time preferences and mortgage choice abstractmortgage decisions have important consequences for consumers lenders and the state of the economy more generally mortgage decisions are also prototypical of consumer financial choices that involve a stream of expenditures and consumption occurring across time the authors use heterogeneity in time preferences for both immediate present bias and long term outcomes to explain a sequence of mortgage decisions including mortgage choice and the decision to abandon a mortgage the authors employ an analytic model and a survey of mortgaged households augmented by zip code level house price and foreclosure data the model suggests and data confirm that consumers with greater present bias and long term discounting tend to choose mortgages that minimize up front costs however greater present bias decreases homeowners willingness to abandon a mortgage locking them into the contract long term patience increases mortgage abandonment this reversal across mortgage decisions is difficult for alternati

household risk management and optimal mortgage choice the portfolio of the typical american household is quite unlike the diversie ed portfolio of liquid assets discussed in e nance textbooks the major asset in the portfolio is a house a relatively illiquid asset with an uncertain capital value the value of the house generally exceeds the net worth of the household which e nances its homeownership through a mortgage contract to create a leveraged position in residential real estate other e nancial assets and liabilities are typically far less important than the house and its associated mortgage contract the importance of housing in household wealth is illustrated in figure i this e gure plots the fraction of household assets in housing and in equities against the wealth percentile of the household poor households appear at the left of the e gure and wealthy households at the right data come from the 1989 and 1998 survey of consumer finances the e gure shows that middle class american families from roughly the fortieth to the eightieth percentile of the wealth distribution have more than half their assets in the form of housing even after the expansion of equity ownership during the 1990s equities are of negligible importance for these households 1

house prices home equity based borrowing and the u s household leverage crisis us household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession the top panel of figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975 which accelerated beginning in 2002 in just five years the household sector doubled its debt balance in comparison the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest the middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt to income ratio during the same time period corporate leverage declined the dramatic absolute and relative rise in us household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years one reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers mian and sufi 2009 strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 however which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners given that 65 percent of us households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively we examine this home equity based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency we follow a random sample of over 74 000 us homeowners who owned their homes as of 1997 at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008 the bottom panel of figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006 while the aggregate trend is suggestive

the nature of precautionary wealth abstract this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics to provide some of the first direct evidence that wealth is systematically higher for consumers with predictably greater income uncertainty however the apparent pattern of precautionary wealth is not consistent with a standard parameterization of the life cucle model in which consumers are patient enough to begin saving for retirement early in life wealth is estimated to be far less sensitive to uncertainty than implied by that model instead our results suggest that over most of their working life time consumers behave in accordance with the buffer stock models of saving described in carroll 1992 1997 or deaton 1991 in which consumers hold wealth principally to insulate consumption against near term fluctuations in income

looking behind mortgage delinquencies abstract delinquency rates for mortgages originated before and after the financial crisis are examined using a novel and large panel obtained by merging data from tax records and credit registers first we estimate the selection into the mortgage market using an exogenous index of local credit supply as exclusion restriction second controlling for selection we estimate the impact of income shocks on the delinquency rate we find that since 2008 the selection process has led to the halving of the delinquency rate conditional on the creation of a new mortgage job losses nearly double the delinquency risk estimates uncorrected for selection are severely downward biased

carbon emissions and energy effects on a two level manufacturer retailer closed loop supply chain model with remanufacturing subject to different coordination mechanisms abstract this paper presents two models classical and vmi cs coordination for a two level closed loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer with a facility to remanufacture used items the paper considers three critical environmental issues which are the energy used in production manufacturing and remanufacturing processes ghg emissions from production and transportation activities subject to a penalty tax and the number of times to remanufacture recover a used item numerical results show that the traditional optimization approach which minimises the sum of inventory related costs suggested less remanufacturing fewer recovery times and more ghg emissions and energy usage a result of operating at high production rates the vmi cs model was shown to be more economical than the classical model for a wide range of manufacturing rates but not necessarily a more environmentally responsible choice an extensive numerical analysis was conducted to enrich the discussion and to draw some managerial insights on how to make environmentally conscious decisions

tax subsidies to owner occupied housing an asset market approach inflation reduces the effective cost of homeownership and raises the tax subsidy to owner occupation this paper presents an asset market model of the housing market and estimates how changes in the expected inflation rate affect the real price of houses and the equilibrium size of the housing capital stock simulation results suggest that the accelerating inflation of the 1970s which substantially reduced homeowners user costs could have accounted for as much as a 30 percent increase in real house prices persistent high inflation rates could lead ultimately to a sizable increase in the stock of owner occupied housing

mortgage default during the u s mortgage crisis this paper asks which theories of mortgage default are quantitatively consistent with observations in the united states during 2002 2010 theoretical models are simulated for the observed time series of aggregate house prices their predictions are then compared to actual default rates on prime fixed rate mortgages an out of sample test discriminates between estimated reduced forms of the two most prominent theories the test reveals that the doubletrigger hypothesis attributing mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event like unemployment outperforms a frictionless option theoretic default model based on this finding a structural partialequilibrium model with liquidity constraints and idiosyncratic unemployment shocks is presented to provide micro foundations for the double trigger hypothesis in this model borrowers with negative equity are more likely to default when they are unemployed and have low liquid wealth the model explains most of the observed strong rise in mortgage default rates a policy implication of the model is that subsidizing homeowners can mitigate a mortgage crisis at a lower cost than bailing out lenders

mortgage debt consumption and illiquid housing markets in the great recession using a model with housing search endogenous credit constraints and mortgage default this paper accounts for the housing crash from 2006 to 2011 and its implications for aggregate and cross sectional consumption during the great recession left tail shocks to labor market uncertainty and tighter down payment requirements emerge as the key drivers an endogenous decline in housing liquidity amplifies the recession by increasing foreclosures contracting credit and depressing consumption balance sheets act as a transmission mechanism from housing to consumption that depends on gross portfolio positions and the leverage distribution low interest rate policies accelerate the recovery in housing and consumption

mortgage terminations heterogeneity and the exercise of mortgage options as applied to the behavior of homeowners with mortgages option theoiy predicts that mortgage prepayment or default will be exercised if the call or put option is in the money by some specific amount our analysis tests the extent to which the option approach can explain default and prepayment behavior evaluates the practical importance of modeling both options simultaneouisly and models the unobserved heterogeneity of borrowers in the home mortgage market the paper presents a uinified model of the competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default considering the two hazards as dependent competing risks that are estimated jointly it also accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers and estimates the unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously with the parameters and baseline hazards associated with prepayment and default functions our results show that the option model in its most straightfolward version does a good job of explaininig default and prepayment but it is not enouigh by itself the simultaneity of the options is very important empirically in explaining behavior the results also show that there exists significant heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers ignoring this heterogeneity results in serious errors in estimating the prepayment behavior of homeowners

evidence on the benefits of alternative mortgage products alternative mortgage products have been identified by many as culprits in the financial crisis however because of their lower initial mortgage payments relative to loan amount they may be a valuable tool for households that expect higher and more certain future labor income and that wish to smooth consumption over the life cycle using u k household level panel data this paper provides evidence in support of this hypothesis and highlights other important benefits of alternative mortgages including portfolio diversification tax benefits and a reduction in the transaction costs incurred in housing transactions

a model of mortgage default in this paper we solve a dynamic model of households mortgage decisions incorporating labor income house price inflation and interest rate risk using a zero profit condition for mortgage lenders we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions the model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates loan to value ratios and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable rate mortgages during the recent u s housing downturn and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates

stochastic house appreciation and optimal mortgage lending w e characterize the optimal mortgage contract in a continuous time setting with stochastic growth in house price and income costly foreclosure and a risky borrower who requires incentives to repay his debt we show that many features of subprime loans can be consistent with properties of the optimal contract and that when house prices decline mortgage modification can create value for borrowers and lenders our model provides a number of empirical predictions that relate the features of mortgage contracts originated in a housing boom and the extent of their modification in a slump to location and borrowers characteristics jel g20 g21 g33

recourse and residential mortgage default evidence from us states we quantify the effect of recourse on default and find that recourse affects default by lowering the borrower s sensitivity to negative equity at the mean value of the default option for defaulted loans borrowers are 30 more likely to default in non recourse states furthermore for homes appraised at 500 000 to 750 000 borrowers are twice as likely to default in non recourse states we also find that defaults are more likely to occur through a lender friendly procedure such as a deed in lieu in states that allow deficiency judgments we find no evidence that mortgage interest rates are lower in recourse states the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

the determinants of attitudes towards strategic default on mortgages we use survey data to measure households propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them strategic default when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house the willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home equity shortfall our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non pecuniary factors such as views about fairness and morality we also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued

optimal mortgage design this article studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income costly foreclosure and a stochastic market interest rate we show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage option arm under the optimal contract the borrower is given discretion of how much to repay until his balance reaches a certain limit the default rates and interest rate payment on the mortgage correlate positively with the market interest rate gains from using the optimal contract relative to simpler mortgages are the biggest for those who face more income variability buy pricey houses given their income level or make little or no down payment our model thus may help to explain a high concentration of option arms among riskier borrowers jel g20 g21 g33

baby boomer retirement security the roles of planning financial literacy and housing wealth abstract we compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the health and retirement study the early baby boomers in 2004 and individuals in the same age group in 1992 levels and patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time though boomers rely more on housing equity than their predecessors most important planners in both cohorts arrive close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than non planners instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no wealth

markov perfect capital and labor taxes abstract this paper analyzes the markov perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good the main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains if agents preference for the public good is sufficiently high then capital is confiscated setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation but some implementations carry a high welfare cost allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the u s economy

the principal principle i analyze optimal loan modification schemes in a stochastic home price and stochastic interest rate environment lenders maximize loan values by managing the borrower s option to default on the loan and prepayment option given negative equity controlling for the borrower s ability to pay rate reductions and maturity extensions result in a higher probability of redefault by homeowners even after modification of their loans in contrast loan write downs the principal principle not a favored recipe are value maximizing for the lender a shared appreciation mortgage enhances the ability to pay mitigates adverse selection and reduces the present value of expected deadweight foreclosure costs

spatial lock in do falling house prices constrain residential mobility abstract falling house prices have caused numerous homeowners to suffer capital losses those with little home equity may be prevented from moving because of imperfections in housing finance markets the proceeds from the sale of their home may be insufficient to repay their mortgage and provide a down payment on a new home a data set of mortgages is used to examine the magnitude of these constraints estimates show that average mobility would have been 24 higher after 3 years had house prices not declined and after 4 years it would have been 33 higher among those with high initial loan to value ratios the differences are even greater

regional differences in mortgage demand and mortgage instrument choice in the uk koblyakova a hutchison n and tiwari p regional differences in mortgage demand and mortgage instrument choice in the uk regional studies this paper presents empirical evidence of regional variations in mortgage choice decisions within the uk s mortgage sector utilizing british household panel survey bhps data for the years 2001 2007 and 2008 the paper suggests that a household s decision to choose a variable rate mortgage is more likely to occur in areas with lower incomes and affordability rates such as northern england scotland and wales since variable rate mortgages are more sensitive to income and monetary policy shocks the disproportional distribution of variable contracts within the mortgage sector may have a differential impact on the regions

forced sales and house prices the market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals this implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions but also by idiosyncratic factors including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house first houses are productive only when people are living in them owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset second houses are fragile assets that need maintenance and are vulnerable to van dalism unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect third short term rental contracts involve high transactions costs resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage fourth houses are expensive indivisible and heterogeneous assets each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer because of the high costs of intermediation in housing this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer fifth most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults the expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006 foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly in a liquid market an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price but

the determinants of default on insured conventional residential mortgage loans this paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of default for insured residential mortgages a multinomial logit model is specified and estimated for regional aggregates constructed from cross sectional and time series data the results document the independent statistical significance of contemporaneous payment income and loan value ratios and unemployment rates as well as more commonly studied determinants of default such as age and the original loan value ratio

the impact of deregulation and financial innovation on consumers the case of the mortgage market we develop a technique to assess the impact of changes in mortgage markets on house holds exploiting an implication of the permanent income hypothesis the higher a household s expected future income the higher its desired consumption ceteris paribus with perfect credit markets desired consumption matches actual consump tion and current spending forecasts future income because credit market imperfec tions mute this effect the extent to which house spending predicts future income measures the imperfectness of mortgage markets using micro data we find that since the early 1980s mortgage markets have become less imperfect in this sense and securitization has played an important role the u s mortgage market has experienced phenomenal change over the last 35 years gone are the days when most households get a cookie cutter 30 year fixed rate level payment mortgage from a savings and loan that takes deposits at 3 and lends at 6 also gone are the days when the typical lender holds that mortgage on its books until the maturity of the loan today consumers choose from an extensive menu of mortgages offering flexibility along almost every dimension furthermore most lenders hold the mortgage for only a short time typically they sell the mortgage on the secondary market many researchers have argued that this transformation has enhanced effi ciency by integrating the mortgage market with the broader financial markets however there has been comparatively little research investigating how or even whether the transformation of mortgage markets has directly affected

should i default on my mortgage even if i can pay experimental evidence abstract we study strategic default in the laboratory i e in a controlled experiment subjects are initially endowed with a house and a mortgage we use neutral wording in the experiment and must decide at each period in which their mortgage is alive among three options making the mortgage payment selling the house or walking away from their house and defaulting on their mortgage at each point in time we can observe whether defaulters can afford to make the mortgage payment and thus directly compute the number of strategic defaulters subjects default in the right periods and quite fast learn what they should consume we find experimental support for the double trigger hypothesis individuals faced with low income and low house prices are more likely to default we observe that subjects default less than optimal and this decision is significantly affected by social norm concerns in the context of the experiment individuals under consume in the first periods of life they are cautious when indebted both introducing a 50 probability of recourse and a responsible homeowner reward are very effective in preventing default in the lab especially by individuals receiving a bad shock to income when house prices are low

restoring rational choice the challenge of consumer financial regulation abstract this lecture considers the case for consumer financial regulation in an environment where many households lack the knowledge to manage their financial affairs effectively the lecture argu

negative equity and foreclosure theory and evidence abstract recent declines in housing prices have focused attention on the relationship between negative housing equity and mortgage default theory implies that negative equity is a necessary condition for default but not a sufficient one this often misunderstood result is clearly illustrated in a dataset of massachusetts homeowners during the early 1990s fewer than 10 percent of borrowers likely to have had negative equity at the end of 1991 experienced a foreclosure during the following three years an econometric model of default estimated on two decades of massachusetts housing data also predicts low default rates for current negative equity borrowers we develop a simple theoretical model to interpret these empirical findings and to assess potential foreclosure reduction policies our results imply that lenders and policymakers face an information problem in trying to help borrowers with negative equity because it is hard to determine which owners really need help in order to stay in their homes

how unsecured credit policies influence mortgage and unsecured loan defaults before the global financial crisis the proportion of households defaulting on the mortgage while remaining current on the unsecured loan was almost the same as the proportion of households current on the mortgage but defaulting on the unsecured loan after the crisis the former ratio became higher than the latter by using a heterogeneous agent model with the mortgage and the unsecured loan i examine how the order of defaults changed before and after the crisis i then analyze the impacts of unsecured credit policies on households mortgage and unsecured loan defaults my quantitative exercise shows that both default rates can decrease as the cost for unsecured loan defaults increases

what triggers mortgage default this paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default negative equity and illiquidity to do so the authors combine loan level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower s broader balance sheet this gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers those with high credit card utilization rates the authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default with comparably sized marginal effects moreover these two factors interact with each other the effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan to value ratios cltv though it is significant even for low cltv county level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk though less so than high utilization and strongly interact with cltv in addition having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk particularly for borrowers who have a first mortgage ltv approaching 100 percent this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item