why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

insiders and outsiders in wage determination a firm starts with a group of insiders or seasoned workers there is also a large pool of outsiders who are initially less productive but are transformed into insiders after one period of employment the firm gains from having a large pool of insiders some of whom may be laid off in bad years insiders gain from keeping their numbers small if the insiders set their wage unilaterally they will choose a path that in this extreme case prevents employment of outsiders even if future employment prospects are good if the wage path is set by bilateral bargaining the extra advantage to the firm permits employment of some outsiders in some situations

optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market this article studies optimal linear and non linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market unlike in standard taxation models firms do not know workers abilities and competitively screen them through non linear compensation contracts unobservable to the government in a miyazaki wilson spence equilibrium adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard mirrlees 1971 model because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms which for higher talent workers results in a rat race and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross subsidies the most surprising result is that if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not policies that endogenously affect adverse selection are discussed the model has practical implications for the interpretation estimation and use of taxable income elasticities which are central to optimal tax design

wages and employment in a segmented labor market this paper analyzes the impact of business cycle fluctuations on a labor market segmented into a unionized primary sector and a competitive secondary sector either permanent or temporary changes in real aggregate demand are shown to widen the intersectoral wage differential in recession and under reasonable specifications of key parameters to cause greater fluctuations of primary sector employment than secondary sector employment this pattern agrees with the stylized facts of the u s economy

efficiency wage models of unemployment keynesian economists hold it to be self evident that business cycles are characterized by involuntary unemployment but construction of a model of the cycle with involuntary unemployment faces the obvious difficulty of explaining why the labor market does not clear involuntarily unemployed people by definition want to work at less than the going wage rate why don t firms cut wages thereby increasing profits

trade unions wage formation and macroeconomic stability an introduction the process of wage formation is a crucial aspect of the current discussion about the causes of stagflation in fact differences between various policy prescriptions usually depend on differing assumptions about wage responses proposals to reduce unemployment through expansion of monetary demand are usually based on assumptions of rigid money wages in contrast recommendations of non intervention policies often rest on the opposite assumption of rigid real wages in which case monetary expansion will cause inflation but not affect employment

a reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax abstract this paper investigates mirrlees model of optimal income taxation it provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual first order model is not implementable i e and example where the first order approach does not work adding second order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions if these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs the properties of an optimal nonlinear income tax are reexamined within the extended model

response of hourly stock prices and trading volume to economic news this paper examines hourly stock returns and trading volume response to announcements about the money supply consumer price index cpi producer price index industrial production and the unemployment rate the empirical results indicate that surprises in announcements about money supply and cpi are significantly associated with stock price changes the announcements of the other three variables do not affect stock prices significantly trading volume is not affected by any of the five economic variable announcements indicating that market participants do not differ substanti ally in the interpretations of the effects of announcements the spee d of adjustment analysis indicates that the effect of information on stock prices is reflected in a short period of one hour or so copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

unemployment in regional labor markets using structural theories to understand local jobless rates in west virginia the author uses a range of structural labor market models to understand differing regional jobless rates in a state affected by pockets of structural unemployment four theories of regional structural unemployment are presented and their hypotheses are statistically evaluated using west virginia county panel data the author then presents case study evidence to compare these statistical results with the realities of the county labor markets both types of empirical evidence suggest that a segmented non market clearing model in which structural unemployment stems from queuing for above market clearing wages in both a high wage primary sector and a lower wage secondary sector can shed the most light on regional unemployment rates in west virginia

social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception this paper considers an economy where individuals differ in productivity and in risk rochet 1991 has shown that when private insurance markets offer full coverage at fair rates social insurance is desirable if and only if risk and productivity are negatively correlated this condition is usually shown to be satisfied for many health risks but it appears to be violated for the old age dependency risk mainly because longevity in turn is positively correlated with productivity we examine the role of uniform and nonuniform social insurance to supplement a general income tax when neither public nor private insurers can observe individual risk and when it is positively correlated with wages consequently a rothschild and stiglitz 1971 equilibrium emerges in the private insurance market and low wage low risk individuals are not fully insured we show that even when social insurance provided to the poor has a negative incentive effect it also increases their otherwise insuficient insurance coverage social insurance to the rich produces exactly the opposite effects whichever of these effects dominates some social insurance is always desirable finally we introduce risk misperception which exacerbates the failure of private markets the insurance term now reflects the combined failure brought about by adverse selection and misperception now the low risk individuals are not only underinsured but also pay a higher than fair rate however and rather surprisingly it turns out that this does not necessarily strengthen the case for public insurance

wages and employment under trade unionism microeconomic models and macroeconomic applications the first part of this paper is a critical survey of microeconomic research into behavioural models of trade unionism although certain formulations of union objectives and models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets have found favor with economists unfortunately only a little is known about their empirical relevance the second part of this paper deals with the daunting problems of applying these models at the macroeconomic level one such model is estimated with data from sweden s mining and manufacturing sector from 1968 to 1982

redistributive taxation in the roy model we consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector we show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens the constrained pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non linear income tax we derive formulas for this optimal tax schedule if sectoral inputs are complements a many sector model with self selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single sector model under natural conditions however they are more progressive than in a multi sector model without occupational choice or without overlapping wage distributions as in stiglitz 1982

union wage setting and unemployment in the netherlands 1965 1987 this paper presents an empirical model of union wage setting and employment the stackelberg equilibrium unemployment rate is shown to be a function of taxes the replacement ratio the gap between consumer and producer prices productivity effects and the rate of long term unemployment the model is estimated with aggregate data from the private sector in the netherlands 1965 1987 the results suggest that the equilibrium unemployment rate is pushed upwards by taxes the replacement ratio and by the gap between consumer and producer prices and is reduced by productivity effects insider outsider effects appear insignificant

optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market in this paper we highlight a novel role played by the non linear income tax in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms relying on the rothschild and stiglitz equilibrium concept we show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market this represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals

an empirical study of age discrimination in norway and germany using a questionnaire and a sample of students and personnel managers we establish the existence of age discrimination in the hiring process in germany and norway as expected age discrimination is more prominent in germany where the hiring probability of equally qualified applicants is reduced by about 22 percentage points due to an age differential of 14 years as opposed to only 12 percentage points in norway within both countries the tendency to discriminate does not differ between students and personnel managers and does not depend on the age of the decision maker the phenomenon of unemployment among older workers is characterized less by the risk of becoming unemployed than by the problem of remaining unemployed and failing to find new work frerichs and naegele 1998 p 59

rat race redux adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms this paper describes an organizational setting in which professional employees are required to work inefficiently long hours the focus of the authors investigation is large law firms the income sharing that characterizes legal partnerships creates incentives to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard law firms use indicators of this propensity especially an associate s record of billable hours in promotion decisions reliance upon work hours as an indicator leads to a rat race equilibrium in which associates work too many hours the authors find evidence in support of this conclusion with data they collected from two large law firms copyright 1996 by american economic association

optimal taxation when people do not maximize well being abstract i derive the optimal nonlinear income tax when individuals do not necessarily maximize their own well being this generates a corrective argument for taxation optimal marginal taxes are higher lower if individuals work too much too little from a well being point of view i allow for multidimensional heterogeneity and derive the optimal tax schedule in terms of measurable sufficient statistics one of these statistics measures the degree to which individuals fail to optimize their labor supply i empirically estimate this by using british life satisfaction data as a measure of well being i find that low income workers tend to work too little and high income workers too much providing a motive for lower marginal tax rates at the bottom and higher marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic