trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

ideas interests and oil prices the political economy of trade reform during soeharto s indonesia indonesia since the late 1960s constitutes an excellent case study in the political economy of trade protection there have been major changes in the overall policy regime from liberalism to significant intervention and back towards liberalism there have been large though declining inter industry variations in effective protection there has been a lively domestic debate much of it dominated by non economists many actors at home and abroad have a stake in that debate and since the 1980s at least trade policy interventions have been reasonably well documented and quantified in this paper we show how quantitative analysis may be employed to shed light on changes in the trade policy regime over time we also examine the principal actors with an interest in and influence over trade policy delineating where possible how their influence translated into the policy arena finally we speculate on whether the framework developed in this paper is applicable to the very different circumstances prevailing in the post soeharto era

welfare specifications and optimal control of climate change an application of fund the sensitivity of the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions to the specification of the social welfare function is systematically explored using the fund model increasing risk aversion emphasises climate change damages relative to emission reduction costs but at the same time increases the discount rate of consumption without international co operation the discount rate effect dominates so that optimal control decreases with increasing risk aversion with international co operation optimal control first increases then decreases with increasing risk aversion since climate change falls heaviest on the poor optimal control increases with increasing inequity aversion full fledged intergenerational welfare functions on the one hand emphasise climate change damages but on the other hand place more weight on current poorer generations in fund the two tendencies almost cancel

rent seeking and market competition this paper emphasizes that political behavior of interest groups is a result of economic calculation and therefore is affected by the market conditions under which they operate we develop a two stage game to link political and market decision making we find that if unproductive rent seekingdirectly contributes to rent seekers market operations then their lobbying efforts will be excessive if the number of outsiders is relatively large restrained if it is relatively small if rent seekingdirectly impairs rent seekers market operations the above described behavior will be reversed the analysis also reveals that as wasteful rent seeking may increase rent seeker s production cost market competition shifts production from now less efficient rent seekers to their non rent seeking rivals welfare gains from this shift may overshadow the direct waste of influence activities

the aggregation of climate change damages a welfare theoretic approach the economic value of environmental goods is commonly determined using the concepts of willingness to pay wtp or willingness to accept wta however the wtp wta observed in different countries or between individuals will differ according to socio economic characteristics in particular income this notion of differentiated values for otherwise identical goods say a given reduction in mortality risk has been criticized as unethical most recently in the context of the social cost chapter of the ipcc second assessment report these critics argue that being a function of income wtp wta estimates reflect the unfairness in the current income distribution and for equity reasons uniform per unit values should therefore be applied across individuals and countries this paper analyses the role of equity in the aggregation of climate change damage estimates using basic tools of welfare economics it shows one way of how wtp wta estimates can be corrected in aggregation if the underlying income distribution is considered unfair it proposes that in the aggregation process individual estimates be weighted with an equity factor derived from the social welfare and utility functions equity weighting can significantly increase aggregate global damage figures although some specifications of weighting functions also imply reduced estimates the paper also shows that while the postulate of uniform per unit values is compatible with a wide range of reasonable utility and welfare specifications there are also cases where the common value notion is not compatible with defensible welfare concepts

stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment abstract this paper discusses a family of two stage decentralized inventory problems using a unifying framework taxonomy depicted as a multilevel graph this framework allows us to model and link different problems of competing retailers who independently procure inventory in response to uncertain demand and anticipated inventory decisions of other retailers in this family of problems in the ex post stage the retailers exercise recourse actions in response to the realized demand and competitors chosen procurement levels for example retailers could coordinate inventory transshipment to satisfy shortage with overage based on profit sharing agreements our framework provides a unifying parsimonious view using a single methodological prism for a variety of problems equally importantly as recourse options are laid out our framework clarifies and contributes a modeling connection between problems in a clear taxonomy of models this unifying perspective explicitly links work that appeared in isolation and offers future research directions

the intergenerational transfer of solar radiation management capabilities and atmospheric carbon stocks solar radiation management srm technologies are considered one of the likeliest forms of geoengineering if developed a future generation could deploy them to limit the damages caused by the atmospheric carbon stock inherited from the current generation despite their negative side effects should the current generation develop these geoengineering capabilities for a future generation and how would a decision to develop srm impact on the current generation s abatement efforts natural scientists ethicists and other scholars argue that future generations could be more sanguine about the side effects of srm deployment than the current generation in this paper we add economic rigor to this important debate on the intergenerational transfer of technological capabilities and pollution stocks we identify three conjectures that constitute potentially rational courses of action for current society including a ban on the development of srm however the same premises that underpin these conjectures also allow for a novel possibility if the development of srm capabilities is sufficiently cheap the current generation may for reasons of intergenerational strategy decide not just to develop srm technologies but also to abate more than in the absence of srm

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

a cost benefit analysis of slowing climate change there are many conflicting views regarding the true dimensions of the climate change problem often these viewpoints are based on different estimates of key parameters with little indication as to why parameter estimates vary so much and which ones might be the more reliable the prospects for a co ordinated strategy to tackle climate change appear dim little consensus has emerged for example regarding the costs of abating carbon emissions some take the view that considerable improvements in energy efficiency are available at negative cost by setting minimum efficiency standards for vehicles and domestic appliances e g mills et al 1991 others regard the macroeconomic costs of even small reductions in carbon emissions as substantial manne and richels 1993 in the judgement of other researchers a proportion of carbon emissions arise purely as a result of institutional failings either at a regional level in the subsidies paid to fossil fuel energy producers in the erroneous belief that this promotes economic growth shah and larsen 1994 in failure to deal with air pollution glomsrod et al 1992 and vehicle congestion in urban areas hughes 1994 or at a global level in failing to make appropriate transfers to those countries whose forests contain rich biodiversity which we would wish to preserve pearce 1991

corporatism trade liberalization and sectoral responses the case of venezuela 1989 99 abstract the venezuelan manufacturing sector unlike agriculture cooperated with state s efforts to liberalize trade in the 1990s despite the economic costs it absorbed and the political opportunities to sabotage the reforms this paper offers two explanations for this which modify and conciliate traditional interest based and corporatist theories of state society relations high levels of sectoral autonomy from the bureaucracy and political parties and hence congress together with low levels of involvement in profit making on the part of the associations representing the sector encourage sectoral cooperation with costly and risky state policies in addition traditional corporatist instruments used by states inducements and constraints hurt rather than enhance state sector cooperation

the closed loop effect and the profitability of horizontal mergers we study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices it is shown that when firms use open loop strategies a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough in the case where firms use closed loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers we first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges when firms use feedback strategies mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that

the social cost of carbon and its policy implications the shadow price or social cost of carbon is an important indicator of the global incremental damage done by emitting greenhouse gases today cost benefit analysis would set the optimal amount of greenhouse gas emission reduction at the point where this social cost just equals the incremental cost of controlling emissions the higher the value for the social cost of carbon the more control is warranted this comparison assumes that cost benefit analysis is the correct way of determining climate change policy and many believe this is not the case because of the very long term irreversible and potentially catastrophic nature of global warming but in the short run at least a comparison of cost and benefits is required and in any event all decisions imply costs and benefits but what is the right figure for the social cost of carbon this paper reviews the uk government s assessment of the cost and concludes that it has been set far too high because of a misreading of the integrated assessment models used to balance costs and benefits moreover adoption of the uk government s shadow price would have formidable implications for energy policy in the uk and for policies on afforestation copyright 2003 oxford university press

equitable cost benefit analysis of climate change policies the literature of welfare maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity this paper introduces three ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously the first method inspired by kant and rawls maximises net present welfare without international cooperation as if all regions share the fate of the region affected worst by climate change optimal emission abatement varies greatly depending on the spatial and temporal resolution that is the grid at which maximum impact is defined the second method is inspired by varian s no envy emissions are reduced so as to equalise total costs and benefits of climate change over all countries of the world and over all time periods emission reductions are substantial this method approximately preserves the inequities that would occur in a world without climate change the third method uses non linear aggregations of welfare the utilitarian default is linear in a cooperative setting this method cannot distinguish between sources of inequity the higher the aversion to inequity the higher optimal greenhouse gas emission reduction

comparative dynamics in a productive asset oligopoly abstract we build a subgame perfect nash equilibrium of a common property productive asset oligopoly and analyze separately the impact of a change in the implicit growth rate of the asset and a change in the number of firms exploiting the asset we show that the steady state level of asset can be a decreasing function of the asset s implicit growth rate this phenomenon arises when the initial stock of asset is below a certain threshold in the short run we show that firms exploitation rate can be a decreasing function of the implicit growth rate we study the impact of a change in the number of firms that share access to the asset reducing the number of firms can result in the long run in higher industry production in the short run it can result in an increase of the industry s exploitation and a decrease of the level of the asset s stock

comparative statics for oligopoly a generalized result we perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival s strategic variable taking into account the responses of all other firms we obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second order partial derivative of the firm s payoff function we then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships i e strategic substitute and complement

markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality beyond the small country case when importing durables and nondurables consumers often cannot discern quality prior to purchase if they cannot also identify the individual producer exporters have diminished incentives to produce high quality goods to raise the quality of traded experience goods previous international literature has proposed consolidation of export firms and the imposition of export quotas policies that may be appropriate for tiny taiwan but not a colossus like china we contribute to this literature in three ways first we explicitly model the way in which consumers of experience goods rely on the reviews of previous buyers who in turn rely on the reviews of buyers before them when deciding whether to purchase an experience good second we endogenize the price of any given quality third we assume that firms may exercise market power as we show once the small country assumption is dropped policies advocated in the literature such as the merger of exporters or the imposition of export quotas can have adverse consequences on the profits of domestic exporters and on the welfare of all consumers on the other hand the unilateral imposition of minimum quality standards will increase the profits of domestic exporters while improving the welfare of all consumers

on the profitability of production perturbations in a dynamic natural resource oligopoly abstract static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in cournot equilibrium were to be forced to marginally contract its production its profits would fall on the other hand if all the firms were simultaneously forced to reduce their production thus moving the industry towards monopoly output each firm s profit would rise we show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly such as a nonrenewable natural resource oligopoly where the exogenous constraint would take the form of a contraction of the firm s output path over some fixed interval of time there are situations where a firm will gain from being the lone firm constrained in this way and cases where each firm will lose if all the firms in the industry are so constrained thus exactly reversing the conclusions obtained from purely static analysis

the effects of a content requirement on a foreign duopsonist abstract this paper considers the operation of a local content requirement in a duopsony between domestic and foreign firms and demonstrates its consequences for the domestic producer of a final good it is shown that content protection may have perverse effects on a foreign firm s profits and may be welfare improving overall shifting profits from the domestic firm to both the foreign firm and domestic input producers

unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly abstract this paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly a closed loop nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction surprisingly such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long run asset s stock we also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset s stock and the long run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction moreover a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production

equity development and climate change control the paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions a game theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control then the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed jel c7 h0 h3 q38

international equity and differentiation in global warming policy ne of the major obstacles to reaching a comprehensive agreement on global warming is the setting of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for individual countries long standing tensions between industrialized and developing countries have raised the issue of equity in burden sharing moreover individual industrialized nations have pleaded special circumstances and have sought differentiation in their obligations this paper analyzes alternative rules for distributing tradable carbon dioxide emissions permits a non linear programming model which distinguishes between allocation based and outcome based rules is used to analyze the relative welfare outcomes the model is applied to the world body of nations and yields several important policy implications

recent progress of cooperation on climate mitigation a bibliometric analysis abstract effective international cooperation is an important measure to mitigate climate change the purpose of this study is to clarify the research progress in the field of cooperation on emission reduction identify the influential authors and articles and reveal the main research topics based on the bibliometric method and the web of science database this study analyzes the literature in the field of cooperation on emission reduction the results show that the publications in this field have increased significantly over the past decade with the usa and china are the most influential countries keyword co occurrence and frequency analysis show that the most important research topics are as follows burden sharing and equity the stability of the climate coalition and international environmental agreements technology transfer and climate finance the linkage of carbon markets and the response to noncooperation behavior the main methods involved are game theory model integrated assessment models and computable general equilibrium model equitable distribution of mitigation responsibilities is the basis for cooperation on carbon reduction specific rulebooks for carbon market linkage is the key to its successful implementation this study helps researchers to clarify the current research status in the field of cooperation on emission reduction and provide valuable information for future research

windfall profits and vertical relationships who gained in the japanese auto industry from vers this paper employs an event study to analyze the effect of the 1981 voluntary export restraint agreements on profits in the japanese automobile industry stock price movements of seven japanese automakers and sixty nine of their suppliers are examined the results indicate that the profits of japan s producers of passenger cars rose as a result of the voluntary export restraints while only some suppliers large ones and those producing specialized parts or services appear to have shared the benefits voluntary export restraints increased profits for some firms in the japanese auto industry but many suppliers did not share the windfall copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

idiosyncratic shocks in an asymmetric cournot oligopoly abstract several authors have studied the impact of a marginal cost variation in the cournot model on consumers surplus firms profits and social welfare we unify and extend the results when all marginal costs change simultaneously hence we bring together two strands of literature respectively on mean preserving and subgroup common shocks the effect of any shock is decomposed into two parts an average impact ai and a heterogeneity effect he the former improves welfare if the inverse demand function is concave enough and the market is concentrated enough the latter when the diffusion of the shock is negatively correlated with the market share distribution finally we apply our decomposition to various special cases

green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry oecd countries reduce or eliminate certain taxes when they introduce new environmental taxes the purpose of this paper is to analyze the incidence of such green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry the paper shows that a rise in taxes could result in the expansion of the aggregate pollution in the presence of a large technology gap the paper further shows that the government loses tax revenue as a result of the green tax reform if it continues to apply the same environmental standard this implies that the government needs to raise environmental standards to keep the existing level of public spending after a green tax reform

on international equity weights and national decision making on climate change abstract estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different jurisdictions implicitly or explicitly such estimates assume a social welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice we show that previous approaches to equity weighting are inappropriate from a national decision maker s point of view because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values we propose four alternatives sovereignty altruism good neighbour and compensation with different views on concern for and liability towards foreigners the four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy

the intra country distributional impact of policies to fight climate change a survey abstract in this paper we present a survey of distributional impact analysis of environmental policies with emphasis on taxes envisaged or implemented to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ghg these policies usually aim at reducing ghg directly or indirectly however they can produce important changes in factor allocation relative prices in specific countries as well as on world markets when adopted by a large number of countries changes in welfare can be important for vulnerable groups of population in developing countries this survey reviews the evidence on the incidence of these policies in the process it shows that the computable general equilibrium cge microsimulation approach has not been fully exploited in the context

good times bad times and vertical upstream integration abstract we consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input downstream firms can produce the input themselves yet do not trade it upstream firms produce the input to sell it through a walrasian market to downstream firms efficient pooling of capacities requires the input to be produced by upstream firms and traded in the market yet downstream firms will always vertically integrate by producing some of its own input needs a downstream firm cuts down on aggregate input demand thus depressing prices in the market

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

optimal cross licensing arrangements collusion versus entry deterrence this paper analyzes optimal cross licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants the optimal cross licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis a vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation we show that a positive cross licensing royalty rate which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome dulls incentives to litigate against entrants our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry deterrence mechanism

the failing firm defense this paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense ffd in the eu and u s merger laws to this end i combine an oligopoly model with an endogenous valuations auction model the ffd is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small the ffd may however lead to total surplus losses due to a least danger to competition ldc condition which favors small and thus possibly inefficient firms it is also shown that in a multi firm setting the ffd increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry specific

how many franchises in a market abstract this paper studies how firms use their number of franchises as a strategic tool firms can commit to high output by creating many franchises however signing a single franchise contract with a low wholesale price is an equally effective way to generate output the value of granting many franchises is undercut when firms can sign contracts afterwards so firms place only a single franchise in a market this finding reverses previous results which did not model contracts the same issues arise in international competition policy where countries use anti trust policy to affect their number of exporters and use subsidies to affect the choices of exporters

frontrunners and laggards the strategy of environmental regulation under uncertainty the extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts first companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation second ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates finally regulators use limited information provided by the industry i construct a game theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator in equilibrium companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry this profit driven behavior is not always socially detrimental however as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost additionally the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates if companies condition compliance on the installation cost only low cost companies install in equilibrium the analysis combines regulatory capture with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator

owners incentives during the 2004 05 national hockey league lockout this study shows that firm owners can indirectly benefit from work stoppages if they own other firms in substitute industries and gain market power for those other firms the incentives of the owners are examined with a model of cross ownership cartels and data from professional sports assuming that various professional sport events are substitutes owners may increase profits by eliminating competition even if they own the competition this study shows that the recent national hockey league nhl lockout caused a statistically significant increase in attendance for the national basketball association and junior hockey leagues given that many nhl owners own teams in these substitutable leagues this could be construed as anti competitive behaviour and may have prolonged the nhl lockout and helped nhl owners in collective bargaining given the public investment in sports facilities and market power in professional sports this analysis calls for cross ownership across professional sports to be questioned

multi sector model of tradable emission permits this paper presents a multi sector model of tradable emission permits which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries the firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market specifically we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets it is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm under certain conditions raising a clean less polluting firm s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices we discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits considering the trade off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit

environmental equity and sustainability rejecting the kaldor hicks criteria abstract an implementable translation of environmental equity and sustainability is provided for use in benefit cost analysis as such the approach builds on the underlying economic structure of benefit cost analysis while trying to cause it to evolve in ways that take into account issues of greater concern to ecological economists environmental equity and sustainability are interpreted as imposing new decision criteria that require additional benefit cost tests based on actual compensation to identified sub groups of the population this rejects the pre world war ii compromise of economists regarding potential compensation embodied in the kaldor hicks criteria for environmental equity a project is proposed to pass a benefit cost test if the identified group either receives net benefits or is more than compensated for its losses for sustainability a project is proposed to pass a benefit cost test if the compensation is larger than the net value of the resource and the net value of the resource is reinvested

spatial and temporal efficiency in climate policy applications of fund fund is an integrated assessment model of the interactions between climate and economy nine world regions emit greenhouse gases and suffer damages from climate change a number of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies are compared including optimal and cost effective strategies strategies with early and late abatement and strategies with and without international co operation the analyses confirm that co operation matters resulting in substantially lower costs or higher welfare the real commitments of policy targets based on an absolute level e g 1990 emissions are hard to estimate because of the uncertainties in the baseline postponing action conflicts with minimising costs and maximising welfare but so does sharp emission reduction at the short term as proposed in the kyoto protocol

a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a cournot model with linear costs under linear demand a small reduction in a firm s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1 2n 2 or equivalently its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market a large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value the paper also extends the results to non linear demand but the characterizations become less tractable

balancing contemporary fairness and historical justice a quasi equitable proposal for ghg mitigations abstract in this paper we analyze the impasse caused by polarizing positions of the united states and china in international negotiations on carbon mitigation by incorporating the bern carbon cycle module into the rice model developed by nordhaus and yang 1996 we set up a framework for tracking regional contributions to carbon concentration and to global climate change our proposal labeled the color preservation principle uses regional contribution share to global carbon concentration as the criterion for international cooperation through simulations in rice model with bern module rice b we examine the rationales of the arguments made by the united states and china we conclude that both countries standpoints are severely flawed to facilitate the global cooperation on carbon mitigations major concessions are needed from the two top carbon emitters

who supports free trade in latin america this paper examines individual trade policy preferences across 17 countries in latin america the focus is on whether skilled or unskilled workers are more likely to support liberalised trade and on whether country characteristics such as factor endowments alter the preferences of skilled and unskilled workers based on the standard heckscher ohlin model and the stolper samuelson theorem wage inequality in developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled workers will benefit we find that on average skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support free trade in latin american countries separate country regressions reveal that this pattern is only statistically significant in 8 out of 17 latin american countries however there are no countries in our sample in which unskilled workers are statistically more likely to support free trade than skilled workers not even in the lowest skill endowed country in the sample we also find that people from latin american countries with higher gdp faster growth more cropland and a longer period of time since reform were more likely on average to support free trade

selective contracts foreclosure and the chicago school view abstract i examine a mechanism by which exclusive supply contracts may inefficiently deter entry into the market in the model the incumbent supplier selectively offers contracts only to some buyers and convinces them to consent by guaranteeing them low prices the contracts strengthen the monopoly position of the incumbent supplier and allow it to extract rents from the remaining buyers that were not offered contracts aside from the favorable contract terms buyers have another reason to consent to the exclusivity scheme the latter raises the input costs of rival buyers that were not offered contracts the model has potential applications to the recent microsoft antitrust case 1994 i define exclusive supply contract as an agreement under which an upstream firm becomes the exclusive supplier of a downstream firm the downstream firm is prohibited from buying from other suppliers

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

an empirical test of the resource based theory strategic regulation in the dutch audit industry the resource based view of the firm is a recent strategic management theory that seeks to identify the resources that may provide firms with a sustainable competitive advantage this paper has two purposes first the paper relates strategic management arguments to parallel lines of reasoning in industrial organization theory and argues that strategic regulation is a major source of sustainable competitive advantage the second purpose of the paper is to report the results of an empirical test of the resource based theory on the basis of a longitudinal data set on the postwar history of the dutch audit industry a key determinant of this history proves to be strategic regulation which stimulates demand for audit services and protects rent producing resources

specifications of social welfare in economic studies of climate policy overview of criteria and related policy insights an important assumption in economic studies of climate policy is the social welfare function this paper shows that applying distinct decision or social welfare criteria can result in different optimal policies of climate control notably if climate change impacts are uncertain first decision criteria in current climate economic studies are reviewed next the most important alternatives are discussed including their mathematical formalization and incorporation in economy climate models most of these alternative criteria suggest more stringent climate policies to be optimal than the standard discounted utilitarianism approach however several important welfare criteria have not or hardly seen any application in the economic analysis of climate policy we conclude that there is clear need for systematic research on this theme for which the current review provides a solid basis

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

upgrades switching costs and the leverage theory of tying this article investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of complementary products previous analyses have found that a monopolist of one product will not increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and leveraging its monopoly position into a complementary market if the initial monopolised product is essential where essential means that all uses of the complementary good require the initial monopolised product we show that this is not true in settings characterised by product upgrades and consumer switching costs we also discuss various extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying

increasing the profits of a subset of firms in oligopoly models with strategic substitutes consider an industry composed of n firms in a symmetric equilibrium designate a subset of s n firms and marginally reduce the strategic variables of the firms in the subset if the remaining firms simultaneously make the best reply to this exogenous displacement under what circumstances will profits of the firms in the designated subset increase we show that in the case of cournot competition among producers of perfect substitutes a marginal contraction is strictly beneficial strictly harmful if and only if the number of firms in the designated subset exceeds the adjusted number of firms outside it by strictly more strictly less than one the adjustment factor is unity when cost and demand functions are linear but more generally depends on the convexity of the cost and demand curves thus a marginal contraction of two firms in a triopoly has no effect on the profits of firms in the subset if cost and demand functions are linear if instead cost is linear but the inverse demand function is strictly concave strictly convex a marginal contraction will strictly decrease strictly increase profits the analysis is extended to the effects of nonmarginal exogenous changes in the outputs of the constrained firms this extension has implications for the relationship of stackelberg sequential move and nash simultaneous move equilibria our analysis has broad application to illustrate we show that it unifies results in the literature on export subsidies horizontal mergers and strikes the paper is organized as follows in section i our comparative static result is derived in section ii we present a wide range of applications in the conclusion and the appendix we generalize our analysis to other situations involving strategic substitutes

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

the damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations it is argued that estimating the damage costs of a certain benchmark climate change is not sufficient what is needed are cost functions and confidence intervals although these are contained in the integrated models and their technical manuals this paper brings them into the open in order to stimulate discussion after briefly reviewing the benchmark climate change damage costs region specific cost functions are presented which distinguish tangible from intangible losses and the losses due to a changing climate from those due to a changed climate furthermore cost functions are assumed to be quadratic as an approximation of the unknown but presumably convex functions results from the damage module of the integrated climate economy model fund are presented next uncertainties are incorporated and expected damages are calculated it is shown that because of convex loss functions and right skewed uncertain ties the risk premium is substantial calling for more action than analysis based on best guess estimates the final section explores some needs for further scientific research

strategic alliances as stackelberg cartels concept and equilibrium alliance structure abstract this paper analyzes incentives of oligopolistic firms to form strategic alliances and the effects of the endogenously derived alliance structure on product market competition a three stage game is considered in the first stage firms decide about forming strategic alliances in the second stage each alliance designs a strategic contract and in the third stage alliance members and outsiders compete in the product market it is shown how contractual terms about transfer prices and profit sharing in a production joint venture for an intermediate product may serve as an appropriate commitment device profits of alliance members and outsiders under different alliance structures are then determined based on this profit structure the alliance formation process is analyzed in a linear cournot oligopoly with at most five firms only one alliance forms and industry output is reduced with more than five firms an alliance structure with at least two alliances results if an equilibrium of the alliance formation game exists and in this case competition is enhanced

the damage costs of climate change towards a dynamic representation economic assessments of climate change impacts are commonly presented as the effect of a climate change associated with a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide on the current economy this paper is an attempt to express impact as a function of both climate change and socio economic change with regard to climate change issues discussed are level versus rate of change speed of adaptation speed of restoration and value adjustment and symmetry with regard to socio economic change agriculture migration and the valuation of intangible losses are addressed uncertainty and higher order impacts are treated briefly it is qualitatively argued and quantitatively illustrated that these issues matter a great deal for the damage profile over the next century a damage model based on my best guesses is presented in the appendix

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

voluntary export restraints profits and quality adjustment this paper develops a model of vertical differentiation to assess the impact of output constraints on the profits and quality choices of firms subject to them a competitive environment is developed with the automobile industry in mind multiproduct oligopolists producing differentiated goods who behave as coumot competitors the results show that an output constraint will not induce constrained firms to upgrade their product line when their unconstrained competitors produce higher quality models it is also shown that an output constraint can raise the profits of constrained firms despite output increases by unconstrained firms