an analysis of interfirm cooperation theory and evidence from electric power pools this paper develops and tests a model for analyzing the extent to which an individual utility participates in a power pool it incorporates the benefits and costs of pool membership in a profit maximization model of an individual utility the study finds that coordination reflects the benefits and costs the degree to which other utilities are committed to the pool and the utility s behavior toward other utilities the results show that large firms are reluctant to pool with small firms and the us pools tend to be loosely coordinated policy implications are that regulatory commissions can be instrumental in coordination efforts and that interstate cooperation among regulatory authorities is needed to encourage pooling and obtain regional solutions to regional problems it is also important to reduce the transactional costs of pooling wherever possible 37 references 3 figures 1 table

measuring returns to scale in dea models when the firm is regulated in the standard framework of data envelopment analysis dea models the returns to scale are fully characterized using the multiplier on the convexity constraint of inefficient decision making units dmu using the projection of the input output vector on the frontier in this note we investigate how the returns to scale measurements in dea models are affected by the presence of regulatory constraints these additional constraints change the role played by the convexity constraint in order to avoid biased estimation of the returns to scale we show that the interaction between the regulatory and the convexity constraints has to be taken into account

the impact of regulation on technical change input based regulation restricts a firm s input choices to a subset of those that characterize the production technology the averch johnson hereafter a j 1962 hypothesis states that rate of return regulation affects a firm s input demands for producing its selected output level given that firms can select the level of innovations in inputs through research and development rate regulation can also impact a firm s selection of innovations among inputs regulation s influence on the choice of innovations also impacts the rate at which technical change occurs in an industry the a j hypothesis has been examined extensively in the literature the impact of regulation on technical change has received less attention in the literature and is the focus of this paper the subject matter is of some importance in that regulation via the a j hypothesis leads to higher production costs regulation s impact on a firm s selection of innovations can magnify or dampen the rate at which technical change occurs a magnification dampening of the rate of technical change leads to lower higher production costs in addition to regulation s impact on input demands regulation s impact on the rate of technical change can lead to small or large changes in prices for consumers regulators can use the information on regulation and technical change to evaluate the effectiveness of policies aimed at enhancing technical change by how much do the policies affect production costs and how much would consumer prices change due to the policies regulators can also use the information to predict the impact deregulation would have on consumer prices both regulators and consumers can attempt to determine the amount by which consumer prices would change under deregulation smith 1974 and okuguchi 1975 examined the impact of regulation on a firm s choice of innovations they showed theoretically that regulation can alter a firm s choice of innovations

a general equilibrium analysis of the insurance bonding approach to pollution threats abstract this paper sheds additional light on the important issue of toxic accidental releases or spills the pollution control literature contains relatively little discussion of accidental releases even risk assessments are more about the risks to the public of predictable continuous emissions than about the risk of major accidents because spills of stored and transported chemicals are not continuous or even inevitable analogs of economic incentive approaches like emissions fees and transferable pollution allowances are inappropriate allowances are inappropriate because potential spills are often too harmful to allow and a fee large enough to pay for clean up and damages is beyond the means of many potential sources the accidental release threat suggests an approach analogous to automobile liability insurance since a car can do more damage than most people can afford to pay for states mandate insurance to ensure financial responsibility some potential sources of harmful spills are already required to demonstrate financial responsibility and more could be insurance is one option for meeting financial responsibility requirements in many cases the only viable option to develop testable hypotheses and determine where traditional partial equilibrium analyses would probably be misleading the paper compares a very basic insurance bonding approach to the traditional command and control approach in a general equilibrium setting that allows a comparison of effectiveness and impacts on output levels prices and factor returns

environmental controls in extractive industries diverging from the literature on optimal resource extraction to consider the effects on a competitive resource industry s extraction rate of environmental controls or taxes designed to limit residual discharge this analysis embeds environmental regulations in a dynamic model in which a mineral industry uses physical capital to extract a nonrenewable resource from a fixed stock the analysis considers only flow pollution the most important pollutant being sulfur dioxide emissions from smelting and the leaking of toxic metals into ground water from mine tailing a comparison of controls and pollution taxes finds it impossible to design a fixed emission standard that will lead to optimal industry behavior the author designs a variable standard that can be firm specific in order to encourage resource conservation 32 references 2 figures

effects of regulation and capital market imperfections on the dynamic behavior of a firm the well known result in the theory of a regulated firm known as the averch johnson effect is that a profit maximizing firm subject to rate of return regulation uses an inefficiently high capital labor ratio to produce its chosen level of output numerous contributions in the literature have been instrumental in clarifying the implications and generalizing the model 1 these contributions however have been mostly couched within a static framework few attempts have been made to investigate the effect of rate of return regulation on the dynamic behavior of the firm in particular its investment plans 2 neoclassical models of investment often assume that the rate of investment under

the economics of enforcing pollution taxation abstract the efficient structure of pollution tax policy is examined when it is recognized that enforcing compliance will be costly there are two components of this cost 1 the direct cost of enforcement and 2 the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement considering only the first cost the efficient pollution policy calls for a tax in excess of that conventionally recommended as efficient t but with little enforcement once avoidance cost is recognized the efficient policy can be substantially altered requiring a tax lower than t but with greater enforcement even when direct enforcement cost is zero it is shown that there is no unique advantage to t in the absence of avoidance cost

a decision model for financial assurance instruments in the upstream petroleum sector the main objective of this paper is to deepen the discussion regarding the application of financial assurance instruments bonds in the upstream oil sector this paper will also attempt to explain the current choice of instruments within the sector the concepts of environmental damages and internalization of environmental and regulatory costs will be briefly explored bonding mechanisms are presently being adopted by several governments with the objective of guaranteeing the availability of funds for end of leasing operations regulators are mainly concerned with the prospect of inheriting liabilities from lessees several forms of bonding instruments currently available were identified and a new instrument classification was proposed ten commonly used instruments were selected and analyzed under the perspective of both regulators and industry surety paid in and periodic payment collateral accounts letters of credit self guarantees investment grade securities real estate collaterals insurance policies pools and special funds a multiattribute value function model was then proposed to examine current instrument preferences preliminary simulations confirm the current scenario where regulators are likely to require surety bonds letters of credit and periodic payment collateral account tools

capacity utilization and new source bias evidence from the us electric power industry abstract while prior research has shown that new source bias has increased construction costs and delayed the building of new electric power plants this research explores the empirical question of whether increased operating costs caused by new source bias are larger than the cost savings of newer technology if new sources do have higher operating costs an incentive exists to utilize order plants more intensively statistical evidence of these differing utilization rates is found

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

endogenous technical change and environmental regulation abstract a model of environmental regulation under uncertainty is developed to compare the effect of price versus quantity rules upon technical change quantity rules tend to encourage more efficient levels of technical change

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

optimizing inventory s contribution to profitability in a regulated utility the averch johnson effect the averch johnson effect is a well known economic phenomenon through which regulated utility companies prefer a capital resource input combination that differs from an efficient level through dynamic network data envelopment analysis ndea this paper first investigates the existence of this effect on a dynamic input that is inventory the analysis was performed for a group of public electric utilities from 2005 to 2014 the result implies that these firms procure a significant extra amount in inventory materials and supplies beyond their efficient levels in order to explore the connection of this effect to profit motives we construct an analytical model of the inventory policy controlling the extra buying of material and supplies that will be inventoried and added to the firm s rate base the model is based on maximizing the net present value of total profits in the deterministic case two results are observed i the firm could achieve a finite optimum by adding a finite amount of inventory above the normal base level which assumes no impact of inventory on the rate hearing and ii the firm could theoretically achieve infinite optimum under the unconstrained model the primary contribution of this paper is the special case of extending typical inventory replenishment models to including the impact on prices and in turn profits in a regulated supply chain

production externalities and long run equilibria bargaining and pigovian taxation this paper analyzes bargaining and pigovian taxation solutions to inefficiencies from production externalities with free entry the coase theorem fails in a decentralized context but remains valid if the property rights holder can act like a command economy planner a less powerful price taking rights holder s objective function is nonconcave causing an inefficient bargaining outcome bargaining complicates pigovian taxes with a nonlinear tax scheme required to sustain the optimum polluting firms pay a franchise tax whose revenue is given lump sum to consumers and face a marginal charge only on excess output which thus raises no revenue in equilibrium

potential for private cost increasing technological innovation under a tax based economic incentive pollution control policy a criticism of the current pollution control policy is its lack of incentive for technological innovation the author argues that the implementation of a tax based economic incentive policy may have its pay off in terms of lower real control outlays but this makes it possible for total private compliance costs resource costs and tax or transfer costs to actually increase upon the introduction of some new less expensive control technologies he presents a numerical illustration of this phenomenon then derives the conditions under which such cost increases may occur cost increasing technological innovations could generally be avoided if the tax incentive is coupled with a net revenue lid for the pollution control authorities 4 references 3 tables

elasticities of substitution for a regulated cost function abstract this paper proposes a modification to the uzawa 1962 characterization of the allen partial elasticity of substitution under cost minimization to take account of the behavioral properties of the cost function for a firm subject to rate of return regulation

environmental bonds and environmental research in innovative activities abstract this paper considers the incentive to uncover potential future social costs of activities having no historical precedents since ex ante markets in the future external effects of historically unique activities are non existent the private incentives to uncover the possibility of thalidomide type results in such activities is weak the paper discusses the value of sequentially determined environmental bonds as mechanisms for the generation of research funds in these cases and derives measures for the calculation of such bonds

x inefficiency and interfirm rivalry evidence from the electric utility industry competition from the natural gas industry is shown to increase the efficiency of the work force of electric power utilities this conclusion is qualified to the extent that duopoly rivalry does not represent perfect competition in a free market as natural gas reserves decline however the impetus to improve efficiency will diminish but this will be offset by technological advances in both power generation and power transmission if regulators develop policies to encourage competitive interplay utility performance is more likely to improve 38 references 3 tables dck

the social cost of carbon and its policy implications the shadow price or social cost of carbon is an important indicator of the global incremental damage done by emitting greenhouse gases today cost benefit analysis would set the optimal amount of greenhouse gas emission reduction at the point where this social cost just equals the incremental cost of controlling emissions the higher the value for the social cost of carbon the more control is warranted this comparison assumes that cost benefit analysis is the correct way of determining climate change policy and many believe this is not the case because of the very long term irreversible and potentially catastrophic nature of global warming but in the short run at least a comparison of cost and benefits is required and in any event all decisions imply costs and benefits but what is the right figure for the social cost of carbon this paper reviews the uk government s assessment of the cost and concludes that it has been set far too high because of a misreading of the integrated assessment models used to balance costs and benefits moreover adoption of the uk government s shadow price would have formidable implications for energy policy in the uk and for policies on afforestation copyright 2003 oxford university press

systematic departures from the frontier a framework for the analysis of firm inefficiency departures from a production or cost frontier may reflect the systematic effect of conditions that contribute to inefficiency to test whether some portion of frontier function departures can be systematically explained the frontier inefficiency error component is modeled as a function of various causal factors and a random component the functional form of the inefficiency error term model is chosen to assure strict one sidedness preliminary empirical results generated from electric utility data suggest the superiority of including both systematic and random components in the inefficiency error term

competition or manipulation an empirical evidence of determinants of the earnings persistence of the u s banks we examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank competition we find that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after their states implement the deregulation this relationship is weakened however with the increase of bank s abilities to sustain earnings as reflected in size diversification managerial efficiency and safety we further find that the impact of compeititon on bank earnings adjustment speed is direct but not indirectly through the channel of earnings management

effects of regulation on utility financing theory and evidence standing of these cross sectional variations might be afforded by the detailed examination of specific industry characteristics and their relationship to firms financing patterns the present study offers a methodology for approaching this issue the first step is to assemble joint theories of industry and financial structure in order to identify the ways in which changing industry conditions might be associated with changes in financing evidence on such simultaneous changes can then be examined in an attempt to identify the most plausible joint theory the methodology is used to investigate the effects of state commission regulation on the financing of electric utilities this is a natural candidate for study since regulation is such a salient feature of the industry in addition the regulatory system imparts some interesting special features to the very nature of utility capital structures inherent in all capital structures for example are opportunities for shifting wealth between bondholders and shareholders but under regulation these wealth shifting opportunities are expanded to encompass consumers as well finally the study of regulation has resulted in several relatively well specified theories of why regulation is imposed and what its observable effects should be in section i the different theories of capital structure and regulation are discussed and their joint implications are derived the capital structure theories include the perfect capital market theory the debt capacity theory and the financing hierarchy theory the regulatory theories include the public interest or market failure theory the political economy theory and the imperfect monitoring theory in section ii financing data from the early days of state commission utility regulation are used to try to distinguish

regulation of administered prices an empirical analysis of the microeconomics of price movement in finland 1972 77 curiously enough the concept of administered prices launched by gardiner means in his 1934 report to the u s secretary of agriculture still shows up in discussions on price policy and control today almost fifty years since it was coined and three decades after the discussion2 in which it should have been buried even more astonishing is the fact that its spin off administered inflation a term introduced by the kefauver committee in 1957 3 is still a part of economic language in some instances in the basic formulation that of means in 1935 administered prices are not assumed to be explicitly linked with market power but simply prices set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time means 12 p 78 although the hypothesis in this form was based on no economic reasoning of acceptable clarity it might still be accepted for the simple truism it is clearly some prices will change more seldom than others since for one thing costs of price changes will vary as is intuitively clear and as shown by sheshinski and weiss 17 pp 294 95 the optimal strategy of a firm in an inflationary environment will consist of longer intervals between successive price changes the higher the cost of such a change is under some very special assumptions risk aversion may also serve as an explanation to a decrease in the number of price changes relative to the number of changes in cost as indicated by the results of schramm and sherman 1 5 4 the administered inflation hypothesis as forwarded by means in his 1957 testimony before the kefauver committee means 12 pp 101 29 and by

economy and environment a theoretical essay on the interdependence of economic and environmental systems preface notation guide 1 introduction part i the physical economy environment system 2 closed physical systems a model 3 structure and time in the physical system 4 technological change and the environmental constraints to physical growth part ii the economic system 5 the price system 6 prices property and the environment 7 economic conflict and environmental change part iii environmental strategies in an evolutionary economy environment system 8 time uncertainty and external effects 9 the market solution 10 the stationary state 11 conclusions references index

regulatory schemes and self protective environmental risk control a comparison of insurance liability and deposit refund systems abstract there has been an increasing interest in considering non traditional regulatory instruments for control of environmental risks traditional regulation has relied on liability in various forms after risky events have actually occurred there is concern that traditional instruments do not provide adequate signals to firms regarding social costs of risks this paper considers two important alternatives to traditional liability instruments insurance and deposit refund systems the purpose of the paper is to determine whether there is any theoretical superiority of these non traditional instruments in controlling environmental risk and safety a relatively simple model designed to capture the essential features of liability insurance and deposit refund instruments is developed and used to compare the resulting control levels under pure risk and pure uncertainty the paper shows how risk aversion limited liability afforded through bankruptcy and differences between social and private discount rates can affect the ranking of control levels under each of the three primary instruments the paper shows that under reasonable assumptions deposit refund systems such as input or discharge deposits or performance bonds will result in higher levels of controls than the other instruments results also suggest that it may be necessary to tailor regulatory instruments to specific firm situations such as requiring deposits from small firms in competitive industries

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

an experimental analysis of the effectiveness of an environmental assurance bonding system on player behavior in a simulated firm it has long been recognized that the present command and control methods for pollution abatement are inefficient using market mechanisms for environmental management is a promising alternative to the direct regulatory approach market mechanisms are just beginning to appear in u s environmental policy for example tradable permit schemes are being developed and implemented for some air pollutants under the amended clean air act various other forms of taxes and tradable permits have been proposed however these systems do not address the large uncertainty inherent in most environmental problems one mechanism currently being studied to address uncertainty more effectively is a flexible environmental assurance bonding system designed to incorporate environmental criteria and uncertainty into market incentives this study uses an experimental approach employing an interactive computer game simulation model with human players to examine the effectiveness of the assurance bonding system under varying degrees of uncertainty an environmental cost efficiency index ecei or profit per unit waste is used to measure player performance preliminary results indicate that players are more successful under the assurance bonding system in terms of ecei than under the simulated current system

opaque financial reports r2 and crash risk abstract we investigate the relation between the transparency of financial statements and the distribution of stock returns using earnings management as a measure of opacity we find that opacity is associated with higher r2s indicating less revelation of firm specific information moreover opaque firms are more prone to stock price crashes consistent with the prediction of the jin and myers 2006 r2 around the world new theory and new tests journal of financial economics 79 257 292 model however these relations seem to have dissipated since the passage of the sarbanes oxley act suggesting that earnings management has decreased or that firms can hide less information in the new regulatory environment

the influence of the economic approaches to regulation on banking regulations a short history of banking regulations this article highlights the theoretical foundations of the regulations at work in the banking sector and examines their responsibility in the onset of the 2007 2008 financial crisis drawing a parallel between the main changes in banking regulations since the 1960s and the evolutions in the economic analyses of regulation over the same period it shows that the shift from the public interest theory of regulation that prevailed until the late 1960s towards the private interest theory of regulation accounts for the substitution of micro prudential regulations for macro prudential ones and explains a paradigmatic change in the conception of the regulatory instruments of the banking authorities it also shows that although the outcome of several factors the 2007 2008 crisis was also a consequence of the fact that the economic analysis of banking regulations supported micro prudential regulations that fail to take the global features and impact of banking activities into account and have proved unable to recommend effective solutions in a context of crisis

bank earnings management and tail risk during the financial crisis we show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price crashes as well as by the pattern of full year returns stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems

a model of industrial pollution in a stochastic environment abstract standard models of pollution abatement assume that pollution accumulation occurs in a deterministic pattern as a by product of the production process governmental intervention often occurs in the form of taxation or mandatory abatement controls to reduce inefficiency caused by incomplete markets in this paper we assume that the accumulation effect of pollution may be stochastic due for instance to the random absorption capacity of the ecosystem furthermore we assume that the level of pollution may vary with input use as well as output level we proceed to analyze properties of a policy for efficient social management of competitive firms which generate pollution

regulation and investment use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many oecd countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment a component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust jel e22 l5

efficiency based rank assessment for electric power industry a combined use of data envelopment analysis dea and dea discriminant analysis da abstract this study discusses a combined use of dea data environment analysis and dea da discriminant analysis to determine the efficiency based rank of energy firms this type of performance evaluation is important because we often have a difficulty in accessing a large sample on energy firms to derive reliable empirical results the proposed approach is useful in dealing with such a limited number of energy firms often found in previous dea studies on energy industries in the world the proposed approach uses dea to classify energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups based upon their efficiency scores then it utilizes dea da to assess their efficiency scores and ranks in this stage we can find an adjusted efficiency score for each energy firm the proposed approach provides us with the following analytical capabilities all of which cannot be found in a conventional use of dea in assessing energy firms first the proposed dea approach can avoid zero in all multipliers on efficient energy firms by incorporating scsc strong complementary slackness condition so that it can handle an occurrence of multiple reference sets and multiple projections the dea result classifies all energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups second dea da applied to the two groups evaluates all energy firms by an industry wide evaluation not depending upon a limited number of efficient energy firms in a reference set as found in a conventional use of dea the analytical capability can reduce the number of efficient energy firms third the proposed approach can provide their efficiency based ranking scores finally we can conduct a rank sum test based upon their ranking scores to obtain a statistical inference as an application this study uses the proposed approach to examine the performance of japanese electric power industry we find two economic implications one of the two implications is that no major change has occurred in the operational performance of japanese electric power industry because of japanese sluggish economy from 2005 to 2009 the other implication indicates that there are strategic differences in the operation of japanese electric power firms after the liberalization

capital vintage time trends and technical change in the electric power industry beginning with tinbergen in 1942 economists have employed a time trend in cost or production functions to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced into the production unit in sufficiently flexible models of the production process the time trend may be used to obtain estimates of the rate as well as direction of technical change the use of the time trend is generally defended on pragmatic grounds as no theoretical justification exists for assuming that new technology is introduced at a steady rate that is independent of a firm s investment in r d education capital of a more recent vintage etc in recent years alternatives to the traditional time trend have been sought to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced research in this area has been concentrated in the telecommunications industry where the stock of r d or the percentage of calls completed by direct dialing or modern switching facilities have been employed as technological indices by nadiri and schankerman 32 denny et al 14 and christensen et al 7 the latter two studies indicate that explicit technological indices provide a better representation of the pace of innovation than the time trend this conclusion must remain tentative however as it is not possible to determine what is the true direction of technical change in these studies this shortcoming is overcome in a recent study by kopp and smith 24 who compare the performance of time trends and explicit technological indices in a study using pseudo data generated by process analysis models their results unambiguously support the use of technologically explicit indicators of technical change and indicate that the use of a time trend may not provide a consistent estimate of the direction of technical change this study does not however shed any light on the ability of a time trend to accurately reflect the rate of technical change the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of alternative technological indices on the estimated rate and direction of technical change in the electric power industry the performance of a time trend is compared with that of a vintage index computed as the average age of a firm s steam generating capacity this latter index is consistent with the notion that new technology is embodied in newly constructed capital an assumption sup

rent seeking with pollution taxation an extension in a recent issue of this journal dwight lee analyzes pollution taxation in a rent seeking environment the purpose of this paper is to extend lee s basic framework to a second best environment in doing so it will be shown that a pigovian tax may be the preferred rate even if rent seeking costs are included the paper is organized as follows in section ii we present a slightly modified version of lee s analysis of the optimal pollution tax in a rent seeking environment having done so it is shown that lee s specification of the optimal pollution tax must be modified in a second best environment some general results that emerge from our analysis are summarized in a proposition in section iii we offer some concluding remarks from authors

cost efficiency of electric grid utilities in china a comparison of estimates from sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls with the purpose of estimating the range of cost efficiency levels of the power grid sector in china we assembled a data set including 23 provincial power grid companies spanning from 2005 to 2009 and conducted an empirical study based on the sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls methodologies empirical results show that the average values of efficiency from different models vary from 0 85 to 0 92 depending especially on the assumptions underlying inefficiency content further results demonstrate that there is exogenous technical progress during the sample period and per capita gdp of the province is negatively related to the costs of the electric grid company located in the corresponding province we hope this empirical study will contribute to the debate on an efficiency based regulation scheme which was introduced to the chinese electric grid sector on a pilot base in 2014

self reporting of pollution and the firm s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations abstract motivated by the nature of u s laws a model is developed for a firm that maximizes expected profit and faces imperfectly enforceable pollution standards with imperfectly enforceable reporting requirements some previous models of imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes are special cases of this general mode when the fine for violating the pollution standard is linear in excess pollution the form will equate the marginal cost of control to the marginal fine rate and thus actual pollution will be insensitive to enforcement parameters related to under reporting the more complex comparative statics that exist when the fine is non linear are analyzed and comparisons with other models are made

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

social cost of forcing a basis for pricing all forcing agents abstract an efficient climate policy is based on cost benefit analysis cba and equates marginal abatement costs across all forcing agents affecting climate change in cba the agents contributions to radiative forcing rf must be consistently priced i e the social cost of rf occurring at a specific time must be the same regardless of the agent causing it we present a concept that enables doing so the social cost of forcing scf is the monetary value of the social damage caused by marginal rf at a given instant wm 2 any forcing agent whose temporal decay profile and radiative efficiency are known can be priced based on it prices obtained for distinct agents are consistent in cba as long as the same scf and discounting assumptions are applied hence the scf is a concise way to communicate social cost information mutually consistent prices for any set of forcing agents can be obtained based on a single integrated assessment model output the scf we explain the theoretical foundations of the concept and illustrate its practical applications with two examples 1 we derive scf based prices for co2 and ch4 and 2 we estimate the social cost of albedo changes in a boreal forest stand

the empirical properties of two classes of designs for transferable discharge permit markets abstract previous work by atkinson and lewis j environ econ manag 1 237 250 1974 and anderson et al an analysis of alternative policies for attaining and maintaining a short term no2 standard mathtech inc princeton n j 1979 has indicated the tremendous cost advantages to be achieved by moving from a policy based on emission standards to one based on marketable emission permits as tietenberg land econ 56 391 416 1980 points out however neither of the major permit designs treated in the literature are optimal from all points of view this has triggered a search for alternative permit designs which while they may not minimize compliance costs have sufficient other virtues as to make them attractive on other grounds the purpose of this paper is to examine within the context of an empirical mathematical programming model the air quality emission and cost consequences of two classes of the permit designs which can be implemented in the absence of information on control costs this case study involves particulate control in st louis

factor price changes technical efficiency and revenue requirements regulation a regulatory framework is considered in which output price adjustments can be initiated only by a change in the price of a non capital input e g fuel at some time in the future which is uncertain at that time there is a processing period and then an adjustment of the output price so that the revenues of the firm meet an allowed rate of return s the regulated firm choosing a putty clay technology is shown to overcapitalize for large values of s and to undercapitalize for sufficiently small values of s a decrease in the length of the processing period is found to accentuate the extent of either the undercapitalization or overcapitalization resulting from the specified rate of return

time of use pricing for load management programs in taiwan power company load management programs have been actively performed by the utilities to reduce peak demand and improve system load factor in recent years the time of use tou tariff based on the peak load pricing theory has been one of the most effective load management strategies proper tou rate structure can actually reflect the generation cost of electricity supplying and give a guideline for customers to modify the power consumption pattern so that the system load factor can be improved the inverse electricity pricing rule can be applied as the basis of tou pricing in this paper the price elasticities of industrial customers of taipower system are solved by the statistical regression model with 2620 data samples

a flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management abstract current methods of regulating activities that are known or suspected to be environmentally danaging are not working well they induce legal confrontation obfuscation and government intrusion into the inner workings of firms they tend to suppress technical and social innovation aimed at long term solutions they do not mesh well with the market signals that firms use to make decisions this paper discusses some of the underlying reasons for this problem and outlines a flexible environmental assurance bonding system designed to incorporate environmental criteria and uncertainty into the market system and to induce positive environmental technological innovation in addition to direct charges for known environmental damages an assurance bond equal to the current best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages would be levied and kept in an interest bearing escrow account the bond plus a portion of the interest would be returned if and only if the firm could prove that the suspected damages had not occured or would not occur if damages did occur the bond would be used to rehabilitate or repair the environment and to compensate injured parties by requiring the users of environmental resources to post a bond adequate to cover potential future environmental damages with the possibility for refunds the burden of proof is shifted from the public to the resource user and a strong economic incentive is provided to research the true costs of environmentally innovative activities and to develop innovative cost effective pollution control technologies

regulator heterogeneity and endogenous efforts to close the information asymmetry gap abstract the now standard principal agent model of regulator firm interactions typically assumes the presence of a single regulator and an exogenously determined information asymmetry between the principal and the agent in this paper we draw upon a unique data set of regulatory inspections conducted by the u s food and drug administration fda to explore the consistency of these assumptions with the actual practice of regulators we find that the canonical assumptions of the agency paradigm are strained by if not altogether inconsistent with the key practical realities of regulation by the fda our analysis uncovers several dimensions along which regulators actively and endogenously seek to close the information asymmetry gap we also find considerable regulator heterogeneity which in turn depends in part upon the specific training and experience of individual regulators

efficient regulation with little information reality in the limit we present a regulatory scheme that converges to ramsey pricing and productive efficiency even if regulators have little information about technology or demand the model has firms selecting prices subject to the regulator s requirement that the firm earn a fair return on capital at today s capital stock and output levels regulators then review later performance and are more likely to request new rate hearings as the firm s return deviates more from the fair return as long as regulators do not review negative returns too fast relative to positive returns these conditions are sufficient for convergence to ramsey prices and productive efficiency public utility regulators generally set prices not rates of return per se these prices however often are meant to achieve approximately some target rate of return but when projecting how prices will affect rates of return regulators are often at the mercy of the firms for economic projections about the effects of various price vectors e g across customer classes upon profits so if realized rates of return deviate from targets regulators may call new rate hearings and they may expedite these hearings if the deviations are large 2 by formalizing these real world observations some rather surprising efficiency results appear suppose that regulators have no knowledge of demands and technologies but can observe past realizations of prices and quantities if the review probabilities are as noted above and satisfy an asymmetry condition then this regulatory process may converge not only to productive efficiency overcoming averch johnson over capitalization effects but to ramsey prices these conclusions are derived from unifying and extending work by bawa and sibley 1980 and vogelsang and finsinger 1979

regulated equity returns a puzzle abstract based on a database of u s electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return this growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset pricing models often in direct contrast to regulators stated intent we suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance public policy public choice and the behavioral economics literature however absent some normative justification for this premium it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

uncertainty and pollution the role of indirect taxation abstract this paper explores the potential usefulness of indirect taxation as a supplement to effluent charges it is argued that effluent charges should typically be accompanied by taxes on privately traded commodities linked to the pollutant in consumption or production the performance of such combinations of taxes and charges is then compared to that of an effluent standard

tax planning regulatory capital planning and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks we test whether banks investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status we document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense we also document an association between banks marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles however banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs we posit specific types of transaction cost impediments to tax planning and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax planning benefits article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan losses and the behavior of security prices abstract the study examines the capital market pricing of discretionary and nondiscretionary components of a major accrual in the banking industry the allowance for loan losses the analysis employs a two stage approach in which the allowance account is first decomposed into estimates of its nondiscretionary and discretionary components the second stage evaluates the market s valuation of the estimates of the components evidence suggests that the capital market perceives the allowance to be comprised of two components a nondiscretionary component which is negatively priced and a discretionary component whose incremental pricing coefficient is positive

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

regulatory and life cycle influences on managerial incentives an important controversy persists in economics concerning the appropriateness of profit maximization as opposed to various competing nontraditional theories of the firm 13 of particular interest has been the comparative relevance of the sales maximization hypothesis suggested by baumol 4 and others a typical methodology employed to empirically analyze the profit versus sales maximization issue has been to question whether the financial rewards of top executives are more strongly influenced by corporate profit or sales performance it is implicitly assumed that the firm has a well defined set of organizational goals and that the structure of executive compensation is designed to provide executives with a consistent set of incentives therefore should profit performance constitute a significant determinant of executive compensation support for the profit maximization hypothesis would be gained on the other hand if executive compensation is closely related to firm sales then the nontraditional sales maximization hypothesis would be supported in an early empirical analysis of the issue mcguire chiu and elbing 14 found that sales and compensation were more highly correlated than were profits and compensation and therefore that the baumol hypothesis seemed most relevant lewellen and huntsman 12 pointed out however that mcguire et al had neglected to consider the deferred and contingent stock options etc elements of executive compensation and in so doing had perhaps biased their analysis against the profit maximization hypothesis by correctly considering the impact of corporate performance on the total compensation of top corporate executives lewellen and huntsman found strong support for the profit maximization hypothesis and no support for sales maximization in fact so convincing were the lewellen and huntsman results that they seemed to resolve the managerial motivation issue in favor of the traditional profit maximization model more recent empirical analyses however have tended to suggest that the issue is far from resolved baker 3 boyes and schlagenhauf 5 and ciscel and carroll 6 have all

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change how much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming the stern review argues that the damages from climate change are large and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions an examination of the review s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds however that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function the review s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates

an examination of the effect of ownership on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities the behavior of privately and publicly owned water utilities is examined by estimating a generalized variable cost function containing the regular characteristics of the neoclassical cost function without requiring that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis assuming that unobserved shadow prices reflect the regulatory environment of the water industry tests for cost minimization are obtained by deriving shadow prices as functions of market prices the empirical results provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than private utilities on average but are more widely dispersed between best and worst practice

a note on allowed and realized rates of return of the us electric utility industry most empirical investigations of electric utility behavior use the realized rate of return as a proxy for the allowed rate of return we examine the validity of this assumption and investigate the relationship of the allowed and realized rates to the cost of capital between 1973 and 1982 we use two measures of the cost of capital one based on returns to book equity the other derived from a market price of equity while realized and allowed rates were generally higher than the book measure throughout the period both of the rates of return were less than the market price of capital after 1979 we also find firms did not earn their allowed rate of return after 1974 therefore the use of the realized rate as a proxy for the allowed rate in empirical models will lead to biased parameter estimates to help correct this bias we give data for allowed rates