deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

on the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies abstract this paper investigates the possibility of implementing an efficient provision of a public good through distortionary tax subsidy policies in a simple one shot game of voluntary contributions within the class of all linear tax subsidy policies two cases are distinguished the first is where individual taxes only depend on the sum of all other individuals contributions although such policies may increase total supply of the public good it is shown that the implementation of an efficient amount is not possible unless the government has complete information about individual characteristics in the second case where taxes depend on the distribution of contributions the equilibrium supply of the public good is no longer unique for any efficient interior solution there might also exist inefficient boundary solutions moreover unlike the boundary solutions the efficient interior solution is in general not stable

corporate pension policy an empirical investigation an empirical investigation of pension funding levels and plan asset allocations suggests that corporations manage their pension funds as if they are an integral part of overall corporate financial policy this corporate financial perspective contrasts with the traditional view of pension management whereby pension assets are seen as a separate pool to be managed in the best interests of beneficiaries the primary evidence concerns the links between corporate profitability and pension policies first reported pension fund liabilities are linked systematically to company profitability by management s choice of a discount rate more profitable firms tend to choose lower discount rates hence to overstate their pension liabilities relative to those of less profitable firms second profitability has a strong positive association with funding level the proportion of pension assets invested in fixed income securities also has a positive association with funding level corporations with taxable income can maximize tax savings by having fully funded plans invested in heavily taxed securities such as bonds evidence regarding specific motivations behind the corporate pension perspective emerges when the sample is investigated more closely for example the subsample of firms with the heaviest tax burdens exhibits a significant relation between level of funding and tax paying status similarly the subsample of riskiest firms tends to hold underfunded portfolios invested in riskier assets stocks rather than bonds this is consistent with the presence of a pbgc insurance effect the tendency of less financially sound firms to lay off their pension burden on the pension benefit guaranty corporation

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

pension deficits an unnecessary evil many companies believe that underfunding pension plans is an inexpensive way to borrow from employees and that mismatching equity investments to bondlike pension promises creates shareholder value to the contrary financial economics calls for fully funding and immunizing accrued pensions for nonguaranteed pensions inadequate funding magnifies employees exposure to their employers financial health exposure that they cannot diversify fully securing the pensions eliminates this inefficiency in employee compensation governmental guarantees eliminate the employees pension risk but invite weak sponsors to extract subsidies from strong ones through underfunding a statutory requirement of full funding and immunization would eliminate these subsidies

government subsidies to private spending on public goods this paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of free riding and the presence of distorting taxation ironically the existence of free riding where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to direct taxation for the gain to be significant the number of donors must be extremely few in number even when the gains from a subsidy relative to direct taxation are small a subsidy may dominate direct taxation because it can reveal an efficient level of the public good the analysis distinguishes between traditional public goods such as national defense and what i call transfer public goods where members of society care about the consumption of a particular group in society such as the poor i generalize the samuelson 1954 results to derive conditions for efficiency in providing transfer public goods

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

procurement contracting with time incentives theory and evidence in public procurement social welfare often depends on how quickly the good is delivered a leading example is highway construction where slow completion inflicts a negative externality on commuters in response highway departments award some contracts using scoring auctions which give contractors explicit incentives for accelerated delivery we characterize efficient design of these mechanisms we then gather an extensive data set of highway projects awarded by the california department of transportation between 2003 and 2008 by comparing otherwise similar contracts we show that where the scoring design was used contracts were completed 30 40 faster and the welfare gains to commuters exceeded the increase in procurement costs using a structural model that endogenizes participation and bidding we estimate that the counterfactual welfare gain from switching all contracts from the standard design to the efficient apb design is nearly 22 of the total contract value 1 14 billion copyright 2011 oxford university press

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

the effect of regulation on optimal corporate pension risk abstract we study firms pension prefunding and portfolio allocation choices in a model in which firms trade off the need to compensate workers for the financial risk in their pension benefit against the cost advantage that may be gained by exploiting underpriced pension insurance in the absence of pension insurance the firm minimizes costs by rendering promised benefits free of risk to workers who are assumed to be unable to hedge firm specific risk various forms of government intervention such as benefit guarantees can alter this outcome dramatically by providing the firm with an incentive to shift risk to other parties in this case we find that the firm s decisions depend on among other influences the degree of insurance mispricing the amount of guaranteed benefits the stringency of minimum funding requirements and the costs of financial distress

social security privatization a structure for analysis this paper identifies the key economic issues that must be addressed in the debate over a privatized social security system we examine a two pillar plan the first pillar would consist of a demogrant a small indexed pension of the same dollar amount for all retirees who had contributed to the system over a full lifetime of work the second pillar would consist of a fully funded individual defined contribution account financed by payroll taxes held in financial institutions and directed by participants we explore how such a system would affect the risks households face how it would alter the distribution of income and how it might influence household behavior including incentives to work and save and portfolio choices we also examine macroeconomic issues how the transition to a private plan would occur and what the likely effects would be on national saving we conclude that a two pillar system offers several positive features namely a reduction in political risk an increase in household portfolio choice and improved work incentives disadvantages include less redistributiveness and national risk sharing and increased administrative costs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

dynamic natural monopoly regulation time inconsistency moral hazard and political environments this paper quantitatively assesses time inconsistency moral hazard and political ideology in monopoly regulation of electricity distribution we specify and estimate a dynamic model of utility regulation featuring investment and moral hazard we find that 1 there is under investment in electricity distribution capital aiming to reduce power outages 2 more conservative political environments have higher regulated returns and 3 more electricity is lost in distribution in more conservative political environments we quantify the value of regulatory commitment in inducing more investment conservative regulators mitigate welfare losses due to time inconsistency but worsen losses from moral hazard

determinants of portfolio performance ii an update 1991 determinants of portfolio performance ii an update financial analysts journal vol 47 no 3 pp 40 48

pensions and wages an hedonic price theory approach this paper examines whether a trade off exists between the level of pension benefits and wages the 1983 survey of consumer finance is used to match detailed information on pension plans to worker characteristics for a random sample of the population the pension wage tradeoff is estimated using both a contractual model of the labor market and the spot market model used in previous studies the results indicate a large negative tradeoff in the contractual model but only a negligible tradeoff in the spot market model results from estimating the underlying structural equations for pensions are also presented copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

investor mood herding and the ramadan effect in view of evidence linking herding and social mood we examine whether the positive mood documented during ramadan translates into higher herding compared to non ramadan days drawing on a sample of seven majority muslim countries we report significant herding during ramadan in most of our sample markets additionally we show that herding appears significantly stronger within rather than outside ramadan for most tests whereby its significance is manifested on both ramadan and non ramadan days overall herding significance within outside ramadan exhibits some variation in its levels across markets in relation to variables reflective of market states both domestically market returns market volume and internationally us market returns us investors sentiment global financial crisis market states

nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model abstract we model a single club heterogeneous consumer exogeneous income economy as an aggregative public good game under common assumptions if club quality functions are homogeneous of positive degree in the club facility investment and use an unique nash equilibrium exists

welfare analysis meets causal inference we describe a framework for empirical welfare analysis that uses the causal estimates of a policy s impact on net government spending this framework provides guidance for which causal effects are and are not needed for empirical welfare analysis of public policies the key ingredient is the construction of each policy s marginal value of public funds mvpf the mvpf is the ratio of beneficiaries willingness to pay for the policy to the net cost to the government we discuss how the mvpf relates to traditional welfare analysis tools such as the marginal excess burden and marginal cost of public funds we show how the mvpf can be used in practice by applying it to several canonical empirical applications from public finance labor development trade and industrial organization

moral hazard incentive contracts and risk evidence from procurement deadlines and late penalties are widely used to incentivize effort tighter deadlines and higher penalties induce higher effort but increase the agent s risk we model how these contract terms affect the work rate and time to completion in a procurement setting characterizing the efficient contract design using new micro level data on minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day by day information on work plans hours worked and delays we find evidence of ex post moral hazard contractors adjust their effort level during the course of the contract in response to unanticipated productivity shocks in a way that is consistent with our theoretical predictions we next build an econometric model that endogenizes the completion time as a function of the contract terms and the productivity shocks and simulate how commuter welfare and contractor costs vary across different terms and shocks accounting for the traffic delays caused by construction switching to a more efficient contract design would increase welfare by 22 5 of the contract value while increasing the standard deviation of contractor costs a measure of risk by less than 1 of the contract value

can private giving promote economic segregation this paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and individual location choice tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects however through its effects on public provision choices such relief may affect individual location decisions and in so doing has an impact on the jurisdictional configurations that can arise in equilibrium for some demographic parameters it will promote economic segregation rather than integration while for others the opposite is true in the former scenario a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be pareto improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority supported federal tax constitution

bidding for incomplete contracts an empirical analysis of adaptation costs abstract procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids a structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7 5 14 percent of the winning bid markups from private information and market power the focus of much of the auctions literature are much smaller by comparison implications for government procurement are discussed jel d44 d82 d86 h57 l13 l74 r42

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

why are tax expenditures for giving embodied in fiscal constitutions abstract this paper asks whether there can be unanimous support for a fiscal constitution that includes tax expenditures for giving among the set of available fiscal instruments we describe a political economy model of fiscal choices where individuals with different incomes vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving and investigate how the availability of such incentives affects political equilibrium outcomes and welfare for different income groups we find that unanimous support for the use of tax incentives for giving can indeed arise and is more likely the more unequal is the distribution of income

what are corporate pension liabilities analyses of corporate pension plans often make unstated assumptions about an implicit labor contract an example of the effect of such an assumption is that many mistakenly believe that if a worker s benefits are tied to final salary he is protected against inflation until retirement also the value of a worker s claims is often considered to be independent of the status of the firm s pension fund these implicit contract assumptions are examined and questioned the implications of analyzed pension liabilities in a manner consistent with the analysis of other corporate liabilities are explored

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

public private partnerships and government spending limits abstract we consider public private partnerships in which a public official selects a project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor we derive optimal public accounting rules when the official s choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or because of pandering to special interests we give particular emphasis to how the rules should constrain the official s incentive to understate the costs of her pet projects in the basic model we show that the optimal accounting rule takes the form of a budget cap with a project s expected cost modified to reflect the official s distortionary incentives if the project can be partially financed privately then fixed price contracts can serve to curb political misbehavior by securitizing public sector liabilities we also consider the possibility that development and operations are each handled by different contractors such unbundling deprives public accountants of forward information about future costs but can prevent the official from funneling hidden future rents to contractors

determinants of portfolio performance in order to delineate investment responsibility and measure performance contribution pension plan sponsors and investment managers need a clear and relevant method of attributing returns to those

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the public and private provision of pure public goods and the distortionary effects of income taxation a political economy approach a pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contri butions of two types of households the government finances its contribution by means of income taxation the latter has distortionary effects a third type of household never makes contributions we analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on a the pro vision of the public good b the private contributions of the households and c changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non contributing households we derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a pareto improvement jel classification h23 h24 h41 la fourniture privie et publique de biens publics purs et les effets de distorsion de l imp6t sur les revenus une approche en terme d conomie politique un bien public pur est fourni par le gouvernement et par des contributions volontaires de deux types de m6nages le gouvernement finance sa contribution par un imp6t sur le revenu qui a des effets de distorsion un troisi6me type de menages ne contribue d aucune maniere on examine les effets de changements dans le taux d imposition du revenu sur a la fourniture du bien public b les contributions privees des menages c les changements dans la distribution du revenu et du bien etre entre les menages qui contribuent et ceux qui ne contribuent pas on derive une condition simple et verifiable qui assure qu une reduction d imp6t sur le revenu va engendrer une amelioration au sens de pareto

privatizing social security at home and abroad a century has passed since otto von bismarck instituted the first social security system in germany since then government provision of retirement income has spread around the globe alleviating poverty among the elderly providing life span insurance via old age annuities overcoming the samaritan s dilemma by forcing everyone to save and in many countries extending coverage to include old age health insurance but for all the good it has done social security is severely limiting world saving investment and growth it threatens to bankrupt the young and future generations of some of the world s leading nations see jagadeesh gokhale et al 1996 it is the chain letter pay as you go method of financing social security that lies at the heart of the problem taking income from young savers and giving it to old spenders while placating the young with promises of repayment not only reduces national saving but straddles the next generation with the obligation the debt to meet these promises the size of these debts and the burden on the next generation will be much greater for countries with rapidly aging populations would privatization solve social security s problems this paper provides a framework for thinking about this issue

robust contracting with additive noise abstract we investigate the idea that linear contracts are reliable because they give the same incentives for effort at every point along the contract we ask whether this reliability leads to a microfoundation for linear contracts when the principal is profit maximizing we consider a principal agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability in which the agent observes the realization of a mean zero shock to output before choosing how much effort to exert we show that such a model can indeed provide a foundation for reliable contracts and illustrate what elements are required in particular we must assume that the principal knows a lower bound but not an upper bound on the shocks

guaranteed trouble the economic effects of the pension benefit guaranty corporation how did the pension benefit guaranty corporation a government corporation created to insure the pensions of workers and retirees in bankrupt firms end up facing financial distress of its own how did an organization designed to strengthen retirement security come to be seen as contributing to retirement insecurity the superficial answer is that the pbgc s current funding problem arises from the decline in stock market prices in 2000 which reduced pension assets and the fall in interest rates at about the same time which boosted the present value of pension liabilities but more fundamentally much of the blame for the poor financial state of the pbgc as well as the defined benefit system more generally lies in some major design flaws of the pbgc pension insurance program specifically the pbgc has 1 failed to properly price insurance and thus encouraged excessive risk taking by plan sponsors 2 failed to promote adequate funding of pension obligations and 3 failed to promote sufficient information disclosure to market participants together these three flaws produced a system in which many firms fail to adequately fund their pension obligations knowing that in financial distress they can dump their pension liabilities onto the pbgc though the pension protection act of 2006 made some progress in improving the pbgc program it failed to correct these three major problems fully absent further reform substantial problems will continue to plague the private defined benefit pension system in decades to come to prevent this deterioration this paper concludes that congress should transfer much of the responsibility for defined benefit pension insurance to compulsory private markets

valuation optimal asset allocation and retirement incentives of pension plans we provide a framework in which we link the valuation and asset allocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetime marginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pension plan formula in turn we examine the retirement policies that are implied by the primitives of the model and the value of pension obligations our model provides an explicit valuation formula for a stylized defined benefits plan the optimal asset allocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio of the pension liabilities and the growth optimum portfolio independent of the pension liabilities we show that the worker will retire when the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reaches a critical value which depends on the parameters of the pension plan and the discount rate using numerical techniques we analyze the feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuation of plans and on the asset allocation decisions article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

interior matching equilibria in a public good economy an aggregative game approach abstract if the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired pareto optimal outcome it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium using the aggregative game approach developed by cornes and hartley 2003 2007 this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good in particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and warr neutrality in the case of matching

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

do government subsidies increase the private supply of public goods we study three different models in which public goods are supplied by private contributions in one of these models tax financed government subsidies to private contributions will definitely increase the equilibrium supply of public goods in the other two models government subsidies are neutralized by offsetting changes in private contributions we explain why it is that these models lead to opposite conclusions and we argue on the basis of our first model that a government that wants to use taxes and subsidies to increase total provision of public goods will be able to do so indeed our model yields a surprisingly decisive comparative statics result if public goods and private goods are both normal goods then an increase in the subsidy rate will necessarily increase the equilibrium supply of public goods

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

a new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production we propose an intergroup competition scheme ics to theoretically solve free riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a voluntary contribution mechanism public goods game the ics includes an internal transfer payment from the lowest to highest contributing team proportional to the difference in group contributions the ics requires minimal information makes the efficient contribution a dominant strategy and is budget balanced these features make the ics ideally suited to solve the moral hazard problem in team production our experiment demonstrates that the ics raises contributions to almost reach optimality with the appropriate parameters we also show experimentally that the success of the ics can be primarily attributed to the effect of higher returns and to the introduction of competition and it is not due to the introduction of potential losses or information regarding other groups data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1922

financing public goods public goods can be financed by direct taxation or a subsidy to private spending this paper examines the relative efficiency and distributional consequences of the two methods efficiency is shown to depend on the price elasticity of private spending and the trade off between public and private spending when this trade off is dollar for dollar however a subsidy is always more efficient than direct taxation the gains from a subsidy are larger for a mixed good than for a pure public good looking a t distributional effects the author shows when richer taxpayers may prefer a tax credit to deductibility even though they face lower prices with deductibility and also shows when richer taxpayers prefer direct taxation to either type of subsidy copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

x efficiency and technical efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behaviour of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realise what it is that is being maximized however we evade this easy escape route into non falsifiable hypothesizing and instead take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

adjustment costs firm responses and micro vs macro labor supply elasticities evidence from danish tax records we show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms we develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs we present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using danish tax records first larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities second kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities third the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods

the portable guarantee to exchange back an old defined benefit for a new defined contribution dc pension plan as a defined contribution dc pension plan is introduced to replace a defined benefit db pension plan the portability benefit from a dc pension plan costs the employees to bear the investment risk from managing the pension fund to protect the retirement income and maintain the portability benefit a guarantee to exchange back the old defined benefit is supposed to be demanded for the new dc plan s participants in the guarantee market in light of such a demand this article applies a claim terminating insurance pricing model to offer a contingent claims pricing model for a portable pension guarantee using the new labor pension plan of taiwan as an illustration a guaranteed dc pension will carry an extra cost of almost 50 up to over 100 of the plan s contributions over the participant s work life given the current mandatory minimum requirement of a contribution rate of 6

social preferences and private provision of public goods a double critical mass model we set up an evolutionary game theoretic model aimed at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commitment of voluntary forces private donors and nonprofit providers only two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within a double critical mass model and we investigate the critical factors affecting the dynamic outcomes of such interaction further we explore the conditions under which what we term evolutionary crowding out in occurs depending on agents degree of opportunism social comparison and positive selective incentives such as subsidies given by the government to virtuous citizens or nonprofits only

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

rear view mirror driving in defined contribution systems the strange formula of the chilean pension funds the pioneering regulation on chilean pension funds under defined contribution program requires private managing institutions to exclusively manage individual accounts and meet a minimum return to their clients the purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the investment behaviour of pension funds and to contribute to the social security debate the findings reveal the benchmark significantly explains funds performance pension funds tend to replicate their asset allocations to exhibit similarities in returns we believe the obligation on fund managers to attain a minimum guaranteed return based on relative performance evaluation encourages them not to deviate from the industry s performance indeed the benchmark explains most of the group performance to hold similar allocations managers may monitor each others through their investment style

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

altruism voluntary contributions and neutrality the case of environmental quality this paper develops an intertemporal model wherein production generates pollution which is viewed by consumers as a public bad there are two types of consumer those who are altruistic and leave bequests to their children and those who are pure life cyclers both types voluntarily contribute to the quality of environment through environmental groups it appears that if bequests by altruists and voluntary contributions by all are positive redistribution is neutral which does not mean that pollution abatement and capital accumulation are optimal to achieve optimality one needs a tax on inheritance and a differential subsidy on all consumer contributions

are bid preferences benign the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions abstract bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms while economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms this paper uses data from california auctions for road construction contracts where small businesses receive a 5 percent bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds and no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid i show that while firms bidding behavior matches theoretical predictions procurement costs are 3 8 percent higher on auctions using preferences the higher procurement cost in preference auctions is attributed to reduced participation by lower cost large firms structural estimates of latent firm costs are then used to evaluate how efficiency and the division of surplus between firms and the government are impacted by bid preferences firm profits are 3 1 percent lower under bid preferences however this is overwhelmed by the efficiency loss due to reduced large firm participation the efficiency loss conditional on firm participation is estimated to represent around 0 1 percent of overall procurement costs including the adverse effect of preferences on the participation of large firms increases the estimated efficiency loss to 3 6 percent which represents 27 cents for each additional dollar awarded to small businesses through the program counterfactual simulations indicate that if participation were instead inelastic to bid preferences the 5 percent bid preference would be close to the optimal level

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

potentially harmful international cooperation on global public good provision recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize instead partial cooperation between like minded countries appears a more likely outcome in this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like minded countries in doing so we link the literature on partial cooperation with so called matching approaches matching schemes are regarded as providing a promising approach to overcome undersupply of public goods like climate protection the functioning of matching mechanisms in a setting with an incomplete agreement i e a contract where only a subset of the players participates has however not been investigated yet this paper fills this research gap by analyzing incomplete matching agreements in the context of international climate protection we analyse their effect on both welfare and the global climate protection level we show that matching coalitions may bring about a decline in global public good provision and a reduction in the welfare of outsiders

pareto optimal redistribution and private charity abstract when private charity exists and is motivated by utility interdependence a non pareto optimal outcome the free rider problem typically arises nevertheless incremental fiscal redistribution cannot achieve a paretian welfare improvement so long as private charity continues at positive levels donors respond to incremental fiscal redistribution by reducing their voluntary contributions by exactly a dollar for every dollar transferred in this way no net transfer is achieved unless incremental fiscal redistribution is pursued to the point where private contributions have been driven to zero alternatively a net transfer may be achieved by fiscal measures which affect donors marginal incentives to donate

matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply abstract matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem but the pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions however we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided

court efficiency and procurement performance disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court a simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation therefore inducing sellers to delay contract delivery by using a large dataset on italian public procurement we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance we find that where courts are inefficient i public works are delivered with longer delays ii delays increase for more valuable contracts iii contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers and iv a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery other interpretations receive less support from the data