long run water demand estimation habits adjustment dynamics and structural breaks this article examines a water demand equation for milan for the second half of the 20th century 1950 2001 we focus mainly on the effects of price and habits but also account for other factors in the demand for water such as climate income and productive activity allowing for trend break stationarity or nonlinear trend stationarity we find evidence against the unit root hypothesis for many time series based on this result standard cointegration analysis would not be appropriate therefore we adopt an alternative estimation and testing procedure we focus in particular on the so called bounds testing approach which can be applied irrespective of the level of integration of the variables and which can be a useful modelling strategy given that dynamics are important when estimating a water demand equation the main results are that long run price elasticity is higher than short run elasticity and that consumption habits are relevant we also find that both climate sectoral and technological modif

managerial reputation and the competitiveness of an industry abstract the interaction between managerial incentives and strategic behavior in a duopolistic industry is explored managers are differentiated by their ability to reduce overhead costs a manager s current compensation is an increasing function of firm profit while his future income depends on the labor market s beliefs over his ability for the purpose of enhancing their reputation in the labor market we show that managers choose to produce in excess of that predicted by profit maximization this result applies only to imperfectly competitive industries though the intensity of competition is independent of industry volatility when firms are profit maximizers we find that the price cost margin is decreasing in the variance of industry wide shocks when firms are manager run

interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

how much does water consumption drop when each household takes charge of its own consumption the case of the city of seville making individuals take charge of their own domestic water consumption is one of the measures used to reduce the growing demand for this resource and to achieve sustainable consumption compatible with the goal of equity the use of individual meters instead of communal meters and fixing tariffs by inhabitant rather than by household are two measures aimed at achieving these objectives this article assesses the measures put in place in the seville metropolitan area during the last 20 years with an unobserved component model set up in a state space framework estimated using maximum likelihood water consumption elasticity to individual meters has changed from 0 307 to 1 317 with the introduction of per inhabitant tariffs which demonstrates that there are water saving synergies when the two measures are implemented together the reductions in water consumption achieved with these measures are also longer lasting than the changes in consumption habits during the frequent droughts in seville

fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

privately operated water utilities municipal price negotiation and estimation of residential water demand the case of france this paper addresses the issue of price negotiation between a municipality and a private water utility operator and its implications for residential water demand estimation we use appropriate econometric procedures to estimate a water demand equation on a panel of french municipalities we find evidence that negotiated water price depends on municipality s characteristics causing endogeneity of price in the demand equation the impact of average household income housing and system features such as metering is investigated both on municipal consumption and price estimated price and income elasticities are significant and close to previous household level studies

to harmonize or to compete that s not the question abstract neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization however policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased economic advisers politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization harmonization is moreover undermined by incentives to re establish tax differences both activities prevent the possibility frontier from being simply a menu of choice popular referenda and functional overlapping competing jurisdictions focjs are institutions able to reduce political distortions and to shift the possibility frontier

corporate taxation in the oecd in a wider context against the background of increased globalisation statutory corporate tax rates have shown a clear downward trend over the last two decades the sharp decline in these rates was accompanied by substantial tax base broadening and a comparable reduction in personal income tax rates only until the early 1990s this suggests that corporate tax competition is of increasing importance so far corporate tax revenues remain fairly stable but an analysis of corporate taxation in the context of the overall tax systems shows that a substantial shift towards value added taxes has taken place while the trends so far have been driven by smaller european countries recent tax reforms indicate that increasing tax competition is inducing a shift towards consumption even for larger economies

do droughts have long term effects on water consumption evidence from the urban area of barcelona this article examines the long term effects of droughts on water consumption using data of municipalities of the urban area of barcelona two important characteristics of the sample of municipalities are the relatively low water consumption in the pre drought period and the fact that indoor uses are clearly predominant controlling for prices income and various socio demographic factors we find a reduction in water consumption not only during the drought episode but also in subsequent periods these permanent reductions in water use may be explained by household behavioural changes technological changes or structural water policy changes

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

on welfare measurement in cities this paper extends project evaluation in a spatial urban economy to consider the more general case of distortionary public finances if a local public improvement is financed at least in part by a distortionary property tax we show that residential land prices do not accurately measure the value of land improvements even when households are identical and the improvement is infinitesimally small the magnitude and direction of the measurement error will depend on the second order effects on aggregate demand via changes in population density at each location and on overall city size

estimating residential water demand in the presence of free allowances the main aim of this paper is to quantify the impact of a rate structure which includes a free allowance on residential water consumption the analysis here differs from most previous research in that it explicitly recognizes that water consumption above the free allowance being sensitive to price responds less to social and climatic factors than consumption below the free allowance while the model specification and estimation procedures used here should be of interest to those interested in the demand for water the results using data for adelaide south australia on the determinants of water consumption should be of interest to water authorities

optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information this paper studies optimal redistribution among two different regions in a federal state regional governments supply local public goods financed with distorting local taxes they have better information on their tax bases than the federal government we model this both as an adverse selection problem on the size of local tax bases and or as moral hazard problem on local tax enforcement moral hazard alone does not affect the first best redistribution rule which is a lump sum transfer from the rich to the poor region in all other cases the optimal transfer rule involves a lump sum tax on the rich regions and a premium for fiscal effort by the poor regions with the transfer falling short of the first best level in the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse selection tax evasion occurs only in the poor region even though the possibility of lax tax enforcement benefits the rich and harms the poor region because it reduces equilibrium redistribution this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the local distribution of endowments matters modelling tax competition with heterogeneous local residents this study expands on the tax competition literature by incorporating the heterogeneity of resource endowments into the tax competition framework it theoretically elaborates that the local distribution of resource endowments affects both the level of tax rate and the degree of spatial dependence in tax competition and empirically confirms the theory using the data for 60 urban municipalities in the seoul metropolitan area sma korea in the years 2004 2006 a spatial panel model for tax cut confirms the presence of tax competition in the sma and the effects on tax cut of the resource endowment distribution another regression model for local indicators of spatial dependence uncovers the fact that the spatial dependence in tax cut is also determined by the local endowment distribution

eco dumping capital mobility and international trade a small open economy s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution the country produces traded as well as non traded goods is it in the country s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded good sector the answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country however if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded good sector the opposite of ecological dumping

tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model abstract this note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital even though a lump sum tax is available the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive in a symmetric equilibrium this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

political economy and the social marginal cost of public funds the case of the meltzer richard economy i introduction the marginal cost of public funds mcf is defined as the full cost to the private sector of raising an additional dollar of tax revenue including deadweight loss or excess burden of taxation imposed on taxpayers much of the theoretical literature on the mcf is cast in the framework of a one consumer economy however the main reason why we have distortionary taxes in the first place is precisely because of the need for redistribution or the existence of consumers with heterogeneity in view of this inconsistency several papers including dahlby 1998 and sandmo 1998 have recently started addressing the so called social marginal cost of public funds smcf in models with heterogenous consumers 1 these papers highlight how the redistributive concern may alter the calculation of the smcf 2 in previous studies on the mcf or smcf the existing of status quo tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal 3 it is arguable however that the existing tax system is neither arbitrary nor optimal but rather represents a political equilibrium the approach adopted by hettich and winer 1999 and persson and tabellini 2000 corroborates this argument in surveying the political economy of public finance the authors of these two books explicitly portrayed public policy as the equilibrium outcome of some specified political process in this note we study the smcf issue on the basis of the plausible premise that the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium the calculation of the smcf is basically a normative exercise the premise that the existing tax system is a policy outcome in political equilibrium will enable us to exploit the positive property of political equilibrium in this normative exercise as an illustration of our approach we revisit the political economy of redistributive taxation as set out in meltzer and richard 1981 hereafter m r the m r model holds a prominent position in the redistribution literature and has been elaborated and extended in many directions persson and tabellini 2000 part ii 4 section ii overviews the m r model sections iii and iv derive and discuss the smcf in the m r economy an interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the smcf and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate ii the m r model a economy consideran economy in which there are n 1 u sup i u c sup i l sup i i 1 n this utility function is assumed to be smooth and possess the usual properties the income tax system consists of two parameters a marginal tax rate t and a lump sum grant a the tax system pays the lump sum grant or demogrant a to each individual and finances the payment by imposing the marginal tax rate t on all earned income 5 the budget constraint facing individual i is 2 c sup i 1 t w sup i l sup i a i 1 n where l sup i denotes the labor supply with l sup i l sup i 1 from equations 1 and 2 we can derive the indirect utility function 3 v sup i v 1 t w sup i a u 1 t w sup i l sup i a 1 l sup i i 1 n it is assumed that the government budget is balanced denoting per capita pretax income by y we then have 4 ty a where y summation y sup i n with y sup i w sup i l sup i b political economy the preferences of individuals qua voters over income tax policy are represented by the indirect utility function 3

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

interaction between federal taxation and horizontal tax competition theory and evidence from canada the aim of this paper is to determine to what extent and how federal taxes affect local tax decisions testing the impact of an increase in the federal tax on horizontal tax competition with canada us data for 1984 1994 it finds evidence that an increase in federal tax makes horizontal tax reactions weaker this is because an increase in federal tax raises the cost in terms of utility of income of a unit increase in the province s tax rate on the methodological side it is possible to estimate the impact of the federal tax on the fiscal policy of the province without neglecting control for year effects which cannot be used in the empirical literature because they are perfectly collinear with the federal tax

the politics of 1992 fiscal policy and european integration the internal market in europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources how will this affect fiscal policy in different countries we consider taxation of capital in a two country model where a democratically chosen government in each country chooses tax policy higher capital mobility changes the politico economic equilibrium in two ways on the one hand it leads to more tax competition between the countries this economic effect tends to lower tax rates in both countries on the other hand it alters voters preferences and makes them elect a different government this political effect offsets the increased tax competition although not completely

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

the political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians in the public finance literature the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable public choice arguments in contrast suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess political distortions may lead to a waste of taxmoney according to this view tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector the present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework the government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians it turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions the effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians

land leasing and local public finance in china s regional development evidence from prefecture level cities by analysing the evolution of local governments roles in different periods of china s growth in transition this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s local land development behaviour is related to china s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements on the basis of panel data covering prefectural level cities from 1999 to 2003 the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing by negotiation versus by auction tender policy implications are drawn from this analysis for the further reform of china s urban land system and fiscal institutions

tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns abstract we augment a standard tax model by concerns about tax equity people get upset when labour is taxed more heavily than capital even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the common tenet that capital remains tax exempt in small open economies this holds for exogenous as well as for endogenous government expenditures and irrespective of whether concerns with tax equity only cause emotional discomfort or also impact on work incentives if concerns with tax equity get more intense the economy may choose higher taxes on labour and move to the downward sloped part of its laffer curve for endogenous government spending stronger concerns with tax equity may lead to a larger size of the public sector

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

tax competition relative performance and policy imitation rather than about their absolute payoffs governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments moreover they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere i study such behavior in a standard tax competition game both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept independently of the number of jurisdictions involved an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players it thus involves drastic efficiency losses

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy abstract this paper explores the implications of the interaction between inter regional tax competition and intra regional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy a la osborne and slivinski 1996 and besley and coate 1997 as an extension of hoyt s 1991 finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered in particular we identify plausible conditions under which i there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and ii intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

is all domestic water consumption sensitive to price control this paper presents a model of residential water demand based on the stone geary utility function which explicitly considers a threshold of water that is insensitive to price and a quantity that can adapt instantaneously to price changes first the threshold is assumed constant being then allowed to vary according to past levels of consumption a proxy for households water using equipment and habits a measure of the depreciation rate of habits is derived and the effectiveness of price and non price conservation measures are compared the results provide useful policy recommendations for the studied case of seville spain

factor taxation income distribution and capital market integration this paper addresses the optimal mix of capital and wage taxation when policymakers maximize the political support of workers and capitalists subject to a fixed revenue requirement capital market integration increases the efficiency costs of a tax on capital hut simultaneously changes the political equilibrium through its effect on the distribution of factor incomes these distributional effects are directly opposed in the capital importing and the capital exporting region while the capital tax rate will always be lowered in the capital importing region the tax rate in the exporting country will rise when political resistance to market induced changes in the distribution of income is sufficiently high

the importance of local corporate taxes in business location decisions evidence from french micro data determinants of businesses locations are known to be multiple locations of partners and competitors are crucial as well as the territory s local characteristics to consider the importance of local taxes we build a poisson model to explain the number of business creations observed in a given municipality first results suggest that there are unobserved factors driving firm creation that are positively correlated with the level of local taxes to deal with this potential source of endogeneity we present an approach close to regression discontinuity design we find that everything else being equal higher local taxes actually tend to deter firms from setting up in a given zone but the effect is weak

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

how do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism tax vs expenditure optimization previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public flnance while expenditures adjust residually this paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable in particular it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments in uences the way local governments decide on public policy unlike the presumption the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures the result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local flscal efiort the results ofier a new perspective of the e ciency implications of federal policy toward local governments and thereby enable a more precise characterization of local government behavior in flscal federalism

economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes this paper analyzes the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with workers and capitalists that own internationally mobile and immobile firms among other results our model predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate relative to the wage tax when preferences for public goods increase or when the share of capital employed in multinational firms is rising we further show how an increase in the wage share changes both the relative size of tax bases and the political influence of different income groups the predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 oecd countries for the period 1980 through 2004 the results of the empirical analysis support our main hypotheses

possible adverse effects of increasing block water tariffs in developing countries ture in which a commodity is priced at a low initial rate up to a specified volume of use block then at a higher or several increasingly higher rates for additional blocks used the ordinary household municipal water bill in developing countries is often calculated on some sort of ibt structure and donor organizations and consultants continue to recommend this practice for town and city water systems the majority of world bank sponsored water tariff studies conducted since 1970 for example have recommended the use of increasing block water tariffs there are two commonly accepted justifications for using ibts the first based on a rationale of equity is that ibts should assist low income households and ensure an equitable allocation of the costs of water production and distribution the argument in this case is that low income households use less water than high income households because they have fewer water using appliances and are less likely to have large lawns and gardens an ibt results in higher marginal prices to the customer and thus higher average prices for higher income households the price of water in the initial block may be set very low usually at a subsidized rate to ensure that the poor are not discouraged from using the amount of water considered essential for human needs typically estimated at 25 50 liters per capita per day the price of water in the initial block is thus sometimes termed the lifeline rate the second justification for ibt structures is that the higher prices charged beyond the initial block discourage extravagant water use and promote water conservation both these justifications for ibts assume that each household has

tax and the city a theory of local tax competition abstract in this paper we propose a novel theoretical model of tax competition at the local level large jurisdictions cities compete both locally with smaller neighbouring communities and interregionally with more distant cities while small jurisdictions hinterlands compete only with other jurisdictions in their neighbourhood the model structure is motivated by recent empirical findings as well as survey results among german mayors the perceived intensity of competition for firms varies considerably between jurisdictions and can mainly be explained by the size and location of the jurisdiction our model predicts contrary to earlier findings for competition between countries or regions that capital taxes of large jurisdictions fall more strongly with increasing interregional competition and may eventually lead to smaller taxes than in small jurisdictions hinterlands are therefore less affected from globalisation than cities we contrast our results with a standard tax competition model in which all jurisdictions compete with all other jurisdictions

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly abstract we demonstrate that the benefit that an oligopolistic firm derives from departmentalization managerial specialization depends upon the internal organization of the rival firm as a result even if both firms are assumed a priori identical they need not select an identical form of internal organization since the benefit from departmentalization exhibits increasing returns to scale a duopolist derives more restricted benefits from departmentalizing compared with a monopolist the implications of increased competition or the form of internal organization upon the compensation of managers depends upon the degree of correlation between the uncertain demands that face competing firms

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

how a race to the bottom can make you fat abstractthis article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the united states through education and health spending we hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms r

effect of price information on residential water demand microeconomic theory predicts that people decrease consumption when price increases the magnitude of the effect depending on price elasticity the law of demand however implicitly assumes that consumers know prices an assumption that is not always satisfied in markets with ex post billing when prices are not transparent elasticity estimates are potentially lower than their full information potential evidence of low price elasticity abounds in residential water demand studies limiting the effectiveness and desirability of using price signals as a conservation tool it is hypothesized that resident s sluggish response to price is partly due to the absence of price information on water bills differences in the informational content of bills are documented for the first time on the basis of sample bills collected from 383 utilities across the usa a standard aggregate water demand model is augmented with qualitative variables describing differences in billing information allowing such variables to a

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

analysing rationing policies drought and its effects on urban users welfare analysing rationing policies during drought the aim of this paper is to study the impact on consumers of rationing policies implemented during water shortages water scarcity gives rise to the need for rationing and various methods including supply cutoffs can be used a model is devised to quantify the welfare losses associated with qualitive and quantitive restrictions based on virtual prices and using the consumer surplus as a welfare measurement welfare variations for different users have been calculated to achieve the aim information relative to seville spain has been used analysing the drought period that took place in the first half of the 1990s it has been possible to observe the main source that led to welfare losses for each kind of user

foreign investment incentives and international cross hauling of capital this note shows how international tax competition can give rise to special tax breaks for foreign investment discriminatory tax treatment of outside investment can give rise to socially harmful cross flows of international investment paradoxically an increase in the costs associated with foreign investment can increase welfare

incentive schemes as strategic variables an application to a mixed duopoly abstract in the context of asymmetry of information between firms owners and their managers we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in a duopoly with a public and a private firm by giving the public manager an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue we show that welfare can be improved furthermore we show that the government should not privatize the public company

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects