crossing network versus dealer market unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow the allocation of order flow to alternative trading systems can be understood as a game with strategic substitutes between buyers on the same side of the market as well as one of positive network externalities we consider the allocation of order flow between a crossing network and a dealer market we show that small differences in traders preferences generate a unique switching equilibrium in which patient traders use the crossing network while impatient traders submit orders directly to the dealer market our model explains why assets with large turnovers and low price volatility are likely to be traded on crossing networks while less liquid assets are traded on dealer markets

does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

political foundations of the resource curse a simplification and a comment in this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original jde 2006 paper generates all the same results we also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

the first law of petropolitics finalversion received19 april2011 we examine empirically the relationship between crude oil prices and the ebb and ow of democratic insti tutions in order to test the hypothesis that high oil prices undermine democracy and sustain autocracy we use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and timeperiods nding strictly no evidence in favour of this so called first law of petropolitics friedman2006

who matters in coordination problems we consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self fullling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky based on their private information agents who have heterogeneous investment incentives form expectations or sentiments about the project s outcome we nd that the sum of these sentiments is constant across dierent strategy proles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives as a result we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the dierent payo types applying this nding we show that agents who benet little from the project s success have a large impact on the coordination process the agents with small benets invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost as the average sentiment is constant a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will free up a large amount of sentiment provoking a large impact on the whole economy intuitively these agents insensitive to the project s outcome and hence to the actions of others are inuential because they modify their

the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information a number of papers have shown that a strict nash equilibrium action profile of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information see for example carlsson and van damme 1993a we present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information a nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the nash equilibrium we show that many games with strict equilibria have no robust equilibrium and examine why we get such different results from existing refinements if a game has a unique correlated equilibrium it is robust a natural many player many action generalization of risk dominance is a sufficient condition for robustness

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

an economic theory of leadership turnover abstract in an infinite horizon stochastic model a coup not only disciplines a dictator s policy towards a group of kingmakers but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator greater competition for the dictator s position a lower impact of the dictator s policy on the kingmakers or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator s policy a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup more talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks so the worst shock in a dictator s reign is informative about the probability of a coup conditional on the worst shock the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator s duration in office the unconditional probability declines with duration

inflation price dispersion and market integration through the lens of a monetary search model monetary search theory implies that the real effects of inflation via its impact on price dispersion depend on the level of search costs and thus on the level of market integration for less integrated markets the inflation price dispersion nexus is predicted to be asymmetrically v shaped which results in an optimal inflation rate above zero for highly integrated markets with low search costs however the impact of inflation on price dispersion should only be small using price data of the european union member states this paper is the first that tests and confirms these predictions of monetary search theory

measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games this paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries we apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives both framed in a similar way despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable the pure or mixed nash equilibria cannot describe subjects behaviour we present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion while previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well the global game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players given the observed distribution of actions we also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities

on the timing of political regime changes in resource dependent economies we consider a resource dependent economy initially ruled by the elite the transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite the occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities both being driven by the elite s redistribution and repression policies first we show that when a political transition is inevitable the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office second we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance and how it relates to the elite s policies more resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime which may not be the case of a repressive regime finally we interpret the arab spring sequence in light of our findings

the choice of exchange rate regime and speculative attacks we develop a framework for studying the choice of exchange rate regime in an open economy where the local currency is vulnerable to speculative attacks the optimal regime is determined by a policymaker who trades off the loss from nominal exchange rate uncertainty against the cost of maintaining a given regime this cost is affected in turn by the likelihood of a speculative attack searching for the optimal regime within the class of exchange rate bands we show that the optimal regime is either a peg a zero width band a free float an infinite width band or a non degenerate finite width band the paper shows that lower costs of moving across currencies induce policymakers to set more flexible exchange rate systems this lowers ceteris paribus the likelihood of financial crises one implication is that a tobin tax does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of currency crises the paper also investigates the effects of country size openess variability in fundamentals and reputation on the choice of exchange rate regime the role of abrupt changes in reputation in triggerering crises even with unchanged fundamentals as an alternative to sunspots is discussed and illustrated

noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games abstract by perturbing symmetric coordination games a la bryant bryant j 1983 quarterly journal of economics 98 525 528 we derive unique solutions the noise proof equilibria our results agree with the experimental findings in van huyck et al van huyck j b r c battalio and r o beil 1990 american economic review 80 234 248 and have an interesting connection with the notion of potential we also briefly discuss median games

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

effective property rights conflict and growth abstract this paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare this interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights a symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor these results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights furthermore if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare improving

a theory of bargaining deadlock abstract i study a dynamic one sided offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information the seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not during bargaining the seller may receive an outside option the value of which depends on the quality of the product if the outside option is sufficiently important there is an equilibrium in which the buyer s belief about the product s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process as a result the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution the equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem under stronger parametric assumptions the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer s belief

characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities abstract global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria we establish two results on the global game selection first we show that for any supermodular complete information game the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the game s global game embedding second we give a simple sufficient criterion to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many action games by decomposing them into games with smaller action sets to which we may often apply simple criteria we also report in which small games noise independence may be established by counting the number of players or actions

strategic complementarities and the twin crises the economic literature has emphasized the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises motivated by evidence from recent financial crises we study a model where strategic complementarities exist not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators but also between the two groups the additional type of strategic complementarities generates a vicious cycle between banking crises and currency crises this vicious cycle magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilizes the economy we discuss some empirical implications and policy implications and in particular show that due to the interaction between the banking sector and the currency market a lender of last resort might not be able to prevent bank runs

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

payroll taxes social insurance and business cycles payroll taxes represent a major distortionary influence of governments on labor markets this paper examines the role of time varying payroll taxes and the social safety net for cyclical fluctuations in a nonmonetary economy with labor market frictions and unemployment insurance when the latter is only imperfectly related to search effort a balanced social insurance budget induces countercyclical payroll taxation renders gross wages more rigid over the cycle and strengthens the model s endogenous propagation mechanism for conventional calibrations the model generates a negatively sloped beveridge curve and countercyclical unemployment as well as substantial volatility and persistence of vacancies and unemployment

noise independent selection in multidimensional global games abstract this paper examines many player many action global games with multidimensional state parameters it establishes that the notion of noise independent selection introduced by frankel morris and pauzner d frankel s morris a pauzner equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities j econ theory 108 2003 1 44 for one dimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by carlsson and van damme h carlsson e van damme global games and equilibrium selection econometrica 61 1993 989 1018 more precisely our main result states that if an action profile of some complete information game is noise independently selected in one dimensional global games then it is also noise independently selected in all multidimensional global games

risk and wealth in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks market participants risk attitudes wealth and portfolio composition in uence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and therefore may have important efiects on the sustainability of currency pegs we analyze such efiects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices generating a rich set of theoretical comparative static predictions related to often discussed but rarely modelled accounts of the onset and timing of currency crises the model can be solved in closed form and the methods could be used to study other economic issues in which coordination and risk aversion play important roles