returns with wholesale price discount contract in a newsvendor problem abstract we consider a newsvendor problem in a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer the manufacturer is the stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower we examine how the manufacturer can contract a wholesale price only agreement with its retailer that maximizes its profit we also propose a returns policy with a wholesale price discount scheme returns discount contract that can achieve supply chain coordination using the wholesale price only contract as a benchmark we show how the manufacturer sets a discounted wholesale price in a returns discount contract that enhances both profits of the manufacturer and the retailer as well as improves the supply chain efficiency

financial collapse a lesson from the great depression abstract we analyze financial collapses such as the one that occurred during the u s great depression from the perspective of a monetary model with multiple equilibria the multiplicity arises from the presence of a strategic complementarity due to increasing returns to scale in the intermediation process intermediaries provide the link between savers and firms who require working capital for production fluctuations in the intermediation process are driven by variations in the confidence agents place in the financial system from a positive perspective our model matches quite closely the qualitative changes in important financial and real variables the currency deposit ratio ex post real interest rates deflation and production over the great depression period an experience often attributed to financial collapse further we assess whether the policy prescription advocated by friedman and schwartz adding liquidity to the banking system through increases in the money supply would have overcome strategic uncertainty and thus avoided a financial collapse

emission trading with fiscal externalities the case for a common carbon tax for the non ets emissions in the eu a government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first best level of public spending when involved in emission trading a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales this fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries our theory explains how and when fiscal externalities may be expected to arise moreover we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect 1 the price of emission permits 2 the global distribution of abatement effort and 3 total greenhouse gas mitigation costs this is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets our findings are especially relevant for the eu which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between eu member countries for all emissions outside the european emissions trading system

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

a single period stocking and pricing problem involving stochastic emergency supply abstract we develop a model for determining jointly optimal price and production policy of products with short life cycles subject to partially uncertain supply capacity within the price setting newsvendor framework we consider that demand in excess of the stocking quantity can be met by an emergency order due to the randomness of emergency supply capacity it may not always be possible to satisfy the demand completely assuming that all customers are charged the same price we explore the optimal sourcing and pricing decisions in the commonly used additive and multiplicative demand scenarios the first order conditions imply that the optimal price in the problem with random emergency supply is less than the optimal price associated with the deterministic demand problem when demand uncertainty is additive and it is greater than the optimal price associated with the deterministic demand problem when demand uncertainty is multiplicative we also find that the same type of comparative static applies in the multiplicative uncertainty case when there exists a dual source emergency system consisting of a perfectly reliable supplier and a second supplier with a stochastic capacity

determining optimal price and order size for a price setting newsvendor under cycle service level abstract there has been significant interest in the single period newsvendor problem where besides determining the order size the decision maker has to set the selling price the model is applicable when demand for the product is a stochastic function of the selling price although there have been several studies the problem needs exploration given that retailers prefer using service level rather than the shortage cost to model the economic consequence of a stock out we analyze the problem using a chance constrained formulation and provide a procedure for determining the optimal price and order size for a price setting newsvendor

unimodality of price setting newsvendor s objective function with multiplicative demand and its applications abstract we present a general solution framework for the price setting newsvendor problem with a multiplicative stochastic demand under mild assumptions such as increasing price elasticity on the mean demand function and increasing generalized failure rate on the distribution of the random factor we first prove that both the profit function with respect to price and its derived function with respect to order quantity are quasi concave three applications are then studied under our solution framework 1 we consider a wholesale price only contract by which a manufacturer sets a wholesale price and a newsvendor determines an order quantity and the retail price and show that the manufacturer s profit function is unimodal with respect to retailing price or stocking factor under certain conditions 2 we consider a newsvendor problem in which the demand depends on both the retail price and the level of sales effort and the cost exerting the sales effort is proportional to the order quantity we prove that there exists a unique pair of price and sales effort levels that maximize the total profit this result is established under a set of mild assumptions on the demand and cost functions 3 we identify a property in the single period profit function that satisfies condition 1 of huh and janakiraman 2008 which in turn guarantees the optimality of s s policy for an infinite stationary dynamic inventory price control system with lost sales and fixed order costs finally the unimodality of the newsvendor problem with a general stochastic and price sensitive demand is studied

who should act as lender of last resort an incomplete contracts model this paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort two govern ment agencies may perform this function a central bank and a de posit insurance corporation the agencies share supervisory information which provides a nonverifiable signal of the bank s fi nancial condition and use it to decide whether to support it it is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agen cies the central bank dealing with small liquidity shocks and the deposit insurance corporation with large shocks furthermore ex cept for very small shocks they should lend at penalty rates

relationships among three assumptions in revenue management this note discusses the relationships among three assumptions that appear frequently in the pricing revenue management literature these assumptions are mostly needed for analytical tractability and they have the common property of ensuring a well behaved revenue function the three assumptions are decreasing marginal revenue with respect to demand decreasing marginal revenue with respect to price and increasing price elasticity of demand we provide proofs and examples to show that none of these conditions implies any other however they can be ordered from strongest to weakest over restricted regions and the ordering depends upon the region

information contagion and bank herding we show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor the increase in a bank s cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality in addition to the systematic risk factor hence banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives

the lender of last resort a twenty first century approach the classical bagehot conception of a lender of last resort lolr that lends to illiquid banks has been criticized on two grounds on the one hand the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is not clear cut on the other a fully collateralized repo market allows central banks to provide the adequate aggregate amount of liquidity and leave to the banks the responsibility of lending uncollateralized the object of this paper is to analyze these issues rigorously by providing a framework in which liquidity shocks cannot be distinguished from solvency ones and then asking whether there is a need for a lolr and how it should operate in the absence of systemic threats determining the optimal lolr policy requires a careful modeling of the structure of the interbank market and of the closure policy in our setup the results depend upon the existence of moral hazard if the main source of moral hazard is the banks lack of incentives to screen loans then the lolr may have to intervene to improve the efficiency of an unsecured interbank market in crisis periods if instead the main source of moral hazard is loan monitoring then the interbank market should be secured and the lolr should never intervene jel e58 628

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

a model of intertemporal emission trading banking and borrowing abstract this paper provides a general treatment of emission trading banking and borrowing in an intertemporal continuous time model using optimal control theory the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least cost solution attainable under joint cost minimization explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits the policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed

newsvendor models for innovative products with one shot decision theory abstract in this paper newsvendor problems for innovative products are analyzed because the product is new no relevant historical data is available for statistical demand analysis instead of using the probability distribution the possibility distribution is utilized to characterize the uncertainty of the demand we consider products whose life cycles are expected to be smaller than the procurement lead times determining optimal order quantities of such products is a typical one shot decision problem for a retailer therefore newsvendor models for innovative products are proposed based on the one shot decision theory osdt the main contributions of this research are as follows the general solutions of active passive apprehensive and daring focus points and optimal alternatives are proposed and the existence theorem is established in the one shot decision theory a simple and effective approach for identifying the possibility distribution is developed newsvendor models with four types of focus points are built managerial insights into the behaviors of different types of retailers are gained by the theoretical analysis the proposed models are scenario based decision models which provide a fundamental alternative to analyze newsvendor problems for innovative products

turning bagehot on his head lending at penalty rates when banks can become insolvent ever since bagehot s 1873 pioneering work it is a widely accepted wisdom that in order to alleviate ex ante bank moral hazard a lender of last resort should lend at penalty rates only in a model in which banks are subject to shocks but can exert effort to affect the likelihood of these shocks we show that the validity of this argument crucially relies on banks always remaining solvent the reason is that when banks become insolvent bagehot s prescription dictates to let them fail penalty rates charged when banks are illiquid but solvent then reduce banks incentives to avoid insolvency ex ante and thus increase bank moral hazard we derive a condition which shows precisely when this effect on ex ante incentives outweighs the traditional one and show that it is fulfilled under plausible scenarios

the design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections abstract market power within a dynamic system of tradeable quotas with banking and borrowing of quotas leads to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across agents in this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the efficiency loss from market power and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across agents that is closer to a cost effective outcome however this system will in general lead to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across periods hence we may face a trade off between a cost effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power

an elasticity approach to the newsvendor with price sensitive demand we introduce a measure of elasticity of stochastic demand called the elasticity of the lost sales rate which offers a unifying perspective on the well known newsvendor with pricing problem this new concept provides a framework to characterize structural results for coordinated and uncoordinated pricing and inventory strategies concavity and submodularity of the profit function as well as sensitivity properties of the optimal inventory and price policies are characterized by monotonicity conditions or bounds on the elasticity of the lost sales rate these elasticity conditions are satisfied by most relevant demand models in the marketing and operations literature our results unify and complement previous work on price setting newsvendor models and provide a new tool for researchers modeling stochastic price sensitive demand in other contexts

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

environmental regulation a value theoretic and class based analysis following a value theoretic and class based approach it is argued in this paper that ecological problems are inseparably linked to the process of extracting surplus value in capitalism and owing to their adverse impacts instigate struggles over the appropriation of nature these struggles fought within and outside the state by competing agents shape environmental regulation in particular taxes permits command and control measures and subsidies affect prices profits and rents and have class and other social implications evidence of current environmental regulation shows that it takes places under the great influence of capitalist concerns

multi sector model of tradable emission permits this paper presents a multi sector model of tradable emission permits which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries the firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market specifically we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets it is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm under certain conditions raising a clean less polluting firm s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices we discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits considering the trade off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit

an intertemporal carbon emissions trading system with cap adjustment and path control abstract cap adjustment with shocks and cost effectiveness in cap and trade system has been an area of concern for regulators by a simple two period model of such system with banking and borrowing we examine how emission reduction technological changes affect the cap in three cases i e pure flow externality pure stock externality and mixed externality and identify the efficiency properties in such system with banking and borrowing we show that the effects of technological changes on cap are negative in both pure flow and pure stock externality cases in the mixed externality case the effects are uncertain which depend on the decayed rate of co2 stock the discounted rate and functions of marginal abatement costs and marginal damage in general cases the social optimum is not attainable via the cap and trade system since firms sub optimally distribute emissions across periods in a particular case if the ratio of marginal damage in period 1 to the discounted marginal damage in period 2 is exactly equal to the decayed rate the decentralized emissions of firms will lead to the social optimum finally a hybrid quantity price policy is proposed to rectify the paths of firms to be socially desirable with an effective quantity control

carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the marrakesh accords abstract we examine the potential effects on permit prices and abatement costs of four compliance rules governing emissions trade across sources and periods in the kyoto protocol the banking rule that allows excess permits to be used later the restoration rate rule that penalizes borrowing the commitment period reserve rule that limits sales and finally the suspension rule that restricts borrowing and sales our framework is a two period model where parties may be out of compliance in the kyoto period but are assumed to comply at a later time under varying assumptions about market power and us participation we find that the rules may have pronounced effects on individual costs but overall efficiency is not severely affected

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

intertemporal emission trading with a dominant agent how does a restriction on borrowing affect efficiency in this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emissions permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power we show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by not distributing the sale of permits cost effectively across periods furthermore we show that a constant present value price over time does not imply a cost effective distribution of abatement permit sales across periods

s s optimality in joint inventory pricing control an alternate approach we study a stationary single stage inventory system under periodic review with fixed ordering costs and multiple sales levers such as pricing advertising etc we show the optimality of s s type policies in these settings under both the backordering and lost sales assumptions our analysis is constructive and is based on a condition that we identify as being key to proving the s s structure this condition is entirely based on the single period profit function and the demand model our optimality results complement the existing results in this area

on the unimodality of the price setting newsvendor problem with additive demand under risk considerations abstract we present a mean variance analysis of the single product single period price setting newsvendor problem with additive price dependent demand the main goal of this paper is to use a mean variance framework to solve any risk sensitive instance and find conditions under which the unimodality of the problem is guaranteed we introduce such conditions via the lost sales rate elasticity the elasticity of the optimal price and the elasticity of the expected safety stock surplus to provide managerial insight in terms of the newsvendor s level of service we also simplify the optimization problem in case that those conditions do not hold the main contribution of this paper is that by evaluating the unimodality of the problem for any possible risk attitude it extends previously published results found for the concavity of the solution in risk neutral and moderately risk sensitive cases

a sheep in wolf s clothing can a central bank appear tougher than it is abstract central banks cbs in europe and the us have been providing virtually unlimited amounts of liquidity to banks for quite some time now this may lead banks to expect that these cbs will be lenient in the future will this expectation be justified i present a model in which a commercial bank subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faces uncertainty about whether the cb is tough hawk or lenient dove specifically the cb knows its nature but the bank does not when uncertainty is high the cb can use this to its advantage and try to build a reputation for toughness in response the bank chooses higher liquidity reserves in equilibrium furthermore increasing bank capital and penalty rates make it easier to build a reputation while bailouts by the fiscal government make it more difficult

monetary stability and liquidity crises the role of the lender of last resort we study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand shocks and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these shocks in this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress in the absence of a lender of last resort the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium the introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services allows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal however this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin ationary equilibria we then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the e ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services when the lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium and when the interest rate charged is high enough no hyperin ationary equilibria arise finally when the lender of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds there is again a unique long run equilibrium and when the upper bound on loanable funds is small enough hyperin ationary equilibria are ruled out

technical note optimal dynamic joint inventory pricing control for multiplicative demand with fixed order costs and lost sales this note studies the optimal dynamic decision making problem for a retailer in a price sensitive multiplicative demand framework our model incorporates lost sales holding cost fixed and variable procurement costs as well as salvage value we characterize the structure of the retailer s discounted expected profit maximizing dynamic inventory policy for both finite and infinite selling horizon problems

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

a note on probability distributions with increasing generalized failure rates distributions with an increasing generalized failure rate igfr have useful applications in pricing and supply chain contracting problems we provide alternative characterizations of the igfr property that lead to simplify verifying whether the igfr condition holds we also relate the limit of the generalized failure rate and the moments of a distribution

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

a tradable permit system in an intertemporal economy it is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates i e rewards for holding permits to find the rates however we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices which is difficult to obtain this study intends to solve this problem in two ways first we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule for example if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate as is the case for global warming if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions as a second approach we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits however we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium

the payments system liquidity and rediscounting in an economy where fiat money serves both as a medium of exchange and the means by which debts are cleared it is shown that nonoptimal equilibria of constrained liquidity may arise optimality may be restored by temporary expansions of the monetary base e g an active central bank discount window copyright 1996 by american economic association

stocking and pricing decisions under endogenous demand and reference point effects abstract in this paper we study the newsvendor s pricing and stocking decisions under reference point effects the demand faced by the newsvendor is endogenous and the customers may also decide to procure the product from an outside option we characterize the firm s optimal pricing and stocking decisions our analysis reveals a threshold policy on the firm s ordering and pricing decisions while considering the impact of reference point effects we also find that as the level of optimism increases the firm s optimal ordering level decreases and optimal price increases we further study the impact of loss aversion on the firm s ordering and pricing decisions

tenure issues in higher education the system of tenure that dominates american higher education has long been a source of controversy the institution of tenure has been attacked for entrenching a lazy professoriate more interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching or developing practical insights while on the other hand it has long been defended as an absolute necessity for the defense of open intellectual inquiry the tenure controversy has been sharpened in recent years by several events the end of mandatory retirement which was abolished by federal law effective january 1 1994 has heightened concerns about the productivity and commitment of professors who received tenure long ago and who no longer have the same incentives to invest in long term reputation there is also ongoing concern over the steadily rising cost of higher education which raises the question of what students as well as the taxpayers who support public institutions of higher education are getting for their money 1 the idea that tenure is a wasteful institution for universities runs up against the puzzling fact that the commitment to tenure is one that academic institutions impose on themselves although the american association of university professors aaup provides a powerful lobby in favor of tenure generally colleges and universities most notably private ones are under no legal requirement to observe tenure constraints although as administrators we certainly feel the weight of those constraints our view is that a tenure system in fact provides important benefits to society and to colleges and universities we argue here that the role of tenure is

a risk averse newsvendor model under marketing dependency and price dependency abstract in this paper we analyze a single period inventory model where a risk averse newsvendor makes a joint decision on ordering pricing and marketing under the cvar risk measure criterion the newsvendor can exert marketing effort to enhance market demand we assume that the newsvendor s marketing effort affects the scale of the demand distribution and hence to model the marketing dependent demand as a multiplicative form we characterize sufficient conditions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions under some mild assumptions on demand distribution expected demand function and marketing effort cost which are widely used in the related literature we show that the optimal order quantity increases in the newsvendor s marketing effort but the optimal price remains unchanged whether the demand is marketing dependent or not additionally we explore impact of exogenous parameters such as unit order cost salvage value and the newsvendor s risk aversion coefficient on the optimal decision variables and find that the optimal marketing effort always keeps the same changing direction with the optimal marketing independent order quantity as the exogenous parameters change this suggests that impact of the parameters on the optimal order quantity gets strengthened in the case of marketing dependent demand

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections a transferable quota system is analysed in a two period model with market power so far the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated in this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions this opens for a trade off between distributional and time efficiency or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency

an integrated approach to price differentiation and inventory decisions with demand leakage abstract price differentiation is among widely practiced tools in revenue management rm in which a seller offers same or slightly different products or services at different prices to its customers earlier research studies have shown that the benefits from price differentiation are evident when the market segmentation is assumed to be perfect in a perfect market segmentation customers associated with a market segment do not move between market segments however it is not uncommon to observe that a market segmentation a firm operates in is seldom prefect and due to imperfect segmentation customers move between market segments which is also referred to as demand leakage in addition the firms predominantly experience stochastic demand and thus a firm experiences both the short sales and leftovers due to demand uncertainty this research proposes a model to address the issue of an optimal market segmentation using price differentiation as a tool we also establish an integrated framework for pricing order and production quantity allocation decisions in each market segment when a firm experiences demand leakage from one market segment to another and faces price dependent stochastic demand the model is analyzed to determine an optimal decision framework on pricing order quantity allocation and market segmentation using the proposed price differentiation due to the complexity of the problem both the hierarchical and joint optimization approaches are developed a simplified closed form optimal solution to the problem is outlined in the case of hierarchical approach the model is also analyzed for a situation in which the distribution of the price dependent stochastic demand is unknown and a distribution free approach is utilized to address the problem it is identified that the use of distribution free approach also results in a closed form optimal solution to the problem a numerical study is presented to demonstrate the performance of the model and solution approaches the benefits of the optimal market segmentation using a differentiation price are also highlighted along with the proposed integrated optimal decision framework when a firm experiences demand leakage

free trade and global warming a trade theory view of the kyoto protocol this paper demonstrates how three important results in environmental economics true under mild conditions in closed economies are false or need serious amendment in a world with international trade in goods since the three results we highlight have framed much of the ongoing discussion and research on the kyoto protocol our viewpoint from trade theory suggests a re examination may be in order specifically we demonstrate that in an open trading world but not in a closed economy setting 1 unilateral emission reductions by the rich north can create self interested emission reductions by the unconstrained poor south 2 simple rules for allocating emission reductions across countries such as uniform reductions may well be efficient even if international trade in emission permits is not allowed and 3 when international emission permit trade does occur it may make both participants in the trade worse off and increase global emissions

optimal order quantity and pricing decisions in single period inventory systems abstract in this paper we consider simultaneous pricing and procurement decisions associated with a one period pure inventory model under deterministic or probabilistic demand we investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for an type policy to be optimal for the determination of the procurement quantity we also show how the corresponding optimal price can be obtained

dynamic pricing and ordering decisions by a monopolist this paper considers the relationship between pricing and ordering decisions for a monopolistic retailer facing a known demand function where over the inventory cycle the product may exhibit i physical decay or deterioration of inventory called wastage and ii decrease in market value called value drop associated with each unit of inventory on hand the retailer is allowed to continuously vary the selling price of the product over the cycle we introduce a notion of instantaneous margin and use it to derive profit maximizing conditions for the retailer the model explains the markdown of retail goods subject to decay it also provides guidance in determining when price changes during the cycle are worthwhile due to product aging how often such changes should be made and how such changes affect ordering intervals and quantities