rethinking the global food crisis the role of trade shocks although fundamental factors were clearly responsible for shifting the world to a higher food price equilibrium in the years leading up the 2008 food crisis there is little doubt that when food prices peaked in june of 2008 they soared well above the new equilibrium price numerous arguments have been proposed to explain overshooting including financial speculation depreciation of the united states us dollar low interest rates and reductions in grain stocks however observations that international rice prices surged in response to export restrictions by india and vietnam suggested that trade related factors could be an important basis for overshooting especially given the very tangible link between export volumes and export prices in this paper we revisit the trade story by closely examining monthly data from thailand the largest exporter of rice and the united states the largest exporter of wheat and maize and the third largest exporter of soybeans in all cases except soybeans we find that large surges in export volumes preceded the price surges the presence of these large demand surges together with back of the envelope estimates of their price impacts suggests that trade events played a much larger and more pervasive role than previously thought

remittances bonds and bridges remittances and social capital in burundi abstractthis study explores the effects of remittances on households structural social capital in urban burundi distinctions are made between bonding and bridging social capital referring to intra versus inter network ties of family members and friends the results demonstrate that remittance receiving households invest more in bridging social capital by participating in organisations donating time but make fewer monetary contributions compared to non receiving households remittances have mixed effects on bonding social capital receiving households give significantly less gifts to family members and friends but are more likely to send internal remittances compared to non receivers the implications of these findings for post conflict development are discussed

dynamic delegation of experimentation i study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent experimentation is modeled as a one armed bandit that yields successes following a poisson process its unknown intensity is high or low the agent has private information his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high the agent values successes more than the principal does so prefers more experimentation the optimal mechanism is a cutoff rule in the belief space the cutoff gives pessimistic types total freedom but curtails optimistic types behavior pessimistic types over experiment while the most optimistic ones under experiment this delegation rule is time consistent

control and ownership of assets within rural ethiopian households this article investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce and on control over assets during marriage using detailed household data from rural ethiopia we show that assets brought to marriage ownership of assets control within marriage and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related productive resources are controlled by the household head disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but control is associated with larger claims upon divorce assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death but matter in case of divorce

asking questions to understand rural livelihoods comparing disaggregated vs aggregated approaches to household livelihood questionnaires summary this study tests the hypothesis that both disaggregated and aggregated data collection methods produce similar estimates of the relative importance of livelihood portfolio activities and expenditures the results show that different methods of data collection yield substantively different estimates of livelihood strategies for two indicators income and expenditure we also find evidence of a seasonal bias in responses to household livelihood questions asked at higher levels of aggregation our findings highlight the challenge of designing household surveys to elicit accurate and precise information and demonstrate that different methods of data collection influence our understanding of rural livelihoods

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

the management of the developing countries debt guidelines and applications to brazil some principles which may be useful in formulating a debt management strategy are articulated there are four major policy recommendations 1 stretch out the repayment of the debt 2 monitor both exports and gdp 3 ignore the capital loss of the creditors and 4 watch the domestic deficit the goal of the recommendations is the maximization of the intertemporal welfare of the country under the constraint that it services its debt

learning while voting determinants of collective experimentation this paper combines dynamic social choice and strategic experimentation to study the following question how does a society a committee or more generally a group of individuals with potentially heterogeneous preferences experiment with new opportunities each voter recognizes that during experimentation other voters also learn about their preferences as a result pivotal voters today are biased against experimentation because it reduces their likelihood of remaining pivotal this phenomenon reduces equilibrium experimentation below the socially efficient level and may even result in a negative option value of experimentation however one can restore efficiency by designing a voting rule that depends deterministically on time another main result is that even when payoffs of a reform are independently distributed across the population good news about any individual s payoff increases other individuals incentives to experiment with that reform due to a positive voting externality

can agricultural input subsidies reduce the gender gap in modern maize adoption evidence from malawi abstract nationally representative data for malawi were used to measure the gender gap in adoption of modern maize and to investigate how if at all malawi s farm input subsidy program fisp has impacted the gap regression results show the probability of adopting modern maize was 12 lower for wives in male headed households and 11 lower for female household heads than for male farmers receipt of subsidized input coupons had no discernible effect on modern maize adoption for male farmers receiving a subsidy for both seed and fertilizer increased the probability of modern maize cultivation by 222 for female household heads suggesting the fisp has likely reduced the gender gap in adoption of modern maize in malawi

poverty in african households the limits of survey and census representations african poverty statistics depend on household level measurements from survey data making the definition of household of critical importance detailed case studies from tanzania and burkina faso explore 1 understandings of household membership and ambiguities and 2 how well survey definitions capture households as economic units and the implications for household size and responses to and mitigation of poverty we develop an analytic framework of open and closed households open households cope with poverty using flexibility movement and extra household networks but are poorly represented by survey data closed households are likely to be better described by survey data

dynamic r d competition with learning to account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation we formulate a differential game of r d competition with an unknown hazard rate we show as time passes with success firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation reducing their r d investment and possibly exiting the race an increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms r d intensities for given beliefs but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race time paths of r d investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms

who should be interviewed in surveys of household income summary this study tests the null hypothesis that it is sufficient to interview only the household head to obtain accurate information on household income results show that using a husband s estimate of his wife s income does not produce statistically reliable results for poverty analysis estimates of the wife s income provided by the husband and wife are in agreement in only 6 of households while limiting interviews to one person has the advantage of reducing the time and expense of household surveys this appears detrimental in terms of accuracy and may lead to incorrect conclusions on the determinants of poverty

how to evaluate the solvency of an indebted nation reassessing third world debt daniel cohen the conventional measures of the solvency of developing countries usually rely on such indices as debt export or debt gnp ratios the underlying rationale is that to be solvent a country must eventually pay back all its debt this paper starts from two simple but important remarks first solvency need not require the full eventual repayment of all debt continued borrowing may be possible rather what is required is that a country s debt accumulation does not outstrip its capacity to make future repayments and the capacity of lenders to make future loans second solvency therefore cannot be defined independently of the growth rates of lender and borrower countries nor of the interest rate at which past debts accumulate putting these ideas together a new solvency index is proposed and this is computed for all the less developed countries this new index suggests a less gloomy view of the international debt crisis the largest debtors may have already accomplished an adjustment which is more than sufficient to restore their solvency when this is properly computed to investigate this claim there is a detailed analysis of the policies recently adopted in argentina and brazil

shocks individual risk attitude and vulnerability to poverty among rural households in thailand and vietnam summary we examine whether the experience of shocks influences individual risk attitude we measure the risk attitude of more than 4 000 households in thailand and vietnam via a simple survey item the experience of adverse shocks which is typical for poor and vulnerable households is related to a higher degree of risk aversion even when controlled for a large set of socio demographic variables therefore shocks perpetuate vulnerability to poverty via their effect on risk attitude we extend this general finding to various categories of shocks and find differences between thailand and vietnam this suggests that risk coping strategies profit from case specific design

how serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality in this report the authors develop a framework for assessing the consequences of ignoring intrahousehold inequality in the measurement and analysis of poverty and inequality they apply this framework to data for the philippines and conclude that 1 the result of neglecting intrahousehold inequality will probably be considerable understatement of the levels of poverty and inequality with the philippine data measured levels of inequality and poverty were off 30 percent as a result of ignoring intrahousehold variation and 2 patterns of inequality revealed by household level data are somewhat different from patterns revealed by individual level data but the differences seem not to be dramatic to confirm these results the exercise should be repeated with data from other countries

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

gender and education impacts on employment and earnings in west africa evidence from guinea this study examines the determinants of labor force participation for men and women in guinea for three sectors and for earnings employment includes self employment private wage employment and public wage employment data were obtained from a survey of 1725 households in the capital city of conakry in 1990 labor force participation lfp was 40 for women aged 15 65 years and almost 100 for men aged 30 50 years men were engaged almost equally in all three sectors while women were mostly engaged in self employment self employed women tended to come from low income households all public sector employees were well educated about 10 12 years average levels of education among the self employed were very low 2 3 years in the private wage sector men averaged 5 years and women averaged 9 years of schooling 47 of men and 59 of women in the public sector were in professional or managerial jobs in the private sector over 50 of women were in professional managerial or clerical jobs compared to only 16 of men few women in the private sector were engaged in skilled trades or unskilled work most self employed women and only 50 of men tended to work in retail trade migration during the past 5 years was positively associated with mens entry in self employment and the private sector and negatively associated with their public sector employment determinants of womens self employment included residence near commercial areas of the center city electricity in the house and work activity during the rainy season of april september fulani and malinke women were less likely to be self employed for women the benefits of education and experience declined after a certain level returns to schooling were high for both genders men earned more than women there is a need to increase educational and employment opportunities for women

household production in the philippines a non neoclassical approach the starting point of any economic analysis is a microeconomic theory of the decision making unit by providing a set of explicit assumptions regarding individual choices a microeconomic theory lays the necessary foundation for the explanation of economic behavior just as a theory of the firm underlies analyses of market production a theory of the family underlies analyses of household production explanations of long run trends such as fertility decline grow out of assumptions regarding the nature of household decision making developing what they term the economic approach to human behavior gary becker and other neoclassical economists forcefully argue that household behavior is motivated primarily by a collective concern for economic efficiency they assume that households seek to maximize exogenously given joint utility functions and they hypothesize that differences in household behavior represent efficient responses to differences in the prices and incomes which households face this approach provides the foundation for an explanation of fertility decline based on long run changes in relative prices associated with economic development simply stated the argument runs as follows as the rate of return to human capital rises and levels of education increase the cost of rearing children goes up as higher wages draw women out of the household into the labor force the opportunity cost of mothers time goes up further increasing the cost of children the demand for children decreases and fertility levels gradually adjust 2 the assumption that joint utility functions are exogenous constant over time and vary randomly if at all across households is crucial to this argument systematic differences in unobservable joint utility functions could seriously confound the interpretation of observed relationships between changes in household behavior and changes in rela

environmental income and rural livelihoods a global comparative analysis this paper presents results from a comparative analysis of environmental income from approximately 8000 households in 24 developing countries collected by research partners in cifor s poverty environment network pen environmental income accounts for 28 of total household income 77 of which comes from natural forests environmental income shares are higher for low income households but differences across income quintiles are less pronounced than previously thought the poor rely more heavily on subsistence products such as wood fuels and wild foods and on products harvested from natural areas other than forests in absolute terms environmental income is approximately five times higher in the highest income quintile compared to the two lowest quintiles

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

searching for good policies policymaking is hard policymakers typically have imperfect information about which policies produce which outcomes and they are left with little choice but to fumble their way through the policy space via a trial and error process this raises a question at the heart of democracy do democratic systems identify good policies to answer this question i introduce a novel model of policymaking in complex environments i show that good policies are often but not always found and i identify the possibility of policymaking getting stuck at outcomes that are arbitrarily bad notably policy stickiness occurs in the model even in the absence of institutional constraints this raises the question of how institutions and the political environment impact experimentation and learning i show how a simple political friction uncertainty over voter preferences interacts with political competition and policy uncertainty in a subtle way that surprisingly improves the quality of policymaking over time

the financing of innovation learning and stopping we consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success we distinguish between two financing modes namely relationship financing where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable and arm s length financing where it is unobservable we find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes the rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time under relationship financing and looser under arm s length financing the tradeoff in the choice of financing modes is between lack of commitment with relationship financing and information rents with arm s length financing

the option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules abstract we consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision voters can either implement the project in the first period or they can postpone the decision to the second period we analyze the effects of different majority rules individual first period voting behavior may become less conservative under supermajority rules and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule we characterize the optimal majority rule which is a supermajority rule in contrast to individual investment problems society may be better off if the option to postpone the decision did not exist these results are qualitatively robust to natural generalizations of our model

a theory of conservatism a free rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group to alleviate the free rider problem the group can commit to a conservative rule whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group s preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision my result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives

approximating the effective protection coefficient without reference to technological data when proposals for reform of tariff or subsidy policies are made attempts to predict the effect on incentives are frequently hampered by the need for input output technical data this article develops and illustrates the use of a methodology for approximating effective protection coefficients epcs when such data are unavailable or outdated it derives the equations which approximate the epc from statistical analysis of a cross section of existing epc studies for four agricultural commodities corn cotton rice and wheat informational requirements for computing approximations include the nominal protection coefficients on output and tradable inputs and readily available macroeconomic data these approximation equations perform well in an out of sample test

the simple dynamics of a debt crisis abstract optimal growth path of an impatient neoclassical economy is studied when creditors impose a credit ceiling to prevent debt repudiation the ceiling becomes binding in finite time when the credit constrained regime begins foreign capital inflows and domestic investment fall abruptly output per capita consumption and real wages gradually decline while the real interest rate rises these results show that debt crises in which high external debt is associated to low growth can occur even in the absence of unanticipated shocks policy mistakes or debt overhang effects if distortionary policies cause impatient behavior the model is consistent with chronic capital flight in the debtor country jel f34 f32

policy experimentation political competition and heterogeneous beliefs abstract we consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally but faces competition from a political opponent in the future both parties care about voters payoffs but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes we show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices policy experimentation future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future thus avoiding facing competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself the model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to over experiment relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods we thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on parties having conflicting objectives but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions

political economy in a changing world we provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural single crossing increasing differences conditions we prove existence of a pure strategy markov voting equilibrium provide conditions for its uniqueness and present a number of comparative static results we then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation

women s income and boy girl anthropometric status in the cote d ivoire abstract this paper examines the effects of the intrahousehold distribution of income on children s anthropometric status in the c te d ivoire we find that increases in the proportion of cash income accruing to women increases boys height for age relative to girls and that this effect is statistically significant we suggest that this result may reflect efficiency and equity concerns which in this case reinforce each other

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

gender inequalities in ownership and control of land in africa myth and reality lack of clarity behind measurement and interpretation of statistics on gender and land leads to an inability to clearly articulate a policy response to the potential inequalities faced by women and men this article sets out to explore conceptually and empirically the levels and relative inequalities in land rights between women and men in african countries the first section of the article engages in a conceptual discussion of how to measure gendered land outcomes what ownership and control mean in different contexts and why attention to these factors is important for the development of gender and land statistics the second section of the article systematically reviews existing evidence from microlevel large sample studies to summarize recent trends in land access ownership and control by sex the third section presents new statistics from a variety of nationally representative and large scale unpublished data on gender and land in africa results provide not only a nuanced understanding of the importance of measuring land indicators for gendered development in africa and globally but also new statistics on a variety of land outcomes to aid stakeholders in the discussion of gender land inequalities