micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

institutional competition versus centralization quo vadis europe lots of steep and sometimes blind bends with harsh speed limits and frequent detours but still it has been one that has attracted more and more traffic after a successful period of shaping a customs union and a free trade area following the treaty of rome 1957 europe became infected with euro sclerosis in the seventies owing to an increased intensity of national regulation especially in the labour market the constructionist approach to harmonization from above slowed down the speed of integration almost to a halt only the change of two fundamental rules revitalized the european integration process namely the introduction of majority voting in the ec council and the mutual recognition of national regulations brought about by the 1979 ruling of the european court with the single european act and the launch of the internal market programme europhoria blossomed finally leading to the maastricht treaty which aimed to be the masterpiece of european integration only very recently the danish no and the unconvincing approval by the french voters cooled off hopes for a united states of europe signalling that european integration is at the crossroads once again

cyclical ratcheting in government spending evidence from the oecd this paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government spending gdp ratios in the oecd countries an empirical framework that includes both long run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering 1975 1998 the main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending gdp ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions the long run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2 of gdp also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending government consumption transfers and subsidies and capital expenditure as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

expenditures and receipts testing for causality in state and local government finances the results of our tests indicate similarities between the expenditure tax receipt relations of state governments to those previously reported for the federal government in manage and marlow 1986 the results reported here indicate support for the hypothesis that tax receipts cause expenditures at the state level of government for tests utilizing symmetric lag structures ranging from three to five years state expenditures appear to follow state tax receipts for the shortest lag length 2 2 the determination of bidirectional causality does not make us reject the hypothesis that higher spending levels result from higher revenue levels rather the causality appears to be in both directions for the shortest lag length

do external grants to district governments discourage own revenue generation a look at local public finance dynamics in ghana summary using rich panel data on all of ghana s districts local public finances over 11 years this paper investigates the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments incentives to collect internally generated revenues and funds igf we find that despite an incentive scheme built into one of the major intergovernmental grants the flow of all grants taken together discourages rather than encourages igf this is reflected both in the depressing effect of transfers on igf levels as well as on igf growth

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

rent seeking and democracy empirical evidence for uruguay i introduction in this article we empirically examine the direction of granger causality between democracy and rent seeking in fact it has been claimed both that democratic regimes may reduce rent seeking behavior in societies and that rent seeking behavior may contribute to the downfall of democratic regimes since theoretical research shows that given reasonable conditions both are likely to occur 1 the actual relationship between these two variables has to be uncovered by analyzing it from empirical and historical perspectives in fact as olson 1982 argues historically democratic political regimes have provided stability and have helped reduce uncertainty in the population by helping to defend societies against roving bandits this can result in an improvement and a stabilization of the institutional setting of the society by providing clear formal and informal rules and regulations regarding the interaction of actors consequently it has been claimed that rent seeking behavior will also decrease on the other hand pervasive rent seeking may translate into an increased degree of uncertainty among the population which may send mixed signals to the market affecting the productive process economic performance the organization of the country and ultimately the democratic process in fact a recent wave of empirical research focuses mostly exclusively on the link between institutional quality and economic performance 2 this is particularly relevant in latin america where a clear understanding of the relationship between institutions economic performance and political regimes may help explain the seemingly puzzling choice of inward looking policies by rulers and especially the persistence of such policies even when it was clear that they were doomed to fail 3 perhaps the choice of government economic policies and performance has to do with latin america s particular political setting according to taylor interest groups might have played a role especially since the politics in the region typically have been marked by dramatic cleavages between different classes and groups only when the costs of maintaining inward looking policies became too high did such phases end these factors may help explain both the choice and the persistence of inward looking development policies in the region as well as the role played by autocratic governments in the region 4 lack of data has not allowed for an adequate study of the direction of causality between political regimes and institutional quality the few available studies are either mainly of a descriptive nature or use indirect or subjective data that despite being widely employed are controversial they also tend to use cross country approaches that may suffer from an omitted variables problem that cannot be controlled by simply applying fixed effects 5 in fact bertrand and mullainathan 2001 claim that there are several problems with the use of subjective data in economic research for instance mauro 1995 in the specific case of institutional data argues that evaluators may be influenced by a country s economic conditions as they may assume that a specific institutional aspect cannot be severe if the country is doing well economically furthermore as there are no guidelines as to what constitutes an expert evaluator assessments may be rendered essentially worthless 6 therefore in order to analyze this possible double causality we use a historical time series of objective rent seeking data based on discretionary foreign trade regulations that permits us to explore the time series dimension of the link between rent seeking and democracy 7 we chose the particular case of uruguay a small historically stable and ethnically and culturally homogeneous latin american country as rama 1991 poses uruguay provides an excellent case from the point of view of a rent seeking society as it represents an extreme case of discretionary trade policies that lasted for decades first via an import substitution strategy that was characterized by high protective trade barriers multiple exchange rates and an explicit policy that allocated discretionary foreign exchange approved import licenses and banned imports that competed with domestic production and second via an export promotion strategy which while not as explicit as the import substitution approach was nonetheless actively pursued for considerable periods of time

government growth in the twenty first century public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories budget maximization theories rational choice models and path dependent models like the ratchet hypothesis the strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty first century government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government s ability to continue to expand the tax base

partisan influence on the local tax burden in the netherlands this paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the netherlands can decide uponthemselves using a new data set on dutch local property taxes in1996 it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden we also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation finally taxexporting increases tax rates

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations a duration analysis this article employs a duration analysis approach to empirically investigate whether political fractionalization leads to delayed fiscal stabilizations using a broad sample of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 2011 we consistently find strong evidence that political fractionalization is significantly associated with longer delays in stabilizing high deficits in particular political fractionalization has a greater impact on delays in periods of macroeconomic distress we also show that while the fractionalization of government parties delays fiscal stabilization the fractionalization of opposition parties tends to facilitate fiscal stabilization

government strength power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in oecd countries a voting power approach we test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inoecd countries from 1970 to 1999 government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by thebanzhaf index of voting power respectivelythe standard deviation of banzhaf indicesof coalition parties we believe that theseare better suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant however coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party

inward looking policies institutions autocrats and economic growth in latin america an empirical exploration this paper explores the institutionaldeterminants of economic growth in latinamerica by taking advantage of recentempirical research that employs subjectiveand objective measures to test for apossible northian explanation that linksinstitutional quality and economic growth we explore a simple framework that may helpbetter understand the policymakers choicesand persistence regarding inward lookingpolicies that were pursued between the1930s and the 1980s by arguing that in thelatin american case olson s 1982 idea ofencompassing interest should be expanded tocover not only the economic stakes of powerholders but in particular their psychicincome which includes their politicalstakes along the lines of recent work byrobinson 1997 coyne 2002 andothers

establishing property rights establishing secure property rights in transition economies amounts to solving two problems inefficiency structures of control rights over assets and poor contract enforcement politicians and bureaucrats still wield excessive control over assets which results in inefficient underinvestment by entrepreneurs corruption is one way of getting around political control but the drawbacks are considerable particularly the limited enforceability of corruption contracts more workable strategies for establishing property rights in transition economies are giving equity to the bureaucrats and other parties that have control reforming the civil service and removing bureaucratic control rights through privatization russia s experience shows how privatization combined with equity incentives for enterprise insiders transfers control rights from the bureaucrats and stimulates political and economic pressures to protect private property rights

the impact of within party and between party ideological dispersion on fiscal outcomes evidence from swiss cantonal parliaments the impact of the fragmentation of executive and legislative bodies on the level and composition of government expenditure is a feature of politics that has attracted considerable attention from economists however previous authors have abstracted from two important concepts ideology and intra party politics in this paper we account for these two phenomena explicitly and make two main contributions first we show that both intra and inter party ideological dispersion matter in explaining the level of sub national public spending therefore it is improper to consider parties as monolithic entities we also show that ideological dispersion matters especially for current expenditures and not so much for investment expenditures to do so we construct a panel database 2003 2010 comprising data from a survey that quantifies the policy preferences of party members who were candidates in swiss elections

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

women in the one percent gender dynamics in top income positions a growing body of research documents the importance of studying households in the top one percent of u s income distribution because they control enormous resources however little is known about

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

rights equity and economic efficiency the adelman morris premise that economic development and equity are incompatible is not supported by the evidence of a strong relationship between equality of rights and the income distribution the premise that equity requires the denial of individual rights and the affirmation of state control is an oxymoron what has been overlooked in the literature on growth and equity is the effect of the rights structure on both economic efficiency and on the income distribution the evidence is that free societies have much larger shares of income going to the middle 60 percent of the distribution than is observed in societies where men are not free to choose in politically open societies compared to politically closed regimes the share of income to the middle three quintiles is q2 10 7 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 5 and q4 22 9 vs 17 9 in the aggregate the shares to the middle quintiles are 49 6 vs 37 4 in nations that obey the rule of law compared to regimes in which the rights of the state relative to the individual are paramount the comparisons are q2 11 2 vs 7 4 q3 16 3 vs 10 6 q4 23 0 vs 17 3 summing the three quintiles yields a comparison of 50 5 vs 35 3 in countries that have private property market allocation of resources and minimum intervention by the state compared to command economies the shares of income to the middle quintiles are q2 10 8 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 1 and q4 22 8 vs 17 7 aggregated the shares of the middle class in regimes with high levels of economic liberty are 49 6 vs 36 8 for regimes with restricted private economic rights

theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in chile although chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow they do so through arrears and leasing contracts a formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007 variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition politically diverse municipal councils years close to elections and deeper municipal involvement in education while leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

land leasing and local public finance in china s regional development evidence from prefecture level cities by analysing the evolution of local governments roles in different periods of china s growth in transition this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s local land development behaviour is related to china s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements on the basis of panel data covering prefectural level cities from 1999 to 2003 the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing by negotiation versus by auction tender policy implications are drawn from this analysis for the further reform of china s urban land system and fiscal institutions

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

leviathan in a dual economy this paper studies the policies of a leviathan state with an ambition to make money and to stay in power the economic framework is a developing country characterized by dual markets government revenue is raised by taxing the agricultural sector part of this revenue is offered to the politically influential urban population in the form of low productive but well paid public sector employment i calculate the optimal level of rural taxation from the point of view of the leviathan and investigate its effects on migration industrialization public sector employment and urban unemployment in different political scenarios

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

interdependencies between transport fuel demand efficiency and quality an application to austria abstract this paper focuses on the interdependencies between technical efficiencies and energy demand which are often either treated in isolation or do not get the sufficient attention in the literature more precisely this paper uses technical efficiencies as one crucial determinant of energy demand in order to integrate at least two issues that are usually investigated separately from each other the rebound effect resulting from improved technical efficiencies and the asymmetry of energy demand in this regard our paper sets out a theoretical framework which has the following implications higher efficiency increases service demand first order rebound low fuel prices and higher efficiency increases the demand for quality second order which in turn increases service demand further third order ceteris paribus energy price shocks should increase scrapping rates fuel prices direct the rd those on engine efficiency are irreversible which has the consequence that energy price elasticities depend on the history of energy prices rather than being asymmetrical derived implications are subsequently tested on austrian data in particular the purchasing decision diesel versus gasoline powered cars allows to refute the myth that consumers apply high implicit rates for discounting the future benefit from efficient cars

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers comment school choice policies promise to align the incentives of school administrators with the demands of parents and may therefore lead to more efficient educational production milton friedman 1962 geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1980 john chubb and terry m moe 1990 absent a large scale school voucher program in the united states however this prediction has been difficult to test several authors e g melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 clive r belfield and henry m levin 2002 have suggested studying the effects of tiebout choice the use of the residential location decision to select among local monopoly education providers the idea here is that fragmented governance induces competition among school districts analogous to that which would occur among schools with nonresidential choice in an influential paper caroline m hoxby 2000 points out that current governance structures are potentially endogenous to school productivity and proposes that variation in topography which may have influenced optimal jurisdiction size before modern transportation technologies provides a source of exogenous variation she estimates instrumental variables regressions of individual test scores and school spending on a metropolitan level tiebout choice index defined as one minus a herfindahl concentration index with districts enrollments as their market shares using as excluded instruments the number of larger and smaller streams in the area she reports substantial positive effects of district fragmentation on student test scores and negative effects on spending this comment presents a reanalysis of hoxby s test score results which form the core of her empirical analysis these results turn out to be quite sensitive to plausible alterations to hoxby s specification in particular the large significant effect of choice on achievement obtains

charitable giving by married couples revisited abstract this paper investigates the effect of gender differences and household bargaining on charitable giving i replicate the study of andreoni brown and rischall 2003 using a different data set the recently available panel study of income dynamics psid supplement on charitable giving and test the sensitivity of their results to inclusion of additional control variables and the endogeneity of the tax price of giving first focusing on singles i find that males and females have significantly different tendencies toward giving to different areas of charitable activity next comparing households in which husband and wife make a joint decision on donations with those in which couples separately decide or assign a sole decisionmaker i show that bargaining over giving increases the amount of charitable contributions by almost 7 percent

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

women in top incomes evidence from sweden 1971 2017 abstract using yearly register data on the full population of sweden we study gender differences in top incomes down to the top 0 01 percentile group over the period 1971 2017 we find that while women are still a minority of the top decile and typically make up a smaller share the higher up in the distribution we move their presence has steadily increased in all top groups over the past half century at the beginning of the period top income women relied more on capital incomes but the rise in the share of top women is not due to the growing importance of capital instead women have increased their presence in the top by gains in the top of labour incomes while top income men have captured most of the growth in capital incomes studying gender differences in observable characteristics we find small gender differences in some respects convergence in others but also some important remaining differences overall our results suggest that many findings in the top income literature have a clear gender component and that understanding gender equality in the top of the distribution requires studying not only earnings and labour market outcomes but also incomes from other sources as well as family circumstances

national family policies and mothers employment how earnings inequality shapes policy effects across and within countries although researchers generally agree that national family policies play a role in shaping mothers employment there is considerable debate about whether how and why policy effects vary across co

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

coalition governments versus minority governments bargaining power cohesion and budgeting outcomes recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult it combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament a general indifferenceresult applies an exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures at the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled if the formateur is strong a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

public choice social choice and political economy since world war ii a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them some scholars refer to their research as public choice some as social choice and still others as political economy this article discusses the distinctions among these three terms it concludes that all of the research falling under these three headings has much in common and that people who refer to their work as public choice or political economy are essentially employing identical methodologies contributions to public choice narrowly defined are more often positive and empirical analyses of government behavior than those in social choice narrowly defined