the rotten kid theorem meets the samaritan s dilemma a familiar result in the economic theory of the family is becker s rotten kid theorem this theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint we extend becker s one period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the samaritan s dilemma implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn

what determines female autonomy evidence from bangladesh abstract this paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country in particular we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women s autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband s farm in a simple theoretical model it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women using data from rural bangladesh empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands farms that contributes to women s autonomy the data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

sense and no n sense of energy security indicators energy security ranks high on the policy agenda of many countries to improve on energy security governments undertake regulatory measures for promoting renewable energy increasing energy efficiency or curbing carbon dioxide emissions the impacts of such measures on energy security are typically monitored by means of so called energy security indicators in this paper we show that the common use of wide spread energy security indicators falls short of providing a meaningful metric regulatory measures to improve on energy security trigger ambiguous effects across energy security indicators we conclude that a major pitfall of energy security indicators is the lack of a rigorous microeconomic foundation

tax planning of married couples and intra household income inequality abstract this paper examines tax planning of married couples under separate taxation it shows that concerns about the intra household income distribution prevent couples from minimizing tax payments the empirical analysis exploits a specific feature of the german tax system which allows married couples to save taxes by deviating from the default symmetric payroll tax treatment and assigning favorable tax treatment to the primary earner and unfavorable tax treatment to the secondary earner based on a representative random sample of individual tax files we find that a couple is less likely to choose the tax minimizing treatment if tax planning is associated with a larger decline of the net of tax income of the secondary earner this applies regardless of whether the husband or the wife is the main earner however couples where the wife is the main earner are generally more reluctant to assign the more favorable tax treatment to the wife

revealed preference analysis of non cooperative household consumption we develop a revealed preference approach to analyse non unitary household consumption behaviour that is not cooperative or pareto efficient we derive global necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with the model we show that the conditions can be verified by means of relatively straightforward mixed integer programming methods which is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods an application to data drawn from the russia longitudinal monitoring survey demonstrates the empirical relevance of the non cooperative consumption model

pigou meets ramsey gender based taxation with non cooperative couples abstract this paper explores the implications of gender based income taxation in a non cooperative model of household behavior in a first step we show how gender based taxes can act as pigou taxes and correct the externality induced by a non cooperative household equilibrium we find that the first best pigou tax rules are solely determined by spouses relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption breaking down this general rule into the primitives of the model the spouse with a comparative advantage in home production should be taxed at a higher rate in a second step we embed our non cooperative framework in a standard second best planning problem in which taxes serve a revenue raising purpose in this case the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is partly determined by a ramsey type inverse elasticity rule and partly by a pigouvian tax element we show that these two forces work in opposite directions in determining whether men or women should be taxed at a higher rate and that either one could be dominant depending on the revenue raising position of the government this result is robust to the introduction of two groups of households that differ in their mode of decision making which can be either cooperative or non cooperative

altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place adam smith argued in a famous passage that people are selfish in their market transactions it is not from the benevolence of the butcher the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but from their regard to their own interest we address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages 1937 p 14 in an earlier study he said with irony we are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness 1853 p 446 selfishness in market transactions has been assumed in practically all subsequent discussions of the economic system objections were dismissed with vague allusions to human nature or with an assertion that altruism loses out to selfishness in the struggle to survive in the market sector yet altruism is generally recognized to be important within a family again adam smith said

a comparison of oil supply risks in eu us japan china and india under different climate scenarios for many countries the inflow of energy is essential to keep economies running oil is typically considered to be the most critical fuel as an input for the petro chemical and transportation sector and due to limited and less spread reserves in this study external oil supply risks are assessed for the period up to 2035 for the european union united states china japan and india being the five largest importers of oil in the world based on their current supplier portfolio scenarios are constructed for several climate policy and oil supply projections it is found that risks increase strongly when stringent climate policies are prevented from being implemented especially when a peak in oil supply is taken into account resulting in major oil supply disruptions china faces the lowest oil supply risks in most scenarios but the trends of india china and us converge over time due to increasing import dependency of china and india japan faces high risks since the country has the highest oil import dependency combined with a low oil import diversification for the eu all figures are strongly influenced by russia accounting for 32 of total imports and to a lesser extent norway 11 with high overall risks

a note on integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time abstract ben daya and hariga 2004 integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time international journal of production economics 92 75 80 recently proposed the paper about integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time the lead time is proportional to the lot size produced by the vendor in addition to a fixed delay due to the transportation setup and nonproductive time the end customers accept backorders when the shortage occurs at the buyer side an order to the vendor is placed each time the inventory level reaches the reorder point in this note a modified model is proposed under a different assumption that there are two different reorder points and service levels

energy security energy modelling and uncertainty the paper develops a framework to analyze energy security in an expected utility framework where there is a risk of disruption of imported energy the analysis shows the importance of an energy tax as a tool in maximizing expected utility and how the level of that tax varies according to the key parameters of the system risk aversion probability of disruption demand elasticity and cost of disruption

analysis of energy embodied in the international trade of uk interest in the role embodied energy plays in international trade and its subsequent impact on energy security has grown as a developed nation the uk s economic structure has changed from that of a primary producer to that of a primary consumer although the uk s energy consumption appears to have peaked it imports a lot of energy embodied in international trade alongside the more obvious direct energy imports the uk has seen increasing dependency on imported fossil energy since the uk became a net energy importer in 2005 in this paper an energy input output model is established to calculate not only the amount of fossil energy embodied in uk s imports and exports but also the sector and country distributions of those embodied fossil energy the research results suggest the following uk s embodied fossil energy imports have exceeded embodied fossil energy exports every year since 1997 uk embodied energy imports through the so called made in china phenomena are the largest accounting for 43 of total net fossil energy imports if net embodied fossil energy imports are considered the gap between energy consumption and production in uk is much larger than commonly perceived with subsequent implications to the uk s energy security

worktime regulations and spousal labor supply we study interdependencies in spousal labor supply by exploiting the design of the french workweek reduction which introduced exogenous variation in one s spouse s labor supply at constant earnings treated employees work on average two hours less per week husbands of treated women respond by reducing their labor supply by about half an hour consistent with substantial leisure complementarity and specifically cut the non usual component of their workweek leaving usual hours unchanged women s response to their husband s treatment is instead weak and rarely statistically significant possibly due to heavier constraints in the organization of their workweek

nash bargained household decisions reply pierre andre chiappori s 1988 claim that the nash bargaining model is of weak empirical relevance and neither convenient nor really restrictive is incorrect nash bargained household behavior implies a rich set of empirical implications extending well beyond the pareto efficiency of intrafamily distributions by systematically accounting for the impact of opportunities outside the family on resource distribution within the family nash bargained demand theory considerably expands the scope of neoclassical demand theory such expansion can elucidate issues ranging from the impact of alimony and child support laws in developed societies to the intrafamily distribution of nutrition in less developed countries copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the mix of social and private provision of goods and services abstract in some countries health insurance and education are supplied as social goods at near zero prices and funded from taxation this paper analyses a case where such provision competes with income supplements as a redistribution device and where taxes or transferable vouchers influence the take up of the social goods compared to alternatives available in a private market each consumer chooses to consume either social or private goods and a vertical market segmentation results from differential demand for quality

bargaining and distribution in marriage the standard economic model of the family is a common preference model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources in recent years this model has been challenged by game theoretic models of marriage that do not impose pooling and are therefore consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior in this paper the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage

the saving behaviour of a two person household the facts that wives are typically younger than their husbands and that women typically live longer than men imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age than do husbands a theoretical model of the determination of household saving and portfolio choice is introduced which takes into account differences in preferences for saving the most important result is that the level and the composition portfolio of saving and the time path of consumption are dependent on the distribution of income within the household women typically live longer than men and wives are typically younger than their husbands these two facts imply that preferences about saving for old age in married households with forward looking members may differ between husband and wife this paper presents a theoretical analysis of saving and portfolio behaviour if the members of the household have differ ent preferences over future consumption as compared to current consump tion the analysis stands in contrast to unitary models of household intertemporal allocation which assume that the household has a single utility function thus this paper is a contribution in a novel context to the burgeoning literature on intra household decision making the base case analysis is for a simple two person husband and wife1 two period model in which there is only one asset saving it is assumed that because of the two facts given at the start of the introductory paragraph the husband discounts the future more than the wife in section ii the implications of a non cooperative decision making process for the base case are derived see ulph 1988 for a non cooperative model of demand and

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

intra household inequality fairness and productivity evidence from a real effort experiment abstract this paper investigates experimentally how changes in wage rates and entitlements affect individual productivity in lab in the field experiments run with married couples from rural regions in uganda we design a game in which the production task itself is straightforward but where the rules governing payment vary across subjects and between rounds in some cases all the value of output goes to the husband in other cases all goes to the wife in other cases the value of output is shared equally and finally in some cases each spouse receives income according to only their own output to consider the effects of wage inequality we vary the price paid for each completed item so that the ratio of male to female wages varies from 0 5 to 2 all this is done transparently so that both partners know the rules of the game the results generally indicate that a rise in relative wages lowers relative effort a result that is contrary to the most straightforward interpretation of standard models of the household but compatible with some models of fairness men do not generally respond strongly to treatment in contrast women s labor supply is strongly backward bending when all income goes to the husband but effort rises with wages when each spouse gets to keep their own earnings the results therefore suggest that the effects of reforming or removing one inequality may depend critically on the existence of other inequalities

do husbands and wives pool their resources evidence from the united kingdom child benefit common preference models of family behavior imply income pooling a restriction on family demand functions such that only the sum of husband s income and wife s income affects the allocation of goods and time testing the pooling hypothesis is difficult because most family income sources are not exogenous to the allocations being analyzed in this paper we present an alternative test based on a natural experiment a policy change in the united kingdom that transferred a substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s using family expenditure survey data we find strong evidence that a shift toward greater expenditures on women s clothing and children s clothing relative to men s clothing coincided with this income redistribution

do intra household effects generate the food stamp cash out puzzle previous empirical studies have noted the higher marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps in the united states compared to that out of cash income analyzing data from u s food stamp program participants we find evidence that this discrepancy may be driven primarily by the behavior of multiple adult households single adult households show no evidence of any discrepancy thus our results suggest that food stamp and cash income welfare or market may have very different impact on the intra household allocation process and that this is reflected empirically in the cash out puzzle

a cournot nash model of family decision making this paper models a two person family each family member is utility maximising yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family the two family members interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non cooperative or cournot nash game theoretic framework the cournot nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game the paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands a full analysis of the determinants of intra household resource allocation including the effect of varying household bargaining power and consideration of policy implications

household behavior and the marriage market abstract there is some controversy in the field of household economics regarding the efficiency of household decisions we make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and the household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact efficiently or inefficiently under strong but standard assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as out of sample information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is efficient or not we develop a new likelihood based metric to compare marriage market fits under the two alternative behavioral assumptions we use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the panel study of income dynamics and find strong evidence supporting the view that household behavior is constrained efficient

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

nash bargained household decisions a rejoinder this note is a rejoinder to marjorie b mcelroy and mary jean horney s 1990 reply it discusses the scope of mcelroy and horney s previous results and the possibility of estimating a nash bargained model from independent observation of threat points copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

price policy poverty and power within rural west african households abstract this paper explores the impact of agricultural price policy on poverty in west africa a region in which prices are an important tool for raising rural household incomes a game theoretic collective model of household income generation and resource allocation is developed that incorporates three features typical of west african rural households preference heterogeneity among women and men individual resource control and power mediated bargaining over resource control in the face of changes in households economic environments to explore price effects the model is used to simulate the income impacts of large increases in cotton prices accompanying fast paced agricultural liberalisation in burkina faso in the 1980s the paper shows that where resources are controlled individually by household members rather than pooled pareto efficiency in income generation does not hold the impact of agricultural price policy on poverty is mediated by bargaining over resource control within households bo

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

noncooperative bargaining models of marriage in this paper we discuss some simple noncooperative models of distribution within marriage in which the equilibria are not necessarily pareto optimal in which history and culture can affect which equilibrium is realized and in which distribution may depend on whether resources are controlled by the husband or by the wife recent moves away from single decision maker models of the family have permitted economists to address distribution within marriage and cooperative bargaining models have played the central role in these moves the next step is to permit strategic interaction between family members by modeling distribution within marriage as a noncooperative game noncooperative game theory allows great flexibility in specifying the rules of the game and unlike cooperative game theory imposes few a priori restrictions on the nature of equilibrium outcomes in particular noncooperative models neither assume nor imply that all equilibria are pareto optimal

security of supply and retail competition in the european gas market some model based insights in this paper we analyze the impact of uncertain disruptions in gas supply upon gas retailer contracting behavior and consequent price and welfare implications in a gas market characterized by long term gas contracts using a static cournot model in order to most realistically describe the economical situation our representation divides the market into two stages the upstream market that links by means of long term contracts producers in exporting countries russia algeria etc to local retailers who bring gas to the consuming countries to satisfy local demands in the downstream market disruption costs are modeled using short run demand functions first we mathematically develop a general model and write the associated kkt conditions then we propose some case studies under iso elasticity assumptions for the long short run inverse demand curves in order to predict qualitatively and quantitatively the impacts of supply disruptions on western european gas trade in the second part we study in detail the german gas market of the 1980s to explain the supply choices of the german retailer and we derive interesting conclusions and insights concerning the amounts and prices of natural gas brought to the market the last part of the paper is dedicated to a study of the bulgarian gas market which is greatly dependent on the russian gas supplies and hence very sensitive to interruption risks some interesting conclusions are derived concerning the necessity to economically regulate the market by means of gas amounts control if the disruption probability is high enough

weakest link public goods giving in kind or transferring money abstract this paper extends the analysis of weakest link public goods whose level equals the smallest of the agents provision levels by permitting an agent either to increase one s own provision or else augment both one s own provision and that of the other agent s nash equilibria may be either symmetric with agents matching one another s provision or else asymmetric with an in kind transfer by one agent to another an equilibrium with cash transfers but no in kind transfers may be pareto superior to one with only in kind transfers if agents differ in their efficiency then in kind transfers by the low cost agent may dominate a cash transfer the possibility of pareto improving transfers is enhanced as the number of agents increases

the effect of gender based returns to borrowing on intra household resource allocation in rural bangladesh summary income from rural microcredit borrowing can empower women and consequently lead to investments in children s education and health this article examines the effect of male and female self employment returns to borrowing in rural bangladesh on intra household resource allocation and decision making abilities and how these effects differ with different borrowing sources household expenditure patterns measure intra household allocation the results show that female borrowers are better able to allocate their income toward goods more valuable to them and make major household decisions when their income increases this serves as evidence of increased empowerment or bargaining power of rural women in bangladesh

microfinance and gender empowerment in this paper we develop a theoretical model of household production bargaining and credit to analyse how access to microcredit affects intra household decision making and welfare and identify conditions under which female household members are most likely to benefit we show that consistent with ethnographic accounts of the impact of microcredit programmes on poor households access to loans can lead to a variety of outcomes for intra household decision making and welfare depending on initial conditions and that in some instances women borrowers may experience a decline in welfare we identify two instances in which a woman is most likely to benefit when there is scope for investing the loan profitably in a joint activity and when a large share of the household budget is devoted to household public goods

collective household models principles and main results in the traditional approach to consumer behaviour it is assumed that households behave as if they were single decision making units this approach has methodological empirical and welfare economic deficiencies a valuable alternative to the traditional model is the collective approach to household behaviour the collective approach explicitly takes account of the fact that multi person households consist of several members which may have different preferences among these household members an intrahousehold bargaining process is assumed to take place in addition to providing an introduction to the collective approach this survey intends to show how different collective household models each with their own aims and assumptions are connected

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

the effect of fossil energy and other environmental taxes on profit incentives for change in an open economy evidence from the uk this paper argues that the underlying supply and demand analysis of fossil energy and other environmental taxes needs further elaboration when a country a introduces national fossil energy or environmental taxes and b is open to international trade at given world prices we provide evidence that such conditions are plausible for many sectors in the uk a key implication is that the short run effects of such taxes should not be felt in final good prices since these are determined in world markets but in terms of underlying profitability these changes in underlying profits provide two key incentives for producers to change to more environmentally friendly production techniques and to switch resources to production of less environmentally harmful goods using input output techniques we provide evidence for the uk to show how existing fossil energy and other green taxes have affected underlying profitability the evidence shows quite strong profit incentives to shift resources from a small number of energy intensive industries to others

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

noncooperative household demand we study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods deriving the counterpart to the slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true slutsky matrix in the unitary model we provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative

economic abuse a theory of intrahousehold sabotage while research on domestic abuse in economics has to date almost exclusively focused on physical violence research in other disciplines has documented that abusive males frequently also use sabotage tactics to interfere with the employability and job performance of the victim this paper puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use labor market sabotage instrumentally to thwart their partners training or career efforts the model predicts a non monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and intrahousehold sabotage committed by abusive males there are no one size fit all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of economic abuse instead specific measures have to be targeted at different types of households

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

the engel curves of non cooperative households we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a system of engel curves to have been generated by a non cooperative model of family behaviour these conditions fully characterise the local behaviour of household level consumption in the cross section i e as a function of total income and distribution factors in this setting any demand system compatible with a non cooperative model is also compatible with a collective model but the converse is not true we describe how these nested conditions may be tested using standard instrumental variables strategies

household bargaining over fertility theory and evidence from malaysia we develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible the model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes we show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage if couples bargain with commitment fertility outcomes take account of both spouses fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining if couples bargain without commitment the influence of each spouse s fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power we test the models using household data from the malaysia family life survey this data set contains information on each spouse s desired fertility level as well as fertility outcomes we exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model the evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment

exploring renewable energy pricing with analytic network process comparing a developed and a developing economy abstract increasing use of renewable sources has a vital importance in mitigating increasing energy demand and global warming the limited reserves and negative environmental impacts associated with fossil fuel consumption make the renewable energy sources considerable alternatives in case environmental externalities are taken into consideration pricing models for renewable energy alternatives are commonly based on the same fundamentals as the fossil fuels but this approach neglects some of the characteristics that are unique to renewable energy alternatives in order to develop more accurate pricing models these unique variables which are mostly considered as market externalities need to be integrated in the current forms of pricing models the originality of this work is its ability to combine social technical environmental and economic aspects using analytic network process in order to provide a more holistic point of view on factors impacting renewable energy pricing through a comparison of two case studies united states u s and turkey are the two cases analyzed in this paper u s represents a developed economy whereas turkey represents a developing economy it is expected that the results of this work would be helpful for further research in understanding the dynamics behind pricing mechanism of the renewable sources in different environments for instance fundamental differences in relative importance of pricing factors between two case countries have been identified as different levels of enforcement through laws and regulations impact of geographic characteristics on site selection and job opportunities created through new investments

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

canadian contributions to family economics canadian scholars have made substantial contributions to the relatively new field of family economics these include new models of how men and women match in marriage markets and of how decisions are made in multi person households several were early contributors to the literature on married women s labour supply and labour supply in a family context and helped to develop empirical methods in this area a particular focus has been on the impacts of policy relevant parameters such childcare costs on family labour supply and child well being new work on child development the impact of early life conditions and the processes of intergenerational transmission also highlight the importance of family context in determining economic well being

intra family distribution of paid work time this article analyses the intra family distribution of paid work time in five european countries france germany italy spain and the uk to that end we formulate a collective model which allows us to characterize the efficient labour supply decisions of each spouse this two equation model is then simultaneously estimated by using national panel data drawn from the european community household panel echp 1994 2001 empirical results clearly show that in all sample countries the labour supply of wives is affected by own wages household and own nonlabour incomes and the number of children whereas evidence for husbands differs across countries

on the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of household labor supply this paper discusses some issues in the empirical implementation of game theoretic models of household labor supply in particular we focus on the identification problems inherent in many of these models as an illustration we estimate a game theoretic model which uses data on preferred working hours as additional identifying information

the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior in households whose allocation decisions can be represented as nash bargained household decisions extrahousehold environmental parameters eeps serve as pure shifters of the threat points the comparative statics of changes in demands due to changes in these eeps are given these are incorporated into a comprehensive statement of the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior including a nash generalization of barten s 1966 fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer demand estimation and data requirements are discussed along with nested testing of the following structure the neoclassical model is nested in the nash bargained model which in turn is nested in an unrestricted model of household demands emphasized throughout is the enriched menu of explanatory variables for demand analysis provided by the nash model as well as the model s ability to jointly analyze i household formation and ii intrahousehold allocation decisions

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

lead time reduction strategies in a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with lot size dependent lead times and stochastic demand this paper studies alternative methods for reducing lead time and their impact on the safety stock and the expected total costs of a q s continuous review inventory control system we focus on a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with stochastic demand and variable lot size dependent lead time and assume that lead time consists of production and setup and transportation time as a consequence lead time may be reduced by crashing setup and transportation time by increasing the production rate or by reducing the lot size we illustrate the benefits of reducing lead time in numerical examples and show that lead time reduction is especially beneficial in case of high demand uncertainty further our studies indicate that a mixture of setup time and production time reduction is appropriate to lower expected total costs

expenditure decisions of divorced mothers and income composition in this paper we analyze the relationship between the income sources of custodial divorced parents and their expenditure patterns we use data from the consumer expenditure survey to directly investigate the issue of whether or not divorced mothers receiving child support income spend larger amounts on child goods than those not receiving child support holding total household income constant by comparing the estimated coefficients on child support income and other income in an endogenous engel curve specification we argue that we can classify child goods as being public or private and say something about the expenditure patterns of noncustodial fathers under a nash equilibrium model of parental expenditures on public child goods and some plausible assumptions regarding the manner in which child support transfer decisions are made by noncustodial fathers our empirical results indicate that income composition does affect the expenditure patterns of divorced mothers and that consumption externalities exist even among divorced parents

a theory of rational marriage and divorce abstract despite high rates of cohabitation before marriage and considerable efforts invested in the search for a life partner a high number of marriages end in divorce this paper develops a model of household formation and dissolution in which it may be rational for individuals to marry fully anticipating that they will subsequently divorce economies of scale associated with living as a couple rather than in two separate households provide an incentive to marry problems with free riding in the provision of household collective goods may lead to divorce marriages which involve partners who are similar in tastes or in their productive capacities and in which private goods are equally shared are the most likely to be stable in contrast marriages which involve very disparate partners or which share the fruits of market labor very unequally between the partners are more likely to be shortlived and end in divorce

domestic violence and women s autonomy in developing countries theory and evidence abstract this paper sets out a simple non cooperative model of resource allocation within the household in developing countries that incorporates domestic violence as a vehicle for enhancing bargaining power we demonstrate that the extent of domestic violence faced by women is not necessarily declining in their reservation utilities or necessarily increasing in their spouses using the national family health survey data of india for 1998 99 we isolate the effect of domestic violence on female autonomy taking into account the possible endogeneity of domestic violence through the choice of appropriate instruments we provide some evidence for the evolutionary theory of domestic violence which argues that such violence stems from the jealousy caused by paternity uncertainty in our evolutionary past the findings have strong policy implications suggesting that it will take more than an improvement in women s employment options to address the problem of spousal violence

tests of intrahousehold resource allocation using a cv framework a comparison of husbands and wives separate and joint wtp in the slums of navi mumbai india summary husbands and wives from 422 households in the slums of navi mumbai india were interviewed separately first and jointly thereafter in a contingent valuation framework to assess their individual and joint household willingness to pay wtp for malaria vaccines husbands and wives demand differed significantly when they were interviewed separately but not when they were interviewed jointly the author rejects the common preference model and unified bargaining model of intrahousehold resource allocation researchers should consider the complexity of intrahousehold decision making when they conduct stated preference surveys even in patriarchal societies

public good valuation and intra family allocation i derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two person households measured alternatively by household member i s willingness to pay wtp for the good on behalf of the household wtp i h or by the sum of individual wtp values across family members wtp c households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient nash bargains over private and common household goods wtp i h is then defined by trade offs between the public good and the household good and wtp c by trade offs of between the public good and private goods wtp i h is found to be higher lower than wtp c when member i has a relatively high low marginal valuation of the public good but tends on average to equal wtp c as a consequence individuals tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household s wtp for a public good even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully adding all members wtp answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting pure and paternalistic altruism the latter attached to consumption of the public good move each member s wtp on behalf of the household closer to the true sum of individual wtp but only paternalistic altruism raises this sum

noncooperative decision making in the household evidence from malawi this paper proposes a novel test of productive efficiency in the household that also allows a test of noncooperative decision making i extend the collective model chiappori 1988 1997 to allow labor choices to affect future bargaining power by raising the value of outside options even if household consumption sharing is efficient labor choices are no longer efficient using data on malawi where there is predetermined variation in land rights that determine outside options in marriage i show that individuals spend more time on agricultural labor and less time on wage labor when household land is theirs they also have lower overall income and consumption the results are inconsistent with the fully efficient collective model but consistent with a noncooperative model with limited commitment where individuals allocate their labor supply to maximize future bargaining power limited commitment can lead to inefficient allocations that reduce household welfare

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

property rights over marital transfers in developing countries the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage focusing on dowry we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom in doing so we clarify and formalize the dual role of dowry as a pre mortem bequest and as a market clearing price identified in the literature we use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that in contrast to other rights women s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development we show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights we also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

erratum to lead time reduction strategies in a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with lot size dependent lead times and stochastic demand international journal of production economics 136 2012 37 44

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

pareto optimal redistribution and private charity abstract when private charity exists and is motivated by utility interdependence a non pareto optimal outcome the free rider problem typically arises nevertheless incremental fiscal redistribution cannot achieve a paretian welfare improvement so long as private charity continues at positive levels donors respond to incremental fiscal redistribution by reducing their voluntary contributions by exactly a dollar for every dollar transferred in this way no net transfer is achieved unless incremental fiscal redistribution is pursued to the point where private contributions have been driven to zero alternatively a net transfer may be achieved by fiscal measures which affect donors marginal incentives to donate