do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

residential energy demand in oecd countries and the role of irreversible efficiency improvements abstract after undergoing substantial changes during a period of high energy prices household energy demand did not rebound in times of declining energy prices as might have been expected hence other factors such as irreversible improvements in technical efficiency must be understood in order to describe both past and future household energy demand in this paper we consider irreversible efficiency improvements as a major reason for the moderate growth in energy demand after the plummeting of the oil price in 1985 we test different econometric models to take into account efficiency indicators the major conclusions of our investigation are i price elasticities are different for rising and falling prices for the latter they are close to zero implying a low rebound effect in the residential sector ii technical efficiency is an important parameter for describing and forecasting energy demand and iii income elasticities turn out to be higher once we incorporate indicators of technological efficiency in the process of estimating energy demand

a new test of money income causality this paper investigates the prima facie causal relationship between money and income employing a methodology the multiple rank f test the results of which are invariant to monotonic transformations of all variables and robust over alternative distributions of the errors in contrast to prior functional form dependent parametric analyses evidence of prima facie causality between money and income is found for the 1970 88 time period this evidence is consistent with an elementary theoretical framework in which the direction and strength of causality is dependent upon the definition of money copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

monopoly wealth and international debt rents generated by long lasting government policies may be capitalized as assets with life cycle saving behavior these rents raise international indebtedness shifts in policy that affect their capitalized value generate correlated movements in the current account and the real exchange rate eliminating rent creating policies imposes a capital loss born entirely by generations currently alive while the benefit of removing a distortion is shared between those alive and unborn generations reform may therefore reduce the expected welfare of everyone alive with monopoly in the provision of nontraded goods there may be multiple pareto ranked equilibria copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

deregulation redux does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare we demonstrate that deregulation in the form of vertical separation of network components into natural monopoly and potentially competitive markets does not truly represent a lessening of regulatory burdens that is vertical separation is not synonymous with deregulation more competitors is not equivalent to more competition we assume a public interest regulator that is constrained to set a unit price that maximizes expected welfare subject to a break even constraint we show that under both symmetric and asymmetric information cases the information demands on the regulator of the vertically integrated system are no greater than those in the case of vertical separation

the disinterest in deregulation reply our paper in this review 1984 aroused a controversy we did not anticipate but no one has yet convinced us that our basic point is wrong joe bell 1988 p 282 now makes the assertion that our conclusion rests entirely upon unexplained asymmetries in resource mobility this seems to us a very curious assertion indeed the main problem with bell s analysis is that he treats investment in capital assets as perfectly malleable a lawyer trained to argue rate cases is not perfectly suited for other jobs when electric utility deregulation occurs the time and effort spent by the lawyer to acquire the requisite skills are irretrievably lost this is the point of our paper even though future labor can be supplied by this lawyer after deregulation it definitionally has a lower value lawyering before a regulatory commission is a specialized input when the demand for these services falls the capital value of the intensive and extensive investments vanish no asymmetry is implied or required more generally capital consumed in using the political process to secure a wealth transfer the resources devoted to organizing coalitions investing in lobbying activities contributing to political campaigns advertising a point of view acquiring the stock of human capital necessary for dealing with regulatory bureaucracies and so onreduces the wealth of society in opportunitycost terms for the reasons just stated the cost of obtaining additional output in the regulated industry following deregulation is higher we also pointed out that the increase in marginal costs due to what bell calls resource immobility may only be a short term phenomenon over time resources in the deregulated industry will adapt to the new competitive environment and new resources coming into the industry will embody the r quisite skills for working in a competitive rather than a government sponsored sector thus after the relevant adjustment period marginal costs in the deregulated sector may decline but it is simply wrong to suppose that deregulation enables the capital value of resources specializing in rent seeking activities to be used again in the production of goods anyway in present value terms it does not take very long for this adjustment process to impose significant costs on the economy this point is covered in fn 7 in our original paper

lag length selection and tests of granger causality between money and income one of the most widely accepred relationships in macroeconomics is the positive relationship between the rate of growth of the money supply and the rate of growth of income a diversity of opinion arises however with the attempt to identify a causal relationship between these variables while friedman and schwartz 1963 initiated the empirical investigation of money income causality sims 1972 made the most significant contribution to this literature with a practical application of the criterion developed by granger 1969 for identifying a causal relationship since the appearance of sims s approach and an alternative one advanced by sargent 1976 many researchers have applied these techniques to the investigation of the causal relationship between money and income l with two exceptions hsiao 1981 and mcmillin and fackler 1984 these researchers have arbitrarily chosen the lengths of their distributed lags the purpose of this paper is to test for granger causality between money and income this paper differs from previous work in that considerably more attention is focused on the effect of the lag specification on the test results in particular we investigate the extent to which rules of thumb arbitrary lag specifications and

rent seeking behaviour and its economic costs in urban land transactions in accra ghana the existing body of knowledge attributes to informal land transactions in sub saharan african cities observed problems in city neighbourhoods substantial resources often backed by donor agencies are therefore being spent in revamping bureaux and governmental bodies in a bid to solve the problems this paper examines the economic impacts of this aspect of market intervention employing insights from rent seeking theory it estimates costs brought to bear on agents by government agencies involvement in the urban land market of accra ghana the sum of these wasteful diversions of resources is found to explain a great deal of the haphazard developments that have come to characterise many neighbourhoods in the city market led regulation emerges as the needed focus of future land policy and management strategy towards this the paper calls for the removal of existing unwarranted market interventions and the reorganisation of responsible bureaux in ways that would induce them to operate efficiently

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

incorporating policymaker costs and political competition into rent seeking games 1 introductionrent seeking in politics involves agents who lobby policymakers for potential benefits in a seminal contribution tullock 1980 modeled rent seeking as a lottery game a major weakness of tullock s game was that it lacked verisimilitude to actual rent seeking because it omitted politics the absence of politics meant that the game essentially assumed that there are no costs to the policymakers of supplying rents but as tollison 1997 and others have pointed out these costs are not zero and the politics surrounding the policy decision influence the pattern of lobbying and the rent seeking outcome in this paper we address two aspects of those politics the costs to policymakers of supplying rents and the variable intensity of political competition among a given number of rent seekers including these aspects increases the similarity of the game to actual rent seeking situations and makes clearer the incentives to rent seekers costs to supplying rents arise due to various constraints legislators must build coalitions acquire parliamentary rights maintain a positive image and service constituent interests policymakers in agencies must follow procedural rules submit to congressional oversight and budgeting pass omb reviews and so forth lower policymaker costs should increase the effectiveness of lobbying and this should attract greater lobbying efforts among rent seekers 1 increasing policymaker costs makes lobbying less effective indeed because of these costs policymakers often turn away lobbies empty handed in short policymakers have constraints that affect the policies they design and this affects lobbying expenditures dougan and snyder 1993 this paper introduces policymaker costs in monetary units such that they are comparable to the value of the rent and rent seeking expenditures political competition among rent seekers also influences the rent seeking outcome competition traditionally has been modeled by varying the number of rent seeking agents actual or potential or their relative lobbying expenditures e g posner 1975 rogerson 1982 sun and ng 1999 competition can vary however even among a given number of rent seekers and for a given profile of expenditures for example two agents may lobby a policymaker for the same unique and exclusive political good then one agent directly opposes the other and only one agent can win the good alternatively the same two agents may lobby a policymaker for two separate political goods in that case the agents oppose each other only indirectly this situation is frequent in politics as rent seeking agents compete for space on the political agenda for policymakers time and for portions of a particular government budget in this situation success by one agent does not necessarily result in failure by the other but it does lower the probability that the other agent will succeed competition is more intense in the first example even though the examples involve the same number of firms industrial organization economists have shown that a single parameter can determine incumbent firms competition in price and quantity regardless of the number of firms present 2 this paper introduces rent seeking competition analogously allowing a parameter to alter the competitiveness of the rent seeking game among a fixed number of firms we incorporate monetized policymaker costs and the political competition parameter into the success probabilities of the standard rent seeking game the resulting model is a game in which the agents simultaneous maximization of expected net returns or profits determines a nash equilibrium in their expenditures incorporating politics into the standard game makes the game more accurate because equilibrium and comparative statics depend in part on the politics of the rent seeking contest more specifically increasing political competition decreases rent seeking expenditures unless the value of the rent is sufficiently large relative to policymaker costs and dissipation rates are lower than in previous research because of policymaker costs

the economic theory of rent seeking tullock s concept of rent seeking was the first statement of a quantitative principle about the social costs of such activities as lobbying and favor seeking as such this part of tullock s legacy to modern economics is one of his most important contributions

oil prices and the terms of trade abstract the combination of substantial terms of trade variability and unstable correlation patterns of trade prices with output and trade volumes has led some to suggest a break in the link between trade volumes and prices we find that oil accounts for much of the variation in the terms of trade over the last twenty five years and its quantitative role varies significantly over time and since our dynamic general equilibrium model predicts that the economy responds differently to oil supply shocks than to other shocks changes in their relative importance helps to account for the unstable correlations in the data

rent seeking in natural resource quota allocations this paper examines the incentives for rent seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies the political body has discretion in making the allocation and competing user groups rent seek to influence the allocation we investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition a political body can affect an allocatively pareto efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default pre rent seeking policy surprisingly an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs however winner take all default policies are likely to maximize not minimize rent seeking a competitive post allocation market reduces rent seeking but is not either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy capable of minimizing social costs however forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and when used together with an efficient default policy is capable of obtaining the first best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent seeking

deregulation despite transitional gains the brewers guild of cologne 1461 acemoglu and robinson in the american economic review 90 2 126 130 2000 argue that historically economic rents have been less of a barrier to regulatory reform and innovation than political rents contrary to this conclusion i argue that the important margin of distinction for factors preventing deregulation is not whether rents are economic or political but rather what alternative profit opportunities are available and how innovation has changed the entrepreneurial opportunity set using the example of medieval cologne i show that the transitional gains trap framework as developed by tullock in the bell journal of economics 6 2 671 678 1975 applies in a static environment and can successfully prevent reform over long periods of time but that neither political nor economic entrepreneurs will ignore an opportunity for increased profitability in the long run in addition the organization of the political unit to which the regulation applies can determine the persistence of said regulation

atheoretical macroeconometrics a critique abstract the spurious nature of the restrictions used to identify many macroeconometric models has led some researchers to advocate a style of econometric inquiry that is less dependent on prior theoretical restrictions of the sort that were central to the approach of the cowles commission this development which we call atheoretical macroeconometrics is summarized and evaluated in the current paper it is contrasted with an updated version of the cowles commission approach we conclude that while some of the exercises of atheoretical macroeconometrics are valid those that have attracted the most attention and appear the most innovative exogeneity testing impulse response analysis and policy analysis using estimated vector autoregressions are based on incorrect analysis

renewables diffusion and contagion effect in italian regional electricity markets assessment and policy implications abstract in the electricity market sudden price jumps occur more frequently than in other markets due to the peculiarity of electricity furthermore the structural spot characteristics of the electricity market determine high price variability all these characteristics have been accentuated by the dramatic increase of renewable energy supply in italy starting in 2010 these features suggest the possibility of contagion effects across italian regional electricity markets considering contagion such as a sudden and significant increase in cross market links arising from a shock to a specific market in this paper we investigate whether such a renewable energy increase has affected the contagion behavior in the italian electricity spot market taking into account both the difference between interdependence and contagion and the direction of the shock we find empirical evidence with significant tests that no changes have occurred in interdependence mechanism nor in contagion effects due to renewable energy sources development in italy

production costs and deregulation unlike some of the existing literature our discussion implies that either 1 regulation lowers production costs and makes the gains to deregulation relatively small or 2 regulation increases production costs and makes the social and political gains to deregulation relatively greater while some may not find alternative 1 credible one thing is clear claiming that the deregulatory gains are small because regulation increases costs is not an alternative society faces

rationing and rent dissipation in the presence of heterogeneous individuals this paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuations the joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium it is argued that under certain conditions an increase in the variance of time costs will reduce the dissipation of rent furthermore it is shown that introducing a secondary market for a rationed good does not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations the model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent seeking activities such as the patent system and import quotas

does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy evidence from indian state elections the effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government expenditures in indian states over the 1980 2000 period is examined the paper finds that excessive turnover in indian state elections results in inefficient government expenditure policy first the higher the turnover the larger the government size second excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of government expenditures by skewing the composition of government spending toward pure consumption and away from more productive investment expenditures third the effect of turnover on fiscal policy is not linear public consumption expenditure is convex in turnover while public investment expenditure is concave in turnover

the disinterest in deregulation in the analysis of the costs of monopoly power the usual experiment is to convert a competitive industry into a monopoly and observe the consequent change in consumer s surplus modern contributions have emphasized the deadweight cost of monopoly arnold harberger 1954 and the possibility of an associated rent seeking cost of monopoly gordon tullock 1967 the harberger cost of course refers to the lost consumer s surplus triangle the tullock cost concerns the role of competition for monopoly returns taken together and assuming that the competition for monopoly rents is perfect the total cost of monopoly power is a trapezoid the rectangle of monopoly profits plus the triangle of lost consumer s surplus richard posner 1975 in this paper we approach the monopoly problem in a different spirit we compare three states of the world competition regulation and deregulation in this setting we ask what happens if a monopoly is eliminated through deregulation our analysis suggests that because under most conditions tullock costs cannot be recouped the returns to deregulation are lower than previously thought rent seeking expenditures in the past leave the economy permanently poorer even if competition is restored to the industry in contrast the returns to preventing monopoly in the first place are relatively high in our model an insight afforded by the analysis is an explanation of the persistence of laws and regulations which appear to serve no interest in this regard the example of railroad regulation in the united states comes to mind the standard explanation for such regulation is either that voters and government decision makers are ignorant of basic economics or that a small interest group like railroad firms wins rents at the expense of uninformed or economically rational consumers of rail services who do not find it cost effective to seek deregulation we offer another and perhaps more plausible explanation for the persistence of regulation and the apathy of consumers about the costs of regulation namely the costs of such regulations are for the most part the original rent seeking expenditures that lead to the regulation in the first place and these costs are sunk abolishing so called uneconomic laws does nothing to recover these losses hence there is little political support from any quarter to return to the status quo ante in fact as we shall show such a deregulatory program can easily impose more costs than it is worth there are numerous examples of this point including tariffs and quotas of all sorts subsidies to farmers the postal monopoly organized labor s antitrust exemption the licensing of doctors and so forth the traditional explanations of these monopoly rights namely ignorance of economic common sense and special interest groups are neither sufficient nor necessary since the primary costs of these laws are rent seeking expenditures which are made prior to their passage there is simply little to be gained by changing them now gains would accrue in the form of reduced harberger costs costs would be borne in passing and implementing the deregulatory program it is not that the potential gainers from deregulation are large in number diffuse heterogeneous and face high organizational costs rather they do not exist to any degree interpreted in this light efforts by political action groups such as the right to work foundation stand to be a drain on society s resources they cannot produce anything unless they prevent further monopolization through regulation we do not of course mccormick and shughart clemson university clemson sc 29631 tollison center for the study of public choice george mason university fairfax va 22030 thanks go to james buchanan rex cottle and gordon tullock for helpful comments the usual caveat applies

deadweight costs and the size of government abstract we provide a model for analyzing effects of the tax system and spending programs on the determination of government spending and taxpayer welfare an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax revenue and spending we demonstrate the similarity of the political responses to revenue shocks spending shocks changes in tax efficiency and changes in spending program efficiency empirical analysis of oil shocks intergovernmental grants and other autonomous changes in taxes or spending indicates that cause and effect is not only from spending to tax structures

dynamic monetary control and interest rate stabilization abstract interest rate stabilization results in an instrument shortage that complicates monetary control by introducing strategic considerations into the trading desk s decision problem the paper demonstrates that when expected future open market operations influence current bank and depositor behavior an instrument shortage is necessary and sufficient for the commitment policy to be time inconsistent and for the discretionary policy to be suboptimal i e worse than the commitment policy the moving average component of the commitment policy is of higher order than the discretionary policy under either regime the expected value of the representative bank is increasing in the trading desk s emphasis on interest rate stability

oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s economists have long been intrigued by empirical evidence that suggests that oil price shocks may be closely related to macroeconomic performance this interest dates back to the 1970s the 1970s were a period of growing dependence on imported oil unprecedented disruptions in the global oil market and poor macroeconomic performance in the united states thus it was natural to suspect a causal relationship from oil prices to u s macroeconomic aggregates since then a large body of work has accumulated that purports to establish this link on theoretical grounds and to provide empirical evidence in its support we do not attempt a comprehensive survey of this literature but rather provide an idiosyncratic synthesis of what we view as the key issues in this debate and the insights gained over the last 30 years the timing seems right for such an account although the experience of the 1970s continues to play an important role in discussions of the link between oil and the macroeconomy there have been a number of new oil price shocks since the 1970s notably the 1986 collapse of oil prices and the 2000 boom in oil prices as well as the oil price increases associated with the 1990 1991 gulf war and the 2003 iraq war given this richer case history we are arguably in a better position than two decades ago to distinguish the idiosyncratic features of each oil crisis from the systematic effects increases in oil prices have been held responsible for recessions periods of excessive inflation reduced productivity and lower economic growth in this paper we review the arguments supporting such views first we highlight some of the conceptual difficulties in assigning a central role to oil price shocks in explaining

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

energy consumption economic growth and prices a reassessment using panel vecm for developed and developing countries this paper reinvestigates the energy consumption gdp growth nexus in a panel error correction model using data on 20 net energy importers and exporters from 1971 to 2002 among the energy exporters there was bidirectional causality between economic growth and energy consumption in the developed countries in both the short and long run while in the developing countries energy consumption stimulates growth only in the short run the former result is also found for energy importers and the latter result exists only for the developed countries within this category in addition compared to the developing countries the developed countries elasticity response in terms of economic growth from an increase in energy consumption is larger although its income elasticity is lower and less than unitary lastly the implications for energy policy calling for a more holistic approach are discussed c 2006 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

induced innovation and energy prices this paper uses u s patent data from 1970 to 1994 to study the impact of energy prices on energy efficient innovations theories of technological change have focused both on demand side factors which spur innovative activity by increasing the value of new innovations and supply side factors such as scientific advancements that make new innovations possible data on demand side factors are easily obtained but data on supply side factors that influence innovation are not readily available this paper uses patent citations as a measure of the usefulness of the existing base of scientific knowledge citations to previous patents are used to construct productivity estimates which measure the usefulness of the existing stock of knowledge to inventors in a given energy field for any given year these estimates are then combined with data on demand side factors to estimate a model of induced innovation in energy technologies the results indicate that both energy prices and the supply of knowledge have strongly significant positive effects on innovation the paper concludes with a discussion of the implication of this work for environmental policy

are rents fully dissipated students of rent seeking have erred in focusing their attention exclusively on the analysis of competitions for exogenously specified transfers when redistributive policies are treated as endogenous choices it is clear that there are both incentives and opportunities for policymakers to design them in ways that prevent the wasteful dissipation of a large proportion of the intended transfers an analytical framework that treats policy design in this way is capable of explaining a variety of common attributes of redistributive policies that are apparent anomalies under the traditional approach to rent seeking furthermore we predict and find supporting evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with higher ratios of government revenue to total income than do democracies we attribute this tendency to the substantially greater potential for dissipative competition for revenues under democracy than under dictatorship finally available estimates of lobbying expenditures and rents transferred under the recent federal crude oil controls contradict the hypothesis that rents are fully or almost fully disspated through political competition

gordon tullock s contributions to the theory of public choice i introduction gordon tullock came to economics and political science through a circuitous route he had almost no formal training in economics beyond a one quarter course that he took as a law student at the university of chicago from henry c simons he served in the foreign service for a number of years his first publications in economics date from the mid 1950s and were on monetary economics campbell and tullock 1954 1957 tullock 1956 tullock s formal entry into academia came in 1958 when he arrived at the thomas jefferson center for studies in political economy and social philosophy part of the department of economics at the university of virginia as a postdoctoral fellow tullock s biography from this point is fairly well known 1 tullock s contributions to economics and political science span almost forty years the following discussion is offered as a modest review of tullock s contributions the presentation is not meant to be detailed or copious but simply efficient in conveying what is important in tullock s work 2 ii methodology and style before turning to tullock s work a brief word is in order about his general approach to economic analysis and his writing style in fact tullock has shown far more interest in obtaining useful results than he has in how he happened to go about obtaining them in this way he has been a methodological anarchist operating under the general maxim that in science anything goes and results count his well known papers generally rely upon simple price theoretic or spatial constructs and perhaps a little algebra and game theory where he has found a need for more formidable tools he has generally acquired them through coauthors this anything goes approach does not seem to have hampered his work he has shown a talent for getting at the essence of problems and avoiding clutter in his work moreover he has shown almost no penchant for methodological exegesis in his work with the major exception of his general insistence that rational economic man models are the best description of behavior in almost any setting on this point he has been steadfast in fact buchanan 1987 uses tullock s emphasis on the homo economicus assumption to describe tullock as a natural economist i think this is an accurate interpretation of tullock we have all known people who are naturally good at things like playing short stop or the piano and in this sense it is analogous to say that tullock has a natural inclination toward economic reasoning and behavior tullock is not a great stylist his normal routine is to dictate the first draft of his papers and work through them from there this allows him to make his points but sometimes not very eloquently or clearly 3 the real question about scientific writing style is whether it matters or not there are protagonists on either side of this issue empirical research laband and taylor 1992 suggests that style has no marginal impact on citations this result can be interpreted in various ways but perhaps the most appropriate interpretation is that researchers have not yet found the margin on which writing style matters tullock of course could interpret this differently to say that style does not matter only results matter and this is what he has been about nonetheless mccloskey lists tullock along with several other modern economists as a good writer to wit when you read any of these in economics pay attention this is as good as it gets 1987 9 this either defends tullock s writing skills or calls into question the care with which mccloskey drew up his list of economists as writers iii the calculus the calculus of consent 1962 by james m buchanan and gordon tullock is a work of astounding creativity of all the classic works in the theory of public choice this book stands out for its range and depth of contribution it is moreover a readable book

how sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices abstract there is growing evidence that the primary effect of energy price shocks on the u s economy involves a reduction in consumer spending we quantify the direct effect on real consumption of unanticipated changes in discretionary income shifts in precautionary savings and changes in the operating cost of energy using durables the possibility of asymmetries in the response of real consumption to energy price shocks is also considered we demonstrate that linear models are consistent with the symmetric behavior of real consumption in 1979 when energy prices increased sharply and in 1986 when they fell sharply it is shown that historically energy price shocks have been an important factor in explaining u s real consumption growth but by no means the dominant factor

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

do welfare benefits cause the welfare caseload analyses of the welfare system generally examine one of five competing models 1 the work disincentive model 2 the human capital model 3 the macroeconomic model 4 the public choice model or 5 the cost of job loss model this paper employs the granger causality concept and the multiple rank f statistic to test the implications of all five of these models simultaneously the results offer modest support to all but the macroeconomic model the relationships among welfare benefits caseloads and labor market conditions appear to be too complex to be fully captured by a single model

constitutional prohibitions in a rent seeking model i extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying fora constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers i examinetwo issues 1 the ability of special interests withsignificant political capacity to block constitutional change and 2 the effect of adding a constitutional stage on totallobbying expenditures defeating a prohibition on wealthtransfers is a public good for rent seekers success inconstitutional politics merely allows them to lobby for wealthtransfers the resulting collective action problem for rentseekers in constitutional politics offsets the generalinterest s free rider problems reducing the probability oftransfers and expected total lobbying expenditures compared tothe traditional rent seeking contest introduction of aconstitutional stage also reverses several comparative staticsresults from the rent seeking game an increase in the numberof rent seekers or the general interest s consumers abilityto organize increase lobbying in the rent seeking game butgenerally reduce expected lobbying in the constitutionalprohibition game

licensing and nontransferable rents traditionally restrictive licensing is assumed to create monopoly profits by restricting output and therefore to produce two kinds of social costs the deadweight loss due to reduced output and the resources devoted to rent seeking however the fact that nonsalvagable resources spent on rent seeking create their own barriers to entry has not been recognized by increasing nontransferable rents licensing prevents the least costly producers from entering and thus produces a third kind of social cost while harold demsetz 1982 dismissal of the traditional notion of entry barriers is correct when assets are transferable the idea of entry barriers is still useful when assets are nontransferable as this note shows in the case of professional licensing

are causal relationships sensitive to causality tests 1987 are causal relationships sensitive to causality tests applied economics vol 19 no 4 pp 459 465

the social cost of rent seeking first estimates omists have been unanimous in their verdict that rent seeking is socially wasteful if rational from the practitioner s perspective 1 the entire literature on rent seeking that has developed over the past twenty years has focused on a describing the process of rent seeking b describing the theoretical consequences of rent seeking and c applying the theory to examination of political behavior and political outcomes to our knowledge there have been no attempts to empirically verify quantify the alleged social waste due to rentseeking the purpose of this paper is to report our first stab efforts in this regard we make no pretense of advancing the theory of rent seeking the investigation is an empirical search for a phillips curve type of relationship between incidence of rent seeking in the u s economy and the size growth of that economy our findings based on both time series and cross sectional analysis of the u s economy verify the existence of a social cost to rentseeking our crude estimate of the impact of rent seeking suggests that rentseeking as we measure it cost the economy an additional 22 6 percent of measured gnp in 1985

interest group politics under majority rule abstract we develop a model of interest group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise and the form of redistributive policies sought are jointly determined the model generates three key results first programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes second nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers third many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income

contagious energy prices we develop an empirical model of the determinants of end use energy prices in 28 organisation for economic co operation and development countries for this we construct a unique panel data set and formulate a spatial panel econometric model with fixed country effects for the period of 1980 2009 a special feature of the proposed empirical model is that cross country interdependence in energy prices surfaces through two channels a metric of similarity towards energy policy and a metric of trade in energy goods we estimate the parameters of that model and conduct several comparative static experiments we find that higher income per capita and lower efficiency in energy distribution tend to raise energy prices whereas higher net imports of energy and more abundant energy resource endowments reduce them we also find that bilateral trade in energy goods is an important channel of transmission of shocks in energy prices across countries the estimation results suggest that countries that use the same types of resources to generate energy are likely to transmit energy price shocks to each other through competition effects

tariffs quotas and domestic content protection some political economy considerations in this paper we have focused our attention on the relation between the configuration of protection seeking and of rent seeking interests and the choice of the protection instruments in doing so we have abstracted from the problem of nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas recent writings on product differentiation rodriguez 1979 donnenfeld 1984 have thrown new light on this old issue it may well be that the discussion is of key importance to the understanding of industry s predilection for quantitative restraints we also failed to deal with the question on nonequivalence of restrictive measures under conditions of uncertainty finally we touched only peripherally on the interaction among state it is perhaps more realistic to regard trade barrier formation as a game among nations as in baldwin and clarke 1985 every player seeks at once to protect its import substituting industries and to promote its exports by putting up barriers and by demanding that others lower theirs this approach is more suited however to explain the severity of restraints than it is to explain the nature of restraints which is the problem at hand trade restrictions have a protective and a revenue effect in less developed countries with ineffectual internal revenue collecting systems revenue seeking governments may ally themselves with protection seeking emergent industries and institute high tariffs tariffs and quotas may coexist if the trade restriction seeking alliance includes traders voluntary export restraints the newest of the protective devices may be popular because they circumvent international treaties and short circuit cumbersome procedures associated with changes in tariffs or quotas but they also have the virtue of inviting foreign exporters to act like price setters the harm to the foreign exporters is thereby mitigated in fact exporters may be gainers hence the danger of retaliatory action on the part of foreign governments is lessened domestic content legislation is a unique device in that the same domestic factor benefits from protection and also collects the protection created revenue we show the formal identity between the south african situation in which the maximum black white worker ratio is a binding constraint and regulations requiring that a given percentage of the value of the product be domestically produced we also derive formally the maximum permissible foreign content ratio which is optimal from the point of view of the protected interests in our analysis we have said virtually nothing about the victims of protectionism a discussion of the impact of the various measures on those who bear the cost of protection would doubtless deepen our understanding of the problem we should thus consider the magnitude of the deadweight loss and of the income transfer and the concentration or dispersion of the losers last but not least we should consider the question of awareness thus the cost impact of a tariff is easier to perceive than that of a quota with the cost of a ver or of domestic import content rule the most difficult to calculate of all it may be that the principle of the hiding hand is as important to the new political economy as the benthamite principles were to the old

the relationship between energy consumption energy prices and economic growth time series evidence from asian developing countries this paper estimates the causal relationships between energy consumption and income for india indonesia the philippines and thailand using cointegration and error correction modelling techniques the results indicate that in the short run unidirectional granger causality runs from energy to income for india and indonesia while bidirectional granger causality runs from energy to income for thailand and the philippines in the case of thailand and the philippines energy income and prices are mutually causal the study results do not support the view that energy and income are neutral with respect to each other with the exception of indonesia and india where neutrality is observed in the short run c 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classifications c22 q43 q48

was it the economy or reform that precipitated the steep decline in the us welfare caseload objectives of the 1996 overhaul of the us welfare system included reducing dependency raising employment and de incentivizing out of wedlock fertility using public use state level panel data from 1990 to 2005 i analyse how state implementation of welfare reform simultaneously affects the caseload employment and out of wedlock births henceforth temporary assistance for needy families tanf objectives because endogeneity and simultaneity could not be rejected i use three stage least squares 3sls method results indicated that most of the steep decline in the caseload is attributed to welfare reform while the economy s overall effect paled in comparison however lagged and contemporaneous unemployment individually ranked second and third behind the hispanic share of state population the conservative tilt over the period studied ranked forth followed in declining order by full family sanctions earned income tax credit eitc payments time limits lagged by length access to abortion clinics

