exploration and extraction in a duopoly exhaustible resource market exploration for an exhaustible natural resource is valuable because it produces information about the resource stock i model a duopoly exhaustible resource industry with imperfect information about stock size as a two period game where each period is made up of an exploration stage and an extraction stage i derive the value of gaining information about stock size prior to committing to an extraction plan both for the exploring firm and for the rival i show that an exploring firm would prefer on average to keep exploration information private but that industry profit is higher when information is made public le processus d e xploration et d extraction dans un marche de ressource naturelle non renouvelable oui il y a un duopole le processus d exploration est utile parce qu il permet de produire des renseignements quant a la taille du stock d une ressource naturelle non renouvelable l auteur examine un modele de duopole dans un jeu a deux p6riodes pour une industrie de ressource naturelle non renouvelable l information est imparfaite quant a la taille du stock de resource et chacune des deux p6riodes a un stage d exploration et un stage d extraction l auteur d6rive la valeur de l information additionnelle qujant a la taille du stock de ressource avant de s etngager dans un plan d extraction a la fois pour l entreprise exploratrice et pour l entreprise rivale on montre que l enterprise exploratrice va pr6f6rer en moyenne garder l information priv6e mais que les profits dans l industrie sont plus 6lev6s quand l information est rendue publique

smallholder market participation concepts and evidence from eastern and southern africa abstract this paper reviews the evidence on smallholder market participation with a focus on staple foodgrains i e cereals in eastern and southern africa in an effort to help better identify what interventions are most likely to break smallholders out of the semi subsistence poverty trap that appears to ensnare much of rural africa the conceptual and empirical evidence suggests that interventions aimed at facilitating smallholder organization at reducing the costs of intermarket commerce and perhaps especially at improving poorer households access to improved technologies and productive assets are central to stimulating smallholder market participation and escape from semi subsistence poverty traps macroeconomic and trade policy tools appear less useful in inducing market participation by poor smallholders in the region

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

the impact of fair trade certification for coffee farmers in peru smallholder farmers producing for fair trade market outlets are usually considered to benefit from better prices and stable market outlets however many empirical studies verifying this impact suffer from strong selection bias this study uses a balanced sample of fair trade farmers and likewise nonfair trade producers of organic and conventional coffee from peru to compare the net effects on production income and expenditures wealth and investments and attitudes and perceptions after careful matching we find only modest direct income and production effects but significant changes in organization input use wealth and assets and risk attitudes moreover important differences between farmers with early and more recent ft affiliation are registered

profits and poverty certification s troubled link for nicaragua s organic and fairtrade coffee producers abstract governments donors and ngos have promoted environmental and social certification schemes for coffee producers as certified market channels are assumed to offer higher prices and better incomes additionally it is presumed that these certifications contribute to poverty reduction of smallholders yet gross margins profits and poverty levels of certified smallholder coffee producers have not yet been quantitatively analyzed applying random sampling techniques our quantitative household survey of 327 randomly selected members of conventional organic and organic fairtrade certified cooperatives in nicaragua is complemented by over a hundred qualitative in depth interviews the results show that although farm gate prices of certified coffees are higher than of conventional coffees the profitability of certified coffee production and its subsequent effect on poverty levels is not clear cut per capita net coffee incomes are insufficient to cover basic needs of all coffee producing households certified producers are more often found below the absolute poverty line than conventional producers over a period of ten years our analysis shows that organic and organic fairtrade farmers have become poorer relative to conventional producers we conclude that coffee yield levels profitability and efficiency need to be increased because prices for certified coffee cannot compensate for low productivity land or labor constraints

vertical coordination financial structure and the changing theory of the firm developments for evaluating these changes including the relationships to financial structure the theoretical developments include contributions from the economics of organizations stiglitz 1991 agency relationships jensen and meckling transactions cost economics williamson 1979 1985 incomplete contracting hart 1988 asymmetric information and financial contracting 1 these theoretical developments provide rich opportunities to apply new interesting concepts toward understanding and evaluating the changing managerial and organizational environment in agriculture

reinventing public r d patent policy and the commercialization of national laboratory technologies when innovations are heterogeneous it may be advantageous to provide a variety of patents by trading off patent breadth for length it is possible that fees are not needed in the optimal policy we present two examples the first is a quality ladder model in which innovations benefit society directly as well as through their use as building blocks to future inventions and the rate of arrival for the future innovation is unobserved more fertile innovations get more breadth for a shorter time menus may also be useful in the case of horizontal product differentiation copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

willingness to pay for sustainability labelled chocolate an experimental auction approach this study evaluates young consumers attitudes to sustainable food and analyzes the determinants of their willingness to pay wtp for chocolate bars with different sustainability labels data were collected through experimental auctions in italy assessing respondents n 80 aged between 18 and 35 wtp for chocolate bars with three selected labels i e fair trade rainforest alliance and carbon footprint econometric outcomes reveal that several socio demographic factors exert a positive and statistically significant effect on wtp for all the selected chocolate bars namely age cohort older gender female and household income high respondents lifestyles and food consumption habits also had an effect on final bids this study offers valuable insights to policy makers and practitioners for efficiently targeting young consumers in campaigns to increase sustainability labelled food consumption

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

information sharing in oligopoly the truth telling problem while under some circumstances information sharing in oligopoly may be beneficial the literature ignores the possibility of strategic information sharing by assuming verifiability of data i endogenize the incentives for truthful information sharing and prove that if firms have the ability to send misleading information they will always do to overcome this problem i introduce a costly mechanism through which the firm will in its own best interest reveal the true value of its private information even though outside verification is impossible i show that in some cases benefits from information sharing exceed the signalling costs while in other cases the reverse is true the fact that i model a two sided signalling enables me to mitigate the signalling cost problem rather than burning money oligopolistic rivals may exchange transfer payments thereby significantly reducing signalling costs

toward improving the design of sustainability standards a gendered analysis of farmers preferences summary recently sustainability standards have gained in importance for export crops produced in developing countries several studies analyzed whether such standards deliver on their promise to improve the livelihoods of poor farmers with mixed results here we ask whether the design of standards could be improved such that farm households benefit more an assessment of what particular features of standards hamper or facilitate participation requires a better understanding of farmers preferences our contribution is twofold first based on a choice experiment we analyze how farmers evaluate actual and hypothetical features of standards data were collected from small scale coffee producers in uganda second this is the first quantitative study on standards employing a gendered research design a gender focus is important because coffee and other certified export crops are often controlled by men the choice experiment included features of standards aimed at reducing gender inequality and was conducted separately with male and female members of farm households results indicate that farmers have positive attitudes toward sustainability standards in general while they dislike bans of productivity enhancing inputs agricultural training and special female support are appreciated many also see requirements that have to be met for certification as a welcome nudge to invest in better farm management and quality upgrading female farmers have a higher preference for standards than male farmers also within households significant preference heterogeneity between women and men is found

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

the value of information in explicit cross border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets abstract we study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross border capacity the total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction the capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information we assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference therefore traders act like bayesian cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors capacities our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components cournot behavior capacity constraints and incomplete information we find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed

rice farmers preferences for fairtrade contracting in benin evidence from a discrete choice experiment abstract private standards such as fairtrade have emerged as a response to consumer civil society and corporate concerns about the production conditions of imported food many studies have investigated the welfare implications of smallholder participation in fairtrade schemes and consumers willingness to pay for fairtrade and other labelled products on the other hand no study has yet investigated farmers preferences for fairtrade and other private standards such insights would be valuable to improve the efficiency of certification schemes and ensure that they are tailored to farmers needs using a choice experiment this study investigates the preferences of smallholder rice farmers in benin for fairtrade and organic standards and compares the value of three types of contracts domestic fairtrade and fairtrade organic the results indicate that farmers positively value contracts but prefer domestic over fairtrade contracts because the former involve fewer requirements at current market prices farmers are willing to accept a fairtrade contract that includes fertiliser and child labour restrictions and a social premium but they are not willing to accept a fairtrade organic contract that completely prohibits chemical input use the results imply that adding organic requirements to fairtrade contracts may undermine the adoption and spread of fairtrade certification in the beninese rice sector

insisting on a non negative price oligopoly uncertainty welfare and multiple equilibria i study cournot competition under incomplete but symmetric information about the intercept of the linear demand function while assuming that market price must be non negative for all demand realizations although the non negativity assumption is very natural it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature yet it has important economic consequences 1 expected demand effectively becomes convex which means that multiple symmetric pure strategy equilibria can exist and 2 expected total surplus can be larger when the firms do not know demand than when they do the arguments of the paper are relevant also for price competition and for uncertainty about e g cost or the number of firms and these issues are discussed

strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain the importance of material flow management for a profit maximizing firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature we demonstrate in our analytical model that a firm must also actively manage information flows within the supply chain which translates to controlling what it knows as well as what its competitors and suppliers know in our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed firm with a common upstream supplier material and information flows intersect through leakage of demand order information to unintended recipients as a result the informed firm s drive to control information flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material flow distortion these losses can be so severe that the firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so our results underscore the importance of strategic information management actively managing the supply chain s information flows and making trade offs with material flows where appropriate to maximize profits

the effects of information transparency on suppliers manufacturers and consumers in online markets this paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment we study these effects in business to business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries the prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm buyer or the upstream firm seller is a monopoly it is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away to answer this question we first develop a simple two echelon e market model and then extend the model to more general settings we find that information transparency can create value for the overall e market yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently one side will be hurt depending on the competition mode cournot or bertrand in the downstream this suggests that a manufacturer owned a supplier owned and a neutral e market will have different preferences for information transparency finally we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in bertrand competition this is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

on communication and collusion we study the role of communication within a cartel our analysis is carried out in stigler s 1964 model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals for a xed discount factor we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in near perfect collusion whereas all equilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome in our model communication improves monitoring and leads to higher prices and pro ts jel classi cation c73 d43

infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders a theoretical model is used to answer these normative questions the analysis focuses on the tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatization of noncompetitive sectors privatization transfers control rights to private interests and eliminates public subsidies yielding benefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers in developing countries where budget constraints are tight privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries but suboptimal for more profitable industries and once a market has room for more than one firm governments may prefer to regulate the industry without a credible regulatory agency regulation is achieved through public ownership

risk and revelation changing the value of information a different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information sharing agreement the measure of risk aversion loving this approach reveals the relationship between information sharing models and the risk literature it also allows uncertainty regarding the slope of a firm s own demand function to be examined which previous work eschews the results suggest that the incentive to reveal information is more prevalent than previously thought firms prefer to commit to reveal private valued information in both quantity and price competition this differs from previous work where the incentive to commit depended on the type of competition

contract farming in staple food chains the case of rice in benin abstract in this paper we analyze the impact of smallholder participation in a contract farming scheme in the rice sector in benin we use data from a cross sectional farm household survey and different propensity score matching estimations to reveal how participation in a contract farming scheme affects smallholder rice production we find that contract farming results in expansion of the rice area intensification of rice production increased commercialization of rice and higher farm gate prices and ultimately contributes to rice output growth and increased income our findings imply that contract farming can contribute to upgrading the rice supply chain and the development of the rice sector in benin promoting and supporting the spread of contract farming schemes in the sector might be an effective way to contribute to reaching the government goals of expanding rice production to become self sufficient and improving rice quality to compete with imported rice while there is a large empirical literature on contract farming in high value and commodity export sectors studies on contract farming in staple food sectors are very scarce our results document that contract farming for staple food crops can be sustainable and benefit smallholder farmers which is against theoretical expectations that contracting for staple food crops is not feasible because of contract enforcement problems that stem from a low value of produce low storage and transport costs and a larger number of buyers in the chain our study contributes to understanding the role that contract farming might play in the much needed upgrading of domestic and staple food crop sectors in developing countries

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

child labor school attendance and intrahousehold gender bias in brazil an extensive survey data set of brazilian households is used to test whether intrahousehold gender bias affects the decisions of mothers and fathers to send their sons and daughters to work and to school an intrahousehold allocation model is examined in which fathers and mothers may affect the education investment and the child labor participation of their sons and daughters differently because of differences in parental preferences or differences in how additional schooling affects son s and daughter s acquisition of human capital brazilian household survey data for 1998 are used to estimate the impact of each parent s education on the labor market participation and school attendance of their sons and daughters for labor market participation the father s education has a greater negative impact than the mother s education on the labor status of sons the father s education also has a greater impact on son s labor status than on daughter s for schooling decisions the mother s education has a greater positive impact than the father s education on daughter s school attendance but fathers have a greater positive impact on sons school attendance than on daughter s

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

note on risk aversion and sharing of firm specific information in duopolies this note extends earlier work on the effects of risk aversion on the preferences of duopolists to share information it is shown that the common finding that cournot duopolists prefer to share firm specific information no longer obtains for some parameterizations in particular the greater the aversion to risk the larger the parameter regions in which not sharing information is preferred copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

contract farming configuration smallholders preferences for contract design attributes while contract farming cf can enhance smallholders income in developing countries empirical research on the motivation of smallholders to participate in cf is scarce this paper explores farmer preferences for particular contract design attributes we combined analytical hierarchy process and discrete choice experiments to investigate the importance of contract design attributes on the basis of data collected among potato farmers in ethiopia we found that input market uncertainty is more important than output market uncertainty in smallholders decision to participate farmers tend to minimize their risk by opting for the buyer firm above the state and ngos as providers of seed inputs and technical assistance the results imply that the success of a cf scheme depends on the willingness of the firm to incorporate the preferred contract design attributes institutional intervention in the input market could induce agribusiness firms to offer attractive contracts for smallholders

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

optimal disclosure policy in oligopoly markets this paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two period oligopoly model an incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period and then competes against an entrant in the second period two main results are derived first it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre committing to disclose both the demand and cost information by disclosing full information the incumbent nullifies its self defeating intertemporal incentives which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand its cost efficiency or both in addition the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure which benefits the incumbent ex ante second the paper shows that the incumbent s full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint in particular the correlation between the firms production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency

information concealment in the theory of vertical integration abstract a model of vertical integration is proposed in which the motive for vertical integration lies in the concealment of information to other firms rather than uncovering of a new information since a vertically integrated firm trades internally rather than making publicly observable market transactions vertical integration offers an opportunity for the integrated firm to turn previously observable market data into private information it will be shown that when the acquisition cost of input is uncertain the ex ante profit of a downstream firm will increase if the ex post realized value is private information thereby providing a theory of vertical integration based on strategic information concealment welfare implications of vertical integration are also considered finally we demonstrate that the vertically integrated firm will adopt an inefficient sourcing rule when there are alternative but inferior input suppliers

an experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing hotelling s 1929 principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far we report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue the levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion the observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions automated vs human market sharing rule for ties individual vs collective decision making and even vs odd number of locations

fair trade organic coffee production in nicaragua sustainable development or a poverty trap abstract this article assesses the impact of fair trade organic coffee production on the well being of small scale farmers in nicaragua studying the results of organic management is crucial for evaluating the advantages of fair trade because approximately half of all fair trade coffee is also organically certified a wide range of farmers representatives of cooperatives and export companies in nicaragua were interviewed during seven months of field work between 2005 and 2008 fair trade organic production raises farmer income when low intensity organic farming is an alternative to low intensity conventional farming however low intensity farming produces very little coffee in the case of the most marginalized farmers keeping these farmers in poverty with higher intensities of management the economic advantages of fair trade organic production largely depend on prices in the mainstream market

fair trade organic coffee rural livelihoods and the agrarian question southern mexican coffee families in transition summary we use a random sample of coffee producing households in southern mexico to compare opportunities associated with government subsidies and migration to the role of fair trade organic coffee in household livelihoods although land and labor returns among fair trade organic coffee growers are higher than for conventional growers differences in yields are more important than price premiums moreover investment in education and labor opportunities outside coffee dominate those in fair trade organic coffee the results highlight the value of an integrated approach to the agrarian question that improves productivity and prices and supports other pathways for improving incomes

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

farmers marketing preferences in local coffee markets evidence from a choice experiment in ethiopia this study investigates transactions in the local coffee markets in ethiopia while the ethiopian commodity exchange which was established in 2008 introduced regulatory institutional and organizational innovations in the coffee market informal norms and conventions remain the primary institutions governing transactions in the local markets based on a choice experiment we found that for coffee farmers the characteristics of the traders are more important than the price offered when anchoring their transactions into personal relationships this can be explained as the institutional response of farsighted calculative farmers to poorly organized coffee markets and to lacking credit and insurance markets contrary to the concept of embeddedness which claims that economic transactions are embedded into social relationships social relationships are observed to be embedded into economic relationships one of the perverse effects of these personal relationship based transactions is that farmers are insufficiently incentivized to maintain and improve coffee quality

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

information sharing between vertical hierarchies abstract when do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information we show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents information with small externalities principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign in this second case principals face a prisoners dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information

voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels this study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information we show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm in addition sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case whereas the follower ex ante reveals less more private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low high we also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare we demonstrate that there may be a u shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly and the disclosure cost moreover in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition improving both firm profitability and social welfare

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

too much information sharing welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly by using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations we study how oligopolists information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade off in cournot oligopoly on the one hand it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision as the literature shows on the other hand information sharing increases the firms incentives to acquire information and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms information interestingly the latter effect may dominate the former effect

export subsidies as signals of competitiveness in a cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm this signalling effect strengthens the usual profit shifting argument for an export subsidy the optimal export subsidy in the signalling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit shifting export subsidy under complete information

customer information sharing among rival firms abstract the recent rapid growth of the internet as a medium of communication and commerce combined with the development of sophisticated software tools are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information databases with detailed records about consumers preferences these databases have become part of a firm s assets and as such they can be sold to third parties this possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned regulated or left unchecked this paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned in the context of a perfect price discrimination model

globalization privatization and vertical coordination in food value chains in developing and transition countries food and agricultural commodity value chains in developing and transition countries have undergone tremendous changes in the past decades companies and property rights have been privatized markets liberalized and economies integrated into global food systems the liberalization and privatization initially caused the collapse of state controlled vertical coordination more recently private vertical coordination systems have emerged and are growing rapidly as a response to consumer demand for food quality and safety on the one hand and the farms production constraints caused by factor market imperfections in this article we 1 demonstrate the importance of these changes 2 discuss the implications for efficiency and equity and 3 provide empirical evidence on the effects in several developing and transition countries

information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching abstract we analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition in the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition since the poaching activities can be targeted towards more creditworthy borrowers we find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits and therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

walk the talk private sustainability standards in the ugandan coffee sector abstractwe investigate the welfare and productivity implications of private sustainability standards in the coffee sector in uganda we use cross sectional household survey data and an instrumental variable method with instruments that pass weak identification and over identification restrictions we find that triple utz rainforest alliance 4c certification increases income and land and labour productivity and reduces poverty double fairtrade organic certification is found to be associated with higher producer prices but results in lower land and labour productivity and thereby fails to increase producer income and contribute to poverty reduction we conclude that private sustainability standards do not always live up the expectations they create towards consumers

duopoly information exchange the case of unknown slope abstract we model information exchange between duopolists facing a common random demand the slope of the common demand curve facing the firms is assumed unknown and firms observe private signals about this slope we show that for sufficiently large variation in the demand slope firms earn strictly higher profit when they share their information rather than keeping it private even with constant marginal costs and homogeneous goods in this case it is a nash equilibrium for the duopolists to share their information in a quid pro quo information exchange consistent with earlier models information exchange raises welfare

when bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs the design of effective public venture capital programmes recently public efforts to finance small high technology firms have proliferated we review the motivations for these efforts and make some preliminary observations about their design we explore the underlying challenges that the financing of young growth firms poses the ways that specialised financial intermediaries address them and the rationales for public efforts to finance these companies the final section makes a set of observations about the ways in which the structure of these efforts can most effectively complement private sector activity a frequent fault in programme design is the presumption that technological criteria can be divorced from business considerations when evaluating firms the federal government has played an active role in financing new firms particularly in high technology industries since the soviet union s launch of the sputnik satellite in recent years european and asian nations and many us states have adopted similar initiatives while these programmes precise structures have differed the efforts have been predicated on two shared assumptions i that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms and ii that the government either can identify investments which will ultimately yield high social and or private returns or can encourage financial intermediaries to do so in contrast to other government interventions designed to boost economic growth such as privatisation programmes these claims have received little scrutiny by economists the neglect of these questions is unfortunate while the sums of money involved are modest relative to public expenditures on defence procurement or retiree benefits these programmes are very substantial when compared to contemporaneous private investments in new firms government programmes in this arena have been divided between those efforts that directly fund entrepreneurial firms and those that encourage or subsidise the development of outside investors in this paper i will focus on public venture capital initiatives programmes that make equity or equity like investments in young firms or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments in some such programmes such as the advanced technology program and the small business innovation research programmes discussed below the funds are provided as a contract or outright grant while these efforts have proliferated a consensus as to how to structure these programmes remains elusive while the design of regulatory agencies has been extensively studied from a theoretical and empirical perspective little work has

information transparency of business to business electronic markets a game theoretic analysis the abundance of transaction data available on the internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces in such a transparent environment it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals costs is this good news or bad news in this study we focus on theinformational effects of business to business b2b exchanges and explore firms incentives to join a b2b exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission we then study the equilibria by developing a game theoretic model under asymmetric information we examine whether the incentives to join a b2b exchange would be different under different competition modes quantity and price different information structures and by varying the nature of the products substitutes and complements our results challenge the information transparency hypothesis i e open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms in contrast to the popular belief we show that information transparency could be a double edged sword the individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality this may have important implications for the microstructure design e g data access rules of b2b electronic marketplaces

cost uncertainty and trade liberalization in international oligopoly abstract trade liberalization has been shown to be unfavourable for firms of at least one country for the homogeneous goods case in an environment of certainty we show that in the presence of private cost information and for ex ante identical firms oligopolistic firms will prefer to operate under free trade rather than under autarky in homogeneous goods industries provided there exists a certain degree of firms heterogeneity and a sufficiently large amount of uncertainty for the particular case of symmetry both in demand and industry sizes the firms of at least one country prefer to operate under autarky rather than under free trade

incentives for information production and disclosure in a duopolistic environment this paper examines the nature of the equilibrium solution to the duopoly problem under various incomplete information structures and the incentives to produce and disclose information attention is focused on the duopolists cost functions the results indicate that disclosure of such information is generally beneficial to the duopolists

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

why do small scale producers choose to produce under contract lessons from nontraditional vegetable exports from zimbabwe summary this article explores the motivations behind the decision of small scale producers to grow nontraditional vegetables under contract for export based on a survey of small scale producers in zimbabwe four factors are identified as motivating contracting namely market uncertainty indirect benefits e g knowledge acquisition income benefits and intangible benefits respondents are clustered according to the relative importance of these factors in their contracting decision four clusters are identified and related to the characteristics of these farmers including size of the farm amount of land devoted to export crops access to alternative markets and the proportion of family income derived from export crops the results suggest that there are systematic differences between farmers in their decisions to contract which needs to be recognized in contract design and management 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

an empirical test of monopoly behaviour an application to the hardwood case 1988 an empirical test of monopoly behaviour an application to the hardwood case applied economics vol 20 no 8 pp 1115 1127

sustainability labels on food products consumer motivation understanding and use this study investigates the relationship between consumer motivation understanding and use of sustainability labels on food products both environmental and ethical labels which are increasingly appearing on food products data was collected by means of an online survey implemented in the uk france germany spain sweden and poland with a total sample size of 4408 respondents respondents expressed medium high to high levels of concern with sustainability issues at the general level but lower levels of concern in the context of concrete food product choices understanding of the concept of sustainability was limited but understanding of four selected labels fair trade rainforest alliance carbon footprint and animal welfare was better as some of them seem to be self explanatory the results indicated a low level of use no matter whether use was measured as self reported use of different types of information available on food labels or as use inferred from the results of a choice based conjoint analysis hierarchical regression indicated that use is related to both motivation and understanding and that both motivation understanding and use are affected by demographic characteristics human values as measured by the schwartz value domains and country differences the results imply that sustainability labels currently do not play a major role in consumers food choices and future use of these labels will depend on the extent to which consumers general concern about sustainability can be turned into actual behaviour

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

the economic sustainability of certified coffee recent evidence from mexico and peru consumers increasingly act on preferences for a more just and sustainable world by purchasing certified agricultural products using survey data from coffee growers in mexico and peru we explore the economic sustainability of certified coffee looking at conventional fair trade organic and rainforest alliance certified growers the analysis reveals that yields rather than price premiums are most important for increasing net cash returns for coffee growing households given the link between net returns and producer participation in certified coffee schemes the findings suggest that certification norms that permit improving yields are essential for improving grower welfare and attracting and maintaining growers

disentangling the effects of fair trade on the quality of malian cotton the increasing importance of premium segments and private labels raise skepticism about the ability of fair trade to help smallholders compete in high value added markets using panel data collected in mali this paper contributes to the debate by estimating the impact of fairtrade certification on the quality of malian cotton controlling for the nonrandom certification of producers results show a significant impact on the quality of cotton produced by both certified and geographically close noncertified growers via spillover effects the analysis suggests that contract farming enforced by third parties and demonstration effects foster the adoption of innovative agricultural practices

on the use of heuristics to approximate competitors private information abstract firms often lack knowledge of the nature of the uncertainty they or their opponents face and use heuristics or approximations to determine their strategy we define and analyze one type of heuristic strategy in which firms choose strategies based on the expectation of their opponents private information rather than the full information about the distribution of that private information we find that in equilibrium the degree to which the heuristic strategy differs from the bayesian strategy depends on 1 the convexity of a firm s marginal profits with respect to their opponents private information and 2 whether firm strategies are complementary or substitutable under certain conditions firms equilibrium profits are greater when all firms use heuristics than when all firms use the full information our results provide insight into incentives firms may have to either facilitate or impede access to industry information

duopolists don t wish to share information abstract this paper shows that in a full bayes cournot equilibrium duopolists would prefer to keep their market information private rather than share it with their opponent this is in contrast to a fulfilled expectations bayes cournot equilibrium where firms are indifferent to sharing

supply chain differentiation contract agriculture and farmers marketing preferences the case of sweet pepper in thailand there is an emerging body of literature analyzing how smallholder farmers in developing countries can be linked to modern supply chains however most of the available studies concentrate on farm and farmer characteristics failing to capture details of institutional arrangements between farmers and traders moreover farmers preferences have rarely been considered here we address these gaps by analyzing different market channels for sweet pepper in thailand using data from a survey and choice experiment with farmers we find that there is a general preference for marketing options that do not involve a contract additional provision of inputs and credit can increase the attractiveness of contracts yet the most important factor for farmers is to personally know the buyer they deal with which may be related to issues of trust some policy implications are discussed

public firms as regulatory instruments with cost uncertainty we re examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about irndustry costs we study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms a symmetric bayesian nash equilibrium an asymmetric bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry we find that a public firm plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument further

commercializing public technology through cooperative r d abstract we analyze 582 r d agreements between air force agencies and outside partners agenices choose partners and contractual terms consistent with predictions from a rational model which suggests that they could be incentive efficient from an ex ante perspective

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

how much more do growers receive for fair trade organic coffee abstract i use a representative sample of coffee growing households in southern mexico to estimate the price premium and gross income gain from participating in fair trade organic markets through grower cooperatives for the 2004 2005 season ft organic growers received an average premium of 12 8 cents per pound yielding a gross income gain of 5 of total household income or about 26 dollars per household member the gain is net of the costs of cooperative participation but not of other costs incurred to become certified and suggests that price premiums alone have a limited potential to increase household returns from growing coffee more broadly speaking the finding raises questions about the persistence of substantial price premiums associated with social or environmental labeling initiatives

food standards certification and poverty among coffee farmers in uganda summary voluntary standards are gaining in importance in global markets for high value foods we analyze and compare impacts of three sustainability oriented standards fairtrade organic and utz on the livelihoods of smallholder coffee farmers in uganda using survey data and propensity score matching with multiple treatments we find that fairtrade certification increases household living standards by 30 and reduces the prevalence and depth of poverty for the other two certification schemes no significant impacts are found several factors that can explain differential impacts are discussed overly general statements about the effects of sustainability standards on smallholder livelihoods may be misleading

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

the impact of information sharing opportunities on market outcomes an experimental study information regarding uncertain demand conditions or industry costs as well as the opportunity to share this information can have an important impact on firm behavior a series of recent game theoretic models have characterized the incentives for firms to share information regarding uncertain parameters 3 7 8 13 14 16 22 26 20 21 provide a comprehensive survey most of the models assume that behavior in the output market is noncooperative regardless of the firms information sharing decisions this paper reports a series of 15 laboratory sessions that test the noncooperative backward induction approach of these models the results suggest that pricing behavior may be influenced by the information sharing decision under most conditions the noncooperative nash model accurately describes average behavior although in certain conditions information sharing appears to facilitate tacit collusion the paper also estimates a simple behavioral model of learning that describes how experimental subjects learn the optimal information sharing decision as an alternative to the theories backward induction assumption the information sharing models tested here have been interpreted as identifying the incentives for competitive firms to form a trade association that reduces their uncertainty thousands of trade and professional associations are active worldwide and the majority collect information from their members that is aggregated and distributed through association statistical programs the theoretical models demonstrate how three variables influence the information sharing incentives 1 the type of competition bertrand or cournot 2 the nature of the goods substitutes or complements and 3 the source of uncertainty demand or cost the first two variables determine the slope of the firms reaction functions and the uncertainty source along with the information sharing decision determines the degree of correlation among the firms strategies the incentive for noncooperative firms to share information shifts as these three variables change because reduced correlation has a negative or positive effect on profit depending upon the slope of the reaction functions

standards as a new form of social contract sustainability initiatives in the coffee industry abstract in the former age of national capitalism the achievement of market fairness was embedded in a normative framework generated by government labor unions and perhaps religious authority in the current age of global capitalism new actors such as ngos industry associations and public private partnerships provide the normative framework that corporations use for social legitimacy in this context standard setting processes operate as new forms of social contract where the state rather than being directly involved between the parties provides a form of basic guarantee while more or less accountable ngos and firms are in charge of hammering out the bargains this article examines the dynamics of this new configuration through the case study of sustainability initiatives in the coffee sector it addresses four questions 1 are these standards effective in communicating information and creating new markets 2 to what extent do they embed elements of collective and private interests 3 is sustainability content actually delivered to their intended beneficiaries and 4 what is the role of public policy in addressing their shortcomings

bertrand competition when rivals costs are unknown the conclusions of the bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of asymmetric information about rivals costs asymmetric information eliminates the discontinuity in the bertrand model and significantly alters the properties of the market equilibrium in the bertrand nash equilibrium when rivals costs are unknown firms price above marginal cost and have positive expected profit the analysis is extended to franchise competition the market equilibrium is sensitive to market structure and yields incentives for entry copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

internal conflict market uniformity and transparency in price competition between teams abstract the way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict we experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams affects teams ability to compete vis a vis each other and consequently market outcomes participants took part in a repeated bertrand duopoly game between three player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict uniform vs mixed profit division was either private pay high conflict each member received her own asking price or equal pay low conflict profits were divided equally we find that internal conflict leads to tacit coordination on high prices in uniform private pay duopolies but places private pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets but intensified in mixed markets we propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers d43 l22 c92

majoritarian preference utilitarian welfare and public information in cournot oligopoly abstract can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from condorcet cycles in a cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a condorcet winner always exists under a monotonicity condition on the demand function we characterize the condorcet winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms under which the condorcet winning precision i hurts consumers surplus and profits or ii remains conflict free these results have interesting implications on collective bayesian persuasion by agencies representing consumers showing that when full transparency maximizes expected consumers surplus collective bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity and vice versa

information sharing in private value lottery contest we investigate players incentives to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent seeking contest information sharing arises in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are sufficiently dispersed