decentralization and corruption evidence from u s federal transfer programs while some recent evidence suggests that more decentralization is associated with reduced corruption no empirical work has examined whether different types of decentraliz ation have differential effects on corruption the theoretical literature has emphasized that expenditure decentralization will only be effective if accompanied by the devolution of rev enue generation to local governments in this paper we examine this hypothesis empirically by studying the mismatch between revenue generation and expenditure in u s states larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office supporting the theory that soft budget constraints created by federal transfers are potentially problematic

how labour market flexibility affects unemployment long term implications of the chain reaction theory this paper evaluates two theories of unemployment the natural rate theory whereby unemployment is depicted as fluctuating around a reasonably stable natural rate and the chain reaction theory which views movements in unemployment as the outcome of the interplay between labour market shocks and a network of lagged adjustment processes we show that for labour market systems with two common characteristics lagged endogenous variables and growing exogenous variables lags affect unemployment not only in the short run but in the long run as well the reason is that in the presence of growing exogenous variables the lagged responses are never able to work themselves out entirely in this respect the chain reaction theory contrasts sharply with the natural theory which commonly views unemployment as approaching a natural rate determined solely by the values of the exogenous variables the policy implications of the two theories are quite different as well for an empirical model of the uk market we show that unemployment does not converge to the natural rate as conventionally defined furthermore we show that lagged adjustment processes account for a substantial part of the uk long run equilibrium unemployment rate and for the movement of uk unemployment over the past 15 years this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

competition among officials and the abuse of power traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption however empirical evidence does not yet support this view in this paper i show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself while competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government corruption at the higher level of government is increased to avoid widespread theft from the central authority competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist hence even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus it may reduce welfare

correlated payoffs in the inspection game some theory and an application to corruption the inspection game as formulated by tsebelis am polit sci rev 83 77 91 1989 has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty this paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender payoffs given correlated payoffs the comparative statics of the equilibrium yield an inverse relationship between crime and the severity of the sanction in an application we enrich the framework of tsebelis by adding corruption stages and show that this can imply such a correlation of payoffs another interesting finding is that harsher anticorruption measures can increase crime incentives

unemployment wage bargaining and capital labour substitution many economists believe that capital accumulation technical progress and labour force expansion have no lasting effect on unemployment this view rests on the empirically doubtful assumption that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to unity i e production is cobb douglas using a simple model based on the work of layard nickell and jackman this paper demonstrates that with a lower elasticity of substitution the equilibrium unemployment rate is affected by all of the above factors it considers briefly how capital accumulation may be endogenised and what long run implications this has for unemployment copyright 1999 by oxford university press

capital accumulation and unemployment new insights on the nordic experience this paper takes a fresh look at the analysis of labour market dynamics and argues that capital accumulation plays a fundamental role in shaping unemployment movements this role has generally been examined by considering indirect transmission channels of the capital stock effects i e using variables like interest rates or investment ratios in the estimation of single equation unemployment rate models here we advocate a different approach we directly estimate the effects of capital stock in the labour market by applying the chain reaction theory of unemployment and we find that capital stock is a major determinant of unemployment in the nordic countries in particular the different unemployment experiences of these economies derive from the temporary albeit prolonged negative shocks to capital stock growth in denmark and sweden and the permanent downturn of capital stock growth in finland we are thus able to explain why the crisis of the early 1990s had a more acute impact in finland than in its twin economy sweden

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

competition and corruption in an agency relationship abstract the paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account it is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents namely low powered incentives and greater competition the paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on african data

empirical determinants of corruption a sensitivity analysis many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption this paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set a global sensitivity analysis based on the leamer s extreme bounds analysis gives a clear answer five variables are robustly related to corruption corruption is lower in richer countries where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period and the population is mainly protestant corruption is instead higher where political instability is a major problem finally a country s colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

the rational racketeer pasta protection in depression era chicago this study evaluates a depression era chicago pasta racket against predictions generated by alternative economic models assuming varying levels of racketeer control over the industry models of an all powerful racketeer and of a racketeer in an omnipotent alliance with a dominant firm are rejected because the actual protection payments were much lower than those implied by the models moreover the regressive structure of the payments made per macaroni press a portion of the total racketeer levied tax was contrary to the models predictions that the most efficient large press firms would pay the highest tax rates in contrast all of the available information on the racket is consistent with a model in which the racketeer acts as a cartel ringmaster whose primary duties are to monitor and control members output levels in addition the regressive tax would block entry by any displaced workers seeking to produce pasta using small previously mothballed presses

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

the system of administrative and political corruption canal irrigation in south india the paper describes how some irrigation engineers raise vast amounts of illicit revenue from the distribution of water and contracts and redistribute part to superior officers and politicians it argues that the corruption system which is centred on control of personnel transfers is an important supply side reason for poor performance of canal irrigated agriculture insofar as the same system operates in other government departments it may be more important for understanding indian politics and the political influences on economic development than has previously been realised

tax structure turbulence in oecd countries this paper analyses whether and to what extent politiciansmanipulate tax structures strategically in order to winelections or for ideological purposes we introduce anindicator for tax structure turbulence which measures thedegree to which a country s tax structure changes from oneyear to another using data on 18 oecd countries over theperiod 1965 1995 we find clear evidence of a politicalbudget cycle in national tax structures more precisely wefind that in election years tax structures are changedsignificantly less than in other years further thedispersion of political power significantly lowers the abilityof governments to change the tax structure we do not however find any evidence of partisan budget cycles innational tax systems following political regime changes

the role of economic theory in modelling the long run this argues for a closer link between the modelling of the long run relations in applied economics and the intertemporal equilibrium notion from economic theory this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wage dynamics reconciling theory and evidence u s macroeconomic evidence shows a negative relation between the rate of change of wages and unemployment in contrast most theories of wage determination imply a negative relation between the level of wages and unemployment in this paper we ask whether one can reconcile the empirical evidence with theoretical wage relations we reach three main conclusions first we derive the condition under which the two can indeed be reconciled we show the constraints that such a condition imposes on the determinants of workers reservation wages as well as the relative importance of workers outside options as opposed to match specific productivity in wage determination second in the light of this condition we reinterpret the presence of an error correction term in macroeconomic wage relations for most european economies but not in the united states third we show that whether this condition holds or not has important implications for the effects of a number of variables from real interest rates to oil prices to payroll taxes on the natural rate of unemployment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

capital formation and unemployment this paper criticizes the current enthusiasm for labour market policies as the main route to employment creation in oecd countries such policies are normally seen as a means of encouraging more employment on existing capital stock this approach is one sided and downplays the equally important task of increasing productive capacity with more investment in productive capacity conventional labour market policies for increasing employment would be more effective and some might be unnecessary the paper analyses the role of capital stock within the framework of a simple nairu model based on previous work by the author it also presents some empirical evidence copyright 1995 by oxford university press

bribery and public procurement an experimental study a procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat the auctioneer who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider procurement is thus a multi dimensional bidding contest with one dimensional type space the privately known cost the optimal price and bribe bid is derived based on an iid private cost assumption in the experiment bribes are negatively framed to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low although bid prices are lower than predicted behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction when bribes generate a negative externality there is a significant increase in the variability of the data

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

irrigation reform in conditions of populist anarchy an indian case abstract it is true that the performance of india s canal irrigated agriculture could be substantially and cheaply improved by change in canal operating and maintenance procedures but current procedures allow some farmers and state officials to capture disproportionate benefits for themselves through a well institutionalised system of corruption these beneficiaries of the status quo make up powerful interes groups against reform the paper illustrates just how intensely political irrigation reform can be by tracing what happened when an attempt was made to carry out an apparently simple improvement in water allocation rules under a south indian canal the events suggest a wider process of cumulative causation making for low rates of growth of food production and weaker political authority the process is not inevitable however and the paper ends with some suggestions about how in the irrigation context public policy might help to offset the decline

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

global economic crisis and corruption we study the effects of the 2008 2009 global economic crisis on the household experience of bribing public officials the data come from the life in transition 2 survey conducted in 2010 in 30 post socialist economies of central and eastern europe and central asia we find that households hit by crisis are more likely to bribe and among people who bribe crisis victims bribe a wider range of public officials than non victims the crisis victims are also more likely to pay bribes because public officials ask them to do so and less likely because of gratitude the link between crisis and bribery is stronger in the poorest countries of the region our findings support the conjecture that public officials misuse sensitive information about crisis victims to inform bribe extortion decisions

capital accumulation and unemployment a tale of two continents in contrast to much recent work regarding the causes of european unemployment in this paper we emphasize the importance of capital accumulation but unlike the few previous studies which have examined the relationship between capital accumulation and unemployment we argue that what matters for the evolution of employment and the unemployment rate is not the absolute growth rate of a country s capital stock but its evolution relative to other countries capital stock the empirical validity of the above statement is demonstrated for almost all oecd countries using quarterly time series data for the period 1961 1995 more detailed evidence is also presented for germany japan and the united kingdom

the economic crisis of the 1990s in finland finland s depression a tale of bad luck and bad policies in the 1990s finland underwent a deep depression as its gdp dropped about 14 and unemployment rose from 3 to almost 20 this is a story of bad luck and bad policies bad luck took the form of external shocks the collapse of trade with the former soviet union in 1991 but also sharp cycles in the oecd area however bad luck is far from being the whole story in the absence of bad policies finland would have experienced a recession not a depression bad policies included a poorly designed financial regulation and mistaken reactions to the onset of the crisis of particular interest is the role of financial factors in triggering the crisis and aggravating the effects of bad policies not only were consumption and investment spending hurt by the credit crunch but there is evidence that the private sector s indebtedness has increased structural unemployment which explains why the recovery is proceeding with few job creations a number of general lessons emerge they concern the deregulation of financial markets the policy reaction to massive capital inflows and the role of employment policies seppo honkapohja and erkki koskela

phillips curves and unemployment dynamics a critique and a holistic perspective the conventional wisdom that inflation and unemployment are unrelated in the long run implies that these phenomena can be analysed by separate branches of economics the macro literature tries to explain inflation dynamics and estimates the nairu the labour macro literature tries to explain unemployment dynamics and determine the real economic factors that drive the natural rate of unemployment we show that the orthodox view that the new keynesian phillips curve is vertical in the long run and that it cannot generate substantial inflation persistence relies on the implausible assumption of a zero interest rate in the light of these results we argue that a holistic framework is needed to jointly explain the evolution of inflation and unemployment