second best property value capitalization abstract a simple model of distortive local finance shows how lump sum finance models are misleading what information local prices contain in the presence of distortions and the feasibility of adjusting observed property value changes to infer resident net benefits of public goods

the demise of the rent controlled public housing programmes of ghana the story of the tema development corporation in 1952 a new town called tema was created in ghana the master plan for tema made provision for 19 planned communities each having roughly 1500 2000 homes about 6355 housing units are government owned rental housing the rental housing stock is the subject of this study this paper reports an empirical study that shows that rent controls coupled with public management have caused investment values in the rental housing stock to disappear for example this study finds that the nominal rate of return on total investment for these rentals based on replacement value has a mean value of only 3 per cent with inflation rates around 15 per cent during the study period this implies a negative real rate of return the findings provide empirical support and justification for recent attempts to privatise all rental public housing in ghana the study concludes with public policy recommendations

the excise tax effects of the property tax abstract this paper constructs a theory of how differences across regions in property tax rates affect product prices and factor prices for a model where labor and capital are perfectly mobile between regions it is shown that consumers residing in different regions face the same nontraded good prices even when property tax rates differ across regions

efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

on the capitalization of land improvement projects abstract a model of two cities is presented to provide sufficient conditions for the value of a capital improvement to be underestimated by the change in land rents

inefficiencies from metropolitan political and fiscal decentralization failures of tiebout competition we examine the welfare effects of provision of local public goods in an empirically relevant setting using a multi community model with mobile and heterogeneous households and with flexible housing supplies we characterize the first best allocation and show efficiency can be implemented with decentralization using head taxes we calibrate the model and compare welfare in property tax equilibria both decentralized and centralized to the efficient allocation inefficiencies with decentralization and property taxation are large dissipating most if not all the potential welfare gains that efficient decentralization could achieve in property tax equilibrium centralization is frequently more efficient an externality in community choice underlies the failure to achieve efficiency with decentralization and property taxes poorer households crowd richer communities and free ride by consuming relatively little housing thereby avoiding taxes copyright oxford university press

the markowitz model of utility supplemented with a small degree of probability distortion as an explanation of outcomes of allais experiments over large and small payoffs and gambling on unlikely outcomes we show that in principal only a small degree of probability distortion is necessary for agents to exhibit the allais paradox we also show that the choices observed in the allais experiments employing small real payoffs cannot be explained by cumulative prospect theory without the assumption of low degrees of probability distortion that rule out gambling at unfair odds on all but the most extreme longshots in cpt given these points we show that the markowitz model of utility supplemented by a small degree of probability distortion can explain the majority choices involved allais experiments and other experiments as well as gambling at actuarially unfair odds

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

indirect distributional effects in benefit cost analysis of small projects small public projects perturb the equilibrium prices of many commodities generating small real income changes pecuniary externalities for many households the analy sis of this paper shows that even extremely small price changes on t he order of 1016 can have distributional effects that are far from n egligible e g 10 percent of project outlays it is shown that at least in some simple cases the benefit cost analyst can accommodate these effects without measuring the actual price changes if certain key empirical parameters such as demand and supply elasticities are known copyright 1988 by royal economic society

a general equilibrium analysis of property tax incidence abstract mieszkowski s 1972 analysis of the new view of property tax incidence dealt with a model of an economy containing only one sector and three factors in which labor was immobile brueckner 1981 incorporated an equal utility condition into his general equilibrium analysis of property tax incidence to take worker mobility into account his model however did not have capital as an input factor and the benefits of public expenditure were ignored this paper extends previous research by using a general equilibrium model of an economy with two sectors three factors and multiple communities both capital and labor are assumed to be mobile and brueckner s labor mobility condition is modified to include public expenditure effects while the results of the analysis support the new view they qualify the original mieszkowski studies in many aspects the model also sheds light on tax incidence in no tax communities which was often ignored in earlier studies

testing for risk aversion a stochastic dominance approach we conduct an experiment based on the stochastic dominance framework in order to investigate risk aversion in isolation of other effects such as subjective probability distortion the certainty effect and framing effects the result is striking most individuals are not risk averse 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

capitalization and the theory of local public finance the tiebout literature is incomplete this paper argues because it has not fully accounted for the capitalization of local fiscal variables into house values the paper explains why capitalization arises why it persists in long run equilibrium how it affects both residential location and the outcome of local voting and why it interferes with the efficiency of a system of local governments the analysis which is based on the main tiebout assumptions plus a property tax combines a model of household bids in a housing market with a median voter model of local public service determination

monopoly pricing of an antibiotic subject to bacterial resistance we develop a dynamic bio economic model of bacterial resistance and disease transmission in which we characterize the pricing policy of a monopolist who is protected by a patent after expiration the monopolist behaves competitively in a generic industry having open access to the common pool of antibiotic efficacy and infection the monopolist manages endogenously the levels of antibiotic efficacy as well as the infected population which represent quality and market size respectively and achieves at least temporarily higher such levels than a hypothetically myopic monopolist who does not take into account the dynamic externalities the pricing policy and the biological system is characterized by the turnpike property before the patent vanishes the monopolist behaves more and more myopically leading to a continuous decrease in the price of the antibiotic once the generic industry takes over a discontinuous fall in price occurs whether a prolongation of the patent is socially desirable depends on the relative levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection

land leasing and local government behaviour in china evidence from beijing since 2004 two auction mechanisms listing auctions and tender auctions have played a dominant role in land lease arrangements for real estate development in beijing listing auctions in land markets are similar to general english auctions where bidders offer the highest price to win however in tender auctions winners are determined by the bidding price and the bidder s financial capability and reputation based on granted land parcels from 2006 to 2012 in beijing this paper attempts to examine the price differences between the two auctions and the role of land auction in urban development and price stabilisation we find that land policy in beijing which aims to stabilise land prices and to provide low price residences has been integrated with urban development planning in terms of spatial and density pattern land leasing in beijing is not only a land policy but also a part of the strategy framework of local development

labor mobility and the incidence of the residential property tax abstract this paper analyzes the incidence of the residential property tax in an economy with two communities workers are perfectly mobile so that their utility levels are equal in the two communities in equilibrium the property tax is modeled as an ad valorem tax on housing services

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

the economic dynamics of antibiotic efficacy under open access abstract we analyze the exploitation of an antibiotic in a market subject to open access on the part of antibiotic producers to the common pool of antibiotic efficacy while the market equilibrium depends only on current levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection of the epidemiological system the social optimum accounts for the dynamic externalities which relate those levels to the intertemporal use being made of the antibiotic we show that depending on the parameters of the model in particular the cost of production and the improvement in the recovery rate that results from antibiotic treatment the positive steady state level of antibiotic efficacy to which the system tends under open access can be lower or higher than the level which should prevail in the socially optimal steady state in fact there are parameter configurations for which the steady states can be exactly the same however the paths leading to the steady state always differ

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

communities competition spillovers and open space we explore the impact of the spatial distribution of developers on the private provision of open space our analysis yields three main findings first we demonstrate that the mixed public good nature of open space relative to private lot consumption can lead a single land rent maximizing developer to over supply open space relative to the utility maximizing level second by explicitly incorporating the spatial distribution of open space spillovers we show how competition can lead not only to inefficient levels of open space but also to inefficiencies in its spatial distribution finally we evaluate the impact of market based open space instruments

the effect of government corruption on the efficiency of us commercial airports abstract in this paper we argue that the cost of providing public goods is affected by local government corruption because bureaucrats have no strong incentives to pursue mandated tasks under a corrupt environment commercial airports in the united states are chosen to demonstrate such impacts of corruption we first develop a theory which predicts the impacts of corruption on productivity and variable input allocation of airports we then test the predictions by estimating a stochastic variable cost frontier model which incorporates both technical and allocative efficiency of airports the empirical evidence confirms the theoretical predictions by revealing the following 1 airports are less productive in more corrupt environments and 2 airports tend to use more contracting out to replace in house labor in more corrupt environments the findings can be applied to the context of other public goods and have important policy implications for reforming governance structure of public good provision

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

the incidence of heterogeneous residential property taxes abstract in an economy with multiple tax jurisdictions the distribution of the burden of heterogeneous residential property taxes is shown to depend on the elasticity of demand for housing the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in housing production the elasticity of supply of land to individual tax jurisdictions and the degree of population mobility between tax jurisdictions it is demonstrated that the excise effects of the residential property tax may not cancel across jurisdictions and the average rate of tax may overstate or understate the burden on residential capital

patterns of growth in chinese cities implications of the land lease abstract a special feature of china s housing market is land use rights in the form of land leasehold contracts granted by the government we consider an equilibrium model in which a representative developer may choose to redevelop existing centrally located housing or to develop new housing at the periphery of the city we show that as the city grows the land leasehold system results in the city center being developed less intensely and more land being used on the outskirts of the city when compared to a fee simple environment thus cities in china are likely to be relatively more spread out with city centers relatively older than would be the case with fee simple ownership our model suggests that excess residential land use is about 6 percent in addition compared with the ownership case housing supply will grow more quickly in the near future but more slowly later on during the transition of the chinese economy parallel to the supply growth pattern equilibrium price grows relative slowly in the near future but more quickly later on while we focus on residential uses we believe our model can be applied to other land uses

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

the persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local public expenditures abstract i both characterize and evaluate equilibrium outcomes in multiple jurisdiction economies with property and land taxation but where direct taxation of residents is not possible the model contains perfectly mobile capital and population and competitive entrepreneurial governments that choose local taxes and expenditures to maximize after tax land rent when the cost of public goods is proportional to population the property tax emerges as the sole source of local finance even though the land tax has no deadweight loss it is shown that equilibria are not constrained efficient in general hence decentralized decision making is not consistent with the best use of the available tax instruments

tax increment financing a theoretical inquiry abstract this paper offers an analysis of tax increment financing tif adding to a small theoretical literature on this important fiscal instrument the analysis exploits the theoretical connection between property values and public good levels which is the subject of a large literature in local public finance using this approach the paper shows that localized public improvements are likely to be opposed by property owners outside the affected area who pay higher property taxes with no offsetting benefits by using tax revenue captured from overlapping jurisdictions tif may circumvent this opposition allowing the city to implement the public improvement without an increase in its tax rate tif is not always viable as a financing method however because it may not generate enough additional revenue the analysis shows that tif s viability is ensured only when the public good is at least moderately underprovided relative to the socially optimal level in the case where the public good is slightly underprovided a public improvement is desirable but tif is not viable finally the analysis shows that the public good level ultimately chosen under tif need not be efficient with both under and overprovision being possible outcomes thus while tif may allow a city to carry out needed public improvements the stimulus it provides may be excessive

the value of school facility investments evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design author s cellini stephanie riegg ferreira fernando rothstein jesse abstract despite extensive public infrastructure spending surprisingly little is known about its economic return in this paper we estimate the value of school facility investments using housing markets standard models of local public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have zero effect on local housing prices our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and failed by narrow margins we extend this traditional regression discontinuity approach to identify the dynamic treatment effects of bond authorization on local housing prices student achievement and district composition our results indicate that california school districts underinvest in school facilities passing a referendum causes immediate sizable increases in home prices implying a willingness to pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of 1 50 or more for each 1 of capital spending these effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners and the impact on test scores appears to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect c 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

taxes pollution and optimal abatement in an urban economy abstract a closed urban spatial model is used to examine the impact on consumer renters and on absentee property owners of pollution abatement and alternative means of financing it an explicit utility function and a relatively general pollution or amenity distribution function are used the incidence effects are developed for exogenously financed abatement and for its finance through an income tax and an excise tax note also is taken of the outcome with a property tax the model also is used to consider optimal abatement from various vantage points the results of consumer utility maximization under an income tax regimen are compared with those under an excise regimen and both results are in turn compared with the outcome when a cost benefit approach is applied

property taxes and property values evidence from proposition 212 abstract we examine the effect of proposition 2 1 2 on revenues and housing prices in massachusetts communities that were initially constrained by the law saw large increases in state aid and the use of fees we use these initial constraints as instruments for changes in other components of revenue while treating the change in the property tax as exogenously determined by proposition 2 1 2 our results strongly suggest that communities that were able to increase their property taxes more rapidly saw greater increases in their housing values in the period following passage of the law

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

tax increment financing interaction between two overlapping jurisdictions abstract this paper analyzes the interaction between two overlapping jurisdictions a school district and a city when one of them the city uses tif tax increment financing to finance an improvement in the provision of its public good both jurisdictions levy taxes on property and they provide different public goods the city is not allowed to raise its tax rate to increase public good provision but since the increment in the public good causes property values to increase the city s revenue is higher with the new level of public good however if this new revenue is not enough to finance the new public good level then tif allows the city to capture for a limited period of time all extra revenues the school district obtains due to the increase in property values then the city and the school district choose the public good level to satisfy their budget constraints with the goal of maximizing total property values two different results regarding efficiency of public good provision are obtained depending on the equilibrium concept used with nash behavior the result is underprovision of the public good provided by the school district the second and more interesting case is when the school district takes into account that its decisions affect the provision of the city s public good in this leader follower equilibrium where the school district plays the role of the leader the results show that the provision of the school district public good depends on how the city s public good is provided if the city s public good is underprovided overprovided then the school district s public good is overprovided underprovided

are efficiency and equity in school finance substitutes or complements this paper analyzes cases made for local and centralized school finance and policies such as vouchers categorical aid and equalization aid an ideal system of school finance would achieve efficiency and equity by ensuring every person invests in the amount of schooling that is socially optimal for him the author evaluates the empirical evidence for and the merit and importance of arguments for each policy she concludes that the theoretical arguments for centralized finance not only exaggerate the efficiency equity tradeoff but actually make better arguments for a system combining local school finance with categorical aid and means tested vouchers

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility abstract a single region s optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility in this model property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods e g residential property the key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods the role of labor mobility is also investigated

prospect theory much ado about nothing prospect theory is a paradigm challenging the expected utility paradigm one of the fundamental components of prospect theory is the s shaped value function the value function is mainly justified by experimental investigation of the certainty equivalents of prospects confined either to the negative or to the positive domain but not of mixed prospects which characterize most actual investments we conduct an experimental study withmixed prospects using for the first time recently developed investment criteria called prospect stochastic dominance psd and markowitz stochastic dominance msd we reject the s shaped value function showing thatat least 62 76 of the subjects cannot be characterized by such preferences we find support for the markowitz utility function which is a reversed s shaped function exactly the opposite of the prospect theory value function it is possible that the previous results supporting the s shaped value function are distorted because the prospects had only positive or only negative outcomes presenting hypothetical situations which individuals do not usually face and which are certainly not common in financial markets

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

the timing of regional development abstract consider a country composed of regions of different qualities or endowments of amenities and natural resources for production and consumption initially only the highest quality regions are occupied as national population grows successively lower quality regions are occupied the equilibrium timing of occupation of uninhabited regions differs from the optimal timing typically being too late policies which would result in better timing are analyzed

preference heterogeneity in the structural estimation of efficient pigovian incentives for insecticide spraying to reduce malaria this paper bridges the theoretical and empirical literatures on the role of preference heterogeneity in characterizing externalities related to disease transmission we use a theoretical structure similar to locational sorting models which characterize equilibria in terms of marginal individuals who are indifferent between locations in our case the locations are binary consisting of whether or not to take a discrete preventative action individual heterogeneity arises in this structure due to variation in the costs and disutility associated with prevention we demonstrate application of this approach in the context of participation in insecticide based indoor residual spraying programs for malaria control in northern uganda we identify the parameters of our theoretical model using a stated preference choice experiment combined with estimates from published epidemiological studies the model implies that pigovian subsidies for participation in this context should decrease household malaria risk by 19 25 our approach can be applied to other bioeconomic externalities with spillovers from discrete preventative actions including agricultural pest management and the control of pest infestations and invasive species

the provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firm and household mobility abstract this paper studies the efficiency properties of allocations when firms and households are mobile and when local governments provide local public goods and local public factors the analysis differentiates between immobile land owners and perfectly mobile workers and concludes that an efficient allocation is obtained if there is no outflow of land rents to absentee owners if rents flow out only local public goods are supplied in accordance with the samuelson rule the provision of local public factors is inefficiently low however and jurisdictions tax mobile firms and mobile households inefficiently high in order to restrict the outflow of rents an optimal intervention scheme is derived in this case we also analyze the distortions that result when the non availability of local head taxes makes it impossible to internalize crowding costs

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

individual vs aggregate preferences the case of a small fish in a big pond we study the relationship between the risk preferences of individuals and the risk preferences of the aggregate economy to emphasize the vast differences that can occur between individual and market preferences brought about through aggregation we assume an economy consisting entirely of risk seekers we show that such individuals can lead to an aggregate economy that is risk averse the converse is also true an aggregate economy that exhibits risk aversion does not imply an economy of individual risk averters an economy demanding a risk premium can be formed from individuals who do not demand such compensation understanding the relationship between the preferences of individuals and the preferences of the aggregate economy is crucial for understanding the connection between the behavioral finance literature which focuses on individual preferences and the asset pricing literature which focuses on aggregate prices we discuss empirical implications of these results this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

using market valuation to assess public school spending abstract we examine whether school expenditures are valued by potential residents and whether the current level of public school provision is inefficient by estimating the effect of state education aid on residential property values we find evidence that overall state aid is valued by potential residents and that school districts do not overspend on education however we find that districts may overspend in areas where residents have fewer schooling options but find no difference in efficiency by the degree of district unionization one interpretation of these results is that increased competition may reduce overspending on public schools in some areas

land rents optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods abstract a general equilibrium model of an economy with cities farms and free migration of population is constructed the cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale they also produce housing and a local public good two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other an area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement the economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area s net export of goods and resources local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value this state is proved to be a necessary condition for pareto optimality of the economy it is then proved that beside piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently are taxes on land rents furthermore if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary and local authorities can be fully autonomous if the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

on the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations abstract we compare the efficiency and social welfare properties of equilibria resulting from different governmental objectives in a federal system with a mobile population the objectives considered are total utility average utility representative resident s utility and profit maximization the representative resident approach is unique in that it depends only on utility it yields the best efficient allocation from the perspective of a government s residents average utility yields an efficient allocation that non residents prefer both the profit maximizing and total utility approaches may lead to inefficient allocations we also show that the representative resident approach is socially preferred to a total utility approach