monitoring and competing principals a double edged sword abstract do monitoring technologies increase a principal s profits if she has to compete with others for an agent while monitoring improves the risk incentive tradeoff it also reduces the costs for a rivaling principal to offer a more attractive contract we show in a two action two outcome model that when the derivative of the agent s risk tolerance is smaller than one equilibrium profits are lower when monitoring is available if there is some competition when the derivative is larger than one equilibrium profits are higher when monitoring is available conversely the agent benefits from monitoring when the competition is intense but can be hurt when it is mild

competitive non linear pricing and bundling we examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly when consumers buy all their products from one firm the one stop shopping model nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare but often lower consumer surplus than linear pricing by contrast in a unit demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus in a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects compared with linear pricing nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when i demand is elastic ii there is substantial product differentiation iii there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand iv consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm and v a consumer s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when i ii iv and v hold but iii does not

optimal pricing and composition of multiple bundles a two step approach abstract this paper analyzes the problem facing a firm that must determine the optimal composition and pricing of multiple bundles it supplies to a single market segment it is assumed the firm s competitors does not react in the short run to its decisions and that their bundles prices and characteristics are known it is further assumed that potential consumers of bundles are rational and maximize a random utility function the problem is modeled as a mixed integer non linear program though such programs are normally hard to solve using traditional methods the difficulties are circumvented here by taking advantage of the problem s mathematical structure to develop a novel two phase solution approach two aspects of the solution are particularly worthy of note 1 we demonstrate that the optimal price of a bundle marketed by a firm depends on the composition of all the firm s bundles and not on their prices and on the composition and price of all the competitors bundles in the market and 2 that if the consumer choice behavior is described by a logit model then the firm s bundles should be very similar to each other

strategic information disclosure the case of multi attribute products with heterogeneous consumers we examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about quality attributes of differentiated products in particular we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and consumers that are heterogeneous in their preferences over these attributes we show that there exist certain configurations of consumer preferences under which a firm producing a high quality product even with zero costs of disclosure may choose not to reveal the quality of its product this failure of firms to voluntarily disclose the quality of their products will arise when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demands for these products which in turn triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for all firms as a result the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory

platform pricing in mixed two sided markets when a consumer can appear on both sides of a two sided market such as a user who both buys and sells on ebay the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides i develop a general model for such mixed two sided markets and show that a monopolist platform s incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand which embody the bundling effect and price cost margins adjusted for network externalities which incorporate two sidedness the optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar lerner formula

elasticity of demand and behaviour based price discrimination behaviour based price discrimination bbpd is typically analysed in a framework characterised by perfectly inelastic demand this paper provides a first assessment of the role of demand elasticity on the profit consumer and welfare effects of bbpd we show that the demand expansion effect that is obviously overlooked by the standard framework with unit demand plays a relevant role in comparison to uniform pricing we show that firms are worse off under bbpd however as demand elasticity increases the negative impact of bbpd on profits gets smaller despite a possible slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods in comparison to uniform pricing we show that bbpd boosts consumer surplus and that this benefit is independent of elasticity in contrast to the welfare results derived under the unit demand assumption where bbpd is always bad for welfare the paper shows that bbpd can be welfare enhancing if demand elasticity is sufficiently high

sectoral shocks and aggregate fluctuations abstract this paper presents a multisector dynamic general equilibrium model of business cycles with a distinctive feature aggregate fluctuations are driven by independent sectoral shocks the model hypothesizes that trade among sectors provides a strong synchronization mechanism for these shocks due to the limited but locally intense interaction that is characteristic of such input trade flows limited interaction characterized by a sparse intermediate input use matrix reduces substitution possibilities among intermediate inputs which strengthens comovement in sectoral value added and leads to a postponement of the law of large numbers in the variance of aggregate value added the chief virtue of this model is that reliance on implausible aggregate shocks is not necessary to capture the qualitative features of macroeconomic fluctuations building on horvath 1998 review of economic dynamics 1 781 808 which establishes the theoretical foundation for the relevance of limited interaction in the context of a stylized multisector model this paper specifies a more general multisector model calibrated to the us 2 digit standard industrial code economy simulations prove the model is able to match empirical reality as closely as standard one sector business cycle models without relying on aggregate shocks

the role of investment specific technological change in the business cycle this is a quantitative investigation of the importance of technological change speci c to new investment goods for postwar us aggregate uctuations a growth model that incorporates this form of technological change is calibrated to us data and simulated using the relative price of new equipment to identify the process driving investmentspeci c technology shocks the analysis suggests that this form of technological change is the source of about 30 of output uctuations 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

product line design we characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions the equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope in a generalized vertical differentiation framework the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first best socially optimal line these upper envelope and first best optimal line findings extend to symmetric cournot oligopoly

compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly this paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal the authors show that for a wide range of parameters firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm however firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts furthermore the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling finally mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

why do manufacturers issue coupons an empirical analysis of breakfast cereals we explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers coupons for 25 readyto eat breakfast cereals we find that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available this result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions we present evidence that is inconsistent with both dynamic theories of price discrimination and explanations of couponing based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers we find support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings as well as suggestions that firmwide incentives may induce managers to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously finally lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase

bundled discounts strategic substitutes or complements bundled discounts by pairs of otherwise independent firms play an increasingly important role as a strategic tool in several industries given that prices of firms competing for the same consumers are strategic complements one would expect their discounts levels also to be strategic complements however in this paper we show that under some circumstances bundled discounts may be strategic substitutes this occurs under vertically differentiated products where a low quality pair of producers may indeed prefer to lower its discount after an increase in the discount offered by a high quality pair of producers

breaking into tradables urban form and urban function in a developing city many cities in developing economies particularly in africa are experiencing urbanization without industrialization this paper conceptualizes this in a framework in which a city can produce non tradable goods and if it is sufficiently competitive also internationally tradable goods potentially subject to increasing returns to scale a city is unlikely to produce tradables if it faces high urban and hinterland demand for non tradables or high costs of urban infrastructure and construction the paper shows that if there are increasing returns in tradable production there may be multiple equilibria the same initial conditions can support dichotomous outcomes with cities either in a low level non tradable only equilibrium or diversified in tradable and non tradable production the paper demonstrates the importance of history and expectations in determining outcomes essentially a city can be built in a manner that makes it difficult to attract tradable production this situation might be a consequence of low and self fulfilling expectations or history the predictions of the model are consistent with several observed features of african cities

antidumping protection and r d competition in recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world evidence shows that antidumping often targets r d intensive sectors raising a con cern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in r d we investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two stage game in which two firms first choose r d levels and then compete in prices we find that when a single government institutes antidumping law the protected firm decreases investment in r d while the constrained firm invests more when both governments engage in antidumping actions both firms invest more in r d than under free trade jel classification f12 f13

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

bundling of substitutes or complements abstract the adams yellen two good bundling framework is generalized to allow the goods to be substitutes or complements general theorems on price change effects are given a monopolist may find it most profitable to offer the goods only as a bundle even if they are imperfect substitutes or to not bundle the goods even if they are complements if one good is competitively sold a monopoly producer of the other good can never increase profits by offering his good only as part of a bundle however such a monopolist might profitably offer his good in both bundled and unbundled form to price discriminate even if the two goods are substitutes

comments on gaussian demand and commodity bundling different commodities are often sold together as a bundle e g complete dinners in a restaurant stereo systems in mixed bundling strategies the individual components of the bundle are also offered for sale separately in block booking or pure bundling strategies they are not via simple hypothetical examples of two product firms stigler 1963 and adams and yellen 1976 have demonstrated that these selling practices can increase profit even if there is no cost advantage to bundling and the component products are independent in demand it is obvious from these examples that heterogeneity in consumer tastes especially in relative valuations of the firm s two products is a necessary condition for profitable bundling unfortunately more specific principles to describe concisely the necessary and or sufficient conditions for profitable bundling are not so obvious since consumer demand in the examples is represented by a complete enumeration of consumer reservation prices optimal prices and pricing strategies must be determined by trial and error marginal analysis is inappropriate or uninformative more important these numerical examples do not yield characterizations of profit for each strategy as functions of a small number of parameters that summarize the relevant features of the distribution of reservation prices in the consumer population by assuming that reservation prices for the firm s two products are distributed in the consumer population according to the bivariate normal probability law schmalensee in this issue has constructed a class of examples within which the profitability of bundling can be analyzed as a function of production costs the mean and variance of the reservation price for each commodity and the correlation between the two commodities reservation prices although this analysis is sometimes mathematically complex schmalensee is quite thorough subject to the normality assumption many of the questions suggested by the

intertemporal price discrimination with two products we study the two product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy we show that if consumers valuations are not strongly ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date for general valuations we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling so we show that the established no discrimination across time result does not extend to two product sellers under standard taste distributions

coupon value a signal for price in this article the author proposes that consumers use the value of a coupon to estimate price study 1 shows that the higher the percentage discount the higher the perceived price study 2 demon

interfirm bundling and vertical product differentiation in this paper we study the competitive effects of bundled discounts offered by pairs of independent firms in a setting with vertically differentiated goods where firms decide whether to participate in a discounting scheme before prices are set it is shown that in equilibrium all pairs of firms producing goods of the same quality level offer bundled discounts relative to the no bundling benchmark we find that i all headline prices rise ii all bundle prices net of the respective discount decrease and iii only high quality sellers will obtain higher profits furthermore this equilibrium corresponds to the worst scenario in terms of consumer welfare and it and decreases social welfare

on the driving forces behind cyclical movements in employment and job reallocation theory restricts short run job creation and destruction responses and cumulative employment and job reallocation responses to allocative and aggregate shocks we formulate these restrictions and implement them for postwar data on u s manufacturing allocative shocks are the main driving force behind cyclical movements in job reallocation but their contribution to employment fluctuations varies greatly across alternative identification assumptions also the data compel one or both of the following inferences aggregate shocks greatly alter the shape and not just the mean of the cross sectional density of employment growth rates allocative shocks cause short run reductions in aggregate employment

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

is perfect price discrimination really efficient an analysis of free entry we analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry with a fixed number of firms and in the absence of coordination failures perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way however with free entry the number of firms is always excessive our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation they also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of the principals

sectoral shifts and cyclical unemployment a substantial fraction of cyclical unemployment is better characterized as fluctuations of the frictional or natural rate than as deviations from some relatively stable natural rate shifts of employment demand between sectors of the economy necessitate continuous labor reallocation since it takes time for workers to find new jobs some unemployment is unavoidable this paper presents evidence that most of the unemployment fluctuations of the seventies unlike those in the sixties were induced by unusual structural shifts within the u s economy simple time series models of layoffs and unemployment are constructed that include a measure of structural shifts within the labor market these models are estimated and a derived natural rate series is constructed

a more general theory of commodity bundling this paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers whether integrated or separate firms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand alone products product substitutability typically gives an integrated firm a greater incentive to offer a bundle discount relative to the model with additive preferences while substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to offer inter firm discounts when separate sellers coordinate on an inter firm discount they can use the discount to overturn product substitutability and relax competition

measures of per capita hours and their implications for the technology hours debate structural vector autoregressions give conflicting results on the effects of technology shocks on hours the results depend crucially on the assumed data generating process for hours per capita we show that the standard measure of hours per capita and productivity have significant low frequency movements that are the source of the conflicting results hodrick prescott hp filtered hours per capita produce results consistent with those obtained when hours are assumed to have a unit root we show that important sources of the low frequency movements in the standard measure are sectoral shifts in hours and the changing age composition of the working age population when we control for these low frequency components to determine the effect of technology shocks on hours using long run restrictions we get one consistent answer hours decline in the short run in response to a positive technology shock we further extend the analysis by examining the effects of demographic controls on the impulse responses to investment specific technology shocks our results are less conclusive

an antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts abstract consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market bundled loyalty discounts in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist have ambiguous welfare effects such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing in some settings they act as tie in sales existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus we apply a new test to an illustrative example based on smithkline that assumes the tied market has homogeneous goods if the tied market is characterized by hotelling competition bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price in numerical examples we find that this can deter entry or induce exit

bertrand supertraps we study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms firms whose products interact in the profit function specifically we focus on the impact of intrafirm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits this impact may be decomposed in two different ways a a direct effect keeping the competitors actions fixed plus a strategic effect i e through the competitors actions or alternatively b a competitive advantage effect change in firmi only plus an imitation effect change in all other firms we derive conditions such that a the strategic effect more than outweighs the direct effect and conditions such that b the imitation effect more than outweighs the competitive advantage effect bertrand supertraps for example an increase in the degree of economies of scope would increase profits if prices were fixed or if the change were limited to firmi s cost function however if all firms increase the degree of economies of scope then all firms receive lower profits a variety of other applications is considered including learning curves core competencies demand synergies systems competition compatibility bundling network effects switching costs durable goods long term contracts

which demand systems can be generated by discrete choice we provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for when a multiproduct demand system can be generated from a discrete choice model with unit demands

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

can long run restrictions identify technology shocks gali s innovative approach of imposing long run restrictions on a vector autoregression var to identify the effects of a technology shock has become widely utilized in this paper we investigate its reliability through monte carlo simulations using calibrated business cycle models overall gali s methodology appears to be fruitful the impulse responses derived from the artificial data generally have the same sign and qualitative pattern as the true responses and the approach can be informative in discriminating between alternative models however our results reveal some important quantitative shortcomings including considerable estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables more generally the conditions under which the methodology performs well appear considerably more restrictive than implied by the key identifying assumption this underscores the importance of using economic models to guide in the implementation of the approach in interpreting the results and in assessing its limitations jel c32 e32 o33

fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination we investigate the effect of a ban on third degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion we build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups two cases are analyzed i best response symmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed ii best response asymmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed in both price discrimination scenarios firms discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim trigger strategies than under uniform pricing

interfirm bundled discounts as a collusive device this paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods i e bertrand competitors can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts by committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups such brand specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome consumers become worse o due to higher effective prices our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other s market power without excluding rivals

cross market discounts firms in several markets attract consumers by offering discounts in other unrelated markets this promotion strategy which we call cross market discounts has been successfully adopted in the last few years by many grocery retailers in partnership with gasoline retailers across north america europe and australia in this paper we use an analytical model to investigate the major forces driving the profitability of this novel promotion strategy we consider a generalized scenario in which purchases in a source market lead to price discounts redeemable in a target market our analysis shows that this strategy can be a revenue driver by simultaneously increasing prices as well as sales in the source market even though we assume the demand curve to be downward sloping in price moreover it distributes additional consumption motivated by the discount in two markets and under diminishing marginal returns from consumption this can simultaneously increase firm profits and consumer welfare more effectively than traditional nonlinear pricing strategies our study provides many other interesting insights as well and our key results are in accordance with anecdotal evidence obtained from managers and industry publications

optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly contrasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products we develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of import to a monopolist i should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold separately pure components together pure bundling or both mixed bundling and at what prices ii how do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products we find that the combination of marginal cost levels and the degree of complementarity or substitutability determines which of the three bundling strategies is optimal complements and substitutes should typically be priced higher than independently valued products

coordinating price reductions and coupon events abstract in this article the authors use an economic model to show that it may be optimal to lower the retail price during a coupon event when marginal consumers have moderate hassle costs of coupon redemption results from the model offer predictions on the relationships among coupon redemptions shelf price and coupon face value the authors test these predictions on a large data set of hundreds of coupon events across six packaged goods categories the data show that when a small coupon face value is offered the shelf price is likely to be reduced they also find that coupon efficiency increases when there is a lower retail price the results are of interest to managers planning a promotion calendar and deciding whether to coordinate price promotions with coupon events and they contribute to economic theory when a firm moves from uniform pricing e g no coupons to second degree price discrimination e g coupons all consumers may face a lower price this finding has public policy implication

dynamic pricing when to entice brand switching and when to reward consumer loyalty this article develops a theory of dynamic pricing in which firms may offer separate prices to different consumers based on their past purchases brand preferences over two periods are described by a copula admitting various degrees of positive dependence when commitment to future prices is infeasible each firm offers lower prices to its rival s customers when firms can commit to future prices consumer loyalty is rewarded if preference dependence is low but enticing brand switching occurs if preference dependence is high our theory provides a unified treatment of the two pricing policies and sheds light on observed practices across industries

valuing new goods in a model with complementarity online newspapers many important economic questions hinge on the extent to which new goods either crowd out or complement consumption of existing products recent methods for studying new goods rule out complementarity by assumption so their applicability to these questions has been limited i develop a new model that relaxes this restriction and use it to study competition between print and online newspapers using new micro data from washington dc i estimate the relationship between the print and online papers in demand the welfare impact of the online paper s introduction and the expected impact of charging positive online prices

the aggregate effects of sectoral reallocations abstract can a one time permanent change in the fundamentals behind the sectoral composition of the economy prompt an aggregate downturn can this downturn be non negligible even if one uses us data to determine the relative size of gross vs net job flows and the importance of job creation costs can one consider the military build down of the 1990s as a plausible cause for the 1990 1991 recession do sectoral reallocations generate responses that are qualitatively similar to productivity shocks we use a variant of the mortensen pissarides 1994 review of economic studies 61 397 415 job creation destruction model calibrate it to us labor market data and run experiments that suggest one can answer yes to all these questions

renewing expectations about africa s cities built with great expectations to connect africa with growing global trade in the nineteenth century many of africa s cities today have economies that are predominantly local not regional or global in their reach at the same time africa s cities are experiencing rapid population growth with the urban population predicted to exceed 1 billion by 2040 why have africa s urban economies not been able to keep pace with their burgeoning populations and get into the production of regionally and globally tradable goods and services and what should policy makers focus on to renew expectations about africa s cities this paper makes the case that as long as african cities lack functioning land markets and regulations and early coordinated infrastructure investments they will remain local cities closed to regional and global markets trapped into producing only locally traded goods and services and limited in their economic growth

production growth and business cycles ii new directions abstract this paper outlines new directions for investigations of real business cycle models consideration of stochastic growth of exogenous and endogenous forms analysis of suboptimal outcomes arising due to externalities of distorting taxes and implications of labor market heterogeneity

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

non discrimination clauses in the retail energy sector the british energy regulator will soon review a non discrimination licence condition which it imposed to ensure that energy retailers charge the same mark up in different regions many consumers are loyal to incumbent firms necessitating heavy discounting by entrants to attract customers which had led to regional price discrimination matching characteristics of the energy market to models of discrimination we identify the necessary conditions for the licence condition to have a positive effect for consumers and explore whether the policy has helped potentially vulnerable consumers we conclude that the most likely effect of the licence condition is to reduce competition in the mainstream energy markets and welcome the regulator s latest review of the retail market

behavior based pricing in vertically differentiated industries we study behavior based pricing bbp in a vertically differentiated model vertical differentiation is innately asymmetric because all customers prefer the higher quality product when prices are equal this asymmetry causes bbp to have different properties than symmetric horizontally differentiated models we highlight two dimensions that affect the analysis the role of quality adjusted cost differences between the firms and the role of consumer discounting relative to firm discounting in the second period consistent with the prior literature we find that there are conditions based on market shares and quality adjusted costs under which either the low quality firm or the high quality firm but not both will reward its current customers with lower prices than it charges to new customers we then consider whether these conditions can arise in a two period equilibrium we find that if consumers sufficiently discount the future periods then firms at enough of a competitive disadvantage will reward their customers i e the low quality firm will reward its current customers if the quality adjusted cost differential between the two firms is small while the high quality firm will reward its current customers if this cost differential is large conversely we find that if consumers do not discount the future very much then the firm at a competitive disadvantage i e a low quality firm competing against a low cost high quality firm or a high quality firm that has very high costs can earn greater profits with bbp than without bbp although there are cases where both firms may benefit from bbp this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

a traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations under the traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations aggregate demand shocks move output and prices in the same direction while aggregate supply shocks move output and prices in opposite directions this paper examines the joint behavior of u s output unemployment prices wages and nominal money and asks whether it is consistent with this interpretation the answer is a qualified yes

optimal product bundling with dependent valuations the price of independence abstract in this paper we investigate the tactical problem of pricing a bundle of products when the underlying valuations of the bundle components are dependent we use copula theory to model the joint density of reservation prices and provide analytical derivations for the prices under different bundling strategies and sharp bounds for the profit function we discover that when only the bundle is offered and the marginal costs are relatively small the seller is better off by bundling products that have a negative association between their valuations while the converse is true when the marginal costs are relatively high we also show that the net benefit of offering a full product line containing both the bundle and the components decreases for mild to strong associations between the component valuations compared to offering just the bundle finally we analyze how the typical literature assumption of independence of reservation prices impacts the seller s profitability when in fact the valuations are dependent and find that this gap in profitability which we call the price of independence can be arbitrarily large

a strategic motivation for commodity bundling the analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination in contrast this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle the profitability of bundling whether it adversely affects rival producers and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition the role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

market segmentation and collusive behavior abstract the recent literature on oligopolistic third degree price discrimination has been primarily concerned with rival firms incentives to acquire customer specific information and the consequences of such information on firm profitability and welfare this literature has taken mostly a static view of the interaction between competing firms in contrast in this paper we investigate the impact of customer specific information on the likelihood of tacit collusion in a dynamic game of repeated interaction this issue is very important because competitive price discrimination usually leads to a cutthroat price competition prisoners dilemma among firms firms therefore may seek ways to soften competition and sustain higher prices our main result is that collusion becomes more difficult as the firms ability to segment consumers improves

urbanization in developing economies the assessment urbanization is an inherent part of economic development yet its success in delivering jobs productivity and liveability varies widely this issue of the oxford review of economic policy compares the experience of different countries and analyses the causes of their different performance cities are policy intensive requiring public provision of infrastructure regulation and coordination this in turn requires authorizing environments with a sufficiently broad span of control and correspondingly powerful checks and balances to prevent abuse

competition with exclusive contracts and market share discounts we analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market share discounts conditional on the seller s share of customers total purchases with incomplete information about demand firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers informational rents however exclusive contracts intensify competition thus reducing prices and profits and in all pareto undominated equilibria increasing welfare market share discounts by contrast produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers we discuss the implications of these results for competition policy jel d43 d83 d86 k21 l14 l42 in this paper we study firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts or mar ket share discounts i e discounts that depend on the seller s share of a customer s total purchases these are common yet seldom studied forms of competition the literature has mainly focused on incumbents use of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts to deter new entrants whilst paying less attention to competitors deploying similar pricing strategies we show that exclusive contracts intensify competition reducing equilibrium prices whereas market share discounts have a double marginalization effect and hence result in higher prices these findings have a bearing on the current lively policy debate 1 fueled by the fact that antitrust authorities view competition by means of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts with some suspicion to say the least the authorities main concern appears to be that a dominant firm can use exclusivity or market share discounts to eliminate not only potential competitors but also existing ones a prime instance of this is the case of intel intel whose main competitor amd has been operating for years in the microchip sector offered electronics manufacturers discounts that depended on their buying a minimum share of their total purchases of microchips from intel some customers to qualify for the discount had to opt for an exclusive supply contract that

demand estimation and merger simulations for drugs logits v aids abstract we use adhd drugs sales data from 2000 2003 and compare estimates of elasticities and merger simulations from three different demand models models include logit random coefficients logit and conditional aids demand model with multistage budgeting the magnitude of cross price elasticities is larger in the third model in comparison to the first two and some of the cross price elasticities are estimated to be negative hypothetical merger simulations show larger price effects for the multistage aids model in comparison to the discrete choice models

intermediate inputs and sectoral comovement in the business cycle abstract the post war us business cycle is characterized by positive comovement of employment and output across sectors it has been argued that multi sector growth models are inconsistent with this observation when changes in relative productivities are the main source of fluctuations we suggest that the input output structure of an economy in particular the pervasive use of intermediate inputs can induce positive comovement in sectoral employment and output following changes in relative productivities we calibrate a model of the us economy for the durable and nondurable goods producing sectors and show that sectoral employment and output move together if intermediate inputs are used in production the model is also consistent with the observation that the relative price of nondurable goods is procyclical

behavior based pricing with experience goods we consider a two period model in which duopolists sell experience goods and practice behavior based price discrimination bbpd we give general conditions for when firms should offer a lower price to existing customers pay to stay or to new customers pay to switch we also demonstrate that unlike previous results bbpd may intensify competition in the first period but weaken it in the second

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

long run implications of investment specific technological change an attempt is made to disentangle its effects from the more traditional hicksneutral form of technological progress the balanced growth path for the model is characterized and calibrated to u s national income and product account nipa data the quantitative analysis suggests that investment specific technological change accounts for the major part of growth jel e13 030 041 047

targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals it is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data which can be used for targeted pricing we propose a modified hotelling model with two dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects we show that these incentives depend on the type of customer data and on consumer heterogeneity in the strength of brand preferences only data on consumer transportation cost parameters is shared the incentives to do so are stronger if consumers are relatively homogeneous customer data sharing is most likely to be detrimental to consumer surplus while the effect on social welfare can be positive

add on pricing by asymmetric firms this paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add on fees at the time of initial purchase we find that consumers who know the add on fees can be penalized and increasingly so by the existence of boundedly rational consumers our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add ons plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits when quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers add on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm i e a lose win result compared to when add on pricing is prohibited or infeasible when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and without boundedly rational consumers the opposite win lose result prevails when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and with boundedly rational consumers the result can be win win win lose or lose win depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add ons this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

interpreting aggregate fluctuations looking at sectors abstract a dynamic factor model is used to investigate on the variability in labor productivity and hours across the 2 digit us manufacturing industries two kind of shocks emerge as quantitatively relevant during the postwar period they can be reasonably interpreted as technology shocks to the production of equipment and economy wide shocks the former induces a positive correlation between productivity and hours growth rates in the durable goods producing sector the latter spurs a negative correlation in the nondurable goods producing sector such evidence provides a novel interpretation of the aggregate near zero correlation between the two variables

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

should mobile marketers collect data other than geo location we take today s mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality we show that depending on consumer heterogeneity higher quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns in equilibrium both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality while only one acquires data if the data quality is low firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and or when data are precise although social welfare weakly improves consumers can be harmed

welfare and output in third degree price discrimination a note abstract one main result on the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement this note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms in these examples price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm this induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination

commodity bundling by single product monopolies consider two products that have independent demands in the sense that all individual buyers consider them neither substitutes nor complements then if the two products are priced separately the demand for either is independent of the price of the other in his classic analysis of block booking of feature films george stigler shows that it may be profitable for a monopoly seller of two such products to bundle them by requiring a buyer to take both in order to get either his work provides a rationale for tying arrangements that does not depend on technological or other dependencies among the products involved 2 adams and yellen extend the analysis of multiproduct monopoly with independent demands 3 they discuss two different bundling strategies pure bundling in which the seller only offers the products in fixed proportions and mixed bundling in which buyers may either buy the products separately or purchase a bundle with fixed proportions of each in this note i consider a single product monopoly and investigate the profit and welfare implications of bundling its product for some other

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in a differentiated oligopoly this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is verified however that consumer surplus is never improved social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms profits in the case of linear demands jel d43 l11 l13 i introduction this article examines the welfare effects of oligopolistic third degree price discrimination explicitly considering product differentiation as a source of market power and strategic interaction product differentiation is one of the main reasons why firms can enjoy market power it enables them to sell products that are no longer perfect substitutes for example coca cola and pepsico sell similar types of soda although it is arguable that they differ in taste each firm thereby attracts some consumers over another as a form of price discrimination coca cola was once reported to be testing a vending machine that would automatically raise prices in hot weather 1 although the plan triggered nationwide controversy and coca cola had to abandon the project as a result it could have changed the regime of uniform pricing to one of price discrimination in the soda market how would the resulting change affect consumer welfare and firms profits in other words is third degree price discrimination good or bad answering this question is important because it helps us to evaluate price discrimination under oligopoly in this article we focus on horizontal product differentiation to consider substitutability as well as complementarity 2 by assuming a linear quadratic utility function of a representative consumer and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game we characterize the conditions relating to such demand properties as substitutability and complementarity required for price discrimination to improve social welfare more specifically we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is also shown that aggregate output must increase for price discrimination to improve social welfare we verify however that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimination welfare improvement from price discrimination is solely owing to an increase in firms profits in the example above the degree of substitution would be higher in the strong market i e when the temperature is high because consumers care less about which brand when it is hot weather our analysis below implies that social welfare might improve in this case the degree of substitution can vary across markets even if consumers in each market face exactly the same products because consumers taste depends on various market specific factors such as geographical and natural conditions if the strong market is where consumers demand a product more eagerly caring less about which brand in the above example individuals demand soda more eagerly in hot weather then our results suggest that price discrimination has large potential to improve social welfare 3 why does allowing price discrimination improve social welfare notice that there are two forces that determine equilibrium prices in price setting oligopoly a larger market size raises the price whereas a larger substitutability parameter lowers the price for price discrimination to raise social welfare it is necessary that a high degree of substitutability mitigates an increase in the discriminatory price in the larger market

the dynamic effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks the neoclassical growth model is used to identify the short run effects of neutral technology shocks which affect the production of all goods homogeneously and investment specific shocks which affect only investment goods the real equipment price crucial for identifying the investment shocks experiences an abrupt increase in its average rate of decline in 1982 so the analysis is based on a split sample on the basis of the preferred specification the two technology shocks account for 73 percent of hours and 44 percent of output s business cycle variation before 1982 and 38 percent and 80 percent afterward the shocks also account for more than 40 percent of hours and 58 percent of output s forecast errors over a three to eight year horizon in both samples the majority of these effects are driven by the investment shocks

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

macroeconomic forecasting using diffusion indexes this article studies forecasting a macroeconomic time series variable using a large number of predictors the predictors are summarized using a small number of indexes constructed by principal component analysis an approximate dynamic factor model serves as the statistical framework for the estimation of the indexes and construction of the forecasts the method is used to construct 6 12 and 24 monthahead forecasts for eight monthly u s macroeconomic time series using 215 predictors in simulated real time from 1970 through 1998 during this sample period these new forecasts outperformed univariate autoregressions small vector autoregressions and leading indicator models