the political economy of government domestic expenditure in the affluent democracies 1960 80 despite the large number of studies of the determination of government expenditure in the affluent democracies most students of the subject admit that we know relatively little about the complex dynamics of spending change using multiple regression analyses of changes in nonmilitary outlays over the years 1960 to 1973 and 1973 to 1980 this study attempts to remedy some of the problems in the literature by providing new tests of several old hypotheses by introducing and testing several relatively new hypotheses and by evaluating such propositions in the context of an integrated theoretical framework and of analyses that span two distinct political economic eras results suggest that the dynamics of domestic expenditure change are partially conditioned by macroeconomic and political environments of particular eras overall the self interests and ideological preferences of policymakers the institutional and extrainstitutional political action of policy relevant groups and needs for state assistance emerge as principal sources of changes in domestic expenditure

corporate economic power and the state a longitudinal assessment of two explanations much has been written about the relationship between the economic resources of corporations and their ability to control politics in advanced capitalist democracies the resource that has received the most attention is economic concentration but there is little agreement about the precise form of concentration that matters in an attempt to find the most useful image of the state this study looks at the connection between the aggregate concentration of assets among the leading manufacturing firms as well as the rate of business investment and taxes on business time series regressions computed on u s national level data show that theories of the state that emphasize the independet activities of private investors are not supported instead the aggrgate concentration of assets as measured by the share of assets held by the leading 100 firms has a strong negative influence on effective corporate tax rates these results are consistent with the theory that heightened aggregate concentration helps corpor

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

tax policy in an era of internationalization explaining the spread of neoliberalism i offer an explanation for the widespread diffusion of neoliberal tax policies in the developed democracies after accounting for the policy influences of commonly experienced domestic and international forces i consider several plausible paths of diffusion of neoliberal tax structure my central argument is that the highly visible 1980s market conforming tax reform in the united states should be especially important in shaping subsequent tax policies in other polities there are substantial reasons to believe however that domestic political and institutional forces will shape policymaker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal reforms the strength of right parties and the degree to which the median voter has moved right should condition adoption of neoliberal tax policy the institutions of national and sector coordinated capitalism should also slow the enactment of neoliberal tax reforms i assess these arguments with empirical models of 1981 98 tax rates on capital in sixteen nations i find that changes in u s tax policy influence subsequent reforms in other polities in the long term all nations move toward the u s neoliberal tax structure analysis also shows however that the short term responsiveness to u s tax reforms is notably greater where uncoordinated market institutions are dominant theory and extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence indicate that pressures to compete for mobile assets as balanced against the economic and political costs of adoption anchor the process of diffusion of neoliberal tax policy there is little evidence for the view that systematic policy learning or social emulation drove tax policy diffusion earlier versions of this article were presented at the center for european studies and weatherhead center for international affairs harvard university center for international studies ucla and yale university as well as the 2002 annual meetings of the american political science association an earlier version was published as minda de gunzburg center for european studies harvard university working paper 120 i thank alex hicks rob franzese torben iversen andy martin cathie jo martin participants in the yale ucla and harvard conferences especially geoffrey garrett helen milner dennis quinn and beth simmons and two anonymous referees and the editors of international organization for helpful comments i also gratefully acknowledge the contribution of sven steinmo that comes by way of our past collaborative work on tax policy

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

comparative economic voting britain france germany italy likelihood of a vote for the incumbent coalition in contrast personal economic circumstances no matter how measured demonstrate nonexistent to weak effects on vote choice overall economic conditions emerge as a relatively important vote determinant when a more properly specified general multi equation model of the vote is estimated economics shows itself to be as powerful as traditional factors used to explain the western european vote in particular economic variables exceed the impact of partisan identification in britain and roughly equal it in germany moreover the economic variables exercise more influence than the social cleavages of class and religion everywhere except italy

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

on the political economy of welfare expansion a comparative analysis of 18 advanced capitalist democracies 1960 1971 this article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies our multivariate model of this thesis specified to 1960 1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product is supported strongly by regression analyses these indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth they also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion while leftist centrist and christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well in addition state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests strike activity and capital investment disinvestment activ

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

bayesian inference for comparative research rv egression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables we describe a bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems this approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization a widely used tool in quantitative comparative politics is the linear regression model estimating relationships between institutional and economic variables observed for a set of countries constituting some population of interest a brief survey of recent comparative research finds no shortage of work of this type for instance remmer 1991 identifies economic crisis as a source of electoral volatility in latin american countries in the 1980s robertson 1990 presents evidence that institutions moderating the transaction costs of negotiations between capital and labor reduce industrial conflict and golden 1993 finds that union wage moderation in industrialized democracies results from coordinated collective bargaining although the methodological advantages are well documented jackman 1985 we identify two distinct problems of statistical inference endemic to this type of quantitative comparative research first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second because data sets tend to be small and collinear the effects of explanatory variables are estimated imprecisely in most applications the first problem is generally ignored and the second is solved by imposing restrictions on the regression model to obtain sensible results the bayesian model of statistical inference provides a unified solution to these two distinct problems of quantitative comparative research two features of bayesian inference are important in this context first probability is conceived subjectively as characterizing a researcher s uncertainty about the parameters of a statistical model this subjective probability concept seems particularly useful in comparative settings where the data are typically convenience samples not generated by a known probability mechanism such as random sampling second bayesian inference allows the inclusion of other information in addition to the quantitative sample information again this seems useful in the comparative context where rich historical material is commonly available sparking ideas for researchers but formally discarded in the final analysis in the bayesian approach this historical material can be formally incorporated into the analysis we begin by detailing why the nonstochastic and weak data typical of comparative research are problematic for conventional linear regression analysis we next introduce some ideas about bayesian inference and describe bayesian regression analysis these ideas are applied to a comparative analysis of unionization the subject of a recent exchange in the american political science review between michael wallerstein and john stephens stephens and wallerstein 1991 wallerstein 1989 the bayesian regressions we present are supplemented with a sensitivity analysis that investigates how our conclusions depend upon the sample data and our prior beliefs although we survey some ideas in bayesian statistics a full introduction to the bayesian approach to statistical inference is beyond our scope here good book length treatments are pollard 1986 lee 1989 and at a slightly higher level press 1989 our intention here is to spotlight problematic but ignored issues of statistical inference in a common area of application the bayesian alternative that we present represents just one way forward to address these inferential problems

the transformation of prison regimes in late capitalist societies recent studies argue that cultural and political economic shifts have led to a sea change in penal regimes among modern western societies resulting in more punitive social policies in general and a trend toward higher incarceration rates in particular this is a special case of a wider argument that globalization has led to a decline in state autonomy and convergence on a market based model of economic and social policy this thesis has been challenged by the empirical literature on welfare states which finds persistent cross national diversity in institutional structures policies and patterns of inequality focusing on incarceration rates as the outcome of interest this study evaluates these arguments by applying a bayesian change point model to four decades of data from 15 countries results show that a regime shift did occur but that incarceration rates increased mainly among countries with unregulated labor markets decentralized polities or weak labor unions profound institutional differences

the future of the income tax the federal income tax has been under attack by the economics profession for more than a decade the attack comes from two directions supply siders who believe that progressive income taxation impairs economic incentives and more traditional economists who would substitute a progressive expenditure tax for the income tax 2 at one time support for the expenditure tax was confined to a few members of our profession including such distinguished names as john stuart mill irving fisher nicholas kaldor and james meade today it is fair to say that many if not most economists favor the expenditure tax or a flat rate income tax this group has joined the opponents of progressive taxation in the attack on the income tax despite an incessant barrage from both groups no country in the world is planning to abandon the income tax or is even considering a personal expenditure tax a wave of tax reform beginning with the u s reform in 1986 has been sweeping the world aimed at improving the income tax not at eliminating it tax preferences formerly regarded as sacrosanct are being removed and there is a distinct movement toward comprehensive income taxation 3 however individual income tax rates are being cut tax progressivity has been declining almost everywhere and reliance on the income tax has been diminishing it will come as no surprise to this audience that i approve of the base broadening feature of the current tax reform movement but i believe that the reduction in the redistributive effect of the income tax has gone too far in this paper i shall show that the progressivity of the u s tax system never very pronounced except during and immediately after the two world wars has been declining for more than two decades and that the tax reform act of 1986 reversed this decline but only slightly consequently we have a long way to go to improve the equity of the tax system i believe this can be done without punitive tax rates that will hurt economic incentives i begin with a brief review of recent changes in the u s distribution of income and follow this with an analysis of the effect of taxes on the income distribution i next examine arguments for and against the income tax with particular emphasis on its effects on economic incentives and its merits when compared with the expenditure tax i then evaluate the income tax as it emerged from the 1986 tax reform and conclude with tjoseph pechman passed away on august 19 1989 his presidential address was delivered at the onehundred second meeting of the american economic association december 29 1989 atlanta georgia joseph a pechman economic studies program the brookings institution 1775 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 i have benefited from the comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper by henry j aaron richard goode jane g gravelle robert w hartman donald w kiefer herbert e klarman robert d reischauer clifford m winston and h peyton young but they should not be held responsible for the views expressed in this paper i am indebted to richard kasten for various simulations i am also grateful to stephen j kastenberg for research assistance and to diane a shugart valerie m owens and sara c hufham for secretarial assistance some of the more extreme supply siders argued that large tax cuts pay for themselves see for example laffer 1981 but i believe it is fair to say that this view has been totally discredited for a more reasonable supply side view see the economic report of the president 1982 2see for example michael j boskin 1978 david e bradford 1980 charles l ballard don fullerton john shoven and john whalley 1985 paul courant and edward gramlich 1982 martin feldstein 1978 robert hall and alvin rabushka 1985 john kay and mervyn king 1983 charles mclure 1987 mieszkowski 1980 and lawrence summers 1981 it is interesting that the recent popularity of the expenditure tax among economists was stimulated by a tax lawyer william d andrews 1974 3see pechman 1988

central banks partisan politics and macroeconomic outcomes what are the implications of the trend toward granting central bank independence for partisan theories of the macroeconomy the conventional view is that parties of the left and right strive to achieve distinctive macroeconomic outcomes when in government however when faced with an independent central bank parties of the left may prove unable to produce their preferred partisan outcomes whereas right parties may be privileged in their ability to pursue their goals moreover granting the central bank independence can be expected to have differing effects depending on whether left or right parties prevail in government these issues are explored with a pooled time series model of inflation and unemployment in 16 organization for economic co operation and development countries from 1961 through 1991 the results support the claim that the effects of partisan government and central bank organization are mutually contingent the pattern of results anticipated by partisan theory only arises where central b

variation of wage rates with size of establishment abstract using census of manufactures data at the four digit level wages rise with establishment size especially in the upper ranges of establishment sizes

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance a corrigendum alvarez garrett and lange 1991 used cross national data panel data on the organization for economic coordination and development nations to show that countries with left governments and encompassing labor movements enjoyed superior economic performance here we show that the standard errors reported in that article are incorrect reestimation of the model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors upholds the major finding of alvarez garrett and lange regarding the political and institutional causes of economic growth but leaves the findings for unemployment and inflation open to question we show that the model used by alvarez garrett and lange feasible generalized least squares cannot produce standard errors when the number of countries analyzed exceeds the length of the time period under analysis also we argue that ordinary least squares with robust standard errors is superior to feasible generalized least square for typical cross national panel studies

unions wages and the common interest three models have dominated recent research on the relationship between labor unions wage behavior and national economic performance a simple linear model a parabolic model and a political model this article argues that an unemployment mediated linear model is theoretically preferable in a context of low unemployment encompassing labor movements can be expected to restrain wage demands whereas localized unions have much less incentive to do so in a context of high unemployment localized unions should exhibit wage moderation and the pressure on encompassing unions to restrain wage demands is further accentuated these four models are assessed as predictors of wage changes inflation and misery index levels for 15 industrialized nations over the periods 1960 1973 1974 1979 and 1980 1990 the linear models outperform the parabolic and political models in each of the latter two time periods for the mid to late 1970s the simple linear model performs best but for the 1980s the unemployment medi

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

work disutility and compensating differentials estimation of factors in the link between wages and firm size this paper investigates the positive wage firm size relationship using a sample of workers performing the same jobs in different sized firms controlling for skill differences wages are still found to be higher in larger firms using an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure as a measure of job disutility the difference in wages between large and small firms is found to be greater than the difference in disutility ruling out compensating differentials as the sole cause of the wage size relationship hence the argument that labor extracts some of the higher profits of larger firms is plausible

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

political parties and the supply side of the economy the provision of physical and human capital in advanced economies 1960 90 theory partisan tenure of government in contrast to institutionalist and structural approaches is used to explain the nature of governmental strategies to affect the supply side of the economy the provision of the input factors capital and labor hypotheses supply side economic strategies are a function of the party in office left wing governments spend heavily in physical and human capital formation to raise the productivity of factors and the competitiveness of the economy rightwing governments rely instead on private agents to maximize economic growth the organization of the domestic political economy and the international economy which place heavy limits on the capacity of parties to affect the conduct of macroeconomic policies hardly constrain the choice of supply side economic strategies methods regression analysis of data for levels of public spending on gross fixed capital formation and on education in oecd nations from 1960 to 1990 results supply side policies conform to partisan preferences throughout the period examined the institutional configuration of the economy affected policies jointly with government partisanship until the oil shock but not afterwards economic openness does not constrain the choice of supply side policies

interest group success in the european union when and why does business lose business lobbying is widespread in the european union eu but because not all lobbying is successful the following question arises when does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy making in the eu we argue that business actors are overall less successful than citizen groups in the european policy process however they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the european parliament is restricted a new data set on the positions of more than 1 000 non state actors with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the european commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate this argument empirical support for our expectations is highly robust our findings have implications for the literature on legislative decision making in the eu and for research on non state actors in international organizations

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

leading the left to the right populist coalitions and economic reform abstract democratic political parties with a history of commitment to statist economic policies face internal stresses when they come to power and preside over programs of wholesale economic liberalization how do such parties and coalitions avoid splintering and manage to maintain electoral support examining the recent experiences of argentina and mexico edward gibson suggests that one can understand these achievements by treating each party as a combination of two separate components performing distinct functions a metropolitan policy component and a peripheral or rural electoral component his framework travels well beyond latin america and helps illuminate the different politics underlying three recent waves of economic liberalization in sri lanka