risk sharing and contagion in networks we investigate the socially optimal design of financial networks that allows to tackle the trade off between risk sharing and contagion we identify conditions on the shock distribution under which full integration or maximal segmentation is optimal we also show that under different conditions the optimal network displays different levels of strength of linkages to other firms or intermediate degrees of segmentation in the latter case the individual and social incentives to establish linkages are not necessarily aligned when firms face heterogeneous distributions of risks they should optimally form linkages only with firms facing risks of the same kind

the formation of financial networks modern banking systems are highly interconnected despite various benefits linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion in this article i investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other when there is contagion risk in the financial system i model banks decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements a financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously i characterize the probability of systemic risk defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing in equilibrium interbank networks i show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur

unfixed resources perceived costs consumption and the accessible account effect consumption depletes one s available resources but consumers may be unaware of the total resources available for consumption and therefore be influenced by the temporary accessibility of resource accounts consistent with this possibility consumers in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more when large resource accounts of money calories or time e g the money in their savings account were made temporarily accessible compared with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible e g the money in their wallet manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior

repayment concentration and consumer motivation to get out of debt many indebted consumers carry multiple credit cards with significant balances and do not generate enough income to pay off these balances in full at the end of each repayment period in managing their debt over time these consumers must decide how to allocate repayments across their debt accounts this research examines how different monthly repayment allocations varying from entirely concentrated into one debt account i e a concentrated strategy to equally dispersed across all debt accounts i e a dispersed strategy influence consumers motivation to repay their debts evidence from a field study of indebted consumers with multiple debt accounts and from three experiments shows that concentrated vs dispersed repayment strategies tend to boost consumers motivation to become debt free leading them to repay their debts more aggressively importantly this motivating effect is most pronounced when the repayments are concentrated into consumers smallest accounts because consumers tend to infer overall progress in debt repayment from the greatest proportional balance reduction proportion of starting balance repaid within any one account these findings advance our understanding of how consumers repay their debts and help pinpoint the psychological process by which debt repayment strategies affect consumers motivation to get out of debt

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

the formation of networks with transfers among players we examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links we vary three aspects of the game i whether players can only make transfers to and receive transfers from players to whom they are directly linked or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in ii whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself and iii whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links we characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs

global imbalances and financial fragility the united states is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the great depression the crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate bubble and amplified by the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result of mistakes in regulatory policy an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period of the bubble and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders in this paper we argue that while correct in some dimensions this story misses two key structural factors behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding lever age first over the last decade the us has experienced large and sustained capital inflows from foreigners seeking us assets to store value caballero emmanuel farhi and pierre olivier gourinchas 2008 second especially after the nasdaq tech bubble and bust excess world savings have looked predominantly for safe debt investments this should not be surprising because a large amount of the capital flow into the us has been from foreign central banks and governments that are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value krishnamurthy and annette vissing jorgenson 2008 in this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment the model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current crisis first during a period of good shocks which we interpret as the period up to the end

on the perceived value of money the reference dependence of currency numerosity effects money illusion research shows that the nominal face value of money affects consumer perceptions of its real value recent mixed findings on consumer valuations in different currencies suggest that the underlying anchoring and adjustment processes are complex we develop a framework to identify boundary conditions that specify the direction of anchoring effects on valuations in different currencies consumers anchor on the numerosity of the nominal difference between prices and salient referents e g budgets when evaluating transactions support for our framework comes from a series of experiments that evoke different reference standards we discuss implications and opportunities for future research

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

consumer skepticism of advertising claims testing hypotheses from economics of information propositions regarding consumers differential skepticism for search experience and credence claims are tested in an experiment using adult consumers the results provide clear support for nelson s 1970 hypotheses that consumers are more skeptical of experience than search attribute claims and more skeptical of subjective than of objective claims no support is found however for the darby and kami 1973 hypothesis that consumers will be more skeptical of credence than of experience attribute claims or for the hypothesis that consumers will not be less skeptical of experience claims for low priced goods

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

consumption self control by rationing purchase quantities of virtue and vice consumers attempts to control their unwanted consumption impulses influence many everyday purchases with broad implications for marketers pricing policies addressing theoreticians and practitioners alike this paper uses multiple empirical methods to show that consumers voluntarily and strategically ration their purchase quantities of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse and that therefore may pose self control problems for example many regular smokers buy their cigarettes by the pack although they could easily afford to buy 10 pack cartons these smokers knowingly forgo sizable per unit savings from quantity discounts which they could realize if they bought cartons by rationing their purchase quantities they also self impose additional transactions costs on marginal consumption which makes excessive smoking overly difficult and costly such strategic self imposition of constraints is intuitively appealing yet theoretically problematic the marketing literature lacks operationalizations and empirical tests of such consumption self control strategies and of their managerial implications this paper provides experimental evidence of the operation of consumer self control and empirically illustrates its direct implications for the pricing of consumer goods moreover the paper develops a conceptual framework for the design of empirical tests of such self imposed constraints on consumption in consumer goods markets within matched pairs of products we distinguish relative virtue and vice goods whose preference ordering changes with whet her consumers evaluate immediate or delayed consumption consequences for example ignoring long term health effects many smokers prefer regular relative vice to light relative virtue cigarettes because they prefer the taste of the former however ignoring these short term taste differences the same smokers prefer light to regular cigarettes when they consider the long term health effects of smoking these preference orders can lead to dynamically inconsistent consumption choices by consumers whose tradeoffs between the immediate and delayed consequences of consumption depend on the time lag between purchase and consumption this creates a potential self control problem because these consumers will be tempted to over consume the vices they have in stock at home purchase quantity rationing helps them solve the self control problem by limiting their stock and hence their consumption opportunities such rationing implies that per purchase occasion vice consumers will be less likely than virtue consumers to buy larger quantities in response to unit price reductions such as quantity discounts we first test this prediction in two laboratory experiments we then examine the external validity of the results at the retail level with a field survey of quantity discounts and with a scanner data analysis of chain wide store level demand across a variety of different pairs of matched vice regular and virtue reduced fat calorie or caffeine etc product categories the analyses of these experimental field and scanner data provide strong convergent evidence of a characteristic crossover in demand schedules for relative vices and virtues for categories as diverse as among others potato chips chocolate chip cookies cream cheese beer soft drinks ice cream and frozen yogurt chewing gum coffee and beef andturkey bologna vice consumers demand increases less in response to price reductions than virtue consumers demand although their preferences are not generally weaker for vices than for virtues constraints on vice purchases are self imposed and strategic rather than driven by simple preferences we suggest that rationing their vice inventories at the point of purchase allows consumers to limit subsequent consumption as a result of purchase quantity rationing however vice buyers forgo savings from price reductions through quantity discounts effectively paying price premiums for the opportunity to engage in self control thus purchase quantity rationing vice consumers are relatively price in sensitive from a managerial and public policy perspective our findings should offer marketing practitioners in many consumer goods industries new opportunities to increase profits through segmentation and price discrimination based on consumer self control they can charge premium prices for small sizes of vices relative to the corresponding quantity discounts for virtues virtue consumers on the other hand will buy larger amounts even when quantity discounts are relatively shallow a key conceptual contribution of this paper lies in showing how marketing researchers can investigate a whole class of strategic self constraining consumer behaviors empirically moreover this research is the first to extend previous theoretical work on impulse control by empirically demonstrating its broader implications for marketing decision making

plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates although political scientists have in the last few decades learned much about the abstract properties of multicandidate electoral systems we have accumulated little theoretical knowledge on the ways in which strategic behavior of voters and candidates changes when we move from one voting system to another this essay has illustrated how the relative desirability of voting systems can change when the number of candidates usually considered fixed in such comparisons is taken as endogenous to the voting system in force at the time our main conclusion is therefore that the method of voting must be understood in relation to the total electoral system it is not enough to analyze properties of voting systems in the abstract but also in terms of the interactions that voting systems have with political groups and the constitutional setting

expectations and preferences in british general elections t a te address two questions how do people form their expectations about the likely winner of the next general election and what are the links between expectations and votes using v v data collected by the gallup organization in great britain we find that the expectations formation process 1 has a significant inertia component but also a rapid adjustment to current information 2 reflects voters ability to translate economic expectations into political forecasts and 3 is time bounded possessing special characteristics immediately before and after a general election the analysis also confirms the existence of a small bandwagon effect whereby expectations that one party will win inflate that party s vote the ability of voters to make reasonable forecasts without being unduly influenced by their own preferences suggests that under normal circumstances voters are expressing real preferences and not simply following the crowd

choosing a runoff election threshold this paper investigates when a runoff election is desirable and when a plurality result is good enough a runoff election increases the likelihood that the condorcet winner will be elected but also entails additional costs the metric for determining whether a runoff election is desirable will be the probability that the winner of the plurality election would win an ensuing runoff statistical models of voter behavior are developed that estimate this probability which are verified with runoff election data from united states elections the models allow governments to make more informed choices in creating rules to decide when to hold runoff elections

discipline and liquidity in the interbank market using 20 years of panel data i demonstrate that high risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity the economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid 1990s when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors subsequently interbank market price discipline roughly doubled and risk based rationing effects increased by a factor of six in imposing this discipline lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions

did inequality cause the u s financial crisis in his widely discussed book fault lines 2010 raghuram rajan argues that many low and middle income consumers have reduced their saving and increased debt since income inequality started to soar in the united states in the early 1980s this has temporarily kept private consumption and employment high but it also contributed to the creation of a credit bubble this surge in household indebtedness turned out to be unsustainable in the financial crisis starting in 2007 although rajan and others emphasize the role of government in promoting credit to those households with declining relative permanent incomes other strands of the literature have focused more explicitly on the implications of rising inequality for aggregate demand and households demand for credit these differences in emphasis may explain why the literature on the inequality crisis nexus appears somewhat disparate even though the various strands are far from mutually exclusive but rather complement each other we therefore place the rajan hypothesis in the context of competing theories of consumption and survey the empirical literature on the effects of inequality on household behaviour we conclude that the empirical evidence calls for a renaissance of the relative income hypothesis of consumption

opportunity cost neglect to properly consider the opportunity costs of a purchase consumers must actively generate the alternatives that it would displace the current research suggests that consumers often fail to do so even under conditions promoting cognitive effort various cues to consider opportunity costs reduce purchase rates and increase the choice share of more affordable options sensitivity to such cues varies with chronic dispositional differences in spending attitudes we discuss the implications of these results for the marketing strategies of economy and premium brands

mental budgeting and consumer decisions consumers often set budgets for categories of expenses e g entertainment and track expenses against their budget because budgets cannot perfectly anticipate consumption opportunities people may earmark too much or too little money for a particular category this leads them to overconsume or underconsume goods in that category the results of three studies suggest that consumers do indeed set budgets and that budgeting may lead to underconsumption to show that consumers track expenses the studies demonstrate that budgeting effects are larger for purchases that are highly typical of their category such purchases reduce the amount people spend in a category and block the purchase of other typical items the studies control for satiation and income effects thus budgeting adds predictive power to standard economic consumer theory

the role of financial systems for cross country differences in the link between income and consumption inequality abstractthis article discusses why consumption inequality stays low despite high income inequality in the u s but income inequality is closely followed by consumption inequality in china we show that different financial systems can play a critical role in shaping the cross country different links between income and consumption inequality this phenomenon is consistent with the cross country different relationships between income inequality and saving rates consumer credit expansion in the u s makes inequality much less serious for consumption than for income and this result holds to an even larger extent if more domestic credit can be financed by foreign savings but this is not the case in china whose financial system focuses only on investment and trade while neglecting liquidity constraints on consumption our assertions accord well with evidence found from the u s china and other related economies

transaction decoupling how price bundling affects the decision to consume abstract in today s marketplace price bundling is widespread manufacturers and retailers routinely offer multiple products for a single bundled price although the effects of price bundling on purchase behavior have been well researched the effects of price bundling on postpurchase consumption behavior have received almost no attention in this article the authors build on the sunk cost literature e g thaler 1980 1985 and predict that price bundling leads to a disassociation or decoupling of transaction costs and benefits thereby reducing attention to sunk costs and decreasing a consumer s likelihood of consuming a paid for service e g a theater performance four studies show this to be the case in two lab studies the authors show that having a bundled four day ski pass as opposed to four one day ski tickets decreases a person s likelihood of skiing on the final day of a four day ski vacation they replicate this result in a field study showing that multiperformance ticket holders are

financial integration and liquidity crises this paper analyzes the effects of financial integration on the stability of the banking system financial integration allows banks in different regions to smooth local liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending on a world interbank market we show under which conditions financial integration induces banks to reduce their liquidity holdings and to shift their portfolios toward more profitable but less liquid investments integration helps reallocate liquidity when different banks are hit by uncorrelated shocks however when a correlated systemic shock hits the total liquid resources in the banking system are lower than in autarky therefore financial integration leads to more stable interbank interest rates in normal times but to larger interest rate spikes in crises these results hold in a setup in which financial integration is welfare improving from an ex ante point of view we also look at the model s implications for financial regulation and show that in a second best world financial integrati

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

the effect of credit on spending decisions the role of the credit limit and credibility the objective of the present research is to study consumer decisions to utilize a line of credit the life cycle hypothesis from economics argues that consumers should intertemporally reallocate their incomes over their life stream to maximize lifetime utility one form of intertemporal allocation is to use past income in the form of savings in the future a second form is the use of future income in the present this can only be done if consumers have access to a temporary pool of money that they can draw from and replenish in the future a function performed by consumer credit however our research reinforces prior findings that consumers are unable to correctly value their future incomes and that they lack the cognitive capability to solve the intertemporal optimization problem required by the life cycle hypothesis instead we argue that consumers use information such as the credit limit as a signal of their future earnings potential specifically if consumers have access to large amounts of credit they are likely to infer that their lifetime income will be high and hence their willingness to use credit and their spending will also be high conversely consumers who are granted lower amounts of credit are likely to infer that their lifetime income will be low and hence their spending will be lower however based on research in the area of consumer skepticism and inference making we also argue for a moderating role of the credibility associated with the credit limit specifically we argue that the above effect of credit availability would be particularly strong for consumers who believe that the credit limit credibly signals their future earnings potential i e a naive consumer who has limited experience with consumer credit however as consumers gain experience with credit they start discounting credit availability as a predictor of their future and start questioning the validity of the process used to set the credit limit hence with experience the effect of credit limit on the willingness to use credit should be attenuated we test these predictions in five separate studies in the first experimental study we manipulate credit limit and credibility and pose subjects with a hypothetical purchase opportunity consistent with our prediction credit limit impacted the propensity to spend but only when the credibility was high in the second experimental study we replicate these findings even when subjects were given information about their expected future salaries and also show that the credit limit influences their expectation of future earnings potential in the third study we show that the mere availability and increase of current liquidity cannot explain our findings in the fourth study we conduct a survey of consumers in which we measure a number of demographic characteristics and also ask them for their propensity to spend in a given purchase situation in the fifth study we use the survey of consumer finances scf dataset a triennial survey of u s families that is designed to provide detailed information on the use of financial services spending behaviors and selected demographic characteristics results from both studies 4 and 5 provide further support for our proposed framework credit limits influence spending to a greater extent for consumers with lower credibility younger consumers and less educated consumers across all studies we achieved triangulation by using a variety of approaches surveys and experiments subjects types young students and older consumers nature of predictor variables manipulated and measured dependent measures purchase likelihood credit card balance new charges and methods of analysis anova and regression and consistently found that increasing credit limits on a credit card increases spending especially when the credibility of the limit is high this paper joins a growing body of literature in marketing and behavioral decision theory that goes beyond the traditional domains of inquiry e g product choice effects of marketing mix variables and focuses on consumer decisions relating to the appropriate use of income to finance consumption our framework differs from prior research on the effect of payment mechanisms on spending in two significant ways first we are interested in the effects of the availability of credit on spending and not necessarily in the effect of the transaction format that is associated with each payment mechanism second while prior research has studied the point of purchase and historic i e prepurchase effects of credit the present research is concerned with the availability of credit in the future specifically our framework is invariant to the current and prior usage of credit by the consumer

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

context dependent drivers of discretionary debt decisions explaining willingness to borrow for experiential purchases mental accounting research suggests that consumers prefer borrowing for longer lasting purchases in order to receive benefits from the purchases as they pay for them in contrast two sets of archival data and five lab studies show that consumers are more willing to borrow for experiential versus material purchases even though experiential purchases tend to have a shorter physical duration further framing the same purchase as more experiential than material increases willingness to borrow this effect occurs because purchase timing is more important for experiential purchases a function of consumers aversion to missing out on planned consumption thus we moderate the proposed effect by varying whether the borrowing decision impacts planned consumption other differences between material and experiential purchases such as scarcity or expected happiness cannot similarly explain our results moreover our conceptualization allows us to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the previous and current research by examining the relative impact of purchase timing importance and payment benefit duration matching in different contexts i e purchasing and source of funding decisions

self command in practice in policy and in a theory of rational choice an increasingly familiar occurrence for obstetricians is being asked by patients to withhold anesthesia during delivery the physician often proposes that a facemask be put beside the patient who may inhale nitrous oxide as she needs it but some determined patients ask that no such opportunity be provided if gas is available they will use it and they want not to be able to the request is interesting for decision theory and raises questions of ethics policy and physician responsibility even if the woman is merely making a mistake if she simply does not know how painful labor will be and how glad she will be even in retrospect if the pain is relieved but some women who make this request have had earlier deliveries during which they demanded anesthesia and received it they are acquainted with the pain they anticipate asking for relief and they want it withheld when they do they expect to regret afterwards any recourse to anesthesia this particular instance of attempted selfdenial has features that are special but many that are common the woman is so far as we know in good health physically and mentally she anticipates a transient period when her usual values and preferences will be suspended or inaccessible she has reasons for wanting to frustrate her own wishes at the critical time she needs cooperation she may ratify her choice afterward by expressing herself grateful that no anesthesia was offered even when requested there are ethical dilemmas and legal issues and there is conflict if say the husband disagrees with the physician in the delivery room about what his wife really wants

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

voting as communicating this paper develops a model where voters trade off two different motives when deciding how to vote they care about current decision making they are strategic but they also care about communicating their views about their most preferred candidate so as to influence future elections by influencing other voters opinion and or party positioning in effect voters in this model are intermediate between strategic and sincere voters of conventional models in elections with more than 2 candidates this allows us to better investigate the relative efficiency of various electoral systems our main conclusion is that since voting is used as a communication device electoral systems should be designed to facilitate efficient communication e g by opting for 2 round systems rather than 1 round systems

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

comparing electoral systems a geometric analysis this paper constructs a game theoretic model of elections inalternative electoral systems with three or four candidates each electoral system specifies how the platforms of thecandidates and their scores give rise to an outcome whengeometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can competeagainst each other for victory a pivot probability isassociated to that pair each voter is rational and picks thecandidate that maximizes her expected utility which resultsfrom the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about thepivot probabilities candidate positioning is endogenous andthe result of a nash game the possible equilibria arecomputed for plurality and runoff majority systems

liquidity coinsurance moral hazard and financial contagion we study the propagation of financial crises between regions characterized by moral hazard problems the source of the problem is that banks are protected by limited liability and may engage in excessive risk taking the regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks so that liquidity coinsurance is pareto improving the moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized under autarky a limited investment is needed to achieve optimality so that a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk taking with interbank deposits the optimal investment increases and capital becomes insufficient to prevent excessive risk taking thus bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crises spread to other regions via the financial linkages opening the financial markets is nevertheless pareto improving consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance although they pay the cost of excessive risk taking finally we show that in this framework a completely connected deposit structure is more conducive to financial crises than an incompletely connected structure

effects of payment mechanism on spending behavior the role of rehearsal and immediacy of payments past expenses have been shown to influence future spending behavior by depleting available budgets however a prerequisite for this relationship is the accurate recall of past payments and the experiencing of the full aversive impact associated with them this article shows that the use of different payment mechanisms influences both these factors and hence moderates the effects of past payments on future spending specifically past payments strongly reduce purchase intention when the payment mechanism requires the consumer to write down the amount paid rehearsal and when the consumer s wealth is depleted immediately rather than with a delay immediacy two experiments show support for the proposed theoretical framework

banks as monitors of other banks evidence from the overnight federal funds market this study provides evidence that banks are effective monitors of their peers by showing that the interest rate paid on federal funds transactions reflects differences in credit risk across borrowers in addition the size and relative importance in the funds market of the trading institutions are shown to affect the rates charged for overnight borrowing thereby providing insight into the nature of competition in the federal funds market transaction volume and size of transaction effects are uncovered as is evidence of relationship banking between banks these results are made possible by unique data identifying individual federal funds transactions copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

the red and the black mental accounting of savings and debt in the standard economic account of consumer behavior the cost of a purchase takes the form of a reduction in future utility when expenditures that otherwise could have been made are forgone the reality of consumer hedonics is different when people make purchases they often experience an immediate pain of paying which can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption the ticking of the taxi meter for example reduces one s pleasure from the ride we propose a double entry mental accounting theory that describes the nature of these reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying and draws out their implications for consumer behavior and hedonics a central assumption of the model which we call prospective accounting is that consumption that has already been paid for can be enjoyed as if it were free and that the pain associated with payments made prior to consumption but not after is buffered by thoughts of the benefits that the payments will finance another important concept is coupling which refers to the degree to which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payment and vice versa some financing methods such as credit cards tend to weaken coupling whereas others such as cash payment produce tight coupling our model makes a variety of predictions that are at variance with economic formulations contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchases to minimize the present value of payments our model predicts strong debt aversion that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get paid for work after it is performed such pay before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future likewise when paying beforehand the pain of paying is mitigated by thoughts of future consumption benefits contrary to the economic prediction that consumers should prefer to pay at the margin for what they consume our model predicts that consumers will find it less painful to pay for and hence will prefer flat rate pricing schemes such as unlimited internet access at a fixed monthly price even if it involves paying more for the same usage other predictions concern spending patterns with cash charge or credit cards and preferences for the earmarking of purchases we test these predictions in a series of surveys and in a conjoint like analysis that pitted our double entry mental accounting model against a standard discounting formulation and another benchmark that did not incorporate hedonic interactions between consumption and payments our model provides a better fit of the data for 60 of the subjects the discounting formulation provides a better fit for only 29 of the subjects even when allowing for positive and negative discount rates the pain of paying we argue plays an important role in consumer self regulation but is hedonically costly from a hedonic perspective the ideal situation is one in which payments are tightly coupled to consumption so that paying evokes thoughts about the benefits being financed but consumption is decoupled from payments so that consumption does not evoke thoughts about payment from an efficiency perspective however it is important for consumers to be aware of what they are paying for consumption this creates a tension between hedonic efficiency and what we call decision efficiency various institutional arrangements such as financing of public parks through taxes or usage fees play into this tradeoff a producer developing a pricing structure for their product or service should be aware of these two conflicting objectives and should try to devise a structure that reconciles them

in efficient interbank networks we study the efficiency properties of the formation of an interbank network banks face a trade off by establishing connections in the interbank market on the one hand banks improve the diversification of their liquidity risk and therefore can obtain a higher expected payoff on the other hand banks not sufficiently capitalized have risk shifting incentives that expose them to the risk of bankruptcy connecting to such risky banks negatively affects expected payoff we show that both the optimal and the decentralized networks are characterized by a core periphery structure the core is made of the safe banks whereas the periphery is populated by the risky banks nevertheless the two network structures coincide only if counterparty risk is sufficiently low otherwise the decentralized network is underconnected as compared to the optimal one finally we analyze mechanisms that can avoid the formation of inefficient interbank networks

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

crises and capital requirements in banking we analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of and moral hazard by banks the regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects and impose capital adequacy requirements capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation and they otherwise substitute for screening ability crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case and contrary to conventional wisdom the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks

credit cards as spending facilitating stimuli a conditioning interpretation four experiments and one study were conducted to test the hypothesis that stimuli associated with spending can elicit spending responses in all experiments credit card stimuli were either present or absent in situations in which subjects were given an opportunity to spend credit card stimuli directed spending such that the probability speed or magnitude of spending was enhanced in the presence of credit card cues a conditioning explanation was used to interpret the results

financial networks and contagion we study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations how discontinuous changes in asset values e g defaults and shutdowns trigger further failures and how this depends on network structure integration greater dependence on counterparties and diversification more counterparties per organization have different nonmonotonic effects on the extent of cascades diversification connects the network initially permitting cascades to travel but as it increases further organizations are better insured against one another s failures integration also faces trade offs increased dependence on other organizations versus less sensitivity to own investments finally we illustrate the model with data on european debt cross holdings jel d85 f15 f34 f36 f65 g15 g32 g33 g38 globalization brings with it increased financial interdependencies among many kinds of organizations governments central banks investment banks firms etc that hold each other s shares debts and other obligations such interdependencies can lead to cascading defaults and failures which are often avoided through massive bailouts of institutions deemed too big to fail recent examples include the us government s interventions in aig fannie mae freddie mac and general motors and the european commission s interventions in greece and spain although such bailouts circumvent the widespread failures that were more prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they emphasize the need to study the risks created by a network of interdependencies understanding these risks is crucial to designing incentives and regulatory responses which defuse cascades before they are imminent in this paper we develop a general model that produces new insights regarding financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through a network of financial interdependencies organizations values depend on each other e g through cross holdings of shares debt or other liabilities if an

financial networks contagion commitment and private sector bailouts i develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion but also induce private sector bailouts where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion introducing this bailout possibility i show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible however in some cases e g when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks the whole network may collapse i also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems linkages among agents in financial markets are a concern because of the risk of financial contagion that is the risk that a small shock to one agent will spread to other agents in a domino effect whether we should worry about these linkages is an open question the main goal of this paper is to show that a network in which agents are closely interlinked may be optimal both because of and despite the potential for contagion another goal is to characterize optimal networks that is whether and how agents should be linked to one another the basic intuition is as follows linkages present the threat of contagion to prevent collapse of the whole network agents who are lucky ex post may be willing to bail out those who are not in this way agents obtain the benefits of mutual insurance even though they cannot precommit to making payments

stability and coordination in duverger s law a formal model of preelection polls and strategic voting this paper investigates the dynamics of the wasted vote phenomenon and duverger s law i construct a theoretical model in order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate the results shed light on how public opinion polls can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election specifically i show that in a bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive votes in the limit these equilibria require extreme coordination however and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from them to one of the duvergerian equilibria thus non duvergerian equilibria are unstable while two party equilibria are not in addition i describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used by voters to coordinate on a duvergerian outcome

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

inequality saving and global imbalances a new theory with evidence from oecd and asian countries global imbalances are attributable to savings deficiency in some economies and savings glut in others the recent global crisis has triggered widespread social conflict over income inequality the inequality saving link has again become a pressing issue needing serious attention we present a new theory to explain why the link between inequality and saving is negative in oecd countries but positive in emerging asia we also offer an econometric analysis of differences in inequality saving links between those economies we find that aggressive financial services lead to a negative link by creating income illusion for overconsumption but imperfect financial markets contribute to a positive link by interacting with industrial policies as part of growth strategies while ignoring liquidity constraints on consumption

the formation of a core periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks recent empirical evidence suggests that nancial networks exhibit a core periphery network structure this paper aims at giving an economic explanation for the emergence of such a structure using network formation theory focusing on intermediation benets we nd that a core periphery network cannot be unilaterally stable when agents are homogeneous the best response dynamics converge to a unique unilaterally stable outcome ranging from an empty to denser networks as the costs of linking decrease a core periphery network structure can form endogenously however if we allow for heterogeneity among agents in size we show that our model can reproduce the observed core periphery structure in the dutch interbank market for reasonable parameter values

invited commentary dynamic structural consumer models and current marketing issues structural models integrate behavioral and psychological decision theory into economics models and are more aligned with the true underlying economic primitives of the consumers this allows researchers to investigate more behavior driven and process oriented customer decision processes such as learning of product attributes formation of a consideration sets stockpiling and flexible consumption that cannot be easily handled by traditional marketing models chintagunta et al 2006 gives an excellent review on the development and applications of structural models in marketing for modeling both consumer demand and firm competition recent interests in consumer research have diversified from frequently purchased packaged goods to services high tech internet and information industries consumers are observed to be more sophisticated long term oriented risk averse and rational when making purchase and consumption decisions in these product categories structural models are better choices to capture the nature of the sophisticated decision process under the new marketing environment and engineering given the thorough review of chintagunta et al 2006 i will focus only on the dynamic structural demand models that have the components of information processing rational expectation and or endogenous decisions to trade off current and future utilities and i discuss some current marketing issues that can be most appropriately addressed by these models

the interbank market during a crisis abstract the autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis this period witnessed russia s effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with federal reserve intentions further risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period