control rights in complex partnerships this paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership that is a partnership which produces impure public goods we show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors the parties valuations of the goods produced and the degree of impurity of these goods when the degree of impurity is large control rights should be given to the main investor irrespective of preference considerations there are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party s investment is more important than the other party s if the parties investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low valuation party if the importance of the parties investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small the low valuation party should receive sole authority we analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible we check for robustness of our results in several dimensions such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships including those involving schools and child custody jel d02 o23 h41 l31

rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

regulation of multiagent research and development this article focuses on the regulation problems raised by two specific characteristics of research and development first it is normally desirable that several units pursue the same goal and second that only the best of the final products made by these units is worthwhile to society when firms have private information these characteristics are seen to generate a substitution effect which in some situations implies that the resources allocated to r d under asymmetric information are excessive relative to the full information allocation i thus identify asymmetric information as one possible source of excessive allocations to research and development

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams abstract this paper considers a team or partnership where the partners effort levels enter as strict complements in the production function the existence of a linear budget balancing sharing mechanism is demonstrated which implements the team s efficient outcome as a nash equilibrium this result is in contrast to a result derived in holmstrom 1982

optimal sales force diversification and group incentive payments in this research we show that the interaction between territory allocation and sales force compensation two key drivers of sales productivity strongly affects the firm s profitability we analyze an agency theoretic model that jointly considers the degree of negative or positive correlation across territory outcomes differences in territories sales potentials the agency problem with risk averse salespeople and the availability of both own territory compensation elements such as commission and elements dependent on the performance of others such as group commissions or tournaments we find that allocating salespeople to negatively correlated sales territories beneficially diversifies each salesperson s portfolio of sales outcomes when this allocation includes a group commission pay component and can improve profitability even with a decrease in average territory sales performance in a larger sales force a balanced allocation of salespeople coupled with a group commission dominates an imbalanced allocation comparing piece rate compensation with or without a group commission component to tournaments alongside the allocation problem we find that tournaments are favored over piece rate plans when territories are highly positively correlated territory sales potentials are similar and salespeople have a low disutility for effort and are not very risk averse a piece rate plan conversely dominates a tournament when these conditions are reversed

dynamic production teams with strategic behavior abstract we analyze if intergenerational teams reveal workers productivities some uncertainty on agents productivities persists when i each agent must work independently or ii technological shocks are agent specific in compulsory teams however when technological shocks are team specific in compulsory teams each worker s productivity is revealed when agents choose to work independently or in teams that problem falls in the class of dynamic games elective teams are preferred by high productivity young workers when the technological shocks are agent specific and maximize the expected utility of a young worker when shocks are team specific

nonpoint pollution control inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats abstract this paper develops an economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre specified environmental goal we show that such a policy can be designed to induce cost minimizing abatement without actually imposing the tax because the threat of imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance thus the combined policy approach can not only be more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach but can also be less costly than a pure ambient tax approach however whether the cost minimizing choices are a unique equilibrium or not depends on the design of the tax policy and whether or not it can be applied retroactively all results still hold if the background threat takes the form of a reducing in government subsidies

the effect of child support policies on visitations and transfers recent research on child support issues has been concerned with normative problems involvingthe distribution of welfare between divorced parents and their children as well as with the assess ment of the behavioral responses of parents to child support orders and custody arrangements see e g del boca and flinn 1995 gar nkel and klawitter 1990 bartfeldt and gar nkel 1996 del boca 1996 del boca and ribero 1998 and flinn 2000 while there is bynow an extensive literature analyzing the e ects of child support policies on monetary transfersof noncustodial parents and the extent of compliance with child support orders little researchhas been done on the relationship between monetary transfers between parents and the divisionof the child s time while income transfers to the custodial parent are no doubt importantfor the child s consumption and general well being there exists considerable empirical evidencesuggesting that the division of the child s time between the parents has important e ects on thechild s welfare beller and graham 1993 there have been few analyses of this relationship weiss and willis 1985 provide one theoretical motivation for the positive relationship betweenthe noncustodial parent s contact time with the child and their level of transfers they claimthat increased contact time allows better monitoring of the custodial parent s expenditures onthe child which induces higher levels of transfers to the custodial parent we have developed a model del boca and ribero 1999 in which visitations and childsupport are the outcomes of a negotiation process whereby the father exchanges income forvisitation time institutional agents such as judges state legislatures etc can impact thewelfareofthemembersofthenonintactfamilybyalteringtheendowmentsofeachofthe1

rationalizing child support decisions the authors provide a framework within which the child support compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and the child support awards set by institutional agents can be coherently interpreted the model of child support transfers is able to capture qualitatively the features of the monthly payment distribution estimated parental decision rules are used to infer the implicit weights given by institutional agents to the postdivorce welfare of parents and children the authors find that the weight attached to the combined welfare of the custodial mother and child is significantly less than the weight given to the father s welfare in most sample cases copyright 1995 by american economic association

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

intra household allocation of resources inferences from non resident fathers child support payments a large proportion of divorced and separated fathers form new partnerships the new partner s preferences are not likely to put much weight on expenditures on the man s children from his previous union thus his own and his partner s income would have different impacts on his child support payments if partners relative incomes affect bargaining power in household decisions this article exploits within father variation in the british household panel survey 1991 2005 to estimate the impacts of the intra household income distribution on child support payments and the father s welfare we find that a higher share of father s income in household income increases the probability of paying child support and its amount relative to household income

parental responses to child support obligations evidence from administrative data abstract we study parental responses to child support obligations using rich administrative data from denmark and variation in the child support formula we estimate that a 1000 dkk 160 increase in a father s obligation is associated with a 273 dkk 45 increase in his payment a higher obligation reduces father child co residence pointing to substitution between financial and non pecuniary investments further obligations increase post separation fertility among remarried fathers but have no impacts on maternal fertility or either parent s labor supply our findings suggest that government efforts to increase child investments through mandates on parents can be complicated by their behavioral responses to them

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining abstract in this paper we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer where inter buyer resale cannot be prohibited the resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers we fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions surprisingly in this optimal mechanism the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in the resale market the seller sells only to the publicly known buyer and reveals no additional information to the resale market the possibility of resale causes the seller to sometimes hold back the object which under our setup is never optimal if resale is prohibited we find that the seller s revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer s bargaining power in the resale market when the publicly known buyer has full bargaining power myerson s optimal revenue is achieved when the publicly known buyer has no bargaining power a conditionally efficient mechanism prevails

single moms and deadbeat dads the role of earnings marriage market conditions and preference heterogeneity why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers why is this behavior more common among blacks than whites we estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage employment fertility and child support decisions we consider the extent to which low earnings marriage market conditions and preference heterogeneity explain nonmarital childbearing deadbeat fatherhood and racial differences in these outcomes we find the black white earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences whereas marriage market conditions are less important

moral hazard and optimal contract form for r d cooperation abstract this paper aims to explain the use of different governance modes for r d cooperation we argue that ex ante cross licensing agreements are preferred to r d joint ventures if potential synergy effects are negligible and the double moral hazard problem caused by unobservable r d effort can be solved by an appropriate royalty scheme it is shown that the first best effort decisions are implementable by a cross licensing agreement if royalty payments are based on r d success however if the payments have to be based on actual know how transfer because r d success is not verifiable there are cases where joint ventures are necessary to induce optimal r d effort

divorce risk wages and working wives a quantitative life cycle analysis of female labour force participation this article develops a quantitative life cycle model to study the increase in married women s labour force participation lfp we calibrate the model to match key life cycle statistics for the 1935 cohort and use it to assess the changed environment faced by the 1955 cohort we find that a higher divorce probability and changes in wage structure are each able to explain a large proportion of the lfp increase higher divorce risk increases lfp not because the latter contributes to higher marital assets or greater labour market experience however instead it is the result of conflicting spousal preferences towards the adjustment of marital consumption in the face of increased divorce risk the dramatic increase in the second half of the twentieth century in married women s labour force participation lfp has given rise to a large and growing literature that explores the roles of the multiple forces that led to this evolution some explanations have emphasised technological change in the household greenwood et al 2005 or in medical contraceptive technology goldin and katz 2002 albanesi and olivetti 2009a b knowles 2007 other explanations have emphasised changes in the wage

optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture abstract we analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free riding problem between the members of an rjv assuming that government intervention is subject to an additional adverse selection problem caused by its inability to distinguish the value of the potential innovation although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms free riding problem they imply different social losses if the government is not able to distinguish perfectly the value of the potential innovation the advantage of monitoring tools relative to subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the government can obtain about firms r d performance

the impact of china s economic reforms on agricultural productivity growth this paper presents a method for assessing the relative importance of price increases and strengthened individual incentives due to the introduction of the responsibility system for the post 1978 increase in china s agricultural productivity data on post 1978 chinese agricultural performance suggest that a little over three quarters of the measured productivity increase is due to payment system changes and the remainder to price increases we also use our method to calculate incentive indices giving an estimate of the fraction of their marginal product that peasants received under the pre 1978 regime

the effects of optimism bias in teams this article imports a behavioural perspective into a team context to study the effort coordination problem among agents specifically we investigate how the presence of optimism bias impacts the severity of the free rider problem the organizational structure of the team and the compensation contracts offered to agents in equilibrium the results indicate that all agents become more reluctant to exert effort and the team welfare decreases when some of its agents are optimistic suggesting that optimism aggravates the free rider problem in teams appointing a team leader makes all agents work harder and the team benefits more by having the optimistic agent as its leader these findings are in sharp contrast to the effects of overconfidence as identified in the literature it is advisable to pay the optimistic agents less than the rational agents encouragingly optimistic agents can learn about their own bias in the long run leaving their team without too much detriment of optimism

child support and partnership dissolution this article studies the determinants of partnership dissolution and focuses on the role of child support we exploit the variation in child support liabilities and entitlements driven in part by the introduction of a new set of complex rules that determined child support liability in the uk and by their interaction with welfare rules our panel has the virtue that the post 1993 variation in child support liability for all couples in partnerships formed prior to 1993 is unanticipated we find strong evidence that the resulting large child support liabilities significantly reduced dissolution risks

asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams abstract we investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent

yours mine and ours do divorce laws affect the intertemporal behavior of married couples divorce laws establish spouses individual property rights over household resources and determine when divorce is allowed this paper examines how such laws inuence the intertemporal behavior and the welfare of u s married couples i build a model of household choice about consumption labor supply and divorce under multiple divorce law regimes and i estimate it using exogenous variation in u s divorce laws from the 1970s to the 1990s couples responded to equal division of property and unilateral divorce by increasing tangible assets up to 19 which suggests the presence of a strong income eect for the primary earner and by reducing female employment by over 5 percentage points because the threat of divorce granted additional bargaining power to married woman the bargaining weight of women implied by these responses in the model corresponds to a third of the weight of men this indicates that equal division of assets beneted women when it was

incentives and the structure of teams abstract this paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams we show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology second we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard we find that i even when the production technology is strongly complementary the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams ii as the degree of complementarity increases the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative solely due to the need to provide incentives

welfare child support and strategic behavior do high orders and low disregards discourage child support awards qualitative research has documented strategic behavior in response to child support policy parents of children on welfare have an incentive to avoid formal child support since most states limit the amount of formal child support that women on welfare can receive the disregard and have relatively high child support orders for low income fathers this pa per develops a simple model to make several predictions about how the disregard and order might interact to influence formal child support or ders using data from the cps css merged with state child support vari ables i find some evidence that higher orders and lower disregards are associated with fewer child support orders

optimal contracts for teams in a team subject to both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed optimal contracts are under certain conditions linear in the team s output the outcome is the same whether the principal observes just the total output or each individual s contribution thus monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by team members instead the role of monitoring is to discipline the monitor production is a collective enterprise by workers in a firm or firms in a joint venture the synergy that is the reason for the team s existence may mean that an individual s contribution to the team s output is not distinguishable so that it is impossible to pay him according to his own productivity how should the principal remunerate the team members so as to maximize his own profit in this paper we analyze incentives in teams with asymmetric information both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed directly holmstrom 1982 showed that in a team model with moral hazard the principal can ensure an outcome arbitrarily close to the full information ideal by using a contract that punishes each team member arbitrarily severely whenever team output falls below some target however this seems to be an unrealistically drastic way of solving the moral hazard problem in our model we in effect prevent the principal from using such a contract by introducing adverse selection in addition to moral hazard and by assuming that ability and effort interact in such a way that the principal is unable to disentangle an agent s effort from his ability under the assumption that the principal and the team members are risk neutral we shall show that the principal can implement his information constrained optimum simply by offering each agent a payment linear in the team s output although the essential feature of our analysis is the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard this result can be understood by first considering the special case in which the agents abilities are common knowledge in this case the moral hazard problem can be completely solved the principal can do as well as he

the effects of in work benefit reform in britain on couples theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of the working families tax credit wftc on couples in britain we develop a simple model of household decisions which explicitly accounts for the role played by the tax and benefit system its main implications are then tested using panel data from the british household panel survey collected between 1991 and 2002 overall the financial incentives of the reform had negligible effects on a wide range of married mothers decisions such as eligible working at least 16 hours per week and full time employment working at least 30 hours per week employment transitions childcare use and divorce rates women s responses however were highly heterogeneous depending on their partners labour supply and earnings mothers married to low income men showed larger responses in employment especially if they had younger children they were more likely to remain in the labour force and had higher rates at which they entered it while more likely to receive the tax credit they also experienced a greater risk of divorce we find virtually no effect for women with higher income husbands likewise there are no statistically significant responses among married men

group decision making theory and behavior under performance based water quality payments abstract two theoretical models explaining group allocation decisions under watershed level performance based payments are explored i reward and penalize individual contributors and ii reduce the problem with cost sharing and cooperative abatement under model i an optimal amount of pollution from individual contributors can be achieved with proper payment incentive and group allocation formula model ii represents a cost effective solution to pollution reduction where the group optimizes its return from group payments but does not necessarily achieve an optimal level of pollution field experiment observations support farmer behavior closer to model ii

unilateral divorce the decreasing gender gap and married women s labor force participation married women s labor force participation lfp increased dramatically in the united states between the 1940 and 1960 cohort the two cohorts lived under different divorce regimes unilateral divorce rather than mutual consent the 1960 cohort also had a lower gender wage gap we use a quantitative dynamic life cycle model of endogenous marital status calibrated to key statistics for the 1940 cohort to study the effects of these two changes we find that both drivers combined are able to account for over 50 percent of the increase in married women s lfp and also generate large movements in marriage and divorce rates

the moral hazard of budget breaking it has recently been suggested in the agency literature that moral hazard in teams can be dealt with by introducing a third party who breaks the budget balancing constraint and that this facilitates the design of contracts that can sustain the pareto optimum as a perfect nash equilibrium this note offers an explanation for why the use of budget breaking schemes is not so widespread as that of active monitoring despite the fact that such schemes would save the resources expended on supervision the note demonstrates that allowing the budget to be broken introduces the potential for moral hazard on the part of the third party which could render the proposed equilibrium incredible

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

personality traits intra household allocation and the gender wage gap abstract a model of how personality traits affect household time and resource allocation decisions and wages is developed and estimated in the model households choose between two behavioral modes cooperative or noncooperative spouses receive wage offers and allocate time to supplying labor market hours and to producing a public good personality traits measured by the so called big five traits can affect household bargaining weights and wage offers model parameters are estimated by simulated method of moments using the household income and labor dynamics in australia hilda data personality traits are found to be important determinants of household bargaining weights and of wage offers and to have substantial implications for understanding the sources of gender wage disparities

deregulation and quality abstract this paper analyses within a static model the effect of quality concern on optimal market structure it focuses on cases where industry quality has public good like features and is not contractible it is shown that the introduction of competition raises a free rider problem which depresses quality the smaller producer free rides on its competitor investment which as a result underinvests to encourage the efficient producer to provide quality the regulator diminishes the market share of the opportunistic producer and chooses more often a monopoly however when quality is verifiable the introduction of competition entails no welfare loss whether the regulator observes total quality outcome or individual contributions

a theory of the optimal cost barrier to corporate takeovers this paper characterizes financial and employment contracts in the presence of both worker moral hazard and the threat of opportunistic takeovers firms in which worker efforts or specific investments are of greater importance are shown to exhibit a greater degree of deferred compensation supported by governance structures that allow managers to resist hostile takeovers more vigorously this effect is most pronounced in firms where workers pay for their job by accepting low wages early in their careers firms in which large deferred payments cannot be offset by low starting wages will offer less resistance to a hostile bidder copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

testing among models of intrahousehold resource allocation households are the locus for much economic decision making households function as producers investors in human and physical capital managers of risk and as consumers many resources are allocated within households and the effects of many policies depend on the dynamics of household decision making for example household decisions about allocating food among individual household members may determine who benefits from programs to improve health nutrition or welfare in many microeconomic studies the household is treated as an individual for analytical purposes in other words it is assumed that a household acts as a single entity with a single set of preferences recently however a number of economists have recognized that households are sites of conflict as well as cooperation and have begun to use new classes of models to explain how resources are allocated among household members this literature has especially improved our understanding of households in which income is not completely pooled in such a setting standard household models may offer misleading conclusions about the effects of policies on individual household members i this paper goes beyond recent surveys of intrahousehold issue by explicitly examining the assumptions predictions and empirical implications of different intrahousehold models in particular it analyzes empirical tests that distinguish among competing models by clarifying the similarities and differences among alternative models this paper also clarifies what has actually been demonstrated and what has not been demonstrated by previous empirical studies in so doing the paper points to specific topics in need of further research this paper is organized as follows section 2 analyzes the assumptions and predictions of each of the five main classes of intrahousehold resource allocation models section 3 describes empirical tests of these assumptions along with an analysis of empirical work that has been generated sections 4 and 5 discuss the questions that remain unanswered and directions for future research

can adequate child support be legislated responses to guidelines and enforcement i introduction in response to the high levels of poverty faced by children of divorced parents federal and state governments adopted a number of policies during the 1980s aimed at increasing child support awards and payments these laws required all states to have numerical child support guidelines to be used by parents who could not agree on their own and to increase state enforcement of delinquent child support awards implicit in much of the policy discussion about divorce is the assumption that within marriage parents will jointly act in the best interest of their children but that after divorce children may not be adequately provided for and legislative action is required in the extreme this view is represented by the stereotype of the deadbeat dad a term that describes a father who doesn t care enough about his children to continue any involvement with them either in terms of time or money similarly economic models often assume a noncooperative outcome in which the non custodial father will not provide what he did during marriage e g weiss and willis 1985 our article makes several contributions to the literature on the determinants of child support by absent fathers in contrast to almost all of the work on this topic that has been based on noncooperative models we develop a theoretical model in which some families may be able to achieve a cooperative outcome which increases the total resources available to children in particular our model identifies three different types of outcomes 1 cooperative and self enforcing 2 noncooperative and self enforcing and 3 noncooperative and state enforced each of these outcomes has different implications for the well being of children and for the level of government involvement in divorce settlements we then derive the conditions under which families can achieve each of these outcomes and we specifically model how policy variables affect whether or not a particular outcome is achieved the levels of payments and levels of compliance conditional on the type of outcome our empirical work provides reduced fo rm evidence that is consistent with a model that distinguishes these different types of outcomes and we find that policies can affect the type of outcome as well as the level of child support awards and payments section ii of this article provides background and motivations for our topic we develop a general theoretical framework in section iii and compare outcomes under assumptions of symmetric versus asymmetric information section iv incorporates the legal environment by modeling the impact of guidelines and state enforcement efforts on the probability the custodial parent cp will impose the guidelines the level of child support awards and the noncustodial parent s ncp s compliance in section v we interpret comparative statics section vi examines the determinants of reduced form models of the probability of a court ordered child support award and shows that the predictions of the model are consistent with data on the characteristics of divorce settlements and parental behavior for those with voluntary versus court ordered settlements a summary of the findings and policy implications concludes ii background and motivation in contrast to the marriage literature which predominately uses cooperative bargaining models the literature on divorce generally assumes that divorcing parents are unable to reach cooperative agreements for example weiss and willis 1985 model parental expenditures on children after divorce as a principal agent problem in which the absent father cannot verify the child expenditures made by the mother this problem of asymmetric information leads to an inefficient noncooperative outcome del boca and flinn 1995 also use a noncooperative model to examine the government s choice of compliance outcomes others have analyzed compliance with child support awards using an economics of crime framework beron 1988 beller and graham 1991 chambers 1979

start ups venture capitalists and the capital gains tax a model of start up finance with double moral hazard is proposed entrepreneurs have ideas and technical competence but lack own resources as well as commercial experience venture capitalists vcs provide start up finance and managerial support both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm s success but neither type s effort is verifiable we find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low entrepreneurial effort and venture capital support in this situation the capital gains tax is particularly harmful the introduction of a small tax impairs effort and advice and leads to a first order welfare loss several other policies towards venture capital and start up entrepreneurship are also investigated

the good the bad and the civil society abstract there are three signature features of autocracies first there is a wide variety across autocracies in terms of economic performance some do much better and some much worse than democracies second economic performance of a given autocracy is more sensitive to leader quality and exhibits higher volatility third all autocracies good or bad tend to have weaker civil societies than democracies do we attribute these features to the core of the autocratic political institution the incumbent leader selects the future leader as opposed to citizens at large selecting the future leader under democracy we deliver our analysis in an overlapping generations model where two kinds of dynamic free riding problems arise the first arises among different generations of citizens in implementing far sighted policies political leaders come in two types good ones aim to correct this first kind of dynamic free riding problem while bad ones do not care and only aim to steal public assets both types need a weak civil society to achieve their goals but a second dynamic free riding problem arises among different leaders when it comes to weakening the civil society the autocratic leader selection mechanism helps resolve this second dynamic free riding problem results in a continuously weakened civil society and generates large variations of economic performances both within a given autocracy and across different autocracies a rich set of comparative statics is derived

divorce and the cognitive achievement of children children of divorced parents exhibit lower test scores and educational attainment have these correlations a causal interpretation parents who divorce may be less likely to invest in their children while together or they may divorce to shield their children from the effects of marital conflict i study the relationship between children s achievement and the marital status of their parents within a dynamic framework in which partners decide on whether to remain married how to interact with or without conflict and child investments i then assess whether a child whose parents divorced would have been better off had divorce not occurred

a stackelberg model of child support and welfare this article models the child support and welfare decisions of never married parents on welfare as a stackelberg game the mother chooses whether to exit welfare report paternity and to obtain a formal child support order if a child support order is obtained the father chooses whether to comply with the order simulation results from the structural parameters indicate that increasing the child support disregard increases paternal compliance slightly and affects maternal paternity reporting more significantly effects are limited however by low paternal incomes results also indicate that high award amounts can decrease expected child support payments to women on welfare

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

child support welfare dependency and poverty female headed families have among the highest poverty rates of any major demographic group in the united states the purpose of this paperis to investigate empirically the effectiveness of current child support enforcement policies and to determine their role in reducing poverty and welfare dependency a special supplement to the april 1982 current population survey provides the data for the analysis the results indicate that child support enforce ment may represent an effective means for re ducing welfare program costs but isunlikely to have a dramatic effect on either welfare de pendency or poverty copyright 1986 by american economic association

transfers to households with children and child development in this paper we utilize a model of household investments in the development of children to explore the impact of various transfer policies on the distribution of child outcomes we develop a cost criterion that can be used to compare the cost effectiveness of unrestricted restricted and conditional cash transfer systems and find that an optimally chosen conditional cash transfer program is the most cost efficient way to attain any given gain in average child quality we explore several design elements for the conditional cash transfer system and discuss the role of production function uncertainty and measurement error

optimal contracts for teams a note on the results of mcafee and mcmillan in a team subject to adverse selection and moral hazard r p mcafee and j macmillan 1991 found surprisingly that under certain conditions the outcome is unaffected whether the principal observes only total output or whether the principal can observe each person s individual contribution to the production of the output this leads mcafee and macmillan to conclude that the purpose of monitoring is to discipline the monitor however when team members are risk averse the principal can benefit by monitoring copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

project characteristics incentives and team production we develop a model to show how agency conflicts free rider effects and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers incentive contracts team size increases with project risk decreases with profitability and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output our predictions are consistent with empirical evidence that firm specific risk has increased over time average corporate earnings have declined and firms organizational structures have also flattened the predicted effects of monitoring costs on team size are supported by evidence that improvements in information technology likely to lower monitoring costs lead to larger teams further firms with relatively more intangible assets where monitoring costs are likely to be higher are smaller optimal incentive intensities decrease with risk and increase with profitability the endogenous determination of team size accentuates the positive effects of a decline in risk and an increase in profitability on incentives

regulating multiple polluters deterrence and liability allocation we conisicler regulation of multiple polluters when inidividual emissions are uniobservable the tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms to isolate the effect of increasinig the niumber of polluters we compare an industiy consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm contrary to previous findings both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection abstract team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations combined with team incentives team production can create externalities among workers since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team s performance and therefore on their colleagues productivity we study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity we find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be pareto efficient separation of workers according to their productivity we further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence where under a particular condition on workers indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence