cores of inventory centralization games abstract consider a set of n stores with single item and single period demands assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty costs only in this case a cooperative inventory centralization game defines allocations of the cost we examine the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we prove the existence of nonempty core for demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal demand distribution we establish the equivalency of four different nonempty core conditions for the newsboy problem and demonstrate their efficacy for discrete independent and identically distributed iid demands journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c62 c71

towards an attention based view of the firm the central argument is that firm behavior is the result of how firms channel and distribute the attention of their decision makers what decision makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on what issues and answers they focus on depends on the specific situation and on how the firm s rules resources and relationships distribute various issues answers and decision makers into specific communications and procedures the paper develops these theoretical principles into a model of firm behavior and presents its implications for explaining firm behavior and adaptation 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

information sharing in dea a cooperative game theory approach abstract in this paper a cooperative dea game is proposed based on the idea that different organizations can gain if they share data on the input consumption and output production of their processing units a larger data sample allows a more complete description of the production possibility set and consequently of the efficient frontier however since not all organizations will benefit in the same way it is convenient to use cooperative game theory in order to share the benefits of the cooperation the proposed cooperative dea game is shown to be subadditive and balanced models for computing the value of the game and checking its stability taking into account the exponential number of coalitions that exist when the number of organizations is large are also presented the approach is illustrated with a dataset from the literature

competition in a deregulated air transportation market abstract under deregulation airlines developed hub and spoke hs networks enabling them to aggregate demand increase frequency reduce airfares and prevent entry into the marketplace this research evaluates airline profit based on micro economic theory of behaviour under deregulation through a two stage nash best response game equilibria in the air transportation industry is sought to evaluate the most profitable hs network for an airline to survive in a deregulated environment in the first stage of the game an integer linear program aids in generating potential networks in the second stage a nonlinear mathematical program maximizes profits for each airline based on the networks chosen by all participants the variables of the mathematical program include frequency plane size and airfares in an illustrative example both monopoly and duopoly solutions are attainable as a function of demand

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers collaboration in supply networks abstract suppliers collaboration is a new paradigm to improve the utilization of collective intelligence in supply networks although existing literature advocates the notion of cooperation in supply networks there is a dearth of studies quantitatively analyzing cost and benefit of cooperation in this study we first develop a model for suppliers dynamic coalition formation using coalitional game theory the proposed cost structure influences the utility of each possible coalition and restricts the coalition size and search space for finding possible coalitions to distribute the profit earned by cooperation in a fair manner a criterion named shared capacity index is developed according to suppliers capacity share in the corresponding coalition a suppliers cooperation algorithm is then proposed to resolve possible conflicts among network members whereby each supplier is able to explore coalitional structures autonomously the efficiency of the proposed approach is evaluated through simulation studies and compared to other solution methods including shapley value and proportional fairness results demonstrate that long term cooperation among suppliers leads to enhanced average individual profit in the network

a note on the room mates problem and a related revenue allocation problem we introduce in this note the consistent organizational structure cos problem which can be viewed as a generalization of the college admission and room mates problems both the room mates problem and the cos problem may have no stable solution when side payments are allowed the cos problem but not the room mates problem always has a nonempty core we further study some nucleoli of the cos problem with side payments

operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics abstract given a set of players and the cost of each possible coalition the question we address is which coalitions should be formed we formulate mixed integer linear programming models for this problem considering core stability and strong equilibrium the objective function looks for minimizing the total cost allocated among the players concerned about the difficulties of managing large coalitions in practice we also study the effect of a maximum cardinality constraint per coalition we test the models in two applications one is in collaborative forest transportation and the other one in inventory of spare parts for oil operations in these situations collaboration opportunities involving significant savings exist but for several reasons it may be better to group the players in different sub coalitions rather than in the grand coalition the models we propose are thus relevant for deciding how to partition the set of players we also prove that if the strong equilibrium model is feasible its optimal cost is equal to the optimal cost of the core stability model and consequently a coalition structure that solves one problem also solves the other problem we present results that illustrate this property we also present results where the core stability problem is feasible and the strong equilibrium problem is infeasible setting an upper bound on the maximum cardinality of the coalitions allows us to study the marginal savings of enlarging the cardinality of the coalitions we find that the marginal savings of allowing one more player significantly decreases as the bound increases

the newsvendor game has a nonempty core we settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game we prove that its core is always non empty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands we give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non negative elements

dynamic coalition formation and the core this paper presents a dynamic model of endogenous coalition formation in cooperative games with transferable utility tu the players are boundedly rational at each time step a player decides which of the existing coalitions to join and demands a payoff these decisions are determined by a best reply rule given the coalition structure and allocation in the previous period further the players experiment with myopically suboptimal strategies whenever there are potential gains from trade we establish an isomorphism between the set of absorbing states of the process and the set of core allocations and show that the process converges to one of these states with probability one whenever the core is non empty these results do not require superadditivity of the characteristic function and they carry over to the case of coalitional values depending on the coalition structure and to non transferable utility ntu games

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

properties and comparison of risk capital allocation methods abstract if a financial unit a bank an insurance company a portfolio the financial system of a country etc consists of subunits divisions subportfolios etc then the risk of the main unit should be allocated to the subunits using a risk capital allocation method in a fair way we analyze seven methods widely discussed in the literature or used in practice activity based beta incremental cost gap marginal risk contribution shapley and nucleolus in terms of ten reasonable fairness properties full domain core compatibility diversification strong monotonicity incentive compatibility efficiency equal treatment property riskless portfolio covariance and decomposition invariance we provide proofs or counterexamples for each method and the ten properties that we consider we also computed how often on average core compatibility is satisfied in randomly generated risk capital allocation situations up to nine subunits in 24 treatments for all methods that do not satisfy core compatibility we believe that through the descriptions of the examined methods our paper can serve as a useful guide for both practitioners and researchers

a capacitated single item lot size model abstract wagner and whitin s inventory model is generalized to incorporate a limited production rate the model is conspicuous amongst related models in the literature as wagner and whitin s original algorithm may be applied the result requires restrictions on the cost coefficients that make conventional material requirements planning the model s natural field of application

toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation abstract the design of a supply chain network can be interpreted as a coalition formation problem in a cooperative game theory and formulated as a linear production game lpg the companies that are members of the optimal coalition share their manufacturing assets and resources to produce a set of end products and globally maximize their profits by selling them in a market this paper investigates the possibility of combining the requirement of coalition stability with a fair allocation of profits to the participants it is shown that in general the purely competitive allocation mechanism does not exhibit the property of fairness a technique is proposed to construct a stable and fair allocation system when the core of the game does not exclusively contain a set of competitive allocations

inventory centralization games with price dependent demand and quantity discount consider a distribution system consisting of a set of retailers facing a single period price dependent demand of a single product by taking advantage of the risk pooling effect and the quantity volume discount provided by suppliers or third party carriers the retailers may place joint orders and keep inventory at central warehouses before demand realization and allocate inventory among themselves after demand realization to reduce their operating costs under rather general assumptions we prove that there is a stable allocation of profits among the retailers in the sense that the resulting inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we also show how to compute an allocation in the core

the efficiency paradox bureaucratic and organizational barriers to profitable energy saving investments abstract the paradox of why profitable energy saving investments are not undertaken continues to provoke debate the underlying phenomenon might be called the efficiency paradox because it represents a case in which business firms which are often presumed or taken axiomatically to be economically efficient make decisions that do not maximize profits new data from one of the us environmental protection agency s voluntary pollution prevention programs enables this paradox to be explored statistically the data show that both the level and variation in returns to lighting upgrade investments cannot be explained by standard economic models substantial gains in energy efficiency can be achieved without sacrificing profitability both economic and organizational factors account for some of the variation in observed returns to these investments but the results suggest a need for improved and more comprehensive theories of the investment behavior of firms and other organizations

coalition formation problem for sourcing contract design in supply networks abstract this article studies a coalition formation problem for cooperative replenishment with a single supplier and multiple firms we consider that a vertical cooperation between the supplier and the set of firms is already set using periodic individual contracts and we investigate the profitability of a horizontal cooperation between firms when designing collaborative contracts given the significant savings that can be realized thanks to horizontal collaboration the main interest of the potential collaborating firms is to figure out how the collaborating group should be formed and how stable alliances and coalitions should be generated in this article the two questions are studied in two business situations focusing either on the collaboration opportunities in the ordering or the transportation process in each collaborative situation a decision making approach is applied to assess the expected profitability of each firm and to determine if firms should form coalitions to maximize their profits an exact solution method based on a game theoretic approach is developed called cooperative replenishment algorithm cra which generates core stable coalitions for cost savings regarding all partner standpoints an analytical study of stability conditions regarding the ordering and transportation cost structures were performed to enhance the cra resolution procedure extensive experiments based on realistic instances are provided to validate the performance of the cra proposed in terms of solution stability and convergence the computational results also confirm the potential benefit of horizontal collaboration between firms in terms of profit maximization compared to the stand alone situation

the resource based theory of the firm interest in the resource based view of the firm continues to grow in the field of business policy and strategy recently most of this interest seems to have been focused on understanding the empirical implications of this theory and especially on how a firm s resources and capabilities can affect its performance evaluating the empirical implications of the resource based view is of course a worthwhile endeavor we present an overview of contributions in this issue

tightening environmental standards the benefit cost or the no cost paradigm ms ff ichael porter and claas van der linde have written a paper that is interesting and to us at least somewhat astonishing it is a defense of environmental regulation indeed an invitation to more stringent regulation that makes essentially no reference to the social benefits of such regulation this approach contrasts starkly with the methods that economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used when assessing environmental or other regulatory programs the traditional approach consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits for environmental regulation the social benefits include the reductions in morbidity or premature mortality that can accompany cleaner air the enhanced recreational opportunities that can result from water quality improvements the increased land values that might attend the cleanup of a hazardous waste site the enhanced vitality of aquatic ecosystems that might follow reductions in agricultural pesticide use or any of the other potentially significant benefits associated with tighter standards from this benefit cost approach emerges the standard tradeoff discussed in virtually every economics textbook porter and van der linde deny the validity of this approach to the analysis of environmental regulation claiming it to be an artifact of what they see as a static mindset in their view economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of

balancedness of infrastructure cost games abstract in this paper we study the class of infrastructure cost games a game in this class models the infrastructure costs both building and maintenance produced when a set of users of different types makes use of a certain infrastructure which may consist of several facilities special attention is paid to one facility infrastructure cost games such games are modeled as the sum of an airport game and a maintenance cost game it turns out that the core and nucleolus of these games are very closely related to the core and nucleolus of an associated generalized airport game furthermore we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an infrastructure cost game is balanced

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

cooperation among liquefied natural gas suppliers is rationalization the sole objective this paper examines the development of cooperative strategies between countries exporting liquefied natural gas lng and members of the gas exporting countries forum gecf this economic study focuses specifically on an often raised scenario the emergence of a cooperative approach designed with the sole aim of logistic rationalization and which would not have any effect on lng prices we first assess the annual gains that may result from this market power free cooperative approach using a simple static transportation model the numerical results obtained suggest that in the absence of a gain redistribution policy this cooperative strategy will probably not be adopted because cooperation would not be a rational move for some exporters the problem of gain sharing is then formulated using cooperative game theory concepts several gain sharing methods have been studied including the shapley value and various nucleolus inspired concepts our results suggest that the choice of a redistribution policy appears relatively restricted out of the methods studied only one per capita nucleolus satisfies two key requirements core belonging and monotonicity in the aggregate lastly we look at how cooperation may give rise to a coordination cost and try to determine the maximum amount of this cost in view of the low level of this amount and the relative complexity of the sharing method implemented we consider that the credibility of a logistic cooperation scenario exempt from market power should be reappraised

discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms in distribution channels with demand that is price sensitive we consider a single vendor single retailer distribution channel demand for the product arises only at the retailer the demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be deterministic but price elastic the retailer in turn buys the product from the vendor the vendor and the retailer act independently and rationally each maximizing their own respective profit the equilibrium point that specifies the vendor s and buyer s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a stackelberg game we consider the cases when quantity discount and volume discount respectively are offered we develop methods to determine the optimal discount policy for these cases we then consider the case where both volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously and develop a method to determine the optimal simultaneous discount offer the relative performance of the alternative discount schemes is then evaluated through a numerical study the results of the study demonstrate that the effectiveness of volume discount as a coordination mechanism is higher when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is higher the effectiveness of quantity discount on the other hand is higher with lower price sensitivity of demand finally the results also demonstrate that perfect coordination is achieved when volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously

competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two stage supply chain we investigate a two stage serial supply chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation times inventory holding costs are charged at each stage and each stage may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost e g the upper stage the supplier may dislike backorders at the lower stage the retailer we consider two games in both the stages independently choose base stock policies to minimize their costs the games differ in how the firms track their inventory levels in one the firms are committed to tracking echelon inventory in the other they track local inventory we compare the policies chosen under this competitive regime to those selected to minimize total supply chain costs i e the optimal solution we show that the games nearly always have a unique nash equilibrium and it differs from the optimal solution hence competition reduces efficiency furthermore the two games equilibria are different so the tracking method influences strategic behavior we show that the system optimal solution can be achieved as a nash equilibrium using simple linear transfer payments the value of cooperation is context specific in some settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent whereas in other settings the cost increase is enormous we also discuss stackelberg equilibria

an extension of the τ value to games with coalition structures abstract we introduce the coalitional value which is an extension of the value for tu games to games with a coalition structure we identify a class of tu games that satisfy the property that for every game in this class and every coalition structure on its player set it holds that the coalitional value can be defined for the corresponding game with a coalition structure we study properties of the coalitional value and provide an axiomatic characterization of this allocation rule we use the coalitional value to study bankruptcy problems and the determination of aircraft landing fees

investment in energy efficiency do the characteristics of firms matter the literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment profit maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value the standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm this model as applied to energy saving investments is tested by examining whether firms characteristics influence their decision to join the environmental protection agency s voluntary green lights program a discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation maximization algorithm the results show that 1 sub

barriers within firms to energy efficient investments abstract many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm reasons for these practices include bounded rationality principal agent problems and moral hazard the policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework

sustainable energy systems and company performance does the implementation of sustainable energy systems improve companies financial performance abstract the main aim of this paper is to analyse whether the adoption of sustainable energy systems improves corporate financial performance to this end we obtained data from a sample of 574 multinational companies from 36 countries in the 2008 2013 period on this data we implement a dynamic system panel data method our findings show that the adoption of sustainable energy systems allows firms to improve their short term corporate financial performance while not leading them to reduce their corporate financial performance in the long term specifically our results indicate that an increase in energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources do not significantly affect corporate financial performance neither does the integration of energy efficiency systems and renewable energy sources have any significant influence on corporate financial performance while the level of implementation of sustainable energy management systems has a significant effect on short term but not long term corporate financial performance furthermore other control variables such as research and development expenditure and year are also relevant in explaining firms financial performance the adoption of sustainable energy systems helps to improve corporate financial performance in the short term but has no affect in the long term this might be because the monitoring of energy efficiency using key performance indicators allows firms to detect and correct failures in the production process and hence improve short term financial performance however this measure does not generate competitive advantages for firms and therefore has no effect on long term corporate financial performance from a scientific perspective of energy this paper contributes to the literature by providing a detailed explanation of how the adoption of sustainable energy systems proposed by peura 2013 influences corporate financial performance on the basis of new empirical evidence these explanations provide a strong rationale for improving the efficient use of energy and harvesting low hanging fruits in the short term from a managerial perspective policymakers should encourage firms to align sustainable energy systems with their core business strategy by developing green technologies that allow them to acquire rare and valuable capabilities and abilities which generate competitive advantage and therefore allow firms to increase their long term corporate financial performance

public policy markets and household coping strategies in bangladesh avoiding a food security crisis following the 1998 floods abstract at their peak the 1998 floods covered two thirds of bangladesh causing severe damage to the major rice crop and threatening the food security of tens of millions of households in this paper we first highlight the contribution of government policy interventions including trade liberalization in the early 1990s to stabilization of rice markets during and after the flood then using a panel data set covering 750 households in three rounds over a 13 month period we analyze impacts of the flood on household assets consumption and nutritional outcomes finally we present empirical estimates of the contribution of rice market stabilization and government transfers to household food consumption

a cost allocation problem arising in hub spoke network systems abstract this paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub spoke network systems when a large scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues we formulate this problem as a cooperative game and analyze the core allocation which is a widely used solution concept the core of this game is not necessarily non empty as shown by an example a reasonable scheme is to allocate the cost proportional to the flow that an agent generates we show that if the demand across the system has a block structure and the fixed cost is high this cost allocation scheme belongs to the core numerical experiments are given with real telecommunication traffic data in order to illustrate the usefulness of our analytical findings

strategy complexity and economic rent this paper discusses important friction forces that future theories of strategy must incorporate some of these are technological and environmental but the most important ones it is argued are psychological the view is developed that strategy at its core concerns the development and testing of heuristics for high stake decisions in environments too unstable and complex to be optimized the paper especially highlights the behavioral dimension in the belief that strategies should incorporate both the rational and suboptimal aspects of human behavior the rational approach is in many ways the easier as there may be only one way to be right yet the great variety in which people and companies can err gives strategy its creative and real world challenge the tension between the rational and behavioral components is what the field of strategy should seek to exploit

product line selection production decisions and allocation of common fixed costs abstract product costs are determined in practice for the purpose of pricing make buy and product line decisions while many costs are directly assignable to individual products common costs have historically presented a difficult conundrum a variety of cost allocation methods are used in practice or have been suggested in the literature to attach these costs to individual products while such procedures are theoretically unsupported they may be able to mimic the correct decisions adequately in this paper we investigate the efficacy of certain cost allocation schemes in a competitive environment the schemes are evaluated with reference to a scenario in which there is a single fixed cost incurred in manufacturing any subset of a set of products under idealized conditions a cournot nash model is developed that describes the number of entering firms and the equilibrium price and production levels using this as a point of reference it is shown that by using gross contribution as an allocation basis optimal product line decisions are achieved without distorting the selection of production levels moreover competitive pressure sufficient to drive total net profits close to zero is sufficient to require that any allocation rule supporting optimal product line decisions yields allocations nearly proportional to gross contributions an analogy is drawn with the allocation of joint costs to coproducts in a competitive environment and the corresponding allocation in proportion to net realizable value

an empirical study on coalition formation and cost savings allocation abstract interest has been raised by the recent identification of potential savings through collaborative planning in logistics operations even though substantial savings can be realized two key questions exist i how should potential savings be divided among a group of collaborating companies and ii among potential collaborating companies how should collaborating group s be formed these two questions are studied in a specific context among potential collaborating companies a subset denoted the leading companies performs collaborative planning on behalf of the others and together they initiate formation of a collaborating group we use the concept of a business model to detail such context based on the literature on network formation where potential savings are modelled by a cooperative game four business models are explored in four different subsets of leading companies we propose a network model as a method to determine the stable collaborating group in each computation a case study including eight forest companies is described and analyzed results show that very different solution characteristics can be achieved depending on the business model selected

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

game theory and cost allocation problems problems of allocating joint costs in a reasonable way arise in many practical situations where people decide to work together to save costs cost allocation methods based on game theoretical concepts take into account the strategic aspects of cost allocation situations we give a survey of cost allocation methods based on the nucleolus and the shapley value and introduce also a new one the so called cost gap allocation method which is based on the i value it is shown that for some large subclasses of cost allocation problems this new cost allocation method coincides with old separable cost methods proposed in the thirties by the tennessee valley authority and also with the separable costs remaining benefits scrb method properties of this cost gap allocation method are also treated

industrial pricing theory and managerial practice we organize the existing theoretical pricing research into a new two level framework for industrial goods pricing the first level consists of four pricing situations new product competitive product line and cost based the second level consists of the pricing strategies appropriate for a given situation for example within the new product pricing situation there are three alternative pricing strategies skim penetration and experience curve pricing there are a total of ten pricing strategies included in the framework we then identified a set of cost product market and information conditions which determine what pricing situation s a firm is facing as well as which strategies are appropriate within a given situation some of these determinant conditions are common to many pricing strategies e g highly elastic demand while others are unique to a given strategy within a particular pricing situation for example within the product line situation the profitability of supplementary sales is a unique determinant of the complementary product pricing strategy razor and blade pricing using this framework as a basis for an empirical study we examined how well current industrial pricing practice matches the prescriptions from the existing research our sample consisted of 270 respondents 27 response rate of these more than 50 indicated that they used more than one pricing strategy in formulating their most recent pricing decision for a high value industrial product sold in the united states as in previous research cost plus pricing was the most often cited pricing strategy 56 of the respondents since the respondents were able to indicate their use of more than one pricing strategy the data are of the pick k from n variety in order to model the managers pricing strategy choices we constructed a stacked binary logit with a separate observation for each strategy within a given pricing situation the signs of the determinant variables were estimated as interaction terms the new product pricing strategies skim penetration experience curve were used for new models in the market skim pricing was used in markets with high levels of product differentiation by firms at a cost disadvantage due to scale penetration pricing was used by firms with a cost advantage due to scale in markets with high level of overall elasticity but low brand elasticity experience curve pricing was used for minor innovations by firms with low capacity utilization in markets with a high level of differentiation the competitive pricing strategies leader parity and low price supplier were used in mature markets parity pricing was used by firms in a poor competitive situation i e high costs low market share low product differentiation these firms were also unable to take advantage of high levels of elasticity since their capacity utilization was high in contrast the low price supplier strategy was used by firmswith low costs due to scale advantages since they have low utilization these firms can take advantage of elastic brand demand none of the determinants were significantly related to the choice of leader pricing product line pricing strategies bundling complementary product and customer value pricing were more likely to be used by firms which sell substitute or complementary products bundle pricing was used for per sale contract pricing in markets with high levels of brand elasticity complementary product pricing razor and blade was used by firms that enjoyed high profitability on its supplementary sales using customer value pricing a firm offers a stripped down version of its current products to appeal to more price sensitive segments or to leverage new distribution channels this strategy was used to target a narrow segment in high growth markets where price changes are difficult to detect cost based pricing was more likely to be used in marketswhere demand is very difficult to estimate in such a situation cost based pricing makes a great deal of sense in general the results show that the managers pricing strategy choices are consistent with normative pricing research however questions about how managers combine their strategies to arrive at a final price as well as the organizational influences on pricing strategies remain important areas for future research

supplier initiated outsourcing a methodology to exploit synergy in transportation over the last decades transportation has been evolving from a necessary though low priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge over their competitors to cut down transportation costs shippers often outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice this paper proposes a new procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead supplier initiated outsourcing this procedure is based on both operations research and game theoretical insights to stress the contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the logistics service provider we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential moreover these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of a so called shapley monotonic path of customized tariffs insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the dutch grocery transportation sector

averting a food crisis private imports and public targeted distribution in bangladesh after the 1998 flood abstract the 1998 flood in bangladesh caused a shortfall of 2 2 million tonnes mill t in the rice production and threatened the food security of tens of millions of households despite the best efforts of donors and the government the public distribution of rice and wheat was only 188 000 t more than originally planned for july 1998 to april 1999 however a major food crisis was averted as private imports made possible by trade liberalisation in the early 1990s stabilised market prices and supplies the government s direct distribution programs though small compared to private imports nonetheless increased access to food by poor households household survey data indicate that immediate relief efforts were well targeted to flood affected households as were transfers from ngos vulnerable group feeding vgf a medium term program was not targeted well to households directly exposed to the flood though the program was relatively well targeted to poor households more broadly the bangladesh experience with the 1998 flood shows that in a liberalised trade regime where private imports respond to price signals food aid s contribution to the total availability of food may be minimal however foreign assistance in kind or in cash can provide resources for subsidised targeted distribution to food insecure households assistance not possible otherwise under tight government budget constraints

dynamic coalition reformation for adaptive demand and capacity sharing abstract to deal with volatile product demand and rapidly changing manufacturing technologies for sustainable returns selective collaboration among companies in supply networks sns is required recently demand and capacity sharing among independent and non competitive manufacturers at the same horizontal layer in sns has been studied through an appropriate coalition for collaborative demand and capacity sharing manufacturers can minimize their lost sales as well as maximize production capacity utilization against lumpy real demand in a previous study we have developed the collaborative demand and capacity sharing cdcs protocol which addresses a long term profitable and well balanced collaboration for each manufacturer through distributed decision making however the uncertainty of circumstances calls for an effective and timely reformation of coalitions in reality there is a trade off between frequent accommodation to changeable environments and high additional costs incurred by reformation hence in this paper we design the adaptive cdcs protocol based on dynamic contract mechanism in each period our protocol suggests whether to reform existing coalitions or not based on theoretical analyses of long term expected net profit to evaluate its performance a numerical experiment is conducted by comparing three models no collaboration static collaboration and dynamic collaboration by adaptive cdcs protocol dynamic collaboration results in more profits and its balanced redistribution by accommodating with changeable conditions

production inventory games a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games in this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production inventory problems several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed each agent has its own unit production inventory holding and backlogging cost cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost we prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced and the owen set reduces to a singleton the owen point based on this type of allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games finally we point out the relationship of the owen point with other well known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the shapley value

organizational capabilities and the economic history of the industrial enterprise in my book scale and scope 1990 i focused on the history of the modern industrial firm from the 1880s when such firms first appeared through world war ii i did so by comparing the fortunes of more than 600 enterprises the 200 largest industrial firms at three points in time world war i 1929 and world war ii in each of the three major industrial economies those of the united states britain and germany in this paper i first describe the similarities in the historical beginnings and continuing evolution of these enterprises and then outline my explanation for these similarities next i relate my explanation of these empirical regularities to four major economic theories relating to the firm the neoclassical the principal agent the transaction cost and the evolutionary finally i suggest the value of the transactions cost and evolutionary theories to historians and economists who are attempting to explain the beginnings and growth of modern industrial enterprises

shipment consolidation who pays for it and how much this paper examines the subject of cost allocation in a multiple product inventory system allowing for consolidation of shipments if we order multiple items using an economic order quantity eoq policy and consolidate shipments part of the ordering cost is shared and part is specific to each item we want to find the consolidation choice with optimal total cost and divide the cost fairly among the individual items such a fair division is central to a costing system in which no group of items subsidizes the others there are no free riders we use a cooperative inventory game to determine when this can be done this game is usually not concave so we want to know what consolidation combinations determine when this cost can be fairly divided using the core of the game we prove that consolidation of all the items is cheaper exactly if there are fair cost allocations core of the game is not empty which happens when the portion of the ordering cost common to all items is not too small we further show how sensitive the nonempty core result is to adjustments in the cost parameters and show how to determine a threshold value for the shared ordering cost which assures the existence of a fair cost allocation

the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from freight transport by pooling supply chains it is well known that freight consolidation is an effective way to improve the utilization of logistics resources in fact today this policy is locally and fragmentally implemented at the operational level we propose here to explore the environmental impact of pooling of supply chains at the strategic level merging supply chains with real data from two main french retailers and through an optimization model we compute co2 emissions for two transport modes road and rail as regards the general dependency of the emissions produced by the modes of transport on their loads the emissions functions of the two modes are both piecewise linear and discontinuous functions the supply network pooling proposed here is an efficient approach to reducing co2 emissions even if the attention is focused on the emissions the transportation costs are also studied and analyzed

ownership structure institutional organization and measured x efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behavior of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realize what it is that is being maximized however we shall evade this easy escape route into nonfalsifiable hypothesizing and instead shall take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

performance measures and metrics in outsourcing decisions a review for research and applications outsourcing an operations strategy that influences the performance of a supply chain has become an important component of global operations management an effective global sourcing strategy helps companies to manage the flow of parts and finished products in meeting the needs of overseas and domestic markets outsourcing reduces the cost of assets facilitates core competencies to reduce production costs leads to strategic flexibility and reduces administrative and overhead costs some of the reasons why companies are against outsourcing include integration challenges sacrificing their competitive base opportunistic behaviour rising transaction and coordination costs limited innovation and higher procurement costs despite these shortcomings outsourcing will continue to play an important role in enhancing organizational competitiveness therefore an attempt has been made to review the literature on outsourcing with particular reference to performance measures and metrics pmms used in arriving at outsourcing decisions the main objective of this paper is to present a taxonomy classification of pmms in outsourcing decisions at the pre outsourcing during outsourcing and post outsourcing stages also based on the literature review and analysis an attempt is made to determine a list of specific tools and techniques for pmms in outsourcing finally the limitations of the paper and future research directions are presented

efficiency gains within firms under voluntary environmental initiatives this paper focuses on efficiency gains that voluntary environmental initiatives may achieve within the firm current debate concerning the extent and significance of inefficiencies within firms is critically important to the progress of energy and environmental policies several recent lines of inquiry in microeconomics help explain the persistence of inefficiencies within firms in addition two of the most prominent new approaches in the field of business strategy resource based strategy and the capabilities perspective focus on the heterogeneity among firms and the resulting pockets of inefficiency within firms they suggest at least three generic strategies for voluntary environmental initiatives challenging outdated organizational routines creating opportunities for differentiation or complementing firms resource investment trajectories these generic approaches suggest that there is considerable scope for further experimentation with voluntary environmental initiatives

recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change this famous passage from marshall s principles of economics it first appeared in the fifth edition which came out in 1907 nicely brings out two issues which are as germane to economics today as they were when marshall wrote the first is the heavy reliance by economists in their formal theorizing on the notion of equilibrium the other is the appeal that biological conceptions3x201d have for many economists particularly when their focus is on economic change

a hybrid milp and benders decomposition approach to find the nucleolus quota allocation for a renewable energy portfolio portfolios of renewable electricity sources are interesting risk management mechanisms for trading in electricity contract markets when formed by players belonging to different companies their stability relies on the way the benefit generated by the optimal portfolio is allocated the challenge of finding a fair and efficient allocation can be mathematically formulated in terms of finding the core of a cooperative game which in turn is stated as an optimization problem with a set of constraints that exponentially grows with the number of participants quickly becoming computationally intractable moreover the right hand side of each constraint relies on a given coalition value which in our case is obtained by a two stage stochastic optimization model this paper presents an efficient methodology based on mixed linear programming and benders decomposition to find the nucleolus share of large scale renewable portfolios case studies are presented with data from the brazilian power system

motives behind purchasing consortia abstract although purchasing cooperation between independent companies has been practiced for a long time the phenomenon is not extensively researched especially purchasing consortiums formed by industrial companies have received relatively little attention in literature of the discipline in this paper the key results of the larger study concerning industrial consortium purchasing are presented the study was recently conducted and tested in finnish machine manufacturing industry the objective of this paper is to find out the motives behind purchasing consortia as foundations for the empirical study three theories explaining why companies form purchasing consortia are presented the results of the study indicate that two main reasons for the companies to cooperate on purchasing are the expected cost savings and the collection of information on supply markets

cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation abstract logistics costs in general and transportation costs in particular represent a large fraction of the operating costs of many companies one way to try to reduce these costs is through horizontal cooperation among shippers thus when the transportation needs of two or more companies are merged their collective transportation requirements can be met at lower cost the attainable cost savings are due to economies of scale which translate into cheaper rates due to increased negotiation power use of larger vehicles and bundling of shipments in this paper a linear model is presented and used to study the cost savings that different companies may achieve when they merge their transportation requirements on the one hand solving this optimization model for different collaboration scenarios allows testing and quantifying the synergies among different potential partners thus identifying the most profitable collaboration opportunities on the other the problem of allocating the joint cost savings of the cooperation is tackled using cooperative game theory the proposed approach is illustrated with an example in which different cooperative game solution concepts are compared extensive numerical experiments have also been carried out to gain insight into the properties of the corresponding cost savings game and the behavior of the different solution concepts

supply chain coordination perspectives empirical studies and research directions supply chains sc are generally complex and are characterized by numerous activities spread over multiple functions and organizations which pose interesting challenges for effective sc coordination to meet these challenges sc members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other a systematic literature review is presented in this paper to throw light on the importance of sc coordination the objectives of this paper are to report and review various perspectives on sc coordination issues understand and appreciate various mechanisms available for coordination and identify the gaps existing in the literature a framework is suggested indicating scope for further research

the energy efficiency gap what does it mean abstract as renewed attention has been given by policy makers to energy conservation issues it has frequently been asserted that an energy efficiency gap exists between actual and optimal energy use the critical questions is how to define the optimal level of energy efficiency this paper seeks to disentangle some confusing strands of argument that are frequently brought to bear on this question by identifying the major conceptual issues that determine the set of feasible answers we identify five separate and distinct notions of optimality the economists economic potential the technologists economic potential hypothetical potential the narrow social optimum and the true social optimum each of these has associated with it a corresponding definition of the energy efficiency gap our analysis demonstrates that necessary preconditions for identifying the right measure of the energy efficiency gap include understanding and disentangling market failure and non market failure explanations for the gradual diffusion of energy efficient technologies

computing core allocations in cooperative games with an application to cooperative procurement abstract cooperative game theory defines several concepts for distributing outcome shares in a cooperative game with transferable utilities one of the most famous solution concepts is the core which defines a set of outcome allocations that are stable such that no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition in this paper we propose a general procedure to compute a core element or to detect that no core allocation exists which is based on mathematical programming techniques the procedure proposed in this paper can be applied to a wide class of cooperative games where the characteristic function is given by the optimum objective function value of a complex optimization problem for cooperative procurement which is an example from the field of supply chain management where some literature on the core concept already exists we prove the applicability and provide computational results to demonstrate that games with 150 players can be handled

how should the cost of joint risk capital be allocated for performance measurement we consider the problem of allocating the cost of risk capital based on value at risk var for performance measurement in a decentralized organization with several divisions the focus of the analysis is on fair risk capital allocation schemes to this end we analyze several well known allocation schemes in the context of a model based on cooperative game theory using the core concept we provide theoretical evidence that two allocation schemes the beta method and the nucleolus method turn out to perform best in allocating the cost of risk capital a simulation study shows that another allocation method the cost gap method shows similar results however within an experiment we obtain empirical evidence that the core concept is of minor importance with respect to individually perceived fairness subjects tend to favor simple allocation rules such as the activity level method and the beta method in summary only the beta method can be considered to be fair both from a normative and a descriptive point of view

trade liberalization and national food security rice trade between bangladesh and india abstract following a poor harvest in late 1997 and a massive flood in 1998 private sector traders in bangladesh imported several million metric tons of rice from india this paper presents evidence that this trade made possible by separate trade liberalizations in india and bangladesh in the early 1990s augmented domestic supplies and stabilized prices in bangladesh at import parity levels letters of credit data indicating the participation of hundreds of importers and a close correlation of price movements across the two countries suggest that the trade was competitive a risk of co incident crop shortfalls in the two countries remains though these have occurred rarely in the past two decades bangladesh imports from alternative sources would also enhance food availability if another production shortfall occurs but these imports face higher transport costs and would involve far fewer importing firms given the economies of scale of shipments by sea the positive contribution of trade liberalization to short run food security in bangladesh in recent years does not minimize the importance of increased agricultural productivity and rural economic growth to provide rural poor households with sufficient incomes to acquire food nonetheless the bangladesh experience shows that trade liberalization offers potential benefits for national food security by enabling a rapid increase of food supplies following domestic production shortfalls

allocation of cost savings in a three level supply chain with demand information sharing a cooperative game approach we analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three level supply chain with a manufacturer a distributor and a retailer to find a unique allocation scheme we use concepts from cooperative game theory first we analytically compute the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer we construct a three person cooperative game in characteristic function form and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of five possible coalitions to divide the cost savings between two members or among three supply chain members we use various allocation schemes we present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of the demand autocorrelation coefficient and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

cooperative interconnection settlement among isps through nap abstract this paper studies the settlement problem among internet service providers isps who interconnect with each other through network access point nap a cooperative game framework is adopted for the analysis two commonly adopted allocations i e the non settlement profit allocation and the shapley value based profit allocation are analyzed and compared we check whether these two allocations can encourage isps to interconnect with each other i e in the core of the game and at the same time demonstrate fairness in settlement our results show that the non settlement allocation is not in the core and does not preserve fairness and the shapley value based profit allocation is in the core and demonstrates fairness however the complex structure of shapley value makes it difficult to understand for isps and hard to be implemented at nap especially when isps can only make their pricing decisions independently therefore we propose a characterized profit allocation cpa which is in the core preserves fairness and is easy to interpret we further propose a settlement rule based on cpa which enables the isps to act independently but achieve global optimality we also extend our basic model to incorporate interconnection quality decisions and market competition and show that the proposed settlement rule and its extended form work well in these scenarios numerical experiments confirm that cpa and its corresponding settlement rule can effectively encourage interconnection among isps and motivate isps to expand their networks

jit purchasing vs eoq with a price discount an analytical comparison of inventory costs abstract the inventory costs of purchasing under economic order quantity eoq model with a quantity discount is determined and compared to the costs under just in time jit it is shown that at low levels of demand jit is the preferred method whereas eoq has the cost advantage for an item with a high demand the model also predicts that the higher the value of the item the carrying cost or the ordering cost associated with the eoq model and the smaller the quantity discount rate the wider will be the range of demand for which jit remains preferable

food aid domestic policy and food security contrasting experiences from south asia and sub saharan africa abstract food aid both for short term emergency relief and as program food aid that helps address medium term food deficits is often a major component of food security strategies in developing countries this study reviews the experience with food aid of four major recipients of food aid india bangladesh ethiopia and zambia regarding food production trade markets consumption and safety nets as well as the policy responses to food emergencies the widely varying experiences of the study countries suggest that food aid that supports building of production and market enhancing infrastructure is timed to avoid adverse price effects on producers and is targeted to food insecure households can play a positive role in enhancing food security however food aid is not the only or in many cases the most efficient means of addressing food insecurity in many cases private markets can more effectively address shortfalls in food availability and cash transfers may be a viable alternative to food transfers in kind

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds

collaboration among small shippers in a transportation market abstract intense competition in markets is pushing companies to increase their operational efficiency one possible way to achieve increased efficiency is through cooperation with other companies we study the coalition formation among small shippers in a transportation market characterized by uncertain demand we analyze the decisions taken by the coalition and study the effect of shipper characteristics on the benefit of collaboration analysis shows that the shippers always benefit from the coalition but when the benefits are to be allocated the coalition may not always guarantee the budget balance which is elementary for sustainability of any coalition using a game theoretical approach this study proposes saving allocation mechanisms and discusses the conditions that lead to a balanced budget