contract enforcement and trade liberalization in mexico s footwear industry abstract the wave of formal legal system reforms sweeping developing countries provides only a partial solution to the problem of enforcing agreements between firms informal institutions govern the majority of interfirm transactions economic reform also necessitates changes in these institutions this paper examines the evolution of contract enforcement in the mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were removed in the closed economy geographic agglomeration of manufacturing allowed the manufacturers trade associations to maintain information about the behavior of retailers and gave retailers strong incentives to maintain reputations by providing an alternative source for procurement trade liberalization weakened the power of manufacturers

the missing link intra country evidence on the relationship between high and uncertain inflation from high inflation countries the notion that high inflation breeds high uncertainty about future inflation is widely accepted this acceptance is based largely on a positive correlation between the mean and variability of inflation across countries 2 this positive relationship is taken as evidence that high inflation creates high uncertainty 3 recently though driffill mizon and ulph 10 have questioned the relevance of this cross country evidence for making inferences about welfare issues within countries they argue that it is the relationship between the time series mean and variance within a country that is important when considering the potential costs of inflation in this paper we examine the within country time series link between the level and uncertainty of inflation for ten countries that experienced a period of very high inflation we use data generated from regression based forecasts of inflation and historical data on actual forecasts our sample does not provide evidence of a general positive link within these countries the ten countries we study are argentina bolivia brazil chile colombia israel mexico peru turkey and uruguay in these countries the average annualized rate of inflation from the quarterly data in our sample was about 54 per year and the average sample standard deviation

offering stock options to gauge managerial talent abstract besides the commonly cited reasons for the use of stock options including motivating employees conserving cash exploiting favorable accounting and tax treatment and retaining managers we demonstrate a complementary benefit of option based compensation options also prove efficient in matching managerial pay to ability options are useful because they force a manager to put his pay on the line if a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm he must naturally also overstate the firm s worth with him at the helm as a result the firm offers a generous package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability since both the likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability only a gifted manager takes such a gamble

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

price adjustment in long term contracts the case of coal in two recent papers i examined the effects of relationship specific investment on the duration of contracts negotiated between electric utilities and coal suppliers that work demonstrated that when relationshipspecific investment is important for a cost minimizing supply relationship contracts are frequently utilized that specify ex ante the terms and conditions of trade over many future years in this article i examine the characteristics of the price adjustment provisions specified in these long term coal contracts i utilize a sample of about 250 coal contracts to analyze the structure of formal price adjustment provisions in coal contracts in order to determine the factors that affect initial negotiated contract prices and to examine actual transaction price behavior over time there has been much recent theoretical work as well as some related empirical work that has focused on the benefits of long term contracts when relationship specific investments are important 2 there has also been some theoretical work that focuses on the contractual arrangements that may be chosen to mitigate opportunism problems and guard against

price instability and inflation some tests based on rational expectations models abstract we test for a group of fourteen latin american countries the hypothesis that as inflation accelerates it also becomes more volatile our analysis uses time series data a less arbitrary measure of inflation volatility rational expectations models and seemingly unrelated regressions the empirical evidence supports the above hypothesis and strengthens the case against inflationary policies in latin america

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

efficient adaptation in long term contracts take or pay provisions for natural gas to mitigate the inflexibility of long term contracting for natural gas parties will look for terms that minimize the need for costly adjudication while maintaining incentives for appropriate adaptation the authors examine the incident of take or pay provisions in contracts between natural gas producers and pipelines from this perspective they argue that take obligations can be viewed as a mechanism for effecting appropriate incentives for contractual performance and show that efficient breach considerations define an optimal take percentage as a function of characteristics of the transaction these incentives are distorted by regulated price ceilings which cause the adoption of take obligations in excess of optimal levels the findings refute the common perception that take or pay provisions are just an artifact of wellhead price regulation and serve no useful purpose in the absence of regulation 20 references 1 figure 1 table

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

should we be worried about the green paradox announcement effects of the acid rain program this paper presents the first empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis according to which well intended but imperfectly implemented environmental policies may lead to detrimental outcomes due to supply side responses we use the introduction of the acid rain program in the u s as a case study the theory predicts that owners of coal deposits expecting future sales to decline would supply more of their resource between the announcement of the acid rain program and its implementation moreover the incentive to increase supply would be stronger for owners of high sulfur coal this would all else equal induce an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions using data on prices heat input and sulfur content of coal delivered to u s power plants we find strong evidence of a price decrease and of an increase in the sulfur premium some indication that the amount of coal used might have increased and no evidence of fuel switching towards higher sulfur coal overall our evidence suggests that while the mechanism indicated by the theory might be at work market conditions and concurrent regulation largely prevented a green paradox from arising these results have implications for the design of climate policies

mexico s experiments with bank privatization and liberalization 1991 2003 during the 1990s mexico conducted two experiments with its banking system in the first experiment 1991 96 it privatized the banks this experiment took place with weak institutions to enforce contract rights it also took place without institutions that encourage prudent behavior by bankers the result was reckless behavior by banks and a collapse of the banking system in the second experiment 1997 2003 mexico reformed many of the institutions that promoted bank monitoring and it opened up the industry to foreign investment it was less successful however in reforming the institutions that promote the enforcement of contract rights the result was that bankers behaved prudently but prudent behavior in the context of weak contract rights implies that banks are reluctant to extend credit to firms and households

the relationship between the inflation rate and its variability the issues reconsidered this paper empirically reexamines the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the inflation rate and its variability the sample consists of 66 countries for the 1955 85 sample period using pooled cross section time series data empirical tests are performed for nine different country groupings ranging from the g 7 developed countries to a group of 10 developing asian countries several important conclusions can be derived first irrespective of the variability measure employed the results indicate the presence of a significant positive relationship between the inflation rate and its variability this provides strong support to okun s hypothesis second this relationship is stronger during the flexible rather than the fixed exchange rate period third there appears to be an optimum zone of inflation rate within which the predictability of inflation is at its highest and hence uncertainty cost is at its lowest for the 1955 85 sample period this optimum zone of average inflation rate lies in th

disentangling the theories of firm boundaries a path model and empirical test theories on the motivation underlying firm boundaries have recently sparked renewed debate what best explains whether a firm relies on market control or hierarchical control to secure required resources how do the characteristics of the resources come into play in this study we consider a comprehensive path model of the governance mode decision for sourcing technological know how by integrating different perspectives on firm boundaries including transaction cost economics a resource based view and an options perspective we link characteristics of the technology i e uniqueness barriers to imitation commercial uncertainty technological dynamism to the perceived threat of opportunism the potential for sustainable advantage and the pursuit of a licensing agreement vis a vis the outright acquisition of the firm that possesses the desired know how we use structural equation modeling to analyze 127 sourcing arrangements our results show that technological dynamism and barriers to imitation indirectly influence the governance mode decision by increasing the perceived threat of opportunism commercial uncertainty directly influences the governance mode and decreases the likelihood of an acquisition vis a vis a licensing agreement although uniqueness and barriers to imitation are also positively associated with the perceived potential for sustainable advantage the potential for sustainable advantage had no direct effect on governance mode implications and suggestions for further research are offered

the effect of land tenure governance on technical efficiency evidence from three provinces in eastern china this study aims to identify the mechanisms through which land tenure governance affects the technical efficiency of grain production in an integrated framework and to examine the impacts of the public governance village self governance and relational governance of land tenure on the technical efficiency of contracted land and rented in land farm level survey data collected from liaoning jiangxi and jiangsu provinces covering the years of 2014 and 2015 is used for the empirical analysis the findings indicate that i public governance associated with land certification significantly increases the technical efficiency of grain production ii village self governance and administrative land reallocations can serve as substitutes for the land rental market in optimizing the distribution of land resources and improving technical efficiency and iii compared to multi year transfer contracts both annual and open ended transfer contracts have negative impacts on technical efficiency

non contractible investments and vertical integration in the mexican footwear industry abstract this paper examines patterns of integration among manufacturers and retailers using data from a survey of footwear manufacturers in mexico the property rights framework developed in papers by grossman and hart 1986 j polit econ 94 691 and hart and moore 1990 j polit econ 98 1119 is differentiated from the standard empirical transactions cost framework in the context of this industry the most relevant distinction between the two frameworks is that the property rights framework addresses both the benefits and costs of integration while the transactions cost framework focuses only on variation in the benefits of integration we show that the costs of integration are highest where the retailer s non contractible investment has an important effect on the overall profits from the relationship consistent with the property rights framework the data suggest that integration is less likely in these circumstances

distance constraints the limits of foreign lending in poor economies how far does mobility of multinational banks solve problems of financial development using a panel of 80 000 loans over 7 years i show that greater cultural and geographical distance between a foreign bank s headquarters and local branches leads it to further avoid lending to informationally difficult yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contracting greater distance also makes them less likely to bilaterally renegotiate and less successful at recovering defaults differences in bank size legal institutions risk preferences or unobserved borrower heterogeneity cannot explain these results these distance constraints can be large enough to permanently exclude certain sectors of the economy from financing by foreign banks

bank privatization in sub saharan africa the case of uganda commercial bank previous empirical analyses have found that bank privatizations are more successful when the government fully relinquishes control when the bank is privatized to a strategic investor and when foreign owned banks are allowed to participate in the bidding the privatization of uganda commercial bank ucb to the south african bank stanbic met all these criteria suggesting that it is a likely candidate for success but other features suggest reasons for caution ucb dominated the ugandan banking sector prior to privatization and the institutional environment in uganda was less favorable than in many of the middle income countries looked at in earlier empirical studies despite these concerns the privatization appears to have been relatively successful the portfolio of the privatized bank which was cleaned prior to sale remains relatively strong and profitability and credit growth are now on par with other ugandan banks though market segmentation remains a concern since stanbic faces little or no direct competition in many remote areas some early results suggest that access to credit has improved for some hard to serve groups

the level and uncertainty of inflation results from oecd forecasts bryce e kanago there is considerable evidence that inflation variability and the level of inflation are positively related across countries evidence of a within county relation is mixed evidence for a significant positive relation comes mostly from studies using some survey measure contrary evidence comes mostly from studies using regression errors our measure of uncertainty is the squared forecast error from organization for economic cooperation and development inflation forecasts most countries do not exhibit a positive and significant relation the greatest number of positive coefficients is for relative uncertainty regressed on contemporaneous inflation jel e310 e370 1342 1340 1323 i introduction although empirical studies have not reached a unanimous conclusion most economists believe one detriment of high inflation is the greater uncertainty it generates about future inflation affirmative evidence of a positive relation between inflation and uncertainty is most frequently found in cross country studies that regress some measure of variability or uncertainty for each country on their average inflation rate time series regressions for individual countries provide mixed results those time series studies that derive inflation uncertainty from a survey of forecasters conclude that higher inflation causes greater uncertainty time series studies that derive uncertainty from ex post regressions constructed by researchers provide most of the negative evidence 1 it is tempting to dismiss this negative evidence as the consequence of poorly or opportunistically constructed ex post forecasts in this paper we use annual inflation forecasts for organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries that have been published in the oecd s economic outlook for about 30 years these data circumvent the problems of constructing forecasts after the fact for each date and each country a single forecast is provided by contrast survey data such as the livingston data average the forecasts of a number of respondents to the extent that the survey sample is representative of the population the surveys may provide a better approximation to the public s expectations however survey respondents have nothing to lose if their forecasts are wildly inaccurate whereas professional forecasters put their reputation on the line a distinct advantage of the published forecasts is that the oecd provides forecasts for 24 countries whereas surveys are available for only a few countries of course ex post forecasts could be constructed for the same set of countries while these ex post forecasts could utilize modern econometrics techniques such as autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity arch and time varying parameters they cannot replicate the specialized human capital the judgment or the particular perspective of the times that were used to construct ex ante forecasts davis and kanago 1998 regressed the squared error from ex ante inflation forecasts produced and published by business international on inflation and found no significant relation for most countries this result makes it less tempting to dismiss the time series evidence of ex post inflation forecasts we extend the results of davis and kanago 1998 by computing the same regression but using squared errors from ex ante forecasts made by the oecd and published in economic outlook the 24 countries in the oecd data include canada iceland luxembourg new zealand the united states and turkey that are not included in the business international data for some countries the oecd data includes a few more years than the business international data the results from the oecd and business international data are broadly similar few countries show a significant relation between inflation and uncertainty we further test the robustness of these results by using relative uncertainty as the dependent variable

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

transaction cost economics past present and future oliver williamson is the founder and chief developer of transaction cost economics tce in this brief essay on the occasion of his nobel memorial prize i offer a partial discussion of williamson s contributions by first summarizing some of the accomplishments of tce past and then sketching some of the opportunities for tce future most of the topics in both sections tce past and tce future start with a quotation from williamson s early work that i think still speaks volumes today that is while fellow travelers and successors have acted on one set of williamson s insights helping to produce the accomplishments of tce past another collection of williamson s insights has gone relatively unremarked creating some of the opportunities for tce future

monetary co operation and economic growth in africa comparative evidence from the cfa zone countries this article compares economic growth performance of ten african countries all members of the cfa monetary zone with that of 23 non zone sub saharan african ssa countries our descriptive results suggest that overall african economies have experienced similar growth trends which are higher in the 1970s than the 1980s however contrary to previous studies disaggregated comparison of the cfa with the ssa indicate that no significant growth differences exist between these economies moreover our empirical findings suggest that monetary expansion and capital formation have positive impacts on output growth whereas inflation and government spending show negative effects in sum although participating in a monetary union has not necessarily resulted in faster output growth it has enabled the cfa countries to better control price fluctuations and monetary expansion

supplier performance in vertical alliances the effects of self enforcing agreements and enforceable contracts the paper examines the significance of enforceability and adaptability in governing vertical alliances and their performance ramifications for suppliers literature on supplier relations suggests that suppliers are skeptical of close ties with their buyers helper 1991 helper and sako 1995 such skepticism persists in spite of the fact that buyers are writing longer enforceable contracts with fewer suppliers in this context the paper develops a transaction cost economics tce based model that distinguishes between the verifiable and nonverifiable aspects of governance attributes of safeguards incentive intensity and adaptability in explaining supplier performance variations the paper argues that the following factors prove valuable for suppliers 1 the adaptive and collaborative orientation fostered by the original equipment manufacturer s oem s credible commitment to the exchange and by information sharing on the part of the supplier 2 the presence of certain nonverifiable safeguards and 3 the incentives inherent in target pricing these assertions have been tested using data from the home appliance industry results indicate that information sharing together with 1 oem dependence and 2 target pricing does indeed enhance supplier performance also results suggest that while nonverifiable safeguards can help verifiable safeguards do not have a positive association with supplier interests under certain conditions then suppliers can venture into closer relationships with buyers and benefit

an empirical investigation of oliver williamson s organization of work oliver williamson argues that the attributes of the employment contract like intermediate transactions in general are essentially driven by the specificity of assets in the case of the organization of work it is the particular attributes of labour that determines the transaction costs of any given governance structure the paper presents a stylized account of the transaction cost model of the efficient organization of work stressing an underlying tension and ambiguity in the transaction cost framework the paper exploits a unique dataset to test for the first time with british data williamson s transaction cost predictions concerning the nature of employment contracts williamson tacitly assumes that asset specificity is exogenous in general however there is evidence in the literature that labour specificity is endogenous to employment contracts the paper endeavours to demonstrate that there is empirical evidence to suggest that specialized labour is indeed endogenous in the transaction cost mode

the relationship between the rate of inflation and its unpredictability in high inflation latin american countries pourgerami and maskus pm 1987 find three difficulties in our analysis of the relationship between the rate of inflation p and its unpredictability pf in latin american countries the first of these is a point very well taken namely that the positive relationship we hypothesized might well be offset by a negative one arising because higher rates of inflation could be expected to induce the relevant economic agents to invest more in generating the relevant information in utilizing it efficiently and in developing the instruments capable of hedging against inflation however since any such adjustments would be institutional in nature and take time to be carried out it is obvious that this consideratipn would not be relevant for short run analysis involving year to year or especially quarter to quarter changes in inflation rates as in our analysis the other difficulties namely that quarterly observations are more relevant than annual ones in testing such relationships and that rational expectations re models of the type employed by pm are preferable to adaptive expectations models of the type we used are criticisms more relevant to the short run relation between inflation and its predictability but as we shall presently demonstrate are not persuasive nevertheless since the results presented by pm as they have noted show the relationship between pi and p to be considerably weaker than was indicated in earlier results including our own the substantial difference in results deserves explanation since their time coverage frequent of adjustment of expectations model of esprct ltions and to some extent countr coverage were all different than ours it is not possible to learn from their results the reason for the difference by employing the same time and country coverage as in pm and also an estimation procedure hildreth lu which corrects for autocorrelation and continuing to use a modified version of our adaptive expectations model mae but varying the duration of the periods the results presented in table 1 shed light on the source of the difference as can be seen the use of quarterly instead of annual data does not have a large effect on the results thereby suggesting that pm s use of quarterly data is not the source of their weaker results indeed note that in six of the seven high inflation countries the slope coefficient is larger and more significant when quarterly data are employed than when annual data are employed the largest differences are between the results obtained from our own mae model estimated with quarterly data and those obtained by pm with their re model with the same data in all seven cases the pm estimate of is significantly lower than our own corresponding estimate which estimate is more reliable even if one were to agree in principle with pm that re models are superior to ae models of price expectations the particular re model employed by pm can hardly be considered acceptable let alone superior to our mae model with their 20 right hand side variables i e four lags of each of five different explanatory variables relative to our four right hand side variables it is not surprising that pm havq been able to increase the explained variation of p correspondingly reduc

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

evolution of the u s natural gas industry in response to changes in transaction costs the u s natural gas industry traditionally had producers interstate pipelines and distributors linked together via bilateral long term contracts recently the federal energy regulatory commission has encouraged buyers and sellers to deal directly with each other leading first to a spot market and marketers then to market hubs and a slight trend back to longer term contracts marketers and pipelines have consolidated to take advantage of economies of scope and systems effects which larger networks provide we use transaction cost economics to explain the evolution of exchange relationships with open access to transportation and the unbundling of transportation and storage from sales

how to deliver foreign aid the case of projects governed by the spanish international agency summary international agencies use two alternative modes of governance to deliver international aid projects under bilateral agreements with recipient governments in house or through incumbent ngos through the lenses of institutional and transaction cost economics this article examines 95 international aid projects delivered in morocco and ecuador by the spanish international agency finding that those projects delivered in house present different features than those projects outsourced through incumbent ngos specifically international aid projects delivered in house involve important investments in specific assets are much more complex and can turn the public agency into a hostage of its own disbursement

lessons from privatization in britain abstract the process of privatizing most of britain s major public enterprises yields interesting conclusions on the three related issues 1 a problem of policy assignment arose in the use of privatization and liberalization to achieve both allocative and productive efficiency 2 evidence on the behavior of the public enterprises is consistent with an organizational model of the relevant principal agent relationships predicting certain types of slack absorption 3 the privatization process entailed policy choices that bear on their future productive efficiency effectiveness of monitoring by the market for corporate control and allocative efficiency provision for regulation

sorting effects of performance pay compensation not only provides incentives to an existing manager but also affects the type of manager attracted to the firm this paper examines the dual incentive and sorting effects of performance pay in a simple contracting model of endogenous participation unless the manager is highly risk averse sorting dampens optimal pay performance sensitivity pps because pps beyond a nominal amount transfers unnecessary information rent to the manager this helps explain why empirical estimates of pps are much lower than predictions from models of moral hazard alone the model also predicts that sorting under asymmetric information causes the firm to turn away more candidates than would be efficient pps increases in the cost of hiring the manager and in the manager s outside option but decreases in output risk information risk and managerial risk aversion and the firm becomes more selective in hiring as either the manager s outside option the cost of hiring risk aversion output risk or information risk increases this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

financial access and exclusion in kenya and uganda abstract policy emphasis has recently shifted to finance for all given evidence that financial sector development contributes to growth but effects on poverty do not arise from pro poor provision we argue that given this policy goal analyses of barriers to access must be country specific and go beyond the emphasis on transactions costs to incorporate the effects of social institutions since these contribute to discrimination this paper uses data from financial access surveys carried out in 2006 in kenya and uganda to investigate the socio economic demographic and geographical factors influencing access to and exclusion from formal semi formal and informal financial services

instabilities of strategic alliances an internal tensions perspective the instabilities of strategic alliances have been examined in the literature through a number of theoretical approaches alliance instabilities refer to major changes or dissolutions of alliances that are unplanned from the perspective of one or more partners although the literature identifies certain characteristics of strategic alliances that may lead to their unplanned dissolution the extent of our understanding of this subject appears to be fragmented and incomplete in this article we propose a comprehensive framework for adequately understanding alliance instabilities based on the notion of internal tensions we suggest that strategic alliances are sites in which conflicting forces develop and which can be viewed as being constituted by three key pairs of competing forces namely cooperation versus competition rigidity versus flexibility and short term versus long term orientation this tensions framework helps us in explaining the intrinsic vulnerability of alliances in terms of a wide range of internal contradictions and enables us to examine in an integrated manner the incidence dynamics and eventual dissipation of the inherent instabilities we discuss the interrelationships among the different internal tensions and their impacts on different types of strategic alliances we also examine the termination of alliances through mergers acquisitions and dissolution finally we suggest ways to empirically test the various ideas and propositions developed here and indicate directions for further research

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

the market for tradable renewable energy credits abstract as states seek to foster the development of renewable energy resources some have introduced renewable portfolio standards rpss which require retailers of electricity to derive a specified amount of their energy supply from renewable energy resources rpss in texas arizona wisconsin and nevada allow for or require the use of tradable renewable energy credits the price of such credits is expected to reflect the cost premium for generating electricity from renewable resources relative to the market price of conventionally generated electricity using the market to trade renewable energy credits exposes buyers and sellers to risks of imperfect information poor performance and opportunism these risks can be managed through contractual arrangements and regulatory requirements pertaining to property rights in credits pricing term of the contract and assurance of performance

bank privatization and performance empirical evidence from nigeria the authors assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of nigerian banks for the period 1990 2001 they find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation their results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many nigerian banks the authors results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non lending activities enjoyed a relatively higher performance

privatization matters bank efficiency in transition countries abstract to investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries we take the largest banks in six relatively advanced countries namely bulgaria the czech republic croatia hungary poland and romania income and balance sheet characteristics and efficiency measures computed from stochastic frontiers are compared across four bank ownership types our empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign owned banks are most efficient and government owned banks are least efficient in addition the importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is confirmed however counter to the conjecture that foreign banks cherry pick the most profitable opportunities we find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee for service business finally we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to performance specifically voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early privatized banks are more efficient than later privatized banks even though we find no evidence of a selection effect

a transaction costs analysis of innovations in the organization of pharmaceutical r d abstract this paper uses transaction costs economics to analyze the increasing importance of vertical disintegration of r d by large pharmaceutical and chemical firms first it discusses three characteristics of the research based pharmaceutical industry then it shows that market failures related to long term joint venture r d contracts between firms and university laboratories are less significant than appears at first and may account for their striking increase over the past fifteen years

effects of exchange rate variability on inflation variability abstract previous studies have postulated that there exists a positive relationship between the rate of inflation and its variability they have shown that a high inflation rate contributes to inflation variability in this paper we argue that with the current floating exchange rate system exchange rate variability is another factor contributing to inflation variability after incorporating a measure of exchange rate variability into a simple model used by previous authors we estimate our model using cross country data from 20 developed and 76 less developed countries the cross sectional regression results support our conjecture

inflation and its unpredictability theory and empirical evidence the effect of inflation on its unpredictability is theoretically ambiguous arthur m okun 1971 and milton friedman 1977 suggest that the effect is positive however a negative effect may exist if higher inflation induces the relevant economic agents to invest more in generating accurate predictions this paper provides a theoretical model to analyze these opposing arguments and specifies the conditions under which a positive effect exists new survey data regarding inflationary expectations in israel are used to empirically examine the model the data which allow single hypothesis testing of the relationship reveal a positive effect only in periods of high inflation indicating a possible threshold effect copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

mitigating contractual hazards unilateral options and contract length in this article we consider the ways in which the desire for efficient low cost adaptation to change influences the tradeoff between the design and duration of long term contractual relationships we examine the distortions in contract terms occasioned by nonprice competition for natural gas in the presence of wellhead price regulation deviations from optimal contract incentives significantly raise the cost of being bound to long term agreements and shorten the duration of contracts the approach we adopt suggests a method for empirically assessing the efficiency of alternative contracting practices and legal standards

buyer investment export variety and intrafirm trade abstract this paper studies a model of buyer investment and its effect on the variety and vertical structure of international trade a distinction is made between two types of buyer investment flexible and specific which differ in the ability of a buyer to match with a seller the interaction of buyer investment with the entry and pricing incentives of suppliers are analyzed it is shown that i there can be multiple equilibria in the variety of products traded and ii less product variety is associated with more intrafirm trade the possibility of multiple equilibria is consistent with the observation that some similar economies such as taiwan and south korea differ substantially in their export varieties to the u s a cross country empirical analysis confirms the negative correlation between export variety and intrafirm trade

historical financing of small and medium size enterprises we focus on the economies of the north atlantic core during the 19th and early 20th centuries and find that an impressive variety of local financial institutions emerged to supply the needs of smes wherever there was sufficient demand for their services although these intermediaries had significant weaknesses they were able to tap into local information networks and so extend credit to firms that were too young or small to secure funds from large regional or national institutions in addition by raising the return to savings for local households they helped to mobilize significant new resources for economic development

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

oligopsony power asset specificity and hold up evidence from the broiler industry in this article we look for empirical evidence of hold up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross sectional national survey of broiler growers first we focus on the problem of under investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent s grower s under investment systematically depends on the principal s integrator s market power and the level of asset specificity second we provide an indirect test of hold up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal s market power the results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold up

playing for keeps pay and performance in the nba i introduction a basic insight of agency theory is that properly designed incentive contracts can align the interests of agents with those of the principal and recent empirical work shows that workers do indeed respond to financial incentives 1 contractual incentives however are not the only force motivating workers workers also have incentives to vary effort at different points of their contract cycle to increase effort just before a new contract is signed to lock in a more lucrative deal and then reduce it after a multi year contract is secured these types of contract related incentives create clear moral hazard problems but have received little empirical attention the motivating hypothesis in this paper is that imperfect information and multi year contracts create an implicit incentive for workers to strategically alter effort over the contract cycle in the year prior to signing the contract their contract year workers may exert above average effort to convince employers that they are high quality and thus raise long term compensation once the contract is signed however workers may exert less effort because wages are effectively independent of contemporaneous performance an empirical difficulty is that this moral hazard may be obscured by two factors a selection effect may lead only high quality workers to receive contracts and career concerns may provide additional incentives and dampen the post contract decline 2 this paper employs a unique dataset for professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba from 1988 to 2002 to examine the contract related incentive effects the data include contract information year signed length of contract and value of contract for every active player in 2000 and performance measures points scored rebounds assists etc throughout each player s career contract related incentive effects are estimated from changes in individual performance over the contract cycle if performance systematically improves just before signing a new contract and falls afterward some of the fluctuation is likely due to contract related incentives i also examine the traditional link between pay and past performance which is necessary for these types of incentives to be relevant the critical advantage of this data is the detailed information on individual performance individual contract status and individual pay 3 in contrast previous work on individual incentives for example lazear 2000 paarsch and shearer 2000 and shearer 2004 studied changes infirmwide compensation plans while the empirical literature on executive pay and performance for example murphy 1985 1986 jensen and murphy 1990 gibbons and murphy 1992 kaplan 1994 and hall and liebman 1998 typically examined the link between individual pay and firm performance the individual level data constructed here have the critical variation across individuals which is needed to identify the impact of these contract related incentive effects the empirical work begins with a test of the link between pay and performance which is necessary for contract related incentives to be operational not surprisingly better performers in the nba are rewarded with higher salaries and longer contracts more relevant to the incentive issue players are strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year a one point increase in a player s scoring average for example is associated with an annual salary increase of over 300 000 this link provides the crucial motivation for the hypothesis that players will exert additional effort in their contract year to lock in the better contracts that they expect to follow the data then provide strong evidence of contract related incentive effects as overall performance does in fact improve relative to a player s long run average in the contract year and then declines after a long run contract is signed

an econometric analysis of telecom competition privatization and regulation in africa and latin america this paper explores the effects of privatization competition and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 african and latin american countries from 1984 through 1997 fixed effects regressions reveal that competition measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines payphones and connection capacity and with decreases in the price of local calls privatization combined with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecom performance measures privatization alone however is associated with few benefits and is negatively correlated with connection capacity

why are interest spreads so high in uganda using international comparisons and a unique bank level dataset on the ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005 we explore the factors behind consistently high interest rate spreads and margins international comparisons show that the small size of ugandan banks persistently high t bill rates and institutional deficiencies explain large proportions of the high ugandan interest rate margins the ugandan bank panel confirms the importance of macroeconomic factors such as high inflation high t bill rates and exchange rate appreciation there is also evidence for the small market place and high costs of doing business explaining persistently high spreads and margins smaller banks and banks targeting the low end of the market incur higher costs and therefore higher margins spreads and margins also vary significantly with the sectoral loan portfolio composition of banks while there is little evidence for foreign bank entry privatization or changes in market structure explaining variation in spreads or margins over time

on the observational equivalence of managerial contracts under conditions of moral hazard and self selection managerial contracts often tie compensation to the performance of the firm two models of contracting under asymmetric information moral hazard and self selection are used to explain this phenomenon an important direction for research in this area will be to use data on managerial contracts to sharpen our understanding of the settings in which a given informational problem is most important the purpose of this paper is to ask whether this is possible using static models of contracting under asymmetric information to address this question we compare the standard principal agent model presented by grossman and hart 1983 with a plausible self selection model where the firm only wants to hire a manager with a particular level of productivity we call this self selection model a talent search

the seeds of dissolution discrepancy and incoherence in buyer supplier exchange in this research we examine a novel mechanism of interorganizational relationship dissolution incoherence in a partner s behavior we propose that the discrepancy between an exchange partner s opportunistic behavior and the focal firm s expectations may create a state of incoherence and uncertainty and that this effect can be damaging to the exchange even when the partner s behavior is better than expected using nearly 500 longitudinal confidential reports of industrial buyers and sellers we find supportive evidence that 1 the net effect of the discrepancy is initially positive when behavior is better than expected but becomes rapidly negative thereafter and 2 the net effect of the discrepancy is always negative when behavior is worse than expected thus these effects will generally damage the exchange even as the partner tries to improve the relationship this gives insight into why exchange relationships that hit a downward spiral can be difficult if not impossible to salvage we also show that the dysfunctional consequences of discrepancy are mitigated through exchange structures such as the magnitude of dependence on an organizational partner the development phase of the relationship and the presence of bilateral idiosyncratic investments implications for theory and the management of interorganizational relationships are developed

moral hazard and adverse selection the question of financial structure this paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed but competitive financial market the adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur s ability to transform effort into value moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing we consider the joint use of both debt and equity and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes it is shown that 1 investment and financing are not separable 2 there is an underinvestment problem for better firms and 3 simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty we also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation agency problems in corporate finance originated with the influential papers of jensen and meckling 11 myers 17 ross 21 and leland pyle 14 they show that the market imperfections induced by unobservable actions lack of contracting ability and information asymmetry generally lead to second best outcomes in which the distribution of corporate ownership is achieved only at significant cost these costs take the form of excessive perquisite consumption overinvestment underinvestment and incomplete diversification of personal investment portfolios moral hazard and adverse selection comprise two forms in which agency problems may take shape arrow 1 equates these two terms with hidden action and hidden information respectively moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to the principal adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the principal the resolution of such difficulties has been explored in a number of contexts with both signals and contingent contracting mechanisms these definitions exclude certain agency problems in the delegation literature for which the preference incongruity results from a lack of precommitment rather than some exogenous feature of the model in corporate finance one would thus identify the jensen meckling paper with moral hazard because perquisites enter the insider s objective differently from outsiders while darrough is from columbia university and stoughton is from the university of california irvine the second author s research was partially supported by grant number 410 83 0786 r 1 from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada this paper was presented at the 1984 meetings of the western finance association in vancouver and at the 1985 european finance association meetings in bern we thank kose john and frans tempelaar for their comments at the meetings

choice of contracts in the british national health service an empirical study following major reforms of the british national health service nhs in 1990 the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts using a mixed multinomial logit analysis we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model based on contract theory in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form the paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform

corporate environmentalism and environmental statutory permitting abstract studies have shown that despite infrequent inspections and low penalties for statutory violations a large fraction of firms comply with environmental restrictions what then motivates compliance i investigate this question by focusing on the length of time it takes environmental agencies to process and issue new source construction permits pursuant to clean air act regulations and new industrial discharge permits pursuant to clean water act regulations i find that plants or firms with fewer instances of noncompliance receive permits for major projects more quickly in addition i find that permit delays are sensitive to economic conditions as well such as local area unemployment as far as voluntary pollution control behavior is concerned i find that regulators that issue permits for plant modifications focus primarily on statutory compliance but when permitting new plant construction where there is no plant compliance history to go on voluntary pollutant releases do matter

natural gas contracts in an emerging competitive market natural gas is being viewed by many as the fuel of the 1990s and beyond because of its environmental qualities relatively low cost and significant domestic resource base however in the fall of 1991 a group of electric utility executives met with then deputy secretary of energy henson moore and asserted that an inability to obtain long term gas contracts meant that supplies are unreliable and construction of gas fueled generating stations is being discouraged this study was requested by the deputy secretary to address the issues surrounding long term gas contracts and supply reliability the relationship between supply reliability and contracts is explained in terms of the number of buyers and sellers in a market with the appropriate state regulatory policies utilities can contract for gas and obtain reliable supplies at competitive market prices public utility commissioners are encouraged to permit utilities a free choice in signing gas contracts but to allow only competitive market prices to be reflected in allowable fuel costs

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

implementing supplier codes of conduct in global supply chains process explanations from theoretic and empirical perspectives western buying companies impose supplier codes of conduct scc on their suppliers in developing countries however many suppliers cannot fully comply with scc and some of them even cheat in scc in this research we link contract characteristics price pressure production complexity contract duration to the likelihood of supplier s commitment to scc through a mediating process how the buying companies govern their suppliers our structural equation model analysis shows that the hierarchy relational norms governance is a perfect mediator of contract characteristics effects on the likelihood of supplier s commitment the market governance an insignificant one the managerial implications are provided for successfully implementing scc in global supply chains

managerial expertise private information and pay performance sensitivity this paper characterizes optimal pay performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities the model presumes that the rate at which a manager s opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise i e whether it is general or firm specific the analysis demonstrates that when managerial expertise is largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity is lower higher than its optimal value in a benchmark setting of symmetric information furthermore when managerial skills are largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity decreases increases as managerial skills become a more important determinant of firm performance unlike the standard agency theoretic prediction of a negative trade off between risk and pay performance sensitivity this paper identifies plausible circumstances under which risk and incentives are positively associated in addition to providing an explanation for why empirical tests of risk incentive relationships have produced mixed results the analysis generates insights that can be useful in guiding future empirical research

the impact of the strategic sale of restructured banks evidence from indonesia summary we examine the effect of strategic sale which is the sale of banks to strategic foreign investors on bank performance the government of indonesia implemented such a policy as part of a bank restructuring in the aftermath of the 1998 banking crisis using difference in differences models we find that strategic sale leads to a 12 15 cost reduction these results are robust to the use of other estimators such as difference in differences matching estimators and stochastic frontier analysis to that of other performance measures such as return on assets and net interest margin and to that of different sample types these results suggest that strategic sale could play an important role in restructuring troubled banks in developing countries

price instability and inflation the latin american case abstract this paper provides empirical evidence substantiating the existence of an over time relationship between inflation and price variability for 23 latin american countries by employing a novel measure of price instability based on price expectations

licensing duration in foreign markets a real options perspective licensing can be considered an initial trial of a foreign market before a firm fully commits to it through other investment modes the length of trial has great importance because licensing duration represents part of the licensing agreement when it is too short the firm may not acquire the necessary experience and knowledge of the foreign market but if it is too long the firm misses optimal expansion timing arguing that licensing can be considered as a european style real option with a fixed holding period we develop and test a model of the determinants of licensing duration in foreign markets empirical results based on a sample of firms in various countries show that uncertainty and threat of competitive pre emption in the foreign market are related to shorter duration of the technology licensing agreements we also find that irreversibility of the impending investment moderates the relationships between uncertainty and duration specifically market and technology uncertainties in the foreign market induce shorter contracts under low levels of irreversibility

the effects of inflation on the predictability of price changes in latin america some estimates and policy implications abstract this paper argues that the relationship between price variability and inflation in high inflation countries should be estimated on a frequent basis and that rational expectations are the appropriate formulation for predicting inflation analysis of seven latin american countries taking these factors into account suggests that higher inflation contributes to the difficulty of predicting price changes the impact is more moderate than that found in previous studies however indicating that less concern may be warranted about the possible stagflationary effects of expansionary policies

complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions an empirical study of it services contracts an increasing volume of business activity appears to be occurring via alliances or other interfirm arrangements in which complex contracts are featured yet there has been relatively little study of contract design in the strategy or management literatures the economics literature on contracting has been extensive but it has been less concerned with learning and evolution phenomena in which strategy and organization scholars are deeply interested in this paper we investigate the relationship between two types of contractual provisions that are important in high technology contracts or contracts for which environmental uncertainty or technological complexity are significant namely contingency planning and task description previous research suggests that contracts can vary significantly in the degree of detail with which such key provisions are written and that they are each subject to learning in this paper we find evidence from a sample of 386 contracts that contingency planning and task description behave as complements in contractual design we argue that this complementarity reflects patterns of learning to contract we also find that repeated exchange between two firms leads to greater effort at contingency planning in subsequent contracts a finding that is also consistent with learning effects but not with frequently made claims that contracts and trust are substitutes

why are different services outsourced to different countries the tradability revolution in services has led to a dramatic expansion of offshore outsourcing of services allowing firms to take advantage of lower production costs in foreign countries however production costs alone cannot explain the location determinants of offshore outsourcing of services in this paper we argue that minimizing transaction costs is also an important determinant of the location of offshore outsourcing of services we empirically analyze characteristics of services and characteristics of foreign countries that may impact on transaction costs in an outsourcing relationship and hence determine where services will be outsourced offshore we derive measures of service characteristics routineness complexity and interactiveness based on the tasks required to provide them further we posit that there are interaction effects between service and country characteristics using bureau of economic analysis data on us service outsourcing across 11 types of services to 31 countries between 1992 and 2005 we find that 1 services that are more routine less complex or less interactive are outsourced more to foreign countries 2 services are outsourced more to countries with higher institutional quality and greater cultural proximity 3 non routine complex and interactive services are outsourced relatively more to countries with a better institutional quality