price discrimination in broadway theater a common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms relative to uniform pricing in this study i resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm i describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second degree and third degree price discrimination using data from a broadway play i estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate the implications of alternative pricing policies the observed price discrimination may improve the firm s profit by approximately 5 relative to uniform pricing while the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible also i show that the gain from changing prices in the face of fluctuating demand is small under the observed price discrimination

nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly market the case of specialty coffee firms that use nonlinear pricing may distort product characteristics away from their efficient levels this paper offers the first empirical study of this issue using data from a specialty coffee market i estimate a structural utility model to compute consumers benefits from changing products sizes i then compare the estimated benefits to cost data design distortions are relatively large for products not targeted to the highest demand consumers distortions decrease toward zero with drink size for products with the largest profit margins these results support some of the central predictions from nonlinear pricing theory including no distortion at the top

endogenous lifetime and economic growth abstract endogenous mortality is introduced in a two period overlapping generations model probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment high mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings development traps are possible productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality high mortality also reduces returns on education where risks are undiversifiable when human capital drives economic growth countries differing in health capital do not converge to similar living standards threshold effects may also result

price discrimination copyright law and technological innovation evidence from the introduction of dvds u s copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets in response these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination i derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination and i analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products using data on vhs and dvd movie distribution i find that firms pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers but harms ancillary retailers finally i examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination

an empirical analysis of consumer purchase decisions under bucket based price discrimination bucket based price discrimination is a unique price format that involves monthly subscription fees and instantaneous quotas the number of rental products that can be checked out we propose an empirical model in which consumers make dynamic purchase decisions under consumption uncertainty accounting for the constraints imposed by the instantaneous quota applying the model to an online dvd rental data set we find that 1 consumers incur a large disutility 8 from stockout i e unmet consumption needs 2 such a disutility drives consumers overpurchase of the service quota as a way to avoid potential stockout situations and 3 the dynamics of overpurchase are driven by the interplay between trends in consumption needs and the magnitude of consumers plan switching costs we run counterfactual exercises to better understand how the instantaneous quota and stockout risk affect consumers consumption rates purchase decisions and firm profitability we find that the instantaneous quota induces a greater stockout compared with a monthly quota we further demonstrate that the company should recognize the drivers of the dynamics in overpurchase to balance short and long term profitability for example by offering targeted discounts to customers with excess overpurchase

learning by doing and the introduction of new goods a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed in which goods are valued according to the characteristics they contain the set of goods produced in any period is endogenously determined and learning by doing is the force behind sustained growth it is shown that the set of produced goods changes in a systematic way over time with goods of higher quality entering each period and those of lower quality dropping out the model is then used to study the effect of introducing a traditional sector in which there is no learning

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

risk taking global diversification and growth this paper develops a continuous time stochastic model in which international risk sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its effect on expected consumption growth the mechanism linking global diversification to growth is an attendant world portfolio shift from safe low yield capital to riskier high yield capital the presence of these two types of capital captures the idea that growth depends on the availability of an ever increasing array of specialized hence inherently risky production inputs calibration exercises using consumption and stock market data imply that most countries reap large steady state welfare gains from global financial integration copyright 1994 by american economic association

paying too much and being happy about it existence causes and consequences of tariff choice biases abstract a common assumption underlying the analysis of consumers choices among optional tariffs is that consumers choose the tariff that maximizes their surplus and thus the tariff that leads to the lowest billing rate for a given amount of usage yet there is evidence that many users prefer a flat rate even though their billing rate would be lower with a pay per use tariff flat rate bias and some users prefer a pay per use tariff even though they would save money with a flat rate pay per use bias the authors conduct four empirical analyses based on three different data sets they show that the flat rate bias is more important and has a greater regularity and time persistence than the pay per use bias they classify potential causes of the flat rate bias as insurance effect taxi meter effect convenience effect and overestimation effect and show that the insurance the taxi meter and the overestimation effects lead to a flat rate bias they provide evidence that underestimation of usag

optimal nonlinear pricing and contingent contracts rationing of output may be required to allocate resources when it is costly to operate a system of spot markets in electric power markets for example interruptible service is the most frequently used form of capacity sensitive allocation after time of use pricing this paper examines the welfare properties and ease of implementation of alternative rationing rules and the pricing of contracts based on rationing rules the model allows for both demand and supply shocks the theoretical analysis is illustrated by application to curtailment rules and pricing in electric power markets rationing rules are a means of sharing risk and joint costs insurance provides a means of sharing the financial costs of random events however there are additional welfare gains to be obtained from pooling physical quantities of goods in the presence of random demand and supply see spulber 1985 by rationing goods the common costs of production or productive capacity can be reduced while also reducing individual risk this explains in part the extensive attention devoted to rationing of electric power electric power is subject to significant randomness in both supply and demand allocation mechanisms based on prices that adjust in real time on complete contingent contracts or on renegotiation of contracts in response to new information can involve prohibitive transaction costs avoidance of the need to ration would require inefficiently high capacity investment electric utilities must therefore employ rationing rules these rules must be

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

the precious bane abstract are natural resources harmful to growth we address this question using a two sector endogenous growth model in which human capital is the engine of growth by increasing the rewards to unskilled labor natural resources make schooling more expensive as long as the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution is not too high this slows down human capital accumulation and growth the presence of production spillovers from human capital however implies that a planner could react to a resource boom by increasing human capital accumulation even though the decentralized solution yields the exact opposite the paper also shows that as the production complementarity between natural resources and unskilled labor declines the growth effects of natural resources become increasingly sensitive to whether or not there is free trade in goods the empirical evidence lends support to the main channel natural resources to human capital to growth that is suggested in the paper

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone service this article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state regulators implicitly place on consumers with different incomes and locations i find no evidence of a bias towards rural consumers on average but the relative weight on low income consumers in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population and the political characteristics of the regulator i also measure the welfare consequences of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria abstract this paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development are discussed lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels expropriation of private wealth corruption of civil servants excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies the origins of property rights are also considered different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the social conflict view and its success and limitations the second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

contracts biases and consumption of access services we study theoretically and empirically the consumption of access services we demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure pay per use versus three part tariffs even if the optimal consumption plans are identical we find that although there is extensive individual heterogeneity on average consumers choices follow a structure that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic and correctly react to imbalances between the number of free calls and call opportunities remaining however consumers use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and lost surplus these errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution we also measure subjects willingness to pay for a contract with free access units and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per unit price with a substantial fraction willing to overpay in response the optimal firm strategy offers a three part tariff at a very small discount which increases revenue by 8 14 compared to only offering a pay per use contract data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1889 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

information technology and the changing workplace in canada firm level evidence recent advances in information and communication technology ict have had dramatic effects on both individual and workplace performance use of computers and the internet as general purpose technologies has spread rapidly across all sectors of the economy transforming business organization increasing competition and fostering innovation understanding the influence of ict on the dynamics of the workplace requires information on both demand and supply sides of the labor market but it is only recently that the study of both sides of the market has become feasible using linked employer employee data in this article we investigate the effects of new technology on firm productivity using the rich canadian workplace and employee survey for the period 1999 2003 we apply a mixed regression model which includes both firm and employee characteristics as well as their interactions with computer use our model allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at higher levels along many dimensions our findings indicate that computer use by employees has a positive and significant effect on the productivity of firms that the effect has not lost its momentum and that spillover effects are not significant moreover human capital enhances the effect of computer use on productivity but organizational changes do not interact with computer use in our sample period copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

price elasticities for local telephone calls price elasticities are estimated for local telephone calls and minutes of conversation using data from a pricing experiment in central illinois conducted by general telephone and electronics the experiment charges separately for calls and for minutes using a model that is consistent with the theory of telephone demand the authors estimate the effects of both prices the nonlinear generalized least squares estimates of the elasticities are fairly small about 0 1 or less in absolute value at experimental price levels but they are estimated with high precision the report briefly considers the application of these results to predict the effects of introducing measured service telephone rates in other cities residential telephone subscribers in the united states typically pay a flat monthly rate for local service with no extra charge for calls within the local area the alternative of explicitly charging for local calls commonly referred to as usage sensitive pricing or local measured service is of increasing interest to u s telephone companies and regulatory commissions cosgrove and linhart 5 garfinkel and linhart 8 baude ed 2 3 charging for calls that are now free clearly holds promise of increasing economic efficiency alleman 1 mitch

returns to scale productive efficiency and optimal firm size evidence from taiwan s firm data by using taiwan s census firm data this paper estimates and tests the variable returns to scale hypothesis for aggregate manufacturing and two digit industries an efficiency measure is constructed to further examine the size efficiency relations among two digit industries analysis indicates that increasing returns exist at the aggregate manufacturing level and its magnitude is higher for exporting firms than for non exporting firms moreover trade is beneficial only for small firms however the property of increasing returns diminishes for most of the industries at the two digit level particularly for the exporting firms this sharp comparison between aggregate and two digit level results suggests that trade is conducive to productivity and provides an indication of the specific form of technology spillovers among firms and across industries further investigation of the relationship between productive efficiency and firm size renders the result that optimal firm size is small for exporting firms i

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

demand and pricing of telecommunications services evidence and welfare implications although telephone pricing has received increasing attention in recent years the geographic patterns of telephone pricing and the corresponding economic consequences of those patterns have remained perplexing to consumers and policymakers and largely unaddressed by economists in this article we first specify a model of the demand for short intralata long distance calling we then draw upon data made available by the recent adoption of extended area service eas in four metropolitan areas to empirically measure the structure of inter exchange telephone demand given these estimates and a conceptual framework for analyzing the economic welfare effects we were able to quantify the consumer surplus effects of alternative pricing policies the empirical results indicate that consumer surplus is noticeably enhanced by adopting eas but the net economic welfare effects are shown to be sensitive to among other things the level of price cost margins prevailing prior to the implementation of eas

unnatural monopolies in local telephone we attempt to overcome the serious data problems of past telecommunications cost studies by focusing on local exchange carriers lecs with enough degrees offreedom to yield precise estimates our global subadditivity tests show that the cost function is definitely not subadditive the results suggest that the benefits to breaking up the monopoly outputs of existing lecs substantially outweigh the potential losses in efficiency they also support permitting entry and increasing competition in local exchange markets furthermore given the competitive nature of long distance service it is doubtful that the predivestiture bell system was a natural monopoly

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

competition collusion and chaos abstract in this paper we present results which show that cartel formation can still be observed in a completely deterministic model where myopic firms compete through price in finite time the firms are spatially differentiated and take turns with their neighboring firms in setting prices among the different possible dynamic scenarios we focus attention on those where cooperative and competitive behavior continue to coexist throughout time the continual interaction of cooperative and competitive behavior results in complex dynamic regimes because the set of prices which firms choose will be discrete a formal equivalence is established between the model s dynamics and the theory of cellular automata

international risk sharing and economic growth international risk sharing which diversifies away income risk will reduce saving with constant relative risk aversion if growth arises from the external effects of human capital accumulation then reducing saving will reduce growth welfare also may fall with risk sharing because endogenous growth with external effects of capital accumulation typically implies a competitive equilibrium growth rate already less than the optimal growth rate we demonstrate these results in a standard representative agent economy diversifying away rate of return risk also will reduce saving and growth rates if relative risk aversion exceeds one but this diversification always increases welfare this paper studies the effects of international risk sharing portfolio diversification in a world economy in which growth rates of income are endogenous growth is based upon the spillover effects of human capital accumulation as in lucas 1988 and romer 1986 there are positive economy wide spillovers of human capital intensity on individual labour productivity in section 2 we construct a multi country growth model with an infinitely lived representative agent in each country each country faces income risk but there is no aggregate uncertainty at the world level we focus on two market structures in the first structure there are no markets which allow for international diversification of country specific income risk in the second structure there are complete international markets for risksharing with no aggregate world uncertainty this completeness allows full diversification of country specific risk the paper has two central results first growth rates in all countries are lower in the equilibrium with full diversification second in this same structure welfare of each country may be lower than in an equilibrium without risk sharing the reasoning is as follows with external effects of capital accumulation the compet

cellular service demand biased beliefs learning and bill shock by april 2013 the fcc s recent bill shock agreement with cellular carriers requires consumers be notied when exceeding usage allowances will the agreement help or hurt consumers to answer this question we estimate a model of consumer plan choice usage and learning using a panel of cellular bills our model predicts that the agreement will lower average consumer welfare by 2 per year because rms will respond by raising monthly fees our approach is based on novel evidence that consumers are inattentive to past usage meaning that bill shock alerts are informative and advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart taris induce marginal price uncertainty additionally our model estimates show that an

uncertain demand consumer loss aversion and flat rate tariffs we consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand possibly consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence we solve for the profit maximizing two part tariff which is a flat rate if a marginal costs are not too high b loss aversion is intense and c there are strong variations in demand moreover we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff this tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two part tariffs

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

buying without using biases of german bahncard buyers we use a large data set of german railway travellers to analyse the purchasing decision for fare reducing bahncards we expect that this tariff choice is neither completely rational nor irrational but bounded rational in a meaningful way actually we predict a flat rate bias i e an under use of their bahncards by many customers however we estimate that this bias is not too large the empirical results approve our hypotheses for the most part especially for the more expensive bahncard50 bc50 whereas the under use of the cheaper bahncard25 bc25 is so extensive that it is not worthwhile on average

choosing the wrong calling plan ignorance and learning when a firm offers several tariff options to its customers the possibility arises that they will make an ex post mistake in tariff choice this occurs since consumers cannot commit to a certain purchase level at the time they subscribe to the service option and thus they might find out later that a different choice of tariff could have resulted in a lower payment for their actual level of consumption this is a common feature of increasingly important subscriptions markets in which buyers and sellers maintain long term nonanonymous relations and where learning induces interesting dynamics on the one hand buyers may learn their taste over time thus making the right choice as times goes by on the other hand the seller may design options to identify the type of each buyer and if possible to extract a higher proportion of their consumer surplus by offering tariff options that are better tailored to the profile of the consumer this paper focuses on the first type of learning in turn i document buyer behavior in a subscriptions market using data from a tariff experiment run by south central bell scb in kentucky during the second half of 1986 the most frequently studied case of subscriptions markets is the choice among optional calling plans ocps in the telephone industry this paper shows that contrary to the conven

natural resource dependence human capital accumulation and economic growth a combined explanation for the resource curse and the resource blessing abstract in existing studies no consensus has been reached on the relationship between natural resource dependence and human capital accumulation to narrow the divergence this paper carries out a normative research to explain the co existence of the phenomena of the resource curse and the resource blessing based on an organic combination of conceptual and mathematical models it first establishes a conceptual model to analyse the potential effects of the government s policy preference and natural resource development activities on human capital accumulation and economic growth furthermore it develops an endogenous growth model to normatively illuminate the effects in the conceptual model and to explore the condition for the occurrence of the resource curse the conceptual model analysis indicates that the rate of return on education investment and government behaviours play the crucial role in promoting the formation of the economic virtuous circle at the micro level and macro level respectively while resource development activities exert dual impacts on the circle the main mechanisms in the conceptual model can be validated in the mathematical model the rise in the subjective discount rate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and resource goods price are adverse to the economic virtuous circle while high quality education and the institutional environment giving priority to manufacturing can become the necessary condition and sufficient condition for forming the circle respectively the allocation efficiency of production factors plays a decisive role in whether the blessing occurs whereas sufficient human capital is an essential guarantee for evading the curse

production experiences and market structure in r d competition abstract in the rd and ii the likelihood of persistent leadership increases with the value of being the winner and the value of being a loser but decreases with expected waiting time of r d innovation and the flow of monopoly profits however destructive innovations may still occur even when production experiences are allowed to play an important role in the r d competition

modelo de acceso y uso de telefonia en un contexto de incertidumbre en los ingresos este documento presenta un marco teorico sencillo para analizar el rol del nivel y la incertidumbre del ingreso como determinantes de la demanda de telefonia fija en terminos de acceso y uso en particular se muestra como un incremento de la incertidumbre en el ingreso desincentiva el acceso y el uso del servicio de telefonia por parte de los hogares ademas a manera de ejemplo se desarrolla un ejercicio de simulacion para una poblacion de hogares los cuales tienen iguales preferencias pero estan afectos a una distribucion del ingreso this document presents a theoretical simple frame to analyze the role of the level and the uncertainty of the revenue as determinants of the demand of telephony fixes in terms of access and use especially it appears as an increase of the uncertainty in the revenue discourages the access and the use of the service of telephony on the part of the home in addition like example an exercise of simulation develops for a population of homes which have equal preferences but are affected on a distribution of the income

competition and subsidies in the deregulated us local telephone industry the 1996 telecommunications act opened the monopolistic us local telephone industry to new entrants however substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive we study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry we estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting we find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets but subsidies to only lower cost firms are less cost effective than a nondiscriminatory policy subsidies in only early periods reduce the option value of waiting and accelerate the arrival of competition

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

push or pull the relationship between development trade and primary resource endowment abstract we develop a model to capture the interaction between transaction efficiency and primary resource endowment for specialization and development this interaction leads to four broad patterns of development countries with low primary resource endowment can be pushed into development so long as their institutions exhibit sufficient transaction efficiency otherwise development may fail to occur similarly a country may fail to develop because it is cursed by abundant natural resources if however that country has sufficiently high transaction efficiency it can overcome the curse and develop but the threshold level of transaction efficiency for development rises as natural resources become more abundant in this sense the institutional hurdle for development increases as natural resources become more abundant we consider the welfare effects of different development paths and also consider how technological development may aid or hinder development

consumption patterns and self selecting tariffs the authors describe and apply methods for empirically investigating the relation between consumption and tariff choice these methods allow 1 testing of alternative specifications for the relations of tariff choice and consumption patterns 2 estimation of parameters that provide information on the response of customers to marginal prices and fixed fees and 3 a determination of the extent to which the assumptions embodied in welfare results on self selecting tariffs are valid in a particular setting they apply the procedures to residential demand for local telephone service in an area where households are offered a choice among tariffs copyright 1989 by mit press

consumer inertia choice dependence and learning from experience in a repeated decision problem abstract understanding when and how individuals think about real life problems is a central question in economics this paper studies the role of inertia inattention state dependence and learning the empirical setting is a tariff experiment when optional measured tariffs for local telephone calls were introduced unanticipatedly we find that consumers tend to align their choices of tariff and telephone use levels correctly despite low potential savings mistakes are not permanent as individuals actively engage in tariff switching in order to reduce the monthly cost of telephone service ignoring unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity of past choices would have reversed these results

nominal interest rates consumption booms and lack of credibility a quantitative examination abstract exchange rate based stabilization programs in chronic inflation countries have often been accompanied by an initial expansion of private consumption followed by a contraction this consumption cycle has been attributed to lack of credibility in the sense that the public views the reduction in the devaluation rate as temporary this paper assesses the quantitative relevance of the temporariness hypothesis by comparing the predictions of a simple model to the actual figures for seven major programs the paper concludes that nominal interest rates must fall substantially for the temporariness hypothesis to account for an important fraction of the observed consumption booms

the demand for local telephone service a fully discrete model of residential calling patterns and service choices we present an empirical model of households choices among local telephone service options for example between flat rate and measured service and the interrelation of these choices with the number and average duration of local calls households make at each time of day to each geographical zone using a nested logit model with estimation performed on a randomly selected subset of the households calling patterns we calculate elasticities of demand for each local service option number of calls average duration and revenues with respect to the fixed monthly charges and the usage charges for calling under each option we find moderate price elasticities of number of calls with respect to usage charges for households subscribing to measured service nevertheless raising usage charges has a negligible effect on revenues since a sufficient number of households either originally subscribe to flat rate service or convert to flat rate service in response to higher usage charges we find a high elasticity of demandfor each service option with respect to itsfixed monthlyfee this indicates high substitutability among service options the shift among service options induces new calling patterns which wefind to be a small but not negligible indirect effect e most telephone operating companies offer residential customers several options for local service there are two general categories of service flat rate service under which a household can for a fixed monthly charge make an unlimited number of calls within a specified geographical area and measured service for which the household pays a lower fixed monthly fee but can make only a specified number or dollar value of calls at no extra charge after which charges are incurred for additional calls various flat rate services differ in the size of the geographical area in which calling is at no extra charge with higher monthly fees for larger areas measured services differ with respect to the threshold number or dollar value of calls beyond which the customer is charged

does uncertainty matter consumer behavior under three part tariffs in communication information and other industries three part tariffs are increasingly popular a three part tariff is defined by an access price an allowance and a marginal price for any usage in excess of the allowance empirical nonlinear pricing studies have focused on consumer choice under two part tariffs we show that consumer behavior differs under three part tariffs and assess how consumer demand uncertainty impacts tariff choice we develop a discrete continuous model of choice among three part tariffs and estimate it using consumer level data on internet usage our model extends prior work in accommodating consumer switching to competitors thereby capturing behavior in competitive industries more accurately our empirical work shows that demand uncertainty is a key driver of choice among three part tariffs consumers expected bill increases with the variation in their usage steering them toward tariffs with high allowances consequently demand uncertainty decreases consumer surplus and increases provider revenue a further analysis of consumers responsiveness to the different elements of a three part tariff under the provider s current pricing structure reveals that prices affect a consumer s tariff choice more than her usage quantity and that the allowance plays a strong role in consumer tariff choice based on our results we derive implications for pricing with three part tariffs

tariff choice with consumer learning and switching costs abstract consumers choosing flat rate contracts tend to have insufficient usage to warrant the cost particularly for new products we propose and estimate a bayesian learning model of tariff and usage choice that explains this flat rate bias without relying on behavioral misjudgments or tariff specific preferences for new products consumers are uncertain about both their utility relative to the population mean and the mean itself we show that this latter uncertainty inflates prior variances which leads consumers to weight their private signals more heavily when updating beliefs posteriors are unbiased across products for a given product however the unknown mean yields a winner s curse consumers with high posteriors tend to overestimate their utility these consumers choose fixed rate tariffs and lower their usage as they correct their beliefs the flat rate bias arises when switching costs deter them from changing tariffs using the estimated model the authors find that tariff menus are ineff