interest groups and the rise and decline of growth interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth a la olson 1982 it is unknown however what impact if any groups exert on the volatility of growth an important hindrance to development in this article we first consider what impact we should expect olson groups to have on the volatility of growth we then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a cross country panel using system generalized method of moments the findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability in addition the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies

partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments taxation in democracies and dictatorships recent political and economic transformations in latin america africa asia and eastern europe have brought about a renewed interest in the incentives and capabilities of different types of political regimes to implement policies that are deemed necessary for economic development in particular policies aimed at increasing tax revenue one central question is whether democracies can collect as much in taxes as dictatorships this article addresses this question by examining whether regime type classified as democracy or dictatorship has a causal impact on a government s capacity to mobilize resources through taxation on the basis of data gathered for 108 countries for the period between 1970 and 1990 the article concludes that observed differences across countries regarding the level of taxes collected by the government are not due to the fact that some are under a democracy and others under a dictatorship concerns about the inability of democratic regimes to collect taxes are therefore unfounded

the influence of black markets on a queue rationed centrally planned economy abstract in centrally planned economies in which prices are fixed and the rationing mechanism is waiting line queues we show that an equilibrium of waiting times exists we then introduce a black market in which individuals can trade commodities that they have acquired through the official economy an equilibrium of black market prices and waiting times is shown to exist further the economy with a black market is queue efficient however the introduction of black markets is not necessarily a pareto improvement over an economy without black markets even when we allow winners to compensate losers

diffusion and the international context of democratization democracy does not evolve sui generis the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forg ing democracies as well as influencing their durability we argue that democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question the scope and extent of con nections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for dem ocratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies results from a transition model demonstrate that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy and the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries

executive constraint political stability and economic growth previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which leadership contests depress economic growth by reducing the violence and uncertainty attendant on such contests we recon

democracy political risks and stock market performance this study examines the impacts of democracy and political risk on stock market using annualized panel data for 49 emerging markets for 2000 2012 we find evidence that democracy and political risk do have impact on stock market returns and the relationship between democracy and political risk is parabolic i e there is a threshold level of democracy after which political risk begins to decline also our results suggest that decreases in political risk lead to higher returns

spatial spillovers in the development of institutions abstract we examine spatial spillovers in institutional development dependent variables are institutional measures reflecting politics law and governmental administration the explanatory variable of interest is the level of institutions in bordering countries a spatial lag of the dependent variable our spatial model directly leads to the identification strategy for the endogenous spatial lag we implement new results in spatial econometrics to counter missing data problems usually rife in spatial empirics spatial institutional spillovers are statistically significant and economically important a counter factual exercise the non existence of the ussr reveals large direct and indirect spillovers numerous robustness exercises bolster conclusions including yearly cross section regressions fixed effects estimates and adding many extra explanatory variables moreover we provide a new theoretical result showing the robustness of estimates in the presence of omitted variables we extend the core model allowing different effects for better and worse neighbors using inverse distance weights estimating the spatial durbin model and using polity s institutional measure

the coevolution of economic and political development from monarchy to democracy this article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development as the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners capitalists and workers shifts accordingly inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers a smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital

democracy and national economic performance the preference for stability appear to arise because democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages another mechanism that might explain democratic stability when growth and volatility are jointly examined democracies reveal highly favorable economic results oes democracy affect national economic performance and if so how no question is more central to the study of political economics almost all previous work on democracy and economic performance has focused exclusively on growth rates with contradictory and confusing results in this article we argue that to reveal the impact of democratic institutions on economic performance scholars must consider two dimensions of economic performance growth rate and volatility we begin with a novel hypothesis economic policy in democracy is risk avoiding relative to policy in nondemocracies 1 because voters are riskaverse they penalize incumbent governments for economic volatility and democratic governments respond accordingly in nondemocracies we posit that elites are more likely to seek risk that voters would reject consequently autocracies produce systematically more economic volatility than

democracy and economic growth a historical perspective recent studies appear to show that democracy has no robust association with economic growth yet all such work assumes that the causal effect of democracy can be measured by a country s regime status in a particular year t which is correlated with its growth performance in a subsequent period t 1 the authors argue that democracy must be understood as a stock rather than a level measure that is a country s growth performance is affected by the number of years it has been democratic in addition to the degree of democracy experienced during that period in this fashion democracy is reconceptualized as a historical rather than a contemporary variable with the assumption that long run historical patterns may help scholars to understand present trends the authors speculate that these secular historical infiuences operate through four causal pathways each of which may be understood as a type of capital physical capital human capital social capital and political capital this argument is tested in a cross country analysis and is shown to be robust in a wide variety of specifications and formats

the democratic effect of direct democracy a key requirement of democratic governance is that policy outcomes and the majority preference of the electorate are congruent many studies argue that the more direct democratic a system is the more often voters get what they want but the empirical evidence is mixed this analysis explores the democratic effect of initiatives and referendums theoretically and empirically the prediction of the formal model is that bad representation i e a large preference deviation between the electorate and the political elite is good for the democratic effect of direct democracy an empirical investigation of original voter and elite survey data analyzed with multilevel modeling and poststratification supports this argument building on the literature the findings of the analysis suggest that the extent to which direct democratic institutions are conducive for policy congruence and may thus be advisable as democratic correctives to representative systems depends on the political conflict structure

does democracy cause innovation an empirical test of the popper hypothesis abstract democratic countries produce higher levels of innovation than autocratic ones but does democratization itself lead to innovation growth either in the short or in the long run the existing literature has extensively examined the relationship between democracy and growth but seldom explored the effect of democracy on innovation which might be an important channel through which democracy contributes to economic growth this article aims to fill this gap and contribute to the long standing debate on the relationship between democracy and innovation by offering empirical evidence based on a data set covering 156 countries between 1964 and 2010 the results from the difference in differences method show that democracy itself has no direct positive effect on innovation measured with patent counts patent citations and patent originality

the first law of petropolitics finalversion received19 april2011 we examine empirically the relationship between crude oil prices and the ebb and ow of democratic insti tutions in order to test the hypothesis that high oil prices undermine democracy and sustain autocracy we use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and timeperiods nding strictly no evidence in favour of this so called first law of petropolitics friedman2006

credit constraints equity market liberalization and growth rate asymmetry abstract this paper provides evidence that financial openness is an important determinant of growth rate asymmetry in emerging markets i exploit exogenous shocks to financial flows and examine the impact of equity market liberalization on the skewness of output growth for 93 countries during the 1973 2009 period i show that opening the economy to foreign portfolio investment results in a substantially higher negative skewness of output growth this result obtains with equal strength in the aggregate data and in the sectoral data and it is disproportionately stronger in sectors that require more external finance the skewness effect of financial openness is stronger in countries which experienced a banking crisis after liberalization

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

extending the use and prediction precision of subnational public opinion estimation the comparative study of subnational units is on the rise multilevel regression and poststratification mrp has become the standard method for estimating subnational public opinion unfortunately mrp comes with stringent data demands as a consequence scholars cannot apply mrp in countries without detailed census data and when such data are available the modeling is restricted to a few variables this article introduces multilevel regression with synthetic poststratification mrsp which relaxes the data requirement of mrp to marginal distributions substantially increases the prediction precision of the method and extends its use to countries without census data the findings of monte carlo u s and swiss analyses show that using the same predictors mrsp usually performs in standard applications as well as the currently used standard approach and it is superior when additional predictors are modeled the better performance and the more straightforward implementation promise that mrsp will further stimulate subnational research

democracy and financial crisis existing scholarship attributes various political and economic advantages to democratic governance these advantages may make more democratic countries prone to financial crises democracy is characterized by constraints on executive authority accountability through free and fair elections protections for civil liberties and large winning coalitions these characteristics bring important benefits but they can also have unintended consequences that increase the likelihood of financial instability and crises using data covering the past two centuries i demonstrate a strong relationship between democracy and financial crisis onset on average democracies are about twice as likely to experience a crisis as autocracies this is an empirical regularity that is robust across a wide range of model specifications and time periods

is democracy more expropriative than dictatorship tocquevillian wisdom revisited abstract we reexamine the incentive effect of political democracy on the tax rate by defining a political regime over two dimensions the extent of the franchise and the extent that the redistribution of tax revenues is biased towards the rich standard tocquevillian models assume that even if there is limited franchise there is no redistribution bias from this it follows that democracy is more expropriative than oligarchy because a poorer median voter opts for higher taxes introducing the realistic assumption of a redistribution bias we find a countervailing effect democratization decreases exploitation by the rich on the disenfranchised poor since tax revenues are redistributed over a larger base the median voter may gain less from redistributive taxation we call this the olson effect

openness country size and government abstract this paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in gdp and are also more open to trade these empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size

do weak institutions prolong crises on the identification characteristics and duration of declines during economic slumps this paper studies periods of prolonged contractions in output per capita in a sample of 145 countries from 1950 to 2014 economic slumps are defined as abrupt interruptions of a period of growth by several regime switches slumps start with a sharp contraction along with a trend break which is followed by another switch when growth stabilizes again the paper then analyzes the correlates of these slumps focusing on the length and depth of the contraction from the beginning of the slump to its trough the results establish three new stylized facts i weak political institutions predate crises whereas political reforms tend to follow them ii the length and depth of economic declines are robustly correlated with executive constraints and ethnic heterogeneity and iii there is a robust interaction between these two variables suggesting that institutions constraining leaders are important for stabilizing growth this is particularly relevant for sub saharan africa where politics are often ethnic and decision makers are comparatively unconstrained

are the poor less well insured evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural china the authors test how well consumption is insured against income risk in a panel of sampled households in rural china they estimate the risk insurance models by generalized method of moments treating income and household size as endogenous insurance exists for all wealth groups although the hypothesis of perfect insurance is universally rejected those in the poorest wealth decile are the least well insured with 40 percent of an income shock being passed on to current consumption by contrast consumption by the richest third of households is protected from almost 90 percent of an income shock the extent of insurance in a given wealth stratum varies little between poor and nonpoor areas

why are some people and countries more protectionist than others we analyze two cross country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio demographic and other indicators we nd that pro trade preferences are signi cantly and robustly correlated with an individual s level of human capital in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed individuals in non traded sectors tend to be the most pro trade while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist third an individual s relative economic status has a very strong positive association withpro trade attitudes finally non economic determinants in the form of values identities and attachments play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade high degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism patriotism are associated withprotectionist tendencies c

output volatility and openness to trade a reassessment many economists believe that while openness to trade increases average gdp growth rates it also raises output volatility by exposing countries to terms oftrade shocks this view does not take into account that commercial trade might also reduce financially related volatility once this is taken into account the relationship between exposure to trade and output volatility is still an open question this paper presents new empirical evidence that suggests that the net effect of trade openness on output volatility is stabilizing the results confirm that exposure to trade raises output volatility through the terms of trade channel as previously documented in the literature but also show that this is counteracted by a quantitatively larger stabilizing effect additional evidence is presented showing that the latter effect comes at least in part through the financial channel the methodology employed seeks to correct for the likely endogeneity of trade in this setting using gravity estimates as instrumental variables

the cost of business cycles under endogenous growth robert e lucas jr argued that the welfare gains from reducing aggregate consumption volatility are negligible subsequent work that revisited his calculation continued to find small welfare benefits further reinforcing the perception that business cycles do not matter this paper argues instead that fluctuations can affect welfare by affecting the growth rate of consumption i show that fluctuations can reduce growth starting from a given initial consumption which can imply substantial welfare effects as lucas himself observed empirical evidence suggests the welfare effects are likely to be substantial about two orders of magnitude greater than lucas original estimates

representation in municipal government municipal governments play a vital role in american democracy as well as in governments around the world despite this little is known about the degree to which cities are responsive to the views of their citizens in the past the unavailability of data on the policy preferences of citizens at the municipal level has limited scholars ability to study the responsiveness of municipal government we overcome this problem by using recent advances in opinion estimation to measure the mean policy conservatism in every u s city and town with a population above 20 000 people despite the supposition in the literature that municipal politics are non ideological we find that the policies enacted by cities across a range of policy areas correspond with the liberal conservative positions of their citizens on national policy issues in addition we consider the influence of institutions such as the presence of an elected mayor the popular initiative partisan elections term limits and at large elections our results show that these institutions have little consistent impact on policy responsiveness in municipal government these results demonstrate a robust role for citizen policy preferences in determining municipal policy outcomes but cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reforms enhance responsiveness in municipal governments

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

risk bearing and the theory of income distribution this paper develops the stochastic theory of distribution with a dynamic model which focuses on the role of incomplete insurance in generating inequality unlike previous work our approach takes explicit account of the reason for market incompleteness in modeling agents behaviour in particular the amount of risk borne is endogenous using a model of growth with altruism in which agents are risk averse and there is moral hazard we show that lineage wealth follows a markov process which converges globally to an ergodic distribution this also represents the long run population distribution of wealth we discuss the role of particular assumptions such as availability of production loans and unboundedness of utility in yielding the qualitative properties of the distribution of wealth the choice of occupation and the prevention of poverty traps

measuring macroeconomic instability a critical survey illustrated with exports series for at least 40 years the analysis of the causes and consequences of macroeconomic instability has greatly deepened our understanding of the handicaps faced by developing countries this concern on economic instability is evidenced by a broad spectrum of indicators based on the deviation of observed values of a given economic aggregate from its reference or trend value in general the choice of this or that indicator is not discussed advocating that the resulting instability indicators are closely correlated focusing on measurements of instability in export revenue data for 134 countries from 1970 to 2005 this paper finds that this assertion may be true for variancebased indicators measuring the average magnitude of deviations from the trend however great discrepancies may arise between different measures of the asymmetry or of the occurrence of extreme deviations around the trend when different trend computation methods are used our purpose is therefore to invite further discussions regarding the use of these indicators and to highlight the different dimensions of instability which have been so far unheeded by the economic literature

endogenous enfranchisement when groups preferences conflict in their seminal paper aumann kurz and neyman found the surprising result that the choice of levels of public goods in a democracy is not affected by the distribution of voting rights this implies that groups of individuals may not value the franchise this conclusion however does not correspond to what we commonly observe we propose a new model to address the question of enfranchisement the main feature of our model is that it takes into account natural affinities such as religion or class that may exist between voters this allows us to show that while individuals may not value the vote they nonetheless value the franchise we also show that in the presence of nonconvexities it is more likely that the group in power will grant the franchise when preferences are severely opposed

the nexus between gender collective action for public goods and agriculture evidence from malawi across the developing world public goods exert significant impacts on the local rural economy in general and agricultural productivity and welfare outcomes in particular economic and social cultural heterogeneity have however long been documented as detrimental to collective capacity to provide public goods in particular women are often underrepresented in local leadership and decision making processes as are young adults and minority ethnic groups while democratic principles dictate that broad civic engagement by women and other groups could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local governance and increase public goods provision the empirical evidence on these hypotheses is scant this article develops a theoretical model highlighting the complexity of constructing a fair schedule of individual contributions given heterogeneity in costs and benefits that accrue to people depending for instance on their gender age ethnicity and education the model demonstrates that representative leadership and broad participation in community organizations can mitigate the negative impacts of heterogeneity on collective capacity to provide public goods nationally representative household survey data from malawi combined with geospatial and administrative information are used to test this hypothesis and to estimate the relationship between collective capacity for public good provision and community median estimates of maize yields and household consumption expenditures per capita the analysis shows that similarities between the leadership and the general population in terms of gender and age and active participation by women and young adult in community groups alleviate the negative effects of heterogeneity and increase collective capacity which in turn improves agriculture productivity and welfare

symposium on democracy and development academic fashions often follow the public political mood in a period when euphoric public commentators have announced the end of history in the triumph of capitalist democracy one sees an increasing number of scholarly studies attempting to show often on the basis of crosscountry statistical evidence and a bit of wishful thinking a positive effect of democracy on development it is in this context refreshing to see the agnostic results reported by adam przeworski and fernando limongi in their paper on the basis of their review of the theoretical arguments and statistical studies they conclude rather bluntly we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth their brief but fairly exhaustive examination of the various statistical studies of the last few decades shows the studies to be hopelessly inconclusive and beset with serious methodological problems at the analytical level they argue that it is not at all clear if democracy with its slow empowerment of the less wealthy secures growth fostering capitalist property rights better than dictatorships democracies may actually be more susceptible to pressures for immediate consumption and other particularistic demands that may hamper long run investment on the other hand authoritarian rulers who have the capacity to resist such pressures may instead be self aggrandi zing plundering the surplus of the economy in fact authoritarian regimes may come in different kinds some deriving their legitimacy from providing order and stability some from rapid growth sah 1991 has argued that authoritarian regimes exhibit a larger variance in economic performance than democracies

stability in a network economy the role of institutions abstract we consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value generating relationships agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions autarkic self provision bilateral interaction and multilateral collaboration through endogenously provided platforms we introduce two stability concepts and provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the network structure that guarantee existence in cases of the absence of externalities link based externalities and crowding externalities we show that institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leadership guarantee stability in particular the stability of more complex economic outcomes requires more strict and complex institutional rules to govern economic interactions we investigate strict social hierarchies tiered leadership structures and global market places

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

the transforming power of democracy regime type and the distribution of electricity theory on democracy and its consequences turns on how democracy influences behavior among politicians and the citizenry ultimately the literature seeks to determine who benefits under democratic rules this is our concern posed in a context that allows us to address a classic question does democracy favor large but diffuse segments of society over small but concentrated interests we employ sectoral electricity consumption data for a panel of 733 country years to examine democracy s impact on the distribution of electricity across three sectors that represent distinct political interests industry agriculture and residential consumers we find that in poorer countries democratization produces significant increases in the residential share of electricity relative to industry suggesting sectors with less per capita financial clout but a stronger voice in elections benefit under democracy unlike the large literatures on democracy s impact on the amounts of publicly provided goods our results are among the first on the distribution of those goods

special interest groups and growth this paper explores empirically the relation between special interest groups and economic growth our analysis exploits new data on the number of groups observed across countries and time in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies also in contrast to earlier work we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth capital accumulation and technological change in addition to the impact of groups on output growth the findings are consistent with olson s the rise and decline of nations the political economy of economic growth stagflation and social rigidities new haven yale 1982 claim that societies with greater numbers of interest groups grow slower accumulate less capital and experience reduced productivity growth relative to others

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

national competitive advantage and the roles of economic and political freedom evidence from hong kong the equivocal interrelationships between economic performance and the institu tions of respectively economic and political freedom are examined using data from firms op erating in hong kong an economy where both an erstwhile paramount international business reputation for competitiveness and the institutional basis on which it was predicated have come into question in recent years it is hypothesized that i both economic and political freedom declines will be associated with a proxy for future economic performance competitiveness decline but that ii the correlation of economic freedom declines with competitiveness de cline will be mediated by political freedom declines hierarchical regression analyses tend to support these hypotheses although results vary by firm origin

computational controversies in disequilibrium and shortage modelling of centrally planned economies abstract most disequilibrium and shortage models of centrally planned economies fall into three categories testable excess demand the portes school disequilibrium indicators and kornai s economics of shortage these models have generated numerous controversies and conflicting empirical results however this paper argues that some disputes are not caused by the theoretical features of the models but rather by the utilisation of different estimation methods that are not directly comparable this suggests that several controversies are more apparent than real and can be resolved through the improvement of computational techniques and statistical hypothesis testing theory

on the welfare cost of economic fluctuations in developing countries macroeconomic fluctuations are much stronger in developing countries than in the united states yet while a large literature debates the welfare cost of economic fluctuations in the united states it remains an open question how large that cost is in developing countries using several models we provide such a measure we find that the welfare cost of consumption volatility per se is far from trivial and averages a substantial multiple of the corresponding u s estimate moreover in many poor countries the welfare gain from eliminating volatility may in fact exceed the welfare gain from an additional percentage point of growth forever

political variables in cross country growth analysis the recent boom in cross country growth analysis has renewed the empirical interest in political sources of economic growth a large number of studies have tested political variables in growth regressions and a very heterogenous set of variables has been proposed to measure economically relevant differences in the political systems of countries this paper distinguishes five categories of relevant political variables democracy government stability political violence policy volatility and subjective perception of politics for each of these categories the specification testing method and results of the most relevant studies are presented and are critically discussed the paper concludes that measures of democracy are least successful and measures of policy volatility and subjective perception of politics most successful as explanatory variables in cross country growth regressions

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

lessons from strange cases democracy development and the resource curse in the u s states the work linking natural resource wealth to authoritarianism and under development suffers from several shortcomings in this article the authors outline those shortcomings and address them in a new empirical setting using a new data set for the u s states spanning 73 years and case studies of texas and louisiana the authors are able to more carefully examine both the diachronic nature and comparative legs of the resource curse hypothesis than previous research has they provide evidence that natural resource dependence contributes to slower economic growth poorer developmental performance and less competitive politics using this empirical setting they also begin parsing the mechanisms that might explain the negative association between resource wealth and political and economic development they draw implications from intranational findings for resource abundant countries across the world and suggest directions for future cross national and cross state work

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

democracy volatility and economic development growth stability is an important objective because development requires sustained increases in income because volatility is costly for the poor and because volatility deters growth we study the determinants of average growth and its volatility as a two equation system and find that higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility whereas volatility itself reduces growth muslim countries instrument for democracy and measures of diversification identify volatility in contrast to the lack of consensus on the democracy growth relationship the democracy stability link is robust rather than focus on growth this paper forges an alternative link between democracy and development through the volatility channel

democracy and economic growth a meta analysis despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth this article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy growth literature it applies meta regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth using traditional meta analysis estimators the bootstrap and fixed and random effects meta regression models it derives several robust conclusions taking all the available published evidence together it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth however democracy has robust significant and positive indirect effects through higher human capital lower inflation lower political instability and higher levels of economic freedom democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade there also appear to be country and region specific democracy growth effects overall democracy s net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental

fiscal policy and regional output volatility evidence from russia eller m fidrmuc j and fungac ova z fiscal policy and regional output volatility evidence from russia regional studies this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal policy and output volatility in russian regions between 2000 and 2009 accounting for endogeneity between output volatility and fiscal developments by using system generalized method of moments gmm estimation techniques the results indicate that discretionary fiscal policy contributes to output volatility and induces macroeconomic instability at the regional level in russia this corroborates previous studies using cross country data to reduce business cycle fluctuations it would be necessary to curtail procyclical fiscal activism at the regional level e g via fiscal rules and sound institutions of fiscal federalism

volatility growth and welfare this paper constructs an endogenous growth model driven by self ful lling expectation shocks to explain the stylized fact that the average growth rate of gdp is related negatively to volatility and positively to capacity utilization the implied welfare gain from further stabilizing the u s economy is about a quarter of annual consumption which is consistent in order of magnitude with estimates based on the empirical studies of ramey and ramey 1995 and alvarez and jermann 2004 hence policies designed to reduce uctuations can generate large welfare gains because smaller uctuations are associated with permanently higher rates of growth

individual preferences for political redistribution what drives people s support of governmental reduction of income inequality we employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces referred to as the homo oeconomicus effect the public values effect and the social rivalry effect the empirical analysis reveals that at the aggregate level all three effects play a significant role in shaping individual preferences for political redistribution attitudes of citizens in formerly socialist countries turn out to differ from those of western citizens in a systematic way 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

income smoothing and consumption smoothing one way that risk averse households protect consumption levels is to borrow and use insurance mechanisms another way common in low income economies is to diversify economic activities and make conservative production and employment choices households thus tend toward limiting exposure only to shocks that can be handled with available credit and insurance typically both types of mechanisms are studied independently but much more can be learned by studying them together first we obtain a more complete picture of risks costs and insurance possibilities second it opens the way to considering biases in standard tests of credit and insurance

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

the good the bad and the civil society abstract there are three signature features of autocracies first there is a wide variety across autocracies in terms of economic performance some do much better and some much worse than democracies second economic performance of a given autocracy is more sensitive to leader quality and exhibits higher volatility third all autocracies good or bad tend to have weaker civil societies than democracies do we attribute these features to the core of the autocratic political institution the incumbent leader selects the future leader as opposed to citizens at large selecting the future leader under democracy we deliver our analysis in an overlapping generations model where two kinds of dynamic free riding problems arise the first arises among different generations of citizens in implementing far sighted policies political leaders come in two types good ones aim to correct this first kind of dynamic free riding problem while bad ones do not care and only aim to steal public assets both types need a weak civil society to achieve their goals but a second dynamic free riding problem arises among different leaders when it comes to weakening the civil society the autocratic leader selection mechanism helps resolve this second dynamic free riding problem results in a continuously weakened civil society and generates large variations of economic performances both within a given autocracy and across different autocracies a rich set of comparative statics is derived

political freedom economic freedom and income convergence do stages of economic development matter in the literature theory and empirical evidence on the nexus of political freedom economic freedom and economic growth are mixed in this paper we test the hypothesis that the effect of political freedom on promoting economic growth is realized and detectable at later stages of social and economic development using panel data for a sample of 104 countries between 1970 and 2003 we find strong support for our hypothesis while economic freedom has greater effects on income convergence in the oecd countries political freedom clearly promotes the convergence among those oecd countries

comparative advantage in agriculture in the newly independent states discussion costs are compared with import prices updated to include data for 1988 and extended to include machinery and equipment grain and meat these comparisons are taken to suggest that there was unrealised comparative advantage in machinery and equipment relative to agricultural products second he offers a conceptual examination of the effects of a complete liberalisation of the pre reform distortions these include a demand effect due to the revival of consumer sovereignty and a supply effect representing improvements in technical and allocative efficiency which might be expected when firms and agents within them are permitted to respond independently to market signals third he discusses evidence independent of the cost estimates offered previously that waste and technical inefficiency were more serious in the machinery and equipment sector than in agriculture this is seen to confirm that the reformed fsu economy will tend to export manufactures and import agricultural products finally he reports results from an analysis using the partial equilibrium swopsim model of world agriculture these results tend to confirm the earlier expectation that the reformed fsu agricultural sector would be import competing although excess supplies could develop in a few products such as wheat the consumption of which was heavily subsidised by the pre reform policy regime the first issue for comment concerns the author s use of import cost ratios as measures of unrealized comparative advantage since these divide the marginal or average cost in each industry measured using the bergson adjusted factor cost approach by the marginal cost of corresponding imports they are a type of domestic resource cost schydlowsky indeed when divided by the nominal exchange rate they are closest to fane s drc p which if all goods were traded would be equivalent to the effective rate of protection to be a good measure of unrealized comparative advantage however it is necessary that the measure be based on shadow prices of all nontraded factors and inputs as well as of foreign exchange domestic prices recorded by the soviet regime are of no help in this incentive prices those at which the same number of price taking firms would maximize their profits by choosing the observed output are needed official statistics do not provide estimates of such prices though they can be approximated where parallel private markets exist 1 in the absence of these the author s icrs must serve as the best that can be done for the

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

the simultaneous evolution of growth and inequality research on inequality and growth can be divided into two strands one deriving from kuznets and lewis has tried to identify a mechanistic relationship between growth or level of income and inequality the other has tried to find causal explanations of growth and inequality treating each independently in this paper we draw from both strands to test whether growth and inequality are the joint outcomes of other variables and processes we find that simultaneous examination of growth and inequality yields significantly different results and has different consequences for policy from previous independent studies the empirical literature on growth and inequality can be divided into two broad strands one following the pioneering work of kuznets and lewis is motivated by the pessimistic conjecture that the process of growth and development somehow requires increasing inequality at least in the early stages this has led to many efforts to identify a mechanical relationship between the level of development and inequality anand and kanbur 1993 or to determine whether faster growth requires higher or lower inequality the second strand has sought to identify the causal factors influencing the evolution of growth and inequality independently this research has looked either at growth for example barro and sala i martin 1995 or at inequality li et al 1997 but has not tried to identify those factors that might simultaneously influence both growth and inequality 2 thus the literature that looks simultaneously at growth and inequality descending most notably from kuznets 1955 relates them in a mechanistic manner that ignores or minimises the role of other causal factors including policy while the literature that incorporates other causal factors including policies looks independently at growth and inequality neither approach is particularly convincing from a theoretical standpoint the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes in addition neither approach is particularly useful for the policy maker who needs to balance the impact of policies on both growth and distribution in this paper we investigate whether growth and inequality are simultaneously determined and if so whether or not they are subject to

core labor standards and development impact on long term income summary the paper focuses on the impact of international core labor standards on long term per capita income in order to do that it is necessary to build a new synthetic indicator of labor standards using multiple correspondence analysis measuring the four core labor standards recognized by ilo we propose an estimation of the steady state per capita income for a large panel of countries 104 and then that of developing countries the two stage least square method is used to correct potential problems of endogeneity the findings show that by and large countries with higher labor standards have a higher steady state level 2007 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

repressed inflation queuing and the resale of goods in a centrally planned economy abstract the barro grossman repressed inflation model is reformulated incorporating the goods rationing scheme widely observed in centrally planned economies the informal queue we assume there are two types of individual differntiated by work ability this enables inclusion of another feature found in practice the private resale of goods less able individuals queue to buy goods both to consume and to resell to more able individuals the latter spend their time working for a relatively high wage rather than queuing among the comparative statics results is that the supply multiplier is negative positive if goods and leisure are gross substitutes complements

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

ready for capital account convertibility abstract this paper investigates whether the impact of capital account convertibility on the long term volatility of economic growth depends on financial development it estimates a system of three simultaneous equations mean growth volatility of growth and financial development this allows for the study of both the impact of capital account liberalization on volatility as well as its direct impact on financial development results indicate that economies with low financial development fall prey to excess volatility arising from capital account openness while capital account openness itself has a significant positive impact on financial development the results are robust to alternative measures of financial development and volatility and to the removal of outliers

decentralization and political career concerns abstract politicians career paths often start at some subnational governments and end at the national one allocation of authorities among national and subnational governments affects i how tempting the prospects of taking national offices are and hence how strong bureaucrats political career concerns are and ii whether the incentives generated by these political career concerns can be put into productive use at subnational governments we illustrate this tradeoff in determining the optimal degree of decentralization using china as a case study we also compare the equilibrium degree of decentralization in autocracy and in democracy

remittances and household consumption instability in developing countries this paper analyzes the impact of remittances on household consumption instability in a large panel of developing countries there are four main results first remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability second remittances play an insurance role by dampening the effects of various sources of consumption instability in developing countries natural disasters agricultural shocks discretionary fiscal policy systemic financial and banking crises and exchange rate instability third the stabilizing role played by remittances is stronger in less financially developed countries fourth the overall stabilizing effect of remittances is mitigated when remittances exceed 6 of gdp

inequality redistribution and growth a challenge to the conventional political economy approach abstract this paper reconsiders the conventional political economy view that 1 1 more unequal societies tend to make more redistribution and 2 2 more redistribution is harmful to growth we present a number of theoretical arguments suggesting that the two previous implications are not necessarily true and that the empirically observed negative correlation between inequality and growth might just come from the fact that more unequal societies tend to redistribute less which in turn is actually detrimental to growth

critical values for an f test for cointegration in a multivariate model critical values for a test for cointegration are generated based on the joint significance of the levels terms in an error correction equation it is shown that the appropriate critical values are higher than those derived from the standard f distribution the power properties of this test are compared with those of the engle granger econometrica 55 251 76 1987 test and kremers et al s oxford bulletin of economics and statistics 54 3 325 48 1992 t test based on the t statistic from an error correction equation the f test has higher power than the engle granger test but lower power than the t form of the error correction test however the f form of the test has the advantage that its distribution is independent of the parameters of the problem being considered finally a test is considered for cointegration between uk and us interest rates it is shown that the f test rejects the null of no cointegration between these variables although the engle granger test fails to do so

the impact of constitutions on economic performance constitutions matter for economic performance to the extent that they promote stability accountability and credibility this article considers the nature of political constituions and their impact on economic efficiny and economic security wnder three aspects the basic righs laid down in the constitution the structure of government and the stringency of amedment procedures while emphasizing that constitutions can be usefid by serving as precommitment devices the analysis also emphasizes the dangers of rigidity and the need for flexibility t he relation between political institutions and economic performance is not well understood the causal link goes in both directions well designed insttutions can improve economic performance but some institutions may be feasible or effective only at specific levels of economic development here i consider only one aspect of the relationship the impact of institutions on economic performance however a full treatment of the subject would consider both aspects and the following discussion must be read with this important proviso in mind i further limit myself to the subset of political institutions that are embodied in constitutions the smdy of the impact of constitutions on economic performance is part of what is usually referred to as constitutional political economy a field that can be traced back to the caklcdus of consent by buchanan and tullock 1962 buchanan was also the founder of the journal constitutional political economy the public choice approach to constitutions has focused somewhat narrowly on fiscal and monetary constitutions although actual constitutions rarely stipulate tax systems or monetary institutions in any detail the ban on paper money in the u s constituton for instance has few analogues in modem constitutions moreover even that document is concerned mostly with other matters such as the organization of the executive and the legislature separation of powers and the relations between the federal government and the states constituitional political economy

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

entitlement to assort democracy compromise culture and economic stability abstract we propose a simple model to support rodrik s 2000 conjecture that democracy lowers economic instability through breeding compromise culture in the model a population of compromisers and opportunists collectively bargain over the assortativity level of matching through a democratic political institution we show that compromisers are able to achieve a positive level of assortativity which helps them to avoid matching with opportunists this in turn raises compromisers payoffs above opportunists and eventually compromisers dominate the population through cultural evolution

democracy diversification and growth reversals there exists convincing evidence that democratic countries are less volatile this conclusion is usually reached with respect to volatility as measured by the standard deviation of annual growth rates of per capita gdp which includes both low and high frequency fluctuations however recently several studies have documented that significant changes in trend growth such as growth accelerations that last a decade or similar periods of negative growth are quite common in this paper we ask whether democracy also has a stabilizing effect on trend volatility i e whether more democratic countries experience fewer and milder swings of trend growth we find a common phenomenon medium term reversals of growth that is periods of exceptionally high growth are on average followed by periods of exceptionally low growth and vice versa the propensity to experience large swings of trend growth is not uniform across countries less democratic countries are more susceptible to it when compared with factors commonly associated with volatility such as measures of quality of institutions macroeconomic policies and financial development we find that democracy is the most robust predictor of a country s propensity for growth reversals we construct a model in which non democracies have high barriers of entry for new firms this leads to less sectoral diversification fewer sectors are operated but more resources are channeled to each in an uncertain environment this leads to infrequent but large growth accelerations when one of the few sectors operated is successful however these accelerations are followed by large declines when fortunes change in favor of the missing sectors we present empirical evidence that confirms the positive relationship between democracy and industrial diversification

participatory politics social cooperation and economic stability few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking in this paper attention is drawn to regularity in the cross national data that has received little attention to date participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability after presenting some of the evidence it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

tractable dynamic global games and applications abstract we present a family of tractable dynamic global games and its applications agents privately learn about a fixed fundamental and repeatedly adjust their investments while facing frictions the game exhibits many externalities payoffs may depend on the volume of investment on its volatility and on its concentration the solution is driven by an invariance result aggregate investment is in a pivotal contingency invariant to a large family of frictions we use the invariance result to examine how frictions including those similar to the tobin tax affect equilibrium we identify conditions under which frictions discourage harmful behavior without compromising investment volume

trade capital and the transition in central europe the potential for export oriented growth and the impact of official capital injections is assessed for five central european countries in the years 1990 2000 by means of a neoclassical simulation model export growth is essential for the transition to a market oriented economy and the recovery of central europe implying the need for trade liberalization by both the east and the west if this condition is being met satisfactory gdp growth rates appear possible even without external financial support

political and economic inequities and the shaping of institutions and redistribution this article studies the joint effect of political and economic inequalities on redistributive taxation and institutional quality the theoretical model suggests that income inequality coupled with political bias in favor of the rich decreases redistribution and lowers institutional quality the effect of the former is to increase productive investment and the effect of the latter is to decrease it with resulting ambiguous implications for economic growth testing these predictions empirically in a panel of countries we find that inequality has a negative effect on both institutional quality and redistribution

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

inequality and redistribution revisited abstract as inequality rises taxation can be less efficient in the sense that a given tax rate produces a smaller tax base if this tax base effect outweighs the conventional political effect then increasing inequality can induce less public spending or redistribution contrarily to alesina and rodrik and persson and tabellini