how resilient are labour markets to natural disasters the case of the 1998 bangladesh flood abstract natural disasters devastate economies as they impede capital accumulation the resilience of labour markets is crucial for the poor who rely on labour to reduce risk we evaluate how the 1998 flood of the century affected wages in bangladesh we find short term declines in agricultural and non agricultural wages agricultural workers who moved towards non agricultural employment to cope benefitted through a lower percentage reduction in short term wages endowed with human capital salaried workers were unable to mitigate income risk extending the eligibility of credit access or relief programmes may preserve local businesses and their employees in the years following a flood

credit market constraints consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low income countries investments in bullocks in india in this paper we formulate and estimate a finite horizon structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that incorporates the major features of low income agricultural environments income uncertainty constraints on borrowing and rental markets and the use of investment assets to generate income and smooth consumption the model is fit to longitudinal indian household data on farm profits bullock stocks and pump sets the estimated structural parameters are used to assess the effects on the life cycle accumulation of bullocks agricultural profits and welfare associated with complete markets and bullock liquidity and with second best policies that provide assured sources of income to farmers and weather insurance

long term impacts of droughts on labour markets in developing countries evidence from brazil abstract climate shocks have well documented impacts on the short term welfare of rural households in developing countries we investigate the impact of droughts on brazilian labour markets we find long term rural wage losses beyond the immediate impact of the drought with affected workers taking five years to catch up with their peers findings are robust to model specification the severity of the losses varies with the dependence on agricultural income supporting the notion of diversifying portfolio strategies in rural areas to reduce climate related income risk

entry and managerial incentives abstract this paper presents a two period full information model of entry where owners of incumbent and entrant firms endogenously select the incentive schemes for their managers it is shown that when output decisions are delegated to managers the incumbent s owner chooses to base incentive schemes only partly on profit but if output decisions are reached via nash bargaining between managers the incumbent s owner will base the reward on profit alone the entrant never bases the incentive scheme solely on profit if there is a sufficiently high fixed cost of entry then the incumbent can deter entry by providing management with appropriate incentive schemes

noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution given a finite set of alternatives players alternate making offers player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto if 2 accepts it is enforced and the game ends otherwise 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives and so on if all alternatives are vetoed a disagreement alternative is enforced first we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game then we show that this outcome converges to the area monotonic solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity

asset smoothing consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints abstract a growing literature asks whether low wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty this paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resource poor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate despite divisible assets and fully rational agents wealthier agents acquire a higher yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing rather than consumption smoothing asset based risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return

on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences the paper reexamines the foundations of the axiomatic nash bargaining theory more specifically it questions the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and extends it to a family of non expected utility preferences a bargaining problem is presented as x d 2 where x is a set of feasible agreements described in physical terms d is the disagreement event and 1 and 2 are preferences defined on the space of lotteries in which the prizes are the elements in x and d the ordinal nash bargaining solution is defined as an agreement y satisfying for all p e 0 1 and for all x e x if px 1 y then py 2 x and if px 2 y then py x where px is the lottery which gives x with probability p and d with probability 1 p revisions of the pareto symmetry and iia axioms characterize the ordinal nash bargaining solution in the expected utility case this definition is equivalent to that of the nash bargaining solution however this definition is to be preferred since it allows a statement of the nash bargaining solution in everyday language and makes possible its natural extension to a wider set of preferences it also reveals the logic behind some of the more interesting results of the nash bargaining solution such as the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the nash bargaining solution and strategic models

wealth weather risk and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments despite the growing evidence that farmers in low income environments are risk averse there has been little empirical evidence on the importance of risk in shaping the actual allocation of production resources among farmers differentiated by wealth the authors use panel data on investments in rural india to examine how the composition of productive and nonproductive asset holdings varies across farmers with different levels of total wealth and across farmers facing different degrees of weather risk income variability is a prominent feature of the experience of rural agents in low income countries the authors report evidence based on measures of rainfall variability that the agricultural investment portfolio behavior of farmers in such settings reflects risk aversion due evidently to limitations on consumption soothing mechanisms such as crop insurance or credit markets the authors results suggest that uninsured weather risk is a significant cause of lower efficiency and lower average incomes a one standard deviation decrease in weather risk measured by the standard deviation of the timing of the rainy season would raise average profits by up to 35 percent among farmers in the lowest wealth quartile moreover rainfall variability induces a more unequal distribution of average incomes for a given distribution of wealth wealthier farmers are willing to absorb significant risk without giving up profits to reduce production risk smaller farmers have to invest their limited wealth in ways that reduce their exposure to risk at the cost of lower profit rates the authors found that at high levels of rainfall variability differences in rates of profit per unit of agricultural assets were similar across classes of wealth but over the sample range of rainfall variability these rates of profit were always higher for the poorer farmers than for the wealthier ones suggesting that the disadvantages of small farmers in risk diffusion are more than offset by their labor cost advantage

subgame perfect implementation of bargaining solutions abstract this paper provides simple four stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two person bargaining solutions in subgame perfect equilibrium the solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent s utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0 this class of solutions includes the nash kalai smorodinsky and relative utilitarian solutions the game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device

nash demand game and the kalai smorodinsky solution we introduce two new variations on the nash demand game in one as in all past variants of nash demand games the nash bargaining solution is the equilibrium outcome the other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands specifically with probability 1 p the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented surprisingly the kalai smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game moreover ranking other solution concepts is impossible

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining in bargaining agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated using the reference function concept of thomson 1981 this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted the kalai smorodinsky solution arises as a special case another solution in this class which depends on the entire feasible set is generated by using the centre of gravity as the reference function

fair allocation when players preferences are unknown suppose an arbitrator needs to allocate an asset among two players whose claims on the asset are incompatible the allocation outcome is said to be fair if the arbitrator awards an outcome that brings the same utility payoff to the two players whenever the two players claims are symmetric and the allocation set is symmetric in conjunction with other natural axioms this fairness requirement implies a unique allocation outcome for any claims problem we propose a mechanism which can be used by the arbitrator to implement this allocation outcome even when the players preferences are unknown to the arbitrator jel c78 d63 j52

robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions abstract most real life bargaining is resolved gradually during this process parties reach intermediate agreements these intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds we identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions the nash proportional and as a special case to the egalitarian solution and discrete raiffa solutions we show that the robustness of intermediate agreements plus additional well known and plausible axioms provide novel axiomatizations of the above mentioned solutions hence we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutions bargaining theories

smoothing consumption by smoothing income hours of work responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural india while research has demonstrated that farm households in developing economies are able to protect consumption from idiosyncratic crop shocks little evidence shows how this is achieved this paper examines the extent to which labor markets allow households to shift labor from farm to off farm employment and the extent to which such a shift explains the observed lack of correlation between consumption and idiosyncratic crop shocks the empirical analysis uses a novel measure of the idiosyncratic crop income shock which utilizes information on start of season cropping choices to more accurately estimate household expectations of weather

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

implementing the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that are used by all non winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner s proposal that procedure non cooperatively implements the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution

the equal loss principle for bargaining problems abstract we introduce a new bargaining solution which we call the equal loss solution this solution equalizes across agents the losses from the ideal point two characterizations of the solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions should respond to changes in the feasible set and the ideal point

bargaining with random implementation an experimental study abstract we use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation we modify the standard nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome rather with exogenous probability q one bargainer receives his her demand with the other getting the remainder we use an asymmetric bargaining set favouring one bargainer and disagreement payoffs of zero and we vary q over several values our results mostly support game theory s directional predictions as with conventional arbitration we observe a strong chilling effect on bargaining for q near one extreme demands and low agreement rates increasing q reinforces the game s built in asymmetry giving the favoured player an increasingly large share of payoffs but also raising efficiency these effects are non uniform over sizable ranges increases in q have minimal effect but for some q small additional increases lead to sharp changes in results

cluster sample methods in applied econometrics inference methods that recognize the clustering of individual observations have been available for more than 25 years brent moulton 1990 caught the attention of economists when he demonstrated the serious biases that can result in estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual specific response variables the source of the downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares ols standard errors is the presence of an unobserved state level effect in the error term more recently john pepper 2002 showed how accounting for multi level clustering can have dramatic effects on t statistics while adjusting for clustering is much more common than it was 10 years ago inference methods robust to cluster correlation are not used routinely across all relevant settings in this paper i provide an overview of applications of cluster sample methods both to cluster samples and to panel data sets

collective risk taking in the commons abstract the management of natural commons is typically subject to threshold effects if individuals are risk averse some of the recent economic literature holds that uncertainty on the threshold may have a positive impact by lowering incentives to over consume the paper shows that this intuitive result may unravel when uncertainty is modeled as a discrete or multimodal distribution using a variant of the nash demand game with two thresholds two types of nash equilibria typically coexist cautious respectively dangerous equilibria in which agents coordinate on the low threshold resp the high threshold when both types of equilibria coexist the symmetric dangerous equilibrium is always pareto dominated by the symmetric cautious equilibrium and the latter is always pareto efficient we use an experimental setting to assess the severity of the coordination and equilibrium selection problem while cautious resp dangerous play is decreasing resp increasing in the probability that the threshold is high coordination failures are salient for intermediate probabilities where the likelihood of coexistence of both type of equilibria is high we find that there is a u shaped relationship between overall coordination and the probability that the threshold is high

incentive schemes as strategic variables an application to a mixed duopoly abstract in the context of asymmetry of information between firms owners and their managers we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in a duopoly with a public and a private firm by giving the public manager an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue we show that welfare can be improved furthermore we show that the government should not privatize the public company

should multiproduct firms provide divisional or corporate incentives abstract this paper points out some of the implications of the internal organization of a multiproduct firm for its market conduct in particular we study the strategic use of organizational forms based on corporate incentives versus forms based on divisional incentives the equilibrium internal organization is determined in a model with full information it is shown that firms provide corporate incentives when goods are substitutes and divisional incentives when goods are complements and the result holds both in the case of quantity setting and price setting

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains