financial incentives to mobilise local citizens as investors in low carbon technologies a systematic literature review abstract mobilising greater levels of private finance through local citizen investment in low carbon technologies can help bridge the capital shortfall to meeting climate objectives while also building societal support for the low carbon transition within this context we undertake a systematic review of literature assessing the impact of technology specific economic and financial incentives promoting greater levels of investment in low carbon technologies from local citizen investors both individuals and community groups we focus in particular on the impact of feed in tariffs compared to quota schemes grants tax incentives and soft loans the analysis suggests that local citizen investors do not necessarily act in an economically rational manner in response to these incentives it underscores the importance of understanding the preferences of target demographics the local context as well as the characteristics of the technologies in question and suggests interventions should be considered as part of wider policy packages while identifying challenges to be overcome through instrument design we find that feed in tariffs grants and tax incentives can be successful in mobilising greater levels of investment from local citizen investors but that soft loans tend to be less effective as a stand alone instrument the review identifies areas meriting further exploration in this emerging field of research

coordinating regime switches the canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity the distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process and individuals are rational bayesians under plausible conditions there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions

information aggregation through costly political action information about various policy alternatives is dispersed among the individual members of a society prior to a vote over the alternatives some people take costly political action to signal their private information to voters by informing voting decisions political action has potential to decrease the likelihood that voters cast mistaken votes perhaps surprisingly preelection communication may be counterproductive the dispersed information is partially aggregated by the vote and political action may contribute noise to the voting process in some cases the voting mechanism is more likely to implement the full information voting outcome in the absence of preelection political action copyright 1994 by american economic association

this mine is mine how minerals fuel conflicts in africa we combine georeferenced data on mining extraction of 14 minerals with information on conflict events at spatial resolution of 0 5 degree x 0 5 degree for all of africa between 1997 and 2010 exploiting exogenous variations in world prices we find a positive impact of mining on conflict at the local level quantitatively our estimates suggest that the historical rise in mineral prices commodity super cycle might explain up to one fourth of the average level of violence across african countries over the period we then document how a fighting group s control of a mining area contributes to escalation from local to global violence finally we analyze the impact of corporate practices and transparency initiatives in the mining industry

do political protests matter evidence from the tea party movement can protests cause political change or are they merely symptoms of underlying shifts in policy preferences this paper studies the effect of the tea party movement in the united states which rose to prominence through a series of rallies across the country on april 15 tax day 2009 to identify the causal effect of protests we use an instrumental variables approach that exploits variation in rainfall on the day of the coordinated rallies weather on tax day robustly predicts rally attendance and the subsequent local strength of the movement as measured by donations media coverage social networking activity and later events we show that larger rallies cause an increase in turnout in favor of the republicans in the 2010 congressional elections and increase the likelihood that incumbent democratic representatives retire incumbent policymaking is affected as well representatives respond to large protests in their district by voting more conservatively in congress finally the estimates imply significant multiplier effects for every protester republican votes increase by seven to fourteen votes together our results show that protests can build political movements that ultimately affect policy and they suggest that it is unlikely that these effects arise solely through the standard channel of private information revelation

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

innovation and price the case of digital cameras this study examines a hedonic regression model of digital camera prices using data collected from an internet price comparison service we find that a small number of product characteristics explains most of the variation in camera prices in addition the model demonstrates substantial downward pressure on camera prices during the time period considered we also examine technological innovation shocks to determine their impact on product prices we find that the corresponding price reaction exhibits gradual adjustment over time providing evidence of some degree of anticipation of the innovation as well as a post innovation price shock this study also demonstrates the power of web based shopping services as a new and novel source of data for econometric analysis

information manipulation coordination and regime change this article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change there is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime s ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that taken at face value makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium s comparative statics holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens if the per unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow in contrast if the number of signals increases so that both total signal precision and the regime s costs of manipulation rise together then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control

fragile states and development policy it is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under development in many parts of the world such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace as of yet mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance this paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states

the long term effects of africa s slave trades can part of africa s current underdevelopment be explained by its slave trades to explore this question i use data from shipping records and historical documents reporting slave ethnicities to construct estimates of the number of slaves exported from each country during africa s slave trades i find a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from a country and current economic performance to better understand if the relationship is causal i examine the historical evidence on selection into the slave trades and use instrumental variables together the evidence suggests that the slave trades have had an adverse effect on economic development

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

protests and trust in the state evidence from african countries this paper provides empirical evidence that after protests citizens substantially revise their views on the current leader but also their trust in the country s institutions the empirical strategy exploits variation in the timing of an individual level survey and the proximity to social protests in 13 african countries first we find that trust in political leaders strongly and abruptly decreases after protests second trust in the country monitoring institutions plunges as well both effects are much stronger when protests are repressed by the government as no signs of distrust are recorded even a couple of days before the social conflicts protests can be interpreted as sudden signals sent on a leaders actions from which citizens extract information on their country fundamentals

the east european revolution of 1989 is it surprising that we were surprised many aspects of the east european revolution are controversial but on one point everyone agrees it caught the world by surprise even local dissidents were stunned by the sudden turn of events we will never know how many east europeans did foresee the explosion of 1989 but at each step accounts painted a picture of nations united in amazement to my knowledge only one study addresses the issue systematically four months after the breaching of the berlin wall the allensbach institute asked a broad sample of east germans a year ago did you expect such a peaceful revolution only 5 percent answered yes though 18 percent responded yes but not that fast fully 76 percent admitted to being totally surprised these figures are all the more remarkable given the i knew it would happen fallacy the human tendency to exaggerate foreknowledge baruch fischhoff and ruth beyth 1975 yet in hindsight the revolution appears as inevitable in each of the six countries the leadership was despised economic promises remained unfulfilled and basic freedoms existed only on paper more importantly winds of change in the soviet union were making soviet intervention increasingly unlikely but if the revolution was indeed inevitable why was it not foreseen what kept us from noticing signs that now after the fact are so plainly visible i preference falsification and revolutionary bandwagons

mobilizing private finance to drive an energy industrial revolution abstract while uptake of renewable energies as a solution to climate change is widely discussed the issue of public vs private financing is not yet adequately explored the debates over the kyoto protocol and its successor culminating in the cop15 climate change conference in copenhagen in december 2009 maintained a strong preference for public over private financing yet it is also clear to most observers that the energy revolution will never happen without the involvement of private finance to drive private investment in this viewpoint we discuss the ways in which private financing could be mobilized to drive the energy industrial revolution that is needed if climate change mitigation is to succeed

war and local collective action in sierra leone abstract we study the brutal 1991 2002 sierra leone civil war using nationally representative household data on conflict experiences postwar economic outcomes local politics and collective action individuals whose households directly experienced more intense war violence are robustly more likely to attend community meetings more likely to join local political and community groups and more likely to vote tests using prewar controls and alternative samples suggest that selection into victimization is unlikely to be driving the results more speculatively the findings could help partially explain the rapid postwar political and economic recoveries observed in sierra leone and after several other recent african civil wars

hedonic price indexes and the distribution of buyers across the product space an application to mainframe computers 2000 hedonic price indexes and the distribution of buyers across the product space an application to mainframe computers applied economics vol 32 no 14 pp 1801 1808

information cascades and revolutionary regime transitions we combine acemoglu and robinson s model of the economic origins of democracy with lohmann s model of political mass protest this allows us to analyse the economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of revolution we are able to derive conditions under which democracy arises peacefully when it occurs only after a revolution and when oligarchy persists we model these possibilities in a world of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible and where these cascades may involve errors in the sense that they make everyone worse off

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

public policy influence on renewable energy investments a panel data study across oecd countries this paper examines the impact of public policy measures on renewable energy re investments in electricity generating capacity made by institutional investors using a novel combination of datasets and a longitudinal research design we investigate the influence of different policy measures in a sample of oecd countries to suggest an effective policy mix which could tackle failures in the market for clean energy the results call for technology specific policies which take into account actual market conditions and technology maturity to improve the conditions for institutional investments advisable policy instruments include economic and fiscal incentives such as feed in tariffs fit especially for less mature technologies additionally market based instruments such as greenhouse gas ghg emission trading systems for mature technologies should be included these policy measures directly impact the risk and return structure of re projects supplementing these with regulatory measures such as codes and standards e g rps and long term strategic planning could further strengthen the context for re investments

political economy in a changing world we provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural single crossing increasing differences conditions we prove existence of a pure strategy markov voting equilibrium provide conditions for its uniqueness and present a number of comparative static results we then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation

electoral competition under the threat of political unrest this paper examines how voting and the outcomesof majority rule elections are affected by factors beyond the control of the winning party we present a model that helps to predict how threats against the electoral process ineuence 1 platform choice by political parties 2 which party wins the election and 3 the policy outcomes enally implemented in a democracy where the majority winner sets policy dissatiseed groups including groups outside the electoral process may still be able to interfere with that policy a losing party may organize a coup voters may riot unions may go on strike investors may take their capital abroad terrorists and foreign powers may threaten disruption and loss of life foreign powers may withdraw aid or even impose a trade embargo we analyze the effect of these nonelectoral factors on electoral outcomes we consider a majority rule electoral competition between two political parties with ideal policies lying to either side of the median voter s ideal policy we allow for only a one dimensional policy space but the disruption possibility leads to a twodimensional outcome space as evident in the examples given above the actors threaten

mobilizing private finance for low carbon innovation a systematic review of barriers and solutions this paper analyses the field of innovation studies regarding barriers to low carbon innovation and consequences for finance investment and divestment and contributes to a more holistic understanding of the underlying mechanisms a combination of technological barriers combined with economic barriers institutional and political barriers contribute to sub optimal low carbon investment all along the innovation cycle policy makers need to take a systemic approach to enable the redirection of diverse private financial sources instruments range from cutting dirty r d subsidies and support for clean technology innovation and diffusion levelling the institutional playing field and making risks of high carbon and low carbon technologies transparent to providing a consistent but adaptive long term transition strategy this would allow financiers to gradually shift their investments away from high carbon mainstream markets and scale low carbon technology niche markets however financiers also need to sharpen their competencies with regard to new clean technologies and markets

what to show on the wine labels a hedonic analysis of price drivers of sicilian wines unlike previous literature we construct a hedonic model of wine price that incorporates all the main categories of variables simultaneously to enable a better evaluation of their importance on wine price formation a comprehensive model has the advantage of providing more reliable estimates of the attributes implicit prices thereby facilitating firms pricing and improving effectiveness of wine production and marketing decisions we utilize two different datasets of sicilian wines collecting data from influential wine guides our results suggest that wine price strongly depends on objective features such as vintage alcoholic content geographical origin grape variety producer size and cellaring potential in addition use of containers like tonneaux and barrique positively affects prices whereas use of concrete containers has a negative influence no univocal indications emerge with regard to the effect of the type of company type of viticulture and firm age as for sensorial characteristics our a

when the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil exploiting one s nuisance power abstract in this paper a lobby group or union may influence public policy because it is able via a costly signal such as a boycott or a strike to negatively impact the image of decision makers the competence of a government is measured by its ability to do a lot with only a little money voters receive through observing the level of public output only a noisy signal of government s quality so that the lobby groups which are better informed may transmit to them more precise information about it we show that when unions are unbiased i e have no hostility against or sympathy for the incumbent government strikes may occur only when the government is bad consequently a strike in this case acts as a clear though costly signal to the public of an incompetent government when some or all unions or lobby groups are biased against the incumbent government we show that the possibility of strikes may distort the budget allocation away from the efficient one bad governments have a tendency to favor their political enemies while good governments favor their political enemies only when they are not overly biased

trust coordination and the industrial organization of political activism we study political activism by several interest groups with private signals when their ideological distance to the policymaker is small a low trust regime prevails agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted taking advantage of the cone rmation provided by others activism conversely the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure when ideological distance is large a high trust regime prevails lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers and the policymaker s response threshold is correspondingly lower within some intermediate range both equilibria coexist we then study the optimal organization of ine uence activities contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate jel d72 d78 d82