statistical moments analysis of production and welfare in multi product cournot oligopoly abstract our context involves n cournot oligopolists producing m products at constant marginal costs when preferences are quasi linear we identify relationships between second moments of unit costs and second moments of firm level production for example a larger variance in unit costs of a product increases own output variance and the variance of any other output we also investigate how second moments of unit costs affect industry cost efficiency industry costs can rise if the wrong firm secures a cost reduction for quadratic preferences it is shown that zhao s zhao j 2001 a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly international journal of industrial organization 19 455 469 3 4 march share criteria for an increase in unit costs to increase welfare extend to the multi product setting

industrial policy and firm heterogeneity our concern in this paper is with firm specific industrial policy when r d subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms the question arises as to which firms in an industry should receive such support we analyze a situation where firms differ in their r d technologies in two distinct ways in the costs of performing r d activities and in the output obtained from such activities we find that the optimal firm specific industrial policy is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity furthermore a change in a firm s r d productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm jel classification o31 l52 f13

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

externally validating contingent valuation an open space survey and referendum in corvallis oregon abstract we ask whether respondents report the same decisions in non binding surveys as they do in real elections we study a corvallis or referendum to raise open space funds and find survey and election compatibility pivots on the characterization of undecided responses the survey and referendum percentage of yes votes match closely only if undecided responses are treated as no we compare survey based mean willingness to pay wtp estimates with election based estimates household wtp averages us 48 89 using election results while survey based wtp averages us 75 43 excluding undecided responses us 49 67 treating undecided responses as no and between us 49 96 and 80 05

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

cost heterogeneity industry concentration and strategic trade policies abstract we show that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs then the interplay between the herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies in some cases the direction of optimal policy is reversed

a satisfactory benefit cost indicator from contingent valuation abstract standard economic concepts are used to develop a model of individual behavior when subject to the constraints of the contingent valuation choice context the model yields refutable consequences that are consistent with previously reported empirical findings including some that have been thought to be anomalous the model is used to show that different contingent valuation formats have predictably different performance characteristics notably the hicksian compensating measures are satisfactory benefit cost indicators when elicited using any one of several formats identified in the text of the formats examined one form of a policy referendum appears to have the most satisfactory characteristics overall we conclude that contingent valuation is a progressing research program

regional allocation of public infrastructure investment the case of greece lambrinidis m psycharis y and rovolis a 2005 regional allocation of public infrastructure investment the case of greece regional studies 39 1231 1244 this paper develops a model on the determinants of the regional allocation of public infrastructure investment and applies it to greece for 1982 94 using panel methods of estimation the principal conclusions are that regional allocations of infrastructure investment 1 were negatively associated with regional product per capita as well as with population size and population density 2 were positively associated with the existing stock of infrastructure capital as well as with the share of agriculture in regional gross domestic product and 3 were increased across prefectures in years preceding national elections these results are related to national and european regional policy

a randomized response approach to dichotomous choice contingent valuation in this paper we combine dichotomous choice contingent valuation dc cv with the randomized response rr method for asking sensitive survey questions rr increases respondents anonymity by allowing them to answer a sensitive question without revealing with certainty their true response we combine rr with dc cv to test for response effects in the valuation of a public good in a setting of expected social pressure while there are practical implementation issues our findings suggest that the rr technique is a useful tool for exploring social context effects rather than generalize from our pre test results we instead emphasize the development of the experimental technique

the regional allocation of infrastructure investment the role of equity efficiency and political factors abstract this paper analyses the main determinants of the regional allocation of infrastructure investment the estimated investment equation is derived from a general specification of the government s objective function berhman and craig am econom rev 77 1987 315 which accounts both for the equity efficiency trade off and for deviations from this rule that arise because of political factors the reaction of investment to changes in the regional output provides information about the strength of the equity efficiency trade off the main political factor considered is a measurement of the electoral productivity of funds invested in each region the equation is estimated from panel data on investment and the capital stock of transportation infrastructure i e roads rails ports and airports for the spanish departments nuts3 during the period 1987 1996 we use a dynamic specification of the equation that allows for slow adjustment and which is estimated by gmm methods arellano and bond rev econom stud 58 1991 277 the results suggest that efficiency criteria play only a limited role in the geographical distribution of government infrastructure investment specific regional infrastructure needs and political factors both appear to be factors that do explain the regional allocation of infrastructure investment

optimal taxation and heterogeneous oligopoly this paper examines the effects of firm specific taxes on an oligopoly composed of firms of unequal sizes holding different conjectures operating with nonidentical costs four types of effects are analyzed on profits on industry concentration on total tax revenue and on social welfare the author derives 1 the revenue maximizing taxes 2 the welfare maximizing taxes and 3 welfare maximizing taxes subject to a revenue constraint

contribution to productivity or pork barrel the two faces of infrastructure investment abstract this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth we model explicitly the political economy process driving infrastructure investments in doing so we eliminate a potential source of bias in production function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy our empirical findings on a panel of france s regions over 1985 92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were indeed significant determinants of the cross regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments by contrast we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending even after controlling for pork barrel

confidence intervals for evaluating benefits estimates from dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies i evaluate the potential usefulness of nonmarket valuation concepts and techniques from environmental economics for improving wildlife conservation the concepts include distinguishing between on site recreation use value and off site passive use or

cost manipulation games in oligopoly with costs of manipulating we analyze a class of two stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two marginal costs may be manipulated by various means such as redistribution of productive assets choice of location or creation of an internal input market a general formulation of the game is provided and several applications are analyzed we show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric even for ex ante symmetric firms this is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

comparative statics for oligopoly a generalized result we perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival s strategic variable taking into account the responses of all other firms we obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second order partial derivative of the firm s payoff function we then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships i e strategic substitute and complement

politics and investment examining the territorial allocation of public investment in greece rodriguez pose a psycharis y and tselios v politics and investment examining the territorial allocation of public investment in greece regional studies this paper discusses how electoral politics shapes the regional allocation of public investment expenditures per capita in greece using regional public investment data for ten political periods 1975 2009 combined with electoral data by constituency a model is proposed that captures the influence of politics on the regional distribution of public investment expenditures the results of the analysis point to a strong relationship between electoral results and regional public investment spending greek governing parties have tended to reward those constituencies returning them to office moreover an increase in both the absolute and the relative electoral returns of the governing party in a region has traditionally been followed by greater public investment per capita in that region regions where the governing party whether liberal or socialist

optimal policies with strategic distortions abstract this paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a variety of policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive a targeting principle to identify optimal policies under imperfect competition is derived using the concept of a strategic distortion this allows us to interpret when trade policy is first best and links the literature on optimal policies with imperfect competition to the standard targeting literature we show that optimal tax subsidy policy depends crucially on the presence of other regulations and assumptions about market segmentation

fat tails and truncated bids in contingent valuation an application to an endangered shorebird species a yes response function in a contingent valuation study is said to have fat tails if it has a high and slowly declining yes response rate at high bid levels truncated bids refer to the practice of dropping high bid offers before a yes response rate of near zero is reached this is a common practice in contingent valuation we explore the extent and implications of fat tails and truncated bids in a study of an endangered shorebird species we find among other things that mean willingness to pay is quite sensitive to the highest bid offered so much so that the choice of highest bid nearly dictates outcomes

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

eco labelling scheme environmental protection and protectionism in this paper a model of international duopoly is developed involving competition in both prices and levels of environmental friendliness and the implications of government policies are studied it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom a regulatory increase in the minimum required level of environmental friendliness of imported goods may harm the home firm and may result in a rise in the volume of imported goods whether consumers lose or gain from such a regulatory increase depends on consumption spillover effects we also show that under certain conditions the duopoly s equilibrium choice of levels of environmental friendliness is socially optimal jel classification f00 eco etiquetage protection environnementale et protectionnisme ce memoire developpe un modele de duopole international ou la concurrence se fait a la fois par les prix et par les niveaux de sensibilite aux problemes environnementaux on etudie les impacts des politiques gouvernementales contrairement a ce que suggere la sagesse conventionnelle il semble qu un accroissement reglementaire dans le minimum requis de disposition favorable a l environnement des biens importes peut nuire a l entreprise locale et peut resulter en un accroissement du volume de biens importes le consommateur perdra ou gagnera en consequence de cette accroissement de la reglementation selon la nature des effets de retombees on montre aussi que sous certaines conditions le choix des niveaux d equilibre de sensibilite aux problemes de l environnement s avere socialement optimal

an independent sample test of yea saying and starting point bias in dichotomous choice contingent valuation abstract we developed several diagnostic tools to test the convergent validity of two common contingent valuation elicitation procedures data were collected from independent samples receiving dichotomous choice and payment card questions we compared actual with counter factual responses using deterministic and monte carlo methods and we found that wtp distributions and mean values varied by the value elicitation method we also developed a paired comparison test for procedure variance which indicated that yea saying and starting point bias influenced dichotomous choice responses

information and effort in contingent valuation surveys application to global climate change using national internet samples this contingent valuation study investigates the issues of information access and respondent effort and is based on a series of national internet samples the focus is on a split sample treatment basic information bi versus enhanced information ei in the latter significantly expanded information is provided about global climate change and the kyoto protocol using a referendum format we compare the treatment effect bi versus ei on willingness to pay wtp we develop measures of respondent effort in accessing optional information through the technology of web based surveys and jointly model effort and wtp using a simultaneous estimation approach results support the use of the joint modeling approach for objective measures of respondent effort and wtp respondent effort is shown to be positively and significantly related to wtp however use of the optional menu is rather modest counts of pages and time spent and is highly variable both across pages and respondents

further investigation of voluntary contribution contingent valuation fair share time of contribution and respondent uncertainty in the spirit of randall s resource energy econom 20 197 206 1998 argument for focusing on mapping the performance characteristics of alternative contingent valuation designs and formats the focus of this study is on three tests of the voluntary contribution mechanism we investigate the response effects of three crossed treatments 1 an informational treatment that randomly varies the total cost of providing the good to identify possible fair share effects 2 a split sample informational treatment that makes the time of contribution explicit and 3 elicitation formats that allow respondent uncertainty both as a follow up to a dichotomous choice question and asked directly in a split sample treatment

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

electoral goals and center state transfers a theoretical model and empirical evidence from india we construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations these considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not a testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers we test this prediction using indian data for 14 states from 1974 75 to 1996 97 we find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non swing

addressing negative willingness to pay in dichotomous choice contingent valuation this paper has four purposes first we outline the controversy surroundingthe issue of negative willingness to pay wtp in contingent valuation cv studies second we use monte carlo simulation to examine theperformance of alternative distributionalassumptions in estimating wtp in the presenceof varying proportions of the populationholding negative wtp values we focus ondichotomous choice cv dc cv where negativewtp values may be especially difficult todetect third we extend the simulation toinvestigate the performance of the mixturemodels that have recently been proposed forhandling identifying non positive wtp values fourth we extend the simulation to investigatethe performance of the nonparametric lowerbound turnbull approach results indicate thatthe relative performance of the dc cv modelingalternatives evaluated here which assumepositive wtp varies across the simulationsetting e g proportion of negative wtp butnone can be said to reasonably solve theproblem ex post this underscores theimportance of ex ante efforts to identify ifnegative wtp is likely to be prominent in agiven valuation setting in such cases appropriately handling negative wtp must beaddressed through ex ante survey design andmodeling choices that allow negative wtp

contingent valuation and social choice the contingent valuation method for estimating the existence value of natural resources is examined for psychophysical robustness statistical reliability and economic sensibility extensions of standard models for willingness to pay and suitable econometric techniques for analyzing these models are developed the analysis is applied to a series of experiments on the value of preserving wilderness areas in the western united states the results call into question the reliability of the cv method for estimating existence values

the economic incidence of smoking laws although laws restricting smoking in restaurants are becoming commonplace most research has focused on either the health benefits that laws may provide customers and workers or whether laws harm owners but while smoking laws may directly alter profits owners may alter prices output and other business attributes in ways that affect the welfare of customers and workers this study examines whether restaurant and bar owners alter prices entertainment hours of operation and other business attributes in response to local smoking laws substantial support is found for these attribute changes in the wisconsin hospitality industry one implication is that an overall assessment of the desirability of smoking laws should consider economic effects imposed on owners customers and workers as well as health benefits that follow laws

on the effectiveness of uniform subsidies in increasing market consumption we study the problem faced by a central planner trying to increase the consumption of a good such as new malaria drugs in africa the central planner allocates subsidies to its producers subject to a budget constraint and endogenous market response the policy most commonly implemented in practical applications of this problem is uniform in the sense that it allocates the same per unit subsidy to every firm primarily because of its simplicity and perceived fairness surprisingly we identify sufficient conditions of the firms marginal costs such that uniform subsidies are optimal even if the firms efficiency levels are arbitrarily different moreover this insight is usually preserved even if the central planner is uncertain about the specific market conditions further in many cases uniform subsidies simultaneously attain the best social welfare solution additionally simulation results in relevant settings where uniform subsidies are not optimal suggest that they induce a nearly optimal market

interviewer effects on the valuation of goods with ethical and environmental attributes this paper investigates the impact of interviewer effects on willingness to pay wtp estimates face to face surveys were conducted with two interviewers both interviewers used a transcript and conducted the survey at the same location and at the same time we found that responses to the wtp questions differ across eco labeled products and by interviewer this interviewer effect is particularly relevant when we analyze the impact on wtp estimates for eco labeled products grown in countries associated with the origin of one of the interviewers

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

bias in discrete response contingent valuation abstract the empirical literature on discrete response contingent valuation has found that seemingly innocuous changes in the statistical models estimated result in significantly different point estimates of willingness to pay this paper hypothesizes and tests several potential explanations for these results first it investigates and compares the biases inherent in single bounded and double bounded maximum likelihood estimation procedures and examines how they react to various bid designs and sample sizes then it examines the presence and identification of outliers in binary choice data and how these outliers influence estimation finally it presents an alternative approach to addressing the issue of outliers which explicitly acknowledges the possibility of upwardly biased response probabilities

when are nash equilibria independent of the distribution of agents characteristics author s bergstrom ted varian hal r abstract we present examples of nash equilibria that do not vary with the distribution of a parameter across agents and then offer a general theorem that characterizes this independence

regional determinants of technical efficiency evidence from the greek economy abstractthis paper emphasizes the role of regional determinants in the technical efficiency of the greek economy we employ a regional production function which is simultaneously estimated with an inefficiency equation the results underline the considerable and growing core periphery disparities in technical efficiency they show the significant efficiency enhancing impact of intra regional market access and its dispersion they also demonstrate that interregional market access specialization sectoral concentration and human capital exert a positive but varying influence on the efficiency of greek regions

distributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile abstractdistributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile regional studies this paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the central government to chilean municipalities drawing upon panel data it shows that investment is mediated by pork barrel and political budget cycles as well as favouring the relatively better off areas estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger whereas national results are not relevant indicating that local governments lobbying capacity is prioritized over national electoral interests based on these results the implications for regional governance and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed

measuring the existence value of wildlife what do cvm estimates really show two research programs are brought together to contribute to the growing body of work on alternatives to standard welfare based approaches to environmental valuation and policy the first is the theoretical literature undermining the new welfare

do children matter an examination of gender differences in environmental valuation abstract this paper is concerned with the role played by children in a household on choice behaviour related to willingness to pay wtp for environmental goods improvements data from a contingent valuation cvm survey dealing with three environmental improvements are used to examine three hypotheses the first is that after controlling for income individuals with children have higher wtp than childless individuals the second hypothesis is that women with children are willing to pay more for environmental improvements than men with children particularly in the case where there is concern for environmental health risks the third is that childless men and women exhibit significant differences in wtp that arise from greater time constraints faced by women estimated wtp functions are shown to be statistically different for four groups of individuals women with children men with children women without children and men without children parents of either gender are willing to pay more than their childless counterparts valuations of mothers and fathers are statistically different for only one of the three goods being evaluated interestingly it is the fathers mean valuations that are higher this may arise from the fact that these environmental improvements lead to better recreational opportunities and as indicated earlier men are less time constrained further support for this view comes from results that show that valuations of childless men are significantly greater than those for childless women for two goods the paper concludes with some directions for future research in the area