target zones and interest rate variability abstract for narrow exchange rate bands and for reasonable parameter values the interest rate differential s asymptotic unconditional variability is increasing in the width of the exchange rate band whereas for wide exchange rate bands it is slowly decreasing in the exchange rate band the interest rate differential s instantaneous conditional variability is decreasing in the width of the exchange rate band a narrow target zone differs from a completely fixed exchange rate regime in that the interest rate differential s instantaneous standard deviation is high and even increases when the zone narrows

repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

the form of incentive contracts agency with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability the analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability we introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state the form of the contract is debt a capped bonus when the critical ratio is increasing decreasing in the state an increasing critical ratio in the state space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced form distribution of output which we term the decreasing hazard rate in effort property dhrep the critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

technical note impact of inventory on quota bonus contracts with rent sharing we study the impact of limited inventory on optimal sales force compensation contracts we adopt a principal agent framework characterized by limited liability and rent sharing with the agent a commonly invoked assumption in the inventory management literature is that the demand distribution satisfies the increasing failure rate ifr property under this assumption however past research has established that a quota bonus contract a widely adopted sales force compensation contract in the practice cannot sustain in equilibrium we show that because of demand censoring in the presence of limited inventory i e demand realizations higher than the inventory level are unobservable a quota bonus contract is the optimal equilibrium contract and it exists even for a demand distribution with the ifr property since most well known distributions satisfy the ifr property and inventory constraints are operative in many real world situations our results significantly extend the scope of the optimality of q

pollution claim settlements reconsidered hidden information and bounded payments abstract a principal s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent the principal may be a pollution generating firm the agent may be a nearby town the principal offers a contract to the agent who has the right to be free of pollution then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution finally a production level and a transfer payment are implemented suppose there is an upper bound possibly zero on payments that the agent can make to the principal in the second best solution there is underproduction for low cost types while there is overproduction for high cost types in contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first best solution

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

how long do unilateral target zones last abstract we examine the expected survival time of a unilateral exchange rate target zone when constraints on monetary policy prevent the central bank from exclusively focusing on defending the target zone generally the width of the target zone has a negligible effect on the expected survival time and the dominant determinants are reserve levels and the degree of real and monetary divergence between the country in question and the rest of the world for seemingly realistic parameters the expected survival time is fairly long a few decades rather than a few years

forward rate target zones and exchange rate dynamics abstract a target zone for the forward exchange rate is developed using a log linear monetary model exchange rates are driven by a wiener process a central bank purchases or sells foreign exchange forward to keep the target forward rate in a specified band defending such a target zone does not require regulated wiener process for the central bank s forward exchange intervention can avoid disturbing the money supply a forward rate target zone can stabilize the spot rate against a free float and its stabilizing effects become more significant if the delivery term applying to the target forward rate is shorter

self control and incentives an analysis of multiperiod quota plans it is well known that individuals often fail to exert proper self control in organizational settings this can lead to reduced productivity and profits we use the literature on present biased preferences to model employees self control problems and examine how firms can design compensation plans to reduce the negative consequences of their employees self control problems our results suggest that firms can mitigate self control problems by delaying payment to the employees this can be achieved by using multiperiod quotas such as annual quotas to compensate employees for their cumulative performance although such plans are prevalent in the market there is little theoretical research that shows when multiperiod quota plans can be optimal the paper provides one potential explanation for the widespread use of such quota plans interestingly we find that such plans may be optimal despite the fact that they encourage more procrastination we also find that such plans lead to higher effort by the employees and can sometimes improve the welfare of not only the firm but also the employees

abnormal returns and the regulation of nonprofit hospital sales and conversions during the 1990s concerns that nonprofit np hospitals were being sold at below market prices to investor owned io chains helped to prompt the widespread adoption of state laws regulating the sale and conversion of nonprofits in this paper we provide a simple test of under pricing using the io acquirer s abnormal stock market returns at the time of the acquisition prior to regulation we find that io chains did not earn abnormal returns from their acquisitions of nps and earned greater returns from purchasing other io and privately owned hospitals in states that subsequently adopted regulations acquisition activity slowed significantly and acquirer returns became negative efficient markets theory suggests that absent regulation expected merger synergies were already being transferred to the np target and that regulation may have reduced expected synergies or increased the costs of acquiring np hospitals

multiperiod contracting and salesperson effort profiles the optimality of hockey stick giving up and resting on laurels the authors study multiperiod sales force incentive contracting in which salespeople can engage in effort gaming a phenomenon that has extensive empirical support focusing on a repeated moral haz

robustness and linear contracts abstract we consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do she knows some actions available to the agent but other unknown actions may also exist the principal demands robustness evaluating possible contracts by their worst case performance over unknown actions the agent might potentially take the model assumes risk neutrality and limited liability and no other functional form assumptions very generally the optimal contract is linear the model thus offers a new explanation for linear contracts in practice it also introduces a flexible modeling approach for moral hazard under nonquantifiable uncertainty jel d81 d82 d86

soft exchange rate bands and speculative attacks theory and evidence from the erm since august 1993 we present a model of a soft exchange rate target zone and interpret it as a stylized description of the post august 1993 erm our central bank targets a moving average of the current and past exchange rates rather than the exchange rate s current level thus allowing the rate to move within wide margins in the short run but within narrow margins in the long run for realistic parameters soft target zones are significantly less vulnerable to speculative attacks than hard target zones these predictions are consistent with the erm s experience and the abatement of speculative pressure in european markets since the bands widening in 1993

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm abstract in the grossman hart moore property rights theory there are no frictions ex post i e after non contractible investments have been sunk in contrast in transaction cost economics ex post frictions play a central role we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex post moral hazard as a consequence central conclusions of the grossman hart moore theory may be overturned in particular even though only party a has to make an investment decision b ownership can yield higher investment incentives moreover ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship specific i e when they have no impact on the parties disagreement payoffs

optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings commissions vs bonuses this paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales the sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time the paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme a pure commission dominates a bonus plan and vice versa a commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period otherwise combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods the results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods however if the firm obtains intermediate sales information bonus plans dominate commissions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

quota based compensation plans for multiterritory heterogeneous salesforces we compare quota based salesforce compensation plans with the blss plan i e the optimal curvilinear agency theory based compensation plans proposed in basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 a quota plan pays a fixed salary which is supplemented by commission income that is a prespecified fraction of the dollar sales that exceed the quota for a salesforce comprised of multiple salespersons territories we consider a basic quota plan where the commission rate and salary remain the same across salespersons however quotas vary across salespersons territories compared to the blss plan that is individually tailored to each salesperson territory the basic quota plan s total nonoptimality in profit has two components i a shapeinduced nonoptimality arising from the fact that the quota based plan does not have the same optimal shape as the curvilinear blss pl

partnerships versus corporations moral hazard sorting and ownership structure team production takes advantage of technological complementarities but comes with the cost of free ridership when workers differ in skills the choice of sorting pattern may be associated with a nontrivial trade off between exploiting the technological complementarities and minimizing the cost of free ridership this paper demonstrates that whether such a trade off arises depends i on how the power of incentives required for effort provision varies with workers types and ii on whether the workers are organized for production in partnerships or in corporations these results have implications for how production is organized in different industries in partnerships or in corporations jel d21 d82 g32 m12 m54 production in self managed teams and use of group incentives within corporations have become increasingly widespread over the last few decades e g see osterman 2000 and references therein increased reliance on group production can be attributed to the presence of technological complementarities between workers skills this in turn has implications for sorting of workers of different skills into teams namely expected output is maximized when high skilled workers are teamed with other high skilled workers at the same time team production comes with the problem of free riding recent studies such as franco mitchell and vereshchagina 2011 and kaya and vereshchagina 2013 have pointed out that the cost of alleviating this free rider problem may depend on how workers of different skills are sorted into teams therefore the sorting of workers may impact the total surplus from team production in at least two ways by taking advantage of technological complementarities and or by minimizing the cost of alleviating the freerider problem in this paper we illustrate that a nontrivial trade off between these two forces may arise and that this trade off has implications for how production is organized in partnerships or in corporations for this purpose we develop a model of joint production with two sided moral hazard in which workers of heterogeneous productivity may organize in partnerships or work for a corporation owned by an entrepreneur the technology available to

does it matter who your buyer is the role of nonprofit mission in the market for corporate control of hospitals abstract the hospital industry is one of this country s largest mixed industries with for profit nonprofit and government hospitals operating in the same local markets but how do ownership types differ previous studies have compared costs among different hospitals however these studies have not been entirely successful because costs cannot be meaningfully compared without controlling for hard to measure quality of service in this study we look to the market for corporate control or takeovers for evidence of ownership related differences we find that nonprofit and for profit firms pay different prices and that these differences relate to the nonprofit s mission specifically nonprofits and for profits pay the same price when buying for profits but nonprofits pay less when buying a like minded nonprofit so religious nonprofits pay less for other religious nonprofits for example the resulting dual price equilibrium suggests that nonprofits have a different objective than do for profits but

monetary contracting between central banks and the design of sustainable exchange rate zones abstract an exchange rate system is a contract which commits central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market the design features of the system include the rules of intervention the limits placed on exchange rates and the crisis scenario describing possible transitions to new regimes this paper considers the various trade offs one faces in designing an exchange rate system one of these pertains to the amount of reserves which the central banks must have on hand in order to forestall a speculative attack and make the system sustainable the amount of reserves needed depends crucially on the assumed crisis scenario

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk

a theory of sales quotas with limited liability and rent sharing sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus this article shows that under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota the results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed the model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job specific skill

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

salesforce incentives market information and production inventory planning salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve they possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions a key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market and to work hard many people have considered this question and provided solutions perhaps the most well known solution is due to gonik 1978 who proposed and implemented a clever scheme designed to elicit market information and encourage hard work the purpose of this paper is to study gonik s scheme and compare it with a menu of linear contracts a solution often used in the agency literature in a model where the market information possessed by the salesforce is important for the firm s production and inventory planning decisions

the gains to bidding firms from merger abstract this study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms shareholders bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids these results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs bidders abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful though the gains are larger prior to 1969 merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms shareholders the results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies the findings of this study are consistent with value maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms

why are bad products so hard to kill it is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low we argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers incentives rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low to avoid investing in low demand products the firm must also reward decisions to kill products however rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success the inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low demand products we explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions

a viable gold standard requires flexible monetary and fiscal policy national domestic credit expansion dce policies which offset the effect of money demand shocks on international gold reserves the gold standard collapses with certainty in finite time through a speculative selling attack against one of the currencies various policies for postponing a collapse are considered when a responsive dce policy eliminates the danger of a run on a country s reserves the exogenous shocks disturbing the system which previously were reflected in reserve flows now show up in the behaviour of the public debt unless the primary non interest government deficit is permitted to respond to these shocks the public debt is likely to rise or fall to unsustainable levels for the idealized gold standard analysed in the paper viability can be achieved only through the active and flexible use of monetary and fiscal policy

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents theoretical articles on incentive systems almost exclusively focus on linear compensations while in practice nonlinear elements such as quota bonuses are not uncommon our article tries to bridge that gap it shows how the use of quotas can increase the owners profits which agents are targeted by these incentives and which factors determine the optimal bonus

a continuous time version of the principal agent problem this paper describes a new continuous time principal agent model in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent s unobserved effort the risk averse agent receives consumption continuously the optimal contract based on the agent s continuation value as a state variable is computed by a new method using a differential equation during employment the output path stochastically drives the agent s continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement quitting replacement or promotion the paper explores how the dynamics of the agent s wages and effort as well as the optimal mix of short term and long term incentives depend on the contractual environment the understanding of dynamic incentives is central in economics how do companies motivate their workers through piece rates bonuses and promotions how is income inequality connected with productivity investment and economic growth how do financial contracts and capital structure give incentives to the managers of a corporation the methods and results of this paper provide important insights to many such questions this paper introduces a continuous time principal agent model that focuses on the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision we identify factors that make the agent s wages increase or decrease over time we examine the degree to which current and future outcomes motivate the agent we provide conditions under which the agent eventually reaches retirement in the optimal contract we also investigate how the costs of creating incentives and the dynamic properties of the optimal contract depend on the contractual environment the agent s outside options the difficulty of replacing the agent and the opportunities for promotion our new dynamic insights are possible due to the technical advantages of continuous time methods over the traditional discrete time ones continuous time leads to a much simpler computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential equation this equation highlights the factors that determine optimal consumption and effort the dynamics of the agent s career path are naturally described by the drift and volatility of the agent s pay offs the geometry of solutions to the differential equation allows for easy comparisons to see how the agent s wages effort and incentives depend on the contractual environment finally continuous time highlights many essential features of the optimal contract including the agent s eventual retirement in our benchmark model a risk averse agent is tied to a risk neutral principal forever after employment starts the agent influences output by his continuous unobservable effort input the principal sees only the output a brownian motion with a drift that depends on the agent s effort the agent dislikes effort and enjoys consumption we assume that the agent s utility function has the income effect that is as the agent s income increases it becomes costlier to compensate him for the effort also we assume that the agent s utility of consumption is bounded from below

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

linearity with project selection and controllable diffusion rate in continuous time principal agent problems i extend holmstrom and milgrom s model by allowing the agent to control privately or publicly the diffusion rate process and show that the optimal contract is still linear i discuss the conditions under which conflicts over the choice of diffusion rate do and do not arise as an application i examine project selection problems of a firm conflicts between the manager and investors arise because giving the manager too much incentive to work to increase the profit from ongoing operations can induce him to be too conservative in project selection possibly resulting in optimal contracts with low sensitivities

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the lifetime of a unilateral target zone some extended results abstract in dumas and svensson journal of international economics 36 1994 467 the lifetime of a krugman quarterly journal of economics 106 1991 669 682 type target zone model is found to be extremely long this paper shows that the lifetime of the identical target zone regime can be much lower when real disturbances occur in particular the mean lifetime is found to be very low when real disturbances occur and the real exchange rate elasticity of the demand for domestic goods is very low it is also shown that allowing for monetary disturbances to have real effects has very little effect on the lifetime the results indicate the conditions under which real disturbances might trigger currency crises

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

sorting incentives and risk preferences evidence from a field experiment abstract we conducted experiments within a firm to measure the risk preferences of workers who face substantial daily income risk we find that these workers are significantly more risk tolerant than individuals from the broader population this is consistent with sorting risk tolerant workers are attracted to high risk occupations

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

event studies in economics and finance the event study is an important research tool in economics and finance the goal of an event study is to measure the effects of an economic event on the value of firms event study methods exploit the fact that given rationality in the marketplace the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices thus the impact can be measured by examining security prices surrounding the event in this paper event study methods are described including some of the potential complications an example is included to illustrate the approach

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives