voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes increasing revenue or increasing incentives to evade many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed i model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs i confirm the importance of administrative costs in a survey of german competent local tax authorities i then test the effects of voluntary disclosure on the tax evasion decision using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the u s for identification the analysis confirms that the introduction of voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion

patent pools as a solution to efficient licensing of complementary patents some experimental evidence production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees summed across patents these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents royalties because they function as excise taxes add to marginal costs resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology resulting in inefficient outcomes we report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool we find that pool like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

from the lab to the field a review of tax experiments tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years although this literature dates back several decades with new developments in methods and data availability tax experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field this movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the credibility revolution in applied economics which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy relevant questions and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax returns these developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental literature on tax compliance this paper reviews this literature giving particular attention to field experiments using administrative data but putting them in the broader context of the compliance literature a particular effort is made to take a global perspective in a literature that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from africa latin america and asia

a designer s choice between single prize and parallel tournaments in this article i theoretically and experimentally compare a designer s profits from two tournament designs the first design is a standard winner take all tournament with a single prize the second design features two winner take all parallel tournaments with different prizes where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing i develop a simple model that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants abilities differ the theoretical model shows that the designer s profit is higher lower in the parallel tournament when contestants abilities differ greatly are similar i complement these findings with experimental evidence the experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable under high heterogeneity whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the single prize tournament furthermore high ability agents under participate and low ability agents over participate in the high prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction jel c72 d82 j33 m51 m52

who participates in tax avoidance evidence from swedish microdata abstractthis article empirically examines why not all individuals participate in tax avoidance we use rich swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers with a link between corporate and individual tax returns and document that few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation in addition to monetary benefits from tax avoidance incentives the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance access as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities awareness are important factors for the individual s tax avoidance decision we further show that tax avoidance spreads within communities the impact of the local network is stronger for non commuters who live and work in the same municipality

fairness spillovers the case of taxation abstract it is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred however grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts causing non compliant behavior there we present evidence that such fairness spillovers can incur large economic costs a belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich do not pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work

reducing evasion through self reporting evidence from charitable contributions abstract in absence of third party reporting taxpayers are required to self report information with various degrees of detail ranging from uncorroborated claims to comprehensive records with receipts using a quasi experimental design applied to noncash charitable contribution deductions i show that even basic self reporting requirements are effective at reducing evasion but impose large compliance costs on taxpayers i find that simplified reporting requirements reduce reporting costs by 55 per person and substantially increase claimed donations however half of the new donations are due to evasion thus information reporting should only be imposed on total reported donations above a pre specified threshold

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

enforcement socioeconomic diversity and tax filing compliance in the united states in this article we examine the determinants of tax filing compliance in the united states we use county level data on non filing rates for the tax year 2000 obtained directly from the internal revenue service we include explanatory variables identified in the rational compliance framework including an enforcement index against identified non filers the audit rate of filers and the average penalty rate for both filers and non filers we also examine the role of socioeconomic diversity on tax compliance testing whether within county heterogeneity in household income language race and religion can help explain variation in non filing rates we find that non filing is increasing with heterogeneity by race although not by income or language and that non filing is decreasing with heterogeneity by religious membership as for enforcement variables we find that non filing rates tend to fall with the enforcement index other variables have somewhat mixed results

ghostbusting in detroit evidence on nonfilers from a controlled field experiment abstract many people who owe income tax fail to file a timely tax return in communication with these ghosts what messages from the tax authority are effective for eliciting a return this is the first study to address message content in communication with income tax nonfilers i assess the efficacy of messages related to penalty salience punishment probability compliance cost and civic pride by evaluating the response to experimental mailings distributed by detroit to 7142 suspected resident nonfilers the penalty salience message was the most effective relative to a basic mailing that requested a return penalty salience mailings that stated the statutory penalty for failing to file a return tripled response rates from 3 to 10 compliance cost mailings that enclosed a blank tax return and punishment probability mailings that stated the recipient s federal income also raised response rates relative to the basic mailing but civic pride mailings did not i investigate the impact of treatment mailings on the behavior of untreated neighbors and find no evidence of geographic network effects

growth convergence some panel data evidence this paper implements a panel data approach of the solow model to study the phenomenon of growth convergence for 22 oecd countries it shows that although the derived estimable solow model is probably underspecified from an econometric point of view it is still possible to conclude that there is a likely convergence to a steady state rate of about 2 4

taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota abstract in 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined compared to a control group that did not receive this letter low and middle income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance the effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade in fact the difference in differences is not statistically significant for those who do not have self employment or farm income and do not pay estimated tax surprisingly however the reported tax liability of the high income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

taxes informality and income shifting evidence from a recent pakistani tax reform abstract this paper examines firm behavior to taxation in a low enforcement and large informality setting using quasi experimental variation created by a tax reform which increased taxation of partnerships substantially relative to firms of other legal form and the population of income tax returns filed in pakistan in 2006 11 i document that treated firms report significantly lower earnings migrate into informality and switch business form in response to the increase in tax rate the revenue loss caused by these behavioral responses is so large that by the third year after the reform the government was collecting less revenue than it would have without the tax increase this implies that the new tax rate was on the wrong side of the laffer curve and would not have been optimal under any social preferences the richness of the data and tax variation permits me to decompose the observed responses into real and evasion margins and to identify fiscal externalities created by the reform on other tax bases the welfare cost of the reform increases by around 40 once these externalities are taken into account

morality in the market abstract being honest can be a competitive disadvantage in markets with the opportunity to violate laws and regulations producers who are willing to cheat may crowd out more efficient producers who are honest and buyers who are willing to cheat may crowd out honest buyers with higher willingness to pay this mechanism makes morality honesty a bad substitute for sanctions in markets honesty reduces cheating but the output may be less efficiently produced and less efficiently allocated among buyers i also show that the effect of honesty depends crucially on the fraction of honest traders among both buyers and sellers while it does not matter whether a buyer or a seller pays the sanction it does matter who is honest

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

bunching at the kink implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts abstract a large literature in empirical public finance relies on bunching to identify a behavioral response to non linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually we conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in medicare part d where a kink in the individual s budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous donut hole we show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts these findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest

feasible smooth income tax schedules benefits and distributional implications existing tax schedules are often overly complex and characterized by discontinuities in the marginal tax burden in this paper we propose a class of progressive smooth functions to replace persona

optimal tax administration abstract this paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions the enforcement elasticity of tax revenue that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates among the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures and of the optimal compliance gap

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

an experimental investigation of research tournaments i introduction research tournaments have played an important role in the economic growth of nations since the earliest stages of the industrial revolution for example the golden age of steam locomotion was spawned by a research tournament sponsored by the liverpool and manchester railway in 1829 1 more recently research tournaments have been used to create a variety of products ranging from fuel efficient refrigerators langreth 1994 and digital televisions economist 1993 to high tech fighter aircraft for the military schwartz et al 1991 today scientists and lawmakers are even considering the use of a research contest to propel the development of the first manned space mission to mars 2 despite the recurring popularity of research tournaments over the last two hundred years the first theoretical model for evaluating their efficiency was not published until taylor s 1995 seminal work taylor s model provides a theoretical basis for evaluating the effect the number of competitors and tournament duration have on the amount of effort expended by contestants in a research tournament taylor proved that by limiting the number of competitors in a research tournament and charging each competitor an entry fee research tournament sponsors can induce an efficient amount of innovative effort fullerton and mcafee 1999 extended research tournament theory to include competitions with heterogeneous contestants showing for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two and sponsors can induce the best qualified competitors to enter the tournament by holding specialized all pay entry auctions although the economic intuition behind these research tournaments is straightforward the empirical calculations required to compute their equilibrium strategies are very complex and it is an empirical question as to whether individuals are able to compute these strategies therefore to investigate the predictive power of research tournament models we conducted a series of laboratory experiments to test taylor s seminal research tournament theory by examining whether subjects in a controlled economic laboratory setting can be induced to expend the predicted amount of research and development rd x 0 each new innovation is drawn with recall from the distribution of innovations allowing each competitor to retain the best draw across all t periods of the tournament

on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments i introduction laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in economics and increasingly they have been used to examine specific public policy issues there is much to be gained from careful laboratory experiments they offer a low cost means of testing and replicating policy innovations and they generate precise data on individual behavior thereby allowing estimation of behavioral responses importantly they allow many policy innovations to be introduced singly and exogenously in a controlled environment and as a result laboratory experiments are typically seen as having a high degree of internal validity brewer 2000 campbell and stanley 1966 shadish cook and campbell 2002 because the causal relation between variables can be properly demonstrated however as emphasized by plott 1987 using laboratory experiments can allow more general inferences regarding human behavior only when the setting implemented in the laboratory parallels what is observed in the naturally occurring world even beyond this requirement of parallelism is the need for generalizing behavioral observations from the laboratory to the field or external validity internal validity can be demonstrated through the evaluation of the design however external validity can only be verified empirically and only with respect to the specific setting being investigated this paper investigates the external validity of laboratory experiments and does so in the context of experiments on tax compliance behavior tax evasion is central to many important policy questions current estimates report the tax gap or difference between taxes owed and taxes paid in the united states to be 450 billion annually internal revenue service 2012 beyond these massive revenue losses evasion creates major misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes its presence requires that government expend resources to detect noncompliance to measure its magnitude and to penalize tax evasion evasion alters the distribution of income in arbitrary unpredictable and unfair ways and it may contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law more broadly it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of tax evasion laboratory methods have been used to examine a wide range of policies that may affect the compliance decision policies that have not always proven amenable to either theoretical analyses or empirical analyses with field data however laboratory studies of compliance are sometimes viewed with skepticism the most common criticism is that the student subjects typically used in experiments may not be representative of taxpayers undergraduates may have little experience with filing tax returns and their economic and demographic backgrounds may differ from those of taxpayers another criticism is that the context of laboratory compliance experiments does not closely enough resemble the context in which actual compliance decisions are made as a result there is a concern that experimental results on policy innovations that rely upon student subjects in laboratory compliance experiments cannot be generalized to the population it is this issue that we examine here building on previous research we present several types of evidence on the external validity of experiments on individual compliance decisions a first question examines whether behavior of laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world that is do participants in laboratory experiments exhibit different patterns of behavior than individuals in a similar naturally occurring setting to answer this question we utilize a special data set from the u s internal revenue service irs assembled as part of its national research program nrp

export to elude abstract how does domestic value added tax vat reform affect firms export we address this question via a model in which firms choose their sales for the domestic and foreign markets optimally the model predicts that strengthening domestic tax enforcement has a negative effect on domestic sales but a positive effect on exports when firms face a convex production cost function we test the model predictions using detailed firm and product level data from chinese industrial surveys and customs records our empirical analyses rely on china s golden tax project which is an information technology introduced in 2001 2002 that dramatically reduces the cost of vat enforcement we find that after the adoption of the technology by the government firms located far from local tax offices face a larger increase in their effective vat rates than those located nearby the enforcement effect and the former increase their export more than the latter the elusion effect we also find that the elusion effect is stronger for firms subject to higher export rebates or more severe financial constraints

reported gross income and marginal tax rates estimation of the behavioural reactions of spanish taxpayers this article estimates for the spanish personal income tax the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates the identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by law 35 2006 which came into force in january 2007 the elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs with significant regional differences the average elasticity estimated for spain as a whole is 0 676 however this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the spanish administrative regions which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax thus households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0 337 compared to 0 682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings lastly a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level an elasticity of 3 6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000

reciprocity and willingness to pay taxes evidence from a survey experiment in latin america are citizens more willing to pay taxes when the government s performance improves we review the tax morale literature disentangling its different components and provide empirical evidence exploiting a novel survey conducted in seventeen latin american cities and an experimental attempt at measuring reciprocity in tax collection in developing countries the evidence suggests that governments interested in increasing tax revenues should not focus solely on escalating the coercive power of the state that is more audits and fines rather providing better public services to society can be an effective albeit limited tool to raise revenues

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

higher taxes more evasion evidence from border differentials in tv license fees this paper studies the evasion of tv license fees in austria we exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion comparing municipalities at the low and high fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0 3 percentage points the positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks