individual heterogeneity and cultural attitudes in credence goods provision abstract i study the heterogeneity of credence goods provision in taxi drivers taking detours in new york city first i document that there is significant detouring on average by drivers second there is significant heterogeneity in detouring across individuals yet each individual s propensity to take detours is stable drivers who detour almost always detour while those who do not detour almost never do drivers who take longer detours on each trip also take such trips more often third cultural attitudes plausibly explain some of this heterogeneity in behavior across individuals

forecasting recessions the puzzle of the enduring power of the yield curve for over two decades researchers have provided evidence that the yield curve specifically the spread between long and short term interest rates contains useful information for signaling future recessions despite these findings forecasters appear to have generally placed too little weight on the yield spread when projecting declines in the aggregate economy indeed we show that professional forecasters are worse at predicting recessions a few quarters ahead than a simple real time forecasting model that is based on the yield spread this relative forecast power of the yield curve remains a puzzle the appendix is included online as supplementary material

why don t people trust experts abstractcredence goods such as health care legal and financial services and auto repair create a conflict of interest by requiring experts to diagnose and provide services to uninformed consumers mistreatment of consumers appears widespread empirically but a simple explanation for mistreatment under realistic assumptions has proved elusive i generalize uwe dulleck and rudolf kerschbamer s credence good model to incorporate the highly realistic assumption that consumers do not observe experts cost functions the model guarantees equilibrium mistreatment in a wide range of price setting and market environments the model also yields testable implications regarding the nature of mistreating firms and the direction of mistreatment

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

forecasting national recessions using state level data a large literature studies the information contained in national level economic indicators such as nancial and aggregate economic activity variables for forecasting u s business cycle phases expansions and recessions in this paper we investigate whether there is additional information regarding business cycle phases contained in subnational measures of economic activity using a probit model to predict the nber expansion and recession classification we assess the forecasting benets of adding state level employment growth to a common list of national level predictors as state level data adds a large number of variables to the model we employ a bayesian model averaging procedure to construct forecasts based on a variety of forecast evaluation metrics we find that including state level employment growth substantially improves short horizon forecasts of the business cycle phase the gains in forecast accuracy are concentrated during months of national recession posterior inclusion probabilities indicate substantial uncertainty regarding which states belong in the model highlighting the importance of the bayesian model averaging approach

efficient informal trade theory and experimental evidence from the cape town taxi market informal sectors in developing countries are often thought of as responses to rigid and cumbersome market regulations in this paper i study informal trade as a first best outcome in the model i propose rigid regulations can be necessary to achieve efficiency even though they are always sidestepped the key assumption is that the regulations define the trading parties fall back position in case the informal bargaining process breaks down i set up a field experiment to test the model s mechanisms in the cape town market for metered taxis consistent with the model i find that sidestepping the regulations increase cost efficiency taxis take the shortest route the price is however unaffected suggesting informal bargaining leads to a pareto improvement

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

credence goods misleading labels and quality differentiation due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation we examine how consumers overestimation of the quality of intermediate quality products affects firms incentives to improve product quality the firms non cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity irrespective of the nature of second stage competition bertrand or cournot we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate quality firm and motivates it to raise its product s quality in response the high quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit overall average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves which raises consumer surplus social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

model averaging in markov switching models predicting national recessions with regional data this paper introduces new weighting schemes for model averaging when one is interested in combining discrete forecasts from competing markov switching models in the empirical application we forecast u s business cycle turning points with state level employment data we find that forecasts obtained with our best combination scheme provide timely updates of u s recessions in that they outperform a notoriously difficult benchmark to beat the anxious index from the survey of professional forecasters for short term forecasts

predicting u s recessions financial variables as leading indicators this paper examines the out of sample performance of various financial variables as predictors of u s recessions series such as interest rates and spreads stock prices and monetary aggregates are evaluated individually and in comparison with other financial and nonfinancial indicators the analysis focuses on out of sample performance from one to eight quarters ahead results show that stock prices are useful with one to three quarter horizons as are some well known macroeconomic indicators beyond one quarter however the slope of the yield curve emerges as the clear individual choice and typically performs better by itself out of sample than in conjunction with other variables

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

signaling corporate social responsibility third party certification versus brands corporate social responsibility csr is a credence attribute of products which can be signaled either through a label certified by a third party or via unsubstantiated claims used as part of a brand building strategy we use an experimental posted offer market with sellers and buyers to compare the impact of these signaling strategies on market efficiency only third party certification gives rise to a separating equilibrium and an increase in csr investments unsubstantiated claims can generate a halo effect on consumers whereby the latter are nudged into paying more for the same level of csr investments by firms

does self regulation work experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations self regulation sr is a common way of enforcing quality in markets such as banking financial services and several professions and in a variety of public and private organizations we provide experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations sros to publicly disclose versus cover up fraud in an incomplete information environment we find that observed behaviour is generally consistent with bayesian equilibrium when subjects are informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by a vigilant versus a lax sro type in particular a fraud disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the vigilant sro is more likely to detect fraud otherwise a cover up equilibrium is supported however when subjects are not informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by the sro types as expected in real sr situations no equilibrium is strongly supported our results suggest that in practice the reputation based incentives for ef

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

consumer information in a market for expert services abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of the valuation they place for getting a serious problem fixed we introduce consumer information into this framework by assuming that prior to visiting an expert some consumers receive an information signal about whether they have a serious or a minor problem we show that when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is sufficiently high the expert does not cheat any low valuation consumer regardless of their information status but cheats the high valuation consumers those high valuation consumers with bad signals are the most frequent victims of cheating whereas those with good signals are the least likely victims when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is below a certain threshold however the unique equilibrium involves no cheating

on the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets a client has a problem but does not know whether it is serious or minor she consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem this paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i the type of treatment is verifiable by the client ii the client has the option of rejecting any treatment recommendation and iii the expert is not liable for the outcome of the treatment it is found for any parameter configuration that there exist equilibria in which the expert makes fraudulent recommendations resulting in inefficient treatment the market outcome is compared with that under an alternative market environment in which the expert is liable for treatment outcome but the type of treatment performed is non verifiable it is shown that for some parameter configurations the equilibrium is more efficient when liability is in place than when the treatment is verifiable these findings stand in sharp contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome under liability for outcome is not finally this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

transparency in markets for experience goods experimental evidence we propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good the market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy we compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality contrary to theoretical predictions firms do not differentiate quality under full information rather both tend to offer products of similar high quality entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory under no information we observe a lemons outcome where quality is low at the same time firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost in two intermediate treatments quality is significantly higher than the no information level and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect jel l15 c91 d82

the competitive advantage of honesty abstract we study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs consumers may benefit from firms dishonesty through lower market prices does firms dis honesty affect consumers purchasing decisions our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent it can provide a competitive advantage honest firms sell more and despite higher costs achieve higher profits this finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty averse consumers by identifying circumstances in which consumers although not the addressee of dishonesty punish firms for their within firm dishonesty we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

gender effects in the credence goods market an experimental study abstract in this paper we offer further explanation for differences in earnings across genders we investigate difference in preferences in payment systems for credence goods we find that women were no less likely to select variable rate payment schemes as compensation for providing credence goods than men however overall earnings remained higher for men than for women disaggregating behavior by type of payment and gender reveals that women who chose fee for service provided significantly fewer units of services paid for than men who chose fee for service this difference accounts for the lower overall earnings for women in our experiments

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

predicting u s recessions with dynamic binary response models abstract we develop dynamic binary probit models and apply them for predicting u s recessions using the interest rate spread as the driving predictor the new models use lags of the binary response a recession dummy to forecast its future values and allow for the potential forecast power of lags of the underlying conditional probability we show how multiperiod ahead forecasts are computed iteratively using the same one period ahead model iterated forecasts that apply specific lags supported by statistical model selection procedures turn out to be more accurate than previously used direct forecasts based on horizon specific model specifications

credence goods experts and risk aversion abstract the existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the importance of risk aversion in this paper we extend a standard expert model of credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk averse consumers our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert s incentive to invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers mistreatment

business cycle phases in u s states the u s aggregate business cycle is often characterized as a series of distinct recession and expansion phases we apply a regime switching model to state level coincident indices to characterize state business cycles in this way we find that states differ a great deal in the levels of growth that they experience in the two phases recession growth rates are related to industry mix whereas expansion growth rates are related to education and age composition further states differ significantly in the timing of switches between regimes indicating large differences in the extent to which state business cycle phases are in concord with those of the aggregate economy

ethics welfare and markets an economic analysis the present article examines society s welfare when goods with identical physical attributes can be produced using two alternative technologies one of them less ethically desirable but less expensive for at least some producers for the scenario where identification costs must be borne by producers and consumers of the high quality good the outcome under unregulated markets is identical to the optimal solution of a central planner constrained to neither ban the undesirable technology nor segregate the low quality good however under certain circumstances the unregulated market equilibrium may be improved upon by government intervention that shifts the burden of identification costs to the producers of the low quality good or which bans the production of the low quality good the optimal intervention needs to be determined case by case and depends on consumer preferences relative production costs and relative costs of identification and fraud prevention

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

are fair trade goods credence goods a new proposal with french illustrations in the literature fair trade ft goods are usually associated with other products differentiated by process attributes such as organic food genetically modified gm food or child labour free clothing all of these products are regarded as credence goods this classification refers to the simplified definition of credence goods which describes product attributes which consumers cannot evaluate even after having consumed the good focusing on the characteristics of ft goods this article proposes a reassessment of the link between ft goods and credence properties as defined by darby and karni we first demonstrate that 1 the usual classification masks important particularities of ft goods compared to other goods with process attributes and 2 the full definition of credence goods may even provide a better description of the quality of ft goods however and this is our second theoretical contribution the lack of consensus among experts concerning ft standards and their level of efficiency encourage us to consider ft goods as indeterminate goods as defined by lupton this result leads us to suggest a new typology of product attributes summarized in an innovative diagram it sheds light on how competition between the different ft approaches works and why the ft market is still confined to a niche if not threatened with collapse we mainly illustrate our theoretical analysis with observations relating to the french ft market and institutions

lumpy demand forecasting using neural networks abstract the current study applies neural network nn modeling in forecasting lumpy demand it is to the best of our knowledge the first such study our study compares the performance of nn forecasts to those using three traditional time series methods single exponential smoothing croston s method and the syntetos boylan approximation we find nn models to generally perform better than the traditional methods using three different performance measures we also independently validate earlier findings that the syntetos boylan approximation performs better than the croston s and single exponential smoothing methods in lumpy demand forecasting

quality incentives for gps in a regulated market abstract this paper analyses whether gps in a capitation system have incentives to provide quality even though health is a credence good a model is developed where the quality of the service varies due to inherent differences between the gps and rational patients make choices based on the outcome of treamtent we find that it is difficult to provide appropriate incentives since the search activity of patients offsets direct effects of a change in reimbursement variation in the inherent ability of the gps is good since it increases the search activity of the patients and the optimal reimbursement scheme is inversely proportional to the dispersion in types finally we find that offering a menu of contracts can potentially increase social welfare above the level of a simple capitation regime but it tends to lead to a higher variation in quality levels

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training