collective action and group heterogeneity voluntary provision versus selective incentives several studies have concluded that heterogeneity within a group facilitates the initiation of collective action however a recent analysis found that heterogeneity can either facilitate or impede collective action depending on factors like the strength of the temptation to free ride reconciling these conclusions is difficult because the earlier studies assumed that public goods are provided voluntarily whereas the later analysis assumed that selective incentives like norms or laws can mandate cooperation i examine the link between group heterogeneity and collective action in three regimes voluntary systems in which actors make unrestricted decisions to participate in collective action compliance systems in which actors create and enforce norms that compel others to participate in public goods production and balanced systems in which actors can create and enforce compliance norms or oppose such norms the analysis reveals a complex link among group heterogeneity collective action and the type of regime by fostering the organization of previously atomized groups and weakening the cohesion of highsolidarity groups heterogeneity in contribution costs and valuation of the public good can reduce social power differentials

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

the ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management abstract the impact of inequality on the ability of human groups to undertake successful collective action is investigated with special reference to overexploitation of common property resources in voluntary provision problems on the one hand inequality has an ambiguous impact on the feasibility of the efficient outcome even though better endowed agents contribute more to collective action in regulated settings on the other hand inequality tends to reduce the acceptability of available regulatory schemes and therefore to make collective action more difficult

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

pricing and green level decisions of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties abstract environmental issues make green manufacturing become inevitable and fuzzy uncertainty prevails in supply chain management in order to further promote the development of green supply chain according to channel leadership scenario we develop three game models of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties of both manufacturing cost and consumer demand we study how prices green levels and expected profits are influenced by channel leadership and governmental interventions green level sensitivity and fuzzy degree of parameters are considered analytical results indicate that manufacturer stackelberg scenario is the inferior structure than other scenarios and retailer stackelberg scenario is superior to other scenarios for all players under the strong governmental interventions then when governmental interventions increase the green level will increase but the tendency of retail price depends on channel leadership governmental interventions are not always beneficial to the green supply chain and the manufacturer further although the government s subsidy is offered to the manufacturer the retailer benefits from it ultimately and further becomes the main puller of the development of green products in addition a relatively high green level floor for subsidy results in the manufacturer s first mover disadvantage

r d policies trade and process innovation we set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each the firms invest in cost reducing r d and each government may grant r d subsidies to the domestic firm we show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher r d subsidies the lower the level of trade costs even if the firms are independent monopolies if firms produce imperfect substitutes policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives international policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome however it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing the optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with r d subsidies to only one of the firms

learning theory and the logic of critical mass the oliver marwell theory of critical mass is a prominent solution to the free rider problem that plagues collective action in large groups i reformulate the theory as a stochastic learning model in which cooperative responses are shaped by the social sanctions and cues generated by the responses of others this relaxes four assumptions in the original formulation that the actors are rational decisions are isolated events outcomes are deterministic and public goods have pure jointness of supply and collective profit computer simulations then show how adaptive actors become trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium and how they escape through attainment of critical mass start up problems arise from accommodation to social costs and not from low returns to early contributors as previously believed simulations also identify a new dilemma of group size and show why solidarity tends to emerge in response to crisis finally normative solidarity appears to be a consequence rather than cause of critical mass but may promote recovery from random deviance

breaking up a research consortium inter firm r d collaborations through contractual arrangements have become increasingly popular but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery we provide a rationale for the breakup date in r d collaboration agreements more specifically we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm a with a firm b b has private information about whether it is committed to the project or a free rider we show that under fairly general conditions a breakup date in the contract is a second best optimal screening device for firm a to screen out free riders with the additional constraint of renegotiation proofness a can only partially screen out free riders entry by some free riders makes sure that a does not have an incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post we also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a breakup date adverse selection moral hazard and project non viability

endogenous r d symmetry in linear duopoly with one way spillovers a duopoly model of cost reducing r d cournot competition is extended to study the endogenous timing of r d strategic investment under the assumption that r d spillovers only flow from the r d leader to the follower sequential and simultaneous play at the r d stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry the only timing structure of the r d stage sustainable as subgame perfect nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and zero spillovers

on stationarity and cointegration of international health expenditure and gdp this paper examines stationarity and cointegration of health expenditure and gdp for a sample of 21 oecd countries using data for the period 1960 1997 by applying a test battery that allows robust inference to be made on the stationarity and cointegration issue trend stationarity and no cointegration are tested using new country by country and panel tests not previously applied in this setting new results for country by country and panel tests of non stationarity and cointegration are presented our unit root and trend stationarity results indicate that both health expenditure and gdp are non stationary the no cointegration and cointegration results indicate that health expenditure and gdp are cointegrated

on the organization of cooperative research and development theory and evidence abstract it has become increasingly prevalent that business firms often rival firms join forces in cooperative r and d to develop new technologies that they can use in their downstream business equity research joint ventures and non equity co development are the two major modes of organization and they differ in how ownership rights over newly developed technologies are assigned this paper addresses the question of when cooperative r and d should be carried out in a research joint venture as opposed to a co development program in a setting of contractual incompleteness the nature of the downstream business of participating firms is shown to determine the organization of cooperative r and d empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical analysis is also presented

networks of collaboration in oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly prior to competing in the market firms have an opportunity to form pair wise collaborative links with other firms these pair wise links involve a commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms we study the incentives of firms to form links and the architecture of the resulting collaboration network we find that incentives to form links are intimately related to the nature of market competition our analysis also suggests that collaborations are used by firms to generate competitive advantage and that strategically stable networks are often asymmetric with some firms having many links while others have few links or are isolated specifically we show that networks with the dominant group architecture stars and inter linked stars are stable we also present some results on the architecture of socially efficient networks

inside the hybrid iron cage political origins of hybridization this paper examines how social movement type political interactions between conflicting parties within an organization influence the adoption of a hybrid practice we argue that a hybrid practice is likely to be adopted when power balance between challengers and incumbents is achieved to shed light on conditions for organizational settlement based on such power balance we focus on three factors structures actors and processes of social movement type political interactions within organizations by studying changes in the presidential selection systems of korean universities between 1988 and 2006 this paper illustrates how organizational settlement resulted in the adoption of a hybrid system by combining elements of two previous competing presidential selection systems appointment and direct voting systems the general implications for the understanding of hybridization organizational settlement and organizational heterogeneity are discussed

the role of information sharing in cooperative research and development abstract this paper develops a model in which r d cooperation enables firms to increase the probability of discovering a new product by sharing information about research strategies and outcomes numerical computations of equilibrium show that cooperation tends to increase in the underlying probability of research success total surplus generally increases as more firms cooperate and cooperation in equilibrium never exceeds that which maximizes total surplus however when the probability of an innovation s success is relatively low no cooperation occurs nor will much be socially desired finally self imposed limits on membership in the cooperative entity tend to reduce total surplus

patent protection with a cooperative r d option patent protection may decrease r d incentives due to the tournament effect in this paper we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative r d option always increases the r d incentive in addition this option dominates imitation to increase the r d incentive under patent protection and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the r d cost

co determination and innovation this paper examines the effect of the german co determination law of 1976 mitbestg on the innovative activity of german firms co determination applies to firms with 2 000 employees or more data from 1971 1976 and 1981 1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to co determined firms before and after the introduction of the law several control variables are applied and in particular in order to avoid a possible bias from specific effects of firm size we compare the co determined firms with others before and after 1976 the results do not support the view that co determination slows down technological progress and reduces innovativity

energy price shocks and productivity growth in us and uk manufacturing because sustained changes in the trend of productivity growth are so very important for people s long run economic welfare the dramatic productivity growth slowdown of the 1970 s and early 1980 s has been the focus of much analysis and discussion for some observers it was much more than coincidence that the oil price shocks of 1973 74 accompanied the sharp slowdowns in traditionally measured productivity growth not only in the united states and the united kingdom but throughout the industrialised world however establishing quantifying and explaining sig nificant linkages between energy price shocks and productivity growth has proved to be most difficult traditional and time honoured relationships involving productivity growth have all seemed incapable of explaining this slowdown for example edward denison author of several widely cited productivity studies has concluded that energy had essentially no role in explaining the productivity growth slowdown and that moreover what happened is to be blunt a mystery 1979 p 4

a theory of the critical mass i interdependence group heterogeneity and the production of collective action collective action usually depends on a critical mass that behaves differently from typical group members sometimes the critical mass provides some level of the good for others who do nothing wh

optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures abstract this paper identifies an overlooked implication of models of research joint ventures initiated by d aspremont and jacquemin 1988 even though the aggregate r d cost of identical firms in a research joint venture would be lowest if they invested equally to reduce subsequent production costs nonetheless members may often enlarge their overall joint profit by making unequal investments such a strategy raises costs in the investment stage but may create more than offsetting benefits in the production stage since industry profits are larger there when the firms are of unequal size when the consideration leading to asymmetry prevails we find that in contrast to previous work a research joint venture can raise welfare even when there are no spillovers

optimal abatement technology adoption based upon learning by doing with spillover effect abstract we specify a general model of the dynamic abatement technology adoption process and show how the accumulated experience among them can alter the adoption timing learning by doing lbd effect is considered to describe the reduction of the costly price to the adoption moreover spillovers effect which reflects how accumulated experience can be shared among different technologies is integrated into the learning process to ensure the specification convincing some reasonable assumptions are considered such as one abatement technology must conduct its own experience in order to realize the spillover besides to investigate how the abatement process is influenced by the technology allocation under the spillovers effect an endogenous emission path is considered to necessitate a meaningful optimization problem finally apart from obtaining some basic properties of the model we implement an empirical study to verify the effectiveness of the model data from the iron industry in china is used to specify the process which can highlight the spillovers effect among different technologies from a sector angle in the results we find that intrinsic mechanism in the model results in the interplay among abatement coefficient spillover factor and the growing rate of the emission etc collaborative relationships between variables are discussed as well

dynamic r d with spillovers competition vs cooperation abstract we investigate dynamic r d for process innovation in a cournot duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost reducing r d investments by comparing the profit and welfare performances of the two settings in steady state we show that private and social incentives towards r d cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity we also evaluate the whole history of the dynamic system along the transition to the steady state showing that the conflict between private and social incentives does not necessarily emerge

credible signals of the release of new versions i introduction many products are marketed some time after they have been developed for instance a new smartphone may be developed and tested well before it is available for purchase a new car might be prototyped and driven months before it comes to the market indeed a firm will often have several products concurrently in a development pipeline consumers may know a product is in that pipeline without knowing its progress towards the market because the outcome of such development and testing is not visible to outsiders the firm knows whether it can market a product before consumers do consumers are uninformed about when and if the new product will be marketed to them economists have long recognized that the present demand for durable goods depends on future prospects such as the future price or the introduction of an improved version 1 the existence of such an improved version is often the seller s private information if consumers anticipate a new version some will defer purchases until the new version is available and the seller will face low demand for the present version disclosing the new version is not in a monopoly seller s interest a seller whose good does not have a new version would also like to communicate that fact to consumers while a firm with a successful product innovation can credibly disclose the new version with relative ease a firm that has failed to develop a new product could have great difficulty convincing consumers that the product has no new version in such situations it is important to examine whether prices can inform consumers whether a new version will be marketed in the near future in a recent paper choi et al 2010 developed a model with a risky product development process in which reputation effects allow cheap talk announcements to signal successful product development to consumers an announcement induces consumers to delay or divert purchases to the announcer s coming product which increases the announcer s profit and can improve welfare 2 in their model the announcer and her non innovative rivals supply the original good competitively because of this an announcement does not reduce profit on the current version this paper will focus on markets where the seller has substantial market power before innovating so announcing a successful product development has a cost in terms of current revenue further because we attend to prices as signals this model may also apply to markets where a long run relationship between consumers and firms may not be sustainable another objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure a government policy mandating disclosure of any new version is an alternative means of informing consumers 3 as long as firms are not willing to lie to the government such a policy would credibly communicate whether a new version of a durable is coming mandatory disclosure would bring about full information as consumers are informed about any improved future version before observing the price of the current version in this paper we explore a two period model of a durable good monopoly in which consumers are initially uninformed about whether there will be a new version of the current good the monopoly seller is privately informed if he will be able to market an improved version in the second period in the first period consumers must decide whether to purchase the good now or wait for an upgraded version they may be able to infer from the price of the current version whether the seller will bring a new version to the market it is important to see first whether prices can serve as signals and second how welfare compares between any signaling outcome and a full information benchmark corresponding to mandatory disclosure we will show that there is a unique equilibrium supported by intuitive beliefs in this equilibrium the seller s private information about an improved version is completely revealed to consumers

cooperative and noncooperative r d in experimental duopoly markets abstract we analyze the relation between technological spillovers and r d cooperation in a duopoly experiment based on the well known model of d aspremont and jacquemin for scenarios without and with full spillovers two noncooperative treatments are run one without and one with non binding communication possibilities and one cooperative treatment with binding contract possibilities we find that without technological spillovers binding r d contracts are needed for r d decisions to deviate from the subgame perfect nash r d level towards the cooperative level with full spillovers the possibility of non binding cheap talk may suffice to move closer to r d cooperation

r d cooperation in smes the direct effect and the moderating role of human capital abstractwe analyse the determinants of r d cooperation for smes in italy we introduce in the literature human capital as one of the main determinants of r d cooperation concentrating on its moder

inequality and inefficiency in joint projects a group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable the output is divided according to some given vector of shares a share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs when the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable and all other vectors can be improved via lorenz domination for higher elasticities of substitution perfect equality is no longer unimprovable our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

research joint ventures and optimal r d policy with asymmetric information abstract when to allow research joint ventures rjvs or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal r d policy the regulator however is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate r d optimally the extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry in a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second best r d policy where the government can either allow rjvs or not and give lump sum subsidies to the parties involved the second best r d policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving rjvs or allow some welfare reducing ones with lump sum subsidies the second best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing rjvs or blocking welfare increasing ones

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers comment claude d aspremont and alexis jacquemin 1988 employ a simple yet elegant symmetric duopoly model of r d and spillovers to compare several equilibrium concepts these concepts include 1 the two stage noncooperative solution 2 the two stage mixed game 3 the two stage fully cooperative solution 2 and 4 the social planner s optimum 3 for each of the cases stated above they computed the equilibrium levels of output q q1 q2 and r d xl x2 x and the required second order conditions they report i for large spillovers i e b 0 5 x x x and q q q q and ii for small spillovers i e 3 x 2x x and q q q q where x denotes a firm s r d level q denotes total industry output denotes the social optimum denotes the fully cooperative model the noncooperative two stage case and the mixed game 3 is the spillover parameter here we show that comparing the pure cooperative and the pure noncooperative solutions as defined by d aspremont and jacquemin is only meaningful when the noncooperative solution is stable that is when spillovers are not too small we find that for very small spillovers in our example this occurs when 3 0 17 the d aspremont jacquemin observation holds because the noncooperative model is unstable the importance of this result rests on the fact that even though the output reaction functions cross correctly when 3 0 17 the r d reaction functions do not when 0 17 0 41 stability obtains but r d levels are higher in the noncooperative case than the fully cooperative one for large spillovers the d aspremont jacquemin result is confirmed moreover we find that the introduction of spillovers in the case of the noncooperative model tends to promote stability in the case of the cooperative model however as the level of spillovers is increased an equilibrium ceases to exist

inter firm cooperation with imperfectly appropriable research abstract inter firm collaboration in pre competitive research is not always beneficial rather its effectiveness in raising social benefits relative to a non cooperative setup depends on both the nature of the agreement and the technological and market conditions of the industry in question joint ventures that simply allow members to coordinate their actions in pre competitive research can restore firm incentives for both pre competitive research and development in the presence of high knowledge spillovers and poor opportunities for innovation joint ventures which additionally improve the dissemination of information among member firms raise social benefits whenever the opportunities for innovation are not exceptionally good even in the presence of relatively insignificant spillovers

the impact of classes of innovators on technology financial fragility and economic growth in this article we study innovation processes and technological change in an agent based model by including a behavioral switching among heterogeneous innovative firms the model is able to replicate via simulations well known industrial dynamic and growth type stylized facts the main original element of the model is that firms are allowed to endogenously change among three different classes namely single innovators collaborative innovators and imitators moreover our analysis focuses on the impact of these three innovation categories on micro meso and macro aggregates we find that collaborative companies are those having the highest positive impact on the economic system furthermore we have paid particular attention to the role of credit market in promoting smart growth for this purpose we analyze the role of banks as sources of external funds for innovative entrepreneurs our results suggest a trade off between short term profit maximization and long term efficiency which prevents banks to foster investment in r d and technological progress the model is then used to study the effect that different innovation policies have on macroeconomic performance

modelling imperfectly appropriable r d via spillovers abstract we provide an extensive comparison of the well known r d models of d aspremont jacquemin and kamien muller zang exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and policy prescriptions using a mix of formal and or intuitive criteria we argue that the first model is of questionable validity for large spillover values the latter being characterized by jointly increasing returns to scale in the r d process an argument leading to equivalence between the two r d processes but not to agreement on some key conclusions is exposited in conclusion the models emerge as fundamentally different although a unilateral shift in the cost function of the first leads to agreement in all equilibrium outcomes

endogenous r d and foreign direct investment in international oligopolies abstract this paper examines the impact of the firms mode of foreign expansion on the incentive to innovate as well as the effects of r d activities and technological spillovers on the firms international strategy we consider a two country imperfect competition model where the firms face three different type of decisions how to expand abroad how much to spend on r d and how much to sell in each market market structure is endogenously determined as the equilibrium solution of a three stage game it is shown that the firm that invests more in research is the one which is a mne while the rival is an exporter the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between multinational expansion and r d investment and that in turn investment in research increases the likelihood of multinational expansion the value of the spillover parameter can also be an important determinant of firms international strategy

learning to cooperate stochastic and tacit collusion in social exchange the prisoner s dilemma formalizes the social trap that arises when individually rational choices aggregate with mutually undesirable consequences the game theoretic solution centers on the opportunity for tacit collusion in repeated play however not all actors grasp the strategic implications of future interaction accordingly this study reformulates the game as a stochastic learning model in which the behavior of interdependent actors is constinually shaped by sanctions and cues generated by their interaction computer simulations of a two person game show that adaptive actors are led into a social trap more readily than are fully rational actors but they are also better at finding their way out prosocial norms appear to be a consequence rather than cause of cooperation but useful in promoting forgiveness of random deviance the model is then elaborated as an n way prisoner s dilemma simulations show how the effects of network size density mobility and anonymity derive from a fundamental princi

equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper analyzes a simple oligopoly model with information spillovers firms spend on r d to affect their costs of production the main finding is that depending on the magnitude of the spillover the market may not provide enough incentives for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place it is shown that the equilibrium size of a research joint venture is usually less than the optimum size which requires all firms to participate in the research joint venture the policy implications of this result are that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high technology industries to form industry wide cooperative agreements copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

persistence of innovation in dutch manufacturing is it spurious this paper studies the persistence of innovation and the dynamics of innovation output in dutch manufacturing using firm data from three waves of the community innovation surveys cis pertaining to the periods 1994 1996 1996 1998 and 1998 2000 we estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data type 2 tobit model accounting for individual effects and handling the initial conditions problem we find that there is no evidence of true persistence in achieving technological product or process innovations while past shares of innovative sales condition albeit to a small extent current shares of innovative sales

the degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective r d abstract the amount of cost reduction or effective r d that results in a symmetric sequential nash equilibrium with quadratic payoffs and differentiated goods is shown to increase with spillovers in oligopolies with a few rivals and to achieve a maximum for spillovers that are not perfect in industries with many firms similar tendencies apply for consumer surplus profits and static welfare more rivals typically lead to reduced investments output and profitability while consumer surplus and welfare increase or at least do not decrease limited entry in markets with a few rivals may enhance innovative investments profitability and consumer surplus if only product differentiation and spillovers are sufficiently high and r d costs sufficiently low too many rivals will then again lead to reductions and a decrease in static welfare

chains of cooperation threshold effects in collective action granovetter s threshold model of collective action shows how each new participant triggers others until the chain reaction reaches a gap in the distribution of thresholds hence outcomes depend on the network of social ties that channel the chain reactions however structural analysis is encumbered by the assumption that thresholds derive from changing marginal returns on investments in public goods a learning theoretic specification imposes less stringent assumptions about the rationality of the actors and is much better suited to a structural analysis computer simulations suggest that threshold effects may be the key to solving the coordination problem when individual choices are contingent on participation by others this interdependence facilitates the coordination of contributions needed to shift the bistable system from a noncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative one further simulations with low density networks show that these chain reactions require bridges that link socially distant actors supporting granovetter s case for the strength of weak ties

collective action and network structure i develop and analyze a mathematical model describing the relationship between individual contributions to a collective good and the network of social relations that makes these contributions interdependent starting from the assumption that actors respond to the contributions of others because of efficacy concerns and norms offairness i derive predictions about the impact of network structure on total contributions network density and size influence collective action outcomes in dramatically different ways depending on the structural position of those who make unconditional contributions moreover these effects are highly nonlinear suggesting that the impact of social ties on collective action may be quite sensitive to mobilization contexts

designing input prices to motivate process innovation abstract we examine the optimal design of regulated input prices accounting explicitly for their impact on incentives for process innovation optimal input prices are shown to vary both with the prevailing vertical industry structure and with the nature of downstream competition the optimal input pricing rule tends to provide stronger incentives for innovation under vertical integration than under vertical separation in the presence of downstream cournot competition the stronger incentives tend to be implemented under vertical separation in the presence of downstream bertrand competition

heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy we develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market we assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights we find that in a non cooperative equilibrium governments resist ipr protection but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection we show that in general countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective ipr protection than those with less efficient firms given the aggregate level of ipr protection it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker ipr protection les auteurs developpent un modele dans lequel coexistent une entreprise innovatrice du nord et des entreprises heterogenes du sud qui se concurrencent dans un marche de produit final on postule que les entreprises du sud different dans leur capacitea adopter la technologie et on etudie les differentes incitations au sud a proteger les droits de propriete intellectuelle dpi il appert que dans un equilibre sans cooperation les gouvernements resistent a la pression pour qu on protege les dpi mais que collectivement ils beneficient de cette protection on montre qu en general les pays dont les entreprises sont les plus efficaces supportent une protection collective des dpi plus robuste que ne le font les pays dont les entreprises sont moins efficaces le niveau general de protection des dpi etant donne c est plus effectif si les pays les plus efficaces ont des niveaux de protection des dpi plus faibles

the paradox of group size in collective action a theory of the critical mass ii many sociologists incorrectly believe that larger groups are less likely to support collective action than smaller ones the effect of group size infact depends on costs if the costs of collective goods rise with the number who share in them larger groups act less frequently than smaller ones if the costs vary little with group size larger groups should exhibit more collective action than smaller ones because larger groups have more resources and are more likely to have a critical mass of highly interested and resourceful actors the positive effects of group size increase with group heterogeneity and nonrandom social ties paradoxically when groups are hetero geneous fewer contributors may be needed to provide a good to larger groups making collective action less complex and less expensive

collective action and the group size paradox according to the olson paradox larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests we address the issue in a model with three distinctive features explicit intergroup interaction collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics and nonlinear lobbying costs the interplay of these features leads to new results when the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function or higher larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize with smaller elasticities a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the olson argument and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function we also demonstrate that these results are true irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria

innovative strategic groups in multinational industries abstract differences in innovative strategies between groups of domestic and multinational enterprises are analyzed within a two stage game model that incorporates the asymmetries in transaction costs between the two species of enterprises nash and cooperative behaviour is shown to result in different equilibrium r d strategies with the multinational companies doing typically more r d for larger markets and domestic companies focusing on specific market segments survey data from companies operating in eleven high tech multinational industries in belgium provide support for these strategic differences and show how they are related to company performance

r d cooperation or competition abstract the economic literature provides empirical evidence of the existence of technological cartels such as research joint ventures or deliberate sharing of technological knowledge our aim is to answer to the questions i is the creation of technological cartels beneficial from a social welfare point of view and ii do the firms have private incentives to form such cartels we depart from the approach adopted in the literature by considering a dynamic model and allowing for the possibility that the firms are asymmetric the results show the importance of the degree of existing technological spillovers and stress the differences between the symmetric and asymmetric cases

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

social networks and collective action a theory of the critical mass iii most analyses of collective action agree that overcoming the freerider problem requires organizing potential contributors thus making their decisions interdependent the potential for organizing depends on the social ties in the group particularly on the overall density or frequency of ties on the extent to which they are centralized in a few individuals and on the costs of communicating and coordinating actions through these ties mathematical analysis and computer simulations extend a formal microsocial theory of interdependent collective action to treat social networks and organization costs as expected the overall density of social ties in a group improves its prospects for collective action more significant because less expected are the findings that show that the centralization of network ties always has a positive effect on collective action and that the negative effect of costs on collective action declines as the group s resource or interest heterogeneity increases these nonobvious resu

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

european market integration through technology driven m as merger and acquisitions m as have been an important tool for reorganizing the european market since the establishment of european economic and monetary union this article suggests that european integration helped and encouraged european firms to source technology across national borders in europe establishing european innovative firms the figures confirm that once barriers impeding the free movement of capital goods and labour had fallen european firms used m as intensively to enter foreign european markets enhancing technology competencies is found to be one of the main motives for cross border acquisitions in the 1990s but is not a factor in domestic acquisitions over the same period

collusion and dynamic under investment in quality in a dynamic game of investment in product quality i investigate whether collusive underinvestment equilibria can be supported by the threat of escalation in investment outlays when there are no spillovers underinvestment equilibria exist even though by deviating a firm can gain a persistent strategic advantage when there are strong spillovers underinvestment equilibria fail to exist a weakening of patent protection can thus lead to more investment in equilibrium a nonfragmentation result is shown to hold in all free entry equilibria industry concentration is bounded away from zero no matter how large the market and despite the existence of underinvestment equilibria

cooperation in r d the case of patent infringement agreements abstract this paper provides an insurance based argument behind patent infringement agreements pia such agreements constitute a form of cooperation in an otherwise non cooperative environment we develop a model where firms initially hold certain patents and undertake further r d by pursuing the latter they face a positive probability of infringing the patents held by the other a prior infringement agreement generates a binding contract so that such infringements would go unpunished if the infringing probability is not too low firms would have incentive to sign an agreement and sacrifice the monopoly option but this depends on the information structure about the patent infringement and search costs such a prior agreement is then compared and contrasted with a suitably designed ex post contract

r d cooperation and product market competition abstract i derive equilibria that is self enforcing agreements for firms that cooperate in improving their product and compete in marketing it i am particularly interested in the interaction between rd ii product improvement is a function of the effort by each firm iii firms cannot observe each other s effort iv firms market the product by simultaneously setting prices the analysis reveals some surprising results i find that in some cases although monopoly prices can be sustained in equilibrium optimal equilibria call for firms to set lower than monopoly prices in the short run thus providing the right incentives for investment in r d under a different set of assumptions i find that it is optimal to reduce r d effort below the efficient level as a means to sustain short run collusion in prices even though efficient r d effort could be achieved in equilibrium

cooperative r d between vertically related firms with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of cooperative r d in two vertically related duopolies which are two final good manufacturers and two input suppliers with horizontal and vertical spillovers vertical r d cartels yield a larger social welfare than non cooperative r d and if the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is not sufficiently high than horizontal r d cartels technological improvement is accelerated by forming vertical research joint ventures rjvs whether or not their member firms r d decisions are coordinated vertical rjv cartels yield the largest social welfare when the vertically related firms can coordinate their r d decisions and or share useful knowledge fully

optimal r d levels when firm j benefits from firm i s inventive activity abstract we amend the static model of industry structure in dasgupta and stiglitz to include external benefits from a firm s r d now the market can be seen to underinvest in r d relative to the social optimum the work of mansfield suggests that such external benefits are pervasive

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

the oil price shocks and the unit root hypothesis the uk experience critics of the standard dickey fuller and augmented dickey fuller tests for unit roots argue that when there have been significant structural breaks during the sample period these tests are often biased toward acceptance allowing for a one time change in the slope of the trend function often leads to rejection of the unit root hypothesis which implies that business cycles are temporary fluctuations around a stable but possibly shifting trend path the validity of the unit root hypothesis in connection with the two oil crises in the seventies is re examined using quarterly time series data for a set of uk macroeconomic series the empirical evidence presented supports the view that only those shocks associated with the oil price crises had a persistent effect on the uk economy

when does one bad apple spoil the barrel an evolutionary analysis of collective action this paper studies collective action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork a leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players quantal response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails a full characterization of long run play reveals the determinants of success these include the correlation between players costs of provision and their valuations for the good the addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers erratum in our article published in this review volume 78 no 5 december 1988 pp 1133 37 we have shown that in the presence of sufficient spillovers of the r d benefits duopolists cooperating in r d but not in the output spend more on r d than noncooperating firms at both stages and also produce more output closest to the socially optimal level a second symmetric result is that for small spillovers duopolists cooperating neither in r d nor in output spend more on r d and produce more output than cooperative firms however this result has been obscured by an obvious inequality inversion and other typos implying a modification in the conclusions indeed in fn 13 on p 1135 one should have that x x iff

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

uncertainty spillovers and cooperative r d abstract this paper extends the literature on cooperative r d in an oligopoly with spillovers the model has three new features it introduces uncertainty focuses on spillover of innovation instead of effort spillover and offers a new definition of the research joint venture rjv the rjv is an arrangement to coordinate r d efforts and also to share the innovation firms form an rjv only if the innovation raises flow industry profit but independently of the speed of spillovers and the degree of uncertainty the model is robust when we allow for licensing the single lab endogenous spillovers and r d effort spillovers