group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

rural financial markets in low income countries recent controversies and lessons abstract recently some researchers have criticized traditional agricultural credit policies in low income countries this article identifies the major points of controversy between traditional views and these new views and also summarizes the primary lessons learned from these controversies savings mobilization more flexible interest rate policies less loan targeting and greater emphasis on improving the quality of financial services in rural areas are new views that are emphasized

informal credit markets in india informal financial markets those which are not regulated or monitored by the banking authorities account for much of business credit in developing countries these unregulated informal credit markets icm are important both in their own right as part of each country s financial system and because of their reciprocal relations with growing enterprises and the regulated financial sector in order to study the operations of some of these markets in detail in urban commercial settings we conducted an extended survey of some of the informal credit markets of india 2 based in some cases on centuries of operation these markets proved to be important in the functioning of the contemporary economy indigenous style bankers belonging to particular ethnic communities and castes formerly provided the full range of banking services to their clients 3 with the rise of modern western style banking the indigenous bankers either have transformed themselves to serve sectors such as wholesale trade not well served by the modern sector or provide services which the modern bankers cannot provide though any estimate is very approximate it seems that informal credit markets account for as much as 20 of commercial credit outstanding in the various markets surveyed we began by surveying the gujeratis some of whom still practice their traditional form of full service banking in their homeland of gujerat and adjoining bombay the shikarpuris or multanis originally full service bankers in sind who now provide commercial credit in various other centers the chettiars in south india the rastogis in uttar pradesh and the marwaris especially in eastern india 4 but our surveys revealed that a wide range of ethnic groups were now involved in informal credit markets and the more meaningful differentiations

the use of village agents in rural credit delivery using a simple principal agent model this article examines the incentive problems that arise when a formal financial institution such as a rural bank utilises a member of the rural community to act as an agent in screening potential borrowers and collecting repayment optimal compensation schemes are derived for the agent and their implications are discussed in addition i show that the norms and rules that govern village life may aid the financial institution by helping to constrain possible strategic behaviour by the agent

moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment abstract this paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and costly peer monitoring we compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring we find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring in the absence of monitoring cost differences however lending monitoring and repayment behavior is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes within group lending contrary to theoretical predictions simultaneous and sequential lending rules provide equivalent empirical performance

the design of successful rural financial intermediaries evidence from indonesia abstract the success outreach and sustainability of eight rural financial intermediation systems in indonesia in profitably reaching large numbers of small individual clients is explained in terms of organizational design networks of semiautonomous units use local information and contract enforcement mechanisms to lower transaction costs reflecting basic concerns with institutional and financial viability elements of mechanism design have included compatible incentives such as performance based compensations profit sharing collection fees efficiency wages equivalent to quasi equity and system monitoring managerial discretion over transactions conducted at market terms policies to protect portfolio value and no dependency creating subsidies are important interventions have been appropriate for the problem at hand

examining the distributional effects of military service on earnings a test of initial dominance existing empirical evidence suggests that the effects of vietnam veteran status on earnings in the decade and a half following service may be concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution motivated by this evidence we develop a formal statistical procedure that is specifically designed to test for lower tail dominance in the distributions of earnings when applied to the same data as in previous studies the test reveals that the distribution of earnings for veterans is indeed dominated by the distribution of earnings for nonveterans up to 12 600 in 1978 dollars thereby indicating that there was higher social welfare and lower poverty experienced by nonveterans in the decade and a half following military service

modeling the length and shape of the r d lag an application to uk agricultural productivity this article updates total factor productivity tfp growth in uk agriculture from 1953 2005 and shows that public and private research and returns to scale explain tfp cointegration and causality tests are used to investigate the validity of attempts to explain uk agricultural productivity with r d and related technology variables then the length and shape of the lag structures are modeled and compared with the structures that are commonly imposed on the data the rates of return ror to r d using the data determined lags differ considerably from those obtained by imposing lag shapes these comparisons show that the ror to public r d are sensitive to the lag shape as well as its length and that the omission of other technology variables such as mechanical and chemical patents pertaining to agriculture and farm size can bias the ror

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory this article presents evidence of the failure of government intervention in rural credit markets of ldcs in the past three decades it then shows how lessons for policy analysis can be drawn from modern theory particularly those theories focussing on credit rationing in competitive markets and interlinking of credit contracts with labor and land contracts the article outlines the policy implications of these theories and finds them insufficient to account for the empirical evidence it contends that a more systematic and rigorous analysis of institutions and institutional environments is essential for understanding and implementing effective policy reforms of rural credit markets it presents suggestions for undertaking such an analysis

designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro poor microfinance institutions abstract credit agents in microfinance institutions mfis must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the mfi s objectives we show that while giving incentives has no cost in for profit mfis it is costly in pro poor mfis when repayment and wealth are positively correlated a pro poor mfi cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment it then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives when audit costs are large pro poor mfis may have to forego selection on wealth and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations driven by donor concerns with mission drift away from the poor audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of mfis we show that introducing pro poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents

subjectivity in credit allocation to micro entrepreneurs evidence from brazil this paper estimates the impact of loan officer subjectivity on microcredit granting by exploiting an exceptionally detailed database from a brazilian microfinance institution the loan officers collect field data meet with applicants and make recommendations to the credit committee which has the final say on both loan approval and loan size ls the loan officer s subjectivity is captured through gender bias our estimations indeed show subjective gender gap in ls this gap is almost exclusively attributable to loan officers we interpret this finding as evidence that despite monitoring and wage incentivization microcredit officers let their subjective preferences interfere with loan granting we conclude by suggesting alternative means to curb subjectivity in credit allocation to micro entrepreneurs

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

a critique of traditional agricultural credit projects and policies abstract authors critique the results assumptions and policies commonly associated with agricultural credit projects in low income countries a summary of new views on these projects is present these views emphasize voluntary savings mobilization and positive real rates of interest several explanations are given for why few of these new views have been adopted by policymakers

interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural india in an attempt to expand rural credit and displace the village moneylender india created a system of rural cooperatives in the 1950s and expanded branch banking into rural areas in the 1970s this article examines how these measures affected the rural market it begins with the question of how large the expansion of institutional credit has been and the extent to which it has dislodged the village and nonresident moneylenders a detailed comparison of three major surveys of the indian rural credit market suggests that in various guises the moneylender is still a major source of loans the article also examines the weak evidence on intermediation between the formal and informal sectors a formal model of the interaction between the informal moneylender and institutional lender is constructed under a variety of assumptions about the exclusivity of loan contracts and the competitive structure of the informal sector the conclusions are drawn together in the form of five proposals for public policy