rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

the control of technology alliances an empirical analysis of the biotechnology industry we examine the determinants of control rights in biotechnology alliances through three case studies and a quantitative analysis aghion and tirole 1994 argue that control rights will be assigned so as to maximize the value of the final output as long as the r d firm has sufficient financial resources consistent with this framework the allocation of control rights to the r d firm increases with the firm s financial resources the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between control rights and the stage of the project at the time the alliance is signed is more ambiguous

alliance governance and technological performance some evidence from biotechnology alliances pursuing alliance opportunities are fraught with difficulties due to information asymmetry between the potential partners as well as technological and or market uncertainties in this article i empirically test how social ties between alliance partners alliance governance and individual firm characteristics impact alliance performance since alliances are by definition relationships between two or more independent firms defining and measuring alliance performance is difficult as the partner firms may have different objectives in entering the alliance therefore analyzing alliance performance at different stages of the alliance process using intermediate indicators of success can provide help to better understand the determinants of alliance performance as well as how these determinants may change over time

democracy comes to europe franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830 1938 abstract this paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in western europe during the period 1830 1938 our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate the election rule and electoral participation as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries we estimate panel regressions and find that 1 the gradual lifting of socio economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security 2 the female suffrage had a weak positive effect through spending on health education and welfare 3 the change from majority to proportional rule which took place in 10 of the countries did not contribute to growth in government spending and held back spending on health education and welfare 4 there exists weak complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy

introducing household production in collective models of labor supply in a recent paper chiappori 1992 i proposed a model of labor supply based on a collective representation of household behavior in this framework each household member is characterized by his or her own utility function and decisions are only assumed to result in pareto efficient outcomes i showed that these simple assumptions were sufficient to i generate testable restrictions on labor supply functions and ii recover individual preferences and the outcome of the decision process from observed behavior for the sake of simplicity the results were derived in the simplest possible case namely a static labor supply model with private consumptions such a framework was appropriate only for the purpose of the paper that is a preliminary exploration of the properties of collective models of labor supply the next step is to evaluate the robustness of the results to various extensions of the basic model this opens a general research program and generates a wide range of particular problems that it is hoped will be considered in the future among the most serious shortcomings of the 1992 model is the absence of household production as in most labor supply models agents were assumed to divide their time between market activities and leisure as apps and rees 1997 in this issue very rightly point out in their comment the absence of domestic production is far from innocuous as soon as welfare issues are considered for instance a low level of market labor supply will automatically be interpreted as a large consumption of leisure whereas it may in fact reflect the specialization of one of the members in domestic

delayed career entry industrial pension structure and early retirement in a cohort of unmarried women the effects of early family and work patterns and industrial pension structures on the timing of retirement among unmarried women are examined within a life course perspective the retirement process is viewed in a longitudinal framework with similar combinations of factors influencing successive stages of final withdrawal from work logistic regression techniques are applied to data from a panel of unmarried women workers of retirement age to predict early versus late retirement over a five year period having children and delayed career entry along with late life family pension and health status affect retirement schedules

retirement in dual career families a structural model a structural econometric model of retirement of dual career couples is specified and estimated with panel data from the national longitudinal survey of mature women a coincidence of spouses retiring together despite the younger ages of wives suggests explicit efforts at coordination the estimates suggest that one reason is a correlation of tastes for leisure more important each spouse and perhaps husbands in particular values retirement more once their spouse has retired the opportunity set accounts for peaks in the retirement hazards of each spouse individually but not for peaks in the simultaneous retirement of both spouses

contractibility and the design of research agreements we analyze how contractibility affects contract design a major concern when designing research agreements is that researchers may use their funding to subsidize other projects we show that when research activities are not contractible an option contract is optimal the financing firm obtains the option to terminate the agreement and in case of termination broad property rights the threat of termination deters researchers from cross subsidization and the cost of exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic termination we test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements contracts with termination options are more common when research is non contractible

retirement effects on health in europe what are the health impacts of retirement as talk of raising retirement ages in pensions and social security schemes continues around the world it is important to know both the costs and benefits for the individual as well as the governments budgets in this paper we use the survey of health ageing and retirement in europe share dataset to address this question in a multi country setting we use country specific early and full retirement ages as instruments for retirement behavior these statutory retirement ages clearly induce retirement but are not related to an individual s health exploiting the discontinuities in retirement behavior across countries we find significant evidence that retirement has a health preserving effect on overall general health our estimates indicate that retirement leads to a 35 percent decrease in the probability of reporting to be in fair bad or very bad health and an almost one standard deviation improvement in the health index while the self reported health seems to be a temporary impact the health index indicates there are long lasting health differences

labor force dynamics of older married couples this article analyzes the dynamics of joint labor force behavior of older couples in the united states using the retirement history survey rhs i analyze the determinants of joint retirement and the effect of one spouse s labor force status on the labor force transitions of the other spouse the results reveal strong associations between the labor force transition probabilities of one spouse and the labor force status of the other spouse these result from structural differences in exit and entry behavior by the spouse s status several lagged endogenous variables have substantial effects on behavior even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity

the non democratic origins of income taxation this article examines the adoption of income taxes in western economies since the 19th century we identify two empirical regularities that challenge predictions of existing models of taxation and

public pension programmes and the retirement of married couples in denmark in this paper we study the economic determinants of the joint retirement process of married couples we propose a tractable dynamic discrete choice model for retirement decisions which allows for non trivial saving behaviour we estimate the model on a 1 sample of danish couples of potential retirement age drawn from a population based administrative register the introduction and subsequent reforms of a publicly financed early retirement programme provide us with variation in the data to insure identification of the parameters of interest the elasticities of participation retirement with respect to income flows our estimates imply a significant asymmetry in the sensitivity of retirement behaviour of men and women with respect to variation in their own or their spouse s income flows

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

health insurance and retirement of married couples summary most health insurance in the usa is provided by employers until eligibility for public health insurance medicare begins at age 65 retiring before 65 exposes workers who lack retiree health insurance coverage to the risk of catastrophic medical expenditure we solve and estimate a dynamic model of the employment behavior of older married couples that includes risky medical expenditure and health insurance parameter estimates imply that the risk reducing feature of health insurance can account for about half of the observed association between retiree health insurance and employment for married men but can account for only one tenth of the much larger observed association for married women policy simulations imply very small effects on employment of changing the age of eligibility for medicare from 65 to 67 copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

the saving behaviour of a two person household the facts that wives are typically younger than their husbands and that women typically live longer than men imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age than do husbands a theoretical model of the determination of household saving and portfolio choice is introduced which takes into account differences in preferences for saving the most important result is that the level and the composition portfolio of saving and the time path of consumption are dependent on the distribution of income within the household women typically live longer than men and wives are typically younger than their husbands these two facts imply that preferences about saving for old age in married households with forward looking members may differ between husband and wife this paper presents a theoretical analysis of saving and portfolio behaviour if the members of the household have differ ent preferences over future consumption as compared to current consump tion the analysis stands in contrast to unitary models of household intertemporal allocation which assume that the household has a single utility function thus this paper is a contribution in a novel context to the burgeoning literature on intra household decision making the base case analysis is for a simple two person husband and wife1 two period model in which there is only one asset saving it is assumed that because of the two facts given at the start of the introductory paragraph the husband discounts the future more than the wife in section ii the implications of a non cooperative decision making process for the base case are derived see ulph 1988 for a non cooperative model of demand and

the role of health insurance in joint retirement among married couples because the near elderly have high expected medical expenditures availability of health insurance is an important factor in their retirement decisions using health and retirement study data colle

elite competition and state capacity development theory and evidence from post revolutionary mexico international wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity this article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict under conditions of intra elite conflict political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals expropriate their assets and consolidate authority because this political consolidation increases rulers chances of surviving an economic elite s challenge it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity these ideas are evaluated in post revolutionary mexico where commodity price shocks induced by the great depression affected the local economic elite differentially negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity which persist to the present

explaining the swollen middle why most transactions are a mix of market and hierarchy why are firms sometimes more efficient than markets at organizing transactions why are most transactions arrayed neither at the pure market nor at the pure hierarchy end of the continuum but rather in the swollen middle incorporating features of both market and hierarchy why don t firms make greater use of price incentives this paper addresses these three questions by developing a model of the choice of institution one key building block is the distinction between organizing methods hierarchy and the price system and institutions firms and markets hierarchy and the price system are two distinct methods for organizing transactions each with particular costs and benefits markets and firms are institutions which use one or both of these methods although markets predominantly use prices and firms rely principally on hierarchy there is not a one to one correspondence between prices and markets or between hierarchy and firms indeed the paper argues that it is generally more efficient to use a mix of both methods than to specialize in either the paper focuses on the enforcement properties of prices and hierarchy hierarchy controls individuals directly by constraining their behavior by imposing behavior constraints while prices do it indirectly by measuring their outputs through price constraints under hierarchy individuals receive a salary to do as told while self employed individuals governed by the price system are rewarded on the basis of their output each system has its own biases using prices maximizes effort minimizes shirking but incites individuals to inflate the price and or reduce the quality of their output it encourages cheating relying on hierarchy results in the opposite bias under hierarchy individuals are not paid in function of their output but instead are rewarded for following directives they have thus strong incentives to minimize effort to shirk unless properly supervised but being paid a fixed sum to follow orders they have few incentives to cheat hence the price system experiences low shirking but potentially high cheating costs while hierarchy faces low cheating but high shirking costs organizing costs are the sum of shirking and cheating costs any given transaction will be organized by the mix of price and hierarchy i e by the mix of price and behavior constraints that minimizes organizing costs a transaction will be organized within a firm if the reduction in cheating costs achieved by replacing price constraints by behavior constraints exceeds the resulting increase in shirking costs and by the market in the opposite case the paper shows that cheating and shirking costs increase more than proportionately as one concentrates in either pure price or behavior constraints hence using a mix of both methods generally minimizes the sum of cheating and shirking costs this explains why most transactions exhibit features of both markets and hierarchy the paper shows clearly the tradeoff involved between price and behavior constraints it explains the costs and benefits of using two types of price incentives in firms piecework and profit centers and predicts when they will be used

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances building relational capital one of the main reasons that firms participate in alliances is to learn know how and capabilities from their alliance partners at the same time firms want to protect themselves from the opportunistic behavior of their partner to retain their own core proprietary assets most research has generally viewed the achievement of these objectives as mutually exclusive in contrast we provide empirical evidence using large sample survey data to show that when firms build relational capital in conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict they are able to achieve both objectives simultaneously relational capital based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners creates a basis for learning and know how transfer across the exchange interface at the same time it curbs opportunistic behavior of alliance partners thus preventing the leakage of critical know how between them copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

economic determinants of workers retirement decisions the landscape for older workers has changed dramatically in recent decades governments have made cuts to public pension programs private pensions have shifted from defined benefit to defined contribution plans equity and housing markets have been unusually volatile and workers have experienced declining morbidity and mortality at the same time the labor force participation rate for older men and women has been rising over the past two decades implying later retirement are these phenomena related this paper reviews the large and growing body of literature exploring the economic determinants of workers retirement decisions including public and private pensions wealth and savings health and health insurance and labor demand

network location and learning the influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation this paper presents a dynamic firm level study of the role of network resources in determining alliance formation such resources inhere not so much within the firm but reside in the interfirm networks in which firms are placed data from extensive fieldwork show that by influencing the extent to which firms have access to information about potential partners such resources are an important catalyst for new alliances especially because alliances entail considerable hazards this study also assesses the importance of firms capabilities with alliance formation and material resources as determinants of their alliance decisions i test this dynamic framework and its hypotheses about the role of time varying network resources and firm capabilities with comprehensive longitudinal multi industry data on the formation of strategic alliances by a panel of firms between 1970 and 1989 the results confirm field observations that accumulated network resources arising from firm participation in the network of accumulated prior alliances are influential in firms decisions to enter into new alliances this study highlights the importance of network resources that firms derive from their embeddedness in networks for explaining their strategic behavior copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

spending time and money within the household we consider both theoretically and empirically the allocation of time and money within the household the research question is whether a married person who enjoys more leisure than their partner also receives more consumption which seems to indicate the outcome of power within the household or receives less consumption which seems to indicate differing intrahousehold preferences we develop a simple parametric structural model with household production that is tested on survey data we find that relative wages have an impact on power for leisure this effect is dominated by a conventional wage effect in which the partner who has the higher wage takes less leisure

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

economic determinants of workers retirement decisions economic determinants of workers retirement decisions the landscape for older workers has changed dramatically in recent decades governments have made cuts to public pension programs private pensions have shifted from defined benefit to defined contribution plans equity and housing markets have been unusually volatile and workers have experienced declining morbidity and mortality at the same time the labor force participation rate for older men and women has been rising over the past two decades implying later retirement are these phenomena related this paper reviews the large and growing body of literature exploring the economic determinants of workers retirement decisions including public and private pensions wealth and savings health and health insurance and labor demand

distance to retirement and older workers employment the case for delaying the retirement age this paper presents empirical evidence and a theoretical foundation in favor of the view that the retirement age decision affects older workers employment prior to retirement to the extent that there are search frictions on the labor market the return on jobs is determined by their expected duration the time to retirement is then key to understanding older workers employment countries with a retirement age of 60 are indeed characterized by lower employment rates for workers aged 55 59 based on the french labor force survey we show that the likelihood of employment is significantly affected by the distance to retirement in addition to age and other relevant variables we then extend mccall s job search model by explicitly integrating life cycle features with the retirement decision using simulations we show that the distance effect in interaction with the generosity of unemployment benefits and the depressed demand for older workers explains the low rate of employment just before the eligibility age for the social security pension finally we show that implementing actuarially fair schemes not only extends the retirement age but also encourages a more intensive job search by older unemployed workers jel j22 j26 h55

time inconsistency and delayed retirement decision the french pension bonus with the increase in life expectancy and demographic shocks several public policies in the last decades aim to encourage individuals to postpone retirement one of them the pension bonus gives a

overoptimism and the performance of entrepreneurial firms recent theoretical and empirical research on cognitive bias in decision making suggests that overoptimism critically influences entrepreneurs decisions to establish and sustain new ventures we investigate whether such cognitive bias influences entrepreneurial venture performance using data on commercialization efforts for university inventions in contrast to prior studies our results suggest that entrepreneurial overoptimism does not appear to be the determining factor in the decision to found a firm we do find that entrepreneurs continue unsuccessful development efforts for longer periods of time than do established firms which is consistent with entrepreneurial overoptimism in the development of technologies with uncertain market prospects this latter finding is also consistent with rationality based models of decision making behavior however we find that the economic returns associated with many of the technologies in our sample are realized after the start up has been acquired by an established firm suggesting that start ups may serve as a transitional organizational form in the market for technology commercialization

should i stay or should i go an econometric analysis of retirement decisions by couples abstractthis article analyses retirement decisions from a household perspective treating the retirement timing of spouses as potentially interdependent choices to identify the determinants of ret

an examination of opportunistic action within research alliances evidence from the biotechnology industry abstract like a photographer trying to take a perfect picture an entrepreneur trying to increase the odds of survival must learn very quickly that focus is everything and what demands an entrepreneur s immediate focus is the development of new products entrepreneurial ventures depend on the rapid creation of new products to gain access to early cash flows create legitimacy grab early market share and increase their odds of survival schoonhoven eisenhardt and lymman 1990 however the increasing costs and complexity of new product development are making it difficult for entrepreneurial ventures to contain the assets needed for successful r d within their boundaries forcing them to reach beyond their borders to access resources barley et al 1992 document the use of more than 900 contractual research agreements within the biotechnology industry alone recent research has also found a positive relationship between the use of alliances in the r d process and the rate of new product development deeds and hill 1996 shan walker and kogut 1994 this particular study focuses on the use of relational contracts in the r d process and extends the prior work on relational contracts to create an explanatory model of the deterrents to opportunism within a relational contract the article begins with a discussion of the traditional modes of deterring opportunism and of modes of deterring opportunism based on the development of a strong cross boundary relationship from this discussion hypotheses are derived that relate certain characteristics of the alliance frequency of communication strength of contractual deterrents hostage investments age of the relationship etc to the level of opportunism within the relationship these hypotheses are then tested on a sample of 109 research alliances in the biotechnology industry we found significant evidence that a strong relationship between the partners serves as a much more effective deterrent to opportunistic action than the creation of hostage investments or contingent claims contracts in particular the results for frequency of communication and the background of the firm highlight the importance of the top management team s understanding and involvement in the management of research alliances the strong results for background congruence indicates the importance of shared expectations and understandings between the partners the strong empirical results for the hypothesized u shaped relationship between age and opportunism provide support for the existence of both a honeymoon period in the relationship and a liability of adolescence among research alliances the data also suggest that the honeymoon period for an alliance will last about 4 6 years we also find that the honeymoon period for alliances that are of little importance to the future of the firm is only 4 1 years and in our sample of alliances that were important to the future of the firm the honeymoon period extended from 4 6 years to 6 1 years

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

racism and redistribution in the united states a solution to the problem of american exceptionalism abstract the two main political parties in the united states in the period 1976 1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race we argue that redistributive politics in the us can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition we identify two mechanisms through which racism among american voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain in common with others we suggest that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti solidarity effect that some voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving we suggest a second effect as well that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti redistributive republican party because its position on the race issue is more consonant with their own and this too decreases the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium this we name the policy bundle effect we propose a formal model of multi dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects and estimate the model for the period in question we compute that voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11 18 points the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub effects we also find that the democratic vote share is 5 38 points lower than it would have been absent racism the magnitude of this effect would seem to explain the difference between the sizes of the public sector in the us and northern european countries

two questions about european unemployment a general equilibrium search model makes layoff costs affect the aggregate unemployment rate in ways that depend on equilibrium proportions of frictional and structural unemployment that in turn depend on the generosity of government unemployment benefits and skill losses among newly displaced workers the model explains how before the 1970s lower flows into unemployment gave europe lower unemployment rates than the united states and also how after 1980 higher durations have kept unemployment rates in europe persistently higher than in the united states these outcomes arise from the way europe s higher firing costs and more generous unemployment compensation make its unemployment rate respond to bigger skill losses among newly displaced workers those bigger skill losses also explain why u s workers have experienced more earnings volatility since 1980 and why especially among older workers hazard rates of gaining employment in europe now fall sharply with increases in the duration of unemployment

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

the impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic r d alliance this paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two stage research and development r d stage and marketing stage alliance with a marketer and an innovator the marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator we find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer we show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later otherwise she should do the opposite we identify two major effects of royalty revision first royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator s incentives this incentive realigning effect improves the marketer s profit second royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later this information revealing effect hurts the marketer s profit we characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract with royalty contracts that are contingent on the r d outcome of the r d stage we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable by fully capturing the incentive re aligning effect or complementary by weakening the information revealing effect to royalty revision depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage managers may need to use a contingent contract if possible either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits this paper was accepted by kamalini ramdas entrepreneurship and innovation

marginal tax rates and tax favoured pension savings of the self employed evidence from sweden in recent years the study of how individuals respond to policies that aim at promoting pension savings has emerged as a vital area of economic research this paper adds to this body of literature by estimating the tax price elasticity of contributions to tax favoured pension savings accounts on a population of self employed individuals i exploit a unique total database over the swedish population that covers the years 19992005 using instrumental variables i obtain a tax price elasticity estimate of 0 51 and an income elasticity estimate of 0 13 whereas ordinary least squares ols produces estimates that conflict with consumer theory

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences