the supply and demand side impacts of credit market information abstract we utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes a guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it one year later we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender this pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game the credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones increasing economic differentiation

is the efficiency wage efficient the social norm and organizational corruption the effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption we model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem we find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect the snowball effect which intensifies the corruption effect this intensified effect due to the snowballing character of social norms may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm jel classification d82 j41

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

cheating in contests i introduction competition to win the rewards attendant to ranking first in a contest motivates effort or performance by agents in all manner of tasks of course competition is also often valued for its own sake as well as for eliciting output from the contestants as evidenced by the popularity of activities as diverse as sports poker tournaments singing contests and the plethora of reality television programs featuring a contest to be the last contestant standing at the end of the season virtually every contest is characterized by rules sometimes implicit regarding acceptable and unacceptable behavior executives within a firm compete for promotion based on their performance but accounting fraud violation of government regulations or simply unprofessional or unethical business conduct unacceptable to the firm may disqualify an individual athletes may cheat by using performance enhancing drugs or banned equipment e g a corked baseball bat firms in a rent seeking contest may go beyond legal forms of buying political influence lobbying to unacceptable bribery wherever competition motivates a desirable activity or productive effort it may also motivate undesirable and therefore prohibited behavior that is cheating that the organizer of the contest must attempt to police if enforcement is sufficiently costly and imperfect cheating will play a role in this article we model cheating behavior in a symmetric rank order tournament contest we ask how the degree of cheating responds to the parameters of the tournament e g the payoff spread the distribution of the random component of output the probability of being caught cheating and the number of contestants and we identify how particular aspects of the design of contests affect cheating since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others a large body of literature has modeled the incentives of agents in contests or rank order tournaments the distinguishing features of these models are that contestants are compensated based on the rank of their output compared with others rather than the level of output compensation levels or prizes are set in advance and output or rank is determined by a combination of costly effort and random noise the somewhat distinct literature on all pay auctions differs in that no random component contributes to the outcome and therefore equilibrium behavior may be characterized by mixed strategies see e g baye kovenock and de vries 1996 baye and hoppe 2003 discuss the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games which are all essentially contests in which each player expends resources in an attempt to win a prize however to our knowledge there have been only limited efforts discussed below to model contestants incentives to cheat in models of contests in our model cheating is deterred through a random audit or inspection process cheating increases a contestant s output but the more a contestant cheats the more likely his cheating will be detected in the event an audit occurs many of the results of our model are quite intuitive the extent of cheating decreases as the probability of detection grows the degree of the randomness increases or the penalty if caught cheating increases however several results are surprising we find that although increasing monitoring intensity drives down the level of cheating it may decrease productive effort in the contest this occurs because effort falls if it becomes more likely that the effort will not determine the outcome and when monitoring is increased from a low level this increases the probability that the outcome of the contest is determined by disqualification we find that the level of cheating is reduced when a contestant can win by default that is if the discovery of cheating on the part of the contestant who finished first results in the next highest ranking contestant winning by default the incentive to cheat is weaker than if no prize is awarded when the top ranked contestant is found to have cheated

how responsible is a region for its carbon emissions an empirical general equilibrium analysis targets for co2 reduction tend to be set in terms of the amount of pollution generated within the borders of a given region or nation that is under a production accounting principle however in recent years there has been increased public and policy interest in the notion of a carbon footprint or the amount of pollution generated globally to serve final consumption demand within a region or nation that is switching focus to a consumption accounting principle however this paper argues that a potential issue arising from the increasing focus on consumption based carbon footprint type measures is that while regional co2 generation embodied in export production is attributed outside of the region i e to the carbon footprints of other regions nations regional consumers are likely to benefit from such production moreover where there is a geographical and supply chain gap between producers and final consumers it may be difficult to identify precisely whose carbon footprint emissions should be allocated to

the dispersion of employees wage increases and firm performance previous studies examining intra firm wage dispersion and firm performance have focused on wage levels the authors of this study argue that for purposes of comparing wage dispersion s positive inc

rewards to academia the remuneration of vice chancellors and principals this paper models the financial remuneration to vice chancellors and principals at uk higher education institutions after describing the alternative theoretical underpinnings for the determination of pay an earnings function is estimated utilizing institutional and personal characteristics the model suggests only a partial linkage of managerial and performance related indicators to remuneration levels this suggests substantial scope for reorientation of rewards towards such indicators rather than relying on an efficiency wage this would appear particularly appropriate given the present and continued disclosure of this information together with the increased focus on performance indicators relating to teaching and research within the uk higher education sector

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

incentives for helping on the job theory and evidence recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers performance through helping efforts this article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation the model is tested with australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups the evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced while individual efforts are increased when promotion incentives are strong piece rates and profit sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

the index of sustainable economic welfare isew as an alternative to gdp in measuring economic welfare the results of the austrian revised isew calculation 1955 1992 abstract although the inadequacy of gdp to measure economic welfare is widely accepted theoretically it is still used as the key indicator for economic policy this article s aim therefore is to give some empirical evidence to the theoretical critique economic welfare or at least its change over time is estimated by the index of sustainable economic welfare isew which takes account of gdp unpaid household labor social costs environmental damage and income distribution the concept of the isew which was originally developed by herman daly and john cobb is entirely reformulated with special regard to questions of inner consistency and clarity in structure as an illustration the methods of the calculation in the austria case study and its results are presented the main result is that gdp and economic welfare as measured by the isew differ significantly up until the 1970s gdp only slightly overestimated the growth of economic welfare but since then it has been completely misleading while gdp continues to rise sustainable economic welfare has been stagnating since the middle of the 1980s the main causes have been growing future welfare reductions increasing income inequality and a stagnation in the value of unpaid household labor as gdp neglects those aspects it systematically misinterprets economic welfare however the isew does not intend to simply replace gdp as a unique welfare measure but should form part of a more holistic social reporting system

competition between and within teams abstract we consider the effect of team size the observability of effort and the competitiveness of the team s environment in determining team members allocations of effort between team oriented and selfish efforts

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

the genuine progress indicator methodological developments and results from australia abstract this paper is a contribution to the continuing development of the methods and results for the index of sustainable economic welfare also known as the genuine progress indicator gpi it attempts a more systematic approach to some of the components of the gpi it includes a more careful specification of types of capital and more plausible methods of estimating the costs of depletion of non renewable resources and environmental damage due to ozone depletion in addition the paper attempts a more comprehensive treatment of the value of time including the costs of unemployment and overwork results of the gpi calculations for australia over the period 1950 1996 are presented and analysed

incentives and wage rigidity with the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect that is they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall this paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

an index of sustainable economic welfare isew for chile abstract chile has experienced a period of strong economic growth the gross domestic product gdp has doubled in the past 12 years however income inequality remains relatively the same as in the 1960s the economic growth is primarily attributed to the exports of natural resources which accounts for 80 of total exports however the gdp fails to account for the loss of natural capital and non marketed services the objective of this paper is to more clearly indicate the status of the chilean economy in terms of welfare using the index of sustainable economic welfare isew designed by daly and cobb 1989 the isew provides corrections to the gdp that includes income inequalities household labor and damage to natural capital this index has been applied in several case studies for developed countries in general the results show that isew runs parallel with gdp until the 1970s when a decline in welfare occurs due to a loss in natural capital this study is the first attempt to utilize the isew for the purpose of analyzing whether or not similar trends exist for chile a developing country the isew for chile grew at a much slower annual rate over the past 30 years compared with gdp 0 16 vs 2 9 the chilean isew parallels the gdp until the 1980s a decline in the isew then occurs showing that chile is not on a sustainable path and that there is a strong link between economic growth and the depletion of natural resources

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

credit information systems in less developed countries a test with microfinance in guatemala abstract increases in formal sector lending among the poor have created a need for credit information systems that provide potential lenders with borrower information in this article we present fixed effects estimations that attempt to measure the effect of a newly implemented credit information system in guatemala our results indicate that improved screening effects from the system caused the level of portfolio arrears to decline approximately 2 percentage points after it was implemented in branch offices we observe an even more substantial and significant effect of the information system in reducing late payments that occur during the loan cycle

cheating and enforcement in asymmetric rank order tournaments author affiliation c jill stowe department of agricultural economics and department of economics university of kentucky 307 c e barnhart building lexington ky 40506 0276 usa jill stowe uky edu corresponding author scott m gilpatric department of economics university of tennessee 520 stokely management center knoxville tn 37996 usa sgilpatr utk edu acknowledgment the authors would like to thank participants at the tournaments contests and relative performance evaluation march 2008 meetings the fuqua summer brown bag series leslie marx luca rigotti and anonymous referees for helpful comments all remaining errors of course are our own gilpatric received support from the u s environmental protection agency epa which provided funding for this research under star grant r832847 the research has not been subjected to epa review and therefore does not necessarily reflect the views of the agency and no official endorsement should be inferred 1 introductionamong the many issues surrounding incentives to cheat in rank order tournaments and contestants behavior when cheating is possible one of the most important is the effect of asymmetry in the position of the contestants if two contestants are competing for a prize but one has an advantage over the other such as greater ability or talent or simply being ahead because of the history of play up to that point in the contest will the trailing player necessarily be more likely to cheat because he needs to close the gap and has less to lose from possible disqualification might there be circumstances under which the leader cheats to maintain her advantage because if she does not the trailing player can close the gap by cheating this article presents a model to provide insights into how positional concerns influence cheating in rank order tournaments 1rank order tournaments present an environment in which the incentive to cheat may be particularly strong for a few reasons 2 first tournaments are generally used in environments in which actions are difficult to monitor second a small increase in a contestant s output can dramatically change his payoff if it increases his rank cheating in various forms has been observed in important competitive settings such as corporate promotion tournaments and sports competitions which can be broadly characterized as taking place in contests and can be modeled as rank order tournaments of the sort first introduced by lazear and rosen 1981 in this article we consider a game in which two heterogenous players simply choose whether or not to cheat this can be thought of as the final stage of a tournament in which players have previously chosen effort and now find themselves having an opportunity to cheat while knowing their current position relative to each other or it can be considered as the final round of a multistage tournament in which one player is ahead of the other entering the last phase of competition our focus is on how equilibrium cheating behavior is affected by varying the intensity of enforcement represented by the probability that contestants are audited to detect cheating and on the conditions required to achieve complete deterrence of cheating and thus a clean contest consistent with intuition we find that the trailing player has a strong incentive to cheat but in some circumstances it is the leading player who is more likely to cheat in addition we explore how differences in the auditing regime affect cheating behavior we find that employing correlated audits both contestants are audited simultaneously with some probability and otherwise neither is yields less frequent cheating in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game than if the two contestants are audited with an equal probability but as a result of independent random draws using a correlated audit regime achieves more effective deterrence of cheating than independent audits for any given expenditure of resources when resources are not sufficient to achieve full deterrence

in kind finance a theory of trade credit it is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash therefore suppliers may lend more liberally than banks this simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets the model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes among other things the model explains why trade credit has short maturity why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms

lying to level the playing field why people may dishonestly help or hurt others to create equity unethical and dishonest behavior has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines recent work has begun to focus on a previous overlooked factor predicting dishonest behavior the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts in two laboratory experiments we manipulate the level of resources allocated to our participants their wealth and investigate whether perceived inequity from wealth that is randomly or subjectively assigned leads individuals to cross ethical boundaries through helping or hurting others the results show that dishonest behavior is influenced by positive and negative inequity that motivates helping and hurting acts furthermore a third experiment shows that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

productivity shocks and repayment behavior in rural credit markets a framed field experiment improving rural credit markets requires a good understanding of the root causes of market failures and taking necessary steps to address them this paper investigates the role of productivity shocks in borrowers repayment choices using a framed field experiment that simulated a repeated interaction in an input credit market the analysis finds strong evidence that negative productivity shocks lead to higher default even when they do not induce negative returns this relationship is robust to the presence of an information exchange system enforcing dynamic incentives the findings suggest that recurrent agricultural production shocks resulting from the negative effects of climate change could exacerbate failures in rural credit markets undermining hard won progress toward rural financial inclusion

intra generational equity and sustainable welfare a time series analysis for the uk and sweden this paper discusses the importance of intra generational equity to sustainable development it outlines a number of methodologies for measuring income inequality in the economy and presents several possible ways of incorporating the impact of distributional effects into measures of welfare in the economy the authors highlight in particular an index developed by atkinson atkinson a b 1970 distributive politics and economic growth q j econ may 465 490 based on the social welfare model this method possesses two main advantages over other methods firstly it is expressed directly in terms of social well being secondly value judgements incorporated into the measure are made explicit through the parameter o which expresses society s degree of aversion to income inequality the paper calculates the value of the atkinson index for two case study countries sweden and the uk between 1950 and 1996 for a central estimate of o0 8 the results show that the welfare loss due to inequalities in the distribution of income varied between 5 and 10 for sweden and between 6 and 14 for the uk with the higher values coming towards the end of the period the paper explores the sensitivity of these results to changes in the value of o for the case of the uk and discusses the relevance of the work to the measurement of sustainable welfare 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

managerial objectives capital structure and the provision of worker incentives worker incentive schemes are invariably assumed to be administered by an owner entrepreneur who has an incentive to understate worker performance after the event while tournaments can overcome this problem they discourage cooperation between workers we show that a professional manager concerned with equality between workers and with avoiding bankruptcy rather than maximizing shareholder wealth will conduct a tournament that preserves individual effort incentives while promoting cooperation between workers the theory predicts lower debt levels and more compressed pay scales as cooperation becomes more important in the limit this becomes a group bonus scheme supported by blue chip debt

monitoring motivation and management the determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation employees are rational cheaters who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs we investigate the rational cheater model by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism a significant fraction of employees behave as the rational cheater model predicts a substantial proportion of employees however do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate this heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer jel d2 j2 l2 l8 m12

winning isn t everything corruption in sumo wrestling although the theoretical literature on corruption is well developed empirical work in this area has lagged because it has proven difficult to isolate corrupt behavior in the data in this paper we look for evidence of corruption in an unlikely place the highest echelons of japanese sumo wrestling this paper provides strong statistical evidence documenting match rigging in sumo wrestling a non linearity in the incentive structure of promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record and their opponents we show that wrestlers win a disproportionate share of the matches when they are on the margin increased effort can not explain the findings winning on the bubble is more frequent when the two competitors have met often in the past success on the bubble tends to rise over the course of a wrestler s career but declines in his last year consistent with the game theoretic predictions wrestlers who are victorious when on the bubble lose more frequently than would be expected the next time they meet that opponent suggesting that part of the payment for throwing a match is future payment in kind systematic differences across wrestling stables suggest that the stables play a role in facilitating the corruption in times of increased media scrutiny the match rigging disappears this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

piece rate contracts for other regarding workers when workers are paid with piece rates inequality arises naturally we consider workers who care about income comparisons and are either status seeking or inequality averse we identify circumstances under which inequality attitudes lead workers to exert more effort than they would otherwise and also circumstances under which workers inequality attitudes lead firms to set lower piece rates than they would otherwise the key behavioral assumption for both of these results to hold when workers are identical is behindness aversion the property that changes in inequality matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead jel d01 j33 m52

here today gone tomorrow can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible this paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives in the form of access to additional loans to discourage borrowers from strategic default or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized we propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions mfis by endogenizing the default penalty while constraining the mfi to maintain sustainable lending operations furthermore accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock we show that under certain circumstances the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

rigging elections with violence in most developing countries even today political parties spend a substantial fraction of their resources in attracting voters through ideological exhortation as well as force in this paper we present a model of political contest between two parties that compete in two distinct arenas though the goal of the contest in both arenas is the same to garner more political support in the first which we call ideological the contest involves no use of force in the second which we call conflictual party activists use violence either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their favor or restrain them from voting we show that a party with lower initial political support will resort to more political violence ceteris paribus and as the fraction of undecided voters goes up elections will tend to be less conflictual we also show that if there is an incumbency advantage then the resources devoted to creating political unrest increase in equilibrium and political competition is more violent we also provide some historic and journalistic evidence that supports our results

developing approaches to measuring and monitoring sustainable development in wales a review munday m and roberts a 2006 developing approaches to measuring and monitoring sustainable development in wales a review regional studies 40 534 535 under the 1998 government of wales act the welsh assembly government committed to the promotion of sustainable development in the exercise of its functions the paper examines a selection of approaches that are being explored in wales to monitor and measure progress towards sustainable development objectives these approaches are the ecological footprint the index of sustainable economic welfare the environmental satellite account and environmental input output tables the paper shows that in wales there are problems with each of the approaches outlined but that development of an environmental satellite account could be useful with this approach linked to the other approaches reviewed and with the satellite account enabling environmental factors to be connected more readily to conventional regional accounting aggregates the findings are expecte

responsibility for regional waste generation a single region extended input output analysis for wales this paper uses a regional input output framework and data derived on waste generation by industry to examine different aspects of regional waste accountability in addition to estimating a series of industry output waste coefficients the paper considers a series of methods for waste attribution from production and consumption perspectives in particular it considers a method that permits a greater focus on regional private and public final consumption as the main exogenous driver of waste generation in doing so it uses a domestic technology assumption to consider a regional waste footprint where local consumption requirements are assumed to be met using production technologies over which regional authorities are likely to have more control

union relative wage effects a survey of macro estimates this paper surveys union wage effect estimates drawn from empirical cross section wage equations fitted to macro aggregated data in 34 post 1963 studies containing such equations each estimate is the partial derivative of the dependent wage variable in logarithmic units with respect to the extent of unionism fraction unionized variable in the equation this paper shows that these estimates contain a mixture in uncertain ratio of the union nonunion wage differential or wage gap on the one hand and an extent of unionism effect on the other therefore the macro estimates should not be interpreted as wage gap estimates

why zero tolerance of misconduct is undesirable in contests competition can foster misconduct in any circumstance where the organizer of a contest cannot perfectly monitor contestants actions or when doing so is prohibitively costly although misconduct comprises all actions that are contrary to the interest of the organizer it is not necessarily the case that it is optimal to prohibit all such behavior in this paper we determine the equilibrium level of misconduct chosen by players in a symmetric rank order tournament between two competitors in which the organizer tolerates some level of misconduct in addition to showing that zero tolerance may not minimize the level of misconduct in equilibrium we show that there exists a range of tolerated misconduct where a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists with players cheating i e misconduct above the tolerated level with some probability when the gain from misconduct is uncertain and unknown the contest organizer faces a tradeoff tolerating more misconduct will reduce such behavior when the state of temptation is high but increase it when temptation is low jel j33 k42

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

the value of relationships evidence from a supply shock to kenyan rose exports this paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation in the context of the kenyan rose export sector a model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and tested a seller s reputation is defined by buyer s beliefs about seller s reliability we show that i due to lack of enforcement the volume of trade is constrained by the value of the relationship ii the value of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship and iii during an exogenous negative supply shock deliveries are an inverted u shaped function of relationship s age models exclusively focusing on enforcement or insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence jel d86 f14 l14 o13 o19 q17 imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real life commercial transactions in the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on informal mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance e g johnson mcmillan and woodruff 2002 greif 2005 fafchamps 2010 among those mechanisms long term relationships based on trust or reputation are perhaps the most widely studied and have received substantial theoretical attention the theoretical literature has developed a variety of models that capture salient features of real life relationships e g enforcement problems e g macleod and malcomson 1989 baker gibbons and murphy 1994 baker gibbons and murphy 2002 levin

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

on the methodology of isew gpi and related measures some constructive suggestions and some doubt on the threshold hypothesis existing country studies of the index of sustainable economic welfare isew the genuine progress indicator gpi and related measures while sharing the same basic methodological approach differ with respect to the valuation of important items this paper provides a critical but constructive discussion of the various methods used for the valuation of non renewable resource depletion and long term environmental damage and for the weighting of consumption expenditures for income inequalities several recommendations are given on how to improve the methodology for future updates of existing studies or for the construction of new measures sensitivity analysis shows that if these recommendations are followed for the valuation of resource depletion and long term environmental damage then the so called threshold hypothesis which seems to have gained empirical support from all studies undertaken so far fails to materialise this suggests that as far as factors related to the environment are concerned the widening gap between isew and gpi on the one hand and gross national product gnp on the other might be an artefact of highly contestable methodological assumptions 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

cleaning house the impact of information technology monitoring on employee theft and productivity this paper examines how firm investments in technology based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity we use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology it product we use difference in differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of it monitoring on theft and productivity we find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover we examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result economic and cognitive multitasking fairness based motivation and perceived increases of general oversight the observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip based earnings of workers our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives