irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

poverty and other determinants of child labor in bangladesh in this research we examine poverty and other determinants of child labor in bangladesh we define income quintiles as a means of measuring family poverty and add child and family characteristics to our model we estimate the likelihood that a child will work using separate logistic regression models for younger and older boys and girls in urban and rural areas our results support the notion that a family s poverty affects the probability that a child will work keeping children away from work is a luxury these families cannot afford moreover it is important to examine separate demographic groups in order to fully understand the determinants of child labor in bangladesh since the effects of child and family variables on the probability that a child will work differ among these groups

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

investment under uncertainty and time inconsistent preferences abstract while standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference there is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the short term but are patient when choosing between long term alternatives we extend the real options framework to model the investment timing decisions of entrepreneurs with time inconsistent preferences the impact on investment timing depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are sophisticated or naive in their expectations regarding their future time inconsistent behavior and whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time the model is extended to the case of a competitive equilibrium

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

considering the investment decisions with real options games approach abstract the mix of games theory with the real options has been a dynamic range of exploration in the most recent decade the engaging quality of the specialists for displaying aggressive speculation choices by blending ideas from both hypotheses is on account of a venture choice in a focused business sector can be seen in its substance as a game between firms in this paper we expand a model to consider finite horizon real option games under incomplete information with various parameters in incomplete information games firms actions express significant information about profitability to contestants the encapsulation of this information proposed original blocks in models with strategic interactions this is because of circularity where best exercise decisions are based on previous decisions taken which at a given time are quiet to be mentioned because about the dynamic programming principle we expand an extended version of the least squares monte carlo algorithm to confront these results the model can aid in understanding the relation between strategic optionality and information besides how this influences the best decision policy and its value results we find the informational feature is of great significance for firms best decision policy and optimization of project values

market concentration macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy abstract this paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy we motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that 1 investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and 2 high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks the empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the us using a structural vector autoregressive var approach the results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions

negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment and market structure this paper examines how industry competition changes the sensitivity of investment to uncertainty using japanese firm data a switching regression model is employed to test the predictions of the real options theory regarding the uncertainty investment relationship under different industry competition attributes we find that the negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment is increased by industry concentration but decreased by market share the latter finding supports the view of strategic investment behavior of rival firms under uncertainty rather than the erosion of option values by competition

valuing flexibility as a complex option this paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing demand curves for our model s underlying assets output products may be downward sloping in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption also our marginal production exercise costs may be increasing in addition we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint these elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system s value we illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

oil futures prices in a production economy with investment constraints we document a new stylized fact that the relationship between the volatility of oil futures prices and the slope of the forward curve is nonmonotone and has a v shape this pattern cannot be generated by standard models that emphasize storage we develop an equilibrium model of oil production in which investment is irreversible and capacity constrained investment constraints affect firms investment decisions and imply that the supply elasticity changes over time since demand shocks must be absorbed by changes in prices or changes in supply time varying supply elasticity results in time varying volatility of futures prices estimating this model we show it is quantitatively consistent with the v shape relationship between the volatility of futures prices and the slope of the forward curve in recent years commodity markets have experienced dramatic growth in trad

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

real options theory in international business the last quarter century has witnessed substantial growth in applications of real options theory rot to international business ib research in this review we explicate the core rot concepts in the ib context and discuss the contributions of rot based research to three core ib issues timing and scale of market entry or exit entry mode and governance form and the role of multinational networks based on our review we propose a holistic rot view of the multinational enterprise that synthesizes the insights of existing studies finally to move the field forward we highlight key questions and challenges in current rot based work provide a more precise definition of exogenous and endogenous uncertainty suggest empirical designs to test unique rot predictions and explore areas where rot can be combined with other theoretical perspectives to better understand ib phenomena

project selection commitment and competition we examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once a new project opportunity arises every period taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends in our dynamic game when two firms are free of commitment they move sequentially in random order symmetric pure strategy markov perfect equilibria always exist in equilibrium the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover even when the value of the project is the same for both firms a monopolist rejects more projects and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior we extend the model to allow for externalities asymmetry and n 2n 2 firms

the impact of lead time on capital investments abstract we study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures investment with significant lead time or time to build and investment without or minor lead time we investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time to build versus when it is not we characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum we offer some new results the model predicts that controlling for demand and production and investment costs investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries which often exhibit time to build than in fast paced industries where time to build is insignificant furthermore for both investment types investment with or without time to build we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest this behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints also expected outputs are lower than cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty moreover the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types

a bayesian approach to real options the case of distinguishing between temporary and permanent shocks traditional real options models demonstrate the importance of the option to wait due to uncertainty over future shocks to project cash flows however there is often another important source of uncertainty uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks adding bayesian uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks augments the traditional option to wait with an additional option to learn the implied investment behavior differs significantly from that in standard models for example investment may occur at a time of stable or decreasing cash flows respond sluggishly to cash flow shocks and depend on the timing of project cash flows during the past two decades the real options approach to valuation of irreversible investment opportunities has become part of the mainstream literature in financial economics the central idea is that the opportunity to invest is equivalent to an american call option on the underlying investment project as a consequence the problem of optimal investment timing is analogous to the optimal exercise decision for an american option applications of the real options approach are now numerous 1 one feature that is common to virtually all real options models is that the underlying uncertainty pertains only to future shocks since future cash flows are uncertain there is an important opportunity cost of investing today the value of the asset might go up so that tomorrow will be an even better time to invest this opportunity cost is often referred to in the literature as the option

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

evaluation of firm s loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision abstract we investigate the effect of incomplete information in a model where a start up with a unique idea and technology pioneers a new market but will eventually be expelled from the market by a large firm s subsequent entry we evaluate the start up s loss due to incomplete information about the large firm s behavior we clarify conditions under which the start up needs more information about the large firm the proposed method of evaluating the loss due to incomplete information could also be applied to other real options models involving incomplete information

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

going multinational under exchange rate uncertainty abstract we analyze a model where an exporting firm competes a la cournot in a foreign market the firm faces exchange rate uncertainty and has the option to invest abroad the paper contributes four results first real option pricing techniques are used to derive the optimal timing rule of the investment and the price of the firm and foreign competitors second the sunk cost of entry into the foreign market introduces hysteresis in direct investment flows we find that the degree of hysteresis grows with the number of firms in the industry third we determine the conditions under which dumping may appear and the role of fdi in precluding this type of dumping fourth tariffs have the well known fdi inducing effect more so in less competitive markets and are more effective at deterring delocation furthermore a tariff might have the effect of triggering dumping

the economic policy uncertainty and firm investment in australia this paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty epu on the australian firm investment activity we find a significant positive relationship between the epu and the firm investment o

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

an empirical examination of the timing of land conversions in the presence of farmland preservation programs using a panel of parcel level data we estimate a hazard model and find strong evidence that the mere existence of an option to preserve farmland delays decisions to convert farmland to developed uses by about six years a reduction in median conversion time of 12 to 43 depending on parcel size where such delays allow local governments to improve infrastructure or implement stricter growth control measures benefits of a preservation option may be even more long term also increases in the variance of returns to development tended to slow conversion for parcels with all but the highest lot capacities copyright 2008 oxford university press

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

production and spatial distribution of switchgrass and miscanthus in the united states under uncertainty and sunk cost abstract the u s cellulosic biofuel mandate has not been enforced in recent years uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the mandate in addition to high production and harvest cost have contributed to a delay in the widespread planting of bioenergy crops such as switchgrass and miscanthus previous literature has shown that under uncertainty and sunk cost an investment threshold is further increased due to the value associated from holding the investment option in this paper we extend the previous literature by applying a real option switching model to bioenergy crop production first we calculate the county level break even price which triggers a switching away from traditional field crops corn soybeans and wheat to bioenergy crops under various scenarios differing by commodity prices production cost and biomass price expectations we show that the resulting break even prices at the county level can be substantially higher than previously estimated due to the inclusion of the option value in a second step we identify counties that are most likely to grow switchgrass or miscanthus by simulating a stochastic biomass price over time our results highlight two issues first switchgrass or miscanthus are not grown in the midwest under any scenario under low agricultural residue removal rates biomass crops are mostly grown in the southeast second under the assumption of a high removal rates bioenergy crops are not grown anywhere in the u s since the cellulosic biofuel mandate can be covered by agricultural residues

irreversible investment financing and bankruptcy decisions in an oligopoly this paper examines a firm s debt level investment timing and investment scale choices in a continuous time model where the output price of a good that the firm produces depends on a stochastic demand shift variable and the total industry supply of the good using the simple symmetric cournot nash equilibrium assumption that all firms are identical and therefore follow the same financing and investment strategies we show that competition decreases the output price and hence encourages a firm to wait for a higher demand level before it is profitable to invest we also demonstrate how uncertainty bankruptcy costs and corporate taxation affect the firm s financing and investment decisions

explicit investment rules with time to build and uncertainty abstract we establish explicit socially optimal rules for an irreversible investment decision with time to build and uncertainty assuming a price sensitive demand function with a random intercept we provide comparative statics and economic interpretations for three models of demand arithmetic brownian geometric brownian and the cox ingersoll ross committed capacity that is the installed capacity plus the investment in the pipeline must never drop below the best predictor of future demand minus two biases the discounting bias takes into account the fact that investment is paid upfront for future use the precautionary bias multiplies a type of risk aversion index by the local volatility relying on the analytical forms we discuss in detail the economic effects for example the impact of volatility on the optimal investment is negligible in some cases it vanishes in the cir model for long delays and in the gbm model for high discount rates

open loop equilibria and perfect competition in option exercise games the investment boundaries defined by grenadier 2002 for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open loop strategies as closed loop strategies they are not equilibria because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth options the perfectly competitive outcome is produced by closed loop strategies that are mutually best responses in this equilibrium the option to delay investment has zero value and the simple npv rule is followed by all firms the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

irreversible investment real options and competition evidence from real estate development abstract we examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in vancouver canada built from 1979 1998 we find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments empirically a one standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development these results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion

supply demand and the value of green buildings attention to sustainability and energy efficiency rating schemes in the commercial property sector has increased rapidly during the past decade in the uk commercial properties have been certified under the breeam rating scheme since 1999 offering fertile ground to investigate the economic dynamics of green certification in the commercial property market this paper documents that over the 2000 09 period the expanding supply of green buildings within a given london neighbourhood had a positive impact on average rents and prices but reduced rents and prices for environmentally certified real estate the results suggest that there is a gentrification effect from green buildings however each additional green building decreases the marginal effect of certification in the rental and transaction markets by 2 per cent and 5 per cent respectively in addition controlling for lease contract features like contract length and the rent free period modifies the impact of environmental certification on

warrant exercise dividends and reinvestment policy in this paper we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants we analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies first we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding however sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders even absent dividends because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm s scale increases the riskiness of an equity share second oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

entry into the electricity market uncertainty competition and mothballing options the present paper analyzes the entry strategies into the electricity market of two firms that have power plants under price uncertainty and competition we consider the symmetric and asymmetric two firms which have either a thermal power plant or a nuclear power plant the differences between the thermal power plant and the nuclear power plant such as the cost structure and operational flexibility are modeled the threshold values of market entry are calculated for each firm with either the thermal power plant or the nuclear power plant as the leader or the follower we show the dependence of cost structures on entry thresholds of the leader and the follower into the electricity market for various market and cost conditions the diagrams of the leader are also shown

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

a normative empirical analysis of state duties and corporate responsibilities related to adverse human rights impacts on the amazonian minerals energy frontier abstract the article probes the existence of a minerals energy complex mec a concept developed in south africa to describe the strong interlinkages between the mining and energy sector in the brazilian amazon within the framework of the mec the authors conduct a normative analysis based on the united nations guiding principles for business and human rights ungps of the state duties and corporate responsibilities for adverse human rights impacts in the complex the authors use a single in depth case study approach focussing on the case of the belo monte hydroelectric dam in the amazonian state of para the mec proves to be a useful framework for studying the advancement of hydroelectricity and mining projects on the amazonian frontier the analysis indicates that the brazilian minerals and energy sectors are mutually dependent and have overlapping interests and decision making structures applying the mec framework to the belo monte case serves to clarify and detangle the relationships between the various actors associated with the dam s adverse impacts this provides a foundation for the normative analysis of the responsibilities and actions required of each actor based on the internationally accepted standards in the ungps by applying the mec as an analytical research framework and drawing on the ungps for normative guidance the present study contributes to the academic literature on corporate responsibility as well as providing policy and decision makers with a normative empirical analysis that can be drawn upon to improve policy and ensure that corporate activity contributes to sustainable development

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors