price wars caused by switching costs in many markets consumers have switching costs for example learning costs or transaction costs of changing between functionally equivalent brands of a product or of using any brand for the first time we analyse a four period complete information model of a market with switching costs in which new entry occurs after the second period the new entry results in equilibrium in a price war that is the new entrants prices are higher in the post entry period than in the entry period and the incumbent s price falls in either the pre entry period or the entry period and subsequently rises we can interpret the incumbent s lowering its price in the pre entry period as limit pricing behaviour we distinguish between two types of price war that can occur and show how the type or mixture of types that arises depends on the size of switching costs

further empirical evidence on popularity and electoral cycle effects this paper empirically examines the hypothesis that popularity is typified by electoral cycle effects we suggest that if the data is filtered on the basis of a model assuming informed voters there is no evidence for the electoral cycle hypothesis

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

trade ins and introductory offers in a monopoly we model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers trade ins or new buyers introductory offers of a quasi durable good we analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third degree price discrimination in our two period model the monopolist sets a first period price that segments the second period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good in the second period different prices are quoted to the two market segments we present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers rationality

an equilibrium politico economic model an equilibrium politico economic model i introduction recent empirical studies by alesina and sachs 1986 and haynes and stone 1987 have found that political elections have significant implications for the time paths of employment and inflation explnations of this phenomenon fall into two general categories political business cycle theories and partisan theories in political business cycle models it is assumed that the government has both the ability and desire to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes partisan theories suggest that if competing parties follow different policies it is the surprise of an election result that causes a response from the economy however partisan theories can only explain why different parties experience different levels of employment and output early in an electoral term here a partisan model is developed in which economic and political shocks before an election have asymmetric effects on inflation employment and voting behavior depending on which party is in power and which economic variables effect voting ii political structure and voting two political parties compete periodically for control of the government the parties are distinguished by their expected monetary growth rates denoted mu sup h high and mu sup l low the electorate consists of a continuum of voters distributed uniformly on the interval p p individuals located closer to p are more favorably pre disposed to party h let x sub t be an index of the relative popularity of the parties at time t if x sub t 0 party h has a plurality of support if x sub t in nonelection years the expected monetary growth rate will be the incumbents trend rate while in election years it will be the probabilistically weighted average of the two parties expected monetary growth rates iii economic structure the economy is described by a rational expectations macro model unemployment is determined by the surprise phillips curve u sub t eta sub 0 eta sub 1 sub t 1 pi sup e sub t pi sub t epsilon sub t where sub t 1 pi sup e sub t denotes expected inflation and epsilon sub t a real shock distributed epsilon sub t is approx n 0 sigma sup 2 sub epsilon independent over time eta sub 0 is greater than 0 and eta sub 1 is greater than 0 are constants eta sub 0 is the natural rate the rate of inflation is given by pi sub t mu sup s sub t mu sup d sub t where mu sup s sub t and mu sup d sub t are respectively the growth rates of the nominal money supply and demand for real beginning of period cash balances

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

general economic conditions and national elections the fact that economic conditions influence voters is a leading commonplace of conversation in election years the question is is this fact in fact a fact despite the overwhelming popularity of the fact it has received neither an explicit theoretical analysis presumably because it is so obvious that economic adversity should create political adversaries nor until recently a satisfactory statistical analysis gerald h kramer has presented a multivariate analysis of congressional elections which would strongly suggest that fluctuations in the rate of unemployment have no appreciable effect upon elections but that fluctuations in per capita real income are influential in the following pages i propose to 1 reaffirm his finding on the electoral unimportance of ordinary fluctuations in unemployment 2 argue that contrary to kramer fluctuations in real income also do not have important electoral effects and 3 present an argument based upon rational voter behavior for the unimportance of general economic conditions in national elections

political business cycles with endogenous election timing evidence from japan this paper empirically investigates the political business cycle hypothesis for japan taking into account the potential two way interaction that originates from the control within certain limitations by the government over election timing of japanese elections using a mixed qualitative and continuous variable simultaneous equation estimation procedure the authors cannot reject the traditional political business cycle manipulation hypothesis causation running from the timing of elections to real gnp growth they also find some limited support for the opportunistic hypothesis strong real gnp growth triggers elections copyright 1991 by mit press

disposable income unemployment inflation and state spending in a dynamic political economic model this paper formulates a medium term macroeconomic model of disposable income unemployment inflation and state spending proposes a theory of qualitative choice to explain electoral popularity in terms of these variables and develops three approaches to the formulation of political economic policy the first approach is static sets the tax rate to reconcile the interests of various pressure groups and yields a political trade off between the private and public sector the second approach relies on maximizing the probability of winning the next election and gives rise to a political business cycle unless the electorate votes strategically the implications of crowding out of private investment under alternative monetary rules autonomous behaviour of the state bureaucracy and tax indexation for the political business cycle are also examined the third approach analyzes the objective of maximizing the uninterrupted length in office it yields a short run political cycle superimposed on a longer cycle

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

the political theory of the business cycle two strands of recent empirical work pose a challenge for the macro theorist when brought together one is the rational expectations interpretation of the business cycle the other is the political theory of the business cycle this paper attempts a reconciliation of these two strands in a theory where national political parties have to satisfy the preference of their own supporters as well as the floating voter the implications are that party voters evaluate government performance with respect to expected inflation and output and their variances and that parties will pursue different feedback rules

sales and consumer lock in this paper examines the dynamically consistent price path for a new product monopolist unable to commit to future prices when consumers must incur setup costs of adopting the product the authors find that setup costs give rise to a price path with introductory sales along the path periods of high prices during which only locked in or captive customers buy the product alternate with sales low price periods during which new customers adopt the product as the stock of captive customers increases over time sales become less frequent after the customer base reaches some critical level no further sales take place they show that the monopolist may hold a sleeping patient in which initial sales of the product are postponed to avoid locking into a high pricing strategy that ignores new customers copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

on testing the scale sensitivity of poverty measures past tests of the sensitivity of aggregate poverty measures to changes in equivalence scales can be very sensitive to the arbitrary choice of the pivotal reference demographics it is recommended that future tests should use demographics typical of people living near the poverty line as their reference

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

economic performance voting and political support a unified approach a presidential vote function and a presidential approval ratings function are jointly estimated for u s postwar observations the estimation technique treats the two equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers of observations cross equation restrictions implying that voters and poll respondents use identical standards in judging the economic performance of incumbents are imposed and tested estimates show that both votes and approval ratings are influenced by gnp growth and inflation the results suggest that poll respondents are more inflation averse than voters however tests of this hypothesis are not conclusive copyright 1990 by mit press

on political business cycles with endogenous election dates abstract the pattern of policy generated cycles which result in the nordhaus model is examined under different hypotheses regarding election date determination

is the political business cycle really dead a decade ago in this journal mccallum 26 proclaimed the theory of the political business cycle 30 25 17 to be dominated by the emergence of the rational expectations literature 23 24 34 clearly the two theories are inconsistent when a strong view of rational expectations sees governments unable to manipulate real variables to create booms in election years since then new developments in macroeconomics have occasioned serious doubts as to whether the strong version of rational expectations is supported by the data 28 2 1 31 12 furthermore new advances in the political business cycle literature 36 4 have attempted to reconciliate the two theories by emphasizing that expectation errors may result from the presence of party dependent policy reaction functions and uncertainty about election outcomes the purpose of this paper is to step back and reconsider whether or not the empirical evidence presented by mccallum favoring rational expectations for the u s was really that strong and could be generalized to other countries here the u k given that the rational expectations hypothesis has been rejected at least in the strong mccallum and sargent version 26 34 it

do patents slow down technological progress abstract this paper challenges the widely held view in the industrial organization literature that patents always speed up technological progress we introduce a model of an innovating firm with uncertain property right to its innovation the impact of a commitment to an r d project is to create future options for patenting and market introduction each decision undertaken will change the conditions in which the innovator operates it is shown that an increase in patent protection reduces the elasticity of the option value of the program with respect to the value of the project raising the threshold value of market introduction and enhancing the ability of the innovator to wait thus while the effect of patent is to raise the rents on and thereby the potential amount of innovations it also tends to slow down market introduction

evolutionary voter sophistication and political business cycles the concept of the sophisticated electorate is central to many contemporary political economic models however no existing studies have yet clarified how voters could develop a sophisticated way of evaluating economic performance this study suggests a transitional hypothesis that removes the constraint that voters have prior knowledge about the macroeconomic environment and the true economic intent of the incumbent government the hypothesis permits behavioral innovation from learning and predicts that the evolutionary process toward sophistication may be triggered by socially suboptimal political business cycles that reveal the self serving characteristic of the government the empirical analyses using recent japanese experiences show that japanese political support behavior shifted from naivete to sophistication in the early 1970s after political manipulation occurred in the 1969 and 1972 parliamentary elections

political business cycles and endogenous elections empirical research of political business cycles pbcs may suffer from endogeneity bias when incumbent governments have discretion to call for an early election using an instrumental variable iv routine on data from japan and the u k we find strong evidence to support the notion that election timing is a function of the economy rather than the macroeconomy being driven by elections as assumed in pbc in single equation regressions no evidence of political cycles are found but hausman tests suggest elections are endogenous in our regressions a monetary cycle in japan and an inflation cycle in the u k are uncovered through iv estimation

rationality and the political business cycle the case of local government the empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in section 2 in pre election periods local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels the extent of deviation is approximately 20

the political business cycle under rational voting behavior this essay argues that politically motivated business cycles could persist in a democratic society even if the electorate votes in a rational fully informed manner provided that government policymakers have the means to systematically generate macroeconomic fluctuations this cyclic outcome reflects the preferences of an electorate that is composed of imperfectly altruistic voters belonging to different overlapping generations since each generation has a different horizon over which it would like to have elected politicians provide an optimal economic policy plan an intergenerational conflict of interests situation arises this conflict is placed into an explicit political context whereby cycles become generated under the institutional constraint of periodic elections

the political manipulation of macroeconomic policy conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political as well as economic forces using vector autoregression analysis i test three models of monetary policy determination for the united states 1953 1984 the electoral cycle model that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle the party differences model that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations and the referendum model that changes in presidential approval create in effect a continuing referendum allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary analysis shows that monetary policies as measured by the monetary base and short term interest rates respond to the election cycle and presidential approval although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables

rationality causality and the relation between economic conditions and the popularity of parties an empirical investigation for the federal republic of germany 1971 1982 abstract two questions are discussed using german popularity data from 1971 to 1982 it is asked whether it is true that using time series methods no relation can be found between economic variables and the popularity of parties taking ex post predictions strong evidence is presented that such a relation exists even if usual granger causality tests cannot detect it but is this relation compatible with rational expectations of the electorate this is at best partly the case as the anticipated part of the unemployment rate has a significant impact on the popularities of the two major german parties

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

who surfs who manipulates the determinants of opportunistic election timing and electorally motivated economic intervention in this paper i develop a career concerns model of government policy choice within a dynamic optimal stopping framework to predict the degree of surfing opportunistic timing and manipulation politically motivated economic intervention under alternate institutional structures and voter characteristics among other results i find that the likelihood of opportunistic elections rises with exogenous economic performance with longer maximum term lengths with future electoral uncertainty and with economic volatility but diminishes in the value of office holding manipulation increases with the maximum term length and with the value of office holding but decreases with exogenous economic performance and with economic volatility the model suggests that single party governments should be highly opportunistic in calling elections and that countries that allow opportunistic election timing should experience less economically distortionary political intervention than their fixed timing counterparts

the rational timing of parliamentary elections this paper presents a rational choice model for the timing of parliamentary elections in political systems where the government has the option of calling an early election the optimal timing of elections involves the government weighing the benefits of calling an election versus the costs and is modelled mathematically as an optimal stopping problem the model implies that the timing of elections depends upon time left in the government s term the degree of electoral uncertainty the volatility of government popularity the government s time rate of discount and institutional constraints such as the length of term and whether the government is likely to be forced from power by a vote of no confidence

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

rebates introductory sales and the coase conjecture abstract a model of a durable goods monopoly is presented in which results can differ qualitatively from the coase conjecture when introductory sales are used the second price can be higher than the opening price when a rebate is given for the first unit purchased the opening price is strictly greater than the minimum valuation

factors affecting inter industry variation of foreign ownership of manufacturing industry a set of hypotheses incorporating various explanations to foreign direct investment are developed and tested on a simultaneous equation model on australian data the analysis shows that foreign ownership of industry tends to be higher in the humanskill intensive and technology intensive industries high protection seems to be an important inducement for multinational enterprises participation in australian industry the results demonstrate how a major bias can be introduced when the simultaneity involved in the determination of foreign ownership is ignored

the political economy of overvaluation most of the literature on political business cycles e g nordhaus 1975 macrae 1977 van der ploeg i984 assumes that the incumbent political party attempts to secure re election by maximising the expected number of votes cast in its favour at the forthcoming election and to exploit lags due to adaptive expectations the government can then fool the electorate by judiciously depressing output in the early part of its term in office in order to force down the expected rate of inflation and to create a boom without too many adverse inflationary consequences towards election eve in order to gain the sympathy of the electorate such political business cycles rely on a naive electorate and cannot occur in new classical economies with market clearing and rational expectations because then the electorate would see through the government s vote maximising strategy e g mccallum 1978 minford and peel i982 if the private sector has rational expectations and prices or wages are sticky this is observationally equivalent to adaptive expectations and flexible prices and wages e g sargent 1976 but nevertheless the electorate would see through a vote maximising strategy and thus no political business cycle would occur in any case it is not clear that the empirical evidence supports this view of the political business cycle e g frey 1978 one reason for this is that it may not be realistic to assume that output can be changed instantaneously whilst inflation can through expectations only be influenced in a gradual fashion in an open economy it is much easier and faster to affect real income and consumers prices through the exchange rate than it is to have an effect on aggregate demand output and employment an appreciation of the exchange rate immediately cuts import prices and consumers prices and therefore immediately boosts real income this combined with the reduction in the real value of imports depresses aggregate demand but over time standard neoclassical substitution effects ensure that the volume of exports decreases the volume of imports decreases and therefore aggregate demand and output increase the above argument is based on the j curve effect in the balance of trade for which there is ample empirical evidence e g diaz alejandro 1966 magee 1973 this note explores the implications of the j curve effect for the political business cycle in a small open economy as suggested by van der ploeg i984 and dornbusch i987 section iv section i sets up the model of the economy section ii derives the development of the exchange rate real income and output over the course of the political business cycle section iii concludes with an interpretation and qualification of the results

the rationality of economic voting and the macroeconomic regime since voter rationality plays a major role in theories of political economics it is important for political analysts to investigate the extent of voter sophistication a conventional strategy for addressing this question is to determine what decision rule voters appear to use by estimating rival political support models that embody varying assumptions about voter rationality however under some circumstances such a strategy may be incapable of identifying the descriptively superior model due to an observational equivalence problem the paper estimates the competing political support models under alternative macroeconomic regimes and finds evidence favoring the nonrationalist or adaptive model

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

the long memory model of political support some further results this article extends the results of byers et al 1997 on long memory in support for the conservative and labour parties in the uk using longer samples and additional poll series it finds continuing support for the arfima 0 d 0 model though with somewhat smaller values of the long memory parameter we find that the move to telephone polling in the mid 1990s had no apparent effect on the estimated value of d for either party finally we find that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the parties share a common long memory parameter which we estimate at around 0 65