banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

financial collapse a lesson from the great depression abstract we analyze financial collapses such as the one that occurred during the u s great depression from the perspective of a monetary model with multiple equilibria the multiplicity arises from the presence of a strategic complementarity due to increasing returns to scale in the intermediation process intermediaries provide the link between savers and firms who require working capital for production fluctuations in the intermediation process are driven by variations in the confidence agents place in the financial system from a positive perspective our model matches quite closely the qualitative changes in important financial and real variables the currency deposit ratio ex post real interest rates deflation and production over the great depression period an experience often attributed to financial collapse further we assess whether the policy prescription advocated by friedman and schwartz adding liquidity to the banking system through increases in the money supply would have overcome strategic uncertainty and thus avoided a financial collapse

reprint of central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

the effects of taxation on the selling of corporate stock and the realization of capital gains this study provides the first econometric analysis of the effect of taxation on the realization of capital gains the analysis thus extends and complements the earlier study by feldstein and yitzhaki 1978 of the effect of taxation on the selling of corporate stock the present analysis using a large new body of data obtained from individual tax returns supports the earlier finding that corporate stock sales are quite sensitive to tax rates and then shows that the effect on the realization of capital gains is even stronger

money in a theory of banking we introduce money in a model of banking in order to examine how open market operations can affect aggregate bank lending and output we see two important ways changes in money supply affect the banking system first by changing prices and interest rates it affects the wealth of demanders of real liquidity and thus the equilibrium production of liquid assets aggregate output and the health of the banking system second it changes the value of money as a means of payment and thus the attractiveness of moving from deposits to currency the demand for financial liquidity again this impacts the health of the banking system and thus bank lending and aggregate output we use this understanding to see how changes in money supply can create alleviate or be ineffective in banking crises

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

money financial stability and efficiency most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts however in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here we consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks we show that with non contingent nominal deposit contracts the first best efficient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system what is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks an interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk in contrast idiosyncratic bank specific return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone real transfers are needed

the case for ending the capital gains tax the treasury department s recent tax proposals call for taxing capital gains at ordinary rates although indexing such gains for inflation those who oppose preferential treatment for capital gains have traditionally based their arguments on grounds of equity preferential treatmnent they argue allows wealthy individuals to escape paying their fair share of taxes but taxing capital gains to investors even at a low rate while also taxing the return on capital represents double taxation inasmuch as an increase in share price for example

why do we have nominal government debt abstract we study the choice between nominal and indexed debt in a stochastic macroeconomic model with discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with distortionary taxes nominal debt provides valuable insurance against the budgetary effects of economic fluctuations we show that a welfare maximizing government always issues some nominal debt even though nominal debt increases inflation along the time consistent path of the economy the result is fairly robust with respect to changes in assumptions about policy constraints and about the macroeconomic setting

monetary policy banking crises and the friedman rule banking crises are frequent events gerard caprio and daniela klingebiel 1997 catalog over 80 banking crises during the last 25 years interestingly some banking crises are associated with no output losses whatsoever while others involve massive recessions finally it is known that the probability of a banking crisis rises as the rate of inflation rises see asli demirguc kunt and enrica detragiache 1997 john boyd et al 2001a b while received wisdom exists about the conduct of monetary policy while a crisis is underway there is no formal treatment of how the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the potential for banking crises to occur to fill that gap i consider economies where spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for money and random shocks to agents liquidity preferences create a role for banks in addition banks confront randomness in withdrawal demand when withdrawal demand is sufficiently high banks exhaust their cash reserves there are good reasons to associate this with a banking panic the output lost during a banking panic depends on how great withdrawal demand is some banking crises generate no output losses while others generate large reductions in resource availability in addition the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the probability of a banking crisis the higher the nominal interest rate the inflation rate the higher is the probability of a panic driving the nominal interest rate to zero following the friedman rule eliminates bank panics this constitutes a new rationale for the friedman rule nonetheless conventional methods of implementing the friedman rule never produce an optimal resource allocation in particular low nominal interest rates induce banks to hold large cash reserves thereby forgoing socially more productive investments in effect the friedman rule induces banks to become narrow banks voluntarily the banking system is very safe but it undertakes a suboptimal level of investment less conventional methods for implementing the friedman rule such as allowing unrestricted access to the discount window at a zero nominal interest rate lead either to the nonexistence of equilibrium or to massive indeterminacies none of the equilibria will be consistent with full optimality

monetary and macroprudential policy coordination among multiple equilibria abstract the notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary macroprudential models with unique equilibria using a game theory setup this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other s objectives one of the tools macroprudential is coarse while the other monetary policy is unconstrained we find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria giving the unconstrained authority a weight on helping the constrained authority leaning against the wind now has unexpected effects the relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump shaped and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities objectives

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

financial fragility liquidity and asset prices we define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects in a model of financial intermediation we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset price volatility or bank defaults or both furthermore as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small the asset price volatility is bounded away from zero in the limit economy with no shocks there are many equilibria however the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small liquidity shocks are those with non trivial sunspot activity

central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

monetary stability and liquidity crises the role of the lender of last resort we study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand shocks and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these shocks in this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress in the absence of a lender of last resort the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium the introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services allows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal however this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin ationary equilibria we then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the e ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services when the lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium and when the interest rate charged is high enough no hyperin ationary equilibria arise finally when the lender of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds there is again a unique long run equilibrium and when the upper bound on loanable funds is small enough hyperin ationary equilibria are ruled out

does reducing the capital gains tax rate raise or lower investment abstract the effect of taxation of capital gains on the decision to purchase a risky asset is explored within a theoretical framework similar to that of the capital asset pricing model tax rate reductions have two offsetting effects one is to raise the after tax expected return while the other is to increase the amount of risk borne by private agents conditions for determining which effect dominates are derived

investment in developed and less developed countries a number of studies have compared the investment risk of various industries and of various individual corporations in developed countries dcs the purpose of this paper is to compare investment risk in dcs with less developed countries ldcs the variance of returns to investment in common stocks provides a natural measure of investment risk and will be used in this study studies in ldcs include work of levy and sarnat 12 13 errunza 3 4 and lessard 11 levy and sarnat and errunza found low economy wide investment risk on an average for ldcs relative to dcs with stock indices being used as surrogates for economy wide risk these results are not unambiguous however because there are probable difficulties due to infrequent trading and averaging in the broad market indices used in the above studies hence we use a sample of the largest corporations that suffer little if at all from thin trading and or averaging

interest rate trap or why does the central bank keep the policy rate too low for too long time this paper provides a framework for modeling the risk taking channel of monetary policy the mechanism how financial intermediaries incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank s reaction to financial crisis anticipating central bank s reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation triggering an interest rate trap the economy will remain stuck in a long lasting period of sub optimal low interest rate equilibrium we demonstrate that interest rate policy as financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent and the constraint efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

credit risk transfer and contagion some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises using a model with banking and insurance sectors we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity however when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare it can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises

bank liquidity interbank markets and monetary policy a major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs this paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds we consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to di erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank we show that when confronted with a distribu tional liquidity shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks the central bank should lower the interbank rate this view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and mon etary policy should be abandoned in addition we show that during an aggregate liquidity crisis central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity two di erent instruments interest rates and liquidity injection are therefore required to cope with the two di erent types of liquidity shocks finally we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs