business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

informing retirement savings decisions a field experiment on supplemental plans although supplemental saving plans can be an important part of an individual s financial security in retirement contribution rates remain low particularly among those with lower salaries and less education we report findings from an intervention that provided information on key aspects of the employer provided supplemental saving plans to older public employees in north carolina among workers participating in a supplemental plan individuals who received an informational flyer increased their contributions in the months following the intervention relative to the control group in contrast individuals who were not enrolled in a retirement saving plan were not moved to begin contributing to a supplemental plan the results suggest that informational interventions can induce workers who are already engaged in the saving process to reassess their level of retirement preparedness jel c93 d14 d9

the public as thermostat dynamics of preferences for spending theory democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well informed about what policymakers actually do such a public would adjust its preferences for more or less policy in response to policy outputs themselves in effect the public would behave like a thermostat when the actual policy temperature differs from the preferred policy temperature the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly and once sufficiently adjusted the signal would stop hypotheses in domains where policy is clearly defined and salient to the public changes in the public s preferences for more policy activity are negatively related to changes in policy methods a thermostatic model of american public preferences for spending on defense and a set of five social programs is developed and then tested using time series regression analysis results changes in public preferences for more spending reflect changes in both the preferred levels of spending and spending decisions themselves most importantly changes in preferences are negatively related to spending decisions whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward upward when appropriations increase decrease thus consistent with the eastonian model policy outputs do feed back on public inputs at least in the defense spending domain and across a set of social spending domains

the political economy of imprisonment in affluent western democracies 1960 1990 research showing an association between business cycles and imprisonment is suspect on both theoretical and empirical grounds most research on this topic uses an impoverished notion of business cycles and pays no attention to differences in the institutional contexts of economic policymaking this article reexamines this issue using data from 15 affluent capitalist democracies observed over 30 years from 1960 to 1990 pooled regression techniques are used to test hypotheses regarding the effects of business cycles political power and the structure of labor market institutions results from simple models show the expected associations between business cycles and imprisonment rates but these associations disappear in models that include measures of politics and institutional structure this suggests that the business cycle imprisonment relationship is not causal but is instead an artifact of antecedent differences between neoliberal and corporatist societies

reapportionment and redistribution consequences of electoral reform in japan does reapportionment in a legislature affect policy outcomes we examine this question from a comparative perspective by focusing on reapportionment associated with the electoral reform in japan first we show that the reform of 1994 resulted in an unprecedented degree of equalization in legislative representation second using municipal level data we present evidence that municipalities in overrepresented districts received significantly more subsidies per capita as compared to those in underrepresented districts in both prereform and postreform years third by examining the relationship between the change in the number of seats per capita and the change in the amount of subsidies per capita at the municipal level we show that the equalization in voting strength resulted in an equalization of total transfers per person

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

reduction stasis and expansion of budgets in advanced democracies this article investigates changes within national budget by examining actors behavioral predilections and the institutional constraints under which they operate the article presents three theoret

did globalization restrict partisan politics an empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries this paper evaluates empirically how in the course of globalization partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries i introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the kof index of globalization two basic results emerge first at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly second policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s but not because of globalization

buying out the state a comparative perspective on the privatization of infrastructures the article describes the retreat of the state from public infrastructures in advanced industrial countries and tests the power of theoretical approaches to explain this reform process the authors data show changes in state ownership in formerly public monopoly enterprises in telecommunications electricity and aviation sectors of 26 countries between 1970 and 2000 combining various analytical techniques the authors use partial order scalogram analysis to visualize the similarity of institutional structures and country specific development trajectories by pooled time series regression they show that only the liberalization of capital markets has a significant effect on infrastructure privatization the effects of party ideology veto players or corporatist interest group systems are rather insignificant over the whole period however by an innovative use of yearly ordinary least squares regressions they show that governmental ideology holds great predictive power for privatization in the 1980s bu

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

social protection around the world external insecurity state capacity and domestic political cleavages this article develops and tests a political model specifying the conditions under which external risk leads to the introduction of redistributive social policies and argues that external risk sharpens a domestic political cleavage over the design of institutions of social insurance workers in sectors facing high volatility of income will support the introduction of social policies characterized by broad levels of insurance coverage and high redistribution of costs across occupations whereas workers in low risk sectors will oppose redistributive social policies the strength of preexisting state institutions also affects policy preferences of various sectors in the presence of weak ineffective states that are unable to collect social insurance contributions from sectors that are net contributors to the system high risk sectors will find redistributive social policies unattractive the article tests predictions of the model using new measures of the level of social insurance coverage in more than 100 c

globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less developed countries why have trends in government welfare spending in developing countries diverged from those in developed countries i address this question by investigating the effects of capital and trade flows on government welfare spending in fifty three developing countries using an original measure of labor power in developing countries i test the links between international markets labor s political strength and the welfare state i argue that labor s collective action problems caused by large populations of low skilled and surplus workers offset labor s potential political gains from globalization i show that when the proportion of low skilled workers in a nation is high globalization will lead to a decline in welfare spending most significantly the results suggest that in nations where labor market institutions are not yet well developed government social welfare spending is constrained by international market forces

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

globalization veto players and welfare spending this article examines the role of globalization and its interaction with domestic political institutions veto players in shaping welfare spending in 18 advanced industrial countries from 1960 to 2000 first the author evaluates how integrated world markets have influenced welfare expenditures results suggest that globalization increased welfare spending in this sample second the author studies how domestic political institutions mediate the impact of globalization on welfare spending with a new data set on veto players for the years 1960 to 2000 the author finds that as the number of and ideological distance among veto players increases the upward pressure of globalization on welfare spending is reduced the results show that globalization has pressured states to expand welfare spending but the extent to which states have responded to pressure critically depends on the number of and ideological distance among veto players whose agreement is required to change welfare policy

democracy and social spending in latin america 1980 92 what is the effect of regime type on public expenditures for social programs we investigate the relationship between democracy and the change in social spending controlling for gdp the debt inflation and age structure of the population through a time series cross sectional panel data set for 17 latin american countries from 1980 to 1992 the results show that especially in poor countries during economic crisis democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes this suggests that the latter are more constrained by economic forces whereas democracies are more constrained by popular demands hence calls to abandon broad categorizations of regime type appear to be premature democracy can matter in systematic and substantial ways

federalism and the politics of old age care in germany and the united states until the early 1990s germany and the united states had similar systems of long term care at that time germany created a new social insurance program whereas american reform efforts stalled as conventional explanations of social policies rooted in objective conditions policy legacies interest group mobilization and party politics fail to explain the diverging trajectories the authors show how differing federal structures shaped reform efforts german federalism gives states a strong voice and encourages collective responses to fiscal problems enabling comprehensive restructuring of long term care financing in the united states states lack a political mechanism to compel federal policy makers to tackle this subject this analysis suggests reform of social welfare issues with weakly mobilized publics is unlikely without proxy actors that have institutional or political means to forcibly gain the attention of policy makers in addition scholars should pay more attention to varieties of federali

the rise of the super rich power resources taxes financial markets and the dynamics of the top 1 percent 1949 to 2008 the income share of the super rich in the united states has grown rapidly since the early 1980s after a period of postwar stability what factors drove this change in this study we investigate the institutional policy and economic shifts that may explain rising income concentration we use single equation error correction models to estimate the long and short run effects of politics policy and economic factors on pretax top income shares between 1949 and 2008 we find that the rise of the super rich is the result of rightward shifts in congress the decline of labor unions lower tax rates on high incomes increased trade openness and asset bubbles in stock and real estate markets

how liable should a lender be the case of judgment proof firms and environmental risk comment recently u s environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability a model of a potentially judgment proof owner of a firm a lender and a potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency and reduce efficiency full partial and zero lender liability rules and a minimum equity requirement are analyzed partial lender liability and an equivalent minimum equity requirement deliver the highest level of efficiency although the former can deliver a higher contribution by the lender to the victim than the latter policy and empirical implications are also discussed copyright 1995 by american economic association

electoral cycles and budgetary growth in veterans benefit programs while many studies have generated negative findings regarding the general existence of electoral cycles in economic phenomena we have found an apparently robust electoral cycle in veterans benefits this pattern was found between 1961 and 1978 but has disappeared since then we use this case to investigate the possibility that electoral cycles might contribute to the growth of government spending using two different methods of inference we find no strong basis to conclude that such cycles cause increasing public sector growth

integration and the structure of public spending he voluminous tax competition literature suggests that increased economic integration leads to reduced tax rates and suboptimal levels of government spending as countries compete for mobile factors of production integration may influence not only the size of the government but also the structure of public spending comprehensive studies analyzing the effect of integration on the overall structure of government spending are rare however this article fills this void by providing an empirical analysis of the effects of economic integration on the overall structure of public spending in a number of organisation for economic co operation and development countries using panel data on the different government spending components for the period 1970 to 2002 the authors find that integration negatively influences government consumption and investment but that there is no empirical evidence that transfers are positively or negatively affected by integration as suggested by the compensation and efficiency views respectively less

on the political economy of welfare expansion a comparative analysis of 18 advanced capitalist democracies 1960 1971 this article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies our multivariate model of this thesis specified to 1960 1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product is supported strongly by regression analyses these indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth they also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion while leftist centrist and christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well in addition state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests strike activity and capital investment disinvestment activ

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

lower class mobilization and policy linkage in the u s states theory political participation by lower class voters should create pressures for government to respond with supportive policies hypotheses lower class voting is associated with more generous state welfare policies political forces and institutions structure this relationship methods a pooled time series analysis for the 50 u s states from 1978 to 1990 results we demonstrate an enduring relationship between the degree of mobilization of lower class voters and the generosity of welfare benefits provided by state governments this relationship can be vitiated by remarkable political and economic events such as the new federalism and the economic recession in the early 1980s finally the importance of lower class mobilization for redistributive policy is enhanced by the liberalism and competitiveness of state democratic parties

educational policies in a long run perspective in this paper we study the effects of educational reforms on school attainment we construct a dataset of relevant reforms that occurred at the national level over the last century and match individual information from 24 european countries to the most likely set up faced when individual educational choices were undertaken our identification strategy relies on temporal and geographical variations in the institutional arrangements controlling for time country fixed effects as well as for country specific time trend by characterizing each group of reforms for their impact on mean years of education educational inequality and intergenerational persistence we show an ideal policy menu which has been available to policymakers we distinguish between groups of policies that are either inclusive or selective depending on their diminishing or augmenting impact on inequality and persistence finally we correlate these reform measures to political coalitions prevailing in parliament finding support for the idea that left wing parties support reforms that are inclusive while right wing parties prefer selective ones michela braga daniele checchi and elena meschi

the economic importance of financial literacy theory and evidence this paper undertakes an assessment of a rapidly growing body of economic research on financial literacy we start with an overview of theoretical research which casts financial knowledge as a form of investment in human capital endogenizing financial knowledge has important implications for welfare as well as policies intended to enhance levels of financial knowledge in the larger population next we draw on recent surveys to establish how much or how little people know and identify the least financially savvy population subgroups this is followed by an examination of the impact of financial literacy on economic decision making in the united states and elsewhere while the literature is still young conclusions may be drawn about the effects and consequences of financial illiteracy and what works to remedy these gaps a final section offers thoughts on what remains to be learned if researchers are to better inform theoretical and empirical models as well as public policy jel a20 d14 g11 i20 j26

can simple informational nudges increase employee participation in a 401 k plan we report results from a field experiment in which a randomized subset of newly hired workers at a large financial institution received a flyer containing information about the employer s 401 k plan and the value of contributions compounding over a career younger workers who received the flyer were significantly more likely to begin contributing to the plan relative to their peers in the control group many workers do not participate in their employers supplemental retirement savings programs even though these programs offer substantial tax advantages and immediate returns due to matching contributions from a survey of new hires we find that many workers choose not to contribute to the plan because they have other financial priorities however some nonparticipants lack the financial literacy to appreciate the benefit these findings indicate that simple informational interventions can nudge workers to participate in retirement saving plans and enhance individual well being and retirement income security

population aging class context and age inequality in public spending although recent experiences in the united states suggest that population aging for both demographic and political reasons favors public spending for the elderly relative to children many european nations with different political environments show no shuch pattern this paper investigates age inequality or bias in public spending for these two age based dependent groups using annual time series data for 18 advanced industrial democracies the results show that a large aged population reduces age inequality in favor of the eldearly in the presence of 1 class based corporatism and 2 strong leftist parties whereas a large aged population increases age inequality in the absence of these two factors

is german domestic social policy politically controversial this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using german data examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951 2007 period leftwing governments however spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after german reunification in 1990 since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon

income inequality democracy and public sector size this study synthesizes and tests explanations of how public sector size and democracy affect income inequality the results based on unbalanced panel data for 64 developing and developed countries

voting inequality and redistribution this paper surveys models of voting on redistribution under reason able assumptions the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner if the median is poorer than average redistribution is from rich to poor and increasing inequality increases redistribution however under different assumptions about the economic environment redistribution may not be simply rich to poor and inequality need not increase redistribution several lines of argument are presented in particular political participation public provision of private goods public pensions and tax avoidance or evasion

public expenditures in canadian provinces an empirical study of politico economic interactions it is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures however frey and schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals and when popularity is low energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election data draw from the canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis the findings support the frey and schneider explanation

economic growth and institutions some sensitivity analyses 1961 2000 do institutions help explain macroeconomic performance this article addresses two issues first especially given the practical implications of the literature measurement of institutions should avoid tautologies and therefore this study uses econometrics to estimate the effect of objectively measurable institutions such as labor market organization financial development fiscal federalism and political regime type second the growing literature on these promising factors in turn is unfortunately incommensurable because previous studies fail to control for other institutional and in some cases standard economic variables given data on up to ninety four countries from 1961 through 2000 extreme bound analysis eba an econometric technique that addresses the sensitivity of previous findings to alternative assumptions about model specification suggests that some institutions associated with the organization of labor and capital are robust correlates of investment few data support the view that variables related to the organization of the state including fiscal federalism and political regime type affect macroeconomic performance without implication the author thanks richard nelson doug chalmers robert shapiro alessandra casella brendan o flaherty geoffrey garrett alexander hicks brett hammond mark kesselman the editor lisa martin and two anonymous referees for helpful comments also ross levine peter rousseau geoffrey garrett and torben iversen were very helpful in locating data the views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the board of governors of the federal reserve system or any member of its staff

explaining presidential priorities the competing aspiration levels model of macrobudgetary decision making this article develops a new statistical model of trade offs among defense nondefense and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process the competing aspiration levels model calm builds on crecine s 1971 great identity argument unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting calm explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense nondefense and totalfederal expenditures calm models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the calm formulation substantively the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level and that when a potential fiscal surplus has existed the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector in keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure budgetary base for both the defense and nondefense sectors both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists the analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as congress

trade openness and public expenditure the spanish case 1960 2000 the empirical link between the post wwii expansion of international market integration and the growth of national public expenditure has been widely noted with no consensus as yet regarding the interpretation of this correlation we posit that a likely link between increased openness and public spending is the use of the latter to offset changes in the distribution of income that result from increased openness to explore this potential link we study time series data from spain in 1960 2000 a period of major changes in political organization as well as in both fiscal and trade policy we find evidence that democracy reinforced the causal relation from increased openness to greater public expenditure thus the paper contributes to the literature that emphasizes that changes in political regimes are potentially important determinants of the observed international patterns of openness and government size

political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies in this article we evaluate two claims made in recent studies of the welfare states of advanced industrial societies first that welfare states have remained quite resilient in the face of demands for retrenchment and second that partisan politics have ceased to play a decisive role in their evolution addressing the first claim we present analysis from a new data set on unemployment insurance and sickness benefit replacement rates for 18 countries for the years 1975 99 we find considerably more evidence of welfare retrenchment during the last two decades than do recent cross national studies second we examine the end of partisanship claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs our results suggest that contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment

environmental risk and extended liability the case of green technologies abstract we analyze the effect of extending environmental risk to banks we assume that the firm needs external funds to invest in green technology and reduce the risk of environmental damage prevention may affect the distribution of both environmental losses and operating revenues we show that under moral hazard the firm does not always invest less in prevention than the optimal social level we also show that extending liability may improve both the level of prevention and the level of compensation however extended liability always leads to an increased probability of bankruptcy for the firm we also obtain that partial extended liability improves social welfare while full extended liability does not

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

explaining government growth in the u s states despite the explosive increase in the research program on government growth in recent years little work has been done on government growth disaggregated to the subnational level i examine the empirical validity of five competing models of government growth for the fifty u s states from 1945 to 1984 wagner s law fiscal illusion party control bureau voting and intergovernmental grant government size is defined in terms of state government spending as a proportion of total state economic output with separate implicit price deflators being employed for the public and private sectors based on a longitudinal test of these competing models the analysis uncovers strong empirical support for the bureau voting and intergovernmental grant models moderately weak support for the wagner s law model and virtually no support for the fiscal illusion and party control explanations these findings have important implications for the study of government growth in general and more specifically in the states

distribution and redistribution the shadow of the nineteenth century the authors present an alternative to power resource theory as an approach to the study of distribution and redistribution while they agree that partisanship and union power are important they argue that both are endogenous to more fundamental differences in the organization of capitalist democracies specifically center left governments result from pr consensus political systems as opposed to majoritarian systems while strong unions have their origins in coordinated as opposed to liberal capitalism these differences in political representation and in the organization of production developed jointly in the early twentieth century and explain the cross national pattern of distribution and redistribution the clusters have their origins in two distinct political economic conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century one in which locally coordinated economies were coupled with strong guild traditions and heavy investment in cospecific assets and one in which market based economies were coupled with liberal states and more mobile assets

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

guns and butter regime competition and the welfare state during the cold war scholars from a number of disciplines have argued that the massive expansion of the welfare state in the postwar period was at least in some part a byproduct of the cold war and the associated political competition between two rival regime blocs however the question of whether regime competition fuelled welfare state growth has never been subject to systematic examination applying spatial econometrics this article offers the first empirical test of this argument the authors findings support the notion that regime competition stimulated the expansion of the welfare state on both sides of the iron curtain in the postwar period

the benefits of extended liability we characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity this firm the agent is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder the principal the level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable this level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent increasing the wealth of the principal that can be seized upon an accident has no value when private transactions are regulated but might otherwise strictly improve welfare an incomplete regulation supplemented by an ex post extended liability regime can sometime achieve the second best

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

social democracy christian democracy constitutional structure and the welfare state the literature on the determinants of welfare state effort displays many inconsistencies and contradictins this article takes imoprtant stepts toward resolving these issues with the use of pooled

central banks partisan politics and macroeconomic outcomes what are the implications of the trend toward granting central bank independence for partisan theories of the macroeconomy the conventional view is that parties of the left and right strive to achieve distinctive macroeconomic outcomes when in government however when faced with an independent central bank parties of the left may prove unable to produce their preferred partisan outcomes whereas right parties may be privileged in their ability to pursue their goals moreover granting the central bank independence can be expected to have differing effects depending on whether left or right parties prevail in government these issues are explored with a pooled time series model of inflation and unemployment in 16 organization for economic co operation and development countries from 1961 through 1991 the results support the claim that the effects of partisan government and central bank organization are mutually contingent the pattern of results anticipated by partisan theory only arises where central b

economic globalization the macro economy and reversals of welfare expansion in affluent democracies 1978 94 a key question in debates over globalization is its effect on the welfare states in particular on welfare retrenchments programmatic retractions of the scope and coverage of social programs we conceptualize such retrenchments as discrete policy events and we offer a comprehensive model of their occurrence that integrates domestic economic political and institutional factors as well as those related to the global economy our analysis of all such retrenchments in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd nations between 1978 and 1994 indicates that the effects of globalization are complex with trade openness and financial liberalization clearly operating against such retrenchments but outward foreign direct investment perhaps pressuring for them in addition we uncover support for a dynamic of self limiting immoderation economic and demographic pressures for costly welfare expenditures provoke actions to roll back eligibility and benefit rates that link increasing numbers of unemployed and retired persons to increased social spending in short the same demographic pressures that gave often been noted to substantially drive welfare spending may trigger welfare cutbacks our thanks to a a alderson bob jackman lane kenworthy joakim palme duane swank john stephen and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and discussions as well as to kendralin freedman for her work preparing the final manuscript all remaining errors are our own previous versions of this article were presented at the annual meetings of the american political science association and the american sociological association the views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of the national science foundation or the u s government all data and commands necessary to replicate the analyses presented here are available at our web site http polisci emory edu zorn hz index html

union organization in advanced industrial democracies i suggest a new explanation of cross national differences in unionization rates the size of the labor force size matters because the gains unions are able to achieve in collective bargaining depend on the proportion of substitutable workers who are organized while the costs of organizing depend in part on the absolute number to be recruited the comparison of the costs and benefits of organizing new workers yields the conclusion that unions in larger labor markets will accept lower levels of unionization statistical analysis of cross national differences in unionization rates among advanced industrial societies in the late 1970s indicates that the size of the labor force and the cumulative participation of leftist parties in government explain most of the variance

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance a corrigendum alvarez garrett and lange 1991 used cross national data panel data on the organization for economic coordination and development nations to show that countries with left governments and encompassing labor movements enjoyed superior economic performance here we show that the standard errors reported in that article are incorrect reestimation of the model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors upholds the major finding of alvarez garrett and lange regarding the political and institutional causes of economic growth but leaves the findings for unemployment and inflation open to question we show that the model used by alvarez garrett and lange feasible generalized least squares cannot produce standard errors when the number of countries analyzed exceeds the length of the time period under analysis also we argue that ordinary least squares with robust standard errors is superior to feasible generalized least square for typical cross national panel studies

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

exploring the impact of trade and investment on income inequality a cross national sectoral analysis of the developed countries this article explores the relationship between international integration and domestic inequality in the developed countries in the mid 1980s and early 1990s the analysis examines two major modes of integration trade and direct investment disaggregating each by economic sector and distinguishing between imports and exports and inbound and outbound flows and stocks in measuring income inequality extensive use is made of micro data sets that have recently become available through the luxembourg income study lis which provides much more detailed and comparable data on income inequality than has heretofore been the case in particular lis data can be aggregated at the level of economic sector and permit the comparison of pre and post government income the study finds few significant relationships between either trade or investment and sectoral income distribution the overall conclusion is that economic globalization is not a critically important factor in explaining recent trends in income inequa

pathways of representation a causal analysis of public opinion policy linkages theory altemative theories of the linkage process between mass policy preferences and public policies are tested empirically hypotheses opinion policy linkage may arise because mass preferences drive the policy process elite preferences drive the process or because of a shared preferences reciprocal influence process policy linkage may also be facilitated by higher voter mobilization and party competition methods a multiple equation model of the opinion policy process in the united states is tested with two stage least squares regression results the state policy process is best explained by an opinion sharing reciprocal influence model shared partisanship party competition and voter mobilization enhance the linkage process in theoretically anticipated ways

retirement contribution rate nudges and plan participation evidence from a field experiment simple interventions like changing the default or sending a short message can induce individuals to save more for retirement however messages that emphasize high savings rates may increase the amount that savings plan participants save while reducing the total number of plan participants we study this possibility in the context of a field experiment designed to increase retirement savings by us military service members we find that service members who received a message emphasizing a low contribution rate were more likely to participate in a savings plan than were service members whose message emphasized a high contribution rate or no rate at all

unemployment benefits as a substitute for a conservative central banker in the many years since their introduction positive theories of inflation have rarely been tested this paper documents a negative relationship between inflation and the welfare state proxied by the parameters of the unemployment benefit program that is to be expected in such theories because unemployment benefits make the monetary authority less concerned about the plight of the unemployed building a welfare state has a similar effect to appointing a conservative central banker the relationship holds in a panel of 20 oecd countries over the period 1961 1992 a region where romer finds no evidence of commitment problems it holds controlling for country and time fixed effects country specific time trends other covariates and using a decadal panel interpreted as causal the estimated effect is economically large a 1 standard deviation decrease in benefit duration is predicted to add 1 4 percentage points onto inflation or 31 of the standard deviation in inflation

electoral competition globalization and subnational education spending in mexico 1999 2004 this article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 mexican states from 1999 to 2004 there is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth this study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross nationally consistent with these studies this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending in contrast to other work however this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending these findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher quality democracy while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy

strategic opposition and government cohesion in westminster democracies cohesive government versus opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in westminster democracies using new data from the modern scottish parliament we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks we look at differences in the way that parties operate in westminster and holyrood and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension using a simple variant of the agenda setting model in which members of parliament can commit to their voting strategies we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in westminster systems can explain this phenomenon in the equilibrium on some bills members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes we introduce new data from the house of lords the welsh assembly and the northern ireland assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data

imprisonment and social classification in five common law democracies 1955 1985 rates of imprisonment have risen in many western democracies over the past few decades most dramatically in the united states the development of a systematic and general explanation of imprisonment trends has been impeded because of the theoretical and methodological limitations of prior quantitative studies most use data from a single country or jurisdiction and focus narrowly on the rusche kirchheimer labor surplus hypothesis with little attention to alternative explanations this study takes a cross national perspective using longitudinal data from australia canada new zealand the united kingdom and the united states to offer an institutional account of imprisonment rates the labor surplus effect is treated as a special case of a more general process by which individuals are allocated among alternative life course paths this allocation process is likely to be influenced by macrolevel institutional arrangements and contests for political power hypotheses are tested using pooled time series

partisan governance women s employment and the social democratic service state the causes of the expansion and cross national variation in the provision of welfare state goods and services are examined social democratic governance is by far the most important determinant of the public delivery of services and is one of the most important determinants of the public funding of the provision of welfare state goods and services christian democratic governance is an important determinant of public funding of services but is not related to public delivery state structure is also an important determinant women s labor force participation is an important determinant of the expansion of public social welfare services net of other social political and historical factors the analysis also shows an interactive effect of women s labor force participation and social democratic governance on public delivery of welfare state services we conclude that public delivery of a wide range of welfare state services is the most distinctive feature of the social democratic welfare state and that this feature is a product of the direct and interactive effects of social democracy and women s mobilization

money and majorities in the federal republic of germany evidence for a veto players model of government spending i formulate a veto players model of policy making by coalition government in the federal republic of germany the model gives testable predictions about how patterns of federal spending respond to changes in government some of the predictions are consistent with conventional wisdom namely that the spd fdp government decreased spending on right wing items when it came to power in 1969 and the return of cdu fdp coalition in 1982 produced a decline in leftwing spending other predictions are less intuitive for example there is no predicted increase in left wing spending associated with the spdfdp coalition and no increase in right wing spending with the cdu fdp government these predictions and those of competing models are tested using disaggregated budget data from fiscal years 1961 1989 controlling for category specific effects and economic conditions the data support the veto players model and this support is robust to a wide variety of plausible assumptions about the parties spending preferences

bankruptcy and care choice this article considers the care choice of a potentially bankrupt injurer when care is pecuniary and the legal system is characterized by strict liability i show contrary to previous results that such an injurer may take too little or too much care and that neither injurer care nor victim welfare is necessarily increasing in injurer wealth when injurers behave optimally analysis of an expected cost function demonstrates that injurer expected costs are a concave and increasing function of injurer assets a result suggesting applications to the study of vertical relationships and markets for agents

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects or dimensions of policy such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members given a distribution of such portfolios final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities we develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy decision in multiparty legislatures in particular we focus on stable portfolio allocations where a stable allocation is one that yields a policy that no legislative coalition is willing or able to overturn several notions of stability are considered and related to the usual concept of the core among the results are that although stable allocations are not guaranteed such allocations can exist with minority governments and that final policy outcomes associated with stable governments need not be centrist

do institutions really matter taxation in industrialized democracies new institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of comparative politics political economy and public policy this article examines the role of institutional variation in political economic regimes in shaping tax burdens in industrialized democracies an institutionalist model for tax policy variation is tested across the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd democracies countries are conceptualized and statistically modeled in terms of majoritarian shifting coalition and dominant coalition governments regression analysis and cluster analysis are used to statistically model crossnational tax burdens relative to the strength of labor organization and party dominance in parliament this study finds that political and economic institutions are important in explaining tax policy variation specifying the structure of political and economic institutions helps to explain the size of the state in modern capitalist democracies this article specifies and demonstrates which institutions matter and how much they matter

immigration globalization and unemployment benefits in developed eu states at a time of mounting concern about how traditional welfare states will react to globalization there has been increasing interest in specifying how global economic forces affect welfare policies in industrialized states building on theories from the political economy and comparative institutional literatures we analyze the influence of an important aspect of globalization the flow of immigration focusing on states in the european union we present a theoretical model that illustrates the interactive relationships between immigration eu labor market integration and domestic institutions our findings highlight how immigration in conjunction with domestic political institutions affects unemployment provisions while labor market integrative forces remain in the background the story of immigration and unemployment compensation in the eu is less about the opening of borders and the market forces of integration and more about the domestic political pressures

should countries engage in a race to the bottom the effect of social spending on fdi summary this paper examines the effect of social spending in developing countries on foreign direct investment fdi existing studies on the race to the bottom in social services attempt to discern the extent to which fdi affects social expenditure however it remains an open question whether fdi is actually attracted to lower spending levels we find no indication that fdi is repelled by social spending indeed there is strong evidence that investment is associated with greater programmatic emphases on health and education these findings have important implications for leaders seeking to attract investment and for those attempting to expand social programs

does political knowledge increase turnout evidence from the 1997 british general election a number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout both information acquisition and turnout however are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations i address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media using survey data from the 1997 british general election study i show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

moral hazard renegotiation and debt abstract renegotiation of financial contracts is frequently observed in practice we show how contract renegotiation based on unverifiable information improves efficiency when both ex ante private action and ex post costly state verification moral hazard are present simultaneously we find that the final contract is always debt since renegotiation allows the parties to handle sequentially the two information problems

moral hazard and limited liability implications for the theory of the firm this paper presents a theory of the firm based on moral hazard in the provision of effort by an owner manager who borrows money in financial markets under conditions of limited liability the authors examine the relationship between the financial structure of the firm and the effort and output decisions of the owner manager results are reported concerning the determination of the firm s optimal financial structure and concerning the positive and normative implications of financial structure for pure competition and monopoly they also identify a strategic advantage from equity finance under cournot oligopoly copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the effects of capital mobility trade openness and democracy on social spending in latin america 1980 1999 empirical studies measuring the impact of globalization on social spending have appeared recently in leading journals this study seeks to improve upon previous work by 1 employing a more sophisticated and comprehensive measure of financial openness 2 using a more accurate measure of trade openness based on purchasing power parities and 3 relying on social spending data that are more complete than those used by previous studies on latin america our estimates suggest that several empirical patterns reported in previous work deserve a second look we find that trade openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures that financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs and that democracy has a strong positive association with social spending particularly on items that bolster human capital formation t he international integration of markets for goods and services over the past two decades is unprecedented amidst a broader context of international integration latin america has experienced the most dramatic change in its economic policy orientation since world war ii few regions have undergone as rapid and thorough an economic transformation how has economic integration affected the social welfare policies of latin american governments has it forced them to reduce spending on social programs in order to compete in the world economy or has it induced them to provide social safety nets for those hurt by economic competition has democratization in latin america compelled governments to spend more on social programs in relatively open economies

unequal participation democracy s unresolved dilemma presidential address american political science association 1996 low voter turnout is a serious democratic problem for five reasons 1 it means unequal turnout that is systematically biased against less well to do citizens 2 unequal turnout spells unequal political influence 3 u s voter turnout is especially low but measured as percent of voting age population it is also relatively low in most other countries 4 turnout in midterm regional local and supranational elections less salient but by no means unimportant elections tends to be especially poor 5 turnout appears to be declining everywhere the problem of inequality can be solved by institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout one option is the combination of voter friendly registration rules proportional representation infrequent elections weekend voting and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most important national elections the other option which can maximize turnout by itself is compulsory voting its advantages far outweigh the normative and practical objections to it

economic globalization domestic politics and income inequality in the developed countries a cross national study this article assesses the impact of economic globalization and domestic political factors on income inequality and state redistribution in the developed countries over the past two decades using household level data from the luxembourg income study that are more detailed accurate and cross nationally comparable than those used in previous empirical work it examines three major modes of international integration trade direct foreign investment and international financial flows as well as four domestic political variables the partisan balance of national cabinets electoral turnout union density and the centralization of wage setting institutions the study finds only scattered relationships between global integration and income distribution or redistribution but reasonably strong positive relationships between several domestic political variables and an egalitarian distribution of income and or extensive state redistribution these findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that emphasize the resilience of domestic political factors in the face of economic globalization

wage wars institutional politics wpa wages and the struggle for u s social policy the wpa was the most expensive and politically prominent u s social program of the 1930s and the generosity and very nature of u s social policy in its formative years was contested through the wpa in this article an institutional politics theory of social policy is elaborated that incorporates the influence of both institutional conditions and political actors institutions mediate the influence of political actors specifically it is argued that underdemocratized political systems and patronage oriented party systems dampen the cause of generous social spending and the impact of those struggling for it state actors left party regimes and social movements spur social policy but only under favorable institutional conditions to appraise this theory key senate roll call votes on wpa wage rates are examined as well as state level variations in wpa wages at the end of the 1930s the analyses which include multiple regression and qualitative comparative analysis support the theory

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

environmental risks and bank liability abstract many governments have introduced or are considering introducing laws to recover from the liable parties the cleanup costs caused by pollution damages in particular the banks who finance the firms causing environmental damages may be considered liable in various court cases in the us and elsewhere banks have been found liable while they have been exempted in others we develop a model in which the insurance sector may insure the firm for the pollution risk and the bank may lend money for investment under complete information of the bank about the firm s activities the limited liability of the firm induces excessive investment and insufficient care but full liability of the bank creates the appropriate internalization of the environmental risk this rationalization of the laws on lender liability must be qualified because in general the banks suffer from agency problems adverse selection and moral hazard in their relationships with firms in the adverse selection case full liability of the bank leads to underinvestment partial liability is better but may fail to implement the optimal second best allocation in the case of moral hazard full responsibility is killing the project too often while still leading to low care too often partial responsibility may achieve the second best optimal allocation but in some cases the level of responsibility necessary to induce the proper level of care is too high for the project to be financed by the bank we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results with regards to liability laws for environmental damages