consumer protection and contingent charges contingent charges for financial services such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts are often controversial we study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers we contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive arguably unfairly the case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part but not only on the weight placed on distributional concerns the economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the u k supreme court jel d14 d18 g21 g28 l51

taxes and capital structure understanding firms savings abstract the u s non financial corporate sector became a net lender to the rest of the economy in the early 2000s with close to half of all publicly traded firms holding financial assets in excess of their debt liabilities we develop a simple dynamic model of debt and equity financing where firms strive to accumulate financial assets even though debt is fiscally advantageous relative to equity moreover firms find it optimal to fund additional financial asset holdings through equity revenues the calibrated model matches well the distribution of public firms balance sheets during the 2000s and correctly predicts which firms are net savers

market frictions a unified model of search costs and switching costs it is well known that search costs and switching costs can create market power by constraining the ability of consumers to change suppliers while previous research has examined each cost in isolation this paper demonstrates the benefits of examining the two types of friction in unison the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important differences in their effects upon consumer behaviour competition and welfare in addition the paper also illustrates a simple empirical methodology for estimating separate measures of both costs while demonstrating a potential bias that can arise if only one cost is considered

behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

overconfident consumers in the marketplace when consumers sign contracts expectations about future usage of the product or service matter for instance the value provided by car insurance depends on how likely a consumer believes she is to file a claim the value provided by a gym membership depends on how often a consumer anticipates going to the gym and the value provided by a cellular phone contract depends on how many gigabytes of data a consumer anticipates using the standard modeling paradigm makes the expedient assumption that consumers have rational expectations imposing rational expectations drastically simplifies models and eliminates the need to directly measure beliefs as they coincide with the distribution of observed outcomes yet a large literature shows that consumer beliefs often deviate substantially from rational expectations in systematic ways this has important consequences for contract design firm profits consumer welfare and public policy the term overconfidence is used broadly in the psychology literature referring to both overoptimism and overprecision overoptimistic individuals overestimate their own abilities or prospects either in absolute terms or in comparison to others in contrast overprecise individuals place overly narrow confidence intervals around forecasts thereby underestimating uncertainty these biases can lead consumers to misforecast their future product usage or to overestimate their abilities to navigate contract terms in consequence consumer overconfidence causes consumers

payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice abstract by using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers attitudes toward each payment method we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity we find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types our policy experiments suggest that for the sub population who hold both credit and debit cards removing rewards would increase their share of paper based payment methods i e cash and checks measured in terms of in store transactions by no more than 4 percentage points

overconfidence and asymmetric information the case of insurance this paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself we first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations between observable variables in perfect competition asymmetric information insurance markets in monopolistic insurance markets in constrast we find that overconfidence may be observationally equivalent to variations in the risk composition of the economy our analysis provides a number of novel testable implications on i price heterogeneity within and across risk classes ii the relationship between ex post risk and insurance coverage iii the fact that a significant fraction of agents chooses to be uninsured and iv the relationship between underinsurance and age

linking savings behavior confidence and individual feedback a field experiment in ethiopia abstract in this paper we investigate behavioral constraints to savings among smallholder farmers in rural ethiopia increasing savings by overcoming such behavioral constraints has been documented to have positive effects on various outcomes such as health education and agricultural investments we causally identify a strong increase in savings to a soft commitment device in the form of a moneybox with a regular savings plan in our randomized field experiment we also provide personalized feedback consisting of recommendations to self set saving goals these recommendations trigger increases in savings of up to 36 percent in a detailed analysis of the behavioral characteristics driving these results we find a strong and robust link between financial confidence and savings behavior in particular the savings of underconfident individuals are less than 2 3 of the savings of overconfident individuals an association stronger than other behavioral traits such as risk lovingness and present biasedness remarkably the effect of our personalized feedback is particularly strong for underconfident individuals we discuss possible underlying mechanisms rule out a set of alternative behavioral explanations and address crowding out behavior into other forms of saving 1

selling to overconfident consumers consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts this overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost followed by steep marginal charges this matches observed cellphone service pricing plans in the us and elsewhere an alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major us cellular phone service provider the model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets and teaser rates on loans nevertheless firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence

how debt markets have malfunctioned in the crisis the financial crisis that began in 2007 is especially a crisis in debt markets a full understanding of what happened in the financial crisis requires investigation into the plumbing of debt markets during a financial crisis when funds often cannot be raised easily or quickly the fundamental values for certain assets can become separated for a time from market prices with consequences that can echo into the real economy this article will explain in concrete ways how debt markets can malfunction with deleterious consequences for the real economy after a quick overview of debt markets i discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions risk capital and risk aversion repo financing and haircuts and counterparty risk in each of these areas feedback effects can arise so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious spiral i will document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during the crisis next i will show how these issues caused debt markets to break down indeed fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far removed from the toxic subprime mortgage assets at the root of the crisis finally i will discuss briefly four steps that the federal reserve took to ease the crisis and how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis

the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies i analyze a new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem i solve for jointly ramsey optimal monetary and macroprudential policies i find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction the optimal policy can replicate the first best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy using monetary policy alone is not enough a policy trade off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges when policy follows simple rules the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix

value function approximation in the presence of uncertainty and inequality constraints an application to the demand for credit cards abstract we present an algorithm for approximating the solution to discrete time stochastic dynamic programs with inequality constraints the algorithm exploits the state preference approach to choice under uncertainty to reduce the dimensionality of the state space and polynomial approximation to improve computational efficiency it is particularly useful in financial applications involving liquidity and credit constraints and more than one asset the algorithm provides information about the derivatives of the value function and therefore risk aversion along with asset demands

regulating consumer financial products evidence from credit cards we analyze the effectiveness of consumer financial regulation by considering the 2009 credit card accountability responsibility and disclosure card act we use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card accounts and a difference in differences research design that compares changes in outcomes over time for consumer credit cards which were subject to the regulations to changes for small business credit cards which the law did not cover we estimate that regulatory limits on credit card fees reduced overall borrowing costs by an annualized 1 6 of average daily balances with a decline of more than 5 3 for consumers with fico scores below 660 we find no evidence of an offsetting increase in interest charges or a reduction in the volume of credit taken together we estimate that the card act saved consumers 11 9 billion a year we also analyze a nudge that disclosed the interest savings from paying off balances in 36 months rather than making minimum payments we detect a small increase in the share of accounts making the 36 month payment value but no evidence of a change in overall payments jel codes d0 d14 g0 g02 g21 g28 l0 l13 l15

securitized markets international capital flows and global welfare we study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on the global supply of securitized assets welfare and international net and gross capital flows in a two country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk the financial sectors in the two countries home and foreign differ by the collateral requirement for investment loans with home requiring lower margins in autarky home endogenously supplies more assets and enables more risk sharing upon financial integration capital flows from foreign to home leading to lower interest rates and an increase in the global supply of assets foreign enjoys substantial welfare gains through better risk sharing and portfolio reallocation while the welfare experience for home is ambiguous gross capital flows arise when agents face aggregate shocks to the expected payoff to investment projects but can collapse when shocks concern the variance of returns

borrowing high versus borrowing higher price dispersion and shopping behavior in the u s credit card market we document substantial cross individual dispersion in u s credit card borrowing costs even after controlling for borrower risk and card characteristics that remaining dispersion arises because cross lender pricing heterogeneity generates dispersion in annual percentage rate apr offers to borrowers and borrowers vary in shopping intensity our empirics match administrative data to self reported card shopping intensity and use instruments suggested by fair lending law to account for the endogeneity between aprs and search the results show that shoppers versus nonshoppers pay aprs as different as those paid by borrowers in the best versus worst credit score deciles we discuss implications for policy and practice

consumer biases and mutual ownership abstract we show how ownership of the firm by its customers as well as nonprofit status can prevent firms from using contractual terms that take advantage of consumer biases by eliminating an outside residual claimant with control over the firm these alternatives to investor ownership reduce the incentive of the firm to offer such terms however customers who are unaware of their behavioral biases may fail to recognize this advantage of non investor owned firms we present evidence from the consumer financial services market that supports our theory comparing contract terms we find that mutually owned firms offer lower penalties such as default interest rates and higher up front prices such as introductory interest rates than do investor owned firms however consumers most vulnerable to these penalties are no more likely to use mutually owned firms

risk based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans abstract by focusing on observable default risk s role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid 1990s it tests three resulting predictions first the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period second debt levels should have reacted accordingly third fewer high risk households should have been denied credit further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest and lowest risk borrowers for people obtaining loans the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid 1990s for example for a 0 01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy the corresponding interest rate increase tripled for first mortgages doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six fold for second mortgages additionally changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices particularly for secured debt borrowing increased most for the low risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall furthermore while very high risk households gained expanded access to credit the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or sometimes fell

permanent income hypothesis in emerging markets some brazilian evidence abstract this paper uses a dataset from one of the largest credit card issuers in brazil to investigate the extent of credit constraints for one of the world s largest emerging market economies in order to deal with the endogeneity problem from an observational dataset an identification strategy based on the issuer actual policies was used to better identify the long run effects of a credit card limit increase on debt the results point to a long run effect of credit limit on credit card debts of 0 1144 a similar size to the ones found in gross and souleles 2001 this value indicates the permanent income hypothesis is rejected for this sample and some evidence supporting a variation of buffer stock behavior is found furthermore results indicate the degree of heterogeneity in effects is much higher than similar results for developed countries lending credence to the conclusion credit constraints are much stronger for lower income groups this conclusion is in line to previous studies in brazil such as de lucinda and vieira 2014

money liquidity and monetary policy in a market based financial system banking and capital market developments are inseparable and funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market based financial intermediaries offering a window on liquidity the balance sheet growth of broker dealers provides a sense of the availability of credit contractions of broker dealer balance sheets have tended to precede declines in real economic growth even before the current turmoil for this reason balance sheet quantities of market based financial intermediaries are important macroeconomic state variables for the conduct of monetary policy

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

slippage in rebate programs and present biased preferences present biased preferences capture the idea that individuals may find immediate payoffs significantly more salient than any future payoffs rather than simply discounting the future in a time consistent manner in this paper we show that consumers present biased preferences can generate slippage and we explore whether this can explain firms use of mail in rebates we assume that the consumer population comprises members who have various degrees of present bias the model demonstrates that if consumers have homogeneous willingness to pay for a product and thus rebates do not serve as a mechanism for traditional price discrimination rebates may still profitably exploit slippage but to do so they must generate very high slippage rates this is because the rebate must greatly exceed the price markup because the rebate must compensate consumers for the cost of redemption and the delay in receiving the rebate the ability of rebate programs to take advantage of present biased consumers is quite limited in settings where there is significant variance in the degree of present bias within the population unless the extent of consumers present bias is highly correlated with their rebate redemption costs

the questionable value of having a choice of levels of health insurance coverage in most health insurance markets in the united states consumers have substantial choice about their health insurance plan however additional choice is not an unmixed blessing as it creates challenges related to both consumer confusion and adverse selection there is mounting evidence that many people have difficulty understanding the value of insurance coverage like evaluating the relative benefits of lower premiums versus lower deductibles also in most us health insurance markets people cannot be charged different prices for insurance based on their individual level of health risk this creates the potential for well known problems of adverse selection because people will often base the level of health insurance coverage they choose partly on their health status in this essay we examine how the forces of consumer confusion and adverse selection interact with each other and with market institutions to affect how valuable it is to have multiple levels of health insurance coverage available in the market

the real costs of credit access evidence from the payday lending market using geographic differences in the availability of payday loans i estimate the real effects of credit access among low income households payday loans are small high interest rate loans that constitute the marginal source of credit for many high risk borrowers i find no evidence that payday loans alleviate economic hardship to the contrary loan access leads to increased difficulty paying mortgage rent and utilities bills the empirical design isolates variation in loan access that is uninfluenced by lenders location decisions and state regulatory decisions two factors that might otherwise correlate with economic hardship measures further analysis of differences in loan availability over time and across income groups rules out a number of alternative explanations for the estimated effects counter to the view that improving credit access facilitates important expenditures the results suggest that for some low income households the debt service burden imposed by borrowing inhibits their ability to pay important bills copyright 2011 oxford university press

how effective are rewards programs in promoting payment card usage empirical evidence card issuers have mainly relied on rewards programs as their main strategy to increase usage however there is scarce evidence on the effectiveness of these programs this paper is addressing two topics which could have important managerial and public policy implications i it estimates the impact of rewards on the use of cards and ii it quantifies their economic effects in terms of the cash substitution we find that rewards may significantly modify choice for card payments their economic impact also varies significantly across types of rewards and merchant activities additionally rewards seem to be more effective for debit cards

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

rational overoptimism and other biases rational agents with differing priors tend to be overoptimistic about their chances of success in particular an agent who tries to choose the action that is most likely to succeed is more likely to choose an action of which he overestimated rather than underestimated the likelihood of success after studying the comparative statics of this mechanism i show that it also causes agents to attribute failure to exogenous factors but success to their own choice of action to disproportionately believe that they will outperform others to overestimate the precision of their estimates and to overestimate their control over the outcome

long term effects of a recession at labor market entry in japan and the united states abstract we examine effects of entering the labor market during a recession on subsequent employment and earnings for japanese and american men using comparable household labor force surveys we find persistent negative effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for less educated japanese men in contrast to temporary effects for less educated american men the school based hiring system and the dismissal regulation prolong the initial loss of employment opportunities for less educated japanese men the effect on earnings for more educated groups is also stronger in japan although the difference between the two countries is smaller than for less educated groups

a price discrimination theory of coupons the objective of this paper is to analyze the consumer s decision in electing to use cents off coupons distributed by manufacturers of consumer products arguing that the decision to use coupons is based on the tradeoff between costs of using coupons and the savings obtained it is shown that coupons can serve as a price discrimination device to provide a lower price to a particular segment of consumers based on a price theoretic model it is shown that the users of coupons are more price elastic than nonusers of coupons and that the opportunity cost of time and other household resource variables are determinant factors in consumers decisions implications derived from the model are tested using diary panel data

evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields 1983 1991 we examine debenture yields over the period 1983 1991 to evaluate the market s sensitivity to bank specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government s policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major u s banking firms an increasingly important issue in the regulation of financial institutions concerns the extent to which market investors can will recognize and control the risks of banking firms although the banking act of 1933 replaced some private risk bearing with federal deposit insurance legislators were reluctant to displace market discipline very extensively flood 1992 by the early 1980s however u s regulators had come to protect virtually all bank liability holders from credit losses most visibly at large banks which were deemed too big to fail sprague 1986 o hara and shaw 1990 this extension of the government safety net largely reflects a skepticism on the part of regulators that normal market forces could adequately identify and control bank risks while u s regulators have recently shown an increased willingness to let some bank investors bear default losses an official suspicion of the efficacy of market discipline remains widespread by contrast some prominent academic economists argue that market investors in bank debentures could provide timely and effective control over banking firms risk exposures and that the social cost of supervising banks would be lower if regulators ceded greater

regulate one service tame the entire market credit cards in turkey abstract in credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services two regulations were recently enacted in the turkish credit card market one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006 by employing the well known panzar and rosse 1982 panzar and rosse 1987 method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 turkish banks between 2002 and 2008 we investigate the extent of banks market power in the turkish credit card market before and after the regulations unlike most of the existing literature which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them we consider the entire market by taking both services into account fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations although the first regulation did not have much impact the second led to rises in both banks total revenues and competition in the entire market

credit provision and banking stability after the great financial crisis the role of bank regulation and the quality of governance abstract in response to the great financial crisis gfc bank regulatory regimes were tightened world wide to strengthen banking stability and the resilience of the banking sectors yet it is often claimed that regulatory tightening may lead banks to cut back on lending and comes at the cost of a lower loan supply the present paper uses a country panel for 50 advanced and emerging market economies to analyze how the post crisis tightening in supervision and regulation affected aggregate bank stability and aggregate credit growth we find that higher capital buffers improved aggregate bank stability after the gfc whereas a strengthening of supervisory independence helped to reduce the decline in domestic credit and improved the stability of banks both effects have been stronger for countries with relatively poor institutions thus our results suggest that bank supervision regulation and institutions tend to be substitutes rather than complements

credit market competition and capital regulation market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt but also from the asset side this will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply so that banks have to compete for projects in such a setting borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending thus creating an asset market based incentive for banks to hold capital borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid off since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds this implies that capital requirements may not be binding as recent evidence seems to indicate

a note on the effect of cost changes on prices in a recent article in this journal sumner 1981 took an ingenious approach to estimating the level of monopoly power in the cigarette industry he noted that differences in marginal costs exist in the industry due to varying levels of state taxes the sales prices established will satisfy the equation p i liq l mr mc where p price and q the elasticity of demand for the product in question if elasticity is a constant observing the change in marginal cost and the change in price enables one to infer the elasticity of demand perceived by the firm elasticity could then be used as a proxy for the firm s market power this technique turns out to be of very limited applicability however because it is extremely sensitive to the functional form assumed for the demand curve consider the general problem of a firm facing constant marginal costs of c in maximizing profits the firm solves

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

leverage across firms banks and countries we present new stylized facts on bank and rm leverage during the period 2000 2009 using internationally comparable micro level data from many countries we document the following patterns a there was an increase in leverage for investment banks prior to the sub prime crisis b there was no visible increase in leverage for the typical commercial bank and non nancial rm c o balance sheet items constitute a big fraction of assets especially for large commercial banks in the us whereas investment banks do not report these items d the leverage ratio is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks in the us e banks in emerging markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experienced signicantly less deleveraging during the crisis the results suggest that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets

rate of return to schooling and business cycles this paper examines the effects of the economic conditions unemployment rate and unemployment change on the rate of returns to schooling as well as the effects on the gender difference in the

why are the returns to schooling higher for women than for men many studies have found that the impact of schooling on earnings is greater for females than for males despite the fact that females tend to earn less both absolutely and controlling for personal characteristics this study investigates possible reasons for this effect using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1979 one explanation is that education appears to have a double effect on the earnings of women it increases their skills and productivity as it does with men and in addition it appears to reduce the gap in male and female earnings attributable to factors such as discrimination tastes and circumstances the latter appear to account for about half of the differential in the returns to schooling

what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs consumers in the united states make billions of transactions each year using cash checks debit cards and credit cards bank and credit card accounts provide consumers with liquidity to clear and settle these transactions in return consumers pay a variety of fees and both explicit and implicit interest charges the importance of retail banking and credit markets to economic activity drives interest in many open policy and research questions do households borrow too much relative to a neoclassical benchmark christopher d carroll 2001 why do many households leave a substantial amount of money on the table in managing their accounts sumit agarwal et al 2006 david gross and nicholas souleles 2002 do firms structure pricing to exploit consumer cognitive biases or limitations stefano dellavigna and ulrike malmendier 2004 xavier gabaix and david laibson 2006 how do learning sumit agarwal john driscoll and gabaix 2008 and disclosure regulation stango and zinman 2009b interact with consumer decision making and firm strategy to determine market outcomes this paper examines some threshold questions that should inform the questions above what do people really pay to use their bank and credit card accounts and which cost components are the largest of all the costs that people pay which could they easily avoid by making different day to day choices and how stable are both the level of costs and the share of costs that are avoidable for a given person over time what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs

us monetary policy and the global financial cycle us monetary policy shocks induce comovements in the international financial variables that characterize the global financial cycle a single global factor that explains an important share of the variation of risky asset prices around the world decreases significantly after a us monetary tightening monetary contractions in the us lead to significant deleveraging of global financial intermediaries a decline in the provision of domestic credit globally strong retrenchments of international credit flows and tightening of foreign financial conditions countries with floating exchange rate regimes are subject to similar financial spillovers

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

beyond revealed preference choice theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics we propose a broad generalization of standard choice theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice that those positive models typically attempt to capture it replaces the standard revealed preference relation with an unambiguous choice relation roughly x is strictly unambiguously chosen over y written xp y iff y is never chosen when x is available under weak assumptions p is acyclic and therefore suitable for welfare analysis it is also the most discerning welfare criterion that never overrules choice the resulting framework generates natural counterparts for the standard tools of applied welfare economics and is easily applied in the context of specific behavioral theories with novel implications though not universally discerning it lends itself to principled refinements

license to cheat voluntary regulation and ethical behavior although monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct their intended targets can often avoid regulation or hide their behavior this surrenders at least part of the effectiveness of regulatory policies to firms and individuals decisions to voluntarily submit to regulation we study individuals decisions to avoid monitoring or regulation and thus enhance their ability to engage in unethical conduct we conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants engage in a competitive task and can decide between having the opportunity to misreport their performance or having their performance verified by an external monitor to study the effect of social factors on the willingness to be subject to monitoring we vary whether participants make this decision simultaneously with others or sequentially as well as whether the decision is private or public our results show that the opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulation produces more unethical conduct than situati

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

cellular service demand biased beliefs learning and bill shock by april 2013 the fcc s recent bill shock agreement with cellular carriers requires consumers be notied when exceeding usage allowances will the agreement help or hurt consumers to answer this question we estimate a model of consumer plan choice usage and learning using a panel of cellular bills our model predicts that the agreement will lower average consumer welfare by 2 per year because rms will respond by raising monthly fees our approach is based on novel evidence that consumers are inattentive to past usage meaning that bill shock alerts are informative and advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart taris induce marginal price uncertainty additionally our model estimates show that an

futile attempts at self control we investigate costly yet futile attempts at self control when consumption of a harmful product has a binary breakdown no breakdown nature and individuals tend to underestimate their need for self control considering time inconsistent preferences as well as temptation disutility we show that becoming more sophisticated can decrease welfare and investigate what kind of mistaken beliefs lead to low welfare with time inconsistent preferences being close to perfectly understanding one s preferences but assigning zero probability to true preferences induces the worst outcome jel d03 d11 d91

consumer inattention and bill shock regulation for many goods and services such as electricity health care cellular phone service debit card transactions or those sold with loyalty discounts the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage as a result consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit i develop a model of inattentive consumption derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive and evaluate bill shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention when inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand bill shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly competitive markets which may be the effect of the federal communication commission s recent bill shock agreement if some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention however then bill shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers hence requiring zero balance alerts in addition to the federal reserve s new opt in rule for debit card overdraft protection may benefit consumers

risk management of non maturing liabilities abstract risk management of non maturing liabilities is a relatively unstudied issue of significant practical importance non maturing liabilities include most of the traditional deposit accounts like demand deposits savings accounts and short time deposits and form the basis of the funding of depository institutions therefore the asset and liability management of depository institutions depends crucially on an accurate understanding of the liquidity risk and interest rate risk profile of these deposits in this paper we propose a stochastic three factor model as general quantitative framework for liquidity risk and interest rate risk management for non maturing liabilities it consists of three building blocks market rates deposit rates and deposit volumes we give a detailed model specification and present algorithms for simulation and calibration our approach to liquidity risk management is based on the term structure of liquidity a concept which forecasts for a specified period and probability what amount of cash is available for investment for interest rate risk management we compute the value the risk profile and the replicating bond portfolio of non maturing liabilities using arbitrage free pricing under a variance minimizing measure the proposed methodology is demonstrated by means of a case study the risk management of savings accounts

overconfidence insurance and paternalism it is well known that when agents are fully rational compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of insurance markets we find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks compulsory insurance makes low risk agents worse off hence behavioral biases may weaken some of the well established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information

interest rates and informational issues in the credit market experimental evidence from brazil summary this paper utilizes brazilian data to investigate interest rate sensitivity and informational issues associated with the credit demand of the middle income class in a large emerging economy this study s data were collected from an experiment in which credit offers with randomized interest rates were sent to recipients the results indicate that credit constraints and informational issues are important for both the lower middle class and higher middle class income groups interest rate reductions may be more effective for higher income groups

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

the intertemporal dynamics of consumer lock in this article examines how dynamic changes in information cost structure and time preferences affect consumers search and switching behavior over time and lead to lock in the information cost structure is conceptualized as a trade off of initial setup costs and ongoing usage costs lock in is defined as consumers decreased propensity to search and switch after an initial investment which is determined both by a preference to minimize immediate costs and by an inability to anticipate the impact of future switching costs the results of three experiments support the proposed mechanism experiment 1 shows that a small initial investment is sufficient to produce lock in experiment 2 shows that the results of a prior investment on lock in are not due to psychological commitment but to a shift in relative costs of incumbent and new options experiment 3 shows that respondents fail to anticipate how their prior investment will lock them in

competition and pricing in the credit card market many credit card issuers charge fixed rates that remain the same for three to five years while the rest charge variable rates that are indexed to market rates the presence of these two distinct rate types forces prices at firms selling an otherwise identical product to move asynchronously variable rates move one for one with the index while fixed rates stay constant empirical and theoretical analysis shows that this pricing structure provides an explanation for the simultaneous yet seemingly contradictory existence of high rate cost margins and aggressive non price competition for new customers a phenomenon that existed in the credit card market in the early 1990s

the paradox of liquidity the more liquid a firm s assets the greater their value in a short notice liquidation it is generally thought that a firm should find it easier to raise external finance against more liquid assets this paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity greater asset liquidity reduces the firm s ability to commit to a specific course of action as a result greater asset liquidity can in some circumstances reduce the firm s capacity to raise external finance firms with excessively liquid assets are in the best position to finance illiquid projects this leads us to a theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation based on the liquidity of assets

competition and stability in modern banking a post crisis perspective abstract competition has been suppressed for extended periods in banking and when it has been unleashed financial stability has suffered this paper elucidates the relationship between competition and stability in modern banking with particular attention to the impact of digital technologies and derives the policy consequences for regulation and competition policy

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

how are preferences revealed revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent s observed actions normative preferences represent the agent s actual interests it sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences but there are many cases where this assumption is violated we identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences passive choice complexity limited personal experience third party marketing and intertemporal choice we then discuss six approaches that jointly contribute to the identification of normative preferences structural estimation active decisions asymptotic choice aggregated revealed preferences reported preferences and informed preferences each of these approaches uses consumer behavior to infer some property of normative preferences without equating revealed and normative preferences we illustrate these issues with evidence from savings and investment outcomes

strategic or nonstrategic the role of financial benefit in bankruptcy i introduction personal bankruptcy rates have increased at an annual rate of 3 9 since 1990 from about 718 thousand non business bankruptcies in 1990 to about 1 5 million in 2010 partly as a response to this increase the congress passed the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act bapcpa of 2005 the largest overhaul of bankruptcy laws since 1980 although recent data are too sparse to determine the longer term effectiveness of the law we know that there was a spike in bankruptcy filings in 2005 just before the law took effect on october 17 2005 and a corresponding decline in 2006 since then bankruptcies have continued to rise reaching a level of about 1 5 million in 2010 the same level as in 2004 the bankruptcy rate has also begun to creep up to the earlier levels one of the major purposes of the new bankruptcy law was to cut down on abusive or fraudulent uses of the bankruptcy system or in other words strategic use of the law therefore it is important to understand the motivations of consumers who file for bankruptcy what constitutes strategic use of bankruptcy law and how widespread is its incidence in the literature there is no clear definition of what constitutes a strategic bankruptcy filing we shall consider strategic behavior to be a conscious decision to benefit from bankruptcy law to make this tractable consider a simple two period model of decision making in the first period consumers receive a noisy signal of experiencing a financial shock in the second period based on this signal consumers may update their probability of an adverse shock and choose their debt level in the second period the shock is realized and consumers decide whether to file for bankruptcy or not a strategic consumer is one who in the first period chooses her debt level after conditioning on the signal that is a strategic consumer takes on debt after accounting for the chance of filing for bankruptcy in other words a strategic consumer is one who is fully rational and takes decisions to maximize her benefit a nonstrategic consumer is one who chooses debt level without conditioning on the signal he plans to repay his debt in the absence of adverse events such a consumer is myopic and may be exhibiting rational inattention as described below consistent with this view we may distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic behavior by testing whether consumers make their debt and filing decision jointly or not strategic behavior is consistent with a joint decision whereas nonstrategic behavior is not in terms of empirical strategy this is implemented by testing whether financial benefit is endogenous to the filing decision or not our test is different from the one in the study by fay hurst and white 2002 henceforth fhw in that approach a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and financial benefit from filing ceteris paribus is taken as evidence of strategic behavior and a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and adverse events such as divorce health shocks employment shocks etc is taken as evidence of nonstrategic behavior using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid fhw show that financial benefit is positively and significantly related to the filing decision and after controlling for financial benefit adverse event variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision except for a marginally significant positive effect of divorce 1 this simple empirical relationship between bankruptcy filing and financial benefit does not consider more realistic relationships among financial benefit adverse events and strategic behavior for example financial benefit from filing may go up due to adverse events regardless of whether a consumer is trying to abuse bankruptcy law or not that is financial benefit goes up when a consumer consciously increases unsecured debts before filing consistent with strategic behavior and it also goes up when she uses unsecured debt e

restoring rational choice the challenge of consumer financial regulation abstract this lecture considers the case for consumer financial regulation in an environment where many households lack the knowledge to manage their financial affairs effectively the lecture argu

strategic effects of three part tariffs under oligopoly the distinct element of a three part tariff 3pt compared with linear pricing lp or a two part tariff is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero this quantity target instrument enriches the firm s strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level even in the absence of a usual price discrimination motive with general differentiated linear demands the competitive effect of a 3pt in contrast to lp depends on the degree of substitutability between products competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated yet softened when two products are more substitutable

why do retired workers claim their social security benefits so early a potential explanation based on the cumulative prospect theory abstractsocial security provides longevity insurance for older americans according to expected utility theory models rational households who are not liquidity constrained should delay claiming th

risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy in the global market for u s dollar corporate loans abstract we study the effects of u s interest rates and other factors on risk taking in the global market for u s dollar syndicated term loans we find that before the global financial crisis both u s and non u s lenders originated ex ante riskier loans to non u s borrowers in response to a decline in short term u s interest rates and after the crisis in response to a decline in longer term u s interest rates after the crisis this behavior was more prominent for shadow banks and less prominent for banks with relatively low capital separately before the crisis lenders originated less risky loans in response to u s dollar appreciation across the periods the responses to risk appetite and economic uncertainty varied to the extent that the federal reserve affects u s interest rates we provide evidence of global risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy which are important but not dominant factors for risk taking in the market

confidence enhanced performance there is ample evidence that emotions affect performance positive emotions can improve performance while negative ones may diminish it for example the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences shaking loss of concentration that may impair performance in sports on stage or at school there is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort while failures are attributed to bad luck in addition these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others the objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions biases in information processing enhance welfare

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

the arbitrage free valuation and hedging of demand deposits and credit card loans abstract using a market segmentation argument this paper uses the interest rate derivative s arbitrage free methodology to value both demand deposit liabilities and credit card loan balances in markets where deposits loan rates may be determined under imperfect competition in this context these financial instruments are shown to be equivalent to a particular interest rate swap where the principal depends on the past history of market rates solutions are obtained which are independent of any particular model for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

cross selling switching costs and imperfect competition in british banks this paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of british banking in the presence of cross selling and switching costs during 1993 2008 it presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross selling of loans and off balance sheet transactions the evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market additionally the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross selling behaviour of british banks which helps explain the rapid growth of non interest income during the last two decades

from ngos to banks does institutional transformation alter the business model of microfinance institutions microfinance which pledges to provide financial services to people without access to banking is chiefly run by non governmental organizations ngos little is known about the extent to which the transformation of these ngos into shareholder owned and most often regulated firms affects the way microfinance institutions mfis conduct their business by applying the event study methodology to 66 mfis that have transformed we quantify the effect that transformation has on the mfis business models our results suggest that portfolio yield is driven down by 3 9 percentage points due to transformation indicating that clients get more favorable interest rates at the same time mfis are able to significantly cut down their operational expenses of which 1 1 percentage points can be attributed to transformation other findings include a steep increase in commercial debt leverage and deposits a significant decrease in the fluctuation of funding costs and a sharp rise in average loan size profitability goes down in the short and medium term while return on equity is driven up in the medium to long run by exploiting within mfi data our approach goes beyond previous studies that mainly relied on between mfi data overall the results suggest that transformed mfis become an attractive environment for investors potentially encouraging a more profit seeking behavior among transformed mfis

financial fragility in the great moderation abstract a nascent literature explores the measurement of financial fragility this paper considers evidence for rising financial fragility during the 1984 2007 great moderation in the u s the literature suggests that macroeconomic stability combined with strong growth of credit to asset markets in asset prices and in credit relative to output are all indicators of rising financial fragility we show each of these trends in the great moderation we derive the testable implication that in the great moderation credit growth is driven more by past credit growth and less by output growth allen and gale 2000 relative to pre great moderation years results from a var model estimated on quarterly data for 1955 2007 are consistent with the hypothesis this invites a reinterpretation of the great moderation our methodology may help understand when a credit boom turns into a credit bubble and contributes to the development of methods of measuring financial fragility