bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment in this paper i structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and i conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure i show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar italy also i show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations

bequests gifts and social security this paper analyses the very long run or stationary state impact of an unfunded social security system we use an overlapping generations model framework a key feature is that while parents care about their children and can leave non negative bequests to them children also care about their parents and can make non negative gifts to them we show that the possibility of negative net bequests may make social security less harmful to private wealth accumulation than would otherwise be the case a subsidiary finding is that risk loving behaviour may emerge for some households due to the nature of intergenerational transfers within family lines

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

coworker influence on annuitization decisions evidence from defined benefit plans abstract we investigate the role of coworker influence on an individual s annuitization decision using rich data on payout options and decisions in defined benefit plans we find that past payout choices of coworkers significantly affect an employee s decision to annuitize at retirement and that the coworkers payout choices have a larger economic effect on annuitization than recent stock market returns we also find that coworker effects are greater for employees who have a similar level of benefit amounts those who share geographic proximity same zip code and those who retire at a norm modal retirement age of their workplace robustness tests show that estimated coworker effects are unlikely to be driven by unobserved common environments or similar preferences

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

inter vivos transfers and intergenerational exchange the surge of interest in intergenerational transfers in the past decade has sparked a debate over the motivation for them are transfers given out of altruism or part of an exchange while each motive is probably at work to some extent we know little about whether one motive predominates the question is relevant for issues concerning public income redistribution and inequality in the family but despite its importance empirical evidence about motives is scarce because of limited data we investigate a new data set the national survey of families and households which remedies many of the shortcomings of other data sets containing private transfer information we find that empirical patterns for inter vivos transfers i e transfers between living persons are more consistent with exchange than altruism

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

a structural model of government formation in this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies we use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process the type of coalitions that form and their relative stability

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

bequest motives and fertility decisions abstract we compare altruistic and strategic bequest motives and examine which one induces the higher demand for children although parents with strategic bequests have the stronger demand for filial attention they choose to have fewer children than those with altruistic bequests

a reexamination of the strategic bequest motive this paper investigates the strength of the empirical evidence of the strategic bequest hypothesis proposed by bernheim shleifer and summers 1985 at issue is whether bequests are primarily motivated by a desire to influnce the behavior of potential beneficiaries alternatively bequests may be motivated by altruism or risk aversion in the presence of incomplete annuity and health insurnace markets e g tomes 1981 hurd 1989

altruism within the family reconsidered do nice guys finish last this paper criticizes the view that altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families the authors identify a variety of circumstances in which members of a group would prefer to interact with less altruistic individuals and in which the efficiency of resource allocation is inversely related to the prevailing degree of altruism reasons that altruism might be a counter productive social force include 1 it can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways 2 it can entail exploitability causing family members to behave in ways that leave all parties worse off 3 altruists may take inefficient actions to preempt exploitation and 4 family members may establish efficient resource allocation by punishing selfish behavior a rise in the level of altruism may lead to the exclusion of certain punishment strategies on the grounds of credibility 1 general positive result is that sufficiently high levels of altruism almost always lead to efficient resource allocation one should not necessarily expect to find strong altruistic linkages between spouses nor should altruism necessarily contributed to marital stability in addition to the connections between this work and the literature on family behavior this analysis has broader implications concerning the role of altruism in society and the evolution of social conscience

specification of the joy of giving insights from altruism this paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest it exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving parameter we demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing literature this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

just luck an experimental study of risk taking and fairness choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society this paper reports the results of the first experiment to our knowledge to study fairness views about risk taking specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes we find that even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities most favor some redistribution ex post many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices these findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators

altruism matching and nonmarket insurance incomplete market insurance gives rise to nonmarket arrangements for coinsurance we find that the effort altruistically linked individuals take to avoid an accident increases with the degree of altruism if the degree of altruism is sufficiently high an economy with nonmarket insurance yields higher social welfare than an economy without nonmarket insurance as altruism increases the equilibrium level of effort approaches the second best solution without the need for costly monitoring coinsurance is above below the socially optimal level if individuals place greater weight less weight on their own utility than on that of their partners

the wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets abstract insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets the swiss government for example paid out chf 4 26 billion or 0 72 of the swiss gdp for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011 analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market other consequences of premium subsidies however have mostly been neglected by the literature we show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses this leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market the effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation using two alternative models we show that providing state dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect depending on which state subsidies are paid we argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured s behavior depends on the market structure

new evidence on altruism a study of tiaa cref retirees this paper investigates the role in household wealth accumulation of saving for bequests it employs data from a 1988 survey of tiaa cref annuitants designed to measure pension and other net worth as well as lifetime earnings about half of the households in the data plan to leave estates and the authors find that their behavior conforms with theoretical altruistic models for the same families the amount of wealth that the authors attribute to estate building is large nevertheless altruism towards one s children does not seem to be the major explanation of saving in the overall sample copyright 1996 by american economic association

the effects of social security on population and output growth in this paper we have considered two unfunded social security programs under the conventional system benefits are related to aggregate fertility under the hypothetical fertility related system benefits are directly linked to individual fertility the effects on fertility and per capita growth rates of the two social security systems are examined in the context of endogenous growth the relative merits of the two systems for developing and developed countries are considered the authors conclude that the conventional social security system existing in many developed nations may be desirable to developing countries in reducing population and promoting economic growth on the other hand the hypothetical fertility related system may be useful to developed countries as far as increasing fertility is concerned

operative gift and bequest motives the ricardian equivalence theorem which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump sum taxes have no effect on assumption or capital accumulation depends on the exist of operative altruistic motives for intergenerational transfers these transfers can be bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to parents in order for the ricardian equivalence theorem to hold one of these transfer motives must be operative in the sense that the level of the transfer is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a binding non negativity constraint this paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive will be operative the gift motive will be operative or neither motive will be operative in a model in which consumers are altruistic toward their parents and their children this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

peers at work we study peer effects in the workplace specifically we investigate whether how and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team using high frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain we find strong evidence of positive productiv ity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him but not workers who do not see him additionally workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact we conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free riding externalities that are built into many workplaces jel j24 l81 m54

corporate bankruptcy reorganizations estimates from a bargaining model this article uses a novel approach to measure the unobserved liquidation value of a firm that relies on the information contained in the allocations that are agreed upon in chapter 11 negotiations i estimate a game theoretic model that captures the influence of liquidation value on the equilibrium allocations using a newly collected data set i find that the liquidation values are higher when the industry conditions are more favorable and the real interest rates are higher i use the estimated model to conduct a counterfactual experiment to quantitatively assess the impact of a mandatory liquidation on the equilibrium allocations

liquidation costs and capital structure abstract we investigate the relation between liquidation costs of assets and composition of capital structure for firms that reorganized under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code firms with high liquidation costs emerge from chapter 11 with relatively low debt ratios the debt of these firms is more likely to be public and unsecured and to have less restrictive covenant terms these firms are also more likely to raise new equity capital assets with high liquidation costs thus lead firms to choose capital structures that make financial distress less likely

universalism and the value of political power although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive i develop a game theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation to quantify the effects of political power on the agreed upon allocation i structurally estimate the model using the bridge bill capital budget in 1992 i find that 16 73 of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs

coalition governments and comparative constitutional design abstract in this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi party parliamentary democracies the approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments we illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two counterfactual experiments of comparative constitutional design

liquidation values and the credibility of financial contract renegotiation evidence from u s airlines how do liquidation values affect financial contract renegotiation while the incomplete contracting theory of financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining power between creditors and debtors there is little empirical evidence on financial contract renegotiations and the role asset values play in such bargaining this paper attempts to fill this gap we develop an incomplete contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline industry in the united states we find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fieet is low our results show that strategic renegotiation is common in the airline industry moreover the results emphasize the importance of the incomplete contracting perspective to real world financial contract renegotiation

the genetics of investment biases abstract for a long list of investment biases including lack of diversification excessive trading and the disposition effect we find that genetic differences explain up to 45 of the remaining variation across individual investors after controlling for observable individual characteristics the evidence is consistent with a view that investment biases are manifestations of innate and evolutionary ancient features of human behavior we find that work experience with finance reduces genetic predispositions to investment biases finally we find that even genetically identical investors who grew up in the same family environment often differ substantially in their investment behaviors due to individual specific experiences or events

rules of thumb for social learning this paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use we analyze two learning environments one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them in both environments players use exogenously specified rules of thumb that ignore historical data but may incorporate a tendency to use the more popular technology in some cases these naive rules can lead to fairly efficient decisions in the long run but adjustment can be slow when a superior technology is first introduced

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

social interaction and stock market participation we propose that stock market participation is influenced by social interaction in our model any given social investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate we test this theory using data from the health and retirement study and find that social households those who interact with their neighbors or attend church are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non social households controlling for wealth race education and risk tolerance moreover consistent with a peer effects story the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock market participation rates are higher

bequest behavior and the effect of heirs earnings testing the altruistic model of bequests that parents transfer resources to children because of altruistic concern is a reasonable a priori assumption however economic theories of altruistic transfers have produced many counterintuitive conclusions and consequently much debate when applied to bequests these theories predict that inheritances will compensate for earnings differences between siblings as well as between parents and children this paper tests these implications using a new data set centered on federal estate tax returns little support can be found for an altruistic theory of bequests this finding has implications for macroeconomic policy government transfer programs and inequality copyright 1996 by american economic association

social security and private saving new time series evidence in an important article in the journal of political economy martin feldstein 1974 estimated that the introduction of the social security system had reduced personal saving by 50 percent with serious consequences for capital formation and output his conclusion was based on a consumer expenditure function estimated with u s time series data and incorporating a social security wealth variable of his construction this paper presents new evidence that casts considerable doubt on feldstein s conclusion first the social security wealth variable used by feldstein was seriously flawed as a result of a computer programming error simply correcting this error substantially changes the estimated effect of social security on saving second the statistical evidence depends upon assumptions which are embedded in the construction of the social security wealth variable assumptions that are not demonstrably preferable and are in some cases inferior to alternative assumptions these assumptions relate first to how individuals form their expectations about the social security benefits they expect to receive and the social security taxes they expect to pay and second to estimates of the number of workers dependent wives and surviving

bargaining over environmental budgets a political economy model with application to french water policy in decentralized water management with earmarked budgets financed by user taxes and distributed back in the form of subsidies net gains are often heterogeneous across user categories this paper explores the role of negotiation over budget allocation and coalition formation in water boards to provide an explanation for such user specific gaps between tax payments and subsidies we propose a bargaining model to represent the sequential nature of the negotiation process in water districts in which stakeholder representatives may bargain upon a fraction of the budget only the structural model of budget shares estimated from the data on french water agencies performs well as compared with reduced form estimation empirical results confirm the two stage bargaining process and provide evidence for systematic net gains from the system for agricultural water users

social interaction at work abstract stock market investment decisions of individuals are positively correlated with those of coworkers sorting of unobservably similar individuals to the same workplaces is unlikely to explain this pattern as evidenced by the investment behavior of individuals who move between plants purchases made under stronger coworker purchase activity are not associated with higher returns moreover social interaction appears to drive the purchase of within industry stocks overall we find a strong influence of coworkers on investment choices but not an influence that improves the quality of investment decisions

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

how destructive is creative destruction effects of job loss on job mobility withdrawal and income we analyze short and long term effects of worker displacement our sample consists of male workers displaced from norwegian manufacturing plants we find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31 the drop out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement the average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate a 3 loss relative to non displaced workers after seven years splitting displaced workers on within and between firm movers we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between firm movers who experience a 3 6 loss transfers to other plants within multi plant firms upon displacement are quite common our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific we find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific

samaritan versus rotten kid another look abstract we set up a two stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents the samaritan s dilemma rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after before the altruist we find that in general the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent s action marginally affects only his own payoff the altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff

social learning and peer effects in consumption evidence from movie sales using box office data for all movies released between 1982 and 2000 i quantify how much the consumption decisions of individuals depend on information they receive from their peers when quality is ex ante uncertain in the presence of social learning we should see different box office sales dynamics depending on whether opening weekend demand is higher or lower than expected i use a unique feature of the movie industry to identify ex ante demand expectations the number of screens dedicated to a movie in its opening weekend reflects the sales expectations held by profit maximizing theatre owners several pieces of evidence are consistent with social learning first sales of movies with positive surprise and negative surprise in opening weekend demand diverge over time if a movie has better than expected appeal and therefore experiences larger than expected sales in week 1 consumers in week 2 update upward their expectations of quality further increasing week 2 sales second this divergence is small for movies for which consumers have strong priors and large for movies for which consumers have weak priors third the effect of a surprise is stronger for audiences with large social networks finally consumers do not respond to surprises in first week sales that are orthogonal to movie quality like weather shocks overall social learning appears to be an important determinant of sales in the movie industry accounting for 32 of sales for the typical movie with positive surprise this implies the existence of a large social multiplier such that the elasticity of aggregate demand to movie quality is larger than the elasticity of individual demand

peer effects in program participation the influence of peers could play an important role in the take up of social programs however estimating peer effects has proven challenging given the problems of reflection correlated unobservables and endogenous group membership we overcome these identification issues in the context of paid paternity leave in norway using a regression discontinuity design our approach differs from existing literature which attempts to measure peer effects by exploiting random assignment to peer groups in contrast we study peer effects in naturally occurring peer groups but exploit random variation in the price of a social program for a subset of individuals fathers of children born after april 1 1993 in norway were eligible for one month of governmental paid paternity leave while fathers of children born before this cutoff were not there is a sharp increase in fathers taking paternity leave immediately after the reform with take up rising from 3 to 35 while this quasirandom variation changed the cost of paternity leave for some fathers and not others it did not directly affect the cost for the father s coworkers or brothers therefore any effect on the brother or the coworker can be attributed to the influence of the peer father in their network our key findings on peer effects are four fold first we find strong evidence for substantial peer effects of program participation in both workplace and family networks coworkers and brothers are 11 and 15 percentage points respectively more likely to take paternity leave if their peer father was induced to take up leave by the reform second the most likely mechanism is information transmission about costs and benefits including increased knowledge of how an employer will react third there is essential heterogeneity in the size of the peer effect depending on the strength of ties between peers highlighting the importance of duration intensity and frequency of social interactions fourth the estimated peer effect gets amplified over time with each subsequent birth exhibiting a snowball effect as the original peer father s influence cascades through a firm our findings demonstrate that peer effects can lead to long run equilibrium participation rates which are substantially higher than would otherwise be expected

social interactions in asset allocation decisions evidence from 401 k pension plan investors abstract this paper investigates social interaction effects on individual asset allocation decisions using a rich dataset of 159 329 individuals enrolled in 401 k plans we find that individuals are likely to increase decrease their risk shares when their coworkers have higher lower risk exposures over the last quarter the social interaction effects are especially strong among individuals with extreme asset allocations and low equity investment performance we also divide the workplaces into subgroups to examine how social interaction effects vary among coworkers with different backgrounds results from additional tests indicate that estimated social interaction effects are not primarily driven by common preferences common environments or reverse causality

understanding declining mobility and inter household transfers among east african pastoralists we model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state dependent consequence of individuals strategic interdependen ce resulting from the existence of multiple opposing externalities a public good security ext ernality among individuals sharing a social e g ethnic identity in a potentially hostile en vironment creates incentives to band together self interested interhousehold wealth transfers fro m wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge endogenously within a limited wealth space as a mea ns to motivate accompanying migration by the recipient the distributional reach and size o f the transfer are limited however by a resource appropriation externality related to the use of com mon property grazing lands when this effect dominates it can induce transfers from households who want to relieve grazing pressures caused by others herds our model augments the extant li terature on transfers and is perhaps more consistent with the limited available empirical evi dence on heterogeneous and changing transfers patterns among east african pastoralists the core principles of our model possibly apply more broadly for example to long distance migrants or e ven among foot soldiers in street gangs

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

network effects and welfare cultures we empirically examine the role of social networks in welfare participation using data on language spoken at home to better infer networks within an area our empirical strategy asks whether being surrounded by others who speak the same language increases welfare use more for those from high welfare using language groups this methodology allows us to include local area and language group fixed effects and to control for the direct effect of being surrounded by one s language group these controls eliminate many of the problems in previous studies the results strongly confirm the importance of networks in welfare participation

the evolution of medical spending risk how has the economic risk of health spending changed over time for u s households we describe trends in aggregate health spending in the united states and how private insurance markets and public insurance programs have changed over time we then present evidence from consumer expenditure survey microdata on how the distribution of household spending on health that is out of pocket payments for medical care plus the household s share of health insurance premiums has changed over time this distribution has shifted up over time households spend more on medical care and insurance than they used to but for the purposes of measuring change in risk it is not the mean but the dispersion of this distribution that is of interest we consider two measures of dispersion that serve as proxies for household risk the standard deviation of the distribution of household health spending and the ratio of the 90th percentile of spending to the median the so called 90 50 gap we find surprisingly that neither has increased despite the rapid rise in aggregate health spending this conclusion holds true for broad subgroups of the population for example the nonelderly as a group but not for some narrowly defined subgroups for example low income families with children we next consider how much risk households should face from the perspective of economic efficiency household risk may not have changed much over the past several decades but do we have any evidence that this level represents either too much or too little risk finally we discuss implications for public policy in particular for current debates over expanding health insurance coverage to the uninsured

how do investment ideas spread through social interaction evidence from a ponzi scheme a unique data set from a large ponzi scheme allows me to study word of mouth diffusion of investment information investors could join the scheme only by invitation from an existing member which allows me to observe how the idea spreads from one person to the next based on inviter invitee relationships i find that the observed social network has a scale free connectivity structure which significantly facilitates the diffusion of the investment idea and contributes to the growth and survival of the socially spreading ponzi scheme i further find that investors invest more if their inviter has comparatively higher age education and income

the role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions evidence from a randomized experiment this paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information and social interactions in employees decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account tda retirement plan within a large university the experiment encouraged a random sample of employees in a subset of departments to attend a benee ts information fair organized by the university by promising a monetary reward for attendance the experiment multiplied by more than e ve the attendance rate of these treated individuals relative to controls and tripled that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were treated tda enrollment e ve and eleven months after the fair was signie cantly higher in departments where some individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated however the effect on tda enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the encouragement as for those who did we provide three interpretations differential treatment effects social network effects and motivational reward effects to account for these results

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

participation and investment decisions in a retirement plan the influence of colleagues choices abstract this paper investigates whether peer effects play an important role in retirement savings decisions we use individual data from employees of a large university to study whether individual decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account plan sponsored by the university and the choice of the mutual fund vendor for people who choose to enroll are affected by the decisions of other employees in the same department to overcome the identification problems we divide the departments into sub groups along gender status age and tenure lines and we instrument the average participation of each peer group by the salary or tenure structure in this group our results suggest that peer effects may be an important determinant of savings decisions

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

identification and estimation of stochastic bargaining models stochastic sequential bargaining models merlo and wilson 1995 1998 have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement this paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios

international charity under asymmetric information abstract international charity is often subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems we show that the burden of informational asymmetries are borne by the most needy countries even when charities design incentive contracts which limit the rents that some countries can extract

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

public pensions as optimal social contracts abstract a simple overlapping generations model is modified to allow for an externality experienced by the young from consumption by the elderly this sets up a game between generations in which one generation s strategy may be to save too little and rely on gifts from the young e g public assistance for retirement income social security can therefore be viewed as a pareto optimal contract to restore efficient intertemporal allocation a funded public pension plan corresponds to forced saving but is vulnerable in that the next young generation may stop contributing rely on its children for retirement assistance and meanwhile reap the consumption externality from the current elderly s social security benefits this suggests a forced giving or pay as you go type of compulsory pension plan such as exists in most nations which also has the advantage of aiding the initial old generation and therefore generating an immediate consumption externality for the initial young the approach can also be used to explain other aspects of existing social security

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

basic versus supplementary health insurance moral hazard and adverse selection this paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection we show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market surprisingly the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance

a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment in this model the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government we then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it we find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility

survey evidence on diffusion of interest and information among investors abstract questionnaire surveys of institutional and individual investors were undertaken to learn about patterns of communications it was found that direct interpersonal communications are very important in investor decisions questions elicited what fraction of investors were unsystematic and allowed themselves to be influenced by word of mouth communications or other salient stimuli randomly sampled investors were studied as well as investors in stocks whose price had recently increased dramatically contagion or epidemic models of financial markets are proposed in which interest in individual stocks is spread by word of mouth the survey evidence is interpreted as supporting such models

loyalty based portfolio choice i evaluate the effect of loyalty on individuals portfolio choice using a unique dataset of retirement contributions i exploit the statutory difference that in 401 k plans stand alone employees can invest directly in their division while conglomerate employees must invest in the entire firm including all unrelated divisions consistent with loyalty employees of stand alone firms invest 10 percentage points 75 more in company stock than conglomerate employees support is also found using variation in loyalty between different groups of employees across and within firms the cost to employees of loyalty is large amounting to nearly a 20 loss in retirement income

precautionary saving and accidental bequests this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests this model is used to analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation a precautionary demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the date at which he will die and he wants to avoid low levels of consumption in the event that he lives longer than expected an implication of this precautionary saving is that when death does occur the consumer is generally holding some wealth which is then passed on to his heirs in the form of an accidental bequest even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities there will be some intracohort variation in the date of death consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by consumers in a cohort this nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth consumption and bequests of subsequent generations the importance of bequests in aggregate saving has been established by laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 who reported that 80 percent of u s household wealth is inherited wealth one interpretation of this finding is that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of saving behavior in the united states but the model i present demonstrates that accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth although some part of bequests especially by the wealthy undoubtedly results from an explicit bequest motive accidental bequests also play a role in the intergenerational transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth in order to focus on the role of accidental bequests i purposely exclude a bequest motive from the specification of the utility function the effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first examined formally in a seminal paper by menachem yaari 1965 yaari s model provided the basic framework for virtually all subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well known papers by nils hakansson 1969 stanley fischer 1973 robert barro and james friedman 1977 david levhari and leonard mirman 1977 and kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 however all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental bequests 2 as will be shown at various points in this paper changes in the economic environment can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ sharply from the effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of bequests the effects of department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 this paper is a revised version of bequests and social security with uncertain lifetimes nber working paper no 1372 june 1984 i thank olivier blanchard john burbidge christopher cavanagh robert clower stanley fischer benjamin friedman elhanan helpman mervyn king nobuhiro kiyotaki laurence kotlikoff robert mcdonald james pesando julio rotemberg lawrence summers lars svensson mark watson and jeffrey wolcowitz for valuable conversations and correspondence i also thank the participants in seminars at boston university columbia university cornell university federal reserve board harvard university university of iowa mit university of minnesota university of montreal national bureau of economic research north carolina state university the wharton school and yale university and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments i also thank the national science foundation for financial support 1 in the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance markets there may or may not be bequests depending on the presence or absence of a bequest motive but there would be no accidental bequests 2 kotlikoff and spivak focus on the role of the family in providing an incomplete annuities market but stop short of a full scale overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is determined endogenously

estimating a bargaining model with asymmetric information evidence from medical malpractice disputes this article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information the main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data the article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms such as imposing limits on contingency fees and caps on jury awards

bequest motives social security and economic growth junxi zhang this article conducts a systematic analysis of four bequest motives in a simple model of endogenous growth it analyzes how bequest motives affect fertility savings growth and the effects of pay as you go social security it is found that altruistic and exchange motives give equivalent outcomes if the discount factors are set the same the outcome under the joy of giving motive may involve a higher bequest ratio higher saving and better growth rates than that under altruism if bequests are accidental the equilibrium values will depend on the probability of survival moreover the results provide testable implications on bequest motives jel d1 d9 h55 j1 i introduction although the importance of bequests in aggregate savings has been established by kotlikoff and summers 1981 who reported that 80 of u s household wealth is inherited wealth what bequest motives lead to inheritance remains an unsolved problem yet it is well known that bequest motives have important implications for the behavior of financial markets the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies and the intergenerational transmission of inequality in the distribution of wealth at least four hypotheses for the existence of bequests have been discussed in the literature 1 bequests may arise from intergenerational altruism that is parents obtain utility from their heirs utility as well as from their own consumption barro 1974 2 the prospect of bequests is used by parents to induce children to behave as desired by parents bernheim et al 1985 3 bequests may arise from the joy of giving that is parents leave bequests simply because they obtain utility directly from the bequest yaari 1964 1 and 4 bequests may be the unintentional by product of precautionary savings and a stochastic date of death in the absence of an annuity market abel 1985 following barro 1974 and becker 1974 the altruistic bequest motive has been used most frequently however the enormous empirical work using micro data has not led to conclusive evidence on the one hand bernheim et al 1985 cox 1987 and cox and rank 1992 show that bequests are more consistent with exchange than altruism altonji et al 1992 1997 also show that altruism is decisively rejected moreover wilhelm 1996 finds little support for an altruistic theory of bequests on the other hand a recent reexamination of the exchange motive by perozek 1998 shows that the finding of bernheim et al is not robust laitner and juster 1996 find some evidence of altruistic bequests therefore a definite conclusion on bequest motives seems far from over indeed though altruism has not been supported by most of those empirical studies it remains a plausible hypothesis and continues to be used frequently see e g coate 1995 and davies and zhang 1995 abel 1985 argues theoretically that although the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of the savi ng behavior in the united states as found in kotlikoff and summers 1981 accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a sizable fraction of aggregate wealth however little formal empirical work has been done to test whether bequests are accidental or arise from joy of giving given the lack of consensus on bequest motives it is interesting to conduct a systematic theoretical analysis of different bequest motives in a particular context becker et al 1990 and caballe 1995 assume altruism in their models of economic growth wiedmer s 1996 analysis of social security and growth does not consider bequests except ihori 1994 there seems to be no analysis of other bequest motives in the context of economic growth the purpose of this article is to analyze how different bequest motives affect fertility savings and economic growth the article will also examine how the effects of pay as you go social security depend on bequest motives

conflicts of interest and market illiquidity in bankruptcy auctions theory and tests i develop and estimate a model of cash auction bankruptcy using data on 205 swedish firms the results challenge arguments that cash auctions as compared to reorganizations are immune to conflicts of interest between claimholders but lead to inefficient liquidations i show that a sale of the assets back to incumbent management is a common bankruptcy outcome sale backs are more likely when they favor the bank at the expense of other creditors on the other hand inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale backs when markets are illiquid that is when industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few nonspecific assets the problem of designing an efficient bankruptcy law has received considerable attention in the last decade much of the debate has centered around the optimality of two different stylized bankruptcy procedures cash auctions such as the u s chapter 7 code and structured bargaining represented by the u s chapter 11 reorganization code recently several european countries including france germany and great britain have changed their bankruptcy regulation by introducing reorganization procedures similar to chapter 11 at the same time the chapter 11 code has been criticized by academics including baird 1986 emphasizing that the bargaining procedure frequently results in long and wasteful negotiations these critics argue that chapter 11 should instead be replaced with a mandatory auction procedure other researchers such as aghion hart and moore 1992 and shleifer and vishny 1992 have pointed out that a cash auction is likely to suffer from considerable inefficiencies arising from transaction costs and market illiquidity the nature and costs of the chapter 11 procedure are

hedging familiarity and portfolio choice we exploit the restrictions of intertemporal portfolio choice in the presence of non nancial income risk to design and implement tests of hedging that use the information contained in the actual portfolio of the investor we use a unique dataset of swedish investors with information broken down at the investor level and into various components of wealth investor income tax positions and investor demographic characteristics portfolio holdings are identi ed at the stock level we show that investors do not engage in hedging but invest in stocks closely related to their non nancial income we explain this with familiarity that is the tendency to concentrate holdings in stocks with which the investor is familiar in terms of geographical or professional proximity or that he has held for a long period we show that familiarity is not a behavioral bias but is information driven familiarity based investment allows investors to earn higher returns than they would have otherwise earned if they had hedged

do liquidation values affect financial contracts evidence from commercial loan contracts and zoning regulation we examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property loan contracts we employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property s permitted uses as a measure of an asset s redeployability or value in its next best use within a census tract more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations lower interest rates and fewer creditors controlling for the property s type sale price and earnings to price ratio these results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure

love thy children abstract this paper proves that barro s 1974 debt neutrality proposition whose relevance hinges in an economy with bequest motives on bequests being operative in the economy without public debt is not applicable to a wide class of overlapping generation economies those with a weak bequest motive in particular it is shown that the bequest motive is always too weak and public debt therefore non neutral when non physical assets have a well defined function reducing oversavings in the corresponding economy without bequest motive i e when the non altruistic economy is dynamically inefficient

gender bias investments in children and bequests the impacts of pure sex preference and differential earnings opportunities by gender on investments in children are modelled with altruism if bequest constraints do not bind human investments are privately efficient with the higher earning gender receiving more education education does not depend on parental wealth the gender differential in bequests is ambiguous however even in this case when bequest constraints bind education may depend on wealth and it is also possible for the gender with better earnings opportunities to get less education the model is tested with data from philippine villages where bequest constraints are generally nonbinding the schooling differential slightly favors daughters estimated bequest behavior however reflects pure sex preference in terms of our model copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

intergenerational transfers and demographic transition abstract this paper presents an analysis of demographic transition based on the endogenous evolution of intergenerational transfers along an economy s endogenous path of development two period lived agents belonging to overlapping generations choose optimally their desired levels of consumption and fertility together with their desired sizes of transfers to both parents and children parents are more efficient than children in producing output but some parental time must be devoted to child rearing at low levels of development fertility is high and the flow of net intergenerational transfers is from the young to the old at high levels of development fertility is low and the flow of net transfers is from the old to the young these results accord strongly with empirical observations and the analysis may be seen as formalising for the first time a long standing and well respected hypothesis in the demographic transition literature

insurance design in the presence of safety nets abstract safety net assistance and insurance exist to manage risk and improve welfare this shared goal may lead to crowding out in a new approach this paper analyzes the interaction of assistance with two dimensions of insurance design level of coverage and types of risks covered in a society of risk averse vulnerable individuals and risk neutral assistance providers pareto improvements in welfare are achieved through incompleteness in the types of risks covered the results imply that safety nets promote demand for and the emergence of incomplete insurance these results have a wide application to insurance markets where safety nets are available including health care disaster aid and social welfare

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

is the extended family altruistically linked direct tests using micro data this paper uses panel study of income dynamics data on parents and their adult children to test the standard altruism model this model predicts that within the extended family the distribution of consumption is independent of the distribution of resources the authors findings strongly reject this prediction copyright 1992 by american economic association

ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy a basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects in contrast this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice increasing the equityholders incentive to favor risky projects as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions