evaluating forecasts from setar models of exchange rates we consider the forecasting performance of two setar exchange rate models proposed by krager and kugler j int money fin 12 1993 195 assuming that the models are good approximations to the data generating process we show that whether the non linearities inherent in the data can be exploited to forecast better than a random walk depends on both how forecast accuracy is assessed and on the state of nature evaluation based on traditional measures such as root mean squared forecast errors may mask the superiority of the non linear models generalized impulse response functions are also calculated as a means of portraying the asymmetric response to shocks implied by such models

testing for nonlinear dependence in daily foreign exchange rates the purpose of this article is to investigate whether daily changes in five major foreign exchange rates contain any nonlinearities although the data contain no linear correlation evidence indicates the presence of substantial nonlinearity in a multiplicative rather than additive form further examination reveals that a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model can explain a large part of the nonlinearities for all five exchange rates copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

limitations of the spatial model one approach to avoiding the implications of arrow s paradox is to impose restrictions on the preferences of voters a restriction often assumed in the literature is that voters preferences can be represented by a choice among points in a space where voters preferences are convex we claim that these assumptions will often be unjustified government must often address issues of externalities or public goods which means that the possibility frontier will not be concave this in turn means that voters preferences over feasible policies will not be convex

line item veto where is thy sting roponents of giving the president the authority to use a line item veto argue that the institutional change is needed to limit special interest legislation and restrain spending opponents respond that it would grant too much added power to the president thereby upsetting the delicate balance wisely crafted by the founding fathers this article focuses on the presumption evidently shared by both sides in the debate that adoption of item veto authority will have significant consequences in terms of budget outcomes and the distribution of power 1 curiously there presently exists little empirical support for the presumption that item veto authority is important most studies comparing states with various types of veto authority have failed to detect significant effects associated with item veto additional tests of our own are consistent with these results after reviewing the empirical evidence we reconsider the alleged effects of item veto authority by seating the popular depiction in an explicit model of the budgetary process formal modeling exposes logical inconsistencies contained in popular veto discourse further the model makes clear that the predicted consequences of item veto commonly projected as ubiquitous in fact arise only in select settings

bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the u s congress explaining why committee systems emerge there but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries to analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures we adopt a vote buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers we show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

the politics of flatland a version of the median voter theorem holds for two dimensional spatial models in which voters regard the two dimensions as economic goods or goodlike activities and in which the set of feasible outcomes is constrained by budget or technology although mathematically trivial this fact has widespread analytical uses after arguing that our two dimensional model with its stability property fits a number of important and general policy areas we use our analysis to address some prominent theoretical issues

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

an empirical example of the condorcet paradox of voting in a large electorate social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon especially in large groups of decision makers however empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real world examples of such and none in large electorates this paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of danish voters preferred prime minister using pair wise comparisons this result is compared with those of a similar poll but by using different voting methods each resulting in different choices the example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions

the power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation in a distributive setting this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous it is found not surprisingly that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage what is surprising is the degree of this advantage we find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 for an majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members the voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process

the statistical properties of daily foreign exchange rates 1974 1983 abstract this paper examines the statistical properties of daily rates of change of five foreign currencies from 1974 to 1983 the main purpose is to discriminate between two competing explanations for the observed heavy tails of the distribution that the data are independently drawn from a heavy tail distribution which remains fixed over time and that the data come from distributions which vary over time evidence point to the rejection of the first hypothesis further investigations show that the rejection can be attributed to changing means and variances in the data which can be described by a simple statistical model

non linearities in foreign exchange markets a different perspective abstract in this paper we estimate self exciting threshold autoregression setar models for five currencies using weekly data over the last ten years the study is motivated by the conjecture that the system of managed floating which prevailed in the 1980s leads to different behavior of moderate and large exchange rate changes in all cases considered statistically significant threshold effects could be found in most cases these are in line with the a priori expected pattern however the application of the brock dechert scheinkman test to the setar residuals and an analysis of stability over time point to some misspecifications of the models similar results are obtained when the standard garch model is applied to our data jel f31

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

circumventing formal structure through commitment presidential influence and agenda control although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the congress and president ought to provide congress with agenda power the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship we show that if the president can make clear cut commitments presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes thus the details of political interactions in particular the possibilities for commitment may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure

a model of political competition in the underlying space of ideology this study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition i develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment three important results arise for thehomogeneous polity case first the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election second a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party third political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate

balance of payments crises and devaluation the collapse of a fixed exchange rate is typically marked by a sudden balance of payments crisis in which speculators fleeing from the domestic currency acquire a large portion of the central bank s foreign exchange holdings faced with such an attack the central bank often withdraws temporarily from the foreign exchange market allowing the exchange rate to float freely before devaluing and returning to a fixed rate regime this paper links the timing of the initial speculative attack to the magnitude of the expected devaluation and to the length of the transitional period off loating an implication of the analysis is that there exist devaluations so sharp and transition periods so short that acrisis must occur the moment the market first learns that the current exchange parity will eventually be altered for sufficiently long transition periods the floating exchange rate overshoots its new peg before appreciating back toward it for shorter periods the rate depreciates monotonically to its new fixed level accordingly the central bank s return tothe foreign exchange market can occasion a capital outflow or a capital inflow this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

rules and games this paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes we develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of pareto improved equilibria points we then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules including examples from malaysia india brazil turkey and canada we show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy

why democracies may actually be less reliable allies recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies this need not be the case alliances serve as commitment devices adding ex ante credibility to states claims about ex post behavior variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments put simply democracies are most improved by formal commitments we offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically we test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention rather than on the duration or the number of commitments our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies

a survey of recent empirical work concerning auctions in this paper the authors survey some recent empirical work concerning auctions first outlining two complementary approaches to the empirical analysis of auctions and then discussing several recent developments in the econometric analysis of field data concerning auctions

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

the cost of governing strategic behavior of the president and legislators in brazil s budgetary process several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing such as presidentialism federalism an open list with proportional representation a multiparty system and coalition governments although brazil suffers from all of these pathologies the authors argue that other characteristics of the brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost in particular the authors examine the role of legislators amendments to the budget which provide the executive a low cost means of obtaining support the authors provide evidence that the brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in congress although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

a nonlinear stochastic rational expectations model of exchange rates abstract this paper constructs an example of a nonlinear stochastic rational expectations exchange rate with an explicit solution which is consistent with nonlinearities in short term movements in exchange rates the model consists of risk neutral agents who know the intervention rule of the central bank the resulting exchange rate switches between two linear stochastic processes one when intervention is present and another when intervention is absent nonlinearity enters through the probability of intervention which is time varying and depends on past outcomes this model is consistent with the empirical observations that the rate of change of the exchange rate has little autocorrelation but it exhibits strong nonlinear dependence and its variance changes over time jel j31 g15

polarization politics and property rights links between inequality and growth most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution however empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth the authors analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization they argue that social polarization whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension makes large changes in current policies including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements the resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth they find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument the policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution if redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth if on the other hand the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty

electoral majorities political parties and collective representation in practice democracies privilege plurality parties theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice abstract social choice theory wonders whether an elec

inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders abstract participation in internet auctions goes well beyond those who place a bid participants arrive in random order and if the auction s standing price has already exceeded a participant s valuation she will not bid even so her unreported valuation is a relevant part of demand for the item and in an alternate random order her bid would have been registered i provide a method to estimate the average number of participants from the average number of bidders per auction this enables estimation of the distribution of participant valuations from either the distribution of closing prices or the distribution of all observed bids

the median voter setters and non repeated construction bond issues the median voter model pervades the literature concerning the estimation of demands for collective expenditures but with some unanswered criticism the general issue addressed in this paper is whether observed collective expenditure levels and the characteristics of observed majorities are more adequately described by the median voter model or the romer and rosenthal setter model on a sample of non repeated hospital construction referenda bond issues the median voter model and the romer and rosenthal setter model are compared in both full information and uncertainty contexts little empirical support of the setter model is found indeed the evidence supports the absence of expenditure maximizing behavior the specific conclusions are 1 the standard median voter model explains quite well for this sample of non repeated bond issues 2 the explanatory power of the median voter model appears to vary across both voting arrangements and types of reversion threats 3 the explanation of hospital expenditures which have been judged too large may be due to how benefits and costs are distributed among voters and 4 the preponderance of large majorities for hospital construction in the face of evidence that such facilities typically become a burden on the general tax fund is consistent with setters offering the median ideal in the presence of a reversion below the ideal

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

recontracting trustworthiness and the stability of vote exchanges tullock 1981 has recently restated a discrepancy between theory and observation that exists in collective decisions and made a start toward explaining the discrepancy the discrepancy stated simply is this the theory of rational action in collective decisions implies that any outcome which requires vote exchanges to be achieved is unstable in that it can be overturned by a coalition all of whom find it their interest to do so yet a high degree of stability is observed in legislation despite the fact that much of this legislation required vote exchanges in order to be passed tullock accounts for this stability in part by pointing out that defections necessary to create the instability e g a defector induced to become an aristocrat in an inegalitarian coalition create an exposed position for the defector and the possible instability is likely to inhibit the defection in the first place tullock looks at two extreme forms that a winning coalition could take given a set of bills each of which has a special interest for one legislator a logrolling form which encompasses all of nearly all the legislature and a minimal winning coalition although the latter dominates the former in a game theoretic sense tullock argues that the latter will be unstable because of the power of enticement held by the excluded minority logrolling which includes nearly all the legislature is although formally dominated stable because of the absence of this potential enticement thus for tullock if i understand correctly his argument the potential instability of minimal winning coalitions leads any one of them to be succeeded not by another minimal winning coalition but by a non minimal winning coalition that it formally dominates shepsle and weingast in a subsequent paper argue that the institutional structure of actual legislatures restricts the richness of logrolling and coalition possibilities that under pure majority rule without such institutions could overturn a proto coalition or reverse an outcome shepsle and weingast 1981 511 thus they explain stability by stability inducing institutions

pennies from ebay the determinants of price in online auctions this paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible united states one cent coins at the ebay web site starting with an initial data set of 20 000 auctions we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value we have three major findings first a seller s feedback ratings reported by other ebay users have a measurable effect on her auction prices negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do second minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price in particular minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder as predicted by theory third when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days this significantly increases the auction price on average

a conditional variance model for daily deviations of an exchange rate a model for the distribution of daily deviations of an exchange rate is suggested the distribution is gaussian with a variance that depends on previous deviations the model is applied to the exchange rate of the u s dollar to special drawing rights

redistribution tax under non benevolent governments i analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system i employ these assumptions members gain special benefits in the majority parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers the member s utility function is given in a quasi linear function the government s objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and i classify governments according to the weight the four main results are a stable majority dose not support myopic government the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers the stable transfer of non benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

rational expectations econometric analysis of changes in regime an investigation of the term structure of interest rates abstract this paper is of interest both for its methodological contribution of new tools for analyzing rational expectations models and for its substantive conclusions concerning the term structure of interest rates during the monetary experiment of october 1979 the paper studies systems subject to changes in regime interpreted here as occasional discrete shifts in the parameters governing the time series behavior of exogenous economic variables the specification is shown to be quite tractable both theoretically and empirically the technique is used to analyze yields on three month treasury bills and ten year treasury bonds during 1962 to 1987 a constant parameter linear model for short term rates is shown to be inconsistent both with the univariate time series properties of short rates and with the observed bivariate relation between long and short rates under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure an alternative nonlinear model that admits the possibility of changes in regime affords a much better description of the univariate process for short rates moreover the cross equation restrictions implied by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure are consistent with the nonlinear specification indeed the residuals of the restricted relation have a standard error of only 0 8 basis points this is a third less than that of a completely unrestricted linear regression of long rates on short rates and compares with an unconditional standard deviation of long rates of 142 basis points i conclude that once the recognition by bond traders of changes in regime is taken into account the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates holds up fairly well for these data

the political economy of the fair labor standards act of 1938 this paper examines the congressional passage of the american minimum wage law the fair labor standards act of 1938 voting on the act is modeled as a function of the concentration of the constituencies for minimum wage legislation north south differentials and legislator ideology it is shown that the house radically altered the final content of the bill abandoning a proposed wages and hours board with discretionary powers to determine minimum wages in favor of a flat rate following the objections of several interest groups north south divisions over the bill had little influence over congressional voting and the influence of constituent groups increased relative to legislators ideology as the bill became an important election issue

a correction in elementary public choice geometry this paper corrects a long standing errorin elementary geometrical constructionsthat involve collective choices inmultidimensional settings the seeminglyinnocuous assumption of separability amongarguments in individual utility functionsdoes not imply symmetric indifferencecontours in shared goods space sharedgoods necessarily become gross substituteswhen resource or budgetary constraints areintroduced the corrected constructionsuggests that issue by issue voting is lessefficacious than is indicated in theconventional analysis

short run fluctuations in foreign exchange rates evidence from the data 1973 1979 abstract the paper examines the statistical properties of daily changes in foreign exchange fx rates for nine currencies it finds that these changes are leptokurtotic i e have long tailed and sharp peaked histograms the evidence suggests that this leptokurtosis does not arise from an underlying paretian stable distribution nor from a stationary mixture of normal distributions but rather from normal processes with time varying parameters this finding casts doubt on the validity of many standard techniques t stats arima methods some moving statistics for estimating the time varying parameters are also presented

modeling heteroscedasticity in daily foreign exchange rates this article estimates autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic arch and generalized arch garch models for five foreign currencies using 10 years of daily data a variety of arch and garch specifications a number of nonnormal error densities and a comprehensive set of diagnostic checks it finds that arch and garch models can usually remove all heteroscedasticity in price changes in all five currencies goodness of fit diagnostics indicate that exponential garch with certain nonnormal distributions fits the canadian dollar extremely well and the swiss franc and the deutsche mark reasonably well only one nonnormal distribution fits the japanese yen reasonably well none fit the british pound

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

bureaucratic agenda control imposition or bargaining niskanen s economic model of bureaucratic behavior assumes that bureaucratic agenda control allows the bureau to impose upon a passive legislature its most preferred alternative from among the set of alternatives that dominate the status quo but does a monopoly on the agenda give bureaus this degree of influence over a voting body this article reports on experiments that demonstrate that a monopoly on the agenda puts the agenda monopolist in a position to bargain with a voting body without being able to impose his or her most preferred alternative on that body this evidence supports theories of bureaucratic legislative bargaining at the expense of theories of bureaucratic imposition

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

the core and the stability of group choice in spatial voting games the core of a voting game is the set of undominated outcomes that is those that once in place cannot be overturned for spatial voting games a core is structurally stable if it remains in existence even if there are small perturbations in the location of voter ideal points while for simple majority rule a core will exist in games with more than one dimension only under extremely restrictive symmetry conditions we show that for certain supramajorities a core must exist we also provide conditions under which it is possible to construct a structurally stable core if there are only a few dimensions our results demonstrate the stability properties of such frequently used rules as two thirds and three fourths we further explore the implications of our results for the nature of political stability by looking at outcomes in experimental spatial voting games and at belgian cabinet formation in the late 1970s

should the holding period matter for the intertemporal consumption based capm abstract empirical studies of the restrictions implied by the intertemporal capital asset pricing model across different asset markets have found conflicting evidence this paper asks whether an auxiliary assumption implicit in these tests could be responsible for the pattern of rejections this auxiliary assumption requires that covariances of returns with consumption move in constant proportion over time the paper tests this condition empirically using data on foreign exchange bonds and equity returns interestingly the evidence suggests that the tendency to reject the intertemporal consumption based asset pricing relationship depends upon the inadequacy of the auxiliary assumption not necessarily the relationship itself

measuring business cycle time the business cycle analysis of arthur f burns and wesley c mitchell and the national bureau of economic research presumed that aggregate economic variables evolve on a time scale defined by business cycle turning points rather than by months or quarters do macroeconomic variables appear to evolve on an economic rather than a calendar time scale evidence presented here suggests that they do however the estimated economic time scales are only weakly related to business cycle time scales providing evidence against the view underlying traditional business cycle analysis copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

transaction costs and coalition stability under majority rule 1 introduction under a majority voting rule representatives of specific political districts must bargain with representatives of other districts to build a coalition for enacting legislation that benefits their narrow constituencies but the theoretical public choice literature warns of potential for unstable majorities minimum winning coalitions divide program benefits just among their members creating incentives for those left out to entice defection by offering rewards to those who leave and form a different coalition as noted in mueller 1989 new coalitions emerge undermining the old ones leading to cyclical majorities short term programs and highly skewed distributions of program benefits 1 despite these dire predictions there is a general consensus in the literature such as tullock 1981 that programs are more stable and allocations more equal than the theory suggests 2 in an effort to explain the discrepancy between prediction and observation researchers have pointed to institutional rules and practices in congress for example as stated in shepsle and weingast 1981a and weingast and marshall 1988 the committee system provides a structure induced equilibrium that limits the possible range of vote trading and thereby helps maintain coalitions further shepsle and weingast 1981b miller and oppenheimer 1982 and collie 1988 argue that universalist sharing of program benefits enlarges the winning coalition and extends its political support 3 in this article we offer additional evidence of broad stable sharing in many programs enacted by congress by describing interstate distributions from the federal highway trusts fund htf the allocation formula for the htf was initiated in 1916 but despite wide divergence across the states in growth of various economic factors over the rest of the twentieth century such as vehicle registration and population that might have led to redirection of highway funds there were comparatively limited htf allocation adjustments analysis of state receipts from the htf relative to tax payments into the fund reveals that some states collect much more than they contribute whereas others pay in more than they receive even so interstate ratios of htf apportionments to payments have remained stable across the years varying less than changes in highway use measures would suggest going beyond this specific program we examine overall federal expenditure and tax shares among the states from 1975 to 1997 and show that there has been a similar continuity in the interstate distribution of federal funds and taxes 4 as with the highway program there is broad stable sharing of federal expenditures across the states with some receiving more than they contribute in taxes to the federal government to better understand this observed stability and use of relatively egalitarian sharing rules and to go beyond existing explanations we emphasize the desire of politicians to minimize the high transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing political coalitions politicians have incentive to prevent unraveling of political agreements to avoid the costs of searching for new coalition partners reaching agreement on the nature and distribution of program benefits and costs and verifying compliance these activities detract from a legislator s ability to address other voter concerns moreover legislators seek to protect constituent benefits accruing from long term programs that would be lost if coalitions unraveled 5 accordingly we argue that politicians assemble greater than minimum sized coalitions to build broad political support for their legislative programs offering benefits to a larger constituency in exchange for additional votes considerable negotiation over the distribution of program benefits a nd costs may be required so that once agreements are reached politicians will be loath to consider a major reallocation that could undermine the coalition

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

political solutions to market problems for some market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention however the fact that self interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion it is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions and hence to analyze self interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector our approach emphasizes this institutional structure warts and all and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance

a structural threshold model of the exchange rate under optimal intervention abstract by considering a social trade off between targeting the exchange rate and minimizing intervention costs nonlinear exchange rate dynamics can be captured by a structural threshold model this article provides a theory based empirical exchange rate model and shows how to put the model into an empirical investigation to estimate the structural threshold model we propose a two step procedure which separately estimates the permanent and temporary fundamentals of the foreign exchange market a demonstration of our approach is applied to 1981q3 2008q3 taiwan s foreign exchange market with a brief review of its monetary policies and central bank given prior estimation results are consistent with theoretical predictions and many intervention operations of taiwan s central bank are successfully identified

logical deficiencies in spatial models a constructive critique a fundamental property of any good theoryis logical consistency however two commonassumptions in the rational choice approach topolitical analysis that induced preferences overpolicy are separable and that such preferences areindependent of changes in exogenous factors are notconsistent with the archetypal assumptions ofindividual utility maximization these particularpathologies of spatial models of politics have notbeen well recognized in the political scienceliterature

a monte carlo study of the forecasting performance of empirical setar models in this paper we investigate the multi period forecast performance of a number of empirical selfexciting threshold autoregressive setar models that have been proposed in the literature for modelling exchange rates and gnp amongst other variables we take each of the empirical setar models in turn as the dgp to ensure that the non linearity characterises the future and compare the forecast performance of setar and linear autoregressive models on a number of quantitative and qualitative criteria our results indicate that non linear models have an edge in certain states of nature but not in others and that this can be highlighted by evaluating forecasts conditional upon the regime

money and majorities in the federal republic of germany evidence for a veto players model of government spending i formulate a veto players model of policy making by coalition government in the federal republic of germany the model gives testable predictions about how patterns of federal spending respond to changes in government some of the predictions are consistent with conventional wisdom namely that the spd fdp government decreased spending on right wing items when it came to power in 1969 and the return of cdu fdp coalition in 1982 produced a decline in leftwing spending other predictions are less intuitive for example there is no predicted increase in left wing spending associated with the spdfdp coalition and no increase in right wing spending with the cdu fdp government these predictions and those of competing models are tested using disaggregated budget data from fiscal years 1961 1989 controlling for category specific effects and economic conditions the data support the veto players model and this support is robust to a wide variety of plausible assumptions about the parties spending preferences

arriving in time estimation of english auctions with a stochastic number of bidders we develop a new econometric approach for the estimation of second price ascending bid auctions with a stochastic number of bidders our empirical framework considers the arrival process of new bidders as well as the distribution of bidders valuations of objects being auctioned by observing the timing of bidder arrival the model is identified even when the number of potential bidders is stochastic and unknown the relevance of our approach is illustrated with an empirical application using a unique dataset of art auctions on ebay our results suggest a higher impact of sellers reputation on bidders valuations than previously reported in cross sectional studies but the impact of reputation on bidder arrival is largely insignificant interestingly a seller s reputation impacts not only the actions of the bidders but the actions of the seller as well in particular experience and a good reputation increase the probability of a seller posting items for sale on longer lasting auctions which we find inc

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices

conditional variance and the risk premium in the foreign exchange market abstract we investigate the existence of a risk premium in the foreign exchange market based on the conditional variance of market forecast errors the forecast errors are assumed to follow the arch process introduced by engle 1982 estimation and diagnostic testing of the model are discussed and results are presented for the currencies of the united kingdom france germany japan and switzerland