interpreting economic time series this paper explores some of the implications for econometric practice of the principle that people s observed behavior will change when their constraints change in dynamic contexts a proper definition of people s constraints includes among them laws of motion that describe the evolution of the taxes they must pay and the prices of the goods that they buy and sell changes in agents perceptions of these laws of motion or constraints will in general produce changes in the schedules that describe the choices they make as a function of the information that they possess until very recently received dynamic econometric practice ignored this principle the practice of dynamic econometrics should be changed so that it is consistent with the principle that people s rules of choice are influenced by their constraints this is a substantial undertaking and involves major adjustments in the ways that we formulate estimate and simulate econometric models

why is the market for long term care insurance so small abstract long term care represents one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly in the united states we present evidence of supply side market failures in the private long term care insurance market in particular the typical policy purchased exhibits premiums marked up substantially above expected benefits it also provides very limited coverage relative to the total expenditure risk however we present additional evidence suggesting that the existence of supply side market failures is unlikely by itself to be sufficient to explain the very small size of the private long term care insurance market in particular we find enormous gender differences in pricing that do not translate into differences in coverage and we show that more comprehensive policies are widely available if seldom purchased at similar loads to purchased policies this suggests that factors limiting demand for insurance are also likely to be important in this market our evidence also sheds light on the likely nature of these demand side factors

management buyouts evidence on taxes as a source of value this paper estimates the value of tax benefits in 76 management buyouts of public companies completed in the period 1980 to 1986 the median value of tax benefits estimated at the time the buyout company goes private has a lower bound of 21 and an upper bound of 143 of the premium paid to pre buyout shareholders the estimated value depends on the rate buyout debt is repaid and the tax rate applied to the interest deductions the paper also presents evidence on the actual taxes paid and debt repayment rates by these companies after the buyout the results in this paper suggest that tax benefits are an important source of the wealth gains in management buyouts

claim timing and ex post adverse selection many health care treatments are not urgent and may be delayed if patients so choose because insurance coverage is typically determined by the treatment date individuals may have incentives to strategically delay treatments to minimize out of pocket costs the strategic delay of treatment a particular form of moral hazard can be an important source of subsequent adverse selection in which ex ante identical individuals select insurance coverage based on their differing accumulation of previously delayed treatments this article investigates these forces empirically in the context of the missing market for dental insurance using rich claim level data my analysis reveals that approximately 40 of individuals strategically delay dental treatments when incentivized to do so and this flexibility in delaying treatment can explain why the market for dental insurance has largely unraveled more generally the counterfactual analysis suggests features such as open enrolment periods and contracting on pre existing conditions may be helpful tools in overcoming adverse selection in insurance contexts where the timing of uncertainty is not contractible

adverse selection commitment and renegotiation extension to and evidence from insurance markets with asymmetric information full commitment to long term contracts may permit markets to approach first best allocations however commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior notably renegotiation we reexamine commitment in insurance markets we present an alternative model which extends laffont and tirole s procurement model to address uncertainty and competition which involves semipooling in the first period followed by separation this and competing models e g single period models and no commitment models have different predictions concerning temporal patterns of insurer profitability a test using california data suggests that some automobile insurers use commitment to attract selective portfolios comprising disproportionate numbers of low risks

adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance can dynamic data help to distinguish a standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard we show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables in the presence of moral hazard experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims we discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are typically available finally we argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse selection even if it is based on asymmetric learning jel d82 g22 c41 c14

determinants of economic well being among u s farm operator households participation in government programs has a mild impact on the economic well being of u s farm households major factors that determine farm household prosperity are the primary operator s education level and ethnicity education level of the spouse and other characteristics such as forward purchasing of inputs use of contract shipping of products having a succession plan farm ownership and location in a metro area this article uses the 2001 agricultural resource management survey arms as well as relative and an absolute measure to assess u s farm households economic well being the relative measure compares the income and wealth position of farm households relative to median income and median wealth of the general population the absolute measure adds annualized wealth to a farm household s income

progressive screening long term contracting with a privately known stochastic process we examine a model of long term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves in addition the realized values are also private information we characterize a class of environments in which the profit maximizing long term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts within each sequence higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision however an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship moreover the menu choices differ by future generosity with more costly up front plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future thus the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods copyright oxford university press

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

early starters versus late beginners we consider a model of wage formation characterized by two features learning and downward rigidity we show that wages should exhibit a late beginning property when one controls for the wage at date t the wage at date t 1 should be negatively correlated with the wage at date 6 1 we test this property on a sample of about 1 000 executives of a french state owned firm whose careers we observe for 15 years this organization exhibits the features that charecterize internal labor markets in particular careers consist of sequences of discrete promotions a fact that generates specific econometric problems the results confirm the prediction

is there adverse selection in life insurance markets adverse selection theory predicts people with a high risk of death are more likely to own life insurance using a unique data set merging administrative and survey records we test this theory and find the opposite people with high death risk are less likely to own life insurance we postulate advantageous selection and price discrimination swamp adverse selection in individual life insurance markets to determine which effect is more powerful we analyze group life insurance markets where insurance companies cannot price discriminate as well as in individual markets our data suggest that price discrimination has a stronger effect than advantageous selection jel d8 g1 i1

one pool to insure them all age risk and the price s of medical insurance asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection and market failure in a dynamic setting asymmetric information also limits reclassification risk this certainty offsets the costs of adverse selection using a dynamic model of endogenous insurance choice and price calibrated to the u s medical insurance market i find that asymmetric information is pareto improving when information is fully asymmetric however when insurers can discriminate by age group but not within age groups the young benefit by paying less for insurance the insurance market for the near elderly collapses because it is no longer implicitly subsidized by the participation of the young

equilibria in health exchanges adverse selection versus reclassification risk this paper studies equilibrium and welfare in a class of regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges we use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual level i projected health risk and ii risk preferences we combine the estimated distributions of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict allocations and prices

is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market abstract this paper finds evidence of dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market lower risk individuals are more likely to cancel a policy and to cancel one of greater face value conditional on cancelation than are individuals with higher mortality risk

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

separating moral hazard from adverse selection and learning in automobile insurance longitudinal evidence from france the identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature this paper performs tests of residual asymmetric information in the french automobile insurance market for the 1995 1997 period this market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experiencerating scheme bonus malus contract choices are strongly associated with the bonus malus of policyholders we have access to longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents we propose a causality test to distinguish pathways through which a positive correlation arises between contract choice and accidents we find evidence of moral hazard among a sub group of policyholders with significant driving experience 5 15 years we distinguish this moral hazard estimate from adverse selection and learning policyholders with less experience have a combination of learning and moral hazard whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience

incentive compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums theoretical models of guaranteed renewable insurance display front loaded premium schedules such schedules both cover lifetime total claims of low risk and high risk individuals and provide an incentive for those who remain low risk to continue to purchase the policy questions have been raised of whether actual individual insurance markets in the us approximate the behavior predicted by these models both because young consumers may not be able to afford front loading and because insurers may behave strategically in ways that erode the value of protection against risk reclassification in this paper the optimal competitive age based premium schedule for a benchmark guaranteed renewable health insurance policy is estimated using medical expenditure data several factors are shown to reduce the amount of front loading necessary indeed the resulting optimal premium path increases with age actual premium paths exhibited by purchasers of individual insurance are close to the optimal renewable schedule we estimate finally consumer utility associated with the feature is examined

human capital risk contract enforcement and the macroeconomy we use data from the survey of consumer finance and survey of income program participation to show that young households with children are under insured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with human capital risk age dependent returns to human capital investment and endogenous borrowing constraints due to the limited pledgeability of human capital limited contract enforcement we show analytically that consistent with the life insurance data in equilibrium young households are borrowing constrained and under insured against human capital risk a calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life cycle variation of life insurance holdings financial wealth earnings and consumption inequality observed in the us data our analysis implies that a reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly like the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act of 2005 leads to a substantial increase in the volume of both credit and insurance

differential human capital and structural evolution in agriculture abstract the growth of market capitalism and the technological advances of the last two centuries underlie the relentless process of structural change in agriculture substantial occupational migration out of farming and geographical migration from rural to urban areas is a characteristic of most if not all economies in the 20th century the process of rural urban migration and the resulting urban problems have received considerable attention the fate of the residual farm population has received less scrutiny and is less well understood in the united states we observe considerable farm poverty increasing farm size inequality and a disturbing decay of rural communities for the last half century the problem of low farm incomes has been perceived as a farm problem amenable to solutio by appropriate farm policy in this paper a model is proposed which suggests that farm poverty and inequality are inevitable consequences of a rural urban migration process in which two types of human capital play a fundamental role general human capital determines a person s expected nonfarm income while farming specific human capital determines his her productivity in farming it is argued that inadequate human capital combined with positive rural urban migration cost positive farm technology adoption costs and inelastic demand for farm output can explain persistently high levels of farm poverty and increasing farm size inequality the model suggests that traditional farm policies are inappropriate programs that directly address the problems of inadequate human capital are advocated

dynamic inefficiencies in an employment based health insurance system theory and evidence we investigate the effects of the institutional settings of the us health care system on individuals life cycle medical expenditures health is a form of general human capital labor turnover and labor market frictions prevent an employer employee pair from capturing the entire surplus from investment in an employee s health thus the pair underinvests in health during working years thereby increasing medical expenditures during retirement we provide empirical evidence consistent with the comparative statics predictions of our model using the medical expenditure panel survey meps and the health and retirement study hrs our estimates suggest significant inefficiencies in health investment in the united states

human capital adaptive ability and the distributional implications of agricultural policy the ability to adapt efficiently to an economic environment that has been altered in a specific way may be a scarce resource in agriculture schultz 1 the setting that i wish to focus upon is one in which farmers face uncertainty about the future course of events production technologies prices and governmental policies and production is dynamic a large share of inputs is purchased from the nonfarm sector and a significant share of output is exported information is available on past realizations of events storing and analyzing information is costly consequently farmers are not assumed to have complete information farmers are assumed to differ in their adaptive ability which is viewed as a form of human capital and to employ efficiently the information that they acquire the thesis of this paper is that adaptive ability is unimportant when the processes generating the variables which farmers take as exogenous are stationary and unaltered however when these processes undergo structural change adaptive ability is expected to affect the quality of production marketing and investment decisions farmers who have superior adaptive skills are expected on average to make better decisions furthermore given the highly competitive nature of u s agriculture successfully adapting to structural change is selective farmers possessing poor adaptive skill can be expected to comprise a relatively large share of the persons forced by economic circumstances to seek alternative employment or retirement provided governmental intervention does not neutralize this selection process when farmers make production marketing and investment plans their decision rules can be expected to incorporate the anticipated values of uncertain variables that are exogeous to their choices the unanticipated components of these exogenous variables however may confuse them and reduce the efficiency of otherwise good plans 2 when shocks occur because of domestic or foreign macroeconomic policy u s agriculture is saddled with transmitting business cycle disturbances

unhealthy insurance markets search frictions and the cost and quality of health insurance we analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance frictions increase insurance premiums enough to transfer 13 2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers approximately 34 4 billion in 1997 and increase insurance turnover by 64 percent for the average pol icy this rent transfer harms consumers and when combined with heightened turnover reduces incentives to invest in future health we also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search fric tion induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts jel d83 g22 i18 in the united states health insurance for those under age 65 is typically provided through group plans purchased by employers from commercial insurers health insurance is a complex multi attribute service so employers looking to buy insur ance face a difficult shopping problem savvy purchasers must consider which of the many drugs their employees might use are in the insurer s formularies which local physicians are part of the insurer s provider network and what copays fees and deductibles apply to which pharmaceuticals providers and services comparison shopping is made even more difficult by the fact that many aspects of insurance involve commitments to provide services under hard to anticipate contingencies medical underwriting by insurers and the great profusion of insurance products raises administrative costs and increases the complexity of an employer group s

on the rate structure of the american life insurance market this article re examines the conclusion of previous studies that price dispersion is extreme in the american whole life insurance market we take an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring price dispersion in the market for the multiparameter whole life contracts studying the distribution across contract offers of a price index which is uniquely determined by two conditions in contrast to the accepted wisdom we find that the derived measure of price dispersion is only 3 6 and that much of this dispersion can be accounted for by measurement error during the past twenty years there has been a growing empirical literature on pricing in the life insurance market the industry s apparent lack of price competition and its tremendous importance in the american economy2 have motivated a number of investigations of the distribution of market prices 1 2 3 8 10 the purpose of this paper is to reexamine the question that is central in these studies is price dispersion large in the american life insurance market the basic products of the industry are introduced below section ii of this paper briefly reviews the literature on the rate structure of this industry section iii presents a simple analysis which derives from a distribution of contracts across firms a measure of price dispersion estimates of the derived measure are given in section iv section v discusses some possible causes of price dispersion and estimates an upper bound to the extent of dispersion that cannot be attributed to measurement error or variation in costs across firms the concluding section summarizes and contrasts the results of this paper with the conventional wisdom

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

time consistent health insurance currently available health insurance contracts often fail to insure long term illnesses sick people can suffer large increases in premiums or denial of coverage i describe insurance contracts that solve this problem their key feature is a severance payment a person who is diagnosed with a long term illness and whose premiums are increased receives a lump sum equal to the increased present value of premiums this lump sum allows him or her to pay the higher premiums required by any insurer people are not tied to a particular insurer or a group and the improvement is free insurance companies can operate at zero economic profits and consumers can pay exactly the same premium they do with standard contracts

flexible exchange rates prices and the role of news lessons from the 1970s recent experience with flexible exchange rate systems has led to renewed interest in the operation of foreign exchange markets as reflected in many recent studies of the principal determinants of exchange rates the 1970s witnessed the dramatic alteration of the international monetary system from a regime of pegged exchange rates which prevailed for about a quarter of a century since the bretton woods conference into a regime of flexible though managed rates as a consequence of the emergence of the new legal and economic system traders national governments and international organisations were confronted with new economic problems choices and instruments during the 1970s ex change rates fluctuated widely and inflation rates accelerated the international monetary system had to accommodate extraordinarily large oil related shocks which affected trade flows in goods and assets huge oil payments had to be recycled uncertainties concerning future developments in international politics reached new heights and the prospects for the world economy got gloomier these developments placed unprecedented pressures on the markets for foreign exchange as well as on other asset markets they were associated with a large slide in the value of the us dollar and resulted in speeding up the creation of new institutions like the european monetary system which provided the formal framework for the management of exchange rates among members

the limits of equality insights from the israeli kibbutz what limits the capacity of society to redistribute what determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality this paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the israeli kibbutzim communities based on the principle of income equality to do this i exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially the main findings are that 1 productive individuals are the most likely to exit and a kibbutz s wealth serves as a lock in device that increases the value of staying 2 higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality and 3 ideology facilitates income equality using a simple model i show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving more generally these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations such as professional partnerships cooperatives and labor managed firms

don t lapse into temptation a behavioral explanation for policy surrender abstract many policyholders surrender their life insurance policies early leading to substantial monetary losses for private households surrender can be explained rationally if it constitutes the last resort providing liquidity in the event of an urgent need of cash yet we find clear evidence in german panel data that for more than half of all surrendered contracts investors had cheaper options available to provide the required liquidity this finding demonstrates that there must be other factors influencing this important life decision we provide a behavioral explanation focusing on the role of individual decision heuristics financial literacy and financial advice in particular we show that financial literacy and financial advice can mitigate the behavioral temptation to lapse while the tendency to rely on heuristics increases lapse probability

long term contracting with markovian consumers to study how a firm can capitalize on a long term customer relationship we characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a markov process the optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory but is described by a simple state variable under general conditions supply converges to the efficient level for any degree of persistence of the types and along any history though convergence is history dependent in contrast as with constant types the optimal contract can be renegotiation proof even with highly persistent types these properties provide insights into the optimal ownership structure of the production technology

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

the role of commitment in dynamic contracts evidence from life insurance we use data on life insurance contracts to study the properties of long term contracts in a world where buyers cannot commit to a contract the data are especially suited to test a theory of dynamic contracting since they include information on the entire proele of future premiums all the patterns in the data et the theoretical predictions of a model with symmetric learning and one sided com

the distribution of income and wealth of farm operator households because of the relatively low incomes of people associated with farming in the past income maintenance has been a major focus of farm policy the average money income of families earning farm self employment income in 1983 was 93 of the average money income of other u s families usdc however an average income of farm households has lost much of its meaning because it masks a great deal of variation compared to the past farm households represent a heterogenous population presenting a new challenge to policy makers concerned about framing income maintenance policies the current farm bill debate began in 1984 amidst piecemeal information on increased bankruptcies and general financial stress of farms analysis of the financial leverage and cash flow positions of farm businesses has since been forthcoming johnson baum and prescott however information on the financial well being of those households associated with farming has remained limited the purpose of this paper is to describe the financial well being of farm operator households by measuring their size distribution of personal income and farm equity in 1984 the contribution of each source of income to the total inequality of incomes is also analyzed

returns to education under collective and household farming in china abstract this paper presents a theoretical model and shows that greater distributional equality decreases individuals returns to education the evidence from a production team in 1977 and the rural household farming in 1990 both in china lends support for the model production team did not reward most members especially for those with higher work points such as the married and males education during most of their lifetimes in distributing work points and labor income however under the household farming system a household s average or highest educational level increased its net agricultural income and total efficiency labor for all households at any average highest educational and age levels thus our findings support the idea that reaping returns from schooling investments requires appropriate economic political environments

the cost of annuities implications for saving behavior and bequests the fact that most elderly u s individuals maintain a flat age wealth profile rather than buy individual life annuities contradicts the standard life cycle consumption model average expected yields on individual life annuities in the united states during 1968 1983 were lower by 4 21 6 13 percent or 2 43 4 35 percent after allowing for adverse selection than yields on plausible alternative investments simulations of a model of saving and portfolio allocation show that during the early retirement years such yield differentials can account for the absence of annuity purchases even without a bequest motive at older ages the combination of such yield differentials and a bequest motive can do so it is common experience that as we grow older and nearer to eternity we become more not less anxious about money derek brewer chaucer and his world p 213

the life insurance market asymmetric information revisited abstract this paper finds evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the life insurance market a conclusion contrasting with the existing literature in particular we find a significant and positive correlation between the decision to purchase life insurance and subsequent mortality conditional on risk classification individuals who died within a 12 year time window after a base year were 19 more likely to have taken up life insurance in that base year than were those who survived the time window moreover as might be expected when individuals have residual private information we find that the earlier an individual died the more likely she was to have initially bought insurance the primary factor driving the difference between our and the prior literature s findings is that we focus on a sample of potential new buyers rather than on the entire cross section to address the sample selection problem induced by potential mortality differences between those with and those without coverage

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

organizing the health insurance market this paper presents a new approach to organizing universal health insurance first the government divides the entire population into many large groups then the government creates a federal health insurance system healthfed modeled on the federal reserve system to fill the role now played by the benefits office of a large firm the healthfed would create a short menu of alternatives solicit bids for insuring the entire group and price alternatives there would be redistribution between groups and pricing of alterna tives to reflect optimal social insurance principles there would be no connection between health insurance and employment it may seem odd that this presidential address is my first publication in health economics at the time when i might have been working on an alternative address i was chair of an expert panel for the advisory council on social security looking at issues in both retirement income and medical care 2 in the process of this work i have come up with a new approach to organizing universal health insurance that is the subject of this paper before starting on health insurance i will say a few words about a wider context offering what i will say as an example in that setting 3 a great deal of attention has been focused on the exciting issue of reorganizing economies dropping central planning commonly economists from those countries em brace capitalism or more specifically laissez faire competition with an enthusi asm which exceeds that ofwestern economists although not necessarily western businessmen yet laissez faire capitalism has received little serious support in the west for a very long time we all know the fundamental welfare theorem which shows many ways that capitalism can be imperfect we have also seen a growth in discussion and analysis of the many ways governments can mess up resource allocation the real question is the design of arrangements that try to integrate the things that each type of institution does better this is hard for two reasons one is that it is in the realm of second best with many constraints the more the constraints the harder the analysis the second is that we do not have good positive theories of government behavior good examples yes good theories no thus the analysis is more intuitive less theory driven than in our picture of private markets but also in our private market analyses we have been greatly complicating our picture recognizing all sorts of information imperfec tions that affect the way that private markets work so i will present to you a proposal for universal health insurance meant to combine something that