scale economies perverse comparative statics results the marshallian stability and the long run equilibrium for a small open economy abstract using a simple general equilibrium model we show that the perverse comparative statics results can occur under scale economies these paradoxes disappear iff the equilibrium is marshallian stable and the latter holds iff it is a stable long run equilibrium under capital adjustment

on the concepts of returns to scale abstract we clarify various concepts of returns to scale scattered in the literature by presenting their six different concepts we find the global relationship among them and apply some of the results to determine the shape of the average cost curves

when is reputation bad abstract in traditional reputation models the ability to build a reputation is good for the long run player in ely j valimaki j 2003 bad reputation naj econ 4 2 http www najecon org v4 htm quart j econ 118 2003 785 814 ely and valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad this paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds the key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short run players and that every action of the long run player that makes the short run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long run player is bad we allow a broad set of commitment types allowing many types including the stackelberg type used to prove positive results on reputation although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the stackelberg type is too high the relative probability of the stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely

evolution and information in a gift giving game abstract we examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift giving game overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game they may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents if the value of the gift is smaller than twice the cost then gifts are not given if the value of the gift is more than four times the cost then gifts are exchanged moreover in the stochastically stable equilibrium a unique information system is selected to support cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c72 d83

repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting in a partnership game each player s utility depends on the other players actions through a commonly observed consequence e g output profit price which is itself a function of the players actions and an exogenous stochastic environment if a partnership game is repeated infinitely and each player s payoff in the infinite game supergame is the long run average of his expected one period utilities then efficient combinations of one period actions can be sustained as nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players actions or information but can only observe the resulting consequences

combining contingent valuation and travel cost data for the valuation of non market goods the travel cost method tcm has long been used to infer the economic value of nonmarket resources and public goods more recently contingent valuation cvm survey methods have gained popularity for eliciting these values here cvm survey responses are combined with tcm data on actual market behavior to estimate jointly both the parameters of the underlying utility function and its corresponding ordinary demand function this is a prototypical empirical example of a new modeling strategy variants of which should prove useful in many applications especially where reliance on a single valuation method is undesirable

a leviathan central bank modeling seigniorage in a money search model this paper studies the nature of optimal monetary policy under a utility maximizing monetary authority in a micro founded model of money based on lagos and wright 2005 such a monetary authority represents a monopoly private money supplier or situations where fiscal policy drives monetary policy and hence the name leviathan under no commitment i characterize an equilibrium with reputation concerns the centralized market interaction is modeled as an infinitely repeated game between the leviathan monetary authority a large player and the economic agents small players where the size of the players refers to the ability to influence aggregate outcomes this large small player dynamics pins down the equilibrium set of payoffs under the assumption that agents do not refuse to use money purely for coordination reasons the one shot game has a unique nash equilibrium with maximum inflation tax the set of equilibria is considerably enlarged in the infinite repetition of the game and equilibria with a lower inflation tax can also be supported by providing appropriate incentives to the money supplier

repeated games with frequent signals we study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals where the signals are the aggregate of many discrete events such as sales or tasks the high frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends on both the probability law governing the discrete events and on how many events are aggregated into a single signal when the underlying events have a binomial distribution the limit equilibria correspond to the equilibria of the associated continuous time game with diffusion signals but other event processes that aggregate to a diffusion limit can have a different set of limit equilibria thus the continuous time game need not be a good approximation of the high frequency limit whenever the underlying events have three or more possible values

sustainable plans and debt abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal fiscal policy similar to that of lucas and stokey j monet econ 12 1983 55 93 except that we let the government default on its debt we consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we concentrate on trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the markov equilibrium after deviations by the government and show that such mechanisms cannot support equilibria with positive debt we go on to show by way of examples that there can be more complicated trigger mechanisms which support positive debt journal of economic literature classification numbers e61 e62

perfect public equilibrium when players are patient we provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work it also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full dimensionality condition fail as in the strongly symmetric equilibrium studied by abreu abreu d 1986 extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames j econ theory 39 191 228 and abreu et al abreu d pearce d stacchetti e 1986 optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring j econ theory 39 251 269 finally we use our characterization to give a sufficient condition for the exact achievability of first best outcomes equilibria of this type for which all continuation payoffs lie on the pareto frontier have a strong renegotiation proofness property regardless of the history players can never unanimously prefer another equilibrium

on disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry we study how a contest organizer who seeks to maximize participant effort should disclose the information on the actual number of contestants in an imperfectly discriminatory contest with stochastic entry when each potential contestant has a fixed probability of entering the contest the optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the properties of the characteristic function h f f where f is the impact function the contest organizer prefers full disclosure full concealment if h is strictly concave strictly convex however the expected equilibrium effort is independent of the prevailing information disclosure policy if a linear h tullock contest applies

repeated games with long run and short run players this paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long and short run players and little discounting because the short run players are unconcerned about the future each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction best response curves the natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values in fact this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player s choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but in contrast to standard repeated games the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents realized actions

endogenous and exogenous commitment abstract i study a dynamic model of monopoly sales in which one long term monopolist without exogenous commitment power interacts with a sequence of short term consumers with private valuations i provide a folk theorem which characterizes the payoffs of a sufficiently patient monopolist and i show that exogenous commitment power can obstruct the endogenous commitment from repeated game incentives

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

combining revealed and stated preference data to estimate the nonmarket value of ecological services an assessment of the state of the science this paper reviews the marketing transportation and environmental economics literature on the joint estimation of revealed preference rp and stated preference sp data the rp and sp approaches are first described with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of each recognizing these strengths and weaknesses the potential gains from combining data are described a classification system for combined data that emphasizes the type of data combination and the econometric models used is proposed a methodological review of the literature is pursued based on this classification system examples from the environmental economics literature are highlighted a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of jointly estimated model is then presented suggestions for future research in particular opportunities for application of these models to environmental quality valuation are presented

the elasticity of scale and the shape of average costs different concepts of returns to scale the first which is most widely used for defining returns to scale is the relative increase in output as all input quantities are increased proportionally along a ray through the origin the second which is the more relevant concept for micro economic analysis is the increase in output relative to costs for variations along the expansion path where input prices are constant and costs are minimized at every output 2 as it turns out these two concepts yield equal measures for the elasticity of scale3 e at every minimum cost point in the input space however the change in e with output is generally different for the two concepts 4 since expansion paths do not coincide with rays unless the production function is homothetic 5 but it is the change of e along the expansion path and not along the raywhich determines the shape of the average cost curve ac and which is therefore relevant for the analysis of firms and industry behavior under competition 6 these relations are stated and analyzed below it is shown that assumptions made in the literature7 which are related to the behavior of e along rays or to the slope of the technically optimal surface where returns to scale are locally constant are irrelevantbeing neither necessary nor sufficient for implying classical u shaped average cost curves the following definitions and results are used here

restricted feedback in long term relationships abstract this paper studies long term relationships modeled as repeated games with restricted feedback players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history as may be the case in online markets our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies we derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of abreu pearce and stacchetti 1986 1990 2 3 for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator we use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal

myopic perception in repeated games abstract in obtaining the celebrated folk theorem not only everyone must value his future sufficiently high but also everyone must be perceived so by the others this common perception of players time preferences must be maintained even after someone deviates this paper explores the implications of myopic perception in repeated games with perfect monitoring under myopic perception a deviator will not be perceived as a long run player in the continuation game which in turn affects the equilibria in the repeated game before deviation we develop an algorithm to compute a set that characterizes almost all equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor is sufficiently high when the stage game has a unique nash equilibrium and it strictly dominates all other stage game payoffs then under myopic perception the corresponding repeated game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

stigmatized asset value is it temporary or long term stigma is a negative attribute of real estate acquired by environmental contamination and reflected in its value elliot jones 1996 using a model of neighborhood turnover with external economies we show that both temporary stigma and long term stigma are possible equilibrium outcomes after the discovery and cleanup of a hazardous waste site the existence and duration of stigma are examined using hedonic price techniques with data from housing sales prices in dallas county texas we find that results depend critically on distance from the hazardous waste site neighborhood turnover due to changes in the level of poverty also appears likely

expropriation risk and technology abstract this paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement the firm s technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking order of expropriations long run investment distortions may be pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum the dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives backloading or efficiency frontloading concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus an increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare the model provides a technology driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

product differentiation heterogeneous labor and non homotheticity statics and dynamics the problem of product diversity and product differentiation under chamberlinian monopolistic competition has been attracting a great deal of attention recently instrumental to this is perhaps the discovery of the dixit stiglitz utility function 7 in conjunction with revived interest in scale economies the d s utility function framework has been useful to make general equilibrium analysis tractable and facilitate obtaining many interesting results scale economies provide an additional appealing feature to the results the application to other fields notably to international trade theory is impressive thus dixit norman 6 265 wrote the large volume of intra industry trade estimated at 50 of world trade by grubel lloyd 8 can only be understood in the context of product differentiation and economies of scale this line of research reached a culmination with the work of helpman krugman 13 this paper develops a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with nonhomothetic production and economies of scale and develops comparative statics and dynamics the lack of homotheticity enters through different types of labor skilled and unskilled the paper investigates two types of dynamic processes one leading to the chamberlinian tangency solution and the other leading to a stable allocation of skilled and unskilled labor in the economy unlike virtually all studies on this topic we have not postulated that the chamberlinian tangency solution or the zero profit condition prevails at the outset of their analysis instead we investigate whether or not the chamberlinian process of achieving the tangency solution via entry or exit of firms depending of course on profits and losses of firms in the industry is indeed stable under a general equilibrium framework with certain assumptions although this result may look intuitively obvious it may be contrasted to a different result obtained elsewhere by us 3 another problem that we are concerned with is the allocation of skilled labor and unskilled labor consider the economy which consists of manufacturing sector x and food sector y

estimating housing demand with an application to explaining racial segregation in cities we present a three stage nonparametric estimation procedure to recover willingness to pay for housing attributes in the first stage we estimate a nonparametric hedonic home price function in the second stage we recover each consumer s taste parameters for product characteristics using first order conditions for utility maximization finally in the third stage we estimate the distribution of household tastes as a function of household demographics as an application of our methods we compare alternative explanations for why blacks choose to live in center cities while whites suburbanize

monopolistic competition nonhomotheticity and the stability of the chamberlinian tangency solution the focal point in the recent literature on international trade and monopolistic competition is to recast the chamberlinian partial equilibrium theory in a general equilibrium framework using a similar setting this paper asks whether the chamberlinian tangency solution is stable under general equilibrium paradoxical results follow when entry occurs profit per firm can increase and the tangency solution can be unstable a necessary and sufficient condition for stability is obtained the concepts of average and marginal factor intensities play an important role in obtaining the stability copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

an example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria in this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate provided the latter is strictly positive on the other hand if the players do not discount the future then every efficient one period payoff vector that dominates the one period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game thus the correspondence that maps the players discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero

combining revealed and stated preference data to estimate preferences for residential amenities a gmm approach we show how stated preference information obtained from a choice experiment and revealed preference information based on housing market transactions can be combined via generalized method of moments gmm estimation specifically we use a moment condition matching the predicted marginal willingness to pay wtp from a first stage hedonic model to the marginal wtp formula implied by the choice experiment utility function this is coupled with other moments from the choice experiment to produce gmm based estimates of parameters that reflect the strengths of each data source our application values remediation of a contaminated site in buffalo new york and we find evidence in support of estimates arising from our approach jel q51 q53

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

a reputation refinement without equilibrium the economic literature concerning agents reputations has grown steadily since the seminal work of kreps milgrom roberts and wilson 2 early work focused on how incomplete information leads to equilibria that are vastly different but more intuitive than those possible in the complete information game recently however game theorists have been studying how incomplete information might refine the set of equilibria 3 one important class of games is that in which a single long run agent plays a simultaneous move stage game with a sequence of opponents each of whom plays only once yet observes all previous play fudenberg and levine 1989 study the reputation of the long run player in this type of game they argue that the most reasonable equilibrium is the one which the long run player most prefers their intuition is sustained when one perturbs the game with the stackelberg strategy fudenberg and levine show that in the perturbed game the equilibrium payoffs of the long run player are bounded below by a number that converges to the stackelberg payoff

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

legalizing bribe giving i introduction corruption remains an endemic problem in the developing world and has become a central political issue in many countries empirical work has considerably advanced our understanding of how widespread corruption is and how it can cause harm 1 governments and agencies such as the world bank have sponsored numerous anticorruption programs however regarding how to best fight corruption in practice research has lagged behind policy 2 recently kaushik basu chief economist then of the indian government and now of the world bank proposed a specific approach in basu s 2011 pamphlet why for a class of bribes the act of giving a bribe should be treated as legal he describes a society where bribery is rampant a scourge that deserves to be banished and proposes for the case of harassment bribes that people pay to get services they are legally entitled to 3 the following policy legalize bribe giving double the fine for bribe taking and make the bribe taker pay back the bribe if discovered when a citizen bribes a bureaucrat under traditional law the two become partners in crime they thus lack incentives to report the activity under basu s policy bp which he deems fairly radical incentives are provided for the bribe giver to report the bribe taker if this is foreseen the bureaucrat would not accept the bribe in the first place that is the key idea will it work a hot debate has raged in indian and international press the economist appeared sympathetic 4 however in some quarters the proposal stirred outrage and commentators discarded it mainly on moral grounds 5 more tempered thoughtful criticism has come from economists dreze 2011 in particular wrote a penetrating comment arguing that basu does not give adequate attention to some institutional and moral concerns which may change conclusions basu s intriguing presentation is informal as is the heated debate it inspired perhaps one should not expect the issues to be easily settled through such discourse the proposal is reminiscent of somewhat analogous tools used in other fields such as leniency policies in antitrust and whistleblower protection and reward schemes against fraud and organized crime scholars who studied those measures have suggested they may be effective if well designed and administered but counterproductive if details are not set right 6 deeper understanding of the pros and cons of subtle legal rules may require careful scrutiny within a formal model in section ii we develop a simple formal model to represent the scenarios basu and his commentators care about as explicit games by comparing equilibria we draw conclusions regarding the conditions under which bp is likely to be effective bp gets mixed context dependent grades and we highlight complementarities with other policies the proposal works best if coupled with measures that increase the costs for bureaucrats of denying citizens what they deserve and that reduce the costs for citizens of getting justice verifying whether a bribe was paid entails costs which may deter reporting hence bp works better against larger bribes inefficient or corrupt law enforcement increases these costs so bp will be more effective if it is part of a wider reform package that also fosters independence and accountability of the legal system in section iii we take into account also the legal and moral considerations brought up by dreze revealing other problems related to bp we propose a modified policy mbp that escapes many objections the idea is inspired by leniency rules in antitrust rather than legalize bribe giving only those who report having paid a bribe would be awarded legal immunity extortionary harassment bribes are distortive when they are not paid because a justified and presumably welfare enhancing licence is then not issued with other arguably often more serious forms of corruption distortions occur when bribes are paid not otherwise

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices