expected inflation and the real rates of interest on taxable and tax exempt bonds this paper analyzes the impact of inflation on rates of return on taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds the paper considers a differential tax system where the tax rate depen ds on both the identity of the investor and the source of income it also consid ers the possibility that inflation may induce investors to switch from holding one asset to holding another it is demonstrated that while inflation should increase the pre personal tax real rate of interest on taxable bonds it should reduce the real rate of interest on tax exempt bonds copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

the fisher equation controversy a reconciliation of contradictory results where r is the real interest rate assuming that the real interest rate is constant the above equation yields the fisherian prediction of co plete adjustment di dit 1 fisher s empirical findings however indicated only a partial adjustment of nominal interest rates to inflation expectations the contradiction between fisher s theoretical and e pirical findings was confounded further by mundell 11 and tobin 19 who provided theoretical results consistent with fisher s empirical finding of partial adjustment the fascination with deriving theoretical results consistent with fisher s empirical finding continues sargent 14 15 16 visco 20 and fried and howitt 8 have all attempted to provide theoretical justification for the partial adjustment result

equilibrium in hotelling s model of spatial competition we study hotelling s two stage model of spatial competition in which two firms first simultaneously choose locations in the unit interval then simultaneously choose prices under hotelling s assumptions uniform distribution of consumers travel cost proportional to distance inelastic demand of one unit by each consumer the price setting subgames possess equilibria in pure strategies for only a limited set of location pairs because of this problem pointed out independently by vickrey 1964 and d aspremont et al 1979 hotelling s claim that there is an equilibrium of the two stage game in which the firms locate close to each other is incorrect a result of dasgupta and maskin 1986 guarantees that each price setting subgame has an equilibrium in mixed strategies we first study these mixed strategy equilibria we are unable to provide a complete characterization of them although we show that for a subset of location pairs all equilibria are of a certain type we reduce the problem of finding an equilibrium of this type to that of solving three or fewer highly nonlinear equations at each of a large number of location pairs we have computed approximate solutions to the system of equations next we use our analytical results and computations to study the equilibrium location choices of the firms there is a unique up to symmetry subgame perfect equilibrium in which the location choices of the firms are pure in it the firms locate 0 27 from the ends of the market at this equilibrium the support of the subgame equilibrium price strategy is the union of two short intervals most of the probability weight is in the upper interval so that this strategy is reminiscent of occasional sales by the firms we also find a subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm uses a mixed strategy in locations in fact in the class of strategy pairs in which the firms use the same mixed strategy over locations and this strategy is symmetric about 0 5 there is a single equilibrium in this equilibrium most of the probability weight of the common strategy is between 0 2 and 0 4 and between 0 6 and 0 8 there is a wide range of pure nash as opposed to subgame perfect equilibrium location pairs the subgame strategies in which each firm threatens to charge a price of zero in response to a deviation support all but those location pairs in which the firms are very close

the risk in hedge fund strategies theory and evidence from trend followers hedge fund strategies typically generate option like returns linear factor models using benchmark asset indices have difficulty explaining them following the suggestions in glosten and jagannathan 1994 this article shows how to model hedge fund returns by focusing on the popular trend following strategy we use lookback straddles to model trend following strategies and show that they can explain trend following funds returns better than standard asset indices though standard straddles lead to similar empirical results lookback straddles are theoretically closer to the concept of trend following our model should be useful in the design of performance benchmarks for trend following funds

on the sensitivity of mean variance efficient portfolios to changes in asset means some analytical and computational results tbis paper investigates the sensitivity of meanvariance mv efficientportfolios to changes in the means of individual assets when only a budget constraint is imposed on the investment problem the analytical results indicate that an mv efficient portfolio s weights mean and variance can be extremely sensitive to cbanges in asset means when nonnegativity constraints are also imposed on the problem the computational results confirm that a positively weigbted mv efficient portfolio s weigbts are extremely sensitive to cbanges in asset means but the portfolio s returns are not a surprisingly small increase in the mean of just one asset drives balf the securities from the portfolio yet the portfolio s expected return and standard deviation are virtually uncbanged this paper supersedes should investors hold well diversified portfolios financial support from the natural science and engineering research council of canada is gratefully acknowledged we also acknowledge the most capable assistance of ruth cornale simon ng jean marc potier and frederick shen the paper was presented at simon fraser university and the western finance association meetings in san diego we thank the participants especially stephen brown john herzog john heaney ray koopman and bruce lehmann and the editors jon ingersoll and chester spatt for

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

direct price controls as a source of instability in the interest rate inflation rate relationship abstract we hypothesize that an efficient capital market is more concerned with effective inflation rates which investors experience than official ones which econometricians observe and that direct consumer goods price controls are likely to result in disparity between the two consequently direct price controls are also likely to affect the interest measured inflation rate relationship we ropose a dummy variable approach which enables us to explore empirically the effects of such controls on the interest inflation rate relationship in the context of dwyer s 1981 model using euro rates and inflation rates of the respective countries we explore the impact of the control programmes imposed in the 1970 s by governments of the united states canada and france france

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

evaluating the impact of inequality constraints and parameter uncertainty on optimal portfolio choice we present new analytical results for the impact of portfolio weight constraints on an investor s optimal portfolio when parameter uncertainty is taken into account while it is well known that parameter uncertainty and imposing weight constraints results in reduced certainty equivalent returns in the general case there are no analytical results in a special case commonly used in the funds management literature we derive analytical expression for the certainty equivalent loss that does not depend on the risk aversion parameter we illustrate our theoretical results using hedge fund data from the perspective of a fund of fund manager our contribution is to formalize the framework to investigate this problem as well as providing tractable analytical solutions that can be implemented using either simulated or asset manager returns

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

noncooperative bargaining and spatial competition the article develops a bargaining model of spatial competition sellers compete by choosing locations in a market region consumers face a cost to moving from one place to another the price of the good is determined as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game between seller and buyer in this game the buyer has the outside option to move to another seller and so the prices at all stores are interdependent existence of a location price equilibrium is established the outcome approaches the perfectly competitive one if the consumer s cost of traveling becomes negligible or if the number of sellers tends to infinity copyright 1989 by the econometric society

inflation taxation and interest rates this paper demonstrates that the response of nominal interest rates to changes in inflationary expectations should lie between that predicted by the fisher and darby effects the exact nature of the response will depend on the relative size of the income and capital gains tax rates and the relative size of the derivatives of investment and savings to their respective after tax real rates the other major conclusion of this paper is that capital gains taxation offsets the negative effect on investment produced by treating depreciation on a historic rather than a replacement cost basis in the 1960s and early 1970s the economics profession and the financial community increasingly accepted irving fisher s analysis of the effect of changes in anticipated inflation on the rate of interest in the last several years darby 4 and feldstein 5 have elaborated fisher s theory and have arrived at the conclusion that in a world with taxes an increase in inflationary expectations should result in a more than proportional increase in the nominal rate of interest since investors base their investing and saving decisions on the after tax and not the pretax expected consequences of their actions darby 4 has argued that if income taxes are proportional at rate t and interest receipts are taxable and interest payments are tax deductible the real after tax interest rate is

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

a bargaining model of financial intermediation abstract in a financial market the investor searches for investment projects and bargains with the entrepreneur about the financial contract alternatively he may delegate search and bargaining to a financial intermediary delegation generates a commitment advantage in bargaining it may however induce excessively risky investments because the investor cannot monitor the intermediary s search behavior this restricts the parameter constellations under which equilibrium intermediation occurs competition may not reduce the intermediaries profits to zero because of incentive restrictions

inflation and taxation nominal and real rates of return abstract the impact on rates of return of an expected change in the rate of inflation is examined in a general equilbrium framework explicit expressions are derived for the marginal relationships between the rate of inflation and nominal and real interest rates one of the conclusions is that with taxation included the nominal rate of interest will tend to increase more than corresponding to the pure fisher effect but less than required to keep consumers after tax real rate of return and the consumption equilibrium unchanged finally some of the implications of the model for the pricing of indexed bonds are examined in a partial equilibrium framework

sensitivity analysis for mean variance portfolio problems this paper shows how to perform sensitivity analysis for mean variance mv portfolio problems using a general form of parametric quadratic programming the analysis allows an investor to examine how parametric changes in either the means or the right hand side of the constraints affect the composition mean and variance of the optimal portfolio the optimal portfolio and associated multipliers are piecewise linear functions of the changes in either the means or the right hand side of the constraints the parametric parts of the solution show the rates of substitution of securities in the optimal portfolio while the parametric parts of the multipliers show the rates at which constraints are either tightening or loosening furthermore the parametric parts of the solution and multipliers change in different intervals when constraints become active or inactive the optimal mv paths for sensitivity analyses are piecewise parabolic as in traditional mv analysis however the optimal paths may contain negatively sloping segments and are characterized by types of kinks i e points of nondifferentiability not found in mv analysis

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

portfolio constraints and the fundamental law of active management active portfolio management is typically conducted within constraints that do not allow managers to fully exploit their ability to forecast returns constraints on short positions and turnover for example are fairly common and materially restrictive other constraints such as market capitalization and value growth neutrality with respect to the benchmark or economic sector constraints can further restrict an active portfolio s composition we derive ex ante and ex post correlation relationships that facilitate the performance analysis of constrained portfolios the ex ante relationship is a generalized version of a previously developed fundamental law of active management and provides an important strategic perspective on the potential for active management to add value the ex post correlation relationship represents a practical decomposition of performance into the success of the return prediction process and the noise associated with portfolio constraints we verify the accuracy of these relati

bargaining search costs and equilibrium price distributions this paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store in the market equilibrium the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game in this game the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller differences between the sellers types create price dispersions typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs the market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small

bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly this paper studies the stability of price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly the firms demand is derived from a distribution of consumer preferences this description of the consumer sector is applicable to a large class of differentiated commodity markets including spatial competition models the author shows that there is a pure price setting equilibrium when consumer tastes are sufficiently dispersed further conditions on the dispersedness of preferences guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in addition the author examines the relation between consumer preferences and the competitiveness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcome copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association