winners losers and the nuclear waste dilemma this paper explores how property right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both public good and public bad components we show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure thus kaldor hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group to illustrate the result we develop social cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary storage facilities to a permanent central repository at yucca mountain nv usa for a representative city with a population of 226 195 the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is 1 42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to health and safety that number swells to 5 95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right thus property right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear waste and thus nuclear energy produced

electoral competition in heterogeneous districts this paper considers a model of elections in which parties compete simultaneously for multiple districts i show that if districts are heterogeneous then a unique two party equilibrium exists under plurality rule in which further entry is deterred the equilibrium requires that parties choose noncentrist policy platforms and not converge to the ideal policy of the median voter these characteristics are consistent with empirical observation in contrast to those of single district models necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are then characterized and related to duverger s law the existence of multiple party equilibria in this environment is also considered

a context based procedure for assessing participatory schemes in environmental planning the efficiency of participatory schemes in environmental planning is an emerging research area and many issues are not solved yet regarding the assessment of such procedures it is essential for decision makers to identify improvement opportunities of participatory schemes we propose an original procedure to address such issue through a bargaining model from the signaling game literature which accounts for participation design as well as for agents preferences beliefs and bargaining power the model is calibrated using qualitative data from surveys in french local communities involved in municipal solid waste management model simulations are used to test for assumptions on the stakeholder dialogue and explore sensitivity of game outcomes to structural parameters we propose a set of performance indicators to identify the most effective participatory schemes in achieving convergence in stakeholder positions regarding environmental and land use planning

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

insurer hospital bargaining negotiated discounts in post deregulation connecticut this paper uses unique data from the state of connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state s hospital industry for the years following deregulation 1995 1998 the data provide a rare opportunity to study payer level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services in addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers payer types and hospital types this study uses matched revenue data to analyze the economic determinants of discount magnitudes payer size appears to affect bargaining power but the economic significance of the effect is small the data exhibit patterns consistent with a bargaining explanation in which discount magnitudes depend critically on payers abilities to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated

non insurance markets loss size manipulation and competition experimental evidence the common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions however in markets where the buyer is an insurer the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned the positive dependence between loss size and the insurer s expected profits limits the insurer s incentives to reign in loss sizes in markets with small initial loss sizes insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance after having defined insurance and non insurance markets based on the initial loss size we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non insurance state this constitutes a welfare loss we design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support monopolistic insurer subjects in non insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers this provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power jel classification c92 d81 g22 i11 l13

life expectancy and human capital investments evidence from maternal mortality declines longer life expectancy should encourage human capital accumulation since a longer time horizon increases the value of investments that pay out over time previous work has been unable to determine the empirical importance of this life expectancy effect due to the difficulty of isolating it from other effects of health on education we examine a sudden drop in maternal mortality risk in sri lanka between 1946 and 1953 which creates a sharp increase in life expectancy for school age girls without contemporaneous effects on health and which also allows for the use of boys as a control group using additional geographic variation we find that the 70 reduction in maternal mortality risk over the sample period increased female life expectancy at age 15 by 4 1 female literacy by 2 5 and female years of education by 4 0 authors

a sealed bid auction mechanism for siting noxious facilities this paper proposes a sealed bid mechanism for facilitating the siting process of noxious facilities such as prisons trash disposal plants and incinerators for hazardous waste these facilities have created such opposition by communities that the acronyms nimby not in my backyard or lulu local undesirable land use are now in common usage to describe the public s reaction to them the noxious facility siting problem arises because there are economies of scale associated with having only one plant to serve the needs of a wide region the community that hosts the plant absorbs all of the environmental costs while the rest of the region enjoys the benefits of the facility one reason that these facilities have been so strongly opposed by communities is that they generate relatively little new employment and provide limited additional taxes in relation to their perceived negative impact d morell and c magorian 1982 some compensation arrangement is thus needed to share the gains from the winners to the potential loser this paper discusses a sealed bid auction mechanism for selecting a location for the facility so that all communities feel they are better off than under the status quo

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

do political parties matter evidence from u s cities are cities as politically polarized as states and countries no is the answer from our regression discontinuity design analysis which shows that whether the mayor is a democrat or a republican does not affect the size of city government the allocation of local public spending or crime rates however there is a substantial incumbent effect for mayors we investigate three mechanisms that could account for the striking lack of partisan impact at the local level and find the most support for tiebout competition among localities within metropolitan areas

property rights protest and the siting of hazardous waste facilities ture since that time no major hwf has been sited anywhere in the united states the epa had anticipated that local opposition would make finding these sites an exceptionally difficult task their pessimism was well founded and if anything understated according to the hazardous waste counsultant s latest state by state review the outlook for siting hwfs in the future is even more bleak than in the past due in large part to what they term a worsening of the emotional atmosphere surrounding siting efforts this failure to site any new hwf has come about in spite of assurances by government and company officials that new facilities built according to the present standards would pose negligible risks to the local residents attempts have been made to break the deadlock by instituting extensive public participation procedures establishing state siting boards with the power to overrule local decision makers and requiring facility owners to compensate local governments for safety services the latter provided in this paper we argue that the ambiguous nature of the present property rights governing the siting of hwfs is an important cause of the stalemate we offer a new approach to siting which recognizes the de facto property rights assumed by local communities we propose a political market via a referendum

how general are risk preferences choices under uncertainty in different domains we analyze the extent to which individuals choices over five employer provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401 k investment decision exhibit systematic patterns as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences we provide evidence consistent with an important domain general component that operates across all insurance choices we find a considerably weaker relationship between one s insurance decisions and 401 k asset allocation although this relationship appears larger for more financially sophisticated individuals estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains

a downsian spatial model with party activism a unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties an individual calculus of participation is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the calculus of voting this calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities and the relationship between the two forms is investigated some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties these results in general conform to the existence of party cleavages in which there are two stable equilibrium distributions of activists such that the two parties activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally finally some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections

do parties matter for economic outcomes a regression discontinuity approach a long standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies this question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities this article uses a regression discontinuity design namely party control changes discontinuously at 50 of the vote share which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes the method is applied to a large panel data set from swedish local governments with a number of attractive features the results show that there is an economically significant party effect left wing governments spend and tax 2 3 more than right wing governments left wing governments also have 7 lower unemployment rates which is partly due to that left wing governments employ 4 more workers than right wing governments jel c21 d72 d78 h71 h72

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

finagle s law and the finagle point a new solution concept for two candidate competition in spatial voting games without a core we investigate the geometry underlying finagle s law which states no matter what happens you can come out ahead if you just know how to finagle and we introduce a new solution concept for two candidate sequential spatial voting games the finagle point the finagle radius is the radius of a circle such that if a candidate locates at its center some alternative in the circle can beat any alternative in the space the finagle point is the point with minimum finagle radius from it a candidate can with only minuscule changes in his initial policy location find a response to any challenger that will defeat that challenger for each possible candidate location we provide a geometric construction which gives an outer bound for its finagle radius a measure of the attractiveness of that location to a finagling politician for three voter games without a core we provide an analytic solution for the point with minimal finagle radius that guarantees that the maximum finagle needed to defeat an opponent will in general be quite small relative to the pareto set we also show how the construction used to generate the finagle point in the three voter case can be extended to the n voter case the basic idea underlying the finagle point is that it is unnecessary and indeed usually impossible to find a position that will defeat all challengers but it is possible to find a position that is virtually invulnerable to challenge since any position that beats it can be countered by shifting to a position very close to the original location that will defeat the challenger moreover even if not at the point with minimal finagle radius in searching for positions to respond optimally to the location of the other candidate a candidate will in general not find it necessary to move far from an initial point located near the finagle point since points located near the finagle point will also have a small finagle radius

undesirable facilities and property values a summary of empirical studies abstract undesirable land uses are expected to impose health or amenity risks on surrounding communities these risks are expected to be translated economically into negative effects on adjacent property values these negative effects may be present even when such uses possess offsetting advantages of proximity such as employment opportunities the purpose of this study is to summarize empirical studies completed to date that test whether undesirable land uses have observable negative effects on adjacent property values this information may be useful in assessing minimum valuations of terminating undesirable land uses such as clean up of hazardous sites or compensation necessary to ameliorate the economic impacts of new undesirable uses

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

buyers strategies entry barriers and competition in markets where sellers have customer specific investments and buyers can make credible but costly commitments to switch suppliers buyers strategies attenuate the market power of sellers furthermore since current prices and a buyer s decision to switch suppliers are related limit pricing becomes an equilibrium limit prices increase with the time it takes a buyer to switch suppliers and with buyers switching costs but fall with the level of sunk investments thus sunk investments may restrain the sellers ability to exert market power the paper questions then the standard inverse relationship between market performance and sunk investments

prices vs quantities the political perspective regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared it is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices vs quotas increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity and decreases with the number of organized producers in the regulated industry control regimes can be ranked for negative but not positive externalities finally a control regime leading to a more efficient commodity allocation also entails using fewer resources in rent seeking activities

voluntary auctions for noxious facilities incentives to participate and the efficiency of siting decisions abstract this paper explores the efficiency properties of a voluntary auction under which the city submitting the low bid hosts the region s noxious facility and receives the high bid as compensation in the nash equilibrium of the auction game the auction mechanism is individually rational participation is rational for all values of the local environmental costs of the facility incentive compatible the facility is located in the low cost city and revenue neutral if the compensation of the host city distorts location choices participation in the auction is rational for all values of local environmental costs if the scale economies associated with the noxious facility are large relative to the average local environmental cost and the distortionary cost per dollar of compensation

explaining variation in the competitiveness of u s senate elections 1922 2004 we develop and test predictions about the factors determining the competitiveness of elections to the u s senate to do so we deliberately abstract away from candidate specific conditions that have often been used to study political competitiveness in order to focus on basic structural features of the electoral landscape in our framework party specific constraints on the ideological positioning of local candidates linked to the national party organization and its contributors interact with the heterogeneity of state electorates to determine the number of highly competitive senate contests three hypotheses emerge from this model 1 the greater the diversity of a party s national legislative delegation the more highly competitive senate elections we will observe 2 states in which the ideological heterogeneity of the electorate is relatively high will exhibit a greater number of highly competitive elections and 3 highly competitive senate contests will be more common in states with closed primaries than in states with open primaries we provide strong evidence in support of the first two hypotheses and some evidence in support of the third

beyond the median voter preferences district heterogeneity and political representation despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts however all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter we utilize a unique data set consisting of individual level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences we find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

on a political solution to the nimby conflict scale economy in the construction and operation of public facilities such as landfills calls for cooperation among communities to build a common facility arthur o sullivan 1993 such a facility is a mixture of a public good and a private bad and hence leads to strong opposition by communities to locate it in their vicinity bruno s frey et al 1996 this is one of the most serious environmental concerns of recent years and is known as nimby not in my backyard in this paper we study the hypothesis that a democratic political process creates an adequate mechanism for the resolution of the nimby conflict the intuitive explanation is simple a nimby conflict is likely to induce lobbying and symmetric pressures by all threatened communities in the relevant region as is well known gene m grossman and elhanan helpman 1994 when subject to symmetric pressures politicians stick firmly to principles and function most efficiently the existing literature on the siting of noxious facilities focuses mainly on normative issues such as welfare maximizing siting via decentralized community based mechanisms e g howard kunreuther and paul r kleindorfer 1986 robert c mitchell and richard t carson 1986 and deborah minehart and zvika neeman 2002 evidently however such mechanisms have seldom been practiced e g stephen k swallow et al 1992 the current study adopts a positive approach integrating a political economic framework with a model of a competitive real estate market in the theoretical section a government of a linear two city economy determines the location of a noxious facility which affects the equilibrium in the real estate market and induces the spatial distributions of price and population the government is subject to political pressures by city level lobbies of landowners both landlords and home owners in general the political equilibrium and the socially optimal siting differ however the more equitable the distribution of landownership in the region the smaller the difference at the limit when property distribution is perfectly equitable and all cities participate in the political arena the government locates the facility at the socially optimal site the analysis proceeds by identifying additional conditions under which the political equilibrium siting coincides with the socially optimal location and with an empirical analysis in the empirical section the theoretical framework is extended to account for a multiple city region and is calibrated to assess the prospects of the political system for resolving the nimby conflict in the context of landfill siting in israel it is shown that if all cities in the region form political lobbies and the politicians are not extremely corrupt the political siting is close geographically to the socially optimal location and the difference entails a less than 0 1 percent reduction in social welfare moreover even if the formation of lobbying in the region is incomplete as long as the weight the politicians assign to social welfare is larger than 0 7 the proximity of the politically and socially optimal locations is preserved we interpret the above results as supportive of the hypothesis of an effective political solution to the nimby conflict

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

the social sub optimality of competitive elections comment buchler public choice 133 3 4 439 456 2007 models elections as methods of making social choices among different options and argues that increased electoral competition may produce inferior outcomes however competitive elections also play a role in affecting the behavior of candidates and of elected officials in office once this role is recognized competitive elections must be seen as a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in the production of socially optimal government

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

how do health insurer market concentration and bargaining power with hospitals affect health insurance premiums the us health insurance industry is highly concentrated and health insurance premiums are high and rising rapidly policymakers have focused on the possible link between the two leading to aca provisions to increase insurer competition however while market power may enable insurers to include higher profit margins in their premiums it may also result in stronger bargaining leverage with hospitals to negotiate lower payment rates to partially offset these higher premiums we empirically examine the relationship between employer sponsored fully insured health insurance premiums and the level of concentration in local insurer and hospital markets using the nationally representative 2006 2011 kff hret employer health benefits survey we exploit a unique feature of employer sponsored insurance in which self insured employers purchase only administrative services from managed care organizations to disentangle these different effects on insurer concentration by constructing one concentration measure representing fully insured plans transactions with employers and the other concentration measure representing insurers bargaining with hospitals as expected we find that premiums are indeed higher for plans sold in markets with higher levels of concentration relevant to insurer transactions with employers lower for plans in markets with higher levels of insurer concentration relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals and higher for plans in markets with higher levels of hospital market concentration

the subnational politics of economic adjustment provincial politics and fiscal performance in argentina existing research has failed to address the impact of subnational politics on economic adjustment this article attempts to fill this gap by outlining theoretical reasons for anticipating policy divergences across levels of government and by offering three hypotheses to account for variation at the subnational level the authors explore these ideas on the basis of the argentine experience the study traces the impact of subnational policy on argentine economic adjustment and tests hypotheses about subnational policy variation on the basis of provincial fiscal data the authors findings underline the importance of subnational policy choice for national performance and suggest a revised understanding of the role of political competition in the economic adjustment process the authors find considerable evidence that interactions between party competition and the structure of the public sector shape provincial fiscal performance and thereby condition the capacity for economic adjustment at the national level

insurance markets with loss prevention activity profits market structure and consumer welfare this article considers the joint production of insurance protection and loss prevention by insurers we first examine the loss distribution of consumers that is potentially the most profitable for insurers unlike in the preponderance of the insurance literature which assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of the insurer in several different market settings whether the insurance protection and loss prevention services can be perfectly bundled plays a key roll in the insurer s pricing decision we consider consumer welfare under various market settings and demonstrate that a consumer may be better off when the insurance market is monopolistic rather than competitive finally we consider whether monopoly power in the loss prevention market leads to monopoly power in an otherwise perfectly contestable insurance market we also show conditions under which a loss prevention monopolist would increase expected profit by integrating into the insurance market

risk preferences are not time preferences risk and time are intertwined the present is known while the future is inherently risky this is problematic when studying time prefer ences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present biased behavior we systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment discounted expected utility performs well with risk but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply the data cannot be explained by prospect theory hyperbolic discounting or preferences for resolution of uncertainty but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty the data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences jel c91 d81 d91 understanding individual decision making under risk and over time are two foundations of economic analysis 1 in both areas there has been research to suggest that standard models of expected utility eu and exponential discounting are flawed or incomplete regarding time experimental research has uncovered evidence of a present bias or hyperbolic discounting frederick loewenstein and o donoghue 2002 regarding risk there are number of well documented departures from eu such as the allais 1953 common consequence and common ratio paradoxes an organizing principle behind expected utility violations is that they seem to arise as so called boundary effects where certainty and uncertainty are combined camerer 1992 harless and camerer 1994 and starmer 2000 indicate that violations of expected utility are notably less prevalent when all choices are uncertain this observation is especially interesting when considering decisions about risk taking over time in particular certainty and uncertainty are combined in intertemporal decisions the present is known and certain while the future is inherently risky this observation is problematic if one intends to study time preference in isolation from

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data

customer ownership and quality provision in public services under asymmetric information the implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and nonhosting communities the article focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring we show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve deadlocks that money transfers to a for profit operator cannot solve the analysis highlights three main factors behind this fact first a customer owned cooperative internalizes at least partially the external effects generated by the project second the alignment of cooperative members preferences with those of the social planner reduces in some cases eliminates the distortions caused by information asymmetries third cooperatives require less costly monitoring than their for profit counterparts we also show that cooperatives productive inefficiency with respect to for profits may emerge endogenously as a consequence of a lower pressure to compete on costs for the market