spousal bargaining over care for elderly parents in china imbalances in sex ratios influence the allocation of support abstractusing a unique chinese survey of parents and adult children this paper examines how married children negotiate with their spouses for time devoted to caring for their own parents applying a collective bargaining framework i show that the sex ratio at marriage shifts household bargaining in favour of the husband s parents when women are less scarce or against his parents when women are scarcer such changing dynamics in the family may potentially reverse the current preference for sons in china implying that those with sons rather than daughters may be increasingly in need of state support

what determines female autonomy evidence from bangladesh abstract this paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country in particular we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women s autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband s farm in a simple theoretical model it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women using data from rural bangladesh empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands farms that contributes to women s autonomy the data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy

rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

marriage market divorce legislation and household labor supply this paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply in our approach the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors these factors are defined as variables that affect the household members bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set we extend the collective labor supply model developed by chiappori to allow for distribution factors we show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process the model is estimated using psid data for the year 1988 our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model also the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects

the demographic transition and the position of women a marriage market perspective we present international evidence on the marriage market implications of cohort size growth and set out a theoretical model of how marriage markets adjust to imbalances since men marry younger women secular growth in cohort size in the second phase of the demographic transition worsens the position of women this e ect has been substantial in many asian countries earlier and continues to be true in sub saharan africa with fertility decline cohort are now shrinking in east asia improves the position of women these demographic trends can explain the increase and spread in dowries in south asia and the persistence of polygyny in sub saharan africa we show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances even though it accommodates transitory shocks jel categories j12 j13 j16

labor supply of husbands and wives a simultaneous equations approach labor supply functions for married men and women are formulated as a dynamic simultaneous equations system which is estimated using panel data controlling for fixed individual effects allows marginal labor supply responses to be disentangled from permanent patterns in hours worked due to assortative mating the results suggest that the labor supply of husbands and wives without pre school children is not jointly determined in the short run while families with young children exhibit strong interactions in work hours and negative cross earnings effects neither the joint utility model of family labor supply nor an ad hoc traditional family model is supported by these results the data are for the united states and concern 381 couples from the denver income maintenance experiment excerpt

the political economy of gender explaining cross national variation in the gender division of labor and the gender voting gap mainstream political economy has tended to treat the family as a unit when examining the distributional consequences of labor market institutions and of public policy in a world with high divorce rates we argue that this simplification is more likely to obscure than to instruct we find that labor market opportunities for women which vary systematically with the position of countries in the international division of labor and with the structure of the welfare state affect women s bargaining power within the family and as a result can explain much of the cross country variation in the gender division of labor as well as the gender gap in political preferences

efficient intra household allocations and distribution factors implications and identification this paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identifiability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developed recently we first provide a simple and general test of the pareto efficiency hypothesis which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods all possible consumption externalities between household members and all types of interdependent individual preferences and domestic production technology the test is proved to be necessary and sufficient we then provide conditions for the identification of the sharing rule and the engel curves of individual household members for a variety of different observational schemes

did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates a reconciliation and new results application of the coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across us states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization i show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock i find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade but that this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade that said this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century both administrative data on the flow of new divorces and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion these results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage with an eye to their partner s divorce threat

how do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets evidence from america s second generation sex ratios i e relative numbers of men and women can affect marriage prospects labor force participation and other social and economic variables but the observed association between sex ratios and social and economic conditions may be confounded by omitted variables and reverse causality this paper uses variation in immigrant flows as a natural experiment to study the effect of sex ratios on the children and grandchildren of immigrants the flow of immigrants affected the second generation marriage market because second generation marriages were mostly endogamous i e to members of the same ethnic group the empirical results suggest that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on female labor force participation perhaps surprisingly the marriage rates of second generation men appear to be a slightly increasing function of immigrant sex ratios higher sex ratios also appear to have raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children the empirical results are broadly consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the marriage market

collective labour supply taxes and intrahousehold allocation an empirical approach most empirical studies of the impact of labor income taxation on the labor supply behavior of households use a unitary modeling approach in this article we empirically analyze income taxation and

changes in the consumption income and well being of single mother headed families there is a long standing debate over how the material well being of the disadvantaged has changed over time in the united states this debate has intensified in light of notable increases in income inequality in the 1970s and 1980s and during the 1990s dramatic changes in welfare and tax policies that target poor families including expansions in the earned income tax credit eitc welfare waivers and the passage of the personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act prwora while some championed these changes as catalysts for self sufficiency others predicted that these reforms would lead to severe deprivation 1 a large body of research has shown that these changes were associated with a dramatic fall in welfare receipt and increases in work and earnings 2 there is little consensus however on how material well being has changed during this period particularly for the most disadvantaged families such as those at the bottom of the income or consumption distribution in this paper we analyze changes in material well being between 1993 and 2003 for single mother headed families a group that has been the target of these recent changes in tax and wel fare policy for these families we analyze changes in income and total consumption as well as changes in disaggregated consumption time use and health insurance coverage we describe the underlying trends in well being for disadvantaged families during this dynamic period rather than identifying the causal effects of individual policies or macroeconomic conditions we begin by briefly documenting the recent trends in income and consumption for single mother headed families for income the trends differ sharply for different deciles of single moth ers for example between 1993 1995 and 1997 2000 reported income in the bottom decile falls by about 16 percent while reported income rises by more than 17 percent in the third fourth and fifth deciles the trends for reported consumption on the other hand tell a very different story these data show neither the sharp decline at low percentiles nor the large increases at the remaining percentiles in the bottom half of the distribution of single mothers rather we find a modest about 7 to 12 percent rise in consumption throughout the entire distribution while we do not examine the reasons for the sharp differences in income and consumption changes in this paper we do argue that consumption is a better measure of material well being for those at the bottom of the distribution

time allocation within the family welfare implications of life in a couple a collective model of leisure demand generalised to the production of a household public good is estimated on the british household panel survey the sharing rule is identified by using an original parametric framework based on the change of family status from single living to couple or from couple to single living womens ratios of private household expenditures are 40 on average the level of intra household inequality appears highly dependent on the intra household wage gap omitting household production in the model would overestimate the ratio by 7 percentage points on average

identifying the disadvantaged official poverty consumption poverty and the new supplemental poverty measure few economic indicators are more closely watched or more important for ew economic indicators are more closely watched or more important for policy than the offi cial poverty rate it is used to gauge the extent of deprivapolicy than the offi cial poverty rate it is used to gauge the extent of deprivation in the united states and to determine how economic well being has tion in the united states and to determine how economic well being has changed over time the poverty rate is often cited by policymakers researchers changed over time the poverty rate is often cited by policymakers researchers and advocates who are evaluating social programs that account for more than half and advocates who are evaluating social programs that account for more than half a trillion dollars in government spending eligibility for some means tested transfer a trillion dollars in government spending eligibility for some means tested transfer programs is determined based on the poverty thresholds and local poverty rates programs is determined based on the poverty thresholds and local poverty rates affect the allocation of billions of dollars in federal funds affect the allocation of billions of dollars in federal funds the methods for calculating the current poverty measure largely unchanged the methods for calculating the current poverty measure largely unchanged since the 1960s have been criticized by many researchers in response the census since the 1960s have been criticized by many researchers in response the census bureau has led a two decade process of research and discussion of poverty measurebureau has led a two decade process of research and discussion of poverty measurement with an eye to revising the offi cial measure the process has involved hundreds ment with an eye to revising the offi cial measure the process has involved hundreds of papers dozens of offi cial census bureau publications u s census 2010 of papers dozens of offi cial census bureau publications u s census 2010 and two national academy of sciences reports citro and michael 1995 iceland and two national academy of sciences reports citro and michael 1995 iceland 2005 we will not summarize this vast literature here rather we will examine 2005 we will not summarize this vast literature here rather we will examine the properties of three measures of poverty the offi cial u s poverty rate the new the properties of three measures of poverty the offi cial u s poverty rate the new supplemental poverty measure fi rst released by the u s census bureau in fall 2011 supplemental poverty measure fi rst released by the u s census bureau in fall 2011 and a consumption based measure of poverty we will focus on two fundamental and a consumption based measure of poverty we will focus on two fundamental goals of these measures to identify the most disadvantaged and to assess changes goals of these measures to identify the most disadvantaged and to assess changes

intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting the two literatures on targeting and on intrahousehold inequality have developed rapidly over the past 15 years but largely independent of each other the literature on targeting concerns itself with the design of tax and transfer programs for poverty alleviation in the presence of limited information on who the poor are the literature on intrahousehold inequality arose out of a dissatisfaction with unitary models of the household especially in explaining inequality in consumption and achievements of different household members even after allowing for relevant differences among them the authors begin to forge the link between the two literatures so they can address issues policymakers face around the world after a brief reprise of the key features of the two literatures they indicate how the presence of intrahousehold inequality and allocation mechanisms could affect the standard analysis of targeting theory they conclude with a list of policy questions for further research this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

household expenditure and the income tax rebates of 2001 using questions expressly added to the consumer expenditure survey we estimate the change in consumption expenditures caused by the 2001 federal income tax rebates and test the permanent income hypothesis we exploit the unique randomized timing of rebate receipt across households households spent 20 to 40 percent of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three month period in which their rebates arrived and roughly two thirds of their rebates cumulatively during this period and the subsequent three month period the implied effects on aggregate consumption demand are substantial consistent with liquidity constraints responses are larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

estimating consumption economies of scale adult equivalence scales and household bargaining power how much income would a woman living alone require to attain the same standard of living that she would have if she were married what percentage of a married couple s expenditures are controlled by the husband how much money does a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart we propose and estimate a collective model of household behaviour that permits identification and estimation of concepts such as these we model households in terms of the utility functions of its members a bargaining or social welfare function and a consumption technology function we demonstrate generic non parametric identification of the model and hence of a version of adult equivalence scales that we call indifference scales as well as consumption economies of scale the household s resource sharing rule or members bargaining power and other related concepts copyright 2013 oxford university press

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

identification of random resource shares in collective households without preference similarity restrictions abstractresource shares defined as the fraction of total household spending going to each person in a household are important for assessing individual material well being inequality and poverty

accounting for racial differences in marriage and employment what can account for the differences in marriage and employment decisions across blacks and whites to answer this question i develop a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage two explanations for the racial differences in behavior are considered differences in population supplies and wages black white differences in population supplies explain one fifth of the difference in marriage rates and between one fifth and one third of the differences in employment rates across race removing the racial gap in wages eliminates the differences in employment but increases the differences in marriage rates

in kind benefits and household behavior the impact of snap on food away from home consumption abstract supplemental nutrition assistance program snap formerly known as the food stamp program provides in kind benefits that can generally be utilized for food at home fah only according to economic theory snap benefits are fungible with cash for inframarginal households which may allow participants to spend benefits on non fah items however empirical evidence for this theory is mixed this paper exploits an underutilized source of state level variation the early 2000 s recession to determine the impact of snap participation on household food away from home fafh consumption in a difference in difference framework i compare households in high post recession snap growth states to households in low post recession snap growth states the results show that snap participation causes a significant decrease in fafh expenditure and fafh s share of total food expenditure

marriage specialization and the gender division of labor we consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition in our formal model agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market we show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor this division is not pareto improving both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase

effect of constraints on tiebout competition evidence from a school finance reform abstracteffect of constraints on tiebout competition evidence from a school finance reform regional studies michigan s school finance reform significantly increased state aid to low spending districts and placed restraints on the growth of spending in high spending districts it is noteworthy that there is no literature yet on the impact of such reforms on resource allocation by school districts this study begins to fill this gap it finds that the reform led the high spending districts to allocate a lower share of their total expenditure to support services and a higher share to instruction relative to the low spending districts to the extent that instructional expenditures are more productive and contribute to student achievement more than support services expenditures these results suggest that the reform led to a relative increase in productivity in the high spending districts

