trademark protection quality improvement and exports in developing countries trademarks indicate the inherent quality or other distinguishing features of products strong trademark protection can lower consumers costs of searching for preferred quality characteristics with weak trademark protection firms in developing countries may not be willing to provide high quality products with strong trademark protection firms have an incentive to maintain or improve quality over time in order not to erode the value of their trademarks by solving the theoretical model we show that strengthened trademark protection in developing countries may induce domestic firms to become exporters and raise the quality of products on the export market the welfare analyses show that strengthened trademark protection in developing countries benefits southern customers and firms producing high quality products but harms firms producing counterfeits and uninformed customers if firm h charges low prices given firm h charges a high price the strengthened trademark protection only helps firm h and informed customers in the south while leaves the others unaffected

marketing mix and brand sales in global markets examining the contingent role of country market characteristics marketing products globally is challenging due to the diverse nature of markets we use market heterogeneity unbranded competition resource and infrastructure availability and sociopolitical governance as country market characteristics that distinguish between developed and emerging countries we investigate their moderating role on the relationship between elements of the marketing mix and brand sales we provide evidence from a hierarchical linear model and a panel data set of brands from 14 emerging and developed markets that account for 62 of the global gdp that country market characteristics moderate the relationship between the complete set of marketing mix elements and brand sales performance asymmetrically while distribution and price have the largest impact in emerging and developed countries respectively product innovation and advertising have significantly larger impacts in emerging markets relative to developed countries these finding highlights the importance of contingency view of marketing strategy in global markets

an experimental investigation of asymmetric contests abstract contest theory has been used in industrial organization to describe phenomena like r d races or efforts to defend a monopoly position when pricing behavior is constrained by regulators competition can also take the form of a contest this paper reports on an experimental test of the effects of asymmetry in the tullock contest success function both the simultaneous move and sequential move frameworks are considered despite high levels of overbidding across the different conditions the introduction of asymmetries in the contest function generates experimental behavior on aggregate qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions at the individual level behavior seems divided into those subjects who bid very high amounts and those who bid very low amounts

positional goods conspicuous consumption and the international demonstration effect reconsidered abstract ragnar nurkse s early formulation of the international demonstration effect explicitly eschewed the possibility that international emulation of the rich has anything to do with status seeking or to use veblen s phrase with conspicuous consumption this paper argues in favor of a reassessment of nurkse s formulation in the light first of recent analyses of advanced countries by hirsch frank and scitovsky which show the powerful welfare implications of consumption based on status seeking and in the light second of the large sociological literature that has investigated the modernization process in developing countries the analysis casts doubt on nurkse s eschewal of status seeking behavior at the international level and suggests an alternative view with a profoundly different set of welfare implications for the third world

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

multiperson tournaments an experimental examination modern hierarchical organizations like corporations must motivate agents to work hard given their pyramid structure it is not surprising that one commonly used motivator is the promotion tournament in such tournaments agents compete to advance to positions at higher organizational levels though these tournaments are common little research has empirically looked at the interface of organizational structure and tournament design this paper aims to take a step in filling this void by comparing the performance of various tournament designs using controlled laboratory techniques

the economic effects of intellectual property right infringements in this article the authors use data from a small but varied sample of u s companies to examine the static welfare consequences of foreign infringement of u s intellectual property rights in five industry sectors they estimate that infringement causes profit losses for the legitimate u s suppliers that are at least one percent as great as their total sales that the static gains to consumers are more than half as great as the losses of legitimate producers and might exceed these losses and that the losses of the legitimate producers exceed the profits of infringers they also find that legitimate producers spend relatively little to combat foreign infringement less than 4 percent as much as their losses from such infringement copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

what s in a sign trademark law and economic theory the aim of this paper is to summarize the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature the proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics copyright 2006 the authors journal compilation 2006 blackwell publishing ltd

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

pricing of conspicuous goods a competitive analysis of social effects abstract social needs play an important role in the purchase of conspicuous goods in this article the authors extend traditional economic models to accommodate social needs such as desire for uniqueness and conformism and examine their implications for pricing conspicuous goods first in the context of a duopoly the authors identify the conditions under which the desire for uniqueness can increase demand among some consumers as the price of a product increases second the authors show that though the desire for uniqueness leads to higher prices and firm profits a desire for conformity leads to lower prices and profits third the authors find that consumers purchase high quality products not because of their desire for uniqueness but despite it finally marketers of conspicuous goods may find it beneficial not to emphasize the functional differences among their products when the need for uniqueness is high in a laboratory test the authors find support for the claim that demand for a product amo

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

workaholics and dropouts in organizations this paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in contests in the aggregate the behavior of subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory but we find that such aggregate results mask an unexpected compositional effect on the individual level whereas theory predicts that subject efforts are continuous and increasing functions of ability the actual efforts of our laboratory subjects bifurcate lowability workers drop out and exert little or no effort and high ability workers try too hard this bifurcation which is masked by aggregation can be explained by assuming loss aversion on the part of the subjects jel c92 d44 d72 d82 j31

counterfeiters foes or friends how counterfeits affect sales by product quality tier a key concern about counterfeits and weak intellectual property protection is that they may hamper innovation by displacing legitimate sales this paper combines a natural policy experiment with randomized lab experiments to estimate the heterogeneous impacts of counterfeiting on the sales and consumer purchase intent related to branded products of various quality levels i collect new product line level panel data 1993 2004 on chinese shoe companies i identify heterogeneous effects of counterfeit entry on sales of authentic products of three quality tiers finding that counterfeits have both advertising effects for a brand and substitution effects for authentic products additionally the effects linger for some years the advertising effect dominates the substitution effect for high end authentic product sales and the substitution effect outweighs the advertising effect for low end product sales the positive effect of counterfeits is most pronounced for high fashion products such as women s high le

collaborative promotion of technology standards and the impact on innovation industry structure and organizational capabilities evidence from modern patent pools this study explores the impact of modern patent pools inter organizational collaborative arrangements for promoting the adoption of technology standards on the rate of follow on innovations based on pooled technologies the vertical structure of associated industries and organizational capabilities of noncollaborating firms on one hand the formation of modern pools can boost follow on innovation by lowering the search negotiation and licensing costs associated with pooled standards on the other hand modern pools may decrease the incentives to invest in follow on innovations because of cannibalization risks and grant back provisions to the extent that modern pools succeed in establishing a dominant standard their collaborative nature and their reliance on markets for technology can reduce technological uncertainty and appropriation hazards hence triggering vertical disintegration in related industries moreover by establishing a dominant standard modern pools can effectively diminish the relati

appropriating signs and meaning the elusive economics of trademark this paper deals with economic analysis of trademark its presence in markets is originally connected with the problem of information asymmetries and the need to provide information for assisting exchanges so as to avert the market failure brought about by adverse selection however this information conveying function is also accompanied by a differentiation effect arising from the power of persuasion that signs can exert on individuals the exploitation of differentiation has given rise to the practice of branding which ties markets and consumption to the realms of meaning and experience branding is so all pervasive in today s economy as to have somehow transfigured it so that the role of persuasion is now pre eminent nonetheless the mainstream economic theory tends to resist acknowledging this change which would to a large extent call into question well established hypotheses and theoretical tools the general response has therefore been to assume that the informational role of trademark predominates and to use this hypothesis to construct models welfare evaluations and policy prescriptions that bear little or no relation to the actual markets the opposing approach in the shadow of the nelson s and arrow s seminal papers on economics of information is recognising the idiosyncratic character of information and therefore drawing conclusions and devising solutions that while still based upon the welfare criterion also incorporate a wider awareness and a deeper representation of the scenario under study the present work attempts to move in this direction showing how different disciplines can provide some key epistemological tools for enabling economists to effectively evaluate the welfare outcomes of the introduction and progressive alteration of a particular intellectual property right within the realm of signs and meanings

tournament rewards and risk taking this article considers a lazear rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution risk taking and its mean the unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort by modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium the first result can be useful to understand the relative performance evaluation puzzle of executive compensation and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

entry of copycats of luxury brands we develop a game theoretic model to examine the entry of copycats and its implications by incorporating two salient features these features are two product attributes i e physical resemblance and product quality and two consumer utilities i e consumption utility and status utility our equilibrium analysis suggests that copycats with a high physical resemblance but low product quality are more likely to successfully enter the market by defying the deterrence of the incumbent furthermore we show that higher quality can prevent the copycat from successfully entering the market finally we show that the entry of copycats does not always improve consumer surplus and social welfare in particular when the quality of the copycat is sufficiently low the loss in status utility from consumers of the incumbent product overshadows the small gain in consumption utility from buyers of the copycat leading to an overall decrease in consumer surplus and social welfare

international trade and consumption network externalities abstract this paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities the framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture in an extended ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that i trade is not pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique ii trade is not pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse network competition under free trade but can be if each country is homogenous network monopoly iii and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky consumers of imported network goods tend to gain while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

grind or gamble an experiment on effort and spread seeking in contests we conduct a contest experiment to study if spread seeking and effort can be managed when participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory we observe higher investments in spread for the winner take all scheme both types of investments can be controlled with a three level prize scheme however the control management is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia we also explore the correlation between effort and spread across subjects and find that is robustly positive

foreign counterfeiting of status goods we study the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting i e trademark infringement in markets where consumers are not deceived by forgeries consumers are willing to pay more for counterfeits than for generic merchandise of similar quality because they value the prestige associated with brand name trademarks counterfeiters of status goods impose a negative externality on consumers of genuine items as fakes degrade the status associated with a given label but counterfeits allow consumers to unbundle the status and quality attributes of the brand name products and alter the competition among oligopolistic trademark owners we analyze two policies designed to combat counterfeiting enforcement policy which increases the likelihood of confiscation of illegal items and the imposition of a tariff on low quality imports