international business research past present and future the editors of the journal of international business studies jibs always try to publish the best international business research unfortunately there will probably never be a simple response to the question what constitutes excellent international business research we might make some progress however if we first attempt to define international business research and then identify several noteworthy examples

international marketing policy a discussion of the standardization construct and its relevance for corporate policy a fundamental question in international marketing concerns the desirability and feasibility of standardizing marketing programs and procedures internationally the primary objective of this paper is to present an overview and evaluation of the standardization debate central issues of interest include a discussion of the standardization construct and an evaluation of the evidence regarding corporate implementation of standardization strategies

fiscal federalism and lobbying abstract which government functions should be decentralized resp centralized once lobbying behavior is taken into account we find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized resp centralized when regional lobbies have conflicting interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization on the contrary when regional lobbies have aligned interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization provided that policy spillovers on the non organized groups are not too strong

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

a cross national comparison of consumer research measures the impact of three factors that affect the psychometric rigor of cross national consumer research comparisons is measured in this study conclusions are also drawn about the interactions among these factors and the resultant deterioration in the psychometric quality of the data

equity in utilization of and access to public sector gps in spain a framework is outlined for testing empirically whether utilization of and access to public sector gps in spain in 1993 was consistent with the twin criteria of horizontal and vertical equity where these are defined with respect to need vertical horizontal inequities in access are assessed by including interactions between determinants of access and need non need variables in a utilization equation findings are consistent with the principle of vertical equity in the utilization of gp services but are not consistent with horizontal equity travel time for individuals who did not visit their gp are imputed but it is not a significant determinant of utilization or access however caution is expressed when interpreting these findings as they may be contaminated by biases arising from unit non response measurement error and simultaneity the paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future studies

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

backward stealing and forward manipulation in the wto abstract motivated by the structure of wto negotiations we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most favored nation mfn principle we identify backward stealing and forward manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the mfn principle in a sequential fashion we show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed we identify the wto nullification or impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems in this way we suggest that wto rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process

empirical research in international marketing 1976 1982 this paper reviews empirical research in international marketing published during the period 1976 82 the review focuses on what has been researched and how the research has been conducted this research is evaluated a cooperative multidisciplinary empirical research program in international marketing is then proposed

on the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations abstract the preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined it is shown that the buyer weakly prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history with substitute goods such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head to head competition with complementary goods strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers their price offers have short deadlines and or goods are weak complements sellers strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

willingness to pay for parallel private health insurance evidence from a laboratory experiment debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles this paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject s willingness to pay wtp for parallel private health insurance consistent with the theoretical predictions of cuff et al 2010 subjects average wtp is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care hurley is also affiliated with the centre for health economics and policy analysis mcmaster university cameron is also affiliated with the centre for health economics and policy analysis mcmaster university we acknowledge helpful comments from two anonymous referees andrew muller michel grignon and other members of the new and emerging team project on experimental methods applied to health economics at mcmaster university in particular we would like to acknowledge dale marsden and aleksandra gajic for research support and stuart mestelman for valuable input on the paper especially section 5 we would also like to thank conference participants from the 2009 canadian economics association meetings and seminar participants from university of innsbruck social science research centre berlin university of regensburg and york university for helpful comments this research was funded by the canadian institutes of health research grant no 76670 the views expressed are those of the authors alone email nbuckley yorku ca

the control of invasive species on private property with neighbor to neighbor spillovers invasive pests cross property boundaries property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion each property manager has a right to future use of his own property but his property may abut others properties enabling spread of an invasive species the incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention we consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated discrete control activities we find that higher rates of dispersal associated with proximity to neighboring properties reduce the private incentives for control controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker link public good problem in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity future use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of coase like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects a tax with a strong income effect e g failure of effective revenue recycling can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one s own property

optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations abstract we examine vertical contracting in a perfect information environment in contrast to mcafee and schwartz mcafee r p schwartz m 1994 opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity american economic review vol 84 pp 210 230 we demonstrate that outcomes are efficient if an upstream monopolist has the choice of requiring upfront fixed fee payments or making them optional

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

comparative marketing the first twenty five years this article reviews the field of comparative marketing in terms of scope types and depth of studies methodological issues conceptual and managerial payoffs and teaching approaches after its first quarter of a century as an international business topic comparative marketing is still relatively green

trading between agents for a better match this paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post i show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract this causes principals to offer agents piece rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece rates they would offer if trading was not allowed although trading reduces an agent s effort and could increase the agent s outside option of rejecting a principal s ex ante contract principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes

innovation orientation environment and performance a comparison of u s and european markets much attention has been paid to the importance of innovation in ensuring the survival and growth of companies for u s companies a key issue is to what extent findings for the u s market can be extrapolated to non u s markets to provide a basis for designing innovation strategy similar innovation orientation types were identified in both markets using a sample of consumer businesses from the pims database a number of similarities and differences in associated environments and performance levels were also identified a major finding was that a high degree of product innovativeness leads to generally poor financial and market share performance in both markets but high rates of market share growth another major finding was that having pioneered in a market leads to effective performance results for the associated environments were more mixed in the sense that there was not a perfect correlation in the environments associated with the types in both markets

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

needs economic constraints and the distribution of public home care when private goods are publicly provided at subsidized prices government authorities have to determine the distribution of services on recipients the distribution of services according to need is frequently referred to as an important policy goal thus governments are assumed to develop standards for evaluating the relative needs of different clients this paper analyses the impact of needs and economic constraints on the distribution of public home care in norway the empirical results show that individual needs have a significant effect on the distribution of home care another finding is that local public authorities with higher disposable incomes meet client needs better finally the results are utilized to derive a measure of client specific need

animal disease incidence and indemnity eradication programs abstract there are many options for controlling the spread of animal diseases some diseases have been treated as public sector problems and many nations have tried to control disease spread by purchasing sick animals from farmers government agencies have purchased breeding stock that might transmit diseases government agencies have purchased animals that might otherwise have gone to the slaughterhouse thereby keeping pathogens out of the food supply our hypothesis is that when it is not immediately obvious to farmers or private sector buyers which animals carry or transmit diseases a government indemnity program s success is not assured instead disease control depends on farmers ability to respond to the relative prices they face we examine the incentives created by prices indemnity payment levels government agencies choose the scrapie indemnity eradication program in the united states 1952 1992 provides a natural laboratory for measuring the responsiveness to government set prices we show that government set prices played a major role in determining the program s outcome the supply of infected animals was price elastic we argue that short run movements in relative prices and the number of infected animals offer a practical method for assessing program effectiveness

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

opportunism and menus of two part tariffs we show that a menu of two part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by mcafee and schwartz 1994 in vertical games with sequential contracting provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large if the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee the prospect of the first firm s choosing the wrong two part tariff in the event of opportunism is in some environments sufficient to make opportunism unprofi table for the seller

private contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract this paper considers the efficacy of divide and conquer strategies in principal agent games involving contracting with externalities we find that whereas divide and conquer offers can arise in equilibrium under some conditions when the principal s offers are publicly observable they cannot arise in equilibrium when the principal s offers are privately observable and the agents hold passive out of equilibrium beliefs this insight applies to technology and platform adoption decisions with network effects labor relations settlement negotiations and input licensing among others

foreign direct investment in vertically related markets we study an mne s choice of fdi mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing we show how the market s vertical structure and trading features affect this choice an mne s incentives to expand through cross border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms the opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts instead of two part tariffs are used our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome fdi and should discourage fdi through acquisition investissements exterieurs directs sur les marches verticaux dans cet article nous etudions le choix d une entreprise multinationale de proceder a un investissement exterieur direct dans un marche vertical avec sources d approvisionnement locales nous montrons la facon dont la structure verticale et les caracteristiques commerciales du marche ont une incidence sur une telle decision les mesures incitatives offertes aux entreprises multinationales pour se developper par l entremise d acquisitions transfrontalieres plutot que par l investissement dans de nouvelles installations sont plus fortes sur les marches dotes d un pouvoir de negociation et d une concentration en amont plus eleves ainsi que par des conditions contractuelles non observables l inverse s observe sur les marches ou les contrats a prix de gros sont utilises en lieu et place des tarifs binomes en termes de bien etre notre analyse suggere que le pays hote ne devrait pas toujours accueillir les investissements exterieurs directs et devrait decourager ces memes investissements realises par l entremise d acquisitions

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities this paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts we use the strategic environment described by rasmusen ramseyer and wiley 1991 and segal and whinston 2000 where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent when discrimination is impossible the game resembles a stag hunt coordination game in which the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium two way non binding pre play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller when discrimination and communication are possible the exclusion rate rises divide and conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given finally secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent s power to profitably exclude

equity in the finance and delivery of health care some tentative cross country comparisons textabstractequity is widely acknowledged to be an important goal in the field of health care indeed mclachlan and maynard 1982 have gone so far as to suggest that the vast majority of the population would elect for equity to be the prime consideration p 556 a view endorsed by mooney 1986 p 145 several researchers have investigated how successful their own country s delivery and or financing system is in achieving its stated equity goals in general the strategy of these studies is to compare the current situation with some ideal or target situation le grand 1978 for example in what has become a classic study in the field compares the distributions across socio economic groups of illness and public expenditure on health care in britain in 1972 and concludes that the national health service nhs has failed to achieve equity in the delivery of health care

optimal border policies for invasive species under asymmetric information this paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost we show how the optimal inspection penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case departing from previous literature we allow for technical assistance a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under article 9 of the world trade organization sanitary and phytosanitary agreement we find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement even if it would otherwise be inefficient further we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy if technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter s country optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive if technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter s economy it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff penalty combination optimal

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control as moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers moreover share supply is shown to be upward sloping rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers furthermore higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen tration and are thus beneficial finally one share one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

diagnosing measurement equivalence in cross national research many researchers have pointed out that it is necessary to ensure measurement equivalence in cross national comparative research three aspects of measurement equivalence translation metric and calibration equivalence are necessary to establish the cross national reliability and validity of items used to measure theoretical constructs this paper discusses these issues and proposes two recently developed empirical techniques multiple group lisrel and optimal scaling for use in diagnosing cross national measurement equivalence these techniques are illustrated by reanalysis of a pioneering u s and japanese study the two techniques yield convergent results indicating measurement equivalence for some but not all ordinal level items under consideration the findings demonstrate that the proposed methods are useful diagnostic tools for exploring measurement equivalence several suggestions for reducing the likelihood of problems with measurement equivalence and a number of methods for dealing with items where lack of equivalence persists are also discussed

coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities abstract building on genicot and ray g genicot d ray contracts and externalities how things fall apart j econ theory 131 2006 71 100 we develop a model of non cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal allowing for agent coordination we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games in particular we find that bargaining can break agents coordination and that the principal s payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power

disease forecasts and livestock health disclosure a shepherd s dilemma we analyze how to induce sellers to disclose food safety with repeated interactions and safety correlated over time cash transfers alone do not ensure disclosure perfect but costly testing ensures disclosure with a complex lottery that may be difficult to implement in practice in contrast even a noisy quality forecast allows the buyer to induce perfect disclosure with a simple pricing scheme forecast introduction may benefit or harm sellers after introduction sellers may suffer from increases in forecast precision as an illustration we cast our model in the context of rift valley fever in an east african livestock market copyright 2010 oxford university press

priority setting in public and private health care a guide through the ideological jungle abstract priority setting means deciding who is to get what at whose expense in the context of health care the what in that statement refers to different sorts of health care and the who to different sorts of people the whose expense is not so straightforward it appears to refer to who will pay the bill and in a public health care system this might seem to be the government though behind the government stands the taxpayer and that means all of us even in a private health care system it is rarely the patient who meets the bill directly for some or all of it will be met by an insurer and the costs of any particular treatment episode will be spread over many premium payers but in the context of an economic rather than a financial analysis the phrase at whose expense has to be interpreted in a different way based on the notion of opportunity cost rather than on the notion of expenditure when so reinterpreted it means who is to go without health care in order that others shall have it giving priority to one group of people means taking it away from another group though for obvious reasons politicians tend not todwell on this implication leaving us to infer from what is not said who the low priority groups are in any honest and open discussion of these issues however that implication must be faced squarely and we must not shrink from identifying who implicitly the low priority people are in any particular system of health care

behavioral incentives equilibrium endemic disease and health management policy for farmed animals the article develops a dynamic capital valuation model in which farms can act with farm varying cost to increase the probability of avoiding an infectious endemic animal disease multiple endemic disease equilibria can exist and the one with the largest set of action takers is socially optimal costly capital markets are shown to be a factor in determining the extent of disease frictions such as dealing with a veterinary public health bureaucracy can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions technical innovations can reduce social welfare and a disease indemnification scheme is also studied suggestions for empirical implementation are provided

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

confining the coase theorem contracting ownership and free riding if individuals own the right to take any action that they please and are free to contract about behaviour will outcomes be efficient in all situations that is does the coase theorem hold we study this classic question through the lens of a non cooperative model of contract negotiations considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations in either case we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players but if participation is voluntary and there are more than two players there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient specifically the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting free riding on others agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions when actions involve the use of assets efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership

network effects and environmental externalities do clean technologies suffer from excess inertia abstract we study the diffusion of a clean substitute to a dirty durable in a dynamic model consumer utility of both durables increases in their respective market shares due to network effects first we characterize the optimal dirty good tax the tax should achieve a long run optimal division of the market between the two goods along the transition path to this steady state the optimal tax depends on the current and future market shares of the clean durable thus even if the marginal environmental damage from an additional dirty durable is constant the optimal tax should not be constant second we study whether excess inertia can occur if the emission tax is not optimally set we then find that a constant tax that only accounts for the environmental damage caused by the dirty good may lead to excess inertia excess inertia could happen even if the clean technology is proprietary and the technology owner has incentives to sponsor the initial market diffusion of the technology

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

influence of role stress on industrial salespeople s work outcomes in the united states japan and korea role theory espouses and extensive empirical research has found that role stress can have deleterious effect on work outcomes of sales personnel the findings of these investigations however are predicated on u s based samples of salespeople whether similar results would be obtained with samples of salespersons in other countries has not yet been determined this paper reports the results of a study that examined the impact of role stress on performance job satisfaction and organizational commitment of industrial salespeople from the united states japan and korea tests of cross national hypotheses indicate general consistency in the findings across the three countries

an optimal auction with identity dependent externalities we analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands private information and identity dependent externalities we derive the seller s optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties we show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys also the seller s allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient as an illustration we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non anchor stores we show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough

strategic interactions among private and public efforts when preventing and stamping out a highly infectious animal disease upon the outbreak of a contagious animal disease a primary motive for restoring disease free status is often to regain access to international product markets efforts applied toward continuing or regaining such access generate a public good all growers benefit regardless of the extent of private effort taken while exclusion is impractical private incentives to take preventive measures and stamp out effort interact in complex ways there are intra farm temporal interactions and also inter farm contemporaneous interactions public effort also takes place and interacts with private effort this paper provides a succinct multi agent model to explore these interactions in social optimum and in nash equilibrium and also to explore how socially optimal and nash behavior differ comparative statics under social optimality are more straightforward than under nash equilibrium whether it is in social optimum or nash equilibrium public prevention effort complements both private prevention and private stamp out efforts however public stamp out effort substitutes for both private stamp out and private prevention efforts reasonable conditions are identified under which nash levels of private prevention and stamp out efforts are both below socially optimal levels concerning policy prescriptions secure property rights and low property transfer costs should promote prevention and eradication efforts other things being equal public prevention effort should be more effective at improving welfare than comparable public stamp out effort subsidies on private effort should favor prevention because subsidies on eradication effort may discourage prevention effort even if products from diseased animals are safe to consume and acceptable to consumers it may be optimal to destroy them

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour part i principal agent models are studied in which outcomes conditional on the agent s action are uncertain and the agent s behaviour therefore unobservable for a model with bounded agent s utility conditions are given under which the first best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes for general models it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent s first order conditions as constraint general conditions of lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite dimensional 1 the moral hazard situation

endogenous games and mechanisms side payments among players we characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played this does not always lead to efficient outcomes despite complete information and costless contracting the characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples including voluntary contribution public good games cournot and bertrand oligopoly principal agent problems and commons games among others

self protection strategic interactions and the relative endogeneity of disease risks self protection is a key behavior that influences infectious disease risks spillovers in disease protection create different types of strategic interactions under certain conditions multiple nash equilibria may arise with the possibility of coordination failure involving excessively low self protection in which case individuals expectations of others efforts determine which outcome arises in prior studies assumed technical relations between self protection and infection probabilities drove the strategic interactions we demonstrate that strategic relations can be endogenously determined and depend on the relative endogeneity of risk rer defined here as the degree to which individuals can take control of their own risks in a strategic setting the potential for coordination failure may arise when rer is sufficiently small whereas larger levels of rer may eliminate this possibility to ensure larger levels of self protection we find that imposing a behaviorally dependent indemnity may increase rer to eliminate the possibility of coordination failure we apply our analysis to the problem of livestock disease and illustrate the theory using a numerical example of the 2001 united kingdom foot and mouth disease epidemic

insurability and moral hazard in agricultural insurance markets pareto optimal and constrained pareto optimal all risk insurance contracts are studied conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo risk averse the effect of moral hazard on all risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard

the integration of claims to health care a programming approach the paper contributes to the use of social choice and welfare theory in health economics by developing and applying the integration of claims framework to health care rationing related to sen s critique of neo classical welfare economics the integration of claims framework recognises three primitive sources of claim consequences deontology and procedures a taxonomy is presented with the aid of which it is shown that social welfare functions reflecting these claims individually or together can be specified some of the resulting social choice rules can be regarded as generalisations of health maximisation and all have normative justifications though the justifications may not be universally acceptable the paper shows how non linear programming can be used to operationalise such choice rules and illustrates their differential impacts on the optimal provision of health care following discussion of relations to the capabilities framework and the context in which rationing occurs the paper concludes that the integration of claims provides a viable framework for modelling health care rationing that is technically rigorous general and tractable as well as being consistent with relevant moral considerations and citizen preferences

livestock disease indemnity design when moral hazard is followed by adverse selection averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves the government and individual livestock producers producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak ex ante moral hazard and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected ex post adverse selection we investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government in the presence of asymmetric information we compare the relative magnitude of the first and second best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to demonstrate the tradeoff between risk sharing and efficiency and we discuss the implications for status quo u s policy