truthfulness with value maximizing bidders on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets abstract in some markets bidders want to maximize value subject to a budget constraint rather than payoff this is different to the quasilinear utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes we refer to bidders who maximize value as value bidders while simple single object auction formats are truthful standard multi object auction formats allow for manipulation it is straightforward to show that there cannot be a truthful and revenue maximizing deterministic auction mechanism with value bidders and general valuations approximation has been used as remedy to achieve truthfulness on other mechanism design problems and we study which approximation ratios we can get from truthful mechanisms we show that the approximation ratio that can be achieved with a deterministic and truthful approximation mechanism with n bidders cannot be higher than 1 n for general valuations for randomized approximation mechanisms there is a framework with a ratio that is tight

a test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to the bell system stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0002 8282 28198409 2974 3a4 3c615 3aatfsot 3e2 0 co 3b2 rthe american economic review is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon jul 2 16 52 19 2007

optimal self protection in two periods on the role of endogenous saving self protection is a costly investment to reduce the probability of loss this paper studies optimal self protection in a two period model with endogenous saving in a setting with a binary loss we show that prudence is negatively associated with the optimal level of self protection consistent with results obtained in single period models we provide intuition for this finding with the help of a recent approach based on stochastic dominance furthermore we determine the effect of interest rate risk on optimal self protection and study a model in which a decision maker engages in advance effort to increase the probability of facing a better risky situation all our results suggest that the understanding of advance self protection crucially hinges on whether the decision maker also uses saving to optimize intertemporal consumption utility if so the fact that self protection expenditures are upfront turns out to be irrelevant

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

risk and precautionary saving in two person households the existing literature on precautionary saving is based almost entirely on the assumption that the household acts as if it consisted of a single individual decision taker in reality saving decisions are typically taken by two person households this paper examines the implications of this observation for the existence of precautionary saving and shows that the assumption that the individual utility functions satisfy the conditions for precautionary saving to exist can imply that the household exhibits precautionary saving but only under strong assumptions on the type of risk change being considered

the economics of new nuclear power plants in liberalized electricity markets abstract even after fukushima the nuclear debate is strong in many countries with the discussion of its economics being a significant part of it however most of the estimates are based on a levelized cost methodology which presents several shortcomings particularly when applied to liberalized electricity markets our paper provides results based on a different methodology by which we determine the break even investment cost for nuclear power plants to be competitive with other electricity generation technologies our results show that the cost competitiveness of nuclear power plants is questionable and that public support of some sort would be needed if new nuclear power plants are to be built in liberalized markets

compact bid languages and core pricing in large multi item auctions we introduce an auction design framework for large markets with hundreds of items and complex bidder preferences such markets typically lead to computationally hard allocation problems our new framework consists of compact bid languages for sealed bid auctions and methods to compute second price rules such as the vickrey clarke groves or bidder optimal core selecting payment rules when the optimality of the allocation problem cannot be guaranteed to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach for a specific complex market we introduce a compact bidding language for tv advertising markets and investigate the resulting winner determination problem and the computation of core payments for realistic instances of the respective winner determination problems very good solutions with a small integrality gap can be found quickly although closing the integrality gap to find marginally better solutions or prove optimality can take a prohibitively large amount of time our subsequent adaptation of a constraint

impacts of variable renewable energy on wholesale markets and generating assets in the united states a review of expectations and evidence abstract we synthesize available literature data and analysis on the degree to which growth in variable renewable energy vre has impacted or might in the future impact bulk power system assets pricing and costs in the united states most studies of future scenarios indicate that vre reduces wholesale energy prices and capacity factors of thermal generators traditional baseload generators are more exposed to these changing market conditions than low capital cost and more flexible intermediate and peak load generators from analysis of historical data we find that vre is already influencing the bulk power market through changes in temporal and geographic patterns areas with higher levels of vre the most significant observed impacts have concentrated in areas with significant vre and or nuclear generation along with limited transmission with negative pricing also often occurring during periods with lower system wide load so far however vre has had a relatively modest impact on historical average annual wholesale prices across entire market regions at least in comparison to other drivers the reduction of natural gas prices is the primary contributor to the decline in wholesale prices since 2008 similarly vre impacts on thermal plant retirements have been limited and there is little relationship between the location of recent retirements and vre penetration levels although impacts on wholesale prices have been modest so far impacts of vre on the electricity market will be more significant under higher vre penetrations

tailored to the extremes quantile regression for index based insurance contract design a new approach for weather index based insurance design based on quantile regression qr to condition the yield index dependency is developed and compared to standard regression technique three conceptual different risk measures i e expected utility expected shortfall and a spectral risk measure are used to evaluate the risk reducing properties of these contracts our findings show that qr is much more powerful in establishing the yield index dependency and lead for all risk measures to a higher risk reduction than the standard technique ordinary least squares ols thus qr leads to a more efficient contract design which is beneficial for both the insurer smaller remaining risk and the insured higher demand and willingness to pay our empirical application is based on a 31 years long time series of wheat yield data from northern kazakhstan

early nuclear retirements in deregulated u s markets causes implications and policy options abstract electricity prices have fallen significantly since 2008 putting commercial nuclear reactors in the united states under substantial financial pressure in this market environment driven by persistently low natural gas prices and stagnant electricity demand we estimate that about two thirds of the 102 gw nuclear capacity are uncompetitive over the next few years under the current trajectory among those 18 gw are retiring or are merchant plants at high risk of retiring prematurely the potential consequences of the hypothetical withdrawal of 20 gw of nuclear capacity include 1 a 3 2 increase in carbon emissions of the power sector if replaced by gas fired units or 2 a significant increase in cost if replaced by renewables without a carbon price out of the market payments would be needed to effectively maintain merchant nuclear capacity filling the revenue gap would come at a fleet average cost of 3 5 5 5 mwh for these plants which is much lower than the cost of subsidizing wind power the policy support could take the form of direct zero emission credits renewable portfolio standard expansion or clean capacity market mechanisms as a last resort the exercise of a new mothballing status could prevent the irreversible retirement of nuclear power assets

frontiers in spectrum auction design abstract spectrum auction design has seen number innovations in the recent years regulators have used various types of combinatorial auction formats including simple ascending combinatorial clock auctions and first price sealed bid combinatorial auctions the simultaneous multi round auction smra and the two stage combinatorial clock auction cca are the most wide spread auction formats for spectrum sales to date we provide an accessible overview of strategic problems in these auction formats and summarize research challenges in this field for a broader audience of readers in industrial organization

cost estimates for nuclear power in the uk abstract current uk government support for nuclear power has in part been informed by cost estimates that suggest that electricity from new nuclear power stations will be competitive with alternative low carbon generation options the evidence and analysis presented in this paper suggests that the capital cost estimates for nuclear power that are being used to inform these projections rely on costs escalating over the pre construction and construction phase of the new build programme at a level significantly below those that have been experienced by past us and european programmes this paper applies observed construction time and cost escalation rates to the published estimates of capital costs for new nuclear plant in the uk and calculates the potential impact on levelised cost per unit of electricity produced the results suggest that levelised cost may turn out to be significantly higher than expected which in turn has important implications for policy both in general terms of the potential costs to consumers and more specifically for negotiations around the level of policy support and contractual arrangements offered to individual projects through the proposed contract for difference strike price

vendor selection with price breaks abstract we study the problem of vendor selection where a buyer must choose order quantities to place with vendors in a multiple sourcing network the selection process is influenced by the price delivery and quality objectives of the buyer as well as by the production or rationing constraints of the vendors vendors are assumed to offer price breaks which depend on the sizes of the order quantities each proce break schedule is characterized by two attributes it represents either quantity discounts or surcharges and is either cumulative all units or noncumulative incremental we present linear and mixed binary integer programming models that provide unifying frameworks for models of vendor performance measures from the purchasing literature and models of price breaks from the operations research literature we argue that our models offer viable approaches to vendor selection with price breaks because of the availability of commercial software packages for personal computers that provide flexible and efficient computational tools for solving the models this implies that vendor selection with price breaks can be performed at the fingertips of purchasing managers

third degree stochastic dominance here f x and g x are less than cumulative probability distributionis where x is a continuous or discrete random variable representing the outcome of a prospect the closed interval a b is the sample space of both prospects the integral shown in rule 2 and those shown throughout the paper are stieltjes integrals recall that the stieltjes integral fb f x dg x exists if one of the functions f and g is continuous and the other has finite variation in a b let d1 d2 and d3 be three sets of utility functions x d1 is the set containing all utility functions with 4 x and 1 x continuous and 41 x 0 for all xe a b d2 is the set with x 1 x 2 x continuous and q j x 0 02 x o for all xc a b d3 is the set with x 1 x 2 x 3 x continuous and 1 x 04 2 x o o for all xc a b here 1 x denotes the ith derivative of x hadar and russell proved that rule 1 is valid for all cd1 and rutle 2 is valid for all ed2 the authors point out that the set of probability distributions that can be ordered by means of second degree stochastic dominance is in general larger than that which can be ordered by means of first degree stochastic dominance note that in rule 2 they assume that x is not only an increasing function of x but also exhibits weak global risk aversion a condition guaranteed by requiring the second derivative of x to be nonpositive in this paper a condition which will be called third degree stochastic dominance is considered it is based on the following assumption about the form of the utility function x from a normative point of view one expects the risk premium associated with an uncertain prospect to become smaller the greater is the individual s wealth the plausibility and implications of this assumption h ave been explored by john pratt as well as others the risk premium of an uncertain prospect is that amount by which the certainty equivalent of the prospect differs from its expected value in mathematical terms given the prospect f x with expected value a the corresponding risk premium t is obtained by solving the following equation rb

risk lovers and the rent over investment puzzle in this paper we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a rent seeking contest given a class of heterogeneous risk loving players we explore the role third order risk attitude plays in equilibrium and find that imprudence is sufficient for risk lovers to increase rent seeking investment above the risk neutral outcome moreover we show that rent can be fully dissipated in a standard tullock contest played by a large number of risk lovers

risk aversion and the propensities for self insurance and self protection for a risk averse individual the methods for reducing the expected financial impact of a loss include reducing the severity of any loss that occurs self insurance and reducing the probability of the occurrence of a loss self protection the literature on this topic has pointed to several anomalies whereby the use of self protection and self insurance yield quite unsimilar results for example ehrlich and becker 5 show that self insurance is always a substitute for market insurance an insurance company s indemnifying a loss whereas self protection and market insurance might be complements dionne and eeckhoudt 4 show that a more risk averse consumer would always invest more in self insurance activities but not necessarily more in self protection activities they argue 4 42 that this result is counterintuitive and provides an exception to the widely accepted result that increased risk aversion reduces risky activities ehrlich and becker 5 639 argue that the incentive to self protect is not so dependent on attitude towards risk both of the above papers seem to take for granted that self protection activities reduce the riskiness of the final wealth distribution however as we argue below this is not the case if riskiness is defined as in rothschild and stiglitz 14 even if we use the variance as our risk measure we do not always reduce risk via self protection dionne and eeckhoudt suggest that these results might not be robust enough to extend to models that incorporate random initial wealth risk and state dependent preferences we show that the model seems to be very robust we also explain why self protection is not at all an exception to the long standing result of arrow 1 whereby more risk averse individuals undertake a lower

coordination in split award auctions we analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier and suppliers have private cost information an intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split the need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information we also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner take all auctions

tax rate uncertainty factor supplies and welfare uncertainty about prospective changes in tax rates may increase factor supplies and hence the tax base permitting a reduction in tax rates that could result in a net increase in welfare under empirically relevant assumptions about attitudes towards risk we find that when an individual exclusively saves or works the tax base rises in response to greater tax rate uncertainty so that welfare could indeed increase however when an individual both saves and works the supply of the randomly taxed factor declines with increased uncertainty implying that tax revenue and welfare decrease when the nonrandom tax rate is sufficiently low

finite mixture estimation of multiproduct cost functions this paper presents a technique of cost function estimation based on the theory of finite mixture distributions which allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple technologies of production when the researcher does not know which observations correspond to which technologies the finite mixture technique provides estimates of the proportions of firms using the various technologies facilitates comparisons between technologies and preserves the traditional interpretations of cost estimation after describing the mixture procedure the technique is illustrated on a large sample of savings and loan associations and it is concluded that this industry exhibits multiple technologies of production copyright 1991 by mit press

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope preference elicitation is a fundamental problem in single unit combinatorial auctions but it becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multi unit combinatorial auctions the bidders cannot express their preferences exactly as this would take a huge number of bids typically leading to inefficient allocations hence markets with economies of scale and scope require more compact and yet expressive bidding languages in this thesis we propose an expressive bidding language allowing bidders to describe the characteristics of their cost functions bidders in these auctions can specify various discounts and markups and specify pricing rules as logical functions finding the optimal allocation given these pricing rules is a strongly np hard optimization problem and we propose a mixed integer program to solve it based on field data we introduce a multi item cost function and provide extensive computational experiments to explore the computational burden and the impact of different language features on the computational effort and total spend of the auctioneer in addition we explore characteristics of the knowledge representation of the bidding language

do risk lovers invest in self protection we show that there is a class of risk lovers who optimally choose a positive level of self protection investment in most cases a risk lover increases his self protection investment as he becomes less downside risk averse

auctions for split award contracts the buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers he uses a sequential second price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract with a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole source auction the premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost when entry is endogenous we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price

stochastic dominance analysis without the independence axiom we characterize the consistency of a large class of nonexpected utility preferences including mean variance preferences and prospect theory preferences with stochastic orders for example stochastic dominances of different degrees our characterization rests on a novel decision theoretic result that provides a behavioral interpretation of the set of all derivatives of the functional representing the decision maker s preferences as an illustration we consider in some detail prospect theory and choice acclimating preferences two popular models of reference dependence under risk and we show the incompatibility of loss aversion with prudence this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

the story of the moment risk averse cypriot farmers respond to drought management this article illustrates the importance of estimating risk preferences when evaluating water policy using agricultural production data from the kiti region of cyprus we estimate farmers risk preferences a la antle journal of business and economic statistics 1 192 201 1983 american journal of agricultural economics 69 509 22 1987 and show sensitivity to higher order moments of profit such as skewness we show that farmers in the kiti region are risk averse with risk premiums in the region of 20 of expected profit we use these estimates to analyse the impact of a water quota from the perspective of three policy makers who differ only in their understanding of farmers risk preferences we show in the case of kiti that policy makers who model risk preferences incorrectly that is either a assume risk neutrality or b ignore down side risk wrongly predict the magnitude and direction of input responses and therefore the magnitude of welfare changes this highlights the importance of accomm

revenue deficiency under second price auctions in a supply chain setting consider a firm called the buyer that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second price procurement auction call this the standard auction in the hope of lowering its purchase cost the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands call this the multiple winner auction choosing the multiple winner auction over the standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer we provide a bound on how much greater the buyer s cost can be in the multiple winner auction and show that this bound is tight we then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon under a monotonicity condition we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios finally this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the t period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands

a smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints we address the problem of designing multi item procurement auctions for a monopsonistic buyer in capacity constrained environments using insights from classical auction theory we construct an optimization based auction mechanism smart market relying on the dynamic resolution of a linear program minimizing the buyer s cost under the suppliers capacity constraints suppliers can modify their offers in response to the optimal allocation corresponding to each set of bids giving rise to a dynamic competitive bidding process to assist suppliers we also develop a bidding suggestion device based on a myopic best response mbr calculation that solves an associated optimization problem assuming linear costs for the suppliers we study within a game theoretic framework the sequence of bids arising in this smart market under a weak behavioral assumption and some symmetry requirements an explicit upper bound for the winning bids is established we then formulate a complete behavioral model and solution methodology based on the mbr rationale and show that the bounds derived earlier continue to hold we analytically derive some structural and convergence properties of the mbr dynamics in the simplest nontrivial market environment which suggests further possible design improvements and investigate bidding dynamics and incentive compatibility issues via numerical simulations