individual taxpayer response to tax cuts 1982 1984 with implications for the revenue maximizing tax rate abstract this paper measures the response of taxpayers to the u s personal rate reductions from 1982 to 1984 a baseline income distribution is created to describe what level and distribution could be expected in the absence of tax changes comparison of this baseline with actual tax return data shows that at least one sixth and probably one quarter of the revenue ascribable to the rate reductions was recouped by changes in taxpayer behavior the data also show that federal income tax revenue would have been maximized at a tax rate of about 35 percent and total income tax revenue maximized at a total tax rate of about 40 percent

mandate based health reform and the labor market evidence from the massachusetts reform we model the labor market impact of the key provisions of the national and massachusetts mandate based health reforms individual mandates employer mandates and subsidies we characterize the compensating differential for employer sponsored health insurance eshi and the welfare impact of reform in terms of sufficient statistics we compare welfare under mandate based reform to welfare in a counterfactual world where individuals do not value eshi relying on the massachusetts reform we find that jobs with eshi pay 2812 less annually somewhat less than the cost of eshi to employers accordingly the deadweight loss of mandate based health reform was approximately 8 percent of its potential size

the international food policy research institute ifpri and the mexican progresa anti poverty and human resource investment conditional cash summary the mexican progresa oportunidades anti poverty and human resource conditional cash transfer cct program has influenced considerably policies in many countries the mexican government engaged the international food policy research institute ifpri to undertake the initial evaluation of progresa oportunidades this paper considers 1 was the progresa program design influenced by prior ifpri research 2 why was ifpri chosen to undertake the initial impact evaluation of progresa 3 how did the ifpri evaluation of progresa contribute to the program 4 were there spillovers of the ifpri evaluation of progresa it concludes that estimated benefit cost ratios of ifpri s evaluation of progesa considerably exceed one

marginal tax rates and income new time series evidence this paper estimates the dynamic effects of marginal tax rate changes on income reported on tax returns in the united states over the 1950 2010 period after isolating exogenous variation in average marginal tax rates in structural vector autoregressions using a narrative identification approach i find large positive effects of tax cuts in the top 1 of the income distribution in contrast to earlier findings based on tax return data i also find large effects in other income percentile brackets a hypothetical tax reform cutting marginal rates only for the top 1 leads to sizeable increases in top 1 incomes and has a positive effect on real gdp there are also spillover effects to incomes outside of the top 1 but top marginal rate cuts lead to greater inequality in pre tax incomes

welfare analysis meets causal inference we describe a framework for empirical welfare analysis that uses the causal estimates of a policy s impact on net government spending this framework provides guidance for which causal effects are and are not needed for empirical welfare analysis of public policies the key ingredient is the construction of each policy s marginal value of public funds mvpf the mvpf is the ratio of beneficiaries willingness to pay for the policy to the net cost to the government we discuss how the mvpf relates to traditional welfare analysis tools such as the marginal excess burden and marginal cost of public funds we show how the mvpf can be used in practice by applying it to several canonical empirical applications from public finance labor development trade and industrial organization

profit sharing and employment stability this paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed time based wage the theory is tested on two data sets one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors the characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the theoretical requirements for stabilizing employment and the authors do find evidence in both samples to support the hypothesis the evidence however is of borderline statistical significance and is therefore more suggestive than definitive

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

taxes informality and income shifting evidence from a recent pakistani tax reform abstract this paper examines firm behavior to taxation in a low enforcement and large informality setting using quasi experimental variation created by a tax reform which increased taxation of partnerships substantially relative to firms of other legal form and the population of income tax returns filed in pakistan in 2006 11 i document that treated firms report significantly lower earnings migrate into informality and switch business form in response to the increase in tax rate the revenue loss caused by these behavioral responses is so large that by the third year after the reform the government was collecting less revenue than it would have without the tax increase this implies that the new tax rate was on the wrong side of the laffer curve and would not have been optimal under any social preferences the richness of the data and tax variation permits me to decompose the observed responses into real and evasion margins and to identify fiscal externalities created by the reform on other tax bases the welfare cost of the reform increases by around 40 once these externalities are taken into account

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1986 tax reform act this paper uses a treasury department panel of more than 4 000 taxpayers to estimate the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in tax rates on the basis of a comparison of the tax returns of the same individual taxpayers before and after the 1986 tax reform the analysis emphasizes that the response of taxable income involves much more than a change in the traditional measures of labor supply the evidence shows an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net of tax rate that is at least one and could be substantially higher the implications for recent tax rate changes are discussed

profit sharing in internal labour markets a main point of weitzman s analysis of profit sharing is that although profit sharing may result in a pareto superior configuration it is not stable under free choices of payment mechanisms weitzman i987 p ioi insiders who face virtually zero probability of unemployment given the set of possible shocks the economy faces will always prefer the fixed wage payment to a profit sharing system since the latter system would result in the firm hiring outsiders and lowering the pay of insiders thus if all the parameters of pay are bargained over in a single firm or industry the profit sharing parameter is zero on the other hand if profit sharing were introduced from outside in all the firms of the economy the macroeconomic impact higher employment and lower prices would offset the negative impact on insiders pay to say it with weitzman s words if every firm converted to profit sharing there would be no outsider unemployed workers to hire and the insiders would be no worse off p i02 weitzman suggests correcting this macroeconomic externality with a subsidy for profit sharing in the form of a reduced rate of tax on income that workers derive from their share of company profits the debate on weitzman s proposal has focused mainly on the effectiveness of subsidies and on efficiency wage considerations see the surveys by estrin et al i986 wadhwani i987 and rees i990 so far little has been done to examine the robustness of the proposition that insiders who face a close to zero probability of unemployment always prefer a wage to a share system so that in equilibrium profit related pay is zero 1 this proposition is obviously a central feature of weitzman s proposal because it implies that without government intervention profit sharing should not be observed this is not very satisfactory if one considers the empirical evidence suggesting that profit related pay is widespread in japan see freeman and weitzman i987 and present both in the united kingdom see blanchflower and oswald i988 and the united states see mitchell et al i990 as remarked by rees this empirical evidence suggests that a desirable feature of the equilibrium should be that the bargain between insiders and the firm yield a corner solution with zero profit sharing in some well specified circumstances and an internal solution with positive profit sharing in others the purpose of this paper is to present an example of such an equilibrium where the factor determining whether we have a corner or an internal solution is the nature of promotion in a hierarchical firm the key idea is to introduce

the use of regression statistics to analyze imperfect pricing policies corrective taxes can solve many market failures but actual policies frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal because of administrative or political constraints we present a method to quantif

the effect of income taxation on labor supply when deductions are endogenous this paper extends the standard static model of labor supply and taxation to the case where people are able to legally avoid taxes through the use of itemized deductions tax deductible expenditures are treated as a hicksian composite good with a price for those who decide to itemize proportional to one minus the marginal tax rate estimation of the commonly used linear labor supply model extended to incorporate the additional composite good on a cross section of prime aged married men suggests that tax deductible consumption is an uncompensated substitute for leisure and complement with labor the impact of taxes through the relative price of deductible expenditures appears to be much stronger than through the net wage copyright 1992 by mit press

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous abstract the optimal income taxation framework is extended to account for heterogeneity in avoidance behavior the optimal tax formulae are shown to be simply and intuitively modified to reflect the value of taxable income as an indicator of the need for transfers at a given skill level this effect is in addition to any effect implied by just considering additional margins of response to taxes alternative sources of heterogeneity and their likely consequences are discussed when the choice of administration is added to the model it is demonstrated that the optimal tax system may include some seemingly wasteful avoidance schemes even if they could be eliminated without any cost when an avoidance scheme is more heavily used by the needy it may provide additional redistribution without affecting standard incentive constraints

adjustment costs firm responses and micro vs macro labor supply elasticities evidence from danish tax records we show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms we develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs we present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using danish tax records first larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities second kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities third the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods

the elasticity of taxable income during the 1990s new estimates and sensitivity analyses author affiliation seth h giertz sgiertz2 unl edu acknowledgment the author wishes to thank david weiner ed harris bob dennis doug hamilton tom woodward emmanuel saez chris bollinger and three anonymous referees for their comments and assistance 1 introductioneconomists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency by distorting relative prices often between leisure and all other goods in the economy even a broad based income tax can have substantial efficiency costs so long as leisure remains untaxed harberger 1964 uses this as motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indirect taxation in so doing he shows how labor supply elasticities can be used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation 1 harberger s analysis had a profound influence on public and labor economists spurring increased research into labor supply elasticities which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from taxation more than two decades after harberger economists began to emphasize the variety of other margins over which taxes can distort behavior in addition to hours worked these economists noted that these other behavioral responses may too have important implications for efficiency an important building block in the evolution of this literature was set forth by slemrod 1990 who presented a hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation slemrod divided behavior into three categories based on their responsiveness to taxes his least responsive category real responses includes individuals changing consumption and work patterns and businesses altering investment and production decisions second in order of responsiveness is circumvention which includes both illegally evasion and legally avoidance bypassing the tax system 2 in the case of evasion income is concealed from tax authorities or factors that offset tax liabilities such as expenses and deductions are inflated beyond what is legally permitted in the case of avoidance income is shifted in order to receive more favorable tax treatment diverting income into a tax deferred retirement account is an example of avoidance 3 included in circumvention is the expenditure of time and money necessary to avoid or evade taxation third on the hierarchy and the most responsive is the timing of income receipt which includes pulling the receipt of income into the previous year or pushing it into the next in order to take advantage of more favorable tax treatment while not altering real behavior 4 slemrod further recognizes that the type of behavioral response could have implications for both tax revenue and tax incidence and in some cases efficiency predating slemrod s insights lindsey 1987 produced elasticity estimates for taxable income although what lindsey termed taxable income more closely approximates adjusted gross income agi instead of labor supply 5 lindsey s estimated elasticities were much larger than the labor supply literature would have suggested lindsey emphasized the revenue implications of the elasticity of taxable income eti but not its efficiency implications building on slemrod and lindsey feldstein 1995 produced eti estimates but went much further than lindsey in describing the behaviors that could affect taxable income he argued that many of these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities furthermore feldstein posited that income taxation creates economic inefficiency not only by distorting the relative price between labor and leisure but more broadly by distorting the relative price between goods or activities that are taxed and those that are not taxed since leisure is not the only untaxed activity for example in response to taxes not only work hours but also work effort might change

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

the tax effect on taxable income from privately held businesses the implications of the tax elasticity of taxable income have been widely discussed in the literature this study uses the reported rate of return to capture the effects of tax changes on taxable income from privately held businesses households decisions concerning reporting rates of return are embedded in a selection model of business investment decisions with 1983 1989 survey of consumer finances panel data the tax elasticity of the reported rates of return on privately held businesses is found to be positive and large the tax elasticity of taxable income from privately held businesses is thus crucial for policy evaluation several reasons for the high tax elasticity and the implications of it are also discussed

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

relocation of the rich migration in response to top tax rate changes from spanish reforms a spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates resulting in substantial tax differentials using administrative data we find that conditional on moving taxes have a signi

steady state unemployment under profit sharing this paper demonstrates how asymmetric treatment of high seniority insider workers and non tenured outsiders gives rise to bad macroeconomic st eady states in a wage economy the framework uses a nash bargaining solution where workers may bargain over pay but firms control hiring profit sharing is then considered as an alternative payment mechanism having the automatically corrective incentive property that employers want to hire more outsiders given the assumptions of the model it is shown that widespread profit sharing results in lower unemployment and more output even though it is individually rational for insiders to prefer wages over profit shares copyright 1987 by royal economic society

reported gross income and marginal tax rates estimation of the behavioural reactions of spanish taxpayers this article estimates for the spanish personal income tax the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates the identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by law 35 2006 which came into force in january 2007 the elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs with significant regional differences the average elasticity estimated for spain as a whole is 0 676 however this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the spanish administrative regions which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax thus households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0 337 compared to 0 682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings lastly a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level an elasticity of 3 6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000

automobile externalities and policies this paper discusses the nature and magnitude of externalities associated with automobile use including local and global pollution oil dependence traffic congestion and traffic accidents it then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities including fuel taxes fuel economy and emissions standards and alternative fuel policies summarizing insofar as possible the welfare effects of those policies finally we discuss emerging pricing policies including congestion tolls and insurance reform and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities

profit sharing and employee share ownership profit sharing and employee share ownership saul estrin paul grout and sushil wadhwani this paper evaluates the likely effects of linking a part of a worker s pay to the employer s profits it has been suggested by weitzman that this would raise employment by lowering the cost of taking on an extra worker however this can only happen if existing workers are willing to let their share of value added fall and experience of those firms in the uk who already operate profit sharing schemes suggests that the weitzman mechanism is not operative there is however some evidence that profit related pay does boost productivity but there are other ways of raising productivity such as performance related pay which may be more effective productivity enhancing effects are likely to be greatest when employees are involved in decision making as well but this is likely to undermine the weitzman case still further even if the argument that profit sharing raises employment is not compelling it is sometimes suggested that it can do little harm however there is evidence that it may well be inflationary in which case the government would be advised to proceed cautiously we argue that there is very little case for the introduction of a permanent subsidy to encourage increased profit sharing although there may be a case for a temporary one to overcome managerial inertia however there is a danger that a subsidy will promote cosmetic schemes designed to be eligible for the subsidy but which do not reflect any real change in behaviour