efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

externalities and asymmetric information a reconsideration of the pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information the presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum but when it has an impact it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels the model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls this may explain authorities apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax cum subsidy schemes to manage many externalities

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

conflict and the social contract we consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other s fighting potential applications include international conflict litigation and elections even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources if this loss is small enough then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict we show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other

pollution claim settlements reconsidered hidden information and bounded payments abstract a principal s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent the principal may be a pollution generating firm the agent may be a nearby town the principal offers a contract to the agent who has the right to be free of pollution then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution finally a production level and a transfer payment are implemented suppose there is an upper bound possibly zero on payments that the agent can make to the principal in the second best solution there is underproduction for low cost types while there is overproduction for high cost types in contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first best solution

refinancing and decentralization evidence from china abstract decentralization can complement market liberalization by strengthening incentives of agents to respond to market signals however in china banks centralized lending authority following financial reforms in the mid 1990s we present a new theory of financial decentralization in which centralization provides a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects by reducing available information using data from chinese rural financial institutions we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization and the likelihood of collateral seizure strongly confirming the predictions of the refinancing model we conclude that weak institutional environments may limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite financial market liberalization

pre sale information in markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre sale consultation services we study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre sale information next to the price of information and the product price and obtain clear cut predictions on when information is over and when it is underprovided even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single crossing property buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre specified price

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

expectation formation mechanisms profitability of foreign exchange trading and exchange rate volatility an attempt is made to identify the expectation formation mechanism dominating the foreign exchange market and to demonstrate that exchange rate volatility can be attributed to the heterogeneity of traders with respect to expectation formation the criterion used to identify the dominance of a particular mechanism is the profitability of trading based on that mechanism it is concluded that mixed and extrapolative expectations are the dominant mechanisms that market participants follow some sort of a herd behaviour and that they pay attention to the expectations of other participants it is also found that the heterogeneity of market participants with respect to expectation formation goes a long way towards explaining volatility

the price of advice we develop a model of consulting advising where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client s original private estimate of the profitability of a project although the client can perfectly observe and evaluate these signals the consultant may only be able to do the same imperfectly or not at all this captures the idea that the expert may not fully understand the impact of her advice on the client we characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client it is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not the main result of the article is that in the optimal mechanism the consultant obtains the same profit as though she could perfectly observe and evaluate the impact of the signals whose release she controls on the client s profit estimate

communication in federal politics universalism policy uniformity and the optimal allocation of fiscal authority the paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy relevant information depending on the type of policy under consideration communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible this generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending universalism and uniformity building on these findings i develop a theory of fiscal de centralization which revisits the work of oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication empirical results from a cross section of us municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

contract renegotiation a simple framework and implications for organization theory this paper provides a unifying framework for studying renegotiation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information we show that interim renegotiation does not constrain the set of contracts attainable with full commitment regardless of whether renegotiation offers are made by the informed or the uninformed agent ex post renegotiation however does constrain the set of attainable contracts these constraints depend on the identity of the agent making the renegotiation offer we then show how the theory of contract renegotiation can provide insights for organization theory specifically we show how decentralization of decision making can be an optimal response to the threat of ex post renegotiation finally we show that our framework can be used to analyse the trade off between internal and external markets

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

central governance or subsidiarity a property rights approach to federalism abstract we consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value increasing investments while negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium non contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes if the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity centralized governance is superior when spillovers are weak strong conversely if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority with majority or unanimity rule does not

the costs of worker displacement this study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship a bargaining model is used to link wage tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship if information is good the profile will flatten as displacement approaches using psid data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981 wage tenure profiles are found not to change this suggests that either workers or both firms and workers are surprised by the displacement the present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker s share of firm specific capital is around 7 000 1980 dollars

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

stop and go agricultural policies with a land market this article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers productivity a government objective to insure farmers a minimum parity income an endogenous land rent and diminishing returns on alternative nonprogram crop land uses in this setting acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy although compensated acreage limits are when there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation or buyout program in which high cost producers participate and low cost producers do not copyright 2003 oxford university press

foreign direct investment and host country policies a rationale for using ownership restrictions abstract this paper examines host governments motivation for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects an mnf with a productivity advantage is willing to invest in a host country the host government wants to capture the mnf s surplus yet cannot observe it due to the mnf s private information about its firm specific advantage in contrast a joint venture jv partner might observe this surplus depending on its ownership share the host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a jv this calls into question the wisdom of calls for liberalizing fdi flows by the wholesale elimination of domestic jv requirements we show that the optimal mechanism involves ownership restrictions that decrease as the size of the mnf s firm specific advantage increases

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

empirical models of the exchange rate separating the wheat from the chaff various popular exchange rate models a standard monetary model a portfolio balance model and sticky price models are estimated and evaluated using u s canadian data for the 1970s nonnested hypothesis tests demonstrate that none are correctly specified the data suggest 1 the exchange rate persistence observed is not fully explained by any of the models 2 the small durbin watson statistics indicate longer lags are required 3 the current account is a useful explanatory variable 4 the portfolio balance model fits the data well but has potentially serious problems measuring the stock of foreign assets this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does structure matter the impact of switching the agricultural policy regime on farm structures abstract this paper investigates the relationship between structural change in agriculture and a policy regime switch at the regional level using the agent based spatial and dynamic simulation model agripolis we simulate structural change for two different farm structures in response to a policy change results show that structural adjustment differs depending on the initial structure

optimal border policies for invasive species under asymmetric information this paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost we show how the optimal inspection penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case departing from previous literature we allow for technical assistance a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under article 9 of the world trade organization sanitary and phytosanitary agreement we find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement even if it would otherwise be inefficient further we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy if technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter s country optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive if technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter s economy it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff penalty combination optimal

public goods with costly access abstract we examine the optimal allocation of excludable public goods with a private access cost that some consumers may not be able to afford the full information benchmark is presented first then individuals access costs and income levels are private information when high income consumers have low access cost asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor for accessing the public good and inequality increases when the low access cost consumers have the lower income subsidizing the poor may involve countervailing incentives but inequality decreases finally monopoly provision exacerbates underprovision of the poor particularly of those with low access cost

exchange rate models and exchange rate expectations an empirical investigation a non parametrictest of popular modern exchange rate models under alternative expectation specifications is presented it is found that there is little difference in the predictive success of the alternative exchange rate models however there are significant differences in the performance of a model depending upon the expectations mechanism specified our most important finding is that the flexible price monetary model the portfolio balance model and a hybrid model under extrapolative and adaptive expectations mechanisms provide statistically significant information about the direction of exchange rate movements by contrast the same models when employing static regressive and rational expectation mechanisms do not provideany satistically significant information

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

the political economy of transition the overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform what are the main insights from that theory how does it reflect the transition reality what have we learned and what do we still need to learn the present article will attempt to answer those questions

contractual distortions in a market with frictions abstract this paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions while principals e g firms have all contractual power their market power is constrained as agents e g workers can choose to wait and search for better offers we find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents utilities with type independent costs of search and waiting equilibrium contracts are always first best if agents are impatient and discount future payoffs however distortions vanish only gradually in the latter case we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities both of which are absent in the case of type independent costs of search

multinationals tax competition and outside options abstract we analyze tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option e g towards a third country an interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may constitute a win win situation the firm as well as its present host countries may gain when this occurs the reason that it benefits the host countries is that an enhanced outside option reduces the inefficiencies of tax competition an implication of the result is that better outside options for multinational firms may reduce the gains from host countries policy coordination and thus reduce those countries incentives to coordinate their policies also with a development where outside options become more accessible the perceived costs of tax competition e g in terms of underprovision of public goods may be overestimated our findings may also have implications for international negotiations since it provides an argument for mutual reduction of entry barriers as this may improve outside options

flexible exchange rates prices and the role of news lessons from the 1970s recent experience with flexible exchange rate systems has led to renewed interest in the operation of foreign exchange markets as reflected in many recent studies of the principal determinants of exchange rates the 1970s witnessed the dramatic alteration of the international monetary system from a regime of pegged exchange rates which prevailed for about a quarter of a century since the bretton woods conference into a regime of flexible though managed rates as a consequence of the emergence of the new legal and economic system traders national governments and international organisations were confronted with new economic problems choices and instruments during the 1970s ex change rates fluctuated widely and inflation rates accelerated the international monetary system had to accommodate extraordinarily large oil related shocks which affected trade flows in goods and assets huge oil payments had to be recycled uncertainties concerning future developments in international politics reached new heights and the prospects for the world economy got gloomier these developments placed unprecedented pressures on the markets for foreign exchange as well as on other asset markets they were associated with a large slide in the value of the us dollar and resulted in speeding up the creation of new institutions like the european monetary system which provided the formal framework for the management of exchange rates among members

the goals of u s agricultural policy a mechanism design approach this article examines motivations underlying the government s choice of alternative policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture optimal policies are analyzed for three government objectives one where the government wishes to ensure a minimum level of net income for all farmers a second where the government s only concern is to transfer income from consumers and taxpayers to the farm sector and a final augmented income transfer objective the analysis offers an explanation for agricultural policy mechanisms that involve overproduction by high cost producers relative to a free market equilibrium such a distortion might arise from the existence of nonmarket values for the production of relatively high cost farmers in the government s objective

socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing abstract we investigate the behaviour of a social planner that secures the supply of a good e g an environmental benefit through contracting with private agents while the social planner seeks to maximise net social benefits she is also controlled with a fixed budget private agents are profit maximising and hold private information concerning their variable costs of production they also have known fixed costs of contracting we find that budget constraints and fixed costs change the optimal contract design in more than one way the social planner minimises costs rations high cost contracts to reduce fixed costs and information rents and distorts contracts for all agent types including low cost agents we find that rationing improves social welfare also even though social costs including tax distortion are explicitly taken into consideration they do not affect the design of optimal contracts when budgets are tight in those cases the budget constraint dominates the solution

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

public investment and real price supports abstract the social rate of return to public investment in industries with fixed real price supports is studied using a simple general equilibrium model fixed real price supports are shown to enhance the likelihood of immiserizing growth due to capital accumulation or technological innovation in the supported sector general conditions under which an intervention price will induce a negative social rate of return to public investment are derived

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

decentralization externalities and efficiency in the competitive model externalities lead to inefficiencies and inefficiencies increase with the size of externalities however as argued by coase these problems may be mitigated in a decentralized system through voluntary coordination we show how coordination is limited by the combination of two factors respect for individual autonomy and the existence of private information together they imply that efficient outcomes can only be achieved through coordination when external effects are relatively large moreover there are instances in which coordination cannot yield any improvement at all despite common knowledge that social gains from agreement exist this occurs when external effects are relatively small and this may help to explain why coordination is so seldom observed in practice when improvements are possible we describe how simple subsidies can be used to implement second best solutions and explain why standard solutions such as pigovian taxes cannot be used possible extensions to issues arising in the structure of research joint ventures assumptions in the endogenous growth literature and the location of environmental hazards are also described

white certificates energy efficiency programs under private information of consumers abstract energy efficiency is an objective of public interventions at least since the public utility regulatory policy act of 1978 purpa recently conservation has received considerable attention in the united states and in particular in the european union but this time in order to mitigate global warming policy measures include regulations at the technical level and the introduction of white certificates in order to force utilities and firms to invest into conservation in a way similar to the already existing renewable energy quota this paper derives the optimal mechanism if utilities must deal with white certificates facing consumers holding private information the optimal mechanism has some theoretically interesting features like restricted participation and a discontinuity

is financial openness bad for education a political economy perspective on development abstract this paper presents a simple model of the links between education democratization and economic development in a context of imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for a capitalist oligarchy to subsidize the education of poor workers and to initiate a political transition it is shown that international financial liberalization while stimulating physical capital accumulation reduces the capitalist elite willingness to subsidize domestic human capital accumulation in the medium run it thus delays without necessarily impeding the process of democratization

from market magic to calypso science policy a review of terence kealey s the economic laws of scientific research the current reconsideration of public research funding policies in the u s and u k and other industrialized economies makes it important that policy makers and the public understand the valid economic grounds for government support of science this review article of a book that which argues for the ending of all government support of non military r d provides an occasion to take stock of what is known about the subject the review concludes that the extreme laissez faire science policy arguments adroitly advanced by terrance kealey s book are analytically without foundation and are based upon distortions and misinterpretations of the evidence of economic history as well as on the misuse of econometric methods the problem is that mr kealey is an engaging writer and there still is in some policy circles an audience for his message hence to undo the damage will call for concerted and persistent efforts on the part of economists specializing in the economics of science and technology this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

the social shaping of the national science base abstract innovation studies confirm de tocqueville s prediction that continuous technical change in business firms in modern society would require the development in close proximity of publicly funded basic research and associated training the rate and direction of the development of a country s science base is strongly influenced by its level of economic development and the composition of its economic and social activities in other words it is socially shaped

floating exchange rates expectations and new information abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between forward exchange rates future spot rates and new information a stochastic model of exchange rate determination is used to formally show how unanticipated changes in the exchange rate determinants or news affect the spot rate the empirical analysis indicates that new information plays an important role in explaining the market forecasting error or difference between the spot rate and the forward rate determined in the previous period

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information abstract we consider the design of government policy to ration such scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the presence of limited information when government policy is formulated some informed agents e g established public utilities know how highly they value the resource other uninformed agents e g potential independent power producers only learn their valuations at some later date the government allows uninformed agents to trade the resource rights they receive on a competitive market informed agents may or may not have the same privilege the optimal initial distribution of resource rights differs significantly according to whether informed agents can trade the rights they receive

heart of darkness modeling public private funding interactions inside the r d black box abstract this paper is a first step toward closing the analytical gap in the extensive literature on the results of interactions between public and private r d expenditures and their joint effects on the economy a survey focusing on econometric studies in this area reveals a plethora of sometimes confusing and frequently contradictory estimates of the response of company financed r d to changes in the level and nature of this category of public expenditures yet a theoretical framework seldom is provided within which the empirical results are to be interpreted some such structure is necessary in view of the multiple channels through which public research can affect private r d performance especially as not all the effects flow in the same direction a major cause of inconsistencies in the empirical literature is the failure to recognize key differences among the various policy experiments being considered depending upon the economy in which they are embedded and the type of public sector r d spending that is contemplated using a simple stylized structural model we identify the main channels of impact of public r d we thus can characterize the various effects distinguishing between short and long run impacts that would show up in simple regression analyses of nominal public and private r d expenditure variables within the context of our simple model it is possible to offer interpretations that shed light on recent cross section and panel data findings at both high i e national and low specific technology area levels of aggregation

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

local pollution in federal systems it is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed this paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant in aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias if the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy if the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy

exchange rate pass through into german import prices a disaggregated perspective this study analyses the exchange rate pass through into german import prices based on disaggregated data taken on a monthly basis between 1995 and 2012 our main contribution is twofold firstly we employ various time series techniques to analyse data for different product categories and also cointegration techniques to carefully distinguish between short run and long run pass through coefficients secondly in a panel data approach we estimate time varying pass through coefficients and explain their development with regard to various macroeconomic factors our results show that long run pass through is only partly observable and incomplete whereas short run pass through shows a more unique character although heterogeneity across product groups does exist we are also able to identify several macroeconomic factors that determine changes in the degree of pass through which is especially relevant for policymakers

regime shifts and the canada us exchange rate in a multivariate framework this study re evaluates the monetary approach for the canada u s exchange rate and shows that its basic structure can be verified although the coefficients are not consistently in line with theory our findings also indicate that exchange rate adjustment is subject to regime shifts

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information abstract politically motivated subsidies can have undesired environmental consequences asymmetric information regarding firm productivity constrains the government s ability both to redistribute income and control emissions taking political and information constraints as given this article characterizes a social welfare maximizing policy the optimal policy uses a single instrument to achieve both goals making income support subsidies contingent upon pollution reduction price variation allows the government to design contracts with countervailing incentives potentially eliminating some firms information advantage