complexity in structured finance we study complexity in the market for securitized products a market at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007 9 the complexity of these products rose substantially in the years preceding the financial crisis we find that securities in more complex deals default more and have lower realized returns the worse performance is economically meaningful a one standard deviation increase in complexity represents an 18 increase in default on aaa securities however yields of more complex securities are not higher indicating that investors did not perceive them as riskier our results are consistent with complexity obfuscating security quality

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

rational beliefs and security design this article studies the security design problem of a cash constrained firm facing investors with diverse beliefs investor rational beliefs are modeled as varying and yet rational in the sense of kurz 1994 with two investors optimal designs are similar under rational beliefs and rational expectations with many investors however optimal securities under rational beliefs maximize investor differences of opinion while under rational expectations optimal designs minimize disagreements we demonstrate that the common practice of issuing multiple securities backed by a single asset is optimal under rational beliefs but not under rational expectations researching market beliefs can create substantial value for firms article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

strategic liquidity supply and security design we study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity in our model asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash flows liquidity suppliers can be competitive or strategic in the optimal trading mechanism associated to an arbitrary given security issuers with low cash flows sell their entire holdings of the security while issuers with high cash flows are typically excluded from trade by designing the security optimally issuers can avoid exclusion altogether we show that the optimal security is debt because of its low informational sensitivity debt mitigates the adverse selection problem furthermore by pooling all issuers with high cash flows debt also reduces the ability of a monopolistic liquidity supplier to exclude them from trade in order to better extract rents from issuers with lower cash flows

optimal vs traditional securities under moral hazard this paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by wellestablished firms standard moral hazard models predict that equity debt and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments i show that issuing these securities is nevertheless nearly optimal the issuer would gain very little by using non traditional securities instead combined with equity one debt issue without multiple layers of seniority and one warrant issue without multiple exercise prices suffice to achieve near optimality the near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer s ability to use war rants in addition to debt and equity

the design of securities abstract this paper investigates the determinants of security design we consider the assignment of both cash flows and voting rights focusing on corporate control we postulate that a conflict of interest exists between contestants for control and outside investors the conflict arises because private benefits of control give contestants an incentive to acquire control even when this reduces firm value security design is a tool for resolving these conflicts and maximizing firm value our main result is that a single voting security is optimal

optimal innovation of futures contracts this article presents a simple model of the innovation of new futures contracts by transaction volume maximizing futures exchanges in incomplete markets under uncertainty with mean variance preferences and proportional transactions costs we characterize the set of nash equilibria for a number of exchanges simultaneously or sequentially choosing contracts the optimal monopolistic contract design is shown to be pareto optimal an example shows the failure of pareto optimality for aparticularnash equilibrium likewise in a monopolistic multiperiod setting an example shows the failure of pareto optimality given an incentive for the exchange to induce turnover

a theory of mandatory convertibles abstract the objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical analysis of mandatory convertibles which are securities that automatically mandatorily convert to common stock on a pre specified date we consider a firm facing a financial market characterized by asymmetric information and significant costs in the event of financial distress the firm can raise capital either by issuing mandatory convertibles or by issuing more conventional securities like straight debt ordinary convertibles or equity we show that in equilibrium the firm issues straight debt or ordinary convertibles if the extent of asymmetric information facing it is large but the probability of being in financial distress is relatively small it issues mandatory convertibles if it faces a smaller extent of asymmetric information but a greater probability of financial distress our model provides a rationale for the three commonly observed features of mandatory convertibles mandatory conversion capped or limited capital appreciation and a higher dividend yield compared to common stock we also characterize the equilibrium design of mandatory convertibles

cash flow tranching and the macroeconomy the volume of cash flow transformation activities has grown markedly over the past few decades we develop a dynamic model that characterizes the effects of changes in the costs and benefits of security creation lower tranching costs and increases in foreign appetite for safe assets can both increase costly security creation with positive effects on gdp and have diverse macroeconomic implications whereas the former counterfactually increases yields the latter lowers them and also raises rents associated with cash flow transformation these two features as well as other subsidiary implications of increased foreign demand are consistent with recent u s data

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

financial innovations and arbitrage pricing in economies with frictions revisited abstract existing literature points to the role of market frictions in providing motivations for financial innovations in this paper we study the effectiveness of the arbitrage pricing approach and the design and pricing of innovated securities in economies with restrictions on short sales in the process we also define the no arbitrage conditions that is appropriate for such economies the differences between our results and chen s 3 are pointed out when appropriate journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 g10 g12 g20

debt and market incompleteness abstract this paper provides a capital structure equilibrium analysis in an environment characterized by market incompleteness and risky debt market incompleteness together with a comparative advantage for corporate borrowing leads to a miller 1977 type capital structure equilibrium wherein each firm within an industry faces an indeterminate debt level however at the aggregate industry level corporations act as financial intermediaries to generate cross sectional capital structure patterns across industries despite the fact that rents associated with financial intermediation services dissipate in equilibrium for any particular firm additional implications are drawn for observed cross sectional and time series regularities in capital structure

a general equilibrium theory of banks capital structure abstract we develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms the liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a cheaper source of funding than equity in equilibrium banks pass on part of this funding advantage in the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them firms and banks choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the risk of costly default an increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky and that in turn reduces the risk of the banks who lend to the firm hence there is some substitutability between firm and bank equity we find that firms have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against systemic shocks whereas banks have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against idiosyncratic shocks

arbitrage and martingales with taxation this paper extends the martingale analysis of no arbitrage pricing to worlds with taxation the absence of arbitrage is shown to imply the existence of different shadow prices for income streams that are subject to differing tax treatments for example no arbitrage implies the existence of different martingale measures for capita l gains and for ordinary income when they are differentially taxed andfor item s such as depreciation expenses that influence only after tax cash flows the analysis is applied to several topics in finance including the debt equity decision tax options and the taxation of dividends and pensions copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

securitization bubbles structured finance with disagreement about default risk abstract an additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets when risk neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists demand on risky tranches with disagreement about default correlation low correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless high correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching

trading in derivatives when the underlying is scarce abstract regulatory restrictions and market frictions can constrain the aggregate quantity of long and short positions in a security when these constraints bind we refer to the security as scarce and its price becomes distorted relative to its value in a frictionless market we show that an otherwise redundant derivative can reduce the price distortion of the underlying security by relaxing its scarcity we also show that it is especially important to analyze the underlying and derivative markets jointly when evaluating the impact of regulation such as short sales bans and position limits in derivatives that restricts trade

the democratization of credit and the rise in consumer bankruptcies financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies to evaluate this story we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions asymmetric information about borrowers risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer innovations that ameliorate asymmetric information or reduce this fixed cost have large extensive margin effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers this results in more defaults and borrowing and increased dispersion of interest rates using the survey of consumer finances and federal reserve board interest rate data we find evidence supporting these predictions specifically the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled while the new cardholders of the late 1980s and 1990s had riskier observable characteristics than existing cardholders our calculation suggest these new cardholders accounted for over 25 of the rise in bank credit card debt and delinquencies between 1989 and 1998

banking scope and financial innovation we explore the implications of financial system design for financial innovation we begin with assumptions about the investment opportunities of firms their observable attributes and the roles of commercial banks investment banks and the financial market we examine the borrower s choice between bank and financial market funding the commercial bank s choice of monitoring capacity and the investment bank s choice of whether to invest in financial innovation our main result is that financial innovation in a universal banking system is stochastically lower than innovation in a financial system in which commercial and investment banks are functionally separated article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

bankruptcy limited liability and the modigliani miller theorem this paper examines the validity of the modigliani miller theorem in the presence of bankruptcy the theorem asserts that the value of a firm and the set of return patterns that the capital markets offer to private investors are independent of firm debt equity ratios the usual proof of the theorem is based on the presumption that in perfect capital markets borrowing by firms and borrowing by individuals can be perfect substitutes it is unclear whether this presumption is valid when there is a positive probability that either the firm or the individual who borrows to invest in the firm goes bankrupt on the one hand joseph stiglitz 1969 and robert merton have argued that the modigliani miller theorem remains valid even with bankruptcy if agents who borrow to invest in a firm can limit their liability to the amount of collateral they put up on the other hand vernon smith 1972 has argued that a margin loan which is secured by a pure equity collateral has a different return pattern from a direct loan to the firm and cannot serve as a substitute for the latter see also david baron smith s argument raises a number of issues first it brings out the important fact that return patterns for limited liability borrowing and lending depend on the composition of the portfolio that serves as collateral if a firm goes bankrupt a pure equity collateral is worthless whereas a collateral that contains some bonds may still earn a positive return because the bonds have a privileged claim to the firm s remaining assets in general margin contracts with different collateral compositions will generate different return patterns both for the borrower and the lender given this multiplicity of return patterns on margin loans one would not expect that all margin loans can be used as substitutes for direct loans to the firm this intuition is confirmed by smith s demonstration that a particular margin loan namely the loan on pure equity collateral cannot serve this purpose the question remains open whether this is actually needed for the modiglianimiller theorem it might be enough if some appropriate margin loan could be used as a substitute for lending to the firm in pursuing this problem one finds a gap in the standard proof of the modiglianimiller theorem usually one applies an arbitrage argument to show that as a firm changes its debt equity ratio investors in shares and bonds adjust their portfolios so as to leave their overall return patterns unchanged no such arguments are given for other securities related to the firm in particular for margin investments and for margin loans that serve to finance those margin investments without an analysis of professor of economics university of bonn research on this paper was supported by nsf grant soc 75 13437 at princeton university and by the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft i have benefited from the advice of dwight jaffee and an anonymous referee in a similar vein stiglitz 1972 asserts the value of the firm decregses because there is a divergence in the estimation of the chances of bankruptcy between the lender and the borrower p 467 this analysis rests upon a form of market segmentation that is without economic merit in his model there are two groups of agents optimists and pessimists the optimists invest all their wealth in the firm s equity valued to make the rate of return equal to that on the riskless asset the pessimists are indifferent between the risky firm s bonds and the riskless asset it follows that the optimists being more optimistic than the pessimists must prefer the risky bond to the riskless asset and hence to the equity yet stiglitz assumes that the optimists invest in the equity and not in the risky bond of course if one group invests all its wealth into one asset that asset need not satisfy a marginal equality condition at all a correct analysis of his model leads to the results of this paper

voting power in the proxy process abstract the likelihood that a firm will enact a management sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure this implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects an estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth the voting power of employee stock ownership plans and the chief executive officer plays a prominent role in determining whether a firm will adopt this type of takeover defense

strategic financial innovation in segmented markets rohit rahi obtained his ph d in economics from stanford university in 1993 he is a reader in finance and economics and a member of the financial markets group at the london school of economics his research interests are in the theory of financial markets in particular arbitrage in segmented markets security design and asset pricing with asymmetric information and in general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets he has published articles in the review of economic studies journal of economic theory and journal of business he served a nine year term on the editorial board of the review of economic studies jean pierre zigrand is a lecturer at the london school of economics his research interests are asset pricing financial intermediation theory and general equilibrium theory any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the fmg the research findings reported in this paper are the result of the independent research of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the lse

efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection do walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection in particular is their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable this paper addresses these questions in the context of a rothschild stiglitz insurance economy we identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality consequently we show that competitive equilibria always exist but are not typically incentive efficient however as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities markets for consumption rights can be designed to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection with such markets competitive equilibria exist and incentive constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems hold

financial innovation the last twenty years and the next the word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institu tions and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years the major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes the outlook for the future is for a slowing down of the rate of financial innovation but much growth and improvement are still in prospect

design and marketing of financial products marketing costs are introduced into the security design environment outlined in allen and gale 1988 it is shown that splitting the firm s cash flow between products enhances their investor appeal and reduces marketing costs we also explain how the extremal product design in allen and gale is thereby avoided and how in simple cases debt equity or warrants can be optimal furthermore we illustrate in general terms how the optimal solution employs portfolios of option type products and we give an example of two optimal products that share profits in seven of eight states article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

long term capacity decisions in uncertain markets for advanced manufacturing systems incorporating scope economies abstract by examining the literature in the field of manufacturing flexibility many researchers have located several form of flexibility by distinguishing them into strategic and operational flexibility forms furthermore many measures and design methods have been proposed for flexible manufacturing systems surely scope economies are one of the most important strategic form of flexibility in manufacturing systems and their strategic impact has been acknowledged by the very beginning of the flexible manufacturing era however despite several researches are available to address scope economies measurement and design methodologies very few researches investigate their economic convenience in front of dedicated manufacturing systems depending on the competitive market conditions this paper proposes a theoretical model whose main aim is the general understanding of the convenience conditions of scope economies based manufacturing systems the results of the theoretical model are very interesting because they locate market conditions that make scope economies manufacturing systems less profitable than dedicated manufacturing ones moreover the proposed model sets some general criteria to guide the entrepreneur in making right investment decision regarding this kind of manufacturing investments such results can explain the reason of many failures of flexible manufacturing systems and it suggests the use of this kind of approach to investigate other flexibility forms of manufacturing systems the ultimate goal of this research is the construction of a decision support system for supporting the entrepreneur in making decision on advanced manufacturing systems investment decisions

tax arbitrage and the existence of equilibrium prices for financial assets in models where both investors and securities are subject to differential taxation there may be no set of prices that rule out infinite gains to trade or tax arbitrage this paper characterizes the joint restrictions on financial asset returns and investors tax schedules that preclude tax arbitrage in the absence of short sale constraints the authors show that if there exists any configuration of marginal tax rates on investors tax schedules that rule out infinite gains to trade then no tax arbitrage prices will exist they also show that the existence of no tax arbitrage prices ensures the existence of equilibrium prices the effects of differential taxation on the equilibrium prices of financial assets have attracted much attention from financial economists in recent years otherwise identical securities that contribute to taxable income to different degrees will in general be valued differently by taxable investors as a result tax considerations have been useful in helping explain the effect of dividend yield on stock returns the effect of coupon levels and term to maturity on bond prices 2 the timing of investors portfolio transactions 3 and the observed capital structures of firms 4 while a rich set of observed behaviors can be better understood by reference to differential taxation there are well known difflculties in dealing with taxes in a general equilibrium setting to clear markets relative prices must reflect the marginal rates of substitution of all agents simultaneously when tax rates differ across investors however this condition can be impossible to achieve to illustrate consider a world of perfect certainty with two assets a tax exempt municipal bond and a taxable government bond to equate marginal rates of substitution the rate of return on the government bond rg must equal that on the municipal rm grossed up by one minus the investor s marginal tax rate ti that is rg rm 1 ti if there are investors in more than one tax bracket this condition will obviously be impossible to satisfy for all of them simultaneously both authors from graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university we wish to thank scott richard steven spear and an anonymous referee for helping us sort through the issues considered here seminar participants at columbia wharton the johnson symposium on asset pricing at the university of wisconsin madison and the 1986 western finance association meeting also provided valuable comments we are also grateful for the financial support provided by the center for public policy research carnegie mellon university all errors are our own responsibility

financial innovation the bright and the dark sides based on data from 32 countries over the period 1996 2010 this paper is the first to assess the relationship between financial innovation on the one hand and bank growth and fragility as well as economic growth on the other hand we find that different measures of financial innovation capturing both a broad concept and specific innovations are associated with faster bank growth but also higher bank fragility and worse bank performance during the recent crisis these effects are stronger in countries with larger securities markets and more restrictive regulatory frameworks in spite of these seemingly ambiguous findings our evidence points to a positive net effect of financial innovation on economic growth financial innovation is associated with higher growth in countries and industries with better growth opportunities

measuring the natural yield curve we generalize the concept of the natural rate of interest laubach and williams 2003 woodford 2003 by defining and estimating the natural yield curve nyc the term structure of natural interest rates our motivation stems i a from the observation that at times when central banks attempt to directly affect long term interest rates e g via quantitative easing the gap between the short term real and natural rate is no more a good indicator of the monetary policy stance we estimate the nyc on us data document its main properties and show i a that in the period 2008 to 2011 the nyc allows to better capture the us monetary policy stance than the short term natural rate

competition among exchanges does competition among e nancial intermediaries lead to excessively low standards to examine this question we construct a model where intermediaries design contracts to attract trading volume taking into consideration that traders differ in credit quality and may default when credit quality is observable intermediaries demand the right amount of guarantees a monopolist would demand fewer guarantees private information about credit quality has an ambiguous effect in a competitive environment when the cost of default is large small private information leads to higher lower standards we exhibit examples where private information is present and competition produces higher standards than monopoly does i introduction in spite of the general acceptance of the competitive mechanism as an allocation scheme many observers consider e nancial intermediation an exception competition is thought to lead to a race to the bottom in which e nancial intermediaries settle for excessively low levels of contractual guarantees in an attempt to increase volume evaluating futures exchanges a joint report from the treasury and the federal reserve board written in the wake of the 1987 crash states that t here is sufe cient possibility that at some point sros self regulatory organizations might establish margins that were inconsistent enough to present market problems or set them at levels that might present potential costs to other parties that regulatory approval should be established in all markets 1

collateral motivated financial innovation collateral frictions have a profound effect on our economic landscape ranging from the design of financial securities laws and institutions to various rules and regulations we analyze a model with disagreement where securities and collateral requirements are endogenous it shows that the security that isolates the variable with disagreement is optimal in the sense that alternative securities cannot generate any trading in an economy with n states investors may introduce more than n securities and markets are still incomplete the model has several novel predictions on the behavior of basis the spread between the prices of an asset and its replicating portfolio

class shares and economies of scope abstract this paper examines the allocative role of class shares that pay dividends based upon the performance of the individual activities of multi activity firms the firms considered operate under economies of scope and technological uncertainty in an incomplete asset market investor unanimity about the choice of production plans and a constrained pareto optimum are attained when all firms in the economy issue a class of shares for each of their activities partial issuance of class shares leads to a pareto superior allocation if the ensuing changes in production plans are individually rational

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

financial innovation and delegation of control the literature on security design has traditionally assumed that control of investment and production rests with the entrepreneur even after flotation in this article i relax this assumption which is both unnecessarily strict and unrealistic the contribution is twofold first i show that when control is delegated during flotation financial innovation is a trade off between agency costs arising from principal agent relationships and targeting costs arising from the inability to split the cash flow second i show that unlevered equity or the use of debt which can be issued without defaulting in equilibrium are optimal means of financing the strand of finance which deals with security design seeks to explain theoretically why certain contracts are used as means of corporate financing if there are zero costs of issuing securities we might well expect to find a myriad of contract designs empirically there are however just a few contract designs which seem to dominate namely debt and equity contracts it is the simple designs which appear to survive as understandably simplicity makes it easy to evaluate the risk of the securities within the class of simple contracts there still are unresolved theoretical issues however some of which i address in this paper perhaps the most puzzling aspect of corporate financing is why controlling securities have residual payoffs and non controlling securities have fixed payoffs this is puzzling in two respects first why is control associated with residual payoff and second why is risk not spread onto more than on security in particular it can be harmftlil to give controlling stakeholders too much discretion as it leads to agency costs green 1984 and risk sharing concerns would normally imply that splitting the risk giving a greater span in the market is the optimal route in this paper i investigate financial innovation in a context where both concerns apply and where indeed the optimal security structure has the properties observed the mnain reason for this which is also the point at which the paper distinguishes itself from most of the literature is that here the floatation is associated with delegation of control to the new owners in the market in particular i consider the problem of optimal security design for an entrepreneur who intends to float a firm when she must delegate the control of the firm to the new owners delegation of control implies two major concern for the entrepreneur first she seeks to design securities which take maximally advantage of existing investor clienteles in the economy as an example we can think of firms that increase their value by issuing tax efficient

tax clienteles and optimal capital structure under uncertainty this article demonstrates that investors heterogeneous tax status implies that they value bonds differently at the margin due to asymmetric personal taxes high risk bonds generate a higher amount of taxable income than low risk bonds and are therefore held by investors in low tax brackets in such a setting firms can increase their value by choosing a capital structure that attracts a particular bondholder clientele the author analyzes how bondholder clienteles change as the uncertainty about a bond s final payoff is resolved over time and shows how tax clientele effects influence firms capital structure decisions copyright 1990 by the university of chicago