the relationship between international trade and capital flow a network perspective abstract the relationship between international trade and capital flow has been extensively discussed using bilateral data from 2001 to 2016 we construct international trade and capital flow networks defined as a weighted graph in which nodes are countries and edges represent trade and capital flow linkages centrality is employed as the main variable in this study to represent the importance of a country in the networks to gain further insight into the network characteristics we adopt a turning parameter centrality to combine both the original degree and strength measurements within the weighted network moreover we develop a new indicator called partner quality centrality to identify the quality of neighbors within the panel cointegration framework we argue that a positive long run equilibrium exists between the trade and capital flow networks as constructed in addition we employ a panel causality test to investigate the short run dynamics indicating that the international capital flow network has predictive power on the trade network from the short run perspective but not vice versa

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

welfare improving asymmetric information in dynamic insurance markets this article presents a two period asymmetric learning model of insurance markets when information about past accidents is not shared by insurers asymmetries of information develop through time equilibrium contracts exist are payoff unique and display a realistic bonus malus pattern eliminating asymmetries through information sharing is welfare decreasing in contrast with past contributions on insurance and adverse selection when second period contract offers cannot be contingent on initial contract choice a strict increase in welfare is obtained through menus of contracts although initial contract choice is in itself worthless information

facilitating consumer learning in insurance markets what are the welfare effects we model a monopoly insurance market where consumers can learn their accident risks at a cost c we then ask what are the welfare effects of a policy that reduces c if c is sufficiently small c c marginally reducing c hurts the insurer and weakly benefits the consumer finally a reduction in c that is successful meaning that the consumer gathers information after the reduction but not before it can hurt both parties this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

housing allowances in the us under section 8 and in other countries a canadian perspective housing allowances are provided in the us by the federal government under section 8 of the 1974 housing and community development act this paper compares the design of section 8 certificates and vouchers with that of canadian housing allowances and with aspects of design in many other developed nations distinguishing elements of section 8 are discussed its minimum standards condition its use of a three way contract in which both the government housing agency and the tenant pays a private landlord its availability to only a limited number of eligibles the absence of a percentage of rent element in its formulas and the low required contribution of its recipients it is argued on the basis of an array of diverse evidence that these characteristics lead to perverse housing consumption effects stigma rent inflation and unnecessary restrictions on recipient choice the paper also addresses the standard objections to dropping the minimum standards condition and to incorporating a percentage of rent eleme

the value of public information in a cournot duopoly we derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale

how natural gas tariff increases can influence poverty results measurement constraints and bias abstract energy tariff increases are generally essential to address environmental and fiscal concerns but they can also push households into poverty this paper estimates the expected poverty and distributional effects of a significant natural gas tariff reform in the context of armenia that increased the country s residential tariff by about 40 it is the first paper in the literature on energy tariff reforms to simultaneously try and control for substitution between all major energy sources not just some to take into account the seasonality of consumption over the full annual cycle and to apply different methods to assess changes in household consumption on natural gas and shifts in natural gas between main and supplementary heating sources existing papers thus generally overestimate the potential effects of energy price increases on household welfare the results here which face like any statistical study a set of important methodological constraints suggest nonetheless that this significant tariff increase led to an estimated 8 of households shifting away from gas mainly towards wood as their heating source it consequently resulted in an estimated 2 8 of households falling below the national poverty line while likely also influencing non monetary human welfare that cannot be well captured econometrically finally methodological assumptions and limitations in assessing these relationships as well as potential policy implications are outlined

does anticipated information impose a cost on risk averse investors a test of the hirshleifer effect this paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk averse investors trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets specifically i examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades consistent with my theoretically derived predictions i find that investors current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short term capital gains taxes on trading profits as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase this evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information which is commonly referred to as the hirshleifer effect

optimality of the disclosure of private information in a production exchange economy this study provides an analysis of the effects on individual welfare of information revelation in a production exchange economy it is shown that the total effect of information revelation on an agent s utility level may be decomposed into three elements a price effect a shareholding effect and a production effect through this decomposition it is demonstrated that although a pareto improvement need not result from information revelation there are perspectives from which the release can be considered beneficial the major conclusion of previous studies of information revelation in a heterogeneous beliefs economy is that the release will not result in general in an economic equilibrium pareto superior to that which would have existed without the disclosure this result by itself does not give an understanding of how information revelation affects agents utility nor does it give much guidance to those regulatory bodies charged with deciding whether or not to mandate information disclosure this study provides further insight into the effects on individual welfare of information revelation in a general production exchange economy it is shown that the total effect of information revelation on an agent s utility level may be decomposed into three elements a price effect a shareholding effect and a production effect the price effect is the change in the agent s utility caused by the change in prices resulting from the revelation of information keeping shareholdings and production fixed the shareholding effect is the change in his utility resulting from the change in his shareholdings caused by the release of information the production effect is the change in his utility caused by the change in the production plan of each firm due to the information revelation conditions are given under which the signs of these three effects will be positive or negative for a given agent the finding that the production effect is positive for some agents and negative for others is of particular interest since it is counter to a result of arrow and hirshleifer they have argued that owners of production processes gain utility by having information revealed before production plans are fixed because they are then able to adjust those plans to account for the additional information it is shown here that such a conclusion can only be made in general when owners of each production process have homogeneous beliefs finally it is

the value of diffusing information abstract how does the speed by which information diffuses affect its value to a stock market investor in a structural model solved in closed form this speed has two opposing effects on the empirically dominant term of the value of information faster diffusing information means quicker and less noisy profits but also increases competing informed trading impounding more information into prices and eroding profits structural empirical analysis of stock market reaction to drug approvals using media coverage as a proxy for the transmission rate of information finds that the value of information is hump shaped in its future transmission rate moreover the estimated amount of noise trading is small

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

information and securities a note on pareto dominance and the second best a unified analysis is provided of two related problems the first concerns the welfare impact of changing the set of tradeable securities in an incomplete market economy the second concerns the welfare implications of changing the common information structure faced by all agents both problems arise from a common second best framework in which expanding the set of trading opportunities can lead to a pareto worsening journal of economic literature classification number 026 rl 1987 academic press inc in this note we provide a unified analysis of two related problems the first concerns the welfare impact of changing the set of tradeable securities in an incomplete market economy the second concerns the welfare implifications of changing the common information structure faced by all agents we will discuss apparent paradoxial results that arise in both problems using a single geometric example the example provides a clear illustration of the source of the apparent paradoxes both problems arise from a common second best framework by second best we mean the lipsey lancaster 20 idea of additional constraints on allocations over and above resource availability constraints our discussion brings together two related but distinct literatures the we are greatly indebted to james ohlson for many constructive comments and to david kreps and n v long for comments on a previous draft

sufficient conditions for public information to have social value in a production and exchange economy conditions are derived under which all consumers in a production and exchange economy will prefer at least weakly disclosure of public information to no such disclosure the conditions involve consumer endowments the allocative efficiency of the financial market and value maximizing behavior by firms cases exist where consumers will prefer disclosure of public information in a production and exchange economy although they would be indifferent to such disclosure in an otherwise similar pure exchange economy the difference in results is due purely to the fact that in production and exchange economies information may be used to reallocate resources across time and firms thus highlighting the fundamental difference between the role of information in pure exchange and in production and exchange economies

price sensitivity of residential energy consumption in norway abstract the main aim of this paper is to test the stability of the results of a model which focus on the relationship between the choice of heating equipment and the residential energy consumption the results for the income and energy price variables are of special interest stability in the time dimension is tested by applying the model on micro data for each of the years 1993 1995 the parameter estimates are stable within a 95 confidence interval however the estimated impact of the energy price variable on energy consumption was considerably weaker in 1994 than in 1993 and 1995 the results for two different income groups in the pooled data set are also subject to stability testing the energy price sensitivity in residential energy consumption is found to be higher for high income households than for low income households

the use of mathematical models in financial accounting well over a year ago it was proposed that i write a survey paper for this conference which discussed the role of mathematical models in financial accounting the difficulty with this assignment is that mathematical models have been used to address a wide variety of issues in financial accounting and a paper which touched on all of them would probably be unable to examine any single one in depth therefore i have chosen in financial accounting three popular mathematical modeling themes and have interpreted these themes in the context of a competitive equilibrium market model to lend greater cohesiveness to the discussion i refer to the three topics chosen as 1 assessing the consequences of public disclosure 2 formalizing the notion that markets are efficient with respect to information and 3 understanding the effect of increased public disclosure on private incentives to acquire information other areas in financial accounting which use mathematical models but are not discussed here include income measurement valuation models i e models which map accounting variables or other information into equi

