fertility social mobility and long run inequality dynastic altruistic models with endogenous fertility have been shown to be unable to generate enough intergenerational persistence using a bewley model with endogenous fertility we show that it is possible to recover persistence key ingredients for our result include exponential child discounting discrete number of children diminishing costs of child rearing and an elasticity of intergenerational substitution larger than one our model provides a unified framework of analysis for long run inequality that incorporates fertility choices

farm productivity and rural poverty in india armed with new data we return to an old question from the pages of this journal to what extent do india s rural poor share in agricultural growth combining data from 24 household sample surveys spanning 35 years with other sources we estimate a model of the joint determination of consumption poverty measures agricultural wages and food prices we find that higher farm productivity brought both absolute and relative gains to poor rural households a large share of the gains was via wages and prices though these effects took time the benefits to the poor were not confined to those near the poverty line

industrialisation catching up and economic growth a comparative study across the world s capitalist economies various hypotheses are examined seeking to explain inter country convergence at the upper end but divergence at the lower end of the world income rankings a model of disequilibrium growth with sector specific technological progress and spillover is developed and then estimated on two samples of capitalist economies 1960 85 it is found that the degree of disequilibrium between agriculture and industry is greatest in the least developed economies but their rate of labor transfer has been slow technological spillover has stimulated productivity growth in less developed agricultural sectors but not in the industrial sectors of the least developed economies copyright 1991 by royal economic society

designing optimal disability insurance a case for asset testing we analyze an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes an optimum is implemented by an asset tested disability system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum the logic behind this result is that an agent who plans to falsely claim disability a finds doing so unattractive if he does not adjust his savings and b cannot collect disability insurance if he does adjust his savings in the desired direction upward for a calibrated economy we find that welfare gains from asset testing are significant

optimal contracting with dynastic altruism family size and per capita consumption we use a barro becker model of endogenous fertility in which parents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are private information either to labor productivity or taste for leisure to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run the planner uses the trade off between family size and future consumption and leisure to provide incentives for workers to reveal their shocks we show that in this environment the optimal dynamic contract no longer features immiseration in consumption we also discuss the implications of the model on the long run properties of family size in the optimal contract and show that the long run trend in dynasty size can be either positive or negative depending on parameters

does agriculture contribute to economic growth some empirical evidence this paper augments the solow swan model of economic growth to include the share of the labour force working outside the agricultural sector as a labour augmenting variable in the aggregate production function the cross country empirical results suggest that transferring labour from the agricultural sector to other sectors of the economy is associated with economic growth this result is robust to using instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of the relative size of the agricultural labour force

fiscal policies capital formation and capitalism abstract this lecture examines the effect of tax policy and social security retirement benefits on capital accumulation and economic welfare the paper begins by examining how capital income taxes reduce the real return to savers and then discusses the welfare loss of capital income taxation relative to the alternatives of taxing consumption and labor income the analysis shows that capital income taxes impose a very substantial deadweight loss even if they do not alter private saving the first section of the paper also discusses the theory and empirical literature on the effect of capital income taxes on national saving the second part of the lecture deals with social security retirement benefits in 1994 the aged members of the u s population will receive cash and medical benefits that cost the government 530 billion or 16 000 per person over age 65 the likely impact of these benefits on private saving and the empirical evidence on this subject are then reviewed the second part of the paper concludes by discussing the welfare loss of unfunded social security benefits and the possibilities for alternative arrangements a final section discusses the implications of international capital flows for this analysis as capital flows become more important particularly in europe the response of government policy may be to compete for foreign capital inflows and to tax domestic savers more heavily this would lead to a smaller total volume of capital the sharp decline in the net national saving rate from more than 8 percent of gdp in the united states in the 1970s to only 4 5 percent in the 1980s and from more than 14 percent of gdp in europe in the 1970s to 9 9 percent in the 1980s may not only create lower real incomes and slower growth but may weaken capitalism itself in the united states a decade of slow growth has increased protectionist tendencies in international trade and led to a new interest in industrial policies that expand the role of government in guiding the direction of technology and of private investment in these ways the government policies that discourage saving might make the schumpeterian vision of a shift from private capitalism to a government dominated economy more likely

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance abstract this paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance we impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility the paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question what is the trade off between equality and efficiency in resource allocation journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 d82 j65

dynamic optimal taxation with private information we study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is similar to that in bewley 1986 agents supply labour and trade risk free claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics an agent s accumulated stock of claims or wealth and her current labour income we show that optimal taxes are generally non linear and non separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences this paper studies optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information we consider an environment in which agents preferences are defined over consumption and labour and each agent receives a privately observed sequence of i i d preference shocks incentivecompatibility constraints stemming from private information imply that socially optimal or constrained efficient allocations in this environment are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is identical to that in bewley 1986 huggett 1993 or aiyagari 1994 agents can trade current consumption for claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a borrowing limit these claims have a non contingent pre tax return crucially taxes are conditioned upon only two observable characteristics of an agent current wealth given by the agent s accumulated stock of claims and current labour income they do not depend on any other aspect of an agent s past history most models of dynamic optimal taxation follow the ramsey approach in which the set of fiscal instruments available to the government is exogenously specified 1 linear labour and capital income taxes are typically included in this set while lump sum taxes are ruled out the exclusion of the latter is justified by appealing to incentive or administrative constraints but these are not explicitly modelled these exogenous restrictions on fiscal instruments represent frictions that the government seeks to ameliorate through its optimal choice of tax rates the approach we adopt in this paper builds on the optimal taxation literature initiated by mirrlees 1971 mirrlees assumes that agents receive privately observed shocks to their

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

inequality and growth why differential fertility matters we argue that inequality and growth are linked through differential fertility and the accumulation of human capital we build an overlapping generations model in which dynasties differ in their initial endowment with human capital growth the income distribution and fertility are endogenous due to a quantiy quality tradeoff families with less human capital decide to have more children and invest less in education when initial inequality is high large fertility differentials lower the growth rate of average human capital since poor families who invest little in education make up a large fraction of the population in the next generation a calibrated model shows that this fertility differential effect is quantitatively important we also provide empirical evidence to confirm the links between inequality differential fertility and growth suggested by the model

economic development and the role of agricultural technology in earlier debates on economic development the agricultural sector s role was somewhat controversial while dualistic models highlighted the importance of agriculture the mainstream literature placed a greater emphasis on the creation of a modern industrial sector soon agriculture disappeared from the mainstream development literature to re emerge recently with a variety of multiple sector growth models emphasizing the key role of agriculture and specifically technology in agriculture this article is an empirical cross country analysis of agricultural technology s role in economic development specifically the hypothesis being tested is whether improvements in agricultural technology have a significant impact on long run economic growth the results indicate that agricultural modernization has a positive effect on both measures of economic growth and human development

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

inequality and social discounting we explore steady state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks when the welfare function depends only on the initial generation efficiency requires immiseration inequality grows without bound and everyone s consumption converges to zero we study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare the social discount factor is then higher than the private one and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady state cross sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists with no one trapped at misery

complements versus substitutes and trends in fertility choice in dynastic models demographers emphasize decreased mortality and economic development as the main contributors generating the demographic transition contrary to previous findings we show that simple dynastic models a la barro becker can reproduce observed changes in fertility in response to decreased mortality and increased productivity growth if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough we show that this is largely due to number and welfare of children being substitutes in the utility of parents in this case we find that with an ies of one third model predictions of changes in fertility amount to two thirds of those observed in u s data since 1800 between 1800 and 2000 fertility choice in the united states underwent a dramatic transition depending on estimates it fell from about six children per woman to around two children per woman this demographic transition from a state of high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality has been documented by demographers and historians in the united states and in every other developed country in the world over this same period natural rates of population growth net of immigration also fell but less substantially demographers have not reached a consensus on the root causes of this transformation but list several changes as likely main contributors these include reductions in infant and child mortality rates imrs and cmrs and the process of industrialization and economic development the work in demography and history on this topic has largely been limited to empirical studies with almost no choice based modeling of the type seen in economics even there issues of the timing of changes

on the long run implications of repeated moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long run consumption or utility given exponential utility it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments next it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents finally it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether the utility of almost all agents becomes arbitrarily low is whether lim c u c is bounded away from zero journal of economic literature classification numbers d30 d31 d80 d82