minimum effort coordination games stochastic potential and logit equilibrium abstract this paper revisits the minimum effort coordination game with a continuum of pareto ranked nash equilibria noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function the resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function in the limit as the noise vanishes the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk dominant outcome for 2 2 games in accordance with experimental evidence logit equilibrium efforts decrease with increases in effort costs and the number of players even though these parameters do not affect the nash equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c92

male female urban income distributions in canada the service sector in a dependency model international trends of increasing income inequality have not occurred equally for male and female income distributions in canadian cities urban male income inequality declined from 1970 to 1980 it increased in the next decade but only to its 1990 level female income inequality has declined consistently these urban income distributions can be well explained using a dependency model in which the female income distribution is influenced by the male income distribution and the income gap between males and females this dependence effect is modified by urban characteristics male and female income distributions are more alike in larger cities and in cities with relatively higher female median incomes beginning in 1990 service sector employment contributes significantly to income inequality for both gender groups with a slightly greater effect for females

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

agglomeration economies and industrial decentralization the wage productivity trade offs abstract this paper examines the industrial location trade offs between the productivity advantages of the metropolitan center and the lower land and the labor costs in outlying regions within the state of sao paulo brazil the results indicate that while plant productivity is enhanced by the considerable agglomeration economies existing within metropolitan sao paulo firms must pay for these benefits in high wages and land costs offsetting labor cost savings can be achieved by locating in outlying regions the evidence presented in this paper suggests that market forces may lead eventually to a spontaneous decentralization of industry

a model of advertising with application to the german automobile industry this paper develops a dynamic duopolistic model of advertising and price competition advertising accumulates a stock of goodwill which enters directly into the demand functions and both the cooperative and predatory effects of advertising are considered it is shown that firms invest more in advertising the higher the degree of cooperativeness of advertising and some comparative static results are provided in the second empirical part of the article estimations of the demand equations are presented using data from the german automobile industry the main conclusion drawn is that advertising plays an important role in this market and has a predatory nature

computing cournot equilibrium through maximization over prices abstract this paper presents a characterization of internal cournot equilibrium based on first order conditions corresponding to profit maximization over prices this characterization may yield significant computational advantage as demand functions need not be inverted and simple first order conditions are obtained

cournot and bertrand equilibria compared substitutability complementarity and concavity abstract this paper assesses the view that bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than cournot equilibrium we consider an oligopoly model with linear demand and a mixture of substitute and complementary products our results provide support for the conventional wisdom and also indicate its limitations we provide counter examples showing that no clear cut comparison of prices and quantities is possible without strategic complementarity in either of the two games however price competition is indeed more competitive according to the following criteria lower mark up output ratios larger average output and lower average price

two little treasure games driven by unconditional regret for traveler s dilemma and minimal effort coordination games the unconditional regret matching urm procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones this supports a claim that the urm procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

a general class of adaptive strategies abstract we exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies in the repeated play of a game having the hannan consistency property in the long run the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players i e there is no regret smooth fictitious play fudenberg and levine 1995 j econ dynam control19 1065 1090 and regret matching hart and mas colell 2000 econometrica68 1127 1150 are particular cases the motivation and application of the current paper come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is in the long run almost a correlated equilibrium for the analysis we first develop a generalization of blackwell s 1956 pacific j math 6 1 8 approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d7 c6

price and quality competition the effect of differentiation and vertical integration abstract this paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent internet market consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level therefore two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm we show an interesting result not seen in the well known bertrand price competition not only does the differentiation always increase the firms profits but also it can increase the consumer s welfare in a quality sensitive market we further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination purchase with a competitor s product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers

efficient urbanisation economic performance and the shape of the metropolis the influences of urban form and transport infrastructure on economic performance show up in several contemporary policy debates notably sprawl versus compact city and in the developing world the future of mega cities this paper probes these relationships using two scales of analysis at the macro scale an econometric analysis using data across 47 us metropolitan areas reveals that employment densities and urban primacy are positively associated with worker productivity suggesting the presence of agglomeration economies congested freeways are shown to be a consequence of strong economic performance an intrametropolitan analysis using data on sub districts of the san francisco bay area generally reinforces the findings of the macro scale analysis in the bay area labour productivity appears to increase with size of labour marketshed and high accessibility between residences and firms higher employment density and well functioning infrastructure also contribute positively to economic performance

price versus quantity rules in dynamic competition the case of nonrenewable natural resources price and quantity competition are compared in the dynamic game framework of a nonrenewable natural resource duopoly it is shown that a price decision rule quantity decision rule strategy dominates in terms of a higher present value of the initial resource stocks if the resources are complements substitutes this result is shown to hold for subgame perfect equilibria it holds although equilibrium price paths resulting from those two types of strategies will cross it is shown however that even though the price trajectories cross initial equilibrium prices resulting from the price rule strategy will be lower than the initial equilibrium prices resulting from the quantity rule strategy copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation abstract we consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation we prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone in the latter case the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both cournot and bertrand competition as well as social planning journal of economic literature classifications numbers c73 l13

free riding in noncooperative entry deterrence with differentiated products 1 introductionthis paper reexamines the phenomenon of free riding in entry deterrence when established firms in an oligopoly are unable to coordinate their entry preventing activities previous authors e g bernheim 1984 gilbert and vives 1986 waldman 1987 1991 appelbaum and weber 1992 have highlighted the public good aspect of noncooperative entry prevention if costly entry deterring actions are successfully undertaken by a proper subset of the incumbents then incumbents outside of that subset cannot be excluded from the benefits of deterred entry it is in this sense that entry deterrence acquires the nature of a public good this observation has prompted previous researchers to raise the free rider question with its associated welfare implications can there occur underinvestment in entry deterrence due to the incentive for each firm to free ride on the others costly entry preventing activities the free rider problem in entry deterrence is first mentioned in the sequential entry model of bernheim 1984 however though bernheim discusses the possibility of free riding in his model the free rider problem is not the main focus of his paper in fact as pointed out by waldman 1987 p 309 footnote 2 the author s discussion of the role of the free rider problem is somewhat vague as regards whether bernheim feels the free rider problem would ever be important in a noncooperative entry deterrence setting 1gilbert and vives 1986 is the first paper in which the underinvestment issue is explicitly addressed the authors define underinvestment in entry deterrence to be associated with one or more of the following a incumbents total profits are higher preventing than allowing entry but the unique industry equilibrium allows entry b either entry prevention or entry may be an industry equilibrium but incumbents profits are higher when entry is prevented c an established monopoly or colluding incumbents prevents entry in more situations than an established noncooperating oligopoly p 77 label a b and c as underinvestment of type 1 2 and 3 respectively gilbert and vives g v go on to show that in none of these respects is there underinvestment in their quantity setting homogeneous product model on the contrary they demonstrate a strong possibility of overinvestment g v consider a situation where symmetric noncooperative incumbents with constant marginal costs of production make credible commitments to outputs in the preentry stage 2 the entrant incurs a fixed entry cost if it enters the industry and makes its entry and output decision after observing the incumbents output choices consequently there exists a limit output which if jointly produced by the oligopoly deters entry 3 g v find that entry is prevented when limit outputs are small while entry is allowed for larger limit outputs for limit outputs in an intermediate range both allowing entry and preventing entry are equilibria they prove that in this intermediate range where both entry accommodating and entry preventing equilibria coexist the unique entry equilibrium pareto dominates every deterrence equilibrium in other words compared with any deterrence equilibrium there is typically a continuum of such equilibria the accommodation equilibrium yields strictly higher profits to every incumbent hence if the industry settles on an entry preventing equilibrium the implication is that overinvestment exists because by jointly reducing incumbents outputs and allowing entry every incumbent can be made better off this paper introduces product differentiation into the g v model and shows that sufficiently large amounts of product differentiation can generate underinvestment in entry prevention the intuition is straightforward consider an incumbent s profit in any entry deterring equilibrium where exactly the limit output is produced by the oligopoly

games with strategic complementarities new applications to industrial organization this paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization oligopoly pricing comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two stage games

second best cost benefit analysis in monopolistic competition models of urban agglomeration abstract this paper examines the agglomeration benefits of a transportation improvement in a city by modeling the microstructure of urban agglomeration based on monopolistic competition of differentiated intermediate products properly extended to include variety distortion in addition to price distortion harberger s measure of excess burden yields the agglomeration benefits the agglomeration benefits are positive if increasing the variety is procompetitive however in the anticompetitive case we cannot exclude the possibility of negative additional benefits if there are multiple cities the net agglomeration benefits can be negative when other cities that experience a reduction in population have larger agglomeration economies

inverted u aggregate investment curves in a dynamic game of advertising abstract we revisit the relationship between market power and firms investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game where firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods the feedback equilibrium obtains under open loop rules and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted u shape under both cournot and bertrand behaviour provided product differentiation is sufficiently high total industry expenditure is higher under cournot competition

quality heterogeneity and welfare abstract in a differentiated product oligopoly with linear demand an increase in the degree of quality heterogeneity across firms increases both aggregate profit and consumer surplus this result is robust to whether firms set prices or quantities

productivity and city size a critique of the evidence a critique of two leading articles in the productivity and city size literature results in revised estimates of the productivity advantages of large cities in particular extant estimates of the elasticity of productivity with city size are revised downward by over 100 percent for the manufacturing sector and about 25 percent for the entire urban economy after revision productivity advantages of larger cities are found to be much larger for the nonmanufacturing sector than for the manufacturing sector hence revitalization policies for large cities should be focused on nonmanufacturing sectors

technical note a comparison of bertrand and cournot profits in oligopolies with differentiated products we compare equilibrium profits of bertrand price and cournot quantity competition in oligopolies with an arbitrary number of nonsymmetric firms offering differentiated substitutable products under an affine demand function we provide a precise characterization of the profit relationship in terms of 1 the number of firms 2 their relative quality and cost differences and 3 the competition intensity defined as the maxiumum absolute value of total change in competitors demand over change in own demand due to a unit change in own price we first examine the case where firms have the same demand sensitivity to own price and the same demand sensitivity to competitor prices but different cost and quality parameters for this case we prove that the total profit of the industry under cournot competition is at least as high as the total profit under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than 28 or if the competition intensity is less than 0 909 or if the differences in quality and cost competitiveness between firms are small we also prove that for each firm the profit achieved under cournot competition is at least as high as the profit achieved under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than eight or if the competition intensity is less than 0 739 we then provide numerical and analytical results that qualitatively support the same conclusions for general affine demand functions with variable demand sensitivities to prices

a productivity growth interpretation of the labour demand shift share model graham d j and spence n 1998 a productivity growth interpretation of the labour demand shift share model reg studies 32 515 525 this paper proposes modifications to the labour demand shift share model set out in this journal by casler 1989 to allow for its implementation and to extend its use to analyses of regional labour productivity growth the paper begins by briefly outlining the theoretical basis for the shift share method provided in casler s paper and then goes on to present a specific reformulation of the model which incorporates input price and technological growth effects on labour demand these additional effects are defined as productivity components within the shift share model and the empirical and theoretical implications of the modifications made are discussed in the paper an empirical example of the results obtained through the modified labour demand shift share model is then provided for selected british regions the paper concludes by outlining potential uses of the modif

strategic underinvestment in informative advertising the cases of substitutes and complements the authors analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts they show that whether the products are substitutes or complements there exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if the advertising cost is zero

the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry abstract this paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability when goods are imperfect substitutes both cournot and bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit maximizing firm overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes similarly cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low and a weaker incentive if this degree is high

comparing bertrand and cournot in mixed markets abstract we revisit the classic comparison between bertrand and cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms the results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in the standard setting with all profit maximizing firms

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

equilibrium prices in the bertrand and cournot oligopolies abstract the equilibrium prices for the bertrand and cournot oligopolies with product differentiation are compared if all firms have linear demand and cost functions and if in addition the jacobian matrix of the demand functions has a dominant negative diagonal the cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the bertrand ones the general condition for the comparison of the bertrand and cournot equilibrium prices can be derived even if the nonlinearity is involved in the cost and or demand functions

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

stakeholders relationships and product market competition abstractin this article we study the relationships between main stakeholders shareholders consumers and employees when firms are consumer oriented co in the sense of caring about consumers interests in the objective function we let these firms first bargain with labour union over their employees wages and then compete either in the quantity space cournot competition or in the price space bertrand competition our model shows that taking care of the consumers interests when determining product market strategies may reverse the traditional ranking between cournot and bertrand equilibria this implies that if shareholders in a co firm can choose either a quantity or a price strategy they will surprisingly choose the latter moreover we show that the conflicting interests between main stakeholders are attenuated under bertrand competition compared to cournot competition

a differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices we investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky we study the open loop and the closed loop memoryless nash equilibrium and show that the latter equilibrium entails a larger level of steady state production as compared to the former both equilibria entail a larger level of production in steady state than the static game we also study the effects of price stickiness and product differentiation upon the steady state equilibrium allocation and profits the per firm equilibrium output is increasing in both product differentiation and price stickiness while profits are increasing in both product differentiation and the speed of price adjustment the steady state social welfare monotonically increases in the speed of price adjustment and the overproduction entailed by dynamic competition has beneficial effect from a social standpoint

on the strategic importance of prices versus quantities in this article i investigate three single shot models of differentiated products oligopoly in each model firms choose both output and price the demand cost and spillover demand specifications are quite general and there are three main results first with simultaneous choice there is no pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium second with output chosen first and announced to all firms before the choice of price equilibrium sometimes exists and when it does it is the same as in a quantity only model third with price chosen and announced first equilibrium always exists and is the same as in a price only model

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

conjectural variations and location theory abstract imperfectly competitive markets such as those involving spatial separation of producers and consumers are characterized by interactions between competing firms actions call forth reactions and the possible reactions form an important part of the information set that should be used to determine the initial actions one method for dealing with this is the conjectoral variation approach despite some shortcomings this methodology sheds considerable light on decision making in the space economy equally importantly it sheds light on more general microeconomies modelled as spatial analogs this paper shows that conjectural variations and the nature of competition between rival firms do indeed matter in location choice and more generally in product design in particular we shall be concerned with showing how the conjectured responses of rival firms affect their desire to agglomerate

anything goes with heterogeneous but not always with homogeneous oligopoly abstract corchon and mas colell 1996 on the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models economics letters 51 59 65 showed that in heterogeneous oligopoly almost everything is possible in order to obtain a similar result for homogeneous oligopoly either one needs an externality in the cost function or the reaction correspondences should fulfill a special condition

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

evolution to equilibrium in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods abstract we present results on finite population evolutionarily stable strategies esss and stochastically stable states for a model of evolution with an imitative rule of strategy choice in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods and two groups of firms one group of low cost firms and one of high cost firms the firms play price setting and quantity setting oligopoly games under linear demand functions we will show that the stochastically stable state in a price setting oligopoly and that in a quantity setting oligopoly coincide

pricing decisions for complementary products with firms different market powers abstract this article reports the results of a study that explores the pricing problems with regard to two complementary products in a supply chain with two manufacturers and one common retailer the authors establish five pricing models under decentralized decision cases including the ms bertrand ms stackelberg rs bertrand rs stackelberg and ng models with consideration of different market power structures among channel members by applying a game theoretical approach corresponding analytic solutions are obtained then by comparing the maximum profits and optimal pricing decisions obtained in different decision cases interesting and valuable managerial insights are established

on stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market abstract in a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity stackelberg games provide some new results with price stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games in the price stackelberg game we show there is a unique spne where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower but both get equal payoffs we prove that generally quantity stackelberg games are less competitive than price stackelberg games however we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result

two state capital accumulation with heterogenous products disruptive vs non disruptive goods the paper considers the problem of a firm that while producing a standard product has the option to introduce an innovative product the innovative product competes with the standard product and will therefore reduce revenues of the standard product a distinction is made between innovative products that do or do not become even more relatively appealing as their market share grows e g because of network externalities it is shown that in the former case which we call a disruptive good history dependent long run equilibria can occur which are in line with recent real life economic examples

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

timing of technology adoption and product market competition abstract this paper examines how product market competition affects firms timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives it demonstrates that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with different market features more specifically technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with cournot competition than in a market with bertrand competition it can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes therefore this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives when goods are sufficiently differentiated adoption occurs later than is socially optimal

firm location and city size reduced productivity advantages as a factor in the decline of manufacturing in urban areas abstract this paper develops a model of firm location and city size that arrives at theoretical conclusions that differ from those of other authors comparative statics results suggest that changes in national wage levels and productivity levels create no determinate dis advantage for large cities relative to small ones as sites for manufacturing activity increased wage and reduced productivity premiums of large cities however result in unambiguous disadvantages statistical analysis indicates that the productivity advantages of large cities have declined in as many as eight two digit manufacturing industries that provide more than one third of metropolitan production worker employment

urban diversity and economic growth at the risk of some simplification it is possible to identify four periods of intense study of cities by economists each of these has led to an increased understanding of the economics of urban areas and the unique role played by cities in the modem economy the first of these periods occurred in the decade after world war i only about ten years after the truck revolutionized the transport of goods within urban areas this period included the first systematic empirical analysis of the forces affecting the location of firms and households within cities robert murray haig 1926 and a number of other microeconomists at columbia analyzed the spatial pattems of manufacturing activity in lower manhattan and in the rest of new york city haig jmd his colleagues devoted considerable attention to where things belong in an urban area p 402 providing the first systematic economic analysis of urban spatial structure for example they analyzed the garment industry concluding that it was destined by nature to disperse north of 14th street and predicting that it would follow the estabhshed spatial pattem of the cooperage barrelmaking industry standardization in size and quality of barrels had meant that identical barrels could be made throughout the new york metropolitan area even in new jersey and the introduction of the truck meant that they could be transported cheaply throughout the region and exported the second of these periods though not in chronological order began in the mid 1960s it formalized many of the insights about location incentives within urban areas which had been uncovered a half century before mixed them with the logic of heinrich von thunen s 1826 ancient theories about agricultural crops and land values and applied them to the hotisehold sector the works of william alonso 1964

on the markovian efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria we characterize and compare closed loop feedback price and quantity strategies within a full fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets we allow for imperfect product substitutability which enables us to deal with price competition we show that the traditional result that the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a markovian environment either in the short run or at the stationary equilibrium or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

comparing cournot and bertrand in a homogeneous product market abstract this paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of cournot and bertrand equilibrium outcomes results obtained by vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the market sharing rules it is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of bertrand equilibria for example the capacity sharing rule if however the sharing rule does not have this property for example the equal sharing rule then the results referred to above may not hold when costs are asymmetric journal of economic literatureclassification numbers l13

manufacturing productivity and city size in canada 1975 and 1985 does population matter this paper analyses the relationship between manufacturing productivity and city size based on canadian data for 1975 and 1985 the results differ in some respects from those of us studies in particular in canada city size appears to have a weaker impact on manufacturing productivity and an impact which is diminishing over time these findings may be a consequence of several differences in the characteristics of canadian and us firms as well as differences between the two urban systems urbanisation economies in canada may also have been weakened by regional development policies there are at the same time some striking similarities in the industries which show positive urbanisation economies in the us and canada there is also a tendency in canada for both industries with smaller firms and industries with higher rates of domestic ownership to exhibit greater urbanisation economies

manufacturer s revenue sharing contract and retail competition this paper investigates a revenue sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers the manufacturer as a stackelberg leader offers a revenue sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season under the offered contract terms the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season the process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the bayesian nash game on the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers the manufacturer designs the revenue sharing contract adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods the study finds that the provision of revenue sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price only contract however the benefits earned under the revenue sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price sensitivity factors the paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers lastly it investigates how the competition between retailers factor influences the decision making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability