a comparative analysis of approaches for determining optimal price and order quantity when a sale increases demand abstract both average cost or profit and present value of cost or profit methods have been used in developing inventory policies although the present value method represents the costs and revenues better both methods generate identical solutions for the classical eoq case this paper discusses the differences between the two methods and illustrates situations where these two methods generate drastically different policies specifically when a supplier reduces the price of a product temporarily a retailer might place a special order and offer a discount on these units to its customers to increase demand this paper uses an average profit method to develop profit functions for different combinations of supplier s sale period and retailer s replenishment time and presents methods for determining the optimal price and order quantity experiments are then conducted to compare the results of average profit and present value of profit approaches for solving the problem the results indicate that these models may generate drastically different policies for the problem and neither model will consistently generate a larger order quantity this paper suggests that the present value approach be used to determine optimal policies when there is a temporary change in price and demand

the cap rate 1966 1984 a test of the impact of income tax changes on income property recently fisher lentz and stern 1984 simulated the impact of federal income tax changes on investment in nonresidential real estate their paper and others have identified the impact that past and proposed income tax changes had or will have on real estate by simulating the impact of tax changes on cash flows current discussions of the likely impact of potential tax reform utilize similar partial equilibrium techniques that probably exaggerate the impact of tax changes no one has looked at the actual impact past changes have had on real estate investment returns this paper will test the statistical impact of past tax changes on one estimate of real estate capitalization rates cap rates fisher lentz and stern illustrated the impact of income tax changes on the rent tovalue ratio which is the cap rate in real estate terminology the cap rate is equal to the net operating income divided by value where net operating income is gross potential income less vacancy and collection loss allowance and less operating expenses excluding financing costs and income taxes in this paper a model of the changes in the cap rate for income property from 1966 through 1984 will be developed and used to show the impact of two tax law changes 1976 and 1981 the 1976 law caused construction taxes and interest to be

learning from others outcomes i develop a simple model of social learning in which players observe others outcomes but not their actions a continuum of players arrives continuously over time and each player chooses once and for all between a safe action which succeeds with known probability and a risky action which succeeds with fixed but unknown probability depending on the state of the world the actions also differ in their costs before choosing a player observes the outcomes of k earlier players there is always an equilibrium in which success is more likely in the good state and this alignment property holds whenever the initial generation of players is not well informed about the state in the case of an outcome improving innovation where the risky action may yield a higher probability of success players take the correct action as k in the case of a cost saving innovation where the risky action involves saving a cost but accepting a lower probability of success inefficiency persists as k in any aligned equilibrium whether inefficiency takes the form of under adoption or over adoption also depends on the nature of the innovation convergence of the population to equilibrium may be non monotone

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function

delays and equilibria with large and small information in social learning abstract the general model of social learning with irreversible investment and endogenous timing is analyzed for any distribution of private informations strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria appear which are generated solely by information externalities different equilibria generate strikingly different amounts of information the impacts of various assumptions bounded beliefs large number of agents discrete time and short periods are examined carefully the properties are robust to the introduction of observation noise with a continuum of agents

optimal ordering and pricing policies in a single period environment with multivariate demand and markdowns this paper investigates a single period inventory model in which the demand of the product is a deterministic multivariate function of price time and level of inventory models are formulated for the basic pricing case and the case with a price markdown during the season solution methodologies are presented for each case when the pricing decisions are predetermined and when they are decision variables comments on the practical use of this model are presented and sensitivity analysis is conducted on the decision variables and demand parameters

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

the impact of market structure and learning on the tradeoff between r d competition and cooperation this paper compares r d competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a safe investment or a risky r d investment when the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non discovering firms equilibrium investment flow ex ante investment and welfare under r d competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation with negative externalities r d cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under r d competition and social welfare may also be less our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of r d cooperation on r d outcomes

the direction of innovation abstract how do innovation policies affect the direction of research is market based innovation too radical or too incremental we construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions that could have been discovered but were not policies which do not do so like patents and prizes may fail to encourage firms to research in the efficient direction even if they obtain the optimal quantity of r d

dynamic delegation of experimentation i study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent experimentation is modeled as a one armed bandit that yields successes following a poisson process its unknown intensity is high or low the agent has private information his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high the agent values successes more than the principal does so prefers more experimentation the optimal mechanism is a cutoff rule in the belief space the cutoff gives pessimistic types total freedom but curtails optimistic types behavior pessimistic types over experiment while the most optimistic ones under experiment this delegation rule is time consistent

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

firm value illiquidity risk and liquidity insurance abstract our interest here concerns liquidity supply to firms we first examine the relation between firm value and access to liquidity supply and then we investigate the existence conditions and efficiency properties of financial contracts with a liquidity covenant in a continuous time infinite horizon stochastic model of a repeated firm investors relationship where the key problem is the mutual commitment between the two parties to model this problem we consider liquidity supply as a stochastic regulator mechanism that prevents the firm s ability to pay from falling below a predefined threshold here the market fixed coupon and we then apply recent developments in dynamic programming techniques for regulated processes to obtain a close form solution for the firm s value our main finding is that efficient i e actuarially fair and renegotiation proof contracts emerge in the absence of perfect commitment as the firm and the investor can exert mutual threat of termination

continuous time repeated games in this paper the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case the model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time the set of equilibria in this game may be large in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s the authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a cournot duopoly example copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning abstract this paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product individual learning generates ex post heterogeneity which affects the buyers purchasing decisions the monopolist s pricing strategy and efficiency when learning occurs through good news signals buyers receive a rent because of the possible advantageous belief caused by short lived deviations if a good news signal arrives the price can instantaneously increase or decrease depending on the arrival time of this signal the equilibrium is inefficient because the monopolist s incentive to exploit known buyers leads to inefficient early termination of exploration when learning occurs through bad news signals ex post heterogeneity has no such effect since only homogeneous unknown buyers purchase the experience good

search duplication in research and design spaces exploring the role of local competition a lack of sufficient diversification in research strategies has been identified as an important problem for delegated research we show that this problem can be solved by local competition such as bribery lobbying rent seeking competition at the patent office among players who apply the same search strategies or develop the same design such competition can restore full efficiency in the non cooperative equilibrium local competition interacts with the choice of whether to cluster or diversify and rather than adding a further inefficiency to the existing ones it eliminates inefficiency the results are robust and hold under simultaneous search strategy choices as well as for sequential choices

rents selling prices and financing premiums this paper examines the effects of below market financing on rents and selling prices of residential income properties a recursive model is used to estimate rent and price equations in order to determine the effect of favourable financing on each variable the results indicate that below market financing has a negative effect on rent and a positive effect on selling price average monthly rent per unit with below market financing is about 43 less than the average rent with current market financing the degree of capitalisation of the financing premium as indicated by cash equivalence in the selling price is less than 100 per cent the average financing premium reflected in the selling price is 4818 various factors including differences in marginal and average costs and leverage effects are presented to explain these results

contests for experimentation we study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation s feasibility and opponents outcomes we characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize sharing scheme and a disclosure policy a public winner takes all contest dominates public contests where any success is immediately disclosed with any other prize sharing scheme as well as winner takes all contests with any other disclosure policy yet jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can increase innovation in a broad class of mechanisms it is optimal to share the prize with disclosure following a certain number of successes under simple conditions a hidden equal sharing contest is optimal

learning and payoff externalities in an investment game abstract this paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two player irreversible investment game each player learns about the quality of his project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent i characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second mover advantage allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities despite private learning the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition in contrast to the case of purely informational externalities all investments happen at the same real time instant irrespective of the sign of the correlation and beliefs never get trapped in a no learning region provided that the second mover advantage is sufficiently high

a continuous dilemma we study prisoners dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds in most cases the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation and cooperation rates approach zero in one shot sessions in follow up sessions with a variable number of subperiods cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and with one second subperiods they approach continuous levels our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner s dilemma jel c72 c78 c91

reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus the share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first order knowledge of rationality is determined as a function of her probability of becoming committed as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the probability of becoming committed e g it equals 30 if the commitment probability is 1 in 10 and equals 13 if the commitment probability is 1 in 1000 and the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

assumption financing and selling price of single family homes periods of high mortgage interest rates that characterized the early 1980s have escalated the use of assumption financing in home buying in these periods there is an increased demand for alternative sources of financing and a movement away from conventional sources the purpose of this study is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of the increased use of assumption financing on selling prices of single family residential housing aside from physical characteristics the financing arranged by the homebuyer is considered a major influence in determining house prices this is especially true in real estate appraisal practice where differences in types of financing are one of the major categories of adjustment see 1 4 and 10

a quantity discount approach to supply chain coordination abstract quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for inventory coordination in supply chains however typical supply chain participants may encounter difficulties in implementing the coordination policy simply because 1 specified lot size adjustments may deviate from the economic lot sizes and 2 the buying firm may face amplified overstocking risks related to increased order quantities the main objective of this study is to develop a quantity discount model that resolves the practical challenges associated with implementing quantity discount policies for supply chain coordination between a supplier and a buyer the proposed buyer s risk adjustment b ra model allows the supplier to offer discounts that capitalize on the original economic lot sizes and share the buyer s risk of temporary overstocking under uncertain demand the analytical results suggest that the proposed b ra discount approach is a feasible alternative for supply chain coordination under uncertain demand conditions

opaque bank assets and optimal equity capital abstract banks assets are opaque and therefore we model their true accounting asset values as partially observed variables we derive a stochastic control model to optimize banks dividend and recapitalization policies in this situation and calibrate that to a sample of u s banks by the calibrated model the noise in reported accounting asset values hides about one third of the true asset return volatility and raises the banks market equity value by 7 8 particularly those banks with a high level of loan loss provisions nonperforming assets and real estate loans and with a low volatility of reported total assets have noisy accounting asset values because of the substantial shock on the true asset values the banks assets were more opaque during the recent financial crisis

academic freedom private sector focus and the process of innovation we develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private sector research rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research we emphasize control rights considerations and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus by serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests academia can be indispensable for early stage research at the same time the private sector s ability to direct scientists toward higher payoff activities makes it more attractive for later stage research

the simple economics of research portfolios this article identifies biases in market portfolios of parallel research projects arising from the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations occasioned by those circumstances where the market rewards only the winner and where the winner is awarded the entire social surplus it is shown that under risk neutrality this noncongruence implies that t he market encourages the development of too many discoveries too lar ge a spread in the distribution of the quality of discoveries and an excessive occurrence of multiple discoveries copyright 1987 by royal economic society

good news and bad news in two armed bandits abstract this note provides a characterization of optimal policies in a class of two armed bandits that allows for correlated arms this characterization extends previously known results in the literature in particular it implies under a mild continuity assumption the optimality of cutoff belief strategies for this class of bandits cutoff beliefs are not unique though

coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems supply chain management scm has become an important management paradigm as supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities a key issue in scm is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance in this paper we provide a review of coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems in a framework that is based on supply chain decision structure and nature of demand this framework highlights the behavioral aspects and information need in the coordination of a supply chain the identification of these issues points out several directions of future research in this area

discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms in distribution channels with demand that is price sensitive we consider a single vendor single retailer distribution channel demand for the product arises only at the retailer the demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be deterministic but price elastic the retailer in turn buys the product from the vendor the vendor and the retailer act independently and rationally each maximizing their own respective profit the equilibrium point that specifies the vendor s and buyer s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a stackelberg game we consider the cases when quantity discount and volume discount respectively are offered we develop methods to determine the optimal discount policy for these cases we then consider the case where both volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously and develop a method to determine the optimal simultaneous discount offer the relative performance of the alternative discount schemes is then evaluated through a numerical study the results of the study demonstrate that the effectiveness of volume discount as a coordination mechanism is higher when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is higher the effectiveness of quantity discount on the other hand is higher with lower price sensitivity of demand finally the results also demonstrate that perfect coordination is achieved when volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously

job matching with finite horizon and risk aversion the consequences of introducing risk averse workers with a known finite retirement age into a simple job matching framework are explored the job matching model includes two jobs in the primary job workers and firms learn about the worker s productivity by observing his output over time in the secondary job productivity of any worker is known with certainty at the outset workers start off in the primary job but based on their observed performance may choose to switch to the secondary job the model is developed in two stages first the finite retirement age is introduced while the usual assumption of risk neutral workers is retained in this model it is shown that all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record denoted r by a certain age denoted t will thereafter remain in the primary job until retirement those who do not achieve r by age t switch to the secondary job at or before age t and remain there second risk aversion is introduced along with finite retireme

incentives in academics why is there tenure this paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market the major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this the analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including tenure track appointments contract buy outs early retirement plans and when a budget crunch hits the elimination of entire departments the results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions

negatively correlated bandits we analyse a two player game of strategic experimentation with two armed bandits either player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known pay off or a risky arm whose expected pay off per unit of time is initially unknown this pay off can be high or low and is negatively correlated across players we characterize the set of all markov perfect equilibria in the benchmark case where the risky arms are known to be of opposite type and construct equilibria in cut off strategies for arbitrary negative correlation all strategies and pay offs are in closed form in marked contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type there always exists an equilibrium in cut off strategies and there always exists an equilibrium exhibiting efficient long run patterns of learning these results extend to a three player game with common knowledge that exactly one risky arm is of the high pay off type

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

go for broke or play it safe dynamic competition with choice of variance we consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influence the variance but not the mean of the one dimensional state variable we show that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in stationary markov strategies me exists and has the property that patient players choose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind we also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ahead a situation that ensures a dominant player emerges quickly

learning and strategic pricing we consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time the true value of each seller s product to the buyer is initially unknown additional information can be gained only by experimentation for exogeneously given prices the buyer s problem is a multi armed bandit problem the innovation in this paper is to endogenize the cost of experimentation to the consumer by allowing for price competition between the sellers the role of prices is then to allocate intertemporally the costs and benefits of learning between buyers and sellers we examine how strategic aspects of the oligopoly model interact with the learning process all markov perfect equilibria mpe are efficient we identify an equilibrium which besides its unique robustness properties has a strikingly simple seemingly myopic pricing rule prices below marginal cost emerge naturally to sustain experimentation intertemporal exchange of the gains of learning is necessary to support efficient experimentation we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria

coordinating ordering and pricing decisions in a two stage distribution system with price sensitive demand through short term discounting abstract we consider a short term discounting model in which the distributor offers a discounted price for the retailers orders placed at the beginning of its replenishment cycle in a non cooperative distribution system with one distributor and multiple retailers each facing price sensitive demand we examine the value of the price discount strategy as a mechanism for the distributor to coordinate the retailers ordering and pricing decisions under two common types of demand linear demand in price and constant elasticity demand in price our numerical study reveals that in the presence of homogeneous retailers namely retailers with identical demand rates the distributor s profit improvement due to coordination generally decreases as the number of retailers or the inventory holding cost rate increases but increases as price elasticity increases although an increase in the inventory holding cost rate has a negative effect on the distributor s profit it may have a positive effect on the retailers profits we further find that with heterogeneous retailers namely retailers with different demand rates offering a discounted price under linear demand benefits the distributor when both the inventory holding cost rate and the variation in demand are either small or large this cross effect however is absent under constant elasticity demand

modeling quantity discounts under general price sensitive demand functions optimal policies and relationships this paper presents models for determining optimal all unit and incremental quantity discount policies and investigates the effect of quantity discounts on increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions under general price sensitive demand functions the paper develops optimal quantity discount policies investigates their interrelationships and their benefits to both the supplier and the buyer and gains managerial insights for the scenarios of maximizing the supplier s profit and the joint profit we develop simple and efficient solution approaches for determining the all unit and the incremental optimal decision policies for general price sensitive demand functions we have three main findings first with price sensitive demand there are two incentives in offering quantity discounts increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions in most cases increasing demand dominates in justifying the offering of quantity discounts second using a single lot size associated with all efficient transactions as with the constant demand case does not hold with the price sensitive demand case third the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in benefiting both the supplier and the buyer

optimal entry timing abstract a player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede information about the potential entrant s type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry i analyze stationary equilibria using the public belief as a state variable no equilibria in pure strategies exist and smooth pasting conditions need not hold under both d1 and a novel refinement the informed player has nondecreasing value functions and her strategy has the following structure for high states both types enter with certainty for a possibly empty interval of intermediate states no type enters and for low states the high type enters while the low type mixes i obtain closed form solutions and analyze comparative statics for such equilibria the welfare effects of the presence of news relative to no news depend on the starting belief however for a fixed equilibrium a marginal increase in news quality always helps the informed player regardless of her type and always hurts total welfare

strategic merger waves a theory of musical chairs this paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment a set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets at each point in time an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt or raid immediately by postponing the takeover attempt an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals first a complete information model is considered and it is shown that the above tradeoff leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in monotone strategies that are strictly pareto ranked all these equilibria share the feature that all acquirers rush simultaneously in merger waves the model is then extended to a dynamic global game by introducing slightly noisy private information about merger profitability this game is shown to have a unique markov perfect bayesian equilibrium in monotone strategies and the timing of the merger wave can thus be predicted last the comparative dynamics predictions of the model are related to stylized facts

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

portfolio choice in research and development we analyze the effects of a winner take all patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competingfirms as well as on thefirms incentives to duplicate research projects nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a oneshot simultaneous move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances we show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion

rivals search for buried treasure competition and duplication in r d we model an r d race in which each fi rm decides in each period between two research projects only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which there is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search if the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects if neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs in which case there is a bias toward the high cost project or asymmetric success probabilities in which case too little duplication is possible if one firm is informed it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent

continuous time games of timing abstract we address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information under weak assumptions any two player timing game has a markov subgame perfect e equilibrium for each e 0 this result is tight for some classes of games symmetric games games with cumulative payoffs stronger existence results are established

continuous time stochastic games abstract we study continuous time stochastic games with a focus on the existence of their equilibria that are insensitive to a small imprecision in the specification of players evaluations of streams of payoffs we show that the stationary namely time independent discounting game has a stationary equilibrium and that the discounting game and the more general game with time separable payoffs have an epsilon equilibrium that is an epsilon equilibrium in all games with a sufficiently small perturbation of the players valuations a limit point of discounting valuations need not be a discounting valuation as some of the mass may be pushed to infinity it is represented by an average of a discounting valuation and a mass at infinity we show that for every such limit point there is a strategy profile that is an epsilon equilibrium of all the discounting games with discounting valuations that are sufficiently close to the limit point

joint pricing and inventory policies for make to stock products with deterministic price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we focus on a firm selling a single make to stock product to price sensitive end customers we develop an integrated operations marketing model that can help determine the relevant profit maximizing decision variable values for two pricing policies that the firm might follow price as a decision variable which is advocated by academicians and mark up pricing used by most practitioners we first consider an eoq based model with price and order quantity as independent decision variables we then develop an analogous model where price is a mark up over operating costs per unit and order quantity becomes the sole decision variable we are able to ascertain the optimal decision variable values for each model for log linear and linear demand functions we prove that for such profit maximizing models the optimal batch size is not necessarily monotone increasing in set up cost interestingly our numerical analytical evidence suggests that from a profit perspective it is better for managers to be aggressive on price rather than reducing price too much especially for highly price sensitive and non linear demand moreover we establish that in general the profit penalty for not including inventory costs in determining the optimal batch size or ignoring the batch size optimization issue in a mark up price model is not significant only when the set up cost is quite high and or the firm faces non linear demand from highly price sensitive end consumers does it become crucial for managers to determine the exact optimal batch size and base the mark up price on the entire unit operating cost not only the unit variable production cost

rational frenzies and crashes most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a walrasian auctioneer because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later rather than only now or never their current willingness to pay is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is a consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information leading to both frenzies in which demand feeds on itself and crashes in which price drops discontinuously the paper also shows how a result from static auction theory the revenue equivalence theorem can be applied to solve for a dynamic price path

learning by observation within the firm abstract this paper explores the implications of learning by observation on the production and wage decisions of a firm firms are viewed as collective arrangements that enable workers to share information this information takes the form of productivity enhancing innovations and is the product of research by workers some workers may choose to free ride on the research of others and the firm by its choice of wage profiles can affect the amount of research done the production function of a firm is then derived from the technology of learning as constrained by the incentives of workers the qualitative properties of the production function most importantly the nature of returns to scale and the incentives to limit firm size are shown to depend on the behaviour and objectives of the firm

business as usual market crashes and wisdom after the fact the authors present a three stage model of market dynamics in the first stage routine behavior tends to keep information of common interest trapped in private hands in the second stage private information reaches a threshold that triggers some agents to alter their behavior these actions release information to the market the final stage involves the market s response to this news as other participants react to the initial departure from routine behavior the authors present an application to industry investment they also outline applications to the international debt crisis to bank runs and to political upheavals copyright 1994 by american economic association

absorptive capacity coauthoring behavior and the organization of research in drug discovery we examine the interface between for profit and publicly funded research in pharmaceuticals firms access upstream basic research through investments in absorptive capacity in the form of in house basic research and pro publication internal incentives some firms also maintain extensive connections to the wider scientific community which we measure using data on coauthorship of scientific papers between pharmaceutical company scientists and publicly funded researchers connectedness is significantly correlated with firms internal organization as well as their performance in drug discovery the estimated impact of connectedness on private research productivity implies a substantial return to public investments in basic research

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

different missions and commitment power in r d organizations theory and evidence on industry university alliances this paper proposes a theory for why firms conduct some research activities in house but outsource other projects to independent partners and for why firms retain different degrees of control over collaborative research projects the focus is on the determinants of a company s choice to outsource research projects to academic organizations because of the different institutional missions of academic organizations outsourcing a project to a university allows a firm to commit not to terminate or alter a scientifically valuable project before it is complete this commitment is potentially valuable for the firm in an environment where scientific value and economic value may not coincide and scientific workers are responsive to the incentives defined by their community of peers an economic model that formalizes these arguments is developed empirical hypotheses are then formulated about the kind of research activities firms will outsource to universities and activities on which they will exert stronger control evidence from a sample of industry university research agreements as well as from other large sample and case studies shows patterns consistent with the predictions of the model

learning and information aggregation in an exit game we analyze information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain common payos players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players we give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and show that information aggregates in randomly occurring exit waves observational learning induces the players to stay in the game longer the equilibria display aggregate randomness even for large numbers of players

preemption games under levy uncertainty abstract we study a stochastic version of fudenberg tirole s preemption game two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand firms differ in sunk costs of entry if the demand process has no upward jumps the low cost firm enters first and the high cost firm follows if leader s optimization problem has an interior solution the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolist otherwise the leader enters earlier than the monopolist if the demand admits positive jumps then the optimal entry threshold of the leader can be lower than the monopolist s threshold even if the solution is interior simultaneous entry can happen either as an equilibrium or a coordination failure the high cost firm can become the leader we characterize subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in terms of stopping times and value functions analytical expressions for the value functions and thresholds that define stopping times are derived

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

revenue management without commitment dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales a seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline at each time he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale over time buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases if a buyer does not purchase when she arrives she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price in the unique markov perfect equilibrium the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods a flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game when it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale the seller holds a big initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good

tenure issues in higher education the system of tenure that dominates american higher education has long been a source of controversy the institution of tenure has been attacked for entrenching a lazy professoriate more interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching or developing practical insights while on the other hand it has long been defended as an absolute necessity for the defense of open intellectual inquiry the tenure controversy has been sharpened in recent years by several events the end of mandatory retirement which was abolished by federal law effective january 1 1994 has heightened concerns about the productivity and commitment of professors who received tenure long ago and who no longer have the same incentives to invest in long term reputation there is also ongoing concern over the steadily rising cost of higher education which raises the question of what students as well as the taxpayers who support public institutions of higher education are getting for their money 1 the idea that tenure is a wasteful institution for universities runs up against the puzzling fact that the commitment to tenure is one that academic institutions impose on themselves although the american association of university professors aaup provides a powerful lobby in favor of tenure generally colleges and universities most notably private ones are under no legal requirement to observe tenure constraints although as administrators we certainly feel the weight of those constraints our view is that a tenure system in fact provides important benefits to society and to colleges and universities we argue here that the role of tenure is

decomposing uncertainty and its effects on imitation in firm exit decisions this study examines the effects of different uncertainty types on interorganizational imitation in firm exit decisions we draw on herding models to conceptualize exit decisions as being based on a firm s private information which the firm updates with information inferred from observing the actions of others we posit that different types of uncertainty differentially affect this observational learning process in particular we propose that certain uncertainty types attenuate rather than foster observational learning and subsequent imitation we test this theory using a 29 year panel data set on the exit of private venture capital firms our results indicate that observational learning does influence imitation in firm exit decisions and they also suggest that a common belief that uncertainty enhances imitation does not apply to all types of uncertainty specifically we find that uncertainty fosters imitation only when it is idiosyncratic to the firm uncertainties that are common to all firms in contrast actually reduce reliance on observational learning by decomposing uncertainty into different types and explicating their effects on imitation we demonstrate that this relationship is more nuanced than previously assumed and in addition highlight the role of deliberate information processing in imitation

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

strategic learning in teams this paper analyzes a two player game of strategic experimentation with three armed exponential bandits in continuous time players face replica bandits with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff whereas the likelihood of the risky arms yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown it is common knowledge that the types of the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated i show that the efficient policy is incentive compatible if and only if the stakes are high enough moreover learning will be complete in any markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value functions if and only if the stakes exceed a certain threshold

information rigidities and asymmetric business cycles abstract we study the link between asymmetries of markups and firm exit rates and asymmetries in information acquisition along the u s business cycle we argue that a model of optimal firm exit under rational inattention produces lagged counter cyclical and positively skewed markups together with counter cyclical exit rates consistent with the empirical evidence our model also predicts counter cyclical information rigidities consistent with survey evidence

delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information abstract we consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities the players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest they learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions we develop new methods of analysis for such large games and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria we show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model although the beliefs converge to truth learning takes place too late ex ante welfare is strictly between that without observational learning and that with full information

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below

learning from trades i study stationary cut off strategy equilibria of a dynamic market model where buyers sample sellers sequentially from an unknown distribution buyers learn about the distribution from the sampled sellers and a trade signal the trade signal reveals whether a randomly chosen seller traded yesterday observing a trade as opposed to no trade is good news about the distribution buyers who observe a trade use a higher cut off than buyers who observe no trade despite buyers learning from sampled sellers that puts a countervailing pressure on the cut offs the trade signal may reduce market efficiency while an appropriate exogenous signal increases efficiency

is the market biased against risky r d this article analyzes the riskiness of the r d strategies chosen by firms engaged in a winner takes all patent race in contradiction to dasgupta and stiglitz 1980 we show that when the distribution of invention times is symmetric the market equilibrium cannot be safer and may be riskier than is socially optimal we identify the economic reason for the emergence but only if there are few competitors

supply chain coordination contracts with inventory level and retail price dependent demand abstract in this paper three unlike coordinating contracts namely i joint rebate contract ii wholesale price discount contract and iii cost sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under stock and price induced demand it is found analytically that the manufacturer s and the retailer s preferences among three contractual forms are not always aligned by applying bargaining theory it is established that stock elasticity plays an important role to select coordination contract and a threshold value stock elasticity is also determined below which cost sharing contract is not feasible it is also found that the retailer with higher bargaining power always prefers wholesale price discount contract among considered three contracts results are illustrated analytically as well as numerically