money deficit and public debt in the united states this study estimates the underlying parameters in a dynamic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities over the determination of public debt these estimates reveal the policymakers attitude towards the goal of stabilizing the time path of public debt the central finding is that in the united states during the 1955 85 period this goal has been pursued by the fiscal authority but not by the central bank monetary policy has not monetized the stock of public debt outstanding whereas cyclically adjusted net of interest fiscal deficits have been reduced to offset increases in the stock of debt in circulation copyright 1989 by mit press

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation abstract if discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt the additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic in the presence of myopic governments debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative independent central bank to focus on price stability with supply shocks monetary unification results in excessive variability of public debt a debt target that constrains stabilization policy helps to prevent this

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

agriculture and the transition to the market agricultural sectors in eastern and central europe are large so that changes in producer prices farm employment and land ownership affect substantial numbers of people in the past food in the region was politicized for decades governments of eastern european countries and the ussr offered their citizens stable subsidized food prices and a steadily improving diet in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of communism over capitalism during the transition the context has changed but food remains politicized many consumers in the region are ill prepared to pay the real costs of food which are quite high the task of reducing those costs will be difficult involving restructuring of farms and fostering competition in processing and distribution management of the agricultural transition will affect the political sustainability of the process and influence agriculture s contribution to the growth of emerging market economies although the agricultural sector of eastern and central europe is large soviet agriculture dwarfs it in its impact on the region and the world a positive program to stop the decline in soviet agriculture could contribute to economic growth and political stability failure to remedy the fundamental flaws in soviet agriculture will speed the country s slide into poverty and ethnic turmoil and undermine the efforts of central and eastern europeans to succeed

the constitution of economic policy one of the most exciting intellectual moments of my career was my 1984 discovery of knut wicksell s unknown and untranslated dissertation finanztheoretische untersuchungen buried in the dusty stacks of chicago s old harper library only the immediate post dissertation leisure of an academic novice allowed for the browsing that produced my own dramatic example of learning by serendipity wicksell s new principle of justice in taxation gave me a tremendous surge of self confidence wicksell who was an established figure in the history of economic ideas challenged the orthodoxy of public finance theory along lines that were congenial with my own developing stream of critical consciousness from that moment in chicago i took on the determination to make wicksell s contribution known to a wider audience and i commenced immediately a translation effort that took some time and considerable help from elizabeth henderson before final publication this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

default probabilities for mortgages abstract models now exist for valuing the default option embedded in a mortgage implicitly these models generate all the information necessary to determine the probability of default in any possible situation economists and policymakers may find such default probabilities considerably more interesting than the nonobservable dollar value of the default option this paper provides the analytical procedure necessary to calculate such probabilities and presents a wide range of results the decision to terminate a mortgage results in the loss of the options to default or prepay in the future because of this consideration the price of a house must fall below the point of zero equity before a rational borrower defaults we provide evidence that even in the absence of transaction costs this value of delay results in substantial levels of negative equity being observed without default occurring in fact by not accounting for the value of delay most of the current empirical literature cited in this article substantially overestimates the role of transaction costs in the decision to default

interest rates and equity extraction during the housing boom credit record panel data from 1999 2010 indicates that the likelihood of home equity extraction borrowing on average about 40 000 against one s home peaked in 2003 when mortgage rates reached historic lows we estimate a 27 percent rise in extraction in response to a 100 basis point rate decline and that house price growth amplifies this relationship differential responses to interest rates and home price appreciation by borrower age and credit score provide new evidence of financial frictions finally equity extractions are associated with higher default risk consistent with the use of borrowed funds for consumption or illiquid investment

the influence of foreclosure delays on borrowers default behavior this paper conducts loan level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower s default propensity we include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration consistent with theoretical predictions we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior in the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers the negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers

comparative productivity the ussr eastern europe and the west this paper compiles comparative measures of output per worker in 1975 in four socialist and seven western market economy wme countries and explores sources of observed differences between the two groups of countries in that regard such differences seem explicable only partially by reference to differences in per worker capital stock and farm land a residual disparity of 25 to 34 percent in favor of wme countries appears to testify to superior efficiency in the latter copyright 1987 by american economic association

the double trigger for mortgage default evidence from the fracking boom this paper exploits a natural experiment afforded by the fracking boom in pennsylvania to shed light on the determinants of mortgage default looking only at mortgages originated before fracking be

the effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel 1989 1998 abstract we discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in israel in the mid 1990s we present empirical evidence that indeed fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns changes in the political environment enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations the hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality or the mayor s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

consumer ruthlessness and mortgage default during the 2007 to 2009 housing bust from 2007 to 2009 u s house prices plunged and mortgage defaults surged while ostensibly consistent with widespread ruthless default analysis of detailed mortgage and house price data indicates that borrowers do not walk away until they are deeply underwater far deeper than traditional models predict the evidence suggests that lender recourse is not the major driver of this result we argue that emotional and behavioral factors play an important role in decisions to continue paying borrower reluctance to walk away implies that the moral hazard cost of default as a form of social insurance may be lower than suspected this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

time inconsistency and fiscal policy empirical analysis of u s states 1969 89 abstract we offer an extensive and robust test of the time inconsistency theory of fiscal politics we employ data of u s states from 1969 to 1989 and the results of our tests indicate the variables such as legislative stability and executive term limits have strongly predictable impacts on the volatility of various measures of fiscal policy

mortgage default during the u s mortgage crisis this paper asks which theories of mortgage default are quantitatively consistent with observations in the united states during 2002 2010 theoretical models are simulated for the observed time series of aggregate house prices their predictions are then compared to actual default rates on prime fixed rate mortgages an out of sample test discriminates between estimated reduced forms of the two most prominent theories the test reveals that the doubletrigger hypothesis attributing mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event like unemployment outperforms a frictionless option theoretic default model based on this finding a structural partialequilibrium model with liquidity constraints and idiosyncratic unemployment shocks is presented to provide micro foundations for the double trigger hypothesis in this model borrowers with negative equity are more likely to default when they are unemployed and have low liquid wealth the model explains most of the observed strong rise in mortgage default rates a policy implication of the model is that subsidizing homeowners can mitigate a mortgage crisis at a lower cost than bailing out lenders

fiscal policy and monetary integration in europe fiscal policy economists policy makers and the media often argue that the maastricht treaty and the stability and growth pact make it difficult for governments of emu countries to stabilize their economies with appropriate fiscal policy and to provide adequate public investment our empirical analysis offers little support to this view discretionary budget deficits have actually become more counter cyclical in emu countries after the maastricht treaty as well as in the other eu and non eu industrialized countries we study and while public investment has declined recently in emu countries a similar tendency is apparent in other countries and started well before the maastricht treaty was signed jordi gali and roberto perotti

constitutions and economic policy at the rare moments in history when a nation debates constitutional reform the key issues often concern how the reforms might affect economic policy and economic performance for example italy abandoned a system of pure proportional representation where legislators were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their parties and moved toward including ingredients of plurality rule where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes key italian political leaders are now considering proposals to introduce elements of presidentialism where the head of government is elected by direct popular vote rather than the current parliamentary regime a common argument in italy was that the electoral reform would help stifle political corruption and reduce the propensity of italian governments to run budget deficits in the 1990s constitutional reforms have been debated and implemented in a number of other countries too for instance new zealand moved away from a pure system of plurality rule in single member districts to a system mixing elements of proportional representation japan also renounced its special form of plurality rule the so called single nontransferable vote in favor of a system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation similar proposals have been debated in the united kingdom in latin america questions have been raised as to whether the poor and volatile economic performance of many countries can be traced to their presidential form of government

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

empirical analysis of soviet agricultural production and policy this paper employs production function analysis to examine a number of pivotal issues concerning the soviet agricultural sector estimates of three input translog production functions for five agricultural commodities grown in the soviet union from 1960 76 are reported these results are used to draw inferences on such matters as the rationality of soviet agricultural factor pricing the nature of agricultural returns to scale in the ussr and the scope of factor substitution in that country the empirical evidence suggests that soviet decisions in the sphere of agricultural production contrary to the conventional wisdom are well founded technologically

recourse and residential mortgage default evidence from us states we quantify the effect of recourse on default and find that recourse affects default by lowering the borrower s sensitivity to negative equity at the mean value of the default option for defaulted loans borrowers are 30 more likely to default in non recourse states furthermore for homes appraised at 500 000 to 750 000 borrowers are twice as likely to default in non recourse states we also find that defaults are more likely to occur through a lender friendly procedure such as a deed in lieu in states that allow deficiency judgments we find no evidence that mortgage interest rates are lower in recourse states the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

fiscal policy when monetary policy is tied to the mast the paper analyses the time inconsistency problem of both exchange rate and fiscal policy in a small open economy the equilibrium under discretion is characterised by inflation and a deficit comm

productivity growth in pre 1990 mongolian agriculture spiralling disaster or emerging success the reasons for the spectacular collapse of so many centrally planned economies are a source of ongoing debate in this paper we use detailed farm level data to measure total factor productivity tfp changes in mongolian grain and potato farming during the 14 year period immediately preceding the 1990 economic reforms we measure tfp growth using stochastic frontier analysis sfa and data envelopment analysis dea methods our results indicate quite poor overall performance with an average annual tfp change of 1 7 in grain and 0 8 in potatoes over the 14 year period however the pattern of tfp growth changed substantially during this period with tfp growth exceeding 7 per year in the latter half of this period this suggests that the new policies of improved education greater management autonomy and improved incentives which were introduced in final two planning periods in the 1980s were beginning to have a significant influence upon the performance of mongolian crop farming crown copyright c 2002 published by elsevier science b v all rights reserved

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

an analysis of the stability and growth pact we use a stylised model to analyse the stability and growth pact for countries that have formed the european monetary union emu in our model shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully therefore while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality with uncertainty a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy with differences in initial conditions conflicts of interest arise we study the nash bargaining solution

analysis of the technical efficiency of state rubber farms in vietnam this study entails an analysis of the technical efficiency of natural rubber production by state farms in vietnam a time varying stochastic frontier production function model for unbalanced data is estimated for 33 farms individual farm technical efficiencies are reported and discussed one of the main results concerns the bimodal distribution of technical efficiency indices a few farms operate near the production frontier while the bulk operate well away from the frontier some implications are drawn from the results as a guide to future policy research work in the rubber industry in light of recent moves by the vietnamese government towards economic reform

is private farming more efficient than socialized agriculture this paper examines the technical efficiency of state and private farms in poland for the period 1960 74 we find that the average technical efficiency of the two types of farms does not differ although the dispersion of efficiency levels is greater among state farms than among private ones we do find clear evidence of allocative inefficiency with state farms oversupplied with fertilizer and machinery

reconciling theory and empirics on the role of unemployment in mortgage default abstract empirical models of mortgage default typically find that the influence of unemployment is negligible compared to other well known risk factors such as high borrower leverage or low borrower fico scores this is at odds with theory which assigns a critical role to unemployment in the decision to stop payment on a mortgage we help reconcile this divergence by employing a novel empirical strategy involving simulated unemployment histories to measure the severity of attenuation bias in loan level estimations of default risk due to a borrower becoming unemployed attenuation bias results because individual data on unemployment status is unobserved requiring that a market wide unemployment rate be used as a proxy attenuation is extreme with our results suggesting that the use of an aggregate unemployment rate in lieu of actual borrower unemployment status results in default risk from a borrower becoming unemployed being underestimated by a factor more than 100 in addition our analysis indicates that adding the unemployment rate as a proxy for the missing borrower specific unemployment indicator does not improve the accuracy of the estimated model over the specification without the proxy variable included hence aggregate portfolio level risk estimates for mortgage guarantors such as fha also are not improved these views represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system this is a revised version of a paper that previously circulated under the title unemployment and unobserved credit risk in the fha single family mortgage insurance fund nber working paper no 18880 john grigsby provided excellent research assistance we appreciate the helpful comments of andrew haughwout wilbert van der klaauw the editor stuart rosenthal and referees but remain responsible for any errors

independent fiscal agencies abstract there has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy however the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called independent fiscal agencies this paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects the motivation for the establishment of such agencies their potential design and the experience with these types of institutions

what should fiscal councils do fiscal watchdogs so called fiscal councils have been proposed as a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy the paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surve

subprime mortgages and the housing bubble this paper explores the link between the house price expectations of mortgage lenders and the extent of subprime lending it argues that bubble conditions in the housing market are likely to spur subprime lending with favorable price expectations easing the default concerns of lenders and thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers since the demand created by subprime lending feeds back onto house prices such lending also helps to fuel an emerging housing bubble these ideas are illustrated in a theoretical model and tentative support is found in empirical work exploring the connection between price expectations and the extent of subprime lending the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the federal reserve bank of philadelphia the federal reserve board of governors or the federal reserve system this paper is available free of charge at http www philadelphiafed org research and data publications working papers

federalism fiscal restraints and european monetary union a prominent feature of the maastricht treaty on european union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy under the provisions of the excessive deficit procedure or edp the success of member states in avoiding excessive deficits during the transition to economic and monetary union emu is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union once monetary union has begun member states are unconditionally required to avoid excessive deficits a state has an excessive deficit when it is so declared by the european council upon a report by the european commission and a judgment by the monetary committee the edp is set in motion if a country s deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of gdp the justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency if excessive deficits cause a debt crisis the european central bank ecb will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government the bailout could be ex post in which case the ecb would monetize the government s debt or ex ante in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt service burden either way unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ecb will find difficult to resist

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

what motivates a subprime borrower to default this paper uses a real options approach to analyse the exercise of the default option embedded in mortgages in particular it examines a subprime household who borrows at a premium but hopes to refinance at prime rates if their house appreciates we show how these optimal default decisions can be used to calculate probabilities of default an important input for risk management and pricing purposes numerical examples are provided calibrated to us data in a low interest rate environment the credit upgrade potential may discourage subprime borrowers from defaulting however default probabilities are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates and house prices this provides a rational explanation for the prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages among subprime borrowers and the subsequent large numbers of defaults when interest rates rose and house prices declined

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

budget deficits and coalition governments this paper shows that compromise between different ideological motivations within multiparty governments may result in a bias toward running budget deficits even if all parties in the coalition prefer balanced budgets the deficit bias increases with the degree of polariz ation of the ideological motivations and generally decreases with the degree of concentration of power within the government although the analysis is conducted assuming a proportional representation electoral system the results will also apply to majoritarian systems if the win ning party comprises ideologically different constituencies the relationship between budget deficits and multiparty governments is investigated using data from a sample of eight european union countries for the period 1971 1990 analysis on pooled data is partly in line with the theory time series within country analysis is less favorable we find clear support to the theory only in the case of italy

the new stability and growth pact a first assessment abstract the paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade offs involved in the recent reform of the stability and growth pact as suggested by the proponents of the reform greater room for case specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare in our model these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high quality measures in practice however the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy hence reforming a rules based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its economic rationale would also require closer monitoring a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget and ultimately stricter enforcement in that sense recent reforms are at best unhelpful

improving fiscal policy in the eu the case for independent forecasts are official output forecasts biased we point out that official forecasts of output dynamics are crucial to the assessment of cyclically adjusted budget balances and provide evidence that in some euro area countries biased forecasts have played a thus far neglected role in generating excessive deficits we suggest that the forecast bias may be politically motivated and that forecasts produced by an independent authority would be better than in house ministry of finance forecasts for the purpose of monitoring budget formation and budget outcomes lars jonung and martin larch

the soviet economic decline soviet growth from 1960 to 1989 was the worst in the world after we control for investment and human capital the relative performance worsens over time there is some evidence that the burden of defense spending modestly contributed to the soviet debacle the declining soviet growth rate from 1950 to 1987 can be accounted for by a declining marginal product of capital with a constant rate of growth of total factor productivity the soviet reliance on extensive growth rising capital to output ratios was no greater than that of market economies such as japan and the republic of korea but a low elasticity of substitution between capital and labor implied especially acute diminishing returns to capital compared with the case in market economies copyright 1995 by oxford university press

the determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation a case study the principal and agent relationship is important in the public sector there elected or appointed representatives act on behalf of the citizens of their jurisdictions this paper examines the importance of the budget referendum which allows the principals to approve or disapprove the proposal of a set of agents in the context of local public expenditure decisions we test the null hypothesis that the institution of referendum when compared to a nonreferendum institution does not lead to significantly different expenditure behavior

consequences of constitutions the paper presents empirical findings regarding the economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements in three different dimensions first the data are consistent with several theoretical predictions about the consequences of electoral rules and forms of government for fiscal policy and rent extraction even when non random constitution selection is taken into account second empirical tests of the predictions from a new comprehensive model of parliamentary democracy show that proportional elections raise government spending through their indirect consequences for party structures and types of government rather than through their direct effects on policymaking incentives third new empirical results suggest that constitutional arrangements may have important consequences for structural policies that promote long run economic performance hinting at a missing link in the causal chain from history to current economic performance all these empirical findings appear statistically robust and the estimated effects are large enough to be of genuine economic interest jel d72 e60 h00 o11

investment under uncertainty the case of replacement investment decisions we analyze the determinants of replacement investment decisions in a contingent claims model with maintenance and operation cost uncertainty we find that the optimal time between replacements is increasing in the volatility of cost the purchase price of a new asset and the corporate tax rate and is decreasing in the systematic risk of cost the salvage value of the asset and the investment tax credit the optimal time between replacements can either increase or decrease with an increase in the depreciation rate extensions of the model to examine the effects of technological and tax policy uncertainty on replacement investment decisions give intuitive but striking results uncertainty about the arrival of a technological innovation that would decrease maintenance and operation cost results in a significant decrease in replacement investment uncertainty in a tax law change that would encourage investment decreases current investment and uncertainty in a tax law change that would discourage investment increases current investment

should i default on my mortgage even if i can pay experimental evidence abstract we study strategic default in the laboratory i e in a controlled experiment subjects are initially endowed with a house and a mortgage we use neutral wording in the experiment and must decide at each period in which their mortgage is alive among three options making the mortgage payment selling the house or walking away from their house and defaulting on their mortgage at each point in time we can observe whether defaulters can afford to make the mortgage payment and thus directly compute the number of strategic defaulters subjects default in the right periods and quite fast learn what they should consume we find experimental support for the double trigger hypothesis individuals faced with low income and low house prices are more likely to default we observe that subjects default less than optimal and this decision is significantly affected by social norm concerns in the context of the experiment individuals under consume in the first periods of life they are cautious when indebted both introducing a 50 probability of recourse and a responsible homeowner reward are very effective in preventing default in the lab especially by individuals receiving a bad shock to income when house prices are low

what do deficits tell us about debt empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the eu fiscal rules such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact sgp aim at constraining government behavior milesi ferretti 2003 develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting the amount of this depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the european union we find that the sgp rules have induced governments to use stock flow adjustments a form of creative accounting to hide deficits the tendency to substitute stock flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large

political biases despite external expert participation an empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in germany this paper explores whether and how political biases arise in an institutional setting where revenue forecasting is delegated to a body that includes experts from institutions neither part of nor controlled by the government the empirical analysis focuses on the performance of german federal tax revenue forecasts in the preparation of which the advice of external experts has a long tradition as an institutional safeguard while on average revenue forecasts turn out to be unbiased the results show that the government exerts an influence in particular optimism pessimism in the government s gdp forecast helps to explain why the revenue forecast turns out too optimistic pessimistic in addition governmental estimates of the revenue effects of tax law changes are found to contribute to forecast errors

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

negative equity and foreclosure theory and evidence abstract recent declines in housing prices have focused attention on the relationship between negative housing equity and mortgage default theory implies that negative equity is a necessary condition for default but not a sufficient one this often misunderstood result is clearly illustrated in a dataset of massachusetts homeowners during the early 1990s fewer than 10 percent of borrowers likely to have had negative equity at the end of 1991 experienced a foreclosure during the following three years an econometric model of default estimated on two decades of massachusetts housing data also predicts low default rates for current negative equity borrowers we develop a simple theoretical model to interpret these empirical findings and to assess potential foreclosure reduction policies our results imply that lenders and policymakers face an information problem in trying to help borrowers with negative equity because it is hard to determine which owners really need help in order to stay in their homes

fiscal stability during the great recession putting decentralization design to the test this paper provides an empirical analysis aimed at disentangling the roles played by decentralization level and design as well as the extended decentralized framework provided by subnational borrow

the economic case for limits to government in june of 1978 the voters of california approved proposition 13 restricting the rate of local property taxation to no more than 1 percent of 1975 market values in november 1978 the voters of michigan approved the headlee amendment which limited state revenues from own sources to a fixed share of state personal income in november of 1980 massachusetts voters followed the lead of california and required all cities and towns to limit their taxation to a rate of 22 percent of full and fair cash value numerous hypotheses have been advanced and analyzed to explain the emergence of these new restrictions on fiscal choice the results point to two explanations voters feel governments are too big providing more services than what they prefer or governments spend too much on redistributive activities to help the poor and through higher wages to help public employees themselves the response to this perceived failure of government has been to propose and in california michigan and massachusetts to approve absolute limits to government expenditures the question i wish to address here is whether a compelling economic argument can be advanced for such a policy response politics and personalities aside the answer i think is yes but particular preconditions must apply first and perhaps most importantly is the inability of citizens to directly control the provision of public services responsibility for providing public goods is delegated to agents of the voter and these agents be they bureaucrats or elected representatives have their own objectives and an ability to act upon them to the possible disadvantage of the voters second without direct control over public outputs voters must use indirect controls through the manipulation of their appointed agents these indirect controls take two general forms price incentives or quantity restrictions third the choice of either of these indirect controls must take place before the agent acts to provide public goods further voters must often make their choice of a price or quantity control before the benefits or costs of the public service are known to them with certainty agents however can wait to observe true benefits and coststhat is why we use agents and then provide a level of public services in response to costs benefits and the voters chosen control voter uncertainty over benefits and costs can be interpreted as placing the voter within a constitutional perspective where a voter s precise position in society that is his or her benefits and costs are unknown when choosing a control geoffrey brennan and james buchanan ch 1 were the first to really stress this important point fourth if benefit and cost uncertainty is predominantly over the position rather than slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost schedules and if the marginal benefit schedule is relatively steep loosely an inelastic demand curve while the marginal cost schedule is relatively flat an elastic supply curve then quantity controls on agents behavior through tax or spending limitations will be the preferred control these four preconditions strike me as quite plausible rather than just an emotional reaction to a peculiar configuration of political and economic circumstances proposition 13 the headlee amendment and proposition 24 may be perfectly reasoned responses to a failure in the politi professor university of pennsylvania and research associate the national bureau of economic research inc an alternative hypothesis which has been tested and generally rejected attributes voter approval to a desire to alter the tax mix away from property taxation and towards other taxes what approving voters really want it seems is increased government efficiency and less redistribution see the recent studies by jack citrin paul courant edward gramlich and daniel rubinfeld and helen ladd and julie wilson

what triggers mortgage default this paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default negative equity and illiquidity to do so the authors combine loan level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower s broader balance sheet this gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers those with high credit card utilization rates the authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default with comparably sized marginal effects moreover these two factors interact with each other the effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan to value ratios cltv though it is significant even for low cltv county level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk though less so than high utilization and strongly interact with cltv in addition having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk particularly for borrowers who have a first mortgage ltv approaching 100 percent this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes evidence from historical constitutions this paper studies the long run fiscal consequences of balanced budget rules bbr that are enshrined in a country s constitution using historical data dating back to the 19th century and applying a difference in difference approach we find that the introduction of a constitutional bbr reduces government debt to gdp and expenditure to gdp ratios on average by around 11 and 3 percentage points respectively we do not find evidence that bbrs affect tax revenues our analysis indicates that such rules reduce the probability of experiencing a debt crisis and that the effective enforcement of bbrs can be conditional on the quality of democratic institutions in addition we implement an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on changing the constitution this and other tests suggest that the relations we find are largely causal going from bbrs to fiscal outcomes