the imf s role in structural adjustment in the 1980s conditional lending for structural adjustment in developing countries moved the imf beyond its role of macroeconomic crisis management fund supported adjustment programmes have often been flawed by a lack of distributional analysis and by poor sequencing of reforms notably premature financial liberalisation as a result they have caused avoidable hardship in addition the attempt to taper out aid as part of the reform programme leads to avoidable reductions in post stabilisation growth an important role for the fund in poststabilisation environments is to provide credible signals to private investors as macroeconomic crises spread across latin america and africa during the 1980s the imf became much more involved in low income countries whereas following its interventions in developed countries the fund had rapidly withdrawn post crisis in the low income countries its involvement became continuous this was partly because stabilisation often took longer however additionally by the 1980s it was already evident that whereas those poor countries which had adopted market based development strategies were developing those which had adopted inward oriented high regulation strategies were in decline unlike the economic crisis of 1998 the crises of the 1980s were concentrated among the inward orientated hence a reasonable diagnosis was that the crises were not merely manifestations of fiscal imbalance but that many other policies needed reform the task thus went beyond the conventional one of rectifying a crisis to reorienting a development strategy the fund joined with the world bank in an attempt to induce these reforms through sustained conditional lending hence the imf moved beyond its traditional role of short run macroeconomic crisis management fund and bank conditions were linked through cross conditionality but with the fund as the lead agency on many areas of policy this gave the fund a critical role in structural adjustment the fund s instrument for concessional lending in low income countries is its extended structural adjustment facility esaf in 1997 the board of the fund commissioned an external review of its esaf programmes in which we participated the report of the evaluation botchwey et al 1998 suggested three lines of criticism of fund adjustment programmes and these form the basis of our analysis in this paper the first is that through flawed design the programmes have sometimes had adverse consequences for the poor either directly through reducing incomes or indirectly through reductions in social service provision our criticism is of the sequence sometimes adopted by fund

catalytic finance when does it work in a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort this model helps us understand a debate about the role of the imf in catalyzing lending to developing countries

catalyzing aid the imf and donor behavior in aid allocation the international monetary fund imf has often asserted that its programs encourage aid by signaling policy credibility commonly referred to as aid catalysis our study investigates this claim for sector specific aid and for bilateral and multilateral donors using data on 136 recipient countries for the 1986 2009 period we employ a two part quantitative model to match the donor decision making process consisting of a first stage recipient selection equation and a second stage allocation equation on selected recipients we find strong support that imf programs catalyze aid on aggregate but the evidence varies across different types of aid aid catalysis is stronger and more robust in sectors linked to the imf s core competency areas namely debt related relief and general budget support but weaker and less robust for infrastructure production multisector and humanitarian aid and non existent for health and education across donors imf programs are associated with increases in aid by countries with larger voting shares in the imf such as the united states and japan but less so by countries with few votes or for multilateral agencies this finding is consistent with research in international political economy arguing that the imf s powerful stakeholders drive the organization s decisions and policies taken together our findings emphasize the imf s multi dimensional impact on the global development agenda an erstwhile overlooked factor in studies of aid allocation while refuting the purported positive effects of imf programs on aid for social policy

borrowing from the imf the policy implications of recent empirical research abstract at a time when the future of the international monetary fund is being widely debated a number of relevant and important studies have been published which advance our knowledge of the factors which determine borrowing from the fund there has been little attempt however to put this recent empirical research into context or to extract from it appropriate policy conclusions while dissent remains over some issues there is an emerging consensus on others which provides a firm empirical foundation for policy formulation unfortunately the policy stance adopted by the g7 is in many ways at odds with much of the recent empirical research

on the equivalence of resale price maintenance and quantity restrictions abstract when demand is known with certainty there is a clear mapping between a monopolist s pricing and output decisions this suggests an equivalence between a monopolist manufacturer specifying a minimum maximum retail price and imposing a maximum minimum quantity on its retailers this paper shows that while the effect of maximum rpm can always be replicated by an appropriate quantity floor the minimum rpm outcome cannot always be replicated by an appropriately chosen quantity ceiling as such the analysis provides one reason that manufacturers will choose a price floor rather than quantity ceiling even though a quantity ceiling would appear to lead to lower monitoring costs

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

the demand for imf credits by sub saharan african countries abstract in this paper the demand behaviour of sub saharan african countries for imf credits will be studied on the basis of pooled cross section and time series analysis it will be concluded that drawings on imf facilities are not a purely economic phenomenon

world bank lending and other financial flows is there a connection at a time when there is a serious debate about reforming the international financial architecture it is important to understand how existing multilateral agencies affect financial flows to emerging and less developed countries this paper extends past research which has focused on the international monetary fund by examining the various mechanisms through which the world bank may be associated with other financial flows and by presenting new empirical evidence based on regression analysis little support is found for a positive connection the implications of this finding for effective reform of the bank and its various activities are then discussed

failure fee under stochastic demand and information asymmetry abstract we study a failure fee contract designed by a price setting newsvendor retailer under information asymmetry under the contract the manufacturer must pay the retailer a failure fee if the sales volume misses a target we propose and compare two types of failure fee contracts a brand by brand contract and a uniform contract we find that the retailer prefers one to the other depending on parameters

equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance abstract this paper investigates the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one or two stage stackelberg non cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced equal decision making power in this paper we relax this assumption and formulate game theoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the stackelberg leader consequently we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications thus a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others i e less prone to power reconfigurations at both agent and group level we find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear regardless of product competition it develops that neither the manufacturer stackelberg nor the retailer stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance

introduction aid and development the debate on the impact of aid on the economies of developing countries is a rapidly evolving one early studies by e g papanek 1972 reported a positive impact of aid on growth within a multiple regression context this conclusion allowed policy makers to entertain the possibility that poverty across the world could be largely eradicated that countries could be moved out of poverty through the allocation of aid and that the following of successful policies would allow them to generate increased prosperity from their own resources unfortunately after some thirty years the poor are still with us poverty shows relatively little signs of disappearing and until recently enthusiasm for aid amongst donors had declined the papers in this symposium examine the effectiveness of aid in the past and its potential in the future a number of economic studies help explain this apparent failure mosley et al 1987 found it impossible to establish any significant relationship between aid and the growth rate of developing countries they suggested that this might be because of the possibility of leakages into non productive expenditure in the public sector and the transmission of negative price effects to the private sector they also argued for the targeting of aid i e its allocation to countries where it would be used most effectively boone 1996 concluded that aid does not significantly increase growth nor benefit the poor it did however increase the size of the government but again the message was not entirely negative in terms of what aid could achieve and argued for the targeting of aid this time at liberal democratic regimes as they appeared more effective in for example reducing infant mortality hence until recently the dominant view within economics had become pessimistic with respect to the past effectiveness of aid but somewhat optimistically perhaps held out the hope for improvement on the basis of aid targeting more recently however work by burnside and dollar 2000 was to put forward a more optimistic view of the former they concluded that aid had a positive impact on growth for developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in place but had little impact for those countries who were following poor policies this therefore partially at least provided an explanation of why aid had been found to have little positive impact on growth in previous empirical work it also provided specific criteria for targeting aid this was then built upon by collier and dollar 2001 2002 who calculated a poverty efficient allocation of aid which focused on those countries with a combination of most poverty and best policies they suggested that targeting of aid in this manner would almost double its effectiveness in reducing poverty this work has had an extraordinary impact upon policy and easterly 2003 as well as dalgaard hansen and tarp dht in this symposium document how it

the effect of imf programmes on economic growth in low income countries an empirical analysis using an lic specific participation model we adopt a propensity score matching psm methodology to compare economic growth performance in countries with and without imf programmes over the period

information and structural holes comment on reagans and zuckerman reagans and zuckerman hereafter rz go behind the performance link with network brokerage to speculate on how information flow is responsible the intuition is a perceived tension between brokers and contacts if nonredundant sources of information provide the broker s competitive advantage as is assumed in empirical research on the returns to brokerage then the broker s contacts have a countervailing advantage as monopoly sources advantage versus countervailing advantage is the tension to be resolved the analysis is interesting in its own right but it carries a broader significance in addressing a critical juncture for network models of advantage empirical success in predicting performance with network models has far outstripped our understanding of the way information flow in networks is responsible for network effects a cluster of network concepts emerged in the 1970s on the idea that advantage results from connections with multiple otherwise disconnected groups and individuals the hubs in a social network were argued to have advantaged access to information and control over its distribution at the center of the concept cluster are granovetter 1973 1983 on weak ties as bridges between groups freeman 1977 1979 on network centrality as a function of being the connection between otherwise disconnected people cook and emerson 1978 cook et al 1983 on the advantage of having alternative

some two echelon supply chain games improving from deterministic symmetric information to stochastic asymmetric information models abstract many supply chain and inventory models use the following two echelon symmetric information and deterministic gaming structure a manufacturer wholesales a product to a retailer who in turn retails it to the consumer the retail market demand varies with the retail price according to a deterministic demand function that is known to both the manufacturer and the retailer it is then assumed that the players the manufacturer and the retailer arrive at their pricing and batch size decisions through a stackelberg game or a fixed markup percentage game the first part of this paper reveals many implausible effects of demand curve forms on the behavior of these gaming models however we do not merely conclude that two echelon gaming results obtained via assuming one convenient demand curve form can often become invalid under other demand curve forms more importantly we argue in the second part of the paper that the various implausible effects revealed here suggest a different but more fundamental conclusion the assumed non cooperative games are themselves flawed because gaming is meaningless and logically circular in a deterministic and symmetrical information system we then present an introductory illustration on how the introduction of stochasticity and information a symmetry leads to more plausible two echelon supply chain gaming models together the two parts demonstrate the necessity and practicality of using a stochastic and asymmetric information instead of the prevalent deterministic symmetric information approach in many supply chain models

the influence of elections on imf programme interruptions using panel data for 104 countries between 1975 and 1998 this article tries to explain interruptions of imf programmes around election dates in the recipient countries on average programmes seem to be more likely to break down before elections this increase in interruption probabilities is however less severe in more democratic countries in true democracies interruption frequencies are even lower prior to elections while no other political variables than elections and democracy were found to influence compliance systematically programme interruptions are significantly more likely in countries with high government consumption high levels of short term debt and low gdp per capita at programme initiation

an analysis of drawings on the international monetary fund by developing countries the nature of relations between the imf and developing countries has come under close scrutiny in recent years this has partly been the result of the deteriorating economic situation in which a large number of non oil developing countries have found themselves a situation characterised by falling rates of economic growth increasing balance of payments deficits and rising debt service ratios and partly it has resulted from the particular but public experiences of a number of developing countries such as jamaica peru and tanzania in their dealings with the fund

the imf and the mobilisation of foreign aid abstract particularly in the context of the millennium development goals there has been much discussion of the association between the international monetary fund and bilateral aid flows what role should the fund be playing in helping to achieve the mdgs some observers have suggested that the fund should seek to reduce its role in poor countries and should be minimising its own lending they see aid donors taking on a larger role and present the imf and aid donors as substitutes others envisage a much bigger lending role for the fund this may hint at complementarities although this discussion raises important policy issues there are very few studies that examine the relationship empirically this paper attempts to help fill this gap it explores the extent to which the imf has had a catalytic effect on official development assistance and the potential channels through which catalysis might work it finds strong evidence of a positive association and suggests that this may have more to do with condit

basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance abstract i analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt i show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare however with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs private lenders profits multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit

when should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer abstract consider a dominated manufacturer manu supplying a dominant retailer reta manu knows the product s unit manufacturing cost m deterministically whereas reta knows it only in the form of an a priori subjective distribution m reta may implement any one of four contract formats price only franchise fee two part tariffs and menu of contracts mc this paper presents two groups of results the first group consists of procedures for reta to compute optimal parameters for each of these contract formats these first group results are then used to study i the conditions under which manu is interested in sharing his m information and thus improving reta s m perception and ii how such information sharing conditions are affected by the contract formats we find that i manu benefits from reducing reta s uncertainty on her m perception only when the product s profitability is quite small ii over a wide range of plausible conditions manu benefits from a poorer quality of reta s a priori m perception regardless of what contract format reta uses iii the range of conditions under which manu benefits from a poorer quality of reta s m perception is not altered or narrowed by reta s use of a more sophisticated contract format such as mc even though such channel coordinating contracts increase channel efficiency and reta s profit in short current methods cannot motivate manu to share m information honestly hence reta should not trust the m information provided by manu these results reveal an overlooked aspect amidst the popular bigger pie notion of supply chain cooperation and emphasize the need to develop arrangements that can truly motivate honest information sharing

dynamics of networks if everyone strives for structural holes when entrepreneurs enter structural holes in networks they can exploit the related benefits evidence for these benefits has steadily accumulated the authors ask whether those who strive for such structural advantages can maintain them if others follow their example burt speculates that they cannot but a formal demonstration of this speculation is lacking using a game theoretic model of network formation the authors characterize the networks that emerge when everyone strives for structural holes they find that the predominant stable networks distribute benefits evenly confirming that no one is able to maintain a structural advantage in the long run

institutions foreign direct investment and domestic investment crowding out or crowding in studies of the relationship between fdi and domestic investment reach contradictory findings we argue that some of the conflicting evidence may be explained by the use of poor proxies for the theoretical concepts and questionable methodological choices we review the paper of morrissey and udomkerdmonkol published in this journal in 2012 improvements in the construction of the proxies and refinements in the estimation methodology reverse the finding of morrissey and udomkerdmonkol that fdi inflows crowd out domestic investment furthermore there is no strong evidence that good governance actually encourages domestic investment

catalysing private capital flows do imf programmes work as commitment devices in this article we examine whether imf programmes influence the ability of developing country issuers to tap international bond markets and if they improve spreads paid on the bonds issued we find that fund programmes do not provide a uniformly favourable signalling effect instead the evidence is most consistent with a positive effect of imf programmes when they are viewed as likely to lead to policy reform and when undertaken before economic fundamentals have deteriorated significantly the size of the fund s programme matters but the credibility of a joint commitment by the country and the imf appears to be critical enhancing its members access to international capital markets is widely regarded as an important objective of the international monetary fund imf or fund though the objective is not an explicitly stated purpose in the fund s articles of agreements the flow of international capital is essential to such stated purposes as the stability of the international monetary system efficient trade and productive resource use and to providing confidence when a member country experiences difficulties with its balance of payments 1 the fund s interest in private international capital flows has moreover increased over the last decade reflecting this evolution the fund s former managing

a comparison of two sourcing tactics for a new component abstract we compare two sourcing tactics for a manufacturer to purchase a new component to be used in a one time production run of a new product with uncertain and price elastic demand one alternative is to issue a request for quote rfq which is where the manufacturer requests a price quantity schedule from suppliers the manufacturer uses this information to determine a production quantity and the number of components to purchase from each supplier the other alternative is to post a bid specifying how the manufacturer s purchase quantity will depend on the supplier s component price the suppliers use this information to compete on quantity we find that relative to rfq which is more challenging for the manufacturer to characterize the supplier response due to the possibility of supplier interaction the benefit to the manufacturer from posting a bid increases with the number of suppliers due to increased intensity of competition if the new component is from an emerging industry where there is little mutual awareness among candidate suppliers then regardless of number of suppliers expected manufacturer profit is higher under rfq posting a bid is more likely to benefit the manufacturer when the new component is from a more established industry with a high degree of awareness among candidate suppliers

discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms in distribution channels with demand that is price sensitive we consider a single vendor single retailer distribution channel demand for the product arises only at the retailer the demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be deterministic but price elastic the retailer in turn buys the product from the vendor the vendor and the retailer act independently and rationally each maximizing their own respective profit the equilibrium point that specifies the vendor s and buyer s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a stackelberg game we consider the cases when quantity discount and volume discount respectively are offered we develop methods to determine the optimal discount policy for these cases we then consider the case where both volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously and develop a method to determine the optimal simultaneous discount offer the relative performance of the alternative discount schemes is then evaluated through a numerical study the results of the study demonstrate that the effectiveness of volume discount as a coordination mechanism is higher when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is higher the effectiveness of quantity discount on the other hand is higher with lower price sensitivity of demand finally the results also demonstrate that perfect coordination is achieved when volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously

the effects of imf and world bank lending on long run economic growth an empirical analysis summary the international monetary fund and the world bank frequently and often repeatedly extend loans to developing nations these loans have been blamed for generating adverse economic outcomes the growth impact of fund and bank loan programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other determinants of growth a unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans rather than the number of programs the estimates indicate that bank lending stimulates growth in some cases primarily by increasing public investment fund lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth the channel for this effect is a negative impact of fund lending on public as well as private investment

ldc creditworthiness and foreign capital inflows 1980 86 abstract this paper estimates the determinants of foreign capital inflows and shows that they are jointly determined with ldc creditworthiness the paper demonstrates that foreign capital inflows respond to government restrictions and the cost of foreign transactions previous research based on single equation models has concluded that the amount of capital inflows is a positive indicator of ldc creditworthiness by contrast this paper estimates a simultaneous limited dependent variable model in order to capture the endogeneity of capital inflows the estimate yields a reversal in sign for the coefficient of the capital inflows variable the paper suggests that defensive lending may explain this finding

von stackelberg and cournot duopoly choosing roles under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von stackelberg duopoly model a key determinant is the slope of the firms reaction function in either price or quantity space the duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward sloping reaction functions each will prefer to be the leader they will also disagree if they have upward sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions each will prefer that the other be the leader preferences between von stackelberg and cournot outcomes are also considered

a stackelberg game and its improvement in a vmi system with a manufacturing vendor vendor managed inventory vmi is an inventory management strategy to let a vendor manage his retailers inventories which makes the vendor have the opportunity to obtain some inventory and market related information of his retailers this paper discusses how the vendor can take advantage of this information for increasing his own profit by using a stackelberg game in a vmi system the vendor here is a manufacturer who procures raw materials to produce a finished product and supplies it at the same wholesale price to multiple retailers the retailers then sell the product in independent markets at retail prices solution procedures are developed to find the stackelberg game equilibrium that each enterprise is not willing to deviate from for maximizing his own profit the equilibrium makes the manufacturer benefited and the retailers profits maximized the equilibrium can then be improved for further benefiting the manufacturer and his retailers if the retailers are willing to cooperate with the manufacturer by using a cooperative contract finally a numerical example and the corresponding sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate that 1 the manufacturer can benefit from his leadership and monopolize the added profit of the vmi system in some cases 2 the manufacturer can further improve his own profit and then the retailers profits by the cooperative contract as compared to the stackelberg equilibrium 3 market and raw material related parameters have significant influence on every enterprise s net profit

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

modeling quantity discounts under general price sensitive demand functions optimal policies and relationships this paper presents models for determining optimal all unit and incremental quantity discount policies and investigates the effect of quantity discounts on increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions under general price sensitive demand functions the paper develops optimal quantity discount policies investigates their interrelationships and their benefits to both the supplier and the buyer and gains managerial insights for the scenarios of maximizing the supplier s profit and the joint profit we develop simple and efficient solution approaches for determining the all unit and the incremental optimal decision policies for general price sensitive demand functions we have three main findings first with price sensitive demand there are two incentives in offering quantity discounts increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions in most cases increasing demand dominates in justifying the offering of quantity discounts second using a single lot size associated with all efficient transactions as with the constant demand case does not hold with the price sensitive demand case third the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in benefiting both the supplier and the buyer

usefulness of resale price maintenance under different levels of sales effort cost and system parameter uncertainties abstract this paper on resale price maintenance rpm has three main parts i using a simple and parsimonious model we show that even with only one retailer a supplier or manufacturer hereafter manu should impose minimum rpm under some circumstances but maximum rpm in others these two sets of circumstances are defined by a very simple formula ii while most earlier rpm models assume that the decision makers have deterministic knowledge of the system parameters we present formulations and solution procedures for optimizing rpm schemes when manu is uncertain about a system parameter s value iii we show that if manu has to estimate certain key system parameters under uncertainties then in many situations rpm rapidly becomes unattractive even when these uncertainties are still quite low this constitutes one often applicable explanation why rpm is not as widely used as it should be theoretically

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

a stochastic and asymmetric information framework for a dominant manufacturer supply chain abstract consider a dominant manufacturer wholesaling a product to a retailer who in turn retails it to the consumers at p unit the retail market demand volume varies with p according to a given demand curve this basic system is commonly modeled as a manufacturer stackelberg ms game under a deterministic and symmetric information det sym i framework we first explain the logical flaws of this framework which are i the dominant manufacturer leader will have a lower profit than the retailer under an iso elastic demand curve ii in some situations the system s correct solution can be hyper sensitive to minute changes in the demand curve iii applying volume discounting while keeping the original ms profit maximizing objective leads to an implausible degenerate solution in which the manufacturer has dictatorial power over the channel we then present an extension of the stochastic and asymmetric information sto asy i framework proposed in lau and lau lau a lau h s 2005 some two echelon supply chain games improving from deterministic symmetric information to stochastic asymmetric information models european journal of operational research 161 1 203 223 coupled with the notion that a profit maximizing dominant manufacturer may implement not only ms but also pm i e using a manufacturer imposed maximum retail price we show that this new framework resolves all the logical flaws stated above along the way we also present a procedure for the dominant manufacturer to design a profit maximizing volume discount scheme using stochastic and asymmetric demand information using our sto asy i framework to resolve the logical flaws of the det sym i framework also reveals two noteworthy points i the attractiveness of the perfectly legal but overlooked channel coordination mechanism pm and ii volume discounting as a means for the dominant manufacturer to benefit from information known only to the retailer

brokers and competitive advantage the broker profits by intermediating between two or more parties using a biform game we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically our analysis reveals that if one considers exogenous the relations between actors brokers can enjoy an advantage but only if 1 they do not face substitutes either for the connections they offer or the value they can create 2 they intermediate more than two parties and 3 interdependence does not lock them into a particular pattern of exchange if on the other hand one allows actors to form relations on the basis of their expectations of the future value of those relations then profitable positions of intermediation only arise under strict assumptions of unilateral action we discuss the implications of our analysis for firm strategy and empirical research

optimal co investment in supply chain infrastructure abstract this paper considers co investment in a supply chain infrastructure using an inter temporal model we assume that firms capital is essentially the supply chain s infrastructure as a result firms policies consist in selecting an optimal level of employment as well as the level of co investment in the supply chain infrastructure several applications and examples are presented and open loop as well as feedback solutions are found for non cooperating firms long and short run investment cooperation and non simultaneous moves stackelberg firms in particular we show that a solution based on nash and stackelberg differential games provides the same level of capital investment thus selecting the leader and the follower in a co investment program does not matter we show that in general co investments by firms vary both over time and across firms and thereby render difficult the implementation of co investment programs for future capital development to overcome this problem we derive conditions for firms investment share to remain unchanged over time and thus be easily planned

the new wave of private capital inflows push or pull abstract this paper studies the determinants and sustainability of the widespread private capital inflows to middle income countries after 1989 the key question is whether these flows are mostly pulled by attractive domestic conditions or pushed by unfavorable conditions in developed countries an analytical model focusing on country risk is developed and used empirically it is argued that the observed improvement in country creditworthiness is mostly due to the decline in international interest rates and that therefore its importance as a proximate cause does not support the pull interpretation all things considered in most countries the key answer that emerges is push

imf lending programs participation and impact abstract participation in imf programs has been an option that more and more developing countries have exercised in recent years in this paper a detailed analysis of such participation over the period 1976 1986 provides a number of insights into the motivations for and the macroeconomic effects of such participation participation is driven by a combination of past performance present external influences and sluggish adjustment of developing countries the ability to predict which countries will participate in the imf program is quite good with nearly 90 percent of variation in such choices accounted for by the explanatory variables employed increased participation has as contemporaneous effects a reduction in economic growth and domestic investment and an improvement in the current account lagged effects of increased participation on economic growth and domestic investment are positive and in most estimates quantitatively greater than the contemporaneous effects there is also evidence of significantly lower public investment an increased budget surplus and real depreciation of the exchange rate with increased participation results for domestic credit creation and government current expenditure although they have a sign consistent with more austere policy cannot be shown to be significantly different from those not participating

the catalytic effect of lending by the international financial institutions for many less developed countries ldcs and countries in transition cits external financing is frequently an effective constraint on economic growth and development capital inflows may be used to overcome shortages of domestic saving thereby permitting higher levels of investment as well as shortages of foreign exchange thereby permitting larger quantities of imports

effects of a demand curve s shape on the optimal solutions of a multi echelon inventory pricing model abstract when a price demand relationship is needed in inventory pricing models very often a convenient typically linear function is arbitrarily chosen the common wisdom implication is that any downward sloping demand curve would lead to similar conclusions this paper applies different demand curve functions to a simple inventory pricing model and shows that while the common wisdom implication is valid for a single echelon system assuming different demand curve functions can lead to very different results in a multi echelon system in some situations a very small change in the demand curve appearance leads to very large changes in the model s optimal solutions other significant but counter intuitive effects of the demand curve form are also revealed this paper does not completely resolve the difficulties revealed by the counter intuitive effects reported here but establishing the existence of these effects represents a first step towards developing procedures to handle such effects these procedures will be necessary to ensure the reliability of many multi echelon models for products having price sensitive demands

supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance abstract supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents this has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers to understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners performance and consumer surplus we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer a dominant retailer and no single agent dominance under random and price sensitive demand channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party we analyze all problems in a game theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price wholesale price and order production quantity we show that the manufacturer dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity the lowest retail price and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer on the other hand the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance while both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits as we show under the manufacturer dominated structure further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer retailer dominance schemes with the no single agent dominance structure and integrated channel we also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost shortage penalty and salvage value

inventory policies under various optimizing criteria and variable markup rates this paper extends the deterministic eoq model to reflect various optimizing criteria and alternative demand and price structures its primary purpose is to develop decision rules for the management of finished goods inventories especially in retailing where inventories are evaluated in the same way as any other investment namely on their ability to generate profits rather than on the traditional least cost basis to that effect the models developed here consider demand to be a function of price with price defined as a markup of unit cost the decision variables are the order quantity and the markup rate possible optimizing objectives include profits return on investment or residual income the three most widely used evaluators of short term investment performance optimal solutions for each case are obtained and the resulting inventory policies evaluated

portfolio capital flows hot or cold a distinction is often made between short term and long term capital flows the former are deemed unstable hot money and the latter are deemed stable cold money using time series analysis of balance of payments data for five industrial and five developing countries we find that in most cases the labels short term and long term do not provide any information about the time series properties of the flow in particular long term flows are often as volatile as short term flows and the time it takes for an unexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows long term flows are also at least as unpredictable as short term flows and knowledge of the type of flow does not improve the ability to forecast the aggregate capital account copyright 1995 by oxford university press

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

ordering and pricing decisions in a two echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information abstract this article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle we consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model we are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand we also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand

the imf forever an analysis of the prolonged use of fund resources considerable concern has been expressed about the prolonged use made of international monetary fund imf resources by a number of member countries some commentators have seen this as being fundamentally at odds with the role of the imf as a source of temporary balance of payments support and as one aspect of mission creep by the fund the perceived importance of the issue is reflected by the fact that the first report of the fund s independent evaluation office focused on it this article provides a detailed analysis of the prolonged use of fund resources it assesses the extent to which it is a problem and draws on available empirical evidence both qualitative and quantitative to isolate the causes of prolonged use it concludes by examining the policy questions to which prolonged use gives rise

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

the economic characteristics of imf program countries abstract a logit analysis is utilized to identify the factors that characterized developing nations that entered imf stabilization programs in the early 1980s program countries recorded higher rates of domestic credit growth larger shares of government expenditure more severe current account deficits smaller reserve holdings and lower per capita incomes

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function