tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

competitive non linear pricing and bundling we examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly when consumers buy all their products from one firm the one stop shopping model nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare but often lower consumer surplus than linear pricing by contrast in a unit demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus in a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects compared with linear pricing nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when i demand is elastic ii there is substantial product differentiation iii there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand iv consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm and v a consumer s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when i ii iv and v hold but iii does not

repayment concentration and consumer motivation to get out of debt many indebted consumers carry multiple credit cards with significant balances and do not generate enough income to pay off these balances in full at the end of each repayment period in managing their debt over time these consumers must decide how to allocate repayments across their debt accounts this research examines how different monthly repayment allocations varying from entirely concentrated into one debt account i e a concentrated strategy to equally dispersed across all debt accounts i e a dispersed strategy influence consumers motivation to repay their debts evidence from a field study of indebted consumers with multiple debt accounts and from three experiments shows that concentrated vs dispersed repayment strategies tend to boost consumers motivation to become debt free leading them to repay their debts more aggressively importantly this motivating effect is most pronounced when the repayments are concentrated into consumers smallest accounts because consumers tend to infer overall progress in debt repayment from the greatest proportional balance reduction proportion of starting balance repaid within any one account these findings advance our understanding of how consumers repay their debts and help pinpoint the psychological process by which debt repayment strategies affect consumers motivation to get out of debt

multi dimensional screening a user s guide abstract multi dimensional screening models have many potential applications but economists have so far been hindered by the considerable technical difficulties involved in their resolution this paper studies the simplest formulation of the general screening model and we provide a complete solution to this case we then show how this model can be applied to multi product nonlinear pricing and to multi product monopoly regulation finally we discuss how the model has been applied to other economic situations of interest including auction design and optimal taxation

optimal bundling of technological products with network externality for many high tech and internet related products utility to consumers depends in part on the size of the user base a phenomenon called network externality a firm with a portfolio of these and other products that are often asymmetric in their degree of network externality or marginal cost may have to look beyond the traditional strategies of pure components pure bundling and mixed bundling one such strategic alternative in a two product case would be a so called mixed bundling 1 under which the bundle and product 1 are offered but the other product can only be purchased in a bundled form the purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the impact of such asymmetry or symmetry in direct network externality and cost on the choice of bundling strategies we model a monopolist firm that has a product in each of two categories and faces heterogeneous consumers results suggest that pure bundling is more profitable when both products have low marginal costs or high network externality whereas pure components or mixed bundling 1 is more profitable when the products diverge in their costs and network externality e g only one product has network externality traditional mixed bundling is optimal in other instances

modularity in technology and organization this paper is an attempt to raid both the literature on modular design and the literature on property rights to create the outlines of a modularity theory of the firm such a theory will look at firms and other organizations in terms of the partitioning of rights understood as protected spheres of authority among cooperating parties and it will assert that organizations reflect nonmodular structures that is structures in which decision rights rights of alienation and residual claims to income do not all reside in the same hands 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

strategy subsets closed under rational behavior a set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior curb of it contains all its best replies each curb set contains the support of at least one nash equilibrium in mixed

measuring the frictional costs of online transactions the case of a name your own price channel we study the offers submitted by consumers to a large name your own price nyop online retailer a distinctive feature of this retailer is that it allows consumers to repeatedly submit offers on one and the same product while consumers could identify the threshold price the minimum price for which the retailer is willing to sell by incrementing their offer in small steps in each consecutive round such a strategy would require them to go through many additional online transactions we define frictional cost as the disutility that the consumer experiences when conducting an online transaction such as submitting an offer thus in our setting consumers trade off a direct financial value lower price for frictional costs based on a consumer choice model capturing this trade off we use the observed consumer behavior to reconstruct the frictional cost parameters for the consumers in our sample we show that perhaps contrary to the general wisdom frictional costs in electronic markets are substantial with median values ranging from eur 3 54 for a portable digital music player mp3 to eur 6 08 for a personal digital assistant pda we find that consumers who have gathered experience with the nyop channel in previous transactions exhibit lower frictional costs than consumers who use the channel for the first time surprisingly sociodemographic variables do not help to explain the variation in frictional costs

the entrepreneur s reward for self policing the collaboration among people is often subject to shirking the net gain from the collaboration depends on the contract governing it i argue that the entrepreneur assumes the role of the residual claimant because his actions are more costly to monitor than those of the factors with which he collaborates by offering fixed pay contracts to others and himself becoming residual claimant the entrepreneur curtails his incentive to gain at the expense of his partners and the net gain from the collaboration is then maximized costly monitoring applies to both labor and capital and thus the entrepreneur may supply both labor services and capital the entrepreneur s capital serves to guarantee the pay of the other factors

bundling as an entry barrier in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry deterrent effect i introduction in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to defend both products without having to price low in each while it is still possible to compete by offering a rival bundle a monopolist can significantly lower the potential profits of a one product entrant without having to engage in limit pricing prior to entry we also show that bundling continues to be an effective pricing tool even if entry deterrence fails or if there is already an existing one product rival a company with a monopoly in product a and a duopoly in product b makes higher profits by selling an a b bundle than by selling a and b independently leveraging market power from a into b and accepting some one product competition against the bundle is better than using the monopoly power in good a all by itself since bundling mitigates the impact of competition on the incumbent an entrant can expect the bundling strategy to persist even without any commitment the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist see stigler 1968 adams and yellen

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

learning in games abstract this essay discusses some recent work on learning in games we explore non equilibrium theories in which equilibrium emerges as the long run outcome of a dynamic process of adjustment or learning we focus on individual level models and more specifically on variants of fictitious play in two player games we discuss both the theoretical properties of the models and their relationship to regularities observed in game theory experiments

evolution rationality and equilibrium in games abstract evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents the approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population s some of the main features of this approach are here outlined and connections with learning models and standard notions of game theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed some desiderata and results for robust long run predictions are considered

clusters entrepreneurial ecosystem co creation and appropriability a conceptual framework extant literature on clusters underplays the role of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial management in creating and co creating organizations markets and supporting ecosystems we employ transaction costs resource knowledge capabilities and power control based theories to provide a comparative static governance based perspective on clusters we embed this into a more general co evolutionary entrepreneurial theory of the emergence evolution and co evolution of markets ecosystems and clusters we suggest that clusters can involve advantages that help engender superior appropriation of co created value as compared to alternatives entrepreneurial managers faced with a degree of choice will help co create clusters and be part of them for as long as they can appropriate more value in this way than through alternatives

retail competition and the dynamics of demand for tied goods we present a demand system for tied goods incorporating dynamics arising from the tied nature of the products and the stockpiling induced by storability and durability we accommodate competition across tied good systems and competing downstream retail formats by endogenizing the retail format at which consumers choose to stockpile inventory this facilitates measurement of long run retail substitution effects and yields estimates of complementarities within and substitution across competing systems of tied goods we present an empirical application to an archetypal tied goods category razors and blades we discuss the implications of measured effects for manufacturer pricing when selling the tied products through an oligopolistic downstream retail channel and assess the extent to which retail substitution reduces channel conflict

an empirical analysis of digital music bundling strategies we use panel data on digital song and album sales coupled with a quasi random price experiment to determine own and cross price elasticities for songs and albums we then develop a structural model of consumer demand to estimate welfare under various policy relevant counterfactual scenarios this approach represents an early application of the big data management paradigm within the media industries and provides managers with detailed guidance on optimal pricing and marketing strategies for digital music our results show that tiered pricing coupled with reduced album pricing increases revenue to the labels by 18 relative to uniform pricing policies traditionally preferred by digital marketplaces while also increasing consumer surplus by 23 thus optimal tiered pricing can yield a pareto improvement over the prior status quo additionally our results indicate that even without tiered pricing unbundling albums outperforms album only pricing policies that dominated the era of physical cd cassette sales this paper was accepted by alok gupta special issue on business analytics

the dynamic capabilities of firms an introduction an expanded paradigm is needed to explain how competitive advantage is gained and held firms resorting to resource bas ed strategy attempt to accumulate valuable technology assets and employ an aggressive intellectual property stance however winners in the global marketplace have been firms demonstrating timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation along with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences this source of competitive advantage dynamic capabilities emphasizes two aspects first it refers to the shifting character of the environment second it emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting integrating and re configuring internal and external organizational skills resources and functional competences toward changing environment 3 only recently have researchers begun to focus on the specifics of developing firm specific capabilities and the manner in which competences are renewed to respond to shifts in the business environment the dynamic capabilities approach provides a coherent framework to integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge and facilitate prescription this paper argues that the competitive advanis tage of firms stems from dynamic capabilities rooted in high performance routines z operating inside the firm embedded in the firm s processes and conditioned by its history it offers dynamic capabilities as an emerging paradigm of the modern business j firm that draws on multiple disciplines and advances with the help of industry studies in the usa and elsewhere

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

tying and freebies in two sided markets abstract in two sided markets where platforms are constrained to set non negative prices tying can be deployed by platforms as a tool to introduce implicit subsidies for a monopoly this raises participation and benefits consumers on both sides in a duopoly tying on one side makes a platform more or less competitive on the other side depending on externalities tying may not be ex ante optimal while the competing platform may benefit from it the impact on consumers surplus depends on whether competition is softened or intensified on the profitable side moreover tying increases total welfare if network effects are strong

the bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games abstract we transform a noncooperative game into a bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players the priors of other players on the choice of other players the priors over priors and so on we provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successively eliminate strategies which are not best responses this paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively undominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior b d bernheim econometrica 52 1984 1007 1028 d pearce econometrica 52 1984 1029 1050 sufficient conditions are also found for nash equilibrium behavior and a result akin to r j aumann econometrica 55 1987 1 18 on correlated equilibria is derived with different hypotheses

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

intertemporal price discrimination with complementary products e books and e readers this paper studies intertemporal price discrimination ipd with complementary products in the context of e readers and e books using individual level data 2008 2012 i estimate a dynamic demand

mixed bundling in two sided markets in the presence of installed base effects we analyze mixed bundling in two sided markets where installed base effects are present and find that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as well as the standard two sided markets literature we determine prices on both sides fall with bundling mixed bundling acts as a price discrimination tool segmenting the market more efficiently consequently as a by product of this price discrimination the two sides are better coordinated and social welfare is enhanced we show unambiguously that platform participations increase on both sides of the market after theoretically evaluating the impact mixed bundling has on prices and welfare we take the model predictions to data from the portable video game console market we find empirical support for all theoretical predictions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

coverage of retail stores and discrete choice models of demand estimating price elasticities and welfare effects consumers choice set of products within stores can be limited ackerberg and rysman 2005 address this problem by modeling unobserved consumer preferences over products and retail stores leading to augmented demand speci cations having carbonated soft drink product level data where we observe products store coverage we are able to estimate their logit nested logit and random coe cient logit speci cations of demand in a structural model of equilibrium allowing for store coverage turns out to have a very signi cant impact on the estimated structural parameters and on the predictive power of the model taking these estimated structural parameters we perform a counterfactual whereby stores carry all products in the market we nd systematic increases in price elasticities and welfare in our new equilibrium competition in markets is more curtailed than normally assumed in structural models of industries

the dynamic effects of bundling as a product strategy several key questions in bundling have not been empirically examined in marketing is mixed bundling more effective than pure bundling or pure components does correlation in consumer valuations make bundling more or less effective does bundling serve as a complement or substitute to network effects to address these questions we develop a consumer choice model from microfoundations to capture the essentials of our setting the handheld video game market we provide a framework to understand the dynamic long term effects of bundling on demand the primary explanation for the profitability of bundling relies on homogenization of consumer valuations for the bundle allowing the firm to extract more surplus we find that bundling can be effective through a novel and previously unexamined mechanism of dynamic consumer segmentation which operates independent of the homogenization effect and can in fact be stronger when the homogenization effect is weaker we also find that bundles are treated as separate products distinct from component products by consumers sales of both hardware and software components decrease in the absence of bundling and consumers who had previously purchased bundles might delay purchases resulting in lower revenues we also find that mixed bundling dominates pure bundling and pure components in terms of both hardware and software revenues investigating the link between bundling and indirect network effects we find that they act as substitute strategies with a lower relative effectiveness for bundling when network effects are stronger

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

endogeneity and heterogeneity in a probit demand model estimation using aggregate data two issues that have become increasingly important while estimating the parameters of aggregate demand functions to study firm behavior are theendogeneity of marketing activities typically price andheterogeneity across consumers in the market under consideration ignoring these issues in the estimation of the demand function parameters can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for the effects of marketing activities endogeneity and heterogeneity have achieved prominence in large measure because of the increasing popularity of logit models to characterize demand functions usingaggregate data the logit model accounts for purchase incidence and brand choice by including a no purchase alternative in the consumer s choice set this allows for category sales to change as a function of the marketing activities of brands in the category there are three issues with using the logit model with the no purchase option to characterize demand when studying competitive interactions among firms 1 the marketing literature dealing with brand choice behavior at the consumer level has found that the iia restriction is not appropriate as each brand in the choice set is more similar to some brands than it is to others 2 studies have found that the purchase incidence decision is distinct from the brand choice decision hence it may not be appropriate to model the no purchase decision as just another alternative in the choice set with the iia restriction holding across all brands and the no purchase option 3 even if the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions is accounted for via for example a nested logit specification accounting for the purchase incidence decision with aggregate data requires assumptions for computing the share of the no purchase alternative which is otherwise unobserved in this paper we propose a probit model as an alternative to the logit model to specify the aggregate demand functions of firms competing in oligopoly markets the probit model avoids the iia property that affects the logit model at the individual consumer level furthermore the probit model can naturally account for the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions due to the general covariance structure assumed for the utilities of the alternatives we demonstrate how the parameters of the proposed model can be estimated using aggregate time series data from a product market in the estimation we account for the endogeneity of marketing variables as well as for heterogeneity across consumers our results indicate that both endogeneity as well as heterogeneity need to be accounted for even after allowing for a non iia specification at the individual consumer level specific to our data we also find that ignoring endogeneity has a bigger impact on the estimated price elasticities than ignoring the effects of heterogeneity a comparison of the elasticities obtained from the probit model with those from the corresponding logit specification indicates that therange of elasticities obtained from the probit model across brands is larger than that obtained from the logit the results have implications for issues such as firm level pricing in addition to specifying a probit model and providing comparisons with the logit model the paper also addresses the third issue raised above we propose a simple alternative to the purchase incidence brand choice specification by decomposing the demand for a brand into a category demand equation and a conditional brand choice share equation we provide a comparison of results from this specification to those from the specification that includes the no purchase alternative and find that estimated elasticities are sensitive to the specification used we also estimate the demand function parameters using a traditional specification such as the double logarithmic model here we find that the estimated elasticities could be signed in such a manner as to be not useful for firm level pricing decisions one of the key limitations of the proposed model is that while it accounts for the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions of households it does not account for differences across consumers in their purchase quantities the model and analysis are best suited for product categories in which consumers typically make single unit purchases another limitation is more practical in nature while recent advances have been made in computing probit probabilities it could nevertheless be a challenge to do so when the number of alternatives is large

demand for differentiated durable products the case of the u s computer printer market i introduction this paper aims to provide a theoretical and empirical description of consumer behavior in a dynamic market for differentiated durable goods the computer hardware industry serves as an example of the type of market we consider markets for computer systems and components as well as for many other high technology products exhibit some striking similarities that are of particular concern for an empirical economist as follows products are differentiated in multiple dimensions in addition to price products are durable yielding consumption services over multiple periods product quality rapidly improves over time empirical work on estimating differentiated product demand systems has been dominated by static discrete choice models with random utility see berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 goldberg 1995 and nevo 2001 among others however markets for durable goods exhibit several features at odds with their assumption of myopic consumer behavior first traditional static discrete choice models implicitly assume that consumers participate in the market every period choosing one of the available products or an outside option thus the fraction of consumers who do not buy any product in a given period could only be explained by the high value they assign to the outside alternative for durable goods however purchases are made infrequently and result in a consumer s exiting the market for a significant period of time hence the model needs to account for consumers outflow from the market arising from their purchase decisions second a static framework may give a misleading picture of the aggregate sales time pattern in a dynamic industry in many markets for durable products it is not uncommon to see rapidly improving product quality and falling prices given any reasonable set of consumer preferences over the product characteristics space static discrete choice models for such an industry will tend to predict an upward trend in aggregate sales this fails to account for a variety of patterns commonly seen in the data third the evolution of product quality leads to the possibility of intertemporal demand substitution by forgoing a current purchase the consumer retains the option to buy a potentially better product in the future hence the decision of when to buy may be just as important for consumers as the decision of what to buy this trade off cannot be accounted for in the static framework the purpose of this paper is to remedy these shortcomings of static discrete choice models in durable goods markets with particular attention paid to technological change and the dynamics of new products adoption the paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers expectations of future product quality and consumers outflow from the market that arises endogenously from their purchase decisions in this model the consumer faces a sequence of static discrete choice problems over a non stationary choice set we show that for a subclass of random utility models which include the multinomial logit and the mcfadden 1978 generalized extreme value gev model there exists a scalar valued sufficient statistic that determines the value of the option to postpone the purchase this allows us to model industry evolution over a vastly reduced state space and to formalize the consumer s decision of when to buy as an optimal stopping problem a solution to that problem defines the hazard rate of product adoptions while the nested discrete choice model determines the alternative specific purchase probabilities integrating individual decisions over the population distribution generates rich dynamics of aggregate and product level sales the paper proceeds to present monte carlo evidence that ignoring the time dimension of consumer choice will induce a downward bias in the estimates of consumer preferences over quality sometimes reversing the sign of the coefficients

competition between networks a study of the market for yellow pages this paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for yellow pages i estimate three simultaneous equations consumer demand for usage of a directory advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher s first order condition derived from profit maximizing behaviour estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising implying a network effect i find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus as an application i consider whether the market benefits from monopoly which takes advantage of network effects or oligopoly which reduces market power i find that a more competitive market is preferable copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

bundling information goods of decreasing value consumers average value for information goods websites weather forecasts music and news declines with the number consumed this paper provides simple guidelines to optimal bundling marketing strategies in this case if consumers values do not decrease too quickly we show that bundling is approximately optimal if consumers values to subsequent goods decrease quickly we show by example that one should expect bundling to be suboptimal

evolutionary consumers imply monopolies exit we address the question of how a monopolist should price when facing evolutionary consumers who gradually move in the direction of following their optimal strategy but may make temporary suboptimal choices we show that under a broad generalization of the most commonly used model of evolution the monopolist will set a path of prices such that all consumers eventually stop purchasing the monopolist s product

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

music for a song an empirical look at uniform song pricing and its alternatives economists have well developed pricing theories that challenge the wisdom of the common practice of uniform song pricing this paper explores the profit and welfare implications of various alternatives including song specific pricing various forms of bundling two part tariffs nonlinear pricing and third degree price discrimination using survey based data on nearly 500 students valuations of 50 popular songs in early january 2008 we find that various alternatives including simple schemes such as pure bundling and two part tariffs can raise both producer and consumer surplus revenue could be raised by nearly 10 percent relative to profit maximizing uniform pricing and by over a fifth relative to current 0 99 uniform pricing moreover revenue could be increased by a tenth while maintaining consumer surplus at the high level accompanying current 0 99 uniform song pricing while person specific uniform pricing can raise revenue by three quarters none of the non discriminatory schemes raise revenue s share of surplus above 35 percent even with sophisticated pricing much of the area under the demand curve for this product cannot be appropriated as revenue

to bundle or not to bundle commodity bundling is studied in an environment where the dispersion of valuations unambiguously decreases when two or more goods are sold as a bundle only bundling is more likely to dominate separately selling the goods if marginal costs are low relative to the average valuation or if the distribution of valuations is very peaked around the mean

leadership beliefs and coordination an explorative discussion although recent economics contributions represent important strides forward in the understanding of leadership behavior the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of the phenomenon have attracted virtually no interests from economists and game theorists i argue that an understanding of these dimensions may be founded on coordination games particularly to the extent that these illustrate interactive belief formation in this context leadership is defined as the taking of actions that coordinate the complementary actions of many people through the creation of belief conditions that at least substitute for common knowledge and where these actions characteristically consists of some act of communication directed at those being led the concept of common knowledge or its approximation by means of notions of common belief is argued to be particularly important to understanding leadership thus leaders may establish common knowledge conditions and assist the coordination of strategies in this way or make decisions in situations where coordination problems persist in spite of common knowledge acknowledgments

one quarter of gdp is persuasion economists view talk as cheap and culture as insignificant yet humans are talking animals talking in their markets the talk probably matters why else would the human animals bother doing it the usual economic view of the talk is that it issues orders and conveys information workers at gm are ordered to report for work tomorrow credit ratings are conveyed economic analysis takes these parts of the talk into account without fuss production theory can be viewed as the theory of one mind issuing orders much of game theory is concerned in one way or another with information though game theory as joseph farrell 1995 and others have found requires more than bits of information but issuing the orders and conveying the information does not account for all of the talk the third part of the economic talk is persuasion

a constitutional interpretation of the firm when members of a firm make firm specific investments they will earn rents potential rent seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee s firm specific investment and as a result reduces the level of those investments in this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others the owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual s property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization this constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property that is the firm specific investments the constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts as a practical matter it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near costless mobility and thus an ordinary at will employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm if in order to function productively within an enterprise individuals have to accumulate and pay for firm specific capital assets the simple neoclasical logic fails furubotn 1988 167

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

frank knight on risk uncertainty and the firm a new interpretation we attempt to interpret frank knight by taking him on his own terms among our conclusions are the following 1 knight s distinction between risk and uncertainty is not solely a distinction between insurable and uninsurable risk 2 knight s explanation for the existence of firms does not reduce to a moral hazard theory except perhaps in the broadest and least interesting sense and 3 knight s treatment of the problem of the separation of ownership from control is not as obviously wrong as commentators have made it out to be

profitability of product bundling using copulas to model the stochastic dependence of values this article establishes new general conditions for the profitability of product bundling a multiproduct monopolist generally achieves higher profit from mixed bundling than from separate selling if consumer values for two of its products are negatively dependent are independent or have sufficiently limited positive dependence the profitability of monopoly bundling also extends to situations where a multiproduct firm competes with a single product rival

vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers inference with limited data in this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared demand estimates are used to compute price cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed the purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non nested competing models the models considered are 1 a simple linear pricing model 2 a vertically integrated model and 3 a variety of alternative strategic supply scenarios that allow for collusion non linear pricing and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the u s the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain this is consistent with non linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers

a naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm the role of cooperation and cultural evolution one reason why firms exist this paper argues is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve in addition we show how an entrepreneur given these predispositions can shape human behavior within a firm to illustrate these processes we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees behavior and the performance of the firm these biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life we also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better

transaction cost economics in real time this paper attempts to place the theq of the boundaries of thejirm within the context of the passage of time more precisely it resurrects and places in a modem frame some of the insights of the chsical and marshallian theories of organization the modem reinterpretation of those theories centers around the capabilities view of the jirm taken together with governance costs the capabilities ofjirm and market determine the boundaries of the jirm in the short run ovw time capabilities change as firms and markets learn which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost the cost of trandewing the firm s capability to the market w vice versa these dynamic governance costs are the costs of persuading negotiating and coordinating with and teaching others they arise in the face of change notably txchnological and organizational innovation in fit they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them dynamic transaction costs provide an explanation for vertical integration that is arguably more general than those dominant in the literature in the face of uncertainty and divwgent views ofthe future common ownership of multiple stages of production is a supwior institutional arrangement for coordinating systemic change asset specrfity is neither necessary nor suffient for this to be true dynamic governance costs may also affit internal organization it may sometimes be costly in 3 terms of persuasion negotiation and teaching to create within the firm capabilities readily available on the market indeed in cases in which systemic coordination is not 4 the issue the market may turn out to be the superior institution of coordination in e 2 genwal the capabilities view of the jirm suggests that we look atfim2 and market as alternative and sometimes overlapping institutions of learning 1 transaction costs in the long rzln and the short 9 x classical and neoclassical perspectives

individual learning and social rationality abstract classical game theory assumes that players have a coherent model of the game in which they are engaged that they make optimum plans assuming that everyone else makes optimum plans and that all of this is common knowledge evolutionary game theory postulates instead that players have limited understanding of their environment only modest reasoning ability and no common knowledge surprisingly a fair amount of classical solution theory survives with this change of perspective we show how high rationality solutions can emerge in low rationality environments provided the evolutionary process has sufficient time to unfold

institutions entrepreneurship and the rationale of government an outline of the schumpeterian theory of the state the schumpeterian theory of the state parallels the theory of entrepreneurship in its concern with the institutional dynamism of capitalist development the evolution of the modern state mirrors the emergence of a distinct sphere of self interested economic activity in the private sector while the state is concerned with the provision of common goods its economic impact needs to be assessed with regard to the social interests that mark its relationship with the private sector this holds for the evolution of fiscal systems as well as for other domains of government activity involving the temporary carrying out of the entrepreneurial function

bundling with customer self selection a simple approach to bundling low marginal cost goods with declining costs of distributing digital products comes renewed interest in strategies for pricing goods with low marginal costs in this paper we evaluate customized bundling a pricing strategy that gives consumers the right to choose up to a quantity m of goods drawn from a larger pool of n different goods for a fixed price we show that the complex mixed bundle problem can be reduced to the customized bundle problem under some commonly used assumptions we also show that for a monopoly seller of low marginal cost goods this strategy outperforms individual selling m 1 and pure bundling m n when goods have a positive marginal cost or when customers have heterogeneous preferences over goods comparative statics results also show that the optimal bundle size for customized bundling decreases in both heterogeneity of consumer preferences over different goods and marginal costs of production we further explore how the customized bundle solution is affected by factors such as the nature of distribution functions in which valuations are drawn the correlations of values across goods and the complementarity or substitutability among products altogether our results suggest that customized bundling has a number of advantages both in theory and practice over other bundling strategies in many relevant settings

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

dynamics of consumer demand for new durable goods most new consumer durable goods experience rapid prices declines and quality improvements suggesting the importance of modeling dynamics this paper specifies a dynamic model of consumer preferences for new durable goods with persistently heterogeneous consumer tastes rational expectations and repeat purchases over time we estimate the model on the digital camcorder industry using panel data on prices sales and characteristics we find that the 1 year elasticity in response to a transitory industrywide price shock is about 25 percent less than the 1 month elasticity standard cost of living indices overstate welfare gain in later periods due to a changing composition of buyers

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

price structure in two sided markets evidence from the magazine industry we present and estimate a model of competition in a two sided market the market for magazine readership and advertising using data on magazines in germany we find evidence that magazines have properties of two sided markets the results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are subsidized and that magazines make all their money from advertisers consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices