how does government ownership affect firm performance a simple model of privatization in transition economies abstract we present a game theoretical model of privatization in transition economies we consider the costs and benefits of government ownership and derive the net effect of government ownership on firm performance model predictions are consistent with empirical evidence in the literature

privatisation around the world evidence from panel data this paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977 99 period the empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries endowed with deep and liquid stock markets and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints but the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries where shareholders are poorly protected banks powerful and capital markets less developed

privatization in eastern germany management selection and economic transition this paper suggests that management s role in enterprise restructuring and market failures in the managerial labor market help explain important features of the german privatization program a model of adverse selection based on information advantages for private owners demonstrates how privatization can improve the quality and number of western managers in eastern enterprises these benefits can increase with the size of the transition evidence of management replacement and significant differences between state owned and privatized firms from a survey of eastern german firms supports model assumptions and predictions these results suggest the importance of management replacement to successful privatization copyright 1997 by american economic association

core equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies we consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information for such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of walrasian equilibrium core equivalence and the blocking size of coalitions moreover we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante pareto core and walrasian allocations

privatisation in developing countries a review of the evidence and the policy lessons privatisation is widely promoted as a means of improving economic performance in developing countries however the policy remains controversial and the relative roles of ownership and other structural changes such as competition and regulation in promoting economic performance remain uncertain this article reviews the main empirical evidence on the impact of privatisation on economic performance in developing economies the evidence suggests that if privatisation is to improve performance over the longer term it needs to be complemented by policies that promote competition and effective state regulation and that privatisation works best in developing countries when it is integrated into a broader process of structural reform

trade policy and mixed enterprises this paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments in the case of rivalry in the home market the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive for the case of cournot rivalry in a third market the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership while in the case of bertrand rivalry with differentiated products the optimal export tax increases

jumping the curse early contracting with private information in university admissions this article introduces a new model of early contracting employers who have private information about the applicant s ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs to avoid this winner s curse employers anticipate the time of contracting the model is developed in the context of university admissions and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that market we show that in contrast to received wisdom allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting

tax smoothing and the cross country pattern of privatization summary privatization generally enhances firm level efficiency the impact of privatization on fiscal efficiency has however been overlooked using the tax smoothing ideas articulated by r barro 1979 on the determination of the public debt journal of political economy 87 940 971 and by h bohn 1990 tax smoothing with financial instruments american economic review 80 1217 1230 we argue that privatization may have an important impact on the welfare losses associated with tax collection this impact can either enhance or erode the efficiency of taxation we hypothesize that countries that benefit in terms of fiscal efficiency will privatize aggressively while countries that enjoy fiscal benefits as a result of state ownership will show little interest in privatization statistical tests are conducted that provide considerable support for the hypothesis

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

dynamic entry and exit with uncertain cost positions abstract we study the dynamics of entry and exit based on firms learning about their relative cost positions each firm s marginal cost of production is its own private information thereby facing ex ante uncertainty about its cost position the inelastic market demand can accommodate only a fraction of firms to operate and thus only firms with relatively lower costs are viable in the long run some firms in the market will exit if excessive entry or overshooting occurs we derive the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium the equilibrium properties are consistent with empirical observations i entry occurs gradually over time with lower cost firms entering earlier than higher cost firms ii exiting firms are among the ones that entered later indeed in the last period moreover equilibrium overshooting probability is shown to always be positive and decreasing over time

privatization and globalization an empirical analysis abstract this paper examines the link between globalization measured by foreign direct investment fdi and foreign portfolio investment fpi and privatization of state owned enterprises in a multi country sample that focuses on developing countries we hypothesize that privatization has an effect on fdi fpi as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors similarly we expect fdi fpi to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows technology and managerial skills that accompany fdi fpi make the environment more prone to competition providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around this relation is assessed in two ways first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach and second through panel causality tests we find a bi directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization particularly in the case of fdi

investment dynamics with common and private values abstract we study a dynamic investment game with two dimensional signals where each firm observes its continuously distributed idiosyncratic cost of investment and a discrete signal correlated with common investment returns we demonstrate that the one step property holds and provide an equilibrium existence characterization result reversals are possible where a large number of firms investing in a given round becomes bad news about investment returns welfare is compared to static and rigid timing benchmarks and computed for large economies

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

tunneling or not the change of legal environment on the effect of post privatization performance motivated by hoff and stiglitz s am econ rev 94 3 753 763 2004 theory we examine empirically how the creation of rules of the game affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy using a sample of chinese state owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006 we find that the post privatization performance ppp of firms depends on institutional factors before 2003 we observe severe post privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse ppp however from 2003 when the state issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined and ppp improved we find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement

how the market solves an assignment problem the matching of lawyers with legal claims in the market for lawyers observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claims there is a scale of resources effect under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality in a law firm the institution of tenure performs a sorting function lawyers found to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leave the value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover

unravelling of dynamic sorting we consider a two sided finite horizon search and matching model with heterogeneous types and complementarity between types the quality of the pool of potential partners deteriorates as agents who have found mutually agreeable matches exit the market when search is costless and all agents participate in each matching round the market performs a sorting function in that high types of agents have multiple chances to match with their peers however this sorting function is lost if agents incur an arbitrarily small cost in order to participate in each round with a sufficiently rich type space the market unravels as almost all agents rush to participate in the first round and match and exit with anyone they meet copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

on entry exit and coordination with mixed strategies abstract a dynamic entry and exit game is studied where following dixit and shapiro 1986 the economics of strategic planning lexington books pp 63 79 firms play symmetric mixed strategies coordination among entrants improves and creates a tendency for the value of incumbency to increase as the number of incumbent firms increases up to the point of excess capacity this feature implies that when considering mixed strategies the relevant payoffs are not monotonic as the probability of entry increases expected profit for a given firm conditional on entry increases over some initial range it is shown that the payoffs have an interesting dynamic structure which allows the complete characterization of the equilibrium

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

disclosure of information in matching markets with non transferable utility we present a model of two sided matching where utility is non transferable and information about individuals skills is private utilities are strictly increasing in the partner s skill and satisfy increasing differences skills can be either revealed or kept hidden but while agents on one side have verifiable skills agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified and certification is costly agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market while others are matched randomly we find that in equilibrium only agents with skills above a cutoff reveal and then they match assortatively we show that an equilibrium always exists and we discuss multiplicity increasing differences play an important role to shape equilibria and we remark that this is unusual in matching models with non transferable utility we close the paper with some comparative statics exercises where we show the existence of non trivial externalities and welfare implications

equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders abstract the number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction in a symmetric model with risk neutral bidders holding independent information we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first price and second price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals five auctions are revenue equivalent first price and second price auctions each with the number of bidders known or uncertain and english auctions

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

first versus second mover advantage with information asymmetry about the profitability of new markets is it better to move first or second to innovate or to imitate we show that if one player s information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first mover advantage on the other hand more extreme information superiority can reverse this leading to a second mover advantage knowing more surely what is the best choice the better informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less informed player wants to delay to learn because of this more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive in fact in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

testing the limits of privatization argentine railroads abstract just how far can privatization be pushed and with what consequences based on a study of argentine railroads this paper concludes that even large unprofitable firms in developing countries faced with market failures can be privatized but the gains from doing so depend on how badly the state enterprise was performing to begin with and the potential for introducing competition in the market and for the market the broader lesson is that when both market failures and government failures are present a public private solution is preferable to a purely private or a purely public solution privatization is not a panacea but potentially a palliative when it comes to reducing subsidies or coping with regulatory failures

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

the role of policy in energy transitions lessons from the energy liberalisation era the aim of this paper is to discuss the period of energy privatisation and liberalisation which began in the 1980s within its wider historical context the key issues are what has been learned from this recent period and how significant is it in the light of an energy transition to low carbon energy system by 2050 energy liberalisation has led to positive and globally widespread but modest efficiency gains but a lack of clearly visible direct benefits to households in many countries it has significantly improved the governance of monopoly utilities via independent regulators the prospects for competition and innovation and the quality of policy instruments for environmental emissions control through the emergence of trading mechanisms we conclude that it is not liberalisation per se that will determine the movement towards a low carbon energy transition but the willingness of societies to bear the cost which will be significant no matter what the extent of liberalisation

government ownership and corporate governance evidence from the eu the ongoing global financial crisis has led to the largest increase in state intervention since the great depression direct government ownership in publicly traded corporations has increased dramatically since 2008 how will this increase in public ownership affect the governance of these erstwhile private companies we examine the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a sample of firms from the european union a region that is relatively familiar with active government participation our main finding is that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality we further show that while government intervention is negatively related to governance quality in civil law countries it is positively related to governance quality in common law countries finally we find that the preferential voting rights of golden shares are especially damaging to governance quality

decentralization duplication and delay we argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low cost solutions these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both consequently decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important we also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

strategic delay in bargaining with two sided uncertainty the role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite horizon alternating offer model of bargaining a buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly an equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer a bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and hence makes concessions earlier on trade occurs whever gains from trade exist but due to the private information only after costly delay panmunjom korea upi the american general and the north korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut maj gen james b knapp negotiator for the united nations command unc was waiting for maj gen ri choonsun of the democratic people s republic of north korea to propose a recess they sat there arms folded for 42 hours not a word finally gen ri got up walked out and drove away evening bulletin philadelphia 11 april 1969

lessons from privatization in britain abstract the process of privatizing most of britain s major public enterprises yields interesting conclusions on the three related issues 1 a problem of policy assignment arose in the use of privatization and liberalization to achieve both allocative and productive efficiency 2 evidence on the behavior of the public enterprises is consistent with an organizational model of the relevant principal agent relationships predicting certain types of slack absorption 3 the privatization process entailed policy choices that bear on their future productive efficiency effectiveness of monitoring by the market for corporate control and allocative efficiency provision for regulation

new data base on state owned enterprises privatization of state owned assets was a central economic reform of the 1980s and 1990s lack of data has made it impossible to judge the extent to which privatization has diminished the importance of state ownership in the economy or changed the performance of state owned enterprises this article introduces a new data base on state owned enterprises the first since the mid 1980s which partly fills this information gap the bureaucrats in business data base provides time series data for up to eighty eight countries on the share of state enterprises in the overall economy investment employment and internal and external credit as well as their overall surplus or deficit and the size of transfers to and from national treasuries the article presents the rationale for the data base describes its seven measures of state enterprise size and performance and explores possible uses of the information

tradable and nontradable directed technical change abstractwe wish to reconcile the major trends in wages and the terms of trade using a directed technical change approach in which i tradable and nontradable goods can be substitutes or complemen

unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market gastroenterology with and without a centralized match the entry level market for american gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996 before and since it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment we find that both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used gastroenterologists are less mobile and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents than when the clearinghouse was in use this suggests that the clearinghouse not only coordinates the timing of appointments but also increases the scope of the market compared to a decentralized market with early appointments

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

the benefits of privatization evidence from mexico critics of privatization often argue that its benefits come at a high cost to society the authors test the validity of this criticism for mexico s privatization program one of the world s largest case by case programs assessing the performance of newly privatized firms in such areas as profitability and efficiency they find that these firms quickly close the gap with their peers in the private sector their findings suggest that the firms profit gains come from productivity gains 52 percent layoffs 33 percent and higher prices 15 percent

ownership changes and access to external financing this paper examines access to external financing in the privatization context and provides new evidence on the effects of financing constraints on performance and investment ownership reforms increase firms reliance on external financing empirically performance and investment changes around ownership reforms are increasing in country level measures of access to credit the presence of a severe prior public financing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization privatized enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries all else given our analyses rely on new international sector and firm level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes

to grab for the market or to bide one s time a dynamic model of entry we consider a simultaneous move dynamic entry game the fixed cost of entry is private information entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry we consider general continuous distributions for the fixed cost and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies comparative statics results are derived as the time between rounds approaches zero all of the action occurs during an arbitrarily small amount of time for the bertrand model we extend the analysis to allow for n firms

employment and wage effects of privatisation evidence from hungary romania russia and ukraine we use longitudinal methods and universal panel data on 30 000 initially state owned manufacturing firms in four transition economies to estimate the impacts of privatization on employment and wages the results in all four countries consistently reject job losses and they never imply large wage cuts from privatization to either foreign or domestic owners the domestic privatization estimates are close to zero for employment while for wages they are negative but small in magnitude estimated foreign privatization effects are nearly always positive and sometimes large for both outcome variables we find that the negligible consequences of domestic privatization result from effects on scale productivity and costs that are large but offsetting in hungary and romania and from small effects of all types in russia and ukraine the positive employment outcome of foreign ownership results from a substantial scaleexpansion effect that dominates the productivity improvement effect and the positive wage outcome from productivity improvement dominating the cost reduction effect

self fulfilling early contracting rush in markets for entry level professionals the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts the rush to early contracting can be self fulfilling as both its effect on expectations about demand supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand supply balance can be nonmonotone matching markets with more risk averse participants a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self fulfilling early contracting rushes employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes

a re examination of china s share issue privatization abstract previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization sip in most other countries have improved firm profitability china s sip of the 1990s had no such effect we argue that the main reason for the failure of china s sip is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time we examine china s sip in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved using a matching sample method we find that sip firms continued to experience negative post sip profitability changes in our sample period however their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non sip soes we also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance our results reconcile the findings of the sip effect in china with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

ownership concentration in privatized firms the role of disclosure standards auditor choice and auditing infrastructure we rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration since the expropriation of corporate resources by insiders hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden after controlling for other country level and firm level determinants we find weak no evidence that extensive disclosure standards auditor choice reduce ownership concentration in contrast we provide strong robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors consistent with ball s 2001 predictions collectively our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a big five auditor and better disclosure standards

informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies abstract in this paper we show that in quasilinear economies the incentive compatible coarse core is non empty if agents are informationally small in the sense of mclean and postlewaite 2002 and the strict core in each state is non empty

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

unraveling over time abstract unraveling the excessively early matching of future workers to employers leads to hiring decisions based on severely incomplete information we provide a model of unraveling in a one to one matching market without transfers its distinguishing feature is the gradual arrival of information about students that occurs over an extended period of time during which matches can be made in equilibrium the market spreads thinly over that period and employers attractiveness to students is uncorrelated with their worker s productivity our model connects previous seemingly unrelated models of unraveling and it highlights the implications of the two period assumption on which they rely our setting permits the analysis of information timing policies these are effective only if they provide a sudden and sufficiently large surge in information our main application is in the market for clerks to u s federal appellate courts a significant input into the efficiency of the justice system

the financial and operating performance of privatized firms during the 1990s this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 industrialized countries that were privatized through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996 we document significant increases in profitability output operating efficiency and dividend payments and significant decreases in leverage ratios for our full sample of firms after privatization and for most subsamples examined capital expenditures increase significantly in absolute terms but not relative to sales employment declines but insignificantly combined with results from two previous directly comparable studies these findings strongly suggest that privatization yields significant performance improvements during the past two decades the privatization of state owned enterprises has moved from being a radical almost desperate policy initiative of the thatcher government in britain to being an accepted economic policy for governments of all ideological stripes according to gibbon 1998 860 billion has been raised by governments worldwide through privatizations with the bulk of this total coming since 1987 and at least one commentator roche 1996 predicts that no less than 6 trillion will be raised through privatizations over the next two decades in 1997 alone sales of public enterprises totaled a record 161 billion worldwide with more than 110 billion of the total coming during the second half of the year and 1998 s total of almost 140 billion indicates that the pace shows no sign of slackening as we approach a new millennium

economic perspectives on privatization despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently in the 1980s however programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries dramatic though some of these policies have been they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies the opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions how does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance what is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits what are the distributional and political implications of privatization finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries britain chile and poland

objectives and incentives evidence from the privatisation of great britain s power plants abstract does privatization increase plant productivity because the private owner s objective is different or because they are better able to control management and is privatization sufficient to improve productivity or is it only effective in combination with competition we answer these questions using the quasi experiment of great britain s electricity industry privatization to separate the effect of a change in objectives from a change in incentives we assume that the former only affects labor but not fuel productivity and assuming that effective competition was only introduced after privatization we are able to separately identify the effects of privatization and competition we find that privatization increased labor but not fuel productivity evidence for the importance of objectives there is no evidence that the introduction of effective competition after privatization increased labor or fuel productivity evidence that privatization increases productivity by itself

the performance of privatised enterprises in developing countries abstract privatisation has been advocated as the predominant way to solve the problems facing ailing public enterprises in developing countries despite this the policy remains controversial the available empirical evidence on the operational and financial performance of enterprises after privatisation has often painted a rosy picture this paper reassesses the situation using a larger sample of enterprises and a comparative perspective between privatised utilities non utilities and private enterprises that have never been state owned the results of our analysis point to there being differences in the performance across the three groups of enterprises and in particular to a deterioration in performance among privatised utilities this suggests that the earlier optimism over the efficacy of privatisation may have been premature

the collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse and why such failures are rare the collapse of the clearinghouse for the entry level gastroenterology labor market offers a unique opportunity to study the failures that sometimes afflict such markets to explore the reasons for the failure of the clearinghouse we conduct an experimental investigation of demand shocks of the kind that occurred in the gastroenterology market we find that a reduction in demand for positions leads to the collapse of the match only when it is detectable by firms before being detected by workers as in the unexpected shock that took place in 1996 which could be seen by firms in their reduced applicant pools simple demand and supply imbalances do not seem to interfere with the operation of the centralized match our results suggest that the market failed when applicants lost their ability to discern when they should reject an early exploding offer this suggests that the failure of the gastroenterology clearinghouse is related to the unraveling also seen in a number of decentralized markets

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

equilibria and incentives in private information economies abstract this paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy namely walrasian expectations equilibrium private core and insurance equilibrium it shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy in contrast to the finite agent setting one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any walrasian expectations equilibrium private core insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type

impacts on investments and transmission distribution loss through power sector reforms abstract this study analyses original panel data from 86 countries between 1985 and 2006 econometric methods were used to identify the effects of different policy devices of power sector reforms on performance indicators installed capacity per capita transmission and distribution loss in the countries analyzed the research findings suggest that reform variables such as the entry of independent power producers ipps unbundling of generation and transmission establishment of regulatory agencies and the introduction of a wholesale spot market are the driving forces of increasing generation capacity as well as reducing transmission and distribution loss in the respective regions in this study we can assume that firstly different electric industry s reform policies measures have different impacts on geographically and economically diverse countries secondly a country s state of economic development has a different impact on policy effects of reforms thirdly coexistent with independent regulatory agencies reform policy becomes more powerful in realizing sector performances

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

the regulation of privatized monopolies in the united kingdom this article examines the experience in the united kingdom with the regulation of privatized monopolies its conclusions are 1 that there are significant differences between rpi x or price cap and u s rate of return regulation which provides greater scope for bargaining in the former system 2 that u k regulators have taken seriously their duty to promote competition but that the existing economic literature is of limited help in this task 3 that price regulation is likely to be more effective where technology is changing slowly and or where technology is changing rapidly and 4 that the case for rpi x price cap rather than rate of return regulation is strongest in telecommunications gas supply and electricity supply and least strong in gas and electricity transmission grids

unraveling in matching markets the authors use a two period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets but causes inefficient assignments unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool the smaller the proportion of more promising applicants and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less promising applicants the effects on more promising applicants depend on how the gains from early contracts are shared ex post buyouts eliminate inefficient assignments and more promising applicants always unravel copyright 1998 by american economic association

clustering in n player preemption games we study a complete information preemption game in continuous time a finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible observable investment upon investment a firm receives flow profits which decrease in the number of firms that have invested the cost of investment declines over time exogenously we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome which is unique up to a permutation of players when the preemption race among late investors is sufficiently intense the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears and two or more investments occur at the same time we identify a sufficient condition in terms of model parameters clustering of investments occurs if the flow profits from consecutive investments are sufficiently close this shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures informational spillovers or positive payoff externalities

rational frenzies and crashes most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a walrasian auctioneer because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later rather than only now or never their current willingness to pay is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is a consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information leading to both frenzies in which demand feeds on itself and crashes in which price drops discontinuously the paper also shows how a result from static auction theory the revenue equivalence theorem can be applied to solve for a dynamic price path

privatization and the economic performance of irish sugar greencore as one of ireland s largest agribusiness companies the irish sugar company played a key role in the country s economic development in the twentieth century the company was privatized in 1991 under the new name greencore and has since transformed from a largely commodity based agribusiness into an international convenience food company this article analyses the financial and economic performance of the company in the 10 years before and after privatization it finds that the change from public to private ownership was not strongly associated with improved financial performance and productivity as the company had experienced rapid growth and improvement in the pre privatization period these findings run counter to perspectives such as public choice theory that suggest a positive relationship between privatization and company performance performance in the post privatization period was strongly influenced by greater exposure to market forces in the company s expanding food division however it is sur

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

core convergence with asymmetric information we analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies we show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately walrasian for the associated arrow debreu economy

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

timing disturbances in labor market contracting roth s findings and the effects of labor market monopsony this paper addresses alvin roth s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants which roth describes as market unraveling a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer seller matching programs this paper shows that while roth s engineering solutions are ingenious the early contracting phenomena derive from labor market monopsony under monopsony price is unavailable to clear the market time of contract becomes the currency for working out market forces roth s matching serves to shore up the monopsony and would be unnecessary if the monopsony were removed a superior solution is to end the monopsony

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms evidence from developing countries this paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992 we use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures both unadjusted and market adjusted results show significant increases in profitability operating efficiency capital investment spending output employment level and dividends we also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

when do international human capital enhancing practices benefit the bottom line an ability motivation and opportunity perspective we study the conditions under which firms can capitalize on their international human capital ihc using the ability motivation opportunity amo perspective we conceptualize ihc as ability collaborative climate as motivation and the firm s level of internationalization as opportunity we test three alternative amo models the additive model main effect the combinative model two way interactions and the multiplicative model a three way interaction using a cross industry sample of south korean firms we find support for the multiplicative model specifically the relationship between ihc enhancement practices and firm performance is significant and positive only when both collaborative climate and internationalization are high

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

informational size incentive compatibility and the core of a game with incomplete information we study the ex ante incentive compatible core and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of mclean and postlewaite 2002a econometrica 70 2421 2453