the economics of investor protection isds versus national treatment abstract investor state dispute settlements isds are supposed to protect foreign investors against domestic policies causing unjustified harm this paper scrutinizes the effects of isds and national treatment provisions in a two period model where foreign investment is subject to a hold up problem it shows that isds may increase welfare but comes with additional regulatory distortions in the first period a national treatment provision avoids these regulatory distortions but implies entry distortions because it makes the hold up problem also apply to domestic firms if the domestic regulatory framework applies to many domestic firms a national treatment provision welfare dominates isds

the microstructure of the canada u s dollar exchange rate a robustness test abstract the recent international economics literature suggests that market microstructure effects matter for exchange rate determination and forecasting this paper investigates performance robustness of the pure microstructure canada u s dollar exchange rate model it is found that when used for forecasting this microstructure model is very sensitive to the choice of time period and forecasting horizon

incentive compatible regulation of foreign owned subsidiaries a tax simulation for the jamaican bauxite industry abstract in 1974 jamaica replaced the corporate income tax on multinationals in the bauxite sector with a production levy on bauxite in order to increase tax revenue the results were mixed tax revenue jumped initially but the multinationsl quickly started shifting production elsewhere we model jamaica s taxation problem assuming that it has incomplete information about the multinationals costs and derive the optimal incentive compatible tax mechanism we simulate and compare the effects on output and tax revenue of the actual and the incentive compatible tax regimes and conclude that there might be substantial benefits to implementing an incentive mechanism

foreign direct investment intra firm trade and ownership structure abstract asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold up problem in foreign direct investment selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational s information rent that is protected from a host government s confiscatory taxation

dual labor markets urban unemployment and multicentric cities a two sector model of urban employment is developed which focuses on the formation of a secondary sector in response to a primary sector demand shock the optimal location of this single firm sector is shown to give rise to a multicentric urban spatial structure conditions are then established under which the new labor market equilibrium involves both a decrease in unemployment and an increase in net income for those unemployed these results are extended to a case where all unemployment benefits are financed by local taxation of firms here it is shown that profit incentives may exist for the primary sector to subsidize entry of the secondary sector c 1997 academic press

quantitative restrictions in the presence of cost based informational asymmetries this study introduces a cost based informational asymmetry into a two period model where a domestic incumbent firm s behavior in the first period affects the entry decision of a foreign firm in the second period the effects of import quota policy within this environment are examined and compared to the standard full information effects when quota quantities are set exogenously the standard effects of quota policy may be significantly altered depending on whether or not policy induces the domestic firm to signal cost structure for example higher quotas may discourage foreign entry because of the induced signaling effects of quota policy recognition that incomplete information is the rule rather than the exception when decisionmakers interact in an international setting has stimulated an emerging literature on the effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures particularly germane to the present study are those papers that introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policy to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firms compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies collie and hviid 1993 qiu 1994 maggi 1995 brainard and martimort 1997 wright 1998 collie and hviid 1994 on the other hand allow for domestic consumption and consider optimal import policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist analysis that focuses on the positive effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures is more limited one such example is a study by hartigan 1994 which considers the effects of antidumping duties to date however there has been no analysis of how and whether the introduction of an informational failure alters the effects of quantitative restrictions to trade the aim of the present study is to extend the existing literature by examining the effects of a quantitative restriction to trade in the presence of a cost based informational asymmetry within a standard two period entry model 2 during the initial time period a domestic firm supplies the home market and

managerial control of international firms and patterns of direct investment abstract formal analyses of international firms have concentrated on advantages from large operations due to for example economies of scope however the standard framework implicitly assumes the existence of managerial costs for running international operations the paper develops a model that explicitly incoporates both economies of scope and costs of managerial control of large and international operations it highlights the potential importance of international firms organizational structure suggesting a qualitative difference between situations where international firms have different stages of production located in different countries and situations where firms in addition have the same stage located in different countries

frequency domain analysis of foreign exchange order flows abstract using a unique data set from the bank of canada this paper presents the frequency domain analysis of a causal relationship between the canada us dollar exchange rate movements and currency order flows the evidence shows that the existence as well as the direction of causality depends on the customer type frequency and time period

expropriation and control rights a dynamic model of foreign direct investment abstract this paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country we analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of creeping expropriation once his investment is sunk it is shown that this hold up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak and overinvestment if it is too strong we also analyze the impact of spillover effects we give a rationale for tax holidays and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country

technology agglomeration and regional competition for investment competition for firms by region has a long standing history and the academic literature has debated whether such competition is efficient we develop a model that explores technology development by firms facing regional competition for their invest ment and examine the endogenous determination of region policy firm technology and agglomeration externalities we find a new source of inefficiency regional competition leads firms to inefficiently distort their development and selection of production tech nology to improve their standing in the regional competition for their investment we show that these inefficient firm decisions on technology and location can also weaken agglomeration externalities jel classification h71 l2

determinants of fdi incentive preferences of mnes in this study managers of u s firms with operations in the caribbean region evaluated the attractiveness of twenty host country incentives multivariate analysis of variance was employed to determine whether incentive preferences were a function of investment characteristics the results indicate that incentive preferences depend on the type of investment market orientation size of investment geographic location year of investment and type of product furthermore exporters considered import duty concessions to be more desirable than did investors oriented toward the local markets these results indicate that government programs waiving import duties such as the free trade zones of the dominican republic and the maquiladora program of northern mexico are providing the incentive deemed most important by their targeted investors

business cycles with staggered prices and international trade in intermediate inputs abstract international trade in intermediate inputs and increasingly in goods produced at multiple stages of processing has been widely studied in the real trade literature we assess the role of this feature of modern world trade in accounting for some stylized facts about international business cycles our model with staggered prices and trade in intermediates across four stages of processing does well in explaining the observed international correlations in aggregate quantities and it performs much better than a single stage model with no trade in intermediates the model in itself does not provide a full account of the cyclical behavior of the real exchange rate but compared to the single stage model it moves in the right direction

capital indivisibility and tax competition are there too many business areas when some of them are empty abstract in this paper we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites we first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are plants to host doing so he diversifies his supply and has a higher probability of hosting the firm then we show that if every jurisdiction is managed by a local government there are more developed sites than with the central planner which implies excess supply

the role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition abstract in this paper we analyse the role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition our primary result is that increasing mobility of firms leads to increasing net tax revenues under plausible assumptions while enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition it weakens subsidy competition the resulting fall in government subsidy payments can overcompensate the decline in tax revenues leading to a rise in net tax revenues interestingly the opportunity costs of subsidy competition can rise along with net tax revenues we derive these conclusions in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to successive policy choices on taxes and subsidies

incentive compatible regulation of a foreign owned subsidiary abstract transfer prices are administered charges for intra firm transfers of factors of production for a multinational firm transfer prices for international transfers provide the means to redistribute costs and increase global profits given variations in national tax and profit repatriation policies local regulation of a subsidiary may thus be necessary to limit the welfare costs of strategic transfer pricing prusa journal of international economics 1990 28 155 172 characterizes the welfare maximizing regulations for a monopoly subsidiary that induce the firm to report transfer prices truthfully we show however that it can be more efficient to implement regulations that encourage the firm to misrepresent its true transfer costs

location costs product quality and implicit franchise contracts abstract in the literature on international trade only little attention has been given to informational asymmetries between firms and consumers with respect to product quality the few economic models that analyze the question of how asymmetric information about product quality might affect trade flows treat product quality as exogeneous in contrast our model takes product quality as an endogeneous variable i e firms can choose the quality they wish to produce in this case location costs can signal product quality under certain conditions and thereby affect international trade flows more specifically intra industry trade in vertically differentiated experience goods can be determined by information asymmetries about product quality

government policies market imperfections and foreign direct investment the internalization eclectic theory of foreign direct investment includes the important insight that government policies create market imperfections which make foreign direct investment an economically rational strategic alternative for firms this paper reexamines the effects of government policies on market imperfections and foreign direct investment fdi it broadens and refines the analysis of the impact of government policies by developing the following arguments 1 there is a wide range of government policies that affect firms fdi decisions via their effects on market imperfections 2 there are numerous dimensions of variability in government policies that need to be identified in order to understand fully the effects of government policies on market imperfections and hence fdi flows 3 some of the effects of government policies on market imperfections and fdi are the opposite of those previously noted in the fdi literature 4 the effects of government policies vary across the several individual components of fdi flows the paper thus examines the following variables and relationships more extensively and precisely than has the previous literature government policy variables as causal factors affecting fdi market imperfection variables as intervening factors in the causal connections between government policies and fdi and the multiple indicators of the various dimensions of fdi as dependent variables

host country policy transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures a theoretical analysis abstract this paper develops a simple model of an international joint venture in which the ownership shares are endogenously determined as the outcome of nash bargaining between a multinational firm and a host firm it shows how tax subsidy policy by the host country s government and transfer pricing of inputs by the multinational firm may influence the equity distribution of the joint venture insofar as the optimal level of these policies is dependent on the primitives the model generates empirical hypotheses regarding the impact of the primitives on the equity distribution

profit taxes and the growth of fringe firms in this paper we examine the optimal taxation of corporate profits in a multi period limit pricing model where a dominant firm faces expansion by a competitive fringe the optimal policy requires tax rates to vary both intertemporally and across firm sizes and balances the benefit of fringe growth in eroding the market power of the dominant firm and the cost of displacing the dominant firm s output with the higher cost output of the fringe the results are relevant for assessing the policy of giving preferential tax treatment to small firms as practised by several oecd countries jel classification h32 lii

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

gradualism in tax treaties with irreversible foreign direct investment bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world s foreign direct investment fdi of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling although the treaties themselves do not specify any such reductions since there is no outside governing agency to redress treaty violations such reductions must be both mutually beneficial and self enforcing furthermore the optimal tax rates must be less than those initially set otherwise no reductions would be necessary to explain such behavior we model a two country setting with two way capital flows in particular only part of fdi is immediately reversible as the extent of irreversibility increases the likelihood of pareto optimal tax rates obtaining as a self enforcing outcome in the initial period is reduced more modest tax reductions from the non treaty levels are still possible these limited tax reductions generate an increase in bilateral fdi as countries increase the stock of capital in one another further reductions in taxes become self enforcing depending on the extent of irreversibility and asymmetry pareto optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run thus the amount of inbound investment a country can attract may be related to the commitment to which its outbound investment binds it this final insight provides an additional rationale for the observed pattern of capital flows in which those countries with the greatest outbound capital flows are also those with the highest inbound flows

foreign direct investment and host country policies a rationale for using ownership restrictions abstract this paper examines host governments motivation for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects an mnf with a productivity advantage is willing to invest in a host country the host government wants to capture the mnf s surplus yet cannot observe it due to the mnf s private information about its firm specific advantage in contrast a joint venture jv partner might observe this surplus depending on its ownership share the host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a jv this calls into question the wisdom of calls for liberalizing fdi flows by the wholesale elimination of domestic jv requirements we show that the optimal mechanism involves ownership restrictions that decrease as the size of the mnf s firm specific advantage increases

an incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem abstract this paper offers an alternative approach to regulating certain types of transfer pricing if the multinational enterprise s transfer price decision is not regulated it will manipulate the transfer price in order to maximize net global profit traditional approaches argue for ad hoc penalty schedules to mitigate manipulative transfer pricing in contrast this paper offers an incentive compatible approach which explicitly incorporates the informational asymmetries that encourage misreports the model has the desirous feature that the optimal regulatory policy has self enforcing properties that is the firm will find it profit maximizing to report true costs

trade factor prices and the gains from trade with increasing returns to scale existing analyses seem to suggest that national increasing returns to scale are not a very useful tool for analysing trade owing to problems such as multiple equilibria and the tendency towards complete specialization the purpose of this paper is to construct a model in which there are in fact determinant relationships among country size the direction of trade the gains from trade and international factor price differences in the model differences in country size determine the direction of trade which in turn determines factor price differences and limits the possible distribution of the gains from trade commerce international prix des facteurs de production et les gains de l change dans un contexte de rendements croissants a l echelle les analyses conventionnelles semblent suggerer que les rendements croissants h l 6chelle au niveau national ne constituent pas une avenue prometteuse dans l analyse du commerce international parce que de tels rendements creent une presomption en faveur de la specialisation complete et conduisent a des situations d 6quilibres multiples le but de ce m6moire est de construire un mod le dans lequel il existe des rapports determinants entre la dimension du pays la direction des 6changes les gains de l echange et les differentiels internationaux entre les prix des facteurs de production dans ce mod le les differences entre les pays en termes de dimension d6terminent la direction du commerce international laquelle d6termine le differentiel entre les prix des facteurs de production et limite l eventail des r6partitions possibles des gains de l echange

industrial blackmail dynamic tax competition and public investment a dynamic model of intergovernmental competition for a large plant is presented when local productivity is uncertain one firm determines the location of its plant in each period by conducting an auction soliciting bids from local governments equilibrium subsidies from the local governments are derived the author also consider a two stage game where local governments first choose a level of costly infrastructure then participate in the sequential auction even when costs are identical across locations investing in different levels of infrastructure is a nash equilibrium moreover when infrastructure is endogenous in this manner it is chosen efficiently

competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by bernheim and whinston in the model national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation s investment it is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all countries use subsidies furthermore it is shown that a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts less investment than in the unsubsidized regime our framework can also be used to study interregional subsidy competition within a country

decentralization and transfer pricing under oligopoly this paper presents a simple model of a partially decentralized multinational firm mnf in competition with a rival firm it is shown that transfer pricing can be used as a rent shifting device by the mnf to compete with the rival this arises because the mnf headquarters uses the transfer price to manage different subsidiaries the specific value of the transfer price chosen by the mnf depends on whether the rival firm produces the intermediate good the final good or both and whether the rival is integrated or not in particular both decentralization and competition with a fully integrated rival result in lower transfer prices

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

commitment efficiency and footloose firms the authors consider dynamic competition between a small number of local governments to attract a single large plant the surplus available in each location is unknown when the initial location decision is made two cases are considered if all agents can commit to second period actions and if they cannot without commitment initially the firm will discriminate against the region with the lower set up costs if first period productivity is low the firm may relocate and receive an ex post subsidy from a second region commitment decreases the expected total surplus and if fixed costs are small favors the firm copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

multinational firms and the theory of international trade and investment tinational corporation in the arena of economic activity and political influence trade theorists have either ignored it or expressed unguarded skepticism at the ability of the conventional trade models to successfully capture and analyze the features of this new phenomenon the purpose of this paper is twofold first by building upon the contribution by richard caves we will show that the traditional trade models can be adapted in a way that preserves most if not all of the attributes introduced by international firms 2 second we will conduct a comparative statics analysis to explore the implications of tariffs and taxes for resource allocation and international capital movements our results here confirm what has already been well established in myriad empirical studies that maturation of the international firm has vastly increased economic interdependence among trading countries and that few nations can eschew the ripples caused by economic policies of other nations 3

american taxation of multinational firms publisher summary this chapter discusses the american taxation of multinational firms it is assumed that a multinational firm starts with an existing stock of foreign and domestic investment and seeks the optimal change in its position over the next year as the earnings generated by existing investments are an important source of capital for new investment one cannot ignore the role of the past in shaping the present the chapter presents an analysis that focuses not only on the levels of foreign and domestic investment but also on the financing of that investment it is also assumed that the foreign subsidiary can deduct from its taxable income interest on intrafirm debt as well as royalties head office charges and other such payments for intrafirm services

corporate tax holidays and investments governments of developing countries commonly adopt tax holidays to encourage investment this article evaluates the incentives provided by company income tax holidays and explains the importance of the timing of depreciation allowances in determining the effective tax rates and the cost of capital to firms considering additional investment during the holiday if an asset is long lived and depreciation allowances for tax purposes are accelerated the tax holiday by preventing depreciation deductions during the periods of peak profits may actually penalize a company for investing during the holiday the closer the investment to the end of the holiday period the more severe the penalty if instead depreciation allowances may be deferred until after the holiday this program of incentives is quite generous to the firm how these sharply contrasting results may emerge is illustrated through estimation of effective tax rates and user costs of capital under tax holiday systems in bangladesh cote d ivoire malaysia morocco and thailand

intrafirm trade arm s length transfer pricing rule and coordination failure abstract this paper demonstrates that uniform imposition of the arm s length principle on transfer pricing leads to coordination failure among countries in terms of economic welfare if the countries trade products in the form of intrafirm transactions by multinational firms mnfs to highlight this implication we first show that imposition of the arm s length principle on an mnf induces it to transfer a product among subordinate divisions at marginal cost i e the competitive price which is consistent with the purpose of the principle nonetheless if regulators in each country impose the principle on mnfs all of the following economic welfare measures decrease compared with the situation where the principle is not imposed 1 consumer welfare in each of the trading countries 2 profit of each mnf and thus 3 total world economic welfare this result indicates that it is possible that enforcement of the principle has no positive effect at all in the world because economic welfare of all economic agents deteriorates when the principle is imposed a numerical analysis demonstrates that this possibility arises in a broad range of circumstances even including the situation where a giant economic world power and a small underdeveloped country mutually trade products in these circumstances an agreement among trading countries that no country imposes the arm s length principle may encourage pareto improvement of the world economy

optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information abstract when cost is private information in the brander spencer model the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options a menu of policies and a uniform policy the former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors the latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information the main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under cournot competition while the opposite occurs under bertrand competition

profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry abstract this paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm s decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market through exports or through foreign direct investment fdi and local supply we show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose fdi even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view with tax competition the host country can enforce exporting instead of fdi this leads to a nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes thus because of the effect on entry mode tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization

politicians decision making with re election concerns abstract we study the impact of elected officials re election concerns on their decisions on whether to undertake new projects the value of a project to a jurisdiction depends in part on its elected official s uncertain ability at providing some public goods our main result is that the elected official s willingness to pay for the project differs from voters willingness to pay if the incumbent official expects to lose win the election then she is willing to pay more less than the project s total value to voters we show how our analysis can be applied to bidding wars among jurisdictions for firms

the location of export oriented foreign direct investment in the caribbean basin this paper analyzes the location of export oriented manufacturing investment the analysis focuses on direct investment in the caribbean basin using micro data for all reported manufacturing plant openings from 1984 87 we test a broad range of influences on country selection and compare the results with the existing literature on foreign direct investment in less developed countries the probability of country selection was estimated with a conditional logit model the estimates were then used to predict the location of caribbean basin investments made in 1988 and 1989 twelve independent variables were tested six variables had a statistically significant positive relationship with plant location per capita gnp exchange rate devaluation the length of income tax holidays the size of free trade zones political stability and manufacturing concentration negative relationships were found for the wage rate inflation rate transportation cost and profit repatriation restrictions

factor movements and commodity trade as complements abstract several models are presented in which factor mobility leads to an increase in the volume of world trade the models share the common characteristic that the basis for trade is something other than differences in relative factor endowments these alternative bases for trade include returns to scale imperfect competition production and factor taxes and differences in production technology taken together the models suggest a more general idea the widely held notion that trade in goods and factors are substitutes is in fact a rather special result which is a general characteristic only of factor proportions models

a mechanism design approach to transfer pricing by the multinational firm abstract this paper is about how multinationals choose transfer prices and optimal production levels in the presence of differential corporate income tax rates and local ownership requirements a key featrure of the model is that there is an asymmetric information problem between a parent and its foreign subsidiary we examine the interaction between ownership structure corporate taxes and bargaining power transfer prices induce underproduction compared to the full information case when the parent has the bargaining ability when bargaining is controlled by the subsidiary overproduction obtains the model is used to illustrate how governmental objectives can be accomplished without direct regulation of the transfer price

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

the development of china s solar photovoltaic industry why industrial policy failed this article studies china s central local government relations in the formation and implementation of an industry policy in china the central government is responsible for policy formation and the local governments are responsible for policy implementation where local governments are allowed ample flexibility in the ways to achieve the policy mandate this arrangement is conducive to local competition but there is no built in mechanism in the system to regulate such competition the system is defective in the execution of an industrial policy in that it fails to discipline the recipients of policy favours and to make efficient exit selections because local competition involves policy resources as well as economic resources the outcome of competition is not necessarily consistent with the comparative advantage of the region the more that policy is emphasised in industrial development the more that competition tends to favour large and rich cities after a certain period of hands off local competition the timing of which is unpredictable but will come when the industry runs into troubles the central government holds the ultimate power to determine the winners the central government typically picks the large and strong firms as the winners which are crowned as a national team and became eligible for further policy support this institutional set up produces a rapidly growing industry which often results in over capacity but not necessarily a competitive industry i use the case of china s solar photovoltaic industry to illustrate these points

incentive auctions and information revelation we study an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services or effort of a single agent each principal has private information about her valuation for these services and the agent has private information about his disutility of providing them we characterize the equilibrium of this auction and examine the agent s incentives to reveal information about his type we show that the effort level taken by the agent is smaller than in the standard auction for a known agent type and greater than in the single principal single agent model additionally inexperienced analysts are less likely to issue timely forecasts and they revise their forecasts more frequently these findings are broadly consistent with existing career concern motivated herding theories

optimal regulation of mnes and government revenues the paper analyses the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises mnes by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues when the mne has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise it is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the mnes ownership of the enterprise and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the mne provides that is above the known production cost of the input for low realizations of the benefits of control the mne transfers control to a domestic partner while for high realizations it retains control

tax incentives for import substituting foreign investment abstract this paper constructs a game theoretic model to study host country policy to attract import substituting foreign direct investment fdi investors are assumed to be incompletely informed about local investment conditions and taxes and tariffs are determined endogenously we show that in certain situations countries will offer tax incentives while in others they will impose a tariff wall to induce fdi tax incentives are motivated by the need to signal favorable investment conditions the paper predicts that tax incentives are more likely to be used the larger is the investment risk the smaller is the local market the smaller is the stock of previous fdi and the lower are trade barriers moreover we conjecture that incentives are positively correlated with the number of jobs created by the investment we test these predictions using data from the us department of commerce benchmark survey of us foreign investment and find that they are supported by the empirical evidence

decentralized international exchange traditional models of international trade take place within trading environments in which trade is coordinated by a walrasian auctioneer who instantly matches buyers and sellers in world markets this assertion seems inconsistent with evidence suggesting that trading arrangements seem to economize on transactions costs associated with international trade recognizing these insights we depart from standard models of international trade by incorporating the difficulties in the coordination of exchange within a two country random matching model of international trade we capture a motivation for trade through comparative advantage and interpret trade across economies to be associated with an agent s endogenous choice to participate in foreign markets although an individual may decide to search abroad to obtain additional gains from trade resulting from comparative advantage she is less likely to meet trading partners abroad as search frictions are higher in the foreign country than in the domestic market using this framework we show that international trade is associated with convergence in relative prices across countries we also show that the extent of market frictions in the foreign country affects relative prices the volume of international trade and welfare levels due to market participation externalities associated with international trade we show that a movement from autarky to free trade may actually lower welfare levels we conclude by examining the possible inefficiencies associated with international trade due to the decentralized nature of exchange and the policy implications of our model

a bargaining model of tax competition abstract this paper develops a model in which competing governments offer financial incentives to induce individual firms to locate within their jurisdictions equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes there is no misallocation of capital under two of these specifications and there might or might not be capital misallocation under the third this result contrasts strongly with that of the standard tax competition model which does not allow governments to treat firms individually that model finds that competition among governments almost always leads to capital misallocation

fixed versus flexible lessons from ems order flow abstract we extend the literature on regime dependent volatility in two ways first our microstructural model provides a qualitatively new explanation second we test implications of our model using europe s recent shift to rigidly fixed rates ems to emu in the model shocks to order flow induce more volatility under flexible rates because the elasticity of speculative demand is endogenously low leading to pronounced portfolio balance effects new data on ff dm transactions show that order flow had persistent effects on the exchange rate before emu parities were announced after announcement the ff dm rate was decoupled from order flow as the model predicts

on the optimal structure of government subsidies for enterprise zones and other locational development programs abstract government locational development programs often reward businesses for decisions they would have made or that are going to be quickly reversed this paper presents a model to determine the amount and structure of government locational subsidies that minimize this problem we model the firm s decision to switch locations as an option whose value depends on stochastic operating costs the costs to switch locations and subsidies offered by the government the government maximizes the expected benefit from the operation of the firm within its preferred location by choosing a subsidy package that explicitly and endogenously recognizes the firm s switching option

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

formalizing internationalization in the eclectic paradigm the paper presents a simple general equilibrium model that formalizes internationalization in the eclectic paradigm based on a reconfiguration of concepts taken from the new classical economics literature the model enables us to address simultaneously the role of ownership location and internalization advantages and their interaction in the emergence of the multinational enterprise mne through a set of mathematical inequalities our model offers a bridge between the detached perceptions of the mne often held by international trade economists and international business scholars and makes specific aspects of the eclectic paradigm empirically testable

bargaining with commitment choice of techniques and direct foreign investment abstract once a firm has installed a plant in a host country the country will have an incentive to reopen negotiations concerning tax rates this paper examines the incentives for the country to commit to not reopening negotiations a commitment deters the firm from inefficiently reducing the capital intensity of its investment but apparently surrenders tax revenues by not exploiting the country s post entry bargaining power we show that commitment will be optimal as long as the tax system does not place too distortionary a burden on capital and the country has access to capital markets

regulation of multinational firms with two active governments a common agency approach abstract when a government agency imposes cost based taxes regulations on a multinational with private cost information it may initiate countervailing regulations by another of the governments with which the multinational interacts we analyze the problem of optimal regulation of a multinational under incomplete cost information via trade taxes by multiple governments as a problem of common agency with adverse selection by focusing on the game played by the competing governments we characterize the equilibrium trade taxes and show that the non cooperative behavior of the governments not only reduces aggregate national welfare but also reduces firm profits

the lechatelier principle under production uncertainty under production uncertainty it is shown that the lechatelier principle holds for the derived demand of the ith factor if it is technically complementary competing with the riskincreasing risk reducing quasi fixed input and absolute risk aversion is decreasing in addition the lechatelier principle for the output supply function holds if the quasi fixed factor is an inferior normal and risk increasing risk reducing input and partial risk aversion is increasing

determinants of foreign direct investment a tale of nine theoretical models abstract this paper presents a review of nine theoretical models of foreign direct investment fdi discussed are early studies of determinants of fdi 1 as well as determinants of fdi based on the neoclassical trade theory 2 ownership advantages 3 aggregate variables 4 the ownership location and internalization advantage framework 5 horizontal and vertical fdi models 6 the knowledge capital model 7 diversified fdi and risk diversification models 8 and policy variables 9 from each of the nine theories the relevant determinants of fdi are derived empirical studies indicate the importance of these determinants in the real world the paper shows that there is not one single theory of fdi but a variety of theoretical models attempting to explain fdi and the location decision of multinational firms therefore any analysis of determinants of fdi should not be based on a single theoretical model instead fdi should be explained more broadly by a combination of factors from a variety of theoretical models such as ownership advantages or agglomeration economics market size and characteristics cost factors transport costs protection risk factors and policy variables

negotiated trade restrictions with private political pressure we consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade the foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad in this setting the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents depending on the level of political pressure we determine globally optimal incentive compatible trade policies in which the home government has no incentive to overstate or understate the pressure for protection

are asean countries havens for japanese pollution intensive industry in an era of closer worldwide economic integration the role that environmental regulations play in shaping a country s comparative advantage is greater than ever this has led to fears that dirty firms will relocate from developed to developing countries where environmental regulations may be less stringent the so called pollution haven hypothesis to date however there is little support for the existence of pollution havens despite anecdotal evidence and the theoretical predictions in this paper we employ a unique industry level dataset for japan and examine whether japanese industries have relocated production to their asean neighbours in response to the relative stringency of japanese environmental regulations not only do we find no evidence for pollution haven consistent behaviour but also some indication that the complex relationship between the characteristics of japanese dirty industries and environmental regulations may actually have reduced japanese outward fdi to the philippines

double tax discrimination to attract fdi and fight profit shifting the role of cfc rules abstract governments worldwide use targeted tax policies to trade off the gains from increased fdi against the cost of excessive profit shifting by multinational firms we show that nationally optimal tax systems generally incorporate both thin capitalization rules which tax discriminate between purely national and multinational firms and controlled foreign company cfc rules which discriminate between home based and foreign based multinationals in the non cooperative policy equilibrium both thin capitalization rules and cfc rules are set more lenient than if tax policies were chosen cooperatively implying an excessive tax discrimination in favor of multinationals we also analyze the effects of reduced transaction costs for fdi and reduced costs for debt shifting on the optimal policy mix our results correspond to the observed developments of anti avoidance rules in oecd countries

strategic investments and the development of multinationals a model of multinational behavior is presented in which either the existence or absence of multinationals can be a nash equilibrium outcome the key determinant is the relationship between plant scale economies a force for geographic centralization and multiplant economies plus transport costs leading to multinationality the model predicts that multinational enterprise production arises when firm specific and transportation costs are large relative to plant scale economies the latter are both a technological and a strategic variable in the entry decision copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise one of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but in the absence of incentives the multinational s preferred location is the other more advanced region the paper shows that subsidies by making the multinational switch location may increase aggregate welfare if the multinational exports in the absence of incentives the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment which otherwise would not take place in one of the two regions further it intensifies competition in the market the paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified but also that the competition effect by hurting domestic firms may cancel out any other positive role of incentives

environmental regulation and foreign direct investment evidence from south korea abstract this paper studies how environmental regulation shapes the pattern of foreign direct investment fdi and thereby assesses the pollution haven hypothesis conflicting results exist in the case studies examining the most advanced countries partly due to the deterrent effect of clean technology adoptions on industry migration to minimize the clean technology effect we examine the pattern of south korean fdi over 2000 2007 the period that korean firms relied on old production technologies despite facing rapidly strengthened environmental standards a difference in differences type identification strategy circumvents other potential confounders we find strong evidence that polluting industries tend to invest more in countries with laxer environmental regulations in terms of both the amount of investment intensive margin and the number of new foreign affiliates extensive margin a similar finding is obtained when imports are analyzed

tariff policy and entry with cost based informational asymmetries i introduction how does the presence of incomplete information alter the usual effects of trade policy recognition that incomplete information characterizes most decision making processes that take place within an international setting has stimulated an emerging body of literature which addresses this question particularly germane to the present study are those papers which introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policies to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firm compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies examples include works by brainard and martimort 1997 collie and hviid 1993 maggi 1995 and qiu 1994 another study collie and hviid 1994 allows for domestic consumption and considers optimal import tariff policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist in general optimal trade policy in the presence of informational failures is found to differ from that under complete information the emphasis of the present study is not on the conduct of optimal trade policy but rather on how the introduction of an informational asymmetry alters the realized impact of trade policy on quantities and welfare 1 specifically we examine the effects of import tariff policy within a standard two period model of entry where the costs of the domestic firm are proprietary information the incumbent domestic firm recognizes the threat of a potential foreign rival entering exporting to the domestic market where the latter is uninformed of the cost structure of the domestic firm as is well known from the industrial organization literature the incumbent domestic firm may have an incentive to change its time period one behavior so as to signal information on costs to the foreign firm in an effort to deter entry see milgrom and roberts 1982 in specifying the degree of knowledge possessed by domestic policymakers we adopt the premise that informational deficiencies on the part of policymakers are likely to be quite acute in trade policy formation indeed as brander 1995 notes it is reasonable to suppose that governments are less informed on market conditions and firm characteristics than firms themselves in contrast to previous studies however we also assume that policymakers either cannot acquire information or if they are able to cannot respond by altering policy here the formation of trade policy does not reflect or incorporate full information and thus cannot provide signals to the other uninformed party the foreign firm moreover because policymakers cannot alter policy the foreign firm perceives the tariff rate as credibly fixed the inability to incorporate information into trade policy is especially relevant for situations where policymakers are subject to previously negotiated trade agreements here even should uninformed policymakers subsequently acquire information on domestic cost structure they will be unable to respond our emphasis on the realized effects of tariff policy reflects this information structure to conduct optimal policy government must hold complete information on markets and firm characteristics at the time policy is set as in collie and hviid 1993 1994 or be able to acquire it through signaling or a screening mechanism as in qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 2 when policymakers lack the ability to acquire or respond to such information optimal policy is not a consideration what is of interest to policymakers in this situation is the response of domestic output and imports to a given tariff rate at the outset of the game then there is a tariff rate set previously by domestic policymakers who were uninformed of domestic costs since the foreign firm cannot infer domestic cost structure by merely observing the tariff rate set by uninformed policymakers any signaling that takes place is on the part of the domestic firm

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

meese rogoff redux micro based exchange rate forecasting meese rogoff redux micro based exchange rate forecasting by martin d d evans and richard k lyons this paper compares the true ex ante fore casting performance of a micro based model against both a standard macro model and a random walk in contrast to existing literature which is focused on longer horizon forecasting we examine forecasting over horizons from one day to one month the one month horizon being where micro and macro analysis begin to over lap over our three year forecasting sample we find that the micro based model consistently outperforms both the random walk and the macro model micro based forecasts account for almost 16 percent of the sample variance in monthly spot rate changes these results pro vide a level of empirical validation as yet unat tained by other models the forecasting experiment proposed by richard meese and kenneth rogoff 1983 re mains a benchmark against which exchange rate models are judged their result that structural macro models cannot outperform a naive random walk has proved robust over the decades yet the meese rogoff paper was never about forecasting in the true sense i e using tirrie f information to forecast exchange rates at t 1 b y using concurrent realized values of the forcing variables their regressions were more about concurrent explanation than about ex ante forecasting their only forecast ing element is in their reliance on ex ante data to estimate equation parameters which appro priately penalized models whose estimated pa rameters were unstable tion for the random walk nature of exchange rates is that there exists some unobserved fun damental that itself follows a random walk un observed being important because fundamentals proposed in most macro models do not follow random walks they offer a different explana tion one rooted in the asset approach to ex change rates and the present value relation that follows from it specifically they show that i f fundamentals are 1 1 but not necessarily ran dom walks then as the discount factor in the present value relation approaches 1 the ex change rate will follow a process arbitrarily close to a random walk intuitively given that an 1 1 process can be split into random walk and stationary components a discount factor near 1 means that most all of the weight is placed on fundamentals far into the future ex pectations of which are dominated by the random walk component charles engel and kenneth west 2004 2005 provide a valuable perspective on the forecastability of exchange rates one explana this paper takes the analysis of engel and west as an important reorientation of thinking and brings it to the natural next step specifi cally if there is little room for forecasting based on stationary components of fundamentals then one needs to focus on where all the action is namely exchange rate dynamics that come from expectational surprises though the sur prise part is by definition orthogonal to public information our micro based model shows that there should exist types of nonpublic infor mation that are useful for forecasting this part and where to look for these types of informa tion we then locate data on these types of nonpublic information and test whether they have true ex ante forecasting power we should evans department of economics georgetown uni versity washington dc 20057 and nber lyons haas school of business university of california berkeley c a 94720 1900 and nber we are grateful to ken west for his comments and to the national science foundation for financial support we refrain from using the word news because it has too strong an association with macro information that is public which even in the most careful of event studies explains less than 5 percent of exchange rate variation in total see torben andersen et al 2003

technology agglomeration and regional competition for investment technology agglomeration the active courting of firms by municipalities regions and even nations has a long standing history and the competition for firm location through a wide variety of incentives seems to have escalated to new heights in recent years we develop a model that explores technology development by firms that face regional competition for their investment and examine the endogenous determination of regions policies firm technology and agglomeration externalities in particular we find that regional competition leads firms to inefficiently distort their research and development efforts in hopes of improving their standing in the competition amongst regions for their investment this loss in efficiency is aggravated by the agglomeration externalities that are inherently present in many industries we offer several case studies that provide evidence consistent with our theoretical conclusions