implicit co2 prices of fossil fuel use in switzerland abstract this study aims to assess the efficiency of the fossil fuel taxation scheme currently in effect in switzerland to this end the concept of implicit co2 prices is introduced based on which prices for different fossil fuel uses are derived implicit co2 prices are defined as the difference between actual prices paid by consumers and efficient domestic fuel prices efficient domestic fuel prices in turn consist of private production costs a uniform value added tax and only local external costs not including external costs due to co2 emissions and global climate change the resulting prices differ substantially which suggests that there is considerable cost saving potential in reducing co2 emissions in switzerland for passenger cars and air traffic the implicit prices are negative for these uses higher fuel charges would therefore be beneficial from a purely domestic perspective i e without considering the negative repercussions of global warming

community based tradable permits for localized pollution this paper considers the assignment of tradable permits representing property rights of an environmental good to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms these community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences for a special case with a sole household market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level however for a group of households the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods we design a revenue sharing mechanism akin to unitization under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation importantly in some cases efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good

effluent regulation and long run optimality a regulator faced with free entry of firms is concerned not only with the implications of public policy for the discharges from a representative firm but also with the total pollution observed at the long run market equilibrium the regulator must take into account not only the effects of regulations upon the net marginal returns of the firm but must also consider the total profit of the firm and incentives for entry and exit this paper shows that effluent charges and tradeable effluent permits lead to long run optimality with entry of small firms the difference between firm payments and environmental damages is interpreted as the rent accruing to the environmental resource this result applies only to the competitive case with small polluters the analysis presented here allows a comparison and clarification of the literature on small and large polluters in a multi input framework with social damages dependent upon total effluents effluent charges are shown here to result in socially optimal entry confirming an assertion of baumol and oates 2 p 179 fn 161 and the important result of schulze and d arge 15 by taking average as well as marginal damages into account the effluent charge results in optimal firm scale levels and the correct input mix at the free entry market equilibrium the firm subject to an effluent tax will operate above or below the private minimum efficient scale depending upon whether average external costs exceed or are less than marginal external costs since public policy to reduce effluents is often directed at reducing the effluentgenerating activity some policy recommendations include a tax on the final output of the polluting firm in some theoretical analyses a relation between the output of the firm and the effluent level is identified and a pigouvian output tax is applied this approach should not be followed by policymakers since an output tax does not provide firms with the correct incentives for either input substitution or market entry it is shown that while a lump sum transfer is needed to provide correct entry incentives when a pigouvian output tax is applied no such transfer is needed if the tax is correctly applied to effluents contrary to 5 even if optimal firm scale and i thank the referees for helpful suggestions the support of the national science foundation under grant ses 82 19121 is gratefully acknowledged any errors are my responsibility 103

avoiding an ecological regime shift is sound economic policy we extend the shallow lake model by adding the capital stock of an industry a government can mitigate the effects of pollution arising from industrial activities by imposing the requirement to abate emissions within this framework two scenarios are examined in the social optimal benchmark the social planner optimally allocates investment in the competitive equilibrium market forces determine the investment in capital but the government can still abate emissions we find that irreversible environmental regime shifts are avoided in the competitive equilibrium by means of a static level of abatement when it is socially optimal to do so

sufficiency or efficiency to achieve lower resource consumption and emissions the role of the rebound effect a frequent criticism of eco efficiency strategies is that an increase in efficiency can be offset by the rebound effect sufficiency is discussed as a new strategy involving self imposed restriction of consumption but can also be subject to the rebound effect we show that the range of possible secondary effects of efficiency and sufficiency strategies goes beyond the rebound effect the rebound effect can indeed also be linked to eco sufficiency strategies but there are further secondary effects of both eco efficiency and eco sufficiency strategies such as double dividend effects we develop an eco efficiency sufficiency matrix to logically order eco efficiency and sufficiency measures to attain lower resource consumption and emissions

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

efficient bilateral taxation of externalities in the context of the example of a factory whose smoke emissions affect a near by laundry coase j law econ 3 1 44 1960 argued for taxing the laundry as well as the factory while baumol am econ rev 62 307 322 1972 argued for taxing only the factory consistent application of marginal cost pricing shows that the efficient tax on laundries is positive when the number of laundries is finite and that the tax approaches zero in the limit as the number of laundries approaches infinity the efficient tax on factories is bounded away from zero regardless of the number of factories our framework is an application of the vickrey clarke groves family of truth telling mechanisms that require each agent to bear the full social cost of changing the outcome that would have prevailed had she not participated in the decision until now the literature has not fully resolved the discrepancies between coase s and baumol s arguments and even contemporary textbooks on environmental economics and public economics do not offer correct and complete analyses

externalities a market model failure we focus here on a set of conceptual problems related to the accepted theory of externalities we are primarily concerned with difficulties that arise when a theoretical system is extended beyond its logical domain this is the practice in externality theory when the market model assuming independent agents is used to analyze physical interdependency the different kinds of dependencies obscure the standard use of the paretian analysis as the issues of rights and efficiency are mixed up the creation of emissions and the creation of externalities are further not held apart producing flows in the efficiency evaluations due to the interdependencies involved actions of both emitter and victim must be taken into account while searching for efficient policies finally we analyze the interrelationships between what is termed the internal structure of the market model and the annexed sphere of externalities we conclude that the accepted policy prescriptions both assume and demand no interrelationships between these two spheres we find the assumption unrealistic and inconsistent as concerns the basic foundations of the market model there are two main traditions addressing externalities the coasean and the pigovian this paper shows that both are vulnerable to the above critique thus the presumption that externality theory is now settled and coherent is seen to be without theoretical support

on optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes abstract we consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with fixed audit resources how to decide which firms to audit after having observed the firms taxable emissions reports the goal of the agency is to implement the socially efficient emissions level the audit mechanism is the agency s sole choice variable while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the fine for non compliance are determined by other governmental actors the fines and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially efficient emissions assuming perfect information among the firms we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially efficient emissions level the optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the firms where the probability of winning not being audited for each firm depends on costly efforts their taxable emissions reports

pigovian taxes which work in the small number case abstract an appropriately conceived pollution tax can achieve a pareto optimal equilibrium which is 1 stable in the presence of myopia 2 not subject to strategic manipulation even in the small number case and 3 resistant to inefficient cost shifting by the participants when transaction costs are low a considerable amount of confusion in the literature exists because different authors use different tax formulas often implicitly and different assumptions regarding conjectural behavior some of this confusion is cleared up by formally presenting various pigovian tax formulas explicitly considering whether there is cournot or stackleberg behavior and comparing the properties of the various configurations

fiscal federalism approach for controlling global environmental pollution this paper finds that optimal international carbon taxes are country specific and we can decompose a tax on a domestically produced carbon intensive commodity into a revenue tax a tax to control local atmospheric pollution and an international carbon tax it shows that an institutional arrangement for the world economy similar to the fiscal federalism in the federal countries can be useful to internalize the global externalities of atmospheric pollution

location choice by households and polluting firms an evolutionary approach this paper examines several policy regimes to deal with the problem of households suffering from environmental damage by firms in the same region we employ an evolutionary framework to analyze migration movements in the course of time since firms and households will not relocate immediately in response to payoff differentials we show that taxation gives firms and households an incentive to stay away from each other laissez faire compensation only gives households firms an incentive to stay away from firms households we find that taxation creates the right incentives to reach a local welfare maximum however when there are multiple local maxima circumstances may arise under which compensation leads to a better outcome than taxation c 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

incentive based policy design for pollution control and biodiversity conservation a review this paper provides a succinct review of the main developments in the literature on incentive based policy mechanisms in the contexts of pollution control and biodiversity conservation dating from the early beginnings of the science in the 1960s a focal point in the review is on the design features of these policy mechanisms key developments in policy design were originally established in controlling externalities arising from pollution and have since been extended to policy design tailored towards biodiversity conservation special emphasis is given to the spatial characteristics of the environmental problems underlying both pollution control and biodiversity conservation the paper concludes by drawing some lessons and setting out elements of a future research agenda in both policy domains

modelling the impacts of a carbon emission differentiated vehicle tax system on co2 emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases in ireland abstract the increasing awareness of the effects of climate change on the environment and the economic pressure on oil supply has focused international attention on reducing co 2 emissions and energy usage across all sectors in order to meet their kyoto protocol commitments and in line with european union policy the irish government has introduced a carbon based tax system for new vehicles purchased from the 1st of july 2008 this new legislation aims to reduce carbon emissions in the transport sector a sector which is responsible for a significant proportion of both this paper presents the results of the development calibration and application of a car choice model which predicts the changes in co 2 emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases as a result of the changes in vehicle tax policy and fuel price in ireland the model also predicts the impact of such changes on tax revenue for the irish government and the changes in the split between the number of diesel and petrol vehicles purchased the investigation found that the introduction of these new carbon based taxes in ireland will result in a reduction of 3 6 3 8 in co 2 emissions intensity and a reduction in annual tax revenue of 191 m

reformulating taxes for an energy transition abstract an energy transition toward clean energy sources would reduce environmental impacts one proposal to trigger this energy transition uses economic instruments particularly environmental taxes this research studies the potential impact of taxes on electricity on the environment and the economy using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model for spain with energy and environmental extensions we assess their current impact on gdp growth energy use and a set of different pollutant emissions then we propose a reform that would foster an energy transition toward clean energies and assess their economic and environmental impact we find that only taxing the production of electricity by coal oil and natural gas can be better for the environment and economy than taxing all forms of electricity production in a revenue neutral context moreover the production of electricity by biomass though considered renewable is an important source of pollutant emissions and in these terms should have less importance in an energy transition

nonconvexity induced by external costs on production theoretical curio or policy dilemma this paper considers with a degree of scepticism the sweeping policy conclusions that can be found in the theoretical literature concerning nonconvexit ies in the social production set induced by external costs on firms this literature has provided proofs of the possibility that such nonconvexit ies exist but these proofs have readily been interpreted as a basis on which to judge the advisability of policies to control external costs 2 indeed a number of authors have felt able to proceed from specific theoretical examples of the existence of nonconvexity to the opinion that nonconvexity represents a general obstacle to policy one of the ma in themes will be to demonstrate that the theoretical possibility of the existence of a nonconvexity at a m icro level does not imply the existence of a m icro or a fortiori macro nonconvexity in the real world nor does it imply that any nonconvexity that does exist in reality is relevant to policy the intention is not to deny that nonconvexit ies may represent an obstacle to the efficient control of external costs in specific contexts but in order to establish the real world policy relevance of a nonconvexity it is necessary to verify its existence emp irically and to establish that it stands in a particular relationship to the no policy starting point

free riding carbon treaties and trade wars the role of domestic environmental policies this paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model of north south trade with carbon emissions to explore the strategic open economy implications of price and quantity based instruments for co2 emission reduction we compute non cooperative environmental and trade policy equilibria and nash bargaining outcomes in environmental policies with side payments of cash results show that quotas can lead to higher internalization levels in a non cooperative zero tariff equilibrium in comparison with emission fees if tariffs are also chosen non cooperatively the form of policy instrument used affects equilibrium tariffs with quotas leading to lower trade barriers particularly under a regional carbon treaty

sharing the cost of global warming due to meteorological factors the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions we argue in favor of osetting this discrepancy and propose a global insurance scheme to be ncanced according to countries respon sibility for climate change because ghg decay very slowly we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a pigovian taxation scheme we characterize new versions of two well known cost sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of bossert and fleurbaey 1996 to a context with externalities j e l classi cation d62 d63 q54

pigou and coase in retrospect this paper documents through direct quotation and mathematical analysis the parallels between both the logic and the policy conclusions of a c pigou and r h coase it is shown that pigou s analysis encompasses the essential features of both the nature of the firm and the problem of social cost but more importantly pigou lays out the logical connection between the two an underlying theme is that particularly in the case of pigou much substance has been lost in mathematical translation had that substance not been forgotten the 1960 coase would not have had to attack pigou c 1993 academic press inc copyright 1993 by oxford university press

the control of externalities abatement vs damage prevention both public policy discussions and the theoretical literature on externalities have focused on abatement by emitters as the chief means of mitigating the harmful effects of pollution the purpose of this paper is to broaden that focus by illuminating the role of damage reduction activities undertaken by victims and by showing how the efficient solution is affected when these preventive actions are incorporated into the standard theory of externalities finding the efficient solution requires a comparison of emitters abatement costs and the damages sustained by victims as browning 5 has shown the correct short run measure of damage is the loss in the victims profits given that they have acted optimally to minimize the harmful effects of the pollution if victims have no options other than passive acceptance of ambient pollution levels this loss in profits simply equals the profit level in the absence of the externality less the harm inflicted directly by exposure to it however if victims have available to them some cost effective means of reducing the harmful effects of untreated pollution the loss in profits will be smaller since a victim sees damage from pollution as a cost it will attempt to minimize this cost at each level of its output just as it endeavors to minimize other private costs of production such as labor or fuel costs the victim will maximize its profits only if it takes into account both the cost of pollution damages and the cost of damage reduction measures surprisingly the theoretical literature on externalities includes very little explicit discussion of victims defensive actions browning for example displayed a victim s set of marginal cost curves corresponding to different pollution levels each curve was drawn under the assumption that the victim had undertaken the efficient amount of damage prevention given the quantity of pollution it had received the mechanism by which it chose this amount of prevention was not discussed a different approach was taken by bohm 2 3

externalities in a regulated industry the aircraft noise problem airline noise is an externality in the traditional sense of being a byproduct of normal economic activity it affects the population around airports in single event bundles and cumulatively the transient nature of noise itself is unlike most other externalities as with the others however general improvements in technology and increases in population have made the situation more difficult to tolerate the combination of these things has led to a critical situation for the affected population since it involves its physical and mental health from among the various methods of dealing with externalities we choose the effluent charge scheme it generally allows each firm to incorporate the environmental standard into its marginal operating choices if each firm makes efficient decisions then the cost to society of achieving an environmental standard will be a minimum in this paper there are two modifications of the traditional charge scheme one is that because of the well known difficulties in specifying and estimating social costs we use the estimated direct noise abatement costs of achieving the environmental standard the second is that airlines cannot be necessarily thought of as cost minimizers the charges used for the control of airline noise are generated as shadow prices in a simple linear programming model solution to the problem involves choosing a mix of noise abating options that achieves proposed environmental standards at least cost additional bounds on the problem are limitations on service reductions and rate of return ror oni investment regulation the data sources used for the program were generally fragmentary and incomplete for our purposes after calculating a noise charge for a hypothetical airport we discuss the implementation and ramifications of the charge plan in the regulated airline industry included is a discussion of the link between noise abatement and fuel consumption

carbon abatement in the fuel market with biofuels implications for second best policies a carbon tax on fuel would penalize carbon intensive fuels like gasoline and shift fuel consumption to less carbon intensive alternatives like biofuels since biofuel production competes for land with agricultural production a carbon tax could increase land rents and raise food prices this paper analyzes the welfare effect of a carbon tax on fuel consisting of gasoline and biofuel in the presence of a labor tax with and without a biofuel subsidy the market impacts of a carbon tax are also compared with that of a subsidy findings show that if a carbon tax increases biofuel demand the tax interaction effect due to higher fuel prices is exacerbated by higher land rent and food prices and greater erosion of the carbon tax base thus the second best optimal carbon tax for fuel is lower with biofuel in the fuel mix especially if biofuel is subsidized

the effect of production versus consumption based emission tax under demand uncertainty abstract emission tax is an instrument widely adopted by countries and regions to incentivize emission abatement by emission intensive firms including manufacturers however policies differ in how they allocate emission responsibilities among stakeholders for example the chile emission tax directly penalizes manufacturers for the emissions they generate during their production production based emission tax whereas the sweden electricity emission tax penalizes the consumption of electricity rather than its production consumption based emission tax these two methods have potentially varying implications on manufacturers profits their emission abatement decisions as well as the resulting emission levels especially when demand uncertainty is involved in this paper we investigate the impact of the two distinct methods by studying a profit maximizing manufacturer facing stochastic demand under either production or consumption based emission tax the manufacturer s optimal decisions on its selling price production quantity and emission abatement investment are derived perhaps surprisingly we show that under either tax it is possible for an increase in the emission tax to discourage the manufacturer from investing in emission abatement the impact of tax rate abatement technology efficiency and demand uncertainty on the manufacturer s profitability and abatement decision are also studied interestingly higher demand uncertainty may motivate the manufacturer to invest more in emission abatement under production based emission tax using a numerical example of an electricity power generator we offer further insights into the comparison between the two taxes and find that there exist cases for either tax to dominate the other in terms of both profit and emissions

political deadlocks and distributional information the value of the veil contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice by eliminating distributional information the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions this paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day to day decision making of democratic institutions our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the u s congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years

the economics of renewable energy support abstract this paper uses theoretical and numerical economic equilibrium models to examine optimal renewable energy re support policies for wind and solar resources in the presence of a carbon externality associated with the use of fossil fuels we emphasize three main issues for policy design the heterogeneity of intermittent natural resources budget neutral financing rules and incentives for carbon mitigation we find that differentiated subsidies for wind and solar while being optimal only yield negligible efficiency gains policies with smart financing of re subsidies which either relax budget neutrality or use polluter pays financing in the context of budget neutral schemes can however approximate socially optimal outcomes our analysis suggests that optimally designed re support policies do not necessarily have to be viewed as a costly second best option when carbon pricing is unavailable

production uncertainty and pollution there has been considerable interest in two sector models in which the production of one of the goods is subject to uncertainty the major papers in this area are by rothenberg and smith 13 batra 1 britto 3 diamond 5 mills 12 and harford and park 8 in the latest of these papers harford and park 8 41 build on a model in mills 12 to show that if constant relative risk aversion r which is mathematically analogous to the pratt arrow measure is less than exceeds or equal to unity the direction of efficient resource flow under uncertainty as compared to certainty is away from the risky sector toward the risky sector or unchanged respectively in their model as in mills 12 the preferences of consumers are represented by a community expected utility function in the present two sector model the risky sector is an industry that is adversely affected by air pollution which is a by product of production in the other industry although there is a deterministic relation between the output and emissions of the polluting stable sector the damage caused to the other sector as a result of any given level of emissions depends upon random variables such as mixing height and wind velocity and is therefore stochastic it is not intuitively obvious whether the results of harford and park 8 hold if the uncertainty in the risky sector is the consequence of production in the stable sector in fact there is substantial dissimilarity in the results if the measure of risk aversion r is less than unity the efficient direction of resource flow is generally though not always toward the risky polluted sector if r equals unity the results also differ with resources shifting under uncertainty in the direction of the risky polluted sector only if r exceeds unity are the results always the same in both models with resources flowing toward the risky sector this paper presents the marginal condition such that under uncertainty the optimal combination of outputs includes less of the stable polluting good and more of the risky pollution sensitive good than would be the case if pollution damage were anticipated with certainty if this marginal condition does not hold the risk averse community may prefer either more or less of the polluting good a narrowed interpretation of the marginal condition is then used to predict the special case in which the efficient flow of resources under uncertainty is toward the polluting sector

externality regulation and the monopoly firm abstract differences in strategic assumptions lead to predictable variations in the conclusions one may draw the formal theory of monopoly power and externalities reflects this variability in assumptions and conclusions this paper contains a unified model of monopoly power marketable product output and externality abatement

tax incentives to promote green electricity an overview of eu 27 countries this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the main tax incentives used in the eu 27 member states mss to promote green electricity sixteen mss use tax incentives to promote green electricity simultaneously with other promotion measures especially quota obligations and price regulation however not all available technologies are promoted for example six mss germany romania slovak republic denmark sweden and poland have included an exemption on the payments of excise duties for electricity when the electricity is generated from renewable energy sources res this tax incentive is the most widely used limited tax incentives in personal income tax are available in belgium france czech republic and luxembourg in corporate tax tax incentives consist mainly of a deduction in the taxable profit belgium greece czech republic and spain lower tax rates in vat are applied in three mss france italy and portugal only spain and italy use effective tax incentives in property tax as a great diversity of tax incentives has been used to promote green electricity this adds another difficulty to the eu objective of providing a renewable energy policy framework but also it offers a useful set of case studies which can be used to inform eu policy development

steering the climate system using inertia to lower the cost of policy common views hold that the efficient way to limit warming to a chosen level is to price carbon emissions at a rate that increases exponentially we show that this hotelling tax on carbon emissions is actually inefficient the least cost policy path takes advantage of the climate system s inertia to delay reducing emissions and allow greater cumulative emissions the efficient carbon tax follows an inverse u shaped path and grows more slowly than the hotelling tax economic models that assume exponentially increasing carbon taxes are overestimating the cost of limiting warming overestimating the efficient near term carbon tax and overvaluing technologies that mature sooner

providing adequate economic incentives for bioenergies with co2 capture and geological storage abstract knowing that carbon capture and storage ccs could play an important role in reducing emissions it is important to have a good understanding of this role and the importance of environmental policies to support carbon capture and geological storage from bioenergies beccs to date ccs technologies are not deployed on a commercial level and policy instruments should be used to provide incentives to firms to use these technologies to reduce pollution the aim of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of several incentive based instruments a fossil fuel tax an emissions tax a cap and trade system and a subsidy on captured emissions needed to spur the adoption of ccs and beccs using a dynamic general equilibrium model this type of model has become the standard for assessing economy wide impacts of environmental and technological policies the study shows that beccs will be deployed only if a specific subsidy per unit of biomass emissions captured with a ccs technology is available we show also that the two most cost efficient instruments for achieving a given emissions reduction target are a specific subsidy that rewards captured emissions and a carbon tax whose revenues are recycled to subsidize beccs

greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating market a microeconomic approach in this paper we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector our research is based on a system dynamics microsimulation of private households investment decisions for heating systems to the year 2030 by accounting for household specific characteristics we investigate the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden we investigate two policies i a carbon tax and ii subsidies on heating system investments we deduce abatement cost curves for both policies by simulating welfare costs and greenhouse gas emissions to the year 2030 we find that i welfare based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs ii given utility maximizing households a carbon tax is the most welfare efficient policy and iii if households are not utility maximizing a subsidy on investments may have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax

the economic impact of shale gas extraction a review of existing studies abstract recent advances in drilling technology have allowed for the profitable extraction of natural gas from deep underground shale rock formations several reports sponsored by the gas industry have estimated the economic effects of the shale gas extraction on incomes employment and tax revenues none of these reports has been published in an economics journal and therefore have not been subjected to the peer review process yet these reports may be influential to the formation of public policy this commentary provides written reviews of several studies purporting to estimate the economic impact of gas extraction from shale beds due to questionable assumptions the economic impacts estimated in these reports are very likely overstated

addressing global environmental externalities transaction costs considerations is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not the transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis this approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so the demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments and determining who will pay and who will receive them four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights i scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs ii varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations iii asymmetric information and iv the extent of compliance and new entry these factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks implement the convention on the international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora execute the montreal protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer set limits on harvest of highly migratory ocean fish stocks and control greenhouse gas emissions jel d23 p14 q22 q51 q54 q58

carbon taxes and carbon emissions trading this paper surveys the literature on and examples of current implementation of carbon taxes and carbon emission permits it sets out the theoretical basis for these instruments with special reference to the revenue recycling and tax interaction effects this theoretical work concludes that instruments which raise revenue which can be recycled so as to reduce pre existing distortionary taxes are significantly less costly than those which do not the paper then reviews the sizable literature on the distributional effects of these instruments especially with regard to industrial competitiveness and regressive effects on low income groups evaluating attempts to mitigate these where they are perceived as unacceptable the paper concludes that such efforts at mitigation while possible can substantially reduce the efficiency benefits of the instruments the projected costs of carbon taxes depend on a wide range of assumptions this is still a contested area but the paper concludes that on a range of plausible assumptions these costs need not be high finally the paper notes that early evaluations of the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes have been generally positive this suggests that if concern about anthropogenic climate change continues to increase more countries will introduce carbon taxes and emission permits with the latter increasingly auctioned

pigou and coase a mathematical reconciliation abstract this paper provides a rigorous statement of the coase theorem and establishes a formal equivalence between abstract allocative mechanisms attributed to coase and pigou the model proceeds from output functions that reduce to production functions in special cases thereby capturing effects that are obscured by conventional production and cost functions the model also emphasizes fundamental differences in the characteristics of inputs particularly land that are implied in the construction of externality stories finally the model embodies a clear distinction between local e g nuisance and global e g pollution externalities the coase theorem as stated is valid only in the former case

retail store density and the cost of greenhouse gas emissions the density size and location of stores in a retailer s network influences both the retailer s and the consumers costs with stores few and far between consumers must travel a long distance to shop whereas shopping trips are shorter with a dense network of stores the layout of the retail supply chain is of interest to retailers who have emission reduction targets and urban planners concerned with sprawl are small local shops preferred over large big box retailers a model of the retail supply chain is presented that includes operating costs such as fuel and rent for floor space as well as a cost for environmental externalities associated with carbon emissions a focus on exclusively minimizing operating costs may substantially increase emissions by 67 in one scenario relative to the minimum level of emissions a price on carbon is an ineffective mechanism for reducing emissions the most attractive option is to improve consumer fuel efficiency doubling the fuel efficiency of cars reduces long run emissions by about one third whereas an improvement in truck fuel efficiency has a marginal impact on total emissions this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure comment abstract conrad and wang 1993 international journal of industrial organization 11 499 518 determine that a tax on emissions decreases the total output of a polluting industry but if demand is sufficiently inelastic can increase the number of firms in that industry this follows from their proposition that the tax reduces the scale of the polluting firm in contrast the scale of the polluting firm in the present model increases when there are increasing returns to scale in abatement whereas conrad and wang extend their results to cases of monopolistic competition the present paper is confined to perfect competition but extends the analysis to the pollution damaged industry

banning the bulb institutional evolution and the phased ban of incandescent lighting in germany much academic attention has been directed at analysing energy efficiency investments through the lens of behavioural failure these studies have challenged the neoclassical framing of regulation which emphasises the efficiency benefits of price based policy underpinned by the notion of rational individual self mastery the increasing use of a regulatory ban on electric lamps in many countries is one of the most recent and high profile flash points in this dialectic of freedom versus the state in the public policy discourse this paper interrogates this debate through a study of electric lamp diffusion in germany it is argued that neoclassical theory and equilibrium analysis is inadequate as a tool for policy analysis as it takes the formation of market institutions such as existing regulations for granted further still it may be prone to encourage idealistic debates around such grand narratives which may in practice simply serve those who benefit most from the status quo instead we argue for an evolutionary approach which we suggest offers a more pragmatic framing tool which focuses on the formation of market institutions in light of shifting social norms and political goals in our case progress towards energy efficiency and environmental goals

debt crisis adjustment policies and capital formation in developing countries where do we stand abstract this paper documents the decline in investment rates observed in developing countries after 1982 and explores analytically and empirically the factors contributing to explain it the paper focuses on the impact of macroeconomic adjustment and reform measures on private investment particularly in latin america and east asia and underscores the importance of macroeconomic uncertainty policy credibility and potential coordination failures in shaping the response of investment to the changes in economic incentives brought about by structural reforms the analysis concludes with some policy recommendations to improve the design of sustainable growth oriented adjustment programs

coasean bargaining in the presence of pigouvian taxation coasean arguments against the pigouvian perspective are well established a central tenet in this criticism argues that a pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency if parties were to bargain in the presence of a pigouvian tax allocative inefficiencies would occur the so called buchanan stubblebine turvey theorem by analyzing a coasean environment where the appropriation of property rights is costly we show coasean bargaining in the presence of a pre existing pigouvian tax may be superior this has implications for policy where dual regulatory environments exist such as regulation at the state and federal level as well as environmental liability and litigation

elements of an economic justification for municipal zoning abstract the possibility that externalities will produce a nonconvexity in the social production set limits the application of both the coase and pigou solutions for achieving an optimal allocation of land resources conditions on relative land prices are derived which indicate that external effects are strong enough to introduce a nonconvexity into the production set these conditions were not fulfilled in a sample of single family and multifamily dwellings in foster city california this does not preclude the possibility that they are fulfilled in cases of more severe external effects

green fiscal reform in sweden econometric assessment of the carbon and energy taxation scheme abstract empirical econometric assessment of environmental policy effectiveness is capable of demonstrating which tools have been helping to achieve the desired effect of reducing harmful emissions or stimulating technological change this paper employs an econometric approach to analyse the effectiveness of energy and carbon taxes in sweden the country which was one of the first to introduce a co2 tax as well as an extensive environmental tax reform the results showed that taken in isolation a co2 tax was not sufficient to result in a significant change in co2 emissions in sweden except in the case of petrol on the other hand energy taxes for coal and lpg have been statistically significantly effective it was also clear that a technological innovation in the form of development of nuclear and hydro energy played a significant role in reducing co2 emissions and higher oil price was also important in reducing national co2 emissions in sweden at the same time renewable energy excluding hydro a more recent innovation has not been a statistically significant driver of co2 emissions reduction perhaps due to the fact that wind and solar play a much lesser role in sweden at the moment the net electricity imports from other countries have contributed positively towards reducing co2 emissions in sweden while the use of coal and biomass tended to increase co2 emissions compared to the ex ante modelling results from the literature review the findings confirm the role of environmental taxation as a viable policy instrument effective in reducing co2 emissions in sweden although point towards a more nuanced picture the paper raises important policy questions focused on the effectiveness of environmental policy tools

the impact of tax reform on new car purchases in ireland we examine the impact of recent tax reforms in ireland on private car transport and its greenhouse gas emissions a carbon tax was introduced on fuels and purchase vehicle registration and ownership motor taxes were switched from engine size to potential emissions we use a demographic model of the car stock by age size and fuel and a car purchase model that reflects the heterogeneous distribution of mileage and usage costs across various engine sizes the model shows a dramatic shift from petrol to diesel cars particularly for large engines the same pattern is observed in the latest data on car sales this has a substantial impact on tax revenue as car owners shift to the lower tax rates the tax burden has shifted from car ownership to car use and that the overall tax burden on private car transport falls as diesel engines are more fuel efficient than petrol engines carbon dioxide emissions fall modestly or if we consider the rebound effect of travel costs on mileage minimally from the perspective of the revenue the costs per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided are very high

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

controlling the monopolistic polluter nihilism or eclecticism abstract this paper is concerned with the consequences of pollution control when the polluter is a monopolist who can choose between abating pollution by reducing output and by adopting a less polluting technology it is suggested that the risk of welfare losses resulting from control policy is lower when technology is flexible than when it is rigid nevertheless some risk does remain so the paper concludes with a discussion of the possible use of selective control instruments to keep the risk to a minimum

peer pressure experimental evidence from restroom behavior we provide experimental evidence on the effect of peer pressure on individual behavior specifically we study the effect of being exposed to an observer in a public restroom on handwashing and urinal flushing behavior our estimates show that being exposed to an observer increases the probability of handwashing by 13 percentage points and the probability of urinal flushing by 15 percentage points given that handwashing and urinal flushing have social benefits that exceed individual benefits our findings provide support for peer pressure as an additional way of addressing the social suboptimality arising from externalities jel c91 c93

a note on externalities and taxation the purpose of this paper is to explore the distributional aspects of a tax that is imposed in order to correct the detrimental effects of a production externality in the framework of a two sector general equilibrium model we show that harberger s classic results of tax incidence may change considerably because of the presence of the externality we also show that the tax is effective in reducing the detrimental effect of the externality although the return of the taxed factor may rise relative to the return of the untaxed factors

in search of alternatives pro poor entrepreneurship in community forestry abstract community forestry is quite likely the most prominent form of development intervention in the present era it has gained momentum since the 1970s and now covers more than 25 per cent of the total forestlands globally however the introduction of commercialisation into community forestry controlled by private capital has not only undermined the livelihood requirements of poor people but also swiftly deteriorated forest conditions by unfolding the nature of commercialisation in community forestry in nepal this article argues that pro poor entrepreneurship models of producing forest resources through a partnership between poor people and community groups could be an appropriate alternative to develop economic opportunities and forest conservation

taxing average emissions to overcome the shutdown problem abstract the paper shows that the optimal regulation of stock pollutants can require fluctuating emissions even in the absence of uncertainty the optimum cannot be implemented by the usual pigouvian flow tax since it leads to a shutdown problem a remedy for the problem is to use a linear tax given by a mechanism that effectively taxes average emissions over time an alternative is to use tax schedules depending on cumulative emissions over a short period of time a calibration using cost estimates of greenhouse gases suggests that potential gains from fluctuating carbon emissions are considerable

fundamental nonconvexities in arrovian markets and a coasian solution to the problem of externalities abstract d starrett j econ theory 4 1972 180 199 argues that the presence of externalities implies fundamental nonconvexities which cause arrow markets to fail while this is true we argue this failure is due to the structure of the arrovian markets that starrett uses and not to the presence of externalities as such we provide an extension of a general equilibrium public goods model in which property rights are explicitly treated nonconvexities are not fundamental in this framework we define a notion of coasian equilibrium for this economy and show first and second welfare theorems in this context the first welfare theorem is a type of coase theorem journal of economic literature classification numbers d62 h41

messy marginal costs internal pricing of environmental aspects on the firm level abstract internal pricing of environmental aspects is usually not embedded in management accounting systems therefore we first show that pricing from a corporative perspective is possible and applicable contrary to common belief we also show that marginal costs curves of environmental aspects are often not monotonic and price changes are highly context specific we introduce a model that addresses different environmental aspects that translate into constraints or change direct cost factors in the objective function environmental constraints originate from different types of limit values concerning emissions and production processes as well as restraining the potential environmental damage as the outcome of ecological valuation methods direct cost factors include the taxation of emissions and costs stemming from being involved in the emissions trading market our model allows for calculating the marginal indirect costs of these environmental aspects as the constraints might enforce factor and product substitutions we show that the marginal costs differ substantially from the direct costs and do not follow a predictable pattern sensitivity analysis and parametric programming are applied to set up an internal pricing and cost allocation scheme for environmental aspects specifically focusing on the pricing of emissions resources and processes of production and recycling the model s implications on corporate decision making are illustrated by a numerical example that draws on the opportunity of process substitution e g producing a product on different machines even though we cannot use original data for proprietary reasons such settings are highly relevant in industry and the energy sector

regulation of externalities in an open economy abstract this paper considers the ranking of second best policies for an open economy that regulate externalities arising from the production of an exportable pesticides and other chemicals used in us agriculture are good examples uncertainty originates from three sources random shifts in production cost and external costs and the random fluctuations in the world price of a traded good world prices become unreliable indicators of comparative advantages in the presence of external costs nonintervention of free trade can encourage excessive production and exports of commodities with spurious comparative advantages the paper analyses the properties of the optimal state contingent tax or first best tax which is difficult to implement these properties are then used to rank second best policies that are determined before uncertainties are resolved it is shown that ex ante taxes and quotas are equivalent when the marginal external cost is subject to random shifts when the world price is uncertain the optimal ex ante effluent charge dominates the optimal quantity standard when the marginal production cost of the exportable is subject to random shifts the ranking of second best policies is generally ambiguous