general equilibrium with price intervention policies a computational approach abstract three alternative formulations of general equilibrium under price intervention policies are presented in a computational framework in the first minimum or ceiling prices are supported by a government marketing agency revenues are recycled to consumers in the minimum price case and losses covered by lump sum taxes in the ceiling case similarities to general equilibrium with taxes are stressed in the second sector specific minimum prices are considered similar to harris todaro equilibria in the third government price supports operate through market interventions existence is discussed numerical examples presented and possible policy applications outlined

property rights and the utilisation of wetlands abstract this paper argues that successful conservation of wetlands is fundamentally determined by the institutions and property rights associated with resource management decisions thus an understanding of property rights regimes the constraints which they impose on users of wetlands resources and the distribution of benefits of use among users and non users are essential if the economic values of wetland ecosystems and functions are to be realised we outline relevant theoretical perspectives on property rights and the sustainable utilisation of natural resources we argue that wetland resources tend to have unique property rights regimes due to their ecological characteristics namely their multiple resource characteristics the indivisible nature of these resources and the seasonal and cyclical nature of different wetland resource components case studies of property rights regimes in indonesia and vietnam are presented these show that wetland resources are often managed as common pool resources and that state appropriation of resources or the imposition of private property rights can contribute to unsustainable utilisation or conversion of wetlands to other uses

institutions governance and incentives in common property regimes for african rangelands the general distinctions between open access state property common property and private property are now well established in the academic literature when applied to african rangelands however common property admits a wide variety of resource management regimes to formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the structure and operations of particular regimes in this paper we discuss three examples of common property regimes two from the southern african nation of lesotho and one from the west african nation of senegal to illustrate some of the key characteristics of common property regimes in particular it is important to understand the structure of governance the types of institutions that govern behavior and the compatibility between governance institutions and individual incentives a common property regime can only be effective if its institutions are compatible with the structure of governance the extent of its effectiveness also depends upon the incentives and expectations of individuals expected to enforce the rules of the institutions or comply with their terms at present most african governments lack the organizational capacity and political will necessary to implement state property regimes official regulations on resource use or individual property rights for rangelands resources in many cases it is more appropriate for governments to define and enforce group rights to particular resources then help to establish conditions in which internal group dynamics yield efficient resource management outcomes

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

some recent results in bargaining theory two person bargaining situations are very frequent in economic life among the most natural examples one can think of wage negotiations between an employer and a person he wishes to hire another example at a more aggregate level concerns wage renegotiations that take place periodically in large firms between the manager and the workers representative as a final example let me mention the simple and very usual situation of a seller and a potential buyer who bargain over the price of some indivisible object unlike for competitive markets economic theory and especially mathematical economics has not until recently been very helpful in explaining how prices are determined in these bargaining situations the usual explanations refer to a vague notion of respective bargaining powers of the two agents there is a clear need to precise the relations between this mysterious notion and quantifiable economic data like preferences what bargainers can get in case of an agreement outside options what they can get if agreement fails impatience risk aversion and finally information of bargainers about each other after the seminal contributions of hicks and zeuthen in the thirties john nash 1950 1953 was the first to adopt in the early fifties a systematic theoretical approach to the bargaining problem nash introduced a distinction between the axiomatic or normative approach on the one hand and the strategic or positive approach on the other hand of course the two approaches must not be viewed as independent what has come to be known as the nash program can be described as follows starting from an axiomatic solution having desirable normative properties like the solution proposed by nash himself is it possible to design a particular bargaining process that would naturally lead rational negotiators to the outcome prescribed by the axiomatic solution behind the word rational hides the main difficulty of this program find a satisfactory concept of non cooperative equilibrium for bargaining games

valuation of wetlands in a landscape and institutional perspective what is a wise use of nature this perennial issue always controversial due to conflicting human interests has in the last decade tended to be clothed in the context of sustainable development the rapid breakthrough of this concept in political and scientific spheres has brought to our attention the dependence of human survival and well being upon ecosystem supports e g baskin 1997 costanza et al 1997 daily 1997 as well as the susceptibility of ecosystems to human influences how can such a political and scientific attention to ecosystems be translated to good public policy one necessary prerequisite is likely to be the adoption of a landscape perspective such a perspective implies studies of the biological and physical interactions among a mosaic of ecosystems in heterogeneous land areas that together comprise landscapes it is worth emphasising however that human presence and man made social economic and physical structures are equally natural landscape elements continually interacting with ecosystems the fact that humans and nature are inseparable and the apparently ever increasing human influence on her biological and physical environments make an analysis of the linkages between ecosystems and humans an indispensable part of a landscape perspective institutional design in the context of interaction between society and nature has indeed been subject to several recent studies for example ostrom 1990 bromley 1991 hanna et al 1996 and berkes and folke 1998 institutions include social norms codes and other informal constraints for human behaviour as well as formal ones such as constitutions and laws their design is one key to understanding human preferences and behaviour in relation to nature the study of institutions is thus an integral part of a landscape perspective corresponding author tel 46 8 6739540 fax 46 8152464 e mail address tore beijer kva se t soderqvist

contracting in strategic situations abstract cooperative games are distinguished from noncooperative games by the ability to form binding pre play agreements the notion of a binding agreement however is ambiguous for two reasons first contracts can be enforced by various provisions for the payment of damages in the event of breach second contracts generally are incomplete not specifying unique actions for each possible state of the world this paper examines the interaction between incompletely specified and enforced pre play contracts and the outcomes that are achieved in 2 player strategic situations comparisons are made among various damage measures for breach of contract

qualitative uncertainty in a market with bilateral trading bargaining between a single seller and a succession of potential buyers of an indivisible object is studied in this paper the seller bargains with one buyer at a time and switching buyers is costly the seller does not know the buyers reservation prices and buyers cannot observe the quality of the object if the costs of switching buyers are high there exists a signalling equilibrium in which the seller s price offer reveals the quality of the object if the costs of switching are low adverse selection occurs and the high quality seller drops out of the market

rents and the cost and optimal design of commodity taxes this paper numerically investigates the significance of rents for both the welfare costs and the optimal design of commodity taxes using a general equilibrium model calibrated to 1986 canadian data in the data we use ricardian rents are concentrated in agriculture and utilities with market structure rents concentrated in manufacturing different types of rents have different implications for the welfare cost of taxes and hence also for appropriate tax design ricardian rents lower the cost of taxes rents supported by imperfect competition with no free entry raise the cost of taxes rents supported by regulation generate rent seeking costs and if taxed improve resource allocation model results show a markedly nonuniform optimal tax structure and a substantial influence of the treatment of rents on the pattern of optimal tax rates by commodity

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

bargaining and the joint cost theory of strikes an experimental study this article reports on an experiment that was designed to test predictions about the frequency of disagreement strikes in games with complete information an empirical test of the joint cost theory which relates strike activity to the marginal cost of striking is based on a set of shrinking pie games in which subjects bargained in consecutive periods over how to divide a sum of money strike activity was a frequent occurrence in these games and moreover did not disappear over time the joint cost theory received some support indicating that further tests may be useful

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers 1 introduction early work in implicit contract theory argues that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm evolves due to the risk sharing nature of the implicit contract between a risk averse worker and a risk neutral firm some authors have criticized this initial argument see for example haltiwanger 1983 feeling that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm and the terms of an implicit contract between the two in large parts is explained via hiring costs training costs and the like this is the approach taken in the early work of becker 1975 oi 1962 and the most recent work of jovanovic 1979a these latter explanations are also appealing because long term relations between a worker and a firm are typically characterized by quits that decline with tenure and wages that increase with tenure as discussed in mortensen 1988 explanations of these phenomena fall into two categories job search theories or job training theories job search theories stress that there is a match specific component to the productivity of any worker firm match that a good match will result in a long term relationship explains why wages are positively correlated with tenure to explain a rising wage profile within a given match requires that the firm and the worker learn about the quality of their match over time a good match will be a long term one and the wage will rise over time as the match is discovered to be a good one jovanovic 1979b and barron and loewenstein 1985 model such a learning process job training theories maintain that long term relationships with rising wages exist because of firm specific training that increases with tenure again see jovanovic 1979a as an example this paper integrates these two theories in this paper firm specific training evolves as an increasing function of a worker s tenure with a firm this is so because there is a positive probability that a worker is unreliable in that he will be searching for another employer the firm being unable to identify in advance which workers are unreliable will update its prior belief as to a worker s reliability as a function of the worker s tenure the total level of training at any point in time will be an increasing function of this updated belief thus learning about the quality of a match an aspect of the job search theories plays an important role in explaining the level of firm specific training this learning process can also play a role in determining optimal layoffs if an unreliable worker is more likely to receive an acceptable outside offer when the worker is laid off than when he is employed the firm can use layoffs to elicit information about the worker s reliabiliy based upon this fact layoffs may occur even when the worker s marginal product exceeds his value of leisure before discussing the model in detail one crucial assumption deserves comment unlike previous work such a salop and salop 1976 enforceable self revealing contracts are ruled out by assumption thus the firm here cannot commit itself to a wage contract promising low wages initially in exchange for high wages as job tenure increases which contract would attract only reliable workers this assumption is of course a polar extreme but as such is consistent with more recent work in contract theory which investigates the terms of self enforcing contracts see for example holmstrom 1983 the idea is to provide a comparison with contracts in an idealized economy with no enforcement problems this assumption is justified if the cost of writing a legally enforceable contract is prohibitive or if as suggested in charmichael 1984 reputational forces are insufficient to deter a firm from cheating although workers here are risk neutral the model could be amended to include risk averse agents

payments and liquidity under adverse selection informational asymmetries regarding the future value of assets affect their role in exchange i construct a random matching economy composed of two assets a risk free bond and a lucas tree whose terminal value is privately known to its holder no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements the main finding supports a pecking order theory of payments agents use their risk free bonds first in order to finance their spending shocks and they use their information sensitive assets only if their holdings of bonds are depleted the theory has implications for the optimal provision of risk free bonds the structure of asset returns and liquidity

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

incidence analysis of a sector specific minimum wage in a two sector harris todaro model in this paper we explore the incidence of a sector specific minimum wage in a two sector harris todaro model with intersectorally mobile capital in addition to the output and substitution effects in harberger s tax incidence analysis an additional effect reflecting the endogenously generated unemployment arises in the harris todaro case we also explore the functional incidence issue numerically for mexico by using general equilibrium computational techniques in a number of the calculations reported capital more than bears the income loss from unemployment caused by the sector specific minimum wage

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

equilibria in extensive games the purpose of this note is to comment on the fundamental difficulties which exist in the foundations of the theory of extensive form games since selten 1973 first pointed out that it is not adequate simply to follow von neumann and morgenstern in replacing an extensive form game by its normal form there have been numerous attempts at defining an equilibrium concept for extensive form games which would fulfil the same role that nash equilibrium fulfils for normal form games notable among these are selten s 1975 two perfectness ideas and the kreps and wilson 1982 notion of a sequential equilibrium but there is also myerson s idea of a proper equilibrium kalai and samet s persistent equilibrium and numerous others the issue is particularly pressing in the study of non cooperative bargaining games with imperfect or incomplete information here sequential equilibrium has been the idea most used partly because it is couched in terms consistent with orthodox bayesian decision theory and partly because it is technically easier to apply than for example selten s trembling hand perfect idea among other authors rubinstein 1983b has noted how sensitive such analyses including his own 1983a paper are to the conjectures players are assumed to form at information sets which will not be reached in equilibrium2 and it is this question which lies at the root of the problem both the power of the equilibrium ideas under study in producing results3 and their weakness in being difficult to justify lie in the fact that they take into account potential behaviour at information sets which will not be reached in equilibrium in this note two methodological points are made the first is that the problems in justifying the use of the various equilibrium ideas can be traced to a considerable degree to the fact that the game structure has been overabstracted4 in particular the mechanism by means of which the players find their way to an equilibrium is typically abstracted away altogether but an appropriate justification requires taking some view on the nature of this mechanism ideally one would wish to offer a formal model of the equilibriating

the design of contracts and remedies for breach in the first part of this article hypothetical contracts providing for all possible uncertain contingencies are considered in the next part contracts providing for only some contingencies are examined and are shown to be advantageous due both to difficulties that could arise in making and enforcing contingent terms and to the presence of implicit substitutes for them in the following major part of the article two of these substitutes for contingent terms are analyzed remedies for breach and the opportunity for renegotiation the existence of both is demonstrated to induce parties to behave approximately as they would under detailed contracts

institutional ecological economics abstract new institutional economics and its forerunners have we argue made important contributions to the evolving agenda of ecological economics the conceptualisation of environmental problems as instances of interdependence and the acknowledgement of positive transaction costs are key insights into the nature of environmental problems we also discuss how plurality of behavioural motivations and limited cognitive capacity have important implications for environmental decision making and its analysis we show how evolutionary and collective action theories offer complementary takes on the choice and change of environmental governance institutions and how the concept of social capital can enrich analyses of environmental governance we conclude that an emerging institutional ecological economics has the greatest relative advantage in analysing the design implementation and effectiveness of environmental governance solutions

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

damage measures and incomplete contracts i present a model of two party contracts that allows for incomplete specification of future states and actions i examine various damage measures under the assumption that courts protect only reasonable reliance expenditures so that parties make efficient reliance choices the expectations damage measure is preferred to the alternative damage measures no matter what the contractual terms are

bargaining structure and strike activity in this paper the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and strike activity in particular they focus on the implications of the fact that the amount of information revealed by a union s actions depends on the bargaining environment in which it operates the authors demonstrate that a union representing workers of more than one firm will face a greater incentive to reject offers than an independent union this implies that a merger of two unions or the formation of bargaining coalitions will lead to a greater level of strike activity

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

north south climate change negotiations a sequential game with asymmetric information this article determines the conditions under which thesouthern countries should act together or separately whilenegotiating with the north about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future southern engagement the papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework results showthat depending on their characteristics the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement

economic interdependence bargaining power and political influence bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power it is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones the use of economic interdependence for political influence requires instead that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship or its direction an explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived

efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract this article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it it is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way without enforceable contracts the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be pareto ranked from best to worst as follows specific performance expectation damages and reliance damages

indonesian aquaculture futures evaluating environmental and socioeconomic potentials and limitations abstract indonesia is the world s second largest seafood producer but capture fisheries landings have stagnated over the last decade in response the indonesian government has set ambitious targets for expanding the aquaculture sector up to 2030 the present research therefore quantifies environmental impacts using life cycle assessments lcas and some socioeconomic indicators for six alternative scenarios projecting the growth of indonesia s aquaculture up to 2030 by tran et al 2017 from these results policy implications are drawn and suggestions for improvements made for gearing the indonesian government and seafood industry towards blue growth ten dominant aquaculture farming systems were characterized and benchmarked using lca building upon data collected on sumatra java lombok and sulawesi between 2014 and 2015 assuming business as usual up to 2030 the impacts indicators global warming 3 3 fold increase acidification 3 3 fold increase eutrophication 3 5 fold increase land use 3 6 fold increase freshwater consumption 4 fold increase energy use 3 4 fold increase reliance on wild fish 3 4 fold increase total fish output 3 3 fold increase and full time employments 3 3 fold increase would increase by three to four fold while monetary value would increase almost six fold business as usual alongside several other future scenarios would consequently require more wild fish and land than is physically manageable using current production practices while still not satisfying the growth targets set by the indonesian government a major transformation of the aquaculture industry supported by public policies is therefore needed to avoid extensive environmental damage similar studies on future food growth projections are encouraged in order to give more realistic recommendations to policy makers

equilibrium under price controls with endogenous transactions costs abstract in this paper we present an equilibrium model for an exchange economy with fixed prices and endogenously determined search or transactions costs given the fixed prices endogenously determined equilibrium buying and selling prices which include transactions costs result these costs occur on either the demand or supply side of each market but not both we see an eventual application of this approach to an evaluation of welfare costs of either economy wide wage and price controls or sector specific price controls such as energy in the final section we present some simple numerical examples which illustrate the approach

the vermont common assets trust an institution for sustainable just and efficient resource allocation both private and public sectors have failed to adequately provide critical ecosystem goods and services or an equitable distribution of wealth and income to address this problem the vermont legislature is considering the creation of a vermont common assets trust vcat that would make the state s atmosphere aquifers and other resources created by nature or by society as a whole the common property of all vermonters present and future under the trust a board of trustees would have the legal obligation to manage these assets for the benefit of all vermonters including future generations this paper first explains why certain resources are likely to be managed more sustainably fairly and efficiently as common property than as private property it then discusses mechanisms for integrating assets into the trust estimates of potential revenue from a vcat suggest that it could eliminate the state budget deficit contribute to a better distribution of wealth and resources and help address critical ecological problems survey results suggest that a vcat is politically feasible the vcat promises to be an important pilot project that could later be scaled up to a national or global level

investing in a relationship a principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining i study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment when investment returns are observable informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts as they induce higher investment ex ante the principal invests not only to generate direct returns but also to improve relational incentives unobservability of returns increases the principal s ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives the optimal information structure depends on bargaining power

sharing the wealth when should firms treat customers as partners marketers often stress the importance of treating customers as partners a fundamental premise of this perspective is that all parties can be weakly better off if they work together to increase joint surplus and reach pareto efficient agreements for marketing managers this implies organizing marketing activities in a manner that maximizes total surplus this logic is theoretically sound when agreements between partners are limitless and costless in most consumer marketing contexts business to consumer this is typically not true the question i ask is should one still expect firms to partner with consumers and reach pareto efficient agreements in this paper i use the example of a firm s choice of product configuration to demonstrate two effects first i show that a firm may configure a product in a manner that reduces total surplus but increases firm profits second one might conjecture that increased competition would eliminate this effect but i show that in a duopoly firm profits may be increasing in the cost of product completion this second result suggests that firms may prefer to remain inefficient and or stifie innovations both results violate a fundamental premise of partnering that firms and consumers should work together to increase total surplus and reach pareto efficient agreements the model illustrates that pareto efficient agreements are less likely to occur if negotiation with individual partners is infeasible or costly such as in business to consumer contexts consumer marketers in one to many marketing environments should be wary of treating customers as partners because pareto efficient agreements may not be optimal for their firm

benefit sharing among local resource users the role of property rights skewed distributions of benefits from natural resources can fuel social exclusion and conflict threatening sustainability this paper analyzes how user group property rights to harvest forest products affect the distribution of benefits from those products within user groups we argue that groups with recognized harvesting rights share benefits more equally among group members than groups without such rights we test this argument with data from 350 forest user groups in 14 developing countries our results suggest that securing harvesting rights for local user groups can contribute to more equal benefit sharing especially in ethnically homogenous groups

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

a social contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance i rational bargaining and justification this essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to the concept of corporate social responsibility csr meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm it focuses on justification according to the contractarian point of view leaving compliance and implementation problems to a related article sacconi 2004b forthcoming in the journal of business ethics it begins by providing a definition of csr as an extended model of corporate governance based on the fiduciary duties owed to all the firm s stakeholders then by establishing the basic context of incompleteness of contracts and abuse of authority it analyses how the extended view of corporate governance arises directly from criticism of the contemporary neo institutional economic theory of the firm thereafter an application of the theory of bargaining games is used to deduce the structure of a multi stakeholder firm on the basis of the idea of a constitutional contract which satisfies basic requirements of impartial justification and accordance with intuitions of social justice this is a sequential model of constitutional bargaining whereby a constitution is first chosen and then a post constitutional coalition game is played on the basis of the unique solution given to each step in the bargaining model the quest for a prescriptive theory of governance and strategic management is accomplished so that i am able to define an objective function for the firm consistent with the idea of csr finally a contractarian potential explanation for the emergence of the multi fiduciary firm is provided

institutions and short run macroeconomic performance abstract this paper reviews the growing interest in institutions it argues that the explanation for this interest is a fresh awareness of how institutions affect economic performance this connection arises because many economic interaction take the form of one or other of three classic games prisoners dilemma coordination and chicken and the outcome in these games and hence performance of the economy is influenced by the institutional context of these interactions the paper provides a detailed illustration of this argument with a survey of the literature which relates unemployment performances to the institutions of wage setting in oecd countries