competitive tension the awareness motivation capability perspective this paper investigates competitive tension or the strain between a focal firm and a given rival that is likely to result in the firm taking action against the rival drawing on the awareness motivation capability perspective we show how perceived competitive tension as constructed from managers and industry stakeholders competitor assessments is influenced by the independent and interactive effects of three factors relative scale rival s attack volume and rival s capability to contest our results provide a new avenue for studying competitors and the relationship between competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry in science there is a steady state in which opposing forces hold each other in check until the build up of tension turns the static relationship into dynamic interplay the point when the steel cable snaps the steam chamber s pressure valve opens or one psychological force overwhelms the other in business practice a similar phenomenon exists when tension that one opponent imposes on another triggers rivalrous actions competitor analysis is central to strategy and organization research hitt ireland hoskisson 2005 porter 1980 previous research has explored a number of important issues including conjecture variation amit domowitz fershtman 1988 competitor identification porac thomas 1990 and blind spots zajac bazerman 1991 and has made advances in such areas as theoretical integration of competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry chen 1996 fundamental questions such as who a focal firm s competitors are and how much competition the firm faces from each rival have been implicitly or explicitly addressed by a variety

dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction in this study of firms entries into and exits from each other s markets we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action oriented dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in california reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others we show that there is an inverted u shaped relationship between firms rates of entry into and exit from each other s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads we also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

strategic interaction across countries and multinational agglomeration an application to the cement industry agglomeration in foreign direct investment fdi is typically attributed to location specific characteristics such as natural resource advantages or production related spillovers between multinational firms the increasing collocation of the largest global firms in the cement industry since the 1980s is not easily attributed to either of these explanations this paper draws on theories of multimarket contact to test whether strategic interaction across national markets has influenced the successive market entry decisions generating the observed agglomeration we first establish that there is indeed nonrandom agglomeration of the six largest cement firms we next show that preexisting cross market interaction with current incumbents helps predict which firm will enter a given market and also the choice of market a given firm enters the association does not appear to be caused by strategic convergence or mimicry of recent entry events and cannot be explained by production side effects which depend only on

market access for sale abstract this paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the united states government to exporters in the rest of the americas we first develop a simple framework based on grossman and helpman grossman g helpman e 1994 protection for sale american economic review 84 4 833 850 to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the united states market we then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the united states the structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the united states government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences thus our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it

multimarket competition theory and evidence the multimarket perspective identifies potential entrants as existing firms in related markets the paper uses this new framework to analyze entry strategies and entry deterrence successful entry permitting and entry deterring strategies require understanding of the feedbacks from the entry market to the home market and vice versa the multimarket perspective integrates literature on industrial organization and strategic management

foreign entry cultural barriers and learning this paper examines the longevity of foreign entries hypotheses are developed on the mode start ups vs acquisitions and ownership structure wholly owned vs joint ventures in relation to cultural distance the hypotheses are tested within a framework of organizational learning using data on 225 entries that 13 dutch firms carried out from 1966 onwards results show that the presence of cultural barriers punctuates an organization s learning cultural distance is a prominent factor in foreign entry whenever this involves another firm requiring the firm to engage in double layered acculturation we also identify locational paths of learning the longevity of acquisitions is positively influenced by prior entries of the firm in the same country similarly the longevity of foreign entries in which the firm has a majority stake improves whenever the expanding firm engaged in prior entries in the same country and in other countries in the same cultural block

a longitudinal study of the competitive positions and entry paths of european firms in the u s pharmaceutical market this paper combines the statistical insights of dynamic strategic group analysis with the qualitative richness of historical analysis to explore the modes of entry expansion paths and competitive postures of european firms in the u s pharmaceutical market patterns of entry and market development over a 20 year period are analyzed the roles of strategic assets and competencies in determining both the entry strategy and the final competitive posture of these firms in the u s market are discussed

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

the political economy of declining industries senescent industry collapse revisited many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection once it is instituted to persist over time this paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment with endogenous protection the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs the more an industry lobbies the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future when the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust however the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection such as that predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 american economic review 76 516 523 in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection finally the paper examines the well documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process

a quantile based test of protection for sale model this paper proposes a new test of the protection for sale pfs model by grossman and helpman 1994 unlike existing methods in the literature our approach does not require any data on political organization we use quantile and quantile iv regressions to do so using the data from gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 surprisingly the results do not provide any evidence favoring the pfs model we also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it

lobbying costs and trade policy abstract we study how endogenous lobbying costs influence trade policies although in practice lobbying expenditures far exceed campaign contributions the literature on the political economy of trade policy has focused on the latter in this paper we develop a model in which informational lobbying costs play a role in determining the structure of protection in the model special interest groups can choose to send a signal to the policymaker regarding some information they possess and the policymaker observes the signal before setting the trade policies we find that lobbying expenditures directly affect the equilibrium policies in order to test the predictions of the model we collected data on lobbying expenditures from the center for responsible politics as well as data on trade and industry characteristic variables for the united states from other sources we perform a structural estimation of the equilibrium trade policies and find support for our model the empirical evidence indicates that lobbying expenditures play an important role in explaining the variation of protection across sectors moreover the model leads to considerably lower and more reasonable estimates of the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions

dynamic natural monopoly regulation time inconsistency moral hazard and political environments this paper quantitatively assesses time inconsistency moral hazard and political ideology in monopoly regulation of electricity distribution we specify and estimate a dynamic model of utility regulation featuring investment and moral hazard we find that 1 there is under investment in electricity distribution capital aiming to reduce power outages 2 more conservative political environments have higher regulated returns and 3 more electricity is lost in distribution in more conservative political environments we quantify the value of regulatory commitment in inducing more investment conservative regulators mitigate welfare losses due to time inconsistency but worsen losses from moral hazard

multiple market contact between savings and loans note when firms diversify into new product or geographic markets via entry or merger they may encounter firms with whom they are already competing an important question for study is whether multiple market contact between firms affects their behavior although most traditional theory assumes that behavior of firms in a market is determined by factors in that market alone edwards 1955 advanced the mutual forbearance or linked oligopoly hypothesis starting from the premise that dominant firms in a market are likely to meet one another in other markets edwards hypothesized that a multimarket firm may not take aggressive actions against a competitor in one market if it fears retaliatory actions by that competitor in another market the crux of the hypothesis is that as the number of contact points between dominant firms of a given market increases the less competitive that market will be regardless of the market s level of concentration although edwards suggested that multimarket contact might reduce competition others including solomon 1970 who studied geographic banking markets and scott 1982 who investigated the diversification of manufacturing firms across different lines of business recognized that contact might increase competition neither edwards solomon nor scott presented a formal model however game theoretic models have been constructed that can be used to study the effects of diversification investigators of the chain store paradox e g kreps and wilson 1982 have shown that in a very simple environment rational strategies in one market cannot be influenced by behavior in a second indepen

nonresponse and delayed response to competitive moves the roles of competitor dependence and action irreversibility competitive moves that are unchallenged or to which response is delayed are important weapons in a strategist s arsenal so variables that discourage or delay response are of great interest using

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

the dynamics of multimarket competition in exploration and exploitation activities prior studies of multimarket contact have investigated exploitation rather than exploration activities we contrast effects of multimarket contact on entry and exit dynamics in these two settin

mutual forbearance in experimental conglomerate markets we conduct economic experiments to gauge the level of cooperation between conglomerate rivals first we run control experiments to observe cooperation between subjects acting as duopolists in one of two markets in the control experiments subject pairs choose a quantity xi or yi from a payoff matrix in a repeated game relatively less cooperation is observed in the y market than in the x market a second series of experiments then combines the two payoff matrices to create a conglomerate setting facing each other in two markets opponents now choose an xi yi pair each period we find that conglomeration encourages more coperation in the y market but less cooperation in the x market time series analysis of our conglomerate subjects choices strongly supports the recent game theoretic propositions in bernheim and whinston 1990

