evolutionary stability in games of communication abstract this paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff relevant action the informed player can communicate at little cost outcomes satisfying a set valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common interest games when there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable the paper introduces a nonequilibrium set valued stability notion of entry resistant sets for games with partial common interest the no communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

putting renewable energy auctions into action an agent based model of onshore wind power auctions in germany abstract the following analysis looks into auctions for renewable energy specifically onshore wind power in germany following an agent based modeling approach the two most commonly applied auction pricing rules are compared uniform and pay as bid and first conclusions on outcomes are drawn for future policy design the auctions are modeled to closely represent the auction design foreseen in the german renewable energy sources act eeg 2017 and replicate their parameters the analysis draws on auction theory for both pricing schemes individually rational agents with independent valuation are assumed as support for renewable electricity through auctions is to be established permanently and auction rounds will be held multi annually a further focus lies on agents learning over time by adapting their behavior to new information the model results show that pay as bid exhibits lower prices and thus support costs than uniform pricing whereas allocative efficiency suffers under pay as bid over time one can observe a decline in the strike price which is due to learning effects whereas agents profits increase in the course of the auctions furthermore smaller actors will experience difficulties and agent diversity is likely to suffer in the long term if this is not accounted for in other ways

appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support prequalifications and penalties abstract auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support res however they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders the major risk for the auctioneer with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for res in general is the risk of non realization awarded bidders do not realize their projects the main reasons are bidders uncertainties concerning their project costs the auctioneer can reduce the non realization risk by taking various measures the most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties an evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for res the non realization option induces lower bids a suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non realization risk significantly however involves sunk costs counterintuitively first price auction and second price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes the appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging under consideration of all implications we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency

back to the future rethinking auctions for renewable electricity support abstract the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of two main types of instruments feed in tariffs and quotas with tradable green certificates have usually been compared in the literature on renewable electricity promotion due to negative past experiences with a third instrument auctions this instrument has been broadly dismissed in academics and until recently also in policy practice however and based on an in depth review of experiences with auction schemes for renewable electricity around the world this paper argues that some of the problems with auctions in the past can be mitigated with the appropriate design elements and that indeed auctions can play an important role in the future implementation of renewable electricity support instruments around the world the paper provides a proposal for the coherent integration of several design elements

risk sharing networks and insurance against illness most risk sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village generally the full risk sharing hypothesis is rejected this paper uses detailed data on all insurance networks within a village in tanzania networks are not clustered but largely overlapping we test whether full risk sharing occurs within these networks while village level full insurance cannot be rejected for food consumption we find evidence consistent with at least partial insurance of non food consumption via networks

the behavior of the exchange rate in the genetic algorithm and experimental economies this paper studies the behavior of the exchange rate in the kareken wallace overlapping generations economy with two currencies in which decision rules are updated using the genetic algorithm the analysis shows that a stationary monetary equilibrium of the kareken wallace model is not stable under the genetic algorithm dynamics the fluctuations in the genetic algorithm exchange rate are driven by fluctuations in the portfolio fractions which change over time in response to the inequality between the rates of return on two currencies further both the genetic algorithm simulations and the experiments with human subjects were characterized by continuing fluctuations of the exchange rate with first period consumption values close to a stationary value

social network effects on mobile money adoption in uganda abstractthis study analyses social network effects on the adoption of mobile money among rural households in uganda we estimate conditional logistic regressions controlling for correlated effects and other information sources results show that mobile money adoption is positively influenced by the size of the social network with which information is exchanged we further find that this effect is particularly pronounced for non poor households thus while social networks represent an important target for policy makers aiming to promote mobile money technology the poorest households are likely to be excluded and require more tailored policy programmes and assistance

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents abstract we study the exchange economies of kiyotaki and wright 1989 in which agents must use a commodity or fiat money as a medium of exchange if trade is to occur our agents are artificially intelligent and are modeled as using classifier systems to make decisions in the assignment of credit within the classifier systems we introduce some innovations designed to study sequential decision problems in a multi agent environment for most economies that we have simulated trading and consumption patterns converge to a stationary nash equilibrium even if agents start with random rules in economies with multiple equilibria the only equilibrium that emerges in our simulations is the one in which goods with low storage costs play the role of medium of exchange i e the fundamental equilibrium of kiyotaki and wright

mobile money agricultural marketing and off farm income in uganda mobile money mm services can contribute to welfare gains in smallholder farm households previous research showed that one important pathway for these mm related welfare gains is through higher remittances received from relatives and friends here the role of other impact pathways is examined especially focusing on agricultural marketing and off farm economic activities the analysis builds on panel data from smallholder coffee farmers in uganda regression models show that the adoption of mm technology has contributed to higher household incomes and consumption levels off farm income gains are identified to be an important pathway also beyond remittances typical off farm income sources are small businesses in trade transport and handicrafts which benefit from novel savings and money transfer opportunities through mm in terms of agricultural marketing mm users sell a larger proportion of their coffee as shelled beans to buyers in high value markets instead of selling to local traders immediately after harvest mm services help to reduce cash constraints and facilitate transactions with buyers from outside local regions in conclusion mm can contribute to rural development through various important pathways analysis of adoption patterns suggests that mm services are socially inclusive

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

auctions with artificial adaptive agents abstract experiments on auctions find that subjects make systematic bidding errors that cannot be explained within the context of nash equilibrium bidding models experimenters and others have conjectured that learning by subjects could lead to errors consistent with those observed here we create and analyze a model of adaptive learning and demonstrate that such a model can capture the bidding patterns evident among human subjects in experimental auctions moreover our model provides a variety of insights into the nature of learning across different auction institutions journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c9

genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model this paper presents the cobweb model in which competitive firms in a market for a single good use a genetic algorithm to update their decision rules about next period production and sales the results of simulations show that the genetic algorithm converges to the rational expectations equilibrium for a wider range of parameter values than other algorithms frequently studied within the context of the cobweb model price and quantity patterns generated by the genetic algorithm are also compared to the data of experimental cobweb economies it is shown that the algorithm can capture several features of the experimental behavior of human subjects better than three other learning algorithms that are considered

mobile money adoption and households vulnerability to shocks evidence from togo we investigate the determinants of mobile money adoption process and whether its use helps households in togo to be resilient to predictable and unpredictable life events using ordered logit and s

limited liability and mechanism design in procurement in the presence of cost uncertainty limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bankruptcy costs when nancial soundness is not perfectly observable we show that incentive compatibility implies that nancially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism informational rents are associated with unsound nancial situations by selecting the nancially weakest contractor stronger price competition auctions may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents thus weak conditions are su cient for auctions to be suboptimal in particular we show that pooling rms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor

a model of auction contracts with liquidated damages abstract this paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller in the event of a default on the auction contract the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit when renegotiation is possible increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller s payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder under these conditions the seller s payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit journal of economic literature classification number d44

mobile money financial inclusion and development a review with reference to african experience we survey literature on mobile money and its contribution in promoting financial inclusion and development with a focus on sub saharan africa we use taxonomic descriptive and analytical methods to evaluate the state of knowledge in the area we analyse how mobile technology in general may contribute to economic development and financial inclusion in theory and practise we explain the mechanics of mobile money using kenya s m pesa as a canonical example and consider whether the literature has fully established the potential economic impact of mobile money especially its contribution to financial inclusion we also consider market structure pricing and regulatory implications of mobile money we conclude by highlighting issues that require further investigation the take up of mobile money mobile money and financial inclusion substitutability between mobile money and conventional finance and regulatory structures for institutions providing mobile money services

guaranteed employment or guaranteed income abstract the paper critically reviews the arguments for and against both employment guarantees and income guarantees when viewed as rights based policy instruments for poverty reduction in a developing economy decentralized implementation of the right to work poses serious challenges in poor places evidence on india s national rural employment guarantee act does not suggest that the potential for either providing work when needed or reducing current poverty is realized despite pro poor targeting instead work is often rationed by local leaders and the poverty impact is small when all the costs are considered the option of income support using cash transfers also has both pros and cons widely used methods for finely targeting cash transfers tend to miss many poor people and can discourage those reached from earning extra income yet it cannot be presumed that switching to a universal basic income will reduce poverty more than workfare or finely targeted transfers that is an empirical question and the answer will undoubtedly vary across settings belying the generalizations often heard from advocates nonetheless more incentive neutral universal and or state contingent transfer schemes merit consideration in settings in which existing public spending is skewed against poor people and or there is scope for raising taxes on the rich

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

is the answer blowin in the wind auctions an assessment of the italian support scheme abstract this article proposes a quantitative data based assessment of the onshore wind auctions conducted in italy from 2012 to 2016 our objective is to provide new insights in the ongoing debate on policy measures to promote renewable energy sources italian wind auction design is examined by firstly investigating its overall outcomes in terms of cost efficiency and policy effectiveness determinants affecting awarded tariffs are then empirically analysed further to explore the role of project related and firm specific factors as well as different auction design elements the extreme simplicity of the auction design undoubtedly has promoted competition encouraging many project developers to bid and reducing support both in static and dynamic terms results provide evidence that localisation factors did not constitute a competitive constraint from a policy perspective the administratively setting of ceiling prices is a major issue when wind resources are widely available and auctioned capacity is not sufficiently high while not limiting competition the effects of pre qualification criteria on the realisation rate deserve further analysis however doubts emerge on the policy effectiveness of the current support scheme which makes difficult to control the total amount of support provided thus likely causing stop and go cycles of financing and potentially favouring distorted bidding behaviour

corporate financing an artificial agent based analysis we examine corporate security choice by simulating an economy populated by adaptive agents who learn about the structure of security returns and prices through experience through a process of evolutionary selection each agent gravitates toward strategies that generate the highest payoffs despite the fact that markets are perfect and agents maximize value a financing hierarchy emerges in which straight debt dominates other financing choices equity and convertible debt display significant underpricing in general the smaller the probability of loss to outside investors the more likely the firm is to issue the security and the smaller the security s underpricing

cheap talk coordination and evolutionary stability abstract asymmetric information games where the informed player can send a costless message sender receiver games typically have equilibria where meaningful communication occurs we therefore know such cheap talk can matter still even when there is no conflict of interest there are also equilibria where no information transmission occurs this paper shows that for a class of games with perfectly coinciding interests modeled as asymmetric contests where players are unsure of which role they will have only meaningful communication is evolutionarily stable journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d82

equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs abstract we investigate equilibria of sealed bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment we focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff since if a bidder finds it optimal to participate she cannot do better than bidding her valuation when bidders are symmetric concavity strict convexity of the cumulative distribution function from which the valuations are drawn is a sufficient condition for uniqueness multiplicity within this class we also study a special case with asymmetric bidders and show that concavity convexity plays a similar role

transaction networks evidence from mobile money in kenya mobile money allows households in kenya to spread risk more efficiently in this paper we show that these efficiencies are achieved through deeper financial integration and expanded informal networks active networks are more geographically dispersed and support more reciprocal financial arrangements consistent with the reported reciprocity mobile money users report a higher share of transactions as being for credit and insurance purposes

risk sharing and transactions costs evidence from kenya s mobile money revolution we explore the impact of reduced transaction costs on risk sharing by estimating the effects of a mobile money innovation on consumption in our panel sample adoption of the innovation increased from 43 to 70 percent we find that while shocks reduce consumption by 7 percent for nonusers the consumption of user households is unaffected the mechanisms underlying these consumption effects are increases in remittances received and the diversity of senders we report robustness checks supporting these results and use the four fold expansion of the mobile money agent network as a source of exogenous variation in access to the innovation jel e42 g22 o16 o17 z13 in developing countries informal networks provide an important means by which individuals and households share risk though the insurance they provide is often incomplete economists have proposed a number of reasons for this incompleteness including information asymmetries which manifest in problems of moral hazard and limited commitment both of which induce positive correlations between realized income and consumption in this article we emphasize a complementary source of incompleteness transaction costs literally the costs of transferring resources between individuals we test the impact of transaction costs on risk sharing by analyzing data from a large panel household survey that we designed and administered in kenya over a three year period to capture the expansion of mobile money this financial innovation has allowed individuals to transfer purchasing power by simple short messaging service sms technology and has dramatically reduced the cost of sending money across large distances mobile money is a recent innovation in developing economies one of the first and most successful examples to date is kenya s m pesa 1 in just four years after its

the evolution of type communication in a sender receiver game of common interest with cheap talk abstract we use a genetic algorithm to simulate play of a sender receiver game of common interest in which players engage in anonymous pairwise interactions the order of an equilibrium is the number of player types that are communicated there are many equilibria of each order equilibria of the same order are pareto equivalent and equilibria of different orders are pareto ranked by their order we discover a dynamic process in which the population climbs an equilibrium payoff ladder successively moving from an equilibrium of one order to an equilibrium of the next highest order eventually converging on an equilibrium of the highest order