small investment and large returns terrorism media and the economy the study investigates the role of the media in the impact of terrorism on the economy a unique data set of the newspaper articles that reported terrorist attacks during 2002 is used to evaluate their impact on the tel aviv stock exchange an econometric analysis is performed in order to understand how a newspaper decides to cover a terrorist attack i e the number of articles positioning of articles whether to include photos and the size of headlines it was found that media coverage is an important channel through which terrorism produces economic damage the findings also showed that the economic damage caused by terrorist attacks increases monotonically with the amount of media coverage it was also found that the economic impact of the media coverage diminishes over time

secure implementation experiments do strategy proof mechanisms really work strategy proofness requiring that truth telling is a dominant strategy is a standard concept used in social choice theory saijo et al 2003 argue that this concept has serious drawbacks in particular announcing one s true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy and almost all strategy proof mechanisms have a continuum of nash equilibria for only a subset of strategy proof mechanisms do the set of nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide for example this double coincidence occurs in the groves mechanism when preferences are single peaked we report experiments using two strategy proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of nash equilibria but the other has a unique nash equilibrium we found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two

implementation via approval mechanisms abstract we focus on the single peaked domain and study the class of generalized approval mechanisms g a m s first players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative and then a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented our main finding is that essentially for every nash implementable welfare optimum including the condorcet winner alternative there exists a gam that nash implements it importantly the gam that nash implements the condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature

trade policymaking in a resource rich landlocked country the wto review of mongolia the aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the trade policy review of mongolia tprm 2014 the tprm 2014 demonstrates that the mongolian economy is relatively open and it has very low formal trade barriers although there remain significant behind the borders barriers including poor governance and infrastructure being a landlocked country any major cross border price differences quickly results in informal trade with neighbouring china limiting mongolia s ability to pursue independent commercial policy mongolia s growth is not broad based and largely driven by the mining boom making its economy highly vulnerable to external shocks while this is not unique to mongolia and has been seen in many natural resource abundant countries experience suggests that countries with sound institutions and macroeconomic policies have overcome the so called resource curse

malaysian trade policy and the 2001 wto trade policy review the purpose of this paper is two fold to examine developments in trade and investment policy regimes in malaysia following the on set of the financial crisis using the trade policy review malaysia 2001 of the wto as a reference point and to evaluate the review in terms of the objectives of the wto trade policy review mechanism as set out in the marrakesh agreement it is found that by and large malaysia has managed to come out of the crisis without compromising on its long standing commitment to maintaining a relatively open trade and investment policy regime by the regional standards however there are some disturbing post crisis developments which deserve scrutiny in a future review these include increase in the degree of dispersion of tariff rates because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines increased reliance on non automatic import licensing to regulate imports of a significant number of products which directly compete with domestic production by public sector enterprises and unexplained delays in meeting commitments under the general agreement on trade in services gats

to bargain or not to bargain that is the question we use economic analysis in a simple game theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no negotiation strategy from the government viewpoint we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure i e expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents and whether to negotiate or not this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades the possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here the specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms the reason for this remains an open question

implementation in dominant strategies under complete and incomplete information this paper shows that if a social choice rule can be implemented in dominant strategies by an indirect mechanism but there does not exist a direct mechanism that implements it in dominant strategies then it must be the case that the original indirect mechanism does not implement the social choice rule in nash strategies under complete information or in bayesian strategies under imcomplete information

terrorism in a bargaining framework a lthough hostage seizures are a small percentage of terrorist incidents they represent some of the most spectacular and influential events 2 the takeover of the american embassy in tehran on november 14 1979 the seizure of eleven dpec oil ministers on december 21 1975 and the capture and killing of nine israeli athletes on september 5 1972 are incidents not easily forgotten from 1968 through 1982 of the approximately 8 000 reported terrorist events 540 7 percent were transna

free riding and paid riding in the fight against terrorism overt terrorist acts and the specter of terrorism impose significant costs on the community of civilized nations these costs can be reduced by taking retaliatory action against terrorist organizations and the countries that sponsor them assuming a positive range over which retaliatory cost is less at the marginal than the resulting benefit from reduced terrorism there exists some positive level of retaliation which is efficient from the perspective of the victimized countries an obstacle to achieving the efficient level of retaliation against terrorists results from the fact that much of the benefit from retaliation is general and cannot be captured entirely by the retaliating country a fully efficient policy of retaliation will therefore require a cooperative response from all victimized countries achieving this cooperation however may confront the well known free rider or prisoner s dilemma problem while collectively the targets and potential targets of terrorism are better off retaliating each will likely see its advantage best served by not retaliating in this case it is quite possible that no one will retaliate when the best response is for everyone to retaliate a closer look at the problem of terrorism however suggests that the standard prisoner s dilemma may not be a significant obstacle to retaliation under plausible conditions it will pay one country to retaliate even if other countries choose to free ride indeed given the two options in the standard prisoner s dilemma setting cooperating retaliating or noncooperating nonretaliating it is very likely that all victimized countries will retaliate that no country will take a free ride but this does not mean that the prospects for genuine cooperation in confronting terrorism are good in the case of retaliation against terrorist free riding is only one way a country can increase the net benefit it receives from the public good provided by another it is possible for one country to in effect sell the public good of reduced terrorism that is generated by the retaliation of another country this paidrider possibility has important and obviously adverse implications for the prospects that retaliation will result from a cooperative effort on the part of those countries victimized by terrorists in section i the implication of free riding and paid riding for retaliation against terrorists will be investigated in a two country setting in section ii the circumstances that either encourage or discourage a country from being a paid rider on the retaliation of another country will be considered and some real world examples of paid riding will be discussed

global terrorism deterrence versus pre emption this paper analyses two anti terrorism policies when a targeted nation s people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad a country s deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected while its preemption decision typically gives external benefits when the threat is reduced for all potential targets with damages limited to home interests a country will overdeter while for globalized terror a country will underdeter pre emption is usually undersupplied leader follower behaviour is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence but worsen inefficiency for pre emption compared with simultaneous choice equilibrium allocations targeted nations can never achieve the proper counterterrorism policy through leadership ce memoire analyse deux politiques anti terrorisme quand la population et la propriete des nations visees sont en danger tant au pays qu a l etranger la decision de dissuasion d un pays entraine des avantages et des couts externes a proportion que la menace terroriste est evitee alors que la decision de preemption produit typiquement des avantages externes quand la menace est reduite pour toutes les cibles potentielles dans le cas de dommages limites aux cibles dans le pays un pays va etre portea sur dissuader alors que dans le cas de terreur globalisee un pays va etre portea sous dissuader la preemption est generalement sous offerte le comportement leader suiveur est susceptible de reduire l inefficacite de la dissuasion mais d empirer l inefficacite de la preemption par rapport a ce qui se passe quand les choix sont simultanes les nations visees ne peuvent jamais en arriver a la politique d anti terrorisme appropriee par la voie du leadership

a strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism abstract we study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power their military effectiveness the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil we characterize analytically the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the key model parameters we provide an algorithm to find the endogenous set of cooperating countries based on their benefit from cooperation and their political economic power

strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments this paper surveys some recent results characterizing strategyproof collective choice rules when preferences satisfy conditions that are meaningful in economic or political environments

whether to attack a terrorist s resource stock today or tomorrow reprinted from games and economic behavior 64 2 kjell hausken whether to attack a terrorist s resource stock today or tomorrow pages no 548 564 copyright 2008 with permission from elsevier

conciliation counterterrorism and patterns of terrorist violence what causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows gov ernment concessions given this pattern why do governments ever conciliate terror ists i propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them leaving extremists in con trol governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their coun terterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises the model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror when moderates accept concessions the terms of negotiated settle ments the duration of terrorist conflicts incentives for moderate terrorists to radical ize their followers and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders the model is illustrated with an application to the israeli0 palestinian conflict

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

optimal voting rules we study dominant strategy incentive compatible dic and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives the agents are privately informed about their preferences and have single crossing utility functions monetary transfers are not feasible we use an equivalence between deterministic dic mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as say a rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained