export market performance of oecd countries an empirical examination of the role of cost competitiveness we investigate the relationship between export market shares and relative unit labour costs using a long panel of 12 manufacturing industries across 14 oecd countries we ask how sensitive are export market shares to changes in relative costs and what determines this sensitivity both costs and embodied technology are important but neither can fully explain changing export positions we explore whether residual country specific trends might be linked to deep structural features of economies sensitivity to labour costs is lower in high tech industries and core erm countries industry elasticities have increased especially in industries subject to increasing product market competition

spillovers investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm this paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager s relationship specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down the investments of non owners may then be devalued but are seldom wholly lost to the owner with such spillovers the outside option principle can be incorporated into the grossman hart moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge

wto membership and the shift to consumption taxes abstract this paper explores tax policy effects and revenue implications of joining the world trade organization wto and its predecessor the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt it documents that countries joining gatt wto after 1990 have implemented tariff cum tax reforms lowering tariff rates and raising consumption tax rates in particular through reform or introduction of a value added tax vat employing a panel of 97 developing and transitional countries 31 of which joined gatt wto between 1990 and 2011 using robust difference in difference specifications as well as the synthetic control method we find a statistically and economically significant decline in revenues from import duties this finding supports concerns about revenue losses but also corroborates the efficacy of the late uruguay gatt and the wto trade regimes in promoting free trade among new members regarding consumption taxes we find robust evidence that revenue substitution was successful since revenue losses from import duties were more than compensated for by enhanced revenues from consumption taxes with regard to the timing of the revenue effects our results show that revenue losses in import duties mostly take place at the time of membership or later changes in consumption taxation however exhibit pre membership effects as revenues are increased and vat is adopted often a few years ahead of losses in import duties no such effects are found before the start of the accession negotiations indicating that consumption tax reforms are initiated once a country is on the road to gatt wto membership

the acquisition of fisher body by general motors abstract it is commonly said that in 1926 general motors was led to acquire its supplier of automobile bodies fisher body because fisher body held up general motors it is claimed that fisher body did this by locating its body plants far away from the general motors assembly plants and by adapting inefficient methods of production thus increasing both the cost of producing bidies and the profits of fisher body under its cost plus contract this tale is factually incorrect what general motors acquired in 1926 was the 40 percent of the shares of fisher body that it did not already own furthermore fisher body did not locate its plants far away from the general motors assembly plants it is also most implausible for many reasons that the fisher brothers would have used inefficient methods of production there is no evidence that a holdup occurred

expanding the solution set organizational economics and agri environmental policy abstract the market failure paradigm dominates agri environmental research and policy organizational economics provides an alternative framework for analyzing agri environmental problems and points to alternative solutions in this paper the traditional approach of creating markets for environmental goods and services is critiqued and set aside to provide space for an organizational analysis from an organizational perspective the relationship between the state and agricultural agents is viewed as grounded in an over arching exchange relationship including elements of cooperation and trust such a collaborative exchange relationship may prove useful in supporting exchange between agricultural agents and the state leading to the provision of ecological goods and services highlighting the potential of organizational economics the analysis suggests that agri environmental research and policy go further in accounting for and investigating the unique organizational modes of exchange governing the production of food fiber and ecological goods and services

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

incentives and the efficiency of public sector outsourcing contracts abstract outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations despite its prevalence there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude and determinants of expected cost savings to the government nor the sources of those savings this article considers the arguments for and against outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time in addition we examine the existing evidence for the redistribution hypothesis and the quality shading hypothesis which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and or lower quality services finally we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes while the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics recent work has suggested that high powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated we discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing

pragmatic collaborations advancing knowledge while controlling opportunism this paper starts from the observation that firms are increasingly engaging in collaborations with their suppliers even as they are reducing the extent to which they are vertically integrated with those suppliers this fact seems incompatible with traditional theories of the firm which argue that integration is necessary to avoid the potential for hold ups created when non contractible investments are made our view is that pragmatist mechanisms such as benchmarking simultaneous engineering and root cause error detection and correction make possible learning by monitoring a relationship in which firms and their collaborators continuously improve their joint products and processes without the need for a clear division of property rights we argue that pragmatic collaborations based on learning by monitoring both advance knowledge and control opportunism and thus align interests between the collaborators copyright 2000 by oxford university press

holdout existence information and contingent contracting abstractthe holdout problem permeates policy discussions of legal issues involving bargaining for land acquisition and more broadly impacts multilateral bargaining between agents laboratory experiments investigate the scope of the holdout problem the research strategy incorporates as treatment variables available information and the exposure problem arising from the unavailability of contingent contracts an examination reveals that holdout can reliably produce large inefficiencies and lost opportunities for mutually advantageous trade the introduction of contingent contracts facilitates successful bargaining however buyers are not made significantly better off by contingent contracts

cities regions and competitiveness turok i 2004 cities regions and competitiveness regional studies38 1061 1075 competitiveness is a complex concept used in a variety of ways and contexts the paper reviews some of the main ideas particularly as they apply to cities and regions its definition should include the relative position of a region s firms in external markets the productivity of local resources and the extent to which they are used competition takes both an institutionalized form local public agencies competing overtly for investment and other resources and more importantly a less organized form involving firms trading in wider markets there are two contrasting perspectives on the competitive advantages of city regions one emphasizes the benefits of scale and diversity that flow from concentrations of economic activity the other stresses the quality of the interactions between firms and supporting institutions recent studies suggest that the significance of localized business networks or clusters might be exagge

corporate contracting for health care this paper examines the process used by fortune 500 companies to contract with health care carriers for complex and hard to observe services we confirm in part the conventional view that large companies partner with health care insurers however we show that the picture is more complex and that most of these companies do not engage in several aspects of partnering the complete nature of our data allows us to describe the distribution of company practices from tough bargaining without continuing relationships to partnering we also show that contract length can be a poor proxy for length of relationship

how effective are fiscal incentives for r d a review of the evidence this paper surveys the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for r d we describe the effects of tax systems in oecd countries on the user cost of r d the current position changes over time and across different firms in different countries we describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate the effect of the tax system on

coase s choice of methodology this paper examines the nature of ronald h coase s realism by considering the relationship between theories and facts in his methodology i focus especially on coase s criticisms of friedman s 1953 essay as set out in a lecture published in 1982 it is shown that in developing his argument coase applies his institutional economics to address the question of how economists operating within a regulated market for ideas choose their theories he calls for realism in methodology and carries out an empirical study of economists choices he explores how the profession is regulated and highlights how discourse impacts on the functioning of science a key question addressed within this paper is how can coase maintain a sociological and rhetorical view of science without falling into relativism i identify the different motives for theory choice that coase considers and show that his answer is both institutional and epistemic this helps to clarify the status of the empirical basis in coase s methodology and sheds new light on the nature of his realism i conclude by carrying out a reflexive analysis of coase s text as a text that attempts to justify the methodology on which it is itself based

does government r d policy mainly benefit scientists and engineers conventional wisdom holds that the social rate of return to r d significantly exceeds the private rate of return and therefore r d should be subsidized in the u s the government has directly funded a large fraction of total r d spending this paper shows that there is a serious problem with such government efforts to increase inventive activity the majority of r d spending is actually just salary payments for r d workers their labor supply however is quite inelastic so when the government funds r d a significant fraction of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages using cps data on wages of scientific personnel this paper shows that government r d spending raises wages significantly particularly for scientists related to defense such as physicists and aeronautical engineers because of the higher wages conventional estimates of the effectiveness of r d policy may be 30 to 50 too high the results also imply that by altering the wages of scientists and engineers even for firms not receiving federal support government funding directly crowds out private inventive activity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

capabilities and industrial policy lessons from the new zealand movie industry this article examines the new zealand government s creation of an internationally successful industry the activities of the new zealand film commission are examined with regard to the effect they had on the entrepreneurs they nurtured factors that contributed to success include the market driven nature of the policy and an emphasis on capability building support is found for the suggestion that government agencies should act like venture capitalists negative aspects of government intervention included political capture and smoke stake chasing

technology and competitiveness this paper reviews the literature on technology and competitiveness first the concept of the international competitiveness of a country and various theoretical approaches on the relationship between trade and growth are discussed then a number of empirical studies of the impact of technology as evidenced by r d patents etc on exports are examined the final section summarizes the evidence and considers the lessons for policy copyright 1996 by oxford university press

sufficient statistics for tariff reform when revenue matters what kinds of tariff reform are likely to raise welfare in situations where tariff revenue is important general conditions for welfare to rise without reducing tariff revenue are opaque we show that they can be greatly simplified using a small number of sufficient statistics primarily the generalized mean and variance of tariffs we present sufficient conditions for a class of linear tariff reform rules that guarantee higher welfare without a loss in revenue the rules consist of convex combinations of i trade weighted average tariff preserving cuts in dispersion and ii uniform tariff cuts that preserve domestic relative prices among tariff ridden goods

trade and tax reforms in a cash in advance economy we examine the effects of both tariff only and coordinated trade tax reforms on market access government revenue and welfare for a small monetary economy under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance we show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable then contrary to previous results i a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access ii tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs and iii export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating

the coasean analysis of lighthouse financing myths and realities in the lighthouse in economics coase r h journal of law and economics vol 17 no 2 357 76 1974 coase reached the conclusion that in england there existed a relatively efficient privately financed lighthouse system which would refute economists traditional statements concerning the production of public goods the purpose of this paper is to challenge his conclusion we first show that from a methodological and theoretical perspective the lighthouse is consistent with the problem of social cost coase r h journal of law and economics vol 3 1 44 1960 then applying coase s own method historical case studies we attempt to re examine the respective roles and efficiencies of private initiative and government

welfare effects of changing commodity tax rates toward uniformity abstract this paper presents a theory of tax reform that is applicable to a many good economy where i the initial tax structure is arbitrarily given ii no lump sum tax exists and iii the initial tax revenue must be maintained after the reform sufficient conditions are established under which tax changes definitely result in increases in welfare they indicate that in a wide class of situations the uniform tax structure can be a useful intermediate target on the way to optimum

tariff and environmental policies with product standards for a small open economy with consumption based pollution emissions the first best optimal policy prescription is free trade along with a pigouvian tax on emissions therefore a package of coordinated tax reform by replacing tariffs with emission taxes can lower pollution emissions and increase market access and hence improve residents welfare and government revenue as long as the initial tariffs are relatively high numerical simulations confirm the results obtained abstract from author

innovation and firm growth does firm age play a role this paper explores the relationship between innovation and firm growth for firms of different ages we hypothesize that young firms undertake riskier innovation activities which may have greater performance benefits if successful or greater losses if unsuccessful using an extensive spanish community innovation survey sample for the period 2004 2012 we apply panel quantile regressions to study the effect of r d activities on firm growth i e sales growth productivity growth and employment growth our results show that young firms face larger performance benefits from r d at the upper quantiles of the growth rate distribution but face larger decline at the lower quantiles r d investment by young firms therefore appears to significantly riskier than r d investment by more mature firms which suggests some policy implications

on the revenue implications of trade liberalization under imperfect competition abstract in a recent paper mujumder mujumder s 2004 revenue implications of trade liberalization under imperfect competition economics letters 82 83 89 argued that only if the industry is a monopoly we could be certain that the government could use profit tax to make up any shortfall in tariff revenue and also make the consumers and producers better off we show that this result is not robust when the products are differentiated we find that there always exists degree of product differentiation such that the government can achieve this goal for any finite number of firms so the picture is not so dismal as shown by mujumder

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

strategic r d policy this paper uses a natural extension of lee and wilde s 1980 model to show that the outcome of technological competition between firms or countries depends on the resolution of two forces the profit incentive and the competitive threat using a duopoly model of a patent race the paper illustrates that by understanding the relative strength of these two forces one can not only go a long way to understanding the outcome of these races but also obtain crucial insights into the desirability of various r d policies the particular example considered in the paper is the subsidizing of r d effort copyright 1989 by royal economic society

management innovation in supply chain appreciating chandler in the twenty first century alfred chandler attributed the rise of the vertically integrated corporation in the twentieth century to improvements in transportation and communication in contrast many have argued that further advances in transportation and communication have made vertical integration obsolete in recent years replacing it with modularity outsourcing and networking this article unpacks this apparent puzzle by regarding technological improvements in transportation and communication as theoretically neutral with respect to the degree of vertical integration we argue that the key concepts and issues in supply chain management that chandler highlighted remain highly relevant today we integrate chandler s detailed historical perspective on the evolution of the visible hand of managerial governance with more recent theories from organization economics and from engineering yielding the following insights first aligning incentives of buyers and suppliers is important in achieving throughput and assured supply but asset ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for this second vertical integration and disintegration decisions affect the internal operation of the firm and its future path third firms need to design their value chains in such a way as to achieve coordination without information overload the article demonstrates the continuing power of these insights in three phases over the last century in the first phase with the rise of mass production chandler himself noted a subtle array of make and buy decisions in the second phase with the rise of lean production several varieties of non integration e g exit vs voice persisted because of the specific ways in which firms combined incentive alignment and information flow in the third new economy phase management of information and material flows through the supply chain remains an important source of competitive advantage in particular disintermediation as a form of vertical integration and successful outsourcing require investment in technical expertise over a wide range of technological fields and coordination of knowledge to manage suppliers see for example brusoni and prencipe 2001 brusoni 2003 clark and fujimoto 1991 by noting that neither externalization through outsourcing nor flattening of managerial hierarchy is the same as decentralization the article provides theoretical and empirical bases for the continuing importance of chandler s principles in managing supply chains

vat tariffs and withholding border taxes and informality in developing countries abstract this paper explores the implications of a distinctive feature of the value added tax vat that is stressed by practitioners but has been largely overlooked by theorists that it functions in part as a tax on the purchases of informal operators from formal sector businesses and not least on their imports it also stresses the potential importance of the withholding taxes that are levied by many developing countries which have also been ignored it is shown in a simple model of informality that if both of these instruments are optimally deployed then the usual prescription that a small economy should not deploy tariffs remains valid even in the presence of an informal sector and a simple strategy is established generalizing the standard prescription developed in models without informality for deploying these instruments so as to preserve government revenue and increase welfare in the face of efficiency improving tariff cuts conditions are established under which a vat alone is fully optimal precisely because it is in part a tax on informal sector production but they are restrictive in general an efficient tax structure requires deploying both a vat and withholding taxes

win win indirect tax reform abstract the literature on tariffs and that on commodity taxes have established sufficient conditions under which tariff or commodity tax reform improves welfare since less developed countries need to raise certain revenue from indirect taxation we consider a policy reform within the complete indirect tax structure i e an increase in consumption taxes combined with a decrease in tariffs that improves welfare and raises government revenue we demonstrate that when uniform reductions in trade taxes accompany offsetting increases in consumption taxes so that consumer prices remain constant welfare improves and government revenue increases if the initial position provides a net subsidy to producers

asset specificity and vertical integration asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration the main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism in this paper i show that asset specificity can be an argument for non integration in a repeated game model of self enforcing relational contracts it is shown that when parties are non integrated increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher powered incentives

contracting on time the paper shows how the time considerations especially those concerning contract duration affect incomplete contract theory time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts we consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting investment trade and renegotiation take place in continuous time we show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed term contracts or through a renegotiation proof evergreen contract a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice we provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts

four formal izable theories of the firm in this essay i define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm these elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by hart holmstrom klein williamson and others although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed i have found it difficult to understand the commonalities distinctions and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions in this essay therefore i attempt to clarify these issues in three steps i begin with informal summaries of the theories then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework

interindustry r d spillovers rates of return and production in high tech industries this paper presents estimates of the productivity and factor bias effects of interindustry r d spillovers for five high tech industries each industry is distinguished as a separate spillover source the industries are each affected by r d spillovers and are themselves spillover sources thus a spillover network between the industries is estimated private and social rates of return to r d capital are calculated the private rates of return are generally greater than the returns to physical capital in addition the social rates of return are greater than the private rates the results show that there are significant differences between industries as to their importance as sources of r d spillovers this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do r d tax credits work evidence from an international panel of countries 1979 1994 this paper examines the impact of fiscal incentives on the level of rd and just under a 10 per cent rise in r d in the long run

tax revenue and or trade liberalization abstract with the public finances of many developing and emerging market countries still heavily dependent on trade tax revenues further trade liberalization may be hindered unless they are able to develop alternative sources of revenue against a background of and to inform heightened theoretical controversy as to the appropriate balance between trade and other taxes not least the vat this paper uses panel data for 117 countries over 32 years cleaned for a variety of problems in standard data sources to address a central question of fact have countries recovered from domestic taxes the revenues they have lost from past episodes of trade liberalization for high income countries the answer is clearly yes for middle income countries there are robust signs of strong replacement both concurrently with the revenue loss and essentially dollar for dollar in the long run signs of significant recovery by low income countries are flimsier however and their experiences appear to have varied widely the picture that emerges for low income countries is thus that replacement has been and become higher than previous studies have suggested but sufficiently incomplete in many cases to give cause for concern

creating holdup through vertical integration fisher body revisited abstract general motors s gm s 1926 acquisition of fisher body has long served as a cornerstone of hold up arguments for vertical integration this paper utilizes primary historical evidence to make three related claims first it shows that gm s initial investment in fisher body occurred primarily to gain access to the fisher brothers specialized human assets second it shows that holdup was not the cause of gm s purchase of fisher body instead the primary factors leading to vertical integration were gm management s fears over the fisher brothers impending departure coupled with problems of financing new body plants finally i show that while holdup was not an issue prior to integration the fisher brothers successfully held up gm after they became employees far from reducing opportunistic behavior vertical integration increased gm s vulnerability to rent seeking behavior based in human asset specificity

lawyers asleep at the wheel the gm fisher body contract in the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership one event has dominated the discussion general motors gm merger with fisher body in 1926 the debates have all been premised on the assumption that the 10 year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement however it was not because fisher s promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration this note suggests that gm s counsel must have known this it raises a significant question in transactional engineering what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable

inside the coasean firm why variations in competence and taste matter abstractronald coase s signal achievement relates to the role of transactions costs in two contexts the formation and maintenance of the firm and the systematic analysis of social costs these transaction cost explanations however do not offer a complete explanation of the variations observed in the internal structures of firms which are elucidated by noting the irreducible role of variations in individual competence temperament and taste in explaining both why firms are formed and how they are structured thus some firms are organized as partnerships and others as straight employment arrangements with many permutations in between sometimes these differences are driven by tax and regulatory considerations that coase well understood but these differences remain prominent even in wholly unregulated markets understanding the internal construction helps explain the difficulties faced by regulation in areas as diverse as employment discrimination law capital markets and tort liability

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

uk industrial policy old tunes on new instruments this paper discusses the current labour government s industrial policy as most recently reflected in its document on manufacturing strategy in the context of industrial policy in the uk over the last 50 years and the form that it has taken elsewhere in europe it concludes that the thematic priorities for uk industrial policy in the 1960s international competitiveness innovation competition and skills continue to be the key themes of uk policy today the paper presents data that illustrate the gaps that exist in key indicators of performance between the uk and its main economic competitors the difference between the 1960s and the 2000s is that there are new instruments of policy two areas in particular are focused on competition policy and technology policy and an attempt is made to assess the likely effectiveness of these new instruments the paper concludes that the international evidence base for these new approaches is reasonably robust but that it is still too soon to tell if they are having the hoped for impact on the performance of the uk economy copyright 2002 oxford university press

why hold ups occur the self enforcing range of contractual relationships one of my most enjoyable intellectual experiences was working with armen alchian on the klein crawford and alchian 1978 hold up paper in this paper i extend the basic framework presented in that paper pointing out what i now consider to be its shortcomings and providing insights into the nature of hold ups and the form of contracts chosen by transactors to avoid hold ups the major analytical extension entails combining hold up analysis with my work on private enforcement because private enforcement capital is limited and written contract terms are necessarily imperfect transactors must optimally combine court enforced written terms together with privately enforced unwritten terms to define what i call the self enforcing range of their contractual relationship hold ups occur when unanticipated events place the contractual relationship outside the self enforcing range this probabilistic framework where transactors enter contractual relationships knowing that a hold up may take place but believing that the expected gains from trade outweigh the expected rent dissipating costs associated with the hold up risk is shown to have important implications for understanding the structure of contracts adopted by transactors in the marketplace i why do hold ups occur i begin with a simple example that illustrates the basic economic forces involved in a hold up assume that a builder constructs a house on a piece of land the builder does not own but rather only leases short term after the initial land lease expires the landowner could hold up the builder by raising the land rent to reflect the costs of moving the house to another lot this example illustrates all the hold up factors emphasized in klein crawford and alchian a the builder has made an investment that is highly specific to a particular piece of land and b the landowner has taken advantage of the incompleteness of the contract that governs the relationship in particular the fact that the lease does not cover future years to c expropriate the quasi rents on the builder s specific investment the obvious question is why anything like this would ever occur that is why would someone be so naive as to build a house on land for which they had only a short term lease our primary goal in klein crawford and alchian was not to explain the existence of hold ups but rather the institutions adopted by transactors to avoid hold ups for example we would expect that builders anticipating a potential hold up problem would decide to purchase the land or at least to sign a long term ground lease before starting construction however we do present some examples in the paper of hold ups that actually occurred the implicit reason we give for the occurrence of these hold ups is transactor ignorance apparently transactors are not always smart enough to choose the contractual arrangement that would eliminate the hold up problem oliver williamson provides a similar but much more explicit answer to the question of why hold ups occur when defining opportunism he states by opportunism i mean self interest seeking with guile this includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms such as lying stealing and cheating opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit more generally opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information especially to calculated efforts to mislead distort obfuscate or otherwise confuse 1 for example the hold up may have occurred in our illustrative house construction example because the landowner deceived the builder with a low up front land rental price and vague promises about the future relying on the ability of one transactor to take advantage of the naivete or ignorance of another transactor is a highly unsatisfactory way to explain the incidence of hold ups simple examples of deception such as a builder constructing a house on land that is only rented short term rarely if ever occur

revisiting the cost of protectionism abstract most studies of the welfare impacts of trade policy have ignored interactions between these policies and pre existing distortions from the income tax this paper demonstrates that when these interactions are taken into account the potential gains or losses from tariffs import quotas or voluntary export restrictions are significantly magnified however as long as the trade barrier doesn t generate rents for domestic households the optimal level of the trade barrier is unchanged from the first best case trade policies which do increase domestic rents either in the form of quota rents or rents to fixed factors in production suffer an additional efficiency cost and the optimal policy in this case is less strict than in the first best case

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention