the expected inflation channel of government spending in the postwar u s abstract there exist sticky price models in which the output response to a government spending change can be large if the central bank is nonresponsive to inflation according to this expected inflation channel government spending drives up expected inflation which in turn reduces the real interest rate and leads to an increase in private consumption this paper examines whether the channel was important in the post wwii u s with particular attention to the 2009 recovery act period first we show that a model calibrated to have a large output multiplier requires a large response of expected inflation to a government spending shock next we show that this large response is inconsistent with structural vector autoregression evidence from the federal reserve s passive policy period 1959 1979 then we study expected inflation measures during the recovery act period in conjunction with a panel of professional forecaster surveys a cross country comparison of bond yields and fiscal policy news announcements we show that the expected inflation response was too small to engender a large output multiplier

what accounts for the changes in u s fiscal policy transmission using vector autoregressions on u s time series for 1957 79 and 1983 2004 we find government spending shocks to have stronger effects on output consumption and wages in the earlier period we try to account for this observation within a dsge model featuring price rigidities and limited asset market participation specifically we estimate the structural parameters of the model for both periods by matching impulse responses model based counterfactual experiments suggest that most of the changes in fiscal policy transmission are accounted for by increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the volcker greenspan period

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

auctions development and privatization efficient auctions with liquidity constrained buyers abstract we exhibit an efficient auction an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget or liquidity constrained

bid costs and endogenous bid caps we study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids and moreover bids may be capped we show that regardless of the number of bidders if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid on the other hand if agents have convex cost functions i e an increasing marginal cost then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

does meeting earnings expectations matter evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices this paper investigates whether the market rewards firms meeting current period earnings expectations and whether any such reward reflects the implications of meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings or reflects a distinct market premium we document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms meeting expectations controlling for the information in the current year s earnings we then test whether firms meeting expectations experience higher returns simply because their expected future earnings are also higher we find firms meeting expectations have significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized earnings than firms that do not we find that controlling for these higher future earnings firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest we find however that the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet expectations consistently controlling for an estimate of the firm s fundamental value

terrorist attacks analyst sentiment and earnings forecasts we examine whether exogenous and extremely negative events such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings influence the sentiment and forecasts of sell side equity analysts we find that analysts w

expected revenue of all pay auctions and first price sealed bid auctions with budget constraints we show that all pay auctions dominate first price sealed bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints this ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all pay auctions which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format

earnings news and small traders an intraday analysis abstract this study separates trading volume into buyer and seller initiated activities and examines the directional volume reaction in small and large trades to different types of earnings news good bad news triggers brief but intense buying selling in the large trades however a persistent period of unusually high buying activity is observed in the small trades irrespective of the news this anomalous proclivity of small traders to buy is robust across firm size trading volume and different earnings expectation models several explanations are discussed although the behavior does not seem fully explained by existing theories

analysts conflicts of interest and biases in earnings forecasts analysts earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients we hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s along with the boom in investment banking business exacerbated analysts conflicts of interest and their incentives to strategically adjust forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments we document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises and related changes in the market s response to surprises and forecast revisions the evidence for shifts is stronger for growth stocks where conflicts of interest are more pronounced however shifts are less notable for analysts without ties to investment banking and in international markets

asymmetric budget constraints in a first price auction abstract i solve a first price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object i show that in any equilibrium the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique if budgets are sufficiently low the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium for sufficiently high budgets mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise a less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off if the budget distribution of one bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of the other bidder in the reverse hazard rate order the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than the stronger bidder in contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions with asymmetric budget distributions a second price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first price auction under an additional assumption i derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all pay auction

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers abstract we study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation both valuation and budget are private information we derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting we show an implementation via a modified all pay auction the highest bidder need not win the good outright or stated differently the auction has pooling despite the usual regularity conditions subsidizing low budget buyers cannot increase revenue from a technical standpoint we contribute to auction design with multidimensional private information by working directly with reduced form allocation rules

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

macroeconomic effects from government purchases and taxes for u s annual data that include world war ii the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0 4 0 5 contemporaneously and 0 6 0 7 over 2 years if the change in defense spending is permanent gauged by ramey s defense news variable the multipliers are higher by 0 1 0 2 since all estimated multipliers are significantly less than 1 greater spending crowds out other components of gdp particularly investment the lack of good instruments prevents estimation of reliable multipliers for nondefense purchases multipliers in the literature of two or more likely reflect reverse causation from gdp to nondefense purchases increases in average marginal income tax rates measured by a newly constructed time series have significantly negative effects on gdp when interpreted as a tax multiplier the magnitude is around 1 1 the combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that the balanced budget multiplier for defense spending is negative we have some evidence that tax changes affect gdp mainly through substitution effects rather than wealth effects

monetary fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus abstract increases in government spending trigger substitution effects both inter and intra temporal and a wealth effect the ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate this paper estimates markov switching policy rules for the united states and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior when the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new keynesian model government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized the paper reports the model s predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the american recovery and reinvestment act s implied path for government spending under alternative monetary fiscal policy combinations

fiscal multipliers under an interest rate peg of deterministic versus stochastic duration this paper revisits the size of the fiscal multiplier the experiment is a fiscal expansion under the assumption of a pegged nominal rate of interest we demonstrate that a quantitatively important issue is the articulation of the exit from the policy experiment if the monetary fiscal expansion is stochastic with a mean duration of t periods the fiscal multiplier can be unboundedly large however if the monetary fiscal expansion is for a fixed t periods the multiplier is much smaller our explanation rests on a jensen s inequality type argument the deterministic multiplier is convex in duration and the stochastic multiplier is a weighted average of the deterministic multipliers the quantitative difference in the two multipliers also arises in a model with capital and in the baseline nonlinear model however the differences between the two is less pronounced in the nonlinear models

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

patent competition rent dissipation and the persistence of monopoly the role of research budgets abstract the paper investigates how patent rights can contribute to the persistence of monopoly patent competition is modelled as a dollar auction game between two firms incumbent and entrant any bid expenditure on r d in the game constitutes sunk cost whose total amount is constrained by fixed research budgets the explicit solution subgame perfect equilibrium determines who wins the patent and how the winning expenditures depend on order of play and budgets of firms the entrant can win if he moves first and has the higher budget rent may or may not be dissipated by the competition

less fighting than expected experiments with wars of attrition and all pay auctions while all pay auctions are well researched experimentally we do not have much laboratory evidence on wars of attrition this paper tries to fill this gap technically there are only a few differences between wars of attrition and all pay auctions behaviorally however we find striking differences as many studies our experiment finds overbidding in all pay auctions in contrast in wars of attrition we observe systematic underbidding

herding in analysts recommendations the role of media abstract this study investigates the impact of media on analysts herding behavior when making stock recommendations we find three main results first we find that analysts herd less when stocks are covered more in the media second when the firm has negative media sentiment analysts tend to herd more third higher disagreement in the media is associated with a higher tendency to herd among analysts these findings are robust to the confounding effect of news flows on returns as well as to alternative explanations in addition we find that the effect of media on the herding behavior is conditional on analyst characteristics

why does the law of one price fail an experiment on index mutual funds we conduct an experiment to evaluate why individuals invest in high fee index funds in our experiments subjects allocate 10 000 across four s p 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio s subsequent return subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees we can reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high fee index funds because of bundled non portfolio services search costs for fees matter but even when we eliminate these costs fees are not minimized instead subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception fees paid decrease with financial literacy interestingly subjects who choose high fee funds sense they are making a mistake

optimal auctions with endogenous budgets we study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets before bidding a bidder decides how much money she will borrow bidders incur a cost to borrowing we show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first price second price and all pay auction the all pay auction gives higher revenue than the first price auction which gives higher revenue than the second price auction in addition when the distribution of values satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition the revenue maximizing auction is implemented by an all pay auction with a suitably chosen reserve price

do security analysts speak in two tongues why do security analysts issue overly positive recommendations we propose a novel approach to distinguish strategic motives e g generating small investor purchases and pleasing management from nonstrategic motives genuine overoptimism we argue that nonstrategic distorters tend to issue both positive recommendations and optimistic forecasts while strategic distorters speak in two tongues issuing overly positive recommendations but less optimistic forecasts we show that the incidence of strategic distortion is large and systematically related to proxies for incentive misalignment our two tongues metric reveals strategic distortion beyond those indicators and provides a new tool for detecting incentives to distort that are hard to identify otherwise

spending reversals and fiscal multipliers under an interest rate peg this paper examines whether fiscal stimuli are more effective when the monetary policy is less responsive to inflation first we provide empirical evidence suggesting that in the period of u s passive monetary policy a positive government spending shock was followed over time by a spending cut second our theoretical analysis reveals that the pegged nominal interest rate is not a sufficient condition to generate a large fiscal multiplier an increase in government spending could increase the long run real interest rate if it is associated with a government spending reversal and a less responsive monetary policy consequently the response of private consumption can be negative and the government spending multiplier is not necessarily greater than 1

self selection and analyst coverage this paper examines the relation between analysts information about a stock s future prospects and their decisions to issue investment recommendations and earnings forecasts for that stock and the implications of this relation for the observed distribution of recommendations and earnings forecast errors articles in the financial press have long argued that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavorable investment information perhaps because they fear jeopardizing potential investment banking

baby boomer retirement security the roles of planning financial literacy and housing wealth abstract we compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the health and retirement study the early baby boomers in 2004 and individuals in the same age group in 1992 levels and patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time though boomers rely more on housing equity than their predecessors most important planners in both cohorts arrive close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than non planners instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no wealth

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

earnings expectations investor trade size and anomalous returns around earnings announcements abstract we provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets investors initiating large trades respond to analysts earnings forecast errors while investors initiating small trades respond to a less sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels this suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that bernard and thomas journal of accounting and economics 13 305 340 theorize causes post earnings announcement drift we also use analysts forecasts to significantly improve the predictability of returns around earnings announcements previously documented by bernard and thomas finally results attempting to link return predictability to the prevalence of small investor trading are mixed

biased forecasts or biased earnings the role of reported earnings in explaining apparent bias and over underreaction in analysts earnings forecasts the extensive literature that investigates whether analysts earnings forecasts are biased and or inefficient has produced conflicting evidence and no definitive answers to either question this paper shows how two relatively small but statistically influential asymmetries in the tail and the middle of distributions of analysts forecast errors can exaggerate or obscure evidence consistent with analyst bias and inefficiency leading to inconsistent inferences we identify an empirical link between firms recognition of unexpected accruals and the presence of the two asymmetries in distributions of forecast errors that suggests that firm reporting choices play an important role in determining analysts forecast errors r 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information we provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue our example suggests that information non revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact

equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders the two bidder case we study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders we prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions comparative static results are provided journal of economic literature classification number d44

sequential second price auctions with private budgets abstract we study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second price auctions sequentially to three or more bidders who have private budgets that limit their spending in the auctions we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in equilibrium while bidders bid the minimum of their valuations and budgets in the second auction their aggression in the first round depends on two factors the competition from other bidders as measured by the probability of facing high budget bidders and the option value from participating the second auction as measured by the budget difference between various bidders the former factor makes bidders more aggressive and the latter makes them less aggressive in particular when the competition factor dominates the sequential auctions generate higher revenue in expectation than the uniform price auction

has monetary policy become more effective we investigate the implications of changes in the structure of the u s economy for monetary policy effectiveness estimating a vector autoregression over the pre and post 1980 periods we provide evidence of a reduced effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period we estimate a structural model that replicates well the economy s response in both periods and perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the change in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the economy s volatility we find that by responding more strongly to inflation expectations monetary policy has stabilized the economy more effectively in the post 1980 period

why new issues and high accrual firms underperform the role of analysts credulity we find that analysts forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings among both equity issuers and nonissuers analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue year accruals the predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long term underperformance of new issuers the predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency copyright 2002 oxford university press

are government spending multipliers greater during periods of slack evidence from 20th century historical data a key question that has arisen during recent debates is whether government spending multipliers are larger during periods of slack some researchers and policymakers have argued that while government spending multipliers are estimated to be modest on average they might become greater during times when resources are underutilized auerbach and gorodnichenko 2012 forthcoming henceforth ag test this hypothesis and find larger multipliers dur

on the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders abstract this paper provides a class of examples of two bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value we show that the seller s expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy the intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows in the presence of financial constraints the bidders upward response in their bids to the seller s good signals is limited by their financial constraints while their downward response to bad signals is not

fiscal stimulus with spending reversals abstract the short run effects of fiscal policy depend not only on current tax and spending choices but also on expectations about future policy adjustment while general equilibrium models typically restrict medium term adjustment to taxation we highlight the importance of government spending dynamics first we provide time series evidence for the united states suggesting that an exogenous increase in government spending prompts a rise in public debt followed over time by a reduction in spending below trend second we show how expected spending reversals alter the short run impact of fiscal policy in a new keynesian model bringing it closer in line with the evidence

conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public we show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date we conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias we show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias the results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap this paper uses a dsge model to examine the eects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap the spending multiplier can be much larger than in the normal situation if the liquidity trap is very persistent and scal stimulus can be rapidly implemented moreover the budgetary costs may be minimal as the large response of output boosts tax revenues allowing for something close to a scal free lunch however we caution that the multiplier may be much smaller under plausible implementation lags for many types of public spending and or if the liquidity trap lasts less than two years in addition because the marginal impact of scal expansion decreases in the scale of the outlay it is crucial to distinguish between average and marginal multipliers

bureaucratic corruption and income evidence from the land sector in bangladesh we examine for the first time the effects of corruption on income using household survey data from a developing country estimating the effects of corruption on income is challenging because of the simultaneous relationship between the two variables we use a two step instrumental variable approach to identify the effects of corruption on income we find that after adjusting for simultaneity bias the act of bribery reduces income and that higher bribes have a negative effect on income taken together our results provide a possible explanation why a vicious cycle between corruption and income inequality does not exist in the land sector in bangladesh

comparative analysis of litigation systems an auction theoretic approach a simple auction theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court the court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys this framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems the british rule continental rule american rule and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press