investment and market dominance we analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment special cases include incremental investment patent races learning by doing and network externalities we investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments to this end we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes which applies to our investment game finally we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient

non cooperative and cooperative climate policies with anticipated breakthrough technology abstract global warming can be curbed by pricing carbon emissions and thus substituting fossil fuel with renewable energy consumption breakthrough technologies e g fusion energy can reduce the cost of such policies however the chance of such a technology coming to market depends on investment we model breakthroughs as an irreversible tipping point in a multi country world with different degrees of international cooperation we show that international spill over effects of r d in carbon free technologies lead to double free riding strategic over pollution and underinvestment in green r d thus making climate change mitigation more difficult we also show how the demand structure determines whether carbon pricing and r d policies are substitutes or complements

on eliciting beliefs in strategic games several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds we elicit beliefs using three different scoring rules linear logarithmic and quadratic we compare forecasts across the scoring rules and compare the forecasts of our trained observers to forecasts of the actual players in the original experiment we find significant differences across scoring rules the improper linear scoring rule produces forecasts closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules and these forecasts are poorly calibrated the two proper scoring rules induce significantly different distributions of forecasts we find that forecasts by observers under both proper scoring rules are significantly different from the forecasts of the actual players in terms of accuracy calibration and the distribution of forecasts we also find evidence for belief convergence among the observers

an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

industry and firm specific factors of innovation novelty this article investigates the underlying factors that might shape the firm s choices with respect to degrees of innovation novelty using a sample of 2983 firms observed under the portuguese community innovation survey we assess the relative relevance of a set of firm and industry specific factors in explaining firms choices about incremental or radical innovation the results indicate that both the firm s idiosyncratic historical factors giving rise to heterogeneous r d capabilities and the industry context have power to shape the firm s innovation choices even though firm specific factors appear to be more powerful the estimated impacts on firm s innovation novelty are nonetheless significantly moderated by the type of firm and industry

efficient division of profits from complementary innovations abstract many products including microprocessors telecommunications devices computer software and on line auction services make use of multiple technologies each of which is essential to make or sell the product the owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies we show that despite this externality the structure of payoffs that support efficient r d investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations the paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect r d investment in complementary technologies the results have policy implications for the organization of r d the assessment of damages for patent infringement and allocations of value in patent pools

patent races and the persistence of monopoly patent races are important determinants of market structure for a new firm a patent can be an entry ticket into the market for an incumbent firm already in the market patents for related technologies can ensure that no new firm enters in this spirit recent work has explored the implications of patenting for the persistence of monopoly see for example dasgupta i982 gilbert i98i gilbert and newbery i982 much attention has been given to pre emptive patenting the strategic acquisition of patents by an incumbent firm solely to prevent potential rivals from entering the market in this context it is important to distinguish between two kinds of patent race a standard race is a competition in which a prize is awarded to the first player to reach the finishing line an asymmetrical race is a competition in which one player loses something of value if one of his rivals reaches the finishing line he is content if nobody wins but a prize is won by the first of the other players to reach the finishing line if any of them does so a patent race in which an incumbent firm s sole concern is to prevent potential rivals from entering his market is an asymmetrical race and not a standard race the distinction between the two kinds of race can be captured only in models with a sufficiently rich dynamic structure this and other advantages of a properly dynamic model are explained in section ii a model of an asymmetrical race with two firms is presented in section iii in this model the challenger wins a prize and the incumbent loses a prize if the challenger is first to reach the finishing line it is shown that the challenger is often automatically deterred from making any effort to win the race because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach the finishing line then the incumbent has no need to make any effort in the race in order to maintain his existing monopoly the reason is that the incumbent unlike the challenger does not need to go all the way to the finishing line to achieve his objective on the other hand it may be truedepending on the parameters describing the firmsthat the challenger wins the patent proceeding to the finishing line just as if he were the only contender for the patent of particular interest is the case in which the firms are identical

negotiated versus competitive underwritings of public utility bonds just one more time over the past decade a number of papers 1 2 3 6 7 9 have explored the relative merits of negotiation versus competitive bidding in the underwriting of corporate bonds particularly bonds issued by public utilities interest in this subject has been stimulated principally by an important public policy issue namely the sec s posture vis a vis its rule u 50 originally promulgated in 1940 this rule required competitive bidding on certain classes of utility bonds in 1974 however it was temporarily suspended on the grounds that chaotic conditions in the market for these securities called for more flexibility in the way issues could be underwritten while this suspension continues in effect rule u 50 could be reinstated at any time by the sec

