two party competition with persistent policies abstract when campaigning for reelection incumbent parties promises to voters are constrained by their records in office while opposition parties can use their time away from power to develop new platforms in this paper i introduce incumbent policy persistence in a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy motivated parties and characterise the long run outcomes of its markov perfect equilibria incumbents reduced policy flexibility leads to alternation in power and policy dynamics that converge to alternations at policies equally preferred by the median voter convergence of policies towards the median is a robust equilibrium outcome while convergence to the median is not while alternations far from the median are never limits of equilibrium dynamics alternations close to the median can be reached only if policy dynamics start exactly there i show that these results are robust to voters being forward looking and to limited policy commitment by parties

term limits and pork barrel politics abstract we develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re election decisions we characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare contributions of our paper include we detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes pork provision transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents especially incumbents in small or poor districts pork provision can explain why re election probabilities in congress exceed those for governors term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision we characterize the welfare of all voters not just the median voter

electoral competition with privately informed candidates we consider a model of elections in which two office motivated candidates receive private signals about the location of the median voter s ideal point prior to taking policy positions we show that at most one pure strategy equilibrium exists and provide a sharp characterization if one exists after receiving a signal each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter s location conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal it follows that a candidate s position conditional on his her signal is a biased estimate of the true median with candidate positions tending to the extremes of the policy space we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium essentially the pure strategy equilibrium exists if for each signal the other candidate is sufficiently likely to receive a signal in the same direction that is at least as extreme though the electoral game exhibits discontinuous payoffs for the candidates we prove that mixed strategy equilibria exist generally that equilibrium expected payoffs are continuous in the parameters of the model and that mixed strategy equilibria are upper hemicontinuous we investigate the robustness of the median voter theorem to private information pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist in models close to the downsian model but mixed strategy equilibria must and they will be close to the downsian equilibrium finally we provide bounds on the support of mixed strategy equilibria and restrictions on possible atoms of equilibrium mixed strategies

disasterization a simple way to fix the asset pricing properties of macroeconomic models a central difficulty in economics is to create a model with both good business cycle properties and asset pricing properties i show how to solve this difficulty by a simple portable modeling device the disasterization of models take an economy with good business cycle properties and create a new disasterized economy which is essentially identical to the original one except that disasters can destroy part of the capital stock and productivity in such a disasterized economy asset prices exhibit high and volatile risk premia but macro variables remain unchanged perturbations of this benchmark allow for feedback from finance to macro

risk unemployment and the stock market a rare event based explanation of labor market volatility what is the driving force behind the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies what is the relation between job creation incentives of firms and stock market valuations we answer these questions in a model with time varying risk modeled as a small and variable probability of an economic disaster a high probability implies greater risk and lower future growth lowering the incentives of firms to invest in hiring during periods of high risk stock market valuations are low and unemployment rises the model thus explains volatility in equity and labor markets and the relation between the two first draft november 15 2014 kilic mkilic wharton upenn edu wachter jwachter wharton upenn edu we are grateful to andy abel gabriel chodorow reich max croce giuliano curatola zvi eckstein joao gomes urban jermann christian opp sang byung seo ctirad slavik mathieu taschereau dumouchel michael wachter nancy ran xu amir yaron and seminar participants at the wharton school at the trans atlantic doctoral conference at the western finance association meetings and at the safe asset pricing workshop for helpful comments

political motivations and electoral competition equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence we study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of nash equilibria of a classical one dimensional majority rule election game with two candidates who might be interested in power as well as in ideology but not necessarily in the same way apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two sided policy differentiation outcome the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations called one sided and probabilistic policy differentiation respectively our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power resp ideology and the uncertainty about voters preferences the theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments as we observe convergence to the nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory

applied general equilibrium models of taxation and international trade an introduction and survey we wish to acknowledge the help of three referees and of john pencavel on several earlier drafts as well as the assistance of the modelers whose work is referred to in the paper they corrected our lack of understanding of their work and provided many other helpful comments excellent research and bibliographical assistance have been provided by debbie fretz radwan shaban and janet stotsky helpful comments have been made by charles ballard michael boskin lans bovenberg sylvester damus harvey galper glenn harrison gordon lenjosek jack mutti serena ng t n srinivasan charles stuart and eric toder the authors also acknowledgefinancial support from the national bureau of economic research the national science foundation international business machines and the social sciences and humanities research council ottawa canada

productivity and unemployment over the business cycle abstract the low correlation between cyclical unemployment and productivity over the post war period hides a large sign switch in the mid 1980s from significantly negative the correlation became significantly positive using a search model of unemployment with nominal rigidities and variable labor effort i show that technology shocks can generate a positive unemployment productivity correlation whereas non technology shocks i e aggregate demand shocks tend to do the opposite in this context i identify two events that can quantitatively explain the increase in the correlation i a sharp drop in the volatility of non technology shocks in the mid 1980s and ii a decline in the response of productivity to non technology shocks which from procyclical became acyclical in the last 25 years

partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters abstract we analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate s policy choice voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy in equilibrium the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his opponent s policy is preferred by all voters the departure from the downsian prediction is most pronounced when candidates have a weak policy preference and care mostly about winning the election in that case uninformed voters choose the candidate with the preferred personality even if electing this candidate implies a lower payoff on average

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

party polarization in legislatures with office motivated candidates we develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties median legislators as long as election outcomes are sufficiently predictable the only stable equilibria exhibit policy divergence between the parties if the degree of uncertainty about election outcomes decreases and if voters place less weight on local candidates valence polarization between the parties increases furthermore a systematic electoral shock makes the party favored by the shock more moderate while the disadvantaged party becomes more extreme finally we examine data on state elections and the ideological positions of state legislatures and find patterns that are consistent with key predictions of our model

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

trade and search generated unemployment we argue that trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemployment is carefully modeled we introduce such a model derive several results and compare them to results derived in full employment models we argue that some traditional results are probably too narrow the determinants of comparative advantage and that some results do not generalize to models with unemployment the link between trade and income distribution for employed factors we also show that in some important cases results do generalize there is an extended stolper samuelson theorem that links trade to the distribution of income for searching factors and that our model allows us to address issues that traditional models cannot handle the impact of trade on unemployment and the welfare of the unemployed 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

unemployment insurance and male unemployment duration in canada a model of unemployment duration is estimated with weekly micro data on canadian men entitlement provisions in the unemployment insurance program and demand conditions are found to have a significant effect on the probability of leaving unemployment the probability of a worker leaving unemployment declines with the duration of unemployment holding unemployment insurance entitlement constant when entitlement is allowed to vary the probability of leaving first falls and then generally rises with unemployment duration these results are robust with respect to allowing for person specific unobserved heterogeneity and alternative specifications of duration dependence

trade turnover and tithing this paper examines the hypothesis that turnover affects trade preferences high turnover industries are similar to the stolper samuelson assumption of perfect factor mobility so factor of production drives trade preferences among low turnover industries as in the specific factors model net export position determines trade preferences we show that pac contribution patterns are consistent with this hypothesis in high turnover industries capital groups give significantly larger shares of their campaign contributions to free trade supporters than labor groups do among low turnover industries on the other hand exporting and import competing groups differ significantly in their financial support for free traders d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the structure of simple general equilibrium models with frictional unemployment we develop a two sector general equilibrium model in which equilibrium unemployment arises endogenously because of trading frictions in the labor market of one sector externalities inherent in the search process lead to inefficient equilibria and this has important implication for the basic structure of the economy in particular the relationship between factor rewards and commodity prices is fundamentally different from the analogous relationship in a frictionless economy one implication is that the economy s relative supply curve may be downward sloping especially when the search sector is small we also present several applications of the analysis

the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment the flow opportunity cost of moving from unemployment to employment consists of forgone public benefits and the forgone consumption value of nonworking time we construct a time series of the opportunity cost of employment using detailed microdata and administrative or national accounts data to estimate benefits levels eligibility take up consumption by labor force status hours taxes and preference parameters the opportunity cost is procyclical and volatile over the business cycle the estimated cyclicality implies far less unemployment volatility in leading models of the labor market than that observed in the data irrespective of the level of the opportunity cost

factor market search and the structure of simple general equilibrium models this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which unemployed workers search for jobs and vacant firms search for employees formally i develop a two sector constrained efficient version of the diamond mortensen pissarides matching model of trade coordination this approach to modeling factor market search appears promising since its algebraic development parallels jones s treatment of the two sector model of production and the latter framework underlies most applied general equilibrium analyses some illustrative short run and steady state results are presented concerning the behavior of open and closed economies that exhibit unemployment and vacancies

unemployment and market size without strong empirical support labour market matching models typically assume constant returns to scale in matching we construct a tractable equilibrium random matching model with a general matching technology introducing market size effects the job finding rate varies with unemployment stable steady states may occur in regions of increasing or decreasing returns and multiple equilibria are welfare ranked by market size while the standard model relies on high frequency shocks to the steady state to explain the co movement of unemployment and job finding locally decreasing returns in matching generate plausible adjustment dynamics and slower convergence lastly an extension of the hosios condition internalises search externalities

employer search training and vacancy duration we develop a model of optimal employer search strategy when information about match quality is endogenous the model is tested using four data sets two of which have not previously been used as theory predicts we find that when filling positions requiring more training employers search more intensively and extensively employers also search more extensively when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience these findings provide strong evidence of systematic variation in search strategies based on the characteristics of the positions and job applicants factors that influence employer search also affect the duration of a vacancy

brain drain informality and inequality a search and matching model for sub saharan africa abstract this paper revisits the effect of brain drain on development and inequality using a two sector model with formal and informal labor markets contrary to existing studies we use a search and matching setting that allows to endogenize the employment structure and the wage differentials between different skill groups in the same sector and between workers with identical skills employed in different sectors theoretically the brain drain induces ambiguous welfare effects for those left behind as the potential loss gain depends on the parameters of the model we thus parameterize our model on 33 sub saharan african countries and produce comparative results for each of them we find that skilled emigration induces heterogeneous welfare losses for the low skilled population the size of these losses varies between 0 2 and 8 and is influenced by the parameters of the production and education technologies the results are fairly robust to identifying assumptions to the inclusion of technological externalities and to the endogenization of training decisions

the case for responsible parties electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars arguably to paraphrase it does not provide enough choice between candidates this article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence we show that when parties do not know voters preferences precisely all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median after characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible policy motivated parties we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic purely office motivated ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge but not so polarized that they diverge excessively however greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design we calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first best outcome if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized

bargaining and the role of expert agents an empirical study of final offer arbitration abstract expert agents such as lawyers play a prominent role in conflict resolution yet little is known about how they affect outcomes we construct a model that permits us to estimate the influence of agents and test whether the parties in a dispute face prisoner s dilemma incentives using eighteen years of final offer arbitration data from new jersey we find the parties do significantly better when they retain agents and that the parties learn about this benefit over time however we also find that the gain to using an agent is fully offset when the opposing party also hires an agent since agents are costly this noncooperative equilibrium is pareto inferior

imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism we analyze a two candidate downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts e g interest group media endorsements to infer candidates policy platforms that is voters do not observe candidates exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist rightist platform relative positions in equilibrium candidates behavior tends to maximum extremism but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates when the tie breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter but when it strongly favors a certain candidate each candidate specializes in a different extreme

unemployment dynamics in britain we examine the inter related dynamics of the unemployment flows and stock our model allows them to be linked through the standard accounting identity but also through behavioural relationships we find that for the uk the bulk of the correlation between duration and the unemployment stock arises from the dependence of duration on unemployment taking careful account of the inter temporal identity outflow shocks have contributed little to the evolution of unemployment since the late 1960s given that the correlation of duration and unemployment arises from the behavioural relationship we show that unemployment dynamics arise mostly from shocks to the inflow unemployment remains one of europe s more pressing economic and social problems as highlighted in the eu s lisbon declaration of 2000 a dynamic approach to unemployment starts from the recognition that unemployment is a stock and changes through shocks to the outflow and inflow the research and policy focus has generally been on the outflow process or equivalently unemployment duration a glance at figure 1 shows why this might be so it reveals a very strong co movement of the unemployment rate and the proportion of the unemployed out of work for a year or more analysts have used data like this to argue that the source of unemployment fluctuations has been changes in the outflow process 1 possibly as a consequence of this most policies directed at reducing unemployment focus on improving the search effectiveness and employability of the currently unemployed the unemployment flows and stock are related in quite complex ways and in this paper we focus on these inter related dynamics the model we use allows them to be linked in two ways first there is the simple accounting relationship whereby shocks to the flows accumulate in the stock second search and matching models suggest behavioural relationships of the flows depending on unemployment the presence of the nonlinear accounting identity in the model makes the analysis of the joint system problematic so we proceed sequentially investigating first one link and then the other we find that for the uk the bulk of the correlation between duration and the unemployment stock displayed in figure 1 arises from the dependence of the former on the latter we find a strong dependence of the outflow rate on unemployment taking careful account of the inter temporal identity on the other hand outflow shocks have contributed little to the evolution of unem

evaluating the performance of the search and matching model abstract does the search and matching model fit aggregate u s labor market data while the model has become an important tool of macroeconomic analysis recent literature pointed to some significant failures in accounting for the data this paper aims to answer two questions i does the model fit the data and if so on what dimensions ii does the data fit the model i e what are the data which are relevant to be explained by the model the analysis shows that the model fits certain specifications of the data on many dimensions though not on all this includes capturing the high persistence and high volatility of most of the key variables the negative co variation of unemployment and vacancies and the behavior of the worker job finding rate a key role in this fit is played by the convexity of hiring costs and the stochastic properties of the separation rate the latter is a major component of the rate discounting the future value of the job worker match the paper offers a workable empirically grounded version of the model for the analysis of aggregate u s labor market dynamics

general equilibrium in a simple economy with imperfect information the author determines equilibrium in a simple economy with imperfect information each risk neutral household acts as a firm making wage offers according to an endogenous wage distribution and as a laborer sampling a stochastic number of offers made by other households over its search period this economy with imperfect information and decentralized production and consumption will not maximize welfare policy must be carefully formulated because there are two nontrivial equilibria an unstable keynesian underemployment equilibrium with coordination failure resulting in underemployment and reduced search effort and a stable high effort low unemployment equilibrium that is reminiscent of a classical equilibrium with frictional unemployment

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

elections with privately informed parties and voters this paper studies a situation in which parties are betterinformed than voters about the optimal policies for voters weshow that voters are able to infer the parties information byobserving their electoral positions even if parties have policypreferences which differ substantially from the median voter s unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions we assumethat voters have some private information of their own if theinformation available to voters is biased parties attempts toinfluence voters beliefs will result in less than fullconvergence even if parties know with certainty the optimalpolicy for the median voter

earnings unemployment and the allocation of time over time since an individual s labour market history can be described by a markov chain in state space it is possible to calculate the steady states it is natural to interpret the steady state proportion in unemployment for a group of identical workers as the natural rate of unemployment for this group i e it is the expected proportion that would be employed if the environment were to remain constant it is shown how the natural rate of unemployment is different for different groups the model is estimated using data from a large u s income maintenance experiment the predictions of the model with some exceptions bear up well to confrontation by data the empirical findings also accord well with existing evidence on cross section studies of labour supply we find that labour force participation rates implied by the estimated models are positively related to earnings for all age sex and race groups as expected we demonstrate that the elasticities of the unemployment rates for all groups with respect to expected wage rates are negative and large in absolute value in the case of adults while the role of the wage in allocation of time is not novel the existing neoclassical labour literature uses static labour supply models to interpret participation rate studies

on the segmentation of markets this paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable there exist infinitely many marketplaces and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium where agents match with the first person they meet all equilibria have the same matching pattern although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models

environmental policy and the equilibrium rate of unemployment abstract this paper integrates environmental policy instruments with the theory of equilibrium unemployment we investigate the question of whether a low equilibrium rate of unemployment and a high quality of the environment are complementary policy goals or must be traded off it turns out that an interval exists for a tax on emissions where the two goals are indeed complementary the tax stimulates the emergence of an abatement sector which provides pollution control and vacancies for the job seekers for constrained efficiency the policy maker operates five instruments to internalize the environmental and the search externalities a tax on emissions employment subsidies and recruiting allowances for the polluting industries are sufficient to implement the first best the optimal emission tax is an increasing function of the workers bargaining strength for labor markets where workers have a strong bargaining position the optimal pollution tax may easily exceed the pigouvian tax

pandering and electoral competition abstract we study an election with two perfectly informed candidates voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them voters elect one of the candidates effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates we explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters optimal policy the model is extended to include strategic voting policy motivated candidates imperfectly informed candidates and heterogeneous preferences

housing search frictions and optimal search abstract by deriving a housing market hosios condition we show that the main conclusions of the seminal paper on housing search frictions by wheaton 1990 were erroneously derived we show that households may search too much optimally or too little which is in contrast to the paper s conclusion that they always search too little furthermore we show that exogenous increases in housing vacancies always have a negative effect on house prices given standard assumptions

are moderates better representatives than extremists a theory of indirect representation few if any elected representatives are capable of unilaterally implementing their platforms rather they choose between options generated by other actors and or external events we present a theory of voters preferences over representatives who will cast votes on their behalf and show that in this setting voters preferences over candidates platforms will not look like voters preferences over policies we demonstrate that these induced preferences for representation tend to favor more extreme representatives and we present two models of electoral competition in which induced preferences over representatives lead to elite polarization

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

rare disasters asset prices and welfare costs a representative consumer model with epstein zin weil preferences and i i d shocks including rare disasters accords with observed equity premia and risk free rates if the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 3 4 if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds one an increase in uncertainty lowers the price dividend ratio for equity and a rise in the expected growth rate raises this ratio calibrations indicate that society would willingly reduce gdp by around 20 percent each year to eliminate rare disasters the welfare cost from usual economic fluctuations is much smaller though still important corresponding to lowering gdp by about 1 5 percent each year

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

hiding information in electoral competition abstract we model a two candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy relevant state of the world the candidates receive private signals about the true state which are imperfectly correlated we study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms our results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate s prior information transmission becomes more difficult the less correlated are the candidates signals the lower is the signals quality and the stronger is the electorate s prior indeed for weak priors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger and welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated

trade theorems with search unemployment we revisit the heckscher ohlin samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictions a la mortensen pissarides relaxing the assumption of the one worker one firm matching rule we show that the stolper samuelson theorem and the rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances we also demonstrate that the factor price equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries but not for employed labour in equilibrium trade patterns are determined by countries factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors independent of factor intensities in production finally our results suggest an additional explanation for the missing trade phenomenon jel classification f 16 j64

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

specific capital and vintage effects on the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies in a reasonably calibrated mortensen and pissarides matching model shocks to average labor productivity can account for only a small portion of the uctuations in unemployment and vacancies shimer 2005a in this paper i argue that if vintage speci c shocks rather than aggregate productivity shocks are the driving force of uctuations the model does a better job of accounting for the data i add heterogeneity in jobs matches with respect to the time

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

the welfare cost of factor taxation in a perfect foresight model this paper examines the marginal efficiency cost of various factor taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium model the au thor solves for the excess burden of anticipated and unanticipated t emporary and permanent tax policies using a range of estimates for taste and technology parameters he finds excess burdens larger than those indicated by previous studies that use static models these exc ess burdens are sensitive to parameter values and timing however th e rankings of alternative tax policies turn out to be insensitive to structural parameter values copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

worker search effort as an amplification mechanism abstract it is well known that the diamond mortensen pissarides model exhibits a strong trade off between cyclical unemployment fluctuations and the size of rents to employment introducing endogenous job search effort reduces the strength of the trade off while bringing the model closer to the data ignoring worker search effort leads to a large upward bias in the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies merging the american time use survey and the current population survey new evidence in support of procyclical search effort is presented average search effort of the unemployed is subject to cyclical composition biases

labor search and matching in macroeconomics abstract the labor search and matching model plays a growing role in macroeconomic analysis this paper provides a critical selective survey of the literature four fundamental questions are explored how are unemployment job vacancies and employment determined as equilibrium phenomena what determines worker flows and transition rates from one labor market state to another how are wages determined what role do labor market dynamics play in explaining business cycles and growth the survey describes the basic model reviews its theoretical extensions and discusses its empirical applications in macroeconomics the model has been developed against the background of difficulties with the use of the neo classical frictionless model of the labor market in macroeconomics its success includes the modelling of labor market outcomes as equilibrium phenomena the reasonable fit of the data and when inserted into business cycle models improved performance of more general macroeconomic models at the same time there is evidence against the nash solution used for wage setting and an active debate as to the ability of the model to account for some of the cyclical facts

explaining asset prices with external habits and wage rigidities in a dsge model in this paper i investigate the scope of a model with exogenous habit formation or catching up with the joneses see abel 1990 to generate the observed equity premium as well as other key macroeconomic facts along the way i derive restrictions for four out of eight parameters for a rather general preference specification of habit formation by imposing consistency with long run growth the leisure share the aggregate frisch elasticity of labor supply the observed risk free rate and the observed sharpe ratio i show that a dsge model with exogenous and lagged habits in both leisure and consumption but not necessarily with additional persistence is well capable of matching the observed asset market facts as well as macro facts provided one allows for moderate real wage stickiness and provided one allows for sufficient curvature on preferences as dictated by the asset market observations without wage stickiness delivery on both the asset pricing implications as well as the macroeconomic implications seems to be much harder

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment the paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data it tests the model s empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers the model is applied to israeli data that are uniquely suited for this kind of empirical investigation the structural estimates are used to quantify the frictions embodied in the model including the costs of search the congestion and trading externality effects and the matching process a calibration simulation analysis then studies the effect of several key variables on equilibrium unemployment

frictional unemployment with stochastic bubbles abstract we show that the volatility puzzle in labor economics shimer 2005 stems from the inability of technology shocks to generate sufficient volatility of firm value we introduce non fundamental shocks to firm value akin to bubbles into an otherwise standard search and matching model when calibrated to stock market data stochastic bubbles significantly improve the ability of the matching model to quantitatively explain the volatility of the us labor market an extension with multiple sectors improves the persistence of simulated labor market variables

unemployment dynamics and labour market tightness an empirical evaluation of matching function models the implications of matching function models for the relationship between labour market tightness and the transition probability into employment are summarized these implications are then tested using monthly data for three canadian provinces british columbia ontario and quebec testing methods use flexible regression techniques so as to reduce the effect of any extraneous restrictions the results show rough concordance between theoretical assumptions and empirical facts evidence of non linearity in the estimated relationships favours a search theoretic model of labour markets over one based on queues and some quantitative results offer guidance to those using calibrated search models in theoretical analysis

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

private polling in elections and voter welfare we study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions in the essentially unique equilibrium candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms policy convergence does not maximize voters welfare although candidates platforms diverge in equilibrium they do not do so as much as voters would like we find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals and thus private over public polling some noise in the polling technology raises voters welfare

labor and the market value of the firm what role does labor play in a firm s market value we explore this question using a production based asset pricing model with frictions in the adjustment of both capital and labor we posit that hiring of labor is akin to investment in capital and that the two interact with the interaction being a crucial determinant of the time series behavior of market value we use aggregate u s corporate sector data to estimate firms optimal hiring and investment decisions and the consequences for firms value the model generates a good fit of the data we decompose the estimated market value thereby quantifying the link between firms value and gross hiring flows employment gross investment flows and physical capital we find that a conventional specification quadratic adjustment costs for capital and no hiring costs performs poorly hiring and investment flows unlike employment and capital stocks are volatile and both are essential to account for market value volatility a key result is that firms value embodies the value of hiring and investment over and above the capital stock