the effect of concealed weapons laws an extreme bound analysis i introduction in a recent paper lott and mustard 1997 provide evidence on the relationship between concealed handgun laws often called right to carry or shall issue laws and crime they examine 16 years 1977 1992 of county level crime data from the fbi s uniform crime reports ucr and compare crime rates before and after the introduction of right to carry laws controlling for demographic factors and county level arrest rates they find that introducing right to carry laws resulted in significant reductions in the violent crimes of murder rape aggravated assault and robbery and increases in some property crimes such as burglary larceny and auto theft the latter increase is attributed to a substitution effect suggesting that potential criminals will at the margin switch from violent crimes that have now become more risky to them to property crimes where the probability of encountering an armed victim is much lower comparing these two effects coupled with a slight increase in accidental gunshots from individuals owning concealed handguns lott and mustard conclude that the social benefits of these laws exceed their costs economists who present one set of empirical results are always vulnerable to criticism that they could have selected another group of right hand side variables or modeled them in a different way lott and mustard s analysis has been criticized by black and nagin 1998 who re examine the data set choosing a different set of controls and a different model and reach different conclusions about the effects of the right to carry laws uncertainty about what to control for and how to do it has been called model uncertainty by leamer 1983 who suggests estimating the size of model uncertainty by testing the sensitivity of the particular results to many different possible model specifications this methodology is called extreme bound analysis in this paper we report extreme bounds from nearly 20 000 estimated regressions that vary the modeling choices made by lott and mustard we find support for the deterrence result from a broad set of specifications in particular we find strong support for the hypothesis that the right to carry laws are associated with a decrease in the trend in violent crime rates we do not find much support for a substitution effect into property crimes in what follows we first describe some econometric issues related to the problem of estimating the effect of the right to carry laws on crime rates we then report our extreme bound analysis and offer concluding remarks ii extreme bound analysis although behavioral theories can provide general guidance about the kinds of factors that should influence the crime rate they do not specifically determine which variables should be included in a regression analysis in addition conflicting theories typically suggest alternate model specifications in the context of crime rates for example we might expect higher crime rates in counties with higher unemployment and a larger percentage of young men age 18 30 following convention we call this a supply effect nagin 1978 however it is also possible that higher unemployment leads to the passage of right to carry laws or that right to carry laws are less likely to be enacted in areas with high percentages of young men age 18 30 we call this a demand effect omitted or unobserved demand or supply variables may induce a spurious correlation between the adoption of the right to carry laws and crime rates that has nothing to do with the supply of crime leamer 1983 suggests a formal specification search or extreme bound analysis to estimate the size of such model uncertainty surrounding certain regression results for example by including different right hand side variables in a supply of crime equation for murder leamer estimates an extreme bound interval for the deterrent effect of capital punishment that ranges from 29 to 12 murders prevented for every execution

why hasn t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom some quantitative lessons from the eu abstract the integration of european financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes the years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results instead of the dreaded race to the bottom in capital taxes the uk lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of france germany and italy while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries the uk increased its labor tax marginally but the other countries increased theirs sharply this paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices wealth distribution and fiscal solvency tax competition is modeled as a one shot game over time invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to european data the calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes the solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency there is no race to the bottom and the nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes in contrast if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency competition over capital taxes triggers a race to the bottom but this outcome entails large welfare gains surprisingly the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments

state investment tax incentives a zero sum game abstract over the past four decades state investment tax incentives have proliferated this emergence of state investment tax credits itc and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions 1 are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective to increase investment within the state 2 to the extent these incentives raise investment within the state how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states to begin to answer these questions we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20 years the dataset contains series on output and capital their relative prices and establishment counts the effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables cross jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives two models are estimated the capital demand model is motivated by the first order condition for a profit maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital output ratio to the relative user cost of capital the twin counties model exploits both the spatial breaks discontinuities in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments using the capital demand model we find that own state capital formation is substantially increased by tax induced reductions in the own state price of capital and more interestingly substantially decreased by tax induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive states similarly using our twin counties model we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital but the difference is economically small suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital extensions of the capital demand model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own state and competitive states user costs tends to have no effect on own state capital formation

the deterrent effect of capital punishment evidence from a judicial experiment i introduction the contemporary debate over capital punishment involves a number of important arguments based on either moral principles or social welfare considerations the primary social welfare issue viewed as the most important single consideration for both sides in the death penalty controversy is whether capital punishment deters capital crimes see for example zimring and hawkins 1986 this issue is also of great interest to several states that are currently considering a change in their death penalty laws 1 psychologists and criminologists studied the death penalty initially and reported no deterrent effect see for example sellin 1959 and eysenck 1970 economists joined the debate later with ehrlich s 1975 and 1977 studies that report a significant deterrent effect applying regression analysis to u s aggregate data for 1933 69 and state level data for 1940 and 1950 ensuing studies use either ehrlich s data with different regression specifications different regressors functional form or endogenous variables or postmoratorium data with a variant of ehrlich s regression model results range from a substantial deterrent effect to no effect or a small adverse effect 2 this study uses a new approach to advance the deterrence literature we exploit an important characteristic that other studies have not considered the experimental nature of the moratorium that the supreme court imposed on executions during the 1970s the moratorium can be viewed as an exogenously imposed judicial experiment the experiment s effect on murder rates provides evidence about the deterrent effect of capital punishment we compare the murder rate for each state immediately before and after it suspended or reinstated the death penalty many factors that affect crime for example law enforcement judicial demographic and economic variables change only slightly over a short period of time therefore changes in a state s murder rate quickly following a change in its death penalty law can be attributed to the legal change also there are considerable cross state variations in the timing and duration of the moratorium that began and ended in different years in different states ranging from four to thirty years see tables 1 and 2 3 these variations can strengthen our comparison based inference because observing similar changes in murder rates immediately after the same legal change in different years and in various states provides compelling evidence of the moratorium s effect on murder moreover our analysis benefits from the experiences of the states that suspended and reinstated their death penalty statutes several times 4 for states that experience similar murder rate changes after suspensions or reinstatements in different crime economic and demographic environments the contribution of the legal change to murder is paramount we supplement the before and after comparisons with time series and panel data regression analyses unlike most existing studies we use both pre and postmoratorium data the regressions disentangle the effect of having death penalty laws on murder from the effect of actual executions on murder basing our inference on two different approaches allows us to corroborate our findings and also detract from the modeling concerns voiced at previous studies that use only regression analysis we also apply a battery of tests to examine the robustness of the findings these include regression sensitivity checks with 89 additional regression equations that differ from our base models in regressors functional form data and estimation method in addition we test whether the moratorium has an effect on property crimes that are not punishable by death if the relationship between the moratorium and these crimes is similar to the relationship between the moratorium and murder then we should suspect that murder rate changes are the result of broader trends in criminal behavior affecting all crimes

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

monetary policy and investment dynamics evidence from disaggregate data we use disaggregated data on the components of private fixed investment pfi to estimate industry level responses of real investment and capital prices to unanticipated monetary policy the response functions derive from a restricted large scale var estimated over 1959 2007 our results point to significant cross sector heterogeneity in the behavior of pfi prices and quantities for assets belonging to the equipment category of fixed investment we find that quantities rather than prices absorb most of the fallout from a policy shock by contrast the price effects tend to be higher and the output effects lower for nonresidential structures

decentralization and international tax competition abstract this paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions in the first stage of the game the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision in the second stage the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital a country s decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition in contrast to standard tax competition models decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare

tax competition among u s states racing to the bottom or riding on a seesaw abstract dramatic declines in capital tax rates among u s states and european countries have been linked by many commentators to tax competition an inevitable race to the bottom and underprovision of local public goods this paper analyzes the reaction of capital tax policy in a given u s state to changes in capital tax policy by other states our study is undertaken with a novel panel data set covering the 48 contiguous u s states for the period 1965 to 2006 and is guided by the theory of strategic tax competition the latter suggests that capital tax policy is a function of foreign out of state tax policy preferences for government services and home state and foreign state economic and demographic conditions the slope of the reaction function the equilibrium response of home state to foreign state tax policy is negative contrary to casual evidence and many prior empirical studies of fiscal reaction functions this result which stands in contrast to most published findings is due to two critical elements that allow for delayed responses to foreign tax changes and responses to aggregate shocks omitting either of these elements leads to a misspecified model and a positively sloped reaction function our results suggest that the secular decline in capital tax rates at least among u s states reflects synchronous responses among states to common shocks rather than competitive responses to foreign state tax policy while striking given prior empirical findings these results are fully consistent with the implications of the theoretical model developed in this paper and presented elsewhere in the literature rather than racing to the bottom our findings suggest that states are riding on a seesaw consequently tax competition may lead to an increase in the provision of local public goods and policies aimed at restricting tax competition to stem the tide of declining capital taxation are likely to be ineffective

how fragile are fragile inferences a re evaluation of the deterrent effect of capital punishment extreme bounds analysis attempts to measure the effects of the uncertainty in the specification of the explanatory variables in a regression model on the estimated coefficients of interest standard errors for the stochastic extreme bounds are computed using the bootstrap technique state by state cross section data are used to study the deterrent effect of capital punishment in the united states in 1950 the bootstrap standard errors are sufficiently large for some bounds to suggest caution in the interpretation of the empirical results regarding the fragility of inferences for the deterrent effect of capital punishment copyright 1989 by mit press

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

the impact of the corporate income tax evidence from state organizational form data abstract by taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non corporate firms taxes can play an important role in a firm s choice of organizational form the sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax this paper uses new cross sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the census of retail trade to estimate this sensitivity the results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporate to personal income on the share of real economic activity that is done by corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has been found in the previous empirical literature based on time series data the results show little impact however on the actual operations of firms such as their labor intensity wages and the like they do indicate that firms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income tax system by dividing into numerous firms

income taxation and the diversity of consumer goods a political economy approach after tax income inequality has risen since the mid 1990s as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution we argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution within a probabilistic voting framework we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate focusing on oecd countries we find empirical support for both the model s micro political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes

common factors and common breaks in panels an empirical investigation abstract unobserved common factors and common breaks are two important features in empirical studies using large panels recently baltagi feng and kao 2016 2019 extended pesaran s 2006 common correlated effects cce approach by allowing for common breaks and endogenous regressors in large heterogeneous panels in this note we empirically investigate these estimators and compare them with cce and bai s 2009 interactive fixed effects ife estimators in the context of china s provincial infrastructure investment

government debt and the demand for money an extreme bound analysis m keivan deravi charles e hegji and h dean moberly the article provides evidence that there is a relationship between government debt and interest rates via the demand for money this relationship is examined through the wealth effect of government debt on money demand and the robustness of the results is tested by the use of extreme bound analysis in addition to standard econometric techniques we find that ols regression shows government debt affecting the demand for money positively implying that federal government debt is net wealth in addition the extreme bound analysis shows that the estimates of the government debt coefficient are robust under alternative specifications of the goldfeld model i introduction this paper studies the relationship between government debt and interest rates the approach used in this paper differs from previous studies in two ways first this relationship is examined through the wealth effect of government debt on the demand for money second the robustness of the results is tested by use of extreme bound analysis as an alternative to standard econometric techniques theoretically there is no clear cut consensus as to whether or not government debt should be net wealth the argument used most often is that government debt will be net wealth if future tax liabilities to service the debt are for the aggregate economy only partially discounted two explanations for this partial discounting are offered first in dealing with finite lived individuals thompson 1967 assumes that the average remaining lifetime of current taxpayers is shorter than for future interest payments on the federal debt in this situation the net present value of a stream of equal interest payments and taxes will be positive as a counter argument barro 1974 has shown that current generations can act effectively as if they are infinite lived when they are linked to future generations through a series of pairwise transfers of wealth here the realization by current generations that tax liabilities will be left to future generations extends the lifetime of the relevant stream of tax liabilities for debt service government debt is then wealth neutral mundell 1971 provides a second reason for partial discounting by assuming that capital markets are imperfect and that the relevant discount rate for tax liabilities is higher than the rate for interest payments these discount rates are respectively thought of as applying to high risk of loan default and low risk of loan default individuals this difference in discount rates creates a positive wealth effect since under mundell s assumptions government debt held by taxpayers involves a loan from low discount rate to high discount rate individuals as barro 1974 has again countered this wealth effect will exist only to the extent that the government is more efficient at providing such a loan than the private sector finally barro 1974 kormendi 1983 and later aschauer 1985 advance an argument as to why government debt might be negative net wealth suppose there is considerable uncertainty about the intertemporal and cross sectional burden of the future tax liability necessary to service the debt in this case the certainty equivalent value of these future taxes might exceed the certainty equivalent value of the future income stream of the debt so that government debt would be negative net wealth the majority of the empirical studies of the net wealth induced linkage between government debt and interest rates have attempted to measure this relationship using consumption functions if privately owned government debt is net wealth the wealth effect of this debt working through a keynesian consumption function will be positive so that increased government borrowing will result in increased current consumption and interest rates several studies have assessed the relationship between government borrowing and consumption or interest rates via this mechanism

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

wagner s hypothesis in time series and cross section perspectives evidence from real data for 115 countries internationally comparable data on income and government expenditure for 115 countries covering the period 1950 80 are used to assess the validity of wagner s hypothesis individual country time series data and several intercountry cross sections are studied besides a tremendous diversity in the position for various countries the results indicate that while there is support for the hypothesis in some time series data sets such support is lacking in most cross section estimates much of the support for the hypothesis reported in many earlier studies therefore was probably due to either use of limited samples or inadequate data comparability across the observations studied copyright 1987 by mit press

the credibility revolution in empirical economics how better research design is taking the con out of econometrics since edward leamer s memorable 1983 paper let s take the con out of econometrics empirical microeconomics has experienced a credibility revolution while leamer s suggested remedy sensitivity analysis has played a role in this we argue that the primary engine driving improvement has been a focus on the quality of empirical research designs the advantages of a good research design are perhaps most easily apparent in research using random assignment we begin with an overview of leamer s 1983 critique and his proposed remedies we then turn to the key factors we see contributing to improved empirical work including the availability of more and better data along with advances in theoretical econometric understanding but especially the fact that research design has moved front and center in much of empirical micro we offer a brief digression into macroeconomics and industrial organization where progress by our lights is less dramatic although there is work in both fields that we find encouraging finally we discuss the view that the design pendulum has swung too far critics of design driven studies argue that in pursuit of clean and credible research designs researchers seek good answers instead of good questions we briefly respond to this concern which worries us little

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

democrats republicans and taxes evidence that political parties matter i estimate the influence of political parties on state tax burdens over a forty year period 1960 2000 holding constant a large number of state and voter characteristic variables i find that i tax burdens are higher when democrats control the state legislature compared to when republicans are in control ii the political party of the governor has little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the state legislature i explain how both findings are consistent with median voter theory my results suggest that after five years of democratic control of the legislature state government would be approximately 3 to 5 percent larger than if republicans controlled the legislature during that same period with the better specifications producing estimates in the higher end of this range

do local government fiscal spillovers exist evidence from counties municipalities and school districts abstract numerous theories posit that the fiscal decisions of one jurisdiction influence the fiscal decisions of its neighbors the main contribution of this paper is to address empirical difficulties in testing for spillovers using a regression discontinuity design on a newly collected dataset i utilize close elections from this large dataset of local referenda in ohio to isolate the effect of exogenous increases in taxation and spending of one jurisdiction on neighbors fiscal decisions for all jurisdictional types and referenda revenue sources bonds income property and sales tax there is no evidence of spillovers and relatively small effects can be ruled out

emergent extremism in a multi agent model of religious clubs i introduction religious extremism is as old as religion itself but the tendency to promote militancy and terrorism from within extremist religions appears to be much more common now than in times past juergensmeyer 2001 stern 2003 wiktorowicz 2005 1 today s terrorists routinely frame their objectives in religious terms and organize their activities within religious movements this shift is not due to increased militancy within religion as a whole not even within the stricter subset of religious groups commonly labeled sectarian or fundamentalist bromley and melton 2002 marty and appleby 1995 rather groups with militant objectives are increasingly leveraging the latent potential for violence within extremist religion krueger and maleckova 2003 and krueger 2007 have shown that contrary to popular hypotheses regarding the salience of poverty and education it is instead institutional conditions such as civil liberties that contribute to the origination of terrorists within a country religious extremism has been shown to be a potentially powerful input into the production of terrorism berman 2004 2 and the origination of terrorists has been empirically connected to civil liberties we seek to complete the triangle and connect religious extremism to social conditions in an extension of existing theory and test the predictions of the model in an empirical context with an eye toward civil liberties this paper extends previous models of religious clubs to better account for observed patterns of extremism across different settings and test policies most likely to reduce the appeal of extremism economists at first blush should have trouble explaining the survival of groups that demand large sacrifices from their members successful religious groups however routinely impose all sorts of apparently unproductive costs on their members iannaccone 1992 introduced a formal model of religious clubs within which apparently irrational sacrifice and stigma enhances the individual and collective utility his model demonstrated the feasibility of extremist groups but does less to explain the relative prevalence of extremism across time and place further the original model allows for only corner solutions and as such the viability of extreme groups is indistinguishable from the viability of the more moderate groups they must compete with for members in the religious marketplace in section ii we revisit analyze and extend the club model of religion we push the analysis of the original model exploring sacrifice substitutability of club and private goods and their relationships to member commitment and the viability of extremist groups in this preliminary analysis we illustrate not only the potential insights of the club theory of religion into the strength and viability of extremist groups but also the limitations inherent to the representative agent model we proceed by extending the model in a multi agent ma computational framework this framework permits us to analyze the distributions of agents and clubs that make up a religious economy the computational nature of the model is critical because it allows for sufficient heterogeneity of agents and clubs and given this heterogeneity agent decision making absent closed form solutions via nash equilibria extremists groups emerge as just one segment the high cost tail of a distribution of religious clubs that range across the full spectrum of potential group imposed sacrifice and stigma extremism is identifiable and comparable in the model because it exists within a full spectrum of clubs by varying the parameters of the model that control the distribution of secular wages across agents and the degree of substitutability between religious and secular commodities we can better explain where and when religious extremism is most popular its strength relative to more moderate groups and which economic policies reduce its prevalence

what will take the con out of econometrics the paper begins with the question of whether leamer s extreme bounds analysis eba really does take the con out of econometrics by analytically demonstrating that the extreme bounds are simply functions of the f statistic for the deletion of variables from a regression we conclude that the information provided by eba represents no advance over that available from traditional methods furthermore there is a degree of arbitrariness in eba which exactly parallels the selective reporting of regressions it was designed to supplant the last part of the paper attempts a positive response to its title by following a well defined series of modelling steps we maintain that cooley and le roy s eba derived conclusions concerning the interest elasticity of money demand owe more to a faulty methodology than to the data this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

fiscal competition and public debt the existing theoretical literature on fiscal competition has to a large extent ignored the role of government debt as a determinant of taxes and productive public spending we develop a simple model of fiscal competition with government borrowing if a default on government debt is no option initial debt levels play no role in fiscal competition this neutrality result is overturned when a default is possible a government that is constrained in its borrowing due to a possible default responds optimally by lowering spending on durable public infrastructure which in turn induces more aggressive tax setting a rise in exogenous firm mobility reinforces the link between legacy debt and fiscal competition our model may help explain the observation that highly indebted countries in europe have decreased corporate tax rates over proportionally our model may also be useful for evaluating decentralization reforms in which the power to tax firms is devolved to lower levels of overnments which differ in their initial debt levels

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

sensitivity analyses of the deterrence hypothesis let s keep the econ in econometrics abstract leamer and mcmanus applied extreme bound analysis eba in an empirical study of the deterrent effects of capital punishment and other penalties their analysis has questioned the validity of the deterrence hypothesis the thrust of our paper is twofold first by applying eba to well known econometric models of demand production and human capital investment our analysis exposes and illustrates the inherent flaws of eba as a method of deriving valid inferences about model specification second since the analysis shows leamer and mcmanus s inferences about deterrence to be based on a flawed methodology we offer an alternative theory based sensitivity analysis of estimated deterrent effects using similar data our analysis supports the deterrence hypothesis more generally it emphasizes the indispensable role of theory in guiding sensitivity analyses of model specification

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

an evaluation of alternative measures of corporate tax rates abstract this paper examines the ability of financial statement measures of average and marginal tax rates mtr to capture tax attributes utilizing firm level tax and financial data the results suggest commonly used average tax rate measures provide little insight about statutory tax burdens and may introduce substantial bias into analyses of tax incidence financial statement based proxies for mtr particularly those based on simulation methods are found to perform well in estimating current year tax rates both current year and present value mtr are found to be highly correlated with an easily constructed binary proxy of firms tax status

dynamic fiscal competition a political economy theory abstract i develop a political economy theory of dynamic fiscal competition via public spending and debt with internationally mobile capital strategic policies generate two cross border externalities that voters in each country fail to internalize 1 an increase in public spending that bolsters capital accumulation but also 2 a race to the top in public debt which crowds out capital the relative size of these two externalities varies with the number of financially integrated countries and interacts with the domestic political conflict between young and old voters despite residence based taxation capital tax rates are lower under strategic policies than under coordination furthermore they may decline with financial integration strategic policies lead to lower long run output and welfare relative to coordination but are preferred by subsequent generations of voters if the number of financially integrated countries is low or the political weight of the young is high

crime punishment and the market for offenses crime is a subject of intense emotions conflicting ideologies however economists have generally explained it as a reflection of individual choice and equilibrating market forces two major themes of the literature are outlined the evolution of a market model to explain the diversity of crime across time and space and the debate about the usefulness of positive versus negative incentives systematic analyses generally indicate that crime is affected on the margin by both positive and negative incentives there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of incapacitation and rehabilitation and optimal enforcement strategies involve trade offs between narrow efficiency and equity considerations

how much do taxes discourage incorporation the double taxation of corporate income should discourage firms from incorporating we investigate the extent to which the aggregate allocation of assets and taxable income in the united states between corporate and noncorporate firms responds to the size of this tax distortion during the period 1959 1986 in theory profitable firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax distortion is large and conversely for firms with tax losses our empirical results provide strong support for these forecasts and imply that the resulting excess burden equals 16 percent of business tax revenue one of the most basic distortions created by the double taxation of corporate income in the united states is the disincentive to incorporate even in most countries with integrated or partially integrated tax systems there are differential taxes across organizational forms however obvious this distortion may be most articles investigating the distortions created by the corporate tax have taken as exogenous a firm s choice whether or not to incorporate assuming for example that some industries are inherently corporate while others are inherently noncorporate a variety of nontax factors described below can certainly influence a firm s choice of organizational form causing some to favor incorporating and others not but are these nontax factors so dominant that taxes do not in practice influence a firm s choice of organizational form as gravelle and kotlikoff 1989 1993 emphasize tax induced changes in firms choices of organizational form in principle can create large excess burdens the size of these excess burdens in practice depends on the extent to which firms respond to these tax incentives in this article we calculate how the tax distortion discouraging firms from incorporating has varied over time then estimate the extent to which the allocation of assets and taxable income between corporate and noncorporate

an unbalanced spatial panel data approach to us state tax competition abstract this paper assesses spatial competition in excise taxation among us states over the time period 1975 1999 we estimate the slope and shifters of the tax reaction curves using spatial panel data methods recently proposed by kapoor et al in press kapoor m kelejian h h prucha i r in press panel data models with spatially correlated error components j econ

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

from the econometrics of capital punishment to the capital punishment of econometrics on the use and abuse of sensitivity analysis the academic debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment has intensified again with a major policy outcome at stake about two dozen empirical studies have recently emerged that explore the issue donohue and wolfers 2005 claim to have examined the recent studies and shown the evidence not to be robust to specification changes we argue that the narrow scope of their study does not warrant this claim moreover focusing on our two studies that they have examined we show the deterrence findings to be robust while their work has serious flaws and their reporting appears to be selective the selectivity is biased towards showing no deterrence