effect of exporter s incentives on foreign distributor s role performance a foreign distributor s motivation to perform local marketing tasks for an exporter is often poor due to agency conflicts and transaction cost constraints characterizing the export channel while exporters may engage in actions such as offering incentives and overseeing partner activities to improve foreign marketing such intrusions into partner operations often fail to enhance the distributor s role performance drawing on motivation theory the authors develop a model explaining the efficiency of different incentive types in enhancing the distributor s motivational context to act on behalf of the exporter thereby improving relationship quality distributor relationship specific investments and consequently distributor role performance the authors use a sample of 278 european exporters to test hypotheses regarding relationship factors that mediate and moderate the incentive role performance relationship the results indicate that the impact of low powered incentives lpis substitutes for the effect of high powered incentives on relationship quality and specific investments the key mediators driving distributor role performance in addition exporter oversight of distributor activities weakens the effectiveness of lpis to increase distributor specific investment the authors derive implications for designing portfolios of incentives with inferences based on efficiently matching incentive induced motivational context with foreign distributor s actions required to accomplish exporter goals

sustainable spending in a lower return world investors whether corporate pensions public pensions foundations endowments or individuals need to focus on sustainable spending which is key to effective strategic planning to assess sustainable spending planners must start with the three building blocks of return for most assets income growth and revaluation changes in the yield offered by that investment analysis based on these components of historical equity and bond returns shows that the long term investor cannot expect to receive in the future the commonly assumed 8 9 percent returns with stock yields below 2 percent and bond yields of 5 percent even a 5 percent spending rate may not be sustainable without future contributions from the investor

the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

cultural values and international differences in business ethics we analyze ethical policies of firms in industrialized countries and try to find out whether culture is a factor that plays a significant role in explaining country differences we look into the firm s human rights policy its governance of bribery and corruption and the comprehensiveness implementation and communication of its codes of ethics we use a dataset on ethical policies of almost 2 700 firms in 24 countries we find that there are significant differences among ethical policies of firms headquartered in different countries when we associate these ethical policies with hofstede s cultural indicators we find that individualism and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with a firm s ethical policies whereas masculinity and power distance are negatively related to these policies

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

the labor market impact of immigration a quasi experiment exploiting immigrant location rules in germany with the fall of the berlin wall ethnic germans living in eastern europe and the former soviet union were given the opportunity to migrate to germany within 15 years 2 8 million individuals had done so upon arrival these immigrants were exogenously allocated to different regions to ensure an even distribution across the country their inflow can therefore be seen as a quasi experiment of immigration i analyze the effect of these inflows on skill specific employment rates and wages the results indicate a displacement effect of 3 1 unemployed workers for every 10 immigrants that find a job but no effect on relative wages

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

forecasting quantiles of day ahead electricity load accurate load forecasting plays a crucial role in the decision making process of many market participants but probably is most important for the dispatch planning of an electricity market operator despite the competitive forecast accuracy achieved by existing point forecast models point forecasts can only provide limited information relating to the expected level of future load to account for the uncertainty of future load and provide a more complete picture of the future load conditions for dispatch planning purposes quantile forecasts can be useful this paper proposes a computationally efficient approach to forecasting the quantiles of electricity load which is then applied to forecasting in the national electricity market of australia the proposed model performs competitively in comparison with one industry standard and two recently proposed quantile forecasting methods one of the main advantages of the proposed approach is the ease with the number of covariates can be expanded this is a particularly important feature in the context of load forecasting where large numbers of important drivers are usually necessary to provide accurate load forecasts

optimal contracts for lenient supervisors we analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal a supervisor and an agent the supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent but his preferences are private information in a model with two supervisor types we find that the optimal contract may be very simple paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and his evaluation of the agent s effort such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent s performance truthfully while the altruistic type reports favorably independent of performance accordingly overstated performance leniency bias may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

innovation and strategic divergence an empirical study of the u s pharmaceutical industry from 1920 to 1960 today firms employing two distinct survival strategies 1 innovation and 2 imitation coexist in the u s pharmaceutical industry history indicates that this intraindustry heterogeneity did not exist prior to 1940 this study empirically investigates the origin of this strategic divergence by focusing on changes in firms r d inputs and outputs it finds that some u s pharmaceutical firms responded to the opportunity presented by the discovery of antibiotics in the 1940s by investing more in r d while many others did not over time the innovators dominated in developing new drugs and the gap between innovators and imitators steadily increased these findings also shed light on the genesis of strategic groups a phenomenon that is not yet well understood

mobile computing the next platform rivalry all modern information and communications technology ict industries use the platform organization a platform is a reconfigurable base of compatible components on which firms and users build applications applications share the general purpose components thereby exploiting increasing returns at an industrywide level bresnahan and trajtenberg 1995 platforms sometimes compete for developers who create applications which make the platform valuable for users we consider such competition in mobile computing different mobile platforms are supplied by firms such as microsoft google apple nokia and research in motion who employ different approaches the approaches vary in the use of hierarchy which frames a seemingly simple question why doesn t one form of platform governance emerge as superior dominating most markets in which platforms play an essential role this essay will stress the reasons for differ entiation and proposes a new argument a platform s hierarchy can help at one moment but then get in the way at a later time hierarchical organization helps coordinate supply and the invention of complements avoids postinvention holdup through contracting and other forms of

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

data revisions are not well behaved we document the empirical properties of revisions to major macroeconomic variables in the united states our findings suggest that they do not satisfy simple desirable statistical properties in particular we find that these revisions do not have a zero mean which indicates that the initial announcements by statistical agencies are biased we also find that the revisions are quite large compared to the original variables and they are predictable using the information set at the time of the initial announcement which means that the initial announcements of statistical agencies are not rational forecasts

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the dynamic capabilities of firms an introduction an expanded paradigm is needed to explain how competitive advantage is gained and held firms resorting to resource bas ed strategy attempt to accumulate valuable technology assets and employ an aggressive intellectual property stance however winners in the global marketplace have been firms demonstrating timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation along with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences this source of competitive advantage dynamic capabilities emphasizes two aspects first it refers to the shifting character of the environment second it emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting integrating and re configuring internal and external organizational skills resources and functional competences toward changing environment 3 only recently have researchers begun to focus on the specifics of developing firm specific capabilities and the manner in which competences are renewed to respond to shifts in the business environment the dynamic capabilities approach provides a coherent framework to integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge and facilitate prescription this paper argues that the competitive advanis tage of firms stems from dynamic capabilities rooted in high performance routines z operating inside the firm embedded in the firm s processes and conditioned by its history it offers dynamic capabilities as an emerging paradigm of the modern business j firm that draws on multiple disciplines and advances with the help of industry studies in the usa and elsewhere

forgiveness in vertical relationships incentive and termination effects two types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conflicts in vertical relationships formal and relational i e enforceable or not by third parties much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts we study a core feature of the latter the conditions leading to continuation of the relationship whose prospect gives relational contracts their force we build a formal model of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for continuation as a function of the values of contractibles noncontractibles and outside options the model highlights a basic trade off between providing strong incentives for the present incentive effect and safeguarding relationships for the future termination effect the stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain conditions when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners i e high contractible value high noncontractible value or unattractive outside options however strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under other conditions when a formal contract is insufficient and a relational contract is most important i e high noncontractible relative to contractible value we discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the ratchet effect and the market for secondhand workers workers in a long term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future we show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece rate contracts when the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm gibbons 1987 has shown that all piece rate contracts will be inefficient together these results may explain why piece rates are common in some jobs such as agricultural work and sales and not as popular for many manufacturing jobs

dynamic asymmetries in u s unemployment we examine dynamic asymmetries in u s unemployment using nonlinear time series models and bayesian methods we find strong statistical evidence in favor of a two regime threshold auto regressive model empirical results indicate that once we take into account both parameter and model uncertainty there are economically interesting asymmetries in the unemployment rate one finding of particular interest is that shocks that lower the unemployment rate tend to have a smaller effect than shocks that raise the unemployment rate this finding is consistent with unemployment rises being sudden and falls gradual

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

cheap talk and bogus network externalities in the emerging technology market many emerging technologies exhibit path dependent demands driven by positive network feedback such network effects profoundly impact marketing strategists thinking in today s network economy however the significant network externalities expected by many people often fail to materialize in the emerging technology market we analyze this phenomenon in the context of a technology distribution channel by studying cheap talk strategies under information asymmetry we show that incentive compatible contracts are essential for achieving credible information transmission in our model the better informed technology vendor has an incentive to inflate the retailer s ex ante belief of network externalities when a wholesale price contract is adopted when properly termed revenue sharing contracts are implemented there are information efficient cheap talk equilibria where truthful information transmission is mutually beneficial when the vendor s information is imperfect even revenue sharing contracts cannot guarantee credible information transmission if there is significant prior belief disparity between the vendor and the retailer this study demonstrates how information inefficient equilibria e g information blockage arise because of the conflict of interest or the conflict of opinion among channel members it also explores the role of cheap talk in facilitating channel coordination

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

are preliminary announcements of the money stock rational forecasts abstract we develop a theoretical framework of analyzing preliminary announcements of economic data and then apply this framework to the money stock we find that preliminary announcements of the money stock are best characterized as measured with classical errors in variables that is the revision is not correlated with the true value of the series the revision is however forecastable using information available at the time of the preliminary announcement our ability to forecast the revision implies that preliminary announcements are not rational estimates of the true money stock

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

data revisions and the expenditure components of gdp the constant price components of the expenditure estimate of gdp for the united kingdom undergo an extensive process of revision as new information comes to light this study is concerned with three central themes the authors assess whether the preliminary vintages efficiently incorporate information available at the time of their compilation whether there is any evidence for the nonstationarity of data revisions and how to construct constant price time series when there are several changes of base copyright 1991 by royal economic society

wage floors imperfect performance measures and optimal job design we analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement due to cost advantages of specialization assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient a sufficiently high wage floor however induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking but may increase profit under specialization we further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

combining forecast densities from vars with uncertain instabilities recursive weight forecast combination is often found to an ineffective method of improving point forecast accuracy in the presence of uncertain instabilities we examine the effectiveness of this strategy for forecast densities using many vector autoregressive var and autoregressive ar models of output growth inflation and interest rates our proposed recursive weight density combination strategy based on the recursive logarithmic score of the forecast densities produces well calibrated predictive densities for us real time data by giving substantial weight to models that allow for structural breaks in contrast equal weight combinations produce poorly calibrated forecast densities for great moderation data copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

piece rate incentive schemes this paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece rate compensation schemes the informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century the formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting the main result is as follows in a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior then no compensation scheme piece rate or otherwise can induce the worker not to restrict output

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

designing incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm we consider a firm where the sales division sales is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division operations is responsible for ordering sales has better information about the demand than operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to operations to incentivize truthful information sharing we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of sales besides monetary payoffs we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of sales we model the setting as a signaling game and derive the pareto dominant separating equilibria of the game in laboratory experiments we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected payoff maximizing behavior we use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out of sample treatments and out of sample subjects we conduct additional experiments to provide further robus

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

relational contracts and the value of relationships this article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known i consider a principal agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option i show that if the principal has the bargaining power she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus i characterize how information is revealed how the relationship evolves and how this depends on bargaining power jel c78 d82 d83 d86

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

can trustworthiness in a supply chain be signaled the relationship between a buyer and its suppliers often relies on factors beyond the terms of a contractual agreement buyers can therefore benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers we argue that precontractual actions by a supplier for example making costly buyer specific investments without a long term contract can signal a supplier s trustworthiness we develop a theoretical model to reflect supplier trustworthiness and determine when a buyer can benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers we show that costly relationship specific investments can serve as a signal of trustworthiness and that supply chain profits increase when trustworthy suppliers are able to identify themselves in this fashion we demonstrate the importance of the signaling mechanism using laboratory experiments the experimental results show that relationship specific investments lead to more collaborative transactions with buyers offering higher prices and suppliers returning higher quality products this results in

governance institutions and adaptation costs evidence from the fall of the berlin wall this paper investigates how institutions governing the employment relationship influence firms adaptation to environmental changes after the berlin wall fell migration from east germany accounted for an abrupt increase in the supply of a key resource labor in the west i study responses to this disruption among firms in the economically important machinery and equipment industry i find that western firms adapted to migration by increasing employment unless they were affiliated with a works council an institution that limits the firm s autonomy in managing its workforce i also find evidence of institution contingent responses to migration in two areas of firm strategy vertical boundaries and the focus on exploration versus exploitation the results suggest that hybrid i e less hierarchical governance institutions increase adaptation costs the results also indicate that such adaptation costs have implications for multiple aspects of firm decision making that are nominally beyond the scope of those governance institutions this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

the interactions of organizational and competitive influences on strategy and performance despite much debate in the strategy literatures there is little consensus as to whether organizational capabilities or market competition are more important in shaping firms actions and performance we suspect that simply comparing firm level and industry level influences will continue to prove fruitless for two reasons in the first place both organization and competition are clearly important in shaping strategy and performance in the second place we suspect that the inconclusive nature of much of the existing research reflects the fact that organizational capabilities competition strategy and performance are fundamentally endogenous that is reciprocal interactions at multiple levels of analysis between the environment and the firm shape business strategy and performance while interactions between strategy and performance in turn shape both organizational capabilities and competitive environments this special issue of the strategic management journal includes papers that focus attention on several dimensions of these interactions a common theme emerges from the work concerning the sequential nature of the interrelationships the papers suggest that firms develop organizational capabilities as they act in competitive institutional and cognitive environments where capabilities arise both by design and as the unexpected by products of firm actions the capabilities managers understanding of the capabilities and the historical context that surrounds them then condition firms reactions to changes in their environment the reactions and firm performance in turn affect the structure of the industry and all these changes generate new information which in turn creates new learning opportunities thus the papers view strategy and performance as an ongoing sequence of capabilities conditioned adaptations by firms which in turn become exogenous events in the environments of the managers of other firms for strategy researchers the important question is not that of which disciplinary perspective or mode of explanation is a more appropriate one but rather that of the conditions under which a given mode of explanation is most appropriate 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

combining var and dsge forecast densities a popular macroeconomic forecasting strategy utilizes many models to hedge against instabilities of unknown timing see among others stock and watson 2004 clark and mccracken 2010 and jore et al 2010 existing studies of this forecasting strategy exclude dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models despite the widespread use of these models by monetary policymakers in this paper we use the linear opinion pool to combine inflation forecast densities from many vector autoregressions vars and a policymaking dsge model the dsge receives a substantial weight in the pool at short horizons provided the var components exclude structural breaks in this case the inflation forecast densities exhibit calibration failure allowing for structural breaks in the vars reduces the weight on the dsge considerably but produces well calibrated forecast densities for inflation

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

are statistical reporting agencies getting it right data rationality and business cycle asymmetry this article provides new evidence on the rationality of early releases of industrial production ip and producer price index ppi data rather than following the usual practice of examining only first available and fully revised data we examine the entire revision history for each variable thus we are able to assess for example whether earlier releases of data are in any sense less rational than later releases and when data become rational our findings suggest that seasonally unadjusted ip and ppi become rational after approximately 3 4 months whereas seasonally adjusted versions of these series remain irrational for at least 6 12 months after initial release for all variables examined we find evidence that the remaining revision is predictable from its own past or from publicly available information in other economic and financial variables in addition we find a clear increase in the volatility of revisions during recessions suggesting that early data releases are less reliable in toughe

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

percentage rent contracts between co stores abstract high rental rates and space scarcity in popular retail areas are encouraging retailers to share available space creating co stores co stores with complementary products enjoy a boost in foot traffic thus higher sales when the space is owned by one a common practice for retailers is to engage in a revenue sharing agreement we study the optimal design of a percentage rent contract between two co stores each having his her own random sales dependent on effort levels of both retailers since the effort level exerted by a retailer is often unverifiable it results in a double moral hazard problem we show that a linear percentage rent which is composed of a sales share and a based rent achieves the second best effort levels the landlord may also find it optimal to set a fixed rent by setting the sales share to zero with cobb douglas sales and power disutility of effort functions we obtain closed form expressions for the optimal contract we show that the landlord charges a high sales share for a tenant with low demand externality and a high sales scale the landlord is better off renting out space to a small but high revenue generating retailer rather than one generating larger traffic but with lower sales scale when the landlord s externality potential is low but he is successful in generating sales optimal sales share is low but the base rent is high the percentage rent can increase the landlord profit by up to 13 compared to the conventional fixed rent

procuring fast delivery sole sourcing with information asymmetry this paper studies a queuing model in which a buyer sources a good or service from a single supplier chosen from a pool of suppliers the buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procurement and operating costs the latter of which depends on the suppliers lead time the selected supplier can regulate his lead time but faster lead times are costly although the buyer selects the supplier to source from possibly via an auction and dictates the contractual terms the buyers bargaining power is limited by asymmetric information the buyer only has an estimate of the suppliers costs while the suppliers know their costs precisely we identify a procurement mechanism that minimizes the buyers total cost procurement plus operating this mechanism is not simple it is a numerically derived nonlinear menu of contracts therefore we study several simpler mechanisms e g one that charges a late fee and one that specifies a fixed lead time requirement no menus no nonlinear functions we find that simple mechanisms are nearly optimal generally within 1 of optimal because asymmetric information conveys significant protection to the supplier i e the supplier is able to retain most of the benefit of having a lower cost renegotiation is another concern with the optimal mechanism because it does not minimize the supply chains cost the firms can be both better off if they throw away the contract and start over interestingly we find that the potential gain from renegotiation is relatively small with either the optimal or our simple mechanisms we conclude that our simple mechanisms are quite attractive along all relevant dimensions buyers performance supply chain performance simplicity and robustness to renegotiation

motivation and markets many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it this paper incorporates such pay with the following results performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply more capital intensive industries pay more than less capital intensive industries as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage the model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover wages growth and unemployment copyright 1998 by american economic association

forecasting substantial data revisions in the presence of model uncertainty a recent revision to the preliminary measurement of gdp e growth for 2003q2 caused considerable press attention provoked a public enquiry and prompted a number of reforms to uk statistical reporting procedures in this article we compute the probability of substantial revisions that are greater in absolute value than the controversial 2003 revision the predictive densities are derived from bayesian model averaging over a wide set of forecasting models including linear structural break and regime switching models with and without heteroscedasticity ignoring the nonlinearities and model uncertainty yields misleading predictives and obscures recent improvements in the quality of preliminary uk macroeconomic measurements

implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties we derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance if corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable to outsiders measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with future firm performance then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance further compensation should be more positively associated with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting our results are consistent with these hypotheses

real time prediction with u k monetary aggregates in the presence of model uncertainty a popular account for the demise of the u k s monetary targeting regime in the 1980s blames the fluctuating predictive relationships between broad money and inflation and real output growth yet ex post policy analysis based on heavily revised data suggests no fluctuations in the predictive content of money in this paper we investigate the predictive relationships for inflation and output growth using both real time and heavily revised data we consider a large set of recursively estimated vector autoregressive var and vector error correction models vecm these models differ in terms of lag length and the number of cointegrating relationships we use bayesian model averaging bma to demonstrate that real time monetary policymakers faced considerable model uncertainty the in sample predictive content of money fluctuated during the 1980s as a result of data revisions in the presence of model uncertainty this feature is only apparent with real time data as heavily revised data obscure these fluctua

regulating financial markets protecting us from ourselves and others the current global financial and economic crisis highlights the ongoing tug of war between those who pull toward free markets and those who pull toward strict regulation of markets between those who pull toward libertarianism and those who pull toward paternalism rising stock markets and economic prosperity empower those who favor free markets and libertarianism stock market crashes and economic recessions empower those who favor strict regulation and paternalism this article discusses the current crisis against the backdrop of earlier crises and focuses on margin regulations which limit leverage suitability regulations which require providers of financial products to act in the interests of their clients blue sky laws which prohibit securities deemed unfair or unduly risky and mandatory disclosure regulations which require providers of financial products to disclose pertinent information even if potential buyers do not ask for it

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

worker cooperation and the ratchet effect workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves we show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment however there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers these predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in england in the nineteenth century and the lincoln electric company in the united states even today

fairness outside the cocoon investment bankers security analysts traders and other finance professionals often behave as if they lived in a cocoon they need to recognize that they live under the community s rules of fairness as well as the market s rules through anecdotes quotations and survey reports this article discusses how internal and external obstacles keep finance professionals from perceiving the community s rules of fairness rules that often make their way into the law ultimately those who fail to understand and follow the community rules of fairness are taking risks they would be wise to avoid

news and noise in g 7 gdp announcements revisions to gdp announcements are known to be quite large in all g 7 countries quarterly growth rate revisions are regularly more than a full percentage point at an annualized rate we examine the predictability of these revisions using standard statistical tests of whether the preliminary announcement is a rational forecast of the subsequently revised data previous work suggests that u s gdp revisions are largely unpredictable as would be the case if the revisions reflect news not available at the time that the preliminary number is produced we find that the degree of predictability varies throughout the g 7 although we find little predictability in u s revisions the data revisions for several foreign countries are highly predictable we also perform a simple real time forecasting exercise showing that for several countries the predictability of data revision could be used to generate improved preliminary data

a new marked point process model for the federal funds rate target methodology and forecast evaluation abstract forecasts of key interest rates set by central banks are of paramount concern for investors and policy makers recently it has been shown that forecasts of the federal funds rate target the most anticipated indicator of the federal reserve bank s monetary policy stance can be improved considerably when its evolution is modeled as a marked point process mpp this is due to the fact that target changes occur in discrete time with discrete increments have an autoregressive nature and are usually in the same direction we propose a model which is able to account for these dynamic features of the data in particular we combine hamilton and jorda s 2002 a model for the federal funds rate target journal of political economy 110 5 1135 1167 autoregressive conditional hazard ach and russell and engle s 2005 a discrete state continuous time model of financial transactions prices and times the autoregressive conditional multinomial autoregressive conditional duration model journal of business and economic statistics 23 2 166 180 autoregressive conditional multinomial acm model the paper also puts forth a methodology to evaluate probability function forecasts of mpp models by improving goodness of fit and point forecasts of the target the ach acm qualifies as a sensible modeling framework furthermore our results show that mpp models deliver useful probability function forecasts at short and medium term horizons

bringing the market inside the firm academics consultants and practitioners have long advocated bringing the market inside the firm for example in the 1950 s and 1960 s economists proposed that the transferpricing problem should be solved by charging market prices for internal transactions similarly in the 1980 s financial economists suggested that the capital allocation problem should be solved by charging the external cost of capital for internal investments and wave after wave of organizational restructuring has advocated radical decentralization empowerment intrapreneurship and the like in short making employees feel like owners proponents of making transactions within firms more market like often seem to ignore the factors that brought these transactions inside firms in the first place but bengt holmstrom and paul milgrom 1991 1994 holmstrom and jean tirole 1991 and holmstrom 1999 hereafter referred to collectively as hmt remind us that in some cases integration is efficient precisely because it eliminates market incentives in such cases bringing the market inside the firm would clearly be undesirable in this paper we show that bringing the market inside the firm is often not feasible even if it would be desirable more precisely if some aspects of the market transaction are noncontractible as we define below then it is impossible to replicate spot market payoffs inside a firm this result would be trivial if the firm s only instruments were court enforceable contracts it is impossible by definition for such contracts to replicate payoffs that were noncontractible in a spot market our contribution is to show that this result also applies to relational contracts i e self enforcing agreements in repeated games to establish this result we follow sanford grossman and oliver hart 1986 hart and john moore 1990 and hart 1995 hereafter referred to collectively as ghm in using asset ownership to determine whether a particular transaction is inside a firm and hmt in adding court enforceable contracts to asset ownership models we also draw on our own work baker et al 2001 to model relational contracts the resulting model is the first we know of that simultaneously analyzes asset ownership courtenforceable contracts and relational contracts

formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms evidence from technology development projects formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment alternatively when firms expect to interact repeatedly relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs however as we now know from a growing body of theoretical and empirical work the resulting intuition that relational mechanisms will be substituted for formal ones whenever possible does not generally hold the extent to which firms substitute relational mechanisms for formal ones in the presence of repeated interaction is an empirical question that forms the basis of this paper we study a sample of 52 joint technology development contracts in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries and devise a coding scheme to allow empirical comparison of contract terms counter to the above intuition but consistent with recent research we find that a firm s contracts are more detailed and more likely to include penalties when it engages in frequent deals whether with the same or different partners our results suggest complementarity between formal and relational contracts and have implications for optimal contracting particularly in high technology sectors

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

the performance consequences of ambidexterity in strategic alliance formations empirical investigation and computational theorizing although alliance studies have generally favored an ambidextrous approach between exploration and exploitation they tend to overlook a firm s characteristics its industry constraints or the dynamic network in which the firm is embedded this study examines the ambidexterity hypothesis and its boundary conditions with a unique research method we not only analyze empirical data from five u s industries spanning eight years but also expand theoretical insights to the network level by building a computer simulation model both our empirical and simulation results reveal the contingencies of the ambidexterity hypothesis in alliance formation our findings show that although an ambidextrous formation of alliances benefits large firms a focused formation of either exploratory or exploitative alliances benefits small firms in an uncertain environment an ambidextrous formation enhances firm performance but so does a focused formation in a stable environment finally the simulation model demonstrates that a firm s centrality and structural hole positions in network relations can moderate the relationships between alliance formation choices and firm performance and that the ambidexterity hypothesis may be limited to the earlier stage of the network our study provides critical evidence into the viability of adopting a dynamic network perspective in understanding the ambidexterity hypothesis and advancing strategic alliance research beyond static and dyadic levels