causal relationships among economic aggregates in china using china s macro data from 1952 to 1989 the stationarity and causality tests to two types of economic aggregates are applied the first type relates to the conventional money income and consumption relationship and the other is associated with the interest rate money and investment income relationship as embodied in a financial repression model stationarity test results show that a different direction of causality exists when different measurement of price is used a causal relationship between interest rate money and investment income is also found

monetary vs credit aggregates an evaluation of monetary policy targets the past decade was characterized by increased emphasis upon monetary aggregates as intermediate targets for monetary policy although growth rate ranges were specified for both narrow and broad monetary aggegates as well as for bank credit the primary focus of the federal reserve was on the growth rate of narrow money however some policy makers 19 have recently expressed doubt about the viability of using narrow money as an intermediate target in particular it has been argued that recent financial innovations such as the introduction of the various now accounts the proliferation of money market mutual funds and the adoption of cash management techniques by both firms and consumers to name a few have distorted the ml1 gnp relationship thereby raising the question of whether broader monetary aggegates or even credit aggregates might bear a closer relationship to income furthermore the federal reserve has recently announced growth rate target ranges for a broad credit aggregate in addition to growth rate ranges for ml and m2 2 friedman 7 8 provides a general discussion of these issues while modiglianipapademos 18 provide a theoretical analysis of the conditions under which a credit aggregate is preferred to a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target however nothing conclusive can be said at the theoretical level since the choice between money and credit aggregates depends upon the true underlying structure of the macroeconomy hence the choice among money and credit aggregates is an empirical issue the aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the issue of credit aggregates versus monetary aggregates as intermediate targets for monetary policy the paper evaluates the characteristics of several monetary and credit aggregates in terms of two attributes of a

lessons on monetary policy from the 1980s t he half decade running from mid 1982 to mid 1987 was a pretty good era for u s monetary policy as these things go a sharp easing of policy beginning some time around midyear 1982 helped set in motion a recovery from the most severe business downturn the united states had experienced since the 1930s a downturn that tight monetary policy earlier on had deliberately brought about in order to slow the alarming acceleration of prices the recovery that ensued developed into a sustained expansion that continued without interruption through the end of 1987 thereby setting a new record for the longest recorded business expansion in u s peacetime experience a fiscal policy based on unprecedentedly large and continually growing structural budget deficits was a major factor underlying this record length expansion but at least monetary policy did not stand in the way just as importantly the severe 1981 82 recession served its intended purpose of substantially restoring price stability and even after five years of expansion inflation remained modest by recent historical standards at least as judged by these outcomes for the standard objectives of macroeconomic policy u s monetary policy was a distinct success during these years economists hoping to say something useful about monetary policy have had a tougher time the quantitative relationships connecting income and price movements to the growth of familiar monetary aggregates including especially the m1 measure of the money stock that had been the chief focus of monetary policy during 1979 82 utterly fell apart during this period moreover the collapse of these long standing

manufacturing energy use in eight oecd countries decomposing the impacts of changes in output industry structure and energy intensity this paper examines trends in manufacturing energy use in eight oecd countries decomposing the changes that occured between 1973 and 1987 into the effects of changes in aggregate manufacturing activity industry structure and energy intensities measured at the industry group level while manufacturing production grew in every country except the uk the rate of growth was variable from nation to nation structural change led to modest reductions in energy use in most countries although in norway structural change led to substantial growth in energy use the reduction in energy intensities was strikingly uniform across all nations ranging from 20 norway to 36 japan over the period of the analysis while other studies have used divisia decomposition techniques we use an alternative method based on laspeyres indices a comparison of the two techniques shows that they yield closely similar empirical results although the laspeyres approach is more easily interpreted while the interactions between changes in structure and intensity are arbitrarily assigned to the two factors by the divisia approach the lapeyres method yields interaction terms that explicitly account for such effects

cultural institutions and value formation on the art market a rent seeking approach the formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers the rent maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher this can be worsened by institutional rent seeking the establishment s strategies cannot always be matched through public policies because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment s lobbying efforts

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back