do intra household effects generate the food stamp cash out puzzle previous empirical studies have noted the higher marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps in the united states compared to that out of cash income analyzing data from u s food stamp program participants we find evidence that this discrepancy may be driven primarily by the behavior of multiple adult households single adult households show no evidence of any discrepancy thus our results suggest that food stamp and cash income welfare or market may have very different impact on the intra household allocation process and that this is reflected empirically in the cash out puzzle

intra household resource allocation and familial ties abstract in this paper we investigate the link between intra household resource allocation and familial ties between household members we show that within the same geographic economic and social environments households where members have stronger familial ties nuclear family households achieve near pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with weaker familial ties extended family households do not we propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns

the lasting effect of sex ratio imbalance on marriage and family evidence from world war ii in russia how does a shock to sex ratios affect marriage markets and fertility i use the drastic change in sex ratios caused by world war ii to identify the effects of unbalanced sex ratios on russian women using unique archival data the results indicate that male scarcity led to lower rates of marriage and fertility higher nonmarital births and reduced bargaining power within marriage for women most affected by war deaths the impact of sex ratio imbalance on marriage and family persisted for years after the war s end and was likely magnified by policies that promoted nonmarital births and discouraged divorce

a theoretical and empirical evaluation of the functional forms used to estimate the food expenditure equation of food stamp recipients the food expenditure equation of food stamp recipients is obtained as a generalization of roy s identity this equation rationalizes a larger marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamps than out of income and is an alternative to the traditional southworth formulation the only previously estimated functional form found to be flexible is due to senauer and young estimates of this specification using data from the san diego cash out demonstration illustrates that flexibility is important an example of welfare reform demonstrates that substantial errors can occur if flexibility is ignored

how does intergenerational investment respond to changes in the marriage market evidence from china abstract this paper examines how intergenerational investment responds to changes in the marriage market two major channels are modeled and empirically tested first expecting gender specific impacts on the future marriage market for their children parents adjustments in educational investment differ by the gender of children and second changes in marriage market conditions have contemporaneous impacts on intrahousehold bargaining because they change existing couples remarriage options which affects their educational investment in their children we test our model by exploiting a policy change in favor of local urban men in the urban marriage market in china we find that educational investment by local local couples decreases for sons but changes little for daughters consistent with the decrease in children s educational investment female favored consumption decreases while male favored consumption increases these results provide evidence of interaction between the intrahousehold bargaining and the future marriage prospect effects

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

expenditure response to increases in in kind transfers evidence from the supplemental nutrition assistance program recent studies on food stamp participant households marginal propensity to spend out of food stamps versus income have had contradictory results experimental studies have found household behavior aligns with standard economic theory where households marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamps is equivalent to cash income observational studies nd that households have a larger marginal propensity to spend out of food stamps than cash income in this study we re examine this question by estimating how an unprecedentedly large increase in food stamp benets due to the implementation of the american recovery and reinvestment act aects food at home expenditure we nd that the policy change caused households to increase food at home expenditure as well as increase households share of total expenditure allocated toward food at home expenditure we compare these results to a time period without a meaningful food stamp policy change and nd our results are unique to the arra implementation time period

more on marriage fertility and the distribution of income according to pareto 1896 the distribution of income depends on the nature of the people comprising a society on the organization of the latter and also in part on chance in the model developed here the nature of the people is captured by attitudes toward marriage divorce fertility and children singles search for mates in a marriage market married agents bargain about work and the quantity and quality of children they can divorce social policies such as child support requirements reflect the organization of the society finally chance is modeled by randomness in income marriage opportunities and marital bliss

estimating the value of an in kind transfer the case of food stamps the value of one in kind transfer food stamps is estimated by evaluating the experience of an actual conversion from stamps to cash in puerto rico in 1982 the evidence indicates that the cashout of the stamps had no detectable influence on food expenditures the explanation partly lies in the distribution of expenditures for the stamps were inframarginal for most recipients however some evidence indicates that trafficking in stamps was widespread as well including indirect evidence from estimation of the piecewise linear constraint model copyright 1989 by the econometric society

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

yours mine and ours do divorce laws affect the intertemporal behavior of married couples divorce laws establish spouses individual property rights over household resources and determine when divorce is allowed this paper examines how such laws inuence the intertemporal behavior and the welfare of u s married couples i build a model of household choice about consumption labor supply and divorce under multiple divorce law regimes and i estimate it using exogenous variation in u s divorce laws from the 1970s to the 1990s couples responded to equal division of property and unilateral divorce by increasing tangible assets up to 19 which suggests the presence of a strong income eect for the primary earner and by reducing female employment by over 5 percentage points because the threat of divorce granted additional bargaining power to married woman the bargaining weight of women implied by these responses in the model corresponds to a third of the weight of men this indicates that equal division of assets beneted women when it was

how important is intra household risk sharing for savings and labor supply abstract while it is recognized that the family is a risk sharing institution little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply in this paper we present a model where workers females and males are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete a household is formed by a female and a male who decide on consumption savings and labor supplies in a calibrated version of our model we find that intra household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth poor households while the wealth rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells wealth poor households rely on spousal labor supply for instance for low wealth households average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8 higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands this response in wives hours makes up 9 of lost family income we also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household

who marries whom and why this paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market the model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects it rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations the model was used to estimate u s marital behavior in 1971 72 and 1981 82 the marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women

changing the rules midway the impact of granting alimony rights on existing and newly formed partnerships this article analyses the effect of a reform granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples in canada a collective household model with a matching framework predicts that changes in alimony laws would affect existing couples and couples to be differently for existing couples it benefits the intended beneficiary but for couples not yet formed it generates offsetting intra household transfers and lower intra marital allocations for the beneficiary our empirical analyses confirm these predictions among couples united before the reform obtaining the right to petition for alimony led women to lower their labour force participation but not among newly formed cohabiting couples

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models we propose a method to identify bounds i e set identi cation on the shar ing rule for a general collective household consumption model unlike the eects of distribution factors it is well known that the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identi ed without strong assumptions on preferences across households of dierent compositions our new results show that though not point identi ed without these assumptions narrow bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained we get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household s continuous aggregate demand functions we obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public private or assignable within the household though having such infor mation tightens the bounds we apply our method to us 1999 2009 psid data this application obtains tight sharing rule bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the eects of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing and on the prevalence of individual as opposed to household level poverty

female labor supply and divorce new evidence from ireland if participation in the labor market helps to secure women s outside options in the case of divorce separation an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution may accelerate the increase in female labor supply this simple prediction has been tested in the literature using time and or spatial variation in divorce legislation e g across us states leading to mixed results in this paper we suggest testing this hypothesis by exploiting a more radical policy change i e the legalization of divorce in ireland the right to divorce was introduced in 1996 followed by an acceleration of marriage breakdown rates we use this fundamental change in the irish society as a natural experiment we follow a difference in difference approach using families for whom the dissolution risk is small as a control group our results suggest that the legalization of divorce contributed to a significant increase in female labor supply mostly at the extensive margin results are not driven by selection and are robust to several specification checks including the introduction of household fixed effects and an improved match between control and treatment groups using propensity score reweighting

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

married with children a collective labor supply model with detailed time use and intrahousehold expenditure information we propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of blundell chiappori and meghir 2005 in our model adults individual preferences not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods they also depend on the consumption of domestic goods which are produced by combining goods bought on the market with individuals time we apply our model to new and unique data on dutch couples with children the data contains detailed information about the spouses time use and the intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures our application uses a novel estimation strategy that builds upon the familiar two stage allocation representation of the collective model we obtain interesting and plausible empirical results spouses preferences depend on the consumption of domestically produced goods including children s welfare in addition pareto weights depend on variables like the individual wages and the share in the household s nonlabor income finally and perhaps surprisingly we do not nd evidence that mothers care more for their children than fathers this paper draws on data of the liss panel of centerdata special thanks go to marika de bruijne and arthur van soest who helped to construct the questionnaire and to guillaume schollier

do snap participants expand non food spending when they receive more snap benefits evidence from the 2009 snap benefits increase this study examines the expenditure response to the largest increase in supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits instituted in april 2009 investigating the effects in both food and non food spending categories i find that the rise in snap benefits increased not only food at home expenditures but also housing transportation and education expenditures of snap households relative to those of non snap households specifically the snap benefit increase leads to the reduced out of pocket spending on food for infra marginal snap recipients and the freed up resources allowed households with bounded budgets to fund other essential needs such as paying mortgage rent utility fee transportation expenses as well as tuition examining non food expenditures provides a more complete picture of the impact of the snap benefit increase by shedding light on the spillover effect of the policy change the result also derives policy implication on ongoing debate about snap allotment generosity

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

efficient intra household allocations a general characterization and empirical tests the neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members this paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member we make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts all we assume is that however decisions are made outcomes are efficient we refer to this as the collective setting we show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the slutsky matrix we also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made we apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from canada the tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two person households but not for one person households we also show that income pooling is rejected for two person households we then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data none of the collective setting restrictions are rejected we conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior

waiting for mr right rising inequality and declining marriage rates abstract this paper demonstrates that women search longer for their first or second husband in cities with higher male wage inequality and examines several alternative explanations a causal link is established by controlling for city fixed effects and city specific time trends and by using inequality in the woman s state of birth as a proxy for local male inequality increasing inequality explains about 25 of the marriage rate decline over the last few decades and this is not due to the endogenous moving or labor force decisions of women nor to the marital decisions of men in reaction to changes in their own wages

parental wealth and adult children s welfare in marriage abstract many studies find that parental resources importantly determine children s human capital schooling returns and earnings the collective household approach suggests that in addition parental resources of marital partners may importantly affect resource distributions within marriage this paper presents empirical results consistent with this framework they suggest that parental wealth continues to play roles in augmenting welfare of children into adulthood beyond provision of human capital in early life cycle stages or direct financial aid during adulthood and that actual transfers from parents to adult children do not fully measure influences of parental wealth on behaviors and welfare of adult children

it s raining men hallelujah the long run consequences of male biased sex ratios we document the short and long run effects of male biased sex ratios we exploit a natural historical experiment where large numbers of male convicts and far fewer female convicts were sent to australia in the 18th and 19th centuries in areas with more male biased sex ratios women were historically more likely to get married and less likely to work outside the home in these areas today both men and women continue to have more conservative attitudes towards women working and women work fewer hours outside the home while these women enjoy more leisure they are also less likely to work in high ranking occupations we demonstrate that the consequences of uneven sex ratios on cultural attitudes labour supply decisions and occupational choices can persist in the long run well after sex ratios are back to the natural rate we document the roles of vertical cultural transmission and marriage homogamy in sustaining this cultural persistence

collective household labor supply nonparticipation and income taxation in this paper we adopt the usual assumptions of the collective approach i e individualism and efficiency to study household labor supply the theoretical innovation is 2 fold first we incorporate the decision to participate in the labor market in the initial setting second we abandon the assumption of linearity of the budget constraint we show that i structural elements such as preferences or the outcome of the decision process can be recovered and ii testable restrictions are generated from the observation of the household labor supplies we also examine for this model how to simulate the incidence of fiscal reforms

gender of children bargaining power and intrahousehold resource allocation in china abstract based on the prevalent son preference in china this paper proposes a new measure of relative bargaining power within the household using data from china health and nutrition survey we show that a woman with a first born son has a 3 9 percentage points greater role in household decision making than a woman with a first born daughter having a first born son improves the mother s nutrition intakes and reduces her likelihood of being underweight while thinking of these impacts as being channeled through intrahousehold bargaining power we cannot fully rule out other possible direct effects of a first born son on the outcomes

a test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply this paper tests the unitary and the collective household labour supply models within a structural framework a nonlinear unrestricted household labour supply system is postulated and the set of parametric restrictions imposed by each model is derived our results generally reject the income pooling restrictions embodied in the unitary model also the symmetry of cross wage effects is rejected however the collective model is not rejected for groups with no pre school children

marriage and divorce informational constraints and private contracting the relationship between divorce rates in the united states and laws regulating divorce are analyzed using data from a special current population survey undertaken in 1979 with particular reference to the adoption by many states of no fault divorce laws the author utilizes a contract theoretic framework to examine the impact of both legal and informational constraints on several aspects of the marriage relationship 1 the probability of divorce 2 compensation at divorce i e the terms of the divorce settlement 3 the probability of entering marriage and 4 incentives for investment in marriage specific capital two different models are developed the first assumes that ex post information about the value of each spouses opportunites at divorce is symmetric and that since divorce would only occur if the joint benefits outweigh the joint costs the law has no effect on the divorce rate the second model asserts that the existence of asymmetric information results in a fixed wage marriage contract and that divorce would be higher in states that allow unilateral divorce the evidence supports the first of these hypotheses excerpt

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

intra family distribution of paid work time this article analyses the intra family distribution of paid work time in five european countries france germany italy spain and the uk to that end we formulate a collective model which allows us to characterize the efficient labour supply decisions of each spouse this two equation model is then simultaneously estimated by using national panel data drawn from the european community household panel echp 1994 2001 empirical results clearly show that in all sample countries the labour supply of wives is affected by own wages household and own nonlabour incomes and the number of children whereas evidence for husbands differs across countries

war marriage markets and the sex ratio at birth in belligerent countries male to female sex ratios at birth increased during and shortly after the two world wars these rises occurred amidst dramatically changed marriage market conditions caused by war related declines in adult sex ratios and still defy explanation based on county level census data for the german state of bavaria in the years just before and immediately after world war ii we explore the reduced form relationship between changes in marriage market tightness the adult sex ratio and changes in the offspring sex ratio and we discuss potential mechanisms that might link the two our results suggest that war induced shortfalls of men significantly increased the percentage of boys among newborns

unilateral divorce and the labor force participation rate of married women revisited two recent articles in this review by h elizabeth peters 1986 and william r johnson and jonathan skinner 1986 address an anomaly recently observed by labor economists james p smith and michael p ward 1985 have noted that real wage growth explains most of the increase in the female labor supply between 1950 and 1980 however in the period after 1970 the female labor supply growth rate rose while the real wage growth rate fell robert t michael 1985 provides a partial explanation by identifying the effect of divorce on the labor market decision of married women in that article a lagged relationship is observed between increases in the divorce rate and increases in the labor force participation rate lfpr of married women with young children during the post world war ii period since the divorce rate rose in the period after 1960 it could explain part of the increase in the growth rate of the lfpr of married women observed after 1970 the articles by peters and by johnson and skinner provide additional insights into this anomaly they recognize that the introduction of no fault grounds for divorce after 1970 may have contributed to the increase in the labor supply of married women after that date the no fault grounds for divorce created what has been called unilateral divorce the shift in female labor supply also could explain the slower real wage growth using 1979 data peters concludes that residence in a unilateral divorce state had a statistically significant positive influence on whether a married woman was in the labor force johnson and skinner use 1972 data to conclude that being in a unilateral divorce state in that year had a negative effect on the labor supply of married women unilateral divorce was introduced in the united states in 1970 when california adopted its no fault divorce statute therefore peters s data are probably more useful for testing the impact of unilateral divorce laws on married women s labor force participation in her article the lack of compensation for marriage specific investment at divorce creates an incentive for married women to increase their more general market capital during marriage by entering the labor force 2 a lack of compensation for marriage specific investment implies that women are not being compensated for being good housewives and mothers given the range of commodities produced by housewives and mothers marriage specific investment should not necessarily vary with characteristics of women such as age race or education if the impact of unilateral divorce on the lfpr of married women is due to the lack of compensation for mar regents professor of management robert 0 anderson schools of management university of new mexico albuquerque nm 87131 i thank michele blazek steve cauley dwight grant ron johnson rod lievano sam peltzman john schatzberg david weeks nelson woodard douglas young and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments the anderson schools of management provided research funding for this project ibefore 1970 most states had grounds for divorce that were based on fault such as adultery or mental cruelty between 1970 and 1985 all the american jurisdictions enacted some form of no fault divorce the no fault divorce statutes generally make either irretrievable breakdown or incompatibility the sole ground for divorce or add one of them to the fault grounds while no fault divorce is often called unilateral divorce that is not technically correct since some states require mutual consent to the no fault grounds see doris j freed and timothy b walker 1990 2while it was recognized by peters p 443 that women who invest in marriage may face lower wages in the future based on gary s becker 1981 p 15 marriage specific investment has value based on its ahilitv to increase houiehold nrodiution

the effect of food stamp cashout on food expenditures an assessment of the findings from four demonstrations using findings from four demonstrations we examine estimates of the effect on household food expenditures of converting food stamps into a cash transfer we provide arguments for why the estimate produced by one of the demonstrations should be regarded as an outlier the disparity in the difference in means estimates from the remaining three demonstrations is reduced when each is normalized by dividing by the average value of benefits in the respective demonstration site the normalized estimates imply a reduction in food expenditures of between 18 and 28 cents for each dollar of food stamps cashed out at the aggregate level these estimates imply that nationwide cashout would result in a reduction in household food spending of between 4 2 and 6 5 billion dollars whereas the associated reduction in the cost of administering the food stamp program would be about 0 3 billion dollars

household bargaining and excess fertility an experimental study in zambia we posit that household decision making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman using an experiment in zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 less likely to seek family planning services 25 less likely to use concealable contraception and 27 percent more likely to give birth however women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well being suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

women s inheritance rights and bargaining power evidence from kenya abstractthis paper investigates the human capital effects of a legal reform granting kenyan women equal inheritance rights i employ a difference in differences strategy exploiting variation in pr

the economics of the marriage contract theories and evidence abstract we analyze the role of the marriage contract we first formalize three prominent hypotheses on why people marry marriage provides an exogenous payoff to married partners it serves as a commitment device and it serves as a signaling device for each theory we analyze how a reduction in the costs of divorce affects the propensity to divorce for couples at any given duration of marriage we then use individual marriage and divorce certificate data from the united states to bring these alternative views of the marriage contract to bear on the data we exploit variations in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce laws across states to proxy a one off and permanent reduction in divorce costs the results suggest that the dominant reason that couples enter into a marriage contract is that it serves as a commitment device

the influence of living with parents on women s decision making participation in the household evidence from the southern philippines abstract this article analyses the dynamics of women s participation in the decisions made in the household by looking at the effects of events that transpired in the recent period results suggest that the wife s participation status is positively affected by the presence of parents either hers or the spouse s in the household results also show that the wife s parents significantly affect participation in minor issues while the spouse s parents significantly affect the more relevant financial issues the article also offers a cursory discussion on the role of household headship

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

for better or for worse the long term effects of postwar reconstruction on family formation abstractthis article estimates the long term legacies of female labour force mobilization on women s family formation outcomes such as marriage age at first marriage and divorce we identify the long term marriage effects of female labour force mobilization by exploring postwar mandatory employment in germany using difference in differences analysis we find that participation in postwar reconstruction efforts increased women s probability of being currently married ever married and marrying at younger ages we also find that postwar employment had no differential effect on divorce rates of the affected cohorts of women these results persist after accounting for the potential changes in the composition of the population demand for female labour war relief payments and postwar state specific policies

the effects of in work benefit reform in britain on couples theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of the working families tax credit wftc on couples in britain we develop a simple model of household decisions which explicitly accounts for the role played by the tax and benefit system its main implications are then tested using panel data from the british household panel survey collected between 1991 and 2002 overall the financial incentives of the reform had negligible effects on a wide range of married mothers decisions such as eligible working at least 16 hours per week and full time employment working at least 30 hours per week employment transitions childcare use and divorce rates women s responses however were highly heterogeneous depending on their partners labour supply and earnings mothers married to low income men showed larger responses in employment especially if they had younger children they were more likely to remain in the labour force and had higher rates at which they entered it while more likely to receive the tax credit they also experienced a greater risk of divorce we find virtually no effect for women with higher income husbands likewise there are no statistically significant responses among married men