implications of dynamic optimal taxation for the evolution of tax structures the paper by james alt 1983 lists several interesting observations in relation to the evolution of tax structures in many developed countries the share of tax revenues collected as direct taxes has been increasing over the past century although the timing of the major increases has varied among the countries on page 201 he says the growth of the business share of direct taxes was the most striking feature of figure 1 the figure compares seven countries in the years 1880 and 1979 some of that growth took place between 1955 and 1979 as figure 4 indicates direct taxes on households have become more progressive over time irt attempting to explain these and other observations alt pays little or no attention to economic efficiency considerations this is perhaps understandable since most of the taxation literature has dealt with static models recently however several papers have

state contingent inflation contracts and unemployment persistence this paper shows that if unemployment or some other real variable follows a dynamic autoregressive process the government can still achieve its precommitment outcome in monetary policy by offering the central banker a linear inflation contract where the penalty for incremental inflation depends positively on lagged unemployment this note therefore offers an extension of recent results of c walsh 1995 to the case of persistence in real economic variables such as output or unemployment copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

price level versus inflation targeting abstract this paper shows that price level targeting outperforms inflation targeting in the standard new keynesian model under the assumption that the central bank is forced to operate in an environment characterized by discretion in the benchmark case with no persistence in the shocks the commitment solution can be fully replicated intuitively price level targeting introduces history dependence and a stationary level of prices both of which are prominent features of the commitment solution

the contractionary effect of bad economic news is bad economic news a self fulfilling prophecy this paper examines the local employment effects of exposure to pessimistic economic news by combining detailed data on newspaper subscriptions with a tabulation of negative newspaper stories the flow of such news across the united states during the 2008 recession is reconstructed at county and quarterly levels the resulting data set is used to estimate the causal impact of such news on unemployment hiring and separation rates exposure to pessimistic news is found to suppress hiring and total employment during the early stages of the recession by up to 40 compared to prerecession levels such news can account for some 7 of the total reduction in employment between 2007 and 2010 content analysis of the articles in question rules out the possibility that this relationship is driven by reverse causation that is newspapers merely reporting poor economic performance further analysis of google search data suggests that the effect is mediated by changes in public attitude caused by exposure to negative news these findings imply that labor market outcomes can differ due to arbitrary differences in the dispersal of economic information bearings on economic theory including the notions of sunspots and animal spirits are discussed

inflation expectations as a policy tool abstract we assess the prospects for central banks using inflation expectations as a policy tool for stabilization purposes we review recent work on how expectations of agents are formed and how they affect their economic decisions empirical evidence suggests that inflation expectations of households and firms affect their actions but the underlying mechanisms remain unclear especially for firms two additional limitations prevent policy makers from being able to actively manage inflation expectations first available surveys of firms expectations are systematically deficient which can only be addressed through the creation of large nationally representative surveys of firms second neither households nor firms expectations respond much to monetary policy announcements in low inflation environments we provide suggestions for how monetary policy makers could pierce this veil of inattention through new communication strategies as well as the potential pitfalls to trying to do so

spatial preemption with finitely lived equipments abstract this paper proposes a dynamic approach to potential competition in a spatial framework where productive investments are location specific and have finite duration we define a notion of strategic sustainability against multiple entries in which spatial preemption comes from anticipated renewal policies of plants we show that in an infinite horizon model with no discounting potential competition leads to average cost renewal but a positive value can be attached to incumbency the conditions for the existence of such strategically sustainable structures are determined in the model of the circular city under mill or discriminatory pricing rules our results are finally related to the usual two stage notion of free entry equilibrium in spatial models

establishing credibility a rational expectations viewpoint ongoing attempts to reduce the rate of inflation through restrictive monetary policy in the united states and a number of other countries have brought practical focus to the problem of establishing the credibility of macroeconomic policy while credibility is usually an unquestioned criterion of good public policy in the case of disinflation it takes on special importance credibility about a future change in the course of policy may be able to directly reduce the costs of disinflation by changing inflationary expectations since inflationary expectations have a significant influence on current wage and price decisions a reduction in actual inflation may result to the extent that it is quantitatively significant this expectations effect of credibility the expectations bonus puts a premium on establishing the credibility of a monetary disinflation program the purpose of this paper is to consider the problem of establishing the credibility of such a program from the perspective of a rational expectations approach to macroeconomic policy evaluation that credibility would have significant disinflation effects once established is closely associated with the rational expectations hypothesis and has been demonstrated both in the context of market clearing and contract based rational expectations models a summary of the results from the different models is contained in my 1980 review paper from macroeconomic research completed during the last ten years it now seems clear that a rational expectations approach to policy evaluation should not be confined to market clearing situations where all prices and wages adjust instantaneously nullifying the real effects of anticipated policy and leaving only unanticipated policy to matter in fact much rational expectations research in macroeconomics has given explicit attention to contracts and other rigidities which lead to infrequent adjustment of most wages and prices in this paper however i will only touch on this technical research and instead attempt to apply some of the more general principles of rational expectations to the problem of establishing credibility of macroeconomic policy at this time in the united

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

central bank announcements big news for little people little is known on how and whether central bank announcements affect consumers beliefs about policy relevant economic figures this paper focuses on consumers perceptions and expectations of inflation and interest rates and confidence therein based on a sound identification running surveys shortly before and after communication events and relying on above 15 000 observations spanning over 12 fomc press conferences between december 2015 and june 2018 we document the impact of the central bank communication on the general public while announcement events have no measurable direct effect on average beliefs they make people more likely to receive news about the central bank s policy in general informed consumers tend to have lower perceptions and expectations higher confidence and at least for perceived inflation smaller errors

the role of media for consumers inflation expectation formation the full information rational expectations model is clearly rejected by the data the expectation formation process has therefore important implications for macroeconomic outcomes we examine how consumers react to information provided by the media by taking into account that this information is imperfect we show that information rigidities play a role empirically intensive news reporting improves the accuracy of consumers inflation expectations because they receive more information however this effect depends on the tone of the news if news are badly toned the effect reverts

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

limited asset markets participation monetary policy and inverted aggregate demand logic abstract this paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation while moderate participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom the slope of the is curve changes sign the taylor principle is inverted optimal welfare maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the effects and propagation of shocks are changed however a targeting rule implementing optimal policy under commitment delivers equilibrium determinacy regardless of the degree of asset market participation our results may justify fed s behavior during the great inflation period

committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility abstract a fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed rogoff 1985 rogoff k 1985 the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target q j econ 100 4 1169 1189 showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally conservative policy maker in real life however policy makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time consistent so delegating to a conservative person could be undesirable a flexible delegation device can be found in a large committee of randomly appointed members voting over policy after observing a shock when facing dynamic inconsistency under a single crossing property there exists a supermajority rule that implements the population median s optimally conservative policy maker with certainty another single crossing property guarantees that if simple majority voting is used to select the voting rule that will govern policy choice the supermajority preferred by the median is chosen for problems where dynamic inconsistency vanishes the committee will choose to make decisions by simple majority implementing median outcomes an application to monetary policy is developed we show that the optimal supermajority is higher when dynamic inconsistency is more severe when preferences are more homogeneous and when the economy is less volatile

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

the price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two dimensional spatial competition abstract consider a horizontal merger between two adjacent stores in a two dimensional model the price and profit increases of merging and neighboring stores are small compared to those that occur in a one dimensional model

monetary policy in the media just like private companies depend crucially on their ability to reach customers policymakers must communicate with private agents to be successful and much of this communication is channeled through the media this is especially true for central banks which need to build credibility among the general public this paper analyses how favorably the print media report about the european central bank s ecb monetary policy decisions favorableness is inter alia influenced by the amount of information communicated by the ecb there are however also indications of a critical monitoring role of the media which reports more negatively when inflation exceeds the inflation target

does cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration abstract locations and quantities are chosen sequentially in spatial markets strikingly different location patterns emerge depending on the shape of the market in a circular city firms locate equidistant from each other in a linear city firms agglomerate at the center

the politics of infrastructure investment the role of product market competition abstract in spatial competition public infrastructure plays a crucial role in determining product market outcomes in our model consideration of infrastructure s impact on the product market drives the preferences of consumers in their dual role as voter taxpayers the spatial heterogeneity of consumers produces conflicting political interests and in many cases inefficient outcomes however across both exogenous and endogenous market environments product market competition consistently leads to higher levels of publicly funded infrastructure than monopoly collusion furthermore competition s boost to the popular support for infrastructure investment is often excessive while monopoly leads to underinvestment

spatial competition monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity abstract this is a republication of a passage from william vickrey s 1964 book microstatics which presents important results in spatial competition and monopolistic competition

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

monetary policy signaling and movements in the term structure of interest rates this paper examines how various monetary policy signals such as repo rate changes inflation reports speeches and minutes from monetary policy meetings affect the term structure of interest rates we find that unexpected movements in the short end of the yield curve are mainly driven by unexpected changes in the repo rate however published inflation reports and speeches also have some impact on short rates speeches are found to be a more important determinant for the longer end of the term structure our conclusion is that central bank communication is an essential part of the conduct of monetary policy

designing monetary policy when unemployment persists this paper investigates how unemployment persistence affects the optimal delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker cb two opposing forces are shown to be at work with more persistence the government s incentive to stabilize the economy is greater but if the cb is forward looking its incentive to create inflation surprises is also greater we show that owing to the second effect the government may wish not to delegate at all unlike the case where there is no persistence in the event that the government does delegate the paper identifies conditions under which either effect dominates in the government s choice of conservatism of the cb we compare delegation to discretion and precommitment using a diagrammatic approach that may be of independent interest we also present some preliminary empirical evidence on the cross country relationship between unemployment persistence and inflation that appears consistent with the model s predictions

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

the un importance of forward looking behavior in price specifications the seminal work of edmund s phelps 1978 john b taylor 1980 and guillermo a calvo 1983 developed forward looking models of price determination that imparted inertia to the price level these models incorporate expectations of future prices and excess demand by imposing constraints typically lag lead symmetry constraints that force future variables to enter the specification in this paper the author tests the empirical significance of future prices in specifications like those of taylor he finds that expectations of future prices are empirically unimportant in explaining price and inflation behavior however the dynamics of a model that includes a purely backward looking inflation specification differ substantially and not altogether pleasingly from those with a forward looking specification copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

communication by central bank committee members different strategies same effectiveness the paper assesses the communication strategies of the federal reserve the bank of england and the european central bank and their effectiveness we find that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision making process the paper shows that the federal reserve has been pursuing a highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision making while the bank of england is using a collegial communication strategy and highly individualistic decision making the european central bank ecb has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision making assessing these strategies we find that predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good for the federal reserve and the ecb this suggests that there may not be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication strategy

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

spatial monopoly and spatial monopolistic competition with two part pricing this paper develops a model of spatial price discrimination by two part pricing when bearing freight and nonlinear pricing are impossible the two part tariff comprises a membership fee and a price per visit when fixed costs per store are low a monopolist makes membership compulsory and builds stores too close together with higher fixed cost the monopolist offers consumers a choice between membership and nonmembership and builds stores too far apart nearby consumers become members more distant consumers nonmembers competition leads to closer spacing than monopoly and lower welfare except at high levels of fixed cost per store copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

on targeting frameworks and optimal monetary policy we show that speed limit policy a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium scale dsge models under discretionary policymaking in contrast to small scale new keynesian models this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward looking importantly the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level

imperfect credibility and inflation persistence in this paper we formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered nominal contracts in which households and rms use optimal ltering to disentangle persistent and transitory shifts in the monetary policy rule the calibrated model accounts quite well for the dynamics of output and insation during the volcker disinsation and implies a sacri ce ratio very close to the estimated value our approach indicates that insation persistence and substantial costs of disinsation can be generated in an optimizing agent framework without relaxing the assumption of rational expectations or relying on arbitrary modi cations to the aggregate supply relation jel classi cation e31 e32 e52

the german public and its trust in the ecb the role of knowledge and information search abstract in this paper we analyse the effects of objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy as well as the information search patterns of german citizens on trust in the ecb we rely on a unique representative public opinion survey of german households conducted in 2011 we find that subjective and factual knowledge as well as the desire to be informed about the ecb foster citizens trust specific knowledge about the ecb is more influential than general monetary policy knowledge objective knowledge is more important than subjective knowledge however an increasing intensity of media usage especially newspaper reading has a significantly negative influence on trust we conclude that the only viable way for the ecb to generate more trust in itself is to spread monetary policy knowledge

goal programming regulation and generalised economies of scale and scope abstract in this paper a new class of goal programming models are employed to define economies of scale and scope first with reference to distribution models and then with reference to more general linear and nonlinear goal programming models applications to interregional production regulation and exchange are provided and in every case these models yield competitive results as special cases but in their general form the models and associated results correspond to appropriately regulated market conditions with regulation being determined inter alia by means of appropriate supply and or demand goal oriented taxes and subsidies

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

the immediate challenges for the european central bank immediate challenges for the ecb issues in formulating a single monetary policy this paper discusses a number of issues that the newly constituted board of the ecb will face early on conducting a european monetary policy will be very different from living under the protective umbrella of the bundesbank we discuss voting on the ecb board and argue that the ability to communicate with the public will be critical for the success of the new institution we also ask how a single monetary policy a common change in the interest rate controlled by the ecb is transmitted to the economy of each member country we show that the monetary process differs significantly inside emu initially at least the cost of a disinflation episode could fall disproportionately on a few member countries those with both a financial structure that spreads a monetary contraction widely and a wage price structure that is relatively inflexible this process moreover is sure to evolve in part as a result of financial industry restructuring already under way but in part accentuated by the common money furthermore as the lucas principle suggests the wage price process itself will adapt to the changing focus of european monetary policy rudi dornbusch carlo favero and francesco giavazzi

policy delegation and fixed exchanges rates recent literature interpreting the european monetary system emphasizes credibility gains from delegating monetary policy to a low inflation country through fixed exchange rates this paper presents a model of an exchange rate system as a device for policy delegation in the context of a repeated monetary policy game in contrast to single shot games it generates credibility gains for the high inflation and low inflation countries in the system credibility gains neither require nor imply hegemony of the low inflation member stochastic realignments enable the members to adopt different inflation trends without destroying the credibility benefits from policy delegation copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

shocking language understanding the macroeconomic effects of central bank communication we explore how the multi dimensional aspects of information released by the fomc has effects on both market and real economic variables using tools from computational linguistics we measure the information released by the fomc on the state of economic conditions as well as the guidance the fomc provides about future monetary policy decisions employing these measures within a favar framework we find that shocks to forward guidance are more important than the fomc communication of current economic conditions in terms of their effects on market and real variables nonetheless neither communication has particularly strong effects on real economic variables

who should control the money supply this paper develops a model determining some motivational peculiarities of an optimal monetary authority an authority inducing a socially optimal inflation rate the model initially assumes that discretionary policy is desirable and that all possible authorities have the same information section ii rationalizes the assumption of the desirability of discretionary policy under rational expectations the assumption of rational expectations is seen to strengthen rather than weaken as its proponents are wont to assume the case for discretionary monetary policy section iii relaxes the assumption that all possible monetary authorities have the same information and thereby immediately exposes a dilemma unique to problem of finding an optimal monetary authority individuals possessing the efficient motivation are so peculiar that it is unlikely to find one that also possesses anything close to the information required to carry out first best discretionary policy the model serves to rationalize both the unusual motivational characteristics and the poor performance of observed monetary authori

targeting nominal income growth or inflation within a simple new keynesian model emphasizing forward looking behavior of private agents i evaluate optimal nominal income growth targeting versus optimal inflation targeting when the economy is mainly subject to shocks that do not involve monetary policy trade offs for society inflation targeting is preferable otherwise nominal income growth targeting may be superior because it induces inertial policy making which improves the inflation output gap trade off somewhat paradoxically inflation targeting may be relatively less favorable the more society dislikes inflation and the more persistent are the effects of inflation generating shocks jel e42 e52 f58

where to locate in a circular city abstract we study the location choices by cournot oligopolists in a circular market where consumers are located uniformly along the circumference we analyze the subgame perfect nash equilibria spne of a two stage location quantity game we demonstrate that the equidistant location pattern is only one of the many equilibrium location patterns that arise in a circular market nonequidistant multiple or a continuum of location equilibria may also arise both spatial agglomeration and dispersion or a combination of agglomeration and dispersion may occur in equilibrium in the case of infinitely many location equilibria we establish the welfare equivalence of the equilibrium location patterns

entry deterrence by non horizontal merger we study when and how pure non horizontal mergers whether cross product or vertical can deter new entry organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition because heightened competition deters entry mergers can occur in equilibrium even when absent entry considerations they do not we show that in order to prevent a flood of entrants mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant

provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions abstract this paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good the equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good which can be uneven varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters can be greater than equal to or less than the socially optimal spacing

central bank communication in the media and investor sentiment abstract this paper explores the relationship between central bank communication and investor sentiment we first use media coverage on fed chair s communication to quantify the degree of confidence and optimism expressed by the fed chair and call this variable the overconfidence indicator second we relate the overconfidence indicator to investor sentiment our results show that an overconfident fed chair is significantly associated with higher investor sentiment further extensions suggest that i investors are more sensitive to central bank communication during a recession and that ii they adjust rapidly their sentiment following central bank communication thus showing that there is no underreaction bias these findings provide additional insights on how central bank communication shapes investor sentiment in the context of the global financial crisis and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates

uneven spacing in free entry equilibrium for spatial product differentiation abstract this paper shows that the spacing of firms can be very uneven in free entry equilibrium in a familiar model of spatial competition in which potential entrants have sophisticated expectations about post entry prices

pioneering price level targeting the swedish experience 1931 1937 in september 1931 sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the domestic price level the official goal of its monetary policy actually the only country that so far has adopted such an explicit price level target starting from the issues and concepts familiar from research and policy experience of inflation targeting as contrasted to price level targeting this paper examines the evolution of the swedish price level targeting in the 1930s we bring out a number of similarities and differences between price stabilization in the 1930s and in the 1990s

sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition we analyze free entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants profit expectations are rational our most interesting results concern large economies economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large when the average cost function is u shaped free entry equilibrium is unique socially optimal and characterized by zero profit in contract when there are no diseconomies of scale even large economies are stubbornly imperfect firms can earn substantial pure profit and free entry equilibrium is neither unique nor socially optimal

the council of economic advisors from stabilization to resource allocation this paper traces the changing role of the council of economic advisers in the 50 years since its creation the cea s focus has shifted from the design of policies to achieve full employment to one of advising on the much enlarged spending and tax activities of the federal government the cea s original attention to achieving cyclical stability through fiscal policy diminished as economists changed their views about the inherent stability of the economy and the usefulness of fiscal policy with the shift of macroeconomic policy to the federal reserve the cea s macroeconomic role has diminished but not disappeared the rapid growth of government spending during the past five decades has greatly increased the role for the cea in seeking efficient resource allocation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

u s monetary policy since the 1950s and the changing content of fomc minutes content analysis is used to analyze 60 years of federal open market committee fomc minutes since there is no unique algorithm to quantify content two different algorithms are applied wordscores compares content relative to a chosen benchmark while diction is an alternative algorithm that is specifically designed to capture various elements that capture the sentiment or tone conveyed in a text the resulting indicators are then incorporated into a var the content of fomc minutes is found to be significantly related to the state of the economy notably real gdp growth and changes in the fed funds rate however the relationship between content and macroeconomic conditions changes after 1993 when minutes are made public with a lag both content indicators also suggest substantive changes in the content of fomc minutes since the 1950s in terms of the fomc s dovishness or hawkishness

average inflation targeting the analysis of this paper demonstrates that when the phillips curve has forward looking components a goal for average inflation i e targeting a j period average of one period inflation rates will cause inflation expectations to change in a way that improves the short run trade off faced by the monetary policymaker average inflation targeting is thus an example of a modified loss function which when implemented in a discretionary fashion results in more efficient outcomes from the standpoint of the true social objective inflation targeting under commitment than the discretionary pursuit of the true objective itself in purely forward looking models average inflation targeting is dominated by price level targeting but we also demonstrate in a micro founded model where the phillips curve has both forward and backward looking components that there are cases when the average inflation target provides more efficient outcomes than both ordinary one period inflation targeting and price level targeting

note competitive price and positioning strategies brand positioning and brand pricing are important strategic decisions for marketing managers such decisions are interrelated and depend upon competitive brand positions and prices however any unilateral decisions may encourage repositioning and price adjustment by competitors thus leading to either new market equilibria or a price positioning war this paper examines such price and positioning decisions in a competitive environment by extending the defender consumer model to more complex equilibria we assume that the brands are already in the market and that positions are sticky in the sense that brands cannot leapfrog one another among the insights for such incumbent brands are if prices are symmetric and held constant firms seek to reposition toward the center of the market but price advantages by central firms can mediate that central tendency such that an equilibrium exists with positive profits if brand positions are held constant the nash equilibria for prices exist and are unique and category profits the sum of brand profits are maximized for maximum brand differentiation for two and three brand markets the subgame perfect nash equilibrium where positioning decisions are made with foresight on the price equilibria causes firms to unilaterally seek maximum brand differentiation but for four or more brands greater foresight and or cooperation appears necessary to reach the point of maximum brand differentiation these results apply where the defender consumer model is an exact description of consumer response and where the competitive reaction assumptions hold in any empirical situation such forces might be softened resulting in differentiated but not maximally differentiated brands

speed limit policies the output gap and optimal monetary policy in a standard new keynesian model a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal timeless perspective precommitment policy by stabilizing output gap changes the central bank imparts inertia into output and inflation that is absent under pure discretion even a fully optimizing i e non myopic central bank operating in a discretionary policy environment achieves better social outcomes if it focuses on inflation and changes in the output gap than are achieved under inflation targeting this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

insider power unemployment dynamics and multiple inflation equilibria this paper incorporates employment dynamics due to insider power into the barro gordon theory of inflation unlike in the static barro gordon case and even though our infinitehorizon model is linear quadratic there can be two markov perfect equilibria so that the same unemployment may correspond to either low or high inflation both equilibrium inflation rates measured per unit of the gap between the insiders and government s employment targets are higher than the corresponding rate in the static case the low inflation equilibrium has intuitive comparative statics properties in that inflation is increasing in insider power and the discount factor but the high inflation equilibrium behaves in the opposite way the highinflation equilibrium can be eliminated by a future precommitment to a fixed inflation regime e g erm but only if this precommitment can be made with certainty contrary to the static model inflation may be lower when the union puts a positive weight on a wage target than when it cares only about employment even when this wage target is consistent with a lower employment level than the employment target

mental health market power and governance this paper is concerned with the pricing behaviour of providers of residential care for people with mental health problems two aspects of pricing were considered first are there differences between providers market power and their actual mark up rates e g due to differences in motivation second do the different governance arrangements used in sectors of the industry such as unified public and non profit organisation and private bilateral contracting affect pricing behaviour a theoretical model was developed to underpin the empirical analysis of 496 residents in 112 mental health care facilities private bilateral organisation was found to be associated with comparatively lower potential price cost mark up but a greater propensity to use this power to make profits surpluses

symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets abstract equilibrium existence and optimality are analysed in a market for products differentiated by their variety a game of three stages is analysed firms enter in the first stage choose varieties in the second stage and choose prices in the third stage the existence of subgame perfect equilibria is established at equilibrium products are symmetrically located in the space of characteristics and are offered at equal prices the surplus maximizing solution is characterized and it is shown that surplus maximizing product diversity is lower than the equilibrium one

credibility of optimal monetary delegation while optimal monetary policy is subject to a credibility problem it is often argued that the government should appoint a central banker whose incentives differ from the government s the author argues however that such delegation does not overcome credibility problems given that delegation is discretionary and without costs reappointment costs of delegation are shown to improve suboptimal outcomes but credibility of optimal monetary policy turns out be worsened at best delegation therefore has no effects on credibility but only if reappointment has no costs copyright 1997 by american economic association

when is discretion superior to timeless perspective policymaking the monetary policy literature assumes increasingly that policy is formulated according to the timeless perspective woodford 1999a however by treating appropriately the auxiliary state variables that characterize the timeless perspective equilibrium when evaluating policy performance this paper shows that discretionary policymaking can be superior to timeless perspective policymaking and identifies model features that make this outcome more likely using standard new keynesian dsge models discretion is found to dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the price wage phillips curves are relatively flat due perhaps to firm specific capital or labor and or kimball 1995 aggregation in combination with nominal rigidities these results suggest that studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to discretion paying careful attention to how policy performance is evaluated

designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation this study analyzes a two country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing a quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers it is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy it might be the case either for fixed or floating exchange rates despite this result simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic gdp and cpi inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation

public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank abstract this paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions the analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation indexed debt if delegation of monetary policy is viable the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt this increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks evidence on central bank independence debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content

optimal monetary policy and the role of hybrid inflation price level targets this study investigates the role of hybrid inflation price level targets as a solution to the well known stabilization bias problem that arises under discretionary policies the analysis shows that social welfare will be improved by employing a weighted average of inflation and price level as one of the central bank s target variables in addition to the output gap growth target the reason is that imposing the optimal hybrid target will reduce inflation variability in a highly efficient way in particular the optimal hybrid regime outperforms other previously suggested regimes when the degree of inflation persistence is moderate

competition tacit collusion and free entry techniques drawn from the analysis of spatial competition that satisfies the criteria of feasibility and sustainability this edc equilibrium derives from a two stage process the first stage deals with the initial entry of firms to the market and the development of a free entry equilibrium a la eaton lipsey this stage determines the identities of the potential participants to the collusive agreement in the second stage firms move their prices from the free entry equilibrium to a tacitly collusive equilibrium in which each firm earns additional long run positive profits to show that our edc equilibrium is sustainable under free entry conditions

two fallacies concerning central bank independence this paper takes issue with two basic conclusions prevalent in the literature on central bank behavior first the paper argues that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any precommitment technology necessarily behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias since there is no functional connection between average rates of money creation or inflation and policy responsiveness to cyclical disturbances it is entirely feasible for the bias to be avoided in other words there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any absolute precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

emu related news and financial markets in the czech republic hungary and poland we analyse the impact of news on five financial markets in the czech republic hungary and poland using a newly constructed data set in a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic garch framework macroeconomic shocks on gross domestic product gdp inflation rate current account and trade balance are constructed as deviations from expected values economic and monetary union emu related political and fiscal news is captured as news dummies macroeconomic shocks significantly affect short term interest rates and to a lesser extent other financial variables political and fiscal news has an impact on long term bond yields and exchange rates news displayed prominently in our media sources has a greater impact on financial markets than other news and in addition the sources of news themselves matter we also discover asymmetric effects of news within markets finally using a pooled garch model we find that macroeconomic shocks have the strongest impact on financial markets in hunga

central bank independence economic freedom and inflation rates william a luksetich measures of central bank independence combine many attributes that may or may not affect inflation central bank attributes are chosen as a result of political calculations over the distribution of resources between competing interest groups simultaneity bias results from regressions of central bank independence or of economic and political freedom on inflation or growth our estimates demonstrate the connections between economic and political freedom and central bank attributes that lead to inflation countries showing high degrees of economic freedom adopt structures that lead to lower inflation those that show high degrees of political freedom do not adopt inflation reducing institutional structures jel e0 e5 i introduction the relationship between inflation rates and central bank independence from political control has been the subject of a number of recent studies generally these studies provide evidence that greater central bank cb independence is associated with lower inflation rates banaian et al 1983 1995 1997 burdekin and willett 1991 masciandaro and spinelli 1993 alesina and summers 1993 this relationship appears to be weaker when developing countries are included in the analysis cukierman 1992 all of these draw rather strong conclusions about the importance of cb independence as a force constraining the political system from using the monetary system to achieve political goals that are likely to be hostile to price stability supporting evidence is not strong however and the indices used to measure cb independence are far from perfect moreover even if the cb independence measures were accurate they may simply be proxies for political and economic freedoms that are the more important checks on political manipulations of the economic system others question the evidence and draw different conclusions lohmann 1994 1997 and posen 1993 1995 1997 argue that the correlation between inflation and central bank independence is spurious lohmann argues that the federalist nature of the german government and its frequent use of coalitions in forming governments limit the number of threats to bundesbank independence posen 1995 finds that political support for independence comes from the financial sector if they effectively lobby for price stability an independent central bank tends to accompany that lobbying miller 1998 provides a framework for understanding the behavior of various interest groups in controlling the rate at which governments inflate their currencies cukierman s 1992 gb independence indices have been widely used in empirical studies to assess the effects of cb independence on inflation rates 1 the term of office of the head of a cb which we will call the central banker is one measure of bank independence he assigns a ranking of 1 if the term of office too is greater than eight years 0 75 if the too is great than or equal to six years and less than or equal to eight years 0 50 if the too is equal to five years 0 25 if it equals four years and 0 if it is less than four years he does this for numerous measure of bank independence since the publication of cukierman s index nearly all the aforementioned researchers have either used these individual rankings or a weighted average of these rankings in their efforts to determine the importance of cb independence on inflation rates in this article we extend the research in this area in three ways first the use of a multipoint ranking of central bank attributes imposes restrictions on the marginal impact of changing structures or attributes of the cb law that have no a priori basis moreover the weights within the aggregate cukierman index are quite arbitrary and do not hold up under any reasonable degree of scrutiny see banaian et al 1998 hereafter referred to as bbw constructing dummy variables for each of the classifications would be more appropriate than using the classification scheme cukierman devised as a continuous variable

conservative central banks and nominal growth exchange rate and inflation targets a framework is developed in which inflation biases with different target variables are compared a nominal growth target measured in consumer prices may yield less stabilization bias than a nominal income growth target exchange rate and inflation targets result in less stabilization bias than an income growth target the more important the terms of trade stabilization persistence in output causes excessive stabilization of productivity shocks and of shocks to the terms of trade under discretion an inflation weight conservative central bank is more likely under an inflation target than under an exchange rate target and less likely under a nominal income growth target

optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts comment inflation targeting regimes like those of new zealand canada the united kingdom and sweden are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit employment targets without employment persistence an inflation target conservative central bank eliminates the inflation bias mimics an optimal inflation contract and dominates a rogoff weight conservative central bank with employment persistence a state contingent inflation bias and a stabilization bias also arise a constant inflation target and a constant inflation contract are still equivalent a state contingent inflation target combined with a weight conservative central bank can achieve the equilibrium corresponding to an optimal rule under commitment copyright 1997 by american economic association

central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy abstract a shared feature of models used to investigate the welfare enhancing potential of a central bank inflation contract is their stochastic nature central to the benefits conferred by such a contract is the presence of supply shocks in constructing a framework where wages are set strategically by a number of nonatomistic inflation averse unions this note identifies circumstances in which an inflation contract improves macroeconomic outcomes even in the absence of supply shocks

institutional arrangements for monetary policy when output is persistent a discretionary monetary policy gives rise to a constant average inflation bias a state contingent inflation bias and a stabilization bias when output is persistent the paper considers institutional arrangements contracts for central banks that remove these policy imperfections the average and state contingent inflation biases can be removed by directing the central bank to target the growth of nominal income and appoint a central banker with a specific relative weight attached to output stabilization an alternative to this institutional solution is to direct central banks to aim for a feasible output target although this would remove the inflationary biases the government must appoint a liberal as opposed to conservative central banker in order to implement optimal stabilization

a theory of quality related differences in retail margins why there is a premium on premium gasoline this paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality the difference in price cost margins between the high and low quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor s closest rival these predictions are largely supported using an extensive station level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the los angeles basin area from 1992 1995

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

adaptive learning persistence and optimal monetary policy we show that when private sector expectations are determined in line with adaptive learning optimal policy responds persistently to cost push shocks the optimal response is stronger and more persistent the higher is the initial level of perceived inflation persistence by the private sector such a sophisticated policy reduces inflation persistence and inflation volatility at little cost in terms of output gap volatility persistent responses to cost push shocks and stability of inflation expectations resemble optimal policy under commitment and rational expectations nevertheless it is clear that the mechanism at play is very different in the case of commitment it relies on expectations of future policy actions affecting inflation expectations in the case of sophisticated central banking it relies on the reduction in the estimated inflation persistence parameter based on inflation data generated by shocks and policy responses jel e52

the clash of central bankers with labour market insiders and the persistence of inflation and unemployment this paper analyses the implications of monetary policy for the dynamic behaviour of inflation in a natural rate model characterized by endogenous unemployment persistence we present evidence for the main industrial economies that suggests that inflation displays persistence which is of the same order of magnitude as the persistence of deviations of unemployment from its natural rate we provide a theoretical explanation of this fact based on a model of the dynamic interactions between central bankers and labour market insiders the clash in the objectives of central bankers and labour market insiders is what causes both inflation and unemployment to display the same persistence in this model the analysis suggests that inflation persistence could be addressed in a welfare improving way if central banks adopted monetary policy rules that targeted unanticipated changes in unemployment rates instead of deviations of unemployment from its natural rate

new keynesian economics and the phillips curve models with sticky prices are an important part of new keynesian economics the author shows that several of the new keynesian models imply a formulation that is similar to the expectations augmented phillips curve of milton friedman and edmund phelps he then presents new estimates of the new keynesian phillips curve the author uses two proxies for price expectations survey based measures and an econometric based measure originally developed by bennett mccallum 1976 overall the results are consistent with the model but the survey based results are more precise suggesting that the surveys may be better measures of actual expectations copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

federal reserve communications and newswire coverage in this article we explore the determinants of newswire coverage of federal reserve fed communications our sample covers all 344 forward looking communications made in the period may 1999 to may 2004 we find first that there is a higher likelihood of newswire coverage for monetary policy reports and speeches by chairman greenspan than for testimony and speeches by other fed members furthermore communications with an explicit monetary policy inclination or tone different from the current interest rate path are particularly likely to be covered however the release of important macroeconomic news reduces the likelihood of newswire coverage second speeches by regional fed presidents are relatively less likely to be reported than speeches by board members nevertheless newswire coverage of fed president speeches is more likely if central bank communication is stale finally our results indicate that ben bernanke played a distinguished role even before his chairmanship

delegating optimal monetary policy inertia abstract in a forward looking business cycle model central banks can achieve the timeless optimal commitment equilibrium even in the absence of a commitment technology if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one the paper develops a general linear quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a markov perfect equilibrium and studies the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework the squared optimal targeting rule inflation output gap growth and nominal income growth targeting and inflation and output gap contracts

from local to global competition abstract we introduce a framework that has known models of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products the circle the logit and the ces as limit cases this integrative approach incorporates both localized and global competition as well as price sensitive individual demands it is used to explain the impact of major changes over the last two centuries reductions in transport costs increased taste for variety population growth and use of technologies with greater returns to scale we work out the properties of an extended chamberlinian model with applications both in industrial organization and economic geography

demand for differentiated products discrete choice models and the characteristics approach we propose a specific characteristics framework in order to construct linkages between alternative conceptual approaches to modelling product differentiation first it is shown that a demand system which satisfies the gross substitutes property imposes specific requirements on the locations of products in particular the dimension of the characteristics space must be larger than or equal to the number of products minus one we then identify a method for casting a given demand system subject to certain restrictions into our characteristics framework this is illustrated for the logit probit and linear probability models of discrete choice theory finally we find a characteristics representation of the ces representative consumer

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

open mouth operations abstract this paper explains how central bank statements rather than open market operations can be used to implement monetary policy in the extreme policy instruments can be held constant and yet interest rates will evolve along the path desired by the central bank we show how the recent implementation of monetary policy in new zealand works in this way using announcement data from new zealand we find that open mouth operations lead to large changes in interest rates across all maturities and these changes cannot be explained by open market operations implications are drawn for monetary policy in other jurisdictions