the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

a positive effect of human capital on growth abstract recent studies have found that economic growth appears to be unrelated to increases in educational attainment in this note i show that there is a correlation in one dataset but it is typically hidden by unrepresentative observations

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

educational human capital and levels of income evidence from states in india 1965 92 abstract this paper examines the long run steady state relationship between levels of educational human capital and levels of income for the 15 major states of india between 1965 and 1992 the relationship is estimated using the pooled mean groups pmg technique which produces common long run coefficients but allows heterogeneity of the short run adjustment parameters the results suggest that levels of educational human capital proxied by high school enrollment rates have a robust positive impact on steady state levels of income this is true for male and female education and the regressions also suggest that states which have larger gender gaps in education have lower steady state incomes the estimated relationship is robust to the inclusion of alternative measures added controls and variation in the degree of state coverage

occupational choice and dynamic incentives we study an overlapping generations version of the principal agent problem where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium all individuals are workers when young but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital these rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints with a labour market that is subject to moral hazard the increased effort raises social welfare policies that reduce credit market imperfections or redistribute income may reduce welfare by dampening this effect

the long term impact of matching and rebate subsidies when public goods are impure field experimental evidence from the carbon offsetting market in this paper we investigate both short and long term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm related behavior we conduct a large scale field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket we systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different price rebates 25 50 75 and corresponding matching grants 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 using data on returning customers we investigate the long term effects of the different stimuli both while treatments were in place as well as their persistence for the time after treatment removal in the first bookings our results show that all price rebate schemes increase the participation rate in the offsetting program while we find weaker effects for matching grants when bookers are treated repeatedly only the equal 1 1 matching scheme continues to lead to higher participation rates even after removing the subsidies we report higher participation rates for customers previously facing a 1 1 matching scheme this treatment is also the only one increasing net contributions of customers compared to the control group

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

educational policy and the economics of the family this paper analyzes the implications of alternative ways to model decision making by families for educational policy we show that many of the policy implications associated with credit constraints cannot be distinguished from the implications of models of the family that differ from the conventional barro becker model we then argue that it is the combination of credit constraints and non conventional preferences that provides a robust basis for government intervention to promote educational investment

private versus social returns to human capital education and economic growth in india abstract this paper investigates whether differences between private and social returns to education of government sector employees can contribute to an explanation of the micro macro paradox in the literature on education and growth we hypothesize that in india educated people find privately rewarding jobs in a sector in which social returns are low namely the government sector this could help explain high returns to education at the micro level and small or negative coefficients on education growth in growth regressions at the macro level the empirical results which are consistent with this hypothesis are based on an analysis of state level data from india spanning 40 years

a probability based stress test of federal reserve assets and income to support the economy the federal reserve amassed a large portfolio of long term bonds we assess the fed s associated interest rate risk including potential losses to its treasury securities holdings and declines in remittances to the treasury unlike past examinations of this interest rate risk we attach probabilities to alternative interest rate scenarios these probabilities are obtained from a dynamic term structure model that respects the zero lower bound on yields the resulting probability based stress test finds that the fed s losses are unlikely to be large and remittances are unlikely to exhibit more than a brief cessation

threshold effects of human capital schooling and economic growth abstract empirical growth studies have often found average years of schooling to be unrelated with economic growth this note shows that the significant positive effect of schooling can only be realized after an economy crosses a threshold level of development

when does a central bank s balance sheet require fiscal support abstract using a simple general equilibrium model we argue that it would be appropriate for a central bank with a large balance sheet composed of long duration nominal assets to have access to and be willing to ask for support for its balance sheet by the fiscal authority otherwise its ability to control inflation may be at risk this need for balance sheet support a within government transaction is distinct from the need for fiscal backing of inflation policy that arises even in models where the central bank s balance sheet is merged with that of the rest of the government

generalizations that aren t evidence on education and growth abstract several papers have suggested that the relationship between changes in average schooling and growth is weak in the cross country data this might call into question the relevance of micro estimates of returns to schooling at least for developing countries this paper examines the reliability of some of the aggregate evidence and presents an alternative framework for analysing these questions

does human capital matter for growth in oecd countries a pooled mean group approach abstract unlike previous panel data studies using an improved dataset and pmg estimators we find a significant impact of human capital on growth the estimated long run elasticity of output to human capital is consistent with the microeconomic evidence on returns to schooling

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

is infrastructure capital productive a dynamic heterogeneous approach this paper offers an empirical evaluation of the output contribution of infrastructure drawing from a large data set on infrastructure stocks covering 88 countries and spanning the years 1960 2000 and using a panel time series approach the paper estimates a long run aggregate production function relating gdp to human capital physical capital and a synthetic measure of infrastructure given by the first principal component of infrastructure endowments in transport power and telecommunications tests of the cointegration rank allowing it to vary across countries reveal a common rank with a single cointegrating vector which is taken to represent the long run production function estimation of its parameters is performed using the pooled mean group estimator which allows for unrestricted short run parameter heterogeneity across countries while imposing the testable restriction of long run parameter homogeneity the long run elasticity of output with respect to the synthetic infrastructure index ranges between 0 07 and 0 10 the estimates are highly significant both statistically and economically and robust to alternative dynamic specifications and infrastructure measures there is little evidence of long run parameter heterogeneity across countries whether heterogeneity is unconditional or conditional on their level of development population size or infrastructure endowments

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

excessive public employment and rent seeking traps we propose a model where the size of the public sector and aggregate output are interrelated through the occupational choice of agents who differ in their skill level and degree of public mindedness when the public sector attracts bureaucrats with low degree of public service motivation they will use their position to rent seek by employing an excessive number of unskilled workers this leads to an equilibrium with relatively high unskilled wages which lowers profits and deters entrepreneurship conversely an equilibrium with a lean public sector and greater private economic activity arises when public service motivated agents populate the state bureaucracy these agents exert high effort and employ a limited number of unskilled workers our model also shows that a bloated public sector with high wages may be supported by the unskilled agents

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

the changing pattern of foreign trade specialization in indian manufacturing this paper examines the pattern of international trade specialization in indian manufacturing since the mid 1980s by using data on trade flows low technology sectors still dominate the categories for which india exhibits the largest degree of trade specialization by contrast high technology sectors are prevalent among the categories for which india is import dependent significantly india has experienced an improvement in the degree of specialization in some of the most dynamic sectors of world trade

where has all the education gone cross national data show no association between increases in human capital attributable to the rising educational attainment of the labor force and the rate of growth of output per worker this implies that the association of educational capital growth with conventional measures of total factor production is large strongly statistically significant and negative these are on average results derived from imposing a constant coefficient however the development impact of education varied widely across countries and has fallen short of expectations for three possible reasons first the institutional governance environment could have been sufficiently perverse that the accumulation of educational capital lowered economic growth second marginal returns to education could have fallen rapidly as the supply of educated labor expanded while demand remained stagnant third educational quality could have been so low that years of schooling created no human capital the extent and mix of these three phenomena vary from country to country in explaining the actual economic impact of education or the lack thereof

stress testing interest rate risk exposure abstract in the current low interest rate environment the possibility of a sudden increase in rates is a potentially serious threat to financial stability as a result analyzing interest rate risk irr is critical for financial institutions and supervisory agencies we propose a new method for generating yield curve scenarios for stress testing banks exposure to irr based on the nelson siegel 1987 yield curve model we show that our method produces yield curve scenarios with a wider variety of slopes and shapes than scenarios generated by the historical and hypothetical methods typically used in the banking industry and proposed in the literature we stress test the economic value of equity of a bank balance sheet based on call report data from a large u s bank we show that our method provides more information about the bank s exposure to irr using fewer yield curve scenarios than the alternative historical and hypothetical methods

do central bank liquidity facilities affect interbank lending rates in response to the global financial crisis that started in august 2007 central banks provided extraordinary amounts of liquidity to the financial system to investigate the effect of central bank liquidity facilities on term interbank lending rates near the start of the crisis we estimate a six factor arbitrage free model of u s treasury yields financial corporate bond yields and term interbank rates this model can account for fluctuations in the term structure of credit and liquidity spreads observed in the data a significant shift in model estimates after the announcement of the liquidity facilities suggests that these central bank actions did help lower the liquidity premium in term interbank rates

a note of caution on shadow rate estimates shadow short rate ssr estimates are generated regressors proposed as a proxy for policy interest rates during unconventional monetary policy ump periods however using the wu and xia 2016 shadow lower bound model i show that ssr estimates can be sensitive to minor choices in their estimation used subsequently in a small macroeconomic model those sensitivities lead to wide variations in the inferred effects of ump on inflation and unemployment outcomes therefore it should not be presumed that any ssr series will necessarily be quantitatively useful vetting ssr series allows appropriate ssr series to be retained within the suite of ump indicators

growth empirics a panel data approach a comment this paper comments on recent developments in the literature on the econometric analysis of international growth and convergence it notes that panel estimates of the neoclassical model accommodating level effects for individual countries through heterogeneous intercepts deal with some of the econometric difficulties arising in some of the earlier cross sectional studies but it notes that in dynamic panels heterogeneity in growth effects and in speeds of convergence renders this estimator inconsistent also the pervasiveness of such heterogeneity is demonstrated in three samples of countries and the effects of incorrectly imposing homogeneity on estimated parameters are illustrated and discussed

enterprise inequality and economic development we characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interaction of the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distribution of entrepreneurial skills when efficient entrepreneurs are relatively abundant a traditional development process emerges in which the evolution of macroeconomic variables accord with empirical regularities and income inequality traces out a kuznets curve if instead efficient entrepreneurs are relatively scarce the model generates long run distributional cycles driven by the endogenous interaction between credit constraints entrepreneurial efficiency and equilibrium wages

contingent match incentives increase donations the authors propose a new means by which nonprofits can induce donors to give today and commit to giving in the future contingent match incentives in which matching is made contingent on the percentage of others who give e g if x of others give we will match all donations a field experiment shows that a 75 contingent match such that matches kick in only if 75 of others donate is most effective in increasing commitment to recurring donations an online experiment reveals that the 75 contingent match drives commitment to recurring donations because it simultaneously provides social proof while offering a low enough target to remain plausible that the match will occur a final online experiment demonstrates that the effectiveness of the 75 contingent match extends to one time donations the authors discuss the practical and theoretical implications of contingent matches for managers and academics

the response of interest rates to us and uk quantitative easing we analyse declines in government bond yields following announcements by the federal reserve and the bank of england of plans to buy longer term debt using dynamic term structure models we decompose us and uk yields into expectations about future short term interest rates and term premiums we find that declines in us yields mainly reflected lower expectations of future short term interest rates while declines in uk yields appeared to reflect reduced term premiums thus the relative importance of the signalling and portfolio balance channels of quantitative easing may depend on market institutional structures and central bank communication policies

the paradox of indian growth a comment on kochhar et al the paradox of india s current success we learn from kochhar et al 2006 is that it is rooted in what were once seen as some of its most egregious policy failures in particular in the 1980s and even the 1990s one always heard complaints about how india invested so much more in tertiary education compared to countries at similar levels of development and how primary education by comparison was under funded and not enough of a priority and it did look like the critics were right highly qualified engineers educated at great public expense worked as bank officers or sales representatives for large multinationals or cooled their heels as minor functionaries in the overfilled bureaucracies of large public companies if they were exceptionally brilliant or fortunate they won a scholarship to do an advanced degree somewhere in the west few came back if there was one thing that has worse press in the community of economists today than india s education policy it was its policy of self reliance this meant making everything at home often behind gargantuan walls of tariffs and quotas this created an industrial sector that was enormously diversified at least compared to other economies at the same level of development and probably in many ways quite inefficient yet according to kochar and company it was the combination of these two policy errors that were instrumental in shaping the indian economy of today the two things that distinguish india from any other economy at its level of development are the skillintensity of its exports and the diversity of what it produces indeed 15 years after liberalization began the indian economy seems to be even more diversified than it used to be

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

thanks for nothing not for profits and motivated agents we re examine the labor donation theory of not for profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them or that they dominate for profits in terms of welfare but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non profit form more attractive to managers we show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not for profit firms would be competed out by for profit firms therefore in the choice between not for profit and for profit provision other than incentive problems the distribution of rents between management and workers and consequently the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role

persistent court corruption levels of court corruption differ widely across the world to give just one example in a recent survey of firms in transition economies the proportion of respondents who answered that firms in their line of business never have to make additional payments to deal with the courts ranged from 86 8 in hungary to just 37 2 in albania a second notable feature of court corruption is its persistence over time in spite of almost universal condemnation of the phenomenon and frequent government anti corruption campaigns this article presents a simple model that explains both the variation and persistence of corruption the main argument is as follows a major role of the legal system is to provide incentives to individuals to take or abstain from certain actions this is true of regulation criminal law contract law and tort law alike however when courts are corrupt the incentive effect provided by court enforced fines and other penalties is reduced to maintain incentives higher penalties are required but these higher penalties in turn raise the bribes that court officials can extract since the stakes to winning a court case are now higher finally higher bribes make court employment more attractive to dishonest individuals which raises the corruptibility of the court loosely speaking then corruption and penalties are complements corruption necessitates higher penalties while higher penalties engender corruption the feedback effect just described gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria that is apparently similar countries can have very different levels of court corruption one country may have a relatively honest pool of court officials and a low level of penalties while a second country may have the opposite moreover if a country in a high corruption equilibrium attempts to shift to using smaller penalties the immediate effect is a fall in the incentives provided by the legal system as such a country can find itself stuck in a high corruption equilibrium

a new database on human capital stock in developing and industrial countries sources methodology and results abstract the paper describes the techniques and data adopted for the construction of a new series of estimates of the stock of education in 85 countries over 28 years 1960 1987 the series are built from enrollment data using the perpetual inventory method adjusted for mortality estimates are corrected for grade repetition among school goers and country specific drop out rates for primary and secondary students enrollment data series used start as far back as 1930 for most countries and even earlier for others this reduces the need for backward extrapolation of enrollments to provide the initial estimates of the investment inventory

intrinsic motivation and optimal incentive contracts i study the role of intrinsic motivation on optimal incentive contracts agents engage in efforts to generate projects with both financial return and intrinsic value to the agent in a neutral environment where intrinsic motivation has no direct effect on the disutility of effort static contracts are unaffected by intrinsic motivation in contrast the firm s profits from an implicit contract are increasing in the degree to which the agent is intrinsically motivated showing that implicit contracts and intrinsic motivation are complements the results are further extended to consider the role of multiple implicit contracts and product market strategy

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

public sector employment rent seeking and economic growth surplus labor in the public sector a characteristic of many developing countries is viewed in this paper as the consequence of rent seeking behavior a theory is presented of a segmented labor market with endogenous government hiring in response to unemployment a simple computable general equilibrium model is used to illustrate how this can give rise to dynamic social costs and to quantify them fiscal resources are diverted to support the unproductive sink the effect of surplus labor on economic growth is shown to be substantial while the government s attempt to reduce unemployment is shown to be futile copyright 1991 by royal economic society

bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation do wages in the civil service affect corruption and by how much abstract this paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption first we show that theory is ambiguous on the relationship between civil service pay and corruption then we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low income countries we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross country averages where we control for a wide array of variables the relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

double for nothing experimental evidence on an unconditional teacher salary increase in indonesia how does a large unconditional increase in salary affect the performance of incumbent employees in the public sector this paper presents experimental evidence on this question in the context of a policy change in indonesia that led to a permanent doubling of teachers base salaries the analysis uses a large scale randomized experiment across a representative sample of indonesian schools that accelerated this pay increase for teachers in treated schools the findings show that the large pay increase significantly improved teachers satisfaction with their income reduced the incidence of teachers holding outside jobs and reduced self reported financial stress nevertheless after two and three years the increase in pay led to no improvement in student learning outcomes the effects are precisely estimated making it possible to rule out even modest positive impacts on test scores the results suggest that unconditional pay increases are unlikely to be an effective policy option for improving the effort and productivity of incumbent employees in public sector settings

a new normal for interest rates evidence from inflation indexed debt the downtrend in u s interest rates over the past two decades may partly reflect a decline in the longer run equilibrium real rate of interest we examine this issue using dynamic term structure m

entrepreneurial talent occupational choice and trickle up policies we study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection the severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs which is working for wages this links credit product and labor markets a rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem these multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria if it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones however if screening is possible e g if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

managerial talent motivation and self selection into public management the quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries calls to attract the economy s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound this paper studies self selection into managerial and non managerial positions in the public and private sector using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation we find that if demand for public sector output is not too high the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector as a result relatively many of the more able managers self select into the private sector since this outcome is efficient our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private sector levels is not cost efficient

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

reputation effects and the limits of contracting a study of the indian software industry this paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes we conduct an empirical analysis of the indian customized software industry using a data set we collected containing detailed information on 230 projects carried out by 125 software firms we propose a model ofthe industry where reputation determines contractual outcomes the evidence supports the view that reputation matters ex ante contracts as well as the outcome after ex post renegotiation vary with firms characteristics plausibly associated with reputation this holds after controlling for project client and firm characteristics

can total factor productivity explain value added growth in services abstract this paper examines the factors responsible for generating the services led growth witnessed in the indian economy during 1980 2005 a sectoral growth accounting exercise shows that total factor productivity tfp growth was the fastest for services moreover this tfp increase was significant in accounting for service sector value added growth a growth model with agriculture industry and services as three principal sectors is calibrated to indian data using sectoral tfp growth rates the baseline model performs well in accounting for the evolution of value added shares and their growth rates but is unable to capture sectoral employment share trends the performance of the model with respect to value added shares improves when the post 1991 increase in service sector tfp growth following the inception of market based liberalization reforms is accounted for a modified version of the model with public capital can better track trends in sectoral employment shares

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

risk endogeneity at the lender investor of last resort abstract to what extent can a central bank influence its own balance sheet credit risks during a financial crisis through unconventional monetary policy operations to study this question we develop a risk measurement framework to infer the time variation in portfolio credit risks at a high weekly frequency focusing on the eurosystem s experience during the euro area sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012 we find that the announcement and implementation of unconventional monetary policy operations generated beneficial risk spill overs across policy portfolios this caused overall risk to be nonlinear in exposures in some instances the eurosystem reduced its overall balance sheet credit risk by doing more in line with bagehot s well known assertion that occasionally only the brave plan is the safe plan

returns to investment in education a global update the author updates compilations of rate of return estimates to investment in education published since 1985 and discusses methodological issues surrounding those estimates some key patterns among the three main levels of education primary education continues to exhibit the highest social profitability in all world regions private returns are considerably higher than social returns because of the public subsidization of education the degree of public subsidy increases with the level of education which is regressive social and private returns at all levels generally decline by the level of a country s per capita income overall the returns to female education are higher than those to male education but at individual levels of education the pattern is more mixed the returns to the academic secondary school track are higher than the vocational track since unit cost of vocational education is much higher and the returns for those who work in the private competitive sector of the economy are higher than in the public noncompetitive sector and the returns in the self employment unregulated sector of the economy are higher than in the dependent employment sector controversies in the literature are discussed in the light of the new evidence the undisputable and universal positive correlation between education and earnings can be interpreted in many ways the causation issue on whether education really affects earnings can be answered only with experimental data generated by randomly exposing different people to various amounts of education given the fact that moral and pragmatic considerations prevent the generation of such pure data researchers have to make do with indirect inferences or natural experiments some have been attempted the author looks at the research on overeducation or surplus schooling the conclusions reinforce earlier patterns they confirm that primary education continues to be the number one investment priority in developing countries they also show that educating females is marginally more profitable than educating males that the academic secondary school curriculum is a better investment than the technical vocational tract and that the returns to education obey the same rules as investment in conventional capital that is they decline as investment is expanded