economic dynasties with intermissions we consider a model of successive generations with a fixed proportion of selfish and altruistic members in each individual s offspring in contrast with the others selfish members bequeath nothing to their own children we assume that parents cannot recognize their heirs types and that negative bequests are forbidden we study markov perfect equilibria of this multistage game of incomplete information and their implications for wealth distribution

a model of the origins of basic property rights this paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights namely the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour my objective is to address the questions of why when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure i develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state of nature which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions including property rights and the state my analysis explores in particular the roles of the players fightin g and productive skills on the emergence and security or otherwise of this property right

re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

pro poor targeting and accountability of local governments in west bengal a commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty socio economic inequality and lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments this hypothesis is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 west bengal villages concerning targeting of credit agricultural input kits employment programs and fiscal grants spanning the period 1978 98 higher poverty land inequality and low caste composition of the poor was associated with negligible adverse effects on targeting of private goods to the poor within villages but with lower employment generation out of allotted funds and significantly lower allocation of resources to the village as a whole political competition or literacy levels among the poor were not systematically related to targeting

a utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods the paper studies utilitarian welfare maximization in a model with an excludable public good where individual preferences are private information if inequality aversion is large optimal allocations involve the use of admission fees and exclusion to redistribute resources from people who benefit a lot from the public good to people who benefit little if inequality aversion is close to zero optimal admission fees are zero these results are robust if earning abilities provide an additional source of heterogeneity and income taxation an additional policy instrument

on optimal non linear taxation and public good provision in an overlapping generations economy abstract using the self selection approach to tax analysis within an olg framework the paper examines optimal non linear labour and capital income taxation and the provision of a durable public good under endogenous wages the marginal tax rules depend on the influence of the tax instruments on self selection and on the income earning abilities of the households in particular we found that production inefficiency occurs in the model justifying capital income taxation for the public good the paper derives a dynamic analogue of the second best samuelson rule encompassing both inter and intragenerational redistributive considerations furthermore the usual conditions guaranteeing the efficiency of the first best samuelson rule are not sufficient in the present model

wealth distribution in life cycle economies abstract this paper compares the age wealth distribution produced in life cycle economies to the corresponding distribution in the us economy the idea is to calibrate the model economies to match features of the us earnings distribution and then examine the wealth distribution implications of the model economies the findings are that the calibrated model economies with earnings and lifetime uncertainty can replicate measures of both aggregate wealth and transfer wealth in the us furthermore the model economies produce the us wealth gini and a significant fraction of the wealth inequality within age groups however the model economies produce less than half the fraction of wealth held by the top 1 percent of us households

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

myopia redistribution and pensions this paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity this double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented the main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save enough for their retirement because their myopic self with a high discount rate emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made some extensions and variations are considered in the second part in particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to habit formation and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption which complicates public policy

measurement of dynamic efficiency a directional distance function parametric approach this research proposes a parametric estimation of the structural dynamic efficiency measures proposed by silva and oude lansink 2009 overall technical and allocative efficiency measurements are derived based on a directional distance function and the duality between this function and the optimal value function the applicability of the parametric proposal is illustrated by assessing dynamic efficiency ratings for a sample of dutch dairy farms observed from 1995 to 2005

the distribution of wealth with imperfect altruism abstract in this paper we study the distribution of wealth in an economy with infinitely lived families individual generations of each family may or may not be altruistic this is represented as a preference shock which follows a first order markov process within each family a feature representingimperfect altruism altruistic individuals care about the welfare of their children and are likely to leave bequests selfish ones do not this results in a non trivial distribution of wealth among families at any point in time we study an economy with a risk free linear production technology and show that a stationary distribution of wealth exists this distribution is discrete and approximates the pareto distribution under additional restrictions we also characterize conditions on the production technology which yields perpetual growth with increasing inequality journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d31 d91 e21

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

dynamic efficiency estimation the shadow cost approach is developed in the context of the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making to formulate theoretical and econometric models of dynamic efficiency the dynamic efficiency model is applied to a panel of 72 u s major investor owned electric utilities using fossil fuel fired steam electric power generation over the period 1986 1999 the major results show that most electric utilities underutilized fuel relative to the aggregated labor and the maintenance input and overutilized capital in production states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of utilities in terms of the technical efficiency of variable inputs

determinacy of equilibrium in stationary economies with both finite and infinite lived consumers abstract we consider the determinacy of perfect foresight equilibrium near steady state equilibria of stationary infinite horizon economies the work of t j kehoe and d k levine econometrica 53 1985 433 453 is generalized by the inclusion of both infinite lived agents and overlapping generations of finite lived agents and the inclusion of production and non depreciating pure rents we show that indeterminacy is possible in robust examples and that the dimension of the indeterminacy can be as large as the number of goods per period we also discuss extreme cases in which determinacy is guaranteed

commodity taxes and taste heterogeneity we study optimal linear commodity taxes in the presence of non linear income taxes when agents differ in skills and tastes for consumption we show that optimal commodity taxes are partly determined by a many person ramsey rule when there is taste heterogeneity within income classes the usual role of commodity taxes in relaxing incentive constraints explains the remaining part of these taxes when there is taste heterogeneity between income classes we quantify these two parts using french consumption microdata and find that commodities taxes are only shaped by many person ramsey considerations

social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception this paper considers an economy where individuals differ in productivity and in risk rochet 1991 has shown that when private insurance markets offer full coverage at fair rates social insurance is desirable if and only if risk and productivity are negatively correlated this condition is usually shown to be satisfied for many health risks but it appears to be violated for the old age dependency risk mainly because longevity in turn is positively correlated with productivity we examine the role of uniform and nonuniform social insurance to supplement a general income tax when neither public nor private insurers can observe individual risk and when it is positively correlated with wages consequently a rothschild and stiglitz 1971 equilibrium emerges in the private insurance market and low wage low risk individuals are not fully insured we show that even when social insurance provided to the poor has a negative incentive effect it also increases their otherwise insuficient insurance coverage social insurance to the rich produces exactly the opposite effects whichever of these effects dominates some social insurance is always desirable finally we introduce risk misperception which exacerbates the failure of private markets the insurance term now reflects the combined failure brought about by adverse selection and misperception now the low risk individuals are not only underinsured but also pay a higher than fair rate however and rather surprisingly it turns out that this does not necessarily strengthen the case for public insurance

dynamic data envelopment analysis modeling intertemporal behavior of a firm in the presence of productive inefficiencies abstract this study extends data envelopment analysis dea to a dynamic framework our dynamic dea not only provides a measure of dynamic productive efficiency but can also be used as a nonparametric alternative to the econometric modeling of the intertemporal behavior of a firm

taxes and pensions pension benefit rules depend on individual history far more than taxes do and age plays a much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination apart from some simulation studies theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications commonly offered for mandatory pensions conversely optimizing models of pension design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes after spelling out this contrast and reviewing and rejecting zero taxation of capital income based on the atkinsonstiglitz and chamley judd results this article raises the issue of tax favored retirement savings a topic where the two subjects come together when i was a young economist i thought methodology was uninteresting and unnecessary just something old guys did when they didn t have anything better to do i taught theory and public finance and the applied theory i did was with an eye on relevance for policy questions although i had had almost no experience with thinking about policy just a summer job with the council of economic advisors under president kennedy now that i am at a stage where methodology is age appropriate i think it is important some of this comes from the natural aging process and some comes from my extended involvement in various policy processes primarily about pensions not taxes in particular i am concerned that too many economists take the findings of individual studies literally as a basis for policy thinking rather than seeking inferences from an individual study to be combined with inferences from other studies that consider other aspects of a policy question as well as with intuitions about aspects of policy that are not in the models to me taking a model literally is not taking the model seriously it is worth remembering that models are incomplete indeed that is what it means to be a model we construct multiple models to highlight different aspects of an issue so thinking thoroughly about policy calls for thinking through multiple models and requires recognizing issues that have not made it into any of the

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

factor income taxation in a horizontal innovation model we consider the optimal factor income taxation in a standard r d model with technical change represented by an increase in the variety of intermediate goods in the model there are externalities both to working and to saving due to market power by firms incomplete appropriability of the benefits of inventions and the cost of economic activity in terms of public expenditures redistributing the tax burden from labor to capital will increase employment but in most cases reduce the rate of growth with conflicting effects on the deadweight loss from the externalities under plausible calibrations of the model the optimal tax rate on capital will be sizable

how should capital be taxed this survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies we review the theoretical optimal tax literature survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortion

voting on pensions a survey abstract the paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence size and political sustainability of pay as you go pension systems it proposes a simple framework of analysis a small open two overlapping generation economy model around which some variants are displayed dictatorship of the median voter is assumed the text is organized to answer the following questions i do political equilibria with payg pension schemes exist ii why do they emerge iii what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified and finally iv what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous e g demographic shock

fiscal policy in a growth model with both altruistic and nonaltruistic agents this paper examines the long run behavior of an overlapping generations model with a population consisting of altruistic and nonaltruistic agents it also studies the effect of fiscal policy on aggregate capital accumulation and on the welfare of both types of agents it shows that an increase in the relative number of nonaltruists is pareto improving in the steady state it also shows that the introduction of public debt or unfunded social security has no effect on the longrun equilibrium but implies a transfer of resources from the nonaltruistic to the altruistic agents finally it indicates that inheritance taxation hurts not only the altruists but also the nonaltruists

innovation and performance evidence at micro level this empirical study aims to shed light on the link between innovation and economic performance at micro level based on a comprehensive survey among dairy and crop farms in the netherlands we estimate a structural multi stage model to deliver evidence on the effect of engagement and investment in innovation on the production of product process and organizational or marketing innovations as well as on the effect of such innovations on farm level productivity the results suggest various market and farm behaviour related factors to stimulate an increase in innovation engagement and production furthermore the study reveals that indeed a greater innovation investment per unit innovation input leads to a higher probability of producing at least one successful product process and or organizational or marketing innovation innovation output the production of process and organizational or marketing related innovation leads to significant productivity gains various recommendations towards a more effective and efficient innovation policy are finally given

long run equilibria with borrowing constraints and altruism this paper adapts a nonstochastic overlapping generations model to include liquidity constraints and intergenerational altruism existing work indicates the importance of both but often considers them separately this paper studies their interactions first it shows that they tend to conflict the model only admits stationary equilibria with dynastic wealth accumulation but no binding liquidity constraints or wity binding constraints but no dynastic accumulation second it examines the latter type of equilibrium closely if liquidity constraints bind quantitative examples imply that consequent utility losses may be small and that economywide wealth accumulation tends to be unrealistically low

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

pay as you go social security and the distribution of altruistic transfers this paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of altruistic transfers in a framework where savings are due to both life cycle and random altruistic motivations we show that the effect of social security on the distribution of these transfers depends crucially on the strength of the bequest motive in explaining savings behaviour we measure this strength by the expected weight that individuals attach to the utility of future generations on the one hand if the bequest motive is strong then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents on the other hand when the importance of altruism in motivating savings is sufficiently low the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed

dynamic efficiency measurement theory and application nonparametric dynamic measures of production efficiency are developed in the context of an adjustment cost technology and intertemporal cost minimization bounds on each efficiency measure are derived for each firm using a nonparametric revealed preference approach long run efficiency measures indicate the relative efficiency of both variable and dynamic factors while short run measures of efficiency indicate whether variable inputs are employed efficiently in the production process the efficiency measures are temporal in nature by describing the degree of efficiency of the firm at a particular point along its adjustment path the empirical implementation is illustrated for a balanced panel of pennsylvania dairy operators during 1986 1992

redistribution and optimal mixed taxation in the presence of consumption externalities abstract the literature on externalities and optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of asymmetric information has so far been confined to the case where externalities are of the atmospheric type one of the main results from this literature has been that the so called additivity property discovered by sandmo sandmo a 1975 optimal taxation in the presence of externalities swedish journal of economics 77 86 98 holds true also in this more general context this paper extends previous analyses by considering a general model where even if there is only one externality generating good the externality is not constrained to be of the atmospheric type the model is sufficiently unrestrictive to admit a variety of interpretations for example it is possible to interpret it as reflecting the case of different types of agents being differently vulnerable to the same externality another possibility is to view agents of different types as not equally effective as externality generating units yet another interpretation can be in terms of positional goods we show that while the additivity property fails in general to hold conditions can be derived which are sufficient to recover it both with respect to the commodity tax structure and with respect to the shape of the income tax schedule moreover stressing one or the other of the aforementioned interpretations delivers different results for the validity of the additivity property

a reduced form model for dynamic efficiency measurement application to dairy farms in germany and the netherlands the stochastic distance function model is extended to allow for the inefficiency component of the error term to be autocorrelated as implied by a dynamic model of firm behavior the autocorrelation parameter can then be interpreted as a measure of the persistence of inefficiency the model is viewed from a state space perspective and kalman filtering techniques are proposed for estimation the model is applied to two panels of dairy farms from germany and the netherlands the results suggest a very high degree of persistence of inefficiency through time

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

random earnings differences lifetime liquidity constraints and altruistic intergenerational transfers abstract this paper develops a model of private savings behavior in which households care about their descendants cannot have negative net worth and have lifetime earnings depending on random draws from an exogenous distribution of abilities the elements interact very lucky parents are likely to leave large estates constrained children are unusually likely to receive intergenerational transfers the paper proves the existence of a stationary cross sectional distribution of wealth endogenously determines where liquidity constraints will bind and shows that the long term interest rate must be such that ricardian neutrality fails its last section generates several illustrative numerical simulations

dynamic effects in inefficiency evidence from the colombian banking sector firms face a continuous process of technological and environmental changes that requires them to make managerial decisions in a dynamic context however costs and constraints prevent firms from making instant adjustments towards optimal conditions and may cause inefficiency to persist in time we propose a dynamic inefficiency specification that captures differences in the adjustment costs among firms and non persistent effects of inefficiency heterogeneity the model is fitted to a ten year sample of colombian banks the new specification improves model fit and have effects on efficiency estimations overall colombian banks present high inefficiency persistence but important differences between institutions are found in particular merged banks present low adjustment costs that allow them to recover rapidly efficiency losses derived from merging processes

decomposition of productivity growth using distance functions the case of dairy farms in three european countries within an output distance function framework the total factor productivity growth index is decomposed into four components technical change technical and allocative efficiency and scale component we estimate stochastic translog output distance functions using panel data from dairy farms over the period 1991 94 for three european countries germany the netherlands and poland results indicate that the change in the productivity growth index in germany 6 and poland 5 are mainly dictated by the technical change component in contrast the productivity growth index in the netherlands 3 is influenced by allocative efficiency components

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

fiscal policy with impure intergenerational altruism recent work demonstrates that dynastic assumptions guarantee the irrelevance of redistributional policies distortionary taxes and prices the neutrality of fiscal policy ricardian equivalence is only the tip of the iceberg this paper investigates the possibility of reinstating approximate ricardian equivalence by introducing a small amount of friction in intergenerational links if ricardian equivalence depends upon significantly shorter chains of links than do these stronger neutrality results then friction may dissipate the effects that generate strong neutrality without significantly affecting the ricardian result however models with friction have other untenable implications and thus the theoretical case for ricardian equivalence remains tenuous copyright 1991 by the econometric society

towards a theory of the direct indirect tax mix despite the fact that all developed economies levy broadly based indirect taxes alongside direct taxes little theory is devoted to explaining the direct indirect tax mix our purpose is to show that if different taxes have different evasion characteristics some optimal tax mix emerges naturally assuming that only income tax can be evaded and focusing on a two class economy we analyse the case for supplementing optimal non linear income taxation with commodity taxation and we develop conditions under which the latter should or should not be uniform

dynasties and destiny on the roles of altruism and impatience in the evolution of consumption and bequests abstract we study the joint role of altruism and impatience and the impact of evolution in the formation of long term time preferences and in the determination of optimal consumption and optimal bequests we show how the consumption paths of dynasties relate to altruism and to impatience and we reason that long lived dynasties will be characterized by a higher degree of altruism and a lower degree of impatience than short lived dynasties

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

direct versus indirect taxation the design of the tax structure revisited this article studies the optimal direct indirect tax mix problem when individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics productivity and endowments it presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to atkinson and stiglitz s 1976 result differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods when cross substitution effects are zero the expressions resemble traditional many households ramsey rules in a cobb douglas illustration where endowments differ only in good 1 interpreted as wealth the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

the distribution of wealth and welfare in the presence of incomplete annuity markets this paper examines the implications of the absence of complete annuity markets on the distribution of wealth and welfare of agents whose saving decisions are obtained under uncertainty regarding the length of their life the absence of annuities is shown to yield a unique nondegenerate intragenerational distribution of wealth which is fully characterized this characterization is then used to evaluate the pareto desirability of an annuity system alternative welfare criteria that can be used when the proposed change has differential impacts on the initial state of subsequent generations are considered

accidental bequests a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor when accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity the population should be partitioned into two groups those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do the first tagged group receives a mirrlees second best tax schedule the second group when its type is fully revealed faces a first best tax schedule receiving an inheritance makes high ability types worse off and low ability types better off high ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent while low ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100 percent and it might even be negative

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

co existence of a representative agent type equilibrium with a non representative agent type equilibrium we provide an example of an overlapping generations model with bequest motives and a non negativity constraint on bequests which has at least two equilibria in one equilibrium the bequest motive is operative at all dates and the equilibrium is formally equivalent to that of a representative infinitely lived agent model in the other equilibrium the bequest motive is never operative and the equilibrium is formally equivalent to that of an overlapping generations model without a bequest motive the example has obvious implications for the ricardian equivalence doctrine and the neutrality of lump sum tax transfers across generations

uncertainty optimal taxation and the direct versus indirect tax controversy this paper examines how the presence of uncertainty affects the design of tax policy when both indirect taxes and a general income tax are available to the government there are two categories of goods the consumption levels in one group are committed to before the resolution of uncertainty and those of the other after the paper proves that contrary to a b atkinson and j e stiglitz s 1976 result differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of optimal tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods copyright 1995 by royal economic society

optimal taxation of bequests in a model with initial wealth we formulate an optimal taxation model where parents leave bequests to their descendants for altruistic reasons in contrast to the standard model individuals differ not only in earning abilities but also in initial inherited wealth in this model a redistributive motive for an inheritance tax which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures arises given that initial wealth increases with earning abilities the introduction of the inheritance tax either increases intertemporal social welfare or has an ambiguous effect depending on whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in the social objective

decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program abstract developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations while retaining control over how much goes to each community we offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes results for bangladesh s food for education ffe program indicate that within village targeting improved with program size lower land inequality less remoteness fewer shocks and less private redistribution there is no sign that the center took account of village attributes conducive to reaching the poor

poverty alleviation and tax policy abstract this paper examines public good provision and tax policy optimal non linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation when the government departs from purely welfarist objective function and seeks to minimise poverty this assumption reflects much policy discussion and may help understand some divergences of practical tax policy from lessons in optimal tax analysis in contrast to atkinson and stiglitz j public econom 6 1976 55 it may be optimal to use differentiated commodity tax rates including the taxation of savings even if preferences are separable in goods and leisure the optimal effective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the distribution may be negative suggesting that wage subsidy schemes can be optimal finally optimal provision of a public good is analysed under poverty minimisation

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice this chapter provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time for this purpose we formulate an infinite horizon extension of dekel lipman and rustichini econometrica 69 891 934 2001 and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those about future discount factors we also show uniqueness of subjective belief about discount factors moreover a behavioral comparison about preference for flexibility characterizes the condition that one s subjective belief second order stochastically dominates the other finally the resulting model is applied to a consumption savings problem

second best optimal taxation of capital and labor in a developing economy abstract as commercial integration reduces the reliance on foreign trade taxation raising tax revenue has become a major concern for the governments of developing economies this paper examines how the tax burden in a developing economy should be distributed between capital income and labor income we study a two sector model where the traditional sector is informal and consequently cannot be taxed by the government in this setup we find that the optimal second best tax structure in order to raise a certain amount of revenue requires to tax capital income at least as much as labor income and possibly more

capital income taxation and the atkinson stiglitz theorem abstract accounting for the role of financial system and money holdings in an optimal nonlinear income tax model we argue that capital income taxation is a non redundant policy tool even if individual preferences are separable between leisure and other goods

does the labour market explain lower female schooling in india labour market discrimination against women and parental discrimination against daughters are two of the most commonly cited explanations of the gender gap in education in developing countries this study empirically tests the labour market explanation for india using recent household survey data the results reveal substantial omitted family background bias in the estimates of rates of return to education the findings suggest that as well as overall labour market discrimination girls face poorer economic incentives to invest in schooling than boys because they reap lower labour market returns to education than boys

inefficiency persistence and heterogeneity in colombian electricity utilities abstract the electricity reform in colombia has exhibited gains in terms of reliability but its effects on firm efficiency and service quality have not been clear previous studies evaluating the performance of distribution companies after the reform have not found evidence of improvements although large differences in efficiency have been found among firms this suggests high inefficiency persistence and heterogeneity in the colombian distribution sector in this paper we propose an extension of dynamic stochastic frontier models that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency persistence and in the technology the model incorporates total expenses service quality and energy losses in an efficiency analysis of colombian distributors over fifteen years after the reform we identify the presence of high inefficiency persistence in the sector and important differences between firms in particular rural companies and firms with small customers present low persistence and evidence the largest gains in efficiency during the period however increases in efficiency are only manifested during thelast five years when the main improvements in service quality and energy losses are presented overall inefficiency persistence customer density and consumption density are found to be important criteria to be considered for regulatory purposes

forced saving redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes this paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia myopic individuals may not save enough for their retirement the welfare function is paternalistic the rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types we show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases there is less redistribution and more forced saving and the desirability of social security increases

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

heterogeneous dynasties and the political economy of public debt we consider a small open overlapping generations economy with descending altruism heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfish children altruistic parents can recognize the type of each child there is no ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruistic dynasty members although there may be no unanimity among them we display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single peaked and we apply the median voter theorem we then describe political equilibrium paths and discuss their compatibility with the steady path of an underlying closed economy with autonomous labor productivity growth

the disadvantaged incumbents estimating incumbency effects in indian state legislatures this paper estimates the incumbency effects using a large dataset on state legislative elections in india during 1975 2003 i use a regression discontinuity design rdd that estimates the causal effect of incumbency by comparing candidates in closely fought elections i find that there is a significant disadvantage to incumbency in indian state legislative elections and the adverse effect of incumbency has increased after 1991 also the incumbency disadvantage is higher in states that have lower availability of public goods such as health centers and lower employment poverty and per capita income

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

equilibrium existence in an overlapping generations model with altruistic preferences abstract we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with altruistic preferences and nonnegative bequests in equilibrium some sequences of agents of successive generations may be continually linked by positive bequests and act as infinitely lived agents other sequences of agents may not be so linked and therefore behave as sequences of finite lived agents thus this paper adds to the literature on competitive equilibrium in dynamic models by endogenising the mix of finite and infinitely lived agents we also discuss optimality and provide some examples which exhibit interesting equilibria

political market characteristics and the provision of educational infrastructure in north india in this paper we are concerned with the provision of schools in rural north india particularly with whether such provision is determined by the demographic and economic characteristics of the region or whether local democracy also plays a role we find that the probability that a governing party loses an election has a positive effect on the provision of schooling infrastructure while the margin of victory of the governing party has a negative effect political reservation for members of the scheduled castes scs has a positive effect on schooling infrastructure in villages with a large sc population but a negative effect overall

bequests taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model this paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth we investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests we obtain all results analytically using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth from a policy perspective taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality

the allocation of publicly provided goods to rural households in india on some consequences of caste religion and democracy abstract what determines the allocation of publicly provided goods to rural households in india although empirically driven this paper draws on the characteristics of india s institutional structure and the implications of existing literature for framing the answer to this question we confront the main empirical implications drawn from this framework with a unique data set which brings together widely used district data with a recently constructed data set on political participation we identify three robust determinants of this allocation process formal and informal characteristics of each state allocation mechanism selectivity in the allocations against muslims and scheduled castes and bureaucratic rules and behavior

precautionary saving and accidental bequests this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests this model is used to analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation a precautionary demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the date at which he will die and he wants to avoid low levels of consumption in the event that he lives longer than expected an implication of this precautionary saving is that when death does occur the consumer is generally holding some wealth which is then passed on to his heirs in the form of an accidental bequest even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities there will be some intracohort variation in the date of death consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by consumers in a cohort this nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth consumption and bequests of subsequent generations the importance of bequests in aggregate saving has been established by laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 who reported that 80 percent of u s household wealth is inherited wealth one interpretation of this finding is that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of saving behavior in the united states but the model i present demonstrates that accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth although some part of bequests especially by the wealthy undoubtedly results from an explicit bequest motive accidental bequests also play a role in the intergenerational transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth in order to focus on the role of accidental bequests i purposely exclude a bequest motive from the specification of the utility function the effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first examined formally in a seminal paper by menachem yaari 1965 yaari s model provided the basic framework for virtually all subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well known papers by nils hakansson 1969 stanley fischer 1973 robert barro and james friedman 1977 david levhari and leonard mirman 1977 and kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 however all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental bequests 2 as will be shown at various points in this paper changes in the economic environment can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ sharply from the effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of bequests the effects of department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 this paper is a revised version of bequests and social security with uncertain lifetimes nber working paper no 1372 june 1984 i thank olivier blanchard john burbidge christopher cavanagh robert clower stanley fischer benjamin friedman elhanan helpman mervyn king nobuhiro kiyotaki laurence kotlikoff robert mcdonald james pesando julio rotemberg lawrence summers lars svensson mark watson and jeffrey wolcowitz for valuable conversations and correspondence i also thank the participants in seminars at boston university columbia university cornell university federal reserve board harvard university university of iowa mit university of minnesota university of montreal national bureau of economic research north carolina state university the wharton school and yale university and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments i also thank the national science foundation for financial support 1 in the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance markets there may or may not be bequests depending on the presence or absence of a bequest motive but there would be no accidental bequests 2 kotlikoff and spivak focus on the role of the family in providing an incomplete annuities market but stop short of a full scale overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is determined endogenously

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

redistribution with unobservable bequests a case for taxing capital income this paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics ability and inheritance we assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non linear in such a setting we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non linear tax on labour income is desirable the role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth

capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable this paper extends the atkinson stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics productive ability and inherited wealth bequests are motivated by the joy of giving a child s inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent s investment in a bequest technology public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule we study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available a non linear wage income tax and a proportional tax on capital income we show that the second instrument ought in general to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive however a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability

love thy children abstract this paper proves that barro s 1974 debt neutrality proposition whose relevance hinges in an economy with bequest motives on bequests being operative in the economy without public debt is not applicable to a wide class of overlapping generation economies those with a weak bequest motive in particular it is shown that the bequest motive is always too weak and public debt therefore non neutral when non physical assets have a well defined function reducing oversavings in the corresponding economy without bequest motive i e when the non altruistic economy is dynamically inefficient

in praise of frank ramsey s contribution to the theory of taxation frank ramsey s brilliant 1927 paper modestly entitled a contribution to the theory of taxation is a landmark in the economics of public finance nearly a half century later through the work of diamond and mirrlees 1971 and mirrlees 1971 his paper can be thought of as launching the field of optimal taxation and revolutionising public finance ramsey f p 1927 a contribution to the theory of taxation economic journal vol 37 145 pp 47 61

productivity growth measurement and decomposition under a dynamic inefficiency specification the case of german dairy farms abstract standard parametric models for efficiency and total factor productivity growth measurement either impose strict structures on the time evolution of efficiency scores or no structure at all when the data capture a sector in turbulent periods both specifications may be inappropriate the dynamic stochastic frontier model takes a middle way in terms of the time structure it imposes on efficiency scores we apply the dynamic stochastic frontier model to the case of german dairy farms in a period that is characterized by high milk price volatility the model is able to capture time specific efficiency and total factor productivity growth shocks that may have been induced by this high volatility furthermore the dynamic stochastic frontier model is favored by the data when compared to a model that imposes a very restrictive time structure on efficiency and two models that do not impose any time structure at all

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

commodity taxation in welfare states i introduction while the nature of unemployment is diverse a substantial part of unemployment in many developed countries it is argued stems from generous social welfare systems meyer 1990 nickell and layard 1999 and see figure 1 1 in fact the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd data show that countries with generous unemployment insurance ui face high unemployment rates and tend to have high commodity tax rates see figure 2 this paper attempts to account for these empirical patterns in the optimal taxation framework in a general equilibrium context the unemployment mentioned above can be viewed as a result of a a low work incentive induced by generous social insurance welfare benefits combined with b the subsequent employment adjustment by firms e g not renewing employment contracts or hiring a portion of temporary part time workers as regular workers to raise labor productivity to deal with this type of unemployment the government may need to seek reforms of social insurance welfare systems including a reduction in unemployment benefits but the public s redistributive motives often do not permit implementation of such reforms 2 under this socioeconomic constraint this paper raises a question can commodity taxation help reduce unemployment and improve efficiency perhaps a slightly different but equally interesting question that concerns many welfare states in recent decades may be suppose that a society agreed on the expansion of welfare programs in financing the increased welfare expenditure which tax increase consumption taxes or income taxes is more relevant figure 1 omitted figure 2 omitted to address these questions we examine the role of commodity taxation in a general equilibrium model where a taking into account wage unemployment benefits and taxes workers choose work effort that the firm can observe only through costly monitoring and b firms use both wage and monitoring as effort eliciting devices and they fire those caught shirking therefore the chosen level of a worker s effort affects the probabilities of employment and unemployment and thus involuntary unemployment arises from moral hazard 3 in this contractual setting with imperfect information we consider the government s problem of maximizing the representative worker s expected utility using income and commodity taxes we derive new results on commodity taxation and present supportive results using quantitative analysis our key results suggest that commodity taxation can be used to alleviate moral hazard and hence unemployment which can account for why countries with generous social welfare systems tend to adopt high commodity tax rates see figure 2 this main result is based on the following feature of the model given the aforementioned environment optimal commodity and income tax rates can be determined in contrast to the indeterminacy result of atkinson and stiglitz 1976 henceforth as 4 therefore our results provide an explanation for the widely observed coexistence of direct and indirect taxation to illustrate the intuition behind our results consider a situation where a a society provides liberal unemployment benefits for unemployed workers and b the government sets the levels of income and commodity tax rates so as to finance the expenditures for ui and public goods liberal unemployment benefits are equivalent to treating the consumption of unemployed workers favorably i e between states consumption choice distortion which creates moral hazard in the supply of effort under imperfect information about effort obviously drastic reforms in social insurance systems e g cutting benefits can correct moral hazard but the public s redistributive motives do not permit such reforms in this setting we show that strengthening commodity taxation while lessening income taxation penalizes moral hazard which lowers the between states consumption choice distortion leading to a greater supply of effort