economics of leadership and hierarchy this paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations for each hierarchy i consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action at the top of the hierarchy are the leaders who learn the state from nature the hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game and determines the equilibrium output and welfare i show that the welfare optimal hierarchy is the chain because it maximizes the incentive of players to lead by example for their subordinates the chain remains optimal even in the presence of verifiable or unverifiable costly information acquisition by the leaders

development fertility and childbearing age a unified growth theory during the last two centuries fertility has exhibited in industrialized economies two distinct trends the cohort total fertility rate follows a decreasing pattern while the cohort average age at motherhood exhibits a u shaped pattern this paper proposes a unified growth theory aimed at rationalizing those two demographic stylized facts we develop a three period olg model with two periods of fertility and show how a traditional economy where individuals do not invest in higher education and where income rises push towards advancing births can progressively converge towards a modern economy where individuals invest in higher education and where income rises encourage postponing births our findings are illustrated numerically by replicating the dynamics of the quantum and the tempo of births for swedish cohorts born between 1876 and 1966

perpetual signalling with imperfectly correlated costs in many imperfect information models in industrial organization a firm is induced to take an action that does not maximize its first period profit because other firms view this action as a signal about the firm s private information in these models because the opponent firms can correctly invert the firm s strategy all information is revealed after play in the first period and in subsequent periods all firms play their single period profit maximizing strategies thus behavior like limit pricing is observed only in the first period and not in any subsequent period the empirical importance of such signalling behavior however depends on its being perpetuated through time rather than being a single period phenomenon in this article such perpetual signalling is obtained by allowing the variable about which firms have private information to vary through time in a separating equilibrium while a firm s action will perfectly reveal its private information in a period it will not perfectly reveal the firm s private information in subsequent periods thus the incentive to signal perpetuates through time

selling an asset to a competitor a seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers the seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item we show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2 who does not interact ex post with the seller and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest the auction is therefore subject to resale when resale is possible the seller must distort the original auction we show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post the seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market however she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage

what do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation this study empirically evaluates the certification and value added roles of reputable venture capitalists vcs using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start ups with multiple financing offers i analyze financing offers made by competing vcs at the first professional round of start up funding holding characteristics of the start up fixed offers made by vcs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted and high reputation vcs acquire start up equity at a 10 14 discount the evidence suggests that vcs extra financial value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital these extra financial services can have financial consequences a central issue for early stage high tech entrepreneurs is obtaining external resources when the assets of their start up are intangible and knowledge based particularly for entrepreneurs without an established reputation convincing external resource providers such as venture capitalists vcs to provide financial capital may be challenging the literature contains two main lines of research for overcoming this problem one research stream has concentrated on designing institutional structures to permit financing early stage ventures this contractual and monitoring based approach is aimed at solving potential agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs e g admati and pfleiderer 1994 lerner 1995 hellmann 1998 and kaplan and str omberg 2001 2002 2003 a second research stream has suggested that when the quality of a start up cannot be directly observed external actors rely on the quality of the start up s affiliates as a signal of the start up s own quality

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

debt deleveraging and the liquidity trap a fisher minsky koo approach in this paper we present a simple new keynesian style model of debt driven slumps that is situations in which an overhang of debt on the part of some agents who are forced into rapid deleveraging is depressing aggregate demand making some agents debt constrained is a surprisingly powerful assumption fisherian debt deflation the possibility of a liquidity trap the paradox of thrift a keynesiantype multiplier and a rationale for expansionary fiscal policy all emerge naturally from the model we argue that this approach sheds considerable light both on current economic difficulties and on historical episodes including japan s lost decade now in its 18th year and the great depression itself

from the crowd to the market the role of reward based crowdfunding performance in attracting professional investors abstract we focus on new technology based entrepreneurial ventures engaging in reward based crowdfunding and examine the effect of their performance in such funding channel on the likelihood of securing subsequent funding from professional investors we also study how this effect is influenced by the presence of patents granted for the new product idea and the entrepreneur social capital results from a sample of technology projects launched on kickstarter demonstrate that pledging a higher amount of money in crowdfunding can ignite professional investors interest and thus help secure subsequent funding however this positive evidence is effective only when complemented by the presence of patents or a large network of social ties

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality this paper analyses the effects of introducing potential entry by an uninformed high quality firm into a market where the privately informed incumbent already uses the price to signal product quality to uninformed consumers contrary to most of the literature on potential entry we show that the effect of potential entry may be to distort the first period price upwards compared to the no entry case and thus to decrease consumer surplus in the first period when separating equilibria exist the quality uncertainty is resolved in the unique self enforcing equilibrium and the pre entry limit pricing does not limit entry compared to the full information case hence not only the high quality incumbent but also the consumers suffer a decrease in the present value of payoffs as a result of potential entry by a high quality firm

a note on debt and economic activity this note explores how debt flows may have an effect on economic activity crucially banks are not viewed as mere financial intermediaries but as agents who create and lend money to borrowers without reducing anyone s holdings of money in the process

when credit bites back using data on 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008 we document two key facts of the modern business cycle relative to typical recessions financial crisis recessions are costlier and more credit intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions in financial crises or otherwise and slower recoveries we use local projection methods to condition on a broad set of macro economic controls to study how past credit accumulation impacts key macro economic variables such as output investment lending interest rates and inflation the facts that we uncover lend support to the idea that financial factors play an important role in the modern business cycle

monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences this paper considers monetary policy when policy makers preferences are private information i show that in the first period of a two period term all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less but respond more to shocks than if there were no private information moderately inflation averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most a tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first with t period terms inflation depends solely on the policy maker s time left in office with unchanging preferences and no discounting inflation is lower the longer he has left

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

incentive compatibility and differentiability new results and classic applications this note provides several generalizations of mailath s 1987 result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability the new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as leland and pyle 1977 glosten 1989 and demarzo and duffie 1999 that were not previously covered

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

the politics of redistributive social insurance this paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative individuals differ both in their income and risk the social insurance is compulsory and charges an income related contribution with pooling of risks the private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks however due to the adverse selection problem private insurance companies provide only partial insurance adopting a non expected utility model we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion we also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population lastly we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests

the impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence an example abstract a simple non pathological example demostrates that when an incumbent firm has private information about the state of demand an entrant s profits and the likelihood of entry may be decreasing in the state of demand

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

signaling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities this article analyzes the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility while risk neutral contractors undertake a non verifiable operating eort the design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government this feature reduces the agent s marginal incentives creating a trade o between signaling and moral hazard we provide extensions of our framework in several directions allowing for risk aversion on the agent s side double moral hazard and political delegation the model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

class systems and the enforcement of social norms abstract we analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people in this model self enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition however the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose we demonstrate that in such cases it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

conspicuous consumption and race using nationally representative data on consumption we show that blacks and hispanics devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles to visible goods clothing jewelry and cars than do comparable whites these differences exist among virtually all subpopulations are relatively constant over time and are economically large although racial differences in utility preference parameters might account for a portion of these consumption differences we emphasize instead a model of status seeking in which conspicuous consumption is used as a costly indicator of a household s economic position using merged data on race and state level income we demonstrate that a key prediction of the status signaling model that visible consumption should be declining in reference group income is strongly borne out in the data for each racial group moreover we show that accounting for differences in reference group income characteristics explains most of the racial difference in visible consumption

how patenting informs vc investors the case of biotechnology in the presence of asymmetric information economic agents need to communicate their quality to investors and other parties this paper investigates how information generated during the patenting process affects the ability of new ventures to attract vc financing while much of the literature on information asymmetries focuses on patent applications we argue that the entire examination process should be considered including information that emerges in the course of patent examination and review we test several hypotheses using a sample of british and german companies that seek venture capital we find that the filing of patent applications is positively related to vc financing moreover the examination process at the patent office generates valuable technological and commercial information via search reports citations and opposition procedures which affect the likelihood of vc financing our results suggest that the patenting process supports investors in updating their expectations regarding the quality of new ventures

export subsidies as signals of competitiveness in a cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm this signalling effect strengthens the usual profit shifting argument for an export subsidy the optimal export subsidy in the signalling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit shifting export subsidy under complete information

equal sacrifice and incentive compatible income taxation abstract the concepts of equal sacrifice and incentive compatibility in income taxation have been of interest to economists for some time here we attempt to integrate the two literatures in a model that offers a labor leisure choice to consumers while imposing an equal relative or absolute sacrifice tax system the main result is that equal sacrifice incentive compatible income tax systems generally exist and are locally unique examples are presented where this tax system is easy to compute comparative statics are calculated finally some remarks about the welfare properties of these tax systems are made

the financial cycle and macroeconomics what have we learnt abstract it is high time we rediscovered the role of the financial cycle in macroeconomics in the environment that has prevailed for at least three decades now it is not possible to understand business fluctuations and the corresponding analytical and policy challenges without understanding the financial cycle this calls for a rethink of modelling strategies and for significant adjustments to macroeconomic policies this essay highlights the stylised empirical features of the financial cycle conjectures as to what it may take to model it satisfactorily and considers its policy implications in the discussion of policy the essay pays special attention to the bust phase which is less well explored and raises much more controversial issues

quality choice trade policy and firm incentives quality choice is examined in a duopoly with one foreign and one domestic firm where consumers have similar preferences for quality but different preferences for brands firms make quality commitments prior to choosing price and policy intervention assumes several forms the policy conclusions depend on whether firms face set up costs in raising product quality in the absence of set up costs both domestic and foreign firms make socially optimal quality choices in the presence of set up costs the foreign firm and often the domestic firm sets quality below the socially optimal level incomplete information alters these conclusions however copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

are green products over priced this article investigates conditions under which high prices in conjunction with low levels of pollution signal environmentally clean products it is shown that when consumers cannot ascertain the environmental performance of products the price must be distorted upward to signal a clean product a clean producer saves less from emitting pollution and so raises price and restricts output with less reluctance than does a dirty producer the theoretical result of over pricing is consistent with the evidence that green products receive higher prices than conventional products however optimistic prior beliefs of high environmental performance may cause signaling to fail

patents and cumulative innovation causal evidence from the courts cumulative innovation is central to economic growth do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow on innovation this paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent as measured by later citations we exploit random allocation of judges at the u s court of appeal for the federal circuit to control for the endogeneity of patent invalidation we find that patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent on average but the impact is highly heterogeneous patent rights appear to block follow on innovation only in the technology fields of computers electronics and medical instruments moreover the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers entry of small innovators suggesting that patents may impede the democratization of innovation

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information when the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand in the signalling equilibrium the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information however it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand the domestic government can avoid the cost of signalling by delegating tariff setting to a revenue maximising agent

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

schooling as human capital or a signal a new way is proposed to distinguish between the human capital and the signaling theories of the value of education if education is a signal then the essence of the signal should be distilled in the position of an individual in the distribution of education for his cohort estimating earnings equations that include both absolute years and relative percentile measures of education provides a test of the two competing theories analyzing two separate panel data sources under a range of alternative specifications we find that the years measure of schooling has a consistently significant positive effect on earnings but that the rank measure rarely does this evidence supports the conclusion that human capital rather than signaling is the predominant explanation of schooling s value

are treble damages neutral sequential equilibrium and private antitrust enforcement a sequential equilibrium model of private antitrust enforcement is presented consumers have incomplete information about cartel costs and cannot accurately estimate a priori the damage recovery from an antitrust action consumers are able to infer cartel costs from the equilibrium pricing strategy of firms the universal divinity criterion is used to characterize the sequential equilibrium it is shown that for a sufficiently large damage multiple antitrust enforcement effectively increases social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

sequential equilibrium investment by regulated firms we examine the investment decisions of regulated firms in a sequential equilibrium model under asymmetric information the regulator is unable to commit to a pricing policy unlike mechanism design models but sets rates after observing the firm s investment the information conveyed by the firm s investment level alleviates the underinvestment observed under full information with limited regulatory commitment the equilibrium regulatory strategy can be characterized by a nonlinear rate of return schedule a regulator announcing such a schedule would be able to make a credible commitment

venture capital investments and the technological performance of portfolio firms what is the relationship between venture capitalists selection of investment targets and the effects of these investments on the patenting performance of portfolio companies in this paper we set out a modelling and estimation framework designed to discover whether venture capital vc increases the patenting performance of firms or whether this effect is a consequence of prior investment selection based on firms patent output we develop simultaneous models predicting the likelihood that firms attract vc financing the likelihood that they patent and the number of patents applied for and granted fully accounting for the endogeneity of investment we find that the effect of vc on patenting is insignificant or negative in contrast to the results generated by simpler models with independent equations our findings show that venture capitalists follow patent signals to invest in companies with commercially viable know how and suggest that they are more likely to rationalise rather than increase the patenting output of portfolio firms

is transparency about central bank plans desirable a central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public s perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation a regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank s preferences and to be non transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation a central bank in the non transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation i find several results about transparent and non transparent regimes some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers in particular i demonstrate that in a non transparent regime increased transparency need not improve the public s ability to infer a central bank s private information i show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency my numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non transparent regimes

how entry threats induce slack abstract profits of incumbent firms are often observable to potential entrants and signal profit opportunities in a market incumbents therefore have an incentive to strategically manipulate profit reports since owners of firms typically derive utility only from profits incumbent firms have to balance the benefit of large profits against the possibility of entry it is shown that owners will generally accept below maximum profit performance i e tolerate slack in order to deter entry and furthermore that such entry deterring behaviour is successful even if it is anticipated by rational entrants

should sellers prefer auctions a laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms when bidders incur a cost to learn their valuations bidder entry can impact auction performance two common selling mechanisms in this environment are an english auction and a sequential bidding process theoretically sellers should prefer the auction because it generates higher expected revenues whereas bidders should prefer the sequential mechanism because it generates higher expected bidder profits we compare the two mechanisms in a controlled laboratory environment varying the entry cost and find that contrary to the theoretical predictions average seller revenues tend to be higher under the sequential mechanism whereas average bidder profits are approximately the same we identify three systematic behavioral deviations from the theoretical model 1 in the auction bidders do not enter 100 of the time 2 in the sequential mechanism bidders do not set preemptive bids according to the predicted threshold strategy and 3 subsequent bidders tend to overenter in response to preemptive bids by first bidders we develop a model of noisy bidder entry costs that is consistent with these behaviors and we show that our model organizes the experimental data well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1800

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

the sale of ideas strategic disclosure property rights and contracting ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea s value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea these problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale an expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining undisclosed know how we examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size

auction and the informed seller problem a seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second price auction with announced reserve price the choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers we characterize the equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the good compared to the symmetric information situation we compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signalling game to the equilibrium of a screening game in which an uninformed monopoly broker chooses the trading mechanism we show that the ex ante expected probability of trade may be larger with a monopoly broker as well as the ex ante total expected surplus

contraception and the demographic transition inspired by the historical english experience we modify the beckerian paradigm of fertility by incorporating costly societal influence on contraception heterogeneous generationally linked households choose between traditional and modern contraception the modern has a higher fixed but lower variable cost of averting childbirths initially the rich adopt the modern which unleashes society wide diffusion eventually everyone switches lowering fertility further and across households hastening the switch is falling child mortality quantitative experiments suggest contraception was a vital link between the historical mortality and fertility transitions though not the latter s proximate cause implications for more recent transitions are discussed

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

two sided altruism and signaling abstract when donors and recipients care about each other two sided altruism asymmetry of information about the donor s income or about the donor s altruism leads naturally to a signaling game the desire to signal income or altruism puts upward pressure on transfers

crime and conspicuous consumption we study how property crime distorts consumption decisions using an incomplete information model we argue that consuming conspicuous goods reveals information to criminals seeking bountiful victims and increases the likelihood of being victimized thus property crime reduces the consumption of visible goods even when these cannot be directly stolen but simply carry information about a potential victim s wealth we exploit the large decline in property crime in the u s during the 90s to test this mechanism using data from the u s consumer expenditure survey from 1986 to 2003 we find that households located in states experiencing sharper reductions in property crime increased significantly their consumption of visible goods even when these goods are not generally stolen both in absolute terms and relative to other consumption goods our findings hold when we instrument the decline in property crime during the 90s using a variety of strategies

social norms fertility and economic development abstract this paper presents an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and human capital accumulation within such a framework it shows how the presence of family size norms can lead to multiple equilibria it can thus potentially explain different development patterns without recourse to increasing returns and differences in initial conditions furthermore it derives sufficient conditions under which different equilibria can be pareto ranked finally it shows that the main results hold also in the case where there exists parental altruism

patents as signals for startup financing patents as signals for startup financing we examine the role of patents as signals used to reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial finance a theoretical model gives conditions for a unique separating equilibrium in which startup founders file for patents to signal invention quality to investors as well as appropriating value the theory allows for heterogeneous investors and examine the optimal match of different types of startups as defined by the quality of their technology to investors who differ in the amount of non financial capital they provide the empirical analysis is consistent with the model s predictions using a novel dataset of israeli startups that received external funding during the period 1994 2011

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

fertility choice under child mortality and social norms abstract in most demographic transitions declines in child mortality precede declines in net fertility rates variants of the barro becker model of fertility fail to deliver this link a simple extension the inclusion of social norms regarding fertility generates the desired effect

reserve price signaling abstract in a general auction model in which bidders signals are affiliated we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information when the buyers signals are independent the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions we also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models

monotone equilibria in signaling games abstract we examine the monotonicity of the sender s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games we show that when the sender s return from the receiver s action depends on her type the spence mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower type we provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone which require that the sender s payoff is decreasing in her action is increasing in the receiver s action and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile we apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling advertising and warranty provision

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item