public trust the law and financial investment abstract how does trust evolve in markets what is the optimal level of regulation and how does this affect trust formation and economic growth in a theoretical model we analyze these questions given the value of social capital and the potential for growth in the market when social capital is valuable regulation and trustfulness are substitutes in this case regulation may cause lower aggregate investment and decreased economic growth when the social capital is less valuable regulation and trustfulness may be complements in the paper we analyze the optimal level of regulation and highlight the novel predictions of the model

intrinsic motivation in public service theory and evidence from state supreme courts abstractthis paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges we construct a panel data set using published decisions from all state supreme courts from 1947 to 1994 we estimate the effects of changes in judges employment conditions on a number of measures of judicial performance the results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high quality decisions and that at the margin they prefer quality over quantity when judges face less time pressure whether from the introduction of an intermediate appellate court the weakening of electoral demands or an increased salary they write more well researched opinions that are cited more often by other judges these effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to select their portfolios of cases

investor protection and equity markets we present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders the model incorporates elements of becker s j political econ 106 1968 172 crime and punishment framework into a corporate finance environment of jensen and meckling j financial econ 3 1976 305 we examine the entrepreneur s decision and the market equilibrium the model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance it also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the hidden transformation the changing role of the state after the collapse of communism in central and eastern europe this article reviews the state s role in the transition economies of central and eastern europe among the countries poland is perceived as the leader because it was the first economy to emerge from the decline following the transition as well the only eu member state to survive the crisis without a recession this success is often attributed to the high quality of government however we show that this popular perception is false and that state malfunctions on numerous fronts may soon impede polish growth prospects in poland the only bright spot is the quality of the financial supervision which should serve as a role model for other countries we attribute the malfunctions to the eu accession period that resulted in an unchecked growth of the government and contributed to the weakening of political and legal institutions copyright 2011 oxford university press

do the new keynesian microfoundations rationalise stabilisation policy systematic monetary policy is analysed in a two period extension of standard static new keynesian models it is shown that countercyclical policies increase the band of inaction of the price setters and that this feedback effect on price rigidity may make such policies self justifying that is the policies themselves cause the fluctuations that they are stabilising moreover countercyclical policies may in general reduce welfare in fact socially optimal policies may very well involve a commitment to enhance shocks

patterns of transition from plan to market patterns of transition from plan to market martha de melo cevdet denizer and alan gelb hungary s bankruptcy experience 1992 1993 cheryl w gray sabine schlorke and miklos szanyi why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform jose edgardo campos and hadi salehi esfahani roads land use and deforestation a spatial model applied to belize kenneth m chomitz and david a gray industrial centralization in indonesia j vernon henderson and ari kuncoro guidlines on searching for a dalton improving tax reform an illustration with data from indonesia shlomo yitzhaki and jeffrey d lewis a new data set measuring income inequality klaus deininger and lyn squire

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

corporate governance provisions and firm ownership firm level evidence from eastern europe we study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions e cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting e in a sample of about 220 firms located in four eastern european countries after controlling for other firm characteristics we find that firms that have a large minority blockholder are more likely to allow cumulative voting we do not find any significant relationship between the use of these corporate governance provisions and foreign ownership we conclude that the use of cumulative voting is associated with the presence of large minority shareholders 2006 published by elsevier ltd jel classification g34 p2

heterogeneity and output fluctuations in a dynamic menu cost economy when firms face menu costs the relation between their output and money is highly non linear at the aggregate level however this needs not be so in this paper we study the dynamic behaviour of a menu cost economy where firms are heterogeneous in the shocks they perceive and the demands and adjustment costs they face in this context we i generalize the caplin and spulber 1987 steady state monetary neutrality result ii show that uniqueness of equilibria depends not only on the degree of strategic complementarities but also on the degree of dispersion of firms positions in their price cycle iii characterize the path of output outside the steady state and show that as strategic complementarities become more important expansions become longer and smoother than contractions and iv show that the potential impact of monetary shocks is an increasing function of the distance of the economy from its steady state but that an uninformed policy maker will have no effect on output on average

menu costs and nominal price friction an experimental examination abstract this paper examines how menu costs affect monopoly behavior using experimental markets this research takes a new keynesian theory of business fluctuations and tests it in a controlled environment where people are making decisions for real salient payoffs these experiments are the first controlled test of a new keynesian explanation for sticky product prices and they offer some insights into nominal price frictions the results from this research indicate that menu costs have real economic effects in a static situation but not in a dynamic setting

the goals and promise of the sarbanes oxley act the primary goal of the sarbanes oxley act was to fix auditing of u s public companies consistent with its full official name the public company accounting reform and investor protection act of 2002 by consensus auditing had been working poorly and increasingly so the most important and most promising part of sarbanes oxley was the creation of a unique quasi public institution to oversee and regulate auditing the public company accounting oversight board pcaob in controversial section 404 the law also created new disclosure based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s in exchange for these higher costs which have already fallen substantially sarbanes oxley promises a variety of long term benefits investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft and benefit from more reliable financial reporting greater transparency and accountability public companies will pay a lower cost of capital and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth sarbanes oxley remains a work in progress section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation by pcaob rather than for repeal of the legislation itself

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

quality of government institutions and spreads on sovereign credit default swaps abstract we examine how the quality of government institutions affects the likelihood of sovereign default we find both economically and statistically significant adverse effects of country governance indicators on sovereign credit default swap spreads the evidence suggests that better quality governance enhances a country s willingness to repay debt and hence reduces the probability of sovereign default the results still hold after we account for potential endogeneity and conduct a number of robustness tests

menu costs and the neutrality of money a model of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented firms follow s s pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized in the aggregate price stickiness disappears and money is neutral the connection between firm price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also investigated the results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed timing of price adjustment

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

estimating the benefits of contractual completeness i provide a revealed preference based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts i use a rational expectations based panel estimator of covenant prices which does not require quasi experimental variation to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices i find that firms surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan leverage and interest rate covenants produce the largest benefits lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants once covenants are chosen the benefits from fine tuning them are small thus rationalizing boilerplate covenants i conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

stock markets and industry growth an eastern european perspective this paper reviews the recent stock market developments in poland and the czech republic and provides a case study insight into the direction of causality between stock market expansion and economic growth it finds no evidence that the relative failure of the czech security market affected the country s economy it also reports that the largest equity issuers in eastern europe do not come from industries traditionally considered financially dependent

the extent of the market and the supply of regulation we present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost as a consequence the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market we test three implications of this model first jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it second jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more this implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely consistent with the model we find that higher population u s states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states we also find that the regulation of entry the regulation of labor and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations as well as in civil law countries where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower

the organizational cost of protection abstract this paper offers another explanation for the proposition that protection induces slack it employs a model of a hierarchic firm in which the firm s owner cannot observe the cost type or the effort level of his manager a production subsidy by stimulating output may increase the marginal information rents that have to be paid to the manager for higher effort the resulting increase in the firm s marginal cost of effort leads to reduced managerial effort amplifying the intra firm effort distortion if effort is initially below the optimal level and yielding an organizational cost of protection additional to the standard deadweight cost

international patterns of ownership structure choices of start ups does the quality of law matter the concentration of ownership of enterprises varies significantly among countries in this paper we investigate the role that differences in legal systems among nations play in molding founders preferences with respect to the ownership structure of their start ups we develop an economic framework which articulates the impact that the quality of protection offered to shareholders and debt holders has on the supply of debt and equity financing and the incentives of the founders to recruit partners or opt for sole ownership the theoretical analysis predicts that a positive relationship is likely to exist between the quality of the legal system and the ownership concentration of start ups this prediction is in contrast to the findings on relationships in large publicly traded firms using data obtained from the adult population survey of the global entrepreneurship monitor project from 2001 to 2004 about ownership preference patterns we confirm the prediction

menu costs posted prices and multiproduct retailers we use a unique store level data set to directly measure menu costs and to study the price change process at a large u s drugstore chain we compare and contrast the magnitude of these measures with similar measures from four large u s supermarket chains we find that 1 the actual magnitude of menu costs as a share of revenues 2 menu costs per price change 3 the frequent use of promotional pricing and 4 the use of weekly pricing rules are similar across both retail formats given that the main common features of these two types of retail formats are that i they both use posted prices and ii both are multiproduct retailers selling a large number of products our findings suggest that the magnitude of the menu cost components we measure and the price change practices we document may be generalizable across retail formats with these two features

how attractive is central eastern europe for risk capital investors abstract this paper addresses the attractiveness of central eastern european countries for risk capital investors by the construction of a tailored composite measure based on a survey among institutional investors we define six key drivers that determine an emerging country s attractiveness for this type of investment using 42 socio economic data series as proxies for these six key drivers we benchmark the central eastern european countries with eu 15 norway and switzerland and identify six tier groups of country attractiveness we highlight socio economic strengths and weaknesses of central eastern europe and provide guidelines for policy improvements to attract more risk capital funding to spur innovation entrepreneurship employment competitiveness and growth in the emerging region

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

regulatory sanctions on independent directors and their consequences to the director labor market evidence from china we investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms financial frauds in china these regulatory sanctions are prima facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics during the period 2003 2010 302 person time independent directors were penalized by the regulator the china securities regulatory commission the csrc and the two stock exchanges we find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the csrc though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors we also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities following a regulatory sanction penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held however they can gain board seats in better quality firms we find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline overall our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have instead created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high risk firms

private politics and public regulation public regulation is increasingly facing competition from private politics in the form of activism and corporate self regulation however its effectiveness welfare consequences and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood this article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation self regulation and boycotts we show that the possibility of self regulation saves on administrative costs but also leads to delays without an active regulator firms self regulate to preempt or end a boycott and private politics is beneficial for activists but harmful for firms with an active regulator in contrast firms self regulate to preempt public regulation and private politics is harmful for activists but beneficial for firms our analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions that are consistent with the rise of private politics over time and the fact that there is more self regulation and activism in the u s while public regulation continues to be more common in europe

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

capital market development and mass privatization are logical contradictions lessons from russia and the czech republic the introduction of mass privatization policies in russia and the czech republic depended on the creation of impersonal capital markets to finance the needs of privatized companies and to provide a secondary market for the trading of securities yet mass privatization created the contradictory conditions of generating millions of poorly informed shareholders with no efficient markets for the sale of the shares the absence of financial markets created systematic pressures to move assets by illegal or non transparent means to users who value them more privatization created the incentives to destroy the financial markets critical to its success a comparative case analysis of post privatization market formation in both these countries demonstrates that the functional necessity for these markets does not engender their own creation in the absence of institutional mechanisms of state regulation and trust markets become arenas for political contests and economic manipulation the irony of these policies is that a principal lesson has been that market reforms cannot create viable markets only institutional formation can copyright 2002 oxford university press

social capital and the cost of equity abstract we find that a firm s cost of equity is inversely related to the level of social capital in the state where the firm is headquartered further the cost of equity declines when firms move their headquarters from a low social capital state to a state with higher social capital the negative relation between social capital and the cost of equity is statistically significant only for firms facing relatively low levels of product market competition and is not significant for firms with good firm specific reputations we interpret these findings as indicating that social capital serves as a societal monitoring mechanism and can be value enhancing for firms that are perceived as having greater agency problems and face weak product market monitoring

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

a dynamic economy with costly price adjustments this paper studies a general equilibrium model of a dynamic economy with menu costs each firm s productivity is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks around a trend and the money supply to monetary shocks around a trend all consumption pricing and production decisions are based on optimizing behavior there exists a staggered markov perfect equilibrium with prices determined by a two sided s s markup strategy the paper analyzes the optimal markup strategy and investigates the dynamics of the price index and the aggregate output the welfare consequences of the uncertain aggregate productivity and money supply are also examined

the injustice of inequality in many countries the operation of legal political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit this subversion takes the form of corruption intimidation and other forms of influence we present a model of such institutional subversion focusing specifically on courts and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion we then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country as well as for capital accumulation and growth we illustrate the model with historical evidence from gilded age united states and the transition economies of the 1990s we also present some cross country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model

how does law affect finance an examination of equity tunneling in bulgaria abstract we model and test the mechanisms through which law affects tunneling and tunneling affects firm valuation in 2002 bulgaria adopted legal changes which limit equity tunneling through dilutive equity offerings and freezeouts following the changes minority shareholders participate equally in equity offerings where before they suffered severe dilution freezeout offer price ratios quadruple and tobin s q rises sharply for firms at high risk of tunneling the paper shows the importance of legal rules in limiting equity tunneling the role of equity tunneling risk as a factor in determining equity prices and substitution by controlling shareholders between different forms of tunneling

does legal enforcement affect financial transactions the contractual channel in private equity analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments we find that transactions vary with nations legal enforcement whether measured directly or through legal origin investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants in low enforcement and civil law nations private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt and rely on equity and board control transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns while relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy

optimum pricing policy under stochastic inflation we describe aggregate inflation as a stochastic process in which the rate of change of the price level can be positive or zero where the times spent in each state are of random duration this class of processes includes two state markov chains and renewal processes as special cases it is shown that the optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm with non convex costs of price adjustment is s s in its real price i e its nominal price relative to the price level a basic certainty equivalence result is proved i e the firm behaves as if it faces a certain and fixed rate of inflation higher than the actual expected rate the difference between the two rates being a risk premium which depends on the real interest rate and the parameters of the stochastic process one can thus apply previous results from the case of certainty sheshinski and weiss review of economic studies 1977 to obtain comparative static results in particular one finds that an increase in the variance of expected inflation leads firms to choose a pricing policy with larger amplitude in real price the paper also addresses the question of consistency in firms expectations when the price level is determined by the firms actions in this paper we consider pricing policies of individual firms in an inflationary environment each firm expects the general price level to increase and must determine the rate of increase of its own price it is assumed that the firm incurs an adjustment cost when it changes its nominal price consequently firms choose to change prices occasionally rather than continuously

the effectiveness of public enforcement evidence from the resolution of tunneling in china this paper examines the effectiveness of public enforcement by studying the effects of regulatory intervention to curb tunneling through intercorporate loans in china specifically we explore whether public enforcement efforts in 2006 blacklisting and sanctions resulted in less tunneling and ultimately in increased performance for tunneling firms we show that tunneling is among the dominant factors increasing the likelihood of becoming blacklisted we also find that firms tunneling mechanisms decreased significantly after the regulatory shock and that their performance increased significantly compared to non tunneling firms after the regulatory shock finally we find a positive market reaction to the public announcement of tunneling both for firms that have been blacklisted and other tunneling firms that are not blacklisted collectively these results suggest that public enforcement in the presence of a credible threat succeeds in deterring the effect on tunneling behavior in china

bank supervision and corruption in lending abstract which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms financing obstacles we find that the traditional approach to bank supervision which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor discipline and influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending rather we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance in extensions we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions

corporate governance and equity prices evidence from the czech and slovak republics the 1992 czechoslavakia mass privatization program involving about 1 500 eneterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy it represents a clear test case of one approach and other countries may benefit from its lessons at the time much skepticisism was voiced about mass privatization it would lead to diffuse ownership and no effective corporate governance would result but innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals voucher points leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure it has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance but the jury is still out so far only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred for example the split of the czech and slovak republics to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance an alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership and possibly improved governance sell for higher prices either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then in a forward looking financial market one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders put differently one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures but otherwise identical would trade at different prices with the firm with a more concentrated ownership and presumably better corporate governance trading at a higher price on a cross sectional basis ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining relative share prices the author explores this line of reasoning controlling for a number of firm and sector specific variables he finds 1 majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices 2 firms with many small owners have lower prices 3 ownership by many small scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices the author also provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor he finds 1 the corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the czech and slovak republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed thus keeping prices low and 2 commercial banks are both managers of invesment funds and creditors of individual firms funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits this could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991