letting rivals come close or warding them off the effects of substitution threat on imitation deterrence a resource based theory postulate is that firms must defend their resources against imitation to sustain competitive advantage however by deterring imitation firms may induce rivals to create su

protection for sale an empirical investigation comment do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient are lobbies net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents we estimate the influence driven grossman and helpman 1994 and the tariff function findlay and wellisz 1982 models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models we find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale the important new result is however that not only the existence of lobbies matters but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions using j tests to compare the power of the models directly we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the influence driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the tariff function model

competitor analysis and foothold moves a foothold is a small position that a firm intentionally establishes within a market in which it does not yet compete we extend theory on competitive dynamics to examine relationships between comp

cumulative advantage and inequality in science the hypothesis of cumulative advantage is widely accepted in the sociology of science but empirical tests have been few and equivocal one approach originated by allison and stewart 1974 is to see whether inequality of productivity and recognition increases as a cohort of scientists ages this paper extends their work by examining true cohorts of biochemists and chemists rather than synthetic cohorts increasing inequality is observed for counts of publications but not for counts of citations to all previous publications it is also shown that a mathematical model of cumulative advantage does not imply increasing inequality when the model is modified to allow for heterogeneity in the rate of cumulative advantage however increasing inequality is implied

information for sale in the european union abstract this paper empirically explores the role of informational lobbying in shaping the eu trade policy to this purpose we construct an original dataset by collecting information on the participation of national and international organizations in the european commission consultations on trade issues and by merging it with newly released data on non tariff measures aggregated at the tariff line level between 1999 and 2007 our results suggest that european lobbies exert a major influence on policy makers drawing upon the panel structure of the dataset we find that participation in consultation meetings increases the probability of a protectionist policy even after controlling for product fixed effects and a number of control variables moreover actual attendance turns out to be more effective than simple registration and organizations representing more than one industrial category are more likely to obtain protection than single sector organizations these findings are interpreted in light of a political economy model of lobbying with possibly endogenous costs

not by productivity alone how visibility and specialization contribute to academic earnings the popular adage publish or perish has long defined individual career strategies as well as scholarly investigations of earnings inequality in academe as researchers have relied heavily on rese

multimarket contact among diversified oligopolists multimarket contact appears to be necessary for effective oligopolistic consensus in a concentrated industry when the industry s firms are diversified evidently without multimarket contact coordination breaks down because the diversified sellers have different costs and demands and hence would not independently choose the same price and because price cuts are less easily detected and matched the evidence suggests that bain s seminal observation of the nexus among profits concentration and barriers resulted because of the multimarket contact of the firms in his sample

competitive parity status disparity and mutual forbearance securities analysts competition for investor attention most studies of responses to change in competitive environments focus on competitor specific adaptations however rivals are often acutely aware of one another and this awareness should influence their competitive behavior in this study we focus on three market structures that affect competitive behavior competitive parity status disparity and multipoint contact in particular we examine how securities analysts responded to a regulatory discontinuity regulation fair disclosure reg fd which promotes competitive parity by eliminating privileged access to proprietary firm information as a critical source of competitive advantage we predict and find that reg fd activated mutual forbearance among analysts linked through multipoint contact we also predict and find that high status analysts forbear more strongly analysts responses to heterogeneity in competitive advantage thus depend importantly on their competitive overlap and status which has implications for both their behavior and the information they provide to investors

hypercompetition in a multimarket environment the role of strategic similarity and multimarket contact in competitive de escalation the effect of intra industry heterogeneity on hypercompetitive escalation and de escalation in a multimarket environment is examined the authors study two critical dimensions of intra industry heterogeneity strategic similarity which captures similarity in competitive orientation and multimarket contact which captures the degree of overlap between rivals in the multiple markets of the industry theory predicts that both variables influence the intensity of rivalry and competitive disruption the predictions in the literature about the effect of strategic similarity on the intensity of rivalry are mixed while strategic group theory proposes that strategic similarity may lead to lower rivalry other theories focusing on product differentiation the resource based view of the firm and hypercompetitive escalation predict that strategic similarity may actually increase rivalry those diametrically opposed propositions are captured as alternative hypotheses of the effect of strategic similarity with r

the effect of the canada us free trade agreement on canadian multilateral trade liberalization in this paper show that the canada us free trade agreement cusfta tariff preferences have triggered a decline in canadian external tariffs explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998 next we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the us firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in canada this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the us and canada finally we estimate the effect of the cusfta on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity resume l effet de l accord de libre echange canada u s sur la liberalisation multilaterale du commerce canadien dans ce texte on montre que les preferences tarifaires de l accord de libre echange canada us alecus ont declenche un declin dans le niveau des droits de douane externes canadiens et expliquent une reduction de deux points de pourcentage dans le tarif moyen entre 1989 et 1998 ensuite on decouvre que les industries qui generent le moins de rentes des exportations vers les etats unis font l experience de reduction de tarifs plus importante au canada ce resultat revele une cooperation dans les politiques commerciales entre canada et etats unis enfin on evalue l effet de l alecus sur l intensite du lobbying industriel a propos de la politique commerciale au canada et on decouvre qu il n existe pas de relation entre la liberation preferentielle du commerce et l intensite de l activite de lobbying

intrinsic vs image related utility in social media why do people contribute content to twitter we empirically study the motivations of users to contribute content to social media in the context of the popular microblogging site twitter we focus on noncommercial users who do not benefit financially from their contributions previous literature suggests that there are two main types of utility that motivate these users to post content intrinsic utility and image related utility we leverage the fact that these two types of utility give rise to different predictions as to whether users should increase their contributions when their number of followers increases to address the issue that the number of followers is endogenous we conducted a field experiment in which we exogenously added followers or follow requests in the case of protected accounts to a set of users over a period of time and compared their posting activities to those of a control group we estimated each treated user s utility function using a dynamic discrete choice model although our results are consistent with both types of utility being at play our model suggests that image related utility is larger for most users we discuss the implications of our findings for the evolution of twitter and the type of value firms may derive from such platforms in the future

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

social contagion and income heterogeneity in new product diffusion a meta analytic test standard diffusion models capture social contagion only coarsely and do not allow one to operationalize different contagion mechanisms moreover there is increasing skepticism about the importance of contagion and as has long been known s shaped diffusion curves can also result from heterogeneity in the propensity to adopt we present hypotheses about conditions under which specific contagion mechanisms and income heterogeneity are more pronounced and test these hypotheses using a meta analysis of the q p ratio in applications of the bass diffusion model the ratio is positively associated with the gini index of income inequality in a country supporting the heterogeneity in thresholds interpretation the ratio also varies as predicted by the gamma shifted gompertz diffusion model but the evidence vanishes after controlling for national culture as to contagion the q p ratio varies with the four hofstede dimensions of national culture for three of them in a direction consistent with the social contagion interpretation furthermore products with competing standards have a higher q p ratio which is again consistent with the social contagion interpretation finally we find effects of national culture only for products without competing standards suggesting that technological effects and culturally moderated social contagion effects might not operate independently from each other

tricked by truncation spurious duration dependence and social contagion in hazard models we show both analytically and through monte carlo simulations that applying standard hazard models to right truncated data i e data from which all right censored observations are omitted induces spurious positive duration dependence and hence can trick researchers into believing to have found evidence of social contagion when there is none truncation also tends to deflate the effect of time invariant covariates these results imply that not accounting for right truncation can lead managers to rely too much on word of mouth in generating new product adoption and to poorly identify the customers most likely to adopt early not accounting for right truncation can also lead to suboptimal pricing decisions and to erroneous assessments of variations in customer lifetime value we assess the effectiveness of four possible solutions to the problem and find that only using an analytically corrected likelihood function protects one against truncation artifacts inflating coefficients of contagion and attenuating coefficients of time invariant covariates

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

oversight of long term investment by short lived regulators certain regulators of economic activity like utility regulators and government procurement officers typically serve for relatively short periods of time the authors consider how to best motivate long term investment in the presence of short lived regulators a firm s investment decision is overseen by one regulator whether the investment is ultimately adopted is determined by a second distinct regulator each regulator is concerned with the welfare of its own contemporary population transfer payments between populations are limited and relevant data cannot be verified by third parties underadoption and underinvestment on average result although overinvestment may also occur under the optimal regulatory charter copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sales at risk a test of the mutual forbearance theory of conglomerate behavior in seeking to understand the implications of the large amount of diversification and conglomeration that has occurred in the united states since the mid 1960s some economists have revived the mutual forbearance hypothesis first presented by edwards 1955 several papers have attempted to formalize or test this hypothesis which states that multimarket contacts mmcs among firms have the potential for facilitating collusion in one or more of the markets where these contacts occur using 1976 data from the federal trade commission s line of business study an earlier paper feinberg 1982 developed a framework for evaluating mmcs and inthis paper tests the mutual forbearance theory of conglomerate behavior at both company and industry levels using 1976 data from the federal trade commission s line of business program this theory states that companies meeting rivals in more than one market will be able to facilitate collusion in one or all of those markets at the company level the evidence supports the theory showing salesat risk a measure of the importance of multimarket contacts to increase price cost margins in the moderate range of concentration where collusion is feasible but difficult to achieve without mutual forbearance the industry level results are weaker casting some doubt on the hypothesis associate professor of economics pennsylvania state university this paper was begun while i was a consultant to the line of business program at the federal trade commission the manager of the line of business program has certified that he has reviewed and approved the disclosure avoidance procedures used by the staff of the line of business program to insure that the data included in this paper do not identify individual company line of business data views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the federal trade commission i would like to thank william long george pascoe david ravenscraft melvin reder and an anonymous referee for their help on this project 1 these studies often refer to terms other than mutual forbearance e g spheres of influence extended interdependence they include adams 1974 reynolds 1976 heggestad and rhoades 1978 areeda and turner 1979 strickland 1980 feinberg 1982 1984 scott 1982 and feinberg and sherman 1985

protection for sale or surge protection this paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential grossman and helpman protection for sale pfs model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting a model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges but only for organized industries is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework this suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought

the structure of competition how competition between one s rivals influences imitative market entry this paper investigates how the pattern of encounters between a firm s competitors affects the firm s inclination to follow its competitors into a new market we theorize that direct encounters between a firm s rivals lead to a herding effect making imitative market entry more likely past mutual forbearance between a firm s competitors resulting from asymmetric multimarket competition further strengthens this herding effect by enhancing the firm s expectations of market attractiveness in contrast aggressive past rivalry between the competitors resulting from symmetric multimarket contact dampens these expectations producing a competition effect that makes herding less probable we test our idea in two distinct contexts the chinese pharmaceutical industry and the taiwanese computer hardware industry and find consistent support in both settings we discuss how our analysis of what we call the structure of competition can be extended to research on other forms of firm behavior

can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the protection for sale model in the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous trade protection sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare we empirically investigate this model using u s and turkish data our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies additionally we assume all specific factor owners to be organized into different lobbies these changes validated by hypothesis tests yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government s concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies peut on obtenir des calibrations realistes des parametres du modele de protection en vue d augmenter les ventes dans le modele de protection commerciale endogene de grossman helpman 1994 des lobbys sectoriels tentent d influencer un gouvernement en place qui maximise une somme ponderee des contributions politiques et du bien etre collectif les auteurs utilisent ce modele pour analyser les donnees pour les etats unis et la turquie on specifie le modele d une maniere qui serre de plus pres la theorie que ce qui a ete le cas dans les etudes anterieures de plus on assume que tous les proprietaires de facteurs de production specifiques sont organises en lobbys differents ces changements valides par des tests d hypotheses engendrent des estimations plus realistes des parametres de la fonction d interet du gouvernement pour le bien etre collectif et pour la fraction de la population organisee en lobbys

competition in a multimarket environment the case of market exit studies of competition typically have two underlying assumptions that competition occurs within the boundaries of industries or markets and that all firms in a market or industry are affected equally by competitive pressures the concept of multipoint competition challenges both assumptions multipoint theory addresses how different levels of contact between firms across multiple markets affect competition in individual markets its main argument is that high levels of contact between firms across markets will induce mutual forbearance causing multipoint competitors to refrain from aggressively attacking each other the restraint stems from the fact that high levels of intermarket contact enable a firm to respond to an aggressive action by a multipoint rival in markets other than the one in which the action takes place that possibility raises the potential costs of aggressive moves and serves as a credible deterrent especially if a firm can respond in several markets in addition multipoint competiti

selective sampling for binary choice models abstract marketing problems sometimes pertain to the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables such as buy and not buy or respond and not respond one outcome can strongly outnumber the other such as when many households do not respond e g to a direct mailing in such situations an efficient data collection strategy is to sample disproportionately more from the smaller group however subsequent statistical analysis must account for this sampling strategy in this article the authors put forward the econometric method that can correct for the sample selection bias when this method does not lead to a loss in precision the authors illustrate the method for synthetic and real life data and document that reductions of more than 50 in sample sizes can be obtained

can the survivor principle survive diversification the survivor principle holds that the competitive process weeds out inefficient firms so that hypotheses about efficient behavior can be tested by observing what firms actually do this principle underlies a large body of empirical work in strategy economics and management but do competitive markets really select for efficient behavior is the survivor principle reliable we evaluate the survivor principle in the context of corporate diversification asking if survivor based measures of interindustry relatedness are good predictors of firms decisions to exit particular lines of business controlling for other firm and industry characteristics that affect firms portfolio choices we find strong robust evidence that survivor based relatedness is an important determinant of exit this empirical regularity is consistent with an efficiency rationale for firm level diversification though we cannot rule out alternative explanations based on firms desire for legitimacy by imitation and attempts to temper

economic analysis and the quest for competitive advantage curred in the past decade between applied microeconomists and those who study business strategy business strategists have cast up a series of questions for industrial economists who have responded with numerous applications of economic theory and quantitative research methods this interchange has been fruitful and indeed more fruit remains for the picking i shall argue for centering the collaborative effort on what may be called committed competition rivalrous moves among incumbent producers that involve resource commitments that are irrevocable for nontrivial periods of time most concerns of business strategy are with policy choices that

the multiprincipal nature of government abstract one of the theoretical tools required to open the black box of the government organization is the theory of multiprincipals which describes how different incentive mechanisms compete with each others in viewing the set of relationships between several government bodies and the entities they regulate as a set of competing contracts in which the control of the regulatory process is shared amongst these different regulators we can address the question of the costs and the possible benefits of such structural separation first this paper surveys the previous literature on the topic then it traces out the possible benefits of such structures to the non benevolence of regulators we discuss also how regulatory rights of control and communication channels must be designed all together to deal with this problem

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

hubs and high fares dominance and market power in the u s airline industry this article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline the results indicate that an airline s share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above cost the high markups of a dominant airline however do not create much of an umbrella effect from which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit the article suggests a number of possible explanations for this asymmetry

nonmonotonic status effects in new product adoption we investigate how the tendency to adopt a new product independently of social influence the recipients susceptibility to such influence and the sources strength of influence vary with social status leveraging insights from social psychology and sociology about middle status anxiety and conformity we propose that for products that potential adopters expect to boost their status both the tendency to adopt independently from others and the susceptibility to contagion is higher for middle status than for low and high status customers applying a nested case control design to the adoption of commercial kits used in genetic engineering we find evidence that status affects i how early or late one adopts regardless of social influence ii how susceptible one is to such influence operating through social ties and iii how influential one s own behavior is in triggering adoption by others the inverse u patterns in i and ii are consistent with middle status anxiety and conformity the findings have implications for how to use status to better understand adoption and contagion mechanisms and for targeting customers when launching new products

toward a theory of status consumption in less industrialized countries how does status consumption operate among the middle classes in less industrialized countries lics those classes that have the spending power to participate effectively in consumer culture globalization research suggests that bourdieu s status consumption model based upon western research does not provide an adequate explanation and what we call the global trickle down model often invoked to explain lic status consumption is even more imprecise we study the status consumption strategies of upper middle class turkish women in order to revise three of bourdieu s most important concepts cultural capital habitus and consumption field to propose a theory specific to the lic context we demonstrate that cultural capital is organized around orthodox practice of the western lifestyle myth that cultural capital is deterritorialized and so accrues through distant textbook like learning rather than via the habitus and that the class faction with lower cultural capital indigenizes the consumption field to sustain a national social hierarchy

new product diffusion with influentials and imitators we model the diffusion of innovations in markets with two segments influentials who are more in touch with new developments and who affect another segment of imitators whose own adoptions do not affect the influentials this two segment structure with asymmetric influence is consistent with several theories in sociology and diffusion research as well as many viral or network marketing strategies we have four main results 1 diffusion in a mixture of influentials and imitators can exhibit a dip or chasm between the early and later parts of the diffusion curve 2 the proportion of adoptions stemming from influentials need not decrease monotonically but may first decrease and then increase 3 erroneously specifying a mixed influence model to a mixture process where influentials act independently from each other can generate systematic changes in the parameter values reported in earlier research 4 empirical analysis of 33 different data series indicates that the two segment model fits better than the standard mixed influence the gamma shifted gompertz and the weibull gamma models especially in cases where a two segment structure is likely to exist also the two segment model fits about as well as the karmeshu goswami mixed influence model in which the coefficients of innovation and imitation vary across potential adopters in a continuous fashion

betrayal as market barrier identity based limits to diversification among high status corporate law firms1 why are some diversified market identities problematic but others are not we examine this question in the context of high status corporate law firms which often diversify into one low status area of work family law fl but face a barrier strong disapproval from existing clients that prevents diversification into another such area plaintiffs personal injury law pil drawing on a qualitative study of the boston legal market we argue that this barrier reflects a situation where loyalty norms have been violated and it surfaces because service to individual plaintiffs is tantamount to betraying the interests of corporate clients our analysis clarifies identity based limits to diversification indicating that they are rooted in concerns about the firm s commitments as well as its capabilities and suggests a more general refinement of theory on status and conformity

living by the golden rule multimarket contact in the u s airline industry this paper examines empirically the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s airline industry the analysis of the time series and cross sectional variability of airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city pair routes reveals the presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket effects fares are higher in city pair markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts these findings are consistent with the claims of industry experts that airlines live by the golden rule i e that they refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a given route for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes during his testimony mr steven b elkins senior director of marketing systems development for northwest airlines cited an example in which northwest lowered fares on night flights that were flying with empty seats in a number of routes from minneapolis and upper midwest cities to various west coast cities he said that continental airlines swiftly responded by cutting prices in important northwest markets mr elkins s memo advises northwest pricing analysts we will live by the golden rule in his testimony he explained that the golden rule in that context was that i did not want my pricing analyst initiating actions in another carrier s market like chicago for fear of what that other carrier might do to retaliate wall street journal october 9 1990 p b1

the effects of 401 k participation on the wealth distribution an instrumental quantile regression analysis we use instrumental quantile regression approach to examine the effects of 401 k plans on wealth using data from the survey of income and program participation using 401 k eligibility as an inst

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51