education variation in earnings and nonmonetary compensation the nas nrc twin offspring data support the proposition that for those with low levels of education earnings may be an adequate proxy for compensation whereas the opposite holds for highly educated individuals the inclusion of variables that control for reasons monetary or nonmonetary individuals chose their occupation explains an additional 9 percent of the variation in earnings for those with 16 or more years of education and lowers the male female wage gap by almost 40 percent and only an additional 2 percent for those with 15 years or less no affect on male female wage gap

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

a search theoretic approach to monetary economics the essential function of money is its role as a medium of exchange the authors formalize this idea using a search theoretic equilibrium model of the exchange process that captures the double coincidence of wants problem with pure barter one advantage of the framework described here is that it is very tractable the authors also show that the model can be used to addre ss some substantive issues in monetary economics including the potenti al welfare enhancing role of money the interaction between specializat ion and monetary exchange and the possibility of equilibria with multip le fiat currencies copyright 1993 by american economic association

the evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining this paper considers equilibrium in transaction mechanisms in an environment with homogeneous buyers and sellers which eliminates the advantage auctions possess of matching buyers and sellers both auctions and bargaining are equilibria however only auctions are evolutionarily stable this identifies a new advantage of auctions over bargaining arising from the division of the gains from trade journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c73 d44

the welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper extends the work of ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor importing country in a two country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility we derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax with capital mobility foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

optimal immigration education and growth in the long run abstract the paper extends manning s model on education and balanced growth to include labour immigration each immigration unit is assumed to consist of one skilled worker and some unskilled members the optimal immigration policy which maximizes the per capita steady state consumption of the host country is derived we show that optimal immigration policy can reduce the steady state skilled labour ratio more interesting still contrary to the widespread belief that immigration of skilled workers hurts local skilled workers it is the unskilled local workers whose interests are threatened by optimal immigration policy

skills and the pattern of migration the role of qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility this paper develops a two country model of international migration in an attempt to study the role of both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility individuals are distinguished in terms of their ability and age enabling the model to examine factors which influence the age and skill profile of those who migrate as well as the equilibrium flow of migrants and the pattern of factor rewards in the two economies effects of changes in certain parameters of the model are related to the nature of the immigration policy enforced by the host country the role of emigration restrictions is also considered excerpt

a general equilibrium model of guest worker migration the source country perspective abstract this paper examines the problem of guest worker migration from an economy populated by identical utility maximizing individuals with finite working lives the decision to migrate the rate of saving while abroad as well as the length of a migrant s stay in the foreign country are all viewed as part of a solution to an intertemporal optimization problem in addition to studying the microeconomic aspects of temporary migration the paper analyses the determinants of the equilibrium flow of migrants the corresponding domestic wage and the level of welfare enjoyed by a typical worker effects of an emigration tax are also investigated

return migration human capital accumulation and the brain drain in this paper we present a model that explains migrations as decisions that respond to where human capital can be acquired more efficiently and where the return to human capital is highest the basic framework is a dynamic roy model in which a worker possesses two distinct skills that can be augmented by learning by doing there are different implicit price in different countries and different rates of skill accumulation our analysis contributes to the literature on the selection of immigrants and return migrants by offering a richer framework that may help to accommodate selections of emigrants and return migrants that are not immediately compatible with the one dimensional skill model our analysis has also implications for the debate on brain drain and brain gain in the two skills model presented here return migration can lead to a mitigation of the brain drain or even the creation of a brain gain where those who return bring the home country augmented local skills

the economic effects of immigration a dynamic analysis abstract this paper examines the economic effects of immigration using a neo classical growth model with overlapping dynasties we demonstrate that in contrast to the predictions of the static models often used in the analysis of immigration in a dynamic model with endogenous capital accumulation shifts in factor prices that result from changes in immigration policy will be very modest consequently benefits to natives from immigration are much smaller than previous studies have found and smaller still if labor supply is elastic on the other hand the adverse effects on wages are much smaller as well implying that in a model with only two inputs immigration plays a much smaller role in redistribution from labor to capital than previously thought

illegal aliens unemployment and immigration policy abstract this paper develops a simple two country model of illegal immigration in an attempt to examine the interaction among variables such as the stock of migrant labor the unemployment rates of the two economies and the rate of spending by the host country on the enforcement of its immigration restrictions the focus of the analysis is on the dynamics of immigration policy and on its role in determining the nature of the mechanism by which disturbances to the labor market of one country are transmitted to that of the other in the short run and in the long run

a model of the skill composition of us immigration a human capital model is specified to explain the skill composition of us immigration a unique set of panel data 57 source countries and 15 annual observations and a methodology not previously used to study a demographic phenomenon are employed to estimate the model coefficients on time invariant variables are recovered by means of the hausman taylor instrumental variable procedure which yields considerably different results than the generalized least squares model

the economics of the to and fro migrant some welfare theoretical considerations the effects of international to and fro migration on the economic welfare of the migrants and the nonmigrants in the host and home countries are examined a to and fro migrant is defined as a worker who changes residence from origin to destination without any systematic tendency to remain in any of the two permanently the study is based on the theoretical framework developed by krauss the results indicate that to and fro emigration from a source country to a recipient country increases the economic welfare of the migrants and the nonmigrants residing in the host country but it tends to decrease the welfare of the nonmigrants residing in the source country in general the migration also tends to be pareto optimal from a world point of view excerpt

scale returns of a random matching model abstract this note considers a random matching model in which the meeting probabilities can be derived from the basics of the model we determine conditions for the matching technology to exhibit decreasing constant and increasing returns to scale

efficient migration and redistribution abstract it has often been noted that the brain drain may be abetted by highly progressive tax systems in the regions which are likely sources for emigration by those with the most income earning potential this paper presents the case in favour of such policies the underlying assumption here is that there are productivity differences between regions and that emigration of the most skilled workers from less productive regions increases the overall value of national output the problem lies in sharing these gains with the less skilled workers left behind in the low productivity region if national governments can transfer income among regions but if the transfers cannot be targeted to particular individuals then there is a trade off between equity and efficiency generous transfers redistribute the gains but tend to impede efficient migration since prospective migrants will only emigrate if their earnings net of all fiscal transfers and net of migration costs are higher in the destination region greater tax progressivity in the source region helps relax a constraint and make the trade off less difficult

migration of skilled workers policy interaction between host and source countries abstract we examine the interaction between policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of skilled worker migration the host country aims to provide low cost labor for its employers while also taking into consideration the fiscal burden of providing social services to immigrants it optimizes by setting a time limit on the duration of a guest worker s permit the source country maximizes its net output by optimally choosing the amount of training provided to its citizens some of whom may migrate we solve for the nash and cooperative equilibrium values of the policy instruments

where to go workers reasons to quit and intra vs interindustry job mobility we show that workers reasons for quitting their job affect their decision to stay in or leave their industry using survey data among public sector employees in the netherlands workers quitting for e g pay work pressure or job duties move relatively often to another industry in contrast to workers quitting for commuting time or the atmosphere at work this suggests that workers use their experience in the initial job to update their expectations on other jobs in the industry as the first set of job aspects is more likely to be related among jobs within an industry than the latter furthermore it is shown that workers reasons to quit fully explain the differences in wage growth between intra and interindustry job movers lastly we find that workers who quit for pay or management often leave the public sector altogether the data used in this article are proprietary

dynamic markets with competitive bidding the model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices are determined in first price auctions it combines competition over time familiar from the pairwise meeting models with instantaneous bidding competition it inquires how different properties of the model determine the relative importance of these two aspects of the competition and in particular how the non market clearing price result of the matching and bargaining models is affected by the

an assessment of the human capital content of international migrants an application to us immigration mcdowell j m and singell l d jr 1993 an assessment of the human capital content of international migrants an application to us immigration reg studies 27 351 363 numerous studies have examined the flow of international migrants generally these studies measure the extent or magnitude of international migration by use of a simple numerical count this paper extends this analysis by providing a methodology for adding an economic dimension to the measure of the magnitude of international migration an earnings equation approach is used to attach an economic value to immigration applying our methodology to us immigration we find considerable variation across source regions in the value of immigrants moreover we find that simply comparing initial earnings without controlling for differences in the characteristics and migration patterns of immigrants from the various source regions can misrepresent the relative earnings potential or value of migrants mcdowell j m et singell l d jr 1993 un

international trade and labor migration a theory of the relationship between international trade and labor mobility is developed that takes into account five characteristics of such migration including its temporary nature differences between migrant and native labor the acceptance of unpredictable conditions of employment by migrant labor the ready availability of further labor resources and international capital mobility particular attention is paid to the role of international labor migration in helping to insulate native populations from the rigors of industrial fluctuations and in helping to preserve import competing industries that would have succumbed without the availability of cheap imported labor

buyers and sellers should i stay or should i go this paper explores some aspects of the exchange process that should be of interest to economists who use search theory and especially to those who use search as a foundation for monetary economics we are mainly concerned with a question that seems basic but has not been analyzed previously is there some way to determine endogenously which agents are willing to invest resources in the process of active search for trading partners and which agents prefer to wait passively for trading partners to come to them in particular given a group of buyers with money and a group of sellers with goods is there any reason to expect that buyers will search for sellers rather than the other way around one obvious factor is the relative cost of transporting goods and money but we are interested in examining whether there is anything about the process of monetary exchange per se and not merely exogenous search costs that makes buyers more willing than sellers to bear the costs of seeking out trading partners we investigate this within a generalized version of the search theoretic model of fiat money in kiyotaki and wright 1991 1993 we find that there may exist equilibria in which buyers search while sellers do not even if the search cost is greater for the former however there can also exist other equilibria with different properties perhaps the key finding is that the situation is not symmetric factors that determine whether to search are fundamentally different for buyers and sellers one property of an equilibrium in which only buyers search is that money appears on one side of every transaction because if sellers do not search they do not meet and cannot barter this is consistent robert w clower s 1967 observation that money buys goods and goods buy money but goods do not buy goods although here it is derived endogenously rather than assumed some search based monetary models simply rule out barter including peter a diamond 1984 douglas m gale 1986 diamond and joel yellin 1990 alessandra casella and johnathon s feinstein 1990 kiminori matsuyama et al 1993 victor e li 1995 and alberto trejos and wright 1995 it is difficult to motivate this absence of barter in these papers in a model that is similar to the one used here except search is costless s rao aiyagari and neil wallace 1992 prove that all equilibria involve some barter a contribution of this paper is to show that barter may disappear once the decision to search is endogenized

an economic model of the brain drain asymmetric information in the labor market is discussed as a major cause of the exodus of foreign trained students from developing countries the authors suggest that employers in the country in which the students have been trained have a more accurate judgment of the true productivity of students than have employers in the students native country an illustrative numerical model is developed and its implications are analyzed annotation

tax policy in the presence of emigration recent policy and theoretical discussions of the effects of highly skilled migration from the underdeveloped countries the so called brain drain have focused on a proposal bhagwati 1972 to levy a supplementary income tax on those who migrate the proceeds of such a tax to be transmitted to the developing country of origin or to developing countries en bloc for developmental spending the welfare implications of such a tax were analyzed in an earlier paper of ours bhagwati and hamada 1974 in the context of a model of the country of emigration characterized by sticky wages and harrisstodaro 1971 type of unemployment in subsequent papers the tax has been analyzed also in the context of modified models still incorporating the unemployment phenomena by rodriguez 1975 and mcculloch yellen 1975 2 essentially these models analyze the impact of the income tax on emigrants incomes as arising primarily through the reduced differential