information and incentives in computing services supply the effect of limited system choices abstract every organization has only limited computing resources that need to be shared by members of the organization rationing mechanisms such as pricing usually are used to regulate the demands for such resources however to derive an effective mechanism for determining the usage or the scale of an organization s computing service is difficult since there are many informational and incentive problems that need to be overcome by incorporating these problems into a game theoretic model this study analyzes the effects of limited system choices on an organization s net value generated from computing service based on the mechanism design approach the optimal incentive compatible mechanism is derived and contrasted with the case where the is department is evaluated as a profit center the results show that limited system choices can have significant effects on the value generated by an organization s computing service also depending on whether the is department is governed by the optimal mechanism or is evaluated as a profit center the effects oflimited system choices can be different managerial implications derived from the study are provided

cost allocation revisited an optimality result the resource manager of a firm is faced with capacity and pricing decisions with regard to a congestion prone system such as computer communication facilities difficulties arise since the manager is uninformed of the system demand when the capacity decision is to be made a game theoretic model is developed to analyze the effects of different accounting rules on the elicitation of relevant information and ex post efficiency in acquisition and allocation decisions the key result is that the cost allocation method aided by an anonymous reporting scheme is indeed as asserted by zimmerman zimmerman j 1979 the costs and benefits of cost allocations accounting rev 54 july 504 521 a full information efficient rule achieving optimality both in acquisition and allocation decisions discussions of the main assumptions underlying this result are provided

self organising behaviour in the presence of negative externalities a conceptual model of commuter choice abstract we use a model with local interaction a one dimensional cellular automaton to study how commuters choose among alternative roads commuters have information about their neighbours most recent experience local interaction and they remember their own experiences memory we illustrate how a simple self organizing system based on local information and locally rational agents can in some cases outperform the nash equilibrium while the social optimum is unenforceable without a central planner due to the variations in individual travel times i e the social optimum is not individually rational variations across commuters in the steady state of our self organising system are at least equivalent to and mostly significantly larger than those required for the social equilibrium increasing the neighbourhood size illustrates that more information without co ordination leads to worse overall performance

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

execution risk in high frequency arbitrage in this paper we investigate the role of execution risk in high frequency trading through arbitrage strategies we show that if rational agents face uncertainty about completing their arbitrage portfolios then arbitrage is limited even in markets with perfect substitutes and convertibility using a simple model we demonstrate that this risk arises from the crowding effect of competing arbitrageurs entering the same trade and inflicting negative externalities on each other our empirical results provide evidence that support the relevance of execution risk in high frequency arbitrage this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

information technology and time based competition in financial markets this paper studies time based competition in imperfect securities markets linking it investment decisions information processing delays and trading strategies at the it investment stage traders trade off the cost of it against their anticipated trading profits at the trading stage each trader devises a trading strategy based on his new information while taking into account the impact of both his own trades and those of other traders in the market our results illustrate how traders react to market imperfections due to trading costs and information processing delays and how superior traders convert a timeliness advantage into higher trading profits they also shed light on the relationship between the price adjustment process and traders information processing delays timeliness imposes an interesting structure on trader competition traders with longer information processing delays trade less frequently submit smaller orders and enjoy lower profits per trade our analysis of traders it investment decisions demonstrates how factors such as it costs number of traders and the frequency and nature of new information affect the level of it investments we further illustrate how improved it infrastructure translates into competitive advantage

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

analytical approximations in models of hysteresis decisions made under ongoing uncertainty and costly reversibility entail a range of the state variable where inaction is optimal which in turn produces hysteresis permanent effects of temporary shifts the range is usually defined by non linear equations that need numerical solutions in this paper a technique of analytical approximations is developed and applied to two models menu costs and investment the resulting explicit solutions help clarify why hysteresis is important even for small irreversibility in the menu cost model hysteresis is two orders of magnitude larger than under the akerlof yellen or mankiw assumptions when decisions that are costly to reverse are made under conditions of ongoing uncertainty the optimum policy usually entails a range of inertia the action should be taken only when the value of the underlying state variable becomes especially favourable and reversed only when it becomes especially unfavourable there is an intermediate range over which inaction is optimal this in turn gives rise to hysteresis starting from a value in the range of inertia if the state variable crosses the action trigger point and then returns to its original level the action will be taken but not reversed thus a temporary change will leave a permanent effect numerical solutions for models of irreversible investment show that the range of inaction is remarkably large even when the cost of reversal is small see brennan and schwartz 1985 constantinides 1986 and dixit 1989a b for examples of this unfortunately the equations tlhat determine the optimum policy are highly non linear they do not have analytical solutions therefore we lack a clearer and more general understanding of why hysteresis is numerically so important in this paper i derive analytical approximations for the solutions of more general problems of this kind when the costs of change are small the idea that small costs of change induce large amounts of inertia has been popularized in the model of akerlof and yellen 1985 mankiw 1985 and others in these models second order small costs of making price changes yield price stickiness in response to first order changes in the money supply this is a simple application of the envelope theorem but these models are static and their application to a dynamic reality must assume either permanent shocks or static expectations when there is ongoing uncertainty which is rationally expected by the decision maker the option value of the status quo enlarges the zone where inaction is optimal adding these features to the mankiw akerlof yellen may model i show that fourth order small costs of change generate first order inertia

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

stability and chaos in input pricing for a service facility with adaptive customer response to congestion we consider the stability of the equilibrium arrival rate and equilibrium admission price at a service facility using a generalization of an input pricing model introduced by dewan and mendelson and further examined by stidham at the equilibrium the marginal value of service equals the admission price that is the sum of the admission fee and the expected delay cost stability means roughly that the system returns to the equilibrium after a perturbation assuming the customers base their join balk decisions on previous prices we extend the discrete time dynamic system pricing model of stidham to allow adaptive expectations in which customers predict the future price based on a convex combination of the current price and the previous prediction we show that this can lead to chaotic behavior when the equilibrium is unstable that is the price and arrival rate can follow aperiodic orbits which appear to be completely random our results suggest an alternative explanation for observed variations in the mean arrival rate to a queueing system which are often modeled by means of a random exogenous e g markovian environment process

is corruption grease grit or a gamble corruption increases variance of productivity across countries the effect of corruption on economic growth has attracted interest in empirical development economics the conventional view of corruption as impediment for growth has been challenged by the grease on the wheels hypothesis we take a new perspective on the issue and suggest corruption as macro risk referred to as a gamble hypothesis using cross country data and two alternative indicators of corruption we find corruption to be a significant driver of heteroscedasticity in total productivity this supports the new gamble hypothesis we also note some misleading interpretations in the previously published frontier applications to avoid these shortcomings we apply a flexible semi nonparametric estimator

corruption is bad for growth even in the united states we estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in u s states we improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption we find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

revenue management model for on demand it services abstract this paper presents a model for applying revenue management to on demand it services the multinomial logit model is used to describe customer choice over multiple classes with different service level agreements slas a nonlinear programming model is provided to determine the optimal price or service level for each class through a numerical analysis we examine the impacts of system capacity and customer waiting incentives on the service provider s profit and pricing strategies

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

capacity and lead time management when demand for service is seasonal and lead time sensitive in today s competitive business environment quick service with minimal waiting time is an important factor for customers when choosing a service many service organizations guarantee a uniform lead time to all customers in order to gain competitive advantages in the market in selecting a lead time to quote the firm has to take into consideration not only how customers will react to the delivery time guarantee but also whether it has adequate capacity to fulfill the commitment a short lead time can bring both benefits and costs it can increase customer demand but might require a higher capacity level we present a mathematical model and a solution method for determining the optimal quoted lead time and capacity level for a profit maximizing firm with time varying and lead time sensitive demand the firm incurs convex capacity costs and pays lateness penalties whenever the actual lead time exceeds the quoted lead time a few studies have been conducted on the relationship between uniform lead time capacity demand and overall profitability however none of them takes the time variation of demand into account our work differs from previous research in that we explicitly model such a demand pattern

dynamic pricing for network service equilibrium and stability consider a data communication network owned and operated by a single organization the network has an infinite number of small users and is managed by a system manager sm whose objective is to maximize the net value of the system as a whole the objective of this paper is to study pricing mechanisms that induce the optimal arrival rates when the sm has no full knowledge of the demand in advance we investigate the system behavior under three alternative dynamic pricing rules and users expectations models and characterize the equilibrium and its stability conditions

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time we analyze the allocation of priority in queues via simple bidding mechanisms in our model the stochastically arriving customers are privately informed about their own processing time they make bids upon arrival at a queue whose length is unobservable we consider two bidding schemes that differ in the definition of bids these may reflect either total payments or payments per unit of time and in the timing of payments before or after service in both schemes a customer obtains priority over all customers waiting in the queue or arriving while he is waiting who make lower bids our main results show how the convexity concavity of the function expressing the costs of delay determines the queue discipline i e shortest processing time first spt longest processing time first lpt arising in a bidding equilibrium

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

waiting line auctions if prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first come first served basis then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue this choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction an equilibrium for this waiting line auction is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed tender auctions when individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line

an efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery abstract governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first come first served basis rationing by waiting while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes a model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting if the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods other income are complements then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency and a dual pricing scheme can augment social welfare however if the rationed commodity and other income are substitutes then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal

sensitivity of optimal prices to system parameters in a steady state service facility we consider the problem of maximizing the long run average reward in a service facility with dynamic pricing we investigate sensitivity of optimal pricing policies to the parameters of the service facility which is modelled as an m m s k queueing system arrival process to the facility is poisson with arrival rate a decreasing function of the price currently being charged by the facility we prove structural results on the optimal pricing policies when the parameters in the facility change namely we show that optimal prices decrease when the capacity of the facility or the number of servers in the facility increase under a reasonable assumption we also show that optimal prices increase as the overall demand for the service provided by the facility increases or when the service rate of the facility decreases we illustrate how these structural results simplify the required computational effort while finding the optimal policy

concurrent pricing and lot sizing for make to order contract production abstract this paper develops a model for the simultaneous i e concurrent determination of the inventory and pricing policies of a supplier which produces and supplies a product to a buyer on the basis of a contractual agreement calling for the delivery of a specific quantity periodically assuming that the customer is rational i e it follows its own optimal purchasing policy the objective of the supplier is to determine the product s selling price in conjunction with an appropriate production inventory policy so that a predetermined gross profit level is achieved it is further assumed that the supplier s production batch size is an integer multiple of the buyer s order quantity in formulating a mathematical model of this situation the interactions between the product s price the buyer s economic order quantity and the supplier s selling price costs and profit are taken into account for solving this model a simple iterative algorithm is proposed which is illustrated through a numerical example sensitivity analysis performed on the model demonstrates that it is relatively robust and quite insensitive to errors in estimating the buyer s ordering to carrying cost ratio on the part of the producer

congestion and network externalities in the short run pricing of information system services transfer pricing provides management with an efficient tool for coordinating the use of information system services in practice these services if they are charged out to end users are priced via an allocation of historical costs based on individual usage or are assigned a price based on the fair market value of outside alternatives both approaches encourage suboptimal usage of information systems resources they ignore three constituents of optimal transfer prices 1 the reaction of other users to any change in a given user s consumption of service 2 the technical response to additional use of an information system service in the form of congestion and network externalities and 3 end user preferences for the information system service together these influences on demand contribute to an externality two types of externalities are significant in information systems congestion externalities decrease and network externalities increase the utility of services this research provides a complete model for computing optimal transfer price which corrects several existing problems in information system service valuation when full absorption cost allocations contain significant fixed precommitted or sunk cost components it is not possible to balance the budget direct costing improves on full absorption costing but misspecifies costs when demand is nonlinear to balance the budget with a minimum of disutility to end users management must resort to second best pricing inefficiency arises from two sources when externalities are ignored in transfer pricing end users cannot plan service usage and thus encounter unanticipated congestion which lowers morale and efficiency and increases costly expediting where congestion effects are highly nonlinear congestion may effectively shut down the system on the other hand incorrect transfer prices can motivate usage too low to take advantage of network benefits end users may confuse externality effects and intrinsic value of an information system service in these cases the price and performance of outside alternatives exert a complex and subtle influence on use and pricing of services where there exist identical outside and inside processing alternatives and transfer pricing does not reflect this there is a significant tendency to overprice and underutilize internal services in this case there may be a tendency to outsource when processing should be kept in house future markets for information systems will favor technologies which exhibit strong network externalities and pricing of these technologies will become increasingly complex because of the interrelationship of hardware software and data originated externalities the models provided in this research will allow management to take advantage of these opportunities

optimal internal pricing and capacity planning for service facility with finite buffer abstract an economic model is developed for exploring optimal internal pricing and capacity planning for service facility with finite buffer capacity because of the limited buffer capacity jobs finding the system full upon their arrival would be rejected such rejections create a gap between the value collectively perceived by users and the actual achievement of the organizational value this gap called a loss externality has never been studied before and plays an important role for designing optimal pricing scheme in general the underlying economic structure may involve multiple equilibria and it is unclear whether or not the system can be controlled through internal pricing in this regard a sufficient condition is given under which the system administrator can find two separate prices for accepted and rejected users at any demand level to be desired so that the desired demand level becomes the unique equilibrium of the system for a short run problem it is shown that the optimal pricing scheme can be expressed as the sum of the congestion and the loss externalities for a long run problem the optimal pricing scheme is expressed in a unified manner so that a structural relationship between the short run problem and the long run problem at optimality can be readily observed a necessary and sufficient condition is also given for the marginal capacity pricing to be optimal i e the optimal long run pricing consists of the marginal cost for processing capacity and the marginal cost for buffer capacity without involving any externality at all

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

pricing and lead time decisions in decentralized supply chains this paper studies a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price and lead time sensitive demands a stackelberg game is constructed to analyze the price and lead time decisions by the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower the equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained using the performance of the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark we show that decentralized decisions in general are inefficient and lead to inferior performance due to the double marginalization effect however further analysis shows that the decision inefficiency is strongly influenced by market and operational factors and if the operational factors are dominating it may not be significant this shows that before pursuing a coordination strategy with retailers a supplier should first improve his or her own internal operations

externalities tangible externalities and queue disciplines externalities are the marginal costs that a user of a common resource imposes on others we introduce the efficient measure of tangible externalities that are the costs that a user imposes on others while being served then for a single server queueing system under various service disciplines we compute the expected externalities and the expected tangible externalities conditioning on the length of the service requirement

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

on controlling crime with corrupt officials abstract this paper attempts to synthesize the recently developed strategic approach towards modeling corruption and the classical views the following propositions are sought to be proved a if reward schemes are introduced the classical and the strategic approaches yield similar results so far as controlling crime is concerned b with probability of detection being dependent on the effort of a corrupt official crime cannot be controlled and c in the context of an infinitely repeated game of crime the corrupt law enforcing agent might choose less bribes and lower effort level than the myopic optimal and hence would strategically pamper crime

an income satiation model of efficiency wages efficiency wages are wages that exceed a worker s reservation wage a standard explanation for such wages is bonding high wages increase the cost of being discharged for misbehavior and so help ensure worker honesty a neglected alternative is satiation by decreasing the worker s marginal utility of income the high wage decreases the benefit from misbehavior satiation unlike bonding applies even in a one period model but it relies on the misbehavior having a monetary benefit and on at least part of the punishment being nonmonetary

user delay costs and internal pricing for a service facility this paper studies optimal pricing and capacity decisions for a service facility in an environment where users delay cost is important the model assumes a general nonlinear delay cost structure and incorporates the tradeoff between the delay cost and capacity cost we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of a pricing rule that charges out service resources at their marginal capacity cost we examine the issue of budgetary balance and find that net value maximization entails a budget deficit for the service facility that is the service facility should be evaluated as a deficit center the results provide guidelines under which the optimal magnitude of the deficit can be determined

pricing and capacity decisions for a service facility stability and multiple local optima we consider a model for optimal pricing and capacity for a service facility the problem is formulated as one of optimal design of a single server queueing system in which the design variables are the service rate and the arrival rate equivalently the price charged for admission the model is a variant of one introduced by dewan and mendelson we allow for an upper bound on the arrival rate and consider slightly more general user value functions we show that an optimal solution may not lie in the interior of the feasible region and thus may not be characterized by the first order differential conditions moreover the first order conditions typically have several solutions some of which may be relative minima and produce a negative value of the objective function customer value minus the sum of expected delay cost and capacity cost per unit time we also examine the stability of the equilibrium arrival rate and the convergence of a dynamic adaptive algorithm for finding the optimal service rate in the context of a model in which the distribution of customers value of service is uniform we show that the equilibrium arrival rate is stable if and only if the service rate is above a threshold value which depends on the price charged for admission and the parameters of the uniform distribution of value of service the dynamic adaptive algorithm always converges to a relative maximum of the objective function if the service rate can be adjusted every time the arrival rate changes otherwise the algorithm will start to diverge if and when the service rate ever falls below the threshold value associated with stability of the equilibrium arrival rate

allocating spending between advertising and information technology in electronic retailing this study examines coordination issues that occur in allocating spending between advertising and information technology it in electronic retailing electronic retailers run the risk of overspending on advertising to attract customers but underspending on it thus resulting in inadequate processing capacity at the firm s website in this paper we present a centralized joint marketing it model to optimally allocate spending between advertising and it and we discuss an uncoordinated case where marketing and it make suboptimal advertising and capacity decisions we show how these decisions can be coordinated either by reducing the value of a customer session or by designing an optimal processing contract between marketing and it both the coordination methods can be implemented with only local knowledge of the it function yet they generate a solution that almost matches the quality of the centralized solution we extend our basic model to consider demand uncertainty lagged advertising effects and uncertainties in the lead time to acquire it capacity with demand uncertainty electronic retailers should reduce spending on advertising and increase it capacity if there is potential for a demand upswing and the cost of it capacity is relatively low the value of a customer session should be further reduced when uncertainties exist this is required to share the risk of excess or inadequate it capacity

pricing production scheduling and delivery time competition this paper studies competition between firms that produce goods or services for customers sensitive to delay time firms compete by setting prices and production rates for each type of customer and by choosing scheduling policies the existence of a competitive equilibrium is proved the competitive equilibrium is well defined whether or not a firm can differentiate between customers based upon physical characteristics because each customer has incentive to truthfully reveal its delay cost further insights are derived in two special cases a unique equilibrium exists for each of the cases in the first case firms are differentiated by cost mean processing time and processing time variability but customers are homogeneous the conclusions include that a faster lower variability and lower cost firm always has a larger market share higher capacity utilization and higher profits however this firm may have higher prices and faster delivery time or lower prices and longer delivery time in the second

clientelism corruption and the allocation of resources corruption has been shown to have more serious effects upon allocation than simply drawing resources into rent seeking activities if politicians anticipate gains from corruption in the policy making process sub optimal policies will be the result typical examples include excessive nationalization of industry excessive regulation of the private sector through practices such as licensing and quotas with a view to extract the rent created by these measures in addition further misallocation will result at the execution state it has been shown that the revisionists were wrong in assuming that licenses and contracts will be allocated to the most efficient producers that rent will be eliminated in government employment and that corruption increases the efficiency of the bureaucracy moreover differential access to government services leads to additional allocative losses

incentive compatible pricing for a service facility with joint production and congestion externalities this paper considers the pricing problem of a service facility when services are jointly produced by the customers and the facility building on the work of mendelson 1985 we model the facility as a gi gi 1 queue with customer chosen service rates and linear delay costs we show that the service rates chosen by the customers based on their self interest are always suboptimal for the facility due to congestion externalities we derive optimal incentive compatible pricing schemes that can achieve optimal arrival rates and induce customers to choose optimal service rates for the case of systemwide net value maximization we show that the optimal incentive compatible pricing scheme consists of a variable fee that is proportional to the actual service time and a fixed rebate that is equal to a customer1s expected delay cost in the queue for the case of profit maximization of the facility we show that the optimal pricing scheme again consists of a fixed fee and a variable fee one insight from our analysis is that it may be appropriate for a service facility to reimburse each customer for his actual delay cost in the queue

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

capacity allocation using past sales when to turn and earn consider a supplier selling to multiple retailers demand varies across periods but the supplier s capacity and wholesale price are fixed if demand is high the retailers needs exceed capacity and the supplier must implement an allocation mechanism to dole out production we examine how the choice of mechanism impacts retailer actions and supply chain performance in particular we analyze turn and earn allocation a method commonly used in the automobile industry this scheme bases current allocations on past sales and thus enables retailers to influence their future allocations they compete for scarce capacity even if they do not compete for customers we show that turn and earn induces the retailers to increase their sales when demand is low and the supplier s capacity is otherwise underutilized supplier profits thus increase the impact on the supply chain depends on how restrictive capacity is with mildly tight capacity the retailers higher sales rate does not significantly lower their profits but does reduce the cost of idle capacity supply chain performance improves with extremely tight capacity the retailers intense competition dissipates more profits than the supplier gains and supply chain performance suffers consequently turn and earn does not generally coordinate the system it is best characterized as a means for the supplier to increase her profits at the expense of the retailers and potentially even the supply chain furthermore these results hold even if the retailers can hold inventory in anticipation of scarce capacity

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

cost allocation and opportunity costs one explanation for the widespread use of allocated fixed costs is that they can serve as a proxy for difficult to calculate opportunity costs this explanation is pursued by modeling a service department as an m m s s queueing system two main results are that the expected value of opportunity costs equals both the incremental productivity of capacity and the optimal transfer price when the cost of capacity is of the form cs as and is close to one we show that allocated fixed costs are a good proxy for average opportunity costs however if there are great economies of scale is close to zero then a method which charges users only for the variable costs of the service department is recommended finally the economic efficiency of transfer prices based on either variable cost or full cost is compared with optimal transfer pricing policies

modeling bounded rationality in capacity allocation games with the quantal response equilibrium we consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers the retailers choose their orders strategically and if their orders exceed the supplier s capacity quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders we experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives we find that the nash equilibrium which assumes that players are perfectly rational substantially exaggerates retailers tendency to strategically order more than they need we propose a model of bounded rationality based on the quantal response equilibrium in which players are not perfect optimizers and they face uncertainty in their opponents actions we structurally estimate model parameters using the maximum likelihood method our results confirm that retailers exhibit bounded rationality become more rational through repeated game play but may not converge to perfect rationality as assumed by the nash equilibrium finally we consider several alternative behavioral theories and show that they do not explain our experimental data as well as our bounded rationality model this paper was accepted by loana popescu guest editor operations management

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

an explicit solution for dynamic menu costs with zero discounting abstract in a dynamic stochastic environment small menu costs generate considerable inertia this paper uses the average cost criterion to analyse a model with zero discounting and considers the relationship between the discounted and zero discounting models of dynamic menu costs

integration of capacity pricing and lead time decisions in a decentralized supply chain abstract we consider a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price and lead time sensitive demand the decision process is modelled by a stackelberg game where the supplier as a leader determines the capacity and the wholesale price and the retailer as a follower determines the sale price and lead time the equilibrium strategy of these two players is obtained by comparing with the performance of the corresponding decentralized chain without capacity decision as a benchmark we characterize the impact of capacity decision on the players profit i e the supplier s profit may be always significantly increased while the retailer s profit is only increased when the capacity is underestimated in the benchmark model further we demonstrate that the integration of capacity decision can also significantly reduce the profit loss caused by double marginalization finally we find that the revenue sharing and two part tariff contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized channel instead we propose a franchise contract with a contingent rebate that can achieve channel coordination and a win win outcome

corruption types of corruption and firm financial performance new evidence from a transitional economy using a nationwide survey of provincial institutional quality and a sample of private manufacturing small and medium scale enterprises the smes this paper contributes to the literature by considering for the first time the effects of corruption on the financial performance of vietnamese private smes interestingly contrary to previous findings we find that corruption when measured by a dummy variable does not affect firms financial performance after controlling for heterogeneity simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity however the intensity of bribery and the majority of the forms of corruption were found to have negative impacts on firms financial performance hence a typical approach using only a dummy variable for bribery might not adequately evaluate the impact of bribe intensity or even ignores the negative impacts of some types of bribes on firms financial performance the findings suggest that anti corruption measures are vital for the development of the vietnamese private smes

on the elements and practices of monitoring abstract politicians and businessmen have to address the principal agent problem whenever delegation of power occurs installing a monitoring scheme may help to ensure that the officers perform the desired functions checks and balances are the theme in the political arena while management and control are the routines in the business world throughout history numerous monitoring networks have been deployed to overcome the difficulties comparing how those monitoring networks solved the controlling issues may shed light on the incentive structures embodied furthermore the evolution of institutions and organizations could be discerned via the changes in incentives

a model of bureaucracy and corruption we analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and lemons exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral random matches agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats as a result private agents might bribe bureaucrats whereas they do not bribe each other an equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist we discuss some welfare implications of the model

a contract and balancing mechanism for sharing capacity in a communication network we propose a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth our approach can be employed either when a network owner wishes to sell bandwidth for a specified period of time to a number of different users or when users cooperate to build a network to be shared among themselves our proposed contract and balancing mechanism can mediate between rapidly fluctuating prices and the longer time scales over which bandwidth contracts may be traded an advantage of the process is that it avoids perverse incentives for a capacity provider to increase congestion

relevant costs congestion and stochasticity in production environments abstract conventional management accounting principles used to evaluate relevant costs have been developed under the assumption of deterministic manufacturing settings manufacturing operations however are complex and stochastic in this paper we examine the impact of stochasticity in the production process on relevant costs based on a dynamic assessment of capacity constraints we develop a model to analyze the behavior of relevant costs with respect to changes in the expected duration and variability in set ups and processing an implication of this analysis is that for profit maximization capacity will exceed expected demand if production rates or demand are stochastic

moonlighting public service and private practice we study job incentives in moonlighting when public service physicians may refer patients to their private practices some doctors in the public system are dedicated and behave sincerely but others the moonlighters are utility maximizers allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare but equilibrium public care quality may increase or decrease if quality increases moonlighting improves each consumer s expected utility unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare

promised delivery time and capacity games in time based competition we investigate firms competitive behaviors in industries where customers are sensitive to both promised delivery time pdt and quality of service qos measured by the on time delivery rate to study the competition in pdt at the marketing level we construct an oligopoly game with an external qos requirement we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium and the equilibrium qos exhibits a switching surface structure with respect to capacities to study the competition in capacity at the strategic level we construct a two stage game in which the firms compete in terms of their capacities in stage 1 and in terms of pdt in stage 2 we show the existence of two different types of pure strategy equilibria and characterize them this study provides the following insights an index of time based competitive advantage itca and the first mover advantage determine the positions of the firms in time based competition either the well known prisoner s dilemma or off equilibrium behaviors due to different preferences for equilibria when multiple equilibria exist may lead the firms to overinvest in capacity but no one may gain a competitive advantage a uniform improvement in internal efficiency i e a uniform capacity cost reduction may harm everyone quality differentiation i e going beyond the qos benchmark plays a dual role in time based competition either helping a firm with a larger itca to compete more effectively or helping a firm possibly with a smaller itca to preempt competitors and protect its market advantage this paper was accepted by paul h zipkin operations and supply chain management

investigating sensitivity and the impact of information on pricing decisions in an m m 1 queueing model we consider a model for optimal pricing for a job shop the problem is formulated as a single server queueing model where an arriving customer enters the system if his reward drawn from a stochastic variable exceeds the sum of the price charge of his job plus the expected waiting costs the optimal price is found with respect to profit optimization and welfare optimization two models are formulated the first model called ninf contains only steady state queue information the other model called ql contains more detailed information because here an arriving customer is informed about the number of customers already in the system the main interpretation of the models is how complex an information system should the job shop provide to its customers we show that for both criteria functions it pays off except for a special case to use the more detailed information system in the paper we also investigate how sensitive the pricing decision and its outcome on the criteria functions are on the variance of the reward distribution which in the paper is assumed to be uniformly distributed concerning welfare optimization we show that a decreased variance always results in a decreased welfare contribution while concerning profit optimization a decreased variance can result in both a decreased as well as an increased profit contribution

how corruption influences foreign direct investment a panel data study abstract this article analyzes the sign and development of the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment fdi economic theory distinguishes grabbing hand corruption from helping hand corruption the former suggests a negative impact of corruption on fdi the latter one a positive effect empirically we apply a data set of 21 home and 59 developed and less developed host countries covering between 1983 and 1999 to investigate the corruption impact we employ a panel data model that particularly refers to the knowledge capital model of multinational activity we find a negative relationship between corruption and fdi this in turn suggests that the helping hand effects of corruption are outweighed by the grabbing hand effects further we observe that corruption is an important impediment of fdi in developed economies but not in less developed ones finally we demonstrate that the importance of corruption has decreased over the years

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

why are prices sticky the dynamics of wholesale gasoline prices the menu cost interpretation of sticky prices implies that the probability of a price change should depend on the past history of prices and fundamentals only through the gap between the current price and the frictionless price we find that this prediction is broadly consistent with the behavior of nine philadelphia gasoline wholesalers nevertheless we reject the menu cost model as a literal description of these firms behavior arguing instead that price stickiness arises from strategic considerations of how customers and competitors will react to price changes

mechanism design for free but no free disposal services the economics of personalization under privacy concerns online personalization services belong to a class of economic goods with a no free disposal nfd property where consumers do not always prefer more services to less because of the privacy concerns these concerns arise from the revelation of information necessary for the provision of personalization services we examine vendor strategies in a market where consumers have heterogeneous concerns about privacy in successive generalizations we allow the vendor to offer a fixed level of personalization variable levels of personalization and monetary transfers coupons to the consumers that depend on the level of personalization chosen we show that a vendor offering a fixed level of personalization does not offer a coupon unless his marginal value of information mvi is sufficiently high and even when personalization is costless the vendor does not cover the market under a fixed services offering the vendor serves the same market with or without couponing next we demonstrate that in the absence of couponing the vendor s optimal variable personalization services contract maximizes surplus for all heterogeneous consumers which is in contrast to standard results from monopolistic screening when the vendor can offer coupons that vary according to personalization levels the optimal contract is not fully revealing unless his mvi is high and he will not offer coupons when this mvi is low however a vendor with a moderate mvi between certain thresholds offers a bunched contract wherein consumers with low privacy concerns receive a variable services coupon contract those with moderate privacy concerns receive a fixed services coupon contract and those with high privacy concerns do not participate in the market the coupon value is decreasing in privacy sensitivity of consumers

competition in multiechelon assembly supply chains in this paper we study competition in multiechelon supply chains with an assembly structure firms in the supply chain are grouped into homogenous sectors nodes that contain identical firms with identical production capabilities that all produce exactly one undifferentiated product that may itself be a kit of components each sector may use several inputs to produce its product and these inputs are supplied by different sectors the production process within any sector is taken to be pure assembly in fixed proportions the number of firms in each sector is known the demand curve for the final product is assumed to be linear as are production costs in all sectors competition is modeled via a coordinated successive cournot model in which firms choose production quantities for their downstream market so as to maximize profits given prices for all inputs and all complementary products production quantities for sectors supplying the same successor are coordinated through pricing mechanisms so that complementary products are produced in the right proportions under these assumptions equilibrium prices for any multiechelon assembly network are characterized by a system of linear equations we derive closed form expressions for equilibrium quantities and prices in any two stage system i e a system with multiple input sectors and a single assembly sector we show that any assembly structure can be converted to an equivalent larger structure in which no more than two components are assembled at any node finally large structures can be solved either by direct solution of the characteristic linear equations or through an iterative reduction compression to smaller structures

price delivery time guarantees and capacity selection this paper studies the impact of using delivery time guarantees as a competitive strategy in service industries where demands are sensitive to both price and delivery time we assume that delivery reliability is crucial and investment in capacity expansion is plausible in order to maintain a high probability of delivering the time guarantee a mathematical framework is proposed to understand the interrelations among pricing delivery time guarantee and capacity expansion decisions specifically an optimization model is developed to determine the joint optimal selection of these three important decision variables with an objective of maximizing the average net profit we characterize the optimal decisions and study their qualitative behaviors as various parameters change we further present a numerical example to illustrate how the results of our model can be used to provide useful managerial insights for selecting the best competing strategies for firms with different operating characteristics our model and results are also applicable to a make to order manufacturing environment

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically