premuneration values and investments in matching markets we analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus the agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus mailath postlewaite and samuelson 2013 showed that when investments are unobservable equilibrium investments are generally inecient in this paper we work with a more structured model that is suciently tractable to analyze the nature of the investment ineciencies we provide conditions under which investment is ineciently high or low and conditions under which changes in the pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus will be pareto improving as well as examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market aects investment eciency

price formation in a matching market with targeted offers abstract we model a market where the surpluses from seller buyer matches are heterogeneous but common knowledge price setting is synchronous with search buyers simultaneously make one personalized offer each to the seller of their choice with impatient players efficient coordination is not possible and both temporary and permanent mismatches occur nonetheless for patient players efficient matching with monopsony wages is an equilibrium the setting is inspired by a labor market for highly skilled workers such as the academic job market but it can be easily adapted to for example the housing market or internet advertising auctions

vertical integration market foreclosure and consumer welfare in the cable television industry i examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry i assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings prices and subscriptions and i compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets the results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions first integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators second vertical integration does not harm and may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains

the pre marital investment game abstract two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively the purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage the paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large it is shown that mixed nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much

wage formation in a centralized matching market it is natural to ask why the market for interns in the united states of america has to be cleared with a centralized matching procedure the nrmp and how this rationing procedure affects equilibrium wages this paper presents a model in which a market failure is caused by insufficiently differentiated wages the nrmp solves the problem but it enables the hospitals to extract more surplus from their interns than they could in an ideal competitive equilibrium it is demonstrated that this distortion causes welfare losses if the hospitals can substitute between physicians and interns copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

asymmetric contests with conditional investments rent seeking scenarios competitions for promotions and research and development r d races are examples of competitions in which participants expend resources regardless of whether they win or lose although similar in their all pay feature such competitions often differ in important dimensions these include the type of technologies employed in competition the type of asymmetries among competitors the degree to which expenditures are sunk and the number of prizes consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policymaker if expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital then it is reasonable to think of firms marginal cost of influence as linear but if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital its lobbying technology may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence due to the reputational advantage and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence due to the high costs of capital similarly the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs lobbying restrictions geographic location or preferential treatment by the policymaker further impact firms lobbying technologies inducing additional nonlinearities and asymmetries among firms in some lobbying settings firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome for example a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses thus the specification of firms lobbying technologies the type of asymmetries among firms the combination of unconditional and conditional investments and the number of eventual winners may change according to the lobbying setting studied the same is true for other competitions with an all pay feature in a competition for promotions workers often differ in their abilities experience and social skills more than one prize

decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries abstract in a shapley shubik assignment problem with a supermodular output matrix we consider games in which each firm makes a take it or leave it salary offer to one applicant and a match is made only when the offer is accepted by her we consider both one shot and multistage games in either game we show that there can be many equilibrium salary vectors which are higher or lower than the minimum competitive salary vector if we exclude artificial equilibria applicants equilibrium salary vectors are bounded above by the minimal competitive salary vector while firms equilibrium payoff vectors are bounded below by the payoff vector under the minimum competitive salary vector this suggests that adopting the minimum competitive salary vector as the equilibrium outcome in decentralized markets does not have a strong justification

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

the competitive impact of vertical integration by multiproduct firms we study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries to do so we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the us carbonated beverage industry while the elimination of double marginalization with vertical integration is normally characterized as procompetitive economic theory predicts that it may cause anticompetitive price increases in multiproduct industries we indeed find that vertical integration causes price decreases in products with eliminated double margins but price increases in the other products sold by the integrated firm these results provide new evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers

matching with contracts comment the theory of two sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and its relevance to the design of real world institutions the medical residency matching mecha nism in the united states the national resident matching program nrmp and student assign ment systems in new york city and boston are important mechanisms designed by economists using the theory 1 hatfield and paul r milgrom 2005 present a unified framework of matching with contracts which includes the two sided matching and package auction models as well as a simplified version of a labor market model of alexander kelso and vincent p crawford 1982 as special cases they introduce the substitutes condition of contracts which is an adaptation of the substitutability condition in the matching literature roth and marilda a oliveira sotomayor 1990 to matching with contracts they show that there exists a stable allocation if contracts are substitutes for hospitals and that a number of other results in matching generalize to problems with contracts they further claim that the substitutes condition on individual hospitals prefer ences is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable allocation for all possible singleton preferences of others that is if contracts are not substitutes for a hospital then there exists a preference profile of other hospitals with single job openings and doctors such that there exists no stable allocation we show that this last claim of hatfield and milgrom 2005 does not hold in general the counterexample we present involves a hospital which has two different kinds of positions and the preferences of the hospital are a combination of preferences of these two positions while the substitutes condition does not hold for that hospital we adopt a technique developed by bettina klaus and flip klijn 2005 and show that there exists a stable allocation we then present the weak substitutes condition which we show is necessary to guarantee existence of stable allocations the modified result we present as well as the original contribu tion of hatfield and milgrom 2005 suggest a connection between the substitutes condition and stability 2

optimal climate change adaptation and mitigation expenditures in environmentally small economies we study the optimal role of mitigation and adaptation strategies for environmentally small economies that is economies that are witnessing an exogenous increase in emissions to which they are contributing very little our results lead to three main conclusions first small economies should concentrate their environmental efforts if any on adaptation this is a recommendation based on cost effectiveness rather than on any idea about these economies indulging in free riding second environmentally small economies that are unable to spend enough on adaptation may end up spending less on mitigation in the long term owing to their impoverishment as a result of negative climate shocks third higher mitigation expenditures may arise not only as a result of greater optimal adaptation expenditures but also because of increased adaptation to the incentives for mitigation provided by richer countries for the simulations we use a calibrated optimal growth model for brazil chile and the united states

imperfect competition in two sided matching markets abstract this paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two sided matching market firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts to make the model tractable i use the azevedo and leshno 2013 framework in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers in equilibrium even if wages are exogenous and fixed firms have incentives to strategically reduce their capacity to increase the quality of their worker pool the intensity of incentives to reduce capacity is given by a simple formula analogous to the classic cournot model but depends on different moments of the distribution of preferences i compare markets with uniform and personalized wages for fixed quantities markets with personalized wages always yield higher efficiency than markets with uniform wages but may be less efficient if firms reduce capacity to avoid bidding too much for star workers

the distribution of talent across contests do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants to what extent do contestants avoid competition in this paper we show theoretically and empirically that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high ability contestants is sufficiently small as this proportion increases high ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases such that reverse sorting becomes a possibility we test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over twenty years we use exogenous variation in the participation of highly able competitors to provide empirical evidence for the relationship among prizes competition and sorting

computing business as usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality abstract computing the no policy equilibrium business as usual in a representative agent ra model is complicated by the presence of a pollution externality since simple optimization internalizes the pollution cost many researchers use ad hoc methods but there is no way to know how reliable these are a solution is presented in which the ra model is divided into n identical components each identified with its own sub agent sub agents play a dynamic game leading to a nash equilibrium for sufficiently large n this approach keeps most of the pollution cost external and in the limit it is equivalent to a myopic firms model in which the entire cost is external this approach has the advantage of theoretical consistency and empirical applications indicate that it is easily implemented

are there limits to growth a simple theoretical model of pollution is developed that generates an inverted u shape relationship between per capita income and environmental quality this model is then used to study long run growth the same inverted u shape is shown to appear in time series and the prospects for sustained growth are shown to hinge on whether increasingly strict environmental regulation is compatible with a constant rate of return on capital implementation is also studied tax and voucher schemes are shown to have an advantage over direct regulation because they provide the correct incentives for capital accumulation copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

estimating a war of attrition the case of the us movie theater industry this paper estimates the impact of competition and exogenous demand decline on the exit process of movie theaters in the us from 1950 1965 i modify fudenberg and tirole 1986 s model of exit in a duopoly with incomplete information to an oligopoly i estimate this model with panel data using variations in tv diusion across house holds and other market characteristics to identify the parameters in the theater s payo function and the distribution of unobservable exit values using the estimated model i show that theaters who are making negative pro ts may choose to remain in the market if they expect to outlast their competitors because at that point their pro ts would increase this creates a signi cant delay in the exit process in addition by decompos ing the across market variation in the exit process i nd that tv diusion explains a substantial proportion of the variation in the exit process

dress to impress brands as status symbols abstract we analyzed the market for indivisible pure status goods firms produce and sell different brands of pure status goods to a population that is willing to signal individual abilities to potential matches in another population individual status is determined by the most expensive status good one has there is a stratified equilibrium with a finite number of brands under constant tax rates a monopoly sells different brands to social classes of equal measure while in contestable markets social classes have decreasing measures under optimal taxation contestable markets have progressive tax rates while a monopoly faces an adequate flat tax rate to all brands in contrast with extant literature subsidies may be socially optimal depending on the parameters in both market structures

vertical mergers in multi product industries and edgeworth s paradox of taxation when a two product monopolist merges with one of its suppliers thus eliminating the double marginalization for one of its goods three qualitative effects on downstream prices can result the monopolist might 1 lower both prices 2 lower the price of the good for which the double marginalization is eliminated and raise the price of the other good or 3 raise both prices since some and even all prices can increase mergers of successive monopolists in multiproduct industries do not necessarily improve welfare this result differs from the single product case in which such mergers necessarily increase welfare copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

asymmetric all pay auctions with interdependent valuations abstract i show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two player all pay auction with a discrete signal structure correlated signals and interdependent valuations the proof is constructive and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics i also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced

innis lecture hedonic equilibrium this paper describes hedonic equilibrium and shows how and why the concept has to be modified when characteristics of traders on both sides of the market are endogenous cet article decrit l equilibre hedonique et montre comment et pourquoi le concept doit etre modifie quand les caracteristiques des agents des deux cotes du marche sont endogenes

efficiency of simultaneous search this paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity they observe firms wage postings before choosing where to apply owing to coordination frictions a firm may not receive any applications otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers it is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient walrasian outcome as application costs vanish even for nonnegligible application costs the entry of firms the search intensity and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

thanks for nothing not for profits and motivated agents we re examine the labor donation theory of not for profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them or that they dominate for profits in terms of welfare but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non profit form more attractive to managers we show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not for profit firms would be competed out by for profit firms therefore in the choice between not for profit and for profit provision other than incentive problems the distribution of rents between management and workers and consequently the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

matching and price competition we develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much implying little inefficiency furthermore the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed in light of our results we discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the national resident matching program

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers inference with limited data in this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared demand estimates are used to compute price cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed the purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non nested competing models the models considered are 1 a simple linear pricing model 2 a vertically integrated model and 3 a variety of alternative strategic supply scenarios that allow for collusion non linear pricing and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the u s the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain this is consistent with non linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers

matching and price competition comment the theory of two sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and relevance to real life applications the matching of medical residents and hospitals in the united states has been studied extensively by alvin e roth 1984 and others the national resident matching program nrmp the matching authority in the us hospital resident matching market runs a centralized matching mechanism that is a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm of david gale and lloyd s shapley 1962 redesigned by roth and elliott peranson 1999 a recent antitrust case against the nrmp charged that the centralized matching mechanism suppressed wages of residents although the lawsuit itself was dismissed it sparked discussion about the effect of centralized matching on wages and efficiency jeremy bulow and jonathan levin 2006 bl henceforth investigate a matching market with price competition where each firm can hire only one worker and show that a the average wage is lower b profit of each firm is higher c wages are more compressed and d the resulting matching is slightly less efficient in the presence of the matching mechanism than in any competitive equilibrium although bl declare we have chosen our assumptions for analytical simplicity and transparency not as the most realistic possible model of the residency match 654 these results were often interpreted as an argument against the nrmp and led to discussion about potential changes of the matching mechanism vincent p crawford forthcoming for instance proposes the flexible salary match in which hospitals are allowed to indicate several levels of possible wages and medical students are allowed to express preferences over pairs of hospitals and wages we show that conclusions a and b above do not necessarily hold when firms may hire more than one worker and the number of workers in different firms are different more specifically we present an example with multiple positions in which the average worker wage is higher in the equilibrium with the matching mechanism than in a competitive equilibrium and profit of each firm is lower in the equilibrium with the matching mechanism than in a competitive equilibrium our findings may explain why some of the results of bl disagree with empirical findings of muriel niederle and roth 2003 2004 who find little or no effect of the centralized matching on wages in some medical matching markets in the united states note that different firms hire different numbers of workers in many labor markets like the nrmp there are other reasons why the conclusions and policy implications of bl may not be applicable to markets like the nrmp for example a competitive equilibrium may not be a

economic engineering and the design of matching markets the contributions of alvin e roth alvin roth s research on and design of new economic systems has had a wide and large impact on human welfare from the matching of residents to medical programs to the assignment of students to schools to the manner in which kidneys are allocated to patients needing transplants this article discusses his important contributions to the understanding and improvement of matching markets highlighting roth s key roles in some of the most prominent successes of market design and the ascension of economic engineering

market power vertical integration and the wholesale price of gasoline this paper examines empirically the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices we use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in west coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals costs the research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices controlling for horizontal market structure cost shocks and trends we find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors input costs this suggests that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices

anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise the dominant firm s advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration a vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy the dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare improving vertical mergers copyright 1998 by american economic association

an empirical model of the medical match abstract this paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many to one matching market using only observed matches i use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression due to residents willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain on average at least 23 000 below the marginal product of labor therefore the match is not the likely cause of low salaries jel c78 i11 j31 j44 k21 l44