complementarities multiplicity and supply information if traders can obtain private information about the payoff and the supply of a stock then there can exist i complementarity in information acquisition and ii multiple equilibria in the financial and information markets the additional dimension of supply information increases coordination possibilities in the financial market leading to multiple equilibria the existence of two information sources can lead to information acquisition being complementary the multiplicity of equilibria is suggestive of excess volatility and crashes the different financial market equilibria imply differing patterns of cost of capital and volume of trade 2009 by the european economic association

transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities how do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities and what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed for example by economic statistics policy announcements or news in the media we first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information an increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility nevertheless as long as there is no value to lotteries welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information hence full transparency is optimal this is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination which is valuable from a social perspective on the other hand when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium in this case constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

impulse control of pension fund contributions in a regime switching economy abstract in defined benefit pension plans allowances are independent from the financial performance of the fund and the sponsoring firm pays regularly contributions to limit deviations of fund assets from the mathematical reserve necessary for covering the promised liabilities this research paper proposes a method to optimize the timing and size of contributions in a regime switching economy the model takes into consideration important market frictions like transactions costs late payments and illiquidity the problem is solved numerically using dynamic programming and impulse control techniques our approach is based on parallel grids with trinomial links discretizing the asset return in each economic regime

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

slow boom sudden crash abstract many asset markets exhibit slow booms and sudden crashes this pattern is explained by an endogenous flow of information in the model agents undertake more economic activity in good times than in bad economic activity generates public information about the state of the economy if the economic state changes when times are good and information is abundant asset prices adjust quickly and a sudden crash occurs when times are bad scarce information and high uncertainty slow agents reactions as the economy improves a gradual boom ensues data from u s and emerging credit markets support the theory

mean variance portfolio and contribution selection in stochastic pension funding abstract in this paper we study the problem of simultaneous minimization of risks and maximization of the terminal value of expected funds assets in a stochastic defined benefit aggregated pension plan the risks considered are the solvency risk measured as the variance of the terminal fund s level and the contribution risk in the form of a running cost associated to deviations from the evolution of the stochastic normal cost the problem is formulated as a bi objective stochastic problem of mean variance and it is solved with dynamic programming techniques we find the efficient frontier and we show that the optimal portfolio depends linearly on the supplementary cost of the fund plus an additional term due to the random evolution of benefits

retirement saving with contribution payments and labor income as a benchmark for investments abstract in this paper we study the retirement saving problem from the point of view of a plan sponsor who makes contribution payments for the future retirement of an employee the plan sponsor considers the employee s labor income as investment benchmark in order to ensure the continuation of consumption habits after retirement we demonstrate that the demand for risky assets increases at low wealth levels due to the contribution payments we quantify the demand for hedging against changes in wage growth and find that it is relatively small we show that downside risk measures increase risk taking at both low and high levels of wealth

time varying fund manager skill we propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market we find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions moreover the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions these fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund s market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms the measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance

learning from others a welfare analysis abstract this paper considers a smooth and noisy version of the statistical prediction model studied in the herding informational cascades literature and compares market and optimal learning the latter is characterized by defining a decentralized welfare benchmark as the solution to an infinite horizon team problem market behavior involves herding in the sense that agents put too little weight on their private information for any given precision of public information and yields underinvestment in the production of public information however both market and optimal learning involve slow learning examples of the model include learning by doing reaching consensus and consumer learning about quality journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d83

information acquisition in an incomplete information model of business cycle abstract this paper studies the consequences of allowing information acquisition in a version of lucas barro incomplete information model of business cycle we apply the information equilibrium concept to show that an agent s information acquisition is not invariant to fluctuations of price level and that it has a significant effect on the size of output inflation tradeoff using the optimality criteria developed by muench we find that a change in mean money growth rate does not have any real consequences and that a constant money growth rule is superior to any monetary policy that induces all the agents to be fully informed

learning asymmetries in real business cycles when a boom ends the downturn is generally sharp and short when growth resumes the boom is more gradual our explanation rests on learning about productivity when agents believe productivity is high they work invest and produce more more production generates higher precision information when the boom ends precise estimates of the slowdown prompt decisive reactions investment and labor fall sharply when growth resumes low production yields noisy estimates of recovery noise impedes learning slows recovery and makes booms more gradual than downturns a calibrated model generates growth rate asymmetry similar to macroeconomic aggregates fluctuations in agents forecast precision match observed countercyclical errors of forecasters

collective bargaining laws threat effects and the determination of police compensation this article demonstrates that state collective bargaining laws are important determinants of union and nonunion public employee compensation state laws that provide stronger bargaining rights and ensure closure to the bargaining process increase the direct effect of police unions on compensation moreover indirect threat effects on the pay of nonunion police also increase with stronger bargaining laws in each law category investigated nonunion police receive most of the compensation premium enjoyed by unionized police previous studies that have not adequately controlled for these effects of bargaining laws have therefore underestimated the full effect of public sector unions on compensation

a dynamic model of expectations equilibrium abstract this paper describes a dynamic information adjustment process which achieves rational expectations equilibria for stochastic exchange environments an informational temporary equilibrium is an exchange equilibrium in which agents expectations are conditioned on their initial information and market data generated in previous informational temporary equilibria an equilibrium is a temporary equilibrium which reveals no further information this process leads to an equilibrium even when the data observed by agents is insufficient to permit the existence of an expectations equilibrium

limited information capacity as a source of inertia abstract we derive optimal time dependent adjustment rules from shannon s 1948 information theory in a continuous time lq prediction problem with a costly rate of information acquisition processing the optimal prediction evolves smoothly but jumps at an optimally chosen frequency when fresh information accrues a more volatile and persistent target raises the information rate required to maintain a sampling frequency this cost effect moderates and may even reverse the benefit effect on the value of information so optimal inertia is unresponsive to and nonmonotonic in the predictability of the environment conventional models with a fixed cost per observation imply no such cost effect so inertia rises quickly in the predictability of the environment

income drawdown option with minimum guarantee abstract this paper deals with a constrained investment problem for a defined contribution dc pension fund where retirees are allowed to defer the purchase of the annuity at some future time after retirement this problem has already been treated in the unconstrained case in a number of papers the aim of this work is to deal with the more realistic case when constraints on the investment strategies and on the state variable are present due to the difficulty of the task we consider as a first step the basic model of gerrard haberman and vigna 2004 where interim consumption and annuitization time are fixed we extend their model by adding a no short selling constraint on the control variable and a final capital requirement constraint on the state variable this implies in particular no ruin the mathematical problem is naturally formulated as a stochastic control problem with constraints on the control and the state variable and is approached by the dynamic programming method we write the non linear hamilton jacobi bellman equation for the problem and transform it into a dual one that is semi linear following a well established duality procedure in the special relevant case without running cost we explicitly compute the value function for the problem and give the optimal strategy in feedback form a numerical application ends the paper and shows the extent of applicability of the model to a dc pension fund in the decumulation phase

equilibrium strategies in a defined benefit pension plan game abstract we study the optimal management of an aggregated overfunded pension plan of defined benefit type as a two player noncooperative differential game the model s key fact is to consider the fund surplus as a strategic variable that makes the pension plan more attractive both for current and future participants we let the worker participants to act collectively as a single player that claims a share of the surplus and let the sponsoring firm act as the player that cares about the investment of the surplus fund assets the union s objective is to maximize the expected discounted utility of the extra benefits claimed we solve this asymmetric game under two different assumptions on the preferences of the firm in the first scenario the firm aims to maximize expected discounted utility derived from fund surplus while in the second scenario the firm cares about minimizing the probability that the fund surplus reaches very low values

incomplete information higher order beliefs and price inertia the question that motivates this paper is how incomplete information impacts the response of prices to nominal shocks our baseline model is a variant of the calvo model in which firms observe the underlying nominal shocks with noise in this model the response of prices is pinned down by three parameters the precision of available information about the nominal shock the frequency of price adjustment and the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions this result synthesizes the broader lessons of the pertinent literature however this synthesis provides only a partial view of the role of incomplete information once one allows for more general information structures than those used in previous work one cannot quantify the degree of price inertia without data on the dynamics of higher order beliefs or of the agents forecasts of inflation we highlight this with three extensions of our baseline model all of which break the tight connection between the precision of information and higher order beliefs featured in previous work

information acquisition and welfare we study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information first we relate the in efficiency in the acquisition of information to the in efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition next we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information i e the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information finally we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

institutional and individual investors saving for old age this paper brings together the academic literature on individual and institutional investors in order to understand the nature of difficulties faced by them and set the background for the special issue this introductory article and the papers in the special issue contribute to the debate on how to support individuals in their savings commitments and investment decision making and whether and how institutional investors have fulfilled their role in supporting the development of the funded pension industry there are three main conclusions i individual investors are not ready for the role that has been assigned to them in the pension industry ii institutional investors are a long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with their clients and iii more effective regulation may be needed

stochastic pension funding when the benefit and the risky asset follow jump diffusion processes we study the asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans of the type designed and sponsored by firms with the aim of providing a lifetime pension to the employees at the age of retirement benefits are stochastic combining poisson jumps with brownian uncertainty the sponsor dynamically forms portfolios where the risky asset is also subjected to poisson jumps and brownian uncertainty possibly correlated with the evolution of benefits the objective is to assure future benefits while controlling the contribution made to the fund reserves the problem is solved analytically using dynamic programming techniques

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

sustainable management of fossil fuels a dynamic stochastic optimization approach with jump diffusion abstract this paper deals with a relevant aspect of energy modeling i e fossil fuels management the issue is faced by using purely operational research techniques which are suitable in this context in particular a dynamic stochastic optimization model is developed to optimally determine use and stock of resources to be employed in consumption and investments in a wide economic sense human and physical capital r d etc it is assumed that a sustainability criterion drives the optimality rules i e decisions are also grounded on the well being of future generations the policymaker maximizes an aggregated intergenerational expected utility under the dilemma of present consumption conservation of natural resources for the future in reference to standard environmental economic theory jump diffusion dynamics for the stock of natural resources and infinite time horizon are assumed extensive numerical experiments complete the analysis and contribute to determine fossil fuels management policies showing that long term investments make the difference for the well being of present and future generations

a theory of demand shocks this paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding aggregate productivity agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks they observe their own productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity the public signal gives rise to noise shocks which have the features of aggregate demand shocks they increase output employment and inflation in the short run and have no effects in the long run numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizable equilibrium dsge models of the business cycle include a large number of shocks to technol ogy monetary policy preferences etc but typically do not include expectational shocks as independent drivers of short run fluctuations 1 this paper explores the idea of expectation driven cycles looking at a model where technology determines equilibrium output in the long run and consumers receive noisy signals about technology in the short run the presence of noisy signals produces expectational errors this paper studies the role of these expectational errors in gener ating volatility at business cycle frequencies the model is based on two ingredients first consumers take time to recognize permanent changes in aggregate fundamentals although they may have good information on the current state of the individual firm or sector where they operate they have only limited information regarding the long run determinants of aggregate activity second consumers have access to public information that is relevant to estimate long run productivity this includes news about technological innovations publicly released macroeconomic and sectoral statistics financial market prices and public statements by policy makers however these signals provide only a noisy forecast of the long run effects of technological innovations this opens the door to noise shocks which induce consumers to temporarily overestimate or underestimate the productive capacity of the economy

socially optimal coordination characterization and policy implications in recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions these models deliver promising positive properties such as heightened inertia and volatility but they also raise important normative questions such as whether the heightened inertia and volatility are socially undesirable whether there is room for policies that correct the way agents use information in equilibrium and what are the wel

dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge abstract introducing private information into the dynamic pricing decision of firms by adding an idiosyncratic component to marginal cost can help explain two stylised facts about price changes aggregate inflation responds gradually and with inertia to shocks at the same time as individual price changes can be large the inertial behaviour of inflation is driven by privately informed firms strategically herding on the public information contained in the observations of lagged aggregate variables the model also matches the average duration between price changes found in the data and it nests the standard new keynesian phillips curve as a special case to solve the model the paper derives an algorithm for solving a class of dynamic models with higher order expectations

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

optimal asset allocation for aggregated defined benefit pension funds with stochastic interest rates in this paper we study the optimal management of an aggregated pension fund of defined benefit type in the presence of a stochastic interest rate we suppose that the sponsor can invest in a savings account in a risky stock and in a bond with the aim of minimizing deviations of the unfunded actuarial liability from zero along a finite time horizon we solve the problem by means of optimal stochastic control techniques and analyze the influence on the optimal solution of some of the parameters involved in the model

information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle abstract we study firms incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles our model predicts that for a wide range of parameter values firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief the equilibrium price system which features endogenous information transmission dampens aggregate fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition our welfare analysis reveals that information acquisition in the decentralized economy is not efficient this is due to inefficient employment dispersion arising from information heterogeneity in equilibrium time series data for the u s economy support the model s prediction of wages being more informative about total factor productivity after recessions than following booms

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector s uncertainty about the economy s fundamentals information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized despite the lack of superior information monetary policy can affect the economy s relative response to the two shocks as time passes better information on past fundamentals becomes available the central bank can then adopt a backward looking policy rule based on more precise information about past shocks by announcing its response to future information the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation if the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks however this policy is typically suboptimal as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices the optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross sectional efficiency copyright wiley blackwell

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed