on measures of excess burden and their application abstract new measures of the additional excess burden of a tax reform are proposed and are shown to be useful in three key policy applications these new measures induce a unique measure of marginal excess burden meb among its interesting properties meb is uniformly zero for a proportional tax on inelastically supplied labor problems in applying the standard measures of total excess burden are demonstrated it is concluded that the induced measure of the marginal cost of funds mcf should be regarded as the most useful concept in applied tax analysis

the marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in africa abstract in this paper we propose estimates of the marginal cost of public funds mcf in 38 african countries we develop a simple general equilibrium model that can handle taxes on five major tax classes and can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data a key feature of our model is the explicit recognition of the informal economy our base case estimate of the average mcf from marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1 2 focusing on the lowest cost tax instruments in each country commonly the vat but not always the average mcf is 1 1 finally extending the tax base to include sections of the informal economy by removing some tax exemptions offers the potential for a low mcf source of public funds and a lowering of mcfs on other tax instruments

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

scientific basis for the greenhouse effect the international community may reach agreement to limit carbon emissions as early as i 992 when brazil will host a negotiating convention on climate change europe and japan have already made commitments to place ceilings on future emissions at or below present rates because the cost of switching to alternative fuels could be high with profound implications for long term economic growth especially in developing countries policy action must be based on the view that the science of the greenhouse effect is compelling this essay considers the scientific logic and evidence for the effect from the viewpoint of an economist it draws heavily on the findings of the intergovernmental panel on climate change ipcc i will stress that both the science and the policy discussion so far including by ipcc have focused insufficiently on effects in the very long term on the order of 250 to 300 years

a taste for taxes minimizing distortions using political preferences abstract we conduct an experiment with online workers to assess whether the distortionary effect of a tax is sensitive to the ideological match between taxpayer and tax expenditures we find that among self identified political moderates the labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is significantly smaller when individuals pay taxes to a favored government agency as compared to an unfavored one while the tax has a significant distortionary effect in the latter case with a point estimate for the labor supply elasticity of approximately 0 77 the elasticity point estimate is close to zero when taxes go to a favored agency there is also an increase in total output for the matched population among moderates there is no evidence that these effects hold for self identified liberals or conservatives

an interdisciplinary model for macroeconomics macroeconomic modelling has been under intense scrutiny since the great financial crisis when serious shortcomings were exposed in the methodology used to understand the economy as a whole criticism has been levelled at the assumptions employed in the dominant models particularly that economic agents are homogeneous and optimizing and that the economy is equilibrating this paper seeks to explore an interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic modelling with techniques drawn from other natural and social sciences specifically it discusses agent based modelling which is used across a wide range of disciplines as an example of such a technique agent based models are complementary to existing approaches and are suited to answering macroeconomic questions where complexity heterogeneity networks and heuristics play an important role

public goods and dynamic efficiency abstract it is well known that the use of distorting taxes to finance a public good in a static economy may indirectly raise the social cost of the public good because of the deadweight loss associated with the tax system however the tax system may also affect the dynamic efficiency of the economy we provide an example where the use of distorting taxes lowers the social cost of a public good in a steady state relative to the first best case due to the effect of the government s tax policy on the dynamic efficiency of the economy

vertically summing public good demand curves an empirical comparison of economic versus political jurisdictions fiscal equivalence for efficient provision of a public good requires perfect correspondence between political and economic jurisdictions however the spatial extent of the economic jurisdiction is an empirical question drawing on four survey based valuation studies we measure the relative public good benefit gradient as a function of residential location from six natural resource public goods the results indicate commonly used state political jurisdictions reflect an average of 13 of total benefits in the economic jurisdiction although with a logarithmic form for distance the upper confidence interval of state benefits can include 100 for some species

evaluation of four tax reforms in the united states labor supply and welfare effects for single mothers an emerging consensus is that labor force participation is more responsive to taxes and transfers than hours worked to understand the implications of participation responses for the welfare analysis of tax reform this paper embeds this margin of labor supply in an explicit welfare theoretic framework we apply the framework to examine the welfare effects on single mothers in the united states following four tax acts passed in 1986 1990 1993 and 2001 we propose a simulation method combining features of fully structural microsimulation studies and simple deadweight loss calculations our approach accounts for the observed heterogeneity in the microdata but is simple to implement because we do not need to specify utility functions and estimate utility parameters we find that each of the four tax acts created substantial welfare gains and that the gains were concentrated almost exclusively on the participation margin our results imply that standard approaches not modeling the participation decision can make large errors

the economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement this study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient the analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers the socially optimal income redistribution and the social welfare from intervention

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

efficient income redistribution for a small country using optimal combined instruments abstract in this paper i improve gardner s surplus transformation curve framework by assuming that governments are able to vary many policy instruments simultaneously instead of only one i use my framework to find the combination of the currently used instruments which provides the most efficient income redistribution for the austrian bread grains market comparing the most efficient policy with the actual policy reveals that 464 10 6 austrian shillings were wasted i theoretically compare for a small country the transfer efficiency of every possible pair of the four major agricultural policy instruments floor price production quota co responsibility levy and deficiency payments without considering the marginal cost of public funds mcf deficiency payments cum quota equal to a fully decoupled direct income support is the most efficient policy succeeded by floor price cum quota and floor price cum deficiency payments if the mcf is taken into account the ranking crucially depends on the market parameters the transfer level and the value of the mcf for the austrian bread grains market i empirically demonstrate that given the present support level a fully decoupled direct income support redistributes income most efficiently as long as the mcf is lower than 1 17 beyond this value a floor price cum quota policy becomes more efficient a floor price cum deficiency payments policy is never superior to the floor price cum quota

policy reform shadow prices and market prices how should public projects and policy reforms be assessed when market prices give misleading signals revenues and costs at market prices then give distorted measures of social gains and losses and our appraisal should use social opportunity costs or shadow prices we show how shadow prices may be integrated into an analysis of policy reform demonstrate the critical dependence of these prices on government policy and analyse their relations with market prices the model allows for a wide range of sources of impairment of price signals we also discuss key issues in the analysis of price reform and privatisation

the marginal cost of funds in the presence of environmental externalities the marginal cost of funds mcf is useful for measuring the cost of taxation in cost benefit and tax reform analysis in this paper we present general equilibrium estimates of the mcf in an economy with environmental externalities we find that excluding such effects can yield quite misleading results the inclusion of externalities opens up a significantly larger potential for tax reform and the ranking of taxes is strikingly changed the estimate of the average base case mcf is reduced we also indicate double dividends in the norwegian economy

greenhouse gas abatement under ambiguity observing that energy related climate change is an ambiguous prospect rather than a risky one this paper examines the consequences of different degrees of and attitudes towards ambiguity ambiguous choices differ from risky choices in that decision makers hold no firm probability distribution as to the consequences of their actions but recognize that preliminary probability estimates may be revised in the light of new information this ex ante recognition may lead to ambiguous choices and risky choices being evaluated differently the paper offers an explanation of why the evaluation of abatement programmes can differ among people who are likely to suffer similar climate impacts and might be thought to hold similar probability assessments

the additionality problem with offsets optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests abstract carbon offsets are a frequently discussed tool for reducing the costs of an emissions reduction policy however offsets have a basic problem stemming from asymmetric information sellers of offsets have private information about their opportunity costs leading to concerns about whether offsets are additional non additional offsets can undermine a cap and trade program or if the government purchases them directly result in enormous government expenditures we analyze contracts for carbon sequestration in forests that mitigate the asymmetric information problem landowners are offered a menu of two part contracts that induces them to reveal their type under this scheme the government is able to identify ex post how much additional forest each landowner contributes and minimize ex ante its expenditures on carbon sequestration to explore the performance of the contracting scheme we conduct a national scale simulation using an econometric model of land use change the results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 61 million acres government expenditures are 5 3 billion lower under the contracting approach compared to a uniform subsidy offered to all landowners this compares to an increase in private opportunity costs of just 110 million dollars under the contracts thus the contracting scheme is preferable from society s perspective

redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds abstract discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one consumer economy while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution this paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high wage to low wage workers in an optimal tax system the mcf will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one without optimality the mcf will in general differ between different sources of finance

the relationship between the marginal cost of public funds and marginal excess burden a large literature has recently developed which attempts to measure the marginal cost shadow price of public funds the motivation for much of this literature is the recognition that many of the tax instruments used by governments generate substantial amounts of excess burden deadweight loss jerry a hausman 1981 for example estimates that for an average prime aged american male with a wage of ten dollars in 1975 the excess burden generated by the federal income tax was over fifty percent of the revenue raised from taxing that individual one might suspect that such large excess burden estimates would require a change in the way government project costs are calculated in benefit cost analysis if the revenue required to finance a project is raised through distortionary taxation then intuition would suggest that the excess burden generated by the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project should be incorporated into the cost of the project however this analysis is not entirely consistent with the theoretical literature on the optimal provision of public goods which are financed by distortionary taxation when distortionary taxes are used to finance public goods and the level of public good provision does not affect consumption of the taxed goods the standard samuelsonian rule which equates the sum over consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between a private good and a public good with the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods must be modified to account for the marginal effect of increases in tax rates on the revenue raised from the existing taxes 2 the intuition behind this result is that we need to correct for indirect leakages from existing government revenue sources when considering an incremental expenditure if the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project causes a reduction in the revenue raised by the current tax structure then we need to account for this loss in calculating the cost of the project it is important to note that this result concerns the values of uncompensated demand elasticities an example first provided by atkinson and stern 1974 illustrates this point consider a world where the only tax is on labor earnings and incremental expenditure on the public good does not affect the demand for leisure in this case the marginal rate of transformation will overstate the cost of the public good as long as the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is negative this is because an increase in the tax rate causes an increase in labor supply leading to an indirect increase in government revenue from the excess burden perspective described earlier this example is very puzzling it is well known that even if the uncompensated own price elasticity of a good is zero a tax on that good can still result in a large deadweight loss we instead need the compensated elasticity to be zero to ensure that there will be no excess burden however the department of economics university of california davis ca 95616 this paper is based on chapter two of my dissertation at the university of wisconsin madison i wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee martin david robert haveman chair and arthur goldberger for very helpful advice and comments i have also benefited from comments by don fullerton and bruce hamilton an anonymous referee provided unusually helpful comments and corrected an error in the figure 1don fullerton 1989 provides a recent survey and analysis of this literature 2this is shown by anthony atkinson and nicholas h stern 1974 and david e wildasin 1979 the effect of provision of the public good on consumption of the taxed goods must also generally be taken into account

environmental policy tax incidence and the cost of public funds this paper studies under what conditions a double dividend may occur in the sense that both environmental quality and employment rise a simple static general equilibrium model is employed in which tax policy faces the dual task of internalising a negative environmental externality and raising revenue to finance public consumption the model features a clearing labour market with both labour demand and supply and a fixed factor of production e g capital hence we can study tax incidence and its effect on employment environmental quality and the marginal cost of public funds it is shown for the case of an upward sloping labour supply curve and less than full tax shifting by employers that a shift towards greener preferences cannot yield a double dividend even if the fixed factor is important however if labour supply curve bends backwards more environmental concern confers a double dividend

a marginal cost of funds approach to multi period public project evaluation implications for the social discount rate abstract although the use of marginal cost of funds mcf has been widely appreciated in public finance literature discussions of mcf have been confined to a static setting this paper develops a multi period project evaluation rule that is based on mcf unlike previous approaches the parameters required for implementing the mcf rule are independent of projects under consideration a lesson from this paper is that the government discount rate policies that are largely based on the concepts of social discount rate and shadow price of capital should be rewritten with the use of parameters representing mcf

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

research frontiers in the economics of climate change academic and policy debates over climate change risks and policies have stimulated economic research in a variety of fields in this article i briefly discuss eight overlapping areas of current research in which further effort is particularly warranted these areas include decision criteria for policy risk assessment and adaptation uncertainty and learning abatement cost and the innovation and diffusion of technology and the credibility of policies and international agreements further analysis in these areas not only will advance academic understanding but also will provide insights of considerable importance to policymakers

optimal public good provision with limited lump sum taxation it is often argued that the use of distortionary taxation lowers the optimal provision of public goods below its optimal level in a first best economy which contains no restrictions on lump sum taxation however this issue is usually investigated using commodity tax models that contain no lump sum taxes this paper examines a many consumer economy in which the only tax instruments are commodity taxes and a poll tax subsidies are negative taxes the optimal level of public good provision in this economy typically exceeds the first best level at least for distributionally neutral public goods copyright 1991 by american economic association

precautionary savers with ricardian propensities in his seminal 1974 paper barro noted that ricardian equivalence may fail if agents face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk and governments finance tax rebates with higher future tax rates 5 higher tax rates reduce the dispersion of future after tax income decrease the precautionary demand for savings and hence tend to stimulate present consumption barro concluded however that the stimulus to consumption would be minor and would likely be offset by induced reductions in future labor income the recent revival of interest in the precautionary savings motive has refocused attention on this tax insurance effect tie 2 8 24 27 in particular two highly influential papers one by barsky mankiw and zeldes 6 and the other by kimball and mankiw 19 argue that the tax insurance effect generates consumption responses roughly equivalent to those obtained from keynesian models where agents ignore future tax liabilities entirely although the existence of a precautionary demand for savings and by implication a taxinsurance effect has received strong empirical support 9 15 21 the magnitude of the effect remains largely unknown the two most difficult empirical issues involve quantifying the degree of uninsured idiosyncratic risk faced by typical agents and determining the appropriate form and shape of agents utility functions on these issues the profession is far from a consensus studies from the labor economics literature 1 17 suggest idiosyncratic risk may be large and persistent whereas a recent paper by heaton and lucas 16 finds idiosyncratic risk to be small and largely transitory similarly the vast literature surrounding the equity premium puzzle highlights the profession s lack of consensus over the degree of risk aversion exhibited by typical agents in this paper i circumvent some of these controversial issues by extending barsky mankiw and zeldes model to include an explicit labor supply decision the introduction of a labor supply decision allows me to bring evidence from the literature on optimal income taxation 22 25 and the literature on the welfare cost of taxation 3 4 7 to bear on these issues the idea is simple under the conditions that make the tax insurance effect large i e very risky income distributions and a high degree of risk aversion agents will place great value on tax induced

the second theorem of the second best abstract this paper interprets many results from the literature on incentive compatibility and cost benefit analysis as illustrations of a second theorem of the second best the theorem states that if there exists any restriction on transactions required for first best efficiency then there is no presumption that a social welfare maximum entails equal marginal social utilities of income across individuals one reason is that incentive constraints shift with redistributions of wealth so that redistributions have an instrumental role in relaxing constraints that make the economy second best two examples relate such wealth effects to countervailing incentives and hostage taking

the marginal cost of public funds hours of work versus labor force participation this paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds mcf to account for labor force participation responses our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive participation responses are more important than intensive hours of work responses in the modelling of extensive responses we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non convexities created by fixed work costs in a non convex framework tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first order effects on government revenue these revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for mcf tend to be substantial

discounting according to output type federal discount rate policies advocate both a high rate representing the marginal productivity of capital and a low rate representing the government borrowing rate these differential discount rate policies could be inconsistent and biased in favor of projects on which the lower discount rate is applied this paper shows that the coexistence of different discount rates may be appropriate depending on the type of project output when a project s outputs are perfect substitutes for private consumption both its costs and benefits should be discounted using the marginal productivity of capital however if the project s outputs are separable in the utility function the benefits should be discounted using the net of tax rate of return

optimal greenhouse gas emissions under various assessments of climate change ambiguity the probabilities associated with global warming damage are likely to be continuously revised in the light of new information such revisions of probability are the defining characteristic of ambiguity as opposed to risk this paper examines how climate change ambiguity may affect optimal greenhouse gas emission strategies via the decision maker s attitude towards anticipated changes of damage probabilities two conceptualizations of ambiguity are distinguished according to the emphasis placed on the ambiguity of priors or on the ambiguity of news respectively it is shown that the way in which ambiguity is viewed and the attitude taken towards it have a substantial influence on the optimal emission trajectory

tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium i introduction if the government changes the tax on wage income what happens to aggregate labor supply this question is at the core of debates between proponents of supply side and keynesian approaches to government fiscal policy it is unfortunate therefore that previous attempts to resolve the issue have obscured decisive assumptions regarding the preference relation between leisure and public spending one argument exposited recently by gwartney and stroup 1983 1986 and ehrenberg and smith 1988 179 80 descends from an older literature represented by the works of friedman 1949 1954 goode 1949 scitovsky 1951 and bailey 1954 and emphasizes the importance of a balanced budget framework for addressing the question this approach reveals the presence of an income effect caused by the change in government spending that must accompany the tax change at optimum according to this view this income effect exactly offsets the income effect of the tax change so that only the substitution effect of the tax remains as a consequence a balanced budget increase in the wage tax unambiguously decreases economy wide labor supply provided the increase in public spending is valued the same as the forgone private spending a different approach was initiated by winston 1965 and subsequently elaborated upon by lindbeck 1982 fullerton 1982 hanson and stuart 1983 bohanon and van cott 1986 and gahvari 1986 this approach stresses the importance of the preference relation between public spending and private spending rather than the role of the public spending income effect in determining the change in aggregate labor supply as a special example gahvari 1986 assumes a preference structure which implies that public spending does not have any influence on labor supply so there is only the partial equilibrium effect of the tax however the general conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the theoretical ambiguity of the labor supply response arises from both tax and spending effects in this paper a simple formal model is used to develop a careful accounting of the various income and substitution effects the model is sufficiently general to permit a rigorous comparison of earlier studies and to expose implicit assumptions responsible for their conclusions we show that the two approaches outlined above are associated respectively with the focal cases of compensated independence and ordinary independence between leisure and public spending the pan of the paper is as follows section ii contains a model of labor supply in the presence of wage taxation and public spending in section iii the effect on aggregate labor supply of a balanced budget change in wage taxation is analyzed section iv provides an interpretation of several previous analyses of these issues section v contains a summary of our results ii the model consider an economy with n identical consumers who derive utility from leisure l a pure private good x which serves as numeraire and a publicly provided good z the utility function u l x z is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi concave everyone is endowed with t units of time which are allocated either to labor market work or leisure nonmarket activities the marginal product of labor in producing the private good is the constant real gross of tax wage rate w because agents are identical we can confine attention to allocations of equal consumption as a consequence the production possibilities frontier assumed to be linear can be expressed in per capita terms as wl x p n z wt 1 where p is the constant marginal cost of z with identical agents and only two goods not publicly provided it may be assumed without loss of generality that public spending is financed by a wage tax with constant marginal and average ad valorem rate t

alternative measures of the marginal cost of funds liqun liu this article reconciles the use of two different marginal cost of funds mcf measures by resorting to alternative marginal benefit measures it demonstrates how the alternative mcf measures can be properly applied to two classic problems in expenditure analysis local cost benefit project evaluation and the second best public good level question relative strengths of the two mcf approaches in addressing the two problems are identified jel h21 h43 1 introduction it is widely appreciated that the welfare cost of taxation should play a role in the normative analysis of government expenditures efficiency in government spending involves balancing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of expenditures the marginal cost of spending in part depends on the welfare costs also known as excess burdens or deadweight losses we will use the term welfare costs that result from raising the revenue that finances the expenditures to determine the marginal cost of government spending we multiply the direct resource cost of the expenditure by a term generally referred to as the marginal cost of funds mcf the mcf is the cost of raising an additional dollar of revenue which includes the direct cost the dollar of revenue actually raised plus any additional welfare costs resulting from the change in the tax structure martin feldstein emphasized the importance of mcf in a recent paper appropriately titled how big should government be feldstein 1997 he correctly stresses that the answer to this question involves comparing the benefits of incremental government spending with the mcf and concludes that the economics profession should devote more attention to informing policy makers of the importance of mcf and providing estimates of its magnitude feldstein s own estimate of mcf is 2 65 feldstein 1999 implying that the distortionary cost of raising revenue is amazingly high raising an additional dollar of revenue carries with it an efficiency loss that is more than one and a half times 1 65 as large in sharp contrast there are a number of estimates in the literature on mcf that are strikingly lower so low as to suggest that mcf should play a minor role in the evaluation of government spending programs for example stuart 1984 reports an estimate of 1 07 and ballard and fullerton 1992 suggest that i n a variety of cases mcf is less than 1 10 these disparate estimates of the magnitude of mcf are worrisome because they have contradictory implications regarding the importance of the distortionary cost of taxation but a major reason for the differences in these estimates is simply definitional fullerton 1991 and ballard and fullerton 1992 feldstein is using a definition of mcf that depends primarily on the compensated effects of taxation whereas the other estimates use a definition of mcf that depends primarily on uncompensated effects the definition based on compensated effects always yields a larger estimate of mcf 1 this raises the obvious question which definition is the appropriate one to use in the evaluation of government expenditures that is the subject of the present paper in this paper we investigate the appropriate measure of mcf for a special case that has been widely discussed in the literature when the government expenditure is to finance the provision of a public good that enters consumers utility functions in a separable fashion from private goods and leisure that the appropriate definition of mcf depends on exactly how the expenditure affects consumer utility was emphasized by wildasin 1984 and ballard and fullerton 1992 recent papers that help clarify the role of the separability assumption include mayshar 1991 snow and warren 1996 and ahmed and croushore 1996 furthermore we restrict our attention to the case in which the public good is financed by a tax on wage income in this case much of the literature on mcf emphasizes that the definition of mcf should be based on the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply in contrast to feldstein s measure

non leaky buckets optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs abstract economists generally have argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate income we provide a counter example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints in the model a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor leisure choices but the redistributive grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in higher education we prove that simple redistributive policies can yield pareto improvements and increase aggregate income indeed redistributive policies are under most circumstances more effective in increasing efficiency than corrective taxes or subsidies where higher education is beyond the reach of the poor

the marginal excess burden of different capital tax instruments others have measured the addition to deadweight loss from an increase in an effective capital income tax rate but there is no single way to raise such a rate in the authors general equilibrium model with multiple distortions in the allocation of real resources they find that an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate has the highest marginal excess burden because it distorts intersectoral and interasset decisions as well as intertemporal decisions an investment tax credit reduction has negative marginal excess burden because it raises revenue while reducing interasset distortions more than it increases intertemporal distortions copyright 1989 by mit press

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

optimal provision of public goods a synthesis the standard approach to the optimal provision of public goods highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns a new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the income tax schedule we demonstrate that both approaches are derived from the same basic formula we also take the new approach further by deriving an intuitive formula for the optimal level of public goods without imposing strong assumptions on preferences this formula shows that distortionary taxation has a role to play as in the standard approach however the main determinants of optimal provision are different and the modified samuelson rule is likely to lead to underprovision

estimation of the greenhouse gas externality with uncertainty the shadow price of carbon dioxide is the value of the external damage caused by an emission a shadow price model for calculating the present value of the external damage of a carbon dioxide emission is derived explicitly sixteen experts provided subjective high low and most likely parameter estimates because correct values for the eight model parameters are uncertain the estimation procedure retains parameter uncertainty while generating the main result which is a distribution of shadow price estimates major assumptions made in the estimation identify the basis for the results of the eight model parameters the discount rate dominates the determination of the shadow price for comparison expert estimates of the shadow price itself provide a second distribution of shadow price estimates

public goods and the distribution of income abstract this article addresses conceptual issues concerning the distributive incidence of public goods solutions depend on the specific purposes for asking the question of distributive incidence notably assessing the extent to which various public goods should be provided determining how the provision of public goods affects the desirability of income redistribution and providing a meaningful description of the distribution of well being in the course of the analysis a simple and intuitive version of the benefit principle of taxation qualitatively different from those commonly advanced in pertinent literatures is presented and some of the problems confronting empirical attempts to measure the distributive incidence of public goods are resolved

infringement of intellectual property rights causes and consequences parallel revolutions in molecular biology and the legal framework that assigns intellectual property rights iprs to plant genetic resources have resultedin the emergence of agricultural biotechnology andthe introd uction of genetically modified gm products into the foodsystem iprs create economic incentives for research andd evelopment by making the innovator the residual claimant of the benefits associatedwith the new technology whereas iprs purport to protect intellectual property full appropriation of the benefits from the innovation is not a given when infringement of iprs i e piracy is profitable rational economic agents compliance with ipr provisions is by no means assured costly monitoring and enforcement are requiredto d eter unauthorized illegal use of the new technology experience from various countries aroundthe worldind icates that ipr enforcement is far from being perfect andmany successful innovations are

efficient redistribution using quotas and subsidies in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating this paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed as well cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies the result is that an all or nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies a combination of quotas and subsidies however usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention a key assumption in agricultural policy analysis is that farmers follow the provisions of the policy instruments in the manner desired by the policy maker or alternatively that it is costless to ensure that farmers do so in reality however farmers may be expected to act opportunistically when faced with an agricultural policy when a production quota is in effect farmers may cheat by overproducing and selling the above quota amount through alternative channels under an output subsidy scheme farmers may report and collect on a greater quantity of production than they actually produced the possibility of misrepresentation and cheating arises because it is costly to determine farmers actions because of this cost farmers are in a position to misrepresent their quantity of production and or to cheat very few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical agricultural policy analysis one exception is alston and smith who raise the question of cheating and black market activity in an examination of rationing in an industry with an effective minimum price policy in place studies that deal with farmer opportunism can also konstantinos giannakas is an assistant professor in the department of agricultural economics university of nebraska lincoln murray fulton is director centre for the study of co

government debt government spending and private sector behavior a current period tax reduction financed by issuing government debt shifts the timing of tax collection from the current period to the future if the future taxes implied by government debt are not fully perceived and discounted by the private sector there will be a net wealth effect that increases private sector consumption thus reducing capital accumulation and growth if on the other hand the implied future taxes are perceived and discounted by the private sector the current period tax reduction will be used to increase private saving to pay for the future taxes and government debt will be absorbed without any real effects on the economy the effects of government spending financed by current period taxation also depend upon private sector perceptions 2 if the benefits of government spending are ignored private sector consumption will decrease in accordance with the reduction in permanent disposable income to the extent that government spending is on consumption type goods that are perceived as substitutes for privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively greater reduction in private sector consumption to the extent that government spending is on investment type goods yielding future goods and services that are perceived as substitutes for future privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively smaller reduction in private sector consumption the standard approach to modeling private sector consumption saving behavior involves a rather asymmetric set of assumptions as to how the private sector perceives the various elements of government fiscal policy 3 current period taxes are assumed to be fully perceived but current period government spending is implicitly assumed to be completely ignored by the private sector in considering permanent personal disposable income the private sector is assumed to be forward looking in its assessment of income and taxation the stock of government debt is nevertheless included as part of the stock of private wealth the implicit assumption associate professor of economics graduate school of business university of chicago 1101 east 58th street chicago il 60637 i thank eugene fama levis kochin michael mussa paul evans and an anonymous referee for helpful comments i am particularly grateful to daniel benjamin for contributing many hours of discussion and laura lahaye who was a research assistant and valuable adviser on earlier drafts the theoretical debate on the burden of the debt has been long standing gerald o driscoll 1977 documents ricardo s nineteenth century position robert barro 1974 reopened the debate by introducing the fundamental issue of intergenerational transfers also discussed in merton miller and charles upton 1974 the empirical side of the debate was initiated by levis kochin s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of deficits on consumption and by martin feldstein s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of social security wealth on consumption other empirical contributions include jess yawitz and laurence meyer 1976 myself 1978 and j earnest tanner 1978 1979 with respect to the effects of government deficits and debt and barro 1978 michael darby 1979 and dean leimer and selig lesnoy 1982 with respect to social security wealth see also interesting recent papers by john seater 1982 who generates detailed tests of the effects of deficits and debt on consumption charles plosser 1982 who explores the effects of government spending and debt shocks on interest rates and feldstein 1982 who attempts tests similar to some in this paper see fn 29 2martin bailey s 1962 1971 development of the effects of government spending on private consumption and aggregate economic activity is the seminal contribution paul david and john scadding 1974 extend bailey s ideas and provide some supporting empirical evidence more recently willem buiter 1977 and myself 1978 developed models based on bailey s earlier work barro 1981 has an interesting paper on related issues see also david aschauer 1982 3the standard approach incorporates fiscal policy through the concept of personal disposable income and by including the stock of government debt as part of personal wealth see for example the empirical specification of albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 which has been the basis of most empirical consumption studies since and feldstein 1974 for one of the more influential papers based on the ando modigliani specification

efficiency and equity in two part tariffs the case of residential water rates as first noticed by coase 1946 a standard result in utility regulation is that efficiency requires two part tariffs with marginal prices set to marginal costs and fixed fees equal to each customer s share of fixed costs residential water customers in france face marginal prices for water that average about 8 more than marginal costs under price elasticity estimates that are consistent with previous results in the literature efficiency costs represent around 8 million euros of welfare losses for 2008 even though the impact is fairly small current price schedules are an important pre existing distortion which should be considered when evaluating current taxes aimed at addressing external costs moreover efficiency gains from reformed tariffs could be used to fund water assistance programs focused on financially stressed households

discounting the distant future how much do uncertain rates increase valuations abstract we demonstrate that when the future path of the discount rate is uncertain and highly correlated the distant future should be discounted at significantly lower rates than suggested by the current rate we then use two centuries of us interest rate data to quantify this effect using both random walk and mean reverting models we compute the certainty equivalent rate that summarizes the effect of uncertainty and measures the appropriate forward rate of discount in the future under the random walk model we find that the certainty equivalent rate falls continuously from 4 to 2 after 100 years 1 after 200 years and 0 5 after 300 years at horizons of 400 years the discounted value increases by a factor of over 40 000 relative to conventional discounting applied to climate change mitigation we find that incorporating discount rate uncertainty almost doubles the expected present value of mitigation benefits

local property taxation with external land ownership abstract when housing in a local jurisdiction is produced using perfectly mobile capital and land owned by non residents a property tax on housing results in tax exporting this paper examines how property tax poll subsidy policies are determined in the presence of tax exporting and shows that the optimal property tax is the optimal tariff when residents are homogeneous when residents have different incomes and are mobile across jurisdictions the majority voting equilibrium property tax poll subsidy policy depends on factors such as tax exporting intrajurisdictional redistribution and congestion if the effect of intrajurisdictional redistribution is negligible for the median voter household mobility may result in a property tax poll subsidy policy that induces emigration of rich households

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

buying greenhouse insurance the economic costs of carbon dioxide emission limits in recent years a growing concern that the increasing accumulation of greenhouse gases will lead to undesirable changes in global climate has resulted in a number of proposals both in the united states and internationally to set physical targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions but what will these proposals cost based on the authors earlier ground breaking work buying greenhouse insurance outlines a way to think about greenhouse effect decisions under uncertainty it describes an insightful model for determining the economic costs of limiting carbon dioxide emissions produced by burning fossil fuels and provides a solid analytical base for rethinking public policy on the farreaching issue of global warming manne and richels present region by region estimates of the costs that would underlie an international agreement using a computer model known as global 2100 they analyze the economic impacts of limiting c02 emissions under alternative supply and conservation scenarios the results clearly indicate that a reduction in emissions is not the sole policy response to potential climate change following a summary of the greenhouse effect its likely causes and possible consequences manne and richels take up issues that concern the public at large they provide an overview of global 2100 look at how the u s energy sector is likely to evolve under businessas usual conditions and under carbon constraints and describe the concept of greenhouse insurance they consider possible global agreements including an estimate of benefits that might result from trading in an international market in emission rights they conclude with a technical description directed toward modeling specialists alan manne is professor of operations research at stanford university richard richels is director of the energy analysis and planning department at the electric power research institute

the equity and efficiency of two part tariffs in u s natural gas markets abstractresidential natural gas customers in the united states face volumetric charges that average about 30 percent more than the marginal cost of gas this inefficient departure from marginal cost pricing allows gas utilities to cover their fixed infrastructure and operating costs proposals for recovering these costs instead through fixed monthly fees are often opposed because of a widespread belief that current rate schedules have desirable distributional consequences using nationally representative household level data we show that the correlation between household income and natural gas consumption is indeed positive but surprisingly weak so current rate schedules are only mildly progressive in part we argue that this is because poor households tend to have larger families and less energy efficient homes we calculate bill impacts under a variety of scenarios and show that even a modest energy assistance program would more than offset the distributional impact of tariff rebalancing for most low

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

a generalized approach to multigeneration project evaluation 1 introductionit is well known that the choice of discount rate plays a significant role in the ranking of projects with varying time paths of costs and benefits for public projects the choice of the appropriate social discount rate sdr is not clear cut even in the context of short lived projects in which costs and benefits occur within a single generation in particular when capital taxes produce a wedge between gross and net rates of return should one discount at the economy s rate of return the before tax rate or the individual s rate of return the after tax rate in the single generation context the literature falls in two camps 1 one camp argues that the appropriate sdr is a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return with weights typically determined by the fractions of resources drawn from consumption and private investment respectively 2 a second camp argues that future benefits should be discounted at the net rate of return but that the initial investment should be multiplied by a scale factor so that the direct costs of the project can be expressed in terms of consumption units 3both approaches suffer from severe implementation problems for the first approach there is no general formula for the weights needed to calculate the sdr as a weighted average of two market rates of return dreze 1974 indeed the appropriate sdr to use is project specific stiglitz 1982 without a systematic methodology to derive project specific sdrs the weighted average approach is hard to implement for the second approach which equalizes the sdr to the net rate of return the scale factor the opportunity cost of public investment must be quantified the opportunity cost of public investment depends on whether resources come from private investment or consumption and on the calculation of the present value of the future consumption yielded by a unit of capital discounted at the net rate of return that is the shadow price of capital as lind 1997 points out however there is no general agreement on a specific procedure for calculating the shadow price of capital indeed the concept of the opportunity cost of public investment suffers the same project dependence problem as the first view of the sdr diamond 1968 multigeneration projects such as nuclear waste disposal natural resource conservation or even social security reform further complicate discount rate choice specifically intergenerational equity in addition to intertemporal efficiency plays a role in determining the appropriate social discount rate for multigeneration public project evaluation 4 as in the single generation context there are two competing views on the appropriate discount rate when evaluating multigeneration projects the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches 5the descriptive approach to discounting is a market based approach it does not rely on an explicit social welfare function swf or the pure time preference rate embedded in the swf however the descriptive approach works under the assumption that intergenerational compensation through changes in the tax debt policy is available 6 it is argued that under appropriate intergenerational compensation the market rates of return are still relevant for calculating the sdr for multigeneration project evaluation and in general the sdr should be a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return this descriptive view of setting the sdr equal to the market return appears to underlie the office of management and budget s omb adoption of 7 as the appropriate discount rate for federal programs 7the intent of the prescriptive approach is to use the social discount rate as an expression of ethical judgment on how consumption of future generations should be compared to consumption of current generations

a bayesian approach to decision making under ambiguity a bayesian characterization of ambiguity is proposed in which outcomes constitute information that modifies the retrospective evaluation of a course of action hindsight bias occurs when the ex ante valuation of a course of action is affected by contemplation of hindsight evaluation the model provides an explanation of various valuations of the expected utility model notably the ellsberg paradox and related effects the common ratio and common consequence effects in contrast to recent theories concerning decision making under ambiguity probabilities are not required to be biased or to be sub or superadditive some experimental tests of ambiguity coherence are also reported copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

policy dependency and reform economic gains versus political pains economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient and ineffective and therefore worthy of radical reform practical experience however indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement economic analysis tends to ignore the path dependencies generated by the policy evolution process without reform strategies that take full account of these dependencies policy reform will continue to be reluctant slow and frequently counterproductive this paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits in so doing it re phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition which may prove more accessible and credible to policymakers and advisors the difficulties of reconciling economic efficiency with political acceptability are identified the paper concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

on the ir relevance of distribution and labor supply distortion to government policy should the assessment of government policies such as the provision of public goods and the control of externalities deviate from first best principles to account for distributive effects and the distortionary cost of labor income taxation for example is the optimal extent of public goods provision smaller than indicated by the samuelson rule because finance is distortionary or should environmental regulations fail to internalize externalities fully if the incidence of the regulations is regressive it is suggested that these questions are best addressed by considering distribution neutral implementation in which budget balance is achieved by choosing an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the distributive impact of the policy in question in basic cases both distribution and labor supply distortion are moot because the target policy and the tax adjustment produce offsetting effects on each thus traditional first best principles provide good benchmarks for policy analysis after all moreover even when actual implementation will not be distribution neutral in aggregate distribution neutral policy analysis has many conceptual and practical virtues that render it quite useful to investigators

on the distributional effects of income in an aggregate consumption relation in this paper we analyse the influence of characteristics of the income distribution in modelling aggregate consumption expenditure we model the aggregate consumption relation of a heterogeneous population using a statistical distributional approach of aggregation and apply it to uk family expenditure survey data a bootstrap test based on a non parametric estimation methodology which accounts for the presence of continuous and discrete variables suggests that the mean and the dispersion of the income distribution significantly influence aggregate consumption expenditure also the parameters of the aggregate relation are time varying these findings have implications for constructing empirically sound models of aggregate consumption expenditure dans ce memoire on analyse l influence des caracteristiques de la repartition des revenus dans la modelisation des depenses agregees de consommation on examine la relation de consommation agregee d une population heterogene a l aide d une approche a l agregation fondee sur une distribution statistique et on applique le modele aux donnees d une enquete sur les depenses des menages au royaume uni un test de type bootstrap construit sur une methodologie d estimation non parametrique et qui tient compte de la presence de variables continues et discretes suggere que la moyenne et la dispersion de la distribution des revenus influencent de maniere significative les depenses de consommation agregees les parametres de cette relation agregee sont sensibles au temps ces resultats ont des implications pour la construction de modeles empiriques fiables de la relation agregee des depenses de consommation

financing agricultural research international investment patterns and policy perspectives abstract for much of the post wwii period governments in rich and poor countries alike have increased public spending on and performance of agricultural research the public involvement in and policies toward agricultural research and development r d have undergone a sea of change in more recent years in this article we document these changes focusing on the public and rapidly evolving private roles in financing agricultural r d and the international dimensions of these funding and policy issues we restate the principles for government intervention in research and highlight the financing aspects of these interventions before concluding the paper with some reflections on the implications of all these changes for internationally conceived and funded public agricultural r d

reconciling alternative views about the appropriate social discount rate abstract this paper shows that in an economy with an exogenous rate of return and a given capital income tax distortion and with lump sum taxes as the marginal tax instrument the soc and mcf criteria both correctly identify all worthwhile projects if the criteria are properly applied the equivalence between the soc and mcf criteria continues to hold i if distortionary taxes are used to balance the budget and ii if the rate of return to capital is endogenous apparent differences between the soc and mcf criteria arise from different definitions of a project s indirect revenue effect neither criterion has an implementation advantage because the information requirements for each are identical

on the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods abstract this paper argues that in models with heterogeneous agents the concept of the marginal cost of public funds mcpf will only be useful if it is compared with an analogous concept for the benefit side the mcpf does not assume a unique value and is not particularly illuminating in and out of itself also gone is the benchmark status of mcpf 1 turning to the provision of public goods using a mechanism design approach the paper constructs a two stage proof for kaplow s kaplow l 1996 the optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation national tax journal 49 513 533 proposition concerning the irrelevance of labor supply and distributional concerns in public good provision this highlights the two fundamental ingredients for his result first the provision of public goods per se when it satisfies the samuelson s rule is only potentially pareto improving second the actual pareto improvement will materialize when or if one reforms the income tax structure if the reform is not forthcoming the decision on public goods provision must rely on redistributional concerns finally the paper generalizes broadway and keen s boadway r keen m 1993 public goods self selection and optimal income taxation international economic review 34 463 478 result to a model with many types of agents many private goods and without making any assumptions regarding which self selection constraints are or are not binding

marginal welfare cost calculations differential analysis vs balanced budget analysis abstract in a differential analysis tax revenue collections are held constant in a balanced budget analysis the spending level is changed and the level of distortionary taxation is changed correspondingly here income effects are important and efficiency calculations depend chiefly on uncompensated elasticities unless government exhaustive expenditure is assumed to substitute closely for cash a small scale computational general equilibrium model is constructed and differential and balanced budget experiments are performed results show that marginal welfare costs calculated from balanced budget experiments can be negative when labor supply functions are backward bending interactions among parameter values and efficiency costs are explored

tax rates government expenditures and labor supply clarifying the record a central claim of supply side economics is that in general equilibrium the income effect of a change in the income tax rate washes out and only the substitution effect remains in the words of ehrenberg and smith 1985 there would be a substitution effect with no overall income effect and labor supply would increase the aggregate supply of labor curve then must be upward sloping p 160 emphasis in the original although there has been a substantial literature on this subject the literature is sometimes confused in this paper a simple model is used to sort through the literature correct mistaken assertions derive a new result and collect earlier results in a compact way

the dynamic efficiency cost of not taxing housing traditional welfare cost estimates of tax subsidies for owner occupied housing are less than 0 5 of gnp in the united states and canada this paper argues that these static measures understate the true cost of the tax subsidy increasing the capital income tax makes untaxed housing more valuable delivering a windfall bonus to existing homeowners at the expense of future generations this intergenerational transfer has real efficiency effects in the presence of pre existing tax distortions when housing is in fixed supply the dynamic efficiency cost of preferential tax treatment for housing is as much as 2 2 of gnp or 120 billion dollars in 1990

the marginal efficiency effects of taxes and subsidies in the presence of externalities a computational general equilibrium approach abstract using 1983 data we develop a 19 sector computational general equilibrium model incorporating producer producer externalities and producer consumer externalities simulation results indicate that when additional government expenditure is financed by pigouvian taxes the marginal cost of public funds is substantially below one labor sales and output taxes also affect the output of the polluting industries and thus have indirect pigouvian effects which tend to reduce the associated marginal costs of public funds pigouvian taxes are usually more efficient than pigouvian subsidies since the tax revenue can be used to reduce other taxes

a structural equations analysis of the impact of price promotions on store performance guided by past research conventional wisdom in the retailing area and microeconomic theory the authors develop a series of hypotheses about the effects of loss leaders in store price specials