the determinants of realignment expectations under the ems some empirical regularities abstract the stability of the ems depends crucially on realignment expectations of the market participants in this paper we discuss how to measure such expectations and how to relate them to economic fundamentals central bank reputation and institutional arrangements of the ems we find the following empirical regularities for ff dm and il dm exchange rates 1 1 expected devaluations are positively related to the current exchange rate deviation from the central parity 2 2 expected devaluations are negatively related to the length of time since last realignment in the short and medium run 3 3 the basle nyborg agreements seem to have a stabilizing effect for both currencies examined albeit through different channels

the political economy of trade institutions of protection d omestic support for a liberal commercial policy in the u s rests on a commonly accepted set of rules and norms these rules and norms best characterized as a defense of free and fair trade arise from two different traditions the first originated as a political reaction to high trade barriers preceding the great depression central decision makers took as a lesson from the depression period that short term political forces should not determine the level of state intervention into the market the second to protect against unfair trade emanates from a long history of state support for industries that claim foreign producers are pursuing unfair predatory practices established in statute before the depression these rules did not fundamentally change in the postwar period together these decision rules are used to interpret american trade protectionism

economic culture and foreign policy the cognitive analysis of economic policy making political scientists researching economic foreign policy have generally taken one of two analytic approaches the first is based on realpolitik the traditional application of high politics to the low politics of economics this approach considers economics subordinate to politics the concept of the national interest dominates the pursuit of power what enables the state to achieve its goals of security welfare and other societal values is seen to underlie most actions the study of foreign economic policy is thus an analysis of the distribution of power among states within the international system by understanding a state s sources of strength and areas of vulnerability in relation to other states the analyst will better understand the creation of foreign policy hans morgenthau notes that while states may sometimes pursue economic policies for their own sake in which case they should take little interest in their success the more important economic policies they will favor are instruments of political power stephen krasner views the state as an autonomously motivated actor able to guide policy in pursuit of state priorities while resisting interest groups and ideologies according to this power theory the state tries to increase its economic competitiveness ensure security of material needs and promote its broad foreign policy objectives economic policy is for the most part subordinate to and best explained by state priorities and prerogatives robert tucker klaus knorr robert gilpin and others have also adopted this framework

optimal retail contracts with asymmetric information and moral hazard constrained joint profit maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer demand is increased by dealer promotion which is unobservable by the manufacturer consequently the manufacturer does not know whether to attribute a low level of sales to a decline in demand or to a lack of promotion we show that in general the optimal contract exhibits some form of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing the type of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing depends on how price and quantity affect the link between sales and promotion

on the existence of franchise contracts and some of their implications abstract we characterize the franchising problem as a contractual agreement between a principal and multiple agents the contract contains a revenue sharing rule the level of national expenditures by the franchisor and the number of units to be enfranchised the franchisor offers the contract to a group of potential agents whose attitudes toward risk and effort differ the revenue of a franchise unit is determined by decisions of both parties as well as a random perturbation under certain conditions we establish the existence and uniqueness of an expected utility maximizing franchise contract with the property that the royalty payment to the franchisor never exceeds one half the revenue we provide an explanation for the use of a common contract and argue that in reality it is non linear we show that this common non linear contract attracts agents deemed desirable by the franchisor

implicit understandings in channels of distribution formal agreements can be used to achieve coordination among channel members these agreements work by exerting explicit control over the members who make the agreements however implicit understandings can be used as a partial substitute for more formal agreements in this paper we show that implicit understandings can develop as channel members learn about each other s behavior we show that this learning leads to the use of the implicit influence each channel member has over the other s behavior the learning leading to an implicit understanding requires some form of experimentation or historical observation this learning results in an oscillating retail price when only one channel member learns the other s behavior both channel members obtain greater profits than when neither member learns and both channel members obtain less profits than when both members learn however the member who does not learn obtains more profits than the member who learns we also show that implicit understandings r

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor this paper develops an information revelation mechanism model of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an outside integrated competitor under demand uncertainty we investigate how the manufacturer designs a wholesale price order quantity contract to induce the retailer to report his risk sensitivity information truthfully we try to explore the effects of the outside competitor and the risk sharing rule on the optimal price service level decisions of the retailer and the optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer we find that the strategic interaction plays an important role in the effect of risk sensitivity on the order quantity for the retailer when the fraction of the risk cost shared by the manufacturer is sufficiently large small the optimal wholesale price for the high risk averse retailer is higher lower than that for the low risk averse retailer

resale price maintenance under asymmetric information we study resale price maintenance rpm and quantity fixing arrangements qf in a framework with successive monopolies under both adverse selection and moral hazard the analysis compares the private and the welfare properties of both contractual modes under asymmetric information both kinds of vertical contracts entail a double marginalization driven by the information rents distributed to a privately informed downstream retailer this forces the upstream producer to sell above his marginal costs the upstream producer always prefers rpm to qf but the impact of rpm on consumers surplus is ambiguous whenever rpm is the preferred contracting mode for the vertical structure from an ex ante viewpoint it also raises consumers surplus thereby producing a pareto improvement relative to qf contracts

the second face of hegemony britain s repeal of the corn laws and the american walker tariff of 1846 one challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulation by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries this article explores a different face of hegemony specifically we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners we examine this argument in the case of the american walker tariff of 1846 american tariff liberalization was intimately related to britain s repeal of its corn laws in the antebellum united states northern protectionist and southern free trade proclivities were fixed western grain growers held the balance of power by allowing access to its lucrative grain market britain altered the economic and political incentives of western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the walker tariff

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

the expectations management approach to stabilization in argentina during 1976 1982 abstract the main goals of the economic authorities in argentina during 1976 1982 were to open the economy to foreign trade and to reduce inflation the stabilization plan relied first on the control of money and wages later on a preannounced schedule of a declining future exchange rate actions that were supposed to be accompanied by a fiscal policy to reduce the public sector deficit the stabilization plan was abandoned in the first quarter of 1981 for two reasons an important financial crisis during the second quarter of 1980 and a deterioration of fiscal discipline that could no longer assure coherence between the deficit and the preannouncement schedule the paper also argues that the political situation in argentina undermined the credibility of the reforms and particularly the stabilization attempts with the abandonment of the stabilization schedule new commercial and exchange rate measures were gradually introduced reversing the policy of opening the economy to foreign trade the financial reform was reversed in 1982 with the virtual nationalization of deposits the experience of argentina suggests that capital inflows responding to interest rate arbitrage play a fundamental role in the short run dynamics of real exchange rates they can promote the adjustment or they can precipitate a run on the foreign exchange market the lesson is that a stabilization plan based on the preannouncement of future exchange rates is highly risky for an economy like argentina s

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

making sense of nonbinding retail price recommendations we model retail price recommendations rprs as a communication device in vertical supply relations with private manufacturer information on production costs and consumer demand with static trade rprs are irrelevant and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient with repeated trade rprs can become part of a relational contract communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing joint surplus we show that this contract is self enforcing if the retailer s profit is independent of production costs and punishment strategies are chosen appropriately the predictions of our analysis are consistent with the available empirical evidence

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

the persistence of the peso problem when policy is noisy abstract the peso problem the market s belief that a discrete event may occur has frequently been blamed for the persistence of on average mistaken forecasts of macroeconomic variables this paper demonstrates how beliefs that a policy process may have switched can induce apparent ex post biased forecasts of exchange rates even after the switch has occurred furthermore during this peso problem period exchange rates may appear to contain a speculative bubble component since they will systematically deviate from the levels implied by observing fundamentals ex post and the conditional variance of exchange rates will exceed the variance implied by observing fundamentals

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

money bonds and foreign exchange in the theory of finance capital markets provide securities which allow the ownership of productive assets to be allocated among investors according to their willingness to bear risk in exchange for return and independently of their tastes for the productive services provided by the assets this paper uses the theory of finance to study the role of money as a productive asset and the transformation of money into a portfolio asset true to its purpose the capital market provides securities nominal bonds that allow an allocation of the current services of the money supply according to its current productivity and without regard for its future purchasing power risk and an allocation of the future purchasing power risk of the money supply according to the willingness of investors to bear this risk in exchange for return and without regard for investor needs for the future transactions services of money in open

sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy 1914 1940 the period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history and in the history of modern u s foreign policy world war i catapulted the united states into international economic and political leadership yet in the aftermath of the war despite grandiose wilsonian plans the united states quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad it did not join the league of nations disavowed responsibility for european reconstruction would not participate openly in many international economic conferences and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market only in the late 1930s and 1940s after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy did the united states move to center stage of world politics and economics it built the united nations and a string of regional alliances underwrote the rebuilding of western europe almost single handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system and led the world in commercial liberalization

existence of coordinating transshipment prices in a two location inventory model we consider a two location production inventory model where each location makes production decisions and is subject to uncertain capacity each location optimizes its own profits transshipment at a cost is allowed from one location to another we focus on the question of whether one can globally set a pair of coordinating transshipment prices i e payments that each party has to make to the other for the transshipped goods that induce the local decision makers to make inventory and transshipment decisions that are globally optimal a recent paper suggests for a special case of our model that there always exists a unique pair of coordinating transshipment prices we demonstrate through a counterexample that this statement is not correct and derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which it would hold we show that in some conditions coordinating prices may exist for only a narrow range of problem parameters and explore conditions when this can happen finally we study the effects of demand and capacity variability on the magnitude of coordinating transshipment prices

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

testing theories of regime change hegemonic decline or surplus capacity two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors a theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector the history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes however a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change surplus capacity in the absence of a hegemon creates the conditions necessary for change

firms and tariff regime change explaining the demand for protection although it is commonly argued that there is a connection between tariff levels and business conditions this hypothesis has not been subjected to systematic empirical analysis or given any theoretical basis the author presents two complementary theories of the movement of tariff levels in response to changing business conditions both explain tariff changes in terms of the changing political demands of business firms and both rely on the business cycle to drive these changing demands one theory is a conventional argument about changing opportunities for entry and exit the other treats firms as satisficers the theories yield similar predictions preliminary empirical analysis while consistent with both does not differentiate between them

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

endogenous residual claimancy by vertical hierarchies in this note we study a model of vertical hierarchies where the allocation of residual claimancy is endogenous and is determined jointly with production and contractual decisions we show that the equilibrium allocation of residual claimancy may be affected by production externalities across hierarchies in a non trivial manner specifically although revenue sharing contracts foster agents non contractible surplus enhancing effort we show that principals dealing with exclusive and privately informed agents might still prefer to retain a share of the surplus from production when dealing with inefficient high cost types this is because reducing the surplus share of those types reduces the information rent given up to efficient low cost types by means of a generalized competing contracts effect

the impact of ideas on trade policy the origins of u s agricultural and manufacturing policies since the close of world war ii the united states has supported contradictory trade policies in manufacturing the united states has fostered a liberal trade regime spurning government involvement in market transactions in agriculture it has sanctioned policies of import restrictions export subsidies and import fees this variation is rooted in decisions that were made in the 1930s and institutionalized in the 1940s in the wake of the great depression policymakers concluded that state intervention helped agriculture and hurt industry this article argues that the choice of government policy and its appropriateness to the economic problems faced by each sector reflect the accepted knowledge at the time neither liberalization nor subsidization was inevitable both were economically viable options however central decision makers made choices that were often based on inaccurate beliefs about the utility of different policy options

ideas institutions and american trade policy nowhere is america s hegemonic decline more evident than in changing trade patterns the united states trade balance a measure of the international demand for american goods is suffering historic deficits lowered demand for american goods has led to the under utilization of both labor and capital in a growing number of traditionally competitive american industries conversely americans taste for foreign goods has never been so great japanese cars european steel third world textiles to name a few are as well produced as their american counterparts and arrive on the u s market at a lower cost

growth waves systemic openness and protectionism there is a distinctively repetitive quality about trade policy problems domestic economic growth slows producers seek protection against foreign competitors and national decision makers raise barriers to trade while at the same time criticizing their counterparts in other governments for engaging in similar practices because trade is one of the more important topics in international and comparative political economy and because this scenario has played itself out more than a few times it is not surprising that a number of theorists have sought to model the underlying processes thought to produce movements toward and away from protectionism by now a variety of different types of approaches ranging from the cognitive to the systemic have been tried systemic structure ideas and ideology surplus capacity business cycles and shifts in elite orientation and domestic coalitions in response to external crises have been emphasized as principal theoretical foci our position is that the different levels of analysis and alternative foci all have merit and utility what they lack is an appreciation for the underlying systemic processes that link together these various facets of the political economy we seek to develop a theoretical argument that explicates these underlying processes the argument centers on recurring growth waves characterized in alternating pattern by the ascent of system leaders and the subsequent successful attempt of technological followers to catch up with the leaders the downturns of the growth waves produce conditions favoring protectionism but we contend the form and the intensity of protectionism that are likely to be produced will depend on which of the two types of growth waves is in progress ascent waves are characterized by the emergence of new technological leaders and a consequent increase in the gap between the leaders and the technological followers during the periods of structural transition and intense

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs

optimal franchise contracts with private cost information abstract this paper considers franchise arrangements in the case where the franchisee has private information about the marginal cost of sale it is shown that the optimal contract in general leads to different margins for the parties than with common cost information however in special cases the same margins than with common cost information are optimal

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

the limitations of structural theories of commercial policy if a structural theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not structural most microeconomic theory is structural so are most balance of power theories in the realm of theories of commercial policy hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description in the latter category judith goldstein s work which attempts to account for american commercial policy in terms of the ideology of american central decision makers and charles kindleberger s ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies

the strategic value of partial vertical integration we investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration namely partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods the partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration this information vertical effect translates into a competition horizontal effect the partially integrated hierarchy s commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price which strategically relaxes competition our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions

the institutional foundations of hegemony explaining the reciprocal trade agreements act of 1934 in 1930 congress approved the highly restrictive smoot hawley tariff the textbook case of pressure group politics run amok four years later congress passed the reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa surrendering much of its tariff making authority to a policy process in which internationalists had increasing influence while the united states had used reciprocity to expand exports before the stick of discriminatory treatment took precedence over the carrot of liberalizing concessions with the transfer of tariff making authority to the executive the united states could make credible commitments and thus exploit its market power to liberalize international trade despite later modifications the rtaa set the fundamental institutional framework for trade politics

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

vertical restraints under asymmetric information on the role of participation constraints the impact on vertical contracting of a type dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information the welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those restricting only sales when firms choose contracts non cooperatively retail price restrictions are desirable for the upstream supplier although detrimental to consumers whenever the retailer reservation utility has a relevant impact on optimal contracts if this impact is relatively weak and contracts are chosen cooperatively vertical price control fails to maximize firms joint profit although it would be beneficial to consumers

frequency bias in consumers perceptions of inflation an experimental study we investigate whether the perception of economy wide inflation is affected by the frequency with which various goods prices are observed we provide novel experimental evidence that consumers perceptions of aggregate inflation are systematically biased toward the perceived inflation rates of the frequently purchased items this frequency bias may affect consumers consumption and investment decisions and thus have important macroeconomic consequences it may also explain why consumers typically over estimate inflation in surveys during periods where frequently purchased non durable goods are inflating faster than durables

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

usefulness of resale price maintenance under different levels of sales effort cost and system parameter uncertainties abstract this paper on resale price maintenance rpm has three main parts i using a simple and parsimonious model we show that even with only one retailer a supplier or manufacturer hereafter manu should impose minimum rpm under some circumstances but maximum rpm in others these two sets of circumstances are defined by a very simple formula ii while most earlier rpm models assume that the decision makers have deterministic knowledge of the system parameters we present formulations and solution procedures for optimizing rpm schemes when manu is uncertain about a system parameter s value iii we show that if manu has to estimate certain key system parameters under uncertainties then in many situations rpm rapidly becomes unattractive even when these uncertainties are still quite low this constitutes one often applicable explanation why rpm is not as widely used as it should be theoretically

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

long waves technological innovation and relative decline the popularity of kondratieff long waves fluctuates according to the economic climate periods of slow growth help make long wave explanations more attractive while their popularity may oscillate the evidence associated with the existence of long waves continues to be disputed a review of the pertinent theoretical literature suggests that one reason for the disagreements about the existence of long waves is that much of the available evidence does not correspond as closely as it might to the theoretical foci a new data series one based on leading sector production growth rates from 1760 to 1985 is developed to remedy this lack of correspondence the appropriate analysis of this series requires that particular attention be paid to the rise and relative decline of the world economy s lead state the empirical outcome provides a close match to the long wave chronology developed by joseph schumpeter simon kuznets and j j van duijn while this approach falls short of bringing closure to many of the theoretical and empirical questions concerning long waves it does establish a solid empirical foundation for further analyses the article concludes with some observations on the long wave implications for the relative economic decline of britain in the nineteenth century and the united states in the twentieth century

diversification of macroeconomic risk and international integration of capital markets the case of mexico this article tests the arbitrage pricing theory in the context of the unstable macroeconomic years in mexico 1977 87 using information on returns on assets available to domestic investors primarily stocks traded at the local stock exchange an attempt is made to ascertain the extent to which these assets have offered premia for a set of proposed sources of risk the pervasive factors that play an important role in asset pricing in mexico are unexpected inflation unexpected money growth innovations in the standard poor s 500 price series and innovations in the dollar oil price a residual market factor is obtained using the mcelroy and burmeister model given that these risks get premia over and above the riskless rate expected rates of return in mexico have been higher during the years of erratic macroeconomic conditions mexico is not considered to be well integrated with the international capital markets because local sources of risk such as inflation are not priced in the united states whereas international sources of uncertainty such as oil price shocks are priced locally but not in the united states capital markets are becoming increasingly important in developing countries because of the international debt problem it seems unlikely that semi industrial nations will be able to raise substantial amounts of funds in the international financial markets the development and growth of modern domestic capital markets will allow these economies to tap additional savings and to improve the allocation of scarce funds organized and liquid capital markets are a vital factor in promoting overall development they provide a means of allocating capital to alternative private and public projects and they furnish essential information for evaluating investment undertakings ross 1978 black 1988

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

from normalcy to new deal industrial structure party competition and american public policy in the great depression industrial partisan preference may be formally modeled as the joint consequence of pressures from labor and the differential impact of the world economy on particular businesses this basic and static model when extended to cover the money market can be used to examine questions of political development including the effects of fluctuations in national income on political coalitions american institutions and public policy during the new deal are used to test the theory against empirical evidence much of it from new primary sources the rise of the new deal coalition is traced to changes in the american industrial structure deriving from the boom of the 1920s and the reversal of the u s financial position that resulted from world war i in addition to the well known labor militancy of the 1930s the effect of these changes was the rise of a democratic political coalition dominated by capital intensive multinationally dominant firms and industries with a strong interest in free trade and a historically unprecedented ability to cope with major industrial upheavals without resort to force the major public policy initiatives of the new deal are reexamined from this standpoint

conditions of reverse bullwhip effect in pricing under joint decision of replenishment and pricing abstract a reverse bullwhip effect in pricing rbp occurs when an amplification of price variability takes place moving from the upstream suppliers to the downstream customers in a supply chain in this study we investigate rbp conditions for supply chains where joint replenishment and pricing decisions are made commencing with a single stage supply chain in which a retailer faces a random and price sensitive demand we extend the results to a multi stage supply chain using a leader follower game theoretical framework we discuss rbp conditions for supply chains where newsvendor and continuous review inventory policies are employed and present numerical examples for commonly used demand functions

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

the incentives for resale price maintenance under imperfect information this paper considers both the incentives for and the welfare effects of resale price maintenance rpm in retail markets characterized by imperfect consumer information in markets where point of sale information on the product is essential for sales and information on prices is costly rpm permits manufacturers with some monopoly power to resolve two incentive conflicts with retailers first because retailers with price setting powers do not appropriate the gains in profit to an upstream manufacturer from actions taken to increase demand their incentives to inform consumers of the product and to set low prices are inadequate this purely vertical externality results in the classic double mark up of final prices second when consumers costs of price search vary stores offering low prices and no information can exist in the market equilibrium these discount houses free ride on the informational services of high price informing retail outlets a horizontal externality in the imperfect information setting of this paper 1 administered pricing improves monopolists profits by resolving the incentive conflict 2 the profitable use of a price floor reduces the maximum retail price charged and may reduce the average retail price 3 price floors or administered prices can be pareto improving and more likely welfare surplus improving 4 price floors are welfare improving

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

collapsing exchange rate regimes abstract the paper develops models of speculative runs and collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes which result from credit policies that are ultimately inconsistent with a fixed exchange rate while no substantially new results are offered the formulation itself is of interest in highlighting the important ideas that have emerged in this area we modify the flood garber model to make the analysis more comparable with the deterministic case specifically we assume that the money growth process is specified in terms of growth rates rather than absolute increments and as a uniform rather than exponential distribution the modified analysis lends itself to a simple geometric interpretation of the krugman and flood garber models highlighting the important difference between the deterministic and stochastic models in the former the speculative attack run is concentrated in the latter the transition to floating is diffuse reserve losses exceed increases in domestic credit because of a rising probability of transition and reserve depletion accelerates on the way to the regime change

entry deterrence by non horizontal merger we study when and how pure non horizontal mergers whether cross product or vertical can deter new entry organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition because heightened competition deters entry mergers can occur in equilibrium even when absent entry considerations they do not we show that in order to prevent a flood of entrants mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant

technological change and the boundaries of the firm the authors examine a firm s decision either to produce an essential input itself or to hire a subcontractor to produce the input the authors focus on how this decision is affected by technological change in the industry in general cost reducing technological change leads the firm to produce the input itself more often the firm s calculus is shown to depend on whether the subcontractor s skills are idiosyncratic or transferable in the latter case technological progress can even be detrimental to the firm and to society as a whole copyright 1991 by american economic association

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

financial policy and speculative runs with a crawling peg argentina 1979 1981 abstract in this paper we present a model of a balance of payments crisis and examine the argentine experiment with a crawling peg between december 1978 and february 1981 the approach taken allows us to examine the evolution of a crisis when a collapse is not perfectly foreseen and yields plausible estimates of one month ahead probabilities of a collapse of the crawling peg the results suggest that the viability of an exchange rate regime depends on the consistency of exchange rate policy with domestic credit policy if the two are not consistent confidence in exchange rate policy is undermined

the choice of organizational form the case of franchising abstract we examine companies that franchise some units and centrally operate own others the agency problems confronting these two organizational forms are analyzed testable hypotheses are developed the empirical results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade off among agency related problems the cost of monitoring store managers appears to be especially important in the own franchise decision the level of repeat business and initial investment requirements per unit also appear to be important

protectionism and world politics much unwarranted gloom and doom has been written of late about the new protectionism it has been widely held to be a major hindrance to third world development an obstacle in the path of world economic recovery and even a threat to good international relations the facts about trade in recent years suggest a different story and the need to look far more critically at some of the myths propounded by liberal economists for it was not protectionism that was responsible for starting the depression of the 1980s any more than that of the 1930s then as now it was financial uncertainty and the consequent shrinkage of credit that slowed both growth and trade nor is protectionism a serious menace not only has it failed to stop the flood of industrial exports from asian countries there afe good reasons of state and corporate self interest why it need not be feared in the future far from being a threat to the international economic order as imf and gatt ideologues would have us believe bilateral trading agreements between states and corporations are sustaining continued growth in trade despite financial disorder

rational and self fulfilling balance of payments crises speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities suchattacks are fully rational as they reflect the market s response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable the authors shows that under someexpectations about policy balance of payments crises can also be purely self fulfilling events in such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis the behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack copyright 1986 by american economic association

an empirical analysis of a firm s decision to franchise abstract hypotheses from monitoring and search cost explanations for the existence of franchising are discussed and tested the evidence offers strong support for the search theory somewhat weaker support for the monitoring shirking theory and no support for the monitoring cheating hypothesis

cooperative advertising models in supply chain management a review this paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising a topic which has gained substantial interest in recent years thereby we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature after that we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising which is the most common object of investigation it is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer s advertising expenditures in total we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising these articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting e g the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program after that we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models the last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel

entry and product variety with competing supply chains we study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with exclusive retailers who are privately informed about their costs the number of brands in the market determined by the manufacturers zero profit condition depends on the presence of asymmetric information and on the types of contracts between manufacturers and retailers with two part tariffs wholesale prices fully reflect retailers costs with linear contracts wholesale prices are constant and independent of retailers costs the number of brands is lower resp higher with asymmetric information than with complete information when contracts are linear resp with two part tariffs moreover although the number of brands is always higher with linear contracts than with two part tariffs joint profits of manufacturers and retailers are higher with linear prices we also discuss manufacturers incentives to choose different contract forms and analyze the effects of endogenous entry on welfare

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

tariff protection in developed and developing countries a cross sectional and longitudinal analysis four political models the international system rational domestic economic policy intragovemmental politics and interest group influence may explain the cross national structure of average nominal levels of tariffs on manufactures using available data measuring or approximating the explanatory variables for the time periods 1902 and 1971 selected hypotheses were tested in regression equations the 1971 tariff levels are best predicted by rational economic policy variables while for 1902 international power variables provide the best predictions of the tariff in general the causal forces influencing the cross national pattern of tariff levels appear to have shifted in the 20th century from those indicating international power to those measuring domestic politico economic development these results provide evidence relevant to some of the general propositions about size and development suggested by the contemporary political economy literature they also lend support to those who argue that a rising level of international interdependence has resulted in long term changes in the pattern of influences on national public policies

using return policies to elicit retailer information we show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions roughly stated the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions a retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms as a consequence a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions by serving as an additional control instrument a returns policy reduces the manufacturer s need to ration cut production

foreign exchange futures prices under fixed exchange rates abstract this paper develops three models for the determination of foreign exchange futures prices under fixed exchange rates and expectations of devaluation these models show that certain characteristics of futures prices behavior that have been used as proof of inefficiency may be present even if the market is efficient they also have several implications that are consistent with the observed behavior of mexican pesos futures prices

taxation and the political economy of the tariff traditional accounts of u s tariff policy emphasize trade strategies and interest group politics this article makes a departure it opens with an observation up until world war i the tariff was the largest single source of federal government revenues it then explores the significance of tariffs as taxes theoretically and empirically in its first part the article develops a theory of taxation politics and applies it to the tariff in its second part it submits the theory to an empirical test modeling changes in u s tariff rates from 1829 to 1940 the politics of tariff revision it argues followed from two characteristics of the tariff as tax from the extent of the treasury s dependence upon it and from the distributive pattern of its burdens and benefits taken together the article concludes revenue dependence and distributive incidence account for several diverse aspects of american tariff policy including the structure of its coalitions the shifts in its objectives and the timing of its innovations

the economic theory of vertical restraints the types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price in addition to setting per unit prices manufacturers and retailers also revert to non linear pricing and non price instruments these instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees resale price maintenance exclusive dealing exclusive territories and slotting allowances the use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers this paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices market structure efficiency and welfare

vertical restraints with incomplete information when a firm contracts with a privately informed retailer vertical restraints may be insufficient to eliminate distortions arising from having to induce truthful reporting with franchise fee contracts which are equivalent to any other quantity forcing contract two distortions arise the first is the need to transfer surplus to the retailer and the second is a reduction in the marginal return to production with rpm contracts the first best outcome of vertical integration is obtainable if the retailer observes private information only about the state of demand if the retailer observes also private information about retailing costs both distortions persist in an earlier paper rey and tirole 1986 r t compare various forms of vertical restraints in a stochastic environment where retailers have superior private information than the firm about the uncertain state of the world they demonstrate that with asymmetric information vertical restraints may be insufficient in order to reproduce the first best outcome of vertical integration in r t contingencies are not feasible in the contracts since there are multiple retailers who can arbitrage in particular the wholesale price and the franchise fee under franchise fee contracting ff or the retail price imposed upon the retailer under retail price maintenance rpm cannot be selected contingent upon any future communication with the retailers in contrast in the present paper we assume that the firm is served by a single retailer which then facilitates consideration of contingent contracts the reason we make this different assumption is in order to investigate whether more sophisticated contracts can resolve the agency problem we still obtain similar negative results to the ones obtained by r t specifically vertical integration cannot generally be reproduced by appropriate contracting if retailers can observe private information about demand or retailing costs there is another characteristic of the class of contracts considered in r t that we modify in the present analysis while in r t the agent agrees to serve the firm as long as its ex ante expected payoff is nonnegative in the present paper we require that the ex post profits of the agent are nonnegative irrespective of how unfavorable is the realization of the state of nature this

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

the economics of franchise contracts as an organizational arrangement the franchise contract lies between anonymous price mediated exchange and centralized intrafirm employment in contrast to conventional market exchange franchise contracts typically impose on franchisees retail quality standards common hours of business price controls and nonlinear payment schedules for example fixed initial royalty fees plus a percentage of gross retail revenues while franchisors typically provide national advertising and training programs monitor and inspect the franchisees performance with varying intensity across industries and hold the residual power to terminate the franchise agreement observations of actual terminations indicate that franchisors sometimes exclude this power franchisors sometimes face persistent queues of potential franchisees in contrast to simple employment contracts franchise agreements provide for sharing of profits through royalties on revenue or output and considerable freedom for independent decisions by local franchisees 1 why do these franchise contracts exist