meeting strangers and friends of friends how random are social networks we present a dynamic model of network formation where nodes find other nodes with whom to form links in two ways some are found uniformly at random while others are found by searching locally through the current structure of the network e g meeting friends of friends this combination of meeting processes results in a spectrum of features exhibited by large social networks including the presence of more high and low degree nodes than when links are formed independently at random having low distances between nodes in the network and having high clustering of links on a local level we fit the model to data from six networks and impute the relative ratio of random to network based meetings in link formation which turns out to vary dramatically across applications we show that as the random network based meeting ratio varies the resulting degree distributions can be ordered in the sense of stochastic dominance which allows us to infer how the formation process affects average utility in the network

toward a theory of financial accounting welfare and public information in this paper we employ the concepts of neoclassical welfare economics to consider the role of publicly available information in various market configurations modeling pure exchange economies the need for such a study arises for several reasons first while the existing process of producing and disseminating accounting information may with some oversimplification be described as generating publicly available information there has been no systematic study of the effects of such a process on either the allocational efficiency of a market or on the broader welfare implications of such information for the participants transacting in such a market second the existing literature fails at least to some extent to capture the flavor or spirit of the role of public information in a market setting at first glance it might appear that information would have no social benefit in a pure exchange economy since it does not increase the aggregate supply of consumptive goods across states and dates as will be demonstrated this impression is not justified as a general conclusion the important dimension of information is that it affects perceived risks

speculation optimism and differential information speculative trading has for quite some time been an important question for at least two reasons firstly as a positive question of whether speculative behavior basically is caused by differences in information or by differences in aversion to risk secondly the question is related to the informational efficiency of decentralized market systems if access to information not currently available to the market makes possible a speculative profit the incentive to acquire information may be too excessive from a social point of view the aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between information and speculation in his seminal article on information acquisition in decentralized market economies hirshleifer 12 showed that the private value of acquiring information depends critically on the speculative profits to be made from this information hirshleifer 12 distinguished between information foreknowledge which affects productive decisions and information which only has implications for exchange similarly fama and laffer 5 distinguish between operational information which improves a firms operating decisions and trading information which only affects trading decisions it is argued due to the speculative profits to be made from having access to information not available to the market that there are excessive private incentives to acquire information without any relevance for productive decisions

the value of information in efficient risk sharing arrangements suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets we show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent that is the economy s demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy s wealth the representative agent moreover is normatively unrepresentative although each agent dislikes information the representative agent is indifferent although we emphasize pure exchange our results imply that a representative agent model might seriously misstate the welfare effects of improved information in an economy with production and risk sharing even if it performs well otherwise

events that shook the market tick data on the standard and poor s 500 stock index s p 500 futures contract and newswire searches are used to match events to large 1 to 5 minute stock price changes sixty nine events that led to large stock price changes are identified between 1982 and 1999 53 of which are directly or indirectly related to monetary policy many large stock price changes have no events associated with them

social interaction and stock market participation we propose that stock market participation is influenced by social interaction in our model any given social investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate we test this theory using data from the health and retirement study and find that social households those who interact with their neighbors or attend church are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non social households controlling for wealth race education and risk tolerance moreover consistent with a peer effects story the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock market participation rates are higher

the dynamics of housing assistance spells abstract over the past several years many researchers have examined public welfare programs but little of this research has examined housing assistance this paper focuses on the duration of housing assistance spells a hazard model is estimated using data from the survey of income and program participation the results suggest that although some people leave housing assistance after brief spells many will continue to receive assistance for relatively long periods the results also present evidence of the absence of duration dependence in housing assistance spells furthermore important interactions between housing assistance and receipt of other public assistance are found

imperfect competition among informed traders we analyze competition among informed traders in the continuous time kyle 1985 model as foster and viswanathan 1996 do in discrete time we explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and confirm the conjecture of holden and subrahmanyam 1992 that there is no linear equilibrium when signals are perfectly correlated one result is that at some date and at all dates thereafter the market would have been more informationally efficient had there been a monopolist informed trader instead of competing traders the relatively large amount of private information remaining near the end of trading causes the market to approach complete illiquidity copyright the american finance association 2000

asset pricing in large information networks we study asset pricing in economies with large information networks we focus on networks that are sparse and have power law degree distributions in line with empirical studies of large scale social networks our theoretical framework yields a rich set of novel asset pricing implications we derive closed form expressions for price volatility profitability and trading volume as functions of the network topology we also study agent welfare and show that the network that optimizes total welfare is typically a uniform one with an intermediate degree of connectedness

natural gas demand at the utility level an application of dynamic elasticities abstract previous studies provide strong evidence that energy demand elasticities vary across regions and states arguing in favor of conducting energy demand studies at the smallest unit of observation for which good quality data are readily available that is the utility level we use monthly data from the residential sector of xcel energy s service territory in colorado for the period january 1994 to september 2006 based on a very general autoregressive distributed lag model this paper uses a new approach to simulate the dynamic behavior of natural gas demand and obtain dynamic elasticities knowing consumers response on a unit time basis enables one to answer a number of questions such as the length of time needed to reach demand stability responses to price and income were found to be much lower even in the long run than has been commonly suggested in the literature interestingly we find that the long run equilibrium is reached relatively quickly around 18 months after a change in price or income has occurred while the literature implies a much longer period for complete adjustments to take place

social value of public information re examined abstract as an extension of hirshleifer s horse race example into a competitive exchange market framework this paper quantitatively re examines the condition under which social value of public information can be positive for a prototype economy of two risk averse traders we prove that their discordance of beliefs makes the social value of a certain class of inconclusive information either positive or negative depending on whether their endowments are or are not predominantly associated with states they regard as more probable whereas it has been known that information acquisition is always socially wasteful under concordant beliefs

the ex post impact of an energy tax on household energy demand this paper presents an econometric study dealing with household demand for energy in the netherlands the main objective of the paper is to present an estimation of the actual impact of an already implemented energy tax introduced in the netherlands in 1996 the approach differs from the existing literature in that 1 it uses panel data for the same period in which the tax was introduced and 2 it estimates a demand function that controls for a large set of variables such as outside temperature type of house and of house insulation household cooking behavior and an extensive number of durable goods and electrical appliances the study concludes that in the short term the energy tax had a small but significant impact on energy consumption in the netherlands concretely the yearly average demand reduction was of 8 for electricity and 4 4 for gas additionally the influence of variables other than price and income on household energy demand is discussed using this information the impact that the energy tax had on household energy use can be compared with the energy reduction that could have been achieved when using other policy instruments

zipf s law for cities an explanation zipf s law is a very tight constraint on the class of admissible models of local growth it says that for most countries the size distribution of cities strikingly fits a power law the number of cities with populations greater than s is proportional to 1 s suppose that at least in the upper tail all cities follow some proportional growth process this appears to be verified empirically this automatically leads their distribution to converge to zipf s law

how do investment ideas spread through social interaction evidence from a ponzi scheme a unique data set from a large ponzi scheme allows me to study word of mouth diffusion of investment information investors could join the scheme only by invitation from an existing member which allows me to observe how the idea spreads from one person to the next based on inviter invitee relationships i find that the observed social network has a scale free connectivity structure which significantly facilitates the diffusion of the investment idea and contributes to the growth and survival of the socially spreading ponzi scheme i further find that investors invest more if their inviter has comparatively higher age education and income

information linkages and correlated trading in a market with informationally connected traders the dynamics of volume price informativeness price volatility and liquidity are severely affected by the information linkages every trader experiences with his peers we show that in the presence of information linkages among traders volume and price informativeness increase moreover we find that information linkages improve or damage market depth and lower or boost the traders profits according to whether these linkages convey positively or negatively correlated signals finally our model predicts patterns of trade correlation consistent with those identified in the empirical literature trades generated by neighbor traders are positively correlated and trades generated by distant traders are negatively correlated

distributional effects of reducing energy subsidies evidence from recent policy reform in argentina abstract we analyze the distributional effects of the reduction in energy subsidies in argentina since 2016 as the policy reform also includes the introduction of a scheme to protect less well off families social tariff we also review how well the targeting mechanism works we apply traditional benefit incidence analysis using household surveys and administrative data focusing on residential subsidies to piped natural gas and electricity in the buenos aires metropolitan area we find that the social tariff is relatively pro poor with significantly higher coverage among the poorest households there are some exclusion errors in the low income deciles and large inclusion errors in the medium and high income deciles the distributive incidence of subsidies does not appear to have changed substantially energy subsidies in argentina albeit lower in aggregate terms continue to be although progressive pro rich this is in large part due to the prevalence of the general flat subsidy rate mechanism over the social tariff mechanism regarding energy budget shares monthly spending on electricity has increased from 1 1 of total household income to 3 4 monthly spending on piped natural gas rose from 1 3 to 3 3 these shares are in line with many other countries in the region naturally there has been a convergence of tariffs towards service provision costs which becomes central in order to incentive sectoral investment and stimulate a good provision of services

volatility persistence in stock market by using the unique dataset that consists of all brokers daily trading information i propose an empirical methodology to construct a granger causality financial network to study the relationship between dynamics of volatility and information diffusion in a stock market the financial network i proposed not only provides a new way to describe mutual interconnectedness of brokers in the market but the empirical results also show the financial network density is positively correlated to the realized volatility of the market

sufficient and necessary conditions for information to have social value in pure exchange this paper extends corrects and unifies earlier statements concerning the social value of public information as well as the no trading conditions in pure exchange sufficient and necessary conditions are provided for both the single period and two period cases in a postsignal trading model the social value of information is shown to be closely linked to the allocational efficiency of the market the degree of homogeneity of prior beliefs and of information structures the time additivity of preferences and the efficiency of endowments we conclude that the case in favor of public information is much stronger than previously suggested

the economic effects of energy price shocks large fluctuations in energy prices have been a distinguishing characteristic of the u s economy since the 1970s turmoil in the middle east rising energy prices in the u s and evidence of global warming recently have reignited interest in the link between energy prices and economic performance this paper addresses a number of the key issues in this debate what are energy price shocks and where do they come from how responsive is energy demand to changes in energy prices how do consumers expenditure patterns evolve in response to energy price shocks how do energy price shocks affect u s real output inflation and stock prices why do energy price increases seem to cause recessions but energy price decreases do not seem to cause expansions why has there been a surge in the price of oil in recent years why has this new energy price shock not caused a recession so far have the effects of energy price shocks waned since the 1980s and if so why as the paper demonstrates it is critical to account for the endogeneity of energy prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and supply shocks in energy markets when answering these questions

location matters an examination of trading profits the electronic trading system xetra of the german security exchange provides a unique data source on the equity trades of 756 professional traders located in 23 different cities and eight european countries we explore informational asymmetries across the trader population traders located outside germany in non german speaking cities show lower proprietary trading profit their underperformance is not only statistically significant it is also of economically significant magnitude and occurs for the 11 largest german blue chip stocks we also examine whether a trader location in frankfurt as the financial center or local proximity of the trader to the corporate headquarters of the traded stock or affiliation with a large financial institution results in superior trading performance the data provide no evidence for a financial center advantage or of increasing institutional scale economies in proprietary trading however we find evidence for an information advantage due to corporate headquarters proximity for high frequency intraday trading

the microeconometric approach to modelling energy demand some results for uk households the paper is concerned with the empirical modeling of domestic demand for energy at the level of the individual household a model of household energy expenditures and energy using durable ownership is described estimation takes place using a pooled sample of households drawn from the repeated cross sections of the annual family expenditure survey fes price and income elasticities are found to be highly dependent on individual household characteristics type of house tenure energy using durable ownership and outside temperature finally the results are placed in a policy relevant context copyright 1991 by oxford university press

pareto optimal electricity tariff rates in the republic of armenia abstract the economic impact of electricity tariff rates on the residential sector of yerevan armenia is examined the effect of tariff design on revenue generation and equity measures is considered and the combination of energy pricing and compensatory social policies which provides the best mix of efficiency and protection for poor households is examined an equity measure is defined in terms of a cumulative distribution function which describes the percent of the population that spends x or less of their income on electricity consumption an optimal pareto efficient tariff is designed based on the analysis of survey data and an econometric model and the armenian tariff rate effective 1 january 1997 to 15 september 1997 is shown to be non optimal relative to this rate

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

the social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies abstract when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge at the time contracts are negotiated the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is positive to the extent that incentive constrained agents are sorted more finely but is negative to the extent that incentive constraining agents impose more stringent signalling requirements on others hence the intuition developed by hirshleifer 1971 marshall 1974 and milgrom and stokey 1982 that privately acquired information has neither positive nor negative social value when agents possess no prior hidden knowledge does not apply when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge during contractual negotiations

adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets abstract models of adverse selection assume that risk type is known to the consumer but not to the insurer many analyses suggest that information has zero social value and negative prior value why then would consumers become informed what is the incentive to gather information and why does adverse selection arise we show that the private value of information is non negative only if insurers cannot observe consumers information status or if consumers can conceal their informational status we examine the existence and characterization of equilibria under different configurations of information costs and benefits finally we examine some welfare implications of the endogenous information model for public policy regarding genetic testing and for state regulations concerning hiv testing

blackwell s ordering and public information abstract we characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty results dating to hirshleifer amer econom rev 61 1971 561 have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect we show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of blackwell and welfare is fully general furthermore blackwell s ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering

hedging familiarity and portfolio choice we exploit the restrictions of intertemporal portfolio choice in the presence of non nancial income risk to design and implement tests of hedging that use the information contained in the actual portfolio of the investor we use a unique dataset of swedish investors with information broken down at the investor level and into various components of wealth investor income tax positions and investor demographic characteristics portfolio holdings are identi ed at the stock level we show that investors do not engage in hedging but invest in stocks closely related to their non nancial income we explain this with familiarity that is the tendency to concentrate holdings in stocks with which the investor is familiar in terms of geographical or professional proximity or that he has held for a long period we show that familiarity is not a behavioral bias but is information driven familiarity based investment allows investors to earn higher returns than they would have otherwise earned if they had hedged

the effects of housing allowance benefit levels on recipient duration evidence from the swedish 1997 reform how the duration of housing allowance spells varies with the generosity of the housing allowance system carries important policy implications in 1997 the swedish housing allowance system implemented a drastic reform which substantially affected claimants who were couples with children in terms of their financial incentives to utilise housing allowance benefits however at the same time the 1997 reform largely left single parent claimants unaffected exploiting the quasi experimental feature of this reform this paper analyses the impacts of benefit shrinkage on couple with children recipients exit hazards using the dd difference in difference estimation strategy careful attention is given to measuring interaction effects appropriately in non linear models the findings in this paper suggest that the 1997 reform led to a sharp increase in the leaving speed of the recipients in the couples with children category

responsiveness to energy price changes when salience is high residential natural gas demand in ukraine abstract despite its importance for policy purposes evidence about the price elasticity of natural gas demand in the residential sector is very limited and based on inference from situations with modest variation in prices we focus on a locale and time when price changes were extreme and salient to consumers namely ukraine between 2013 and 2017 we exploit the tariff reforms and detailed micro level household consumption records to assess whether consumers adjust their consumption in response to the rate changes and estimate the price elasticity of the demand for natural gas to isolate behavior attention is restricted to those households that made no structural energy efficiency upgrades to their homes thus keeping the stock of gas using capital fixed we find that households are capable of reducing consumption even without installing insulation or making any other structural modifications to their homes the price elasticity is about 0 16 wealthier households people living in multifamily buildings and heavy users have more inelastic demands households reduced consumption even when they received government assistance this and the fact the demand is inelastic especially for wealthier households bode well for tariffs or energy tax schemes where wealthier households subsidize the consumption of the poorer ones

distributional effects of higher natural gas prices in russia abstract this paper analyses the distributional effects of eliminating the implicit subsidy on natural gas consumption in russia the analysis is based on a computable general equilibrium model with multiple households and a detailed power generation sector it is found that using additional government revenues from higher domestic gas prices to increase the income of low and middle income households could improve the welfare of these households and alleviate income inequality in russia e g total private consumption of the poorest decile could increase by 3 nevertheless the most efficient revenue recycling policy would be to invest in the energy efficiency of buildings which have the largest energy savings potential in russia in the long term investing in the energy efficiency of buildings could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 240 million tonnes of co2 equivalent per year and increase the welfare of low and middle income households e g total private consumption of the poorest decile increases by 1 it is also found that increasing the regulated domestic gas price could lead to windfall profits for non gazprom producers hence to increase government revenues the gas price reform could be supplemented by an increase in the capital income tax in the gas sector

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed