defence procurement theory and uk policy since the early 1980s competition as a means of obtaining best value for money has dominated uk defence procurement policy this paper describes the uk defense equipment market and the procurement problem there are sections on the economic theory of procurement contracting regulation and competition the conclusion evaluates uk defence procurement policy and assesses some of the policy issues for the 1990s copyright 1996 by oxford university press

entry costs reduction and competition in the portuguese mobile telephony industry we study the eect of entry on costs and competition in the portuguese mobile telephony industry we construct and estimate a model that includes demand network and cost equations the latter accounts for ine ciency and cost reducing eort we show that failure to account for cost reducing eort leads to biased estimates of competition in the industry we also nd that our estimated price cost margins are similar to hypothetical nash margins if rms are patient and have optimistic beliefs about the industry growth finally our results suggest that the entry of a third operator in 1998 lead to signi cant cost reductions and fostered competition

mechanisms for incentive regulation theory and experiment this article develops the theoretical properties of a new incentive mechanism for regulating a monopoly seller and reports the results of laboratory experimental tests of its behavioral properties the design of the new mechanism draws upon the results of our earlier experimental research on the behavioral properties of two other mechanisms one by loeb and magat 1979 and a second by finsinger and vogelsang 1981 as with finsinger and vogelsang the new mechanism weakens loeb and magat s requirement that regulators have complete knowledge of market demand the new mechanism however is not subject to the destabilizing profit destroying cycles of nonoptimal behavior observed with finsinger and vogelsang s

policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities abstract with the development of modern information technologies relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers consumers or travelers road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents our contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time we determine the second best tax rates the pattern of monitoring technology adoption and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time simulations show the welfare gains compared to alternative policies

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

deregulation redux does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare we demonstrate that deregulation in the form of vertical separation of network components into natural monopoly and potentially competitive markets does not truly represent a lessening of regulatory burdens that is vertical separation is not synonymous with deregulation more competitors is not equivalent to more competition we assume a public interest regulator that is constrained to set a unit price that maximizes expected welfare subject to a break even constraint we show that under both symmetric and asymmetric information cases the information demands on the regulator of the vertically integrated system are no greater than those in the case of vertical separation

what s different among banks abstract based on commercial paper being a nearly perfect substitute for certificates of deposits cds and cd reserve requirements creating a higher cost of funds for banks fama shows that the banking industry must have some monopoly power relative to other financial institutions his analysis does not resolve whether this monopoly power is vested in banks collectively vis a vis other financial institutions or if the monopoly power extends to the level of individual banks using an event study framework to examine the elimination of a reserve requirement we find significant evidence of monopoly power at the level of individual banks

comparing welfare effects of different regulation schemes an application to the electricity distribution industry abstract we compare the welfare effects of different regulation schemes of electricity distribution utilities the compared regulation schemes are fixed price regulation cost of service regulation menu of cost contingent contracts and simple menu of contracts in our calculations we utilize the information of a firm s potential to improve cost efficiency the firm specific cost information of finnish electricity distribution utilities is obtained by using various stochastic frontier models our basic result is that welfare can be improved by changing the cost of service regulation scheme to the menu of contracts regulation welfare also increases in the case of fixed price regulation and simple menu of contract regulation there is however a significant difference among regulation regimes on how this improved welfare is distributed to consumers and producers

three sides of harberger triangles prevailing economic wisdom is highly critical of injudicious tax policies or government regulations uncorrected externalities unchecked monopolistic practices and various other market failures when economists are challenged to quantify the economic costs of associated price distortions it is standard practice and has been since the 1960s to use a small number of assumptions and selected elasticities to estimate areas of the relevant harberger triangles this simple and straightforward exercise has numerous applications and the virtue of producing answers rather than conjectures harberger triangles come in many shapes and sizes figure 1 offers an illustration of such a triangle for the simple case of an excise tax point a of figure 1 at which the demand and supply schedules intersect denotes market equilibrium in the absence of the tax with quantity q1 transacted at price p1 introduction of an excise tax at rate t payable by firms selling the commodity shifts the supply schedule upward by t at the new market equilibrium firms sell q2 units of the commodity at a market price of p2 receiving after tax p3 a p2 0 t market equilibrium at point a in figure 1 has the feature that marginal consumption benefits equal marginal production costs the excise tax drives a wedge between marginal benefits and marginal costs at consumption level q2 consumers are willing to pay any amount up to p2 for additional units of the good and suppliers would readily provide additional units of the good for any price of p3 or greater but these additional transactions do not take place due to the effect of the tax wedge the loss associated

environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment abstract a group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally conscious countries conditions are examined under which they can provide self financing side payments too a second group of less environmentally conscious countries so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to reduce emissions a mechanism that detects cheating is also developed in order to induce the desired emissions even when the emissions level of an individual country cannot be observed by the rest of the participating countries

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

a cross country analysis of electricity market reforms potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract the paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others we analyze this question by using an empirical econometric model based on poisson regression with cross section data covering 51 states in the us 13 provinces in canada and 51 other countries in the course of the study we check the validity of three important arguments of new institutional economics nie for the power market liberalization process the first argument is the path dependency to test its impact on the reform progress we try to explain whether the background of the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or that of the governor minister responsible for energy policy at that time has an impact on the subsequent reform progress the second argument is the impact of democracy as an institution on the reform progress we look at the effect of two important indicators of democracy i e civil liberties and political rights on the reform progress the final argument of nie is about transaction costs we concentrate on the level of corruption in a country as one of the key factors that determine transaction costs and try to explore its impact on the reforms the results show that the backgrounds of the chairperson and the minister governor the level of democracy and corruption in a country are significantly correlated with how far reforms have gone in that country the negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties may indicate that reforms may be limited in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as harmful to their self interest

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

three reasons to use annual payments in contingent valuation surveys convergent validity discount rates and mental accounting abstract we present three arguments for using ongoing annual payments in contingent valuation cv surveys that estimate the benefit of a long lasting environmental improvement first by matching the duration of the payments with the duration of the environmental benefits survey respondents are spared from performing complicated present value calculations second willingness to pay wtp estimates from cv surveys that include ongoing annual payments best match wtp estimates obtained using travel cost surveys third respondents are less likely to face binding mental budget constraints with ongoing annual payments than with a larger one time payment in addition respondents discount rates may be estimated by collecting non hypothetical individual time preference data as part of the valuation survey

measures of effectiveness for governmental organizations for organizations whose objective is not necessarily the maximization of a financial quantity there is little written in the economics and management literature about methods that quantify their effectiveness potential users of such methodologies are typically governmental organizations and agencies to whom congress allocates funding periodically but may also include many nonprofit organizations such research is importantly needed because government is no longer making outlay allocations on a merely historical basis but is using as a criterion how effectively an organization uses its resources in meeting its objectives in this paper we analyze the maritime safety program of the u s coast guard uscg which is responsible for monitoring the quality of vessels that sail in u s waters and present measures of effectiveness moes for the program we do this at two levels of activity at an overall program level level i and at a component activity level level ii poisson models are used to construct the moes using data on maritime casualties accidents between 1990 1993 from the real time marine safety management system msms database maintained by the coast guard a feature of the empirical methodology is the bayesian imputation of missing data the moes constructed here have at least four important uses first as the name suggests they perform the function that financial quantities such as returns on equity or returns on sales perform for private sector organizations that is they are indicators of efficiency second they can be used as inputs into allocative decisions within the organization for example the level ii moes can be used as inputs into a programming problem that determines the optimal allocation of resources among component activities third internal performance evaluation across uscg programs or across port units called marine safety offices can be based on their respective level i moes fourth and possibly the most important long run consideration moes provide the basis for better regulation by the government without moes the nature of regulation is probably suboptimal by adopting these moes as criteria it will be easier for the government to redesign those aspects of its regulation of the coast guard which curtail incentives

gathering information before signing a contract after being offered a contract an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature this enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation cost the authors show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to observe the state of nature and they explore its terms later they show that the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents even though he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility copyright 1992 by american economic association

adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard this paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions i contracts are subject to renegotiations ii the agent s action has long term effects the action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or type renegotiation proof contracts that implement various actions including random ones are characterized under appropriate conditions the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action therefore the equilibrium has standard properties of adverse selection models

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

verifiable and non verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist abstract optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum existing non bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function while bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution we introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information our p rice based s ubsidy ps mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period the regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand cost or damage functions of the firm all of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost either immediately or asymptotically

how much discretion for risk regulators we analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort congress delegates regulation to an agency although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry the optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade off the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm but it implements policies that are too pro industry the agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent partial discretion is preferred otherwise we then investigate how this trade off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified

fat tails and truncated bids in contingent valuation an application to an endangered shorebird species a yes response function in a contingent valuation study is said to have fat tails if it has a high and slowly declining yes response rate at high bid levels truncated bids refer to the practice of dropping high bid offers before a yes response rate of near zero is reached this is a common practice in contingent valuation we explore the extent and implications of fat tails and truncated bids in a study of an endangered shorebird species we find among other things that mean willingness to pay is quite sensitive to the highest bid offered so much so that the choice of highest bid nearly dictates outcomes

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

public versus regulated private enterprise a comparison of public enterprise with regulated private enterprise shows that the efficiencies of privatization stem from the insulation it brings from arbitrary political and self serving influences the critical insulation springs from the costliness of interventions when there is a regulatory compact in place that protects private property from expropriation while it also corrects for market failures that same insulation means that public enteprise is a better form of organization for activities that call for a response to public interest exigencies which cannot be specified in advance or reliably adjudicated after the fact the analysis emphasizes that an appropriate regulatory compact requires institutional support international organizations that seek to implement privatization should consider promoting credible regulatory commitment by requiring countries to execute explicit regulatory compacts and by bringing to bear the weight of their continuing relationship as a means of motivating the countries to conform to such strictures

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

the dual role of demand deposits under asymmetric information when there is initial asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers accepting checkable deposits can give banks information about the quality of future borrowers hence the two main types of bank activities are complementarities nevertheless it is shown that intermediaries who fund themselves by other means and thus do not get the same borrower information as banks can coexist with banks in equilibrium with the possibility of legally binding contingent contracts banks earn zero expected profits in equilibrium in spite of their information advantage relative to other intermediaries if legally binding contingent contracts are infeasible there may exist an implicit contract equilibrium

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

repeated moral hazard the role of memory commitment and the access to credit markets abstract the dynamic dimension introduces new questions in moral hazard models thus the roles of memory and commitment have recently raised a marked interest the goal of this paper is to discuss and clarify the issues at hand and to present some new results we show that two conditions are necessary for the optimal long term contract to be implementable via spot contracts first the long term optimum should be renegotiation proof second spot contracts should provide efficient consumption smoothing we discuss how the availability of credit to the agent affects these two prerequisites we also study the hitherto neglected case in which the repetition of the moral hazard problem generates hidden information at recontracting dates the optimal renegotiation proof contract then implements the minimum effort level unless it involves randomized savings

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

branch banking and the geography of bank pricing we show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks even though branch banking allows banks to differentiate themselves through their choices of branch locations banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks we develop a theoretical model in support of this view and offer empirical evidence

on the interaction between vertical and horizontal product differentiation an application to banking the author studies the conditions under which banks offer remote access note there exists interaction between location and taste for remote access offering remote access is an instrument to partially segment depositors according to their taste for that technology the interaction between location and taste for remote access enhances this effect different equilibria emerge as the result of two effects first introducing remote access steals depositors from the opponent as the product specification becomes more appealing second deposit rate competition is affected as remote access determines the substitutability of banks copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

milestone payments or royalties contract design for r d licensing we study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee s valuation of the innovation and limited control over the licensee s development efforts a licensing contract typically contains an up front payment milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase and royalties on sales we use principal agent models to formulate the licensor s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee s valuation of the innovation as the licensee s valuation increases the licensor s optimal level of involvement in the development directly or through royalties should decrease only a risk averse licensor should include both up front and milestone payments moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor s value but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract

penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts no good deed goes unpunished we examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present we find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower powered incentive contract penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent s initial incentive to understate his ability

nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions the extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment three linear rules of thumb with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the constant relative risk aversion model crram in addition the crram is tested against the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level within the parametric environments studied and reported in the experimental literature game theoretic solutions are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated in this study agents drew values from non uniform distributions as a result the game theoretic bidding behavior is nonlinear due to the nonlinearity special econometric and numerical techniques are applied to solve the model and obtain the estimates the crram exhibits good fit of the data the pseudo r2 is greater than 0 8 in 90 percent of the subjects the crram is more accurate than the markdown model mm and the simple ad hoc model simam but not as accurate as the sophisticated ad hoc model sop am the data also supports the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the theory of belief formation

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

monitoring and market power in credit markets abstract whether or not banks are engaged in monitoring of customers information acquisition may have important consequences to the whole economy theory suggests an inverse relation between both average loan interest rates and credit losses and banks investments in monitoring in contrast investments in market power result in a direct relation these predictions are tested using panel data on finnish local banks we find evidence that banks investments in branch network density and human capital personnel contribute more to monitoring than to market power we also find that managing the money transactions of customers enables banks to better control risks in their lending

long term short term and renegotiation on the value of commitment in contracting spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long term contracting it is proved here that short term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long run efficiency when transfers are not limited objectives are conflicting and no relevant asymmetric information appears at recontracting dates this last assumption excludes adverse selection but not moral hazard when technologies and preferences are time separable copyright 1990 by the econometric society

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

regulation and incentives in european aviation we study the effect of liberalization on costs and competition in the european airline industry we construct and estimate a model that includes demand capacity and cost equations the latter accounts for inefficiency and cost reducing effort we show that failure to account for the choice of effort would lead to biased estimates of efficiency and competition in the industry we also find that the last european union package of deregulatory measures has led to significant efficiency improvements and has fostered competition

on the profitability and cost of relationship lending abstract we provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks we derive bank specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates and then estimate cost and profit functions to examine how smoothing affects bank costs and profits our results suggests that in general loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part of an optimal long term contract between a bank and its borrower while loan rate smoothing in response to an interest rate shock is

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

estimating benefits for effective enforcement of speed reduction from dichotomous choice cv we present an empirical estimation of the distribution of wtp foreffective speed restriction via implementation of local trafficcalming schemes random samples are drawn from the populations ofhouseholds henceforth hhs of three centres intersected by maintrunk roads with varying through traffic conditions we estimatethe underlying wtp distributions from discrete choice responsesto site specific referendum contingent valuation studiesaccounting for zero bidders we then test the hypothesis ofdifferent distributions across villages the statistical analysisconsists first of a parametric specification and then of atotally non parametric one stated welfare changes for effectivespeed reduction are found to be sizeable and the parameters ofthe random utility models are plausibly related to differences inobjective speed measures across centres the results appear toencourage the use of the referencum cv method in the estimationof local public goods in this case study the proposed publicproject would seem to pass the kaldor hicks potentialcompensation test

referendum models and economic values theoretical intuitive and practical bounds on willingness to pay innovations in the estimation of referendum type contingent valuation models have led to willingness to pay wtp measures inconsistent with consumer preferences and unbounded from above or below we propose a set of criteria which guarantee a bounded measure of wtp the criteria reject the traditional random utility model with unrestricted error terms in favor of the random wtp model with bounds on wtp once wtp is bounded by zero and income the form of the distribution is less consequential a new model for wtp is developed based on the beta distribution and is compared to previously estimated models

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

statistical approaches to the fat tail problem for dichotomous choice contingent valuation if a cumulative density function esti mated from dichotomous choice data has an unre alistically fat right hand tail mean willingness to pay wtp will be overestimated truncating the range of integration results in a lower bound esti mate of the true mean wtp a normalization pro cedure proposed by boyle welsh and bishop 1988 unnecessarily depresses the estimate further a new statistical approach is presented that allows a best guess estimate of mean wtp because this estimate involves extrapolation beyond the range of the data it tends to be highly variable jel q21

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

majoritarian preference utilitarian welfare and public information in cournot oligopoly abstract can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from condorcet cycles in a cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a condorcet winner always exists under a monotonicity condition on the demand function we characterize the condorcet winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms under which the condorcet winning precision i hurts consumers surplus and profits or ii remains conflict free these results have interesting implications on collective bayesian persuasion by agencies representing consumers showing that when full transparency maximizes expected consumers surplus collective bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity and vice versa

decision support for target based resource allocation of public services in multiunit and multilevel systems this paper is concerned with the problem of resource allocationand target setting in the provision of public services the paper develops a network based representation of multilevel resource management with equity efficiency and effectiveness being recognised as the fundamental objectives of the system on the modelling side the proposed method combines data envelopment analysis and goal programming formulations integrated within an interactive planning framework an illustrative application on fire departments is used to show the applicability of the method developed to assist the resource allocation process