organizing the global value chain a firm level test in this paper we study the organization of global value chains on a sample of about 4 000 manufacturing parent companies operating more than 90 000 affiliates on a global scale which chose to integrate at least once in the period 2004 2012 assuming a technological sequence of production stages a recent property rights framework antra s and chor 2013 alfaro et al 2015 predicts that a choice of vertical integration is crucially based on both the position of a supplier along the chain and on the relative size of demand elasticities faced by the final producer and the supplier we positively test whether if final demand is sufficiently elastic inelastic producers of final goods integrate production stages that are more proximate to far from the consumers however this is not valid for cases of midstream parents i e for producers of intermediate inputs that can integrate either backward or forward along the chain we document that midstream are at least as common as are downstream parent companies but that existing theory neglects them in these cases we find that demand elasticities do not play a significant role in integration choices interestingly both midstream and downstream parents tend to integrate affiliates that are more proximate in segments of a supply chain our findings point to a role for technological determinants that may be as important as are contracting frictions in organizing global value chains

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation abstract we study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits we allow for non tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration therefore typically consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability if access prices are unregulated however legal unbundling may be quite undesirable

vertical economies in electric power evidence on integration and its alternatives abstract the restructuring of the electric power industry raises questions about the possible sacrifice of economies previously secured by integrating generation with downstream transmission and distribution this study utilizes a data set of u s electric utilities that differ widely in their degree of vertical integration in order to model estimate and measure such economies cost savings from vertical integration are found to be quite substantial for all but the smallest utilities and are largest for those that are nearly fully integrated the study goes on to investigate alternatives to sources of and determinants of vertical integration among other findings it appears that some holding companies achieve economies comparable to those from vertical integration

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

is the response of output to monetary policy asymmetric evidence from a regime switching coefficients model this paper investigates regime switching in the response of u s output to a monetary policy action we find substantial statistically significant time variation in this response that corresponds to high response and low response regimes we then investigate whether the timing of the regime shifts are consistent with three particular manifestations of asymmetry by modeling the transition probabilities governing the switching process as functions of state variables we find strong evidence that policy actions taken during recessions have larger effects than those taken during expansions we find less evidence of asymmetry related to the direction or size of the policy action

computable markov perfect industry dynamics we provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment entry andexit toensurethatthereexistsacomputationallytractablemarkov perfectequilibrium we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model our game of incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry exit strategies in contrast the existence of an equilibrium in the ericson and pakes model of industry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed entry exit strategies contrary to the assertion in their article that existing algorithms cannot cope with in addition we provide a condition on the model s primitives that ensures that the equilibrium is in pure investment strategies building on this basic existence result we first show that a symmetric equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions on the model s primitives second we show that as the distribution of the random scrap values setup costs becomes degenerate equilibria in cutoff entry exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry exit strategies of the game of complete information

upstream competition between vertically integrated firms we propose a model of two tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms we show that even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input the bertrand logic may collapse and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient we discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market

the competitive impact of vertical integration by multiproduct firms we study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries to do so we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the us carbonated beverage industry while the elimination of double marginalization with vertical integration is normally characterized as procompetitive economic theory predicts that it may cause anticompetitive price increases in multiproduct industries we indeed find that vertical integration causes price decreases in products with eliminated double margins but price increases in the other products sold by the integrated firm these results provide new evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers

the measurement of vertical economies and the efficient structure of the electric utility industry in this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integration the utility of this measure is then demonstrated by estimating the vertical cost structure of the electric utility industry and by carrying out the calculations necessary to determine the magnitude of vertical economies in this industry the results provide empirical evidence of the existence of significant economies of vertical integration between the generation and transmission distribution stages of electricity supply copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

the effectiveness of the public support policies for the european industry financing as a contribution to sustainable development in recent years the debate about the role of the public institutions in the fields of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development has gained momentum nevertheless the ambiguity of the latter concepts makes it difficult both to measure them and to estimate the impact that the different public initiatives may have on them in this sense the present research has the aim to design a fuzzy logic based methodology applied to the evaluation of the above mentioned processes in relation to the state aid policies for the european industry regarding the study contour the european union state aids seems not to have introduced important changes leading to socially responsible results and therefore favourable for the sustainable development generated by the european manufacturing industry

patents licensing and market structure in the chemical industry abstract the strategies of rent appropriation and industry structure are inter dependent how firms use patents depends upon industry structure and in turn affects industry structure in the 19th century market leaders in the chemical industry combined patents and secrecy to deter entry within cartels patents were used to stabilize cartels and organize technology licensing the role of patents changed in the less concentrated post world war ii markets in bulk organic chemicals and petrochemicals chemical producers use licensing as an important means of generating revenue from process innovations the increased importance of technology licensing is closely related to the emergence of a class of specialized process design and engineering firms that have played an important role in the development and diffusion of process innovations

vertical foreclosure versus downstream competition with capital precommitment abstract the recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level we allow the upstream firm to make an ex ante capital precommitment we show that if integration is outlawed the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output we show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration

endogenous price leadership with an essential input abstract the hamilton slutsky endogenous timing methodology is applied to differentiated duopolies where motivated by access pricing literature one firm owns an essential input sold wholesale to the rival both firms then set retail prices for their differentiated goods the scenario and results are different from standard endogenous timing duopolies encompassing three prices one wholesale two retail rather than two with unique timing game equilibrium which always entails retail price leadership by the input owner thus providing a new and powerful rationalisation for stackelberg the results call into question the generic access pricing assumption that simultaneous moves determine retail downstream prices

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

vertical mergers and product differentiation this paper presents an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers that incorporates strategic behaviors in the hotelling type location model this enables one to consider the relationship between downstream firms strategies for product differentiation and vertical integration i show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation of the integrated firm under some conditions partial integration arises in equilibrium which may increase the profit of the nonintegrated downstream firm the paper also discusses the welfare implications of vertical integration

vertical restraints and producers competition this paper examines the rationale for vertical restraints it shows that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have significant anti competitive effects the paper focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements among the retailers of two products which are imperfect substitutes such arrangements are shown to increase consumer prices under plausible conditions the increase in consumer prices is sufficiently large to more than offset the deleterious effects from double marginalization resulting from reduced competition among retailers the imposition of exclusivity provisions is may be part of a nash equilibrium among producers these results hold whether there are or are not franchise fees this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the asymmetric effects of monetary policy a nonlinear vector autoregression approach this paper tests for nonlinearity in a standard vector autoregression including output prices and money supply using an estimation strategy that is consistent with a wide range of structural macroeconomic models shocks to the money supply are found to have stronger output effects and weaker price effects when output growth is initially low positive and negative monetary shocks are found to have nearly symmetric effects in addition there is some evidence that shocks of different magnitudes have asymmetric effects these results are consistent with the view that the aggregate supply curve is convex

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

product improvement and technological tying in a winner take all market in a winner take all duopoly market for systems in which rms invest to improve their products a vertically integrated monopoly supplier of an essential system component may have an incentive to advantage itself by technological tying that is by designing the component to work better in its own system if the vertically integrated rm is prevented from technologically tying then there is an equilibrium in which the more e cient rm invests and serves the entire market however another equilibrium may exist in which the less e cient rm invests and captures the market technological tying enables a vertically integrated rm to foreclose its rival the welfare implications of technological tying are ambiguous and depend on the asymmetric qualities of the system suppliers and on equilibrium selection

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

on the competitive effects of vertical integration by a research laboratory abstract an independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry that produces differentiated goods we analyze whether the laboratory prefers to license the innovation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry licensing the innovation as an internal patentee under linear demand and cournot competition we show first that the vertical merger is profitable only in the case of small innovations whereas a merger increases welfare only for significant innovations second all profitable vertical mergers reduce welfare however some profitable mergers are welfare improving under price competition

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

on the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy decisions this paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make or buy decisions because of strategic downstream considerations entrants may always undertake efficient make or buy decisions regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers

intimidating competitors endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly this paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly analyzing a linear cournot model we establish the following key results i vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment intimidation effect ii asymmetric integration is a non degenerate equilibrium outcome iii compared to a benchmark model without investment complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome we argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear cournot model under reasonable assumptions

regulation vertical integration and sabotage we consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a bertrand competitive differentiated products downstream industry to 1 vertically integrate forward and 2 raise its downstream rivals costs through non price activities which we characterize generally as sabotage we examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price we find that while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation welfare effects are also explored

access to bottleneck inputs under oligopoly a prisoners dilemma we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market first two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept if any second firms compete on salop s circle the firms may be asymmetrically located on the circle to reflect differences in consumer shares for some levels of asymmetry the incumbents face a prisoners dilemma with respect to conceding access to their bottleneck inputs entry by a downstream firm may lead to lower retail prices however entry may also lead to higher retail prices for the access provider and for the entrant we also consider the cases where there are several incumbents and where the entrant makes the access price offers

abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property patent thickets layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers patent thickets involve complementary products which gives rise to double marginalization the so called royalty stacking problem and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare this paper examines the impact of licensing policies of one or more upstream owners essential intellectual property ip on the downstream firms that require access to that ip the terms under which downstream firms can access this ip affects entry decisions product diversity prices and welfare we consider both the case in which a single party controls the essential ip and the case in which different parties control complementary pieces of essential ip we compare the outcome of several alternative standard licensing arrangements such as flat rate access fees royalty percentages per unit fees patent pools and cross licensing arrangements with or without vertical integration we first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential ip increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety which creates added value but it also intensifies downstream competition which dissipates profits we derive conditions under which the upstream ip monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare when there are multiple owners of essential ip royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face the paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society finally the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies with fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price an upstream ip owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition in contrast volume based license fees i e per unit access fees do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration the paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when ip owners charge fixed or volume based access fees

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

strategic aspects of vertical delegation abstract this paper offers an overview of the strategic aspects of situations where either institutionally or contractually a firm delegates some of its decisions to another firm a subsidiary an internal division etc delegation may have several kinds of strategic benefits in the short term it may improve the competitive position of the firm or induce a more lenient behavior from its competitors in the long run it may be used to deter the entry of potential competitors to foreclose market access or to induce actual competitors to exit the paper analyzes the trade off between these possible benefits and the agency costs of delegation and emphasizes the key issues of credibility and commitment

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

are the effects of monetary policy asymmetric huntley schaller by building on the hamilton 1989 markov switching model we examine questions like does monetary policy have the same effect in expansions and recessions given that the economy is currently in a recession does a fall in interest rates increase the probability of an expansion does monetary policy have an incremental effect on the growth rate within a given state or does it only affect the economy if it is sufficiently strong to induce a state change e g from recession to expansion as suggested by models with sticky prices or finance constraints interest rate changes have larger effects during recessions jel e52 e32 much of the recent work in macroeconomics has proceeded under the assumption that variables follow linear stochastic processes with constant coefficients as a result some of the richness of the burns mitchell analysis such as its focus on asymmetries between recessions and expansions may well have been lost blanchard and fischer 1989 7 i introduction for decades macroeconomists have debated whether monetary policy has the same effect on real output in expansions and recessions as far back as the 1930s keynes and pigou debated whether monetary policy would have less effect on output during a severe economic downturn in the 1960s there were active debates on a very different proposition namely whether the rightward portion of the aggregate supply curve was vertical so that monetary policy would have less effect on real output during expansions in this article we provide a new type of evidence on whether monetary policy has different effects depending on whether the economy is in an expansion or recession empirical evidence on this issue is particularly relevant in light of new theoretical work in macroeconomics that predicts asymmetric effects of demand shocks conditional on the state of the economy two examples of this work are s s type models of price adjustment and models in which there are agency costs of financial intermediation 1 the intuition for the latter class of models is simple 2 when there is information asymmetry in financial markets agents may behave as if they were constrained for a variety of reasons these finance constraints are more likely to bind during recessions when the net worth of agents is low an increase in interest rates will then have two effects on investment the standard effect of increasing the cost of capital and therefore reducing investment demand and an additional effect of reducing liquidity e g by increasing debt service obligations and thus reducing investment demand for constrained agents as a result monetary policy actions that change interest rates will have greater effects during a recession 3 the s s type price adjustment models of ball and mankiw 1994 caballero and engel 1992 and tsiddon 1993 lead to a convex aggregate supply curve and therefore also imply that monetary policy will have stronger effects during recessions one of the more frequently cited empirical papers on the potentially asymmetric effects of monetary policy is cover 1992 which finds evidence that positive monetary shocks have different effects from negative monetary shocks we are looking at a different type of asymmetry namely between booms and recessions we study asymmetries using an extension of the markov switching model developed by hamilton 1989 estimated over the period 1955 93 in hamilton s econometric specification the growth rate of output depends on a state variable that corresponds to an expansion or recession this approach has several advantages first unlike linear projections it allows for nonlinearities and asymmetries second in estimating the recession coefficients it gives greater relative weight to observations that most clearly correspond to recessions and similarly for the expansion coefficients

a market power based model of business groups we propose an model of vertically and horizontally integrated business groups that allows the number and size of each group to be determined endogenously we find that more than one configuration of groups can arise in equilibrium several different types of business groups can occur each of which are consistent with profit maximization and are stable we suggest that the strongly integrated groups arising in the model characterize the chaebol found in south korea whereas the less integrated groups describe those found in taiwan

vertical integration as a source of hold up while vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold up problem this article highlights instead that it can generate hold up problems for rivals we consider a successive duopoly where downstream firms invest and then secure support from an upstream supplier we first show that vertical integration generates ex ante incentives to create hold up problems an integrated supplier is willing to pre commit itself to appropriating or dissipating part of its customer s profits to expose the independent rival to being held up by the other supplier and discourage in this way the rival s investment we then show that even in the absence of any pre commitment vertical integration also creates hold up problems ex post when degrading the quality of the support provided to one downstream firm benefits its rival we also provide illustrations in terms of standard industrial organization models and of antitrust cases and discuss the robustness of the insights

is there anti competitive behaviour in the central canadian cement industry testing arbitrage cost hypotheses allegations of anticompetitive behavior in the central canadian cement industry have focused around the effects of cement producers buying their downstream distributors if indeed vertical integration is causing cement prices to rise the relevant economic theories imply that the arbitrage cost of shipping cement to central canada is greater than the cost of shipping cement from this region the authors investigate this theory by econometrically estimating the relevant arbitrage costs their analysis supports the hypothesis that vertical integration has increased barriers to entry for cement in toronto but it fails to support a similar hypothesis for montreal

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

incentives for input foreclosure we analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in contrast to the extant literature our model allows for upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs as the integrated firm decides on the degree of foreclosure through the scale of its continued participation in a merchant market the model can be applied also to cases where the foreclosed input is not essential as well as to cases where foreclosure is not complete we find that incentives to foreclose are much lower than in existing models with upstream cournot competition if there is also cournot competition downstream there will never be complete foreclosure in the case of linear demand potentially more important for practical purposes is our criticism of some explicit assertions made in the european commission s 2007 non horizontal merger guidelines we find that pre merger margins on the up and downstream markets are not necessarily good predictors of the incentives for subsequent i e post merger foreclosure

how to compete cournot versus bertrand in a vertical structure with an integrated input supplier we study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and its retail competitor in a differentiated duopoly using a similar vertical structure arya et al 2008 show that bertrand competition is more profitable than cournot competition which contrasts with conventional wisdom in this article we first demonstrate that such a result is robust to the endogenous determination of the type of contract second by introducing managerial incentives in the model we find that delegation to managers may lead each firm to choose a quantity contract and as long as products are sufficiently differentiated entails conflicting choices causing nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies significantly high product substitutability reconciles firms objectives under delegation leading unique or multiple equilibria with symmetric types of contracts to arise

real time forecasting with a mixed frequency var this article develops a vector autoregression var for time series which are observed at mixed frequencies quarterly and monthly the model is cast in state space form and estimated with bayesian methods under a minnesota style prior we show how to evaluate the marginal data density to implement a data driven hyperparameter selection using a real time dataset we evaluate forecasts from the mixed frequency var and compare them to standard quarterly frequency var and to forecasts from midas regressions we document the extent to which information that becomes available within the quarter improves the forecasts in real time this article has online supplementary materials

do government subsidies stimulate training expenditure microeconometric evidence from plant level data this paper examines whether financial assistance provided by government induces firms to spend more of their own funds on training expenditures using plant level data for the republic of ireland we pay particular attention to the potential problems in such an evaluation study namely selectivity and endogeneity by first identifying a valid counterfactual for grant receiving plants via a matching estimator and then employing a difference in differences technique on this matched sample our results show that there are differences in causal effects between domestic and foreign owned plants for the former we find clear evidence that grant receipt stimulates private expenditure whereas there are no statistically significant effects for foreign owned plants based in ireland

structural vector autoregressions with nonnormal residuals in structural vector autoregressive svar modeling sometimes the identifying restrictions are insufficient for a unique specification of all shocks in this paper it is pointed out that specific distributional assumptions can help in identifying the structural shocks in particular a mixture of normal distributions is considered as a possible model that can be used in this context our model setup enables us to test restrictions which are just identifying in a standard svar framework the results are illustrated using a u s macro data set and a system of u s and european interest rates

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

strategic investments with spillovers vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market abstract we analyse competition between two retailers of broadband access when they differ in their ability to offer value added services one retailer is vertically integrated and controls the input market for local access this firm invests to increase the input quality upgrading to broadband before an access price regulation is set we first show that access price regulation may lower consumer surplus and welfare if retailers do not differ too much second if the integrated firm s ability to offer value added services is much higher than that of the rival the integrated firm uses overinvestment as an alternative foreclosure tool

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

entry deterrence by non horizontal merger we study when and how pure non horizontal mergers whether cross product or vertical can deter new entry organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition because heightened competition deters entry mergers can occur in equilibrium even when absent entry considerations they do not we show that in order to prevent a flood of entrants mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant

state dependent transmission of monetary policy in the euro area we estimate a logit mixture vector autoregressive model describing monetary policy transmission in the euro area over the period 1999 2015 in contrast to other classes of nonlinear vector autoregressive models regime affiliation is neither strictly binary nor binary with a transition period and based on multiple variables we show that monetary policy transmission in the euro area can be described as a mixture of two states in both states output and prices are found to decrease after contractionary monetary policy shocks however the effects of monetary policy are less enduring in the crisis state

human capital theory and uk vocational training policy since the industrial training act of 1964 the uk government has adopted a variety of policies intended to redress a problem of under investment in vocational training in the 1960s and 1970s it attempted to regulate the training provided by firms through a levy scheme more recently subsidised training schemes have been the centrepiece of policy this paper examines the explanations for market failure in vocational training and explores the rationale for such policies under investment can arise from credit constraints and uncertainty facing trainees and from imperfect competition in the labour market which creates external benefits for firms both subsidies and regulation can be effective in dealing with these problems although it is argued that the training levy scheme as implemented in the uk and other countries should be viewed mainly as a mechanism for releasing credit constraints copyright 1999 by oxford university press

equilibrium vertical foreclosure reply in ordover saloner and salop 1990 hereafter oss we showed that a downstream duopolist may have an incentive to backward integrate in order to foreclose its downstream rival from a source of upstream supply as a result of the vertical integration the downstream rival s input price increases giving the integrating firm a competitive advantage in the downstream market moreover in equilibrium the foreclosed downstream rival does not find it profitable to negate these effects by integrating itself oss considers a four stage game involving two upstream firms ul and u2 and two downstream firms dl and d2 in the first stage the downstream firms can bid to acquire ul if there is an acquisition say dl acquires ul to form f1 upstream input prices are set in the second stage in the third stage knowing the input prices it faces d2 can attempt to acquire u2 finally in the fourth stage dl and d2 compete a la bertrand with differentiated products in his comment david reiffen 1992 makes three distinct points first he notes that once dl has acquired ul the equilibrium of the subsequent subgame depends critically on how upstream prices are set in the second stage he argues that our results depend on the ability of fl to commit to a high upstream price this criticism previously has been made by oliver hart and jean tirole 1990 we show below that the results in oss do not depend on the ability of fl to commit instead our main result stems from the fact that vertical integration changes the firm s incentives to engage in price cutting in the input market the notion that vertically integrated firms behave differently from unintegrated ones in supplying inputs to downstream rivals would strike a businessperson if not an economist as common sense 1 we show that there is theoretical merit to that common sense view second reiffen argues that the game considered by oss is similar to a game in which there is no vertical integration but rather where a nonintegrated dl has a first mover advantage in the downstream market in such a game dl benefits from the ability to commit to the price that its stackelberg leadership position gives it reiffen considers this to be additional evidence in support of the claim that oss depends critically on fl s ability to commit not on vertical integration we explain why the mechanism by which dl is able to raise its profits in the sequential one shot game considered by reiffen is conceptually quite different from the mechanism by which dl profits from vertical integration in oss third reiffen argues that our results depend on there being only two upstream firms this is correct in the symmetric bertrand model analyzed however as we discuss below our results do obtain as long as the upstream price is decreasing in the number of firms as occurs in many oligopoly models particularly when costs vary across firms the next section summarizes the conceptual problems pertaining to upstream pricing these problems are resolved in section ii by means of simple and natural price ordover department of economics new york university 269 mercer st 7th floor new york ny 10003 saloner graduate school of business stanford university stanford ca 94305 salop georgetown university law center 600 new jersey avenue nw washington dc 20001 we have benefited greatly from several discussions with faruk gul research support from the national science foundation grant 8813943 iri the sloan foundation and the c v starr center for applied economics at nyu is gratefully acknowledged for example the japan u s strategic impediments initiative is predicated on the proposition that the loosely linked japanese firms that form the various keiretsu do discriminate against nonaffiliated firms