securitization of taxes implicit in payg pensions to preserve solvency a pay as you go payg pension system needs to adjust contribution rates and pension promises over time currently it is not possible to hedge in the financial market against politically determined uncertainty as regards these parameters i consider a policy reform whereby property rights are established on the implicit lifetime tax levied by payg finance and are assigned to the pension institution these property rights are well defined if the reform also features rule based allocation of aggregate risk in the form of defined contribution or defined benefit schemes i show that a payg pension system may indeed be instantly restructured so as to minimize political risk and allow financial market diversification of risk a side benefit is securitization of human capital flows which are not traded in existing financial markets the new securities if traded in appropriately competitive financial markets are complementary to the notional account reforms of the 1990s however fiscal instability can increase if securitization is implemented in the absence of initial solvency and credible adoption of rule based methods to allocate aggregate risk salvador valdes prieto

religiosity and earnings management international evidence from the banking industry using an international sample of banks we study how differences in religiosity across countries affect earnings management given that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical behavior it may reduce excessive risk taking and act as deterrence for earnings manipulations therefore we predict lower earnings management in societies that have higher religiosity consistent with expectations our cross country analysis indicates that religiosity is negatively related to income increasing earnings management for loss avoidance and just meeting or beating prior year s earnings we also find that religiosity reduces income increasing earnings management through abnormal loan loss provisions in additional tests we document that religiosity increases the information value of bank earnings with both earnings persistence and cash flow predictability being enhanced by higher religiosity for the crisis period analysis i e 2007 2009 our evidence shows that banks in countries with higher religiosity exhibit lower probability of reporting asset deterioration and lower probability of having poor performance

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

religion and the method of earnings management evidence from china previous studies argue that religious firms are more ethical and thus engage less in accrual earnings management at odds with the ethical view we use a sample of chinese listed firms and show that firms in religious regions use more real earnings management we postulate that besides ethics religion also proxies for risk aversion which motivates firms to substitute accrual earnings management with real earnings management consistent with this view we show that the positive negative association between religiosity and real accrual earnings management is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk and for firms with less reputable auditors in addition we use a mediation model introduced by baron and kenny j pers soc psychol 51 6 1173 1182 1986 to show that religiosity affects earnings management through the channel of risk aversion we conclude that firms choose real earnings management over accrual based earnings management because of risk aversion rather than ethical reasons

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

value destruction and financial reporting decisions the comprehensive survey reported here allowed analysis of how senior u s financial executives make decisions related to performance measurement and voluntary disclosure chief financial officers were asked what earnings benchmarks they cared about and which factors motivated executives to exercise discretion even sacrifice economic value to deliver earnings these issues are crucially linked to stock market performance the results show that the destruction of shareholder value through legal means is pervasive perhaps even a routine way of doing business indeed the amount of value destroyed by companies striving to hit earnings targets exceeds the value lost in recent high profile fraud cases

risk rationality and religious portfolios i introduction this paper builds on two assumptions the first self evident the second more controversial together they yield a provocative theory of religious behavior and organization the first assumption is that religion involves a great deal of risk those who engage in religious acts cannot know that their efforts will have the desired effects religious acts thus have the character of risky investments exacting resource costs in return for uncertain rewards the second assumption is that people choose their religious behavior rationally weighing the costs and benefits of religious behavior and seeking to limit the risk associated with religious choices churches and other religious firms employ a variety of institutional arrangements that mitigate religious risk most arrangements follow one of two major risk management strategies which in turn give rise to two different styles of religion one centers on collective production the other on private production and diversified consumption collective religion is congregationally oriented and tends to employ exclusivity and costly prohibitions to limit free riding and maintain high levels of commitment private religion is less susceptible to free rider problems but also less capable of generating commitment private religion tends to center on client practitioner relationships or fee for service transactions and consumers tend not to form exclusive attachments to a single religious firm outright payments for goods and services overshadow costly demands for an austere deviant or sacrificial life style a large body of descriptive historic and anecdotal evidence confirms these predictions and illustrates their range of application the concluding sections of the paper apply the proposed theory to a series of contrasts asian versus western religion mainstream churches versus exclusive sects new age versus standard american religion and greco roman paganism versus judeo christian monotheism ii religious commodities and the problem of risk economic models of religious behavior typically begin by assuming that individuals allocate their time and money so as to maximize their utility from religious commodities r and all other secular commodities s the production of religious commodities depends on personal inputs of time and money but may also depend on past experience religious human capital styles of behavior such as diet dress and sexual practices and the time and money inputs of others such as fellow church members see azzi and ehrenberg 1975 sullivan 1985 and iannaccone 1992 for formal analyses and empirical tests with the exception of durkin and greeley 1991 and montgomery 1992 previous models take belief as given thereby sidestepping the issue of risk but religious commodities do involve risk sermons and scriptures do emphasize the need for faith and people do wrestle with and often yield to doubt insights from secular markets and the economics of uncertainty explain a broad range of behaviors and institutions that arise in response to religious risk in particular they highlight two different risk reducing strategies one of which centers on exclusivity and collective production the other centers on diversification and private production managing risk through collective action religious congregations the would be believer faces a situation not unlike the would be used car buyer used cars are classic experience goods nelson 1970 since potential buyers are hard pressed to determine car quality in advance of purchase sellers thus have an incentive to overstate the value of their merchandise and to disguise its true nature used car buyers in turn are aware of the sellers incentive to misrepresent their products and so will attempt to increase their stock of information and or reduce their risk in many ways they may demand guarantees seek information from third parties investigate the seller s reputation and so forth

does religion mitigate earnings management evidence from china using a sample of 11 357 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2011 we investigate whether and how religion can mitigate earnings management specifically based on geographic proximity based religion variables we provide strong and robust evidence to show that religion is significantly negatively associated with the extent of earnings management suggesting that religion can serve as a set of social norms to mitigate corporate unethical behavior such as earnings management our findings also reveal that the negative association between religion and earnings management is less pronounced for firms with closer distance to the regulatory centers than for their counterparts implying the substitutive effects between religion and the distance to regulators the proxy for regulatory intensity on mitigating earnings management the above results are robust to different measures of earnings management various religion variables and a variety of sensitivity tests

political parties and the size of government in multiparty legislatures examining cross country and panel data evidence this article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of gdp in multiparty legislatures the author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure conversely as the size of the majority party grows from a bare minimum majority to above the supermajority level it has a nonlinear specifically cube effect on central government expenditure panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments the results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected finally an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods

earnings management and earnings quality abstract viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close relative earnings quality the works of ball and shivakumar 2008 earnings quality at initial public offerings journal of accounting and economics in press and teoh et al 1998 earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings journal of finance 53 1935 1974 are used to illustrate the application of seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research

the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations abstract this paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts earnings expectations mbe enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations further such a premium to mbe although somewhat smaller exists in the cases where mbe is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management the findings also indicate that the premium to mbe is a leading indicator of future performance this premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the mbe is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management

does religion mitigate tunneling evidence from chinese buddhism in the chinese stock market controlling shareholders often use inter corporate loans to expropriate a great amount of cash from listed firms through a process called tunneling using a sample of 10 170 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2010 i examine whether and how buddhism china s most influential religion can mitigate tunneling in particular using firm level buddhism data measured as the number of buddhist monasteries within a certain radius around chinese listed firms registered addresses this study provides strong evidence that buddhism intensity is significantly negatively associated with tunneling this finding is consistent with the view that buddhism has important influence on corporate behavior and can serve as a set of social norms and or an alternative mechanism to mitigate controlling shareholders unethical tunneling behavior in addition my findings also reveal that the negative association between buddhism intensity and tunneling is attenuated for firms that have high analyst coverage the results are robust to various measures of buddhism intensity and a variety of sensitivity tests

does religion matter to owner manager agency costs evidence from china in china buddhism and taoism are two major religions using a sample of 10 363 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2010 i provide strong and robust evidence that religion i e buddhism and taoism on the whole is significantly negatively associated with owner manager agency costs in particular using firm level religion data measured by the number of religious sites within a radius of certain distance around a listed firm s registered address i find that religion is significantly negatively positively associated with expense ratio asset utilization ratio the positive reverse proxy for owner manager agency costs this finding is consistent with the following view religiosity has remarkable effects on the way how an individual thinks and behaves and thereof can curb managers from unethical business practices moreover my findings suggest that the negative association between religion and owner manager agency costs is attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as higher marketization and high quality auditors furthermore after separating buddhism from taoism my finding indicates that above conclusions are only available for buddhism suggesting that different religions may have asymmetric influence on owner manager agency costs above results are robust to various measures of religiosity and a variety of robustness checks

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

does religion matter in corporate decision making in america abstract we examine how corporate culture influences firm behavior prior research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion we find that this relationship also influences organizational behavior firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure as measured by variances in equity returns or returns on assets they exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth but generate a more positive market reaction when they announce new investments finally chief executive officers are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in their previous firm when they switch employers

electoral competition and agricultural support in oecd countries agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue we consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers based on cox 1987 1990 and myerson 1993 we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support we test this theoretical hypothesis using oecd agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country a cross classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries commodities and time our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow broad constituencies are associated with relatively high low levels of agricultural subsidies

accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education abstract this paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index ideb basic education development index in 2007 to identify the effect of education accountability on yardstick competition in educational spending among brazilian municipalities an exploratory analysis of the data shows a minor reduction 20 in spatial interaction in public educational spending after ideb disclosure compared with the spatial correlation before disclosure of the index our main results explore a discontinuity around the cutoff of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment after ideb disclosure the estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation and thus yardstick competition is reduced by 52 falsification and robustness tests were performed and suggest that we can claim causality around small bandwidths of the cutoff this finding suggests that the public release of information may decrease the importance of neighbors information on voters decisions

the financial stability of notional account pensions a number of european countries are reforming their pension benefit formulas by adopting notional accounts these accounts are used to determine individual benefits but pay as you go financing is retained this paper addresses the belief that by choosing adjustment rules cleverly notional accounts can provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run if this were true it would be a valuable advantage in terms of insulating the government budget from demographic pressures while insulating the pension budget from fiscal pressures it is shown that notional account benefit formulas cannot provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run the paper also suggests that if indexing rules are chosen in a particular way and shocks revert rapidly to a mean the pension institution may achieve financial stability in the long run however long run stability is unlikely to be valuable because political interference occurs in the short run

comment on s valdes prieto the financial stability of notional account pensions in an important contribution to this journal valdes prieto 2000 has shown that the recently popular concept of notional accounts cannot guarantee short run financial stability of pay as you go financed public pension schemes in the sense of automatic budget equality for any given time path of the contribution rate in result 2 p 406 he states that notional accounts do not provide automatic financial balance in the short run when the credited notional interest rate is the growth rate of contribution revenue except for the steady state growth case in the proof he uses a table p 408 table 1 in which the maximum value of the ratio of expenditures to revenues of the pension plan is calculated for the case of a rising growth rate of contribution revenue this maximum ratio is always above 1 the author explains his finding as follows when the growth rate of contribution revenue is used as the notional interest rate which is credited to the stock of notional capital of those members reaching age 65 the rise in expenditure is greater than the rise in revenue generating a deficit ibid the following simple example confirms result 2 but shows that the ratio of expenditures to revenues behaves in the opposite way to that asserted by valdes prieto a rise in the growth rate of revenues leads to a temporary surplus of the plan whereas a fall in the growth rate implies a temporary deficit the example is based on a discrete time 3 olg model in which individuals work the first two periods of their three period life earning 1 dollar each and the contribution rate 0 is fixed at 20 percent contributions are credited to the notional account in the period in which they are paid and earn an interest equal to the growth rate of contribution revenue which is credited to the account at the beginning of the next period at the beginning of the third period the account balance is paid out as a one shot retirement benefit in panel a of table 1 it is assumed that there are 100 workers in each of the cohorts entering the labor market in period t 2 and that this number

short versus long coalitions electoral accountability and the size of the public sector this article examines the policy consequences of the number of parties in government we argue that parties externalize costs not borne by their support groups larger parties thus internalize more costs than small parties because they represent more groups this argument implies that the public sector should be larger the more parties there are in the government coalition we test this prediction using yearly time series cross sectional data from 1970 to 1998 in 17 european countries we find that increasing the number of parties in government increases the fraction of gdp accounted for by government spending by close to half a percentage point or more than one billion current dollars in the typical year we find little support for the alternative claim that the number of legislative parties affects the size of the public sector except via the number of parties in government

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

an explanation for accounting income smoothing it is widely believed that corporate managers often engage in income smoothing taking actions to dampen fluctuations in their firms publicly reported net income one reason given for this is that managers think that investors pay more for a firm with a smoother income stream see ronen and sadan 1981 while there have been many empirical studies attempting to document whether or not income smoothing actually occurs there has been little exploration of why a manager might rationally want to smooth his firm s income explaining why smoothing might be observed and how it can result in an increased stock price is the focus of this paper in two recent studies lambert 1984 and dye 1988 demonstrate in agency settings that a risk averse manager who is precluded from borrowing and lending in the capital markets has an incentive to smooth his firm s reported income in this paper in contrast it is shown that within a market setting an incentive exists for a manager to smooth income that is independent of either risk aversion or restricted access to capital markets the market setting is also useful in that it allows for the analysis of the effect of income smoothing on stock prices it is shown here that if a manager can choose which of two periods to recognize certain income he may prefer the choice that is expected to