development effectiveness what have we learnt we suggest that the poverty efficiency aid allocation is merely a benchmark guide if a donor lacks other information about the country and also the power to change or prevail over government preferences we argue that in most circumstances donors have only limited scope for the latter and that while high aid dependence may reduce the fungibility problem and the use of ngos can by pass it altogether such circumstances are not very common hence the main reasons for departing from the benchmark are when the donor has additional information about likely poverty impact or if poverty reduction is not the objective

why is china different from eastern europe perspectives from organization theory we draw from recent work in organization theory to explain the differences in reform strategies between china and eastern europe an experimentation approach was adopted in china whereas a big bang approach was more favored in eastern europe the explanation is based on differences in the organizational structure of central planning u form in eastern europe and m form in china the m form is more flexible because it makes local experiments possible contrary to the u form where this would give rise to major complications in coordination

governance or poverty reduction assessing budget support in nicaragua abstract general budget support gbs is assumed to lead to more effective poverty reduction through non earmarking of the money and through recipient country ownership a second and more hidden objective of gbs however is to influence policies and governance of recipient countries this article develops an evaluation framework that takes the tensions between these two objectives into account it then assesses the results of gbs in nicaragua under two administrations it concludes that for most donors the aim of improving governance was more important than poverty reduction in both government periods thus reducing the effect of gbs on poverty reduction in addition donor influence on governance was limited

responding to financial crisis the case of jamaica abstract the adverse economic and social effects of the financial crises that have afflicted many developing countries in recent years have highlighted the need to develop a policy response which addresses the vulnerability of financial systems to systemic instability and crisis the article examines the experience of jamaica a country which managed a financial sector crisis during the 1990s without the assistance or involvement of the international monetary fund lessons are drawn from the jamaica case study for the domestic management of banking sector failures in lower income countries

determinants of united states trade balance with australia this study explores the determinants of the usa s trade balance ne with australia and tests for long run relationships regression results suggest the most important determinant of ne is the price ratio usa relative to australia followed by the lending rate ratio gdp ratio money supply ratio and the real exchange rate which together explain 93 of the variation in ne f tests suggest ne responds to rising and falling exchange rate regimes symmetrically johansen s cointegration test suggests a significant at 1 long run relationship between ne and its determinants based on engle granger import share is and output growth q are cointegrated at 10 if q shocks precede is shocks suggesting a weak long run relationship between them there is a positive long run relationship between ne and the exchange rate er at 5 if er shocks precede ne shocks results based on the error correction model suggest a positive relationship between expected er and ne and reinforce the cointegration results

do elites benefit from democracy and foreign aid in developing countries abstract a popular argument for the absence of any beneficial effects of foreign aid is that it is skimmed by political elites in recipient countries however studies also suggest that aid may be more effective in relatively democratic developing countries by exploring data on income quintiles derived from the world income inequality database for 88 developing countries a set of results indicate that foreign aid and democracy in conjunction are associated with a higher share of income held by the upper quintile it thus appears that foreign aid contrary to popular beliefs leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing countries while the effects are negligible in autocratic countries the paper closes with a discussion of potential mechanisms generating this perverse effect

estimating income poverty in the presence of measurement error and missing data problems reliable measures of poverty are an essential statistical tool for public policies aimed at reducing poverty in this article we consider the reliability of income poverty measures based on survey data which are typically plagued by missing data and measurement error neglecting these problems can bias the estimated poverty rates we show how to derive upper and lower bounds for the population poverty rate using the sample evidence an upper bound on the probability of misclassifying people into poor and nonpoor and instrumental or monotone instrumental variable assumptions by using the european community household panel we compute bounds for the poverty rate in 10 european countries and study the sensitivity of poverty comparisons across countries to missing data and measurement error problems supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from the jbes website

factor inputs and japanese manufacturing trade structure the japanese international trade structure in manufactured goods has been analyzed using cross section regression analysis in which labor capital human capital and energy are regressed on japanese net exports exports and imports with the world oecd and developing countries for 1967 and 1975 skill and wage differential measures have been utilized for the measuring of human capital contrary to the dualism found in earlier studies the estimated results show that in 1967 japan exported unskilled labor intensive goods with respect to the developing countries as well as the oecd countries in 1975 japan exported capital intensive goods to all regions and imported unskilled labor intensive goods from the world and the developing countries skilled labor intensive goods were imported from the oecd countries in both years drastic changes between 1967 and 1975 are noted japanese exports shifted from unskilled labor intensive goods to capital intensive goods while imports did the opposite this result conforms to the changes in unskilled labor and capital usage in japan and her major trading partners

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

poverty reduction strategy papers a new convergence abstract poverty reduction strategy papers represent both a primary policy device of international development institutions and an instance of a wider international convergence of public policy around global integration and social inclusion charting the emergence of these approaches this paper argues that this convergence has a number of structural predilections which favor the technical and juridical over the political economic and a disciplinary framework over a practical contest drawing extensively on decentralized governance and poverty reduction programs in uganda this paper shows how these predilections obscure power relations and restrict practical and political options while exacting heavy establishment and compliance costs

the imf a bird s eye view of its role and operations the international monetary fund imf is the world s premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time the fund attracts a great deal of attention much of it critical but the discussion is often polemic in style strongly held but frequently opposing views are expressed this survey attempts to examine in an objective way the theory and evidence relating to the fund s operations many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist however the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues the format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of imf arrangements what makes a country turn to the fund for assistance should the imf be lending what influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes are imf programmes effective and why do some countries make prolonged use of imf resources for completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the imf the extent to which fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the fund s systemic role important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly although primarily adopting an economist s perspective the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the imf s operations economics has to be combined with politics examining the imf is an exercise in applied political economy copyright 2007 the author journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd

determinants of the structure of u s foreign trade 1958 1976 abstract the heckscher ohlin model with three direct factor inputs is borne out for u s net exports of manufactures in annual cross section regressions for 1958 1976 the coefficient on unskilled labor became significantly more negative over the period and there is evidence that the negative sign on physical capital may reflect the inclusion of natural resource industries further analysis based upon 1960 and 1970 census years suggests the importance as well of skill and technological variables calculations of the total factor requirements of u s trade uphold the leontief paradox for 1958 but not for 1972

divided we reform evidence from us welfare policies abstract divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock i investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in us states between 1978 and 2010 panel data regressions show that under divided government a us state is around 25 more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government several robustness checks confirm this counter intuitive finding case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor senate and house

political economy influences within the life cycle of imf programmes increasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the imf s operations however up until now the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context this paper sets out to fill the gap its conceptual basis is that of the life cycle of an imf programme what determines the decision to turn to the fund for financial assistance what determines the outcome of negotiations what determines whether a country will come back to the fund answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone the paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved it also points the direction in which future research needs to go some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined

exchange rate volatility and aggregate export growth in bangladesh the long and short run determinants of bangladeshi export growth are examined these are modelled as depending on world trade volume bangladeshi and world export prices and exchange rate volatility several techniques are used to estimate and test hypotheses about the cointegration space of these variables we find that there are two plausible restricted cointegrating vectors one appears to be an export demand while the other is suggestive of an export supply these are then imposed on an error correction model estimates suggest that in the long run bangladeshi export growth is driven by the volume of world trade and is negatively and inelastically related to the volatility of bangladeshi exchange rates once these long run effects are accounted for it is found that none of the variables significantly explains any short run changes in export growth

when does it take a nixon to go to china substantial policy changes like market oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by hawks are sometimes implemented by unlikely parties to account for such episodes this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters the incumbent is unable to credibly transmit all this information since voters are also imperfectly informed about his ideology the paper identifies conditions under which an incumbent party s electoral prospects increase the more atypical the policy it proposes popular support for a policy or its credibility depends on the policymaker policy pair copyright 1998 by american economic association

financial liberalization and reversals political and economic determinants what accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms this paper identifies the political regime as one of the main factors focusing on democratization and financial reform it puts forward novel evidence for a u shaped relation across countries and over time for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization when incomplete may lead to severe financial reform reversals nauro f campos and fabrizio coricelli

the welfare effects of trade and capital market liberalization treatise on the welfare effects of trade and capital market liberalization consquenses of the capital account liberalization in the presence of trade restrictions specifies on the liberalization of trade in the presence of foreign borrowing constraints proves superiority of gradual liberalization of trade to an abrupt liberalization

holding on for too long an experimental study on inertia in entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs disinvestment choices abstract disinvestment in the sense of project termination and liquidation of assets including the cession of a venture is an important realm of entrepreneurial decision making this study presents the results of an experimental investigation modeling the choice to disinvest as a dynamic problem of optimal stopping in which the patterns of decisions are analyzed with entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs our experimental results reject the standard net present value approach as an account of observed behavior instead most individuals seem to understand the value of waiting their choices are weakly related to the disinvestment triggers derived from a formal optimal stopping benchmark consistent with real options reasoning we also observe a pronounced psychological inertia i e most individuals hold on to a losing project for even longer than real options reasoning would predict the study provides evidence for entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs being quite similar in their behavior

foreign aid and market liberalizing reform market oriented economic policies reflected in limited economic activity by government protection of private property rights sound monetary policy outward orientation regarding trade and efficient tax and regulatory policy have been strongly linked to faster rates of economic growth foreign aid is often provided in the belief that it encourages liberalizing reforms in these areas this paper analyzes the impact of aid on market liberalizing policy reform correcting for the possible endogeneity of aid results indicate that higher aid slowed reform over the 1980 2000 period as measured by a broad index of policies disaggregating policy into five areas aid is significantly linked to slower reform in some policy areas but not in others disaggregating by decade aid s adverse impact on policy reform is much more pronounced for the 1980s than for the 1990s

basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance abstract i analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt i show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare however with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs private lenders profits multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit

political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations a duration analysis this article employs a duration analysis approach to empirically investigate whether political fractionalization leads to delayed fiscal stabilizations using a broad sample of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 2011 we consistently find strong evidence that political fractionalization is significantly associated with longer delays in stabilizing high deficits in particular political fractionalization has a greater impact on delays in periods of macroeconomic distress we also show that while the fractionalization of government parties delays fiscal stabilization the fractionalization of opposition parties tends to facilitate fiscal stabilization

dancing to the donors tune policy choice in aid dependent countries current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients own plans in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies i show that when recipients have private information policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime however generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case study evidence moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid seeking in the least needy countries in summary optimal aid policies are highly context specific and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity

income distribution functions with disturbances abstract recent exercises in the maximum likelihood estimation of income distribution functions provide goodness of fit tests which lead to the rejection of most models this result is usually ignored on the ground that the test is too strict since it allows for sampling variation only if income distribution functions like other econometric models are not meant to hold exactly we should introduce disturbances in the statistical model here we treat observed income as the sum of a systematic component with a specific two parameter distribution pareto gamma or lognormal and an independent normal error the ensuing models fit conventional u s income data much better than their traditional counterparts but they still fail a goodness of fit test

poverty and inequality under income and price dispersions many policies simultaneously affect the distribution of prices and incomes in the economy moreover a bias may occur when there is a stochastic relationship between prices and incomes and this relationship is being ignored it is therefore important to dispose of an analytical framework for welfare analysis that could account for changes in this joint distribution how can the joint influences of price and income distributions on poverty and inequality indicators be analysed we offer a method to deal with this problem by using parametric formulae of poverty and inequality measures we propose statistical indicators for the levels variabilities and a statistical link of price indices and nominal living standards these indicators are consistent with an approximation of the problem based on a bivariate lognormal distribution of price indices and nominal living standards our analysis provides hints about the social welfare impact of economic shocks or policies affecting levels variabilities and correlation of prices and incomes intuitive insights are obtained while using arithmetic means and variances instead does not lead to illuminating results the role of price and income variabilities for poverty and inequality is more complex than generally expected with the possibility of several variation regimes empirical investigation of these statistics would guide social policies

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

capital and opposition in africa coalition building in multiethnic societies under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions in africa s patronage based political systems incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups opposition politicians however must rely on private resources to do the same this article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions it shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries liberalizing financial reforms in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent s pecuniary coalition building strategy a binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim greater financial autonomy for business as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

divide et impera strategic underpricing in privatizations in several recent initial public offerings in privatization casesshares seemed to be severely underpriced in this paper weprovide a political economy explanation for this apparentunderpricing using a variant of grossmann and helpmann s 1996 model of special interest politics we demonstrate thatgovernments may raise their election chances by rationinginvestors because the resulting broader distribution of sharesmakes regulation that is favorable to the privatized firm morepopular somewhat surprisingly even revenues from theprivatization can be increased through rationing the model alsoexplains the common practice of bonus systems designed to preventinvestors from taking profits immediately

learning from the doers developing country lessons for advanced economy growth from 1980 to 1992 emerging and developing countries grew by 3 4 percent per year their annual rate of growth increased to 5 4 percent between 1993 and 2012 no such increase occurred for advanced nations whose average growth from 1980 to 2012 was roughly constant excluding the impact of the 2008 2009 recession developing nations turned themselves around by embracing discipline sustained commitment to a pragmatic and flexible growth strategy three illustrations of discipline through the lens of trade fiscal and debt reforms in the developing world offer relevant practical lessons for recovery in advanced economies and continued catch up growth in developing nations

the inequality of actual incomes and earning capacities between households in europe abstract in this paper the distributions of net household income in seven european countries belgium denmark france great britain italy the netherlands and west germany are considered the analysis is made by means of inequality measurement in terms of the variance of logincomes and the theil index t both these measures are so called decomposable inequality measures comparisons and decompositions are presented with respect to several socio economic characteristics for each country the differences between countries are also discussed furthermore a new concept is introduced the earnings inequality index which is intended to measure earnings differences between occupations and other social characteristics irrespective of the actual numbers in those groups the data on which we base our estimates are from a survey carried out in seven european countries in october 1979

the dynamics of optimal gradual stabilizations inflation inertia may be quite tenacious because of the simultaneous interaction between policy actions and inflationary expectations under imperfect credibility this result is particularly relevant for understanding some of the failed efforts to stabilize inflation in south america this article deals with the issue of inertia in the framework of imperfect information about the type of the policymaker and extends the existing models to an infinite horizon because policymakers do not have perfect control of inflation a frivolous stabilizer may deviate from the policies of a serious stabilizer without necessarily being unmasked immediately when the difference in the ability of strong and weak policymakers to control inflation is large unexpected inflation may be persistently negative for quite a while thus causing reduced economic activity and giving the indication that credibility is low if the policymaker persists with the stabilization this pattern gradually disappears as his reputation rises but before this final stage the serious policymaker has to compromise his inflation objective in view of adverse expectation about this type and pay the cost of imperfect credibility

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

long run price and income elasticities of demand for hong kong exports a structural cointegrating var approach this article revisits a system of export volume and price equations to estimate the long run price and income effects in the demand for hong kong s exports using a recently developed restricted cointegrating var approach it tests theorybased restrictions and obtains estimates of the long run structural coefficients the estimation results provide supporting evidence for the theory based restrictions and suggest that the demand for hong kong s exports is both price and income elastic this article is therefore able to present a long run model of hong kong s exports that is both theory and data consistent and long run elasticities that are economically interpretable the short run properties of the model are illustrated by means of persistence profiles which confirm the cointegrating vectors tendency of convergence

on the reversibility of structural reforms abstract what are the factors that explain reversals in the implementation of structural reforms our main hypothesis is that reversals in different reforms are driven by different factors this paper presents novel evidence showing that a fdi inflows reduce the likelihood of privatization reversals b worsened terms of trade increase the probability of external liberalization reversals and c labor strikes propel reversals in price liberalization

the economic and political determinants of imf and world bank lending in the middle east and north africa mena assumes both political and economic significance politically it is arguably the epicentre of world crisis chronically war prone and the site of the world s most protracted conflicts hinnebusch 2003 p 1 economically it owns the bulk of the world s oil reserves driving in particular the usa economic engine in light of the region s geopolitically and economically strategic position in the world economy it is clear that economic and political factors are inextricably linked when it comes to the manner in which the west particularly the usa responds to the region s needs

good countries or good projects macro and micro correlates of world bank project performance abstract this paper investigates macro and micro correlates of aid financed development project outcomes using data from over 6000 world bank projects evaluated between 1983 and 2011 country level macro measures of the quality of policies and institutions are strongly correlated with project outcomes consistent with the view that country level performance matters for aid effectiveness however a striking feature of the data is that the success of individual development projects varies much more within countries than it does between countries a large set of project level micro variables including project size project length the effort devoted to project preparation and supervision and early warning indicators that flag problematic projects during the implementation stage accounts for some of this within country variation in project outcomes measures of world bank project manager quality also matter significantly for the ultimate project outcomes we discuss the implications of these findings for donor policies aimed at aid effectiveness

defining poverty lines as a fraction of central tendency we show under lognormality that when the gini coefficient is stable over time defining the poverty line as a fraction of a central tendency of the living standard distribution restricts the evolution of the poverty measures to be stable that is poverty does not change if the gini coefficient does not change moreover when the gini coefficient slightly changes most of the poverty change can be considered a change in inequality then the consequences of using different poverty lines are analysed thus important features in studies of poverty change based on these lines may result from methodological choices rather than from economic mechanisms

selective intervention and internal hybrids interpreting and learning from the rise and decline of the oticon spaghetti organization infusing hierarchies with elements of market control has become a much used way of simultaneously increasing entrepreneurialism and motivation in firms however this paper argues that such internal hybrids particularly in their radical forms are inherently hard to successfully design and implement because of a fundamental incentive problem of establishing credible managerial commitments to not intervene in delegated decision making this theme is developed and illustrated using the case of the world leading hearing aids producer oticon in the beginning of the 1990s oticon became famous for its radical internal hybrid the spaghetti organization recent work has interpreted the spaghetti organization as a radical attempt to foster dynamic capabilities by organizational means neglecting however that about a decade later the spaghetti organization has given way to a more traditional matrix organization in contrast an organizational economics interpretation of oticon organizational changes is developed this lens suggests that a strong liability of the spaghetti organization was the above incentive problem frequent managerial meddling with delegated rights led to a severe loss of motivation and arguably caused the change to a more structured organization refutable implications are developed and the discussion is broadened to more general issues of economic organization

structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition abstract economies in transition are faced with a high degree of structural uncertainty i e uncertainty about which it is possible to learn through experience we study structural uncertainty s effects on a subsidy removal program subsidy removal causes unemployment but yields fiscal benefits and facilitates private sector growth when the policymaker does not know the speed with which the private sector absorbs the unemployed he will be driven toward a more decisive and therefore more informative policy the model also rationalizes policy reversals and implies that irreversibility constraints and political instability dampen the learning effect making policy more gradualist

funding self sustaining development the role of aid fdi and government in economic success this article challenges a long held development policy assumption that aid and foreign direct investment fdi serve as substitutes or complements in accelerating the development of the world s poorer countries we show both theoretically and empirically that aid and fdi affect development differently aid contributes powerfully to both economic growth and human development and the higher the level of human capital in a country the more aid contributes by contrast fdi at best has no effect on economic growth and actually slows the rate of human development in less developed countries we find no evidence that the degree of democratic responsiveness in government conditions the effectiveness of either aid or fdi although we do find that democracy independently increases human development in all but the most developed countries our results demonstrate that fdi and aid are not and cannot be substitutes in the development of the world s poorer countries nor even can they be thought of as complements certainly not at mid to low levels of development in the end poor countries need democracy and aid not fdi we are extremely grateful to susan rose ackerman gustav ranis frances rosenbluth kenneth scheve and participants at the leitner political economy seminar at yale university in december 2003 for very helpful comments we also received valuable suggestions from two anonymous reviewers stephen kosack would like to thank the national science foundation for the support of a graduate research fellowship

can the world cut poverty in half how policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals abstract poverty in the developing world will decline by about one half by 2015 if the trends of the 1990s persist most of this poverty reduction will occur in asia however while poverty will decline only slightly in africa effective aid could make a contribution to greater poverty reduction in lagging regions even more potent would be significant policy reform in these countries we develop a model of efficient aid in which flows respond to policy improvements that create a better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid we investigate scenarios of policy reform and efficient aid that point the way to how the world can cut poverty in half in every major region

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

debt relief and governance quality in developing countries summary in this paper we empirically discuss whether or not debt relief has been economically rational in the past 15 years from analyzing the determinants of debt relief our results suggest that governance quality did not play a role in the decision of creditor countries to forgive debt in the 1990s furthermore even the actual debt burden of highly indebted poor countries was not crucial in deciding whether or not debt forgiveness was granted rather debt relief followed a strong path dependence those countries whose debt had been forgiven in the first half of the 1990s were also granted debt forgiveness in the second half of the decade however this allocation pattern changed at the beginning of the 21st century when path dependence diminished and some dimensions of governance quality were taken into account by donor countries

export performance in china s regional economies china enjoyed unprecedented economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s associated with this growth was the rapid expansion of exports from the chinese regions this study aims to provide an empirical assessment of export performance in the chinese regions during 1992 2001 it has shown that on an average china s regional economies have only achieved 70 of their export potential leaving substantial scope for improvement there is also considerable variation in export performance among the chinese regions with the noncoastal areas lagging behind in addition this article also shows that several region specific factors e g foreign direct investment government spending infrastructure development and the nonstate sector have affected regional export performance positively furthermore it is found that the development of china s western regions has boosted and will continue to improve the export sectors in these regions

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

the political economy of transition the overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform what are the main insights from that theory how does it reflect the transition reality what have we learned and what do we still need to learn the present article will attempt to answer those questions

relationships between economic growth foreign direct investment and trade evidence from china this study investigates the causal links between trade economic growth and inward foreign direct investment fdi in china at the aggregate level the integration and cointegration properties of quarterly data are analysed long run relationships between growth exports imports and fdi are identified in a cointegration framework in which this paper finds bi directional causality between economic growth fdi and exports economic development exports and fdi appear to be mutually reinforcing under the open door policy

long run income and price elasticities of demand for colombian nontraditional exports a multivariate cointegration framework a long run income and price elasticities of demand is estimated for colombian nontraditional exports through a multivariate cointegration analysis based on the combination of cointegration and exogeneity concepts and the inclusion of the complete dynamic system the paper shows the existence of a long run relationship among nontraditional exports relative price and foreign demand and higher long run elasticities than those provided by the long run cointegration vector coefficients that are usually reported in the trade literature

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

economic reform voting and local political intervention evidence from india abstract this paper uses the indian tariff reforms of the early nineties to estimate how voters hurt by economic reforms respond regions more hurt by the tariff reform increased their support for both the party that initiated their suffering and parties with similar preferences in favor of poverty centric policies this response is surprisingly sophisticated where voters did not simply punish incumbents for negative income shocks and correctly discounted initial anti reform stances by opposition parties that later turned out to be false furthermore the strength of this voting response varied with both geography and local political incentives suggesting that the economic effects of reforms might vary substantially in large and decentralized democracies

institutions and performance in european labour markets taking a fresh look at evidence this paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new empirical eu based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market adjustment although the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements as a consequence the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels although empirical evidence does not show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of the economic and monetary union and the creation of the euro the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and increasing labour market adjustment

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

company interests and foreign aid policy playing donors off against one another abstract the evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works and sometimes does not work we suggest that third parties to the donor recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement the halt in aid that should follow non compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement we use a multi agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties like companies and others influence the disbursement decision failing to take account of third parties role yields the opposite result conditionality becomes successful

does economic analysis improve the quality of foreign assistance the world bank undertakes an annual expenditure of around 60 million on country specific economic analysis and advice for its member developing countries what is the impact of this economic and sector work on the quality of world bank lending it will be useful to know whether past analytical work has generated measurable economic benefits that will justify its continued provision in an environment of increasingly scarce resources this article sets out an idealized model of decision making in which a country manager makes a broad allocation of resources between lending services and economic and sector work given that decision the task manager for each project makes project specific decisions with respect to the allocation of resources between preparation and supervision the analysis indicates that economic and sector work has a significant positive impact on the quality of world bank loans the results provide clear evidence of underinvestment in economic and sector work and the analysis shows that resources can be switched from preparation and supervision to economic and sector work to the benefit of both the quality of programs and level of disbursements

economic determinants of imf financial arrangements abstract we analyze factors that lead to imf approval of financial arrangements we account for both economic variables that induce a country to seek an imf arrangement demand side factors and macroeconomic policy commitments that the imf considers when deciding whether to approve it supply side factors using a pooled sample of annual observations for 91 developing countries over 1973 1991 we obtain maximum likelihood bivariate and univariate probit estimates of the approval of an imf arrangement for a given country in a given year a number of demand side and supply side variables are statistically significant determinants of the approval of an imf arrangement

priorities and sequencing in privatization evidence from czech firm panel data abstract while privatization of state owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously this raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically in this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization to obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing we investigate the following competing government objectives i maximizing efficiency through resource allocation ii maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public iii minimizing political costs iv maximizing efficiency through information gains and v maximizing privatization revenues next we use firm level data from the czech republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first the sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

welfare measurement and measurement error the approximate effects of measurement error on a variety of measures of inequality and poverty are derived they are shown to depend on the measurement error variance and functionals of the error contaminated income distribution but not on the form of the measurement error distribution and to be accurate within a rich class of error free income distributions and measurement error distributions the functionals of the error contaminated income distribution that approximate the measurement error induced distortions can be estimated so it is possible to investigate the sensitivity of welfare measures to alternative amounts of measurement error and when an estimate of the measurement error variance is available to calculate corrected welfare measures the methods are illustrated in an application using indonesian household expenditure data

measurement error bias in estimates of income and income growth among the poor analytical results and a correction formula abstract in any population income growth among the poor may be higher or lower than overall income growth estimates of income growth among the poor are almost always based on household surveys but income and expenditure data in those surveys are almost always measured with error this article uses the assumption that income follows a lognormal distribution to demonstrate that such measurement error can lead to biased estimates of the mean income of the poor and the growth of that mean income over time in particular when both income and the measurement error are lognormally distributed i measurement error leads to underestimation of the mean income among the poor at any point in time ii increases decreases in measurement error over time for a given level of inequality lead to underestimation overestimation of income growth among the poor and iii increases decreases in inequality over time for a given level of measurement error lead to overestimation underestimation of income growt

the labeling effect of a child benefit system child benefit systems exist in many countries while they show a lot of differences in terms of eligibility rules amounts involved and implementation tax deduction tax credit or direct benefit the common motivation for their existence is to increase children s welfare in the dutch child benefit system the case i focus on in this paperone of the parents usually the mother is entitled to an untaxed child benefit amount which only depends on the child s age and the number of children in the household thus child support does not depend on household income marital status or labor market status as a result child benefit is exogenous to the household given the presence of children this is in contrast with the situation in many other countries including germany france the united kingdom and the united states where government provided child support is partly means tested see jonathan bradshaw et al 1993 in the netherlands child benefit is generally a nonnegligible addition to the household income the median share of child benefit in the total net income of households with children is 8 percent on the national level expenditures on child benefits amount to 1 2 percent of gnp the use of the child benefit is completely at the discretion of the parent there are no legal requirements that a certain amount be spent on particular goods or services nor does the government provide any guidelines regarding expenditure on children a policy question that arises is to what extent children benefit from child benefits standard microeconomic demand theory allows no role for effects of the composition of income given the fungibility of income sources it is only the sum of income components that is relevant in explaining expenditure patterns thus within that framework the answer would be that the marginal propensity to consume child goods from one guilder of child benefits is no different than from one guilder of any other income source in the more general class of gametheoretic models of household behavior however the composition of household income will generally affect expenditure patterns see e g shelly j lundberg and robert a pollak 1993 and martin browning et al 1994 if fathers and mothers have different preferences and mothers have control over child benefits the effect of child benefits on expenditures will differ from the effect of other income sources lundberg et al 1997 provide empirical evidence showing that a transfer of control over child benefits from fathers to mothers in the united kingdom due to a change in legislation resulted in a significant increase in expenditures on child clothing daniela del boca and christopher j flinn 1994 have analyzed the effect of income composition on expenditure decisions of divorced mothers they find that the coefficients associated with child support and alimony income differ from those for other income in engel curves for expenditures on childspecific goods their results can be explained in terms of a noncooperative nash model in which the child support transfer decisions of the noncustodial father and the expenditure decisions of the mother are determined simultaneously in contrast to del boca and flinn s analysis in which child support is a decision variable the present paper focuses on the possible differential effect of government provided child support which is truly exogenous in this paper i analyze the effects of child benefits on expenditures by running regressions in which child benefit enters as a separate explanatory variable the enipirical analysis is based on a time series of 17 cross section consumer expenditure surveys in the netherlands covering the period 1978 through 1994 it is important to note that in a single cross section it department of economics university of groningen p o b 800 9700 av groningen the netherlands e mail p kooreman eco rug nl i am indebted to two anonymous referees for constructive comments helpful comments were also provided by rob alessie maarten allers chris bojke werner de bondt bert schoonbeek and tom wansbeek i thank vincent linderhof for organizing the data financial support was provided by the dutch organization for scientific research nwo homes project grant

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

what explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments such as roads and dams to promoting policy reform this change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment after nearly 20 years experience with policy based or conditional lending there have now been many studies of adjustment lending most of which take a case study approach many conclude that policy based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform the authors examine a database of 220 world bank supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail they find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time variables under the world bank s control resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions have no relationship with an adjustment program s success or failure what development agencies must do then is select promising candidates for adjustment support when the candidates is a poor selection devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform to improve its success rate with adjustment lending the world bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not that is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers to become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending

foreign direct investment industrial restructuring and the upgrading of polish exports this paper poses a central question in relation to the economic structural effect of foreign direct investment fdi with polish manufacturing as an empirical case how fdi coincides with the technology intensity of polish exports a short review of the available literature discusses critically the possibility of establishing one sided cause effect relationships between trade and fdi subsequently the empirical analysis investigates what role incoming fdi appears to have played in relation to polish export specialization over the period 1989 1996 results indicate that fdi has affected positively the technology intensity of the polish export base

is aid oil an analysis of whether africa can absorb more aid summary this paper considers whether africa can absorb a doubling of aid if oil revenues provide a natural experiment the results are disappointing far from being transformational they have been markedly less successful than aid one implication is that the delivery modalities of aid though heavily criticized have substantially added value the paper discusses which modalities may have been most useful unfortunately aid appears to be subject to diminishing returns so that doubling aid through conventional modalities would not double its impact the paper concludes by considering innovations in aid modalities which might offset diminishing returns