who gives who receives and who wins transforming capital into political change through nongovernmental organizations how does international support for nongovernmental organizations ngos lead to political change in the developing world massive amounts of domestic government spending and international aid are now distributed through ngos instead of state bureaucracies recent scholarship suggests that this decentralization of developmental aid to ngos has unintended political effects on recipient communities but the mechanisms driving political effects are unclear in this article the authors test whether ngo type affects the results of ngo aid comparing the political impact of politicized and nonpoliticized ngos they do not find any difference between politicized and nonpoliticized ngos the results imply that to create political change ideological predispositions held by individual ngos are less important than is their ability to raise the level of social capital and civil society simply providing the infrastructure necessary to develop social capital and civil society can have a measurable political impact

market state and civil organizations in latin america beyond the debt crisis the context for rural development abstract the development strategy emerging in latin america implies a sharply redefined balance in the relative roles of the market the state and civil organizations market liberalization has been extensive and intense efforts have been undertaken to make the new rules credible the state has been divested of many productive and regulatory activities but descaling is a reflection of short run stabilization policies and signaling not of long term tendencies since an active state remains strongly in demand civil organizations are assuming active roles as alternative forms to produce and service members and as pressure groups agriculture has gained considerably from the policy reforms together with democratic representation and decentralization of governance this gives renewed opportunities for successful rural development initiatives

the development of a market for sustainable coffee in the netherlands rethinking the contribution of fair trade in recent years researchers have observed the process of mainstreaming fair trade and the emergence of alternative sustainability standards in the coffee industry the underlying market dynamics that have contributed to these developments are however under researched insight into these dynamics is important to understand how markets can develop to favor sustainability this study examines the major developments in the market for certified coffee in the netherlands it finds that in the creation of a market for sustainable coffee decisions that significantly influence market creation are made in the lead companies retailers and coffee roasters these decisions are made possible by the availability of multiple systems of sustainability standards and by the existence of a small segment of loyal fair trade customers that ensured that sustainability remained an issue on the coffee market in the years before the market creation took off fair trade did not become the new rule in this process but it became the benchmark against which companies could compare themselves and the basis upon which they built in adopting or developing new standards that would be more feasible in their business models

fair trade and the depersonalization of ethics fair trade has changed considerably since its early days in this article we argue that these changes have led to a depersonalization of ethics thus raising serious questions about the future of fair trade in particular the depersonalization of ethics which is seen to accompany the current changes has led to greater variety in the interpretations of fair trade hiding these divergences behind the labels is increasing the risk that the movement will lose its credibility

a principal agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system abstract mechanism design problems optimize contract offerings from a principal to different types of agents who have private information about their demands for a product or a service we study the implications of uncertainty in agents demands on the principal s contracts specifically we consider the setting where agents demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution we present analytical solutions for the special case when there are two distributions each taking two discrete values as well as a method for deriving analytical solutions from numerical solutions we describe one application of the model in carbon capture and storage systems to demonstrate various types of optimal solutions and to obtain managerial insights

equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

women s participation in local organizations conditions and constraints abstract civic organizations have a capacity to contribute to economic growth and an equitable distribution of welfare by reducing information asymmetries and transaction costs while donors increasingly recognize that group based projects are a means to advocate organizational capacities of target groups it is not clear whether group based organizations always increase efficiency and equity this article analyses the determinants of participation in local development groups ldgs using data from two projects funded by undp in kashmir and gtz in chad a major result of the empirical analysis is the identification of a middle class effect of participation the exclusion of the majority of the poor can be explained by high opportunity costs to join the group especially for income earning women in addition it can be shown that an existing social network is a pre condition for participation finally the assumption has been confirmed that bargaining power of the members is important for their decision to participate in groups

collective action for small scale producers of agricultural biodiversity products the role of well functioning markets for development is now widely recognized however the challenge remains to make these markets benefit the poor and the environment increasing attention is being given to the potential role markets can play for agrobiodiversity conservation through product diversification and increasing competitiveness in niche and novelty markets several case studies were undertaken that explore the use of market based approaches to on farm agrobiodiversity management and livelihood improvement this paper explores how the theory of collective action can provide a more synthetic understanding of how market chains operate and the changes that could permit a more equitable distribution of benefits the case studies illustrate the need for improved trust mutual understanding of each actor s involvement and an agreed process of collective action with a high level of community participation the cases differ in their degree of collective action the level of market organization and the ways in which handling processing and innovative marketing add value to the agrobiodiversity products comparative analysis identified a range of situations in which market development can support agrobiodiversity conservation and livelihoods

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

the impacts of collective action and property rights on plant genetic resources summary the loss of agricultural biodiversity can reduce food security increase economic uncertainty and threaten the viability and sustainability of agricultural systems often overlooked in the discussion about genetic erosion is the role that collective action and property rights play in controlling the propagation and use of landrace varieties this paper presents examples from around the world of collective management practices over plant genetic resources and discusses some of the impacts that private property rights legislation could have on the conservation of plant genetic resources reflecting upon recent advances in related research areas the paper concludes with suggestions of directions for future research in this emergent topic

non linear pricing with a general cost function abstract in this paper we treat the one good monopolist non linear pricing problem with a general cost function if the monopolist sees the consumer type as the realization of a random variable then the solution is obtained by the usual pointwise maximization method however if the distribution of consumers types is the realized distribution of buyers then the solution is harder and is presented here

focus on fairtrade propositions for integrating fairtrade and supply chain management research driven by increased consumer interest and stakeholder pressure the number of fairtrade ft products has been steadily increasing the mainstreaming of ft means that the products are now facing stiff competition within the generic product categories in which they operate while consumers may pressure organizations for ethical conduct they are less willing to pay premium prices for fairly traded products for ft to continue to grow more efficient operating models are required to offset the premium prices paid to producers to ensure competitiveness in the market one such improvement approach may be the management of ft supply chains to investigate the feasibility of this approach this article systematically combines literature on ft with key supply chain management scm constructs and theories we discuss existing scm paradigms in the context of ft and demonstrate aspects where the efficiency of ft chains needs to be improved to ensure their viability we present propositions that demonstrate the key limitations of the ft model from the point of view of scm theory and practice and suggest the potential changes needed in the management of ft supply chains the article provides a timely first attempt to systematically combine ft with scm constructs thus establishing a basis for the further development of ft chains and for the improvement of the operating efficiency within them

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

hiring and leasing with nonlinear prices this paper examines the problem of a monopolist setting an optimal nonlinear pricing schedule in the face of consumers of unknown type who arrive randomly over time and self select a choice of hire period the major determinant of pricing policy is the customer arrival distribution with the overall level of price higher than in the atemporal yield management nonuniform pricing solution by a margin which increases with the average frequency with which potential customers arrive by contrast the solution is generally fairly insensitive to variations in the time rate of discount although there is a tendency for the rate of price discount to increase with increases in the time discount rate

wage setting institutions and economic growth abstract wage setting institutions in several asian and latin american economies are compared and contrasted the asian economies have relied more on market wage determination whereas the latin american economies have encouraged institutions which push wages in key sectors up above market clearing levels market wage determination combined with exportled growth has resulted in rapidly rising real wages in the context of full employment in the asian

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines this paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved using an original data set from u s airline markets we find strong evidence supporting our model price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

cost functions in non linear pricing abstract this paper compares the optimal selling strategies with symmetric and asymmetric information when monopolist s cost function depends both on individual and aggregate production we show how standard underproduction and higher exclusion with incomplete information are affected

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

optimal nonuniform prices we consider optimal nonuniform pricing schedules where the price depends upon the amount purchased such schedules are regularly used by public utilities and other services welfare optimal nonuniform prices are related to the theory of optimal uniform prices developed by ramsey we characterize situations in which upward or downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal our results are applicable to a number of related problems including optimal taxation insurance and incentives economic theory has confined most of its attention to markets with uniform prices in which the price per unit charged is invariant to the level of a customer s purchases this focus is warranted when goods are resellable since any attempt to charge nonuniform prices could be circumvented by reselling amongst customers but when goods are not resellable nonuniform prices are not only possible but common public utilities have declining block pricing with lower unit charges for large levels of consumption many agencies providing services including communications transportation even education use two part pricing with a fixed entry or retainer charge and a further charge per unit consumption nonuniform price schedules can be expected to be ever more common as services become a larger fraction of total output the increasing prevalence of nonuniform pricing policies have made them the focus of recent public and economic attention oi 1971 feldstein 1972 and ng and weisser 1974 have examined optimal two part pricing policies leland and meyer 1976 examine block pricing and show by example that optimal welfare policies may require nonuniform prices if zero profit constraints are binding in this paper we consider arbitrary nonuniform pricing policies using variational techniques two part and block pricing schedules are of course special cases of the environment we consider the work most closely related to our examination is the seminal paper by spence 1978 and subsequent analysis by roberts 1979 spence however does not pay explicit attention to the key role played by constraints on optimal pricing schedules roberts considers upward price discontinuities which lead to bunching of consumers at a given level of consumption but not downward price discontinuities which lead to regions in which no consumer chooses to consume gaps bunching or gaps may appear in the optimal price schedule even when underlying demand and cost functions are smooth and well behaved the prevalence of discontinuous pricing schedules e g the block pricing structures of public utilities argues that these questions are of practical as well as theoretical interest

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

ethical value added fair trade and the case of cafe femenino this article engages various critiques of fair trade from its participation in commodification to providing a cover for fair washing corporations and argues that fair trade has the potential to answer the challenges contained within them if and when it initiates an ongoing process of developing the ethical valued added content of the label this argument is made in a number of ways first by distinguishing between economic and human development impacts and ethics this article argues that these impacts are necessary but not sufficient conditions for ethical trade second it engages the question of the possibility of ethical practice in economics generally developing the idea that when economics is concerned with securing the material basis of a broad range of life capacities it becomes ethical third fair trade practice itself is examined from this standpoint and is conceived of as both comprising a promising ethical value added practice as well as posing a problem in its current formulation that the framework of ethical value added can help understand and resolve finally an examination of these theoretical ideas in practice is undertaken through a case study of cafe femenino a fair trade coffee produced in peru in conclusion it is argued that for fair trade to build upon its economic and human impacts and therefore remain a meaningful ethical and economic alternative to corporate capitalism and globalization it must distinguish itself clearly in ethics from those market relations it wishes explicitly or implicitly to challenge

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

an exploration of opportunities for the growth of the fair trade market three cases of craft organisations businesses that maintain ethical standards have an advantage in the marketplace based on the increasing interest of consumers in products that have a social and ethical component fair trade organisations that adopt environmental social and ethical principles in trading are in a good position to make the most of this growing interest in the market however it is unclear whether fair trade organisations are taking full advantage of emerging market opportunities for ethically traded products this research explores this issue by describing the business strategies of three fair trade organisations that import and sell craft goods into western countries and evaluates them in the context of this growing market the research findings indicate that in order to remain in business fair trade craft organisations have had to adopt better business practices in recent years improving quality customer service and product offerings to customers however growth appears to be limited as distribution remains focused on a small niche market this paper explores the distribution strategies of two fair trade commodity organisations that are successfully reaching a wider customer base demonstrating that fair trade products have a unique selling advantage in the mainstream marketplace in conclusion fair trade craft organisations are not exploiting this market opportunity to the degree they should and will need to explore wider distribution and alternative business strategies to expand their market share

engendering social capital women workers and rural urban networks in indonesia s crisis recent approaches to social capital have cautioned against the view that social networks are resources to be called upon in times of crisis we contribute a feminist perspective to this argument and call attention to the gendered power relations of social capital and social networks we draw on field studies that examine women migrants rural urban networks in two regions of indonesia during the 1997 99 economic crisis period our findings direct attention toward the gender specific limitations of social capital as a resource for development and identify some ways in which the costs and benefits of social capital are organized by gender

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

structural change power politics and community organizations in africa challenging the patterns puzzles and paradoxes abstract this paper explores two phenomena shaping processes of local institutional and organizational change in rural africa the first is the complexity of institutional layering and dissonance in which local organizations and institutions in rural africa coexist the second is the paradox often found in state local relations in africa central governments encourage local communities to take on responsibilities which the center cannot manage should significant organizational strength emerge at the local level however central powers often move expeditiously to destroy it illustrative material comes primarily from kenya and zimbabwe and selectively from several other countries we ask what new structures are emerging and what old ones are being adapted to new functions we argue that local organizations are critical for addressing ecological decline and restoring the productivity and sustainability of rural africa both localities and national governments have much to gain if the capacities of local organizations can become themselves a valued resource in the resource scarce setting comprising much of rural africa

intertemporal quality discrimination of a durable good monopolist abstract consider a durable good monopolist facing the technology constraint that when he introduces a new product he cannot produce a cheaper variant without a time lag we show that the qualities of his high end and low end products are higher than their efficient quality levels

strategic environmental policy under incomplete information this paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy it is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition relative to the full information case incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour a countervailing effect tending to raise distortion is however revealed from the analysis this effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies the results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information when environmental standards rather than direct production subsidies are the strategic instrument

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation abstract this paper analyzes profit maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation two forms of regulatory constraint are considered i a cap on the firm s average revenue and ii a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge of the regulatory regimes the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least but there are also distributional effects between consumers although the optional tariff regime pareto dominates uniform pricing it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime an example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity

equivalence between the diamond dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model abstract it is shown that the diamond dybvig journal of political economy 96 1983 768 banking model with a continuum of types of agents has the same analytical structure as the standard optimal income taxation model review of economic studies 38 1971 175 review of economic studies 43 1976 261 insights from the income taxation literature immediately imply that a bank run equilibrium exists in the banking model as long as the long term project is sufficiently costly to liquidate

what do corporations have to do with fair trade positive and normative analysis from a value chain perspective there has been tremendous growth in the sales of certified fair trade products since the introduction of the first of these goods in the netherlands in 1988 many would argue that this rapid growth has been due in large part to the increasing involvement of corporations still participation by corporations in fair trade has not been welcomed by all the basic point of contention is that while corporate participation has the potential to rapidly extend the market for fair trade goods it threatens key aspects of what many see as the original vision of fair trade most notably a primary concern for the plight of small producers and the goal of developing an alternative approach to trade and development and may even be undermining its long term survival the primary purpose of this article is to explore the normative issues involved in corporate participation in fair trade in order to do that however it first provides a positive analysis of how corporations are actually involved in fair trade in order to achieve both of these ends the article draws upon global value chain analysis

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

optimal number of standards under economies of scope in quality abstract stivers stivers andrew e 2003 quality standards with exogenously distributed quality economics letters 80 1 130 136 finds the optimal segmentation of quality when the distribution of quality is exogenous this paper characterizes the optimal number of standards as the cost of information falls both the number of standards and the market coverage of the firm rise

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

opportunism and ngos entrepreneurship and green north south transfers abstract through the lens of entrepreneurship this paper applies the new institutional economics to examine two case studies of environmental nongovernmental organizations ngos in latin america to clarify their political economic roles southern ngos that rely on northern donors are viewed as entrepreneurial economic entities producing international public goods these nonprofit ngos take their place alongside for profit firms as contributors to economic production employment institutional innovation and technology transfer the theoretical framework proposed assumes that self interested behavior coexists with loyalty commitment and altruism as well as opportunism

impact of cooperatives on smallholders commercialization behavior evidence from ethiopia this article examines the impact of marketing cooperatives on smallholder commercialization of cereals using detailed household data in rural ethiopia we use the strong government role in promoting the establishment of cooperatives to justify the use of propensity score matching to compare households that are cooperative members to similar households in comparable areas without cooperatives the analysis reveals that although cooperatives obtain higher prices for their members they are not associated with a significant increase in the overall share of cereal production sold commercially by their members however these average results hide considerable heterogeneity across households in particular we find that smaller farmers tend to reduce their marketed output as a result of higher prices whereas the opposite is true for larger farmers

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

too close for comfort the impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations abstract in promoting a new policy agenda bilateral and multilateral donor agencies are keen to finance nongovernmental organisations ngos and grassroots organizations gros on the grounds of their economic efficiency and contribution to good governance this paper reviews the impact of this trend on ngo gro programming performance legitimacy and accountability if finds that much of the case for emphasizing the role of ngos gros rests on ideological grounds rather than empirical verification in addition though the evidence is inconclusive there are signs that greater dependence on official funding may compromise ngo gro performance in key areas distort accountability and weaken legitimacy

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

grassroots organizations and ngos in rural development opportunities with diminishing states and expanding markets abstract this article undertakes to deal systematically with nongovernment organizations ngos and grassroots organizations gros usually treated as a residual category ten levels for development decision making and action are identified in the tradition of central place theory three of these are considered local or grassroots because of their collective action possibilities then three sectors are delineated instead of the usual two ngos are part of the collective action sector which differs from the public and private sectors in theoretically consistent ways a careful distinction is made between institutions and organizations usually conflated in the literature examples of accelerated rural development through grassroots organizations and ngos are discussed form asia africa and latin america