sequential labor decisions under uncertainty an estimable household model of west african farmers this paper reports estimates of the structural parameters of a stochastic control model that describcs the labor decisions of small farmers in burkina faso west africa the focus of the estimation is on measuring flexibility in production and intertemporal substitutability in consumption full information maximum likelihood estimates of the primitive parameters of the model are computed even though optimal labor decision rules cannot be derived analytically vuong s non nested model specification test shows that this method yields parameter estimates that are superior to those derived by assuming that farmers solve a deterministic control problem the low levels of agricultural labor effort commonly observed in the survey area are shown to be a consequence both of the low productivity of labor in archaic rainfed agriculture and of farmers awareness that in the absence of a labor market overly ambitious production plans lead to seasonal manpower constraints to meet rainfed farmers concerns agricultural research institutes and extension services should factor flexibility into their research agendas

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

unemployment in south africa the nature of the beast abstract unemployment in south africa is so widespread that it demands an explanation this paper examines a central question about south african unemployment why do the unemployed not enter the informal sector as is common in other developing countries the data do not support the idea that unemployment is largely voluntary the policy implications that government should diminish labor market segmentation and the obstacles to entering the productive informal sector may be relevant also to other developing countries with high unemployment

club good intermediaries abstract the emergence and ubiquitous presence in everyday life of digital goods such as songs movies and e books give renewed salience to the problem of providing public goods with exclusion because digital goods are typically traded via intermediaries like itunes amazon and netflix the question arises as to the optimal pricing mechanism for such club good intermediaries we derive the direct bayesian optimal mechanism for allocating club goods when the mechanism designer is an intermediary that neither produces nor consumes the goods and we develop an indirect mechanism that implements this mechanism we also derive sufficient conditions for the intermediary optimal mechanism to be implementable with revenue sharing contracts which are widely used in e business

optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders abstract we analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders the traders virtual valuations now depend on the choice of the trading mechanism and are generally nonmonotonic we show that the trading mechanisms that maximize a broker s expected profit or expected total gains from trade are generalized double auctions which maximize the gains from trade measured in some modified monotonic virtual valuations for the traders the bunching phenomena will be a general feature in these mechanisms we also show that the optimal mechanisms converge towards simple bid ask price mechanisms as the number of participants in the market increases journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

towards a testable model of entry a study of the us manufacturing industries this paper develops a simple model of firms entry decisions fits it to interindustry data and tests hypotheses related to contestability theory it is shown that entry increases with the profit level of incumbents holding fixed the expected losses that the entrant would suffer in the event of exit these expected losses are greater the higher the probability of a predatory incumbent response and the larger the sunk costs that must be committed by the entrant the effects of sunk costs are significant and incumbents are significantly more likely to react aggressively when they are both profitable and concentrated copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

on involuntary unemployment this paper argues that on a proper definition of equilibrium involuntary unemployment equilibrium is a logically coherent concept it then proposes two alternative routes of modeling the labor market efficiency wage and fairness which allows an equ ilibrium with involuntary unemployment copyright 1987 by royal economic society

farm productivity and rural poverty in india armed with new data we return to an old question from the pages of this journal to what extent do india s rural poor share in agricultural growth combining data from 24 household sample surveys spanning 35 years with other sources we estimate a model of the joint determination of consumption poverty measures agricultural wages and food prices we find that higher farm productivity brought both absolute and relative gains to poor rural households a large share of the gains was via wages and prices though these effects took time the benefits to the poor were not confined to those near the poverty line

the determinants of research and development intensity in the uk the primary purpose of this paper is to discover whether research and development expenditures are related to firm size market structure and technological influences in the uk after providing a preliminary analysis of r d activity the paper tackles the problem of the rather limited data set two approaches are adopted first analysing part of the relationship using a broadly based sample and second providing data on a more narrowly based sample over three years the results suggest that firm size and concentration have virtually no influence on r d intensity in the uk among firms with r d programmes

transfer benefits from public works employment evidence for rural india current knowledge provides little guidance on one of the key questions in evaluating public employment schemes aimed at directly reducing poverty what are the net income gains to participating workers this paper offers an answer for rural public employment in two villages in the state of maharashtra in india a model of intrahousehold time allocation is proposed and estimates are made using household data over six years the empirical implementation indicates that the projects induce significant behavioral responses transfer benefits are large and are greatly underestimated using prevailing market wage rates for similar work to estimate forgone incomes copyright 1994 by royal economic society

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

robustly ranking mechanisms for a mechanism designer with an objective such as welfare we propose a method for robustly ranking mechanisms the method is based on eliminating weakly dominated strategies only and thus does not require any assumptions about agents beliefs about each other except full support we illustrate the usefulness of this method in two examples in both examples we show that there are mechanisms that are ranked by our method above dominant strategy mechanisms these examples question the liter ature s focus on dominant strategy mechanisms in cases when such mechanisms yield undesir able outcomes i informal examples

using evidence of household income diversification to inform study of the rural nonfarm labor market in africa abstract the labor market literature in developing countries has seldom drawn on the studies of rural household income diversification this paper draws on such studies to inform future study of the rural nonfarm labor market in africa the review of evidence provides some surprising departures from traditional images of nonfarm activities of rural households among the most striking is the dominant importance in the majority of case study areas of nonfarm wage labor as compared to self employment of nonfarm sector earnings as compared to farm sector wage earnings and of local nonfarm earnings as compared to migration earnings the most worrying finding was the poor distribution of nonfarm earnings in rural areas despite the importance of these earnings to food security and farm investments this poor distribution implies significant entry barriers and market segmentation it is probable that this will lead over time to an increasingly skewed distribution of land and other assets in rural africa

bilateral trading as an efficient auction over time a market composed of pairwise trading under incomplete information is modeled in order to analyze how resources are allocated among competing uses when information about trade gains is incomplete contrary to the results from studying a single such trade sufficient homogeneity across potential trades guarantees that efficiency obtains this is analogous to simple first price auctions with homogeneous bidders where bidders have a common bid function and as a result the high bidder also places the highest value on the auctioned object with enough symmetry the decentralized bilateral trades in the present model occur as if they were made in a first price auction that occurs through time the robustness of the efficiency result to heterogeneities among agents and to nontrivial search intensity decisions is then considered

optimal allocation of an indivisible good abstract in this paper we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good efficiently between two agents with monetary transfers we focus on allocation mechanisms that are dominant strategy incentive compatible when agents types are private information inefficiency of an allocation mechanism may come from two sources misallocation of the indivisible good and an imbalanced budget unfortunately as green and laffont 1979 demonstrate no allocation mechanism can always overcome both kinds of inefficiency we identify allocation mechanisms that maximize the expected total utilities of agents and characterize optimal mechanisms for a large class of agents type distributions for strongly regular type distributions we show that the optimal mechanisms must be budget balanced they are either fixed price mechanisms or option mechanisms the result may not hold for other type distributions for certain type distributions we show that optimal mechanisms are hybrids of vickrey clarke groves mechanisms and budget balanced mechanisms

village labor markets in sheikan district sudan abstract this paper examines salient features of village labor markets in western sudan labor markets are well established contrary to conventional impressions that labor markets do not exist in villages of the semi arid tropics wages vary considerably and are not uniform across workers or villages or the agricultural season transactions are short term and casual there is no long term attached labor most transactions are on a task basis rather than time rate work parties are primarily held by wealthier villagers and are considerably less expensive than hired labor these observations contrast with other descriptions of village labor markets

age size growth and survival uk companies in the 1980s this paper examines growth and survival amongst quoted and unquoted u k companies in the period 1975 85 and compares the results with earlier u k and u s studies an examination of death rates shows that smaller companies had higher death rates but the largest and smallest companies were least vulnerable to takeover careful attention is therefore paid to problems of sample selection bias it is shown that smaller companies grew faster than larger companies that gibrat s law does not hold amongst smaller firms that age is negatively related to growth and that these results are not an artifact of sample selection bias copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

implementation in weakly undominated strategies optimality of second price auction and posted price mechanism we study the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies we first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms the bound is represented as the maximized value of the designer s objective subject to the inequality version of the standard envelope incentive conditions we then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions on the designer s prior over the agents pay off types in auction and bilateral trade applications in private value auction and bilateral trade the optimal mechanisms a second price auction and posted price mechanism respectively satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility the classical notion of robust mechanisms in an interdependent value auction we find that a second price auction is optimal in revenue with interdependent values which is neither dominant strategy nor ex post incentive compatible but satisfies the novel incentive compatibility introduced in this analysis

how to estimate market concentration given grouped data a novel method is proposed of estimating market concentration for the census case in which firms are grouped into size classes and all that is known about the firms in each category is their number and aggregate size the formula arises as a way of applying an alternative expression for the concentration ratio based upon the original and first moment size distributions of firms the semi parametric technique which includes a method of interval as well as point estimation is derived applied and validated using actual and simulated data it is anticipated that the estimator will be of use in competition analysis as well as in academic research

asymmetric non separation and rural labor markets abstract this paper develops and implements a test that provides insight into the state of rural labor markets the test is based on a theoretical link between a shortage or surplus in the labor market and asymmetric responses to changes in household composition we develop auxiliary tests to distinguish other market imperfections from labor market imperfections and provide evidence that most changes in household composition are exogenous to local labor market conditions we implement the test using data from ethiopia malawi tanzania and uganda the overall pattern is one of excess labor supply in rural areas with heterogeneity across cultivation phases genders and agro ecological zones surplus labor is most evident during low intensity cultivation phases in ethiopia there is suggestive evidence that credit constraints create a de facto labor shortage for poorer households there is also evidence of partial gender segmentation in rural labor markets

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

house allocation with transfers we consider the shapley scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed we characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy proof ex post individually rational ex post budget balanced and collusion proof in these mechanisms the price of each object is fixed in advance and the objects are reallocated according to the unique core assignment of the shapley scarf economy associated with the prices the special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by shapley and scarf our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the groves mechanisms which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion proofness journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

optimal robust bilateral trade risk neutrality a risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item we prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non wasteful randomized posted prices

an efficient nonmarket institution under imperfect markets labor sharing for tropical forest clearing this article examines the substitutability efficiency and evolution of an important nonmarket institution in agrarian societies labor sharing from analyses of field level data on forest clearing through time among shifting cultivators in the peruvian amazon we find 1 no productivity difference and unitary elasticities of substitution among family hired and cooperative labor i e perfect substitutes 2 the combination of labor market and sharing makes total labor use unconstrained by household and network endowments i e efficient labor allocation and 3 as labor composition is constrained by network endowments and liquidity credit policies alter not only labor composition but also network formation

wage determination in agricultural labour markets under monopsonist labour tying arrangements there is need for a study of wage formation in agricultural labour markets which can simultaneously explain the existence of involuntary unemployment on the one hand and responsiveness to market forces on the other this paper offers an analysis and empirical study of wage determination in a typical rural agricultural setting and finds that based on the notion of efficiency wages a two tier situation explains why rural wage rates are known to vary widely among workers and across regions

effect of flood on agricultural wages in bangladesh an empirical analysis summary this paper analyzes the effects of riverine floods on agricultural wages in bangladesh drawing upon the district wise monthly data over 1979 2000 we model wages as a dynamic process we find that floods have positive implications for wages in the long run in flood months however agricultural wages decline in the inundated districts we obtain difference in difference estimates to show that the magnitude of impact of flood depends on the relative flood proneness of a district and the relative severity of flood conditions our results indicate that favorable demand and supply conditions in the agricultural labor market can mitigate the impact of disasters on wages in bangladesh

seller concentration the technological explanation and demand uncertainty the level of seller concentration in an industry depends on two characteristics of the size distribution of the firms concerned their number and the inequality of their sizes acknowledging these two dimensions the aim of this paper is to construct a unified theoretical framework capable of shedding some light on the economic forces which determine the degree of concentration it builds on the analysis of two schools of thought within the existing literature the first of these we shall label the technological explanation of concentration since it emphasises the role of the cost curve in particular the minimum efficient scale of production and barriers to the entry of new firms implicitly this attaches most importance to the firm number component of concentration the second school includes the various stochastic models of firm growth these models have demonstrated the influence on concentration of what is sometimes called luck or more deterministically those factors which might influence the spread of growth rates of firms within an industry to that extent these models emphasise the other component of concentration size inequalities we see our present contribution as an attempt to build a bridge between these two approaches we develop the well known simon and bonini i958 stochastic growth model in such a way as to provide a formal statement of the technological explanation and then discuss various ways of deepening the economic content of their original contribution section i provides a brief resume of the technological explanation and section ii describes the salient features of the simon and bonini model it goes on to show how this model can be used to disentangle a mathematical relationship between the concentration ratio and i minimum efficient scale ii the share of sub optimal firms and iii the degree of firm size inequalities this relationship is tested with some success using i968 uk census data an important conclusion of the simon and bonini model is that firm size inequalities depend crucially on the probability of entry by new firms section iii considers how this proposition may be invested with more economic content the discussion is couched at a fairly general level but in the appendix we suggest a specific model which explains entry as a consequence of the fact that incumbent firms typically operate in a world of demand uncertainty where entry deterrence may be too costly it provides specific economic predictions

do firm sizes and profit rates converge evidence on gibrat s law and the persistence of profits in the long run three panel unit root tests are applied to a 31 year firm size growth and profit rate data set for 96 large quoted uk firms all tests reject the unit root null for log size if the augmented dickey fuller autoregressions exclude a linear time trend if a linear trend is included the results are more ambiguous and appear to differ systematically between tests the view that firm growth is either random or near random does not receive unequivocal support in all tests there is however strong and consistent evidence of mean reversion in profit rates

industrial growth in india performance and prospects abstract the objective of this paper is to analyse the trends in industrial growth since the mid fifties and examine the factors that contributed to industrial stagnation after the mid sixties more specifically the paper focuses on the pathology of the organised industrial sector while also documenting the broad trends in the unorganised sector section 1 presents a brief review of the long term trends in the growth of value added and productivity in the industrial sector section 2 analyses the major factors that contributed to the dual phenomenon of a slowdown in the growth of heavy industries and continued slow growth of consumer goods industries after the mid sixties in the light of this analysis an attempt is made in section 3 to draw some implications for policy if industrial growth is to be revived in the future

cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames abstract it is well known that cooperative outcomes can be supported by noncooperative equilibrium strategy combinations in games that are infinitely repeated however the example of the repeated prisoner s dilemma has led people to conclude that such cooperative outcomes cannot be sustained if the game is repeated finitely often in this paper it is proved that the belief about finitely repeated games is false conditions are given that allow the existence of cooperative outcomes in finitely repeated games that are supported by subgame perfect noncooperative equilibrium strategies

a nonparametric efficient public good decision mechanism undominated bayesian implementation abstract it is known that with incomplete information there are bayesian mechanisms that undertake public projects achieving ex post efficiency and budget balance however there are two shortcomings in these mechanisms first the mechanism designer is required to know the agents prior beliefs which is quite demanding second the mechanism may possess multiple equilibria including undesirable ones this paper presents a bayesian mechanism that is nonparametric in that the mechanism designer cannot incorporate any information other than that received from the agents moreover at all undominated bayesian equilibria of the mechanism the public project is undertaken efficiently and budget is balanced journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d78 d82

preplay communication participation restrictions and efficiency in initial public offerings the extent to which the observed procedures for selling new issues are efficient is studied we show that a posted price mechanism in conjunction with nonbinding preplay communication and participation restrictions leads to an allocation of the security and payment that maximizes the seller s expected revenue given the informational constraints imposed by the optimizing incentives of the potential buyers article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

robust bilateral trade and mediated bargaining we consider bilateral trade problems subject to incomplete information on the reservation values of the agents we address negotiations where the communication of proposals takes place through the filter of a third party a mediator traders submit proposals over continuous time to the mediator that receives bids and keeps them secret until they are compatible a regular robust equilibrium rre is an undominated ex post equilibrium where with sufficient delay all compatible traders reach agreement we present a characterization of rre for risk neutral traders that discount the future at the same exponential rate we show how to compute rre strategy profiles and we explicitly display the unique one where agreements split the net surplus in equal shares our results support the claim that bargaining through a mediator is an effective procedure to promote efficiency jel c78 d02 d74 d82

the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed bid double auctions abstract this paper modifies myerson and satterthwaite s j econ theory 29 1983 265 281 analysis of direct bilateral trade mechanisms with two sided incomplete information by developing a new technique for analyzing their payment rule restrictions for each member of a narrow class of beliefs this new technique defines a mechanism that is both ex ante efficient and ex post individually rational moreover the resulting allocation is shown to be equivalent to that generated by the linear equilibrium of a k double auction

on public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget abstract consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible dsic ex post individually rational epir and ex post budget balanced epbb it is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold or fixed cost sharing form providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds when there are more than two agents there are mechanisms that are dsic epir and epbb that are not of the threshold form any dsic epir and epbb mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form this additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to dsic epir and epbb

robust collusion with private information the game theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars without resorting to either impatience symmetry restrictions inability to communicate or failure to optimize this paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of these assumptions if the cartel s member firms have private information about their costs price wars can be optimal in the face of complexity specifically equilibria that are robust to pay off irrelevant disruptions of the information environment generically cannot attain or approximate efficiency an optimal robust equilibrium must allocate market shares inefficiently and may call for price wars under certain conditions for a two firm cartel cost interdependence is a sufficient condition for price wars to arise in an optimal robust equilibrium that optimal equilibria are inefficient generically applies not only to collusion games but also to the entire separable pay off environment a class that includes most typical economic models copyright 2012 oxford university press

optimal private good allocation the case for a balanced budget abstract in an independent private value auction environment we are interested in strategy proof mechanisms that maximize the agents residual surplus that is the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity we find that under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents that is it will be budget balanced specifically optimal mechanisms have a simple posted price or option form in the bilateral trade environment we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions

deagrarianization and rural employment in sub saharan africa a sectoral perspective abstract sub saharan africa is steadily becoming less rural in character for decades development thinking has prescribed industrialization as the virtuous path leading away from economic dependence on agriculture but africa s industrial record has been plagued with underperformance an alternative perspective centered on the process of deagrarianization and attendant rural employment generation may offer more explanatory power and policy direction this paper outlines key theoretical components and practical concerns of a deagrarianization approach the nature and incidence of deagrarianization in sub saharan africa is contrasted with that experienced in developed industrial countries conceptual approaches dealing with rural non agricultural employment are identified within different social science disciplines through a thematic review of the literature the conclusion highlights the need for more focused study of the deagrarianization process and rural service sector development

wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy abstract we model slack season wages in a village economy in the presence of involuntary unemployment our model draws its inspiration from sociological notions of everyday peasant resistance in particular labourers can react to employers who pay low slack wages by refusing to work for them in the relatively tight peak season such refusals however are not automatic and are modelled endogenously a continuum of equilibrium wage configurations is obtained these configurations barring one involve wages exceeding reservation wages despite the presence of involuntary unemployment several qualitative observations follow these are examined with respect to available empirical data in particular the village survey of palanpur

offered wage and recipient attribute wage functions for rural labour in india abstract wage functions are estimated for daily hire labour in two village markets in india through a single equation procedure with the dependent variable defined to yield a true measure of offered wage in the presence of censorship wages for males rise with age up to forty but decline thereafter for females by contrast reward for experience is relatively unimportant but there is a positive association between offered wage and economic status these findings differ from those reported so far in the literature without correction for censorship bias and challenge the assumed homogeneity of rural labour in much theorising about factor markets in less developed countries

repeated games some applications to under cutting and harassment in the labour market this paper consists of some simple applications of the complete information repeated game rg framework to the labour market in many economic and social problems agents participate in an environment for many periods in such contexts one often observes some degree of collusion obeying behavioural norms which are not in the agents immediate interests among agents one explanation of such collusive activities is agents do not deviate from the norm because of the fear of punishment by other players that the deviation might invoke the literature on rgs has tried to model the above explanation of collusive activities within a game theoretic framework the result of the research has been that with the introduction of time many types of activities which may at first seem irrational in terms of selfish utility maximisation such as co operation altruism threats revenge etc can be explained as solutions to some rgs it can be argued that the rg framework has been too successful it can explain too many behavioural rules in fact the folk theorem of repeated games see sabourian 1988b for a survey states that any individually rational payoff of the one shot game can be supported as a nash equilibrium ne in fact as a subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the rg if players do not discount the future the reason for the existence of so many equilibria in rgs is that in such games a strategy is a plan of what to do at every contingency history many norms of behaviour which are not in players immediate interest can be supported as equilibria if players can choose history dependent strategies which punish any player who does not adhere to the norm but why should players in equilibrium choose a history dependent strategy this is even more surpris

designing call auction institutions is double dutch the best this paper is an exercise in the institutional design of call markets schwartz i988 whitcomb i985 using the experimental laboratory as a test bed we evaluate the comparative performance1 of three new institutions for exchange when all trades are simultaneously executed at a uniform price call markets have been used on many european and israeli stock exchanges and for the daily opening on the new york american and tokyo stock exchanges in all outstanding listed issues in some versions the bids offers are verbal in others written in some cases the procedure is walrasian orders may be modified after a trial price is given whitcomb i985 also see jarecki i976 for the walrasian mechanism implemented with a unanimity stopping rule in the london bullion market in france new issues are offered in fixed quantity using modified uniform price sealed bid auction rules mcdonald and jaquillat i974 the rules of trading on all these exchanges are subject to incremental adjustment in the light of experience in recognition of this continuing adaptation the chicago mercantile exchange publishes its consolidated rules as a loose leaf three ring notebook these considerations motivate our interest in examining three potential new exchange mechanisms as their names suggest these institutions are generalisations of auctions which already exist in the field 2 double dutch dd is a generalisation of the dutch auction double english ee a generalisation of the english auction and dutch english de a special form of tatonnement using a single clock which is a dutch clock to buyers and an english clock to sellers our generalisations make the supply quantity endogenous thus broadening the scope of english and dutch auctions to markets in which both buyers and sellers are active in the exchange process two cited disadvantages of sealed bid offer call markets schwartz i988 pp 442 6 are corrected by

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

the modified vickrey double auction abstract we modify w vickrey s 1961 j finance 16 8 37 mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism we provide sufficient conditions under which the modified vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency in addition we prove that the modified vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d44 d82

wage determination in rural labour markets the theory of implicit co operation abstract this paper argues that the process of determination of daily wage rate in rural labour markets is best seen as an act of implicit co operation among workers using the framework of repeated non cooperative game it is argued that this hypothesis can explain better than existing theories several known features of a typical south asian rural labour market e g the co existence of involuntary unemployment with responsiveness to supply and demand plasticity of wage rate in some cases co existing with rigidity in others etc

calibrated incentive contracts this paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability moral hazard and adverse selection the paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible due to limited liability constraints the resulting dynamic contracts are detail free and satisfy robust performance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns which need not be i i d or even ergodic publication abstract

limited observability as a constraint in contract design limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information given this constraint contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail we consider the extent to which finite contracts can approximate the idealized complete contracts the objectives of the paper are i to identify properties of agents preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts causes significant inefficiency ii to evaluate the performance of finite contracts against the ideal optimal contracts in principal agent and bilateral bargaining models

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases