the role of risk preferences in pay to bid auctions we analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions assuming risk neutral bidders if risk loving preferences are incorporated in the model expected revenue increases our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices which we test against observed auction data the degree of fit depends on how unobserved parameters are chosen in particular a slight preference for risk has the biggest impact in explaining auction behavior suggesting that pay to bid auctions are a mild form of gambling this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

search unemployment and the production of jobs the authors investigate the performance of the economy when search is required to find employment and when the duration of unemployment varies across sectors they assume that in one sector factor markets are frictionless while in the other se ctor idle factors of production must actively search each other out i n order to produce they focus on how well the economy allocates work ers across sectors and the conditions under which the factor mix with in a sector is correct the authors demonstrate that in equilibrium t he search sector is too small and its factor intensity is too asymmet ric copyright 1987 by royal economic society

decision making under uncertainty a field study of cumulative prospect theory abstract the presented research tests cumulative prospect theory cpt kahneman d tversky a 1979 prospect theory an analysis of decision under risk econometrica 47 263 291 tversky a kahneman d 1981 the framing of decisions and the psychology of choice science 211 453 480 in the financial market using us stock option data option prices possess information about actual investors preferences in such a way that an exploitation of conventional option analysis along with theoretical relationships makes it possible to elicit investor preferences the option data in this study serve for estimating the two essential elements of the cpt namely the value function and the probability weighting function the main part of the work focuses on the functions simultaneous estimation under cpt original parametric specification the shape of the estimated functions is found to be in line with theory comparing to results of laboratory experiments the estimated functions are closer to linearity and loss aversion is less pronounced

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

fair wages in the open economy we show how an extended theory of fair wages can be incorporated in the two by two heckscher ohlin model an important feature of the model is the existence of involuntary unemployment several results stand out first there is no longer a simple relatio

an empirical analysis of risk incentives and the delegation of worker authority the authors empirically test prendergast s 2002 theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives using data from the 1998 british wers the authors investigate whether there is 1 evidence of a risk incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal agent model 2 evidence of a positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority 3 evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority 4 support for the main testable implication of prendergast s model namely that the evidence favoring a risk incentives tradeoff should strengthen when authority controls are added to the empirical model the answers are affirmative for all four questions thereby providing evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with

trade and search generated unemployment we argue that trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemployment is carefully modeled we introduce such a model derive several results and compare them to results derived in full employment models we argue that some traditional results are probably too narrow the determinants of comparative advantage and that some results do not generalize to models with unemployment the link between trade and income distribution for employed factors we also show that in some important cases results do generalize there is an extended stolper samuelson theorem that links trade to the distribution of income for searching factors and that our model allows us to address issues that traditional models cannot handle the impact of trade on unemployment and the welfare of the unemployed 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

trade turnover and tithing this paper examines the hypothesis that turnover affects trade preferences high turnover industries are similar to the stolper samuelson assumption of perfect factor mobility so factor of production drives trade preferences among low turnover industries as in the specific factors model net export position determines trade preferences we show that pac contribution patterns are consistent with this hypothesis in high turnover industries capital groups give significantly larger shares of their campaign contributions to free trade supporters than labor groups do among low turnover industries on the other hand exporting and import competing groups differ significantly in their financial support for free traders d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the structure of simple general equilibrium models with frictional unemployment we develop a two sector general equilibrium model in which equilibrium unemployment arises endogenously because of trading frictions in the labor market of one sector externalities inherent in the search process lead to inefficient equilibria and this has important implication for the basic structure of the economy in particular the relationship between factor rewards and commodity prices is fundamentally different from the analogous relationship in a frictionless economy one implication is that the economy s relative supply curve may be downward sloping especially when the search sector is small we also present several applications of the analysis

factor market search and the structure of simple general equilibrium models this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which unemployed workers search for jobs and vacant firms search for employees formally i develop a two sector constrained efficient version of the diamond mortensen pissarides matching model of trade coordination this approach to modeling factor market search appears promising since its algebraic development parallels jones s treatment of the two sector model of production and the latter framework underlies most applied general equilibrium analyses some illustrative short run and steady state results are presented concerning the behavior of open and closed economies that exhibit unemployment and vacancies

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

does delegation increase worker training we model a principal firm offering training to its agent worker under two alternative organizational structures integration where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker and delegation where the principal cannot overrule the worker s preferred investment project we assume that training reduces the worker s effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit maximizing intensity of training empirical estimates from matched employer employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training this result persists in two cross sections in panel fixed effect estimates and critically in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects jel d21 d22 d23 m53 m54

employer skill demands and labor market outcomes of blacks and women the author uses data from a 1992 94 survey of employers in four metropolitan areas to investigate the effects of skill demands as measured by hiring requirements and job tasks on the wages and employment of newly hired workers skill demands were generally associated with lower employment of blacks than whites and with higher employment of women than men most tasks and requirements had statistically significant positive effects on starting hourly wages together these effects help to account for some of the differences between the hourly wages of white and black men and for some of the trends over time in the relative wages and employment of race and gender groups

individual preferences monetary gambles and stock market participation a case for narrow framing we argue that narrow framing whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation may be a more important feature of decision making than previously realized our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small independent gamble even when the gamble is actuarially favorable we find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions including many nonexpected utility specifications have trouble explaining this evidence but that this difficulty can be overcome by allowing for narrow framing our analysis makes predictions as to what kinds of preferences can most easily address the stock market participation puzzle

existence and dynamic consistency of nash equilibrium with non expected utility preferences sufficient conditions for the existence of a nash equilibrium are given when preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption rcla without rcla decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the same probabilities of final outcomes therefore the conditions depend on how players perceive the game whether they view themselves as moving first or second we also review conditions under which the equilibria will be dynamically consistent

timid choices and bold forecasts decision makers have a strong tendency to consider problems as unique they isolate the current choice from future opportunities and neglect the statistics of the past in evaluating current plans

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

the sunk cost fallacy in penny auctions this article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions a relatively new auction mechanism as in the us dollars or war of attrition players in penny auctions commit higher non refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding i first show that in any equilibria that does not end immediately players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero then using two large data sets covering 166 000 auctions i calculate that average profit margins actually exceed 50 to explain this deviation i incorporate a sunk cost fallacy into the theoretical model to generate a set of predictions about hazard rates and player behaviour which i confirm empirically while players do slowly learn to correct this bias and there are few obvious barriers to competition activity in the market is rising and concentration remains relatively high

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

on the segmentation of markets this paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable there exist infinitely many marketplaces and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium where agents match with the first person they meet all equilibria have the same matching pattern although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models

multiple free trade equilibria in micro models of unemployment abstract neoclassical theory suggests that trade patterns are linked to autarkic differences in relative opportunity costs we demonstrate that when the heckscher ohlin samuelson model is extended to allow for unemployment there are forces present that create multiple free trade equilibria even when both countries are identical and autarkic equilibrium is unique there is no necessary link between relative opportunity costs and trade patterns while our primary focus is on search generated unemployment we argue that the analysis also applies to situations where unemployment is generated by minimum wages efficiency wages or implicit contracts

gender and trade aspects of labour markets we provide a comprehensive up to date review of the large body of theory and evidence on the linkages between trade liberalisation and gender inequality in income as well as two of the latter s key underlying determinants wages and employment on balance the evidence for developing countries points to an overall beneficial impact of trade expansion on female employment both relative to male employment and in absolute terms although largely concentrated in unskilled manufacturing by contrast the bulk of the evidence suggests a widening gender wage gap as a result of freer trade

prospect theory in a dynamic game theory and evidence from online pay per bid auctions abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision making under risk although prospect theory is a popular alternative it is rarely applied in strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions this study fills this research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model using a large field data set from multiple online pay per bid auction sites the authors empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferences makes a better out of sample prediction than a corresponding expected utility model prospect theory also provides a unified explanation for two behavioral anomalies average auctioneer revenues above current retail prices and the sunk cost fallacy the empirical results indicate that bidders are loss averse and overweight small probabilities such that the expected revenue of the auction exceeds the current retail price by 25 46 the authors illustrate and empirically confirm a managerial implication for how an auctioneer can increase revenue by changing the details of the auction design

bidding behavior in competing auctions evidence from ebay much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction however in many online auctions a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from ebay our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid as the theory predicts the paper also shows that winning bidders who cross bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not

trade theorems with search unemployment we revisit the heckscher ohlin samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictions a la mortensen pissarides relaxing the assumption of the one worker one firm matching rule we show that the stolper samuelson theorem and the rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances we also demonstrate that the factor price equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries but not for employed labour in equilibrium trade patterns are determined by countries factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors independent of factor intensities in production finally our results suggest an additional explanation for the missing trade phenomenon jel classification f 16 j64

the impact of product market competition on training provision evidence from canada while standard models of training focus on how input market affects firms training decisions this paper investigates the impact of product market competition on training provision using the longitudinal data from statistics canada s workplace and employee survey we find that increased competition is strongly associated with more training provision this association is unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity specific measures used and other relevant factors to the extent that training is a significant source of human capital and industry competitiveness our results suggest that increasing training is an important channel through which competition raises productivity

the generalized war of attrition abstract we model a war of attrition with n k firms competing for n prizes in a natural oligopoly context the k 1 lowest value firms drop out instantaneously even though each firm s value is private information to itself in a standard setting context in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen even after giving up on its own preferred alternative each firm s exit time is independent both of k and of other players actions our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem jel d43 d44 l13 o30

trade capital accumulation and structural unemployment an empirical study of the singapore economy the past three and a half decades witnessed a distinctly declining trend in singapore s unemployment rate which dropped from an average annual rate of 7 85 percent in 1966 70 to 2 74 percent in 1991 2000 the authors seek to identify and empirically examine the factors that have influenced singapore s unemployment rate in an environment of low and stable inflation they incorporate a union bargaining framework into a standard factors trade model in which an increase in the relative price or capital stock in the export sector raises the demand wage that firms can afford to pay relative to workers fall back income and consequently lowers equilibrium unemployment the magnitude of the effects depends on the fall back income the weight unions attach to employment and the elasticity of labor demand which the authors estimate using data on singapore the results show that labor unions in singapore care more about employment than wages together with a small fall back income and elastic labor demand the authors show that given the same percentage change in relative export prices and capital accumulation in the export sector the effect on unemployment is larger for the former however the empirical importance of capital accumulation in the export sector dominates increases in relative export prices in reducing unemployment since the manufacturing sector experienced a tremendous increase in capital inputs throughout the sample period whereas the relative price of exports experienced a far smaller increase and only in the early part of the sample period the authors conclude that through a very open trading regime the tremendous increase in capital stock of the exporting sector has been the main reason behind singapore s declining unemployment rate

search and choice in online consumer auctions price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price much of this price dispersion appears to be due to a lack of switching by bidders between auctions which in turn could be due to inertia related to search costs we identify some of the influencing factors through a controlled field experiment involving pairs of simultaneous auctions keeping the sellers and the goods sold identical between two auctions we vary auction design features between and within pairs including shipping cost open reserve secret reserve price and duration and we provide bidders with incentives to search we use a choice model that examines individual choice between pairs of simultaneous auctions we find that within pair price dispersion is substantial and that prices and auction choice by bidders are indeed related to search costs we find strong inertia in auction choice and find that this effect significantly interacts with time left in the auction although individuals do not always choose a lower priced auction they are more likely to do so when search costs are low or search incentives are high

a model of casino gambling we show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior first we demonstrate that for a wide range of preference parameter values a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino offers only bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value second we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency at the moment he enters a casino the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy but after he starts playing he wants to switch to a different strategy the model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency and if he is aware of it on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

unemployment dynamics and labour market tightness an empirical evaluation of matching function models the implications of matching function models for the relationship between labour market tightness and the transition probability into employment are summarized these implications are then tested using monthly data for three canadian provinces british columbia ontario and quebec testing methods use flexible regression techniques so as to reduce the effect of any extraneous restrictions the results show rough concordance between theoretical assumptions and empirical facts evidence of non linearity in the estimated relationships favours a search theoretic model of labour markets over one based on queues and some quantitative results offer guidance to those using calibrated search models in theoretical analysis