profit sharing and productivity some further evidence new estimates for west germany indicate overall productivity differentials of 20 30 percent in favor of firms practicing profit sharing these compare with estimates of 3 8 percent for comparable british firms reported in a recent issue like the u k results they reveal important interactions between profit sharing and other firm specific characteristics reinforcing the view that profit sharing be regarded as an integral element of overall organizational design but the fact that in germany profit sharing is apparently used in a different way than in the united kingdom by different kinds of firms suggests that there is no single uniquely appropriate context and role for profit sharing copyright 1990 by royal economic society

social interaction co worker altruism and incentives social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers to attract and retain workers managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high quality co worker relationships this paper develops a principal multi agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities but also in social interaction with their colleagues which in turn creates co worker altruism we study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate we show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate

the political economy of trade institutions of protection d omestic support for a liberal commercial policy in the u s rests on a commonly accepted set of rules and norms these rules and norms best characterized as a defense of free and fair trade arise from two different traditions the first originated as a political reaction to high trade barriers preceding the great depression central decision makers took as a lesson from the depression period that short term political forces should not determine the level of state intervention into the market the second to protect against unfair trade emanates from a long history of state support for industries that claim foreign producers are pursuing unfair predatory practices established in statute before the depression these rules did not fundamentally change in the postwar period together these decision rules are used to interpret american trade protectionism

retaliation bargaining and the pursuit of free and fair trade that domestic political economic factors are important determinants of a nation s trade barriers has been empirically well established however the question of how effective strategically retaliatory trade barriers are in deterring foreign protectionism has received far less systematic empirical attention in this article we use bilateral nontariff barrier ntb data between the united states and five developed partner countries japan france germany italy and the united kingdom to systematically examine the effectiveness of strategic retaliation we employ a simultaneous tobit model where the home and foreign ntb levels are determined endogenously in a bilateral game the model provides estimates of deterrence coefficients that is the reduction in foreign trade barriers as a result of u s retaliation which we use to characterize the nature of bilateral ntb games our hope is that the empirical results presented here which have realistic though controversial implications will inform u s trade policy

a political economic analysis of congressional voting patterns on nafta this paper delves into the question of the determinants of congressional voting on nafta it uses a logit model to examine both house and senate votes and is able to use district specific estimates in the former it finds only very limited support for the thesis that narrowly defined employment gainers and losers were important determinants of congressional voting patterns though some substantial support that districts that were highly agricultural or already possessed a substantial hispanic population and skilled labor force and had the most to gain from the general effects of nafta lead to a positive effect on the probability that a member of the house would vote affirmatively contributions from labor unions lowered the likelihood of affirmative votes political partisanship and ideological positions apparently had little effect on the votes a representative s political capital had a marginally significant effect on the probability on an affirmative vote but it performed positively in the senate and negatively in the house

business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

profit sharing in the british retail trade sector the relative performance of the john lewis partnership this paper investigates the effects of profit sharing on wages and employment by comparing the labour market behaviour of the john lewis partnership with that of four main competitors the john lewis partnership employs around 30000 workers who since 1970 have been paid between 13 and 24 per cent of workers income in the form of a profit related bonus the empirical works suggests that profit sharing in the john lewis partnership may be associated with greater levels of employment but does not significantly affect the level of remuneration in recent years a growing proportion of employment contracts in britain have linked pay with the fortunes of the firm see for example blanchflower and oswald 1988 this trend has been stimulated by the british government s introduction of tax relief for profit related pay prp first in 1987 and extended in 1991 weitzman 1984 argues that profit sharing will stabilize employment reduce unemployment and increase wage flexibility the possibility of these externalities from profit sharing on wider economic performance has been used to justify policy interventions this paper reports empirical tests of wage determination and employment creation effects based on a comparison of the labour market behaviour of the john lewis partnership with that of four important competitors in the british retail sector we find some evidence that profit sharing enhances employment

understanding international trade policies an emerging synthesis the international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists at least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the united states emphasizing market conditions policy beliefs and values national political institutions and global structures respectively new studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle nevertheless we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis with single works blending insights from several traditions thus the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive categories of economics or political science the emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways including the development of conditioning hypotheses that will reduce remaining apparent confusions

economic growth strategies the effects of ideological partisanship on interest rates and business taxation in the united states we reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it the reformulated version ideological partisanship is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth interest rates business taxation rates and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined we advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one and test for political influences the united states is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven while republican administrations promote an investment driven strategy democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital these findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature we conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries

leadership turnover and the durability of international trade commitments under what conditions do states uphold their formal trade commitments while recent work focuses on the formation and design of trade agreements we know comparatively little about the durability of agreements over time we argue that government turnover undermines states commitments to liberalization even if they have already signed an international agreement meant to constrain their behavior we test this argument using data on realized trade in the presence of around 300 preferential trade agreements ptas since 1970 even in the presence of an international agreement ideological turnover is associated with increased political barriers to trade especially when the shift is toward left wing leaders these findings have important implications for our understanding of international cooperation if new leaders do not adhere to their predecessors commitments international agreements may not have lasting economic consequences

fundamental dimensions of u s trade policy abstract how many dimensions adequately characterize voting on u s trade policy how are these dimensions to be interpreted this paper seeks those answers in the context of voting on the landmark 1988 omnibus trade and competitiveness act the paper takes steps beyond the existing literature first using a factor analytic approach the dimension issue is examined to determine whether subsets of roll call votes on trade policy are correlated a factor analytic result allows the use of a limited number of votes for this purpose second a structural model with latent variables is used to find what economic and political factors comprise these dimensions the study yields two main findings more than one dimension determines voting in the senate with the main dimension driven by economic interest not ideology although two dimensions are required to fully account for house voting one dimension dominates that dimension is driven primarily by party based on reported evidence and a growing consensus in the congressional studies literature this finding is attributed to interest based leadership that evolves in order to solve collective action problems faced by individual legislators

international asset pricing and portfolio diversification with time varying risk we test the conditional capital asset pricing model capm for the world s eight largest equity markets using a parsimonious generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity garch parameterization our methodology can be applied simultaneously to many assets and at the same time accommodate general dynamics of the conditional moments the evidence supports most of the pricing restrictions of the model but some of the variation in risk adjusted excess returns remains predictable during periods of high interest rates our estimates indicate that although severe market declines are contagious the expected gains from international diversification for a u s investor average 2 11 percent per year and have not significantly declined over the last two decades

wage flexibility in the united states lessons from the past in another paper forthcoming i have contrasted wage setting in the 1920 s with that of the post world war ii period during the 1920 s and early 1930 s the u s bureau of labor statistics published an incomplete sample of reported wage change decisions at the establishment level perhaps the best way to summarize the results is to direct attention to table 1 which presents the distribution of manufacturing wagechange decisions during 1924 and 1925 years in which consumer price inflation was respectively 2 and 4 0 percent on a december to december basis the table shows a wide array of wagechange decisions ranging from cuts of over 20 percent to increases of similar magnitude this dispersion of decisions is remarkable by post world war ii standards moreover the postwar evidence suggests that nominal wage cuts are a rarity even in periods of low inflation when they do occur as in some recent union concessions the cuts result from a painful negotiations process against a background of threatened or actual mass layoffs by the 1920 s many features of modern corporate enterprise were present but unions were of little significance in most sectors including manufacturing the result of a sustained open shop campaign by employers after world war i there was little labor market intervention by government workers resented wage cuts during periods of generalized wage cutting such reductions became important causes of strikes but employers implemented them anyway and when employers did not want to take the blame for wage cuts they used company unions to negotiate reductions robert dunn 1927 pp 21 23 in short in the absence of unions or other institutional constraints the implicit contracts offered by employers in the 1920 s provided substantially more wage flexibility than existed after world war ii the wagesetting mechanisms of the 1920 s did not approach the flexibility of a classical auction market a fact of some comfort to implicitcontract theorists however it is unclear that one needs to go much beyond simple explanations of how wage cuts or even relative wage slippage would lead to worker resentment and management caution

profitability and profit sharing claims that profit sharing is a purely distributive wealth confiscation scheme without incentive effects due to free rider problems are based on neglect of cooperation and interaction in the workforce when these activities are difficult to monitor directly group incentives such as profit sharing can increase efficiency and maintain a superior nashequilibrium with strictly individual optimization with simultaneous wls tobit estimates we find here strong effects of profit sharing and worker ownership shares on residual owners return on capital in medium sized metal working firms in west germany complementing earlier results on productivity

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

are economists traditional trade policy views still valid recent analysis of trade policies under imperfectly competitive market conditions as well as in situations where trade in high technology products is important have raised doubts whether economists should continue their traditional opposition to trade taxes and subsidies this paper evaluates the new theoretical arguments for interventionist trade policies by comparing them with the traditional arguments for and against free trade investigating the empirical evidence supporting the conditions assumed in the new models appraising the realism of the behavior assumptions of these models and the sensitivity of their conclusions to changes in these assumptions and considering the political economy implications of these conclusions the general conclusion is that there are serious practical difficulties with the interventionist arguments of the new trade theorists as they themselves recognize just as there are with such traditional arguments for trade intervention as the terms of trade case for protection however the new industrial organization approach to trade theory has already provided valuable insights into trade behavior in international markets and promises to provide many more as more realistic behavior models are developed this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection the recent confrontation between china and the united states over currency policy illustrates a broader phenomenon exchange rate misalignments tend to spill over into trade policy although previous studies have shown that aggregate protectionist activity is positively related to the level of the real effective exchange rate we explore this relationship at the industry level several industry specific characteristics determine the protectionist response to exchange rate changes including the degree of exchange rate pass through the level of import penetration and the share of imported intermediate inputs in total industry inputs we find that the marginal effect of currency appreciation on the number of industry level antidumping petitions is positive and significant only for industries with high pass through therefore exchange rates appear to induce demands for trade barriers only in industries where competitiveness is directly harmed by currency appreciation

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

cooperation productivity and profit sharing firm specific assets generate an ex post bargaining problem over surplus division and rational workers may collude to obtain a surplus share in nonpecuniary form through restriction of effort conversely profit sharing should motivate cooperation to increase productivity when work organization facilitates interaction and horizontal monitoring since productive effort yields positive externalities to workers under contractual surplus sharing in simultaneous tobit estimates we find a strong influence of profit sharing on factor productivity in a sample of medium sized metalworking capitalist firms in west germany proxies for human capital and organizational factors were included

on some recent explanations of why capital hires labor conventional microeconomics contains no explanation of why capital hires labor and not the reverse in view of some surprisingly positive results in the theoretical analysis of worker run enterprise systems recent contributions to the theory of the firm have attempted to explain the dominance of capitalist production relations in efficiency terms the present paper critically reviews works in this area by alchian and demsetz 1972 williamson 1975 1980 and jensen and meckling 1979 and contends that a convincing efficiency argument for the general superiority of capital owners over workers control of enterprises still is lacking

employment entrepreneurship and 1992 microeconomic policy and european problems this essay has covered several areas which are not usually regarded as closely interrelated policy conclusions have been discussed briefly at various points and will now be developed more fully in this final section as evidence for the interrelatedness of such disparate fields as corporate finance and employment policy we start from the observation that many large firms are relatively inefficient particularly at product innovation and flexible organization and employment policies in part because top managerial compensation depends mainly on size this creates an incentive for excessive growth and empire building rather than payment to shareholders of the free cash flow which cannot be profitably invested internally more appropriate incentives for top management would increase dividend payments and hence the flow of funds into the capital market available for financing new start ups and small firms as venture capital even in the u s the cost of obtaining external capital often constrains small firms to invest only their internal cash flow fazzari et al 1988

explanations of protectionism in international trade votes in this study we analyze the voting records of u s senators on three recent international trade bills our objective is to assess the importance of ideology and constituent interest as forces that influence protectionist vs free trade voting behavior the methodology uses discriminant analysis supplemented with expert judgement the first conclusion is that ideology is the more important force in generic protectionism issues and local constituent interests are more important for commodity specific issues second we find that protectionism is especially associated with liberal ideology high import impact and low export dependence although the discriminant analysis outperforms expert judgement in classifying protectionist vs free trade votes in two of the three bills studied the best explanation is obtained by using both methods together

innovation rent sharing and the organization of labour in the federal republic of germany rent seeking by unions may inhibit various kinds of investment particularly r d and unionization is often negatively related to innovation across industries formal organization and collective bargaining may also reduce the flexibility of work organization and hence inhibit innovation in a sample of small and medium sized firms in the frg metal working industry a measure of organized labour was negatively related to product innovation but there was little evidence for rent seeking in simultaneous estimates

why u s wage and employment behavior differs from that in britain and japan if a poll were to be conducted among american academic economists to select the most mystifying economic phenomenon of our time surely the sticky nominal wage rate would emerge at or near the top of the list the slow and partial response of the nominal wage rate to changes in aggregate nominal spending has been a central postulate of macroeconomic theory for the past 45 years from keynes general theory down to the standard postwar textbook keynesian paradigm to the more modern fixed wage price models of robert barro and herschel grossman i976 and edmond malinvaud i977 unwilling passively to accept nominal wage rigidity as an unexplained assumption many labour market theorists have followed the lead of costas azariadis i975 and martin baily i974 in building models to explain rigid wages and layoff unemployment as the rational outcome of a profit maximising calculus as i pointed out in an early critique of the azariadis baily model i976a their assumptions cannot explain cycles in employment but rather why workers would want fixed incomes i e a fixed wage rate and fixed employment soon thereafter barro i977 went one step further and argued that contract theory is a facade which cannot explain why workers would choose a rigid wage and variable employment in preference to the classical equilibrium quantity of employment that equates the marginal product of labour with the marginal value of time now an examination of the evidence has led me to the realisation that rigid wages cannot provide the underpinnings for a universally valid theory of the business cycle simply because wages are not universally rigid i document below with postwar quarterly data that the share of fluctuations in the manufacturing wage bill taking the form of nominal wage changes as compared to changes in hours worked is five to ten times greater in britain and japan than in

unobservable effects and business performance while unobservable factors such as corporate culture access to scarce resources management skill and luck can be postulated to be principal determinants of business success their effects are all but ignored in studies of business performance this study making use of the pims data base reports empirical evidence indicating that failure to control for unobservable factors influencing profitability both biases and exaggerates the effect of strategic factors indeed the influence of unobservable factors is so pervasive as to invalidate many of the conclusions drawn from studies failing to control for their effects

the effects of logrolling on congressional voting the theoretical public choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading these models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology this study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology the empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables the results reflect the presence of vote trading coalitions on some votes but not on others the results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators copyright 1992 by american economic association

work norms and involuntary unemployment consider the organizational environment of labor management wherein the firm can measure the average performance i e group work norm of its employees but has difficulty in observing the individual worker s performance within the group accordingly the worker s remuneration is based on the observed group norm because of the way in which workers interact among themselves in setting work norms there results an undersupply of effort from a given workforce size furthermore the group work norm is shown to be negatively correlated with the size of the workforce consequently short run unemployment can arise with involuntary features the paper also explores the effectiveness of alternative remuneration schemes in mitigating the inefficiency associated with the group work norm setting

ideas institutions and american trade policy nowhere is america s hegemonic decline more evident than in changing trade patterns the united states trade balance a measure of the international demand for american goods is suffering historic deficits lowered demand for american goods has led to the under utilization of both labor and capital in a growing number of traditionally competitive american industries conversely americans taste for foreign goods has never been so great japanese cars european steel third world textiles to name a few are as well produced as their american counterparts and arrive on the u s market at a lower cost

innovation and market strategy in italian industrial cooperatives econometric evidence on organizational comparative advantage abstract this paper argues that more than one type of organizational form can be simultaneously efficient within an industry when differentiation in product qualities are significant firms with some exogenous or persistent component to their organizational structure will specialize in product qualities for which their organizational structure puts them at an advantage relative to other firms this framework is used in an empirical study of innovation and market strategy of industrial cooperatives results of management surveys of italian cooperatives on company strategy are combined with company financial data to test the hypothesis that industrial cooperatives will hold organizational comparative advantages in innovative activity which stresses the production knowledge of ordinary employees in high quality products and in the use of specialized corporate alliances strong evidence supporting the hypotheses are found when the performance of the firm is measured by its profitability and income per member

ideology interests and the american executive toward a theory of foreign competition and manufacturing trade policy faced with a formidable competitiveness problem the american government chief executive appeared to offer a series of ad hoc responses in the 1980s contrarily this article suggests that executive responses to foreign economic challenges follow a predictable pattern pointing to the interactive effects of ideology and interest this article argues that both the degree and type of executive response be it in the form of market opening strategies of temporary or permanent forms of protectionism or of adopting a laissez faire approach can be predicted based on two factors whether a sector is characterized as high tech and whether it is considered to be competitive a major implication of this argument is that the u s chief executive has used trade policy as a surrogate for industrial policy but in so doing the strategic considerations associated with industrial policies have been bypassed the major effect is that the executive fails to intervene only in the realm of an infant industry policy the area most likely to generate a dynamic economy the product of this combiantion of protectionist policies is a stagnant economy that we term compromise protectionism

the political economy of nontariff barriers a cross national analysis nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge more attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross national studies of trade policy

cooperative oligopoly equilibrium abstract oligopoly cooperation is investigated in an industry with n firms each firm selects its own output we show that such oligopoly problems have the same structure as problems of allocating public goods since each firm views its own output as a private good while viewing the outputs of others as public bads this leads to cooperative oligopoly equilibria which are the lindahl equilibria of the oligopoly model agreements are modeled by the selection of a mechanism or game form which obeys certain axioms under the postulated axioms we show the equivalence of agreed allocations with the set of oligopoly equilibria it is argued that the principle of lindahl agreements may have wider applications

worker participation and productivity in labor managed and participatory capitalist firms a meta analysis using meta analytic techniques the author synthesizes the results of 43 published studies to investigate the effects on productivity of various forms of worker participation worker participation in decision making mandated codetermination profit sharing worker ownership employee stock ownership or individual worker ownership of the firm s assets and collective ownership of assets workers collective ownership of reserves over which they have no individual claim he finds that codetermination laws are negatively associated with productivity but profit sharing worker ownership and worker participation in decision making are all positively associated with productivity all the observed correlations are stronger among labor managed firms firms owned and controlled by workers than among participatory capitalist firms firms adopting one or more participation schemes involving employees such as esops or quality circles

public opinion distribution and party competition in us trade policy mass public opinion has generally been presumed to have little or no impact on american trade policy i argue against this presumption i assert that mass public opinion significantly affects us trade policy by shaping the way the two parties compete over that trade policy when public opinion is unbalanced the competition between the parties is likely to resemble a bidding war when public opinion is balanced but split in a partisan manner the competition is likely to descend into manichean conflict when public opinion is balanced but split in a non partisan manner the competition is likely to be characterised by political actors seeking to maintain the support of their core constituencies to examine this relationship i investigate three cases the push to punish china over tiananmen square in 1989 90 the ratification of nafta in 1992 93 and the process through which president bush was granted trade promotion authority in 2001 02

hard heads soft hearts tough minded economics for a just society introduction murphys law of economic policy needed hard heads and soft hearts striking a balance between unemployment and inflation do we know how to manage the national economy who will protect us from protectionism cleaning up the environment sometimes cheaper is better it can happen here the improbably saga of tax reform on breaking murphys law

hours layoffs and unemployment insurance funding theory and practice in an international perspective the strikingly different behaviour of important economic aggregates in the united states and other industrial countries has received surprisingly little attention from economists among recent exceptions however gordon i 982 has shown that wages and hours of work are much more flexible in the united kingdom and japan than in the united states such relative hours variability is confirmed in a macro analysis by capdevielle and alvarez i98i and at micro level by sengenberger and kohler i982 the latter authors are concerned with labour market adjustment within the u s and west german automobile industries between i 97 i and i 980 estimates of the german workeroutput elasticity are found to be less than half that of the united states while the german hours elasticity is twice the united states figure at the national aggregate level capdevielle and alvarez also reveal much greater employment variability in the united states than in most other oecd countries in the years following the i973 74 opec supply shock much in line with these employment hours observations moy and sorrentino i98i argue that after

the incentive effects of dismissals efficiency wages piece rates and profit sharing the relation of several incentive schemes to productivity is studied with a particular emphasis on the effects and determinants of dismissals dismissals turn out to be positively but in a nonlinear way associated with productivity similarly profit sharing raises productivity wages and piece rates are insignificant profit sharing decreases the number of dismissals made by firms copyright 1991 by mit press

profit sharing as macroeconomic policy when keynes came to sum up the central message of the general theory for the economics profession in a remarkable but by now long forgotten qje article of 1937 he began with a general philosophical disquisition on the behavior of mankind under uncertainty here as elsewhere keynes made it abundantly clear that he shared frank knight s distinction uncertainty did not mean risk that which is at least in principle reducible to well defined actuarial probabilities by uncertainty keynes intended i believe to convey the idea of ignorance that which is essentially due to insufficient or precarious knowledge of the mechanism by which the future is generated out of the past the keynesian scenario looks out over an economic world that is rife with uncertainty in that world expectations play an important dual role as both a manifestation of uncertainty and a cause of it such expectations are arbitrary to some degree because they can be based on almost anything including self fulfilling expectations of the behavior and expectations of others and as keynes pointed out being based on so flimsy a foundation these expectations of expectations are subject to sudden and violent changes it follows that while there may ultimately be some long run forces drawing it toward full employment capitalism may also have some deep seated tendencies toward shortrun instability unadulterated laissez faire is likely to be out of equilibrium much of the time and even when it is in equilibrium there is no guarantee of being in a good equilibrium whether in a state of bad equilibrium or merely in disequilibrium such coordination failures generate undesirable macroeconomic consequences like unemployment which can cause very significant welfare losses by the ultimate logic of this keynesian worldview then the stage is set for some form of government intervention to recoordinate the economy into a better configuration any such government policy will inevitably introduce some microeconomic distortions but as an empirical matter such losses tend to be small relative to the enormous welfare gains from having an economy operate at its full employment level such general considerations do not indicate the best form of government intervention to stabilize the macroeconomy indeed we do not currently have a general realistic framework within which a meta issue like that might be properly addressed nevertheless it is possible i believe to give some common sense criteria for desirable forms of government intervention it is my contention that economists have not been sufficiently imaginative in devising operational mechanisms or systems possessing advantageous macroeconomic properties the usual fiscal and monetary policies are to my mind sledgehammer like tactics for controlling unemployment and inflation they do the job but clumsily by brute force and they can leave a big mess afterwards i think it is possible to find subtler alternatives that operate more cleanly and with a softer touch by taking a page from the book of adam smith a good mechanism for fighting unemployment and inflation should have several noteworthy characteristics it should be decentralized based on the natural microeconomic incentives of a market like environment it should work more or less automatically keeping to a minimum the need for using discretionary government policy and in a highly uncertain world it should be robust in retaining its desirable macroeconomic characteristics over a wide range of possible situations or circumstances including some that are currently unforseen i want to argue that a superior form of government policy for combating unemploy department of economics massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02139

pacs and the congressional supermarket the currency is complex although pacs attempt to influence the legislative process with contributions this research finds little evidence that the contributions of 120 pacs affiliated with 10 organizations affected the voting patterns of the house members who served continuously from 1975 to 1982 in the few cases in which a relationship between contributions and a member s votes is established the analysis indicates that contributions are a surrogate measure of a more important and larger package of support for the member from the interest groups two stage least squares regression models are used to test the relationship between pac contributions and a member s votes controlling for the incumbent s ideology and party and the political leaning of the district interviews with pac officials supplement the statistical analysis

profit related pay prose discovered this paper estimates that in 1984 43 percent of british private sector establishments had some form of profit related pay regression results do not show that these establishments had statistically significant better financial performance cross ta bulations do not suggest that the establishments with income sharing schemes had noticeably greater employment growth or better industrial relations copyright 1988 by royal economic society

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

evolution and organisational choice in nineteenth century britain this paper offers an explanation for the dearth of labor managed firms in western economies it argues that the historical evolution of labor managed firms put them at a disadvantage relative to their classical capitalist counterparts in britain the government played an instrumental role in creating the initial disadvantage specifically it took too long for the british government to remove the legal burden of unlimited liability and other company laws that were especially costly of labor managed firms early financial instruments were also ill suited to the establishment and continuation of producers cooperatives of the day since organizational forms and their supporting institutions must coevolve a path dependent process has continued to impede the development of labor managed firms c 1993 academic press inc copyright 1993 by oxford university press

from normalcy to new deal industrial structure party competition and american public policy in the great depression industrial partisan preference may be formally modeled as the joint consequence of pressures from labor and the differential impact of the world economy on particular businesses this basic and static model when extended to cover the money market can be used to examine questions of political development including the effects of fluctuations in national income on political coalitions american institutions and public policy during the new deal are used to test the theory against empirical evidence much of it from new primary sources the rise of the new deal coalition is traced to changes in the american industrial structure deriving from the boom of the 1920s and the reversal of the u s financial position that resulted from world war i in addition to the well known labor militancy of the 1930s the effect of these changes was the rise of a democratic political coalition dominated by capital intensive multinationally dominant firms and industries with a strong interest in free trade and a historically unprecedented ability to cope with major industrial upheavals without resort to force the major public policy initiatives of the new deal are reexamined from this standpoint

trigger strategies in chinese agricultural teams in this paper the reasons why chinese agricultural teams could not reply on the threat of internal effort response to solve incentive problems are investigated the detrimental effects of state extractive agricultural policies the basic needs program and cultural revolution era ideology on the dynamic self enforcing mechanism in chinese teams are analysed using the data on the teams of a moderately prosperous commune during the period 1970 76 the author estimates the discount factor and the impact of the trigger strategies on workers effort decisions it is found that the estimates of the discount factor and the trigger strategy effect are significantly greater than zero in some periods but not large enough to eliminate the need for monitoring

efficiency and internal organization works councils in west german firms efficiency voice theory has not explained why highly competent managers cannot maintain effective communication without formal or mandatory institutions of l abor s voice powerful west german works councils are negatively rela ted to productivity in the sample suggesting that the best managers can do better without councils however excessive pressure on worker s should encourage both unionization and councils to gain compensatin g differentials and the simultaneous wls tobit estimates also suppor t this effect general productivity benefits from formal voice organi zation are strongly rejected but evaluating welfare efficiency and causality directly requires data on job satisfaction and managerial ability copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

modeling heteroscedasticity in daily foreign exchange rates this article estimates autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic arch and generalized arch garch models for five foreign currencies using 10 years of daily data a variety of arch and garch specifications a number of nonnormal error densities and a comprehensive set of diagnostic checks it finds that arch and garch models can usually remove all heteroscedasticity in price changes in all five currencies goodness of fit diagnostics indicate that exponential garch with certain nonnormal distributions fits the canadian dollar extremely well and the swiss franc and the deutsche mark reasonably well only one nonnormal distribution fits the japanese yen reasonably well none fit the british pound

on the choice of incentives in firms abstract simple models of individual and group incentives under uncertainty are compared and comparative performance is shown to depend upon various exogenous parameters the incentive effects of profit sharing will thus vary with organizational and other characteristics that may be difficult to observe and attempts to quantify productivity effects that neglect selection bias are likely to be misspecified significant selection effects are found in previously used firm level data and productivity effects of existing profit sharing are found to be much larger than potential effects in firms without sharing arrangements this throws doubt on policies to encourage sharing in isolation

the incentive effects of monitoring under alternative compensation schemes abstract this paper examines the marginal incentive effect of monitoring under share and wage payment schemes using various assumptions concerning the risk preferences of workers and the informational content of monitoring signals the direction of this effect is shown to depend critically on the set of assumptions employed furthermore the conditions necessary to generate a positive response of labor effort to monitoring may be restrictive and intuitively unappealing a positive incentive effect is most easily guaranteed under both compensation schemes if monitoring produces an accurate signal of effort with a probability which depends on the level of monitoring intensity implications for the argument that the problem of monitoring dictates efficient organizational form are briefly explored

the american political economy macroeconomics and electoral politics here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from eisenhower through reagan extending and deepening his earlier work which had major impact in both political science and economics hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth unemployment and inflation he identifies which groups win and lose from inflations and recessions he also shows how voters perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents hibbs s analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters behavior at the polls the consequences of eisenhower s last recession of ford s unwillingness to stimulate the economy of carter s stalled recovery were electorally fatal whereas johnson s nixon s and reagan s successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections the book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth unemployment inflation and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the white house the analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party s core political supporters throughout the study hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes hibbs s interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the american political economy than either purely economic apolitical analyses or purely partisan politicized accounts his book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s a handy volume for politicians and their staffs as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics

the committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias the view that congressional committees tend to be biased subsets of their parent chambers provides the foundations for a substantial body of theoretical literature on distributive politics and legislative structure more recent revisionist work suggests that committees composed of preference outliers are in fact rare we reject the categorical account of preference outliers a priori and elaborate conditions under which committees should be unrepresentative of their parent chambers we argue that the most widely available and frequently used data floor roll call votes are inappropriate to the task of assessing outlier predictions in any form finally we conduct a differentiated set of hypothesis tests within one policy jurisdiction to illustrate the characteristics of evidence and analysis necessary to evaluate alternative theoretical accounts of legislative organization the appearance of policy relevant biases in congressional work groups we conclude is not so much rare as it is conditional and we suggest several conditions on which future models of legislative organization should build

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

the role of exchange rates in intertemporal risk return relations abstract this paper investigates the significance of an intertemporal relation between expected returns on countries stock market portfolios and their risk exposures to the world market portfolio we find that the intertemporal risk return relation differs significantly under different currency denominations the slope coefficient is the largest at around seven when the returns are denominated in japanese yen moderate at about five when the returns are denominated in the canadian or us dollars and the smallest at around three when the returns are denominated in pound or euro and its predecessors the ranking of the risk return coefficients across different currency denominations remains the same when we replace country equity indices with global industry portfolios in estimating the intertemporal relations when we change the return frequency from monthly to daily and when we consider different specifications for the conditional covariance process

firm size efficiency and employment a review article s j s book contains much careful and interesting discussion of small firm employment data and related issues and will be read by all workers in the field however it also contains too much detailed quantification and international comparison of doubtful relevance at least for most economists and misses much background material of direct importance for evaluating the role of small firms as a result the authors seriously under estimate the contribution of small business to both employment and efficiency of modern economies as well as the importance of policy to correct the traditional and still pervasive bias towards large organizations

profit sharing and the financial performance of companies evidence from u k panel data this paper examines the dynamic relationship between profit sharing and profitability in a sample of u k firms during the 1980s the estimates indicate a positive short run effect of the introduction of profit sharing schemes on the financial performance of companies this relationship is evident even if unobserved firm specific fixed effects and potential endogeneity of profit sharing are controlled for quite apart from its widely recognized influence on productivity and industrial relations profit sharing is arguably a financially attractive option for firms there is also evidence of the persistence of profitability in u k profit sharing firms copyright 1994 by royal economic society

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

is free trade passe abstract if there were an economist s creed it would surely contain the affirmations i understand the principle of comparative advantage and i advocate free trade yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of ricardo s principles of political economy and this is due to changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade while new developments in international trade theory may not yet be familiar to the profession at large they have been substantial and radical in the last ten years the traditional constant returns perfect competition models of international trade have been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect competition these new models call into doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import restrictions export subsidies

between free trade and protectionism strategic trade policy and a theory of corporate trade demands conventional theories of the political economy of trade argue that industries in import competing businesses favor protectionism while multinational firms and export dependent corporations advocate unconditional free trade however many multinational industries have recently advocated strategic trade policies that is they are willing to support free trade at home only if foreign markets are opened or foreign governments reduce subsidies to their firms if demands for strategic trade policy were adopted by the united states they could represent a threat to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and the multilateral trading system this article seeks to explain the emergence of these new corporate trade demands and thereby broaden theories of the political economy of trade the article begins with the widely supported position that multinational and export oriented firms prefer unconditional free trade building on concepts from theories of industrial organization and international trade the article then hypothesizes that rising economies of scale and steep learning curves will necessitate that these firms have access to global markets via exports if growing dependence on world markets is combined with foreign government subsidies or protection the trade preferences of firms will shift from unconditional free trade to demands that openness at home be contingent on openness overseas the manner in which firm demands then get translated into industry demands will vary with the industry s structure if the industry consists of firms with symmetric strategies it will seek strategic trade policy but if the industry is highly segmented it will turn toward protectionism the article concludes with a preliminary test of these hypotheses in four brief studies of the politics of trade in the semiconductor commercial aircraft telecommunications equipment and machine tool industries

profit sharing and employee share ownership profit sharing and employee share ownership saul estrin paul grout and sushil wadhwani this paper evaluates the likely effects of linking a part of a worker s pay to the employer s profits it has been suggested by weitzman that this would raise employment by lowering the cost of taking on an extra worker however this can only happen if existing workers are willing to let their share of value added fall and experience of those firms in the uk who already operate profit sharing schemes suggests that the weitzman mechanism is not operative there is however some evidence that profit related pay does boost productivity but there are other ways of raising productivity such as performance related pay which may be more effective productivity enhancing effects are likely to be greatest when employees are involved in decision making as well but this is likely to undermine the weitzman case still further even if the argument that profit sharing raises employment is not compelling it is sometimes suggested that it can do little harm however there is evidence that it may well be inflationary in which case the government would be advised to proceed cautiously we argue that there is very little case for the introduction of a permanent subsidy to encourage increased profit sharing although there may be a case for a temporary one to overcome managerial inertia however there is a danger that a subsidy will promote cosmetic schemes designed to be eligible for the subsidy but which do not reflect any real change in behaviour

stock returns and volatility most asset pricing models postulate a positive relationship between a stock portfolio s expected returns and risk which is often modeled by the variance of the asset price this paper uses garch in mean models to examine the relationship between mean returns on a stock portfolio and its conditional variance or standard deviation after estimating a variety of models from daily and monthly portfolio return data we conclude that any relationship between mean returns and own variance or standard deviation is weak the results suggest that investors consider some other risk measure to be more important than the variance of portfolio returns