exchange rate adjustment and oligopoly pricing behaviour this paper sets out a general theoretical structure for analyzing price adjustments to cost changes within asymmetric oligopolistic markets the theory implies that contrary to the usual assumption exchange rate changes may leave prices unaltered this is explored by an empirical examination of the european car market intracountry changes in car prices and the huge differences in u k and european car prices are both examined the empirical results are in line with the theoretical implications changes in relative supply costs are more likely to be converted into changes in price cost margins than prices within a national oligopolistic market copyright 1989 by oxford university press

a mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms in this paper a mixed oligopoly model is considered in which a state owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms previous articles on mixed oligopoly did not include foreign private firms the effect on the equilibrium involves a lower price and a different allocation of production relative to the case when all private firms are domestically owned in addition issues such as the effects of an open door policy allowing foreign firms to enter and the effects of foreign acquisition of domestic firms are discussed

a public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination we visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded we demonstrate that the nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal in the presence of a publicly owned firm notwithstanding the degree of privatization

effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly abstract in a mixed oligopoly an increase in tax ad valorem or specific does not change total output but increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue also privatization may increase both tax revenue and welfare

the interaction of foreign exchange and market power effects on german domestic prices this paper illustrates the importance of international influences on domestic markets a model is presented in which changes in a country s terms of trade pass through to industrial prices in varying degrees depending on import penetration and seller concentration empirical results suggest that the 8 4 percent decline in the real external value of the deutsche mark from 1977 to 1983 allowed upward movement of about 2 percent in domestic producer prices of traded goods relative to the gnp price deflator increased market concentration led to a reduced effect while increased import penetration led to some increase in the exchange rate passthrough standard industrial organization models stress the impact of market power and entry conditions on economic performance with particular interest in price effects at the industry level greater concentration is expected to lead to higher prices ceteris paribus while greater ease in entry or a larger competitive fringe implies lower prices the international economics literature indicates that in the absence of trade barriers transactions and transportation costs and market power foreign exchange rate changes will be fully passed through to import and export prices implying that domestic prices of traded goods for an appreciating currency will be adjusted downward by the full amount of the exchange rate change the dramatic changes in exchange rates since the early 1970s provided exporters with new opportunities to enter markets of nations that had a strong currency west germany has been regarded as one such country this paper investigates the effect of exchange rate movements on particular german industrial prices i test to see whether the prominence of imports

reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

mixed oligopoly sequential entry and spatial price discrimination this paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination it demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a stackelberg location leader the presence of a public firm always improves welfare moreover when three firms locate sequentially the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last thus despite examining a variety of location timings including simultaneous location privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare this conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare

quality and competition between public and private firms abstract we study a multistage quality then price game between a public firm and a private firm the market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations the public firm aims to maximize social surplus whereas the private firm maximizes profit in the first stage both firms simultaneously choose qualities in the second stage both firms simultaneously choose prices consumers quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution each firm s unit production cost is an increasing and convex function of quality there are multiple equilibria in some the public firm chooses a low quality and the private firm chooses a high quality in others the opposite is true we characterize subgame perfect equilibria equilibrium qualities are often inefficient but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution equilibrium qualities are first best various policy implications are drawn

horizontal mergers with free entry abstract we consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit in contrast to much of the previous literature on mergers our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial even under quantity competition there is no free rider problem in that insiders always benefit more than outsiders and quantity setting and price setting games yield similar predictions about profitability we also derive two welfare results that hold under quantity competition with homogeneous goods if the initial no merger equilibrium is symmetric then with free entry 1 a horizontal merger has no impact on the equilibrium price and 2 all privately beneficial mergers are socially beneficial

suggestions for research themes and publications with the volume of world trade over 2 trillion and the sales of foreign affiliates of u s companies over 500 billion international marketing is a very large and complex activity yet existing research in international marketing does not do justice to the size and complexity of the subject in this note 3 major areas of research in international marketing are sketched out export marketing international marketing by multinationals and other topics the outline will be suggestive rather than comprehensive it does however indicate many areas where research is needed to expand our understanding of international marketing

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association

the effects of foreign exchange movements on u s domestic prices this paper draws on the fields of international economics and industrial organization to model and empirically examine the relationship between currency value fluctuations and domestic producer prices the major focus is the issue of whether and why domestic industries differ systematically in their response to exchange rate changes the major findings are that changes in the external value of the u s dollar between 1974 and 1987 passed most fully into domestic prices of industries heavily reliant on imported inports and producing goods highly substitutable for imports highly capital intensive and concentrated industries and those protected by extensive barriers to entry both from domestic and foreign sources have exhibited less domestic price change from the exchange rate movements copyright 1989 by mit press

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms abstract in this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities confronting remarks by milton friedman and gary becker we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non profit motives we find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit maximizing rivals one insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare but that the level of social concern should not be too high based on a strategy s profitability we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity here we observe that the consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm if the firms propensity to switch between a social or a profit maximizing strategy is sufficiently large steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur

is price adjustment asymmetric evaluating the market share and marketing bottlenecks hypothesis abstract export price adjustment is asymmetric with respect to currency fluctuations in at least two circumstances if firms face capacity constraints in distribution networks or quantitative trade restrictions then pricing to market may be greater during depreciations of the exporter s currency if firms attempt to build market share subject to the threat of trade restrictions then pricing to market may be greater during appreciations of the exporter s currency this paper tests for asymmetries using panel data on german and japanese 7 digit industry exports the data seldom reject the hypothesis of a symmetric response of prices to exchange rates

exchange rate pass through and international pricing strategy a conceptual framework and research propositions the extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect international prices is called exchange rate pass through this paper develops a conceptual model in explaining how exchange rate fluctuations are channeled into international pricing strategy and offers research propositions our model posits that the extent of exchange rate pass through in international pricing is affected by the firm s pricing orientation performance orientation distribution policy and brand equity as well as by exchange rate uncertainty and competitive symmetry

markup adjustment and exchange rate fluctuations evidence from panel data on automobile exports abstract this paper uses data on bilateral automobile export prices from the usa germany and japan to gauge the importance of markup adjustment driven by exchange rate movements across several destination markets we find that japanese exports are characterized by a high degree of markup adjustment designed to stabilize the price measured in the buyer s currency there is weak evidence for such behavior on the part of german exporters and no evidence of markup adjustment by us exporters where it exists markup adjustment tends to be highly persistent the dynamic pattern of markup adjustment is consistent with invoicing in the exporter s currency except for exports to the usa and canada

hyteresis in import prices the beachhead effect this paper shows that temporary real exchange rate fluctuations can have persistent hysteretic effects on trade specifically when market entry costs are sunk sufficiently large exchange rate shocks alter domestic market structure and thereby induce hysteresis this simple result has strong implications for exchange rate theory t rade policy and estimation of trade equations empirical evidence su ggests that the recent dollar overvaluation induced hysteresis in u s import prices namely the aggregate pass through equation of exchange rates to import prices shifted in the 1980s the shift s nature and timing is broadly consistent with the hysteresis hypothesis copyright 1988 by american economic association

price equilibrium and willingness to pay in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly in the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market and zero costs we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit maximizing private firm producing high quality goods we show that a price equilibrium exists if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis a vis a measure of the convexity of the distribution of the consumers willingness to pay and that such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened logconcavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium

price induced patterns of competition this research focuses on how price changes influence the observed pattern of brand competition the paper begins with a basic utility model formulation and examines the implications of three major classes of preference distributions on the expected patterns of competition a price tier model is proposed to operationalize the theory and to allow predictive testing the price tier model is estimated on 28 brands across four product categories the results show a specific asymmetric pattern of price competition higher price higher quality brands steal share from other brands in the same price quality tier as well as from brands in the tier below however lower price lower quality brands take sales from their own tier and the tier below brands but do not steal significant share from the tiers above the results are consistent with a bimodal preference distribution with the regular price indifference point being located toward the lower quality end of the preference distribution for the categories analyzed

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

mixed oligopoly with differentiated products abstract the paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly with horizontal product differentiation firms choose their location and price in a model a la hotelling with quadratic transport costs and the solution concept is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium this enables one to determine how the presence of one or several public firms competing with private ones affects social welfare and how the results depend on the total number of firms n and their relative positions it is shown that is only for n 2 or n 6 that a mixed oligopoly with one public firm is socially preferable to the private oligopoly

privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry we consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized in the short run privatization is harmful because prices rise the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost in the long run privatization leads to further entry the net effect is beneficial if consumer preference for variety is not too weak a sufficient statistic for the social surplus to be higher in the long run is that the public firm makes a loss this suggests that profitable firms should not necessarily be privatized

optimal public rationing and price response abstract we study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity defined as treatment cost due to a limited budget some consumers must be rationed rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market we consider two information regimes in the first the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information means testing in equilibrium the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers rationing some poor consumers implements price reduction in the private market in the second information regime the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers wealth and cost information in equilibrium consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold cost effectiveness rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth

import sourcing dynamics an integrative perspective the character of import sourcing for manufacturing has changed beyond the reach of current explanatory schemes this study knits several evolving trends in the area of import sourcing into a theoretical framework in order to facilitate research in this under researched topic and expose to practitioners the increasing strategic value of import sourcing

welfare maximisation with endogenous average costs abstract in contrast to the earlier literature about industries mixing public and private ownership costs are not exogenous because firms choose capacity if capacity is increased the fixed costs increase but more can be produced at constant marginal costs it turns out that mixing private and public firms improves welfare if the deadweight loss of imperfect competition is significant all firms break even but welfare maximisation implies higher unit costs and lower profitability

strategic flexibility and exchange rate uncertainty we examine the implications of exchange rate swings in international markets paying particular attention to the importance of firm flexibility we use the term flexibility to refer to the ease with which firms can respond to exchange rate swings there are two kinds of flexibility that we consider 1 flexibility in the timing of output and sales allocation decisions relative to the exchange rate realization and 2 flexibility in the number of sales outlets available to the firms we show that differing degrees of flexibility have important implications for equilibrium prices i e exchange rate pass through market shares and profits

the impact of public ownership in the lending sector we examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects for instance it can increase lender profit furthermore borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers projects in addition there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare resume l impact de la propriete publique sur le secteur des prets les auteurs examinent les effets de la propriete gouvernementale croissante des offreurs dans le secteur des prets un phenomene qui se traduit en un plus grand interet pour le bien etre global et un interet moindre pour le profit un tel accroissement de la propriete publique peut avoir des effets non anticipes par exemple cela peut accroitre les profits des preteurs de plus le bien etre des emprunteurs decline souvent a proportion que la croissance de la propriete gouvernementale d un preteur connote une competence relativement limitee pour discerner la veritable qualite des projets des emprunteurs enfin il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles l accroissement de la propriete gouvernementale d une institution preteuse n a aucun impact soit sur le profit du preteur soit sur le bien etre de l emprunteur

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

spatial price discrimination and the locations of firms with different product selections or product varieties abstract the equilibrium locations of two firms are partially centralized to the socially optimal extent if there is spatial price discrimination and if each firm has two out of three products or else one variety of a differentiated product with some consumers indifferent between varieties

mixed duopoly location choice and shadow cost of public funds we examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly where a welfare maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm we introduce shadow costs of public funding i e the excess burden of taxation the profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs we find that in a mixed duopoly the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare this result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly where the level of product differentiation is too high finally we show that when the shadow cost is high privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare

exchange rate pass through abstract the resilience of trade balances of the major industrialized economies to changes in their exchange rates has evoked interest in the exchange rate pass through relationship so far there has not been a comprehensive survey of this literature the paper aims to fill this gap in two ways first it pieces together the theoretical literature on exchange rate pass through second it provides a critical survey of the empirical literature on exchange rate pass through emphasis is placed on the data and methodology employed in previous work this is done in order to guide future work in this growing area of research

la pleiade and exchange rate pass through abstract we examine the effects of a change in the exchange rate on sales and prices in the framework of a two country two commodity duopoly model with joint production we distinguish two kinds of reaction when the firm located in the country whose currency depreciates appreciates increases decreases sales in both countries we call it the firm specific effect if all sales in the country which appreciates depreciates its currency increase decrease we call it the country specific effect strategic substitutability economies of joint production and or economies of scale lead to the firm specific effect strategic complementarity diseconomies of joint production and or diseconomies of scale lead to the country specific effect

mixed oligopoly privatization and strategic trade policy this paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market if the government uses a domestic production subsidy then welfare is always increased with privatization while the optimal subsidy falls if the government uses an import tariff privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space the optimal tariff however may rise or fall in recent years many countries around the world are privatizing their state owned industries at the same time many of these countries are also showing remarkable changes in their economic policies toward international trade on many occasions tariffs are significantly altered and domestic production subsidies are substantially reduced for example russia has privatized its aircraft industry and doubled its tariff on imported aircraft colombia has privatized its stateowned automobile maker colombia automotriz and reduced the import tariffs on foreign made cars in argentina the government is pursuing a policy of selective privatization and subsequent reduction of subsidies in western europe countries such as germany and spain have privatized their major airlines lufthansa and iberia respectively and significantly reduced subsidies what is the connection between privatization and strategic trade policies does privatization require a welfare maximizing government to alter trade barriers the objective of this paper is to answer these questions by investigating the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies the effects of privatization are typically analyzed in the context of mixed oligopoly models where state owned welfare maximizing public firms interact with profit maximizing private firms 1 we investigate the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies by incorporating strategic trade instruments in an international mixed oligopoly model specifically we consider two strategic trade instruments an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy the government chooses the optimal level of tariff or subsidy to maximize domestic welfare for each trade instrument we primarily focus on two questions first does privatization increase

should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining a mixed duopoly approach abstract should civil servants employees in the public sector be allowed to bargain collectively to answer this question we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm the wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects the wage regulation intensifies downstream market competition while it loosens upstream market competition the overall welfare effect is ambiguous depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms we also show that in contrast to the popular belief granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively finally we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social

breaking the silos distributed knowledge and strategic responses to volatile exchange rates a model of effective decision making in a situation of distributed knowledge is developed drawing on three perspectives the sociocognitive perspective which focuses on framing issues the economic perspective which focuses on the role played by incentives in the integration of knowledge and decision making authority and the process perspective which stresses the role of integrating mechanisms and of processes that either hinder or foster risk awareness and flexibility the model is tested on a sample of managers from different functional areas of fortune 500 firms using strategic responses to exchange rate volatility as the context the results show that all three perspectives framing incentives and process are significant in explaining the effectiveness of strategic responses to volatile exchange rates the findings suggest that simultaneously addressing managerial mindsets incentives and process may be crucial to generating effective strategic responses across functions

regulating innovative activity abstract without spillovers and under the winner take all hypothesis there is overinvestment in r d in a non cooperative equilibrium due to duplication of effort we show that a public firm can represent an effective instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem in particular it is proved that in a mixed duopoly i each firm invests less than in a private duopoly and ii although the expected time of innovation is postponed social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly