dynamic price competition with fixed capacities in this paper we study price competition for an oligopoly in a dynamic setting where each of the sellers has a fixed number of units available for sale over a fixed number of periods demand is stochastic and depending on how it evolves sellers may change their prices at any time this reflects the fact that firms constantly and almost costlessly change their prices reacting to updates in their estimates of market demand competitor prices or inventory levels in a setting with demand uncertainty we show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for a duopoly in which all states sellers engage in bertrand competition and the seller with the lower equilibrium reservation value sells a unit at a price equal to the competitor s equilibrium reservation value this structure therefore extends the marginal value concept of bid price control used in many revenue management implementations to a competitive model we give a closed form solution to the equilibrium price paths for a duopoly and extend all the results to an n firm oligopoly we then study extensions to multiple customer types uncertain valuations and differentiated products this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

new product introduction and incumbent response strategies their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact in this article the author studies the determinants of both new product introduction and incumbent response strategies in a single integrated framework building on previous research in strategic

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

a note on distribution in a vote bidding game with general interest and single issue voters abstract this paper explores the strategies of candidates bidding for votes from a population made up of single issue voters and voters who respond in a probabilistic manner

british bus deregulation competition and demand coordination abstract our framework formally explains some of the recent curious events surrounding deregulation of the british local bus industry the winner takes all nature of this market induces competitive providers to engage in predatory or preemptive behavior in scheduling and pricing unlike previous works we explicitly model consumers responses to firms schedule announcements we show that the market is unstable if demand is uncoordinated but stable otherwise our results highlight the important role played by demand coordinating mechanisms in local bus markets and our results suggest that pure strategy nash equilibria exist in models a la hotelling 1929 whenever demand is effectively coordinated

information technology and time based competition in financial markets this paper studies time based competition in imperfect securities markets linking it investment decisions information processing delays and trading strategies at the it investment stage traders trade off the cost of it against their anticipated trading profits at the trading stage each trader devises a trading strategy based on his new information while taking into account the impact of both his own trades and those of other traders in the market our results illustrate how traders react to market imperfections due to trading costs and information processing delays and how superior traders convert a timeliness advantage into higher trading profits they also shed light on the relationship between the price adjustment process and traders information processing delays timeliness imposes an interesting structure on trader competition traders with longer information processing delays trade less frequently submit smaller orders and enjoy lower profits per trade our analysis of traders it investment decisions demonstrates how factors such as it costs number of traders and the frequency and nature of new information affect the level of it investments we further illustrate how improved it infrastructure translates into competitive advantage

capacity investment under postponement strategies market competition and demand uncertainty we consider duopoly models where firms make decisions on capacity production and price under demand uncertainty capacity and price decisions are made respectively ex ante and ex post demand realizations the interplay between the timings of demand realization and production decision endows firms with different capabilities flexible firms can postpone production decisions until the actual demand curve is observed but inflexible firms cannot under general demand structures and cost functions we characterize the equilibrium for a symmetric duopoly and establish the strategic equivalence of price and quantity competitions when firms are flexible we investigate the stochastic order properties of capacity and profit and show that they both increase for a flexible firm when the market is more volatile we find that flexibility allows a firm to increase investment in capacity and earn a higher profit while benefiting customers by keeping the price in a narrower range strategic equivalence implies that

order of entry as a moderator of the effect of the marketing mix on market share order of entry has been demonstrated to have a significant effect on market share a number of explanations for this effect have been suggested in the marketing and strategy literatures to date the market share advantage gained by pioneers has typically been treated as a main effect an automatic regularity treating order of entry as a main effect implies that there is no penalty on the effectiveness of a brand s marketing instruments for late entry and that a late entrant can compensate for being late by dedicating sufficient marketing resources to their product in this study we investigate the influence of order of entry into a market on the effectiveness of a firm s marketing mix decisions by asking the question can followers compensate for not being first by their marketing mix decisions also even if they can compensate for being late does this effort become increasingly more difficult with later entry that is are there asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing mix variables that relate to its order of entry into the market or as has been typically assumed to date is order of entry strictly a main effect an asymmetry exists for example if the market response to advertising is different for the first entrant versus the second or third entrant an asymmetry also exists if the effects of say a price change by the first entrant on the second entrant are different than the effects on the third entrant we develop a market share attraction model where the parameters vary as a function of order of entry our main contribution is in modeling the sources of order of entry advantage as asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing instruments hence distinct from previous research we explain why there are inherent order of entry effects this paper is potentially of interest to researchers developing market share models and studying the effectiveness of marketing mix variables the substantive implication of our results concern directly academics interested in marketing strategy as well as the practicing marketing strategists we model asymmetries in the market response of early entrants versus late entrants using data from two durables and three nondurables categories with one exception all data sets are established from the inception of the category and hence do not suffer from the possible bias of excluding pioneers who have failed results show that asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing mix variables are an essential source of order of entry effects we find that the main effects of order of entry are minimal order of entry effects do not necessarily lead to lower shares but overcoming these effects is not without substantial cost to the late entrant our results support previous research that has demonstrated advantages to early entry in addition we provide guidelines for how late entrants should compete later entry tends to reduce a competitor s price sensitivity suggesting that they not instigate in a price war with earlier entrants in order to gain share order of entry tends to decrease response to quality and to promotion to achieve the same impact on market share later entrants need a bigger change in quality and need to spend more on promotion our data did not support an asymmetric effect on advertising

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

generalized quantity competition for multiple products and loss of efficiency we study a generalized model of quantity cournot oligopolistic competition the impact of competition on social surplus and firms profit is analyzed firms produce multiple differentiated products and face production constraints we compare the social surplus produced by competing firms and by colluding firms with the maximum achievable total surplus in the market similarly we quantify the loss of profit that firms incur by competing instead of colluding our goal is to understand how the presence of competition affects the firms and society as a whole but also to determine what are the key drivers of the inefficiencies that arise due to competition

equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard abstract existence of pure strategy equilibria is studied in health insurance markets that exhibit both ex ante adverse selection of the rothschild stiglitz wilson type and ex post hidden information moral hazard it is found that ex post moral hazard has two offsetting effects on the existence of equilibrium and that in general it is difficult to say whether an equilibrium is more or less likely to exist numerical simulations and an analytical example confirm that moral hazard may increase the likelihood of equilibrium these results are interpreted as evidence that health maintenance organization hmo markets could be less likely to exhibit stable equilibria than are fee for service insurance markets

bundling as a facilitating device a reinterpretation of leverage theory tying good monopolists that extract full consumer surplus from independent sales of their tying good may nevertheless choose to bundle in order to induce a favorable response by their tied market rivals in particular bundling may facilitate supracompetitive prices for the tied good copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

digital piracy a competitive analysis in recent years the issue of copyright protection for intellectual properties such as computer software music cds and videos has become increasingly important it is often claimed that illegal copying of intellectual property costs companies billions of dollars in lost revenues and reduces firms incentives to innovate some researchers have shown that copying can be beneficial to firms when there are strong network effects and copying expands the market in this paper we first examine the impact of illegal copying of software and other similar intellectual properties on firms prices profits and quality choices even when there are no network effects and the market is saturated we show that contrary to the claims of manufacturers there are conditions under which copying can increase firms profits lead to better quality products and increase social welfare this is because weaker copyright protection enables firms to reduce price competition by allowing price sensitive consumers to copy thus weaker copyright protection can serve as a coordination device to reduce price competition we also examine how equilibrium copyright enforcement is affected by network externalities in contrast to previous research we show that strong network effects can sometimes lead to a firm choosing higher levels of copyright protection our results show that in the presence of strong network effects stronger copyright enforcement by one firm can serve as a coordinating device to reduce price competition

asymmetric information and search frictions a neutrality result this paper integrates asymmetric information between firms into a canonical model of on the job search workers are heterogeneous in ability but not all employers observe a worker s type wage dispersion caused by search frictions makes the equilibrium wage distribution insensitive to informational asymmetries hence the equilibrium outcome may be the same as when a worker s ability is known to every firm the supportability of the full information outcome depends on market parameters related to productivity knowledge and search the theoretical results elucidate an empirical puzzle about demographic differences in asymmetric information between employers

bertrand competition and cournot outcomes further results the model of kreps and scheinkman where firms choose capacities and then compete in price is extended to oligopoly further capacity is an imperfect commitment device firms can produce beyond capacities at an additional unit cost when is larger than the cournot price the cournot outcome obtains in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when decreases from the cournot price towards zero the whole range of prices from cournot to bertrand is obtained in equilibrium

the changing nature of stock and bond volatility this article examines the changing nature of u s stock and bond risk from 1871 through 2000 and the implications for asset allocation using geometric means and standard deviations we examine nominal and inflation adjusted monthly returns over nonoverlapping 5 year periods as well as annual returns over periods of approximately 25 years and we document how stock and bond volatility changed over the period our analysis suggests that the relative change in the volatility of stocks and volatility of bonds over the past 50 years has increased the importance of stocks in asset allocation the change is even more pronounced when inflation is considered

adverse selection and the middleman the question analyzed in this paper is whether a market that otherwise experiences an akerlofian lemons impasse can function if a middleman organizes trade it is found that the middleman s intervention can prove successful even if neither signals nor quality screening methods exist that could help him to assess the good s qualities the result is obtained under the hypothesis that the middleman randomizes his price offers to the sellers of the units to be intermediated copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

the value to a firm of its rival learning abstract in price competition a firm f reduces its rival s r learning about r s cost in quantity price competition f wants r not to learn about f s cost i show that in quantity competition f wants r not to learn about r s cost

equilibrium existence in the linear model of spatial competition this paper considers a generalization of the hotelling model of spatial competition it is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two stage location price game exists only under very stringent conditions these conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair when the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strategies if transport costs are not sufficiently convex the convexity of transport costs is crucial in determining whether there is excessive or insufficient diversity of products copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

beyond gdp an overview of measurement issues in redefining wealth in the last decades a growing quantity of literature has been written about concepts such as quality of life and well being as a proxy for evaluating societal prosperity and progress this paper analyses the theoretical foundations and the empirical validity of multi dimensional technical tools that can be used for well being measurement there is no doubt that there is a lot of complexity and fuzziness inherent in multi dimensional concepts such as well being a possible reduction of this complexity a pre condition for policy making introduces the problem of the descriptors used indicators and indexes in a multi dimensional framework multi criteria evaluation is a consistent approach for the construction of so called composite indicators often some individual indicators improve while others deteriorate this is the classical conflictual situation dealt with in multi criteria evaluation in particular non compensatory methods are quite relevant since compensability implies complete substitutability between different types of capital uncertainty and sensitivity analysis can estimate the robustness of the results obtained and help the framing of the debate around the conceptual framework used that is which representation of reality and thus which societal values and interests has been considered

the nature of equilibrium in a location model models of location are appropriate in a number of contexts in economics and political science for example firms choose where to position stores and which of a spectrum of goods to produce and politicians select the nature of their platforms in such models it is natural to look for a collection of locations with the property that the location of each individual is optimal given the positions of all other individuals however the pure strategy nash equilibrium provides a solution which is both incomplete and unsatisfactory incomplete because in many cases no such equilibrium exists unsatisfactory because even when it does exist it may not be robust to the specification of the model

non compensatory non linear composite indicators for ranking countries a defensible setting composite indicators or indexes are very common in economic and business statistics for benchmarking the mutual and relative progress of countries in a variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness sustainable development globalization and innovation the proliferation of the production of composite indicators by all the major international organizations is a clear symptom of their political importance and operational relevance in policy making as a consequence improvements in the way these indicators are constructed and used seem to be a very important research issue from both the theoretical and operational points of view this article aims at contributing to the improvement of the overall quality of composite indicators or indexes by looking at one of their technical weaknesses that is the aggregation convention used for their construction for this aim we build upon concepts coming from multi criteria decision analysis measurement theory and social choice we start from the

credible entry threats into contestable markets a symmetric multi market model of contestability the theory of contestable markets emphasizes potential competition yet it is reticent on the identity of potential entrants recent literature discusses the im possibility of hit and run entry for several types of entrants r d cairns and d mahabir 1988 argue that existing firms in related markets are most likely to be capable of hit and run entry but unlikely to be motivated this paper expands their arguments by sketching a multimarket framework and by discussing a model that captures most of the current debate the model marks a first step into revising contestability theory along the lines of this debate copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

the east end the west end and king s cross on clustering in the four player hotelling game nicolaas j vriend i introduction despite the popularity of simple location models in industrial economics and voting theory in the tradition following hotelling 1929 and despite the recent rise of the experimental method in economics there have been only few experimental tests of such models brown kruse et al 1993 and brown kruse and schenk 1999 study models with elastic demand while collins and sherstyuk 2000 focus on the simpler case which we address too where demand is inelastic collins and sherstyuk implement a model with three agents who choose locations on a line segment with a uniform density of consumers who due to the assumption of inelastic demand can also be seen as voters with one vote each it is well known that this game has no pure strategy equilibrium see eaton and lipsey 1975 normalizing the line segment to the unit interval the unique mixed strategy equilibrium prescribes uniform randomization over the middle two quarters for all firms see shaked 1982 as it is a well established fact that experimental subjects have difficulties in randomizing see for example rapoport and budescu 1997 it is not very surprising that collins and sherstyuk do not find strong support for the equilibrium hypothesis their empirical distribution of choices is m shaped and has a considerably larger support than the equilibrium distribution in this study we analyze the case of four agents with uniform consumer density and inelastic demand as the equilibrium of this case implies that two firms locate at the edge of the first and second quarters and the other two at the edge of the third and fourth quarters this setup seems ideal for the investigation of various matters first there is no other number of agents where the equilibrium prediction has a better chance to be valid 1 with three competitors the unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed with five the unique equilibrium configuration is asymmetric and implies unequal payoffs and with six and more agents the equilibrium configurations cease to be unique thus only the two and the four agent cases yield unique pure and symmetric equilibrium configurations that give identical payoffs to all agents second the equilibrium in the four agent case has a property that makes it interesting from a behavioral and empirical point of view not only the focal midpoint is empty but the whole middle segment of the linear city is empty as well that is notwithstanding the nice theoretical properties the equilibrium is not entirely intuitive and is also conflicting with casual empirical evidence there are no cities without shops in the center nor are there democracies without parties located in the political middle ground the picture we will discern in our experimental data can be summarized in the following experimental result in the four seller case the equilibrium prediction is of substantial but limited help about one third of all choices are clustered around the equilibrium locations but in no session do we observe convergence to equilibrium at the same time the focal midpoint exerts a considerable attraction with almost 10 of all choices clustered around it consumers profit from this considerably in the form of lower transportation costs the remainder of the article is organized as follows in section ii we give a theoretical account of the model we implement in section iii we present the experimental design in section iv we analyze the results and explain the data and section v concludes ii theory consider a linear city in which four firms produce a good at constant marginal cost the price of the good is fixed due to some unmodeled features of the market consequently costs can be normalized to zero and the price to one to sell the goods the firms simultaneously choose a location on the unit interval 0 1

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

why competition may drive up prices abstract we show that the expected price of an incumbent firm may increase in response to increasing competition as it may become more profitable to exploit a rather immobile fraction of consumers instead of capturing a larger but more contested segment of the market to derive this result we consider two approaches of modelling the degree of competition first in a duopolistic setting competition is said to be more intense if the entrant s product becomes more attractive to the mobile fraction of buyers in this case we find that all buyers i e both the mobile and the immobile fraction may lose if the market becomes more competitive secondly in a model with two entrants competition is said to become intense if entrants serve an overlapping segment of the market for mobile buyers

pure strategy e nash equilibrium inn person nonzero sum discontinuous games abstract in this paper we considern person nonzero sum games where the strategy spaces of players are compact subsets ofrs the main result states that if the payoff functions are semicontinuous and strongly quasi concave then an e nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for every positive e journal of economic literatureclassification number c72

a model of advertising competition using a dynamic model of advertising rivalry between competitors in a duopoly the author obtains analytical results for the case of pure market share rivalry in a mature market a more general mod

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

signaling strategies in competitive interaction building reputations and hiding the truth abstract the authors develop a conceptual framework of how managers interpret competitors signals over time in various market contexts from the framework the authors generate hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of signaling strategies used by firms in different market contexts the authors conducted two empirical studies involving a repeated entry pricing game to test the hypotheses the results of study 1 show that the entrant s perceptions of the aggressiveness of the incumbent depend on the focus and strength of the incumbent s signals the results of study 2 show that the strength of the entrant s responses to the incumbent s signals depends on the incumbent s use of bluffs and the cost of information about the factors driving the incumbent s signals the implications of these findings for how firms should signal to achieve such strategic objectives as revealing or concealing information developing a desired reputation and influencing competitors responses over time are discussed the au

pioneers marketing mix reactions to entry in different competitive game structures theoretical analysis and empirical illustration pioneers marketing mix reactions to new entries are recognized as important determinants of the outcome of pioneerlate mover competition particularly in price inelastic markets such as those for pharmaceuticals cigarettes and luxury goods managers in such markets are interested in better understanding when to accommodate i e decrease marketing spending or retaliate i e increase spending in nonprice marketing variables such as advertising and salesforce in addition the reallocation of marketing resources toward advertising indicated by a pull strategy or salesforce indicated by a push strategy upon entry is strategically important to managers previous theoretical research shows that pioneers should retaliate in both static and growing markets results from empirical research are mixed in that they support both accommodation and retaliation in growing markets empirical research also shows that a pioneer accommodates retaliates with its low high elasticity marketing mix variable contrary to prior research however some pioneers have successfully accommodated late movers in growing markets and in some cases have accommodated with their stronger marketing mix variables and also retaliated with their weaker marketing mix variables for example bristol myers squibb s capoten accommodated the entry of merck s vasotec in the growing ace inhibitors market with its more powerful variable salesforce but also retaliated with its less potent variable advertising moreover not much is known about how the pioneer s marketing mix allocation should change i e toward pull vs push strategies in response to new entries we seek to better explain the pioneer s reactions and predict its shift in marketing mix allocation upon new entry we note that prior research s predictions on the pioneer s reactions are based on a limited number of key factors such as product market characteristics and the pioneer s elasticities prior to a new entry in this paper we extend previous research by adding two other critical factors namely the impact of new entry on the pioneer s elasticities and margin and different competitive game structures to better predict and explain the pioneer s reactions we develop analytical results on the pioneer s reactions in price advertising and salesforce in different competitive games both nash and different leader follower games in these results we identify the conditions under which the pioneer should accommodate or retaliate or not react to a late mover s entry and shift its marketing mix allocation toward pull versus push strategies we empirically illustrate some of the analytical results using data from a pharmaceutical category we show that a pioneer who adopts a follower leader role with respect to a marketing mix variable in a static growing market and witnesses a decrease an increase in own elasticity and margin upon a new entry generally should accommodate retaliate in that variable however we are also able to show that there are cases where these general reactions don t hold thus for example it is possible for a pioneer to find it optimal to accommodate in a growing market or to retaliate even when its elasticity decreases upon entry depending on the combination of competitive game the impact of entry on elasticities and margin and market growth in this way our results point to the fact that it is necessary to look not only at one factor at a time but instead examine the combination of all the factors we explain the empirical support for both accommodation and retaliation in growing markets by showing that the pioneer should accommodate retaliate a late mover with its competitively low high elasticity marketing mix variable competitively high low elasticity variables are not are likely to be significantly reduced by a new entry in the anticipated competitive game with regard to reallocation of the pioneer s marketing mix we show that the change in the pioneer s marketing mix allocation should follow the change in the relative marketing mix effectiveness after new entry this in turn depends on the structure of competition the impact of the late mover on its elasticities and margins and the competitor s marketing mix elasticities in addition to own elasticities the results can guide managers on how factors such as competitive structure changes in elasticities and margin and market growth impact the pioneer s marketing mix decisions and on when to accommodate retaliate or not react to a late mover s entry and shift marketing mix allocation toward pull versus push strategies

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection do walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection in particular is their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable this paper addresses these questions in the context of a rothschild stiglitz insurance economy we identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality consequently we show that competitive equilibria always exist but are not typically incentive efficient however as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities markets for consumption rights can be designed to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection with such markets competitive equilibria exist and incentive constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems hold

the equity premium stock and bond returns since 1802 1992 the equity premium stock and bond returns since 1802 financial analysts journal vol 48 no 1 pp 28 38 46

analytical models of competition with implications for marketing issues findings and outlook the authors review a representative cross section of analytical models of competition using a framework for competitive analysis developed from a marketing perspective models are classified by the

approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry this paper considers the existence and properties of approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry price setting firms produce a homogeneous product with weakly convex costs the main results are that a given e 0 an e equilibrium exists if the industry is large enough b if the e is small enough and the industry large enough any e equilibrium is approximately competitive these results depend on how contingent demand is specified

bertrand edgeworth equilibria with unobservable output uncoordinated consumers and large number of firms abstract we examine a bertrand edgeworth model of price competition where the output levels of the firms are unobservable and consumers are uncoordinated we show that if the number of firms is large enough then any price greater than the competitive one can be sustained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium

bertrand competition with cost uncertainty abstract we analyze the classical model of bertrand competition in a homogeneous good market with constant marginal costs and uncertainty regarding rivals costs first we show that there exists a mixed strategy nash equilibrium under the conventional equal sharing rule second we illustrate the result for the case of piecewise affine market demand

testing competitive market structures an accurate understanding of the structure of competition is important in the formulation of many marketing strategies for example in new product launch product reformulation or positioning decisions the strategist wants to know which of his competitors will be most affected and hence most likely to respond many marketing science models have been proposed to identify market structure in this paper we examine the managerial problem and propose a criterion by which to judge an identified market structure basically our criterion is a quantification of the intuitive managerial criterion that a submarket is a useful conceptualization if it identifies which products are most likely to be affected by our marketing strategies we formalize this criterion within the structure of classical hypothesis testing so that a marketing scientist can use statistical statements to evaluate a market structure identified by 1 behavioral hypotheses 2 managerial intuition or 3 market structure identification algorithms mathematically our criterion is based on probabilities of switching to products in the situation where an individual s most preferred product is not available submarkets are said to exist when consumers are statistically more likely to buy again in that submarket than would be predicted based on an aggregate constant ratio model for example product attributes e g brand form size use situations e g coffee in the morning versus coffee at dinner and user characteristics e g heavy versus light users are specified as hypotheses for testing alternate competitive structures measurement and estimation procedures are described and a convergent approach is illustrated an application of the methodology to the coffee market is presented and managerial implications of six other applications are described briefly

the dynamics of majoritarian blotto games abstract we study colonel blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective for a large class of contest success functions the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player s overall budget as a consequence a player s chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player has accumulated in prior battles this result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective we also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget for many contest success functions if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended game resembles an all pay auction without noise

incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection we decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms that is for menus of contracts facing a budget constraint informed individuals purchase lottery tickets to enter mechanisms whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices beyond optimization market clearing and rational expectations an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change or cut prices an equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient an equilibrium can be computed as the solution to a programming problem that selects the incentive efficient outcome preferred by the highest type within an appropriately defined set for two types economies this is the only equilibrium outcome

banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality abstract competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality following arrow and debreu 1954 6 i formulate a standard growth model with externality a two period version of romer 1986 39 as a game among consumers firms and intermediaries the walrasian equilibrium with an auctioneer does not achieve the social optimum without an auctioneer or intermediaries i show that no nash equilibrium exists with several banks strategically intermediating capital a nash equilibrium emerges with a realistic institution i e an interbank market with a negotiation process in the loan market the equilibrium outcome is uniquely determined and socially optimal

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

the microfoundations project in general equilibrium theory the author 1 argues that the long lived microfoundations project based on general equilibrium models has come to an end and 2 shows that non walrasian models intended to provide microfoundations for macroeconomics are inadequate the arguments are derived from the sonnenschein mantel debreu smd demonstration of the arbitrariness of aggregate excess demands in general equilibrium models of the walrasian arrow debreu mckenzie type the issues raised have significance for the proper method of modeling macroeconomic phenomena for instance the smd results have led a growing number of general equilibrium theorists to make assumptions concerning macroeconomic structure in order to analyze other regularities at the macro level these points validate the position that systematic macroeconomic phenomena are intrinsically macroeconomic copyright 1994 by oxford university press

existence of equilibria in discontinuous bayesian games abstract we provide easily verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral strategy bayes nash equilibrium we allow players payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all pay auction with general tie breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results

product design in selection markets insurers choose plan characteristics to sort for profitable consumers in a model with multidimensional types this sorting incentive is proportional to the covariance among marginal consumers between marginal willingness to pay and cost to the insurer standard forms of cost sharing successfully repel costly consumers but reducing plan comprehensiveness instead alienates the risk averse in a perfectly competitive equilibrium the sorting incentive must vanish market power increases insurance quality and welfare nonetheless a competitive equilibrium with positive insurance is possible when insurance value is suciently negatively correlated with cost however in a calibration to handel hendel and whinston 2013 s data equilibrium still fails to exist

tinbergen and theil meet nash controllability in policy games abstract this paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static lq strategic context between n players we show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and nash equilibrium existence

seventy five years of investing for future generations university endowments invest for future generations so their strategy should reflect their long horizon we researched whether they really do behave like long term investors we examined the behav

all equilibria in a class of bidding games abstract we consider a class of bidding games under complete information and construct a continuum of pure and mixed strategy equilibria as corollaries of our results we obtain a continuum of equilibria for the n bidder first price auction and the n firm bertrand game

an analysis of the s p 500 index and cowles s extensions price indexes and stock returns 1870 1999 this article provides a consistent monthly stock price index from january 1871 through 1999 the broadly defined s p weekly index is reconstructed from 1918 and carried forward as the s p 500 composite index to the present cowles s monthly index is improved in order to provide month end estimates from february 1885 cowles s estimates of dividends and earnings for this index from 1871 are reevaluated and are carried forward until spliced to the s p daily estimates that began in 1957 the result is a monthly index of prices dividends and earnings based on consistent definitions over a period of 130 years

pure strategy nash equilibria of non zero sum two person games non convex case abstract consider the class of the non zero sum two person games on the unit square if the payoff functions are continuous and satisfy a new and weaker condition than the usual conditions of concavity or quasiconcavity we prove that these games possess a pure strategy nash equilibrium

discontinuous stable games and efficient nash equilibria abstract in the recent paper by the author scalzo v 2010 pareto efficient nash equilibria in discontinuous games economics letters 107 364 365 a class of discontinuous games where efficient nash equilibria exist has been defined in the present paper we complete the previous investigation and recognize a class of discontinuous games where the efficient nash equilibria are stable with respect to perturbations of the characteristics of players

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

market making oligopoly this paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers the unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the cournot outcome the paper thus provides a rationale for cournot type competition between market makers this contrasts with previous findings in the literature where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the bertrand result typically obtains

strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games abstract we introduce the new concept of prudent equilibrium to model strategic uncertainty and prove it exists in large classes of discontinuous games when the game is better reply secure we show that prudent equilibrium refines nash equilibrium in contrast with the current literature we don t use probabilities to model players strategies and beliefs about other players strategies we provide examples first price auctions location game nash demand game etc where prudent equilibrium concept removes most non intuitive solutions of the game

production in advance versus production to order abstract we use a theoretical framework to compare production in advance type and production to order type environments carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity constrained bertrand edgeworth duopoly game we prove that the equilibrium profits are the same in case of production in advance and production to order in addition advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies

informative advertising and entry deterrence a bertrand model abstract this paper shows that strategic entry deterrence via informative advertising is impossible in a game of sequential advertising followed by simultaneous price setting in a homogenous product market it contrasts schmalensee s journal of political economy 91 1983 636 653 result that when the strategic variables at the post advertising stage are quantities not prices optimal entry deterrence is possible and involves underinvestment in advertising

certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed we compare certification to a minimum quality standard mqs policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods compared to the unregulated outcome both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality an mqs restricts the firms quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods this fuels competition and may therefore deter entry a certification policy which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold does not restrict the firms quality choice in contrast to an mqs certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits we find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small in that case certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry

bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study abstract we review an asymmetric auction experiment based on plum int j game theory 20 1992 393 private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions one of which first order stochastically dominates the other we test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders preference for first vs second price auctions

a model of stability and persistence in a democracy abstract we develop an intertemporal model of political competition which accounts for three stylized facts of political life in representative democracies i political stability and the absence of discrimination ii a limited degree of political competition and iii the persistence of different political outcomes in otherwise similar economies in our model political stability is desirable for risk averse voters voters only vote for decent policy proposals which do not discriminate against single groups we derive properties of the set of possible political outcomes and study the issue of robustness against renegotiation journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d70 d72

tax evasion tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies abstract this note extends janeba and peters econ j 109 1999 93 paper on tax evasion and tax competition by allowing for equilibrium mixed strategies it shows that discrimination is still the weakly dominant strategy for both countries

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

firms r d decisions under incomplete information abstract the paper considers a patent race in which firms do not know their relative positions in this setting firms that start in the same position proceed at the highest possible speed and if one firm has an initial advantage it preempts the rival but at the cost of dissipating a significant part of its monopoly rent so the paper shows that incomplete information in a patent race leads to rent dissipation the latter is higher the higher the value of the prize and the lower the cost of r d thus for innovations that provide relatively high profits the time to discovery is shortened but the social losses are likely to be high due to duplication of effort

should countries control international profit shifting we present a fiscal competition model with two policy instruments the level of corporate taxation and the tightness of control of profit shifting by multinational firms mnf we show that a country may optimally decide not to monitor the mnf for two reasons firstly this country becomes an attractive location for mnf activity despite a high corporate tax secondly as the profits of the mnf become mobile the focus of tax competition is shifted taxation then influences both an mnf s location and the place where it declares its profits

competition strategy and price dynamics a theoretical and empirical investigation the authors explore how competition affects dynamic pricing of new products dynamics of diffusion saturation and cost reduction due to experience are all considered with emphasis on the last t

symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria abstract it is known that not every symmetric game has a symmetric equilibrium because there are examples of symmetric games that fail to have any equilibria at all but this leads to the following question if a symmetric game has a nash equilibrium does it have a symmetric nash equilibrium in this note we show that the answer to this question is no by providing two examples of symmetric games that have only asymmetric equilibria

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

monotone equilibrium in multi unit auctions in two sided multi unit auctions having a variety of payment rules including uniform price and discriminatory auctions a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi dimensional types and interdependent values in fact all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to mpse thus for standard expected surplus revenue analysis there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies