indirect taxation and undesirable competition abstract this paper studies undesirable competition in an asymmetric oligopoly under ad valorem taxation we show that when the cost advantage of efficient firms is large both the entry of and the cost reduction in efficient firms raise social welfare but unexpectedly hurt consumers moreover we find that unit taxation yields higher consumer surplus in equilibrium and it could also be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation under certain conditions

performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision abstract this paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends by lessening local information spill overs to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto correlation among local government expenditures it analyses local government expenditures on personal social services in the uk before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system sspr social services performance rating that would attribute a rating to each local authority the empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the sspr has reduced local yardstick competition

does right or left matter cabinets credibility and fiscal adjustments abstract this paper tests the widely held assumption that left wing cabinets favor higher public spending and examines whether cabinet ideology affects the persistence of major fiscal adjustments in a panel of large fiscal adjustments in oecd countries during the last 40 years we find evidence that left wing and right wing cabinets are partisan the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies in other words the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments the effect is significant for cuts in public spending public consumption wage or nonwage increases in total revenues direct taxes on businesses and other taxes we test for the role of several other determinants of persistence confirming that coalition and majority cabinets are associated with less persistence while periods of high or rising levels of indebtedness favor persistence the estimates of the impact of ideology and other variables on gdp and its components show that it is the size of the spending cut rather than cabinet ideology that is most important

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

valuing english primary schools this paper provides the first empirical evidence for the uk on the effect of primary school performance on property prices we find that on average a one percentage point increase in the neighbourhood proportion of children reaching the government specified target grade pushes up neighbourhood property prices by 0 67 at 2000 property prices we calculate the social valuation of a sustained 1 improvement in primary school performance to be up to 90 per child per year our instrumental variable and semi parametric approach avoids the problems of school quality endogeneity and omitted neighbourhood variables that occur in typical property value models

the analytics of the pricing of higher education and other services in which the customers are inputs many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser higher education is the premier example others are legion we provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services prices that charge customers for what they get on net output minus input from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other few examples of such prices exist in the real world

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

testing the taxmimicking versus expenditure spill over hypotheses using english data spatial interaction among local governments in tax setting and public spending decisions is receiving increasing attention in the applied public economics literature spatial interaction models rely on the presence of an externality from local budget making in traditional public finance models external effects originate either from interjurisdictional resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base or from local public expenditure spill overs into neighbouring jurisdictions however the recent political agency yardstick competition literature has stressed the role of informational externalities between neighbouring jurisdictions and predicted tax mimicry at the local level the actual relevance of the above hypotheses clearly needs to be assessed empirically in this paper an attempt is made at discriminating between alternative sources of local fiscal interaction by using data on the english municipal authorities budgets while both public spending levels and local property tax rates ex

entry deterrence in stackelberg perfect equilibria this paper examines entry deterrence in a duopoly where the postentry game is stackelberg it is argued that in reality firms can use a broader range of precommitments than is allowed for in the literature this paper permits such precommitments and analyzes the perfect equilibria it also allows for the fact that there may be fixed costs associated not only with entry but with beginning production several interesting possibilities are explained including the existence of excess capacity and the holding of inventories even in the absence of any uncertainty copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

multi market competition r d and welfare in oligopoly we investigate a multi market cournot model with strategic process research and development r d investments wherein a multi market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets we show that entry can enhance the total r d expenditures of the multi market firm moreover the incumbent s profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases depending on the fixed entry costs and r d technologies both insufficient and excess entry can appear our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms

welfare reform and the race to the bottom theory and evidence economists have argued that welfare migration leads to a race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits although a system of federal matching grants can remedy this problem the recent welfare reform law replaced the existing matching grant structure with block grants a policy change that appears undesirable to judge whether this critique of welfare reform is justified this paper evaluates the evidence in favor of a race to the bottom after explaining the theoretical effects of welfare migration the paper surveys the empirical evidence on the occurrence of such migration concluding that the evidence is mixed the discussion also considers recent empirical tests for strategic interaction which show that benefit levels in nearby states affect a given state s benefit choice the most plausible source of such interaction is a concern about welfare migration which leads policymakers to look at benefits in neighboring states when making their own choices judging that the evidence appears consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom the paper concludes that the demise of matching grants may be undesirable from a policy perspective

spatial patterns in local taxation tax mimicking or error mimicking this paper tests for mimicry in local tax setting by using a panel data set of the english non metropolitan districts in the 1980s when property tax rate variability across districts was highest the results confirm the presence of large and significant spatial interactions among districts even after allowing for district specific and time effects a district appears to be significantly affected by its neighbours policies a 10 increase in the local property tax rate of a district s neighbours leads to an increase of 4 5 in its own property tax rate on the other hand the absence of correlation in tax rates between lower tier district authorities and upper tier county authorities suggests that the spatial pattern in district tax rates is not simply driven by spatially auto correlated shocks

profit raising entry common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms on the contrary we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like stackelberg followers then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones and the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry

competition incentives and public school productivity abstract when competition increases it is often presumed that public schools will be forced to become more efficient this paper challenges that presumption showing that in well defined circumstances rent seeking public schools find it optimal to reduce productivity when a voucher is introduced this occurs for incentive reasons alone more generally the productivity effects of vouchers are shown to be non uniform varying systematically according to the distribution of households and the form the voucher takes when the voucher is targeted perverse productivity outcomes do not arise the analysis has relevance to the policy issue of voucher design

the spillover effects of state spending abstract this paper estimates the extent to which state spending is influenced by the spending of neighboring states examining several different metrics of neighborliness in order to better identify the channels for interstate spillovers it improves on previous studies by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to state medical spending to abstract from correlated local conditions and by allowing for spatial autocorrelation focusing on mandated increases in medical spending the analysis shows that each dollar of state spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by almost 90 cents the most predictive measure of neighborliness is the degree of population mobility between states suggesting that rational concerns about adverse migration may drive the interdependence of state spending policy

spatial dependence through local yardstick competition theory and testing abstract we propose a model of contracting for natural monopolies in which yardstick evaluation of performance can be optimal where principals have partially unobservable objective functions and agents are risk averse an externality is generated which can be observed in patterns of spatial dependence imposing standard contracting rules on principals can eliminate the externality and spatial dependence we test this prediction using spatial econometrics on uk data covering a regime shift from independent contracting to compulsory competitive tendering rules

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

the effect of school quality on educational attainment and wages the paper examines the effects of school pupil teacher ratios and type of school on educational attainment and wages using the british national child development survey ncds the ncds is a panel survey which has followed a cohort of individuals born in march 1958 and has a rich set of background variables recorded throughout the individual s life the results suggest that once we control for ability and family background the pupil teacher ratio has no impact on educational qualifications or on male wages it has an impact on women s wages at the age of 33 particularly those of low ability we also find evidence that those who attend selective schools have better educational outcomes and in the case of men higher wages at the age of 33 the impact is higher for the type of individuals who are less likely not to attend selective schools but for whom a comparison group does exist among those attending

market competition r d and firm profits in asymmetric oligopoly we investigate a cournot model with strategic r d investments wherein efficient low cost firms compete against less efficient high cost firms we findthat an increase in the number of high cost firms can stimulate r d by the low cost firms while it always reduces r d by the high cost firms more importantly this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition the low cost firms profits may indeed increase with the number of high cost firms an implication of this result is far reaching as it gives low cost firms an incentive to help rather than harm high cost competitors we relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure especially ford s strategy of disclosing its know how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

geographical variations in expenditure of learning disability services in england this article investigates the determinants of local authority learning disability ld expenditure in england it adopts a reduced form of demand and supply model extended to account for possible interdependence between municipalities risk factors such as people aged under 14 mortality rate and lone parents seem to play an important role in explaining geographical variation of spending further labour municipalities on average allocate lower resources on ld than do other political parties finally results corroborate recent findings in economics that authorities interact with each other when allocating public resources

evidence on macroeconomic complementarities this paper provides empirical evidence on macroeconomic complementarities a restriction on the nature of interaction between individuals in a multiagent setting these models imply that activities across agents will be positively correlated that discrete decisions will be synchronized and that disturbances will be magnified and propagated the paper shows that these implications are consistent with aggregate observations as well as some microeconomic evidence further looking at certain historical episodes such as the national industrial recovery act as well as seasonal fluctuations provides additional support for models with macroeconomic complementarities copyright 1996 by mit press

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

the efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities abstract this paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities contrary to conventional wisdom if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter manufacturers strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions i e wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under bertrand competition second if the strength of network effects is strong enough both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration finally if network effects are strong weak outputs wholesale prices retail prices consumer surplus and social welfare are higher lower under separation than integration

could do better the effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools this paper studies the eects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and stu dents in a set up where their eort aects the students educational attainment we show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the eectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive ef fect of lowering the students attainment in a simple dynamic set up where the reputation of the schools aects recruitment we show that increased competition leads to segregation of pupils by ability

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

the effect of competition on the efficiency of secondary schools in england abstract in this paper we calculate the technical efficiencies based upon multiple outputs school exam performance and attendance rates of all secondary schools in england over the period 1993 1998 we then estimate models to examine the determinants of efficiency in a particular year and the determinants of the change in efficiency over the period our results suggest that the greater the degree of competition between schools the more efficient they are the strength of this effect has also increased over time which is consistent with the evolution of the quasi market in secondary education competition is also found to be an important determinant of the change in efficiency over time there is however some evidence of conditional convergence between schools

peer group effects and educational attainment abstract given the aims of an educational system the relationship between educational inputs and educational outputs the educational production function a frequency distribution of students by ability and a fixed educational budget how should students and educational expenditures be allocated over classrooms the paper focuses on peer group effects which capture the influence of a student s classmates on his educational attainment and the determinants of whether streaming or mixing is preferable it should be noted that peer group effects arise in other contexts notably in the workplace thus the paper casts some light on the optimal composition of teams

the trade off between child quantity and quality an empirical investigation of trade offs between number of children and their scholastic performance confirms that family size directly affects children s achievement though parents show no favori

mental health expenditure in england a spatial panel approach we empirically investigate the determinants of local authority mental health expenditure in england we adopt a reduced form demand and supply model extended to incorporate possible interaction among authorities as well as unobserved heterogeneity the model is estimated using an annual panel dataset that allows us to explore both time series and cross municipality variation in mental health expenditure results are consistent with some degree of interdependence between neighbouring municipalities in spending decisions this first attempt to apply spatial panels in investigating health expenditure offers insights and raises new questions