adaptive versus rational expectations and the fisher effect substantial controversy remains over the causes of interest rate fluctuations this controversy frequently focuses on the role of expected inflation the theoretical determinats of the nominal rate are examined usig the is lm as model and it is shown that the augmented fisher equation is sensitive to the expectations generating mechanism the model assumes that the nominal rate ceteris paribuschanges one for one with expected inflation the total impact however may take any value from zero to one the empirical analysis sequentially estimates reduced form equations based on adaptive and rational expectations the results confirm prior findings that nominal rates do not adjust one for one with inflation the results also yield some insight on the applicability of the assumption of rational versus adaptive expectations

discussion of the effects of accounting diversity evidence from the european union this paper evaluates the effects of accounting diversity on financial ratios and the stock market valuation of accounting data reported by companies in france germany and the united kingdom and investigates the effectiveness of european union eu efforts to reduce accounting diversity the study contributes to research on the effects of measurement differences by using a capital markets approach and by introducing several capital markets based measures of diversity in accounting measurement practice the original focus of this paper was accounting harmonization the term harmonization is used loosely in the accounting literature and most commonly refers to narrowing the choice among alternative measurement methods a second use of harmonization concerns the amount and detail of information disclosed in the financial report van der tas 1992 finally harmonization may mean comparability and transparency of information consistent with the eu accounting directives emphasis on the true and fair view concept walton 1993 harmonization operates at different levels concepts principles regulations and practice tay and parker 1990 harmonization achieved at one level such as regulations does not necessarily imply harmonization at a different level such as accounting practice the eu accounting directives narrow the choice of accounting measurement principles require a specified set of annual report disclosures and emphasize the true and fair view tfv which appears to aim for comparability and transparency thus testing for the effects of

on success and dissolution of the labor managed firm in the capitalist economy labor managed firms lmfs in the developed capitalist economy exhibit an interesting life cycle pattern often they come into existence as a way of reorganizing insolvent entrepreneurial profit maximizing firms yet successful lmfs tend to be assimilated to the entrepreneurial modus operandi in the long run i propose a simple theoretical model that explains this lmf phenomenon as the outcome of the lmf s interaction with outside markets especially competitive spot labor markets the interpretations and limitations of the model are also discussed as the basic framework is extended to deal with imperfections in capital markets and with contractual labor markets

productivity and distribution effects of codetermination in an efficient bargaining model codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is derived that is suited to empirical testing the empirical test is based on german data and includes years before and after the extension of german codetermination law in 1976 the estimates determine the productivity of labor and relative bargaining power of capital and labor it turns out that codetermination does not affect productivity but leads to a significant increase in workers bargaining power and the distribution of rents

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

monetary policy regimes and the reduced form for interest rates this study investigates whether the recent poor performance and inst ability of reduced form interest rate equations can be accounted for by changes in monetary policy regimes the results imply that reduced form coefficients move by statistically significant and economically meaningful amounts in response to such policy parameter shifts both in sample and out of sample predictions from the models that allow f or the endogeneity of the money stock outperform those produced by the conventional specification copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

the short run demand for money a reconsideration the partial adjustment approach to the specification of the short run demand for money has dominated the literature for more than a decade there are three basic problems with this approach first the same lag structure is imposed on all variables and each independent variable enters only as a current value in contrast a rational individual would respond to different variables income interest rates prices with quite different lags second when the general price levelis subject to gradual adjustment hut can move quickly in response to supply shocks the influence of these supply shocks should enter with a negative sign third the estimated equation for real balances may not be a money demand equation at all but rather its coefficients may represent a shifting mixture of demand and supply responses the empirical work examines several alternative dynamic specifications including a generalized partial adjustment framework and the error correction model both of the latter specifications exhibit greater structural stability after 1973 than the standard partial adjustment specification and the generalized partial adjustment model also yields relatively small errors in post sample dynamic simulations shifts in coefficients as the sample period is extended after 1973 are consistent with the interpretation that the real balance equation no longer traces out structural demand parameters hut rather a mixture of demand and supply responses this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

labor participation in corporate policy making decisions west germany s experience with codetermination if workers are wealth maximizers codetermination should lead to less risky investments smaller dividends reduced firm leverage higher and more stable salaries and more capital intensive production processes unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm shareholder wealth and firm value will decline an analysis of west germany s case however indicates that codetermination has little if any effect on corporate operations and performance

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

monitoring physicians a bargaining model of medical group practice this paper challenges the proposition that large physician owned groups will be inefficient because of failures to control opportunism a bargaining model implies that even large partnerships will make efficient resource and monitoring decisions in addition opportunism has much the same payoff for employees and partners the data show that most large medical practice organizations are physician owned empirical analyses of nine forms of monitoring by large groups generally show no clear link between monitoring and ownership there is one exception physician owned firms tend to base compensation on productivity which may help explain the continued dominance of professional partnerships

cheap talk and investment rivalry in the pulp and paper industry determinants of the abandonment of previously announced capacity expansions are analyzed in eleven industries within the north american pulp and paper sector given the investor s initial confidence extent of precommitment of resources and post announcement fresh news abandonment s likelihood increases with unanticipated projects subsequently announced by rivals the process suggests a continual auction with the winning projects and firms having certain systematic properties unexpected announcements by rivals promote abandonment only in less concentrated industries elsewhere completion is actually encouraged short run price competition is found highly sensitive to capacity utilization and the market s geographic scope is tested

on the economic rationale for codetermination law abstract this paper develops a positive efficiency economic case for codetermination law resting on the correction of labor and capital market and organizational failures a legally mandated codetermination structure is shown to provide employee checks on several structural incentives for management opportunism codetermination is shown to offer advantages for technical efficiency skill development and knowledge generation through its protection of specific human capital investments financial markets cannot enforce codetermination due to a set of free rider problems

do meetings in smoke filled rooms facilitate collusion the sherman act prohibits firms from discussing prices in meetings traditional thought suggests that this prohibition makes it harder for firms to collude and economists have concluded that the sherman act operates in the public interest i provide an alternative explanation for the act that also accounts for the small sanctions chosen by the legislature when firms interact in a dynamic environment in which the law helps them to prevent renegotiation the firms may benefit from the law that makes it costly but not very costly to meet to discuss prices the sherman act may help firms to collude

entry and managerial incentives abstract this paper presents a two period full information model of entry where owners of incumbent and entrant firms endogenously select the incentive schemes for their managers it is shown that when output decisions are delegated to managers the incumbent s owner chooses to base incentive schemes only partly on profit but if output decisions are reached via nash bargaining between managers the incumbent s owner will base the reward on profit alone the entrant never bases the incentive scheme solely on profit if there is a sufficiently high fixed cost of entry then the incumbent can deter entry by providing management with appropriate incentive schemes

wage pressure bargaining and price cost margins in uk manufacturing to the extent that union employer bargaining is efficient price cost margins in oligopolistic industries are predicted to depend on wage rents and on the elasticity of substitution between wages and employment in union preferences unanticipated wage inflation will also affect margins cross section and time series analysis of price cost margins in u k manufacturing industries finds that margins tend to be eroded by the level of wage rents and are invariant to the rate of wage inflation copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

does privatization improve job satisfaction the case of ghana this paper analyzes the impacts of privatization in ghana on the basis of a survey of 300 workers in privatized and state owned enterprises the findings indicate a significant positive relationship between privatization and job satisfaction whereas monthly wage is an important determinant of job satisfaction in state owned enterprises education and the availability of training opportunities are strong determinants in privatized enterprises the study also shows that there exists a variety of instruments to implement a privatization program smoothly

on central bank independence and the stability of policy targets it is argued that impediments to the establishment of an independent central bank arise in the presence of unstable policy targets changing policy targets may occur with an officemotivated policymaker this differs from politico economic models where targets change depending on the partisanship of the politicians in office in the model the principal faces a tradeoff between the credibility benefits of an independent central bank and the flexibility to pursue shifts in his policy targets allowed by a regime of policy discretion an empirical section addresses the issue of the correlation between central bank independence and the stability of policy targets

economic effects of codetermination the success of west german scandinavian and japanese economies particularly when compared with lagging productivity and competitiveness of the u s and the u k have focused attention on comparative institutions in labour markets and corporate control declining unions and increasing reliance on competitive market pressures in the angloamerican countries contrast with more state intervention and regulation of the european social market economies as noted by henzler 1992

employee participation in management bargaining power and wages the paper analyzes the impact of employee participation in management on bargaining power and wages it presents an empirical model which allows for variable bargaining powers of the parties who jointly control the firm and it tests this model with postwar west german data the results suggest that parity codetermination has had a positive effect on earnings in iron and steel but not in coal mining moreover it appears that the positive effect in iron and steel could be due to increased profitability rather than an increase in the bargaining power of labor as defined in this study

the persuasive power of a committee chairman arthur burns and the fomc this paper investigates persuasion as a means of influence for the federal reserve chairman in meetings of the federal open market committee fomc using textual records of fomc meetings federal funds rate targets have been recorded for committee members who served in the arthur burns era 1970 1978 results show that burns member differences in stated funds rate targets were lower when burns made recommendations early in the meeting consistent with the hypothesis that the chairman is persuasive additional results show that members tendencies to respond to burns s recommendations were related to their personal and political loyalties

worker participation and productivity in labor managed and participatory capitalist firms a meta analysis using meta analytic techniques the author synthesizes the results of 43 published studies to investigate the effects on productivity of various forms of worker participation worker participation in decision making mandated codetermination profit sharing worker ownership employee stock ownership or individual worker ownership of the firm s assets and collective ownership of assets workers collective ownership of reserves over which they have no individual claim he finds that codetermination laws are negatively associated with productivity but profit sharing worker ownership and worker participation in decision making are all positively associated with productivity all the observed correlations are stronger among labor managed firms firms owned and controlled by workers than among participatory capitalist firms firms adopting one or more participation schemes involving employees such as esops or quality circles

quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing if firms in a homogeneous duopoly game can respond with negligible delay to their rival s price changes equilibrium is unique at the monopoly price

money interest rates and risk abstract this paper analyzes the role of the risk in the form of the volatility of open market interest rates as a factor in the demand for money we demonstrate using an inventory theoretic model of money demand that increases in interest rate volatility will increase the demand for money we then present empirical evidence that the demand for money has been influenced by alterations in the volatility of open market rates using standard specifications of the demand for money

the nobel memorial prize for robert f engle work is a fine example of best practice applied time series econometrics he identifies important dynamic economic phenomena formulates precise and interesting questions about those phenomena constructs sophisticated yet simple econometric models for measurement and testing and consistently obtains results of widespread substantive interest in the scientific policy and financial communities although many of engle s contributions are fundamental i will focus largely on the two most important the theory and application of cointegration and the theory and application of dynamic volatility models moreover i will discuss much more extensively engle s volatility models and their role in financial econometrics for several reasons first engle s nobel citation was explicitly for methods of analyzing economic time series with time varying volatility arch whereas granger s was for for methods of analyzing economic time series with common trends cointegration second the credit for

employment determination in enterprises under communism and in transition evidence from central europe the authors present a comparative analysis of employment determination in four transition economies as they moved from central planning to a market economy in the early 1990s they use firm level panel data sets from the czech republic hungary poland and slovakia to estimate dynamic employment equations for the period from immediately before to immediately after the start of transition for the most part firms appear to have been quick to adjust employment to wage levels and there is little evidence of labor hoarding there were important cross country variations in the determinants of employment during the reform process however hungarian and polish firms started the transition already substantially reformed and became even more responsive to market signals as transition proceeded in contrast firms in the czech and slovak republics started in the completely unresponsive mode characteristic of central planning but rapidly caught up with their counterparts in hungary and poland

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

unemployment collective bargaining and the demand for protection there is a widespread consensus among nonacademic observers that labor unions with large numbers of unemployed members have been central actors in political coalitions demanding protectionist trade policies since the mid 1970s in advanced industrial societies yet trade unions and unemployment are hardly mentioned in most theories of the politics of international trade the purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the importance of unemployment as a determinant of protectionist demands that is consistent with optimizing behavior on the part of union members and firms models of labor negotiations derived from cooperative bargaining theory are used to illustrate why the material benefits of protection received by union members and their employers in protected industries increase when union members are unemployed even when workers are risk neutral and capital is immobile

the postwar stability of the fisher effect most research concerning the fisher relationship has concentrated on the magnitude and significance of the response of nominal interest rates to anticipated inflation recently attention has shifted to the stability of that response according to previous estimates the impact of anticipated inflation on interest rates varies substantially over time by extending a standard model to include tax and aggregate supply shock effects we are able to reduce such instability considerably our results also reveal that increased foreign demand for bonds lowers the interest rate

behavior of participatory firms in yugoslavia lessons for transforming economies this paper develops a multiparty model of enterprise behavior with the management workers and government authorities being the decisionmakers the model captures the behavior of yugoslav enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s enterprises in transitional economies and public sector bargaining in western countries estimating the model on yugoslav firm level data from the 1970s and 1980s indicates that the perverse behavior predicted by the ward domar vanek model of labor managed firms is not supported by the data as firms place emphasis on both wages and employment a direct test shows that the employment response to output price changes is insignificant coauthors are jan svejnar dubravko mihaljek and vesna prasnikar copyright 1994 by mit press

when are cartels stable contracts why do some industry cartels survive for decades while others are quickly undermined by price wars and entry variation in cartels longevity can be explained by differences in their costs of self enforcement and service value to members analyzing legal cartel contracts formed under the webb pomerene export trade act i find that longer lived cartels tended to export to small buyers to have wide industry coverage to operate in periods of stable prices and growing demand and to sell under side agreements with foreign competitors contracts in which the cartel centralized its control through a common sales agency tended to be more stable however cartels usually grew less stable with age and when there was a recent and long history of cartelization in the industry finally cartels whose primary rationale was to fix price tended to be particularly unstable because these contracts invited fringe competition and entry

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

strategic investment and the co existence of labour managed and profit maximising firms the authors examine firm profitability in mixed duopoly equilibrium with one labor managed lm firm and one profit maximizing pm firm and with strategic investment conventional wisdom suggests that firms deviating from profit maximization will suffer forced exit in the long run the authors reverse this conclusion in mixed lm pm duopoly with strategic investment no equilibrium can have both firms making zero profits and pm profitability implies lm profitability but not the converse adverse parameter shifts would cause the pm firm to exit first empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction of robust market survivability of lm firms

market imperfections labor management and earnings differentials in a developing country theory and evidence from yugoslavia in this paper we evaluate empirically the relative importance of two explanations of yugoslav interindustry income differentials one explanation proposed initially by vanek and jovicic 1975 stresses capital market imperfections which permit capital rents to be appropriated as workers incomes the second explanation points to labor allocation problems under self management we first present a critique of the vanek jovicic original formulation and then respecify the problem to permit simultaneous evaluation of the two schools of thought results based on two data sets suggest that labor allocation factors and monopoly power rather than capital rents are the main source of yugoslav earnings dispersion

internal bargaining labor contracts and a marshallian theory of the firm the theme of this paper is due to alfred marshall who states that nearly the whole income of a business may be regarded as a composite quasi rent divisible among different persons in the business by bargaining supplemented by custom and by notion of fairness and the division of quasi rents entails de facto some sort of profit loss sharing between almost every business and its employees principles of economics 8th ed book vi ch viii sec 10 pp 520 21 marshall emphasizes that a significant portion of composite quasi rent is derived from the organization of business and would be lost if employer employee connections were dissolved in this view bargaining can even be tacit insofar as there is an organizational basis which ensures agreement among the concerned parties consequently internal bargaining models of the firm may be applicable to the analysis of european style codetermination and japanese style labor management also as the relative bargaining strength between labor and management changes such a view of the firm admits as its extrema the organization of a labor managed firm lmf and the textbook case of a profit maximizing firm pmf masahiko aoki 1980 1982 and jan svejnar 1982 have recently explored models of an internal bargaining firm their analyses however consider the firm s long run behavior only under restricted circumstances without market uncertainty the relevance of the internal bargaining approach to profit sharing and labor management would be enhanced if we integrated the firm s short run wage employment policies with its long run plans for the rate of growth and capital labor substitutions this i do by underscoring the firm s organizational basis which is essentially a long term contractual association between workers and management i combine costas azariadis 1975 and martin baily s 1974 apparatus of labor contracting with efficient bargaining to investigate the effect of varying degrees of labor s bargaining power upon the firm s shortand long run policies under uncertainty these results are then contrasted with the empirical findings of collective bargaining for example richard freeman and james medoff 1981 conventional results of lmf models jaroslav vanek 1970 benjamin ward 1958 and the recent macroeconomic approaches to wage employment adjustments ian mcdonald and robert solow 1981

models of modern sector labor market institutions in developing countries abstract the paper argues that policy conclusions derived from existing theories of economic development may be seriously flawed because the theories do not model correctly the modern sector labor market the paper first presents evidence that trade unions and governments frequently exert positive influence not only on firms wages but also on their employment levels it then presents models that capture this phenomenon and permit one to determine whether the observed levels of employment are insufficient optimal or excessive from the private and social standpoints the paper concludes with a discussion of how the analysis could be implemented in empirical studies and in practical policy work

monetary policy and interest rates abstract in the eighties u s interest rates have been characterized by high volatility often related to the fed changes in operating procedure a semiparametric estimator for heteroskedasticity and the diagnostic provided by the bounded influence estimator are applied to a short term interest rate equation attempts to model changes in operating procedure by means of exogenous dummy variables are not satisfactory heteroskedasticity is detected and corrected by gls and the chosen semiparametric estimator the estimates are compared by means of bounded influence regressions which reveal that the semiparametric estimates improve upon gls since the latter does not fully correct for heteroskedasticity

rational expectations econometric analysis of changes in regime an investigation of the term structure of interest rates abstract this paper is of interest both for its methodological contribution of new tools for analyzing rational expectations models and for its substantive conclusions concerning the term structure of interest rates during the monetary experiment of october 1979 the paper studies systems subject to changes in regime interpreted here as occasional discrete shifts in the parameters governing the time series behavior of exogenous economic variables the specification is shown to be quite tractable both theoretically and empirically the technique is used to analyze yields on three month treasury bills and ten year treasury bonds during 1962 to 1987 a constant parameter linear model for short term rates is shown to be inconsistent both with the univariate time series properties of short rates and with the observed bivariate relation between long and short rates under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure an alternative nonlinear model that admits the possibility of changes in regime affords a much better description of the univariate process for short rates moreover the cross equation restrictions implied by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure are consistent with the nonlinear specification indeed the residuals of the restricted relation have a standard error of only 0 8 basis points this is a third less than that of a completely unrestricted linear regression of long rates on short rates and compares with an unconditional standard deviation of long rates of 142 basis points i conclude that once the recognition by bond traders of changes in regime is taken into account the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates holds up fairly well for these data

a cartel s response to cheating an empirical investigation of the de beers diamond empire cartel theory suggests that serious punishment in the form of price competition is the predicted response to cheating by a cartel member but recent work on cartel operations suggests that some cartels might use a richer set of more measured responses to support their arrangements levenstein 1997 and genesove and mullin 2001 describe cartels that used limited retaliation as well as communication to maintain collusion however even these cartels reacted to massive public cheating with the retaliatory response predicted by traditional theory the record of the diamond cartel headed by de beers suggests that in some circumstances a cartel might be flexible in its response to cheating even when that cheating is massive in this paper we study a particular episode of such cheating by one of the diamond cartel s principal members namely russia our findings suggest that de beers did not respond with aggressive price com petition but rather used a policy that combined accommodation and negotiation key to this result were the importance to de beers of preventing diamond prices from falling and the firm s willingness and ability to absorb excess diamonds into inventory de beers as head of the diamond cartel influences the entire diamond trade from mining to retail the bulk of its direct involvement however aside from mining is in the purchase and sale of just mined diamonds or rough the central selling organization cso 1 buys the rough from

u s money demand instability a flexible least squares approach this paper uses a jle rrhle leust squares fls time varying linear regression technique to investiaate coefficient stabilitv for the goldfeld u s money demand model over the period 1959 62 to 19x5 q3 time paths traced out by the fls coefficient estimates exhibit shifts in 1974 and 1983 but these shifts are small relative to a persistent downward trend in the estimated coefficient for the inflation rate indicating potential model misspecitication the fls estimates also indicate that the unit root nonstationarity problem reported by ols money demand studies disappears if the coefficient estimates are allowed to exhibit even small amounts of time variation

vancouver s gasoline price wars an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies this paper uses a unique data set to determine which dynamic model of tacit collusion best describes behaviour in a particular industry the area investigated is a region of the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market players are service station managers who compete daily firms choose price in each period using strategies that depend on prices chosen in the previous period periodically unanticipated demand shocks precipitate price wars when shocks occur the firms in the market must determine the new demand conditions and adjust their strategies from an econometric point of view slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables the resulting system of equations with time varying parameters is estimated via the kalman filter different repeated game oligopoly models correspond to different transition matrices for the latent variables the models can thus be assessed in terms of their power to explain firm behaviour in this market

priorities and sequencing in privatization evidence from czech firm panel data abstract while privatization of state owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously this raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically in this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization to obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing we investigate the following competing government objectives i maximizing efficiency through resource allocation ii maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public iii minimizing political costs iv maximizing efficiency through information gains and v maximizing privatization revenues next we use firm level data from the czech republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first the sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias

asymmetric monetary effects on interest rates across monetary policy stances this paper provides new evidence that the interest rates response to a money supply shock varies across the state of the monetary policy stance the state is assigned to one of the tight neutral and loose regimes based on an estimated policy stance index the results of threshold vector autoregression analysis imply that pure liquidity and expected inflation effects vary across regimes with agents reactions to policy the results exhibit a persistent dominating liquidity effect under the neutral and loose regimes but a reversed liquidity effect after a short lag under the tight regime

price wars and the stability of collusion a study of the pre world war i bromine industry between 1885 and 1914 us bromine producers colluded to raise prices and pro ts this collusion was disrupted by price wars bromine price wars are compared with the green porter and abreu pearce stacchetti models some price wars resulted from the imperfect monitoring problems which motivate these models several empirical implications of the aps model are borne out but the bromine industry s price wars were generally milder than contemplated by aps more severe price wars were part of a bargaining process in which rms tried to force renegotiation to a new collusive equilibrium with a diierent distribution of rents

optimal membership employment and income distribution in unionized and labor managed firms this article presents a static and dynamic intertemporal analysis of employment and income distribution in unionized and labor managed firms motivated by theoretical considerations and institutional features of western trade unions and labor managed firms we examine firms in which worker members share the risk of layoffs by acting as if compensating laid off members in the static framework we show that although the firms do not behave perversely their behavior depends crucially on the initial membership since the issue of optimal initial membership has been virtually ignored in the literature we analyze it next within a dynamic framework

government borrowing and tax adjusted real and nominal interest rates the purpose of this paper is to test for the effect of federal government budget deficits on one year tax adjusted nominal and real interest rates in an is lm as model the results suggest that the specification of the dependent variable is a crucial issue in the debate over the linkage between deficits and interest rates the evidence shows a positive and significant effect of various measures of the federal government deficit and debt on the real tax adjusted treasury bill rate in both the levels and the first differenced equations but not on the nominal tax adjusted rate the positive and significant deficit debt coefficients are also confirmed when the first differenced equation is estimated by instrumental variables and when the equation is estimated over various time periods thus there is robust evidence of a positive linkage between federal government borrowing and the tax adjusted real but not nominal interest rates

information production decisions and intra firm bargaining a firm s factor suppliers often receive private signals which are useful in managerial decision making productive efficiency requires the pooling of such decentralized information however factor suppliers may threaten to withhold private signals in order to secure side payments from the potential beneficiaries of this information j harsanyi s theory of the n person cooperative game is applied to a model where both physical inputs and information can be withheld by factor owners for the special case of a binary decision problem the central limit theorem is used to approximate the harsanyi solution by a linear combination of are as under the standard normal curve copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on illyrian macroeconomics the ward vanek labor managed economy macro models are found to contain errors in capital pricing treatment which when correct ed removes perverse responses and leads to monetary neutrality vanek s 1977 open model is shown not to be a labor managed econ omy model but rather one of any economy with fixed output a rational e xpectations macro model is developed in which labor managed firms mus t decompose price movement into its nominal and real parts this unce rtainty about the information content of observed prices leads to out put effects similar in spirit to the ward vanek models implications for monetary policy are explored copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

relative wage effects of unions dictatorship and codetermination econometric evidence from germany t he present study estimates the effects of trade unions hitler s regime and codetermination on relative wages in germany i each of these establishments is considered to have had important implications for germany s labor market moreover a thorough understanding of their effects can be valuable for comparative purposes following a brief discussion of these phenomena and their hypothesized effects on wages the analytical model is developed in section ii the empirical results are reported in section iii and section iv contains the summary and conclusions the extensive literature on the relative wage effects of trade unions has focused almost exclusively on the union impact in north america2 and more recently in great britain 3 since the german institutions of industrial and labor relations differ considerably from their angloamerican counterparts4 and often have been studied as a successful possibly superior system which might be adopted by others it is worthwhile exploring the magnitude of the union wage effect in the german institutional setting in particular it has been argued that compared to their american and british counterparts the continental unions tend to place more emphasis on political and social rather than economic achievements 5 if this hypothesis is correct then ceteris paribus the estimated relative wage effect of german unions ought to be smaller than that found in the united states and great britain with the advent of hitler s regime in 1933 there was a dramatic transformation of the existing political and economic institutions trade unions which in 1932 represented over 40 of the industrial labor force were promptly abolished6 and replaced by a government operated labor front 7 strikes and lockouts were forbidden and wages were determined centrally 8 while the effects of these changes on the cultural political and social life have been well documented few economic studies attempted to analyze the effect of hitler s regime on wages and incomes moreover those that did used a qualitative or only a loose quantitative approach partially as a result of the lack of a systematic wage series prior to 1934 9 w krelle 1962 p 17 has shown for example that labor income received for publication july 30 1979 revision accepted for publication may 1 1980 cornell university i would like to thank orley ashenfelter albert rees and two anonymous referees for helpful comments i have also benefited from discussions with j s butler william greene louis phlips and katherine terrell any remaining errors are of course my own this research was in part supported by a grant to the princeton university economics department from the sloan foundation i the term codetermination refers to the german participatory system of management as it was originally established in the federal republic by the 1951 codetermination act and the 1952 works constitution act 2 the most important work and collection of references on the subject is still lewis 1963 among the later studies in the private sector are ashenfelter 1972 ashenfelter and johnson 1972 bloch and kuskin 1978 boskin 1972 de menil 1971 rosen 1969 and schmidt and strauss 1976 public sector studies are summarized by lewin 1977 x see especially pencavel 1974 mulvey 1976 and metcalf 1977 4 needless to say there are important differences between the u s and british systems of industrial and labor relations they exhibit considerable homogeneity however when compared to the systems in continental europe historically the relatively most salient features of the german system have been 1 trade union affiliation with political parties and or religioiis organizations 2 industrial unionism 3 governmental interference in industrial and labor relations and 4 paternalistic management world war ii led to the unification of the formerly splintered unions in the deutsches gewerkschafts bund dgb close collaboration with the social democratic party sdp and the establishment of codetermination for institutional references see almanasreh 1977 fiirstenberg 1969 1977 schregle 1978 and vollmer 1976 1979 5 see kassalow 1969 1980 and windmuller 1969 6 employers associations followed their lead in 1934 7 the labor front included all employees and employers it represented the nazi government in the factories and possessed broad powers over its member subjects 8 in fact the entire economy underwent considerable centralization as hitler proclaimed his first four year plan in 1933 and a second one in 1936 9 among the most thorough and informative of these conventional studies is that of bry 1960 for a discussion of the data see gerss 1977

wage bargaining imperfect competition and the markup optimizing microfoundations abstract combining the conjectural variations and nash bargaining approaches it is shown that the demand insensitive markup depends on the bargaining power of unions relative to owners of firms in addition to more standard product market characteristics

codetermination as a strategic advantage abstract a theoretical model of codetermination is considered where consistent with german institutions firm owners bargain with employees representatives about employment but not about wages a duopoly and a more general oligopolistic situation are analyzed for some range of bargaining power a prisoner s dilemma exists codetermination leads to increased profits if the other firm is a traditional profit maximizer bargaining is the dominant strategy although joint profits would be maximized with unrestricted profit maximization the theory is tested with data from 22 german firms who operate in the same markets over 23 years codetermined firms actually show a different behavior than other companies

the effects of inflation uncertainty and supply shocks on real interest rates abstract increased inflation uncertainty and negative supply shocks have been suggested separately as causes of the 1970s decline in real interest rates when both factors appear in empirical interest rate models supply forces exert a statistically significant impact on real rates while the effect of inflation uncertainty is insignificant

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association