speculative attacks unique equilibrium and transparency abstract models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks morris and shin 1998 have shown that in the context of those models unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced in this paper we apply the method of morris and shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies that their results continue to hold even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents we provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack for the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks

a model based indicator of the fiscal stance we argue that the conventional approach to assessing the fiscal stance based on econometric tests of the government present value budget constraint pvbc is of limited practical use we propose an alternative measure that focuses on short run fluctuations in the fiscal stance namely a model based indicator that compares a target level of the debt gdp ratio at a given point in the future with a forecast based on the government budget constraint gbc where the forecasts are obtained using a recursively estimated var by log linearising the gbc the index can be decomposed into the various different components of which it is comprised using data from 1970 to 2011 we conduct a detailed time series study of the fiscal stances of four countries the united states the united kingdom germany and greece and we calculate the index for 11 other eu countries for most countries the index shows that their fiscal stances vary from being too loose to too tight almost without exception the index drops sharply from 2007 showing the harmful effect on their fiscal stances of the recent recession

identifying a forward looking monetary policy in an open economy i identify a forward looking monetary policy function in a forecast augmented var foavar model by using forecasted macroeconomic variables in addition to the realized variables used in a standard var i find that forecasted variables play a greater role than realized variables in a central bank s policy decisions i also find that a contractionary policy shock in the foavar generates impulse responses of macroeconomic variables that are consistent with the predictions of economic theory while the same shock causes a price puzzle and a delayed overshooting response of the exchange rate in the standard model

sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations we formalize the keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations when production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions externalities nonconvexities or strategic complementarities in production the models we consider are deliberately simple but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features

eductive stability in real business cycle models we reexamine issues of coordination in the standard rbc model is the unique rational expectations equilibrium attainable by rational agents who contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equilibrium surprisingly we nd that coordination cannot be expected even with strong common knowledge assumptions rational agents anticipating small but persistent deviations are led to take actions that eventually contradict the common knowledge assumption this impossibility theorem for eductive learning is not fully overcome when adaptive learning is incorporated into the framework

criteria of external sustainability abstract this paper examines the problem of assessing external sustainability that is determining whether present paths of external imbalance can continue indefinitely conditional on present policies being maintained the main contribution of the analysis is to show how conditional forecasts of external imbalance may be generated in a consistent way that explicitly incorporates a mechanism for achieving sustainability an index of external unsustainability is derived that reflects the probability of future changes in policy expected by private agents over time

time preference and international lending and borrowing in an overlapping generations model two economies represented by diamond type overlapping generations models and differing only in their pure rates of time preference are joined together capital formation balance of payments behavior and welfare are compared under autarky and openness with a positive natural rate of growth the low time preference country runs a current account surplus in the steady state but not necessarily outside it if preexisting capital is not shiftable between countries integration in the world economy makes the high time preference country worse off in the short run the ranking of stationary utility levels under autarky and openness is ambiguous

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks comment in a recent issue of this journal stephen morris and hyun song shin 1998a prove the uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks when speculators face uncertainty in their signals about macroeconomic fundamentals in theorem 2 of their paper morris and shin characterize the equilibrium as uncertainty approaches zero they claim that the threshold of the fundamental state up to which a currency attack will occur with probability one is independent of the critical mass of capital needed for an attack to be successful hence direct capital controls are less effective when speculators have fairly precise information about fundamentals yet their theorem 2 holds only for a special case this comment gives the correct generalization and proves that for small uncertainty currency crises depend on the critical mass of capital needed for success thus direct capital controls are effective even when fundamentals are fairly transparent to all market participants the reduced game structure is given by the following assumptions fundamentals of the economy are characterized by some parameter u unknown to agents there is a continuum of agents receiving independently and identically distributed i i d signals x about the fundamentals each agent must decide whether or not to attack the currency which is associated with transaction costs t 0 if a proportion a u of all traders attacks the currency the attack is successful and each attacking agent obtains a reward r u 5 e 2 f u a and r are continuous there is a state u with a u 5 0 for all u u a is strictly increasing above u and a u 1 for all u r is strictly decreasing and there is a state u u with r u 5 t u is uniformly distributed over an interval say 0 1 given u signals have a uniform distribution in u 2 u 1 critical levels u and u must be at least 2 away from the margins of the interval 0 1 in section ii of their paper morris and shin show that a unique equilibrium switching point x and a threshold u exist such that an agent attacks does not attack the currency if her signal x is smaller larger than x and that a successful speculative attack occurs with probability one zero if state u is below above u in section iii theorem 2 states that in the limit as tends to zero u is given by the unique solution to the equation f u 5 e 2 2t p 594 as stated this theorem holds only for the special case where a u 5 1 2 it should therefore be generalized as follows

equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games abstract we experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary n player entry games with strategic complementarities in static entry games we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a related global game of incomplete information by contrast in dynamic n period entry games the efficient subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is for all to enter whenever the payoff relevant state variable exceeds a certain threshold the subgame perfect entry threshold of the dynamic game will generally differ from the global game threshold of the static version of the same game nevertheless our experimental findings suggest that entry thresholds are similar between static and dynamic versions of the same game an implication is that the modeling of entry games with strategic complementarities as static one shot games ignoring the dynamic element of such interactions may not be unreasonable

the current account in the macroeconomic adjustment process macroeconomic adjustments to changes in the economic environment are to a large extent conditioned by the intertemporal choices of economic agents when agents face an intertemporal budget constraint a decision to alter current indebtedness implies changes in future consumption possibilities and will be based on expectations of the entire future path of key variables and not only current variables a formal model to show how today s current account is a function of both current and future economic variables is presented the determination of the current account under classical assumptions of market clearing and continuous full employment is emphasized

to intervene or not to intervene monetary policy and the costs of currency crises abstract in case of speculative attacks the central banks decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs of currency crises the central bank can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention which in turn can be successful or unsuccessful therefore an adequate analysis of the costs of currency crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises i an immediate depreciation without any central bank interventions ii a successful defense and iii an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate we find that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky if the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average however if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe abstaining from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option for a risk averse central bank

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

expectations and contagion in self fulfilling currency attacks this paper shows how expectations driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation the model of morris and shin 1998 is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market if speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely they will engage in trades that link the two markets a sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of ac risis there fulfilling the original expectations even though this contagion is driven solely by expectations the model places restrictions on observable variables and these restrictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence

platform selection in the lab abstract emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games these games converge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions we replicate the remarkable results of hossain and morgan 2009 in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform next we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out of equilibrium payoffs are introduced the inflated payoffs keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not influence players security levels our design allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance we find that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non rational learning furthermore and contrary to the literature we find that efficiency suffers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

regional output growth in the united kingdom more timely and higher frequency estimates from 1970 output growth estimates for the regions of the uk are currently published at the annual frequency only and are released with a long delay regional economists and policymakers would benefit from having higher frequency and more timely estimates in this paper we develop a mixed frequency vector autoregressive mf var model and use it to produce estimates of quarterly regional output growth temporal and cross sectional restrictions are imposed in the model to ensure that our quarterly regional estimates are consistent with the annual regional observations and the observed quarterly uk totals we use a machine learning method based on the hierarchical dirichlet laplace prior to ensure optimal shrinkage and parsimony in our over parameterised mf var thus this paper presents a new regional quarterly database of nominal and real gross value added dating back to 1970 we describe how we update and evaluate these estimates on an ongoing quarterly basis to publish online at www escoe ac uk regionalnowcasting more timely estimates of regional economic growth we illustrate how the new quarterly data can be used to contribute to our historical understanding of business cycle dynamics and connectedness between regions

living in an imaginary world that looks real abstract in the paper we show using standard approaches general equilibrium modeling and the assumption of complete rationality that the macroeconomic environment is endogenous and is indeterminate specifically it is argued without resorting to sunspot type arguments that microeconomic fundamentals do not suffice to characterize the economy at the macro level in particular we show how perceptions of rational agents of the workings of the economy a shape the environment b affect the environment sufficiently to ensure that rational economic agents find the observed environment consistent with their beliefs even though it is not as a by product we illustrate that endogenous macro uncertainty can arise as an outcome if rational economic agents whose expectations are anchored on endogenous variables expect them to arise finally we show that systematic errors can persist indefinitely under rationality

assessing the fiscal stance in the european union and the united states 1970 2011 the huge increases in debt gdp ratios following the 2007 2009 global financial crisis which are unprecedented except in times of war has focused attention on the viability of the fiscal positions of eu countries and the us how to assess this and the likely future evolution of these positions this paper proposes an indicator of the fiscal stance which computes the fiscal adjustment required to reach a specific debt gdp targeted given the forecasts of future deficit and interest rates obtained from an unrestricted recursively estimated var model the index is easy to compute and can be decomposed to disclose the different contribution of revenue expenditure nominal yields inflation and growth to the fiscal stance for this reason it provides a transparent and detailed measure of the fiscal stance particularly suitable for multi country surveillance as a result the index improves on the tax gap indicators widely used by governments and international agencies and is far more informative than formal econometric tests of fiscal sustainability the time series of the indicator for individual eu countries and the us show that their fiscal position has fluctuated considerably over the last 40 years and has particularly deteriorated since 2007 the index predicts that the adjustment required to restore pre crisis debt gdp levels are higher for high debt countries like greece italy and portugal they become more severe the shorter is the time horizon for the adjustment as a large degree of uncertainty surrounds the assessment of the fiscal stance in the medium and long run we argue that policy makers should inform their policy based on the worst case scenario predicted by the indicator

deposit competition and financial fragility evidence from the us banking sector preliminary and incomplete please do not cite without permission we develop and estimate an empirical model of the u s banking sector using a new data set covering the largest u s banks over the period 2002 2013 our model incorporates insured depositors and run prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks banks compete for deposits in the spirit of matutes and vives 1996 and can endogenously default we estimate demand for uninsured

coordinated bubbles and crashes abstract in a market with information friction investors strategically consider the actions of others and evolutionarily switch between fundamental and technical strategies to maximize their payoffs the collective actions of all investors exert feedback on asset price which affects investors subsequent actions we find that investors have the incentive to adopt fundamental strategy to restore market efficiency only if the mispricing is sufficiently large when investors fail to coordinate on the fundamental strategy market inefficiency increases which blows the bubble as market inefficiency grows the coordination on fundamental strategy strengthens which eventually bursts the bubble

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge the paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem two players have to play one of two possible coordination games only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played it is shown that the situation with almost common knowledge is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge

exchange rate attack as a coordination game theory and experimental evidence this paper compares theoretical predictions for a coordination game used to explain the onset of a currency crisis with observations from laboratory experiments theories that assume full rationality suggest that public information may destabilize an economy by creating self fulfilling belief equilibria while private information leads to a unique equilibrium in experiments differences in behaviour for these two kinds of information are small public information increases efficiency and coordination among players and there is no evidence for destabilizing effects owing to self fulfilling beliefs copyright 2002 oxford university press

two cases for sand in the wheels of international finance the incompatibility of pegged exchange rates international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy is a basic postulate of open economy macroeconomies in the present environment of high capital mobility and political uncertainty even the possibility that governments may utilize their policy autonomy can defeat efforts to peg the exchange rate this leaves two possibilities one is to fix the exchange rate irrevocably through monetary unification the other is to live with floating rates either way a case can be made for throwing sand in the wheels of international finance where monetary unification is not an option this is a may to make distinct national currencies tolerable and international money and capital markets compatible with modest national autonomy in monetary and macroeconomic policy for eu counties striving to create a monetary union it is the only politically and economically feasible way of completing the transition to stage iii of the maastricht process

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

global inspection games abstract in the tax evasion game a typical example of inspection game audits are costly and audit probabilities are determined by the tax agency based on the tax returns submitted by taxpayers we find that if taxpayers incomes are correlated e g when they are subject to a common shock the optimal audit probability for low declarations is an increasing function of the average declaration as the latter is an informative signal of the realized level of income since a taxpayer s optimal declaration is an increasing function of the probability of an audit the optimal auditing rule creates incentives for taxpayers to coordinate their declarations the resulting coordination game features multiplicity of equilibria and thus strategic uncertainty about the equilibrium that will be selected when we add a source of fundamental uncertainty about the type of agency taxpayers face the situation can be realistically modeled as a global game further and unlike the coordination game before it yields a unique and usually interior equilibrium which is consistent with empirical evidence and supported by the data collected in a computerized experiment the model can be applied to other inspection games of economic interest such as the regulation of industries and the allocation of welfare benefits among others

strategic complementarities and the twin crises the economic literature has emphasized the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises motivated by evidence from recent financial crises we study a model where strategic complementarities exist not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators but also between the two groups the additional type of strategic complementarities generates a vicious cycle between banking crises and currency crises this vicious cycle magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilizes the economy we discuss some empirical implications and policy implications and in particular show that due to the interaction between the banking sector and the currency market a lender of last resort might not be able to prevent bank runs

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the more we know about the fundamental the less we agree on the price i allow trading horizon heterogeneity across groups in a standard differential information model of a financial market this approach can explain the well established phenomenon that after a public announcement trading volume increases more private information is incorporated into prices and volatility increases in such environments public information has the important secondary role of helping agents learn about the information of other agents therefore whenever the correlation between the private information of different groups is sufficiently low a public announcement increases disagreement among short horizon traders regarding the expected selling price even as it decreases disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset additional testable implications are also suggested

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

an indicator of monthly gdp and an early estimate of quarterly gdp growth a range of monthly series are currently available giving indications of short term movements in output in the uk the main aim of this paper is to suggest a formal and coherent procedure for grossing these monthly data up to represent the whole of gdp although the resultant estimates of gdp would be worse than those obtained by direct measurement they should be more satisfactory than simply making an informal inference from whatever monthly data are available our examination of the efficacy of the method for estimation of the state of economic activity indicates a rather satisfactory outcome macroeconomic policy making in real time faces the perennial problem of uncovering what is actually happening to the economy movements of seasonally adjusted real gdp referred to subsequently simply as gdp and related estimates of the output gap are widely regarded as important predictors of future inflation and thus are relevant to the problem of inflation targeting estimates of gdp are typically produced quarterly with the first estimates in the uk available about 25 days after the end of the quarter to which they relate 1 in many countries

macroeconomic forecasting using diffusion indexes this article studies forecasting a macroeconomic time series variable using a large number of predictors the predictors are summarized using a small number of indexes constructed by principal component analysis an approximate dynamic factor model serves as the statistical framework for the estimation of the indexes and construction of the forecasts the method is used to construct 6 12 and 24 monthahead forecasts for eight monthly u s macroeconomic time series using 215 predictors in simulated real time from 1970 through 1998 during this sample period these new forecasts outperformed univariate autoregressions small vector autoregressions and leading indicator models

assessing the economy wide effects of quantitative easing this article examines the macroeconomic impact of the first round of quantitative easing qe by the bank of england we attempt to quantify the effects of these purchases by focusing on the impact of lower long term interest rates on the wider economy we use three different models to estimate the impact of qe on output and inflation a large bayesian vector autoregression var a change point structural var and a time varying parameter var our estimates suggest that qe may have had a peak effect on the level of real gdp of around and a peak effect on annual cpi inflation of about points