deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

on the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions we establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first price auctions with asymmetric bidders interdependent values and affiliated one dimensional signals by extending a monotonicity result due to milgrom and weber 1982 we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational we avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second price auctions

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

a study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel this paper examines bidding in over 1 700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel or ring of stamp dealers in the 1990s the knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by daniel graham robert marshall and jean francois richard 1990 following a reduced form examination of these data damages induced inefficiency and the ring s benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of emmanuel guerre isabelle perrigne and quang vuong 2000 a notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers

comparing open and sealed bid auctions evidence from timber auctions we study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions using data from the u s forest service timber auctions we document a set of systematic effects sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders shift the allocation toward these bidders and can also generate higher revenue a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format we estimate the model s parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well we then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness which has important consequences for auction design

detecting collusion on highway procurement this paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first price procurement the main objective is twofold first to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in california i identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric i find evidence supporting the collusive scheme for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion

can affirmative action be cost effective an experimental examination of price preference auctions one of the most controversial questions facing our economy and society in recent years is the question of affirmative action the debate centers around an issue of minority representation in which the rights of the majority are depicted as being compromised by affirmative action programs set up to increase the welfare of minorities implicit in this discussion is the assumption that all affirmative action programs must be cost increasing this result it is claimed follows trivially from economic theory since any interference into the competitive process which prevents the most capable from being chosen must be wasteful and costly in this paper we challenge this claim with experimental results demonstrating that pricepreference auctions in which high cost minority firms are given preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts in such a way that it is possible for these firms to win a contract but not have submitted the lowest bid can be programs that both enhance minority representation and are cost effective in that they decrease the cost of government procurement in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions eric maskin and john riley 1995 and the optimal auction literature roger myerson 1981 it has been shown that in asymmetric auctions in which firms draw their costs from

predicting bid prices by using machine learning methods abstractit is well known that empirical analysis suffers from multicollinearity and high dimensionality in particular this is much more severe in an empirical study of itemized bids in highway pr

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first price auctions under exclusion restrictions this paper studies the nonparametric identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders within the private value paradigm first we show that the benchmark model is nonindentified from observed bids we also derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables and show that these restrictions are weak second we establish the nonparametric identification of the bidders utility function under exclusion restrictions our primary exclusion restriction takes the form of an exogenous bidders participation leading to a latent distribution of private values that is independent of the number of bidders the key idea is to exploit the property that the bid distribution varies with the number of bidders while the private value distribution does not we then extend these results to endogenous bidders participation when the exclusion restriction takes the form of instruments that do not affect the bidders private value distribution though derived for a benchmark model our results extend to more general cases such as a binding reserve price affiliated private values and asymmetric bidders last possible estimation methods are proposed

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

an empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product type choices i describe a model of entry with endogenous product type choices these choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals differentiated products have nonuniform competitive effects on profits i estimate the model for location choices in the video retail industry using a nested fixed point algorithm solution the results imply significant returns to product differentiation simulations illustrate the tradeoff between demand and intensified competition and the extent to which markets with more scope for differentiation support greater entry

identifying barriers to large scale integration of variable renewable electricity into the electricity market a literature review of market design abstract for reaching the 2 c climate target the robust growth of electricity generation from variable renewable energy sources vre in the power sector is expected to continue accommodation of the power system to the variable uncertain and locational dependent outputs of vre causes integration costs integrating vre into a well functioning electricity market can minimize integration costs and drive investments in vre and complementary flexible resources however the electricity market in the european union eu as currently designed seems incapable to deliver this end this paper aims to provide a comprehensive literature review of barriers to the large scale market integration of vre in the eu electricity market design based on the set up of the eu electricity market a framework was developed to incorporate the most pertinent market integration barriers and resulting market inefficiencies this paper concludes that an overhaul is needed for the current eu electricity market to address all barriers identified firstly a discrete auction intraday market a marginal pricing balancing market a two price imbalance settlement and a nodal pricing locational marginal pricing mechanism seem more promising in limiting integration costs secondly to support business cases of vre and complementary flexible resources in the electricity market a level playing field should be established and the price cap should be lifted up to the value of lost load voll meanwhile to fit vre s market participation a higher time resolution of trading products and later gate closure time in different submarkets would be required lastly feed in support schemes currently widely used for vre investments might be inconsistent with market integration as they increase integration costs and lock vre investments in a subsidy dependent pathway to avoid such lock in further investigation of alternative capacity based support schemes is recommended

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

when should sellers use auctions the simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit offers from buyers a simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make offers sequentially if it is costly for buyers to participate the sequential mechanism will tend to be more efficient than the simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation decisions on earlier bids however the sequential mechanism s greater efficiency may not produce higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead early bidders to bid aggressively the fact that later firms might be deterred will tend to reduce revenues the relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend on whether the threat of potential future competition which can raise bids in the sequential mechanism is more valuable to the seller than actual competition which will tend to be greater in the simultaneous auction the relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications for how assets should be sold in the case of how to structure the sale of corporations this question has attracted attention from practitioners and commentators since the delaware supreme court s 1986 revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a company with the duty of getting the best price for the stockholders revlon v mcandrews and forbes holdings 1986 in practice

not knowing the competition evidence and implications for auction design in a government auction program where first price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than english auctions i document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants motivated by additional data evidence i estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals participation is stochastic allowing for bidders risk aversion and asymmetry counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders uncertainty about the number of entrants combined with risk aversion substantially softens the revenue impact of low competition in first price auctions this explains the observed revenue patterns and uncovers an empirically important reason for sellers to favor first price auctions over english auctions

identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity in many procurement auctions the bidders unobserved costs depend both on a common shock and on idiosyncratic private information assuming a multiplicative structure i derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and propose a non parametric estimation procedure that results in uniformly consistent estimators of the cost components distributions the estimation procedure is applied to data from michigan highway procurement auctions private information is estimated to account for 34 of the variation in bidders costs it is shown that accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity has important implications for the evaluation of the distribution of rents efficiency and optimal auction design

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

procurement favouritism and technology adoption abstract it is well known that the design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of a contractor among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms in this paper i show that if technology adoption is non contractible these policies will also provide optimal incentives for the inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies

are bid preferences benign the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions abstract bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms while economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms this paper uses data from california auctions for road construction contracts where small businesses receive a 5 percent bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds and no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid i show that while firms bidding behavior matches theoretical predictions procurement costs are 3 8 percent higher on auctions using preferences the higher procurement cost in preference auctions is attributed to reduced participation by lower cost large firms structural estimates of latent firm costs are then used to evaluate how efficiency and the division of surplus between firms and the government are impacted by bid preferences firm profits are 3 1 percent lower under bid preferences however this is overwhelmed by the efficiency loss due to reduced large firm participation the efficiency loss conditional on firm participation is estimated to represent around 0 1 percent of overall procurement costs including the adverse effect of preferences on the participation of large firms increases the estimated efficiency loss to 3 6 percent which represents 27 cents for each additional dollar awarded to small businesses through the program counterfactual simulations indicate that if participation were instead inelastic to bid preferences the 5 percent bid preference would be close to the optimal level

estimating the distortionary effects of ethnic quotas in singapore using housing transactions abstract desegregation is a key policy issue in many countries i investigate a residential desegregation program in singapore the ethnic housing quotas i show that choice restrictions imposed on apartment blocks above the quota limits constrained could have distortionary effects causing price and quantity differences for constrained versus unconstrained blocks i test these predictions by hand matching more than 500 000 names in the phonebook to ethnicities to calculate ethnic proportions at the apartment block level i can then investigate differences for constrained and unconstrained blocks close to the quota limits and test for sorting around the limits i find that price differences are between 3 and 5 quantity effects are economically significant translating to longer time on market durations selection cannot fully explain these results my results point to challenges in achieving desegregation using quantity restrictions

how costly is affirmative action government contracting and california s proposition 209 abstract this paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using california s proposition 209 which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state funded contracts after proposition 209 prices on state funded contracts fell by 5 6 relative to federally funded projects for which preferences still applied most of the price decline after proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high minority areas finally short run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices