does politics make a difference at the eeoc stability and responsiveness are features of bureaucracy that affect both policy success and policy consistency with dynamic public values this article explores the stability and responsiveness of a bureaucracy which according to normative theory should be less responsive to political stimuli the u s equal employment opportunity commission measures are constructed across time of political support for commission policies as well as agency outputs and their effect on the client community linear time series regression methods are then applied in quantifying changes through time in policy implementation and their consistency with the ideology of incumbent political administrations the findings demonstrate that equal employment opportunity policy is unstable undergoing frequent transformations in response to changing political conditions

the butterfly effect of small open economies abstract the rational expectations equilibrium of a small open economy can be subject to indeterminacy if foreign monetary policy does not satisfy the taylor principle we study the implications of foreign induced indeterminacy in the two country version of the sticky price small open economy model our main finding is that smallness is a property of the unique rational expectations equilibrium of the large economy and not a general property of the small open economy model if the large economy fails to anchor expectations shocks to the small economy can affect the large one this form of indeterminacy gives rise to a butterfly effect additional assumptions are required to preserve the smallness of the small economy

politics and the implementation of public policy the case of the us military housing allowance program are bureaucracies in fact controlled by the president congress or legislation we analyze a 1998 policy change in the department of defense s dod 6 5 billion annual military housing allowance program results show that both the president and congress were able to influence the bureaucracy even in the presence of an exceedingly specific law that outlined the manner in which the dod was to allocate the funds after policy implementation allowances were disproportionately higher in locations that a supported the president in the 1996 election and b were represented by members of the house or senate armed services committees

the valuation of floating rate instruments abstract a framework for valuing floating rate notes is developed to examine the effects of 1 lags in the coupon formula 2 special contractual features and 3 default risk evidence from a sample of floaters indicates they sold at significant discounts while lags in the coupon formulas and other contractual features make these notes more variable they do not account for the magnitude of the discounts we conclude that the fixed default premium in the coupon formula of a typical note is inadequate to compensate for time varying default premiums demanded by investors who treat other corporate short term paper as close substitutes

the dynamics of political bureaucratic adaptation through the 1980s political science research produced a more dynamic view of how bureaucracies respond to changing political conditions however much of this research ignored the complex stimulus environment within which bureaucracies operate as well as the potentially rich bureaucratic response dynamic that can exist we extend our previous work on the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy by developing a model of political bureaucratic adaptation themodel is tested with output data from four environmental protection agency programs between 1979 and 1988 the results show that politicalbureaucratic adaptation is indeed a more complex phenomenon than suggested by earlier research stimuli to bureaucratic behavior include discrete events event progressions and tonal shifts in the policy environment bureaucratic responses can be immediate delayed or distributed through time in probabilistic fashion substantively the results offer new insights on how political institutions affect bureaucratic behavior they also suggest how why and to what bureaucracy responds

the relative termination experience of adjustable to fixed rate mortgages our study uses a multinomial logit model to analyze the concurrent termination experience of adjustable rate and fixed rate mortgages a new set of arm specific interactive determinants expands the conventional frm specification to isolate the unique termination behavior of arms we find that expected rate adjustments and large lifetime caps are positively related to arm termination probabilities while long adjustment frequencies are inversely related caps both periodic and lifetime have a secondary inverse effect on termination probabilities when interest rate movements exceed cap limits the model also shows that interest rate expectations affect frm terminations more strongly than arm terminations in september 1981 commitment rates on fixed rate mortgages frms peaked at 18 after a 3 year 850 basis point rise lenders encumbered with losses from devalued frm portfolios faced insolvency while mortgage applicants constrained by large payment burdens contended with disqualification adjustable rate mortgages arms emerged as a solution to both problems the adjusting note rate allowed lenders to hedge their portfolios against rising interest rates and the discounting of initial arm rates kept household payment ratios within underwriting guidelines the benefit of arms remains questionable however because of the uncertainty surrounding their future payment streams in particular the shift of interest rate risk to borrowers may result in higher default and prepayment risks to lenders uncertainty is further compounded by nonstandard contracts for buydown terms period caps life caps indexes and adjustment periods originators and insurers of arms as well as investors in the emerging market for arm backed securities need arm specific methods for evaluating the cashflow risks of these unique instruments in this paper we address these issues by examining the concurrent default and prepayment experience of arms

valuation of adjustable rate mortgages with automatic stretching maturity abstract in hong kong 35 of residential mortgage loans are adjustable rate mortgages with variable tenor vrt that is with a change in interest rates the loan adjusts its maturity and principal payment such that the monthly installment remains the same in other words instead of bearing a volatility on monthly payments as in a fixed tenor variable payment vrp mortgage vrt mortgagors bear interest rate risk by bearing a tenor risk in this paper we analyze the valuation of this type of mortgages and the results are compared with the conventional vrp mortgages we find vrt loans are less expensive from a borrower s perspective than vrp loans but the difference between the loans becomes less significant if a tenor cap is added to the vrt loan

subprime mortgage design abstract this paper offers evidence on the design of subprime mortgages as bridge financing products we show that the viability of subprime mortgages was uniquely predicated on the appreciation of house prices over short horizons high rates of early prepayments on subprime mortgages suggest the use of prepayments as an exit option this paper argues that high early defaults on post 2004 originations can be explained when one considers high early prepayment rates for pre 2004 originations

adjustable and fixed rate mortgages as a screening mechanism for default risk abstract this paper studies how borrowers with different levels of default risk would self select between fixed rate mortgages frms and adjustable rate mortgages arms we show that under asymmetric information where the risk type of a borrower is private information to the borrower and not known by the lender the unique equilibrium may be a separating equilibrium in which the high risk low risk borrowers choose arms frm s thus the borrower s mortgage choice will serve as a signal of default risk enabling lenders to screen high risk and low risk borrowers it is possible for the separating equilibrium to yield positive economic profits for lenders in a competitive market it is also possible to have a unique pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose either frms or arms the model implies that an increase in the proportion of high risks will increase the likelihood of a separating equilibrium where both mortgage types are offered also a uniform downward shift in the expected change in the interest rate or an increase in borrowers current or future incomes make arms more attractive for both types of borrowers

the power of the purse and its implications for bureaucratic policy making a dilemma of the power of the purse is thatcutting an agency s budget may make a desired policyinfeasible i examine the implications of thisdilemma with a repeated game in which a bureau choosesunobservable policies after a legislature sets itsbudget the bureau is work averse and has its ownpolicy preferences and therefore may cheat but thelegislature may perform an audit to recover slack funds a main result is that if the legislaturedesires a higher policy level than the agency then itfaces a trade off between good but wasteful policiesand bad but efficient ones

adaptive signal processing hierarchy and budgetary control in federal regulation control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency i advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question the principal findings of the paper are two first presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts second bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency s response time in processing budgetary signals limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control i also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms i conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies

a generalized valuation model for fixed rate residential mortgages this paper uses option pricing techniques to rationally price mortgage instruments subject to both default and prepayment risk attention is given to terminations due to purely financial consideration of the mortgage contract itself as well as to personally induced terminations explicit inclusion of default in the mortgage valuation procedure also permits the valuation of insurance against such default qualitatively it is found that default differs significantly in the behavior from either prepayment or nonfinancial termination quantitatively however there is significant substitution between prepayment and default so that the addition of a default feature to the contract has only a modest impact on mortgage values unless there is substantial price volatility in the housing market or a high loan to value ratio copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

hierarchy and ecological control in federal budgetary decision making a central issue for fiscal sociology is the articulation between state and society operationally what is required is the embedding of bureaucratic decision making in history this article proposes the concepts of hierarcy and ecological control as one possible bridge between organization theorists and macro sociologists a stochastic process model of federal budgetary decision making within the executive branch is developed and tested using hud program allocation data from the johnson administration the model emphasizes that budgets emerge from the interaction of three levels of organizational decision making each of which is embedded in a distinct cultural context historical application focuses on the impact of the vietnam war on domestic antipoverty and housing programs

presidential particularism and divide the dollar politics when inuencing the allocation of federal dollars across the country do presidents strictly pursue maximally ecient outcomes or do they systematically target dollars to politically inuential constituencies in a county level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008 we nd that presidents are not universalistic but particularistic that is they reliably direct dollars to specic constituents to further their political goals as others have noted presidents target districts represented by their co partisans in congress in the pursuit of inuence visavis the legislature but we show that at much higher levels presidents target both counties within swing states and counties in core states that strongly supported the president in recent elections swing state particularism is especially salient during presidential reelection years and core partisan counties within swing states are most heavily rewarded rather than strictly pursuing visions of good public policy or pandering to the national median voter our results suggest that presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

an adaptive model of bureaucratic politics in this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics it departs from standard neoclassical approaches notably those of niskanen 1971 and peltzman 1976 in several important respects first our approach explicitly models a system of three way interaction among bureaus politicians and interest groups second it allows for institutional features of each type of participant third it is a model of dynamic process fourth participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing fifth participants are only minimally informed the result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior very much in the spirit of simon s 1947 behavioral tradition that offers a new perspective on political control bureaucratic power and the intelligence of democracy

doctors with borders occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking conclusions that skilled americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants in this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition in practice high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high skill migrants who share their occupation specific skills licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants from a collective action perspective skilled natives can more easily secure sub national occupation specific policies than influence national immigration policy we exploit the unique structure of the american medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations we show that over the 1973 2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and as a consequence received fewer new migrant physicians by our estimates over a third of all us states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements this article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration regulatory rent seeking as a barrier to the cross national mobility of human capital and the public policy implications of such barriers

auction failures and the market for auction rate securities abstract the market for auction rate securities ars made headlines during the second week of february 2008 when auctions at which the bonds interest rates reset experienced a wave of failures contrary to headlines that attribute the failures to a frozen market or investors irrationality we find that 1 even at their height less than 50 of ars experienced auction failures 2 the likelihood of auction failure was directly related to the level of the bonds maximum auction rates 3 the implied market clearing yields of bonds with failed auctions were significantly above their maximum auction rates and 4 ars yields were generally higher than yields of various cash equivalent investment alternatives we infer that investors priced the possibility of auctions failures into ars yields and rationally declined to bid for bonds for which required market yields exceeded their maximum auction rates

governmental structure trustee selection and public university prices and spending multiple means to similar ends estimate the effects of multiple instruments for exercising political control over public university prices and spending i find that public universities located in states with governmental structures that enhance political control and universities whose trustees are selected by nonacademic stakeholders charge significantly lower prices than universities located in states with decentralized systems

option theory and floating rate securities with a comparison of adjustable and fixed rate mortgages this article demonstrates how to value floating rate securities in particular adjustable rate mortgages in the presence of default the problem is not a straightforward one since endogenous termination default and prepayment necessitates solution by backward procedures but caps on the floating rate then create path dependencies the solution is to introduce an artificial state variable the past contract rate in addition to the natural stochastic variables the interest and the house price process with this technique a numerical investigation of the properties of defaultable adjustable rate mortgages is provided in all cases a comparison is made with standard fixed rate mortgages coauthors are donald c keenan walter j muller iii and james f epperson copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

an integrated theory of budgetary politics and some empirical tests the u s national budget 1791 2010 we develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on u s government expenditures from 1791 to 2010 we draw on three major approaches to budgeting decision making theories primarily incrementalism and serial processing policy process models and path dependency we show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form the equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures associated with wars or economic collapse we assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods we offer three takeaways 1 exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting 2 disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments 3 temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path longer returns to the path within budgetary eras and annual punctuations in budget changes