the earnings and human capital of american jews this paper analyzes the earnings and returns from human capital investments of second generation american jews compared with non jews jewish men have 16 percent higher earnings other things the same a 20 percent higher rate of return from schooling and a steeper experience earnings profile these patterns persist even after controlling for occupation self employment status and geographic concentration in the new york area there are no systematic differences among jews by parents country of birth the findings suggest that american jews are more productive in creating and using human capital and that this has encouraged greater investments in human capital

research design meets market design using centralized assignment for impact evaluation a growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed the resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness yet the question of how best to separate the lottery generated randomization integral to such designs from non random preferences and priorities remains open this paper develops easily implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in a wide class of mechanisms while also revealing why seats are randomized at one school but not another we use these methods to evaluate charter schools in denver one of a growing number of districts that combine charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system the resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance our approach generates efficiency gains over ad hoc methods such as those that focus on schools ranked first while also identifying a more representative average causal effect we also show how to use centralized assignment mechanisms to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

sacrifice and stigma reducing free riding in cults communes and other collectives this paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions the analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity rather religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to participatory crowding the analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma self sacrifice and bizarre behavioral restrictions the model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious social clubs fraternities communes political parties work groups and families

choices of organizational structures in religious organizations a game theoretic approach abstract this study has extended the work done by allen journal of economic behavior and organization 27 1995 97 and others who attempted to show a relationship between a denomination s doctrine and its organizational structure while allen s work resulted in a one to one mapping between doctrinal beliefs and organizational structure this study has argued that there exists a continuum of structures that are consistent with a particular church s doctrine the church s ultimate organizational structure is a game theoretic outcome resulting when churches attempt to maximize membership subject to the constraints imposed by their doctrines we examine how churches organizational structures depend on the extent to which members are willing to sacrifice their structural preferences to hold on to their doctrines consistent with allen s outcome our result indicates the further apart are the doctrines held by two churches the greater the variation in their structural organization this paper also examines the relationship between churches organizational structures and the degree of the majority church s majority

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

economists as the subject of economic inquiry friedman s argument is a point of departure he offers a standard view of invention among economists in effect creativity whether in economics or elsewhere in the economy is pushed outside the domain of economics it is a black box about which we know little and which is not subject to explanation by conventional economic analysis we observe such activities as entrepreneurship and creative insight but we balk at attempting to explain them

efficient resource allocation under multi unit demand abstract we study resource allocation with multi unit demand such as the allocation of courses to students in contrast to the case of single unit demand no stable mechanism not even the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm achieves desirable properties it is not strategy proof and the resulting allocation is not even weakly efficient under submitted preferences we characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy proofness or efficiency we show that stability is compatible with strategy proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority structure is essentially homogeneous this result suggests that efficient allocation under multi unit demand is difficult and that the use of stable mechanisms may not deliver desirable outcomes

stability in large matching markets with complementarities labor markets can often be viewed as many to one matching markets it is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets a stable matching may not exist we study large random matching markets with couples we introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market a stable matching will be found with high probability if however the number of couples grows at a linear rate with constant probability not depending on the market size no stable matching exists our results explain data from the market for psychology interns

incentive compatibility and competitive allocations abstract it is shown that as the number of individuals in an economy grows the demand functions which are optimal for an agent converge to the competitive price taking demand

market segmentation and non uniform shariah standards in islamic finance abstract this paper proposes a new answer to a controversial paradox in islamic finance described by el gamal 2002 despite the long development of uniform standards for islamic finance the market remains largely segmented we explain market segmentation as a separating equilibrium in which finance premiums serve as a socially beneficial although costly signaling mechanism market segmentation under a uniform standard of shariah compliance occurs when the shariah boards of two islamic finance institutions ifis use different degrees of stringency even though they agree on a common set of minimum requirements to comply with shariah law heterogeneous degrees of stringency chosen by different ifi shariah boards translate into different premiums paid by different customers one ifi targets the moderately pious consumer segment while the other targets the highly pious segment the ifi that targets highly pious consumers voluntarily offers a more limited set of investments and financing products by allowing for multiple muslim communities with distinct group identities and correspondingly variable willingness to pay to signal piety types the model provides an explanation for market segmentation

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

the importance of brand and competition in defining u s religious markets author affiliation brian goff department of economics 1906 college heights boulevard western kentucky university bowling green ky 42101 usa brian goff wku edu corresponding authormichelle w trawick dagger department of economics 1906 college heights boulevard western kentucky university bowling green ky 42101 usa michelle trawick wku edu acknowledgment the authors thank bob tollison colleagues participating in the economics workshop at wku and two anonymous reviewers for comments any remaining flaws are the authors responsibility 1 introductionover the past 40 years economists have vastly expanded their study of behavior in markets where there is no explicit trade of goods or services one of the most fundamental and ubiquitous of these markets is that of religious behavior where economists and other social scientists have explored a variety of influences on religious participation at the outset of this research program economic models of religious choice borrowed from long used choice theoretic concepts such as the law of demand or the cost of time more recent contributions have included household production models taking account of human capital or the role of market level forces particularly religious competition prior empirical research has resulted in the identification of a variety of determinants of religious participation these include income education race and the degree of monopolization or competitiveness in the religious market as the empirical application and testing of these models has proceeded researchers have been aware of problems in measuring various aspects of religious choice such as religious participation or religiosity at the most general level religiosity may imply a difference in a secular versus religious worldview at the level of actual observation it often measures how frequently one attends church while some of the basic measurement issues related to religious choice and behavior may be beyond the power of researchers to investigate one important aspect is not but has largely been overlooked that is the type or brand of religious choice by and large empirical research has skirted this important definitional issue and treated different types or brands of religious choice much like one would treat different brands of carbonated soft drinks using such a broad homogeneous definition of the religious product implicitly assumes that economic and demographic characteristics exert similar influences on different types or brands of religious participation and thereby assumes that such branding is not of empirical significance in defining religious markets and behavior within them 1 moreover some tension has existed in prior empirical work as to whether religious competition is an exogenous factor the common assumption or whether it helps to define the choice variable 2our central question is whether the same processes are driving religiosity across brands we ask do consumers of religion respond differently to key economic variables such as income religious competition or other factors based on the brand of religion being consumed likewise do some economic variables exert their influence independently of brand an important part of our investigation centers on how to measure brand we first rely on two indicators of brand broad denominational categories and intensity of participation in religious activity the denominational categories are mainline protestant evangelical protestant and catholic the intensity breakdown is based on geographic regions of low moderate and high religious participation in addition we also examine whether the degree of religious competition itself helps to define brand in the next section we develop theoretical explanations for variation in overall religious participation as well as by brand and discuss prior empirical work in this area

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

an economic analysis of the protestant reformation this paper seeks to explain the initial successes and failures of protestantism on economic grounds it argues that the medieval roman catholic church through doctrinal manipulation the exclusion of rivals and various forms of price discrimination ultimately placed members seeking the z good spiritual services on the margin of defection these monopolistic practices encouraged entry by rival firms some of which were aligned with civil governments the paper hypothesizes that protestant entry was facilitated in emergent entrepreneurial societies characterized by the decline of feudalism and relatively unstable distribution of wealth and repressed in more homogeneous rent seeking societies that were mostly dissipating rather than creating wealth in these societies the roman church was more able to continue the practice of price discrimination informal tests of this proposition are conducted by considering primogeniture and urban growth as proxies for wealth stability

an economic theory of economic analysis the case of the school of salamanca the school of salamanca often is identified as the first economic tradition in the history of the dismal science its members anticipated principles later developed by the likes of adam smith and carl menger this paper provides an economic theory of the production of economic analysis by the doctors of salamanca beginning from the observation that producers of economic analysis respond to incentives the same way producers of meat beer or bread do historically the demand for economic analysis arises from two sources governments and interest groups i argue that the changes in international trade associated with the emergence of new transatlantic markets in the sixteenth century led to an increase in the demand for economic analysis by spanish merchants and that the contribution of the school of salamanca was grounded in the predictable supply response to those fresh incentives

religion and the method of earnings management evidence from china previous studies argue that religious firms are more ethical and thus engage less in accrual earnings management at odds with the ethical view we use a sample of chinese listed firms and show that firms in religious regions use more real earnings management we postulate that besides ethics religion also proxies for risk aversion which motivates firms to substitute accrual earnings management with real earnings management consistent with this view we show that the positive negative association between religiosity and real accrual earnings management is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk and for firms with less reputable auditors in addition we use a mediation model introduced by baron and kenny j pers soc psychol 51 6 1173 1182 1986 to show that religiosity affects earnings management through the channel of risk aversion we conclude that firms choose real earnings management over accrual based earnings management because of risk aversion rather than ethical reasons

risk rationality and religious portfolios i introduction this paper builds on two assumptions the first self evident the second more controversial together they yield a provocative theory of religious behavior and organization the first assumption is that religion involves a great deal of risk those who engage in religious acts cannot know that their efforts will have the desired effects religious acts thus have the character of risky investments exacting resource costs in return for uncertain rewards the second assumption is that people choose their religious behavior rationally weighing the costs and benefits of religious behavior and seeking to limit the risk associated with religious choices churches and other religious firms employ a variety of institutional arrangements that mitigate religious risk most arrangements follow one of two major risk management strategies which in turn give rise to two different styles of religion one centers on collective production the other on private production and diversified consumption collective religion is congregationally oriented and tends to employ exclusivity and costly prohibitions to limit free riding and maintain high levels of commitment private religion is less susceptible to free rider problems but also less capable of generating commitment private religion tends to center on client practitioner relationships or fee for service transactions and consumers tend not to form exclusive attachments to a single religious firm outright payments for goods and services overshadow costly demands for an austere deviant or sacrificial life style a large body of descriptive historic and anecdotal evidence confirms these predictions and illustrates their range of application the concluding sections of the paper apply the proposed theory to a series of contrasts asian versus western religion mainstream churches versus exclusive sects new age versus standard american religion and greco roman paganism versus judeo christian monotheism ii religious commodities and the problem of risk economic models of religious behavior typically begin by assuming that individuals allocate their time and money so as to maximize their utility from religious commodities r and all other secular commodities s the production of religious commodities depends on personal inputs of time and money but may also depend on past experience religious human capital styles of behavior such as diet dress and sexual practices and the time and money inputs of others such as fellow church members see azzi and ehrenberg 1975 sullivan 1985 and iannaccone 1992 for formal analyses and empirical tests with the exception of durkin and greeley 1991 and montgomery 1992 previous models take belief as given thereby sidestepping the issue of risk but religious commodities do involve risk sermons and scriptures do emphasize the need for faith and people do wrestle with and often yield to doubt insights from secular markets and the economics of uncertainty explain a broad range of behaviors and institutions that arise in response to religious risk in particular they highlight two different risk reducing strategies one of which centers on exclusivity and collective production the other centers on diversification and private production managing risk through collective action religious congregations the would be believer faces a situation not unlike the would be used car buyer used cars are classic experience goods nelson 1970 since potential buyers are hard pressed to determine car quality in advance of purchase sellers thus have an incentive to overstate the value of their merchandise and to disguise its true nature used car buyers in turn are aware of the sellers incentive to misrepresent their products and so will attempt to increase their stock of information and or reduce their risk in many ways they may demand guarantees seek information from third parties investigate the seller s reputation and so forth

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

an economic theory of church strictness this paper introduces spatial location models into the economics of religion we offer a new explanation for the observed tendency of state monopoly churches to locate toward the low tension end of the strictness continuum obtained through the conjunction of benevolent preferences denominations care about the aggregate utility of members and asymmetric costs of going to a more or less strict church than one prefers we derive implications regarding the relationship between religious strictness and membership religious market interactions and asymmetric costs of membership highlight new explanations for some well established stylised facts opening the way to new empirical comparisons with more traditional explanations

an experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism we report an experiment on the probabilistic serial ps mechanism for allocating indivisible goods the ps mechanism a recently discovered alternative to the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully however the mechanism is not strategy proof so participants may not truthfully report their preferences we investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the ps mechanism we confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport we find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a nash equilibrium however we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so these findings suggest that the ps mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation

the economists and the problem of monopoly for much too long a time students of the history of the american antitrust policy have been at least mildly perplexed by the coolness with which american economists greeted the sherman act was not the nineteenth century the period in which the benevolent effects of competition were most widely extolled should not a profession praise a congress which seeks to legislate its textbook assumptions into universal practice and with even modest foresight should not the economists have seen that the sherman act would put more into economists purses than perhaps any other law ever passed of course there were partial explanations the coolness of the economists sometimes rested more on disbelief in the efficacy of the sherman act than on hostility to its purpose the route of regulation was preferred although this preference hardly restores the reputations of those economists as prophets one might even point out that there were not many good american economists at the time although an undeniable giant such as irving fisher shared the common view i intend on this occasion to review the attitudes of economists toward monopoly as a problem in public policy my subject however is a good deal broader than the sherman act and its reception the last two centuries of the economic writings on monopoly policy particularly in england and the united states will be surveyed thereafter i shall examine the reciprocal effects of economics and antitrust policy

a theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in germany as far as energy policy is concerned the design of the regulatory framework for energy transmission and distribution is a key issue consequently also the embodiment of balancing power markets drives mainly the effectiveness of political implications for the energy sector initially tertiary control in germany was solely offered by transmission system operators of the respective power control areas and their associated power plant the recast of the energy industry act of 2005 led in last consequence to a common procurement auction for the supply of tertiary control which starts on december 1 2006 admittedly the reform has fallen short of expectations so far first concerning the intensification of market entry of tertiary control providers as well as the desired decline of the price level hence this article examines the effects of the changeover on observable demand charges in order to identify attributes of the common procurement auction for tertiary control hampering market entry of providers giving stimuli to collusion and strategic behavior reducing intensity of competition and encouraging an upswing of prices we analyze the design under an auction theoretical approach and deduce empirically whether structural components of the auction design have to be touched up again

electricity market reform failures uk norway alberta and california an analysis of electricity market reforms already taken place in the uk norway alberta canada and california usa leads to our overall conclusion that the introduction of a competitive generation market of itself has failed to deliver reliable service at low and stable prices the market reform failures are attributed to market power abuse by few dominant sellers especially at times of transmission congestion poor market design that invites strategic bidding by suppliers the lack of customer response to price spikes capacity shortage caused by demand growth not matched by new capacity and thin trading of forward and futures contracts that are critical for price discovery and risk management the paper then explains why an electricity market reform can easily fail to deliver the promised gains of better service at lower and more stable prices the policy implication is that an electric market reform can be extremely risky and may lead to a disastrous outcome thus it is imprudent to implement such a reform in countries with limited sites for newgeneration and no indigenous fuels e g israel and hong kong these countries should therefore consider introducing performance based regulation that can immediately benefit electricity consumers in terms of lower prices more stable prices improved reliability more choices while encouraging the electric sector to pursue efficient operation and investment r 2003 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

balancing power and variable renewables three links abstract balancing power is used to quickly restore the supply demand balance in power systems the need for this tends to be increased by the use of variable renewable energy sources vre such as wind and solar power this paper reviews three channels through which vre and balancing systems interact the impact of vre forecast errors on balancing reserve requirements the supply of balancing services by vre generators and the incentives to improve forecasting provided by imbalance charges the paper reviews the literature provides stylized facts from german market data and suggests policy options surprisingly while german wind and solar capacity has tripled since 2008 balancing reserves have been reduced by 15 and costs by 50

why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments we consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents recent research introduced a promising mechanism the probabilistic serial that has superior e ciency properties than the most common real life mechanism random priority on the other hand mechanisms based on gale s celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature with the exception of the present context thanks to their outstanding e ciency features we present an equivalence

shifting load through space the economics of spatial demand side management using distributed data centers demand side flexibility dsf in the electricity grid has become an active research area in recent years while temporal flexibility e g load shedding load shifting is already discussed intensively in literature spatial load migration still is an under researched type of dsf spatial load migration allows us to instantly migrate power consuming activities among different locations data centers dcs are power intensive and process information goods since information goods are easily transferable through communication networks power intensive processing of information goods is not necessarily tied to a specific location consequently geographically distributed dcs inherit in theory a considerable potential to globally migrate load we analyze the economics of spatially migrating load to provide balancing power using geographically distributed dcs we assure that neither of the participating electricity grids will be burdened by this mechanism by using historical data to evaluate our model we find reasonable economic incentives to migrate positive as well as negative balancing power in addition we find that current scenarios favor the migration of negative balancing power our research thus reveals realistic opportunities to virtually transfer balancing power between different market areas worldwide

designing random allocation mechanisms theory and applications randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation we generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi unit allocations and various real world constraints such as group specific quotas controlled choice in school choice and house allocation and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation we develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments and that incorporate certain non additive substitutable preferences we also develop a utility guarantee technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization this can be applied to multi unit assignment problems and certain two sided matching problems jel c78 d82

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

law or economics w hen aaron director and edward levi launched the journal of law and economics in 1958 director suggested the title law or economics this alternative title certainly described the world more accurately at that time the traditional attitude of each discipline toward the other had been one of indifference only gradually has that attitude been replaced by a mixture of cooperation and hostility the first systematic application in america of economics to law was the use of price theory to explain economic phenomena involved in the antitrust cases director made creative use of price theory to explain phenomena such as tie in sales and patent licensing and assisted younger colleagues such as john mcgee and lester telser in their respective studies of predatory competition and resale price maintenance in such applications professional economic analysis was replacing the amateur economics of the lawyer lawyers did not welcome this development the national committee for the study of the antitrust laws was the scene of a deep schism between the fifty three lawyers and the eight economists 2 these numbers probably represented the belief that 13 percent of antitrust policy is economics the remainder law at one point the lawyers attempted to exclude the economists completely from the formulation of the report the division was not simply one between angels and legally trained devils consider the question of price discrimination economists insisted that price discrimination could persist only under noncompetitive conditions under full competition rivals would undermine any attempt to sell part of the supply at a higher price the lawyers argued to the contrary

introduction to the economics of religion after a very long hiatus economists have begun again to study the relationship between economics and religion this article seeks to summarize and evaluate the principal themes and empirical findings that have appeared in some 200 recent papers on the economics of religion although some of the research concerns the economic consequences of religiosity most applies standard economic theory to the study of individual religious activity the characteristics of religious groups and the impact of regulation and competition on religious markets

simultaneous determination of church contributions and church attendance in a standard model of household allocation of time and income church attendance and church contributions are determined simultaneously there are life cycle aspects to both attendance and contributions as azzi and ehrenberg 1975 and ehrenberg 1977 have argued and contributions behavior is affected by tax treatment and by a potential free rider problem as well this paper motivates an econometric specification which recognizes these features and estimates the parameters with a data set of over 2000 protestant church members

strategy proof stochastic assignment abstract i study strategy proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects a stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments and mechanisms are compared according to first order stochastic dominance i show that non wasteful strategy proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy proof mechanisms however non wastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization in fact the random priority mechanism i e the random serial dictatorship and a recently adopted school choice mechanism deferred acceptance with random tie breaking are wasteful i find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy proof mechanisms in general strategy proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects and therefore must involve assigning more objects

incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism abstract the probabilistic serial mechanism bogomolnaia and moulin 2001 9 is ordinally efficient but not strategy proof we study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems we establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences the non manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems

order in the church a property rights approach this paper examines the organizational structure of christian churches and in doing treats churches as firms constrained by their theology like all firms churches must manage opportunistic behaviour the hypothesis of the paper is that the particular organizational structure of a given church is the result of transaction cost problems that arise in the production of its spiritual good an effort to test the theory is made by examining the history of the church and examining cases of church failures and successes

the spontaneous evolution of commercial law jeremy bentham contended that property and state made law are born and must die together before the state s law there was no property take away the law all property ceases 4 309 most economists have taken this argument to heart clearly some system of defining and then protecting and enforcing property rights property law and rules of exchange contract law is needed for a market system to develop but does the state have to develop and enforce property and contract law one purpose of the following presentation is to demonstrate that the commercial sector is completely capable of establishing and enforcing its own laws a second purpose is to illustrate that modern commercial law is in fact largely made by the merchant community despite governmental efforts to take over provision of such law commerce is an evolving process of interaction and reciprocity which is simultaneously facilitated by and leads to an evolving system of commercial law carl menger 17 proposed that the origin formulation and the ultimate process of all social institutions including law is essentially the same as the spontaneous order adam smith 20 described for markets markets guided by smith s invisible hand coordinate interactions and so does customary law 6 7 these systems develop because perhaps through a process of trial and error it is found that the actions they are intended to coordinate are performed more effectively under one institutional arrangement or process than under another the more effective institutions and practices replace the less effective in the case of customary commercial law traditions and practice evolve to produce the observed spontaneous order as hayek explained however while smith s and menger s insights are firmly established in economics the study of jurisprudence has been almost completely unaffected by their arguments 9 101 one reason of course is that the invisible hand explanation for the emergence of market order is highly plausible because there is an obvious mechanism the mechanics of individual but interrelated market prices which provides the necessary coordination we call the price system the mechanism of evolution for a legal order is much less obvious thus the legal positivist view which holds that law is the product of deliberate design has a strong following among economists another major purpose of this discussion of commercial law therefore is to demonstrate that the rules of property and contract necessary for a market economy which most economists and legal scholars feel must be imposed have evolved without the

harmonization of the european balancing power auction a game theoretical and empirical investigation abstract the shift towards renewable energies is accompanied by great volatility on the supply side demanding european wide instead of national balancing services for the integrated european procurement of balancing reserves the european commission proposes a multi attributive auction mechanism which is very similar to the current german auction the key difference however is a switch from pay as bid to uniform pricing we develop a game theoretical model of the current german and the future european balancing market design both market designs have desirable economic properties in their one shot version i e an efficient auction outcome and competitive prices we show that a switch to uniform pricing does not induce bidders to report their true costs in their bids but leads to underbidding we contrast the equilibrium outcomes with german market data and find a substantial discrepancy i e non competitive prices we provide a game theoretical grounded explanation that is based on the regular repetition of the auction combined with the invariant supplier side

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha