the impact of agricultural research in africa aggregate and case study evidence abstract this paper presents case study results and aggregate data to evaluate the impact of research in african agriculture of 32 case studies all but eight report annual returns over 20 and many are far higher with most gains arising in the late 1980s and 1990s spurred by policy reforms and changing incentives these innovations have led to sustained growth in aggregate cereal crop yields since 1985 africa s belated green revolution is based on new varieties often with early maturation for drought escape complemented by new management techniques typically labor intensive efforts to conserve soil moisture and build soil fertility

the impact of integrated aquaculture agriculture on small scale farms in southern malawi sustainable agricultural intensification is an urgent challenge for sub saharan africa one potential solution is to rely on local farmers knowledge for improved management of diverse on farm resources and integration among various farm enterprises in this article we analyze the farm level impact of one recent example namely the integrated aquaculture agriculture iaa technologies that have been developed and disseminated in a participatory manner in malawi based on a 2004 survey of 315 respondents 166 adopters and 149 nonadopters we test the hypothesis that adoption of iaa is associated with improved farm productivity and more efficient use of resources estimating a technical inefficiency function shows that iaa farms were significantly more efficient compared to nonadopters iaa farms also had higher total factor productivity higher farm income per hectare and higher returns to family labor

adapting household behavior to agricultural technology in west bengal india wage labor fertility and child schooling determinants the emergence of the high yielding varieties hyvs as alternatives to traditional varieties tvs of wheat rice and several other crops has been a major event in many developing countries during the last 2 decades the output income and employment augmenting effects of this modern technology have been documented in many regions of the world the existing studies have focused on aggregate economic indicators at national regional and sectoral levels analyses of technological change and household well being are now needed to explore the implications of this process for intrahousehold allocation of the resources among persons and activities the critical household activity is labor force participation in the market in own enterprise or in home production by male female and child members of the household these activities change as household demand for children changes and parents become able and willing to invest more in the health nutrition schooling and training of their children and thereby improve their productivity quality analysis of these interrelated household decisions helps to clarify efficient policies for rural development and to trace the societal repercussions of these policies ii background and objective although much has been written on the green revolution technology at the national and regional levels in india few studies have dealt with the eastern region of the country the question assumes special significance for the eastern indian states because of several factors first this region produces about three fourths of the country s output of rice the major food crop but the yield per acre is less than in other regions the new technology in rice came to this region at a later date

environmental regulation by private contest abstract it is widely expected that the recent trend in the us eu and elsewhere towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue if environmental regulation is to be privatised in this way it is natural to ask how far the activities of environmental groups on whose shoulders much of the responsibility for defending the environment is likely to fall should be subsidised or taxed in this paper we identify the trade offs involved and characterise the optimal subsidy tax the analysis is argued to have significant implications for how governments should think about the way in which fiscal law treats environmental ngo s

male female differences in agricultural productivity methodological issues and empirical evidence abstract most estimates of male female differences in technical efficiency from production function studies show that male and female farmers are equally efficient farm managers controlling for levels of inputs and human capital there is some evidence however of allocative inefficiency within households marginal products of labor depend on the relative scarcities of labor and the gender division of labor in specific farming systems many of these studies however are methodologically flawed greater attention needs to be given to appropriate estimation methods endogenous input choice the use of headship as a stratifying variable and the implications of intrahousehold resource allocation

repeated contests a general parameterization abstract contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year this paper characterizes equilibrium effort both individual and aggregate in a general parameterization of such repeated contests

rent seeking in natural resource quota allocations this paper examines the incentives for rent seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies the political body has discretion in making the allocation and competing user groups rent seek to influence the allocation we investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition a political body can affect an allocatively pareto efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default pre rent seeking policy surprisingly an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs however winner take all default policies are likely to maximize not minimize rent seeking a competitive post allocation market reduces rent seeking but is not either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy capable of minimizing social costs however forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and when used together with an efficient default policy is capable of obtaining the first best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent seeking

learning by doing and learning from others human capital and technical change in agriculture household level panel data from a nationally representative sample of rural indian households describing the adoption and profitability of high yielding seed varieties hyvs associated with the green revolution are used to test the implications of a model incorporating learning by doing and learning spillovers the estimates indicate that i imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant barrier to adoption ii this barrier diminished as farmer experience with the new technologies increased iii own experience and neighbors experience with hyvs significantly increased hyv profitability and iv farmers do not fully incorporate the village returns to learning in making adoption decisions

trends in earnings differentials by gender 1971 1981 this paper clarifies trends in relative earnings by sex over the decade 1971 1981 and decomposes these trends to determine which factors contributed to a decline and which to an increase our analyses are based upon data from the annual demographic files of the current population survey for 1972 and 1982 this study is unique in that it estimates earnings functions in each year which are corrected for selectivity bias it is found that such a correction markedly raises the progress of white women relative to men among blacks the impact of the selectivity bias correction was to substantially lower the relative earnings increase of women however the coefficients on the selectivity variable were not significant the findings suggest declining sex role specialization and discrimination as conventionally measured over the decade on the other hand contrary to expectations the total effect of variables reflecting the sex composition of the individuals occupation worked to widen the sex differential over the period the sex differential was also adversely affected by a decline in the relative return to education especially for whites authors modified

endogenous strength in conflicts in this paper we study a two period contest where the strength of players in the second period depends on the result of the contest in the first stage we show that in contrast to one shot contests in the same setting heterogeneous players exert different efforts in the first stage and rent dissipation in the first period may be large we study the conditions under which the discouragement effect holds in addition new issues emerge like the evolution of the strengths and the shares of the prize during the game

dynamic rent seeking abstract a dynamic model of the political process is presented under conditions of uncertainty as in an earlier model by becker several interest groups vie for political influence exerted in the form of taxes and subsidies some results of the static single interest group theory of rent seeking are given slightly modified interpretations among other things it is shown that a group s rent seeking activity is negatively related to the rate of growth of national income to the group s relative position in the income distribution and to measures of how deserving it is the importance of voting is modelled explicitly it is also found that policies tend to be adopted which minimize the deadweight welfare losses from rent seeking

the disinterest in deregulation in the analysis of the costs of monopoly power the usual experiment is to convert a competitive industry into a monopoly and observe the consequent change in consumer s surplus modern contributions have emphasized the deadweight cost of monopoly arnold harberger 1954 and the possibility of an associated rent seeking cost of monopoly gordon tullock 1967 the harberger cost of course refers to the lost consumer s surplus triangle the tullock cost concerns the role of competition for monopoly returns taken together and assuming that the competition for monopoly rents is perfect the total cost of monopoly power is a trapezoid the rectangle of monopoly profits plus the triangle of lost consumer s surplus richard posner 1975 in this paper we approach the monopoly problem in a different spirit we compare three states of the world competition regulation and deregulation in this setting we ask what happens if a monopoly is eliminated through deregulation our analysis suggests that because under most conditions tullock costs cannot be recouped the returns to deregulation are lower than previously thought rent seeking expenditures in the past leave the economy permanently poorer even if competition is restored to the industry in contrast the returns to preventing monopoly in the first place are relatively high in our model an insight afforded by the analysis is an explanation of the persistence of laws and regulations which appear to serve no interest in this regard the example of railroad regulation in the united states comes to mind the standard explanation for such regulation is either that voters and government decision makers are ignorant of basic economics or that a small interest group like railroad firms wins rents at the expense of uninformed or economically rational consumers of rail services who do not find it cost effective to seek deregulation we offer another and perhaps more plausible explanation for the persistence of regulation and the apathy of consumers about the costs of regulation namely the costs of such regulations are for the most part the original rent seeking expenditures that lead to the regulation in the first place and these costs are sunk abolishing so called uneconomic laws does nothing to recover these losses hence there is little political support from any quarter to return to the status quo ante in fact as we shall show such a deregulatory program can easily impose more costs than it is worth there are numerous examples of this point including tariffs and quotas of all sorts subsidies to farmers the postal monopoly organized labor s antitrust exemption the licensing of doctors and so forth the traditional explanations of these monopoly rights namely ignorance of economic common sense and special interest groups are neither sufficient nor necessary since the primary costs of these laws are rent seeking expenditures which are made prior to their passage there is simply little to be gained by changing them now gains would accrue in the form of reduced harberger costs costs would be borne in passing and implementing the deregulatory program it is not that the potential gainers from deregulation are large in number diffuse heterogeneous and face high organizational costs rather they do not exist to any degree interpreted in this light efforts by political action groups such as the right to work foundation stand to be a drain on society s resources they cannot produce anything unless they prevent further monopolization through regulation we do not of course mccormick and shughart clemson university clemson sc 29631 tollison center for the study of public choice george mason university fairfax va 22030 thanks go to james buchanan rex cottle and gordon tullock for helpful comments the usual caveat applies

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

income inequality among female heads of households racial inequality reconsidered this paper investigates the factors that might have influenced earnings inequality among female heads of households over an extended period the study used the generalized entropy measures of inequality in short run as well as long run income for the period 1978 86 the results suggest that short run inequality has generally increased these fluctuations are due partially to the existence of transitory components which distort our view the measured long run inequality shows a decline in the early years because of the smoothing of the transitory components race in conjunction with age education and marital status is used to investigate their effects race and education are shown to be the most influential factors the mobility profiles show the existence of permanent inequality among female heads of households

access to water women s work and child outcomes abstractpoor rural women in the developing world spend considerable time collecting water do women living in places where more time is needed for water collection tend to participate less in income earning market based activities do the education outcomes of their children tend to be worse we use micro data for nine developing countries to help address these questions our primary aim is to describe the patterns in the data rather than to infer causality although we do treat the household level access to water as endogenous assuming that community level access is exogenous conditional on a wide range of geographic factors better access to water is not found to be associated with greater off farm paid work but is associated with less unpaid work for women in countries where substantial gender gaps in schooling exist both boys and girls enrollments also tend to be better

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

inequality measurement an axiomatic approach the theory of inequality measurement is examined using some basic axioms which extend the pigou dalton principle of transfers from these basic axioms various inequality indices may be derived as an alternative to ad hoc methods or to methods involving prior specification of a social welfare function the key idea is the concept of distance between two income shares conventional inequality indices are analysed in terms of their implied distance functions

interest group competition over policy outcomes dynamics strategic behavior and social costs this paper analyzes a two period model of interestgroup competition between two groups to affect thepolicy outcome the paper characterizes the subgameperfect equilibrium and considers the welfareimplications of the model the subgame perfectequilibrium to this game is allocatively efficient ifand only if the initial equilibrium is allocativelyefficient and interest groups are equally adept atproducing political pressure when rent seeking isconstitutionally protected the notion of rent seekingconstrained efficiency is defined as the cooperativesolution to the rent seeking game it is shown that arent seeking constrained efficient equilibrium isattainable by forcing winners in political competitionto fully compensate losers

new developments in the labor market toward a new institutional paradigm the structure of employer employee relationships is changing these original contributions report on new developments taking place in today s labor market and on the role of public policy in shaping that process they provide an illuminating description of the current state of internal labor market theory and practice document the evolution of trends in the public and private sectors and are joined in a concern for disadvantaged and unemployed workers that is all too rare in scholarly work a central theme is the adaptation of labor market institutions to the important environmental changes of recent years including the shift to an international marketplace for goods and services the spread of new workplace technologies new work force demographics and changing conceptions of the role that government should be expected to play katharine abraham is associate professor of economics at the university of maryland robert mckersie is professor of industrial relations at the sloan school of management at mit contents introduction katharine g abraham norms and cycles the dynamics of nonunion industrial relations in the united states 1897 1987 sanford m jacoby the effects of worker participation in management profits and ownership of assets on enterprise performance michael a conte jan svenjar restructuring the employment relationship the growth of marketmediated work arrangements katharine g abraham the evolving role of small business and some implications for employment and training policy gary w loveman michael j piore werner sengeneberger employment security and employment policy an assessment of the issues paul osterman thomas a kochan the equity and efficiency of job security contrasting perspectives on collective dismissal laws in europe susan n houseman continuousprocess technologies and the gender gap in manufacturing wages susan b carter peter philips reducing gender and racial inequality the role of public policy peter gottschalk government and the labor market robert m solow

managing green revolution technology an analysis of a differential practice combination in swaziland the process of technology adoption in agriculture is not well understood numerous studies have attempted to explain the adoption process but their shortcomings have resulted in limited success almost all technological adoption studies have characterized adoption as a discrete phenomenon adopters versus nonadopters rather than a continuum that reflects the intensity of use of various technologies only a few studies have used continuous adoption variables 2 most studies view technological practices in isolation from one another that is interdependencies among these practices have largely been ignored 3 some authors have hypothesized a specific type of interdependency referred to as sequential adoption behavior 4 the sequential adoption process is one in which one modern input is adopted and then after a lag another input is adopted for example it is best to adopt modern varieties and fertilizer together because of the interactions among practices however it is argued that farmers may first adopt modern varieties and 2 3 years later adopt fertilizer h d leathers and m smale argue that the empirical evidence shows that for the most part farmers choose to adopt inputs sequentially adopting initially only part of the package and subsequently adding components over time d byerlee and e h de polanco found that the farmers in the mexican alliplano have adopted a package of biochem

the dynamics of lobbying a differential game this paper presents a dynamic model on lobbying the interactions between two competing lobbies who attempt to influence regulations and legislation are modelled as a differential game we consider for this game first a time consistent and then a subgame perfect equilibrium in linear markov strategies the subgame perfect equilibrium lowers considerably lobbying activity and expenses this provides a partial explanation of the puzzle that rent seeking expenses are often small compared with the prize sought

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed