intertemporal labor supply and human capital accumulation we solve and estimate a dynamic model that allows agents to optimally choose their labor hours and consumption and that allows for both human capital accumulation and savings estimation results and simulation exercises indicate that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is much higher than the conventional estimates and the downward bias comes from the omission of the human capital accumulation effect the human capital accumulation effect renders the life cycle path of the shadow wage relatively flat even though wages increase with age hence a rather flat life cycle labor supply path can be reconciled with a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

on the optimal progressivity of the income tax code this paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor pro ductivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution a progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare these bene cial eects of a progressive tax system have to be traded oagainst the e ciency loss arising from distorting endoge nous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions a determination of the optimal progressivity of the income tax code therefore calls for a quantitative exploration using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we nd that the optimal us income tax is well approximated by a at tax rate of19 5 and a xed deduction of about 3 700 the steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 0 4 higher consumption in each state of the world an explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates however that a majority of the population currently alive would suer welfare losses calling into question the political feasibility of such

implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

an introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property although economists have written on topics of intellectual property for a long time the impact of economics on public policy in this area has been slight especially as compared to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation we believe that too few of the profession s resources have been devoted to these issues and that of those resources that have been employed too few have been devoted to empirical analyses we hope that this introductory essay and the three papers that follow will stimulate interest in this subject this introductory essay first describes some of the basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law and then describes the framework of the law in the six areas described above patent copyright semiconductor protection trademark trade secret and misappropriation it is intended both to provide thumbnail descriptions of the various intellectual property regimes to economists working in this area and to indicate where additional economic research might be useful

gradual tax reforms if you like it you can keep it abstract one of the key practical challenges facing by tax reforms are their short run welfare consequences in this paper i focus on a consumption based tax reform for which despite long run welfare gains it generates welfare for some groups such as retirees or the working poor falls during transition between steady states using a life cycle model with heterogeneous households i show how to devise a transition path from the current u s federal tax system to a consumption based tax system that improves the welfare of current as well as future generations in a nutshell all households alive at the time of the policy change can choose when they want to switch to the new tax system or whether they want to switch at all i find that implementing a tax reform with this feature improves the welfare of 95 of population in the short run compared to less than a quarter of population in the conventional case with no choice it takes about twenty years for half of the population to pay their taxes under the new tax code

micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes we build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work we find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work moreover we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers in our model micro and macro elasticities are effectively unrelated our model is also consistent with other cross country patterns

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

an empirical model of labor supply in a life cycle setting this paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior a two step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path

demographic differences in cyclical employment variation demographic differences in patterns of employment variation over the business cycle are examined in this paper three primary conclusions emerge first both participation and unemployment must be considered in any analysis of cyclical changes in the labor market second young people bear a disproportionate share of cyclical employment variation third failure to consider participation has led to undue pessimism about the effect of aggregate demand policy on high unemployment groups if participation did not surge reduction in overall unemployment to its 1969 level would reduce the unemployment of almost all demographic groups to very low levels

how should capital be taxed this survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies we review the theoretical optimal tax literature survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortion

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

a quantitative analysis of capital income taxation this paper studies the quantitative impact of eliminating capital income taxation on capital accumulation and steady state welfare in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of sixty five period lived individuals who face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty under a wide range of parameter configurations the capital income tax rate that maximizes steady state welfare is positive even though eliminating it completely would raise the steady state capital stock toward the golden rule this is because the tax burden is shifted toward the younger and liquidity constrained years reducing the individuals ability to self insure copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

taxation of human capital and wage inequality a cross country analysis wage inequality has been significantly higher in the united states than in continental european countries ceu since the 1970s moreover this inequality gap has further widened during this period as the us has experienced a large increase in wage inequality whereas the ceu has seen only modest changes this paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts we begin by documenting two new empirical facts that link these inequality differences to tax policies first we show that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules have significantly lower before tax wage inequality at different points in time second progressivity is also negatively correlated with the rise in wage inequality during this period we then construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to school work or be unemployed individuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working wage inequality arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well as from idiosyncratic shocks progressive taxation compresses the after tax wage structure thereby distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital in turn reducing the cross sectional dispersion of before tax wages we find that these policies can account for half of the difference between the us and the ceu in overall wage inequality and 76 of the difference in inequality at the upper end log 90 50 differential when this economy experiences skill biased technological change progressivity also dampens the rise in wage dispersion over time the model explains 41 of the difference in the total rise in inequality and 58 of the difference at the upper end

the cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input comparing efficiency units and hours worked summary a monthly labour input series designed to correct for the fact that all hours worked are not of the same quality is constructed and its properties compared with unadjusted hours worked this efficiency units series is constructed from bls data on hours worked and earnings by age and sex the cyclical fluctuations displayed by the efficiency units series are smaller on average than those displayed by hours worked although the difference is not large however the secular behaviour of the series is quite different hours worked per capita displays a significant positive trend while efficiency units per capita does not

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

taxing capital along the transition not a bad idea after all this paper quantitatively characterizes optimal tax systems in a model of overlapping generations when transitional cohorts are explicitly taken into account we use the recent study of conesa et al 2009 as an example but extend it by transitional dynamics we furthermore develop a general and coherent way of aggregating welfare effects of different individuals and cohorts in the short and long run our welfare measure includes the case of a utilitarian social welfare function yet is not limited to this perspective we show that the optimality of a high capital income tax rate along the transition crucially depends on the assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function this objective of the policy maker comprises implicit redistributive objectives across and within cohorts based on pure economic efficiency and insurance effects however we find a zero capital income tax rate and a less progressive labor income tax schedule to be optimal such a tax system receives political support from initial cohorts a high capital income tax regime on the other hand doesn t

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

determining the motives for a positive optimal tax on capital previous literature demonstrates that in a computational life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is positive and large given the computational complexities of these overlapping generations models it is helpful to to determine the relative importance of the economic factors driving this result i highlight the impact of changing two common assumptions in a benchmark model that generates a large optimal tax on capital similar to the model in conesa et al 2009 first the utility function is altered such that it implies an agent s frisch labor supply elasticity is constant as opposed to increasing over his lifetime second the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests at a separate rate from ordinary capital income the main nding of this paper is that these two changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half furthermore i nd that the welfare costs of adopting the high optimal tax on capital from the benchmark model in the model with the altered assumptions which calls for a lower tax on capital are equivalent to 0 35 percent of total lifetime consumption quantifying the impact of these assumptions in the benchmark model is important because the rst has limited empirical evidence and the second although included for tractability confounds a motive for taxing capital with a motive for taxing accidental bequests jel e62 h21

on the optimality of age dependent taxes and the progressive u s tax system abstract in life cycle economies where an individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant the optimal marginal tax rates on capital and labor income vary with age conversely the progressivity imbedded in the u s tax code implies that marginal tax rates vary with age because tax rates vary with earnings and earnings vary with age using numerical simulations this paper shows that if the tax authority is prevented from conditioning tax rates on age some degree of progressivity is desirable as progressive taxation better imitates optimal age dependent taxes than an optimal age independent tax system this role for progressive taxation emanates from efficiency reasons and does not rely on any insurance nor re distribution arguments

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

age dependent taxes with endogenous human capital formation we assess the gains attained by the introduction of age dependent labor income taxes in an overlapping generations economy where individuals live a meaningful life cycle and endogenously accumulate human capital the model is sufficiently rich to isolate the role of general equilibrium effects credit market imperfections and different forms of human capital accumulation the large welfare gains we obtain cannot be attained without age dependence nor can they be attained with age dependent taxes if progressivity of labor income taxes and capital income tax rates are not suitably adjusted to profit from the complementarity of these instruments

anticipated and unanticipated wage changes wage risk and intertemporal labor supply in this article i estimate how labor supply responds to anticipated wage growth unanticipated wage growth and wage risk using the 1989 93 panel section of the bank of italy survey of households income and wealth shiw which collects individual expectations of future wages the use of subjective expectations has several advantages first they provide information on the evolution and riskiness of future wages that the econometrician may never hope to observe moreover this avoids the need for specifying instruments for the growth rate of wages finally forecast errors can be directly controlled for thus avoiding inconsistency in short panels

the effects of health wealth and wages on labour supply and retirement behaviour this paper estimates a life cycle model of labour supply retirement and savings behaviour in which future health status and wages are uncertain individuals face a fixed cost of work and cannot borrow against future labour pension or social security income the method of simulated moments is used to match the life cycle profiles of labour force participation hours worked and assets that are estimated from the data to those that are generated by the model the model establishes that the tax structure of the social security system and pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65 removing the tax wedge embedded in the social security earnings test for individuals aged 65 and older would delay job exit by almost one year by contrast social security benefit levels health and borrowing constraints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages for example reducing social security benefits by 20 would cause workers to delay exit from the labour force by only three months

altruism incomplete markets and tax reform abstract we compute the welfare effects of different revenue neutral tax reforms that eliminate capital income taxation in two general equilibrium models calibrated to the u s economy in our dynastic model the reform with the largest welfare gain is the one that eliminates all income taxation and increases the consumption tax to 35 75 of the population alive at the time of the reform benefit from it individuals use intervivos transfers and bequests to redistribute the long run benefits in a pure life cycle economy that lacks this redistribution technology we find that the same reform would benefit only 9 of the population

should capital income be taxed in the steady state this paper provides a new economic interpretation of the well known dynamic optimal taxation principle that capital income should not be taxed in the steady state we show that the result is related to the minimization of distortions at the intratemporal margin when every factor of production can be taxed at the optimal rate capital income should not be taxed in the steady state but when there are restrictions on the taxation of production factors the tax rate on capital income in the steady state is different from zero

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state