aggregate earnings and gross domestic product international evidence abstractrecent studies in macro accounting suggest that changes in aggregate accounting earnings can predict quarterly gdp growth in the usa our objective in this study is to test the robustness o

refinancing profitability and capital structure abstract we revisit the well established puzzle that leverage is negatively correlated with measures of profitability in contrast we find that at times when firms are at or close to their optimal level of leverage the cross sectional correlation between profitability and leverage is positive at other times it is negative these results are consistent with dynamic trade off models in which infrequent capital structure rebalancing is optimal the time series of market leverage and profitability in the quarters prior to rebalancing events match the patterns predicted by these models our results are not driven by investment layouts market timing payout or mechanical mean reversion of leverage

debt in industry equilibrium this article shows 1 how entry and exit of firms in a competitive industry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure and 2 how given a trade off between tax advantages and agency costs a firm will optimally adjust its leverage level after it is set up we derive simple pricing expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for industry output plays a crucial role when a firm optimally adjusts its leverage over time we show that total firm value comprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixed capital structure plus a continuum of options for marginal increases in debt article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries

how does industry affect firm financial structure we examine the importance of industry to firm level financial and real decisions we find that in addition to standard industry fixed effects financial structure also depends on a firm s position within its industry in competitive industries a firm s financial leverage depends on its natural hedge its proximity to the median industry capital labor ratio the actions of other firms in the industry and its status as entrant incumbent or exiting firm financial leverage is higher and less dispersed in concentrated industries where strategic debt interactions are also stronger but a firm s natural hedge is not significant our results show that financial structure technology and risk are jointly determined within industries these findings are consistent with recent industry equilibrium models of financial structure copyright 2005 oxford university press

capital structure and product market rivalry how do we reconcile theory and evidence this paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior we examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure the evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing this finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition following the empirical evidence we introduce the strategic investment effects of debt and argue that this effect in conjunction with agency costs appears to fit the data this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

determinants of capital structure evidence from a major developing economy a major shortcoming of capital structure studies on developing economies is that they generally restrict their analyses to large publicly traded manufacturing firms consequently we know little about the applicability of various capital structure theories to firms that are private small and or outside the manufacturing industry in these economies in this paper we conduct a comparative test of the trade off and pecking order theories using a comprehensive firm level dataset that covers manufacturing non manufacturing small large publicly traded and private firms in a major developing economy turkey the trade off theory provides a better description of the capital structures of all firm types than the pecking order theory moreover the trade off theory appears to be particularly suitable for understanding the financing choices of large private firms in the non manufacturing sector and when the economic environment is relatively stable by contrast pecking order theory is most useful when it comes to small publicly traded manufacturing firms especially when the economic environment is relatively unstable

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

evidence on the impact of the agency costs of debt on corporate debt policy in the last several years there has been increased theoretical emphasis on the agent principal problem as it applies to corporate finance this paper is an attempt to empirically test for the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of corporations we find that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower insider ownership which may be explained by the agency costs of debt and or the agency costs of equity other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal relationships put forth by myers we find that high growth firms use less debt rather than more debt high operating risk firms use more debt rather than less debt and firm size appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt

control rights and capital structure an empirical investigation we show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower s alternative sources of finance are costly in addition despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation a fundamental question in financial economics is how do firms choose their financial policies extant empirical research on this question has focused primarily on the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs e g scott 1976 information asymmetry e g myers and majluf 1984 and more recently market timing behavior e g baker and wurgler 2002 however beginning with jensen and meckling 1976 a large body of theoretical research examines how incentive conflicts between managers and external investors affect corporate financial policies in particular theoretical research on financial contracting shows that in the presence of incentive conflicts optimal debt contracts will allocate certain rights to creditors after negative performance in order to help firms secure financing ex ante e g aghion and bolton 1992 and dewatripont and tirole

how stable are corporate capital structures leverage cross sections more than a few years apart differ markedly with similarities evaporating as the time between them lengthens many firms have high and low leverage at different times but few keep debt to assets ratios consistently above 0 500 capital structure stability is the exception not the rule occurs primarily at low leverage and is virtually always temporary with many firms abandoning low leverage during the post war boom industry median leverage varies widely over time target leverage models that place little or no weight on maintaining a particular ratio do a good job replicating the substantial instability of the actual leverage cross section

an international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices this study examines how the institutional environment influences capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms in 39 developed and developing countries we find that a country s legal and tax system corruption and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios specifically firms in more corrupt countries and those with weaker laws tend to use more debt especially short term debt explicit bankruptcy codes and deposit insurance are associated with higher leverage and more long term debt more debt is used in countries where there is a greater tax gain from leverage

real flexibility and financial structure an empirical analysis i examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure i test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution i measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment i find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility this split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable copyright 2003 oxford university press

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

on the debt capacity of growth options we relate the value of growth options in the firm s investment opportunity set to the level of debt in the firm s capital structure underinestment costs of debt increase and free cash flow benefits fall with additional growth options thus if debt capacity is defined as the amount of debt the firm optimally adds for an incremental project then the debt capacity of growth options is negative this result implies that book leverage should fall with the addition of growth options our tests using a large sample of industrial firms confirm this prediction

capital structure and interaction among firms in output markets theory and evidence i develop a simple model that examines the relations between the extent of competitive interaction among firms in output markets their capital structures and the aggressiveness of their operating strategies a firm s optimal leverage is related to the degree to which its operating strategy affects its rivals value functions and resulting optimal output market choices this relation is positive regardless of whether the competition in output markets is in strategic substitutes or in strategic complements i test the model s prediction using two proxies for the extent of competitive interaction among firms the empirical evidence provides support for the model

debt agency costs and industry equilibrium we show that risk characteristics of projects cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry as a result in reasonable settings financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium without taxes capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders incentives but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels the effect of firms financial structures on subsequent investment and output decisions has recently received considerable attention in the finance literature the central insight that equityholders control the firm s investment and production decisions and in general do not maximize the value of a levered firm has been applied to the analysis of risk shifting underinvestment and firms abilities to enter into optimal contracts with their customers existing models of firms financial structures and their effect on investment decisions are generally based on a single firm framework and do not take into account the relationship between project cash flows and the investment decisions of all firms in the industry 2 in this paper we allow the distribution of investment projects within an industry to adjust and show that this generates new insights and reverses several key results of single firm agency cost models the new predictions conform with well documented

debt and communications technology diffusion retrospective evidence this study has evaluated the relationship between debt in the capital structure of firms and the dynamics of broadband and digital technology adoption in the united states based on a large dataset on local exchange carriers in the united states over a contemporary historical fourteen year period from 1988 to 2001 using treatment effects modeling the impact of debt in impacting the levels of firms broadband deployment has been found to be negative and significant the primary source of debt in the sector has been in the form of arm s length corporate bonds and the assumptions of the monitoring hypothesis associated with such debt that lenders in the face of information and collective actions problems might not be able to control managers and hence invest less in highly technology intensive situations are supported by the data additionally the data set has been split into separate sets for two periods one between 1988 and 1995 for the period before the telecommunications act of 1996 came into force and the other set between 1996 and 2001 and the results have stayed consistent a test of the coefficients between the two periods has shown that the negative impact of leverage on broadband deployment has become stronger after the introduction of competition in the sector and this has suggested that the change in the institutional logics between the two periods has been of material impact in influencing lenders perceptions

risks and financing decisions in the energy sector an empirical investigation using firm level data using a sample of 102 uk energy firms over the period 1981 2009 this paper empirically examines the effects of uncertainty on firms leverage decisions the results indicate that both firms specific and macroeconomic uncertainty have negative sizeable and statistically significant impacts on the uk energy sector firms target leverage the results also indicate that the profitability of energy firms plays an important role in uncertainty leverage relationship by changing the total effect of uncertainty on leverage while more profitable firms appear to reduce their leverage by a relatively large amount in response to increased macroeconomic uncertainty they are less likely to be affected by firm specific uncertainty these results suggest that stability in macroeconomic conditions and business activity is important to the stability of the capital structure of firms in the energy sector which would in turn be conducive to stability in their investments and production

do industry level analyses improve forecasts of financial performance prior research documents mean reversion in firm profitability and growth under the implicit assumption that profitability and growth of all firms revert to a common benchmark at the same rate however a large body of academic research suggests that there are systematic interindustry differences e g industry barriers to entry that differentially affect firm performance based on industry membership we evaluate the relative forecast accuracy of mean reverting models at the industry and economywide levels and find that industry specific models are generally more accurate in predicting firm growth but not profitability

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

the limitations of industry concentration measures constructed with compustat data implications for finance research industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry are poor proxies for actual industry concentration these measures have correlations of only 13 with the corresponding u s census measures which are based on all public and private firms in an industry also only when u s census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that moreconcentrated industries which should be more oligopolistic are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price cost margins further the significant relations of compustatbased industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when u s census measures are used one of the reasons for this occurrence is that compustat based measures proxy for industry decline overall our results indicate that product markets research that uses compustat based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions jel g10 g30 l10 a growing number of studies that consider the effects of product markets on financial economics related phenomena use industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry these studies examine issues related to asset pricing hou and robinson 2006 informed trading tookes 2008 idiosyncratic stock return volatility gaspar and massa 2006 mergers and acquisitions song and walkling 2000 fee and thomas 2004 shahrur 2005 corporate governance defond and park 1999 engel hayes andwang2003 rennie2006 karuna2007 capitalstructure lang and stulz 1992 kaleand shahrur 2007 corporate disclosurepolicy

do rivals enhance your credit conditions abstract in a model where firms rely on bank financing to build capacity put up specialized productive assets as collateral and then compete a la cournot we introduce a probability of default we investigate how the number of competitors affects the equilibrium amount of bank credit and derive conditions under which an inverted u shaped relationship occurs on the one hand more competitors enhance the resale value of collateralized productive assets on the other hand more competitors shrink firms profits and the resulting income that can be pledged to banks we then extend the analysis to firms outside the cournot industry that are willing to buy productive assets in liquidation and show that the equilibrium bank credit becomes monotonically decreasing in the number of competitors

investment efficiency and product market competition does more competition lead to more information production and greater investment efficiency this question is largely unexplored in the finance literature this article provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests the model features a 2 stage bayesian game in differentiated products market competition we find that competition causes firms to acquire less information and investments to become more inefficient relative to a first best case with the same market structure empirically the panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries

labor protection and leverage this paper exploits inter temporal variations in employment protection across countries and finds that rigidities in labor markets are an important determinant of firms capital structure decisions over the 1985 2007 period we find that reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187 basis point reduction in leverage we interpret this finding to suggest that employment protection increases operating leverage crowding out financial leverage this result is robust across measures of employment protection and leverage and does not appear to be due to pre treatment differences between treated and control firms omitted variables unobserved changes in regional economic conditions and reverse causality heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with our economic intuition we find that the negative effect is more pronounced in firms that are subject to frequent hiring and firing

pricing exit and location decisions of firms evidence on the role of debt and operating efficiency abstract we compare pricing and exit decisions of discounters across the business cycle cities containing high debt and or low efficiency firms display higher prices during non recession years during recessions prices increase in cities with less efficient incumbents but decrease in cities with a mix of high and low debt firms high debt firms are more likely to exit cities with lower prices and high debt exiting firms are more likely to be efficient apparently low debt firms strategically lower prices during recessions to force exit of efficient financially constrained rivals weaker competitors face another cost new entrants locate closer

oligopoly structure and the incidence of cigarette excise taxes abstract a model of oligopoly price behavior and tax incidence for the u s cigarette industry for the period 1955 1990 is presented a cost function is estimated and shows manufacture to be subject to increasing returns to scale the mean price elasticity of demand is 0 71 the model indicates that competition among manufacturers has been decreasing since 1980 a simulation shows that an increase in the federal excise tax causes a greater increase in price and a greater decrease in consumption than does the same increase in the average of state and local tax rates

bankruptcy costs and the theory of oligopoly this paper examines the relationship between financial decisions and output decisions in oligopolistic markets assuming a duopoly market structure in which financial decisions and output decisions follow in sequence the authors analyze how bankrupt cy costs which are incurred when the firm is unable to meet current debt obligations affect the firm s behavior in output markets with fixed bankruptcy costs firms have an incentive to increase output le vels if they take on more debt proportional bankruptcy costs lead to a u shaped relationship between output and debt foresighted owners of firms are led to take into account the strategic output effects of financial structure when considering an optimal financial structure for the firm

comment on the intended and unintended consequences of financial market regulations a general equilibrium analysis by adrian buss bernard dumas raman uppal and grigory vilkov