interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion rivalry in the vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game service station demand cost and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices costs and sales these functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game the actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution nevertheless all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

the effects of different contractual arrangements the case of retail gasoline markets the change in the contractual arrangement at a gasoline station from a refiner controlled to a franchise operation implies different incentives for the individual who sets prices and determines hours but reflects no change in the product nor the market environment the outcome can lead to higher prices and reduced hours at the station affected the divorcement experience in maryland illustrates how change can be imposed by the legal system average self service and full serve prices rose and hours of operation fell relative to those of competitors even though refiner operations that were forced to franchise had previously had prices below the competition the evidence of an effect on the prices and hours of competitors is less convincing 16 references 2 tables

economics of devolution decentralization in the uk some questions and answers mcgregor p g and swales k 2005 economics of devolution decentralization in the uk some questions and answers regional studies 39 477 494 the paper explores the economic implications of the radical process of devolution decentralization and delegation of decision making and policy delivery initiated by the post 1997 uk labour government it is argued that the economies of all the presently devolved regions ultimately suffer if the barnett formula is rigorously imposed it is shown that the efficiency of devolving fiscal authority involves a balance of positive and negative elements depending on wage bargaining and migration responses it is then argued that delegation devolution of regional economic development policies while exploiting regional information advantages neglects regional economic interdependence so there are potential gains from greater cooperation coordination

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

testing the taxmimicking versus expenditure spill over hypotheses using english data spatial interaction among local governments in tax setting and public spending decisions is receiving increasing attention in the applied public economics literature spatial interaction models rely on the presence of an externality from local budget making in traditional public finance models external effects originate either from interjurisdictional resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base or from local public expenditure spill overs into neighbouring jurisdictions however the recent political agency yardstick competition literature has stressed the role of informational externalities between neighbouring jurisdictions and predicted tax mimicry at the local level the actual relevance of the above hypotheses clearly needs to be assessed empirically in this paper an attempt is made at discriminating between alternative sources of local fiscal interaction by using data on the english municipal authorities budgets while both public spending levels and local property tax rates ex

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

the impact of decentralization of health services on health outcomes evidence from canada this article contributes to the limited empirical literature on the impact of decentralization on economic welfare by investigating the hypothesis that shifts towards more fiscal decentralization in health services would be accompanied by improvements in population health building on a conventional public finance model applied to health care this hypothesis is tested on a panel data of the highly decentralized canadian provinces during the period 1979 to 1995 the results of the exploratory empirical analysis presented in this article suggest that fiscal decentralization of health services in canada has had a positive and substantial influence on the effectiveness of public policy in improving a population s health over the period studied

fiscal federalism and redistributive politics abstract we consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems we examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system we examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers we analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants we also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility

a comprehensive analysis of expenditure decentralization and of the composition of local public spending sacchi a and salotti s a comprehensive analysis of expenditure decentralization and of the composition of local public spending regional studies many industrialized countries have recently implemented fiscal decentralization reforms assigning more spending responsibility to sub national governments this paper investigates the causes of the decentralization of different categories of public expenditure in 19 developed countries over the period 1980 2006 different models for each of the spending functions under analysis are estimated adopting a general to specific empirical approach results confirm existing findings on the negative link between regional income disparities and expenditure decentralization a similarly negative relationship is found for a set of demographic variables leading to the conclusion that macroeconomic and more importantly political factors are responsible for the recent increase in decentralization finally the analysis is completed by a study of the factors driving sub n

ex post redistribution in a federation implications for corrective policy abstract this paper analyzes whether changes in the timing of equalizing transfers to state governments necessitate an adjustment in federal corrective policy according to the existing literature assuming an ex ante choice of transfers the corrective grant is equal to the marginal damage benefit inflicted by externality generation when the federal government accommodates state finances ex post the grant differs in formula from existing prescription allocative federal policy corrects state policy incentives twofold it entails a correction for the distortion in the marginal benefit of state spending as in earlier literature and for the distortion in the marginal cost of public funds induced by the ex post provision of transfers the required grant rule is generically disproportionate to the equilibrium externality even with lump sum taxation furthermore the ex post provision of transfers is critical for the nature of the equilibrium inefficiency equalizing transfers at least partly internalize consumption spill overs but simultaneously establishes a new source of inefficiency as a final result the existing prescription for allocative federal policy continues to apply if the public good is pure

rockets and feathers the asymmetric speed of adjustment of uk retail gasoline prices to cost changes abstract the paper develops a quadratic quantity adjustment model to test the hypothesis put forward in the recent monopolies and mergers commission report that the speed of adjustment of uk retail gasoline prices to cost changes is more rapid when costs rise than when they fall and that the adjustment path is more concentrated around the mean value on the upswing using data from 1982 to 1989 evidence of faster and more concentrated responses to cost increases were found

do rockets rise faster and feathers fall slower in an atmosphere of local market power evidence from the retail gasoline market this study explores the possibility that local market power influences the observed asymmetric relationship between changes in wholesale gasoline costs and changes in retail gasoline prices i exploit an original data set of weekly gas station prices in southern california from september 2002 to may 2003 and take advantage of detailed station and local market level characteristics to determine the extent to which geographic and product differentiation influence price response asymmetry i find that brand identity proximity to rival stations and local market features and demographics each influence a station s predicted price response asymmetry

optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government abstract in this paper we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax federal transfers and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents multiple local governments and the federal government in general the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive when the local consumption tax is chosen optimally the federal income tax can be either positive or negative for most reasonable parameter values our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government

an equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities this paper proposes a framework for studying policy making in a federal system in the presence of spillover externalities local jurisdictions choose local policies by majority rule subject to standards that are set by majority rule at the federal level we characterize the induced preferences of voters for federal policies prove existence of local majority rule equilibrium provide an example of non existence of global majority rule equilibrium and explore the welfare properties of federal standards in the presence of spillovers

inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions this article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget we show that states can use their financial institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal government as a result there is a bias towards large deficits and high inflation rates our model also predicts that state owned financial institutions should underperform the market mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non performing loans to their own shareholders that is the states brazil and argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions

price controls and market structure evidence from gasoline retail markets in this paper we study the effect of price floor regulations on the organization and performance of markets the standard interpretation of the effects of these policies is concerned with short run market distortions associated with excess supply since price controls prevent markets from clearing they lead to higher prices while this analysis may be correct in the short run it does not consider the dynamic equilibrium consequences of price controls we demonstrate that price floor regulations can have important long run effects on the the structure of markets by crowding them and creating endogenous barriers to entry for low cost retailers moreover we show that these factors can indirectly lower productivity and possibly even prices we test this in the context of an actual regulation imposed in the retail gasoline market in the canadian province of quebec and show that the policy led to more competition between smaller less efficient stations this resulted in lowered sales and despite the reduction in efficiency did not increase prices

spillover effects in local public spending abstractthis paper investigated the fiscal interactions between italian municipalities over the period 2001 11 and found a positive horizontal interdependence in spending decisions the results are robust to different specifications of the spatial neighbours and are confirmed by a natural experiment an earthquake in the abruzzo region of italy in 2009 that creates an exogenous variation in the neighbours spending furthermore there is no evidence of yardstick competition when one considers political effects while a negative relationship is found between spatial interaction and the size of the municipality thus it can be concluded that spillover effects drive the strategic interactions in spending decisions

competitive tax theory in open economies constrained inefficiency and a pigovian remedy abstract in an economy with multiple governments each is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes on a directly mobile tax base a government is said to be competitive if the total cost of its decisions including the excess burden is perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there is another set of distortionary taxes and associated public expenditures for which all individuals in the economy are better off it is shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy is derived

retail gasoline price dynamics and local market power using monthly data from the 48 contiguous states except nevada for the 1988 2002 period it is shown that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases moreover markets with high average retail wholesale margins experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response since gasoline is the only variable input average margins in a state likely reflect the degree of retail market power this suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries in the gasoline market are at least partially a consequence of retail market power

a volatility based theory of fiscal union desirability abstract heterogeneous countries may rationally choose to form a currency union first and a fiscal union later we find and illustrate empirically for the emu countries reasonable volatility conditions under which this sequencing in the deepening process is indeed rationalizable changes in the distribution of expected income shocks require a reassignment of political weights to restore unanimous support for an added fiscal dimension the bargaining space depends on countries relative income size and cross correlation of shocks

selling costs and switching costs explaining retail gasoline margins recent theoretical work has shown that price discrimination can take place in imperfectly competitive as well as monopoly markets the persistence of higher retail margins on unleaded than on leaded gasoline during the 1980s suggests that discrimination may occur even in very competitive markets this article studies a number of cost based explanations for such gasoline pricing as well as the possibility of price discrimination the analysis indicates that gas stations discriminate against groups of customers who are less likely to switch to another station the conclusions highlight the influence of shopping or search costs on pricing decisions even in markets thought to be quite competitive

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

the consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households states implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good a vertical fiscal externality reflecting the effect of state policies on federal revenues provides an incentive for state taxes to be too progressive a horizontal fiscal externality causes nonoptimal state taxes and expenditures because of the migration effect the federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states the federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states c 1998 elsevier science s a

dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets supergame models of tacit collusion show that supportable price cost margins increase with expected future collusive profits ceteris paribus as a result collusive margins will be larger when demand is expected to increase or marginal costs are expected to decline using panel data on sales volume and gasoline prices in 43 cities over 72 months we find behavior consistent with tacit collusion in retail gasoline markets controlling for current demand and cost current margins increase with expected next month demand and decrease with expected next month cost the results are not consistent with intertemporal l inkages due to inventory behavior or customer loyalty

in a world without borders the impact of taxes on internet commerce the rapid rise in sales over the internet and the fact that most internet buyers pay no sales tax has ignited a considerable debate over taxes and the internet this paper uses new data on the purchase decisions of approximately 25 000 online users to examine the effect of local sales taxes on internet commerce the results suggest that controlling for observable characteristics people living in high sales taxes locations are significantly more likely to buy online the results are quite robust and cannot be explained by unobserved technological sophistication shopping costs or other alternative explanations the magnitudes in the paper suggest that applying existing sales taxes to internet commerce might reduce the number of online buyers by up to 24 percent

time inconsistency in environmental policy tax earmarking as a commitment solution tax earmarking imposes a constraint on government policymaking and may be desirable if i t solves a time inconsistency problem in tax policy in a two period economy in which the policy decisions regarding taxes public goods provision and pollution abatement are taken by a majority elected individual we show how the time inc onsistency problem in environmental policy arises we demonstrate that the commitment equilibrium under no earmarking rules cannot be as fully implemented as a no commitment equilibrium under earmarking rules however th e earmarking rules do act as a partial commitment mechanism

price uniformity and competition in a retail gasoline market abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the price uniformity prediction of the competitive market model of retail gasoline pricing using station specific data on gasoline prices from vancouver bc the specified econometric model also generates results that describe the actual pricing pattern in the market and that permit an assessment of tacit collusion and imperfectly competitive non collusive competition as possible alternative explanations for the results contrary to the competitive model variables measuring brand effects spatial and product characteristics local market structure and time series variation do affect the probability that a station matches the market mode price

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

market structure and pricing strategy of china s automobile industry in this study using market level data on quantities prices and automobile characteristics from 1995 to 2001 we conduct a market analysis of the chinese automobile industry under imperfect competition on the demand side we apply a nested multinomial logit model to the national market share data in order to ascertain the demand features of china s automobile market on the supply side we assume bertrand behavior to uncover the markups set by automobile manufacturers our empirical results suggest that some large automobile manufacturers set high markups indicating their strong market power in china s automobile market however their declining markups in the late 1990 s imply a reduction in market control by the major producers

gradual reforms and the emergence of energy market in china evidence from tests for convergence of energy prices this study investigates the emergence of energy markets by testing for convergence of energy prices with a new dataset on energy spot prices in 35 major cities in china both descriptive statistics and unit root are employed to test the convergence of energy prices for each of four fuel price series the whole study period is divided into two sub periods in order to reconcile the gradual energy reforms the results show the steady improvement in energy market performance in china especially during the second sub period which suggests that the market appears to be playing an increasing role in determining energy prices while panel unit root tests show energy markets are integrated in china as a whole city by city univariate unit root tests suggest that there are still many regional energy markets probably because energy reserves especially coal vary widely across regions since china s energy economy is gradually moving towards market oriented mechanisms the existing literature may become obsolete soon

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

a positive model of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states abstract this paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states the analysis provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium federal and states tax rates as functions of the level of total productivity dispersion between the states the federal rate is increasing in the level of total productivity dispersion between the states even if the income of the decisive voter at the federal level is above the mean income given that the individuals income is endogenously determined there exists a negative trade off between the implemented federal tax rate and the resulting states tax rates regardless of the pre tax income of the decisive voter at the state level thus high levels of productivity dispersion between the states cause a higher than optimal federal tax rate together with low states tax rates it is also shown that a system of overlapping income taxation is not efficient the resulting inefficiency might be exacerbated by the implementation of a federal matching grants program contradicting previous results in the related normative literature

the 1 5th mover advantage there has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games however one assumption usually goes unquestioned namely that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover in many cases this is not realistic since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree partial commitments an example is the announcements of price changes i analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized in the case of strategic complements a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly she chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover which gives her a 1 5th mover advantage

price ceilings as focal points to reach price uniformity evidence from a chinese gasoline market abstract this paper studies the price uniformity in the chinese gasoline market using station level data of hohhot city inner mongolia we first document that the mode prices of the gasoline stations are consistent with the price ceilings set by the government implying that the price ceiling regulation in the chinese gasoline market may serve as a focal point for the gasoline stations to reach price uniformity we corroborate the focal point hypothesis by providing evidence showing that some stations would jump to the ceilings as their prices approach the ceilings also we find that local market structure distance between stations station capacity market characteristics and past pricing behavior could affect the probability of gas stations to price at the ceilings moreover a higher price ceiling would reduce the probability that stations reach price uniformity our results provide another piece of evidence to the literature regarding the unintended effect of price ceiling regulation

the emergence and evolution of regional convergence clusters in china s energy markets employing the new regression tests for convergence club convergence and clustering proposed by phillips and sul 2007 this paper models and analyses the behaviour of china s energy sectors energy market convergence clusters are identified using new price data and their regional spatial distributions are mapped for four major fuel types coal gasoline diesel and electricity the findings are as follows i as yet there are no fully integrated national energy markets in china as more than one convergence cluster is identified for all four fuels ii some regional energy markets can be regarded as quite mature as evidenced by the existence of some highly concentrated convergence clusters connected geographically iii some regional markets remain in a state of transition as witnessed by convergence clusters that are scattered geographically and that are growing in membership iv it seems that there is more regional based integration for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel as more convergent clusters were identified for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel and v overall china still appears to be in the process of energy market integration as demonstrated by the number and evolution of convergence clusters over time

the deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax we show that the optimal deductible which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government the optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income two apparently contradictory positions full deductibility of a payroll tax and non deductibility are special cases of our model la deductibilite des taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises dans une federation ou il y a des externalites fiscales verticales est ce que les taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises devraient etre deductibles de l impot federal sur les profits les auteurs montrent que l optimum de deductibilite qui neutralise les externalites fiscales verticales entre le federal et les provinces est le changement dans la base d imposition federale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecte par le gouvernement provincial le taux de deductibilite optimal d un impot sur les salaires depend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est deportee vers les travailleurs et de la difference entre les taux d imposition du federal sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail deux positions apparemment contradictoires pleine deductibilite d un impot sur les salaires et deductibilite nulle sont des cas speciaux du modele general

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

income taxes sorting and the costs of housing evidence from municipal boundaries in switzerland this paper provides novel evidence on the role of income taxes for residential rents and spatial sorting drawing on comprehensive apartment level data we identify the effects of tax differentials across municipal boundaries in switzerland the boundary discontinuity design bdd corrects for unobservable location characteristics such as environmental amenities or the access to public goods and thereby reduces the estimated response of housing prices by one half compared to conventional estimates we identify an income tax elasticity of rents of about 0 26 we complement this approach with census data on local sociodemographic characteristics and show that about one third of this effect can be traced back to a sorting of high income households into low tax municipalities these findings are robust to a matching approach mbdd which compares identical residences on opposite sides of the boundary and a number of further sensitivity checks

collusion or competition interfirm relationships in the chinese auto industry the chinese passenger vehicle industry contains a large number of manufacturers some of them are members of big corporate groups centered around state owned enterprises these corporate relationships may facilitate collusion this paper applies the non nested hypothesis test methodology to data on passenger vehicles to identify whether price collusion exists within corporate groups or across groups our empirical results support the assumption of bertrand nash competition in the chinese passenger vehicle industry we find no evidence for within or cross group price collusion our policy experiments show that indigenous brands will gain market shares and profits if within group companies merge

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

tax rights in transition economies a tragedy of the commons abstract this paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies a government s tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base existing evidence suggests that chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their russian counterparts using the big push model of industrialization murphy k shleifer a vishny r 1989 industrialization and the big push journal of political economy 95 1003 1026 within a common property resource framework we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why china has been significantly more successful than russia

vancouver s gasoline price wars an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies this paper uses a unique data set to determine which dynamic model of tacit collusion best describes behaviour in a particular industry the area investigated is a region of the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market players are service station managers who compete daily firms choose price in each period using strategies that depend on prices chosen in the previous period periodically unanticipated demand shocks precipitate price wars when shocks occur the firms in the market must determine the new demand conditions and adjust their strategies from an econometric point of view slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables the resulting system of equations with time varying parameters is estimated via the kalman filter different repeated game oligopoly models correspond to different transition matrices for the latent variables the models can thus be assessed in terms of their power to explain firm behaviour in this market

nimby taxes matter the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes this paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes it begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters responses the paper then uses panel data from the toxics release inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

new evidence on asymmetric gasoline price responses in a 1997 paper borenstein cameron and gilbert bcg claim that gasoline prices rise quickly following an increase in the price of crude oil but fall slowly following a decrease this note estimates an error correction model with daily spot gasoline and crude oil price data over the period 1985 1998 and finds no evidence of asymmetry in wholesale gasoline prices the sources of the difference in results are twofold first we use the standard engle granger two step estimation procedure whereas bcg used a nonstandard estimation methodology second even using bcg s nonstandard specification the use of daily rather than weekly data yields little evidence of price asymmetry

decentralisation and government provision of public goods the public health sector in uganda while many developing countries have devolved health care responsibilities to local governments in recent years no study has examined whether decentralisation actually leads to greater health sector allocative efficiency this paper approaches this question by modeling local government budgeting decisions under decentralisation the model leads to conclusions not all favourable to decentralisation and produces several testable hypotheses concerning local government spending choices for a brief empirical test of the model we look at data from uganda the data are of a type seldom available to researchers actual local government budgets for the health sector in a developing country the health budgets are disaggregated into specific types of activities based on a subjective characterisation of each activity s publicness the empirical results provide preliminary evidence that local government health planners are allocating declining proportions of their budgets to public goods activities

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

fiscal decentralization and growing regional disparities in rural china some evidence in the provision of social services this paper provides evidence of inter regional and inter sectoral inequality in china by comparing local government provision of social services an examination of a number of education and health status indicators reveals large disparities in the level and quality of service provision across regions with service provision in poorer regions falling far short of targets enunciated in state policy fiscal centralization has weakened the capacity of government to effect equalization across regions as the fiscal system moved towards self financing fiscal pressures particularly intensified for the county level whose expenditure burdens have generally been increasing with higher level governments themselves under severe fiscal strain and in no position to subsidize services rural governments are forced to seek supplementary funding off budget by imposing a variety of fees and levies in poor regions however access to off budget resources is limited resulting in lower levels of service provided and amplification of regional inequalities copyright 1995 by oxford university press

vertical control and price cycles in gasoline retailing we examine norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station specific observations from 2003 to 2006 the four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry wide labeled price support this moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern where we observe de facto simultaneous decision making by the headquarters without knowledge of their rivals prices when every monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level the price level on mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies

the optimal property tax with mobile nonresidential capital abstract implications of the dynamic nature of mobile nonresidential capital for community fiscal behavior are examined using the median voter framework the representative voter s control rule calls for the community to lower its current public service demand in order to retain or attract taxable capital the model predicts a positive short run and a negative long run income effect on public good demand incorporating intergovernmental aid into the model asymmetry between effects of the unconditional aid and of the voter income is demonstrated

fiscal capacity tax effort and optimal equalization grants in this paper we address the question how should the tax burden in a feder ation be distributed across the different jurisdictions so that the social cost of providing government services is minimized using optimal tax theory we derive formulas for the optimal equalization grants that equalize the social marginal cost of raising revenue across all provinces we show how the optimal equalization grants are related to a measure of tax effort based on the marginal cost of public funds and a measure of fiscal capacity that takes into account the elasticity of the tax base and its substitutability with other tax bases

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

when is two better than one how federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition the current paper models power maximizing politicians behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility it then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non federal structures the model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences the most common argument in favor of federalism and externalities the most common argument against showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications there is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process however there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating safe districts for both political parties 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

strategic aspects of public finance in a world with high capital mobility abstract in a world with high capital mobility an increase in equity taxes is likely to induce a capital out flow it is commonly believed that in consequence there may be an under provision of public goods when governments have only equity taxes at their disposal this paper compares the provision of public goods under cooperative and non cooperative tax policies suprisingly the non cooperative regime may result in either an over or an under provision of public goods it is also shown that the gains from coordination increase as countries become atomistic

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

making reform work institutions dispositions and the improving health of bangladesh we examine whether local governance can improve social development empirically using good and bad cases of public health outcomes in bangladesh we explore the institutional underpinnings of service provision digging down beneath the rules of the game to analyze the beliefs understandings and dispositions that drive social behavior changes in deep social attitudes led to improvements in social indicators regional variation in health outcomes is explained by the presence or absence of a dense web of relationships that enmeshed reformers in local systems of authority and legitimacy strengthening their actions and making local society more susceptible to change

a continuum of commitment we examine a generic three stage game for two players with alternating moves where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period in the resulting continuum of commitment options convexifying the choice between first mover and second mover advantage in pure strategies we characterize when an intermediate adjustment cost level is chosen in equilibrium we show that the wastefulness of the adjustment cost may be in the players best interest improving both of their individual net payoffs over making any fraction of the adjustment cost a side payment from the first to the second player c 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

price leadership and coordination in retail gasoline markets with price cycles abstract this study examines the coordination mechanism used by gasoline stations in the midwestern united states where prices exhibit highly cyclical fluctuations known as edgeworth cycles stations in these markets repeatedly coordinate large marketwide price increases following periods of aggressive price undercutting by studying these periodic price jumps both over time and across cities i find that a particular retail chain in each city acts as a price leader initiating each price restoration the leader signals the new price level to competitors by simultaneously jumping prices at all its stations to a single price competitors follow quickly with a large majority of stations jumping to the exact same price within a 24 hour period the characteristics of the leading firms and the nature of observed price coordination suggest that successful price jumps may be facilitated by the existence of a retailer controlling the prices of a significant number of stations in a city identifying the important role of these firms in the market contributes to a broader understanding of price leadership and coordination and highlights another potential reason why price cycles exist in some in retail gasoline markets and not others

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

the welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with distortionary local taxes a simple general equilibrium analysis this paper examines the welfare impact of intergovernmental transfers when recipient governments use distortionary taxes both lump sum and matching grants are investigated a distortionary factor depending on local demand and supply elasticities and the local tax rate on the taxed commodity determines the real income change to a jurisdiction per dollar transferred matching grants are dominated by lump sum grants when these can be set optimally for each recipient if grant policy must be uniform positive or negative matching rates are desired if equity adjusted distortionary factors are positively negatively correlated with local public service levels

a theory of endogenous commitment commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action the weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed as it is assumed this paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model we construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish but pay a switching cost if they do so we show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple structure this equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications moreover despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches strategic delays may arise in equilibrium the flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments in particular we study an entry deterrence situation its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

learning to coordinate a study in retail gasoline this paper studies equilibrium selection in the retail gasoline industry we exploit a unique dataset that contains the universe of station level prices for an urban market for 15 years and that encompasses a coordinated equilibrium transition mid sample we uncover a gradual three year equilibrium transition whereby dominant firms use price leadership and price experiments to create focal points that coordinate market prices soften price competition and enhance retail margins our results inform the theory of collusion with particular relevance to the initiation of collusion and equilibrium selection we also highlight new insights into merger policy and collusion detection strategies

the impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the location of firms and on employment some panel evidence for the swiss cantons abstract the impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms investment decisions empirical evidence on tax induced relocation and subsequent economic development in the us and europe is still inconclusive much the same applies to switzerland while there is some evidence on personal income tax competition between swiss cantons evidence on the impact of intercantonal corporate income tax differences on the location of business within switzerland is missing in this paper we present econometric evidence on the influence of corporate and personal income taxes on the regional distribution of firms in 1981 and 1991 and on cantonal employment using a panel data set of the 26 swiss cantons from 1985 to 1997 the results show that corporate and personal income taxes deter firms to locate in a canton and subsequently reduce cantonal employment

the politics of public services a service characteristics approach summary politics is widely regarded as affecting and being affected by the performance of public services yet little research differentiates between services in exploring these effects the article addresses this gap by proposing a framework for understanding and comparing the politics of different services it identifies how the nature of the good type of market failure tasks involved in delivery and demand for a service hitherto regarded largely as economic and managerial concerns affect political commitment organizational control and user power policy responses can be targeted to address service characteristics where they present opportunities or constraints to better services

do gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude oil price changes the authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices among the possible sources of this asymmetry are production inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers by analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain the authors attempt to shed light on these theories spot prices for generic gasoline show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes which may reflect inventory adjustment effects asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes possibly indicating short run market power among retailers