the relative valuation of caps and swaptions theory and empirical evidence although traded as distinct products caps and swaptions are linked by noarbitrage relations through the correlation structure of interest rates using a string market model we solve for the correlation matrix implied by swaptions and examine the relative valuation of caps and swaptions we find that swaption prices are generated by four factors and that implied correlations are lower than historical correlations long dated swaptions appear mispriced and there were major pricing distortions during the 1998 hedge fund crisis cap prices periodically deviate significantly from the no arbitrage values implied by the swaptions market the growth in interest rate swaps during the past decade has led to the creation and rapid expansion of markets for two important types of swap related derivatives interest rate caps and swaptions these over the counter derivatives are widely used by many firms to manage their interest rate risk exposure and collectively represent the largest class of fixed income options in the financial markets the international swaps and derivatives association isda estimates that the total notional amount of caps and swaptions outstanding at the end of 1997 was over 4 9 trillion which was more than 300 times the 15 billion notional of all chicago board of trade treasury note and bond futures options combined caps and swaptions are generally traded as separate products in the financial markets and the models used to value caps are typically different from those used to value swaptions furthermore most wall street firms use a piecemeal approach in calibrating their models for caps and swaptions making it difficult to evaluate whether these derivatives are fairly priced

the effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer markets abstract we report the results of six posted offer market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path to competitive equilibrium the posted offer experiments are compared with twelve double auction experiments reported by smith and williams 1982 results differ markedly across trading institutions unlike trading under double auction rules we cannot reject the proposition that contract price convergence paths are unaffected by the distribution of consumer and producer surplus posted offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from above regardless of the distribution of the exchange surplus

on the determinants of bank interest margins under credit and interest rate risks abstract this paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion the model demonstrates how cost regulation credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision we find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank s market power to the operating costs to the degree of credit risk and to the degree of interest rate risk an increase in the bank s equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk the effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

discussion of a laboratory investigation of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship the first question concerned the assumption of risk neutrality of both the principals and agents in the models specifically given this assumption it was not clear what element s in the modeling or experimental design precluded the principal s from simply selling or renting the firm to the agent s more important the risk neutrality assumption has a direct effect on the predictions of the models the experimental results and their interpretation finally it was suggested that new experimental techniques such as those developed by berg et al forthcoming might be used to induce specific risk preferences given a particular model to be tested and its attendant experimental design although these techniques have not been fully tested using them may reduce the need to make assumptions about subjects risk preferences and thereby overcome the kinds of questions raised on this issue a second issue dealt with why the experimental study of the moral hazard problem in the principal agent relationship was carried out in a market setting with several principals and agents rather than following

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

what s different among banks abstract based on commercial paper being a nearly perfect substitute for certificates of deposits cds and cd reserve requirements creating a higher cost of funds for banks fama shows that the banking industry must have some monopoly power relative to other financial institutions his analysis does not resolve whether this monopoly power is vested in banks collectively vis a vis other financial institutions or if the monopoly power extends to the level of individual banks using an event study framework to examine the elimination of a reserve requirement we find significant evidence of monopoly power at the level of individual banks

the exercise of market power in laboratory experiments douglas d davis and charles a holt march 1998 introduction many aspects of antitrust policy are influenced by the possibility that sellers in concentrated markets may have the power to raise prices above competitive levels of course anyone can raise price so the issue is whether a change in structure e g a merger will allow one or more sellers to raise price profitably a price increase by one seller diverts sales to others so a firm is more likely to have market power when its competitors have limited capacity to expand their sales thus a merger that reduces competitors capacity may create market power in laboratory experiments any treatment that reassigns units of capacity from one seller to another may create or destroy market power even if the aggregate supply curve is unchanged for example giving one seller a relatively large endowment of infra marginal low cost units may make it less risky for this seller to raise price and forego the sale of high cost units thus it is not surprising that experiments with apparently similar supply and demand structures may yield different price outcomes as discussed below there are a number of other ways in which structural changes can affect the degree of power that sellers enjoy market power can also be sensitive to the trading institution and this is the context that power issues first arose in experimental economics for example the public posting of uniform prices in a posted offer auction eliminates the incentive to offer discounts on marginal units that arises in a double auction in fact smith 1981 found that even monopolists are sometimes unable to maintain prices above competitive levels in double auctions whereas supra competitive prices are the norm in postedoffer monopolies similarly holt langan and villamil 1986 found that sellers in concentrated double auctions were sometimes able to raise prices but that prices fell to competitive levels in about half of the sessions despite the high concentration of seller capacity davis and williams 1991 replicated the holt langan and villamil results for double auctions and then used the same market

some models of the international capital market abstract the original feature of international portfolio theory is that it considers investors of different countries who look at returns differently from each other because of deviations from purchasing power parity its purposes are i to explain the different portfolio compositions of investors of different countries ii to explain the structure of expected returns across securities worldwide i show here that this theory fails on the first count home equity bias but may still have some potential on the second count i also discuss some results of general equilibrium models of the international economy that incorporate frictions

fickle investors an impediment to growth the aim of this paper is to construct theoretical models which help to shed light on the recent criticisms of volatile investment flows we do not make any empirical attempt to establish the exisitence or gauge the importance of the adverse affects of flows in recent exchange rate crises instead we simply assume the existence of fickle outside investors and examnine the consequences for the economy in the context of two partial equilibrium endogenous growth models in our first model the scale of fickle outside investment funds traces out a meanvariance tradeoff for the growth rate of the economy in particular the volatility of these funds dissuades risk averse agents from the risky entrpreneural activities this result opens up the possibility theat some regulation of outside investment may increase growth our second model involves increasing returns and multiple equilibria in the context of this model fickle investor behaviour can have very persistent and substantial effects on both output growth and volatility

the effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade abstract mindful of the market structure conduct performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance we compare posted offer markets where sellers but not buyers are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups 1 posted offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities 2 double auction markets with conspiratorial opportunities and 3 posted offer markets with true single seller monopolists the basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are 1 seller conspiracies in posted offer markets tend to raise prices but not profits relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies 2 posted offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices but not profits than double auction conspiracies and 3 posted offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits but not prices then posted offer conspiracies

advance production in posted offer markets abstract data from market sessions in which production is to demand are compared with data from sessions requiring that output decisions be made and production costs incurred prior to the start of trading in each period no inventory carry over is permitted differences in aggregate output measures such as average contact price sales and market efficiency tend to disappear as traders gain experience in an unchanging environment however the addtional risk introduced by the sunk cost aspect of advance production appears to offset any advantage regarding sellers share of the surplus conferred by the power to post prices

advance production in oral double auction markets abstract the effects of advance production in oral double auction markets are investigated price distributions under advance production ap and production to demand td conditions do not differ however production and efficiency in ap markets tend to be lower than in td markets

experience and inventory management in double auction markets abstract prior research indicates that double auction markets with inexperienced traders and production to demand consistently perform very close to the competitive ideal with high efficiency and average prices in the competitive equilibrium range when the environment becomes more complex with the introduction of advance production and costless inventory carryover the efficiency of the double auction market with inexperienced traders is reduced and production and sales are lower in comparison with the production to demand double auction market the central finding of this paper is that even when traders are experienced the efficiency losses associated with this more complex double auction environment remain

indeterminacy and increasing returns abstract we investigate properties of the one sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms the first involves input externalities the second involves monopolistic competition we show for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of business fluctuations driven by self fulfilling beliefs in our first class of models growth is generated by exogenous increases in factor productivity in the second class the marginal product of capital is large enough for endogenous growth journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 o40

a model of the commercial loan rate this paper explores the theoretical and empirical determinants of the commercial loan rate charged by commercial banks based on a model of financial intermediary behavior which assumes monopolistic competition in asset and liability markets the model incorporates the constraint that banks must maintain at least a minimum quantity of bonds in asset portfolios equations are estimated on a time series basis to explain the behavior of commercial loan rates over the period 1953 to 1980 the evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that commercial banks operate in a market characterized by imperfect competition and that they explicitly set loan rates the development of large scale econometric models has focused attention on the operation of the commercial loan market because of the importance of commercial loan activity in the transmission of monetary policy moreover it is commonly accepted that the quantity of commercial loans or changes in these loans has an important influence on the holding of free reserves by commercial banks and this implies that the commercial loan market has an effect on the supply of money 2 nevertheless the determinants of commercial loan rates have drawn relatively little analytical attention previous work on the commercial loan market has generally focused on the question of whether this market is characterized by credit rationing 3 most studies assume that the commercial loan market is generally competitive but at times the commercial loan rate does not clear the market the quantity of loans transacted is constrained by the supply function and commercial banks engage in nonprice rationing of customers a corollary of this rationing hypothesis is that events in the deposit market have an important influence on the quantity of commercial loans 4 the purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of the commercial

asymmetric surplus distribution and the price convergence path in posted offer markets a note abstract we report results from five posted offer experiments with firm specific quotas the average contract price converges from below the competitive equilibrium thus the independence of the contract price convergence path from surplus distribution is questioned in our results

a comparison of posted offer and double auction pricing institutions this paper presents an experimental study of a computerized posted offer pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the u s posted offer market performance is evaluated relative to double auction market performance using two supply and demand designs subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable the market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted offer pricing relative to double auction however the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions when feasible the predictive power of competitive nash and limit price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

advance production in experimental markets the effects of advance production in posted offer and double auction markets are investigated previously observed differences between these institutions in mean contract prices and in the distribution of producers and consumers surpluses under the production to demand condition disappear when sellers make output decisions and incur production costs prior to the start of trading the double auction institution remains more efficient under advance production the results suggest that the differential effects of alternative trading institutions on market outcomes may be partially offset by the production conditions characterizing a market

price formation in double auctions abstract we develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer similarly buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted these beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data including frequencies of asks bids accepted asks and accepted bids then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus the trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve transaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d8

competitive equilibrium convergence in a posted offer market with extreme earnings inequities abstract we present the results of five laboratory posted offer experiments in which the competitive equilibrium model predicts that all exchange profits are received by one side of the market thus defining a boundary condition price converges to the prediction more slowly when buyers rather than sellers receive the exchange surplus apparently due to the increased market power of sellers in this trading mechanism a model of the seller s decision in this market is developed to explain this result we also observe costly signalling and tacit collusion in our experiments

modeling the banking firm a survey this paper reports on the status of the literature on micro bank modeling and assesses our understanding of the banking firm s optimal behavior this is no mean task for much has been written on banking broadly defined over the past couple of decades the review is developed in pieces each major subproblem is outlined and the analysis used to deal with the issue explicated this is not the best way to summarize the development of a field it should be immediately recognized one would prefer to have a smooth continuum of development moving the frontier of knowledge evenly through time and across subareas yet this is rarely the way a field develops more likely individual questions attract attention and are the subjects of a substantial number of contributions after a time the field moves on to the new area of interest the banking field is no exception before embarking upon the review however a couple of lines should be devoted to previous attempts there have been essentially three first pyle 1972 analyzes the uncertainty portfolio models at a time when little existed in the literature and hence one finds the review a bit vague and sketchy baltensperger s contributions 1978 1980 are the next serious and rather extensive reviews the quality of these

bank liquidity providing in a real synergy management under a cap based valuation since banks often lend via commitments their lending and deposit taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function the provision of liquidity on demand we explore this function under a cap based valuation we find that i the strike price of the cap based valuation increases the bank s liquid asset holdings by increasing its loan rate and loan commitment rate with the strategic rate adjustment complements and decreases the bank s external finance need by increasing its deposit rate when the bank realizes a less risky state of the world and ii the number of caplet days decreases the bank s liquid asset holdings by decreasing its loan rate and loan commitment rate with the strategic rate adjustment complements and the strategic timing substitutes and increases the bank s external finance need by decreasing its deposit rate with the strategic timing substitutes when the bank realizes a more risky state our findings provide alternative explanations concerning the bank s liquidity funct

the intersection of market and credit risk abstract economic theory tells us that market and credit risks are intrinsically related to each other and not separable we describe the two main approaches to pricing credit risky instruments the structural approach and the reduced form approach it is argued that the standard approaches to credit risk management creditmetrics creditrisk and kmv are of limited value when applied to portfolios of interest rate sensitive instruments and in measuring market and credit risk empirically returns on high yield bonds have a higher correlation with equity index returns and a lower correlation with treasury bond index returns than do low yield bonds also macro economic variables appear to influence the aggregate rate of business failures the creditmetrics creditrisk and kmv methodologies cannot reproduce these empirical observations given their constant interest rate assumption however we can incorporate these empirical observations into the reduced form of jarrow and turnbull 1995b drawing the analogy risk 5 63 70 model here default probabilities are correlated due to their dependence on common economic factors default risk and recovery rate uncertainty may not be the sole determinants of the credit spread we show how to incorporate a convenience yield as one of the determinants of the credit spread for credit risk management the time horizon is typically one year or longer this has two important implications since the standard approximations do not apply over a one year horizon first we must use pricing models for risk management some practitioners have taken a different approach than academics in the pricing of credit risky bonds in the event of default a bond holder is legally entitled to accrued interest plus principal we discuss the implications of this fact for pricing second it is necessary to keep track of two probability measures the martingale probability for pricing and the natural probability for value at risk we discuss the benefits of keeping track of these two measures

the effects of rent asymmetries in markets characterized by advance production abstract the results of 40 controlled market sessions are reported the effects of advance production and the distribution of the market surplus between buyers and sellers on the relative performance of posted offer and double auction markets are compared with the relative performance of posted offer and double auction institutions in markets with production to order performance differences between the two institutions across production conditions as the surplus distributions are varied are similar but not identical the distribution of surplus appears to have an effect on the performance measures in advance production markets

advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments i introduction for years the federal trade commission ftc has attacked unfair and deceptive advertising recently it has turned its attention to errors of omission rather than commission by challenging agreements among sellers to limit advertising even when it is truthful one reason for eliminating advertising restrictions is to stimulate competition in the advertised dimension of the good or service for example price advertising may result in more price competition on the other hand professional associations argue that price competition causes product quality to deteriorate because sellers of high quality services are forced to match the lower prices of sellers of low quality products and through their codes professional associations have implicitly or explicitly discouraged some forms of advertising including price advertising restrictions of this nature still exist in some local markets although they have become the subject of ftc litigation 1 the quality deterioration argument of professional associations is plausible only when buyers are unable to observe quality prior to purchase 2 when buyers cannot distinguish quality moral hazard invites sellers to lower cost by providing lower quality adverse selection can result from price advertising causing lower cost products to drive out higher cost products as argued by akerlof 1970 the opposite point of view is that even when quality cannot be determined prior to purchase price advertising may enable sellers to signal quality and develop reputations 3 moreover transactions repeatedly involving the same buyers and sellers may enable buyers to form expectations about seller quality based on their experience that can make it worthwhile for a seller to provide higher quality the series of laboratory experiments described here permits the evaluation of market performance when buyers have very limited information the claim to be investigated is that price advertising prevents quality deterioration and improves market efficiency reputation formation through advertising is emphasized instead of other mechanisms such as warranties that may prevent quality deterioration 4 so that quality can be kept relatively neutral and easily understood by subjects we represent it as the grade of a commodity the structure underlying the experiments is based on holt s model of the determination of industry quality which is summarized in schmalensee 1979 demand is induced through the values for which buyers can redeem their purchases value is linearly related to grade so that no difference between average and marginal valuation of quality can arise to cause nonoptimal quality as it did in spence 1976 the production cost for each seller is quadratic in the grade selected by the seller therefore the efficient grade level is unique the most closely related experimental work on product quality decisions is reported in lynch miller plott and porter 1986 in their experiments sellers chose one of two quality levels prices were determined in an oral double auction efficient price and quality outcomes resulted when prospective buyers were given full information about quality removing the identities of sellers and allowing only post purchase quality information sometimes resulted in a lemons outcome in which sellers offer a low quality product even though the market would be more efficient with the production and sale of a high quality product private information tended to yield less efficient outcomes than full public information the posted offer experiments reported in this paper differ from the oral double auction experiments in lynch miller plott and porter because one of our objectives was to examine the effect of advertising restrictions on market efficiency in our experiments price advertising is implemented in a standard posted offer auction

sharp reductions in current account deficits an empirical analysis abstract we study determinants and consequences of sharp reductions in current account imbalances reversals in low and middle income countries we pose two questions what triggers reversals and what factors explain how costly reversals are we find that both domestic variables such as the current account balance openness and the level of reserves and external variables such as terms of trade shocks us real interest rates and growth in industrial countries seem to play an important role in explaining reversals in current account imbalances we also find some evidence that countries with a less appreciated real exchange rate higher investment and more openness prior to the reversal tend to grow faster after a reversal occurs

the paradox of liquidity the more liquid a firm s assets the greater their value in a short notice liquidation it is generally thought that a firm should find it easier to raise external finance against more liquid assets this paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity greater asset liquidity reduces the firm s ability to commit to a specific course of action as a result greater asset liquidity can in some circumstances reduce the firm s capacity to raise external finance firms with excessively liquid assets are in the best position to finance illiquid projects this leads us to a theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation based on the liquidity of assets

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

natural monopoly and contested markets some experimental results a firm may become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the product reaches a minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the entire market at a price that is profitable in a situation of this sort if there is more than one firm producing the product each must be producing at a higher thanminimum level of average cost each may be inclined to cut the price to increase its output rate and reduce its average costs the result is likely to be economic warfare and the survival of a single victor the monopolist

lapm a liquidity based asset pricing model the intertemporal capm predicts that an asset s price is equal to the expectation of the product of the asset s payoff and a representative consumer s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution this paper develops an alternative approach to asset pricing based on corporations desire to hoard liquidity our corporate finance approach suggests new determinants of asset prices such as the distribution of wealth within the corporate sector and between the corporate sector and the consumers also leverage ratios capital adequacy requirements and the composition of savings affect the corporate demand for liquid assets and thereby interest rates starting with the capital asset pricing model capm derived by sharpe 1964 lintner 1965 and mossin 1966 market finance has emphasized the role of consumers time preference and risk aversion in determining asset prices the intertemporal consumption based asset pricing model e g rubinstein 1976 lucas 1978 breeden 1979 harrison and kreps 1979 cox ingersoll and ross 1985 hansen and jagannathan 1991 predicts that an asset s current price is equal to the expectation conditioned on current information of the product of the asset s payoff and a representative consumer s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution imrs while fundamental this dominant paradigm for pricing assets has some wellrecognized shortcomings see below and there is clearly scope for alternative and complementary approaches this paper begins developing one such approach based on aggregate liquidity considerations 1 our starting point is that the productive and financial spheres of the economy have autonomous demands for financial assets and that their valuations for these assets are often disconnected from the representative consumer s corporate demand for financial assets is driven by the desire to hoard liquidity in order to fulfill future cash needs in contrast with the

optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation and deposit insurance this paper examines the relationships among capital regulation deposit insurance and the optimal bank interest margin in a model where loan losses are the source of uncertainty changes in capital regulation or deposit insurance premiums have direct effects on the bank s interest margin an increase in bank capital requirement or in deposit insurance premiums results in a reduced interest margin under nonincreasing risk aversion comparative static analysis also explores the relation between asset quality and interest margin it is shown that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of loan losses results in a reduced margin

credit swap valuation this review of the pricing of credit swaps a form of derivative security that can be viewed as default insurance on loans or bonds begins with a description of the credit swap contract turns to pricing by reference to spreads over the risk free rate of par floating rate bonds of the same quality and then considers model based pricing the role of asset swap spreads as a reference for pricing credit swaps is also considered

real business cycles and the animal spirits hypothesis abstract we calibrate a quantitative equilibrium macroeconomic model with an aggregate technology that is subject to increasing returns and show that this model may display fluctuations at business cycle frequencies even when there are no shocks to the fundamentals of the economy these fluctuations are due to the self fulfilling beliefs of investors which we call animal spirits we compare the impulse response functions predicted by our model and by two other more standard models with a four variable vector autoregression on u s data our animal spirits economy is the most successful of the three at matching broad features of the dynamic responses in the data journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 e32

unspanned stochastic volatility evidence from hedging interest rate derivatives most existing dynamic term structure models assume that interest rate derivatives are redundant securities and can be perfectly hedged using solely bonds we find that the quadratic term structure models have serious difficulties in hedging caps and cap straddles even though they capture bond yields well furthermore at the money straddle hedging errors are highly correlated with cap implied volatilities and can explain a large fraction of hedging errors of all caps and straddles across moneyness and maturities our results strongly suggest the existence of systematic unspanned factors related to stochastic volatility in interest rate derivatives markets

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association