learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

the credit crisis as a problem in the sociology of knowledge this article analyzes the role in the credit crisis of the processes by which market participants produce knowledge about financial instruments employing documentary sources and 87 predominantly oral history interviews the article presents a historical sociology of the clusters of evaluation practices surrounding abss asset backed securities most importantly mortgage backed securities and cdos collateralized debt obligations despite the close structural similarity between abss and cdos these practices came to differ substantially and became the province e g in the rating agencies of organizationally separate groups in consequence when abs cdos cdos in which the underlying assets are abss emerged they were evaluated in two separate stages this created a fatally attractive arbitrage opportunity large scale exploitation of which sidelined previously important gatekeepers risk sensitive investors in the lower tranches of mortgage backed securities and eventually magnified and concentrate

stock market volatility and investment do only fundamentals matter the empirical evidence in the volatility literature suggests that movements in stock prices cannot be satisfactorily explained purely in terms of changes in fundamentals this paper shows how to obtain proxies for the fundamental and fad components of changes in stock prices and asks the question do only fundamentals matter for investment decisions we find that changes in investment are significantly associated with movements in both components of stock prices the point estimates suggest that changes in fundamentals have a greater effect than changes in non fundamentals the statistical significance of the difference between their coefficients depends upon the financing regime these conclusions are shown to be robust to modifications and extensions of the model

contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

globalization and emerging markets with or without crash we analyze the effects of financial and trade globalization on the likelihood of financial crashes in emerging markets while trade globalization always makes crashes less likely financial globalization may make them more likely especially when trade costs are high pessimistic expectations can be self fulfilling and lead to a collapse in demand for goods and assets such a crash comes with a current account reversal and drops in income and investment lower income countries are more prone to such demand based financial crises a quantitative evaluation shows our model is consistent with the main stylized facts of financial crashes in emerging markets

intertemporal pricing and price discrimination a semiparametric hedonic analysis of the personal computer market we apply a smooth coefficient semiparametric model to a unique high frequency data set to examine the intertemporal pricing of personal computers furthermore we test whether firms charge differential component prices for their top performance personal computers and whether premium firms charge both a premium for all their computers and a premium for their top performance ones we find nonlinear effects in the pricing of personal computer components we also find that firms in general do not charge differential prices for the components of their top performance computers in addition high quality firms charge higher premia only for their most advanced products copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

global factors and emerging market spreads this paper shows that a large fraction of the variability of emerging market bond spreads is explained by the evolution of global factors such as risk appetite as reflected in the spread of high yield corporate bonds in developed markets global liquidity measured by the international interest rates and contagion from systemic events like the russian default this link has remained relatively stable over the history of the emerging market class is robust to the inclusion of country specific factors and helps provide accurate long run predictions overall the results highlight the critical role played by exogenous factors in the evolution of the borrowing cost faced by emerging economies

sovereign debt as a contingent claim a quantitative approach abstract we construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt in the model benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates for a wide set of parameters the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states additional output losses however sustain equilibria that resemble the data we show that due to the adverse selection problem some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation moreover although equilibria with no default imply greater welfare levels they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries

do new york dairy farmers maximize profits or minimize costs the weak axiom of profit maximization and weak axiom of cost minimization were used to determine whether each of forty nine new york dairy farms displayed behavior consistent with profit maximization or cost minimization these were tested for each farm across eleven years of data correcting for technological change using previously estimated nonparametric malmquist productivity indices the results indicate that some were moderately successful in maximizing profits but more came closer to minimizing costs over half of the observations were within 10 of minimum costs

retrospectives friedrich hayek and the market algorithm friedrich a hayek 1899 1992 is known for his vision of the market economy as an information processing system characterized by spontaneous order the emergence of coherence through the independent actions of large numbers of individuals each with limited and local knowledge coordinated by prices that arise from decentralized processes of competition hayek is also known for his advocacy of a broad range of free market policies and indeed considered the substantially unregulated market system to be superior to competing alternatives precisely because it made the best use of dispersed knowledge our purpose in writing this paper is twofold first we believe that hayek s economic vision and critique of equilibrium theory not only remain relevant but apply with greater force as information has become ever more central to economic activity and the complexity of the information aggregation process has become increasingly apparent second we wish to call into question hayek s belief that his advocacy of free market policies follows as a matter of logic from his economic vision the very usefulness of prices and other economic variables as informative messages which is the centerpiece of hayek s economics creates incentives to extract information from signals in ways that can be destabilizing markets can promote prosperity but can also generate crises we will argue accordingly that a hayekian understanding of the economy as an information processing system does not support the type of policy positions that he favored thus we find considerable lasting value in hayek s economic analysis while nonetheless questioning the connection of this analysis to his political philosophy

the taylor principle fights back part ii abstract the existing literature holds that the taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy in new keynesian models that allow for capital accumulation and limited asset market participation this conclusion is special however to the case of continuous full employment when the assumption of perfect wage flexibility is relaxed very slightly so that the labor market clears quickly but not instantaneously determinacy is the norm the threat of indeterminacy is limited to a tiny irrelevant corner of the parameter space where the elasticity of labor supply is unusually high and real wage adjustment is unbelievably fast everywhere else the taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium the dramatic difference in results reflects the sensitivity of the monetary transmission mechanism to the speed of adjustment in the labor market

generalized q models for investment the authors extend the q theory of investment to allow for adjustment costs for labor under the additional assumption that the firm is a monopolistic competitor in the output market the issue of nonconstant returns to scale is also discussed the authors show that the standard q model is a special case of a more general model involving testable parameter restrictions estimates for the u s manufacturing sector suggest that the departure from the assumption of perfect competition and lack of adjustment costs for labor receive empirical support in the data copyright 1991 by mit press

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

the competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely abstract this paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which i achieves pareto optimal allocations ii gives each consumer an allocation which is according to his preferences at least as good as his endowment iii satisfies certain regularity conditions and iv has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy i iii

the near optimality of adaptive expectations abstract rational expectations require more information than adaptive expectations and thus must be more costly in a standard macro model the losses associated with adaptive expectations are shown to be very small indeed even for quite large monetary disturbances as a result adaptive expectations may be close to optimal as long as the monetary regime is relatively stable further with adaptive expectations fully anticipated monetary changes lead to large and persistent fluctuations in aggregate output this is true even if only a very small percentage of firms behave adaptively

the rise and decline of general laws of capitalism economists have long been drawn to the ambitious quest of discovering the general laws of capitalism david ricardo for example predicted that capital accumulation would terminate in economic stagnation and inequality as a greater and greater share of national income accrued to landowners karl marx followed him by forecasting the inevitable immiseration of the proletariat thomas piketty s 2014 tome capital in the twenty first century emulates marx in his title his style of exposition and his critique of the capitalist system piketty is after general laws that will demystify our modern economy and elucidate the inherent problems of the system and point to solutions but the quest for general laws of capitalism is misguided because it ignores the key forces shaping how an economy functions the endogenous evolution of technology and of the institutions and the political equilibrium that influence not only technology but also how markets function and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed despite his erudition ambition and creativity marx was led astray because of his disregard of these forces the same is true of piketty s sweeping account of inequality in capitalist economies in the next section we review marx s conceptualization of capitalism and some of his general laws we then turn to piketty s approach to capitalism and his general laws we will point to various problems in piketty s interpretation of the economic relationships underpinning inequality but the most important shortcoming is that

transaction cost economics the natural progression abstract this manuscript provides the nobel laureate s reflections on transaction cost economics the overview section frames governance as the overarching concept and transaction cost economics as the means by which to breathe operational content into governance and organization the vertical integration section identifies efficiency factors associated with determining when a firm produces a good or service to its own needs rather than outsource a discussion of the rudiments of transaction cost analysis is subsequently provided puzzles and challenges that require pushing the logic of efficient governance to completion are examined and followed by concluding remarks

modeling long term dynamics of electricity markets in the last decade many countries have restructured their electricity industries by introducing competition in their power generation sectors although some restructuring has been regarded as successful the short experience accumulated with liberalized power markets does not allow making any founded assertion about their long term behavior long term prices and long term supply reliability are now center of interest this concerns firms considering investments in generation capacity and regulatory authorities interested in assuring the long term supply adequacy and the stability of power markets in order to gain significant insight into the long term behavior of liberalized power markets in this paper a simulation model based on system dynamics is proposed and the underlying mathematical formulations extensively discussed unlike classical market models based on the assumption that market outcomes replicate the results of a centrally made optimization the approach presented here focuses on replicating the system structure of power markets and the logic of relationships among system components in order to derive its dynamical response the simulations suggest that there might be serious problems to adjust early enough the generation capacity necessary to maintain stable reserve margins and consequently stable long term price levels because of feedback loops embedded in the structure of power markets and the existence of some time lags the long term market development might exhibit a quite volatile behavior by varying some exogenous inputs a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the influence of these factors on the long run market dynamics

incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies abstract hurwicz s theorem states that pareto optimality individual rationality and incentive compatibility are inconsistent in a class of private goods economies a similar result is obtained by ledyard and roberts in a class of public good economies hurwicz and walker show that generically there are no incentive compatible and pareto optimal mechanisms in a class of both private and public goods economies without imposing pareto optimality this paper explores the possiblity of the existence of incentive compatible and autarkically individually rational mechanisms in a class of public good economies autarkic individual rationality which strengthens individual rationality in a natural way and incentive compatibility are shown to be inconsistent

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

can neoclassical economics handle complexity the fallacy of the oil spot dynamic abstract this paper is essentially a rebuttal of the view that neoclassical economics can handle complexity i have coined the locution oil spot dynamic to denote the neoclassical ability to subsume each and every new perspective the main part of the paper is devoted to showing why the oil spot dynamic cannot work with the complexity approach which is seen as a coherent stand alone research program that stems from the sfi economics program and manifests itself with different nuances the fallacy of the oil spot dynamic is relevant in this period in which economists are beginning to realize that the neoclassical samuelsonian paradigm no longer represents the common language of their profession the spread of the complexity approach and the dissolving notion of mainstream are here interpreted as indicative of a changing economics a short foray into the features of the process of change completes my arguments by showing that the shift from one paradigm to another has many interrelated dimensions and that there may be rigidities internalizing changes

the intertemporal dimension of neoclassical production theory abstract the aim of this survey paper is to provide a guide to the literature on optimal dynamic factor demands to the non specialist reader interested in applied work we start with the distinction between variable and quasi fixed factors of production and use these to characterize the firm s temporary equilibrium we then review the optimal intertemporal behaviour of the firm using the notion of adjustment costs as a means to solve the firm s optimization problem this process gives rise to a system of interrelated dynamic factor demands in a flexible accelerator format theoretical difficulties and empirical limitations of this model are discussed this fact leads us to review the theory of intertemporal duality we next analyze the issue of expectations in this class of dynamic models a section reviewing the empirical work on dynamic factor demands follows after which we offer some concluding remarks

forward guidance and the role of central bank credibility under heterogeneous beliefs abstract this paper studies the macroeconomic effects of central bank forward guidance when central bank credibility is endogenous we take a stylized new keynesian model with an occasionally binding effective lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates and heterogeneous and boundedly rational households central bank forecasts follow a bivariate var not taking into account the time variation in the distribution of aggregate expectations in this framework we extend the central bank s toolkit to allow for the publication of its own forecasts delphic guidance and the commitment to a future path of the nominal interest rate odyssean guidance we find that both delphic and odyssean forward guidance increase the likelihood of recovery from a liquidity trap even though odyssean guidance alone appears more powerful in inducing recovery we find it to increase ex post macroeconomic volatility and thus reduce welfare

the real exchange rate the capital stock and fiscal policy abstract this paper studies the joint determination of aggregate supply the real exchange rate and the current account in response to changes in government spending in a model where there is no uncertainty in the aggregate but where individuals are uncertain about their lives duration international capital mobility fixes the steady state capital stock and aggregate supply in a small country whereas in a large country the steady state capital stock is endogenous an increase in government spending is more likely to generate a real exchange rate depreciation in a small country since the loss of wealth associated with cumulated current account deficits does not increase rest of the world spending in the case of a large country current account deficits are wealth transfers to the rest of the world and increase foreign spending thus the normal long run response is an increase in the relative price of domestic output

ratio lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed ownership system abstract in this paper we formalize an informationally efficient and implementable mixed ownership economic institutional framework by using the ratio lindahl equilibrium that yields pareto efficient and individually rational allocations for public goods economies with general variable returns we consider the incentive aspects of the system by giving an incentive compatible informationally efficient and privacy preserving mechanism whose nash allocations coincide with ratio lindahl allocations moreover the mechanism is well behaved in the sense that it uses an individually feasible balanced and continuous outcome function and further has a message space of minimal dimension

mechanism design how to implement social goals existing economic institutions the theorist wants to explain or forecast the economic or social outcomes that these institutions generate but in mechanism design theory the direction of inquiry is reversed we begin by identifying our desired outcome or social goal we then ask whether or not an appropriate institution mecha nism could be designed to attain that goal if the answer is yes then we want to know what form that mechanism might take in this paper i offer a brief introduction to the part of mechanism design called implementation theory which given a social goal characterizes when we can design a mechanism whose predicted

multiple capital inputs q and investment spending despite their explicit treatment of dynamics and solid theoretical basis investment models based on the brainard tobin q have recorded a generally disappointing empirical performance when the q model is expanded to recognize the possibility that the value of the firm depends on two or more capital inputs with differing adjustment cost technologies the econometric equation following from optimizing behavior includes q as well as a set of additional explanatory variables the importance of these omitted variables is assessed and the capital homogeneity assumption for equipment and structures implicit in conventional q models is rejected the multi capital q model is then extended in two ways i adding inventory research and development and labor as quasi fixed factors and ii exploring the sensitivity of the instrumental variables estimates to normalization we conclude that the multi capital q model is a useful extension that overcomes an important omitted variables problem in the conventional q framework

a unique informationally efficient allocation mechanism in economies with consumption externalities this article investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in pure exchange economies with consumption externalities it is shown that the distributive lindahl mechanism has a minimal informational size of the message space and thus it is informationally the most efficient allocation process that is informationally decentralized and realizes pareto efficient allocations over the class of economies that include nonmalevolent economies furthermore it is shown that the distributive lindahl mechanism is the unique informationally efficient decentralized mechanism that realizes pareto efficient and individually rational allocations over a certain class of nonmalevolent economies

complexity and economic policy a paradigm shift or a change in perspective a review essay on david colander and roland kupers s complexity and the art of public policy in their recent book colander and kupers 2014 argue that viewing the economy as a complex adaptive system should change the way in which we make economic policy this would necessitate a paradigm shift economics has over time tried to produce a coherent model to underpin the dominant laissez faire liberal approach but we have never proved in that model that left to their own devices the participants in an economy will self organize into a satisfactory state this is an assumption complex interactive systems with direct interaction between heterogeneous agents may show no tendency to self equilibrate and will undergo endogenous crises economists should concentrate on the emergence of certain patterns colander and kupers suggest that we may be able to nudge the system into good basins of attraction a more radical view is that there are no fixed basins of attraction these change with the evolution of the system and it is illusory to believe that we can choose good basins we may be able to recognize and influence the emergence of certain states of the economy but we are far from leon walras s dream of economics as a science like astrophysics

perfect competition and the creativity of the market from the perspective of the walrasian general equilibrium model entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior many would say no but we argue the contrary indeed we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to rather than a detour from such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives the trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist seeking out profit potentials wherever he can

tariffs transfers and the real exchange rate the deviation of exchange rates from purchasing power parities ppp s has recently become the subject of theoretical and empirical attention the massive body of data collected and presented by the international comparisons project icp under the direction of kravis heston and summers khs 9 11 has permitted new empirical investigation of an old topic and has stimulated the construction of theoretical models to account for observed patterns in the icp project and the related literature the focus is on the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp the concept of this ratio is closely related to the concept of the real exchange rate which is defined as the actual exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of an index of foreign prices to an index of domestic prices the term real exchange rate a term widely employed in both economics journals and in the financial press is frequently used to describe changes over time in a particular country and its calculation requires only time totime changes in exchange rates and price indexes the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp on the other hand refers to a comparison of the levels of the exchange rate and the ppp at a moment in time and its calculation requires the availability of a ppp survey of the kind performed by the icp the purpose of the present paper is to analyze the effects of tariffs and transfers on the real exchange rate of a small country in this theoretical endeavor we shall hold constant the prices in foreign countries in this context it can easily be seen that the real exchange rate and the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp are identical concepts provided that the expenditure weights used in the index of domestic prices are the same as those used in the calculation of the ppp

expectations and bubbles in asset pricing experiments abstract we present results on expectation formation in a controlled experimental environment in each period subjects are asked to predict the next price of a risky asset the realized market price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium equation with feedback from individual forecasts in most experiments prices deviate from the benchmark fundamental and bubbles emerge endogenously these bubbles are inconsistent with rational expectations and seem to be driven by trend chasing behavior or positive feedback expectations of the participants we also analyze individual predictions of participants and find that participants within a group tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy

learning from the behavior of others conformity fads and informational cascades learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior for example why do people tend to converge on similar behavior why is mass behavior prone to error and fads the authors argue that the theory of observational learning and particularly of informational cascades has much to offer economics business strategy political science and the study of criminal behavior

auction protocols for decentralized scheduling decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules we investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems the quality of equilibrium solutions and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol to remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods finally we consider direct revelation mechanisms and compare to the market based approach journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c70 d44

persistent gaps and default traps we show how vicious circles in countries credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks in such an environment default signals the borrower s vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook this translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income raising the cost of future repayments thereby creating default traps we build a long and broad cross country dataset to show the existence of a history dependent default premium and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness consistent with the model s predictions

the role of asset specificity in the vertical integration decision abstract according to the logic of transaction cost economics several factors determine the most efficient form of economic organization these factors include uncertainty and frequency of transactions involving the transfer of goods or services although the most important factor is asset specificity these characteristics of transactions engender high transaction costs but they also parallel the conditions under which the sunk cost effect is most likely to be observed the potential influence of sunk cost considerations in the choice of corporate governance structure is illustrated with respect to vertical integration and was tested in a laboratory study in which subjects were asked to play the role of a firm s chief strategist the results support the view that asset specificity drives vertical integration but for reasons that may have little to do with transaction cost economizing

real exchange rate effects of fiscal expansion under trade restrictions we develop a small open economy trade model where either a tariff or a quota or a voluntary export restraint ver exists and where one exported one imported one non traded and one public good are produced within this context we examine the effects of fiscal expansion on welfare and the real exchange rate rer among other things it is demonstrated that when the direct social profitability effect of the public good is positive and the public good is a net complement to the non traded good fiscal expansion causes an appreciation of the rer under free trade and under a tariff when the public good is also a net complement to the imported good the paper identifies additional conditions required to ensure the appreciation of the rer due to fiscal expansion under an import quota or a ver les effets de 1 expansion fiscale sur les taux de change reels quand il y a des restrictions au commerce international les auteurs developpent un modele de commerce international d une petite economie ouverte oiu existe soit un tarif douanier soit un contingentement soit une restriction volontaire des exportations dans ce modele un bien import6 un bien exporte un bien qui n est pas transige internationalement et un bien public sont produits

efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection do walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection in particular is their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable this paper addresses these questions in the context of a rothschild stiglitz insurance economy we identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality consequently we show that competitive equilibria always exist but are not typically incentive efficient however as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities markets for consumption rights can be designed to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection with such markets competitive equilibria exist and incentive constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems hold

modern theories of entrepreneurial behavior a comparison and appraisal this paper compares and appraises three principal contemporary theories of entrepreneurial decision making neoclassical austrian and behavioral we employ theory appraisal criteria made available in fritz machlup s 1967 celebrated article on alternative theories of the firm the paper considers theories that treat sequences of behavior by which individual entrepreneurs reach decisions on two levels the discovery of profit opportunities and their exploitation we also consider how each theory characterizes the entrepreneur s decision making process by contrast with the posited behavior of other economic agents austrian theory is suited to explaining novel adventurous behavior at the discovery stage the algorithm for opportunity exploitation in both the neoclassical and austrian approaches is a single repertoire optimization rule neoclassical theory is situated in frictionless atomistic walrasian markets and emphasizes mathematical tractability austrian and behavioral theories conceive entrepreneurial acts taking place in market processes understood as complex institutional phenomena there are strong theoretical complementarities between austrian and behavioral approaches both approaches value descriptive accuracy though the behavioralists place more weight on operational tractability austrians and behavioralists share an interest in heuristics they emphasize the role of prior micro level knowledge at the discovery stage therefore more collaborative research in future between austrians and behavioralists should prove fruitful

success in maximizing profits and reasons for profit deviation on dairy farms the weak axiom of profit maximization wapm was used to test how successful each of 70 individual new york state dairy farms was in maximizing profits using nine years of data the netput vectors were corrected for technological change using nonparametric indices that do not require the assumption of profit maximization nor any functional form for the underlying technology these technology indices are consistent with the nonparametric assumptions used in the wapm tests the average negative wapm deviation over the 70 farms was 0 20 indicating that on average these farms could have selected available netput vectors that would have increased profits by 20 of total receipts a tobit regression showed that the available characteristics on these farms explained very little of the variability in their abilities to select the best netput vectors yet increased age and additional education increased the ability to select the best netput vector

my first employee an empirical investigation the challenge for solo entrepreneurs to add their first employee is arguably the single biggest growth event facing any growing firm to understand how this event affects performance and the antecedents of hiring we analyse danish matched employer employee data those who hire enjoy superior sales outcomes in subsequent years while the dispersion in profits increases furthermore those that hire enjoy faster sales growth in the previous year suggesting that sales growth precedes the first hire finally we show that founders with a stronger profile in terms of education and previous income are more likely to increase profits while the characteristics of the employee are less important the latter finding is important from a job creation perspective in light of the suggested sorting of more marginalized employees into new and established firms

nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets lack of common knowledge of rationality vs actual irrationality we report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets in a setting in which speculation is not possible bubbles and crashes are observed the results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation in markets where speculation is possible is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment

resurrecting the weak credibility hypothesis in models of exchange rate based stabilization abstract we analyze how weak credibility affects the volatility of consumption spending in a model of exchange rate based stabilization that allows for both durable and nondurable goods the inclusion of durables greatly improves the explanatory power of the weak credibility hypothesis the hypothesis can account for the main qualitative properties of the boom bust cycle provided the elasticity of durables expenditure with respect to tobin s q is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution moreover the quantitative effects are very large in numerical simulations based on conservative assumptions about the expenditure share of durables 20 and wealth effects none aggregate consumption increases 17 22 and the real exchange rate appreciates 24 26 when the crawl decreases from 100 to zero for 3 years in variants of the model that incorporate supply effects the consumption boom is equally strong but appreciation of the real exchange rate rises to 30 40

on the behavioral and rational foundations of economic dynamics abstract existing uncertainties about the correct explanations for economic growth and business cycles cannot be settled by aggregative analysis within the neoclassical framework current disputes in theory rest largely on ad hoc casually empirical assumptions about departures from perfect rationality under uncertainty such disputes can only be settled by painstaking microeconomic empirical study of human decision making and problem solving microeconomic research of the kinds that are required can receive powerful guidance from the theories of human thinking that have been developed and tested over the past twenty five years by cognitive psychologists

micro shocks and aggregate risk the paper presents a micro shock explanation of aggregate risk shocks are independent over agents and equilibria are always unique it is shown that any amount of aggregate risk can be generated by games in which shocks to players are independent explicit examples are given some of which elaborate on examples in the literature implications are drawn for factor analytic methods of extracting aggregate shocks

financial development and the instability of open economies this paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of financial factors as a source of instability in small open economies our basic model is a dynamic open economy model with a tradeable good produced with capital and a country specific factor we also assume that firms face credit constraints with the constraint being tighter at a lower level of financial development a basic implication of this model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies this is true both in the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and also in the sense that these economies can exhibit cycles thus countries that are going through a phase of financial development may become more unstable in the short run similarly full capital account liberalization may destabilize the economy in economies at an intermediate level of financial development phases of growth with capital inflows are followed by collapse with capital outflows on the other hand foreign direct investment does not destabilize

adaptive behavior and economic theory the relationship between psychological and economic views of behavior once a subject of heavy dispute is now understood in a very similar way by practitioners of both these disciplines and of our sister social sciences in general terms we view or model an individual as a collection of decision rules rules that dictate the action to be taken in given situations and a set of preferences used to evaluate the outcomes arising from particular situation action combinations these decision rules are continuously under review and revision new decision rules are tried and tested against experience and rules that produce desirable outcomes supplant those that do not i use the term adaptive to refer to this trial anderror process through which our modes of behavior are determined if one is interested in modeling particular decisions in any very explicit way it is obviously necessary to think about rather narrow aspects of an individual s entire set of decision rules his or her personality experimental psychology has traditionally focused on the adaptive process by which decision rules are replaced by others in this tradition the influence of the subject s or as an economist says the agent s preferences this essay uses a series of examples to illustrate the use of rationality and adaptation in economic theory it is argued that these hypotheses are complementary and that stability theories based on adaptive behavior may help to narrow the class of empirically interesting equilibria in certain economic models an experiment is proposed to test this idea

dynamic factor demands under imperfect competition the greek manufucturing industry 1958 1981 the intertemporal maximization problem of the firm under adjustment costs for its factors of production and imperfect competition in the output market is considered the first order conditions with respect to capital and labour the production function and the demand equation have been jointly estimated using greek manufacturing data and values for the structural parameters have been obtained the estimates are plausible and most of them significant tests of the overidentifying restirctions are unable to reject the overall specification of the model at conventional levels of significance

home biased expectations and macroeconomic imbalances in a monetary union abstract under monetary union economic dynamics may diverge across countries due to regional inflation differentials and a pro cyclical real interest rate channel yet stability is generally ensured through endogenous adjustment of the real exchange rate the speed of adjustment depends inter alia on the way agents form expectations we propose a model in which agents expectations are largely based on domestic variables and less so on foreign variables we show that such home bias in expectations strengthens the real interest rate channel and causes country specific shocks to generate larger and more prolonged macroeconomic imbalances

exchangeability and its economic applications abstract the symmetry possessed by exchangeability is the key to its usefulness the methods that are used to comprehend reality will edify insofar as they reflect this symmetry this is true of theoretical models empirical methods and algorithms indeed if the design of mechanisms is by rearrangement of natural matter their survival value will depend on the degree to which they retain the symmetry of the original matter this comment encompasses complex machinery and sophisticated political social and economic institutions the paper simply embroiders this observation

