strategic export policy with foreign direct investment and import substitution abstract the paper examines discretionary and strategic foreign direct investment fdi incentives in the export sector relative to a non interventionist policy the analysis is based on a two country model with both countries seeking to attract fdi countries differ in cost levels and in their levels of tariff protection on intermediate inputs a shift in the trade policy regime toward the strategic promotion of exports results in a decrease in fdi allocated to the low cost country when it has a low level of protection on intermediate inputs and an increase in fdi when it has a high level of protection on intermediates inputs furthermore even if fdi increases with export policy activism relative to non intervention welfare may be lower

the competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures abstract antitrust authorities should consider the trade off between enhanced efficiency and reduced competition in cases of partial ownership this paper examines the competitive effects side of that trade off in the context of a modified cournot model we show that in markets where entry is difficult partial ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise even if the ownership shares are relatively small these effects arise solely because these arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors producing a positive correlation among their profits in this sense the effects are purely structural they arise not because of increased opportunities for collusion or changes in the concentration of control but because the linking of profits reduces each firm s incentive to compete since these links internalize free rider problems associated with policing collusion and investing in entry deterrence however they could also enhance cartel stability and profitability

demand for local public spending evidence from the british social attitudes survey the british social attitudes survey bsas is a uk wide survey that provides a rich source of information on individuals attitudes to a variety of topics including locally provided service in this paper we seek to model answers to questions on attitudes to local authority spending which invite the expression of a private demand for local public spending a convincing picture has emerged of locally provided public goods as imperfectly congested public goods with a price elastic and probably income inelastic demand the view that central government grants may induce voter confusion over tax prices of public services also finds support

foreign equity participation under incomplete information abstract this paper demonstrates how an interaction between ownership rules and trade policy provides a rationale for a host government to impose local equity requirement ler on a foreign multinational it presents a model where in the presence of an import tariff ler can serve as an effective instrument for a host government in removing any incentive for the multinational to mimic an inefficient firm when the government does not have complete information on the cost of the multinational s foreign unit it is shown that the ler can increase national welfare by removing possible distortions under incomplete information it is also shown that product market competition lowers the ler

national ownership requirements and transfer pricing abstract this paper examines the interaction between a national ownership requirement and transfer pricing it turns out that where indigenization implies managerial control by domestic owners it may result in greater retained profits and a more intensive use of domestic resources

intellectual property rights and the governance of international r d partnerships this paper studies the degree to which country differences in intellectual property rights protection affect the choice of companies for a particular mode of international inter firm r d partnering it focuses on the preference of companies for either an equity joint venture or a contractual partnership we find that international differences in intellectual property rights protection are a significant factor with less secure protection firms choose r d joint ventures rather than contractual partnerships the level of technological change in industries has an inverse effect on the preference for international r d joint ventures

a dynamic model of voter behavior and the demand for public goods among social groups in great britain abstract a dynamic model of voter behavior is discussed explaining transitions in party choice by imputed party responsibilities with respect to public and private consumption possibilities the model uses a group framework to explicitly describe voter interests it allows for an estimation of the relative preference for public goods as determined by the revealed preference mechanism of voting the model is compared to popularity functions in their general form an empirical application to great britain is presented it appears that retired individuals have the highest relative preferences for public goods followed by housewives men manual workers self employed and non manual workers

east west joint ventures and buyback contracts abstract contractual joint ventures cjvs and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that socialist countries use to attract foreign investment in this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs the model stresses the incentive problems involved when a socialist host country which does not allow foreign direct investment uses a cjv to obtain the fruits of some knowledge based production process from a multinational enterprise

the economics of joint ventures in less developed countries the paper examines the microeconomic partial equilibrium behavior of joint ventures established between transnational corporations and domestic partners in less developed countries it focuses on issues relating to resource allocation and profit distribution under various institutional scenarios the analysis places special emphasis on the role of bargaining power transfer pricing stock ownership and profit shares of the parties and the responsiveness of joint ventures to national development goals some of the results apply to wholly owned subsidiaries of transnational corporations local firms and licensing arrangements which emerge as special cases

host country policy transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures a theoretical analysis abstract this paper develops a simple model of an international joint venture in which the ownership shares are endogenously determined as the outcome of nash bargaining between a multinational firm and a host firm it shows how tax subsidy policy by the host country s government and transfer pricing of inputs by the multinational firm may influence the equity distribution of the joint venture insofar as the optimal level of these policies is dependent on the primitives the model generates empirical hypotheses regarding the impact of the primitives on the equity distribution

transactional characteristics institutional environment and joint venture contracts this study examines how transactional characteristics and the institutional environment influence contractual governance for international joint ventures ijvs unlike previous studies that view joint venture contractual governance as a unidimensional construct clause specificity thus causing a debate upon whether ijv contracts should be more specific contractual governance herein is defined as a three dimensional construct that includes the extent to which contractual terms are clearly specified term specificity possible contingencies are accounted for contingency adaptability and joint venture parties are legally bound to the contract contractual obligatoriness our analysis of ijvs in china suggests that term specificity and contractual obligatoriness increase when the proprietariness of resources to be invested in the ijv or the incompleteness of the host country s legal system increase contractual obligatoriness appears to be an increasing function of economic exposure and environmental volatility whereas contingency adaptability in a contract rises when interparty dependency investment uncertainty and knowledge proprietariness intensify or when environmental hazards escalate these results suggest that an ijv contract if structured multidimensionally as above can curtail opportunism and guide venture evolution at the same time these contractual dimensions should not be prefixed but properly aligned with transactional and institutional characteristics this alignment has strong implications in reducing transaction costs and spurring ijv evolution in the complex and volatile institutional environment

revealed preferences for public goods applying a model of voter behavior most analyses of preferences for government supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society these preferences are revealed by an individual choice the vote in this paper this is taken account of in a model explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi party system the model assumes that voters may be categorized into k groups of individuals pursuing the same interests who remember how parties do in representing these interests given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy the model allows one to estimate party identification sensitiveness to economic performances time preference and relative preferences for public versus private goods all for each of the groups furthermore the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies

public goods an exercise in calibration this paper considers a measure of the publicness of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending at the limit all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good thus any differences between an individual s self interest preferences and public interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision but only on differences in the individual s public and self interest utility functions if we rule out the latter self interest and public interest preferences for a pure public good are identical using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods

does economic integration cause foreign direct investment the authors analyze the effect of economic integration on oligopolists international trade and foreign direct investment activities using a three country three firm model increased country size leads to dispersed foreign direct investment while improved market accessibility leads to export platform foreign direct investment increased intraregional market accessibility prompts outside firms to invest in the regional bloc reducing product prices profits of intrabloc firms and increasing total surplus integrating economies are more likely to gain from improving intraregional market accessibility than from tougher external trade policy and may wish to offer investment incentives to encourage foreign direct investment by outside firms copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multiparty cooperation and performance in international equity joint ventures previous studies have examined the relationship between cooperation and performance in international equity joint ventures ejvs mostly at the partner level this study revisits the issue at multiple levels and considers vertical and horizontal cooperation among the foreign partners the local partner and the venture management team the study also examines how goal incongruence between partners and market uncertainty affect the tripartite relationships between cooperation and performance the test results show a strong positive impact of cooperation between partners on performance as perceived both by the partners and by the venture management team one partner s cooperation with the venture management team is perceived favorably by that party but not necessarily by the other party unless both partners share the same goal market uncertainty requires stronger cooperation at all levels to improve performance in ejvs

a theory of joint venture life cycles abstract in this paper we provide a dynamic theory of joint venture life cycle that relies on synergy organisational learning and moral hazard we demonstrate that depending on parameter values the outcome may involve any one of the following stable joint venture formation joint venture formation followed by breakdown or cournot competition in all the periods we also provide some interesting welfare results

are wholly foreign owned enterprises better than joint ventures abstract this paper provides a general equilibrium model for examining the individual as well as the joint effects of export requirements and local equity controls of multinational firms the results suggest that for a small open economy under tariff protection the desirable policy is 100 foreign ownership of subsidiaries coupled with an export share requirement

rationalizing public private joint ventures in an open economy abstract this paper analyzes the problem of foreign investment in a less developed country where the threat of expropriation leads necessarily to withholding of technological knowledge of the foreign firm in a dynamic model it is shown that if the political authority of the host country shares the investment chances are high that the multinational will be willing in such a venture sharing of investments by the political authority serves as credible precommitment against future nationalization

a non monotonic relationship between fdi and trade this paper presents a non monotonic relationship between foreign direct investment and trade based on the idea that although fdi eliminates trade costs on the final good the investing firm has to bear increased trade costs on an intermediate good

an economic theory of the open shop trade union there has been significant interest recently both in the empirical investigation of the determinants of trade union membership in the u k and elsewhere and in the theoretical analysis of the economic effects of the closed shop trade union however there is little rigorous microeconomic explanation of union membership which is relevant for much of the u k and similar labour markets where the open shop union is prevalent this paper attempts to overcome the free rider problem of explaining union membership in the open shop we argue that both private pecuniary gains and social influences affect the individuals union membership decisions citing evidence in support of these basic assumptions we show that stable intermediate union density is a possible equilibrium outcome in a generalised social custom model we also analyse the simultaneous determination of wages and union membership deriving a number of comparative static results in particular we find that both wages and union density depend upon inter alia the level of strike pay the net cost of union membership and the individual s sensitivity to social custom and associated solidarity effects we argue that the approach is consistent with various stylised facts concerning both wage bargaining and union membership and is able to explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of union membership

the nonexcludable publicness of primary and secondary public education abstract existing theoretical models of education as with most practical applications of public good theory suggest some form of joint public private financing empirical work has only rarely addressed these theoretical considerations employing individual level observations we model and estimate the private and social demands for public education in a community an ordered probit model with known thresholds is used to obtain unique parameter estimates the individual private and social demands are then employed to construct a measure of the publicness of education at various quantities

the impact of congestion on local public good production abstract this paper models local public goods production where allocation of the publicly provided input occurs simultaneously with production of the final service output the framework models local public goods as developed in club theory where congestion is an increasing function of population central to identification of the model is that the quantities of the input police are differentiated from the produced output safety estimation is across neighborhoods within a single city the results show there is a very low elasticity of congestion on average but safety in some neighborhoods in more congested than private goods

fertility regulation in an economic crisis abstractsubstantial international aid is spent reducing the cost of contraception in developing countries as part of a larger effort to reduce global fertility and increase investment per child worldwide the importance for fertility behaviors of keeping contraceptive prices low however remains unclear targeting of subsidies and insufficient price variation have hindered prior attempts to estimate the effect of monetary and nonmonetary contraceptive costs on fertility behavior using longitudinal survey data from the indonesia family life survey we exploit dramatic variation in prices and incomes that was induced by the economic crisis in the late 1990s to pin down the effect of contraceptive availability and costs as well as household resources on contraceptive use and method choice the results are unambiguous monetary costs of contraceptives and levels of family economic resources have a very small and well determined impact on contraceptive use and choice of method

tariff jumping and joint ventures it is well known that high tariffs tend to induce foreign direct investment fdi by encouraging the investors to jump the tariff wall this paper examines the economic interaction among tariffs fdi and international joint ventures ijv we show that in the presence of a strong local competitor even if opening a fully owned subsidiary is not profitable to a foreign firm the foreign firm may still enter the host country market through ijv however ijv is not profitable for sufficiently high tariff rates hence we argue that liberal trade policies may attract foreign investments through the formation of joint ventures

contraceptive supply and fertility outcomes evidence from ghana abstracttotal fertility rates in sub saharan africa are nearly double that of any other region in the world some argue that providing contraceptives has only a negligibly small impact on fertility i exploit exogenous temporary reductions in contraceptive supply in ghana resulting from cuts in us funding to examine impacts on pregnancy abortion and births women are unable to fully compensate for the 10 16 supply reduction using traditional methods for preventing pregnancy which increases by 10 only nonpoor women offset these unwanted pregnancies with induced abortion using separate data i find that poor women experience increases in realized fertility of 7 10

evaluating the effects of optimally distributed public programs child health and family planning interventions this paper develops and tests an optimizing model determining the distribution of family planning and health subsidies across heterogeneous households and assesses the biases in cross area estimates of the health effects of such subsidies due to public resource optimization the model incorporates both health externalities and the endogenous response of the size of the recipient population to program subsidies longitudinal data describing child health and publicly provided family planning and health programs in 20 barrios in laguna province in the philippines are used to estimate the effects of such programs on child health and the relationships between the distribution of the programs and preprogram health levels the impact of a program on a particular childs health status is viewed as dependent upon the childs length of exposure to the program a basic feature of the model is the presence of health externalities which is shown to be sufficient along with plausible features of household behavior to make selective subsidization of fertility control either alone or in combination with health investment subsidies pareto efficient the model suggests that subsidization of fertility control is likely to be pareto efficient in the presence of health or human capital externalities when human capital and family size are gross substitutes and or when any per child human capital subsidies may substitute for direct subsidies to health investment and an equalizing distribution of the subsidies the highest family planning subsidies to the lowest health recipient households is efficient when both health and family planning subsidies are used fertility control subsidies minimize the subsidy burden for donors and are highest when total subsidy expenditures per child are greatest