efficiency and information aggregation in auctions the tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects the k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k first highest bid we find conditions under which in the limit objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type

the fisher hypothesis and the forecastability and persistence of inflation abstract for the period 1860 to 1939 the simple correlation of the u s commercial paper rate with the contemporaneous inflation rate is 0 17 the corresponding correlation for the period 1950 to 1979 is 0 71 this paper attributes this apparent change in the fisher relation to differences in the stochastic process of inflation rather than a change in any structural relationship between interest rates and expected inflation contrary to recent claims in the literature there is little evidence of inflation non neutrality in data from the pre world war i period

what do interest rates reveal about the functioning of real business cycle models abstract this paper begins by documenting the extent to which the predictions of standard real business cycle rbc models are incompatible with observed movements in real interest rates the main finding of the paper is that extending the baseline model to include habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs to capital significantly improves the model s empirical performance in our evaluation of the model s performance we take special care of estimating and testing predictions of the model using both moments drawn directly from the data and moments calculated after identifying shocks to the stochastic trend

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

interest rate volatility and the term structure a two factor general equilibrium model we develop a two factor general equilibrium model of the term structure the factors are the short term interest rate and the volatility of the short term interest rate we derive closed form expressions for discount bonds and study the properties of the term structure implied by the model the dependence of yields on volatility allows the model to capture many observed properties of the term structure we also derive closed form expressions for discount bond options we use hansen s generalized method of moments framework to test the cross sectional restrictions imposed by the model the tests support the two factor model there are essentially two approaches to the modeling of the term structure of interest rates in continuous time the equilibrium approach pioneered by

inflation and asset returns in a monetary economy postwar u s data are characterized by negative correlations between real equity returns and inflation and by positive correlations between real equity returns and money growth these patterns are closely matched quantitatively by an equilibrium monetary asset pricing model the model also implies negative correlations between expected asset returns and expected inflation and it predicts that the inflationasset return correlation will be more strongly negative when inflation is generated by fluctuations in real economic activity than when it is generated by monetary fluctuations the co movements of real asset returns inflation and money growth have been studied extensively over the past fifteen years table i displays some of the statistical properties of these series using quarterly u s data from 1959 to 1990 note first the significantly negative correlation between real equity returns and inflation note also the negative correlation between inflation and the ex post real return to nominally riskless bonds while this fact is not particularly surprising numerous studies conclude that the correlations between ex ante real asset returns and expected inflation are also negative 2 in contrast to these patterns the correlation between money growth and real equity returns is weakly positive in the data while the correlation between money growth and the real bond return is virtually zero initially these empirical patterns were viewed as anomalies negative correlations between inflation and ex post real stock returns contradict the traditional view that equities ought to act as an inflation hedge 3 negative correlations between expected inflation and ex ante real returns violate the

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

term premiums in bond returns abstract this paper examines expected returns on u s treasury bills and on u s government bond portfolios expected bill returns are estimated from forward rates and from sample average returns both estimation methods indicate that expected returns on bills tend to peak at eight or nine months and never increase monotonically out to twelve months reliable inferences are limited to treasury bills and thus to maturities up to a year the variability of longer term bond returns preempts precise conclusions about their expected returns

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

on the superneutrality of money in a stochastic dynamic macroeconomic model abstract this paper explores the robustness of the superneutrality of money result to the introduction of uncertainty while qualitatively superneutrality fails to obtain in our model quantitatively the observed tobin effect is insignificant the equilibrium time paths of real variables are nearly unaffected by changes in the money growth rule we argue that our conclusions reinforce the theoretical case for superneutrality

interest rate targeting abstract the paper develops a model in which the monetary authority successfully targets the nominal interest rate while also holding down the forecast variance of the price level the latter objective pins down the extent of monetary accommodation to shifts in the demand for money and other shocks and thereby makes determinate the levels of money and prices at each date empirical evidence for the united states suggests that the model s predictions accord reasonably well with observed behavior for nominal interest rates growth rates of the monetary base and rates of inflation

bond and stock returns in a simple exchange model this paper studies asset pricing in a general equilibrium representative agent exchange model the assumptions of isoelastic period utility and lognormal endowment allow the derivation of closed form solutions for asset returns without restricting the serial correlation of the log endowment risk premiums on stocks and real bonds are found to be simple functions of relative risk aversion the variance of the log endowment innovation and the weights in the moving average representation of the log endowment the paper analyzes the sign of term premiums the size of the equity premium and the effect of taste shocks on asset prices

full implementation and belief restrictions we introduce a framework to study the problem of full implementation under general restrictions on agents beliefs which we call implementation first we provide a characterization of the properties of the mechanisms that achieve implementation these conditions relate the possibility of achieving full implementation to the strength of the strategic externalities induced by the mechanism we then study how to achieve full implementation via the design of simple transfer schemes in these context the general conditions for implementation suggest a simple design principle in which belief restrictions are used to weaken the strategic externalities induced by the baseline transfers of the belief free benchmark importantly our results require minimal information on agents beliefs which regard simple moments of the distribution of types these moment conditions arise naturally in applications and in practical problems of mechanism design

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

a dynamic non direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems much of the literature on mechanism design and implementation uses the revelation principle to restrict attention to direct mechanisms we showed in mclean and postlewaite 2014 that when agents are informationally small there exist small modifications to vcg mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility we show here how one can construct a two stage non direct mechanism that similarly restores incentive compatibility while improving upon the direct one stage mechanism in terms of privacy and the size of messages that must be sent the first stage that elicits the part of the agents private information that induces interdependence can be used to transform certain other interdependent value problems into private value problems

the optimal inflation path in a sidrauski type model with uncertainty abstract in this paper it is shown that in a sidrauski type model with uncertainty the chicago rule remains valid as a prescription for the average rate of inflation although there is a systematic difference between the perfect foresight and the uncertainty case quantitatively however the difference turns out to be very small the paper shows how to calculate the optimal monetary policy as a function of the state variables using the method of parameterized expectations in terms of expected utility the optimal policy is as good as the simple policy that reduces the money supply at the rate of time preference

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

multidimensional private value auctions we consider parametric examples of symmetric two bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent s private valuation we show that in such environments the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions spas breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking while the spa is always efficient allocatively the first price auction fpa may be inefficient equilibria may fail to exist for the fpa we also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents valuation

equilibria and incentives in private information economies abstract this paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy namely walrasian expectations equilibrium private core and insurance equilibrium it shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy in contrast to the finite agent setting one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any walrasian expectations equilibrium private core insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type

efficient auctions and interdependent types we consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi linear environment we present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between payoff types and belief types and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially bayesian implemented on a finite type space the characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting we report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types developed in a more general setting by bergemann morris and takahashi 2011 applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type belief type language

expectations and the treasury bill federal funds rate spread over recent monetary policy regimes this paper shows that the spread between the 3 month treasury bill and the federal funds rate has significant predictive power for the future change in the federal funds rate during the volatile nonborrowed reserves operating regime but it has less and no predictive power during the borrowed reserves regime and the federal funds targeting regime respectively these findings suggest that treasury bill rates forecast future federal funds rates most accurately when the federal reserve follows a well defined rule that does not smooth the impact of shocks on the federal funds rate

informational size and efficient auctions we develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents signals are correlated we provide conditions under which a modification of the vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome furthermore we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small the efficiency of market processes has been a central concern in economics since its inception auction mechanisms constitute a very important class of market processes yet the analysis of auctions has typically focused on their revenue generating properties rather than their efficiency properties this is partly due to the fact that for many of the problems typically studied efficiency is trivial when bidders have private values a standard vickrey auction guarantees that the object will be sold to the buyer with the highest value for the object in the case of pure common values that is when all buyers have the same value for the object any outcome that with probability one assigns the object to some bidder will be efficient the intermediate case in which bidders values are not identical but may depend on other bidders signals is more problematic when bidders values are interdependent in this way any single bidder s value may depend on the information of other agents and hence he may not even know his own value it is not clear what it would mean for an agent to bid his true value even before we ask if it is optimal for him to do so several papers have studied efficient auctions with interdependent values and independent types 1 while this is a natural place to begin the independence assumption is not compelling for many problems a prototypical problem is one in which an object is to be sold and individual bidders have private information about the object say the quantity or quality of oil in a tract to be sold that affects other agents values for the object when bidders types include information about objective characteristics of the object being sold their types will typically not be independent when agents types are statistically dependent we show that there exist efficient auction mechanisms for interdependent value auction problems that are essentially vickrey auctions augmented by payments to not from the agents most importantly we link the

what does the term structure tell us about future inflation abstract this empirical analysis indicates that for maturities of six months or less the term structure of nominal interest rates provides almost no information about the future path of inflation but does provide information about the term structure of real interest rates however as maturities lengthen to nine and twelve months the nominal term structure begins to contain information about future inflation but ceases to provide information about the real term structure these results are explained by differences in the relative variability of expected future inflation changes and real term structure slopes at different points in the term structure

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

long and short term interest rates in a risky world abstract the paper develops and tests a general equilibrium model in which variability or risk affects the choice of portfolios our measures of variability include only the variability of unanticipated growth in monetary and non monetary aggregates and our tests use data ending with the change in federal reserve procedures in october 1979 we find that increased variability of unanticipated money growth raises demands for debt and money and reduces the demand for real capital interest rates on both short and long term debt rise by a risk premium we estimate the size of the risk premium before and after the october 1979 change and we show that the change in federal reserve procedures moved the economy to a less efficient point

a simple model of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves i examine the anomalous behavior of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves long municipal yields appear too high relative to the equivalent after tax yield that can be earned in treasury or corporate bonds i discuss existing explanations of the problem and propose a simple model that relates the yields of taxable bonds to the yield curve for par tax exempts the ratio of the tax exempt yield to the taxable yield increases with maturity in the model so it is consistent with observed phenomena such as inverted yield curves for taxables and contemporaneous rising yield curves for tax exempts statistical and descriptive comparisons between the yields predicted by the model and observed yields on par bonds that the model has some promise in explaining the apparent anomalies in the behaviors of the two yield curves article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

on the term structure of interest rates abstract this paper tests the one good stochastic growth model with respect to its ability to explain the term structure of real interest rates we undertake both a qualitative and quantitative analysis first we assess the changing shape of the yield curve over the model economy s business cycle and compare our results with what is empirically observed second we employ the model to study various implications of informational and allocative efficiency properties which the artificial economy must possess it is found for example that long term rates are less volatile than short term rates and that holding premia can be highly correlated over time third we study the time varying risk premium implicit in the economy s forward rate structure a purely quantitative assessment of the model s explanatory power is also provided

the term structure of interest rates in real and monetary economies abstract this paper modifies standard asset pricing models by introducing capital a variable labor supply and money a surprising but very positive result is that in a real production economy the interest rate is close to a random walk this result is found to be true even if there is no persistence in the driving process of the model in this paper we generalize the standard cash in advance constraint by using a shopping time technology this generalization makes it possible to match observed variability for the velocity of money this type of monetary model however is not successful in matching observed behavior of bond prices

deconstructing income and income inequality measures a crosswalk from market income to comprehensive income recent research on levels and trends in the united states in income inequality vary substantially in how they measure income we show the sensitivity of alternative income measures in capturing income trends using a unified data set focusing solely on market income or including realized taxable capital gains based on irs tax return data in more comprehensive household income measures will dramatically increase inequality growth compared to capital gains measures more in keeping with haig simons principles using a measure of yearly accrued capital gains dramatically reduces observed growth in income inequality across the distribution but also equalizes income growth since 1989