pioneering price level targeting the swedish experience 1931 1937 in september 1931 sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the domestic price level the official goal of its monetary policy actually the only country that so far has adopted such an explicit price level target starting from the issues and concepts familiar from research and policy experience of inflation targeting as contrasted to price level targeting this paper examines the evolution of the swedish price level targeting in the 1930s we bring out a number of similarities and differences between price stabilization in the 1930s and in the 1990s

money still makes the world go round the zonal view many leading monetary economists have come to regard the monetary aggregates as obsolete measures of the monetary policy stance this critique has led some to view money as having lost its central role in the conduct of monetary policy we say to those advocating excising money from monetary policy not so fast to better understand the potential role for money we develop a zonal view of monetary policy which reflects the historical regularity for the relative informativeness of the quantitative measures of monetary policy such as the monetary aggregates and real interest rates to depend on the inflation zone in which a central bank finds itself the zones range from high inflation zone 1 to deep deflation zone 5 with intermediate zones of moderate inflation zone 2 low inflation zone 3 and low deflation zone 4 we find considerable support for this view in the historical data which stretches back to the 19 th century seen from this perspective the past experience of central banks casts doubt on the singular importance often attributed to the short term real interest rate as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy this applies especially in the current low inflation environment in which many central banks find themselves the zonal view has far reaching implications for monetary policy frameworks for the analytical efforts to understand the monetary policy transmission mechanism and for central bank communication strategies this paper was prepared for the 21 st congress of the european economic association held in vienna on august 27 2006 the views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors

a mechanism design approach to climate change agreements we take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities incentive compatibility and voluntary participation by sovereign countries the optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement this mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu making the business as usual scenario more likely

some cambridge reactions to the general theory david champernowne and joan robinson on full employment this essay analyses early reactions put forward by cambridge economists david champernowne and joan robinson to j m keynes s treatment of the labour market in the general theory champernowne s and robinson s critical reactions represented attempts to fill the gap of the determinants of changes in money wages which they both identified as a weak spot in the argument of the book they rejected albeit for different reasons keynes s notion of the point of full employment as an upper limit defined by the equality between the real wage rate and the marginal disutility of employment instead of keynes s taxonomy of types of unemployment champernowne and robinson introduced respectively the concepts of monetary employment and monetary unemployment and of critical levels of employment copyright 2005 oxford university press

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

price level targeting with evolving credibility abstract global learning dynamics for price level targeting plt monetary policy are analyzed and compared to inflation targeting in a nonlinear new keynesian model domain of attraction of target steady state is a new robustness criterion for policy regimes robustness of plt depends on whether a known target path is incorporated into learning credibility is measured by accuracy of this forecasting method relative to simple statistical forecasts evolving through reinforcement learning initial credibility and target price are key factors influencing performance model results are in line with the swedish experience of price stabilization in1930 s

uncertainty learning and international environmental policy coordination in this paper we construct a simple model of global warming which captures a number of key features of the global warming problem i environmental damages are related to the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere ii the global commons nature of the problem means that these are strategic interactions between the emissions policies of the governments of individual nation states iii there is uncertainty about the extent of the future damages that will be incurred by each country from any given level of concentration of greenhouse gases but there is the possibility that at a future date better information about the true extent of environmental damages may become available an important aspect of the problem is the extent to which damages in different countries may be correlated in the first part of the paper we consider a simple model with two symmetric countries and show that the value of perfect information is an increasing function of the correlation between damages in the two countries in both the cooperative and non cooperative equilibria however while the value of perfect information is always non negative in the cooperative equilibrium in the non cooperative equilibrium there is a critical value of the correlation coefficient below which the value of perfect information will be negative in the second part of the paper we construct an empirical model of global warming distinguishing between oecd and non oecd countries and show that in the non cooperative equilibrium the value of perfect information for oecd countries is negative when the correlation coefficient between environmental damages for oecd and non oecd countries is negative the implications of these results for international agreements are discussed

price level targeting vs inflation targeting a free lunch price level targeting without base drift and inflation targeting with base drift are compared under commitment and discretion with persistence in unemployment price level targeting is often said to imply more short run inflation variability and thereby more employment variability than inflation targeting counter to this conventional wisdom under discretion a price level target results in lower inflation variability than an inflation target if unemployment is at least moderately persistent a price level target also eliminates the inflation bias under discretion and as is well known reduces long term price variability society may be better off assigning a price level target to the central bank even if its preferences correspond to inflation targeting a price level target thus appears to have more advantages than commonly acknowledged

international environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment abstract we modify a canonical participation game used to study international environmental agreements iea considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage and including a prior cost reducing investment stage the use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result with mixed strategies equilibrium participation and welfare are higher in equilibria that involve higher investment

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

inflation forecast targeting implementing and monitoring inflation targets abstract inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting the central bank s inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy the weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior than inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability commitment to target rules may be better than commitment to instrument rules

wicksellian rules and the taylor principle some practical implications in this paper we derive and compare the determinacy regions of price level targeting rules wicksellian rules and taylor rules in a standard new keynesian model we conclude that wicksellian rules do not require the taylor principle to hold in order to induce determinacy our results have two implications first in a univariate setting the estimation of simple taylor rules when the true rule is wicksellian can lead to the erroneous conclusion that the equilibrium is indeterminate second indeterminacy is ruled out when using system based methods but it can be concluded that the central bank is less averse to inflation movements than it actually is

the macroeconomics of the great depression a comparative approach recently research on the causes of the great depression has shifted from a heavy emphasis on events in the united states to a broader more comparative approach that examines the interwar experiences of many countries simultaneously in this lecture i survey the current state of our knowledge about the depression from a comparative perspective on the aggregate demand side of the economy comparative analysis has greatly strengthened the empirical case for monetary shocks as a major driving force of the depression an interesting possibility suggested by this analysis is that the worldwide monetary collapse that began in 1931 may be interpreted as a jump from one nash equilibrium to another on the aggregate supply side comparative empirical studies provide support for both induced financial crisis and sticky nominal wages as mechanisms by which nominal shocks had real effects still unresolved is why nominal wages did not adjust more quickly in the face of mass unemployment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

federal deficits macro stabilization goals and federal reserve behavior the effects of federal deficits on federal reserve behavior as proxied by changes in the growth rate of the monetary base are analyzed in this study multivariate granger causality tests are employed in the analysis the deficit measure that is the focus of the analysis is the change in the real market value of privately held federal debt the tests indicate that the deficit granger causes the monetary base additionally concerns for financial market stability real output and exchange rate movements in the period of floating rates also affect federal reserve behavior

price level versus inflation targeting abstract this paper shows that price level targeting outperforms inflation targeting in the standard new keynesian model under the assumption that the central bank is forced to operate in an environment characterized by discretion in the benchmark case with no persistence in the shocks the commitment solution can be fully replicated intuitively price level targeting introduces history dependence and a stationary level of prices both of which are prominent features of the commitment solution

providing global public goods under uncertainty abstract we study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods we consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs when countries directly contribute to a public good uncertainty tends to lower signatories efforts but may increase participation despite risk aversion uncertainty may improve welfare in contrast when countries try to reduce a global public bad uncertainty tends to increase signatories efforts and decrease participation in that case an ex ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare

comment lucas on involuntary unemployment keynes distinguishes three concepts voluntary frictional and keynesian involuntary unemployment frictional unemployment is a classical form of involuntary unemployment not voluntary as lucas suggests and reflects the marshallian rather than walrasian treatment of time and equilibrium lucas contradicts both keynes and pigou in asserting that there are always immediate vacancies for unskilled labour and abstracts from the very problem that keynes seeks to address if voluntary unemployment is re defined appropriately as de vroey helpfully suggests elsewhere the prefix involuntary is dispensable not because all unemployment is voluntary as lucas would have it but because it is all involuntary copyright 2006 oxford university press

price and output stability under price level targeting it is commonly believed that a monetary policy that targets the price level reduces the long term variability of the price level but only at the cost of increased variability of both inflation and output we develop a model in which the one step ahead variance of output and the price level are lower under price level targeting than under inflation targeting this increased stability under price level targeting works through an interest rate channel that to our knowledge has not previously been emphasized in the literature surprisingly if the sensitivity of demand to the real rate of interest is high enough then the variance of inflation can also be lower under price level targeting than under inflation targeting

are policymakers ambiguity averse we investigate the ambiguity preferences of a unique sample of real life policymakers at the paris un climate conference cop21 we find that policymakers are generally ambiguity averse using a simple design we are moreover able to show that these preferences are not necessarily due to an irrational behaviour but rather to intrinsic preferences over unknown probabilities exploring the heterogeneity within our sample we also show that the country of origin and the degree of quantitative sophistication affect policymakers attitudes towards compound risk but not towards ambiguity robustness results are obtained in a lab experiment with a sample of university students

who anticipated the great depression gustav cassel versus keynes and hayek on the interwar gold standard the intellectual response to the great depression is often portrayed as a battle between the ideas of friedrich hayek and john maynard keynes yet both the austrian and the keynesian interpretations of the depression were incomplete austrians could explain how a country might get into a depression bust following a credit fueled investment boom but not how to get out of one liquidation keynesians could explain how a country might get out of a depression government spending on public works but not how it got into one animal spirits by contrast the monetary approach of gustav cassel has been ignored as early as 1920 cassel warned that mismanagement of the gold standard could lead to a severe depression cassel not only explained how this could occur but his explanation anticipates the way that scholars today describe how the great depression actually occurred unlike keynes or hayek cassel analyzed both how a country could get into a depression deflation due to tight monetary policies and how it could get out of one monetary expansion

overvalued swedish monetary policy in the 1930s the article discusses sweden s monetary policy in the 1930s which has been hailed as the first and only example of successful price level targeting our contribution is twofold first we argue that the crucial measure that immediately ended deflationary expectations and enabled a swift recovery was a strong and involuntary devaluation of the currency not the adoption of a new monetary policy framework second starting from the recent literature on monetary policy at the zero lower bound we conclude that sweden s exchange rate policy is more relevant for the current discussion than its tentative experience with price level targeting

money and credit confused an appraisal of economic doctrine and federal reserve procedure it is a serious error to suppose that if the monetary authorities are to alter the actual quantity of money people must first be persuaded through interest rate movements to alter the quantity of money they wish to hold nevertheless the error in one guise or another pervades the literature on monetary policy as a result of the fed s willingness to prevent or moderate a demand induced movement in the interest rate write lombra and kaufman 16 1156 in this very journal shifts in money demand cause shifts in the same direction in reserve supply and therefore money supply econometrically determined money supply functions are thus not what they

irving fisher and price level targeting in austria was silver the answer the question of price level versus inflation targeting remains controversial disagreement concerns not so much the desirability of price stability but rather the means of achieving it irving fisher argued for a commodity dollar standard where the purchasing power of money was fixed by indexing it to a basket of commodities we show that movements in the price of silver closely track the movements in overall prices during the classical gold standard era the one to one relationship between paper and silver bonds suggests that a simple silver rule could have sufficed to fix the purchasing power of money

uncertainty and climate change uncertainty is pervasive in analysis of climate change how should economists allow for this and how have they allowed for it this paper reviews both of

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

inflation inertia and the optimal hybrid inflation price level target a hybrid inflation price level target combines elements of both inflation and price level targets the paper derives an optimal hybrid target within a new keynesian model with inflation persistence due to price indexation the result generalizes a result by vestin forthcoming that the optimal policy could be implemented with a price level targeting regime we show that the optimal price level drift in the hybrid target is equal to the degree of price indexation if there is complete indexation the optimal monetary regime is inflation targeting

harvest uncertainty and the tragedy of the commons abstract this paper demonstrates that a fixed number of risk averse firms faced with harvest uncertainty owing to resource stock uncertainty will typically reduce their exploitation of a commons in addition the total exploitation of the industry will decrease when entry is permitted and uncertainty is compared with certainty this result holds for perfectly competitive output markets and also characterizes imperfectly competitive output markets with linear market demand and risk neutral firms in the latter case the socially optimum number of firms is determined based upon the degree of uncertainty the price elasticity of market demand and the elasticity of input productivity

prudence in bargaining the effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes abstract we investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player s pay off from agreement is risky we find that a risk averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay off is made risky this is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave more patiently in bargaining strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving literature we show that the effect of risk on receipts can be sufficiently strong that a decreasingly risk averse player may be better off receiving a risky pay off than a certain pay off

international cooperation for sale abstract this paper shows that strong asymmetry among countries warrants a change in the rules of the game of global public goods provision with the consequence that cooperation by some countries is bought by others and aggregate welfare is increased perhaps substantially side payments on their own have virtually no effect on the outcomes that can be sustained by self enforcing cooperative agreements but when the rules of the game are changed by strong asymmetry when some countries are effectively committed to being non signatories to an agreement eschewing money transfers side payments become the vehicle for increasing participation in a cooperative agreement

can uncertainty alleviate the commons problem global commons problems such as climate change are often affected by severe uncertainty the paper examines the effect of uncertainty on pollution emissions and welfare in a strategic context we find that emissions are always lower under uncertainty than under certainty reflecting risk reducing considerations we show that uncertainty can have a net positive impact on the welfare of risk averse polluters we extend the analysis to increases in risk increases in risk aversion and to risk heterogeneity jel d81 c72 q54 h23

escaping from a liquidity trap and deflation the foolproof way and others existing proposals to escape from a liquidity trap and deflation including my foolproof way are discussed in the light of the optimal way to escape the optimal way involves three elements 1 an explicit central bank commitment to a higher future price level 2 a concrete action that demonstrates the central bank s commitment induces expectations of a higher future price level and jump starts the economy and 3 an exit strategy that specifies when and how to get back to normal a currency depreciation is a direct consequence of expectations of a higher future price level and hence an excellent indicator of those expectations furthermore an intentional currency depreciation and a crawling peg as in the foolproof way can implement the optimal way and in particular induce the desired expectations of a higher future price level i conclude that the foolproof way is likely to work well for japan which is in a liquidity trap now as well as for the euro area and the united states in case either would fall into a liquidity trap in the future

the effect of uncertainty on interactive behaviour economists have studied extensively the effects of uncertainty on the optimising choices of a single agent two areas among many where this has been done are optimal savings by consumers and optimal production by firms 2 work of a more theoretical nature on uncertainty includes the seminal essay of rothschild and stiglitz i970 cheng et al i987 feder i977 kraus i979 meyer and ormiston i985 among others more recently dardanoni i988 has presented an elegant unifying treatment of the effect of uncertainty on an agent who has a two argument utility function and faces a linear constraint which relates the two arguments many situations of interest in economics go beyond the analysis of a single optimising agent since they involve several agents interacting with each other the outcomes in such cases have often been analysed as the nash equilibrium of a non cooperative game examples include a variety of oligopoly models 3 the voluntary provision of public goods 4 the tragedy of the commons 5 the behaviour of workers in self managed cooperatives6 and different kinds of strategic contests 7 surprisingly the effect of common uncertainty on the nash equilibrium of such games either specifically or in general has hardly been studied 8 in this paper we seek to provide a general analysis of the effect of uncertainty on equilibrium outcomes for the class of games in which each agent has one choice variable since this class includes the single agent case which is usually considered in the uncertainty literature and which was recently comprehensively studied in dardanoni 1 988 our paper in effect extends this literature to game situations in particular we examine when the results for games and for single agent optimisation coincide and when and how they differ our analysis focuses on the class of symmetric games but we also present some results in asymmetric cases

monetary policy in a forward looking input output economy this paper examines the implications for monetary policy of sticky prices in both final and intermediate goods in a new keynesian model both optimal policy under commitment and discretionary policy under simple loss functions are studied household utility losses under alternative loss functions are compared additionally the robustness of policy performance to model and shock misperceptions and parameter uncertainty is examined targeting inflation in both consumer and intermediate goods performs better than targeting inflation in one sector targeting price levels of both final and intermediate goods performs significantly better moreover targeting price levels in both sectors yields superior robustness properties

some stronger measures of risk aversion in the small and the large with applications the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion for von neumann morgenstern utility functions have become workhorses for analyzing problems in the microeconomics of uncertainty they have been used to characterize the qualitative properties of demand in insurance and asset markets to examine the properties of risk taking in taxation models and to study the interaction between risk and life cycle savings problems to name just a few applications equally importantly they have generated the linear risk tolerance class of utility functions which has provided canonical examples in such diverse areas as portfolio theory and the theory of teams despite these successes there have been a number of areas for which the results have been weaker than hoped it is natural to use the risk aversion measures to compare the behavior of individuals in risky choice situations for example consider the individual portfolio choice problem in a two asset world with a riskless asset and a risky asset if individual a has a uniformly higher arrow pratt coefficient of risk aversion than individual b then b will always choose a portfolio combination with more wealth invested in the risky asset but suppose that both assets are risky now there is no obvious sense in which the more risk averse individual can be said to hold a less risky portfolio but it seems strange that such a simple alteration should destroy the analytics which support the basic intuition similarly consider the basic insurance problem if one individual a is more risk averse than another b in the arrow pratt sense it follows that a will pay a larger premium to insure against a random loss than will b typically though an individual evaluates partial rather than total insurance that is only some gambles can be insured against and others must be retained in this case even when the gambles which are retained are independent from those which are insured it is no longer true that the individual whose arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is higher will pay a larger insurance premium the situation is no better when we consider comparative statics exercises for a single individual decreasing absolute risk aversion in the sense of arrow and

the effects of lower reserve requirements on money market volatility in late 1990 the federal reserve eliminated reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits and required reserves fell by about 10 billion an almost 20 percent reduction in early 1992 reserve requirements against transaction accounts were lowered from 12 percent to 10 percent releasing an additional 3 5 billion of required reserves 1 these reductions by lowering total reserve balances potentially could increase reserve market volatility impeding the implementation of monetary policy and possibly spilling over into other markets this paper examines the effects of reserve requirements on market volatility and on the central bank s ability to achieve shortrun policy objectives although a number of earlier studies have examined the effects of reserve requirements on the effectiveness of monetary policy our approach differs in two important respects first we focus on the ability to achieve short run objectives second we provide empirical estimates of the likely effects of lower reserve requirements the central bank cannot directly achieve its long run objectives of output and price stability so it uses policy rules to set shortand intermediate run targets for certain economic variables such as interest rates or monetary aggregates consistent with its long term goals 2 the central bank cannot however perfectly control shortor intermediate run targets so it also relies on a set of operational rules operational rules are used to set instruments such as reserve requirements the discount rate and openmarket operations in order to achieve the shorter run targets previous studies such as ira kaminow 1977 jeremy siegel 1981 ernst baltensperger 1982 richard t froyen and kenneth j kopecky 1983 and brian r horrigan 1988 focused exclusively on longer term objectives of monetary policy in contrast we focus on the shortterm goals of monetary policy in addition we provide empirical estimates of the impact that changes in reserve requirements are likely to have on volatility in the money market previous studies were largely theoretical and therefore could only show that the impact of a change in policy depended on various unknown parameters of a particular model

taking one for the team is collective action more responsive to ecological change debate persists around the timing of risk reduction strategies for large scale ecological change for three reasons risks are difficult to predict they involve irreversibilities and they impact multiple jurisdictions the combination of these three factors creates a general class of filterable spatial dynamic externalities fsde in which one person s risk reduction investments reduce or filter undesirable events experienced by others and underestimates the option value placed on being able to respond to new information about the consequences of ecological change by focusing on the optimal intervention decision we illustrate how and when the opposing forces created by an fsde will lead to a divergence in private and collective risk reduction strategies we use bioinvasions as our motivating example the bioinvasion first hits one jurisdiction and that jurisdiction s risk reduction investment reduces the risk faced by all other jurisdiction we find that efforts to internalize the full benefits of risk reduction investments may have unintended consequences on the responsiveness of environmental policy there is a social welfare gain from asking the first jurisdiction to delay a risk reduction investment to internalize the option values of all at risk jurisdictions

the perils of nominal targets a monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation price level or nominal gdp target yet systematically fail to achieve the prescribed goal constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private sector expectations stray far enough from the target low inflation expectations become self fulfilling resulting in an additional markov equilibrium in which the monetary authority falls short of the nominal target average output is below its efficient level and the policy rate is typically low introducing a stabilization goal for long term nominal rates can implement a unique markov equilibrium without fully compromising stabilization policy

uncertainty learning and international environmental agreements the role of risk aversion this paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements ieas under uncertainty learning and risk aversion it bridges two strands of the iea literature i the role of learning when countries are risk neutral ii the role of risk aversion under no learning combining learning and risk aversion seems appropriate as the uncertainties surrounding many international environmental problems are large often highly correlated e g climate change but are gradually reduced over time through learning the paper analyses three scenarios of learning a key finding is that risk aversion can change the ranking of these three scenarios of learning in terms of welfare and membership in particular the negative conclusion about the role of learning in a strategic context under risk neutrality is qualified when countries are significantly risk averse then it pays them to wait until uncertainties have been largely resolved before joining an iea this may suggest why it has been so difficult to reach an effective climate change agreement

stabilisation policy rational expectations and price level versus inflation targeting a survey we survey literature comparing inflation targeting it and price level targeting pt as macroeconomic stabilisation policies our focus is on new keynesian models and areas that have seen significant developments since ambler s 2009 price level targeting and stabilisation policy a survey journal of economic surveys 23 5 974 997 survey optimal monetary policy the zero lower bound financial frictions and transition costs of adopting a pt regime ambler s conclusion that pt improves social welfare in new keynesian models is fairly robust but we note an interesting split in the literature pt consistently outperforms it in models where policymakers commit to simple taylor type rules but results in favour of pt when policymakers minimise loss functions are overturned with small deviations from the baseline model since the beneficial effects of pt appear to hang on the joint assumption that agents are rational and the economy new keynesian we discuss survey and experimental evidence on rational expectations and the applied macro literature on the empirical performance of new keynesian models overall the evidence is not clear cut but we note that new keynesian models can pass formal statistical tests against macro data and that models with rational expectations outperform those with behavioural expectations i e heuristics in direct statistical tests we therefore argue that policymakers should continue to pay attention to pt

how the european central bank decided its early monetary policy the main goal of this paper is to detect the mechanisms that should rationally stimulate the decision making policies of the european central bank ecb this is carried out under the framework of theoretical principles of interest rate rules firstly we deduce a set of logically advisable guidelines for the strategy actually developed by this central bank then we contrast a wide set of hypotheses with reference to those variables the ecb takes into account on deciding its monetary policy with a flexible treatment regarding the number of months of advance or delay in the explanatory variables the results lead us to the conclusion that the ecb besides adopting a smooth strategy especially bears in mind the expected core inflation rate with a reaction coefficient adjusted to that initially proposed by taylor the economic growth rate though it has a significant positive coefficient matters relatively little and is backward looking finally we evaluate up to what point the behaviour of the ecb is a

long and short term interest rates in a risky world abstract the paper develops and tests a general equilibrium model in which variability or risk affects the choice of portfolios our measures of variability include only the variability of unanticipated growth in monetary and non monetary aggregates and our tests use data ending with the change in federal reserve procedures in october 1979 we find that increased variability of unanticipated money growth raises demands for debt and money and reduces the demand for real capital interest rates on both short and long term debt rise by a risk premium we estimate the size of the risk premium before and after the october 1979 change and we show that the change in federal reserve procedures moved the economy to a less efficient point

piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements this paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states a measure of difficulty is constructed related to side payments necessary to make an agreement a pareto improving move using a simple model it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier

business cycles with costly search and recruiting a business cycle model is developed in which output is traded on lucas phelps islands and labor services on each island are exchanged through costly search and recruiting with transactions externalities the model exhibits persistent involuntary unemployment and inefficient equilibria even though there are no nominal rigidities and no unexploited privately attainable gains from trade it also exhibits employment fluctuations without any real wage fluctuations it yields a lucas aggregate supply curve to a linear approximation it also implies that the natural rate of unemployment depends positively upon the variability and persistence of relative price shocks

precautionary bidding in auctions we analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky we show that when the risk in the valuations increases dara bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium ceteris paribus buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price second price and english auctions with affiliated common interdependent values this precautionary bidding effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly we also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make dara bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk neutral or cara bidders would be indifferent thus the potential for a winner s curse can be a blessing for rational dara bidders

price expectations capital accumulation and employment lindahl s macroeconomics from the 1920s to the 1950s erik lindahl s approach to macroeconomics focused on the non neutrality of monetary policy in the short and the long run and on the denial of the existence of natural rates of interest and unemployment from the 1920s until his death in 1960 lindahl advocated the use of norms for monetary policy to fight inflation and deflation precisely because he would not rely on the market system s return to natural rates making use of hitherto unexplored material this paper analyses the development of lindahl s thinking about price level changes investment and employment from the 1920s to the 1950s copyright 2006 oxford university press

hicks a teoria geral e a teoria geral generalizada despite the most common interpretation of john hicks s formalization of the general theory that it was mainly oriented to achieve mathematical elegance this paper shows that hicks s results are based on theoretical arguments and specific causality relations hicks acknowledges the importance of the liquidity preference doctrine and examines the effects of investment on income the multiplier as well as the effects of income on investment the accelerator our interpretation of hicks s formulation and especially of the role of the rate of interest rate in his paper avails the understanding of the success of the so called neoclassical synthesis