using loopholes to reveal the marginal cost of regulation the case of fuel economy standards estimating the cost of regulation is difficult firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly however when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation we apply this insight to fuel economy standards for automobiles these standards feature a loophole that gives automakers a bonus when they equip a vehicle with flexible fuel capacity profitmaximizing automakers will equate the marginal cost of compliance using the loophole which is observable with the unobservable costs of strategies that genuinely improve fuel economy based on this insight we estimate that tightening standards by one mile per gallon would have cost automakers just 9 27 per vehicle in recent years jel l51 l62 q48

market barriers to energy efficiency abstract discussions of energy policy in an environmentally constrained world often focus on the use of tax instruments to internalize the external effects of energy utilization or achieve specified reductions in energy use in the most cost effective manner a substantial literature suggests however that significant opportunities exist to reduce energy utilization by implementing technologies that are cost effective under prevailing economic conditions but that are not fully implemented by existing market institutions this paper examines the theory of the market for energy using equipment showing that problems of imperfect information and transaction costs may bias rational consumers to purchase devices that use more energy than those that would be selected by a well informed social planner guided by the criterion of economic efficiency consumers must base their purchase decisions on observed prices and expectations of post purchase equipment performance if it is difficult or costly for individuals to form accurate and precise expectations the level of energy efficiency achieved by competitive markets will vary from the socially efficient outcome such market barriers suggest a role for regulatory intervention to improve market performance at prevailing energy prices

the economic cost of global fuel subsidies by 2015 global oil consumption will reach 90 million barrels per day in part this high level of consumption reflects the fact that many countries provide subsidies for gasoline and diesel this paper examines global fuel subsidies using the latest available data from the world bank finding that road sector subsidies for gasoline and diesel totaled 110 billion in 2012 pricing fuels below cost is inefficient because it leads to overconsumption under baseline assumptions about supply and demand elasticities the total annual deadweight loss worldwide is 44 billion incorporating external costs increases the economic costs substantially

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

the strategy structure of some coalition formation games in coalitional games with side payments the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared the predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully these difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form as the collection of pairs of buyer seller in an assignment game the incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection furthermore the relationships with vickrey clarke groves mechanisms are drawn

consumers perceptions and misperceptions of energy costs this paper presents three initial stylized facts from the vehicle ownership and alternatives survey voas a nationally representative survey that elicits consumers beliefs about gasoline prices and the relative energy costs of autos with different fuel economy ratings first american consumers devote little attention to fuel costs when purchasing autos second consistent with a cognitive bias called mpg illusion consumers underestimate the fuel cost differences between low mpg vehicles and overestimate the differences between high mpg vehicles third americans mean and median expected future gas prices were above current prices and predictions of the futures market at the time of the survey although it is often argued that misperceived energy costs justify policies to encourage the sale of energy efficient durable goods these results show that misperceptions and expectations that differ from market information could either increase or decrease energy efficiency

car buyers and fuel economy abstract this research is designed to help researchers and policy makers ground their work in the reality of how us consumers are thinking and behaving with respect to automotive fuel economy our data are from semi structured interviews with 57 households across nine lifestyle sectors we found no household that analyzed their fuel costs in a systematic way in their automobile or gasoline purchases almost none of these households track gasoline costs over time or consider them explicitly in household budgets these households may know the cost of their last tank of gasoline and the unit price of gasoline on that day but this accurate information is rapidly forgotten and replaced by typical information one effect of this lack of knowledge and information is that when consumers buy a vehicle they do not have the basic building blocks of knowledge assumed by the model of economically rational decision making and they make large errors estimating gasoline costs and savings over time moreover we find that consumer value for fuel economy is not only about private cost savings fuel economy can be a symbolic value as well for example among drivers who view resource conservation or thrift as important values to communicate consumers also assign non monetary meaning to fuel prices for example seeing rising prices as evidence of conspiracy this research suggests that consumer responses to fuel economy technology and changes in fuel prices are more complex than economic assumptions suggest the us department of energy and the energy foundation supported this research the authors are solely responsible for the content and conclusions presented

social insurance and the optimum piecewise linear income tax abstract this paper calculates optimal linear income taxes when differences in income are caused by random factors luck rather than by unobserved individual skills as assumed in the classical theory of income taxation as first shown by varian 1980 varian h r 1980 redistributive taxation as social insurance journal of public economics 14 49 68 in the former case income taxation acts as social insurance by introducing life uncertainty and precautionary behavior we find higher optimal marginal tax rates than those found by varian we also find that in the context of a piecewise two bracket linear tax schedule the second marginal tax is higher than the first a finding that contrasts with results recently obtained in the framework of classical income taxation theory which show a lower second marginal tax

on the optimal income taxation some further numerical results abstract using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 0 5 leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by mirrlees 1971 and atkinson 1973 the marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear a new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin as done by atkinson 1973 we study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion this result is really very local we also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability an important methodological remark analogous to sen s critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations

optimal marginal and average income taxation under maxi min using the mirrlees optimal income tax model with a maxi min social welfare function we derive conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution a strictly concave tax function in income and a single peaked average tax schedule with additive preferences and a constant labor supply elasticity marginal tax rates are decreasing below the modal skill level and will also decrease above the mode if aggregate skills are non decreasing with the skill level in this case and with a bounded skill distribution or with a constant hazard rate the tax function is strictly concave in income and the average tax rate single peaked when quasilinear utility functions apply in either consumption or leisure under fairly mild restrictions on the truncated or untruncated distribution function marginal tax rates are decreasing in skill and the average tax profile is single peaked the distribution of skills has the same quantitative influence for either case of quasilinearity these results continue to hold when there is bunching at the bottom due to a binding non negativity constraint we also illustrate how relaxing the assumption of constant elasticity of labor supply generally used in the literature modifies the results

on the optimal marginal rate of income tax abstract the paper shows that in the quasi linear model of income taxation the optimal marginal rate of tax can be calculated without needing to specify the utility of consumption this result is used to investigate the qualitative behavior of the marginal rate it is shown that every possible qualitative outcome may be achieved by appropriate selection of the skill distribution therefore the model does not place any a priori restrictions on the behavior of the marginal rate and the constancy of findings in previous simulation analysis is a consequence of their restricted structures

optimal income taxation an example with a u shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax rates comment using the mirrlees optimal income tax model with quasi linear preferences the paper examines conditions for marginal tax rates to be rising at high income levels and declining in an interval containing the modal skill it examines conditions for the marginal tax rate to be higher at a low skill level than at the high skill level with the same density an argument only holding for skill levels above a cutoff where resources of a worker are marginally of the same value as resources of the government data on earnings rates are presented copyright 1998 by american economic association

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

relativity inequality and optimal nonlinear income taxation how does concern for consumption relative to others relativity affect the structure of optimal nonlinear income taxation our article provides three sets of answers to this general question first it supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher marginal tax rates in doing so it both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is obtained in the literature and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax rates for specific functional forms for distribution utility function and social welfare function second the article goes beyond the literature and examines the impact of relativity on the progression of optimal marginal tax rates by and large we find support for greater progressivity defined as the steepness of the rise of the marginal tax rate schedule as relativity concern increases third none of the papers in the literature to our knowledge examines the interplay of relativity and inequality in determining the optimal structure of income taxes our special analytical cases and more general numerical calculations support the conclusion that higher inequality dampens the positive impact of greater relativity on the level and the progression of marginal tax rates more work is needed to further explore this interaction between relativity and inequality that our analysis has uncovered

optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model this paper characterizes optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labour markets redistributive taxation distorts labour demand and wages compared to their efficient values gross wages unemployment and participation are lower average tax rates are increasing marginal tax rates are positive even at the top finally numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable mirrlees type setting

what do consumers believe about future gasoline prices a full understanding of how gasoline prices affect consumer behavior frequently requires information on how consumers forecast future gasoline prices we provide the first evidence on the nature of these forecasts by analyzing two decades of data on gasoline price expectations from the michigan survey of consumers we find that average consumer beliefs are typically indistinguishable from a no change forecast justifying an assumption commonly made in the literature on consumer valuation of energy efficiency we also provide evidence on circumstances in which consumer forecasts are likely to deviate from no change and on significant cross consumer forecast heterogeneity

inventories and the automobile market this article studies the within model year pricing production and inventory management of new automobiles using new monthly data on u s transaction prices we document that for the typical vehicle prices fall over the model year at a 9 0 annual rate concurrently both sales and inventories are hump shaped to explain these time series we formulate an industry model for new automobiles in which inventory and pricing decisions are made simultaneously the model predicts that automakers build to stock inventory management policy substantially influences the time series of prices and sales accounting for four tenths of the price decline observed over the model year

economics and rational conservation policy energy analysts have long been concerned with the apparently low level of energy efficient investments and have suggested the presence of various market barriers and failures that hinder investment the concept of a barrier as defined here is some force that is working against investment in energy efficient technologies market failures on the other hand are failures of the competitive paradigm that lead to economically inefficient outcomes market barriers require no particular response on the part of government while market failures may call for some policy response

rational inattention and energy efficiency abstractthis paper argues that it will often be rational for consumers to pay limited attention to energy efficiency when choosing among energy consuming durable goods like automobiles or home appliances the reason is that the proper valuation of energy efficiency requires time and effort but differences in efficiency across products will rarely be pivotal to choice when consumers have strong preferences regarding other product attributes the paper first explains why proper valuation of efficiency is difficult even in the presence of government energy labels it next develops a model that shows how to value additional information about energy efficiency in a discrete choice context it then uses data on automobiles to show that consumers experience only small welfare losses when forced to choose a car without detailed information about fuel costs finally the paper discusses the implications of rational inattention for both economic research and public policy

wage inequality segregation by skill and the price of capital in an assignment model abstract some pieces of empirical evidence suggest that in the u s from the 1970s to the 1990s i wage inequality between plants rose much more than wage inequality within plants and ii there was an increase in the segregation of workers by skill into separate plants this paper presents a frictionless assignment model in which these two features can be explained simultaneously as the result of the decline in the relative price of capital additional implications of the model regarding the skill premium and the dispersion in labor productivity across plants are also consistent with the empirical evidence the model permits to consider changes in the skill distribution too combining these changes with falling capital prices provides a more comprehensive view of the overall trend of wage inequality and of workers segregation by skill in the data and it helps explaining some episodes of decreasing wage inequality

inherent inequality and the optimal graduation of marginal tax rates in most countries marginal tax rates increase with income this is at variance with the results of the optimal income taxation literature whose numerical calculations have established the presumption that optimal marginal tax rates should decline with income have the existing results of optimal income tax literature therefore established a presumption that the observed pattern is suboptimal the object of this paper is to attempt to answer this question the numerical calculations that followed mirrlees s 1971 pioneering contribution tried many variations on his basic parametrisation including different preference structures and different functional forms however so far as we are aware most of the reported results maintain his basic assumption of a log normal distribution of abilities or wages with a standard deviation of logs of 0 39 mirrlees 1971 himself appealed the work of lydall 1969 for this figure but it has become the industry standard we show in this paper that departures from this assumption in particular increases in inherent inequality can alter the qualitative pattern of optimal marginal tax rates dramatically contrary to the currently available calculations we show that the optimal graduation can indeed be such that marginal tax rates increase for the majority of the population which is consistent with the observed pattern but that there continues to exist a significant income range at the top where marginal tax rates decline which of course is counter to the observed pattern

the kuznets process and the inequality development relationship abstract in his classic paper on economic growth and income inequality kuznets discussed the process of population shift from traditional to modern activities as the basis for a theory of distributional change during the course of development in this paper we present a formalization of the kuznets process conduct a general analysis of distributional change under this process and derive the functional forms of and conditions for a turning point in the inequality development relationship for six commonly used indices of inequality the functional form appropriate to each index is then estimated using cross section data on 60 developing and developed countries finally some extensions to the initial formalization of the kuznets process are considered

how work effort responds to wage taxation an experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate abstract phelps 1973 sadka 1976 seade 1977 presented theorems that showed work effort could increase if the marginal tax rate was zero at the top income this was tested in a laboratory experiment the prediction was supported

teach a man to fish education vs optimal taxation in models of redistribution differences in human capital are often the relevant source of heterogeneity among individuals presumably the distribution of human capital can be manipulated through education spending this paper examines the use of education as a redistributive tool when there is a non linear tax system in place the results show that taxation whether under full or asymmetric information substantially reduces the redistributive role of education spending in maximizing social welfare this points to a conflict between the equalization of utility and human capital outcomes dans les modeles de redistribution des differences dans le capital humain sont souvent la source pertinente d heterogeneite entre individus censement la distribution de capital humain peut etre manipulee par le truchement des depenses en education ce texte examine l utilisation de l education en tant qu instrument de redistribution quand un regime de fiscalite non lineaire est en place les resultats montrent que la fiscalite en regime de d information complete ou asymetrique reduit substantiellement le role de redistribution des depenses en education pour maximiser le bien etre social voila qui souligne un conflit entre l egalisation de l utilite et les resultats en termes de capital humain

a property of the core abstract for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core we show that given any allocation outside the core there is an allocation in the core that indirectly dominates it journal of economic literatureclassification number c71

are consumers myopic evidence from new and used car purchases abstract we investigate whether car buyers are myopic about future fuel costs we estimate the effect of gasoline prices on short run equilibrium prices of cars of different fuel economies we then compare the implied changes in willingness to pay to the associated changes in expected future gasoline costs for cars of different fuel economies in order to calculate implicit discount rates using different assumptions about annual mileage survival rates and demand elasticities we calculate a range of implicit discount rates similar to the range of interest rates paid by car buyers who borrow we interpret this as showing little evidence of consumer myopia jel d12 h25 l11 l62 l71 l81

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

is it fair to make work pay the design of the income transfer program for the lower incomes is a hot issue in current public policy debate should we stick to a generous welfare state with a sizeable basic income but high marginal tax rates for the lower incomes and thus little incentives to work or should we make work pay by subsidizing the work of low earners but possibly at the cost of a smaller safety net we think it is difficult to answer this question without making clear what individuals are held responsible for and what not first we present a new fair allocation coined a pareto efficient and shared resources equivalent pese allocation which compensates for different productive skills but not for different tastes for working we also characterize a fair social ordering which rationalizes the pese allocation second we illustrate the optimal second best allocation in a discrete stiglitz 1982 1987 economy the question whether we should have subsidies for the low earners or not crucially depends on whether the low skilled have a strictly positive or zero skill third we simulate fair taxes for a sample of belgian singles our simulation results suggest that making work pay policies can be optimal according to our fairness criterion but only in the unreasonable case in which none of the unemployed are ever willing to work

the optimal linear taxation of employment and self employment incomes abstract this paper models optimal linear taxation when occupational choice and labour supply are endogenous workers choose between paid employment self employment and unemployment self employment incomes are risky and employees may be involuntarily laid off calibrating the model to the uk economy the optimal tax solution involves relatively high taxation with substantial redistribution and a higher nominal but not effective marginal tax rate imposed on the self employed than on employees the implications of making unemployment benefits as well as tax rates endogenous are also analysed and robustness checks are performed

car notches strategic automaker responses to fuel economy policy notches where small changes in behavior lead to large changes in a tax or subsidy gure prominently in many policies but have been rarely examined by economists in this paper we analyze a class of notches associated with policies aimed at improving vehicle fuel economy we provide several pieces of evidence showing that automakers respond to notches in fuel economy policy by precisely manipulating fuel economy ratings so as to just qualify for more favorable treatment we then describe the welfare consequences of this behavior and derive a welfare summary statistic applicable to many contexts