median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

the median voter according to garp this paper adapts the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp empirical method to the public goods problem to test whether observed municipal public spending can be explained as if the city governments maximize the utility of the median income voter it applies the test procedure for medium size municipal governments in five midwest states the data are consistent with garp and reveal that the local governments in the sample behave as if they maximize median voter utility once we control for the state specific effects government management structure and population density the median voter hypothesis is the proposition that local governments behave as if they maximize the utility of the median income voter in the jurisdiction although an important tool in public economic analysis there has been no conclusive direct test of the maximization hypothesis to date revealed preference theory shows that any finite set of price and quantity observations satisfying the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp can be rationalized by the constrained maximization of an increasing continuous concave utility function afriat 1967 1973 varian 1982 this paper adapts the revealed preference method to the public goods problem in order to test municipal spending data for consistency under garp thereby providing the first direct test of whether or not the local governments behave as if they maximize median voter utility the median voter hypothesis represents a simple tool that is the most widely used characterization of local government behavior given its prominence in the literature it is not surprising that the hypothesis itself has become the subject of scrutiny the framework assumes direct or representative democracy without strategic behavior in which competition among politicians ensures that the public sector bureaucracy responds efficiently to voters desires public sector decision making reduces to an as if constrained maximization problem a simplified picture of the outcome of collective action still much of the empirical testing literature is motivated by concerns over whether the model is too simplistic nonetheless it can be argued that given its depiction as an as if outcome the median voter hypothesis should be judged not by its descriptive accuracy of the public sector decision process but instead by how well it explains observed local fiscal choices on this basis the existing empirical evidence although mixed reveals a surprising amount of indirect support for the framework one approach taken in the literature is to evaluate the median voter hypothesis by testing the predictive power of regression equations with median income and tax price terms for explaining state or local fiscal behavior in this line of the

bureaucratic behavior in the local public sector a revealed preference approach public sector bureaucratic utility is typically assumed to be a function ofbudget size or government employment although intuitively appealing thereare no definitive direct tests of the assumption to fill this gap thispaper exploits data that isolate resource allocation decisions made by localpublic sector bureaucrats we use revealed preference theory to find thatthe bureaucracy behaves as if bureaucratic utility is an increasingfunction of employment across government functions and public spending providing direct evidence justifying the popular assumption in theoreticalmodels of government behavior

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

local government internal structure external constraints and the median voter this paper examines how internal structure and external constraints affect local government ability to meet voters demands it applies the revealed preference method to us counties to identify those that fail to satisfy the pure democracy outcome of the median voter hypothesis mvh probit analysis identifies the factors associated with counties that satisfy the mvh internal government structure does not matter but restricting home rule increases the likelihood of satisfying the mvh equilibrium the latter result consistent with the leviathan model the systematic differences found for urban and rural county governments reinforce this conclusion

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

demand for locally provided public services within the median voter s framework the case of the brazilian municipalities in this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the brazilian municipalities within a median voter s framework the rationale for applying that framework came from the fact that in federal systems voters preferences are more likely to be reflected at the local level as the consumers of public services have a better knowledge of the benefits and costs of the local public expenditures results obtained are consistent with the theoretical background thus suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local public goods in brazil in particular the use of quantile regression permitted us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on local public expenses across different expenditures classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across municipalities our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows crowding effects as is between zero and one however in the estimated models marginal congestion slightly d

the median voter model across levels of government the median voter model provides a method of aggregating individual voter s demands to obtain community demand although higher level governments are often assumed to be less responsive to voters than lower level governments it remains an open question whether or not the median voter model which has been found to apply to the lowest tier of the federalist system extends to higher level governments we use the cox specification test to find that the ad hoc model dominates the median model for counties and states the county results are sensitive to the time periods budgetary structure and degree of urbanization

entitlements availability and famine a revisionist view of wollo 1972 1974 abstract this article reviews two stylized theories of famine causation food availability decline fad and food entitlement decline fed as competing explanations of the famine of 1972 1974 in wollo province ethiopia a sen s market entitlement failure argument is challenged by j seaman and j holt s price ripple hypothesis a consideration of the role of transactions costs and wealth inequalities suggests a synthesized approach wollo 1972 1974 was a fad supply slump famine for the relatively wealthy and an entitlements collapse demand slump famine for the absolutely poor

a classroom exercise voting by ballots and feet this classroom experiment illustrates the efficiency enhancing property of a tiebout system in which local public goods decisions are determined by a political process students are given playing cards that induce diverse preferences for expenditures on alternative public goods and are initially assigned to specific communities then those in each community vote on the type and level of public goods provision which determine the tax cost after the provision and tax results are announced students are free to move to a location where the prior results are more consistent with their preferences this process continues for several rounds with a new vote taken at each location after moves have been made the exercise demonstrates that the combination of voting with feet and ballots tends to increase the total net benefit for all communities the voting on provision levels is structured to facilitate a discussion of the median voter theorem

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

government form and performance fiscal illusion and administrative ability in u s counties key differences in local government organizational form lie in separation of powers versus unified powers and elected versus professional chief executive officers ceos this paper studies how these features lead to differences in fiscal illusion and production cost evidence from u s counties indicates that there is less fiscal illusion under separation of powers which by itself reduces spending separation of powers however leads to greater overall spending when compared with unified governments the inelastic public demand therefore implies that separation of powers leads to services being provided at greater cost than under governments with unified powers similar conclusions hold for professional relative to elected ceos

the flypaper effect and other anomalies abstract i develop a model in which income both in its own right and as a proxy for other socioeconomic characteristics is an input in the production function for local public services the most obvious example is education though there are other applications as well the comparative statics results from this model yield the following results 1 the observed flypaper effect the tendency for local government to spend a higher fraction of unrestricted grants than income of residents may be due at least in part to the fact that own income but not grants is a substitute for purchased inputs in the technology hence the propensity to spend on purchased inputs out of own income is lower than out of grants 2 the income elasticity of demand for public sector output may be higher than the observed income elasticity of demand for purchased inputs 3 equalization of educational opportunity via wealth neutrality as suggested by feldstein requires major changes in education finance once we recognice the distinction between purchased inputs and output

on expenditure indices in revealed preference tests recently in this journal chalfant and alston 1988 utilized revealed preference techniques to demonstrate that changes away from consumption of red meat may not be due to changes in tastes but rather to changes in relative prices the authors stressed that previous studies that find evidence of changes in taste are based on estimation of particular functional forms the revealed preference approach is therefore appropriate since consumers with the same tastes will yield observations consistent with revealed preference regardless of the particular utility function the research is carefully done and the conclusions seem appropriately drawn the authors found some violations of revealed preference but they concluded that the violations are negligible on the basis of computation of an expenditure index without disagreeing with their conclusion i believe that the expenditure index is an inappropriate metric of the seriousness of violations of revealed preference instead i present a metric that captures differences in tastes not captured by the expenditure index the use of this superior index is particularly important when consumers face very similar prices and have similar incomes afriat 1967 1973 and varian 1982 prove that for observations to be consistent with the hypothesis of no change in taste satisfaction of the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp is a necessary and sufficient condition knoblauch 1990 proves that when only two goods are in the consumption bundle consistency with the weak axiom is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a common

on government structure and spending the effects of management form and separation of powers summary this paper contributes to the on going debate over how government form affects spending it broadens the previous focus on elected versus professional management to address the separation of legislative and executive powers the empirical results reveal spending differences between governments with separation of powers and those with unified powers only for southern counties of the us in addition for all regions and time periods professional or elected executive management does not significantly affect either municipal or county spending

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

the median voter hypothesis evidence from general purpose local governments the median voter hypothesis mvh represents a much used as well as much criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists to evaluate the mvh this paper applies the cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments the cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the mvh and all tested models thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical mvh analyses the test results reveal that the mvh is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments but not specific services further the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical mvh performance

the crowding parameter and samuelsonian publicness in a recent issue of this journal gramlich and rubinfeld 1982 introduced a distributive share parameter into a public expenditures demand function they also included a parameter linked to population size and estimated the resulting demand function since the initial median voter formulations by borcherding and deacon 1972 and bergstrom and goodman 1973 it has been standard practice to include the population parameter known as the crowding parameter in public expenditures demand functions it has also been standard practice to interpret the parameter as a samuelsonian index of the extent to which public expenditures constitute a pure public or pure private good gramlich and rubinfeld found public expenditures to be a pure private good a conclusion they share with all previous researchers who have estimated the crowding parameter 1 this comment demonstrates that the private good conclusion is

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures