signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

timing of product allocation using probabilistic selling to enhance inventory management this paper examines probabilistic selling ps as an inventory management mechanism paying special attention to the impact of the timing of product assignment to buyers of probabilistic goods in practice sellers tend to offer probabilistic products only after major demand uncertainty has been resolved by deferring product assignments a firm is able to obtain more information about demand for each specific product before deciding which product to assign to consumers however our analysis demonstrates that ps can be an effective inventory management mechanism even if the firm allocates products before knowing which product will be more popular and thus scarcer interestingly we show that it can be more profitable for the firm to allocate products to consumers before rather than after learning the true demand for a product because although early allocation imposes higher inventory costs as a result of larger required inventory levels it also enables the firm to charge higher prices our results also reveal that when introducing probabilistic goods the firm should order less inventory relative to the case where probabilistic goods are not offered if costs are very low but more inventory otherwise finally we show that ps as an inventory management mechanism can create a win win situation both improving profit and increasing social welfare this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

retail pricing and clearance sales sellers of new products are faced with having to guess demand conditions to set price appropriately but sellers are able to adjustprice over time and to learn from past mistakes additionally it is not necessary that all goods be sold with certainty it is sometimes better to set a high price and to risk no sale this process is modeledto explain retail pricing behavior and the time distribution of transactions prices start high and fall as a function of time on theshelf the initial price and rate of decline can be predicted and depends on thinness of the market the proportion of customers who are window shoppers and other observable characteristics copyright 1986 by american economic association

the name your own price channel in the travel industry an analytical exploration name your own price nyop retailers such as priceline offer an alternative distribution channel for service providers in the travel industry such as airlines hotels and car rental companies our research employs an analytical model to identify and understand key trade offs driving the decision by a service provider to employ an nyop channel assuming that such a channel is available this decision requires the existence of forces that counteract the adverse consequences of cannibalization of sales through traditional posted price channels our analysis provides some insight into these forces contracting with the nyop retailer facilitates market segmentation and price discrimination and allows for disposal of excess capacity after meeting business travel demand however the cost of this flexibility is that the service provider can no longer credibly precommit to maintaining high prices when there is unsold capacity also when contracting with an independent retailer the service provider is unable to extract the entire revenue generated from nyop consumers a key insight from our model is that the rationale for contracting with an nyop retailer is driven by the uncertainty in business travel demand not the expectation of excess capacity indeed all else equal the larger the capacity the less likely it is that contracting with an nyop retailer is the right decision on the part of the service provider

revenue management of callable products a callable product is a unit of capacity sold to self selected low fare customers who willingly grant the capacity provider the option to call the capacity at a prespecified recall price we analyze callable products in a finite capacity setting with two fare classes where low fare customers book first and show that callable products provide a riskless source of additional revenue to the capacity provider an optimal recall price and an optimal discount fare booking limit for the two period problem are obtained numerical examples show the benefits from offering callable products can be significant especially when high fare demand uncertainty is large extensions to multifare structures network models overbooking and to other industries are discussed

an experimental and theoretical analysis of price matching refund policies abstract price matching refund policies or offers by firms to match competitor s prices are common in both consumer and industrial marketing much of the previous theoretical work in economics suggests that price matching refunds are associated with higher prices in contrast the trade press postulates that price matching policies are associated with lower prices given these inconsistent views regarding price matching policies the authors experimentally examine how consumers view and interpret such policies and then develop a model that incorporates these consumer interpretations as well as asymmetries across stores in the model the asymmetry across stores is the key to deriving the conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exists in the presence of price matching policies the critical point is that the competition reducing and price discrimination effects which seem to form the basis of most of the previous theoretical literature can be counteracted by the presence of differentiated firms

service escape profiting from customer cancellations this paper explores the benefits of letting customers escape from prepurchased service contracts by offering refunds for cancellations we show that such a policy creates opportunities for multiple selling in a capacity constrained service i e collecting cancellation fees from advance buyers who cancel and then reselling the freed slots the better the alternative that motivates a cancellation the more profitable is a refund for cancellations policy compared with a no refund policy that locks in customers in contrast to previous research on money back guarantees for durable goods we show that offering refunds for service cancellations can be profitable 1 without charging a higher price compared with a no refund policy and 2 even when advance buyers would be willing to abandon the service for no refund also service providers should decrease rather than increase the customer hassle cost of cancellations our research also suggests a new profit advantage of advance selling i e capturing some of the consumer added surplus created when customers find new alternatives and are therefore willing to pay a fee to terminate the prepurchased contract finally yield management research typically assumes exogenous no shows by advance buyers we suggest that offering refunds for cancellation reduces the need to reserve capacity for high paying customers and improves capacity utilization

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

selling with binding reservations in the presence of strategic consumers we analyze a revenue management problem in which a seller endowed with an initial inventory operates a selling with binding reservations scheme upon arrival each consumer trying to maximize his own utility must decide either to buy at the full price and get the item immediately or to place a nonwithdrawable reservation at a discount price and wait until the end of the sales season where the leftover units are allocated according to first come first serve priority we prove the existence of an equilibrium consumer s strategy in this game and develop a simple and accurate asymptotic approximation for it through an extensive numerical study we find that our proposed mechanism delivers higher revenues than the markdown practice with a preannounced fixed discount the benefit is more emphasized when the seller is more patient than the consumers and 1 the ratio between the number of units put up for sale and the expected demand is moderate and or 2 the heterogeneity of the consumers valuations is moderate to high in our numerical experiments the revenue gap can reach more than 12 which is quite significant for retail businesses that typically operate with narrow margins

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

incentives and supervision in hierarchies abstract this paper describes a simple and therefore limited model for incentives design under imperfect hierarchical supervision in order to explain certain empirical evidence on the relative importance of bonuses and salaries for the compensation of managers some theoretical implications are also derived from the model first we find that improvements in the activity of supervision do not always imply higher salaries and less incentives as is implicitly recognized in certain agency models secondly the introduction of incentives in a hierarchy which is performing imperfect supervision may not be sufficient to remove the limits to the firm s size which is attributed to this imperfection

demand uncertainty and sales a study of fashion and markdown pricing the theory of clearance sales is expanded and applied to explain why markups markdowns and the frequency of sales of merchandise sold by department stores have increased dramatically in recent years and why they differ across merchandise groups tha major theme of the paper is that the growing role of fashion and product variety is an important reason for these increases and for the differences between merchandise groups the growing importance of fashion is illustrated by documenting the declining use of whites and the increasing use of colors and prints estimates of the effects of imports and technological and demographic changes on markups and markdowns are presented copyright 1988 by american economic association

contingent pricing to reduce price risks the price for a product may be set too low causing the seller to leave money on the table or too high driving away potential buyers contingent pricing can be useful in mitigating these problems in contingent pricing arrangements price is contingent on whether the seller succeeds in obtaining a higher price within a specified period we show that if the probability of obtaining the high price is not too high sellers profit from using contingent pricing while economic efficiency increases the optimal contingent pricing structure depends on the buyer s risk attitude a deep discount is most profitable if buyers are risk prone a consolation reward is most profitable if buyers are risk averse to motivate buyers to participate in a contingent pricing arrangement the seller must provide sufficient incentives consequently buyers also benefit from contingent pricing in addition because the buyers with the highest willingness to pay get the product contingent pricing increases the efficiency of resource allocation

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

the right to return this article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract the two extreme cases are the consignment contract which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer and the no return contract in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory contract choices are shown to vary across countries industries products and types of transactions the article identifies six main factors affecting this choice optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory optimal risk allocation incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand information asymmetry and costs associated with the consignment contract per se several testable implications are presented and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model

clearance pricing and inventory policies for retail chains clearance pricing and end of season inventory management are challenging and important problems in retailing sales rates depend upon price seasonal effects and the remaining assortment of items available to customers there is little time to react to observed sales and pricing errors result in either loss of potential revenue or excess inventory to be liquidated this paper develops optimal clearance prices and inventory management policies that take into account the impact of reduced assortment and seasonal changes on sales rates versions of these policies have been tested and implemented at three major retail chains and these applications are summarized and discussed

a spatial interpretation of the density dependence model in industrial demography in this paper the density dependence model which was developed in organizational ecology is compared to the economic geographical notion of agglomeration economies there is a basic resemblance both involve some form of positive feedback between size of the population and growth the paper explores how the theoretical concepts compare to each other and if an interdisciplinary cross fertilization between both is fruitful it is found that there are a number of important similarities in the underlying theories these refer to the process of legitimation which has some close similarities to concepts derived from theories of new industrial districts such as social capital institutional thickness and innovative milieux differences remain important as well for instance the sociological interpretation of competition is not transferable into notions of agglomeration economies an important conclusion is that agglomeration effects can and should be incorporated into the density dependence model

service cancellation and competitive refund policy although previous research demonstrates the profitability of partial refund policies in a monopoly setting there is a certain lack of ubiquity in practice about these refunds in competitive service markets this raises the question of how a partial refund policy may work and whether it is even sustainable in a competitive environment this study investigates how competition may influence the profitability and the equilibrium choice of refund policies it is shown that partial refunds may endogenously change the nature of strategic interaction between service providers from local monopolies into a competition regime which moderates the gains from exploiting the efficiency enhancing effect of partial refunds a whole range of pure strategy equilibria can be obtained as a result of the interplay between the efficiency improving and the competition intensifying effects when the capacity is small large such that the efficiency improving the competition intensifying effect is dominant both firms in equilibrium follow identical partial zero refund policies moreover interestingly the symmetric firms may end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm follows a partial refund policy and the other adopts a zero refund policy

agency costs and innovation abstract stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of innovative research there are many possible explanations for this fact the paper seeks to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across individuals and organizations it is shown that incentive costs associated with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that an individual or an organization undertakes mixing hard to measure activities innovation with easy to measure activities routine is particularly costly since it will either lead to misallocation of attention across tasks or to misallocation of risk larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research because of the costs associated with managing a heterogeneous set of tasks it is further argued that optimal organizational responses to coordination and control of routine tasks will lead to bureaucratization within the firm and to financial constraints imposed by capital markets both of which are hostile to innovation

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

overselling in a competitive environment boon or bane in this paper we study the practice of overselling in a competitive environment where late arriving consumers value the good higher than early arriving ones but the former s arrival is uncertain we show that overselling is a dominant strategy for the firms however it can lead to a prisoners dilemma situation in which all firms are worse off overselling we further show that only when demand from the late consumers far exceeds the supply and there is a sufficiently high profit margin from reselling does overselling result in a pareto dominant outcome for the firms

editorial are consumers rational experimental evidence despite some misconceptions consumer rationality is a property of the researcher rather than the consumer consumers become more rational as we are better able to predict their behavior or other important outcomes influenced by their behavior perfect rationality results when we achieve accurate predictions consequently at least for many marketing science articles consumers are becoming more rational as we find better ways to predict however some experimental consumer behavior articles find the opposite the difference between experimental and statistical controls explains the divergence in conclusions experimental controls test rationality based on whether previously absent variables exhibit significant explanatory power holding known explanatory variables constant statistical controls test rationality based on the incremental explanatory power of previously absent variables after accounting for known explanatory variables moreover experimental tests tend to isolate consumer behavior predictions while statistical tests check for sufficient accuracy to choose among different firm strategies both perspectives are correct but ask very different questions

why are products sold on sale explanations of pricing regularities this paper reports on interesting changes in markdown pricing practices over time and differences in the pricing within a product line the price discrimination and the uncertainty hypotheses appear to better explain the data than the peak load hypothesis fashion has become more important over time and appears to explain the greater seasonal variation in retail apparel prices in recent years differences in uncertainty also explains differences in the pricing of different types of men s dress shirts

partial repeat bidding in the name your own price channel this paper presents an initial examination of an emerging business model the name your own price nyop channel as popularized by priceline com focusing on how to optimally structure such market interactions i ask whether it is more profitable to restrict individuals to a single bid as is currently done by priceline or conversely to allow consumers to continue bidding if the previous offer was rejected i find that both market structures yield the same expected profit in practice a single bid policy may not be perfectly enforceable especially in the internet environment because a sophisticated user can circumvent such a policy by camouflaging one s identity or otherwise manipulating the bidding procedure thus priceline s single bid restriction is likely to result in partial repeat bidding the case in which some consumers are limited to a single bid while other sophisticated users may rebid i ask whether such surreptitious bidding is detrimental to the nyop firm and find that profits are lower than if such opportunistic behavior were absent surprisingly i find that the impact of the number of repeat bidders on profits is not monotonic thus if it is prohibitively costly or logistically infeasible for the nyop firm to eliminate surreptitious rebidding behavior the firm may in fact benefit from encouraging rather than discouraging users to rebid the direction that increases profits depends on the percentage of sophisticated bidders

electronic tickets smart cards and online prepayments when and how to advance sell advance selling occurs when sellers allow buyers to purchase at a time preceding consumption shugan and xie 2000 electronic tickets smart cards online prepayments and other technological advances make advance selling possible for many if not all service providers these technologies lower the cost of making complex transactions at a greater distance from the seller s site they also give sellers more control over advance selling by decreasing arbitrage as technology enhances the capability to advance sell more academic attention is vital this paper strives to exploit these technologies by developing advance selling strategies until recently advance selling research focused on the airline industry and specific characteristics of that industry these characteristics included the price insensitivity of late arrivals e g business travelers compared with early arrivals e g leisure travelers demand uncertainty across flights on the same day and capacity constraints recent findings by shugan and xie 2000 show that advance selling is a far more general marketing tool than previously thought it does not require these industry specific characteristics it only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations moreover sellers without the ability to price discriminate can use advance selling to improve profits to the level of first degree price discrimination this finding is important because buyers are nearly always uncertain about their future valuations for most services e g the utility of next year s vacation or a future college education in this paper we take the next step from shugan and xie 2000 we show that advance selling profits do not come from buyer surplus but from more buyers being able to purchase we determine when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations including situations with limited capacity second period arrivals refunds buyer risk aversion exogenous credibility continuous preference distributions and premium pricing we determine when advance selling improves profits and when it does how to set advance prices we ask and answer seven questions first when should sellers advance sell second how much can advance selling improve profits compared with only spot selling third what factors impact the profitability of advance selling and how fourth should advance prices be higher or lower or the same as spot prices fifth how do capacity constraints impact advance selling strategies sixth should sellers limit the number of advance sales finally what is the possible impact of buyer risk aversion first we provide precise conditions when sellers should advance sell for example without capacity constraints we show that sellers should advance sell when marginal costs are sufficiently low to make it profitable to sell to buyers with low valuations and sufficiently high to convince buyers that the spot price will be higher than the advance price second we find that advance selling can almost double the profits from optimal spot selling to early arrivals we also show that advance selling has no impact on consumer surplus in markets with homogenous consumers and no capacity constraints therefore advance selling can increase social welfare because seller profits increase third we find that two very important factors impacting the profitability of advance selling are seller credibility and marginal costs buyers only advance buy when they expect an advantage from advance buying over spot buying without capacity constraints sellers must credibly convince buyers that the advance price is at a discount to the spot price we show that this condition is met under different circumstances for example large marginal costs can create credibility because buyers believe that these costs will lead to high spot prices fourth we find although optimal advance prices can be at a discount to the spot price that sometimes a premium is optimal premiums are optimal when capacity is large but limited and marginal costs are not too large buyers advance purchase at a premium to spot prices when capacity is limited and spot prices are low note that this is not a risk premium and risk aversion is not required no prior research has suggested this strategy because that research relies on the assumption that early arrivals are more price sensitive than later ones without that assumption premium advance pricing is sometimes optimal fifth we find that binding capacity constraints can impact the profitability of advance selling in opposite ways on one hand capacity constraints create seller credibility buyers believe that spot prices will be high when they know spot capacity is limited and perhaps more limited by advance sales on the other hand when capacity is limited the need to increase sales from discounted advance prices diminishes sixth consistent with desiraju and shugan 1999 we find that limiting advance sales can be profitable but only under restrictive conditions these conditions are 1 selling to all early arrivals would leave insufficient capacity in the spot period to sell to all second period arrivals with high valuations 2 the optimal spot price is high and 3 marginal costs are sufficiently small to make advance selling profitable finally we find that buyer risk aversion can sometimes increase the profitability of advance selling our findings provide precise guidelines for a large number of service providers that will have the technical capability to advance sell for those service providers advance selling provides a creative pricing strategy that can potentially provide substantial improvements in profits

electronic price testing scheme for fashion retailing with information updating abstract pricing is a crucial decision for electronic fashion retailers motivated by various observed industrial practices in electronic retailing we study in this paper the optimal internet pricing schemes which employ price testing with bayesian information updating following the bernoulli process this paper contributes to the literature and advancement of knowledge in a number of ways i we propose an analytical model to study the internet pricing problem with price testing and bayesian information updating for fashion retailers ii we derive the closed form expressions of the expected value of sampling information evsi and the expected value of perfect information evpi under the price testing scheme iii we conduct the pre posterior analysis and construct the optimal sampling plan with three different rules iv we develop the optimal posterior pricing policies with respect to the mean risk and value at risk var objectives numerical analyses which include the studies on evpi and the efficient frontiers are presented to generate more insights

a model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition this paper analyzes the use of meeting and beating competition clauses in duopoly markets a differentiated products price setting model is considered in which firms have the option of precommitting themselves to contracts which bind their own price to be some prespecified function of their competitor s price the analysis establishes conditions under which these contracts facilitate oligopoly coordination under which they result in price discrimination and under which they can actually be procompetitive

optimal production and selling policies with fixed price contracts and contingent price offers abstract this paper investigates optimal production and selling decisions for a single supplier with two types of customers specifically risk averse buyers would rather pay higher fixed prices with guaranteed supply contracts whereas risk prone buyers prefer to secure remaining stocks and pay lower contingent prices this study formulized this problem with a dynamic programming model and analyzed it further using successive approximations theoretical results indicate that no controls are needed for fixed price orders however thresholds exist for manufacturing and contingent price ordering policies these two types of threshold planes increased with the addition of waiting customers furthermore a sensitivity analysis of seasonal factors revealed that the optimal threshold plane shifts upward during high demand periods

the capabilities of new firms and the evolution of the us automobile industry firms that diversify into new and existing industries typically outperform de novo entrants but in some new industries diversifying firms are displaced by later entering de novo firms little is known about when and how new firms can overcome the advantages of diversifying firms this is investigated for one industry automobiles where new firms had considerable success all the entrants into the industry from its inception in 1895 through 1966 are identified the heritage of every entrant into the industry is traced including the founders of de novo entrants to explore how time of entry and pre entry experience affected firm survival while diversifying firms on average outperformed de novo entrants de novo entrants founded by individuals that worked for the leading automobile firms outperformed all firms and dominated the industry this is attributed to the novel organizational challenges faced by automobile firms which made the leading firms ideal training grounds for new entrants the implications of these findings for firm capabilities industry competition and regional economic development are discussed copyright 2002 oxford university press

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

fashion and sales abstract when there is unpredictable fashion in taste it will be optimal to limit the stock of each variety of a horizontally differentiated durable good if consumers are uncertain about one another s taste they will then accept higher first period prices for perfect matches in order to avoid finding only bad matches on sale thus there exists a mechanism which allows a monopolist to price discriminate inter temporally even when it has predictable clearance sales and consumers are infinitely patient there is no distortion in product selection when this equilibrium arises

research note overselling with opportunistic cancellations in many business sectors such as airlines hotels trucking and media advertising customers arrivals and willingness to pay are uncertain managers must decide whether to quote a price low enough to guarantee early sales or to quote a higher price and risk that some units remain unsold in allocating capacity they face a trade off between two types of potential losses 1 yield loss selling at a low price and losing a better price later and 2 spoilage loss waiting in vain to sell at a high price and losing the opportunity of an earlier low price offer yield loss means that consumers who value the product most do not get to use it and spoilage loss means that valuable products are wasted because no consumers get to use them sellers typically hedge against the risk of spoilage loss by selling some units early at low prices and against the risk of yield loss by blocking some units in hope of selling them later at a high price in this paper we show that the use of overselling with opportunistic cancellations can increase expected profits and improve allocation efficiency under this strategy the seller deliberately oversells capacity if high paying consumers show up even when capacity is already fully booked the seller then cancels the sale to some low paying customers while providing them with appropriate compensation we derive a new rule to optimally allocate capacity to consumers when overselling is used and show that overselling helps limit the potential yield and spoilage losses yield loss is reduced because the seller can capture more high paying customers by compensating low paying customers who give up their right to the product spoilage loss is reduced because the compensation decreases the price spread perceived by the seller and as a result the seller is less anxious to speculate and block units overselling with opportunistic cancellations assures that the product will be sold to consumers who value it most this means that everybody wins and resources are allocated more efficiently than in conventional selling

firm entry and institutional lock in an organizational ecology analysis of the global fashion design industry few industries are more concentrated geographically than the global fashion design industry we analyze the geography and evolution of the fashion design industry by looking at the yearly entry rates at the city level in contrast to other industry studies we find that legitimation processes operate locally and competition processes globally this result points to the rapid turnover of ideas in the fashion design industry on the one hand and the global demand for fashion apparel on the other hand we attribute the decline of paris in the post war period to institutional lock in which prevented a ready to wear cluster to emerge despite the presence of the haute couture cluster an extended organizational ecology model provides empirical support for this claim