a solution concept for majority rule in dynamic settings we define and explore the notion of a dynamic condorcet winner dcw which extends the notion of a condorcet winner to dynamic settings we show that for every dcw every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games existence of dcws is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient we characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes study the effects of changes in the discount factor investigate efficiency properties and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation proof outcomes we apply this solution concept to a standard one dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single peaked preferences as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

a median voter model of social security this paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security the framework for the analysis is a continuous time overlapping generations model with nonaltruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market a majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity constrained the desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the preexisting level of social security as a consequence in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level the program initially overshoots its steady state value copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

transmission of the great depression to a first approximation the question of how the great depression spread from country to country is short and straightforward fixed exchange rates under the gold standard transmitted negative demand shocks the first half of this paper consequently will describe current thinking about the relationship between the gold standard and the great depression the second half of the paper will look at a phenomenon not included in this first approximation financial crises many have noted that banking panics and currency crises are bad for national economies but few have tried to model their international spread

intergenerational redistribution with short lived governments we study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping generations model with short lived governments the successive governments who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions are unable to pre commit the future course of redistributive taxation in a stationary politico economic equilibrium the intergenerational transfer in each period depends on the current value of the state variable and all expectations about future political outcomes are fulfilled we find that there exist multiple stationary equilibria in many political settings steady state welfare is often lower than it would be in the absence of redistributive politics

spending cuts or tax increases the composition of fiscal adjustments as a signal abstract this paper shows that the composition of fiscal adjustments spending cuts versus tax increases serves as a signal of the government s degree of collusion with special interests the politico economic model of fiscal policies combining retrospective voting with common agency type lobbying presents undominated separating equilibria and intuitive pooling ones in both of which fiscal adjustments with sufficiently large spending cuts lead to incumbent reappointment whereas those with only tax increases lead to incumbent defeat these findings are consistent with the recent empirical evidence of voters behaving as fiscal conservatives the efficiency enhancing aspects of the signaling mechanism and the effects of imposing a deficit limit are also analyzed

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

can democracy induce development a constitutional perspective we examine the constitutional design required for democratic societies to overcome poverty traps restricting agenda setting by ensuring subsistence levels of consumption and applying simple majority voting as a decision rule will not enable a society to overcome poverty we show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules can however overcome poverty and induce economic well being besides majority voting these rules include rotating agenda setting agenda repetition and tax protection rules we thus highlight the crucial role of democratic institutions for economic development

the influence of central planning on the economic slowdown in the soviet union and eastern europe a comparative production function analysis the estimation of various forms of the production function and because of the use of different data sets predictions of future growth based on these calculations have varied significantly but generally have implied continued decreasing growth of the economy the interpretation is that there are system determined technological constraints in the soviet economy causing the slowdown in growth and that these constraints are identifiable through the parameters of an aggregate production function the finding of diminishing returns to capital is linked to the belief that existing and future deployments of capital cannot be improved and the decreasing rate of factor productivity growth is attributed to microeconomic barriers to the introduction and diffusion of new technology and to expectations about future trends in technical and economic inefficiency the validity of these inferences has not been systematically tested although

voting on pensions a survey abstract the paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence size and political sustainability of pay as you go pension systems it proposes a simple framework of analysis a small open two overlapping generation economy model around which some variants are displayed dictatorship of the median voter is assumed the text is organized to answer the following questions i do political equilibria with payg pension schemes exist ii why do they emerge iii what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified and finally iv what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous e g demographic shock

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

estimation of technical inefficiency in manufacturing industry an extension of the method of estimation of technical ineficiency is presented based on the stochastic production frontier approach a derivation of the estimation procedure is given and the technique applied at the industry level the choice of production function is considered and empirical results pertaining to australia and the uk are presented

the demand for money and non gdp transactions abstract this paper argues that transactions in non gdp items have an important influence on the level of money demand the paper provides empirical estimates of models of both m 1 and m 2 money demand that include variables proxying for the volume of transactions in real estate and financial assets these variables have the theoretically predicted positive sign and are statistically significant their inclusion also improves out of sample forecasts

measuring enterprise efficiency in the soviet union a stochastic frontier analysis western economists of diverse persuasions broadly concur that in pursuit of full employment sustained growth and macroecdnomic stability the soviets have built an economic system that imposes sundry constraints on enterprise management and substitutes centralized resource allocation for the automatic market mechanism these expedients to the extent that they have prevented resources from being directed to their best use have imposed efficiency losses on the economy of unknown but perhaps significant dimensions numerous western scholars have inferred from this command economy paradigm as well as from international productivity comparisons that these efficiency losses are large however the proper attribution of these efficiency losses to microlevel sources i e inefficient enterprise operation and to higher level sources i e resource misallocation among enterprises branches etc has been the subject of more speculation than evidence this is because until recently requisite micro level data on enterprise operations were unavailable in a form suitable for empirical analysis of enterprise efficiency this deficiency now has been partially remedied for one sub sector of the soviet economy the cotton refining industry estimates of technical efficiency reported in this study computed using stochastic frontier techniques with a sample of 151 cotton refining enterprises suggest that productive efficiency is high relative to the estimated frontier and exhibits little dispersion this finding in turn suggests that soviet planning administrative procedures and managerial incentive systems may be reasonably effective in controlling overt technical inefficiency by inducing cotton refining enterprises to operate close to the standards established by the most technically efficient enterprises in the industry although these domestic best practice standards may be absolutely high or absolutely low by international standards and may not fully reflect engineering potential our finding of high modal efficiency relative to these standards together with little dispersion does constitute an important piece of evidence bearing on the sources of efficiency loss in the soviet economy this finding suggests that inter enterprise efficiency variation may not be a promising place to look for sources of efficiency loss

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

member bank borrowing and the fed s contractionary monetary policy during the great depression this paper examines the causes of federal reserve policy errors during the great depression it finds compelling evidence that the fed developed a flawed strategy during the 1920s and continued to use that strategy during the depression the fed s strategy relied on the behavior of member bank borrowing and interest rates as policy indicators a detailed empirical examination of borrowed reserve demand reveals the errors in the fed s strategy and helps to explain why the fed did not undertake vigorous countercyclical policy during the depression copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

the nation in depression t he economic cataclysm of the 1930s was an international phenomenon experienced by countries in all parts of the globe countries as diverse as the united states germany chile and japan all experienced significant depressions in the 1930s thus the title of charles kindleberger s classic book the world in depression 1973 captures an important feature of the great depression these international aspects especially the importance of the gold standard in causing the downturn and transmitting depression from one country to another have been emphasized in recent years in excellent books by peter temin 1989 and barry eichengreen 1992 these books have rightly received widespread attention and have successfully changed the focus of much analysis of the great depression from the united states to the world economy while such a change from american provincialism is surely healthy and warranted adopting an international perspective on the great depression risks losing sight of the many ways in which the u s depression differed in timing and severity from depressions elsewhere more important it may obscure the many uniquely american causes of america s great depression this paper examines the ways in which the u s experience during the 1930s resembled that of other countries in some regards and fundamentally differed in other aspects i also evaluate the evidence on the causes of the great depression in the united states and the sources of the eventual recovery i suggest that the path of american output and unemployment before 1931 can be explained quite well with only domestic factors even after 1931

is private farming more efficient than socialized agriculture this paper examines the technical efficiency of state and private farms in poland for the period 1960 74 we find that the average technical efficiency of the two types of farms does not differ although the dispersion of efficiency levels is greater among state farms than among private ones we do find clear evidence of allocative inefficiency with state farms oversupplied with fertilizer and machinery

currency substitution and instability in the world dollar standard comment myron ross correctly points out in his comment that u s price inflation is better predicted by the american money supply mlus than by the broader ten country world money supply mlw over the whole statistical time series from 1960 to 1980 provided in mckinnon s 1982 article specifically he showed that american price inflation is more highly correlated with mlus lagged one or two years than with mlw similarly lagged however mckinnon s present tense assertion that in general growth in the world money supply is a better predictor of american price inflation than is american money growth applies only to the weak dollar standard of the 1970 s and early 1980 s as his preceding discussion intended but failed to indicate clearly only in this later period of volatile exchange rates and price level instability in the united states do alternative hard currencies such as the yen and deutsche mark become competitive as international stores of value and units of account hence international currency substitution associated with the ebb and flow of speculation against or for the dollar significantly destabilized the demand for mlus in the 1970 s and 1980 s and only in this later period might one expect the sum of these internationally substitutable monies ml to predict world and perhaps even american price inflation better than does mlus in contrast during the strong dollar standard of the 1950 s and 1960 s the dollar was unchallenged as international money exchange rates were by and large convincingly fixed speculation for or against the dollar was incapable of substantially altering u s interest rates or of directly affecting the demand for mlus because cyclical international influences did not then destabilize the demand for dollars mlus was by itself a fairly efficient predictor of american prices thus ross s statistical results for the period 1960 to 1980 show somewhat greater predictive strength in mlus compared to ml because the 1960 s data outweigh the dissimilar data of the 1970 s let us instead partition the sample of imf data around the year 1970 whence began the transition from fixed to fluctuating exchange rates and the maturation of alternative monetary systems in europe and japan after applying similar statistical correlation procedures to those used by ross we show a striking structural shift in the world s monetary system the explanatory power of mlw increases sharply as that of mlus declines moderately tan 1982 for the early period of 1960 to 1970 table 1 shows simple correlation coefficients between annual percentage changes in money supplies and changes in american and world wholesale price indices the mlus provides a good explanation of u s prices and of world prices one to two years hence whereas the broader definition of mlw in which mlus enters with a 50 percent weight does surprisingly poorly being insignificantly correlated with american or world prices apparently money growth in industrial countries other than the united states was not then an independent source of worldwide inflationary pressure during the strong dollar standard table 2 shows the same simple correlations between percentage changes in prices and money for the weak dollar standard of stanford university please note that a typographical error giving the last word in the original title as market appeared on the cover of the june 1982 issue of this review the title was correct in the table of contents and on the article

economic optimization and technical efficiency in soviet enterprises jointly regulated by plans and incentives abstract it is shown under a very general set of conditions that soviet multi product enterprises should be technically efficient in the sense that factors are fully employed and put to best internal use soviet firms may also be economically efficient to the extent that supplies respond to selected purchaser s demand these attributes suggest that the economic efficiency potential of soviet firms is higher than many institutional theorists intimate but at the same time falls very short of the paretian ideal

political intergenerational risk sharing abstract in a stochastic two period olg model featuring an aggregate shock to the economy ex ante optimality requires intergenerational risk sharing we compare the level of intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a benevolent government and by an office seeking politician in our political system the transfer of resources across generations is determined as a markov equilibrium of a probabilistic voting game low realized returns on the risky asset induce politicians to compensate the old through a payg system this political system typically generates an intergenerational risk sharing scheme that is i larger ii more persistent and iii less responsive to the realization of the shock than the social optimum this is because the current politician anticipates her transfers to the elderly to be compensated by future politicians through offsetting transfers and hence overspends

the composition of government expenditure economic conditions and preferences i introduction there are substantial variations among countries in their tax and expenditure policies even among developed democracies sharing similar economic and political regimes as discussed by tanzi 2000 and alesina and glaeser 2004 this study examines the question of why expenditure patterns differ among democratic countries using a sample of countries with a high democracy index section ii presents empirical evidence showing that the united states has a low ratio of expenditure on transfer payments to that on public goods despite its high income inequality scandinavian countries typically combine low inequality and much higher expenditure on transfer payments relative to public goods british commonwealth countries have higher income inequality than scandinavian countries and yet a lower ratio of transfer payments to public goods expenditure these findings seem inconsistent with the prediction of a large theoretical literature more basic income inequality leads to a larger extent of redistributive expenditure 1 however the observed partial relationship between the expenditure composition and income inequality is possibly obscured by many other factors reflecting differences in economic and demographic conditions or cultural differences across countries see lind 2005 and alesina and glaeser 2004 in order to attempt to understand the way in which cultural factors and economic conditions may combine to influence the composition of expenditure this paper examines the division of expenditure between public goods and a transfer payment under majority voting in the context of an overlapping generations model by taking a growth context and focusing on the expenditure composition for a given tax rate the model allows for a range of factors which may contribute to cross country variations in expenditure compositions such as income and population growth rates and the discount factor in particular cultural factors are captured by a parameter in the utility function reflecting individuals preference for public goods relative to private goods consumption direct independent evidence regarding preferences for public goods is extremely difficult to obtain in view of well known problems of preference revelation mechanisms a wide range of studies however take such differences as their starting point see for example haufler 1996 the transfer payment in the model is referred to as a pension as it is received in the second period of life 2 however it may be thought of more broadly as a standard type of income transfer as it involves in the present overlapping generations framework a decision regarding income shifting between periods within the life cycle as well as intra and intergenerational redistribution members of each cohort are considered to vote on their desired pension during the retirement period on the understanding that during the working period each cohort finances the expenditure previously agreed by the preceding cohort and voters are aware of the nature of the government budget constraint therefore there is a social contract in which each generation in the retirement period is able to benefit from the income and population growth of the following generation the condition under which the social contract is supported by a majority of the members of any cohort involves extending the condition obtained by aaron 1966 and samuelson 1958 the model yields a closed form solution for the majority choice of the expenditure ratio defined as the ratio of transfer payments to public goods expenditure consistent with previous theoretical literature the model predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and the expenditure ratio a numerical exercise is then implemented to examine the sensitivity of the expenditure ratio to variations in model primitives where baseline parameter values are calibrated to the dataset for a group of democratic countries

positive arithmetic of the welfare state abstract this paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because i retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group and ii the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low income young to support this system in a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity we show that for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population a welfare system composed of a within cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election social security is sustained by retirees and low income young while intragenerational redistribution by low income young unlike unidimensional voting model our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups

efficiency loss from resource misallocation in soviet industry the paper analyzes the problems that arise in estimating the efficiency loss from misallocation of resources in soviet industry as revealed by the inequality of marginal rates of substitution among factors in the eight branches of soviet industry econometric estimates of production functions in these branches are utilized to reach estimates of the loss arising from interbranch misallocation of capital and labor deployed in soviet industry this loss appears to be nonnegligible ranging from a low of about 3 to 4 percent to a high of 10 percent of efficient factor use and to be rising over time thus an added reason for the current deceleration in soviet industrial and overall growth is suggested

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

special interests and technological change we model an olg economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources process innovation and learning by doing there is a trade off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies a conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning we model the interaction between different generations and short lived policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintainance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one by focusing on truthful markov perfect equilibria we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying technological parameters

scale factor intensity and efficiency an empirical study of the chinese coal industry this paper deals with the interrelationship among firm scale factor intensity and efficiency using the chinese industrial survey data in 1985 and stochastic frontier models according to empirical

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

a second chance at success a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes a stationary markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment agents become rich or poor through educational investment and the poor have a second chance at success the results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance first when the cost is low the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility second when the cost is high there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility inequality and redistribution numerical examples show that the shift from a high cost economy to a low cost economy may reduce social welfare

antisocial security the puzzle of beggar thy children policies the u s social security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents after some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of social security s future retrenchment incorporating elements of tabellini s 2000 positive theory of social security and benabou and ok s 2001 analysis of income mobility the model identifies specific forces affecting this time varying individual support for social security these forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility relative income level and age an ordered logit analysis of cumulative anes data supports these hypotheses

a small open economy in depression lessons from canada in the 1930s this paper tests the hypothesis that idiosyncratic u s disturbances and their inter national propagation can account for the global depression exploiting common stochastic trends in u s and canadian interwar data we estimate a small open economy model for canada that decomposes output fluctuations into sources identifiable with world and country specific disturbances we find that the onset depth and duration of output collapse in both canada and the united states are primarily attributable to a common permanent output shock leaving little significant role for idiosyncratic disturbances originating in either economy

can neoclassical economics underpin the reform of centrally planned economies te here s a curious symmetry between the arguments propounded over the last century in advocacy of socialism and the present popular discussion of the reform of centrally planned economies in those old discussions the vision of socialism was utopian which was contrasted with the dickensian realities of capitalism now the disasters of central planning are contrasted with the benefits flowing from perfectly functioning markets in the conventional wisdom of reform the vision of markets is utopian and that of central planning concentrates on the awful reality what is largely missing in the conventional wisdom is a satisfactory attempt to come to grips with the central question that should be answered in formulating reform plans how does one explain the differences in performance of market capitalist and centrally planned economies of course capitalism has outperformed central planning the developed west is therefore an obvious source of ideas for reforms but the institutions of capitalism come in many varieties and cannot be put in place instantaneously there are many alternative reform paths depending upon the importance attributed to each of these institutions thus there remains the problem of tracing the source of the superiority of capitalist economies to specific characteristics this point was made clear to me on hearing a vietnamese official justify single party rule by noting the economic success of taiwan and singapore reformers need a filter that interprets the experience of capitalist and socialist systems this is exactly where economic theory plays a vital role

mandatory versus discretionary spending the status quo eect do mandatory spending programs such as medicare improve eciency we analyze a model with two parties allocating a xed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an innite horizon we compare two institutions that dier in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory we model mandatory spending as an endogenous status quo since it is enacted by law and remains in eect until changed mandatory programs result in higher public good spending furthermore they ex ante pareto dominate discretionary programs when parties are patient persistence of power is low and polarization is low

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

monetary factors in the great depression this paper examines the role of monetary policy in the early stages of the great depression and considers the mechanism whereby this policy may have affected real activity i conclude that the depression was preceded by a dramatic shift towards a highly contractionary monetary policy the economic impact of this policy seems unlikely to have come through the conventional keynesian channels of a shortage of liquidity and high ex ante real interest rates but instead may have operated through unanticipated deflation and after 1930 through the disruption of financial intermediation as a consequence of the banking panics

macroeconomic issues for latin america abstract recent macroeconomic issues in latin america are reviewed with an emphasis on theory topics covered include multiple equilibria from hysteresis or increasing returns exchange rate management and the output and asset market effects of devaluation speculation interest rate management and financial reform government behavior income distribution and growth inertial inflation and heterodox policy shocks and disequilibrium theories

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

public education and pensions in democracy a political economy theory a dynamic political economy theory of scal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies the driving force of the model is the intergenerational conict over the allocation of the public budget successive generations of voters choose scal policies through repeated elections the political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy the equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational