investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers abstract i analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers i then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm s ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology when regulation is weak a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price in this case the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology the price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation when regulation is sufficiently stringent the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology with weak regulation the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent

existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences abstract shafer econometrica 48 1980 467 476 proved that in a finite exchange economy value allocations exist provided that each agent has convex complete transitive compact and monotone preferences however if preferences are not convex then value allocations may not exist to remedy this difficulty we enlarge the set of value allocations by introducing the concept of approximate value allocations and show that in a finite exchange economy approximate value allocations exist even if preferences are not convex or compact or monotone this value existence result can be used to provide a very general value existence theorem for a sequence of finite economies further we show that value allocations may discriminate in favor of or against a coalition of agents

eco labelling consequences in general equilibrium a graphical assessment international environmental groups propose to implement new standards of forest management through programs that certify producers who meet criteria to enhance biodiversity or sustainability these producers could earn an eco label that identifies their products for consumers we consider whether a market economy might generate feedbacks that produce undesirable side effects as consumers respond to price changes while the general case is ambiguous the theoretical framework shows the potential that certification may lead to a reallocation of land toward less ecologically sustainable uses with the possibility of sufficient impact to diminish global biodiversity or sustainability of forest products

consumption effects of genetic modification what if consumers are right this paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the consumption effects of genetic modification gm under alternative labelling regimes and segregation enforcement scenarios analytical results show that if consumers perceive gm products as being different than their traditional counterparts gm affects consumer welfare and thus consumption decisions when the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of cost savings associated with the new technology to consumers gm results in welfare losses for consumers the analysis shows that the relative welfare ranking of the no labelling and mandatory labelling regimes depends on i the level of consumer aversion to gm products ii the size of marketing and segregation costs under mandatory labelling iii the share of the gm product in total production and iv the extent to which gm products are incorrectly labelled as non gm products

inserting gm products into the food chain the market and welfare effects of different labeling and regulatory regimes the purpose of this article is to examine the system wide effects of the introduction of genetically modified gm products with and without labeling and to compare these two regimes to a third regime where gm products are not present either because they have not yet been developed or because they have been banned for each regime the decisions and welfare of consumers producers and life science companies are examined the article explicitly incorporates the consumer response to the introduction of gm technology and considers different market structures of the life science sector

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

explaining the choice of organic produce cosmetic defects prices and consumer preferences the choice between organic and conventional produce was estimated empirically using a two equation probit model data were collected in store on cosmetic defects produce prices and consumers demographic and economic traits store choice displayed a significant impact on the probability of purchasing organic produce shoppers at the specialty grocer were sensitive to price differences between organic and conventional items households with children under eighteen were more likely to purchase organic produce while shoppers with graduate or professional degrees were less likely to do so differences in cosmetic defects had statistically significant albeit small effects on the probability of purchasing organics

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

a market value approach to approximate equilibria we consider the market value of excess demand as a measure of disequilibrium we show that in a fixed exchange economy there exist approximate equilibria whose measures of disequilibrium depend only on the endowments and not on the preferences a related bound on the norm of excess demand depending on the endowments and the approximate equilibrium price is also obtained we show the existence of allocations which are nearly competitive as measured by the largest proportion of demand given up at the allocation by any trader we use these results to obtain for very general sequences of exchange economies allocations giving all traders bundles close in norm to their demands this result includes a 0 l1 n rate of convergence in the case of uniformly bounded endowments

innovation complementarity and environmental productivity effects reality or delusion evidence from the eu abstract innovation is a key element behind the achievement of desired environmental and economic performances regarding co2 mitigation strategies would require cuts in emissions of around 80 90 with respect to 1990 by 2050 in the eu we investigate whether complementarity namely integration between the adoption of environmental innovation measures and other technological and organizational innovations is a factor that has supported reduction in co2 emissions per value added that is environmental productivity we merge new eu innovation and wiod data to assess the innovation effects on sector co2 performances at a wide eu level we find that jointly adopting different innovations is not a widespread factor behind increases in environmental productivity nevertheless even though complementarity is not a low hanging fruit a case where innovation complementarity arises is for manufacturing sectors that integrate eco innovations with product innovations one example of this integrated action is a strategy that pursues energy efficiency with product value enhancement we believe that the lack of integrated innovation adoption behind environmental productivity performance is a signal of the current weaknesses economies face in tackling climate change and green economy challenges incremental rather than more radical strategies have predominated so far the latter have been confined to industrial niches in terms of the number of involved firms this is probably insufficient when we look at long term economic and environmental goals

resource allocation in non walrasian environments abstract we are interested in resource allocation mechanisms that perform satisfactorily in environments which are problematic for the walrasian equilibrium theory and the tatonnement the b idding process of hurwicz radner reiter is informationally decentralized and has appealing normative properties the speed of convergence of the b process is characterized in an economy with indivisible commodities a modification of this process is shown to converge in an economy with both divisible and indivisible goods some simulation results on the b process and its modifications throwing light on its performance in non walrasian environments are also reported

innovation and trade with endogenous market failure the case of genetically modified products a partial equilibrium two country model is developed to analyze implications from the introduction of genetically modified gm products in the model innovators hold proprietary rights farmers are competitive adopters some consumers deem gm food to be inferior in quality to traditional food and the mere introduction of gm crops affects the costs of non gm food because of costly identity preservation among the results derived it is shown that although gm innovations have the potential to improve efficiency some groups can be made worse off indeed it is even possible that the costs induced by gm innovations outweigh the efficiency gains

environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets abstract survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates less environmental harm we induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers incentives to offer products of differing quality buyers are unaware of the product quality before purchase as is often the case for goods with differing environmental quality we first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible we then study various treatments that could remedy this failure seller reputations and unverified cheap talk signals sometimes increase the number of higher valued green goods the only reliable way to improve product quality in the experiment however is to use a third party that charges a fee to certify product quality claims

signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe in a symmetric bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm s product quality is private information unknown to consumers and to other firms there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices signaling requires that the market power and rent of low quality firms be large enough and often this requires that high quality firms exercise sufficient market power there is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the d1 criterion in this equilibrium too both low and high quality firms may exhibit considerable market power market power of high quality firms may persist even as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large every d1 equilibrium involves some revelation of information

a simple stochastic adjustment process in this note we present a stochastic adjustment process which has nice optimality and probablistic dynamic stability properties for a large class of economic environments in addition the process relies on a strikingly simple information exchange procedure at each iteration it can also be termed as strongly locally individually incentive compatible 2 in that each consumer agent has no incentive to lie about his preferences provided he is concerned only with maximization of one step expected utility gain at each iteration the obvious source of inspiration for this process is the stochastic decentralized resource allocation mechanism the b process by hurwicz radner and reiter 2 indeed it should be regarded as the latter s informationally simplified descendent for general background information on resource allocation mechanisms and motivations for designing such mechanisms see hurwicz radner and reiter 2 and hahn 1 in order to simplify the exposition we present the process only for the case of pure exchange economies with possible consumption externalities for more general cases see mitsui 4 mitsui 4 also constructs a core convergent version of the process

labour and environmental standards the lemons problem in international trade policy environmental and labour standards have become an important international trade issue this article examines and ranks alternative trade policy responses available to an importing country with concerns over such standards while a full import embargo may sometimes be preferable to allowing unrestricted access to unlabeled noconforming imports a partial embargo that allows imports which demonstrably conform to the standard is always a better policy and labeling solutions which separate conforming and non conforming imports are typically better still consequently full import embargoes based on non conformity with labour or environmental standards are poor policy choices and should generally remain prohibited by wto rules

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

approximate equilibria with bounds independent of preferences authors prove the existence of approximate equilibria in exchange economies giving bounds on the excess demand in terms of the number of traders and norms of the endowments but independent of the preferences

willingness to pay for environmental practices implications for eco labeling consumer survey data collected in former west and east berlin after the unification of germany are used to address the issue of willingness to pay wtp for foods produced with techniques consistent with environmental stewardship results show differences in the wtp between residents of the two former german states attributed to area of residence residents of eastern city districts were generally less willing to pay a premium for foods produced with environmental friendly methods which suggests that marketing of such foods will be more successful in western districts unless educational efforts can be used to bridge the gap in the stated wtp

mainstreaming green product innovation why and how companies integrate environmental sustainability green product innovation has been recognized as one of the key factors to achieve growth environmental sustainability and a better quality of life understanding green product innovation as a result of interaction between innovation and sustainability has become a strategic priority for theory and practice this article investigates green product innovation by means of a multiple case study analysis of 12 small to medium size manufacturing companies based in italy and canada first we propose a conceptual framework that presents three key environmental dimensions of green product innovation such as energy minimization materials reduction and pollution prevention as identified in the life cycle phases of products based on insights gained from in depth interviews we discuss firms motivations to develop green products environmental policies and targets for products different dimensions of green product innovation and challenges faced during developing and marketing of green products results from the study are then synthesized and integrated in a toolbox that sheds light on various aspects of green product innovation and provides solutions to challenges and risks that are faced by firms finally implications for managers academia and public policy makers are discussed

on lionel mckenzie s 1957 intrusion into 20th century demand theory in this essay we read mckenzie s 17 paragraphs of 1957 on demand theory without a utility index as an opening to the narrative of 20th century demand theory and as a lever for the understanding of what has now reached culmination as the neoclassical theory of demand in tracking the influence of these paragraphs on both theoretical and applied work we also use them as a foothold for reflection on the process of theorizing to argue for the view that one cannot neglect the changing problematic that the theory is adduced to address that the historical narrative behind a particular theorem is indispensable in understanding the theorem itself this implicit theorizing of the process of theorizing then forces us to consider stigler s distinction between textual and scientific exegesis and confront it to a second order level of theorizing and thereby bring out the continuity possibly not quite seamless between a theorem and its history

can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment a three stage game of production technology signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non observable by consumers the only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it however a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost by assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level finally and importantly under restrictive conditions on labeling cost ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy however ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point

can ecolabels survive in the long run the role of initial conditions abstract this paper analyzes the interaction between three environmental strategies within a population of firms brown green and certified green strategies we first present a restricted version of an evolutionary game where only brown and green strategies are possible next the model is extended to allow green firms to certify their environmental strategies by joining an ecolabel our analysis shows that when it survives the ecolabel tends to fully replace other uncertified environmental initiatives and to increase the proportion of firms implementing voluntary abatement nevertheless the long run survival of the ecolabel is not a necessary outcome of the model although it can be facilitated via policies that reduce abatement or certification costs increase consumer s environmental concerns or improve the credibility of the certifier whereas it may be reduced by green wash news about the sector an ecolabel s survival may also depend on how and when it is launched in those common situations where the model has two stable equilibria initial conditions play a key role in determining the ecolabel s survival specifically important determinants are the degree of adoption of voluntary abatement when the ecolabel is launched and the amount and composition of firms that participate in the creation of the ecolabel

public goods and the value of product quality regulations the case of food safety abstract the paper examines preferences for product quality regulations our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods the model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation the results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

comparative statics of the firm abstract complementarities arise naturally in diverse models of optimal decision making in a firm theoretical properties of supermodular functions provide a powerful tool for analyzing qualitative properties in such circumstances this paper considers a general model of the firm and gives sufficient conditions for complementarities to hold and for optimal decisions to be monotone with a parameter a variety of specific models of the firm are shown to satisfy these conditions necessary conditions delimit those models of the firm that may exhibit monotone optimal decisions journal of economic literature classification numbers b41 c61 d20 l00

costly diagnosis and price dispersion abstract in the standard search model under monopolistic competition when the consumer encounters a seller he knows the price before purchasing the commodity consequently the price cannot exceed the consumer s reservation price in a market with rational and homogeneous agents the price distribution must therefore be degenerate in markets for indivisible professional services the consumer does not necessarily know the price of the service when he encounters the seller this possibility arises when the cost of ascertaining the price the diagnosis cost is high and the consumer decides to enter the market without searching in contrast to the standard model under monopolistic competition price dispersion in equilibrium is possible even when fully rational economic agents on both sides of the market are homogeneous we characterize such equilibria and provide a sufficient condition for their existence we then study the effect of manipulating the search technology typically through a professional code of ethics on the equilibrium in markets for such professional services

estimates from a consumer demand system implications for the incidence of environmental taxes abstract most studies suggest that environmental taxes are regressive making them less attractive policy options we consider the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase using four incidence measures and under three scenarios for gas tax revenue use to incorporate behavioral responses we use consumer expenditure survey data to estimate a consumer demand system that includes gasoline other goods and leisure our estimates confirm that when revenues are not recycled a gasoline tax is regressive use of incidence measures that ignore demand responses however will substantially overstate this regressivity in contrast the differences between the equivalent variation and easier to implement consumer surplus measures are relatively small in addition our results suggest that using the additional gas tax revenue to fund labor tax cuts makes the policy substantially less regressive while using the revenue to fund lump sum transfers actually makes it progressive

approximate equilibria in markets with indivisible commodities abstract this paper presents results on the existence of approximate equilibria in large but finite exchange economies in which all the traders have non convex consumption sets as such the paper gives a natural extension to the finite economy of mas colell s results on existence with indivisible commodities and a continuum of agents it also presents an approximate equilibrium theorem without any assumption of compactness or bounded non convexity of preferences

how should food safety certification be financed an analytical framework where consumers are imperfectly informed about the safety of products is used to investigate the welfare effects of a public certification system several certification fees under alternative structures of certification cost are analyzed by maintaining competition among numerous sellers voluntary certification financed by a per unit fee is efficient and sufficient to signal product safety however mandatory certification linked with a fixed user fee may be necessary if a seller wields monopoly power further certification by a single private agency results in a distorted fee copyright 2001 oxford university press

beyond ecolabels what green marketing can learn from conventional marketing ecolabels have emerged as one of the main tools of green marketing although a great deal of effort has been invested in making them more effective and efficient the market share of ecolabelled products is still low partly because they have been addressed mainly to green consumers in a theoretical exposition of marketing theory we find that green marketing could learn from conventional marketing in discovering other means than labelling to promote green products examples include addressing a wider range of consumers working with the positioning strategies of price place and promotion and actively engaging in market creation

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

ecolabels and international trade in the textile and apparel market we provide a formal analysis of the welfare and trade implications of ecolabeling schemes we couch our analysis in the context of a stylized model of the textiles market between an industrialized north and a developing south textiles ecolabeling involves production process standards raising concerns of protectionism against the south we investigate several labeling scenarios labeling by north labeling by both north and south and harmonization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the political economy of sin taxes we analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self control problems we show that under reasonable assumptions the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self control problems further we analyse how individuals with self control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level when the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful

eco labels as a multidimensional research topic trends and opportunities abstract this study analyzes the importance of ecolabels as an eco innovation tool that can contribute to the sustainable design production and consumption of products our research has a dual objective the first is to build a theoretical framework that explains the relationship between ecolabels and eco innovation their determinants demand supply and institutional and political influences and the dimensions that arise from them second according to this framework a systematic literature review was carried out to identify the trends and opportunities in ecolabeling as a multidimensional topic from empirical geographical and sectorial perspective the main contributions of this paper are a proposal for cyclical ecolabeling innovation process an understanding of the ecolabeling dimensions according to the studies analyzed and ecolabel performance in the market additionally the systematic literature review revealed that ecolabels have been mainly explored in food sectors and developed countries and researchers tend to assess their performance from the dimension of market dynamics

global stability in a class of markets with three commodities and three consumers abstract the paper gives an estimate of the fraction of initial endowment distributions which result in global stability of a t tonnement process for a class of economies which includes the scarf instability example as a limiting case the measure of such a fraction for our class of economies is necessarily larger than or equal to the corresponding measure for the scarf example itself

differentiating the consumer benefits from labeling of gm food products although recurrent evidence is found that consumers have different willingness to pay for gm and non gm products there is disagreement in the scientific community about the size of consumer benefits from gm labeling in this article we use a theoretical model based on a standard constant elasticity of substitution ces to explain the importance of the quality effect it is shown that failing to consider the quality effect may yield an overestimation of benefits from gm labeling voluntary or mandatory

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

green greener greenest eco label gradation and competition abstract this paper analyzes two common features of markets in which eco label programs certify that products are green gradation single programs offering multiple certification standards e g platinum gold silver and competition multiple programs vying to certify to their respective standards we find that depending on whether programs are sponsored by industry environmental groups or a government they have strikingly different incentives to grade or compete industry sponsors are indifferent about both environmentalist sponsors optimally grade or compete with other environmentalist sponsors only if consumer preferences for green consumption are skewed in a specific way and government sponsors decisions depend on the relative importance of private vs public benefits generated by the green market we find also that it is no accident that green markets frequently have an environmentalist program competing with an industry one for each of the cases examined our analysis is consistent with casual empirical evidence

eco labelling scheme environmental protection and protectionism in this paper a model of international duopoly is developed involving competition in both prices and levels of environmental friendliness and the implications of government policies are studied it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom a regulatory increase in the minimum required level of environmental friendliness of imported goods may harm the home firm and may result in a rise in the volume of imported goods whether consumers lose or gain from such a regulatory increase depends on consumption spillover effects we also show that under certain conditions the duopoly s equilibrium choice of levels of environmental friendliness is socially optimal jel classification f00 eco etiquetage protection environnementale et protectionnisme ce memoire developpe un modele de duopole international ou la concurrence se fait a la fois par les prix et par les niveaux de sensibilite aux problemes environnementaux on etudie les impacts des politiques gouvernementales contrairement a ce que suggere la sagesse conventionnelle il semble qu un accroissement reglementaire dans le minimum requis de disposition favorable a l environnement des biens importes peut nuire a l entreprise locale et peut resulter en un accroissement du volume de biens importes le consommateur perdra ou gagnera en consequence de cette accroissement de la reglementation selon la nature des effets de retombees on montre aussi que sous certaines conditions le choix des niveaux d equilibre de sensibilite aux problemes de l environnement s avere socialement optimal

greener than thou the political economy of fish ecolabeling and its local manifestations in south africa summary developing country governments and industries have been reluctant to support ecolabels fearing their potentially protectionist effects this reluctance has been countered by international organizations such as fao and ecolabel initiatives with assurances of transparency non discrimination and technical assistance the analysis of the marine stewardship council msc label shows that developing country fisheries and small scale ones in particular have been marginalized furthermore the msc certification of the hake industry in south africa illustrates that ecolabeling is sought in the context of competitive pressures and specific political economies not simply on the basis of value free science and systemic management this article concludes that developing country producers need dedicated systems of standards and verification procedures not only special flexibilities

differential importance and comparative statics an application to inventory management abstract in this work we deal with the problem of establishing which parameters impact an inventory policy the most a new sensitivity measure is introduced by relating the differential importance d and the comparative statics cs techniques we discuss the properties of the new indicator and show that it shares the additivity property we provide the expression of for optimization models numerical results are offered for the sensitivity analysis of a recently introduced inventory management model

eco labels trade and protectionism eco labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes we analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm the environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm while both firms can adopt the eco label pollution is production related and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an environmentally friendly way our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco label and get both firms to adopt the label instead of setting an environmental standard however to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous in particular if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard on the other hand if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard

the impact of environmental management on firm performance environmental management has the potential to play a pivotal role in the financial performance of the firm many individuals suggest that profitability is hurt by the higher production costs of environmental management initiatives while others cite anecdotal evidence of increased profitability a theoretical model is proposed that links strong environmental management to improved perceived future financial performance as measured by stock market performance the linkage to firm performance is tested empirically using financial event methodology and archival data of firm level environmental and financial performance significant positive returns were measured for strong environmental management as indicated by environmental performance awards and significant negative returns were measured for weak environmental management as indicated by environmental crises the implicit financial market valuation of these events also was estimated cross sectional analysis of the environmental award events revealed differences for first time awards and between industries first time award announcements were associated with greater increases in market valuation although smaller increases were observed for firms in environmentally dirty industries possibly indicative of market skepticism this linkage between environmental management and financial performance can be used by both researchers and practitioners as one measure of the benefits experienced by industry leaders and as one criterion against which to measure investment alternatives

voting for environmental policy under income and preference heterogeneity we examine the design of policies for promoting the consumption of green products under preference and income heterogeneity using organic food products as an example two instruments are considered a price subsidy for the organic food products and a tax on the conventional products under income disparity consumers with high income always prefer a socially optimal subsidy to a socially optimal tax while low income consumers prefer a tax on conventional products when environmental policy is determined by the median voter the policies implemented tend to be stricter than socially optimal policies if income differences are large

a theory of consumer boycotts under symmetric information and imperfect competition this article models strategic interactions between non identical duopolistic firms and a public interest environmental organisation eo that promotes green production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against brown producers the article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be green and also when a boycott arises in equilibrium despite symmetric information when a boycott arises it is either a small persistent boycott against the small firm in the industry or a large transitory boycott against the large firm in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly

economic growth inequality democratization and the environment we augment the stokey 1998 model by allowing agents to differ with respect to environ mental quality and income in order to analyze the impact of income and environmental inequality and of democratization on aggregate pollution we find that the impact of a more equal income distribution depends on the degree of democracy in a complete democracy a more equal income distribution generates ceteris paribus less pollution which is consistent with indirect empirical evidence whereas the opposite is the case if democratic rights are highly restricted furthermore a democratization is argued to typically lower both the income and the environmental quality of the median voter in this case if in utility terms the fall in environmental quality is worse than the fall in consumption the median voter decides to tighten environmental legislation so that aggregate pollution decreases

determinants of environmental innovation new evidence from german panel data sources abstract in most cases empirical analyses of environmental innovations based on firm level data relied on surveys for one point in time these surveys allow for the inclusion of many explanatory variables such as different policy instruments or the influence of pressure groups but it is not possible to address the dynamic character of environmental innovations this paper uses two german panel databases the establishment panel of the institute for employment research iab and the mannheim innovation panel mip of the centre for european economic research zew to explore the determinants of environmental innovations the econometric estimations show that the improvement of the technological capabilities knowledge capital by r d triggers environmental innovations environmental regulation environmental management tools and general organizational changes also encourage environmental innovation a result that has also been postulated by the famous porter hypothesis

eco labeling and market equilibria with noisy certification tests an intriguing alternative to traditional methods for regulating externalities is the provision of information about firms environmental attributes an increasingly important example of this approach is eco labeling where a third party certifies firms products such schemes are currently used in a variety of countries this paper investigates the equilibria that may occur with eco labeling and the attendant welfare effects i model certification as a noisy test subject to both type i and type ii errors but where green firms more likely to pass than brown firms while it commonly leads to an increase in the fraction of green units in the market the introduction of an eco label can either increase or decrease welfare

competition and confidentiality signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information abstract we model non cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms respective products and each firm has private information about its own product s quality we characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm s price reveals its respective product quality we show that the equilibrium prices the difference between those prices the associated outputs and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety if horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known thus while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition finally average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low quality firms

do fair trade and eco labels in coffee wake up the consumer conscience abstract in this study a face to face survey was conducted in order to reveal consumer preferences for ethical and environmentally sound labeling programs in coffee valuation questions regarding the fair trade shade grown and organic coffee labels were asked using a payment card format after consumers were previously informed about each of the labeling programs results suggest that consumers are very receptive toward both fair trade and shade grown coffee labels and consequently are willing to pay higher premiums for these labeling programs than for the organic coffee

infectious disease productivity and scale in open and closed animal production systems trade in feeder animals creates externalities when animal diseases can spread beyond the purchasing farm if growers choose between open and closed production systems then nash equilibrium likely involves excessive trading while first best equilibrium involves market wide adoption of either an open trade or closed farm system equilibrium may entail heterogeneous systems if so then the feeder trade should be restricted supply response to an increase in marginal costs may be positive within a farm infectious disease risk can create decreasing returns to scale when the technology is otherwise increasing returns contractual procurement and damage control technologies will likely increase scale in finishing

choice interactions and business strategy choice settings are strategic to the extent that they entail cross sectional or intertemporal linkages these same factors may impose daunting demands on decision makers we develop a graph theoretic generalization of the nk model of fitness landscapes to model the way in which policy choices may be more or less strategic we use this structure to examine through simulation how fully articulated a strategy or set of policy choices must be to achieve a high level of performance and how feasible it is to offset past strategic mistakes through tactical adjustments instead of alignment our analysis highlights the role of asymmetry in the interaction of strategic choices and in particular the degree to which choices vary in terms of being influential dependent or autonomous from other choices

market and welfare effects of second generation consumer oriented gm products we examine the economic effects of the introduction of consumer oriented genetically modified gm products into the food system by developing a model of heterogeneous consumers and producers that allows for vertical and horizontal differentiation between the products available to consumers the model facilitates the estimation of consumer and producer surpluses in the product utility and product net returns spaces results show that the introduction of consumer oriented gm products can change the relationship between gm and conventional and organic products from one of vertical to one of horizontal product differentiation and can enhance both economic welfare and the market acceptance and growth of agricultural biotechnology

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

the cold shiver of not giving enough on the social cost of recycling campaigns governments sometimes try to increase individuals contributions to public goods through appeals to consumer responsibility rather than by economic incentives for example in recycling campaigns using standard consumer theory one would hardly expect such campaigns to work at all but if consumers are motivated by norms appeals may work through changing consumers perception of the normrequirement however increasing voluntary contributions through appeals may come at a social cost the reason is that appeals work through imposing a heavier perceived responsibility on consumers this represents a welfare loss which is not necessarily outweighed by warm glow benefits

ethics welfare and markets an economic analysis the present article examines society s welfare when goods with identical physical attributes can be produced using two alternative technologies one of them less ethically desirable but less expensive for at least some producers for the scenario where identification costs must be borne by producers and consumers of the high quality good the outcome under unregulated markets is identical to the optimal solution of a central planner constrained to neither ban the undesirable technology nor segregate the low quality good however under certain circumstances the unregulated market equilibrium may be improved upon by government intervention that shifts the burden of identification costs to the producers of the low quality good or which bans the production of the low quality good the optimal intervention needs to be determined case by case and depends on consumer preferences relative production costs and relative costs of identification and fraud prevention

green business and blue angels this paper presents a model of a monopolist svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm s environmental impacts the key assumptions are the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring and adaptive consumer expectations conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit maximizing equilibrium are derived the effectsof a third party eco labeling system are analyzed itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit maximizing moreover firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem the effect of consumers risk preferences andan instrument for preventing greenwash companieslying about their environmental performance is alsodiscussed

competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers abstract in a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition i study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms incentive to invest in cleaner technology firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices i also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting compared to full information incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and or expected liability are not too high requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed competition has a positive effect relative to monopoly on the incentive to invest

genetically modified crops their market and welfare impacts a framework is developed for examining price and welfare effects of the introduction of genetically modified gm products in the short run non gm grain generally becomes another identity preserved product however more profound market effects are observed under some reasonable parameterizations when calibrated to reflect the u s corn market introducing gm technology increases aggregate welfare over a wide range of scenarios unless the corresponding production cost savings are small and consumers are seriously concerned about gm products the possibility that gm technology may reduce aggregate welfare is interesting because the model assumes rational agents and does not include regulatory constraints

voting for pollution policy the importance of income inequality and openness to trade abstract this paper analyzes how openness and the distribution of factor ownership interact to determine individual and aggregate demand for pollution policy analysis of voter preferences in autarky shows that an increased stake in either the dirty or the clean industry can induce an individual voter to prefer stricter environmental policy similarly the paper shows that poorer voters may be the greener voters within an electorate the model also reveals that the incidence of pollution policy depends upon a country s trade regime with consequences for the direction in which income inequality influences aggregate demand for pollution policy

voluntary eco labeling and the price premium international environmental organizations propose voluntary eco labeling as a market incentive to promote industry to operate in an ecologically sustainable and environmentally friendly manner a microeconomic analysis questions whether voluntary eco labeling will cause producer profits in a competitive industry to decline and whether eco labeling will necessarily generate different prices for labeled and unlabeled product using wood product as an example results identify conditions that may exist when firms lose profits even under a voluntary system and where existing production constraints may lead to a single price regardless of labeling

is environmental innovation embedded within high performance organisational changes the role of human resource management and complementarity in green business strategies abstract this paper investigates whether firms joint implementation of organisational innovation and training may foster their adoption of environmental innovation ei and if this correlation falls within porter hypothesis ph framework we study the relationship of complementarity between strategies of high performance work practices hpwp and human resource management hrm when ei adoption is the firms objective using an original dataset on 555 italian industrial firms regarding ei hpwp and hrm coherent with the last cis2006 2008 survey results show that sector specificity matter the only case in which strict complementarity is observed in organisational change concerns co 2 abatement a relatively complex type of ei but this is true only when the sample is restricted to more polluting and regulated sectors this evidence is coherent with the porter hypothesis complementarity related adoption of ei is an element of organisational change in firms that are subject to more stringent environmental regulations nevertheless the fact that strict complementarity is not a diffuse factor behind the adoption of all environmental innovation indeed does not come as a surprise at this stage in the development of green strategies the share of eco firms is still limited even in advanced countries that are seeking tools for a new competitiveness the full integration of eis within the internal capabilities and firm s own assets is far from being reached even in advanced and competitive industrial settings

green markets eco certification and equilibrium fraud abstract consumers voluntarily pay significant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green markets this paper considers the performance of eco certification policy under circumstances where consumers cannot discern environmental attributes in goods but are able to form rational expectations regarding the extent of illicit activities in the green market the main results are i fraud is less prevalent in green markets when entry barriers limit the number of firms ii conventional environmental policies on polluting techniques increase the incidence of fraud and can even preclude the use of non polluting techniques which would otherwise emerge in green markets iii voluntary eco certification policies can decrease fraud increase output and raise profits per firm and iv in cases where the socially optimal resource allocation can be supported the optimal policy involves negative unit certification fees positive fixed certification fees and is revenue generating for the certifying agent

a convergent price adjustment process abstract in this paper we describe a price adjustment mechanism which leads to an economic equilibrium starting from an arbitrarily chosen initial price vector the process is global and universal

distributional effects of alternative vehicle pollution control policies abstract previous work shows that policies that subsidize new vehicles and tax size miles or gasoline efficiently reduce pollution less is known about their distributional effects this paper examines distributional effects by estimating the joint demand for vehicles and miles using the consumer expenditure survey greater price responsiveness among low income households enhances progressivity of gas or miles taxes across lower incomes and mitigates regressivity across upper incomes taxes on engine size or subsidies to new vehicles are significantly more regressive than gas or miles taxes