why is china different from eastern europe perspectives from organization theory we draw from recent work in organization theory to explain the differences in reform strategies between china and eastern europe an experimentation approach was adopted in china whereas a big bang approach was more favored in eastern europe the explanation is based on differences in the organizational structure of central planning u form in eastern europe and m form in china the m form is more flexible because it makes local experiments possible contrary to the u form where this would give rise to major complications in coordination

learning about a new technology pineapple in ghana this paper investigates the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new agri cultural technology in ghana we use unique data on farmers communication patterns to define each individual s information neighborhood conditional on many potentially confounding variables we find evidence that farmers adjust their inputs to align with those of their information neighbors who were surpris ingly successful in previous periods the relationship of these input adjustments to experience further indicates the presence of social learning in addition applying the same method to input choices for another crop of known technol ogy correctly indicates an absence of social learning effects jel d83 013 033 q16

is diversity good or bad evidence from esports teams analysis we use esports data to construct an empirical model to measure the effect of diversity on team performance different kinds of diversities are considered diversity of culture diversity of languag

the political economy of linguistic cleavages article i nfo this paper uses a linguistic tree describing the genealogical relationship between all 6912 world languages to compute measures of diversity at different levels of linguistic aggregation by doing so we let the data inform us on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant for a range of political economy outcomes rather than making ad hoc choices we find that deep cleavages originating thousands of years ago lead to better predictors of civil conflict and redistribution the opposite pattern emerges when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision where finer distinctions between languages matter 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

social networks and technology adoption in northern mozambique despite their potentially strong impact on poverty agricultural innovations are often adopted slowly using a unique household dataset on sunflower adoption in mozambique we analyse whether and how individual adoption decisions depend upon the choices of others in the same social networks since farmers anticipate that they will share information with others we expect farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other adopters dynamic considerations however suggest that farmers who know many adopters might strategically delay adoption to free ride on the information gathered by others we present empirical evidence that shows that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of known adopters is shaped as an inverse u in line with information sharing the network effect is stronger for farmers who report discussing agriculture with others the data contains information which is needed to ameliorate the identification issues that commonly arise in this context in particular social networks are precisely identified and in addition we can control for village heterogeneity and endogenous group formation

the law of genius and home runs refuted i introduction empirical regularities in biology as in other fields can be extremely interesting in particular such regularities may suggest the operation of fundamental laws unfortunately apparent regularities sometimes cannot stand up under close scrutiny solow costello and ward 2003 a lively provocative article by devany 2007 in economic inquiry argues that the statistical law of home run hitting is the same as the laws of human accomplishment developed by lotka pareto price and murray there is no evidence that steroid use has altered home run hitting the greatest accomplishments in science art and music all follow the same universal law of genius and the stable paretian model developed here will be of use to economists studying extreme accomplishments in other areas which apparently follows from his claim that the size distribution of annual home run production has a finite mean but infinite variance and follows a power law distribution devany s argument is not unique it is part of a large and growing literature where claims of the ubiquity of power laws are legion 1 devany takes the additional step of connecting this statistical analysis to an argument about the effect of steroids on home run hitting by major league ballplayers steroid advocates have to argue that the new records are not consistent with the law of home runs and that the law itself has changed as a result of steroid use our purpose of this article is to suggest that the above should be met with a fair amount of skepticism first we try to provide some background on previous attempts to identify the existence of universal laws and provide the intellectual context for devany s claims second we show that devany s claims follow from a flawed statistical inference procedure his procedure with probability l would find evidence consistent with infinite variance for virtually any nontrivial data set to do so we first analyze the size distribution of a quantity which could not follow a power law distribution and show that using devany s inference procedure we would be led to the same incorrect claim we also discuss the important distinction elided by devany and others writing in related literatures between an unconditional distribution and a conditional distribution third we observe that the size distribution of home runs cannot follow a power law distribution and show that the posited class of distributions provide an inadequate approximation to the data at best fourth while concurring with devany s implicit criticism that steroid advocates who rely on recent trends to substantiate their views have not made their case we suggest that the problem is that the question is ill posed the level and distribution of total home runs in any given year is minimally a function of hundreds of things the quality of pitching the weather the introduction of new ball parks the number of games played the distribution of baseball talent across the teams and so forth to claim that only one cause is responsible for a trend involves some possibly unstated assumption about the myriad of other factors indeed what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander those seeking to support or deny the claim that increased use of steroids have led to increased home run hitting will have to employ considerably more shoe leather than mere statistical analysis of the unconditional distribution of home runs per player or time trends in home run hitting we conclude by observing that neither examination of time trends in annual home run production nor examination of the unconditional distribution of home runs will settle the dispute between steroid advocates and steroid opponents and that more convincing evidence will have to be sought elsewhere ii

