a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

the earnings and human capital of american jews this paper analyzes the earnings and returns from human capital investments of second generation american jews compared with non jews jewish men have 16 percent higher earnings other things the same a 20 percent higher rate of return from schooling and a steeper experience earnings profile these patterns persist even after controlling for occupation self employment status and geographic concentration in the new york area there are no systematic differences among jews by parents country of birth the findings suggest that american jews are more productive in creating and using human capital and that this has encouraged greater investments in human capital

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

strategic restraint in contests abstract economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a political game between two interest groups the possible ex post realized outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies in the literature policy proposals are exogenous we extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies in a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then in a second stage engage in a contest over the proposed policies our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and in turn wasteful lobbying activities

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

the wage effect of the occupational segregation of women in britain married females earn around 60 percent of the male rate of pay part of this wage difference der ives from inequality of pay within occupations and part derives from the different occupational distributions of the male and female workf orces this paper merges models of occupational attainment and gender wage distributions it shows that the gender wage difference derives largely from wage differences within occupations the effect of fema le nonparticipation in the paid workforce is found to be an important aspect of occupational attainment as well as of pay differences with in occupations copyright 1987 by royal economic society

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

price dispersion and incomplete learning in the long run abstract in each period a seller chooses a price and the customer for that period buys either one unit or nothing the relationship between price and purchase probability is one of two linear functions it is shown that the seller behaving optimally does not necessarily learn which function is the actual relationship since there can be a positive probability of sequences of prices converging to the price at which the two functions give the same purchase probability

the declining talent pool of government we consider a government for which success requires high performance by talented ministers a leader provides incentives to her ministers by firing those who fail however the consequent turnover drains a finite talent pool of potential appointees the severity of the optimal firing rule and ministerial performances decline over time the lifetime of an effective government is limited we relate this lifetime to various factors including external shocks the replenishment of the talent pool and the leader s reputation some results are surprising an increase in the stability of government and the exogenous imposition of stricter performance standards can both shorten the era of effective government and an increase in the replenishment of the talent pool can reduce incumbent ministers performance

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

dynamic policymaking with decay it is often said that the only constant is change itself as time passes the population grows new technologies are invented and the skills demographics and norms of the populace evolve these changes whether in isolation or in aggregate influence the effectiveness of policy in particular policies designed for today s world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow we develop a notion of policy decay that captures this impact formally we introduce policy decay into a paradigmatic model of legislative policymaking and show that it leads to a starkly different perspective on legislative politics our results upend the classic notion of gridlock and bear implications more broadly for the practice of politics we show how a changing world impacts the power of agenda control how it drives the dynamic path of legislation how it reveals a novel conception of policy expertise and how it ultimately provides a foundational logic to the design of bureaucracy

uncertainty electoral incentives and political myopia we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty when politicians ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable elections improve political accountability and selection however incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re election probability surprisingly uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare we also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one term limit our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline

the war of information we analyse political contests campaigns between two parties with opposing interests parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy the information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit parties actions are strategic substitutes increasing one party s cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information for voters parties actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party s cost may be beneficial asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party s decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

occupational segregation and selectivity bias in occupational wage equations an empirical analysis using irish data the gender wage effects of occupational segregation are assessed within the framework of occupational attachment and wage equations this paper exploits the modified index number approach suggested by brown et al 1980 and used recently by miller 1987 however neither of these papers allowed for the potential effects of selectivity bias in occupational wage equations in this study selectivity bias is corrected for using the method outlined in lee 1983 this allows for the effects of occupational selectivity buas on the gender wage gap to be assessed the findings for this sample of young lrish workers suggest that the greater part of the female wage disadvantage lies in intraoccupational wage differences furthermore selectivity bias is found to be important for a number of occupational categories

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

policy specific information and informal agenda power in gilligan and krehbiel s models of procedural choice in legislatures a committee exerts costly effort to acquire private information about an unknown state of the world subsequent work on expertise delegation and lobbying has largely followed this approach in contrast we develop a model of information as policy valence we use our model to analyze a procedural choice game focusing on the effect of transferability i e the extent to which information acquired to implement one policy option can be used to implement a different policy option we find that when information is transferable as in gilligan and krehbiel s models closed rules can induce committee specialization however when information is policy specific open rules are actually superior for inducing specialization the reason for this surprising result is that a committee lacking formal agenda power has a greater incentive to exercise informal agenda power by exerting costly effort to generate high valence legislation

learning while voting determinants of collective experimentation this paper combines dynamic social choice and strategic experimentation to study the following question how does a society a committee or more generally a group of individuals with potentially heterogeneous preferences experiment with new opportunities each voter recognizes that during experimentation other voters also learn about their preferences as a result pivotal voters today are biased against experimentation because it reduces their likelihood of remaining pivotal this phenomenon reduces equilibrium experimentation below the socially efficient level and may even result in a negative option value of experimentation however one can restore efficiency by designing a voting rule that depends deterministically on time another main result is that even when payoffs of a reform are independently distributed across the population good news about any individual s payoff increases other individuals incentives to experiment with that reform due to a positive voting externality

spatial models of legislative effectiveness spatial models of policymaking have evolved from the median voter theorem through the inclusion of institutional considerations such as political parties committees and various voting and amendment rules such models however implicitly assume that no policy is more effective than another at solving public policy problems and that all proposers are equally capable of advancing proposals we relax these assumptions by modeling proposal quality and the effort needed to make better proposals the resulting legislative effectiveness model lem offers three main benefits first it can better account for policy changes based on the effectiveness or popularity of the status quo changing our understanding of how to overcome gridlock in polarized legislatures second it generalizes canonical models of legislative politics such as median voter setter negative agenda setting and pivotal politics models all of which emerge as special cases within the lem third the lem offers significant new empirical predictions some of which we initially test and find support for within the u s congress

political accountability and sequential policymaking abstract we develop a model of political accountability with sequential policymaking when a bureaucrat s actions are transparent his overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policymaking process as a result the bureaucrat s equilibrium behavior overemphasizes later tasks if the overseer knows the technology by which policies translate into outcomes then she can eliminate these distortions using task specific budget caps however if the overseer is uncertain about this technology such budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency when uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential the overseer prefers an institutional environment with a fungible budget and no transparency such an environment allows the overseer to exploit the bureaucrat s expertise though at the cost of weaker overall incentives

wage discrimination across ethnic groups evidence from israel i introduction wage differentials and occupational segregation have been intensively studied and well documented in the economic literature empirical analyses have demonstrated differences by gender and ethnicity and theoretical studies have attempted to explain the results polachek 1975 1993 leads the group that emphasizes human capital differences in explaining wage differences and segregation while bergmann 1974 1986 is in the forefront of a second group of scholars who claim that discrimination is the major source of inequality of wages and occupations in the united states race differentials in earnings and racial segregation decreased dramatically during the 1960s and the 1970s but sex differentials did not in 1980 the duncans 1955 segregation index calculated by fuchs 1989 across 503 occupations was about 30 for blacks versus whites and about 60 for men versus women 1 fuchs 1989 also showed that by 1980 the wage differential between white and black men 15 percent was less than half the difference between white men and white women 40 percent polachek and siebert 1993 137 39 present data showing that in 1990 the pay of u s women averaged 65 to 90 percent of that of men depending on the occupational category the gap has been relatively constant but there is some evidence that it has been narrowing in recent years they also find that earning ratios by occupation in the u k are very similar to parallel ratios in the u s chiswick 1983a 1983b and carlson and swartz 1988 among others examine earnings of ethnic minorities they find that most ethnic groups fare quite poorly compared to the white population but a few minorities jews chinese and japanese do as well or even better than the white majority the earnings gap for most groups declined over the 1960s and the 1970s and the portion of that gap that might be assignable to discrimination also declined in this study we examine ethnic wage differentials discrimination and segregation in the israeli labor market israel provides a tailor made setting for ethnic studies since its jewish population 4 335 million in 1993 consists of people with a large diversity in their countries of origin the first wave of jewish immigrants following the establishment of the state of israel in 1948 were holocaust survivors from europe or refugees from the predominantly moslem countries of north africa the middle east and yemen others came from north and south america western europe south africa and australia to live a more meaningful jewish life in the homeland israel encouraged and assisted these immigrants as part of an active pro immigration ideology and policy the main wave of immigration arrived in the late 1940s and early 1950s as friedlander 1975 shows between 1948 and 1952 the jewish population in israel increased from about 630 000 to nearly one and a half million an annual average growth rate of over 24 percent later there were three significant waves of immigration the first occurred at the beginning of the 1960s with annual immigration reaching an average of 57 000 per year an increase of 2 percent per year in population the second occurred in 1972 73 when 55 000 immigrants arrived annually an annual population increase of 1 7 percent the third large wave began in august 1989 with a massive influx of immigrants from the former u s s r generating about a 10 percent increase in the population in the years 1990 93 the absolute figures are 199 516 immigrants in 1990 176 100 in 1991 77 057 in 1992 and 66 145 in 1993 israel central bureau of statistics 1994 in 1991 about 15 000 ethiopian jews also arrived in israel the major ethnic division in israel is based on the country of origin although jews of various origins speak a number of different languages and perceive themselves as having some distinctive ethnic characteristics the main distinction is between jews originating from asia and africa excluding south africa easterners and those from america europe south africa and australia westerners

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

the case for responsible parties electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars arguably to paraphrase it does not provide enough choice between candidates this article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence we show that when parties do not know voters preferences precisely all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median after characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible policy motivated parties we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic purely office motivated ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge but not so polarized that they diverge excessively however greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design we calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first best outcome if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

increasing returns path dependence and the study of politics it is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as path dependent the concept however is often employed without careful elaboration this article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences the investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism specific patterns of timing and sequence matter a wide range of social outcomes may be possible large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events particular courses of action once introduced can be almost impossible to reverse and consequently political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life

learning from neighbours when payoffs from different actions are unknown agents use their own past experience as well as the experience of their neighbours to guide their decision making in this paper we develop a general framework to study the relationship between the structure of these neighbourhoods and the process of social learning we show that in a connected society local learning ensures that all agents obtain the same payoffs in the long run thus if actions have different payoffs then all agents choose the same action and social conformism obtains we develop conditions on the distribution of prior beliefs the structure of neighbourhoods and the informativeness of actions under which this action is optimal in particular we identify a property of neighbourhood structures local independencewhich greatly facilitates social learning simulations of the model generate spatial and temporal patterns of adoption that are consistent with empirical work

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

replacing cabinet ministers patterns of ministerial stability in parliamentary democracies inp arliamentary democracies individual ministers play the central role in policy formulation and implementation policymaking success therefore requires that governing parties assign well qualified individuals to key cabinet posts and that these ministers remain in office long enough to do their jobs effectively if ministers are incompetent or if competent ministers are removed from office before they have an opportunity to make an impact on their departments it will be difficult for governing majorities to develop and implement their preferred policy programs the quality of policymaking processes should therefore be influenced by turnover among ministers which can impede the accumulation of experience necessary for effective governance at one extreme if ministers in key portfolios were replaced daily it would be impossible for parties to achieve their policy objectives but changes in ministers are not always a bad thing at the other extreme if ministers were never replaced regardless of their performance this should hardly be viewed as good for democracy in fact turnover can help governments improve the public s confidence in their performance dewan and dowding 2005 and can serve as a tool to control the ministers responsible for the most powerful and organizationally complex departments indridason and kam 2005 forthcoming turnover can reflect the need for innovation and renewal in policymaking or it can reflect underlying conflictandinstability hence therelationshipbetween turnoverandpoliticalperformanceshoulddependcrucially on the underlying causes of turnover thispaperexaminesthestabilityofindividualministers in parliamentary systems one source of instability isgovernmentfailure andourstudyisthereforerelated

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

the politics of compromise abstract an organization must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members each agent chooses a project and exerts effort affecting its completion time when one or more projects are complete the agents select which one to adopt the selection rule for multiple projects that maximizes ex post welfare leads to inefficiently high polarization rules that favor later proposals improve upon ex post optimal selections the optimal degree of favoritism increases in the cost of effort and discount rate this trade off informs the design of process rules in standard setting organizations and helps explain their performance jel c78 d23 d71 d72 d83 l15

gridlock and delegation in a changing world fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time if left unattended such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation to better understand the mechanics of policy making in a changing world we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation of powers system we show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion institutional features that in isolation elicit widespread criticism can effectively ameliorate policies susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change the critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation which increases all decision makers well being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation of powers system we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium the presence of drift provides an opportunity for self interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency

prospects for the eurozone for wim duisenberg the euro s perceived independence from the nation state was a path breaking achievement to be proud of and to cherish little more than a decade later and three years into the deepest economic crisis europe has known since the great depression duisenberg s elation rings strangely anachronistic since what the nationless euro seems to have achieved above all is to undermine whatever mutual confidence at the heart of our community there may have been at the start this special issue takes stock of the euro crisis so far it is concerned with the in depth analysis of its main causes policy proposals for a recovery from the crisis and reform strategies for the reconstruction of a more viable and egalitarian eurozone in the future this introduction provides an overview of both core features of the euro crisis and related debates as well as individual contributions to this special issue section 1 examines the origins of the euro crisis section 2 reviews key policy developments in the evolution of the crisis from its onset in may 2010 to the adoption of outright monetary transactions omts by the european central bank ecb in september 2012 and section 3 provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

elections with platform and valence competition abstract we study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences e g engage in campaign spending the marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization the closer platforms are the more valence affects the election outcome consequently candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition moreover exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence as a result the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms finally the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter s ideal point to a shock to one candidate s valence as is common in the literature leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

a formal model of learning and policy diffusion we present a model of learning and policy choice across governments governments choose policies with known ideological positions but initially unknown valence benefits possibly learning about those benefits between the model s two periods there are two variants of the model in one governments only learn from their own experiences while in the other they learn from one another s experiments based on similarities between these two versions we illustrate that much accepted scholarly evidence of policy di usion could simply have arisen through independent actions by governments that only learn from their own experiences however di erences between the gametheoretic and decision theoretic models point the way to future empirical tests that discern learning based policy di usion from independent policy adoptions

segmented or competitive labour markets a normal roy model with four sectors is developed it allows to derive tests of several assumptions on the working of the labor market strongly or weakly competitive or segmented it shows that more important a feature of labor markets than segmentation is the presence of comparative advantages for individuals between the various economic sectors the model is applied to data on women s labor force participation in the main towns of colombia in 1980 it uses multivariate probit and tobit techniques copyright 1991 by the econometric society

experimentation in federal systems will decentralization lead to a laboratory in policy experimentation or is centralization necessary to prevent free riding in the innovation process we present a model where experiments have two dimensions all prefer quality but preferences

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

scandal protection and recovery in the cabinet empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals we explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls we find that protection can sometimes discourage activism it enhances the value of a minister s career and hence encourages him to sit tight by moderating his activities on the other hand an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to live for today by pursuing controversial policies the prime minister s ability to protect ministers is limited by her short term incentive to fire she may however enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

two or three things i know about her europe in the global crisis and heterodox economics europe is in the middle of an economic and social storm although the turmoil since the mid 2008 originated elsewhere the european dynamics may turn the great recession into a full blown great depression within this dynamics the faulty design of the single currency is a key element together with the neomercantilist fracture dividing the core of northern europe and the periphery mostly composed of southern european countries the paper gives a quick reminder of what the true nature of the global crisis is section 2 the neoliberal great moderation was a paradoxical kind of financial and privatised keynesianism the heart of the anglo saxon model has been the overcoming of the stagnationist tendencies emerging from traumatised workers thanks to the transformation of manic savers into indebted consumers i will then section 3 dissect the peculiarities of the neomercantilist export led posture the eventual establishment of the euro as the single currency was in stark discontinuity with the maastricht treaty originating from the delors commission section 4 the real puzzle is to understand how the euro actually came into being from such fragile foundations and also why for many years it seemed a happy experiment the institutional setting of the eurozone and the german self defeating obsession for fiscal austerity decisively drove the area into a double dip recession a way out of the crisis section 5 requires not only monetary reforms and expansionary coordinated fiscal measures but also a wholesale change of economic model this latter must be built upon a new engine of demand and growth a monetary finance of good deficits is called for realising a radicalised socialisation of the investment a class and keynesian new deal

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

searching for good policies policymaking is hard policymakers typically have imperfect information about which policies produce which outcomes and they are left with little choice but to fumble their way through the policy space via a trial and error process this raises a question at the heart of democracy do democratic systems identify good policies to answer this question i introduce a novel model of policymaking in complex environments i show that good policies are often but not always found and i identify the possibility of policymaking getting stuck at outcomes that are arbitrarily bad notably policy stickiness occurs in the model even in the absence of institutional constraints this raises the question of how institutions and the political environment impact experimentation and learning i show how a simple political friction uncertainty over voter preferences interacts with political competition and policy uncertainty in a subtle way that surprisingly improves the quality of policymaking over time

bi ethnic labor markets mono ethnic labor markets and socioeconomic inequality the research examines the role of local opportunity structure in the determination of social and economic outcomes by focusing on the impact of local labor market segregation on socioeconomic inequality between jews and arabs in israel analysis of the 1983 israeli census reveals that the rules by which minority members achieve socioeconomic status vary considerably across bi ethnic and mono ethnic labor markets arabs working in jewish communities bi ethnic labor markets suffer the detrimental consequences of both occupational and income discrimination more than any other group by contrast arabs working in arab communities mono ethnic labor markets are occupationally advantaged with the absence of competition they produce incumbents for positions usually held by jews the findings suggest that the magnitude of disadvantages that superordinate groups force on minority groups is highly dependent on the degree of group competition in the local labor market

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

do businessmen make good governors this paper evaluates the economic performance of u s state governors with a business background chief executive officer ceo governors applying a matching method i find first that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain second the tenures of ceo governors are associated with a 0 5 percentage points pp higher annual income growth rate a 0 4 pp higher growth rate of the private capital stock and a 0 6 pp lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non ceo governors state level income inequality is not affected by ceo governors holding office indicating that low income households benefit from the economic upswing

labor market discrimination against hispanic and black men h ispanic american men have lower average wage rates than white non hispanics in 1975 the average white non hispanic male wage earner in the united states earned 5 97 an hour mexican men earned 4 31 72 as much as white non hispanics puerto rican men earned 4 52 76 as much and cuban men earned 5 33 89 as much as white non hispanics by way of comparison black men s average wages in 1975 were 4 65 78 of the white male wage several possible reasons for the hispanics lower wages come to mind among them are age and education geographic location immigration language difficulties and discrimination for example as shown in table 1 mexicans and puerto ricans are younger on average than the white non hispanic population and earnings tend to rise with age hispanics have lower average levels of education than white non hispanics and wages are positively associated with education many mexican americans live in the southwest where prices are relatively low moreover hispanics are more likely to be recent immigrants and to lack fluency in english than white non hispanics and so to be at a disadvantage in the labor market in addition there is a widespread belief that hispanics suffer from employment discrimination and cannot obtain the wages that their human capital would command if they were non hispanic whites how much of the wage differentials described above are due to each of these factors and to other inter group differences in wage related characteristics in particular how much impact does labor market discrimination have on the average hispanic man s wage and how does this compare with discrimination against blacks this paper provides answers to these questions a few other efforts have been made to analyze the relative earnings of hispanic and white nonhispanic men using 1960 and 1970 census data fogel 1966 poston and alvirez 1973 poston alvirez and tienda 1976 long 1977 and gwartney and long 1978 we use more recent data from the 1976 survey of income and education this data set enables us to measure wage rates more accurately and to specify the wage function more completely than does the census unlike previous analysts in estimating the wage function we take account of possible selectivity bias due to the distinction between average wage offers and average observed wages thus we hope to obtain a more accurate and up to date measure of labor market discrimination against hispanic men section ii explains the method used to separate the minority white non hispanic wage differential into the portions due to differences in average characteristics and the portion due to differences in unobserved factors and discrimination taking into account the possibility of selectivity bias in the observed wage sample section iii describes the data used in the study and the specification of the wage equation the breakdown of the observed wage differentials into components due to differences in participation in the wage and salary sector local price levels average characteristics and discrimination are presented in section iv section v summarizes our findings and discusses their implications for efforts to improve the economic situation of hispanics in the united states

an analysis of the earnings and employment of asian american men this paper analyzes the earnings and employment of chinese japanese filipino and white men born in the united states the chinese and japanese have higher levels of schooling and earnings than white men and the japanese work more weeks ceteris paribus there are no substantive group differences in these variables or in returns from schooling the filipinos have a lower level of schooling earnings employment and returns from schooling it is therefore not appropriate to view asian americans as a single disadvantaged minority group further the success of the chinese and japanese challenges conventional wisdom regarding the consequences of racial discrimination

does financialization retard growth time series and cross sectional evidence abstractalthough financial development is essential for economic development excessive financialization of the economy is believed to exert a negative effect on output growth in this article empirical evidence is presented on the relation between economic growth and financialization as measured by the ratio of credit to gdp and the ratio of publicly traded shares to gdp the empirical results are based on annual time series data for six country groups as well as cross sectional data covering a large number of countries the model is initially specified with unobserved components and estimated in a time varying parametric framework to account for missing variables thereafter the issue of linear versus quadratic specifications is examined the results are robust with respect to model specification estimation method data type and variable definition showing in general that financialization has a negative impact on growth some evidence is also presented to support the notion of the financial kuznets

economic trends and government survival in west european parliamentary democracies in this study i investigate the linkage between trends in key economic indicators inflation unemployment and growth in gross domestic product and government survival in 16 postwar european parliamentary democracies the partial likelihood method which allows for variation in indicator values over the lifetimes of individual governments constitutes the basic analytic tool the findings reveal overall causal roles for both inflation and unemployment as well as important differences in these roles between socialist and bourgeois governments and between pre oil crisis and post oil crisis eras most significant the introduction of these indicators to the analysis helps to resolve the debate between two rival explanations of governmental stability the bargaining complexity hypothesis and the ideological diversity hypothesis in favor of the latter

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

spatial models of delegation canonical assumptions this approach may be justified on grounds of tractability but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation consequently the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation we show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion and surprisingly many turn on the ignored though equally canonical technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed relative to policies relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation one that is closer to classical treatments the theory allows us to relate different institutional features commitment specialization costs monitoring multiple principals to delegation s observable properties lthough the practice of delegation dates back to antiquity the book of exodus refers to itonly in the last century has much scholarship examined its causes and effects and only recently has research focused on developing and testing formal theories that explore the logic of delegation 1 despite this recent surge in formal work on delegation scholars have failed to generalize several important properties of the early pathbreaking models instead of revisiting assumptions that were initially imposed for the sake of convenience recent papers tend to maintain and reinforce the cannonical assumptions applying these limited models to ever richer institutional settings although the breadth of understanding about delegation across various settings is impressive this approach has come at a price it has produced an understanding that only partly captures delegation s informational rationale in even the simplest contexts the literature is rich in predictions about delegation in complicated institutional settings when stylized foundational assumptions are satisfied but poor in explanations for and intuitions about why a poorly informed boss chooses to delegate to subordinates with different preferences moreover we lack an understanding of what basic features drive the boss s choice of which agent is given control of policy for example scholars have provided detailed explanations about how separation of power systems affect delegation by legislatures to agencies but the basic question does the informational rationale for delegation hinge on the boss s risk preferences has been ignored despite the analysis of complicated signaling and screening games between bosses with ex post controls and their subordinates we do not yet understand when or why the ally principle the boss picks the most ideologically similar agent as delegatee fails in simple settings we try to put models of delegation on more solid footing by examining a larger more general set of environments we eschew the canonical assumptions of quadratic utility or even risk aversion unidimensional outcome spaces and additive and homogeneous random shocks to policy our analysis focuses first on two basic questions when does delegation occur and to whom does the boss delegate we then consider richer institutionally driven extensions e g the role of commitment and monitoring devices the impact of multiple bosses and the institution in which their preferences are aggregated through a sequence of nested models with varying levels of abstraction the analysis isolates the relations between various assumptions and different findings

searching and learning by trial and error i study a dynamic model of trial and error search in which agents do not have complete knowledge of how choices are mapped into outcomes agents learn about the mapping by observing the choices of earlier agents and the outcomes that are realized the key novelty is that the mapping is represented as the realized path of a brownian motion i characterize for this environment the optimal behavior each period as well as the trajectory of experimentation and learning through time applied to new product development the model shares features of the data with the well known product life cycle jel d81 d83 d92 l26

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

ideologues or pragmatists we study a model of electoral control where the politician is a policy expert but the voter is not first we focus on the case of an ideologue namely a politician who always wants the same policy implemented regardless of the state we show that the voter s lack of policy expertise comes at no cost to him but may come at an electoral cost to the politician next we turn to the case of a pragmatist namely a politician whose preferences are state contingent we show that the voter s lack of policy expertise does come at a cost to him as a consequence the voter may fare better with an ideologue than with a pragmatist this can occur even if the pragmatist s preferences are arbitrarily close to and perfectly correlated with the voter s

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

optimal dissent in organizations we model an organization as a two agent hierarchy an informed decision maker in charge of selecting projects and a possibly uninformed implementer in charge of their execution both have intrinsic preferences over projects this paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences that is dissent within the organization dissent is useful to 1 foster the use of objective and sometimes private information in decision making and 2 give credibility to the decision maker s choices however dissent comes at the cost of hurting the implementer s intrinsic motivation thereby impairing organizational efficiency we show that dissent can be optimal in particular when information is useful and uncertainty is high moreover dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when implementers can choose their employer or when decision makers have real authority over hiring decisions

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

industry input in policy making evidence from medicare in setting prices for physician services medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry the committee itself comprises members from industry we investigate whether this arrangement leads to regulatory capture with prices biased toward industry interests we find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10 we then evaluate whether employing a biased committee as an intermediary may nonetheless be desirable if greater affiliation allows the committee to extract information needed for regulation we find industry proposers more affiliated with the committee produce less hard evidence in their proposals however on soft information we find evidence of a trade off private insurers set prices that more closely track medicare prices generated under higher affiliation

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

testing the dual labor market hypothesis evidence from the israel labor mobility survey little research seems to have addressed the testing of the dual labor market model for nondeveloping economies outside the u s and the u k this paper examines the hypothesis for israel utilizing individual data drawn from the israel labor mobility survey and assigning workers to primary and secondary sectors on the basis of occupational prestige scores earnings functions are estimated and compared for the two sectors the results are very closely in line with predictions of the dual labor market model thus strongly suggesting that the dual labor market hypothesis may be relevant for israel