collateral heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium abstract this paper examines the argument that the availability of collateral rules out credit rationing a model of the credit market with ex ante asymmetric information and heterogeneous entrepreneurs attitudes toward risk is set up it is shown that due to the interplay between project choice and entrepreneurs preferences using collateral as a signal to screen safer projects may prove impossible instead a partially separating two contract equilibrium with rationing at one contract emerges contrary to previous theoretical research and consistently with conventional wisdom and systematic evidence the use of collateral is never negatively correlated with project risk

pro poor targeting and accountability of local governments in west bengal a commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty socio economic inequality and lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments this hypothesis is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 west bengal villages concerning targeting of credit agricultural input kits employment programs and fiscal grants spanning the period 1978 98 higher poverty land inequality and low caste composition of the poor was associated with negligible adverse effects on targeting of private goods to the poor within villages but with lower employment generation out of allotted funds and significantly lower allocation of resources to the village as a whole political competition or literacy levels among the poor were not systematically related to targeting

collateral and credit rationing a review of recent empirical studies as a guide for future research abstract the relationship between firms and banks often suffers from informational opacity that may result in credit rationing in theory providing collateral to the bank can have a mitigating effect on these informational asymmetries and thus solve the credit rationing problem even though collateral is already a widespread debt contract feature recent trends predict that in the future collateral will become even more important for informationally opaque firms the aim of this paper is twofold first we provide a review of the recently growing empirical research on collateral as a remedy for credit rationing second we would like to pinpoint gaps and limitations in current empirical research most studies contend with a flawed research design by not distinguishing between business and personal collateral and excluding other information opaqueness reducing tools such as the strength of the relationship between borrower and lender loan maturity and covenants we also discuss the limitations of using a single equation estimation method and the usefulness of incorporating interaction effects into the estimation models finally we provide suggestions for fruitful research avenues that would fill these gaps and enrich the empirical knowledge in this research domain

time to build and capacity choice abstract this paper studies how demand uncertainty and time to build interact in affecting irreversible investment activity using impulse control methods we find the optimal timing and size of investment for a firm such as an electric utility that considers expanding its capacity in order to meet an uncertain demand when the construction lag is short uncertainty delays investment while increasing its size once it takes place however for comparatively long and realistic times to build the sensitivity to uncertainty is drastically reduced and the results can even be reversed more uncertainty can speed up investment and reduce its size

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

the incidence of secured debt evidence from the small business community critics claim that theories of secured debt fail to explain the widespread use of collateral because they incorrectly predict when a loan will be secured this paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of the transaction cost models of secured debt data from two samples of over 1 000 small business loans generally support the common set of predictions of these theories the incidence of secured debt is positively related to probability of default loan size loan maturity and marketability of assets changes in the legal and economic environment also alter firms decisions regarding the pledging of collateral

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

overdrafts and the demand for money this paper presents a stochastic analysis of the demand for interest bearing money such as now accounts when overdrafting is allowed at some penalty rate it is shown that the short run interest elasticity of money demand is probably large in absolute value and negative but in the long run this elasticity is much smaller or even positive it is also argued that current definitions of the monetary aggregates which exclude unused credit may spuriously generate instability of money demand an alternative definition of money stock is suggested and seems to be conceptually more satisfying copyright 1990 by american economic association

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

cash burns an inventory model with a cash credit choice abstract a dynamic cash management model is analysed where agents choose whether to pay with cash or credit at every point in time in the model credit usage depends on the current stock of cash a novel result that matches recent micro evidence on households payment choices the optimality of such a decision rule is novel and cannot be obtained by models where cash credit decisions are made at the beginning of each period we discuss how to use the model to account for cross country evidence on the intensity of credit usage and for several statistics on the size and frequency of cash withdrawals the model is used to assess the household s welfare cost of phasing out cash

lending to small businesses the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems we investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending we find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories are older and less experienced and for firms that are more informationally opaque supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk finally while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm creditor ties

the higher cost of follow up loans this paper uses unique data and looks at the interest margin for follow up finance vis a vis first round finance applying data for asset values we examine the substitution between collateral and interest margins consistent with the theories of bester 1985 besanko and thakor 1987 and the empirical evidence of cressy 1996b we find that a trade off between collateral and interest margins exists our main result indicates that follow up finance is more expensive for loans but not for overdrafts we suggest that a relatively fixed asset base land and buildings as seen in higher security to loan values raises the price and risk of successive financial increments this explains the higher relative cost of follow up finance to borrowers

business borrowing and control a theory of entrepreneurial types a formal model of the bank borrowing decision by the small firm is provided to explain why some entrepreneurs borrow and others do not and why some businesses grow and others remain stationary over long periods loan capital is productive and increases the firm s revenue but brings the business under the control of the bank profits generated by borrowing are a good increasing owner utility whereas control is a bad reducing it the consequent tradeoff between borrowing and control implies that the business optimum will involve borrowing less than the amount that maximises profits if owner control aversion is strong enough equilibrium may involve a corner solution with the business being entirely self funding the above result holds under conditions of symmetric information and zero credit rationing dynamic analysis distinguishes one group of entrepreneurs movers whose preferences towards control evolve through time and their control aversion diminishes from another group stayers whose preferences remain stationary for the movers borrowing increases over time up to a profit maximising optimum whereas for the stayers independence of control is maintained but at the expense of non growth

the effects of formal and informal contracting in credit availability this paper investigates how the use of collateral formal contracting along with the market power of banks which facilitates relational contracts affects the availability of credit for business firms using loan data from the spanish credit register we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral additionally the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable we also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets therefore market power relations and collateral formal contracting act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information

identifying the disadvantaged official poverty consumption poverty and the new supplemental poverty measure few economic indicators are more closely watched or more important for ew economic indicators are more closely watched or more important for policy than the offi cial poverty rate it is used to gauge the extent of deprivapolicy than the offi cial poverty rate it is used to gauge the extent of deprivation in the united states and to determine how economic well being has tion in the united states and to determine how economic well being has changed over time the poverty rate is often cited by policymakers researchers changed over time the poverty rate is often cited by policymakers researchers and advocates who are evaluating social programs that account for more than half and advocates who are evaluating social programs that account for more than half a trillion dollars in government spending eligibility for some means tested transfer a trillion dollars in government spending eligibility for some means tested transfer programs is determined based on the poverty thresholds and local poverty rates programs is determined based on the poverty thresholds and local poverty rates affect the allocation of billions of dollars in federal funds affect the allocation of billions of dollars in federal funds the methods for calculating the current poverty measure largely unchanged the methods for calculating the current poverty measure largely unchanged since the 1960s have been criticized by many researchers in response the census since the 1960s have been criticized by many researchers in response the census bureau has led a two decade process of research and discussion of poverty measurebureau has led a two decade process of research and discussion of poverty measurement with an eye to revising the offi cial measure the process has involved hundreds ment with an eye to revising the offi cial measure the process has involved hundreds of papers dozens of offi cial census bureau publications u s census 2010 of papers dozens of offi cial census bureau publications u s census 2010 and two national academy of sciences reports citro and michael 1995 iceland and two national academy of sciences reports citro and michael 1995 iceland 2005 we will not summarize this vast literature here rather we will examine 2005 we will not summarize this vast literature here rather we will examine the properties of three measures of poverty the offi cial u s poverty rate the new the properties of three measures of poverty the offi cial u s poverty rate the new supplemental poverty measure fi rst released by the u s census bureau in fall 2011 supplemental poverty measure fi rst released by the u s census bureau in fall 2011 and a consumption based measure of poverty we will focus on two fundamental and a consumption based measure of poverty we will focus on two fundamental goals of these measures to identify the most disadvantaged and to assess changes goals of these measures to identify the most disadvantaged and to assess changes

decentralization and efficiency of subsidy targeting evidence from chiefs in rural malawi abstract lower income countries spend vast sums on subsidies beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxy means test pmt or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders a decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages but may be prone to elite capture we study this trade off in the context of two large scale subsidy programs in malawi for agricultural inputs and food decentralized to traditional leaders chiefs who are asked to target the needy using household panel data we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences importantly we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through strict poverty targeting this could be welfare improving since within village redistribution is common productive efficiency targeting is concentrated in villages with above median levels of redistribution

personal bankruptcy and credit supply and demand this paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit while generous state level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policy makers as benefiting less well off borrowers our results using data from the 1983 survey of consumer finances suggest that they increase the amount of credit held by high asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low asset households conditioning on observable characteristics thus bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets interest rates on automobile loans for low asset households also appear to be higher in high exemption states

targeting the poor evidence from a field experiment in indonesia the brief summarizes the targeting the poor evidence from a field experiment in indonesia for the period december 2008 january 2009 this paper reports an experiment in 640 indonesian villages on three approaches to target the poor proxy means tests pmt where assets are used to predict consumption community targeting where villagers rank everyone from richest to poorest and a hybrid defining poverty based on ppp 2 per capita consumption community targeting and the hybrid perform somewhat worse in identifying the poor than pmt though not by enough to significantly affect poverty outcomes for a typical program elite capture does not explain these results instead communities appear to apply a different concept of poverty

reaching the poor cash transfer program targeting in cameroon identifying and selecting poor households with efficient targeting methods is essential for effective poverty alleviation programs this paper assesses the ex post performance of two popular targeting mechanisms proxy means testing pmt and community based targeting cbt in a pilot cash transfer program in cameroon several indicators and metrics to measure each method s performance in terms of inclusion of poor households and exclusion of non poor households are employed results consistently show that cbt performs poorly in terms of selecting households with low per capita consumption when compared to pmt cbt appears to select households with low physical and human capital regardless of actual consumption level however cbt also shows more variability in the selection decision than pmt even when alternative poverty definitions are used as robustness tests the pmt method used in the pilot slightly outperforms other targeting methods hybrid alternative pmt and universal targeting with equal budget but errors remain high when selecting 35 of the population for program participation the results suggest caution is needed in employing cbt methods to select households with low per capita consumption in an environment where poverty levels are high and administrative capacities are limited cbt performance may be improved through more uniform and consistent guidance on program selection criteria and process including explicit criteria that enable cbt monitoring as well as a better integration between pmt and cbt

loan collateral decisions and corporate borrowing costs we examine the relation between borrowing costs and the presence of loan collateral we find the presence of collateral increases with default risk consistent with low quality borrowers reducing their risks and borrowing costs through the use of collateral by explicitly controlling for the interdependence between the decision to pledge collateral and borrowing costs we find that secured loans have predicted spreads substantially lower than if they had been made on an unsecured basis alternatively loans made on an unsecured basis have spreads not substantially different from if they had been secured the evidence suggests that collateral pledging decisions are generally consistent with borrowing cost minimization

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries we study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program while governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales but interregional targeting may deteriorate as central grants to high poverty regions shrink owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions

repossession and the democratization of credit we exploit a 2004 credit reform in brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans we show that the reform expanded credit to riskier self employed borrowers who purchased newer more expensive cars the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers access to credit it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit

the demand of liquid assets with uncertain lumpy expenditures abstract we consider an inventory model for a liquid asset where the per period net expenditures have two components one that is frequent and small and another that is infrequent and large we give a theoretical characterization of the optimal management of liquid asset as well as of the implied observable statistics we use our characterization to interpret some aspects of households currency management in austria as well as the management of demand deposits by a large sample of italian investors

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

on the instability of long run money demand and the welfare cost of inflation in the united states we evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting for instabilities in the long run money demand for the u s over the period 1900 2013 we extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in lucas 2000 and ireland 2009 also considering the recent theoretical contributions of lucas and nicolini 2015 and berentsen et al 2015 breaks in the long run money demand give rise to regime dependent welfare cost estimates we find that the welfare cost is about 0 1 of annual income over 1976 2013 as compared to 0 8 over 1945 1975 overall these values are substantially lower than those reported in the literature

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

financing difficulties for smes and credit rationing an expanded model of mortgage loans with asymmetric information this article presents a new model of mortgage loans under reasonable assumptions a several key variables that affects the success of a project such as project risk total investment lending rate

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

foreign entry and bank competition abstract foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent s informational advantage both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low cost outside competitors into credit markets the entrant s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency cost advantage this paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises the results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets

collateral type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk abstract this paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default pd of bank loans we focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables collateral type of lender and bank borrower relationship while controlling for the other explanatory variables the study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle 1988 2000 collected by the bank of spain s credit register central de informacion de riesgos we find that collateralised loans have a higher pd loans granted by savings banks are riskier and finally that a close bank borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk

revealed community equivalence scales abstract this paper estimates the equivalence scale revealed by discretionary community allocations of welfare benefits to poor households i apply the proposed approach to a subsidized rice program in indonesia in which villages designated program beneficiaries and estimate the equivalence scale implicit in the beneficiaries they selected i find that the revealed community equivalence scale for this program lies much closer to per capita expenditure than traditional demand based equivalence scales particularly in the poorest communities this suggests that per capita expenditure may be closer to how poor communities actually compare households when allocating aid than previously thought

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

relationship lending accounting disclosure and credit availability during the asian financial crisis we examine whether lending relationships benefit firms by making credit more available during periods of financial stress our main finding is that during the asian financial crisis of july 1997 through the end of 1998 relationship lending increased the likelihood that korean and thai firms would obtain credit but it had no effect on indonesian and philippine firms we ask if accounting disclosure might explain the observed differences among the three countries for which audit information is available we find that for indonesian firms with weak lending relationships banks replace relationship lending technology with a financial statement lending technology such a result does not hold for korean and philippine firms

do binary collateral outcome variables proxy collateral levels the case of collateral from start ups and existing smes this paper is designed to test whether the factors which affect the decision to collateralise business loans affect the level of collateralisation in the same manner if the level of collateralisation does matter the provision of collateral becomes more than a goodwill gesture to placate banks and more a device to ameliorate the risk of lending we use a thitherto unseen dataset from a u k retail bank comprising 4 618 transfers and start ups ts group who applied for business loans and overdrafts between january 1998 and january 2000 the control sample comprised 9 596 existing businesses from the same period our unique dataset permits an analysis of this kind for the first time because it contains a continuous variable for collateral unlike previous studies existing businesses exhibit a higher frequency binary outcome and level tobit outcome of collateral than the businesses who are start ups or have transferred from another bank only when distortions within the data are not controlled for these distortions negate the value of binary collateral variables factors such as business type and loan purpose are useful at explaining the likelihood of a borrower having his loan collateralised and the level of collateralisation for borrowers who provided collateral or not

loan collateral corporate investment and business cycle abstract collateral and loan rates are observed to be highly cyclical in their use for bank lending the effects of such cyclicality on corporate investment are analyzed in this paper using a dynamic model we find that more collateral causes firms to select riskier safer projects if the loan rate rises above falls below the expected investment return we show that the incentive effect of loan rates becomes stronger with greater collateral with the two credit terms having larger incentive effects on lower quality firms these results offer a new explanation for why lenient collateral policies are associated with rising loan rates in economic upturns but stricter collateral requirements come with falling loan rates during downturns

the role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth this paper examines the characteristics of new firm founders who use loans and overdrafts from the clearing banks to finance initially their business bank lending to new firms appears unrelated to the personal characteristics of founders but related to whether individuals provide personal savings and the legal status of the business this contrasts with the factors which influence the growth of new firms here the founder s age employment status and birthplace are associated with larger firms the only variable which appears to influence consistently both bank lending and the employment growth in firms is whether or not the business is a limited company

short term loans and long term relationships relationship lending in early america recent banking theory holds that durable firm bank relationships are valuable to both parties this paper uses the contract specific loan records of a 19th century u s bank and shows that firms with extended relationships received three principal benefits first firmswith extended relationships had lower credit costs second long term customers provided fewer personal guarantees which were an alternative to collateral third long term customers were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch these findings support theories that banks realize cost advantages through the use of proprietary information

capital market imperfections high tech investment and new equity financing highly variable returns asymmetric information and a lack of collateral should cause small high tech firms to have poor access to debt new equity financing has several advantages over debt but may be costly compared to internal finance we examine an unbalanced panel of over 2 400 publicly traded us high tech companies over the period 1981 98 most small high tech firms obtain little debt financing new equity financing in the form of the initial public offering is very important and permits a major increase in firm size after going public comparatively few firms make heavy use of external finacing

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

financial system architecture this article builds a theory of financial system architecture we ask what is a financial market what is a bank and what determines the economic role of each starting with basic assumptions about primitives the types of agents and the nature of the informational asymmetries we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market it is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

when arm s length is too far relationship banking over the credit cycle we conduct face to face interviews with bank ceos to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders we then use the geographic coordinates of these banks branches and of 14 100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle we find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom it alleviates such constraints during a downturn this positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn moreover our evidence suggests thatrelationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans

information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs we investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the aid are different and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most effective policies intuitively our model shows that donors should stay in control of how their aid is spent when their own private information is more important than the private information of the recipient less obviously an increase in the difference of preferences between donors and recipients can increase rather than decrease the leeway that donors should grant the recipients as the recipients information gains in importance relative to those of the donors and recipients become less likely to communicate truthfully we test the model using dyadic data for 28 bilateral aid donors and 112 recipients over the 1995 2010 period our proxy for centralized aid is project aid while budget aid leaves more leeway to the recipient and thus proxies for decentralized aid in line with the model misaligned interests and informational asymmetries indeed influence the shares of aid given as budget and project aid jel c23 d82 f33 o1

debt collateral and renegotiation under moral hazard abstract this paper demonstrates that renegotiation will increase initial collateral requirements in debt contracts under moral hazard hence it confirms smith and warner s conjecture that severity of contractual covenants and ease of renegotiating debt contracts are positively related in case where the covenant provision is collateral

the effect of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 on small business loan pricing abstract the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 contains several provisions that can affect the cost of producing loans for financial intermediaries in a competitive lending market the additional monitoring and expected foreclosure costs imposed by the change in the bankruptcy law should be passed on to the borrower using survey data from a sample of small business loans from commercial banks evidence is presented that the enactment of the new law resulted in higher contract rates of interest

relationship lending and sme financing in the continental european bank based system this paper analyzes the relationship between banks and smes in the continental european bank based system we find that smes with longer bank relationships have enhanced access to loans but at the same time they bear a higher cost for their debt we also find that firms maintaining two bank relationships get the cheapest debt which establishes a limit for the degree of concentration of bank relationships our results also show that the existence of trust between firm and bank improves access to financing and reduces the borrowing costs whereas it increases the likelihood that guarantees will have to be provided as a consequence it seems that a relationship based on trust is a better strategy to improve smes access to finance than the establishment of longer or more concentrated relationships

product market competition and the financing of new ventures this paper examines the interaction between venture risk product market competition and the entrepreneur s choice between bank financing and venture capital vc financing under bank financing a debt type contract emerges as optimal which allows the entrepreneur to retain full control of the venture and thus yields strong effort incentives as long as the entrepreneur can service the debt repayment however this leads to liquidation in the case of default making the venture s success quite sensitive to exogenous even temporary shocks that may hinder debt repayment under vc financing an equity type contract emerges as optimal although it is not sensitive to exogenous shocks this contract requires the entrepreneur to share a fraction of the rents with the financier thus yielding lower effort incentives for the entrepreneur there exists a threshold level of venture risk such that bank financing is optimal if and only if venture risk is below that threshold product market competition increases the value of stronger entrepreneurial incentives and thus increases the maximum level of risk the entrepreneur is willing to take before switching from bank financing to vc financing this is a robust result that is shown to hold in various models of competition including the hotelling salop dixit stiglitz and cournot to bertrand switch this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information the authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered the principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts specifically some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept two somewhat surprising results emerge first high quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits second high quality borrowers may put up more collateral this paper explores the allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications we model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium under both banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits however under the first concept of equilibrium ti as in jaffee and russell 11 all rents accrue to borrowers whereas under the second concept t2 all rents accrue to depositors as in stiglitz and weiss 17 our research makes two main points first we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations specifically one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of stiglitz and weiss 17 and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used for instance

excess liquidity bank pricing rules and monetary policy abstract this paper studies the implications of excess bank liquidity for the effectiveness of monetary policy in a simple model with credit market imperfections the demand for excess reserves is determined by precautionary factors and the opportunity cost of holding cash it is argued that excess liquidity may impart greater stickiness to the deposit rate in response to a monetary contraction and induce an easing of collateral requirements on borrowers which in turn may translate into a lower risk premium and lower lending rates as a result asymmetric bank pricing behavior under excess liquidity may hamper the ability of a contractionary monetary policy to lower inflation

financial distress and the business cycle in this paper we argue that firms financial distress should play a greater role in the macroeconomic analysis of the business cycle we provide a non technical account of a general equilibrium model that exhibits financially driven equilibrium cycles we show that the empirical evidence is widely supportive of the key hypothesis and implications of our approach we use the model in order to evaluate the effects of several policy measures it turns out that deepening the market for second hand capital goods subsidizing the interest payments of companies which start up when financial conditions are tight and bailing out some companies in default can indeed stabilize the economy by way of generalization we may say that the policy reaction to a financially driven bust should be accommodating

new firm growth and bank financing this paper examines the extent to which lucas ideas on human capital and jovanovic theorising on learning can provide further insights into the development of small firms it focuses exclusively upon newly established independent firms our evidence from two surveys is that bank lending to new firms is unrelated to many of the personal characteristics of founders which have been argued by other researchers to relate to small firm performance instead lending appears to be more related to whether or not the founder can or chooses to use personal savings and the legal status of the business

demand for cash with intra period endogenous consumption abstract we extend the literature on the demand for money by relaxing the assumption of a constant rate of consumption although total consumption is still fixed over the period agents can choose more than one rate of consumption and cash depletion in the period to minimize the cost of money management consistent with empirical evidence we find that agents do not smooth intra period consumption instead their rate of consumption will be positively related to their cash position this positive correlation depends on the volatility of the consumption process

capital market access and corporate loan structure in this article we use a sample of 14 075 loan packages issued between 1993 and 2007 to examine if borrower access to external capital markets influences corporate loan structure we classify firms into three access categories private unrated public and rated public private firms have the lowest access and to date no large sample investigation of their loans has been done in the literature rated public firms access the capital markets the most we find the level of access influences loan structure in ways that are consistent with having greater or fewer financing alternatives as well as theories on information asymmetry agency and monitoring in particular loans to firms with higher levels of access have shorter maturities fewer loan facilities per package and a lower probability of being secured we also find that a higher level of access results in a higher incidence of single lender loans but among multiple lender loans it leads to a larger number of lenders furthermore we find evidence

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

clustered pricing in the corporate loan market theory and empirical evidence abstract existing theories explaining security price clustering as well as clustering in the retail deposit and mortgage markets are incompatible with the clustering in the corporate loan market we develop a new theoretical model that the attitude of the lender toward the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower leads to the clustering of spreads our empirical results support our theoretical model and we find that clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty between the lender and the borrower in contrast clustering is less likely when the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower has been reduced through repeated access and through prior interactions of the lender and the borrower

clientelism in indian villages abstract we study the operation of local governments panchayats in rural maharashtra india using a survey that we designed for this end elections are freely contested fairly tallied highly p

does better nutrition raise farm productivity household level data from sierra leone are used to test whether higher caloric intake enhances family farm labor productivity this is the notion behind the efficiency wages hypothesis which has found only weak empirical support a farm production function is estimated accounting for the simultaneity in input and calorie choice instruments include prices household demographic characteristics and farm assets the latter two sets of instruments are later dropped to explore the robustness of the results to different specifications of exogeneity the exercise shows a highly significant effect of caloric intake on labor productivity providing solid support for the nutrition productivity hypothesis the marginal effect on productivity falls drastically as calorie consumption rises but remains positive at moderately high levels of intake one result is a fall in the effective price of food a decline that is larger for households that consumer fewer calories

homogeneity and the transactions demand for money the paper presents the properties of money demand implied by the frenkel jovanovic 1980 inventory model without approximation the money demand function is implicitly defined by the first order condition of the model from the implicit function we show that the elasticities of money demand satisfy a set of homogeneity conditions we also show that increasing transactions cost increases the cash flow elasticity the interest elasticity in absolute value and the uncertainty elasticity but decreases the transactions cost elasticity if the ratio of cash flow uncertainty to the transactions variable is small then the interest elasticity is greater than 1 2 in contrast it lies between 71 and 1 2 when the approximation method is applied

the commitment problem of secured lending the paper presents a new theory of trade credit in which firms buy inputs on credit from suppliers to restore the benefits of secured bank financing impaired by contract incompleteness in a setting where investment is endogenous and unobservable to financiers we show that a bank secured credit contract is time inconsistent upon being granted credit the entrepreneur has an incentive to alter the original input combination jeopardizing the bank s revenues anticipating the entrepreneur s opportunism the bank offers an unsecured credit contract reducing the surplus from the venture one way for the entrepreneur to commit to the contract terms is to purchase inputs on credit from the supplier the supplier observes the input investment and acts as a guarantor that inputs will be purchased as contracted thus facilitating access to secured bank financing the commitment role of trade credit still holds in a multi period extension that investigates the impact of bank relationship lending on secured debt and trade credit our model provides novel testable predictions on optimal financial contracts in both one period and repeated lending relationships

commitment lending under asymmetric information theory and tests on u k startup data u k business startup data is used to examine the role of contract parameters in solving the bank s problem of lending under asymmetric information margins are found to be a direct function of the probability of failure and an inverse function of security for given loan size consistently with collateral being invoked to solve the moral hazard problem business survival is also found to be enhanced by owner equity inputs for given debt again consistent with a requirement for owner financial inputs to enhance unobservable effort security rises along with loan size and survival chances a finding consistent with a a firm loan size effect larger borrowers have lower marginal admin cost to the bank and with b positive borrower self selection better borrowers offer collateral because they are less likely to experience forfeiture observable business characteristics are found to play an important intermediary role in the solution to the moral hazard problem more mature proprietors have more experience business commitment assets for borrowing and the willingness to use them for loan collateral their contract parameters reflect these facts

the real effect of banking crises finance or asset allocation effects some international evidence abstract this paper analyzes whether the decline in economic growth that follows a banking crisis occurs because of a reduction in the amount of credit available finance effect or a worsening in the allocation of investable resources asset allocation effect we use a sample of more than 2500 industrial firms in 18 developed and developing countries that experienced 19 systemic banking crises between 1989 and 2007 the results indicate that banking crises negatively affect firms intangible investments which intensifies the economic downturn the negative growth effect produced by the worsening of the investment allocation is stronger in countries with highly developed financial systems and institutions

the determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements the paper examines the determinants of contract terms on bank revolving credit agree ments revolvers of medium large publicly traded companies we model the duration maturity secured status and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision frame work thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equation studies of debt contract terms we find strong interrelationships between contract terms with significant bi directional relationships between duration and secured status and be tween the all in spread and commitment fees and a unidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all in spread we also illustrate how several single equa tion studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their inappropriate assumption that other contract terms and leverage were exogenous finally our results sup port the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems

direct and indirect effects of malawi s public works program on food security labor intensive public works programs are important social protection tools in low income settings intended to supplement income of poor households and improve public infrastructure in this evaluation of the malawi social action fund an at scale government operated program across and within village randomization is used to estimate effects on food security and use of fertilizer there is no evidence that the program improves food security and some negative spillovers to untreated households these disappointing results hold even under modifications to the design of the program to offer work during the lean rather than harvest season or increase the frequency of payments

the relationship between u k banks and their small business customers much emphasis is placed upon the benefits to both parties of a good relationship between banks and their small business customers having explained the significance of smes in the u k economy the papers goes on to consider briefly some of the arguments which underpin the rationale for these relationships the roles of information and communication are discussed and the poor co ordination between banks smes and their accountants is highlighted evidence from over 6 000 small businesses in response to the forum of private business survey in 1994 is then presented this demonstrates the strong positive association between more participative relationships and more positive perceptions of their banks by firms finally it is suggested that a virtuous circle of information and communication could be established if the parties cooperate in a systematic process of risk assessment

role of collateral and personal guarantees in relationship lending evidence from japan s sme loan market this paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in japan s sme loan market we find that firms riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used we find however that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral these findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank s seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring this incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees

credit ratings collateral and loan characteristics implications for yield this article studies how collateral affects bond yields using a large data set of public bonds we document that collateralized debt has higher yield than general debt after controlling for credit rating our model of agency problems between managers and claim holders explains this puzzling result by recognizing imperfections in the rating process we test the model s implications consistent with our model and in results new to the literature we find the yield differential between secured and unsecured debt after controlling for credit rating is larger for low credit rating nonmortgage assets longer maturity and with proxies for lower levels of monitoring

organizational distance and use of collateral for business loans abstract this paper examines the effect of organizational distance i e distance between the headquarters of the bank that grants a loan and the location of the borrower on the use of collateral for business loans by spanish banks on the basis of the recent lender based theory of collateral inderst r mueller h m 2007 a lender based theory of collateral journal of financial economics 84 826 859 we find that for the average borrower the use of collateral is higher for loans granted by local lenders than by distant ones we also show that the difference in the likelihood of collateral in loans granted by local lenders relative to distant lenders is higher among older and larger firms than respectively younger and smaller firms we also find that banks use lending technologies that are different for near and for distant firms in response to organizational diseconomies

credit market imperfections and the distribution of policy rents this article shows that credit market imperfections have important implications for the distribution of policy rents in a model with land as fixed factor and credit market imperfections when an area payment is given land rents go up by more than the subsidy on aggregate farms may lose from the subsidy the results depend on the extent to which subsidies have direct and indirect effects on the credit constraints on whether farms rent or own land and on farm heterogeneity

money demand function estimation by nonlinear cointegration conventionally the money demand function is estimated using a regression of the logarithm of money demand on either the interest rate or the logarithm of the interest rate this equation is presumed to be a cointegrating regression in this paper we aim to combine the logarithmic specification which models the liquidity trap better than a linear model with the assumption that the interest rate itself is an integrated process the proposed technique is robust to serial correlation in the errors for the usa our new technique results in larger coefficient estimates than previous research suggested and produces superior out of sample prediction copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

collateral relationship lending and family firms prior research suggested that relationship lending could play a role in solving asymmetric information problems between borrower and lender other studies suggest a relationship between family ownership and the shareholder bondholder agency conflict the present paper investigates the impact of relationship characteristics family ownership and their interaction effects upon the use of collateral in sme lending we examine the determinants of collateral as well as the determinants of the choice between business and personal collateral using decision tree analysis the results reveal that relationship characteristics have a significant influence but not always in the direction as expected moreover they do not seem to be the primary determinants in our classification models the most important determinants in both classification models seem to be the loan amount total assets and the family versus non family firm distinction in addition we differentiate between line of credit and non line of credit loans and find significant differences between these decision trees

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs

business collateral and personal commitments in sme lending abstract using a database of sme credit approvals from a large belgian bank this paper extends the empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral by examining the determinants of business collateral simultaneously with the determinants of personal collateral commitments our results suggest that firm and relationship characteristics seem to be more important determinants of collateral commitment protection than loan and lender characteristics family firms are more likely to offer a higher degree of collateral commitment protection while introducing competition between banks decreases this likelihood the collateral requirement decreases in the length of the bank borrower relationship furthermore trade credit seems to have a signalling effect the lazy banks hypothesis was not supported our results suggest that beside risk arguments also commercial arguments help explain the pledging of collateral using a continuation ratio logit model we discover several differences in the determinants of the collateralisation decision and the determinants of the type of collateral commitments