contrast explanation in economics its context meaning and potential in this article we place tony lawson s account of contrast explanation in context lawson s development of it is given meaning both by the roots of the approach in his work on social ontology and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the critique contained in that social ontology this is important because such an approach to explanation is not new most notably van fraassen and garfinkel have developed it in particular ways and for particular purposes within the philosophy of science and social theory setting out the different ways in which the contrastive approach has been developed is useful for identifying what is different about lawson s approach its potential and limits lawson s proposal is more modest and focusses on causal investigation in a manner that flows from his approach to social ontology contrast explanation provides a substitute for controlled experiments and facilitates identifying social mechanisms it also enables exploration of the manifold presuppositions of our explanatory questions we argue that this is a useful and important contribution to overcoming some of the many problems economics faces

macroeconomic features of the french revolution this paper describes aspects of the french revolution from the perspective of theories about money and government budget constraints we describe how unpleasant fiscal arithmetic gripped the old regime how the estates general responded to reorganize france s fiscal affairs and how fiscal exigencies impelled the revolution into a procession of monetary experiments ending in hyper inflation

seven centuries of european economic growth and decline this paper investigates very long run pre industrial economic development new annual gdp per capita data for six european countries over the last seven hundred years paint a clearer picture of the history of european economic development first the paper confirms that sustained growth has been a recent phenomenon but rejects the argument that there was no long run growth in living standards before the industrial revolution instead the evidence demonstrates the existence of numerous periods of economic growth before the nineteenth century unsustained but raising gdp per capita it also shows that many of these economies experienced substantial economic decline thus rather than being stagnant pre nineteenth century european economies experienced a great deal of change finally it offers some evidence that from the nineteenth century these economies increased the likelihood of being in a phase of economic growth and reduced the risk of being in a phase of economic decline

the theory of sovering debt and spain under philip ii this paper examines lending by a genoese led cartel to philip ii of spain 1556 98 from the perspective of theory on sovereign debt models in this literature suggest that the genoese linked specie deliveries from spain to the low countries to lending in order to create a penalty to enforce their loans the king tried to renege the genoese applied the penalty and the king ultimately repaid when the episode is used to examine theory the crown s observed debt ceiling and estimates of its cost of enduring the penalty and its ability to repay are in line with predctions of bulow and rogoff the nature of the penalty has the flavor of gole and kehoe s model its observation on the path of play is suggestive of atkeson s model

political power and the credibility of government debt abstract if political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups then a self selection equilibrium can arise where the government s promise to repay its debt is credible we illustrate this using a formal model where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital journal of economic literature classification numbers d72 e60 h63

renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games abstract the paper derives a theory of renegotiation proofness in symmetric repeated games based on a notion of equal bargaining power according to consistent bargaining equilibrium a player can mount a credible objection to a continuation equilibrium in which he receives a particular expected present discounted value if there are other self enforcing agreements that never give any player such a low continuation value after any history the definition does not imply strongly symmetric solutions but under modest assumptions consistent bargaining equilibria of infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring are strongly symmetric such solutions have an unusually elementary characterization journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

managing the maturity structure of government debt abstract it is known that a government can implement the optimal complete market ramsey allocations by issuing non contingent bonds of different maturities the implied optimal maturity structure is time and state invariant i e it is not actively managed i construct a model where the ramsey allocations can be implemented with active management of the maturity structure in a numerical example that reflects the time series properties of the british government s expenditure during the 18th century its historic pattern of maturity management is replicated

fiscal discriminations in three wars in 1790 a u s paper dollar was widely held in disrepute something shoddy was not worth a continental by 1879 a u s paper dollar had become as good as gold these outcomes emerged from how the u s federal government financed three wars the american revolution the war of 1812 and the civil war in the beginning the u s government discriminated greatly in the returns it paid to different classes of creditors but that pattern of discrimination diminished over time in ways that eventually rehabilitated the reputation of federal paper money as a store of value

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model this paper develops the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model in a stationary equilibrium the ex ante tax rate on capital income is approximately zero there is an equivalence class of ex post capital income tax rates and bond policies that support a given allocation within this class the optimal ex post capital tax rates can range from close to independently and identically distributed to close to a random walk the tax rate on labor income fluctuates very little and inherits the persistence properties of the exogenous shocks thus there is no presumption that optimal labor tax rates follow a random walk most of the welfare gains realized by switching from a tax system like that of the united states to the ramsey system come from an initial period of high taxation on capital income

cities constitutions and sovereign borrowing in europe 1274 1785 this article investigates the politics of sovereign borrowing in europe over the very long run i consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the sources of borrower credibility according to the first european states with constitutional checks on executive authority found it easier to obtain credit at low interest rates than did states that lacked such constraints my second hypothesis focuses on state type city state versus territorial state and the way in which this may have influ enced the balance of political power between owners of land and owners of capital in a society this hypothesis suggests that after controlling for other factors one should observe that city states in europe found it easier to borrow than did larger territorial states and that these city states paid lower interest rates on their debt finally my third hypothesis suggests that borrower credibility depended on the simultaneous presence of both constitutional checks and balances and a city state when one con siders a broad sample of cases over a long time span there is strong support for the proposition involving city states and merchant power but less support for the argu ment that constitutional checks influenced credibility regardless of state type city state or territorial state there is however some empirical evidence of an interaction effect whereby constitutional constraints on rulers made city states particularly cred ible as borrowers my results are robust to a number of controls for alternative deter minants for sample selection bias and for the endogeneity of city state development one of the most frequently cited recent arguments about european state develop ment involves the effect of constitutional checks and balances on economic per formance in areas where political institutions placed constraints on rulers scholars have argued that property rights were more secure which helped stimulate invest ment innovation and growth authors have suggested that checks and balances also facilitated long term borrowing by governments since creditors found it less likely that constrained rulers would default on loans easier access to loans at low interest rates gave some states an advantage in international competition the con trasting cases of great britain and france provide a popular illustration of the

the forgotten history of domestic debt there is a rich scholarly literature on sovereign default on external debt comparatively little is known about sovereign default on domestic debt even today cross country data on domestic public debt remains curiously exotic particularly prior to the 1980s we have filled this gap in the literature by compiling a database on central government public debt external and domestic the data span 1914 to 2010 for most countries reaching back into the nineteenth century and earlier for many our findings here on debt sustainability sovereign defaults the temptation to inflate and the hierarchy of creditors only scratch the surface of what the domestic public debt data can reveal first domestic debt is big for the 64 countries for which we have long time series domestic debt accounts for almost two thirds of total public debt for most of the sample this debt carries a market determined interest rate except for the financial repression era between wwii and financial liberalization second the data go a long way toward explaining the puzzle of why countries so often default on their external debts at seemingly low debt thresholds third domestic debt has largely been ignored in the vast empirical work on inflation in fact domestic debt a significant portion of which is long term and nonindexed is often much larger than the monetary base in the run up to high inflation episodes last the widely held view that domestic residents are strictly junior to external creditors does not find broad support

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

what s in a name tony lawson on neoclassical economics and heterodox economics in this article i respond to tony lawson s what is this school called neoclassical economics lawson s paper is provocative because it reformulates neoclassical economics based on veblen s original intent as a mismatch created by recognising the value of an evolutionary approach to the economy whilst remaining over reliant on elements of a taxonomic approach for lawson many heterodox economists may be neoclassical under this description i argue that there is clearly a case to be heard but that the reformulation of the neoclassical raises a number of issues there are issues concerning the specific critique of the current usage of the term neoclassical regarding genealogy and meaning there are specific issues regarding the further development of the new old veblen definition of the neoclassical how clear is the definition in a practical context as a way to identify a neoclassical group based on the commitments of the critique and the definition what does it mean to be more realistic and what is the strategic value of such a provocation for heterodoxy i argue that the combination of these are reasons for more consideration of issues of social ontology not less insofar as the terms of the argument are incomplete and this invites both lawson and those he is criticising to progress the argument particularly on method

renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting abstract renegotiation and conflict resolution are studied in relational contracting under subjective evaluation renegotiation has three effects first it makes the incentive pay scheme low powered the maximum variation of compensation across performance levels is compressed and the contract is less extreme compared to the case without renegotiation this effect is stronger when the players are less patient second renegotiation typically renders termination impossible the contract relies on a low morale mechanism to enforce mutual cooperation finally renegotiation compels the players to resolve their conflicts by selecting a contract that maximizes the lowest possible surplus along the path of the contract

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

optimal taxation without state contingent debt in an economy studied by lucas and stokey tax rates inherit the serial correlation structure of government expenditures belying barro s earlier result that taxes should be a random walk for any stochastic process of government expenditures to recover a version of barro s random walk tax smoothing outcome we modify lucas and stokey s economy to permit only risk free debt having only risk free debt confronts the ramsey planner with additional constraints on equilibrium allocations beyond one imposed by lucas and stokey s assumption of complete markets the ramsey outcome blends features of barro s model with lucas and stokey s in our model the contemporaneous effects of exogenous government expenditures on the government deficit and taxes resemble those in lucas and stokey s model but incomplete markets put a near unit root component into government debt and taxes an outcome like barro s however we show that without ad hoc limits on the government s asset holdings outcomes can diverge in importa

the democratic advantage institutional foundations of financial power in international competition despite their presumed liabilities institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear the theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state s ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms all other things being equal states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions the ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries these claims are explored by analyzing the anglo french rivalry 1688 1815 and the cold war

central banks at war war is expensive troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured when the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns credibility problem more difficult central banks enhance a government s ability to borrow by being the sole direct purchaser of government debt the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender this increases lenders confidence that the government will be punished in case of default making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest the sovereign dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank has an incentive to retain the bank data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign s borrowing costs particularly during times of war

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

the bullionist controversy theory and new evidence the bullionist controversy in the united kingdom is one of the first debates about the determination of the price level and the exchange rate under a paper money standard despite the importance of the debate in the development of monetary theory there remains little empirical evidence that uses modern multivariate time series techniques the evidence that does exist provides support for the anti bullionist position the purpose of this paper is to review the debate and develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that is capable of capturing key features of the 19th century british financial system the model is estimated using bayesian procedures to test the competing hypotheses the paper provides support for the bullionist position

money as stock abstract the fiscal theory determines the price level from the value of nominal government debt as a claim to government primary surpluses just as private stock is valued as a claim to corporate profits valuation equations are not constraints so this theory does not mistreat the government s intertemporal budget constraint i anchor the analysis in a simple cash in advance model when money demand falls to zero i show that the price level can still be determined by the government debt valuation equation

applied economics contrast explanation and asymmetric information the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the workings of an explanatory method for applied economics it is a method that is rarely explicitly examined or defended in the discipline but which i believe has a lot of promise for the sorts of contexts that economists must address my strategy is to show that and how the method in question effectively underpins at least one study already widely regarded as explanatorily successful copyright the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

politicians taxes and debt the standard analysis of the efficient management of income taxes and debt assumes a benevolent government and ignores potential distortions arising from rent seeking politicians this paper departs from this framework by assuming that a rent seeking politician chooses policies if the politician chooses extractive policies citizens throw him out of power we analyse the efficient sustainable equilibrium unlike in the standard economy temporary economic shocks generate volatile and persistent changes in taxes along the equilibrium path this serves to optimally limit rent seeking by the politician and to optimally generate support for the politician from the citizens taxes resembling those of the benevolent government are very costly since the government over saves and resources are wasted on rents political distortions thus cause the complete debt market to behave as if it were incomplete however in contrast to an incomplete market economy in the long run taxes do not converge to zero and under some conditions they resemble taxes under a benevolent government

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

a reinterpretation of classical monetary theory relevance to current policy issues is usually not the motivation for studying the history of economic theory however questions about the practicality of conducting monetary policy in a deregulated financial system by controlling the monetary aggregates are stimulating interest in convertibility as an alternative to our present monetary arrangements 3 6 66 since classical writers were mainly concerned with monetary theory and policy under a gold standard it is to be expected that renewed attention will be devoted to classical monetary theory my aim in this paper is to show that contrary to received views about classical monetary theory it was not based on the quantity theory of money on the contrary it was based on a theory of a convertible competitively produced money supply that was fundamentally different from the quantity theory using the modern theory of a competitive money supply we can now rigorously derive many of the basic propositions of classical monetary theory that have been denied or misunderstood by modern theorists operating within the framework of the quantity theory received views about classical monetary theory can be summarized by the following propositions

peacock and wiseman s displacement hypothesis some new long run evidence for the uk this article presents new evidence on the ability of peacock and wiseman s displacement hypothesis to explain temporal increases in the ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic product gdp in the uk using univariate modelling techniques that are robust to structural changes in the underlying data generating process and a data set extending back to 1836 we find four instances where the ratio of expenditure to gdp displays an evidence of a structural break two of these breaks coincide with major social upheavals as predicted by the displacement hypothesis

the suspension of the gold standard as sustainable monetary policy abstract this paper models the gold standard as a state contingent commitment technology that is only feasible during peace monetary policy during war when the gold convertibility rule is suspended can still be credible if the policymaker s plan is to resume the gold standard in the future the dsge model developed in this paper suggests that the resumption of the gold standard was a sustainable plan which replaced the gold standard as a commitment technology and made monetary policy time consistent trigger strategies support the equilibrium private agents retaliate if a policymaker defaults on its plan to resume the gold standard

nuclear energy policy in the united states 1990 2010 a federal or state responsibility this paper examines from a policy perspective nuclear energy policy in the united states us from 1990 to 2010 and questions whether it is or has become a federal or state responsibility the present study as befits policy research engages with many disciplines for example in particular law and politics and hence the contributions move beyond that of nuclear energy policy literature and in particular to that on nuclear new build and other assessments of large infrastructure projects several examples at the federal level are identified that demonstrate that the nuclear industry has evolved to a stage where it requires a focus on the power of actions at a more localised state level in order to re ignite the industry the research concludes that there remains a misunderstanding of the issue of project management for complex construction projects and it is highly arguable whether many of its issues have been resolved further the research asserts that the economics of nuclear energy are not the most influential reason for no nuclear new build in the us

a price discrimination analysis of monetary policy monetary policy is analysed within a model that appeals to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest bearing default free bonds the interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in a version of the overlapping generations model the model shows that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a nonlinear inflation tax and that such a tax may be better in terms of the pareto criterion than a linear inflation tax

an empirical assessment of the swedish bullionist controversy in the eighteenth century a fierce political debate broke out in sweden about the causes of an extraordinary depreciation of the currency more specifically the deteriorating value of the swedish currency was discretionarily blamed on monetary causes e g the overissuing of banknotes or nonmonetary causes such as balance of payments deficits this paper provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of this so called swedish bullionist controversy the results of vector autoregressions suggest that increasing amounts of paper money did give rise to inflation and a depreciation of the exchange rate conversely nonmonetary factors were probably less important for these developments

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

introduction to repeated games with private monitoring abstract we present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring the literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents actions although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price cutting exchange of goods with uncertain quality and observation errors it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players this is in sharp contrast to the well explored case of repeated games under public information with the celebrated folk theorems and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case however rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d43 d82 l13 l41

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

the origins of central banking solutions to the free rider problem certain domestic institutions are sources of international power by way of their abilities to encourage investment and to mobilize social resources in wartime for example states with democratic institutions almost always win the wars they e ght a regularity known as the democratic advantage 1 this result is intriguing since it rests on intuition about the effects of military competition on domestic institutions rivalry among states may put pressure on sovereigns to provide the political foundations for secure markets in order to enlarge future military capabilities in this article i address the role of war in inducing domestic institutions that allowed governments to credibly commit to promises to pay their debts a probable source of democracies edge in war rather than investigate the entire range of protections affected by democratic institutions a life s endeavor as the work of douglass north attests i focus on a single e nancial element of the reforms the innovation of central banking britain s superior e nancial economic and military performance after 1689 rested in large part on the establishment of the bank of england 2 the central bank provided a commitment technology that improved the government s ability to borrow a need impelled by intense military competition 3 my motivation derives from puzzles concerning the origins and the diffusion of credibility enhancing institutions like central banks institutions resolve collective action problems but institutions themselves are public goods meaning that their origins are subject to the same dilemmas they are meant to resolve 4 what then explains the incentives of self interested and free riding individuals to contribute to

state capacity and military conflict powerful centralized states controlling a large share of national income only begin to appear in europe after 1500 we build a model that explains their emergence in response to the increasing importance of money for military success when fiscal resources are not crucial for winning wars the threat of external conflict stifles state building as finance becomes critical internally cohesive states invest in state capacity while divided states rationally drop out of the competition causing divergence we emphasize the role of the military revolution a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflict using data from 374 battles we investigate empirically both the importance of money for military success and patterns of state building in early modern europe the evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model

information cascades and revolutionary regime transitions we combine acemoglu and robinson s model of the economic origins of democracy with lohmann s model of political mass protest this allows us to analyse the economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of revolution we are able to derive conditions under which democracy arises peacefully when it occurs only after a revolution and when oligarchy persists we model these possibilities in a world of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible and where these cascades may involve errors in the sense that they make everyone worse off

bargaining reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts consider a two person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period and collect payoffs as a function of that period s actions while bargaining proceeds this can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split because a folk theorem applies perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided as the perturbation probabilities approach zero behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent s play in equilibrium rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues how much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining in both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the nash bargaining with threats nbwt theory developed for two stage games in any perfect bayesian equilibrium she can guarantee herself virtually her nbwt payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy in every period ask for and accept nothing less than that player s nbwt share and while waiting for the other side to concede take the action nash recommends as a threat in his two stage game the results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others this is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two sided reputational perturbations and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go

the application of contrast explanation to energy policy research uk nuclear energy policy 2002 2012 abstract this paper advances the application of the methodology contrast explanation to energy policy research research in energy policy is complex and often involves inter disciplinary work which traditional economic methodologies fail to capture consequently the more encompassing methodology of contrast explanation is assessed and its use in other social science disciplines explored in brief it is then applied to an energy policy research topic in this case nuclear energy policy research in the uk contrast explanation facilitates research into policy and decision making processes in energy studies and offers an alternative to the traditional economic methods used in energy research further contrast explanation is extended by the addition of contested and uncontested hypotheses analyses this research focuses on the methods employed to deliver the new nuclear programme of the uk government in order to achieve a sustainable nuclear energy policy three issues are of major importance 1 law policy and development 2 public administration and 3 project management further the research identifies that policy in the area remains to be resolved in particular at an institutional and legal level however contrary to the literature in some areas the research identifies a change of course as the uk concentrates on delivering a long term policy for the nuclear energy sector and the overall energy sector

the effect of distributive goals on the time inconsistency of optimal taxes abstract in the context of a two period n consumer model of optimal wage and interest taxation this paper asks whether the government s distributive goals can inhibit its incentives to renege on its announced policies inconsistent interest tax increases may be moderated by distributed goals if they create an unacceptable utility distribution in the economy this result is developed for a general case its implications for welfare and savings are illustrated with numerical examples

dictators development and the virtue of political instability a large body of literature stresses the benefits of regime stability for economic growth in poor countries this view however discounts the gains from threats to regime security when populations living under dictatorial regimes cannot benefit from the disciplining of political competition available to voters in democracies this paper applies a model of economic growth to study the sources of the differences in economic performance and repression policy among dictatorships as well as the parallel in dictatorial regimes of the benefits achieved through political competition in democracies threats to the security of dictatorial regimes are shown to be a means of benefiting the population through the responses of the regime

the riksbank emergency finance policy experimentation and sweden s reversal of fortune abstract at the beginning of the 18th century sweden was an imperial power that had just sustained a century of modest economic growth in 1800 sweden s empire was gone after a series of military defeats real gdp per capita had fallen to the same level as the early 1600s in other words the 18th century witnessed the end of the swedish empire and a startling reversal of economic progress in this paper i propose a possible explanation for both of these outcomes first i argue that sweden s limited fiscal capacity played an important role the creation of the riksbank should have facilitated government borrowing and military spending as the bank of england did for the british however the riksbank was not designed or equipped for this role i document the constraints on financing national defense through the riksbank and argue that the bank was ill equipped to finance an adequate national defense this explains the reversal of the empire second when the hats took power in the riksdag in 1739 they used the riksbank to give loans to firms which were financed through the issuance of bank notes the objective was to increase investment and economic activity i find no evidence that these loans had any effect on real gdp per capita however the resulting inflation has a negative and significant effect on output during the period of inconvertible paper money the combined evidence suggests that hat policy contributed to the decline in economic activity during the reversal of fortune

modern hyper and high inflations since 1947 hyperinflations by cagan s definition in market economies have been rare much more common have been longer inflationary processes with inflation rates above 100 percent per annum based on a sample of 133 countries and using the 100 percent threshold as the basis for a definition of very high inflation episodes this paper examines the main characteristics of such inflations among other things we find that i close to 20 percent of countries have experienced inflation above 100 percent per annum ii higher inflation tends to be more unstable iii in high inflation countries the relationship between the fiscal balance and seigniorage is strong both in the short and long run iv inflation inertia decreases as average inflation rises v high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic performance and vi stabilizations from high inflation that rely on the exchange rate as the nominal anchor are expansionary

price discriminating monetary policy a nonuniform pricing approach abstract this paper establishes that a version of the bryant and wallace 1984 price discrimination analysis of monetary policy can be viewed as a special case of the spence 1977 nonuniform pricing model to this end a general equilibrium model is constructed with heterogeneous agents and a government that faces an informational restriction the government must finance an exogenously determined stationary deficit by issuing bonds or currency with quantity dependent prices in addition to generalizing the bryant and wallace model the analysis accomplishes the following i the informational restriction helps justify the ruling out of lumpsum taxation a crucial assumption of the bryant and wallace model and ii the analysis provides insight into nonuniform pricing in a simple general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents

the financial power of the powerless socio economic status and interest rates under partial rule of law in advanced economies interest rates vary inversely with the borrower s socio economic status which itself depends inversely on default risk these relationships depend on the impartiality of the law where the law is markedly biased in favour of certain groups the latter will pay a surcharge for capital legal power as measured by privileges before the law thus undermines financial power the capacity to borrow cheaply developing this argument this paper also tests it through judicial records from ottoman istanbul 1602 1799 three privileged ottoman groups men muslims and titled elites all paid relatively high interest rates conditional on various loan characteristics this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

paying for war and building states the coalitional politics of debt servicing and tax institutions many scholars believe that intense warfare propelled state formation in early modern europe because rulers built tax institutions to pay for wars scholars likewise cite milder geopolitical pressures to explain the lackluster state building in the developing world the authors analyze episodes of ferocious warfare in and beyond europe and find that despite similar fiscal strains not all governments built strong tax institutions to service wartime debt when net creditors in a country s credit market were part of the ruling political coalition they pressed governments to diversify taxes and strengthen fiscal institutions to ensure debt service but when net debtors held political sway governments were indifferent to debt servicing and fiscal invigoration coalitional politics can help to explain why mounting debt service obligations led to fiscal institution building in some cases but not others the analysis highlights how the private economic interests of ruling coalition members can affect state building