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

a patent race in a real options setting investment strategy valuation capm beta and return volatility abstract in this paper we study financial properties of r d intensive firms through a continuous time real options patent race model numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor furthermore we find that a firm s position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties for instance a firm s cost of capital is a non monotonic function of its relative position in the race in addition the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind or positive when firms are close in the race

the choice of call provision terms evidence of the existence of agency costs of debt an examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm a substantial number of firms however also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate the additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities informational asymmetry and the risk incentive problem using a sample of newly issued bonds statistical tests are performed to show that there are in fact differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption this paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs one of the decisions which a firm must make when it floats a bond issue concerns the use of a call provision if a call provision is included in the bond then the terms of the call provision must be specified such as the years to the first call the initial call price the call price in subsequent years and the circumstances under which a call provision can be used previous work in the area of call provisions focused on fluctuations in interest rates as the reason for their existence it was shown by krause 12 however that in an efficient capital market any call provision decision based on interest rate uncertainty is irrelevant recent work in agency theory has shown that the existing contractual relationships between bondholders and stockholders may not be a zero sum game under these circumstances such financing decisions as capital structure debt maturity and call provisions may not be irrelevant an examination of the call provisions of currently outstanding bond issues reveals an institutional feature which is often overlooked many bonds have a standard call provision which restricts the firm from calling the issue for a stated number of years followed by a period during which firms have the option to call the bond at a stated call price another group of bond issues however contain a two tiered type of call provision which allows the corporation to call the bond for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate during the initial years of the life of the bond after this initial period the firm has the option of calling the bond issue for any purpose

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

preemption in r d races abstract fudenberg gilbert stiglitz and tirole 1983 consider a patent race in which each firm s instantaneous probability of discovering a patentable invention is an increasing function of its cumulative expenditure on rd in particular we show that for intermediate values of it is possible for the follower to spoil the race by forcing the leader to drop out

bond covenants and delegated monitoring this paper examines alternative contracting arrangements available to a firm seeking to finance an investment project the authors consider the choice between loan contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of the firm s financial health and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist in one interpretation the specialist is a financial intermediary the firm s choice is shown to depend upon the firm s credit rating the accuracy of financial indicators of the firm s condition the loss from premature liquidation of the firm s project and the cost of monitoring

negotiated accounting rules in private financial contracts abstract this paper explores how private contracts tailor gaap and whether tailoring reflects the characteristics of the contracting parties the analysis reveals that contracts of bank and insurance lenders are different with bank agreements closer to public debt tailoring is one of several characteristics associated with insurance lending agreements the extensive tailoring of gaap income in insurance contracts enforces dividend and payout restrictions that are consistent with the interest of long term insurance lenders in contrast bank lenders deal with borrowers default risk by negotiating shorter maturities security sinking funds and loan syndication

patents imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic r d race abstract rd some may have an advantage in early stages of the r d process while others may have advantages in other stages of the process this paper uses a two firm asymmetric ability multistage r d race model to analyze the effect of patents imitations and licensing arrangements on the speed of innovation firm value and consumers surplus by using numerical analyses to study the mpe of the r d race the paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a weak patent protection regime that facilitates free imitation of any intermediate technology may yield a higher consumers surplus and total surplus than a regime that awards a patent for the final innovation the advantage of imitation may hold even when we allow for voluntary licensing of intermediate technologies

inertia risk improving economic models of catastrophes we model endogenous catastrophic risk in a new way we call it inertia risk which accounts for delays between physical variables and the hazard rate a characteristic often observed in reality the added realism significantly affects optimal policies relative to the standard model of catastrophic risk the probability of a catastrophe occurring at some point in time can span the entire interval 0 1 and is not 0 or 1 as is typical in standard models inertia risk can also generate path dependences we illustrate the implications for policy in a simple model of climate change

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

firm asymmetries and sequential r d theory and evidence from the mainframe computer industry we incorporate strategic considerations into the analysis of a problem that has hitherto been treated in a decision theoretic fashion the allocation of scarce r d resources when r d proceeds in stages in doing so we formalize a notion of system complexity and investigate its implications for the allocation of these scarce resources using detailed data from fieldwork at all mainframe manufacturers in the world to investigate our theoretical predictions we provide evidence that larger market share firms set more aggressive stage targets as do more resource rich firms our results can be seen as a verification of the mechanism underlying arrow s replacement effect

financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds the financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms for investment grade firms that issue bonds in both markets our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs we find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

technology ladders and r d in dynamic cournot markets abstract motivated by dramatic and unpredictable technological advances in energy production for instance drilling and extraction of shale oil we extend cournot models of competition to incorporate research and development rd for example the potential of future monopoly can spur r d investment now even if the firm is presently uncompetitive and not actively producing we also show that surprisingly random innovations have an ambiguous effect on r d this feature which is driven by the cournot framework contrasts with the common situation whereby uncertainty lowers innovation and delays r d investments finally we demonstrate that increased competition may actually increase efforts to innovate through higher desire to achieve dominance this would match the anecdotal evidence that the threat of market entrants forces incumbents to maintain high r d

non cooperative and cooperative responses to climate catastrophes in the global economy a north south perspective the optimal response to a potential productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption this paper investigates how differences between regions in terms of their vulnerability to climate change and their stage of development affect the cooperative and non cooperative responses to this aspect of climate change it is shown that the cooperative response to these stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions the non cooperative response leads to a bit more precautionary saving and diverging carbon taxes we illustrate the various outcomes with a simple stylized north south model of the global economy

invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry abstract this article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain in this framework under general conditions the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem the implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry the first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist by its mere presence can deter the invention of complements to its own detriment as well as that of society the implications of policies such as patent protection price regulation and mandatory divestiture are considered three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

r d competition versus r d cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure this paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress it is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation production capacities of both firms are product specific it is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under investing if the new product is a substitute to the established product and higher profits and over investing in case of complements and lower profits compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game this anticipation effect is stronger in the case of r d cooperation furthermore since due to r d cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced in addition we show that under r d competition the firm that innovates first overshoots in new product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position taking into account all these effects the result is that if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product positive synergy effects in r d cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than r d competition

eliciting beliefs proper scoring rules incentives stakes and hedging accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments proper scoring rules psr are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent s beliefs this paper generalizes the analysis of psr to richer environments relevant to economists more speci cally we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a psr may be biased when i the psr payments are increased ii the agent has a nancial stake in the event she is predicting and iii the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs thereby raising concerns about the ability of psr to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments

dropout behavior in r d races with learning we examine a game theoretic model of a two firm r d race in which expenditures on r d and the concomitant increase in experience learning enable thefirms to increase their probability of discovering an invention the learning process is stochastic it generates a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for identicalfirms with the characteristic that the leader never drops out but the follower drops out if the leader gains a significant lead the leader can find it optimal to drop out if the firms value the invention differently or have different r d efficiencies thus our analysis generates results between vigorous competition and natural monopoly central to schumpeter s 1934 vision of entrepreneurship are the extraordinary profits associated with innovation the lure of these profits fuels the fires of creative destruction as innovators replace declining firms this article analyzes the competition for the profits obtained by bringing an innovation to fruition and receiving the associated patent we restrict attention to the subclass of innovations known as inventions innovations that are the product of a firm s research and development in particular we are concerned with the conditions that cause a firm after having invested in r d to drop out of the competitive race situations in which the leading firm drops out are of even greater interest competition in r d is often modelled as a race in which the winner receives a patent and reaps most or all of the benefits of the invention as exemplified by kamien and schwartz 1972 the early theoretical literature tended to be based on decision theoretic models the firm seeks an optimal rate of expenditure on r d determined in part by the expected value of the invention the extent of the first mover advantage the economies or diseconomies of scale in r d and the perceived intensity of rivalry it is not anticipated that the firm s decisions will affect the r d efforts of the perhaps unknown rivals kamien and schwartz 1982 p 124 show that the firm does no research if rivalry is sufficiently intense because their model is static however it is never the case that a firm enters the race and then drops out

a controlled field experiment on corruption abstract this paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues the experimenter s scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption in the experiment a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade we find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous it lowers the bribe s acceptance but it fosters reciprocation monitoring and punishment can deter corruption but we cannot reject that it may also crowd out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified finally our results suggest several micro determinants of corruption including age ability religiosity but not gender

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

speculative profits innovation and growth when technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations we propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument originally due to hirshleifer 1971 we then use the model to assess two claims advanced by hirshleifer namely that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in r d when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection or else even in a perfectly competitive economy the analysis confirms the first claim but casts doubts on the second one jel o30 o40

callable bonds a risk reducing signalling mechanism the theory of financial economics has failed to distinguish advantages of callable bonds from those of short term debt this paper shows that either type of borrowing can signal a firm s better prospects but that short term debt does so at the cost of weakened risk sharing with capital markets by issuing either equity or long term non callable debt a firm with poor investment opportunities will not pool its prospects with those of a better firm but equity produces superior risk sharing perhaps this explains the almr ost complete absence of long term non callable bonds from observed corporate capital structures financial theory has found only moderate success in explaining the routine inclusion of call provisions among the covenants of corporate bonds in the absence of market imperfections or incompleteness the incremental compensation promised to bondholders should exactly offset the value of the call provision retained by equityholders indifference should obtain 1 nevertheless it is hard to accept indifference as an explanation given the near universality of call provisions in corporate bond contracts in this paper we argue that in the presence of asymmetric information about investment quality corporate managers can signal their firm s better prospects by issuing bonds that include call provisions our major result shows that this signalling mechanism can be more attractive to risk averse managers than would be the choice of short term debt which could also serve to signal furthermore we demonstrate that non callable corporate debt is a dominated security that is both it and equity signal bad news but equity provides risk sharing this finding helps to explain the relative absence of long term non callable debt from corporate financial markets previous attempts to explain the prevalence of call provisions in corporate bond contracts fall into four categories two categories involve pure wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders in these constant sum environments a gain to one group constitutes a loss to the other in the first category managers possess private information with regard to future interest rate movements issuing callable bonds will capture gains for stockholders when anticipated drops

venture capital financed investments in intellectual capital abstract the paper considers a new company in the it industry founded by a management team and partially financed by venture capital among the questions that the paper addresses are how much venture capital should be acquired to help finance the development of the firm how should a wish to grow with the aim of making a breakthrough in the it area be balanced against the stockholders wish to consume the problem is studied as an optimal control problem with a random time horizon and we derive a series of prescriptions for investment and financial decisions

a stochastic competitive r d race where winner takes all the paper considers a race among multiple firms that compete over the development of a product the first firm to complete the development gains a reward whereas the other firms gain nothing each firm decides how much to invest in developing the product and the time it completes the development is a random variable that depends on the investment level the paper provides a method for explicitly computing a unique nash equilibrium parametrically in the interest rate for a given interest rate the nash equilibrium is determined in time that is linear in the number of firms the structure of the solution yields insights about the behavior of the participants furthermore an explicit expression for a unique globally optimal solution is obtained and compared to the unique nash equilibrium

returns to r d on new drug introductions in the 1980s abstract this study finds that the mean irr for 1980 1984 u s new drug introductions is 11 1 and the mean npv is 22 million 1990 dollars the distribution of returns is highly skewed the results are robust to plausible changes in the baseline assumptions our work is also compared with a 1993 study by the ota despite some important differences in assumptions both studies imply that returns for the average nce are within one percentage point of the industry s cost of capital this is much less than what is typically observed in analyses based on accounting data

product innovation incentives by an incumbent firm a dynamic analysis we employ a dynamic framework to study how product innovation activities of a firm are influenced by its investments in production capacity of an established product and vice versa the firm initially has capacity to sell an established product additionally it also has the option to undertake an r d project which upon completion allows the firm to introduce a new vertically and horizontally differentiated product to the market thereby extending its current product range the breakthrough probability of detecting the new product depends on both the value of the firm s r d stock and its current r d investment it is shown that the initial production capacity for the established product influences the intensity of r d activities of the firm in particular there are constellations such that for large initial production capacity for the established product the firm never invests in r d and the new product is never introduced for small initial capacity the firm keeps investing in r d implying that eventually the new product is always introduced finally for an intermediate range of initial capacity levels the firm initially invests in product r d but then reduces these investments to zero in this scenario the new product is introduced with a positive probability which is however substantially smaller than 1 from a technical perspective this analysis gives the example of a new type of skiba threshold phenomenon in the framework of a multi mode optimization model

persistence of technological leadership emerging technologies and incremental innovation in a model of competitive innovation i derive theoretical conditions for an entrant to displace the incumbent firm by innovating in an undeveloped substitute emerging technology the main result presents conditions on profitability and innovation speed that yield a markov perfect equilibrium in which the entrant pursues the emerging technology while the incumbent chooses to persist with the established technology and collect short run profits notably this result does not require the entrant s superiority to the incumbent for innovation finally when the model is calibrated to hard drive industry data its predictions are consistent with the observed outcomes

dynamic competition in technological investments an empirical examination of the lcd panel industry abstract when are technological laggards more likely to try to catch up with leaders we offer empirical evidence on firm level data of plant investments in the tft lcd panel industry where technological competition has been intense and dynamic we find that the followers level of technology has a non monotonic effect on technology improving investments with intermediate followers the most apt to invest in catch ups this result is a puzzle given the existing theory on technology race we also find that followers catch up investments increase with the capacity of the leader that employs the state of the art technology these results are robust to variations in specification and alternative accounts of effects we discuss our findings and contributions in light of the technology race literature

why put all your eggs in one basket a competition based view of how technological uncertainty affects a firm s technological specialization conventional wisdom suggests that when a firm faces technological uncertainty it responds by becoming less technologically specialized so as to remain adaptable to subsequent resolution of this uncertainty we adopt a competition based view of technological uncertainty to identify an opposite effect in competitive settings the firm may instead become more specialized when faced with greater technological uncertainty so as to focus on advancing its technologies against competition and influence the resolution of uncertainty in its favor over rivals we propose that this effect is accentuated when the firm expects that it cannot easily adapt to rivals technologies subsequently specifically when rivals are a greater deterrent through being litigious or innovative using u s government funding for fuel cell research as a policy shock with stock option implied volatilities to measure expected uncertainty we find empirical support for our propositions among firms active in research and development in the u s communications equipment industry through these findings we demonstrate that a competition based view of uncertainty identifies an alternative path for the firm s resource accumulation under uncertainty and we stress that the resolution of uncertainty can be something the firm attempts to influence rather than adapt to

dynamic r d competition the authors study a simple two stage stochastic patent race involving two firms they examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race the authors find that the leader engages in rd 2 a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results and 3 the effects of research joint ventures whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results copyright 1987 by royal economic society

risk premia and preemption in r d ventures i analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of r d ventures engaged in a multiple stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty after solving in closed form for the case of a two stage race in continuous time i show that a firm s risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead compared to the case where firms collude r d competition erodes the option value to mothball a project reduces the completion time and the failure rate of r d and causes higher and more volatile risk premia numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry

optimal r d investment strategies under the threat of new technology entry abstract this paper studies the r d investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry the r d project is subject to technical uncertainty the incumbent can successfully prevent entry by innovating however in an entry deterrence situation the resulting monopoly is different from a monopoly without an entry threat because potential competition means that the monopolist completes the r d project which it otherwise would not have done greater technical uncertainty stimulates initiating exploratory r d and can result in implementation of more expensive research projects this is a result of the limited downside risk of the project it does not matter whether the outcome of an initial r d stage is disappointing or very disappointing since in both cases the firm will simply abandon the project the welfare analysis shows that the threat of entry may reduce welfare in case of entry deterrence

how do firms choose their lenders an empirical investigation this article investigates which companies finance themselves through intermediaries and which borrow directly from arm s length investors our empirical results show that large companies with abundant cash and collateral tap credit markets directly these markets cater to safe and profitable industries and are most active when riskless rates or intermediary earnings are low we show that determinants of lender selection sharpen during investment downturns and that there are substantial asymmetries in the way firms enter and exit capital markets these results support a theoretical framework where intermediaries have better reorganizational skills but a higher opportunity cost of capital than bondholders