rational deterrence theory i think therefore i deter deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior they generally assume that would be initiators are i instrumentally rational 2 risk prone gain maximizers 3 free of domestic constraints and 4 able to identify themselves correctly as defenders or challengers these assumptions are contradicted by empirical studies that indicate that risk prone gain maximizing initiators are relatively uncommon that leaders at times calculate as deterrence theories expect but behave contrary to their predictions and that the calculus of initiators generally depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence theories deductive theories of deterrence are also inadequate because they do not define their scope conditions nor can they accommodate deviation by initiators from processes of rational calculation rational deterrence theories are poorly specified theories about nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments

rationality and deterrence this essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it the author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence he also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are nonetheless deficient in their application of the rationality postulate finally he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence

testing deterrence theory rigor makes a difference there is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically the disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data but they are magnified by methodological confusion especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure

procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption abstract in procurement quality manipulation corruption arises when the agent tasked with quality evaluation exaggerates the quality of a corrupt firm if an inefficient firm is favored by the agent the buyer can adjust the procurement mechanism such that the corruption rent of the inefficient firm erodes the technological rent of the efficient firm however doing so may require procuring the project at an undesirable quality level to resolve this trade off between corruption deterrence and quality distortion unlike standard results in the literature the buyer may overstate her preference for quality and the dominance of scoring auctions over minimum quality auctions disappears

arms races and negotiations two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game each player s type determines his propensity to arm types are private information and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution with probability close to one the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will there is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons we find conditions under which the unique bayesian nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one however if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small then there is an equilibrium of the cheap talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

a comparison of buyer determined and price based multiattribute mechanisms reverse auctions are fast becoming the standard for many procurement activities in the past the majority of such auctions have been solely price based but increasingly attributes other than price affect the auction outcome specifically the buyer uses a scoring function to compare bids and the bid with the highest score wins we investigate two mechanisms commonly used for procurement in business to business markets in a setting in which buyers welfare is affected by exogenous nonprice attributes such as the quality service and past relationships under both mechanisms bidders bid based on price but in the buyer determined mechanism the buyer is free to select the bid that maximizes her surplus while in the price based mechanism the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the low price bidder we find both in theory and in the laboratory that the buyer determined mechanism increases the buyer s welfare only as long as enough suppliers compete if the number of suppliers is small and the correlation between cost and quality is low the buyer is better off with the price based mechanism these findings are intended to help procurement managers make better decisions in designing procurement mechanisms for a variety of settings

the design of multidimensional auctions procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled in this article i study the design of such mechanisms allowing for a special case of correlation of the firm s costs i describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions contrary to the independent costs model to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two stage auction in the first stage the procurer selects one firm in the second stage he bargains to readjust the level of quality to be provided

conflict and deterrence under strategic risk we examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict we contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk where players have different information about their environment these two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict in our model weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information in contrast under strategic risk we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation we also show that under strategic risk asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior

economics coursework and long term behavior and experiences of college graduates in labor markets and personal finance i introduction if economics is a unique way of thinking as many economists like to claim some level of coursework in economics may provide enough specific knowledge and skills to lead students to make different choices in their adult roles as consumers workers and voters citizens of course the same could be claimed for training in business and other areas even though or perhaps because it could be argued that most content and training in business courses is more applied and pragmatic than what is presented in economics courses some empirical evidence though not really a great deal suggests that training in economics and business is associated with different adult behaviors and outcomes for example golec 1996 finds that mutual funds perform better if mutual fund managers have an mba and chevalier and ellison 1999 also report a positive correlation between mutual fund performance and the educational background of mutual fund managers black sanders and taylor 2003 found that economics majors earn almost 20 more than graduates in other social science majors and about 10 more than those who major in business administration in fields with large numbers of graduates they find that only engineering majors earn more than economics majors similarly hecker 1995 reported that males majoring in economics had median earnings 3 higher than all majors for the age cohort of 25 34 and 53 more than average for the cohort aged 35 44 craft and baker 2003 find that lawyers with an undergraduate major in economics earn 13 more than otherwise comparable lawyers with other undergraduate majors and economics is the only major with a statistically significant effect on earnings 1 hamermesh and donald 2008 however find that higher earnings by economics majors are partly due to economics majors working more hours than others the relationship between financial literacy knowledge and adult behavior and outcomes in financial markets has been addressed in several recent studies many sponsored by federal reserve banks hilgert hogarth and beverly 2003 and braunstein and welch 2002 find that knowledge about credit saving and investment is significantly related to recommended financial practices in cash flow management credit management saving and investment unfortunately there is also evidence of widespread financial illiteracy in u s households and particularly among elderly women see lusardi and mitchell 2007 2008 employee education programs have been found to affect workers savings retirement and investment behaviors bayer bernheim and scholz 2009 bernheim and garret 2003 state mandates for precollege education in personal finance appear to succeed in at least exposing students to more information and sources on financial education and students from states with such mandates report higher levels of savings and net worth as adults bernheim garrett and maki 2001 tennyson and nguyen 2001 much less research exists linking college coursework or majoring in economics to personal finance outcomes 2 but christiansen joensen and rangvid 2008 find that those trained in economics in college courses or employee education programs are more likely to invest in stocks than those who receive training in other areas guiso and jappelli 2005 report that among college graduates having a degree in economics is positively associated with knowledge about financial assets chert and volpe 1998 107 concluded that business majors had better knowledge about personal financial literacy than other students but that in general college students were not knowledgeable about personal finance 3 in this paper we use a large and unique data set to investigate the relationships between taking college coursework in economics or majoring in economics with long term labor market and personal finance behaviors and outcomes our information on long term behaviors and outcomes is drawn from a detailed questionnaire we mailed in january 2003 to over 25 000 graduates who attended four public universities in 1976 1986 or 1996

general deterrence between enduring rivals testing three competing models general deterrence unlike immediate deterrence has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner we outline a research design for doing so by studying the circumstances under which in a set of enduring rivalries challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes we indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often competing theoretical frameworks rational deterrence a general model of rational conflict initiation and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception the results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

extended deterrence and the outbreak of war successful deterrence it is argued requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender s credibility without provoking a potential attacker hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty eight historical cases the empirical results indicate that 1 the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence 2 a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success and 3 a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure

configurable offers and winner determination in multi attribute auctions abstract the theory of procurement auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity and quality is fixed prior to source selection multi attribute reverse auctions allow negotiation over price and qualitative attributes such as color weight or delivery time they promise higher market efficiency through a more effective information exchange of buyer s preferences and supplier s offerings this paper focuses on a number of winner determination problems in multi attribute auctions previous work assumes that multi attribute bids are described as attribute value pairs and that the entire demand is purchased from a single supplier our contribution is twofold first we will analyze the winner determination problem in case of multiple sourcing second we will extend the concept of multi attribute auctions to allow for configurable offers configurable offers enable suppliers to specify multiple values and price markups for each attribute in addition suppliers can define configuration and discount rules in form of propositional logic statements these extensions provide suppliers with more flexibility in the specification of their bids and allow for an efficient information exchange among market participants we will present mip formulations for the resulting allocation problems and an implementation

efficiency in the use of technology in economic education some preliminary results this paper reports preliminary results of a project funded by the andrew f mellon foundation that is intended to ascertain whether technology enhanced introductory economics courses are more effective and also more efficient than traditionally taught courses blecha s 2000 survey of faculty at different types of institutions of higher education documents that economics instructors now use a continuum of technological enhancements ranging from e mail web sites presentation software computerized games and spreadsheets to computerized instruction and distance learning while several studies investigate the consequences of using technology on student performance there has been little attempt to compare the efficacy and efficiency of the various types of available technologies

trust on the brink of armageddon the first strike game abstract we introduce the experimental first strike game two players accumulate earnings over many rounds in any round a player can deactivate the opponent this means that the opponent loses all earnings and faces severely reduced future payoffs it also means that the opponent can no longer deactivate the aggressor in later rounds thus deactivation is a hostile act but can serve as a self protection device we run four treatments to disentangle the effect of spite fear of spite and trust we find the absence of pure nastiness but nevertheless a strong fear of it mutual trust can considerably reduce hostility

a binary conflict ascending price bicap mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks the questions posed for study are motivated by controversies over how sweden might change from a centralized system of railroad management to a decentralized system the central rail administration banverket will retain ownership and maintenance responsibility of the tracks but will sell access to the tracks to private firms the questions are about the mechanism that might accomplish this task parties to the controversy have claimed that the technical aspects of networks will as a matter of principle preclude the operation of any decentralized method this paper explores the properties of a mechanism developed as a challenge to that claim the mechanism is examined in the context of a testbed experimental environment that contains many potential problem causing elements in the tests performed the mechanism operated to efficiently allocate access to the network and it did so for behavioral reasons that are understandable in terms of theory the paper closes with suggestions for further study of environments that might present additional challenges to a mechanism

the might of the pen a reputational theory of communication in international disputes i present a theory of effective diplomacy based on honesty and reputations i model diplomacy as a form of cheap talk and international interactions as an infinitely repeated game in which similar states find themselves in disparate situations over time the theory explains the success and failure of diplomacy reputations for honesty make honest communication possible a state caught bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals in the near future these findings imply that domestic audience costs are unnecessary for international signaling and that military strength is not the only way to build credibility

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics force or the threat of force may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence defined by patrick morgan as the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else 1 deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history in the nuclear age a failure could cost us our lives the conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis

design competition through multidimensional auctions this article studies design competition in government procurement by developing a model of two dimensional auctions wherefirms bid on both price and quality and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer three auction schemes first score second score and second preferred offer are introduced and related to actual practices if the buyer can commit to a scoring rule in his best interest the resulting optimal scoring rule underrewards quality relative to the buyer s utility function and implements the optimal outcome for the buyer underfirst and second score auctions absent the commitment power the onlyfeasible scoring rule is the buyer s utility function under which 1 all three schemes yield the same expected utility to the buyer and 2 first and second score auctions induce the first best level of quality which turns out to be excessive from the buyer s point of view

market structure in the production of economics ph d s a century ago economics began to develop as a separate and significant part of the curriculum in american colleges and universities along with increased popularity and enrollment came the need for faculty specifically trained in economics a number of american scholars turned to europe germany in particular for their training and brought the german ph d back as a model for graduate education the first economics ph d s earned in this country were awarded by harvard 1875 yale 1877 and johns hopkins 1878 1 these first ph d s were two year degrees by 1900 economists had generally upgraded the ph d to three years beyond the baccalaureate degree consisting of two years of course work and another year for the dissertation graduate classes were taught in seminar format with considerable interaction between professors and students as the production process matured dissertations became longer more sophisticated and more specialized i e they were no longer the mark of a cultured gentleman but the demonstration of a professional skill 15 11 the newly formed american economic association began to keep track of doctoral candidates in economics in 1904 6 in 1904 there were 8 institutions which reported having men working on ph d s and by 1928 that number had increased to 27 2 while the american economic association did not tabulate the output of completed ph d s the national research council has compiled a database containing the number of ph d s by institution by year since 1920 their survey of earned doctorates indicates that 22 ph d s were awarded in economics by 6 different universities in 1920 by 1992 that number had grown to 910 ph d s from 123 different institutions

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

guns butter and anarchy a state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power i formalize this guns versus butter problem in a simple infinite horizon model in which two states must continually decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack the other state the analysis establishes sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which neither state attacks shows that there is a strictly pareto dominant pair of peaceful equilibrium payoffs characterizes the unique peaceful markov perfect equilibrium that yields them and describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocations more broadly the analysis also suggests that the notion of anarchy has little if any substantive significance distinctively related to international politics and that the problem of absolute and relative gains is superfluous

the war trap revisited a revised expected utility model the expected utility framework developed in the war trap is revised to correct several deficiencies risk taking orientations are now treated as an integral part of the model by introducing concavity or convexity into the utility functions the zero sum properties of the theory are largely eliminated and the tendency toward interpersonal comparisons of utility is removed several earlier results are replicated with the new model and with annual capabilities data new propositions are deduced that identify important limitations on conflict initiation and relationships resulting from differences in perceptions are tested support is found for the contention that the revised version of the theory of which the original model is a special case is a powerful tool for integrating many extant hypotheses about conflict and for explaining a substantial portion of the tendency for some threats to escalate to violence or warfare and for others to be resolved peacefully

the escalation of great power militarized disputes testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism realism we test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984 we derive a set of hypotheses from each model operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis the results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported in contemporary research on the causes of international conflict the realist paradigm has been the dominant theoretical approach within this broad framework however scholars have developed at least two prominent alternative models of the conditions under which conflict is likely to arise the first approach structural realism 1 focuses on the attributes of the international system while the second deterrence theory is largely dyadic and emphasizes the resolve and relative military capabilities of adversarial states while both theoretical approaches attempt to identify the conditions under which international crises and wars are likely to arise their

allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources an experimental approach we identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply unresponsive supplies no inventories and fixed capacities and significant demand indivisibilities rigidities examples of such problems include scheduling job shops airports or supercomputers zero inventory planning and the allocation and pricing of nasa s planned space station using experimental methods we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem markets and administrative procedures can perform at very low efficiencies 60 65 efficiency in a seemingly robust example thus there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments we develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single dimensional goods these new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures

rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies several recent books have argued that comparative case studies of crises demonstrate the failure of rational deterrence theory they have offered certain empirical generalizations as substitutes this paper shows that such contentions are unwarranted first the empirical generalizations are impressive as historical insights but they do not meet the standards for theory set out by the most sophisticated case study analysts themselves second the tests of rational deterrence used in the case studies violate standard principles of inference and the ensuing procedures are so biased as to be useless rational deterrence then is a more successful theory than portrayed in this literature and it remains the only intellectually powerful alternative available case studies are essential to theory building more efficiently than any other methods they find suitable variables suggest middle range generalizations for theory to explain and provide the prior knowledge that statistical tests require their loose constraints on admissible propositions and suitable evidence are appropriate and even necessary for these tasks these same characteristics however inevitably undermine all attempts to construe case study generalizations as bodies of theory or tests of hypotheses

procurement when price and quality matter a buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure xed cost and marginal cost of providing quality we characterize the buyer s optimal buying mechanism we then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining scoring auctions can extract a signifi cant proportion of the buyer s strategic surplus the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the e cient auction bargaining does less well and often does worse than the e cient auction

learning information and sorting in market entry games theory and evidence previous data from experiments on market entry games n player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure nash equilibria here we show that in this class of game learning theory predicts sorting that is in the long run agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the market and some permanently out we conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions than in previous work in order to test this prediction we find that when subjects are given minimal information only after close to 100 periods do subjects begin to approach equilibrium in contrast with full information subjects learn to play a pure strategy equilibrium relatively quickly however the information which permits rapid convergence revelation of the individual play of all opponents

deterrence the elusive dependent variable the testing of theory in international relations requires clearly articulated assumptions the specification of scope conditions rigorously formulated propositions appropriate tests and a valid and reliable data set against which to test the propositions this last requirement has generally been the most neglected dimension of research in this article we examine two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence by paul huth and bruce russett that do not deal adequately with the problems intrinsic to constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis t the problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties inherent in identifying deterrence successes which leave few if any behavioral traces and of inferring the intentions of would be challengers our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference 2 we would like to thank the canadian institute for international peace and security and

nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve explaining nuclear crisis outcomes scholars have long debated whether nuclear superiority or the balance of resolve shapes the probability of victory in nuclear crises but they have not clearly articulated a mechanism linking superiority to victory nor have they systematically analyzed the entire universe of empirical cases beginning from a nuclear brinkmanship theory framework i develop a new theory of nuclear crisis outcomes which links nuclear superiority to victory in nuclear crises precisely through its effect on the balance of resolve using a new data set on fifty two nuclear crisis dyads i show that states that enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely to win nuclear crises i also find some support for the idea that political stakes shape crisis outcomes these findings hold even after controlling for conventional military capabilities and for selection into nuclear crises this article presents a new theoretical explanation and the first comprehensive empirical examination of nuclear crisis outcomes

game theory and the spiral model when one state engages in a military buildup other states sometimes take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than they previously thought some argue that such increases in mutual suspicion can drive arms races and even lead to war psychological bias is often invoked to explain this pattern of growing suspicions leading to hostility this article presents an incomplete information model of an arms race and investigates when escalations should rationally generate increased fears and when in order to reduce such fears security seekers can refrain from building it shows that escalations rationally provoke fear even in the absence of bias and that weak states and states facing high costs of arms racing and war will be especially likely to refrain from building as a way of signaling benign intentions

research in economic education five new initiatives research is essential for improvement in teaching and learning economics william e becker et al 1991 called for new research on the relative merits of multiple choice and essay tests on the lasting effects of course work in economics and on the effects of instructors instructional techniques and new technologies on student learning to respond to the call the committee on economic education cee of the american economic association recruited robin bartlett william becker w lee hansen peter kennedy and the authors to organize a conference that would jump start new research projects the organizers chose three conference goals identifying research priorities recruiting new economists to economic education research and building teams to undertake identified priorities they recruited 21 economists to participate 1 provided them with a list of potential research questions and asked them which questions were most important and which they were willing to work on with survey results in hand the organizers divided participants into five teams corresponding to the following five topics teaching methods and incentives for collegelevel economics instruction ph d education in economics in the united states improving the assessment of student learning in college economics courses long term effects of learning economics and efficiency in the use of technology in economic education at the conference participants discussed briefing papers prepared for each topic worked on project design and funding issues and began writing proposals herein we describe our research priorities and our progress in developing research plans and securing financial support

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

crime and punishment the role of norms in crisis bargaining in this work i test the proposition that normative standards of behavior can influence state actions in security related conflicts specifically i examine the construction of norms in the settlements of security related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent militarized interactions i argue that dispute settlements alter subsequent crisis bargaining in two important ways first they act as normative referents that alter the interpretation of subsequent crisis bargaining behavior both by identifying a solution to the dispute which alleviates fears of demands for future concessions and by defining a set of acts which both sides consider illegitimate second in combination with the response to their violation dispute settlements inflict reputational costs on states that violate them i test these arguments against a realist theory of crisis bargaining through an analysis of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979 i find strong support for the hypothesis that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises whereas realist theory receives only mixed support

domestic audience costs in international relations an experimental approach what makes international threats credible recent theories point to domestic audience costs the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down this article provides the first direct evidence of audi ence costs the analysis based on experiments embedded in public opinion surveys shows that audience costs exist across a wide range of conditions and increase with the level of escalation the costs are evident throughout the population and espe cially among politically active citizens who have the greatest potential to shape government policy finally preliminary evidence suggests that audience costs arise because citizens care about the international reputation of the country or leader these findings help identify how and under what conditions domestic audiences make commitments credible at the same time they demonstrate the promise of using ex periments to answer previously intractable questions in the field of international relations

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions abstract this paper considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several suppliers who hold private information about their own efficiency type both quality and price need to be determined different from scoring auctions we present a new method i e contingent payment auction mechanism cpam which can effectively deal with the optimal procurement strategy in multidimensional procurement auctions cpam can implement the optimal mechanism for the buyer and is thus optimal among all possible procurement strategies cpam implies that the buyer should first design and announce a contingent payment function that specifies a payment for each possible quality level before the bidding begins compared to scoring auctions cpam has some advantages it does not require a special form of scoring rule and can be generalized in a more broad auction formats furthermore it can help us to solve the ex post moral hazard problem we consider two kinds of cpam for the cpam i is sensitive to different auction formats we come up with cpam ii which can improve the performance of cpam i broadly speaking cpam integrates the idea of dimension reduction from scoring auction into that of incentive contract design from contract theory to solve the problem of ex post moral hazard

homo diplomaticus mixed method evidence of variation in strategic rationality psychology is traditionally used in political science to explain deviations from rationality lost in the debate between rationalists and their critics however is a sense of whether the kinds of strategic self interested behavior predicted by these models has psychological microfoundations what would homo economicus look like in the real world we argue that strategic rationality varies across individuals and is characterized by a pro self social value orientation and a high level of epistemic motivation testing our argument in the context of international relations we employ a laboratory bargaining game and integrate it with archival research on german foreign policy making in the 1920s we find in both contexts that even among those interested in maximizing only their own egoistic gains those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to adapt to the strategic situation particularly the distribution of power our results build a bridge between two approaches often considered to be antithetical to one another

a new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions in this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design we merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes the simultaneous multiple round smr design used by the fcc to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the adaptive user selection mechanism ausm of banks et al 1989 allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources an experimental approach rand journal of economics vol 20 no 1 pp 1 25 then by adding one crucial new feature we are able to create a new design the resource allocation design rad auction process which performs better than both our experiments demonstrate that the rad auction achieves higher efficiencies lower bidder losses higher net revenues and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder s problem

a dispositional theory of reputation costs politicians frequently turn to reputational arguments to bolster support for their proposed foreign policies yet despite the prevailing belief that domestic audiences care about reputation there is very little direct evidence that publics care about reputation costs and very little understanding of how we propose a dispositional theory of reputation costs in which citizens facing ill defined strategic situations turn to their core predispositions about foreign affairs in order to weigh competing reputational dimensions employing a diverse array of methodological tools from vignette based survey experiments to automated text analysis we show that the mass public has a taste for reputation but understands it in fundamentally different ways with hawks concerned about the negative reputational consequences of inconsistency and doves equally concerned with the negative reputational consequences of belligerence and interventionism in illustrating how reputation costs are in our heads our findings offer both good and bad news for theories of reputation in ir

a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence we present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis the theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the deterrence logic in huth 1988 and huth and russett 1984 coupled with private information concerning utilities our statistical analysis suggests that the attacker and defender s decisions are influenced by the balance of forces nuclear weapons defender protege military alliances arms transfers and trade as well as the regime types of those involved many of these findings contradict previous research by huth 1988 and huth and russett 1988 we find that many of the variables involved in the deterrence calculus are nonmonotonically linked to the probability of deterrence success or war we illustrate the results with case studies of the soviet japanese dispute over manchukuo 1937 1938 and the berlin blockade 1948

revisiting reputation how past actions matter in international politics policy makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation especially a good reputation for resolve recent work however has argued that reputations for resolve do not form and hence that past actions do not influence observers behavior in subsequent interactions this conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics in particular juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers beliefs about interests while the common approach of looking at crisis decision making misses the impact of reputation on general deterrence we thus derive hypotheses about conflict onset from both the arguments of reputation critics and the logic of more standard reputation arguments which we put to statistical test we find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute although reputation is not all important leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict

deterrence and foreign policy the article by christopher achen and duncan snidal in this issue however provocative some of its observations has the merit of raising an important question how should we think about the relationship between deductive theories of deterrence on the one hand and on the other research on deterrence that is at the same time empirical and oriented toward theory while forcefully defending the deductive form of theory achen and snidal also clearly dissociate themselves from the extreme position that it is a self contained enterprise that need not take empirical research seriously rather they recognize that empirical case studies are capable of contributing and indeed have to some extent already contributed to the development of theory perhaps even to the kind of deductive theory they favor

contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice we contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues the results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory in particular our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains risk seeking in the domain of losses and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains this is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times the results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options contrary to the assumption of invariance finally we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

equilibrium play in large group market entry games coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games featuring symmetric players complete information zero entry costs and several randomly presented values of the market capacity once the market capacity becomes publicly known each player must decide privately whether to enter the market and receive a payoff which increases linearly in the difference between the market capacity and the number of entrants or stay out payoffs for staying out are either positive giving rise to the domain of gains or negative giving rise to the domain of losses the major findings are substantial individual differences that do not diminish with practice aggregate behavior that is organized extremely well in both the domains of gains and losses by the nash equilibrium solution and variations in the population action strategies with repeated play of the stage game that are accounted for by a variant of an adaptive learning model due to roth and erev 1995

the effect of repeated play on reputation building an experimental approach what effect does repeated play have on reputation building the liter ature on international relations remains divided on whether when and how reputa tion matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict we examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments using comparative statics from a repeated entry deterrence game we isolate how incentives for reputation build ing should change as the number of entrants changes we find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted in order to explain this we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population our research suggests that rational choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated

checkmate exploring backward induction among chess players it is difficult to overstate the profound impact that game theory has had on the economic approach and on the sciences more generally for that reason understanding how closely the assumptions that underpin game theoretic analysis conform to actual human decision making is a question of first order importance to economists in this spirit backward induction represents one of the most basic concepts in game theory backward induction played a prominent role in reinhard selten s 1965 development of perfect equilibrium and it has helped to shape the modern refinement literature although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory existing empirical evidence suggests that economic agents engage in backward induction less frequently than theorists might hope backward induction has fared especially poorly in the centipede game which was introduced by robert w rosenthal 1981 and has since been extensively analyzed ken binmore 1987 robert j aumann 1988 philip j reny 1988 david m kreps 1990 geir b asheim and martin dufwenberg 2003 the original centipede game is a two player finite move game in which the subjects alternate choosing whether to end the game or to pass to the other player the subject s payoff to ending the game at a particular node is greater than the payoff he receives if the other player ends the game at the next node but less than the payoff earned if the other player elects not to end the game the player making the final choice gets paid more from stopping than from passing and thus would be expected to stop if the opponent will stop at the last node then conditional on reaching the penultimate node the player maximizes his earnings by stopping at that node following this logic further backward induction leads to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the game is stopped at the first node as pointed out in prior research

what students remember and say about college economics years later in his presidential address to the american economic association george stigler 1963 offered the provocative hypothesis that students would retain very little knowledge from principles courses in economics five years or more after taking the courses the few empirical studies that have been published on this topic generally found no or small lasting effects at least for those who took fewer than four courses see e g g l bach and phillip saunders 1965 gerald j lynch 1990 that raises even broader questions about the long term effects of studying economics in college in terms of individuals behavior as consumers workers and voters which we are now beginning to investigate using both survey and transcript data we have two major goals in this study first we want to learn how students perceive their classroom experience in economics courses years after leaving school both in absolute terms and compared to other courses they took we drew samples of economics business and other majors who attended our four universities in 1976 1986 and 1996 and asked which topics regularly covered in economics courses they now viewed as being most and least important we asked whether they now viewed the economics courses they took as interesting important too difficult or too abstract we also compared their perceptions of teaching methods and grading rigor in economics courses to those developed in other courses our second major goal represents an empirical test of the common claim that economics is a unique way of thinking if it is we might reasonably expect people with more training in economics to have different views on policy issues and to make different decisions as consumers workers savers investors and voters we collected survey data on many of these choices and by matching those responses with transcript data we plan to investigate whether there are observable behavioral responses associated with being an economics major or simply taking some minimum number of economics courses compared to students who took fewer courses or none at all there are other uses for these data they can likely be used to study choice of major and course taking behavior as well as common laboreconomics issues such as human capital versus screening in the labor market certainly the data can provide insight into curriculum development for economics departments and business schools as well there is obviously the potential for response biases in the analysis of these data but we expect that having transcript data for respondents and nonrespondents will allow us to deal with these issues econometrically this first brief report from this ongoing project addresses only the first goal of the project specifically how our former students evaluate their experience with economics courses and instructors what economic courses and concepts do they now believe are most important do they wish they had taken more or less coursework in economics what do they think now about various economic issues and allgood department of economics university of nebraska lincoln ne 68588 e mail sallgood unlnotes unl edu bosshardt department of economics florida atlantic university boca raton fl 33431 e mail wbosshar fau edu van der klaauw department of economics university of north carolina chapel hill nc 27599 e mail vanderkl email unc edu watts department of economics purdue university west lafayette in 47907 and while this paper was written the german international school of management and administration hanover germany e mail mwatts mgmt purdue edu we thank the board of the calvin k kazanjian economics foundation for the grant that made this work possible and the aea committee for economic education for bringing us together to write the proposal as described in michael salemi et al 2002 mike salemi provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper april fidler provided major assistance in project coordination administration and data entry georg schaur worked extensively with data organization and preliminary tabulations

when does it pay to delay supplier qualification theory and experiments we study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening qualification screening is costly for the buyer involving product tests site visits and interviews in addition to a qualified incumbent supplier the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification the buyer wishes to run a price only open descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction we analytically study the buyer s optimal strategy accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract in our analysis we derive the incumbent s optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott the auction to preserve their profit margin and only lower cost incumbents bid to win these results are strikingly different from the usual open descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy we test our analytical results in the laboratory with human subjects we find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

conflict war and redistribution this article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war in the first period both countries can either consume or build arms whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the use of force to reallocate resources if both countries are fully informed then there will be no war but rather a voluntary redistribution of resources in a situation of asymmetric information however in which one country is fully informed and the other is not a war can occur if the uninformed country uses a separating equilibrium strategy precommitting itself to a positive probability of war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country

arms races and arms control modeling the hawk perspective of the three major theories developed by post world war 11 american social science to explain arms races the repeated prisoner s dilemma the spiral model and the deterrence model the deterrence model has received the least attention from game theorists i present a model of this perspective and discuss its implications for arms racing and armscontrol theory arms races arise in the model when there is a conflict of interest between two states and uncertainty about the ability of at least one side to bear the strains of increased military spending the model provides support for two common critiques of arms control first arms control is difficult to achieve when it is most needed when there is a dispute accompanied by uncertainty that could lead to war second arms races though they occur in times of tension do not necessarily increase the likelihood of war and may even reduce it by reducing uncertainty about relative power

crisis stability in the nuclear age in the logic of crisis stability first strike advantages may still be destabilizing although even a successful first strike cannot protect a state from a terribly costly retaliatory second strike if there is an advantage to striking first and if war seems sufficiently likely launching a preemptive first strike may seem to be the least of evils i reconsider the logic of crisis stability by studying games that are completely stable although there are first strike advantages four general conditions ensure stability identifying these conditions refines our understanding of crisis stability by also identifying the potential sources of instability and this more refined understanding shows that the logic of crisis stability focuses attention too narrowly on first strike advantages stability results from a more subtle interaction of several factors of which a first strike advantage is only one

the abolition of slavery and the end of international war slavery and war have both historically been considered inevitable consequences of human nature yet slavery has been abolished and moral progress may have contributed to slavery s disappearance both realists and marxists are skeptical about the impact of ethical constraints on political decisions while idealists as well as at least some regime analysts emphasize the role of those constraints however elements of all of these approaches support the proposition that moral progress may bring an end to international war some historical trends do not support the idea that international war is on the verge of disappearance but there has not been a war between major powers since 1945 in addition norms against colonialism are strong no war has occurred between democratic states nor does a war appear likely among the rather sizable number of industrialized democratic states in the international system today explanations of these pockets of peace based on caution induced by nuclear weapons or on economic interdependence for example are certainly not beyond question therefore it may be that norms inhibiting the initiation of international war have already made obsolete not only wars between the richest and most powerful states in the world but also some forms of depradation by the strong against the relatively weak states

reputation and hegemonic stability a game theoretic analysis we develop and explicate a game theoretic model in which repeated play incomplete information and reputation are major elements a significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes the model is used to formalize certain aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability it shows that the dilemma or limits of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved unifying both benevolent and coercive strands of hegemony theory an example drawn from recent developments in the organization of petroleum exporting countries shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction we conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information

optimal multi object auctions this paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects in the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object in which case the optimal auction is efficient the optimal auction takes one of two formats either objects are sold in independent auctions or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other the format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders in the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed and the optimal auction is then inefficient

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight color and terms of delivery in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods this paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special preferential independent additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs auction additive discrete provides a refined design for a price based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier in addition this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments the auction terminates with an outcome of a modified vickrey clarke groves mechanism this paper also develops auction nonlinear discrete for the more general nonlinear case a particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels

better faster cheaper an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback the majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single attribute price format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time alternatively a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes while such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer it is not clear that this theoretical improvement will be realized given the increased complexity of the auction in this research we present an ascending auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes motivated by a supply chain procurement problem setting we consider quality and lead time for the two attributes in addition to price the auction mechanism provides the bidders with restricted feedback regarding the buyer s utility function we explore experimentally the performance of this multiattribute auction mechanism as compared to a price only auction mechanism compared with the price only auction we find that our mechanism design is effective in increasing both buyer utility and bidder supplier profits

rational deterrence in an imperfect world this chapter applies recent economic research on games with incomplete information to the calculus of deterrence 1 we do not attempt to provide a complete theory of rational deterrence the focus is on the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence we show how strategic players signal a reputation for strength from the perspective of an internally consistent equilibrium model

multi attribute procurement contracts abstract we consider the design of multi attribute procurement contracts when the supplier possesses multi dimensional private information specifically we consider a buyer who must design a contract to procure a single product whose value is a function of two attributes the potential supplier s cost structure is two dimensional including one component for each attribute and is unknown to the buyer in contrast to the existing one dimensional models we find that in some cases the buyer can extract all of the channel profits without distorting the specifications of the final product and we identify conditions under which that will be the case in other words with more dimensions to leverage the buyer may be able to discern the supplier s type without paying any information rents thus reducing her procurement costs it is also possible that the buyer can extract all the channel profits by distorting the product specifications downward finally we demonstrate how our results can be extended to a setting with multiple customer classes where the valuation for the product attributes varies across the classes we find that greater differentiation in customer valuation leads to a setting in which the buyer is less likely to extract all of the channel profit without distortion

arms races and conflict experimental evidence we study escalation and aggression in an experimental first strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money earning task in each round both players can spend money to accumulate weapons the player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player which almost totally eliminates the victim s earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike weapons can serve as a means of deterrence in four treatments we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races