a common agency with incomplete information in the present article i demonstrate that forming a common agency by oligopolistic firms may not be to their advantage if agents have access to private information about their costs bernheim and whinston 1985 1986 pointed out that a common agency allows the firms to sustain the collusive outcome by giving them a vehicle to internalize the externality generated by their pricing or output decisions if agents have access to private information the advantage pointed out by bernheim and whinston may be more than outweighed by the possible existence of an informational disadvantage specifically if the unit costs of different potential agents are correlated the firm may be more successful in extracting the informational rents of its agent if it contracts with an independent agent and not with the same agent as its rival firm when oligopolistic firms contract with independent agents the revenues of one firm reveal implicit information about the unit costs of agents serving competing firms in the same industry however if the unit costs of different agents are correlated revenues also reflect information about the unit cost of the firm s own agent this additional information transmitted by revenues cannot be controlled by the agent s reporting behavior as a result if the firm conditions its agent s payoff upon revenues it can limit the informational rents that this agent can secure due to the existence of private information this possibility of limiting its agent s informational rents is eliminated if the firm contracts with the same agent as its rivals with a common agency the agent can manipulate the reports delivered to all the firms thus reducing the options available to each of them various patterns of agency relationship exist in markets where oligopolistic producers

pricing variation within dual distribution chains the different implications of externalities and signaling for high and low quality brands within many of the multioutlet branded chains that dominate the retail and services landscape the organizational form e g company management franchising used to manage an outlet varies from site to site as do the prices charged at those sites i propose that organizational form and prices may be systematically related as a result of brand externalities in particular i develop logic that the relevant form of externality should differ for upper quality tier brands and lower tier brands using panel data on price and organizational form from more than 6 700 branded u s hotels affiliated with 40 dual distribution brands those brands that simultaneously company manage and franchise individual outlets i find that consistent with the brand externality arguments company managed locations have higher prices within high quality chains whereas franchisees price higher in the lower tiers this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference the legality of nonprice vertical practices in the u s is determined by their likely competitive effects an optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs which should be guided by empirical evidence empirically vertical restraints appear to reduce price and or increase output thus absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint s effect an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive

resale price maintenance and collusion the article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude we analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance rpm when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs in the absence of rpm retail prices react to retailers information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect by eliminating retail price flexibility rpm facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short run gains from a deviation overall rpm can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it

the empirical performance of the ecb s repo auctions evidence from aggregated and individual bidding data abstract we analyze the empirical performance of the ecb s fixed rate tenders by estimating bid functions using aggregated and individual bidding data the intention of the study is twofold first in view of the ecb s emphasis on the principle of equal treatment we employ the aggregated data to compare the bidding behavior of german and non german banks specifically we investigate banks overbidding and its response to opportunity cost and interest rate expectations second we use the individual bidding data of german banks and estimate panel data models to investigate the impact of a bank s type on its bidding the results indicate that large banks bid more informed or sophisticated than smaller banks with regard to interest rate expectations however there is no evidence for a size effect in banks overbidding behavior

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

the repo auctions of the european central bank and the vanishing quota puzzle until june 2000 the european central bank ecb used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions a switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks in this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ecb s liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ecb s practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target

european central bank operations experimental investigation of the fixed rate tender abstract in an experimental study the auction procedure of the fixed rate tender is investigated with which the main refinancing operation of the eurosystem was carried out in the past in june 2000 the fixed rate tender was replaced by the american variable rate tender this change was occasioned by the suspicion that banks grossly exaggerate their liquidity needs in their bids the experimental results clearly support this hypothesis and demonstrate that the fixed rate tender method can be a regular invitation to the banks to continually raise their bids from auction to auction

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

market power and joint dominance in u k brewing market power and joint dominance are examined in u k brewing i assess unilateral and coordinated effects where the latter is equated with joint dominance and show how one can distinguish between the two econometrically the application makes use of two demand equations the nested logit of mcfadden 1978a and the distance metric of pinkse slade and brett 2002 the two equations yield very different predictions concerning elasticities and markups nevertheless although there is evidence of market power using either demand model that power is due entirely to unilateral effects in other words neither model uncovers evidence of coordinated effects tacit collusion

the competitive effects of exclusive dealing evidence from the u s beer industry abstract several recent theoretical articles have modeled the effects of exclusive dealing contracts that restrict dealers to selling a single brand yet detailed empirical analysis of the impact of exclusivity on actual market outcomes has been lacking i analyze a unique set of firm level data on nearly 400 beer distributors in the united states the impacts of economies of scale and restrictions on distributor promotional activities on the use of exclusive dealing are measured as well as the effects of exclusivity on costs prices and output the results support the view that exclusive dealing serves to minimize manufacturer dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare

mergers coordinated effects and efficiency in the portuguese non life insurance industry we evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three portuguese non life insurance markets we specify and estimate with a panel of firm level data a structural model which includes preferences technology and a market equilibrium condition firms demand curves are not very elastic firms technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores we find that for the period following the mergers there is no evidence of i an increase in market power through coordinated behavior or ii changes in cost efficiency levels in addition social welfare increased

the daily market for funds in europe what has changed with the emu this paper shows that the existence of deposit and lending facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate we reach this conclusion by comparing the behavior of this rate in germany before and after the start of the emu the analysis of the german experience allows us to isolate the effects on the overnight rate of these particular instruments of monetary policy to illustrate that this outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the german market we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which is able to reproduce our empirical findings

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

do fast food chains price discriminate on the race and income characteristics of an area this article reports tests for differences in prices charged by fast food restaurants that serve markets with customers of widely divergent incomes and ethnic backgrounds the data contain detailed prices on items sold at over 400 burger king wendy s kfc and roy rogers restaurants in new jersey and pennsylvania locations i find significant differences in price based on the race and income characteristics of a zip code region when income and cost differences are taken into account meal prices rise approximately 5 for a 50 rise in the black population

mergers brand competition and the price of a pint abstract mergers in the uk brewing industry have reduced the number of national brewers from six to four the number of brands in contrast has remained relatively constant we analyze the effects of mergers on brand competition and pricing brand level demand equations are estimated from a panel of draft beers to model brand substitution possibilities we estimate the matrix of cross price elasticities semiparametrically our structural model is used to assess the strength of brand competition along various dimensions and to evaluate the mergers in particular we compute equilibria of pricing games with different numbers of players

agency problem institutions and technology policy explaining taiwan s semiconductor industry development abstract taiwan has made significant progress in the semiconductor industry with government agencies and bureaucrats as the driving forces over the past 30 years taiwan s impressive achievement in the semiconductor industry clearly indicates that the government failures and agency problem usually associated with deep government involvement did not occur in taiwan why is that the case this paper proposes a principal agent framework for technology policy and applies the framework to discuss the institutional arrangements through which bureaucrats were controlled effectively in executing the semiconductor industry policies in taiwan by analyzing the institutional and organizational arrangements taiwanese leaders made to mitigate the agency problem this paper brings bureaucrats into the popular developmental state theory and emphasizes that the success of state intervention should not be taken for granted and it also brings politics into technology policy analysis and stresses the importance and complexity of agency problem in technology policy

intimidating competitors endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly this paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly analyzing a linear cournot model we establish the following key results i vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment intimidation effect ii asymmetric integration is a non degenerate equilibrium outcome iii compared to a benchmark model without investment complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome we argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear cournot model under reasonable assumptions

searching for a break in gnp it has been suggested that existing estimates of the long run impact of a surprise move in income may have a substantial upward bias due to the presence of a trend break in postwar u s gross national product data this article shows that the statistical evidence does not warrant abandoning the no trend break null hypothesis a key part of the argument is that conventionally computed p values overstate the likelihood of the trend break alternative hypothesis this is because they do not take into account that in practice the date is chosen based on pretest examination of the data

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

franchising versus corporate ownership abstract this paper uses data on the prices charged at fast food restaurants in the metropolitan pittsburgh and detroit areas to assess the effect of franchising on price dispersion within chains in fairly narrowly defined geographical areas a review of reasons why firms may face more price dispersion under franchising guides the empirical analyses results indicate that 1 franchisors do not aim for fully uniform prices even on the corporate side of their chains 2 the degree of price dispersion is highest for firms with both franchised and company owned units as predicted by models implying a systematic price differential between units operated under these different contracting mechanisms and 3 price dispersion for fully franchised chains is greater than for fully corporate chains these last two results combined with evidence from court cases that franchisors sometimes try to control franchisee prices directly suggest that franchisors indeed lose some amount of control over prices charged to customers when they use franchising as opposed to corporate ownership finally i find a positive effect of the royalty rate on price dispersion this suggests that double marginalization is behind at least some of the higher prices found in franchised units in the existing literature

demand driven integration and divorcement policy abstract traditionally vertical integration has concerned industrial economists only insofar as it affects market outcomes particularly prices this paper considers reverse causality from prices and more generally from demand to integration in a model of a dynamic oligopoly if integration is costly but enhances productive efficiency then a trend of rising prices and increasing integration could be due to growing demand in which case a divorcement policy of forced divestiture may be counterproductive divorcement can only help consumers if it undermines collusion but then there are dominating policies we discuss well known divorcement episodes in retail gasoline and british beer as well as other evidence in light of the model

markets beer in germany and the united states between 1950 and 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio for beer increased from 22 to 95 in the united states and anheuser busch s share of domestic output ballooned from 6 to 54 percent in germany concentration has risen but it remains low in 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio was just 29 and the eight firm ratio in germany was smaller than the one firm ratio in the united states in 2005 after five years of important mergers involving big brewers the german beer industry was still much less concentrated than its american counterpart in this article i discuss several candidate explanations for the failure of beer producer concentration to rise as much in germany as in the united states the relevance of the new technologies to german brewers the preferences of german consumers the rules for advertising on german television and other factors largely absent from the consensus interpretation of american experience i find that market structure depends on a remarkably broad range of factors extending well beyond technological opportunity and market size

retailer power recent developments and policy implications retailing is big business ranking firms by revenue retailing includes belgium s largest company delhaize le lion tesco and j sainsbury from the uk top ten the giant metro group in germany and wal mart stores number four in the usa and the eighth largest company in the world with 119 billion turnover and 825 000 employees fortune 3 8 98 retailing is getting more concentrated over time the top ten grocers in europe were 28 of the market in 1992 but 36 by 1997 1 the behaviour of retailers matters for consumers cross country studies of pricing for near identical products e g cars televisions compact discs branded sportswear groceries find big differences between prices across european countries and between europe and the usa 2 the european commission is to start examining why europeans pay substantially more on average than us consumers

measuring the knowledge base of regional innovation systems in germany in terms of a triple helix dynamics the interaction among the three sub dynamics of economic exchange technological innovation and institutional control can be captured with a generalized triple helix model we propose to use the information contained in the configuration among the three sub dynamics as an indicator of the synergy in a configuration this measure indicates the reduction of the uncertainty which prevails at the level of an innovation system on the basis of data at the district level in germany the conclusions of a previous study about the netherlands are tested medium tech manufacturing is the main driver of the knowledge based configuration in a regional economy while knowledge intensive services tend to uncouple the economy from the regional configuration at the level of regions nuts 2 germany s knowledge based economy is no longer structured in terms of the previous east west divide of the country while this divide has prevailed at the level of the states nuts 1 that constitute the federal republic however the effects of high and medium tech are not specific for the western or eastern parts of the country the configuration of medium tech manufacturing can be considered a better indicator of the knowledge based economy than that of high tech manufacturing

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

market power and rents in global supply chains market power and competition policy in food supply chains has emerged as an important economic issue in economics and a highly sensitive item on the policy agenda consolidation is taking place in the food industry both in high income countries and in emerging economies but the impact of concentration in global food chains on efficiency and rent distribution is more nuanced and complex than often claimed we review the literature and extend it by developing a model which explicitly takes into account market imperfections and contract enforcement problems in supply chains increased competition benefits farms by improving contract conditions but contract enforcement becomes more complicated

ownership form managerial incentives and the intensity of rivalry this study investigates how differences in ownership form between franchised and company owned units affect managerial incentives and competitive pricing in different oligopolistic contexts we arg

overbidding in fixed rate tenders an empirical assessment of alternative explanations abstract this paper investigates various theories explaining banks overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the european central bank ecb using auction data from both the bundesbank and the ecb we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding this implies that the proposed new rules by the ecb aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

science policies as principal agent games institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science national science policies seem to converge in policing the double edged problem of how to get policy and industry interested in the conduct of science and how to get science interested in the problems of policy and industry however similarity in the labels of institutes and instruments for science policy conceals traditional differences in the institutionalization of the relation between the state and science this article conceptualizes the relation between government and science as an ongoing principal agent game with different possibilities for stabilization each of these differ to the extent the principal or the agents can pursue their strategy institutionalization of the endless frontier ideology of consensus making and of competition between agents is elaborated path dependency emerges as costs for institutional changes are often higher than the accommodation of new instruments and policies to existing structures the argument is mainly and deliberately analytical but empirically illustrated by the development of foresight in the uk germany and the netherlands

australian beer wars and pub demand how vertical restraints improved the drinking experience recently australia s two largest brewers carlton and united breweries and lion nathan have been aggressively competing for market share in the state of victoria among other strategies the two breweries have implemented vertical restraints in the form of extensive agreements with retailers and the outright purchase of pubs a key outcome of these purchases and agreements is the renovation of many pubs as brewers attempt to attract increasingly sophisticated drinkers this paper attempts to quantify the value of these renovations and measure their associated impact on consumers relying on insights from the hedonic literature a simple but novel approach is used to estimate the implicit price of the pub environment and the effects of renovations on that price

the arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks abstract the question this paper addresses is what is the evidence for the superiority of the ownership unbundled transmission models i e uk or nord pool hybrid over other models we assess the theoretical costs and benefits of ownership unbundling and judge these to be generally positive though these may be potentially offset by the actual reorganisation costs of the ownership unbundling process next we assess the empirical evidence this is in two forms econometric evidence from samples of countries and case studies of reforms in particular jurisdictions the econometric evidence is weak due to problems with simultaneity of reform steps and a lack of studies but the case study evidence is compelling we conclude with a discussion of the issues faced by countries considering implementing ownership unbundling we conclude that evidence seems to be that ownership unbundling of transmission is a key part of energy market reform in the most successful reform jurisdictions

equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly we consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing manufacturers producing differentiated brands can choose to distribute through exclusive retail dealerships or nonexclusive dealerships with nonexclusive dealing manufacturers face an interbrand externality because brand enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may benefit the brands of other manufacturers although exclusive dealing eliminates this externality oligopolistic manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing exclusive dealing enhances the incentive to invest but the promotional investments are a form of competition between manufacturers thus manufacturers might earn higher profits with nonexclusive dealing making lower promotional investments we find cases in which nonexclusive dealing is a dominant strategy we also find cases in which some but not all manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing moreover even if adoption of exclusive dealing by all manufacturers is the equilibrium it can arise from a prisoner s dilemma in that each manufacturer would prefer nonexclusive dealing

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

can creative destruction be destroyed military ir d and destruction along the value added chain we elaborate a supply chain innovation matrix that can be applied to both commercial and military supply chains by shifting the analysis from a focal firm to industry structure we argue that the market structure of the entire supply chain functions as a major moderating variable in determining both the timing and adoption of innovations both for commercial and military markets we extend work on supply chain resource dependency by drawing a distinction between market structure induced resource dependency and supplier over reliance on a customer in a competitive market this has policy implications for the organization of military industrial research and development ir d joint service research and development jointness will certainly bring about innovation but it will be incremental reinforcing established military hierarchies policy makers may need to add this probable consequence when comparing jointness and inter service rivalry the cost savings inherent in jointness may unwittingly sustain a military force unready for fighting the next war

consolidation by merger the uk beer market this paper examines the determinants of market structure in the uk brewing industry over 1949 1969 sutton sunk costs and market structure price competition advertising and the evolution of concentration 1991 points to technology and advertising races as two key drivers of market concentration this study uses an own built longitudinal data set of the population of firms and breweries and reveals the importance of institutional factors in explaining the dynamics of market structure the practice of tying outlets to brewers and legal restrictions on opening retail outlets together with a permissive policy towards mergers made acquisition of medium sized firms and brewery closure shortly after acquisition the main driving mechanism towards industry consolidation during this period the number of firms and plants fell sharply by 74 and 60 respectively and production rose by about 25 with no firm entry and just one new brewery opening as a result concentration increased and the market transformed from a highly fragmented one into a stable oligopoly

the leverage theory of tying revisited evidence from newspaper advertising data from the canadian newspaper advertising industry is used to assess the private profitability of tying in a market where the standard efficiency motives e g price discrimination cost saving and quality control are unlikely to apply the empirical assessment is based on a model of leveraging in which suppliers of the tied good are paid a commission rather than a fee for service this model demonstrates that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances furthermore it is found that with newspapers tying and monopoly power go hand in hand