duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

speculative investor behavior and learning as traders learn about the true distribution of some asset s dividends a speculative premium occurs as each trader anticipates the possibility of reselling the asset to another trader before complete learning has occurred small differences in prior beliefs lead to large speculative premiums during the learning process this phenomenon helps explain a paradox concerning the pricing of initial public offerings the result casts light on the significance of the common prior assumption in economic models

an approach to asset pricing under incomplete and diverse perceptions we model a dynamic competitive market where in every period risk neutral traders trade a one period bond against an infinitely lived asset with limited short selling of the long term asset traders lack structural knowledge and use different incomplete theories all of which give statistically correct beliefs about next period s market price of the long term asset the more theories there are in the market the higher is the equilibrium price of the long term asset investors with more complete theories do not necessarily earn higher returns than those with less complete ones who can earn above the risk free rate we provide two necessary conditions for a trader to earn above the risk free rate

collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited abstract in a letter previously published in this journal rothschild 1992 rothschild r 1992 on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies economics letters 40 33 37 claims to obtain results in contrast with those obtained by deneckere 1983 deneckere r 1983 duopoly supergames with product differentiation economics letters 11 37 42 we show however that taking correctly into account non negativity constraints on output rothschild s formulation yields the same conclusions as deneckere s

bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations i present a framework for analyzing decision makers with an imperfect understanding of their environment s correlation structure the decision maker faces an objective multivariate probability distribution his own action is one of the random variables he is characterized by a directed acyclic graph over the set of variables his subjective belief filters the objective distribution through his graph via the factorization formula for bayesian networks this belief distortion implies that the decision maker s long run behavior may affect his perception of the consequences of his actions accordingly i define a personal equilibrium notion of optimal choices i show how recent models of boundedly rational expectations as well as new ones e g reverse causality can be subsumed into this framework as special cases some general properties of the bayesian network representation of subjective beliefs are presented as well as a missing data foundation

relative wages wage growth and quit behavior using italian social security records for male workers from a sample of firms in turin from 1981 to 1983 we show that conditional on the worker s own wage the average wage in the establishment for similar workers is negatively related to quits we also find that this variable predicts future wage growth this is consistent with an economic model in which workers compare the longrun value of employment opportunities when making quit decisions

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

correlation misperception in choice we present a decision theoretic analysis of an agent s understanding of the interdependencies in her choices we provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks we introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her possibly misspecified beliefs

modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognize equilibrium patterns we model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices using the concept of debruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the more competent agents jel c7 d4 s477

wages nonwage job characteristics and labor mobility this paper examines the effects of a set of nonwage job characteristics on the quit decisions of young and middle aged men the data set was constructed by merging data in the national longitudinal surveys of young and mature men with data from the dictionary of occupational titles file and the bureau of economic analysis file on fringe benefits the empirical analysis shows that some nonwage job attributes have significant influence on worker quit behavior and that there are important differences in the effects of the nonwage job characteristics across age groups young men are significantly more likely than older men to quit repetitive jobs for example whereas the presence of bad working conditions is a more important factor in the quit decisions of the older cohort the results also indicate that for the older men fringe benefits have a stronger effect on quit decisions than wages do further evidence on age differences is provided through an analysis of panel data from the quality of employment survey since the time of adam smith the theory of equalizing differences that individuals are induced to accept less attractive jobs by receiving compensating increases in their wages has been used by economists to explain the existence of wage differences in the labor market by definition the theory has important implications for understanding the mobility of labor since an individual s decision to change jobs is based on all the characteristics of a job the wage rate fringe benefits and nonpecuniary job at

equity in economic relationships towards a positive theory abstract a new theory of equity in economic relationships has begun to develop the theory is consistent with conventional assumptions such as rationality and self interest but it explains phenomena that have baffled orthodox microeconomics productivity variation by workers in response to perceived inequity can cause wage stickiness and the persistence of inefficient wage structures studies by economists and social psychologists provide empirical support potentially the theory is a rich one having implications for areas such a welfare economics and the microfoundations of macroeconomics

fact free learning aragones acknowledges financial support from the spanish ministry of science and technology grant sec2003 01961 and creabarcelona economics aragones gilboa and schmeidler gratefully acknowledge support from the polarization and conflict project cit 2 ct 2004 506084 funded by the european commission dg research sixth framework programme gilboa and schmeidler gratefully acknowledge support from the israel science foundation grant 790 00 and 975 03 postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from national science foundation grant sbr 9810693

opec s oil exporting strategy and macroeconomic in stability aguiar conraria and wen 2008 argued that dependence on foreign oil raises the like lihood of equilibrium indeterminacy economic instability for oil importing countries we argue that this relation is more subtle the endogenous choices of prices and quantities by a cartel of oil exporters such as the opec can aect the directions of the changes in the likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy we show that uctuations driven by self ful lling expectations under oil shocks are easier to occur if the cartel sets the price of oil but the re sult is reversed if the cartel sets the quantity of production these results oer a potentially interesting explanation for the decline in economic volatility i e the great moderation in oil importing countries since the mid 1980s when the opec cartel changed its market strategies from setting prices to setting quantities despite the fact that oil prices are far more volatile today than they were 30 years ago

the economic consequences of labor mobility unlike most previous research on the relative changes in earnings of job stayers and job changers this study examines the variance in earnings changes rather than simply average changes men and women rather than only men and the five year period following job change rather than only the first year or two the author finds great variability in earnings changes both within and across race and gender groups notably men gained more from quits and except in the case of low wage workers lost less from layoffs than women also men suffered a much smaller penalty than women for repeated job changes for all groups the percentage difference between earnings before and after leaving a job generally persisted for several years

interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure this article shows by example that when workers care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers the equilibrium distribution of wages within firms must be less dispersed than the corresponding distribution of marginal products an implicit market for within firm status is shown to produce welfare gains by sorting workers among firms in accordance with how much they are willing to pay for high rank the resulting equilibrium pareto dominates allocations in which each worker is paid his marginal product

can agents with causal misperceptions be systematically fooled using data on house sales and inventories this paper shows that housing market dynamics are driven mainly by listings and less so by transaction speed thus the decision to move house is key to understanding the housing market the paper builds a model where moving house is essentially an investment in match quality implying that moving depends on macroeconomic developments and housing market conditions the endogeneity of moving means there is a cleansing effect those at the bottom of the match quality distribution move first which generates overshooting in aggregate variables the model is applied to the 1995 2004 housingmarket boom

relative income effects on subjective well being in the cross section abstract recent work suggests that a person s subjective well being swb depends to a large degree on relative income focusing on the underlying identification this paper makes four contributions to this literature it describes the aggregation problem with past studies implements an estimation strategy to overcome this problem finds micro level evidence in support of the hypothesis that relative income does matter in individual assessments of swb and uses cross section estimates to replicate the aggregate time series the evidence further indicates that relative income effects may be smaller at low income levels the results are obtained from ordered probit techniques and the general social survey gss

job satisfaction and co worker wages status or signal we use matched employer employee panel data to show that individual job satisfaction is higher when other workers in the same establishment are better paid this runs counter to substantial existing evidence of income comparisons in subjective well being we argue that the difference hinges on the nature of the reference group we here use co workers their earnings not only induce jealousy but also provide a signal about the worker s own future earnings in our data this positive future earnings signal outweighs any negative status effect this phenomenon is stronger for men and in the private sector but weaker for those nearer retirement

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy based expectations this paper studies the effects of analogy based expectations in static two player games of incomplete information players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent s state contingent strategy they bundle states into analogy classes and play best responses to their opponent s average strategy in those analogy classes we provide general properties of analogy based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games we characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information rubinstein a 1989 the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge amer econ rev 79 385 391 we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in crawford and sobel s cheap talk games crawford v p sobel j 1982 strategic information transmission econometrica 50 1431 1451 and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem

internal decision making rules and collusion we study the impact of internal decision making structures on the stability of collusive agreements to this end we use a three firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company the holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units it is shown that when transportation costs are high collusion is more stable under delegation furthermore collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units profitability is reversed for low discount factors

on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies abstract we consider a rule designed to maintain collusion in a duopoly made up of firms producing differentiated products we analyse both price setting and quantity setting models and show that product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of this rule our results contrast with those obtained by earlier writers

price or quantity the strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly this paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable price or quantity taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition while matsumura and ogawa 2012 in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium we show that by introducing firm subsidization in the same setting quantity can constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

price or quantity in tacit collusion abstract we investigate the choice of market variable price or quantity of an optimal implicit cartel if the discount factor is high the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases otherwise it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements the reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play