efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

expanding demand through price advertisement abstract retail stores frequently advertise prices when consumer search is costly advertising low prices expands the number of consumers who visit and buy we show that this demand enhancement may offset a retailer s loss in margins from the low price making advertisement desirable we further show that a multi product monopolist may choose to advertise low prices only for select products even when advertised and non advertised products are substitutes for duopolist retailers at a common location an equilibrium exists in which for some range of advertising costs one store advertises and the other free rides on its competitor

buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

digital content provision and optimal copyright protection advances in digital technologies have led to an increasing concern about piracy for providers of digital content e g e books games music software videos yet controversies exist over the influence of copyright protection on firm profitability the objective of this paper is to provide an alternative rationale for the growing anti protection trend and to investigate optimal copyright enforcement and quality provision in a monopoly setting the proposed economic mechanism centers on the influence of copyright protection on consumer search when consumers can get to know the firm s actions e g price quality only after costly search we show that more stringent copyright protection can induce the consumers to rationally expect lower ex post surplus thus exerting a negative strategic effect on the consumers willingness to search this strategic effect may outweigh the positive main effect on the relative attractiveness of the authorized versus the pirated product which can hence explain the opti

on the function of sales assistance the paper provides a formal rationale for the common practice of using sales assistance the argument is made in a model where a consumer s situation determines his needs the products are differentiated and the map identifying the best match between a consumer s situation and a product is known only to the sales assistant i look at procedure which involves the consumer revealing his needs and the sales assistant identifying the best matching product this is compared to several other procedures and found to be best when the number of possible consumer situations is large it is shown that reputational considerations may keep the sales assistant honest i look at the impact of guarantees and other modifications to the model and discuss normative implications

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

modeling response to advertising and pricing changes for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice this paper is based on a series of studies undertaken for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice over a five year period the studies were a consequence of management questions regarding the effectiveness of a new advertising campaign the best media mix for this campaign and the apparent wear out of the advertising copy the studies included controlled experimentation estimation of advertising response functions and exploration of price sensitivity following major price increases by v 8 it was found that the short term response to advertising was s shaped and that the new creative approach rather than expenditure levels alone accounted for by far the largest component of the impact of advertising on sales it was also found that for a short period following the major price increases v 8 became extremely price sensitive however after about six months the marginal impact of price returned to historical levels the application of results at campbell soup company their relationship to the literature and their implications for both researchers and practitioners are discussed

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

the economics of dams dams provide a host of benefits to societies helping to balance variability in water availability with demand for multiple uses allowing power generation providing and enhancing recreation opportunities and offering protection against damaging floods yet dams are often controversial due to their high investment requirements unequal distributional effects and concerns over the irreparable harm they may cause to free flowing rivers and ecosystems this paper considers the economic case for such projects organized around a review of what we know about their value and impacts though heterogeneity across contexts is a common feature of interventions in many sectors we argue that it is particularly acute in the case of dams and that this creates difficulties for drawing general conclusions about their social value still evidence suggests that investment in additional surface water storage may not always be the best solution for addressing water scarcity furthermore a number of biases and blind spots exist in economic frameworks used to evaluate dams and these often challenge analysts ability to correctly identify which projects will be most attractive perhaps due to some of these perceived deficiencies policy makers do not appear to make much use of economic analyses for decision making about dams if progress is to be made in avoiding costly mistakes related to construction and removal of such infrastructures in the future economists need to improve the realism and methods underlying their analyses of the value of dams and offer more useful interpretations of the results that these approaches produce

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

selling formats for search goods the paper offers a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs since these costs are sunk at the moment of trade buyers may refrain from incurring them for fear of later opportunism on the part of sellers it is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem specifically i explain price advertising seller colocation and bargaining the theory explains much of the divergence in retail trading institutions and leads to several testable predictions

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

price reactions to rivals local channel exits in this paper we study the effect of a firm s local channel exits on prices charged by incumbents remaining in the marketplace exits could result in higher prices due to tempered competition or lower prices due to reduced colocation or agglomeration benefits the net effect of these two countervailing forces remains unknown in addition little is known about how this effect could change depending on incumbents geographic locations we address this research gap by examining new car price reactions by incumbent multiproduct automobile dealerships who experience the exit of a chrysler dealership in their local markets we find evidence that the competition effect exceeds the colocation effect prices increase by about 1 318 following an exit relative to the price change in the absence of an exit more important we find that the price increase is lower at dealerships more proximate to the exiting dealership than dealerships farther away for the same set of cars available across these locations this

gathering information before signing a contract after being offered a contract an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature this enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation cost the authors show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to observe the state of nature and they explore its terms later they show that the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents even though he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility copyright 1992 by american economic association

competition by choice the effect of consumer search on firm location decisions this paper relates firm location choice and consumer search firms that cluster together attract consumers by facilitating price comparison but clustering increases the intensity of local competition the author constructs a simple model which shows that firms may choose head on competition by locating together under reasonable conditions this is the only equilibrium outcome copyright 1990 by american economic association

optimal search for product information consumers often need to search for product information before making purchase decisions we consider a tractable continuous time model of gradual learning in which consumers incur search costs to learn further product information and update their expected utility of the product at each search occasion we characterize the optimal stopping rules for either purchase or no purchase as a function of search costs and of the importance informativeness of each attribute this paper also characterizes how the likelihood of purchase changes with the ex ante expected utility search costs and the importance informativeness of each attribute we discuss optimal pricing the impact of consumer search on profits and social welfare and how the seller chooses its price to strategically affect the extent of the consumers search behavior we show that lower search costs can hurt the consumer because the seller may then choose to charge higher prices discounting creates asymmetry in the purchase and no purchase search thresholds and may lead to lower prices if search occurs in equilibrium or higher prices if there is no search in equilibrium this paper also considers searching for signals of the value of the product heterogeneous importance of attributes endogenous intensity of search and social learning this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

incorporating consumer price expectations in diffusion models in this paper the sensitivity of the optimal price path of a new durable product to the price expectations of consumers is examined consumers enter the market every period in a diffusion type framework during the initial periods more consumers enter the market due to word of mouth influence but in the latter periods saturation effects set in the entering set of cohorts form expectations about future prices and in a stable equilibrium these expectations are fulfilled it is shown that the price path is cyclical with the following properties at the beginning of the cycle the price is at its highest level it falls monotonically over time reaching a low price at the end of the cycle equal to the reservation price of the consumers willing to pay less the cycle lengths are not equal the sensitivity of the optimal price path to model parameters is explored through a numerical procedure

a model of competing selling mechanisms abstract a model where sellers choose sequentially between any two selling mechanisms is studied with monotonicity and minimum mechanism difference there exists a unique equilibrium where all sellers choose the mechanism of higher per seller surplus at a critical number of sellers

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry