transfers and the generalized theory of distortions and welfare recent theoretical attention devoted to the transfer paradox has included attempts to incorporate it into the body of commercial policy in this paper the existence of a family of always feasible corrective tax policies is proved which guarantees normal welfare response the set of pol icies is shown to contain the external trade fixing tariff and the op timal tariff the set of policies is then extended to include a capit al flow fixing profits tax to deal with the problems of foreign inves tment the results are then interpreted in terms of a general proposi tion in the theory of distortions and welfare copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

global warming technological change and trade in carbon energy challenge or threat is it possible to combat global climate change through north to south technology transfer even without a global climate treaty or do carbon leakage and the rebound effect imply that it is possible to take advantage of technological improvements under the umbrella of a global arrangement only for answering these questions two possible states of the world are discussed one where more energy efficient technologies are transferred unconditionally from the north to the south and where regions do not cooperate in the solution of the global climate problem but unilaterally decide on climate policies and technology transfers one where the north to south technology transfer is tied to the requirement that the south in some way contributes to the solution of the global climate problem rebound and leakage effects hinder a sustainable and welfare improving solution of the climate problem

transfer problem dynamics macroeconomics of the franco prussian war indemnity we study the classic transfer problem of predicting the effects of an international transfer on the terms of trade and the current account a two country model with debt and capital allows for realistic features of historical transfers they follow wartime increases in government spending and are financed partly by borrowing the model is applied to the largest historical transfer the franco prussian war indemnity of 1871 1873 in these three years france transferred to germany an amount equal to 22 percent of a year s gdp when the transfer is combined with measured shocks to fiscal policy and productivity over the period the model provides a very close fit to the historical sample paths of french gdp terms of trade net exports and aggregate consumption this makes a strong case for the dynamic general equilibrium approach to studying the transfer problem more generally our results provide striking evidence of the importance of international capital markets in the nineteenth century

the pitfalls of work requirements in welfare to work policies experimental evidence on human capital accumulation in the self sufficiency project abstract this paper investigates whether policies that encourage recipients to exit welfare for full time employment influence participation in educational activity the self sufficiency project ssp was a demonstration project where long term welfare recipients randomly assigned to the treatment group were offered a generous earnings supplement if they exited welfare for full time employment we find that treatment group members were less likely to upgrade their education along all dimensions high school completion enrolling in a community college or trade school and enrolling in university thus work first policies that encourage full time employment may reduce educational activity and may have adverse consequences on the long run earnings capacity of welfare recipients we also find that there was a substantial amount of educational upgrading in this population for instance among high school dropouts at the baseline 19 completed their diploma by the end of the demonstration finally we simulate the consequences of the earnings supplement in the absence of adverse effects on educational upgrading doing so alters the interpretation of the lessons from the ssp demonstration

foreign aid tariffs and nontraded private or public goods abstract the possibility of transfer paradoxes or immiserizing growth in tariff ridden small open developing countries with a nontraded goods sector is analysed in four models a short run sector specific factor model a dual economy model capital is mobile between some but not all sectors a long run model factors are mobile between all sectors and a model with public goods several results of the received literature on transfer paradoxes and or immiserizing growth in distorted small open economies are generalized to nontraded private and public goods allowing for intersectoral factor mobility or immobility

advantageous reallocations a constructive example this note shows how to construct smooth examples of a phenomenon noted by gale in which a pair of agents make themselves better off at the expense of a third agent by reallocating their own endowments walrasian stability prevails

identifying the response of fertility to financial incentives summary while using financial incentives to increase fertility has become relatively common the effects of such policies are difficult to assess we propose an identification strategy that relies on the fact that the variation in wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among comparable households we implement our approach by estimating a discrete choice model of female participation and fertility using individual data from the french labor force survey and a detailed representation of the french tax benefit system our results suggest that financial incentives have had a significant effect on fertility decisions in france as an example we simulate the effects of an additional unconditional child credit of 150 euros per month the effects are strongest for the third child copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

foreign ownership and the theory of trade and welfare some standard topics in the theory of international trade are reconsidered in this paper by distinguishing between national and aggregate income when fixed supplies of foreign inputs are present within the home country under conditions that would ensure a national welfare gain if foreign ownership were absent international transfer economic growth or tariff policy might cause a national welfare loss in the presence of foreign ownership the techniques developed could be applied to other domestic distinctions such as those based on race sex age or ethnicity and to the theory of customs unions in a three country world

