material flows vs natural capital what makes an economy sustainable abstract in the discourse about sustainable development constant natural capital is frequently referred to as a criterion for ecological sustainability but what is natural capital the concept will be analyzed by presenting arguments in favour of using the term and different versions of sustainability strong and weak subsequently a critique of the natural capital concept is brought forward from an ecological as well as from an economic perspective following this critique the use of material inputs and the material input per unit of service mips as a measure for the environmental impact potential is suggested dematerialisation is understood to be an alternative management rule for sustainability in conclusion a change of perspective is proposed due to the conceptual and measurement problems associated with the constant natural capital criterion which refers to a stock it seems more reasonable from a scientific as well as from a practical perspective to add flows i e material inputs to a decision criterion for whether a development is sustainable or not

interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

residential vertical rent curves abstract we estimate the equilibrium bid rent function for vertical locations within residential buildings using geocoded rental price data we find that the vertical rent curve is non monotonic with respect to floor level specifically residential bidders pay a 1 5 to 3 5 ground floor premium for the remaining vertical locations the slope of the vertical rent curve is positive with respect to floor level our analysis shows that the ground floor premium is indeed a valuation of access similar to the valuation of access to the central business district cbd in a monocentric setting based on the cities in our sample the ground floor premium is roughly equivalent to moving between 250 450 m closer to the cbd the positive slope of the vertical rent curve with respect to floor level is predominately explained by amenities e g views that compensate residents for the lack of easy access to the street furthermore our analysis provides evidence of an equilibrium relationship between rental prices and proximity to initially high priced areas that is consistent with rental price spillovers more precisely dwellings at higher vertical locations exhibit stronger rental price growth if they are located closer to an initially expensive neighborhood compared to dwellings on lower floor levels

decentralization and intra country transfers in the great recession the case of the european union empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government viewing the great recession or recessions in general as a shock it is found that a

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation with a land market this paper examines the segregative properties of tiebout like endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation in presence of a competitive land market in the model considered a continuum of households with different wealth levels and the same preferences for local public goods private spending and housing choose a location from a finite set each location has an initial endowment of housing that is priced competively and that belongs to absentee landlords each jurisdiction is also endowed with a specific technology for producing public goods households preferences are assumed to be homothetically separable between local public goods on the one hand and private spending and housing on the other public goods provision is financed by a given but unspecified mixture of linear wealth and housing taxes we show that stable jurisdiction structures are always segregated by wealth only if households view any public good conditionally on the quantities of the other public goods as either always a gross substitute or either always a gross complement to private spending we also show that if there are more than one public good this condition is not sufficient for segregation unless households preferences are additively separable since this condition is necessary and sufficient for the segregation of stable jurisdiction structures without land market and with only one public good our results suggests that introducing a land market does not affect the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation but that increasing the number of public goods mitigates segregation

corporate taxation in the oecd in a wider context against the background of increased globalisation statutory corporate tax rates have shown a clear downward trend over the last two decades the sharp decline in these rates was accompanied by substantial tax base broadening and a comparable reduction in personal income tax rates only until the early 1990s this suggests that corporate tax competition is of increasing importance so far corporate tax revenues remain fairly stable but an analysis of corporate taxation in the context of the overall tax systems shows that a substantial shift towards value added taxes has taken place while the trends so far have been driven by smaller european countries recent tax reforms indicate that increasing tax competition is inducing a shift towards consumption even for larger economies

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous this paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers the small country always gains and the large country always loses from tax competition thus implying tax competition leads to redistribution from the large to the small country however the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country these results imply that our model encapsulates both the importance of being small as well as the importance of being large we also show that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small country

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

on welfare measurement in cities this paper extends project evaluation in a spatial urban economy to consider the more general case of distortionary public finances if a local public improvement is financed at least in part by a distortionary property tax we show that residential land prices do not accurately measure the value of land improvements even when households are identical and the improvement is infinitesimally small the magnitude and direction of the measurement error will depend on the second order effects on aggregate demand via changes in population density at each location and on overall city size

interactions neighborhood selection and housing demand abstract this paper contributes to the growing literature that aims at identifying and measuring the impact of social context on individual economic behavior we develop a model of housing structure demand with neighborhood effects and neighborhood choice modeling neighborhood choice is of fundamental importance in estimating and understanding endogenous and contextual neighborhood effects controlling for non random sorting into neighborhoods allows for unbiased estimates and provides a means for identifying endogenous neighborhood effects estimation of the model exploits a household level data set that has been augmented with contextual information at two different levels scales of aggregation one is at the neighborhood level consisting of about ten neighbors with the data coming from the neighborhood clusters sub sample of the american housing survey a second level is the census tract to which these dwelling units belong these data were geocoded by means of privileged access to confidential us census data our results for the neighborhood choice model indicate that individuals prefer to live near others like themselves our estimates of the housing structure demand equation confirm that neighborhood effects are important in particular one s demand for housing depends on the mean of neighbors demand for housing

eco dumping capital mobility and international trade a small open economy s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution the country produces traded as well as non traded goods is it in the country s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded good sector the answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country however if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded good sector the opposite of ecological dumping

the local distribution of endowments matters modelling tax competition with heterogeneous local residents this study expands on the tax competition literature by incorporating the heterogeneity of resource endowments into the tax competition framework it theoretically elaborates that the local distribution of resource endowments affects both the level of tax rate and the degree of spatial dependence in tax competition and empirically confirms the theory using the data for 60 urban municipalities in the seoul metropolitan area sma korea in the years 2004 2006 a spatial panel model for tax cut confirms the presence of tax competition in the sma and the effects on tax cut of the resource endowment distribution another regression model for local indicators of spatial dependence uncovers the fact that the spatial dependence in tax cut is also determined by the local endowment distribution

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

sustainability through cost internalisation theoretical rudiments for the analysis and reform of global structures abstract in the last 250 years capitalism has been the cause of great wealth and affluence this was brought about by the interaction between a dynamic mobilisation of resources and the efficient allocation of production factors produced goods and services through control of the market technical progress the spread of trade and use of comparative cost advantages in this respect classical and neoclassical economics since adam smith has been proven correct however this school s postulation that the market s invisible hand will also provide for a balanced development of wealth between rich and poor regions and nations has not been proven correct on the contrary the gap between rich and poor has grown the contradiction between theory and reality is not at all coincidental classical and neoclassical economics subordinate absolute equal opportunities between all world market actors and exclude extra economic factors such as for example the disparity of power as a lever of wealth increment furthermore it neglects the circumstance of capital accumulation and growth in consumption through the cost free use of nature which has many consequences for the destruction of the ecological balance these methodical foreclosure proceedings do not only have fatal consequences for the theory politics is also especially affected to be sure neoclassicism offers no solutions to the greatest challenges of the present namely social inequality on a global scale and the ecological crisis the individual measures which have been enacted such as the imf s structural adjustment programme often cause the opposite social and ecological effects an important prerequisite for the development of strategies in a global reform perspective is therefore the dealing with some fundamental deficits in the dominant economic theory this paper will a develop the idea that the disparity of political and economic power has historically promoted the externalisation of social and ecological costs and as a result caused the rise of non sustainable structures in the world economy as well as social and ecological crises and b prove that cost internalisation by means of new basic conditions in the world economy is an indispensable must for sustainable development in the world economy

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

tax induced mobility evidence from a foreigners tax scheme in switzerland abstract we study location choice and residential mobility responses to local income taxes exploiting a special tax regime which applies to foreign employees residing in switzerland the institutional setting used generates a deterministic duration threshold at 5 years of stay in the country at which the local tax rates an individual faces simultaneously change in all municipalities we exploit this exogenous variation by applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to merged survey and administrative individual level data a dynamic location choice model allows us to derive testable hypotheses of individuals location choices and mobility decisions our estimated treatment effects provide causal evidence for tax induced residential choices and tax induced intra national mobility

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

income segregation and local progressive taxation empirical evidence from switzerland this study investigates spatial income segregation in fiscally decentralized urban areas the theoretical part proposes the progressivity of local income taxes as a new theoretical explanation for income segregation the empirical part studies how income tax differentials across municipalities affect the households location decisions i use data from the swiss metropolitan area of basel that contains tax information on all moving households in 1997 the location choice of the households is investigated within the framework of the random utility maximization model different econometric specifications of the error term structure such as conditional logit nested logit and multinomial probit are compared the empirical results show that rich households are significantly and substantially more likely to move to low tax municipalities than poor households this result holds after controlling for alternative explanations of segregation social interactions and distance from the central business district are established as other major factors for income segregation households in general tend to choose locations close to other households like themselves

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

the effect of incentive policies on the practice location of doctors a multinomial probit analysis in this article we estimate a spatial autoregressive multinomial probit model of the choice of location by general practitioners for establishing their initial practice this model allows us to account for potential interdependencies among location choices the model is used to assess the effect of various incentive measures introduced in quebec canada to influence the geographical distribution of physicians across 18 regions our data set covers subperiods before and after the introduction of these measures incentive policies are captured through price and income effects our results provide evidence that these measures had a significant effect on location choices

non existence of equilibria in multicommunity models abstract this paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods we show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions the basic structure of multicommunity models i e perfect mobility majority rule single crossing property implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist stratification equilibria with sorting of the population according to income classes are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested mechanisms that can serve to support stratification i e tight housing markets returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods are discussed

a conditional logit model of the role of local public services in residential choice this study develops and estimates an econometric model of choice among residential communities the econometric method employed is maximum likelihood estimation of a multinomial logit this makes i

taxation and migration evidence and policy implications in this article we review a growing empirical literature on the effects of personal taxation on the geographic mobility of people and discuss its policy implications we start by laying out the empirical challenges that prevented progress in this area and then discuss how recent work has made use of new data sources and quasi experimental approaches to credibly estimate migration responses this body of work has shown that certain segments of the labor market especially high income workers and professions with little location specific human capital may be quite responsive to taxes in their location decisions when considering the implications for tax policy design we distinguish between uncoordinated and coordinated tax policy we highlight the importance of recognizing that mobility elasticities are not exogenous structural parameters they can vary greatly depending on the population being analyzed the size of the tax jurisdiction the extent of tax policy coordination and a range of non tax policies while migration responses add to the efficiency costs of redistributing income we caution against over using the recent evidence of sizeable mobility responses to taxes as an argument for less redistribution in a globalized world

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

the political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians in the public finance literature the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable public choice arguments in contrast suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess political distortions may lead to a waste of taxmoney according to this view tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector the present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework the government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians it turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions the effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians

land leasing and local public finance in china s regional development evidence from prefecture level cities by analysing the evolution of local governments roles in different periods of china s growth in transition this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s local land development behaviour is related to china s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements on the basis of panel data covering prefectural level cities from 1999 to 2003 the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing by negotiation versus by auction tender policy implications are drawn from this analysis for the further reform of china s urban land system and fiscal institutions

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

tax competition relative performance and policy imitation rather than about their absolute payoffs governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments moreover they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere i study such behavior in a standard tax competition game both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept independently of the number of jurisdictions involved an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players it thus involves drastic efficiency losses

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

industry environment and health through 200 years in manchester abstract the manchester urban area evolved rapidly in the early 19th century from a series of small towns to a major industrial conurbation with huge material flows and worldwide trade connections a combination of the availability of nearby coalfields canals and free trade which encouraged entrepreneurial enterprise made manchester into the shock city of the industrial revolution rapid nucleated urban growth associated with industrialisation throughout the 19th century involved an exponential growth in materials transfers and in waste flows the 20th century suburban dispersal of residential and industrial growth led to further increase in the impact of the urban metabolism especially in terms of mass distance of materials movement the current post industrial phase in greater manchester has to cope with the environmental and social legacies of its industrial past and with growing per capita materials consumption and increases in number of households despite a nearly static population of around 2 5 million changes in material flows land usage and river morphology in greater manchester over the past 200 years have reflected changing technologies industry economics social expectations and environmental legislation manchester had the first passenger railway the first inter basin domestic water transfer in the uk the first urban smokeless zones and was part of a pioneering land reclamation partnership in the 1970s even so the environmental legacy of industrial material flows constantly presents new challenges from the cost of reclaiming contaminated brownfield sites to finding destinations for today s urban waste

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

estimating preferences for local public services using migration data using swedish micro data the paper examines the impact of local public services on community choice the choice of community is modelled as a choice between a discrete set of alternatives it is found that given taxes high spending on child care attracts migrants less conclusive results are obtained with respect to the role of spending on education and elderly care high local taxes deter migrants relaxing the independence of the irrelevant alternatives assumption by estimating a mixed logit model has a significant impact on the results

the importance of local corporate taxes in business location decisions evidence from french micro data determinants of businesses locations are known to be multiple locations of partners and competitors are crucial as well as the territory s local characteristics to consider the importance of local taxes we build a poisson model to explain the number of business creations observed in a given municipality first results suggest that there are unobserved factors driving firm creation that are positively correlated with the level of local taxes to deal with this potential source of endogeneity we present an approach close to regression discontinuity design we find that everything else being equal higher local taxes actually tend to deter firms from setting up in a given zone but the effect is weak

income taxes sorting and the costs of housing evidence from municipal boundaries in switzerland this paper provides novel evidence on the role of income taxes for residential rents and spatial sorting drawing on comprehensive apartment level data we identify the effects of tax differentials across municipal boundaries in switzerland the boundary discontinuity design bdd corrects for unobservable location characteristics such as environmental amenities or the access to public goods and thereby reduces the estimated response of housing prices by one half compared to conventional estimates we identify an income tax elasticity of rents of about 0 26 we complement this approach with census data on local sociodemographic characteristics and show that about one third of this effect can be traced back to a sorting of high income households into low tax municipalities these findings are robust to a matching approach mbdd which compares identical residences on opposite sides of the boundary and a number of further sensitivity checks

how do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism tax vs expenditure optimization previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public flnance while expenditures adjust residually this paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable in particular it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments in uences the way local governments decide on public policy unlike the presumption the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures the result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local flscal efiort the results ofier a new perspective of the e ciency implications of federal policy toward local governments and thereby enable a more precise characterization of local government behavior in flscal federalism

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

urban economic theory land use and city size this book examines the economic reasons why people choose to live where they live and develops through analysis of the bid rent function a unified theory of urban land use and city size the first part of the book explicates the basic theory of urban land use and optimal city size residential location behavior of households is examined in a microeconomic framework and equilibrium and optimal patterns of residential land use are discussed the corresponding equilibrium and optimal city sizes are studied in a variety of contexts part two extends the classical theories of von thunen and alonso with the addition of externality factors such as local public goods crowding and congestion and racial prejudice the rigorous mathematical approach and theoretical treatment of the material make urban economic theory of interest to researchers in urban economics location theory urban geography and urban planning

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

neighbourhood effects and housing demand in this paper we estimate a model of housing demand with neighborhood eects we exploit special features of the national sample of the american housing survey and properties of housing markets that allow us to create natural instruments and therefore identify the impact of social interactions we find evidence of both endogenous and contextual neighborhood eects we report two alternative sets of estimates for neighborhood eects that dier in terms of the instruments we use for estimating the model when the endogenous neighborhood eect is large the respective contextual eects are weak and vice versa the elasticity of housing demand with respect to the mean of the neighbors housing demands the endogenous eect ranges from 0 19 to 0 66 and is generally very significant the contextual eects are also very significant a key such eect the elasticity with respect to the mean of neighbors permanent incomes ranges from 0 17 to 0 54

sustainable ecological economies abstract a brief accounting is presented of the evolution of natural ecosystems and human cultures including industrialization and its ecologically significant interactions with natural abiotic and biotic processes of the earth these accounts show among other things that excess resource harvest rates and material releases into the natural environment have been ecological risks of growing scope and scale throughout the history of political economies the growing ecological risks of industrialization are attributed to disparities between the rates and directions of evolution in the ecological features of process and structure of corporate and political economies relative to the rates and directions of evolution in their cultural institutions of control many social and political organizations are now calling for adaptations toward sustainable industrialization by promoting evolution in the cultural institutions of control through research education ethics politics and government what is required are on line institutional processes for effectively translating emerging ecological risk assessments into economic incentives for feasible adaptations throughout the systems institutionalization of such on line adaptive processes requires broad moral ethical enlightenment and social political commitment to make the emerging scientific technological and economic dimensions productive faber et al 1996 this paper presents on line strategies of ecological risk assessment and control which are believed to be superior to alternatives that require a prior consensus on economic valuations of natural resource stocks natural processes and environmental damages and incentives have advantages over prescriptive regulations when viewed in their greater economic context the proposed strategies are formulated as coordinated institutions of on line ecological and fiscal control processes on what is here defined as the ecological economies of corporate and political economies the objective of the proposed control strategies is to pursue trajectories of joint ecological and cultural evolution toward systems that are ecologically and culturally both satisfying and sustainable

competition for migrants in a federation tax or transfer competition this paper provides an analysis of competition for migrants competing in taxes transfers renders migration flows less more elastic with respect to changes in fiscal policy jurisdictions with aligned preferences i e jurisdictions that maximize the interest of the same type of households either mobile or immobile households prefer to reduce the competitive pressure and compete in taxes jurisdictions with distinct preferences on the other hand prefer to expose themselves to more competitive pressure and compete in transfers this paper offers insights into the optimal use and design of transfers and helps interpret existing empirical evidence

interactions in swiss households energy demand a holistic approach abstract this article analyzes the interactions and possible trade offs between direct energy consumption and embodied energy requirement of households in switzerland in order to assess the net impacts of standard energy policies focusing exclusively on direct energy use direct and embodied energy demand of swiss households are estimated by combining consumption data of a national expenditure survey with data on energy intensity from life cycle analysis using a system of equations and an instrumental variable approach we find that both domains are driven by same determinants but that there is no evidence for significant substitution between them we also find an increasing effect of income on both domains with particularly important effects on embodied energy from a policy perspective our findings highlight a concern that economic growth could bring about an increasing global energy demand through energy requirement for non energy commodities however the wide spread policies targeting direct energy are unlikely to cause a substantial shift in household consumption to embodied energy

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

assessing the importance of tiebout sorting local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 this paper argues that long run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods the tiebout hypothesis we develop an extension of the tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must weakly increase given the secular decline in mobility costs these predictions can be evaluated using historical data we find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across i a sample of u s municipalities 1870 1990 ii all boston area municipalities 1870 1990 and iii all u s counties 1850 1990

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

how a race to the bottom can make you fat abstractthis article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the united states through education and health spending we hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms r

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

relocation of the rich migration in response to top tax rate changes from spanish reforms a spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates resulting in substantial tax differentials using administrative data we find that conditional on moving taxes have a signi

foreign investment incentives and international cross hauling of capital this note shows how international tax competition can give rise to special tax breaks for foreign investment discriminatory tax treatment of outside investment can give rise to socially harmful cross flows of international investment paradoxically an increase in the costs associated with foreign investment can increase welfare

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

the political geography of tax h e avens and tax hells worldwide many governments rely on personal income taxation as one of their major sources of tax revenue casual empirical evidence suggests that although most developed countries levy substantial taxes particularly on higher incomes there also exist a few countries that are characterized by no or very low income taxation a distinguishing feature of the countries in the latter group is that they are geographically very small as can be seen from table 1 which presents international income tax policies and geographical dimensions of some selected countries in the present paper we investigate whether the geography of a country is related to its pattern of taxation central to our argument is the ongoing international integration in the last decades in some cases e g in the european union the process has advanced to the point at which all formal constraints to mobility have been abandoned this development has also greatly improved the mobility of households across states or national borders in contrast to the mobility of production factors however the effects of household mobility migration are not confined to budgetary consequences as taxpayers immigrate or emigrate the inand outflow of citizens also alters policy objectives by changing the composition of the electorate in a jurisdiction at the same time migration decisions especially those of wealthy individuals are based on local tax policies consequently the migration of households determines fiscal policies through the interplay of two basic effects 1 residential choices determine tax rates through a process in which a jurisdiction s inhabitants select their local policies and 2 tax and welfare policies in each jurisdiction influence residential decisions as we argue in this paper this interdependency of residential and political decisions may provide an explanation for the stylized facts illustrated in table 1 we consider a simple framework in which households differ in incomes and national tax policies are democratically determined as a natural implication of their earning characteristics high income households ceteris paribus prefer to live in countries with low taxation for ease of exposition we refer to those countries as tax h e avens in a slight perturbation of popular nomenclature low income households in contrast are more interested in generous public spending than in low income tax rates ceteris paribus they prefer to reside in countries with large welfare programs financed by substantial taxation which we call tax hells for obvious reasons thus individual preferences imply a self selection process which leads to the segregation of households across countries according to income classes 1 if this segregation is in turn supported by a national vote for low taxes in countries where high income earners live and high taxes in countries where lower income earners live an equilibrium with tax heavens populated by wealthy residents and tax hells populated by the less affluent evolves yet the geographical size of countries plays a crucial role in this development first it affects the number of a country s inhabitants the population size because households sort hansen apax partners company possartstr 11 81679 miinchen germany kessler department of economics university of bonn adenauerallee 24 42 53113 bonn germany kessler wipol uni bonn de we thank two anonymous referees marcus berliant dennis epple christian ewerhart gerhard glomm david pines urs schweizer and participants in presentations at the university of munich the 1997 site meeting stanford the 1997 american econometric society summer meeting pasadena and the 1996 iipf congress tel aviv for helpful suggestions and discussions both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn remaining errors are our own the views expressed in this paper should not be attributed to apax partners company 1 the sorting of individuals by preferences across jurisdictions goes back to the famous contribution of charles m tiebout 1956 on migration as a means to reveal preferences over public goods