collateral heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium abstract this paper examines the argument that the availability of collateral rules out credit rationing a model of the credit market with ex ante asymmetric information and heterogeneous entrepreneurs attitudes toward risk is set up it is shown that due to the interplay between project choice and entrepreneurs preferences using collateral as a signal to screen safer projects may prove impossible instead a partially separating two contract equilibrium with rationing at one contract emerges contrary to previous theoretical research and consistently with conventional wisdom and systematic evidence the use of collateral is never negatively correlated with project risk

a note on the nonexistence of a rationing equilibrium in the besanko thakor model it is shown that in a credit market with two types of borrowers distinguished only through their not commonly known probability of default and with a perfectly elastic supply of deposits a pair of contracts with random rationing of less risky loan applicants cannot be a nash equilibrium copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

collateral in credit rationing in markets with imperfect information note in their 1981 article joseph stiglitz and andrew weiss analyze adverse selection and incentive effects in the loan market the models considered are based on two crucial assumptions borrowers are subject to limited liability and lenders cannot distinguish borrowers projects of different risk stiglitz and weiss show that a bank that raises its interest rate may suffer adverse selection because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow at the higher rate thus lenders may choose not to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand resulting in the possibility of a credit rationing equilibrium stiglitz and weiss also consider briefly the role of collateral in such credit rationing models they conclude that lenders may choose not to use collateral requirements as a rationing device an increase in collateral requirements like an increase in the interest rate potentially leads to a decrease in the lender s expected return on loans because of resulting adverse incentive and selection effects the purpose of this note is to further investigate the role of collateral in these models stiglitz and weiss discussion in section iii establishes that adverse selection effects can result from increases in collateral when borrowers are risk averse i will show by returning to a model they discussed earlier in section i that the adverse selection effects can also occur when borrowers are risk neutral stiglitz and weiss outline a model to consider the use of collateral as a rationing device section iii in that model all potential borrowers face the same array of risky projects each potential borrower chooses at most one of those projects to undertake the individuals are by assumption risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion and possess different amounts of initial wealth thus choice of project if any to undertake and the method of finance selffinance from initial wealth or loan finance will differ from one individual to the next stiglitz and weiss show that among those who undertake risky projects and who choose borrowing as the method of finance wealthier individuals undertake riskier projects an increase in collateral has two effects on the market for loans those individuals who remain in the market will choose to undertake less risky projects and those individuals who drop out of the market are less wealthy low risk borrowers if the second effect is sufficiently strong then increased collateral requirements will mean decreased expected returns for the lender thus a credit rationing equilibrium may occur since lenders may not choose to use collateral requirements or the interest rate to eliminate excess demand the adverse selection effect just described does not occur in this model if the individuals are risk neutral consequently the potential for a credit rationing equilibrium is limited to cases where borrowers are risk averse to see that increases in collateral requirements can also result in adverse selection if borrowers are risk neutral consider the model stiglitz and weiss used to analyze the adverse selection effects of increases in the interest rate section i pp 395 99 it differs from the section iii model discussed above in three ways first borrowers are risk neutral second all projects ar loan financed the analogy to the section iii model is that no individuals have sufficient wealth to self finance projects third in the section

design and rating of risk contingent credit for balancing business and financial risks for kenyan farmers abstractweather related agricultural risks and limited access to credit are serious impediments to agricultural productivity and growth in developing countries this paper describes a novel insuran

auctions actions and the failure of information aggregation we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform price auction where n k bidders each demand one object before the auction each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world the good that is auctioned is a common value object for the bidders and a bidder s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state we show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction in the equilibrium that we construct because prices do not aggregate information agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market also market statistics other than price such as the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex post action

do online homework tools improve student results in principles of microeconomics courses recent technological advances in education have made it possible for instructors to use new tools in their attempt to enhance student interest and improve understanding of economic principles a substantial body of economic education literature has examined the effectiveness of these tools in influencing student performance generally these studies compare student performance between a control group and a test group in the last decade or so these new tools have tended to focus on different aspects of computer technology and whether or not use of the technology enhances student learning along these lines agarwal and day 1998 found that use of the internet in economics instruction had a positive effect on student learning as measured by improvement in the test of understanding in college economics tuce scores in both graduate and undergraduate economics courses similarly sosin et al 2004 suggest that tuce scores of students in classes using extensive technology showed a small but significant improvement over those students in classes using little technology this paper contributes to and extends the literature by reporting the results of an empirical study investigating the effect on student learning of an online homework tool aplia compared to the more traditional instructor assigned and graded homework do online homework tools improve student results in principles of microeconomics courses

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

symmetrical information and credit rationing graphical demonstrations as this article shows the pro debtor u s bankruptcy code alone can cause credit rationing even without asymmetrical information in the market because the code entails substantial costs to lenders if borrowers file for bankruptcy in the absence of bankruptcy cost lenders are always justified in raising interest rates and clearing markets if the bankruptcy cost is nontrivial however lenders profits are concave in the relevant range of interest rates thus lenders cannot always clear the market by using higher rates the study reported here also found that the use of collateral in debt contracts can reduce rationing but that even 100 percent collateral does not eliminate all rationing possibilities a positive relationship was found between credit risk and the amount of pledged collateral which is not necessarily true with models based on asymmetrical information

the higher cost of follow up loans this paper uses unique data and looks at the interest margin for follow up finance vis a vis first round finance applying data for asset values we examine the substitution between collateral and interest margins consistent with the theories of bester 1985 besanko and thakor 1987 and the empirical evidence of cressy 1996b we find that a trade off between collateral and interest margins exists our main result indicates that follow up finance is more expensive for loans but not for overdrafts we suggest that a relatively fixed asset base land and buildings as seen in higher security to loan values raises the price and risk of successive financial increments this explains the higher relative cost of follow up finance to borrowers

adjustable and fixed rate mortgages as a screening mechanism for default risk abstract this paper studies how borrowers with different levels of default risk would self select between fixed rate mortgages frms and adjustable rate mortgages arms we show that under asymmetric information where the risk type of a borrower is private information to the borrower and not known by the lender the unique equilibrium may be a separating equilibrium in which the high risk low risk borrowers choose arms frm s thus the borrower s mortgage choice will serve as a signal of default risk enabling lenders to screen high risk and low risk borrowers it is possible for the separating equilibrium to yield positive economic profits for lenders in a competitive market it is also possible to have a unique pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose either frms or arms the model implies that an increase in the proportion of high risks will increase the likelihood of a separating equilibrium where both mortgage types are offered also a uniform downward shift in the expected change in the interest rate or an increase in borrowers current or future incomes make arms more attractive for both types of borrowers

efficiency in the use of technology in economic education some preliminary results this paper reports preliminary results of a project funded by the andrew f mellon foundation that is intended to ascertain whether technology enhanced introductory economics courses are more effective and also more efficient than traditionally taught courses blecha s 2000 survey of faculty at different types of institutions of higher education documents that economics instructors now use a continuum of technological enhancements ranging from e mail web sites presentation software computerized games and spreadsheets to computerized instruction and distance learning while several studies investigate the consequences of using technology on student performance there has been little attempt to compare the efficacy and efficiency of the various types of available technologies

maturity rationing and collective short termism financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined this interdependence links firms asset and liability sides and can lead to short termism in investment in our model asymmetric information frictions increase with the investment horizon such that financing for long term projects is relatively expensive or even rationed in response firms whose first best investment opportunities are long term may distort their investment towards second best projects of shorter maturities this worsens financing terms for firms with shorter maturity projects inducing them to distort their investment as well in equilibrium investment is ineciently short term moreover equilibrium asset side adjustments by firms amplify shocks and while privately optimal may be socially undesirable

are small innovators credit rationed drawing upon a sample of 256 small firms who applied for bank loans the current paper is concerned with the extent to which innovativeness is associated with a lower level of loan application success the paper records the proportion of loan successfully applied for and estimates a series of tobit models utilising a number of proxy measures for innovation in terms of inputs outputs and commercial significance to the firm and incorporating standard controls in general the models suggest as anticipated that the most innovative firms are less successful in loan markets than their less innovative peers though there is some variation by proxy moreover there is tentative evidence that a little innovation may be a good thing

nonlinear contracts zero profits and moral hazard contracts that base payments on an ex post variable are examined it is shown that a quadratic contract form may elicit truthful responses from auction participants and offer zero expected profits to the winning bidder but not eliminate adverse incentives ex post a general impossibility theorem is proven this theorem establishes that regardless of functional form no contract can offer zero expected profits and resolve the ex post moral hazard problem copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

the poor are twice cursed wealth inequality and inefficient credit market abstract this paper investigates the role of unobservable wealth differences on credit market equilibrium given there is also asymmetric information concerning effort preferences and choices in equilibrium poor but able entrepreneurs may subsidise the rich and incompetent or be excluded as a result investment may exceed or fall short of the optimal level low inequality may deliver conditions for perfect screening and an efficient level of investment the equilibrium with cross subsidisation is consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical observations

on the coexistence of banks and markets we examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible standard banks can alleviate moral hazard problems while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse selection problems in competition standard banks are forced to increase repayments since financial markets can attract the highest quality borrowers this in turn increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks the coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient the same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies

repossession and the democratization of credit we exploit a 2004 credit reform in brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans we show that the reform expanded credit to riskier self employed borrowers who purchased newer more expensive cars the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers access to credit it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit

is relationship lending special evidence from credit file data in germany the german financial market is often characterized as a bank based system with strong bank customer relationships the corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending it is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and normal banks as to their credit policy therefore we analyze a new data set representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading german banks over a period of five years we use credit file data rather than industry survey data and thus focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions in particular we use bank internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality and the bank s own assessment of its housebank status to control for information intensive relationships the major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long term commitment we find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings with respect to loan pricing we find no evidence for intra or intertemporal price differentiation related to housebanking

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

the test of understanding of college economics this edition of the test of understanding of college economics tuce 4 is a revision of a test that was developed 40 years ago and has a long history of use by teachers and research ers in the economics profession the previous editions and their uses have been described in earlier studies e g rendigs fels 1967 phillip saunders fels and arthur l welsh 1981 saunders 1991 and in research in economic education e g william e becker 1997 as with past editions the tuce 4 has two main objectives to offer a reliable and valid assessment instrument for students in principles of economics courses and to provide norming data for a national sample of students in prin ciples classes so instructors can compare the performance of their students on a pretest and a posttest with this national sample separate exams were prepared in microeconomics and macroeconomics both exams consist of 30 multiple choice items and can be administered within the time constraints of a single class period for most course formats what follows is a description of the revision process the con tent and cognitive specifications the norming sample and the statistical characteristics of the tuce 4

the demand and supply of external finance for innovative firms access to finance has figured prominently in the debate on barriers to firm growth even though existing empirical research has not found conclusive evidence of a finance gap moreover it is not clear to what extent innovation aggravates financial constraints and what role innovation inputs processes and outputs play in the market for external capital in this article we analyze how firm level innovation affects i the likelihood of seeking external finance and ii the likelihood of obtaining it we analyze an original data set of 3095 uk and us firms small and medium size enterprises and middle market containing information on firms innovation behaviors performance and finances for the period 2002 2004 controlling for firm specific characteristics we provide novel and extensive evidence on the links between innovation in its input process and output dimensions and the demand for external capital and its supply

collateral type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk abstract this paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default pd of bank loans we focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables collateral type of lender and bank borrower relationship while controlling for the other explanatory variables the study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle 1988 2000 collected by the bank of spain s credit register central de informacion de riesgos we find that collateralised loans have a higher pd loans granted by savings banks are riskier and finally that a close bank borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk

foreign entry and bank competition abstract foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent s informational advantage both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low cost outside competitors into credit markets the entrant s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency cost advantage this paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises the results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

firm heterogeneity internal finance and credit rationing this paper assesses the role of internal net worth holding constant investment opportunities in the allocation of credit in the presence of asymmetric information in the capital market the authors consider an economy in which both symmetric information and information intensive entrepreneurs seek funds from the capital market and they develop a simple general equilibrium model of credit allocation their emphasis is on shocks to borrower net worth depending on levels of net worth the symmetric information allocation a credit collapse or intermediate allocations are possible the model yields predictions corresponding to accelerator effects on investment and output as well as real effects of collateral redistributions copyright 1990 by royal economic society

investment policy in family controlled firms abstract we explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy our analysis centers on two incentives risk aversion and extended investment horizons which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake we find that family firms devote less capital to long term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures when dividing long term investment into its two components of r d and capital expenditures we note that family firms relative to nonfamily firms prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier r d projects additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of r d investment relative to nonfamily firms overall all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk across all family sub types affects corporate r d spending and capital expenditures

loan contract structure and adverse selection survey evidence from uganda abstract while adverse selection is an important theoretical explanation for credit rationing it is difficult to quantify empirically many studies measure the elasticity of credit demand of existing or previous borrowers as opposed to the population at large other studies use cross sectional approaches that may confound borrower risk with other factors we circumvent both issues by surveying a representative sample of microenterprises in urban uganda and by measuring their responses to multiple hypothetical contract offers varying in interest rates and collateral requirements the two seminal theories on selection provide contradicting predictions following a change in the contractual terms under adverse selection a lower interest rate or a lower collateral obligation should increase take up among less risky borrowers by contrast advantageous selection implies that take up should increase among the riskier borrowers we test these two predictions by examining if firm owners respond to changes in the interest rate or the collateral requirement and whether higher take up varies by firms risk type we find support for the presence of adverse selection as contracts with lower interest rates or lower collateral obligations increase hypothetical demand especially for less risky firms our results imply that changes to the standard loan product available to microenterprises may have substantial effects on credit demand

doing more with less innovation input and output in family firms family firms are often portrayed as an important yet conservative form of organization that is reluctant to invest in innovation however simultaneously evidence has shown that family firms are flourishing and in fact constitute many of the world s most innovative firms our study contributes to disentangling this puzzling effect we argue that family firms owing to the family s high level of control over the firm wealth concentration and importance of nonfinancial goals invest less in innovation but have an increased conversion rate of innovation input into output and ultimately a higher innovation output than nonfamily firms empirical evidence from a meta analysis based on 108 primary studies from 42 countries supports our hypotheses we further argue and empirically show that the observed effects are even stronger when the ceo of the family firm is a later generation family member however when the ceo of the family firm is the firm s founder innovation input is higher and contrary to our initial expectations innovation output is lower than that in other firms we further show that the family firm innovation input output relationships depend on country level factors namely the level of minority shareholder protection and the education level of the workforce in the country

pyramidal groups and debt abstract this paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company however when this behavior increases the cost of funds the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent after accounting for standard controls we find that holding companies in italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role these findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure

incentive contracts and competitive bidding an increasing segment of economic activity is taking place in nonmarket situations in which economic agents act outside the traditional markets or create markets to deal with specific resource allocation problems one such problem involves the selection by a buyer of a contractor using a competitive bidding process competitive bidding is used extensively by the government for the selection of suppliers of goods and services and for the sale of resources such as offshore oil leases firms may use competitive bidding for the selection of certain suppliers of factor inputs and may attempt to sell certain products in markets in which competitive price quoting is the established market mechanism this paper is concerned with a bidding process in which a firm has an opportunity to bid on a project under the terms of an incentive contract incentive contracts

teaching un sustainability university sustainability commitments and student experiences of introductory economics the three largest public universities in british columbia canada have signed the talloires declaration committing themselves to promoting sustainability and creating expectations that they will integrate sustainability across the curriculum in order to improve students environmental literacy and stewardship about 40 of north american university students take a mainstream introductory economics course few of these students take economics at more advanced levels as such introductory economics courses are an important vehicle for students to learn economic theory they have the potential to contribute to the knowledge that students can mobilize to foster sustainability interviews were held with 54 students who had recently completed an introductory level mainstream economics course at one of the three universities students reported that introductory economics courses place little emphasis on the environment and sustainability they recalled course content with normative connotations that are problematic from a sustainability perspective and they described how discussion of the limitations of mainstream theory was set aside student reports of the insights introductory economics offers into environmental problems imply that these courses are failing to substantively increase students understanding of sustainability and linkages between the environment and the economy findings suggest that current introductory economics curriculum undermines the universities sustainability commitments

measuring the effect of blended learning evidence from a selective liberal arts college abstract we compare introductory microeconomics courses that employ a blended learning approach to more traditional control courses at a selective liberal arts college the blended learning courses

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

courts and banks effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance we document this point with reference to the credit market in a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts according to the model improvements in judicial efficiency should reduce credit constraints and increase lending with an ambiguous effect on interest rates that depends on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform these predictions are supported by panel data on italian provinces in provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials credit is less widely available

family ownership does it matter for funding and success of corporate innovations using the mannheim innovation panel we investigate whether family firms have higher financial need and how this affects both innovation input and innovation outcomes such as firm or market novelties or process innovation applying the cdm framework we find that family firms are more likely to have a latent financial need for innovation which means that they have innovation ideas which they have not implemented yet we find that family firms have a significantly lower marginal innovation productivity in particular for innovations with radical character i e market novelties we conclude from this evidence that family firms have a comparative disadvantage in innovation projects that imply high risk and require high innovation capability

technology improves learning in large principles of economics classes using our wits much recent innovation in teaching economics has focused on active learning strategies and on the use of technology at the same time budget realities make large lecture classes a fact of life for principles of economics courses at many universities unfortunately neither active learning strategies nor teaching with technology tend to work well in large classes active learning is difficult to facilitate with many students and learning with technology in economics has been limited for the most part to classes small enough to fit in computer labs we have developed a system that uses handheld devices and wireless technology to facilitate interactive learning in large classes by putting technology in the hands of the students during class the wireless interactive teaching system wits consists of handspring visors a hand held pda equipped with wireless capabilities a laptop server a wireless access point and projector and proprietary software this intranet uses the 802 11b wireless standard wits allows students to trade in markets play standard economics games prisoner s dilemma public goods 2 2 matrix etc take multiple choice quizzes and communicate with the instructor during class see http lshta vt edu index html for a sample exercise and instructional material we report the results of a controlled experiment to test the impact of wits facilitated active learning exercises our study differs from previous work in three important ways first use of the wits system allows us to implement experiments in larger classes than previous studies using hand run exercises second we measure learning using exam scores rather than the test of understanding in college economics tuce so that improved results are understandable in terms of students grades the metric that students and universities use to evaluate performance finally to isolate whether changes in learning are from substituting experiment based material for standard lectures or whether gains are the result of active learning the control class held parallel research days where students discussed the same experiment students in the wits class earned final grades that averaged 3 2 points higher than the control class though impact varies by gender and class level the impact on learning is highest for freshmen and women groups that often struggle with introductory economics and lowest for male seniors who in our sample tend to be engineering majors satisfying a general education requirement teaching evaluations are also significantly higher in the experimental class

internal vs external financing of r d the empirical evidence suggests that while small firms in united states united kingdom and canada rely on internal funds for financing r d similar firms in japan germany and france have access to bank loans in this paper we analyze the financial decisions of small firms willing to invest in r d we find that their high ratio of intangible assets along with the high risk nature of their investments can explain their inability to raise debt in external capital markets we also show that financing r d with bank loans might be feasible especially if banks are willing to monitor the investment activities of their clients

the rise of risk based pricing of mortgage interest rates in italy abstract this paper assesses how much mortgage interest rates in italy are priced on credit risk as proxied by the probability of household mortgage delinquency estimated using the eu silc database owing to data availability we restrict the analysis of mortgage pricing to italian households consistent with the more widespread use of credit scoring estimates indicate that italian lenders have increasingly priced mortgage interest rates on household credit risk for mortgages granted between 2000 and 2007 we find that a 1 point increase in the probability of default is associated with a 21 basis point rise in mortgage interest rates lower than the 38 basis point premium edelberg 2006 estimated for the us at the end of the 1990s

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

evaluation of credit guarantee policy using propensity score matching in this article we evaluate the effect of the credit guarantee policy by comparing a large sample of guaranteed firms and matched non guaranteed firms from 2000 to 2003 the sample firms are compared with respect to growth rates of different performance indicators including productivity sales employment investment r d wage level and the survival of firms in the post crisis period in order to avoid the selectivity problem propensity score matching methodologies are adopted results suggest that credit guarantees influenced significantly firms ability to maintain their size and increase their survival rate but not to increase their r d and investment and hence their growth in productivity moreover due to the adverse selection problem firms with lower productivity were receiving guarantees

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

sharing contracts marginalisation adverse selection and markup calculation this paper proposes a new approach to explain the dominance in the islamic banking market of markup contracts at the expense of sharing ones we show that the dual pricing practised in this market produces an additional or artificial dimension of adverse selection which is causing the sharing contracts marginalization we suggest specialized use of two islamic contractual categories as a device for eliminating artificial adverse selection we suggest also an endogenous calculation of the markup that is independent of the interest rate based on the financing cost unification this approach allows the deduction of default and liquidity risk premiums

an investigation of the average bid mechanism for procurement auctions in a procurement context it can be quite costly for a buyer when the winning seller underestimates the cost of a project and then defaults on the project midway through completion the average bid auction is one mechanism intended to help address this problem this format involves awarding the contract to the bidder who has bid closest to the average of the bids submitted we compare the performance of this mechanism with the standard low price mechanism to determine how successful the average bid format is in preventing bidder losses as well as its impact on the price paid by the buyer we find the average bid mechanism to be more successful than expected because surprisingly bidding behavior remains similar between the average bid and low price auctions we provide an explanation for the bidding behavior in the average bid auction that is based on subjects having problems processing signals near the extremes of the distribution this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

financial matching asymmetric information and entrepreneurial risk taking we study financial matching in credit markets when entrepreneurs have private information about their success potential entrepreneurs can search for financing for either a risky or a safe investment and only the risky project is sensitive to entrepreneurs intrinsic types there is excess risk taking in the sense that entrepreneurs with inefficiently low success probabilities choose the risky investment however steady states featuring greater market liquidity are associated with higher efficiency as market liquidity also reflects the intensity of competition among financiers earlier results which indicate a negative relationship between competition and allocative efficiency do not hold in our setup

competition among exchanges does competition among e nancial intermediaries lead to excessively low standards to examine this question we construct a model where intermediaries design contracts to attract trading volume taking into consideration that traders differ in credit quality and may default when credit quality is observable intermediaries demand the right amount of guarantees a monopolist would demand fewer guarantees private information about credit quality has an ambiguous effect in a competitive environment when the cost of default is large small private information leads to higher lower standards we exhibit examples where private information is present and competition produces higher standards than monopoly does i introduction in spite of the general acceptance of the competitive mechanism as an allocation scheme many observers consider e nancial intermediation an exception competition is thought to lead to a race to the bottom in which e nancial intermediaries settle for excessively low levels of contractual guarantees in an attempt to increase volume evaluating futures exchanges a joint report from the treasury and the federal reserve board written in the wake of the 1987 crash states that t here is sufe cient possibility that at some point sros self regulatory organizations might establish margins that were inconsistent enough to present market problems or set them at levels that might present potential costs to other parties that regulatory approval should be established in all markets 1

are good or bad borrowers discouraged from applying for loans evidence from us small business credit markets this paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by kon and storey kon y storey d j 2003 a theory of discouraged borrowers small business economics 21 37 49 and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self rationing mechanism using us data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement which increase with longer financial relationships suggesting discouragement is an efficient self rationing mechanism it also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that in concentrated markets high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships we conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated than in competitive markets

role of collateral and personal guarantees in relationship lending evidence from japan s sme loan market this paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in japan s sme loan market we find that firms riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used we find however that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral these findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank s seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring this incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees

do liquidation values affect financial contracts evidence from commercial loan contracts and zoning regulation we examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property loan contracts we employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property s permitted uses as a measure of an asset s redeployability or value in its next best use within a census tract more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations lower interest rates and fewer creditors controlling for the property s type sale price and earnings to price ratio these results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

motives for forming research development financing organizations abstract we study the decision to fund r d through a separate financing organization an rdfo that takes the form of either a limited partnership or a corporation the rdfo offers tax and financial reporting benefits as a form of external funding it also creates moral hazard and adverse selection problems information costs using convertible debt as a comparative form of external funding we find that debt related but not equity related financial reporting benefits affect the decision to form rdfos the evidence is mixed on whether taxes influence the formation decision and the information costs of rdfos restrict their use

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

aggregate consumption behaviour and liquidity constraints the canadian evidence this paper considers a general permanent income model in which a fraction of consumers in the economy is liquidity constrained consumption growth rate for these individuals is related to the growth rate of their income and the level of real interest rates the interest rate coefficient is predicted to be smaller in the presence of liquidity constraints empirically liquidity constraints are found to be important and the estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter is much larger than the one obtained by estimating the standard representative agent model lastly there is some evidence of structural changes over the sample period which are associated with the 1982 recession

a matter of relational style loan officer consistency and exchange continuity in microfinance social scientists have long considered what mechanisms underlie repeated exchange three mechanisms have garnered the majority of this attention formal contracts relational contracts and relationally embedded social ties although each mechanism has its virtues all three exhibit a common limitation an inability to fully explain the continuation and stability of intertemporal exchange between individuals and organizations in the face of change drawing on extensive quantitative data on approximately 450 000 microfinance loans made by a microfinance institution in mexico from 2004 to 2008 that include random assignment of loan officers this research proposes the concept of relational styles to help explain how repeated exchange is possible in the face of personnel change we define relational styles as systematically reoccurring patterns of interaction employed by social actors within and across exchange relationships in this paper between microfinance clients and loan officers we show that relati

the importance of equity finance for r d activity this article analyzes the importance of equity finance for the r d activity of small and medium sized enterprises we use information on almost 6 000 german smes from a company survey using the intensity of banking competition at the district level as an instrument to control for endogeneity we find that a higher equity ratio is conducive to a higher r d intensity owners may only start r d activities if they have the financial resources to sustain them until successful completion we find a larger influence of the equity ratio for young companies equity may be more important for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can rely less on bank financing

cost of capital and public loan guarantees to small firms in this paper we study the determinants of the spread charged by banks under a uk policy intervention scheme aimed at supporting access to the credit market for small firms through guarantee backed loans we exploit a unique dataset containing data on 29 266 guarantee backed loans under the uk sflg scheme over the period 2000 to 2005 results suggest that lower spreads are offered for loans of larger amounts and higher durations for service firms for larger firms and for those located in the most advanced regions higher spreads are applied to high tech manufacturing firms and to loans issued for working capital purposes we also find that the presence of other extant debt is associated with a relatively higher spread and that this effect is especially significant for the subset of firms that have reached a maximum debt capacity based on collateralized assets further we also find that the higher the incidence of the publicly guaranteed debt over the total amount of outstanding loans the lower on average the spread however an increase in the guaranteed coverage leads to a contraction in the spread only for loans aimed at covering working capital needs rather than investments