sense and surprise in competitive trade theory 2010 weai presidential address i introduction the competitive theory of international trade is well known for its abundance of paradoxes perhaps the most widely known is the leontief paradox associated with the rather startling results presented by leontief 1953 that the trade pattern of the united states suggested that its export sectors were more labor intensive than factor proportions found in its import competing sectors this result stimulated decades of research but is not the focus of the present paper other so called paradoxes include the metzler 1949 result wherein a country levying a tariff on an imported item may end up with a lowering of its domestic price that is a tariff may not be protective 1 lerner 1936 who earlier hinted at the metzler outcome emphasized the possibility that a tariff might instead worsen a country s terms of trade which is at the opposite extreme to the metzler result both of these paradoxes are attributed to possible income effects in demand more recently income effects stemming from asymmetry in demand patterns among countries were shown to open the door to paradoxical results if one country makes a transfer to another in a world in which other countries are also engaged in trade in the same commodities the surprising results the giver in the transfer might end up better off i e it may pay to give rather than to receive and or the recipient of the transfer may end up worse off 2 finally a classic result that does not depend on asymmetries in taste patterns but rather upon the degree of elasticity in demand and the nature of growth is the question of whether a country that unequivocally grows transformation schedule shifts out can be made worse off as a consequence of growth the so called immiserizing growth paradox 3 this is an issue familiar to particular sectors of the economy for example agriculture can a good harvest yield lower returns because of the subsequent price fall instead of revisiting these familiar paradoxes here i wish to concentrate on the production side of competitive models used in international trade and to focus on the question involving ways of judging economic models clearly the question of realism often comes up whether it is in terms of assumptions made or of outcomes expected here i suggest a different criterion does the model conform in many ways to common sense that is would one be tempted to suggest that the model is not necessary because common sense would lead to the same results and if it does do the outcomes in certain scenarios seem to be paradoxical or surprising if so can the model reveal in simple terms why these somewhat surprising results make sense 4 i shall restrict myself to a pair of basic models of production used in competitive trade theory the specific factors model on the one hand and the heckscher ohlin model on the other i shall argue that in many ways both conform to common sense but in addition provide the very tools that expose the underlying rationale for surprise ii a preliminary question consider any economy that is characterized by competitive markets and constant returns to scale technology suppose for such an economy there is an increase in the factor endowment bundle to fix on an example suppose there is an increase in the economy s labor force the very general question i wish to ask is how does such an economy absorb this increased endowment to maintain full employment of all factors note that if this economy is not engaged in international trade there will likely result a change in commodity prices as they adjust in order to equilibrate local supply and demand given the points i wish to make later let me assume that the country is engaged in free trade with the rest of the world if this economy were particularly small world prices could be taken as given even if world prices are disturbed it is legitimate to ask how the economy absorbs the extra supplies before any change in commodity prices takes place

poverty and public policy the problem of poverty is particularly acute in india with 14 of the world s population we have the misfortune of having almost twice as large a share of the world s poor indeed as i shall presently underline the question of poverty and its amelioration has been at the center of our concerns from the beginning of our planning efforts almost four decades ago little therefore can be said on it that some distinguished indian economist has not already said in some ways therefore to talk on the design of public policy for poverty to an indian audience is to carry coal to newcastle or as the old saying goes to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs nonetheless i hope to provide a fresh perspective by putting the problem into an explicit analytical framework that permits alternative policy designs to be sharply defined and contrasted i also intend to draw on international experience to put our efforts and problems into both historical and comparative perspectives

distortions true trade price and quantity indices and welfare trade expenditure functions are used to develop true trade price and quantity indices for multihousehold open economies with domestic distortions such as commodity or production taxes subsidies factor unemployment or exogenous factor price differentials these indices are then used to analyse the welfare effects of changes in world market prices and or the distortions in contrast to earlier literature we derive a set of novel globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from trade in the presence of the listed distortions novel sufficient conditions for welfare improvement which are readily measurable are also proven

how does parental leave affect fertility and return to work evidence from two natural experiments this paper analyzes the effects of changes in the duration of paid job protected parental leave on mothers higher order fertility and postbirth labor market careers identification is based on a major austrian reform increasing the duration of parental leave from one year to two years for any child born on or after july 1 1990 we find that mothers who give birth to their first child immediately after the reform have more second children than prereform mothers and that extended parental leave significantly reduces return to work employment and earnings also decrease in the short run but not in the long run fertility and work responses vary across the population in ways suggesting that both cash transfers and job protection are relevant increasing parental leave for a future child increases fertility strongly but leaves short run postbirth careers relatively unaffected partially reversing the 1990 extension a second 1996 reform improves employment and earnings while compressing the time between births

a result on the transfer problem in international trade theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a result on the welfare effect of a transfer in a general equilibrium exchange model with no arbitrary restrictions on either the number of commodities traded or the number of countries our result can be stated as follows the donor country is worse off after a transfer if a all goods are net substitutes for the donor b all goods are gross substitutes for the other countries and c all goods are normal for all countries

the transfer paradox in a one sector overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines the effects of international income transfers on capital accumulation and welfare in a one sector overlapping generations model it is shown that a strong form of the transfer paradox in which the donor country experiences a welfare gain while the recipient country experiences a welfare loss may occur both in and out of steady state in addition it is shown that a weak form of the transfer paradox where either the donor or recipient but not both experiences a paradoxical welfare effect may characterize all segments of the transition path not already characterized by the strong transfer paradox

international investment and immiserizing growth abstract a country with significant foreign investment can be immiserized by growth of its labor force because this increases the payments that have to be made to foreign investors we show that this occurs when the elasticity of supply of foreign capital and the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the host country are low we relate this phenomenon to bhagwati s general analysis of immiserizing growth and identify several new sources of immiserization that can arise from the interaction of the bhagwati johnson mechanisms and international investment

consistency of risk preference measures an artefactual field experiment from rural china a variety of measures have been developed to elicit individual risk preferences how these measures perform in the field in particular in developing countries with non student subjects is still a

the influence of wages and industrial relations environments on the production location decisions of u s multinational corporations using the benchmark and annual surveys of u s direct investment abroad collected by the bureau of economic analysis the authors examine the operations of u s multinational corporations mncs in seven manufacturing industries and twenty two countries over the years 1982 91 they analyze how tariffs wages and industrial relations environments influenced u s mncs decisions about where to locate assets and employment the results imply that wages and the industrial relations environment were statistically significant determinants of the extent to which mncs located operations in a particular host country however while these factors were important their impact was much smaller than that of host country market size which was by far the main determinant of mnc location decisions furthermore the authors find no evidence that tariff reductions increased the share of u s mnc activities located abroad thus concerns that tariff reductions may lead to loss of american jobs appear to be exaggerated

the economics of country specific tariffs a three country model of the world economy is used to show that when effective a country specific tariff will have an impact on the world economy that is equivalent to the imposition of a uniform tariff plus a subsidy to the production of home importables in the favored country financed by a transfer from the home country lerner s symmetry theorem and the optimum tariff problem are discussed country specific tariffs were a prominent feature of the congressional debate surrounding the recent u s trade bill a preliminary version of the bill which passed the house contained the well known gephardt amendment that would have required increased tariffs or quotas on imports from countries running unacceptably large bilateral trade surpluses with the u s in addition since 1976 the u s has allowed most goods produced in less developed countries to enter duty free under its version of the generalized system of preferences the country specific nature of these preferences runs contrary to all previous u s trade policy and sparked controversy in the u s congress when the original legislation was passed in 1974 and again when it was extended in 1984 while country specific tariffs are a relatively new feature of u s trade policy they have an established history in other countries prior to joining the european economic community great britain granted preferential tariff rates on imports from the commonwealth countries moreover these countries granted tariff preferences to less developed countries nearly five years before the u s initiated its general system of preferences program a proper theoretical analysis of country specific tariffs and preferential tariff reductions requires a multi country model however most work on tariff policy uses the standard two country framework almost all of the multi country models found in the literature consider only uniform tariffs or as in the customs union literature consider preferential tariffs as part of a multilateral effort to coordinate trade policies rather than as a unilateral policy instrument an exception is the partial equilibrium analysis of mcculloch and pinera 1977 they consider a three country world economy and examine the impact of a preferential tariff reduction

health risky behaviour and the value of medical innovation for infectious disease we propose a dynamic framework to study the value of medical innovation in the context of infectious disease we apply our framework to evaluate an hiv treatment breakthrough known as haart the model captures how in lowering both the expected cost and likelihood of hiv infection haart reduced the implicit price of risky sex forward looking agents responded by optimally shifting their behaviour the model also imposes equilibrium constraints explicitly capturing how optimal shifts in behaviour affect equilibrium choices by changing both infection probabilities and the ease of finding partners willing to engage in risky sex using the estimated model we conduct counterfactual simulations to compute the value of haart from the perspective of uninfected agents this includes the option value of the innovation along with value accruing from changes in sex behaviour in response to haart introduction we also calculate the added value of a fully functional vaccine from the perspective of both infected and uninfected agents where infected agents benefit from a vaccine due to resulting shifts in market equilibrium

the global correspondence principle a generalization this paper generalizes the global correspondence principle by extending in two major ways samuelson s 1971 analysis of the exchange rate response to an international purchasing power transfer first the authors analyze the price effect of a shift in anyparameter not necessarily a transfer second the authors explore the resulting adjustments in any nonprice variable such as welfare as the analysis shows the direction of these adjustments depends neither on whether they are small or large nor on whether equilibrium is locally stable or unstable thus the authors generalize the conventional algebra of comparative statics which typically assumes small shifts from a stable equilibrium copyright 1987 by american economic association

the possibility of recipient harming donor benefiting transfers with more than two countries the possibility of a commodity transfer among nations which simultaneously benefits the donor and harms the recipient is examined an example of a three country exchange economy is presented where a transfer may be made which gives the counter intuitive result the result is then explained

violence and risk preference experimental evidence from afghanistan we investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk preferences in afghanistan combining i a two part experimental procedure identifying risk preferences violations of expected utility and specific preferences for certainty ii controlled recollection of fear based on established methods from psychology and iii administrative violence data from precisely geocoded military records we document a specific preference for certainty in violation of expected utility the preference for certainty which we term a certainty premium is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure and controlled fearful recollections the results have implications for risk taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and marketers

the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes in choice and pricing tasks we examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation procedures we find that individuals are on average risk seeking over low probability gains and high probability losses and risk averse over high probability gains and low probability losses when we elicit prices for the gambles however a choice based elicitation procedure where participants choose between a gamble and its expected value yields individual decisions that are indistinguishable from random choice sensitivity to elicitation procedure holds between and within participants and remains when participants are allowed to review and change decisions the price elicitation procedure is more complex this finding may be further evidence that an increase in cognitive load exacerbates behavioural anomalies

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

competition for aid and trade policy this paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries it is shown that given consumer preferences a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid if on the other hand the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries the result is just the opposite finally we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid it is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries

foreign aid domestic investment and welfare this paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two period two country model of trade domestic investment is endogenous providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two transfer induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient in the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly pareto improving

who is behavioral cognitive ability and anomalous preferences in this paper we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability evidence from a new laboratory study of chilean high school students with similar schooling backgrounds shows that small stakes risk aversion and short run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores the relationship with test scores survives controls for parental education and wealth we find some evidence that elementary school gpa is predictive of preferences measured at the end of high school two laboratory interventions provide suggestive evidence of a possible causal impact of cognitive resources on expressed preferences jel j24 d14 c91

terms of trade and domestic distribution export led growth with abundant labour abstract a general equilibrium macro model is constructed to explore effects of export led growth policies on the terms of trade and the domestic distribution of a developing region with abundant labour this region the south trades with another the north they have different technologies and supplies of factors it is shown that under certain conditions of dualism in the production of goods and of abundant labour supply in the south an increase in the volume of exports from the south may bring about a sustained worsening of the south s terms of trade with the north even if this increase in exports is due to a positive shift in demand from the north this change in the terms of trade is accompanied by a sustained loss of purchasing power of wages within the south these results take place in a walrasian stable market when technologies are more homogenous and labour less abundant the results are reversed increased exports will take place together with improvements in terms of trade and a tendency to equalise factor prices between the regions the results argue for coordination of domestic and international policies with special attention to technologies and labour markets

give and take how the funding of adaptation to climate change can improve the donor s terms of trade this paper discusses the interplay between international trade regional adaptation to climate change and financial transfers for funding adaptation it combines insights from a theoretical model of north to south transfers with the findings of a calibrated dynamic multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium model that takes into account the impacts of climate change and the adaptation to it assessing the effects of adaptation funding indicates that funding of adaptation in developing regions can be pareto improving not only will developing regions which do not own sufficient resources for adapting optimally profit from receiving adaptation funding terms of trade improvements in the high and middle income donor countries can dominate transfer costs and hence lead to a net welfare gain in almost any developed region except north america as such our consideration adds a new argument for financially supporting adaptation in the developing world besides the well known ones such as fairness and incentives for participation in a global climate treaty

the measurement of waste in a public goods economy abstract a small open economy model is developed to measure the waste of the whole economy when levels of public goods are determined by the government the allais debreu diewert measure of waste is defined and its second order approximation is calculated this measure utilizes the second order substitution matrices of the restricted profit function and the restricted expenditure function evaluated at an equilibrium finally simple examples and diagrams are utilized to clarify the economic implications of our approach

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

addiction and cue triggered decision processes we propose a model of addiction based on three premises 1 use among addicts is frequently a mistake 2 experience sensitizes an individual to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usage 3 addicts understand and manage their susceptibilities we argue that these premises find support in evidence from psychology neuroscience and clinical practice the model is tractable and generates a plausible mapping between behavior and the characteristics of the user substance and environment it accounts for a number of important patterns associated with addiction gives rise to a clear welfare standard and has novel implications for policy

optimal foreign aid and tariffs this paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non cooperative fashion three alternative scenarios depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied are analyzed it is shown that in the case where aid is decided before tariffs untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient s optimal trade tax when the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient s tariff the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a pareto efficient equilibrium

a dual self model of impulse control we propose that a simple dual self model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi hyperbolic discounting and rabin s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small the model also implies that self control costs imply excess delay as in the o donoghue and rabin models of quasi hyperbolic utility and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist the base version of our model is consistent with the gul pesendorfer axioms but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load

welfare aspects of the transfer problem using the standard trade model with three countries and allowing for substitutability in both production and consumption this paper demonstrates that a country may gain by giving a transfer that the receiver may lose and that these two phenomena may appear at the same time this result is an extension of gale s example in a fixed coefficient model where he shows both transferer and transferee may become better off harming the third country and it is contrasted with the traditional welfare proposition whereby a giver is immiserized and a recipient is enriched

variation in risk seeking behaviour following large losses a natural experiment this study explores people s risk taking behaviour after having suffered large real world losses following a natural disaster using the margins of the 2011 australian floods brisbane as a natural experimental setting we find that homeowners who were victims of the floods and face large losses in property values are 50 more likely to opt for a risky gamble a scratch card giving a small chance of a large gain 500 000 than for a sure amount of comparable value 10 this finding is consistent with prospect theory predictions regarding the adoption of a risk seeking attitude after a loss

estimating welfare effects consistent with forward looking behavior part i lessons from a simulation exercise an extensive literature in economics seeks to determine the quantitative impact of welfare benefits on economic and demographic behaviors most studies adopt a static choice framework to motivate their empirical specifications the behaviors that are studied however have both immediate and long term consequences if potential welfare recipients are forward looking they will consider these long term consequences when making current decisions in this paper we investigate the implications of the existence of forward looking behavior for estimation methodology in the companion paper that follows we estimate the effect of welfare on those decisions adopting an empirical specification that is consistent with forward looking behavior and interpretable within that framework

paradoxes associated with the administration of foreign aid abstract this paper shows that if because of administration costs or other wastes only a proportion of an aid reaches the recipient then it is possible that the donor is enriched by its act of charity the extent of the enrichment increasing with the extent of the leakage and or that the recipient is impoverished by aid the extent of the impoverishment increasing with the extent of the leakage these outcomes are possible even when trade is optimally restricted by donor or recipient

aid nontraded goods and the transfer paradox in small countries this paper constructs a model of the transfer paradox for a small open economy with nontraded goods it demonstrates that increased production of nontraded goods can change their domestic price so as to offset the otherwise beneficial effect of aid and under certain conditions to create a transfer paradox even in a small country the model is estimated with time series data for 44 aid dependent countries for the period 1970 90 the results support the model and show that the nontraded goods expansion effect is more likely to cause immiserization than harry g johnson s 1967 tariff distorting export displacement effect

tied aid and the paradoxes of donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment it is part of received doctrine that in a two country world without hindrance of commodity taxes or other distortions and with market stability assured international transfers necessarily harm the donor and benefit the recipient 2 however in the case of most non private international aid those conditions fail donors often require that aid be spent in a manner not closely related to private preferences in the recipient countries indeed not closely related to any well behaved preferences and they normally finance the aid by means of distorting taxation hence one cannot rule out by appeal to standard theorems the possibility that aid perversely leaves the donor better off and or the recipient worse off let us say that aid is tied in the recipient if it is spent inefficiently in terms of individual preferences and that aid is tied in the donor if it is financed inefficiently thus whether aid is tied is a question of how it is spent or financed it is not a question of the numeraire in terms of which aid is accounted nor of the form in which it is offered 3 evidently the definition of tying is uncommonly broad for example aid may be tied in the recipient not because the donor attaches strings but because the government of the recipient is incompetent or unrepresentative moreover the definition is relevant however the aid is applied whether to private or public goods whether to consumption or investment goods we follow the literature on the transfer problem in assuming that aid is spent on private consumption goods like hospital services and powdered milk this is a matter of convenience and continuity only 4 in the present note we seek to rework the economics of foreign aid under novel assumptions in particular allowance will be made for the possibility that aid is tied in whole or in part in the donor or in the recipient it will be verified that the donor may benefit and the recipient suffer and that these outcomes are com

equilibrium and optimality some imprints of david gale abstract the paper is a review of some of the themes to which david gale made lasting contributions it touches upon a number of the fundamental issues in the walrasian equilibrium theory existence uniqueness and stability the overlapping generations model non optimality and indeterminacy of competitive equilibria the von neumann equilibrium as a turnpike and in the theory of decentralized intertemporal allocation through competitive prices efficiency and golden rules duality and existence of optimal programs

the welfare effects of targeted export subsidies a general equilibrium approach a three country model of export subsidies is developed with an exporter an importer and a neutral country which can act on either side of the market when the neutral country is an exporter the country offering a targeted export subsidy always suffers a welfare loss however when the neutral country is an importer the possibility of a paradoxical result that the subsidizing country can gain and the subsidized country can lose is shown to exist and the conditions under which this result occurs are derived the model fails to provide justification on national welfare grounds for widespread use of targeted export subsidies such as the export enhancement program

what determines family structure i introduction the most prevalent type of family structure in which children in the united states are raised today is the traditional one in which both biological parents are present in the home and married but in the past 30 40 years it has become increasingly common for children to experience alternative family structures such as living with the mother with no father present the mother and a stepfather and cohabiting parents children who grow up in a family with married biological parents have better education employment marriage childbearing and psychological outcomes on average than their counterparts who spend substantial parts of childhood living in alternative family structures 1 these differences are generally quite large and dwarf the effects of income and maternal employment the evidence suggests that at least part of the association between family structure and child outcomes is causal there is much still to be learned about the consequences of growing up in alternative family structures but there is a consensus that family structure matters for child development in contrast there is much less known about the determinants of family structure the proximate determinants of family structure are well studied demographic behaviors union formation and dissolution transition from cohabitation to marriage and fertility both in and outside of unions but the implications of adult demographic behaviors for the family structure experiences of children depend crucially on interactions among these behaviors for example the impact on a child of being born out of wedlock is likely to depend on whether the mother and biological father subsequently marry or cohabit and if so how soon after the birth of the child the impact on a child of the dissolution of a union may depend on whether the man in the union was the child s biological father or a stepfather and on the duration of the union economic theories of family formation and dissolution suggest a number of observable factors that affect the demographic behaviors that determine family structure 2 these include the wage rates available to men and women the tax and transfer incentives to cohabit marry and bear children the legal environment governing divorce and child support provided by absent parents and the state of the marriage market many studies have examined the effects of these factors on the family structure experiences of children but most have taken a narrow approach for example a typical study examines the impact of changes over time in one or two determinants of family structure without considering the implications of simultaneous changes in other factors most studies examine only one or two of the key demographic behaviors that determine the family structure experienced by children for example one study might focus only on entry to cohabitation and marriage whereas another study examines childbearing while single and a third study analyzes marital dissolution in this article we propose a new approach to analyze the determinants of the family structure experiences of children our approach has four distinguishing features first we jointly model union formation union dissolution and childbearing decisions previous analyses have integrated some of these behaviors in a single model but none has integrated the full range of behaviors needed for a thorough analysis of family structure a major feature of change in recent years has been de linking of marriage and childbearing decisions hence it is crucial to recognize as emphasized by ellwood and jencks 2004 that marriage and childbearing are in fact distinct decisions and that treating single parenthood as one decision rather than the consequence of related but distinct union and childbearing decisions misses key elements of changes in behavior furthermore bumpass and lu 2000 point out that a substantial part of the increase in single parenthood in the last three decades can be accounted for by a rise in the presence of children with cohabiting parents but child outcomes are worse in cohabitation than marriage other things equal

welfare use when approaching the time limit time limits reduce caseloads directly by cutting off benefits after a time limited usage but may also provide families with an incentive to reduce welfare use in order to conserve their benefits both effects depend on the stock of remaining months of eligibility this is the first empirical study to incorporate information on this crucial determinant of takeup and eligibility under time limits accounting for the potential endogeneity of an individual s past use time limits are estimated to have decreased welfare use by 25 percent between 1996 and 2003 roughly one fifth of this reduction is due to behavioral responses

targeted export subsidies as an exercise of monopoly power a country with monopoly power in its export good normally benefits from an export tax however if it exports to two countries and the tax on exports to one is suboptimal then it may be best to subsidize exports to the other this is more likely the smaller is the import demand elasticity in the country being taxed suboptimally and the larger the elasticity in the other it is also more likely the larger are exports to the first and the smaller are exports to the other finally it is more likely the less elastic is home export supply

foreign aid and public goods abstract most less developed countries ldcs use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods or public intermediate inputs this paper constructs a two country general equilibrium trade model where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good within this framework the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country s terms of trade and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country the paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise reduce world welfare in which case a welfare increase decrease in both the donor and the recipient country is possible

does self control depletion affect risk attitudes abstract a core prediction of recent dual self models is that risk attitudes depend on self control while these models have received a lot of attention empirical evidence regarding their predictions is lacking we derive hypotheses from three prominent models for choices between risky monetary payoffs under regular and reduced self control we test the hypotheses in a lab experiment using a well established ego depletion task to reduce self control and measuring risk attitudes via finely graduated choice lists manipulation checks document the effectiveness of the depletion task we find no systematic evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions in particular depletion does not increase risk aversion

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

estimating incentive and welfare effects of nonstationary unemployment benefits the distribution of unemployment duration in our equilibrium matching model with spell dependent unemployment benefits displays time varying exit rates building on semi markov processes we translate these rates into an expression for the aggregate unemployment rate structural estimation using german microdata allows us to discuss the effects of an unemployment benefit reform hartz iv the reform reduced unemployment by less than 0 1 percentage points contrary to general beliefs the net wage for most skill and regional groups increased taking the insurance effect of unemployment benefits into account however the reform is welfare reducing for 76 of workers

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

bilateral war in a multilateral world carrots and sticks for conflict resolution this paper constructs a three country many good and many factor trade theoretic model in which two of the countries are in conflict and where war eort is determined endogenously

immiserizing transfer under variable returns to scale this paper examines the welfare consequences of a unilateral transfer for both the transfer paying and the transfer receiving country in which the production functions are subject to variable returns to scale we obtain the conditions for the strong paradox that is the welfare of the transfer paying country improves and that of the transfer receiving country declines in the standard two country framework the conditions for the weak paradox that is both the transferor and transferee gain or lose simultaneously and the normal results that is the transferor loses and the transferee gains are also derived transferts appauvrissants quand les rendements a l echelle sont variables ce memoire examine les effets de bien etre d un transfert unilateral a la fois pour le pays donateur et le pays recipiendaire quand les fonctions de production ont des rendements variables a l echelle les auteurs d6veloppent les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe fort i e le cas oii le bien r ils d6rivent aussi les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe faible i e le cas oui les deux pays gagnent ou

income effects and paradoxes in the theory of international trade every field in economics has its paradoxes phenomena which initially are thought to confound economic sense but ultimately come to be better understood the field of international trade can claim its fair share the examples of the metzler paradox wherein a tariff fails to provide protection or that of immerising growth wherein a country suffers a loss in welfare despite an improvement in production possibilities come easily to mind more recently a reexamination of the transfer problem in the context of many country trade or of tax distortions has revealed possibilities for donor countries to gain or transfer recipients to lose results which would be considered so paradoxical in standard treatments as to be ruled out by stability arguments behind each of the examples just cited lies a rational explanation in which income effects prove crucial in supporting a paradoxical outcome in some situations the potential for paradox rests on the possibility of income redistribution nationally or internationally when tastes differ among the various trading participants paradox becomes impossible if tastes at the margin are identical in other instances income redistribution is not the crucial mechanism and paradoxical outcomes may occur even if all traders possess the same taste patterns all cases share the property that paradoxes can arise only if the terms of trade are sufficiently disturbed substitution effects high values of which serve to dampen the required adjustment of prices to a market disturbance thus work to prevent paradoxical outcomes in the first section of this paper i focus on those issues for which income effects are associated with income redistribution especially the analysis of tariffs and transfers in markets that initially are free of taxes or other distortions in the second section i analyse an issue for which income redistribution is no longer the central ingredient the welfare consequences of growth a standard technique in game theory allows for a reinterpretation of the growth case to reveal the fundamental connection between a wide variety of standard two country results in the theory of international trade and the possibility of paradoxes in the three agent transfer problem i would therefore argue that the three agent transfer literature has wider applicability than is commonly perceived in the final section i analyse briefly the frequently encountered argument that some instances of paradoxical welfare loss can be avoided by optimal tariff policy i wish to thank isaias coelho for helpful conversations makoto yano for stimulating my interest in the transfer problem with many agents and j peter neary for comments on an earlier draft useful suggestions were also received at seminar presentations at the institute for international economic studies in stockholm and the london school of economics research support was provided by the national science foundation grants ses 78o6159 and ses 8309386 i the role of substitution effects in transfer paradoxes with more than two commodities and agents is discussed by de meza 1983

who supports global economic engagement the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy in this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand u s foreign policy in particular foreign trade and aid using votes in the u s house of representatives from 1979 2004 we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy we assess the impact of domestic factors namely political economy and ideological preferences versus foreign policy pressures our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas first aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences second trade preferences but not economic aid ones are shaped by the president s foreign policy concerns for economic aid domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones third aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones but ideology plays a different substantive role in each different constituencies support aid and trade this finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability the internationalist coalition in u s foreign policy statist theories of foreign policy and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

do multinationals deteriorate developing countries export prices the impact of fdi on net barter terms of trade this paper explores the economic relationship between foreign direct investment fdi to developing countries and the export prices of the latter measured by terms of trade it is rst shown that economic theory suggests such a relationship for various reasons but is inconclusive about the direction of the eect to address this open issue empirically i analyze data on more than 50 developing countries throughout the period 1980 2008 using robust dynamic panel data methods the results show that fdi had an economically relevant and statistically signicant positive impact on developing countries net barter terms of trade a higher level of education in the developing country fosters this eect

measuring beliefs and rewards a neuroeconomic approach the neurotransmitter dopamine is central to the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics it is hypothesized to encode the difference between expected and realized rewards and thereby to mediate belief formation and choice we develop the first formal test of this theory of dopaminergic function based on a recent axiomatization by caplin and dean 2008a these tests are satisfied by neural activity in the nucleus accumbens an area rich in dopamine receptors we find evidence for separate positive and negative reward prediction error signals suggesting that behavioral asymmetries in response to losses and gains may parallel asymmetries in nucleus accumbens activity

the brain as a hierarchical organization based on recent neuroscience evidence we model the brain as a dual system organization subject to three conflicts asymmetric information temporal hori zon and incentive salience under the first and second conflicts we show that the uninformed system imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period furthermore decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conflicts under the first and third conflicts it becomes optimal to set a consumption cap finally we discuss the behavioral implications of these rules for choice bracketing and expense tracking and for consumption over the life cycle jel dil d74 d82 d87 d91

misery loves company social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty abstract extensive field evidence shows individuals decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers decisions one hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects an individual s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action we employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty we find strong peer group effects in the laboratory our design allows us to rule out social learning social norms group affiliation and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause we use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including social regret are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity we observe spillover effects as observing another s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen

international redistribution of income summary how do international policies on aid trade and factor movements affect the international distribution of income we calculate the impact by world decile of the actual level of aid flows and the effect on income of merchandise trade restrictions by high income countries we find that aid s distributional impact is equality enhancing extremely small in terms of changes in inequality measures but of some importance for the lowest decile of the distribution we also find that some of this impact is counteracted by lost potential income in the lower deciles from merchandise trade barriers imposed by high income countries

why is the rate of single parenthood lower in canada than in the u s a dynamic equilibrium analysis of welfare policies a critical question in the design of welfare policies is whether to target aid according to household composition as was done in the u s under the aid to families with dependent children afdc program or to rely exclusively on means testing as in canada restricting aid to single mothers for instance has the potential to distort behavior along three demographic margins marriage fertility and divorce we contrast the canadian and the u s policies within an equilibrium model of household formation and human capital investment on children policy differences we consider are eligibility dependence of transfers on the number of children and generosity of transfers our simulations indicate that the policy differences can account for the higher rate of single parenthood in the u s they also show that canadian welfare policy is more effective for fostering human capital accumulation among children from poor families interestingly a majority of agents in our benchmark economy prefers a welfare system that targets single mothers as the u s system does yet does not unlike the u s system make transfers dependent on the number of children

examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives experimental evidence from the people s republic of china several experimental sessions were conducted to elicit certainty equivalents for a sequence of lotteries involving real monetary outcomes the opportunity to conduct sessions in the people s republic of china afforded the ability to offer very large monetary incentives relative to subjects living costs in the highest payoff condition subjects earned three times their normal monthly revenue in the course of a two hour experiment results indicate a statistically significant impact of the level of monetary incentives on revealed risk preferences however even under extreme monetary incentives subjects demanded amounts well in excess of expected value for low probability gain prospects copyright 1992 by american economic association

the multi country transfer problem abstract a general formula is derived for the welfare effects of a set of transfers among several countries in a two good model with production and substitution and compatible with walrasian stability the relation to recent work on transfer paradoxes is sketched

transfers the terms of trade and capital accumulation in the context of a two sector overlapping generations model it is demonstrated that a steady state transfer paradox may arise under commodity trade with stability and without distortions or bystanders the existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation which is shown to always i e for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates improve the donor s terms of trade transfers may also improve steady state welfare for both donor and recipient and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path la litterature en statique du commerce international a conclu que en l absence de distorsions ou de tierces parties les mouvements des termes d echange induits par les transferts ne peuvent pas etre suffisamment importants quand il y a stabilite walrasienne pour engendrer le paradoxe du transfert on a tire la conclusion de modeles dynamiques a un secteur que le paradoxe du transfert est possible mais en comptant sur la mobilite internationale du capital et sur les mouvements dans le niveau mondial du taux d interet plutot que sur les prix et les marches des biens dans un modele dynamique a deux secteurs ou les generations se chevauchent ce qui permet des effets a la fois statiques et intertemporels dans les termes d echange le commerce des biens peut engendrer un paradoxe du transfert en regime permanent quand il y a stabilite walrasienne sans distorsions et tierces parties l existence du paradoxe est attribuable a l effet du transfert sur l accumulation du capital qui toujours pour tout ordre des intensites de facteur et des taux d epargne ameliore les termes d echange du donneur les transferts peuvent aussi ameliorer le bien etre du donneur et du recipiendaire en regime permanent et produire des resultats paradoxaux de bien etre dans le sentier de transition

global imbalances revisited the transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition we study the welfare eects of trade imbalances in a two sector model of monop olistic competition as in perfect competition a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the de cit country and possibly a terms of trade deterioration unlike the conventional wisdom however trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries this is because of a production delocation eect which leads to a reduction in the local price index in the presence of intermediate goods new results arise a trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate to a terms of trade improvement and to a welfare increase under standard parameter con gurations in addition policies that stabilize the exchange rate can make the balanced trade equilibrium unstable these results can explain why the manufac turing sector may agglomerate in countries that resist the real appreciation of their currency and suggest that a xed exchange rate and nominal rigidities may generate short run instability

immiserizing transfers from abroad abstract this paper shows that an international transfer payment may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or increase the donor country s welfare even when world markets are stable despite the traditional view that such a paradox theoretically requires market instability to demonstrate this paradoxical possibility the paper extends the conventional trade theoretic analysis to admit exogenous distortions created by tax cum subsidies in domestic production or endogenous distortions due to additionality requirements imposed by the donor on the recipient this analysis of immiserizing transfers from abroad immediately suggests significant implications for important policy issues including the evaluation of real benefits from foreign aid

negotiating free trade we develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once we show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome leading to worldwide free trade a model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection global free trade is not achieved when the political economy motive for protection is sufficiently large furthermore the model generates both building bloc and stumbling bloc effects of preferential trade agreements in particular we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form a building bloc effect and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden a stumbling bloc effect the analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges

the effects of single mothers welfare use and employment decisions on children s cognitive development i introduction in this article we study the effects of low skilled single mothers welfare use and employment choices during their children s early years on their children s cognitive development we use participation in aid to families with dependent children afdc and after 1996 temporary aid to needy families tanf to represent welfare use before 1996 afdc was one of the largest welfare programs in the united states in addition to cash benefits participation in the afdc program often assured eligibility for other programs such as head start food stamps and medicaid 1 in 1996 the personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act prwora ended afdc replacing it with the tanf program even though prwora introduced a time limit on welfare benefits tanf is still one of the most expansive government programs and participation in tanf remains highly correlated with other program participation welfare is used mostly by low skilled single mothers with low incomes who are likely to be highly constrained in terms of resources to invest in their children s development welfare program participation can provide these mothers with monetary and nonmonetary resources that can be very important to early nurturing but does welfare use benefit the development of the participating children through provision of these resources we analyze the relationship between a mother s welfare use and employment decisions during the first 5 years of her child s life and the child s first observed standardized mathematics score from the peabody individual achievement test piat math it is important to identify contributors to early cognitive development since this has been shown to be a strong predictor of long term achievement in particular early test scores are strongly correlated with educational attainment criminal activity salaries and out of wedlock pregnancy see reviews by duncan and brooks gunn 1997 haveman and wolfe 1995 and currie and thomas 1999 we use math scores on piat test as our primary measure of attainment primarily because they have been shown to be predictors of not only later math scores but also other academic achievement for example see claessens duncan and engel 2009 and duncan et al 2007 we contribute to the literature in three ways first the effects of a mother s decisions in our attainment function are allowed to interact with the child s observed innate ability which we will define later this allows us to obtain distributions for the effects of work and welfare by children s innate ability in addition to a single coefficient that measures only the effect at the mean level to our knowledge our article is one of few that allow for this flexibility bernal 2008 and bernal and keane 2010 2011 find that the marginal effects of a mother s work and child care choices decrease with the innate ability of the child that is although the effects on a child with average innate ability may be small and positive there are significantly larger positive impacts for the children with below average innate ability and large negative effects for children with above average innate ability second we model the child s attainment as a function of the mother s cumulative inputs a child s attainment observed when they turn six is determined by the cumulative welfare use and work experiences of the first 20 quarters 5 years after birth the longer multiple periods not only enable us to identify the effects using a much richer variation in mothers decisions but also allow us to investigate the influence of different intensity levels of work and welfare use third we model multiple channels through which a mother s decisions can affect her child s attainment including direct monetary benefits available for each child parental time and exemplary behavior role model effects captured by the mother s employment and non pecuniary benefits from in kind transfer programs