redistribution income and voting a model that reconciles the positive association between income and voting found in cross sectional studies with the negative correlation between income and turnout over time is developed voting is modeled as a group rational activity voter turnout rates in the united states for the 1948 1960 1968 and 1980 elections are used to test the model voter turnout is found first to fall and then to rise as families move up the income distribution voter turnout also rises as real wages fall as educational attainment increases as elections become closer and as poll taxes and literacy tests are removed

an empirical examination of quality certification in a lemons market i introduction researchers have long understood that a variety of mechanisms may be used to overcome problems of adverse selection stigler 1961 224 notes that s ome forms of economic organization may be explicable chiefly as devices for eliminating uncertainties in quality and akerlof 1970 cites independent groups such as the consumers union and united laboratories that test and certify the quality of goods there is however little empirical evidence that illustrates the effectiveness of such mechanisms in this article we examine the effect certification has on a market characterized by adverse selection using data from the market for young thoroughbreds we compare the performance of sales where auction houses provide certification services with sales where certification is absent the thoroughbred racehorse market consists of two distinct types of public auctions certified and noncertified sales in a certified sale auction houses physically inspect the horses nominated to their sales selling only the horses they conclude are from the upper end of the quality distribution in noncertified sales auction houses sell all horses nominated to a sale our empirical strategy is to perform tests that indicate whether adverse selection affects market outcomes in either certified or noncertified sales a finding that adverse selection is present in noncertified sales but absent in certified sales is consistent with the hypothesis that certification alleviates problems of adverse selection we adopt three approaches to test for the presence of adverse selection 1 the first approach is in the spirit of chiappori and salanie 2000 who examine the relationship between unobservable factors from participation and performance equations we model adverse selection as a case of sample selection bias and examine the correlation between errors in participation and price equations 2 to accomplish this we use a unique data set that allows us to estimate how breeder decisions to sell or retain horses affect market prices the data set consists of a 10 random sample of all thoroughbreds born in 1993 and includes both horses retained by their breeders who own a horse at the time of its birth and horses that breeders chose to sell our second test follows genesove 1993 and chezum and wimmer 1997 by examining the relationship between seller characteristics and price theoretically when observable seller characteristics are correlated with seller incentives to select goods adversely prices should reflect these differences chezum and wimmer observe that some breeders sell all of their horses whereas others retain a portion to race they find that market prices are inversely related to the extent of a breeder s involvement in racing concluding that adverse selection affects market outcomes we extend this work in two respects first we isolate the effect seller characteristics have on price through the decision to sell or retain a horse second we compare the effect seller characteristics have on observed prices in certified and noncertified sales our last test follows bond 1982 who attempts to identify adverse selection in the market for used trucks by comparing the repair records of trucks that were sold with the records of trucks retained by their original owners because the horses in our sample had not begun their racing careers at the time they were sold we use data on racetrack earnings as an ex post measure of quality and compare the quality of horses sold in noncertified sales with certified horses and horses retained by their breeders the results from each approach are consistent with certification alleviating problems of adverse selection we find that holding observable attributes constant horses that would receive unusually high market prices in noncertified sales are even more valuable in other options and are less likely to be sold in a noncertified sale

formative experiences and portfolio choice evidence from the finnish great depression we trace the impact of formative experiences on portfolio choice plausibly exogenous variation in workers exposure to a depression allows us to identify the effects and a new estimation approach makes addressing wealth and income effects possible we find that adversely affected workers are less likely to invest in risky assets this result is robust to a number of control variables and it holds for individuals whose income employment and wealth were unaffected the effects travel through social networks individuals whose neighbors and family members experienced adverse circumstances also avoid risky investments

agricultural household models extensions applications and policy this book presents the basic model of an agricultural household that underlies most of the case studies undertaken so far the model assumes that households are price takers and is therefore recursive the decisions modeled include those affecting production and the demand for inputs and those affecting consumption and the supply of labor comparative results on selected elasticities are presented for a number of economies the empirical significance of the approach is demonstrated in a comparison of models that treat production and consumption decisions separately and those in which the decisionmaking process is recursive the book summarizes the implications of agricultural pricing policy for the welfare of farm households marketed surplus the demand for nonagricultural goods and services the rural labor market budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings in addition it is shown that the basic model can be extended in order to explore the effects of government policy on crop composition nutritional status health saving and investment and to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the effects on budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings methodological topics primarily the data requirements of the basic model and its extensions along with aggregation market interaction uncertainty and market imperfections are discussed the most important methodological issues the question of the recursive property of these models is also discussed

are there civic returns to education abstract the hypothesized effects of educational attainment on adult civic engagement and attitudes provide some of the most important justifications for government intervention in the market for education in this study i present evidence on whether these externalities exist i assess and implement two strategies for identifying the effects of educational attainment one is based on the availability of junior and community colleges the other on changes in teen exposure to child labor laws the results suggest that educational attainment has large and statistically significant effects on subsequent voter participation and support for free speech i also find that additional schooling appears to increase the quality of civic knowledge as measured by the frequency of newspaper readership

costly information acquisition is it better to toss a coin abstract this paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition it proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government

the role of real income level and income distribution in fulfillment of basic needs abstract using internationally comparable estimates of real gdp per capita along with world bank data on seven basic needs indicators and one income equality measure relative importance of real income level and income equality for improvement in the provision of basic needs is assessed on the basis of a multiple regression model income level seems important in almost all cases but the importance of income equality is observed only on a limited scale although income is probably more important in low income ldcs the relationships studied appear broadly similar in the low income and the middle income ldc contexts

information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation a laboratory experiment abstract this paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation pr elections comparing this with majority rule consistent with theoretical predictions poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed a dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under pr so abstention is higher in pr in contrast with private interest environments and welfare is lower deviations from nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium qre which allows for voter mistakes

income inequality and the environment aggregation bias in environmental kuznets curves abstract the environmental kuznets curve assumes an inverted u shaped relation between environmental damage and per capita income recently it has been argued in the literature that in addition to income levels the inequality in the distribution of power and income is positively related to environmental degradation we provide an additional argument based on simple aggregation for including a measure of income dispersion in empirical analyses when the relationship between environmental damage and household income is concave e g resembles an environmental kuznets curve then income inequality is negatively related to total environmental damage results from an empirical analysis of cross national variation indicate that the aggregation effect can run counter to and outweigh the political economy effect for some environmental indicators

uninformed votes information effects in presidential elections theory recent scholarship has emphasized the potential importance of cues information shortcuts and statistical aggregation processes in allowing relatively uninformed citizens to act individually or collectively as if they were fully informed hypotheses uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed failing that individual deviations from fully informed voting cancel out in a mass electorate producing the same aggregate election outcome as if voters were fully informed methods hypothetical fully informed vote choices are imputed to individual voters using the observed relationship between political information and vote choices for voters with similar social and demographic characteristics estimated by probit analysis of data from national election study surveys conducted after the six most recent united states presidential elections results both hypotheses are clearly disconfirmed at the individual level the average deviation of actual vote probabilities from hypothetical fully informed vote probabilities was about ten percentage points in the electorate as a whole these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation but by no means eliminated incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points better and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better than they would have if voters had in fact been fully informed

religious beliefs gambling attitudes and financial market outcomes this study investigates whether geographic variation in religion induced gambling norms affects aggregate market outcomes we conjecture that gambling propensity would be stronger in regions with higher concentrations of catholics relative to protestants consistent with our conjecture we show that in regions with higher catholic protestant ratios investors exhibit a stronger propensity to hold lottery type stocks broad based employee stock option plans are more popular the initial day return following an initial public offering is higher and the magnitude of the negative lottery stock premium is larger collectively these results indicate that religion induced gambling attitudes impact investors portfolio choices corporate decisions and stock returns

do better informed investors always do better a buyback puzzle we explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source auctions of yearling racehorses horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction however those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average earning 30 less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders moreover this underperformance is concentrated in male horses despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes these puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities or by nonfinancial objectives or by behavioral or selection biases jel g02 g11 g14 l83 d44

