iterated regret minimization a new solution concept abstract for some well known games such as the traveler s dilemma or the centipede game traditional game theoretic solution concepts most notably nash equilibrium predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations we introduce a new solution concept iterated regret minimization that exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest including traveler s dilemma the centipede game nash bargaining and bertrand competition as the name suggests iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret

an efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences there are n agents who have von neumann morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives a each agent i s utility function is known to lie in the nonempty convex relatively open set ui suppose l is a lottery on a that is undominated meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to pareto dominate l no matter what the true utility functions are then there exist utility functions ui ui for which l is pareto efficient this result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case

who gains from capital market integration tax competition between unionized and non unionized countries the welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries the asymmetry is expressed through the labour market one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other country s labour market is unionized our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital in the absence of active governments capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes subsidies

on the existence of a strictly strong nash equilibrium under the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm abstract this study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem we assume that each college s true preferences are known publicly and analyze the strategic behavior of students we demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it specifically i the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm and ii in a one to one matching market it coincides with the student optimal von neumann morgenstern vnm stable matching we also show that i when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists it can be supported by a strictly strong nash equilibrium and ii there exists a strictly strong nash equilibrium under the college optimal deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the student optimal stable matching is pareto efficient for students

on two competing mechanisms for priority based allocation problems we consider the priority based allocation problem there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies e g schools with seats and a set of agents e g students with priorities over objects e g proximity of residence area we study two well known and competing mechanisms the agentoptimal stable mechanism aosm allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm the top trading cycles mechanism ttcm allots objects via gale s top trading cycles algorithm we show that the two mechanisms are equivalent or ttcm is fair i e respects agents priorities or resource monotonic o rpopulation monotonic if and only if the priority structure is acyclic furthermore if aosm fails to be efficient consistent for a problem ttcm also fails to be fair consistent for it however the converse is not necessarily true

boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting an experimental investigation abstract while much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness recent research has aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non truthtelling equilibria we address two issues that arise from this approach we first show that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition agents fail to reach non truthtelling equilibria we offer another way forward implementing truth telling as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium we show that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and provide experimental evidence that this is also the case in practice in fact truth telling rates are basically the same whether truthtelling is implemented as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy equilibrium this provides a proof of concept that ordinal bayes nash design might provide a middle path achieving efficiency gains over strategy proof mechanisms without relying on real life agents playing a non truth telling equilibrium

simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty we consider full implementation in complete information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty we offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

a note on unemployment and capital tax competition abstract we introduce a labor market imperfection into the capital tax competition literature to study the equilibrium tax formulae and their efficiency in the presence of unemployment since we allow for labor market imperfection the standard conclusions of the tax competition literature would be generalized in the case of non full employment our first result shows that even when head taxes on immobile residents are available the optimal capital tax rate for jurisdictional governments is not zero our second finding is that decentralized equilibrium might be characterized by the overprovision of local public goods when the labor market is imperfect

constrained school choice an experimental study 31 pages 18 tables jel classification c72 c78 d78 i20 trabajo publicado como articulo en american economic review 100 4 1860 1874 2010 http dx doi org 10 1257 aer 100 4 1860

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

efficient resource allocation under multi unit demand abstract we study resource allocation with multi unit demand such as the allocation of courses to students in contrast to the case of single unit demand no stable mechanism not even the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm achieves desirable properties it is not strategy proof and the resulting allocation is not even weakly efficient under submitted preferences we characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy proofness or efficiency we show that stability is compatible with strategy proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority structure is essentially homogeneous this result suggests that efficient allocation under multi unit demand is difficult and that the use of stable mechanisms may not deliver desirable outcomes

strategy subsets closed under rational behavior a set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior curb of it contains all its best replies each curb set contains the support of at least one nash equilibrium in mixed

matching markets with mixed ownership the case for a real life assignment mechanism we consider a common indivisible good allocation problem whose popular applications include on campus housing kidney exchange and school choice we show that the so called new house 4 nh4 mechanism which has been in use at mit since the 1980s is equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well known gale shapley gs mechanism we run two experiments comparing nh4 with the prominently advocated top trading cycles ttc mechanism and nh4 with gs we find that under nh4 the participation rate is significantly higher than under ttc based on a new ordinal test of efficiency nh4 is more likely to pareto dominate ttc

broadening the market design approach to school choice school choice refers to policies that allow parents preferences to be an input to the decision of which school a student will attend a rich body of research has developed over the past 10 15 years to study mechanisms that implement school choice this literature has mostly taken the inputs of school choice preferences priorities and capacities as exogenous more recently researchers have sought to embed the school choice problem into its wider context thereby broadening the scope of market design questions and enriching the analysis this article discusses current school choice policy issues in light of this recent literature and outlines remaining open questions

the equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice the equitable top trading cycles mechanism a particular adaptation of gale s top trading cycles ttc procedure applied to school choice the so called ttc mechanism has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features we discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of gale s original procedure that can offer improvements over ttc in terms of equity along with various other distributional considerations instead of giving all the trading power to those students with the highest priority for a school we argue for the distribution of the trading rights of all slots of each school this allows them to trade in a thick market where additional constraints can be accommodated by choosing an appropriate pointing rule we propose a particular mechanism of this kind the equitable top trading cycle ettc mechanism which is also pareto efficient and group strategy proof just like ttc and eliminates avoidable justified envy situations ettc generates significantly fewer justified envy situations than ttc both in simulations and the lab

do states play welfare games abstract this paper uses a panel of state level annual data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous united states and the district of columbia to explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare benefits using instrumental variables estimation we find substantial empirical evidence that is supportive of the notion of welfare competition furthermore we find that state responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be significantly larger in magnitude as their responses to neighbor benefit increases our results therefore have potential implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare reform of 1996

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

the mechanism is truthful why aren t you abstract honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy proof mechanism irrespective of others behavior the best course of action is to report one s preferences truthfully we review evide

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

strategic capital tax competition a pecuniary externality and a corrective device abstract d e wildasin journal of urban economics25 193 212 1989 identifies a source of inefficiency in capital tax competition models with price taking jurisdictions and provides a pigovian correction this paper identifies a second source of inefficiency in a non price taking environment when a jurisdiction increases its capital tax it affects the price of capital and thus other jurisdictions returns from trade in capital the pigovian correction to internalize this pecuniary externality is derived since a focus of recent research is on non price taking environments the existence of the pecuniary externality is important in qualifying existing results in the literature

unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market gastroenterology with and without a centralized match the entry level market for american gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996 before and since it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment we find that both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used gastroenterologists are less mobile and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents than when the clearinghouse was in use this suggests that the clearinghouse not only coordinates the timing of appointments but also increases the scope of the market compared to a decentralized market with early appointments

stable and strategy proof matching with flexible allotments we introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross division hiring restrictions our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints building upon our recent work on observable substitutability we show that multi division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy proof matching these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy proof matching is possible

the welfare effects of coordinated assignment evidence from the new york city high school match abstract coordinated single offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform we show that uncoordinated offers in nyc s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches one third of

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization the paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital regions choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme this framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes boadway r flatters f 1982 efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extension of recent results canadian journal of economics 15 613 633 weingast b r 2006 second generation fiscal federalism implication for decentralized democratic governance and economic development working paper hoover institution stanford university we show that tax competition distorts downwards public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes however the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and under a low degree of regional asymmetry also for each region c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting abstract this paper reexamines the main findings of cardarelli et al cardarelli r taugourdeau e vidal j p 2002 a repeated interactions model of tax competition journal of public economic theory 4 19 38 and catenaro and vidal catenaro m vidal j p 2006 implicit tax co ordination under repeated policy interactions recherches economiques de louvain 72 1 17 who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition in particular this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination it is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination

survey measures of family decision processes for econometric analysis of schooling decisions in this article we consider the collection of novel subjective data on family processes of schooling decisions in particular we review recent progress on survey measurement of expectations information and locus of decision of american families within the context of secondary schooling and we discuss possible future developments by providing concrete examples from recent exploratory efforts we argue that collection of data on adolescents and parents perceptions of the available school options and the application and admission rules their subjective expectations about short and long term consequences of alternative choices and their assessments of the locus of decision making within families could greatly enhance economic modeling and contribute to effective econometric analysis of schooling decisions jel c83 d19 d79 d83 d84 i21 i26 j24

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game abstract this paper addresses capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries countries are asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant national governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a fixed public budget asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to a distortion on the international capital market we fully characterize how equilibrium taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries population and capital endowments we compare it to the autarky situation and show that fiscal competition erodes some but not all of the gains from capital markets liberalization

social protection and political competition this paper analyses how the level of social protection is determined when its choice depends on political competition first this is done under autarky then the analysis is extended to take account of the existence of an international capital market we show that social protection never increases under international competition and in several circumstances drastically decreases

affirmative action through minority reserves an experimental study on school choice abstract minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by hafalir et al 2013 in the context of school choice in a laboratory experiment we find that adding minority reserves to the gs and ttc mechanisms has positive effects on stability but is quite disappointing in terms of efficiency also gs induces higher rates of truth telling by minority students and thus outclasses ttc

tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria when people interact in familiar settings social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention for rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block we explore two set valued concepts coarsely and finely tenable blocks that formalize this notion for finite normal form games we then identify settled equilibria which are nash equilibria with support in minimal tenable blocks for a generic class of normal form games our coarse and fine concepts are equivalent and yet they differ from standard solution concepts on open sets of games we demonstrate the nature and power of the solutions by way of examples settled equilibria are closely related to persistent equilibria but are strictly more selective on an open set of games with fine tenability we obtain invariance under the insertion of a subgame with a unique totally mixed payoff equivalent equilibrium a property that other related concepts have not satisfied

admissibility in games suppose that each player in a game is rational each player thinks the other players are rational and so on also suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement that is the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies which strategies can be played we provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question specifically we formulate conditions of rationality and mth order assumption of rationality rmar and rationality and common assumption of rationality rcar we show that i rcar is characterized by a solution concept we call a self admissible set ii in a complete type structure rmar is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m 1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies iii under certain conditions rcar is impossible in a complete structure

rationality nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect information games we say that a player is certain of an event a if she assigns probability 1 to a there is common certainty cc of a if the event a occurred each player is certain of a each player is certain that every other player is certain of a and so forth it is shown that in a generic perfect information game the set of outcomes that are consistent with common certainty of rationality ccr at the beginning of the game coincides with the set of outcomes that survive one deletion of weakly dominated strategies and then iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies thus the backward induction outcome is not the only outcome that is consistent with ccr in particular cooperation in rosenthal s 1981 centipede game and fighting in selten s 1978 chainstore game are consistent with ccr at the beginning of the game next it is shown that if in addition to ccr there is cc that each player assigns a positive probability to the true strategies and beliefs of the other players and if there is cc of the support of the beliefs of each player then the outcome of the game is a nash equilibrium outcome

reserve design unintended consequences and the demise of boston s walk zones we show that in the presence of admissions reserves the effect of the precedence order i e the order in which different types of seats are filled is comparable to the effect of adjusting reser

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies abstract this paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies we apply these conditions to bertrand duopolies and first price auctions our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

leveling the playing field sincere and sophisticated players in the boston mechanism empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the boston public school student assignment plan we analyze the preference revelation game induced by the boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response we characterize the set of nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the pareto dominant nash equilibrium of the boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student optimal stable mechanism jel d82 i21

rational behavior with payoff uncertainty abstract the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has been advanced as a necessary requirement for rational play however this requirement relies on the assumption that the players have no doubts about their opponents payoffs we show that once such doubts are introduced all that can be justified by an appeal to rationality is one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterated deletion of strategies that are strongly dominated this extends the fudenberg kreps and levine j econ theory 12 1988 354 380 study of the robustness of nash equilibrium refinements to the robustness of solution concepts based only on rationality our results also clarify the relationship between various notions of what it means for payoff uncertainty to be small

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

market size and tax competition abstract with international externalities different country sizes imperfect competition and trade costs tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency enhancing with respect to the free market outcome under both scenarios the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough otherwise only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms

interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents abstract this paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions the paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms throughout the paper shows that at a nash equilibrium in tax levels the sparsely populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely populated neighbor the paper also demonstrates how equilibrium state taxes differ depending on whether firms employ marginal cost or profit maximizing pricing

iterated elimination of dominated strategies in a bertrand edgeworth model we consider a bertrand edgeworth model of price competition firms have identical and constant marginal costs and finite exogeneous capacities firms choose prices our interest is in the set of those prices which are left over after the iterated elimination of dominated strategies we show that in two circumstances this set will be close to the set containing only the marketclearing walrasian price i if any n 1 out of n firms assumed to be in the market have sufficient capacity to cover demand at marginal costs ii if any given total capacity is owned by a very large number of very small firms

should trade unions appreciate foreign direct investment abstract it is often argued that fdi hurts workers in the home country because jobs are moved abroad contrary to that view businessmen often argue that fdi benefits home workers because there will be an expansion in the firm we show that both views may be correct and whether home workers gain or lose on fdi depends on which kinds of activities the firm moves to the host country if there is a big degree of substitutability complementarity between activities in the home country and activities in the host country it is likely that the workers lose gain on fdi

do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials we address the role of labor cost differentials for national tax policies modeling a tax competition race between two countries competing for a population of mobile firms we show that in equilibrium the high wage country charges a lower tax than the low wage country moreover under tax competition the high wage country attracts more firms than in a setting without taxation exploiting exogenous variation in labor cost differentials induced by the breakdown of communism in eastern europe we find that tax policies are in line with the model prediction our most conservative estimates suggest that a one dollar increase in the compensation cost differential in prices as of 2000 triggers a cut of the statutory corporate income tax rate by about one percentage point

matching with branch of choice contracts at the united states military academy branch selection is a key decision in a cadet s military career cadets at usma can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement this real life matching problem lls an important gap in market design literature although priorities fail a key substitutes condition the agent optimal stable mechanism is well dened and in contrast to the current usma mechanism it is fair stable and strategy proof adoption of this mechanism benets cadets and the army this new

what parents want school preferences and school choice we investigate parents preferences for school attributes in a unique data set of survey administrative census and spatial data using a conditional logit incorporating characteristics of households schools and home school distance we show that most families have strong preferences for schools academic performance parents also value schools socio economic composition and distance which may limit the potential of school choice to improve academic standards most of the variation in preferences for school quality across socio economic groups arises from differences in the quality of accessible schools rather than differences in parents preferences although more advantaged parents have stronger preferences for academic performance

unionized labor markets and globalized capital markets abstract this paper studies the effects of international integration of capital markets in a world where countries differ in their labor market institutions one country has a perfectly competitive labor market while the other is unionized we show that workers should favor autarky in the unionized country but oppose it in the non unionized country and vice versa for owners of capital aggregate gains from integration however are negative we also show that under capital mobility an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does not always improve workers welfare

sincere and sophisticated players in an equal income market abstract we study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents they non cooperatively coordinate on the equal income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are pareto undominated for them within the set of equal income competitive allocations sincere agents are protected to some extent however their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff

strategy proofness and stability of the boston mechanism an almost impossibility result abstract public school systems generally use one of the three competing mechanisms the boston mechanism the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mechanism for assigning students to specific schools although the literature generally claims that the boston mechanism is pareto efficient but neither stable nor strategy proof this study delineates a subset of school priority structures for which it fulfills all three criteria we show that the boston mechanism is stable if and only if it is strategy proof if and only if the priority structure is strongly acyclic however we find that the condition of strong acyclicity is nearly impossible to satisfy any priority structure is quasi cyclic whenever there are two schools whose admission quotas are less than the number of students seeking admission

an experimental study on decentralized networked markets abstract we design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of deferred acceptance agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners their payoff depends on who they match with the experiment is designed in such a way that a stable configuration exists but cannot be eyeballed by the participants due to the computational complexity of the game in spite of this subjects are remarkably good at reaching a stable match even when the payoffs of others are not publicly observed more information does however speed up convergence thanks to self censoring we trace irrational matching choices mostly to two sources the tendency of over think in a setting where strategic thinking is not necessary and the reluctance to accept matching offers from those who have been disloyal in the past

priorities in school choice the case of the boston mechanism in barcelona abstract the boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world and has been criticized for its incentive problems in order to resolve overdemands for a given school most often priority is given to families living in the neighborhood of the school using a very rich data set on school applications for the case of the boston mechanism in barcelona we exploit an unexpected change in the definition of neighborhood this change allows us to identify that a large fraction of families systematically ranks first high priority schools neighborhood schools in this case additional data on school enrollment decisions and census data shows that some seemingly unsophisticated parents are high income families that can rank hard to get schools because they can afford the outside option of a private school in case they do not get in this sheds light on important inequalities beyond parents lack of sophistication found in the literature

structural estimation of a model of school choices the boston mechanism vs its alternatives we model household choice of schools under the boston mechanism bm and develop a new method applicable to a broad class of mechanisms to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible

signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice we consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future actions by incurring costs the main result is that in a class of games if one player can incur costs then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome surprisingly the player does not have to incur any costs to achieve this the option alone suffices however when all players can incur costs one player s attempt to signal a future action is vulnerable to a counter signal by the opponent this vulnerability to counter signaling distinguishes signaling future actions from signaling types

inter jurisdictional competition for firms regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs the redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled who cannot work able individuals may work be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market or choose to be voluntary unemployed labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore firms location decisions allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient if regions cannot tax firms they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies

resolving conflicting preferences in school choice the boston mechanism reconsidered the boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro cedures in use yet the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances which led the boston public schools to recently replace it with gale and shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm henceforth da the da elicits truthful revelation of ordinal preferences whereas the boston mechanism does not but the latter induces participants to reveal their cardinal preferences i e their relative preference intensities whereas the former does not we show that cardinal preferences matter more when families have similar ordinal preferences and schools have coarse priorities two common features of many school choice environ ments speci cally when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities the boston mechanism pareto dominates the da in ex ante wel fare the boston mechanism may not harm but rather bene t participants who may not strategize well in the presence of school priorities the boston mechanism also tends to facilitate a greater access than the da to good schools by those lack ing priorities at those schools these results contrast with the standard view and cautions against a hasty rejection of the boston mechanism in favor of mechanisms such as the da

mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm implications for positive assortative matching abstract recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy proof deferred acceptance algorithm i consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools i find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting through this channel the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects i discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for nudges that correct these mistakes

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

demand analysis using strategic reports an application to a school choice mechanism several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences we find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in cambridge such strategizing can complicate preference analysis this paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms we show that preferences are non parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter we then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to cambridge estimates suggest that while 82 of students are assigned to their stated first choice only 72 are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools assuming that students behave optimally the immediate acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the deferred acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0 08 miles the estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased and reversed if students report truthfully

recombinant estimation for normal form games with applications to auctions and bargaining abstract when analyzing economic games researchers frequently estimate quantities describing group outcomes such as the expected revenue in an auction for such applications we propose an improved statistical estimation technique called recombinant estimation the technique takes observations of players strategies and recombines them to compute all possible group outcomes that could have resulted from different player combinations in applications to an auction and a bargaining game the improved efficiency of our estimator is equivalent to increasing the sample size between 25 and 200 we discuss how to design experiments in order to utilize recombinant estimation we also discuss practical computational issues and provide software for computing estimates and standard errors

welfare reform and the race to the bottom theory and evidence economists have argued that welfare migration leads to a race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits although a system of federal matching grants can remedy this problem the recent welfare reform law replaced the existing matching grant structure with block grants a policy change that appears undesirable to judge whether this critique of welfare reform is justified this paper evaluates the evidence in favor of a race to the bottom after explaining the theoretical effects of welfare migration the paper surveys the empirical evidence on the occurrence of such migration concluding that the evidence is mixed the discussion also considers recent empirical tests for strategic interaction which show that benefit levels in nearby states affect a given state s benefit choice the most plausible source of such interaction is a concern about welfare migration which leads policymakers to look at benefits in neighboring states when making their own choices judging that the evidence appears consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom the paper concludes that the demise of matching grants may be undesirable from a policy perspective

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism