planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

airport congestion when carriers have market power this paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic showing how the results of the road pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power the analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist congestion is fully internalized yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions under a cournot oligopoly however carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves a toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic the analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence

clearing the air the costs and consequences of higher cafe standards and increased gasoline taxes abstract concerns about energy security and climate change have sparked legislators interest in reducing gasoline consumption by increasing corporate average fuel economy cafe standards using an empirically rich simulation model and cost estimates for anticipated fuel economy technologies we estimate annual costs of reducing long run gasoline consumption by 10 via a 3 8 miles per gallon increase in the standards and the potential cost savings from allowing manufacturers to buy and sell fuel economy credits maximum gasoline savings would be realized only after all existing vehicles were replaced or 14 years in our model a gasoline tax would produce greater immediate savings by encouraging people to drive less and eventually to choose more fuel efficient vehicles we demonstrate the advantage of a tax by comparing the cost of the higher cafe standards over the first 14 years against the cost of a gasoline tax that would save the same amount of gasoline over that time

road transport externalities during the last decade much progress has been made in defining measuring the external costs of transport as the cost of tolling equipment falls the set of realistic policy options to internalise these externalities will continue to grow this will determine the research and policy agenda we make three points firstly empirical work is still necessary to better identify marginal external costs including congestion accident and environmental costs secondly any assessment of policy options should treat externalities simultaneously the use of pricing instruments and emissions standards are discussed within this framework thirdly we emphasise the role of government designing the optimal road pricing institutions requires consideration of horizontal and vertical tax competition while double dividend arguments are central to the question of securing public support

optimal two part tariffs in a model of discrete choice abstract in this paper we study welfare optimal two part tariffs in a model of discrete choice the determinants of the sign and magnitude of the fixed and variable tax are analysed in terms of the nature and degree of consumer heterogeneity the price sensitivities of participation probabilities and conditional demands and the nature of distributional concerns in the absence of distributional concerns the model generalises the corrected ramsey rule for the variable tax and it shows that in the absence of collection or fixed participation costs the fixed fee may be negative the conditions that determine the sign of the participation fee turn out to have an intuitive economic interpretation finally the implications of distributional concerns for the optimal fixed and variable taxes are analysed

marginal tax reform externalities and income distribution the paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the consumption of taxed goods it considers three types of policy instruments the indirect taxes the uniform poll transfer and public abatement this extends the framework set up by ahmad and stern 1984 bovenberg and de mooij 1994 and schob 1996 the theoretical model is illustrated for a specific externality namely congestion caused by peak car transport

on the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods abstract this paper contends that a measurement problem the zoo effect has led to upwardly biased estimates of the degree to which local public goods are subject to congestion the suggestion is that the observed positive correlation between public expenditure and population size reflects in large measure the wider range of services provided in more populous jurisdictions not simply a high propensity of these goods to become congested

congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports a bottleneck model with stochastic queues this paper models and estimates congestion prices and capacity for large hub airports the model includes stochastic queues time varying traffic rates and endogenous intertemporal adjustment of traffic in response to queuing delay and fees relative costs of queuing and schedule delays are estimated using data from minneapolis st paul simulations calculate equilibrium traffic patterns queuing delays schedule delays congestion fees airport revenues airport capacity and efficiency gains the paper also investigates whether a dominant airline internalizes delays its aircraft impose it tests game theoretic specifications with atomistic nash dominant stackelberg dominant and collusive airline traffic

a simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators e g cost of pollution abatement this paper proposes a simple mechanism that implements the first best for any number of firms a uniform price sealed bid auction of an endogenous number of transferable licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms paybacks which rapidly decrease with the number of firms are such that truth telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non cooperatively or collusively the mechanism also provides firms with incentives to invest in socially optimal r d jel d44 d62 d82 q28 regulatory authorities generally find that part of the information they need for implementing an efficient regulation is in the hands of those who are to be regulated regulating externalities such as access to common resources e g clean air water streams fisheries etc is a good example environmental regulators for example know little about firms pollution abatement costs so without communicating with firms they would be unable to establish the efficient level of pollution a number of mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for different reasons

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a temporal and spatial equilibrium analysis of commuter parking abstract this paper examines the effects of parking availability on morning rush hour congestion and assesses the relative efficiency of road tolls and parking fees without pricing drivers occupy parking in order of increasing distance from the cbd a time varying toll can prevent queueing but does not affect the order in which parking spots are taken optimal location dependent parking fees may be superior they do not eliminate queueing but induce drivers to park in order of decreasing distance from the cbd thereby concentrating arrival times closer to work start times competitively set parking fees do nothing to reduce queueing and are relatively inefficient

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

optimal policies in cities with congestion and agglomeration externalities congestion tolls labor subsidies and place based strategies abstract this paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that accommodates both congestion and agglomeration externalities while firms and households land use decisions are endogenous across continuous space focusing on the interaction between externalities and land use patterns we examine the efficiencies of first best policies and second best pricing and place based strategies using numerical simulations a first best policy must combine both pigouvian congestion tolling pct and pigouvian labor subsidies pls instruments or design an optimal toll or subsidy internalizing agglomeration externalities or congestion externalities we also examine second best pricing policies if only one instrument is adopted congestion pricing policies alone e g a partial pct or a flat rate toll can improve social welfare only in heavy congestion cities and their welfare gains may be insignificant e g below 10 of the welfare improvement achieved by first best policies in contrast second best labor subsidy policies alone are a more effective alternative to first best policies as to place based policies the firm cluster zoning fcz regulation is more efficient than the urban growth boundary ugb policy ugbs only have small effects on the agglomeration economy but could worsen land market distortions via residential rent escalation effects these findings suggest that it is important to internalize business land use decisions and relax monocentricity assumptions in order to appreciate the interplay of both urban externalities since spatial adaptations to policy interventions can distort system efficiencies

comparing the efficiency of alternative policies for reducing traffic congestion abstract this paper compares the efficiency of a single lane toll a uniform congestion tax across freeway lanes a gasoline tax and a transit fare subsidy at reducing congestion there are three conditions for an efficient outcome relating to travel across modes across peak and off peak periods and sorting out drivers with high and low time costs across faster and slower freeway lanes each policy involves some inefficiency indeed the single lane toll gasoline tax and transit subsidy forego at least two thirds of the efficiency gains under an ideal congestion tax that varies across lanes however the uniform congestion tax achieves over 90 of these gains

information and usage of free access congestible facilities with stochastic capacity and demand we investigate the effect of information on users participation decisions at a free access congestible facility that is subject to unpredictable fluctuations in capacity and demand with demand isoelastic in user cost and user cost isoelastic in the ratio of demand to capacity optimal design capacity is larger with mean preserving spreads in capacity and demand if and only if demand elasticity is less than one expected welfare is greater with better information interestingly with nonconstant elasticity demand and or user costs information can be welfare reducing

congestion agglomeration and the structure of cities abstract congestion costs in urban areas are significant and clearly represent a negative externality nonetheless economists also recognize the production advantages of urban density in the form of positive agglomeration externalities the long run equilibrium outcomes in economies with multiple correlated but offsetting externalities have yet to be fully explored in the literature therefore i develop a spatial equilibrium model of urban structure that includes both congestion costs and agglomeration externalities i then estimate the structural parameters of the model using a computational algorithm to match the spatial distribution of employment population land use land rents and commute times in the data policy simulations based on the estimates suggest that congestion pricing may have ambiguous consequences for economic welfare

atomistic congestion tolls at concentrated airports seeking a unified view in the internalization debate abstract the goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature s theoretical results can be derived within one simple and unified framework the analysis starts by replicating the results of brueckner brueckner j k 2002 airport congestion when carriers have market power american economic review 92 1357 1375 who showed that because airlines behaving in cournot fashion internalize congestion they should be charged low congestion tolls the analysis then validates the findings of daniel daniel j i 1995 congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports a bottleneck model with stochastic queues econometrica 63 327 370 who argued that larger atomistic tolls are required in a model where a stackelberg leader interacts with competitive fringe airlines however it is shown that this result only holds approximately when the carriers outputs are imperfect substitutes

effects of asymmetric information on airport congestion management mechanisms abstract we study and compare three different mechanisms for capacity slot allocation in a congested airport when airlines have one dimensional private information direct allocation of slots differentiated tolls and slot auctions with perfect information direct allocation is a first best policy which can be implemented through pigouvian taxes or slot auctions the mechanisms are equivalent in terms of social welfare with the introduction of asymmetric information this equivalence is lost direct allocation is always ex post inefficient and in some cases tolls and subsequent quantity delegation is a better alternative social welfare wise auctions may be superior or inferior to tolls we further show that naive application of pigouvian tolls is sub optimal when imperfect information exists

the economics of airport congestion pricing abstract conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports several characteristics of aviation markets however may make naive congestion prices equal to the value of marginal travel delays a non optimal response this paper develops a model of airport pricing that captures a number of these features the model in particular reflects that 1 airlines typically have market power and are engaged in oligopolistic competition at different sub markets 2 part of external travel delays that aircraft impose are internal to an operator and hence should not be accounted for in congestion tolls and 3 different airports in an international network will typically not be regulated by the same authority we present an analytical treatment for a simple two node network and some numerical results to illustrate our findings some main conclusions are that second best optimal tolls are typically lower than what would be suggested by congestion costs alone and may even be negative and that cooperation between regulators need not be stable but that non cooperation may lead to welfare losses also when compared to a no tolling situation

weitzman revisited emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs and market power of polluting firms studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets by introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of weitzman rev econ stud 41 477 491 1974 this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric cournot oligopoly that weitzman s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price their total abatement effort including the restriction of output is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price taking firms consequently the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes in a further step the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric

price vs quantity based approaches to airport congestion management abstract this paper analyzes price and quantity based approaches to management of airport congestion using a model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize congestion under these circumstances optimal congestion tolls are differentiated across carriers and a uniformity requirement on airport charges as occurs when slots are sold or tolls are uniform distorts carrier flight choices flight volumes tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers but quantity based regimes where the airport authority allocates a fixed number of slots via free distribution or an auction lead carriers to treat total flight volume and thus congestion as fixed and this difference generates an efficient outcome as long as the number of slots is optimally chosen

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

structural estimation of congestion costs abstract we estimate a structural model of congestion costs using a bayesian nash equilibrium approach the individual s preference for traveling depends on the anticipated level of congestion which in turn is determined by travelers decisions of mobility the model is estimated using a french transportation household survey results confirm the presence of incomplete information and show that aversion to congestion is 6 6 lower during peak times than during off peak times a traveler s willingness to pay to save 1 min in traffic is estimated at 0 73 euros during peak times and 0 25 euros during off peak times

transport tax reform commuting and endogenous values of time abstract we consider a model of urban transport with two trip purposes commuting assumed perfectly complementary to labour supply and noncommuting to analyse the effects of transport tax reform on the value of time and marginal external congestion costs higher commuting taxes plausibly reduce time values but higher noncommuting transport prices will typically raise the value of time the intuition for this latter finding is that the reduction in congestion that follows from the tax increase itself raises net wages per hour of work inclusive of commuting time empirical illustrations with belgian data show a potentially large effect of transport tax reform on time values in quite a few of the tax reforms studied traffic levels are reduced but the increase in time values implies that marginal external congestion costs actually increase

pareto improvements from lexus lanes the effects of pricing a portion of the lanes on congested highways abstract though economists have long advocated road pricing as an efficiency enhancing solution to traffic congestion it has rarely been implemented primarily because it is thought to create losers as well as winners this paper shows that a judiciously designed toll applied to a portion of the lanes of a highway can generate a pareto improvement before using the revenue a sufficient condition being that drivers with a high value of time travel at the peak of rush hour i obtain these new theoretical results by extending a standard dynamic congestion model to reflect an important additional traffic externality extra traffic does not simply increase travel times but also introduces frictions that reduce throughput the analysis draws attention to a practical policy that may help overcome the widespread opposition to road pricing

the value of automobile travel time implications for congestion policy abstract public policy has remained stoutly resistant to the economic profession s call to use congestion tolls to minimize the social costs from automobile congestion this paper explores this issue by using stated preference models to estimate the value that commuters are willing to pay to save travel time we find that this value is low and surprisingly insensitive to travel conditions and how toll revenues are used it appears that even high income commuters having adjusted to congestion through their modal residential workplace and departure time choices simply do not value travel time savings enough to benefit substantially from tolls

bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output the empirical results of this paper are derived from a monopoly view of local government decisionmaking in contrast to the competitive view offered by earlier researchers that our results are similar to earlier findings lends additional support to the conclusion that local output is largely private in nature other than park and recreation services there appear to be no economies in consumption for local services nor any economies of density larger cities do not appear to be more efficient than smaller cities 10 of course this result holds only for the sample of cities used here and does not rule out scale economies for communities smaller than those in our sample i e below 25 000 population

the crowding parameter and samuelsonian publicness in a recent issue of this journal gramlich and rubinfeld 1982 introduced a distributive share parameter into a public expenditures demand function they also included a parameter linked to population size and estimated the resulting demand function since the initial median voter formulations by borcherding and deacon 1972 and bergstrom and goodman 1973 it has been standard practice to include the population parameter known as the crowding parameter in public expenditures demand functions it has also been standard practice to interpret the parameter as a samuelsonian index of the extent to which public expenditures constitute a pure public or pure private good gramlich and rubinfeld found public expenditures to be a pure private good a conclusion they share with all previous researchers who have estimated the crowding parameter 1 this comment demonstrates that the private good conclusion is

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand the authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand than the regulator from the outset of their relationship the firm s cost structure is common knowledge but monitoring of output is prohibitively costly the authors find that when marginal production costs increase with output the firm command s no rents from its private information and the efficient price is established for each realization of demand in contrast with declining marginal costs the same price is established by the regulator for all demand realizations and the firm s rents can be substantial overall major qualitative differences in the optimal regulatory policy arise when the firm s private information concerns demand rather than costs copyright 1988 by american economic association

manipulable congestion tolls the recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency though agents are large enough to recognize self imposed congestion and exert market power over prices they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion tolls when large agents are confronted with tolls derived under this parametric assumption but understand the rule used to generate them the toll system will no longer guide the market to the social optimum to address this problem the present paper derives alternate manipulable toll rules which are designed to achieve the social optimum when agents anticipate the full impact of their actions on toll liabilities

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the incidence of congestion tolls on urban highways abstract the incidence of an optimal short run congestion toll is investigated using an equilibrium model of modal choice and congestion on a highway corridor served by express bus transit it is argued that for an externality tax the usual equi revenue analysis of burdens is inappropriate instead welfare effects are computed under three alternative assumptions about redistribution of toll revenues in almost all cases the net result is benefits for all income groups it is concluded that congestion tolls should not be rejected on grounds of income distribution but that an explicit package of tolls and revenue uses is probably a political prerequisite for adoption

economics of a bottleneck abstract drawing on vickrey amer econ rev 59 251 261 1969 and subsequent literature this paper provides a thorough economic analysis of the simplest bottleneck model of road congestion with peak load demand in the morning rush hour a fixed number of identical individuals one per car must travel from home to work between which is a bottleneck of given capacity the costs of travel include queuing time and schedule delay time early or late for work the frequency distribution of departure times adjusts so that in equilibrium all individuals have the same travel costs the paper extends the previous literature by examining a coarse toll and solving for optimal capacities the application of congestion tolls can generate efficiency gains by altering the frequency distribution of departure times previous estimates of the efficiency gains from congestion tolling are likely to be substantially downward biased because they have ignored this effect