financial literacy financial education and downstream financial behaviors policy makers have embraced financial education as a necessary antidote to the increasing complexity of consumers financial decisions over the last generation we conduct a meta analysis of the relationship of financial literacy and of financial education to financial behaviors in 168 papers covering 201 prior studies we find that interventions to improve financial literacy explain only 0 1 of the variance in financial behaviors studied with weaker effects in low income samples like other education financial education decays over time even large interventions with many hours of instruction have negligible effects on behavior 20 months or more from the time of intervention correlational studies that measure financial literacy find stronger associations with financial behaviors we conduct three empirical studies and we find that the partial effects of financial literacy diminish dramatically when one controls for psychological traits that have been omitted in prior research or when one uses an instrument for financial literacy to control for omitted variables financial education as studied to date has serious limitations that have been masked by the apparently larger effects in correlational studies we envisage a reduced role for financial education that is not elaborated or acted upon soon afterward we suggest a real but narrower role for just in time financial education tied to specific behaviors it intends to help we conclude with a discussion of the characteristics of behaviors that might affect the policy maker s mix of financial education choice architecture and regulation as tools to help consumer financial behavior this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets the paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the sincere agents privately know their preferences it shows that for a large class of choice rules any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is in the choice rule is by verifying a budget equilibrium i e that the alternative is optimal to each agent within a budget set given to him therefore any communication mechanism realizing the choice rule must find a supporting budget equilibrium we characterize the class of choice rules that have this property furthermore for any rule from the class we characterize the minimally informative messages budget equilibria verifying it this characterization is used to identify the amount of communication needed to realize a choice rule measured with the number of transmitted bits or real variables applications include efficiency in convex economies exact or approximate surplus maximization in combinatorial auctions the core in indivisible good economies and stable many to one matchings

a corporate balance sheet approach to currency crises this paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the third generation in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms credit constraints and nominal price rigidities despite our emphasis on microfoundations the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically the analysis hinges on four main features i ex post deviations from purchasing power parity ii credit constraints a la bernanke gertler iii foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms iv a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short term lending facilities we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises we show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective but that a relaxation of short term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms

instability in the implementation of walrasian allocations abstract the existence of game forms which implement walrasian allocations as cournot nash equilibrium outcomes is well known however if the equilibria are also required to be locally dynamically stable at least for environments with unique walrasian allocations this paper shows that the requisite game forms do not exist our definition of a game form entails certain regularity conditions and requires the cournot equilibrium to be unique when the walrasian equilibrium is unique the main result is that for such a game form there does not exist a continuous time strategy adjustment process which ensures the local stability of cournot equilibria throughout a certain class of environments having unique walrasian equilibria each trader adjusts his strategy in response to his own characteristics and the observed current strategies of others but the direction and magnitude of adjustments are not constrained by any behavioral assumptions the definitions permit the inclusion of an artificial player such as an auctioneer so the well known tatonnement instability emerges as a special case

sequentiality versus simultaneity interrelated factor demand abstract firms may adjust capital and labor sequentially or simultaneously in this paper we develop a structural model of interrelated factor demand subject to nonconvex adjustment costs and estimated by simulated method of moments based on norwegian manufacturing industry plant level data parameter estimates reveal cost advantages for adjusting capital and making net changes in labor simultaneously factor demand models with fully specified interrelated adjustment costs structures perform best to describe the dynamic panel data

the basic unit of economic analysis individuals or markets a comment on markets come to bits by phil mirowski abstract mirowski has put forward an argument for viewing the economy as a set of interlocking markets i argue that he is right to shift attention from the individual to a higher level he further holds that there has been a shift to considering the informational problem as central to economics and that this can provide the framework for a new vision of markets as automata i see the decline of homo economicus as rather due to a dissatisfaction with the intrinsic value of that concept with the development of cognitive economics and a realisation that this notion can give us no hold on analysing aggregate behaviour however markets are indeed important and they have been largely ignored as a result of our preoccupation with the individual different market forms co exist in reality and it is necessary to analyse the reasons for this however to reduce them to computable algorithms may miss many of the other features which make them fascinating but intractable

international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises abstract we build a model of emerging markets crises which features two types of collateral constraints firms in a domestic economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other we study how the presence and changes in these collateral constraints affect financial and real variables a binding international constraint in the aggregate leads to a sharp rise in interest rates and fire sales of domestic assets while limited domestic collateral can lead to wasted international collateral these two collateral constraints can interact in important ways the first is disintermediation a fire sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail in their function of reallocating resources across the economy leading to wasted international collateral the second is a dynamic effect we show that firms in an economy with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks increasing the severity of these shocks

theory and practice of decentralized planning procedures the paper surveys the theory of decentralized planning procedures dealing with price guided quantity guided and mixed procedures informational and incentive properties of the various procedures are dealt with as is the problem of public goods the practice of planning in the u s s r hungary and india is also discussed copyright 1990 by blackwell publishers ltd

trade reform with quotas partial rent retention and tariffs quotas are the predominant means of protection in developed countries with quota rents commonly shared between exporter and importer this paper derives shadow prices appropriate to evaluating trade reform under these circumstances and provides a number of useful sufficient conditions for welfare improving piecemeal reform in doing so the authors apply the distorted quantity constrained expenditure function and use implicit separability to derive more powerful results than have previously been available

competitive pooling rothschild stiglitz reconsidered we build a model of competitive pooling which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join in equilibrium pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price even though each household s deliveries are the same at all pools the rothschild stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case we show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it does not and is unique

rationality in psychology and economics the task i shall undertake here is to compare and contrast the concepts of rationality that are prevalent in psychology and economics respectively economics has almost uniformly treated human behavior as rational psychology on the other hand has always been concerned with both the irrational and the rational aspects of behavior in this paper irrationality will be mentioned only obliquely my concern is with rationality economics sometimes uses the term irrationality rather broadly e g becker 1962 and the term rationality correspondingly narrowly so as to exclude from the domain of the rational many phenomena that psychology would include in it for my purposes of comparison i will have to use the broader conception of psychology one point should be set immediately outside dispute everyone agrees that people have reasons for what they do they have motivations and they use reason well or badly to respond to these motivations and reach their goals even much or most of the behavior that is called abnormal involves the exercise of thought and reason freud was most insistent that there is method in madness that neuroses and psychoses were patients solutions not very satisfactory solutions in the long run for the problems that troubled them the assumption that actors maximize subjective expected utility economic rationality supplies only a small part of the premises in economic reasoning and that often not the essential part the remainder of the premises are auxiliary empirical assumptions about actors utilities beliefs expectations and the like making these assumptions correctly requires an empirically founded theory of choice that specifies what information decision makers use and how they actually process it this behavioral empirical base is largely lacking in contemporary economic analysis and supplying it is essential for enhancing the explanatory and predictive power of economics

creation of financial markets in previously centrally planned economies abstract one of the key issues in reforming previously centrally planned economies is the creation of financial markets in the present paper the macroeconomic consequences of their introduction are investigated given the impossibility of the immediate introduction of a complete set of markets in the transition phase the second best theorem applies using an overlapping generation model it is shown that the existence of financial markets allows the choice of different combinations of growth and consumer s welfare given the existing trade off between these two targets financial markets can exist under different ownership schemes in the context of the model chosen it is shown that it is impossible to obtain unequivocal conclusions about the sequence of financial reforms and the optimal ownership scheme thus it is necessary to judge on a case by case basis and caution is suggested in the policy prescriptions

testing the rank of engel curves with endogenous expenditure abstract we find that the endogeneity of consumer expenditure tends to increase the estimated rank of engel curves this result based on nonparametric procedure is in line with previous results obtained in the context of parametric specifications

public sector pricing and the real exchange rate we examine the effects of consumption subsidies public enterprise pricing and price controls on the real exchange rate under plausible assumptions we show that permanent reform in these areas leads to a permanent real exchange rate appreciation an empirical application to the 1990 fujimori plan in peru is discussed redistribution purposes sometimes even to buy votes by populist leaders since economic reform usually requires the shutting down of loans from the central bank to parastatals reducing consumption subsidies and increasing public enterprise prices price reform plays an important role in imf and world bank programmes edwards 1989a for example found that public enterprise price increases and reductions in consumption subsidies were involved in 79 and 44 per cent respectively of imf programmes between 1983 and 1985 trade reforms in contrast were present in just 35 per cent of cases to date the real exchange rate effects of public sector price policies have

on auction protocols for decentralized scheduling abstract this note shows that for the combinatorial market goods defined by wellman et al 2001 there may not exist an optimal allocation that is in equilibrium moreover this result holds even if the value of each processed job is independent of its completion time the proposed algorithm for finding an equilibrium allocation using an assignment model fails due to complementarity even for instances that admit an optimal allocation which is in equilibrium

a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection the paper describes a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome equilibrium exists under standard conditions it is shown that under certain conditions a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria for generic models there exists a stable outcome that is all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome these ideas are applied to markets with one sided and two sided uncertainty under standard monotonicity conditions it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers

house price beliefs and mortgage leverage choice we study the relationship between homebuyers beliefs about future house price changes and their mortgage leverage choices whether more pessimistic homebuyers choose higher or lower leverage depends on their willingness and ability to reduce the size of their housing market investments when households primarily maximize the levered return of their property investments more pessimistic homebuyers reduce their leverage to purchase smaller houses on the other hand when considerations such as family size pin down the desired property size pessimistic homebuyers reduce their financial exposure to the housing market by making smaller downpayments to buy similarly sized homes to determine which scenario better describes the data we investigate the cross sectional relationship between house price beliefs and mortgage leverage choices in the u s housing market we use plausibly exogenous variation in house price beliefs to show that more pessimistic homebuyers make smaller downpayments and choose higher leverage in particular in states where default costs are relatively low as well as during periods when house prices are expected to fall on average our results highlight the important role of heterogeneous beliefs in explaining households financial decisions

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries