fixing exchange rates a virtual quest for fundamentals abstract fixed exchange rates are less volatile than floating rates but the volatility of macroeconomic variables such as money and output does not change very much across exchange rate regimes this suggests that exchange rate models based only on macroeconomic fundamentals are unlikely to be very successful it also suggests that there is no clear tradeoff between reduced exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic stability

is there a leviathan in your neighborhood this paper measures effects of decentralization in local government hierarchies on local public sector size this sector shrinks if decentralization encourages competition among governments it expands if decentralization sacrifices scale economies in a sample of 3 022 counties larger county governments reduce competition and increase aggregate local public sector size relative to aggregate county income more cities and towns increase competition and reduce its size more special and school districts sacrifice scale economies and increase it two recent articles have attempted to identify the effects of decentralization in state and local government on the size of the state and local public sector wallace oates 1985 finds no important effects michael nelson 1987 finds modest evidence that increased competition among government units reduces the size of the public sector this article demonstrates that the effects of decentralization are important and complex decentralization which encourages competition reduces the size of the local public sector decentralization which discourages scale economies increases it

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

real aspects of exchange rate regime choice with collapsing fixed rates abstract typical evaluations of the choice of exchange rate regime examine the performance of the real economy and assume that the regimes last indefinitely in contrast actual regimes are quite transitory this paper examines how the predictions of two popular models for the determination of some real economic variables must be modified when agents rationally perceive that a fixed rate regime will be transitory the models studied are simple stochastic versions of the models in dornbusch 1976 and flood and marion 1982

general economic conditions and national elections the fact that economic conditions influence voters is a leading commonplace of conversation in election years the question is is this fact in fact a fact despite the overwhelming popularity of the fact it has received neither an explicit theoretical analysis presumably because it is so obvious that economic adversity should create political adversaries nor until recently a satisfactory statistical analysis gerald h kramer has presented a multivariate analysis of congressional elections which would strongly suggest that fluctuations in the rate of unemployment have no appreciable effect upon elections but that fluctuations in per capita real income are influential in the following pages i propose to 1 reaffirm his finding on the electoral unimportance of ordinary fluctuations in unemployment 2 argue that contrary to kramer fluctuations in real income also do not have important electoral effects and 3 present an argument based upon rational voter behavior for the unimportance of general economic conditions in national elections

agency growth salaries and the protected bureaucrat agency growth salaries and the protected bureaucrat i introduction in recent years increased attention has been directed towards understanding bureaucratic behavior and its implications for economic performance a key element of this literature is the application of utility maximization for deriving implications about bureaucratic behavior representative is niskanen 1971 38 who argues that bureaucratic decisions are made rationally to maximize utility which is assumed to be a function of salary perquisites reputation power patronage and output implicit in the literature is an activist bureaucracy which engages in purposeful action to advance its interests an important part of some of the bureaucracy literature is the notion that government employees are a source of the documented growth of government it is commonly asserted that government employees acting in their own self interest will foster the growth of their organization growth of the organization is seen as a means for increasing salaries as well as the other arguments in the utility function the positive link between salaries and growth is emphasized by downs 1967 11 in his classic study of bureaucracy any organization experiencing rapid overall growth provides many more opportunities for promotion in any given time period than a static one additional references to the importance of agency growth for salaries include niskanen 1971 38 41 1975 619 tullock 1974 127 and heclo 1977 131 building on that theme other researchers such as bush and denzau 1977 borcherding bush and spann 1977 and bennett and orzechowski 1983 have argued that government employees will use their power to influence election outcomes to promote government growth and hence salaries despite the often critical nature of the salary growth relationship in recent discussions of bureaucratic behavior and the growth of government there is no direct empirical evidence of the asserted linkage related evidence provided for example by wolfinger and rosenstone 1980 97 101 that government employees have higher voter participation rates than do private employees is not conclusive support for the growth salary assertion voting results alone do not permit one to distinguish the underlying reasons for the higher participation rates and there are many more importantly for the federal government at least the assertion that salaries of government employees are significantly affected by agency growth seems inconsistent with the idea that the civil service system shields federal white collar employees from the uncertain fluctuations of political outcomes skepticism about the growth salary linkage due to the constraints of the civil service system is noted by wilson 1980 375 few officials need fear for their jobs and their salaries are determined by government wide laws and regulations rather than by the size rate of growth or success of the organization further while senior agency officials would be in the best positions to promote the growth of their agencies within the federal government the salaries of high gs general schedule level and senior executive service personnel are capped by law and may not exceed those paid to officials in executive level v the restriction limits the salaries of senior managers regardless of the growth of the agency one could however argue that managers promote growth to motivate their subordinates or that medium and lower level employees are the primary proponents of agency growth but as kaufman 1981 79 notes most officers and employees once they have attained career status could do nearly as well materially without pushing themselves as they could by working at capacity the absence of incentives and resulting inertia can contribute to the often cited tension between career bureaucrats and political appointees the above discussion points out a serious problem with the growth salary linkage often asserted in the bureaucracy literature

legislative monopoly and the size of government if the economics profession had a fetish it would surely be competition unrestricted competition allows resources to flow to their most productive uses and maximizes the net welfare of society one of the few points virtually all modem economists would agree on is that with the possible exception of a few well defined special cases e g money production and public utilities they have never met an entry barrier they did not want to eliminate entry barriers facing potential competitors in markets reduce economic efficiency and generate social waste in a classic article tullock 2 extended this reasoning to the political process he makes the following argument lower entry barriers into politics e g lowered costs of entry into the legislature for potential entrants makes governmental decision making more competitive and tends to make p mc 2 competitive government will supply a higher level of public goods at lower tax prices taxes will therefore be lower holding other things equal in political jurisdictions which are more competitive while taxes will be higher in monopoly jurisdictions which will seek to exploit monopoly rents from taxpayers this reasoning makes the assumption that it is appropriate to model government as a kind of firm which provides public goods in exchange for tax revenues from taxpayer voters in such a setting increased competition would most likely produce increased efficiency in the provision of public goods and increase net social welfare buchanan 6 made a very different argument which while not directly intended to apply to the problem of the behavior of government may have direct bearing on those problems he was concerned with the social welfare effects of the monopolization of crime by organized criminal

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

electoral cycles and the earnings of federal bureaucrats this paper analyzes the relationship between the timing of federal elections and the pay raises received by civilian employees of the federal government the theoretical framework discusses how electoral wage cycles are generated as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of voters bureaucrats and the government the empirical analysis uses a time series of wage rates for the twenty eight largest federal agencies over the period 1961 1978 the study indicates that pay hikes during the presidential election year are significantly greater about 2 to 3 percent higher than bureaucratic pay raises in other years

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

public sector unions and public spending this study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public sector based on public goods theory our paper models how unions influence the supply of and demand for public sector activities on the demand side public sector unions are special interests which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers on the supply side they exert pressure to maintain and expand monopoly powers empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending

some evidence on the effect of the separation of spending and taxing decisions it is often argued that separation of public spending and taxing decisions engenders in the voter overoptimistic hopes that someone else will bear the cost of public services thereby inducing an increase in the size of government but are perceived tax prices systematically and persistently reduced by separation although in stock markets all agents expectations may be unbiased they may or may not be unbiased in political markets this paper analyzes the separation created in federal states when the central government finances local expenditures evidence from a dynamic decisive voter model is presented that indicates that the separation introduced by federal grants to canadian provinces did in fact reduce the perceived tax price of provincial public services and raise provincial expenditures the results suggest also that the effect of separation diminished over time

the cyclicality of consumption wages and employment of the public sector in the euro area this study empirically examines the business cycle behaviour of public consumption and its main components the public wage bill including its breakdown into compensation per employee and public employment and intermediate consumption in the euro area aggregate euro area countries and a group of selected non euro area organization for economic co operation and development oecd countries denmark sweden the uk japan and the us it looks across a large number of variables and methods using annual data from 1960 to 2005 it finds robust evidence supporting that public consumption wages and employment co move with the business cycle in a pro cyclical manner with 1 2 year lags notably for the euro area aggregate and euro area countries the findings reflect mainly the correlation between cyclical developments but also point to an important role of pro cyclical discretionary fiscal policies

government size and decentralization evidence from disaggregated data public choice models of government behavior draw heavily from the economics literature of industrial organization following the argument that private monopoly in production leads to relatively high prices and profits the public choice literature suggests that similar analysis of government structure may be useful in the modeling of public production brennan and buchanan 3 4 model government as leviathan a public entity which seeks to maximize its revenue the leviathan hypothesis is motivated by the desire to successfully understand government behavior as well as to recommend effective means of controlling its behavior among other suggestions brennan and buchanan offer the private monopoly corollary that competition among different fiscal units is an effective means of controlling the aggregate size of leviathan the resulting decentralization hypothesis is total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller ceteris paribus the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized 3 15 this paper tests the decentralization hypothesis by examining a data set which considers all units of government by disaggregating federal spending on a state by state basis we construct a cross section of state data on federal state and local government activity all previous examinations of the decentralization hypothesis at the level of the state have excluded the activity of the federal government however given that federal government expenditures greatly exceed those of state and local governments previous cross sectional tests of the decentralization hypothesis may have employed grossly incomplete measures of governmental activity in each state our study provides two extensions to the debate one by testing the decentralization hypothesis at the level of state aggregation we suggest that previous cross sectional studies do not report strong evidence in support of the hypothesis because of their exclusion of the federal sector two our study suggests the importance of including all potential competitors in the government arena state local and federal governments our study does not solve all issues concerning aggregation

civil service and the growth of government abstract i study a model of elections which links the scale of government activity to civil service rules without tenure protections bureaucrats career prospects are tied to the electoral prospects of the party that hires them to avoid wasteful partisan spending voters only consent to minimal taxation if bureaucrats are protected by tenure they have no incentive to favour one party over another and governments only produce public goods in turn voters consent to high taxes however because higher tax revenues increase the ability of governing parties to co opt the bureaucracy through favourable compensation large scale government activity is accompanied by inefficiently high public sector wages

public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model it is common wisdom that public sector wages are not determined in the same way as private sector wages at the same time the empirical evidence available for oecd countries finds a strong positive correlation between public and private sector wages in this paper we develop a model that is consistent with a political economy view of the determination of public sector wages and employment while being consistent with the said empirical evidence public finance constraints are crucial in booms governments expand employment and wages while in downturns lack of tax revenues forces the government to cut back the wage bill

public education supply and student performance this paper develops a model of public exchange whereby voters and education policy makers exchange with one another within school districts because school district consolidation lowers alternatives to voters parents consolidation is hypothesized to raise public education spending because weakened intergovernmental competition allows policy makers to promote their own utility rather than that of constituents models of public education spending and academic performance are estimated over 1988 1990 while evidence indicates little support for the traditional treatment of the leviathan hypothesis that greater competition lowers public spending this paper argues that education spending by itself does not fully provide a valid test of the leviathan hypothesis since spending by itself does not necessarily indicate the quality of public education programmes empirical evidence indicates that greater numbers of schools and school districts promote higher student achievement as evidenced by higher math and v

searching for leviathan comment and extension in a recent article wallace oates 1985 investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector this hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including richard musgrave s 1959 model of how the distribution function of government would be carried out by subnational governments geoffrey brennan and james buchanan s 1980 leviathan model and the more traditional public choice model for example walter hettich and stanley winer 1984 all contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources and thereby constrains taxing power oates analyzed two data sets one pertaining to the state and local sector in the united states and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis the purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments specifically it will be argued that oates s measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis furthermore by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities i measuring fiscal decentralization among the states

fragmentation and the growth of local government an assumption of the post world war ii metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient increasing the cost and size of government more recently polycentrists have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources in this article i explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels

economic competition and political competition an empirical note this paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition the empirical evidence garnered in section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and consequently local government expenditure levels

an empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the leviathan model of government this paper has investigated the ability of an extreme and relatively simple model of political behavior to explain the level of revenues generated by state and local governments in general the behavior of these governments appears to be at least consistent with many of the fiscal outcomes predicted by the leviathan theory several although not all of the specific leviathan theory hypotheses considered received empirical support the evidence was consistent with the hypothesis that states utilizing comprehensive tax bases especially a personal income tax can be expected to generate higher levels of aggregate revenues strong support was also observed for the contention that intergovernmental competition by general purpose substate governments may serve as a substitute for constitutional constraints in limiting the revenue generating power of local governments

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

a markov model of heteroskedasticity risk and learning in the stock market abstract we examine a variety of models in which the variance of a portfolio s excess return depends on a state variable generated by a first order markov process a model in which the state is known to economic agents is estimated it suggests that the mean excess return moves inversely with the level of risk we then estimate a model in which agents are uncertain of the state the estimates indicate that agents are consistently surprised by high variance periods so there is a negative correlation between movements in volatility and in excess returns

on the volatility and comovement of u s financial markets around macroeconomic news announcements the objective of this paper is to provide a deeper insight into the links between financial markets and the real economy to that end we study the short term anticipation and response of u s stock treasury and corporate bond markets to the first release of surprise u s macroeconomic information specifically we focus on the impact of these announcements not only on the level but also on the volatility and comovement of those assets returns we do so by estimating several extensions of the parsimonious multivariate garch dcc model of engle 2002 for the excess holding period returns on seven portfolios of these asset classes we find that both the process of price formation in each of those financial markets and their interaction appear to be driven by fundamentals yet our analysis reveals a statistically and economically significant dichotomy between the reaction of the stock and bond markets to the arrival of unexpected fundamental information we also show that the conditional mean volatility and comovement among stock treasury and corporate bond returns react asymmetrically to the information content of these surprise announcements overall the above results shed new light on the mechanismsbywhichnewinformationisincorporatedintopriceswithinandacrossu s financial markets

risk inflation and the stock market most explanations for the decline in share values over the past two decades have focused on the concurrent increase in inflation this paper considers an alternative explanation a substantial increase in the riskiness of capital investments we show that the variance of firms real gross marginal return on capital has increased significantly increasing the relative riskiness of investors returns on equity and that this can explain a large part of the market decline we also assess the effects of increase in the mean and variance of the inflation rate and a decline in firms expected return on capital this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

labor turnover in the u s federal bureaucracy this paper presents an empirical analysis of labor turnover in the u s federal bureaucracy the results indicate that job experience in politically important federal agencies is valued by the private sector hence high level bureaucrats employed in these agencies have high turnover probabilities the analysis also shows that equalization of federal sector and private sector wage rates would lead to a relatively small increase in turnover but to substantial savings in federal payroll costs

centralization and government competition this paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the united states the empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government the findings at the state and local levels however show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization

fiscal illusion and the grantor government empirical studies indicate that unconditional intergovernmental grants have a flypaper effect several authors have modeled recipient government spending under fiscal illusion to explain this phenomenon in short grants reduce the perceived marginal cost of recipient government output this paper develops a more general model of illusion that incorporates the grantor government thereby eliminating inconsistencies encountered in previous models the more general model implies that grant finance increases the perceived marginal cost of grantor government output thus grant induced illusion should have two effects an increase in recipient output and a decrease in grantor output the empirical work supports this hypothesis

the political economy of centralization and the european community since 1972 the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries in an international cross section analysis it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in gdp the actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed the dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds popitz law of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the ec commission high ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states the voters attitudes toward european unification are analyzed in a pooled regression

what drives international equity correlations volatility or market direction abstract we consider impulse response functions to study the impact of both return and volatility on the correlation between international equity markets using data on the us as the reference country canada the uk and france equity indices empirical evidence shows that without taking into account the effect of return there is an asymmetric effect of volatility on correlation the volatility seems to have an impact on correlation especially during downturn periods however once we introduce the effect of return the impact of volatility on correlation disappears these observations suggest that the relation between volatility and correlation is an association rather than a causality the strong increase in the correlation is driven by the past of the return and the market direction rather than the volatility

exchange rate regime volatility and international correlations on bond and stock markets focusing on the recent experience of the ems the paper examines the behavior of domestic daily returns on bond and stock markets with the objective of identifying whether there exist significant differences in the patterns of volatilities and international correlations between erm and non erm countries and across alternative episodes of erm exchange rate variability the paper provides substantial evidence that a credible peg is associated with a decline in bond market volatility the analysis also shows that an increase in exchange rate volatility is accompanied by a decline in international correlations between bond and to a lesser extent stock markets c 1999 published by elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

fiscal decentralization and government size an extension this paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants grants it is argued serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self finance their expenditures the results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector the results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling

the influence of special district government on public spending and debt growth in special district governments is examined as a reason behind public sector expansion in the united states a theoretical model is developed of the optimal mix of government suppliers which predicts how special district governments affect the overall provision of government policies the hypothesis that expansion of special district governments leads to expansion of the public sector is expirically examined over two time periods

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

are there election cycles in wage agreements an analysis of german public employees in this article the possibility of nordhaus political wage cyclesin the west german public services during 1961 1965 is investigated since wage negotiations are centralized one might expect a systematicallyhigher wage increase shortly before a federal election a regression ofwage increases from 30 consecutive public sector pay contracts is run onan election variable and several additional explanatory variables thenull of no election influence is rejected for worker wage increases theestimated increase in wages due to an imminent election is predicted to bein the range of 2 5 to 3 percentage points

centralization and the size of government in canada the determinants of the growth of government in canada over the period 1926 90 are examined of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector s share of gdp unlike other studies using time series data the effect of decentralization toward the provincial state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government