renewable energy policies and initiatives for a sustainable energy future in malaysia abstract effective policies and incentive on renewable energy re is critical to promote low carbon economy and society in the future re was first introduced in the country s energy mix through the fifth fuel policy which was formulated under the eighth malaysia plan 2001 2005 to reduce dependency on fossil fuel and to address the rising global concern on climate change this paper addresses the re progress and achievement over the past 10 years and discusses the key policies for re programmes funding schemes and incentives that has been introduced by the government of malaysia to develop and promote the utilisation of re the recent re mechanisms under the tenth malaysia plan 2011 2015 will also be highlighted

review on malaysia s national energy developments key policies agencies programmes and international involvements this paper aims to present a review on malaysia s national energy developments by looking at various angles in terms of renewable energy and energy efficiency energy demand and consumption by sectors are presented as well as the fuel mix in electricity generation key energy policies implemented from the incorporation of malaysia s national oil company petronas in 1974 until the national green technology policy 2009 and a future policy will be addressed the roles of key players as well as important agencies in energy development are briefly presented key programmes in energy development such as malaysian industrial energy efficiency improvement project small renewable energy power programme and building energy efficiency programme are discussed as well as successful initiatives from the programmes malaysia s international involvements towards reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon emissions especially montreal protocol and kyoto protocol are highlighted as a conclusion malaysia is aware of its role in formulating its national energy development policies sensitive towards the country s development towards the environment and utilization of energy resources as well as conscientious and responsive towards the call for sustainable development in promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency

cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited abstract in a letter previously published in this journal pal economics letters 60 1998 49 show that firms locate equidistant from each other in a circular city however we show that the following location pattern is also an equilibrium outcome firms agglomerate at two points in a circular city

spatial competition among multi store firms abstract the paper analyzes spatial cournot competition among multi store firms it demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi store firms can be approximated by a simple one in which each firm behaves as a multi store monopolist in choosing its store locations a firm s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations and in general converge to its monopoly locations as the demand grows larger when the firms have an equal number of stores the stores belonging to competing firms agglomerate at discrete points that coincide with each firm s monopoly store locations

on the optimality of the full cost pricing abstract this article is aimed at defining the full cost pricing as a leader follower game in two tier organizations i the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost ii the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost in the cournot oligopoly case the full cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules there exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost for which the full cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules in terms of gross profit

economic welfare in delivered pricing duopoly bertrand and cournot abstract we investigate two delivered pricing models we find that in the bertrand cournot model the equilibrium distance between two firms locations is too large small for maximum social welfare while it is too small for maximum consumer surplus in both models

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

cost heterogeneity industry concentration and strategic trade policies abstract we show that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs then the interplay between the herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies in some cases the direction of optimal policy is reversed

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

feed in tariff outlook in malaysia this paper aims to present the feed in tariff fit outlook in malaysia which is in the process of being enacted through a renewable energy re policy by the government of malaysia gom a brief in policies leading towards the re policy and the potential of each re sources under fit mechanism have been discussed the successful utilisation of re source in electricity generation and the fit implementation globally are positive indicators to implement fit in malaysia potentials of fit on biomass biogas and solid waste energy are currently very promising in malaysia but it is solar energy which is predicted to be the main re of the future surpassing all other res

a note on credible spatial entry deterrence abstract this note revisits the question of spatial entry deterrence to investigate the credibility of pre emption by crowding in a differentiated market judd rand j econ 16 1985 153 argues that pre emption by crowding is not a credible entry barrier because an incumbent monopolist has an ex post incentive to withdraw products in response to entry we demonstrate that pre emption by crowding may be a credible entry barrier if multiple potential entrants choose the timing of entry endogenously

publics knowledge attitudes and behavioral toward the use of solar energy in yemen power sector abstract this paper presents the information of the public s views on the solar energy use in yemen it examines the public knowledge of attitudes and behavioral intentions that include the variables willingness to pay willingness to change and willingness to invest and then compare them a personal interview with 348 urban household and 258 rural household was performed the descriptive statistics chi square for independence odds ratios mann whitney and kruskal wallis tests were the statistical tools employed in the analysis the results showed that the citizens in both areas have a moderate level of knowledge about renewable energy resources the benefits and drawbacks of solar energy use in the power sector and the solar power technologies despite that they have highly positive attitudes towards the use of renewable energy particularly solar energy and its technologies they also accept to engage in the renewable energy activities which aim to improve the quality of the electrical service provided in the country the findings also indicate 66 55 7 and 78 4 of urban citizens are willing to pay to change and to invest compared to 70 55 4 and 75 6 of rural citizens the place of residence factor affected significantly the citizens knowledge level about renewable energy wind biomass and geothermal energy renewable energy resources the drawbacks of solar energy use in the power sector and the solar power technologies it also affected significantly the citizens attitudes towards the use of solar power technologies at home the implications for the policymakers are that elevating the knowledge and awareness of the citizens by formal and informal education and enacting effective supportive policies assists in encouraging the citizens to use renewable energies in their daily lives would lead to achieve the country s renewable energy targets for 2025

competitive auction mechanisms for the promotion renewable energy technologies the case of the 50 mw photovoltaics projects in cyprus abstract there are a range of policy frameworks and support mechanisms to promote the penetration of renewable energy technologies into the energy mix assembled by the governments and regulatory bodies around the world the three dominant and most common support schemes that have also been implemented within the eu and proven successful in the past include the competitive auctions the feed in tariff scheme fit and tradable green certificates tgcs this study reviews the use of the competitive auction mechanism for the promotion of power generation from renewable energy technologies the process of the specific policy instrument as well as its pros and cons are introduced successful and failed case studies from countries that have already incorporated this mechanism into their renewable energy technologies development policies are also presented among these cases is the cyprus auction procurement for the licensing of 50 mw of photovoltaic power plants conducted in january 2013 which is thoroughly elaborated in this paper the timeline of the bids is presented and the auction winner strategy is tracked and examined a discussion is also presented on the feasibility of the awarded projects eventually the entire auction procurement procedure is evaluated to expose the defects of the mechanism and to offer some recommendations for the viability of the process

malaysia s renewable energy policies and programs with green aspects malaysia as a developing country and a member of the association of southeast asian nations asean is looking into inexhaustible and repeatable alternative energy sources such as solar wind mini hydro and biomass the estimated gdp at 2010 is 15 385 per capita and the economic and industrial growth of the country implies that energy demand is growing very fast in addition the growing prices of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas ghg emissions make inevitable renewable energy solutions for the country geographically malaysia is located in a region of tropical and humid climate which provides easy access to a variety of renewable energy sources the government of malaysia has initiated renewable energy policies to encourage industries and individuals to employ renewable energy powered systems in power applications this paper first gives a brief overview of the current status of renewable energy in malaysia then it provides the energy policies specifically the renewable energy policies in malaysia in section 2 the renewable energy programs are reviewed in section 3 the building energy efficiency program with green aspect is provided in section 4 lastly the conclusion and forecasts of this paper are

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

partial agglomeration or dispersion in spatial cournot competition 1 introductionsince the seminal work of hotelling 1929 a rich and diverse literature on spatial competition has emerged location models can be classified into two types one type is shipping or spatial price discrimination model where sellers bear transport costs the other is shopping or mill pricing model where buyers pay for transport for each type one can have either bertrand type price setting or cournot type quantity setting 1most studies on location theory use shopping mill pricing models with bertrand competition although cournot and bertrand types of non spatial models are equally popular the body of literature on spatial competition that uses cournot type models is relatively small economists have recently considered shipping models with cournot competition hamilton thisse and weskamp 1989 and anderson and neven 1991 carry out pioneering works on location models 2 they use linear city models and show that all firms agglomerate at the central point pal 1998 shows that their result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a linear city he investigates a circular city duopoly model3 and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium that is locational dispersion appears 4 matsushima 2001a extends pal s model to an n firm oligopoly and shows another equilibrium where half of the firms locate at one point and the other half locate at the opposite point partial agglomeration these results indicate the multiplicity of equilibria in spatial cournot models with a circular city the multiplicity of equilibria restricts the applicability of the model because the model does not give us a distinct prediction in this article we take a close look at pal 1998 and matsushima 2001a we try to solve this problem by extending their linear transport cost model to one with nonlinear transport cost 5 we consider a simplified model the numbers of firms and markets and so possible locations are four four firms choose location a b c or d see if each of the four firms chooses a different location we call this outcome pal type if two firms locate at a and the other two locate at c we call this outcome matsushima type we find that the pal type equilibrium is much more robust because i pal type equilibrium always exists as long as transport cost is increasing in distance while matsushima type equilibrium fails to exist when the transport cost function is significantly convex or concave proposition 1 ii if firms choose their locations sequentially the unique equilibrium outcome is pal type under nonlinear transport cost functions proposition 2 and iii the profit of each firm in pal type is never smaller than that in matsushima type and the former is strictly larger if the transport cost function is nonlinear proposition 3 we also compare the welfare implications of pal type and matsushima type models if the transport cost function is linear the two outcomes yield exactly the same profits consumer surplus and total social surplus however this equivalence does not hold if the transport cost function is nonlinear either convex or concave in this case pal type yields greater total social surplus and profit of each firm while matsushima type yields greater consumer surplus these results indicate that the welfare implications are sensitive to whether or not the transport cost function is linear anderson and neven 1991 show that in the linear city model a strong concavity in transport cost changes the equilibrium outcome this result is related to our results but we emphasize that our results are different from theirs first we show that both concavity and convexity of the transport cost function affect the results while in anderson and neven 1991 only strong convexity changes the result second in our propositions 2 and 3 even a slight nonlinearity changes the results

malaysia energy strategy towards sustainability a panoramic overview of the benefits and challenges sustainable energy supply is essential for actualizing malaysia s vision to become a high income country the current power production and demand trends show that malaysia has a reserve margin that will only last for the next few years this calls for further investment research and development in the country s power sector in order to meet the ever increasing energy demand the government s diversification policy and power sector expansion plan emphasizes on the incorporation of renewable energy sources ress and other less co2 emitting sources like nuclear into the national energy mix however the environmental ramifications of this policy should be part of any future expansion plan of national grid this paper presents a panoramic overview of the malaysian energy sector the energy policy revolution and the power sector expansion strategy towards secure sustainability we want to bring into focus the benefits and challenges of malaysia s power sector expansion plan with the aim of stimulating further discussion and research on the environmental ramifications of the plan

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

vertical restraints and producers competition this paper examines the rationale for vertical restraints it shows that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have significant anti competitive effects the paper focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements among the retailers of two products which are imperfect substitutes such arrangements are shown to increase consumer prices under plausible conditions the increase in consumer prices is sufficiently large to more than offset the deleterious effects from double marginalization resulting from reduced competition among retailers the imposition of exclusivity provisions is may be part of a nash equilibrium among producers these results hold whether there are or are not franchise fees this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

spatial competition and spatial price discrimination the analysis of spatial competition under conditions of free entry which derives its major impetus from the seminal work of losch 1954 has been conducted in general on the assumption that the competitive firm will adopt an f o b pricing scheme see for example capozza and van order 1978 and holahan 1978 greenhut 1956 does consider some of the implications of discriminatory pricing within competitive markets but his analysis adopts an essentially short run view and provides little rationale for the choice of such a pricing policy by competitive firms this is in contrast with developments in the analysis of spatial monopoly the early work of singer 1937 and hoover 1937 and subsequent developments by for example greenhut 1956 beckmann 1976 beckmann and ingene 1976 greenhut and greenhut 1977 holahan 1975 and norman 1977 indicate that the spatial monopolist should adopt a discriminatory spatial pricing policy where spatial price discrimination is taken conventionally to mean that delivered prices do not follow an f o b scheme but that all concumers equidistant from a particular supplier pay the same price it is rarely however that the results generated by the analysis of spatial monopoly are reconsidered in the analysis of spatial competition in particular although we know that spatial price discrimination will in general increase a monopolist s profit the assumption that profit maximising spatially competitive firms will adopt f o b pricing schemes has rarely been questioned and has not been questioned within the loschian competitive framework greenhut and ohta 1975a chapter 8 and chapter 8 appendix i are notable exceptions but in both cases they depart from the loschian scheme the first objective of this paper is therefore to show that when loschian competitive firms are allowed the option of discriminatory pricing i e are free of institutional constraints which require f o b pricing they will be forced to exercise that option in order to maintain normal profits secondly we shall show that if competitive conditions change the form of price discrimination will also change and that under certain competitive conditions the degree of discrimination will increase with the degree of competition leading eventually to uniform pricing thirdly we compare two competitive cases with multi plant monopoly and derive the spatial analogue of the conventional spaceless monopoly perfect competition comparison the monopolist s plants will be larger in area and total output than each competitive firm but will supply less per consumer at a higher average price welfare comparisons are less clear cut in that they are dependent upon the type of competition we assume we show however that welfare maximisation requires marginal cost pricing where marginal cost includes transport costs and so requires f o b pricing if there are economies of scale to production it follows that welfare maximisation will require production subsidy

feed in tariff mechanisms for large scale wind power in china abstract in recent years with the large scale and centralized development of the wind power industry in china wind power curtailment has become increasingly serious in order to promote wind power consumption in china this paper designs four kinds of feed in tariff fit mechanisms a double track fit mechanism based on a ratio a time of use benchmarking tariff mechanism a net back pricing mechanism based on the inter provincial wind power consumption market and an fit mechanism based on negotiation then we establish a benefit distribution model to analyze the wind power stakeholders benefits finally based on the four kinds of fit mechanisms and the benefit distribution model we propose the best fit mechanisms for the various electricity market circumstances in china in order to provide a reference to formulate wind fit to promote the consumption of wind power and to advance the sustainable development of renewable energy in developing countries

information sharing in union firm relationships large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions when they do an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade however if the firm refuses to share information the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance this reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare as a result there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information many firms and their input suppliers form long term relationships in which they periodically negotiate their terms of trade as has long been recognized the presence of private information can cause negotiations to break down on occasion resulting in an inefficient disruption of production for example the united auto workers with superior knowledge of its strike fund and or its member s outside options may call for a strike against general motors if the firm is unwilling to meet its wage demands and the firm s unwillingness to concede may be due to its superior knowledge of demand productivity and or its stock of inventories theoretically such disruptions could be avoided if the agents would simply agree to reveal their private information before the negotiations begin 2 whether or not this will occur is unclear however since some agents may be unwilling to enter into such an agreement if it sufficiently weakened their bargaining position the literatures on noncooperative bargaining and mechanism design have already dealt with many of the issues that arise in this environment in the bargaining literature it is generally assumed that the agents already possess the private information and then the implications of different bargaining processes are examined see ausubel et al 2002 for a survey in the mechanism design literature one of the questions addressed is whether the agents can find a way to commit to ex

on distance metrics in location problems product space metrics reflect the complementarity of product attributes and lead to different geometries in multidimensional spaces this matters for optimal product positioning i consider how a planner should design two substitute public goods with multiple attributes to best serve different needs attribute complementarity affects whether a given menu dominates another using an extension of the pareto criterion distancing the goods proportionately in every attribute guarantees improvement when tastes are maximally diverse the intuition is that the planner must minimize overlap in the populations the goods serve since benefits are wasted in appealing to the same individual with two offerings jel c65 d78 h41

economic relations between germany and southern europe two interpretations have been advanced to account for persistent german current account surpluses that translate into equally persistent deficits of countries in the european periphery according to the first the german surplus is the expression of a virtuous savings behaviour to be extended to the periphery the second maintains that the increase in net exports reflects the stagnation of german domestic demand the paper argues that differences in price competitiveness are only part of the explanation of the disequilibria and that an expansion of german internal demand albeit necessary would not suffice to provide a viable response to the long term sustainability of the euro area adopting a multilevel perspective the paper argues that to understand the persistence of deficits in the european periphery the main features of the reorganisation of the german economic system including its income redistribution and demand implications should be considered three elements are singled out the effects of eastward enlargement the impoverishment of the productive matrix of peripheral countries and the quality composition of trade flows this analysis it is argued is a crucial premise for devising trade and industrial policies targeted on redressing the increasing skewness of eu trade especially through greater trade among the deficit countries copyright oxford university press

solar photovoltaic in malaysia the way forward abstract this paper examines solar photovoltaic pv in malaysia first it analyzes the current energy demand in malaysia and discusses some of the national policies and the installations of solar pv in urban and rural areas in the country next the general feed in tariff fit scheme is explained indicating its potential as one of the investment options for malaysians finally the loan financing option for solar pv is presented providing examples that have been implemented in other countries as well as explaining the green technology financing scheme gtfs for companies and the proposed soft loan scheme for individual households in malaysia it also analyses the impact of the proposed interest rate to household consumers in malaysia in terms of total profit net present value and internal rate of return it is found that the fit scheme could potentially help in increasing renewable energy penetration particularly for solar pv to provide upfront capital for solar pv installation it is shown that the gtfs is a good financial source for companies while for individual home owners a soft loan facility from banking institutions is a feasible source if the interest rate is 5 or less

cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration most theoretical models of spatial competition show a strong tendency toward spatial dispersion of firms yet common observations suggest that firms tend to agglomerate in this paper the authors show that competition between cournot type oligopolists that discriminate over space leads to spatial agglomeration one implication is that firms do not necessarily earn supernormal profits at the free entry equilibrium copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

an evaluation of the installation of solar photovoltaic in residential houses in malaysia past present and future abstract this paper examines solar energy development in malaysia particularly in relation to the installation of solar photovoltaic pv in residential houses it analyzes the past activities related to solar energy in malaysia in terms of research and developments r ds the implementations used as well as the national policies for the past 20 years which have pushed the installation of pv in the country the feed in tariff fit scheme is discussed showing comparative cost benefit analysis between the pv installation in houses in the united kingdom uk and malaysia and with other investment schemes available in malaysia to investigate the awareness of renewable energy policies and incentives a preliminary survey of the public opinion in malaysia has been carried out and an evaluation of public willingness to invest in the fit scheme by installing the pv on their houses is presented the cost benefit analysis shows that the proposed fit programme is capable of generating good return on investment as compared to the one in the uk but the return is lower than other investment tools the survey suggests that most malaysians are unaware of the government s incentives and policies towards renewable energies and are not willing to invest in the fit scheme

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

consumer benefited cartels under strategic capital investment competition abstract the purpose of this paper is to refute the genrally accepted idea that a cartel raises producers surplus at the expense of consumers surplus if firms in an industry expect that a cartel in which the output is allocated on the bases of the capital equipment will be formed then each firm tries to make a larger capital investment than before which may lead to larger consumers surplus through this argument i shall present one of the reasons why heavy industries had excess capacity in postwar japan

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

producer opportunism in retailing contracts this paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints it considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation it shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee this conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies direct eviction of initial retailers excessive entry of new retailers on the market or resale price maintenance used to encourage voluntary exit of initial retailers

sustainable energy transitions in emerging economies the formation of a palm oil biomass waste to energy niche in malaysia 1990 2011 the economic development in emerging economies in southeast asia has significantly increased the use of fossil fuel based energy this has severe implications for global climate change and against this background scholars within the sustainable transition tradition have taken an interest in addressing how transitions towards more sustainable development pathways in this region may be achieved this paper contributes to the abovementioned literature by examining the conducive and limiting factors for development and proliferation of a palm oil biomass waste to energy niche in malaysia during the period 1990 2011 rising oil prices strong pressure on the palm oil industry from environmental groups and a persisting palm oil biomass waste disposal problem in malaysia appear to have been conducive to niche proliferation and on top of this national renewable energy policies and large scale donor programmes have specifically supported the utilisation of palm oil biomass waste for energy however in spite of this the niche development process has only made slow progress the paper identifies reluctant implementation of energy policy rise in biomass resource prices limited network formation and negative results at the niche level as the main factors hindering niche development

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

a theory of hub and spoke collusion abstract we develop a model of hub and spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers demand is stochastic and collusion between retailers is difficult the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient rotemberg and saloner 1986 in the hub and spoke collusive agreement retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier the supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price by organizing the collusion the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain we show that surprisingly this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

a critical review of china s rapidly developing renewable energy and energy efficiency policies renewable energy and energy efficiency reee policies have far reaching implications for energy security climate change economic competitiveness pollution and human livelihood for these reasons reee has become a national priority for the chinese government particularly since 2005 this paper aims to critically review china s reee policies in six sectors electricity industry transportation buildings and local government in addition to examining the progress china has made in the development and implementation of reee policies this review also identifies limitations and room for improvement finally five policy recommendations are presented

supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance abstract supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents this has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers to understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners performance and consumer surplus we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer a dominant retailer and no single agent dominance under random and price sensitive demand channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party we analyze all problems in a game theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price wholesale price and order production quantity we show that the manufacturer dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity the lowest retail price and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer on the other hand the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance while both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits as we show under the manufacturer dominated structure further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer retailer dominance schemes with the no single agent dominance structure and integrated channel we also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost shortage penalty and salvage value

the determinants of income inequality in oecd countries the objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of the increase in income inequality that oecd countries have experienced over the past two decades my hypothesis is that along with the financialisation of economies that has taken place since 1990 inequality increased because labour flexibility intensified labour market institutions weakened as trade unions lost power and public social spending started to retrench and did not compensate for the vulnerabilities created by the globalisation process using data from 25 high income oecd countries from 1990 to 2013 i empirically evaluate this hypothesis my results clearly suggest that the increase in inequality over the past two decades is caused by an increase in financialisation a deepening of labour flexibility the weakening of trade unions and the retrenchment of the welfare state

vertical restraints and the law evidence from automobile franchising abstract after a 2002 european commission regulation prohibited the use of dealer exclusive territories automobile franchise contracts in italy introduced price ceilings and standards on verifiable marketing and service inputs such as advertising and salespeople the contracts also imposed quantity floors a practice already in use before the regulatory change the introduction of standards suggests that consistent with a view of vertical restraints as coordination mechanisms manufacturers used exclusive territories to induce desired dealer services and once the use of exclusive territories was prohibited they switched to alternative contractual devices to achieve this goal the introduction of price ceilings despite free intrabrand competition also suggests that car manufacturers tried to prevent some dealers from gaming the quantity floors by selling to other dealers customers while charging monopolistic prices at their own locations

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

product differentiation in spatial cournot markets abstract we introduce to the spatial cournot markets model the inverse demand function of deneckere economics letters 11 1983 37 that allows product differentiation the circular model s outcome alters depending on if goods are complements or substitutes while the linear model results in central agglomeration

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

does cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration abstract locations and quantities are chosen sequentially in spatial markets strikingly different location patterns emerge depending on the shape of the market in a circular city firms locate equidistant from each other in a linear city firms agglomerate at the center

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

renewable energy in five south east asian countries review on electricity consumption and economic growth abstract the present study is an archival statistical overview of the possibility of renewable energy production in five south east asian countries and their economic capacity the five south east asian countries under review are the philippines thailand malaysia indonesia and singapore all of which have a combined population of 420 million this number is a little less than the population of 25 european countries these five countries have created a large market in the world and have enjoyed significant economic growth in recent years tropical climate in the region facilitates the potential for using clean and green energies this article clarifies the effective relation between energy capacities and economic indices in these countries and analyzes the results using a survey the paper shows that despite the shortage of energy in these countries brought by their fast economic growth the share of renewable energy in energy production is constantly declining and more reliance is still placed on fossil fuels for energy production

how many firms should be leaders beneficial concentration revisited we investigate how the number of stackelberg leaders and followers aects economic welfare first we discuss the model with m leaders and n m followers compete in a homogeneous good market daughety 1990 nds that under constant marginal costs the stackelberg model m2 0 n yield a higher welfare than the cournot model m 0 or

anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise the dominant firm s advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration a vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy the dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare improving vertical mergers copyright 1998 by american economic association

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social