financial development and the fdi growth nexus the malaysian experience this article examines the fdi growth nexus in the small open economy of malaysia by controlling for the level of financial development financial development is proxied by a composite index which is a summary measure of four financial development indicators using time series data from 1965 to 2004 the results show that fdi and financial development are positively related to output in the long run the impact of fdi on output is enhanced through financial development to supplement these findings we assess the causal relationships between the variables using the recent causality tests available in the literature the results indicate that economic growth causes fdi growth in the long run but no feedback relationship is observed

when transparency improves must prices reflect fundamentals better no in the presence of speculative opportunities investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders we show that this learning exhibits complementarity learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other as a result regulatory changes may be counterproductive first increasing transparency i e making fundamental information cheaper to acquire can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others second public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals while encouraging information acquisition about others accordingly disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness received april 20 2016 editorial decision september 30 2017 by editor itay goldstein

banking for the poor evidence from india state led credit and savings programs have been implemented in numerous low income countries but their success in reaching the poor remains widely debated we report on research which exploits the policy features of the indian social banking program to provide evidence on this issue state led branch expansion into rural unbanked locations reduced poverty across indian states in addition the enforcement of directed bank lending requirements was associated with increased bank borrowing among the poor in particular low caste and tribal groups

explaining presidential priorities the competing aspiration levels model of macrobudgetary decision making this article develops a new statistical model of trade offs among defense nondefense and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process the competing aspiration levels model calm builds on crecine s 1971 great identity argument unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting calm explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense nondefense and totalfederal expenditures calm models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the calm formulation substantively the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level and that when a potential fiscal surplus has existed the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector in keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure budgetary base for both the defense and nondefense sectors both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists the analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as congress

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

intervention analysis of electoral tax cycle the case of japan this paper analyzed the impact of elections on tax policy in japan using an arima autoregressive integrated moving average intervention analysis from 1953 through 1992 we used discretionary tax revenues which means the changes in tax receipts attributable to changes in the tax code rather than automatic tax revenues due to business cycles in the economy

thinking inside the box a closer look at financial inclusion and household income using national representative household finance survey data covering more than 6200 chinese households we first construct a new multidimensional indicator for financial inclusion then we examine the effect of financial inclusion on household income our results elicit several findings first financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on household income this effect can be found across all households with different levels of income second low income households are found to benefit more from financial inclusion than high and mid level income ones we argue that in this sense financial inclusion helps reduce income inequality

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions we show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions including the first general existence result for double auctions the set of equilibria is invariant to the tie breaking rule the model incorporates multiple unit demands all standard pricing rules reserve prices entry costs and stochastic demand and supply valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed for double auctions we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade the existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous bayesian games

does microfinance reduce poverty in bangladesh new evidence from household panel data abstract the study examines whether loans from microfinance institutions mfi reduce poverty in bangladesh drawing upon the nationally representative household panel with four rounds from 1997 to 2004 the effects of general microfinance loans and loans for productive purposes on income food consumption and women s body mass index are estimated overall effects of mfi loans on income and food consumption were positive and the purpose of the loan is important in predicting which household welfare indicator is improved alternative estimation methods confirm a positive impact of mfi loans on food consumption growth which supports the poverty reducing effects of microfinance in bangladesh

getting to the top of mind how reminders increase saving we provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect these empirical results do not map neatly into existing models so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2296 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

financial markets the real economy and self fulfilling uncertainties we develop a model of informational interdependence between financial markets and the real economy linking economic uncertainty to information production and aggregate economic activities in general equilibrium the mutual learning between financial markets and the real economy creates a strategic complementarity in their information production leading to self fulfilling surges in economic uncertainties in a dynamic setting our model characterizes self fulfilling uncertainty traps with two steady state equilibria and a two stage economic crisis in transitional dynamics

counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using quantile regression we propose a method to decompose the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time in several factors contributing to those changes the method is based on the estimation of marginal wage distributions consistent with a conditional distribution estimated by quantile regression as well as with any hypothesized distribution for the covariates comparing the marginal distributions implied by different distributions for the covariates one is then able to perform counterfactual exercises the proposed methodology enables the identification of the sources of the increased wage inequality observed in most countries specifically it decomposes the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time into several factors contributing to those changes namely by discriminating between changes in the characteristics of the working population and changes in the returns to these characteristics we apply this methodology to portuguese data for the period 1986 1995 and find that the observed increase in educational levels contributed decisively towards greater wage inequality copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

taxation and political business cycles in eu economies this paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the european union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles opportunistic or partisan the empirical evidence based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period does not support this hypothesis rather it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies

the effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k double auctions abstract this paper describes how introducing statistical dependency among trader values changes the equilibrium bidding strategies in bilateral k double auctions and uses the special case of affiliation to illustrate the range of equilibrium responses to a change in the value distribution consistent with standard intuition a change from independent to strictly affiliated valuations can result in high value buyers and low value sellers bidding closer to their actual values while low value buyers and high value sellers distort their bids farther from their true values however there also exist equilibria for which either type of trader responds to a change in the distribution of values in the opposite direction whether a given trader bids more aggressively or less aggressively can also be non monotonic with respect to the trader s value

should we regulate financial information regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payoff relevant information to potential buyers sound like obvious measures to increase investor welfare but in many cases such regulations harm investors in an equilibrium model asset returns compensate investors for risk by making payoffs less uncertain disclosure reduces risk and therefore reduces return as high risk high return investments disappear investor welfare falls of course information is still valuable to each individual investor but acquiring information is like a prisoners dilemma each investor is better off with the information but collectively investors are better off if they remain uninformed the only cases in which providing information improves investors welfare are ones where there would otherwise be severe asymmetric information using a model of information markets the paper explores when such outcomes are likely to arise when we extend the model so that financial markets with information allocate the real capital stock more efficiently these conclusions do not change disclosure improves efficiency but more efficient firms do not have more risk and therefore do not offer investors higher return instead they simply command a higher price which only benefits the asset issuer since the efficiency gains are fully internalized by asset issuers who can choose to disclose without disclosure being mandatory the efficiency argument is not a logical rationale for regulation

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

elections keynes bureaucracy and class explaining u s budget deficits 1961 1978 the determination of u s federal budget deficits and surpluses during a period of keynesian fiscal activism is modeled in light of relevant social science literatures rational choice emphases upon electoral manipulation of the economy and keynesian stabilization marxian emphases upon monopolization andfiscal control of labor militancy organizational decision theory emphases upon budgeting inertia and a number of additional thrusts from other literatures are supported by time series regression analyses of 1961 1978 surpluses deficits the final model is statistically well behaved analysis of so called high employment measures of discretionary surpluses deficits supports all interpretations requiring discretionary policy making but an indication of automatic stabilization emerges as well a focus upon executive policy making roles is suggested as one means to further theoretical integration of explanations of state macroeconomic policy

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

the political policy cycle presidential effort vs presidential control after disentangling presidential budget proposals from budgetary changes attributable to fluctuations in the economy and to congressional action we find consistent evidence for a presidential macroeconomic policy cycle attuned to the elctoral cycle proposed budgets are more expansionary in election years than at other times the congress however also plays a significant role in determining fiscal outcomes its budgets are systematically related to those of the president and in general reinforce presidential efforts to respond to the electoral cycle

tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets abstract perfect competition in liquidity provision in limit order markets is characterized by a tail expectation condition glosten 1994 in this paper we model imperfect competition in schedules by infinitely many liquidity suppliers quoting on a limit order book we show that there are zero rent mixed strategy equilibria featuring finite numbers of active liquidity suppliers none of the equilibria satisfies the competitive outcome not even on average considering a sequence of equilibria with the number of active liquidity suppliers becoming large we show that the aggregate stochastic marginal price schedule converges to the deterministic competitive marginal price schedule

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

testing the satisficing version of the political business cycle 1905 1984 this paper develops a test of the satisficing version of the political business cycle previous tests have focused on maximizing models of political behavior and are not sufficiently general to test for satisficing behavior using annual u s data for the period 1905 to 1984 we find evidence supporting the satisficing version of the political business cycle model but we reject the maximizing version in accordance with the satisficing hypothesis we find that increasing inflation or unemployment and decreasing monetary base growth in the third year of a presidential term are followed typically by reversals during the election year

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

information acquisition price informativeness and welfare abstract we consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price we study the learning externalities that arise in this setting and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare when private signals are noisy so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices discouraging information gathering may be pareto improving complementarities in information acquisition can lead to multiple equilibria

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

influences on executive and congressional budgetary priorities 1955 1981 a reduced form equation system is used to analyze the influence of economic political and institutional influences on the budgetary priorities of the executive branch and congress during fiscal 1955 81 three related issues are considered the extent to which political and macroeconomic factors affect priorities the degree of interdependence among the components of the federal budget and between spending and revenues and differences between the executive branch and congress with respect to these issues both types of interdependence are present within both executive branch and congressional budgeting although this interdependence is stronger within the executive branch the influence of economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across spending categories there is no evidence of apolitical business cycle political variables exert a modest influence on the budgetary outcomes examined differences between democratic and republican budgetary policies as well as differences in the budgetary priorities of different presidential administrations are small by comparison with the differences between executive and congressional policies

financial markets with trade on risk and return in this paper i develop a model in which risk averse investors possess private information regarding both a stock s expected payoff and its risk these investors trade in the stock and a derivative whose payoff is driven by the stock s risk in equilibrium the derivative is used to speculate on the stock s risk and to hedge against adverse fluctuations in the stock s risk i analyze the derivative price and variance risk premium that arise in this equilibrium and their predictive power for stock returns finally i examine the relationship between prices and trading volume in the stock and derivative received july 31 2017 editorial decision december 3 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

trading frenzies and their impact on real investment we study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm s security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment this feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies in which speculators all wish to trade like others generating large pressure on prices coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency but speculators incentives push in the opposite direction so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable we analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise

political cycles and cyclical policies we test how government revenue and expenditure depend on ideology elections and economic activity we show how fiscal forecasts can be used to identify the determinants of government revenue and expenditure the approach is illustrated using a unique unpublished swedish data set of fiscal forecasts and forecasts of economic activity we find partisan effects but no election effects revenue and expenditure but also the fiscal surplus are lower with right wing governments fiscal policy has been countercyclical revenue varies positively with nominal earnings expenditure varies negatively with real gdp

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

the real impact of improved access to finance evidence from mexico this paper provides new evidence on the impact of access to finance on poverty it highlights an important channel through which access affects poverty the labor market the paper exploits the opening of banco azteca in mexico a unique natural experiment in which over 800 bank branches opened almost simultaneously in preexisting elektra stores importantly the bank has focused on previously underserved low income clients our key finding is a sizeable effect of access to finance on labor market activity and income levels especially among low income individuals and those located in areas with lower preexisting bank penetration

contracting to compete for flows abstract we present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital we find that they make their contracts depend on public information e g credit ratings or benchmark indices as a way to attract flows rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems as has been emphasized in the literature unfortunately asset managers competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient this inefficiency arises because contracting on public information prevents risk sharing

does financial development contribute to poverty reduction the article examines the contribution of financial development to poverty reduction in developing countries building on earlier research which has established links between financial development and economic growth and between economic growth and poverty reduction the article tests for a causal process linking financial sector growth and poverty reduction the empirical results indicate that up to a threshold level of economic development financial sector growth contributes to poverty reduction through the growth enhancing effect the impact of financial development on poverty reduction will be affected however by any change in income inequality resulting from financial development

accounting information disclosure and the cost of capital in this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital despite the forces of diversification we build a model that is consistent with the capital asset pricing model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital both directly and indirectly the direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm s assessed covariances with other firms cash flows which is nondiversifiable the indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm s real decisions which likely changes the firm s ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market we show that this effect can go in either direction but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital

good disclosure bad disclosure we study the implications of public information in a model where market prices convey information to relevant decision makers and the uctuation of market prices is driven by multiple factors disclosure has a positive direct eect of providing new information and an indirect eect of changing the price informativeness if disclosure is about a variable of which real decision makers are well informed then the indirect eect is also positive so that the direct eect is ampli ed leading to a positive overall eect on real e ciency if disclosure is about a variable that real decision markers care to learn much then the indirect eect is negative and the direct eect is attenuated moreover in markets which aggregate private information eectively the negative indirect eect can dominate so that disclosure can harm real e ciency

the congress and fiscal policy although the common belief is that the congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy the same kinds of political economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior the congress fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy as for political factors the president s lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side the electoral cycle in particular the off year congressional election year is also important inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues

the more we know about the fundamental the less we agree on the price i allow trading horizon heterogeneity across groups in a standard differential information model of a financial market this approach can explain the well established phenomenon that after a public announcement trading volume increases more private information is incorporated into prices and volatility increases in such environments public information has the important secondary role of helping agents learn about the information of other agents therefore whenever the correlation between the private information of different groups is sufficiently low a public announcement increases disagreement among short horizon traders regarding the expected selling price even as it decreases disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset additional testable implications are also suggested

information aggregation in a large multi stage market game abstract a three stage market game mechanism is devised that is simple actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy and achieves efficiency in a two divisible good pure exchange setting with potential information aggregation after an entry stage agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small randomly selected group then those offers are announced and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a shapley shubik market game for a finite and large number of players there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium conditions for uniqueness are also provided

feedback effects and asset prices feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented this finding raises a question for asset pricing how are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value which in turn affects price in this environment by buying assets that others are buying investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves hence investors have an incentive to coordinate which may generate self fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria using insights from global games we pin down investors beliefs analyze equilibrium prices and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility

wealth information acquisition and portfolio choice i solve with an approximation a grossman stiglitz economy under general preferences thus allowing for wealth effects because information generates increasing returns decreasing absolute risk aversion in conjunction with the availability of costly information is sufficient to explain why wealthier households invest a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets one no longer needs to resort to decreasing relative risk aversion an empirically questionable assumption furthermore i show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations finally i find that the availability of costly information exacerbates wealth inequalities copyright 2004 oxford university press

agricultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints the investment decisions of small scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by their financial environment binding credit market constraints and incomplete insurance can limit investment in activities with high expected profits we conducted several experiments in northern ghana in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants grants of or opportunities to purchase rainfall index insurance or a combination of the two demand for index insurance is strong and insurance leads to significantly larger agricultural investment and riskier production choices in agriculture the binding constraint to farmer investment is uninsured risk when provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they face farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms demand for insurance in subsequent years is strongly increasing with the farmer s own receipt of insurance payouts with the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer s social network and with recent poor rain in the village both investment patterns and the demand for index insurance are consistent with the presence of important basis risk associated with the index insurance imperfect trust that promised

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha