irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

feed in tariff contract schemes and regulatory uncertainty abstract this paper presents a novel analysis of two feed in tariffs fit under market and regulatory uncertainty namely a sliding premium with cap and floor and a minimum price guarantee regulatory uncertainty is modeled with a poisson process whereby a jump event may reduce the tariff before the signature of the contract using a semi analytical real options framework we derive the project value the optimal investment threshold and the value of the investment opportunity for these schemes taking into consideration the optimal investment threshold we also compare the two aforementioned fits with the fixed price fit and the fixed premium fit which are policy schemes that have been extensively studied in the literature our results show that increasing the likelihood of a jump event lowers the investment threshold for all the schemes moreover the investment threshold also decreases when the tariff reduction increases we also compare the four schemes in terms of the corresponding optimal investment thresholds for example we find that the investment threshold of the sliding premium is lower than the minimum price guarantee this result suggests that the first regime is a better policy than the latter because it accelerates the investment while avoiding excessive earnings for producers or excessive payments for consumers

global warming and hyperbolic discounting the use of a constant discount rate to study long lived environmental problems such as global warming has two disadvantages the prescribed policy is sensitive to the discount rate and with moderate discount rates large future damages have almost no effect on current decisions time consistent quasi hyperbolic discounting alleviates both of these modeling problems and is a plausible description of how people think about the future we analyze the time consistent markov perfect equilibrium in a general model with a stock pollutant the solution to the linear quadratic specialization illustrates the role of hyperbolic discounting in a model of global warming

volume flexibility and capacity investment under demand uncertainty the paper considers optimal capacity investment decisions under uncertainty taking a real options approach concerning the production decision we study a flexible and an inflexible scenario the flexible firm can costlessly adjust production over time with the capacity level as the upper bound while the inflexible firm fixes production at capacity level from the moment of investment onwards we find that the flexible firm invests in higher capacity than the inflexible firm where the capacity difference increases with uncertainty for the flexible firm the initial capacity utilization rate can be quite low especially when investment costs are concave and the economic environment is uncertain as to the timing of the investment there are two contrary effects first the flexible firm has an incentive to invest earlier because flexibility raises the project value second the flexible firm has an incentive to invest later because costs are larger due to the higher capacity level the latter effect dominates in highly uncertain economic environments our model being dynamic enables us to derive the at first sight counterintuitive result that an increase in capacity holding cost raises the capacity level the firm invests in

changing the way the elderly live evidence from the home health care market in the united states abstract i examine how decreases in government coverage of home health care visits to the elderly in the united states have affected their living arrangements specifically i exploit geographic variation in the medicare home health care reimbursement rate that arose as a result of legislation passed in 1997 and i identify its impact on the living arrangements of older medicare beneficiaries i find that less generous reimbursement policies lead to a greater fraction of elderly giving up independent living baseline model estimates suggest that a decline in reimbursement of one visit per user leads to a 0 98 increase in the fraction of elderly medicare beneficiaries living in shared living arrangements that is living with somebody else rather than alone or with only the spouse this estimate implies that a decline in reimbursement of 5 1 visits per medicare beneficiary increases the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements by 1 12 percentage points such an increase is consistent with the time series increase in the fraction of elderly that live in shared living arrangements between 1997 and 2000

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand this paper extends the real options literature by discussing an investment problem where a firm has to determine optimal investment timing and optimal capacity choice at the same time under conditions of irreversible investment expenditures and uncertainty in future demand after the project is installed with a certain maximum capacity this capacity is fixed as an upper boundary to the output and cannot be adjusted later on it turns out that in the framework of this once and for all decision uncertainty in future demand leads to an increase in optimal installed capacity but on the other hand it causes investment to be delayed to an extent that even small uncertainty makes waiting and accumulation of further information the optimal decision for large ranges of demand limiting the capacity which may be installed weakens this extreme effect of uncertainty

the earnings of informal carers wage differentials and opportunity costs a substantial proportion of working age individuals in britain are looking after sick disabled or elderly people often combining their work and caring responsibilities previous research has shown that informal care is linked with substantial opportunity costs for the individual due to forgone wages as a result of non labour market participation in this paper we show that informal carers exhibit further disadvantages even when participating using the british household panel study bhps we decompose wage differentials and show that carers can expect lower returns for a given set of characteristics with this wage penalty varying along the pay distribution and by gender furthermore opportunity costs from forgone wages and wage penalties are estimated and found to be substantial

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

love hate and murder commitment devices in violent relationships many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times to explain this we develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence this time inconsistency generates a demand for commitment we present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices we find that no drop policies which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges result in an increase in reporting no drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

a dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion abstract we model capacity building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible while building their capacity over time firms compete a la cournot in the product market given their installed capacity there is no exogenous order of moves no commitment regarding future decisions and no finite horizon we investigate markov perfect equilibrium mpe paths of the investment game which may include episodes during which firms invest at different times a preemption pattern and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously a tacit collusion pattern these episodes may alternate and are typically several when firms have yet to invest in capacity the sole pattern that is mpe compatible is a preemption episode firms invest at different times but have equal value the first such investment may occur earlier and therefore be riskier than socially optimal when both firms hold capacity tacit collusion episodes may be mpe compatible firms invest simultaneously at a postponed time hence holding back production in the meantime thereby generating an investment wave in the industry such investment episodes are more likely with higher demand volatility faster market growth and lower cost of capital discount rate

green electricity investments environmental target and the optimal subsidy abstract we investigate the optimal investment decision in renewables under market demand uncertainty in the context of the italian strategy for renewable deployment under the eu policy the firm has to decide about the time and size of the investment we find that a higher subsidy level induces the firm to invest earlier with a smaller investment capacity this implies that a given environmental target cannot be reached by a too high too low subsidy level since this will cause the investment level to be too low too late we show that there exists an optimal intermediate subsidy level due to uncertain demand in some cases ensuring to reach the environmental target in time requires an additional conditional subsidy we propose a heuristic for policy makers stating when and how much subsidy to provide furthermore we find that in a more uncertain economic environment the subsidy adjustment to maintain the target level of investment results in the firm investing earlier which is opposite to the standard real options result

money for nothing universal child care and maternal employment abstract the strong correlation between child care and maternal employment rates has led previous research to conclude that affordable and readily available child care is a driving force both of cross country differences in maternal employment and of its rapid growth over the last decades we analyze a staged expansion of subsidized child care in norway our precise and robust difference in differences estimates reveal that there is little if any causal effect of subsidized child care on maternal employment despite a strong correlation instead of increasing mothers labor supply the new subsidized child care mostly crowds out informal child care arrangements suggesting a significant net cost of the child care subsidies

investment timing and optimal capacity choice for small hydropower projects this paper presents a method for assessing small hydropower projects that are subject to uncertain electricity prices we present a real options based method with continuous scaling and we find that there is a unique price limit for initiating the project if the current electricity price is below this limit it is never optimal to invest but above this limit investment is made according to the function for optimal size the connection between the real option and the physical properties of a small hydropower plant is dealt with using a spreadsheet model that performs a technical simulation of the production in a plant based on all the important choices for such a plant the main results of the spreadsheet are simulated production size and the investment costs which are in turn used for finding the value of the real option and the price limit the method is illustrated on three different norwegian small hydropower projects

investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit abstract this paper investigates the interplay of investment irreversibility and endogenous exit in a duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty endogenous exit and investment irreversibility produce predatory behavior in very competitive industries in which prices react strongly to changes in quantity and in which capacity increases are not too costly when the market is in decline firms increase capacity in order to subsequently monopolize this market upon a further decrease in demand predatory behavior is particularly likely to occur if fixed costs of operation are substantial large uncertainty has the opposite effect and makes predatory behavior less prevalent predation occurs as investment irreversibility gives commitment power to delay one s own exit and to promote the exit of a competitor this explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking reputation network effects or learning effects

capacity expansion games with application to competition in power generation investments abstract we consider competitive capacity investment for a duopoly of two distinct producers the producers are exposed to stochastically fluctuating costs and interact through aggregate supply capacity expansion is irreversible and modeled in terms of timing strategies characterized through threshold rules because the impact of changing costs on the producers is asymmetric we are led to a nonzero sum timing game describing the transitions among the discrete investment stages working in a continuous time diffusion framework we characterize and analyze the resulting nash equilibrium and game values our analysis quantifies the dynamic competition effects and yields insight into dynamic preemption and over investment in a general asymmetric setting a case study considering the impact of fluctuating emission costs on power producers investing in nuclear and coal fired plants is also presented

reconsidering the moral hazard risk avoidance tradeoff the received model for optimal demand side cost sharing trades off moral hazard and risk avoidance this model appears to lie behind recent increases in initial cost sharing such as those embodied in health savings accounts and health reimbursement accounts at the same time there is evidence that lower cost sharing for certain drugs can reduce future total health care costs and or improve future health and this may be true of other medical services as well to the degree that individuals remain in the same common insurance pool lower cost sharing that induces increases in certain services that reduce total costs including future costs represents a classic case for a subsidy and will minimize an employer s labor costs even if total costs increase the value of a change in health could increase more in that case such a subsidy is consistent with recent work in behavioral economics for those with self control problems

empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting the derivation of the correct discount rate for intergenerational projects in cost benefit analysis is particularly contentious public choice has resulted in lower discretionary exponential discount rates for many intergenerational projects in britain and the usa this is shown to be strong indirect evidence that the true social discount rate may be a hyperbolic rather than an exponential function there is also empirical evidence for this hypothesis the hyperbolic nature of discounting is also a standard finding in the behavioural sciences for intergenerational time frames hyperbolic discount rates should be employed together with exponential discount rates in cost benefit sensitivity analyses

entry deterrence and hidden competition abstract this paper studies strategic investment behavior of firms facing an uncertain demand in a duopoly setting firms choose both investment timing and the capacity level while facing additional uncertainty about market participants which is introduced via the concept of hidden competition we focus on the analysis of possible strategies of the market leader in terms of its capacity choice and on the influence of hidden competition on these strategies we show that due to hidden competition the follower is more eager to invest as a result an entry deterrence strategy of the leader becomes more costly and it can only be implemented for smaller market size leaving additional room for entry accommodation the leader has incentives to prevent entry of the hidden competitor stimulating simultaneous investment if the hidden firm has a large capacity and has more incentives to apply entry deterrence in the complementary case of a small capacity of the hidden player in the first case overinvestment aimed to deter the follower s entry does not occur for a wide range of parameters values

delaying product introduction a dynamic analysis with endogenous time horizon abstract we consider a capital accumulating incumbent firm which produces an established product and has the option to introduce an improved substitute product to the market by incurring adoption costs we find that depending on the initial capacities on the established market and the value of adoption costs three scenarios are possible namely introducing immediately later or abstaining from product introduction in case of delayed product introduction the incumbent reduces capacities for the established product before the new product is introduced we find that the higher the adoption costs the higher is the gain by delaying the product introduction compared to immediate introduction from a welfare perspective the product introduction is welfare enhancing but the option of delay decreases the welfare gain the model is calibrated using data on hard disk and solid state drives

timing of investments in oligopoly under uncertainty a framework for numerical analysis abstract we present a modeling framework for the analysis of investments in an oligopoly market for a homogenous commodity the demand evolves stochastically and the firms carry out investment projects in order to adjust their production cost functions or production capacities the model is formulated as a discrete time state space game where the firms use feedback strategies the firms are assumed to move sequentially to ensure a unique markov perfect nash equilibrium once the equilibrium has been solved monte carlo simulation is used to form probability distributions for the firms cash flow patterns and accomplished investments such information can be used to value firms operating in an oligopoly market an example of the model is given in a duopoly market the example illustrates the trade off between the value of flexibility and economies of scale under competitive interaction

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

uncertainty and the trade off between scale and flexibility in investment abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of a firm that chooses both the scale and timing of its investment sensitivity analysis shows that greater demand volatility is associated with the firm investing in larger increments less frequently this is in contrast to the conventional wisdom which is that greater volatility leads to investment in smaller increments more frequently overall the reduced frequency dominates the greater scale so that the long run average rate of investment is a decreasing function of demand volatility the timing and scale of investment are most sensitive to volatility when there are substantial investment economies of scale

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

the opportunity costs of informal care does gender matter in this paper we investigate the costs borne by both male and female carers in terms of their forgone formal employment opportunities traditionally informal care was supplied by women but nowadays women are not only more likely to work but also likely to be significant contributors to family finances for women this implies that the size of any forgone earnings cost of informal care is increasing at the same time population ageing is making for increasing numbers requiring care from a policy perspective it is therefore helpful to consider a less traditional but nevertheless important source of informal care men we find that both male and female carers bear indirect costs in that they are less likely to be in paid work than otherwise similar non carers and when they are in paid work they earn significantly less however we find that the motivation for lower employment participation is not the same for men as it is for women

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

lifting the burden state care of the elderly and labor supply of adult children we use a reform in the federal funding of care for the elderly in norway to examine the effects of formal care expansion on the labor supply decisions of middle aged children we find a consistent and significant negative impact of formal care expansion on insured work absences for the adult daughters of single elderly parents this effect is particularly strong for daughters with no siblings who are also more likely to exceed earnings thresholds after the reform we find no impacts of the reform on daughters mobility or parental health and no effects on adult sons

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

poverty and self control we argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self control in line with a distinguished psychological literature we consider modes of self control that involve the self imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards we study settings in which consumers with quasi hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self control trapping people in poverty while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely thus even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective we examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving the demand for commitment devices the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources we also explore the nature of optimal self control demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self renegotiation

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

investment flexibility as a barrier to entry abstract this paper presents a model of investment in a duopoly with firms that choose the scale and timing of investment decision making flexibility and the costs saved by investing in large steps rather than sequences of small steps determine an incumbent s ability to deter entry by a potential competitor entry occurs when these cost savings are very small or very large because the effect of increased industry capacity on the incumbent s assets in place is the same regardless of which firm invests in intermediate cases the incumbent is able to deter entry by making a smaller earlier investment than the potential entrant the smaller investment scale protects the incumbent s assets in place which offsets the incumbent s cost disadvantage from investing in smaller steps than the entrant would choose nevertheless the threat of entry constrains the incumbent s investment behavior and limits its profitability the model is solved using a combination of best response iteration and the projected successive over relaxation method

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

discounting the distant future how much do uncertain rates increase valuations abstract we demonstrate that when the future path of the discount rate is uncertain and highly correlated the distant future should be discounted at significantly lower rates than suggested by the current rate we then use two centuries of us interest rate data to quantify this effect using both random walk and mean reverting models we compute the certainty equivalent rate that summarizes the effect of uncertainty and measures the appropriate forward rate of discount in the future under the random walk model we find that the certainty equivalent rate falls continuously from 4 to 2 after 100 years 1 after 200 years and 0 5 after 300 years at horizons of 400 years the discounted value increases by a factor of over 40 000 relative to conventional discounting applied to climate change mitigation we find that incorporating discount rate uncertainty almost doubles the expected present value of mitigation benefits

lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries in this paper we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment we use our model to suggest answers to two questions first what economic factors facilitate preemption races second what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination with a series of examples we show that low product differentiation low investment sunkness and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races the same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination although depreciation removes capacity it might impede capacity coordination finally our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values the distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination taken together our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand in hand with capacity coordination in the long run

capacity investment under uncertainty the effect of volume flexibility abstract real option theory is a central tool in today s investment theory as it integrates uncertainty and managerial flexibility in the analysis and valuation of investment projects this paper studies the optimal time and size of investment for a monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty and volume flexibility in our modeling framework demand is random and the firm first decides the optimal time and size of the production process after entry the firm adjusts continuously production volume to match the observed demand volume flexibility comes at a cost which depends on both the current output and the established capacity we study two different models of volume flexibility downside volume flexibility allows the firms to produce any quantity below the installed capacity upside volume flexibility allows to expand production above the firm s capacity size in both cases the option to temporary suspend production is not given a priori but it is part of the firm s optimal choice with this feature the model provides conclusions that contrast some of the most recent theoretical findings on the same subject we find that an increase of the degree of downside volume flexibility makes the firm willing to invest earlier in a larger plant we also show that downside volume flexibility reduces the utilization rates especially in highly uncertain markets upside volume flexibility has the joint effect of reducing the size of the investment and the investment threshold at which the firm installs capacity the utilization rates are significantly higher compared to the case of downside volume flexibility only and there is an increasing relationship between increased upside flexibility and utilization rates

exit in duopoly under uncertainty this paper examines a declining duopoly where the firms must choose when to exit from the market the uncertainty is modeled by letting the revenue stream follow a geometric brownian motion we consider the markovperfect equilibrium in firms exit strategies with a low degree of uncertainty there is a unique equilibrium where one of the fi rms always exits before the other however when uncertainty is increased another equilibrium with the reversed order of exit may appear ruining the uniqueness whether this happens or not depends on the degree of asymmetry in the firm specifi cp arameters

cross disciplinary evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates researchers in different disciplines have independently found evidence to suggest that the social discount rate may be hyperbolic rather than exponential in nature both behaviorist research and some empirical economics studies support the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis u s and u k government discounting dispensations for some long run public development projects are explicable in terms of an underlying hyperbolic social discount rate a statistical aggregation argument demonstrates that even if the behaviorist economics and public choice evidence for hyperbolic discounting is not conclusive the social discount rate of a set of people who individually express time preferences best modeled by exponential discounting functions is nonetheless hyperbolic further empirical economics studies of discounting preferences are required comparisons of different national discounting practices would also be useful to see how widespread is the use of unusually low exponential rates of discount for long run projects the application of hyperbolic discounting would have most impact in long run benefit cost analyses however government agencies would require overwhelming evidence before switching from exponential to hyperbolic discounting

strategic technology choice and capacity investment under demand uncertainty this paper studies the impact of competition on a firm s choice of technology product flexible or product dedicated and capacity investment decisions specifically we model two firms competing with each other in two markets characterized by price dependent and uncertain demand the firms make three decisions in the following sequence choice of technology technology game capacity investment capacity game and production quantities production game the technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed we develop best response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium we show that the firms may respond to competition by adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts we conclude that contrary to popular belief flexibility is not always the best response to competition flexible and dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium we demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes increases a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology whereas the decision of a monopolist is not affected further we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands for two products but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor s technology choice our results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under competition whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition finally we show that contrary to intuition as the competitor s cost of capacity increases the premium a flexible firm is willing to pay for flexibility decreases

on what basis should health be discounted the discount rate to be applied in health care programmes should be based on the time preference rate for health and this same rate should be applied to costs as well due to the limited tradeability of health when eliciting its time preference rate the intertemporal choices must be framed in such a way as to resemble as closely as possible those facing health planners and decision makers

sensitivity to market incentives the case of policy loans the standard neoclassical theory is rejected as an explanation for the observed reluctance of most holders of whole life insurance to borrow against the cash value of their policies at favorable rates of interest even when the neoclassical theory is augmented with transactions costs and short awareness lags several empirical tests using survey and time series data reject the standard theory in favor of an explanation invoking self imposed rules against borrowing or the debt ethic this evidence lends support to the psychology based theories of thaler and shefrin 1981 copyright 1987 by mit press

how to escape a declining market capacity investment or exit this paper considers a firm that faces a declining profit stream for its established product the firm has the option to invest in a new technology with which it can produce an innovative product while having the option to exit at any point in time in the presence of an exit option earlier work determined the optimal timing to invest where it was shown that higher uncertainty might accelerate investment timing in the present paper the firm also decides on capacity this extension leads to monotonicity i e higher uncertainty delays investment timing we also find that higher potential profitability of the innovative product market increases the incentive to invest earlier where however we get the counterintuitive result that the firm invests in smaller capacity finally if quantity has a smaller negative effect on price the firm wants to acquire a larger capacity at a lower investment threshold

investing in electricity production under a reliability options scheme abstract reliability options ros are used to enhance the security of supply in electricity systems when a power producer writes a ro s he agrees to set a cap on the price of electricity that s he cashes in return the system operator i e the party that is buying the option pays to the option issuer a fixed premium in this paper we analyze how ros affect the timing and value of investments in the energy sector and we show under what conditions they can be used as investment stimuli we prove that contrarily to what is expected ros can potentially harm the security of supply by delaying the adoption of new capacity and by reducing the value of investing in it to avoid such a result a careful setting of the relevant parameters is needed

canadian contributions to family economics canadian scholars have made substantial contributions to the relatively new field of family economics these include new models of how men and women match in marriage markets and of how decisions are made in multi person households several were early contributors to the literature on married women s labour supply and labour supply in a family context and helped to develop empirical methods in this area a particular focus has been on the impacts of policy relevant parameters such childcare costs on family labour supply and child well being new work on child development the impact of early life conditions and the processes of intergenerational transmission also highlight the importance of family context in determining economic well being

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

capacity choice under uncertainty in a duopoly with endogenous exit abstract applying the real options framework this article investigates the investment decision of the entrant given that an incumbent is already active both firms have an option to exit this market if the demand level falls too low the combination of three decision components capacity choice entry and exit timing results into multiple trigger strategies for the entrant in particular in the presence of a large incumbent it can either choose to coexist with its rival in a duopoly or eventually monopolize the market by installing a sufficiently large capacity the former scenario is realized when the market is large while the latter occurs when the market is small when the market is of intermediate size a hysteresis region emerges where the entrant does not take any actions and prefers to postpone investment

capacity expansion under stochastic demands we consider the problem of optimally meeting a stochastically growing demand for capacity over an infinite horizon under the assumption that demand for product follows either a nonlinear brownian motion or a non markovian birth and death process we show that this stochastic problem can be transformed into an equivalent deterministic problem consistent with earlier work by a manne the equivalent problem is formed by replacing the stochastic demand by its deterministic trend and discounting all costs by a new interest rate that is smaller than the original in approximate proportion to the uncertainty in the demand

choosing among alternative discrete investment projects under uncertainty abstract irreversible choice among mutually exclusive projects under output price uncertainty is considered increasing returns are shown to make it optimal to wait for the largest project greater uncertainty of the price process makes it optimal to wait for a larger project

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

investments in flexible production capacity abstract we examine the technology and capacity choice problem of a multi output firm facing stochastic demands in a continuous time framework the firm can install output specific capital or at greater cost flexible capital that can be used to produce different outputs investment is irreversible the firm must choose a technology and decide how much capital to install knowing it can add more later as demand evolves we formulate the capacity choice problem as a singular stochastic control problem show that the value of the firm equals the value of its installed capital plus the value of its options to add capacity in the future and derive an optimal investment rule that maximizes the firm s market value we also address the analogous problem for a multi input firm that faces stochastically evolving factor costs and can install input specific or flexible capital

procrastination on long term projects we investigate naive procrastination on projects with multiple stages in addition to classic procrastination in starting projects naive people might undertake costly effort to begin projects but then never finish procrastination is more likely when the costs of completing different stages are more unequal and it is when later stages are more costly that people start but do not finish projects moreover if the cost structure is endogenous people are prone to choose cost structures that lead them to start but not finish projects some extensions further illustrate how people may incur costs on projects they never complete

entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework this paper examines a dynamic incumbent entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the inverse demand in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered we find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment this is because the incumbent invests earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry if on the other hand the size of the investment is exogenously given the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the incumbent does

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

saving in developing countries theory and review in the literature on economic development much of the interest in saving has been focused on the relation between saving and growth but saving is not only about accumulation it is about smoothing consumption in the face of volatile and unpredictable income and helping to ensure the living standards of poor people whose lives are difficult and uncertain this paper develops a model of households which cannot borrow but which accumulate assets as a buffer stock to protect consumption when incomes are low such households dissave as often as they save do not accumulate assets over the long term and have on average very small asset holdings but their consumption is markedly smoother than their income much of the evidence is as consistent with this view of saving as it is incosistent with standard views of smoothing over the life cycle and with explanations of the link between saving and growth in terms of life cycle saving behavior consumption smoothing is also a useful way of thinking about government policy where volatility in the world prices of taxed commodities can generate sharp fluctuations in government revenues as well as reallocations of revenue between the private and public sectors many important policy issues in developing countries hinge on issues of consumption and smoothing and research on these issues is currently likely to be more productive than work on the relation between saving and growth

optimal firm growth under the threat of entry the paper studies the incumbent entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting we find that under an open loop information structure the incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting whereas in the markov perfect equilibrium the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before the entry the entry cost level where entry accommodation passes into entry deterrence is lower in the markov perfect equilibrium further we find that the incumbent s capital stock level needed to deter entry is hump shaped as a function of the entry time whereas the corresponding entry cost where the entrant is indifferent between entry and non entry is u shaped

strategic capacity investment under uncertainty this article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level the simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence accommodation to consider a timing delay element we find that when applying an entry deterrence policy the first investor or incumbent overinvests in capacity for two reasons first it delays the investment of the second investor or entrant second the entrant will invest in less capacity we also find that greater uncertainty makes entry deterrence more likely

preemption and rent dissipation under price competition abstract we study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous price competition on a market of finite size driven by stochastic taste shocks different patterns of equilibria may arise depending on the importance of the real option effect if the average growth rate of the market is close to the risk free rate or if the volatility of demand shocks is high no dissipation of rents occurs in equilibrium despite instantaneous price competition if these conditions do not hold the equilibrium investment timing is suboptimal and the firms long run capacities may depend on the initial market conditions our conclusions contrast sharply with standard rent dissipation results

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

uncertain discount rates in climate policy analysis abstract consequences in the distant future such as those from climate change have little value today when discounted using conventional rates this result contradicts our gut feeling about such problems and often leads to ad hoc application of lower rates for valuations over longer horizons a step facilitated by confusion and disagreement over the correct rate even over short horizons we review the theory and intuition behind the choice of discount rates now and importantly the impact of likely variation in rates in the future correlated changes in future rates imply that the distant future should be discounted at much lower rates than suggested by the current rate thereby raising the value of future consequences regardless of opinions concerning the current rate using historic data to quantity the likely changes and correlation in changes in future rates we find that future valuations rise by a factor of many thousands at horizons of 300 years or more almost doubling the expected present value of climate mitigation benefits relative to constant 4 discounting ironically uncertainty about future rates reduces the ratio of valuations based on alternate choices of the current rate

strategic technology switching under risk aversion and uncertainty abstract firms devising green investment strategies within a deregulated environment must take into account not only economic and technological uncertainty but also strategic interactions due to competition also further complicating green investment decisions is the fact that firms are likely to exhibit risk aversion since alternative energy technologies entail risk that cannot be diversified therefore we develop a utility based real options framework for pre emptive and non pre emptive competition in order to analyse how economic and technological uncertainty interact with risk aversion to impact the adoption of an existing technology in the light of uncertainty over the arrival of an improved version we confirm that greater risk aversion delays investment and show that technological uncertainty accelerates the follower s entry delays the entry of the pre emptive leader and intriguingly does not affect the non pre emptive leader s investment decision also we show how the relative loss in the leader s value due to the follower s entry is affected by economic and technological uncertainty as well as risk aversion and how the risk of pre emption under increasing economic uncertainty raises the value of direct investment in the new technology relative to stepwise investment