government policy with time inconsistent voters behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for benevolent government intervention this paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets in equilibrium government accumulates debt to respond to individuals desire to undo their commitments which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation as a consequence i large and distortionary government debt accumulation occurs and ii banning illiquid assets could improve individuals welfare these results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments responses to voters self control problems

anticipating regret why fewer options may be better we study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the agent selects an alternative from a menu and experiences regret if her choice is ex post inferior since regret arises from comparisons between the alternative selected and the other available alternatives our axioms reflect the agent s desire to limit her options we prove that our representation is essentially unique we also introduce two measures of comparative regret attitudes and relate them to our representation finally we explore the formal connection between the present work and the literature on temptation

temptation and social security in a dynastic framework abstract we investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go payg social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self control problems the presence of self control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption individuals efforts to balance between the short term urge for temptation and the long term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self control costs in this environment payg social security works as a self control cost reducing device in contrast the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more this in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self control problems and payg social security on savings but magnifies the self control costs we find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a payg system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately however the level of mitigation is quite modest

a new year a new you within individual variation in food purchases abstract we document that within individual variation in food choices is substantial and has potentially important consequences for nutrition and hence well being we develop an approach that allows us to study the determinants of this within individual variation within an economic framework and allow for across individual preference heterogeneity we show that around one fifth of within individual fluctuations in diet quality is explained by standard economic variables prices and budgets along with advertising and weather the residual fluctuations are important and are larger for lower income and younger people and individuals who state they are impulsive we propose a two selves model of food purchase behavior to structurally interpret these empirical patterns we use nonparametric revealed preference techniques to show that this model rationalizes our food purchase data

competing for endorsements endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members the members who share policy concerns may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues if their leaders cannot fully explain the issues they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party when interest groups endorse legislative contenders the candidates may compete for backing policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public the authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed and the normative properties of the political equilibria

getting to the top of mind how reminders increase saving we provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect these empirical results do not map neatly into existing models so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2296 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

axiomatization and measurement of quasi hyperbolic discounting this article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi hyperbolic preferences we impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade offs by relying on what we call annuity compensations our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in a pilot experiment we use the partial identification approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the subject pool consistent with previous studies we find evidence for both present and future bias jel codes c10 c99 d03 d90

temptation and commitment in the laboratory temptation and self control in intertemporal choice environments are receiving increasing attention in the theoretical economics literature nevertheless there remains a scarcity of empirical evidence from controlled environments informing behavior under repeated temptations this is unfortunate in light of the fact that in many natural environments the same temptation must be repeatedly resisted this paper fills that gap by reporting data from a novel laboratory study of economic decisions under repeat temptations subjects are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings we show that this option is tempting in the sense that a substantial fraction of our subjects incur pecuniary costs to eliminate the choice and thus commit to not choosing the tempting alternative we compare the timing and price elasticity of these commitment decisions to predictions from existing theoretical models of decision under temptation our data are broadly consistent with theory with the notable exception that commitment often occurs with delay rather than at the first opportunity moreover the timing of commitment is significantly impacted by the cost of the commitment device the patterns we report have direct implications for economic theory and are a first step toward designing mechanisms that promote prudent economic decisions under temptation

potential pitfalls for the purchasing power parity puzzle sampling and specification biases in mean reversion tests of the law of one price the ppp puzzle is based on empirical evidence that international price differences for individual goods loop or baskets of goods ppp appear highly persistent or even nonstationary the present consensus is these price differences have a half life that is of the order of five years at best and infinity at worst this seems unreasonable in a world where transportation and transaction costs appear so low as to encourage arbitrage and the convergence of price gaps over much shorter horizons typically days or weeks however current empirics rely on a particular choice of methodology involving i relatively low frequency monthly quarterly or annual data and ii a linear model specification in fact these methodological choices are not innocent and they can be shown to bias analysis towards findings of slow convergence and a random walk intuitively if we suspect that the actual adjustment horizon is of the order of days then monthly and annual data cannot be expected to reveal it if we suspect arbitrage costs are high enough to produce a substantial band of inaction then a linear model will fail to support convergence if the process spends considerable time random walking in that band thus when testing for ppp or loop model specification and data sampling should not proceed without consideration of the actual institutional context and logistical framework of markets

media and gridlock abstract i develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism i show that when voters are less informed by media obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party the model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via signaling by contrast the previous literature on causes of gridlock focuses on polarization and other factors the model also makes several auxiliary predictions consistent with recent trends in u s politics

bubbles and self enforcing debt we characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future periods first we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period second we provide an equivalence result whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles in contrast to the classic result by bulow and rogoff 1989a positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment incentives

timing and self control the dual self model of self control with one period lived short run selves is excessively sensitive to the timing of shocks and to the interpolation of additional no action time periods in between the dates when decisions are made we show that when short run selves have a random length of time this excess sensitivity goes away we consider both linear and convex cost of self control models illustrating the theory through a series of examples we examine when opportunities to consume will be avoided or delayed we consider the way in which the marginal interest declines with delay and we examine how preference reversals depend on the timing of information to accommodate the combination of short time periods and convex costs of self control we extend the model to treat willpower as a cognitive resource that is limited in the short run

timing is money does lump sum payment of the earned income tax credit affect savings and debt earned income tax credit eitc benefit income is paid out in a lump sum around tax time we investigate whether savings and debt among eitc eligible families reflect the timing of payments using nationally representative individual level data on self reported debt and savings outcomes we search for differences in monthly behavior between eitc eligible and ineligible households we find evidence that credit card and unsecured debt holding among eitc eligible families reflects the timing of the eitc with low debt levels at tax time relative to other months debt holding among ineligible families with children does not exhibit a similar pattern we find limited evidence of intrayear patterns in savings behavior among eitc eligible families

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

behavioural characterizations of naivete for time inconsistent preferences we propose non parametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete these definitions leverage ex ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behaviour and ex post random choices from menus to identify actual behaviour the main advantage of our definitions is their independence from any assumed functional form for the utility function representing behaviour an individual is sophisticated if she is indifferent ex ante between retaining the option to choose from a menu ex post or committing to her actual distribution of choices from that menu she is naive if she prefers the flexibility in the menu reflecting a mistaken belief that she will act more virtuously than she actually will we propose two definitions of comparative naivete and explore the restrictions implied by our definitions for several prominent models of time inconsistency

asymmetric information and legislative rules some amendments we reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness when committees are heterogeneous full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule in contrast the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies when committees are homogeneous the situation is different all equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule furthermore the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence we also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

expectations based reference dependent life cycle consumption this study incorporates a recent preference specification of expectations based loss aversion which has been applied broadly in microeconomics into a classic macro model to offer a unified explanation for three empirical observations about life cycle consumption first loss aversion explains excess smoothness and sensitivity that is the empirical observation that consumption responds to income shocks with a lag intuitively such lagged responses allow the agent to delay painful losses in consumption until his expectations have adjusted secondly the preferences generate a hump shaped consumption profile early in life consumption is low due to a first order precautionary savings motive however as uncertainty resolves over time this motive is dominated by time inconsistent overconsumption that eventually leads to declining consumption towards the end of life thirdly consumption drops at retirement prior to retirement the agent wants to overconsume his uncertain income before his expectations catch up post retirement however income is no longer uncertain and overconsumption is associated with a sure loss in future consumption as an empirical contribution i structurally estimate the preference parameters using life cycle consumption data my estimates match those obtained in experiments and other micro studies and generate the degree of excess smoothness observed in macro consumption data

willpower and the optimal control of visceral urges common intuition and experimental psychology suggest that the ability to self regulate willpower is a depletable resource we investigate the behavior of an agent who optimally consumes a cake or paycheck or workload over time and who recognizes that restraining his consumption too much would exhaust his willpower and leave him unable to manage his consumption unlike prior models of self control a model with willpower depletion can explain the increasing consumption sequences observable in high frequency data and corresponding laboratory findings the apparent links between unrelated self control behaviors and the altered economic behavior following imposition of cognitive loads at the same time willpower depletion provides an alternative explanation for a taste for commitment intertemporal preference reversals and procrastination accounting for willpower depletion thus provides a more unified theory of time preference it also provides an explanation for anomalous intratemporal behaviors such as low correlations between health related activities

temptation driven preferences my own behaviour baffles me for i find myself not doing what i really want to do but doing what i really loathe saint paulwhat behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a standard rational agent in earlier work gul and pesendorfer 2001 use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by dekel lipman and rustichini 2001 to those explainable via temptation we argue that set betweenness rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be important in applications we propose a pair of alternative axioms called dfc desire for commitment and aic approximate improvements are chosen dfc characterizes temptation as situations in which given any set of alternatives the agent prefers committing herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the flexibility of choosing later aic is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves the menu it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances from this interpretation the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse as a commitment than some commitment from the menu then the best commitment from the improved menu is strictly preferred to facing that menu we show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization of the gul pesendorfer representation copyright wiley blackwell

how to commit if you must commitment contracts and the dual self model this paper studies how dual self fudenberg and levine 2006 decision makers can use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long run optimal actions i consider three types of commitment technologies carrot contracts rewards for good behavior financed by borrowing from future consumption stick contracts self imposed fines for bad behavior and binding commitment i compare the welfare implications of these contracts and show that dual self decision makers strictly prefer to use carrots instead of either sticks or binding commitments this is for several reasons sticks are highly vulnerable to trembles while carrots are not sticks and binding commitments create a temptation to cancel them while carrots do not and finally carrots allow easy tradeoffs between commitment and flexibility while sticks and binding commitments do not

assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default abstract a life cycle model with equilibrium default in which agents with and without temptation coexist is constructed to evaluate the 2005 bankruptcy law reform the calibrated model indicates that the 2005 reform reduces bankruptcies as seen in the data and improves welfare as lower default premia allows better consumption smoothing a counterfactual reform of changing income garnishment rate is also investigated interesting contrasting welfare effects between two types of agents emerge agents with temptation prefer a lower garnishment rate as tighter borrowing constraint prevents them from over borrowing while those without prefer better consumption smoothing enabled by a higher garnishment rate

present biased preferences self awareness and shirking abstract we model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent but agents may have time inconsistent present biased preferences and lack complete self awareness of these preferences the self control problem and naivete of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack off even though doing so is observable when the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naive the second best solution entails allowing a present biased agent to slack off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking with greater self awareness among present biased agents the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract furthermore when shirking can be severely punished this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem instead the principal may exploit present biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack off which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do but at the expense of foregoing much compensation

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

temptation and taxation we study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self control problems embedding the class of preferences developed by gul and pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting we first prove in a two period model that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by excessive impatience the savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive we then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests as a special case the phelps pollak laibson multiple selves model thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model we prove that when period utility is logarithmic the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon moreover as the horizon grows large the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy in contrast to the well known chamley judd result

temptation and self control some evidence and applications this paper studies the empirical relevance of temptation and self control using household level data from the consumer expenditure survey we construct an infinite horizon consumption savings model that allows but does not require temptation and self control in preferences in the presence of temptation a wealth consumption ratio in addition to consumption growth becomes a determinant of the asset pricing kernel and the importance of this additional pricing factor depends on the strength of temptation to identify the presence of temptation we exploit an implication of the theory that a more tempted individual should be more likely to hold commitment assets such as individual retirement account ira or 401 k accounts our estimation provides empirical support for temptation preferences based on our estimates we explore some quantitative implications of this class of preferences for capital accumulation in a neoclassical growth model and the welfare cost of the business cycle

the isomorphism hypothesis the prisoner s dilemma as intertemporal allocation and vice versa abstract economists model the choice of the current self in intertemporal allocation as the outcome of identity the current and future selves belong to the same decision maker by the sheer fact they reside in the same biological skin defined by biological identity the economists should be consistent and likewise model the choice of each player in the prisoner s dilemma or generally the social dilemma as the outcome of identity the selves of the players belong to the same decision maker by the sheer fact they reside in the same social skin defined by social identity if the economists consider cooperation rather than defection to be the rational strategy of the current self in intertemporal allocations they should be consistent and consider cooperation rather than defection to be the rational strategy of each player in social dilemmas symmetrically if the economists judge defection rather than cooperation to be the rational strategy in social dilemmas it behooves them to also judge defection rather than cooperation to be the rational strategy in intertemporal allocations

voting under temptation abstract within the confines of linear tax and complete market we show that the efficiency force for a negative capital tax may not be strong enough to reverse the politico economic force for a positive redistributive taxation under temptation and self control preferences

social security and self control preferences abstract we analyze the welfare effects of an unfunded social security system we do so using an overlapping generations economy wherein agents have self control preferences face mortality risk individual income risk and borrowing constraints given our specification of preferences unfunded social security helps reduce the agents temptation to consume in every period consequently the welfare costs it otherwise entails are substantially mitigated while both social security and self control when considered separately reduce welfare their combination renders this effect considerably less severe moreover if the cost of resisting temptation is very high the introduction of social security might even improve welfare

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

inventories as factors of production and economic fluctuations this paper presents a theory of inventory investment by stage of processing and uses it to examine the role of inventory investment in economic fluctuations the model in which inventories are treated as factors of production is estimated for four durable goods industries three conclusions emerge from the estimation first the estimates generally satisfy the theoretical restrictions second the elasticity of inventory demand with respect to output is high indicating an important accelerator effect finally the estimates suggest that shifts in the demand for inventories are an important source of economic fluctuations copyright 1989 by american economic association

a dual self model of impulse control we propose that a simple dual self model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi hyperbolic discounting and rabin s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small the model also implies that self control costs imply excess delay as in the o donoghue and rabin models of quasi hyperbolic utility and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist the base version of our model is consistent with the gul pesendorfer axioms but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load

strotz meets allais diminishing impatience and the certainty effect abstract decision makers tend to exhibit a higher degree of impatience when considering a delay to an immediate reward than when contemplating an identical delay to an equal future reward this work argues that diminishing impatience originates from the distinction between the certain present and the risky future a simple functional representation of preferences exhibiting time inconsistency when the future is uncertain is derived experimental evidence which is inconsistent with other formulations that account for diminishing impatience supports the proposed approach the new theory uncovers a tight relation between diminishing impatience and well known behavioral regularities in choice under risk and uncertainty jel d12 d81

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

temptation driven behavior and taxation a quantitative analysis in a life cycle model i introduction a central research question in the dynamic fiscal policy literature during the last 30 years or so is whether under fairly general modeling choices the government should impose a positive tax on capital income in the long run the original answer to this question is negative and is due to the seminal papers by chamley 1986 and judd 1985 who established that in the context of a standard neoclassical growth model with infinitely lived individuals an optimal income tax policy entails taxing capital at confiscatory rates in the short run and setting capital income taxes equal to zero in the long run only labor income should be taxed in the long run since then several modeling choices that cast doubt on the validity of this result were identified in the literature imrohoroglu 1998 showed that the optimal capital income tax rate is strictly positive in an overlapping generations olg setting where individuals face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty conesa kitao and krueger 2009 extended imrohoroglu 1998 by adding a labor leisure choice they demonstrated that the optimal capital income tax rate is equal to 36 and concluded that this high rate is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model in contrast krusell kuruscu and smith 2010 analytically showed that within a class of ramsey tax schemes the optimal capital income tax rate should be negative that is savings should be subsidized when agents have self control problems moreover in the special case where consumers succumb completely to temptation ramsey taxes deliver first best welfare outcomes and in contrast to the chamley judd result the optimum calls for a subsidy to savings however an integrated assessment of the combined effects of the relevant trade offs both along the dimension of differences in preferences and along the dimension of the scope of capital income taxation versus labor income taxation is missing from all previous studies in both social security and capital taxation literature and this paper aims to bridge the gap in the literature and contribute in this aspect to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first study that introduces temptation driven preferences in a quantitative model aiming to tackle the question on the optimal capital income tax before proceeding to specifically articulate this paper s contribution to the literature we consider critical to address a question that lies at the very core of our line of research namely why fiscal policy models with time inconsistent or self control preferences are relevant in the first place initially the literature pioneered by strotz 1956 and phelps and poliak 1968 corroborated evidence coming from both introspection and experiments that agents exhibit preference reversals as time passes different strands within this literature have suggested that these preference reversals could be induced by either time inconsistent preferences see laibson 1997 or self control preferences gul and pesendorfer 2004 time inconsistent preferences typically assume that agents have sequences of different selves each valuing consumption streams in a unique way in contrast gul and pesendorfer 2004 provide a dynamically consistent model suitable for addressing preference reversals that does not necessitate splitting up the consumer in multiple selves that is self control preferences these preferences describe an individual that in every period is tempted to consume his entire endowment when he consumes less than his endowment he incurs a disutility cost that stems from exercising self control that is self control cost optimal behavior trades off the temptation to consume vis a vis the long run self interest of the individual 1 alongside these theoretical underpinnings there is sound empirical and experimental evidence that agents suffer from self control problems

the rate of time preference and dynamic economic analysis strong restrictions on the structure of preferences are a central feature in the received theory of intertemporal allocation in fact most of the modern literature concerned with capital theoretic problems represents preferences by a functional in which an additive utility function is discounted by a constant rate of time preference this specification is attractive because it is analytically tractable in dynamic models and it clearly delineates how tastes and opportunities interact to determine an economy s household s paths of consumption and capital formation however its rigid structure constancy of time preference severely limits the conclusions and explanatory power of the corresponding models this paper considers a class of utility functionals in continuous time which have the appealing feature that the rate of time preference depends systematically on an index of aggregate future consumption the more flexible structure embodied in these functionals leads to important generalizations and

hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets does the existence of secondary markets for durable goods affect price and allocation on primary markets we study competitive equilibria for durable goods where the possibility of future trade on secondary markets does not affect consumer behaviour in the primary market provided consumers are exponential discounters if consumers are hyperbolic discounters however secondary markets are no longer neutral as they allow consumers to postpone their purchasing decisions in this case the equilibrium price in the primary market is decreasing in the number of periods in which the good can be traded hence primary producers have an incentive to close down secondary markets if secondary markets never close hyperbolic discounters may use collusive intrapersonal strategies which lead to a pareto improvement for all incarnations of the same consumer we characterise the set of all stationary equilibrium prices and show that the competitive equilibrium allocation may be inefficient

precautionary saving a review of the empirical literature standard macroeconomic models show that uncertainty plays a significant role in consumption and saving decisions under rather mild conditions namely the convexity of the marginal utility of consumption increased uncertainty generates a positive extra saving the so called precautionary saving although this hypothesis has been tested by a large number of authors both at macro and micro level the empirical results are not conclusive and the main conclusion than can be drawn is that there is neither consensus on the intensity of that motive for saving nor on the most appropriate measure of uncertainty this paper provides a comprehensive review of the empirical literature discussing the main controversial issues and the different approaches followed by the studies addressing empirically the test of precautionary saving

commitment and self control abstract the literature on self control problems has typically concentrated on immediate temptations this paper studies a gul and pesendorfer temptation and self control econometrica 69 2001 1403 1435 self control and the theory of consumption econometrica 72 2004 119 158 style model in which decision makers are affected by temptations that lie in the future while temptation is commonly understood to give rise to a demand for commitment it is shown that temptation by future consumption can induce its absence the model also exhibits procrastination provides an alternative to projection bias as an explanation for some experimental results and can simultaneously account for myopic and hyperopic behavior the evidence on preference reversals supports temptation by future consumption and suggests that it may not be restricted to short time horizons

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

manipulated news model electoral competition and mass media abstract this paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media and self mediatization the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates in elections in the model a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office motivated candidates the voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place while the media outlet suppresses some of this information because the voter s decision making could be incorrect direct distortion the candidates have an incentive to win the election by influencing the media coverage through policy settings indirect distortion as a result policy convergence to the voter s ideal policy occurs if and only if the media bias is sufficiently small we then characterize the set of equilibria in terms of the degree of distortion the results suggest that if either strategic media manipulation or competition among the candidates is omitted then the distortion is nonnegligibly misspecified

reconsideration proofness a refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency this paper examines a game in which an infinitely lived decision maker with inconsistent preferences makes choices over time there are typically many subgame perfect equilibria to this game i describe a refinement of subgame perfection that i term reconsideration proofness there is always a reconsideration proof equilibrium and all reconsideration proof equilibrium paths provide the same utility to the decision maker i show that reconsideration proofness is relevant for macroeconomic policy games by proving an equivalence result between sustainable equilibria in policy games as defined by chari and kehoe 1990 and subgame perfect equilibria in intertemporally inconsistent choice problems journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c73 d91 e61

measuring self control problems a structural estimation we perform a structural estimation of the preference parameters in a buffer stock consumption model augmented with temptation disutility we adopt a two stage method of simulated moments methodology to match our simulated moments with those observed in the us survey of consumer finances to identify the parameters we use liquid and quasi liquid retirement wealth holdings at different ages as target moments we find evidence of a significantly positive degree of temptation and estimates under the unrestricted model are more precise than estimates under the restricted model with no temptation overall a model with temptation preferences explains better the observed target moments

self coordination in time inconsistent stochastic decision problems a planner doer game framework abstract time inconsistency has been a thorny issue in many economic and financial decision making problems especially when risk measures are involved in performance criteria we develop in this paper a two tier planner doer game framework with self coordination by aligning the global interest of the planner and the local interests of the doers by applying suitable penalty functions a degree of internal harmony measured quantitatively by the expected cost of self coordination can be achieved by the self coordination policy we establish an axiom system for modified preferences under which the self coordination policy can be obtained by solving a corresponding optimization problem we then apply our game framework successfully in dynamic mean variance portfolio selection

elections with privately informed parties and voters this paper studies a situation in which parties are betterinformed than voters about the optimal policies for voters weshow that voters are able to infer the parties information byobserving their electoral positions even if parties have policypreferences which differ substantially from the median voter s unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions we assumethat voters have some private information of their own if theinformation available to voters is biased parties attempts toinfluence voters beliefs will result in less than fullconvergence even if parties know with certainty the optimalpolicy for the median voter

over savings and hyperbolic discounting abstract hyperbolic discounting models are widely seen as implying that consumers do not save enough in accordance with the observed low rates of savings of some households this paper qualifies this view by showing that hyperbolic consumers may oversave in the short run the result extends to uncertainty on future income and does not depend on whether preferences are present biased or future biased a generalized comparative statics analysis of self control is introduced and its relationship to the analysis of uncertainty on discount factors is emphasized

the revealed preference theory of changing tastes we analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision makers with changing tastes we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the strotz model of consistent planning building on an example given by peleg and yaari 1973 we show that for problems with infinitely many choices strotz s representation of preferences may not be well defined for that case we propose a well defined approximation which is empirically indistinguishable from the strotz preference that is being approximated

media as watchdogs the role of news media in electoral competition abstract we develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition when policy payoffs are state dependent party policies do not converge to the median voter s ideal policy if the media report only party policies news analysis about the state though possibly biased can discipline off equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies since voters are rational the party favored by the media need not win with a higher probability instead media bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and lead to more polarized policies

social security reform with self control preferences abstract this paper analyzes a fully funded social security system under the assumption that agents face temptation issues agents are required to save through individually managed personal security accounts without and with mandatory annuitization when the analysis is restricted to crra preferences our results are congruent with the literature in indicating that the complete elimination of social security is among the reform scenarios that maximize welfare however when self control preferences are introduced and as the intensity of self control becomes progressively more severe the social security elimination scenario loses ground very rapidly in fact in the case of relatively severe temptation the elimination of social security becomes the least desirable alternative under the light of the above findings any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference specifications suitable for dealing with preference reversals

are biased media bad for democracy this paper assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased media using a political agency framework with a strategic voter polarized politicians and news providers my model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased than biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences however biased media may improve voter welfare contrary to several scholars fear partisan news providers are not always bad for democracy my theoretical findings also have important implications for empirical analyses of the electoral consequences of changes in the media environment left wing and right wing biased outlets have heterogeneous effects on electoral outcomes which need to be properly accounted for existing empirical studies are unlikely to measure the consequences of biased media as researchers never observe and can rarely approximate the adequate counterfactual elections with unbiased news outlets

temptation and forward guidance abstract motivated by the extensive experimental and empirical evidence on preference reversal in consumption choices we introduce temptation with self control preferences into a new keynesian model to study the effects of forward guidance in monetary policy and the related forward guidance puzzle in our set up the representative agent faces a trade off between the temptation for immediate satisfaction liquidate wealth with his long run best smooth consumption which he manages by exerting cognitive effort or self control for higher risk aversion in temptation than in commitment utility there is discounting in the linearized euler equation the latter makes the response of current real activity to the announcement of a future policy change declining in the forward guidance horizon which then helps solving the puzzle our framework delivers testable aggregate and policy implications that distinguish it from alternative microfoundations for discounting in the euler equation previously used to solve the puzzle

subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice this chapter provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time for this purpose we formulate an infinite horizon extension of dekel lipman and rustichini econometrica 69 891 934 2001 and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those about future discount factors we also show uniqueness of subjective belief about discount factors moreover a behavioral comparison about preference for flexibility characterizes the condition that one s subjective belief second order stochastically dominates the other finally the resulting model is applied to a consumption savings problem

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus abstract i characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus the numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference these expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation perfectionism context effects and other phenomena

nominal exchange rate regimes and the real exchange rate abstract two assumptions about the real exchange rate are common in the literature on international finance 1 the real exchange rate is a random walk 2 the time series properties of the real exchange rate depend on the nominal exchange rate regime this paper presents evidence that indicates that the random walk behavior of the real exchange rate is only a characteristic of the post world war ii period moreover our findings also suggest that what is crucial to the real exchange rate behavior is the particular historical period rather than the nominal exchange rate arrangement

self control and the theory of consumption to study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty we define and characterize dynamic self control dsc preferences dsc preferences are recursive and separable in economies with dsc agents equilibria exist but may be inefficient in such equilibria steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self control increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self control constant increases the equity premium removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract

exponential growth bias and household finance exponential growth bias is the pervasive tendency to linearize exponential functions when assessing them intuitively we show that exponential growth bias can explain two stylized facts in household finance the tendency to underestimate an interest rate given other loan terms and the tendency to underestimate a future value given other investment terms bias matters empirically more biased households borrow more save less favor shorter maturities and use and benefit more from financial advice conditional on a rich set of household characteristics there is little evidence that our measure of exponential growth bias merely proxies for broader financial sophistication what drives household financial decisions the canonical economic model assumes that consumers choose to consume borrow or save based on their preferences their expectations and the costs and benefits of borrowing and saving a growing body of work applies insights from psychology to enrich specifications of three of the model s key pieces preferences expectations and problem solving conditional on parameter values 1 in this paper we bring psychological evidence to bear on a fourth specification issue how consumers perceive the costs and benefits of borrowing and saving we begin by tying together existing and new evidence on these cost perceptions to show that most consumers err systematically when given information commonly available in the market on the saving side consumers display future value bias a systematic tendency to underestimate a future value given

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

communication between rational agents abstract conventional game theoretic solution concepts never guarantee meaningful communication in cheap talk games i define a solution concept which does guarantee communication in some games i assume full rationality without imposing equilibrium conditions but add a natural behavioral assumption about how agents use language agents have a propensity to speak the truth and to believe others speak the truth but use the game s strategic incentives to check whether such behavior and beliefs are rational i also define and prove the existence of an equilibrium version of the concept and present examples where its predictions seem more natural than farrell s neologism proof equilibrium

toward an understanding of the welfare effects of nudges evidence from a field experiment in the workplace social scientists have recently explored how framing of gains and losses affects productivity we conducted a field experiment in peri urban uganda and compare output levels across 1000 workers over isomorphic tasks and incentives framed as either losses or gains we find that loss aversion can be leveraged to increase the productivity of labor the estimated welfare costs of using the loss contract are quite modest perhaps because the loss contract is viewed as a soft commitment device

the retirement savings puzzle reviewed the role of housing and bequests the so called retirement savings puzzle is a phenomenon by which contrary to what the standard life cycle model predicts households do not run down their wealth significantly during retirement in this review paper we survey the literature on the retirement savings puzzle and we connect it with the literature on housing equity during retirement to establish a link between these two streams of literature we use as a framework the work of nakajima and telyukova 2013a home equity in retirement ucsd working paper and nakajima and telyukova 2017 reverse mortgage loans a quantitative analysis journal of finance 72 911 950 who find that home ownership interacts with factors that explain the retirement savings puzzle notably with the bequest motive we complement the results by nakajima and telyukova by relating them to the literature on altruistic bequests strategic bequests and housing as a commitment device all of which give further insights on the connection between home ownership and bequests we complement our review of the literature with descriptive evidence using the netherlands as a case study

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

new evidence on excess sensitivity of household consumption the monthly salaries and allowances of korean government employees are known in advance but vary greatly throughout the year using a korean monthly panel data set the present study examines how nondurable consumption expenditures in households headed by government employees respond to predictable income changes the study finds a moderate excess sensitivity in consumption that can be attributed to about 9 of the households further analysis shows that these 9 of the households have lower committed expenditures and are likely inattentive consumers

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

happiness and time preference the effect of positive affect in a random assignment experiment abstract we conduct a random assignment experiment to investigate whether positive affect impacts time preference where time preference denotes a preference for present over future utility our result indicates that compared to neutral affect mild positive affect significantly reduces time preference over money this result is robust to various specification checks and alternative interpretations of the result are considered our result has implications for the effect of happiness on time preference and the role of emotions in economic decision making in general finally we reconfirm the ubiquity of time preference and start to explore its determinants djel d12 d83 i31

a spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition we characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news when there are two media outlets each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones but voter welfare is not always higher copyright 2008 wiley blackwell