content based agendas and qualified majorities in sequential voting we analyze sequential binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players beliefs about each other our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium in particular we uncover a strong rationale for content based agendas if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others nor to the deployment of strategic skills the agenda needs to be built from the extremes to the middle so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt and are put to vote before other more moderate options an important corollary is that under simple majority the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the condorcet winner finally we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies

why do stocks and consumption imply such different gains from international risk sharing abstract estimates of the gains to international risk sharing based upon stock returns tend to find dramatically higher gains than do estimates from consumption based models in this paper i examine the reasons for these differences using a common theoretical framework for both approaches i find that the differences are largely due to the much higher variability of stock returns and its implied intertemporal substitution in marginal utility also contrary to conventional wisdom the differences in gains from the two approaches do not arise from treating stock returns as exogenous rather than endogenous

optimality of incomplete markets abstract in a static exchange economy where the traders initial endowments are risky the optimality of the financial structure is studied when markets are incomplete only financial structures with the same number of assets are compared a market structure is optimal when in a particular economy it yields an allocation of risks which cannot be pareto dominated through the implementation of any other market structure in a linear gaussian setup the optimal market structures are shown to span an eigenspace of a matrix which combines the risk exposures of the participants in the market approximately weighted by a measure of their risk aversions journal of economic literature classification numbers d60 g10

competing for market shares does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn t abstract this paper investigates whether the order of moves affects behavior and outcomes even in the absence of material incentives for pre commitment evidence from laboratory experiments with shared rents symmetric players and either a simultaneous or a sequential move order suggests that it is an inherent advantage to move second rather than first the reason is that first movers face strategic uncertainty while second movers have the power to ultimately determine the outcome through their investment choices many first movers acknowledge this power and decrease investments below the standard prediction which is interpreted as an attempt to collude this strategy leads to higher absolute payoffs for the first movers compared to a situation where they do not try to establish collusion however relative payoffs are low since collusive outcomes are typically asymmetric to the advantage of the second mover

the expected utility of the doubling strategy it has been noted that a certain continuous time trading strategy termed the doubling strategy generates a positive net return on borrowed funds with probability one and within a finite period of time since the doubling strategy seems to represent a free lunch or arbitrage opportunity a variety of constraints to render it infeasible have been proposed in this paper we show that the doubling strategy generates infinite disutility for a large class of utility functions and we can think of no utility function for a risk averse agent which is a counterexample harrison and kreps 5 pointed out that a certain continuous time trading strategy in frictionless markets since termed the doubling strategy generates a positive net return on borrowed funds with probability one and within a finite period of time moreover the returns can be made arbitrarily large by increasing the initial amount borrowed thus the doubling strategy seems to represent a free lunch or arbitrage opportunity the theory of valuation of derivative assets also assumes continuous time trading in frictionless markets an assumption necessary to argue that the derivative asset can be perfectly hedged by the underlying asset and the risk free asset as in black and scholes 2 or equivalently that the returns on the derivative asset can be replicated by a self financing trading strategy see harrison and kreps 5 or harrision and pliska 6 in addition it must be assumed that the economy is free of arbitrage opportunities so that the continuously revised hedge portfolio earns the risk free rate or again equivalently that the value of the derivative asset is equal to the replicating strategy s initial portfolio consequently harrison kreps and others have viewed the existence of the doubling strategy and its apparent violation of the arbitrage free economy condition as a serious problem in contingent claims theory more generally the doubling strategy seems to suggest an inconsistency in standard sets of assumptions e g diffusion type asset prices frictionless continuous time markets and market efficiency when sufficiently complex trading strategies are permitted since the doubling strategy was introduced by harrison and kreps a number of constraints have been proposed to eliminate the doubling strategy without at the same time ruling out the other continuous time trading strategies essential to derivative asset pricing and continuous time portfolio theory bounds on portfolio positions kreps 9 a positive constraint on wealth dybvig 3 and margin requirements heath and jarrow 7 more generally dybvig and huang 4 show that a lower bound on wealth precludes other complex trading strategies

the significance of the market portfolio the market portfolio is in one sense the least important portfolio to provide to investors in an j agent one period stochastic endowment economy where preferences are quadratic a social welfare minded contract designer would never create a contract that would allow trading the market portfolio even the complete set of contracts all j 1 of them which achieve a first best solution never span the market portfolio these conclusions rely on the assumption that the contract designer has perfect information about agents utilities we also show that as the contract designer s information about agents utilities becomes more imperfect the optimal contracts approach contracts that weight individual endowments in proportion to elements of eigenvectors of the variance matrix of endowments then if there is a strong enough market component to endowments a portfolio approximating the market portfolio may be the most important portfolio

repeated contests a general parameterization abstract contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year this paper characterizes equilibrium effort both individual and aggregate in a general parameterization of such repeated contests

welfare gains from international risksharing abstract this paper uses consumption data to compute yet unexploited welfare gains that can be achieved through risksharing among twenty oecd countries there is both aggregate national consumption risk and nondiversifiable individual specific risk countries engage in an optimal risksharing arrangement to pool risk associated with the aggregate consumption endowment streams welfare gains are associated with reduced consumption variability and with the international pricing of the consumption streams of individual countries the paper considers the standard vnm time additive preferences as well as nonexpected utility and habit formation preferences large unexploited gains are found under all sets of preferences leading to an international risksharing puzzle

favorites and underdogs strategic behavior in an experimental contest conflicts between favorites and underdogs are everyday phenomena we examine their strategic behavior in an experimental contest and find behavior partially consistent with predictions favorites given a first mover advantage do overcommit effort relative to nash underdogs often select the best response effort level given the favorite s move overall dissipation of the prize was significantly higher with the strategic commitment relative to nash

parliamentary procedure principal forms and political effects legislative agendas depend on parliamentary procedure of which there are two main versions and a noteworthy variant anglo american euro latin and mex italian theorems proved here identify the output of each procedure under strategic and sincere voting surprises abound strategic voting makes anglo american procedure more restrictive than euro latin and either sort of voting makes anglo american procedure more conservative or stabilizing although sincere voting makes mex italian procedure equivalent to the similar looking euro latin strategic voting makes it equivalent rather to anglo american also strategic voting reduces the effects of agenda manipulation only under mex italian procedure these findings raise new research questions

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

the cyclical behavior of individual production series 1889 1984 this paper uses simple summary statistics to analyze the volatility persistence and comovement of 38 annual individual production series for the period 1889 1984 it seeks to identify the size source and correlation of fluctuations in the production of specific commodities within various sample periods and to analyze possible changes in these characteristics over time the paper also discusses the implications of the behavior of individual production series for the behavior of the aggregate economy within the prewar interwar and postwar eras

world income components measuring and exploiting risk sharing opportunities a method is constructedfor decomposing the variance of changes in incomes in the world into components to indicate the most important risk sharing opportunities among people of the world a constant absolute risk premium carp model an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world is presented to permit optimal contract design for a contract designer maximizing a social welfare function the optimal contracts maximize the equilibrium world real interest rate securities are defined in terms of eigenvectors of a transformed variance matrix the method is applied using penn world table data on the g 7 countries 1950

consumption puzzles and precautionary savings abstract when marginal utility is convex agents accumulate savings as a precautionary measure against labor income eventualities this paper shows that precautionary savings can go a long way in making the excess growth excess smoothness and excess sensitivity features of consumption consistent with the stochastic processes of labor income observed in the u s at the microeconomic level

balance of power and the propensity of conflict we study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict our experimental results suggest in a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power if bargaining involves endogenous demand choices however the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced in turn the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities given self protection from an undesirable environmental externality we examine under several conditions the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior we demonstrate that if self protection can transfer the externality to another agent then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection if self protection filters or dilutes the externality then noncooperation leads to underprotection in addition overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain finally a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the european single internal market of 1992 coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes

intra experimental income effects and risk aversion abstract harrison s 1986 modification of the bekker degroot and marshak 1964 mechanism for eliciting risk preferences is employed to test the hypotheses of expected utility theory with respect to changes in income increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion subjects in the laboratory are shown to exhibit such behavior

a foundation for strategic agenda voting abstract we offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world the amendment also known as the anglo american procedure and the successive or equivalently the euro latin procedure our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions and allows comparisons between them and with other voting procedures