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

low cost decisions as a challenge to public choice in the last 25 years we have seen a great deal of success in the scientific research programme called public choice one of the main aims of this programme is to develop positive theories of political processes like theories of voting behaviour of government behaviour of bureaucratic behaviour and of interest group behaviour just to mention the most important theory sets in this area 1 the methodological core of this research programme consists in the economic model of behaviour the homo oeconomicus or rational evaluating maximising man remm as he is sometimes called see e g brunner 1987 it is assumed that individuals subjectively evaluate different action possibilities according to the perceived costs and benefits and that they choose that action which promises the highest expected net benefit during recent decades this standard methodological approach in economics has in a kind of imperialism been applied to decisions largely outside the realm of traditional economics thus new sub disciplines have been created for example the economic analysis of law the economic analysis of the family or the economics of arts to name just a few public choice is the application of this approach to political public sector decisions and in this area it is a successful competitor of traditional political science which follows more or less a public interest approach i e assuming that political decision makers do not follow their own personal interests but have strong enough incentives to pursue the interests of society or at least of the social group to which they belong

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

does education improve citizenship evidence from the united states and the united kingdom abstract many studies document an association between schooling and civic participation but none credibly investigate causal links we explore the effect of extra schooling induced through compulsory schooling laws on the likelihood of becoming politically involved in the united states and the united kingdom we find that educational attainment is related to several measures of political interest and involvement in both countries we find a strong and robust relationship between education and voting for the united states but not for the united kingdom our us results approach the uk findings when conditioning on registration possibly indicating that registration rules present a barrier to participation

the paradox of voter participation a laboratory study it is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout we report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout predictions of the rational choice palfrey rosenthal model of participation with asymmetric information we find that the three main comparative statics predictions are observed in the data the size effect whereby turnout goes down in larger electorates the competition effect whereby turnout is higher in elections that are expected to be close and the underdog effect whereby voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher turnout rates we also compare the quantitative magnitudes of turnout to the predictions of nash equilibrium we find that there is undervoting for small electorates and overvoting for large electorates relative to nash equilibrium these deviations from nash equilibrium are consistent with the logit version of quantal response equilibrium which provides a good fit to the data and can also account for significant voter turnout in very large elections

the paradox of information and voter turnout the most prominent explanation for the paradox of voter turnout is that citizens are willing to bear the cost of voting because they perceive a benefit e g fulfilling a civic duty or expressing themselves that is independent of the election outcome however a separate literature highlights the empirical importance of information for voter participation and existing explanations for this are that uninformed citizens either expect smaller benefits from voting or defer strategically to peers who know more this paper simply points out that while either of these theories offers a plausible explanation for the importance of information neither is robust if the motivation for voting is unrelated to the election outcome this is because citizens with positive net voting costs should abstain no matter how well informed while those with negative net voting costs should vote no matter how poorly informed thus the purported resolution to the turnout paradox raises a new paradox of information and voter turnout intuitively the quality of a vote should matter only if the vote is somehow instrumental suggesting that future work should continue to explore instrumental rationales for voting

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

inequality as a cause of environmental degradation abstract this paper advances two hypotheses first the extent of an environmentally degrading economic activity is a function of the balance of power between the winners who derive net benefits from the activity and the losers who bear net costs second greater inequalities of power and wealth lead all else equal to more environmental degradation

the courage of misguided convictions the field of modern financial economics assumes that people behave with extreme rationality but they do not furthermore people s deviations from rationality are often systematic behavioral finance relaxes the traditional assumptions of financial economics by incorporating these observable systematic and very human departures from rationality into standard models of financial markets we highlight two common mistakes investors make excessive trading and the tendency to disproportionately hold on to losing investments while selling winners we argue that these systematic biases have their origins in human psychology the tendency for human beings to be overconfident causes the first bias in investors and the human desire to avoid regret prompts the second

peasant household behaviour with missing markets some paradoxes explained a model of peasant household behavior under varying degrees of household specific food and labor market failures is constructed to show that these structural features can explain several well known patterns of peasant response which have often been attributed to peculiar motives presumed specific to peasants the model explains sluggish response to cash crops prices and high instability in perceived food and labor scarcities the key role of manufactured consumer goods prices in stimulating peasants effort in cash crops production the effectiveness of taxation as opposed to incentives in stimulating cash crops production and the key role of technological change in food production to enhance cash crop production results are obtained analytically in the case of one market failure and by numerical simulation with more than one

a household level environmental kuznets curve abstract richer households may create more vehicle emissions because they own more vehicles and drive more poorer households may pollute more because they use high polluting vintages and maintain them less well this paper uses 1993 california vehicle microdata to show that there is a kuznets u shaped hydrocarbon emissions relation

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

residential mobility and voter turnout we examine the characteristics of a largely ignored low turnout group people who have recently moved we find that neither demographic nor attitudinal attributes explain their lower turnout instead the requirement that citizens must register anew after each change in residence constitutes the key stumbling block in the trip to the polls since nearly one third of the nation moves every two years moving has a large impact on national turnout rates we offer a proposal to reduce the effect of residential mobility on turnout and estimate that turnout would increase by nine percentage points if the impact of moving could be removed the partisan consequences of such a change would be marginal

voting as communicating mandates multiple candidates and the signaling voter s curse abstract in this spatial model of common value elections votes convey citizens private opinions regarding which policies are socially optimal and the winning candidate utilizes this information in choosing policy in equilibrium large margins of victory convey mandates for candidates to make bold policy changes to communicate extreme policy views citizens support extreme parties that may be unlikely to win office to convey moderate views citizens deliberately abstain from voting thereby avoiding the signaling voter s curse of encouraging overextremism in large elections mandates can identify the optimal policy from an entire continuum thereby greatly strengthening condorcet s 1785 classic jury theorem behavioral patterns are consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical features of elections and can also apply to other political activities such as public protests or writing letters to elected officials

does political knowledge increase turnout evidence from the 1997 british general election a number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout both information acquisition and turnout however are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations i address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media using survey data from the 1997 british general election study i show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation

aggregating information by voting the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses this article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common value election with continuous private signals in equilibrium some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting in deference to those with higher quality signals even as the number of highly informed peers grows large however citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting so that voter participation remains at realistic levels e g 50 to 60 percent for simple examples the precise level of voter turnout along with the margin of victory are determined by the distribution of expertise improving a voter s information makes her more willing to vote consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence but makes her peers more willing to abstain providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting equilibrium participation is optimal even though the marginal voter may have very little e g below average expertise and even though nonvoters information is not utilized copyright oxford university press

a structural model of turnout and voting in multiple elections this paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections the theoretical setting combines an uncertain voter model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior we apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in u s presidential and congressional elections we structurally estimate the model using individual level data for the 2000 elections and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens ideological preferences information and civic duty we then use the estimated model which replicates the patterns of abstention selective abstention split ticket voting and straight ticket voting observed in the data to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior

the marginal voter s curse an intuitive explanation for voter abstention is that a voter is uncertain which policy or candidate to vote for and so defers to the rest of the electorate to make the decision in majoritarian elections this has been formally modelled as a strategic response to the swing voter s curse which arises because the rare event of a pivotal vote conveys substantial information in electoral systems other than majority rule however the standard pivotal voting calculus may not apply this paper analyzes one such system namely proportional representation where additional votes continue to push the policy outcome in one direction or the other a new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case to avoid the marginal voter s curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction intuitively conditioning on the rare event of a pivotal vote might seem to have a greater impact on behavior but the marginal voter s curse actually presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter s curse this and other predictions of the model are con rmed empirically by a series of laboratory experiments

choosing not to choose on the link between information and abstention abstract we use a dataset that allows us to circumvent a number of estimation difficulties that have plagued previous studies of the relationship between information and abstention our results show that information is a major determinant of abstention

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

income inequality and pollution a reassessment of the environmental kuznets curve abstract improvements in some measures of air and water quality can accompany rising per capita income as illustrated by the so called environmental kuznets curve for pollution variables which show such a relationship we hypothesize that a more equitable distribution of power contributes to these outcomes by enhancing the influence on policy of those who bear the costs of pollution relative to the influence of those who benefit from pollution generating activities an empirical analysis of international variations in seven indicators of air and water quality supports this hypothesis literacy political rights and civil liberties are found to have particularly strong effects on environmental quality in low income countries

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

anomalies the winner s curse abstract next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch try the following experiment in your class take a jar and fill it with coins noting the total value of the coins now a

abstention ideology and information acquisition we consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity in contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities we show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are we also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd