defence procurement theory and uk policy since the early 1980s competition as a means of obtaining best value for money has dominated uk defence procurement policy this paper describes the uk defense equipment market and the procurement problem there are sections on the economic theory of procurement contracting regulation and competition the conclusion evaluates uk defence procurement policy and assesses some of the policy issues for the 1990s copyright 1996 by oxford university press

competition cooperation and innovation organizational arrangements for regimes of rapid technological progress abstract discussions of the link between firm size and innovation are outmoded because the boundaries of the firm have become fuzzy in recent decades strategic alliances constellations of bilateral agreements among firms are increasingly necessary to support innovative activities such alliances can facilitate complex coordination beyond what the price system can accomplish while avoiding the dysfunctional properties sometimes associated with hierarchy antitrust law and competition policy need to recognize that these new organizational forms are often the functional antithesis of cartels though they may have certain structural similarities a more complete understanding of bilateral contracts and agreements ought to reveal when and how cooperation can support rather than impede innovation and competition

artificial adaptive agents in economic theory economic analysis has largely avoided questions about the way in which economic agents make choices when confronted by a perpetually novel and evolving world as a result there are outstanding questions of great interest to economics in areas ranging from technological innovation to strategic learning in games this is so despite the importance of the questions because standard tools and formal models are ill tuned for answering such questions however recent advances in computer based modeling techniques and in the subdiscipline of artificial intelligence called machine learning offer new possibilities artificial adaptive agents aaa can be defined and can be tested in a wide variety of artificial worlds that evolve over extended periods of time the resulting complex adaptive systems can be examined both computationally and analytically offering new ways of experimenting with and theorizing about adaptive economic agents many economic systems can be classified as complex adaptive systems such a system is complex in a special sense i it consists of a network of interacting agents processes elements ii it exhibits a dynamic aggregate behavior that emerges from the individual activities of the agents and iii its aggregate behavior can be described without a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the individual agents an agent in such a system is adaptive if it satisfies an additional pair of criteria the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a value performance utility payoff fitness or the like and the agent behaves so as to increase this value over time a complex adaptive system then is a complex system containing adaptive agents networked so that the environment of each adaptive agent includes other agents in the system complex adaptive systems usually operate far from a global optimum or attractor such systems exhibit many levels of aggregation organization and interaction each level having its own time scale and characteristic behavior any given level can usually be described in terms of local niches that can be exploited by particular adaptations the niches are various so it is rare that any given agent can exploit all of them as rare as finding a universal competitor in a tropical forest moreover niches are continually created by new adaptations it is because of this ongoing evolution of the niches and the perpetual novelty that results that the system operates far from any global attractor improvements are always possible and indeed occur regularly the everexpanding range of technologies and products in an economy or the everimproving strategies in a game like chess provide familiar examples adaptive systems may settle down temporarily at a local optimum where performance is good in a comparative sense but they are usually uninteresting if they remain at that optimum for an extended period a theory of complex adaptive systems based on aaa makes possible the development of well defined yet flexible models that exhibit emergent behavior such models can capture a wide range of economic phenomena precisely even though the development of a general mathematical theory of complex adaptive systems is still in its early stages the aaa models complement current theoretical directions they are

product market competition and managerial slack this article analyzes the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives in contrast to hart 1983a i show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem the difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences the importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives

second sourcing and the experience curve price competition in defense procurement we examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve asymmetric cost information and the availability of a higher cost alternative system we model acquisition as a two stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production we characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information when high costs are revealed these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system

do external grants to district governments discourage own revenue generation a look at local public finance dynamics in ghana summary using rich panel data on all of ghana s districts local public finances over 11 years this paper investigates the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments incentives to collect internally generated revenues and funds igf we find that despite an incentive scheme built into one of the major intergovernmental grants the flow of all grants taken together discourages rather than encourages igf this is reflected both in the depressing effect of transfers on igf levels as well as on igf growth

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

explaining government growth in the u s states despite the explosive increase in the research program on government growth in recent years little work has been done on government growth disaggregated to the subnational level i examine the empirical validity of five competing models of government growth for the fifty u s states from 1945 to 1984 wagner s law fiscal illusion party control bureau voting and intergovernmental grant government size is defined in terms of state government spending as a proportion of total state economic output with separate implicit price deflators being employed for the public and private sectors based on a longitudinal test of these competing models the analysis uncovers strong empirical support for the bureau voting and intergovernmental grant models moderately weak support for the wagner s law model and virtually no support for the fiscal illusion and party control explanations these findings have important implications for the study of government growth in general and more specifically in the states

price caps and output floors a comparison of simple regulatory rules we study in this paper a simple alternative to price cap regulation the mechanism which we label output floor regulation requires the regulated firm to supply a given level of output this rule is as simple as price cap regulation and performs identically when the regulated firm is a natural monopoly however we show that in the presence of a competitive fringe output floor regulation yields lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction its introduction however is likely to be resisted by the industry since it lowers managerial utility and shareholders profits

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

pricing and entry in regulated industries the role of regulatory design abstract this paper studies the optimal regulatory policy in a market where entry may occur in the event of entry the regulator regulates the incumbent but not the entrant we show that the effect of entry on prices depends on the length of the interval between regulatory reviews if the gap is long then the market outcome following entry has a higher price than it would have with a shorter gap 1997 elsevier science s a

regulating an oligopoly with unknown costs abstract we examine the problem of a planner who is regulating an oligopoly with unknown costs we provide a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism which takes the following simple form firm s which report low costs produce together the first best output corresponding to this low cost and firm s which report high costs produce nothing when all firms report high costs only the ex ante least efficient firm produces the entire output and all the other firms produce nothing we show that under mild conditions as the number of firms increases the planner attains the same welfare level as if he had complete information of low cost

incumbents use of pre entry alliances before expansion into new technical subfields of an industry industry incumbents frequently delay entry into emerging technical subfields fearing product cannibalization and uncertain investment and enter only after technical and market uncertainties have subsided we predict that many incumbents particularly stronger firms will participate in alliances with other firms before their standalone entry the alliances will be used to realize part of the value of specialized assets and to gain information about the emerging products and markets we support the predictions with evidence from the us market of the medical diagnostic imaging industry

regulating a dominant firm unknown demand and industry structure in this article we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm actively competes generally the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding constraints on regulatory problems we characterize optimal policies both when demands are known complete information and unknown incomplete information to the regulator optimal policies under complete information may set the price at the dominant firm above or below its marginal cost optimal policies under incomplete information may be either pooling or separating constant over a range of the prior distribution of the firm s private information and leave no information rent to the firm

geographical redistribution with disproportional representation a politico economic model of norwegian road projects politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts according to the traditional common pool model districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects we suggest a swing voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes we analyze the allocation of state road investments in norway from 1973 1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts geographical representation to parliament is biased mostly due to an ancient constitution shares of swing voters and legislative over representation lead to higher levels of road investments while high levels of party identification reduce investments

innovation and cooperation implications for competition and antitrust n k robel laureate robert solow and his colleagues on mit s industrial productivity commission recently noted dertouzos lester and solow 1989 p 7 undeveloped cooperative relationships between individuals and between organizations stand out in our industry studies as obstacles to technological innovation and the improvement of industrial performance and later p 105 that interfirm cooperation in the u s has often though not always been inhibited by government antitrust regulation these striking conclusions warrant further exploration unfortunately industrial organization textbooks still discuss horizontal cooperation and competition almost exclusively in terms of standard cartel theory on the other hand vertical cooperation contracting is viewed differently and some textbooks provide treatments of supplier buyer relationships in which cooperation is viewed as enhancing efficiency both in the textbooks and in policy discussion among economists cooperation among competitors is highly suspect being perhaps the last bastion of what was once referred to as the inhospitality tradition in antitrust as a result very little literature addresses how cooperation among competitors can promote competition notwithstanding that cooperation among competitors may sometimes be essential if innovating firms are to compete in today s increasingly global markets imai and baba 1989 such cooperation is already important in japan and in europe 1

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

network location and learning the influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation this paper presents a dynamic firm level study of the role of network resources in determining alliance formation such resources inhere not so much within the firm but reside in the interfirm networks in which firms are placed data from extensive fieldwork show that by influencing the extent to which firms have access to information about potential partners such resources are an important catalyst for new alliances especially because alliances entail considerable hazards this study also assesses the importance of firms capabilities with alliance formation and material resources as determinants of their alliance decisions i test this dynamic framework and its hypotheses about the role of time varying network resources and firm capabilities with comprehensive longitudinal multi industry data on the formation of strategic alliances by a panel of firms between 1970 and 1989 the results confirm field observations that accumulated network resources arising from firm participation in the network of accumulated prior alliances are influential in firms decisions to enter into new alliances this study highlights the importance of network resources that firms derive from their embeddedness in networks for explaining their strategic behavior copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

aggregate local public sector investment and shocks norway 1946 1990 local public sector investment is determined in an environment of shifting economic conditions investments are investigated using an intertemporal decision model allowing for tests of forward looking behaviour and adjustments to expected and unexpected shocks the econometric analysis of the aggregate local public sector over the period 1946 1990 indicates that local and county governments are forward looking and have small adjustment costs to investment in a full investment demand model only unexpected changes of gross domestic product and unemployment are shown to be important in the short run the central government has arranged stable revenue growth of the local public sector but greater volatility in macroeconomic conditions has led to fluctuations in local public investment

optimal bypass and cream skimming this paper develops a normative model of regulatory policy toward bypass and cream skimming it analyzes the effects of bypass on second degree price discrimination on the rent of the regulated firm and on the welfare of low demand customers it shows that pricing under marginal cost may be optimal for the regulated firm excessive cream skimming occurs if access to the bypass technology is not regulated and the prohibition of bypass may increase or decrease the regulated firm s rent jel 026 613 the regulation of natural monopolies is often associated with policies toward competition including restrictions on entry this paper is concerned with a common form of competition which threatens the regulated firm on its most lucrative markets examples abound in the telecommunications industry the development of microwave radio and communication satellites in the 1960 s introduced the possibility that big telecommunication customers might bypass the major common carrier att and the 1978 natural gas policy act in the united states has created the possibility for industrial plants to bypass the local distribution utilities by building direct connections to the pipelines gas producers or intermediaries

multi firm regulation without lump sum taxes abstract this paper considers a problem of multi firm regulation where the regulator cannot make monetary transfers to or from firms otherwise the set up is standard two firms charging two part tariffs sell in separate markets and marginal costs are private information without transfers the regulator faces an additional consumer participation constraint that the representative consumer must wish to participate in the market in all states the paper studies the second best optimal regulatory scheme that respects this constraint and shows that it has some surprising properties i the regulator may wish to drive informational rents down to zero even at the cost of some price distortion ii consumer surplus may be zero in some states and iii the price that one firm charges is decreasing in the other s cost

learning from competing partners outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in europe north america and asia this paper investigates the outcomes and durations of strategic alliances among competing firms using alliance outcomes as indicators of learning by partner firms we show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances link alliances are interfirm partnerships to which partners contribute different capabilities while scale alliances are partnerships to which partners contribute similar capabilities we find that partners are more likely to reorganize or take over link alliances than scale alliances by contrast scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes the two types of alliances are equally likely to shut down at similar ages these results support the view that link alliances lead to greater levels of learning and capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

powering up developing countries through integration power market integration is analyzed in a two country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds if the generation costs between the two countries are too similar negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that the subsequent integration welfare decreases in both regions integration is welfare enhancing when the cost difference between two regions is large enough the benefits from export profits increase the total welfare in the exporting country whereas the importing country benefits from lower prices in this case market integration also improves incentives to invest compared to autarky the investment levels remain inefficient however especially for transportation facilities free riding reduces incentives to invest in these public good components of the network whereas business stealing tends to decrease the capacity to finance new investment

the duality of collaboration inducements and opportunities in the formation of interfirm linkages i argue that the linkage formation propensity of firms is explained by simultaneously examining both inducement and opportunity factors drawing upon resource based and social network theory literatures i identify three forms of accumulated capital technical commercial and social that can affect a firm s inducements and opportunities to form linkages firms possessing these capital stocks enjoy advantages in linkages formation however firms lacking these accumulated resources can still form linkages if they generate a radical technological breakthrough thus i identify paths to linkage formation for leading as well as peripheral firms i test these arguments with longitudinal data on technical collaborative linkages in the global chemicals industry copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

knowledge and competitive advantage the coevolution of firms technology and national institutions this issue of jibs offers reviews of two books that analyse the dynamic interaction between the business environments and business strategies in very different ways the institutional underpinnings for business strategies are a major research topic for comparative management aiming to explain why in different contexts firms pursue different strategies and with different implications for performance j peter murman in knowledge and competitive advantage takes a historical perspective focusing on the co evolutionary processes between national innovation systems business strategies and performance this books thus adds to the industry level longitudinal research reviewed in jibs no 4 2003 tom murtha et al s managing new industry creation and david mckendrick et al s from silicon valley to singapore

r d subsidies external collaborative breadth differential gains and the role of collaboration experience abstract external collaboration breadth is important for firms to acquire the knowledge needed to innovate in this paper we combine cross sectional and longitudinal data from the spanish panel of technological innovation survey pitec to examine the indirect impact of r d subsidies on firm external collaboration breadth we contribute to understanding of the indirect impacts of r d subsidies by first providing strong evidence of an economically significant average positive impact of r d subsidies on firm external collaboration breadth second our results advance understanding of the differential impacts of r d subsidies by revealing the vast heterogeneity of the impact at the firm level where approximately only half of treated firms experience a positive collaboration impact from r d subsidies while the remainder experience no impact or a negative effect finally we advance understanding of the characteristics explaining the differential impact of r d subsidies on external collaboration breadth by utilising the organisational learning literature to demonstrate the important role of firm collaboration experience

the performance of corporate alliances evidence from oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico abstract i use data on oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico to measure how a corporate alliance a group of firms that jointly develops an offshore tract performs relative to a solo firm i employ a regression discontinuity strategy based on bids in first price sealed bid auctions for the rights to develop leases by focusing on leases where one organizational form narrowly outbids the other i measure drilling outcomes while controlling for the endogenous matching of projects and organizational forms solo firm leases are less profitable than alliance leases because alliance members combine their information and expertise

networks and innovation in a modular system lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component industries in this paper we examine theoretically and through case studies the phenomenon of the modular system which we distinguish from a product conceived of as a prepackaged entity or appliance we argue that such systems offer benefits on both the demand side and the supply side supply side benefits include the potential for autonomous innovation which is driven by the division of labor and provides the opportunity for rapid trial and error learning demand side benefits include the ability to fine tune the product to consumer needs and therefore blanket the product space more completely both of our case studies suggest that innovation in a modular system can lead to vertical and horizontal disintegration as firms can often best appropriate the rents of innovation by opening their technology to an outside network of competing and cooperating firms we conclude by speculating on the increased importance of modular systems in the future since flexible manufacturing and rising incomes are likely to increase the driving requisites of modular systems low economies of scale in assembly and sophisticated consumer tastes

spatial proximity and firm survival in a declining industrial district the case of knitwear firms in baden wu rttemberg the literature on small firm networks in industrial districts postulates the importance of territorial proximity for business innovation and regional development but empirical research to test this proposition is sparse while there is some research on the extent of interfirm co operation little is known about the performance outcomes of co operation i develop competing hypotheses from institutional ecological and random action theories concerning the survival chances of firms located in geographic proximity and test them with data on the complete population of knitwear firms in baden wurttemberg germany for the period from 1960 to 1998 proportional hazard estimates show that location in clusters of firms in the same industry increased business failure rates and location in diversified clusters of firms operating in complementary industries reduced failure rates the empirical results are most consistent with the ecological model of localized competition in resource environments la documentation

endogenous public sector budgeting to centralize or not in this paper the impact of budget size on a government s choice to centralize or decentralize the budgetary process is investigated using asymmetric information differing preferences and endogenous budgetary arrangements the central government chooses between a budgetary process that excludes the regional board centralization and one that includes the board decentralization in the determination of program budget levels it is predicted that the central government will decentralize the budgetary process at low and centralize at high overall budget levels switching from decentralization to centralization is predicted to

survival of businesses using collaborative relationships to commercialize complex goods authors with many theoretical and managerial perspectives argue that businesses commercializing technologically complex goods benefit when they collaborate closely with other businesses collaboration is viewed as a means for businesses to overcome competency limitations and to achieve the close configuration of components required for complex goods we predict that collaborative relationships often assist businesses to produce complex goods but that the relationships might also cause problems for the collaborating businesses we find that firms using development oriented and marketing oriented collaborative relationships in the hospital software systems industry are less likely to shut down than businesses that follow independent approaches when the environment changes gradually but businesses using collaborative relationships are sometimes susceptible to being acquired by other firms following a sudden environmental shock businesses with collaborative relationships for activities central to the shock became more likely to shut down while businesses with collaborative relationships for activities outside the focus of the shock became more likely to survive the study critically evaluates and tests the widely stated but little tested argument that interfirm collaboration is usually beneficial the results address the issue of whether organizational choices affect comparative business performance

death of the lethargic effects of expansion into new technical subfields on performance in a firm s base business this paper finds that industry incumbents that do not expand into new technical subfields tend to fare poorly in their established businesses even if the market for the established products continues to exist firms that expand from their established businesses survive longer and achieve greater subsequent market share than competitors that do not expand by some measures however a failed attempt to expand into a new subfield may be even more harmful to a base business than nonexpansion the study employs conventional and accelerated event time regression models to analyze market share and survival the sample which includes 371 incumbents in four base subfields of the medical diagnostic imaging industry between 1953 and 1989 examines performance following the emergence of five new technical subfields of the industry

cost disease in defense and public administration baumol and politics william baumol s model predicts a steady increase in relative public sector prices or costs because of the combination of slow productivity growth and wage growth similar to sectors wherein productivity is growing more quickly in this paper we extend the baumol model with political variables and analyze price growth in defense and public administration using norwegian data we find strong support for the mechanism of the baumol model since manufacturing productivity is the most important determinant of relative public sector prices greater political fragmentation has also contributed to the price growth but its quantitative effect is smaller than that of manufacturing productivity an analysis of a labor intensive private service restaurants and cafes supports the broader relevance of the baumol mechanism and the validity of the estimated effect of political fragmentation on the two sectors considered herein

local government grants and income tax revenue redistributive politics in norway 1900 1990 an important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods primarily education and health care in norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector the development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes the important revenue sources of the local and county governments grants and income tax revenue have been controlled nationally and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900 1990 the approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength the decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome the analysis shows how politics matter and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30 more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run