commodity tax harmonization and the location of industry we study the positive implications of commodity taxation and tax harmonization under the destination and origin principles when firms are monopolistic competitors facing variable demand elasticity and segmented markets our emphasis is on the international location of firms in the presence of market size asymmetries and trade costs under the destination principle an increase in the tax rate of a country always causes some firms to relocate to the other this effect may be reversed under the origin principle when economic integration is deep enough under tax harmonization the choice of a common tax principle is irrelevant for the market outcomes and for the global tax revenues it affects however the distribution of revenues between small and large countries c 2006 elsevier b v all rights reserved

tax competition and the creation of redundant products there are products that are assembled from kits but that once assembled are identical to other products an example is the roll your own cigarette because the kit requires time to assemble it is more costly than the assembled product in the absence of tax competition the kit is not bought or is redundant i show that tax competition between regions supports strategies that tax the redundant product at a lower tax rate than its assembled counterpart and it is bought a welfare loss is thereby created jel classification h71 bien des produits peuvent etre assembles a partir de trousses une fois assembles ces produits sont identiques a d autres produits un exemple est le fait de rouler ses propres cigarettes parce que la trousse reclame du temps pour l assemblage le produit coute plus cher que le produit deja assemble en l absence de concurrence fiscale on n achete pas la trousse ou elle est redondante on montre que la concurrence fiscale entre regions supporte des strategies qui taxent le produit redondant a un taux plus bas que sa contrepartie assemblee et que ce produit redondant est achete une perte de bien etre s ensuit

environmental taxation in open economies unilateralism or partial harmonization there are two reasons why countries might set weak environmental policies transboundary pollution and concerns for competitiveness this article explores the full interactions between these two features within a unified general equilibrium framework first we show that competitive concerns change the structure of output taxes but not that of emission taxes they lead to a lowering of output taxes lower polluting good prices an increase in emission taxes adoption of less or same polluting technologies increased aggregate emissions and lower overall welfare levels second we show that partially harmonizing commodity taxes above their unrestricted nash equilibrium value can potentially hurt as well as improve the pollution technology overall quality of the environment and welfare the three attributes move positively together on the other hand harmonizing of emission taxes above their nash equilibrium values appear to always lead to improvements in the environment and welfare via adoption of cleaner technologies

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation in the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source based residence based and related systems next tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country s point of view given those of the others the achievability of these rates under the various systems is analyzed finally tax rates that are optimal from an international point of view are considered again achievability of an international optimum under the various systems is considered leading to the main conclusions that i a pure residence based system in all countries can achieve an international fiscal optimum ii it cannot however be sustained as an equilibrium

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information abstract should environmental policy be set at the federal level to counter incentives for environmental dumping when states act non cooperatively assuming that environmental damage costs are known only by state governments i ask whether this asymmetry of information could rationalize a federal government harmonizing environmental policies across states i show that asymmetric information narrows the difference in environmental policies across states relative to full information but does not justify harmonization the welfare loss from harmonization rises sharply with the variance in damage costs across states and can erode the benefit of setting policy at the federal level to counter environmental dumping

the spatial effects of wage or property tax differentials and local government choice between tax instruments abstract this paper considers the spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized differential in source based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between for example a central city and the surrounding suburbs a simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways if given a choice a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax

competitive tax theory in open economies constrained inefficiency and a pigovian remedy abstract in an economy with multiple governments each is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes on a directly mobile tax base a government is said to be competitive if the total cost of its decisions including the excess burden is perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there is another set of distortionary taxes and associated public expenditures for which all individuals in the economy are better off it is shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy is derived

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

tax harmonization and tax competition in the european union lessons from switzerland abstract this paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in switzerland tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents however it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible thus if tax competition works well in switzerland there is no reason why it should have disastrous effects in a future european union

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

in a world without borders the impact of taxes on internet commerce the rapid rise in sales over the internet and the fact that most internet buyers pay no sales tax has ignited a considerable debate over taxes and the internet this paper uses new data on the purchase decisions of approximately 25 000 online users to examine the effect of local sales taxes on internet commerce the results suggest that controlling for observable characteristics people living in high sales taxes locations are significantly more likely to buy online the results are quite robust and cannot be explained by unobserved technological sophistication shopping costs or other alternative explanations the magnitudes in the paper suggest that applying existing sales taxes to internet commerce might reduce the number of online buyers by up to 24 percent

a model of welfare competition with evidence from afdc in this paper we test empirically for strategic behavior among the states using the cash support program aid to families with dependent children afdc to motivate the empirical work we adapt wildasin s model of income redistribution 1991 american economic review 81 757 773 to a model of interjurisdictional welfare competition although welfare competition may be generated from different frameworks we choose wildasin s model to illustrate how welfare benefit interdependence is genereated in the context of welfare migration we estimate a representative reaction function for afdc using both cross sections and pooled cross section data after controlling for other determinants of afdc benefit levels and for spatial error autocorrelation we find evidence showing competition 2000 academic press

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

the relativity ability to tax coal in the western states over the past decade state governments have begun to acknowledge an implicit relationship between states in the tax setting process the recent taxation literature suggests that differences in tax burdens do affect economic decisions and that states do compete with each other when designing tax policy moreover there has been a growing interest in the theoretical models of strategic interactions between regions as they compete for tax revenues natural source laden states enjoy an advantage in the collection of own source revenues reserves of coal oil copper or other natural resources with a national market provide states with an opportunity to exploit their advantage through the imposition of severance taxes the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the western states in their relative power to tax the extraction of coal in section ii of this paper we examine earlier work on the taxation of western coal section iii contains the details of the coal model we use in section iv we determine the composition of the western coal market and the strategic tax setting behavior of the state governments involved in section v we discuss our empirical results 17 refs 2 tabs

public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation the paper considers the welfare effect of the harmonisation of indirect taxes in two open economies the revenue from taxation is used for the production of a non tradeable public good the welfare levels are affected via two channels i changes in the levels of public good provision and ii changes in deadweight loss associated with the taxes we develop a number of rules of harmonisation and derive conditions under which they lead to potential pareto improvement

social protection and political competition this paper analyses how the level of social protection is determined when its choice depends on political competition first this is done under autarky then the analysis is extended to take account of the existence of an international capital market we show that social protection never increases under international competition and in several circumstances drastically decreases

tax evasion fiscal competition and economic integration abstract this paper examines the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in an economic union first for symmetric countries it proves that the equilibrium values of the tax and audit rates are less than optimal tax harmonization alone will also lead to a less than optimal audit rate second for asymmetric countries the paper shows that integration may turn an honest country into an evading one it argues that tax harmonization alone may be a bad policy in that it can make both countries worse off it may also cause an otherwise honest country to turn to evasion

transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition abstract a multinational parent sells a non marketed commodity to a foreign subsidiary that uses the product as an input to produce a product it then sells the subsidiary is controlled by a local managing partner whose compensation consists of a lump sum payment plus a share of the subsidiary s profit the parent chooses an optimal transfer price taking into account incentives for the subsidiary s managing partner and taxes home and host governments impose corporate income taxes on the parent and subsidiary s respective profits subject to a transfer pricing rule e g cost plus price method or comparable profit method a nash equilibrium is derived for effective tax rates chosen by home and host governments we then examine harmonization and suggest that tax rates would be reduced

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

the seesaw principle in international tax policy abstract the standard analysis of the optimal international tax policy of a small country typically assumes that the country either imports or exports capital but does not do both this paper considers the situation in which a small country both exports and imports capital and can alter its tax on one or the other but not both in each case a seesaw relationship is identified in which the optimal tax on the income from capital exports imports is inversely related to the given tax rate on income from capital imports exports the standard results for optimal taxation of capital exports and imports are shown to be special cases of the more general seesaw principle

which border taxes origin and destination regimes with fiscal competition in output and emission taxes abstract this paper posits a two stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second best emission and output taxes in a two country world with an atmospheric externality it shows that i either the destination destination or the origin origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game ii either regime may pareto dominate the other iii it is possible to have a prisoner s dilemma game where the origin origin regime pareto dominates but the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for each country other results include iv under origin origin regime the output tax is used for fiscal competition the emission tax is set at a rate equal to the national marginal social damage of emissions and public goods are provided suboptimally v under destination destination regime the output tax is ineffective as an instrument for fiscal competition the emission tax is used not only for combating pollution but also for tax competition the tax is set at a rate below the national marginal social damage of emissions emissions are pushed above their closed economy level the provision of public goods are optimal

the deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax we show that the optimal deductible which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government the optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income two apparently contradictory positions full deductibility of a payroll tax and non deductibility are special cases of our model la deductibilite des taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises dans une federation ou il y a des externalites fiscales verticales est ce que les taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises devraient etre deductibles de l impot federal sur les profits les auteurs montrent que l optimum de deductibilite qui neutralise les externalites fiscales verticales entre le federal et les provinces est le changement dans la base d imposition federale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecte par le gouvernement provincial le taux de deductibilite optimal d un impot sur les salaires depend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est deportee vers les travailleurs et de la difference entre les taux d imposition du federal sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail deux positions apparemment contradictoires pleine deductibilite d un impot sur les salaires et deductibilite nulle sont des cas speciaux du modele general

technology and tax systems abstract technological innovations facilitating e commerce have had major effects on consumer behavior and firm organization in the retail sector but the effects of these new transaction technologies on fiscal systems remain unknown we extend models of commodity tax competition to include multiple types of commodities trade and remote commerce assuming in accordance with current policy that e commerce is taxed at destination while cross border shopping is taxed at origin when the cost of online shopping falls we show that equilibrium tax rates and revenues decrease in large core jurisdictions but increase in small peripheral ones reducing tax differentials policy commentators warn that e commerce erodes tax revenue true enough for some governments but more accurately changing transaction costs can generate entirely new commercial and fiscal equilibria that ultimately redistribute tax revenues from jurisdictions with concentrations of traditional vendors toward others with some reinterpretation the model is also adapted to analyze profit tax competition when firms can respond to high taxes both through profit shifting and through relocation each dependent on transactions costs changes in technology may again redistribute tax revenues from high tax to low tax jurisdictions

customer markets and the welfare effects of monetary policy a customer market model in which firms and customers form long term relations is developed and integrated into the canonical new keynesian framework this leads to two important differences compared to the standard model first the purely forward looking phillips curve is replaced by a hybrid variant where current inflation also depends on past inflation second the welfare cost of inflation is much lower which leads to an optimal monetary policy where relatively more weight is put on output gap stabilization than previously found in the literature

on distinguishing between leviathan and public interest governments in a federal state the purpose of this paper is to derive testable implications for the proposition that provincial governments in a specific federal system are leviathans that is revenue maximizers the leviathan model associated with brennan and buchanan 1980 hypothesizes that governments behave like monopolies who seek to maximize their revenue this model is contrasted with an alternative hypothesis the public interest theory a theoretical model of a federal state based on the canadian system is constructed and testable implications are derived the principal feature of the model is that it is set in the context of a particular game involving the federal government provincial governments and a consumer in attempting to model this situation care has been taken to try to incorporate as many institutional features of the canadian federal system as possible while still allowing the model to be somewhat parsimonious with some modification the model may be applicable to other countries with similar federal systems

vertical tax competition in brazil empirical evidence for icms and ipi in the period 1995 2009 abstract the main objective of this study is to quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the brazilian states considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states using panel data covering 26 brazilian states plus the federal district during the period 1995 2009 two models were estimated representing the average reaction of the states in response to changes in federal tax rates in the first model both levels of government act simultaneously whereas in the second model reaction is sequential with the federal government acting as the leader in defining its effective tax rates the results indicate a positive and significant response of states to increases in the federal tax rate resulting in an over taxation of the common tax base and higher tax rates additional tests show that the first model is the most suitable to represent the problem analysed

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

why truck distance taxes are contagious and drive fuel taxes to the bottom this paper analyzes the way in which countries with international and local truck traffic decide to switch from a simple fuel tax system to a dual system of fuel and distance charge taxes we show what drives a country to switch and how this affects the level of fuel taxes as well as incentives for other countries to also adopt the dual system the model is partially able to explain the gradual extension of kilometer charging for trucks in europe the model also shows that in the absence of diesel cars the gradual introduction of kilometer charges will make fuel taxation for trucks virtually disappear and will lead to a system where truck use is 1 taxed mainly based on distance 2 is taxed too heavily and 3 where highest distance taxes are expected in transit countries with a strong market position when the fuel tax must in addition serve as an externality tax for diesel cars the introduction of distance charges for trucks will give rise to diesel taxes that are lower than the external cost of diesel cars for trucks this leads to a sum of diesel taxes and distance charges that are higher than the external cost of trucks

how large are the welfare costs of tax competition abstract competition among regional governments may lead to suboptimal levels of capital taxation as governments ignore the external benefits of capital flight to other regions however there have been few attempts to quantify the magnitude of the resulting efficiency losses this paper presents extensive calculations of the efficiency costs over a wide range of parameter scenarios and assumptions about government behavior using various generalizations of wildasin journal of urban economics 25 1989 193 213 the efficiency costs tend to be fairly moderate under most though not all scenarios and particularly when allowance is made for the possibility of leviathan and non competitive government behavior

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

nimby taxes matter the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes this paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes it begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters responses the paper then uses panel data from the toxics release inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

selfcon rming equilibrium and model uncertainty we propose to bring together two conceptually complementary ideas 1 selfcon rming equilibrium sce at rest points of learning dynamics in a game played recurrently agents best respond to con rmed beliefs i e beliefs consistent with the evidence they accumulated and 2 ambiguity aversion agents other things being equal prefer to bet on events with known rather than unknown probabilities and more generally distinguish objective from subjective uncertainty a behavioral trait captured by their ambiguity attitudes using as a workhorse the smooth ambiguity model of klibano marinacci and mukerji 2005 we provide a de nition of smooth sce which generalizes the traditional concept of fudenberg and levine 1993a b here called bayesian sce and admits waldean maxmin sce as a limit case we show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases the intuition is simple by playing the same strategy in

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

implementing tax coordination abstract this paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination when information is private or nonverifiable we focus on a two jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders and where jurisdictions have different public good requirements but are otherwise identical in this setting coordination may call for a second best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates if however coordination must be achieved via a set of common rules that condition tax rates on jurisdictions choices the second best allocation may not be implementable we show that incentive compatibility requirements will generally affect not only the choice of coordinated rates in states where jurisdictions are different but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical preferences for public consumption

fiscal capacity tax effort and optimal equalization grants in this paper we address the question how should the tax burden in a feder ation be distributed across the different jurisdictions so that the social cost of providing government services is minimized using optimal tax theory we derive formulas for the optimal equalization grants that equalize the social marginal cost of raising revenue across all provinces we show how the optimal equalization grants are related to a measure of tax effort based on the marginal cost of public funds and a measure of fiscal capacity that takes into account the elasticity of the tax base and its substitutability with other tax bases

strategic aspects of public finance in a world with high capital mobility abstract in a world with high capital mobility an increase in equity taxes is likely to induce a capital out flow it is commonly believed that in consequence there may be an under provision of public goods when governments have only equity taxes at their disposal this paper compares the provision of public goods under cooperative and non cooperative tax policies suprisingly the non cooperative regime may result in either an over or an under provision of public goods it is also shown that the gains from coordination increase as countries become atomistic

commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles abstract this paper studies the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non cooperative commodity tax equilibrium when taxes are constrained to be uniform across commodities the switch has no effect when differentiated taxes are allowed the effects of the switch depend on whether countries are small or large in both cases the switch imposes the requirement that taxes must be uniform across commodities within each country in the second case there are two further effects of the switch i negative spillover effects from tax policy are introduced ii incentives to manipulate the terms of trade are changed the switch does not necessarily lead to a fall in all tax rates

federalism partial prohibition and cross border sales evidence from recreational marijuana abstract marijuana is partially prohibited though banned federally it is available to 1 in 4 u s adults under state statutes we measure the size of the interstate trade generated by state level differences in legal status with a natural experiment oregon allowed stores to sell marijuana for recreational use on october 1 2015 next to washington where stores had been selling recreational marijuana since july 2014 using administrative data covering the universe of washington s sales and a differences in discontinuities approach we find retailers along the oregon border experienced a 36 decline in sales immediately after oregon s market opened we investigate the home location of recent online reviewers of marijuana retailers and find similar cross border patterns by the end of washington s 2018 fiscal year our results imply that washington had earned between 44 million and 75 million in tax revenue from cross border shoppers these cross border incentives may create a race to legalize

a theory of user fee competition we develop a two region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees we show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient if the regional spillover goods are substitutes user fees tend to be inefficiently low whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements

destination based vs origin based commodity taxation in large open economies with unemployment we construct a perfectly competitive model of two symmetric countries producing tradable commodities and a public consumption good destination or origin based taxes are levied on the consumption of the tradable goods in both countries a fixed wage leads to involuntary unemployment we derive the nash equilibrium consumption taxes under the two taxation principles with endogenous world prices and compare them to i the cooperative rates and ii the rates when world prices are fixed we demonstrate that with endogenous world prices the induced terms of trade effects cancel out under the destination principle but they prevail under the origin principle of taxation nash equilibrium destination based taxes are inefficiently low when the exporting sector in each country is non labour intensive the nash equilibrium origin based taxes can be either higher or lower than the corresponding cooperative rates

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

how tame will leviathan become in institutional competition competition among governments in the provision of public goods this article critically examines thehypothesis of brennan and buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments since leviathan type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors indeed such arule leads to a nash equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor however net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may depending on the same variables evendecrease net income moreover somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium finally applying the rule in a real worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies forthese reasons such a rule will hardly everbe introduced hence competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints whoever is afraid of leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments alone

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

tacit collusion and international commodity taxation the paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other s home market we consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry the conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets

commodity tax harmonisation and public goods this paper examines the welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation incorporating in the analysis the important feature that tax revenue is not returned to the consumer as a lump sum but it is used to finance a local public good only under certain conditions commodity tax harmonisation is potentially welfare improving introducing both transfers between consumers and transfers between governments it is shown inter alia that the analysis is sensitive to the kind of transfers assumed suggesting that arguments that rely on international transfers should be handled with care

does fiscal decentralization constrain leviathan new evidence from local property tax competition this paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains leviathan government using panel data for pennsylvania we compare actual property tax rates to the leviathan revenue maximizing rates for municipalities school districts and counties using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government we find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates we also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates this calls into question the current literature s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

nonlinear income taxation and matching grants in a federation with decentralized in kind transfers we extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation local governments have a cost advantage motivating decentralization of the in kind transfer the cost structure varies across regions and the central government cannot observe which region is which we show that decentralized in kind transfers can in this setting be an even more important instrument for relaxing self selection constraints thus helping redistribution than in single government models we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants the grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies