cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

regulation profitability and diffusion of photovoltaic grid connected systems a comparative analysis of germany and spain abstract although both germany and spain were pioneers in the support and adoption of photovoltaics pv through feed in tariffs fits germany is the world s leading country in terms of installed pv capacity per capita and remains on a path of pv growth while the spanish pv market is virtually paralysed we analyse the divergent performance in both countries by reviewing the evolution of fits and by analysing the profitability of different types of installations for the period 2004 2014 while in germany the policies profitability and diffusion of pv were relatively stable over time in spain erratic policy changes and the distortionary effect of the solar orchard ownership structure caused a diffusion bubble june 2007 september 2008 and a subsequent profitability bubble 2009 2011 these bubbles led to the collapse of the support system in 2012 revealing the difficulty inherent in designing innovation and diffusion policies in the context of high uncertainty and rapid technological change

simple strategy proof approximately walrasian mechanisms abstract this note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the walrasian mechanism it presents mechanisms under which truth telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies in contrast to the walrasian mechanism and whose outcomes generically approximate walrasian ones for large economies these mechanisms provide new insights on the well know trade off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies journal of economic literature classification numbers d50 d71 d78

assessing the short term revenue impacts of residential pv systems on electricity customers retailers and network service providers abstract falling costs and supportive government policies have seen remarkable growth in residential photovoltaic systems in jurisdictions around the world while there have been detailed studies of the financial attractiveness of pv for home owners under different policy and retail market arrangements there has been less consideration of the impacts of such systems on some other key industry participants in this paper we undertake an investigation of the annual short term revenue impacts of pv systems for those households installing them for their electricity retailers and network service providers nsps and for all electricity customers more in general in the australian state of nsw we use actual half hourly pv generation and electricity consumption for 80 households in sydney to estimate the real world impacts of a range of former current and possible future pv policy and retail tariff arrangements including gross and net feed in tariffs fit we found that the short term revenue impacts differ significantly for different commercial arrangements and are highly variable and largely driven by the pv performance and its match with household consumption patterns results highlight that current net metering policies in australia with low net fit rates may provide only moderate revenue incentives to households yet quite adverse revenue impacts on nsps and retailers depending on the level of pv export while nsp short term revenue losses will likely involve increasing electricity tariffs in the longer term losses for retailers may add risks to the profitability of household customers with pv the challenge for policy makers is to facilitate socially valuable pv deployment whilst appropriately managing the impacts on all key electricity industry stakeholders

consistent solutions in atomless economies we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we prove for an atomless economy with possibly satiated preferences any solution that is efficient equitable and consistent must select allocations that are supported by equal budget walrasian equilibria with slack we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we search for systematic methods or solutions of resolving this problem for a solution to be considered desirable we propose that it should satisfy several requirements first it should be efficient second it should be equitable a variety of distributional require ments have been proposed in the literature the requirement we will impose here is that it select allocations at which no agent would prefer the equal division of the social endowment to his own consumption in addition to these two basic efficiency and equity conditions we require that the solution be consistent the recommendations it makes for any economy are never contra dicted by the recommendations it makes for any reduced economy obtained by allowing some subgroup of agents to leave the scene with their allotted consumptions the requirement of consistency is very natural here is a motivation for it offered by thomson 1988 consider all the resources available on the planet earth one would like not only that they be distributed fairly when the planet is considered as a whole but also that whatever resources end up in each continent country city be fairly distributed among the members of that subpopulation when considered in isolation in this paper we study economies with a large number of agents modelled as a complete atomless measure space our main result is a characterization of the solutions that satisfy all three requirements of efficiency equity and con sistency it follows from our result that under standard assumptions on preferences any such solution must select allocations that are supported by equal income walrasian equilibria however our characterization holds for more general economies since it applies to economies in which preferences are possibly satiated mas colell 1988 extended traditional general equilibrium theory to the class of such economies by introducing the notion of walrasian

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

pricing of fluctuations in electricity markets abstract in an electric power system demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers furthermore in the near future deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to exacerbate the variability of demand on conventional thermal generating units we address this issue by explicitly modeling the ancillary cost associated with demand variability we argue that a time varying price equal to the suppliers instantaneous marginal cost may not achieve social optimality and that consumer demand fluctuations should be properly priced we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism that explicitly encourages consumers to adapt their consumption so as to offset the variability of demand on conventional units through a dynamic game theoretic formulation we show that under suitable convexity assumptions the proposed pricing mechanism achieves social optimality asymptotically as the number of consumers increases to infinity numerical results demonstrate that compared with marginal cost pricing the proposed mechanism creates a stronger incentive for consumers to shift their peak load and therefore has the potential to reduce the need for long term investment in peaking plants

efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform price auctions abstract we prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent value uniform price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy we show that the uniform price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price more generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model approximations to analyze the large market behavior of game theoretic models we demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the finite game approaches infinity

do employee spinoffs learn markets from their parents evidence from international trade abstract it is well established that employee spinoffs learn their parents technologies but little is known about their demand side learning we exploit the identification in international trade data of parent markets countries to investigate whether exporting employee spinoffs of exporting parents have an advantage in accessing their parents markets over exporting comparison firms well positioned to learn those markets at arm s length we find that controlling for the greater overlap of spinoffs with their parents export products at entry spinoffs access 51 percent more parent markets than exporting firms in the same 4 digit industries and municipalities as the parents this advantage shrinks monotonically with time becoming statistically insignificant four years after entry indicating that intrafirm learning provides spinoffs with a four year head start over learning at arm s length spinoffs do not overlap more than comparison firms with parent markets that the parents did not serve at spinoff entry providing evidence against the alternative hypothesis that product overlap inadequately controls for greater technological similarity of spinoffs to parents firm entry into parent markets predicted by spinoff status does not lead to entry into adjacent markets the following year

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

threshold strategy proofness on manipulability in large voting problems in voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives a voting rule is threshold strategy proof if any agent can obtain only a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative if the number of agents is large enough for anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but is in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent decreasing to zero as the number of agents grows if there are at least five agents the mean rule taking the average vote is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy proofness

informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents abstract for an incomplete information model of public good provision with interim participation constraints we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated with approximately full surplus extraction when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small the result holds even if agents payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs the contrary result of neeman z neeman the relevance of private information in mechanism design j econ theory 117 2004 55 77 rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

renewable energy sources in the spanish electricity market instruments and effects the implementation of directive 2001 77 ec on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable sources sets a target of 22 1 of electricity consumption in the eu in 2010 and establishes various mechanisms that member countries may adopt depending on their needs this paper analyses these mechanisms their implementation in spain by means of rd 661 2007 and the degree of fulfilment of objectives it concludes with an analysis of the effectiveness of the mechanisms adopted and recommendations on market design

grid parity and self consumption with photovoltaic systems under the present regulatory framework in spain the case of the university of jaen campus abstract the cut off of any subsidy or feed in tariff that incentives the installation of new renewable energy systems which are close to the grid parity is a reality in most of the european countries but in the recent years the grid parity has worsened because of the global economic crisis in the case of spain in addition to the economic problems the photovoltaic sector has been dramatically damaged through a changeable regulatory framework an excessive bureaucracy and the inclusion of additional fees or possible back up tolls that are very prejudicial for the deployment of this sector nowadays the current spanish legislation mentions the possibility of self consumption totally or partially of the electricity generated by pv or any renewable energy systems but up to the date of this work the law that regulates the administrative technical and economic conditions for the net metering of the electrical energy produced within the consumer s network is still under a draft stage in this paper it is analyzed the case of the university of jaen where it has been identified and simulated several pv systems on the roofs and parking lots of the university campus and considering the current electrical tariffs hourly defined for the case of high power and high voltage consumers it has been done a cost and economic analysis as a result it has been obtained an average levelised cost of energy around 0 125 kwh 1 a discount payback time of 17 5 years or less a positive net present value and a nominal internal rate of return of 8 48 in the worst case beyond that it has been carried out a sensitivity analysis of the factors that have more influence in the profitability of these systems like the initial investment cost the pv electricity yield additional taxes and the variations in the electricity price market

solar feed in tariffs examining fair and reasonable retail rates using cost avoidance estimates abstract growing solar photovoltaic pv electricity systems in geographically diverse regions presents a complex policy problem for governments during 2013 16 the queensland government in australia examined establishing a fair and reasonable retail feed in tariff fit policy noting it regulates state retail electricity consumption prices a combined cost avoidance and stakeholder analysis was applied to show that determination of a fair and reasonable fit for all stakeholders while aspirational is difficult to achieve typically agreement on a fair tariff rate will depend on stakeholders relative position in energy supply chains service providers retailers suppliers customers advocates and interpretations of fairness that can be shaped by competition in the supply area also increases in financial benefits to pv customers might be considered unreasonable by non pv customers and retailers that experience increases in electricity prices and operating costs importantly the application of a retail fit in regional and isolated areas requires careful energy policy design taking account of network losses remote and isolated customer metering cost effective network control technologies and diesel generator operating limits the study also observed that shifting funding of fit schemes from electricity distributors to competitive retailers will likely have negative consequences for retail fit offerings and pv customer servicing

on the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information in interim economies with asymmetric information we show that the coarse core of wilson 1978 does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated this failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either interim core or price equilibrium

prospect theory and market quality abstract we study equilibrium trading strategies and market quality in an economy in which speculators display preferences consistent with prospect theory kahneman and tversky 39 tversky and kahneman 63 i e loss aversion and mild risk seeking in losses loss aversion risk seeking in losses induces speculators to trade less more and less cautiously more aggressively with their private information but also makes them less more inclined to purchase private information when it is costly in order to mitigate enhance their perceived risk of a trading loss we demonstrate that these forces have novel nontrivial state dependent effects on equilibrium market liquidity price volatility trading volume market efficiency and information production

residential energy efficiency and distributed generation natural partners or competition abstract residential energy efficiency and distributed generation seem to be natural partners in our journey towards a more sustainable energy future a growing range of energy efficient consumer technologies and extraordinary declines in photovoltaics system prices has seen household electricity demand fall whilst a growing proportion of the remaining load is provided by household self generation australia is a particularly interesting example of these developments with around 15 of households now possessing a pv system while per capita household demand has also fallen markedly however existing retail electricity tariffs and regulatory arrangements can create mixed incentives for households contemplating both pv and energy efficiency options and for their network service providers this is certainly the case in australia with net metering arrangements that value self consumption of pv far more than pv exports to the grid there are also complex benefits for the electricity network created by these household energy resources that can be significant in this paper we use real household load and pv data from sydney households to model the potential implications of existing electricity tariff arrangements on the financial attractiveness of pv and energy efficiency we model these options separately and in combination for both households implementing these options and their network service providers our results highlight how inappropriate tariffs may well adversely impact on the value that the combination of energy efficiency and pv offers not only to households but also to their network service providers and suggest ways that such impacts might be ameliorated by acknowledging the benefits that these resources can offer to the electricity network

market power and information revelation in dynamic trading we study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty there is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers all buyers are uninformed while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world when n 1 full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period with n 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers information and even more importantly on the intensity of competition allowed by the existing trading rules when there is intense competition absence of clienteles information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough regardless of the number of informed sellers on the other hand for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition presence of clienteles for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed moreover in that case when only one seller is informed for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation even for large n jel c72 c78 d82 d83

the efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information we consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically specifically a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy in our model some traders may have non vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved we show that given any desired level of approximation there is n such that any bayesian nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with n or more traders leads with high probability to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy in particular allocations are approximately efficient a key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non strategically

trade with heterogeneous prior beliefs and asymmetric information no trade theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the same prior beliefs this paper explores the structure of no trade theorems with heterogeneous prior beliefs it is shown how different notions of efficiency under asymmetric information ex ante interim ex post are related to agents prior beliefs as well as incentive compatible and public versions of those efficiency concepts these efficiency results are used to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on agents beliefs for no trade theorems in different trading environments

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

monotonicity and rationalizability in a large first price auction this paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases wilson 1977 instead of analysing the symmetric nash equilibrium we examine rationalizable strategies bernheim 1984 pearce 1984 among the set of monotonic bidding strategies to prove that any monotonic rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the truthful valuation of the object conditioned on the signal received by the bidder we obtain an information aggregation result similar to that of wilson 1977 while dispensing with almost all symmetric assumptions and using a milder solution concept than the nash equilibrium in particular if every bidder is ex ante identical then any rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the symmetric nash equilibrium in a symmetric first price auction the symmetry of outcomes is implied rather than assumed copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

private information in large economies this paper examines the effect of private information in large economies we show that in a model with stochastic information structures the restrictions imposed on allocations by the presence of private information disappear in large economies we also show that for a large class of direct mechanisms the incentive for any agent to falsely report private information goes to zero as the number of agents becomes large these results provide an informational smallness analog to existing quantity smallness limiting results in the literature

money as a mechanism in a bewley economy we study what features an economic environment might possess such that it would be pareto ecient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money we prove a conjecture that is essentially due to bewley 1980 1983 the gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly ecient ex ante in an environment where very patient agents can accumulate large enough money stocks to be completely self insured we also study examples where a nonmonetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to any monetary mechanism at least when the comparison is restricted to stationary equilibria and where an inflationary monetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to a laissez faire or deflationary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient agents j e l classification e31 e42

asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information the authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible individually rational and nearly efficient the main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty in addition the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer s bid double auction problem akerlof s lemons problem and insurance with asymmetric information copyright 1992 by the econometric society

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

employee spinoffs and other entrants stylized facts from brazil using a comprehensive linked employer employee database from brazil for the period 1995 2001 we are able for the first time to compare firms founded as employee spinoffs to new firms without parents and to diversification ventures of existing firms entering a new industry employee spinoffs are defined either as the director manager having moved from a parent in the same industry or as one quarter of the employees having shifted from a common parent depending on definition employee spinoffs account for between one sixth and one third of the new firms in brazil s private sector during this period regardless of definition size at entry is larger for employee spinoffs than for new firms without parents but smaller than for diversification ventures of existing firms similarly exit rates for employee spinoffs are less than for new firms without parents and comparable to those for diversification ventures of existing firms these results suggest that we can think of some part of a firm s productivity draw in the jovanovic 1982 model as embodied in the firm s employees and portable by them to a new firm

imperfect competition and efficiency in lemons markets this article studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets more precisely we characterise the second best mechanism i e the optimal mechanism with private information in a stylised lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers we then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second best mechanism and market competitiveness a general message of our results is that increasing competition may not help lemons markets in some circumstances moreover increasing competition beyond a certain degree increases the distance between the first best and second best levels of efficiency

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

firm spin offs in denmark 1981 2000 patterns of entry and exit abstract this paper adds large sample evidence on the extent to which the likelihood of business failure or success is related to relationships between parent firms and their off spring for this purpose we make use of an exhaustive matched employer employee data set covering the entire danish private sector in years 1981 to 2000 to study firm entry and exit special focus is on spin offs a particular group of small entrants which are founded by groups of persons originating from the same former workplace we estimate a multinomial logit model in order to examine which characteristics of the founders and the parent firms increase the probability of spinning off next we carry out a duration analysis of the subsequent transitions of the spin offs and compare their exit risks with those of other entrant firms which have less strong parent progeny relationships in terms of worker flows

the genealogy of modern theoretical public economics from first best to second best abstract the development of second best modelling in the seventies has shaped modern theoretical economics the paper discusses some key changes in the economists conceptions the first two sections examine the efficiency equity dilemma the study of non convexities has shown that counterintuitive efficiency enhancing income redistribution might occur the introduction of asymmetric information has shed doubts on virtues of lump sum compensation the last sections focus on the intricate geometry of second best optimisation and the ambiguous value of the signals provided by the price system outside a first best world

endogenous private information structures we formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure we ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization any nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure we provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when nash is replaced by sequential we characterize the sequential nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a sequential nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition

efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive abstract efficient anonymous and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive i e each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone s wealth equivalently in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type the characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear and it also applies to continuum economies perfectly competitive mechanisms are non generic although non vacuous in finite economies and are generic but non universal in continuum economies we use these results to provide bridges to related work journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d51 d62

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

envy freeness and distributive justice the criterion of envy freeness according to which no agent should prefer any of his neighbours allocation to his own has become a central part of the economic theory of distributive justice it essentially corresponds to the need to express an ideal of equality in societies where preferences and endowments are heterogeneous this paper surveys various formulations of the idea of envy freeness starting with the simple distribution model then adding the possibility for agents to have different native talent endowments and finally moving to models with production many classical results are displayed but emphasis is also put on recent developments mainly the ideas of minimizing envy and of absence of domination five major difficulties facing envy freeness are identified and listed as directions of future research copyright 1994 by blackwell publishers ltd

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

revisiting the techno economic analysis process for building mounted grid connected solar photovoltaic systems part two application part one in this two part paper identified monte carlo analysis as an improved approach over traditional deterministic techno economic methods for solar pv prosumers in deregulated markets in this

perfect competition in asymmetric information economies compatibility of efficiency and incentives the idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents and the individual agents relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature thus there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information the existence of incentive compatible ex post walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without common values consequently the conflict between incentive compatibility and pareto eciency is resolved exactly and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large but finite private information economies

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

profitability analysis of grid connected photovoltaic facilities for household electricity self sufficiency abstract spain exhibits a high level of energy dependence and has significant solar energy resources these two facts have given rise to the prominence that renewable energy particularly solar photovoltaic technology has enjoyed in recent years supported by a favorable regulatory framework currently the spanish government is providing new ways in energy policy to enhance and accelerate the development of low power photovoltaic generation facilities for self consumption by introducing energy policies for feed in payments of surplus electricity such facilities are an example of distributed electrical generation with important benefits for the environment and the rest of the electrical system because when properly managed they can help improve the system s stability and reduce overall losses by analyzing household demand and solar photovoltaic energy resources the profitability of such facilities is considered in this article taking into account the technical and economic impact of storage systems and proposing models for feed in payments of surplus electricity in an attempt to assess whether this method of electricity generation versus the method of conventionally supplied power from a grid at a regulated tariff can rival each other economically in terms of parity

equilibria and incentives in private information economies abstract this paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy namely walrasian expectations equilibrium private core and insurance equilibrium it shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy in contrast to the finite agent setting one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any walrasian expectations equilibrium private core insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type

financial assessment of government subsidy policy on photovoltaic systems for industrial users a case study in taiwan due to taiwan s limited energy resources the development of solar photovoltaic pv in taiwan has become one of the most important solutions for meeting future energy supply needs and ensuring environmental protection a huge amount of researches about renewable energy sources has emerged recently in response to these issues however the amount of researches considering the effects of various influential parameters on the efficiency and performance of pv systems remains small and is still limited to some specific parts of pv systems in particular researches considering thoughtfully the influence of government subsidies on pv financial assessment are still in development this paper proposes an approach to analyze the benefit of installing a pv system under the impact of government financial subsidies focusing especially on feed in tariff fit and tax abatement policies for industrial users in taiwan in addition a method for selecting the most appropriate policies is proposed for the government through the analysis of both user demand and the government s pv installation capacity target

an informational externality in a competitive market abstract consider a new competitive market with unknown demand the market price generated by incumbents conveys information that firms including potential entrants use for future decisions yet the incumbents are not rewarded for their assistance suggesting that an inefficiency can exist it has been argued that greater entry generates more information about a new market and should be subsidized a simple model of partial information and learning is developed finding that an informational externality can exist in competitive markets but there may be excessive entry free entry and a public price conditions for competitive market efficiency are conditions for inefficiency

a note on incentives in large economies nash equilibria of anonymous and efficient mechanisms are studied in economies with a continuum of traders conditions are given under which some or all the nash equilibria of such mechanisms yield competitive allocations particular attention is payed to the case of direct mechanisms where the truth constitutes a nash equilibrium

welfare bounds in the fair division problem to any anonymous division method corresponds a lower and an upper bound function they measure the impact on a given agent s utility of the other agents preferences the highest lower bound is the equal split utility the lowest upper bound is the indirect utility from equal split at a canonical price these two bounds are compatible yet any method with the elqual split lower bound exhibits the growth paradox and any method with the lowest upper bound generates envy we criticize competitive equilibrium from equal split because it puts no finite upper bound on any agent s welfare

a unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes it is shown that any informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes fair allocations over the class of classical pure exchange environments has a message space of dimension no smaller than the number of agents times the number of commodities since the equal income walrasian mechanism in which all agents take prices parametrically and maximize utility subject to the average income constraint realizes fair outcomes over the class of classical pure exchange environments and has a message space of that dimension it is informationally efficient further it is shown that it is the unique informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair allocations

informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty in mclean and postlewaite econometrica 56 1992 p 2421 we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents we defined a notion of informational size and showed that when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature the conflict between incentive compatibility and ex post efficiency can be made small if agents have sufficiently small informational size this paper investigates the relationship between informational size and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present i e when significant uncertainty about the world persists even when the information of all agents is known

rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices a mean variance example abstract the paper uses an intertemporal mean variance model of the market for a dividend paying risky asset to analyse rational expectations equilibria when all agents condition their expectations on past rather than current prices the main result shows that if the time span between successive market periods is short the market will approximate full informational efficiency arbitrarily closely yet the returns to being informed are bounded away from zero this contrasts with the grossman stiglitz proposition that markets cannot come close to informational efficiency if the acquisition of information is costly

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

the economic viability of battery storage for residential solar photovoltaic systems a review and a simulation model battery storage is generally considered an effective means for reducing the intermittency of electricity generated by solar photovoltaic pv systems however currently it remains unclear when and under which conditions battery storage can be profitably operated in residential pv systems without policy support based on a review of previous studies that have examined the economics of integrated pv battery systems in this paper we devise a simulation model that investigates the economic viability of battery storage for residential pv in germany under eight different electricity price scenarios from 2013 to 2022 in contrast to previous forward looking studies we assume that no premium is paid for solar photovoltaic power and or self consumed electricity additionally we run the model with a large number of different pv and storage capacities to determine the economically optimal configuration in terms of system size we find that already in 2013 investments in storage solutions were economically viable for small pv systems given the assumptions of our model the optimal size of both residential pv systems and battery storage rises significantly in the future higher electricity retail prices lower electricity wholesale prices or limited access to the electricity wholesale market add to the profitability of storage we conclude that additional policy incentives to foster investments in battery storage for residential pv in germany will only be necessary in the short run at the same time the impending profitability of integrated pv storage systems is likely to further spur the ongoing trend toward distributed electricity generation with major implications for the electricity sector

information aggregation in a large multi stage market game abstract a three stage market game mechanism is devised that is simple actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy and achieves efficiency in a two divisible good pure exchange setting with potential information aggregation after an entry stage agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small randomly selected group then those offers are announced and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a shapley shubik market game for a finite and large number of players there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium conditions for uniqueness are also provided

core convergence with asymmetric information we analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies we show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately walrasian for the associated arrow debreu economy

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies in this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allociation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies we prove that when agents utility functions are differentiable the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal income walrasian equilibria this is shown using both the limit theorem approach and the limit economy approach we also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector these results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal income walrasian equilibria in terms of economic efficiency and economic equity

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

vickrey clarke groves mechanisms and perfect competition abstract we present a game theoretic mechanism characterization of perfect competition we prove the perfectly competitive mechanism is the only pareto optimal individually rational dominant strategy allocation mechanism thus perfect competition is uniquely capable of efficiently and non coercively solving the incentive bargaining problem when there is incomplete information i e when each individual knows his own tastes and production possibilities better than anyone else we also show one can interpret any dominant strategy demand revealing mechanism as working because it mimics the reward scheme that characterizes the perfectly competitive market namely the marginal product reward scheme

fair allocations in large economies the purpose of this paper is the study of problems of equity in an economy with many agents conditions are given under which every equitable and pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for all agents the results are also of potential relevance for the literature on incentive compatibility since the allocations that are obained through incentive mechanisms in large economies turn out to be equitable

informational robustness of competitive equilibria abstract consider an exchange economy with complete information we perturb this economy by assuming that each agent s observation about the true state of the world is noisy the paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information we provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economies with incomplete information as the noise in the signal converges to zero journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases