varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment we experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition at one extreme a subject s probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures at lower levels of competition a subject s probability of winning is affected more by her own expenditures than by the expenditures of others predicted expenditure levels are positively associated with higher levels of competition consistent with previous rent seeking experiments we find that subjects spend significantly more than the nash equilibrium prediction at all levels of competition however expenditure patterns generally follow the nash prediction expenditures decrease as the level of competition decreases our experimental design also includes a lottery choice experiment to control for subjects risk preference we find that subjects who are more risk averse spend significantly less in the contest and this effect is particularly strong for female subjects

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

new revelations about unemployment persistence in spain time series and panel data approaches using regional data this article aims to re examine the persistence of unemployment in spain for this purpose we use time series and cross section analysis from a time series viewpoint we disaggregate unemployment by regions and use unit root tests ar coefficients and fractional differencing parameters as indicators of persistence for the cross section approach we first estimate mean regressions of regional unemployment rates then using a panel of 114 periods and 50 provinces we estimate pooled fixed and random effects models finally following some recent developments we implement several panel data unit root tests previous studies had already shown the strong persistence of spanish unemployment our disaggregated analysis extends the finding to reveal that the persistence is greater in the most industrialized regions the results also suggest that a structural break took place in 1994 implying a decline in the unemployment persistence since then

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

grim down south the determinants of unemployment increases in british cities in the 2008 2009 recession lee n grim down south the determinants of unemployment increases in british cities in the 2008 2009 recession regional studies this paper investigates the impact of the 2008 2009 recession on unemployment in the sixty largest cities in great britain the key determinant of changes in unemployment was the skills of the population with highly skilled cities experiencing smaller increases cities with employment in financial services or manufacturing sectors experienced larger increases in unemployment whether a city has a specialized or a diverse economy appears less important than the industries in which the city is specialized the results highlight a problem as the largest unemployment increases were in cities seen as having least potential for future growth

the social costs of monopoly and regulation posner reconsidered focuses on social costs of monopoly and trade regulation in the united states benefit of marginal changes on antitrust activities equality of cost in obtaining monopoly and expected profit of monopolist elasticity of inputs in obtaining monopoly ebsco

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

transitory shock or structural shift the impact of the early 1980s recession on british regional unemployment this paper examines the impact of the early 1980s recession on regional unemployment in britain more specifically it seeks to evaluate the hypothesis that this recessionary shock was so severe that it caused an upward structural shift in the underlying mean unemployment rates of the regions this proposition is analysed using dickey fuller tests for difference versus trend stationarity and the augmented structural shift and trend break time series models developed by perron the results suggest that the apparent stochastic non stationarity in regional unemployment over the period 1965 95 is in fact due to an upward structural shift in regional mean unemployment rates in 1980 furthermore the nature of this shift appears to have differed as between the northern and southern regions of the country

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

defense against an opportunistic challenger theory and experiments abstract this paper considers a contest setting in which a challenger chooses between one of two contests to enter after observing the level of defense at each despite the challenger s chance of success being determined by a proportional contest success function the defenders effectively find themselves in an all pay auction that largely dissipates the value of the defended resources because the challenger will target the weaker defender however if the defenders form a protective alliance then their expected profits increase despite the fact that a successful challenge is theoretically more likely given the overall reduction in defense controlled laboratory experiments designed to test the model s predictions are also reported observed behavior is generally consistent with the comparative static predictions although challengers exhibit the familiar overbidding pattern defenders appear to anticipate this reaction and adjust their behavior accordingly

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests we analyze nash equilibria of probabilistic and share contests where players have distributional preferences if players are sufficiently similar distributional preferences create multiple equilibria for the case of only mildly heterogeneous players equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort exerted by players with selfish preferences these findings can explain the following three anomalies observed in empirical tests of probabilistic and share contests the large variance of effort levels overspreading individual spending that exceeds the nash equilibrium prediction overspending and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize overdissipation if players are sufficiently heterogeneous the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the selfish nash equilibrium it turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong we analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players becomes larger and how sequential moves influence behavior two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential move game first sequential moves act as a coordination device in case of multiple simultaneous equilibria and second inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort this effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead

gordon tullock and experimental economics gordon tullock s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular we present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement we show how tullock s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis we also describe tullock s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games

evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation entry effort and overdissipation this paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players participation can be stochastic we find for exogenously given participation probabilities players exert more effort under the concept of a finite population evolutionarily stable strategy fpess than under nash equilibrium ne we show that there is ex ante overdissipation under fpess for sufficiently large participation probabilities if and only if the impact function is convex with costly endogenous entry players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under fpess than under ne importantly under endogenous entry overdissipation can occur for all tullock contest success functions in particular those with concave impact functions

appropriability and market structure in a stochastic invention model this research examines in the laboratory a class of game theoretic equilibrium models of private research and development r d we formulate a stochastic model of r d investment whose predictions can be examined by using laboratory experiments the noncooperative nash equilibrium of our operational model yields testable predictions about the effects of appropriability and market structure on r d the experimental results support the hypothesis that the degree of appropriability is inversely related to r d spending the results strongly support the hypothesis that an increase in group size yields greater aggregate r d the noncooperative nash equilibrium is shown to be a good predictor of central tendencies in the experiments

spatial variations in the unemployment rate a case study of north west england taylor j and bradley s 1983 spatial variations in the unemployment rate a case study of north west england reg studies 17 113 124 this paper extends earlier work on the categorization of unemployment by exploring the reasons for spatial variations in cyclical unemployment and non cyclical unemployment regression analysis is used to divide total unemployment into a cyclical category and a non cyclical category in twenty eight travel to work areas in north west england during 1969 80 the spatial patterns of these two categories of unemployment are examined and an attemptis made to explain them the main conclusions are that spatial variations in the unemployment rate have been severely exacerbated by national recessions that the spatial patterns of cyclical unemployment and non cyclical unemployment are not random and that there is considerable scope for public policy in rectifying the persistent structural weaknesses in certain groups of travel to work areas in the nw region

the sensitivity of regional unemployment rates to the national trade cycle forrest d and naisbitt b 1988 the sensitivity of regional unemployment rates to the national trade cycle reg studies 22 149 153 this paper provides recent estimates for the uk of a model of regional unemployment rate variability due to thirlwall the principal findings are that regional industrial structure has continued to play a major role in determining regional unemployment variability and that the pattern of industrial variability appears to have changed little in the post war period however there remains a degree of regional specific variability which warrants further study forrest d et naisbitt b 1988 la sensibilite des taux de chomage regionaux au cycle economique national reg studies 22 149 153 cet article fournit des estimations recentes pour le royaume uni d un modele de la variation du chomage regional d apres thirlwall a partir des resultats principaux il s avere que la structure industrialo regionale ne cesse de jouer un role cle dans la determination de la variation du

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

two stage team rent seeking experimental analysis this paper presents a two stage team rent seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among winning team members when early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort early actors can free ride on their late moving teammates however when early and late efforts are complements all team members exert positive effort levels asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers the theory is tested with laboratory experimental methods although subjects overinvest relative to the nash equilibrium in all treatments chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model early movers exerted higher effort in the complement treatment and second stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response functions surprisingly in both single shot and repeated play environments early movers in the substitute treatment did not free ride choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers

segmented trends and non stationary time series since the influential work of charles r nelson and charles plosser 1982 many empirical studies have concluded that macroeconomic time series are difference stationary this paper proposes the segmented trend model as an alternative in which the series is the sum of a nonstationary trend and a stationary cycle and where the trend shows infrequent shifts the paper proposes tests between the difference stationary and segmented trends models and applies these to the data of nelson and plosser in general the results indicate that prices are difference stationary but quantities follow segmented trend processes copyright 1989 by royal economic society

hysteresis in east asian unemployment high performing asian economies are quite distinctive with efficient flexible and responsive labour markets comparing the persistence of unemployment in east asian economies to that in western countries is difficult due to the data s short time spans and possible structural breaks this article employs advanced unit root tests to deal with these problems and fails to reject hysteresis in the unemployment rates of the high performing asian countries even after taking into account structural change an alternative explanation of different productivity growth for the hysteresis phenomenon of the asian countries is proposed herein

the dynamics of regional unemployment in the uk 1974 89 this paper investigates the relationship between regional and national unemployment for the uk for the period 1974 1989 this problem is approached by using the time series methods of cointegration and causality tests the main conclusions are that regional and national unemployment are not as closely related as might have been supposed although any causation may as previously assumed run from the national to the regional level some regions are seen to be changing their position in the hierarchy of relative regional unemployment while most retain their relative status

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

information diversity and market behavior the paper addresses two major issues raised by information diversity in a speculative market first we analyze what property of an investor s information leads to an expected speculative profit and show that independence is more important than accuracy second we consider whether the market price must become fully efficient in the sense that every investor s information is accurately discounted when traders use it rationally as an information source we prove that for any information structure there is a unique equilibrium weighting of investor beliefs at which the price is fully efficient and also every trader s expected profit is zero except for special structures however this equilibrium need not be attained in finite time much of modern capital market theory depends heavily on the assumption that investors know the expected values variances and covariances of asset returns although the assumption of homogeneous expectations is a conventional one and necessary for many theoretical results it is not one which can be offered with much confidence real world investors have access to differing information and may also disagree on the correct interpretation of widely held information when asset returns are assumed to be governed by a known probability distribution many features of trading in real world markets are eliminated from consideration there is no role for information gathering and no way for an investor to profit from having superior information indeed this term has no real meaning since all relevant information is contained in the known returns distribution speculative trading is also hard to explain without divergence of opinion a speculator who thought the market price impounded all available information would never trade against it with heterogeneous information we lose some of the neat results of standard capital market theory but new questions can be addressed about how information diversity among investors affects the markets in which they participate one issue concerns the impact of informational differences on investor profits investors who are better informed than others or are better able to evaluate widely held information should be able to earn higher returns all effort devoted to security analysis and market research depends on the belief that this is so but what makes one investor s information superior to another s beyond the circular observation that those investors with consistent profits must be better informed than those with losses do investors with inferior information however measured continually lose money until they are squeezed out of the market or can an

information diversity and market behavior a reply professor minassian has raised technical points regarding my paper which for the most part seem to be well founded though not crucial to the basic results in this reply my objective will be to discuss what these mean in the context of the model and to offer slightly revised statements of theorems 1 and 3 to eliminate the problems equation 1 which duplicates equation 9 in 1 gives the following expression for the expected profits earned by trader i from trading in a pure speculative market

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

two views of the geographic distribution of unemployment this paper investigates the extent to which equilibrium and disequilibrium explanations can account for unemployment rate differentials between cities it shows that shocks that disturb the steady state relationship among the unemployment rates of metropolitan areas tend to be eliminated by mobility within a single year it also shows that high unemployment areas tend to be those with attractive climates and amenities high wages and high unemployment insurance it argues that the main effect of government programs that create jobs in high unemployment areas will be to lure additional job seekers to those areas

overbidding and overspreading in rent seeking experiments cost structure and prize allocation rules we study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent seeking contests most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost and find both overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts which we term overspreading we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally and of convex versus linear costs of effort while holding fixed the nash equilibrium prediction for effort we find the share rule results in average effort closer to the nash prediction and lower variation of effort combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results we can explain a significant amount of non equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design these results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

wildlife corridor market design an experimental analysis of the impact of project selection criteria and bidding flexibility in this work we used controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the impact of project selection criteria and bidding flexibility on the economic performance of wildlife corridor auctions bidders coordinated their bids to form valid corridors and compete with other valid corridors to be successful we tested the impact of bidding flexibility in terms of a bidders differentiating their offers for different eligible corridors and b bidders submitting a single offer that would automatically be considered for all eligible corridors within the bidding options we compared the performance of the auctions under a net benefit and a benefit cost ratio selection criteria we found that participants conditioned their offers in terms of corridor benefit information as a consequence allowing multiple offers significantly increased payment and rent extraction on the other hand a single offer restriction facilitated a higher proportion of valid agreements and reduced rent extraction and as a result the agency s payment we could not find any significant difference between project selection criteria in terms of payment and rent extraction these results provide important insights for policy makers engaged in conservation market design throughout the world

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

searching for a break in gnp it has been suggested that existing estimates of the long run impact of a surprise move in income may have a substantial upward bias due to the presence of a trend break in postwar u s gross national product data this article shows that the statistical evidence does not warrant abandoning the no trend break null hypothesis a key part of the argument is that conventionally computed p values overstate the likelihood of the trend break alternative hypothesis this is because they do not take into account that in practice the date is chosen based on pretest examination of the data

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

characterizing equilibrium rent seeking behavior a reply to tullock rent seeking contests can have different rules for designating the successful rent seeker we have investigated the case where the rule is that the successful rent seeker is the contender who has made the greatest outlay in the rentseeking quest hillman and samet this issue it is well known that for such contests there exists no nash equilibrium in pure strategies i e contenders choosing outlays as strategies we show however that there does exist a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies the equilibrium has the characteristic that the expected value of outlays made by the rival contenders equals the value of the prize being contested without regard for the number of contenders hence for any number of contenders rent dissipation is expecta

when less is more rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests this paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy we consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally we show that whenever a tullock contest yields under dissipation the auctioneer s revenue can be increased by optimally fixing the number of tickets in particular in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities it is possible to obtain almost full rent dissipation we test this hypothesis with a laboratory experiment the results indicate that as predicted revenue is significantly higher in a lottery with rationing than in a standard lottery on the other hand an alternative rationing mechanism that does not limit total expenditures fails to increase revenue relative to a standard lottery

are rents fully dissipated students of rent seeking have erred in focusing their attention exclusively on the analysis of competitions for exogenously specified transfers when redistributive policies are treated as endogenous choices it is clear that there are both incentives and opportunities for policymakers to design them in ways that prevent the wasteful dissipation of a large proportion of the intended transfers an analytical framework that treats policy design in this way is capable of explaining a variety of common attributes of redistributive policies that are apparent anomalies under the traditional approach to rent seeking furthermore we predict and find supporting evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with higher ratios of government revenue to total income than do democracies we attribute this tendency to the substantially greater potential for dissipative competition for revenues under democracy than under dictatorship finally available estimates of lobbying expenditures and rents transferred under the recent federal crude oil controls contradict the hypothesis that rents are fully or almost fully disspated through political competition

regional unemployment disparities and their dynamics martin r 1997 regional unemployment disparities and their dynamics reg studies 31 237 252 unemployment in the united kingdom has doubled every decade since the 1960s regional unemployment trends during this period are shown to have been characterized by a high degree of synchronicity and regional unemployment disparities by a remarkable persistence this persistence or stability of the regional unemployment structure or what can be termed co integration of the regional labour market system is argued to be an equilibrium phenomenon although the unusual recession of the early 1990s appears to have disturbed this stable pattern of regional disparities whether this change represents a temporary shock or marks a shift to a new equilibrium geography of unemployment is as yet unclear martin r 1997 les ecarts du chomage regional et leur dynamique reg studies 31 237 252 au royaume uni le chomage a doubletoutes les decennies depuis les annees 60 pendant cette periode ce qui caracterise les

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

balance of power and the propensity of conflict we study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict our experimental results suggest in a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power if bargaining involves endogenous demand choices however the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced in turn the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power

rent seeking with non identical sharing rules the primary object of this paper is to examine the role of differential sharing rules within a collective rent seeking setting on the possible non existence of nash equilibrium focusing on groups that distribute part of the rent equally among their members and the residual according to relative effort we show that in rent seeking societies applying the two polar sharing rules equilibrium never exists in the general case where groups apply different but not necessarily the polar sharing rules we study the relationship between group variability in distributing rents and the problem of non existence of equilibrium in the rent seeking game

the cyclical sensitivity of regional employment and unemployment differentials gordon i r 1985 the cyclical sensitivity of regional employment and unemployment differentials reg studies 19 95 110 this paper examines inter regional variations in the cyclical sensitivity of employment and unemployment in the uk over the past thirty years it shows that the patterns for employment and for unemployment are quite different the cyclical sensitivity of unemployment is greatest in the high unemployment regions while that for employment is greatest in the more industrial regions it is argued that the primary reason for differences in the sensitivity of unemployment is not demand side factors but cyclical variations in labour mobility between regions lower mobility in periods of high unemployment reduces the effectiveness of inter regional supply adjustments and increases the variance of unemployment rates

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

rent seeking rent defending and rent dissipation in the preceding analyses of rent defending the posner model yielded welfare losses in excess of the combined areas of the tullock rectangle and the harberger triangle in only one instance furthermore this particular circumstance necessitated voluntary participation in a game with a negative expected value 13 for the tullock rogerson model the explicit addition of rent defenders had no impact on aggregate dissipation

information diversity and market behavior a comment in figlewski 1 the author construct s a model of a purely speculative market in which speculation on price changes is the only motive for trading and the return for investors as a group is zero even though each trader possesses information which he believes will allow him personally to make a profit p 90 lines 8 12 1 this zero sum game of commodity speculation is played over several successive periods in each period information is released the market opens and a market clearing price is established by tatonnement so that investors know what the market price pm will be before they trade and thereby obtain additional information about other traders estimates of p the ultimate endof period commodity spot price they use this information to update their expectations and all trading by the ith investor is ultimately based on forecasts conditioned on both 4ji trader i s information set and pm p 91 paragraph 2 of course investor i believes he has information that pm does not accurately reflect which will allow him to earn a speculative profit trading against the market p 91 paragraph 3 figlewski presents four theorems in his paper the major result of his paper is theorem 1

examination of taiwan s travel and tourism market cycle through a two period markov regime switching model abstract this study analyzes the taiwan travel and tourism t t market cycle according to data of the weighted taiwan tourism stock index from january 1997 to august 2015 the two period markov regime switching model identifies two distinct regimes of the t t cycle and incorporates a specific set of mean and variance parameters for each period to control for the structural changes in taiwan s t t market the effect of china visitor arrivals to taiwan on the t t market is also verified the empirical findings offer essential information and policy implications for taiwan s government tourism policymakers and business managers

the social cost of rent seeking first estimates omists have been unanimous in their verdict that rent seeking is socially wasteful if rational from the practitioner s perspective 1 the entire literature on rent seeking that has developed over the past twenty years has focused on a describing the process of rent seeking b describing the theoretical consequences of rent seeking and c applying the theory to examination of political behavior and political outcomes to our knowledge there have been no attempts to empirically verify quantify the alleged social waste due to rentseeking the purpose of this paper is to report our first stab efforts in this regard we make no pretense of advancing the theory of rent seeking the investigation is an empirical search for a phillips curve type of relationship between incidence of rent seeking in the u s economy and the size growth of that economy our findings based on both time series and cross sectional analysis of the u s economy verify the existence of a social cost to rentseeking our crude estimate of the impact of rent seeking suggests that rentseeking as we measure it cost the economy an additional 22 6 percent of measured gnp in 1985

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

inter team contests with power differential abstract we investigate the impact of asymmetry on behavior in inter team contests in asymmetric environments one team has a greater probability of winning given the same contribution level unfair contests or has a lower cost of contributing uneven contests we explore how such asymmetries impact behavior asking how being advantaged or disadvantaged influences contributions we find both advantaged and disadvantaged teams contribute much more than theory predicts but in such a way that ex post winning probabilities of the contests are consistent with theoretical predictions at the individual level contributions are predicted by beliefs about own team and opponent team contributions the determinants of contribution by members of the disadvantaged team differ depending on the nature of asymmetry contributions by the disadvantaged team members are responsive to beliefs about contribution by opponents in unfair contests while in uneven contests they are responsive to beliefs about the contribution by teammates

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals