increasing dominance with no efficiency effect abstract i uncover a new force towards increasing dominance the property whereby in dynamic games the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms the new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races i assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources i show that in equilibrium the laggard chooses a less promising path in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the leader this results in increasing dominance and holds true even if no joint payoff or efficiency effect is present journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 l1

interfering with secondary markets we present a model to address in a unified manner four ways in which a monopolist can interfere with secondary markets in the model consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality so that used good markets play an allocative role our results are the following 1 in contrast to swan s famous independence result a monopolist does not provide socially optimal durability 2 allowing the monopolist to rent does not restore socially optimal durability and increases the monopolist s market power in the used market however forcing the monopolist to sell the goods may be a bad policy because it would lead to either lower output or lower durability 3 the manufacturer benefits from a well functioning used good market despite the fact that used goods provide competition for new goods 4 the monopolist prefers to restrict consumers abilities to maintain the good

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog abstract in a model of an uncovered market of vertically differentiated products incentives of non identical duopolists to improve the technological maximum quality are analyzed it is assumed that initially firms offer products with different qualities and that the r d cost function changes exogenously this induces a reconsideration of firms quality decisions both firms have the same r d costs for improving the maximum quality quality changes within the existing quality range are assumed to incur only fixed adjustment costs it is shown that the firm which initially is in the low quality position always has a higher incentive to improve industry s quality than its rival if adjustments costs are sufficiently high persistence of dominance may occur for a low degree of initial differentiation low adjustment costs and r d cost functions with a high slope

an evolutionary model of bertrand oligopoly we analyze the long run outcome of markets in which boundedly rational firms with a decreasing returns to scale technology compete in prices the behavior of these firms is based on limitation of success and experimentation in this framework we introduce a new approach to model boundedly rational behavior based on the idea of behavioral principles i e formal descriptions even with the simplest ones the result is that the prices announced are a strict refinement of the set of nash equilibria with more sophisticated behavioral principles the long run outcome corresponds to the concept of central prices wich are also nash equilibria introduced here this is a robust and clear cut prediction wich under quadratic costs and arbitrary demand essentially coincides with the walrasian equilibrium

disruption costs learning by doing and technology adoption abstract we study technology adoption in a dynamic model of price competition adoption involves disruption costs and learning by doing because of disruption costs the adopting firm begins in a market disadvantage which may persist if its rival captures the customers that the adopting firm needs to learn the technology the prospect of future rents by the rival results in i a failure to adopt socially efficient technologies ii an equilibrium preference for technologies that are learned faster but have lower social value and iii more technologies being adopted if more firms enter the market

a note on the estimation of the equity efficiency trade off for qalys abstract in this note the veil of ignorance approach is tested as a basis for empirically determining the shape of the social welfare function for qalys an experiment is carried out where the participants choose between different societies that differ with respect to per capita qalys and the distribution of qalys the answers are analyzed using logistic regression analysis according to the results the respondents are willing to give up 1 qaly in the group with more qalys to gain 0 45 qalys in the group with fewer qalys but this trade off is independent of the size of the difference in qalys between the groups

does sticky information affect the locus of innovation evidence from the japanese convenience store industry abstract scholars have long discussed the locus of innovation and its determinants there is empirical evidence that innovations can be developed by those holding any of a number of functional relationships to them such as manufacturers users or materials suppliers past studies have considered two factors important in predicting the functional locus of innovation one is expected profit of a player involved in the innovation and the other is stickiness of innovation related information although some studies have shown empirically the link between an innovator s expected profits and the locus of innovation no research has yet been conducted to test the hypothesized relationship between stickiness of innovation related information and the locus of innovation in the study reported upon here i explore relationships between these two variables via a study of 24 innovations for the japanese convenience store industry my study shows empirically that stickiness of innovation related information does have the hypothesized relationship to the functional locus of innovation i discuss implications of these findings and some directions for future research

understanding preference for egalitarian policies in health are age and sex determinants this article presents an empirical assessment of the relevance of different factors when understanding preferences for outcome egalitarian policies in health in particular respondent age and sex a representative sample of the spanish population was interviewed n 1209 after being informed that those from the higher social class have longer life expectancy at birth than those from the lower social class respondents were required to choose between two programmes to increase life expectancy of the two groups by the same amount the distribution neutral programme and to target the lowest social class group thereby reducing current health inequalities the targeting or egalitarian programme two variants one with and the other without visual aid are used majority 69 of respondents support targeting an effect of age was observed where younger and older individuals are less likely to target the egalitarian policy than those in middle age however individual s sex was not associated wit

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

competition or predation consumer coordination strategic pricing and price floors in network markets although network effects can make predation more likely to succeed we find that the leading anti predation rules may lower or raise efficiency and consumer welfare in network markets we find that a the extensive debates about the correct measure of cost on which to base price floors are unlikely to be productive b the ordover willig rule that is widely thought to be correct in theory but difficult to apply in practice is in fact incorrect in theory and c efficient price floors would have to depend on consumer expectations and coordination processes that are unlikely to be observable in practice

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

theories of justice and their implications for priority setting in health care abstract the paper aims to show how three theories of distributive justice utilitarianism egalitarianism and maximin can provide a clearer understanding of the normative basis of different priority setting regimes in the health service the paper starts with a brief presentation of the theories followed by their prescriptions for distribution as illustrated with their respective preferred points on a utility possibility frontier after this general discussion attention is shifted from utils to health the paper discusses how the recent norwegian guidelines for priority setting can be understood in the light of the theories

bertrand competition and cournot outcomes further results the model of kreps and scheinkman where firms choose capacities and then compete in price is extended to oligopoly further capacity is an imperfect commitment device firms can produce beyond capacities at an additional unit cost when is larger than the cournot price the cournot outcome obtains in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when decreases from the cournot price towards zero the whole range of prices from cournot to bertrand is obtained in equilibrium

entry and competitive dynamics in the mobile telecommunications market abstract we propose an extension of the gans stern gans j s stern s 2003 the product market and the market for ideas commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs research policy 32 2 333 350 framework that includes entry by existing firms an incumbent firm possessing complementary assets and strong appropriability is in a formidable position teece d j 1986 profiting from technological innovation implications for integration collaboration licensing and public policy research policy 15 6 285 305 however a de alio entrant can leverage complementary assets to enter along a new technological trajectory and then develop appropriability we illustrate how several mobile telecommunications firms ericsson nokia and samsung pursued this strategy to catch up with the market leader motorola we also identify several shortcomings in motorola s approach it was too inward looking in developing technologies but ironically not inward looking enough in exploiting its most valuable patents

what should you do when your competitors send in the clones this paper develops a model to address an important problem facing a manufacturer of a durable product that is how can it plan its new product introductions to minimize the obsolescence of the old product preserve its market for the new product and keep copycat products at bay we analyze these issues by developing a two period model in which a firm sells an old product in period 1 and a new product in period 2 we consider various new product introduction strategies such as product replacement line extension and upgrading we find that the optimal response to a threat of competitive clones is to increase the level of product innovation this increase in innovation coupled with the entry of a competitive product implies that the incumbent firm has less of an incentive to leapfrog the old product or shelve the new product

comparing cournot and bertrand in a homogeneous product market abstract this paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of cournot and bertrand equilibrium outcomes results obtained by vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the market sharing rules it is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of bertrand equilibria for example the capacity sharing rule if however the sharing rule does not have this property for example the equal sharing rule then the results referred to above may not hold when costs are asymmetric journal of economic literatureclassification numbers l13

when do stronger patents increase continual innovation under continual innovation greater patent strength expands innovating firms profit against imitation but also shifts profit from current to past innovators we show how the impact of patents on innovation as determined by these two opposing effects varies with industry characteristics when the discount factor is sufficiently high the negative profit division effect is negligible and innovation monotonically increases in patent strength otherwise innovation has an inverted u relationship with patent strength and stronger patents are more likely to increase innovation when the discount factor or the fixed innovation cost is higher we also show how the impact of patents on innovation may change with firms innovation capability and with the intensity of competition from imitators

the learning curve market dominance and predatory pricing sufficient conditions for id and iid are given in the case of two step learning in which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve after just two sales however examples are also constructed for the two step learning case in which neither id nor iid holds it is also shown that in equilibrium iid implies that learning is privately disadvantageous although it is socially advantageous finally introducing avoidable fixed costs and possible exit into the model yields a new theory of predatory pricing based on the learning curve hypothesis

innovation imitation and social welfare this paper focuses on the impact of competition by imitation more specifically copying for innovative activity and social welfare in part it is a response to recent empirical work 10 12 that has tried to measure the relationship between innovation and imitation costs these papers include a direct call for theoretical modeling that takes explicit account of such cost relationships and we try to answer this challenge specifically we examine the implications for product quality and social welfare when innovators anticipate that a successful product will be copied by rivals obviously previous empirical research is not the only source of interest in these issues the potential effects of imitation on innovative activity have long been both a theoretical and practical concern in recent years a variety of authors have addressed the appropriability issue raised by imitation and its implications for innovative activity 4 7 2 there has also been work on explicit copying i e photocopying 8 11 in the policy arena the protection of product design and intellectual property rights is the focus of much recent actual and proposed u s legislation and a major issue in the uruguay round of trade talks 1 21 our analysis of this topic differs from that of previous work in a number of important respects first we focus explicitly on product as opposed to process innovations second and perhaps even more important we do not restrict the firm s choice to be to innovate or not to innovate instead we allow the innovator to choose what kind or quality of new good to introduce into the market the higher the quality the higher is the development cost third when the innovating firm decides what kind of new product to market it does so under uncertainty about demand the popularity of the new product is not known until after the innovator has chosen the level of quality and sunk its product development costs fourth at the initial time at which the innovator chooses the quality of product to develop it does so with the knowledge that its innovation if it is popular will be copied by later rival entrants finally in direct response to the empirical work mentioned above we explicitly focus on the ratio of imitation to innovation costs our approach yields a number of insights not the least of which is a more precise identification of the potential gains and losses from imitative competition indeed using a quadratic development cost function we explicitly calculate the impact of copying on social welfare this explicit welfare analysis further distinguishes our analysis from most previous work

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

is it a car or a truck managerial beliefs the choice of product architecture and the emergence of the minivan market segment new markets segments are a common setting for studies in technology strategy these studies generally assume that new segments already exist or have formed following the introduction of a product innovation by an entering firm thus theory on the role of established firms in the emergence of new market segments is underdeveloped this study informs current research by explaining the product innovation decisions of established firms during the emergence of a new market segment the results of a case study on the development and commercialization of the minivan at chrysler ford and general motors between 1970 and 1985 indicate that existing theories based on managerial cognition firm capabilities economic incentives and organizational structure are insufficient to explain the decisions this article develops theory based on the interrelationship of these four mechanisms

inequality aversion health inequalities and health achievement this paper addresses two issues the first is how health inequalities can be measured in such a way as to take into account policymakers attitudes towards inequality the gini coefficient and the related concentration index embody one particular set of value judgements by generalising these indices alternative sets of value judgements can be reflected the other issue addressed is how information on health inequality can be used together with information on the mean of the relevant distribution to obtain an overall measure of health achievement

innovation and the persistence of monopoly abstract the auction framework enables us to highlight a crucial feature of many r d races the losing firm can recoup part but not the entirety of its r d investments this feature is shown to account for the marked differences in results obtained by gilbert and newbery and by reinganum when the firm investing the largest amount wins with certainty we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium neither firm employs a pure strategy and the incumbent wins more often than the challenger

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

unbundling the structure of inertia resource versus routine rigidity i work to unbundle the structure of inertia into two distinct categories resource rigidity failure to change resource investment patterns and routine rigidity failure to change organizational p

dynamic inducements in r d investment market signals and network locations this research shows that alliance networks shape how firms respond to uncertainty reducing information generated outside a network product awards signal the potential commercial success of the awa

strategic innovation and technology adoption in an evolving industry abstract we introduce a racing model with multiple product generations product innovation spin outs and licensing industry conditions and innovation characteristics affect who wins the race and who markets the resulting product small firms market their innovations when they pioneer a new generation or improve quality in a young generation and license their innovations in mature generations if old generation leaders ever market improvements in young generation goods they do so early on leadership in mature generations persists tests on the rigid disk drive industry 1977 1997 provide empirical support the results have implications for antitrust policies and policies governing employee non compete agreements

regulation innovation and the introduction of new telecommunications services i examine the effects of fcc regulation on the innovation and introduction of advanced telecommunications services in the united states an interim of lighter regulation provides an experiment to test the regulatory regime s impact the econometric model comprises an arrival process for service innovation followed by a duration process for regulatory delay the number of services the firms created during the interim is 60 99 higher than the model predicts they would have created if the stricter regulation had still been in place overall firms would have introduced 62 more services to consumers during the study period if the regulation had not been in place

persistence of innovation in dutch manufacturing is it spurious this paper studies the persistence of innovation and the dynamics of innovation output in dutch manufacturing using firm data from three waves of the community innovation surveys cis pertaining to the periods 1994 1996 1996 1998 and 1998 2000 we estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data type 2 tobit model accounting for individual effects and handling the initial conditions problem we find that there is no evidence of true persistence in achieving technological product or process innovations while past shares of innovative sales condition albeit to a small extent current shares of innovative sales

sleeping quotas pre emptive quota bidding and monopoly power abstract we rationalize the puzzling existence of binding quotas that are not fully utilized our model has its roots in bhagwati 1965 in r baldwin et al eds trade growth and the balance of payments essays in honor of g haberler mit press new york on tariffs quotas equivalence and is related to the io literature on preemption we study the conditions that lead a monopolist facing a quota restricted market to buy the quota licenses itself and the conditions under which they may remain unused the divisibility of the quota is crucial for the monopolist to pre emptively buy the quota furthermore we study the implications of use it orlose it clauses commonly imposed on auctioned quotas

comparing bertrand and cournot in mixed markets abstract we revisit the classic comparison between bertrand and cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms the results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in the standard setting with all profit maximizing firms

determining the parameters in a social welfare function using stated preference data an application to health one way in which economists might determine how best to balance the competing objectives of efficiency and equity is to specify a social welfare function swf this paper looks at how the stated preferences of a sample of the general public can be used to estimate the shape of the swf in the domain of health benefits the results suggest that it is possible to determine the parameters in a social welfare function from stated preference data but show that people are sensitive to what inequalities exist and to the groups across which those inequalities exist

health inequality and non monotonicity of the health related social welfare function in a recent paper in this journal abasolo and tsuchiya abasolo i tsuchiya a 2004 exploring social welfare functions and violation of monotonicity an example from inequalities in health journal of health economics 23 313 329 have strongly argued for the use of a non monotonic health related social welfare function this note discusses both the limitations of the measure proposed by abasolo and tsuchiya abasolo i tsuchiya a 2004 exploring social welfare functions and violation of monotonicity an example from inequalities in health journal of health economics 23 313 329 and the problems associated with their empirics we are able to show how non monotonicity may lead to paradoxical results and policies further we examine the empirics of abasolo and tsuchiya abasolo i tsuchiya a 2004 exploring social welfare functions and violation of monotonicity an example from inequalities in health journal of health economics 23 313 329 and provide an alternative explanation to the observed patterns in the data that do not violate monotonicity finally we briefly mention why the atkinson sen framework may be more appropriate as a way forward

equilibrium prices in the bertrand and cournot oligopolies abstract the equilibrium prices for the bertrand and cournot oligopolies with product differentiation are compared if all firms have linear demand and cost functions and if in addition the jacobian matrix of the demand functions has a dominant negative diagonal the cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the bertrand ones the general condition for the comparison of the bertrand and cournot equilibrium prices can be derived even if the nonlinearity is involved in the cost and or demand functions

invention and innovation under alternative market structures the case of natural resources this paper examines the interactions between market structure and resource allocation over time when there is endogenous technical progress the structures considered are a planned economy pure monopoly and competition with patent rights in an efficient allocation the date of invention coincides with the date of innovation the date at which technology is used this is also true with a pure monopoly but monopoly retards technical progress relative to the efficient level competition for patents rights to a new technology results in excessively rapid technical progress if the resource endowment of the economy is sufficiently large also competition may lead to sleeping patents where invention strictly precedes the date of innovation

price cap regulation and technical change abstract existing analyses of the implications of price cap regulation for the development of cost reducing technologies assume that all r d is done by the regulated industry this is unrealistic we present a simple model of non cooperative r d by a regulated firm and a single external developer under a price cap regime of the sort characterised by cabral and riordan in equilibrium the external developer exerts less r d than is socially optimal the regulated firm may exert more or less a tightening of the regulatory regime impacts the r d incentives of both players though in different ways the optimal regulatory adjustment parameter may be bigger or smaller than that suggested by existing studies despite the scope for duplication of results research by an outsider necessarily enhances welfare

equilibrium vertical differentiation in a bertrand model with capacity precommitment both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition however their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed in this article we consider a three stage game in which firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price when the cost of quality is negligible we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium in other words capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality

health inequality and non monotonicity of the health related social welfare function a rejoinder this rejoinder demonstrates that the arguments made in at 2006 are not robust and the case against non monotonic hrswf and their empirics remain overwhelming

welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed bertrand duopoly abstract i investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces while a private enterprise has no such obligation i show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first best outcome walrasian equilibrium

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

patent licensing entry and the incentive to innovate abstract we analyze the economic impact of process innovations where the innovator auctions off licenses to both potential entrants and incumbent firms it is shown that opening the market to entrant licensees the incentive to innovate is maximized if the industry is initially a monopoly as was envisioned by schumpeter 1942 this is in contrast to previous literature on licensing of process innovations when entry is excluded the incentive to innovate is maximized in an oligopoly market if licenses are sold by auction sen and tauman 2007 or in a competitive market if licenses are sold by royalty arrow 1962 the post innovation market structure the diffusion of the innovation and the social welfare are analyzed and compared with the case where entry is excluded

qalys and the equity efficiency trade off as the volume of research on quality adjusted life years qalys has increased concern has begun to be expressed about the equity aspects of resource allocation decisions based on the results of this research this paper suggests that a common theme running through the criticisms of the qaly approach is a concern about inequality it also suggests that the method for incorporating distributional concerns which is currently being pursued by advocates of the qaly approach will only ever capture concerns other than a concern about inequality the paper suggests a method for incorporating both sets of concerns into resource allocation decisions

prices capacities and service levels in a congestible bertrand duopoly we study the duopolistic interaction between congestible facilities that supply perfect substitutes and that make sequential decisions on capacities and prices the consumers time cost of accessing or using a facility is determined by the volume capacity ratio we analyze duopoly prices capacities and service quality defined as the inverse of time costs of using the facility and compare the results to monopoly and first best outcomes findings include the following first while price competition between duopolists is beneficial for consumers introducing capacity competition is harmful the duopolist offers lower service quality than the monopolist who does provide the socially optimal quality level second higher marginal costs of capacity may increase profits third asymmetric nash equilibria may result even when firms are ex ante identical more specifically when capacity is cheap or demand is relatively inelastic the only stable equilibria are asymmetric in such an equilibrium the large facility provides high quality at a high price and the smaller facility offers lower quality at lower prices in other words there is endogenous product differentiation by ex ante identical firms

distorting the direction of technological change abstract this article explores a monopolist s incentive to distort the direction of technological change for strategic reasons the monopolist might invent and employ a socially undesirable technology in so doing he might jeopardize not only the vigor of product market competition but also the development of socially desirable methods of production as a result technological dynamism cannot be considered a social virtue until its direction is compared with the social optimum

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

dynamic price competition with network effects i consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices i derive a series of results pertaining to a existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria b monotonicity of the pricing function e g larger networks set higher prices c network size dynamics increasing dominance vs reversion to the mean and d firm value how it varies with network effects finally i apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications i consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics

aftermarket power and foremarket competition i revisit the issue of aftermarkets by developing an infinite period model with overlapping consumers if the aftermarket is characterized by constant returns to scale then social surplus and consumer surplus are invariant with respect to aftermarket power under increasing returns to scale however greater aftermarket power leads to greater concentration in the foremarket higher barriers to entry higher social surplus and possibly higher consumer surplus

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

differences in the rates of return to r d for european and us young leading r d firms this paper examines the sources of europe s lagging business r d performance relative to the us particularly the role played by missing young leading innovators in high technology intensive sectors in europe it investigates through econometric analysis differences in the rates of return to r d of european and us large r d firms it finds that while in the us young firms succeed in realizing significantly higher rates of return to r d as compared to their older counterparts including in high tech sectors european firms fail to generate significant rates of return even if they are yollies and even if they are in high tech sectors these findings can at least partly explain why europe has less r d intensive young leading innovators in high technology intensive sectors

the strength of direct ties evidence from the electronic game industry abstract we analyze the economic effects of a developer s connectedness in the electronic game industry knowledge spillovers between developers are likely to be of special relevance in this knowledge intensive and regionally concentrated industry we calculate social network measures for a developer s connectedness to other developers at multiple points in time in a regression in which we exploit within career variation in social network measures we find that the number of direct ties a developer has to other developers has a strong effect on both a game s revenues and critics scores the quality of indirect ties makes no additional contribution to the game s success

anything goes with heterogeneous but not always with homogeneous oligopoly abstract corchon and mas colell 1996 on the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models economics letters 51 59 65 showed that in heterogeneous oligopoly almost everything is possible in order to obtain a similar result for homogeneous oligopoly either one needs an externality in the cost function or the reaction correspondences should fulfill a special condition

production experiences and market structure in r d competition abstract in the rd and ii the likelihood of persistent leadership increases with the value of being the winner and the value of being a loser but decreases with expected waiting time of r d innovation and the flow of monopoly profits however destructive innovations may still occur even when production experiences are allowed to play an important role in the r d competition

exploring social welfare functions and violation of monotonicity an example from inequalities in health the social welfare function swf has been used within the economics literature to study trade offs between equality and efficiency these swfs are characterised by properties determined by traditional welfare economics one of these properties the monotonicity principle is explored in this paper in the context of health there may be occasions when the monotonicity principle is violated as there may be circumstances where distributional issues dominate efficiency concerns when this is the case conventional swfs are not flexible enough to represent such social preferences therefore we propose a swf with an alternative specification which is general enough to accommodate preferences that are not necessarily monotonic a survey of the spanish general public was undertaken to estimate preferences regarding equality in health relative to efficiency in health the results with 973 usable responses give strong support to the existence of public preferences which violate the monotonicity principle and thus to the usefulness of the alternative specification proposed here

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

on stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market abstract in a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity stackelberg games provide some new results with price stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games in the price stackelberg game we show there is a unique spne where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower but both get equal payoffs we prove that generally quantity stackelberg games are less competitive than price stackelberg games however we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result

the measurement of individual utility and social welfare it has been suggested by a number of economists that decisions about how to allocate scarce health care resources should be informed by the cost per quality adjusted life years qalys of the different alternatives one of the criticisms of the qaly approach is that it is based on the measurement of individual utility yet the values elicited are used to inform social choice in this respect it is argued that the qaly approach fails to take account of distributional issues that are known to be important in the context of health care this paper addresses this issue and presents an approach grounded in microeconomic theory that is flexible enough to deal with a wide range of efficiency equity trade offs while making the nature of the trade off transparent in addition it is an approach that is relatively simple to investigate empirically and the results of a preliminary study are presented as illustration of this

bertrand edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away this paper provides a simple solution to the problem of nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria in bertrand edgeworth models with strictly convex costs the voluntary trading constraint in standard bertrand edgeworth models is generalized to allow for there being costs incurred when customers are turned away so long as the industry is sufficiently large the presence of such costs ensures that the competitive price will be an equilibrium there will be other single price equilibria but if the offense costs are small all equilibria will be close to the competitive outcome

property rights and wireless license values abstract while extending the scope of spectrum property rights promotes efficiency such reforms are often deterred by equity concerns theoretically however the windfalls may be negative relaxing license restrictions may increase profits by allowing enhanced productivity yet liberalization across a class of licensees can reduce the expected profits by increasing competitiveness this article examines license value changes for regimes that decisively shift toward private property rights in radio spectrum by analyzing the average prices paid in international cellular phone license auctions during 1995 2001 this unique data set encompasses 1 365 licenses assigned by competitive bidding in 38 auctions held in 24 countries licenses awarded by regimes with more expansive spectrum property rights generated winning bids that were 61 percent lower adjusting for other factors this evidence reverses the equity argument against liberalization over the policy margin studied and is consistent with coase s view

the normative economics of health care finance and provision whereas in many countries the crisis in medical care has been seen in terms of excess spending on health services in the uk it has been seen at least by most of those who manage and work in the nhs as a crisis of underfunding this has come about as the result of the government s successful attempts to restrain the rate of growth of real spending on the nhs which in turn reflects the government s belief that its principal effective weapon against what it perceives to be inefficiency in the nhs is to challenge management itself reformed and to some extent liberated by systematic financial squeezes the same concern has given rise to a host of proposals for reform of the nhs most of which involve a much greater role for private insurance private finance of other kinds such as out of pocket payments and private provision of health care itself

monopoly incentives for cost reducing r d abstract it is shown in this paper that there exist cost innovations for which a monopolist has a higher incentive to invest than a social planner this unveils the limits of the claim based on arrow 1959 that a monopoly always has a lower incentive to innovate than a social planner and therefore than is socially desirable in contrast to previous results the comparison of incentives may also depend upon the demand function finally for a restricted domain of analysis a rule for comparing the monopoly and the social planner incentives is derived

and the winner is acquired entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations new entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations we provide a new explanation for this phenomenon based on markets for technology it applies in industries where successful entrepreneurial firms or their technologies are acquired by incumbents that then commercialize the innovation to this end we analyze an innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants in the first stage firms compete to develop innovations of high quality they do so by choosing at equal cost the success probability of their rd the bigger the number of entrants the more radical the most radical project generally entrants tend to choose more radical r d approaches and generate the highest value innovation in case of success we illustrate our theoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the electronic design automation industry and derive implications for research and management

on the markovian efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria we characterize and compare closed loop feedback price and quantity strategies within a full fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets we allow for imperfect product substitutability which enables us to deal with price competition we show that the traditional result that the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a markovian environment either in the short run or at the stationary equilibrium or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

analyzing literature based innovation output indicators the italian experience abstract this paper presents the results of a study on the product innovations introduced in the italian market in 1989 and reported in a selected number of trade journals the analysis of data collected by means of this literature based counting procedure confirms that r d oriented industries and large firms do not in italy have a marked competitive advantage in innovation the country appears to be instead characterized by a significant presence of consumer goods industries and small firms in innovation our data indicate a statistically significant association between trade competitiveness and strength in product innovation and show the comparatively higher capacity for product innovation of some of the industries in which italy achieves a positive performance in international trade moreover the presence of spillovers at the regional level from both private and public r d expenditures proves to be positively correlated with the development of product innovations finally small firms with fewer than 50 employees appear to be more innovative than is usually believed to be the case

sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical claims in sequential auctions they subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final allocation of claims iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leaves a unique nash equilibrium for any prize schedule prices weakly decline as the auctions progress and points of strict decline have a simple characterization for one class of prize schedules which arises naturally if duopolists bid for a scarce input the equilibrium is completely characterized many initial allocations generate the same final unequal division of claims which may be interpreted as the natural market structure journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 l11

licensees as entry barriers in a more general setting than has been considered hitherto this paper examines how the incumbent in a market threatened by entry can exploit its first mover advantage by licensing its technology not to a potential entrant but to firms that would have remained outside the industry it is shown among other things that the incumbent may subsidize the variable costs of its licensees in order to deter entry even when entry is not deterred it is demonstrated that the incumbent might opt to invite outsiders as licensees

shirking sharing risk and shelving the role of university license contracts abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard risk sharing and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties the potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm this supports the rationale for bayh dole march in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts

intellectual property rights and the mode of technology transfer abstract transferring technology in an environment where patent protection is uncertain can pose significant risks to an innovating firm s ability to appropriate rents this paper incorporates asymmetric information in a screening game where the innovating firm has the choices of licensing a new product at arm s length to a foreign firm exporting it or licensing it to a subsidiary subsidiary production avoids the risk of imitation but involves higher costs for the innovating firm the gains to the southern country from the lack of intellectual property right protection may be offset by strategic behavior by northern firms who opt for technology transfer via subsidiary or monopoly production