reforming libor and other financial market benchmarks libor is the london interbank offered rate a measure of the interest rate at which large banks can borrow from one another on an unsecured basis libor is often used as a benchmark rate meaning that the interest rates that consumers and businesses pay on trillions of dollars in loans adjust up and down contractually based on movements in libor investors also rely on the difference between libor and various risk free interest rates as a gauge of stress in the banking system benchmarks such as libor therefore play a central role in modern financial markets thus news reports in 2008 revealing widespread manipulation of libor threatened the integrity of this benchmark and lowered trust in financial markets we begin with a discussion of the economic role of benchmarks in reducing market frictions we explain how manipulation occurs in practice and illustrate how benchmark definitions and fixing methods can mitigate manipulation we then turn to an overall policy approach for reducing the susceptibility of libor to manipulation before focusing on the practical problem of how to make an orderly transition to alternative reference rates without raising undue legal risks

endogenous market segmentation for lemons information asymmetry between sellers and buyers often prevents socially desirable trade this article presents a new mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry i consider decentralized markets under adverse selection and show that such markets can be endogenously segmented in a way that improves social welfare endogenous segmentation is driven by low quality sellers incentive to attract more buyers by separating from high quality sellers the mechanism helps us understand the roles of several real world institutions such as multiple marketplaces costless advertisements and nonbinding list prices

multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game abstract we analyse a two period model of the interbank market i e the market where banks trade liquidity we assume that banks do not take the interbank interest rate as given but instead negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes with each other the solution concept applied is the shapley value we show that there are a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation on the interbank market as the banks control not only the transaction volumes but also the interest rates they can leave the interest rates constant and adjust the transaction volumes when for example a liquidity deficit becomes more likely

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

efficient competition through cheap talk the case of competing auctions we consider a large market where auctioneers with private reservation values compete for bidders by announcing cheap talk messages if auctioneers run efficient first price auctions then there always exists an equilibrium in which each auctioneer truthfully reveals her type the equilibrium is constrained efficient assigning more bidders to auctioneers with larger gains from trade the choice of the trading mechanism is crucial for the result most notably the use of second price auctions equivalently ex post bidding leads to the nonexistence of any informative equilibrium we examine the robustness of our finding in various dimensions including finite markets and equilibrium selection

competition among auctioneers in large markets we analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers first the auctioneers commit to some reserve prices second the bidders enter one auction if any and finally the auctions take place we show that for any finite set of feasible reserve prices each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production cost if the numbers of auctioneers and bidders are sufficiently large though finite our result supports the idea that optimal auctions may be quite simple our model also confirms previous results for some limit versions of the model by mcafee econometrica 61 1993 1281 1312 peters rev econ stud 64 1997 97 123 and peters and severinov j econ theory 75 1997 141 179

optimal strategies for selling an asset this paper considers the problem of selling an asset on the open market the seller receives a random sequence of price offers which may arrive either periodically or randomly over time after each offer is received the seller must decide whether or not to sell weighing the possibility of obtaining a better offer against the cost of waiting a number of authors have established the properties of optimal selling policies when the distribution of offers is known and offers are received periodically this paper investigates the conditions under which these same properties hold for an unknown offer distribution which is updated as successive offers are received

cheap talk and strategic rounding in libor submissions interbanking rates were until recently based on judgmental estimates of borrowing costs we interpret this as a cheap talk game that allowed banks to communicate nonverifiable information about their opportunity cost to potential counterparties under normal market conditions there is a welfare maximizing equilibrium where banks truthfully disclose their borrowing cost but in times of financial stress only coarse equilibria survive we take this prediction to the data and show that banks round more frequently if the risk of the bank increases rounding is also more frequent for the more liquid short term rates and certain benchmark maturities

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

a search based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation we present a search based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation banks are subject to reserve requirements and the central bank tenders reserves interbank payments redistribute holdings and banks trade with each other in a decentralized over the counter market the central bank provides standing facilities where banks can either deposit surpluses or borrow to cover shortfalls of reserves overnight the model provides insights on liquidity trading volume and rate dispersion in the interbank market features largely absent from the canonical models in the tradition of poole 1968 and fits a number of stylized facts for the eurosystem observed during the recent period of unconventional monetary policies moreover it provides insights on the implications of different market structures

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

the intraday price of money evidence from the e mid interbank market we provide empirical evidence based on tick by tick data for the e mid euro area interbank market covering 2003 and 2004 that the overnight interest rate shows a clear downward pattern throughout the operating day thus a positive hourly interest rate half basis point implicitly emerges from the intraday term structure of the overnight rate such a pattern was not detected in the mid 1990s we explain this evolution as an outcome of the recent trend toward real time settlement the estimated intraday interest rate is lower than in the united states this is due to the different cost of central bank daylight credit

a micro model of the federal funds market this paper demonstrates that valuable insights into the determination of federal funds rates can be gained through modeling the micro decisions of market participants fed fund demand functions are derived for different bank valuation functions and several implications are discussed specifically it is i possible to rationalize the observation that large banks are net purchasers and small banks net sellers of fed funds ii to explain the positive spread of fed funds rates over other short term money market rates and iii to link the size of this spread to the federal reserve s underlying monetary policy strategy

optimal adaptive price search consider the problem of a consumer desiring to buy a good which is sold at a variety of prices such a buyer will be able to obtain a sequence of price quotations from various sellers when should the buyer stop searching for a lower price if he continues he may obtain a lower price but he incurs additional time effort and expense in searching the optimal price search decision is one of balancing the expectation of a possibly lower price obtained by continued search against cumulative costs from search when the prices arise from a known probability distribution the optimal search strategy has certain well defined and desirable properties in the more realistic case that the buyer has only partial information about the price distribution and must update his beliefs after observing prices in the marketplace the problem becomes more complex and search strategies become less well behaved the major purpose of this article is to determine new conditions under which optimal policies have these desirable characteristics in the case where the consumer possesses only incomplete information about the distribution of prices price quotations he receives in addition to providing him with price possibilities provide him with information about that distribution rothschild 151 in citing an unpublished paper of gastwirth has noted that small specification errors for an assumed distribution can lead to substantial changes in expected number of searches and expected cost consequently the assumption of a known distribution of prices can have a profound effect on total cost 1 0022 053 l 8 l 040001 20 02 00 o

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy i develop an asset pricing model in which financial assets are valued for their liquidity the extent to which they are useful in facilitating exchange as well as for being claims to streams of consumption goods the implications for average asset returns the equity premium puzzle and the risk free rate puzzle are explored in a version of the model that nests the work of mehra and prescott 1985

statistical evidence about libor manipulation a sherlock holmes investigation this paper contributes to the crucial problem of libor malfunctioning due to its manipulation by banks a phenomenon described clearly in the fsa inquiry report published in september 2012 after applying classical tests of non stationarity to a series of participating banks libor quotes we detected some significant breaks in the data that correspond to significant economic events namely lehman brothers bankruptcy or central banks decisions our conclusion is that a possible manipulation confirmed ex post in the fsa report can be deduced throughout the crisis period as a result of the behavior of the coefficients in a linear three regime threshold regression model finally we applied an original procedure to detect those banks most likely to build cartels or at least homogeneous groups during the important period of turmoil under review namely august 2007 through november 2012 this method called hierarchical clustering analysis helped us to precise the conclusions of the abovementioned fsa inquiry

a note on inventory models with cost increases in this note a simple procedure is given for determining the optimal ordering policy for an item for which an increase in the price has been announced the procedure eliminates the need for evaluation and comparison of the total costs of alternate ordering policies for determining the optimal ordering policy

interest rate dispersion and volatility in the market for daily funds abstract the purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds we use the eonia panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks the data clearly show an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period these increases are highly correlated we design a model to account for these empirical facts our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period this reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity is able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data we also investigate the effects of the changes in the eurosystem s operational framework enacted on march 2004 for interest rate behaviour

optimal ordering strategies for announced price increases the familiar model for determining the optimal ordering strategy given an announced price increase assumes that the buyer has an opportunity to place an order at the end of the next economic order quantity cycle before the price increase takes effect this paper extends the price increase model by relaxing the requirement on the timing of the price increase specifically we develop optimal ordering strategies for situations where the price increase becomes effective at any future specified time we also calculate savings for alternate ordering strategies

monetary policy transmission with interbank market fragmentation this paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy fragmentation is the fact that banks depending on their country of location have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation excess liquidity arises endogenously this leads short term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates using data on monetary policy operations i show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008 the model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures

upping the ante how to design efficient auctions with entry of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage we first formalize hold up regarding entry costs that preys on second price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill bidding activity we derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions second we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post which offers some valuable flexibility the english auction with jump bids implements then the first best in general environments

some results on the optimality and implementation of the friedman rule in the search theory of money abstract i characterize a large family of monetary policies that implement milton friedman s prescription of zero nominal interest rates in a monetary search economy with multiple assets and aggregate uncertainty this family of optimal policies is defined by two properties i the money supply must be arbitrarily close to zero for an infinite number of dates and ii asymptotically on average over the dates when fiat money plays an essential role the growth rate of the money supply must be at least as large as the rate of time preference

asset prices liquidity and monetary policy in an exchange economy i formulate a model in which money coexists with equity shares on a risky aggregate endowment agents can use equity as a means of payment so shocks to equity prices translate into aggregate liquidity shocks that disrupt the mechanism of exchange i characterize a family of optimal monetary policies and find that the resulting equity prices are independent of monetary considerations i also study a perturbation of the family of optimal policies that targets a positive constant nominal interest rate and find that in this case the real equity return includes a liquidity return that depends on monetary considerations

cheap talk advertising and misrepresentation in vertically differentiated markets i consider a cheap talk model in which a firm has a chance to communicate its product quality to consumers the model describes how advertising can be both informative to consumers and profitable for the firm through its content in a vertically differentiated market i find that advertising content may be effective in inducing search even if incentives for misrepresentation exist in particular a firm with an undesirable low quality product is able to attract consumers who would have not incurred a search cost had they known its true quality in this case a semiseparating equilibrium occurs where the lowest firm types pool upward in order to increase the expected product quality while simultaneously signaling that the product is affordable although consumers always benefit from truth in advertising total welfare may decrease if an undesirable firm is required to reveal its type finally i show that the extent to which misrepresentation can take place increases with the cost of advertising coverage

a model for the federal funds rate target this paper is a statistical analysis of the manner in which the federal reserve determines the level of the federal funds rate target one of the most publicized and anticipated economic indicators in the financial world the paper introduces new statistical tools for forecasting a discrete valued time series such as the target and suggests that these methods in conjunction with a focus on the institutional details of how the target is determined can significantly improve on standard vector autoregression forecasts of the effective federal funds rate we further show that the news that the fed has changed the target has statistical content substantially different from the news that the fed failed to make an anticipated target change causing us to challenge some of the conclusions drawn from standard linear var impulse response functions

liquidity regulation and the implementation of monetary policy in addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital basel iii introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation one part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio lcr which requires banks to hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to survive a 30 day period of market stress as monetary policy typically involves targeting the interest rate on loans of one of these assets central bank reserves it is important to understand how this regulation may impact the efficacy of central banks current operational frameworks we introduce term funding and an lcr requirement into an otherwise standard model of monetary policy implementation our model shows that if banks face the possibility of an lcr shortfall then the usual link between open market operations and the overnight interest rate changes and the short end of the yield curve becomes steeper our results suggest that central banks may want to adjust their operational frameworks as the new regulation is implemented

winter is possibly not coming mitigating financial instability in an agent based model with interbank market abstract we develop a macroeconomic agent based model to study how financial instability can emerge from the co evolution of interbank and credit markets and the policy responses to mitigate its impact on the real economy the model is populated by heterogenous firms consumers and banks that locally interact in different markets in particular banks provide credit to firms according to a basel ii or iii macro prudential frameworks and manage their liquidity in the interbank market the central bank performs monetary policy according to different types of taylor rules we find that the model endogenously generates market freezes in the interbank market which interact with the financial accelerator possibly leading to firm bankruptcies banking crises and the emergence of deep downturns this requires the timely intervention of the central bank as a liquidity lender of last resort moreover we find that the joint adoption of a three mandate taylor rule tackling credit growth and the basel iii macro prudential framework is the best policy mix to stabilize financial and real economic dynamics however as the liquidity coverage ratio spurs financial instability by increasing the pro cyclicality of banks liquid reserves a new counter cyclical liquidity buffer should be added to basel iii to improve its performance further finally we find that the central bank can also dampen financial instability by employing a new unconventional monetary policy tool involving active management of the interest rate corridor in the interbank market

exit strategies for monetary policy abstract in response to the financial crisis of 2007 08 all major central banks decreased interest rates to historically low levels and created large excess reserves central bankers and academics currently discuss how to implement monetary policy going forward we find that paying interest on reserves ior is optimal if the central bank has full fiscal support if the central bank has no fiscal support reducing reserves is optimal this can be achieved by reserve absorbing operations which hold the size of the balance sheet constant or by selling assets which reduces the size of the balance sheet

systemic illiquidity in the federal funds market this paper shows how the intra day allocation and pricing of overnight loans of federal funds reflect the decentralized inter bank market in which these loans are traded a wouldbe borrower or lender typically finds a counterparty institution by direct bilateral contact once in contact say by telephone the two counterparties to a potential trade negotiate terms that reflect their incentives for borrowing or lending as well as the attractiveness of their respective options to forego a trade and to continue shopping around this overthe counter otc pricing and allocation mechanism is quite distinct from that of most centralized markets such as an electronic limit order book market in which every order is anonymously exposed to every other order with a centralized order crossing algorithm while there is a significant body of research on the micro structure of specialist and limit order book markets most otc markets do not have comprehensive transactionslevel data available for analysis the federal funds market is a rare exception we go beyond a previous study by craig furfine 1999 of the microstructure of the federal funds market by modeling how the likelihood of matching a particular borrower with banking studies federal reserve bank of new york 33 liberty street new york ny 10045 we are grateful for support and data from the federal reserve bank of new york and for comments from guillaume plantin jamie mcandrews craig furfine michael fleming and anonymous federal funds traders we have also benefited from comments by andrew metrick jeremy stein ken french larry harris owen lamont john taylor and randy westerfield the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system

voluntary reserve targets we study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets vrts operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade as they have since the financial crisis we show that no matter the abundance of reserves vrts encourage market activity and support the central bank s control over interest rates we consider i the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and ii a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the federal reserve overall a vrt framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks

liquidity premia in dynamic bargaining markets abstract this paper develops a search theoretic model of the cross sectional distribution of asset returns abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity in contrast with much of the transaction cost literature it is not assumed that different assets carry different exogenously specified trading costs instead different expected returns due to liquidity are explained by the cross sectional variation in tradeable shares the qualitative predictions of the model are consistent with much of the empirical evidence

interest rate corridors and reserves abstract this paper evaluates reserves regimes versus interest rate corridors which have become competing frameworks for monetary policy implementation rate corridors relying on lending and deposit facilities to create ceilings and floors for overnight interest rates evince mixed results on controlling volatility reserve requirements allow period average smoothing of interest rates but even if remunerated are subject to reserve avoidance activities a system of voluntary period average reserve commitments could offer equivalent rate smoothing advantages if central banks created symmetric opportunity costs of meeting or falling short of period average reserve requirements or commitments they could achieve flat reserve demand on settlement day

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

designing random allocation mechanisms theory and applications randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation we generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi unit allocations and various real world constraints such as group specific quotas controlled choice in school choice and house allocation and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation we develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments and that incorporate certain non additive substitutable preferences we also develop a utility guarantee technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization this can be applied to multi unit assignment problems and certain two sided matching problems jel c78 d82

the over the counter theory of the fed funds market a primer we present a dynamic over the counter model of the fed funds market and use it to study the determination of the fed funds rate the volume of loans traded and the intraday evolution of the distribution of reserve balances across banks we also investigate the implications of changes in the market structure as well as the effects of central bank policy instruments such as open market operations the discount window lending rate and the interest rate on bank reserves

portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets abstract this paper studies portfolio choice and pricing in markets in which immediate trading may be impossible it departs from the literature by removing restrictions on asset holdings and finds that optimal positions depend significantly and naturally on liquidity when expected future liquidity is high agents take more extreme positions given that they do not have to hold those positions for long when they become undesirable consequently larger trades should be observed in markets with more frequent trading liquidity need not affect the price significantly however because liquidity has offsetting impacts on different agents demands this result highlights the importance of unrestricted portfolio choice the paper draws parallels with the transaction cost literature and clarifies the relationship between the price level and the realized trading frequency in this literature

trade dynamics in the market for federal funds we develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features banks have to search for a suitable counterparty and once they have met both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment the theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions what are the determinants of the fed funds rate how does the market reallocate funds is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds we also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks

a model of job and worker flows we develop a model of gross job and worker flows and use it to study how the wages permanent incomes and employment status of individual workers evolve over time and how they are affected by aggregate labor market conditions our model helps explain various other features of labor markets such as the size and persistence of the changes in income that workers experience due to displacements or job to job transitions the length of job tenures and unemployment duration and the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation we also examine the effects that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross flows as well as on the resulting wage distribution employment and aggregate output in the equilibrium from a theoretical point of view we study the extent to which the competitive equilibrium achieves an efficient allocation of resources

optimal eoq for announced price increases in infinite horizon in this paper we consider an infinite horizon economic order quantity eoq model with single announced price increase with an option of placing a special order just before the price increase takes effect we extend earlier work where it is assumed that the special order is an integral multiple of the new eoq quantity in the process we show that when the assumption of integrality is not valid the earlier approach of minimizing the cost difference over a finite horizon is no longer valid and establish the periodicity of cost difference function next we show that the cesaro limit of the function exists and utilize that to derive the optimal special order quantity we find that the optimal special ordering policy is of s s type

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

market power and efficiency in a search model we build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications of firms market power in a frictional labor market our environment has two main characteristics wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there is a finite number of agents we find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and that the firms market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms a minimum wage forces the low productivity firms to increase their wage leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit firms market power by improving the workers outside option

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

search in asset markets market structure liquidity and welfare this paper investigates how market structure affects efficiency and several dimensions of liquidity in an asset market to this end we generalize the search theoretic model of financial intermediation of darrell duffie et al 2005 to allow for entry of dealers and unrestricted asset holdings

recent developments in matching with constraints in an earlier work kamada and kojima 2015 we introduced matching with constraints a two sided matching problem in which the market is subject to feasibility constraints that paper proposed and analyzed a possible solution to this problem and discussed various real market applications of our results the present paper reorganizes some of the findings from our more recent effort based on kamada and kojima 2016a b

economic replenishment strategies for announced price increases abstract the usual model for determining the optimal replenishment lot size for an announced price increase is the basic eoq model this analysis extends the logic to a composite lot sizing model that can be disaggregated into a family of hybrid models with additional operational flexibility the composite model permits broader diversity and the ability to decompose complexity it provides decision support resourcefulness with its resultant economies

leaning against the wind during financial disruptions market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure they buy when the pressure is large accumulate inventories and sell when the pressure alleviates this paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order execution delays i show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity provided they have access to sufficient capital if raising capital is costly this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions

a theory of money and marketplaces this article considers an infinitely repeated economy with divisible fiat money the economy has many marketplaces that agents choose to visit in each marketplace agents are randomly matched to trade goods there exist a variety of stationary equilibria in some equilibrium each good is traded at a single price whereas in another every good is traded at two different prices there is a continuum of such equilibria which differ from each other in price and welfare levels however it is shown that only the efficient single price equilibrium is evolutionarily stable

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

liquidity requirements and the interbank loan market an experimental investigation abstract we develop a stylized interbank market environment and use it to evaluate with experimental methods the effects of liquidity requirements baseline and liquidity regulated regimes are analyzed in a simple shock environment which features a single idiosyncratic shock and in a compound shock environment in which the idiosyncratic shock is followed by a randomly occurring second stage shock interbank trading of the illiquid asset follows each shock in the simple shock environment we find that liquidity regulations reduce the incidence of bankruptcies but at a large loss of investment efficiency in the compound shock environment liquidity regulations not only impose a loss of investment efficiency but also fail to reduce bankruptcies

information reliability and welfare a theory of coarse credit ratings abstract an enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies cras use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare we model a cheap talk game in which a cra assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors the cra wishes to inflate ratings but prefers an unbiased rating to one whose inflation exceeds a threshold ratings coarseness arises in equilibrium to preclude excessive rating inflation we show that competition among cras can increase ratings coarseness we also examine the welfare implications of regulatory initiatives

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism