does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in china abstract using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of eight chinese provinces for the period 1986 2002 this paper studies how the introduction of village elections affects income distribution at the village level we estimate both a static fixed effect panel model and a dynamic panel model for the within village gini coefficient and take care of the endogeneity of the introduction of elections the dynamic panel model shows that having elections reduces the gini coefficient by 0 04 or 14 3 of the sample average we also find that elections tend to increase the income shares of poorer portions of the population further econometric analysis based on dynamic panel models shows that elections increase per capita public expenditures by 271 yuan but do not increase the level or progressiveness of net or total income transfer in a village therefore elections positive role in reducing income inequality is not played through more income redistribution but through more pro poor public investment

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

from the classical economists to empiricists a review of the terms of trade controversy contrary to the classical position the works of prebisch and singer in the middle of the last century launched the controversial hypothesis of a long term decline in the terms of trade of primary products vis a vis manufactured goods and a corresponding decline in the terms of trade of developing countries vis a vis advanced ones the present study traces the origin and evolution of the hypothesis and reviews the related statistical debate it also reviews the theoretical support for the prebisch singer hypothesis it is an exercise in the history of economic thought to trace how the controversies surrounding the terms of trade have evolved over time specifically noting that with the development of the field of econometrics the central thesis of the argument got lost somewhere in the realm of hi tech statistical debates

the effect of distance and road quality on food collection marketing margins and traders wages evidence from the former zaire abstract food price variation is typical of the food economies of many low income countries the presence or absence of road infrastructure is perceived to be one of the main determinants of this variation this analysis shows that in the case of the former zaire food price dispersion is significant both across products and across regions it is demonstrated that transportation costs explain most of the differences in food prices between producer regions and that road quality is an important factor in the transportation costs however food prices decrease relatively faster than transportation costs increase and traders wages are higher on bad roads

south north trade and southern growth bleak prospects from the structuralist point of view abstract a three country three commodity model is developed to illustrate the dynamics of growth among the north the south and opec one conclusion is that the southern growth rate will be increased by faster growth of northern capital with a steady state response coefficient of unity however if the steady state is perturbed by increases in northern productivity or the oil price then the coefficient becomes less than one in the short run higher capital flows from north to south increase the former s growth rate but may have only marginal impact on growth in the south higher productivity in the south will slow its growth rate and reduce its terms of trade when the engel elasticity of northern demand for its exports is less than one these and other results follow from surplus labor in the south and its dependent position in international trade from which it will be difficult to escape

infrastructure quality and the subsidy trap abstract electricity and water are often subsidized in developing countries to increase their affordability for low income households ideally such subsidies would create sufficient demand in poor neighborhoods to encourage private investment in their infrastructure instead many regions receiving large subsidies have precarious distribution networks supplying users who never pay using a structural model of household electricity demand in colombia i predict the change in consumption and profits from upgrading low quality electricity connections i show that the existing subsidies which provide greater transfers to areas with unreliable supply deter investment to modernize infrastructure finally i analyze alternative programs with stronger investment incentives jel h23 h54 l94 l98 o12 o13

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

progress in behavioral game theory i s game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not it is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question the seminal book by von neumann and morgenstern the theory of games and economic behavior was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational in more recent work game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise at one extreme highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions at the other extreme adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple modelsmostly developed to describe nonhuman animals in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all when game theory does aim to describe behavior it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing this paper describes an approach called behavioral game theory which aims to describe actual behavior is driven by empirical observation mostly experiments and charts a middle course between over rational equilibrium analyses and under rational adaptive analyses the recipe for behavioral game theory i will describe has three steps start with a game or naturally occurring situation in which standard game theory makes a bold prediction based on one or two crucial principles if behavior differs from interested readers familiar with game theory should read crawford 1997 whose approach is more eclectic than mine he concludes p 236 that most strategic behavior can be understood via a synthesis that combines elements from each of the leading theoretical frameworks traditional game theory evolutionary game theory and adaptive learning with a modicum of empirical information about behavior behavioral game theory adds psychological interpretations to this synthesis

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

convergence an experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state where players hold correct beliefs about the other players behavior and act rationally we experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state our results indicate that some players emerge as teachers those subjects who by their actions try to influence the beliefs of their opponent and lead the way to a more favorable outcome and that the presence of teachers appears to facilitate convergence to nash equilibrium in addition to our experiments we examine games with different properties from other experiments and show that teaching plays an important role in these games we also report results from treatments in which teaching is made more difficult in these treatments convergence rates go down and any convergence that does occur is delayed jel c70 c91 d83 d84

community based development and poverty alleviation an evaluation of china s poor village investment program we conduct the first systematic evaluation of the world s largest community based development program china s flagship poverty alleviation program began in 2001 which finances public investments in designated poor villages based on participatory village planning we use matching methods and a panel household and village data set with national coverage to compare changes from 2001 to 2004 in designated poor villages that began plan investments and in designated poor villages that had yet to begin plan investments we find that the program significantly increased both government and village financed investments while the program did not increase the income or consumption of poorer households it did increase the income and consumption of richer households by 6 1 to 9 2 we also find suggestive evidence that governance matters in the distribution of program benefits relative gains were greater for richer households in villages with more educated leaders and higher quality village committees delivered greater benefits to both richer and poorer households

local governance and public goods provision in rural china in developing countries identifying the most effective community level governance mode is a key issue in rural development therefore empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed since the 1980s tens of thousands of villages in rural china have held local government elections providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time this article compares two different governance modes it finds that elections affect little on the size of revenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if possible however privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult it also shows that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures

local governance and the quality of local infrastructure evidence from village road projects in rural china abstract research has shown that allowing local communities to elect their own leaders increases local infrastructure investment however much less is known about the effects of local governance reform on the quality of local infrastructure this paper examines the effects of governance reform implemented in rural chinese villages on the quality of village road projects we conduct surveys in 101 rural villages and collect data related to the implementation of the reform over the last two decades we also measure the quality of over 550 village road projects completed in these villages using fixed effects and instrumental variable estimation methods we find that the implementation of village governance reform increases the quality of village road projects we also find evidence supporting the following effect mechanisms 1 village leaders become younger and more educated 2 high quality road projects increase incumbent leaders re election chances and 3 village residents participate more actively in the management and monitoring of village road projects

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

features of experimentally observed bounded rationality abstract on the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning ex post rationality and learning direction theory presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches to repeated decision tasks and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization in typical repeated game strategies

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

village elections public goods investments and pork barrel politics chinese style a key issue in political economy concerns the accountability that governance structures impose on public officials and how elections and representative democracy influence the allocation of public resources in this paper we utilise a unique set of survey data set from nearly 2450 randomly selected villages describing china s recent progress in village governance reforms and its relationship to the provision of public goods in rural china between 1998 and 2004 two sets of questions are investigated using an empirical framework based on a theoretical model in which local governments must decide to allocate fiscal resources between public goods investments and other expenditures the empirical analysis both in the descriptive and econometric analyses suggests that when the village leader is elected directly ceteris paribus the provision of public goods rises compared to when the leader is not elected directly by villagers thus in this way it is possible to conclude that democratisation at least at the village level in rural china appears to increase the quantity of public goods investment second we seek to understand the mechanism that is driving the results also based on the survey data we find that when village leaders who had been directly elected were able to implement more public projects during their terms of office they as the incumbent were more likely to be re elected in this way we argue that the link between elections and investment may be a rural china version of pork barrel politics

grassroots democracy and local governance evidence from rural china summary this paper studies the impacts of village elections on the accountability of the village committee local fiscal sharing and state taxation in rural china using data of 48 villages for the period of 1986 2002 elections are found to substantially increase the share of public expenditures in the village budget but reduce the shares of administrative costs and income handed to the township government these findings suggest that elections have enhanced the accountability of the village committee but weakened local fiscal sharing and the state s grip no strong evidence is found that state taxation is affected by elections nor is it found that the role of a more competitive election is different from that of a closed election

the impact of agricultural extension and roads on poverty and consumption growth in fifteen ethiopian villages this article investigates whether public investments that led to improvements in road quality and increased access to agricultural extension services led to faster consumption growth and lower rates of poverty in rural ethiopia estimating an instrumental variables model using generalized methods of moments and controlling for household fixed effects we find evidence of positive impacts with meaningful magnitudes receiving at least one extension visit reduces headcount poverty by 9 8 percentage points and increases consumption growth by 7 1 percentage points access to all weather roads reduces poverty by 6 9 percentage points and increases consumption growth by 16 3 percentage points these results are robust to changes in model specification and estimation methods

introduction to experimental game theory the title experimental game theory refers to experiments whose goal is to learn about general principles of strategic behavior as opposed to the performance of specific institutions twenty five years ago it would have been startling to see experimental modifying game theory in this way or to find an entire issue of an economics journal devoted to game experiments if this now seems natural it is a tribute to the increasingly

the effects of rural electrification on employment new evidence from south africa this paper estimates the impact of electrification on employment growth by analyzing south africa s mass roll out of electricity to rural households using several new data sources and two different identification strategies an instrumental variables strategy and a fixed effects approach i find that electrification significantly raises female employment within five years this new infrastructure appears to increase hours of work for men and women while reducing female wages and increasing male earnings several pieces of evidence suggest that household electrification raises employment by releasing women from home production and enabling microenterprises migration behavior may also be affected jel h54 l94

a response to glazer and rosenthal we are most grateful to glazer and rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our work abreu and matsushima 1992a b c in the process of criticizing our mechanism they have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts the criticisms themselves we feel are misplaced and based on a close reading but narrow interpretation of our results glazer and rosenthal seek to show that in our mechanisms the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies is or indeed ought to be controversial in terms of conventional decision theory the iterative logic is impeccable when iterative deletion leads to a unique profile that profile is the unique rationalizable profile the unique nash equilibrium and so on of course the logic of iterative dominance entails common knowledge of rationality the theoretical coherence of this assumption has been questioned in the context of backward programming in extensive form games see luce and raiffa 1957 pp 80 81 rosenthal 1981 basu 1988 reny 1992a 1992b bonanno 1991 binmore 1987a 1987b and gul 1989 among others these paradoxes of common knowledge of rationality have been highlighted in stylized examples such as the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and rosenthal s centipede game which in fact has been a seminal inspiration for this recent literature 2 but our mechanisms are simultaneous there is no opportunity to demonstrate irrationality strategic or otherwise and therefore no scope to rationalize iteratively dominated behavior from a decision theory perspective the glazer and rosenthal critique might therefore be viewed as an elaborate revival of the indefensible claim that players in a one short prisoners dilemma will choose not to confess because they are both better off doing so than by both playing their dominant strategies within the standard game theory paradigm there is really nothing more to be said before turning to issues of bounded rationality we note that the glazer and rosenthal critique is essentially premised on the existence of a countervailing focal point but what is a focal point the notion is notoriously vague and we are aware of no widely accepted definition 3 this is not to deny that in very simple and particular games certain behavior may be focal frequently focalness is identified with a pareto dominating equilibrium and this is the point of view glazer and rosenthal seem to adopt 4 this is implicit in their acknowledgement that when the social choice function does satisfy pareto optimality our objection loses much of its immediate

abreu matsushima mechanisms experimental evidence abstract abreu matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome we conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games in these games one pure strategy equilibrium is focal we assess the efficacy of abreu matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure strategy equilibrium outcome abreu matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome but more choices reflect the focal outcome moreover strengthening the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a pareto dominated risk dominated equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c7

the effect of irrigation on poverty reduction asset accumulation and informal insurance evidence from northern mali summary the impact of small scale irrigation investments on household consumption assets and informal insurance is estimated from a panel of northern malian households 1998 2006 access to irrigation increases household consumption by 27 30 relative to water recession and rain fed cultivators the paper also investigates whether irrigation has secondary impacts on risk mitigating strategies by reducing covariate risk and reinforcing informal food sharing networks that allow households to insure against idiosyncratic risk we find that households with irrigation save between 4 5 and 6 4 more tropical livestock units and are 20 more likely to engage in informal food sharing with non irrigators this finding suggests that impact estimates that rely on consumption may underestimate welfare gains by ignoring the household s savings behavior and informal insurance network

prudence justice benevolence and sex evidence from similar bargaining games abstract most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and hence can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning in this paper subjects confront a sequence of similar but not identical bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight person cohorts we found no economically significant differences between all male and all female cohorts journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 c92 d83

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

laboratory experimentation in economics six points of view 1 introduction and overview alvin e roth 2 bargaining phenomena and bargaining theory alvin e roth 3 equity and coalition bargaining in experimental three person games reinhard selten 4 the psychology of choice and the assumptions of economics richard thaler 5 hypothetical valuations and preference reversals in the context of asset trading marc knez and vernon l smith 6 economics according to the rats and pigeons too what have we learned and what can we hope to learn john h kagel 7 dimensions of parallelism some policy applications of experimental methods charles r plott

new directions for modelling strategic behavior game theoretic models of communication coordination and cooperation in economic relationships author s crawford vp abstract in this paper i discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress to keep the topic manageable i focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game theoretic that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships with particular attention to the role of communication i begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory s principal model of behavior nash equilibrium i next discuss the alternative thinking and learning rationales for how real world actors might reach equilibrium decisions i then review how nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination communication and cooperation in relationships and discuss possible developments

does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs evidence from bolivia this paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from bolivia empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization these changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need nationally these changes were driven by the smallest poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest priority projects the findings contradict common claims that local government is too corrupt institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve upon central government s allocation of public resources d 2002 published by elsevier b v

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association