research development and firm growth empirical evidence from european top r d spending firms abstract following recent literature we present a model of endogenous firm growth with r d investment as one of the main mechanisms of growth our study evidences a positive effect of r d intensity on the sales growth by using ols quantile regressions and gmm system estimators for a sample of 754 european firms for the 2003 2007 period we also find this association is more intense in high growth firms and is especially significant when referring to high technology sectors this paper gives empirical support to those recommendations from policy makers and business leaders for maintaining the r d expenditures especially in high technology sectors even when facing a recession

current publication lags in economics journals phe economics profession depends to a large degree upon its scholarly journals to disseminate the results and applications of its recently completed research the journal of economic literature is in fact evidence of that dependence much of the contents of each issue is devoted to an indexing of the current articles to facilitate both access to primary sources and quick cross referencing with related material but how recent are the results reported in the current literature how long does it usually take for a piece of research to evolve from a submitted manuscript to a published article to my knowledge only one study has confronted this question directly and it was published nearly 15 years ago in that study robert coe and irwin weinstock 1967 p 40 reported an average lag between submission and publication of 250 days 8 2 months for articles published in 1966 what has happened since there are no formal surveys to support the suspicion but there is evidence to suggest that the lags have actually increased some journals have begun to charge submission fees ostensibly to reduce the number of manuscripts they must review a plethora of specialized journals have emerged to provide new outlets for specialized papers and to relieve some of the burden from the traditional journals of more general scope one new journal economics letters has been founded completely in response to the lag problem it publishes short papers as quickly as possible in an effort to distribute at least the thrust of current research without a prolonged waiting period all of these responses to long lags lead to one question how severe are the current lags between submission and publication this brief note will report on the results of a survey that can begin to assess the current magnitude of the lag problem the major components of that problem and the success of the various efforts to alleviate it information about the lags involved in the 40 most recently published articles in each journal was solicited from the editors of 66 journals whose contents are routinely recorded in the jel twenty editors responded directly to the request and their reports formed the foundation of this study seven other journals were also in

size r d productivity and decision styles we extend the size innovation debate by incorporating decision making style as a relevant factor in the innovation process we propose that the size of firms affects the scale and quality of product innovation through the adoption of different decision making styles using the literature on cognition we conceptualize decision making style as the degree to which firms rely on analytical information for decision making during the r d process using longitudinal data of spanish firms we show that as firms increase in size they rely more extensively on analytical decision tools for the innovation activity additionally we show that the size of firms is negatively related to product innovation productivity in terms of scale and positively related to the quality and that these relationships are mediated by firms reliance on analytical decision making style we discuss theoretical and managerial implications for innovation research and practice

credit risk in european banks the bright side of the internal ratings based approach abstract this paper investigates the accuracy of internal rating based irb models in measuring credit risk we contribute to the growing debate on the current prudential regulatory framework by investigating the use of validated irb models in promoting efficient risk management practices our empirical analysis is based on a novel panel data set of 177 western european banks observed from 2008 to 2015 in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis we find that irb banks were able to curb the increase in credit risk driven by the macroeconomic slowdown better than banks under the standardized approach this suggests that the introduction of the internal ratings based approach by basel ii has promoted the adoption of stronger risk management practices among banks as meant by the regulators

does securitization of corporate loans lead to riskier lending this paper finds that loans sold to collateralized loan obligations clos underperform matched unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank we find that banks put less weight on the hard information on borrower risk available to them when they set interest rates on the loans they sell to clos and that they retain less skin in the game on these loans suggesting that lax underwriting standards contributed to the worse performance of securitized loans we also find that the median non clo syndicate participant retains a lower stake in securitized loans when compared to loans that are not securitized suggesting that these investors like lead banks expected securitized loans to perform worse

ceo characteristics and firm r d spending over the past fifteen years a number of studies have examined the determinants of firm r d spending these studies however almost invariably focus on the role of firm or external ownership characteristics in predicting r d spending while overlooking the attributes of the top managers involved in allocating corporate resources in this study we change that focus by empirically examining how r d spending as compared to industry competitors varies at firms based on the characteristics of their ceos using a sample of publicly traded firms we find that ceo characteristics explain a significant proportion of the sample variance in firm r d spending even when corporate strategy ownership structure and other firm level attributes are controlled in terms of individual ceo characteristics we find that r d spending is greater at firms where ceos are younger have greater wealth invested in firm stock and signifacant career experience in marketing and or engineering r d in contrast to existing theory we find that the amount of a ceo s formal education had no significant association with r d spending once a ceo has attained a college degree however significant r d spending increases are found at firms where ceos have advanced science related degrees from subgroup analyses we further find that ceo effects on relative r d spending increase with longer ceo tenure implying that ceos over time may mold r d spending to suit their own preferences from these results we make implications for both research on determinants of r d spending and managerial practice

a behavioral theory of r d expenditures and innovations evidence from shipbuilding i base an integrated model of innovation development and launch on the behavioral theory of the firm this model specifies that research and development expenses are increased when low performance causes problemistic search and when excess resources cause slack search innovations generated by search are launched if low performance gives managers high risk tolerance using data from shipbuilding firms i show that high performance reduces r d intensity and innovation launches and high slack increases r d intensity as predicted

evolving standards for academic publishing a q r theory this paper develops models of quality standards to examine two trends academic journals increasingly require extensive revisions of submissions and articles are becoming longer and changing in other ways papers are modeled as varying along two quality dimensions q reflects the importance of the main ideas and r other aspects of quality observed trends are regarded as increases in r quality a static equilibrium model illustrates comparative statics explanations a dynamic model in which referees with a biased view of their own work learn social norms for weighting q and r is shown to produce a long gradual evolution of social norms

does macro prudential regulation leak evidence from a uk policy experiment the regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro prudential regimes internationally for such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that i changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks and ii unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks this paper examines micro evidence lacking to date on both questions using a unique data set in the uk regulators have imposed time varying bank specific minimum capital requirements since basel i it is found that regulated banks uk owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements but unregulated banks resident foreign branches increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks this leakage is substantial amounting to about one third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change

contextual influences on the corporate entrepreneurship performance relationship a longitudinal analysis abstract over the past several years corporate entrepreneurship has been widely touted by executives and researchers alike as an effective means for revitalizing companies and improving their financial performance for the most part the call for greater entrepreneurial behavior on the part of established companies has been accepted on faith as an inherently desirable objective the implicit logic behind the pervasive belief in the value of corporate entrepreneurship seems to be that risk taking innovation and aggressive competitive action the key elements of entrepreneurial corporations will help in identifying and pursuing lucrative product market opportunities and in providing new bases for achieving superior competitive positions but what do we really know about the financial consequences of corporate entrepreneurship most of the evidence that corporate entrepreneurship pays off is anecdotal in nature or based on cross sectional studies that focus on the short term implications of entrepreneurial behaviors as such in a definitive sense we know very little about the financial consequences of corporate entrepreneurship in an attempt to improve our understanding of this issue this article describes a study of corporate entrepreneurship and its impact on company financial performance data were collected from three different samples over a seven year period to assess the longitudinal impact of corporate entrepreneurship on firm performance these samples consist of 24 medium sized manufacturing firms representing 14 industry segments 39 chemical companies and 45 fortune 500 industrial firms representing five industry segments data were gathered on each sample using both primary and secondary sources regression analysis was then used to analyze the data the results suggest that corporate entrepreneurship has a positive impact on financial measures of company performance this effect on performance which tends to be modest over the first few years increases over time suggesting that corporate entrepreneurship may indeed be a generally effective means for improving long term company financial performance moreover the results indicate that corporate entrepreneurship is a particularly effective practice among companies operating in hostile environments as opposed to benign environments the study has three principal implications for practicing managers first the study documents the general financial viability of engaging in corporate entrepreneurship this is not to suggest that corporate entrepreneurship is a panacea for improving financial performance however entrepreneurial behavior when considered on the whole i e across firms and industries is associated with superior financial performance second the study suggests a need to use a long term time horizon in order to adequately judge the financial consequences of corporate entrepreneurship the use of a shorter evaluation period may not allow sufficient time for entrepreneurial actions to have their full market and corresponding financial impact finally the study identifies the context specific character of effective entrepreneurial practice specifically corporate entrepreneurship appears to be a particularly effective strategic practice among firms operating in hostile business settings

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

agency models in different stages of ceo tenure the effects of stock options and board independence on r d investment this study examines how r d investment is shaped by governance devices combining the two agency models of limited competence and managerial opportunism it suggests that governance devices exert differing effects in early vs later stages of ceo tenure early in ceo tenure r d investment is reduced by stock options and board independence whereas in later stages these effects reverse r d investment is enhanced by stock options and board independence an empirical test on a sample of u s companies provides support for the hypothesized effects for policy makers this study implies that r d investment can be enhanced by setting rules and standards of good governance that take into account ceo time in office and firm context

diversification strategy and r d intensity in multiproduct firms this study provides empirical evidence that choice of diversification strategy systematically affects r d intensity in large multiproduct firms research and development intensity in dominant busin

a guide to choosing absolute bank capital requirements resampling implementation of a stress scenario approach to estimating portfolio default loss distributions is proposed as the basis for estimates of the appropriate absolute level of economic capital allocations for portfolio credit risk estimates are presented for stress scenarios of varying severity and implications of different time horizons are analyzed results for a numeraire portfolio are quite sensitive to such variations although the analysis is framed in terms of recent proposals to revise regulatory capital requirements for banks the arguments and results are also relevant for bankers making capital structure decisions

r d and the growth of firms empirical analysis of a panel of italian firms abstract this paper deals with the growth of firms and with their innovative activities the main hypothesis of the paper maintains that firms with a strong commitment to r d have a higher rate of growth because they succeed in the product market after a review of the related literature the paper presents an econometric analysis of the r d growth of firms relation based on a database of italian firms data on a sample of 500 firms with time series in the range 1989 1997 were drawn from the mediocredito survey of italian manufacturing descriptive analysis shows that the sales growth rate of firms with r d is higher than that of firms without r d econometric analysis is performed in two steps first we apply a panel unit root test im k pesaran h shin y 1997 testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels dae university of cambridge mimeo to verify whether the firm size significantly affects firm growth the test confirms gibrat s law that firm size has a stochastic trend second we explore whether there are variables with stochastic trends that could account for firm size according to our estimates the growth rate of firms is positively correlated with research intensity in these estimates a further interesting result is that investment in ict is not significant or shows a parameter with negative sign

ceo duality as a double edged sword how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command when a firm s chief executive officer is also the chairperson of its board directors have opposing objectives according to organization theory such ceo duality establishes strong unambiguous le

the slowdown in first response times of economics journals can it be beneficial the first response time henceforth frt of economics journals has increased over the last four decades from 1 2 months to 3 6 months the optimal frt however is not zero because the frt deters submission of mediocre papers to good journals and consequently saves valuable time of referees and editors the change in the actual frt is in the same direction as the change in the optimal frt which has increased because of the availability of research on the internet prior to publication and because the costs of refereeing a paper have increased

who should act as lender of last resort an incomplete contracts model a comment researchers have pointed out that conflicts between the objectives of different bank regulators necessitate careful design of the institutional allocation of regulatory authority in doing this however they often assume that regulators have incentives to share their private information regarding regulated banks our paper shows that the very same considerations that lead bank regulators to make different policy choices render the informationsharing assumption invalid we further show that this result has important implications for the institutional allocation of lending of last resort deposit insurance and bank supervision

testing macroprudential stress tests the risk of regulatory risk weights we compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests to that o fa benchmark methodology the v lab stress test that employs only publicly available market data we find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk weighted assets the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the v lab stress test whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets we show that the risk measures used in risk weighted assets are cross sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk as they do not account for the risk that risk will change furthermore the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk weighted assets were no better than the rest when the european economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011

are all economic facts greatly exaggerated theory competition and selectivity there is growing concern and mounting evidence of selectivity in empirical economics most empirical economic literatures have a truncated distribution of results the aim of this paper is to explore the link between publication selectivity and theory contests this link is confirmed through the analysis of 87 distinct empirical economics literatures involving more than three and a half thousand separate empirical studies using objective measures of both selectivity and contests our meta meta analysis shows that publication selection is widespread but not universal it distorts scientific inference with potentially adverse effects on policy making but competition and debate between rival theories reduces this selectivity and thereby improves economic inference

horizon problem and firm innovation the influence of ceo career horizon exploitation and exploration on breakthrough innovations abstract building on labor market evaluations and legacy conservation motivation perspectives we propose a mechanism to explain the relationship between ceo career horizons and breakthrough innovations using 10 year panel data from 681 u s firms we find that firms that have a ceo with a short career horizon tend to produce fewer breakthrough innovations we also find that the relationship between ceo career horizon and breakthrough innovation is partially mediated by r d spending and also moderated by organizational learning behavior exploration vs exploitation this study highlights how a ceo s motivation to protect success in the short term affects the firm s innovativeness

research and development cash flow agency and governance uk large companies this paper investigates the determinants of r d expenditure using a sample of uk listed companies with the highest spend from 2000 to 2005 we investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership on r d using panel data the results provide some evidence that more governance tends to depress r d activity a finding that is robust to whether a composite or disaggregated index of governance is used one innovation of the paper is that we treat agency and finance effects interactively the ownership stake of the ceo appears to be supportive for r d

differences in citation patterns across journal tiers the case of economics we study how citation patterns differ between journal tiers in economics concretely we analyze citations patterns of more than 6 000 economics research articles published in top five second tier and top field economics journals between 1992 and 1996 in line with previous literature we find that top five journals articles generally receive more citations and that the life cycles of those citations are longer however their influence in term of citations is overestimated in its first twenty five years since publication the median top five article accumulates 4 25 around 3 as many citations when compared to the second tier and top field median article we show that this ratio is strongly associated with the field of economics research e g this ratio is the lowest for econometric methods papers and with articles impact e g in all fields of economics research except for theory this ratio decreases sharply as one moves toward high impact articles in term of citations

r d investment and financing choices a comprehensive perspective abstract we posit that the effects of r d investment on financing choices depend on the degree of intervention barriers and appropriation discrepancy between capital providers and the firm based on these two contingencies we categorize financing instruments into four types common equity common stock convertible securities preferred stock and convertible debt transactional debt corporate bonds and relational debt bank and commercial loans from the experiences of 39 petroleum firms during the period 1976 2005 we found r d investment has a positive effect on the use of common equity a u shaped effect on the use of convertible securities and an inverted u shaped effect on the use of relational debt to raise capital these effects are sustained over several years

how to write an effective referee report and improve the scientific review process author s berk jonathan b harvey campbell r hirshleifer david abstract the review process for academic journals in economics has grown vastly more extensive over time journals demand more revisions and papers have become bloated with numerous robustness checks and extensions even if the extra resulting revisions do on average lead to improved papers a claim that is debatable the cost is enormous we argue that much of the time involved in these revisions is a waste of research effort another cause for concern is the level of disagreement amongst referees a pattern that suggests a high level of arbitrariness in the review process to identify and highlight what is going right and what is going wrong in the reviewing process we wrote to a sample of former editors of the american economic review the journal of political economy the quarterly journal of economics econometrica the review of economic studies and the journal of financial economics and asked them for their thoughts about what might improve the process we found a rough consensus that referees for top journals in economics tend to make similar correctable mistakes the italicized quotations throughout this paper are drawn from our correspondence with these editors and our own experience their insights are consistent with our own experiences as editors at the journal of finance and the review of financial studies our objective is to highlight these mistakes and provide a roadmap for how to avoid them

the slowdown of the economics publishing process over the last three decades there has been a dramatic slowdown of the publication process at top economics journals a substantial part is due to journals requiring more extensive revisions various explanations are considered democratization of the review process increases in the complexity of papers growth of the profession and cost and benefit arguments changes in the profession are examined using time series data connections between these changes and the slowdown are examined using paper level data there is evidence for some explanations but most of the slowdown remains unexplained changes may reflect evolving social norms

the quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized organizations a central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of its successors and subordinates corporate presidents spend a significant part of their time selecting upper management tenured faculty sometimes spends months deciding whether particular individuals should be admitted into their ranks the effort and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that it has important consequences for the organization it is recognized that there are large differences in individuals abilities and that the abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance and survival of the organization our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentralization of decision making authority affects the quality of the managers who are actually selected this question is naturally dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers but it in turn affects the quality of future managers we consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary number of hierarchies organizations of different sizes the size of a hierarchy is the number of managers within the hierarchy one of whom is the hierarch the boss and others are subordinates the current hierarch appoints his own successor and those of his subordinates but has no influence on any other hierarchy this assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of authority between the hierarch and the subordinates our definition of a more or less centralized economy is intuitive an economy is more centralized if it has a larger proportion of the total number of managers in larger hierarchies our main result is that there is a greater variability over time in the steady state quality of managers in a more centralized economy this is because highly capable decision makers have greater beneficial effects on the managerial choices in a more centralized economy by the same token highly incapable managers placed in the same positions have greater deleterious effects

moving closer to the action examining compensation design effects on firm risk we examine the influence of ceo equity based compensation on strategic risk taking by the firm building off the behavioral agency model agency theory and prospect theory we develop arguments about when equity based compensation elements will increase or decrease executive risk propensity and in turn strategic risk taking incorporating a behavioral perspective into our models of incentive alignment provides us with new and potentially more accurate predictions about how individual elements of ceo pay will influence risk selection as well as how equity compensation interacts with cash compensation and with other factors to influence risk preferences in general this study provides evidence that ceo equity based compensation significantly influences strategic risk but that this influence is more nuanced and complex than conventional treatments of executive compensation assume in particular we find that different forms of equity based pay exhibit dissimilar influences on strategic risk and that their influence changes as their value and vesting status change second we find that cash based forms of pay moderate the incentive properties of equity based pay indicating that cash based pay may affect how executives perceive risks associated with equity pay finally we find that stock price volatility and board actions each also moderate the incentive effects of equity based pay in sum our results argue for increased recognition of a behavioral perspective on executive compensation and greater precision in how we measure and model the incentive alignment properties of ceo compensation

internal ratings systems implied credit risk and the consistency of banks risk classification policies abstract this paper aims at improving our understanding of internal risk rating systems irs at large banks of the way in which they are implemented and at verifying if irs produce consistent estimates of banks loan portfolio credit risk an important property of our work is that the size of our data set allows us to derive measures of credit risk without making any assumptions about correlations between loans by applying carey s carey mark 1998 credit risk in private debt portfolios journal of finance liii 4 1363 1387 non parametric monte carlo re sampling method we find substantial differences between the implied loss distributions of two banks with equal regulatory risk profiles both expected losses and the credit loss rates at a wide range of loss distribution percentiles vary considerably such variation will translate into different levels of required economic capital our results also confirm the quantitative importance of size for portfolio credit risk for common parameter values we find that tail risk can be reduced by up to 40 by doubling portfolio size our analysis makes clear that not only the formal design of a rating system but also the way in which it is implemented e g a rating grade composition the degree of homogeneity within rating classes can be quantitatively important for the shape of credit loss distributions and thus for banks required capital structure the evidence of differences between lenders also hints at the presence of differentiated market equilibria that are more complex than might otherwise be supposed different lending or risk management styles may emerge and banks strike their own balance between risk taking and the cost of monitoring that risk

swinging for the fences the effects of ceo stock options on company risk taking and performance we unpack the concept of managerial risk taking distinguishing among three of its major elements the size of an outlay the variance of potential outcomes and the likelihood of extreme loss we

long run versus short run decisions r d and market structure in spanish firms abstract i present new econometric evidence on the relation between market structure and r d using data on spanish firms i adopt a different approach from previous studies by distinguishing between long run and short run decisions of firms regarding r d i assume that the long run or strategic decision is whether to conduct r d or not and the short run choice is how much to invest once the firm decides to be innovative i argue that market structure affects long run r d decisions but does not affect short run ones a heckman type selection model is used to test such a relation the results are robust to several specifications and measures of monopoly power

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

ceo duality and firm performance what s the fuss rising shareholder activism following poor corporate performance and a subsequent drop in shareholder value at many major u s corporations had rekindled interest in duality and corporate governance despite limited empirical evidence duality chairman of the board and ceo are the same individual has been blamed in many cases for the poor performance and failure of firms to adapt to a changing environment in examining the relationship between duality and firm performance this study considers the announcement effects of changes in duality status accounting measures of operating performance for firms that have changed their duality structure and long term measures of performance for firms that have had a consistent history of a duality structure our results suggest that 1 the market is indifferent to changes in a firm s duality status 2 there is little evidence of operating performance changes around changes in duality status and 3 there is only weak evidence that duality status affects long term performance after controlling for other factors that might impact that performance

apprentice departure and demotion an examination of the three types of ceo board chair separation past research has consistently shown that separation of ceo and board chair roles has no systematic effect on firm performance in this study we introduce the different forms of such separation apprentice departure and demotion in a study of standard poor s s p 1500 and fortune 1000 firms we find that separation of the two leadership roles positively impacts future firm performance when current performance is poor but negatively impacts future firm performance when current performance is high we find that this effect is most dramatic for demotion separations finally we test theory about the permanency of ceo board chair separation our results show that the different types of ceo board chair separation have very distinct consequences abstract from author

choosing among alternative technological strategies an empirical analysis of formal sources of innovation abstract this work aims to offer a detailed conceptual and empirical analysis of the inter firm differences in deciding the composition of their technological efforts using data for spanish firms in the period 1990 1996 the study begins with the standard analysis of the determinants of innovative investment then moves on to the less analysed question of the determinants of the generate versus import alternative and ends with a novel analysis of the characteristics which lead firms to organise research internally as compared to the possibility of contracting r d services externally in contrast to standard practice the econometric approach takes into account the existence of non linearities in the used data the results obtained support the conceptual ideas on which they are based

r d productivity and the spillover effects of high tech industry on the traditional manufacturing sector the case of taiwan this study sets out to estimate the impact of r d on productivity within the private sector with further analysis of the different impacts of r d within high tech and traditional manufacturing firms we also attempt to examine the spillover effects from r d investment in the high tech sector on productivity growth within the traditional industries using a sample of 136 large manufacturing firms during the period 1994 2000 we develop an extended version of the cobb douglas production function model and our findings suggest that taiwan s r d investment had a significant impact on firm productivity growth with output elasticity standing at around 0 18 when the sample is divided into high tech and traditional firms the r d output elasticity in high tech firms is significantly greater than that found in traditional firms in addition the average rate of return in high tech firms is much greater than that estimated for other industries besides our empirical results show that although significant the impact of r d investment from the high tech sector on the productivity growth of traditional firms is rather limited

is there value added from the review process in economics preliminary evidence from authors do referees employed by journals merely screen acceptable from unacceptable manuscripts or are they charged with an additional value adding responsibility vis a vis the papers they review drawing from editorial correspondence provided by survey respondents i address this question by examining the relationship between citations of published papers and comments provided by reviewers and editors referees comments demonstrate a positive impact on subsequent citation of papers while comments made by editors show no such impact value adding by editors appears to derive principally from efficient matching of papers with reviewers

do ceos encounter within tenure settling up a multiperiod perspective on executive pay and dismissal we consider a central puzzle surrounding ceo accountability what explains the payoffs and penalties that ceos receive invoking fama s concept of settling up we examine how a ceo s entire perfo

on publication refereeing and working hard we present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous effort to evaluate recent changes in the publication process in economics we analyze the implications of these developments on research output lowering the precision of refereeing signals lowers the effort choices of intermediate ability authors but invites more submissions from less able authors increasing the number of journals stimulates less able authors to submit their papers the editor can improve the journal s quality pool of submitted manuscripts by improving the precision of refereeing but not by lowering acceptance standards the submission strategy of an author is informative of his ability

unnatural selection perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in japan we examine the misallocation of credit in japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they arein poor financial condition because troubled japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets this evergreening behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations

banks incentives and inconsistent risk models this paper investigates banks incentive to bias the risk estimates they report to regulators within loan syndicates we find that banks with less capital report lower risk estimates consistent with an effort to mitigate capital requirements the sensitivity to capital is robust to bank fixed effects and greater for large risky and opaque credits also low capital banks risk estimates have less explanatory power than those of high capital banks with regard to loan prices indicating that their estimates incorporate less information our results suggest banks underreport risk in response to capital constraints and highlight the perils of regulation premised on self reporting received september 21 2016 editorial decision september 18 2017 by editor philip strahan authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

ceo hubris and firm risk taking in china the moderating role of managerial discretion this study linked ceo hubris to firm risk taking and examined the moderating role of managerial discretion in this relationship drawing on upper echelons theory and behavioral decision theory we

the impact of corporate governance practices on r d efforts a look at shareholders rights cross listing and control pyramid the paper considers the impact of multiple shareholder oriented governance practices on rd decisions based on a sample of 5 528 firms belonging to 110 large french listed business groups our results substantiate the idea that shareholder oriented governance practices and a lower position in a control pyramid are better for rd investment the introduction of any additional shareholder oriented practice is found to result in more rd we show however that this anglo americanization of the french corporate governance system is only partial we provide evidence of the co existence of an old french system of corporate governance with a hybrid model of corporate governance the lack of concrete results on complementarity among shareholder oriented governance practices casts doubt on the stability of this hybrid model in the french context

statistical default models and incentives the likelihood that a bank loan will default is of interest to both regulators and investors under the basel ii regulatory guidelines a bank must hold capital in proportion to the riskiness of its assets the probability of default is a pri mary determinant of the riskiness of a loan investors in turn price a loan in the secondary market based on its expected cash flow which again depends on the default probability how should market participants assess the default probability on a pool of bank loans it is natural to consider historical data on loan condi tions and default rates and to estimate a statisti cal model that can be used to predict defaults going forward such statistical models have been widely used across the financial markets to enhance market liquidity and impose capital requirements on financial institutions the accuracy of predictions from statistical models was especially poor in the subprime mortgage market in the period from august 2007 onwards 1 we argue that one cause for this failure was that these models relied entirely on hard information variables and ignored changes in the incentives of lenders to collect soft infor

the failure of models that predict failure distance incentives and defaults statistical default models widely used to assess default risk fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior we demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997 2006 as the level of securitization increases lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality consistent with this behavior we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors ignoring other credit relevant information as a result among borrowers with similar reported characteristics over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension this change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults to illustrate this effect we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases moreover a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants