asset pricing with loss aversion using standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful to match asset price characteristics such as the risk free interest rate equity premium and the sharpe ratio to time series data behavioral nance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as preferences with loss aversion to model asset pricing research has now started to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics encouraged by some studies of benartzki and thaler 1995 and barberis et al 2001 we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy we here employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences as our results show a model with loss aversion performs considerably better than pure consumption based asset pricing models

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

optimal vs traditional securities under moral hazard this paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by wellestablished firms standard moral hazard models predict that equity debt and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments i show that issuing these securities is nevertheless nearly optimal the issuer would gain very little by using non traditional securities instead combined with equity one debt issue without multiple layers of seniority and one warrant issue without multiple exercise prices suffice to achieve near optimality the near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer s ability to use war rants in addition to debt and equity

fairness price stickiness and history dependence in decentralized trade this chapter investigates the implications that social preferences have for the stationary strategic equilibrium of such a decentralized market agents are supposed to be averse to unfairly unfavorable as well as unfairly favorable deals in the spirit of fehr and schmidt 1999 but we stay rather close to standard individualistic preferences the negative weights on advantageous and disadvantageous deviations from what is considered as the fair benchmark are such that utility remains strictly increasing in own surplus share and in contrast to the original fehr schmidt model the fair split need not automatically be a 50 50 division any price between sellers cost and buyers willingness to pay may be the one which for whatever reasons is agents reference point in a given market this makes it possible to consider a more flexible notion of fairness than is usually done it is in line with cognitive dissonance theory from psychology and the noteworthy experiments of binmore et al 1991 1993 where subjects who were triggered to play different bargaining equilibria ended up considering very different surplus distributions as fair

wage bargaining with time varying threats we study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm s willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired as strikers find temporary jobs and as inventories or strike funds run out we find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary if dispute costs increase in the long run then dispute durations are longer settlement rates are lower and wages decline more slowly during the short run and may even increase the settlement wage is largely determined from the long run threat rather than the short run threat

liquid capital and market liquidity this article considers how the supply of liquid capital affects the liquidity of asset markets the article views the former notion as a technological property of real investments and the latter as an endogenous property of financial market equilibrium and describes a channel by which the two are linked when agents hold more wealth in technologically liquid investments a marginal adjustment to portfolio holdings alters discount rates less causing a smaller price impact thus even without intermediaries or frictions the stock of transformable capital may be a crucial determinant of the resilience of financial markets

complexity and the character of stock returns empirical evidence and a model of asset prices based on complex investor learning empirical evidence on the distributional characteristics of common stock returns indicates 1 a power law tail index close to three describes the behavior of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns pr r x x a reflection of fat tails 2 general linear and nonlinear dependencies exist in the time series of returns 3 the time series return process is characterized by short run dependence short memory in both returns as well as their volatility the latter usually characterized in the form of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and 4 the time series return process probably does not exhibit long memory but the squared returns process does exhibit long memory we propose a model of complex self referential learning and reasoning amongst economic agents that jointly produces security returns consistent with these general observed facts and which are supported here by empirical results presented for a benchmark sample of 50 stocks traded on the new york stock exchange the market we postulate is populated by traders who reason inductively while compressing information into a few fuzzy notions that they can in turn process and analyze with fuzzy logic we analyze the implications of such behavior for the returns on risky securities within the context of an artificial stock market model dynamic simulation experiments of the market are conducted from which market clearing prices emerge allowing us to then compute realized returns we test the effects of varying values of the parameters of the model on the character of the simulated returns the results indicate that the model proposed in this paper can jointly account for the presence of a power law characterization of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns with exponent on the order of three for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity for long memory in volatility and for general nonlinear dependencies in returns

market resolution and valuation in incomplete markets the arrow debreu approach to general equilibrium in an economy has been recognized as one of the most general and conceptually elegant frameworks for the study of financial problems under uncertainty 2 9 equally well known is its elusiveness when it comes to ready application to practical problems like capital budgeting or empirical testing see 6 15 18 however some recent research see 1 3 6 12 16 18 and 19 has made a serious attempt to put the state preference theoretic model in an operational setting breeden and litzenberger 6 have developed an interesting approach to derive constructively the prices of elementary arrow debreu securities from the prices of call options on aggregate consumption banz and miller 3 use a similar technique to value capital budgeting projects based on values for state contingent claims computed from prices of call options written on the market portfolio the supershare securities proposed by hakansson 14 16 and related work by garman 13 ross 24 etc have also served to give the so called state contingent approach a practical flavor

search intensity job advertising and efficiency this paper demonstrates that if both firms and workers search the other side of the market for job matches the equilibrium rate of unemployment is likely to be too high both sides ignore a positive externality of their search when they establish a job match they remove from the market a job searcher so they save society his search costs i show that there is no feasible wage rate that can internalize this externality under fairly weak restrictions on the technology of search

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

sex preferences marital dissolution and the economic status of women author s bedard kelly deschenes olivier abstract the rise in the divorce rate over the past 40 years is one of the fundamental changes in american society a seemingly ever increasing number of women and children spend some fraction of their life in single female headed households leading many to be concerned about the economic circumstances of these women their and children estimating the cause to effect relationship between marital dissolution and female economic status is complicated because the same factors that increase marital instability may also affect the economic status and labor market behavior of women we propose an instrumental variables solution to this problem based on the sex of the firstborn child this strategy exploits the fact that the sex of the firstborn child is random and the fact that marriages are less likely to survive following the birth of girls as opposed to boys our iv estimates cast doubt on the contention that marital instability causes large declines in woman s economic status once the negative selection into divorce is accounted for we find that women who have experienced marital dissolution have considerably higher levels of personal income and annual wages than women who remain married at the same time we find little evidence of differential poverty rates and equivalized household incomes among ever divorced women and never divorced women we further show that the higher wages of ever divorced women mostly reflect increased labor supply intensity hours and weeks of work of woman who experienced marital dissolution

equilibrium portfolios in the neoclassical growth model abstract this paper studies equilibrium portfolios in the standard neoclassical growth model under uncertainty with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete markets preferences are purposely restricted to be quasi homothetic the main source of heterogeneity across agents is due to different endowments of shares of the representative firm at date 0 fixing portfolios is the optimal equilibrium strategy in stationary endowment economies with dynamically complete markets however when the environment displays changing degrees of heterogeneity across agents the trading strategy of fixed portfolios cannot be optimal in equilibrium very importantly our framework can generate changing heterogeneity if and only if either minimum consumption requirements are not zero or labor income is not zero and the value of human and non human wealth are linearly independent

wage bargaining inventories and union legislation this paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm may or may not be able to sell out of its inventory of finished goods during a strike firms and the union are both risk neutral and have the same discount rate it is shown that the wage equilibrium corresponds to the axiomatic nash bargaining solution where the threatpoints are the agents payoffs should bargaining continue indefinitely we use the 1980 and 1982 employment acts to test this theory interpreting that legislation change as changing the firm s threatpoint but not its bargaining power this allows us to identify the value of the firm s threatpoint post 1982 formal tests support the theory also consistent with the theory it is found that union wages decrease with inventories after 1982 but not before and that the union wage gap is smaller after 1982 wage bargaining as described in the strategic bargaining literature is a peaceful affair if there is no agreement workers simply withdraw their labour for one period and there is a consequent one period loss of production for the firm but strikes tend to generate a lot of conflict in the u k in the 1970s striking unions would form picket lines across the factory gates their aim was not only to prevent strikebreakers going to work but also to stop lorries delivering goods conversely firms often with the help of the police would try to get the lorries across those lines the employment acts of 1980 and 1982 stopped this struggle stopping lorries crossing picket lines had always been illegal but this new legislation gave firms power to have picket lines immediately lifted should striking workers act illegally the courts would immediately sequester the union s assets if its members refused to comply with the law using the strategic bargaining approach this paper considers the equilibrium effect of this change in legislation on union wage formation using wage and inventory data from a panel of firms across this time period this paper also formally tests that theory there have been two main approaches to bargaining theory the strategic bargaining

inventories and wage bargaining abstract a union is assumed to make a sequence of take it or leave it wage demands to a firm which produces a storable good equilibrium has the following properties 1 the firm chooses to accumulate inventories even though there is no uncertainty 2 the accumulation of inventories lowers wages by reducing the rents from further production and therefore harms the union without benefitting the firm 3 there can be intermittent work stoppages i e strikes even though there is no uncertainty these work stoppages limit the firm s inventories and hence raise wages journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 j31

the effects of average revenue regulation on electricity transmission investment and pricing this paper investigates the long run effects of average revenue regulation on an electricity transmission monopolist who applies a two part tariff comprising a variable congestion price and a non negative fixed access fee a binding constraint on the monopolist s expected average revenue lowers the access fee promotes transmission investment and improves consumer surplus in a case of any linear or log linear electricity demand function with a positive probability that no congestion occurs average revenue regulation is allocatively more efficient than a coasian two part tariff if the level of capacity under average revenue regulation is higher than that under a coasian two part tariff

on the fluctuations in consumption and market returns in the presence of labor and human capital an equilibrium analysis abstract we examine the effects of human capital on consumption stock market and other fluctuations in a general equilibrium continuous time model a representative consumer worker investor derives utility from consumption and leisure a representative firm demands labor as the sole input to a stochastic production technology driven by general possibly nonmultiplicative shocks for cobb douglas utility and multiplicative shocks labor is nonstochastic and consumption and stock market volatility are equated as under no human capital deviations from this are analyzed for logarithmic utility and constant elasticity of substitution production technology cases are identified where the presence of labor causes consumption to be smoother than the stock market

contract costs and financing decisions like bondholders most agents contract for fixed payoffs thus corporate capital structures which are less than 50 percent debt are less levered than overall contract structures in which about 90 percent of total flows are fixed payoffs the hypothesis analyzed here is that loans and bonds lower contract costs by delegating the monitoring and bonding of the default risks of fixed payoffs to credible specialists financial intermediaries bond holder trustees rating agencies and auditors other agents can then focus on their specialties that is efficient supply of labor materials and other services and the contract problems of these specialties copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

search for a monetary propagation mechanism abstract this paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search it is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high the model produces persistent hump shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence the model also generates desirable features in job vacancy sales inventory and the velocity of money all these features emerge here in an economy with perfectly flexible prices and wages journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e40 e30

animal spirits financial crises and persistent unemployment this article uses a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium unemployment rates to explain financial crises the model has equilibria where asset prices are unbounded above i argue that this is an important feature of any rational agent explanation of a financial crisis since for the expansion phase of the crisis to be rational investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep increasing forever with positive probability i explain the sudden crash in asset prices that precipitates a financial crisis as a large shock to expectations that leads to a permanent increase in the unemployment rate

firm specific determinants of the real wage bargaining models suggest that firm specific variables play an important role in wage determination yet previous empirical studies of wage determination have largely ignored these variables the authors analysis of a large panel data set of u s wage contracts suggests that firm specific variables suggested by bargaining models such as the value of sales the capital labor ratio and the financial liquidity of the firm are important determinants of negotiated real wages copyright 1992 by mit press

a dynamic equilibrium model of search bargaining and money abstract this paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching strategic bargaining and money equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation when we embed this characterization into the monetary economy the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic nash bargaining solution as has been done in the past journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d83 e31

rethinking the risks of poverty a framework for analyzing prevalences and penalties this article develops a framework for analyzing the risks of poverty in terms of prevalences share of the population with a risk and penalties increased probability of poverty associated with a risk a comparison of the four major risks low education single motherhood young headship and unemployment across 29 rich democracies reveals there is greater variation in penalties than prevalences the united states has high poverty partly because it has the highest penalties despite below average prevalences also u s poverty in 2013 would be worse with prevalences from 1970 or 1980 there is little evidence that penalties discourage prevalences while welfare generosity significantly moderates the penalties for unemployment and low education the authors conclude that a focus on risks does not provide a convincing explanation of poverty single motherhood may be the least important of the risks and studies based solely on the united states are constrained by potentially large sample selection biases

the equity premium in brock s asset pricing model abstract in this paper we combine dynamic programming methods with projection methods for solving stochastic growth models as an application of these methods we solve brock s asset pricing model with a variety of parameterizations we focused on finding parameterizations that result in an equity premium that is high relative to the variation in consumption we show both analytically and numerically that the equity premium can be higher in a production based asset pricing model than it is in the consumption based asset pricing model even when the real output level is the same in both models

capital market equilibrium with externalities production and heterogeneous agents abstract the paper studies general equilibrium in an economy with externalities production and heterogeneous agents the model developed builds on brock brock w a 1982 asset prices in a production economy in mccall j j ed the economics of information and uncertainty university of chicago press chicago pp 1 43 and merton merton r c 1987 a simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information journal of finance 42 483 510 it involves both a stock market and a market for loans together with negative externalities produced by a subset of firms importantly the technological production structure of the firms is reflected in the properties of the shares traded in the stock market agents are heterogeneous in their financial choices potentially discriminating against the firms producing a negative externality the model sheds light on the utility costs of the discriminating behavior and on the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is responsible for the externality the model is used to study the factors which may magnify or reduce the impact of discrimination a set of discriminated firms may be seriously affected only if the discriminating investors command a large portion of overall wealth and or they do not represent important diversification instruments the model can be applied to understanding the effects of socially responsible investment whereby investors discriminate against companies belonging to some sectors which are perceived as socially dangerous or unethical

a non cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers abstract rubinstein s alternating offers bargaining model is enriched by allowing players to choose when and whether or not to make an offer time is continuous and players make offers whenever they wish it is assumed that upon making an offer players must wait a fixed amount of time before making another it is shown that if players can react arbitrarily quickly to their opponent s offers then all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are rubinstein like in particular efficient however if it takes time to react then some delay can be supported this potential delay becomes arbitrarily large as reaction times increase journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c72

a structural decomposition of black white earnings differentials this research demonstrates the impact of labor market structure and segmentation on differentials in black and white earnings this paper argues that there are two very different factors which create black white earnings differences 1 differences between blacks and whites within divisions of the labor market and 2 differences between labor market divisions in earnings combined with the differential distribution of blacks and whites across labor market divisions use of a decomposition based on a regression standardization approach discloses that the second factor accounts for a minimum of 14 of the black white earnings gap this implies that eliminating all black white differences within labor market divisions would still leave a significant earnings gap between blacks and whites due to the structure of the labor market

returns to scale in a matching model of the labor market abstract this paper presents evidence on the degree of returns to scale in the labor market using a transcendental logarithmic model of the labor market matching technology the empirical results imply locally increasing returns to scale and are consistent with multiple equilibria thereby suggesting a potentially welfare enhancing role for macroeconomic policy intervention

site selection bias in program evaluation site selection bias can occur when the probability that a program is adopted or evaluated is correlated with its impacts i test for site selection bias in the context of the opower energy conservation programs using 111 randomized control trials involving 8 6 million households across the united states predictions based on rich microdata from the first 10 replications substantially overstate efficacy in the next 101 sites several mechanisms caused this positive selection for example utilities in more environmentalist areas are more likely to adopt the program and their customers are more responsive to the treatment also because utilities initially target treatment at higher usage consumer subpopulations efficacy drops as the program is later expanded the results illustrate how program evaluations can still give systematically biased out of sample predictions even after many replications jel codes c93 d12 l94 o12 q41

inventory accumulation wages and employment this paper analyzes the effect of inventory accumulation on the outcome of wage and employment agreements between a union and a firm a two period model is set up with bargaining in each period and the paper analyzes under what circumstances inventories will be held even if demand and production conditions are constant it is found that inventories have an important strategic role they bring forward employment and strengthen the bargaining position of the firm in the later period however the firm s strategic use of inventories will generally be to the detriment of both parties copyright 1991 by royal economic society

optimal timing of transmission line investments in the face of uncertain demand an option valuation approach abstract grid based electrification programmes involve irreversible transmission line investments that can be delayed by temporarily resorting to decentralized powet supply technologies in this context decision makers face the difficulty that the future evolution of demand and thus the returns from postponing the transmission line investment are uncertain this imposes an opportunity cost resembling the value of a financial call option therefore standard option valuation techniques can be applied to solve the problem of timing transmission line investments in the presence of stochastic demand it is shown analytically and in terms of numerical examples that demand uncertainty may provide a strong incentive to defer the extension of the grid beyond the date that would be optimal under deterministic conditions

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

tight average revenue regulation can be worse than no regulation price regulation of a multi market monopolist with the cap based on average revenue can cause welfare to be below the unregulated level in a model with linear demands and constant but unequal marginal costs a sufficient condition for this welfare effect is that the cap equals the average revenue that would be earned with marginal cost pricing relaxation of the price cap can lower all prices welfare with uniform pricing at the level of the price cap can be above or below the average revenue welfare level

on the adjustment speed of smes to their optimal capital structure the aim of this paper is to analyse the speed of adjustment of small and medium sized enterprises smes to the target leverage by applying a system gmm technique to spanish panel data collected during the period 1995 2005 we estimate a partial adjustment model in which both target leverage and speed of adjustment are simultaneously endogenized we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of target leverage and the speed of adjustment more specifically the rate of financial flexibility growth opportunities and size are positively related to the speed of adjustment whereas the distance to the optimal ratio of debt shows a negative impact our findings demonstrate that in terms of sample mean a high percentage of spanish smes adjust rationally to their target additionally the smes analysed appeared to be over levered and fairly motivated to adjust annual adjustment speed 26

strategic bargaining with firm inventories this paper characterizes how a firm s opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers in equilibrium the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration this outcome is equivalent to a nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents expected payoffs should a strike last forever we also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories the wage increases when demand is high conversely given demand the wage falls as inventories rise

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

welfare effects of price discrimination by a regulated monopolist should a multiproduct monopolist whose average price is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in third degree price discrimination if the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm but if perhaps more realistically it is the firm s average revenue that is capped then consumers prefer uniform pricing in this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed which increases welfare but marginal utilities differ across markets which is inefficient and the overall effect is ambiguous a small amount of discrimination is desirable however it is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost the consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined

do capm results hold in a dynamic economy a numerical analysis in this research we use the projection method reported by judd to find numerical solutions to the euler equations of a stochastic dynamic growth model the mode1 that we solve is brock s asset pricing model for a variety of parameterizations of the production functions using simulated data from the model conjectures which are not analytically tractable can be verified we show that the market portfolio is mean variance efficient in this dynamic context we also show a result that is not available from the static capm theory the efficient frontier shifts up and down over the business cycle