causality in mean and causality in variance within the international steam coal market abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the integration of the steam coal market the analysis of dependencies between mean rates of return of prices on the steam coal market and volatility spillover was conducted using weekly data from the period 04 01 2002 to 30 12 2011 the prices of the world s largest exporters and importers on the pacific and atlantic markets were chosen to analyse the dependencies the methodology was based on the tests from cheung and ng 1996 and hong 2001 which allow for the analysis of granger causality both in mean and in variance the analyses indicate that the dependence between participants is not the same the strongest links were observed between the pairs of participants from the same market that is either the atlantic market or the pacific market and the price of australian coal turned out to be the most important factor in shaping other prices on the pacific market on the atlantic market the coal prices in the amsterdam rotterdam antwerp ara ports and the richards bay port had the greatest influence on coal prices and were the granger cause of prices in the pacific region

market power versus regulatory power in the spanish electricity system 1973 1996 this study not only establishes that the institutional changes the change of political regime and economic changes the energy crisis that occurred during the 70s and 80s had an important effect on business strategies within the spanish electricity sector but above all it shows how the resulting regulatory model was not the product of any clearly defined plan on the part of the spanish authorities as the majority of authors seem to implicitly or explicitly maintain but rather it arose from the dialectical interaction between companies which resisted losing the power of the market and institutions which in order to define any medium term energy policy in the future european domestic electricity market required an increase in their regulatory power

the economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators party leaders and groups doing business with congressional committees the costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements the problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible as in congressional committees while legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees once an issue leaves a committee the costs of monitoring decline and leadership influence increases the absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain thus party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior however obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains

the impact of divided government on legislative production it seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the u s national government the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers the state level data set employed in this study is not so limited the results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30 nonetheless consistent with previous studies using national level data executive legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production the reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated additional hypotheses of interest are also tested including whether republican controlled legislative chambers are more conservative than democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their democratic counterparts

the globalization of steam coal markets and the role of logistics an empirical analysis abstract in this paper we provide a comprehensive multivariate cointegration analysis of three parts of the steam coal value chain export transport and import prices the analysis is based on a rich dataset of international coal prices in particular we combine data on steam coal prices with freight rates covering the period december 2001 until august 2009 at weekly frequency we then test whether the demand and supply side components of steam coal trade are consistently integrated with one another in addition export and import prices as well as freight rates for individual trading routes across regions and globally are combined we find evidence of significant yet incomplete integration we also find heterogeneous short term dynamics of individual markets furthermore we examine whether logistics enter coal price dynamics through transportation costs which are mainly determined by oil prices our results suggest that this is generally not the case

price and volatility spillovers across the international steam coal market we examine the degree of integration of the global steam coal market using a variety of measures we show that the australian market remains the dominant force in setting world coal prices followed by mozambique and south africa we find little evidence of asymmetric price and volatility transmission in fact most markets react to both positive and negative shocks in a symmetric manner the coal market displays a significant degree of integration although this effect varies over time while china provides a major source of volatility to the global coal market it is relatively insignificant in terms of price transmission

profitability and productivity changes in the korean electricity industry abstract the korean electricity industry saw significant changes following the reform in april 2001 until the last decade the industry was monopolized by the korea electric power corporation kepco a state owned vertically integrated company the 2001 reform divided kepco s power generation division into six power generation companies gencos with the aim of improving efficiency and introducing competition in the electricity industry in this study we used capital total factor productivity ktfp to analyze profit changes from fixed input capital and an index number profit decomposition inpd to examine the sources of the profit changes we investigate the industry thoroughly from three points of view the overall industry over time the power generation sector by company and the transmission and distribution sectors of the korea electric power corporation kepco next we measured how the profits from productivity growth were distributed to consumers fuel suppliers employees and company owners the results suggest that a more reasonable price system for both wholesale and consumer prices needs to be implemented prior to the privatization and deregulation of the korean electricity industry

reputational capital opportunism and self policing in legislatures this paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the house of representatives i create a measure of reputational trustworthiness based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the national election studies surveys i then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame duck foreign travel by exiting house incumbents within the context of a quasi experimental research design the analysis suggests that legislators may be self policed by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity urveys i then examine the extent to which such s derived from the national election studies

legislative organization of fiscal policy in the voluminous literature on fiscal policy there is little evidence about the impact of legislative organization on shaping fiscal decisions by comparing different organizations of committee structure to control tax and spending policies this article presents such evidence regarding spending we test whether the dispersion of spending authority among multiple committees creates a problem similar to that of the common pool using american state data we find that when only one committee has the authority to spend spending is restrained relative to when spending authority is balkanized regarding taxation we hypothesize that if a single committee controls not only all spending authority but also all taxation authority that committee will have more incentive to tax than a committee that does not control spending it can obtain the benefits of increased taxation more directly again this proposition is supported by evidence at the state level

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

searching for symptoms of political shirking congressional foreign travel despite the hypothesized propensity for shirking to marklegislative institutions the evidence is rather equivocal moreover most of the research has focused exclusively onlegislator voting thereby constraining whatevergeneralizations might emerge the purpose of this paper is tocontribute to the debate over the question of politicalshirking by extending the range of phenomena examined toinclude congressional foreign travel our analysis providesevidence that opportunism is a problem in congress we findthat last period problems have arisen in the area of foreigntravel and that increased scrutiny to the problem on the partof congress only shifted consumption patterns i e legislators began taking foreign junkets near but not at theend of their legislative careers not all foreign travelshould be construed as worthless junketing since there isstrong evidence that some foreign travel is related tomembers responsibilities on congressional committees

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

defining geographic coal markets using price data and shipments data abstract given the importance of coal in world energy supply an analysis of the relevant geographic market is essential for consumers producers as well as for competition policy the purpose of this paper is to define the relevant economic market for steam and coking coal and to test the hypothesis of single world markets for these coal products methodologically the paper relies on two different tests for defining markets using both shipments data and price data the results from both methods point in the same direction in the case of coking coal the results indicate that the market is essentially global in scope and also that the market has become more integrated over time the results for steam coal show that the market is more regional in scope and there exist no clear tendencies of increased integration over time one policy implication of the finding that the steam coal market is more regional in scope and thus that the market boundary is smaller than if the market would have been international is that a merger and acquisition in this market likely would have been of a more concern for antitrust authorities than the same activity on the coking coal market

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency in their comment subhash c ray and evangelia desli 1997 hereafter rd point out that the specification of the decomposition of the malmquist productivity index used by fare et al 1994 hereafter fgnz is not unique and propose and compute an alternative specification of that decomposition we will discuss additional decompositions at the end of this note but proceed here by comparing the rd decomposition with fgnz based on both conceptual and computational grounds rd provide a discussion of the overall malmquist productivity index including the important issue of when this index is equivalent to the traditional notion of total factor productivity tfp namely under the condition that the reference technology be consistent with constant returns to scale crs as they point out this will yield a measure of tfp even if the true underlying technology is not crs for example both rd and fgnz use the crs reference technology to compute overall malmquist productivity one of the key issues raised is the role of the underlying scale properties of the benchmark technologies used to define and compute both productivity and its components in particular two reference technologies are employed in both rd and fgnz what we refer to as crs and variable returns to scale vrs technologies by construction these technologies are nested the crs technology contains the vrs technology as in figure 1 in rd this nestedness provides the logical basis for our decomposition at a very intuitive level we would argue that these two benchmarks can be used to provide bounds on the underlying true but unknown technology 2 intuitively we see the vrs technology providing a type of convex inner approximation whereas the crs technology provides a type of convex outer approximation thus these two technologies provide alternative benchmarks they do not require that the data satisfy either crs or vrs another possible intuitive interpretation is that the crs captures a perhaps hypothetical long run and the vrs approximates the short run as a reference technology the crs technology has some very useful features for example it captures the notion of maximal

technical efficiency of french nuclear energy plants this article analyses the efficiency of french nuclear energy plants belonging to edf electricity of france from 2004 to 2008 with a dea data envelopment analysis model the convexity model is used to investigate the technical efficiency of a representative sample of nuclear plants the results indicated that some plants have undergone an improvement in technical efficiency while others have regressed in terms of technical efficiency policy implications related to the results are discussed

final voting in legislatures in representative democracies such as the united states legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process for example much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs ideological influences on congressional voting behavior in this approach the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups including the legislator s own preferences for wealth and ideology james kau and paul rubin 1979 joseph kalt and mark zupan 1984 sam peltzman 1985 missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence gary becker 1983 as such rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature in this paper we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control we seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing sequence and outcomes of such votes specifically we look at final floor voting in the u s congress the patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required the findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints in section i the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail the purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization rather it is to focus the reader s attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature empirical results including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills are reported in section ii the data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the u s house of representatives during the 96th and 98th congresses some concluding remarks are offered in section iii

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

state government expenditure determinants and tax revenue determinants revisited the primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes that the preferences of public officials and the decision processes used to act on those preferences matter state government data state only not state and local from 1980 1985 and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models a previous merrifield 1991 state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables but it was based only on 1985 data 49 observations the larger data set 147 observations including better data for some of the variables indicated that most of merrifield s 1991 findings are robust the state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis as well as the hypotheses about specific variables the expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants and comparisons with results published in the literature though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses

the competitive effects of resale price maintenance the competitive effects of resale price maintenance rpm are theoretically diverse rpm can cause allocation distortions or promote productive efficiencies in the distribution process moreover extant cross sectional empirical evidence is incapable of distinguishing among the potentially disparate effects of rpm this paper conducts hypothesis tests of the alternative theories of rpm the empirical framework relates estimates of the effects of rpm for a cross section of observations to necessary conditions of the alternative models this analysis indicates that rpm is used both to foster cartels and promote efficiencies in the distribution process this result is consistent with the growing body of case study analysis that suggests that rpm is used for a variety of reasons this result also questions the current per se illegal status of rpm in the antitrust laws evidence is also provided concerning the strategic interaction between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution process and the use of financial data in analyzing propositions in industrial organization

dynamic steam coal market integration evidence from rolling cointegration analysis abstract the aim of the paper is twofold first to assess the dynamics of the integration process of the international steam coal prices and second to investigate the changes in the roles of particular coal prices in this market in the light of changes in the structure of supply and demand the analysis is based on steam coal prices set by the largest world exporters and importers on both the atlantic and the pacific markets we use weekly data spanning from october 5 2001 to march 28 2014 the aim is achieved in two stages during the first one we use the rolling trace test to identify the integration of the steam coal market and during the second one we apply the rolling weak exogeneity test to determine the roles of the participants of the international steam coal market namely price setters and price takers our main findings can be summarized in two observations firstly the main world steam coal prices are integrated and during the period when freight costs are higher the coal market integration is weaker and when the costs are lower the integration is stronger secondly the role of particular coal prices is not stable in time generally price setters appear in the market which covers greater shares in the physical coal trade although indonesia and russia have a great share in the global export their prices remain price takers during the whole period as a consequence although russia remains the largest coal exporter of the steam coal to the european market it cannot dictate its prices in this market

efficiency analysis of hydroelectric generating plants a case study for portugal abstract this paper estimates changes in total productivity breaking this down into technically efficient change and technological change by means of data envelopment analysis dea applied to the hydroelectric energy generating plants of edp the portugal electricity company the aim of this procedure is to seek out those best practices that will lead to improved performance in the energy market we rank the plants according to their change in total productivity for the period 2001 2004 concluding that some plants experienced productivity growth while others experienced a decrease in productivity the implications arising from the study are that edp should adopt an internal benchmark management procedure in order to evaluate the relative position of each hydroelectric generating plant and to adopt managerial strategies designed to catch up with the frontier of best practices as the frontier is shifting along the time constant efforts are needed in this respect along the time

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

generating efficiency economic and environmental regulation of public and private electricity generators in spain abstract economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive based regulation such as price caps we focus on the effect of regulation as distinct from ownership and identify the effect of two different regulatory schemes on both publicly and privately owned spanish electricity generators publicly owned generators were more efficient under cost of service regulation private but not public firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency bringing their productivity to similar levels we introduce some novelty in modelling efficiency including three pollutants and declared plant availability as outputs and we test for the effect of environmental regulation in reducing pollutants

the evolution of hard coal trade in the pacific market abstract this article analyses the evolution of hard coal trade in the asia pacific region known as the pacific market from the 1980s to the present years it investigates the development of the trade pattern the nature of contracts the price setting the supply demand and the future of trade over the last two decades the international trade in the pacific market has achieved dramatic increases in coal commerce this achievement is due to strong demand in japan and north east asian countries and progressive coal export in australia and indonesia it is likely that this market will continue to expand and become a more important market in replacing the atlantic market in this market historically long term supply contracts were usual and concluded between producer and consumer even recently there are still annual contracts but with a small number of deals in contrast spot transactions are now becoming more important previously japan had been influential in price setting by establishing a benchmark price with australian coal suppliers afterward a reference price was becoming a trend nowadays spot price indices such as the barlow jonker the barlow jonker acr and globalcoal have become important to set the price the pacific market growth is not without problems the exporter countries particularly australia and indonesia have some challenges that if they are not resolved at present it would implicate the performance of the coal trade

the sources of productivity change in spanish banking abstract in this paper we examine the pattern of productivity change in spanish banking over the period 1986 1993 two sectors dominate spanish banking commercial banks and the faster growing savings banks we begin by examining productivity change separately within each sector however since the two sectors are gradually becoming more competitive we continue by merging the two sectors and by examining productivity change in the industry the merging procedure follows a methodology originally proposed by charnes cooper and rhodes 1981 in which intra sectoral managerial inefficiency is eliminated prior to merging this procedure allows us to distinguish differences in managerial efficiency within each sector from differences in the institutional efficiency of the two sectors it also enables us to decompose potential productivity change into institutional efficiency change technical change and the impact of scale economies we find the commercial banks to have had a slightly lower rate of productivity growth but a slightly higher rate of potential productivity growth we attribute this phenomenon to differences in both managerial efficiency and institutional efficiency to differences in the rate of technical progress and to the adverse impact of diseconomies of scale in the commercial banking sector

hyperbolic efficiency and return to the dollar abstract this paper after establishing the relations between hyperbolic graph measure of technical efficiency and the radial measures of technical efficiency shows that the dual cost and revenue interpretation of the hyperbolic efficiency measure is related to georgescu roegen s notion of return to the dollar n georgescu roegen in koopmans t ed activity analysis of production and allocation wiley new york 1951 pp 98 115 once this relation is established it leads to a derivation of an allocative efficiency index which measures the price distortions using data on observed costs and revenues without requiring information on prices

comparative statics of a monopolistic firm facing price cap and command and control environmental regulations abstract an exhaustive comparative statics analysis of a model of a monopolistic firm facing price cap regulation and a variety of commonly implemented command and control environmental regulations is carried out the comparative statics are intrinsic to each of the models and thus form their basic empirically testable properties several unanticipated results emerge from the analysis in particular it is shown that a subset of the intrinsic comparative statics are qualitatively invariant to all of the commonly employed command and control environmental regulations that a price cap regulated profit maximizing monopoly might face while others are specific to the type of command and control environmental regulation in place

the new institutional economics and its applicability to development abstract the several remarkable developments in the social sciences which have come to be known as the new institutional economics nie have not yet been fully exploited for analyzing the determinants and effects of institutional change in the context of development this paper identifies two important components of the nie and illustrates both a potential complementarities between them and b their applicability to various problems and policies in the long term development of developing countries

political deadlocks and distributional information the value of the veil contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice by eliminating distributional information the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions this paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day to day decision making of democratic institutions our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the u s congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years

productive efficiency in public and private firms abstract this paper compares the degree of x inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms using a straightforward principal agent model with two possible states of the world it establishes the rather surprising result that in the good state of the world public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

malmquist indices of productivity change in the uk gas industry before and after privatization the uk government s privatization programme was justified in terms of potential efficiency gains this paper concentrates on measures of technical efficiency in the regions of the uk natural gas industry before and after privatization and the associated regulatory changes it uses non parametric frontier analysis and malmquist indices to show that the rate of productivity growth increased significantly after privatization however the differences in technical efficiency amongst regions remain suggesting that failure to break up the industry has sacrificed potential gains from direct competition or indirect competition through yardstick regulation

less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement comment the purpose of this comment has not been to question the main point of holcombe s paper unanimous legislative agreement if it occurs could be inefficient for the reasons put forth by holcombe the motivation for this comment is that holcombe s explanation for the existence of legislative unanimity is not a compelling one since it begs an important question that question is if the cooperation exists to maintain a unanimous coalition why does not the cooperation exist to maintain a less than unanimous coalition unless holcombe can answer this question satisfactorily his explanation for legislative unanimity is fundamentally flawed

the committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem this paper adapts a simple model from the optimal contracting literature to explain the relationship between political parties and non incumbent candidates the model predicts that legislators with a higher opportunity cost of government service will receive better committee assignments using data that spans 12 congresses 97th to 108th i find that when the opportunity cost of senate service is measured by previous occupation freshmen senators with a high opportunity cost for serving those who were lawyers were given good committee assignments while freshmen senators with a low opportunity cost for serving professors and those with relatives already in politics were given worse committee assignments

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

non parametric efficiency progress and regress measures for panel data methodological aspects this purely methodological paper deals with the role of time in non parametric efficiency analysis using both fdh and dea technologies it first shows how each observation in a panel can be characterized in efficiency terms vis a vis three different kinds of frontiers i contemporaneous ii sequential and iii intertemporal these are then compared with window analysis next frontier shifts outward and inward interpreted as progress or regress are considered for the two kinds of technologies and computational methods are described in detail for evaluating such shifts in either case these are also contrasted with what is measured by the malmquist productivity index finally an alternative way of identifying progress and regress independent of the frontier notion and referring instead to some benchmark notion is extended here to panel data

the behaviour of productivity growth rates and price cost margins during contractions and expansions panel data on thirteen two digit us manufacturing industries were analysed using a random coefficients approach to determine the behaviour of total factor productivity growth rates and price marginal cost ratios during recessions and expansions results show 1 productivity growth is procyclical it decreases during recessions and increases during expansions in addition the decrease during recessions is greater than the increase during expansions 2 the price marginal cost ratio is very asymmetric it decreases during recessions but shows no significant movement during an expansion the lower price marginal cost ratio during a recession implies that the elasticity of output with respect to labour decreases thus not only does the level of productivity fall but the productivity of labour relative to capital also falls these characteristics are consistent with labour hoarding

integrating the regulatory and utility firm perspectives when measuring the efficiency of electricity distribution abstract several dea applications for benchmarking in utility regulation use classical models which reveal inconsistencies due to pareto inefficient targets the natural course of action would be to incorporate weight restrictions reflecting value judgments and requiring interaction between analyst and decision maker we show that weight restricted dea models still present some inconsistencies since it is not possible to ensure that the target both dominates the observed dmu and lies on the empirical production frontier besides the decision maker and analyst interaction it is necessary to consider a further distinction between the two parties the regulatory agency and the utility company which adopt different criteria to determine the efficient target a model to obtain a preferred target dea index is formulated taking advantage of the dual based dea graphical analysis thus we propose a two phase dea analysis that can integrate both perspectives a case study about the brazilian electricity sector is included which illustrates the above mentioned issues

macroeconomic conditions and committee re election rates the traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and house elections follows kramer 1971 and assumes all members of the president s party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes using presidential party return rates from 10 house committees over the time period 1916 1996 i find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee generally committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations contrastingly members of the public works committee and the rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations

objectives and incentives evidence from the privatisation of great britain s power plants abstract does privatization increase plant productivity because the private owner s objective is different or because they are better able to control management and is privatization sufficient to improve productivity or is it only effective in combination with competition we answer these questions using the quasi experiment of great britain s electricity industry privatization to separate the effect of a change in objectives from a change in incentives we assume that the former only affects labor but not fuel productivity and assuming that effective competition was only introduced after privatization we are able to separately identify the effects of privatization and competition we find that privatization increased labor but not fuel productivity evidence for the importance of objectives there is no evidence that the introduction of effective competition after privatization increased labor or fuel productivity evidence that privatization increases productivity by itself

a sequential malmquist luenberger productivity index environmentally sensitive productivity growth considering the progressive nature of technology this study proposes an index for measuring environmentally sensitive productivity growth which appropriately considers the nature of technical change the rationale of this methodology is to exclud

a political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments one of the main themes of partisan dispute in the recent past and doubtless in the foreseeable future is whether or not the value of detailed governmental regulation of the economy exceeds the cost this is exactly the kind of dispute that might be resolved by raising it from the level of mere partisan interest to the level of economic and political science unfortunately however it has not been raised because we do not have the necessary intellectual apparatus namely a theory about the motivation for the operation of and the consequences of regulation as a result most of the discussion consists of biased ad hoc explanations of particular cases with little effort to formulate and test alternative generalizations we have therefore nothing but unresolved and unresolvable disputes about a more or less random collection of stories and some contradictory recipes about cause and effect

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

international market integration for natural gas a cointegration analysis of prices in europe north america and japan this paper investigates the degree of integration of natural gas markets in europe north america and japan in the time period between the early 1990s and 2004 the relationship between international gas market prices and their relation to the oil price are explored through principal components analysis and johansen likelihood based cointegration procedure both of them show a high level of natural gas market integration within europe between the european and japanese markets as well as within the north american market at the same time the obtained results suggest that the european respectively japanese and the north american markets were not integrated

committee characteristics and re election margins an empirical investigation of the us house models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re election interests of incumbent legislators attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful nevertheless the notion lives on nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system in the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents contrary to this simplifying characterization the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions we suggest here that these realities warrant a re opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member s vote share and that assignment to a narrowly focused specialized committee does not

the malmquist total factor productivity index the definitions of the malmquist output and input quantity indexes specified by d w caves l r christensen and w e diewert 1982 are applied in this study based on these indexes a malmquist total factor productivity index is derived for general production structures the definition maintains the fundamental characteristic of a productivity index as a ratio between an output quantity change index and an input quantity change index this index provides a remedy for the shortcoming of the traditional definition of the malmquist productivity index in that the latter does not correctly measure changes in productivity in the presence of changes in returns to scale copyright 1996 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

the committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias the view that congressional committees tend to be biased subsets of their parent chambers provides the foundations for a substantial body of theoretical literature on distributive politics and legislative structure more recent revisionist work suggests that committees composed of preference outliers are in fact rare we reject the categorical account of preference outliers a priori and elaborate conditions under which committees should be unrepresentative of their parent chambers we argue that the most widely available and frequently used data floor roll call votes are inappropriate to the task of assessing outlier predictions in any form finally we conduct a differentiated set of hypothesis tests within one policy jurisdiction to illustrate the characteristics of evidence and analysis necessary to evaluate alternative theoretical accounts of legislative organization the appearance of policy relevant biases in congressional work groups we conclude is not so much rare as it is conditional and we suggest several conditions on which future models of legislative organization should build

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

productivity growth environmental regulation and win win opportunities the case of chemical industry in italy and germany abstract this paper analyzes the environmental and economic efficiency of a sample of firms located in italy and germany operating in the chemical sector and included in the european pollution release and transfer register e prtr the directional distance function ddf approach in a conditional setting has been applied to obtain efficiency score and total factor productivity tfp growth indexes considering pollution in computations emissions increase in absolute term between 2004 and 2007 with a worse performance of italian firms but efficiency indicators show a reduction of inefficiency over time with similar performance of firms from the two countries the formal test for the porter s hypothesis suggests that chemical firms suffering higher compliance costs in the first period react with investment increasing productivity in the following years the empirical evidence robust to different specifications and estimation methods supports the presence of win win opportunities

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

the world price of coal a significant increase in the seaborne trade for coal over the past 20 years has unified formerly separate coal markets into a world market in which prices move in tandem by virtue of its large domestic market the usa has become the residual supplier and price setter in the world coal market changes in multifactor productivity have been the primary cause of the long term fluctuations in coal prices that have been observed in the usa since the end of the second world war and in the world coal market

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

centralized vote trading this paper presents a model of centralized vote trading in a legislature in this model legislators trade only with party leaders who set prices at which they will buy needed vote changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders and purchases promises from the leaders to pass or defeat particular bills of high concern to the legislator relative to the price the leguslator must pay

price regulation in the spanish energy sectors who benefits abstract this paper analyses the distribution of benefits between firms and consumers due to the price regulation of the spanish energy sectors electricity oil fuels and gas during the decade 1987 1997 to that effect we compare the actual evolution of energy prices with alternate benchmarks in order to assess the potential existence of a pro industry or a pro consumer bias in the pricing policies followed by the regulator our results show a pro industry biased regulatory context where consumers benefitted very little from price control the successive price adjustments over time allowed the companies to keep all the productivity gains and cost reductions and to increase their profitability rates relative to those achieved in the manufacturing sector

does duration of political control matter interstate differences in branch banking laws this study began by trying to explain differences in state branch banking regulations introducing a variable that captures the effect of political dominance over time improves upon the commonly used measures of political dominance at a specific point in time even the direct comparison with the previously used percentage point in time variables shows that duration of political influence matters significantly no matter which party is in control the length of time it has been in control in a state influences political outcomes we show that in terms of which kind of legislation will be enacted democratic and republican control exert equal but opposite effects on legislative results in other words length of control matters independently of party affiliation but party affiliation affects the nature of the outcome of the political process

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

stationarity changes in long run energy commodity prices abstract situated at the intersection of the literatures on speculative storage and non renewable commodity scarcity this paper considers whether changes in persistence have occurred in long run u s prices of the energy commodities crude oil natural gas and bituminous coal we allow for a structural break when testing for a break in persistence to avoid a change in the stochastic properties of prices being confounded by an unaccounted for deterministic shift in the price series we find that coal prices are trend stationary throughout their evolution and that oil prices change from stationarity to non stationarity in the decade between the late 1960s to late 1970s the result on gas prices is ambiguous our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for a possible structural shift when testing for breaks in persistence while being robust to the exact date of the structural break based on our analysis we caution against viewing long run energy commodity prices as being non stationary and conclude in favor of modeling commodity market fundamentals as stationary meaning that speculative storage will tend to have a dampening effect on prices we also cannot reject that long run prices of coal and with some hesitation gas follow a hotelling type rule in contrast we reject the hotelling rule for oil prices since the late 1960s early 1970s

efficiency assessment and benchmarking of thermal power plants in india abstract per capita consumption 1 of electricity in india is many folds lesser than canada usa australia japan chaina and world average even though total energy shortage 2 and peaking shortage 3 were recorded as 11 2 and 11 85 respectively in 2008 09 reflecting non availability of sufficient supply of electricity performance improvement of very small amount can lead to large contribution in financial terms which can be utilized for capacity addition to reduce demand supply gap coal fired thermal power plants are main sources of electricity in india in this paper relative technical efficiency of 60 coal fired power plants has been evaluated and compared using ccr and bcc models of data envelopment analysis target benchmark of input variables has also been evaluated performance comparison includes small versus medium versus large power plants and also state owned versus central owned versus private owned result indicates poor performance of few power plants due to over use of input resources finding reveals that efficiency of small power plants is lower in comparison to medium and large category and also performance of state owned power plants is comparatively lower than central and privately owned study also suggests different measures to improve technical efficiency of the plants

executive veto power and credit claiming the line item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods the item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

the evolution of hard coal trade in the atlantic market abstract this article analyses the evolution of hard coal trade in west europe known as the atlantic market from the 1980s to the end of 2002 it investigates the development of trade pattern nature of contracts price setting supply demand and the future of trade the region s demand has underpinned steam coal in the recent past in 2002 steam coal imports reached 155 0 mt while coking coal imports were 43 2 mt the market is progressing to become a perfect market transparent and simple in operation the spot market for coal has made the transaction bring into line the current market situations historically long term contracts were usual and concluded between producer and consumer recently there are still annual contracts but with a small number of deals the percentage of spot market has risen from 14 in 1983 to 80 in 2003 previously coal price settlement was referenced by south africa s and the us offers now spot price indices have become important in price setting the increasing power needs the advantages of reserves conditions and market systems open the opportunities for coal demand in the forthcoming years however these opportunities are not without problems the demand for reducing environmental impacts and the efforts for seeking capital to fund the investment are some of the challenges to be addressed