do greens drive hummers or hybrids environmental ideology as a determinant of consumer choice this paper uses several california data sets to test for differences in consumption patterns between greens and browns a person s environmentalism is rarely observed in consumer data sets in california a community s share of green party registered voters is a viable proxy for community environmentalism environmentalists are more likely to commute by public transit purchase hybrid vehicles and consume less gasoline than non environmentalists

are policy incentives for solar power effective evidence from residential installations in the northeast abstract state incentives for solar power have grown significantly in the past several years this paper examines the effectiveness of policy incentives to increase residential solar photovoltaic pv capacity we use county level panel data and control for demographic characteristics solar resources and pro environmental preferences results show that among financial incentives rebates have the most impact with an additional 1 per watt rebate increasing annual pv capacity additions by close to 50 factors that affect financial returns to solar pv such as electricity price and solar insolation are also found to be significant results also point to a significant positive relationship between hybrid vehicle sales and residential pv capacity growth indicating the importance of pro environmental preferences as a predictor of solar pv demand back of the envelope calculations suggest that the cost of carbon mitigation through rebates is around 184 per ton of co2

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

dynamic limit pricing i study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one sided incomplete information i characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing for some parameter constellations the unique equilibrium surviving a d1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices for others there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then possibly separate separation involves setting prices such that the inefficient incumbent s profits from mimicking are negative as the horizon increases or as firms become more patient limit pricing becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in equilibrium

bargaining over reform abstract this paper models the delay in a macroeconomic stabilization as the outcome of a bargaining game between two parties who must reach an agreement over how the stabilization cost is to be shared the paper modifies alesina and drazen s 1991 american economic review 81 1170 1189 war of attrition model by endogenizing the distribution of the stabilization costs through a bargaining game using this bargaining framework the paper analyzes the role of crises and foreign assistance in bringing about a settlement to the distributional conflict in the bargaining game a crisis that increases the welfare loss from not stabilizing the economy will lower the probability of delay in contrast foreign aid that is used to reduce the stabilization costs will further increase the delay in reaching an agreement between the two parties

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

information disclosure policies evidence from the electricity industry i introduction developed nations environmental policies have evolved substantially in the past several decades early pollution control programs involved command and control approaches policies then frequently included pollution charges tradable permits and other market based instruments most recently a third wave of environmental policy has emerged that emphasizes information provision as an integral part of the risk mitigation strategy here government regulation is replaced or augmented by publicly provided information presumed to assist more cost effective private market and legal forces common examples include the toxics release inventory lead paint disclosures drinking water quality notices and eco labels the empirical effects of such programs however remain largely undetermined this paper examines the impact of a prominent mandatory disclosure program on the fuel mix percentages of large electric utility corporations the prominence of mandatory information policies is not restricted to environmental arenas for example developed countries equity markets generally require firm level financial information provision in many countries agricultural goods require country of origin and other health labels domestic colleges and universities are required by law to inform current and prospective students of crime statistics equity data and performance metrics even significant medical errors must now be disclosed to the community there are several potential advantages of information provision policies and theory suggests that disclosure programs may effectively achieve their goals healy and palepu 2001 provided a survey of the evidence in capital markets brouhle and khanna 2007 demonstrated that information provision can improve product quality in the environmental area kennedy laplante and maxwell 1994 arora and gangopadhyay 1995 maxwell lyon and hackett 2000 kirchhoff 2000 and khanna 2001 showed that the provision of information about pollution may correct a market failure improve performance and enhance welfare despite the literature s theoretical findings the empirical effects of disclosure programs remain inconclusive early studies of securities regulation found mixed results see stigler 1964 robbins and werner 1964 and benston 1973 a more recent literature suggested that disclosure programs in financial markets can achieve their desired effects la porta and lopez de silanes 2006 and greenstone oyer and vissing jorensen 2006 found that both market size and market returns were positively influenced by mandatory disclosure programs in product quality settings chipty and witte 1998 established that resource and referral agencies significantly influenced childcare prices but had no impact on the quality of care in contrast jin and leslie 2003 found that mandatory hygiene grade cards positively affected restaurant quality and health outcomes studies of environmental performance yielded similarly mixed results desvousges smith and rink 1992 found that information based programs influenced attitudes favorable to radon testing but testing itself only increased when mass media dissemination was coupled with community based implementation programs konar and cohen 1997 and khanna quimio and bojilova 1998 found that stock movements associated with toxics release inventory tri announcements led to increased abatement and reduced emissions however bui 2005 found that the declines in emissions after tri reporting events may have been attributable to regulation rather than investor pressure bennear and olmstead 2006 found that drinking water quality notices lowered violations for some systems but not others this paper is the first empirical economic study of the impacts of mandatory information provision in the electric utility industry the disclosure programs considered here differ significantly from the tri information programs examined previously

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

conflict and the social contract we consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other s fighting potential applications include international conflict litigation and elections even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources if this loss is small enough then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict we show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other

signalling in a dynamic labour market this paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the spence job market signalling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time the dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria including ones that sustain implicit collusion even though the length of the game is finite emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the independence of never weak best response criterion of kohlberg and mertens 1986 it is shown that in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero any such equilibrium results in expectation in the unique stable outcome of the static spence model

peer effects in the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels social interaction peer effects are recognized as a potentially important factor in the diffusion of new products in the case of environmentally friendly goods or technologies both marketers and policy makers are interested in the presence of causal peer effects as social spillovers can be used to expedite adoption we provide a methodology for the simple straightforward identification of peer effects with sufficiently rich data avoiding the biases that occur with traditional fixed effects estimation when using the past installed base of consumers in the reference group we study the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels in california and find that at the average number of owner occupied homes in a zip code an additional installation increases the probability of an adoption in the zip code by 0 78 percentage points our results provide valuable guidance to marketers designing strategies to increase referrals and reduce customer acquisition costs they also provide insights into the diffusion process of environmentally friendly technologies

a model of negotiated transfer pricing abstract a large majority of firms employ negotiated transfer pricing yet this method of decentralization remains largely unexplored this study develops a model of negotiated transfer pricing incorporating private divisional information as this is the setting where decentralization is most compelling the firm designs a compensation system utilizing divisional performance evaluation and negotiated transfer pricing a dynamic bargaining model is employed to capture managerial negotiations the study demonstrates that the firm can design managerial compensation schemes and bargaining infrastructures so that the negotiated transfer pricing structure allows it to reach the upper bound on available profits

bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers this paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model incorporating five features two sided incomplete information with potentially information revealing strategies an infinite horizon uncertainty concerning the potential gains from trade an illumination of interesting qualitative bargaining issues and plausible free from arbitrarily specified out of equilibrium conjectures equilibria these features motivated in the paper have powerful implications a nash equilibrium exists and is generically both unique and sequential comparative static implications of variations in the game s specifications are developed we find that natural indications of bargaining strength emerge from the model and establish the intuitive result that an increase in a player s relative bargaining strength makes that player more likely to capture the gains from bargaining

evolving market structure an ace model of price dispersion and loyalty we present an agent based computational economics ace model of the wholesale sh market in marseille two of the stylized facts of that market are high loyalty of buyers to sellers and persistent price dispersion although it is every day the same population of sellers and buyers that meets in the same market hall in our ace model sellers decide on quantities to supply prices to ask and how to treat loyal customers while buyers decide which sellers to visit and which prices to accept learning takes place through reinforcement the model explains both stylized facts price dispersion and high loyalty in a coevolutionary process buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to o er higher utility to loyal buyers while these sellers in turn learn to o er higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to realize higher gross revenues from loyal buyers the model also explains the e ect of heterogeneity of the buyers we analyze how this leads to subtle di erences in the shopping patterns of the di erent types of buyers and how this is

understanding the reductions in us corn ethanol production costs an experience curve approach the us is currently the world s largest ethanol producer an increasing percentage is used as transportation fuel but debates continue on its costs competitiveness and energy balance in this study technological development of ethanol production and resulting cost reductions are investigated by using the experience curve approach scrutinizing costs of dry grind ethanol production over the timeframe 1980 2005 cost reductions are differentiated between feedstock corn production and industrial ethanol processing corn production costs in the us have declined by 62 over 30 years down to 100 2005 tonne in 2005 while corn production volumes almost doubled since 1975 a progress ratio pr of 0 55 is calculated indicating a 45 cost decline over each doubling in cumulative production higher corn yields and increasing farm sizes are the most important drivers behind this cost decline industrial processing costs of ethanol have declined by 45 since 1983 to below 130 2005 m3 in 2005 excluding costs for corn and capital equivalent to a pr of 0 87 total ethanol production costs including capital and net corn costs have declined approximately 60 from 800 2005 m3 in the early 1980s to 300 2005 m3 in 2005 higher ethanol yields lower energy use and the replacement of beverage alcohol based production technologies have mostly contributed to this substantial cost decline in addition the average size of dry grind ethanol plants increased by 235 since 1990 for the future it is estimated that solely due to technological learning production costs of ethanol may decline 28 44 though this excludes effects of the current rising corn and fossil fuel costs it is also concluded that experience curves are a valuable tool to describe both past and potential future cost reductions in us corn based ethanol production

consumers willingness to pay for the color of salmon a choice experiment with real economic incentives in most retail markets sellers post the price and consumers choose which products to buy we designed an experimental market with posted prices to investigate consumers willingness to pay for the color of salmon salmon fillets varying in color and price were displayed in twenty choice scenarios in each scenario the participants chose which of two salmon fillets they wanted to buy to induce real economic incentives each participant drew one binding scenario the participants then had to buy the salmon fillet they had chosen in their binding scenario the choice data were analyzed with a mixed logit model

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

bargaining and the right to remain silent this paper analyzes a class of alternating offer bargaining games with one sided incomplete information for the case of no gap if sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity monotonicity pure strategies and no free screening we establish the silence theorem when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating offer bargaining games a class of parametric examples suggests that the time interval required to assure silence is not especially brief as a byproduct of the analysis we also prove under the same set of assumptions a uniform version of the coase conjecture when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the initial serious offer by either party in an alternating offer bargaining game must be less than e times the highest possible buyer valuation for an entire family of distribution functions

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

the role of commitment in bilateral trade abstract this paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers as discounting vanishes the seller of a good is informed of its quality which affects both his cost and the buyer s valuation but the buyer is not to characterize this payoff set we derive an upper bound using mechanism design with limited commitment we then prove that this upper bound is tight by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment in bargaining in particular they imply that the buyer s inability to commit before observing the terms of trade is what precludes efficiency

endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game we investigate an infinite horizon two person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs the game takes the form of a concession game in each period each player chooses to give in or hold out the game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates for any discount factor if the players priors about each other s type are sufficiently asymmetric there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in their willingness to give in

uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining we study a one sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer s valuation we show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes in particular second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers we show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay when the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer s value then delay not only can occur but it must occur for a class of equilibria however in all other cases delay will never occur

solar pv where the sun doesn t shine estimating the economic impacts of support schemes for residential pv with detailed net demand profiling abstract countries with low irradiation and solar pv adoption rates are increasingly considering policy support for solar pv although consumer electricity demand and solar generation profiles are often mismatched this paper presents a methodology for policymakers in such conditions to examine more precisely the financial performance of residential solar pv from the consumer perspective as part of an ex ante policy assessment we model a range of prospective policy scenarios and compare policy mechanisms that compensate homeowners for generation those that reduce their upfront costs and those that assist with financing using ireland as a case study the results confirm the intuitive notion that more generous financial remuneration schemes provide quicker payback however we observe that in low irradiance regions there is little difference between upfront grants and feed in tariffs to accelerate payback timeframes we also show the importance of retail tariff structure in consumer payback for solar pv systems with one part tariffs generating shorter paybacks than two part tariff structures although the latter is more likely to secure revenue for electricity infrastructure investment drawing from this analysis the paper proposes some options for the design of policy supports and tariff structures to deliver a sustainable residential renewable electricity system in low irradiance regions

carbon geography the political economy of congressional support for legislation intended to mitigate greenhouse gas production over the last 5 years the u s congress has voted on several pieces of legislation intended to sharply reduce the nation s greenhouse gas emissions given that climate change is a world public bad standard economic logic would predict that the united states would free ride and wait for other nations to reduce their emissions within the congress there are clear patterns to who votes in favor of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions this paper presents a political economy analysis of the determinants of pro green votes on such legislation conservatives consistently vote against such legislation controlling for a representative s ideology representatives from richer districts and districts with a lower per capita carbon dioxide footprint are more likely to vote in favor of climate change mitigation legislation representatives from districts where industrial emissions represent a larger share of greenhouse gas emissions are more likely to vote no jel q54 q58 r50

strategic delay in bargaining with two sided uncertainty the role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite horizon alternating offer model of bargaining a buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly an equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer a bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and hence makes concessions earlier on trade occurs whever gains from trade exist but due to the private information only after costly delay panmunjom korea upi the american general and the north korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut maj gen james b knapp negotiator for the united nations command unc was waiting for maj gen ri choonsun of the democratic people s republic of north korea to propose a recess they sat there arms folded for 42 hours not a word finally gen ri got up walked out and drove away evening bulletin philadelphia 11 april 1969

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

price formation on the marseille fish market evidence from a network analysis abstract the empirical analysis of fish markets always reveals strong price dispersion for homogeneous or very similar goods the problem is how to explain this price dispersion on a market where there is no evident arbitrage explanations proposed by different authors include differences in organization the characteristics of the good and the influences of social interactions between buyers and sellers in line with the last of these three approaches we consider the fish market of marseille as a seller seller network we start by examining the influence of market interactions through a static and then a dynamic econometric model we then analyze the role of the seller s position in the network we bring to light a surprising paradox in that the sellers who share the most buyers with competitors i e the most central sellers charge the highest prices

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

durable goods monopoly with incomplete information this article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist s marginal cost is private information we show that the coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem in any equilibrium in which the lowest cost seller s initial offer approaches her marginal cost the aggregate probability of trade must vanish however we also construct non coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model these stationary equilibria are comparatively efficient the results are equally applicable to the mathematically equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers what are the consequences of monopoly in a market for a durable good present day understanding of this question divides into two strands of thought first the monopolist may effectively lack any ability to credibly precommit on her future output under this scenario the price will drop almost instantaneously to marginal cost apparently yielding the efficient outcome normally associated with perfect competition 1 second the monopolist may possess an explicit e g leasing the good rather than selling2 or implicit e g the maintenance of reputation3 device enabling her to adhere to an output restriction under such circumstances price will be maintained at a non competitively high level suggesting an outcome fraught with all the inefficiency of classical monopoly the conclusions of the first paragraph rest on analysis of a standard model in which the monopolist s payoff function is taken to be common knowledge a single firm with known constant marginal cost sells an infinitely durable good to consumers with a known distribution of valuations for the good 4 the firm has the ability to revise its posted price

the inverse almost ideal demand system abstract a new demand system related to the almost ideal demand system aids of deaton and muellbauer is developed and illustrated this inverse aids iaids retains all of the desirable theoretical properties of the aids model with the exception of consistent aggregation an empirical issue is whether a linear approximation will work as well for the iaids as it has for the aids model since quantities are not as highly correlated as prices an application to u s meat demand demonstrates that the linear approximation of the iaids is excellent which enhanced the ease and range of application

alternating offer bargaining with two sided incomplete information i study alternating offer bargaining games with two sided incomplete information about the players discount rates for both perfect bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability style notion i characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game i also construct bounds on agreements that may be made the set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models my main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players discount rates is of wide support yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution i prove a lopsided convergence result each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type

toward a more complete model of individual transferable fishing quotas implications of incorporating the processing sector abstract economic analyses of individual transferable quota itq fisheries management traditionally have focused on the harvesting sector however harvester decisions impact the economic performance of co dependent processing firms this paper incorporates both sectors in an analysis of the effect of itqs on commercial fisheries results show that as a consequence of season elongation under a harvester only allocation of fishing rights capital nonmalleability implies that processor quasi rents will be redistributed to harvesters these losses could promote political gridlock and jeopardize adoption of an itq policy unless they are fully compensated or unless redistribution is avoided by a policy superior initial allocation of rights to both harvesters and processors

contract design and non cooperative renegotiation abstract we study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements in particular we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if having observed the agent s contract choice the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place an outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent types which is more pessimistic in the sense of the likelihood ratio order than the prior furthermore the outcome function cannot be too sensitive to variations in the agent s type we show that the direct revelation mechanism which implements such a function when renegotiation can be prevented will also implement it in any equilibrium when it cannot so the standard contract is robust to renegotiation

delay in trade networks we study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen we do this by analyzing a noncooperative networked bargaining game we assume a complete information setup wherein all the agents know the structure of the network the values of the consumers and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consumers trade with middlemen in such a setting we show that sunk cost problems and a heterogeneous network can give rise to delay or failure in negotiation and therefore reduce the total trade capacity of the network in the limiting regime of extremely patient agents we provide a sharp characterization of the trade pattern and the segmentation of these markets

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

efficient allocation with continuous quantities abstract the inefficiency of allocation mechanisms in the presence of bilateral asymmetric information is reconsidered in an environment with continuous quantities the result of myerson and satterthwaite is proved in this environment under the condition that zero trade is efficient if the highest cost seller or the lowest value buyer appears in addition if this condition fails there may exist mechanisms implementing efficient allocations the problem of hidden endowments is considered where any agent may be either a buyer or seller depending on the realization of the privately observed information in this environment it is often possible to arrange efficient trades ex ante asymmetries rather than interim asymmetries tend to prevent efficient allocations

bargaining structure and strike activity in this paper the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and strike activity in particular they focus on the implications of the fact that the amount of information revealed by a union s actions depends on the bargaining environment in which it operates the authors demonstrate that a union representing workers of more than one firm will face a greater incentive to reject offers than an independent union this implies that a merger of two unions or the formation of bargaining coalitions will lead to a greater level of strike activity

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

price formation of fish an application of an inverse demand system inverse demand systems explain price variations as functions of quantity variations they have properties analogous to those of regular demand systems there are very few examples of their empirical application in part this is due to lack of data for which price is the decision variable and the quantity given the case of fish landed at belgian sea ports appears to suit an inverse demand system well a rotterdam variant of such a system in estimated allais interaction intensities have been derived and show a reasonable pattern

understanding the solar home price premium electricity generation and green social status this study uses a large sample of homes in the san diego area and sacramento california area to provide some of the first capitalization estimates of the sales value of homes with solar panels relative to comparable homes without solar panels although the residential solar home market continues to grow there is little direct evidence on the market capitalization effect using both hedonics and a repeat sales index approach we find that solar panels are capitalized at roughly a 3 5 premium this premium is larger in communities with a greater share of college graduates and of registered prius hybrid vehicles

the demand for salmon in france the effects of marketing and structural change two aspects of change in the market for salmon in france during the 1980s are the subject of econometric analysis first an hypothesis that a change in the distribution pattern for salmon with a larger share of the product traded further down the distribution channel has lead to more elastic demand is tested via demand analysis second the effects of advertising in expanding the salmon market is tested

a theory of bargaining deadlock abstract i study a dynamic one sided offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information the seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not during bargaining the seller may receive an outside option the value of which depends on the quality of the product if the outside option is sufficiently important there is an equilibrium in which the buyer s belief about the product s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process as a result the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution the equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem under stronger parametric assumptions the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer s belief

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

information on sellers and buyers characteristics added value to explain price formation at primary fish markets in managed french scallop fisheries the aim of this article is to explore through a hedonic approach the factors that might explain the price variability for the french managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets in addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation the characteristics of operators are tested the relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers and market assiduity are notably considered

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

state distributed pv policies can low cost to government policies have a market impact this analysis examines the use of state policy as a tool to support the development of distributed generation photovoltaic pv markets the focus is on low cost market opening policies instead of various forms of government subsidies aimed at reducing installation costs the ideas tested in this work are 1 low cost market opening policies can be effective in facilitating pv market growth without subsidizing projects and 2 policies can be made more effective if states and localities stage their enactment in a particular order the policies selected for evaluation emerge from a policy stacking theory outlined in doris 2012 nrel cp 7a30 54801 golden co national renewable energy laboratory a cross section econometric analysis that takes into account the quality of interconnection standards net metering standards renewable portfolio standards rps rps set asides and a non policy determinant population explains about 70 of the variation in newly installed pv capacity across states and indicates that all of the selected policies are significant nonparametric statistical tests confirm the regression results qualitative evidence is also presented indicating that effective policy ordering starts with improving interconnection standards closely followed by improvements in net metering standards and eventually strengthened by the enactment of an rps and set asides

adoption of residential solar power under uncertainty implications for renewable energy incentives abstract many incentives at the state and federal level exist for household adoption of renewable energy like solar photovoltaic pv panels despite generous financial incentives the adoption rate is low we use the option value framework which takes into account the benefit of delaying investment in response to uncertainty to examine the decision by households to invest in solar pv using a simulation model we determine optimal adoption times critical values of discounted benefits and adoption rates over time for solar pv investments using data from massachusetts we find that the option value multiplier is 1 6 which implies that the discounted value of benefits from solar pv needs to exceed installation cost by 60 for investment to occur without any policies median adoption time is eight years longer under the option value decision rule compared to the net present value decision rule where households equate discounted benefits to installation cost rebates and other financial incentives decrease adoption time but their effect is attenuated if households apply the option value decision rule to solar pv investments results suggest that policies that reduce the uncertainty in returns from solar pv investments would be most effective at incentivizing adoption

conspicuous conservation the prius halo and willingness to pay for environmental bona fides abstract this paper develops a theory of conspicuous conservation a phenomenon related to conspicuous consumption in which individuals seek status through displays of austerity amid growing concern about environmental protection we identify a statistically and economically significant conspicuous conservation effect in vehicle purchase decisions and estimate a mean willingness to pay for the green signal provided by the distinctively designed toyota prius in the range of 430 4200 depending upon the owner s location results are related to the growing literature on green markets and suggest that policy should target less conspicuous conservation investments that will be under provided relative to those that confer a status benefit

efficient estimation of hedonic inverse input demand systems this article is concerned with efficient estimation of characteristics demand we derive and estimate an inverse input demand system for quality characteristics by using 172 946 observations over 881 trading days in the icelandic fish auctions an improved estimation method based on an expanded random coefficient model is suggested as an alternative to the currently used two stage method of brown and rosen the estimates demonstrate the improved efficiency of the suggested method a number of empirical results emerge including a general increase in the demand for quality the purpose of hedonic price analysis is to determine how the price of a unit of a commodity varies with its characteristics that is to estimate the hedonic price function some recent examples of the estimation of hedonic price functions are nerlove combris lecocq and visser and mcconnell and strand however theory predicts that shifts in supply or demand affect the implicit price relationships between the overall price of the good and its individual characteristics and so we need to estimate the underlying demand and supply functions for the characteristics rosen developed a two stage method for analyzing hedonic markets in the first stage of this method the hedonic price function is estimated and in the second stage a system of demand and supply functions for characteristics is estimated using the shadow prices of the characteristics from the first stage as variables brown and rosen showed that this procedure could yield estimates of demand and supply functions that are mere transformations of the coefficients in the hedonic function they suggested the currently used two stage method using data from multiple markets this method utilizes the within market variation to iden

what s that got to do with the price of fish buyers behavior on the ancona fish market abstract in this paper we analyze the ancona wholesale fish market meritan where transactions take place in three simultaneous dutch auctions our objective is to characterize the behavior of market participants and in particular that of buyers in such a market structure our analysis shows that buyer seller relationships are less important than in a pairwise bargaining market such as the marseille fish market but that a significant amount of loyalty is still present under the auction mechanism we provide an explanation of the declining price paradox for the fish market of ancona by linking the rule used by the buyers to set their bid to the relationship between the variation in the price of the last transactions in the day and the quantity of fish available on that day in fact the average price tends to increase for the last transactions on days characterized by a limited supply of fish

renewable energy and politics a systematic review and new evidence abstract this paper reviews the literature in the intersection of renewable energies and politics adopting a multidisciplinary social sciences perspective we begin by analyzing the recent literature dealing with renewable energies and politics illustrating the analysis with bibliometric data the search protocol revealed 853 contributions dated from 1998 then we focus on the 186 contributions approached from a social sciences perspective establishing a taxonomy to classify the contributions into the main issues covered we identify contributions dealing with governance with public acceptance with markets and prices and with political or policy determinants of renewable energies in an empirical application we show that more democratic countries tend to invest more in renewable energies taking into account other determinants e g income energy dependence pollution emissions of this investment

wind power development in the united states abstract this paper analyzes the drivers of wind power development in the united states focusing on government renewable energy incentives and access to the electricity grid the effects of wind capacity electricity transmission line coverage and grid regulation as well as state and federal subsidies from 1998 to 2007 are estimated via random effects tobit probit and ordinary least squares instrumental variables regression the results indicate that the federal production tax credit state level sales tax credit and production incentives play an important role in promoting wind power in addition higher wind power penetration levels can be achieved by bringing more parts of the electricity transmission grid under independent system operator regulation this paper concludes that state and federal government policies play a significant role in wind power development both by providing financial support and by improving physical and procedural access to the electricity grid

consumer rationing and the posssibility of intertemporal price discrimination abstract intertemporal price discrimination is explained from consumer rationing if some consumers who have a low valuation for a good are served first at low prices high valuation consumers buy at a high price although they rationally foresee future price drops price discrimination then yields more profits to a monopolist than a uniform pricing strategy

stationarity rationalizability and bargaining strategies for the seller and the buyer which are weakly stationary we demonstrate that any initial offer from the seller induced by a strategy rationalized by a weakly stationary acceptance rule for the buyer must entail the coase property our result does not presume the selection of a particular equilibrium and follows directly from the weak stationarity assumption of the buyer s acceptance rule and the rational behaviour of the players

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

energy conservation nudges and environmentalist ideology evidence from a randomized residential electricity field experiment nudges are being widely promoted to encourage energy conservation we show that while the electricity conservation nudge of providing feedback to households on own and peers home electricity usage works with liberals it can backfire with conservatives our regression estimates predict that a democratic household that pays for electricity from renewable sources that donates to environmental groups and that lives in a liberal neighborhood reduces its consumption by 3 percent in response to this nudge a republican household that does not pay for electricity from renewable sources and that does not donate to environmental groups increases its consumption by 1 percent

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

state renewable energy electricity policies an empirical evaluation of effectiveness over the past decade state governments have emerged as us energy policy leaders across the country states are adopting policy instruments aimed at carbon mitigation and renewable energy deployment one of the most prevalent and innovative policy instruments is a renewable portfolio standard rps which seeks to increase the share of renewable energy electrification in the electricity market this analysis evaluates the effectiveness of state energy programs with an empirical investigation of the linkage between state rps policy implementation and the percentage of renewable energy electricity generation across states we use a variant of a standard fixed effects model referred to as a fixed effects vector decomposition with state level data from 1998 to 2006 results indicate that rps implementation is not a significant predictor of the percentage of renewable energy generation out of the total generation mix yet for each additional year that a state has an rps policy they are found to increase the total amount of renewable energy generation these findings reveal a potentially significant shortcoming of rps policies political institutions natural resource endowments deregulation gross state product per capita electricity use per person electricity price and the presence of regional rps policies are also found to be significantly related to renewable energy deployment

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

bargaining with endogenous information two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values this paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable three types of inefficiencies can arise if the information cost is in an intermediate range no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information if the information cost is low any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition if the agents face asymmetric information cost the akerlof s lemons problem arises as a self fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs

elasticity of substitution and technical efficiency evidence from the us electricity generation abstractthe implications of national or regional energy policies for technical efficiency and environmental outcomes in electricity generation depend on fossil fuel input substitution this study u

incomplete contracting and price regulation abstract this paper deals with price regulation of a monopolistic distribution grid which sells a license to some retailer the regulator aims at attaining efficient sale of the license and efficient relationship specific investments of the agents the first best can be attained by a sequential regulatory mechanism which gives the seller an option to grant the license but allows the buyer to make counteroffers this sequential mechanism runs counter to the usual price cap idea since possible upward but never downward renegotiation of the regulated prices is the vehicle to attain the first best