the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

truthfulness with value maximizing bidders on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets abstract in some markets bidders want to maximize value subject to a budget constraint rather than payoff this is different to the quasilinear utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes we refer to bidders who maximize value as value bidders while simple single object auction formats are truthful standard multi object auction formats allow for manipulation it is straightforward to show that there cannot be a truthful and revenue maximizing deterministic auction mechanism with value bidders and general valuations approximation has been used as remedy to achieve truthfulness on other mechanism design problems and we study which approximation ratios we can get from truthful mechanisms we show that the approximation ratio that can be achieved with a deterministic and truthful approximation mechanism with n bidders cannot be higher than 1 n for general valuations for randomized approximation mechanisms there is a framework with a ratio that is tight

fairness self interest and the politics of the progressive income tax all advanced democracies have adopted income taxes with considerable progression in marginal tax rates to explain this we examine the nature of individual and collective preferences over alternative tax schedules in the context of a simple two sector model we first consider the case of altruistic or sociotropic citizens who view the income tax as a means of achieving a fairer or more egalitarian distribution of income we show that greater marginal rate progressivity may well be less fair that a fairest tax however defined is always a linear or flat rate schedule in which all incomes are taxed at the same marginal rate and that with a purely sociotropic electorate there exists a flat rate schedule which is a majority equilibrium we then show that with self interested voters who seek to minimize their own tax burdens greater marginal rate progression may well be preferred by middle and upper income voters that for middle income citizens the optimal schedule is a sharply progressive one and that within the set of individually optimal schedules there exists a majority equilibrium which is a progressive schedule which minimizes the burden on median income or middle class citizens at the expense of lower and upper income taxpayers

representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation abstract this paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income we present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules this set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear continuous function each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election there is a fixed cost of running the elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax policies our main results provide conditions under which a strong nash equilibrium exists and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some nash equilibria and in any strong nash equilibrium

is there a demand for income tax progressivity recently marhuenda and ortuno ortin economics letters 48 1995 319 have provided a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progressive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is less than the mean income in this paper we provide under similar circumstances a popular support for regressivity theorem according to which for any existing tax scheme there is always a majority support for a regressive reform reducing marginal progressivity or increasing marginal regressivity this regressive reform is supported by both extremes of the income distribution combining this result with marhuenda and ortuno ortin s result implies that vote cycling between regressive and progressive tax reform is inevitable and thus that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in the standard downsian framework with self interested voters

taxes tariffs and transfer pricing in multinational corporate decision making three interrelated aspects of u s multinational corporation activity are analyzed here the ability to shift profits from high tax countries to low tax countries the impact of host country taxes and tariffs on the distribution of real capital and the influence of these policies on international trade patterns of the united states and host countries the cross sectional empirical analysis indicates that the observed pattern of reported profits in high and low tax countries is consistent with income shifting behavior and that real investment responds to host country effective tax rates and tariffs the united states appears both to import more from and export more to low tax countries where mnc investment is greater but this bilateral focus must be amplified to consider multilateral effects if trade benefits are to be projected copyright 1991 by mit press

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

voting over income taxation abstract a major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal rate progressive while it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task we do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim we first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties unfortunately we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal rate progressive taxes

foreign direct investment and investment under uncertainty we show that in uncertain environments ownership and internalization advantages may be negatively rather than positively associated with fdi this reversal from extant theory occurs because ownership advantages often serve to make fdi delayable while internalization advantages often serve to make it less reversible when fdi becomes either more delayable or less reversible it is less likely to occur at a point in time our approach enriches the who where and why explanations offered by current fdi theory to incorporate the question of when

regulation of a risk averse firm abstract we extend the laffont tirole regulation model to the case of risk averse firms our main results are the impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost plus contract as compared with the risk neutral case distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller for high levels of risk aversion the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 l5

the sterling dollar franc triangle monetary diplomacy 1929 1937 the late interwar years encompass a full spectrum of international monetary conflict and cooperation why did great britain france and the united states cooperate in some periods and not in others first the transience of monetary cooperation and conflict is explained in part by inherent characteristics of gold exchange and floating monetary systems second environmental changes swings between prosperity and depression between peace and the threat of war and between monetary orthodoxy and inflationist heresy altered the strategic setting confronting the central monetary powers third the actions of governments both followed from and shaped the circumstances that they confronted through strategies of composition across issues and decomposition across time and actors nations deliberately fostered the emergence of cooperation by altering the context of monetary diplomacy

multinationals and corporate social responsibility in host countries does distance matter prior studies have found that foreign affiliates of multinational enterprises mnes suffer from liability of foreignness lof foreign affiliates may be able to improve their social legitimacy and overcome lof by demonstrating social commitment to host country constituents through corporate social responsibility csr if lof is positively related to the distance between the home and host countries and csr activities confer social legitimacy benefits on foreign affiliates we should expect csr activities and distance to be positively related however we argue that despite this potential motivation foreign affiliates from more distant home countries are in fact less likely to engage in host country csr our argument focuses on the ways in which distance affects the mne s willingness and ability to engage in csr abroad we also predict that host country csr reputation negatively moderates this relationship using community reinvestment act data for foreign bank affiliates from 32 countries in the united states over 1990 2007 we find strong support for our hypotheses the paper enriches our understanding of csr practices in mnes and of when and how mnes try to overcome legitimacy issues in host countries

search and taxation in a model of underground economic activities i introduction it is widely recognized that one major effect of taxation is to stimulate activities in the so called underground or shadow economy indeed the extent of underground activities even in the western countries is by no means negligible schneider and enste 2000 report that the size of the shadow economy as percent of gross domestic product gdp in the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries in 1996 ranged from 7 5 in switzerland to 28 5 in greece this existence of underground activity is a significant source for concern the possibility of evading taxes makes taxation less efficient by undermining the tax base this possibility may jeopardize long run scope for financing adequate public services furthermore it implies that official measures of for example income and unemployment which form the basis for policy will necessarily be biased the purpose of this article is to suggest a simple micro founded framework for studying the relationship between tax policy and underground economic activities a defining characteristic of the latter is that they are illegal 1 the traditional approach starting with the seminal contribution of allingham and sandmo 1972 characterizes tax evasion as an activity for which there is a risk of detection 2 this approach however does not particularly highlight that underground economic activity involves trade we argue that although underground economic activities and regular activities are similar and can coexist one effect of the illegal status of the former is to differentiate the amount of information that is available in the two market segments whereas information about trading opportunities in regular markets can be assumed to be perfect because underground activity is by definition furtive information about trading opportunities in this segment will be less than perfect traditionally search theory has been used to capture the notion of imperfect information in markets this has a natural interpretation in the current context though trading in the regular market can be regarded as frictionless an agent wishing to trade in the underground sector must devote some time and effort to locating trustworthy trading partners with whom he or she can trade illegally at no risk hence we model underground trade as the outcome of a standard bilateral search process where buyers and sellers devote some time to locating each other and implicitly verifying each others trustworthiness 3 this process individually rational when facing taxes is a socially wasteful activity because it subtracts effort from physical production the model identifies a natural link between participation in the underground economy and individual characteristics this is important for analysis of micro level data our model suggests that individuals with lower earnings capacity are more active in underground economic activities hence the model predicts a negative correlation between individual participation in the underground economy and for example hourly wage and education from the evidence that is available this seems consistent with the data 4 the current model can be used as a framework for future empirical work using micro data because it can fairly easily be extended to include other features such as unemployment and variation across industries in the technology available for underground production to make further predictions about individual involvement in underground activities the systematic relation between earnings capacity and participation in the underground economy is also relevant for policy design consider the implementation of a redistributive tax although the tax aims at improving the welfare of the individuals with low earnings capacity the same individuals can benefit from trading in a relatively large underground economy if the tax is only mildly enforced

government policies market imperfections and foreign direct investment the internalization eclectic theory of foreign direct investment includes the important insight that government policies create market imperfections which make foreign direct investment an economically rational strategic alternative for firms this paper reexamines the effects of government policies on market imperfections and foreign direct investment fdi it broadens and refines the analysis of the impact of government policies by developing the following arguments 1 there is a wide range of government policies that affect firms fdi decisions via their effects on market imperfections 2 there are numerous dimensions of variability in government policies that need to be identified in order to understand fully the effects of government policies on market imperfections and hence fdi flows 3 some of the effects of government policies on market imperfections and fdi are the opposite of those previously noted in the fdi literature 4 the effects of government policies vary across the several individual components of fdi flows the paper thus examines the following variables and relationships more extensively and precisely than has the previous literature government policy variables as causal factors affecting fdi market imperfection variables as intervening factors in the causal connections between government policies and fdi and the multiple indicators of the various dimensions of fdi as dependent variables

foreign direct investment in the united states an analysis by country of origin given the large size and rapid growth of foreign direct investment in the united states this subject is a central concern of u s firms and u s government policymakers this study explores the factors that contribute to the explanation of fdi in the united states by country of origin of investment evidence from the past twelve years shows that the main significant positive influences are home country s exports to the united states and home country market size significant negative influences include the home country s imports from the united states the cultural and geographic distances of the home country from the united states and the exchange rate fx

choosing tax rates and public expenditure levels using majority rule abstract a sufficient condition is presented for a policy to be a condorcet winner when voters differ only in a single characteristic the condition is that all voters utility gradients with respect to the n different policy dimensions lie in the same plane in r n if the policy is a set of commodity tax rates then the condition is implied by the linearity of voters common engel curves if the policy includes levels of public good provision then the vectors of marginal willingness to pay for the various public goods of the different voters must all lie on the same line

compensation and transfer pricing in a principal agent model this paper studies transfer prices and compensation mechanisms in a principal agent model with moral hazard and private information by the agent production requires unobservable effort by the agent and a purchased input in general it is optimal for the principal to create an internal market for the input and charge the agent a tax or subsidy that differs from the market price conditions are found under which the optimal compensation function is given by the difference between a nonlinear revenue function depending only on output and a nonlinear transfer pricing function that depends only on the amount of the purchased input copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

international investment and colonial control a new interpretation the impact of economic factors on colonial imperialism in the late nineteenth century has long been a topic of debate this article examines the expected relationship between different forms of international investment and different patterns of political ties between developed and developing countries drawing on the literature on relational contracts and collective action it argues that direct colonial control was likely to be associated with cross border investments whose rents were particularly easy to seize or protect and whose protection did not require multilateral action where such rents were difficult to seize or protect unilaterally colonialism is expected to be less likely the most common example of the former sort of investment is primary raw materials or agricultural investment of the latter multinational manufacturing affiliates the argument is weighed against both a survey of the qualitative evidence and some simple quantitative evaluations the approach also has potential applications to more general problems of international conflict and cooperation

trends in foreign direct investment flows a theoretical and empirical analysis this paper seeks to provide a rationale for changing trends in the flow and determinants of foreign direct investment fdi as a result of macro economic and firm strategy considerations we identify several factors that impact on such trends and develop propositions that could explain the phenomenon generically the study then provides preliminary empirical support for the propositions presented and outlines the path for further research needed to investigate more causal links the statistical analysis of investments by us multinational enterprises mnes reveals significant changes in the regional distribution of fdi and a change in some of its traditional determinants results show that us mnes are now making increasing investments into asia to exploit low wage levels and to secure entry into new markets

determinants of sovereign wealth fund investment in private equity vs public equity this paper examines the investments of 19 sovereign wealth funds swfs in 424 firms both public and private around the world from 1991 through 2010 the data indicate that swfs similar to other institutional investors are less likely to invest in private equity than in public equity internationally however the economic significance of this impact is surprisingly low unlike other institutional investors swfs are more likely to invest in private equity compared with public equity in target nations where investor protection is low and where the bilateral political relations between the swf and the target nation are weak surprisingly cultural differences play a marginally positive role in the choice to invest in private equity investment outside an swf s own sovereign nation comprehensively we find that swfs act distinctively from other traditional institutional investors when investing in private equity

majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences this paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when incomeis fixed and taxation non distortionary the set of feasibletaxes is compact and self interested voters have cornerpreferences we first show that if a majority winning taxpolicy exists it involves maximum progressivity we then givea necessary and sufficient condition on the incomedistribution for a majority winner to exist this conditionappears to be satisfied for a large class of distributionfunctions

the effect of political events on united states direct foreign investment a pooled time series cross sectional analysis this paper examines the effect of political events on the manufacturing direct foreign investment mdfi decisions of u s multinational corporations the relationship between political events and nonpolitical factors and mdfi is investigated through regression analysis of pooled time series 21 years and cross sectional 24 countries data and through various tests of the homogeneity of the relationship across groups of countries the study finds that the relationship between political events in mdfi is different for less developed countries as opposed to developed countries for the less developed countries both inter nation and intra nation conflict and cooperation affect mdfi in contrast u s mdfi in developed countries appears to be affected only by inter nation conflict and cooperation

spatial effects in dyadic data political units often spatially depend in their policy choices on other units this also holds in dyadic settings where as in much of international relations research analysis focuses on the interaction or relation between a pair or dyad of two political units yet with few exceptions social scientists have analyzed contagion in monadic datasets only consisting of individual political units this article catego rizes all possible forms of spatial effect modeling in both undirected and directed dyadic data where it is possible to distinguish the source and the target of interaction for example exporter0importer aggressor0victim and so on this approach enables scholars to formulate and test novel mechanisms of contagion thus ideally paving the way for studies analyzing spatial dependence between dyads of political units to illus trate the modeling flexibility gained from an understanding of the full set of specifi cation options for spatial effects in dyadic data we examine the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing countries building and extend ing on elkins guzman and simmons s 2006 study however we come to different conclusions about the channels through which bilateral investment treaties diffuse rather than a capital importing country being influenced by the total number of bits signed by other capital importers as modeled in their original article we find that a capital importing country is more likely to sign a bit with a capital exporter only if other competing capital importers have signed bits with this very same capital exporter similarly other capital exporters bits with a specific capital importer influ ence an exporter s incentive to agree on a bit with the very same capital importer

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

reversal of fortunes democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries does increased democracy promote or jeopardize foreign direct investment fdi inflows to less developed countries we argue that democratic institutions have conflicting effects on fdi inflows on the one hand democratic institutions hinder fdi inflows by limiting the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of multinational enterprises facilitating indigenous businesses pursuit of protection from foreign capital and constraining host governments ability to offer generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign investors on the other hand democratic institutions promote fdi inflows because they tend to ensure more credible property rights protection reducing risks and transaction costs for foreign investors hence the net effect of democracy on fdi inflows is contingent on the relative strength of these two competing forces our argument reconciles conflicting theoretical expectations in the existing literature empirical analyses of fifty three developing countries from 1982 to 1995 substantiate our claims we find that both property rights protection and democracy related property rights protection encourage fdi inflows after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection democratic institutions reduce fdi inflows these results are robust against alternative model specifications statistical estimators and variable measurements

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

alliances preferential trading arrangements and international trade c oncerns about the stability of the international trading system have become widespread in recent years many observers feel that the relatively liberal system forged after world war ii is being undermined by the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements these concerns have spawned a great deal of empirical research much of which has found that such arrangements exert a substantial effect on trade flows yet these studies have neglected the role political military alliances play in shaping patterns of commerce this omission is important because there is ample reason to expect that alliances guide trade flows and preferential trading arrangements often are comprised of allies as a result extant analyses risk confusing the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on commerce and systematically overstating the effects of the latter in this study we analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows both factors are likely to promote trade among members but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce the combination of an alliance which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade and a commercial institution which liberalizes trade among members is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both 1

popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis abstract we show that a marginal rate progressive tax always defeats a marginal rate regressive tax under pairwise majority voting so long as the latter collects at least as much revenue as the former one irrespective of whether the voters care at all about their relative incomes or not

the politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects this paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome in our model with endogenous income there is no majority condorcet winning tax schedule we then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions we follow three strategies i reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter ii elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard downsian two party competition game iii assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior they point to the same simulation based conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle

popular support for progressive taxation abstract the popular support obtained by two parties who propose two qualitatively different tax schemes is analyzed we show that if the median voter is below the mean then any progressive proposal wins over a regressive one

the location of export oriented foreign direct investment in the caribbean basin this paper analyzes the location of export oriented manufacturing investment the analysis focuses on direct investment in the caribbean basin using micro data for all reported manufacturing plant openings from 1984 87 we test a broad range of influences on country selection and compare the results with the existing literature on foreign direct investment in less developed countries the probability of country selection was estimated with a conditional logit model the estimates were then used to predict the location of caribbean basin investments made in 1988 and 1989 twelve independent variables were tested six variables had a statistically significant positive relationship with plant location per capita gnp exchange rate devaluation the length of income tax holidays the size of free trade zones political stability and manufacturing concentration negative relationships were found for the wage rate inflation rate transportation cost and profit repatriation restrictions

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

investing in the peace economic interdependence and international conflict research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace still existing understanding of linkages between cone ict and international economics is limited in at least two ways first cross border economic relationships are far broader than just trade global capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy coordination second the manner in which economics is said to inhibit cone ict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war we discuss and then demonstrate formally how interdependence can ine uence states recourse to military violence the risk of disrupting economic linkages particularly access to capital may occasionally deter minor contests between interdependent states but such opportunity costs will typically fail to preclude militarized disputes instead interdependence offers nonmilitarized avenues for communicating resolve through costly signaling our quantitative results show that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade democracy interest and other variables students of world politics have long argued that peace is a positive externality of global commerce theorists like montesquieu and kant and practitioners like woodrow wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction mounting evidence in recent years appears to substantiate these claims multiple studies many identie ed with the democratic peace link interstate trade with reductions in militarized disputes or wars 1 while we concur with the evolving

diplomatic and corporate networks bridges to foreign locations firms and governments operate in broad networks in which the home government and its diplomatic service are a critical node or a referral point between firms and potential partners in foreign locations thus diplomatic relations between countries matter for the choice of foreign investment location using a network perspective we argue that the extent to which good diplomatic relations induce firms to invest in friendly host countries depends on their political connections to home governments those with stronger ties to home governments can better access and leverage intergovernmental diplomatic connections thus benefiting potentially from enhanced access to information reduced political risks and increased legitimacy such ability of politically connected firms is more useful where weak institutional impartiality in the host country inhibits neutral treatment of foreign investors empirically using overseas investment location decisions by chinese firms we find that the types of home government ties i e whether they are organizational or personal and whether those relationships are with central or local goverments and the impartiality of host institutions are both important contingencies affecting firms utilization of diplomatic relations we discuss the implications of our study to research on network theory political ties and internationalization of emerging market firms

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

income taxation uncertainty and stability abstract this paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules it is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo a tax policy is stable if it is a condorcet winner it is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare we show however that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo it is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information abstract this paper models a decentralized firm under information asymmetry and effort disutility on the part of managers we assume that managers choose efforts before observing some private information however after the effort choice managers receive private information on their cost parameters which they report to the headquarters there exist many situations in which managers need to take efforts before obtaining private information for example the regular maintenance effort on the machine the effort on rd 2 under certain demand conditions managers cannot receive any information rent benefit for their private information even if they have the option to renege on the contract after obtaining their private information

investment liberalization and international trade abstract this paper estimates the cross price elasticity of exports with respect to investment costs for bilateral relations between 36 countries we show that the effect of reducing foreign direct investment costs on exports depends on country characteristics and trade costs as predicted by the markusen 1997 markusen 2002 model when countries differ in relative factor endowments and trade costs are low investment liberalization stimulates exports whereas when countries are similar in terms of relative factor endowments and size and trade costs are moderate to high investment liberalization reduces exports

state owned mncs and host country expropriation risk the role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment fdi however state owned multinational corporations may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government the magnitude of this counter force we argue may vary depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state and the level of economic dependence of the host country on the home market we find supporting evidence of our hypotheses using chinese firm level fdi information between 2003 and 2010

project evaluation and control in decentralized firms is capital rationing always optimal when capital investments are made in an agency setting we show that even without risk considerations capital rationing need not be the only rational outcome we analyze a principal agent model with risk neutrality and with two productive inputs the agent s efforts and capital investment the two inputs can be either economic complements or substitutes the agent has pre contract private information about his own type the output is measured with an additive noise we show that when the two inputs are substitutes the optimal solution entails a marginal capital rationing but when the two inputs are complements then either a marginal capital rationing or a marginal leniency could be the optimal response our results therefore provide an explanation for why firms may employ a capital rationing for a project that may increase manufacturing complexity and hence may reduce managerial labor productivity yet employ a less strict criterion for evaluating a productivity enhancing project this result contrasts with earlier results where only a capital rationing is shown to be optimal

dyadic military conflict security alliances and bilateral fdi flows although multinationals operate under cross border jurisdictions the relevance of interstate security relations to international business has received little attention despite the impressive accumulation of knowledge in international business and international relations the two intellectual communities have largely ignored the insights from each other in this article we seek to bridge this gap we argue that interstate military conflict and security alliances as two central features of interstate security relations often change both government policies toward international business and investor expectations of political risk from the perspectives of both states and investors military conflict should reduce bilateral investment whereas security alliances increase it our empirical analysis applies the system gmm estimator to a gravity model of bilateral investment flows for 1117 directed dyads among 58 countries from 1980 to 2000 among 18 countries whose per capita real incomes remain consistently above 12 000 constant dollars the security factors do not affect bilateral investment in the high income low income dyads interstate military conflict and security alliances significantly influence bilateral investment as expected the findings depict two separate realms in which international politics does and does not interfere with international business helping us improve political risk assessments and understand the interactions between states and firms

managerial incentives investment and aggregate implications scale effects we explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor managerial effort is not publicly observed we show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment from the perspective of incentive scheme design a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables investment and output rather than one as is customary

dodging bullets the heterogeneous effect of political violence on greenfield fdi the relationship between political violence and greenfield foreign direct investment is contingent on the type of violence characteristics of the investment receiving sector and extent to which the investing firm is geographically diversified this paper presents an analysis with a dynamic fixed effects model for a panel of 90 developing countries from 2003 to 2012 the analysis shows that nationwide political conflict is negatively associated with total and non resource related greenfield foreign direct investment but not with resource related greenfield foreign direct investment the insensitivity to political conflict of multinational firms in the resource sector is associated with the high profitability of natural resource extraction and the companies geographic constraints on location choice during the period of estimation in the non resource sector the less geographically diversified firms are most sensitive to the risk of conflict

survey of economic implications of maritime and territorial disputes drawing on studies on the economics of conflict this paper reviews the literature on maritime and territorial disputes and it examines an array of economic implications associated with territorial and maritime disputes these include adverse effects on certain economic and development outcomes arising from possible armed confrontation with some of these possibly lingering in the aftermath of conflict there are also various economic disruptions and costs associated with these disputes emphasizing how they also affect the livelihoods of resource users in the disputed areas a clearer understanding of these economic links could help inform and motivate policymakers on mitigating the risks of conflict based on the review of evidence herein the economic implications of conflict in terms of foregone average trade among the country pairs considered in the west philippine sea south china sea in 1985 dollars which differ in important ways but hint at some common channels of impact could range from us 909 3 million to us 98 8 billion more broadly the impacts on a disrupted global production chain can easily amplify these results even further affecting global growth prospects for many decades according to experience

fdi in space spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment abstract there are a number of theoretical reasons why foreign direct investment fdi into a host country may depend on the fdi in proximate countries such spatial interdependence has been largely ignored by the empirical fdi literature with only a couple recent papers accounting for such issues in their estimation this paper conducts a general examination of spatial interactions in empirical fdi models using data on us outbound fdi activity we find that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of fdi are surprisingly robust to inclusion of terms to capture spatial interdependence even though such interdependence is estimated to be significant however we find that both the traditional determinants of fdi and the estimated spatial interdependence are quite sensitive to the sample of countries one examines

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

governance infrastructure and us foreign direct investment this paper examines the statistical importance of governance infrastructure as a determinant of us foreign direct investment fdi in broad terms governance infrastructure represents attributes of legislation regulation and legal systems that condition freedom of transacting security of property rights and transparency of government and legal processes our econometric analysis uses a two stage estimation procedure in the first stage the probability that a country is an fdi recipient is estimated the results indicate that countries that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely to receive any us fdi countries that receive no us fdi are typically countries that do not promote free and transparent markets that have ineffective governments and that often have legal systems that are not rooted in english common law in the second stage the analysis is restricted to those countries that did receive fdi flows the estimated equations focus on the determinants of the amount of fdi received given that a country is a recipient of us fdi governance infrastructure including the nature of the legal system is an important determinant of the amount received

policy and non policy determinants of u s equity foreign direct investment this study examined the effects of policy and non policy variables on the location of new u s direct investment abroad as distinct from reinvested earnings of existing affiliates using 1977 and 1982 benchmark data the data revealed statistically significant effects for investment incentives positive performance requirements negative and host country effective tax rates negative with interesting differences between the two time periods and between developed versus developing countries significance was also found for non policy variables such as political stability cultural distance gdp per capita and infrastructure

alliances in international governmental organizations regional trade agreement formation and multinational enterprise regionalization strategy abstract drawing from political science alliance theories we explain why countries are likely to enter regional trade agreements we argue that the probability that this will happen is higher if the countries are allies in the same international governmental organizations igos as such alliances can help build trust and reduce political risk our results show that igo scope and also partner reliability and influence in the igo network play important roles our findings provide guidance to multinational enterprises in formulating regionalization strategies

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

international business responses to institutional voids for nearly two decades scholars in international business and management have explored the implications of institutional voids for firm strategy and structure although institutional voids offer both opportunities and challenges they have largely been associated with firms efforts to avoid or mitigate institutional deficiencies and reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in settings subject to those institutional shortcomings the goal of this special issue is to advance scholarship on this topic by a exploring institutional voids that are new to the literature b providing a deeper assessment of the different ways in which firms respond to these voids and c utilizing diverse disciplines and theoretical approaches to do so in this introduction we first review and synthesize extant research on institutional voids tracking the evolution of institutional void scholarship since the inception of the concept khanna palepu journal of economic literature 45 2 331 372 1997 and providing our perspective on its contributions and limitations we then summarize the contributions of the articles included in this special issue in addition to identifying an array of institutional voids economic and social the articles highlight four different strategies for responding to them internalization substitution borrowing and signaling drawing on these we develop new insights on the implications of institutional voids for firm behavior we conclude with suggestions for future research

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies