intertemporal cost dependence in the presence of managerial impatience abstract a multi period agency problem arising in the presence of intertemporal cost dependence is investigated the principal delegates production decisions to a manager who is impatient the manager has private information on the nature of cost dependence that takes the form of an experience effect since the impatient manager would not invest enough to gain experience the principal designs a second best scheme to motivate the manager to increase intertemporal profit for the firm the second best scheme is obtained as a direct revelation mechanism that specifies outputs prices as well as the manager s compensation a significant result is that unlike the first best case impatience is not necessarily a disadvantage with asymmetric information impatience can be exploited to reduce the manager s information rent resulting in preferred outcomes for the principal

cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous abstract this paper addresses a neglected question in the literature of cartel stability and the use of trigger strategies to maintain such stability we employ a model in which market demand is linear and involving n firms each operating subject to one of possibly n different cost functions we show that the stability of the cartel may depend crucially upon the relative efficiencies of the firms and argue that in such models explicit attention must be given to this possibility

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

lessons from the debt deflation theory of sudden stops this paper reports results for a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with credit constraints that can account for some of the empirical regularities of the sudden stop phenomenon of recent emerging markets crises in these models credit constraints set in motion irving fisher s debt deflation mechanism and they bind as an endogenous equilibrium outcome when agents are highly indebted the quantitative predictions of these models yield three key lessons 1 sudden stops can occur as an endogenous response to typical realizations of adverse shocks to fundamentals in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of sudden stops into account 2 credit constraints cause output declines during sudden stops when collateral constraints limit debt to a fraction of the market value of capital when there are limits on access to working capital or when debt deflation lowers the value of the marginal product of factors of production 3 the debt deflation mechanism has significant quantitative effects in terms of the amplification asymmetry and persistence of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to standard shocks and in the occurrence of sudden stops as infrequent events nested within regular business cycles precautionary saving rules out the largest sudden stops from the stochastic stationary state but sudden stops remain a positive probability event in the long run this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

disagreement in bargaining an empirical analysis of opec abstract we consider a stylised model in which two cartel members bargain over the aggregate production quota in a world of asymmetric information we show that when the two cartel members are sufficiently different the probability of agreement depends on both the current state of demand and initial production specifically the probability of agreement is much lower when demand is low and initial production is relatively high than when demand is high and initial production is relatively low we also find that regardless of the current demand state the more extreme is initial production the higher is the probability of agreement using an event study where we take as events opec production quota announcements we demonstrate empirically that the predictions of the model are borne out

the cyclical behavior of the department of justice s antitrust enforcement activity abstract we study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the us department of justice the key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical this finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices corporate profits and business cycles and across different types of cases the finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions one interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated the broad implication being that the antitrust division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency our results show that politics as measured by the party of the president and the republican versus democrat composition of the house and senate does not have a clear impact on case activity finally the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding

sovereign debt as a contingent claim a quantitative approach abstract we construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt in the model benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates for a wide set of parameters the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states additional output losses however sustain equilibria that resemble the data we show that due to the adverse selection problem some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation moreover although equilibria with no default imply greater welfare levels they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries

oligopolistic pricing over the deterministic market demand cycle some evidence from the us portland cement industry abstract haltiwanger and harrington 1991 haltiwanger j harrington j e jr 1991 the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior rand journal of economics 22 89 104 formulated a theory of self enforcing collusion assuming a deterministic demand cycle they predicted that under a self enforcing non cooperative pricing scheme for any level of demand the price in the rising part of the cycle would always be greater than the price in the falling part of the cycle they also predicted that the path of collusive profits should reach its peak before market demand we test their predictions using data from the portland cement industry the hypotheses are tested using a multi equation system differentiating the boom and the bust periods from 1974 to 1989 the results support both of haltiwanger and harrington s hypotheses

product market competition and the industry price cost markup fluctuations abstract we examine the role played by imperfect competition in the response of markups to energy price and monetary changes we find i for concentrated industries markups increase with monetary expansion and decrease when energy prices increase the elasticity with respect to energy prices is greater than monetary changes ii for low concentration industries markups are virtually unaffected by monetary changes and the energy price elasticities are statistically insignificant iii markups are procyclical over the industry specific cycle and iv increased import competition lowers markups only in the concentrated industries the energy price increases decreases during the 1970s 1980s may have been a key factor contributing to the narrowing widening of the markup gap between high and low concentration industries we provide evidence that procyclical markups in concentrated industries are not being driven by differences in the degree of labor hoarding between low and high concentration industries

default settlement and signalling lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt this paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments this implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement but after varying periods of exclusion copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

empirical studies of gasoline retailing a guide to the literature abstract this paper surveys the empirical literature on gasoline retailing which has been growing rapidly over the last three decades possibly in response to antitrust and regulatory concerns and increased availability of pricing data studies of both pricing and non price decision variables are considered in general it is found that crude oil prices are the primary driver of national price movements over time however market structure has been identified as playing a role in price dynamics equilibrium selection and price differentials across markets and stations the economic literature emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity across stations and coordination problems faced by retailers several directions for future work are suggested including the development of theory and demand estimation using high frequency station level data

the intertemporal stability of the concentration margins relationship using a longitudinal data base we find that there has been a substantial narrowing of the spread between the price cost margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries including measures of macroeconomic fluctuations into standard price cost margin regressions we find significant differences in cyclical behavior across market structure we also explore a possible explanation unionization for differences in cyclical behavior finally we investigate the degree to which our results are affected by the potential simultaneity of concentration advertising and the price cost margin

theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee this article reexamines the experience of the joint executive committee an 1880s railroad cartel to assess the applicability of the green and porter 1984 and rotemberg and saloner 1986 theories of price wars after discussing necessary modifications to the theories i estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars the cyclical nature of pricing and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given the estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory

recent developments in quantitative models of sovereign default the current crisis and discussions in the euro area in particular show that sovereign debt crises defaults are no longer confined to developing economies following crises in many latin american countries the literature on quantitative dynamic macro models of sovereign default has been advancing rapidly current debate should take note of the findings of this literature an extensive overview of which has been provided in this paper this paper also discusses the inherent difficulties as well as possibilities of integrating this type of model into standard business cycle models rbc and dsge models this is likely to be particularly helpful when using models to analyse upcoming issues in the euro area such as a suitable sovereign insolvency law or the assumption of joint liability

sovereign insolvency procedures a comparative look at selected proposals abstract the most practicable short term approaches for sovereign debt restructuring would include a code of conduct voluntary approach and collective action clauses contractual approach in the medium term a sovereign insolvency procedure statutory approach may have an important role to play because it would be a comprehensive instrument designed to coordinate different creditor groups prior to and during a debt crisis this paper provides a survey of six comprehensive policy proposals for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure it points to approaches that could improve existing proposals and creates a basis for new proposals which could prove conducive to reaching political consensus

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

profit margins and the business cycle evidence from uk manufacturing firms this paper presents some empirical models of profitability using panel data covering 709 large u k companies ove r the 1970s and 1980s focusing specifically on the role of aggregate demand shocks in shaping firm level profitability in basic regressi ons and in quite complex econometric models the results suggest that firm level profit margins fell heavily during the deep manufacturing recession of the early 1980s and as such are consistent with model s predicting the procyclical nature of profit margins this result hol ds across different product groups producer goods consumer durables a nd nondurables though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears to differ copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

time varying competition normative models typically suggest that prices rise in periods of high demand and cost however in many markets prices fall when demand or costs rise this inconsistency occurs because the normative models assume that competitive intensity does not change with demand and cost conditions over time we therefore introduce the notion of time varying competition by suggesting that it is important not only to account for the direct effect of demand and cost on prices e g higher demand means higher prices but also the indirect effect of demand and cost changes on competition e g higher demand could cause more competition and hence lower prices we develop a general unified framework to empirically model the direct and indirect effects of demand and cost shifts on pricing in differentiated product markets our approach allows us to measure the indirect effect of multiple demand and cost drivers on competitive intensity and test predictions from alternative theories of repeated games the empirical application is to the u s photographic film industry where there are two main players kodak and fuji we find that the indirect effects are highly significant and comparable in magnitude to the direct effects competitive intensity is greater in periods of high demand and lower cost and is moderated by whether demand or costs are expected to grow or decline interestingly we find asymmetries in the competitive responses of kodak and fuji while kodak is sensitive to demand factors fuji is sensitive to costs our results suggest that market characteristics such as observability of competitor prices can be an important determinant of how competitive intensity is affected by demand and cost conditions

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

a dynamic theory of countervailing power in this article i develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers the buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which similar to a boom in demand forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting if the buyer s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint profit maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one the model is extended to allow for multiple buyers large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers buyer mergers increase pro t for all buyers not just the merging pair at the expense of the sellers in contrast buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers

fiscal policy and monetary integration in europe fiscal policy economists policy makers and the media often argue that the maastricht treaty and the stability and growth pact make it difficult for governments of emu countries to stabilize their economies with appropriate fiscal policy and to provide adequate public investment our empirical analysis offers little support to this view discretionary budget deficits have actually become more counter cyclical in emu countries after the maastricht treaty as well as in the other eu and non eu industrialized countries we study and while public investment has declined recently in emu countries a similar tendency is apparent in other countries and started well before the maastricht treaty was signed jordi gali and roberto perotti

ratings quality over the business cycle credit rating agencies cras have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior the value of reputation however depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle in a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies we find that ratings quality is countercyclical specifically a cra is more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee income is high competition in the labor market for analysts is tough and securities default probabilities are low persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results while mean reversion exacerbates them the presence of naive investors reduces overall quality but quality remains countercyclical finally we demonstrate that competition among cras yields similar results

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

is fair treatment enough augmenting the fairness based perspective on stakeholder behaviour fairness and justice are core issues in stakeholder theory although such considerations receive more attention in the normative branch of the stakeholder literature they have critical implications for instrumental stakeholder theory as well in research in the instrumental vein although the position has seldom been articulated in significant detail a stakeholder s inclination to take action against the firm or conversely to cooperate with it is often taken to be a function of its perceptions concerning the fairness or unfairness or equity or inequity of the treatment it receives in its relationship with the firm thus from various works in this domain can be distilled what might be termed a fairness based perspective on stakeholder behaviour this perspective as it currently stands assumes a high degree of homogeneity in stakeholders responses to fair unfair or munificent treatment by the firm this supposition is itself typically based on a presumption that stakeholders consistently and uniformly adhere to norms of equity and reciprocity in their relationships with firms however research developments in equity theory and social exchange theory suggest that such assumptions are likely untenable accordingly in this work after outlining the fairness based perspective on stakeholder behaviour i undertake to augment it by presenting propositions concerning the possible influences of stakeholders equity preferences and exchange ideologies on their propensities to sanction or support the firm incorporating these stakeholder traits into the fairness based perspective should enhance the predictive validity of its propositions concerning stakeholder behaviour in response to fairness or unfairness in the firm stakeholder relationship

sovereign default private sector creditors and the ifis abstract the data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from international financial institutions ifis is small intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors the ifi loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them taking these contractual differences as given this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of ifi loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the ifis

dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets supergame models of tacit collusion show that supportable price cost margins increase with expected future collusive profits ceteris paribus as a result collusive margins will be larger when demand is expected to increase or marginal costs are expected to decline using panel data on sales volume and gasoline prices in 43 cities over 72 months we find behavior consistent with tacit collusion in retail gasoline markets controlling for current demand and cost current margins increase with expected next month demand and decrease with expected next month cost the results are not consistent with intertemporal l inkages due to inventory behavior or customer loyalty

social polarization fiscal instability and growth abstract we present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization of preferences plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse in a highly polarized society a deficit occurs endogenously fiscal spending path becomes more volatile output collapses and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output one novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit the magnitude of fiscal volatility and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization this is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers or socio economic groups to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting polarization effect thereby we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth moreover we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

dynamic pricing in the spanish gasoline market a tacit collusion equilibrium abstract during the last twenty years the spanish petrol market has undergone an intensive restructuration process it has changed from being a state owned monopoly to total liberalization and privatization this liberalization process was accompanied by measures that facilitated the creation of a national champion the repsol group which is a huge vertically integrated company with a high market share in all the industry s segments using a dynamic model this paper analyses whether the prices established by companies in the spanish gasoline market after the restructuration process fits with a tacit collusion equilibrium the empirical results show that a strategic behaviour of companies occurs and is compatible with a tacit collusion price strategy so the restructuration process does not seem to have introduced effective competition into the spanish gasoline market

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

sunk costs and cartel formation theory and application to the dyestuff industry we first develop a simple model of entry showing that cartels are more likely to emerge during periods of downturns and in industries with significant sunk costs cartel formation is also accompanied by a decline in profits we then use the framework to investigate the emergence of the swiss dyestuff export cartel during the inter war period and find empirical evidence that supports the main predictions of the model the analysis indicates that sunk costs and entry may be important determinants of cartel formation and are complementary to the traditional cartel stability conditions

when are cartels stable contracts why do some industry cartels survive for decades while others are quickly undermined by price wars and entry variation in cartels longevity can be explained by differences in their costs of self enforcement and service value to members analyzing legal cartel contracts formed under the webb pomerene export trade act i find that longer lived cartels tended to export to small buyers to have wide industry coverage to operate in periods of stable prices and growing demand and to sell under side agreements with foreign competitors contracts in which the cartel centralized its control through a common sales agency tended to be more stable however cartels usually grew less stable with age and when there was a recent and long history of cartelization in the industry finally cartels whose primary rationale was to fix price tended to be particularly unstable because these contracts invited fringe competition and entry

collusion and predation under almost free entry abstract this study investigates the degree of cooperation that firms can support in the absence of significant barriers to entry a free entry subgame perfect equilibrium is defined by q n where q is the collusive output rate and n is the number of active firms such that there is no incentive for an active firm to deviate output from q and there is no incentive for a potential entrant to enter the industry it is shown that for all n 1 if the discount factor is sufficiently high there exists a free entry equilibrium in which active firms sustain a non trivial degree of cooperation cooperation is supported by active firms credibly threatening to respond to entry with a period of aggressive competition

the joint profit maximum as a free entry equilibrium outcome abstract this study investigates the degree of collusion that can be sustained at a free entry equilibrium when the number of active firms is endogenous an increase in the discount factor is found to have two counter acting effects on the incentive for active firms to deviate from the collusive arrangement holding the number of firms fixed a higher discount factor reduces the incentive for cheating according to the standard argument however a higher discount factor also makes entry more profitable since entry entails an initial loss the cost of entry and a future stream of positive profits raising the discount factor then increases the number of active firms which tends to increase the incentive for firms to cheat our analysis shows that the first effect dominates so that the joint profit maximum can be sustained as a free entry equilibrium outcome when the discount factor is sufficiently high

entry sunk costs and market structure typically models that study the role of sunk costs suppose that incumbent firms face entry by a single firm each period in this paper the set of equilibrium market structures that result when all firms are free to enter or exit and set prices each period are characterized the effect of sunk costs on the market structure is examined and it is shown that sunk costs can take on various forms each having a different effect on the set of equilibrium market structures costs that are sunk due to the existence of product specific capital do not in general deter entry rather entry deterrence is a necessary outcome only when costs are sunk due to the time it would take to leave the market

financial integration and international risk sharing abstract conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk there is little evidence however that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization we show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets while actual markets are far from frictionless financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited when countries remove official capital controls default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows if default risk were eliminated capital flows would be six times greater and international risk sharing would increase substantially

asymmetric price adjustment cross industry evidence several studies document asymmetric price adjustment in gasoline and agricultural markets do these results extend to other subsectors of the economy this paper investigates the existence of asymmetric price adjustment in 269 6 digit north american industrial classification system naics industries using quarterly financial data from 1966 2006 results which are consistent with the previous literature show that positive price asymmetry is frequent in nondurable goods and natural resource manufacturing however price asymmetry is not readily evident in mining durable goods manufacturing and service sectors the differing results may best be explained by theoretical explanations of price asymmetry based on inventory management

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads

tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion i study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects i find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also and more surprisingly on its volatility collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level but decrease with its volatility these results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games

collective action clauses in international sovereign bond contracts whence the opposition in the debate on strengthening the international financial architecture which peaked in 2002 after a series of emerging market sovereign debt crises the universal adoption of collective action clauses cacs was the most promising reform proposal academics and the official sector had been promoting cacs at least since 1995 yet market practice did not begin to change until 2003 this delay is often attributed to the opposition of investors and sovereign borrower to cacs this paper evaluates the publicly stated as well as the suspected private motives of the two sides to block the spread of cacs it draws on a wide range of existing evidence and adds some new theoretical considerations to show that there is no reason to be sceptical of cacs unless bailouts exist as an alternative crisis resolution mechanism this conclusion may be of interest purely for the sake of historical accuracy but more importantly it may help to better understand any potential future resistance by market participants e g in the process of introducing cacs in bonds governed by german law

the cyclical behavior of marginal cost and price the author examines the cyclical behavior of price marginal cost margins for u s manufac turing after 1956 short run marginal cost is markedly procyclical this is primarily due to procyclical overtime payments incurred beca use employment is not perfectly flexible in most industries output price fails to respond to the cyclical movement in marginal cost so price marginal cost margins are markedly countercyclical the res ults contradict business cycle theories that explain low production i n a recession by a high real cost of producing they support theories that explain low production in a recession by the inability of firms to sell their output copyright 1987 by american economic association

tax reform and labour market performance in the euro area a simulation based analysis using the new area wide model in this paper we employ a calibrated two country version of the new area wide model nawm developed at the european central bank to examine the potential benefits and spillovers of reducing labour market distortions caused by euro area tax structures our analysis shows that lowering tax distortions to levels prevailing in the united states would result in an increase in hours worked and output by more than 10 at the same time tax reductions would have positive spillovers to the euro area s trade partners bolstering the case for tax reforms from a global perspective finally we illustrate that in the presence of heterogeneous households distributional effects may be of importance when gauging the impact of tax reforms

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

the dynamics of the revenue maximization market share trade off saudi arabia s oil policy in the 2014 15 price fall given its highly undiversified economic base maximizing revenues will always rank highly in saudi arabia s output decision however this objective needs to be balanced against another maintaining its share in key markets and maximizing long term revenue given the massive size of saudi arabia s reserves the trade off between these two objectives tends to change over time depending on market conditions the nature of the shock and the behaviour of other producers saudi arabia s oil policy is hence not constant we argue that the advent of us shale has made the calculus of the trade off more uncertain complicating saudi arabia s output decision using a simple game we show that under uncertainty it is always safer for the kingdom to assume that the shale oil supply is highly elastic and thus decide not to cut output but as saudi arabia learns more about this new source of supply its policy could adapt accordingly the fact that saudi arabia s oil policy could change as the trade off between revenue maximization and market share evolves and as new information to the market arrives will keep the market second guessing and will continue to shape market expectations and to influence market outcomes jel q48 government policy d43 oligopoly and other forms of market imperfection q41 demand and supply prices d81 criteria for decision making under risk and uncertainty q02 commodity markets

profit sharing with workers facilitates collusion among firms we show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand we first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions the optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price wage differential but reduces price wage variability we then show that given any cartel there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer s impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel

motivators of mobilization although the possibility that a firm s stakeholders may take damaging measures against it in response to its activities has been an underlying assumption of stakeholder theory from inception the conditions that predispose stakeholders to act against firms remain largely unexplored in the literature based on work in equity theory expectancy theory and resource dependence theory we present and test hypotheses concerning stakeholders propensities to impose sanctions upon or to support firms using a vignette based experiment we found strong confirmation of the criticality of fairness in the firm stakeholder relationship stakeholder equity perceptions were unequivocally associated with the proclivity to sanction the firm or to engage in prosocial behaviours of benefit to it stakeholder expectancy perceptions and resource dependence were related to only certain forms of stakeholder action indicating that researchers should take care to differentiate between types of stakeholder response when investigating questions surrounding stakeholder mobilization our results also suggest specific avenues for stakeholder dialogue that could help firms mitigate the likelihood of stakeholders taking damaging action against them

price response asymmetric information and competition we compare predictions from a theoretical model based on the structure of the main outdoor retail market in jerusalem with the results of an empirical analysis of price response to changes in cost we find that firms without adjacent competition exhibit both upward and downward price rigidity an outcome we ascribe to asymmetric information between the consumer and the firm given that previous studies have focused on downward price rigidities of firms with market power our findings highlight the importance of accounting for transitory information asymmetries between the consumer and the firm when studying price rigidity

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

collusive market structure under learning by doing and increasing returns learning by doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar implications for market structure and conduct we analyse this in the context of an infinite horizon price setting game learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market sharing collusion between a given number of firms whereas intra period increasing returns invariably does we subsequently develop a model where the number of active firms is determined endogenously under the assumption that the post entry game is collusive in this model learning has no effect on concentration while scale economies increase concentration

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default we extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power we show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions under high political stability political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions a higher and more volatile spread and lower borrowing levels after a default episode

competition in the economic crisis analysis of procurement auctions we study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions using data from austrian construction procurements we estimate bidders construction costs within a private value auction model we find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1 5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis markups of winning bids decrease by 3 3 percentage points we also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger these two pieces of evidence point to pro cyclical markups

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

long duration bonds and sovereign defaults abstract this paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long duration bonds this contrasts with previous studies which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter we show that when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one quarter bonds this narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data which indicates that the introduction of long duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets

wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations abstract empirical investigations suggests that the real wage is surprisingly flat over the business cycle this paper analyses a repeated game between a union and a firm which can contribute to explaining the flat wage the parties cannot enter binding contracts and revenue is fluctuating the paper focuses on the best subgame perfect equilibrium among those sharing the expected surplus in given fixed shares e g equal shares it is shown that for moderate discount factors this equilibrium has a more counter cyclical wage than what would be the case if the parties shared the surplus in each period in the same shares

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

input choices under price uncertainty theory shows that depending on risk preferences and technological parameters price uncertainty may alter firms choice of capital intensity this paper presents an empirical analysis of the effect of price uncertainty on firms choices of capital and labor stocks empirical results from a cross section of manufacturing industries as well as within industries over time show that greater price uncertainty increases an industry s capital labor ratio it appears that risk aversion does not dominate firms decision making these empirical findings have implications for the analysis of factor demand and productivity and capacity utilization rates

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates a reappraisal fiscal stimuli to recover a cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support this essay surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression var evidence on the short run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

reactions to perceived inequity in u s and dutch interorganizational relationships in an empirical examination of inequity in interorganizational relationships we found similarities and differences in dutch and u s automobile dealers reactions to inequity in their relationships with their automobile suppliers as predicted by equity theory both positive and negative inequity have detrimental effects on the reactions of dutch firms in contrast u s firms do not react negatively to positive inequity only negative inequity has deleterious effects

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking abstract this paper develops a political economic model of fiscal policy one in which government resources are a common property out of which interest groups can finance expenditures on their preferred items this setup has striking macroeconomic implications transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be fiscal deficits emerge even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing and in the long run government debt tends to be excessively high peculiar time profiles for transfers can emerge with high net transfers early on giving rise to high taxes later on

does financial globalization promote risk sharing article i nfo in theory one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing in this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns using a variety of empirical techniques we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory in addition only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization developing countries have by and large been shut out of this benefit even emerging market economies many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross border capital flows have seen little change in their ability to share risk we find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefi to f financial globalization in particular our results suggest that portfolio debt which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently is not conducive to risk sharing