strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

a theory of retail pricing until recently the retail enterprise the shop has been comparatively neglected by economic theorists partly because they assigned little role to retailing the growth of interest in the problem in recent years reflects the development of models of imperfect information and the revival of interest in location theory pricing theory for the retail enterprise however remains a neglected area after surveying existing models of retailing the paper concentrates on the idea that the shop saves its customers costs by assembling goods in one place this introduces an essential non convexity and importantly affects the conditions under which shops compete with each other and the constraints on their price setting under the admittedly unrealistic assumption of full buyer information a theory of retail pricing is developed retail prices are frequently regarded as exceptions both to the law of costs and generally to every rational process of price formation which is all the more remarkable since these prices are the only ones which are of direct interest to the consumer and which are directly influenced by consumption knut wickselt

strategic restraint in contests abstract economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a political game between two interest groups the possible ex post realized outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies in the literature policy proposals are exogenous we extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies in a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then in a second stage engage in a contest over the proposed policies our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and in turn wasteful lobbying activities

welfare analysis of uniform entry tax in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous industries abstract this paper examines whether uniform entry taxes across all industries can improve welfare in a monopolistic competition model with multiple groups of differentiated goods which vary in parameters including their elasticity of substitution and taste for variety the results show that even if taste for variety is high and monopoly power is weak in some industries the uniform tax rate on entries across all industries can improve welfare when the weighted average of taste for variety over all industries is low and when the weighted average of the lerner index of monopoly power over all industries is high

on the dixit stiglitz model of monopolistic competition our purpose in this note is to revisit the popular monopolistic competition model of avinash k dixit and joseph e stiglitz 1977 and to stress the fact that the variant of this model used in the recent macroeconomic literature is significantly different from the original in particular by taking n as the number of active monopolists the recent discussion of dixit and stiglitz 1993 and xiaokai yang and ben j heijdra 1993 about the the advantages of neglecting terms of the order 1 n in the computed elasticities is significantly affected by the choice of the variant of the model the basic model presented in section i has been used from the start by dixit and stiglitz to study optimum product diversity it is a simple general equilibrium model with n monopolistic goods and a numeraire good which can be interpreted as labor or leisure time or as the aggregation of all the other goods in the economy the variant of the model analyzed in section ii was independently developed by several authors for different simple applications in macroeconomics 1 it is an enlarged model that includes an additional good interpreted as labor time but not taken as the numeraire more importantly the enlarged model does not lead to a general equilibrium analysis until the wage rate taken as given in a first step is adjusted competitively or strategically it is for the basic model that yang and heijdra 1993 yh give an alternative computation method taking into account the priceindex effect of individual pricing decisions this effect had been neglected in the original paper of dixit and stiglitz 1977 ds who were only concerned with the large n case ensured by low fixed costs and imperfect substitution between the monopolistic goods limiting their model to the special case of a unitary elasticity of substitution between the monopolistic goods and the numeraire good yh obtain an explicit solution but yh s solution is still an approximation because it neglects the indirect effects that feedback has on pricing decisions we will show that in the enlarged model taking into account this income feedback effect allows for an explicit solution and simplifies calculations but in the variant some meaningful cases are incompatible with free entry and thus prohibit the use of ds s approximation however as we conclude in section iii this is not to say that their approximation should never be used on the contrary the approximation hypothesis is a very useful part of dixit and stiglitz s contribution

domestic trade and transportation costs as barriers to international trade available evidence indicates that costs of nontraded services in domestic transportation wholesaling and retailing domestic margins are higher if a good is shipped in international trade than if it is shipped from domestic producers to domestic consumers consequently domestic margins appear to act as natural barriers to trade in the same manner as international transp ort costs do this paper presents estimates of the barriers that the domestic margins impose against u s imports and shows that they exc eed the barriers imposed by tariffs and international transport costs combined

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

service sector restrictiveness and economic performance an estimation for the mena region this article aims to assess barriers to service provision in the banking and telecom sectors of four middle east and north africa mena countries and the impact of these barriers on firm performance our methodology involves the computation of aggregate and modal trade restrictiveness indices tris by sector and utilisation of these tris as regressors of firms economic performance our analysis shows that significant regulatory reforms have taken place in the service sectors over the last decade in the mena region but that a broad range of restrictions still remain the most significant change in these service sectors has been the lifting or softening of constraints on foreign equity participation these regulatory reforms however have had varying degrees of impact on market structure depending on the country the sector and the mode moreover service restrictions have had an impact on economic performance in the three studied sectors while a rent creating effect seems to dominate restrictions on banking and fixed telecom sectors a cost inefficiency effect seems to dominate the mobile telecom sector finally we find evidence of interactions between modal restrictions for banking services our results suggest a complementarity between modes 3 and 1 as well as a substitution effect between modes 3 and 4 in the banking sector

paying the price final goods protection in oecd countries this paper presents new measures of final goods trade protection in eight developed countries the analysis exploits detailed comprehensive and careful price comparisons to derive estimates that it is argued reliably capture all kinds of barriers the results show extensive protection japan s average tariff equivalent is 57 those of the european countries range from 48 to 55 and that of the united states is lowest at 12 an applied general equilibrium analysis of this protection is conducted the results include the following japan s barriers impose large costs on itself japanese and u s barriers greatly burden poorer countries the united states would benefit significantly from multilateral but not unilateral opening

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

the welfare implications of services liberalization in a developing country abstract we propose an integrated method based on a two sector small open economy dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium model to estimate non tariff barriers and quantify the impact of services liberalization the major component of trade barriers is explicitly modeled through the introduction of entry sunk costs hence liberalization is treated assuming a government s policy decision aimed at reducing those costs then we estimate the model using bayesian techniques for tunisia and the euro area the paper presents a precise quantitative evaluation of services trade barriers as the difference between entry sunk costs in tunisia versus the euro area we find significant welfare benefits in addition to aggregate and sectoral growth gains the tunisian economy could attain following services liberalization surprisingly the good sector is the one that benefits the most from services liberalization in the short and long term horizons

advertising sunk costs and barriers to entry this paper tests hypotheses about the entry deterring effects of advertising the model isolates three separate effects of advertising on entry the effect on the irrecoverable costs of entry the effect on the uncertainty underlying the entry environment and the effect on the measured rates of profit we find that advertising impedes entry since necessary advertising expenditures give rise to a sunk cost which raises the risk of entry however we also find a countervailing force due to advertising in that the entrant perceives a greater likelihood of success in markets where advertising is important our analysis shows that the overall impact of advertising on entry is positive

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

normal costs and demand effects in price setting a study of retailing the study aims at contributing to the debate whether there are demand effects in models that seek to explain prices as mark ups on costs for costs it considers actual costs normal costs and an intermediate model with a partial adjustment to the deviation of actual from normal costs for demand effects it considers an effect on the price level of a change of demand with an allowance for asymmetry between demand growth and demand decline tests and estimates are conducted on the basis of data from retailing

concentration of marketing channels and brand level retailer margins evidence from japan this article investigates the impacts of marketing channel concentration at each distributive channel stage on brand level retailer gross margins a unique official japanese dataset the national survey of prices which reports brand level wholesale prices as well as retail prices of national brand items in various consumer product categories enables us to estimate the retail margin directly for each specified brand the most notable conclusion is that an inverse relationship is found between brand level retailer margins and the degree of wholesaler concentration which is consistent with empirical results in previous marketing and economic studies that investigated the impacts of manufacturer concentration on category level retailer margins

primaries and the new hampshire effect candidates for u s presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states the primaries we develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning the equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well campaigning is very intensive in the first district the outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates incentives to campaign in the next district which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts on the normative side our model oers a possible explanation for the sequential organization it leads in expectation to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections moreover if one of the candidates is the more eective campaigner sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

committees and rent seeking effort under probabilistic voting congleton 1984 shows that a rent awardedby a committee results in smaller aggregaterent seeking expenditures than a similarrent awarded by a single administrator this note modifies congleton s model byconsidering a model in which voting isprobabilistic instead of deterministic ishow that the relative magnitudes ofrent seeking expenditures could go eitherway depending on the relative weightedsensitivities to rent seeking efforts ofthe committee and the single administrator i show how the distribution of votingpowers of committee members affectsrent seeking efforts i also examine thecase where there is some probability thatthe rent may not be awarded if thecommittee is unable to reach a majoritydecision my results diverge from congleton 1984 because of the absence ofmajoritarian cycles in my model

