on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

valuation of the operating flexibility of multinational corporations the returns to multinationality are estimated as the value of operating flexibility empirical measures of the return of multinationality require a precise specification of the extensiveness of the mnc s transnational network to measure the degree of multinationality this precise empirically grounded definition of multinationality has been absent from the academic literature to date we address this omission and we find that two characteristics of the transnational network its breadth number of foreign countries in which the mnc has operations and depth the concentration of foreign subsidiaries in a few countries are significant in explaining the value of operating flexibility in particular we find that the returns to multinationality are maximized for firms with networks that have breadth but not depth the role of market intangibles such as r d and advertising on mnc market valuation is shown to depend on the flexibility regime

the eclectic paradigm of international production a restatement and some possible extensions this article reviews some of the criticisms directed towards the eclectic paradigm of international production over the past decade and restates its main tenets the second part of the article considers a number of possible extensions of the paradigm and concludes by asserting that it remains a robust general framework for explaining and analysing not only the economic rationale of economic production but many organisational and impact issues in relation to mne activity as well

troubled banks impaired foreign direct investment the role of relative access to credit during the 1980 s theories were developed to explain the striking correlation between real exchange rates and foreign direct investment fdi however this relationship broke down for japanese fdi in the 1990 s as the real exchange rate appreciated while fdi plummeted we propose the relative access to credit hypothesis and show that unequal access to credit by japanese firms contributes to the explanation of declining japanese fdi using bank level and firm level data sets we find that financial difficulties at banks were economically and statistically important in reducing the number of fdi projects by japanese firms into the united states jel g21 f36

bundling information goods of decreasing value consumers average value for information goods websites weather forecasts music and news declines with the number consumed this paper provides simple guidelines to optimal bundling marketing strategies in this case if consumers values do not decrease too quickly we show that bundling is approximately optimal if consumers values to subsequent goods decrease quickly we show by example that one should expect bundling to be suboptimal

foreign direct investment and regulatory remedies for banking crises lessons from japan can regulatory interventions alleviate financial crises if so which ones work we draw inferences from the japanese banking crisis of the 1990s using a hand gathered database of bank loans gathered from original sources our results indicate that whereas risk based capital infusions in japan similar to those following the 2009 supervisory capital assessment program stress tests in the us were successful in stimulating aggregate lending by japanese banks earlier blanket infusions comparable to the 2008 troubled asset relief program tarp in the us were not effective moreover changes in accounting rules in japan that revalued bank assets similar to the relaxation of mark to market requirements for banks in the us did not increase aggregate japanese bank lending but rather reallocated it capital constraints during the crisis also induced many japanese banks to close their overseas branches and switch their charters from international to domestic this endogenous charter switch reversed the process of foreign direct investment fdi for many japanese banks therefore we use the japanese banking crisis as a natural experiment to test fdi theories and find empirical support for the relative access hypothesis but not for the industrial organization approach or for the relative wealth hypothesis

semiglobalization and international business strategy if markets were either completely isolated by or integrated across borders there would be little room for international business strategy to have content distinctive from mainstream strategy but a review of the economic evidence about the international integration of markets indicates that we fall in between these extremes into a state of incomplete cross border integration that i refer to as semiglobalization more specifically most measures of market integration have scaled new heights in the last few decades but still fall far short of economic theory s ideal of perfect integration the diagnosis of semiglobalization does more than just supply a relatively stable frame of reference for thinking about the environment of cross border operations it also calls attention to the critical role of location specificity in the prospects of distinctive content for international business strategy relative to mainstream business and corporate strategy in addition it flags factors products subject to location specificity as being salient from the perspective of international business finally it highlights the scope for strategies that strive to capitalize on the large residual barriers to cross border integration as well as those that simply try to cope with them

the structure of a contract and the theory of a non exclusive resource the process of arriving at a useful concept of analysis is not only slow and painful but also may go astray and attain nothing useful someone begins with one example or observation followed by a theory which is intuitively plausible a theoretical term associated with a vague concept is coined examples of a seemingly different type emerge which call for another theory the process goes on as examples and theories continue to accumulate the different categories under the same heading of analysis serve only to confuse and each associated theory becomes ad hoc such has been the fate of the concept of externality a more useful approach i think is via contractual conditions the example chosen for illustration is marine fisheries where the fishing right is taken

federal control over education crisis deception and institutional change abstract this paper analyzes the emergence of two key statutes which first established comprehensive federal controls over education in the united states the national defense education act of 1958 and the elementary and secondary education act of 1965 the u s experience in establishing federal control over education is examined against a model of institutional change grounded in the economics of political transaction cost manipulation detailed examination of relevant congressional documents shows the roles of real and feigned crisis and of deliberate deception in effecting acceptance of federal control over education

fdi and internationalization evidence from u s subsidiaries of foreign banks nine foreign banks own the ten largest u s affiliates or subsidiaries of foreign banks these account for 86 of the assets in affiliates and subsidiaries their histories suggest that most now represent an attempt by the parents to grow outside the confines of home markets original motives for their establishment have included ethnic banking and operational stability stemming from geographical dispersion there is one major instance of acquiring capabilities but it does not involve retail banking the dispersal of national origins suggests that bank specific capabilities are the primary source of the parents competitive advantage being from english speaking countries also appears to help lastly the growth of the affiliates and subsidiaries has not come from incremental growth but rather from a rearrangement of assets among banks

mitigating risk in international mergers and acquisitions the role of contingent payouts previous internationalization studies have focused on the entry modes employed by multinational firms but have not considered the contractual heterogeneity that underlies each mode it is important to examine these contractual details as the firm may be able to obtain some of the benefits typically associated with one entry mode while selecting another in the case of international mergers and acquisitions m as a key contractual variable is whether the parties agree to a performance contingent payout structure which can mitigate the risk of adverse selection in this paper we examine the antecedents of contingent payouts in the form of earnouts and stock payments the results indicate that firms lacking international and domestic acquisition experience turn to contingent payouts when purchasing targets in high tech and service industries firms tend to avoid contingent payouts in host countries with problems with investor protection and legal enforceability

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

government manipulation of constitutional level transaction costs a general theory of transaction cost augmentation and the growth of government transaction costs are pivotal to the ongoing political choice of where to draw the line between the private sector and the public sector contrary to the dominant paradigm politically important transaction costs are actively manipulated in the public sector by those who perceive potential personal gain from such action over time transaction cost changes so created by government decision makers may fundamentally redefine the role and scope of government to analyze the role of transaction costs in the growth or decline of government it is essential to distinguish transaction costs that are unavoidable realworld constraints from those that are contrived in the sense that they are created by government officials use or extension of their existing authority once discretionary power is vested in the government its officials have both the capacity and the incentive to restructure the transaction costs constraining the revision ofgovernrnental authority this restructuring of transaction costs may take two forms 1 altering people s perceptions of the costs and benefits of governmental authority in a given sphere an information cost problem 1 2 altering the cost of acting upon one s perceptions of the costs and benefits of collectivization in order to procure revision of the scope of governmental authority 2

budget maximizing governmental agencies an empirical test niskanen s theory of government budgeting involving powerful agencies interested in maximizing their budgets through bargaining with a weak poorly informed governmental sponsor has received wide recognition this paper presents the first direct empirical tests of niskanen s ideas one implication of niskanen s model of budgeting is that the demand for public services will appear to be elastic niskanen s model also implies restrictions on the elasticity of the derived demand for labor in the public sector neither set of predictions is supported by existing empirical research on government activity

recapitalization credit and liquidity this paper documents the characteristics of public recapitalizations of banks undertaken since 2008 and examines their relationship with bank lending the analysis covers the 15 oecd countries whose banking sectors were most severely hit by the crisis and that provided the largest public bailouts relative to their national gross domestic product gdp we show that the design of the interventions varied considerably across banks and countries larger and higher loss absorbing capital injections were targeted at weaker banks and at banks of systemically relevant size when the state of public finances allowed our results encourage theoretical research with respect to non linear and potentially adverse effects of bailouts as well as further investigation into the link between the loss absorbing properties of bank capital and loan growth with respect to bank lending we find that only large recapitalizations and infusions of common equity are associated with higher total regulatory capital ratios and sustained loan growth we find no significant relationship between public capital provisions and interbank lending and challenge the view that local banks increase loan growth relatively more in response to a recapitalization mike mariathasan and ouarda merrouche

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked