imperfect competition and the keynesian cross abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which the only non walrasian feature is imperfect competition in the goods market the model is shown to exhibit various keynesian characteristics in particular as competition in the goods market becomes less perfect the fiscal policy multipliers approach the values implied by the textbook keynesian cross

bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate public debt1 we examine whether the existence of a bank firm relationship lowers the cost of public debt financing using a sample of first public straight debt o ers we test the crossmonitoring e ect of bank debt and diamond s 1991 journal of political economy 99 689 721 reputation building argument we find that the existence of bank debt lowers the at issue yield spreads for first public straight bond o ers by about 68 basis points on average consistent with diamond s reputation building argument we document that firm reputation is negatively related to the at issue yield spread for initial public debt o ers 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

do banks provide financial slack we study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm s marginal financing choice using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding these results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing why do some firms borrow from public sources while others rely exclusively on private lenders the answer to this question is not well understood existing theories suggest that a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt financing relative to other potential financing choices the potential benefits of bank financing include low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and ease of renegotiation in financial distress 1 the potential costs of bank financing include monitoring costs suboptimal liquidation outcomes and distortions induced by information monopolies 2 the goal of this paper is to identify whether adverse selection problems influence a firm s choice between new bank debt public debt or common stock in particular we are interested in assessing the empirical validity of the hypothesis that banks have the ability to accurately price a firm s claims thus inducing a preference for firms that are undervalued by the market to

does competition from new equity mitigate bank rent extraction insights from japanese data previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems however this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction this paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern using japanese data from 1983 to 1997 we show that the relationship between loan to debt ratio and growth while starting significantly negative consistent with holdup theory turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum we confirm that high growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance this is consistent with a generalized myers majluf framework these results suggest that for high growth firms when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth based valuations competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction

can the trade off theory explain debt structure we examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tradeoff model where banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy flexible bank debt offers a superior tradeoff between tax shields and bankruptcy costs ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity however optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively strong firms lever up to their lower bank debt capacity augment with market debt and place the bank senior therefore the tradeoff theory offers an explanation for i why young small firms use bank debt exclusively ii why large mature firms employ mixed debt financing and iii why bank debt is senior the tradeoff theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence in countries where the bankruptcy regime entails soft tough enforcement of contractual priority bank debt capacity is low high implying greater less reliance on market debt

issuing costs to existing shareholders in competitive and negotiated underwritten public utility equity offerings abstract this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of whether there is any difference in the cost incurred by public utilities if they issue new equity through a negotiated or competitive underwriting we conclude that the expected cost of a competitive offer is less than the expected cost of a negotiated offer but that the variance of the cost is substantially greater with a competitive offer these results are interesting because most public utilities use negotiated underwriting unless forced by regulation to use competitive offers this paper is also an addition to the growing agency theory literature

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

negotiated versus competitive underwritings of public utility bonds just one more time over the past decade a number of papers 1 2 3 6 7 9 have explored the relative merits of negotiation versus competitive bidding in the underwriting of corporate bonds particularly bonds issued by public utilities interest in this subject has been stimulated principally by an important public policy issue namely the sec s posture vis a vis its rule u 50 originally promulgated in 1940 this rule required competitive bidding on certain classes of utility bonds in 1974 however it was temporarily suspended on the grounds that chaotic conditions in the market for these securities called for more flexibility in the way issues could be underwritten while this suspension continues in effect rule u 50 could be reinstated at any time by the sec

financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds the financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms for investment grade firms that issue bonds in both markets our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs we find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure abstract this paper models debt renegotiation as a bargaining game between debtholders and shareholder oriented management in which management credibly threatens to run down firm assets to force concessions from the creditors creditors anticipate this opportunistic behavior by management creating an upper bound on debt capacity that is less than the value of the firm if an advantage to debt is introduced such as favorable tax treatment an interior optimal capital structure obtains even in the absence of realized bankruptcy costs our model also explains variations in debt equity ratios and the use of certain puzzling debt covenants

fare prediction websites and transaction prices empirical evidence from the airline industry the marketing and operations disciplines have increasingly accounted for the presence of strategic consumer behavior theory suggests that such behavior exists when consumers are able to consider future distribution of prices and that this behavior exposes firms to intertemporal competition that results with a downward pressure on prices however deriving future distribution of prices is not a trivial task online decision support tools that provide consumers with information about future distributions of prices can facilitate strategic consumer behavior this paper studies whether the availability of such information affects transacted prices by conducting an empirical analysis in the context of the airline industry studying the effect at the route level we find significant price reduction effects as such information becomes available for a route both in fixed effects and difference in differences estimation models this effect is consistent across the different fare percentiles and amounts to a red

optimal choice of contracting methods negotiated versus competitive underwritings revisited1 abstract we use a previously unexploited data base specifically debt offerings by at t and its subsidiaries in the period 1970 1974 to examine the relative costliness of competitive and negotiated offerings a sample based on the experience of a single issuer allows us to minimize the influence of agency considerations and differential riskiness of the issuers we find no systematic ex post cost difference and we also find that negotiation was chosen during comparatively unsettled times

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

cross jurisdictional income shifting by u s multinationals evidence from international bond offerings we examine whether tax incentives influence where u s multinationals locate their interest deductions worldwide our sample includes international bond offerings by u s multinationals during 1987 1997 denominated in the currencies of australia canada france germany italy japan or the united kingdom our results suggest that u s multinationals debt location decisions take into account the effect of jurisdiction specific tax loss carryforwards and binding foreign tax credit limitations on the value of debt tax shields our results are also consistent with u s multinationals locating interest deductions in different tax jurisdictions as a mechanism to achieve tax motivated income shifting

direct equity financing a resolution of a paradox when raising new equity capital managers have historically rejected the direct offer method favoring instead the seemingly more expensive underwritten public issue this paper provides a resolution for this equity financing paradox by demonstrating empirically that firms which engage in direct offers enjoy a comparative cost advantage that is more than sufficient to account for the absolute reported cost differences between the two methods of equity financing

borrowing relationships intermediation and the cost of issuing public securities abstract this paper investigates how an established borrowing relationship affects the costs associated with initial public offerings of equity our model illustrates how the existence of a borrowing relationship reduces the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm s equity in the secondary market if underpricing is related to uncertainty a borrowing relationship can reduce underpricing empirically we find that other things equal ipos of firms with previously established borrowing relationships are underpriced substantially less than other ipos

does the liquidity of a debt issue increase with its size evidence from the corporate bond and medium term note markets to investigate the liquidity of large issues this study tests for yield differences between corporate bonds and medium term notes mtns in the sample mtns have an average issue size of 4 million compared with 265 million for bonds among mtns that have the same issuance date the same maturity date and the same corporate issuer we find no relation between size and yields moreover bonds and mtns have statistically equivalent yields thus rather than suggesting that large issues have greater liquidity these findings indicate that large and small securities issued by the same borrower are close substitutes the objective of this study is to test for a relation between the size of corporate debt offerings and their yields if investors value large offerings for their greater liquidity then large issues will have lower yields than small issues alternatively if investors view securities of the same borrower as close substitutes there may be no relation between issue size and yields to investigate whether issue size is a significant determinant of liquidity we test for yield differences between medium term notes mtns and bonds of the same corporate issuers in most respects mtns are similar to corporate bonds however mtns have an average issue size of around 5 million in contrast most offerings in the bond market raise at least 100 million thus if liquidity increases with issue size bonds will have lower yields than mtns and large mtns will have lower yields than small mtns the data we use consist of 4 182 mtns and 68 bonds offered by four large borrowers between october 1987 and december 1992 the issues in the sample range in size from 102 000 to 1 2 billion a disperse distribution that allows us to make reliable inferences about the relation between issue size and yields to test for a size effect within the mtn market we create subsamples of mtns that have the same issuance date the same maturity date and the same corporate issuer mtns in these subsamples are identical except for their yields and size on average yields on large mtns in the subsamples are 0 35 basis point higher than yields on small mtns a finding that is inconsistent with the liquidity hypothesis we also test for a yield difference between bonds

investor yield and gross underwriting spread comparisons among u s dollar domestic yankee eurodollar and global bonds abstract the characteristics and features of domestic foreign eurobonds and global bonds differ from one another as do their regulation we develop regression models to compare investor yield differences that should logically exist at issuance for these bond market segments for u s dollar denominated bonds our empirical results show that ceteris paribus both privately placed and rule 144a eurodollar issues yield more than publicly placed bonds yankee bonds yield insignificantly more than domestic bonds and the bearer feature common to eurodollar bonds is not prized enough by institutional investors for them to accept a lower yield relative to domestic or yankee bonds we do not find a statistically significant difference between the investor yield spread on u s dollar global bonds and u s domestic bonds or yankee bonds or eurodollar bonds we also study underwriting costs of publicly traded bonds and find ceteris paribus that eurodollar bonds are far more costly for the firm to issue than domestic bonds yankee bonds or global bonds domestic and yankee bonds are more expensive than global bonds and there is no significant cost difference between domestic and yankee bonds

imperfect competition the keynesian cross and optimal fiscal policy abstract this note analyzes a simple keynesian macro model with imperfect competition and demonstrates that the optimal fiscal policy is a complete shutdown taxes and government purchases should both be zero if the model is extended slightly then welfare improving policies may exist however the benefits are generated in part by the public goods nature of government purchases and not just by the multiplier process it appears that the multiplier alone is not sufficient to justify the use of fiscal policy

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

capital raising in the offshore market abstract us corporations can raise capital in the offshore market using regulation s adopted by the securities and exchange commission sec in 1990 and modified in 1996 we examine how offshore offerings are done under regulation s what types of companies use this market the discount companies offer investors to compensate for illiquidity in the market and the impact of the new disclosure requirements on capital raising in the offshore market we find that small firms tend to raise capital in this market during our sample period before the 1996 rule change the median market capitalization of reporting firms was 16 82 million with a median stock price of 1 13 the mean and median discount offered to foreign investors was 32 84 and 40 53 respectively offerings during this period resulted in average share dilution of 11 97 we find that before the disclosure requirements firms were gaming the system by giving foreign investors just enough time to resell the securities back into the united states before the initial sale became public information after the rule changes regulation s offerings are not perceived to be shady and larger firms are now using the market resulting in lower average discount and dilution