demand uncertainty and sales a study of fashion and markdown pricing the theory of clearance sales is expanded and applied to explain why markups markdowns and the frequency of sales of merchandise sold by department stores have increased dramatically in recent years and why they differ across merchandise groups tha major theme of the paper is that the growing role of fashion and product variety is an important reason for these increases and for the differences between merchandise groups the growing importance of fashion is illustrated by documenting the declining use of whites and the increasing use of colors and prints estimates of the effects of imports and technological and demographic changes on markups and markdowns are presented copyright 1988 by american economic association

do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak link contest abstract laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states moves of nature however in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival this is particularly important in aggressor defender contests this paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor s action the results of the experiments indicate that the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender s win rate prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors decisions that is not being exploited by defenders and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast

the outputs of retail activities concepts measurement and evidence from u s census data the authors develop a new economic framework for the empirical analysis of retail margins this framework formalizes the role of distribution services as outputs of retail activities their main results are the following the measures of outputs of retail activities identified in the data perform as important and robust determinants of retail margins variables that purport to capture oligopolistic features of market structure play a limited or no role in determining retail margins quantity setting and price setting under the assumptions of profit maximization and monopolistic competition are categorically rejected by the data the data base is information on 49 retail sectors from the 1982 u s census of retail trades copyright 1993 by mit press

taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic competition abstract many positive and normative results in models using the monopolistic competition framework of the dixit stiglitz spence type depend on the value of an important parameter the taste for variety in these models however the taste for variety is linked in a close but arbitrary manner to the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in this paper we make a simple modification to the basic model which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power we then show how this changes the usual comparisons between social optimum and market outcomes

the design of rent seeking competitions in the standard tullock model of rent seeking as a noncooperative game aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal exceed or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker s investment if the supply of an input into the rent seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem he supplies it and designs the rent seeking game to maximize his wealth the author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician s wealth in one input and two input rent seeking processes

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

selling costs and switching costs explaining retail gasoline margins recent theoretical work has shown that price discrimination can take place in imperfectly competitive as well as monopoly markets the persistence of higher retail margins on unleaded than on leaded gasoline during the 1980s suggests that discrimination may occur even in very competitive markets this article studies a number of cost based explanations for such gasoline pricing as well as the possibility of price discrimination the analysis indicates that gas stations discriminate against groups of customers who are less likely to switch to another station the conclusions highlight the influence of shopping or search costs on pricing decisions even in markets thought to be quite competitive

the welfare effects of distribution regulations in oecd countries i introduction the distribution sector plays a crucial and large role in most economies 1 in the g 7 united states japan germany france united kingdom italy and canada distribution s share of gross domestic product gdp ranges from 8 to 15 and its share in employment ranges from 11 to 19 pilat 1997 table 2 1 because almost all goods in an economy pass through this sector distribution can heavily influence prices for consumer goods in particular these price effects can be large in organisation for economic cooperation and development oecd countries consumer prices for final goods exceed the corresponding producer prices by 40 and more in addition to indeed because of its economic importance distribution producers enjoy substantial political clout and have won many favorable regulations from the political process see kalirajan 2000 and pilat 1997 these regulations may impose large welfare costs and may exert a large influence on trade flows nonetheless relatively few publications rigorously analyze the potential overall welfare and trade effects of deregulating distribution this study seeks to fill some of that void i first provide a brief overview of distribution regulations then i present new internationally comparable distribution margins data for a sample of eight oecd countries these data are used to infer the extent to which distribution regulations reduce efficiency for four of these countries i conduct an applied general equilibrium age analysis of the welfare effects of high margins and find that they impose large costs rivaling those of protection it appears that efforts to increase economic welfare should not ignore the potentially large gains from liberalizing distribution this article also examines the relationship between restricted distribution and imports ii distribution regulations several studies have described a variety of distribution regulations in oecd countries nicoletti 2001 boylaud 2000 kalirajan 2000 and pilat 1997 provide excellent overviews these studies imply that despite some liberalization many impediments remain the most burdensome regulations include restrictions on large stores onerous business set up rules restrictive zoning laws and other real estate regulations limits on product ranges store hours and pricing and monopoly distributors for certain products such as pharmaceuticals liquor and tobacco in addition many local regulations work under the radar of studies such as these the limited literature on the subject implies that distribution regulations reduce welfare pellegrini 2000 estimates that deregulating retail trade would increase italian gdp by more than 1 japan s economic planning agency 1996 finds that loosening restrictions on large retailers has increased japanese gdp by 1 pilat 1997 cites a european commission study that finds that liberalizing store hours has greatly increased consumer welfare carree and nijkamps 2001 find efficiency gains after entry barrier removal in the netherlands nicoletti 2001 concludes both simulation and econometric studies point unequivocally to potentially large welfare gains from the liberalization of retail trade also burda 2000 and studies cited in nicoletti 2001 find that employment would increase not decrease with liberalization these studies provide valuable information but none simulate the effect of a country s total package of distribution regulations on welfare i do so by exploiting age modeling which takes account of links among industries and nations to produce broad brushed estimates of inflated margins effects in multiple countries distribution s widespread influence on an economy makes an age approach especially important 2 iii measuring margins the underlying data the distribution margins data grow out of protection data developed in bradford 1998 2003

dynamic multi activity contests in many contests players can influence the outcome through efforts in multiple activities several of which can be chosen before others in this paper we develop a model of dynamic multi activity contests players simultaneously choose efforts in long run activities observe each other s efforts in these activities and then simultaneously choose efforts in short run activities a player s long run and short run efforts complement each other in determining the player s probability of winning we compare the outcomes of this two stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players do not observe each other s first stage efforts before the second stage and thus effectively choose efforts in all activities simultaneously interestingly effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi activity contest than in the simultaneous multi activity contest the implications of this result for the organization of military litigation innovation academic and sporting contests are highlighted

the europe u s productivity gap in a rear view mirror will measurement differences in the services sector output please rise the deterioration in 1995 of europe s productivity performance relative to the u s coincided with the renaissance of the u s statistical system which can be regarded by now as the frontier in official statistics this paper raises the natural question whether the european statistical system was left at the station while its u s counterpart departed making it possible for measurement differences to become the primary suspect for the existing productivity gap my retrospective review of the development path in the services sector productivity statistics suggests that europe lags significantly behind the u s in the services producer price index program both in terms of scope and timing of its implementation accordingly the role of these measurement differences in the post 1995 europe u s productivity story cannot reasonably be ruled out the paper concludes with a structured guess that provides a circumstantial evidence on the benefits generated by the upgrades in the u s services sector statistics the results show that these enhancements led to two kinds of benefits during the post 1995 period a considerable reduction in the contribution of industries that traditionally dampened the aggregate productivity trend combined with a larger contribution of those that generally lifted it this contrasts markedly with europe where the contribution of these two sources remained unchanged in the meantime

retailers strategies and food price dynamics evidence from dairy scanner data abstract we investigate the relationship between retailers strategies and dairy price dynamics using high frequency italian scanner data for different dairy products we compute a weekly drift free price index specific for product category chain and type of store exploiting the unbalanced panel data structure to control for unobservable strategies by chain time and type of store we test if unobservables are statistically significant in influencing the price dynamics of each of the products covered by our analysis in general chain and type of store specific unobservables play a significant role moreover we identify the role of some observable strategic variables in controlling or in stimulating price inflation rates we obtain mixed results on the relationship between private label pl market shares and price trend while we find price promotions to be more effective if applied to national brands nbs rather than pls we conclude with some implications for the potential role of public policies in controlling food inflation

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

legal expenditure as a rent seeking game legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent seeking contest in civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent seeking contests the endogenous decision to participate in the rent seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case and the decision by the defendant to defend it the desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology

economic success factors in spanish small retail businesses an analysis based on sector relative definitions the purpose of this study was to carry out a sectorial analysis of the strategic profile of successful small businesses in spanish retailing first a one dimensional statistical formalisation of the concept of small business was proposed based on yearly sales revenue and relative to the sector likewise some statistical formalisations of the concept of economic success were proposed based on profit margins and also relativised according to sector once a conceptual framework was established a sectorial model of strategic characterisation of successful small retailing firms was developed the results of applying these proposals to the spanish retail industry confirmed the importance of a sectorial approach as opposed to an overall analysis

measuring protection mission impossible abstract there seems to be some confusion between openness and protection measures in the international trade literature the aim of this paper is to bring together the state of the art in quantifying trade policy measures and for this reason we focus on the extent of the protection granted by policies rather than on the degree of openness of the economy given the considerable amount of literature that deals with these issues we will limit our review as follows on the one hand we focus on trade policies implemented at the border and therefore do not consider all the other possible public interventions influencing trade flows on the other hand we only take into account indexes that explicitly adopt a metric expressed in a scalar aggregate tariff and quota equivalent measures or an index in a closed interval we distinguish between indexes that aggregate across products same barrier for more products and indexes that aggregate across instruments more barriers for the same product finally in order to classify the large number of indexes covered in our review we propose a typology based on three categories incidence outcome and equivalence

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

on monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity workers rents also matter in the dixit stiglitz model of monopolistic competition entry of firms is socially too small other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity we sow that workers rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits which entices too many firms to enter we discuss the possibility of over provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled

institutions infrastructure and trade we work with a panel of bilateral trade flows from 1988 to 2002 exploring the influence of infrastructure institutional quality colonial and geographic context and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral trade we are interested in threshold effects and so emphasize those cases where bilateral country pairs do not actually trade we depart from the institutions and infrastructure literature in this respect using selection based gravity modeling of trade flows we also depart from this literature by mixing principal components to condense our institutional and infrastructure measures with a focus on deviations from expected values for given income cohorts to control for multicollinearity infrastructure and institutional quality are significant determinants not only of export levels but also of the likelihood exports will take place at all our results support the notion that export performance and the propensity to take part in the trading system at all depends on institutional quality and access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure indeed this dependence is far more important empirically than variations in tariffs in explaining sample variations in north south trade this implies that policy emphasis on developing country market access instead of support for trade facilitation may be misplaced

committees and rent seeking effort abstract this paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent seeking effort within the environments explored relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators to the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent seeking the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees

allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game abstract we consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency in other cases the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific we present conditions under which each result obtains our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric we show however that a selfish income maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer

mean variance analysis of supply chains under wholesale pricing and profit sharing schemes in this paper we explore the use of a wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme wpps for coordinating supply chains under the mean variance mv decision framework we first analytically establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for coordinating the centralized supply chain by wpss we then show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the stackelberg game with wpps in the decentralized case after that we discuss the information asymmetric case in which the retailer can be benefited by pretending to be more risk averse finally we propose a new measure for the manufacturer to prevent this cheating from happening insights are generated

trade in the triad how easy is the access to large markets in this paper we measure market access between the united states the eu and japan the triad using the effect of national borders on trade patterns we investigate overall and industry level trends of bilateral trade openness and provide explanations for those using proxies for bilateral observed protection tariffs and ntbs home bias of consumers product differentiation and levels of fdi the explanations related to actual protection home bias and substitutability of goods put together explain a large part of the border effect between blocs of the triad although they do not explain the whole of the border effect puzzle jel classification f12 f15 commerce dans la triade jusqu a quel point l acces aux grands marches est il facile cet article mesure le niveau d integration commerciale entre les pays de l ue le japon et les etats unis la triade en utilisant l effet des frontieres nationales sur le commerce international nous etudions le niveau et l evolution du degre d ouverture bilateral ainsi que les differentes explications possibles des effets frontiere estimes qui sont testees a l aide de variables capturant la protection tarifs et bnts le biais domestique des consommateurs le degre de differenciation des produits et les niveaux d ide bilateraux les explications liees a la protection au biais domestique et a la substituabilite entre produits considerees ensemble expliquent une bonne partie de l effet frontiere entre pays de la triade meme si elles n expliquent pas la totalite de l enigme

the outputs of retail activities french evidence a new economic framework is applied to the empirical analysis of retail margins this framework is founded on the definition of profits and incorporates recent theoretical developments formalizing the role of distribution services as outputs of retail activities the main results are the measures of outputs of retail activities identified in the data perform as important and robust determinants of retail margins variables that purport to capture the oligopolistic features of market structure have little association with the variation in retail margins hypotheses of price setting and quantity setting under the assumptions of profit maximization and monopolistic competition are categorically rejected by the data the data base is information on 50 retail sectors from the 1982 survey of firms in commerce and the 1983 survey of firms in services reported by insee

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

a model of retail formats based on consumers economizing on shopping time retailers in developed countries increasingly provide one stop shopping why are they responding to growing demand for time saving convenience or are they responding to economies of scale made possible by new retail technology and what role if any is played by improvements in automotive refrigeration and other consumer technology to examine these questions we develop a model that can help explain the growth of one stop shopping estimate the model with aggregate grocery retail data and compare the implications of our model with competing explanations our model includes several desirable features 1 the extent of one shop shopping is endogenously determined 2 consumer store choice is determined in an explicit household production utility maximizing context this choice is based on a tradeoff between time saving shopping convenience and price 3 the model is readily amenable to empirical testing the key endogenous parameter of our model describes the number of categories carried by a store in the context of grocery retailing this parameter can distinguish between a single category specialty store a simple grocer a supermarket and a large superstore this parameter is determined by the interplay of consumers economizing on shopping time and retail competition in the presence of technological constraints which relate operating cost with assortment size our approach may also be viewed as an example of how the boundary between retail service production and household service production can be modeled as a market outcome in the spirit of betancourt and gautchi betancourt roger david gautschi 1990 demand complementarities household production and retail assortments marketing sci 92 spring 146 161 and wernerfelt wernerfelt birger 1994 an efficiency criterion for marketing design j marketing res 31november 462 470 the nature of extant retail formats and other channel related institutions circumscribes the boundary between retailers and households with the notable early exception of baumol and ide baumol william j edward a ide 1956 variety in retailing management sci 31 october 93 101 few explicit models describe retail format determination as an equilibrating market mechanism our model describes the determination of one aspect of retail formats namely the extent of one stop shopping our hope is that similar approaches can be used to describe other aspects and types of emergent retail formats we estimate our model using u s aggregate annual data for a 26 year period and later corroborate parts of the analysis using cross sectional data for the 48 contiguous states of the u s the equilibrium conditions of our model translate into a system of two equations with two endogenous variables estimates of the reduced form parameters provide our central empirical finding that per capita disposable income has had a significant positive effect on both supermarket assortment as expected from our model and store operating costs perhaps somewhat less expected this suggests that greater prevalence of one stop shopping has been a response to growing demand for time saving convenience the estimates of the underlying structural parameters also provide a measure of the imputed net savings to consumers from supermarket shopping taking into account reductions in shopping time made possible by supermarkets savings equivalent to approximately 2 2 of expenditures on grocery products over the 1961 1986 period we lastly consider competing hypotheses while a number of explanations can account for increased store assortment these explanations have divergent implications for retail margins operating costs and profits these implications suggest that retail scale economies were not the drivers of one stop shopping in the years of our data nor was the impetus to increase store size primarily a desire to bring in new higher margin items however we acknowledge that transportation and inventory holding technologies are prerequisites to one stop shopping and that improvements in these technologies were particularly important in the early growth period of supermarkets

rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained in the original tullock 1975 1980 game an individual bidder s probability of winning with a bid b is proportional to br where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking different interpretations can be given to these probabilities first one may view r as a reflection of the political culture alternatively one may view r as a choice variable for a politician intuition suggests that a society with a high tolerance for the selling of political favors and politicians who are receptive to rent seeking would both induce greater rent seeking expenditures than other societies all else equal this paper shows that a lower value of r can actually lead to more rent dissipation than a higher value this paper also reinforces two points concerning rent seeking first the analysis confirms the robustness of under dissipation of rents even in the face of entry second it points out the importance of distinguishing between rent seeking expenditures and rent dissipation when bidders must borrow for example total expenditure may understate rent dissipation

oligopolistic competition and the optimal provision of products this paper considers the theory of market versus optimal product diversity in the light of two recent advances in oligopoly theory the first is the development of discrete choice models to describe heterogeneous consumer tastes and the application of such models to oligopolistic competition the second advance is the proof that logconcavity of the consumer taste density guarantees the existence of a price equilibrium we analyze an oligopoly model with price competition and free entry taking explicit account of the integer constraint under the chamberlinian symmetry assumption that tastes are i i d we first show that logconcavity of the taste density implies there is excessive market provision of variety when each consumer buys one unit of the product from one of the firms we then show that this result extends to price sensitive individual demands by proving that the equilibrium number of firms is at least as great as that which would be provided at the second best social optimum subject to a zero profit constraint for firms our results call into question previous findings for representative consumer models that left open the possibility of insufficient product diversity

the role of prices in measuring the poor s living standards in this paper we revisit two pieces of conventional wisdom in the current debate about poverty paying close attention to the price data underlying these findings that the poor pay more than households of higher income for the goods and services they purchase and that poverty rates at least as measured by the u s census have remained essentially flat since the late 1960s raising questions about the success of the policies implemented to reduce poverty by examining scanner data on thousands of household purchases we find that the poor pay less not more for the goods they purchase and by extending the advances on price measurement in the recent decade back to the 1970s we find that current poverty rates are less than half of the official numbers

comparative analysis of litigation systems an auction theoretic approach a simple auction theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court the court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys this framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems the british rule continental rule american rule and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model