inequality and the dynamics of public opinion the self reinforcing link between economic inequality and mass preferences this article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public s policy mood recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality public opinion and government redistribution one group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time series data from 1952 to 2006 supplemented with cross sectional analysis where appropriate we show that economic inequality is in fact self reinforcing but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments

distribution of research gains in multistage production systems research irrespective of the incidence of the levy and benefits no longer is valid we have no disagreement with this important observation but we are concerned about the lack of reliable estimates of the elasticity of substitution building on muth s analysis for which we suggest some changes we explore further the sensitivity of the effects of the distribution of benefits of research to different ways in which research can impact on a multistage production system and to the effects of the elasticities

insecure alliances risk inequality and support for the welfare state popular support for the welfare state varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue that these variations vital to understanding the politics of the welfare state reflect in part the degree to which economic disadvantage low income and economic insecurity high risk are correlated when the disadvantaged and insecure are mostly one and the same the base of popular support for the welfare state is narrow when the disadvantaged and insecure represent two distinct groups popular support is broader and opinion less polarized we test these predictions both across nations within a single policy area unemployment insurance and across policy domains within a single polity the united states using a new survey results are consistent with our predictions and are robust to myriad controls and specifications when disadvantage and insecurity are more correlated the welfare state is more contested hy do citizens support the welfare state the answer remains as elusive as the question is fundamental we know that patterns of public support vary greatly across nations and domains of social policy we also know that these differences are associated with variations in levels of spending and program generosity brooks and manza 2006a 2006b 2007 kang and powell 2010 svallfors 1997 2004 yet there has only been limited effort to explain why patternsofpublicsupportvary thatis whyaggregatepublic support polarization of opinion and the breadth of opposition to the welfare state differ across societies and social policy areas in this article we develop such a proposition distinguish it from other leading claims and show that it finds strong confirmation not only in cross national analysis but also when examining popular support for different social policies within the united states the proposition is that the structure of support for the welfare state varies with the joint distribution of economic disadvantage low income and economic in

economic welfare evaluations for producers under uncertainty the validity of producer and consumer surplus measures of firm welfare under risk is examined under constant absolute risk aversion and output price uncertainty only these measures are an exact measure of firm welfare as defined by compensating variation equivalent variation or the change in the certainty equivalent under decreasing absolute risk aversion qualitative comparisons of various measures are discussed for example producer s surplus as measured by the area above the uncompensated risk averse supply curve overstates the compensating variation of a change in expected price of output procedures for calculating firm welfare under production uncertainty and a variety of economic environments are proposed generally these procedures are applicable only when absolute risk aversion is constant

inequality labor market segmentation and preferences for redistribution we formalize and examine two overlapping models that show how rising inequality combined with ethnic and racial heterogeneity can explain why many advanced industrial countries have experienced a drop in support for redistribution as inequality has risen one model based on altruism and homophily focuses on the effect of increasing social distance between the poor and the middle class especially when minorities are increasingly overrepresented among the very poor the other based on self interest combines an insurance model of preferences for redistribution with increasingly segmented labor markets in which immigration of workers without recognized skills leaves most native workers better off but intensifies competition for low end jobs empirically when we estimate parameters from the two models using data from multiple waves of issp surveys we find that labor market segmentation previously omitted in this literature has more consistent effects than social distance

government versus opposition at the polls how governing status affects the impact of policy positions we argue that governing status affects how voters react to extreme versus moderate policy positions being in government forces parties to compromise and to accept ideologically unappealing choices as the best among available alternatives steady exposure to government parties in this role and frequent policy compromise by governing parties lead voters to discount the positions of parties when they are in government hence government parties do better in elections when they offset this discounting by taking relatively extreme positions the relative absence of this discounting dynamic for opposition parties on the other hand means that they perform better by taking more moderate positions as the standard downsian model would predict we present evidence from national elections in germany the netherlands norway sweden and the united kingdom 1971 2005 to support this claim

optimal production with learning by doing abstract this paper characterizes optimal production over time when production cost is a decreasing function of past accumulated output when production exhibits learning by doing monopolistic competitive and socially optimal solutions are considered

intertemporal consumer surplus in lagged adjustment demand models an application to natural gas pricing abstract applied welfare analyses of policy options typically measure surplus as a single period snapshot or a flow over time assuming stationary supply and demand curves these curves however generally are not independent of time therefore the effects of various policy changes are likely to differ in type and magnitude over time as adjustments are made this paper presents an algorithm for calculating the welfare effects of a policy change in the context of commonly used lagged adjustment demand models an example involving natural gas price decontrol is presented in this example assuming stationary demand curves would overestimate lost consumer surplus by 15

divergence in alternative hicksian welfare measures the case of revealed preference for public amenities this paper investigates the divergence between the two hicksian welfare measures of non traded amenity improvement associated with housing first the hicksian surplus measures for amenity changes are analytically developed based on explicit specification of utility structures a hedonic two stage approach is then applied to empirically show that for quantity changes in contrast to hypothetical markets divergence in real market is small the paper also analytically develops expressions for the income and substitution effects and empirically shows that for a given income effect the greater the substitution effect the smaller the divergence between the two measures copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

what moves policy sentiment in spite of the fact that political eras in the united states are widely and often ambiguously defined in terms of a general policy sentiment or mood political scientists have done little in the way of rigorous analysis regarding this subject i argue that shifts in domestic policy sentiment along a liberal conservative continuum may be understood in part as responses to changing economic expectations specifically expectations of a strong economy result in greater support for liberal domestic policies whereas anticipation of declining economic conditions pushes the national policy mood to the right using quarterly data for the period 1968 88 i present a multiple time series error correction model that lends considerable support to the hypothesis

endogenous credible commitment and party competition over redistribution under alternative electoral institutions political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters i argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution the model i develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules parties efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment thus left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation the model also generates new insights about the anti left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device i find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies

application of sample selection model to double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies modeling households behavior with the data from a contingentvaluation cv survey is often complicated by samplenon response which can cause non response bias and sampleselection bias leading to inconsistent parameter estimates and adistorted mean willingness to pay estimate this paper reportsthe results of empirical tests for both biases using householdsurvey data in which the double bounded dichotomous choice cvquestion involved the benefit of a tap water quality improvementpolicy in korea no non response bias but sample selection bias is detected in the sample to correct for sample selection bias a sample selection model is employed the authors also discusshow failure to correct for bias may distort aggregate benefitestimates

global markets and national politics collision course or virtuous circle increasing exposure to trade foreign direct investment and liquid capital mobility have not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottom among the oecd countries one reason is that there are strong political incentives for governments to cushion the dislocations and risk generated by openness moreover countries with large and expanding public economies when balanced with increased revenues even from capital taxes have not suffered from capital flight or higher interest rates this is because the modern welfare state comprising income transfer programs and publicly provided social services generates economically important collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and that actors are interested in productivity value these range from the accumulation of human and physical capital to social stability under conditions of high market uncertainty to popular support for the market economy itself as a result arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are considerably overdrawn

consumer s surplus versus compensating variation revisited consumer s surplus and a second order approximation to compensating variation are compared to the exact compensating variation for a subsystem of several commodities an empirical application to the relative retail price distortions created by the u s dairy program is presented in the application a new specification for weakly integrable incomplete demand models is developed and estimated the integrable demand model has sufficient flexibility that it is not rejected by the data both welfare approximations are found to introduce large errors in the measurement of deadweight losses

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

a model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy abstract this paper studies political equilibrium in a two party representative democracy in which the political parties are policy motivated and voters trade off their policy preferences against their party identity it is shown that the parties will in general adopt differing policy positions in equilibrium and that under certain qualifications the winning policy will lie between the more popular party s preferred policy and a certain utilitarian optimum the winning policy will be closer to this utilitarian optimum the less biased the electorate is in terms of party identification

can weak substitution be rehabilitated this paper develops a graphical analysis and an analytical model that demonstrate how weak substitution can be used for non market valuation weak complementarity and weak substitution represent preference restrictions that allow us to develop equivalent price changes to describe quantity or quality changes in non market goods the price changes are hicksian equivalents in that they yield the same utility changes as would the quantity or quality changes after discussion of several potential applications of weak substitution the paper develops the parallel between the restriction and recent strategies from modeling differentiated goods

the public as thermostat dynamics of preferences for spending theory democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well informed about what policymakers actually do such a public would adjust its preferences for more or less policy in response to policy outputs themselves in effect the public would behave like a thermostat when the actual policy temperature differs from the preferred policy temperature the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly and once sufficiently adjusted the signal would stop hypotheses in domains where policy is clearly defined and salient to the public changes in the public s preferences for more policy activity are negatively related to changes in policy methods a thermostatic model of american public preferences for spending on defense and a set of five social programs is developed and then tested using time series regression analysis results changes in public preferences for more spending reflect changes in both the preferred levels of spending and spending decisions themselves most importantly changes in preferences are negatively related to spending decisions whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward upward when appropriations increase decrease thus consistent with the eastonian model policy outputs do feed back on public inputs at least in the defense spending domain and across a set of social spending domains

rent seeking and x inefficiency this paper discusses the social cost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost notably rent seeking and x inefficiency the possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent seeking

measuring oligopsony power with shadow prices u s markets for pulpwood and sawlogs empirical estimation of input market power hindered by problems in measuring an input s value of marginal product vmp by estimating a variable profit function system however one can infer a factor s vmp through its shadow price this technique is used here to specify a structural equation system which is estimated using time series data for the u s sawmilling and paper industries to empirically measure the degree of oligopsony power for sawlog and pulpwood inputs respectively results evaluated at sample means indicate that pulpwood markets are more oligopsonistic than sawlog markets though both perform closer to perfect competition than monopsony time trends for market power differ for each product and perfect competition cannot be rejected for sawlogs in later years copyright 1995 by mit press

health insurance tradeoffs revisited abstract in two recent papers journal of health economics 18 2 141 152 journal of health economics 18 6 811 824 nyman raised some questions about the welfare calculations and conclusions in our earlier paper manning and marquis health insurance the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard vol 15 1996 this note discusses the erroneous criticisms in his papers first although we estimated a marshallian demand curve our calculations are based on compensating variations that incorporate the gains from risk pooling second our estimates of second best insurance plans indicate that some cost sharing is optimal in contradiction to his assertion that our results raise questions about the desirability of insurance coverage the comment also deals with other issues raised by nyman

public and private returns from joint venture research an example from agriculture public research institutions are turning increasingly to the private sector for additional financial support such a trend in the short run lessens the need for public research expenditures but may in the long run prove to be very costly to the economy as a whole this is because private funding increases the chance that the direction of research will shift so that private benefits are enhanced such a shift is especially costly if public research funds are then not forthcoming that would have the potential of producing the maximum level of benefits to the economy as a whole a case study of canadian barley research is used to illustrate this problem

the economic benefits of surface water quality improvements in developing countries a case study of davao philippines two nonmarket valuation techniques the contingent valuation method and travel cost model are used to estimate the economic value that people in davao philippines place on improving the water quality of the rivers and sea near their community the contingent valuation and travel cost estimates are very close to each other and are quite low both in absolute terms and as a percentage of household income these findings suggest that water pollution control is simply not a high priority for davao s residents and support the argument that households willingness to pay for environmental amenities such as improved water quality is low

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

environmental issues and economic decisions in developing countries abstract this paper explains the key role of environmental economics in incorporating environmental concerns into decision making and in facilitating the more efficient management of natural resources as a step toward sustainable development it reviews concepts and techniques for valuation of environmental impacts for use in conventional cost benefits analysis as well as key related aspects including environmental impacts of economywide policies multicriteria analysis risk and uncertainty and discount rate issues several developing country case studies are summarized which cover a range of practical valuation methods the evidence presented suggests that the valuation techniques for determining use values may be applied successfully in appropriate cases but examples involving nonuse values are rare the use of multiobjective desicion methods also needs to be explored where economic valuation is not feasible

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

the demand function for residential heat through district heating system and its consumption benefits in korea abstract the demand for residential heat rh through a district heating system dhs has been and will be expanded in korea due to its better performance in energy efficiency and the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions than decentralized boilers the purposes of this paper are two fold the first is to obtain the demand function for dhs based rh in korea and investigate the price and income elasticities of the demand employing the quarterly data covering the period 1988 2013 the short run price and income elasticities are estimated as 0 700 and 0 918 respectively moreover the long run elasticities are 1 253 and 1 642 respectively the second purpose is to measure the consumption benefits of dhs based rh employing the economic theory that they are the sum of the actual payment and consumer surplus for the consumption considering that the average price and estimated consumer surplus of the dhs based rh use in 2013 are computed to be krw 87 870 usd 84 1 and krw 62 764 usd 60 1 per gcal the consumption benefits of the dhs based rh are calculated to be krw 150 634 usd 144 2 per gcal this information can be beneficially utilized to conduct an economic feasibility study for a new dhs project related to rh supply

on the equivalence of input and output market marshallian surplus measures in a series of papers which has appeared in this review the following question is raised given a change in the vector of unit factor prices to what is the resulting change in marshallian surplus in the factor markets equal as is probably now well known the first two papers in this series written by richard schmalensee 1971 and daniel wisecarver answered the above question incorrectly indeed james anderson and schmalensee 1976 in two separate papers discussed the error of the first two papers anderson answers the question correctly under the assumptions of linear homogeneous and single output production competition and a change in only one factor price schmalensee corrects his previous paper by correctly answering the question under the assumptions of general single output production competition and a change in only one factor price however schmalensee does not completely answer the question under monopolistic conditions and as a result appears to believe that it may be possible to infer marshallian surplus change in the final output market from marshallian surplus change in the factor markets the basic purpose of this article is to demonstrate the answers for both the monopoly and competitive cases under conditions more general than those of the above authors in particular the answers are derivable regardless of how many factor prices are changed and regardless of the number of final outputs which these factors produce the approach employed in the last two papers cannot provide this generalization i will show that under monopoly conditions the change in marshallian surplus in the factor markets due to a factor price vector change is precisely equal to the change in monopoly profits that occurs because of the factor price vector change also it will be shown that under competitive conditions the marshallian surplus change in the factor markets is precisely equal to the change in marshallian surplus measured in the final output markets plus the change in producer s surplus i e industry profits which is the correct answer arrived at by both anderson and schmalensee in his second paper under the above mentioned restrictive conditions the generality of the answers is demonstrated by utilizing i what w erwin diewert p 12 has called shephard s lemma for example see paul a samuelson p 68 ronald w shephard p i 1 or daniel mcfadden p 5 and ii the profit function from which the factor demands are derived

compensating variation consumer s surplus and welfare the compensating variation was defined by j r hicks 1942 as the amount one would have to deduct from a person s income to make him just as well off after a change in prices and income as he had been in the initial situation if the compensating variation is positive the individual is better off under the new situation since the compensating variation furnishes a uniquely defined numerical cardinal indicator of welfare improvement it provides an implicit ranking of alternative prospective situations not only relative to the initial situation but also relative to each other in practice this appears to be how this and other tools of cost benefit analysis are actually used one is interested in knowing not only whether a particular bridge or a particular excise tax will lead to an improvement in welfare but which out of a set of alternative bridges or alternative tax systems will improve welfare the most 1 in this paper we analyze conditions under which the compensating variation can be validly used in this generalized sense these turn out to be precisely the same as conditions previously derived see our 1976 paper for the valid use of consumer s surplus as a welfare measure in our final section we analyze the problem of deriving the generalized equivalent and compensating variations either exactly or approximately from observable demand functions by means of generalizations of or alternatives to consumer s surplus

social democracy christian democracy constitutional structure and the welfare state the literature on the determinants of welfare state effort displays many inconsistencies and contradictins this article takes imoprtant stepts toward resolving these issues with the use of pooled

welfare implications of community forest plantations in developing countries the orissa social forestry project community forest plantations are a common intervention in developing countries we use household and remote sensing data from orissa india to estimate welfare effects of community forest plantations in terms of the value of decreased collection times plantations afford users a selection model accounting for possible jointness in site location and productivity is used to estimate collection production functions for different household labor categories in natural and community forests two measures of an opportunity cost of time are used to determine welfare effects of time saved due to community forests we find access to community forests is important to marginal productivity of different labor categories but to different degrees highlighting the need to disaggregate household data when analyzing these interventions we also find substantial welfare improvements from time savings for many households and villages

what do income tests tell us about the gap between wta and wtp for public goods abstract theory relates the gap between wta willingness to accept compensation and wtp willingness to pay to the income elasticity of wtp it has been suggested that empirical estimates of the income elasticity of wtp can therefore be used to test whether an observed gap between wta and wtp is consistent with rational behavior we examine this issue for the case of non market public goods we identify the theoretically appropriate tests of income sensitivity and examine conditions for valid income sensitivity tests we show that income tests may provide false signals in common settings indicating an inconsistency where none exists

bootstrapping in applied welfare analysis bootstrapping procedures are used to estimate the statistical properties of common empirical welfare measures results from a monte carlo experiment indicate that welfare estimates such as marshallian consumer surplus often exhibit significant bias standard errors of welfare estimates are found to often exceed the magnitude of the point estimate for typical cross section data sets and are generally larger than the difference between comparable hicksian and marshallian measures precision of welfare estimates can be markedly enhanced through generating larger data sets obtaining better model fits and through imposition of innocuous inequality restrictions on the demand function parameters

welfare measurement in the household production framework the household production approach to consumer behavior developed from the work of gary becker william gorman and kelvin lancaster has considerable descriptive appeal in modelling the decisions of households the approach derives from the observation that households frequently purchase market goods that do not yield utility directly but are combined to produce commodity service flows which the household values thus observed behavior is determined by household production technology as well as by tastes the advantage of this distinction is that we can pose reasonable hypotheses about characteristics of technology though we rarely possess useful a priori information regarding tastes the putative advantages of the household production approach are questioned on empirical and conceptual grounds by robert pollak and michael wachter 1975 they show that jointness in production or nonconstant returns to scale cause implicit commodity prices to depend on both tastes and technology raising serious econometric difficulties in the estimation of commodity demand functions in addition since commodity prices become functions of the commodity bundle consumed the analogy to traditional demand theory breaks down joint production occurs when a good enters several production processes simultaneously or equivalently when a good in one production process also enters directly into the individual s utility function the most common example is time which provides the context for all production processes and is often associated with the production of several commodities simultaneously since joint production in the household is likely to be pervasive the critique by pollak and wachter cannot be ignored in response to the comment by william barnett pollak and wachter 1977 suggest dispensing with the notion of commodity prices and treating the demand for commodities as a function of goods prices this approach confounds tastes and technology but it eliminates the troublesome concept of commodity prices as parameters when in fact they are likely to be endogenous in this paper we show that results from positive analysis such as the critique by pollak and wachter have implications for the use of the household production framework for welfare analysis the household production function approach has had considerable appeal for measuring welfare effects of public actions in the environmental and natural resource areas gardner brown john charbonneau and michael hay elizabeth wilman yet traditional approaches to welfare measurement are frequently inapplicable we argue that welfare measurement in this framework is complicated by the difficulties of unravelling tastes and technology we extend pollak and wachter s results by demonstrating that marshallian demand functions for commodities cannot be uniquely defined thus marshallian functions cannot be used to derive exact compensated functions in the manner of jerry hausman and of george mckenzie and i f pearce nor can compensating and equivalent variation measures be bounded by marshallian consumer s surplus estimates following robert willig in fact duality results that normally allow us to move between marshallian and hicksian functions are not assistant and associate professors respectively department of agricultural and resource economics university of maryland college park md 20742 this paper is scientific article no a3404 contribution no 6476 of the maryland agricultural experiment station we wish to thank darrell hueth james opaluch v kerry smith and elizabeth wilman for comments on an earlier draft

estimating farm level input demand and wheat supply in the indian punjab using a translog profit function application of the translog profit function to farm level data from punjab india allowed a more disaggregated analysis of the farm production structure compared to the case of cobb douglas formulation the flexibility afforded by translog formulation permitted measurement of the different impacts that exogenous variables have within and across input demand and output supply functions policy relevant elasticity estimates with respect to variable inputs and output prices fixed inputs a few soil related state of nature variables measured by soil analysis and education which are usually considered constraints to farm production were obtained and two examples of policy applications were developed

leaders and followers perspectives on the nordic model and the economics of innovation abstract what kinds of social and economic systems are most conducive to innovation we formulate a simple model in which countries can close the gap with the technological leader but where the cost of doing so may be so high that the country chooses to remain laggards observed disparities in productivity may be the result of a recognition that the cost of closing the gap exceeds benefit and there may therefore exist an international equilibrium in which there are leaders and followers even if it is granted that the united states is the leader and scandinavia are followers there are theoretical grounds for arguing that the nordic model may in fact be better for innovation suggesting that if the us adopted some of the nordic institutions innovations would be higher and societal welfare would be improved even more

contingent valuation techniques for assessing environmental impacts further evidence abstract this paper provides further evidence on the development and application of the iterative bidding technique used to assess environmental impacts three specific issues the hypothetical nature of the survey technique the questionnaire information structure and the bidding procedure starting point are examined theoretically and empirically to determine their effect on individual bid behavior the empirical results indicate that the importance of these influences may have been overstated in earlier studies

axiomatic foundations of hicksian measures of welfare change abstract the aggregate hicksian measures i ev i and i cv i are characterized by three simple properties one property concerns the ranking of two states the measures are paretian a second property expresses the postulate that welfare changes are to be evaluated in money the third one deals with redistributions of incomes distributional considerations are taken into account by employing variable distributional weights i

value of recreational fishing in the brazilian pantanal a travel cost analysis using count data models abstract recreational fishing value of the brazilian pantanal is measured using travel cost method tcm we compare non linear poisson and negative binomial count data models to estimate recreational fishing trip demands the count data and truncated models are used primarily to account for non negative integer and truncation properties of recreational fishing trips as suggested by the recreation valuation literature the results reveal that non linear and truncated count data models perform relatively well in our study the economic values of recreational fishing in terms of consumer surplus cs are derived using non linear and truncated models we estimate the cs values from 540 54 to 869 57 per trip resulting in the total social welfare estimate range from 35 to 56 million the study demonstrates a relatively high value of recreational fishing in the pantanal in comparison to similar studies conducted in other parts of the world the findings of this study would be important for resource management decisions in the pantanal and could serve as a reference in valuing similar resources in other ecosystems around the world

the equality multiplier how wage compression and welfare empowerment interact we explore how more wage equality fuels the generosity of the welfare state via political competition in elections and how a more generous welfare state fuels wage equality via empowerment of weak groups in the labor market together the two mechanisms may generate a cumulative process that explains how equality multiplies and why countries with more equal distributions of market outcomes also have stronger welfare states the complementarity between wage setting and welfare spending can explain why almost equally rich countries differ so much in economic and social equality among their citizens jel h53 i31 j31

comparing open ended choice experiments and experimental auctions an application to golden rice we use two experimental valuation methods to estimate consumer demand for genetically modified golden rice the first is an open ended choice experiment oece where participants name the quantities of golden rice and conventional rice demanded at each of several price combinations one of which will be randomly chosen as binding this allows us to estimate market demand by aggregating demand across participants this estimate of market demand also allows us to estimate own price elasticity and consumer surplus for golden rice comparing willingness to pay wtp estimates from the oece with those from a uniform price auction we find that oece wtp estimates exhibit less affiliation across rounds and the effects of positive and negative information under the oece are more consistent with prior expectations and existing studies we also find that while auction wtp estimates more than double across five rounds oece wtp estimates are stable across rounds and are always roughly equal to those from the final auction round

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

on measuring the value of a nonmarket good using market data we use line integral theory to lay out in a more general theoretical framework the conditions under which it is possible to measure with market data the welfare effects of a change in a nonmarket good we present in detail a numerical method of measuring the value of nonmarket goods using market data under either weak neutrality or weak complementarity our numerical method is more flexible than the existing analytical method because it can be used with any well behaved marshallian demand function and can be used even when the willig condition does not hold

markets and the measurement of value consumer s surplus and the hicksian measures of compensating and equivalent variation have a long history in empirical economic analysis however at both the theoretical and the empirical level economists psychologists and public choice theorists have not been able to reach a significant consensus regarding the usefulness of these measures economic theorists have only recently dissected the differences which exist between alternative welfare measures in a systematic and transparent fashion in willig 1976 hausman 1981 and takayama 1984 the role of income in determining the correct theoretical measurements of compensating and equivalent variations was exposed during this same period of time theoretical results obtained by the psychologists kahneman and tversky 1979 indicated that the fundamental structure of preferences upon which the theoretical economic results are based is flawed the so called prospect theory of decision developed by these authors indicated that measured of welfare based upon payment will differ from measures of welfare based upon compensation because of the fact that individuals will value losses at a greater marginal rate than gains this difference was then predicted to dominate any income effect important in the economist s model finally this period recorded the emergence of many demand revealing processes which provide individuals with appropriate incentives to accurately reveal their preferences as summarized in coursey and schulze 1986 one interpretation of the literature on incentive compatibility suggests a set of well defined guidelines for improving both the accuracy and validity of compensating and equivalent variation measures these differences in professional preferences regarding what is important in improving the accuracy of economic welfare measurements led john

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

welfare losses due to market power hicksian versus marshallian measurement this paper warns against the use of marshallian welfare loss in applied analysis of market power we show how to compute the hicksian deadweight loss from an ordinary demand then from an experiment using real data on twenty one sectors of the french food industry we find that the marshallian deadweight loss poorly approximates the exact hicksian measure hence it is advisable to use the latter in applied welfare analysis copyright 2001 oxford university press

estimating substitution and expansion effects using a profit function framework this study reports a first attempt to derive all the relevant information with respect to the structure of production of an industry using knowledge of only a profit function using estimates of a profit function for canadian agriculture a procedure to separate substitution and expansion effects for both inputs and outputs was implemented information concerning net input and output substitution and complementarity possibilities were obtained the most important empirical results suggest that the hypothesis of nonjoint production of crop and animal outputs in canadian agriculture cannot be rejected and that hired and operator labor are complements rather than substitutes

rents producers surplus and the long run industry supply curve the term producer surplus conventionally has been used to refer to the area above the competitive industry supply curve for output and below the equilibrium price for the short run there is general agreement as to the meaning of this area in the short run this area equals the payments to the firm in excess of the firm s total variable costs such payments are often referred to as quasirents for the long run there is no general agreement as to the meaning of this area some claim that this area has no particular meaning except under very special circumstances for example see mishan 7 221 22 225 30 and formby 1 316 323 24 others argue that this area is equal to the rents paid to factors of production for example see shepherd 9 and helmberger and rosine 2 helmberger and rosine 2 were the only ones to present an analytical example to support their position they demonstrated that producer surplus will in fact equal rents if i an aggregate production function is used ii the production function has four inputs is of the cobb douglas variety and exhibits constant returns to scale and iii two of the industry input supply functions are log linear and two are perfectly elastic the current paper brings the analysis down to the level of the individual firm and significantly extends the result of helmberger and rosine 2 it is demonstrated that producer surplus equals rents whenever the individual firm has a u shaped long run average cost curve regardless of i the form of the industry input supply functions and ii the number of inputs throughout the paper the analysis is general that is no specific functional forms are used

what marshall didn t know on the twentieth century s contributions to economics some of this century s many valuable contributions to economics like macroeconomics econometrics and game theory are widely recognized however arguably equally important is the enhanced role of empirical study permitted by more abundant data and improved methods also insufficiently recognized are the increased rigor and use of applied economics in public finance regulation corporation finance etc employing abstract theory and sophisticated data analysis the striking contrast with earlier intuitively based applied economics and empirical study is illustrated comparison with marshall s principles also indicates that except for macroeconomics remarkably little space in today s texts deals with some of the rich contributions of this century what has twentieth century economics accomplished a great deal as will be shown here but the discussion needs an illuminating starting point in 1946 after arriving at the london school of economics as an entering graduate student 1 i soon found that in

welfare and distribution effects of water pricing policies in this paper distribution and welfare effects of changes in block price systems are evaluated a method is discussed to determine for a marshallian demand function equivalent variation in case of a block price system the method is applied to compare for the metropolitan region of sao paulo alternative pricing policies on the basis of their demand welfare and distribution effects of changing water prices results show that there is a trade off between average welfare and income distribution a pro poor price system may result in lower average welfare than a flat price system but in higher individual welfare for the poor moreover there is a trade off between revenues for the water company and income distribution even though pro poor price systems may not be as good for average welfare as flat price systems their direct effects on poverty are important introducing pro poor price systems however may have financial consequences for the water companies

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

public monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions we estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government controlled retailing on entry patterns in the absence of the pennsylvania liquor control board the state would have roughly 2 5 times the current number of stores higher consumer surplus and lower payments to liquor store employees with just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing government operation mitigates but does not eliminate free entry s bias against rural consumers we find only limited evidence of political influence on entry jel d42 d72 l11 l12 l43 l81

understanding how income influences willingness to pay for joint programs a more equitable value measure for the less wealthy the preponderance of evidence from many studies is that less wealthy households are subjected to greater exposure per capita and in aggregate to air pollution water pollution and toxic wastes it also is the case that the less wealthy are provided with a disproportionately low amount of other programs to enhance amenities provided by the natural environment such as recreational resources and high quality esthetic opportunities both quality and quantity however to date no study has quantified the scale of this effect on the less wealthy as compared to their more wealthy counterparts when it comes to policy choices made on the basis of benefits analysis this study provides a new equity adjustment method to measure quantitatively the effect of this inequity in the case of public goods

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

trade and labour standards will there be a race to the bottom the objective of this paper is to investigate whether international rivalry will lead to a race to the bottom rtb in labour standards we derive the equilibrium levels of labour standards in an environment that is most conducive to a rtb specifically the brander and spencer 1985 model of strategic trade in which each government has an incentive to lower the cost of a domestic firm our analysis suggests that strategic trade considerations do not lead to a rtb in labour standards to the contrary equilibrium labour standards are higher than those in the absence of government intervention in the case where governments are free to choose the rate of an export subsidy labour standards are inefficiently high binding global trade rules that reduce the subsidy rate would move the equilibrium labour standards closer to their efficient level and a prohibition of the subsidy would eliminate the efficiency loss in labour markets

analysing the effects of labour standards on us export performance a time series approach with structural change the empirical effects of different measures of labour standards on the export performance of the united states are analysed using annual data for the period 1950 1998 applying a time series approach based on the structural change literature hence a model with endogenous breaks is estimated following the methodology proposed by bai and perron econometrica 66 47 78 1998 the results show that the labour standards represented by the number of hours worked the rate of occupational injuries and the unionization rate are all very important to explain the behaviour of exports for the united states in particular it is found that low labour standards may both improve or lead to a deterioration in export performance

how costly is the maintenance of the coal mining jobs in europe the spanish case 1989 1995 abstract the aim of this paper is to estimate the welfare effects of the coal policy in spain for the period 1989 1995 in order to carry out the study a partial equilibrium analysis has been used and the so called conventional or neo classical cost of protection is calculated the results indicate that the coal policy produces an important conventional cost even when applied to the most profitable areas of the industry thus the maintenance of coal mining jobs in spain appears to be quite expensive in terms of protection costs

approximating compensated income from ordinary demand functions abstract this paper proposes a re versible s econd or der t aylor resort approximation to compensated income from ordinary demand functions resort yields the malmquist vartia m v algorithm as a first order case using the slutsky equation resort obtains the substitution matrix and checks it for symmetry and negative semi definiteness to validate compensated income this validation procedure is an improvement over m v

despairing over disparities explaining the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept this paper examines the three major explanations for the disparity between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta observed in contingent value surveys and laboratory experiments a belief that the results must be biased in some fashion hanemann s 1991 substitutes hypothesis and the loss aversion model proposed by tversky and kahneman 1991 starting from the assumption that individuals make utility maximizing choices we develop structural equations that yield parametric tests of the hypotheses within a single non experimental framework the approach is flexible enough to incorporate a variety of functional form and distributional assumptions and can be applied to either data from either open ended bids or dichotomous choice questions the usefulness of the approach is demonstrated using data from a survey that asked both wtp and wta questions the results provide weak support for loss aversion

analysing rationing policies drought and its effects on urban users welfare analysing rationing policies during drought the aim of this paper is to study the impact on consumers of rationing policies implemented during water shortages water scarcity gives rise to the need for rationing and various methods including supply cutoffs can be used a model is devised to quantify the welfare losses associated with qualitive and quantitive restrictions based on virtual prices and using the consumer surplus as a welfare measurement welfare variations for different users have been calculated to achieve the aim information relative to seville spain has been used analysing the drought period that took place in the first half of the 1990s it has been possible to observe the main source that led to welfare losses for each kind of user

economic globalization domestic politics and income inequality in the developed countries a cross national study this article assesses the impact of economic globalization and domestic political factors on income inequality and state redistribution in the developed countries over the past two decades using household level data from the luxembourg income study that are more detailed accurate and cross nationally comparable than those used in previous empirical work it examines three major modes of international integration trade direct foreign investment and international financial flows as well as four domestic political variables the partisan balance of national cabinets electoral turnout union density and the centralization of wage setting institutions the study finds only scattered relationships between global integration and income distribution or redistribution but reasonably strong positive relationships between several domestic political variables and an egalitarian distribution of income and or extensive state redistribution these findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that emphasize the resilience of domestic political factors in the face of economic globalization

earnings inequality and welfare spending a disaggregated analysis the welfare state is generally viewed as either providing redistribution from rich to poor or as providing publicly financed insurance both views are incomplete welfare policies provide both insurance and redistribution in varying amounts depending on the design of the policy the authors explore the political consequences of the mix of redistribution and insurance in the context of studying the impact of income inequality on expenditures in different categories of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies from 1980 to 1995 they find that spending on pensions health care family benefits poverty alleviation and housing subsidies is largely uncorrelated with income inequality but that spending on income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance sickness pay occupational illness and disability are significantly higher in countries with more egalitarian income distributions they show that this pattern is exactly what a theory of political support for redistributive social insurance programs would predict

political reinforcement how rising inequality curbs manifested welfare generosity we propose a political reinforcement hypothesis suggesting that rising inequality moves party politics on welfare state issues to the right strengthening rather than modifying the impact of inequality we model policy platforms by incorporating ideology and opportunism of party members and interests and sympathies of voters if welfare spending is a normal good within income classes a majority of voters moves rightward when inequality increases as a response the left in particular shift their welfare policy platform toward less generosity we find support for our arguments using data on the welfare policy platforms of political parties in 22 oecd countries

the generosity of social insurance 1971 2002 international comparisons of national social policy rely overwhelmingly on programme spending ratios however there are widespread problems with this type of data as an indicator of trends in societies commitments to social protection this paper suggests an alternative approach to understanding social commitments and introduces a new international data set of social insurance programmes that is comprised of important characteristics of three types of public insurance unemployment sick pay and public pensions the data are available annually from the 1970s for 18 oecd countries looking more closely at trends in two programme characteristics income replacement rates and programme coverage we develop an indicator of expected benefits according to this indicator there is considerably more evidence of welfare state retrenchment in recent years than most analyses of public spending have suggested copyright 2006 oxford university press

urban cassava markets the impact of fresh root storage abstract the authors explain how although fresh cassava is important in rural nutrition its importance in urban areas is limited and declining in colombia the third most important cassava producing country in latin america both the structure of the marketing channel and consumer preferences are considered in explaining this difference the principal factor limiting urban market volume and demand is identified as the rapid root post harvest deterioration which necessitates high margins to cover marketing risks appropriate storage techniques which overcome this problem are evaluated and their possible positive impact through reduction of marketing margins on retail and farmgate prices and on urban consumption is estimated a strategy for storage technology adoption is discussed

a review article the case against the use of the sum of compensating variations in cost benefit analysis this paper presents a case against the use of the sum of compensating varia tions as a cost benefit test we argue that 1 the ethical judginents implied by the test are not defensible 2 positive sums of compensating variations occur without potential pareto improvements resulting in social preference reversals without simultaneous scitovsky re versals 3 when lump sum transfers are feasible a positive sum of compensating variations is necessary but not sufficient for a potential pareto improvement 4 in order to eliminate preference reversals and intransitivities all households must have almost identical quasi homothetic preferences a condition that is not satisfied in real economies