banking in computable general equilibrium economies abstract in this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that models the banking sector explicitly banks intermediate between households and between the household sector and the government sector households borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses and they lend to banks to save for retirement banks pool households savings and they purchase interest bearing government debt and non interest bearing reserves we use this structure to answer two sets of questions one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of alternative monetary and tax policies and one positive in nature that studies the real effects of following a procyclical interest rate policy rule

the life cycle effects of house price changes we develop a life cycle model that explicitly incorporates the dual feature of housing as both a consumption good and an investment asset our analysis indicates that the consumption and welfare consequences of house price changes on individual households vary significantly in particular the non housing consumption of young and old homeowners is much more sensitive to house price changes than that of middle aged homeowners more importantly while house price appreciation increases the net worth and consumption of all homeowners it only improves the welfare of old homeowners renters and young homeowners are worse off due to higher lifetime housing consumption costs

monetary policy and liquid government debt abstract we examine the conduct of monetary policy in a world where the supply of outside money is controlled by the fiscal authority a scenario increasingly relevant for many developed economies today central bank control over the long run inflation rate depends on whether fiscal policy is ricardian or non ricardian the optimal monetary policy follows a generalized friedman rule that eliminates the liquidity premium on scarce treasury debt we derive conditions for determinacy under both fiscal regimes and show that they do not necessarily correspond to the taylor principle in addition non ricardian regimes may suffer from multiplicity of steady states when the government runs persistent deficits

constrained efficiency in the neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we investigate the welfare properties of the one sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first order condition of a constrained planner s problem this condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low the factor composition of income of the consumption poor using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature we illustrate that there can be either over or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long run distribution of wealth for the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking it has much too low a steady state capital stock

equilibrium heterogeneous agent models as measurement tools some monte carlo evidence abstract this paper discusses a series of monte carlo experiments designed to evaluate the empirical properties of heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models in the presence of sampling variability the calibration procedure leads to the welfare analysis being conducted with the wrong parameters the ability of the calibrated model to correctly predict the long run welfare changes induced by a set of policy experiments is assessed the results show that for the policy reforms with sizable welfare effects i e more than 0 2 the model always predicts the right sign of the welfare effects however the welfare effects can be evaluated with the wrong sign when they are small and when the sample size is fairly limited quantitatively the maximum errors made in evaluating a policy change are very small for some reforms in the order of 0 02 percentage points but bigger for others in the order of 0 6 percentage points finally having access to better data in terms of larger samples does lead to substantial increases in the precision of the welfare effects estimates though the rate of convergence can be slow

effectiveness of macroprudential policies under borrower heterogeneity we study the impact of macroprudential policies using a novel model which takes into account households ability to borrow under different loan to value ratios which are tied to their collateral values such model generates a larger amplification in real and financial variables compared to standard models that assume homogeneity in the leveraging and deleveraging process conditional on this model we consider the implications of macroprudential policies that aim to lean against an excessive credit cycle in particular we allow macroprudential authorities to tighten excessive lending to higher leveraged households whose riskiness had been evaluated too optimistically we find thata policy that targets only the group of households that most strongly deleveraged after an adverse idiosyncratic housing investment risk shock is welfare improving at social and individual levels relative to a macroprudential policy which targets all households in the economy

targeted transfers and the fiscal response to the great recession abstract between 2007 and 2009 government expenditures increased rapidly across the oecd countries while economic research on the impact of government purchases has flourished in the data most of the increase in expenditures was in government transfers after documenting this fact we argue that future research should focus on the positive impact of transfers towards this we present a model in which there is no representative agent and ricardian equivalence does not hold because of uncertainty imperfect credit markets and nominal rigidities targeted lump sum transfers are expansionary both because of a neoclassical wealth effect and because of a keynesian aggregate demand effect

optimal debt endogenous fertility and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests abstract this paper explores optimal debt in a model with altruistic bequests endogenous fertility and human capital externalities because of such externalities education investment is too low and fertility is too high while education subsidies are the conventional means to deal with these problems we show that the optimal policy also comprises debt even when distortionary taxes are used the reason is that debt tips the usual trade off between children s quantity and quality in favor of the latter by increasing the bequest cost of children the optimal debt output ratio exceeds 10 for plausible parameterization

the optimum quantity of debt abstract we find that the welfare gains to being at the optimum quantity of debt rather than the current us level are small and therefore concerns regarding the high level of debt in the us economy may be misplaced this finding is based on a model of a large number of infinitely lived households whose saving behavior is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints this model incorporates a different role for government debt than is found in standard models and it captures different cost benefit trade offs on the benefit side government debt enhances the liquidity of households by providing an additional means of smoothing consumption and by effectively loosening borrowing constraints on the cost side the implied taxes have adverse wealth distribution and incentive effects in addition government debt crowds out capital via higher interest rates and lowers per capita consumption

optimal taxation and debt with uninsurable risks to human capital accumulation we consider an economy where individuals face uninsurable risks to their human capital accumulation and analyze the optimal level of linear taxes on capital and labor income together with the optimal path of government debt we show that in the presence of such risks it is beneficial to tax both labor and capital and to issue public debt we also assess the quantitative importance of these findings and show that the benefits of government debt and capital taxes both increase with the magnitude of idiosyncratic risks and the degree of relative risk aversion jel d52 h21 h24 h25 h63 j24 human capital is an important component of wealth both at the individual and aggregate level and its role has been investigated in various fields in economics in public finance jones manuelli and rossi 1997 show that the zero capital tax result of chamley 1986 and judd 1985 1 can be strengthened if human capital accumulation is explicitly taken into account specifically they demonstrate that in a deterministic economy with human capital accumulation in the long run not only capital but also labor income taxes should be zero hence the government must accumulate wealth that is public debt be negative to finance its expenditure

the fiscal multiplier in a liquidity constrained new keynesian economy we study the effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy using a liquidity constrained new keynesian model in which government bonds are liquid and private financial assets are only partially liquid we find that the fiscal multipliers in this economic environment are large enough for fiscal policy to be highly effective in this model a bond financed fiscal expansion can stimulate output because higher public borrowing improves liquidity by increasing the proportion of liquid assets in private sector wealth

interpreting income distributions in a welfare state the case of sweden abstract it is shown in this paper that the distribution of purchasing power and hence probably also economic well being in a welfare state like sweden is not tightly connected with the contribution of households in the production system moreover economic inequality is drastically exaggerated when income statistics are not adjusted for differences in working time and in the time profile of income over life however it is also shown that some important inequalities are not removed even by the very ambitious tax and welfare state system in sweden and that some new inequalities are in fact introduced the paper also tries to highlight the wide wedges which in an advanced welfare state are necessarily driven between factor costs for firms and factor rewards for households all this holds in particular for annual income

the effectiveness of government debt and transfers as insurance abstract government debt and redistributive taxation can help people to smooth consumption when facing uninsurable individual specific risk i examine the effects that variations in public debt and transfers have on risk sharing efficiency and the distribution of resources i find that risk sharing can be improved significantly by both debt and transfers but that debt has adverse effects on equity when used in isolation debt will enhance welfare if transfers are lower than optimal however the beneficial effects of public debt vanish if transfers are used optimally

market externalities of large unemployment insurance extension programs we provide evidence that unemployment insurance affects equilibrium conditions in the labor market which creates significant market externalities we provide a framework for identification of such equilibrium effects and implement it using the regional extension benefit program rebp in austria which extended the duration of ui benefits for a large group of eligible workers in selected regions of austria we show that non eligible workers in rebp regions have higher job finding rates lower unemployment durations and a lower risk of long term unemployment we discuss the implications of our results for optimal ui policy jel e24 j64 j65 r23

the cyclicality of separation and job finding rates this paper uses cps gross flow data to analyze the business cycle dynamics of separation and job finding rates and to quantify their contributions to overall unemployment variability cyclical changes in the separation rate are negatively correlated with changes in productivity and move contemporaneously with them while the job finding rate is positively correlated with and tends to lag productivity contemporaneous fluctuations in the separation rate explain between 40 and 50 percent of fluctuations in unemployment depending on how the data are detrended this figure becomes larger when dynamic interactions between the separation and job finding rates are considered

the impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment abstract this paper examines the impact of the potential duration of unemployment insurance ui benefits on unemployment in the united states first we use a large sample of household heads to examine differences in the unemployment spell distributions of ui recipients and nonrecipients sharp increases in the escape rate from unemployment both through recalls and new job acceptances are apparent for ui recipients around the time of benefits exhaustion such increases are not apparent at similar points of spell duration for nonrecipients second our analysis of accurate administrative data from 12 states indicates that a one week increase in potential benefit duration increases the average duration of the unemployment spells of ui recipients by 0 16 to 0 20 weeks

the level and distribution of global household wealth the level of average household wealth in all countries is estimated via the determinants of assets and debts for 39 countries which have balance sheet or survey data the distribution of wealth in all countries is inferred from information on the pattern of wealth ownership for 20 countries covering 59 of world population combining the level and distribution figures suggests that median global wealth was ppp 8 635 in the year 2000 and that ppp 518 361 was needed to belong to the top percentile the top decile owned 71 of world wealth and the global gini value was 0 802

public sector debt dynamics the persistence and sources of shocks to debt in 10 eu countries this paper characterises the time series properties of debt gdp ratios in ten eu countries over the period 1982 2009 it establishes that shocks to debt ratios persist and measures the size and source of the permanent effects of shocks as they evolve over time the analysis shows that debt dynamics in the eu10 are complicated involving important inter country interactions and protracted adjustment periods of the order of ten years we find evidence of asymmetries in the effects of different forms of fiscal consolidation with unanticipated reductions in government spending having a more permanent effect than unanticipated increases in government revenue unanticipated business cycle fluctuations also have important long term effects on the ratio

unemployment insurance recall expectations and unemployment outcomes this paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the united states we find that the spells of individuals who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance ui recipients than do spells actually ending in recall our results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables we also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that ui benefits lapse over the past fifteen years many studies have empirically analyzed the determinants of individual unemployment spell durations in the united states much of this literature has used a job search framework in which the unemployed are viewed as permanently displaced workers who are unattached to jobs the possibility of recall to a former job a process not requiring search has been omitted from explicit consideration in the majority of these studies 2 an explicit treatment of the layoff rehire process is necessary for a proper understanding of the determinants of unemployment durations and of the impacts of unemployment policies in the united states for at least three reasons first temporary layoffs in which workers are often rehired by their original employers are a quantitatively quite important feature of the u s labor market 3 second expectations concerning the likelihood of recall are likely to affect the responses of employers and unemployed workers to labor market interventions such as reemployment bonuses and subsidies

a measure of horizontal inequity politicians academicians and the general public alike have perceived that the status quo tax and transfer legislation creates inequities among living units tax laws create numerous situations in which living units with seemingly equal abilities to pay are taxed quite different amounts state by state differences in welfare eligibility rules benefit schedules and administrative procedures the general unavailability of cash welfare to childless nonaged healthy couples and single individuals and other features of transfer programs similarly provide vastly different levels of income support to units with equal needs advocates of major tax and welfare reform have marshalled such evidence into a central argument in favor of their proposals while there is wide agreement that the process of redistributing incomes abounds with inequities there have been few attempts to quantify their extent 2 this paper develops a measure of horizontal inequity and illustrates its use section ii discusses the concept of horizontal equity then builds upon familiar lorenz curve gini coefficient analysis to derive the inequity index the third part considers some problems of implementing the measure and illustrates it section iv provides a short conclusion

fiscal sustainability using growth maximizing debt targets this article highlights the importance of debt related fiscal rules and derives growth maximizing public debt ratios from a simple theoretical model on the basis of evidence on the productivity of public capital we estimate public debt targets that governments should maintain if they wish to maximize growth for panels of oecd eu and euro area countries these are not arbitrary numbers but are founded on long run optimizing behaviour assuming that governments implement the golden rule of financing that is they contract debt only to finance public investment our estimates suggest that the euro area should target debt levels of around 50 of gdp if member states are to have common targets that is about 15 points lower than the estimate for the growth maximizing debt ratio in our oecd sample and comfortably within the stability and growth pact s debt ceiling of 60 of gdp we also indicate how forward looking budget reaction functions fit into a debt targeting framework

microeconomic heterogeneity and macroeconomic shocks in this essay we discuss the emerging literature in macroeconomics that combines heterogeneous agent models nominal rigidities and aggregate shocks this literature opens the door to the analysis of distributional issues economic fluctuations and stabilization policies all within the same framework in response to the limitations of the representative agent approach to economic fluctuations a new framework has emerged that combines key features of heterogeneous agents ha and new keynesian nk economies these hank models offer a much more accurate representation of household consumption behavior and can generate realistic distributions of income wealth and albeit to a lesser degree household balance sheets at the same time they can accommodate many sources of macroeconomic fluctuations including those driven by aggregate demand in sum they provide a rich theoretical framework for quantitative analysis of the interaction between cross sectional distributions and aggregate dynamics in this article we outline a state of the art version of hank together with its representative agent counterpart and convey two broad messages about the role of household heterogeneity for the response of the macroeconomy to aggregate shocks 1 the similarity between the representative agent new keynesian rank and hank frameworks depends crucially on the shock being analyzed and 2 certain important macroeconomic questions concerning economic fluctuations can only be addressed within heterogeneous agent models

a three state model of worker flows in general equilibrium abstract we develop a simple model featuring search frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision along the extensive margin the model is a standard version of the neoclassical growth model with indivisible labor and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and frictions characterized by employment loss and employment opportunity arrival shocks we argue that it is able to account for the key features of observed labor market flows for reasonable parameter values persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks play a key role in allowing the model to match the persistence of the employment and out of the labor force states found in individual labor market histories

the effectiveness of consumption taxes and transfers as insurance against idiosyncratic risk we quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of a consumption tax and transfer program as insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk our framework is a heterogeneous agent incomplete market model with idiosyncratic wage risk and indivisible labor the model is calibrated to the u s economy we find a weak insurance effect of the transfer program extending the transfer system from the current scale raises consumption uncertainty which increases aggregate savings and reduces the interest rate furthermore consumption inequality shows a small decrease

random earnings differences lifetime liquidity constraints and altruistic intergenerational transfers abstract this paper develops a model of private savings behavior in which households care about their descendants cannot have negative net worth and have lifetime earnings depending on random draws from an exogenous distribution of abilities the elements interact very lucky parents are likely to leave large estates constrained children are unusually likely to receive intergenerational transfers the paper proves the existence of a stationary cross sectional distribution of wealth endogenously determines where liquidity constraints will bind and shows that the long term interest rate must be such that ricardian neutrality fails its last section generates several illustrative numerical simulations

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

distributional incentives in an equilibrium model of domestic sovereign default the european debt crisis shares features of historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research has been done this paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default in which a government chooses debt and default optimally responding to distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk averse agents who are split into debt holders and non holders equilibria with debt do not exist if the government is utilitarian and default is costless adding exogenous default costs the model supports equilibria with debt exposed to default risk in which debt falls as the fraction of agents who own the debt falls debt can also be sustained if the government s welfare weights are biased in favor of bond holders resulting in equilibria in which debt rises as debt ownership is more concentrated these results are robust to adding a second asset opening the economy to foreign investors or introducing taxes as an alternative redistributive policy instrument

lifetime versus annual tax and transfer progressivity sweden 1968 2009 in this paper we analyze the evolution of tax and transfer progressivity in sweden over both annual and lifetime horizons using a rich micro panel covering the period 1968 2009 we calculate tax rates over a cohort s entire working life cycle our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year social insurance transfers to transitory low income earners account for most of this result we offer a number of robustness checks of the measurement of lifetime incomes and progressivity but none of them changes our overall findings

unsecured debt with public insurance from bad to worse abstract in u s data income interruptions the receipt of public insurance and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related the central contribution of this paper is to evaluate bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other our analysis delivers two striking conclusions first we find that u s personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier that prevents the public insurance system from improving welfare second contrary to popular belief we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more not less bankruptcy

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

repeated price competition between individuals and between teams abstract we conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market the market was operationalized as a repeated game between two teams with one two or three players in each team we found that asking and winning prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two or three person teams there were no general effects of team size but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team s profits were divided equally this result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning

risk premia and the real effects of money this paper proposes a flexible price theory of the role of money in an economy with incomplete idiosyncratic risk sharing when the risk premium goes up money provides a safe store of value that prevents interest rates from falling reducing investment investment is too high during booms when risk is low and too low during slumps when risk is high monetary policy cannot correct this money is superneutral and ricardian equivalence holds the optimal allocation requires the friedman rule and a tax subsidy on capital the real effects of money survive even in the cashless limit

the optimal public and private provision of safe assets abstract we develop a theory of optimal government debt in which publicly issued and privately issued safe assets are substitutes while government bonds are backed by future tax revenues privately issued safe assets are backed by the future repayment of pools of defaultable private loans we find that a higher supply of public debt crowds out privately issued safe assets less than one for one and reduces the interest spread between borrowing and deposit rates our main result is that the optimal level of public debt does not fully crowd out private lending and maintains a positive interest spread moreover the optimal level of public debt is higher the more severe are financial frictions

the role of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard the potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance along with the optimal replacement ratio are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model to provide a role for unemployment insurance agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets in the absence of moral hazard replacement ratios as high as 65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large however if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally but is instead set to an empirically plausible value the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance

the case for a financial approach to money demand the distribution of money across households is much more similar to the distribution of financial assets than to that of consumption levels even controlling for life cycle effects this is a puzzle for theories which directly link money demand to consumption such as cash in advance cia money in the utility function miuf or shopping time models this paper shows that the joint distribution of money and nancial assets can be explained by an incomplete market model when frictions are introduced into financial markets money demand is modeled as a portfolio choice with a fixed transaction cost in financial markets

the evolution of top incomes in an egalitarian society sweden 1903 2004 this study presents new homogenous series of top income shares in sweden over the period 1903 2004 we find that starting from levels of inequality approximately equal to those in other western countries at the time the income share of the swedish top decile drops sharply over the first eighty years of the twentieth century most of the decrease takes place before the expansion of the welfare state and by 1950 swedish top income shares were already lower than in other countries the fall is almost entirely due to a dramatic drop in the top percentile explained mostly by decreases in capital income while the lower half of the top decile consisting mainly of wage earners experiences virtually no change over this period in the past decades top income shares evolve very differently depending on whether capital gains are included or not when included sweden s experience resembles that in the u s and the u k with sharp increases in top incomes excluding capital gains sweden looks more like the continental european countries where top income shares have remained relatively constant a possible interpretation of our results is that sweden over the past 20 years has become a country where it is more important to make the right financial investments than to earn a lot to become rich

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

a quantitative analysis of unemployment benefit extensions abstract extensions of unemployment insurance ui benefits have been implemented in response to the great recession this paper measures the effect of these extensions on the unemployment rate using a calibrated structural model featuring job search and consumption saving decisions skill depreciation and ui eligibility the ongoing ui benefit extensions are found to have raised the unemployment rate by 1 4 percentage points which is about 30 of the observed increase since 2007 moreover the contribution of the ui benefit extensions to the elevated unemployment rate increased during 2009 2011 while the number of vacancies recovered the successive extensions kept search intensity down

a note on optimal fiscal policy in an economy with private borrowing limits abstract we consider the implications for optimal fiscal policy when taxes are non distortionary and households are heterogeneous and borrowing constrained the main result is that optimal policy keeps some households borrowing constrained in order to reduce interest rates on government debt

fiscal policy in a tractable liquidity constrained economy we analyse the effects of fiscal expansions when public debt is used as liquidity by the private sector aggregate shocks are introduced into an incomplete market economy where heterogenous agents face occasionally binding borrowing constraints and store wealth to smooth out idiosyncratic income fluctuations debt financed increases in spending facilitate self insurance by bond holders and may crowd in private consumption they also loosen the borrowing constraints faced by firms thereby raising labour demand and possibly the real wage whether private consumption and wages rise or fall ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the liquidity and wealth effects that arise following the shock

monetary fiscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions i develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand monetary fiscal interactions with liquidity frictions agents face idiosyncratic investment risks and meet financial intermediaries in competitive search markets asset liquidity is determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the financial intermediaries and it drives the financing constraints of entrepreneurs those who have investment projects and their ability to invest in contrast to private assets government bonds are fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest a higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs portfolios and raises investment however the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures a higher level of distortionary taxation and or a higher real interest rate a long run optimal supply of government debt emerges i also show that a proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies can avoid a deep financial recession

myopic governments and welfare enhancing debt limits abstract this paper studies welfare effects of a soft borrowing constraint on sovereign debt the constraint is modeled as a proportional fine per unit of debt in excess of a specified reference value resembling features of the stability and growth pact sovereign debt is the result of myopic fiscal policy it reduces welfare in the absence of lump sum taxes the paper shows that the borrowing constraint enhances welfare by reducing long run debt in an economy calibrated to a generic oecd country the maximum attainable welfare gain of debt consolidation which is induced by imposing the optimally parameterized constraint amounts to 0 5 in terms of consumption the short run welfare costs of the constraint which arise from restricting the use of debt to smooth taxes are quantitatively negligible

the welfare cost of inflation under imperfect insurance abstract this paper examines the welfare cost of inflation in an economy where agents hold money in order to smooth consumption in the face of income variability for which there is no insurance the findings indicate that for the type of economies considered here the area under the empirical money demand curve is a poor measure of the welfare cost of inflation this area accounts for only one fourth of the true costs in the case of 5 inflation

rising government debt causes and solutions for a decades old trend over the past four decades government debt as a fraction of gdp has been on an upward trajectory in advanced economies approaching levels not reached since world war ii while normative macroeconomic theories can explain the increase in the level of debt in certain periods as a response to macroeconomic shocks they cannot explain the broad based long run trend in debt accumulation in contrast political economy theories can explain the long run trend as resulting from an aging population rising political polarization and rising electoral uncertainty across advanced economies these theories emphasize the time inconsistency in government policymaking and thus the need for fiscal rules that restrict policymakers fiscal rules trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks this tradeoff guides design features of optimal rules such as information dependence enforcement cross country coordination escape clauses and instrument versus target criteria

public versus private provision of liquidity is there a trade off abstract to what extent is public debt private liquidity much policy advice given in the aftermath of the financial crisis rests on the assumption that increasing public debt relaxes borrowing constraints of private households this is the case for ad hoc debt limits which are exogenous to public policy instead if debt limits are fully endogenous as e g in the case of the natural borrowing limit public debt has no impact we assume that borrowing limits arise because of limited contract enforceability and are therefore determined as equilibrium outcomes using an incomplete markets economy in which households are subject to uninsurable earnings shocks we show that public debt provides some liquidity but less so than it would if constraints were imposed ad hoc we show that generating borrowing constraints as an equilibrium outcome substantially alters the answers to other important questions such as for the welfare effects of government debt or its impact on real economic activity

fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets i undertake a quantitative investigation into the short run effects of changes in the timing of proportional income taxes for model economies in which heterogeneous households face a borrowing constraint temporary tax changes are found to have large real effects in the benchmark model a temporary tax cut increases aggregate consumption on impact by around 29 cents for every dollar of tax revenue lost comparing the benchmark incomplete markets model to a complete markets economy income tax cuts provide a larger boost to consumption and a smaller investment stimulus when asset markets are incomplete copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

unemployment insurance in a three state model of the labor market abstract the paper extends the model of krusell et al 2010 to study the welfare effects of unemployment insurance the model unemployment insurance program includes four realistic features 1 a 50 replacement rate up to a benefit cap 2 finite duration of eligibility during a jobless spell 3 limited eligibility and 4 and an imperfectly monitored job search requirement the model is parameterized to fit the size of scope of unemployment insurance in the united states removing unemployment insurance from the model leads to only a 0 1 consumption equivalent increase in average welfare simplifying assumptions about the structure of unemployment insurance such as allowing all job losers to receive benefits lead to much larger welfare effects similar to the effects found in the past literature understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance requires careful modeling of the structure of the program

how progressive is the u s federal tax system a historical and international perspective this paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the united states since 1960 with special emphasis on very top income groups we include individual and corporate income taxes payroll taxes and estate and gift taxes the progressivity of the u s federal tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s this dramatic drop in progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income the sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity international comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall tax progressivity both for time trends and for cross country comparisons the pattern for the united kingdom is similar to the u s pattern france had less progressive taxes than the united states or the united kingdom in 1970 but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than the united states or the united kingdom

lifetime incidence and the distributional burden of excise taxes this implies that low income households in one year have some chance of being higher income households in other years and significantly affects the estimated distributional burden of excise taxes this paper shows that household expenditures on gasoline alcohol and tobacco as a share of total consumption a proxy for lifetime income are much more equally distributed than expenditures as a share of annual income from a longer horizon perspective excise taxes on these goods are therefore much less regressive than standard analyses suggest this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the insurance value of state tax and transfer programs abstract this paper estimates the total value that individuals derive from their state s tax and transfer program and shows how this value varies by income the paper decomposes this total value into two components redistributive value which is due to predictable changes in income and family circumstances and insurance value which occurs when taxes and transfers compensate for unexpected income shocks our approach is a forward looking one where we examine income and transfers net of taxes over a 10 year period we model state taxes personal income taxes the eitc and sales taxes and state means tested transfers afdc tanf and medicaid schip the calculations are made using the panel study of income dynamics and allow for analysis of the role of changes in tax and transfer programs demographics and income in the value of state net benefits over a period of more than 30 years we find that the redistributive value of state tax and transfer programs sharply declines with income but that the insurance value is increasing in income the resulting total value still declines with income but not nearly as sharply as the redistributive value hence the insurance value mitigates the incentives for mobility that would undo state redistributive spending

aggregate implications of indivisible labor incomplete markets and labor market frictions this paper analyzes a model that features frictions an operative labor supply margin and incomplete markets we flrst provide analytic solutions to a benchmark model that includes indivisible labor and incomplete markets in the absence of trading frictions we show that the steady state levels of aggregate hours and aggregate capital stock are identical to those obtained in the economy with employment lotteries while individual employment and asset dynamics can be difierent second we introduce labor market frictions to the benchmark model we flnd that the efiect of the frictions on the response of aggregate hours to a permanent tax change is highly non linear we also flnd that there is considerable scope for substitution between voluntary and frictional nonemployment in some situations

optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents the framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance ui scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms in a first step the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio ui systems are obtained in simulations then the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the population is explored finally the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed accounting for this transition has an important influence on the support for a policy change

the horizontally s shaped laffer curve in a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous liquidity constrained agents the properties of the laffer curve depend on whether debt or transfers are adjusted to balance the government budget constraint the laffer curve conditional on public debt is horizontally s shaped two opposing forces explain this result first when government wealth increases the fiscal burden declines calling for lower tax rates second because the interest rate decreases when government wealth increases fiscal revenues may also decline calling for higher taxes for sufficiently negative government debt the second force dominates leading to the odd shape of the laffer curve conditional on debt

unemployment insurance and capital accumulation abstract in this paper i examine a model economy with production search and unemployment insurance the introduction of capital into the economy of wang and williamson j monetary econom 49 7 2001 1337 generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero the result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise unlike most of the literature i compute explicitly the cost of the transition path agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path i then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios

history remembered optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt abstract infrequent but turbulent sovereign defaults on domestic creditors were a forgotten history in macroeconomics we propose a bewley model in which the government chooses debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives versus the benefits of debt for self insurance liquidity and risk sharing a feedback mechanism links debt issuance the debt distribution the default decision and risk premia calibrated to eurozone data the model is consistent with key long run and debt crisis statistics defaults are rare and preceded by surging debt and spreads debt sells at the risk free price most often but lack of commitment cuts sustainable debt sharply

cost of business cycles with indivisibilities and liquidity constraints it is almost universally agreed that individuals face incomplete insurance markets and cannot perfectly insure against the idiosyncratic risk in this paper simple general equilibrium models with incomplete insurance markets are examined in order to assess the impact of imperfect insurance on the magnitude of the welfare costs of business cycles two versions of incomplete insurance markets are considered and certain statistical properties of the equilibrium stochastic processes in these environments are compared with those of a perfect insurance economy

evidence on the insurance effect of redistributive taxation copyright 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

fiscal policy and asset prices with incomplete markets we study the simultaneous impact of fiscal policy decisions on macroeconomic activity wealth distribution and asset prices we consider a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents where government debt and capital are imperfect substitutes increases in public debt lead to significant increases in the riskless rate and to a reduction in the equity premium while higher capital income tax rates lead to a higher equity premium the crowding out effects on capital and output are much higher than in models where government debt and capital are perfect substitutes which thus ignore households portfolio reallocation decisions the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

negative income taxes inequality and poverty we use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit demogrant we show that changing the demogrant to output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income specifically we find that increasing the demogrant to output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty all measured in terms of post tax total income however these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output

some calculations of lifetime tax incidence this paper reports a set of lifetime tax incidence calculations using a life cycle simulation model for canada due to davies 1979a 1982 a repeatedly stated qualification to annual calculations in the empirical tax incidence literature is that it would be more satisfactory to make calculations on a lifetime basis even though it is acknowledged that lifetime tax incidence could well differ from annual it is widely believed that data and other difficulties make such calculations next to impossible indeed the widespread acceptance of the data problems of lifetime calculations seems also to have inhibited speculation about how lifetime tax incidence might differ from annual as a result redistributive tax policy judgments continue to be based on annual incidence calculations in spite of the reservations many have about their usefulness our paper is intended to reorient discussion towards lifetime tax incidence by providing some initial null hypotheses about the shape of lifetime tax profiles our main finding is that under the standard competitive assumptions common in the incidence literature lifetime and annual incidence calculations both produce mild progression in tax rates across household deciles ignoring the bottom decile in the annual calculation while the income tax is less progressive in lifetime than in annual calculations other taxes are for the most part less regressive also lifetime incidence calculations are much more robust to alternative shifting assumptions than annual calculations in the lifetime context key distributions such as earnings transfer payments and consumption are less heavily concentrated in particular percentiles of the population than is true in annual data as a result changing the allocative series for any particular tax does not have the large effect on incidence results found in annual calculations each component of the tax system is allocated to households grouped by lifetime income using particular distributive series following a procedure similar to that employed in annual incidence calculations for example richard musgrave et al 1974 joseph pechman and benjamin okner 1974 edgar browning and william johnson 1979 w irwin gillespie 1980 in the process we are able to compare lifetime and annual incidence calculations using the same data set in both lifetime and annual calculations we allocate five groups of taxes among households using distributive series which come partly from the 1971 statistics canada survey of consumer finances scf and partly from our life cycle simulation model the scf data are used to construct synthetic longitudinal lifetime profiles of earnings and transfer payments for a sample of 500 households the latter are assigned inheritances by simulating patterns of mortality and bequest these data are then used in the life cycle model to generate lifetime consumption profiles and bequests the earnings transfer and inheritance data plus the model output provide the distributive series on which alternative incidence calculations are based while the incidence calculations presented in this paper use canadian data results would likely be similar for the united states

optimal public debt redux abstract we examine the role played by government investment in infrastructure in determining the optimal quantity of public debt in a heterogeneous agent economy with incomplete insurance markets calibrating our model to the key aggregate and distributional moments of the u s economy for the period 1990 2015 we show that i the inclusion of infrastructure and ii transitional dynamics between stationary states critically affect the characterization of the optimal level of public debt our results indicate that the inclusion of public infrastructure in the model specification implies a lower optimal debt level relative to the specification without infrastructure both when comparing stationary equilibria and when accounting for transitional dynamics when welfare comparisons are made by comparing stationary equilibria we find that it is optimal for the government to accumulate assets public surplus however once transitional dynamics are accounted for accumulating debt becomes optimal with the optimal share implied by our model being significantly higher than the average public debt gdp ratio for the u s observed during our sample period

internal conflict market uniformity and transparency in price competition between teams abstract the way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict we experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams affects teams ability to compete vis a vis each other and consequently market outcomes participants took part in a repeated bertrand duopoly game between three player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict uniform vs mixed profit division was either private pay high conflict each member received her own asking price or equal pay low conflict profits were divided equally we find that internal conflict leads to tacit coordination on high prices in uniform private pay duopolies but places private pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets but intensified in mixed markets we propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers d43 l22 c92

inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents i introduction many strategic situations in economics and politics can be understood as contests rd nitzan and ueda 2009 a private good nitzan 1991a 1991b nitzan and ueda 2009 or a mixed good esteban and ray 2001 nitzan and ueda 2011 to a large extent the intensity of free riding or conversely the motivation for individuals to exert effort in a contest is shaped by the intra group incentive scheme or governance structure in standard contests incentives are inseparably linked to the sharing rule i e to the usually exogenous procedure by which the rents acquired in the contest are distributed within the group 1 in a number of economic applications however incentives to exert effort appear to be separate or are even willfully separated from the sharing rule phenomena such as team spirit akerlof and kranton 2005 identification with the group sherif 1966 bornstein and ben yossef 1994 peer pressure kandel and lazear 1992 or social norms to contribute to the social good elster 1989 are examples for this separation alternatively groups could apply selective incentive schemes based on relative performance lazear and rosen 1981 or marginally align individual and group incentives nitzan and ueda 2009 in all these scenarios individuals behave cooperatively i e in the interest of the entire group even if the final distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule mechanisms to induce cooperation often are costly sanchez pages and straub 2010 may only work under restrictive conditions che and gale 2003 require strategic coordination among individuals hardin 1995 or cannot be ensured to be obeyed unanimously oliver 1980 this might explain why they do not emerge universally or automatically the point we make in this article is even stronger even if there existed perfect and costless solutions to within group free riding problems which will henceforth be called intra group efficient incentive schemes igeis they might not always be adopted why would a group for which an igeis is freely available not wish to utilize it but rather adopt an apparently inefficient governance structure by definition an igeis internalizes all within group externalities and seems to be a safe way to increase one s payoffs however this reasoning ignores repercussions that arise in strategic environments like contests suppose for example that the competing groups have sufficiently unequal strengths say due to unequal sizes or different comparative advantages then the weaker group may refrain from implementing a costless igeis to avoid the contest from heating up adoption of an igeis makes a group more efficient and consequently more aggressive in the contest on one hand higher efforts constitute a cost on the other they affect the share of the rent that this group can hope to acquire or the likelihood of succeeding in the contest 2 an igeis clearly enhances a group s prospects if the other group did not change its behavior however if members of the opponent group reply with a sufficiently strong increase in their contest efforts this diminishes and may potentially more than offset the gains from one s own increased efforts whether this happens depends on the direction of the strategic interaction between groups the detrimental firing back effect can only become relevant if the other group s efforts are sufficiently strong strategic complements to one s own efforts

short run fiscal policy welfare redistribution and aggregate effects in the short and long run abstract this paper quantifies the effects of two short run fiscal policies a temporary tax cut and rebate transfer that are intended to stimulate economic activities a reduction in income taxation provides immediate incentives to work and save more raising aggregate output and consumption a temporary rebate is mostly saved and increases consumption marginally both policies improve the overall welfare of households and the rebate policy benefits especially low income households in the long run however the debt accumulated to finance the stimulus and a higher tax to service the debt can crowd out capital and lower output and consumption causing welfare to deteriorate