a dynamic analysis of licensing the boomerang effect and grant back clauses this article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on r d competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant back clauses of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant back clause can mitigate this distortion i also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee s incentive to engage in r d and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

royalties vs fees how do firms pay for foreign technology abstract the theoretical determinants of technology licensing contracts have been extensively studied but empirical evidence is scarce we assemble a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in india between 1989 and 1993 industry firm and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts our findings support theoretical arguments licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts we also find that firms are more likely to use output based payments to control the sale and diffusion of r d or brand intensive know how to unaffiliated firms

pre empted patents infringed patents and firms participation in markets for technology abstract in recent years firms have increasingly contributed to and been confronted with a patent landscape characterized by numerous but marginal inventions overlapping claims and patent fences as a result firms risk their patent applications to be pre empted or to be infringed upon by rivals while both aspects constitute major challenges for the appropriation of returns to inventive activity extant literature suggests that participation in the market for technology might actually resolve or at least alleviate these problems in this paper we investigate the effect of pre empted and infringed patents on firms engagement in in and cross licensing based on a sample of more than 1100 german manufacturing firms our results show that firms engage in in licensing as a reaction to pre empted patents and in cross licensing if their protected ip was infringed upon however these effects vary depending on the fragmentation of technology fields and whether the firm operates in a discrete or complex product industry

evaluating interval forecasts a complete theory for evaluating interval forecasts has not been worked out to date most of the literature implicitly assumes homoskedastic errors even when this is clearly violated and proceed by merely testing for correct unconditional coverage consequently i set out to build a consistent framework for conditional interval forecast evaluation which is crucial when higher order moment dynamics are present the new methodology is demonstrated in an application to the exchange rate forecasting procedures advocated in risk management

choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals we examine a rm that can license its production technology to a rival when rms are heterogeneous in production costs we show that a complete technology transfer from one rm to another always increases joint pro t under weakly concave demand when at least three rms remain in the industry a jointly pro table transfer may reduce social welfare although a jointly pro table transfer from the most e cient rm always increases welfare we also consider two auction games under complete information a standard rst price auction and a menu auction by bernheim and whinston 1986 with natural re nement of equilibria we show that the resulting licensees are ordered by degree of e ciency menu auction simple auction and joint pro t maximizing licensees in weakly descending order

what happens when food marketers require restrictive farming practices the dimensions that define a food product have expanded rapidly to include characteristics of the production process marketing arrangements and implications that production and consumption of the product have for the environment some market intermediaries have responded by requiring that their suppliers abide by restrictive production practices we examine the economic effects of such restrictions and apply this analysis to limitations on the use of antibiotics in u s pork production results from conceptual and simulation analyses show that in the absence of demand growth less pork is sold due to higher costs in the restricted segment and both pork consumers on average and producers are harmed demand growth of between 6 11 from adding new consumers who will consume the restricted antibiotic free product but not the conventional product is needed to return consumer surplus to the level in the base case and between 2 4 demand growth was required to return producer surplus to base when restricted and conventional products are modeled using a vertical differentiation framework results depend importantly on the ease with which consumers can switch to a seller who offers their desired product type significant distributional impacts among consumers are present when switching costs are prohibitive

a patent system for both diffusion and exclusion public policy analysis of optimal patent regimes is often framed as a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency in this analytical framework weak patent protection and strict antitrust policy are taken to be directed toward static concerns while protection of intellectual property through strong patent laws is taken as a reflection of broader social concerns for long run growth and technological progress this characterization has some truth but the magnitude of the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency can easily be exaggerated in this article i want to argue that weak patent protection need not be inimical to economic growth and conversely that strong patent protection need not be an enemy of diffusion appropriately structured patent law and antitrust rules can together ensure incentives for r d and also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing r d results through licensing and other means at the same time cooperation among firms at the r d stage can counterbalance weak patent protection by internalizing spillovers from ongoing r d programs and such cooperation may also produce additional spillovers from the existing knowledge

international technology licensing monopoly rents transaction costs and exclusive rights as firms increasingly use licensing to exploit knowledge based assets in global technology markets appropriate structuring of these agreements has become an important line of research inquiry one area that has received less attention is the nature of rights granted in inter firm licensing relationships although it is an important clause that has implications for profit generation from licensing of proprietary assets conceptualizing licensing rights in terms of number of licenses granted and exclusivity rights given to a licensee in a foreign market this paper examines the determinants of these rights based on monopoly rents and transaction costs associated with different types of licensing contracts hypotheses are empirically tested through two studies one based on large us manufacturing firms and the other on a cross national sample of medium sized firms actively involved in international technology licensing results from both studies show a greater propensity to use non exclusive multiple licensing when the licensed technology has greater potential to produce differentiated products or when there is greater threat of substitutive technologies entering the market on the other hand innovative technologies and a higher degree of asset specific investments required of the licensee for the technology are related to the use of single exclusive licensing agreements

corporate governance and innovation a survey abstract the traditional economics of innovation inspired by schumpeter and more recent advances on his work seem unable to explain why firms with similar external conditions may show greatly different performance in innovation contrastingly the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity to the extent that such literature examines the economic effects of different modes of coordination between firm members the process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central to the dynamics of corporate innovation this paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue we start by discussing how various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological innovation we then describe three main channels corporate ownership corporate finance and labour through which a system of corporate governance shapes a firm s innovation activity finally we examine the relationship between country level institutional settings national patterns of corporate governance and the aggregate innovation activity of corporations we conclude by suggesting that future research should focus more deeply on the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and on their joint effect on firm innovation

risk sharing in licensing abstract this paper studies the design of linear license contracts under demand or cost uncertainty the optimal contract consists in general of a mix of a fixed fee and royalties the source of uncertainty has a crucial impact on the type of royalties that must be used in particular under demand uncertainty at most two of the instruments are used the contract generally combines a fixed fee with an ad valorem royalty when cost is uncertain a wider variety of cases can arise the contract may involve a combination of either type of royalties coupled with a fixed fee alternatively it may be optimal to use all three available instruments

optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation this paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity is uncertain we provide sufficient conditions of a general nature under which the licensor prefers to use a per unit royalty contract in particular we show that this is the case for the holders of weak patents if the strategic effect of an increase in a potential licensee s unit cost on the equilibrium industry profit is positive the latter condition is shown to hold in a cournot resp bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous resp differentiated products under general assumptions on the demands faced by firms as a byproduct of our analysis we contribute to the literature on the cost paradox in oligopoly by offering some new insights of independent interest regarding the effects of cost variations on cournot and bertrand equilibria

socially excessive dissemination of patent licences compared with the social optimum a monopolist usually sells too little this result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation katz and shapiro 1986 find conditions under which the lab will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences however i find instead that its incentives can be socially too high the monopoly seller may sell too much for example it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences while it is socially optimal that none is sold en comparaison avec l optimum social un monopoleur habituellement vend trop peu voila qui semble tenir pour le cas d un laboratoire qui vend des licences pour une innovation brevetee qui reduit les couts katz shapiro 1986 ont montre dans quelles conditions le laboratoire va emettre moins que le nombre optimal de licences cependant l auteur decouvre que les incitations peuvent plutot l amener a en emettre trop plus que l optimum social par exemple il se peut que la maximisation du profit amene a vendre plusieurs licences alors qu il serait socialement optimal de n en vendre aucune

a structural model on the impact of prediscovery licensing and research joint ventures on innovation and product market efficiency abstract using a novel database on prediscovery licensing agreements one type of r d cooperation as well as detailed firm level and semiconductor market specific information we estimate the impact of prediscovery licensing agreements pdlas on innovation and product market efficiency our results show that pdlas reduce innovative activity in the semiconductor industry by 10 percent or 4089 patents throughout the 1989 1999 period on the contrary research joint ventures a different type of r d cooperation increase innovative activity based on a structural model we provide evidence that pdlas increase production costs and semiconductor prices by 1 percent which results in customers paying an additional 1 1 billion for semiconductors per year beyond the common concern that r d cooperations facilitate coordination activities in product markets via price fixing our study highlights that pdlas can be used as an instrument to coordinate r d activities which can reduce innovation activity and increase costs and prices

on the design of stable joint ventures abstract an analytical model is developed to study the problem of designing stable joint ventures aimed at jointly developing and supplying a new technology the analysis focuses on the extent to which traditional motives for joint ventures like cost sharing synergy effects or technological spillovers may shape the incentives for firms to cheat on the arrangement and hence despite larger cooperative benefits endanger the formation of a stable agreement the cheating firm although supplying the contractually specified inputs to the venture manages to keep its knowhow proprietary while benefiting from the loyal partner s know how through spillovers from the venture only if know how can be kept sufficiently proprietary within the venture will synergy effects stimulate the formation of a stable joint venture increasing the profitability of cooperation while at the same time stifling the incentives to cheat but if know how becomes difficult to appropriate synergy effects may increase the incentives to cheat resulting in no agreement at least when both parties have perfect foresight

innovation expenditures and the role of government in belgium abstract unlike suggestions from earlier research on the schumpeterian hypothesis it is argued and shown that sales and employment are not simply substitute size measures to test the r d behaviour of foreign and domestic companies operating in belgium further suggests that government sponsored r d has not substituted for privately funded r d foreign companies are found to behave differently and to do less r d the more they pay for externally supplied technology

revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental industry revenue sharing contracts in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers are now widely used in the video rental industry we show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic unpredictable or variable e g systematically declining downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition unlike two part tariffs revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers inventory decisions our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers adoption of revenue sharing contracts

noncooperative oligopoly and preemptive innovation without winner take all earlier models of innovation under oligopolistic rivalry are modified to include a share parameter a describing the manner in which profits are divided among rivals when one firm is successful in its search for a valuable resource stock there is a unique value of a that maximizes expected industry profits by guiding noncooperative oligopolists to choose the profit maximizing exploration rate moreover setting a at this maximizing value which always allocates some share of industry profits to the losers in the exploration race leads to an exploration rate identical to what would be chosen by a jointly managed cartel

quantifying market risk with value at risk or expected shortfall consequences for capital requirements and model risk the basel committee on banking supervision recently proposed fundamental changes in the regulatory treatment of financial institutions trading book positions among others a replacement of value at risk 0 99 by expected shortfall 0 975 for the quantification of market risk is recommended while this increases capital requirements for heavy tailed risks its consequences for model risk related to the estimation process have not been explored hence the aim of this paper is to analyze how both risk measures react to different sources of model risk in order to better understand the impact of the intended change in risk measures our results show that the expected shortfall 0 975 is more sensitive towards regulatory arbitrage and parameter misspecification we find that this is based on a trade off between a model s ability to better capture the heavy tailed behavior of risks and a higher vulnerability to model risk these new aspects should be taken into account in the regulatory decision for expected shortfall 0 975

incentives for cooperation the effects of institutional controls on common pool resource extraction in cambodia cooperation among humans is highly dependent on social and institutional conditions with individual incentives playing a key role in determining the level of cooperation achieved understanding the conditions under which cooperation can emerge has important implications for the design of resource management and wildlife conservation interventions incentive based conservation approaches are being widely implemented yet very few studies test the role of incentives in promoting cooperation in relevant developing country contexts using a common pool resource game in four villages in cambodia we investigated how the level of within group cooperation varies under different institutional arrangements including opportunities for social approval external enforcement of rules and individual and collective incentive payments our results demonstrate the significance of self organisation the ability to devise monitor and enforce a set of rules among resource users treatments which promoted self organisation had the greatest effect in reducing individual extraction achieved the greatest efficiencies and had the strongest interaction with group decision making in reducing extraction the effects of these treatments carried over to reduce extraction in subsequent treatments irrespective of their institutional arrangements these results suggest that policies designed to incentivise certain behaviour in local stakeholder groups may be more successful if they create opportunities for local decision making

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

patents learning by doing and market structure in the chemical processing industries for a sample of 24 chemical products count data models are used to evaluate firms propensity to patent and the link between patented process innovations and output prices the results show that process patenting was largely an outgrowth of learning by doing propensity to patent increased with firm size but decreased with market concentration reductions in output prices were strongly linked to learning by doing and more weakly to the rate of patenting producer firms appear to have been more successful than non producers in appropriating the value of patented process innovations

drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies abstract considering the licensing of a drastic cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n firm cournot oligopoly we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties there are either n 1 or n optimal licensing policies

how closely do hypothetical surveys and laboratory experiments predict field behavior we compare the ability of three preference elicitation methods hypothetical choices nonhypothetical choices and nonhypothetical rankings and three discrete choice econometric models the multinomial logit mnl the independent availability logit ial and the random parameter logit rpl to predict actual retail shopping behavior in three different product categories ground beef wheat flour and dishwashing liquid overall we find a high level of external validity our specific results suggest that the nonhypothetical elicitation approaches especially the nonhypothetical ranking method outperformed the hypothetical choice experiment in predicting retail sales we also find that the rpl can have superior predictive performance but that the mnl predicts equally well in some circumstances experiment

waiting to imitate on the dynamic pricing of knowledge we study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally imitated imitators may enter the market by imitating the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention the possibility of contracting dramatically affects the need for patent protection our results show that i imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist ii the inventor sells knowledge through contracts that allow resale by the imitators and iii under certain conditions the inventor s payoff increases with the number of imitators

market capitalization and value at risk abstract the potential of economic variables for financial risk measurement is an open field for research this article studies the role of market capitalization in the estimation of value at risk var we test the performance of different var methodologies for portfolios with different market capitalization we perform the analysis considering separately financial crisis periods and non crisis periods we find that var methods perform differently for portfolios with different market capitalization for portfolios with stocks of different sizes we obtain better var estimates when taking market capitalization into account we also find that it is important to consider crisis and non crisis periods separately when estimating var across different sizes this study provides evidence that market fundamentals are relevant for risk measurement

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

improving daily value at risk forecasts the relevance of short run volatility for regulatory quality assessment abstract in this paper we present a novel perspective on data filtering and present an innovative wavelet based approach that leads to improved value at risk var forecasts a separation of financial conditional volatility into short mid and long run components allows us to study the relevance of these frequency components with respect to a regulatory quality assessment for daily var forecasts a simulation study and an analysis of daily market prices suggest that short and mid run information components cover the relevant information that is necessary for estimating adequate daily var excluding long run information components reduces daily var forecasts by up to 4 and does not impact the quality of regulatory back testing

endogenous r d and foreign direct investment in international oligopolies abstract this paper examines the impact of the firms mode of foreign expansion on the incentive to innovate as well as the effects of r d activities and technological spillovers on the firms international strategy we consider a two country imperfect competition model where the firms face three different type of decisions how to expand abroad how much to spend on r d and how much to sell in each market market structure is endogenously determined as the equilibrium solution of a three stage game it is shown that the firm that invests more in research is the one which is a mne while the rival is an exporter the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between multinational expansion and r d investment and that in turn investment in research increases the likelihood of multinational expansion the value of the spillover parameter can also be an important determinant of firms international strategy

which deceptive practices if any should be allowed in experimental economics research results from surveys of applied experimental economists and students deceptive experimental practices are banned in some professions but are standard in others recently the journals of the agricultural and applied economics association introduced guidelines that allow researchers to publish articles that use some forms of deception however in their present form these guidelines leave room for interpretation this situation is not ideal for researchers and a clearer definition of which deceptive practices should be banned could be beneficial our aim is to help provide greater clarity and potential guidance for journal policies regarding deception by using the results of surveys of both researcher and student subjects evaluating ten potentially deceptive experimental techniques we find consistent support for banning certain practices while allowing others

patent pools and cross licensing in the shadow of patent litigation this paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable it analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives it shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges this result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other s patents if litigation costs are not too large

an incentive compatible conjoint ranking mechanism a simple method for making ranking based conjoint analysis incentive compatible is proposed the incentive compatible mechanism involves people purchasing a product profile with a probability proportional to its assigned rank in an empirical application related to consumer preferences for beef attributes we find that the forecasted market share for a new pasture raised steak obtained using incentive compatible rankings was significantly greater than that implied from traditional hypothetical conjoint rankings people s rankings of ground beef products were not affected by the mechanism or by information about pasture raised beef copyright 2008 oxford university press

discriminating oligopolists and common markets we analyse the properties of a cournot nash equilibrium which arises when two monopolies operating each in a separate market become a duopoly in a common market with two sub markets the formerly separated markets and are allowed to price discriminate across sub markets this equilibrium implies intra industry trade or crosshauling of identical commodities and freight absorption which is an increasing function of the slope of the marginal cost schedule it also leads to price differences such as those observed in the european car market

transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise an assessment abstract this paper applies transactions cost principles to the multinational enterprise in order to ascertain its distinctive properties as a mode of economic organization the analysis helps identify just when and where contractual alternatives to the multinational firm are likely to be viable this turns out to depend upon the nature of the technology the regime of appropriability within which the firm operates and the characteristics of the markets in question transactions cost analysis is also extended to the multinational enterprise host country relationship implications for management and public policy are derived

socio ecological explanations for crowding out effects from economic field experiments in southern africa abstract economic and psychological literature mentions three conditions under which the crowding out effect of pro social behaviour is likely to occur and to crowd out citizens moral obligations to behave co operatively i use a framed field experiment on joint extraction from a common pool resource cpr where the crowding out effect has already been reported before in combination with the trust game carried out in farming communities of namibia and south africa to replicate these conditions the research design and the cross cultural setting enable to explicitly control for these effects the results of the experiments support that the crowding out effect depends on the nature of the external intervention controlling vs supportive external intervention the degree of participants self determination high vs low self determination in the group a society s norms of trust and reciprocity high vs low trust within the society the results imply that outside regulations aiming to conserve natural resources risk worsening the situation when neglecting democratic legitimization as well as local community norms

innovative strategic groups in multinational industries abstract differences in innovative strategies between groups of domestic and multinational enterprises are analyzed within a two stage game model that incorporates the asymmetries in transaction costs between the two species of enterprises nash and cooperative behaviour is shown to result in different equilibrium r d strategies with the multinational companies doing typically more r d for larger markets and domestic companies focusing on specific market segments survey data from companies operating in eleven high tech multinational industries in belgium provide support for these strategic differences and show how they are related to company performance

optimal cross licensing arrangements collusion versus entry deterrence this paper analyzes optimal cross licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants the optimal cross licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis a vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation we show that a positive cross licensing royalty rate which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome dulls incentives to litigate against entrants our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry deterrence mechanism

milestone payments or royalties contract design for r d licensing we study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee s valuation of the innovation and limited control over the licensee s development efforts a licensing contract typically contains an up front payment milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase and royalties on sales we use principal agent models to formulate the licensor s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee s valuation of the innovation as the licensee s valuation increases the licensor s optimal level of involvement in the development directly or through royalties should decrease only a risk averse licensor should include both up front and milestone payments moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor s value but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract

university licensing of patents for varietal innovations in agriculture there has been a sharp increase in the number of patented agricultural products from public universities in the united states we develop an experiment to examine the revenue stream to universities from licensing plant based innovations in the experiment we asked subjects to bid for access for a patented input that would be used to manufacture a differentiated product treatments were employed to solicit bids that were financed by fees royalties and a combination of the two mechanisms under exclusive and non exclusive contracts the literature studying the economics of downstream duopoly competition in quantity suggests that revenues for the innovator would be greatest under a non exclusive contract that uses fees and royalties in our experiment we allow more than two firms to obtain access to the patent in the non exclusive treatments and our empirical results suggest that innovator revenues are greatest when royalties are used alone in a non exclusive contract

fee versus royalty reconsidered for an outsider innovator in a cournot oligopoly royalty licensing could be superior to both fixed fee and auction the result depends on a simple fact that has been overlooked in the existing literature namely the number of licenses can take only integer values

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

optimal licensing of technology in the face of asymmetric competition abstract we reconsider the optimal technology licensing by an incumbent firm facing multiple competitors first we cover the case of one license and show that competition has a drastic effect on optimal two part tariffs we also consider license auctions and design a more profitable dynamic mechanism next we allow the licensor to award multiple licenses and design a dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry profit it awards licenses to all firms prescribes maximum permitted royalty rates and positive fixed fees and is more profitable than other dynamic mechanisms finally we show that a slight modification of that mechanism is also optimal for outside patent holders

external validity of a framed field experiment abstract results obtained from a value elicitation experiment are used to predict the sales of a new grocery product while the experimental results correspond well with actual retail sales there is a tendency for subjects to exhibit more pro social behavior in the framed field experiment than in the naturally occurring market

technology transfer with moral hazard abstract this paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship that is susceptible to the moral hazard problem the optimal contractual form of licensing derived in the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice for instance the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the prevalence of royalty contracts in the licensing relationship moreover the model is able to relate the size of the royalty rate to the parameters that represent the environments under which the concerned parties operate finally the model can be naturally extended to analyze the choice of a technology holder between direct investment and licensing in an attempt to serve a foreign market

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

fixed fee liscensing of innovations and collusion unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses or output royalties licensing contracts with only a fixed fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences this paper illustrates that fixed fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the licensee s ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion motivated licenses are discussed copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

strategic leaders or strategic groups a longitudinal data envelopment analysis of the u s brewing industry abstract this paper builds on strategic group theory which was originally introduced to help explain the observed variation in firm profitability across an industry this paper applies data envelopment analysis dea to identify both strategic leaders the best practice players in the industry and strategic groups to examine which are the source of the most sustained heterogeneity in the performance of u s brewers contrary to the prevalent research approach in strategy and organization research which places a premium on empirical analyses that maximize explanation of average behavior daft and lewin 1990 this paper examines extremal observations as a means of studying or inducing theories about best practice such as best strategies or most effective organization design lewin and minton 1986 the paper argues that significant insights new knowledge and unexpected theories can arise from studying the best or worst of a population the paper applies dea to a longitudinal reanalysis of u s brewing data to demonstrate its usefulness for obtaining new insights from identifying and studying industry outliers the paper raises important questions about the construct of strategic groups and illustrates how competing theories can be deduced and analyzed for explaining performance heterogeneity in the u s brewing industry

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

licensing a new product with non linear contracts this paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good the licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good we show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good the equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee le memoire examine la situation ou un detenteur de brevet sur une technologie qui permet de produire un nouveau bien cherche a ceder une autorisation d exploiter cette innovation a un ensemble de producteurs qui ont differents couts marginaux de production d un bien existant on montre que le detenteur de brevet est capable d obtenir le profit qu un monopoleur obtiendrait en produisant le nouveau bien le contrat de licence d equilibre specifie a la fois un paiement forfaitaire et un arrangement de royautes sur la base du volume de production de l exploitant

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

general licensing schemes for a cost reducing innovation optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost reducing innovation in a cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators it is shown that for any nondrastic innovation a the license is practically sold to all firms ensuring full diffusion of the innovation b consumers are better off firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved c the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations d compared to an incumbent firm an outsider invests more in r d and has higher incentive to innovate and e as a function of the magnitude of the innovation the industry size that provides the highest incentive to innovate is u shaped

practical implications of game theoretic models of r and d the purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic models of research and development and to ask whether they yield practical implications or testable hypotheses the papers i will be discussing have been written or published within the past five years they have a good deal in common relying upon similar assumptions and building upon each other because of this the literature surveyed here may seem narrow and some relevant work has probably been inadvertently omitted i apologize for these omissions for want of space i will not discuss the normative conclusions of this literature

the effectiveness of reward systems on innovative output an empirical analysis this study investigated the relationship of patent output to the reward systems for individual r d scientists in high technology firms a survey of technical managers in 57 connecticut firms collected information on firm size r d expenditure and the frequency of use of eighteen different reward systems using a regression model patent output was found to be dependent on firm size r d expenditure and on monetary and non monetary reward systems informal award programs and variable bonuses based on the issue of patents when a subset of small firms was investigated separately non monetary rewards were shown to be ineffective however variable bonuses remained important to patent output and large sum reward payments 50 000 also demonstrated a significant effect

on the duration of technology licensing abstract we model an innovator s choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer we find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion moreover licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods

improving the value at risk forecasts theory and evidence from the financial crisis abstract the recent financial crisis has raised numerous questions about the accuracy of value at risk var as a tool to quantify extreme losses in this paper we develop data driven var approaches that are based on the principle of optimal combination and that provide robust and precise var forecasts for periods when they are needed most such as the recent financial crisis within a comprehensive comparative study we provide the latest piece of empirical evidence on the performance of a wide range of standard var approaches and highlight the overall outperformance of the newly developed methods

per unit vs ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information we study an inside patent holder s optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival the patent holder can choose any two part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties we demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a fully separating contract with different per unit royalty rates or a contract with a single ad valorem royalty that excludes a high cost rival fixed fees will not be used the presence of asymmetric information uniquely drives the per unit royalties that otherwise would not be adopted per unit royalties always generate higher social welfare than ad valorem royalties

multinational enterprise internal governance and industrial organization abstractthe following sections are included monopoly vs efficiency interpretations of the multinational enterprisehost country controlsdynamic considerationsconclusionreferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion abstract we present a differential game to study how companies can simultaneously license their innovations to other firms when launching a new product the licensee may cannibalize licensor s sales albeit this can be compensated by gains from royalties nonetheless patent royalties are generally so low that licensing is not an attractive strategy in this paper we consider the role of licensing to speed up the product diffusion word of mouth by licensee s customers and licensee s advertising indirectly push forward sales of the licensing company accelerating new product diffusion we find evidence that licensing can be a potentially profitable strategy however we also find that a weak intellectual property right ipr protection can easily diminish the financial attractiveness of licensing

shirking sharing risk and shelving the role of university license contracts abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard risk sharing and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties the potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm this supports the rationale for bayh dole march in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts

caviar conditional autoregressive value at risk by regression quantiles value at risk var has become the standard measure of market risk employed by financial institutions for both internal and regulatory purposes var is defined as the value that a portfolio will lose with a given probability over a certain time horizon usually one or ten days despite its conceptual simplicity its measurement is a very challenging statistical problem and none of the methodologies developed so far give satisfactory solutions interpreting the var as the quantile of future portfolio values conditional on current information we propose a new approach to quantile estimation which does not require any of the extreme assumptions invoked by existing methodologies such as normality or i i d returns the conditional autoregressive value at risk or caviar model moves the focus of attention from the distribution of returns directly to the behavior of the quantile we specify the evolution of the quantile over time using a special type of autoregressive process and use the regression quantile framework introduced by koenker and bassett to determine the unknown parameters since the objective function is not differentiable we use a differential evolutionary genetic algorithm for the numerical optimization utilizing the criterion that each period the probability of exceeding the var must be independent of all the past information we introduce a new test of model adequacy the dynamic quantile test applications to simulated and real data provide empirical support to this methodology and illustrate the ability of these algorithms to adapt to new risk environments

climate change and index insurance demand evidence from a framed field experiment in tanzania abstract index insurance has been touted as part of an adaptation strategy to mitigate climate risks among smallholder farmers however in the face of increasing drought probabilities demand for index insurance may decrease compared to a scenario with no climate change if farmers learn slowly or place considerable weight on prior beliefs using data from a framed field experiment in tanzania we estimate a structural learning model based on a bayesian change point inference method and separately identify the effect of learning expectations recency bias and ambiguity on insurance demand furthermore by simulating the supply side of the insurance market under a set of plausible assumptions we show that climate change results in reduced uptake rates in most cases although demand may increase if the severity of climate change is sufficiently low overall our results provide an alternative explanation for the puzzle of low index insurance demand