a search theoretic model of legal and illegal currency abstract using a search theoretic model of money we explore the conditions under which two currencies domestic and foreign will co exist despite legal restrictions on the use of foreign currency for internal trade we study how changes in government policy i e its enforcement of currency laws through fines or the rate of enforcement affects the acceptability of illegal currency the equilibrium value of both currencies and the implicit exchange rate first we construct a model with indivisible goods to show conditions under which legal currency is fully acceptable but illegal currency circulates with varying acceptability we then introduce bargaining to determine prices in legal and illegal currency we show that some enforcement polices can create multiple equilibria while others will not also some methods of enforcement are capable of driving the illegal currency out of circulation while others are not

coalition proof trade and the friedman rule in the lagos wright model the lagos wright model a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting has been extensively analyzed but always using particular trading protocols here trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings it is shown that the first best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion without taxation if people are sufficiently patient and if people are free to skip the centralized meeting then lump sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations

a walrasian theory of money and barter we study a barter economy in which each good is produced in two qualities and no trader can distinguish between the qualities of those goods he neither consumes nor produces we show that in competitive equilibrium there exists a unique good the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest that serves as the medium of exchange this good mediates every trade equilibrium is inefficient because production of the medium would be lower if it were not for its mediating role introducing fiat money enhances welfare by eliminating this distortion however high inflation drives traders back to the commodity medium

hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution abstract a cash in advance model in which the cost of buying goods with a foreign currency is decreasing in the economy s accumulated experience in transacting in the foreign currency is shown to display hysteresis in money velocity that is a temporary increase in expected inflation can cause a permanent increase in velocity in addition the model implies that the domestic currency does not have to dominate the foreign currency in rate of return to induce agents to stop using the foreign currency finally inflation rates that trigger currency substitution need not be associated with steady states in which the domestic currency disappears from circulation

nash s theory of cooperative games as a predictor of the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations an experiment in media purchasing the authors report an experimental investigation of the ability of nash s theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations using the purchase of media time as an ex

endogenous currency substitution inflationary finance and welfare in some countries a foreign currency has replaced the domestic one to perform the functions of money this phenomenon is known as currency substitution this paper explores the relationship between currency substitution and inflationary finance in an overlapping generations model in which currency substitution is an endogenous equilibrium outcome the author describes when currency substitution may emerge and shows that it may be a purely expectational phenomenon he uses the model to discuss the welfare effects of inflation and the effects of policies that deal directly with currency substitution cs copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

dollarization and currency exchange abstract we use a dual currency money search model to study dollarization agents hold portfolios consisting of two currencies one of which is risky we use numerical methods to solve for the steady state distributions of currency portfolios transaction patterns and value functions as risk increases agents increasingly use the safe currency as a medium of exchange dollarization occurs furthermore the safe currency trades for multiple units of the risky currency this type of currency exchange and the corresponding nominal exchange rate are often observed in black market or unofficial currency exchange markets in developing countries due to decentralized trading a distribution of exchange rates arises whose mean and variance change in predictable ways when currency risk increases

barter and monetary exchange under private information the authors develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information the model is specified so that without private information only high quality commodities are produced and there is no welfare gain from using money with private information there can be equilibria and sometimes multiple equilibria where low quality commodities are produced and money can increase welfare money works by promoting useful production and exchange in efficient monetary equilibria agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high quality output copyright 1994 by american economic association

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

money barter and costly information acquisition abstract endogenous information structure is analyzed in a search model of production and exchange under qualitative uncertainty by allowing agents to invest in an inspection technology at a fixed cost where incurring a higher cost permits quality to be recognized with higher probability in any equilibria where agents acquire information some bad commodities are always produced the information acquisition promotes production and exchange of good commodities as the information problem becomes severe money can improve welfare by economizing on information costs in the optimal monetary equilibrium agents adopt trading strategies which contribute to the saving of information costs

endogenous multiple currencies in this paper i study a model in which households can decide which currency or currencies they will accept i provide a simple set of assumptions that are sufficient to prevent the indeterminacy of the exchange rate in the sense of kareken and wallace 1981 in a two country model stable equilibria have either a single currency or national currencies i also show currency substitution occurs as an endogenous response to high growth in the stock of a currency

an information based theory of international currency abstract this paper develops an information based theory of international currency based on search frictions private trading histories and imperfect recognizability of assets using an open economy search model with multiple competing currencies the value of each currency is determined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country s goods strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements while some inflation can benefit the country issuing an international currency the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country when monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the friedman rule the calibrated model can produce a welfare cost of losing international status for the issuing country larger than previous findings though estimates depend critically on inflation rates and information costs

payments and liquidity under adverse selection informational asymmetries regarding the future value of assets affect their role in exchange i construct a random matching economy composed of two assets a risk free bond and a lucas tree whose terminal value is privately known to its holder no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements the main finding supports a pecking order theory of payments agents use their risk free bonds first in order to finance their spending shocks and they use their information sensitive assets only if their holdings of bonds are depleted the theory has implications for the optimal provision of risk free bonds the structure of asset returns and liquidity

currency exchange in a random search model this paper investigates foreign exchange trading a phenomenon that typically accompanies international trade a search theoretic general equilibrium approach is adopted to study a two country two currency model for some parameter values of the model there exist some pure strategy equilibria in which commodity currency trade is conducted primarily through local currency and in which there is active currency currency exchange the coexistence of valued foreign currency and its local non acceptability conforms largely with the country specific cash in advance constraint that is often assumed exogenously in international finance literature

toward a theory of international currency we use the framework of random matching games and develop a two country model of the world economy in which two national currencies compete and may be circulated as media of exchange there are multiple equilibria which differ in the areas of circulation of the two currencies in one equilibrium the two national currencies are circulated only locally in another one currency is circulated as an international currency there is also an equilibrium in which both currencies are accepted internationally we also find an equilibrium in which the two currencies are directly exchanged we first characterize the existence conditions of these equilibria in terms of the relative country size and the degree of economic integration and then use an evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection to explain the evolution of the international currency as the two economies become more integrated some welfare implications are also discussed for example a country can improve its national welfare by letting its own currency circulate internationally provided the domestic circulation is controlled for when the total supply is fixed however a resulting currency shortage may reduce the national welfare

a fundamental theory of exchange rates and direct currency trades in this paper we construct a two country search model to determine the nominal exchange rate between two fiat monies our model allows agents to use any currency to trade for goods in all countries however search frictions restrict agents opportunities for instantaneous arbitrage and hence make the nominal exchange rate determinate the nominal exchange rate depends on the two countries economic fundamentals including the stocks and growth rates of the two monies direct exchanges between currencies are essential and they imply a nominal exchange rate that is different from the relative price between the two currencies in the goods markets there are persistent violations of the law of one price and purchasing power parity in equilibrium despite the fact that prices are perfectly flexible and all goods are tradeable between countries nominal and real exchange rates can move together in the steady state in response to money growth shocks

on the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates in this paper we consider a particular international economic policy regime the laissez faire regime the distinguishing features of which are unrestricted portfolio choice and floating exchange rates and as we show this regime although favored by many economists is not economically feasible it does not have a determinate equilibrium that is an implication of an overlapping generations model more basically it is an implication of the notion that money is wanted only in order to accomplish trades

currency areas and monetary coordination we integrate a monetary search model into open economy macro to analyze the gains from coordinating on inflation search frictions and local congestion lead to a determinate exchange rate between two currencies relative prices deviate from the law of one price because the deviations depend on the cross country differential in money growth each country is tempted to inflate to exploit the deviations policy coordination reduces inflation and improves welfare for all countries in contrast to traditional models the gains from coordination continue to exist even after each country optimally sets a direct tax on the foreign use of the country s currency

nonfundamental uncertainty and exchange rates this paper shows that there can be equilibria in which exchange rates display randomness unrelated to fundamentals this is demonstrated in the context of a two currency one good model with three agent types and cash in advance constraints a crucial feature is that the type i agents for i 1 2 must satisfy a cash in advance constraint by holding currency i while type 3 agents can satisfy it by holding either currency it is shown that real allocations vary across the multiple equilibria if markets for hedging exchange risk do not exist and that the randomness is innocuous if complete markets exist

shareholder wealth effects of directors liability limitation provisions the adoption of liability limitation provisions llps is associated with insignificant stock price reactions for all firms but with positive stock price reactions for poorly performing firms this result is consistent with the hypothesis that the net benefit of llps is larger for financially troubled firms than for other firms because outside directors are valuable to the distressed firm and llps substantially affect experts expected costs of serving as directors

government transaction policy the medium of exchange and welfare abstract policy regarding what the government accepts in transactions is embedded in a version of the kiyotaki wright model of media of exchange in an example with two goods and one fiat money the policies that are consistent with fiat money as the unique medium of exchange are identified these policies have the government favoring fiat money in its transactions a benefit and a cost accompany any such policy the benefit is that a worse nonmonetary steady state is eliminated the cost is that a better monetary steady state is eliminated journal of economic literatureclassification number e40

bargaining with revoking costs abstract a simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed the players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie if the demands add up to more than one the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the other s offer while both parties sticking to their offers leads to an impasse accepting a lower share than the original demand is costly for each party the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game is characterized for continuously differentiable payoff and cost functions strictly increasing in the pie share and the amount conceded respectively higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power the limit equilibrium prediction of the model as the cost functions are made arbitrarily high selects a unique equilibrium in the nash demand game that corresponds to a proportional bargaining solution of kalai 1977

international dimensions of optimal monetary policy abstract this paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities an inward looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms markups are exposed to currency fluctuations such a policy raises exchange rate volatility leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis a vis increased uncertainty in the export market as higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices optimal rules in a world nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward looking rules and discretionary policies even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary or deflationary bias gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass through

pairwise trade and coexistence of money and higher return assets abstract a new theory of coexistence of money and higher return assets is set out it applies to any setting in which some trade involves an exchange of goods for assets and occurs between two people a buyer and a seller we show that there exists a function mapping the portfolios of the buyer and the seller to the trade that occurs such that i the trade is in the buyer seller core and ii some people are induced to enter the buyer seller meeting with money

money and information this paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply when the fraction of high quality producers in the economy is given money promotes the production of high quality goods which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously when this fraction is endogenous however we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium the origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low quality producers which can result in a higher fraction of low quality producers in the monetary equilibrium finally we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium consequently money is welfare enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange but not because it saves information costs

the empirics of international currencies network externalities history and persistence using a new database for the late nineteenth century when the pound sterling was the world s leading international currency this article provides evidence on the empirical determinants of international currency status we report evidence in favour of the search theoretic models to international currencies using a microeconomic model of currency choice we provide empirical support to strategic externalities we find strong confirmation of the existence of persistence but reject the view that the international monetary system was subject to pure path dependency and lock in effects suggesting that even in the absence of wwi the usd was bound to overtake sterling

government transaction policy media of exchange and prices abstract we study government transaction policies in search theoretic models of money we model government as a subset of agents who are subject to the same random matching technology and other constraints as private agents but who behave in an exogenous way regarding which objects they accept in trade and at what price the objective is to see how these policies affect private agents strategies and hence the set of equilibria we analyze how the effects depend on factors like the size of government the intrinsic properties of money and the availability and efficacy of substitutes like barter or foreign currency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e31 e42