pricing in multiple item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost in a sealed bid multiple item procurement auction bidders may incur a fixed cost which is common to all items the paper develops pricing methods which ensure that a preset percentage profit level is always realized and the fixed cost is completely recovered even if the eventual order is for some of the items at reduced quantities one approach sets constraints and determines acceptable orders another alternative is to provide appropriate discounts finally a third method considers fixed prices and imposes constraints that address the exposure problem of recovering the fixed cost these methods may also be used for pricing combinatorial auctions

can education subsidy reverse falling fertility the case of taiwan abstract the education subsidy in taiwan is available for government employees only in 1996 the government ceased to index the education subsidy for inflation which created a natural experiment ideal for studying the effect of the education subsidy on fertility using the difference in differences approach we find that the reform reduced the fertility probability for public sector households by 17 per cent and this negative response appears to be permanent the estimated probability elasticity of fertility is 0 05 which is smaller than that of personal tax exemption 0 8 the results also suggest that the education subsidy has a heterogeneous effect on fertility across income groups

bidding for contracts in a competitive procurement a buyer seeks to institute a bidding and contracting procedure which selects the most efficient firm to undertake the contract while offering terms that promote risk sharing between buyer and contractor this paper develops a model to analyze formally the trade off between the objectives of risk sharing and efficient contractor selection

testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions this paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in new jersey at the auction every unit was hammered down but unknown to the 2 348 registered bidders 40 of the sales fell through prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiations resulted in identical units selling for 13 less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units hammered down early in the auction these results are inconsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of common value auctions and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a winner s curse which generated considerable profit for the seller this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from ano this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the global rise of the value weighted portfolio we first develop a theory based metric to judge the popularity of value weighting in a stock market we then use our metric to document that although value weighting is less popular in emerging markets than in developed markets its popularity is increasing almost everywhere finally as we have better data for the united states we explore why value weighting is becoming more popular in the united states

how does parental leave affect fertility and return to work evidence from two natural experiments this paper analyzes the effects of changes in the duration of paid job protected parental leave on mothers higher order fertility and postbirth labor market careers identification is based on a major austrian reform increasing the duration of parental leave from one year to two years for any child born on or after july 1 1990 we find that mothers who give birth to their first child immediately after the reform have more second children than prereform mothers and that extended parental leave significantly reduces return to work employment and earnings also decrease in the short run but not in the long run fertility and work responses vary across the population in ways suggesting that both cash transfers and job protection are relevant increasing parental leave for a future child increases fertility strongly but leaves short run postbirth careers relatively unaffected partially reversing the 1990 extension a second 1996 reform improves employment and earnings while compressing the time between births

appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support prequalifications and penalties abstract auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support res however they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders the major risk for the auctioneer with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for res in general is the risk of non realization awarded bidders do not realize their projects the main reasons are bidders uncertainties concerning their project costs the auctioneer can reduce the non realization risk by taking various measures the most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties an evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for res the non realization option induces lower bids a suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non realization risk significantly however involves sunk costs counterintuitively first price auction and second price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes the appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging under consideration of all implications we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency

auctions with contingent payments there now exists a host of results concerning the revenue performance of various auction methods this note delves deeper into auction markets by examining the effects on sellers revenue of certain noncash means of payment the basic result that bidding mediums which include some contingent pricing feature generally yield the seller more revenue than do cash bids is intriguing by itself and also points out the limitations of received theory since what follows builds on the independent preferences framework it is useful to first note the assumptions of that model and the major results pertaining to it to model an auction in the independent preferences tradition one assumes that bidders have reservation values vi that are known only privately and that can be depicted as being drawn independently from some distribution f v the most important result for this model is the revenue equivalence theorem as given in john riley and william samuelson 1981 any auction involving risk neutral bidders for which the following four conditions hold a a buyer can make any bid above some minimum reserve price b the buyer making the highest bid is awarded the object c the auction rules are anonymous and d there is a common equilibrium bidding strategy in which each buyer makes a bid bi which is a strictly increasing function of his reservation value vi yields an expected revenue of

participation and welfare in auctions with default abstract in an auction with costly participation we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through i the possibility of no trade and ii the under participation of bidders in equilibrium we also provide closed form solutions to the model

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

fertility and the personal exemption implicit pronatalist policy in the united states the personal exemption in the us provides households with an income tax subsidy for each child this paper uses aggregate time series data for the us from 1913 to 1984 to estimate the impact of the tax value of the personal exemption on the aggregate birth rate the empirical results indicate that the personal exemption has a positive and significant impact on fertility and this result is robust to a variety of specifications the us therefore pursues an implicit pronatalist policy through the income tax and the empirical results indicate that the recent tax reform act of 1986 will on average increase this subsidy for fertility authors

credit auctions and bid caps abstract in this paper we offer two contributions to the field of credit auctions first we compare first and second price credit auctions and provide solvency dependent conditions such that one mechanism dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs of all the parties involved in addition we present a new possibility of using bid caps in credit auctions we study the equilibria in the capped mechanisms and show that bid caps can increase the seller s expected payoff and in some cases the expected payoffs of all sides a win win situation

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

will the stork return to europe and japan understanding fertility within developed nations we seek to explain the differences in fertility rates across high income countries by focusing on the interaction between the increasing status of women in the workforce and their status in the household particularly with regards to child care and home production we observe three distinct phases in women s status generated by the gradual increase in women s workforce opportunities in the earliest phase characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s in the united states women earn low wages relative to men and are expected to shoulder all of the child care at home as a result most women specialize in home production and raising children in an intermediate stage women have improved but not equal labor market opportunities but their household status lags women in this stage are still expected to do the majority of child care and household production increasing access to market work increases the opportunity cost of having children and fertility falls female labor force participation increases working women in this phase of development have the strongest disincentives to having additional children since the entire burden of child care falls on them in the final phase of development women s labor market opportunities begin to equal those of men in addition the increased household bargaining power that comes from more equal wages results in much higher if not gender equal male participation in household production female labor force participation is higher than in the intermediate phase the increased participation of men in the household also reduces the disincentives for women to have additional children and fertility rates rise compared to the intermediate phase the intermediate low fertility phase might describe japan italy and spain in the present day while the scandinavian countries the netherlands and the modern day united states may be entering the final phase after presenting the empirical evidence we predict that high income countries with the lowest fertility rates are likely to see an increase in fertility in the coming decades

the effects of social security on population and output growth in this paper we have considered two unfunded social security programs under the conventional system benefits are related to aggregate fertility under the hypothetical fertility related system benefits are directly linked to individual fertility the effects on fertility and per capita growth rates of the two social security systems are examined in the context of endogenous growth the relative merits of the two systems for developing and developed countries are considered the authors conclude that the conventional social security system existing in many developed nations may be desirable to developing countries in reducing population and promoting economic growth on the other hand the hypothetical fertility related system may be useful to developed countries as far as increasing fertility is concerned

fertility and the size of the u s labor force this paper reviews and interprets from an economic perspective the demographic trends in the u s since the turn of the century the primary focus will be upon the interplay between the fertility and labor force participation of women and how they may be interpreted within simple economic models we will begin by stating what economic demography is and why careful analytic methods are needed section ii provides a brief demographic history of the u s section iii describes the major economic theories of fertility and section iv discusses the empirical performance of these theories section v discusses the linkages between fertility and the size of the labor force and section vi concludes excerpt

is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly a widespread practice particularly in public sector procurement and dispersal is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage arguments for such policies vary but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy when disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively we consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters

the effect of tax transfer policies on fertility in canada 1921 88 this paper estimates the effect on fertility of the personal tax exemption for children child tax credit family allowances and maternity leave benefits in canada using time series data from 1921 to 1988 it is found that the exemption child tax credit and family allowances all have significant and positive effects on fertility the results are robust to a variety of specifications including first differencing while the three tax transfer programs seem to be very distinct the null hypothesis that they have no differential effects on fertility can hardly be rejected all the results also hold for the cumulative effect of the three tax transfer programs the estimates predict that a large increase in the value of the tax transfer programs would be needed to increase fertility to the replacement level

financial incentives and fertility using panel data on over 300 000 israeli women from 1999 to 2005 we exploit variation in israel s child subsidy to identify the impact of changes in the price of a marginal child on fertility we find a positive statistically significant and economically meaningful price effect on overall fertility and consistent with becker 1960 and becker and tomes 1976 a small effect of income on fertility which is negative at low and positive at high income levels we also find a price effect on fertility among older women suggesting that part of the overall effect is due to a reduction in total fertility

the fertility effect of dependent tax exemptions estimates for the united states the effect of the dependent tax exemption on the fertility rate in the united states is estimated the estimation is an improvement on previous work in that a non linear specification is used to better capture the shape of the demand for children it is found that the marginal effect of the dependent exemption decreases with the level of the exemption this suggests that although subsidies for childbearing will increase fertility it becomes increasingly difficult for countries to increase fertility through this type of scheme

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

retrospectives john maynard keynes investment innovator john maynard keynes made a major contribution to the development of professional investment management based on detailed archival research at king s college cambridge we describe keynes investment philosophy his investment performance and the evolution of his investment approach as the manager of a large educational endowment his portfolios were actively managed and unconventional he was an investment innovator both in making a substantial allocation to the then new institutional asset class of common stocks as well as in championing value investing

auction theory with private values for many centuries auctions have been a common form of selling procedure although auction methods vary across country and product the two most frequently observed are the open ascending bid or english auction and the sealed bid auction recent theoretical research has led to a theory of equilibrium bidding in these two auctions and a wide range of alternatives as well as a result it has been possible to compare the revenue extracted by the seller under different auction methods and even to characterize the revenue maximizing auction the revenue equivalence theorem see for example william vickrey 1961 roger myerson 1981 and riley and william samuelson 1981 asserts that when each bidder s reservation price for a unit of an indivisible good is an independent draw from the same distribution and bidders are risk neutral the sealed bid auction generates the same expected revenue as the open auction much recent research has involved weakening each of the main hypotheses risk neutrality identically distributed values and independence of values in turn we shall illustrate some of the principal conclusions of this work by considering the properties of open and sealed bid auctions in a model of two bidders whose reservation prices can assume only two values and by comparing these auctions to the optimal or revenuemaximizing auction i revenue equivalence

ex post information in auctions assumptions maskin and riley 1984 show that when the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the auctioned object is not independent of his wealth expected revenue tends to be lower under open bidding in contrast milgrom and weber 1982 relax the assumption that valuations are independent and assume instead that buyers private estimates of the item s value are affiliated a buyer with a high estimate then tends to believe that other buyers will have higher estimates as well maintaining the other assumptions milgrom and weber show that expected revenue is higher in the open ascending bid auction the intuition behind this result is that in sealed high bid auctions a buyer s bid is determined not only by his own beliefs but via their bids by the beliefs of those with lower estimates a buyer with a low estimate believes that others are more likely to have low estimates as well he therefore bids less aggressively it follows that a buyer can beat all opponents who have lower estimates with a bid which is lower than it would be if beliefs were independent 2 milgrom and weber also show that if the seller purchases and then publicly reveals information which is positively linked to buyers valuations this also raises expected gross revenue from an auction the intuition here is that this helps to reduce the difference in bidders willingness to pay 3 that such a reduction should raise expected revenue is easily understood for the limiting case in which the seller s information includes all the buyers private information for then all buyer asymmetry is eliminated and so expected buyer profit is bid away to zero the seller therefore reaps the entire surplus in the following pages the implications of correlated signals are further explored while milgrom and weber emphasized the potential gains to a seller who reveals information ex ante the focus here is on ex post information in section 2 it is shown that under weak assumptions the sealed high bid auction is dominated by any auction

fertility and the personal exemption comment one of the most commonly cited studies on the effect of child subsidies on fertility whittington alm and peters 1990 claimed a large positive effect of child tax benefits on fertility using time series methods we revisit this question in light of recent increases in child tax benefits by replicating this earlier study and extending the analysis we do not find strong evidence to justify the model specification from the original paper moreover even if the original specification is appropriate we show that the results are not robust to more general measures of child tax benefits jel h24 j13

auctions with contingent payments an overview i survey a literature on auctions with contingent payments that is auctions in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex post verifiable variable such as revenues in oil lease auctions based on demarzo et al 2005 i describe a partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms pricing rules and seller commitment and why the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply even in an independent private values setup i discuss models that incorporate adverse selection moral hazard competition between auctioneers common values and the sale of multiple units

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

limited liability and mechanism design in procurement in the presence of cost uncertainty limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bankruptcy costs when nancial soundness is not perfectly observable we show that incentive compatibility implies that nancially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism informational rents are associated with unsound nancial situations by selecting the nancially weakest contractor stronger price competition auctions may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents thus weak conditions are su cient for auctions to be suboptimal in particular we show that pooling rms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

population aging class context and age inequality in public spending although recent experiences in the united states suggest that population aging for both demographic and political reasons favors public spending for the elderly relative to children many european nations with different political environments show no shuch pattern this paper investigates age inequality or bias in public spending for these two age based dependent groups using annual time series data for 18 advanced industrial democracies the results show that a large aged population reduces age inequality in favor of the eldearly in the presence of 1 class based corporatism and 2 strong leftist parties whereas a large aged population increases age inequality in the absence of these two factors

equilibria in open common value auctions abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness of nash equilibrium in second price common value auctions is identified we establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit common value auctions for the case of two bidders we provide plausible sufficient conditions under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium an example in which the auctioneer s revenue at the symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction is strictly greater than the revenue at many asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding irrevocable exit auction is provided

a model of auction contracts with liquidated damages abstract this paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller in the event of a default on the auction contract the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit when renegotiation is possible increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller s payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder under these conditions the seller s payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit journal of economic literature classification number d44

marital status and fertility in the united states welfare and labor market effects the incidence of marriage and the proportion of childbearing that occurs within marriage have decreased sharply in the united states in the last several decades this paper examines whether the probability that a woman is currently married and the number of children she has borne as reported in the 1980 u s census are related to two identifiable factors the variation in welfare programs across states specifically afdc and medicaid benefits and afdc up expenditures or the variation in the market wage opportunities available to women and to their potential husbands afdc and medicaid benefit levels are associated with fewer women being currently married medicaid benefits are related to lower fertility levels for both black and white women whereas afdc benefits in cash and food are associated with lower fertility among white women ages 15 24 those states that extend afdc benefits to families with unemployed parents in other words fathers in intact poor families do not have significantly more women married or higher fertility rates contrary to what might be expected from economic incentives men s market wages are associated with more frequent marriage and higher fertility whereas higher market wage opportunities for women have substantial effects in the opposite direction all of which are consistent with standard models of gender specialization and the demand for marriage and fertility

withdrawable bids as winner s curse insurance when bidders have a common value or strongly affiliated values for an object or contract being auctioned by sealed bids it is possible that the maker of a rational and apparently winning bid would upon learning the competing bids prefer losing the auction to honoring his bid the ability to withdraw a bid perhaps at a cost in such circumstances provides a form of winner s curse insurance bidding with such insurance is analyzed obtaining the general condition for rational bid withdrawal and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with more aggressive bidding next we define a compensation penalties bid withdrawal penalty scheme and show that with it the bid taker is better off on the average than if bid withdrawal is impossible finally we find equilibrium bidding and withdrawal strategies in a multiplicative model as a function of the magnitude of the bid withdrawal penalty and of the bid taker s likelihood after a withdrawal of honoring the second best bid this model has

are children really inferior goods evidence from displacement driven income shocks abstract this paper explores the causal link between income and fertility by analyzing women s fertility response to the large and permanent income shock generated by a husband s job displacement i find that the shock reduces total fertility suggesting that the causal effect of income on fertility is positive a model that incorporates the time cost of children and assortative matching of spouses can simultaneously explain this result and the negative cross sectional relationship i also find that a husband s displacement accelerates childbearing which is consistent with lifecycle models of fertility in which the incentive to delay is driven by expected earnings growth

redistribution fertility and growth the effect of the opportunities abroad abstract this article analyzes the effect of the opportunities abroad on the growth path that a small open economy in which redistribution policy in favor of less prosperous segments takes place is expected to follow the model shows that redistribution policy raises fertility among the unskilled recipients lowers fertility among the contributing skilled slows human capital accumulation and reduces per capita output growth the paper demonstrates that the opportunities abroad determine the share of income redistributed and ultimately induce the offspring of the unskilled to invest in human capital and decrease their family size

did expanding the eitc promote motherhood during the 1990 s the earned income tax credit eitc emerged as a primary means of providing income support for low income families in the united states in an effort to keep the program well targeted the credit largely restricts eligibility to tax filers with children one potentially unintended consequence of this design is that it might encourage childbearing we raise the question of whether the eitc through its generous benefits to families with children actually increases fertility we approach this topic for three reasons the first is to expand upon an existing literature of economic incentives and fertility using the eitc expansion as a large exogenous variation in the price of childbearing findings in the welfare literature are inconclusive robert a moffitt 1998 and the income tax literature typically finds small but statistically significant effects of the income tax system on fertility behavior e g leslie a whittington et al 1990 second declining fertility rates in many western counties raise the general issue of whether the tax system can be used as a tool for encouraging fertility finally by considering the link between the eitc and fertility we question a common yet untested assumption in the literature on the eitc and the labor supply of single parents that the presence of a child is exogenous to the value of the eitc

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions abstract in this paper we study renegotiation in procurement auctions a procurer with private valuation announces a project which can be completed by many firms these firms submit bids which may be renegotiated upon later in the equilibrium we characterize the probability of renegotiation is decreasing in both the cost of renegotiation and the number of firms we conclude that the initial bids are more than cheap talk these prices serve simultaneously as bids to win the contract and signals of the firms costs finally we compare our model to other renegotiation models in the literature

subsidizing the stork new evidence on tax incentives and fertility this paper exploits the introduction of a pronatalist transfer policy in the canadian province of quebec that paid up to c 8 000 to families having a child i implement a quasi experimental strategy by forming treatment and control groups defined by time jurisdiction and family type the incentive was available broadly rather than to a narrow population as studied in previous work providing an exceptional opportunity to investigate heterogeneous responses i find a strong effect of the policy on fertility and some evidence of a heterogeneous response that may help reconcile these results with previous estimates

bidding in common value auctions how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner s curse experienced construction industry executives suffer from a winner s curse in laboratory common value auction markets dyer et al dyer d j h kagel d levin 1989 a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions laboratory analysis econom j 99 108 115 this paper identifies essential differences between field environments and the economic theory underlying the laboratory markets that account for the executives success in the field and a winner s curse in the lab these are 1 industry specific mechanisms which enable contractors to escape the winner s curse even when they bid too low 2 learned industry specific evaluative processes which enable experienced contractors to avoid the winner s curse in the first place and 3 important private value elements that underlie bidding also identified are a number of industry specific bidding characteristics whose evolution can be explained using modern auction theory lessons are drawn regarding the use of experime

income risk the tax benefit system and the demand for children because children represent an irreversible commitment parents might hedge against higher income risk by having fewer children we show that under plausible assumptions recent increases in income risk might have reduced prudent parents desired fertility responses to this via the tax benefit system are considered introducing an expected revenue neutral transfer cum child benefit system under proportional taxation which lets the government share the household s income risk increases desired fertility for parents who would choose to have small families in this system s absence pound for pound the targeted child benefit enhances fertility more than the lump sum transfer

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

rfq auctions with supplier qualification screening we consider a manufacturer using a request for quotes rfq reverse auction in combination with supplier qualification screening to determine which qualified supplier will be awarded a contract supplier qualification screening is costly for the manufacturer for example involving reference checks financial audits and on site visits the manufacturer seeks to minimize its total procurement costs i e the contract payment plus qualification costs although suppliers can be qualified prior to the auction prequalification we allow the manufacturer to delay all or part of the qualification until after the auction postqualification using an optimal mechanism analysis we analytically explore the trade offs between varying levels of pre and postqualification although using postqualification causes the expected contract payment to increase bids from unqualified suppliers are discarded we find that standard industrial practices of prequalification can be improved upon by judicious use of postqualification particularly when supplier qualification screening is moderately expensive relative to the value of the contract to the manufacturer

j m keynes s investment performance a note aside from his contribution to the development of economic theory john maynard keynes is reputed to have had extraordinary skills as an investor in the stock market there has been no evidence to date however to support this widely accepted legend the purpose here is to examine empirically the investment performance of john maynard keynes in particular as first bursar of the chest fund at king s college cambridge over the period from 1927 to 1945 on the basis of modern performance evaluation measures the evidence indicates that keynes was an outstanding portfolio manager beating the market by a large margin

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

income taxes and the marriage decision economic incentives have been found to play an important role in the marriage decision in developed and developing countries however the way in which the income tax treatment of the family affects these incentives has been routinely ignored this paper uses time series data for the united states from 1947 to 1988 to estimate the impact of economic factors including for the first time the tax consequences of marriage on the aggregate marriage rate the estimation results indicate that economic factors like income female wages and education play an important and statistically significant role in the marriage decision in particular the tax consequences of marriage clearly affect the marriage decision when income taxes increase with marriage the aggregate marriage rate declines however the magnitude of this impact is quite small this result suggests that some individuals respond to tax incentives in their marriage choices but that for many individuals taxes do not affect these decisions

paternity deferments and the timing of births u s natality during the vietnam war i background during the conflict in vietnam men between 18 5 and 25 yr of age were subject to the draft several exemptions to this rule existed for example students were exempt importantly for the purposes of this study married men with dependents could also obtain a deferment from the draft and the particulars of this policy underwent substantial changes in the 1960s in august 1965 president johnson issued executive order 11241 which formally eliminated deferments for childless men who got married after august 26 1965 and in october 1965 the selective service declared that childless married men irrespective of the date of marriage were to be called up both announcements came as a surprise new york times 1965a since married men with children remained exempt the declarations provided a strong incentive for young couples to conceive a first born child before august 1965 marriage had been a sufficient condition for a deferment even just a few hours before the august 26 midnight deadline desperate couples tried to make use of this provision by quickly scheduling their wedding between august and october couples who had missed the deadline had to satisfy an additional condition conceiving a child childless men who got married in this period were still subject to the draft and so had an incentive to conceive a child in october 1965 the risk of induction was further extended to all couples who had remained childless finally in april 1970 the family deferments were entirely eliminated by executive order 11527 the selective service system office of public and intergovernmental affairs 2004 past research has demonstrated that taxes and expenditure programs can affect fertility e g whittington alm and peters 1990 see also milligan 2005 for an excellent review as well as the timing of delivery dickert conlin and chandra 1999 the goal of this article was to provide additional evidence on the responsiveness of childbearing to incentives embedded in public policy by studying a dramatic yet unexamined government intervention the effects of the vietnam war paternity deferments on the decision to conceive a first born child as discussed in the popular press vice president dick cheney s first daughter elizabeth was born 9 mo 2 d after the selective service system announced that childless married men were to be drafted boston globe 2000 slate chatterbox 2004 did draft eligible men strategically react to the announcement and if so how widespread and fast was the response to my knowledge no one has investigated the impacts of the vietnam draft on natality using the vietnam draft rules to identify a causal effect however i build on several prior studies angrist for example uses the exogeneity of the vietnam draft rules to identify the effects of military service on lifetime earnings angrist 1990 angrist and chen 2007 and to measure the racial differences in the value of military service angrist 1991 gullason 1989 and card and lemieux 2001 2002 estimate the effects of the vietnam draft on schooling explicitly recognizing that college attendance often served as a vehicle to avoid the draft both studies find a significant effect of the probability of being drafted on school enrollment the fact that the changes in the selective service rules were both unexpected and widely publicized makes this an ideal example to study the effects of policy on fertility decisions milligan 2005 argues that the assumptions made about the timing of the response to policy are arbitrary since a reaction will be delayed not only by a 9 mo gestational lag but also by the time necessary for the diffusion of information about the change in policy in the case examined here however the criticism seems less relevant newspaper clippings from august 27 1965 suggest that the issuance of the executive order 11241 did receive broad attention for example the story was listed on the front pages of new york times 1965c and washington post 1965b

the butz ward fertility model in the light of more recent data butz and ward b w in their 1979 article the emergence of countercyclical us fertility postulated a change in the longstanding pattern of procyclical fertility first documented by dorothy thomas in 1927 the paucity of published data on female wages led b w to approximate a time series using a number of disparate sources there has been some criticism of the b w methodology focusing mainly on the problem of autocorrelation in time series analysis and misspecification 15 years after the 1979 article a great deal of both micro and macro data exist which were not available at the time of the original b w research the author tests the robustness of the b w results by first updating them using their original sources then with data drawn from the march current population survey cps the results indicate that there are wide divergences between the original b w estimates of female wages and the cps time series in particular the cps time series shows that much of the dramatic increase in the female hourly wage in the 1960s as estimated by b w appears to have been the result of the proxy they used for average hours worked that proxy was a series of average hours of all workers in the retail trade which trends sharply downward contrary to the actual pattern for married women estimates of the b w model using the new cps series fail to work neither in terms of the signs nor significance of the variables even using the original b w data their model no longer fits in the period after about 1954 their results seem to have been driven by relationships exhibited during 1947 54 almost 10 years before the increases in female labor force participation which began in the 1960s