socio economic characteristics and the effect of taxation as a health policy instrument abstract this paper analyses the quantitative effects of using economic instruments in health policy on the basis of price elasticities calculated from estimated demand systems the nutritional effects of various taxation schemes are compared for households in different age groups and social classes focusing on the consumption of saturated fats fibre and sugar it is generally found that the impact of price instruments is stronger for lower social classes than in other groups of the population with regard to age groups it is mostly the youngest that decrease their demand for saturated fat in response to price changes while it is mostly the middle aged who exhibit price responsiveness in their demand for sugar these groups are however not considered as key target groups for dietary regulation thus tax instruments may be effective in improving diets on average but the design of the instruments and the targeting of vulnerable groups with special needs should be done with care it should be noted that a tax on a single nutrient or food may have undesired effects on the demand for other food components though this may be avoided by introducing taxes subsidies on several food products simultaneously

national animosity and cross border alliances we extend the cross border strategic alliance knowledge base by introducing dyad specific antagonism animosity between nation pairs and hold that the formation and the type of firm level cross border alliances are nontrivially impacted by conflicting relations and animosity between their home nations we examine the formation of alliances between firms among nation dyads with and without a history of conflicts the frequency and magnitude of conflicts increase the perception of likelihood of opportunism and dyad specific risks materially affect the context in which firms make alliance decisions as animosity between two nations increases the number and the probability of forming alliances within the dyad the nations form decreases conditional on the expected number of alliances increased antagonistic actions of nations outside the dyad and dissimilarity in the historical conflicts that each nation has engaged in outside the dyad i increase the number of equity alliances and ii decrease the number of nonequity alliances as a proportion of total alliances we find positive main effects of learning to contract through prior experience only for equity vs nonequity alliances the reputation effects of antagonism based on relationships with nations outside of the dyad negatively moderate the positive learning effects of prior equity alliance experience abstract from author

modelling the joint determination of household labour supplies and commodity demands in addition to choosing the allocation of total expenditure between commodities households may also be able to make decisions over the allocation of their time between market work and leisure in both theoretical and empirical work it has often been the case that these decisions have been analysed separately in this paper we stress the theoretical attractions of considering the joint determination of the allocation of time between work and leisure and the allocation of total expenditure between commodities in a utility maximising framework using a sample of individual households we attempt to evaluate the empirical importance of the joint determination model over the separate determination of labour supplies and commodity demands our approach follows that of abbott and ashenfelter i976 phlips i978 barnett i979 deaton and muellbauer i980 and atkinson and stern i980 here we pay particular attention to the following four important aspects of household decision making over commodity demand and labour supply the first concerns the commonly assumed restriction on the household s preferences of weak separability between goods and leisure this assumption allows the estimation of commodity demand systems and engel curves that exclude wage rate variables in cross section household budget data with large variation in wage rates across the sample the invalidity of this assumption would involve a serious mis specification any correlation between the excluded wage variable and the included price income and demographic variables would lead to biased parameter estimates and hence biased estimated elasticities similarly this assumption allows the estimation of labour supply curves that exclude relative price variables and its invalidity could produce biased labour supply elasticities a second aspect of household decision making which we wish to highlight arises from the suspicion commonly alluded to in labour economics texts that primary male workers may not be free to choose their hours of work thus we estimate a matched pair of rationed and unrationed systems following the work of neary and roberts i 980 and deaton and muellbauer i 979 the separability restriction is not unrelated to this point since without it we will see that the rationed hours of work enter demand systems in a complex fashion in effect

