on success and dissolution of the labor managed firm in the capitalist economy labor managed firms lmfs in the developed capitalist economy exhibit an interesting life cycle pattern often they come into existence as a way of reorganizing insolvent entrepreneurial profit maximizing firms yet successful lmfs tend to be assimilated to the entrepreneurial modus operandi in the long run i propose a simple theoretical model that explains this lmf phenomenon as the outcome of the lmf s interaction with outside markets especially competitive spot labor markets the interpretations and limitations of the model are also discussed as the basic framework is extended to deal with imperfections in capital markets and with contractual labor markets

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

contracting structures for custom software development the impacts of informational rents and uncertainty on internal development and outsourcing custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs relationship specific investments and a resulting likelihood of positive externalities for the user or the developer from the other party s investment furthermore in a custom project market prices for software are not helpful in solving either the valuation or the cost problems in this paper we analyze the unique nature of the software development agreements that can be reached between the user and the developer in such a setting we compare the value of using internal and external developers with the goal of better understanding the factors relevant to the outsourcing decision for internal development we derive a new mechanism that achieves the first best system whenever the project has positive expected net value while achieving ex ante budget balance in contrast the optimal mechanism for an external developer will not in general yield the first best system this implies that when internal and external developers have identical cost functions internal development definitely yields the larger net value more generally this implies that an external developer must have considerable cost advantages over an internal developer in order to have the larger net value numerical results indicate that this difference in net values can be very large as much as a 100 increase for internal development over external development this is consistent with the strong bias in favor of internal custom development found in recent empirical studies we also explain why the efficient levels of investment can be achieved only when there are no externalities and we show that the presence of positive externalities results in underinvestment since using an external developer will typically yield a system that is not first best inefficient investments result with or without externalities we present examples showing that uncertainty about system value is not a significant factor in choosing between internal and external development however uncertainty about the development costs is highly significant with greater uncertainty making outsourcing less attractive

firm size credit scoring accuracy and banks production of soft information research on sme bank financing generally assumes that smaller firms are more opaque from a lender s perspective we propose that the discriminatory power of credit scoring models can be thought of as a proxy for firm opaqueness given that when these models perform poorly lenders must invest in the production of soft information to supplement the financial data used in these models measuring the discriminatory power of probit default models across quintiles of the irish sme size distribution we show that our proxy for firm opaqueness increases monotonically as firms get smaller this finding supports an assumption that is the starting point to a wide strand of literature on sme bank financing our findings can also be interpreted as providing an insight to the literature on the determinants of banks choice of lending technology while smaller banks may as found in a substantial previous literature produce larger amounts of soft information due to their organizational advantages they may also do

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

learning behavior and mixed strategy nash equilibria abstract the paper considers whether an adaptive justification like those commonly available for non interactive optimization models can be found for the mixed strategy nash equilibrium although it is known that such a justification is frequently available for pure strategy equilibria it is shown that all members of a wide class of behaviorally plausible learning mechanisms must fail to converge in almost all games in which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies an exact formal analogy is developed which allows these learning mechanisms to be viewed as discrete ta tonnement processes in properly chosen competitive exchange economies in the analogy the instability derives from the independence of excess demand functions except at the boundaries from own prices this independence arises because of the linearity in probabilities of von neumann morgenstern risk preferences and therefore does not extend to pure strategy equilibria in general thus assuming that agents will play equilibrium strategies implicitly assumes more sophistication when the equilibrium involves mixed strategies than when it involves only pure strategies

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

equilibrium growth of the hierarchical firm shareholder employee cooperative game approach in recent years an implication of a classic paper by wassily leontief 1946 that is the possible inefficiency of the profit maximization principle within a certain bargaining framework has attracted the attention of economists faced with the increased possibility of such inefficiency due to the emergence of firm specific employment structures in large enterprises explorations into the possible modes of efficient and or equilibrium bargains over wage employment constellations have become a topic of recent research by economists most notably robert hall and david lilien 1979 and ian mcdonald and robert solow 1981 among others this paper investigates a similar and related problem supposing that the firm internalizes its own employment structure organized on the seniority principle is the value maximization rule for investment decision making efficient if it is not can we determine the proper rule for striking a balance between the time preference of the shareholder body and that of the employee body this problem will be dealt with in the framework of the cooperative game model of the firm as developed in my 1980 paper it will be shown that lower investment rationing of new jobs and higher pay rates are the consequences of a shift in the power balance within the firm in favor of the incumbent employees vis a vis the shareholder body this analysis will attempt to provide an integrated micro explanation of a widely observed macro phenomena in the 1970 s that is the negative relationship between the real wage and capital accumulation or between the real wage and employment see for example edmond malinvaud pentti kouri and jeffrey sachs the plan of the paper is as follows section i describes the model of the corporate firm internalizing employment structure hierarchically ordered upon the seniority principle section ii derives the coalitional equilibrium values of the endogenous variables of the model as a cooperative game solution it is shown that in the determination of the equilibrium growth rate of the firm gains from growth of the firm accruable to employees in the form of possible promotions must be taken into account to a degree determined by the power balance between the shareholders and the incumbent employees but under what types of institutional mechanisms can the time preference of employees be incorporated into the corporate policymaking section iii describes three highly stylized institutional models of shareholderemployee manager relationships with a view to their efficiency implications the appendix gives some technical results

the organization of work a historical dimension abstract an evaluation of the organizational efficiencies of various modes of production by o e williamson has led him to conclude that given identical technologies the factory was more efficient than the putting out system the superior organizational efficiency of the former he maintains was one reason for the transition to factory production during the nineteenth century this paper challenges that view it is argued that the way in which williamson evaluates efficiency is open to methodological and other objections and that there is limited empirical support for his hypothesis given an identical technology the evidence suggests that the putting out system was usually able to compete with the factory

bumping layoffs and worksharing this paper deals with an interesting but often neglected labor practice prevalent in large north american firms with well developed internal labor markets large north american firms typically respond to a decline in demand for their products by first reducing the number of hours worked or worksharing as the demand continues to fall however they begin to make skilled workers bump onto unskilled jobs displacing unskilled workers skilled workers are laid off only after a considerable number have bumped i develop an implicit contract model and explain the practice

on some recent explanations of why capital hires labor conventional microeconomics contains no explanation of why capital hires labor and not the reverse in view of some surprisingly positive results in the theoretical analysis of worker run enterprise systems recent contributions to the theory of the firm have attempted to explain the dominance of capitalist production relations in efficiency terms the present paper critically reviews works in this area by alchian and demsetz 1972 williamson 1975 1980 and jensen and meckling 1979 and contends that a convincing efficiency argument for the general superiority of capital owners over workers control of enterprises still is lacking

tying the manager s hands constraining opportunistic managerial intervention we discuss and examine empirically a firm level equivalent of the ancient problem of tying the king s hands namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertaken to reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation that is managerial opportunism the link from managerial intervention to firm level value creation is moderated by employee motivation thus intervention in the form of managers overruling employees or reneging on delegation may demotivate employees particularly when the intervention is perceived as being unfair undertaken for personal gain etc we argue that a number of mechanisms such as managers staking their personal reputation employees controlling important assets strong trade unions etc may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to intervene thus reducing the problem of managerial opportunism we derive four hypotheses from these ideas and test them using path analysis on a rich dataset based on 329 firms in the spanish food and electric electronic industries

the function of authority in transaction cost economics abstract this paper questions the transaction cost characterization of observed authority relations as efficient governance structures various inadequacies in the transaction cost account of work organization and the limits of firm size are traced to its neglect of the possibility that authority may be abused opportunistically this exemplifies a more general propensity in the transaction cost literature that of explaining economic organization in functionalist terms with little attention to the causal mechanisms through which efficient governance structures might actually arise three such mechanisms are considered but none is found to provide an adequate rationale for the imputation of efficiency to observed structures

employee ownership and internal governance abstract this paper is designed to counter oliver williamson s hypothetical peer group model of organization with a discussion of three prosperous populations of employee owned firms worked owned scavenger companies taxi cooperatives and professional partnerships such as the large law firm it will be shown here that these firms are formed endure and prevail over their competition for reasons that williamson more than anyone else has taught us to appreciate in particular this paper will argue that the metering problems and human asset considerations that are so prominently featured in williamson s work are crucial for understanding the success of these firms

on the economic rationale for codetermination law abstract this paper develops a positive efficiency economic case for codetermination law resting on the correction of labor and capital market and organizational failures a legally mandated codetermination structure is shown to provide employee checks on several structural incentives for management opportunism codetermination is shown to offer advantages for technical efficiency skill development and knowledge generation through its protection of specific human capital investments financial markets cannot enforce codetermination due to a set of free rider problems

an empirical investigation of oliver williamson s organization of work oliver williamson argues that the attributes of the employment contract like intermediate transactions in general are essentially driven by the specificity of assets in the case of the organization of work it is the particular attributes of labour that determines the transaction costs of any given governance structure the paper presents a stylized account of the transaction cost model of the efficient organization of work stressing an underlying tension and ambiguity in the transaction cost framework the paper exploits a unique dataset to test for the first time with british data williamson s transaction cost predictions concerning the nature of employment contracts williamson tacitly assumes that asset specificity is exogenous in general however there is evidence in the literature that labour specificity is endogenous to employment contracts the paper endeavours to demonstrate that there is empirical evidence to suggest that specialized labour is indeed endogenous in the transaction cost mode

frictions in asset pricing and macroeconomics abstract this paper is about a useful way of taking account of frictions in asset pricing and macroeconomics i start by noting that complete frictionless markets models have a number of empirical deficiencies then i suggest an alternative class of models with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents which can also accommodate a variety of other frictions these models are quantitatively attractive and computationally feasible and have the potential to overcome many or all of the empirical deficiencies of complete frictionless markets models the incomplete markets model can also differ significantly from the complete frictionless markets model on some important policy questions

innovation and market strategy in italian industrial cooperatives econometric evidence on organizational comparative advantage abstract this paper argues that more than one type of organizational form can be simultaneously efficient within an industry when differentiation in product qualities are significant firms with some exogenous or persistent component to their organizational structure will specialize in product qualities for which their organizational structure puts them at an advantage relative to other firms this framework is used in an empirical study of innovation and market strategy of industrial cooperatives results of management surveys of italian cooperatives on company strategy are combined with company financial data to test the hypothesis that industrial cooperatives will hold organizational comparative advantages in innovative activity which stresses the production knowledge of ordinary employees in high quality products and in the use of specialized corporate alliances strong evidence supporting the hypotheses are found when the performance of the firm is measured by its profitability and income per member

financial intermediation business failures and real business cycles in this paper a general equilibrium business cycle model is construct ed that when subjected to real disturbances mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output money business failures risk pr emia intermediary loans and prices in contrast monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence thus providing support for real business cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business cycle behavior a credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

national culture and corporate debt maturity abstract we investigate the influence of national culture on corporate debt maturity choice based on the framework of williamson we argue that culture located in social embeddedness level can shape contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects human actors incentives and choices in market exchange we therefore expect national culture to be related to debt maturity structure after controlling for legal political financial and economic institutions using hofstede s four cultural dimensions uncertainty avoidance collectivism power distance and masculinity as proxies for culture and using a sample of 114 723 firm years from 40 countries over the 1991 2006 period we find robust evidence that firms located in countries with high uncertainty avoidance high collectivism high power distance and high masculinity tend to use more short term debt we interpret our results as consistent with the view that national culture helps explain cross country variations in the maturity structure of corporate debt

a transaction costs analysis of innovations in the organization of pharmaceutical r d abstract this paper uses transaction costs economics to analyze the increasing importance of vertical disintegration of r d by large pharmaceutical and chemical firms first it discusses three characteristics of the research based pharmaceutical industry then it shows that market failures related to long term joint venture r d contracts between firms and university laboratories are less significant than appears at first and may account for their striking increase over the past fifteen years

governance strategies and transaction costs in a renovated electricity market abstract this study applies a transaction cost economics tce framework to examine how economic agents adopt governance strategies in brazil s recently renovated electricity market in light of a well established tce model four attributes of transactions i e asset specificity uncertainty complexity and frequency are examined for three unregulated transactions between generating firms and final consumers the qualitative analysis of attributes unfolds into a comparative analysis of theory predicted governance strategies versus strategies observed in the marketplace it is argued that williamson s model continues to effectively predict the most efficient governance strategy in the sense of minimizing transaction costs and safeguarding idiosyncratic assets misalignment between theory predictions and observations however suggests that two additional concepts implementability and reputation must be examined alongside with williamson s four attributes of transactions in order to better explain strategic decisions in brazil s electricity market capital availability existence of compatible partners and reputation play crucial roles in explaining those decisions

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

optimal firm size taxes and unemployment abstract we analyze a model similar to the standard implicit contracting framework but assume that the size of the firm the number of workers under contract is endogenous some well known predictions from contract theory with firm size fixed exogenously are reversed in particular a result obtained by feldstein concerning unemployment insurance does not hold when firm size is chosen optimally he concludes an increase in experience rating the extent to which firms pay for unemployment benefits through their taxes reduces unemployment while we show that it increases unemployment under reasonable conditions

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

asset returns with transactions costs and uninsured individual risk abstract we explore whether incorporating an explicit motive for holding liquid assets within an equilibrium asset pricing model helps explain the following features of asset returns and turnover in the post war u s economy i the low risk free real interest rate ii the large spread between returns on liquid assets and stocks and iii the greater transaction velocity of liquid assets relative to stocks we introduce a demand for liquid assets by adding uninsured individual risk together with differential costs of trading securities numerical simulations attempting to match the return data generate a ratio of liquid assets to income considerably below observed levels

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

management versus ownership ii two fields in economics have developed without much interaction in the past the theory of the firm and mathematical economics the former has accumulated a wealth of thoughts observations on the firm activities without analytical scrutiny the latter has raised the standard of analytical rigor only within simple frameworks which do not fit the nature of the firm activities in the preceding paper ichiishi 1982 a mathematical model of a capitalistic economy was constructed and a rigorous analysis was given to the model this paper presents the economic interpretations implications of the formal study in ichiishi 1982 and shows how the gap between the two fields is bridged it is also intended to serve as a survey article

internal bargaining labor contracts and a marshallian theory of the firm the theme of this paper is due to alfred marshall who states that nearly the whole income of a business may be regarded as a composite quasi rent divisible among different persons in the business by bargaining supplemented by custom and by notion of fairness and the division of quasi rents entails de facto some sort of profit loss sharing between almost every business and its employees principles of economics 8th ed book vi ch viii sec 10 pp 520 21 marshall emphasizes that a significant portion of composite quasi rent is derived from the organization of business and would be lost if employer employee connections were dissolved in this view bargaining can even be tacit insofar as there is an organizational basis which ensures agreement among the concerned parties consequently internal bargaining models of the firm may be applicable to the analysis of european style codetermination and japanese style labor management also as the relative bargaining strength between labor and management changes such a view of the firm admits as its extrema the organization of a labor managed firm lmf and the textbook case of a profit maximizing firm pmf masahiko aoki 1980 1982 and jan svejnar 1982 have recently explored models of an internal bargaining firm their analyses however consider the firm s long run behavior only under restricted circumstances without market uncertainty the relevance of the internal bargaining approach to profit sharing and labor management would be enhanced if we integrated the firm s short run wage employment policies with its long run plans for the rate of growth and capital labor substitutions this i do by underscoring the firm s organizational basis which is essentially a long term contractual association between workers and management i combine costas azariadis 1975 and martin baily s 1974 apparatus of labor contracting with efficient bargaining to investigate the effect of varying degrees of labor s bargaining power upon the firm s shortand long run policies under uncertainty these results are then contrasted with the empirical findings of collective bargaining for example richard freeman and james medoff 1981 conventional results of lmf models jaroslav vanek 1970 benjamin ward 1958 and the recent macroeconomic approaches to wage employment adjustments ian mcdonald and robert solow 1981

strategic investment and the co existence of labour managed and profit maximising firms the authors examine firm profitability in mixed duopoly equilibrium with one labor managed lm firm and one profit maximizing pm firm and with strategic investment conventional wisdom suggests that firms deviating from profit maximization will suffer forced exit in the long run the authors reverse this conclusion in mixed lm pm duopoly with strategic investment no equilibrium can have both firms making zero profits and pm profitability implies lm profitability but not the converse adverse parameter shifts would cause the pm firm to exit first empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction of robust market survivability of lm firms

models of modern sector labor market institutions in developing countries abstract the paper argues that policy conclusions derived from existing theories of economic development may be seriously flawed because the theories do not model correctly the modern sector labor market the paper first presents evidence that trade unions and governments frequently exert positive influence not only on firms wages but also on their employment levels it then presents models that capture this phenomenon and permit one to determine whether the observed levels of employment are insufficient optimal or excessive from the private and social standpoints the paper concludes with a discussion of how the analysis could be implemented in empirical studies and in practical policy work

does hierarchical governance facilitate adaptation to changed circumstances abstract the transaction cost theory of economic organization maintains that by merging and adopting a hierarchical governance structure two firms can circumvent the bargaining problem which would impede adaptation to changing circumstances if they remained independent i analyze this claim in a simple model which allows the costs of hierarchical organization imperfect selective intervention to be evaluated alongside the costs due to the bargaining problem delays and disagreement both costs are due to informational asymmetries which are assumed to be unaffected by the choice of governance structure examples are presented which support the fundamental transaction cost proposition that hierarchical governance is preferred when parties are highly interspecific and there are significant gaps in the contract the intuition is that rational bargainers make less attractive offers in precisely those circumstances where adaptation is likely to be extremely valuable integration effectively separates the decision to adapt from the division of the resulting surplus and so is relatively efficient when substantial quasi rents are at stake

customer markets trade unions and stagflation customer market analysis combined with trade union wage setting is shown to yield a range of equilibrium levels of employment only when employment is forced outside this range can the disequilibrium acceleration or d eceleration of the price level be expected to operate numerical calc ulations suggest that this range is quite large implying that the ma ximum level of unemployment consistent with nondecelerating inflation is way above the minimum level of unemployment consistent with nonac celerating inflation a range of equilibrium employment levels appear s to be in closer agreement with empirical experience than a unique natural rate of unemployment copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

capital labor and the firm a study of german codetermination under the german corporate governance system of codetermination employees are legally allocated control rights over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board that is the board of nonexecutive directors the supervisory board oversees the management board the board of executive directors approves or rejects its decisions and appoints its members and sets their salaries we empirically investigate the implications of this sort of labor participation in corporate decision making we find that companies with equal representation of employees and shareholders on the supervisory board trade at a 31 stock market discount as compared with companies where employee representatives fill only one third of the supervisory board seats we show that under equal representation management board compensation provides incentives that are not conducive to furthering shareholders interests possibly because labor maximizes a different objective function than shareholders we document that under equal representation companies have longer payrolls than their one third representation peers have finally we provide evidence that shareholders respond to the allocation of control rights to labor by linking supervisory board compensation to firm performance and by leveraging up the firm jel g32 g34

labor management bargaining contract curves and slutsky equations consider a firm in which labor and management bargain over division of the firm s organizational rent and negotiate the firm s policy i emphasize the relationship between the bargainer s contract curve and the firm s slutsky equations i can describe a bargaining firm as a hybrid of a neoclassical profit maximizing firm and a pure labor managed firm i apply the methodology to models of employment contracts and identify three separate circumstances in which labor s bargaining power affects the firm s comparative static behavior first there is inefficiency in contractual bargaining second income effects in the worker s utility function interact with the firm s capital cost burden third labor s interest in long term utility maximization need not coincide with management s interest in profit maximization this last case arises from the incompleteness of the market for property rights in the firm

regulation of the employment relationship the old institutional perspective abstract this review article examines the rationale developed by the old institutional economists particularly john r commons and associates of the wisconsin school for the regulation of the employment relationship factors emphasized by the old institutionalists include the promotion of noneconomic social goals the deleterious effects of unrestrained self interest and competition the highly imperfect nature of labor markets the skewed distribution of property rights and labor s inequality of bargaining power the paper then describes the policy strategy and regulatory program advocated by the old institutionalists to improve the efficiency and equity of the market system implications of the old institutional perspective for current debates over the extent and form of employment regulation are then assessed

works councils and employment growth in german establishments using data from german manufacturing establishments this article examines the relationship between works councils and employment growth taking the endogeneity of councils into account the estimates show a positive growth effect of works councils this suggests that the performance enhancing voice role of german works councils dominates their monopoly role moreover the findings of this study support the hypothesis that workers are more likely to implement a council to protect their quasi rents when the establishment is facing a long term crisis copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

information production decisions and intra firm bargaining a firm s factor suppliers often receive private signals which are useful in managerial decision making productive efficiency requires the pooling of such decentralized information however factor suppliers may threaten to withhold private signals in order to secure side payments from the potential beneficiaries of this information j harsanyi s theory of the n person cooperative game is applied to a model where both physical inputs and information can be withheld by factor owners for the special case of a binary decision problem the central limit theorem is used to approximate the harsanyi solution by a linear combination of are as under the standard normal curve copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the political origin of corporate governance species although economies business practices and living standards have converged since wwii corporate structures continue to differ among the advanced economies of the world looking at the diversity of corporate structures of large sized firms around the world and over time would fascinate charles darwin this work develops a critical review of the literature on political determinants of corporate governance through the darwinian theory including some lamarckian aspects as darwin in his work on the origin of species explicates the diversity of species of tortoises finches and iguanas of the galapagos islands so darwinism may contribute in understanding the origin and the persistence of corporate diversity in particular this article takes into account politics driven variations their inheritances and the subsequent selection of advantageous corporate attributes

why capital hires labor a bargaining perspective organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi rent capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets because worker control would divert quasi rents away from ass et owners ex post conversely labor managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general purpose physi cal assets a key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor managed firms would yield a larg er total surplus copyright 1993 by american economic association

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

soft information in insurer lending and reinsurance under capital regulation the paper develops a capped call option framework explicitly integrating the borrowing firm credit risk moreover modelling the structural breaks in assets and volatility captures soft informatio

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

the theory of the labour managed firm revisited the voluntary interactive approach membership in the authors labor managed firm is determined in the long run by expected income maximization in the short run upon the realization of output price each member may leave the labor managed firm however a decision to leave when the entire membership quits is associated with fixed cost this arrangement ensures ex post egalitarianism and sense of job security the authors short run result is that employment does not exhibit a perverse response to price variations the long run result is that their labor managed firm is more populous than the illyrian firm and may even be more than its capitalistic twin copyright 1993 by royal economic society

radical political economy and the economics of labor markets this essay is the result of a long process involving many drafts and revisions i am grateful to duncan foley for the careful and constructive criticisms offered throughout the project the following people read the manuscript at different stages and although they often disagreed with me they generously provided helpful comments two anonymous referees for this journal samuel bowles william dickens greg dow robert drago richard edwards kathleen engel richard freeman james galbraith herbert gintis jody hoffer gittel sandfordjacoby tom kochan david levine lisa lynch paul osterman michael piore bob rebitzer gil skilman dan slesnick robert thomas and tsuyoshi tsuru comments from participants in seminars at the massachusetts institute of technology university of massachusetts at amherst and hitotsubashi university are also gratefully acknowledged

theoretical isolation and explanatory progress transaction cost economics and the dynamics of dispute two related goals are pursued first the development of and debates around oliver williamson s version of transaction cost economics are organised in terms of an emerging metatheoretical framework it proposes looking at economic theorising and its changes in terms of rival theoretical isolations which are often responses to challenging explanatory questions as a side product williamson s strategy of theorising is portrayed second using transaction cost economics as an illustration and as a source of inspiration the paper amends and refines the earlier framework of theoretical isolation by incorporating notions of explaining and explained items notions of progress in questions as well as increased causal penetration and increased degree of unification and the notion of the dynamics of dispute copyright 2004 oxford university press