communication networks in markets abstract this paper proposes and tests experimentally a dynamic model of bargaining to analyze decentralized markets where buyers and sellers obtain information about past deals through their social network there is a unique equilibrium in which every individual obtains the same outcome independent of their network position and this outcome depends on the peripheral least connected individuals in the network the main testable predictions are that networks with high density and or low variability in the number of connections across individuals allow their members to obtain a better deal these predictions are tested in a lab experiment through 4 treatments that vary the network that subjects are assigned to the results of the experiment lend support to the theoretical predictions subjects converge to an outcome that is independent of their network position and they fare better if they are assigned to a network that is dense and or has low variability in number of connections across members

prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

technology and transaction cost economics a reply abstract i argue here as i have previously that technology is neither fully determinative of nor irrelevant to economic organization transaction cost economizing occupies a prominent position in any effort to assess the efficacy of alternative forms of economic organization

learning by doing vs learning from others in a principal agent model abstract we introduce learning in a principal agent model of output sharing under moral hazard we use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement experience weighted attraction ewa and individual evolutionary learning iel to represent individual learning learning in the principal agent model is difficult due to the stochastic environment the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for iel and ewa social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms a modified iel using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning

organizational governance and ethical systems a covenantal approach to building trust american businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem the loss of public confidence public criticism increased government controls and growing expectations for improved financial performance and accountability have accompanied this decline in trust traditional approaches to corporate governance typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory have been expensive to direct and have focused on short term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results we explain why the organizational governance theories are fundamentally inadequate to build trust we advance a conceptual framework based on stewardship theory characterized by covenantal relationships and argue that design of governance mechanisms using a covenantal approach is more effective in building trust in organizations a covenantal relationship is a specialized form of a relational contract between an employee and his or her organization we argue that regardless of incentives and control mechanisms carefully designed through contractual mechanisms in the absence of covenantal relationships it is extremely difficult to build trust within organizations we propose that organizations are more likely to build trust both at the organizational level and at the interpersonal level when they create reinforcing and integrated systems that honor implied duties of covenantal relationships

cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection abstract we study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with markovian private information after any history signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder in equilibrium players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions we discuss several applications of our results we explain the cycles of cooperation and conflict observed in trench warfare during world war i show that price leadership and unilateral price cuts can be part of an optimal signaling equilibrium in a repeated bertrand game with incomplete information and show that communication between cartel members may be socially efficient in a repeated cournot game finally we show that the welfare losses disappear as the persistence of the process of types increases and the interest rate goes to zero

a simple model of voice we think of voice as a means of information aggregation within groups operating in a variety of settings we explore how the characteristics of groups and their leaders influence voice in relatively homogeneous groups members farthest away from the leader have the best incentives to provide information and their voice tends to moderate policy decisions in large heterogeneous groups where leaders cannot identify individual members the possibilities for informational exchange are severely limited and any communication that exists pushes policies farther to the extreme

communication networks knowledge and decisions that communication pervades the everyday life of organizations is a statement of the obvious how this widespread communication affects organization s performance is less clear another truism about organizations is that their members are seldom fully knowledgeable of the exact state of the world in which they operate to overcome this information uncertainty burden organizations tend to devote a substantial amount of resources to retrieve information about their environment individual experimentation is a natural way to obtain superior information when the nature and the consequences of the prevailing uncertainty is common to all organization members a natural substitute for replications of individual experiments is to have agents communicate their private information among themselves communication is then a means to save on experimentation costs when they display diminishing returns in another vein shared information fosters coordination between individual agents which is beneficial to the organization as a whole when coordinated actions lead to higher benefits for everyone altogether when each organization member individually ascertains that both uncertainty and coordination are the main driving networked interactions

competitive cheap talk we study a competitive cheap talk model with two senders each sender is responsible for a single project and observes its return exactly one project will be implemented both senders share some common interests with the principal but have own project biases under simultaneous communication all equilibria are shown to be partition equilibria but all the equilibria can no longer be ranked ex ante in terms of pareto efficiency the payoff of the principal depends on both the total conflict between the agents and the asymmetry in the own project biases in the equilibrium preferred by the principal the agent with a smaller bias always has veto power to determine which alternative is implemented and weakly more messages in any given equilibrium decreasing the own project bias of one agent improves the precision of communication by both agents finally sequential communication and simple delegation are shown to be essentially outcome equivalent to simultaneous communication

governing adaptation super 1 to remain competitive an organization must both respond to information about its environment and coordinate its activities we analyse how the allocation of decision rights within an organizational hierarchy influences the organization s ability to solve such problems of coordinated adaptation when information is both soft and distributed inside the organization and the organizational participants behave strategically the results show that contrary to the common intuition the performance differential between centralized and decentralized decision making is non monotone in the importance of coordination further both these common structures are dominated by asymmetric structures in sufficiently asymmetric environments such as a small division developing a new product in the presence of a large division with an established product finally if the incentive conflicts between the participants can be made sufficiently small centralized decision making is always dominated by decentralized decision making copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

asset specificity and economic organization abstract this paper examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization in which both production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset specificity in general markets enjoy advantages by aggregating the demands of many buyers thereby realizing economies of scale or scope such production cost savings need to be assessed in relation to the transaction cost advantages that internal organization sometimes enjoys over markets in adapting to changed circumstances as it turns out both production cost economies and the transaction cost differences between firm and market organization vary systematically with the characteristics of the investments this paper employs a unified framework to assess the choice of organization form the condition of asset specificity is featured

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

strategic vertical integration without foreclosure we determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects foreclosure effects are purposely left aside the profitability of integration originates in the greater ability of integrated firms to adopt a specific type of technologies we show that vertical merger waves can stop by themselves before integration is complete because of strategic substitutability in vertical integration this is in contrast to the strategic complementarity result in mclaren 2000 that leads to either complete integration or complete separation

another look at the radner stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information abstract this paper revisits the well known result of r radner and j stiglitz 1984 in bayesian models of economic theory elsevier amsterdam which shows that under certain conditions the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition we provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcavity in the value of information in a general framework the role that these conditions play is clarified and illustrated with several examples we also discuss the robustness of the nonconcavity result and the difficulties involved in getting the value of information to be globally concave journal of economic literature classification number d83

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

cheap talk with two senders and complementary information this paper studies a cheap talk model with two senders having partial and non overlapping private information communicating with an uninformed receiver the two senders private information is complementary in the sense that the marginal impact of one sender s private information on the receiver s ideal action depends on the other sender s private information when the two senders communicate simultaneously their information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity more information transmitted by one sender leads to more information transmitted by the other sender when the two senders have like biases it is always optimal for the receiver to delegate the decision rights to the sender with a smaller bias when two senders have opposing biases simultaneous communication is more likely to dominate delegation

communication networks externalities and the price of information information goods or information for short play an essential role in modern economies we consider a trading framework where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer exerts externalities and can be freely replicated and transmitted through links in a communication network prices paid for information are determined via the asymmetric nash bargaining solution with endogenous disagreement points this decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network we use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre trade network formation stage an application to citation graphs results in eigenvector like measures of intellectual influence

what is in a surname the role of ethnicity in economic decision making this article reports results from two experiments that investigate possible incidence of discrimination against people with foreign backgrounds in sweden in the first experiment participants play

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

the economic consequences of social network structure we survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks we develop a taxonomy of macro and micro characteristics of social interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning diffusion decisions and resulting behaviors we also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

strategic communication networks in this paper we consider situations in which individuals want to choose an action close to others actions as well as close to a payoff relevant state of nature with the ideal proximity to the common state varying across the agents before this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who decide to whom they reveal the private information they hold about the state the strategic information transmission taking place in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network we provide a direct link between players preferences and the strategic communication network emerging at equilibrium depending on the strength of the coordination motive and the prior information structure equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very tractable way and compared in term of efficiency in general a maximal strategic communication network may not exist and communication networks cannot be ordered in the sense of pareto however expected social welfare always increases when the communication network expands strategic information transmission can be improved when group or public communication is allowed and or when information is certifiable

filtered social learning knowledge sharing is economically important but also typically incomplete we filter our communication this paper analyzes the consequences of filtering in the model homogeneous agents share knowledge with their peers whenever the private benefits exceed communication costs the welfare implications of this transmission mechanism hinge on whether units of knowledge complement substitute for or are independent of each other both substitutability and complementarity generate externalities cheaper communication eliminates externalities in the former case but not necessarily in the latter complementary basic skills such as numeracy catalyze technology adoption and adoption may be path dependent even when payoffs are certain and independent across agents

union bargaining power subcontracting and innovation we show that if a firm can subcontract production to an informal sector an increase in union power may either increase or decrease innovation an increase in union power makes the firm worse off irrespective of its effect on innovation however in contrast to the usual belief an increase in union power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting innovation thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful an increase in union power may create an ambiguous effect on social welfare our analysis provides new insights to the relation between union power and innovation

rational inattention and organizational focus this paper studies optimal communication flows in organizations a production process can be coordinated ex ante by letting agents stick to a prespecified plan of action alternatively agents may adapt to task specific shocks in which case tasks must be coordinated ex post using communication when attention is scarce an optimal organization coordinates only a few tasks ex post those tasks are higher performing more adaptive to the environment and influential hence scarce attention requires setting priorities not just local optimization our results provide microfoundations for a central idea in the management literature that firms should focus on a limited set of core competencies

entrepreneurial universities and overt opportunism entrepreneurial universities are a catalyst for regional economic development and growth yet the entrepreneurial university may not always capture the full gains made by the broader economy due to opportunistic behavior by its faculty scientists we expand agency theory to address conditions when opportunistic behavior persists in the face of substantial information symmetry and where principals appear to tolerate opportunism despite the authority to sanction their agents using a sample of 105 us research universities and 73 603 scientists we demonstrate that some scientists privately leak discoveries invented while working for their universities counter to prior prediction we find that universities acting as principals often do not retaliate even when having knowledge of such opportunistic behavior and the capability to punish non complying agents to extend theory we examined contexts that exacerbate and alleviate such overt opportunism high value discoveries and sizable entrepreneurial activity are associated with greater opportunistic behavior whereas efforts to empower those who have close professional ties with scientists their departments and technology commercialization offices are related to reduced opportunism to complement our empirical analyses we provide a stylized mathematical model that shows how agency theory can improve its predictive power once it formally recognizes certain conditions under which agents wield substantial bargaining power over their principals who in turn seem to tolerate agents overt opportunistic behavior

hedging and vertical integration in electricity markets this paper analyzes the interactions between competitive wholesale spot retail and forward markets and vertical integration in electricity markets we develop an equilibrium model with producers retailers and traders to study and quantify the impact of forward markets and vertical integration on prices risk premia and retail market shares we point out that forward hedging and vertical integration are two separate mechanisms for demand and spot price risk diversification that both reduce the retail price and increase retail market shares we show that they differ in their impact on prices and firms utility because of the asymmetry between production and retail segments vertical integration restores the symmetry between producers and retailers exposure to demand risk whereas linear forward contracts do not vertical integration is superior to forward hedging when retailers are highly risk averse we illustrate our analysis with data from the french electricity market this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

good times bad times and vertical upstream integration abstract we consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input downstream firms can produce the input themselves yet do not trade it upstream firms produce the input to sell it through a walrasian market to downstream firms efficient pooling of capacities requires the input to be produced by upstream firms and traded in the market yet downstream firms will always vertically integrate by producing some of its own input needs a downstream firm cuts down on aggregate input demand thus depressing prices in the market

discrimination in a deprived neighbourhood an artefactual field experiment abstract we present a field experiment designed to examine the discriminatory motives of an understudied demographic the poorest people in england subjects are first asked to divide 10 between two strangers and then play a 10 dictator game with another stranger we subtly vary the ethnicity of the receivers by providing subjects with surnames randomly drawn from the electoral register including treatments that allow us to parse behaviour into either in group favouritism or out group negativity an important behavioural distinction that is typically overlooked in the discrimination literature our results suggest that the observed discriminatory attitudes are the result of out group negativity rather than in group favouritism we advance the literature on discrimination through the estimation of a structural model of group contingent social preferences which we exploit to perform counterfactual simulations our results provide insights into the behaviour of this unique demographic and provide a rationale for why they may support discriminatory policies in their voting behaviour

opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity abstract we study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks in our model boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors expressed opinions but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or counter conforming with their neighbors we show that an agent s social influence on the long run group opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in conformity concerning efficiency of information aggregation or wisdom of the society it turns out that misrepresentation of opinions need not undermine wisdom but may even enhance it given the network we provide the optimal distribution of conformity levels in the society and show which agents should be more conforming in order to increase wisdom

can discrimination in the housing market be reduced by increasing the information about the applicants we investigate how increasing the information about applicants affects discrimination in the rental housing market we let four fictitious applicants two with typical arab muslim names and two with typical swedish names use application letters containing different amounts of information to apply for apartments over the internet in sweden the arab muslim applicants received fewer responses from the landlords than did the swedish applicants all of the applicants gained by providing more information about themselves but the amount of discrimination against the arab muslim applicants remained unchanged indicating that increasing the amount of information about the applicants will not reduce discrimination

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

information acquisition and welfare in network games abstract this paper studies information acquisition and use in network games the network structure incorporates both strategic complements positive links and substitutes negative links an information use game played on a correlation adjusted network is derived equilibrium inefficiencies in both acquisition and use of information are characterized inefficient bunching obtains in information acquisition where the spread in equilibrium signal precisions is below that prescribed by the planner the welfare analysis offers a policy intervention publicizing players information investments the more linked a player is positively or negatively the more strongly they respond to the policy to influence others information acquisition and use

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

a note on partial vertical integration a simple model is constructed to show how partial vertical integration may emerge as an equilibrium market structure in a world characterized by rationing differences in the reservation prices of buyers and in the risk attitudes of buyers and sellers the buyers with the high reservation prices turn out to be vertically integrated

money or friends social identity and deception in networks abstract strategic communication occurs in virtually all committee decision environments theory suggests that small differences in monetary incentives between committee members can leave deception a strategically optimal decision crawford and sobel 1982 galeotti et al 2013 at the same time in natural environments social incentives can also play an important role in determining the way people share or withhold truthful information unfortunately little is known about how monetary and social incentives interact to determine truth telling we investigate this issue by first building a novel model and then testing its equilibrium predictions using laboratory data in the absence of social identity the model s predictions are supported there is more truthful communication between those who share monetary incentives than those who do not we find that the effect of identity is asymmetric sharing the same identity does not promote truth telling but holding different identities reduces truthfulness overall as compared to environments lacking social identity committees with both monetary and social incentives exhibit truthful communication substantially less frequently

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

movers and shakers most projects in most walks of life require the participation of multiple parties while it is difficult to unite individuals in a common endeavor some people who we call movers and shakers seem able to do it the paper specifically examines moving and shaking of an investment project whose return depends both on its quality and the total capital invested in it we analyze a model with two types of agents managers and investors managers and investors initially form social connections managers then bid to buy control of the project and the winning bidder puts effort into making investors aware of it finally a subset of aware investors are given the chance to invest and they decide whether to do so after receiving private signals of the project s quality we first show that connections are valuable since they make it easier for a manager to move and shake the project i e obtain capital from investors when we endogenize the network we find that while managers are identical ex ante a single manager emerges as most connected he consequently earns a rent in extensions we move away from the assumption of ex ante identical managers to highlight forces that lead one manager or another to become a mover and shaker our theory sheds light on a range of topics including entrepreneurship venture capital and anchor investments

information aggregation in polls we study information transmission via polling a policymaker polls constitu ents who differ in their information and ideology to determine policy full rev elation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample but not with a large one in large polls full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists who respond truth fully and extremists who do not we find polling statistics that ignore strate gic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the polvs margin of error we construct estimators that account for strategic behavior finally we compare polls and elections jel c42 d83

the competitiveness of joint bidding in multiple units uniform price auctions recent literature on joint bidding in a single unit common value cv auction argues that the inference and precision that emerges from pooling information by joint bidders enhances competition such information pooling mitigates adverse selection and results in more aggressive bidding and may even increase revenue despite the reduction in the number of bidders we analyze here for the first time joint bidding in a simple cv uniform price auction with multi unit demand this introduces an opposite force due to increased monopsony power of the joint bidders called demand reduction dr we show that the pro competitive benefit from joint bidding in single unit auctions does not generalize to a multi unit environment even when dr is disallowed with dr the scope for improved competition is further eroded

communication and coordination in social networks i model people in a coordination game who use a communication network to tell each other their willingness to participate the minimal sufficient networks for coordination can be interpreted as placing people into a hierarchy of social roles or stages initial adopters then followers and so on down to late adopters a communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways by informing each stage about earlier stages and by creating common knowledge within each stage we then consider two examples first we show that low dimensional networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than high dimensional networks second we show that wide dispersion of insurgents people predisposed toward participation can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad although collective action depends on both social structure and individual incentives these integral aspects have been formalized separately in the fields of social network theory and game theory by considering them together this paper engages the classic question of which structures are conducive to coordination and shows that structure and strategy are related in a mutually interesting way here we consider a coordination game in which each person wants to participate only if others participate social structure is thought of as a communication network by which people tell each other their willingness to participate each person knows whether her neighbours in the network are willing but does not know about anyone else our model is thus a game of incomplete information in which each person given his local knowledge decides whether to participate the main result is a characterization of the minimal sufficient networks for coordination in terms of a hierarchy of social roles or stages initial adopters then followers and so on down to late adopters for example a communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways by informing each stage about earlier stages and by creating common knowledge within each stage we also consider two simple examples first we show that low dimension or strong link networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than high dimension or weak link networks second we show that wide dispersion of insurgents people predisposed toward participation can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad this paper is built on the assumption that the most basic and common mechanism for coordination is the i ll go if you go mechanism individuals first communicate with each other about their preferences and then each individual chooses whether to participate or not hence a person s participation depends on what he knows about his neighbours it does not depend solely on their participation itself either through learning adaptation or social influence the physical analogies of contagion or diffusion are not

endogenous information acquisition in coordination games in the context of a beauty contest coordination game in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari 3 ous informative signals each signal has an underlying accuracy how precisely it 4 identifies the state and a clarity how easy it is to understand the unique linear 5 equilibrium has interesting properties the signals which receive attention are the 6 clearest available even if they have poor underlying accuracy the number of sig 7 nals observed falls as the complementarity of players actions rises and if actions 8 are more complementary the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium 9 is more public in nature the consequences of rational inattention constraints on 10

characterizing social value of information abstract this paper characterizes the social value of information in bayesian games with symmetric quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals the main result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public or private information in so doing we represent welfare as a linear combination of the variance of a common term in an equilibrium strategy and that of an idiosyncratic term which are referred to as the common variance and the idiosyncratic variance of actions respectively the ratio of their coefficients is a key parameter in our condition if the coefficient of the common variance is relatively large welfare necessarily increases but if it is relatively small welfare can decrease using our condition we find eight types of games with different welfare effects of information

optimal market intelligence strategy when management attention is scarce this paper extends the theoretical literature on firms optimal information strategies to the situation when a firm s management attention capacity to process available data is scarce in this case a firm s optimal market intelligence strategy must trade off learning a little about a broad range of markets a broad strategy with gaining a very deep understanding of one or a few markets a focused strategy this trade off is not present when data are scarce an assumption made in most of the existing literature on optimal information search strategies however in data rich environments which are of increasing relevance given technology changes we show a focused market intelligence strategy is always best when managers need to process a substantial amount of data before beginning to gain insights i e there are increasing returns to attention interestingly this focused strategy can also be best with decreasing returns to attention when a managers are sufficiently efficient in processing the available data and b managers have sufficiently strong initial priors on the unknown market parameters we show a broad market intelligence strategy is only optimal when new data points are sufficiently redundant i e when the learning rate is sufficiently decreasing with the allocation of more attention our results also indicate that advances in information technology can account for the pressure on firms to become more focused and that competition increases the likelihood of a focused strategy competition can lead to asymmetric outcomes where firms focus on different markets finally we note that a focused market intelligence strategy and thus an asymmetric allocation of attention does not require a priori differences between firms markets or market specific core capabilities consequently a focused market intelligence strategy can result in market specific core competencies and produce firm differences from equivalent starting conditions