contracting in the shadow of the law economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance as a matter of law this is not the case this leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts this article shows that american standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules it is shown that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties our model also implies that the legal remedies of mistake impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of hadley v baxendale are efficient solutions to the problem of implementing complex exchange

the evolution of property rights state law or informal norms abstractthis paper investigates the factors that have shaped the evolution of property rights institutions using a regression discontinuity design i show that the divergent state laws of ghana and cote d ivoire have had little effect on de facto property rights institutions in contrast the data show that these states laws and policies have had large impacts on other economic outcomes furthermore i show that part of the substantial within country variation in property rights institutions is explained by economic factors areas that are more suitable for growing cocoa have a greater prevalence of land transfer rights my findings highlight the importance of nonstate sources of norms and show that these norms do to some extent evolve to accommodate the changing needs of society

control and ownership of assets within rural ethiopian households this article investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce and on control over assets during marriage using detailed household data from rural ethiopia we show that assets brought to marriage ownership of assets control within marriage and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related productive resources are controlled by the household head disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but control is associated with larger claims upon divorce assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death but matter in case of divorce

comparative productivity the ussr eastern europe and the west this paper compiles comparative measures of output per worker in 1975 in four socialist and seven western market economy wme countries and explores sources of observed differences between the two groups of countries in that regard such differences seem explicable only partially by reference to differences in per worker capital stock and farm land a residual disparity of 25 to 34 percent in favor of wme countries appears to testify to superior efficiency in the latter copyright 1987 by american economic association

environmental and gender impacts of land tenure regularization in africa pilot evidence from rwanda although increased global demand for land has led to renewed interest in african land tenure few models to address these issues quickly and at the required scale have been identified or evaluated the case of rwanda s nation wide and relatively low cost land tenure regularization program is thus of great interest this paper evaluates the short term impact some 2 5 years after completion of the pilots undertaken to fine tune the approach using a geographic discontinuity design with spatial fixed effects three key findings emerge from the analysis first the program improved land access for legally married women about 76 percent of married couples and prompted better recordation of inheritance rights without gender bias second the analysis finds a very large impact on investment and maintenance of soil conservation measures this effect was particularly pronounced for female headed households suggesting that this group had suffered from high levels of tenure insecurity which the program managed to reduce third land market activity declined allowing rejection of the hypothesis that the program caused a wave of distress sales or widespread landlessness by vulnerable people implications for program design and policy are discussed

endogenous enforcement institutions we model the state as a self enforcing agreement over the use of force powerful individuals punish violations of contracts and property rights and if they shirk or abuse their power society reverts to a low production anarchy stage our model has two implications first improvements in coercion move the optimal enforcement system from private ordering where coercive punishments are not used to centralized state where punihments sanction violations by citizens but not by the ruler to decentralized state where punishments sanction all violations second institutions that reinforce the allegiance of state militias to the law simultaneously insure that contract violations are punished and that the ruler does not expropriate citizens thus they are more productive than judicial institutions which solely facilitate contract enforcement the model is consistent with the historical correlation between technological advances in coercion and the transition from private to state enforcement and with the fact that institutional constraints on the executive affected the long run economic development of nations more than improvements in judicial institutions acemoglu and johnson 2005 we also provide a framework for the optimal sequencing of institutional reforms they should focus first on the binding self enforcement constraint punishment or expropriation and switch to other constraints when the initially binding constraint becomes slack

the evolution of common law we present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost we find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views policy motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law s precision we call our central finding the cardozo theorem even when judges are motivated by personal agendas legal evolution is on average beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law

thou shalt not covet prohibitions temptation and moral values abstract this paper proposes a theory of the relationship between prohibitions and temptation in the presence of self control problems moral values may increase individual material welfare and utility by serving as a self commitment device the model investigates the relationship between morality and temptation the individual gains from morality the interaction between external sanctions and moral self punishment and the spread and strength of individually optimal moral values the empirical analysis based on survey data for a large set of countries documents a hump shaped pattern of morality in social class which supports the theoretical predictions of the model

speculation and demand reduction in english clock auctions with resale many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants from the original auction the existence of such transactions may initially appear counter intuitive however this paper will show that active inter bidder resale results from payoff maximizing decisions in the auction that take into account the incentives of a resale opportunity specifically i examine how the existence of an inter bidder resale opportunity impacts bidder behavior in an english clock auction and to what extent altering the bargaining power of the final buyer and reseller in the resale market determines the strategies followed in the initial auction in an attempt to understand the existence of these inter bidder transactions theoretical and behavioral analysis is used to develop hypotheses of speculation bidding above value and demand reduction bidding below value which are directly tested in a controlled experimental setting while value bidding is a dominant strategy in a standard english clock auction without resale when resale is allowed this theoretical claim is weaker demand reduction is observed when the bargaining power is shifted to the final buyer in resale and when the bargaining power is shifted toward the reseller speculation is observed the revenue achieved in the initial auction depends on the behavior observed in the auction regardless of bargaining power revenue is shown to decrease below what would have been earned in an english auction without resale due to demand reduction when the reseller has the bargaining power and speculation is observed this loss in revenue is somewhat mitigated by increased speculation

is land titling in sub saharan africa cost effective evidence from madagascar formalizing land rights has been promoted as a way to encourage agricultural investment and stimulate land markets yet little is known about the benefits of such policies in sub saharan africa where the preconditions for success are less favorable the analysis uses a large sample of plots from an intensively titled rice growing area of madagascar and compares land specific investments land productivity and land values for titled and untitled plots cultivated by the same household having a title has no significant effect on plot specific investment and correspondingly little effect on land productivity and land values these results are broadly consistent with a simulation of a theoretical model of investment under expropriation risk calibrated to the same data a cost benefit analysis suggests that the current system of formal titling should not be extended in rural madagascar and that any new system of land registration will have to be quite inexpensive to be worthwhile

economic development legality and the transplant effect abstract we analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions legality using data from 49 countries we show that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant than the supply of law from a particular legal family countries that have developed legal orders internally adapted the transplanted law and or had a population that was already familiar with basic principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that received foreign law without any similar predispositions the transplanting process has a strong indirect effect on economic development via its impact on legality while the impact of particular legal families is weaker and not robust to alternative legality measures

endogenous institutional selection building trust and economic growth abstract private order market institutions founded on trust based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems while public order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts i model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate that the state s contract enforcement capacity is complementary to private order contract enforcement institutions for low to moderate levels of public order enforcement capacity this suggests that initial improvements to public order institutions cause the accumulation of trust and result in economic growth in both institutions however i show that the private order institution must collapse once the public order contract enforcement capacity is too great

strategic behavior and marriage payments theory and evidence from senegal abstract this article proposes an original theory of marriage payments based on insights gained from firsthand information collected in the senegal river valley this theory postulates that decisions about the bride price which are made by the bride s father take into account the likely effects of the amount set on the risk of ill treatment of the wife and the risk of marriage failure based on a sequential game with three players the bride s father the husband and the wife and a matching process it leads to a number of important predictions that are tested against senegalese data relating to bride prices and various characteristics of women the empirical results confirm that parents behave strategically by keeping bride prices down so as to reduce the risk of marriage failure for their daughters other interesting effects on marriage payments and the probability of separation are also highlighted stressing the role of the bride s bargaining power in her own family

women s empowerment and wellbeing evidence from africa abstractwe use household survey data from senegal to model the effects of empowerment within the home on married women s wellbeing the estimated effects of empowerment are at least as large as more conventional development indicators such as household income the size of the empowerment effect is robust to alternative estimation techniques including an instrumental variables estimator

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

the mystery of capital formation in sub saharan africa women property rights and customary law summary economists such as hernando de soto have argued that clearly defined property rights are essential to capital formation and ultimately to economic growth and poverty alleviation this article traces two impediments to the clear definition of property rights in the african context customary law and the status of women both of these issues interfere with the attempt of african countries to rearticulate property law with the goal of capital formation constructive attempts to define property rights must address the problem of enforcement in under resourced environments where changes may not be welcomed

collusion via resale the english auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post auction interbidder resale is allowed we show this by constructing equilibria where with positive probability one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders these equilibria interim pareto dominate among bidders the standard value bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division

speculation in standard auctions with resale in standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale we study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private value bidders for second price and english auctions the efficient value bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits first price and dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders the value distribution and the discount factor speculators do not make profits in first price or dutch auctions

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

experimental comparisons of auctions under single and multi unit demand i introduction the study of multiple unit auctions is important because of their widespread use and the high value of goods sold examples include auctions of u s treasury debt cut flowers wine foreign exchange and other financial and monetary instruments moreover since auctions are often proposed by economists as a method of sale for other goods as in mcmillan 1994 the use of auctions can be expected to increase in the future many different auction rules are used to sell these diverse commodities and auction rule changes are often suggested usually with the intention of increasing revenue or improving the allocations and thus there is a considerable and increasing number of known auction formats evaluating new or comparing different auction mechanisms using field tests can be very costly and risky however experimental methods can and have been used by economists to study the behavioral characteristics of different auction procedures kagel 1995 provides a recent comprehensive survey most experimental studies consider the behavior of auctions when there is a single unit to be sold a few studies such as cox et al 1984 1985 and mccabe et al 1990 1991 study multiple unit auctions in environments in which each bidder demands at most one object from a set of identical objects being sold the studies of smith 1967 belovicz 1979 miller and plott 1985 and burns 1985 consider multi unit demand environments these are environments in which bidders have demand for multiple identical units and are permitted to purchase multiple units of the commodity sold the extension to multi unit demand is important since the presence of multi unit demand is a characteristic of many auctions in the field including all of the examples above in this study we consider the behavior of two types of multi unit auction under both single unit and multi unit demand we construct a laboratory environment which we use to study an english clock ec which is a special type of english auction and a sealed bid auction with lowest accepted bid pricing sb in the sb each bidder pays a per unit price equal to the lowest accepted bid the ec was chosen because it is known to provide highly efficient allocations in auctions of single unit goods and therefore is likely to be suggested for many field applications the sb was chosen because of its widespread use which makes its outcomes a useful basis of comparison for the outcomes of the english clock auction 1 however we do not attempt to represent a particular field situation here instead since our interest is in understanding the basic properties of the auctions we chose an experimental design that enables us to make simple comparisons across treatments and with previous and possibly future studies the design enables us to perform simple testing of game theoretic models in some of the treatments in our view the difference between single and multi unit demand is critical as we discuss in section ii many of the results of auction theory that are valid in single unit demand environments no longer apply in multi unit demand environments suggesting that the observed behavior of auctions might also differ between the two environments therefore we isolate the effects of multi unit demand by conducting single unit demand experiments under identical market demand and supply conditions as the multi unit demand experiments these and other aspects of the experimental design are described in detail in section iii the results and a discussion are given in sections iv and v respectively ii institutions theory and previous studies the english clock auction this variant of the english auction was modeled by milgrom and weber 1982 and studied by mccabe et al 1990 1991 in our version the auction begins with all bidders publicly and simultaneously announcing their initial quantity demanded at price zero if there is excess demand the price is increased by a small increment and the bidders then announce new quantities demanded

institutions economics and the development quest institutions crucial for the analysis of how agents deal with uncertainty have been gaining increasing relevance on the economic research agenda in this paper we analyze the institutional literature aiming to explain why this perspective obtains better results than others in development economics in particular we stress the relevance of new institutional economics as an adequate framework for a broad understanding of development issues

a hidden markov model of credit quality abstract this paper presents a hidden markov model of credit quality dynamics and highlights the use of filtering based estimation methods for models of this kind we suppose that the markov chain governing the true credit quality evolution is hidden in noisy or incomplete observations represented by posted credit ratings parameters of the model namely credit transition probabilities are estimated using the em algorithm filtering methods provide recursive updates of optimal estimates so the model is self calibrating the estimation procedure is illustrated with an application to a data set of standard poor s credit ratings