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

monotone instrumental variables with an application to the returns to schooling for fifty years econometric analyses of treatment response have made extensive use of instrumental variable iv assumptions holding that mean response is constant across specified subpopulations of a population of interest 2 yet the credibility of mean independence conditions and other iv assumptions has often been a matter of considerable disagreement with much debate about whether some covariate is or is not a valid instrument in an application of interest there is therefore good reason to consider weaker but more credible assumptions to this end we introduce monotone instlumental variable miv assumptions holding that mean response varies weakly monotonically across specified subpopulations we study the identifying power of these miv assumptions and give an empirical application the findings reported here add to the literature developing nonparametric bounds on treatment effects 3 this paper uses the same formal setup as manski 1997 there is a probability space j x2 p of individuals each member j of population j has observable covariates xi e x and a response function yj t y mapping the mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments t e t into outcomes yj t e y person j has a realized treatment zj e t and a realized outcome y 1 y zi both of which are observable the latent outcomes yj t

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

on the empirics of social capital this paper critically examines the way in which empirical evidence is developed in support of a role for social capital in socioeconomic outcomes three leading studies of social capital are reviewed and in each case argued to suffer from various identification problems a general set of conditions under which social capital effects may be identified in linear models is given careful attention to these conditions combined with greater openmindedness as to what constitutes appropriate evidence seems the best route to improving empirical studies of social capital

the firm as a nexus of treaties part 1 knowledge its acquisition sharing and or asymmetry the participatory generation of information rents and the theory of the firm masahiko aoki common knowledge and the co ordination of economic activities jacques cremer profit sharing information and employment matti pohjola part 2 vertical integration and the strategic management of the enterprise what is vertical integration michael h riordan vertical integration transaction costs and learning by using kurt lundgren the firm as a nexus of internal and external contracts torger reve part 3 issues of labour organization the viability of worker ownership an economic perspective on the political structure of the firm henry hansmann intellectual skill and the role of employees as constituent members of large firms in contemporary japan kazuo koike the implicit contract for corporate law firm associates ex post opportunism and ex ante bonding robert h mooking part 4 finance and the political structure of the firm capital structure as a mechanism of control a comparison of financial systems erik berglof long term contracts in financial markets hakan lindgren the principle of external accountability in competitive markets herbert gintis union militancy and plant designs kar ove moene can transaction cost economics explain trade associations marc schneiberg and j rogers hollingsworth

interactions neighborhood selection and housing demand abstract this paper contributes to the growing literature that aims at identifying and measuring the impact of social context on individual economic behavior we develop a model of housing structure demand with neighborhood effects and neighborhood choice modeling neighborhood choice is of fundamental importance in estimating and understanding endogenous and contextual neighborhood effects controlling for non random sorting into neighborhoods allows for unbiased estimates and provides a means for identifying endogenous neighborhood effects estimation of the model exploits a household level data set that has been augmented with contextual information at two different levels scales of aggregation one is at the neighborhood level consisting of about ten neighbors with the data coming from the neighborhood clusters sub sample of the american housing survey a second level is the census tract to which these dwelling units belong these data were geocoded by means of privileged access to confidential us census data our results for the neighborhood choice model indicate that individuals prefer to live near others like themselves our estimates of the housing structure demand equation confirm that neighborhood effects are important in particular one s demand for housing depends on the mean of neighbors demand for housing

consistent testing for stochastic dominance under general sampling schemes we propose a procedure for estimating the critical values of the extended kolmogorov smirnov tests of stochastic dominance of arbitrary order in the general k prospect case we allow for the observations to be serially dependent and for the first time we can accommodate general dependence amongst the prospects which are to be ranked also the prospects may be the residuals from certain conditional models opening the way for conditional ranking we also propose a test of prospect stochastic dominance our method is based on subsampling and we show that the resulting tests are consistent and powerful against some n 1 2 local alternatives we also propose some heuristic methods for selecting subsample size and demonstrate in simulations that they perform reasonably we describe an alternative method for obtaining critical values based on recentring the test statistic and using full sample bootstrap methods we compare the two methods in theory and in practice

consumption externalities and diffusion in pharmaceutical markets antiulcer drugs we examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs externalities emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value and or conveys information about efficacy and safety to patients and physicians this can affect the rate of market diffusion for a new entrant and can lead to dominance of one drug despite the availability of close substitutes we use data for h2 antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects the model has three components an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug as well as conventional attributes affect brand valuation equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality adjusted prices and marketing levels and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process we find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion and that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level

enfranchising your own experimental evidence on bureaucrat diversity and election bias in india this paper investigates the effects of polling station administrator diversity on elections in india using a natural experiment the random assignment of government officials to teams managing stations on election day together with surveys conducted with voters and election officers i demonstrate that changes in the religious and caste composition of officer teams impact voting at the polling station level causing shifts in coalition vote shares large enough to influence election outcomes effects are strongest when officers have greater discretion over the voting process i also provide evidence suggesting own group favoritism by election personnel as one relevant mechanism

the value of transparency in multidivisional firms we study internal incentives transparency and firm performance in multidivisional organizations two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives and decide whether to publicly disclose their performances in each division a risk neutral principal deals with a risk averse exclusive agent under moral hazard each agent exerts an unverifiable effort that creates a spillover on the effort cost of the other agent we first study the determinants of the optimal principal agent contract with and without performance transparency then we show how effort spillovers affect the equilibrium communication behavior of each division both principals commit to disclose the performance of their agents in equilibrium when efforts are complements while no communication is the only equilibrium outcome when efforts are substitutes

optimal disclosure policy in oligopoly markets this paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two period oligopoly model an incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period and then competes against an entrant in the second period two main results are derived first it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre committing to disclose both the demand and cost information by disclosing full information the incumbent nullifies its self defeating intertemporal incentives which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand its cost efficiency or both in addition the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure which benefits the incumbent ex ante second the paper shows that the incumbent s full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint in particular the correlation between the firms production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency

political contribution caps and lobby formation theory and evidence abstract the perceived importance of special interest group money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions we present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician it thus increases the payoff from lobbying which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending we present empirical evidence from u s states that support various predictions of the model we find a positive effect on the number of pacs formed from enacting laws constraining pac contributions moreover the estimated effect is non linear as predicted by the theoretical model very stringent caps reduce the number of pacs but as the cap increases above a threshold level the effect becomes positive contribution caps in the majority of u s states are above this threshold

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

a comparison of optimal tariffs and welfare under no lobbying domestic lobbying and domestic foreign lobbying whether and what type of the lobbying induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare we show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying the domestic foreign lobbying may achieve the lowest tariff and may also realise the highest welfare for the domestic country our finding provides a theoretical explanation to the prevalent lobbying competition between asian firms and us firms in usa recently we argue that the domestic foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in the domestic country and lobbying competition may be one of the strongest forces pushing for trade liberalisation

the economic consequences of social network structure we survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks we develop a taxonomy of macro and micro characteristics of social interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning diffusion decisions and resulting behaviors we also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors

scaling in economics a reader s guide this paper discusses examples of scaling laws in economics and finance it argues that these regularities in data are useful for disciplining theory formation estimation of the conditional predictive distribution and estimation of impulse response functions is a main goal of econometric work scaling type regularities give useful information on the underlying data generating process the ability of scaling laws to suggest lines of potentially fruitful research was illustrated by the suggestion of several speculative research projects in this paper most importantly the paper stresses the challenges that face empirical and theoretical researchers who wish to make use of scaling law type regularities to improve econometric identification of the underlying causal data generating mechanism copyright 1999 by oxford university press

incentives and the structure of teams abstract this paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams we show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology second we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard we find that i even when the production technology is strongly complementary the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams ii as the degree of complementarity increases the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative solely due to the need to provide incentives

political reform and trade policy abstract the welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import competing industries in return for tariff protection ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare worsening particularly if the contributor elasticity is high because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also worsen welfare because candidates respond by increasing contributions and tariff protection for each active contributor the results suggest that the ability of candidates to circumvent partial restrictions may eliminate any potential benefits

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

filtered social learning knowledge sharing is economically important but also typically incomplete we filter our communication this paper analyzes the consequences of filtering in the model homogeneous agents share knowledge with their peers whenever the private benefits exceed communication costs the welfare implications of this transmission mechanism hinge on whether units of knowledge complement substitute for or are independent of each other both substitutability and complementarity generate externalities cheaper communication eliminates externalities in the former case but not necessarily in the latter complementary basic skills such as numeracy catalyze technology adoption and adoption may be path dependent even when payoffs are certain and independent across agents

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

language and the theory of the firm we characterize efficient technical languages and study their interaction with the scope and structure of organizations efficient languages use precise words for frequent events and vague words for unusual ones a broader organizational scope allows for more synergies to be captured but reduces within unit efficiency since it requires a more generic language a manager working as specialized translator may also be used to achieve between unit coordination while maintaining separate languages our theory reconciles two recent well documented phenomena within organizations the recent increase in information centralization and the reduction in hierarchical centralization

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

an experimental investigation of the impact of information on competitive decision making managers often employ market response models as decision aids and historical information of competitors market outcomes to aid their competitive decisions in oligopolistic settings however little is known about how access to a decision aid or the availability of competitors market outcomes impact a firm s competitive decisions e g prices or market outcomes resulting from those decisions e g profits or how managers make these decisions across such informational conditions hence the objective of this paper is twofold first we investigate whether access to a decision aid and historical information of competitors outcomes yields more or less competitive decisions and outcomes second we determine which learning constructs such as choice reinforcement and beliefs about projected profits best explain competitive actions across various information conditions we find that relative to the availability of competitive information access to a decision aid has a larger effect on lowering prices and profits we also find that in two firm markets price competition is even more intense than in five firm markets similarly the availability of market share information leads to more aggressive pricing even when profits are held constant finally we outline the implications of our findings in making managerial resource allocations to market research endeavors

a model of addiction and social interactions many consumer behaviors are both addictive and social understanding how these two phenomena interact informs basic models of human behavior and matters for policymakers when the behavior is regulated i develop a new model of demand that incorporates both addiction and social interactions and show that under certain conditions social interactions reinforce the effects of addiction i also show how the dynamics introduced by addiction can solve the pernicious problem of identifying the causal effects of social interactions i then use the model to illustrate a new and important identification problem for studies of social interactions existing estimates cannot be used to draw welfare conclusions or even to deduce whether social interactions increase aggregate demand finally i develop a method that allows researchers to distinguish between two common forms of social interactions and draw welfare conclusions jel d11 h20

competitive pricing in markets with different overhead costs concealment or leakage of cost information this paper experimentally investigates how leaders and followers in a duopoly set prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs in a fully crossed two by two design we manipulate the participants private cost report quality as either low or high representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets have different overhead costs we show that when only the leader is given a high quality cost report private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into market prices that are observable to participants both the leader and follower improve in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the follower infers information from the leader s prices information leakage in contrast when only the follower receives a high quality cost report the leader s profits and prices do not improve this occurs because the follower conceals cost information when the leader has a low quality cost report

frictionless technology diffusion the case of tractors many new technologies display long adoption lags and this is often interpreted as evidence of frictions inconsistent with the standard neoclassical model we study the diffusion of the tractor in american agriculture between 1910 and 1960 a well known case of slow diffusion and show that the speed of adoption was consistent with the predictions of a simple neoclassical growth model the reason for the slow rate of diffusion was that tractor quality kept improving over this period and more importantly that only when wages increased did it become relatively unprofitable to operate the alternative laborintensive horse technology jel l62 n51 n52 n71 n72 o33 q11 understanding the determinants of the rate at which new technologies are created and adopted is a critical element in the analysis of growth even though modeling equilibrium technology creation can be somewhat challenging for standard economic theory understanding technology adoption should not be specifically once the technology is available the adoption decision is equivalent to picking a point on the appropriate isoquant dynamic considerations make this calculation more complicated but they still leave it in the realm of the neoclassical model a simple minded application of the theory of the firm suggests that profitable innovations should be adopted instantaneously or with some delay depending on various forms of cost of adjustment the evidence on the adoption of new technologies seems to contradict this prediction jovanovic and lach 1997 report that for a group of 21 innovations it takes 15 years for its diffusion to go from 10 percent to 90 percent the 10 90 lag they also cite the results of a study by grubler 1991 covering 265 innovations who finds that for most diffusion processes the 10 90 lag is between 15 and 30 years 1

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

pay to play politics informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access abstract we develop a game theoretic model of informational lobbying between two interest groups and a politician in which the politician can require political contributions in exchange for access the analysis considers three claims 1 the rich have better access to politicians than less wealthy groups 2 this access advantage makes the rich better off and skews policy in their favor and 3 contribution limits can reduce the rich group advantage and result in less skewed policy we show that the rich do have better access with the politician always offering access to the rich groups and only sometimes offering access to the less wealthy group this does not however mean that the rich group is better off or that policy is biased in its favor the politician sets access fees to extract the greatest amount of rent from the political process when only the rich group has access its expected benefit from gaining access is fully offset by its payment to the politician in this case the less wealthy interest group who is not targeted by the politician is better off contribution limits decrease the politician s ability to extract rent which improves the payoffs of rich interests and decreases politician payoffs finally the paper presents a novel benefit of contribution limits they can encourage the formation of lobby groups or the search for evidence which results in more evidence disclosure and better policy

adoption curves and social interactions this paper considers the observational implications of social influences on adoption decisions for an environment of perfect foresight adopters we argue that social influences can produce two observable effects 1 discontinuities in unconditional adoption curves and 2 pattern reversals in conditional adoption curves in which earlier adoption is found for one group of actors versus another when fundamentals suggest the reverse ordering should occur in turn the presence of either of these features can under weak assumptions be interpreted as evidence of social influences as such these properties are robust implications of social effects jel c40 d01 o33

are there spatial spillovers in the adoption of clean technology the case of organic dairy farming this paper examines spatial spillovers associated with the adoption of organic dairy farming we hypothesize that neighboring farmers can help to reduce the uncertainty of organic conversion by lowering the fixed costs of learning about the organic system a spatially explicit 10 year panel dataset of more than 1 900 dairy farms in southwestern wisconsin is used as input into a reduced form econometric model of the decision to convert to organic production using an identification strategy that exploits the panel aspect of the micro dataset we find evidence that the presence of neighboring organic dairy farms affects the conversion decision

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

models of technology diffusion abstract the literature on new technology diffusion is vast and it spills over many conventional disciplinary boundaries this paper surveys the literature by focusing on alternative explanations of the dominant stylized fact that the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an s curve the most commonly found model which is used to account for this model is the so called epidemic model which builds on the premise that what limits the speed of usage is the lack of information available about the new technology how to use it and what it does the leading alternate model is often called the probit model which follows from the premise that different firms with different goals and abilities are likely to want to adopt the new technology at different times in this model diffusion occurs as firms of different types gradually adopt it there are actually many ways to generate an s curve and the third class of models which we examine are models of density dependence popularized by population ecologists in these models the twin forces of legitimation and competition help to establish new technologies and then ultimately limit their take up finally we look at models in which the initial choice between different variants of the new technology affect the subsequent diffusion speed of the chosen technology such models often rely on information cascades which drive herd like adoption behaviour when a particular variant is finally selected

should a team be homogeneous abstract should an organization hire people with similar backgrounds or with different backgrounds we formulate this question within the framework of team theory the team is formed by n agents the type of each agent is endogenous and determines his information structure and his cost for the team we show that the sign of complementarity between jobs determines workforce homogeneity with positive complementarities the team should be composed of agents of the same type while with negative complementarities workforce heterogeneity is optimal these results do not rely on the restrictions on the way uncertainty is modeled or on the feasible set of agent types they can be explained in terms of correlation between errors committed by different agents

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

hierarchical sorting and learning costs theory and evidence from the law abstract garicano and rossi hansberg garicano l rossi hansberg e 2005 organization and inequality in a knowledge economy nber working paper 11458 show that knowledge based hierarchies are characterized by positive sorting between workers and managers when knowledge acquisition takes place before production we extend the analysis and find that complementarities between manager and worker skill are even stronger when knowledge is acquired on the job we then examine empirically the existence of sorting in law firms along the dimensions of cognitive ability and experience we find strong evidence of positive sorting by cognitive ability as proxied by the quality of the law school attended but little evidence of sorting by experience suggesting little substitutability between cognitive ability and experience

the impact of information sharing opportunities on market outcomes an experimental study information regarding uncertain demand conditions or industry costs as well as the opportunity to share this information can have an important impact on firm behavior a series of recent game theoretic models have characterized the incentives for firms to share information regarding uncertain parameters 3 7 8 13 14 16 22 26 20 21 provide a comprehensive survey most of the models assume that behavior in the output market is noncooperative regardless of the firms information sharing decisions this paper reports a series of 15 laboratory sessions that test the noncooperative backward induction approach of these models the results suggest that pricing behavior may be influenced by the information sharing decision under most conditions the noncooperative nash model accurately describes average behavior although in certain conditions information sharing appears to facilitate tacit collusion the paper also estimates a simple behavioral model of learning that describes how experimental subjects learn the optimal information sharing decision as an alternative to the theories backward induction assumption the information sharing models tested here have been interpreted as identifying the incentives for competitive firms to form a trade association that reduces their uncertainty thousands of trade and professional associations are active worldwide and the majority collect information from their members that is aggregated and distributed through association statistical programs the theoretical models demonstrate how three variables influence the information sharing incentives 1 the type of competition bertrand or cournot 2 the nature of the goods substitutes or complements and 3 the source of uncertainty demand or cost the first two variables determine the slope of the firms reaction functions and the uncertainty source along with the information sharing decision determines the degree of correlation among the firms strategies the incentive for noncooperative firms to share information shifts as these three variables change because reduced correlation has a negative or positive effect on profit depending upon the slope of the reaction functions

a stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry abstract we consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader follower type move each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm we show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally we then devise a simple to implement information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off we also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

incentives compensation and social welfare first version received january 1985 final version accepted august 1986 eds alternative wage structures under conditions of moral hazard are analysed from a social welfare standpoint it is argued that ex post equity judgements in an uncertainty context should incorporate a preference for positive correlation of utilities of different individuals in the design of compensation schemes this may give rise to a conflict between ex post equity objectives and the need to provide effort incentives relative performance clauses in compensation schemes that are useful for providing incentives are undesirable from an ex post equity standpoint this is demonstrated by showing a in a context of independent production uncertainties every rankorder tournament is welfare dominated by a set of independent randomized contracts and b welfare optimal compensation schemes in general depend separately on an equity and an incentive component that tend to correlate agent compensations in different directions a central question in welfare economics concerns the design of a system of rewards for productive effort that balances distributive considerations with the provision of effort incentives this issue has usually been studied in the context of a model due to mirrlees 1971 in which the conflict between distribution and incentives arises because the social planner lacks perfect information about the abilities of individuals in this paper we analyse a model in which individual abilities are publicly known a conflict between distribution and incentives arises instead from the existence of uncertainty in production processes and a moral hazard problem stemming from the unobservability of workers effort most analyses of moral hazard have concentrated on the tradeoff between insurance of agents against wage fluctuations and provision of effort incentives the context is generally taken to be a capitalist firm where the self interested planner has a residual claim on workers output in other settings such as public sector or labour managed firms the planner may have preferences over the distribution of ex post welfare among the workers this paper analyses how with such preferences effort incentives under moral hazard are constrained both by insurance and by distributive considerations in section 2 we suggest that a concern for ex post equality of individual welfares can be expressed by a preference for positive correlation among welfare levels we then consider what properties of the ex post welfare function incorporate this preference for correlation welfare functions that are additively separable across individuals are inappropriate no matter how concave with them expected value depends only on the

social learning and technology adoption the case of coffee pruning in peru a unique natural experiment involving a coffee pruning technology is used to study social learning the yield effects of pruning take two years to appear a characteristic that aids in identifying social learning apart from correlated unobservable variables that are a concern in the social learning and technology adoption literature panel data are employed that start with a private initiative which introduced systematic pruning in central peru and that contain the population of participating growers results show a jump of at least 0 15 in the probability of adoption two years after the first pruning in a grower s group jel classifications d83 q12

should we tax or cap political contributions a lobbying model with policy favors and access abstract this paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors or sell access access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy here selling access maximizes policy utility while selling policy favors maximizes total contributions imposing a binding contribution limit makes it more likely that the politician sells access which can improve expected constituent welfare however a contribution limit distorts the signals associated with the contributions which tends to result in worse policy alternatively a tax on political contributions can ensure that the politician sells access without distorting his information therefore from the viewpoint of a representative constituent a tax on contributions is strictly preferred to a contribution limit or no reform the politician however may prefer regulation in the form of a contribution limit even when a tax is better for the constituent

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

manufacturer s revenue sharing contract and retail competition this paper investigates a revenue sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers the manufacturer as a stackelberg leader offers a revenue sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season under the offered contract terms the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season the process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the bayesian nash game on the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers the manufacturer designs the revenue sharing contract adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods the study finds that the provision of revenue sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price only contract however the benefits earned under the revenue sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price sensitivity factors the paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers lastly it investigates how the competition between retailers factor influences the decision making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability