daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies the paper presents an analysis of the coexistence of daily wage and piece rate contracts in agrarian economies we show that when individual effort is taken into account daily wage labourers typically form a convex set in the space of working ability the most able and the least able labourers work on piece rates as they can thus choose their own level of effort we also prove that on a monopsonistic labour market the use of both contracts in equilibrium results from the profitability of market segmentation imperfect substitutability between workers under different contracts and the downward rigidity of daily wages can also explain the coexistence of the two types of contracts in more general settings e g perfect competition q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

international business alliance under asymmetric information technology vis a vis information advantage author affiliation chifeng dai daic siu edusajal lahiri lahiri siu edu corresponding author acknowledgment we are grateful to two anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments and suggestions 1 introductioninternational inter firm business cooperation as a means to reach a foreign marketplace has been rapidly increasing in popularity and has been growing hand in hand with the overall process of globalization business collaborations in general take different forms licensing franchising and joint venture jv are two important forms of this collaboration the exact nature of the contract between firms can also take different forms involving one or more of the following up front licensing fees equity investments annual maintenance fees milestone payments and royalties 1 for example under the jv agreement between generex biotechnology canada and sejong capital korea sejong agrees to invest 25 million in the jv as a non refundable license fee paid to generex and to purchase 5 million of generex s equity under the jv agreement between cambridge biostability united kingdom and panacea biotec india panacea purchased 1 935 million of cambridge s equity up front and signed a long term licensing agreement that provides gross royalty income to cambridge over the agreement period 2apart from the contractual arrangements another important issue in international business cooperation is the question of transfer or adaptation of technology for the international alliance ia and this has received a lot of attention in the literature see for example katz rebentisch and allen 1996 it is generally agreed that the technology adaptation issue is a rather complicated engineering and economic issue and often requires significant efforts there are four broad research questions here first why do firms from developing and industrialized countries form an alliance miller et al 1997 studied 76 ias in six developing countries they found that more than 65 of the foreign companies chose domestic partners because of their knowledge of local politics government regulations local custom and local markets and more than 70 of the domestic firms in developing countries sought collaboration with multinationals based on their superior technology the second question involves why ias have diverse contractual arrangements the third question involves how each firm s advantage and disadvantage in technology and market information affect their profits in ias do firms in the alliance always prefer more market information and better technology the final question has to do with whether technology spillover hinders the formation of an ia 3in order to answer some of the research questions outlined above we consider a simple model consisting of two firms a multinational corporation mnc and a domestic firm the firms operate under uncertain market demand the mnc possesses a production technology that is superior to that of the domestic firm however the domestic firm has an information advantage in the sense that with costly and non contractable efforts it can predict demand conditions with some probability we start with the case in which the credit market is perfect and the technology adaptation in the ia is exogenous and costless we show that in the ia the mnc optimally charges the domestic firm a lump sum payment but offers it the entire profits of the ia under the contractual arrangement market uncertainty and the domestic firm s ability to gather information increase the domestic firm s profits but not the mnc s profits in ia however the mnc prefers duopoly competition to ia if the technology adaptation is imperfect and the domestic firm s production technology is exceedingly inferior we then deviate from the benchmark case in two different directions but one at a time

facilitating fit revelation in the competitive market this study examines firms strategic decisions in the competitive market regarding whether to engage in marketing activities to assist consumers in finding the fit between their personal tastes and products horizontal attributes we find that competitive firms strategies to facilitate fit revelation critically depend on the product qualities they offer in particular a firm offering a high quality product is more likely to facilitate fit revelation in the competitive market than it would as a market monopolist whereas a firm offering a low quality product is less likely to do so in addition the firm offering the high quality product implements fit revealing activities in a greater intensity than its rival that offers the low quality product if the quality difference between the two products is small and both products qualities are sufficiently high

private information and intertemporal job assignments this paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information the combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long term assignments more generally however rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents which mitigates incentive constraints with complete contracts that communicate interim states rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better targeted incentives furthermore it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal properties of the production technology are also shown to matter substitutability of intertemporal effort is a force for long term assignments while coordination with nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation copyright 2006 wiley blackwell

information and subsidies complements or substitutes abstract does providing information about a product influence the impact of price subsidies on purchases this question is particularly relevant for health products in developing countries where both informational campaigns and price subsidies are common policy instruments we conduct a field experiment in zambia and find that providing information about a new version of a product significantly increases the impact of price subsidies on take up taken alone the information manipulation has no significant impact on demand while the price subsidy substantially increases demand however the evaluation of either intervention in isolation fails to capture the significant complementarity between the two

pre sale information in markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre sale consultation services we study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre sale information next to the price of information and the product price and obtain clear cut predictions on when information is over and when it is underprovided even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single crossing property buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre specified price

refunds and returns in a vertically differentiated industry abstract firms frequently offer refunds both when physical products are returned and when service contracts are terminated prematurely we show how refunds act as a metering device when consumers learn about their personal valuation while experimenting with the product or service our theory predicts that low quality firms offer inefficiently strict terms for refunds while high quality firms offer inefficiently generous terms this may help to explain the observed variety in contractual terms

dynamic adverse selection and the supply size in this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information we obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium moreover we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough we conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero

what drives employment relationships in taxicab organizations linking agency to firm capabilities and strategic opportunities agency theorists argue that organizations typically get little value from using employees and that they should instead use nonemployees operating fully as residual claimants yet even in a context where those theorists would predict virtually no employees taxicab organizations they are common what drives the use of employment relationships in these organizations the authors show how employment relationships are linked to firm capabilities and strategic opportunities in a sample of taxicab organizations relying on arguments about the linkage of employment to the internal liquidity of labor organizational routines and internal cooperation the theoretical arguments and findings suggest what organizations gain by having employment relationships and show that integrating the agency theoretic argument with the other theoretical arguments leads toward a resource based view of strategy and human resources the authors highlight the importance of embedding arguments on the internal management of human resources in the strategic and competitive context in which organizations operate their arguments also have implications for the resource based approach to strategy in mapping the resource space of human assets in organiz ations and within that space directing attention to how organizations gain sustainable competitive advantage through managing human resources

niche market or mass market abstract the definition of a niche or a mass market is based on the ranking of two variables the monopoly price and the product mean value we characterize properties of the demand function that determine this ranking without calculation of the variables

dynamic pricing of new experience goods we develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations we show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy in a mass market prices are declining over time in a niche market the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay we consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers

communism federalism and ethnic minorities explaining party competition patterns in eastern europe scholarship on east european politics expects that party competition in the region is determined by various communist legacies juxtaposing state centric authoritarianism to a liberal market economy recent empirical evidence however uncovers significant variance of party competition patterns across east european countries to explain this variance this article argues that an interaction between communist institutional framework and partisan responses to ethnic minorities determines party competition structure in the region while experience with communist federalism determines partisan affinities with ethnic minorities tolerance or support for ethnic minorities leads the political actors associated with those minorities to general socially liberal positions consequently and contrary to received knowledge ethnic politics influence the ideological content of party competition and structure party systems in eastern europe

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

growth and chronic poverty evidence from rural communities in ethiopia abstract what keeps some people persistently poor even in the context of relative high growth in this article we explore this question using a 15 year longitudinal data set from ethiopia we compare the findings of an empirical growth model with those derived from a model of the determinants of chronic poverty we ask whether the chronically poor are simply not benefiting in the same way from the same factors that allowed others to escape poverty or whether there are latent factors that leave them behind we find that this chronic poverty is associated with several initial characteristics lack of physical assets education and remoteness in terms of distance to towns or poor roads the chronically poor appear to benefit from some of the drivers of growth such as better roads or extension services in much the same way that the non chronically poor benefit however they appear to have lower growth in this period related to time invariant characteristics and this suggests that they face a conside

payment systems and the structure of inequality conceptual issues and an analysis of salespersons in department stores output related payment systems such as commissions and piece rates are common in many jobs their central feature is that the wage of an employee is tied directly to her current performance focusing on salespersons in department stores the author considers wage differences under three payment systems a straight salary a straight commision and a salary plus commission four conceptions of wage inequalities under the three systems are contrasted a risk sharing a bargaining a sorting and a social status interpretation the empirical analyses compare the pay schemes and wages of approximately 63 000 salespersons in 178 department stores in 1981

the performance and competitive effects of school autonomy this paper studies a recent british reform that allowed public high schools to opt out of local authority control and become autonomous schools funded directly by the central government schools seeking autonomy had only to propose and win a majority vote among current parents almost one in three high schools voted on autonomy between 1988 and 1997 and using a version of the regression discontinuity design i find large achievement gains at schools in which the vote barely won compared to schools in which it barely lost despite other reforms that ensured that the british education system was by international standards highly competitive a comparison of schools in the geographic neighborhoods of narrow vote winners and narrow vote losers suggests that these gains did not spill over

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

gathering information before signing a contract after being offered a contract an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature this enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation cost the authors show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to observe the state of nature and they explore its terms later they show that the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents even though he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility copyright 1992 by american economic association

inequality growth and democracy the analysis of the relationship between inequality and economic growth in distinct politi coeconomic environments has been one of the central preoccupations of the extensive theoretical and empirical work on growth in the last decade the authors argue that the empirical evidence available to date strongly indicates the relevance of this work for understanding the elusive causal connection between economic development and democracy the state of the literature suggests considerable sophistication in conceptualizing the direct economic effects of inequality and contains critical insights into politically unconstrained policy making aimed at the alleviation of their negative economic impact however the political feasibility of the recommended policy measures and the politically mediated effects of inequality and redistributive policy on growth and on the strength and stability of democratic regimes are understood less well the authors discuss the critical factors influencing these effects and sketch several approaches to creating a comprehensive politicoeconomic account of the interaction between inequality redistributive policy making and political regimes

inequality and democracy why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization under what conditions do democracies emerge and consolidate recent theories suggest that inequality is among the leading determinants of both democratization and consolidation by contrast this article argues that inequality harms consolidation but has no net effect on democratization the author shows that the existing theories that link inequality to democratization suffer from serious limitations 1 they are useful only for understanding transitions from below and thus do not apply to many other transitions that is those from above 2 even for democratization from below their predictions are unlikely to hold since inequality actually has two opposite effects and 3 they ignore collective action problems which reduces their explanatory power however these objections do not affect the relationship between inequality and consolidation in particular while inequality has two opposite effects on the probability of transition to democracy it unambiguously increases the probability of transition away from democracy this article conducts the most comprehensive empirical test to date of the relationship between inequality and democracy it finds no support for the main democratization theories contrary to what they predict estimation suggests neither a monotonic negative nor an inverted u shaped relationship yet inequality increases the probability of backsliding from democracy to dictatorship

decentralization and access to social services in colombia decentralization is meant to improve access to public services but relatively few studies examine this question empirically we explore the effects of decentralization on access to health and education in colombia using an original database covering over 95 of colombian municipalities we show that decentralization improved enrollment rates in public schools and access of the poor to public health services in both sectors improving access was driven by the financial contributions of local governments small increases in own shares of spending led to surprisingly large increases in the access of the poor in both sectors our theoretical model implies that where local information dominates productive efficiency elected local governments will provide services better tailored to local needs decentralizing such services should increase their use by the public together theory and empirics imply that decentralization made the colombian state more accountable it provided local officials with the information and incentives they need to allocate resources in a manner responsive to voters needs and improve the impact of public expenditures

the value of buyer s ignorance in monopoly abstract a non linear pricing monopolist always prefers to sell to buyers with no private information about their tastes for the product if the marginal production cost is smaller than the marginal utility of consumption for all buyers

school decentralization helping the good get better but leaving the poor behind abstract the decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation the main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability however decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences in this paper we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on educational quality in argentina we find that decentralization had an overall positive impact on student test scores the decentralization gains however did not reach the poor thus although bringing decisions closer to the people may help the good get better the already disadvantaged may not receive these benefits

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

growth inequality and poverty looking beyond averages the evidence is compelling that the poor in developing countries do typically share in the gains from rising aggregate affluence and in the losses from aggregate contraction but how much do poor people share in growth do they gain more in some settings than others do some gain while others lose does pro poor growth mean more or less aggregate growth recent theories and evidence suggest some answers but deeper microeconomic empirical work is needed on growth and distributed change only then will we have a firm basis for identifying the specific policies and programs needed to complement and possibly modify growth oriented policies

the big push deja vu a review of jeffrey sachs s the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time jeffrey sachs s new book the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time penguin press new york 2005 advocates a big push featuring large increases in aid to finance a package of complementary investments in order to end world poverty these recommendations are remarkably similar to those first made in the 1950s and 1960s in development economics today as then the big push recommendation overlooks the unsolvable information and incentive problems facing any large scale planning exercise a more promising approach would be to design incentives for aid agents to implement interventions piecemeal whenever they deliver large benefits for the poor relative to costs

balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation the contradictions of uganda s decentralization program abstract uganda s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a dual mode system of local governance under a technocratic mode conditional funding from the center is earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation in contrast the patronage mode is an elaborate system for local bottom up planning but with limited resources which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments these resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty in the absence of a culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability it remains to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local empowerment simultaneously

fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks at least to some extent due to pressure from international donors many countries have become more fiscally decentralized the underlying premise being that greater decentralization might improve the provision of local public goods and services we test this proposition by determining whether relatively more decentralized countries fare better when natural disasters strike in terms of its effects on the population overall we find evidence supporting our maintained hypothesis though the effect appears much more robust in developing countries

design and marketing of financial products marketing costs are introduced into the security design environment outlined in allen and gale 1988 it is shown that splitting the firm s cash flow between products enhances their investor appeal and reduces marketing costs we also explain how the extremal product design in allen and gale is thereby avoided and how in simple cases debt equity or warrants can be optimal furthermore we illustrate in general terms how the optimal solution employs portfolios of option type products and we give an example of two optimal products that share profits in seven of eight states article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

internal labor markets in retailing the early years this study of two new york city department stores shows that contrary to the implications of previous studies internal labor markets existed before world war i outside heavy industry and in the absence of overt worker discontent among male office employees in one store the internal market was marked by job ladders relatively high wages and many senior employees in the other store female employees in both the office and sales divisions were in a mixed situation characterized by rudimentary job ladders and pay increasing with seniority but low average wages and no protection against arbitrary dismissal the authors hypothesize that classic internal markets exist only where workers possess the collective power to impose substantial turnover costs on the employer

segmenting the market the monopolist s optimal product mix abstract in an industry producing products which differ in quality to consumers who vary in their willingness to pay it may happen that only a bounded number of producers can coexist at noncooperative price equilibrium in other words the industry is a natural oligopoly we are here concerned with a special example in which only one producer can survive our focus of interest in the present paper is to examine this monopolist s optimal product range depending on the dispersion of consumers willingness to pay income either i the monopolist will find it optimal to segment the market completely offering the maximum number of products permitted or ii the monopolist will offer only a single product the precise nature of this switch of policy which occurs at a certain critical distribution of consumer incomes willingness to pay is explored fully

waterfall versus sprinkler product launch strategy influencing the herd a seller decides the price and sequence in which a product of unknown value is introduced to consumers consumers inspect the product before consumption and observe past prices and sales consumption at a high price is informative for later consumers as it indicates that the product is likely to be of high value i show that on an average prices decrease over time however expected revenue on an average rises over time for a high enough discount factor i find that for extreme beliefs the firm introduces the product to all consumers but for intermediate values the product is introduced only to one consumer

blending top down federalism with bottom up engagement to reduce inequality in ethiopia donors increasingly fund interventions to counteract inequality in developing countries where they fear it can foment instability and undermine nation building efforts to succeed aid relies on the principle of upward accountability to donors but federalism shifts the accountability of subnational officials downward to regional and local voters what happens when aid agencies fund anti inequality programs in federal countries does federalism undermine aid does aid undermine federalism or can the political and fiscal relations that define a federal system resolve the contradiction internally this study explores this paradox via the promotion of basic services program in ethiopia the largest donor financed investment program in the world using an original panel database comprising the universe of ethiopian woredas districts the study finds that horizontal geographic inequality decreased substantially donor financed block grants to woredas increased the availability of primary education and health care services in the bottom 20 percent of woredas weaker evidence from household surveys suggests that vertical inequality across wealth groups within woredas also declined implying that individuals from the poorest households benefit disproportionately from increasing access to and utilization of such services the evidence suggests that by combining strong upward accountability over public investment with extensive citizen engagement on local issues ethiopia s federal system resolves the instrumental dissonance posed by aid funded programs to combat inequality in a federation

on aid growth and good policies this study provides a critical analysis of the growth regressions in burnside and dollar 2000 first we analyse the relationship between aid and government expenditure in a modified neo classical growth model one of the main results of the analysis is that while good policies spur growths they may at the same time reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid second we show that the econometric results in burnside and dollar emphasising the crucial role of interaction between aid and good policies in the growth process are fragile as they are extremely data dependent finally we demonstrate that the burnside and dollar data lend support to the idea that the association between aid and growth can be approximated by decreasing returns to aid this finding conforms well to regression results in other recent studies

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

the social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies abstract when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge at the time contracts are negotiated the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is positive to the extent that incentive constrained agents are sorted more finely but is negative to the extent that incentive constraining agents impose more stringent signalling requirements on others hence the intuition developed by hirshleifer 1971 marshall 1974 and milgrom and stokey 1982 that privately acquired information has neither positive nor negative social value when agents possess no prior hidden knowledge does not apply when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge during contractual negotiations

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

right target wrong mechanism agricultural modernization and poverty reduction in uganda summary household consumption surveys suggest that the downward trend in rural poverty indicators recorded in uganda during the 1990s has been reversed since 2000 this paper examines the ugandan government s strategy to reduce rural poverty the plan for modernization of agriculture pma it argues that while there appear few better choices of target for the pma than to improve incomes of the rural poor through increased agricultural productivity emphasis on decentralization as a mechanism for poverty reduction is misplaced in the current political context of uganda the paper considers what alternative mechanisms might better deliver reductions in rural poverty

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

making reform work institutions dispositions and the improving health of bangladesh we examine whether local governance can improve social development empirically using good and bad cases of public health outcomes in bangladesh we explore the institutional underpinnings of service provision digging down beneath the rules of the game to analyze the beliefs understandings and dispositions that drive social behavior changes in deep social attitudes led to improvements in social indicators regional variation in health outcomes is explained by the presence or absence of a dense web of relationships that enmeshed reformers in local systems of authority and legitimacy strengthening their actions and making local society more susceptible to change

political connections and social networks in targeted transfer programs evidence from rural ethiopia abstractdespite increasingly large scale social protection programs in africa we have limited evidence on the local political economy of their allocation we investigate community based processes for food aid allocation and the role of political and social networks using the case of ethiopia in the aftermath of a serious drought in 2002 local political authorities are in charge of food transfers in terms of free food aid or food for work programs we find that although targeting is clearly imperfect free food aid is responsive to need as well as targeted to households with less access to support from relatives or friends we also find a strong correlation with political connections households with close associates in official positions have more than a 12 higher probability of obtaining free food than households that are not well connected this effect is large someone without political connections has the same probability of getting food aid as someone more than twice as rich but with these conne

information control in the principal agent problem this paper compares the principal s payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the agent s access to information the agent may make decisions before is uninformed or after is informed learning the state of nature when there are two possible outcomes the principal typically prefers informed to uninformed agents whether the agent receives the information before or after contracting this result is false when there are more than two outcomes conditions under which a principal prefers one agent to another when the agents differ only in their disutility of effort are also given copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

welfare state retrenchment revisited entitlement cuts public sector restructuring and inegalitarian trends in advanced capitalist societies in recent years it has become commonplace for comparativists to emphasize the resilience of welfare states in advanced capitalist societies and the failure of neoliberal efforts to dismantle the welfare state challenging some tenets of the resilience thesis this article seeks to broaden the discussion of welfare state retrenchment the authors argue that a sharp deceleration of social spending has occurred in most oecd countries since 1980 that welfare states have failed to offset the rise of market generated inequality and insecurity and that welfare programs have become less universalistic they stress the distributive and political consequences of market oriented reforms of the public sector

aid allocation and poverty reduction the authors derive a poverty efficient allocation of aid and compare it with actual aid allocations they build the poverty efficient allocation in two stages first they use new world bank ratings of 20 different aspects of national policy to establish the current relationship between aid policies and growth onto that they add a mapping from growth to poverty reduction which reflects the level and distribution of income they compare the effects of using headcount and poverty gap measures of poverty they find the actual allocation of aid to be radically different from the poverty efficient allocation in the efficient allocation for a given of poverty aid tapers in with policy reform in the actual allocation aid tapers out with reform in the efficient allocation aid is targeted disproportionately to countries with severe poverty and adequate polices the type of country where 74 percent of the world s poor live in the actual allocation such countries receive a much smaller share of aid 56 percent than their share of the world s poor with the present allocation aid is effective in sustainably lifting about 30 million people a year out of absolute poverty with a poverty efficient allocation this would increase to about 80 million people even with political constraints introduced to keep allocations for india and china constant poverty reduction would increase to about 60 million reallocating aid is politically difficult but it may be considerably less difficult than quadrupling aid budgets which is what the authors estimate would be necessary to achieve the same impact on poverty reduction with existing aid allocations

too much information information provision and search costs a seller often needs to determine the amount of product information to provide to consumers we model costly consumer information search in the presence of limited information we derive the consumer s optimal stopping rule for the search process we find that in general there is an intermediate amount of information that maximizes the likelihood of purchase if too much information is provided some of it is not as useful for the purchase decision the average informativeness per search occasion is too low and consumers end up choosing not to purchase the product if too little information is provided consumers may end up not having sufficient information to decide to purchase the product the optimal amount of information increases with the consumer s ex ante valuation of the product because with greater ex ante valuation by the consumer the firm wants to offer sufficient information for the consumer to be less likely to run out of information to check one can also show that there is an intermedi

persuasive puffery sellers often make claims about product strengths without providing evidence even though such claims are mere puffery we show that they can be credible because talking up any one strength comes at the implicit trade off of not talking up another potential strength puffery pulls in some buyers who value product attributes that are talked up or emphasized while pushing away other buyers who infer that the attributes they value are relative weaknesses when the initial probability of making a sale is low there are more potential buyers to pull in than to push away so puffery is persuasive overall this persuasiveness requires that buyers have some privacy about their preferences so that the seller does not completely pander to them more generally the results show how comparative cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker can be credible and persuasive in standard discrete choice models used throughout marketing economics and other disciplines

economic policy distribution and poverty the nature of disagreements abstract the last 20 years have seen growing areas of agreement on poverty reduction strategies but disagreements on economic policy distribution and poverty seem to have intensified this paper tries to identify the underlying nature of these disagreements related to differences in perspective and framework between finance ministry and civil society tendencies it is argued that the deep divisions one sees can be located in differences in the level of aggregation adopted the time horizon considered and assumptions made on market structure and power mutual understanding could be advanced by further exploration of these differences and the adoption by both sides of the approach of dialogue rather than negotiation

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had