media scrutiny and the quality of public officials i investigate whether attempts by the media to determine a candidate s fitness for office lowers the average quality of public officials what i call the media scrutiny paradox media scrutiny imperfectly signals heterogeneous candidates type but imposes privacy costs and reputational costs on politicians the quality of office holders falls if the selection effect is adverse and outweighs the screening effect a low quality information signal which could result if the media focus on irrelevant aspects of behavior makes the screening effect small and the media paradox more likely to hold individuals of good character might invest more in their reputation and have more at stake from being falsely identified as a rapscallion the actual malice standard established in new york times v sullivan likely increased relatively the cost of candidacy for good people and lowered the quality of officials

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

handling unobserved site characteristics in random utility models of recreation demand abstract this paper presents a new random utility model of recreation demand that addresses the unobserved characteristics of recreation sites most random utility recreation demand models implicitly assume that all relevant site characteristics are observed by the researcher or allow for the possibility of unobserved characteristics in a restrictive manner unlike traditional approaches the proposed model avoids the bias unobserved site characteristics can cause in welfare estimates and the travel cost parameter monte carlo simulations motivate the proposed model by showing that it provides more efficient parameter estimates in contrast existing methods yield less efficient estimates and biased standard errors that overstate precision an empirical application to recreational fishing in wisconsin illustrates the potential importance of this modeling innovation in this application controlling for unobserved characteristics is important for a range of model specifications

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

leviathan at bay constitutional versus political controls on government a dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on government but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions james madison federalist no 51 i introduction citizens possess two main methods of controlling politicians elections and constitutional constraints the british system of parliamentary supremacy and america s written constitution with judicial review by the supreme court reflect the contrasting approaches political theorists continue to debate the relative effectiveness of constitutional and electoral controls on politicians these controls seemingly are substitutes if elections effectively control politicians constitutional constraints become redundant and can only lower the effectiveness of government public choice theory separately examines elections and constitutions an extensive literature beginning with barro 1973 analyzes electoral controls but has not considered constitutional controls constitutional political economy examines various constraints on politicians buchanan 1987 brennan and buchanan 1980 yet assumes elections insufficiently control politicians recent studies of term limits i e dick and lott 1993 represent one effort to analyze constitutional and electoral controls together i integrate constitutional limits on government into a model of electoral control of politicians my model features two types of politicians knaves who abuse discretionary powers at their disposal and angels who never misuse power citizens delegate a variable amount of discretionary power to government which provides benefits if properly employed but lowers welfare if abused the interaction between constitutional limits and elections is complicated constraints complement electoral controls based on politician payoffs selection and incentive effects while the screening and sorting effects substitute for constraints i proceed in this paper as follows section ii describes the citizen s constitutional delegation of authority to government and incorporates electoral screening of candidates optimal delegation of power increases with the effectiveness of screening but unless screening is perfect constitutional limits help keep leviathan at bay section iii endogenizes the candidate pool and examines the selection effect constitutional controls the composition of the candidate pool depends on delegation to government which has implications for the propensity of politicians to pursue their personal self interest while constitutional political economy relies heavily on the threat from knavish politicians many political observers contend that most politicians sincerely pursue the public interest as they perceive it i show that politicians observed honesty does not invalidate the argument for chains section iv considers the ability of repeated elections to sort knaves out of office the sorting effect increases optimal delegation of power to government but constraints can still play a useful role if knaves try for office and electoral review is not continuous section v allows knaves to act opportunistically and considers the incentive effect of retrospective voting and post political incentives constitutional constraints complement electoral incentives by limiting opportunistic knaves gain from shirking the final section concludes ii constitutional choice in a model of angels and knaves i adopt a principal agent view of government a representative citizen selects an agent to exercise the powers of government on her behalf the representative citizen framework abstracts from differences amongst the population about the actions the agent should undertake the control of politicians becomes difficult in the absence of a common interest both positively and normatively consequently models of electoral control typically employ this assumption 1 the agency model assumes a conflict of interest between the principal and agent

estimation and welfare analysis with large demand systems we develop an approach for estimating individual or household level preferences for a large set of quality differentiated goods and for constructing hicksian welfare measures within the demand system framework our approach uses a maximum simulated likelihood procedure to recover estimates of the structural parameters and a multistage monte carlo markov chain algorithm for constructing hicksian consumer surplus estimates we illustrate our approach with a recreation dataset consisting of day trips to 62 mid atlantic beaches

non price equilibria for non marketed goods abstract as part of the resources for the future frontiers of environmental economics collection of papers we consider the problem of general equilibrium feedback effects in non price space as they relate to non market valuation our overall objective is to examine the extent to which non price equilibria arising from both simple and complex sorting behavior can be empirically modeled and the resulting differences in partial and general equilibrium welfare measures quantified after motivating the problem in general we consider the specific context of congestion in recreation demand applications which we classify as the outcome of a simple sorting equilibrium using both econometric and computable general equilibrium cge models we examine the conceptual and computational challenges associated with this class of problems and present findings on promising solution avenues we demonstrate the relevance of accounting for congestion effects in recreation demand with an application to lake visits in iowa our econometric and cge results confirm that for some plausible counterfactual scenarios substantial differences exist between partial and general equilibrium welfare estimates we conclude the paper by describing tasks that are needed to move forward research in this area

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

the neoclassical model of consumer demand with identically priced commodities an application to time of use electricity pricing hick s theorem permits aggregation of commodities when their relative prices are fixed but contrary to a widely expressed view it does not require that they be aggregated even where commodities have identical prices all of their income elasticities and many of their price elasticities can be identified through econometric estimation our empirical illustration uses the generalized leontief indirect utility function with data from the wisconsin residential electricity pricing experiment we model the demand for six commodities although there are only two unique prices

employment time and the cyclicality of earnings growth abstract we study how the distribution of earnings growth evolves over the business cycle in italy we distinguish between two sources of annual earnings growth changes in employment time number of weeks of employment within a year and changes in weekly earnings changes in employment time generate the tails of the earnings growth distribution and account for its procyclical skewness in contrast the distribution of weekly earnings growth is close to symmetric and stable over the cycle this suggests that studies of earnings risk should carefully model the employment margin to avoid erroneous conclusions on the nature and magnitude of risks underlying individual earnings we show that the combination of simple employment and wage processes is enough to capture the complex features of the earnings growth distribution

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

an empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product type choices i describe a model of entry with endogenous product type choices these choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals differentiated products have nonuniform competitive effects on profits i estimate the model for location choices in the video retail industry using a nested fixed point algorithm solution the results imply significant returns to product differentiation simulations illustrate the tradeoff between demand and intensified competition and the extent to which markets with more scope for differentiation support greater entry

general equilibrium benefits for environmental improvements projected ozone reductions under epa s prospective analysis for the los angeles air basin abstract this research demonstrates how locational equilibrium models can be used for benefit measurement with the detail required to match epa s benefit analysis for the first prospective analysis using the projected changes in ozone concentrations for 2000 and 2010 together with the sieg et al int econ rev forthcoming estimates for household preferences for housing education and air quality this paper measures general equilibrium willingness to pay for the policy scenarios developed for the prospective study as they relate to households in the los angeles area benefits are evaluated taking account at the household level of initial air quality conditions relocation based on changes in ozone and price changes the framework generalizes the partial equilibrium general equilibrium comparisons available with conventional computable general equilibrium and property capitalization models estimated general equilibrium gains from the policy range from 33 to 2400 annually at a household level in 1990 dollars

evaluating policy interventions with general equilibrium externalities abstract we report on the results of analytical and numerical models that describe the effects of non separable externalities or public goods on public policies with important general equilibrium consequences in the numerical exercise we calibrate a general equilibrium model with non separable air quality benefits in order to measure the excess burden and total net benefits of transportation and energy taxes in the 1995 u s economy the change in the physical level and the economic value in air quality associated with a given policy is a function of the substitution patterns between air quality and market goods that we assume the size of the deadweight loss due to pre existing distortions such as a tax on labor income is substantially affected by these substitution patterns

a dual approach to modeling corner solutions in recreation demand abstract the dual approach of lee and pitt to estimating demand systems for which individuals often choose not to consume one or more of the available goods provides a utility consistent framework for estimating preferences over visits to recreation sites because of the complexity of the model however this approach has not been applied in the recreation demand literature this paper provides the first application of the model to recreation demand and develops a methodology for conducting welfare analysis relying on monte carlo integration to derive estimates of compensating variation the methods are applied to the demand for fishing in the wisconsin great lakes region

linear demand functions in theory and practice abstract integrability conditions for an incomplete system of linear demand functions are considered the parameter restrictions consistent with integrability are identified and the structure of the conditional preference map is obtained it is found that the conditional preferences for a set of linear demand functions are either quadratic or leontief from a translated origin welfare analysis with linear demand models is also considered

political hierarchies and political shirking abstract we analyze how citizens can screen candidates for high political office in a political hierarchy in our model politicians differ in willingness to misuse discretionary powers of office those politicians willing to abuse the powers of office knaves can be induced in a hierarchy to reveal their type while in low office thus disqualifying themselves for advancement hierarchy s capacity for screening knaves out of high office depends on the conditions for reappointment to low office a seemingly perverse rule that reappoints shirking politicians can perform well to demonstrate an empirical application we analyze shirking in the house bank check bouncing scandal