intrinsic motivation in public service theory and evidence from state supreme courts abstractthis paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges we construct a panel data set using published decisions from all state supreme courts from 1947 to 1994 we estimate the effects of changes in judges employment conditions on a number of measures of judicial performance the results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high quality decisions and that at the margin they prefer quality over quantity when judges face less time pressure whether from the introduction of an intermediate appellate court the weakening of electoral demands or an increased salary they write more well researched opinions that are cited more often by other judges these effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to select their portfolios of cases

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

price adjustment in long term contracts the case of coal in two recent papers i examined the effects of relationship specific investment on the duration of contracts negotiated between electric utilities and coal suppliers that work demonstrated that when relationshipspecific investment is important for a cost minimizing supply relationship contracts are frequently utilized that specify ex ante the terms and conditions of trade over many future years in this article i examine the characteristics of the price adjustment provisions specified in these long term coal contracts i utilize a sample of about 250 coal contracts to analyze the structure of formal price adjustment provisions in coal contracts in order to determine the factors that affect initial negotiated contract prices and to examine actual transaction price behavior over time there has been much recent theoretical work as well as some related empirical work that has focused on the benefits of long term contracts when relationship specific investments are important 2 there has also been some theoretical work that focuses on the contractual arrangements that may be chosen to mitigate opportunism problems and guard against

contracting in the shadow of the law economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance as a matter of law this is not the case this leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts this article shows that american standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules it is shown that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties our model also implies that the legal remedies of mistake impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of hadley v baxendale are efficient solutions to the problem of implementing complex exchange

public subsidies and the employment growth of high tech start ups assessing the impact of selective and automatic support schemes the aim of this article is to assess the impact of public subsidies on the employment growth of new technology based firms ntbfs contingent on i the type of policy scheme either selective or automatic and ii the age of the firms at the time of receipt of the subsidy for this purpose we analyze a sample composed of 536 italian independent ntbfs observed during a 10 year period 1994 2003 we estimate augmented gibrat law type dynamic panel data models using different techniques aimed at controlling for the potentially endogenous nature of public financing namely the generalized method of moments system fixed effect instrumental variable and inverse probability treatment weights estimators the results of the estimates show that selective support schemes had a larger impact on employment growth than automatic ones but only if they were awarded in the very early period of the recipient firms lives however selective subsidies awarded to young ntbfs are rare in italy calling into question the capability of the italian industrial policy to sustain the growth of the high tech entrepreneurial sector

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

can markets stimulate rights on the alienability of legal claims the alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access to justice and fostering development of law i develop a principal agent framework where litigation funders provide expertise in reducing uncertainty in agents disutility of production the model leads to the counterintuitive prediction that litigation funders prefer cases with novel issues and social surplus is positively correlated with legal uncertainty consistent with the model court backlog court expenditures and a slowing in average time to completion are associated with third party funding cases with third party funding receive more citations and are reversed less often than comparable cases without such arrangements

the association between venture capitalists selection and value adding behavior evidence from early stage high tech venture capitalists building upon self efficacy and collective effort theories we study the association between the selection behavior of venture capitalists and their involvement in value adding activities we argue that investors who prioritize different characteristics of a business proposal during selection will be more or less confident of their own abilities and the abilities of entrepreneurial teams to effectively add value to portfolio companies and hence will be more or less involved in providing value adding activities in order to test this claim we use a stratified sample comprising 68 european early stage high tech venture capitalists results show that venture capitalists who focus on entrepreneurial team characteristics or financial criteria during selection are less involved in value adding activities compared to their peers who focus on technological criteria we discuss these findings from a theoretical and practical perspective

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

a direct test of the lemons model the market for used pickup trucks of the implications of models of markets with asymmetric information in the seminal paper on markets with asymmetric information george akerlof 1970 pointed out two possible outcomes that may occur where sellers have better information about the quality of products than do buyers one possibility is that bad products will drive out good products if buyers cannot distinguish quality until after the purchase has been made there will be no incentive for sellers to provide good quality products and the average quality in the market will decline in the case of cars an often cited example of this phenomenon owners who discover that they have a lemon will attempt to sell it in the used car market to an unsuspecting buyer the owner of a creampuff will not sell his car since it is indistinguishable from a lemon to buyers and must therefore sell for the price of a car of average quality the effect of quality uncertainty is to reduce the volume of transactions in the used car market below the socially optimal level a second possibility suggested by akerlof is that institutions may develop to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty warranties and brand names can be used to give the buyer some assurance of quality these institutions may prevent good products from being driven from the market but they will

optimal price quality schedules and sustainability this paper derives a general solution for optimal price quality scheduling under imperfect information the solution is general in t he sense that it generates the first best the second best and the profit maximizing solutions depending on the weights in the objective function the important assumption is that the fixed setup cost is related to the range of qualities produced by a firm this paper also demonstrates a nonlinear version of the occasional incompatibility between the second best pricing and sustainability and derives the conditions for sustainability of the second best price quality schedule in many markets firms can provide many different qualities for a generic type of product with relatively little cost disadvantage if such markets are characterized by heterogeneous consumers who have different evaluations of product qualities firms would find it optimal to offer a multitude of different qualities at different prices in order to discriminate among consumers however since a firm cannot normally determine each individual consumer s willingness to pay for quality the firm would have to design a price quality schedule that discriminates among consumers through self selection if the firm knows the overall distribution of consumer tastes mussa and rosen 1978 considered a monopolist s problem of selecting a price quality schedule that maximizes profit given the same information constraint mentioned above maskin and riley 1984 considered a monopolist s profit maximizing quantity discount strategy under the same information constraint in a more general model which can readily incorporate and extend mussa and rosen s results by interpreting quantity as quality both of the studies however assumed constant returns to scale technologies and mussa and rosen did not assume the cost disadvantage that can arise from producing a wide range of qualities in this paper we analyze a firm that can provide a continuum of different price and quality pairs for a certain range of qualities we assume that the cost of production is related to the range of qualities produced as well as the quality level of each output we assume an increasing returns to scale

the ratchet effect and the market for secondhand workers workers in a long term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future we show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece rate contracts when the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm gibbons 1987 has shown that all piece rate contracts will be inefficient together these results may explain why piece rates are common in some jobs such as agricultural work and sales and not as popular for many manufacturing jobs

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

bidding for incomplete contracts an empirical analysis of adaptation costs abstract procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids a structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7 5 14 percent of the winning bid markups from private information and market power the focus of much of the auctions literature are much smaller by comparison implications for government procurement are discussed jel d44 d82 d86 h57 l13 l74 r42

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

gasoline prices and the used automobile market a rational expectations asset price approach this paper examines the impact of changes in gasoline price expectations on the market values of used automobiles an asset model of automobile valuation is used to relate year to year changes in market values to changes in the present discounted value of gasoline expenses econometric evidence from data covering the years 1972 through 1981 substantially confirms the hypothesis of the model that a gasoline price shock causes relative price changes across automobile types in proportion to the differences in their rates of fuel consumption

the evolution of common law we present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost we find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views policy motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law s precision we call our central finding the cardozo theorem even when judges are motivated by personal agendas legal evolution is on average beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law

a theory of quality related differences in retail margins why there is a premium on premium gasoline this paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality the difference in price cost margins between the high and low quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor s closest rival these predictions are largely supported using an extensive station level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the los angeles basin area from 1992 1995

backward induction normal form perfection and explicable equilibria a weakening of d kreps and r wilson s 1982 notion of sequential rationality is presented the motivation stems from the difficulty in justifying sequentially rational behavior in subgames reachable only through a violation of sequential rationality although the present notion of weak sequential rationality is based upon extensive form considerations it bears a close relation to r selten s 1975 normal form perfect equilibria backward induction outcomes can be achieved in generic games of perfect information with additional restrictions on beliefs an example with imperfect information shows that sequential rationality is not the consequence of equilibrium play and the absence of incredible threats copyright 1992 by the econometric society

learning while setting precedents a decision maker dm must address a series of problems over time each period a random case arises and the dm must make a yes or no decision which we call a ruling she is uncertain about the correct ruling until she conducts a costly investigation a ruling establishes a precedent which may be costly to violate in the future we compare the dm s incentive to acquire information the evolution of standards and the social welfare under two institutions nonbinding precedent and binding precedent under nonbinding precedent the dm is not required to follow previous rulings but under binding precedent she must follow previous rulings where applicable we find that compared to nonbinding precedent the incentive for information acquisition is stronger under binding precedent in earlier periods when few precedents exist but as more precedents are established over time the incentive for information acquisition becomes weaker under binding precedent even though erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent social welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation conducted early on

the demand for cars and the price of gasoline the user cost approach the theory of the user cost of capital is used to estimate the demand for new and used cars in israel the results demonstrate that the price of operating costs must be included in the demand function they also show that the importance of gasoline price increases with engine size income elasticities are higher for new than for old cars and increase with engine size the inevitability of further increases in gasoline prices implies a further reduction in the average size of cars and a possible decline in the number of cars in the economy unless the trend is moderated by an acceleration in economic growth the future of the us auto industry will depend to a large extent on its ability to compete in the small and medium car markets 13 references 3 tables

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

the role of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements although disputes are typically treated as synonymous with concerns about enforcement in economic models of trade agreements in reality most wto disputes seem to concern the interpretation of vague provisions or instances where the agreement is silent and some have suggested that the wto s dispute settlement body dsb could usefully grant exceptions to rigid contractual obligations these activist dsb roles could help complete an incomplete contract but how activist should the dsb be should dsb rulings set precedent we address these questions by characterizing the optimal choice of contract form and dsb mandate under various contracting conditions jel codes d02 d78 d86 f13 k12 k33

public policy measures to support new technology based firms in the european union abstract this paper provides a review of public policy measures implemented in eu countries to support new technology based firms ntbfs during the 1980s and early 1990s it identifies five policy areas and provides a synthesis of the policy developments during this period and an assessment of their effectiveness the policy areas examined are science parks the supply of phds in science and technology the relationships between ntbfs and universities research institutions direct financial support to ntbfs from national governments and the impact of technological advisory services on ntbfs although considered independently these issues are clearly part of an interdependent system of policies and we conclude with an overview of the whole policy area together with our personal recommendations for its improvement

the design of contracts and remedies for breach in the first part of this article hypothetical contracts providing for all possible uncertain contingencies are considered in the next part contracts providing for only some contingencies are examined and are shown to be advantageous due both to difficulties that could arise in making and enforcing contingent terms and to the presence of implicit substitutes for them in the following major part of the article two of these substitutes for contingent terms are analyzed remedies for breach and the opportunity for renegotiation the existence of both is demonstrated to induce parties to behave approximately as they would under detailed contracts

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

effects of government financial incentives on firms innovation performance in china evidences from beijing in the 1990s abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of chinese government financial incentives on firms innovation performance during the nation s initial economic transition period in the mid 1990s through a large scale empirical survey of more than 1000 chinese manufacturing firms the empirical evidences show that whereas the major government financial incentives such as special loans and tax credits were positively influential to innovative economic performance of firms direct earmarks not only failed to enhance innovative economic performance it sometimes negatively affected it surprisingly the findings show that all financial incentives of governments were unrelated to the patents of either high tech or general firms and direct earmarks affected the patents of these firms negatively although not to a significant degree this indicates that the centrally planned funding system of the 1990s was ineffective for enhancing technological progress for chinese manufacturing firms the study results imply that the chinese government should further increase the role of market force in its reforms a more market driven model by developing more s t initiatives to match the strategic directions of different enterprises particularly soes is recommended

market segmentation by price quality schedules some evidence from automobiles discrimination among heterogeneous buyers of a product is possible through the use of multiple quality variants this article quantifies various implications of the standard mussa rosen model of price quality discrimination as applied to the u s automobile industry it demonstrates that the price quality variants of a major manufacturer indeed segment the market as predicted by the model distortions in the range and nature of products offered in their prices and in the resulting consumer surplus in the automobile market are measured and shown to be significant copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

consumer strategies limiting the monopolist s power multiple and joint purchases i characterize the menu of bundles price quantity combinations offered by a monopolist when consumers can buy several bundles share bundles with others or do both in a two type setting i find that although perfect arbitrage prevents any price discrimination partial arbitrage in the form of multiple or joint purchases may actually lead to more pronounced price discrimination than when consumers can only pick one single bundle further clear predictions emerge for the price pattern contrasting with the existing literature with multiple purchases only the firm offers strict quantity discounts with joint purchases only discounts are infeasible

legal realism for economists abstract economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets including voters legislators and bureaucrats the incentives and behavior of judges however remain largely opaque do judges act as neutral third party enforcers of substantive decisions made by others are judges ordinary policymakers who advance whatever outcomes they favor without any special consideration for law as such emerging recent scholarship has started to explore more nuanced conceptions of how law facts and judicial preferences may interact to influence judicial decisions this work develops a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of american legal realism a jurisprudential movement of lawyers judges and law professors that flourished in the early twentieth century the purpose of this essay is to introduce in simplified form the realist account of judicial decision making to contras

the efficacy of state mandated minimum quality certification the case of used vehicles this paper investigates whether the quality certification required by certain state used vehicle disclosure laws has been effective metzger concluded from a theoretical investigation of non market responses to the lemons problem that such laws may or may not be effective we have been unable to find evidence that the currently mandated disclosure requirements in wisconsin known defects provision and iowa safety certification are effective in increasing the number of good quality vehicles traded in those used markets these disclosure requirements do not seem to decrease a prospective buyer s risk of purchasing a lemon

why has regional income convergence in the u s declined the past thirty years have seen a dramatic decrease in the rate of income convergence across states and in population flows to wealthy places these changes coincide with 1 an increase in housing prices in productive areas 2 a divergence in the skill specific real returns to living in productive places 3 a redirection of low skilled migration and 4 diminished human capital convergence due to migration we develop a model where falling housing supply elasticity and endogenous labor mobility generates these patterns using a new panel measure of housing supply regulations we demonstrate the importance of this channel income convergence continues in less regulated places while it has stopped in more regulated places

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

cherries lemons and the ftc minimum quality standards in the retail used automobile industry the ftc initially considered two forms of regulation in the used automobile market requiring dealers to either certify or warrant the mechanical condition of each automobile sold since the regulation would have been imposed only on dealers and not on private sellers its effectiveness was dependent on the magnitude of the induced shift of sales into the private market accordingly this paper employs a gametheoretic model to examine the theoretical conditions under which society could be expected to benefit from either regulatory alternative among other things it is concluded that a socially beneficial minimum quality standard may not exist in some situations

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract this article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it it is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way without enforceable contracts the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be pareto ranked from best to worst as follows specific performance expectation damages and reliance damages

the demand for cars and gasoline a simultaneous approach abstract this paper develops and estimates a simple model of the demand and supply of cars and gasoline in israel focusing on an individual maximizing his life time utility function under various constraints particular emphasis is placed on the transaction cost in a car purchase and the fact that cars can be characterized by size and age factors which in turn affect running costs and maintenance costs the empirical results show that a change in the price of gasoline and or the price of new cars changes the structure of the stock of cars with respect to engine size

status quo bias in bargaining an extension of the myerson satterthwaite theorem with an application to the coase theorem we use a generalized version of the myerson satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good where there is two sided private information on the valuations we show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution that the most efficient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo in the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism there is an expected bias towards the disagreement point in other words for the class of preferences we study there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information

cognition and incomplete contracts thinking about contingencies designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete the paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

a test of racial bias in capital sentencing this paper proposes a test of racial bias in capital sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors in lower courts we model the behavior of the trial court as minimizing a weighted sum of the probability of sentencing an innocent and that of letting a guilty defendant free we de ne racial bias as a situation where the relative weight on the two types of errors is a function of defendant and or victim race the key prediction of the model is that if the court is unbiased ex post the error rate should be independent of the combination of defendant and victim race we test this prediction using an original dataset that contains the the race of the defendant and of the victim s for all capital appeals that became nal between 1973 and 1995 we nd robust evidence of bias against minority defendants who killed white victims in direct appeal and habeas corpus the probability of error in these cases is 3 and 9 percentage points higher respectively than for minority defendants who killed minority victims

endogenous cases and the evolution of the common law i develop a dynamic model of judge made law in which the ideal legal rule is unknown but can be learned in contrast to existing articles the flow of cases heard by the court is affected by the court s prior decisions the model highlights the significance of this feedback in explaining when and why the court will write broader or narrower opinions and the long run properties of common law in equilibrium the law settles endogenously because the incentives to make legally controversial choices disappear as the law evolves settled law exhibits residual uncertainty and ambiguity and potentially implements inefficient outcomes

legal efficiency and consistency abstract we analyze the efficiency and consistency of court decisions under common and civil law as a leading example we study the enforcement of property rights judges are of two types some are conservative and follow the precedent or the statute while others maximize social welfare when courts intervene ex post after the relevant economic choices have been made welfare maximizing courts face a commitment problem such an ex post bias has implications on the relative consistency and efficiency of each legal system surprisingly we find that court decisions are more consistent under common law than under civil law the welfare comparison between the two systems is instead ambiguous however in changing economic environments common law is more likely to dominate civil law because of its greater adaptability

consumer demand for automobiles a disaggregated market approach using a disaggregated model and a three stage least squares procedure this paper estimates the demand for automobiles in the u s by size class while the price elasticity of demand in each submarket was significantly greater than one factors such as gasoline prices styling changes and demographic changes influenced each submarket differently

quality distortion by a discriminating monopolist the standard model of monopolistic imperfect quality discrimination involving consumer self selection has shown that no distortion occurs at the highest quality level while all lower quality levels are degraded in order to maintain profitable market segmentation this result flows from the assumption that consumers with a higher total utility of quality also have a higher marginal utility of quality the paper develops a reasonable model in which the standard assumption is not satisfied and this alternative model yields vastly different conclusions regarding the form of quality distortion in particular quality may be enhanced not degraded to maintain profitable market segmentation copyright 1989 by american economic association

automobile quality choice under pollution control regulation in this paper we develop a modified quality choice model to study the effects of various mobile source air pollution control regulations we have a single producer that supplies a fixed number of car types two but faces a spectrum of consumers differing in their valuation of car quality the car manufacturer chooses the quality levels of the two car types as well as the sales mix between the two types and the size of the market it wishes to supply by endogenizing both the sales mix and the market size while still allowing quality to be a choice variable we are able to more completely analyze the impact of any car pollution control regulation existing studies of this impact either focus on the model line adjustment response shifts in the quality array or on the price adjustment response changes in the sales mix and market size in allowing for both the model line and the price adjustment options we find that the corporate average fuel efficiency cafe standard is unambiguously welfare superior to the low emission vehicle quantity constraint lev and zero emission vehicle zev programs we also show that the effects of the cafe standard are not equivalent to those of a fuel tax as previously found and that for a given car pollution target the former is preferred to the latter

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

the efficiency of used vehicle markets the case of technological obsolescence and differential repair records this paper examines the effect of technological oboslescence differential maintanance expenditures and differential fuel efficiencies on the depreciated value of automobiles our results support the widely held belief that used vehicle markets are efficient we show that the significant decline in the depreciated values of used automobiles is predominantly due to age we also conclude that technological obsolescence causes a once and for all decrease in the depreciated value of used automobiles that for imported vehicle lines differential maintanance expenditures affect depreciated value and that for domestic vehicle lines differential fuel efficiencies impact depreciated value

court efficiency and procurement performance disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court a simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation therefore inducing sellers to delay contract delivery by using a large dataset on italian public procurement we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance we find that where courts are inefficient i public works are delivered with longer delays ii delays increase for more valuable contracts iii contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers and iv a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery other interpretations receive less support from the data