infrastructure investment the cost of capital and regulation an assessment the paper considers the role of infrastructure in improving economic performance and its compar ative neglect relative to traditional macroeconomic and microeconomic policies it explains why infrastructure matters why britain s infrastructure performance has been poor and summarizes the scale of the challenge for the coming decade privatization liberalization and competition have focused on monopoly market failure and private incentives but they have neglected the time inconsistency problem which confronts investors in networks with high fixed and sunk costs the failure to commit which has characterized british approaches to infrastructure has been partially addressed through the creation of regulated asset bases rabs backed up by the duty on regulators to ensure that functions can be financed the paper considers how the rabs can be developed to provide credible long term contracts over a wide range of activities and how the financial regu latory regime can complement this commitment notably through the split cost of capital and the indexation of the cost of debt approaches the paper concludes by setting out the building blocks of a credible regulatory framework for infrastructure together with the impacts on reducing the cost of capital the role of the state in reinforcing this commitment and the associated institutions are also set out

variable returns to agglomeration and the effect of road traffic congestion abstract this paper investigates the links between returns to urban density productivity and road traffic congestion a generalised translog production inverse input demand function is estimated to test for the existence of variable returns to agglomeration in manufacturing construction and service industries two separate measures of urban density in which proximity is represented by straight line distance or by generalised cost are constructed and included in the translog to identify the effect of road traffic congestion the results show that for some sectors of the economy diminishing returns to urban density can set in causing the magnitude of agglomeration elasticity to fall as effective densities increase the generalised cost based measure of agglomeration produces higher elasticities because it captures both time and distance dimensions of density a comparison of spatial variance in estimates indicates that road traffic congestion plays an important role in explaining diminishing returns for the most highly urbanised locations

intertemporally consistent shadow prices in an open economy estimates for cyprus abstract in the practical estimation of shadow prices the assumption that the economy is on a steady state growth path is often invoked usually implicitly most developing countries are far from this trajectory we derive shadow prices where the dynamic evolution of the economy is endogenously determined important influences being initial conditions and the constraints on foreign borrowing hence the resulting dated shadow prices of tradeables nontradeables labor and the accounting rate of interest ari are mutually consistent estimates for the republic of cyprus show that derivations from steady state growth can be significant leading to large fluctuations in the ari and thereby making the timing of investment projects crucial

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

public capital and long run costs in u k manufacturing a model of u k manufacturing production that incorporates the inputs of public as well as private capital is specified and estimated the model is then used to measure the contribution of public capital to productivity growth over the period 1966 to 1990 it is found that before 1980 the public and private capital contributions were of comparable magnitude after 1980 the contribution of public capital declined significantly copyright 1993 by royal economic society

road pricing lessons from london lessons from london this paper assesses the original london congestion charging scheme lccs and its impacts and it simulates the proposed extension which will include most of kensington and chelsea it also touches upon the political economy of the congestion charge and the increase of the charge from 5 to 8 per day the possibility of transferring the experience to paris rome and new york is also discussed the lccs has had positive impacts this was despite the considerable political influences on the charge level and location it is difficult to assess the impacts of the increase of the charge from 5 to 8 which took place in july 2005 because no data have yet been released by transport for london the proposed extension of the charging zone does not seem to be an efficient change on economic grounds at least for the specific boundaries method of charging and level of charging that is currently planned our benefit cost ratios computed under different assumptions of costs and benefits are all below unity overall the experience shows that simple methods of congestion charging though in no way resembling first best pigouvian taxes can do a remarkably good job of creating benefits from the reduction of congestion nevertheless the magnitude of these benefits can be highly sensitive to the details of the scheme which therefore need to be developed with great care georgina santos and gordon fraser

the comparative advantage of cities abstract what determines the distributions of skills occupations and industries across cities we develop a theory to jointly address these fundamental questions about the spatial organization of economies our model incorporates a system of cities their internal urban structures and a high dimensional theory of factor driven comparative advantage it predicts that larger cities will be skill abundant and specialize in skill intensive activities according to the monotone likelihood ratio property we test the model using data on 270 us metropolitan areas 3 to 9 educational categories 22 occupations and 19 industries the results provide support for our theory s predictions

risky business the decline of defined benefit pensions and firms shifting of risk since the early 1980s employment in the united states has undergone significant transformation as the large corporations that once safeguarded employees with stable jobs and rewards for loyalty have replaced these employment relationships with ones based on cost containment and flexibility one important consequence of these developments is that firms have abdicated their role as a critical risk bearer in society although evidence suggests that firms have increasingly shifted market risks onto their workforce to date there have been few detailed analyses exploring what factors have driven this phenomenon this study adds to our understanding of why firms have transferred risk to their employees by examining the decline of a highly institutionalized practice wherein large u s firms used to bear retirement risk the defined benefit db pension plan through a detailed analysis i show that variance in the presence power and interests of shareholders and employees at the firm level differentially affect a firm s willingness to shift the risk of retirement onto its workers specifically i demonstrate empirically that different types of shareholders have differential effects on a firm s retirement practices suggesting that the changing equity ownership structure of large u s firms has played a key role in how risk is allocated between workers and firms declines in employee power have also played a role because firm levels of unionization positively affect rates of db participation for both unionized and nonunionized workers

allocation of individuals to job levels under rationing summary we augment an ordered response model for the job level at which individuals desire to work with allowance for individual reporting of a discrepancy between actual and desired job level and we also investigate possible biases from restricting the observations to the employed and omitting the unemployed we find that the latter bias can be ignored and interpret this as evidence that the unemployed are not choosier than the employed people claiming inadequate capability utilization are not markedly differently allocated than those claiming a proper match women s lower job levels cannot be explained from rationing by capability utilization

search sorting and urban agglomeration studies have suggested that urban agglomeration enhances productivity by facilitating the firm worker matching process this article develops a model that formalizes this notion and demonstrates that when firm capital and worker skill are complementary in production urban agglomeration will tend to generate more efficient yet segregated matches as a result not only will local market size be positively associated with average productivity it will also generate greater between skill group wage inequality and a higher expected return to skill acquisition recent data from the counties and metropolitan areas of the united states is consistent with each of these implications

self selection bias in longitudinal estimation of wage gaps cross sectional regression analyses of wage gaps may be biased by omission of unobserved worker characteristics recent studies therefore have used longitudinal data to difference out the effects of such variables this paper however shows that self selection of job changers may cause longitudinal estimation of wage gaps to be inconsistent

ability and power over production in the distribution of earnings t he aggregate distribution of earnings in all western countries is approximately lognormal over most of its range but the earnings of the top 10 or 20 of individuals follow the pareto form which generates a great excess of very high earnings compared with the tail of a lognormal distribution individuals at the top appear to be paid according to the job they perform rather than their ability this paper explains these features in terms of profit maximising behaviour from time to time a single new manager or management team improves a company s profit by millions of dollars per year this shows that a senior manager can influence the company s total output far more than a junior employee his greater influence over output derives from having much more control over the company s resources profit maximising companies offer high salaries for senior management jobs because even a small improvement in their performance leads to a worthwhile increase in output and competitive bidding for the best managers then drives their salaries up to high levels this in outline is the explanation for high earnings developed formally in the rest of this paper

shadow prices and substitution in trade distorted economies abstract this paper derives simple and operational shadow pricing rules in a three sector three factor general equilibrium model incorporating nontraded goods under the little mirrlees method if a single simple and empirically plausible condition is satisfied the accounting ratio for land will exceed unity and those for capital and labor will lie below unity if this condition is not satisfied or cannot be verified it is still possible to fix some accounting ratios above or below unity just from knowledge of the signs of substitution patterns in consumption and factor intensity patterns in production guidelines are also derived for setting the shadow prices of nontraded goods or quota restricted imports it is shown that the alternative domestic price method generally yields less useful guidelines than the little mirrlees method

how the market solves an assignment problem the matching of lawyers with legal claims in the market for lawyers observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claims there is a scale of resources effect under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality in a law firm the institution of tenure performs a sorting function lawyers found to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leave the value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover

estimating gender differences in access to jobs this paper proposes a new measure of gender differences in access to jobs based on a job assignment model this measure is the probability ratio of getting a job for a female and a male at each rank of the wage ladder we derive a nonparametric estimator of this access measure and estimate it for french full time executives aged 40 45 in the private sector our results show that the gender difference in the probability of getting a job increases along the wage ladder from 9 to 50 females thus have a significantly lower access to high paid jobs than to low paid jobs

the housing market s of san diego this paper uses an assignment model to understand the cross section of house prices within a metro area movers demand for housing is derived from a lifecycle problem with credit market frictions equilibrium house prices adjust to assign houses that dier by quality to movers who dier by age income and wealth to quantify the model we measure distributions of house prices house qualities and mover characteristics from micro data on san diego county during the 2000s boom the main result is that cheaper credit for poor households was a major driver of prices especially at the low end of the market

learning about the nature of production from equilibrium assignment patterns this paper exploits empirically a key insight from lucas 1978 and rosen 1982 that the organization of production and the distribution of earnings across individuals are jointly determined by the equilibrium assignment of individuals to firms and hierarchical positions we study how different classes of production functions generate alternative equilibrium assignments we then use confidential census data on u s law offices to investigate the form that the production function should take to rationalize earnings patterns in legal services we argue that earnings patterns in this industry are consistent with a production function that is characterized by asymmetric sensitivity to the skill of agents in different organizational positions complementarity between managers and workers skill and scale effects in individual skill

uk transport policy 1997 2001 the 1997 government announced policies and changes in administration but the statistics show that little else was achieved road traffic growth was temporarily tamed by an increase in the price of fuel which integrated policies on transport environment and land use this was not sustained so there will be more congestion and more road capacity must be provided a coherent policy on charges was absent though congestion charging will help if eventually implemented little freight was transferred to rail neither integration nor social inclusion was improved london became less integrated and policy on the underground was a failure administration of the railways remains confused there are doubts about the technical managerial and financial feasibility of the expansion envisaged the bus was given inadequate attention the treasury dominates through the public spending control process which fetters local authorities and impedes infrastructure investment proven borrowing mechanisms offer alternatives for locally accountable capital financing copyright 2002 oxford university press

distribution of ability and earnings in a hierarchical job assignment model we examine the mapping of the distribution of ability onto earnings in a hierarchical job assignment model workers are assigned to a continuum of jobs in fixed proportions ordered by sensitivity to ability the model implies a novel marginal productivity interpretation of wages we derive comparative statics for changes in technology and in the distribution of ability we find conditions under which a more unequal distribution of ability maps onto a more less unequal distribution of earnings we also analyze an assignment model with variable proportions and find that in the cobb douglas case a rise in the inequality of ability always narrows the range of earnings

on the optimal realignment of a contest the case of college football this article examines the relationship between demand and scheduling in college football we first derive two different metrics for team quality and then use those metrics to see how they impact attendance we find that there is a positive interaction between the quality of the teams then various simulations are run to see how attendance would change under different scheduling scenarios if teams are put into conferences based on the team quality measures the average per game attendance only rises 1 2 this is true if 1 year or 10 year quality measures are used however our simulation suggests that this effect would be more than offset mainly because schools with larger capacity would play fewer home games and so aggregate attendance would fall we discuss whether this effect would be mitigated by capacity adjustments in the longer term jel l83 z20 c78

glass ceilings or sticky floors statistical discrimination in a dynamic model of hiring and promotion i show that when two groups differ in i their average skill level ii the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market and or hi the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker s skill over time equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs in 1995 95 of senior level managers in the top fortune 1000 industrial and 500 service companies in the us were male 97 of whom were also white federal glass ceiling commission 1995 in the uk females make up just 8 3 of the senior judi ciary 9 7 of top business leaders and 9 1 of newspaper editors eoc 2005 at the end of the 2004 american football season only 5 of the 32 nfl head coaches were black and only 2 of the 117 division i college football teams had black head coaches rosenburg 2004 in 1999 there were only 68 female full professors at the 120 phd granting economics departments in the us cswep 1999 this severe underrepre sentation of females and minorities at the highest levels of occupational achievement throughout a wide range of occupations has often been referred to as the glass ceiling 1

worker allocation hierarchies and the wage distribution economists have traditionally viewed the allocation of workers among jobs through the concept of comparative advantage this paper investigates hierarchical production models which display an absence of comparative advantage in order to demonstrate that for hierarchical production there is a second allocating factor which plays an important role two results are found first the allocation of workers among jobs tends to match high ability workers with positions which value ability highly second despite the fact that the models display an absence of comparative advantage i e the standard theoretical explanation for why wage distributions might be skewed the models wage distributions are skewed to the right relative to the underlying ability distributions

the importance of bundling in a gorman lancaster model of earnings the idea that the labor market of individuals can be decomposed into payments to separate productive attributes has an enduring appeal in economics assuming that demographic groups differ only in their endowments of productive characteristics it is possible to rationalize observed demographic earnings differentials without invoking the arguments that characteristics specific to a particular demographic group are direct objects of employer demand by aggregating skills over all demographic groups it is possible to produce a theory of the market determination of the prices of skills held in different amounts by different demographic groups this paper considers conditions under which characteristics are uniformly priced across sectors of a multisector economy the paper presents empirical evidence that rejects uniform pricing of characteristics as a description of the us labor market bundling may account for this evudence but other hypotheses do as well authors

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

a spillover based theory of credentialism i propose a model in which credentials such as diplomas are instrumentally valuable to workers the model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker s wage to their output a worker s productivity is influenced by the skills of their co workers where such skills arise from an ability augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co workers credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market thereby allowing them to match with high skill co workers in equilibrium despite the positive externality associated with a worker s investment i show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium

housing assignment with restrictions theory and evidence from stanford university s campus this paper studies housing markets where a subset of houses in a restricted area is available exclusively to a subset of eligible buyers an empirical part shows that houses on stanford campus available only to faculty trade at substantial discounts to comparable houses off campus the theoretical part describes an assignment model with heterogeneous houses and buyers which predicts such discounts if the matchup of quality and buyer pools is sufficiently different inside versus outside the restricted area the restriction can distort allocations by making eligible buyers choose either higher or lower qualities than ineligible buyers with the same characteristics

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

grade inflation social background and labour market matching a model is presented where workers of differing abilities and from different social backgrounds are assigned to jobs based on grades received at school it is examined how this matching is affected if good grades are granted to some low ability students such grade inflation is shown to reduce the aggregate wage of the lower class workers because employers use social origin as a signal for productivity if grades are less than fully informative moreover the high ability students from the higher class may benefit from grade inflation since this shields them from the competition on the part of able students from the lower classes

stable partnerships matching and local public goods abstract in the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed heterogeneity in tastes for private vs public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched we show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities

transport infrastructure investment implications for growth and productivity theory and evidence on the effects of public investment on growth and productivity are reviewed it is concluded that on average public capital has positive impacts on output and private investment partly offset by the effects of the taxation needed to finance it a possible future shortfall in public capital in the uk is highlighted the paper also reviews the contribution of transport infrastructure to productivity and considers implications for cost benefit analysis it is suggested that there is a case for greater uk investment in roads but ideally this should be implemented along with an efficient national road pricing scheme

investment and shadow pricing in a growing economy with tax restrictions abstract this paper analyses the evolution of investment and shadow prices in a growing economy where government investment must be financed by distortionary taxation it pays particular attention to the sensitivity of this evolution to the sort of shocks that have affected developing countries recently increased debt service and an increased price for energy the analysis is conducted with the help of a numerical model of a dual economy the main policy implications are that it is inappropriate to use time invariant shadow prices in cost benefit analysis that the response of shadow prices to changes in the economic environment may not be unidirectional and that the accounting rate of interest cannot simply be seen as a regulator of investment that responds to shortages of investment finance in addition the paper develops a new approach to the valuation of terminal capital stock in a finite horizon model and shows how the non convexity of second best models can lead to discontinuities in investment

frictional assignment i efficiency abstract this paper examines the two sided matching problem where the agents on each side of the market are heterogeneous and the matching process is time consuming this is cast in a labor market setting where workers of different skills match with different machine qualities i characterize the efficient allocation and then show that it can be decentralized by a market mechanism the efficient assignment is not always positively assortative despite the fact that machine qualities and skills are complementary in production to decentralize the efficient allocation the market mechanism requires the firms to post wages and commit each machine quality to a particular skill implications on wage inequality are briefly examined journal of economic literature classification numbers j31 e24 j64

social limits to redistribution in many countries equality of political rights including the right to vote over taxes and transfers goes along with substantial inequality of economic conditions this observation lies at the root of one fundamental issue in political economy one about the factors that limit the extent of redistribution in democracies the conventional economic wisdom on this issue can roughly be summarized by two arguments firstly redistributive taxation may be limited by various kinds of incentive costs of taxation as e g in james a mirrlees 1971 kevin w s roberts 1977 dennis n epple and thomas romer 1991 and thomas piketty 1995 secondly redistribution may be dampened by the lobbying activity of high income groups and by various imperfections inherent to the political process that determines the tax system as e g in gary s becker 1983 and john e roemer 1995 while both arguments offer illuminating insights into the phenomenon of redistribution they are also based on a very crude description of human behavior one which ignores social motivations of action both in the economic and the political sphere the present paper develops an explanation that takes such motivations into account specifically it shows that limits to redistribution may arise when economic inequality has an informational value for social decisions our approach is based upon the following observation many goods and decisions that heavily affect an individual s quality of life are not allocated or made through markets but through social interactions thomas scitovsky 1976 for instance although people have strong preferences over how they are treated by others and over whom they mate with these things are not the object of market transactions a number of sources of satisfaction like conversation dinners and parties playing with others and being observed and admired are nonmarket goods for which a keen social competition between individuals often develops as shown by harold cole et al 1992 the existence of social rather than market competition for some goods can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in the income distribution when information about relative income is private individuals become interested in the observable consumption differentials between them and their social competitors since consumption differentials are influenced by redistributive taxation the political attitudes of people toward redistribution will be shaped by its expected impact on social competition in some identifiable environments this concern for social success may be the crucial factor that limits the extent of redistribution desired by a majority of voters specifically while the middle class may obtain economic benefits from a large amount of redistributive taxation it may oppose an equalization of living standards since this would harm its social success the fear of losing social status in favor of the poor induces the middle class to enter a political alliance with the rich which supports conservative taxation programs in the sociological literature scholars of voting behavior have often suggested that the need for social recognition plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes seymour m lipset 1967 pointed out that white collar workers tend to be socially valued similarly as those higher in the system and although their income may be only slightly larger than that of manual workers white collars are much more likely to corneo department of economics university of osnabruck rolandstrasse 8 d 49069 osnabruck germany cesifo munich and cepr london gruner department of economics university of mannheim d 68131 mannheim germany iza bonn and cepr london we would like to thank emmanuelle auriol dieter bos peter funk mike hout olivier jeanne peter jonas georg noldeke thomas piketty regis renault john roemer jens weidmann and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions we have also benefited from the comments of participants at workshops and conferences in barcelona bonn davis jena maastricht magdeburg mannheim montreal munich rotterdam silvaplana tel aviv tilburg toulouse and warwick at which we presented earlier versions of this work financial support from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn is gratefully acknowledged

pay technology and the cost of worker absence i introduction the complexity of patterns of worker absence is well known but is yielding reluctantly to studies that use highly detailed information about individual workers and their work environments to date these studies have focussed on how specific contractual details affect worker absenteeism rates 1 in this paper we instead take an equilibrium perspective where we assume heterogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers participate in a competitive labor market by understanding why firms with different technologies may have different policies toward absenteeism we can begin to explain observed differences in absenteeism rates across workers and firms the empirical framework is based on coles and treble 1996 which considers an equilibrium assignment model with heterogeneous firms and workers the standard assignment framework 2 assumes that each filled job is characterized by one machine of quality q and one employee with skill level s a competitive equilibrium yields a wage schedule w and an assignment rule q where a worker of skill s is hired at wage w w s by a firm holding machine q q s coles and treble 1996 do not assume that workers are differently skilled instead workers have different propensities to go absent also instead of a one worker one machine production process firms utilize different production technologies some use an assembly line technology where output requires that a sufficient number of workers show up for work and others use a linear production technology in which there are constant marginal returns to labor for reasons that will become clear a competitive equilibrium yields a wage schedule and an assignment rule that depend on worker propensities to go absent specifically workers with a lower propensity to go absent earn a higher wage and are employed in firms using assembly line technologies the key insight is that firms who operate assembly line technologies have a different shadow cost of absenteeism from those which operate a linear technology as in weiss 1985 and coles and treble 1993 in the latter technology an absence by one particular worker does not affect the marginal productivity of other workers at the firm this is not true in an assembly line firm or in production functions where labor inputs are strict complements as in kremer 1993 coles and treble 1996 consider a market equilibrium in which workers are also heterogeneous say workers have different family responsibilities in this case a competitive labor market implies equilibrium sorting by firms and workers assembly line firms require a low level of absenteeism and pay a relatively high wage to compensate workers for attending work reliably we refer to this as the shadow cost of absenteeism workers who have a comparative advantage in attending work reliably say those who do not have to look after children when the children are sick take employment in assembly line firms and enjoy the wage premium attached to employment there we refer to this as the shadow price of absenteeism conversely those who appreciate greater flexibility in work attendance take employment in the linear technology firms and in equilibrium earn a lower average wage rate although absenteeism may be costly to firms observed absenteeism rates are not necessarily inefficient the worker who misses a day at work to look after sick children or enjoy a sports event is expressing a trade off between workplace production and home production where home productivity is perhaps subject to idiosyncratic shocks efficient contracting implies that firms and workers agree to an acceptable absenteeism rate and a compensating wage differential efficient sorting implies that those workers who can commit to attending work reliably accept employment in assembly line occupations and so earn a wage premium reflecting the shadow price of absenteeism our goal is to identify and measure this shadow price using a unique data set from france

inter industry mobility and the cyclical upgrading of labor we investigate whether a market clearing model is consistent with industry employment and wage patterns related to the cyclical upgrading of labor we demonstrate that roy s 1951 market clearing

roads to prosperity assessing the link between public capital and productivity does the positive correlation between infrastructure and productivity reflect causation if so in which direction the author finds that when growth in roads the largest component of infrastructure changes productivity growth changes disproportionately in u s industries with more vehicles that vehicle intensive industries benefit more from road building suggests that roads are productive at the margin however road investments do not appear unusually productive intuitively the interstate system was highly productive but a second one would not be road building thus explains much of the productivity slowdown through a one time unrepeatable productivity boost in the 1950s and 1960s

does job testing harm minority workers evidence from retail establishments because minorities typically fare poorly on standardized tests job testing is thought to pose an equality efficiency trade off testing improves selection but reduces minority hiring we develop a conceptual framework to assess when this trade off is likely to apply and evaluate the evidence for such a trade off using hiring and productivity data from a national retail firm whose 1 363 stores switched from informal to test based worker screening over the course of one year we document that testing yielded more productive hires at this firm raising mean and median tenure by 10 or more consistent with prior research minorities performed worse on the test yet testing had no measurable impact on minority hiring and productivity gains were uniformly large among minority and nonminority hires these results suggest that job testing raised the precision of screening without introducing additional negative information about minority applicants most plausibly because both the job test and the informal screen that preceded it were unbiased

shadow prices for project evaluation under alternative macroeconomic specifications for purposes of social cost benefit analysis a project may be viewed as a disturbance to the economy displacing it from some initial equilibrium to a new one but the new configuration will depend on which particular variables adjust to restore equilibrium this paper examines the shadow prices for project evaluation under alternative assumptions about how equilibrium is restored when the government reacts by altering its foreign exchange reserves the shadow prices coincide with those advocated in the manuals on social cost benefit analysis however if the government adjusts its domestic expenditures or tariff rates the shadow prices will differ from those of the manuals except insofar as the relative shadow prices of tradeables remain their relative border prices the paper first presents the model followed by two cases in which domestic prices and wage rates do not vary because ad valorem tariffs are fixed and one case in which they are endogenous

labor supply as a choice among latent jobs unobserved heterogeneity and identification this paper discusses aspects of a framework for modeling labor supply where the notion of job choice is fundamental in this framework workers are assumed to have preferences over latent job opportunities belonging to worker specific choice sets from which they choose their preferred job the observed hours of work and wage is interpreted as the job specific hours and wage of the chosen job the main contribution of this paper is an analysis of the identification problem of this framework under various conditions when conventional cross section micro data are applied

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

a simple model of educational standards the author models standards for educational credentials such as high school diplomas standard setters maximize their conception of social welfare knowing that utility maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard the author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards the median voter would prefer higher standards under symmetric distributions and decentralization lowers standards among identical communities optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education or increased student heterogeneity superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity egalitarianism and pooling under decentralization

is public expenditure productive abstract this paper considers the relationship between aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending variables the empirical results indicate that i the nonmilitary public capital stock is dramatically more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending ii military capital bears little relation to productivity and iii a core infrastructure of streets highways airports mass transit sewers water systems etc has most explanatory power for productivity the paper also suggests an important role for the net public capital stock in the productivity slowdown of the last fifteen years

statistical discrimination and efficiency this paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure i consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibriumphenomenon it is found that there are potential efficiency gains from discrimination in terms of reduced mismatch between workers and jobs whether the solution to the planning problem involves discrimination depends on the trade off between the informational gains of specialization and the losses in terms of increased investment costs

why has house price dispersion gone up we calibrate a dynamic general equilibrium island model to investigate the 30 year increase in the level of house prices and their dispersion across u s metropolitan areas the model is based on two main assumptions households o w in and out metropolitan areas in response to local productivity shocks and the housing supply cannot adjust instantly because of technological and regulatory constraints the calibration reveals that the observed tightening of housing supply regulation cannot quantitatively account for the rise in the level and dispersion of house prices in equilibrium workers o w out of tightly regulated towards less regulated metropolitan areas undoing most of the price impact of local supply restrictions in contrast the observed increase in wage dispersion across metropolitan areas does create the observed increase in the level and dispersion of house prices workers o w towards exceptionally productive metropolitan areas and drive house prices up the calibration also suggests that the welfare eects of housing supply regulation are large when wages become more dispersed

the dynamics of inequality the past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the united states while there is a large number of existing theories of the pareto tail of the long run income distributions almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data we show that standard theories which build on a random growth mechanism generate transition dynamics that are too slow relative to those observed in the data we then suggest two parsimonious deviations from the canonical model that can explain such changes scale dependence that may arise from changes in skill prices and type dependence that is the presence of some high growth types these deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of superstar entrepreneurs or managers

market forces and ceo pay shocks to ceo demand induced by ipo waves i develop a simple competitive equilibrium model and derive the prediction that ceo pay size elasticity increases when more firms compete for an inelastic supply of managers using industry level ipo waves as a proxy for increased competition for ceos i find that pay size elasticity increases by 6 with a one standard deviation increase in ipo activity this effect is stronger in specialized industries in addition increased ipo activity leads to a greater likelihood of executive transitions between firms these findings indicate that market forces play a key role in the determination of ceo pay received august 6 2015 editorial decision september 24 2016 by editor francesca cornelli

self selection and the distribution of hourly wages this article formulates and estimates alternative equilibrium models of industrial wage determination and self selection in explaining industrial wage differentials we find that it is important to account for heterogeneous sector specific skills and self selection decisions by agents concerning their sector of employment the classical roy model is rejected so is an efficiency units model of the labor market a revised roy model that accounts for comparative advantage in the choice of industrial sectors and choice between market and nonmarket work is much more successful in explaining cross section wage distributions and their evolution over time

education matching and the allocative value of romance societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non market goods such as marital partnerships we explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples we consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt these generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy while marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market the analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes

marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods theoretical results and empirical implications this paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods assuming transferable utility within marriage the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on wealth when spouses differ only in endowments and the gains to marriage result only from public goods when spouses differ in wages and household public goods are produced at home the results imply offsetting effects with public good economies creating an incentive for positive assortative mating on wages and gains from specialization creating an incentive for negative assortative mating on wages the results help explain the persistent lack of empirical support for becker s prediction of negative assortative mating on wages and have implications for empirical analysis of all joint living arrangement decisions

the wage distribution in a model of the assignment of skills to jobs this paper discusses a general equilibrium model of the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs both jobs and workers are measured along a continuous one dimensional scale the c

aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and the minimum wage paradox while the employment effects of minimum wages are usually reported to be small suggesting low substitutability between skill types direct estimates suggest a much larger degree of substitutability this article argues that this paradox is largely due to a bias induced by the aggregation of skill types into broad categories an assignment model is applied where skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs the implied pattern of substitutability reveals the sources of the bias estimation results for the united states show elasticities of complementarity to be underestimated by up to a factor 2 5 the methods laid out likewise can be applied to other markets where different quality types are close substitutes such as the housing market

introduction to the distribution of earnings and of individual output by a d roy this article summarises the lasting contribution of roy s 1950 fundamental paper roy a d 1950 the distribution of earnings and of individual output economic journal vol 60 239 pp 489 505

overeducation undereducation and the british labour market this paper addresses the issue of overeducation and undereducation using for the first time a british dataset which contains explicit information on the level of required education to enter a job across the generality of occupations three key issues within the overeducation literature are addressed first what determines the existence of over and undereducation and to what extent are over and undereducation substitutes for experience tenure and training second to what extent are over and undereducation temporary or permanent phenomena third what are the returns to over and undereducation and do certain stylized facts discovered for the us and a number of european countries hold for britain

can centralized educational standards raise welfare abstract i examine conditions under which centralized educational standards raise welfare compared to decentralization in this model a uniform centralized standard only raises welfare when there is excessive cross district pooling of graduates by employers high cross district heterogeneity of students and high degrees of egalitarianism can surprisingly favor centralization in other cases centralization can lower standards in all districts including the weakest the cross district patterns of winners and losers among high and low achievers depend crucially on the degree of cross district pooling finally i show that centralized standards with a local option to set higher standards are always welfare improving

education and skills mismatch in the italian graduate labour market this paper focuses on education and skills mismatch among italian graduates indicators for over and under utilization of education and under utilization of skills are included as explanatory factors in a wage equation testing theories that could explain the effect of over schooling on wages we find little evidence to support assignment theory and also identify a relatively weak wage effect arising from educational mismatch associated with employers as opposed to employees perceptions of the job requirements our interpretation is that some employers have re categorized jobs as requiring a degree when they were previously filled by non graduates and many have not altered pay scales accordingly

empirical analysis of occupational hierarchies using data on u s engineers and the position of engineering jobs within firms this paper estimates a model of hierarchies within firms the model extends rosen s 1982 model of recursive production to two skills and multiple hierarchy levels the model generates an empirical model that is nested within a general roy 1951 model of self selection maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the production technology and the skill experience profiles are estimated the results suggest that approximately two thirds of changes in employment shares across hierarchy levels across time are explained by demographic shifts in the stock of engineering skills most of the returns to experience and to assignment to higher hierarchy levels within firms are caused by skill accumulation and self selection rather than technological dierences across hierarchy levels

returns to talent and the finance wage premium to study the role of talent in finance workers pay we exploit a special feature of the french higher education system wage returns to talent have been significantly higher and have risen faster since the 1980s in finance than in other sectors both wage returns to project size and the elasticity of project size to talent are also higher in this industry last the share of performance pay varies more for talent in finance these findings are supportive of finance wages reflecting the competitive assignment of talent in an industry that exhibits a high complementarity between talent and scale received october 11 2017 editorial decision september 4 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

a note on aggregation of skills and labor quality we use a unique new data set that combines data on individual workers and their employers to estimate marginal productivity differentials among different types of workers we then compare these to estimated relative wages leading to new evidence on

cheap talk in the classroom how biased grading at school explains gender differences in achievements career choices and wages in this paper i provide a theoretical explanation for the gender differences in education and on the labour market that are observed empirically in most oecd organisation for economic cooperation and development countries including the us within a cheap talk model of grading i show that biased grading in schools results in 1 boys outperforming girls in maths and sciences 2 boys having more top and more bottom achievers in maths and sciences than girls 3 girls outperforming boys in reading literacy 4 female graduates enrolling in university studies more often than male graduates 5 the predominance of female students in arts and humanities at the university 6 the predominance of male students in maths and sciences at the university and 7 the gender wage gap on the labour market for the highly educated copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

the impact of educational standards on the level and distribution of earnings the goal of this paper is to present the following finding an egalitarian policy maker might prefer higher standards than would a policy maker whose goal was to maximize the sum of earnings the result is based on the observation that if workers are differentiated with respect to ability an increase in educational standards will increase the earnings of both the most able and the least able workers the only workers whose earnings fall are those workers who after the increase fail to continue meeting the standard

fractionalization polarization and economic growth identifying the transmission channels in this article we examine empirically both the direct and indirect links between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth we find that both ethnic fractionalization and polarization are negatively associated with growth if considered in isolation an effect that is though primarily attributed to their link to other growth related activities i e investment conflict control of corruption fertility we study the corresponding transmission channels and calculate their relative importance in explaining a development curse based on ethnic diversity for both measures of ethnic fragmentation we find the corruption channel to be the most important one

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is

field of study earnings and self selection why do individuals choose different types of post secondary education and what are the labor market consequences of those choices we show that answering these questions is difficult because individuals choose between several unordered alternatives even with a valid instrument for every type of education instrumental variables estimation of the payoffs require information about individuals ranking of education types or strong additional assumptions like constant effects or restrictive preferences these identification results motivate and guide our empirical analysis of the choice of and payoff to field of study our context is norway s post secondary education system where a centralized admission process covers almost all universities and colleges this process creates credible instruments from discontinuities which effectively randomize applicants near unpredictable admission cutoffs into different fields of study at the same time it provides us with strategy proof measures of individuals ranking of fields taken together this allows us to estimate the payoffs to different fields while correcting for selection bias and keeping the next best alternatives as measured at the time of application fixed we find that different fields have widely different payoffs even after accounting for institutional differences and quality of peer groups for many fields the payoffs rival the college wage premiums suggesting the choice of field is potentially as important as the decision to enroll in college the estimated payoffs are consistent with individuals choosing fields in which they have comparative advantage we also test and reject assumptions of constant effects or restrictive preferences suggesting that information on next best alternatives is essential to identify payoffs to field of study