the one child policy a macroeconomic analysis abstract this paper studies the effects of china s one child policy using a calibrated general equilibrium model a benchmark with a fertility constraint in place is compared to a counterfactual experiment without the fertility constraint the results indicate that the implementation of the one child policy promotes the accumulation of human capital and increases per capita output in addition the policy leads to different welfare effects across generations and skill groups the initial generation would benefit from relaxing the one child policy but the following generations would be hurt a redistribution effect between skilled and unskilled workers is also observed these findings demonstrate that focusing solely on gdp per capita as a measure of economic well being paints an incomplete picture of the welfare consequences of population policies

the evolution of china s one child policy and its effects on family outcomes abstract in 1979 china introduced its unprecedented one child policy under which households exceeding the birth quota were penalized however estimating the effect of this policy on family outco

the effect of bond rating changes on common stock prices abstract the evidence in this paper suggests that downgrades by both moody s and standard and poor s are associated with negative abnormal stock returns in the two day window beginning the day of the press release by the rating agency significant negative abnormal performance can still be detected after eliminating observations containing obvious concurrent potentially contaminating news releases there is little evidence of abnormal performance on announcement of an upgrade significant abnormal returns are associated with announcements of additions to the standard and poor s credit watch list if either a potential downgrade or a potential upgrade is indicated

designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice an overview of the issues abstract payments for environmental services pes have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external non market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services es in this introductory paper we set the stage for the rest of this special issue of ecological economics by reviewing the main issues arising in pes design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics we start with a discussion of pes definition and scope we proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of pes programs and then analyze how pes compares to alternative policy instruments finally we examine in detail two important aspects of pes programs their effectiveness and their distributional implications pes is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems those in which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers pes is based on the beneficiary pays rather than the polluter pays principle and as such is attractive in settings where es providers are poor marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors an important distinction within pes is between user financed pes in which the buyers are the users of the es and government financed pes in which the buyers are others typically the government acting on behalf of es users in practice pes programs differ in the type and scale of es demand the payment source the type of activity paid for the performance measure used as well as the payment mode and amount the effectiveness and efficiency of pes depends crucially on program design

can information heterogeneity explain the exchange rate determination puzzle empirical evidence shows that most exchange rate volatility at short to medium horizons is related to order flow and not to macroeconomic variables we introduce symmetric information dispersion about future macroeconomic fundamentals in a dynamic rational expectations model in order to explain these stylized facts consistent with the evidence the model implies that a observed fundamentals account for little of exchange rate volatility in the short to medium run b over long horizons the exchange rate is closely related to observed fundamentals c exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future fundamentals and d the exchange rate is closely related to order flow

last bank standing what do i gain if you fail banks are highly leveraged institutions potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance a counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value which depends on future rents we show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending and may in fact increase it in contrast a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution is very effective by making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent subsequent entry policy fine tunes the trade off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

enduring impacts of land retirement policies evidence from the conservation reserve program we examine the persistence of cropland retirements induced by the conservation reserve program crp the largest u s conservation program we analyze micro data on observed land use choices following crp contract expiration over 1995 1997 and predict that 42 of crp acres would not have been returned to crops within a year if the program had expired in 1997 these results indicate that temporary cropland retirement payments under crp generate land use changes that often extend beyond contract periods the analysis suggests that targeted signing bonuses for first time enrollees would increase the longer term impacts of crp and perhaps other incentive based land use programs

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

behavioral environmental economics promises and challenges environmental issues provide a rich ground for identifying the existence and consequences of human limitations in this paper we present a growing literature lying at the interface between behavioral and environmental economics this literature identifies alternative solutions to traditional economic instruments in environmental domains that often work imperfectly but it also faces a set of challenges including the difficulty of computing welfare effects and the identification of a robust environmental policy based on context dependent socio psychological effects we illustrate our critical discussion with two behavioral schemes that have been widely implemented green nudges and corporate environmental responsibility

do population control policies induce more human capital investment twins birthweight and china s one child policy in this paper we address the issues of whether reductions in fertility increase human capital investments per child and whether twinning can identify the quantity quality q q trade off we show that estimates of the effects of twinning at higher parities on the outcomes of older children in prior studies do not identify family size effects but are confounded by inter child allocation effects because of the endowment deficit and close spacing of twins however examining the effects of twinning by birth order net of the effects stemming from the endowment deficit of twins can provide upper and lower bounds on the trade off between the family size and average child quality our estimates based on data from china indicate that an extra child at parity one or at parity two net of one component of birth endowment effects associated with birth weight significantly decreases the schooling progress the expected college enrolment grades in school and the assessed health of all children in the family despite the evident significant trade off between number of children and child quality in china the findings suggest that the contribution of the one child policy in china to the development of its human capital was modest copyright wiley blackwell

credit ratings and security prices in the subprime mbs market we present and discuss preliminary evidence suggesting that credit ratings significantly influenced prices for subprime mortgage backed securities issued in the period leading up to the recent financial crisis ratings are closely correlated with prices even controlling for a rich set of security and loan level controls this incremental variation in ratings has much less predictive power for security defaults however based on findings to date from our ongoing research suggesting prices were excessively sensitive to ratings relative to their informational content

nudges social norms and permanence in agri environmental schemes agri environmental schemes aes implemented to address a wide range of environmental issues suffer from what has been referred to as the end of the contract problem in the sense that many of the land management practices adopted under the scheme cannot be expected to persist in the absence of payments a first objective of this paper is therefore to investigate farmers actual land management intentions at the end of aes contracts the second objective is to investigate the effect of social norms and framing of these norms on the likely permanence of land management practices adopted under aes that is we are interested in whether a nudge in the form of a social norm can help solve the end of contract problem our results are based on the stated intentions of 395 farmers participating in the french aes scheme maet they show that almost half of the farmers of our sample are willing to maintain the practices adopted during the aes even in the absence of payments after the contract ends and that information about what other farmers intend to do the social norm can greatly influence farmers decisions however the framing of this information has no significant effect on stated intentions

fertility restrictions and life cycle outcomes evidence from the one child policy in china this study considers the experience of china s one child policy to examine how fertility restrictions affect economic and social outcomes over a lifetime using variations in these penalties across

number of siblings credit constraints and entrepreneurship in china with an under developed financial market borrowing from relatives becomes an important funding source in starting one s own business in china this paper examines the positive effect of number of

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

carrots and sticks fertility effects of china s population policies for 20 years following 1949 average total fertility per woman in china hovered just above six children the year 1970 marked the beginning of persistent fertility declines by 1980 the rate had dropped to 2 75 and since 1992 it has remained under 2 while some of this transition can be accounted for by broad socioeconomic developments the extent to which it is attributable to china s unique population policies remains controversial this paper analyzes household data from the 1992 household economy and fertility survey hefs to provide the first direct microeconomic empirical evidence on the efficacy of these policies

beauty contests and iterated expectations in asset markets in a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived and prices are noisy asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow s price thus iterating this relationship the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation of the date 3 price this will not in general equal the date 1 average expectation of the date 3 price we show how this failure of the law of iterated expectations for average belief can help understand the role of higher order beliefs in a fully rational asset pricing model and explain over reaction to noisy public information

bond rating agencies and stock analysts who knows what when both bond rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and com municate their opinions to investors comparing the timeliness of each we find that granger causality flows both ways while most bond downgrades are preceded by declines in actual and forecast earnings both actual earnings and forecasts of future earnings tend to fall following downgrades although part of this post downgrade forecast revision can be attributed to negative news regarding actual earnings most appears to be reaction to the downgrade itself we find little change in actual earnings following upgrades analysts however tend to increase their forecasts of future earnings

when choosing makes a good thing better temporal variations in the valuation of hedonic consumption abstract this research investigates how the valuation of delayed consumption of hedonic products such as concerts and chocolate varies with the passage of time between choice and consumption the authors find that when consumers make their own choices they exhibit increases in evaluations of delayed consumption but only if the interval between choice and consumption is relatively short the effect attenuates over longer periods resulting in an inverted u shaped relationship between evaluations and time in contrast when somebody else chooses the same option for the consumer evaluations decrease with the passage of time these effects depend on the extent of intrinsic motivation toward the object of consumption and occur only for consummatory consumption that is of inherent interest moreover anticipatory increases in evaluations before consumption have ironic negative effects on postconsumption evaluations the authors discuss implications and directions for further research

ratings hardwiring and asset prices this paper discusses the asset pricing implications of ratings hardwiring the latter is defined as the mechanical response of trading decisions to changes in ratings this issue is studied within a noisy rational expectations framework of asset pricing under asymmetric information in which traders specialize in different driving factors of asset payoffs and interact with others who mechanically link their asset supply to ratings we show that ratings hardwiring leads to predictable supply shocks and induces informed traders to overreact to new information thus creating a channel through which shocks are amplified and prices become less informative and more volatile

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices