the form of incentive contracts agency with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability the analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability we introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state the form of the contract is debt a capped bonus when the critical ratio is increasing decreasing in the state an increasing critical ratio in the state space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced form distribution of output which we term the decreasing hazard rate in effort property dhrep the critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection

can agents be better off with pay caps a popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers pay using a small extension of the standard principal agent model we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose because the agent might be better off with a pay cap specifically we show that given a fixed effort level to be implemented the agent s expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent s reward the effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized while an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

international evidence on investment and fundamentals abstract if a firm s costs of installing capital are not quadratic then its optimal investment is not a linear function of fundamentals such as the returns and costs of capital this study specifies a model in which a firm may face fixed linear and convex costs of investing and estimates the resulting investment function using firm level data from 11 countries the evidence suggests important nonlinearities consistent with the presence of fixed or other non quadratic costs in the relationship between investment and fundamentals for most countries these findings are statistically signficant at the level of the firm and economically significant when aggregated by country

100 percent reserve banking a critical review of green perspectives abstract 100 percent reserve banking c perb is an enduring proposal for monetary reform that has been taken up by some ecological economists this paper identifies three groups of green arguments in favor of c perb and offers some criticism first the proposal could serve to constrain new investments by the availability of savings thereby checking economic growth however this would strongly increase interest rate volatility second it could potentially elevate environmental considerations in decisions about resource allocation by increasing the role of the democratic state as an economic actor this line of argument faces problems that require further detailed exploration and historical perspective third a transition to c perb would allow debt levels to be drastically cut this is technically possible but politically a tall order whether the existing system of debt based bank money generates a significant growth imperative is unclear and the importance of other driving forces behind perennial economic growth in modern societies which c perb does not address remains an issue of contention in general the adoption of c perb presupposes a tremendous reconfiguration of power relations between states and finance capital

a flexible specification of adjustment costs in dynamic factor demand models this paper proposes a flexible form of adjustment cost function an empirical illustration shows that the flexible form can detect both convex and non convex adjustment costs furthermore the flex

authority and incentives in organizations the paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts the analysis includes the owner of a firm a top manager and two division heads if it is more expensive to incentivize the division heads the owner will prefer full delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control in that situation decentralization is optimal given that selfish behavior is more important than cooperation for maximizing returns but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial if however incentivizing the division heads is clearly less expensive than creating incentives for the top manager the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue but partial delegation if selfish behavior is crucial

why do investment euler equations fail this article isolates sources of misspecification in neoclassical investment euler equations without ad hoc alterations of the basic model first allowing for nonlinear marginal investment adjustment costs improves model performance slightly some further improvement results from isolating firms whose optimality conditions hold even in the presence of fixed costs of adjustment or costly reversibility finally i identify which instruments contribute to model failure via standard gmm based tests and also via the empirical likelihood estimator of imbens which allows testing overidentifying restrictions individually both methods show that financial instruments contribute to rejection of the overidentifying restrictions for all firms however only the empirical likelihood estimator shows that they are a source of failure for firms that attain an interior optimum

the stock market and consumer confidence european evidence this paper studies the short run relationship between stock market developments and consumer confidence in eleven european countries over the years 1986 2001 we find that stock returns and changes in sentiment are positively correlated for nine countries with germany as the main exception moreover stock returns generally granger cause consumer confidence at very short horizons two weeks to one month but not vice versa the stock market confidence relationship is driven by expectations about economy wide conditions rather than personal finances this suggests that the confidence channel is not part of the conventional wealth effect but a separate transmission channel

non convexities in the adjustment of different capital inputs a firm level investigation recent developments in investment research have highlighted the importance of non convexities and irreversibilities in firms adjustment of quasi fixed inputs aggregation across capital goods may smooth out the discontinuities associated with the adjustment of individual assets lack of suitable data is one of the reasons why empirical work has typically relied on the assumption of capital homogeneity in this paper we exploit a data set of 1539 italian firms which allows us to disaggregate capital into equipment and structures and purchases and sales of assets we construct measures of fundamental q to capture investment opportunities associated with each asset we uncover the pattern of dynamic adjustment by using non parametric techniques to relate each individual investment to its own fundamental q

exploring futures for amazonia s sierra del divisor an environmental valuation triadics approach to analyzing ecological economic decision choices in the context of major shifts in boundary conditions abstract this text presents a new methodological approach to ecological economic analysis employing georgescu roegen s flow fund theory of economic process it offers an alternative to monetary valuation based analyses and aims to contribute toward advancing work concerned with addressing complex ecological economic questions as complete wholes the methodology is demonstrated through reference to the empirical case of a proposed rail link between peru and brazil which would cut across the sierra del divisor of western amazonia connecting the pacific and atlantic coasts and further opening up the amazon commodity frontier in order to analyze the potential impacts of the rail link four flow fund representations of economic process two at the regional and two at the local level are developed in order to juxtapose two alternative political economy contexts that might govern the rail link s impacts in the region one where conservation is prioritized over cash income and one where it is not our results suggest that completion of the rail link under the current political economy context which prioritizes cash income over conservation is likely to have substantial negative consequences for forest conservation in both peru and brazil and for local livelihoods throughout the region

managing innovation optimal incentive contracts for delegated r d with double moral hazard abstract managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates r d to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions the analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated r d is an option delegated r d with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated r d with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome the analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated r d attains the first best the discussion also considers delegated r d with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions

another look at the linear q model an empirical analysis of aggregate business capital spending with maintenance expenditures the paper revisits the empirical investment literature which has established that aggregate business fixed investment is not found to be related linearly to marginal or average tobin s q the theoretical background is extended here by developing a supply side model where the depreciation rate of private capital is determined endogenously the firm can either invest in new capital which adds directly to the existing capital stock at the presence of convex adjustment costs or extend the durability of installed capital through maintenance expenditure which affects its depreciation rate the model shows that tobin s q is then a positively related sufficient statistic for both components of aggregate capital expenditures this central implication is tested empirically using aggregate time series survey data from canada on new investment and maintenance expenditures covering the period 1956 93 the estimated relationships produce significant and plausible parameter estimates for the structural parameters of the q model le texte examine la litterature empirique sur l investissement qui a etabli que le niveau d investissement agrege des entreprises en capital fixe n est pas relie de facon lineaire au coefficient moyen ou marginal q de tobin on enrichit l arriere plan theorique en developpant un modele d offre dans lequel le taux de depreciation du capital prive est determine de facon endogene l entreprise peut soit investir dans du capital nouveau ce qui ajoute directement au stock de capital existant soit allonger la vie du capital en place par des depenses de maintenance qui modifient le taux de depreciation le modele montre que le coefficient q de tobin est alors positivement relie aux deux composantes des depenses agregees en capital cette implication importante est mise au test empiriquement en utilisant les series chronologiques en provenance des enquetes de statistiques canada sur les nouveaux investissements et les depenses de maintenance pour la periode 1956 93 les relations estimees produisent des parametres plausibles et significatifs pour les parametres structurels du modele q

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

investment behavior observable expectations and internal funds we use earnings forecasts from securities analysts to construct a new measure of the neoclassical fundamentals that drive investment spending we find that investment responds significantly to our new measure of fundamentals but is insensitive to cash flow even for firms typically thought to be liquidity constrained these results have two key implications first fundamentals may be more important for investment spending than would be suggested by the results to date from investment q models second the positive cash flow effects obtained in such models may reflect a failure to control properly for fundamentals rather than the presence of financial constraints jel d92 e22

bonus pools and the informativeness principle abstract previous work on moral hazard problems has shown that under certain conditions bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk neutral workers in our paper we demonstrate that if a firm employs at least two workers it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus pool contract and relative performance evaluation such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions in addition if the employer is wealth constrained complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable effort levels all our results hold even though workers outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that in view of holmstrom s informativeness principle individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus pool contracts

bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability we study a principal agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces the principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability quantifying welfare loss as the ratio between the first best social welfare and that arising from the principal s optimal pay for performance contract we provide simple parametric bounds for problem instances with moral hazard relying on that we compute the worst case welfare loss ratio among all problem instances with a fixed number of effort and outcome levels as a function of the number of possible effort levels and the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome as extensions we look at linear contracts and at cases with multiple identical tasks our work constitutes an initial attempt to quantify the losses arising from moral hazard when the agent is subject to limited liability and shows that these losses are non negligible in the worst case

factor adjustment spikes and interrelation an empirical investigation we take a descriptive look at interrelated factor demand starting from the observation that adjustment of capital and labor is lumpy we find that the adjustment dynamics of an input factor are affected by large adjustments in the other

a bottleneck capital model of development abstract a simple augmentation of the ramsey cass koopmans growth model allows it to match observed transitions by initially poor economies a high convexity installation cost directly dampens investment demand for a first capital input the resulting scarcity acts as a bottleneck strongly dampening demand for investment in a complementary capital input as well the match to observed transitions holds both for narrow and broad interpretations of capital in either case the bottleneck capital s share of factor income need not be large

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

internal net worth and the investment process an application to u s agriculture recent models of firm investment decisions stressing informational imperfections in capital markets provide a foundation for interpreting evidence that movements in internal finance can predict investment spending even after one controls for measures of firms investment opportunities while such evidence is suggestive it is often open to other interpretations we examine these models using data on equipment investment in the u s agricultural sector this sector is particularly interesting because it has experienced large fluctuations in net worth and the profitability of investment and reasonable measures of net worth can be constructed our findings provide support for a class of internal funds models of investment under asymmetric information

market power and inflation market power exercised by firms has become central to macroeconomics recent theoretical work highlights the importance of the relation between market power and inflation we examine this relation for individual firms in eleven u s industries our econometric framework exploits restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets to generate quantitative evidence on the responsiveness of market power to inflation we find that inflation usually has a positive effect on market power this relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries and statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power

structural identification of high and low investment regimes abstract we propose a structural model to investigate the existence and possible differences between low and high regimes of investment expenditures in equipment at the firm level the existence of such differences is predicted by recent theoretical studies of investment behavior stressing the role of asymmetries and non convexities in the adjustment cost technology the structural spike model is estimated for a balanced panel of dutch firms operating in 13 different industrial sectors the flexibility of the structural approach explains why the proposed method outperforms models applying ad hoc spike definitions often encountered in the empirical literature of lumpy investments

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings commissions vs bonuses this paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales the sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time the paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme a pure commission dominates a bonus plan and vice versa a commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period otherwise combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods the results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods however if the firm obtains intermediate sales information bonus plans dominate commissions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

what determines the japanese firm investments real or financial in this article i test both the real and the financial frictions in the japanese firm investments using structural approach the real represents the nonconvex capital adjustment costs and the financial means the financing constraints these two factors have been studied for a long time but rarely analysed simultaneously through this analysis i find the following results first both these two factors affect japanese firm investments second convex adjustment costs parameter is estimated at a very small level third this small convex adjustment costs lead to the model introduced in wang and wen 2012 which insists that the firm investments are determined by the upper bound of the borrowing constraints

institutional ecological economics abstract new institutional economics and its forerunners have we argue made important contributions to the evolving agenda of ecological economics the conceptualisation of environmental problems as instances of interdependence and the acknowledgement of positive transaction costs are key insights into the nature of environmental problems we also discuss how plurality of behavioural motivations and limited cognitive capacity have important implications for environmental decision making and its analysis we show how evolutionary and collective action theories offer complementary takes on the choice and change of environmental governance institutions and how the concept of social capital can enrich analyses of environmental governance we conclude that an emerging institutional ecological economics has the greatest relative advantage in analysing the design implementation and effectiveness of environmental governance solutions

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

irreversible capital and the stock market response to shocks in profitability this paper develops a vintage model of capital accumulation to identify the structural linkage between shocks to input or output prices and a firm s stock market value the model accounts for a substantial part of the sample variation in excess returns thus providing evidence for a systematic link between the stock market valuation of firms and the economic factors that affect their profitability the 1973 74 oil shock is shown to have had a strong impact on excess returns firms whose capital consisted of vintages built when energy was relatively cheap were hit the hardest in value copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

employment changes the structure of adjustment costs and plant size abstract in this paper we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of norwegian plants the data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size we develop and estimate a simple q model of labor demand allowing for the presence of fixed linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs the econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components unrelated to plant size as a result the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants the quadratic component of costs is also always important in most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions the quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants while this is not true for larger plants

investment in greek manufacturing under irreversibility and uncertainty the message in used capital expenditures this article contributes to the existing literature by showing that uncertainty produces a nonuniform impact to the extent that different types of capital goods exhibit heterogeneous irreversibility which we define as asset specific irreversibility hence asset specific irreversibility is responsible for asymmetries in responses across types of capital goods to uncertainty we also show that for a given type of capital good uncertainty produces a variety of responses across sectors which we define sector specific irreversibility in other words sectoral differences in terms of the ability to substitute a given type of capital with labour introduce a second order effect of uncertainty on investment

nonlinear response of firm investment to q abstract abel and eberly 1994 study optimal investment behavior in the presence of flow fixed costs proportional costs and convex costs a clear prediction is that investment will alternate between regimes of insensitivity and responsiveness to q separated by unknown threshold levels of q at the firm level we find evidence for different regimes of sensitivity to q but not for a regime of zero sensitivity our finding that investment has a nonlinear relationship to q is important because it implies an elasticity of aggregate investment to q and fundamentals that is high and variable over time

zeros and lumps in investment empirical evidence on irreversibilities and nonconvexities the objective of this paper is to investigate if and how capital adjustment departs from the smooth pattern implied by standard model based on convex adjustment costs using norwegian micro data we start by documenting the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment rates we then present two pieces of econometric evidence on these issues first we estimate a discrete hazard model to determine the probability of having an episode of high investment conditional on the length of the interval from the last high investment episode second we estimate a switching regression model that allows for the response of the investment rate to fundamentals to differ across regimes in both cases we investigate the aggregate implications of our results

plant level irreversible investment and equilibrium business cycles this paper evaluates the importance of microeconomic irreversibilities for aggregate dynamics using a real business cycle rbc model characterized by investment irreversibilities at the establishment level the main finding is that investment irreversibilities do not play a significant role in an otherwise standard realbusiness cycle model even though investment irreversibilities are crucial for establishment level dynamics aggregate fluctuations are basically the same under fully flexible or completely irreversible investment jel e22 e32

machine replacement and the business cycle lumps and bumps this paper explores investment fluctuations due to discrete changes in a plant s capital stock the resulting aggregate investment dynamics are surprisingly rich reflecting the interaction between a replacement cycle the cross sectional distribution of the age of the capital stock and an aggregate shock using plant level data lumpy investment is procyclical and more likely for older capital further the predicted path of aggregate investment that neglects vintage effects tracks actual aggregate investment reasonably well however ignoring fluctuations in the cross sectional distribution of investment vintages can yield predictable nontrivial errors in forecasting changes in aggregate investment

why are population flows so persistent abstract a neoclassical model of local growth is developed by integrating the static equilibrium underlying compensating differential theory as the steady state of a neoclassical growth model numerical results show that even very small frictions to labor and capital mobility along with small changes in local productivity or local quality of life suffice to cause highly persistent population flows wages and house prices in contrast jump most of the way to their new steady state the model suggests that cross sectional regressions of local population growth can help to identify past and present changes in the determinants of representative agent welfare more generally it provides a framework for interpreting observed local growth rates

managerial incentives investment and aggregate implications scale effects we explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor managerial effort is not publicly observed we show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment from the perspective of incentive scheme design a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables investment and output rather than one as is customary

small scale cooperative banking and the production of capital reflecting on the role of institutional agreements in supporting rural livelihood in kampot cambodia this paper explores the ecological economics of small scale cooperative banking sscb through reference to the empirical case of a rice farming village in kampot cambodia it combines georgescu roegen s discussion of an economy s capacity to produce economic processes with ostrom s concept of institutional performance in order to address the implications and functioning of sscb within a small farmer economy the local collective action situation of maintaining and making use of a sscb system a specific finance model provides the studied community with access to a pooled capital fund that may play an important role in ensuring its capacity to produce and reproduce economic processes according to its own specifications the coordinated action among the villagers which matches up well with ostrom s criteria for effective institutional performance of common pool resource use governance is found to include social and environmental dimensions which we understand to be necessary for achieving transformations toward more sustainable economic activity while we do not wish to suggest that the adoption of sscb guarantees either improved ecological or social impacts our results suggest that this finance model could play a supporting role in enhancing the potential of small farming communities to improve both should they wish to do so

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

flows funds and the complexity of deprivation using concepts from ecological economics for the study of poverty abstract poverty has been increasingly conceptualized as being multidimensional involving deprivation in many dimensions of life this paper discusses issues and implications of multidimensional poverty by adopting concepts commonly used in ecological economics in particular poverty is approached as an irreducible complex phenomenon for which many legitimate but non equivalent descriptions exist issues of social and technical incommensurability are illustrated for different meanings and measurement types of poverty georgescu roegen s flow fund framework is interpreted informed by the capability approach of amartya sen the paper argues that a predominant focus on flows as a proxy to analyze poverty represents rather a short term perspective on access to satisfiers to fulfill particular needs contrary to that focusing on valued funds may provide useful information for the analysis of capabilities that persons and societies might pursue in the long term furthermore it is argued that strong poverty alleviation needs to adopt analytical tools that can deal with non trade off cases improvements in one poverty dimension cannot always compensate for the deterioration of other poverties this implies to rethink the usefulness of aggregate multidimensional poverty indices as well as the predominant use of income measures

the relation between firm growth and q with multiple capital goods theory and evidence from panel data on japanese firms we derive from a model of investment with multiple capital goods a one to one relation between the growth rate of the capital aggregate and the stock market based q we estimate the growth q relation using a panel of japanese manufacturing firms taking into account the endogeneity of q identification is achieved by combining the theoretical structure of the q model and an assumed serial correlation structure of the technology shock which is the error term in the growth q equation for early years of our sample cash flow has significant explanatory power over and above q the significance of cash flow disappears for more recent years for the heavy industry when japanese capital markets was liberalized the estimated q coefficient implies that the adjustment cost is less than a half of gross profits net of the adjustment cost

intellectual mercantilism and franchise equity a critical study of the ecological political economy of international payments for ecosystem services abstract this text addresses the ecological political economy of international payment for ecosystem services ipes taking the united nations collaborative programme on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries redd as a case in point it asks in what ways may ipes schemes impinge upon the political and economic autonomy of local and indigenous peoples in tropical countries it is argued that pes schemes like redd should be assessed not only with respect to questions of distributional equity does everyone have enough pie but also with respect to franchise equity does everyone want pie and that failure to take questions of franchise equity into account in ipes schemes reflects a form or intellectual mercantilism where wealth transfers from new economies to old ones are achieved by redefining existing locally available resources as internationally tradable speculative commodities this proposition is considered through exploration of two illustrative cases the redd social and environmental standards redd ses and the yasuni itt initiative and through normative political theory recommendations building on dryzek and stevenson s discussion of deliberative systems regarding how it might be possible to ensure franchise equity within redd in particular and within global environmental governance more generally

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

is investment time irreversible some empirical evidence for disaggregated uk manufacturing data it has long been suggested that investment may be time irreversible and consideration of the option value of waiting to invest has aroused renewed interest in this issue this study tests for time irreversibility in uk investment according to disaggregation by type of investment expenditure and across manufacturing sector groupings the test results reported indicate that the irreversibility of investment patterns varies not only from industry to industry but also according to the type of capital being purchased with significant time irreversibility detected in gross fixed capital formation and aggregate vehicles expenditure and industrial sector groupings comprising fuels and oil refining engineering and vehicles and textiles and leather however only in the first and last of these series is time irreversibility attributable to non linearities in the underlying data generating process and consistent with threshold effects which may be associated with s s type models of investment dynamics

moral hazard with bounded payments we study the moral hazard problem with general constraints on how little or much the agent can be paid as a function of output we provide a characterization and existence result using only very simple methods in the dual problem of minimizing costs for a given effort level a constraint that harms the principal will always result in a contract that pays according to the constraint on some range of outcomes for the case of a simple fixed minimum feasible payment the resultant contract will be option like we show how the strike price and intensity of incentives once the strike price is exceeded vary in the minimum payment and the outside option of the agent when the principal can also choose the effort to induce then even if the constraint harms the principal he may optimally choose a contract that never pays the minimum or maximum we show that this can only occur if the problem without the payment constraints fails a form of concavity

how does labor mobility affect income convergence abstract labor mobility is introduced into the neoclassical growth model for a small open economy with capital intensity below its steady state level outmigration directly contributes to faster income convergence but also creates a disincentive for gross capital investment at low relative income levels the latter disincentive effect tends to dominate so that labor mobility can actually slow the speed of income convergence

household strategies and rural livelihood diversification this article reviews the recent literature on diversification as a livelihood strategy of rural households in developing countries with particular reference to sub saharan africa livelihood diversification is defined as the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in order to survive and to improve their standards of living the determinants and effects of diversification in the areas of poverty income distribution farm output and gender are examined some policy inferences are summarised the conclusion is reached that removal of constraints to and expansion of opportunities for diversification are desirable policy objectives because they give individuals and households more capabilities to improve livelihood security and to raise living standards

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties