learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games abstract although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness i e the fulfillment of trust are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts less is known about how the economic environment influences them in this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined stochastic past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships we find that shorter lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow while longer lasting relationships have the opposite effect the effect of stochastic end points declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects gain experience indicating that trust is able to rebound when longer lasting relationships follow shorter lasting ones

the labour demand of firms an alternative conception based on the capabilities approach the aim of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework for the analysis of labour demand alternative to the neoclassical one taking as its starting point the conception of the firm that derives from the capabilities or competence based theories of the organization after briefly reviewing the essential elements of this approach to the firm we tackle a range of diverse aspects such as the link between labour demand decisions and the firm s strategic planning and its determinants the characterisation of labour demand as a demand for productive competencies the consequences that these competencies are embedded in human beings or the relative independence between labour demand decision making and the process of wage setting in general terms this conception of labour demand allows us to incorporate many of the main peculiarities of labour and the demand for it from a number of different areas of heterodox economics particularly from institutional and post keynesian economics and it fits in with the conventional literature on internal labour markets and labour market segmentation

inventory and credit decisions for time varying deteriorating items with up stream and down stream trade credit financing by discounted cash flow analysis abstract in today s competitive markets most firms in united kingdom and united states offer their products on trade credit to stimulate sales and reduce inventory trade credit is calculated based on time value of money on the purchase cost i e discounted cash flow analysis recently many researchers use discounted cash flow analysis only on the purchase cost but not on the revenue which is significantly larger than the purchase cost and the other costs for a sound and rigorous analysis we should use discounted cash flow analysis on revenue and costs in addition expiration date for a deteriorating item e g bread milk and meat is an important factor in consumer s purchase decision however little attention has been paid to the effect of expiration date hence in this paper we establish a supplier retailer customer supply chain model in which a the retailer receives an up stream trade credit from the supplier while grants a down stream trade credit to customers b the deterioration rate is non decreasing over time and near 100 percent particularly close to its expiration date and c discounted cash flow analysis is adopted for calculating all relevant factors revenue and costs the proposed model is an extension of more than 20 previous papers we then demonstrate that the retailer s optimal credit period and cycle time not only exist but also are unique thus the search of the optimal solution reduces to a local one finally we run several numerical examples to illustrate the problem and gain managerial insights

entry its deterrence and its accommodation a study of the u s photographic film industry this work set in the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1987 examines firm level demand based and cost based explanations for entry and accommodation strategies in the u s photographic film industry i first estimate preentry and postentry market structures then using the estimated demand cost and market conduct parameters i show how entry by fuji photo or lack thereof by others is a function of two market structures i also show how market structure and conduct and changes in them over the pre and postentry periods are in turn functions of entry its deterrence and it accommodation

taxes and labor supply of high income physicians abstract we use the 1983 1985 physicians practice costs and income survey supplemented with federal and state tax rates to estimate the effect of variation in marginal tax rates on work hours for high income physicians we find that self employed physicians are much more sensitive to the marginal tax rate than would be suggested by previous labor supply studies while those who are employees have no discernible sensitivity to marginal tax rates

the hidden persuaders institutions and individuals in economic theory in his classic book the hidden persuaders vance packard claimed that large corporations manipulated consumers using advertising techniques john kenneth galbraith and others have repeated a similar view against this gary becker and george stigler have claimed that advertising is essentially informative rather than manipulative in contrast it is argued here that both of these opposed accounts of human agency neglect the more subtle and undesigned processes by which institutions bear upon and mould individuals this paper proposes a concept of reconstitutive downward causation in which institutions act upon individual habits and dispositions the mechanisms involved do not fall foul of past critiques of holism or methodological collectivism this argument involves a rehabilitation of the concept of habit in social science with far reaching implications

sketching a socio economic model of labour markets using insights from the socio economics of labour markets and building upon critical realist meta theory this paper offers the first sketch of a socio economic model of labour markets as an alternative to the orthodox model the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved

a shred of credible evidence on the long run elasticity of labor supply all public policies regarding taxation and the redistribution of income rely on assumptions about the long run effect of wages rates on labour supply the variation in existing estimates calls for a simple natural experiment in which men can change their hours of work and in which wages have been exogenously and permanently changed we use a panel dataset of taxi drivers who choose their own hours and who experienced two exogenous permanent fare increases and estimate an elasticity of labour supply of 0 2 implying that income effects dominate substitution effects in the long run labour supply of males

managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment abstract can performance bonuses increase the likelihood that managers coerce their subordinates into exerting high levels of effort when doing so promotes neither efficiency nor equity we consider a laboratory setting in which managers compete to obtain a large bonus at the end of the experiment and the probability of obtaining it depends partly on the effort exerted by the subordinates we find that managers are more than twice as likely to punish subordinates exerting fair levels of effort if they compete for individual bonuses than when there are no bonuses this is not the case when they compete for pooled bonuses giving managers discretionary power over how to share them with their subordinates as most subordinates willingly exert maximal effort a model in which individuals are assumed to care about equity captures subordinates behavior well managers willingness to coerce subordinates into exerting unfairly high levels of effort on the other hand cannot be readily accounted for by any of the existing models of social preferences

trusting behavior in a repeated investment game we compare a seven period repeated investment game to the one shot investment game on an average in the repeated game player a the trustor sends more and player b the trustee returns a larger percentage than in the one shot game both the amount sent and the percentage returned increase up to period 5 and drop sharply thereafter the reciprocity hypothesis for b players behavior is compatible with the first five periods but in the two end periods most b players behaved strategically by not returning the reciprocity hypothesis for a players behavior is compatible for all periods of the game

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

bargaining and reputation an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types we conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining the experiments implement the abreu and gul 2000 bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types which are obstinate in their demands creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers the data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as subjects mimic induced types furthermore we find evidence for the presence of complementary types whose initial demands acquiesce to induced behavioural demands however there are quantitative deviations from the theory subjects make aggressive demands too often and participate in longer conflicts before reaching agreements overall the results suggest that the abreu and gul 2000 model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior particularly in environments where the process underlying obstinate play is well established

collective labor supply heterogeneity and nonparticipation in this paper we extend the collective model of labour supply developed by chiappori 1988 to allow for discrete choices censoring and nonparticipation in employment we derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions that we contrast with restrictions implied by the usual unitary framework we apply our results to the estimation of a collective labor supply model for married couples without children using uk data from 1979 to 1993 taking into account unobserved heterogeneity we use the log linear labor supply framework the implications of the unitary framework are rejected while those of the collective approach are not the estimates of the sharing rule show that wages have a strong influence on bargaining power within couples

collective labour supply heterogeneity and non participation we present identification and estimation results for the collective model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices censoring of hours and non participation in employment we derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied by the usual unitary framework using the large changes in the wage structure between men and women in the u k over the last two decades we estimate a collective labour supply model for married couples without children the estimates of the sharing rule show that male wages and employment have a strong influence on bargaining power within couples

new evidence on labor supply employment versus hours elasticities by sex and marital status using the tri annual micro panel data of the survey of income and program participation we estimate fixed effects labor supply models separating the extensive and intensive margins the employment elasticity is 0 6 for single men versus 1 1 for married men the employment elasticity is 2 4 for single women versus 1 8 for married women the compensated hours worked elasticity is 0 4 for employed single and married men and 0 7 for employed single and married women the implied aggregate employment elasticity of 1 5 and hours per employee elasticity of 0 5 indicate employment fluctuations account for three fourths of wage induced variation in labor hours

micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes we build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work we find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work moreover we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers in our model micro and macro elasticities are effectively unrelated our model is also consistent with other cross country patterns

in search of predatory pricing can predatory pricing be reproduced in a laboratory environment we report research motivated by this objective we began with conditions that based on the literature appeared to combine the features this literature has suggested are favorable to the emergence of predation next we operationalized what was meant by predatory pricing in our design in order to compare prices with predictions from alternative theories of 10 experiments none evidenced predatory behavior most supported the dominant firm theory the second series of experiments addresses remedies for predation and finds that the effect is to increase prices and reduce efficiency

a labor supply elasticity accord a dispute about the size of the aggregate labor supply elasticity has been fortified by a contentious aggregation theory used by real business cycle theorists the replacement of that aggregation theory with one more congenial to microeconomic observations opens possibilities for an accord about the aggregate labor supply elasticity the new aggregation theory drops features to which empirical microeconomists objected and replaces them with life cycle choices whether the new aggregation theory ultimately indicates a small or large macro labor supply elasticity will depend on how shocks and government institutions interact to put workers at interior solutions for career length

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

extortion in the laboratory in a laboratory experiment we study a finitely repeated game t 15 under complete information in each round p demands tribute cash transfer from a a complies or refuses and after refusals p may punish a in equilibrium payoff maximization p does not punish and a refuses any positive demand in the experiment p punishes increasingly often and increasingly severely as she gains experience most as comply with p s demands the observations are compatible with linear spite in a finite mixture model the types of p and a in the subject pool are characterized an a that is resistant to extortion declines all demands is very rare and hence the threat of punishment in general is effective but all as either ignore actual punishment or react negatively to it they accept to pay tribute but they are resistant to piecemeal expropriation

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

addressing nurse shortages what can policy makers learn from the econometric evidence on nurse labour supply this paper provides a detailed review of the international studies that have used formal econometric models to investigate the labour supply decision of registered nurses rns the main finding is that at least in the short run rn labour supply appears to be fairly unresponsive to wage changes consequently even large wage increases are unlikely to be successful in tackling current and predicted nurse shortages this finding points to the importance of non pecuniary job aspects in influencing labour supply however the paper concludes by arguing that these empirical findings should be viewed with some caution given both theoretical and econometric limitations

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

on the existence of predatory pricing an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain store game a single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants there are two types of monopolists weak monopolists whose single period best response is to acquiesce after entry and strong monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry data show high levels of predatory pricing defined as weak monopolists fighting all entrants in early periods both with and without experimenter induced strong monopolists we reject a number of predictions of the asymmetric information sequential equilibrium model of kreps and wilson 1982 and find important deviations from more general sequential equilibrium models as well

estimating labour supply responses using tax reforms the 1980 s tax reforms and the changing dispersion of wages offer one of the best opportunities yet to estimate labor supply effects nevertheless changing sample composition aggregate shocks the changing composition of the tax paying population and discontinuities in the tax system create serious identification and estimation problems we develop grouping estimators that address these issues our results reveal positive and moderately sized wage elasticities we also find negative income effects for women with children

unemployment wage bargaining and capital labour substitution many economists believe that capital accumulation technical progress and labour force expansion have no lasting effect on unemployment this view rests on the empirically doubtful assumption that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to unity i e production is cobb douglas using a simple model based on the work of layard nickell and jackman this paper demonstrates that with a lower elasticity of substitution the equilibrium unemployment rate is affected by all of the above factors it considers briefly how capital accumulation may be endogenised and what long run implications this has for unemployment copyright 1999 by oxford university press

on the detection of collusion and predation abstract this lecture not only shows how game theory can contribute to the detection of collusion and predation but also how experts for the defense can use game theoretic arguments to make such detection difficult a few important european anti trust cases are discussed to illustrate

an empirical model of collective household labour supply with non participation i present a structural empirical model of collective household labour supply that includes the non participation decision i specify a simultaneous model for hours participation and wages of husband and wife i discuss the problems of identification and statistical coherency that arise in the application of the collective household labour supply model the model includes random effects and it is estimated using a panel data set of dutch couples the estimates allow me to check the underlying regularity conditions on individual preferences and to obtain estimates of the sharing rule that governs the division of household income between husband and wife

does self regulation work experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations self regulation sr is a common way of enforcing quality in markets such as banking financial services and several professions and in a variety of public and private organizations we provide experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations sros to publicly disclose versus cover up fraud in an incomplete information environment we find that observed behaviour is generally consistent with bayesian equilibrium when subjects are informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by a vigilant versus a lax sro type in particular a fraud disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the vigilant sro is more likely to detect fraud otherwise a cover up equilibrium is supported however when subjects are not informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by the sro types as expected in real sr situations no equilibrium is strongly supported our results suggest that in practice the reputation based incentives for ef

do anomalies disappear in repeated markets there is some evidence that as individuals participate in repeated markets anomalies tend to disappear one interpretation is that individuals particularly marginal traders are learning to act on underlying preferences which satisfy standard assumptions an alternative interpretation the shaping hypothesis is that individuals preferences are adjusting in response to cues given by market prices the paper reports an experiment designed to discriminate between these hypotheses with particular reference to the disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept

does unemployment compensation affect unemployment duration abstract we use a flexible hazard rate model with unrestricted spell duration and calendar timeeffects to analyse a dataset including all norwegian unemployment spells during the1990 s the dataset provides a unique access to conditionally independent variation inunemployment compensation we find that a marginal increase in compensation re duces the escape rate from unemployment significantly irrespective of business cycleconditions and spell duration the escape rate rises sharply in the months just prior tobenefit exhaustion while men are more responsive than women with respect to mar ginal changes in compensation women are most responsive with respect to benefitexhaustion keywords unemployment spells business cycles unemployment compensation non parametric duration analysis jel classification c41 j64 the ragnar frisch centre for economic research oslo we wish to thank the re search council of norway for financial support and christian brinck harald goldstein costas meghir espen moen steinar strom rolf aaberge and three anonomyous referees for helpful comments cor respondence to knut roed the ragnar frisch centre for economic research gaustadalleen 21 0349oslo norway e mail knut roed frisch uio no

optimal order quantity and selling price over a product life cycle with deterioration rate linked to expiration date it is evident that the lower the price the higher the demand therefore price is an important factor in a consumer s purchasing decision additionally for today s health conscious consumers product freshness is another important factor in purchasing decisions since product freshness declines over time today s health conscious consumers prefer a perishable product with a longer sell by date to a shorter one moreover a product s demand rate moving through its life cycle can be approximately represented by a trapezoid type pattern which includes constant demand increasing demand and decreasing demand as special cases in existing literature several researchers have developed inventory models for trapezoidal demand however they failed to consider pricing strategy product freshness linked to expiration date and purchasing cost in this study we enhance previous models by 1 taking pricing into consideration 2 exploring deterioration rate linked to expiration date and 3 adding an appropriate non constant purchasing cost we then derive theoretical results and run numerical examples to obtain managerial insights for instance the total profit without purchasing cost is significantly lower than that with purchasing cost included also if the cost of lost sales is improperly low then the total profit may become negative due to a large amount of lost sales

the supply of qualified nurses a classical model of labour supply the need to ensure adequate numbers of nurses is a key requirement of the current modernization of the uk nhs however it is unclear how effective wages are as an instrument to maintain or increase the nursing workforce both in terms of absolute numbers and in the number of whole time equivalents this study sets out to estimate a classical model of labour supply for british qualified married or cohabiting nurses and midwives looking at both the participation decision and the hours of work supplied data are from the quarterly labour force survey over the years 1999 2000 participation and hours of work are found to be inelastic with respect to own wage these results suggest that increasing the wage would only have a moderate effect on labour supply interestingly there is no significant statistical difference between having a child of nursery age 3 4 and having a child of school age 5 15 on participation and hours supplied this suggests that recent policy initiatives to increase female labour f

lessons learned generalizing learning across games this paper synthesizes findings from an ongoing research program on learning in signaling games the present paper focuses on crossgame learning the ability of subjects to take what has been learned in one game and generalize it to related games an issue that has been ignored in most of the learning literature we begin by laying out the basic experimental design and recapitulating early results characterizing the learning process we then report results from an initial experiment in which we find a surprising degree of positive cross game learning contrary to the predictions of commonly employed learning models and to the findings of cognitive psychologists we next explore two features of the environment that help to explain when and why this positive transfer occurs first we examine the effects of

strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary contribution experiments abstract voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time we use a two stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1 repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct response method which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

learning in common value auctions some initial observations abstract inexperienced bidders in first price common value auctions suffer from a winner s curse losing money on average with experience bidders approximate the nash equilibrium the mechanisms underlying this adjustment are 1 a market selection effect as the most aggressive bidders are less likely to return for subsequent sessions and 2 players who lose money bid less experiential learning and those who would have lost money had they won the auction with the high bidder s signal bid less observational learning

inventory models for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime under downstream partial trade credits to credit risk customers by discounted cash flow analysis abstract getting loans from banks are almost impossible after 2008 global financial crisis as a result about 80 of companies in united kingdom and united states offer their products on various short term free interest loans i e trade credit to customers numerous researchers and academicians apply discounted cash flow dcf analysis merely to compute the interest earned and charged during the credit period but not to the revenue and other costs which are considerably larger than the interest earned and charged for a rigorous analysis the dcf on all relevant costs is applied in addition many products deteriorate continuously and cannot be sold after their maximum lifetimes or expiration dates however very few researchers and investigators have implemented the product lifetime expectance into their models in this paper a supplier retailer customer chain system is developed in which the retailer gets an upstream full trade credit from the supplier whereas offers a downstream partial trade credit to credit risk customers the deterioration rate is non decreasing over time and near 100 particularly close to its expiration date and dcf analysis is applied to compute all relevant costs this paper demonstrates that the retailer s optimal replenishment cycle time not only exists but also is unique thus the search of the global optimal reduces to finding a local solution finally several numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are performed in order to illustrate the problem and obtain managerial insights

a note on seller s optimal credit period and cycle time in a supply chain for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime in 2014 wang et al 2014 extended the model of lou and wang 2012 to incorporate the credit period dependent demand and default risk for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime however the rates of demand default risk and deterioration in the model of wang et al 2014 are assumed to be specific functions of credit period which limits the contributions in this note we first generalize the theoretical results of wang et al 2014 under some certain conditions furthermore we also present some structural results instead of a numerical analysis on variation of optimal replenishment and trade credit strategies with respect to key parameters

peer induced fairness in games people exhibit peer induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as a reference to evaluate their endowments we analyze two independent ulti matum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers with peer induced fairness the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower using laboratory experimental data we estimate that peer induced fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower allowing for heterogeneity we find that 50 per cent of subjects are fairness minded we discuss how peer induced fairness might limit price discrimination account for low variability in ceo compensa tion and explain pattern bargaining

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

self confirming equilibrium rium path of play thus if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs even though beliefs about play at off path information sets need not be correct we characterize the ways in which self confirming equilibria and nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self con firming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts nash equilibrium and its refinements describe a situation in which i each player s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and ii each player s beliefs about the opponents play are exactly correct we propose a new equilibrium concept self confirming equilibrium that weakens condition ii by requiring only that players beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play thus each player may have incorrect beliefs about how his opponents would play in contingencies that do not arise when play follows the equilibrium and moreover the beliefs of different players may be wrong in different ways the concept of self confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that noncooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play suppose that each time the game is played the players observe the actions chosen by their opponents but that players do not observe the actions their opponents would have played at the information sets that were not reached along the path of play then if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs so the equilibrium is self confirming in the weak sense of not being inconsistent with the evidence by analogy with the literature on the bandit problem e g rothschild 1974 one might expect that a non nash self confirming equilibrium can be the outcome of plausible learning processes this point was made by fudenberg and

signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game in an experimental investigation of milgrom and roberts 1992 model play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima followed by an attempt to pool and then if no pooling equilibrium exists separation suggesting myopia rather than a forward looking process when both pure strategy equilibria and separating equilibria exist equilibrium selection is a function of the past history of play an adaptive learning model characterizes the major features of the data and provides predictions of intermediate term behavior that is otherwise lacking in the theory

differences in labor supply to monopsonistic firms and the gender pay gap an empirical analysis using linked employer employee data from germany this article investigates women s and men s labor supply to the firm within a semistructural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony using methods of survival analysis and a large linked employer employee data set for germany we find that labor supply elasticities are small 1 9 3 7 and that women s labor supply to the firm is less elastic than men s which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market our results imply that at least one third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by profit maximizing monopsonistic employers

a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift abstract binmore and samuelson binmore k samuelson l 1999 evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection review of economic studies 66 363 393 have shown that perturbations drift are crucial to study the stability properties of nash equilibria we contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift based on the similarity theory introduced by tversky tversky a 1977 features of similarity psychological review 84 327 352 the innovation is that we derive the similarity relations from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game we obtain different models of drift depending on how we model that perception and show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in components of nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect

should sellers prefer auctions a laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms when bidders incur a cost to learn their valuations bidder entry can impact auction performance two common selling mechanisms in this environment are an english auction and a sequential bidding process theoretically sellers should prefer the auction because it generates higher expected revenues whereas bidders should prefer the sequential mechanism because it generates higher expected bidder profits we compare the two mechanisms in a controlled laboratory environment varying the entry cost and find that contrary to the theoretical predictions average seller revenues tend to be higher under the sequential mechanism whereas average bidder profits are approximately the same we identify three systematic behavioral deviations from the theoretical model 1 in the auction bidders do not enter 100 of the time 2 in the sequential mechanism bidders do not set preemptive bids according to the predicted threshold strategy and 3 subsequent bidders tend to overenter in response to preemptive bids by first bidders we develop a model of noisy bidder entry costs that is consistent with these behaviors and we show that our model organizes the experimental data well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1800

experimental evidence of pooling outcomes under information asymmetry operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm s prospects to less informed parties such as investors customers competitors and regulators consequently managers in these settings often face a trade off between making an optimal decision and sending a favorable signal we provide experimental evidence on the choices made by decision makers in such settings equilibrium assumptions that are commonly applied to analyze these situations yield the least cost separating outcome as the unique equilibrium in this equilibrium the more informed party undertakes a costly signal to resolve the information asymmetry that exists we provide evidence however that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available this result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications we find evidence that the choice to pool is influenced by changes in t

predation asymmetric information and strategic behavior in the classroom an experimental approach to the teaching of industrial organization abstract classroom market experiments can complement the theoretical orientation of standard industrial organization courses this paper describes various experiments designed for such courses and presents details of a multi market game with entry and exit in this experiment incumbents have a cost advantage in their home markets and mobile firms decide which market to enter after entry decisions are made firms choose prices and quantities to offer for sale predatory pricing is possible with this setup and the experiment can be used to motivate discussions of monopoly competition entry and efficiency other classroom experiments with an industrial organization focus are surveyed

joint pricing and inventory model for deteriorating items with expiration dates and partial backlogging under two level partial trade credits in supply chain abstract this paper develops an inventory model for deteriorating items under a two level partial trade credit with allowable shortages this paper considers a supplier retailer customer supply chain in which a for settling the cost of purchasing the retailer receives a partial trade credit from the supplier and at the same time the retailer offers a separate partial trade credit to the customer b the downstream credit period not only increases demand but also opportunity cost c the deterioration rate is non decreasing over time and the product is fully deteriorated close to its expiration date and d shortages are allowed the objective of the problem is to determine the optimal selling price the optimal replenishment cycle time and the time taken for the inventory to reach zero at the same time such that the total profit per unit is maximized theoretical results are established a numerical example is provided to illustrate the theoretical results and yield some managerial insights

predatory pricing in a multiple market experiment a note abstract isaac and smith 1985a b present a strong behavioral case that predatory pricing is not an observable laboratory phenomenon we propose several modifications of their design resulting in a multiple market experiment in which predatory pricing is present the primary modification involves conducting several markets concurrently providing an active escape opportunity for any prey and a potential reward to a reputation for predation these results provide a behavioral existence proof for the predatory pricing phenomenon they do not address the issue of the phenomenon s behavioral robustness

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma more than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience as suggested by backward induction remains inconclusive this paper provides a meta analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game we describe forces that affect initial play formation of cooperation and unraveling breakdown of cooperation first contrary to the backward induction prediction the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation we identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect to account for an important part of this effect second despite these initial differences the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations importantly despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round and conditional on establishing cooperation the first defection round moves earlier with experience simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation

integrating the internal and external labour markets evidence of shifts towards atomized relations in the labor market appears to conflict with economic theories of the internal labor market the problem however lies not with the irrelevance of internal labor market systems and broader institutional structures but rather with the misspecification of theoretical analysis new institutional and labor market segmentation models are typically restricted to a static dualistic framework of comparative forms of work organization this paper outlines a dynamic approach to the study of internal labor markets the authors argue that internal and external competitive pressures mutually interact to shape employer strategy and the relative labor market positions of employees copyright 1998 by oxford university press

estimates of a labour supply function using alternative measures of hours of work abstract depending on the data source estimates of hours of work give widely different results both as to level and change in this study three alternative measures of hours worked are used to estimate a simple labor supply function to investigate if the estimated wage rate and income effects are data dependent as well the measures used include those from time use surveys and from labor force surveys the latter are based on the responses to a question about normal weekly hours of market work the results suggest that the estimates of the wage rate effects become much smaller when measures of normal hours are used compared to data collected for a well defined time period close to the date of interview such as time use data the income effects appear less sensitive to the choice of data

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma experimental evidence this paper presents experiments designed to examine the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma the authors test the hypothesis by controlling the subjects ability to build reputations and by manipulating their beliefs that their opponent is irrational or altruistic the responses of subjects strongly support the sequential equilibrium prediction the results also suggest an important role for homemade altruism that is a natural tendency to cooperate that subjects bring to the experiment from the outside the authors find that there may be no difference between the beliefs that an opponent is altruistic and the actual chance it is so copyright 1993 by royal economic society

the effect of repeated play on reputation building an experimental approach what effect does repeated play have on reputation building the liter ature on international relations remains divided on whether when and how reputa tion matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict we examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments using comparative statics from a repeated entry deterrence game we isolate how incentives for reputation build ing should change as the number of entrants changes we find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted in order to explain this we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population our research suggests that rational choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated

adaptive learning vs equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game signalling models are studied using experiments and adaptive learning models in an entry limit pricing game even though high cost monopolists never play dominated strategies the easier it is for other players to recognise that these strategies are dominated the more likely play is to converge to the undominated separating equilibrium and the more rapidly limit pricing develops this is inconsistent with the equilibrium refinements literature including cho kreps intuitive criterion and pure bayesian adaptive learning models an augmented adaptive learning model in which some players recognise the existence of dominated strategies and their consequences predicts these outcomes

oligopoly limit pricing in the lab we examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable the results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels yet in a large number of cases asymmetric information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low the results also show that the entrants behavior is by and large bi polar entrants tend to enter when the incumbents prices are low but tend to stay out when the incumbents prices are high

do labour supply and demand curves exist the objective of this paper is to show that circumstantial and empirical evidence for the existence of labour supply and demand curves is at best inconclusive and at worst casts doubt on their existence because virtually all orthodox models of labour markets simple and complex are built upon the foundation stones of labour supply and demand curves these models lack empirically supported foundations orthodox labour economists must therefore either provide stronger evidence or stop using labour supply and demand curves as the foundation stones of their models the conclusion discusses implications for future orthodox and heterodox labour economics

market structure and incomplete information price formation in a real world repeated english auction abstract this paper examines the effect of buyer size on price formation in an english auction of used state police cars while open auctions generally favor competitive pricing bikhchandani 1988 develops a model of a second price common value auction in which bidders can use strategic behavior based on repeated sales to develop an aggressive reputation and as a result pay lower prices in equilibrium the paper tests this hypothesis by examining sales of 340 used automobiles sold at 13 public auctions conditional on the volume of purchases made by the three largest buyers at the auctions the empirical results show that the number of buyers plays a stronger role in price formation than does buyer size

advertising and limit pricing we enrich milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow an incumbent to signal his costs with both price and advertisements our fundamental result is that a cost reducing distortion occurs in that the incumbent behaves as if there were complete information but his costs were lower than they are preentry price is therefore distorted downward and demand enhancing advertising is distorted upward as a consequence of signalling if advertising is a purely dissipative signal it is not used nor therefore distorted recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are featured

naked exclusion in the lab the case of sequential contracting in the context of the naked exclusion model of rasmusen ramseyer and wiley 1991 and segal and whinston 2000b we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting we find that an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers sequentially is better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously in contrast to theory this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent