relative wage positions and quit behavior evidence from linked employer employee data the authors analyze the importance of relative wage positions within firms in western germany in the context of individual quit decisions as an inverse measure of job satisfaction using a linked employer employee data set liab for the years 1996 2005 whose sample consists of full time male prime age workers in western germany without college degrees they ascertain whether workers find status or signal effects stronger motivators for quit decisions they find that workers with higher relative wage positions within their firms are on average more likely to quit their jobs than those with lower relative wage positions and that workers who experience a loss in their relative wage positions are also more likely to accept a wage cut associated with their job transition overall results suggest that a signal effect is on average stronger than a status effect

retail bank deposits as quasi fixed factors of production neoclassical models of the banking firm for example michael klein 1971 treat all deposit liabilities as fully variable factors of production banks then maximize profits minimize liability costs by equating the marginal costs of all liability types during each period the empirical relevance of these models is difficult to establish because binding deposit rate ceilings regulation q force bank competition for many retail deposits into implicit interest channels that are not readily measured it is therefore noteworthy that during two recent periods when deposit rate ceilings were not binding banks paid retail deposit rates considerably in excess of the rate at which they could borrow via large unregulated certificates of deposit such behavior seems inconsistent with the cost minimization prescribed by neoclassical bank models however if retail deposit accounts are interpreted as quasi fixed gary becker 1962 walter oi 1962 donald parsons 1972 sherwin rosen 1968 inputs to the banking firm these important historical observations can be reconciled with bank profit maximization this paper first describes two historical episodes during which the bank retail deposit rate exceeded the negotiable certificate of deposit rate for substantial periods of time while no profit maximizing cost minimizing bank would pay such a rate differential if retail deposit quantities are costlessly variable interpreting retail deposit accounts as quasi fixed inputs to the bank explains the peculiar rate structures a simple two period model of bank liability selection formalizes the analysis i two puzzling historical episodes

bank forward lending in alternative funding environments this paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit funding and liability management environments assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain the bank must choose its supply of commitments given this choice the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending but merely accommodate the credit needs of their customers similarly the central banker s claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short run becomes understandable in a new context it is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system it is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments expected bank and banking system size

a quantitative model of sovereign debt bailouts and conditionality in times of sovereign debt crises international financial institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies this paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy in the model the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long run increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump shaped pattern of sovereign default risk

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

commercial paper bank reserve requirements and the informational role of loan commitments abstract an explanation is provided of the often observed purchase of back up bank loan commitments by corporations immediately preceding their sale of dealer placed commercial paper since loan commitments are typically viewed as hedging instruments our paper explains why a risk neutral corporation would purchase this type of instrument and how it is priced it is assumed that while firms know their own credit risks neither banks nor the paper market can distinguish between some credit applicants we show that the purchase of a commitment can identify these firms to the market the equilibrium is partially revealing of the firms with unobservable quality those with higher quality identify themselves by purchasing commitments while those with lower quality sell unbacked paper and are pooled together unbacked paper is sold also by firms whose quality is observable unidentified firms in the lowest quality range do not sell commercial paper

tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries abstract based on a sample of 56 countries we show that fiscal policy in the g7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical i e fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times to explain this puzzle we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending given this distortion a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base as is the case for developing countries will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy

the dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover abstract this paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the interaction of sovereign default risk and political turnover two parties differ in their preferred size of unproductive public spending which is financed by taxes and external debt electoral outcomes are characterized by the economic benefits from the incumbent s policies and stochastic idiosyncratic ideological aspects quantitative findings suggest that endogenous political turnover increases the discrepancies between the optimal borrowing and default policies of the two parties prior to a debt crisis the incumbent government accumulates external debt to foster the probability of remaining in power the dynamic interaction of electoral outcomes external debt and sovereign default supports arguments for imposing institutional constraints on incumbent governments

money and rank in the labor market abstract we analyze the gains losses in wage and in rank position for workers switching firm voluntary movers enjoy a wage premium relative to stayers but that premium declines with rank inside the new firm indicating that movers are trading off money and rank

sovereign and private default risks over the business cycle abstract sovereign debt crises are often accompanied by deep recessions with sharp declines in external credit to the private sector in a sample of emerging economies we find that both sovereign and private interest rate spreads are countercyclical this paper presents a model of a small open economy that accounts for these empirical regularities it includes private firms which finance a fraction of imports by external debt and are subject to idiosyncratic productivity risk and a government which borrows internationally and taxes firms to finance public expenditures the model gives rise to endogenous private and sovereign interest rate spreads and a dynamic feedback mechanism between sovereign and private default risks through the endogenous response of fiscal policy to adverse productivity shocks

maturity intermediation and intertemporal lending policies of financial intermediaries this paper considers the maturity intermediation and intertemporal lending decisions of risk averse financial intermediaries in particular the maturity mismatch problem and the fixed versus variable rate lending decision are modeled when the major source of risk involves uncertain future interest rates the results imply that the strategy of matching the maturity of assets and liabilities is not generally optimal or even minimum risk this is due primarily to the built in hedge that the intermediary has as a result of rolling over short term loans while continuing to finance long term loans intertemporal dependencies between loan demand and costs or both also have an effect on the optimal degree of maturity mismatching and provide one rationale for making loans at rates below current marginal cost

an analysis of bank loan rate indexation this paper examines the economic rationale for the use of bank loan commitments and the effect on the allocation of bank credit of indexing the loan rate offered through the commitment to the prime a simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in loan demand and the cost of bank funds have on the allocation of bank credit under indexation it is shown that indexing implies changes in the relative cost of borrowing for certain groups of bank customers for nonprime customers an increase in the cost of bank funds results in a decline in the relative cost of borrowing under commitments the pattern of commitment use is found to be consistent with the predictions of the model recent surveys have found that the majority of commercial and industrial loans are made under pre existing loan commitments these surveys also find that for most commercial and industrial loans the interest rate is tied or indexed to the prime rate although indexing loan rates is widespread there has been little theoretical or empirical work on the effect of this pricing scheme on the allocation of bank credit the paucity of research in this area is surprising considering the frequency with which indexed contracts are used and the current controversy surrounding the use of the prime as an index 2 the purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the effect of indexed loan rates on the intertemporal allocation of bank credit a simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in the cost of bank funds and changes in loan demand have on the allocation of credit under indexation use of this model demonstrates that indexed contracts do not result in an efficient allocation in the sense that the resulting allocation does not replicate the allocation obtained with complete contingent contracts finally the model is tested empirically using data on commitment use from the quarterly survey of the terms of commercial bank lending it is shown that indexing

toward a theory of bank loan commitments abstract the characteristics of fixed and variable rate bank loan commitments are analyzed in a contingent claims framework and valuation expressions are derived for these commitments the valuation expressions are used to present estimates of the impact of interest rate uncertainty on the liability assumed by a bank issuing loan commitments finally a simple two period asymmetric information model is employed to explain the recent trend among bankers to substitute variable rate commitments for their fixed rate counterparts

community comparisons and subjective well being in a divided society using a south african data set the paper poses six questions about the determinants of subjective well being much of the paper is concerned with the role of relative concepts we find that comparator income measured as average income of others in the local residential cluster enters the household s utility function positively but that income of more distant others others in the district or province enters negatively the ordered probit equations indicate that as well as comparator groups based on spatial proximity race based comparator groups are important in the racially divided south african society it is also found that relative income is more important to happiness at higher levels of absolute income potential explanations of these results and their implications are considered

social comparisons in oligopsony abstract a large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers valuation of the wage they receive the consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood we analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive dis utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms as social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages the wage distribution becomes more equal and employment shifts to high productivity firms moreover the total wage bill and output increase while aggregate profits decline overall welfare rises our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm

fairness and frictions the impact of unequal raises on quit behavior we analyze how separations responded to arbitrary differences in own and peer wages at a large us retailer regression discontinuity estimates imply large causal effects of own wages on separations and on quits in particular however this own wage response could reflect comparisons either to market wages or to peer wages estimates using peer wage discontinuities show large peer wage effects and imply the own wage separation response mostly reflects peer comparisons the peer effect is driven by comparisons with higher paid peers suggesting concerns about fairness separations appear fairly insensitive when raises are similar across peers suggesting search frictions and monopsony are relevant in this low wage sector

relative pay and its effects on firm efficiency in a transitional economy abstract in this study we examine the impact of relative pay manager pay divided by average worker pay on a firm s productivity using data from a major transitional economy china we find that relative pay is negatively associated with high productivity our results provide support for the view that workers are alienated when their incomes are far lower than that of top management and this leads to lower productivity this effect is most pronounced in labor intensive firms

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

sovereign defaults and liquidity crises abstract sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises the conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation although there is no clear empirical evidence on classic default penalties this paper emphasizes instead a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions i government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and ii the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default in this context external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties and government default is countercyclical triggers a liquidity crunch and amplifies output volatility in addition a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments access to foreign credit

intermediation and cost determinants of large bank liability composition abstract a translog profit function is estimated for an aggregate of large u s money center banks over 1970 1975 estimates of liability substitution elasticities and own price elasticities of demand are obtained and contrasted with results from earlier partial equilibrium studies statistical analyses led to the rejection of two commonly held propositions in banking 1 that the aggregation of all bank debt to obtain a debt equity ratio is valid and 2 that asset structure can be ignored when liability composition is being determined a mixed full information maximum likelihood estimation technique was used in estimation

loan commitment contracts terms of lending and credit allocation this paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters lenders offer borrowers a set of loan packages from which the latter may choose that package found to be most appealing borrowers may trade off changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments the borrower at this time may purchase a larger credit ration for a price supporting empirical evidence is presented recently researchers have begun to study the determinants of loan commitment or line of credit contracts such contracts play an extremely important role in bank credit allocation according to the federal reserve bulletin over 70 of u s commercial and industrial loans are made under loan commitment contracts given the central importance of the institution it is not surprising that it is the subject of a growing literature loan commitment contracts have importance both at the micro level in terms of the bank customer relationship and at the marco level in terms of the channels of operation of monetary policy in this paper we seek to present and test empirically an analytic model of loan commitment contracts our paper differs from most previous work in that we include empirical analysis of credit allocation moreover most previous theoretical work on the subject has concentrated on the specific issue of pricing of the contracts often using an approach based on option theory and not on the quantity allocation of credit and its determinants we are particularly interested in the determinants of the quantitative allocation of credit to bank customers and in the composition of and trade offs among the various parameters comprising such a loan commitment package our model helps explain how contract terms are established in the market and will illuminate the institutional framework of commercial lending a view of the credit contract as a package of loan terms has been implied recently in connection with the credit rationing problem studies by azzi and cox 21 arzac schwartz and whitcomb 11 and koskela 81 show that the

bank forward lending a note increase in the bank s borrowing cost similarly leads to reduced commitment sales and expected bank lending a stochastic increase in customer takedowns is found to have an ambiguous effect on the bank s commitment decision the force of these results is limited because all bank lending is assumed to be done via loan commitments although most bank lending particularly to businesses is indeed done via commitments see hanweck 4 the possibility of spot market lending can be expected to influence the bank s commitment decision for example if the bank initially chooses its commitment volume and the customer subsequently determines the fraction of commitments to exercise the bank commonly retains the option of purchasing and or selling additional loans in the spot market after the customer s takedown is realized moreover the bank s opportunity to transact in the spot market after realizing the customer s takedown can be expected to influence its initial choice of commitments the purpose of this note is to examine whether the dgk results continue to hold in a setting where banks have spot market lending opportunities the model used here incorporates two significant modifications whereas both deposits d and the takedown fraction 0 were random variables in dgk we now have only one random variable the spot interest rate s realized after the bank chooses its commitment volume the takedown fraction is consequently expressed as a deterministic function of the spot interest rate second a more general bank borrowing cost function mc l s depending on the bank s level of lending l and the spot interest rate obviates the need for a deposits variable with our slightly altered formulation we examine three cases

on matching book a problem in banking and corporate finance in each of the asset and liability markets in which the banking firm is an intermediary typically there are instruments with differing maturities the bank matching book problem is to manage the term structures of assets and liabilities in our first model the bank borrows and lends only short run in our second model the bank borrows only short run but can lend short run and long run the criterion in both models is the expected value of the present value of dividends issued both models yield dynamic programming problems broad aspects of optimal policies are indicated

loan commitments investment decisions and the signalling equilibrium abstract this paper analyzes the use of loan commitments to finance future risky investment projects when the capital market is informed of a firm s project quality having a loan commitment would lead the firm to overinvest if banks are competitively rational the cost of this overinvestment would be borne by the firm making the loan commitment contract unattractive when the project quality is private information firms will signal their project qualities through purchasing loan commitments this signal is credible because purchasing a loan commitment poses overinvestment cost to the firm this paper establishes and characterizes this dissipative signalling equilibrium

the determinants of recovery rates in the us corporate bond market we examine recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the us corporate bond market based on a complete set of traded prices and volumes a study of the trading microstructure around various types of default events is provided we document temporary price pressure with high trading volumes on the default day and the following 30 days and low trading activity thereafter based on this analysis we determine market based recovery rates and quantify various liquidity measures we study the relation between the recovery rates and these measures considering additionally a comprehensive set of bond characteristics firm fundamentals and macroeconomic variables

job satisfaction and co worker wages status or signal we use matched employer employee panel data to show that individual job satisfaction is higher when other workers in the same establishment are better paid this runs counter to substantial existing evidence of income comparisons in subjective well being we argue that the difference hinges on the nature of the reference group we here use co workers their earnings not only induce jealousy but also provide a signal about the worker s own future earnings in our data this positive future earnings signal outweighs any negative status effect this phenomenon is stronger for men and in the private sector but weaker for those nearer retirement

optimal borrowing and bank lending policies an interactive approach abstract in recent years the literature on bank lending has greatly expanded to cover such issues as the role of different lending systems alternative funding environments and interest rate polities in this paper we consider these issues from an interactive borrower bank perspective the borrower makes his borrowing decisions as a function of interest rates given his credit requirements which are assumed to vary over time and the available lending systems the bank determines its funding lending and investment polities which are dynamic determined over time and assuming optimal behavior on behalf of its borrowers determines interest rates on loans credit balances and other deposits the analysis of the bank s model provides interesting insights into lending and funding policies and shows that fixed term lending arrangements may generate additional costs to the financial system while the overdraft system does not and therefore is more efficient in this environment

when information dominates comparison abstract we propose a micro econometric evaluation of the relation between life satisfaction and income distribution using a balanced panel survey of the russian population russian longitudinal monitoring survey rlms running from 1994 to 2000 covering 4685 individuals we show that in the context of the very volatile russian environment hirschman s q j econ 87 1973 544 tunnel effect conjecture seems to be confirmed variables reflecting income distribution do not influence satisfaction through social comparisons individuals rather seem to use their informational content in order to form their expectations the reference group s income thereby exerts a positive influence on individual satisfaction which contrasts with other studies on the subject inequality indices do not affect individual welfare

bank loan commitments and interest rate volatility bank loan commitments are examined in the context of option pricing models and a valuation formula is obtained the partial takedown phenomenon which is both distinctive and vexatious is considered in detail finally estimates of the value of u s bank loan commitments and their sensitivity to interest rate changes are provided

happiness and job satisfaction in urban china a comparative study of two generations of migrants and urban locals this study investigates determinants of happiness and job satisfaction of urban locals first generation migrants and new generation migrants in china s urban workforce we present evidence to suggest that new generation migrants are less satisfied with their jobs and lives than first generation migrants despite having higher income this finding is consistent with aspirations rising faster than income in china s fast growing urban economy

why not cut pay abstract i interviewed over 300 business people labor leaders business consultants and counselors of unemployed people all in the northeast of the united states during the recession of the early 1990 s in order to learn why wages and salaries declined in only a few firms employers were reluctant to cut pay because they believed doing so would hurt employee morale leading to lower productivity and current or future difficulties with hiring and retention it was thought that these effects would in the end cost more than the savings from lower pay there were few indications that unemployed people had excessive wage expectations on the contrary many unemployed were too flexible and found themselves rejected by firms as overqualified in most companies pay cuts were not a useful alternative to layoffs because pay cuts would not make it worthwhile to retain many employees and because layoffs harmed morale less than would pay cuts the findings support none of the theories of wage rigidity except those of solow and akerlof that emphasize morale

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

comment on what drives bank competition some international evidence the question of bank competition is vitally important for a number of reasons the essential role of bank credit and other financial services as an input in the production of most other goods and services places banks in a unique and influential position such that any allocative inefficiency or other market distortions in banking are almost certain to be felt throughout the economy moreover recent history has provided numerous instances where the textbook paradigm of atomistic competition has proven inadequate as a policy guide for efficient banking either because there are simply too few banks to rely on sheer numbers as a guarantee of vigorous competition as in canada or because of evidence that there can be such a thing as too much competition in banking as suggested by several studies or because of instances where nearly competitive pricing has been observed in markets containing only one or two banks or because conversely substantially noncompetitive pricing has sometimes been deduced in banking products such as credit cardswith thousands of suppliers thus the study of bank competition remains an urgent field of research claessens and laeven 2004 this issue of jmcb make two key contributions here first they extend a proven empirical method to an unprecedentedly large and varied crosscountry sample second they offer the logical and policy relevant additional step of seeking to identify factors associated with variations in measured conduct this step is needed to assess the empirical validity of the traditional structure conductperformance paradigm in their sample and is especially important where that paradigm is found lacking as a predictor of bank conduct indeed although the authors

social network structure and status competition in status competition studies the utility of heterogeneous individuals typically depends on an economy wide average indicator of status in our model emulative and jealous agents are embedded in an exogenous network where agent specific reference group is determined by the direct link emanating from the agent similarly to ghiglino and goyal 2010 but in a somewhat different framework we show that individual consumption is proportional to the agent s outbound katz bonacich network centrality measure and equilibrium is generally inefficient more important the negative externality associated with each agent depends on her inbound centrality measure the conspicuousness index a tax based on this index combined with a uniform lump sum transfer attains efficiency

a general model of the banking firm under conditions of monopoly uncertainty and recourse abstract we develop a stochastic programming model of the monopolistic competition banking firm it assumes the bank faces a downward sloping loan demand curve and is a price taker in securities markets uncertainty and liquidity requirements are incorporated bank decisions are made within a two stage framework where realized disturbances that violate constraints can be rectified ex post at a cost the results are 1 optimal loan and deposit rates are positive functions of the recourse penalty 2 asset liability decisions are interdependent and elastically supplied deposits lower the loan rate 3 the effect of uncertainty depends upon the penalty rate level

executive compensation and tournament theory empirical tests on danish data this article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation i test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2 600 executives in 210 danish firms during a 4 year period i ask are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance most of the predictions gain support in the data

relative wages efficiency wages and keynesian unemployment while modern economic theorists have produced a variety of explanations for the failure of wages to fall in the face of unemployment keynes emphasis on relative wages has not been reflected in most contemporary discussions this short paper suggests that relative wage theories in which workers productivity depends primarily on their relative wage provide the best available apparatus for understanding actual unemployment and its fluctuations such theories are very closely related to the efficiency wage theories that have received widespread attention in recent years this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

caste comparisons in india evidence from subjective well being data this paper evaluates how caste influences economic comparisons in india using happiness data from an original panel survey we find that both within caste comparisons and between caste comparisons reduce well being between caste comparisons reduce well being three times more than within caste comparisons in absolute terms an increase in rival caste expenditures affects well being as much as primary expenditure these findings highlight the strong influence that comparisons between rival castes have on well being yet this comparison scheme turns out to be asymmetrical only low caste individuals are affected by the economic successes of their rivals whereas only higher caste individuals compete with their fellows

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

financial intermediary s choice of borrowing this research investigates several dynamic stochastic models of a bank s management problem of the term structures of its assets and liabilities a bank can either eliminate most of its interest risk with appropriate options or it can utilize its expertise in its core business and seek extraordinary profits this research concerns a bank with the latter goal in this model the bank seeks to maximize the expected present value of dividend issued subject to the federal reserve s regulatory constraint and liquidity constraint with this model we find that if the available deposits are not too high and the level of liquid assets is high enough then it is optimal for a bank to accept all of the available deposits however if the level of liquid assets is too low then a bank should not issue a dividend or to accept any deposits the properties are still valid even if the bank is not risk neutral

who compares to whom the anatomy of income comparisons in europe this article provides unprecedented direct evidence from large scale survey data on both the intensity how much and direction to whom of income comparisons income comparisons are considered to be at least somewhat important by three quarters of europeans they are associated with both lower levels of subjective well being and a greater demand for income redistribution the rich compare less and are happier than average when they do which latter is consistent with relative income theory with respect to the direction of comparisons colleagues are the most frequently cited reference group those who compare to colleagues are happier than those who compare to other benchmarks

sovereign risk and secondary markets conventional wisdom says that in the absence of default penalties sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade we show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets without this assumption foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties this result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly to reduce its effects one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets jel f34 g12 g15

internal debt crises and sovereign defaults internal and sovereign debt crises occur together and happen more frequently in economies with weak bankruptcy institutions this paper provides a novel explanation internal crises arise because of the inability to liquidate private debtors when many default in an optimal contract a successful entrepreneur repays yet an unsuccessful one defaults and liquidates his assets the bounds on liquidation generate however a second equilibrium where domestic borrowers default because others are also defaulting during these coordinated defaults tax collections fall which increases sovereign default risk in the model joint debt crises are an optimal response to informational problems in private sector lending

sovereign risk interbank freezes and aggregate fluctuations abstract this paper shows how spillovers from sovereign risk to banks access to wholesale funding establish a bank sovereign nexus in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set up heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral government borrowing under limited commitment is costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral drops these spillovers by impeding interbank intermediation lower the penalty from defaulting due to an interbank freeze during a recession and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy the model is calibrated using greek data and is capable of reproducing stylized facts from the european sovereign debt crisis in an application we show that the ecb s non standard financing operations mitigate the adverse feedback mechanism

long duration bonds and sovereign defaults abstract this paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long duration bonds this contrasts with previous studies which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter we show that when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one quarter bonds this narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data which indicates that the introduction of long duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets

market interest rates and commercial bank profitability an empirical investigation the widespread notion that commercial banks borrow short and lend long implies that sharp market interest rate increases may induce a significant number of banking failures this paper develops a method for estimating average asset and liability maturities for a sample of large money center banks regression models are tested to determine if market rate fluctuations have a significant impact on bank profitability the conclusion is negative large banks have effectively hedged themselves against market rate risk by assembling asset and liability portfolios with similar average maturities the impact of market interest rates on commercial bank revenues costs and profitability has increasingly concerned economists and policymakers as financial market conditions have become more volatile in recent years the widespread notion that depository intermediaries borrow short and lend long implies that rapid market rate increases may induce an unacceptable number of financial firm failures monetary policy discussions have reflected this concern for many years the federal reserve board considered stable market rates a goal or at least an intermediate target of monetary policy the extent to which money market conditions are permitted to fluctuate in the short run is also affected by the unique role of the federal reserve system as the nation s lender of last resort liquidity pressures ultimately devolve on the money market and the federal reserve has a responsibility for maintaining orderly conditions in that market

lending policies of financial intermediaries facing credit and funding risk this paper compares the optimal lending decisions of financial intermediaries that differ in their risk exposure all intermediaries are assumed to face a loan demand described by a random applicant arrival process with each applicant offering a unique risk adjusted rate of return loan demand is therefore uncertain in both quantity and quality the intermediaries differ in terms of their risk exposure because of disparate funding practices intermediaries functioning as brokers minimize their exposure by borrowing funds only as demand is realized whereas those behaving as asset transformers borrow in advance of realizing loan demand thereby maintaining a loanable funds inventory and sustaining the related exposure the optimal sequential lending policy is shown to involve setting a credit standard that becomes stricter with the length of the intermediary s planning horizon and the volume of loans outstanding most importantly it is shown that brokers adopt stricter credit standards than asset transformers and therby reduce their volume of lending

fixed rate loan commitments take down risk and the dynamics of hedging with futures this paper develops a normative model to analyze the hedging and fee pricing decisions of a financial institution supplying fixed rate loan commitments to its customers in supplying fixed rate loan commitments the financial institution hereafter referred to as bank is assumed to act as an agent that transforms commitment risk through the use of financial futures contracts while most pre vious loan commitment models have analyzed the interest rate or price risk the bank faces in supplying fixed rate loan commitments they either have ignored or assumed away the loan take down or quantity risk l in general by making a formal fixed rate loan commitment the bank exposes itself to both a price and a quantity risk specifically a formal loan com mitment prespecifies the maximum size of the loan the purpose of the loan of ten project specific as well as the interest rate and fee to be paid by the borrower 14 15 however while a formal loan commitment imposes a contractual re quirement on the bank to supply funds up to a maximum amount at an agreed rate of interest the expected size of the loan to be taken down is often uncertain the reason is that for project specific lines of credit the amount taken down will depend on the future state s of the world that are revealed to the borrower at the end of the commitment period as well as on the limitations and constraints im posed on the use of funds in the loan commitment contract for example construction delays and other market imperfections that hamper a planned invest

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being