the returns to criminal capital human capital theory posits that individuals increase their labor market returns through investments in education and training this concept has been studied extensively across several disciplines an analog concept of criminal capital the focus of some speculation and limited empirical study remains considerably less developed theoretically and methodologically this article offers a formal theoretical model of criminal capital indicators and tests for greater illegal wage returns using a sample of serious adolescent offenders many of whom participate in illegal income generating activities our results reveal that consistent with human capital theory important illegal wage premiums are associated with investments in criminal capital notably an increasing but declining marginal return to experience and a premium for specialization furthermore as in studies of legal labor markets we find strong evidence that if left unaccounted for nonrandom sample selection causes severe bias in models of ille

education work and crime a human capital approach this article develops a model of crime in which human capital increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs associated with incarceration older more intelligent and more educated adults should commit fewer street unskilled crimes white collar crimes decline less or increase with age and education predictions for age crime and education crime relationships receive broad empirical support in self report data from the national longitudinal survey of youth and arrest data from the uniform crime reports the effects of education training and wage subsidies as well as enforcement policies on criminal behavior are discussed

cost allocation and convex data envelopment abstract this paper considers allocation rules first we demonstrate that costs allocated by the aumann shapley and the friedman moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming second from the linear programming problems involved it becomes clear that the allocation rules technically speaking allocate the non zero value of the dual variable for a convexity constraint on to the output vector hence the allocation rules can also be used to allocate inefficiencies in non parametric efficiency measurement models such as data envelopment analysis dea the convexity constraint of the bcc model introduces a non zero slack in the objective function of the multiplier problem and we show that the cost allocation rules discussed in this paper can be used as candidates to allocate this slack value on to the input or output variables and hence enable a full allocation of the inefficiency on to the input or output variables as in the ccr model

building criminal capital behind bars peer effects in juvenile corrections this paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional facility have on each other s subsequent criminal behavior the analysis is based on data on over 8 000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two year period in florida these data provide a complete record of past crimes facility assignments and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each individual to control for the non random assignment to facilities we include facility fixed effects thereby estimating peer effects using only within facility variation over time we find strong evidence of peer effects for various categories of theft burglary and felony drug and weapon crimes the influence of peers primarily affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime category we also find evidence that peer effects are stronger in smaller facilities and that the predominant types of peer effects differ in residential versus non residential facilities effects in the latter are consistent with network formation among youth serving time close to home

applied cost allocation the dea aumann shapley approach this paper deals with empirical computation of aumann shapley cost shares for joint production we show that if one uses a mathematical programing approach with its non parametric estimation of the cost function there may be observations in the data set for which we have multiple aumann shapley prices we suggest to overcome such problems by using lexicographic goal programing techniques moreover cost allocation based on the cost function is unable to account for differences between efficient and actual cost we suggest to employ the notion of rational inefficiency in order to supply a set of assumptions concerning firm behavior these assumptions enable us to connect inefficient with efficient production and thereby provide consistent ways of allocating the costs arising from inefficiency

options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets analysis and applications this paper provides analytical formulas for european put and call options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets the properties of these formulas are discussed in detail options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets are useful to price a wide variety of contingent claims of interest to financial economists applications discussed in this paper include the valuation of foreign currency debt option bonds compensation plans risk sharing contracts secured debt and growth opportunities involving mutually exclusive investments

supportability sustainability and subsidy free prices this article studies the relationships among the concepts of subsidy free prices anonymously equitable prices supportability and sustainability in particular we set out conditions under which these concepts are not vacuous several new sets of conditions under which a subsidy free price vector is sustainable are also presented for general nonseparable demands we establish the existence of an aumann shapley price vector that is anonymously equitable and sustainable

goal congruence analysis in multi division organizations with shared resources based on data envelopment analysis abstract in multi division organizations goal congruence between different divisions and top management is critical to the success of management in this paper drawing upon a nonparametric framework to model production technology we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a firm with multiple divisions to be goal congruent and then extend it to a goal congruence testing measure which coincides with a data envelopment analysis dea model the goal congruence measure not only shows empirically whether the firm is goal congruent or not but also provides a measurement for the degree of goal incongruence to be goal congruent resources shared among divisions are suggested to be allocated so that the conditions for an optimizable operation are satisfied in addition goal congruent firms are verified to be cost efficient all findings in this research are examined and illustrated with a dataset of 20 bank branches with shared resources for service and sales divisions

the socioeconomic determinants of ill gotten gains within person changes in drug use and illegal earnings generalizing from the sociology of earnings attainment we develop a conceptual model of social embeddedness in conventional and criminal activities to explain illegal earnings among criminal offenders to isolate the effects of time varying factors such as legal earnings drug use and criminal opportunities we use data from the national supported work demonstration project to estimate fixed effects models predicting month to month changes in illegal earnings we find that criminal earnings are sensitive to embeddedness in conforming work and family relationships criminal experience and the perceived risks and rewards of crime moreover heroin and cocaine use creates a strong earnings imperative that is difficult to satisfy in the low wage labor market and offenders earn far more money illegally when they are using these drugs than during periods of abstinence

estimates of the economic returns to schooling from a new sample of twins this paper uses a new survey to contrast the wages of genetically identical twins with different schooling levels multiple measurements of schooling levels were also collected to assess the effect of reporting error on the estimated economic returns to schooling the data indicate that omitted ability variables do not bias the estimated return to schooling upward but that measurement error does bias it downward adjustment for measurement error indicates that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12 to 16 percent a higher estimate of the economic returns to schooling than has been previously found copyright 1994 by american economic association

estimating marginal returns to education this paper estimates marginal returns to college for individuals induced to enroll in college by different marginal policy changes the recent instrumental variables literature seeks to estimate this parameter but in general it does so only under strong assumptions that are tested and found wanting we show how to utilize economic theory and local instrumental variables estimators to estimate the effect of marginal policy changes our empirical analysis shows that returns are higher for individuals with values of unobservables that make them more likely to attend college we contrast our estimates with iv estimates of the return to schooling

empirical age earnings profiles the human capital earnings function in which earnings are expressed as a quadratic in potential experience is probably the most widely accepted empirical specification in economics in spite of its widespread acceptance the human capital earnings function provides a very poor approximation of the true empirical relationship between earnings and experience the standard formulation understates early career earnings growth by about 30 50 and overstates midcareer growth by 20 50 however simple alternative specifications that fit the data are available

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

three methods to share joint costs or surplus abstract we study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods additive in the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom we consider four axioms scale invariance si demand monotonicity dm upper bound for homogeneous goods ubh placing a natural cap on cost shares when goods are homogeneous average cost pricing for homogeneous goods acph the random order values based on stand alone costs are characterized by si and dm serial costsharing by dm and ub the aumann shapley pricing method by si and acph no other combination of the four axioms is compatible with additivity and dummy journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d62 d63

market wages and youth crime to study the problem of widespread youth crime i analyze a timeallocation model in which consumers face parametric wages and diminishing marginal returns to crime the theory motivates an econometric model that i estimate using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth my estimates suggest that youth behavior is responsive to price incentives and that falling real wages may have been an important determinant of rising youth crime during the 1970s and 1980s moreover wage differentials explain a substantial component of both the racial differential in criminal participation and the age distribution of crime

the risks and rewards of criminal activity a comprehensive test of criminal deterrence whereas previous analyses of criminal deterrence have focused on the effect of criminal enforcement on crime rates this study analyzes the existence of compensating differentials for criminal pursuits by analyzing the risk rewards trade off this approach represents a more comprehensive test of the criminal deterrence hypothesis the sample consisted of black inner city youths who reported their crime participation crime income and self assessed risks from crime the risk premiums for the three principal adverse outcomes arrest conviction and prison constituted between one half and two thirds of all crime income on the average providing strong support for the criminal deterrence hypothesis

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

rational inefficiency adjustment costs and sequential technologies abstract in this paper we propose a novel approach to estimate the rational inefficiency of decision making units in the presence of adjustment costs using sequential definitions of the production technology we show how cost inefficiency can be decomposed into rational and residual inefficiency as well as inefficiency caused by technical change furthermore we estimate lower bounds for the unobserved adjustment costs based on unexploited cost reductions due to rational inefficiency these adjustment costs are used to evaluate the feasibility of exploiting cost reductions caused by residual inefficiency we demonstrate the empirical applicability of our model by estimating and decomposing the cost inefficiency of u s coal fired power plants using panel data which cover the period between 1994 and 2009

portfolio management and appropriation of private benefits of control in many countries around the globe portfolio managers utilize well accepted models assuming that a partial stake of ownership is proportionally valued this assumption is incorrect in markets in which traded firms or publicly held firms are controlled by major owners who would take any possible measure to protect and maintain a lock on control so they can secure a sellable asset to another control seeker in this case estimation of key parameters such as volatility expected returns and diversification effect may be grossly distorted we would argue that a major trigger for the value of the benefits of control is the ability of control owners to transfer assets from their own portfolio to a controlled publicly traded firm while it is obvious that these transfers will take place if and only if it is beneficial to the control owners the impact on the minor shareholders may not necessarily be negative and may vary depending on several parameters thus the benefits of control are not entirely private i e appropriation and diversion of the resources of publicly traded firms for the benefit of the control owners this paper aims to model the effect of the benefits of control on the value of a minority held public firms it focuses on two related issues that are discussed in the literature on the benefits of control what drives the value of the benefits of control given the empirical evidence that control seekers are willing to pay a significant premium for control and secondly can these benefits be rationally modeled to better understand these issues it then models a specific drive on the part of control seekers who in addition to their stake in a publicly traded firm own a private portfolio it could be argued that they may transfer inferior investments to the public firms that they control exploiting less than perfect transparency however while they own this valuable option of transferring inferior investments into the public firm these actions may still be beneficial to the minority shareholders we establish a model and derive a simulation procedure that are applied to several cases in which transfers are made in exchange for cash or equity instances of full disclosure or partial transparency the likelihood that the control owners actions will be contested in court level of risk and other parameters then we will compare the results to empirical finding the final model will be greatly simplified so that the end formula can be easily used by practitioners