distributed energy infrastructure paradigm community microgrids in a new institutional economics context abstract this paper provides a theoretical framework based on new institutional economics nie concepts to guide the development of community microgrids given limited application thus far of such energy systems this paper also draws on empirical studies and experiences from the planning and development of other public community infrastructure and utility services in the development of this framework it links an efficient ownership and governance structure with transactional characteristics such as asset idiosyncrasy frequency and uncertainty defined in section 3 1 the key role of the customers and the microgrid service provider and more specifically their bilateral monopoly relationship and its effects on the choice of institutional structure is highlighted the paper examines the optimum conditions for public private or hybrid financial ownership and for unified or network governance through long term contracting this allows ex ante investment uncertainty and ex post appropriation risks to be efficiently managed the analysis suggests that long term contract completeness future demand for electricity and level of uncertainty are the determining factors in the selection of institutional structure this has significant real world implications for the communities seeking to achieve electricity self sufficiency and environmental benefits through community microgrids service providers and other private or public actors

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

co firing coal with wood pellets for u s electricity generation a real options analysis abstract in contrast to eu u s electric utilities are not employing the bioenergy technology of co firing wood pellets with coal this difference in employment patterns is explored within a real options analysis roa for possible u s utilization of wood pellets considering fuel price series from 2009 to 2014 for analysis these series are divided into two sub periods based on different market conditions infancy 2009 2011 and substitution 2012 2014 roa indicates co firing wood pellets with coal is feasible considering adoption during wood pellets infancy under low discount rates and long power plant lifespans a portfolio effect of employing multiple fuels underlies this result however co firing is not currently economically feasible the different adoption decisions are likely a consequence of recent cheap and abundant u s natural gas for co fired wood pellets to be feasible government incentives and or a market increase in natural gas prices appear necessary

detecting abnormal credit union performance abstract credit unions are an important financial intermediary but little credit union research is done a primary reason for the lack of research is the cooperative nature of the industry making traditional methods of detecting abnormal performance inappropriate this paper proposes two methods of detecting abnormal performance one parametric the other non parametric instead of testing the efficiency of the institution this paper proposes testing the return vector as indicated in the theoretical objective function of the member simulations demonstrate that both methods are correctly specified and powerful

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

to elect or to appoint bias information and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians in this paper we address empirically the trade offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians in order to do this we map institutions of selection and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce we do this by specifying a collective decision making model and exploiting its equilibrium information to obtain estimates of the unobservable types we focus on criminal decisions across us states supreme courts we find that justices that are shielded from voters influence bureaucrats on average i have better information ii are more likely to change their preconceived opinions about a case and iii are more effective make less mistakes than their elected counterparts politicians we evaluate how performance would change if the courts replaced majority rule with unanimity rule

principals agents and the learning curve the case of steam electric power plant design and construction a number of factors including design variation and the combination of uncertain costs and cost plus contracting diminished opportunities and incentives to improve power plant design and construction over the last several decades this paper incorporates these factors into a model of learning that relies on a principal agent framework the author finds that because of design variation learning was reduced when an agent contracted with a series of different principals agent learning declined when cost uncertainty increased during the late 1970s and 1980s and at the same time the locus of learning may have shifted from agents to principals copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining comment the authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give rise to an objective function for the firm that places weight on inframarginal profits in an economically significant manner the authors in turn employ this methodology to explore applications of organizational design hiring and capital decisions training and cross training the importance of labor and asset specificity managerial hierarchies preferences for unionization responses to competition and internal capital budgeting copyright 1996 by american economic association

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

investment decisions in finite lived monopolies abstract this paper studies the value and optimal timing for investment in finite lived monopolies extending the literature on real option games by considering the cases of random and certain lived monopolies under these settings firms face the risk of demonopolization that can occur as a random or a certain event we show that these new settings produce significantly different results when compared to the canonical monopolistic and duopolistic models in a certain lived monopoly the leader invests sooner than in a duopoly if there is a risk of being preempted and later than in a monopoly if the leader role is pre assigned in a random lived monopoly entry occurs somewhere between the duopoly and monopoly cases higher uncertainty delays investment in all cases

why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes an evolutionary approach abstract two bargaining parties play the nash demand game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party s investment decision various investment levels are subgame perfect adding the investment decision to young s evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long run outcome efficient investment prevails and the investor s share of the pie approximates die maximum of i the smallest share that induces efficient investment even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment and ii half of the pie the result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold ups journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 l14

credit union rate and earnings retention decisions under uncertainty and taxation this paper presents a model of credit union loan and deposit rate setting when net income flows are uncertain and subj ect to taxation optimal rates are chosen to maximize the expected va lue of a performance measure based on a comparison of the credit unio n s rates to alternative rates subject to a probabilistic constraint on the net change in capital reserves relative to a capital adequacy standard taxation will alter the end of period trade off between th e change in capital reserves and the immediate distribution of surplu s and would likely affect credit unions in a nonuniform manner and p erhaps be regressive in nature copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

an aggregate model of the credit union industry prior to 1971 credit unions cus were almost exclusively short term lenders with their deposit base consisting primarily of passbook share accounts radical institutional changes during the 1970 s have reshaped the industry and increased the competition between cus and other financial institutions the introduction of federal share insurance in 1971 coupled with the highest deposit ceiling allowed by regulators allowed cus to attract funds from other intermediaries while cus have a yield advantage they have been much slower to introduce day of deposit to day of withdrawal interest accumulation so that many cu deposits may be regarded more as short term certificate accounts rather than open passbooks thus as the federal reserve system and the federal home loan bank board have liberalized cu yields maturities and minimum denominations it has affected cus ability to attract share deposits substantial competition exists in loan markets as well banks finance companies and the credit acceptance subsidies of many manufacturing corporations also extend consumer credit while cus have entered mortgage markets in this study a six equation simultaneous model is developed to estimate three different aggregate flows within the industry new loan extensions net share flows and net change in financial investments two price variables the average cu loan rate and average dividend rate and the median maturity on newly extended loans to account for endogenous changes in non price terms which may affect both the supply and demand for loans this study is important to both researchers and policymakers despite the movement to make credit unions more like and more competitive with other financial institutions there remains a general perception that cus are different that they cannot be analyzed by applying well known economic theories and methods and that they remain insulated from both general economic conditions and competition the evidence from this study suggests that those perceptions are in error even though the industry remains small relative to other providers of consumer financial services because cus are no longer insulated it is important to know the impact of changing economic conditions on the industry department of economics john carroll university funding by the national credit union administration ncua is gratefully acknowledged participants in a seminar at ncua provided the author with seveal suggestions which were incorporated in the research special thanks are due to john wolken who spent countless hours in discussion with the author and catherine melfi and george kosicki who provided research assistance any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author

are tenured judges insulated from political pressure tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure and as a result indifferent to the concerns of the electorate we investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior english judges between 1985 and 2005 throughout this period the popular view was one of ill disciplined elitism senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over their equally capable non elite counterparts we find evidence in support of this view to be surprisingly weak most of the unconditional difference in promotion prospects between the two groups can simply be explained by differences in promotion relevant characteristics we then exploit an unexpected proposal to remove control over promotions from the judiciary and find that judges behaviour dramatically changed when faced by the prospect of losing autonomy senior judges began to favour non elite candidates as well as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee

information polarization and term length in democracy abstract this paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left right scale parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are a short term length makes the government more accountable but the re election incentive leads to policy distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters beliefs to make its ideology more popular this creates a trade off a short term length improves accountability but gives distortions a short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized partisan voters always prefer a long term length when politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters

technology choice under changing peanut policies the effect of marketing quotas and price supports on technology adoption are examined for peanut production in the southeastern united states using a real options model of investment with output price and yield uncertainty the optimal choice of peanut production technology dryland versus irrigated in the southeast is shown to depend on price supports and how they change the manner in which price supports change will have an effect on the choice and rates of abandonment or adoption of production technologies

real investment options with multiple sources of rare events abstract we value real investment options when the underlying asset follows a mixed jump diffusion process involving various types sources of rare events jumps these jumps are assumed independent of each other with each type having a log normally distributed jump size and a random poisson distributed arrival time they may represent uncertainties about the arrival and impact on the underlying investment of new information concerning technological innovation competition political risk regulatory effects and other sources an analytic solution is presented for european claims call or put options with multiple sources of jumps a discrete time markov chain methodology implemented within a finite difference scheme is proposed for the valuation of american as well as european options the approach is also applicable to financial options with multiple types of rare events the approach is illustrated through valuing complex real options with compound features involving interactions between optimal investment and subsequent operating decisions specifically we value a growth option and an extension option

regulation and investment in the u s telecommunications industry abstractreversing a two decade deregulatory trend of telecommunications services in 2010 u s regulators embarked on an aggressive regulatory agenda including but not limited to the regulation of high speed internet services under the auspices of net neutrality using utility style regulations codified in the 1930s firms regulators and analysts feared a reduction in capital spending contradicting established policy goals of expanding internet availability and adoption in this article a difference in differences regression model augmented with randomization inference is applied to government data on capital spending in telecommunications large negative effects on investment are found the estimated effects are robust across changes in estimation periods and model specifications and multiple tests of the model s assumptions lend credibility to the findings

an economic theory of a credit union the majority of research to date on cus has been empirical cf cargill 1 and kidwell and peterson 7 yet there is serious need to develop a theoretical framework of cu behavior that incorporates their unique characteristics a cu is essentially a financial intermediation cooperative however the standard theoretical treatments of financial intermediaries cf meyer 8 and cooperative enterprises cannot be directly applied to model credit union behavior there are two principal characteristics of cus that prevent this first in a cu and cooperatives in general the members are both the owners of the organization and the consumers of its output or suppliers of its input one cannot simply assume that the members seek to maximize the profit generated by their transactions with the cu irrespective of the price and quantities of those same transactions thus models of a financial firm based on profit maximization cannot be directly translated to a cu environment second in a cu the membership provides both the demand for and supply of loanable funds the cu then intermediates between its member savers and member borrowers this heterogeneity is an inherent source of conflict between members clearly a cu cannot simultaneously maximize its dividend rate for savers and minimize its loan rate for borrowers since most theoretical models of cooperative enterprises assume a homogeneous member objective they are not generally applicable to cus there are two basic requirements for a framework to model cu behavior first the specification of the objective function should focus on the value of cu participation to the members this value should include the prices and quantities of transactions as well as any profit that results second the analysis should explicitly consider the possibility of conflict among members and the resolution of that conflict being a preference to either the borrowers or savers the existing literature on cus contains a wide variety of objective functions hempel and yawitz 5 ignore the owners are consumers issue and simply contend that cus like other financial intermediaries should maximize profit most writers however recognize that profit maximization would be a somewhat incongruous objective for an organization that typically labels itself not for profit murray and white 9 use cost minimization subject to an output constraint keating 6 employs the managerial discretion approach by maximizing the manager s utility function subject to minimum member benefit constraints taylor 11 12 suggests that the cu should minimize the difference between its average loan rate and savings rate paid smith 10 argues that the cu should

investment incentives in bilateral trading abstract we characterize the surplus maximizing trading mechanism under two sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality when one party can make a value enhancing specific investment this mechanism exhibits a trade off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary participation we analyze how the trading area of the optimal mechanism is further distorted in order to provide investment incentives applications of our main results and the underlying geometric analysis to institutional design issues are also provided

the learning curve market dominance and predatory pricing sufficient conditions for id and iid are given in the case of two step learning in which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve after just two sales however examples are also constructed for the two step learning case in which neither id nor iid holds it is also shown that in equilibrium iid implies that learning is privately disadvantageous although it is socially advantageous finally introducing avoidable fixed costs and possible exit into the model yields a new theory of predatory pricing based on the learning curve hypothesis

extracting information or resource the hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information we characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource under asymmetric information a virtual hotelling rule describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along an optimal extraction path in sharp contrast with the case of complete information elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow di erent extraction paths some resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives the optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees with a market of concessionaires asymmetric information leads to a virtual her ndahl principle and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires under asymmetric information the market price converges faster to its long run limit exhibiting more stability

a theoretic framework for the analysis of credit union decision making this paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits the unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative are used to develop the objective function this is based on a comparison of the credit union s rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower saver conflict the principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members

information and the hold up problem we examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input we study how the resulting hold up problem is affected by the seller s information about the investing party s likely returns from its investment our principal focus is on the effects of the investment s being observable by the non investing party contrary to popular intuition we find that an improvement in the seller s information e g the investment s being observable rather than not can benefit the buyer and harm the seller we also find that other popular intuitions about this problem are either false incomplete or require strong assumptions to be valid

delays and partial agreements in multi issue bargaining abstract we model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically one player values the existing pie more than the future one while the other player has the opposite valuation we show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period and then consume the remainder of it along with the second pie at the date at which the second pie becomes available thus our model features a special form of bargaining delay in which agreements take place in multiple stages such partial agreements arise when players are patient enough when they expect the second pie to become available soon and when the asymmetry in their valuations is large enough

are emily and greg more employable than lakisha and jamal a field experiment on labor market discrimination we study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help wanted ads in boston and chicago newspapers to manipulate perceived race resumes are randomly assigned african american or white sounding names white names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews callbacks are also more responsive to resume quality for white names than for african american ones the racial gap is uniform across occupation industry and employer size we also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the u s labor market jel j71 j64

ex post renegotiation proof mechanism design we study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation proof eprp i e robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures and which social choice functions are eprp implementable in complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced groves allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents all ex post efficient allocations are in environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced groves in expectations allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs all ex post efficient allocations are

capital investment strategies under uncertain regulation this article presents a positive model of investment choices by regulated firms that offers rational explanations for electric utilities recent behavior of delaying investment and choosing smaller shorter lead time technologies the model assumes thatfirms capital investments require long lead times during which the value of the completed project is uncertain firms anticipate regulatory profit and loss restrictions but expectations about the value of a completed project change over time firms decisions are modelled using an option pricing approach that incorporates the value of flexibility to delay or abandon projects the article shows why rational firms invest in smaller shorter lead time plants or delay investment when faced with uncertain and asymmetric profit and loss restrictions it also looks at decisions to abandon partially completed plants and shows that the static result that a higher cost allowance on abandoned projects increases the incentive for investment is not generally true in a dynamic model

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

piecewise procurement of a large scale project this paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large scale project in the unique markov perfect equilibrium mpe of the dynamic procurement game it is found that 1 unlike the static setting the procurer s optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly it is nonmonotonic as one more supplier participates in the procurement auction the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost btypesq while increasing competition in the mature stages 2 this in turn implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers 3 absent scheduling and or resource constraints the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers technology exhibits constant or increasing returns and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid and 4 the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the vickrey type d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

managing dynamic competition in many important high technology markets including software development data processing communications aeronautics and defense suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost this paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions the protection and allocation of intellectual property and the sharing of information among rival suppliers jel c73 d44 l10

contractual signaling relationship specific investment and exclusive agreements i analyze a model of hold up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties i show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible this conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment

civil service reform abstract civil service rules governing the selection and motivation of bureaucrats are among the defining institutions of modern democracies although this is an active area of reform in the us and elsewhere economic analyses of the issue are virtually nonexistent this paper provides a welfare evaluation of civil service reform it describes the effect of reform on the interaction of politicians voters and bureaucrats and shows that society often faces trade offs between improving the bureaucracy and improving the performance of politicians my results characterize the conditions under which merit based recruitment and civil service protections such as tenure can improve welfare

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

an option valuation analysis of investment choices by a regulated firm this paper analyzes a utility power plant construction project using an option pricing model of the value of the capital investment it includes descriptive factors frequently ignored in the valuation of capital investments by regulated firms including lead time lumpy and sequential cost outlays irreversibility of expenditures and uncertainty about regulatory outcomes for completed projects the analysis shows the value of shorter lead time technologies the value of flexibility to delay or abandon construction the incentive to delay construction under uncertain regulation and how cost recovery policies such as possible disallowance of allow for funds used during construction afudc create incentives to invest less but to complete construction quickly the analysis may also apply in unregulated contexts where the value of a completed project is affected by taxation the possibility of nationalization or possible competitors actions that create uncertain restrictions on potential profits

the design of contracts and remedies for breach in the first part of this article hypothetical contracts providing for all possible uncertain contingencies are considered in the next part contracts providing for only some contingencies are examined and are shown to be advantageous due both to difficulties that could arise in making and enforcing contingent terms and to the presence of implicit substitutes for them in the following major part of the article two of these substitutes for contingent terms are analyzed remedies for breach and the opportunity for renegotiation the existence of both is demonstrated to induce parties to behave approximately as they would under detailed contracts

regulation and corporate investment policy in a previous paper it was shown that the traditional rule that the allowed return on the equity of a regulated firm should be set equal to its cost of equity capital was conceptually deficient 2 this deficiency arises because the cost of equity capital of a regulated firm depends upon its risk which depends in turn upon the regulatory policy that will be followed in the future including the allowed rate of return it was argued therefore that this traditional rule should be replaced by the requirement that the regulatory policy be consistent a consistent regulatory policy achieves what the traditional rule only attempts it ensures that at the time of a regulatory hearing the market value of the firm equity is equal to the equity financed portion of the rate base to devise a consistent regulatory policy it is necessary to have a valuation model which takes explicit account of regulatory policy such a model was developed in the above mentioned paper in this paper we generalize the earlier valuation model so that the investment policy of the regulated firm is determined by the value maximizing decisions of the management instead of being taken as exogenous to the extent that investment policy is discretionary its endogeneity must be taken into account in devising a consistent regulatory policy and this is made possible by the generalized model in reality it seems unclear to what extent the investment policies of regulated firms are predetermined by the requirement that they meet demand and to what extent they are discretionary since the model presented here easily accommodates constraints on the investment policy it is the more appropriate model so long as there exists any element of discretionary investment behaviour and permits a more adequate approach to the determination of consistent regulatory policies with discretionary investment policy an important consequence of any particular consistent regulatory policy is the investment policy it induces in section 4 we show how the value maximizing investment policy is affected by the choice of regulatory policy on the other hand regulated firms are wont to argue that their investments are in the main predetermined by demand and must be undertaken regardless of their profitability this putative lack of discretion it is maintained means that the appropriate allowed rate of return is higher than would otherwise be the case in section 4 also we evaluate the strength of this consideration by comparing the allowed rate of return under consistent regulatory policies when investment policy is and is not discretionary section 5 shows briefly how the analysis can be extended to account for the effect of debt in the capital structure

option valuation of claims on real assets the case of offshore petroleum leases this paper extends financial option theory by developing a methodology for the valuation of claims on a real asset an offshore petroleum lease several theoretical and practical problems not present in applying option pricing theory to financial assets are addressed most importantly we show the necessity of combining option pricing techniques with a model of equilibrium in the market for the underlying asset petroleum reserves the advantages of this approach over conventional discounted cash flow techniques are emphasized the methodological development provides important insights for both company behavior and government policy promising empirical results are reported

can gender parity break the glass ceiling evidence from a repeated randomized experiment this paper studies whether the gender composition of recruiting committees matters we make use of the unique evidence provided by spanish public examinations where the allocation of candidates to evaluating committees is random we analyse how the chances of success of 150 000 female and male candidates for positions in the four main corps of the spanish judiciary from 1987 to 2007 were affected by the gender composition of their evaluation committee we find that a female male candidate is significantly less likely to be hired whenever she he is randomly assigned to a committee where the share of female male evaluators is relatively greater evidence from multiple choice tests suggests that this is due to the fact that female majority committees overestimate the quality of male candidates

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

monopolistic screening under learning by doing this article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents production technologies display learning effects and agents learning rates are private knowledge in a simple two period model with full commitment available to the principal we show that whether learning effects are over or underexploited crucially depends on whether more effcient agents also learn faster so costs diverge through learning effects or whether it is the less effcient agents who learn faster so costs converge we further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full commitment assumption is relaxed

technical change and irreversible investment under risk abstract a stochastic dynamic model was constructed to analyze investment decisions of an individual farmer under risk in the presence of irreversibilities embedded technical change and indivisible capital an analytical solution was obtained and its local behavior studied by numerical methods optimal investment is obtained by regulating the difference between the desired and actual capital stocks between two barriers that define an inaction interval while the desired capital drifts between the barriers no action is taken if the desired capital touches the upper barrier the farmer invests pushing the average efficiency of the actual capital stock up this in turn raises the desired capital even higher and contracts the inaction interval if these effects are strong enough the farmer will invest again until the potential gains of the technological package are exhausted if the desired capital falls enough the farmer disinvests pushing down the average productivity and expanding the inaction interval disinvestment continues until it stops either because the inaction interval becomes so wide that it is no longer optimal to disinvest or because the actual capital stock is so small that it is no longer profitable to produce

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

limited contract enforcement and strategic renegotiation this paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation in this theory suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past the authors develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motivate renegotiation copyright 1988 by american economic association

efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract this article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it it is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way without enforceable contracts the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be pareto ranked from best to worst as follows specific performance expectation damages and reliance damages

investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities abstract this paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them the shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities we show that agents investments improve their bargaining position this induces rent seeking behavior that generates a negative external effect on other investing agents in this setting the effects of rent seeking counterbalance the effects of positive consumption externalities so that equilibria may be efficient or display either over or under investment

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure this article reexamines the problem of breach of contract studied by shavell 1980 1984 and rogerson 1984 by considering explicitly the incentive problems that arise from asymmetric information and transaction specific investment we derive the optimal contract which consists of variable price and damage payment schedules each of which is set before any private information is observed we show that the optimal contract attains full classical efficiency

credit union structure growth and regulatory problems at year end 1979 there were 12 738 federal and 4 769 state chartered federally insured credit unions in the united states their assets were 36 5 billion and 18 5 billion respectively the industry was the fastest growing of all financial intermediaries during the early to mid 1970s factors contributing to a growth rate of 18 percent from 1970 to 1978 were the absence of regulation q restrictions on cu dividend rates tax exempt status of cus the advent of share insurance in 1970 and the impact of sponsor subsidies however during 1979 federal credit union savings grew by only 2 4 which was more than 85 lower than in the preceding year and was the slowest annual growth rate on record indeed since 1977 federal credit unions have gone from the fastest growing to the second slowest growing type of depository institution the reason for the changes in credit unions will be discussed after this section which provides background information on the structure of the industry that structure has historically led to a reduction in risk the basic components of that structure are common bond and sponsorship common bond credit unions are unique financial depository institutions in that they are consumer cooperatives and are limited to serving the market for consumer credit and savings generally these institutions cannot do business with the general public due to charter limitations based on serving a membership that is characterized by a common bond the common bond is based on occupation association or residence the only exceptions are generally found under state law and apply to state chartered institutions the common bond restriction on credit union membership is assumed to reduce the cost of gathering credit information reducing bad debt losses and manifests national credit union administration the views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the national credit union administration an extensive review of the history of credit unions and the institutional structure is found in

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

renegotiation proof implementation and time preferences this paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents valuations is nonverifiable this paper explicitly adds a time dimension to an implementa tion problem and introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation proofness for the case of time consuming renegotiation the main insight gained is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be implemented in a renegotiation proof manner jel c70 d23 this paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation proof affects the set of con tracts that can be implemented in a seller buyer scenario in which the informa tion regarding the agents valuations is non verifiable the paper s main contributions are that first it explicitly adds a time di mension to an implementation problem and second it introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation proofness for the case of time consuming renegotiation for concreteness the discussion will be conducted in the context of the following example there are two agents a seller and a buyer who sign a contract for the sale of one unit in the future their valuations for the unit denoted by s and b respectively are not known when they sign the contract they become known to both parties after the contract is signed and before it is imple mented thus when it comes to implement ing the contract the parties information is complete but it is assumed to be nonverifi able i e not observable to third parties such as a court 1 when they sign the con tract the parties want to specify for any possible realization of the valuations s b whether or not there will be trade and the price p s b at which it will take place the contract describes the procedure that will be followed after the valuations are real ized the purpose of this procedure is to make sure that the original intentions of the parties are indeed carried out the idea is that the steps laid out in the contract are independent of s b and hence are en forceable by a third party or by a social convention in game theoretic terms a contract specifies a game form that imple ments the function p in the sense that for all s and b p s b is the resulting game s unique subgame perfect equilibrium out come in the context of this scenario we shall investigate the set of price functions p s b that can be so implemented by a contract and examine how this set is affected by the requirement that the contract be renegotia

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

a model of sequential investment abstract this paper specifies a model of a two stage sequential investment where the stages take time to complete it presents algebraic solutions for an individual firm s optimal sequential investment with costless suspension without suspension in the intermediate case of costly suspension and for aggregate investment with suspension the first stage trigger is below the second stage trigger for sufficiently long lags and high levels of output price uncertainty thus the firm may carry out exploratory investment we also evaluate the comparative statics of investment and show how the patterns of project costs and lags affect the incentive to invest

learning by doing and dynamic regulation from experience regulated monopolists learn to employ cost reducing innovations we characterize the optimal regulation of an innovating monopolist with unknown costs regulatory policy is designed to minimize current costs of service while encouraging development of cost saving innovations we find that under optimal regulation i innovation is encouraged by light handed regulation allowing the monopolist to earn greater information rents while providing greater service ii innovation occurs in the absence of long term agreements when private information is recurring and iii innovation is more rapid in a durable franchise and the regulator prefers durable franchises for exploiting learning economies

racial discrimination among nba referees the nba provides an intriguing place to assess discrimination referees and players are involved in repeated interactions in a high pressure setting with referees making split second decisions that might allow implicit racial biases to become evident we find that more personal fouls are awarded against players when they are officiated by an opposite race officiating crew than when they are officiated by an own race refereeing crew these biases are sufficiently large so that they affect the outcome of an appreciable number of games our results do not distinguish whether the bias stems from the actions of white or black referees

the right of first offer abstract this paper examines the right of first offer which requires a seller to bargain with the contracted buyer before subsequent buyers arrive the contract also prevents the seller from selling his unique asset to subsequent buyers at a price below what he offers to the contracted buyer the right of first offer makes the seller less aggressive in bargaining with the contracted buyer who is privately informed about his valuation such a contract can reduce inter temporal misallocation in which a subsequent buyer gets the asset when the contracted buyer has higher valuation but it also may cause misallocation in which the contracted buyer gets the asset when subsequent buyers have higher valuations overall whether the right of first offer can increase the joint surplus for the seller and the contracted buyer as well as social welfare depends on the contracted buyer s renegotiation power and the distribution of the buyers valuations this paper also discusses the differences between the right of first offer and the most favored customer clause

dynamic regulation of quality we develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact when the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect when the regulator contracts with a single agent the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator s ability to transfer rents across periods hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is socially preferable to hiring a sequence of agents even when no commitment is feasible by contrast shorter franchises are socially preferable if the agent has limited liability

demand uncertainty and the regulated firm in this paper we investigate the impact of demand uncertainty on the choice of plant capacity by a regulated firm over the past few years demand uncertainty has become a major element in the decision making of utilities and particularly in their decision making with respect to capacity choices in a recent study by sri 1977 it was reported that to maximize expected consumers surplus more generating capacity was required for the electric utility industry when operating under demand uncertainty than under demand certainty 1 this finding raises the question whether the structure of rate regulation of electric utilities provides the appropriate incentives for them to invest in more capacity under demand uncertainty then under certainty the present paper addresses such questions the model of the regulated firm that is employed in this paper derives from the work of joskow 1974 concerning the recent history of rate regulation in the electric utility industry briefly joskow reported that during the 1960s and the early 1970s the impetus for rate reviews in the electric utility industry came mainly from the utilities and not from the public utility commissions puc s joskow s findings are corroborated by data for the period 1948 1978 a study of all rate cases involving electric utilities in the u s for that period shows that of a total of 363 cases 350 of these were instances of utility initiated rate reviews and only 13 were cases of puc initiated reviews 2 from the point of view of the formal theory of the regulated firm this strongly suggests that the averch johnson model of a firm operating at or near an allowed rate of return constraint with the allowed rate of return being in excess of the cost of capital to the firm should be replaced by a model of price regulation in which attention is shifted to the non negativity of profits constraint or at least this should be done with respect to the electric utility industry with some elaborations this is basically what we do in this paper building on the approach adopted in a recent paper on a related topic 3

a political agency theory of central bank independence we propose a theory to explain why and under what circumstances a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency we apply this theory to mon etary policy by extending a stochastic general equilibrium model this model provides a theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard time inconsistency problem which underlies all formalized theories of central bank independence we derive five key predictions of the model and show that they are broadly consistent with the data finally we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable goal independence is not

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

male female wage differentials in job ladders much of the male female wage differential exists because men and women are assigned to different jobs within narrow job categories there is no male female differential only a tortured taste theory of discrimination can reconcile these facts we argue that differential movement along job ladders entails comparative advantage so the ability standard for promotion is higher for women this implies that more able women will be passed over in favor of less able men women assumed to have the same ability distribution as men earn less the differential reflects females lower promotion probability not within job discrimination

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

strategic ex ante contracts rent extraction and opportunity costs this article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers the seller s optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant moreover this ex ante contract mitigates the seller s ex post rent seeking vis a vis the contracted buyer accordingly it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts depending upon the contracted buyer s financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed

expectation damages divisible contracts and bilateral investment this paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship specific investment by the buyer and the seller as demonstrated by edlin and reichelstein 1996 no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic we show that this result does not extend to more general payoff functions if both parties face the risk of breaching the first best becomes attainable with a simple price quantity contract

uncertainty asymmetric information and bilateral contracts on considere un monopole bilateral avec incertitude et information asymetrique on donne les conditions necessaires et suffisantes a l existence de contrats qui soient efficaces et a la fois stimulants

incomplete contracting and price regulation abstract this paper deals with price regulation of a monopolistic distribution grid which sells a license to some retailer the regulator aims at attaining efficient sale of the license and efficient relationship specific investments of the agents the first best can be attained by a sequential regulatory mechanism which gives the seller an option to grant the license but allows the buyer to make counteroffers this sequential mechanism runs counter to the usual price cap idea since possible upward but never downward renegotiation of the regulated prices is the vehicle to attain the first best

benefit imbalances among credit union member groups evidence of borrower dominated saver dominated and neutral behaviour theoretical models of credit union cu behaviour suggest that cus may be saver dominated borrower dominated or neutral a cu is dominated if it is operated for the benefit of one member group at the expense of the other neutral behaviour occurs when a cu is managed so that both member groups are equally benefited this empirical study develops a direct measure of the monetary benefits to each member group and tests for the existence of dominated behaviour among us cus in 1984 and 1985 evidence of dominated and neutral behaviour is found and the operating characteristics of these distinct organizational forms are generally consistent with theoretical expectations