central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions abstract in a monetary union the central bank constitution must distribute the power over monetary policy between the members and the administrative center of the union we compare alternative distributions and evaluate their performance dominance of regional interests always leads to inefficient monetary stabilization policies whether or not dominance of regional interests leads to a higher long run rate of inflation depends on the union s political constitution

a bayesian model of voting in juries abstract we model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule we offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent regardless of the size of the jury and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed we prove a jury theorem for our general model as the size of the jury increases the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule for unanimity rule the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency a property that could emerge only in a continuous model journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

information pooling through majority rule voting condorcet s jury theorem with correlated votes abstract does majority rule voting steer an imperfectly informed assembly of people towards the full information outcome condorcet s jury theorem provides an affirmative answer under certain conditions a key condition is that the votes be statistically independent however it is unrealistic and hence unacceptable this paper generalizes the jury theorem to certain general models of correlated voting viz normal hypergeometric and polya distributions the paper proves that the effectiveness of majority rule voting decreases as the correlation between votes increases potential applications are indicated

race discrimination an economic perspective we review the empirical literature in economics on discrimination in the labor market and criminal justice system focusing primarily on discrimination by race we then discuss theoretical models of taste based discrimination particularly models of frictional labor markets and models of statistical discrimination including recent work on invalid statistical discrimination we explore and evaluate the evidence for and against these theories although there is substantial evidence of the existence of discrimination little is known about the extent to which disparities are driven by discrimination finally we argue that economists miss the important self enforcing relationship between disparities and discrimination and the effect of disparities in one domain on discrimination in other domains

monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations this paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness i show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group but group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare not publishing individuals votes raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare if the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers the incentive to build a reputation is greater but expected social welfare may be higher or lower

information processing and jury decisionmaking abstract we develop a model to explore the information processing function that jury deliberation and its analogues perform the central question we ask is how much better could a jury possibly perform if it optimally used the collective information available to it than if it decides cases by a simple majority vote before any deliberation or information sharing occurs it is shown how the answer depends on a number of considerations including the correlation among jurors observations the jurors assessments of the relative importance of type i and type ii errors compared with society s assessment of those errors and differences in jurors abilities

monetary policy committees and interest rate setting abstract this paper shows that it is preferable for monetary policy to be conducted by a committee instead of a single policy maker if there is uncertainty about potential output we examine three decision procedures an optimal procedure averaging and voting and find that the latter is the appropriate way to reach decisions if policy makers are not equally skilled finally we demonstrate that efficient decision procedures reduce the persistence of shocks

first impressions matter signalling as a source of policy dynamics we provide the first direct empirical support for the importance of signalling in monetary policy by testing two key predictions from a novel structural model first all policymaker types should become less tough on inflation over time and secondly types that weigh output more should have a more pronounced shift voting data from the bank of england s monetary policy committee strongly support both predictions counterfactual results indicate signalling has a substantial impact on interest rates over the business cycle and improves the committee designer s welfare implications for committee design include allowing regular member turnover and transparency regarding publishing individual votes

foreign owned banks in the united states earning market share or buying it foreign owned u s banks have been chronically unprofitable for more than a decade the authors employ a profit efficiency model introduced by allen n berger diana hancock and david b humphrey 1993 modified to be less sensitive to variations in asset size to estimate the relative profit efficiency of 62 foreign owned and 240 u s owned banks between 1985 and 1990 their results indicate that foreign owned banks were significantly less profit efficient than were u s owned banks primarily due to foreign banks reliance on expensive purchased funds for foreign owned banks the results are consistent with a strategy of sacrificing profits in exchange for fast growth and increased market share during the 1980s copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

size and performance of banking firms testing the predictions of theory abstract in recent years two important literatures on the theory of banking firms have developed one examines the economic functions of banks in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed another considers the incentive effects moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance both theories make predictions about the relation between banking firm size and performance an empirical analysis of large bank holding companies investigates measures of market valuation and risk of failure limited support is provided for either set of theoretical predictions

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

a study of bank efficiency taking into account risk preferences abstract i use the stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency of banks operating in the third federal reserve district accounting for the quality and riskiness of bank output in addition to the mean and mode of the conditional distribution of the one sided error term i calculate confidence intervals for the inefficiency measures based on the conditional distribution the results indicate that third district banks are operating at cost efficient output levels and product mixes but are not efficiently using their inputs the second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several correlates

multinationals and market structure in mexico abstract this paper examines how foreign direct investment influences market concentration in mexican manufacturing industries the results suggest that mnc presence has a positive influence on concentration independently of the industrial variables which are commonly thought to determine it several tentative explanations including the mncs market conduct are offered although no definite conclusions can be drawn other variables that are found to be significant indetermining market concentration are market size economies of scale capital intensity and advertising intensity

the impact of liberalization and foreign investment in colombia s financial sector abstract this study analyzes financial liberalization measures undertaken in 1990 of which an opening to foreign investment was a major component after a brief description of the major changes in legislation on foreign investment we compare performance of foreign owned vs domestic banks first using a descriptive approach then in a more systematic manner using econometric analysis panel data estimations reveal that financial liberalization in general had a beneficial impact on bank behavior in colombia by increasing competition lowering intermediation costs and improving loan quality although the positive contribution of foreign entry may be overstated in recent studies by not controlling for other liberalization factors foreign and domestic entry beginning in 1990 did improve bank behavior by enhancing operative efficiency and competition however the greater competition may have resulted in increased risk and a subsequent deterioration in loan quality particularly among domestic banks

inflation forecast targeting implementing and monitoring inflation targets abstract inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting the central bank s inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy the weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior than inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability commitment to target rules may be better than commitment to instrument rules

international banking a survey two distinct sets of issues are involved in the analysis of international banking one set the industrial organization issues centers on the patterns of expansion of foreign branches and subsidiaries of banks headquartered in the united states great britain japan and a few other industrial countries and on the nature of the advantage that these branches and subsidiaries have in relation to their host country competitors the second set the international finance issues involves the role of banks in cross border and cross currency financial flows both from their head offices and from their foreign branches and subsidiaries despite the attention to international banking there are few uniquely international institutions rather international banks are a subset of domestic banks with significant numbers of foreign branches and subsidiaries moreover there are few uniquely international banking activities although foreign exchange trading may seem to be one in many countries most or all foreign exchange trading involves domestic banks with few if any foreign branches the growth of foreign branches and subsidiaries of major banks occurred in two waves the first occurred in the decades before world war i when the war started

plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion a model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented the prosecutor s private information consists of the strength of the case while the defendant s private information consists of h is guilt or innocence in equilibrium a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant in the remaining cases the prosecutor s offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case it is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality copyright 1988 by american economic association

the evolution of common law we present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost we find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views policy motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law s precision we call our central finding the cardozo theorem even when judges are motivated by personal agendas legal evolution is on average beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law

do asymmetries matter for european monetary policy in this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional ecb decision rules asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in euroland we consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ecb concerning the conduct of common monetary interest rate policy welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed

is the mpc s voting record informative about future uk monetary policy it is shown that the voting record of the monetary policy committee of the bank of england helps predict future policy rate changes this result is robust to the inclusion of market participants expectations as measured by the slope of the term structure of money market rates and interest rate futures moreover expectations seem to adjust to the information contained in the voting record which suggests that publishing the minutes of mpc meetings increases the transparency of monetary policy

the economic effects of foreign bank presence evidence from the philippines abstract this study examines the economic effects of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the philippines from 1990 to 2006 the findings provide strong evidence on the dominance of competition effects from foreign bank presence which lead to the reduction in the profitability and overhead costs of domestic commercial banks these findings which reveal that both the actual market penetration and mere presence of foreign banks seem to exert competitive pressure to domestic banks imply that foreign banks may serve as an effective competitive force reducing the excess profits earned by domestic banks and compelling domestic banks to update their production technologies and techniques to improve their cost efficiency from a policy perspective the findings on competition effects of foreign banks in the domestic banking system justify the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the philippines the main findings demonstrate that the goal of banking liberalization in transforming domestic banks to be more competitive and efficient works considerably well in the case of the philippines aside from the policy of easing the entry of foreign banks bank specific conditions can have significant impact on the performance of domestic banks therefore a sustained improvement in the efficiency of domestic commercial banks requires not only liberalizing the entry of foreign banks but also on continued strengthening of domestic prudential regulation and supervision on the commercial banking system

an alternative test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches theory and evidence we propose a simple model of trooper behavior to design empirical tests for whether troopers of different races are monolithic in their search behavior and whether they exhibit relative racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches our test of relative racial prejudice provides a partial solution to the well known infra marginality and omitted variables problems associated with outcome tests when applied to a unique data set from florida our tests soundly reject the hypothesis that troopers of different races are monolithic in their search behavior but fail to reject the hypothesis that troopers of different races do not exhibit relative racial prejudice

bank reforms foreign ownership and financial stability abstract numerous studies have focused on foreign ownership of banks but instead of linkages to financial stability they typically analyzed other issues and used country level data this article fills the gap in the literature by applying the gmm techniques on dynamic panels using bank level data for asian countries to investigate the impact of foreign ownership on financial stability as well as whether the relation between foreign ownership and stability changes under different conditions of bank reforms in the host country specifically we reach five conclusions first the existence of the home field advantage hypothesis is supported nevertheless when considering the effects of bank reforms the global advantage hypothesis holds second an inverse u shaped relation between foreign ownership and stability is supported third a higher degree of credit control liberalization mitigates the negative effect of foreign ownership on stability fourth liberalization of interest rate control and banking supervision do enhance stability fifth and finally we confirm a significantly negative relation between an explicit deposit and stability

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

bad news from the front and from above bombing raids military fatalities and the death penalty in nazi germany we examine how the decision making of political elites respond to an imminent external threat to the existence of the state in times of war to do so we exploit exogeneous variation in exposure to battle deaths and bombing raids to estimate the effect of variation in the intensity of war on the probability that individuals charged with treason and or high treason in nazi germany received the death sentence a doubling of the number of military fatalities as well as bombing raids in the same week in which a defendant was sentenced increased the likelihood of receiving the death penalty by about 10 percentage points jel k14 n44

what factors cause foreign banks to stay in london the banking literature focuses extensively on the phenomenon of bank entry and pays less attention to the factors driving the continuation of banking activities in foreign markets in this paper we analyze this important but overlooked issue by constructing a unique database of foreign banks that continue operating and those that have withdrawn from arguably the world s most international banking center london this new data set comprises information on 408 offices from 77 countries spanning the period from 1945 to 1999 giving us 4643 observations of which 2795 represent offices that continue operating and 1848 that withdrew from london during this period our empirical work shows that the continuation of international banking activity in london is positively related to the setup of locally integrated organizational forms at entry the experience in the local market and the size of local operations continuation of banking activities is however negatively related to the setup of organizational forms integrated into the parent bank at entry and to the geographic distance of the home country to london we also find that higher global economic activity increases the likelihood of international banking operations continuing in london however the more volatile the global economic environment the greater the prospect of a cessation of this activity

a test of racial bias in capital sentencing this paper proposes a test of racial bias in capital sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors in lower courts we model the behavior of the trial court as minimizing a weighted sum of the probability of sentencing an innocent and that of letting a guilty defendant free we de ne racial bias as a situation where the relative weight on the two types of errors is a function of defendant and or victim race the key prediction of the model is that if the court is unbiased ex post the error rate should be independent of the combination of defendant and victim race we test this prediction using an original dataset that contains the the race of the defendant and of the victim s for all capital appeals that became nal between 1973 and 1995 we nd robust evidence of bias against minority defendants who killed white victims in direct appeal and habeas corpus the probability of error in these cases is 3 and 9 percentage points higher respectively than for minority defendants who killed minority victims

rational choice and the condorcet jury theorem abstract in a recent paper austen smith and banks 1996 amer polit sci rev 90 34 45 criticize the current literature on the condorcet jury theorem as neglecting the behavioral underpinnings of decision making they leave open the question whether allowing mixed strategies would sustain the conclusions of the condorcet jury theorem in this paper it is shown that these conclusions can hold in equilibrium in other words a rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals is derived journal of economic literatureclassification number d72

is the fed too timid monetary policy in an uncertain world estimates of the taylor rule using historical data from the past decade or two suggest that monetary policy in the u s can be characterized as having reacted in a moderate fashion to output and in

preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee using bank of england voting data we show empirically that members votes are driven by heterogeneous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences estimates indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish the estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation on monetary policy committees the marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly after five members there is no evidence of gains through externals moderating internals preferences a relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee structure

can politicians police themselves natural experimental evidence from brazil s audit courts to enhance government accountability reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of horizontal accountability particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected offi

marginal deterrence at work abstract the marginal deterrence principle of law enforcement implies that penalties must be scaled according to the severity of crimes in order to deter individuals from committing more severe offenses in this paper we test whether the us legal system is consistent with the rational economic model of marginal deterrence to this purpose we use novel and unique data on sentence length for a large sample of inmates in us correctional facilities combined with an official ranking of crimes by severity and with proxies for the maximum possible punishment and for the cost of monitoring criminals specifically the cost of policing in each us state over a period spanning up to 50 years we find that sentences are on average longer in states where maximum punishment is higher and monitoring cost is lower we document that these relations are systematically stronger in states where the private benefits from crime are more heterogeneous finally we show that sanctions increase relatively faster with the severity of crimes in states with higher maximum punishment and lower monitoring cost overall these results point to the rational economic model of marginal deterrence as providing a reasonable description of the actual enforcement policies chosen by regulators

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

sex and credit do gender interactions matter for credit market outcomes abstract this paper studies the effects of gender interactions on the supply of and demand for credit using data from a large albanian lender we document that first time borrowers assigned to officers of the opposite sex are less likely to return for a second loan the effect is larger when officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender and when they have more discretion to act on their gender beliefs as proxied by financial market competition and branch size we also find that first time borrowers matched with opposite sex officers pay higher interest rates and receive smaller and shorter maturity loans but do not experience higher arrears our results are consistent with the existence of a gender bias and learning effects that lead to the disappearance of the bias

the price concentration relationship in banking the commonly observed positive correlation between market concentration and profitability may be explained by noncompetitive pricing behavior as argued by the structure performance hypothesis or by the greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares as argued by the efficient structure hypothesis by examining the price concentration relationship instead of the profit concentration relationship this paper tests the structure performance hypothesis in a manner that excludes the efficient structure hypothesis as an alternative explanation of the results the results strongly support the structure performance hypothesis and are robust with respect to model specification measurement of concentration and econometric technique copyright 1989 by mit press

federal monetary policy what is the optimal institutional structure for a federal central bank the framework developed in this paper is used to analyze under what conditions an individual region will prefer a monetary union to be organized according to regional or common influences and how a combination of both can be rationalized the implications of an enlargement of a monetary union for changes in its institutional setup are also derived