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

weak separability and the estimation of elasticities in multistage demand systems the necessary conditions for multistage budgeting to be at least approximately justified are reviewed and the plausibility of these assumptions i e weak separability and low variability of price indices with utility level are discussed using no further assumptions simple relationships between expenditure and price elasticities in different budgeting levels are derived these results are applied to a three stage model for swedish food consumption and it is shown that the assumptions are not inappropriate restricting the analysis to the last stage of a multistage budgeting process is also shown to lead to considerable errors which could well have policy consequences

predicting the effects of in kind transfers on labor supply few empirical questions in economics have received the degree of attention that has been directed at measuring the impact of income transfers on work incentives the labor market effects of cash assistance have been carefully examined by numerous investigators while in kind programs have received relatively scant treatment despite that over the past twenty years the composition of federal antipoverty expenditures has dramatically shifted in favor of in kind aid two arguments are frequently offered in support of this change in approach to combatting poverty the first expresses concern over the competence of the poor to make wise decisions regarding their own consumption activity restricted transfers are a means of helping the poor while ensuring that the assistance is used in accordance with society s views on what will best improve the lot of recipients the second argument is that in kind transfers are less attractive to the poor than unrestricted cash grants and as such offer greater incentives for the poor to work and leave the welfare rolls this is a question for which little direct evidence exists given the absence of explicit studies to draw upon it has been natural to consider the disincentive effects of in kind transfer programs within conventional models by treating the transfers as if they had taken the form of cash this is a valid approach only if these programs induce the same consumption patterns as do money transfers existing evidence indicates that this is often not so a sizeable literature has evolved concerning recipient valuation of in kind assistance studies that entail computation of cash equivalent values for food stamps 6 7 18 20 22 24 public housing 7 8 15 and medicaid 20 24 provide evidence that these transfers are frequently valued well below market cost this indicates that many current and prospective recipients of in kind assistance are by the nature of the programs forced to consume a different mix of commodities and leisure than they would have had they received cash in terms of economic theory this means that the appropriate model should incorporate quantity constrained commodity demand and labor

politics at the water s edge parties voters and the use of force abroad this article examines the effects of party politics and presidential election cycles on u s recourse to force abroad i analyze a game theoretic model to generate predictions about these effects in the unique time consistent equilibrium outcome of the one shot game policy varies across political parties in a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated game the use of force is invariant to the partisan composition of government in neither case does policy respond to the electoral cycle an empirical analysis supports the predictions of the repeated game between 1870 and 1992 u s recourse to force abroad responds neither to partisan politics nor to the domestic political calendar it responds only to changes in u s power status and to the advent of general wars

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

testing the infrequent purchases model using direct measurement of hidden consumption from food stocks survey reports of zero expenditure result from either genuine non consumption or purchases undertaken too infrequently to observe during a survey with hidden consumption from stocks infrequent purchase models rely on untested hypotheses to distinguish these types of zeros we test such models with data from an unusual survey where food stocks are measured at the start and end of the survey reference period parameter estimates using these direct measures of hidden consumption out of stocks are compared with estimates from infrequent purchase models that attempt to recover this hidden consumption the results suggest considerable bias when using the infrequent purchase models copyright 2012 oxford university press

food stamps and food insecurity what can be learned in the presence of nonclassical measurement error policymakers have been puzzled to observe that food stamp households appear more likely to be food insecure than observationally similar eligible nonparticipating households we reexamine this issue allowing for nonclassical reporting errors in food stamp participation and food insecurity extending the literature on partially identified parameters we introduce a nonparametric framework that makes transparent what can be known about conditional probabilities when a binary outcome and conditioning variable are both subject to nonclassical measurement error we find that the food insecurity paradox hinges on assumptions about the data that are not supported by the previous food stamp participation literature

union contracts and money wage changes in u s manufacturing industries this paper analyzes the relationship between wage changes negotiated in selected large collective bargaining agreements and industry wide changes in average hourly earnings multiple regressions are used to examine the relationship in two digit manufacturing industries for the period 1958ii to 1978il negotiated wage changes are found to have a major impact on overall movements in hourly earnings the estimated equations have potential applications for short run wage forecasting and for policy analyses

the danish tax on saturated fat short run effects on consumption substitution patterns and consumer prices of fats abstract denmark introduced a tax on saturated fat in food products with effect from october 2011 the objective of this paper is to make an effect assessment of this tax for some of the product categories most significantly affected by the new tax namely fats such as butter butter blends margarine and oils this assessment is done by conducting an econometric analysis on weekly food purchase data from a large household panel dataset gfk panel services denmark spanning the period from january 2008 until july 2012 the econometric analysis suggest that the introduction of the tax on saturated fat in food products has had some effects on the market for the considered products in that the level of consumption of fats dropped by 10 15 furthermore the analysis points at shifts in demand from high price supermarkets towards low price discount stores at least for some types of oils and fats a shift that seems to have been utilised by discount chains to raise the prices of butter and margarine by more than the pure tax increase due to the relatively short data period with the tax being active interpretation of these findings from a long run perspective should be done with considerable care it is thus recommended to repeat and broaden the analysis at a later stage when data are available for a longer period after the introduction of the fat tax

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

uncertainty shifting power and appeasement great britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state if those aims are limited then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state s demands rather than go to war to oppose them if however the rising state s demands are unlimited then the declining state prefers fighting and given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war this situation creates a trade off the earlier a state stands firm the stronger it will be if war ensues but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war in equilibrium the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions

effects of an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden this study evaluated the environmental impacts of introducing an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden three meat products beef pork and chicken four dairy products milk fermented products cream and cheese and four pollutants generating environmental damage greenhouse gases ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus were included in the analysis the unit tax applied corresponded to between 8 9 and 33 3 of the respective price per kg product in 2009 consumer response to the tax was calculated by econometric estimates of the almost ideal demand system aids for meat and dairy products using per capita consumption data and prices the results indicated relatively inelastic own price elasticities and high income elasticities for all meat products and slightly lower for dairy products simultaneous introduction of a tax on all seven products decreased emissions of ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus from the livestock sector by up to 12

the inefficient use of power costly conflict with complete information recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in american comparative and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power revolutions civil wars high levels of public debt international conflict and costly policy insulation in terms of commitment problems this paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies this common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings the present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an inefficiency condition that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient this condition has a natural substantive interpretation large rapid changes in the actors relative power measured in terms of their minmax payoffs may cause inefficiency

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

why many eligible individuals choose not to go on welfare this article investigates why many eligible for welfare do not participate we show that on the job wage rising potential is the key factor motivating nonparticipation although individuals with very low earnings and little wage rising potential are typically welfare recipients those with good wage rising potential may choose to work participate in old age or never participate nonparticipation remains the best choice for eligible individuals with large wage rising potential even if universal old age social security is available we will also apply this model to a comprehensive welfare system in hong kong

five a day a price to pay an evaluation of the uk program impact accounting for market forces we provide an ex post assessment of the uk 5 a day information campaign where the positive effects of information are disentangled from potentially conflicting price dynamics using 4 years of data from the expenditure and food survey between 2002 and 2006 we estimate that the 5 a day program has lifted fruit and vegetable consumption by 0 3 portions on average we also provide quantitative evidence of a differentiated impact by income group ranging from 0 2 to 0 7 portions all impacts are larger than those observed by simply comparing pre policy and post policy intakes

when do power shifts lead to war we present and test a choice theoretic model of war decisions during shifts in power the model assumes a rising state that overtakes a declining state in capabilities in equilibrium the declining state yields at a critical point in the transition war can occur only before that critical time power shifts are more likely to lead to war as the challenger becomes more risk acceptant the declining state more risk averse the expected costs of war decrease the rising state s dissatisfaction with the status quo increases and during periods of equality between the two sides the rate of growth of the rising state s capabilities and the transition point do not affect the probability of war all these hypotheses are supported by an empirical analysis of all major power dyads since 1815 we also find that expected support from allies must be included in the calculation of a nation s capabilities the implications of the model for theories of hegemonic decline and war are discussed

economic evaluation of nutrition policy abstract the good news from prevention research is that it appears possible to dramatically improve health in the us by changing identified risk factors the goal of this paper is to discuss how to evaluate the economic consequences of improvements in nutrition and exercise related health cost benefit analysis and the related tools of cost effectiveness analysis and cost utility analysis are proposed as preferred methods the decision rule is simply if the sum of the potential gains to all those affected by a policy intervention exceed the sum of costs there is a potential gain in societal welfare by this standard preventive interventions can be worthwhile even when they do not reduce lifetime medical expenditures or increase lifetime earnings that is even when the intervention is not a free lunch the distinction between the internal costs for an individual patient versus the external costs an individual s illness imposes on others is an important conceptual issue practical issues include determining whether a poor health habit causes the costs and other results being attributed to it and the completeness of the analysis in principle the analysis should examine all of the effects and resource costs of the intervention including changes in morbidity mortality the quality of life allocations of patient time and caregiving by others as well as traditional health sector costs and changes in productivity improvements in nutrition and exercise related health may also have important implications for public sector finances of programs including medicare and social security

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

the impact of tax reforms designed to encourage healthier grain consumption in this paper we simulate the effects of tax reforms aimed at encouraging healthier grain consumption we use a rich data set on household grain consumption in 2003 from the market research institute gfk sweden combined with information on the nutritional content of the consumption we estimate behavioral parameters which are used to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fiber or a subsidy of the fiber density in grain products our results suggest that to direct the fiber intake towards nutritional recommendations reforms with a substantial impact on consumer prices are required regardless of the type of subsidy implemented the increase in the intake of fiber is accompanied by unwanted increases in nutrients that are often overconsumed fat salt and sugar funding the subsidies by taxing these nutrients or less healthy commodities helps to counteract such developments

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world abstract with the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community this paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries in a situation of asymmetric information in which the policy maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not we also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy maker additionally the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

civil war and u s foreign influence we study how foreign interventions affect civil war around the world in an infinitely repeated game we combine a gambling for resurrection mechanism for the influencing country with the canonical bargaining model of war in the influenced country to micro found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners which are known to lead to war due to commitment problems we test two of our model predictions that allow us to identify the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence i civil wars around the world are more likely under republican governments and ii the probability of civil wars decreases with the u s presidential approval rates these results withstand several robustness checks and overall suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of domestic conflict

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

the food stamp program and food insufficiency food stamp participants have higher food insufficiency rates than eligible nonparticipants even after controlling for other factors given the food stamp program s prominent role in the alleviation of hunger this is a counterintuitive result we conjecture that these higher rates are due to adverse selection insofar as households more likely to be food insufficient are also more likely to receive food stamps we establish a theoretical framework to address this adverse selection using a simultaneous equation model with two probits we show that once one controls for this adverse selection food stamp recipients have the same probability of food insufficiency as nonrecipients copyright 2001 oxford university press

the persistence of subjective poverty in urban ethiopia using panel data spanning 15 years this paper investigates the persistence and correlates of subjective and consumption poverty in urban ethiopia despite the decline in consumption poverty in recent years which has been linked to rapid economic growth subjective poverty has remained largely unchanged dynamic probit regression results show that households with a history of past poverty continue to perceive themselves as poor even if their material consumption improves our results also suggest that the relative economic position of households is a strong determinant of subjective poverty and having at least some type of employment reduces the likelihood that households will perceive themselves as poor even if they remain in objective poverty receiving remittances from abroad on the other hand does not reduce perceived poverty even if it raises material consumption we argue that any analysis to measure the impact of growth on welfare should encompass subjective measures as well

the economics of early warfare over land abstract we investigate the incidence of early warfare among foragers and farmers in prehistory our focus is specifically on conflict over land food is produced using inputs of labor and land and the probability of victory in a conflict depends on relative group sizes the group sizes are determined by individual migration and malthusian population dynamics both factors result in larger populations at better sites which deters attack there are two necessary conditions for warfare high enough individual mobility costs and large enough shocks to the relative productivities of the sites together these conditions are sufficient in particular technological or environmental shocks that alter the productivities of sites can trigger warfare but only if individual agents do not change sites in response these results are consistent with evidence from archaeology and anthropology

power transitions and great power war from westphalia to waterloo this study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era it improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain unlike the original power transition theory the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era this study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period the data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war that is when the challenging great power with its allies support catches up with the dominant power great power war is most likely

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

economic assessment of nutritional recommendations abstract the effect of consumers compliance with nutritional recommendations is uncertain because of potentially complex substitutions to lift this uncertainty we adapt a model of consumer behaviour under rationing to the case of linear nutritional constraints dietary adjustments are derived from information on consumer preferences consumption levels and nutritional contents of foods a calibration exercise simulates for different income groups how the french diet would respond to various nutrition recommendations and those behavioural adjustments are translated into health outcomes through the dietron epidemiological model this allows for the ex ante comparison of the efficiency equity and health effects of ten nutritional recommendations although most recommendations impose significant taste costs on consumers they are highly cost effective with the recommendations targeting salt saturated fat and fruits and vegetables f v ranking highest in terms of efficiency most recommendations are also economically progressive with the exception of that targeting f v

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

valuing food store access policy implications for the food stamp program food stamp recipients may lack access to larger stores reducing the availability of nutritious food reliance on smaller stores may have undesirable impacts policy alternatives include limiting food stamp redemption to larger stores and subsidizing store development i estimate that limiting redemption to supermarkets and grocery stores or supermarkets alone results in losses ranging from 499 2 million to 1 05 billion or 1 17 billion to 2 44 billion respectively annual loss in food stamp recipient welfare nationwide the impact of improving access is also significant ranging from 333 6 million to 931 2 million

power alliance and the escalation of international conflict 1815 1965 a considerable amount of the internationalpolitics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations there are however divergent views of this linkage one view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects

cash equivalence welfare stigma and food stamps the food stamp program fsp is one of the largest domestic redistributive transfer programs with approximately 22 million participants at a cost of 12 billion in 1983 the stated objective of the fsp is to raise the levels of nutrition among low income households by providing such households with an opportunity to obtain a low cost nutritionally adequate diet 29 5 for program evaluation and cost forecasting accurate estimates of the determinants of eligible households program participation and food expenditure decisions are of particular concern in light of the elimination of the purchase requirement epr and other recent structural changes in the program the problem of obtaining these estimates has three dimensions first observations on the behavior of eligible households under the post epr institutional setting are required second the roles of welfare stigma and the cash equivalence of the in kind food stamps must be clarified finally because program participation is a household choice that affects food expenditures the interdependence of eligible households fsp participation and food expenditure decisions must be accommodated emphasizing an important component of this interdependence the connection between cash equivalence of stamps in the participation decision and in expenditures for food this paper tackles all three dimensions the purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which food stamps are cash equivalent and to determine which program and household characteristics including the degree of cash equivalence and stigma affect post epr food stamp program participation

statistical models for zero expenditures in household budgets household budget surveys are an important source of data on consumer s expenditure not just for individual consumers but also for estimating national aggregates however it is a widespread finding that for certain commodities most notably tobacco and alcohol the estimate from the household survey falls short of the known consumption total calculated with some confidence from data on production imports exports and excise duties for example in the british family expenditure survey with which we shall largely be concerned total tobacco expenditure was underestimated in 1976 by 21 percent see kemsley redpath and holmes 1980 p 51 much of this understatement together with that on alcohol is thought to occur because of the design of the survey which excludes many persons amongst whom consumption of such items is thought to be atypically high e g prisoners hoteliers and their residents merchant seamen even so the possibility remains that some of the understatement is due to various types of misreporting by households included in the survey in this paper we consider a model in which the standard tobit specification tobin 1958 is supplemented by the operation of a simple binary censor the tobit model is essentially a linear regression model in which non positive observations of the dependent variable are replaced by zero we take this specification as our starting point but add a second censoring process that randomly replaces a fraction of the observations generated by the tobit model bv zeroes the combined model can serve as a representation of several types of

the welfare effects of health based food tax policy this paper examines the effects of health oriented food tax reforms on the distribution of tax payments food demand and health outcomes we offer an illustration of how one can take into account the uncertainty related to both demand estimation and health estimates and to produce confidence intervals for the overall health effects instead of only point estimates taxation of sugar could lead to a statistically significant reduction in both the incidence of type 2 diabetes and coronary heart disease the health effects appear to be most pronounced for low income individuals and the reforms may therefore reduce health inequality this effect undermines the traditional regressivity argument against the heavy taxation of unhealthy food

introduction unipolarity state behavior and systemic consequences the united states emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global unipolar state this extraordinary imbalance has triggered global debate governments and peoples around the world are struggling to understand to how an american centered unipolar system operates and to respond to it what is the character of domination in a unipolar distribution to what extent can a unipolar state translate its formidable capabilities into meaningful influence will a unipolar world be built around rules and institutions or be based more on the unilateral exercise of unipolar power scholars too are asking these basic questions about unipolarity and international relations theory the individual contributions develop hypotheses and explore the impact of unipolarity on the behavior of the dominant state on the reactions of other states and on the properties of the international system collectively they find that unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics international relations under conditions of unipolarity force a rethinking of conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power the meaning of alliance partnerships the logic of international economic cooperation the relationship between power and legitimacy and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states

military capabilities and escalation a correction to bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict i show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions and i offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games

an assessment of the potential consumption impacts of who dietary norms in oecd countries the member countries of the world health organization who have recently endorsed its global strategy on diet physical activity and health the strategy emphasises the need to limit the consumption of saturated fats and trans fatty acids salt and sugars and to increase consumption of fruits and vegetables in order to combat the growing burden of non communicable diseases this paper attempts a broad quantitative assessment of the consumption impacts of these norms in oecd countries using a mathematical programming approach we find that adherence to the who norms would involve a significant decrease in the consumption of vegetable oils 30 dairy products 28 sugar 24 animal fats 30 and meat pig meat 13 5 mutton and goat 14 5 and a significant increase in the human consumption of cereals 31 fruits 25 and vegetables 21

an empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining these models can be applied to contract negotiations yielding an economic theory of strikes to date however few empirical tests of these models have been carried out in this paper a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm s future profitability these predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major u s contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977

means testing versus basic income the lack of political support for a universal allowance this paper studies the political economy of a basic income bi versus a means tested welfare scheme we show in a very simple setting that if society votes on the type of system its generosity as well as the severity of means testing if any a bi system could only emerge in the political equilibrium under very strong and empirically implausible conditions instead the political process leads to a means tested system the necessity to draw political support does affect the design of the system but it only implies that means testing becomes less severe so that benefits are extended also to themiddle classes however a fully universal system is rejected by a majority

food stamp benefits and child poverty in 2000 8 8 million children lived in households participating in the food stamp program making this assistance program a crucial component of the social safety net despite its importance little research has examined food stamps effect on children s overall well being using the current population survey from 1989 to 2001 we consider the impact of food stamps on three measures of poverty the headcount the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap we find that in comparison to the headcount measure food stamp benefits lead to large reductions in the poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures

a model of spoils politics accounts of state failure in the developing world frequently highlight a logic of spoils politics in which a government and an opposing faction vie for control of the state and the accompanying spoils attempts to buy the opposition off play a key role in this logic and an informational problem often complicates these efforts because of limited transparancy the government generally has a better idea about the actual size of the spoils than the opposition does we formalize this aspect of spoils politics as a signaling game in which the government has private information about the size of the spoils and tries to co opt the opposition by offering a share of the spoils the opposition can accept the offer or reject it by fighting consistent with the strong empirical finding that the probability of civil war is higher when income is low the probability of breakdown increases as the size of the spoils decreases we also study the effects of uncertainty the opposition s military strength the cost of fighting and power sharing agreements on the probability of fighting

reason and war a new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system treats thirdparty choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies more fully represents the expected costs of conflict and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size by assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders expectations of gain we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war intervention violence and peace the revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in europe between 1816 and 1970 in this essay

participation in the afdc program and the stigma of welfare receipt estimation of a choice theoretic model one of the important issues in policy discussions of the present welfare system and of welfare reform alternatives concerns the degree to which low income families eligible for welfare will in fact participate in the major program in the current system aid to families with dependent children afdc participation rates have risen over time particularly in the late 1960 s but have never been 100 percent explaining such changes in participation rates is an important subject of investigation because a participation rates lead directly to caseload sizes and thus to the possibility of a welfare explosion and b the estimates of the effect of welfare program tax rates and guarantees 10 are strictly applicable only to participants and not to non participants the most likely explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon of families rejecting an increase in disposable income lies in the stigma of welfare receipt for many families consider welfare participation to be demeaning socially undesirable and or destructive of self respect and feelings of self worth however although there has been considerable discussion of the nature of stigma 13 particularly in the sociological literature 11 there is a need to establish a firm theoretical base for the phenomenon and to formally investigate its properties in this paper a model of welfare participation is developed which incorporates stigma and thus establishes such a theoretical base and estimates of the parameters of the model are obtained there are two key characteristics of the model first participation in a welfare program is introduced into the utility function under the assumption that stigma represents a distaste for welfare the desire to participate is thus formulated within a traditional consumer

welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with discrete responses comment in a previous issue of this journal michael hanemann developed three interpretations for compensating and equivalent variations in discrete choice models and the corresponding computational approaches hanemann then showed that one of the three interpretations is inconsistent with ordinal utility and that one of the remaining interpretations is preferable because of the statistical properties of the corresponding computational approach this note clarifies the interpretation of hanemann s preferred computational approach and offers an alternative interpretation it should strengthen the case for the preferred approach that researchers can agree on computation without necessarily agreeing on its interpretation

policy watch the food stamp program and welfare reform major changes have been proposed for the food stamp program including replacing the program with block grants to the states cashing out the benefits and reducing program funding from baseline levels this paper will explore the impacts of food stamp reform on food spending income support welfare reform agriculture and the rest of the economy a comprehensive set of scenarios is used to examine the potential economic consequences the analysis shows that the effect of cashing out the food stamp program can be as much as four times larger than the effects of program reduction alone

determining the impact of food price and income changes on body weight we develop a theoretical model to identify conditions under which price and income changes are most likely to change weight although it is intuitive that raising the price of high calorie food will decrease consumption of such goods it is not clear that such an outcome will actually reduce weight our empirical analysis demonstrates a case where a tax on food away from home a food intake category blamed for much of the rise in obesity could lead to an increase in body weight a finding which emphasizes the need to employ economic modeling when developing public policy to reduce obesity

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

environmental food taxes and inequalities simulation of a meat tax in sweden abstract this paper investigates the distributional effect of an environmental tax on meat in sweden if such a tax was to be introduced welfare effects are measured as compensation variation cv for multiple price changes where hicksian cross price elasticities household expenditures and price changes are included in the calculations results show that taxes on meat are almost neutral over households when expenditures on meat are used as welfare indicators and regressive if income is used this can be explained by the households similar shares of total expenditures on meat the households with the smallest income levels need to be compensated with 904 sek per person and year equivalent to euro 86 6 per year in the year 2009 exchange rate to feel that utility is not lowered if taxes on meat are introduced and the households with the highest income levels need to be compensated with 1141 sek euro 109 3 per person and year for the year 2009 these compensations correspond to 0 74 and 0 78 of total expenditures for the low and high income group respectively when instead comparing the compensation with income levels the effects correspond to 0 99 for the households with the smallest income levels and to 0 51 for the households with the largest income

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

what do we learn about consumer demand patterns from micro data the aim of this paper is to assess the importance of using micro level data in the econometric analysis of consumer demand to do this we utilize a time series of repeated cross sections covering some 4 000 households in each of 15 years employing a number of different aggregation procedures we conclude that aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable estimates of structural price and income coefficients however once certain aggregation factors as well as trend and seasonal components are included an aggregate model is not necessarily outperformed across all demand equations in terms of forecasting ability jel d12 c52 c31 the purpose of this paper is to develop a complete consumer demand system based on a time series of individual household data and to use it to measure the biases introduced into the study of consumer de mand behavior when aggregate data are used in place of the appropriate microeco nomic data we assess the suitability of ag gregate data through the impact on income and price elasticities and by evaluating the ability of both micro and aggregate based models to forecast aggregate consumer de mand the biases introduced by the use of aggregate data depend upon the way that household characteristics interact with in come and price effects and on departures of demand systems from linearity we explore the structure of microeconomic demand sys tems and the role of household characteris tics in the behavior of consumer demand both for the light this may shed on the pattern of future demands and for the im plications this behavior has for issues of aggregation consumer demand patterns typically found in micro data sets vary considerably across households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income we model this variability by making intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of our demand sys tem depend on household characteristics and by allowing for nonlinear total log expenditure terms in fact in theory consistent demand systems it is total ex penditure rather than disposable income that is allocated across goods we find that this general framework leads to a well specified data coherent demand system which is a quadratic extension of the popu lar almost ideal model of angus s deaton and john muellbauer 1980 the micro level estimates are shown to be sensitive to the treatment of endogeneity of total expen diture and to the specification of interaction terms with household characteristics in ad dition this specification is also shown to possess many attractive features for the evaluation of aggregate models

can targeted food taxes and subsidies improve the diet distributional effects among income groups this paper analyses distributional effects of revenue neutral tax reforms aimed at improving dietary quality and encouraging healthier grain consumption using data on household grain purchases we analyse both the impact on dietary quality and the tax incidence among income groups of vat reforms and excise duty reforms the vat reforms include subsidies of healthy products products labelled with the swedish national food administration s healthy symbol funded by increased vat on less healthy products the excise duty reforms contain a subsidy of fibre content funded by excise duties on either added sugar or saturated fat our results suggest that the vat reforms have a similar impact on dietary quality across all income groups with increases in fibre intake but also unwanted increases in the intake of nutrients frequently overconsumed fat salt and sugar the impact on dietary quality of the vat reforms is therefore difficult to evaluate with the exception of the lowest income group the excise duty reforms seem to have a positive health effect across all other income groups with increases in the intake of fibre and reductions in the intake of saturated fat sugar and added sugar for the lowest income group we find the highest increase in the intake of fibre but generally an increase in the intake of the other nutrients too the excise duty reforms also result in a more energy dense grain diet with increases in the intake of calories for all income groups both the vat reforms and the excise duty reforms appear to be progressive the lowest income group pays less food taxes and generally faces a lower overall post reform price level the income group that increases its tax payments most is the one with the highest income this is also the income group that faces the largest increase in the overall post reform price level

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

quadratic engel curves and consumer demand this paper presents a model of consumer demand that is consistent with the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys and is also able to provide a detailed welfare analysis of shifts in relative prices a nonparametric analysis of consumer expenditure patterns suggests that engel curves require quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure while popular models of demand such as the translog or the almost ideal demand systems do allow flexible price responses within a theoretically coherent structure they have expenditure share engel curves that are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure we derive the complete class of integrable quadratic logarithmic expenditure share systems a specification from this class is estimated on a large pooled data set of u k households models that fail to account for engel curvature are found ro generate important distortions in the patterns of welfare losses associated with a tax increase

adjusting vat rates to promote healthier diets in norway a censored quantile regression approach the effects of health related taxes and subsidies on food and beverages have mainly been investigated using models that assume identical price responses among high and low consuming households diet related health problems are however more likely among households with high intakes of unhealthy foods or low intakes of healthy foods than in households with average intakes in this article we focus on purchases of healthy and unhealthy foods among low median and high purchasing households the effects of an increase in the norwegian value added tax vat on some unhealthy foods and a removal of the vat on some healthy foods are investigated using censored quantile regressions we reject equality of the own price elasticities for eight of nine food and beverage groups we find that a vat increase is more effective in reducing purchases of unhealthy foods among high purchasing households than a vat removal is in increasing the purchases of healthy foods among low purchasing households

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small