what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

welfare economics risk and uncertainty social decisions in risky contexts raise a number of difficult questions such as 1 should social decisions be more or less risk averse than the average person 2 should we try to avoid large catastrophes more than frequent but limited harms with similar expected impact 3 should social decisions be ambiguity averse or stick to the expected utility canon this paper reviews the welfare economics of risk and uncertainty and examines possible answers to these questions based on the pros and cons of utilitarianism ex ante egalitarianism and ex post egalitarianism

global risk investment and emotions we investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self reports the choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a global risk of losing all earnings from both options including any return from the risky option our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option this result cannot be explained by expected utility or by its main contenders rank dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory an explanation is offered by taking account of emotions using the emotion data from the experiment and recent psychological findings

on the interpretation of nonsymmetric bargaining solutions and their extension to nonexpected utility preferences abstract in a recent paper rubinstein safra and thomson reexamine the foundations of the axiomatic bargaining theory as formulated by nash in it they reinterpret the nash bargaining solution and extend it to a family of nonexpected utility preferences providing an interpretation of this solution concept and an axiomatization by means of a suitable translation of nash axioms this paper extends the work of these authors to the family characterized by kalai of nonsymmetric solutions that appear from the nash bargaining solution when the symmetry axiom is dropped this extension requires an axiom relating the solution outcomes of isomorphic games journal of economic literature classification number c78

evaluating decision strategies for equity of public risks many important decisions include the loss of life among their possible consequences alternative actions have different implications for the number of possible fatalities the equity of those eventual fatalities and the equity of the process resulting in those fatalities this paper defines a concept of ex ante risk equity to address the equity of the process and distinguishes this concept from the ex post risk equity of the fatalities the paper indicates that an analysis of decision strategies addresses ex ante equity in this context both types of equity as well as loss of life are included in a von neumann morgenstern utility model developed to evaluate public risks this approach provides a method to investigate the implications of different value judgments in examining alternatives and illustrates an appropriate use of von neumann morgenstern utility for problems involving social consequences such as public risks

the ellsberg paradox and risk aversion an anticipated utility approach the paper describes a decision process under which it is rational to prefer a lottery with known probabilities to a similar ambiguous lottery where the decision maker does not know the exact values of the probabilities the ellsberg paradox this is done by modeling ambiguous lotteries as two stage lotteries by assuming the independence axiom without the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and by using the anticipated utility functional this paper also gives conditions under which less ambiguity is preferred and presents some comparative statics analysis as well as some inter personal comparisons finally it proves that within the anticipated utility framework risk and ambiguity are almost identical copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the strategic implications of sunk costs a behavioral perspective abstract this paper examines some of the strategic implications of the sunk cost phenomenon in sequential allocation decisions drawing from psychology and behavioral decision theory we first present a taxonomy of possible causes for the sunk cost effect the tendency of many managers to throw good money after bad we then present the analysis of some implications of this behavior in strategic situations a two period strategic game is developed and analyzed to derive optimal allocations as a function of one player s sunk cost behavior we establish when this behavior can be used as a successful precommitment strategy by the sunk cost player and when it is exploitable by an opponent welfare implications are also explored the sunk cost effect constitutes a form of strategic preference manipulation in which a credible preference change can be induced to provide a strategic advantage to one of the players

optimism pessimism and financial bubbles this paper shows that it is possible to extend the scope of the existence of rational bubbles when uncertainty is introduced associated with rank dependent expected utility this rdu assumption can be viewed as a transformation of probabilities depending on the pessimism optimism of the agent the results show that pessimism favors the existence of deterministic bubbles when optimism may promote the existence of stochastic bubbles moreover under pessimism the rdu assumption may generate multiple bubbly equilibria the rdu assumption also leads to new conditions ensuring the absence of pareto optimality of the competitive equilibrium without bubbles these conditions still govern the existence of bubbles

social preferences under risk equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome this paper axiomatizes a utility function for social preferences under risk in the model a single parameter captures a preference for equality of opportunity i e equality of exante expected payoffs relative to equality of outcome i e equality of ex post payoffs in a deterministic environment the model reduces to the model of fehr and schmidt 1999 the model is consistent with recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games

generalized expected utility analysis of risk aversion with state dependent preferences in this paper the author develops measures of absolute risk aversion for preference relations on risky prospects that are state dependent and are representable by frechet differentiable nonlinear functionals a comparative statics analysis of optimal air travel insurance coverage illustrates the usefulness of the proposed measures it is also demonstrated that the analytical framework described above is consistent with the purchase of air travel insurance even in circumstances where expected utility theory is not copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

corrigendum to bargaining and boldness abstract we show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in shaked s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the allais paradox thus the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in burgos grant and kajii 2002 games econ behav 38 28 51 does not go beyond the two person case

vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities abstract when decision makers maximize expected utility with rank dependent probabilities and the object being auctioned is a risky prospect then with independent private value vickrey auctions lose their demand revealing property moreover they might be non pareto optimal

failure of blackwell s theorem under machina s generalization of expected utility analysis without the independence axiom abstract considerable evidence suggests that the independence axiom of expected utility theory is not empirically supported in response machina has generalized expected utility theory in such a way that the independence axiom is not required most of the basic concepts and results of expected utility theory still hold under machina s generalization however blackwell s theorem a fundamental result in information economics fails to hold under machina s generalization of expected utility theory without the independence axiom

the duality of a dynamic model of equilibrium and an optimal growth model the heterogeneous capital goods case the equivalence between optimal growth solutions and solutions of decentralized models of intertemporal allocation is explored in a one consumer heterogeneous capital goods framework the decentralized economy follows a perfect foresight path the main result is that the decentralized economy will impose on itself a transversality condition this yields the interpretation of equilibrium prices as prices consistent with a certainty version of the efficient markets hypothesis the results rest on the recent contribution by benveniste and scheinkman providing sufficient conditions for infinite horizon concave programs to exhibit capital value transversality as a necessary condition for optimality

transversality conditions budget constraints and the determinacy of a perfect foresight equilibrium in a monetary growth model the purpose of this paper is to analyze the number of perfect foresight equilibria in a monetary model where the consumer s behavior and the firm s behavior are explicitly derived from an intertemporal optimization we show that the relevant transversality conditions reduce to the satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer or alternatively of the government the assumption of a separable utility function enables us to characterize completely the perfect foresight equilibria their number is shown to depend both on the specification of the government s policy instruments and on the utility function

to save or savor the rate of return to storing wine for 28 000 one can buy a jaguar xj6 308 shares of mcdonnell douglas stock a one tenth interest in an oklahoma gas well 4i years of undergraduate life at stanford or one bottle of chateau lafite vintage 1806 that s 1 166 67 an ounce at this moment gold is worth only 275 an ounce and you can t smell or drink it saturday review of literature 1979 p 38 nine years ago 70 could persuade a paris restaurant to part with this same bottle of liquid gold goldwyn 1979 p 4 but for balance admire the growth of a slightly more pedestrian vintage a 1959 beaulieu estate bottled cabernet today a case of it may be purchased for 1 200 for the more modest budget 950 will buy a case of 1970 beaulieu george latour private reserve cabernet all this goes to show that wine the right wine in the last 10 years has provided the prudently daring investor with a spectacular return the virtues of wine as a liquid asset have been tested recently by krasker 1979 krasker cannot reject a hypothesis that wine offers no extraordinary rate of return the wine investor can expect no greater return than that which accrues to riskless assets while krasker finds the concept that an investment in wine outperforms treasury bills in nominal return incompatible with the way economists believe most assets are priced his result seems counter to intuition wine as a subcategory of riskless assets seems contrary to wine s very nature wine is a living substance its maturation process extends well beyond the bottling day lasting as long as 20 40 years in the case of some reds while a few others refuse to retire at 65 but the proper age

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

bargaining and boldness abstract we study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of shaked s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown if preferences are smooth then as the risk of breakdown vanishes the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold where a bargainer s marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position under smoothness any ordinal nash solution is an equally marginally bold outcome however unlike the concept of the ordinal nash solution a unique equally marginally bold outcome exists in natural cases in particular if all bargainers have risk averse preferences of the rank dependent expected utility type for these preferences the equally marginally bold outcome maximizes a bargaining power adjusted asymmetric nash product where the degree of asymmetry is determined by the disparity in the marginal valuation of certainty among bargainers journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d81

nonparametric test of the expected utility hypothesis a nonparametric test of the expected utility hypothesis is developed in this paper the expected utility hypothesis is shown to hold if there exists a feasible solution to a particular system of linear inequalities furthermore when a feasible solution exists boundaries on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion can be calculated explicitly the test is applied to data on land allocations modeled as choices over lottery sets results contrary to those obtained in many laboratory experiments show that in most cases the expected utility hypothesis cannot be rejected

fiscal policy in a growth model with both altruistic and nonaltruistic agents this paper examines the long run behavior of an overlapping generations model with a population consisting of altruistic and nonaltruistic agents it also studies the effect of fiscal policy on aggregate capital accumulation and on the welfare of both types of agents it shows that an increase in the relative number of nonaltruists is pareto improving in the steady state it also shows that the introduction of public debt or unfunded social security has no effect on the longrun equilibrium but implies a transfer of resources from the nonaltruistic to the altruistic agents finally it indicates that inheritance taxation hurts not only the altruists but also the nonaltruists

can expected utility theory explain gambling we investigate the ability of expected utility theory to account for simultaneous gambling and insurance contrary to a previous claim that borrowing and lending in perfect capital markets rules out a demand for gambles we show that expected utility theory with non concave utility functions can still explain gambling when the rates of interest and time preference are equal agents will seek to gamble unless income falls in a finite set of exceptional values when these rates differ there will be a range of incomes for which gambles are desired in both cases repeated gambling is not explained but market imperfections such as different borrowing and lending rates can account for persistent gambling provided the rates span the rate of time preference

wine consumption by us men wine consumption is modelled by focusing on three decisions the first is whether to consume any alcoholic beverages setting aside the teetotalers the second decision is whether to consume wine and the third choice is how much to consume we model these decisions using a double hurdle approach our econometric results indicate that the probability a man drinks wine increases if he is under age 65 has a high income and is a high school graduate heavy wine consumers are over age 65 are well educated physically active and have high incomes

existence and uniqueness of ordinal nash outcomes abstract in this paper we present necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of ordinal nash outcomes these outcomes are derived from the ordinal nash solution a reinterpretation and an extension of the nash bargaining solution that allows bargainers to have preference relations that are more general than expected utility our task is undertaken by the construction of a new notion called induced utilities journal of economic literature classification number c78

the impact of the canada united states free trade agreement on u s wine exports on 1 january 1989 the canada united states free trade agreement went into effect the agreement reduced the restrictions on the importation and marketing of wine produced in the united states this article analyzes the impact of this lessening on united states wine exports to canada a demand relation for united states exports to canada is estimated and then used to decompose the effects into their proximate causes these causes are a own price and exchange rate effects b substitute price and exchange rate effects c changes in real income in canada d tariff removal effects and e removal of nontariff trade barriers by canada

politics economics and the regulation of direct interstate shipping in the wine industry in 1986 california passed legislation restricting the direct importation of wine from another state by california residents unless the originating state allowed direct shipment from california wineries to residents in that state the result has been a patchwork of direct shipment regulations across states we examine how various economic and public interest factors affect the likelihood that a state adopts a change in its direct shipment regulation and the nature of that change our results suggest that private and public sector economic considerations lie at the root of direct shipment regulations in the wine industry

decision making over time and under uncertainty a common approach this paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice we begin by demonstrating a one to one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains i e expected utility and discounted utility models we argue that such violations or preference reversals are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice specifically it appears that 1 if we add a constant to all values of an attribute then that attribute becomes less important 2 if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute or if we change the sign of an attribute from positive to negative then that attribute becomes more important the generality of these propositions as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences is discussed

high yield bond default and call risks this paper empirically investigates high yield bond default and call behavior using a competing risks hazard model that simultaneously estimates the impact of bond age issue specific characteristics and business conditions on both events results reveal nonmonotonic aging effects default rates increase and then drop while call rates first increase and then level off rating and coupon size affect default risk while maturity and issue size impact only call rates defaults are more likely when economic conditions have worsened and no improvement is anticipated calls are more likely when interest rates have decreased but are expected to rise

many good choice axioms when can many good lotteries be treated as money lotteries abstract without the independence axiom a weaker substitution axiom adi is necessary for the preferences over money lotteries induced by the money metric utility function to be well behaved given adi the agent s preferences over many good lotteries can be reconstructed from knowledge of preferences over money lotteries and over sure multivariate outcomes moreover other substitution properties of underlying many good lottery preferences are inherited by the money lottery preferences we analyze the formal and intuitive nature of adi and conclude that analysis of choice under uncertainty without adi cannot be one dimensional

changing tastes and effective consistency in a single commodity setting with changing tastes an individual s consumption plan can be obtained using naive or sophisticated choice we provide two sufficient conditions for when the solutions are unique and agree and the common plan is representable by a non changing tastes utility because the solution is not revised over time the plan and associated preferences are referred to as being effectively consistent afriat style revealed preference tests are derived the assumption of effective consistency can mitigate the problems of vulnerability to dutch books non existence of a competitive equilibrium and the aggregation of heterogeneous agents with changing tastes abstract from author

cumulative prospect theory option returns and the variance premium the variance premium and the pricing of out of the money otm equity index options are major challenges to standard asset pricing models we develop a tractable equilibrium model with cumulative prospect theory cpt preferences that can overcome both challenges the key insight is that the variance premium can be written as the expected return on a portfolio of otm call and put options and the probability weighting feature of cpt can explain the puzzlingly low returns observed for these options using gmm on a sample of u s index option returns between 1996 and 2010 we show that the cpt model ts well observed option prices and therefore the variance premium in a dynamic setting probability weighting and time varying equity return volatility combine to match the observed time series pattern of the variance premium

making book against oneself the independence axiom and nonlinear utility theory an individual with known preferences over lotteries can be led to accept random wealth distributions different from his initial endowment by a sequential process in which some uncertainty is resolved and he is offered a new lottery in place of the remaining uncertainty this paper examines the restrictions that can be placed on an individual s preferences by axioms that stipulate that such a process not be able to generate a new wealth distribution that is prima facie inferior to the original the relationship of these axioms to the independence axiom of von neumann and morgenstern and to the quasi convexity of preferences in the wealth distribution are explored

welfare maximization entices participation abstract we consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew symmetric bilinear ssb utility functions a generalization of classic von neumann morgenstern utility functions we show that every welfare maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions as a corollary we obtain a characterization of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies condorcet consistency and entices participation this stands in contrast to moulin s well known no show paradox j of econ theory 45 53 64 1988 which shows that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously

on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences the paper reexamines the foundations of the axiomatic nash bargaining theory more specifically it questions the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and extends it to a family of non expected utility preferences a bargaining problem is presented as x d 2 where x is a set of feasible agreements described in physical terms d is the disagreement event and 1 and 2 are preferences defined on the space of lotteries in which the prizes are the elements in x and d the ordinal nash bargaining solution is defined as an agreement y satisfying for all p e 0 1 and for all x e x if px 1 y then py 2 x and if px 2 y then py x where px is the lottery which gives x with probability p and d with probability 1 p revisions of the pareto symmetry and iia axioms characterize the ordinal nash bargaining solution in the expected utility case this definition is equivalent to that of the nash bargaining solution however this definition is to be preferred since it allows a statement of the nash bargaining solution in everyday language and makes possible its natural extension to a wider set of preferences it also reveals the logic behind some of the more interesting results of the nash bargaining solution such as the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the nash bargaining solution and strategic models

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

fiscal requirements for price stability maintaining price stability requires not only commitment to an appropriate monetary policy rule but an appropriate scal policy rule as well ricardian equivalence does not imply that scal policy is irrelevant except in the case of a certain class of policies ricardian policies the role of scal developments in inflation determination under a non ricardian regime is illustrated through an analysis of the bond price support regime of the 1940s a monetary scal regime with attractive properties would combine a taylor rule for monetary policy with nominal decit targeting as a scal policy commitment

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

a cardinal characterization of the rubinstein safra thomson axiomatic bargaining theory in a recent paper rubinstein safra and thomson rst have provided an interesting re examination of the widely applied nash solution for a two person bargaining problem they recast the usual nash bargaining problem into a more natural setting of feasible alternatives with a disagreement outcome the two players are then described by their risk preferences defined on the set of lotteries over the alternatives and the disagreement outcome this enables them to define an ordinal nash solution in terms of the agents risk preferences essentially their ordinal solution is an outcome that is immune against possible objections freeing the definition of the nash solution from utility naturally led rst to extending its scope to non expected utility neu preferences we contend however that the family of neu preferences considered by rst is unduly restrictive the assumptions imposed on the risk preferences by rst essentially exclude any members of the rank dependent expected utility rdeu and betweenness families that can accommodate the very choice paradoxes that stimulated the development of neu theory as these are two of the most extensively analyzed and widely applied neu models in the literature this seems to cast doubt on how broad an extension to neu preferences the rst approach affords we demonstrate however that rst s analysis can be modified so that their conclusion is valid in a wider class of preferences that can include examples of rdeu preferences this class consists of preferences that admit what we term a disagreement linear representation

equilibrium without independence abstract because players whose preferences violate the von neumann morgenstern independence axiom may be unwilling to randomize as mixed strategy nash equilibrium would require a nash equilibrium may not exist without independence this paper generalizes nash s definition of equilibrium retaining its rational expectations spirit but relaxing its requirement that a player must bear as much uncertainty about his own strategy choice as other players do the resulting notion equilibrium in beliefs is equivalent to nash equilibrium when independence is satisfied but exists without independence this makes it possible to study the robustness of equilibrium comparative statics results to violations of independence

prospect theory in a dynamic game theory and evidence from online pay per bid auctions abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision making under risk although prospect theory is a popular alternative it is rarely applied in strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions this study fills this research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model using a large field data set from multiple online pay per bid auction sites the authors empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferences makes a better out of sample prediction than a corresponding expected utility model prospect theory also provides a unified explanation for two behavioral anomalies average auctioneer revenues above current retail prices and the sunk cost fallacy the empirical results indicate that bidders are loss averse and overweight small probabilities such that the expected revenue of the auction exceeds the current retail price by 25 46 the authors illustrate and empirically confirm a managerial implication for how an auctioneer can increase revenue by changing the details of the auction design

flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models in this paper we specify and estimate a flexible parametric proportional hazards model the model specification is flexibly parametric in the sense that the baseline hazard is non parametric while the effect of the covariates takes a particular functional form we also add parametric heterogeneity to the underlying hazard model specification we specify a flexible parametric proportional competing risks model which permits unrestricted correlation among the risks unemployment duration data are then analysed using the flexible parametric duration and competing risks specifications we find an important effect arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance and significantly different hazards for the two types of risks new jobs and recalls

the nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions abstract a simple derivation of the non expected utility nash outcome as defined in rubinstein et al 1992 rubinstein a safra z thomson w 1992 on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences econometrica 60 1171 1186 is given for the class of decision weight utility functions conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided

food scares in an uncertain world we develop a model that explains the stylized facts of food scares an immediate and sharp decline in consumption of the product followed by a slow and frequently partial recovery of demand after the scare passes the model is used in conjunction with the natural experiment afforded by the mad cow crisis to elicit empirical information on decision makers perception of uncertainty our theoretical and quantitative results suggest that observed behavior is consistent with sharp changes in beliefs and the presence of knightian uncertainty as measured by the degree of imprecision in our model

the effect of decision weights in bargaining problems abstract bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory under rank dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker the same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion the main finding is that these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity property in particular in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player this is demonstrated for the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect

risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities expected utility with rank dependent probability theory is a model of decision making under risk where the preference relations on the set of probability distributions is represented by the mathematical expectation of a utility function with respect to a transformation of the probability distributions on the set of outcomes this paper defines based on g teaux differentiability measures of risk aversion for such preferences which characterize the relation more risk averse and applies these measures to the analysis of unconditional and conditional portfolio choice problems

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

do non expected utility choice patterns spring from hazy preferences an experimental study of choice errors individuals often have only incompletely known preferences when choosing between pair wise gambles particular presentations of the choice problem may then passively encourage the use of some choice method to clarify the preference different presentational displays can then lead to choice patterns predicted by one or other generalised expected utility theory when a preference is not or cannot be constructed choices will be arbitrary i run an experiment that uses three different presentational displays and incorporates a strength of preference indicator the experiment investigates regret theory as an example of a generalised expected utility theory as preference strength is found to vary by display regret effects event splitting effects and choice reversals are all found to be display dependent it is suggested that the evidence is best explained by assuming incomplete eu preferences which are clarified by constructive heuristics rather than some generalised expected utility model coupled with an error term

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis abstract we first generalize the nash bargaining solution to the case where decision makers are not necessarily expected utility eu maximizers we suggest two different approaches and show that the two extensions coincide when the preferences are of the eu and the rank dependent utility rdu types the extensions differ in the case of weighted utility wu preferences we also investigate the sensitivity of the extensions to changes in the degree of risk aversion when the first extension is considered the existing results depend on the eu assumption for more general preferences the solutions depend on the concavity of the certainty utilities when the second extension is considered the well known eu results remain unchanged journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets a bargaining solution based on the rubinstein safra thomson ordinal nash outcome is investigated in the peters wakker revealed group preferences framework assuming non expected utility preferences necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well defined and axiomatized uniquely

decision theory under ambiguity we review recent advances in the field of decision making under uncertainty or ambiguity we start with a presentation of the general approach to a decision problem under uncertainty as well as the standard bayesian treatment and issues with this treatment we present more general approaches choquet expected utility maximin expected utility smooth ambiguity and so forth that have been developed in the literature under the name of models of ambiguity sensitive preferences we draw a distinction between fully subjective models and models incorporating explicitly some information we review definitions and characterizations of ambiguity aversion in these models we mention the challenges posed by some of the models presented we end with a review of part of the experimental literature and applications of these models to economic settings

the equivalence of a fisher competitive equilibrium and a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium in a multi sectoral model of capital accumulation the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of the transversality condition for an intertemporal competitive equilibrium to be equivalent to a fisher competitive equilibrium the transversality condition also emerges to show the optimality of either equilibrium process 2 another concern of this paper is the importance of assumptions about individual savings and expectations 3 the models of this paper derive an agent s savings decision from an explicit intertemporal optimization model under conditions of perfect capital markets and long run perfect foresight the perfect foresight assumption means that paths of prices dividends and rental rates expected to occur at any future time are realized in an intertemporal equilibrium referred to as a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium this paper provides a demonstration that a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is equivalent to a fisher competitive equilibrium the abstract economy under consideration consists of a representative consumer and a production or investment opportunity sector there are n capital goods used for investment goods and one pure consumption good produced under the condition of nojoint production capital goods are not consumed nor do they depreciate

a model of casino gambling we show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior first we demonstrate that for a wide range of preference parameter values a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino offers only bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value second we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency at the moment he enters a casino the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy but after he starts playing he wants to switch to a different strategy the model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency and if he is aware of it on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

the integration of claims to health care a programming approach the paper contributes to the use of social choice and welfare theory in health economics by developing and applying the integration of claims framework to health care rationing related to sen s critique of neo classical welfare economics the integration of claims framework recognises three primitive sources of claim consequences deontology and procedures a taxonomy is presented with the aid of which it is shown that social welfare functions reflecting these claims individually or together can be specified some of the resulting social choice rules can be regarded as generalisations of health maximisation and all have normative justifications though the justifications may not be universally acceptable the paper shows how non linear programming can be used to operationalise such choice rules and illustrates their differential impacts on the optimal provision of health care following discussion of relations to the capabilities framework and the context in which rationing occurs the paper concludes that the integration of claims provides a viable framework for modelling health care rationing that is technically rigorous general and tractable as well as being consistent with relevant moral considerations and citizen preferences

dynamic choice and the common ratio effect an experimental investigation the common ratio effect is a well attested violation of expected utility theory this paper uses four principles of dynamic choice to characterise alternative theoretical strategies for explaining the effect it reports an experiment which tests these principles and by implication several well known accounts of the common ratio effect unlike previous work the experimental design uses real financial incentives without presupposing any dynamic choice principles we find violation of a principle of timing independence which is part of most existing theories of dynamic choice we examine the implications of this finding for decision theory and economics

an intertemporal model of saving and investment this paper characterizes a market economy with infinitely long lived consumers and value maximizing firms which face costs of adjustment for capital the temporary equilibrium of this economy is similar to the short run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models consumption is a function of wealth investment is related to the value of firms equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates the dynamic behavior of output consumption and investment in this economy is the same as in an optimal growth model with adjustment costs the paper shows this equivalence and then uses it together with the equivalence of taxes to technological shocks to study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy

trade liberalization in the presence of domestic regulations public policies applied to eu and u s wine markets abstractwine is the highest valued product in the agricultural food and beverage sector traded between the united states and the european union eu and wine faces a range of tariffs that are differentiated by country and product category in addition the production of wine grapes is heavily regulated within the eu and there are complicated state level policies in the united states designed to limit the retail availability of wine there continues to be economic and political pressure for reform to the tariffs between the united states and the eu and to the domestic regulations in each region we carefully develop parameters to characterize the effects of tariffs and domestic regulations that affect production and consumption of wine in the two regions simulation results show that reductions in tariffs would have relatively small effects in eu and u s wine markets whereas reductions in eu domestic policies that affect wine grape production would have much larger trade and welfare implications

costly predation and the distribution of competence an evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve when members of a population prey on one another but when predatory competence is costly to acquire under one interpretation the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality an example shows how tricksters and suckers might coexist in the long run the analysis leads to a curious result about a mixed equilibrium for a symmetric zero sum game an increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels