are contributions of time and money substitutes or complements abstractthis article empirically investigates the relationship between donations of time and money using canadian tax policy reforms that changed the tax price of charitable donations the 1988 reform where a charitable tax deduction was converted to a credit and the 2000 reform in provincial income taxes provide tax price variations plausibly exogenous to individuals unobserved heterogeneity our estimates on cross price effects imply that individuals make more time donations as the tax price of charitable donations increases and hence money and time donations are substitutes as some theories would imply this contrasts with earlier findings using cross sectional data

to float or to fix evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth we study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post bretton woods period using a new de facto classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables in contrast with previous studies we find that for developing countries less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth as well as with greater output volatility for industrial countries regimes do not appear to have any significant impact on growth the results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk for example a bank and a finance company or a good bank bad bank structure such bipartite structures may prevent risk shifting in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders by insulating safer loans from riskier loans a bipartite structure reduces risk shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower

the classification and performance of alternative exchange rate systems abstract owing to dissatisfaction with the imf s de jure classification of exchange rate regimes a substantial literature has emerged presenting de facto classifications of exchange rate systems and using the latter classifications to compare performances of alternative regimes in terms of key macroeconomic variables this paper critically reviews the literature on de facto regimes in particular the paper 1 describes the main methodologies that have been used to construct de facto codings 2 surveys the empirical literature generated by de facto regime codings and 3 lays out the problems inherent in constructing de facto classifications the empirical literature is found to yield few robust findings we argue that the as yet unfulfilled objective of this literature and the major research agenda for the future in this area lies in the need of a more thorough investigation of the degree of monetary policy independence without relying exclusively on movements in exchange rates an agenda the attainment of which is made especially challenging because of the lack of comprehensive and reliable data on reserves and interest rates

modeling charitable giving using a box cox standard tobit model there is a large literature investigating the determinants of charitable giving in particular price and income elasticities we find that many of the most often reported results from this literature rely on a model specification that is inappropriate when applied to recent federal tax file data we develop a standard tobit model with a box cox transformation parameter that nests a number of other specifications the box cox model yields estimates of price elasticities and expected charitable contributions that differ from those obtained using the typical specification additionally we find that the use of sample weights provides potentially important policy insights copyright 1991 by mit press

charitable giving by married couples who decides and why does it matter we examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily responsible for giving decisions looking first at single person households we find men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving setting up a potential conflict for married couples we find that with respect to total giving married households tend to resolve these conflicts largely in favor of the husband s preferences bargaining over charitable giving rather than letting one spouse take charge reduces giving by about six percent when the woman is the decision maker she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each our results give new insights into both the demographics of charitable giving and the costliness of household bargaining

foreclosures house prices and the real economy from 2007 to 2009 states without a judicial requirement for foreclosures were twice as likely to foreclose on delinquent homeowners analysis of borders of states with differing foreclosure laws reveals a discrete jump in foreclosure propensity as one enters nonjudicial states using state judicial requirement as an instrument for foreclosures we show that foreclosures led to a large decline in house prices residential investment and consumer demand from 2007 to 2009 as foreclosures subsided from 2011 to 2013 the foreclosure rates in nonjudicial and judicial requirement states converged and we find some evidence of a stronger recovery in nonjudicial states

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

the optimal size of a bank costs and benefits of diversification abstract this paper provides a theory of diversification and financial structure of banks it shows that by diversifying the bank portfolio and financing it with debt the bank can commit to a higher level of monitoring by linking the benefits of diversification to the costs the paper derives an optimal size of the bank which is bounded the costs of diversification lie in the higher overload costs with which the banker is faced by monitoring more projects the benefits of diversification lie in increasing the bank s owner s incentives to monitor the lenders

currency unions and international integration this paper characterizes the integration patterns of international currency unions such as the cfa franc zone we empirically explore different features of currency unions and compare them to countries with sovereign monies by examining the criteria for mundellos concept of an optimum currency area we find that members of currency unions are more integrated than countries with their own currencies for instance we find that currency union members have more trade and less volatile real exchange rates than countries with their own monies business cycles are more highly synchronized across currency union countries than across countries with sovereign monies

forecasting bank loans loss given default abstract with the advent of the new basel capital accord banking organizations are invited to estimate credit risk capital requirements using an internal ratings based approach in order to be compliant with this approach institutions must estimate the loss given default the fraction of the credit exposure that is lost if the borrower defaults this study evaluates the ability of a parametric fractional response regression and a nonparametric regression tree model to forecast bank loan credit losses the out of sample predictive ability of these models is evaluated at several recovery horizons after the default event the out of time predictive ability is also estimated for a recovery horizon of 1 year the performance of the models is benchmarked against recovery estimates given by historical averages the results suggest that regression trees are an interesting alternative to parametric models in modeling and forecasting loss given default

monitoring the monitor an incentive structure for a financial intermediary this paper studies financial intermediation i e delegated monitoring in a costly state verification model there are a finite number of agents thus the intermediary cannot fully diversify its portfolio and is subject to default risk the role of the intermediary is to satisfy simultaneously the different portfolio preferences of borrowers and lenders two questions arise when a delegated monitor is subject to non trivial default risk a what arrangement solves the problem of monitoring the monitor b what intermediary portfolio accomplishes optimal asset transformation between borrowers and lenders unlike previous delegated monitoring studies the law of large numbers is not sufficient to obtain our results instead we appeal to a stronger results the large deviation principle which establishes that convergence in the law of large numbers is exponential

women in the one percent gender dynamics in top income positions a growing body of research documents the importance of studying households in the top one percent of u s income distribution because they control enormous resources however little is known about

strict dollarization and economic performance an empirical investigation in this paper we analyze the macroeconomic record of strictly dollarized economies in particular we investigate whether dollarized countries have historically exhibited faster growth and lower volatility than countries with a domestic currency we analyze this issue by using a treatment regression analysis that estimates jointly the probability of being a dollarized country and outcome equations our analysis indicates that the probability of being a dollarized country depends on regional geographical political and structural variables our results also suggest that gdp per capita growth has not been statistically different in dollarized and in non dollarized countries we also find that volatility has been significantly higher in dollarized than in non dollarized economies these results are robust to the estimation technique and to the sample used

a multinomial logit approach to exchange rate policy classification with an application to growth we model a country s de jure exchange rate policy as the choice from a multinomial logit response conditioned on the volatility of its bilateral exchange rate the volatility of its international reserves and the volatility of its effective exchange rate the category with the highest predictive probability implied by the logit regressions serves as our de facto exchange rate policy an empirical investigation into the relationship between the de facto classifications and gdp growth finds that growth is higher under stable currency value policies for non industrialized countries a more nuanced characterization of exchange rate policy finds that those who exhibit fear of floating experience significantly higher growth

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

modeling charitable contributions of time and money abstract public goods theory predicts that government spending on charity can perfectly crowd out charitable contributions empirical research has found little support for the perfect crowd out hypothesis however the empirical work only measures part of a contributor s total contribution gifts of money contributors also volunteer labor this article extends the public goods model to the case in which individuals contribute both time and money to a charity that in turn produces a public good the model suggests that charitable contributions of time and money are perfectly substitutable in equilibrium this result offers new interpretations for existing empirical observations and suggests a new test of the crowd out hypothesis the implications of the model are empirically tested using a national survey of charitable activity

charitable giving by married couples revisited abstract this paper investigates the effect of gender differences and household bargaining on charitable giving i replicate the study of andreoni brown and rischall 2003 using a different data set the recently available panel study of income dynamics psid supplement on charitable giving and test the sensitivity of their results to inclusion of additional control variables and the endogeneity of the tax price of giving first focusing on singles i find that males and females have significantly different tendencies toward giving to different areas of charitable activity next comparing households in which husband and wife make a joint decision on donations with those in which couples separately decide or assign a sole decisionmaker i show that bargaining over giving increases the amount of charitable contributions by almost 7 percent

stabilization policies in developing countries what have we learned abstract the paper reviews the recent experience with stabilization programmes in latin america in the light of traditional and monetarist models of inflation and the exchange rate the traditional model links both inflation and payments problems to budget deficits the monetarist model too believes that inflation is caused by fiscal deficits but it takes a more optimistic view of stabilization full purchasing power parity and perfect capital mobility make stabilization just a question of the appropriate exchange rate policy and the proper rate of domestic credit creation the traditional view is substantially right as a long run model but it fails in the dynamics the monetarist model is as we know now fundamentally wrong as a short run description of the possibilities of inflation control there is need and room for a paradigm that places emphasis on the debt money mix in financing the budget on the stickiness of inflation rates and on the place of short run real exchange rate and real interest rate variations that these are key features of the transition phase is amply borne out by the devasting and unsuccessful experiences with monetarist stabilization in argentina chile and brazil

the information content of bank exam ratings and subordinated debt prices do supervisory examinations of large commercial banking firms produce useful information not already reflected in market prices to investigate this question we apply a new research methodology to data on bank exam ratings and the subordinated debt risk spreads of their parent holding companies we find that government exams do produce new value relevant information that debenture prices do not immediately reflect this information and that the market prices the likely regulatory actions implied by this information these results have implications for market versus regulatory discipline at large banking firms and for proposals to make subordinated debt mandatory for these firms

the impact of charitable subsidies on religious giving and attendance evidence from panel data the literature documents that charitable giving is responsive to tax subsidies but often ignores the spillover effects of such policies this paper investigates the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on religious participation using individual level panel data the results show that religious giving and participation are complements the implied cross price elasticity of religious participation with respect to the after tax price of giving is 0 27 furthermore a 1 increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with a 0 4 increase in religious attendance these results are robust under several different specifications and highlight the positive externalities created by charitable subsidies

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable this paper analyzes choice theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur an intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions the goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts the paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable theorem 1 in contrast stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex ante optimal decisions theorem 2 the paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice we consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future actions by incurring costs the main result is that in a class of games if one player can incur costs then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome surprisingly the player does not have to incur any costs to achieve this the option alone suffices however when all players can incur costs one player s attempt to signal a future action is vulnerable to a counter signal by the opponent this vulnerability to counter signaling distinguishes signaling future actions from signaling types

all or nothing monitoring a principal can observe both the output and input of an agent who works at a job involving multiple tasks we provide a simple theory that explains why it may be optimal for the principal to use only an output based incentive contract even though the principal can monitor the agent s actions perfectly in all but one task and knows exactly which action is optimal for each task jel d82 d86 m54

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

recovery rates default probabilities and the credit cycle in recessions the number of defaulting firms rises on top of this the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease this paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved markov chain which we interpret as the credit cycle this model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables we use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time variation in recovery rates which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models

the mirage of exchange rate regimes for emerging market countries this paper argues that much of the debate on choosing an exchange rate regime misses the boat it begins by discussing the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes and then explores the weaknesses in this theory especially when it is applied to emerging market economies it then discusses a range of institutional traits that might predispose a country to favor either fixed or floating rates and then turns to the converse question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime may favor the development of certain desirable institutional traits the conclusion from the analysis is that the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the development of good fiscal financial and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic success in emerging market countries this suggests that less attention should be focused on the general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable and more on these deeper institutional arrangements a focus on institutional reforms rather than on the exchange rate regime may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have seen in recent years

the costs of bankruptcy chapter 7 liquidation versus chapter 11 reorganization our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in arizona and new york from 1995 to 2001 bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to the measurement method used we find that chapter 7 liquidations appear to be no faster or cheaper in terms of direct expense than chapter 11 reorganizations however chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better thereby allowing creditors to recover relatively more our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities our paper analyzes the largest sample of corporate bankruptcies to date we research approximately 300 cases from the arizona and new york federal bankruptcy courts from 1995 to 2001 these cases consist of 1 both publicly traded and privately held corporations and 2 both chapter 7 liquidations and chapter 11 reorganizations this sample is practically the entire population of unique corporate bankruptcies in these courts our paper s primary objective is to measure how the two available bankruptcy procedures differ especially but not only in terms of cost we explore four variables namely the change in the estate s value during bankruptcy a measure of indirect costs the time spent in bankruptcy another and more common measure of indirect costs the expenses submitted to and approved by the bankruptcy court a measure of direct costs and the recovery rates for creditors and apr violations our most important findings are that chapter 7 liquidations are not cheaper than chapter 11 reorganizations particularly after we control for endogenous self selection of firms into bankruptcy procedure bankruptcy professionals attorneys accountants trustees regularly end up with most of the post bankruptcy firm s value in chapter 7 arturo bris is at imd yale school of management and ecgi ivo welch is at brown uni

coping with terms of trade shocks pegs versus floats the choice of the exchange rate regime has always been an area of great controversy and debate the discussion has once again taken center stage in the developing world the sequence of currency crises in the 1990 s the success of cultency board arrangements the dollarization plan of ecuador and the apparent swing toward flexible regimes of many emerging economies has revived interest in this debate milton friedman 1953 argued that one of the most important advantages of flexible regimes over fixed regimes is that they can smooth adjustment to real shocks even in the presence of nominal rigidities ever since this has been one of the least disputed benefits attributed to fully flexible exchange rate regimes subsequent to friedman many theories of the international transmission of real shocks have confirmed the original intuition that the shortrun responses to terms of trade shocks should be different across exchange rate regimes here i look at a post bretton woods sample of 74 developing countries to test whether flexible regimes can buffer terms of trade shocks better than fixed regimes

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

fewer monies better monies in the aftermath of emerging market crises from russia to asia and latin america there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis proof fixed rates are out flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting but there is of course the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together this paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up the case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment this paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment moreover countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and as a result only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility on the contrary they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design