equitable representation in councils theory and an application to the united nations security council we analyze democratic equity in council voting games cvgs in a cvg a voting body containing all members delegates decision making to a time varying subset of its members as describes e g the relationship between the united nations general assembly and the united nations security council unsc we develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in cvgs at both the country and region levels and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation we apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the unsc and the claims of those who seek to reform it we find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21 3 times united kingdom and 3 8 times china from a country level perspective while from a region perspective eastern europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation and africa the most heavily underrepresented our equity measures do not preclude some unsc members from exercising veto rights however

financial dollarization short run determinants in transition economies this paper examines the determinants of financial dollarization in transition economies from a short run perspective using aggregate monthly data of deposit and loan dollarization we study the drivers of short term fluctuations in dollarization and test their importance at different levels of dollarization the results provide evidence that a the positive negative short run effects of depreciation monetary expansion on deposit dollarization are exacerbated in high dollarization countries b short run loan dollarization is mainly driven by banks matching of domestic loans and deposits currency matching of assets and liabilities international financial integration and institutional quality and c both types of short run dollarization are affected by interest rate differentials and deviations from desired dollarization

financial dollarization the role of foreign owned banks and interest rates abstract why in many economies households and firms borrow and make deposits in foreign currency expanding on the existing literature our framework addresses this question allowing for interest rate differentials and access to foreign funds to play a role in explaining this process of asset substitution or financial dollarization using a newly compiled data set on transition economies and employing a standard panel as well as a panel var methodology we find that increasing access to foreign funds leads to higher credit dollarization while it decreases deposit dollarization interest rate differentials matter for the dollarization of both loans and deposits

entry in greek manufacturing industry athens vs the rest of greece the paper reports an attempt to estimate the determinants of entry in greek manufacturing industry in the 1984 87 period and to identify the differences between locatio nal entry preferences entry in athens is found to be hesitant with respect to factors such as profitability and increased competition conversely entry in the rest of the country is strongly related to expected profits and safe markets negatively affected by relative labour costs and indifferent to international competition threats the healthier approach of regional entry is enhancing regional development prospects and partly justifies the strict regional policies of the 1980s

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

the mass political economy of capital controls this article examines mass public opinion toward international financial market regulations known as capital controls conventional wisdom maintains that most voters do not pay attention to or c

bargaining in bicameral legislatures when and why does malapportionment matter malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures it is widely argued confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures the theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak it is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed rule infinite horizon model of baron and ferejohn 1989 we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures two sets of results are derived first when bills originate in the house and the senate considers the bill under a closed rule the equilibrium expected payoffs of all house members are surprisingly equal second we show that small state biases can emerge when 1 there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber 2 the senate initiates bills which produces maldistributed proposal probabilities and 3 the distributive goods are lumpy we thank seminar participants at new york university the university of pennsylvania and the 2002 annual meeting of the american political science association for helpful comments james snyder and michael ting gratefully acknowledge the financial support of national science foundation grant ses 0079035 stephen ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the carnegie corporation under the carnegie scholars program this paper was written while michael ting was at the university of north carolina at chapel hill and he thanks the department of political science there for their support

predictability and power in legislative bargaining the rules and procedures of legislatures often provide legislators with information bearing on the identities of upcoming proposers for a broad class of legislative bargaining games we establish that markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer whenever the information structure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance this result holds regardless of the recognition process and even if players vary in patience and risk aversion it raises the possibility that procedures adopted in the interest of transparency may contribute to the imbalance of political power

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

the power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation in a distributive setting this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous it is found not surprisingly that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage what is surprising is the degree of this advantage we find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 for an majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members the voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process

early birds late risers and sleeping beauties bank credit growth to the private sector in central and eastern europe and in the balkans abstract following a period of privatization and restructuring commercial banks in central and eastern europe and more recently in the balkans have expanded rapidly their lending to the private sector this paper studies whether these developments are consistent with a process of convergence and structural financial deepening by estimating an equilibrium level of the bank credit to gdp ratio it concluded that while there is no clear evidence that the recent increases in bank credit ratios is inconsistent with financial deepening policy makers will have to evaluate carefully its implications for macroeconomic developments and financial stability

why do firms default on their foreign currency loans the case of hungary abstract i isolate the effect of the choice of foreign currency on the loan performance of firms borrowing in different currencies in crisis times i use a novel micro level dataset from hungary to decompose the factors contributing to the worse loan performance of foreign currency borrowers compared to local currency debtors i find that foreign currency denomination can worsen loan performance considerably while selection also contributes significantly to the default differences on the one hand per se less creditworthy firms borrowed in foreign currency and during the crisis the foreign currency shocks further weakened their loan performances on the other hand more creditworthy firms that were also well prepared for the currency risks also borrowed in foreign currency my results suggest that not the institution of foreign currency lending per se that should be blamed for the bad loan performance of foreign currency borrowers instead one should consider the characteristics of the borrowers

money in a theory of banking we introduce money in a model of banking in order to examine how open market operations can affect aggregate bank lending and output we see two important ways changes in money supply affect the banking system first by changing prices and interest rates it affects the wealth of demanders of real liquidity and thus the equilibrium production of liquid assets aggregate output and the health of the banking system second it changes the value of money as a means of payment and thus the attractiveness of moving from deposits to currency the demand for financial liquidity again this impacts the health of the banking system and thus bank lending and aggregate output we use this understanding to see how changes in money supply can create alleviate or be ineffective in banking crises

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

agglomeration and competitiveness from marshall to chinitz chinitz like marshall is better known as a seminal theorist of the urban supply side than for his useful insights on continental economic regeneration this paper draws on both themes in chinitz s work assuming that the us trade deficit is a fiscal outcome the question remains as to why some us industries flourish while others fail the literature since 1988 emphasises the role of urban industrial clusters in nurturing globally competitive industries but route 128 s fall suggests limits to this view the alternative theme is that continentality 1 provides a menu of economic cultures and 2 generates feedback to demature declining older regions enter europe s 1992 more generally world development in the 1990s is seen as being led by three continental systems including east asia and operating via the dance of continents and regions now the primal economic constructs

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

borrowing in foreign currency austrian households as carry traders household borrowing in a foreign currency is a widespread phenomenon in austria thirteen percent of austrian households report their housing loan to be denominated in foreign currency mostly swiss franc yet despite its importance peculiar character and acute policy concerns we know little about the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved in this type of carry trade we analyze a uniquely detailed financial wealth survey of 2556 austrian households to sketch a comprehensive profile of the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved we employ both univariate tests and multivariate multinomial logit models the survey data suggest that risk seeking affluent and married households are more likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency financially literate or high income households are more likely to take a housing loan in general these findings partially assuage policy concerns about household default risk on foreign currency housing loans or household retirement security

saving growth and investment a macroeconomic analysis using a panel of countries this paper provides a descriptive analysis of the long and short run correlations among saving investment and growth rates for 123 countries over the period 1961 94 three results are robust across data sets and estimation methods i lagges saving rates are positively related to investment rates ii investment rates granger cause growth rates with a negative sign iii growth rates granger cause investment with a positive sign

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

foreign banks and foreign currency lending in emerging europe based on survey data from 193 banks in 20 countries we provide the first bank level analysis of the relationship between bank ownership bank funding and foreign currency fx lending across emerging europe our results contradict the widespread view that foreign banks have been driving fx lending to retail clients as a result of easier access to foreign wholesale funding our cross sectional analysis shows that foreign banks do lend more in fx to corporate clients but not to households moreover we find no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on fx lending for either foreign or domestic banks panel estimations show that the foreign acquisition of a domestic bank does lead to faster growth in fx lending to households however this is driven by faster growth in household lending in general not by a shift towards fx lending

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

demand commitment in legislative bargaining morelli 1999 provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party morelli s main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power we provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff furthermore there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves

bank funding securitization and loan terms evidence from foreign currency lending we examine how bank funding structure and securitization activities affect the currency denomination of business loans we analyze a unique data set that includes information on the requested and granted loan currency for 99 490 loans granted to 57 464 firms by a bulgarian bank our findings document that foreign currency lending is at least partially driven by bank eagerness to match the currency structure of assets with that of liabilities our results also show that loan currency as well as loan amount and maturity are adjusted to make loans eligible for securitization

get rid of unanimity rule the superiority of majority rules with veto power we study unanimous decision making under incomplete information we argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent we show that majority rules with veto power are i pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and ii ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations

the determinants of attitudes towards strategic default on mortgages we use survey data to measure households propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them strategic default when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house the willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home equity shortfall our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non pecuniary factors such as views about fairness and morality we also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

euroization what factors drive its persistence household data evidence for croatia slovenia and slovakia the question asked in this article is why people continue to use foreign currencies even after their economies have stabilized survey data for croatia slovenia and slovakia are employed to provide an answer the results confirm the role of network effects and of remittances furthermore the extent of currency substitution is found to be positively associated with the level of income and education an important aspect of euroization seems to be age older people are more likely to hold foreign currencies in contrast neither expectations about inflation rates nor about exchange rates do seem to affect the degree of euroization in a systematic and predictable way trust in the banking system is found to affect the choice between foreign currency cash and foreign currency deposits overall the results support the view that the persistence in the use of foreign currencies is driven to a large extent by factors that are related to the past

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

coalitional bargaining games with random proposers theory and application abstract we consider a non cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference we characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core the model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient

voting and vetoing the consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory it is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee that is in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game nonveto players earn zero some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed specifically i study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players quantitative results are given for the case of the un security council

computation of equilibrium values in the baron and ferejohn bargaining model abstract computation of exact equilibrium values for n player divide the dollar legislative bargaining games as in baron and ferejohn 1989 with general quota voting rules recognition probabilities and discount factors can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations the approach recovers eraslan s 2002 uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations

long waves and uneven regional growth in recent years the phenomenon of uneven economic growth between different regions of the country has received increasing attention in the academic literature 16 17 20 27 the conventional explanation of uneven growth centers on disparities between regions in such things as unionization labor costs local taxes energy costs climate extent of local government regulation the availability of technology and access to markets the purpose of the present paper is to suggest that uneven regional development is a manifestation of regional long waves of economic growth and decline and that disparities between regions in such things as unionization labor costs and taxes are simply the result of different regions being at different phases of development in their respective long waves the essence of the view to be presented in the following pages is that regions experience long periods of sustained rapid economic growth followed by relatively lengthy periods of slow economic growth or economic decline the growth retardation stage of the long wave sets up the conditions for an eventual economic recovery and a return to a more rapid rate of growth the first section of the paper will be devoted to presenting the theoretical underpinnings of regional long waves supporting empirical evidence will be provided in the second section

dollarization of bank deposits causes and consequences abstract this paper assesses the benefits and risks associated with dollarization of bank deposits we provide novel empirical evidence on the determinants of deposit dollarization its role in promoting financial development and on whether dollarization is associated with financial instability we find that a the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross country variations in dollarization b dollarization is likely to promote financial deepening only in a high inflation environment and c financial instability is likely higher in dollarized economies the implications of these findings for financial sector and monetary policies are briefly discussed

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

households foreign currency borrowing in central and eastern europe abstract foreign currency loans represent an important feature of recent financial developments in ceecs this might pose a serious challenge for macroeconomic stability against this background we study the determinants of foreign currency loans of households using data on the behavior of households in nine ceecs our results reveal that foreign currency loans are driven by households lack of trust in the stability of the local currency and in domestic financial institutions moreover special factors including remittances and expectations of euro adoption play an important role in selected regions the financial crisis reduced foreign currency borrowing but there is some indication this effect might be only temporary

the euroization of bank deposits in eastern europe in central eastern and southeastern europe a substantial share of bank deposits are denominated in foreign currency deposit euroization poses key challenges for monetary policy and financial sector supervision on the one hand it limits the effectiveness of monetary policy interventions on the other hand it increases financial sector fragility by exposing banks to currency risk or currency induced credit risk policymakers disagree on whether countries in the region should tackle deposit euroization with dedollarization policies or should rather strive to adopt the euro as their legal tender assessing the potential effectiveness of dedollarization policies requires a clear understanding of which households hold foreign currency deposits and why they do so on the basis of survey data covering 16 375 households in ten countries in 2011 and 2012 we provide a comprehensive household level analysis of deposit euroization in central eastern and southeastern europe we examine how households preferences for and holding of foreign currency deposits are related to individual expectations about monetary conditions and network effects we also examine to what extent monetary expectations and deposit euroization are the legacy of past financial crises or the outflow of current policies and institutions in the region our findings suggest that deposit euroization in central eastern and southeastern europe can be partly tackled by prudent monetary and economic decisions by today s policymakers the preferences of households for euro deposits are partly driven by their distrust in the stability of their domestic currency which in turn is related to their assessment of current policies and institutions however our findings also suggest that a stable monetary policy may not be sufficient to deal with the hysteresis of deposit euroization across the region first we confirm that the holding of foreign currency deposits has become a habit in the region second we find that deposit euroization is still strongly influenced by households experiences of financial crises in the 1990s our findings question the effectiveness of supply side interventions e g bank regulation or demand side interventions e g local currency capital market development in de euroizing household savings first we show that deposit euroization is largely demand driven second we show that households already have access to a broad range of savings products in local currency

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

foreign currency denominated debt an empirical examination we examine the determinants of debt issuance in 10 major currencies by large u s firms using the fraction of foreign subsidiaries and tests exploiting the disaggregated nature of our data we find strong evidence that firms issue foreign currency debt to hedge their exposure both at the aggregate and the individual currency levels we also find some evidence that firms choose currencies in which information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors is low we find no evidence that tax arbitrage liquidity of underlying debt markets or legal regimes influence the decision to issue debt in foreign currency

what drives credit dollarization in transition economies abstract this paper provides an in depth analysis of the use of foreign currencies in the lending activities of banks in transition economies the impact of bank and firm variables on credit dollarization is studied in an optimal portfolio allocation model and estimated using new aggregate data for 21 transition economies for the period 1990 2003 empirical results provide evidence that credit dollarization is the combined outcome of domestic deposit dollarization and banks desire for currency matched portfolios beyond regulatory requirements the effects of international financial factors and natural hedges are less robust across alternative specifications the paper further discusses the role of regulations in affecting the impact of these factors on credit dollarization and calls for more developed domestic forward foreign exchange markets

deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment abstract bilateral sequential negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal and if the common discount factor is close enough to one journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c78 j52

the impact of planning on local business rents despite the pervasiveness of planning intervention in the land and property market the economic effects of the planning system have been little researched while there is a growing body of work addressing this issue in the housing sector similar work considering the business sector is marked only by its absence the paper describes the first substantive attempt to explore this subject area through an analysis of the impact of planning on business rents a full structural model of a local property market was developed it incorporates the planning regime as a key element of the system and it allows for the interaction between property market use sectors the model formed the basis for the creation of a simplified five equation system that could be operationalised within extant data constraints upon application a local effect of planning was identified that was consistent with theory as planning regimes become tighter the local supply of space decreases this has a negative effect on local economic ac

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

why bank credit policies fluctuate a theory and some evidence in a rational profit maximizing world banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit this paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions this leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies evidence from the banking crisis in new england in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory

some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic abstract it is commonly believed that voting rules that are relatively more inclusive e g unanimity or supermajority are likely to yield relatively more equitable outcomes than simple majority rule we show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments we study a multilateral bargaining model a la baron and ferejohn 1989 where players are heterogeneous with respect to the potential surplus they bring to the bargaining table we show that unanimity rule may generate equilibrium outcomes that are more unequal or less equitable than under majority rule in fact as players become relatively more patient we show that the more inclusive the voting rule the less equitable the equilibrium allocations

order independent equilibria we study a noncooperative game of coalition formation based on an underlying game in coalitional form we introduce order independent equilibria oie a strategy profile is an oie if for any specification of first movers in the sequential game it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff our results are 1 payoffs in oie that use pure stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form 2 if the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then for each payoff vector there exists an oie with the same payoff journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71 c72 c78

foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture abstract this paper discusses some problems posed by foreign currency debt for emerging economies in the context of the ongoing debate on the reform of the global financial architecture we present a model in which the currency composition of corporate debt is endogenous and discuss the optimality of measures aimed at coping with the risks posed by foreign currency debt while removing these risks is not necessarily efficient in the presence of moral hazard some forms of public intervention such as a tax on foreign currency debt or international bailouts may be optimal