competition between multiple asymmetric networks theory and applications this paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms elastic subscriber demand off net price discrimination call externalities and cost and market share asymmetries we characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm and market level network effects the model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates market maturity and retail pricing strategies we show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading in particular concerning the effects of termination rates

competition and the number of firms in a market are duopolies more competitive than atomistic markets this paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of an increase in the number of firms if marginal search costs increase with the number of searches then the demand curve facing any firm will be kinked with the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases being less than with respect to price increases prices may not change in response to changes in marginal costs as the number of firms increases the maximum price that is consistent with equilibrium increases to the monopoly price but the minimum price decreases on the other hand if marginal search costs decrease with the number of searches equilibrium if it exists is characterized by a

price coherence and excessive intermediation suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary s technology we develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates with this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary we show that this leads to inflated retail prices excessive adoption of the intermediaries services over investment in benefits to buyers and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise we discuss applications to payment card systems travel reservation systems rebate services and various other intermediaries jel codes d40 l11 l14 l42

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin a general model this paper develops a model of large group chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which 1 there are many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve the existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established in a companion paper more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model

product variety informative advertising and price competition abstract in many product categories consumer tastes are diverse and firms use finely targeted advertising to inform consumers about their products this article proposes a model of informative advertising that allows for diverse consumer tastes and multiple competing firms using this framework the authors analyze how diversity in consumers tastes informative advertising and improvements in advertising technology may influence prices first informative advertising can lead to lower prices if consumer valuations are high however if consumer valuations are low informative advertising can lead to higher prices second when consumer valuations are high price increases with greater diversity in tastes though this result reverses if consumer valuations are low third improvements in advertising technology lead to higher levels of advertising when consumer valuation is high but the opposite effect can occur when consumer valuation is low the authors relate these theoretical findings to previous e

the cyclical behavior of prices abstract the procyclical behavior of prices has been a staple of business cycle lore since the work of the early nber business cycle researchers this paper reexamines that empirical fact the aggregate data do not support procyclical price movements as a stable feature of the business cycle the only episode where it is a robust feature of the data is the period between the two world wars particularly the period of the great depression

pricing prototypical products when we think of colas coca cola first comes to mind products such as cola cola tide laundry detergent and chapstick lip balm are the prototypical products in their respective categories for more than three decades research in consumer psychology has accumulated evidence on how prototypicality influences memory shapes the composition of consideration set and affects purchase decision yet there is no research on how it changes the competitive behavior of firms in a horizontally differentiated market for example some prototypical products are priced lower than other products in their category whereas in certain other categories the prototypical product is priced higher we propose a novel model of spatial competition where the prototypicality of a product influences the probability of the product being included in consumers consideration sets without affecting its valuation using the model we examine theoretically the impact of prototypicality on the pricing decisions of competing firms our analysis shows that when consumer valuations are low the prototypical product is priced lower than a nonprototypical product and earns more profits however when consumer valuations are high the rank order of the prices of the prototypical product and a nonprototypical product is reversed but not the order of profits we subject these predictions to an empirical test the experimental results lend support for the qualitative predictions of the model

mobile termination network externalities and consumer expectations we re examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and o net calls or when subscription demand is elastic this literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase this is puzzling since in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators this puzzle is resolved when consumers expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as defined by katz and shapiro aer 1985 instead of being responsive to non equilibrium prices as assumed until now

do consumers search for the highest price oligopoly equilibrium and monopoly optimum in differentiated products markets we develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price in which the structure of search costs is manipulable by the suppliers of these variants e g by joining an existing market or opening a new one we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria arising in a multistage game involving specialized firms choice of entry variant and price and we compare them to a multiproduct monopolist s optimal choice we show that equilibrium prices increase in the number of substitutes sold in one market and that in the situation considered here monopoly increases welfare

multi market competition r d and welfare in oligopoly we investigate a multi market cournot model with strategic process research and development r d investments wherein a multi market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets we show that entry can enhance the total r d expenditures of the multi market firm moreover the incumbent s profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases depending on the fixed entry costs and r d technologies both insufficient and excess entry can appear our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms

churn versus diversion in antitrust an illustrative model an important question in horizontal merger analysis is what share of a firm s lost output from a unilateral price increase will divert to its merger partner this diversion ratio is often estimated using data on customer switching from a firm to its rivals churn we use a tractable oligopoly model to investigate the potential biases of such estimates depending on what caused the churn shifts in quality or marginal cost of the firm or of a rival or demand side shifts due to changed circumstances or learning about product attributes with demand side shifts churn can be greater between more distant competitors

better product at same cost lower sales and lower welfare we consider a high quality dominant firm facing a low quality competitive fringe we show that the dominant firm s quantity is weakly increasing in its quality if and only if its marginal cost weakly exceeds that of the fringe otherwise it is strictly decreasing in quality this result is driven by the fact that a quality increase causes the marginal revenue curve to rotate clockwise rather than shift outwards and at a height equal to the fringe firms marginal cost this fact combined with the dominant firm s mr mc condition determines the result for closely related reasons the effect of a quality increase on consumer welfare also depends on the relationship between the costs it is possible that all consumers are weakly better off that some are better off and some worse off or that all are weakly worse off we also consider several extensions and variations of the model

most favored customer pricing product variety and welfare abstract most favored customer mfc clauses are usually seen as anticompetitive co ordination devices that firms adopt for the purpose of higher prices here i examine the welfare impact of mfc clauses under endogenous product variety product variety is relevant because prospective higher prices from mfc clauses can be anticipated by multi product firms in their provision of product lines under such circumstances i find that these clauses can be socially harmful but this is not always the case they tend to be socially neutral for relatively large fixed costs of product line assortment harmful for intermediate costs and beneficial for relatively small costs

hub and spoke free trade areas theory and evidence from israel we study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries in a three country three good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an fta and both sign a similar agreement with the third trade between the two decreases however if only one of them signs an additional fta a hub and spoke pattern arises and trade between the initial members increases israel s experience lends strong support to our model trade between israel and the eu subject to an fta since 1975 increased by an additional 29 after the introduction of the us israel fta in 1985 on etudie comment la formation sequentielle de zones de libre echange affecte les flux commerciaux entre les pays membres dans un modele d avantage comparatif avec trois pays et trois biens si deux pays ont un accord de libre echange et qu ils signent tous deux un accord similaire avec un tiers pays le commerce entre les deux pays originaux decroit cependant si seulement un des deux pays originaux signe un accord avec le troisieme un reseau en etoile emerge et le commerce entre les deux payx d origine s accroit l experience d israel donne un fort support au modele le commerce entre israel et l union europeenne sujet a un accord de libre echange depuis 1975 s est accru de 29 apres l introduction de l accord de libre echange entre israel et les etats unis en 1985

price and variety in the spokes model the spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool for dierentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition an increase in the number of rms leads to lower equilibrium prices when consumers have relatively high product valuations but surprisingly to higher equilibrium prices for in termediate consumer valuations new entry alters consumer and social welfare through price market expansion and matching eects with free entry the market may pro vide too many or too few varieties from a social welfare perspective and the equilibrium price remains above marginal cost even when the number of rms is arbitrarily large

money bonds and foreign exchange in the theory of finance capital markets provide securities which allow the ownership of productive assets to be allocated among investors according to their willingness to bear risk in exchange for return and independently of their tastes for the productive services provided by the assets this paper uses the theory of finance to study the role of money as a productive asset and the transformation of money into a portfolio asset true to its purpose the capital market provides securities nominal bonds that allow an allocation of the current services of the money supply according to its current productivity and without regard for its future purchasing power risk and an allocation of the future purchasing power risk of the money supply according to the willingness of investors to bear this risk in exchange for return and without regard for investor needs for the future transactions services of money in open

quantity restrictions on advertising commercial media bias and welfare abstract we study the welfare effect of a quantity restriction on advertising in free to air television and other advertising financed media in the presence of commercial media bias broadcasters face a trade off between increasing the number of viewers by sending content that is highly valued by viewers and increasing the price of advertising by choosing advertiser friendly content a cap on advertising drives the per viewer price of ads up thus content improves for viewers therefore the cap can be welfare enhancing even when viewers are not ad averse competition among broadcasters makes it more likely that a cap on advertising improves welfare thus there is a complementarity between regulation and competition on this market we also show that a tax on advertising revenues has quite different effects than a cap on advertising quantity

concentration and self censorship in commercial media within a simple model of non localized hotelling type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under dierent ownership structures assuming advertising sponsored prot maximizing outlets we show that i topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported self censored by all outlets in the market ii self censorship increases with the concentration of ownership iii adding outlets while keeping the number of owners xed may even increase self censorship the latter result relies on consumers most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies we argue that externalities resulting from self censorship could be empirically large

the great industry gamble market structure dynamics as a survival contest industry dynamics are studied as an endogenous tournament with infinite horizon and stochastic entry in each period firms investments determine their probability of surviving into the next period this generates a survival contest which fuels market structure dynamics while the evolution of market structure constantly redefines the contest more concentrated markets endogenously generate less profit rivals that are more difficult to outlive and more entry the unique steady state distribution exhibits ongoing turbulence correlated exit and entry rates and shakeouts the model s predictions fit empirical findings in markets where firms trade off profits for smaller risk of failure e g banking

equilibrium with product differentiation tive consumer formulations is used to examine the properties of single and multiple price equilibria conditions under which decreases in the intensity of consumer preferences reduce price are given it is shown that with certain types of demand curves entry can eliminate price cost markups even given product differentiation if competition is localized it is demonstrated that entry does not affect the markup finally the effect of spurious product differentiation on price is examined

money does granger cause output in the bivariate money output relation abstract a bivariate granger causality test on money and output finds statistically significant causality when data are measured in log levels but not when they are measured in first differences of the logs bootstrap simulation experiments indicate that most probably the first difference results reflect lack of power whereas the level results reflect granger causality that is actually in the data the reason for the lack of power in the first difference f statistic is that first differencing the data appears to entail a specification error by showing that money does granger cause output in the bivariate relation we remove a potential embarrassment for models that assign an important role to money in business fluctuations

price increasing competition in a discrete choice model of product differentiation the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than equal to or higher than the single product monopoly price whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm s demand curve the joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects the analysis provides precise conditions for price increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

paying positive to go negative advertisers competition and media reports this paper analyzes a two sided market for news where two rival advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product paying positive to avoid negative and or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitor s product paying positive to go negative we show that competition in the product market does not necessarily prevent the emergence of commercial media bias whether or not competing advertisers end up having negative consequences on news accuracy ultimately depends on the extent of correlation in the quality of their products the lower the correlation the higher the expected accuracy of the media outlet s reports these findings provide a rationale to explain the observed differences in the extent of commercial media bias across seemingly similar industries or products within the same media market the results are robust to the presence of multiple media outlets and to asymmetries between the advertisers overall the paper provides theoretical insights for media regulators and for the empirical literature examining the link between advertising and news contents

consumer rationing and cournot outcomes experimental evidence author affiliation jason j lepore department of economics orfalea business college california polytechnic state university san luis obispo ca 93407 usa e mail jlepore calpoly edu aric p shafran dagger department of economics orfalea business college california polytechnic state university san luis obispo ca 93407 usa e mail ashafran calpoly edu corresponding author acknowledgment the authors acknowledge the orfalea college of business for financial support we thank blake allison for assistance running the experiments and the anonymous reviewers and conference participants at the north american economic science association meetings for helpful comments 1 introductionthis article reports the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices the theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes the goal of this study is to test the impact of residual demand rationing on the behavior of subjects in an experimental environment in a two stage game where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices kreps and scheinkman 1983 hereafter k s prove that the unique nash equilibrium outcome coincides with the cournot equilibrium outcome with efficient rationing of residual demand efficient rationing means that the higher priced firm is left with the worst possible residual demand curve if demand is composed of many similar consumers that each demand multiple units and we construct aggregate demand by way of a representative consumer then efficient rationing is imposed by the model on the other hand if demand is instead composed of a mass of consumers with unit demand and varied willingness to pay then the efficient rationing rule imposes the restriction that the highest valued consumers buy from the firm with the lower price davidson and deneckere 1986 make a compelling argument that proportional rationing is a more appropriate assumption in the latter case proportional rationing means that a uniform distribution of possible consumers buy from the firm with the lower price davidson and deneckere show that under proportional rationing as well as any rationing rule other than the efficient rule the cournot outcome is not necessarily the unique equilibrium of the two stage game the davidson and deneckere result is problematic for the k s model because it deflates the generality of their theoretical result 1lepore 2009 further clarifies the relationship between proportional rationing and the cournot outcome in the k s game with proportional rationing the cournot outcome is the unique nash equilibrium only when capacity cost is greater than a threshold level the purpose of our experiments is to assess if the play of experimental subjects in the two stage game is sensitive to the rationing scheme in the way that theory predicts to do this we construct an experimental design with four treatments the treatments vary by two controls the demand rationing scheme and the cost of capacity we conduct two efficient rationing treatments one with a high capacity cost and one with a low cost for both costs theory predicts that the outcome coincide with the cournot model we also conduct two treatments using proportional rationing one with each of the capacity costs used in the efficient rationing treatments with a high cost theory predicts the outcome should coincide with the cournot model as in the case of efficient rationing however theory predicts that the cournot outcome should not occur when the cost of capacity is low and prices should not clear the market recently several authors have used laboratory experiments as a means to empirically test the predictions of the k s model

market competition r d and firm profits in asymmetric oligopoly we investigate a cournot model with strategic r d investments wherein efficient low cost firms compete against less efficient high cost firms we findthat an increase in the number of high cost firms can stimulate r d by the low cost firms while it always reduces r d by the high cost firms more importantly this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition the low cost firms profits may indeed increase with the number of high cost firms an implication of this result is far reaching as it gives low cost firms an incentive to help rather than harm high cost competitors we relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure especially ford s strategy of disclosing its know how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century

atheoretical macroeconometrics a critique abstract the spurious nature of the restrictions used to identify many macroeconometric models has led some researchers to advocate a style of econometric inquiry that is less dependent on prior theoretical restrictions of the sort that were central to the approach of the cowles commission this development which we call atheoretical macroeconometrics is summarized and evaluated in the current paper it is contrasted with an updated version of the cowles commission approach we conclude that while some of the exercises of atheoretical macroeconometrics are valid those that have attracted the most attention and appear the most innovative exogeneity testing impulse response analysis and policy analysis using estimated vector autoregressions are based on incorrect analysis

indivisible labor and the business cycle abstract a growth model with shocks to technology is studied labor is indivisible so all variability in hours worked is due to fluctuations in the number employed we find that unlike previous equilibrium models of the business cycle this economy displays large fluctuations in hours worked and relatively small fluctuations in productivity this finding is independent of individuals willingness to substitute leisure across time this and other findings are the result of studying and comparing summary statistics describing this economy an economy with divisible labor and post war u s time series

monopolistic competition and preference diversity approach our model is especially attractive because it starts from economic primitives a specification of the set of possible individual preference patterns it shows how specific properties of the distribution of preferences translate into properties of aggregate demand this allows us to understand the relationship between the distribution of preferences and the degree to which the market introduces biases in product selection this paper presents a general model of the demand for differentiated products which has as special cases two of the most popular approaches used to analyse welfare and competition in monopolistically competitive markets the model of spatial competition on the circle and the model of symmetric aggregate demand the circle model is attractive because both demand and costs have a definite and easy to visualize physical foundation and because it is tractable salop 1979 provides an exemplary modem analysis with this model one can analyze the relationship between the optimal amount of product variety and the amount which a monopolistically competitive market will support in many plausible cases competition produces too much variety such a strong conclusion raises questions of robustness almost simultaneously spence 1976 and dixit and stiglitz 1977 developed an alternative approach to monopolistic competition based upon the chamberlinian assumption of symmetry see also shubik 1959 rather than specifying a distribution of preferences and deriving demand through aggregation as did salop and his predecessors these authors started by specifying a symmetric aggregate benefit function indicating how social welfare depends on the amounts of the various products supplied both spence and dixit stiglitz were able to show that the welfare conclusions from the circle model were not robust depending on the functional form of the benefit function equilibrium may entail either excessive or insufficient product variety 1 the assumption of symmetric demand has proven fruitful in the analysis of many economic problems it is therefore natural to ask what distribution of tastes would give

imperfect competition in selection markets policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces coexist we build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection we use graphical price theoretic reasoning to characterize the interaction between these forces using a calibrated model of health insurance we show that the risk adjustment commonly used to offset adverse selection can reduce coverage and social surplus conversely in a calibrated model of subprime auto lending realistic levels of competition can generate an oversupply of credit implying that greater market power is desirable

when showrooming increases retailer profit abstractshowrooming the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick and mortar b m store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature it is considered a major threat to the b m retailers and determining how to fight it seems to be the only consideration however the manufacturer s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability the popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel this article analytically shows that when the manufacturer s decisions are considered i e when the manufacturer retailer contract is endogenous consumers ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased rather than decreased profitability for b m retailer s thus retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior m

the existence of low end firms may help high end firms two models of competition between high end and low end products benefiting the high end firms are presented one is a quantity competition model and the other is a price competition model with product differentiation the key factor is the existence of two heterogeneous consumer groups those who demand only high end name brand products and those who care little whether products are high or low end we show that under certain conditions the profits of firms in the high end market are larger when there are firms producing low end products than when there are not the existence of price sensitive consumers who care little about product quality intensifies competition among the high end firms the existence of low end firms functions as a credible threat which induces the high end firms not to overproduce because price sensitive consumers buy products from the low end firms the result provides a new theoretical mechanism concerning the profitability and pricing of national brand firms after the entry of private labels it has an implication for pricing and marketing strategies established firms should not decrease their prices after the entry of nonestablished firms

access to bottleneck inputs under oligopoly a prisoners dilemma we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market first two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept if any second firms compete on salop s circle the firms may be asymmetrically located on the circle to reflect differences in consumer shares for some levels of asymmetry the incumbents face a prisoners dilemma with respect to conceding access to their bottleneck inputs entry by a downstream firm may lead to lower retail prices however entry may also lead to higher retail prices for the access provider and for the entrant we also consider the cases where there are several incumbents and where the entrant makes the access price offers

prices profits and preference dependence we develop a new approach to discrete choice demand for differentiated products using copulas to separate the marginal distribution of consumer values for product varieties from their dependence relationship and apply it to the issue of how preference dependence affects market outcomes in symmetric multiproduct industries we show that greater dependence lowers prices and profits under certain conditions suggesting that preference dependence is a distinct indicator of product differentiation we also find new sufficient conditions for the symmetric multiproduct monopoly and the symmetric single product oligopoly prices to be above or below the single product monopoly price

empirical evidence on the relationship between mobile termination rates and firms profits the theoretical literature on mobile termination rates mtrs is inconclusive on how the level of mtrs affects overall consumer charges and firms profits we show that when firms offer bundles with fixed included usage a tariff structure that has become more common in recent years an identical change in all mtrs does not affect firms retail prices or profits we use a panel dataset from saturated european markets to estimate the effect of mtrs on mobile operators profits as predicted by the theoretical model we cannot reject the fact that firms profits are unaffected by an identical change in all mtrs

production growth and business cycles ii new directions abstract this paper outlines new directions for investigations of real business cycle models consideration of stochastic growth of exogenous and endogenous forms analysis of suboptimal outcomes arising due to externalities of distorting taxes and implications of labor market heterogeneity

a reconsideration of sims evidence concerning monetarism abstract in var systems such as those of sims 1980 monetary policy surprises may be more accurately represented by interest rate than money stock innovations especially if the monetary authority uses an interest rate instrument

models and their uses it is argued that economists ought to recognize that modeling in different styles will be appropriate for different purposes or different stages in the development of an area of economics as an example the paper displays simulations of a stochastic general equilibrium model which shed light on the interpretation of widely discussed small macroeconomic vector autoregressive models connecting monetary variables to output and prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property patent thickets layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers patent thickets involve complementary products which gives rise to double marginalization the so called royalty stacking problem and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare this paper examines the impact of licensing policies of one or more upstream owners essential intellectual property ip on the downstream firms that require access to that ip the terms under which downstream firms can access this ip affects entry decisions product diversity prices and welfare we consider both the case in which a single party controls the essential ip and the case in which different parties control complementary pieces of essential ip we compare the outcome of several alternative standard licensing arrangements such as flat rate access fees royalty percentages per unit fees patent pools and cross licensing arrangements with or without vertical integration we first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential ip increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety which creates added value but it also intensifies downstream competition which dissipates profits we derive conditions under which the upstream ip monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare when there are multiple owners of essential ip royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face the paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society finally the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies with fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price an upstream ip owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition in contrast volume based license fees i e per unit access fees do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration the paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when ip owners charge fixed or volume based access fees

causality and correlations of output and nominal variables in a real business cycle model abstract a dynamic general equilibrium economy in which output is exogenous with respect to money is calibrated and simulated following a procedure commonly used in the real business cycle literature it is then confronted with key comovement patterns of output and nominal variables in post war u s time series data the model economy performs well in matching second moment patterns involving output money and price the model economy with its embedded reverse causation from output to money also provides the means for carrying out a probabilistic appraisal of the observed money to output granger causality in u s data repeated applications of the granger causality test to simulated data lead to the rinding that money causes output more often than expected

product diversion to a direct competitor a manufacturer will often limit competition among downstream partners by authorizing only a select group of retailers to carry its product however it is not uncommon for authorized retailers to create an additional competitor by diverting units to an unauthorized seller this paper presents an analytical model that demonstrates how diversion from authorized retailers to an unauthorized direct competitor can occur under circumstances not considered by the prior literature in fact diversion can represent a prisoner s dilemma whereby retailers diminish their own profit by selling to the unauthorized direct seller the authorized retailer s profit loss actually increases as the per unit diversion costs incurred by the authorized retailer decrease the model also shows that the unauthorized direct seller earns greater profit by strategically procuring a unilaterally constraining quantity even though this procurement strategy results in an equivalent increase in the quantity sold by the retailers combined the results identify a new reason for diversion and its consequences for retailers and the unauthorized direct seller

strategic pricing consumer search and the number of firms discover prices there are three distinct price dispersed equilibria characterized by low moderate and high search intensity the effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour expected prices price dispersion and welfare are sensitive i to the equilibrium consumers search intensity and ii to the status quo number of firms for instance when consumers search with low intensity an increase in the number of firms reduces search does not affect expected price leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare in contrast when consumers search with high intensity increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms a question that has received much attention in economic theory is how the number of competitors and market outcomes are related despite the existence of work showing the contrary see e g satterthwaite 1979 rosenthal 1980 the prediction that emerges from a market where firms interact in a cournot fashion has come to dominate economic thought namely that an increase in the number of competitors leads to larger aggregate production lower market price and improved market performance measured in terms of some social welfare criterion ruffin 1971 this paper challenges the generality of this belief by presenting an oligopoly model with consumer search where the equilibrium expected price may be constant increasing or nonmonotonic in the number of firms we present an economy with two types of consumers consumers who search for prices at no cost fully informed and consumers who must pay a fixed search cost for each price quotation they observe less informed 1 all buyers have the same willingness to pay for the good and buy either a single unit or nothing at all on the supply side of the market there are n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost we analyse a one shot simultaneous move game firms set prices and consumers decide how many prices to search for at the same moment in time our model is essentially an oligopolistic version of burdett and judd 1983 where some consumers search costlessly in this model consumers search using a fixed sample size search strategy i e they choose the number of prices to observe before receiving any offer nonsequential search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather price information quickly morgan and manning 1985 this occurs when the search outcome is observed with delay and delay is costly for instance an mba graduate looking for a job 1 the presence in the model of consumers who search costlessly captures the fact that some people have a

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

value of an additional firm in monopolistic competition the paper develops a model of monopolistic competition in which the satisfaction levels consumers get from products are independently and identically distributed potential substitution among products then generates demand curves through the mechanism of order statistics the value of extra variety can be calculated directly pareto lognormal and beta distributions are investigated using numerical integration some but not all cases support the argument that the optimal number of firms exceeds the equilibrium number

reference dependent utility product variety and price competition products such as nike running shoes gillette razors and gatorade sports drink serve as the standard against which consumers evaluate other members of the category empirical evidence suggests that consumers care about not only the consumption utility derived from a product but also the gain loss utility in comparison to the reference product of the category this paper examines how reference dependent utility affects price competition in a horizontally differentiated market where consumers tastes are diverse when consumer valuations are low the reference product is priced lower than a nonreference product in contrast when consumer valuations are high the reference product is priced higher than a nonreference product moreover loss aversion on the price dimension always intensifies competition among low valuation goods whereas loss aversion on the taste dimension softens competition among high valuation goods only if consumer sensitivity to the difference in match quality is above a threshold we also find that an increase in the diversity of consumers tastes reduces equilibrium profits if consumer valuation is low but has the opposite effect if consumer valuation is high we further explore how an increase in the popularity of the reference product affects price competition finally we assess the robustness of the findings by extending the model in different directions the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2834 this paper was accepted by juanjuan zhang marketing

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

productivity shocks and real business cycles abstract productivity shocks play a central role in real business cycles as an exogenous impulse to macroeconomic activity however measured solow prescott residuals do not behave as an exogenous impulse rather econometric evidence provided in this paper indicates that 1 money interest rates and government spending granger cause these impulses and 2 a substantial component of the variance of these impulses between one quarter and one half is attributable to variations in aggregate demand these results are robust to a number of econometric issues including measurement errors specification of the production function and certain forms of omitted real variables

competition with targeted product design price variety and welfare abstract we consider the price and welfare effects of competition in targeted product design in the context of the salop circle model changes in product design lead to demand rotations that set the stage for our analysis with an exogenous number of firms we show that the degree of targeted product design tends to increase with the number of firms moreover under reasonable conditions price increasing competition takes place for intermediate levels of the number of firms this effect is associated with the possibility of lower consumer welfare with endogenous firm entry an interesting insight from our analysis is that in some situations an increase in market size or a technological progress that reduces entry costs both might reduce consumers welfare

markets and linguistic diversity abstract producers of cultural goods and media products can make their specific contents available to their audiences and readerships only through a particular language the choice of language is a non trivial decision in markets with bilingual or multilingual consumers in this paper i argue that the very existence of bilingual consumers may seriously bias market outcomes against minority languages in particular i show that the level of linguistic diversity determined by profit maximizing firms tends to be inefficiently low except when and where the cost of producing a second linguistic version becomes sufficiently low thus the model provides an efficiency argument supporting policies that protect the presence of minority languages in these markets

a model of market power in customer markets we develop a model for studying dynamic competition in environments with frictions that lead to partial lock in of customers to products the dynamic aspects associated with customer retention and acquisition introduce pricing incentives that do not exist in more traditional static product markets the proposed model while highly stylized maintains certain symmetry properties that allow us to obtain equilibrium existence and uniqueness we then study the comparative statics of the model and derive a closed form relationship between average equilibrium markups and the herfindahl index we illustrate how the model can be used by analyzing mergers in such a dynamic environment

are loyalty rewarding pricing schemes anti competitive abstract many economists and policy analysts seem to believe that loyalty rewarding pricing schemes like frequent flyer programs tend to reinforce firms market power and hence are detrimental to consumer welfare the existing academic literature has supported this view to some extent in contrast we argue that these programs are business stealing devices that tend to enhance competition in the sense of generating lower average transaction prices and higher consumer surplus in highly competitive environments this result is robust to alternative specifications of the firm commitment power and demand structures however it could be reversed if the number of firms is sufficiently small and if firms are restricted to use program designs with sufficiently weak commitment capacity

nominal prices and interest rates in general equilibrium endowment shocks the outstanding problem of neoclassical monetary theory has been to determine the effect of changes in the money stock on nominal prices and interest rates the classic result is that in the absence of money illusion contracts fixed in nominal terms and other such impedimenta money is neutral thus a doubling of the money stock results in a doubling of the nominal price level and in no change in nominal interest rates except at most for a temporary liquidity effect while the price level is rising to its new level during the adjustment period the nominal interest rate might temporarily drop this neutrality result has conventionally been proved in a static framework in intertemporal models it is necessary to distinguish between static neutrality and dynamic neutrality if a model displays dynamic neutrality fluctuations in the money stock immediately induce a proportional change in the nominal price level and no change in nominal interest rates or any real variable this property is different from and stronger than static neutrality which in dynamic models states only that if the money stock at all dates is doubled so will be the price level at all dates the effects of exogenous shocks in the monetary growth rate on nominal prices and interest rates are analyzed a representative individual rational expectations framework is adopted and a demand for money is generated by entering money in the utility function the effects of monetary shocks on inflation and interest rates are shown to depend on the autocorrelation of the monetary growth rate for example under serial independence the inflation rate equals the monetary growth rate and the nominal interest rate is nonrandom while under positive negative autocorrelation the nominal interest rate is affected positively negatively by positive growth rate shocks i am grateful to the staff of the federal reserve bank of philadelphia to the finance groups at the university of southem california and virginia polytechnic institute and to c j lacivita dan peled john seater and jon sonstelie for valuable comments on earlier drafts

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin special results the idea of large group monopolistic competition was first introduced by chamberlin in i 933 although a large literature has developed on this topic since that time it can be argued that few of the models which have been formulated really capture monopolistic competition in chamberlin s sense in a companion paper to this one hart i 983 a model was presented which it was claimed did satisfy the desiderata of large group monopolistic competition specifically the model had the property that i there were many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm was negligible in the sense that it could ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry led to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faced a downward sloping demand curve and hence equilibrium price exceeded marginal cost the model of hart i983 was quite general and only such issues as the existence and limiting properties of equilibrium were considered the purpose of the present paper is to analyse a special case of this model in greater detail and to consider in this context the old question of whether too few or too many brands are produced under monopolistic competition before embarking on the analysis however let me briefly indicate why i believe that there is a need for a new model of monopolistic competition further discussion of this may be found in hart i983 in the last few years a sizeable literature has developed on imperfect competition and product differentiation see for example dixit and stiglitz i977 lancaster i979 salop i979 and spence i976 in much of this literature see for example spence i976 markets of fixed finite size are considered where the entry of firms is limited by the existence of set up costs under these conditions only a finite number of firms can operate and hence firms will not be negligible in the sense of 2 in addition due to the integer problem operating firms will generally make strictly positive profits i e 3 is violated models of

centrality and pricing in spatially differentiated markets the case of gasoline we highlight the importance of centrality for pricing firms characterized by a more central position in a spatial network are more powerful in terms of having a stronger impact on their competitors prices and on equilibrium prices these propositions are derived from a simple theoretical model and investigated empirically for the retail gasoline market of vienna austria we compute a measure of network centrality based on the locations of gasoline stations in the road network results from a spatial autoregressive model show that prices of gasoline stations are more strongly correlated with prices of central competitors

the dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly abstract this paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time consumers experience temporary satiation and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties the equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits competitive timing in particular if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head to head competition and set the short run profit maximizing price however firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs from a second best perspective the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity however if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions then consumers are likely to be harmed it is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors first consumers option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay second competition reduces firms incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination

dynamic product diversity the goal of this paper is to study the frequency of new product introductions in monopoly markets where demand is subject to transitory saturation we focus on those types of goods for which consumers purchase at most one unit of each variety but repeat purchases in the same product category the model considers in nitely lived forward looking consumers and rms we show that the share of potential surplus that a monopolist is able to appropriate increases with the frequency of introduction of new products and the intensity of transitory saturation if the latter is su ciently strong then the rate of introduction of new products is higher than socially desirable excessive dynamic product diversity jel classi cation numbers l12 l13

a network city model of spatial competition abstract in this paper we analyze a spatial bertrand oligopoly model called network city model firms compete directly and simultaneously with all other firms in the model we allow for heterogeneous product differentiation heterogeneous constant marginal costs of production and heterogeneous consumer densities we show that the equilibrium is unique and easily computable our model is more general than the existing spatial models and more importantly our model provides a spatial microfoundation for the traditional linear demand functions in a differentiated bertrand oligopoly

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

can prominence matter even in an almost frictionless market consumer search on the internet is rarely random sponsored links appear higher up a webpage and consumers often click them firms also bid aggressively for these prominent positions at the top of the page but why should prominence matter when visiting an additional website is almost costless i present a model in which consumers know their valuations for the products offered in the market but do not know which retailer sells which product i show that a prominent retailer earns significantly more profit than other firms even when the cost of searching websites and comparing products is essentially zero

impact of the information asymmetry between managers and owners under oligopoly we show using a hotelling 1929 model with laffont and tirole 1986 firms that under duopoly the information asymmetry caused by the separation of ownership and control has two effects on owners incentives to induce effort information asymmetry raises the marginal cost of inducing effort which decreases efforts and increases prices since all firms prices increase this leads to a change in the expected demand of each firm and thus in the marginal benefit of inducing effort which may amplify or mitigate the initial impact as a consequence information asymmetry may induce some firms to increase efforts and lower prices more surprisingly it may increase both ex post and ex ante social welfare

true monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information the paper restates hart s 1985a 1985b definition of large group monopolistic competition distinguishes it from oligopolistic competition and raises the question of whether there are reasonable circumstances that give rise to true monopolistic competition as defined the purpose is to show that consumers imperfect information may create conditions that will turn an otherwise oligopolistic market into a truly monopolistically competitive one