duopolistic vertical restraints abstract in an industry where competition exists at the wholesale level vertical restraints are not necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the manufacturers when vertical restraints are employed it is never in the form of retail price maintenance but rather in the form of franchise fee pricing when the products produced by the manufacturers are only slightly differentiated the producers may benefit from the double marginalization that arises with linear pricing such double marginalization results in higher retail prices which relieve competitive pressures

migration remittances and the family remittances by migrants along with migration itself are elements in a migrant familys intertemporal contractual arrangement the reasons why the migrant and his family voluntarily enter into a mutually beneficial contractual arrangement with each other rather than with a 3rd party are discussed and the conditions under which the contractual arrangement is self enforcing are identified both parties can usually benefit from a number of pareto efficient mutual contractual arrangements this gives rise to an indeterminacy problem solved through a bargaining process between the parties who consequently converge to a contractual arrangement implying a specific flow of migrant to family remittances the chosen contractual arrangement reflects the relative bargaining powers of the parties and variables impinging upon these powers thus bear upon remittances in the light of these arguments tests are conducted on observed remittance behavior across individual migrants in botswana authors

on vertical control in monopolistic competition abstract this paper demonstrates that vertical restraints are profitably imposed by a manufacturer or wholesaler who has some market power and whose product is sold in a monopolistically competitive downstream market simple conditions are developed under which a price floor resale price maintenance or a price ceiling is profitable and under which private incentive for a restraint is sufficient for its social desirability where demand elasticities are constant observed vertical price floors are always welfare improving but profitable price ceilings may decrease welfare in the special case of the ces aggregate surplus specification with competitive conjectures price ceilings are profitable and welfare decreasing

making sense of nonbinding retail price recommendations we model retail price recommendations rprs as a communication device in vertical supply relations with private manufacturer information on production costs and consumer demand with static trade rprs are irrelevant and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient with repeated trade rprs can become part of a relational contract communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing joint surplus we show that this contract is self enforcing if the retailer s profit is independent of production costs and punishment strategies are chosen appropriately the predictions of our analysis are consistent with the available empirical evidence

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

openness imperfect exchange rate pass through and monetary policy abstract this paper analyses the implications of imperfect exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary policy in a linearised open economy dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to euro area data imperfect exchange rate pass through is modelled by assuming sticky import price behaviour the degree of domestic and import price stickiness is estimated by reproducing the empirical identified impulse response of a monetary policy and exchange rate shock conditional on the response of output net trade and the exchange rate it is shown that a central bank that wants to minimise the resource costs of staggered price setting will aim at minimising a weighted average of domestic and import price inflation

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

low inflation pass through and the pricing power of firms abstract recently there has been a significant decline in the degree to which firms pass through changes in costs to prices a decline that is frequently characterized as a reduction in the pricing power of firms the decline appears to be associated with the decline in inflation in many countries the decline has important implications for monetary policy because it affects both forecasts of inflation and the effects of changes in monetary policy on inflation some have argued that the decline in pricing power helped to keep inflation low in the face of apparently strong demand pressures in the united states in the late 1990s this paper puts forth the view that the decline in pass through or pricing power is due to the low inflation environment that has recently been achieved in many countries first a microeconomic model of price setting is used to show that lower pass through is caused by lower perceived persistence of cost changes evidence is then presented showing that inflation is positively correlated with persistence of inflation suggesting that the low inflation itself has caused the low pass through an economy wide model consistent with the micromodel is then presented to illustrate how such changes in pricing power affect output and inflation dynamics in favorable ways but can disappear quickly if monetary policy and expectations change

optimal franchise contracts with private cost information abstract this paper considers franchise arrangements in the case where the franchisee has private information about the marginal cost of sale it is shown that the optimal contract in general leads to different margins for the parties than with common cost information however in special cases the same margins than with common cost information are optimal

export restrictions do consumers really benefit the wheat to bread supply chain in serbia abstract our approach combines price transmission and gross margin analysis at different stages of the wheat to bread supply chain results suggest that the effects of export restrictions on the end consumer prices for bread and thus food price inflation heavily depend on the price behavior of the intermediates in contrast to theory consumers in serbia experienced welfare losses despite comprehensive governmental market interventions in particular consumers were confronted with increasing flour and bread prices which cannot be fully explained by increasing production costs whereas mills bakeries and retailers increased their profits thus export controls in combination with high price volatility in the supply chain have to be considered as a further factor driving food price inflation

vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry abstract this paper considers forward vertical integration by a monopolist producer of an intermediate good when the downstream industry is monopolistically competitive alternative methods of vertical control are considered in addition to the usual input mark up these include franchise fees royalties and resale price maintenance it is found that these methods in combination achieve perfect or near perfect replication of the outcome under full vertical integration the case where downstream products are differentiated by location in a circular space is studied in detail and alternative outcomes are ranked according to their social desirability

wheat export restrictions and domestic market effects in russia and ukraine during the food crisis abstract studies investigating the effects of wheat export controls on the domestic market in the exporting country itself are scarce this paper analyses the domestic market impact of wheat export controls in russia and ukraine during the 2007 2008 global food crisis within a spatial price transmission approach using a markov switching vector error correction model we contrast our estimation for russia and ukraine with germany and the usa two countries that did not intervene in their wheat export markets an explicit crisis regime during times of export controls is exclusively identified for russia and ukraine we find that export restrictions temporarily reduced the degree of integration of russian and ukrainian domestic markets in world wheat markets which pushed the growers prices below their long run equilibrium level further domestic markets were disconnected from their equilibrium and market instability increased these effects were even more pronounced and long lasting in ukraine export quota than in russia export tax the negative market effects discouraged private investors thereby preventing russia and ukraine from maximizing their grain potential and contributing to global food security

strategic spin offs of input divisions abstract when a downstream producer enters backward into the input market a helping the rivals effect exists such entry hurts the firm s downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms this negative externality prevents the newly created upstream unit from expanding a spin off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively spin offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level when there is more than one integrated firm a spin off by a firm can trigger spin offs by others that would not occur otherwise

the exchange rate in a dynamic optimizing business cycle model with nominal rigidities a quantitative investigation this paper studies a quantitative dynamic optimizing business cycle model of a small open economy with staggered price and wage setting the model exhibits exchange rate overshooting in response to money supply shocks the predicted variability of the nominal and especially of the real exchange rate is noticeably higher than in standard real business cycle models with flexible prices and wages a positive domestic money supply shock is predicted to lower the domestic interest rate raise gdp and trigger a depreciation of both the nominal and real exchange rate increases in domestic productivity and in the world interest rate are also predicted to induce a nominal and real exchange rate depreciation 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

explaining business cycles a multiple shock approach abstract aiyagari 1992 and prescott 1986 1991 claim that a large fraction of the variance of united states quarterly detrended real gnp is attributable to an unobservable shock to total factor productivity this paper argues that the importance of a productivity shock in explaining the variance of output is fundamentally indeterminate any model that is in accord with the several time series that make up united states macroeconomic data must feature multiple shocks that are correlated at all leads and lags sorting out the separate effects of these various shocks on a single variable such as real gnp is impossible we illustrate this argument using a multiple shock version of the king plosser rebelo 1988 benchmark real business cycle model

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

an estimated canadian dsge model with nominal and real rigidities this paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dgse model for the canadian economy and evaluates the real effects of monetary policy shocks to generate high and persistent real effects the model combines nominal frictions in the form of costly price adjustment with real rigidities modelled as convex costs of adjusting capital and employment

macroeconomic determinants of remittances evidence from romania given the globalization of the labour market and the promotion of free movement for work young people are looking for employment opportunities from at least two perspectives professional careers

crossing mother entrepreneur franchisees attempts to reduce franchisor influence abstract contractual terms guide many entrepreneur franchisees actions with the franchisor however it is impossible for franchisors to completely specify all future actions they compensate by continually attempting to influence franchisees using what franchisees perceive as suasion in their ongoing interactions we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics between franchisors and franchisees most franchise arrangements include the payment of royalties based on sales this encourages a growth oriented strategy usually appropriate for the franchisees during the initial stages of their operations whereas a franchising strategy can reduce entreprenerial risk for franchisees it does not eliminate it thus as sales of the franchisees increase profit oriented strategies will be favored because they represent the payoffs that accrue to continuing entrepreneurial effort and risk taking these strategies may be in opposition to franchisors sales orientation when market conditions do not allow continual growth without margin penalties a research model is developed depicting the relationship between franchisees strategies and performance and the moderating effect that contractual goals and franchisees perception of franchisors attempts at suasion have on this relationship a set of research hypotheses was then empirically tested using a large sample of franchisees from the commercial truck retailing industry the results indicate that sales growth and profit growth goals are not always congruent balancing the goals of the franchisor and franchisee did not appear to be a popular option either one or the other was emphasized more importantly the results indicate that when franchisees perceive attempts by franchisors to use suasion lower levels of profits result but there is no corresponding increase in the level of sales in the long term franchisors are likely to determine that current contractual arrangements are not protecting their longer term interests thus they will be expected to attempt to modify franchise contracts in ways that force franchisees to implement sales gain strategies this will require that entrepreneur franchisees anticipate future events more carefully at the time they are examining the original franchise contract because most entrepreneurs are concerned with immediate survival at the start up stage this makes examination of the contract less likely to happen the franchise option is attractive because it reduces such risks we recommend that entrepreneurs write ex ante contingent claims contracts that ensure a gradual reduction of franchisor influence although this would assume a power or knowledge balance that favors the franchisees which is unlikely during the start up phase it will change over time as franchisees gain a better understanding of the local competitive dynamics thus it may well serve the franchisees to take a defensive posture or push a royalty arrangement that decreases the emphasis on sales over time this is most likely to be effective where the entrepreneur is considering several competing franchises at the time of the signing of the contract finally we recommend that entrepreneur franchisees should not assume that the expert advice offered by their franchisor is always in their best interests although technical advice is more likely to be unbiased and should be fully exploited as this is what makes the franchise valuable strategic advice or that which relates to goal setting may well be colored by the financial interests of the franchisor franchisors are unlikely to consider the possibility that franchisees would be better served by formulating their own strategies nor are they likely to consider that the franchise network would be better off in the longer term by the collective impact associated with numerous franchisees independently formulating their own strategies in short although we do not suggest that franchisees should always assume that crossing mother is the best response to all perceived franchisor suasion efforts they should carefully examine all strategic advice

internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly abstract we demonstrate that the benefit that an oligopolistic firm derives from departmentalization managerial specialization depends upon the internal organization of the rival firm as a result even if both firms are assumed a priori identical they need not select an identical form of internal organization since the benefit from departmentalization exhibits increasing returns to scale a duopolist derives more restricted benefits from departmentalizing compared with a monopolist the implications of increased competition or the form of internal organization upon the compensation of managers depends upon the degree of correlation between the uncertain demands that face competing firms

endogenous money or sticky prices abstract what explains the correlations between nominal and real variables in the postwar us data are these correlations indicative of significant nominal rigidity or do they simply reflect the particular way that monetary policymakers react to developments in the real economy to answer these questions this paper uses maximum likelihood to estimate a model of endogenous money this model allows but does not require nominal prices to be sticky the results show that nominal price rigidity over and above endogenous money plays a role in accounting for key features of the data

incomplete pass through and the welfare effects of exchange rate variability abstract this paper considers the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy a two country model is presented which allows an explicit derivation of welfare functions in terms of a weighted sum of the second moments of producer prices and the nominal exchange rate from a single country perspective the optimal exchange rate variance depends on the degree of pass through the size and openness of the economy the elasticity of labour supply and the volatility of foreign producer prices welfare may be decreasing or increasing in the volatility of the exchange rate

product market competition and boundaries of the firm this paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries in a duopoly setting each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer disintegration transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits owing to the retailer s superior efficiency however it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient vertically disintegrated structures cet article etudie la concurrence sur le marche des produits et ses effets sur les limites de l entreprise dans un modele de duopole chaque producteur associea un distributeur choisit soit une structure verticale integree dans laquelle le distributeur est son employe soit une structure desintegree dans laquelle le distributeur est independant plus efficace en termes d incitations au distributeur la structure desintegree genere des profits joints plus importants elle oblige cependant le producteur a partager les profits avec le distributeur la concurrence augmente le benefice et reduit le cout de la desintegration favorisant ainsi des structures verticales desintegrees et efficaces

international dimensions of optimal monetary policy abstract this paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities an inward looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms markups are exposed to currency fluctuations such a policy raises exchange rate volatility leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis a vis increased uncertainty in the export market as higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices optimal rules in a world nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward looking rules and discretionary policies even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary or deflationary bias gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass through

has exchange rate pass through really declined evidence from canada several empirical studies suggest that exchange rate pass through has declined in recent years among industrialized countries results for canada also indicate that import and consumer prices have become less responsive to exchange rate movements in the 1990s these findings are based on reduced form regressions that are typically motivated by partial equilibrium models of pricing this paper uses instead a structural general equilibrium approach to test the premise that exchange rate pass through has decreased in canada our approach consists in estimating a dynamic stochastic generalequilibrium model for canada over two sub samples which cover the periods before and after the adoption of inflation targeting by the bank of canada we then use impulseresponse analysis to assess the stability of exchange rate pass through across the two sub samples our results indicate that pass through to canadian import prices has been rather stable while pass through to canadian consumer prices has declined in recent years counterfactual experiments reveal that the change in monetary policy regime is largely responsible for this decline

monetary policy in a low pass through environment in a dynamic new keynesian optimizing model we introduce incomplete exchange rate pass through on import prices three results stand out first unlike canonical models with perfect pass through which emphasize a type of isomorphism incomplete pass through renders the analysis of monetary policy of an open economy fundamentally different from the one of a closed economy second productivity driven deviations from the law of one price assume the interpretation of endogenous cost push shocks third the optimal commitment policy relative to discretion entails a smoothing of the deviations from the law of one price and requires more stable nominal and real exchange rates

export restrictions and price insulation during commodity price booms for individual countries variable trade barriers can be used to reduce the volatility of domestic relative to world prices if this is done by countries accounting for a large share of the market its effect is offset by increases in world price volatility this study shows the nature of the resulting collective action problem with the policy being ineffective on average in stabilizing domestic prices while increasing the volatility of the income transfers from terms of trade changes a simple approach to assessing the contribution of insulation to the price increases is developed and used with new estimates of agricultural distortions to assess its contribution to the price spikes in 1972 74 and 2006 08 for rice and wheat the analysis suggests that 45 percent of the increase in rice prices in 2006 08 and 30 percent of the increase in wheat prices was due to insulating behavior one sign of progress since 1972 74 was a substantial reduction in the extent of price insulating behavior by the industrial countries this provides little stabilizing benefit in the rice market because countries not classifying themselves at the world trade organization as developing account for only 3 percent of world rice consumption but it does offer some benefit for the wheat market where non developing countries account for 27 percent of consumption

vertical restraints with incomplete information when a firm contracts with a privately informed retailer vertical restraints may be insufficient to eliminate distortions arising from having to induce truthful reporting with franchise fee contracts which are equivalent to any other quantity forcing contract two distortions arise the first is the need to transfer surplus to the retailer and the second is a reduction in the marginal return to production with rpm contracts the first best outcome of vertical integration is obtainable if the retailer observes private information only about the state of demand if the retailer observes also private information about retailing costs both distortions persist in an earlier paper rey and tirole 1986 r t compare various forms of vertical restraints in a stochastic environment where retailers have superior private information than the firm about the uncertain state of the world they demonstrate that with asymmetric information vertical restraints may be insufficient in order to reproduce the first best outcome of vertical integration in r t contingencies are not feasible in the contracts since there are multiple retailers who can arbitrage in particular the wholesale price and the franchise fee under franchise fee contracting ff or the retail price imposed upon the retailer under retail price maintenance rpm cannot be selected contingent upon any future communication with the retailers in contrast in the present paper we assume that the firm is served by a single retailer which then facilitates consideration of contingent contracts the reason we make this different assumption is in order to investigate whether more sophisticated contracts can resolve the agency problem we still obtain similar negative results to the ones obtained by r t specifically vertical integration cannot generally be reproduced by appropriate contracting if retailers can observe private information about demand or retailing costs there is another characteristic of the class of contracts considered in r t that we modify in the present analysis while in r t the agent agrees to serve the firm as long as its ex ante expected payoff is nonnegative in the present paper we require that the ex post profits of the agent are nonnegative irrespective of how unfavorable is the realization of the state of nature this

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the impact of remittances on economic growth an econometric model abstract remittances in the world represent one of major international financial resources which sometimes they exceed the flows of foreign direct investment fdi for centuries there have been heated debates on the sources of economic growth in developing economies and also why some countries reflect strong economic growth comparing to others this study aims to observe the impacts of remittances on economic growth using panel data set of six high remittances receiving countries albania bulgaria macedonia moldova romania and bosnia herzegovina during the period 1999 2013 these countries have experienced a major increase in remittance inflows and at this time accounts for the bulk of total remittance receipts compared with other regions most countries remittances represent the largest source of foreign exchange earnings and represent more than 10 percent of gdp in other words the econometric analysis will be based on those six remittance receiving countries the paper is then to review the empirical literature devoted to the impact of remittances on economic growth in order to identify empirically if there are significant relationships between remittances and growth in these countries the results suggest that remittances have a positive impact on growth and that this impact increases at higher levels of remittances relative to gdp

putting the new open economy macroeconomics to a test abstract this paper explores one way to extend the new open economy macroeconomics in an empirical direction adapting maximum likelihood procedures it estimates and tests an intertemporal small open economy model with monetary shocks and nominal rigidities results offer mixed support for a benchmark model where prices are assumed to be sticky in the currency of the buyer price stickiness seems to be an important element as overall results are poorer for versions of the model in which prices either are flexible or are sticky in the currency of the producer the benchmark model does a better job explaining some variables than others in particular it does a poor job explaining exchange rate movements

vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces abstract in the present paper we link the decisions concerning the sales strategies that are made by competing firms we demonstrate that when the demand schedules facing competing firms are moderately correlated asymmetric equilibria may arise where only one firm decides to establish its own sales force while its competitor sells its product through an independent sales agency when demand schedules are highly correlated however only symmetric equilibria can arise since firms derive greater benefits from imitating rather than contradicting their rivals choices we demonstrate that vertical separation of its sales function is more likely than vertical integration when firms produce products that are highly substitutable