small firms and the merger mania empirical research has found an average or even superior performance of small firms this seems to be at variance with the secular concentration process and the recurrent merger waves this paper tries to integrate size and merger research higher profitability of small firms is explained by their incentive structure and shorter decision lags but also by lower wages and higher individual risk premia their faster growth in the eighties was in addition fostered by diversification of demand miniaturization of technology and a need for flexibility under uncertainty the merger wave on the other hand does not necessarily prove that large firms are superior managers and shareholders may be seduced by stockmarket optimism a sizeable industry of banks agents and lawyers have their own interests in mergers mergers may be important in declining markets and for the acquisition of technology on average mergers do not improve efficiency profits or internal growth small and large firms serve different purposes performance depends on the market incentives and technology the establishment growth and closure of small firms as well as mergers are attempts to find the optimal organization for utility maximization in a world of severe uncertainty and diverse needs

the power of green defaults the impact of regional variation of opt out tariffs on green energy demand in germany abstract the present paper focuses on green defaults as demand side policies supporting the uptake of renewable energy in germany it sets out to gain a better understanding of whether and for whom green electricity defaults work the present study is one of the first to use a large scale data set to investigate this question we combine micro level data from the german socio economic panel gsoep covering private households including a wealth of individual information with macro level information such as population density of a region and proportion of energy suppliers in a given region that use a green opt out tariff within their basic supply we show that in germany green defaults automatically enrolling customers in renewable energy sources tend to stick especially but not only among those who are concerned about the problem of climate change this finding based on real world rather than experimental evidence attests to the power of automatic enrollment in addressing environmental problems in germany and potentially beyond including climate change and also adds to the growing literature on the substantial effects of shifting from opt in to opt out strategies

incomplete wage posting we consider a directed search model in which workers differ in productivity productivity becomes observable to firms after assessing their workers on the job but it is not verifiable firms with vacancies choose between posting a noncontingent wage and leaving wages subject to bargaining with the worker under wage bargaining firms cannot optimize the trade off between paying higher wages and having a larger probability of filling vacancies but wage bargaining makes wages increasing in worker productivity and so may allow firms to attract better workers into the vacancy when workers heterogeneity is large and bargaining powers come close to satisfying hosios s rule firms opt for bargaining yet equilibria with bargaining fail to maximize aggregate net income and sometimes are not constrained pareto optimal

product differentiation and profitability an asymmetric model the purpose of this paper is to develop a model of product differentiation in which there is an asymmetry namely that some customers are easier to serve than others it turns out that profits are negatively related to difficulty of service and that profits and market share are negatively related the results of this model are used to shed light on some aspects of the collusion versus differential efficiency debate and are also compared with vertical product differentiation models copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

international trade and labor market discrimination textabstractwe embed a competitive search model with labor market discrimination or nepotism into a two sector two country framework in order to analyze how labor market discrimination impacts the pattern of international trade and also how trade trade affects discrimination discrimination or nepotism reduces the matching probability and output in the skilled labor intensive differentiated product sector so that the country with more discriminatory firms has a comparative advantage in the simple sector as countries alter their production mix in accordance with their comparative advantage trade liberalization can then reinforce the negative effect of discrimination on development in the more discriminatory country and reduce its effect in the country with fewer discriminatory firms similarly the profit difference between non discriminatory and discriminatory firms increases in the less discriminatory country and shrinks in the more discriminatory one in this way trade can further reduce discrimination in a country where it is less prevalent and increase it where it is more firmly entrenched

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

do residential customers respond to hourly prices evidence from a dynamic pricing experiment this paper uses the results of a dynamic pricing experiment for households in the district of columbia to determine whether the reduction in demand associated with an hourly price signal is economically different from the demand reduction associated with an equivalent price signal that is four times longer in duration for both regular and all electric customers the percentage demand reduction associated with a given percentage increase in the hourly price is approximately equal to the percentage demand reduction associated with the same percentage price increase of a much longer duration

labour market performance effects of discrimination and loss of skill we examine the impact of discrimination on labor market performance when workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during an unemployment experience within a search and matching framework we show that both natives and immigrants are affected by discrimination discrimination in one sector has positive spillovers inducing employment to increase in the other sector and the effect on labor market performance therefore depends on whether discrimination is present in only one sector or in both discrimination may induce workers to train more or less than natives after having lost their skills dependent upon in which sector there is discrimination net output tends to be most negatively affected by discrimination among high skilled workers jel j15 j31 j61 j64 j71

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

discrimination in an equilibrium search model i construct an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and show that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers one implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination in addition the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market

on gender gaps and self fulfilling expectations alternative implications of paid for training i introduction the recent literature on gender differences in the labor market has focused mainly on two issues the first one deals with the mechanisms e g adverse selection that can amplify initial differences in preferences or productivity across genders leading to sizeable gender gaps in wages labor force participation or working hours these models help us understand to what extent changes in gender gaps have been due to changes in fundamentals including differences in the pattern of endogenous accumulation of human capital by men and women 1 the second one is related to the channels explaining persistence in gender gaps even when exogenous differences across the sexes are of little importance or even absent 2 these studies tend to rely upon the existence of incentive problems in the labor market e g moral hazard leading to self fulfilling prophecies about differences in gender roles without assuming any initial comparative advantages our paper falls into this second strand of the literature by considering an alternative mechanism based on statistical discrimination by firms in the provision of paid for training to male and female workers this yields multiplicity of equilibria in gender gaps even in the absence of moral hazard 3 the basic idea in models of gender gaps relying upon self fulfilling prophecies is that employers beliefs about women s lower attachment to the labor market lead to wage differentials in favor of men hence since women expect to face a lower expected opportunity cost they end up devoting more time to housework validating in this way firms beliefs for example albanesi and olivetti 2009 propose a model where firms are subject to incentive compatible constraints due to their imperfect monitoring of workers effort a moral hazard problem and of hours of housework an adverse selection problem as a result different types of labor contracts are offered to men and women in a similar vein lommerud and vagstad 2007 deal with a model where firms allocate workers to fast and slow track jobs the former requiring a fixed investment cost if women have traditionally exerted primary major responsibility at home and wages are non contractible they will predominantly follow a mommy track in equilibrium while incentive problems often used to derive additional predictions on the structure of wages to be confronted with the data provide a useful modeling device they could be somewhat restrictive for instance concerning the difficulty of perfectly monitoring effort pay gaps should be negligible for routine tasks performed by less skilled employees for whom effort and output should be easily observable yet even after removing differences in observable characteristics and in the overall wage dispersion there is evidence about substantial gender gaps in hourly wages in these categories see e g blau and kahn 2000 bassanini and saint martin 2008 de la rica et al 2008 our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a novel mechanism which does not rely on incentive problems we consider a two period model in which firms initially offer paid for training to workers taking as given the division of housework between spouses in the second period spouses decide on how to split the certain and uncertain parts of housework where the latter is captured by the realization of a shock affecting household tasks during this period e g unexpected need of housework or events that require parental leave etc both decisions interact because the housework decision determines whether a spouse works or quits after receiving training and the firm chooses the amount of training without observing the household s housework allocation statistical discrimination arises in this setup as a result of firms prior beliefs about which spouse is more likely to quit the job under the key assumptions that wages are predetermined with respect to housework shocks and that the household does not re optimize after the shock is revealed asymmetric beliefs will induce differences in the provision of training across spouses

an equilibrium search matching model of discrimination abstract a model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical groups which are discriminated against e g blacks women earn lower wages and endure longer unemployment spells

behavioral study of personalized automated demand response in the workplace abstract this paper presents a quasi randomized controlled trial in a workplace with personalized lighting control and investigates the impact of automated demand response dr on employees it also clarifies what type of conditions will make employees participate in dr to meet this objective we set up four treatment groups opt in performance incentive opt in fixed incentive opt out performance incentive and opt out fixed incentive in the experiment the group with the highest participation rate is the opt out fixed incentive subsequently we estimate two average treatment effects intent to treat and treatment on treated for dr the results reveal a significant reduction in electricity consumption during peak hours for all four treatment groups we find that although the dr participation rate is high for the opt out group its average energy saving effect is not significantly different than that for the opt in group and the average energy saving amount of opt in consumers is larger than that of opt out consumers we also show a similar trade off between the participation rate and the power saving effect for employees participating in dr

making the implicit explicit a look inside the implicit discount rate implicit discount rates idrs are employed in energy models to capture household investment decisions yet the factors behind the idr and their respective implications for policy making usually remain blurred and fractional the proposed comprehensive framework distinguishes three broad categories of factors underlying the idr for household adoption of energy efficient technologies eets preferences notably over time risk loss debt and the environment predictable ir rational behavior bounded rationality rational inattention behavioral biases and external barriers to energy efficiency existing empirical findings suggest that the factors underlying the idrs that differ across household characteristics and technologies should be accounted for in energy models furthermore the framework allows for a fresh look at the interplay of idrs and policies we argue that a simple observation of high idrs or observing correlations between idrs and socio economic characteristics does not provide guidance for policy making since the underlying sources cannot be identified instead we propose that some of the factors underlying the idr notably external barriers can be changed through directed policy interventions whereas other factors notably preferences and predictable ir rational behavior are innate and can only be taken into account through reactive policy interventions

racial disparity in unemployment abstract in the united states black workers earn less than their white counterparts and have higher rates of unemployment empirical work indicates that most of this wage gap is accounted for by differences in cognitive skills that emerge at an early age in this paper we demonstrate that the same is not true for black white disparity in unemployment a large unexplained unemployment differential motivates the paper s second contribution a potential theoretical explanation this explanation is built around a model that embeds statistical discrimination into the subjective worker evaluation process that lies at the root of the efficiency wage theory of equilibrium unemployment

competition and gender prejudice are discriminatory employers doomed to fail according to becker s famous theory on discrimination gary becker 1957 the economics of discrimination university of chicago press entrepreneurs with a strong prejudice against female workers forgo profits by submitting to their tastes in a competitive market their firms lack efficiency and are therefore forced to leave we present new empirical evidence for this prediction by studying the survival of start up firms in longitudinal matched employer employee data we find that firms with strong preferences for discrimination approximated by a low share of female employees relative to the industry average have significantly shorter survival rates this is especially relevant for firms starting out with female shares in the lower tail of the distribution competition at the industry level additionally reduces firm survival and accelerates the rate at which prejudiced firms are weeded out we also find evidence for employer learning as highly discriminatory start up firms that manage to survive submit to market powers and increase their female workforce over time

strategic gains from discrimination abstract according to a classical argument an employer handicaps herself if basing hiring decisions on factors unrelated to productivity therefore discrimination is undermined by competition this paper in contrast argues that being discriminatory can be a commitment device that helps an employer and its rivals to partially segment the labor market which leads to lower wages and higher profits discrimination can thus be an endogenous response to competition indeed the relationship between discrimination and competition can be non monotone moreover the logic suggests that a ban on wage discrimination may instead lead to discrimination in hiring

expectations as endowments evidence on reference dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments while evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points little is known about what determines them we conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined at least in part by expectations in an exchange experiment we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item in a valuation experiment we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness to accept for it the high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20 30 copyright 2011 oxford university press

prejudice and wages an empirical assessment of becker s the economics of discrimination we test the predictions from becker s 1957 seminal work on employer prejudice and find that relative black wages a vary negatively with the prejudice of the marginal white in a state b vary negatively with the prejudice in the lower tail of the prejudice distribution but are unaffected by the prejudice of the most prejudiced persons in a state and c vary negatively with the fraction of a state that is black our estimates suggest that one quarter of the racial wage gap is due to prejudice with nontrivial consequences for black lifetime earnings

behavioral environmental economics promises and challenges environmental issues provide a rich ground for identifying the existence and consequences of human limitations in this paper we present a growing literature lying at the interface between behavioral and environmental economics this literature identifies alternative solutions to traditional economic instruments in environmental domains that often work imperfectly but it also faces a set of challenges including the difficulty of computing welfare effects and the identification of a robust environmental policy based on context dependent socio psychological effects we illustrate our critical discussion with two behavioral schemes that have been widely implemented green nudges and corporate environmental responsibility

persistent wage dispersion and involuntary unemployment it is costly for firms offers to workers to be turned down both because firms must make additional offers and making offers is costly and because capital is underused or unused provided that workers apply to at least two firms for jobs there will be wage dispersion in equilibrium and some workers will randomly fail to receive any wage offers firms in the same industry with access to the same technology may nevertheless choose different levels of capital intensity firms using capital intensive technologies will pay higher wages

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

testing the effect of defaults on the thermostat settings of oecd employees default options have been shown to affect behaviour in a variety of economic choice tasks including health care and retirement savings less research has tested whether defaults affect behaviour in the domain of energy efficiency this study uses data from a randomized controlled experiment in which the default settings on office thermostats in an oecd office building were manipulated during the winter heating season and employees chosen thermostat setting observed over a 6 week period using difference in differences panel and censored regression models to control for maximum allowable thermostat settings we find that a 1 c decrease in the default caused a reduction in the chosen setting by 0 38 c on average sixty five percent of this effect could be attributed to office occupant behaviour p value 0 044 the difference in differences model shows that small decreases in the default 1 led to a greater reduction in chosen settings than large decreases 2 we also find that office occupants who are more apt to adjust their thermostats prior to the intervention were less susceptible to the default we find no evidence that offices with multiple occupants displayed different patterns in thermostat choices than single occupant offices we conclude that this kind of intervention can increase building level energy efficiency and discuss potential explanations and broader policy implications of our findings

gender economics an assessment concerns about gender equality have jumped to the forefront of public debate in recent years and gender economics is slowly affirming its place as a major field of study this assessment examines where we are in terms of gender equality it reviews the theoretical foundations that can explain existing inequalities and documents the empirical findings supported by the theories identifying avenues for future research and providing a fruitful framework to think about the effectiveness of policies and interventions targeting gender inequality in doing so i provide the foundations against which the contributions in this issue can be placed

do good workers hurt bad workers or is it the other way around i study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model a worker s productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker firm specific component firms advertise unconditional wage offers only the resulting equilibrium is inefficient with a too high wage premium for high type workers and too few high type jobs this reduces the welfare of high type workers my findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation where it is argued that the existence of high type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low type workers

on the misuse of the profits sales ratio to infer monopoly power the common use of the profits sales ratio as a measure of the lerner index of monopoly power is flawed even with the assumption of constant returns because of problems connected with the valuation of capital the size of the error is related to the cost of capital the growth rate of the firm the depreciation method used and most important the shape of the stream of benefits resulting from an investment examples show that the error can be quite large further the error is likely to be systematically related to the variables used in regression studies

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

impact measurement of tariff changes when experimentation is not an option a case study of ontario canada abstract this paper presents the first year results of a three year study that was designed to measure the impact of time of use rates in the canadian province of ontario unlike prior studies which have analyzed such impacts in an experimental setting featuring the randomized allocation of customers to treatment and control groups this study deals with a situation where the deployment of time of use rates was not experimental in nature it was part of a full scale program by carefully drawing samples across four local distribution companies we were able to interpret the study as a natural experiment and construct control groups and treatment groups we used the addilog model of consumer demand to estimate elasticities of substitution between peak mid peak and off peak periods the addilog model includes as a special case the constant elasticity of substitution model that has been widely used in the literature on customer response to time of use rates the estimated elasticities are well behaved and consistent with those found in the literature

on the effects of ranking by unemployment duration abstract we propose a theory based on the firm s hiring behavior that rationalizes the observed significant decline of callback rates for an interview and exit rates from unemployment and the mild decline of reemployment wages over unemployment duration we build a directed search model with symmetric incomplete information on worker types and non sequential search by firms sorting due to firms testing of applicants in the past makes expected productivity fall with duration which induces firms to rank applicants by duration in equilibrium callback and exit rates both fall with unemployment duration in our numerical exercise using u s data we show that our model can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns with the firm s ranking decision accounting for a sizable part

measuring market power for some industrial sectors in austria this paper applies an oligopoly model which parameterizes the degree of market power for two industrial sectors glass industry non electrical machinery in austria in contrast all other paper in the new empirical indsutrial organization literature we account for the non stationarity characteristics of the data series a dynamic specification procedure which assumes structural long run equilibrium relationships is therefore applied since a simultaneous system with non linear cross equation restrictions is implied by the economic model a full information maximum likelihood method is used the data reveal a higher degree of market power for the glass industry than for non electrical machinery this hierarchy is in line with the position of these industries for concentration rates and herfindahl indices

investment incentives for flexible demand options under different market designs abstract this paper analyzes investment incentives for flexible manufacturing facilities under different market designs we propose a multi stage equilibrium model incorporating endogenous determination of generation capacity investment network expansion and redispatch based on the model introduced by grimm et al 2016 including flexibilization of industrial electricity consumption the model allows to investigate incentives for flexibilization and the impact of flexible industrial electricity consumers on the system an application to the german electricity market reveals that flexible industrial electricity consumption can be profitable for firms if the share of flexible electricity consumers is high price fluctuations are mitigated which lowers the individual cost savings from demand flexibility comparing different market designs positive impacts of flexible electricity demand on the system are observed in both the system optimum and the market equilibrium in scenarios with flexible industrial electricity consumption welfare is considerably higher than in those without this is due to lower electricity costs of industrial consumers but more importantly due to less investment in conventional power generation as well as a reduced transmission network expansion however a comparison of nodal and uniform pricing underlines the importance of regional price signals with respect to an efficient allocation of flexible industrial demand

on the segmentation of markets this paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable there exist infinitely many marketplaces and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium where agents match with the first person they meet all equilibria have the same matching pattern although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models

racial discrimination in labor markets with posted wage offers we analyze race discrimination in labor markets in which wage offers are posted if employers with job vacancies receive multiple applicants they choose the most qualified but may choose arbitrarily among equally qualified applicants in the model firms post wages workers choose where to apply and firms decide which workers to hire labor market frictions greatly amplify racial disparities so mild discriminatory tastes or small productivity differences can produce large wage differentials between the races compared with the nondiscriminatory equilibrium the discriminatory equilibrium features lower net output lower wages for both white and black workers and greater profits for firms this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

confronting the implications of the cournot model with industry and firm data this paper derives testable implications of the standard cournot models and confronts these implications with real world data though we cannot expect that real world may be characterized by a simple static homogeneous model it is surprising that little empirical work exists on testing the implications of this most popular model of oligopoly and non cooperative game theory

self confirming equilibrium rium path of play thus if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs even though beliefs about play at off path information sets need not be correct we characterize the ways in which self confirming equilibria and nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self con firming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts nash equilibrium and its refinements describe a situation in which i each player s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and ii each player s beliefs about the opponents play are exactly correct we propose a new equilibrium concept self confirming equilibrium that weakens condition ii by requiring only that players beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play thus each player may have incorrect beliefs about how his opponents would play in contingencies that do not arise when play follows the equilibrium and moreover the beliefs of different players may be wrong in different ways the concept of self confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that noncooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play suppose that each time the game is played the players observe the actions chosen by their opponents but that players do not observe the actions their opponents would have played at the information sets that were not reached along the path of play then if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs so the equilibrium is self confirming in the weak sense of not being inconsistent with the evidence by analogy with the literature on the bandit problem e g rothschild 1974 one might expect that a non nash self confirming equilibrium can be the outcome of plausible learning processes this point was made by fudenberg and

a language theory of discrimination any advanced industrial society is composed of a number of speech communities with different verbal and nonverbal languages in particular in the united states blacks and whites and men and women have sharply differing methods of speaking and listening this paper develops a model in which people can only work together if they speak the same language and in which it is costly to learn a second language the competitive market will tend to minimize communication through segregation but if interaction is required the cost will be borne by the minority a number of nontrivial predictions are derived from the model

hard to get the scarcity of women and the competition for high income men in urban china reports of the difficulties of elite women in finding suitable mates have been increasing despite the growing availability and value of men in china we rationalize this leftover women phenomenon within the directed competitive search framework which uniquely allows for equilibrium crowding out within this framework we show that the leftover women phenomenon can be the result of women s aversion to men who have a lower income than themselves hereafter alm and the long predicted complementarity between women s non market traits in particular beauty and male earnings for high income h women even when high income h men are more plentiful and richer the direct effect of the greater number of desirable men can be overwhelmed by the indirect effect of competitive entry by low income l women particularly the beautiful we test for these competitive search effects using online dating field experimental census and household survey data consistent with the competitive entry of l women when sex ratio and h men s income increase the search intensity of beautiful l women for h men increases in response to this competitive entry plain h women who are constrained by their alm to search predominantly for h men also increase the search intensity however only their marriage probability decreases our evidence is consistent with intra female competitive search for spouses who can cover the labor market opportunity cost of marriage and childbirth which increases with a woman s income

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products abstract this paper examines the relationship between product differentiation and the sustainability of collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products the main finding is that collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are exactly the opposite result may be obtained in models of horizontal differentiation consequently when products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically theory provides no clearcut prediction

wage differentials discrimination and efficiency abstract i analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity i show that the model has a unique equilibrium the wage differential depends positively on the workers productivity differential only when the latter is large when the productivity differential is small high productivity workers get a lower wage than low productivity workers this reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero however the equilibrium is socially efficient high productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low productivity workers although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model

does equal pay legislation reduce labour market inequality this paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality when the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely however with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before profits of discriminating firms might increase and discrimination can persist in the long run although it would have disappeared without the policy

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

gender discrimination in job ads evidence from china we study explicit gender discrimination in a population of ads on a chinese internet job board gender targeted job ads are common favor women as often as men and are much less common in jobs requiring higher levels of skill employers relative preferences for female versus male workers on the other hand are more strongly related to the preferred age height and beauty of the worker than to job skill levels almost two thirds of the variation in advertised gender preferences occurs within firms and one third occurs within firmoccupation cells overall these patterns are not well explained by a firm level animus model by a glass ceiling model or by models in which broad occupational categories are consistently gendered across firms instead the patterns suggest a model in which firms have idiosyncratic preferences for particular job gender matches which are overridden in skilled positions by factors such as thinner labor markets or a greater incentive to search broadly for the most qualified candidate jel codes j16 j63 j71 copyright 2013 oxford university press

unemployment dynamics and duration dependence a major issue in the analysis of unemployment durations concerns distinguishing genuine duration dependence of the exit rate out of unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity we present a method for the nonparametric estimation of both phenomena designed to be applicable to time series data on aggregate outflows from different duration classes the model explicitly takes into account that individual exit rates are affected by the business cycle and by seasonal effects the method is applied to u s data we find diverging duration effects among black and white individuals however except for white males duration dependence is dominated by unobserved heterogeneity

racial prejudice and labour market penalties during economic downturns do economic downturns encourage racist attitudes does this in turn lead to worse labour market outcome for minorities we assess these important questions using british attitude and labour force data the attitude data show that racial prejudice is countercyclical with the effect driven by large increases for high skilled middle aged working men a 1 point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase self reported racial prejudice by 4 points correspondingly the labour force data show that racial employment and wage gaps are counter cyclical with the largest effects also observed for high skilled men especially in the manufacturing and construction industries a 1 point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase the wage gap by 3 these results are entirely consistent with the theoretical literature which proposes that racial prejudice and discrimination are the result of labour market competition among individuals with similar traits and that the effects of this competition are exacerbated during periods of economic downturn

the dynamics of company profits an international comparison 1 profits and the process of competition dennis c mueller 2 modelling persistent profitability paul a geroski 3 the persistence of profits in the united states dennis c mueller 4 the persistence of profits in us manufacturing industries ioannis kessides 5 the persistence of profitability in canada r shyam khemani and d m shapiro 6 persistence of corporate profits in the federal republic of germany joachim schwalbach and talat mahmood 7 the persistence of profits in france frederic jenny and andre paul weber 8 the persistence of profits in japan hiroyuki odagiri and hideki yamawaki 9 the persistence of profits in the uk john cubbin and paul a geroski 10 the persistence of profits international comparison hiroyuki odagiri and hideki yamawaki 11 the persistence of profits in perspective paul a geroski and dennis c mueller

are experienced people affected by a pre set default option results from a field experiment the objective of the present paper is to investigate the robustness of the well known result that pre set default options determine people s choices we do so by conducting a field experiment among environmental economists attending a large international conference on environmental economics the participants were at the time of registration randomly allocated to different treatments related to carbon offsetting what differs from earlier default studies is that our subjects have good knowledge about the good at hand we investigate whether the choices of these experienced individuals are affected by a pre set default option and we also study the effect of a treatment with no pre set default option our results together with previous findings indicate that the effect of a default option attenuates with experience

demand customer base line and demand response in the electricity market a survey the increasing use of demand side management as a tool to reliably meet electricity demands at peak time has stimulated interest among researchers consumers and producer organiza tions managers regulators and policymakers this research reviews the growing literature on models which are used to study demand customer base line cbl and demand response in the electricity market after characterizing the general demand models the cbl based on which the demand response models are studied is reviewed given the experience gained from the review and existing conditions the study combines an appropriate model for each case for a possible application to the electricity market moreover it discusses the implications of the results in the literature these aspects are studied independently the main contribution of this survey is attributed to the treatment of the three issues as sequentially interdependent the review is expected to enhance the understanding of the demand cbl and demand response in the electricity market and their relationships the objective is conducted through a combination of demand and supply side managements in order to reduce demand through different demand response programs during peak times this enables electricity suppliers to save costly electricity generation and at the same time reduce energy vulnerability