education poverty and terrorism is there a causal connection the paper investigates whether there is a connection between poverty or low education and terrorism we review evidence on hate crimes which are closely related to terrorism the occurrence of hate crimes is largely independent of economic conditions we analyze data on support for attacks against israeli targets from public opinion polls conducted in the west bank and gaza strip support for violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living standards the core contribution of the paper is a statistical analysis of the determinants of participation in hezbollah militant activities having a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary or higher education is positively associated with participation in hezbollah we also find that israeli jewish settlers who attacked palestinians in the west bank in the early 1980s were overwhelmingly from high paying occupations although our results are tentative and exploratory they suggest that neither poverty nor education has a direct causal impact on terrorism

portfolio selection using hierarchical bayesian analysis and mcmc methods abstract this paper contributes to portfolio selection methodology using a bayesian forecast of the distribution of returns by stochastic approximation new hierarchical priors on the mean vector and covariance matrix of returns are derived and implemented comparison s between this approach and other bayesian methods are studied with simulations on 25 years of historical data on global stock indices it is demonstrated that a fully hierarchical bayes procedure produces promising results warranting more study we carried out a numerical optimization procedure to maximize expected utility using the mcmc monte carlo markov chain samples from the posterior predictive distribution this model resulted in an extra 1 5 percentage points per year in additional portfolio performance on top of the hierarchical bayes model to estimate and and use the markowitz model which is quite a significant empirical result this approach applies to a large class of utility functions and models for market returns

one man one bid abstract we compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice e g adopt one of two proposals we show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome we introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others payments this mechanism is budget balanced individually rational and fully efficient in the limit moreover the mechanism redistributes from those that gain from the outcome to those that lose and everyone is better off under bidding compared to voting we test the two mechanisms in the lab using an environment with moderate and extremist voters the observed efficiency losses under voting are close to theoretical predictions and significantly larger than under bidding because of redistribution the efficiency gain from bidding benefits mostly the moderate voters

are church and state substitutes evidence from the 1996 welfare reform abstract churches provide community services similar to those provided by the government but there has been no convincing analysis of the extent to which church activity can substitute for government activity to address this important issue this paper uses a new panel data set of presbyterian church usa congregations to regress both church member donations and a church s community spending on a number of variables including government welfare expenditures a provision of the 1996 welfare law that decreased the availability and use of welfare services by non citizens serves as an instrument to identify the causal effect of government spending on church activity the results show that church activities substitute for government activities extrapolating the findings to all denominations the estimated crowd out effect lies between 20 and 38 cents on the dollar the results are subjected to a number of robustness tests

sacrifice and stigma reducing free riding in cults communes and other collectives this paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions the analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity rather religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to participatory crowding the analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma self sacrifice and bizarre behavioral restrictions the model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious social clubs fraternities communes political parties work groups and families

choice by sequential procedures article history we propose a rule of decision making the sequential procedure guided by routes and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule in addition the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related we show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees which in turn is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability thus we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures

the role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation an empirical investigation in this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which moore and repullo s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth telling in practice both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good s value we nd that moore repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good this failure to implement truthtelling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one s trading partner therefore although the mechanism should in theory provide incentives for truth telling many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payo by lying the deviations from truth telling become signicantly more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good s value our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of moore repullo mechanisms in practice

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

rich regions poor regions and bank branch deregulation in spain abstractrich regions poor regions and bank branch deregulation in spain regional studies the links between financial deregulation and economic performance are evaluated in a european context specifically the study analyses the relaxation of bank branching restrictions in spain which triggered a remarkable interregional expansion of savings banks that coincided with an unprecedented period of sustained economic expansion although related questions have been widely investigated for the united states experiences in europe have received far less research attention an additional contribution of the paper lies in its use of quantile regression which enables the investigation of the possibility of economic effects taking into account the degree of regional development the potential endogeneity of some of the regressors is also explicitly considered results do not support the case for a positive effect of bank branch deregulation in spain out of region entry in particular does not seem to have had

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design a basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency voluntary participation and dominant strategy incentive compatibility previous work has shown that this is impossible unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge these results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications however recent work has shown that these limitations can be overcome in simple settings using neurometric technologies that provide noisy signals of subjects preferences that can be used in the mechanism design problem here we build on this work by carrying out two new experiments designed to test the extent to which these neurometrically informed mechanisms nims can be applied to more complicated and realistic environments we find robustness to large type and action space and to the degrees of loss and risk aversion observed in most of our sample

on the justice of decision rules which decision rules are the most efficient which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax we study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives a key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined particularly simple and well known the class of scoring rules we provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration utilitarianism efficiency maximin and maximax the optimal utilitarian scoring rule depends crucially on the probability distribution of the utilities the optimal maximin respectively maximax scoring rule takes the optimal utilitarian scoring rule and applies a factor that shifts it towards negative voting respectively plurality voting

distribution of personal income development of a new model and its application to u s income data summary this paper proposes a four parameter statistical model of the personalized distribution of income using the income share elasticity approach suggested by esteban 1986 our proposed model includes the singh maddala 1976 and dagum 1977 distributions as special cases the generalized beta ii distribution of mcdonald 1984 is also a variant of this model it appears to give an excellent fit to us income data and its empirical performance turns out to be superior to those of the singh maddala 1976 dagum 1977 the five parameter champernowne 1953 distributions and the generalized beta ii distribution of mcdonald 1984 on some data

entrepreneurship social mobility and income redistribution in south india development economists have been preoccupied with the problem of increasing the size of the gnp pie to the relative neglect of its distribution despite the recent disenchantment with the viewpoint that all classes share in the benefits of industrial growth empirical data on the distribution of income business opportunity and economic power are in short supply many of the studies on entrepreneurship and economic development when they are not apologetics for ruthless capitalist exploitation as paul baran suggests extol the achievements of the capitalist entrepreneur without examining class origins and monopoly advantage joseph schumpeter sees entrepreneurs irrespective of class origin as heroic figures with the dream and will to found a private kingdom to conquer adversity to achieve success for its own sake and to experience the joy of creation for gustav papanek 1967 the private entrepreneur who is frugal diligent far sighted remarkably able and willing to take political risks is in large part responsible for the success of pakistan in achieving rapid industrialization

secure implementation experiments do strategy proof mechanisms really work strategy proofness requiring that truth telling is a dominant strategy is a standard concept used in social choice theory saijo et al 2003 argue that this concept has serious drawbacks in particular announcing one s true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy and almost all strategy proof mechanisms have a continuum of nash equilibria for only a subset of strategy proof mechanisms do the set of nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide for example this double coincidence occurs in the groves mechanism when preferences are single peaked we report experiments using two strategy proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of nash equilibria but the other has a unique nash equilibrium we found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two

sect subsidy and sacrifice an economist s view of ultra orthodox jews israeli ultra orthodox men study full time in yeshiva until age 40 on average why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance yet attendance typically continues long after exemption fertility rates are high tfr 7 6 and rising a social interaction approach explains these anomalies yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community which provides mutual insurance to members prohibitions strengthen communities by effectively taxing real wages inducing high fertility historically the incursion of markets into traditional communities produces ultra orthodoxy subsidies induce dramatic reductions in labor supply and unparalleled increases in fertility illustrating extreme responses social groups may have to interventions

bayes stein estimation for portfolio analysis in portfolio analysis uncertainty about parameter values leads to suboptimal portfolio choices the resulting loss in the investor s utility is a function of the particular estimator chosen for expected returns so this is a problem of simultaneous estimation of normal means under a well specified loss function in this situation as stein has shown the clas sical sample mean is inadmissible this paper presents a simple empirical bayes estimator that should outperform the sample mean in the context of a portfolio simulation analysis shows that these bayes stein estimators provide significant gains in portfolio selection problems

implementation in dominant strategies under complete and incomplete information this paper shows that if a social choice rule can be implemented in dominant strategies by an indirect mechanism but there does not exist a direct mechanism that implements it in dominant strategies then it must be the case that the original indirect mechanism does not implement the social choice rule in nash strategies under complete information or in bayesian strategies under imcomplete information

generalized median voter schemes and committees abstract we define a multidimensional analogue of a single peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme every onto strategy proof social choice function on a single peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme since a single peaked preference can be identified unequivocally with its bliss point one can view a social choice function as an arrowian social welfare function we show that a social choice function is strategy proof iff viewed as a social welfare function it satisfies a monotonicity property finally we investigate strategic decision making in hierarchical committees journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71

relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment we compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments one mechanism the falkinger mechanism rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good falkinger mechanism the other the compensation mechanism allows agents to subsidize the other agents contributions compensation mechanism it is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods however the falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism

an economic theory of church strictness this paper introduces spatial location models into the economics of religion we offer a new explanation for the observed tendency of state monopoly churches to locate toward the low tension end of the strictness continuum obtained through the conjunction of benevolent preferences denominations care about the aggregate utility of members and asymmetric costs of going to a more or less strict church than one prefers we derive implications regarding the relationship between religious strictness and membership religious market interactions and asymmetric costs of membership highlight new explanations for some well established stylised facts opening the way to new empirical comparisons with more traditional explanations

on the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation we consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent one dimensional private types we prove that for any bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus the short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to gutmann kemperman reeds and shepp 1991 we also show that the equivalence between bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations

informal family insurance and the design of the welfare state we study unemployment benefit provision when the family also provides social insurance in the benchmark case more generous state transfers crowd out family risk sharing one for one an extension gives the state an advantage in enforcing transfers through taxes whereas families rely on self enforcement more generous state transfers lead to more than one for one reductions in intra family insurance so that total transfers to the unemployed fall as the state s generosity increases this does not imply that the optimal size of the welfare state is zero our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the state at monitoring job search activities of unemployed

untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm abstract we examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm under substitutable and quota filling choice functions we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria

alternative estimators for factor garch models a monte carlo comparison this paper proposes four estimators for factor garch models two stage univariate garch 2sue two stage quasi maximum likelihood 2sml quasi maximum likelihood with known factor weights rmle quasi maximum likelihood with unknown factor weights mle a monte carlo study is designed for bivariate one factor garch models to examine the finite sample properties results are presented for biases ratios of standard errors to standard deviations ratios of variances coverage of confidence intervals effects of misspecified factor weights and finite sample properties of the 2sue for factor garch in mean models

the groves ledyard mechanism an experimental study of institutional design the groves ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the free rider problem in public good provision in certain environments two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mechanism the first is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general the second is the choice of a punishment parameter which is the only parameter that is available for those who may want to actually use the mechanism thus the determination of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances along the lines of actual implementation in studying the groves ledyard mechanism we show that the punishment parameter plays a crucial role in the performance of the mechanism by using 1 and 100 we show that under the higher punishment parameter the groves ledyard equilibrium is chosen much more frequently a higher level of the public good is provided and efficiency is higher by examining two behavioral models we show that a higher leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing a best response predicted by the model the parameter alone explains nearly 70 of the data in both the cournot and the carlson auster behavioral model we also found that convergence to cournot behavior is faster and more stable under a high than under a low

when costly voting is beneficial abstract we present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote when there is a zero cost to voting all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be by having a cost to voting only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost we show that by adding this cost welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

the church versus the mall what happens when religion faces increased secular competition recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation an unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation in this paper we identify a policy driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on sunday known as blue laws many states have repealed these laws in recent years raising the opportunity cost of religious participation we use a variety of data sets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls and that church donations and spending fall as well these results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change nor do we see comparable declines in membership in or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws we then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the nlsy we find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws the effect is economically significant for example the gap in heavy drinking between religious and nonreligious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed

emergent extremism in a multi agent model of religious clubs i introduction religious extremism is as old as religion itself but the tendency to promote militancy and terrorism from within extremist religions appears to be much more common now than in times past juergensmeyer 2001 stern 2003 wiktorowicz 2005 1 today s terrorists routinely frame their objectives in religious terms and organize their activities within religious movements this shift is not due to increased militancy within religion as a whole not even within the stricter subset of religious groups commonly labeled sectarian or fundamentalist bromley and melton 2002 marty and appleby 1995 rather groups with militant objectives are increasingly leveraging the latent potential for violence within extremist religion krueger and maleckova 2003 and krueger 2007 have shown that contrary to popular hypotheses regarding the salience of poverty and education it is instead institutional conditions such as civil liberties that contribute to the origination of terrorists within a country religious extremism has been shown to be a potentially powerful input into the production of terrorism berman 2004 2 and the origination of terrorists has been empirically connected to civil liberties we seek to complete the triangle and connect religious extremism to social conditions in an extension of existing theory and test the predictions of the model in an empirical context with an eye toward civil liberties this paper extends previous models of religious clubs to better account for observed patterns of extremism across different settings and test policies most likely to reduce the appeal of extremism economists at first blush should have trouble explaining the survival of groups that demand large sacrifices from their members successful religious groups however routinely impose all sorts of apparently unproductive costs on their members iannaccone 1992 introduced a formal model of religious clubs within which apparently irrational sacrifice and stigma enhances the individual and collective utility his model demonstrated the feasibility of extremist groups but does less to explain the relative prevalence of extremism across time and place further the original model allows for only corner solutions and as such the viability of extreme groups is indistinguishable from the viability of the more moderate groups they must compete with for members in the religious marketplace in section ii we revisit analyze and extend the club model of religion we push the analysis of the original model exploring sacrifice substitutability of club and private goods and their relationships to member commitment and the viability of extremist groups in this preliminary analysis we illustrate not only the potential insights of the club theory of religion into the strength and viability of extremist groups but also the limitations inherent to the representative agent model we proceed by extending the model in a multi agent ma computational framework this framework permits us to analyze the distributions of agents and clubs that make up a religious economy the computational nature of the model is critical because it allows for sufficient heterogeneity of agents and clubs and given this heterogeneity agent decision making absent closed form solutions via nash equilibria extremists groups emerge as just one segment the high cost tail of a distribution of religious clubs that range across the full spectrum of potential group imposed sacrifice and stigma extremism is identifiable and comparable in the model because it exists within a full spectrum of clubs by varying the parameters of the model that control the distribution of secular wages across agents and the degree of substitutability between religious and secular commodities we can better explain where and when religious extremism is most popular its strength relative to more moderate groups and which economic policies reduce its prevalence

on the weights of nations assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union we study indirect democracy in which countries states or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf we show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district s vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change we analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents preferences and then we compare the voting weights in the council of the european union under the nice treaty and the recently proposed constitution

bayesian inference methods for univariate and multivariate garch models a survey this survey reviews the existing literature on the most relevant bayesian inference methods for univariate and multivariate garch models the advantages and drawbacks of each procedure are outlined as well as the advantages of the bayesian approach versus classical procedures the paper makes emphasis on recent bayesian non parametric approaches for garch models that avoid imposing arbitrary parametric distributional assumptions these novel approaches implicitly assume infinite mixture of gaussian distributions on the standardized returns which have been shown to be more flexible and describe better the uncertainty about future volatilities finally the survey presents an illustration using real data to show the flexibility and usefulness of the non parametric approach

arch models properties estimation and testing abstract the aim of this survey paper is to provide an account of some of the important developments in the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity arch model since its inception in a seminal paper by engle 1982 this model takes account of many observed properties of asset prices and therefore various interpretations can be attributed to it we start with the basic arch models and discuss their different interpretations arch models have been generalized in different directions to accommodate more and more features of the real world we provide a comprehensive treatment of many of the extensions of the original arch model next we discuss estimation and testing for arch models and note that these models lead to some interesting and unique problems there have been numerous applications and we mention some of these as we present different models the paper includes a glossary of the acronyms for the models we describe

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

efficient voting with penalties abstract simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters preferences this paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non transferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information the designer faces a dilemma a punishment may induce a more correct choice but its cost is socially wasteful the efficient mechanism is a weighted majority weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applied if preferences are relatively homogeneous eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous

flexible majority rules for central banks we propose a flexible majority rule for central bank committees where the size of the majority depends monotonically on the change in interest rate within a particular time frame small changes in the interest rate require a small share while larger changes require a larger share of supporting votes we show that flexible majority rules are superior to simple majority rules

sensitivity analyses of the deterrence hypothesis let s keep the econ in econometrics abstract leamer and mcmanus applied extreme bound analysis eba in an empirical study of the deterrent effects of capital punishment and other penalties their analysis has questioned the validity of the deterrence hypothesis the thrust of our paper is twofold first by applying eba to well known econometric models of demand production and human capital investment our analysis exposes and illustrates the inherent flaws of eba as a method of deriving valid inferences about model specification second since the analysis shows leamer and mcmanus s inferences about deterrence to be based on a flawed methodology we offer an alternative theory based sensitivity analysis of estimated deterrent effects using similar data our analysis supports the deterrence hypothesis more generally it emphasizes the indispensable role of theory in guiding sensitivity analyses of model specification

strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments this paper surveys some recent results characterizing strategyproof collective choice rules when preferences satisfy conditions that are meaningful in economic or political environments

an experiment in the demand revealing process the principal findings of this experiment are it is somewhat time consuming but not otherwise difficult to employ the demand revealing process in groups of 10 to 60 the ability of the demand revealing process to take account of intensities of preferences is appreciated by many of the persons who have used the process but the departure from one man one vote is strongly resisted by others the outcomes reached by demand revealing differed from majority rule in about one tenth of the cases the improvement in efficiency associated with these reversals of majority rule was 2 25 percent of the net benefit of making the efficient decisions the clarke taxes which would decline in percentage terms as group size increased were 3 04 percent of the net value of efficient decisions for the decisions studied

bandwagons and momentum in sequential voting in this paper i show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1 these bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate significantly in this equilibrium the pivot probability for each voter is non zero even in an infinite population consequently the bandwagons do not always start after one or at most two favourable decisions as do economic cascades and varying levels of informative voting are observed consistent with observations from sequential voting in u s presidential primaries further voters are exposed to counterintuitive incentives referred to as buyers remorse that have been attributed to real primary voters i also derive equilibrium behaviour in this environment when voting is simultaneous and compare the quality of information aggregation within each mechanism i relate the conclusions to u s presidential primaries and find they are consistent with a common conclusion about the front loading of the primary process that in tight elections with no front runner simultaneous voting is preferred whereas in lopsided elections sequential voting is preferred the superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

the craft of labormetrics using a wide array of examples from the literature and from original estimates the author examines the pitfalls that make good empirical research in labor economics at least as much craft as statistical technique among the subjects discussed are the appropriateness and cleanliness of data problems of extreme observations the validity of attempts to produce exogeneity using instrumental variables natural experiments and structural models and the treatment of selectivity and unobservable individual effects the author stresses the importance of testing empirical results to ensure that they make sense and of presenting them clearly and economically

optimal voting rules we study dominant strategy incentive compatible dic and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives the agents are privately informed about their preferences and have single crossing utility functions monetary transfers are not feasible we use an equivalence between deterministic dic mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as say a rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained

a semiparametric bayesian approach to the analysis of financial time series with applications to value at risk estimation abstract garch models are commonly used for describing estimating and predicting the dynamics of financial returns here we relax the usual parametric distributional assumptions of garch models and develop a bayesian semiparametric approach based on modeling the innovations using the class of scale mixtures of gaussian distributions with a dirichlet process prior on the mixing distribution the proposed specification allows for greater flexibility in capturing the usual patterns observed in financial returns it is also shown how to undertake bayesian prediction of the value at risk var the performance of the proposed semiparametric method is illustrated using simulated and real data from the hang seng index hsi and bombay stock exchange index bse30

full bayesian inference for garch and egarch models a full bayesian analysis of garch and egarch models is proposed consisting of parameter estimation model selection and volatility prediction the bayesian paradigm is implemented via markov chain monte carlo methodologies we provide implementation details and illustrations using the general index of the athens stock exchange

continuous decisions by a committee median versus average mechanisms abstract a group of strategic agents with diverse private information and interdependent preferences has to take a continuous collective decision i study the design of the decision making procedure from the viewpoint of a utilitarian social planner for uniformly distributed information the implementation of the average report as decision dominates the implementation of the median report when the set of admissible reports is optimally designed this is true for any number of agents and for any degree of interdependence the result extends to a general class of distributions when the number of agents is large

implementation via approval mechanisms abstract we focus on the single peaked domain and study the class of generalized approval mechanisms g a m s first players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative and then a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented our main finding is that essentially for every nash implementable welfare optimum including the condorcet winner alternative there exists a gam that nash implements it importantly the gam that nash implements the condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature

a foundation for strategic agenda voting abstract we offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world the amendment also known as the anglo american procedure and the successive or equivalently the euro latin procedure our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions and allows comparisons between them and with other voting procedures

experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades the possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here the specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms the reason for this remains an open question

monetary policy by committee consensus chairman dominance or simple majority this paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under four different voting protocols the protocols are a consensus model where a supermajority is required for a policy change an agenda setting model where the chairman controls the agenda a dictator model where the chairman has absolute power over the committee and a simple majority model where policy is determined by the median member these protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks the models are estimated by maximum likelihood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks namely the bank of canada the bank of england the european central bank the swedish riksbank and the u s federal reserve for all central banks results indicate that the consensus model fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models this suggests that despite institutional differences committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions

do religious proscriptions matter evidence from a theory based test a large literature shows that religious participation is associated with various behaviors and outcomes but researchers lack an accepted instrument for religion and have struggled to establish whether these associations are causal using the canonical economic model of religiosity i develop an empirical test to investigate the importance of religious participation in particular religious proscriptions and rules on determining behavior the test relies on exogenous variation in the cost of secular activities rather than an instrument for religious participation several empirical applications of this test are conducted the results indicate a strong role for religious proscriptions in determining behavior

the gaussian mixture dynamic conditional correlation model parameter estimation value at risk calculation and portfolio selection a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model with dynamic conditional correlations is proposed in which the individual conditional volatilities follow exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models and the standardized innovations follow a mixture of gaussian distributions inference on the model parameters and prediction of future volatilities are addressed by both maximum likelihood and bayesian estimation methods estimation of the value at risk of a given portfolio and selection of optimal portfolios under the proposed specification are addressed the good performance of the proposed methodology is illustrated via monte carlo experiments and the analysis of the daily closing prices of the dow jones and nasdaq indexes

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

the sub optimality of the majority rule abstract we consider collective choice from two alternatives ex ante each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences an environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives in many environments the majority voting rule maximizes agents ex ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant strategy implementable choice rules but in some environments where the agents utilities are stochastically correlated other dominant strategy choice rules are better for all agents if utilities are stochastically independent across agents majority voting is ex ante optimal among all anonymous and incentive compatible rules we also compare rules from an interim viewpoint

quadratic voting and the public good introduction this introduction to the public choice special issue on quadratic voting qv and the public good provides an opinionated narrative summary of the contents and surveys the broader literature related to qv qv is a voting rule proposed by one of us weyl quadratic vote buying http goo gl 8yeo73 2012 lalley and weyl quadratic voting https papers ssrn com sol3 papers cfm abstract id 2003531 2016 building off earlier work by groves and ledyard econometrica 45 4 783 810 1977a hylland and zeckhauser a mechanism for selecting public goods when preferences must be elicited kennedy school of government discussion paper d 70 1980 where individuals buy as many votes as they wish by paying the square of the votes they buy using some currency an appreciation of the history of research in the field suggests that qv is uniquely practically relevant compared to the other approximately pareto efficient mechanisms economists have proposed for collective decisions on public goods however it faces a number of sociological and ethical concerns regarding how a political system organized around qv would achieve the efficiency aims stated in abstract theory and whether the pure aggregate income maximizing definition of efficiency qv optimizes in its simplest form is desirable the papers in this volume flesh out and formalize these concerns but also provide important responses in two ways by suggesting domains where they are unlikely to be applicable primarily related to survey research of various kinds and versions of qv using an artificial currency that maintain many of qv s benefits while diffusing the most important critiques together this work suggests both a practical path for applying qv in the near term and a series of research questions that would have to be addressed to broaden its application

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

ordinal versus cardinal voting rules a mechanism design approach abstract we consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a bayesian environment agents have independent private values there are at least three alternatives and monetary transfers are prohibited first we show that in a neutral environment meaning alternatives are symmetric ex ante essentially any ex post pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible importantly however we can improve upon ordinal rules we show that we can design an incentive compatible cardinal rule which achieves higher utilitarian social welfare than any ordinal rule finally we provide numerical findings about incentive compatible cardinal rules that maximize utilitarian social welfare

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules we consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives independent private values and no monetary transfers the utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule where agents weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen it is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient we also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules