the effect of initial inequality on meritocracy a voting experiment on tax redistribution abstract according to alesina and angeletos 2005 societies are less redistributive but more efficient when the median voter believes that effort and talent are much more important than luck in determining income we test these results through a lab experiment in which participants vote over the tax rate and their pre tax income is determined according to their performance in a real effort task with leisure time subjects receive either a high or a low wage and this condition is either obtained through their talent in a tournament or randomly assigned we compare subjects decisions in these two different scenarios taking into consideration different levels of wage inequality in our framework this initial income inequality turns out to be crucial to support the theoretical hypothesis of alesina and angeletos 2005 overall we find that only if the wage inequality is high subjects choose a lower level of income redistribution and provide a higher effort level in the scenario in which high wage subjects are selected based on their talent through a tournament than when it is randomly assigned thus we confirm almost all theoretical results in alesina and angeletos 2005 when the wage inequality is high enough the big exception is for efficiency measured as the sum of total payoffs since theoretical results are not significant for both wage inequality scenarios

evidence from an experiment on charity to welfare recipients reciprocity altruism and the empathic responsiveness hypothesis this article investigates the determinants of generosity in an experiment on charity to real life welfare recipients it tests the effects of various measures of unconditional altruism and conditional or reciprocal altruism the results show strong support for conditional or reciprocal altruism however people who are self reported unconditional altruists make offers that are highly elastic with respect to the apparent worthiness of the recipient one interpretation of this is that self reported unconditional altruists have combined desires to help others and to reciprocate unconditional altruism and reciprocal altruism may not be independent motives i refer to this combination as empathic responsiveness

joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

inequality aversion and voting on redistribution some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair minded voters are pivotal pivotality in turn depends on the structure of income classes we experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the rich are in majority with a poor majority we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self interest

insecure alliances risk inequality and support for the welfare state popular support for the welfare state varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue that these variations vital to understanding the politics of the welfare state reflect in part the degree to which economic disadvantage low income and economic insecurity high risk are correlated when the disadvantaged and insecure are mostly one and the same the base of popular support for the welfare state is narrow when the disadvantaged and insecure represent two distinct groups popular support is broader and opinion less polarized we test these predictions both across nations within a single policy area unemployment insurance and across policy domains within a single polity the united states using a new survey results are consistent with our predictions and are robust to myriad controls and specifications when disadvantage and insecurity are more correlated the welfare state is more contested hy do citizens support the welfare state the answer remains as elusive as the question is fundamental we know that patterns of public support vary greatly across nations and domains of social policy we also know that these differences are associated with variations in levels of spending and program generosity brooks and manza 2006a 2006b 2007 kang and powell 2010 svallfors 1997 2004 yet there has only been limited effort to explain why patternsofpublicsupportvary thatis whyaggregatepublic support polarization of opinion and the breadth of opposition to the welfare state differ across societies and social policy areas in this article we develop such a proposition distinguish it from other leading claims and show that it finds strong confirmation not only in cross national analysis but also when examining popular support for different social policies within the united states the proposition is that the structure of support for the welfare state varies with the joint distribution of economic disadvantage low income and economic in

are emissions permits regressive grandfathered emissions permits redistribute income to wealthy households by creating firm rents that ultimately accrue to shareholders consequently they can be highly regressive even if the poor do not have large budget shares for polluting goods using an analytical model this paper estimates the burden of emissions permits borne by different income groups under control of power plant emissions of carbon so2 and nox we also compare the burden borne by poor households under permits with that under emissions taxes performance standards technology mandates and input taxes and we show how the social costs of policies differ from efficiency costs when society has aversion to inequality

a glimpse through the veil of ignorance equality of opportunity and support for redistribution abstract this study is an experimental investigation into preference for redistribution of income it had been hypothesized that belief in equality of opportunity in a society diminishes support for the welfare state this could potentially explain the low taxes and social benefits in the united states vis a vis europe to verify this hypothesis participants in an experiment were assigned different probabilities of winning and matched in groups of four next before finding out who would actually win they selected preferred transfers to be paid by the winners to the group as a whole it was found that the average transfers were about 20 lower in the sessions in which winning was determined by performance in a task rather than by sheer luck this difference cannot be explained by overconfidence in predicting own score it corroborates the conjecture that perceived determinants of success i e whether poverty results from laziness or bad luck affect the support for redistribution on the other hand greater inequality of opportunity measured simply by dispersion of probabilities of winning within a group did not lead to higher transfers

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

the impact of social mobility and within family learning on voter preferences evidence from a sample of twins abstract income maximizing consumers should vote in predictable ways support for liberal redistributive governments should fall as income rises but weak empirical evidence for these voting patterns might suggest that voters are influenced by alternative factors such as perceptions of social mobility from within family learning to examine these effects this paper uses a data set of twins and a recently developed econometric approach to show that within family learning and family specific effects are important determinants of voting preferences and preferences for redistribution

inequality fairness and social capital we study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful in a controlled economic experiment we find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions probing the boundaries of this effect we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context if a well off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse off person then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate moreover our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro social attitudes the successful are always more generous groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game

trust and the welfare state the twin peaks curve we show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs but civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals we provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the oecd countries

spend it like beckham inequality and redistribution in the uk 1983 2004 a main activity of the state is to redistribute resources standard political economy models predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution this paper shows that for the uk in the period 1983 2004 a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution we explore this example of the paradox of redistribution using attitudinal data we show that standard political economy models of the individual demand for redistribution do have explanatory power but that other attitudes and beliefs are also very important moreover these attitudes and beliefs change quite quickly so are very important in explaining variation in the demand for redistribution

the right look conservative politicians look better and voters reward it previous research has established that good looking political candidates win more votes we extend this line of research by examining differences between parties on the left and on the right of the political spectrum our study combines data on personal votes in real elections with a web survey in which 2 513 non finnish respondents evaluated the facial appearance of 1 357 finnish political candidates we find that political candidates on the right are better looking in both municipal and parliamentary elections and also have a larger beauty premium in municipal but not in parliamentary elections we discuss possible explanations for these patterns based on the fact that municipal candidates are relatively unknown jel code d72 j45 j70

a study on the relationship between economic inequality and mobility abstract a significant positive relationship between inequality and income mobility key for the theory of political redistribution is found among the growth dispersion and exchange mobility components dispersion is the most important

understanding preference for egalitarian policies in health are age and sex determinants this article presents an empirical assessment of the relevance of different factors when understanding preferences for outcome egalitarian policies in health in particular respondent age and sex a representative sample of the spanish population was interviewed n 1209 after being informed that those from the higher social class have longer life expectancy at birth than those from the lower social class respondents were required to choose between two programmes to increase life expectancy of the two groups by the same amount the distribution neutral programme and to target the lowest social class group thereby reducing current health inequalities the targeting or egalitarian programme two variants one with and the other without visual aid are used majority 69 of respondents support targeting an effect of age was observed where younger and older individuals are less likely to target the egalitarian policy than those in middle age however individual s sex was not associated wit

biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution evidence from a survey experiment abstract individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and public finance models yet there is little evidence regarding their origins or accuracy this study examines how individuals form these perceptions and explores their potential impact on preferences for redistribution a tailored household survey provides original evidence on systematic biases in individuals evaluations of their own relative position in the income distribution the study discusses one of the mechanisms that may generate such biases based on the extrapolation of information from endogenous reference groups and presents some suggestive evidence that this mechanism has significant explanatory power the impact of these biased perceptions on attitudes toward redistributive policies is studied by means of an experimental design that was incorporated into the survey which provided consistent information on the own ranking within the income distribution to a randomly selected group of respondents the evidence suggests that those who had overestimated their relative position and thought that they were relatively richer than they were tend to demand higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking

suspicious success cheating inequality acceptance and political preferences abstract supporters of left wing parties typically place more emphasis on redistributive policies than right wing voters i investigate whether this difference in tolerating inequality is affected by suspicious success achievements that may arise from cheating using a laboratory experiment i exogenously vary cheating opportunities for stakeholders who work on a real effort task and earn money according to their self reported performances an impartial spectator is able to redistribute the earnings between the stakeholders although it is not possible to detect cheating i find that the opportunity to cheat leads to different views on whether to accept inequality left wing spectators substantially reduce inequality when cheating is possible while the treatment has no significant effect on choices of right wing spectators since neither differences in beliefs nor differences in norms about cheating can explain this finding it seems to be driven by a difference in redistributive preferences these results suggest that views on redistribution will diverge even more once public awareness increases that inequality may be to a certain extent created by cheating

from rational actor to efficient complexity manager exorcising the ghost of homo economicus with a unified synthesis of cognition research it is now commonplace to note that economics canonical model of humans as rational self interested utility maximizers homo economicus is both descriptively misleading and often insufficiently predictive however certain outdated assumptions tied to homo economicus persist often influencing discourse and research design even in sustainability oriented fields we argue this ghost of homo economicus endures because the diversity of findings that confound the canonical model has surfaced across multiple behavioral and cognitive sciences each with its own terminology and focus area as such a unified accessible synthesis of this new information has yet to emerge in this paper we review recent insights from across the behavioral and cognitive sciences and propose an efficient complexity manager ecm model homo efficens as the best synthesizing option the crux of this model is that our species works within biological limits to efficiently filter massive environmental complexity this is achieved largely through analogical or case based reasoning we explain this synthesized model using a series of accessible metaphors finally we speculate on how this model may enrich future sustainable development research insofar as it points to fruitful units of analysis can stimulate methodological innovation and provide a more explicit theoretical foundation for the field

how giving affects giving a long term analysis of donations social preferences theories suggest that at least some people show altruistic behaviour however this philanthropic behaviour ranges from pure altruistic preferences to reluctant altruists the fa

relativity mobility and optimal nonlinear income taxation in an open economy abstract recent evidence suggests that globalization has reduced the barriers to international labor mobility and induced more cross country social comparisons in an open economy with tax driven migration and consumption externalities relativity we derive an optimal tax formula that subsumes existing ones obtained under a maximin social objective and additively separable utility and sign the second best mirrleesian marginal tax rates for all skill levels we establish the thresholds of the elasticity and level of migration to determine when relativity and inequality act as complements or substitutes in shaping the optimal top tax rate under both nash and stackelberg tax competition if the migration probability of top income workers is approximately 50 numerical calculation using parameter estimates from empirical studies shows that the country with labor inflow outflow implements over 10 lower higher marginal tax rates than suggested by the autarky equilibrium of kanbur and tuomala 2013

individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution abstract redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks this in turn implies that an individual s demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion to test this prediction we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well established set of measures in a representative sample of the swedish population we document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redistribution that is also economically important we show that previously used proxies for risk aversion such as being an entrepreneur or having a history of unemployment do not capture the effect of our measure of risk aversion but have distinctly different effects on the demand for redistribution we also show evidence indicating that risk aversion can explain significant parts of the well studied relations between age and gender on the one hand and demand for redistribution on the other

commercial policy with altruistic voters in public discussions of policy evidence that import competing sectors earn low or falling incomes is often used to argue for protection this paper rationalizes the apparent effectiveness of this argument in both direct and indirect democracies in direct democracies a small degree of voter altruism leads to protection in the specific factors model when the import competing sector earns little similarly voter altruism creates an incentive in representative democracies for self interested parties to present evidence to legislators on the income of import competing factors this leads to a theory in which campaign contributions buy access to legislators rather than buy votes

self centered inequity aversion and the mass politics of taxation the politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates how policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central p

the evolution of ideology fairness and redistribution ideas about what is fair influence preferences for redistribution we study the dynamic evolution of different economies in which redistributive policies perception of fairness inequality and growth are jointly determined we show how including beliefs about fairness can keep two otherwise identical countries on different development paths for a very long time we show how different initial conditions regarding how fair is the same level of inequality can lead to two permanently different steady states we also explore how bequest taxation can be an efficient way of redistributing wealth to correct unfair past accumulation of inequality

education redistributive taxation and confidence we consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital it is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the highly confident want higher taxes than the less confident do the results however turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals

race and charitable church activity i introduction faith based organizations provide social services for more than 70 million americans annually johnson tompkins and webb 2002 of the more than 350 000 congregations in the country more than 85 support some type of social service activity solomon 2003 biddle 1992 estimates that each year congregations spend 24 billion dollars on philanthropic activities these actions have gained new relevance for policymakers as the availability of public funding for charitable church activity has dramatically increased in the past decade starting with the charitable choice provision of the 1996 welfare reform law and continuing with the creation of centers for faith based and community initiatives located in 11 different federal agencies policymakers have instituted a devolution of federal funds intended to provide community services in 2005 more than 2 1 billion dollars in government grants were awarded to religious organizations by federal agencies office of the press secretary 2006 1 some observers fear that this policy trend will encourage racial discrimination by congregations leonard 2002 as bartkowski and regis 2003 write congregational definitions of legitimate social problems that members care about are in actuality influenced by various considerations among them racialized perceptions of welfare recipients past studies by economists have postulated but not substantiated that churchgoers warrant special consideration as individuals whose actions are sensitive to community demographics e g alesina and la ferrara 2000 gruber 2005 alternately some policymakers have championed faith based organizations because they are not likely to display sensitivity to community demographics when providing services as president bush stated in a speech in 2002 faith based charities work daily miracles because above all they recognize the dignity of every citizen and the possibilities of every life office of the press secretary 2002 john diiulio the former director of the white house office of faith based and community initiatives argued for charitable choice by saying government at all levels blatantly denies the equal protection of the laws to low income urban african american and latino children and families who depend disproportionately on faith based organizations for both basic life necessities and the delivery of specific social welfare benefits diiulio 2002 there is also noneconomic research consistent with this view e g billiet 1995 johnson 1977 the goal of this article was to examine whether congregations are affected by the racial composition of the local community when deciding whether and how much charitable activity to provide exploring this relationship is valuable not only because it addresses a key policy debate but also because it contributes to existing economic work on diversity and redistribution much prior work on socioeconomic conditions and tastes for redistribution relies on hypothetical questions asked to respondents in the general social survey or in gallop polls examples include alesina and la ferrara 2005b luttmer 2001 fong 2001 this article examines how a community s racial composition affects actual charitable expenditures studying actual charitable activities will be valuable if individuals stated preferences are different from their actual preferences or if stated preferences are sensitive to the wording of a question as is the case in alesina and la ferrara 2005b to investigate the effect of race on charitable church activity we compare how racially homogeneous congregations respond to the community s racial composition relative to other congregations several factors support this approach first members of homogeneous congregations have ostensibly taken race into account when selecting a congregation to attend consequently these congregations may be especially likely to display sensitivity to a community s racial composition when providing charitable services

demand for redistribution individuals responses to economic setbacks although economic circumstances have been argued to be a major determining factor of attitudes to redistribution there is little well identied evidence at the individual level utilizing a unique dataset with detailed individual information provides new and convincing evidence on the link between economic circumstances and demand for redistribution in the form of benefits and support the swedishnational election studies are constructed as a rotating survey panel which makes it possible to estimate the causal effect of economic changes the empirical analysis shows that individuals who experience a job loss become considerably more supportive of redistribution yet attitudes to redistribution return to their initiallevel as economic prospects improve suggesting that the effect is only temporary despite the fact that a job loss also changes attitudes to the political parties theprobability to vote for the left wing is not affected

voting for redistribution under desert sensitive altruism we endow individuals that differ in skill levels and tastes for working with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy when altruistic preferences are desert sensitive i e when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard working to the lazy we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium we provide empirical evidence based on the issp 1992 dataset that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish and that desert sensitive motivations play a significant role we estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert sensitive in the us than in europe we believe that differences in desert sensitive preferences for redistribution help explain the different social contracts that prevail in both continents

a little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy we use a model of self centered inequality aversion suggested by fehr and schmidt 1999 to study voting on redistribution we theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda we test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and flnd that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self interest

when is inequality fair an experiment on the effect of procedural justice and agency abstract we investigate how the perceived fairness of an income distribution depends on the beliefs about the process that generates the inequality specifically we examine how two crucial features of this process affect fairness views 1 procedural justice equal treatment of all 2 agency one s ability to determine his her income we do this in a lab experiment by differentially varying subjects ability to influence their earnings comparison of ex post redistribution decisions of total earnings under different conditions indicate both agency and procedural justice to matter for fairness highlighting the importance of agency we observe lower redistribution of unequal earnings resulting from risk when risk is chosen freely highlighting the importance of procedural justice we find introduction of inequality of opportunity to significantly increase redistribution despite this increase under inequality of opportunity the share of subjects redistributing none remain close to the share of subjects redistributing fully revealing an underlying heterogeneity in the population about how fairness views should account for inequality of opportunity

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

how elastic are preferences for redistribution evidence from randomized survey experiments we analyze randomized online survey experiments providing interactive customized information on us income inequality the link between top income tax rates and economic growth and the estate tax the treatment has large effects on views about inequality but only slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences an exception is the estate tax informing respondents of the small share of decedents who pay it doubles support for it the small effects for all other policies can be partially explained by respondents low trust in government and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the public policies meant to address them jel d31 d72 h23 h24

the rise of the modern welfare state ideology institutions and income security analysis and evidence in the 25 year period between 1960 and 1985 there was a great expansion of welfare state programs throughout the west the fraction of gdp accounted for by social expenditures doubled in much of europe and grew by 40 50 in many other oecd nations after 1985 growth in social insurance programs slowed relative to other parts of the economy this paper explores the extent to which institutions and ideological shifts may have accounted for the period of rapid growth for differences in the extent of that growth and for the subsequent reduction in the growth rates of social insurance programs

wealth and welfare divergent moral reactions to ethical consumer choices this article examines perceptions of low income consumers receiving government assistance and the choices they make showing that this group is viewed differently than those with more resources even when making identical choices a series of five experiments reveal that ethical purchases polarize moral judgments whereas individuals receiving government assistance are perceived as less moral when choosing ethical vs conventional products income earners particularly high income individuals are perceived as more moral for making the identical choice price is a central component of this effect because equating the cost of ethical and conventional goods provides those receiving government assistance some protection against harsh moral judgments when choosing ethically moreover earning one s income drives perceptions of deservingness or the right to spend as one desires those who receive assistance via taxpayer dollars are under greater scrutiny frequently resulting in harsher moral judgments by others in addition to influencing perceptions of individual consumers the results demonstrate that such attributions extend to groups who make ethical choices on others behalf and that these attributions have real monetary consequences for nonprofit organizations

does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention the paper considers trust as an empirical determinant of individual support for government intervention the central notion is that the influence of generalized trust on policy attitudes is conditional on confidence in both state actors and major companies the starting point is the idea that individuals who generally distrust other persons have a stronger taste for the regulation of economic activities while people with high interpersonal trust are in favor of less stringent regulatory control yet people who do not trust unknown others also tend to mistrust government and private companies if mistrust in state actors dominates we should not necessarily expect stronger interventionist preferences estimating the determinants of interventionist attitudes using data from the world values survey european values study for approximately 130 000 individuals in forty oecd and eu countries we find evidence that the impact of social trust on government intervention attitudes is conditional on institutional trust confidence in major companies appears to have a stronger effect on preference formation than trust in state actors

a theory of the welfare state the welfare state can be seen as an insurance device that makes lifetime careers safer increases risk taking and suffers from moral hazard effects adopting this view the paper studies the trade off between average income and inequality evaluating redistributive equilibria from an allocative point of view it studies the problem of optimal redistributive taxation with tax induced risk taking and shows that constant returns to risk taking are likely to imply a paradox where more redistribution results in more post tax inequality in general optimal taxation will either imply that the redistribution paradox is present or that the economy operates at a point of its efficiency frontier where more inequality implies a lower average income redistribution welfare state

are people inequality averse or just risk averse individuals preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries the median relative risk aversion which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion is between 2 and 3 most people are also found to be individually inequality averse reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society left wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality averse than others the model allows for non monotonic swfs implying that welfare may decrease with an individual s income at high income levels which is illustrated in simulations based on the empirical results

understanding preferences for income redistribution abstract recent research suggests that income redistribution preferences vary across identity groups we employ statistical learning methods that emphasize pattern recognition classification and regression trees cart and random forests randomforests to uncover what these groups are using data from the general social survey we find that out of a large set of identity markers only race gender age and socioeconomic class are important classifiers for income redistribution preferences further the uncovered identity groupings are characterized by complex patterns of interaction amongst these salient classifiers we explore the extent to which existing theories of income redistribution can explain our results but conclude that current approaches do not fully explain the findings

preferences for redistribution a country comparison of fairness judgements this paper seeks to explain within and between country variation in redistributive preferences in terms of self interest concerns and an input based concept of fairness which we examine by looking at the effects of beliefs regarding the causes of income differences results of estimations based on data for 25 countries indicate that both factors are indeed important determinants of redistribution support in line with hypothesised patterns we find that while differences in beliefs on what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining within country variation in redistributive preferences they do little to explain between country differences differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs however are important for explaining between country variation in redistributive preferences suggesting considerable heterogeneity across societies in what is considered as fair

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution abstract we examine whether individuals experienced levels of income inequality affect their preferences for redistribution we use several large nationally representative datasets to show that people who have experienced higher inequality during their lives are less in favor of redistribution after controlling for income demographics unemployment experiences and current macroeconomic conditions they are also less likely to support left wing parties and to consider the prevailing distribution of incomes to be unfair we provide evidence that these findings do not operate through extrapolation from own circumstances perceived relative income or trust in the political system but seem to operate through the respondents fairness views

who gives who gains progressivity and preferences the extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue and show formally that these variations largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity when progressivity is high politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify when progressivity is low and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap redistributive struggles become politically less salient we test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution

explaining mass support for agricultural protectionism evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession why are citizens in advanced industrialized countries willing to accept high prices for agricultural products conventional wisdom suggests that agricul tural interests secure government protection because producers are concentrated and better politically organized than diffused consumers due to its focus on pro ducer capacity for collective action however the literature fails to account for the high levels of mass support for agricultural protectionism in advanced industrial ized nations this article presents new evidence from a survey experiment in japan conducted during the recent global recession december 2008 that accounts for this puzzle using randomly assigned visual stimuli the experiment activates respon dents identification with either producer or consumer interests and proceeds to ask attitudinal questions regarding food imports the results suggest that consumer priming has no reductive or additive effects on the respondents support for liberal izing food imports surprisingly producer priming increases respondents opposi tion to food import particularly among those who fear future job insecurity we further disentangle the puzzling finding that consumers think like producers on the issue of food import along two mechanisms sympathy for farmers and projec tion of their own job insecurity the results lend strong support to the projection hypothesis

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

growing up in a recession does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution we find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort support more government redistribution and tend to vote for left wing parties the effect of recessions on beliefs is long lasting we support our findings with evidence from three different datasets first we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional variation in macroeconomic conditions using data from the 1972 2010 general social survey our specifications control for nonlinear time period life cycle and cohort effects as well as a host of background variables second we rely on data from the national longitudinal survey of the high school class of 1972 to corroborate the age period cohort specification and look at heterogeneous effects of experiencing a recession during early adulthood third using data from the world value survey we confirm our findings with a sample of 37 countries whose citizens experienced macroeconomic disasters at different points in history

explaining social policy preferences evidence from the great recession to what extent do personal circumstances as compared to ideological dispositions drive voters preferences on welfare policy addressing this question is difficult because a person s ideological position can be an outcome of material interest rather than an independent source of preferences the article deals with this empirical challenge using an original panel study carried out over four years tracking the labor market experiences and the political attitudes of a national sample of americans before and after the eruption of the financial crisis the analysis shows that the personal experience of economic hardship particularly the loss of a job had a major effect on increasing support for welfare spending this effect was appreciably larger among republicans than among democrats a result that was not simply due to a ceiling effect however the large attitudinal shift was short lived dissipating as individuals employment situations improved the results indicate that the personal experience of an economic shock has a sizable yet overall transient effect on voters social policy preferences

political self serving bias and redistribution we explore the impact of the self serving bias on the supply and demand for redistribution we present results from an experiment in which participants decide on redistribution after performing a real effort task dependent on individual performance participants are divided into two groups successful and unsuccessful participants success is exogenously determined because they are randomly assigned to either a hard or easy task however because participants are not told which task they were assigned to there is ambiguity as to whether success or failure should be attributed to internal or external factors participants take two redistribution decisions first they choose a supply of redistribution in a situation where no personal interests are at stake second they choose a redistributive system behind a veil of ignorance our results confirm and expand previous findings on the self serving bias successful participants are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck and they opt for less redistribution unsuccessful participants tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution we demonstrate that the self serving bias contributes to a polarization of the views on redistribution

measuring impartial preference for biodiversity biodiversity undergoes unprecedented rates of erosion despite the important services it provides this is considered evidence that biodiversity is undervalued biodiversity valuation is accordingly a prominent issue in the literature economic valuations are however largely criticized numerous alternatives have been introduced most of them involve participatory protocols aimed at producing high quality results being time consuming and expensive it is difficult to implement and reproduce them at a large scale we produce an easily reproducible inexpensive survey methodology to measure impartial preference for biodiversity we implement it in switzerland through a mail based survey our result is that biodiversity should be ranked after retirement schemes and public transportation but before relations with foreign countries order and security and culture and leisure in the expanses of the state current expenses therefore substantially underestimate the value that swiss people grant to biodiversity our new method is a viable alternative to standard economic valuation given the impartiality achieved at least in the swiss political context our estimate can be used by decision makers to assess the legitimacy of conservation programs or to gauge public support at a philosophical level our measure is relevant for public policies because it captures the stances that people take when they participate in public decisions

public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched in democratic countries elected policymakers determine public spending the level of public spending depends on taxes that are decided by a voting mechanism policymakers also decide how to allocate funds among different policies such as public education and pure redistributive transfers how are the levels of funding for public education and redistribution determined in the political process what impacts do votes on these two policies have on inequality growth and social mobility we develop a politico economic model that highlights a novel mechanism public education provides opportunities for the children of the poor to be recognized for their talent this reduces the probability of a mismatch which takes place when individuals with low talent who come from rich families find jobs that should go to people with high talent and vice versa hence the poor may prefer public spending on education to direct redistribution while the rich prefer redistribution as education implies more competition for good jobs from the poor

risks and redistribution an individual level analysis much of the disagreement in the debate about globalization and its present or absent effects on the welfare state stems from competing assumptions about the individual level determinants of redistributional preferences this article calls for and provides testing of these causal mechanisms at the individual level traditional accounts suggest that risks at the industry level are important determinants of redistributional preferences this article argues that risks at the occupational level should also be considered a comprehensive new data set is used to test whether and what types of risks in the labor market play an important role in shaping preferences statistical analyses of public opinion surveys european social survey show strong evidence for the assumed causal mechanism contrary to much of the literature but in line with this article s claims it is the occupational rather than the industry level that is most important the article lays out implications of these findings

what s the monetary value of distributive justice this paper proposes a model that can be implemented to estimate the willingness to pay for distributive justice defined as distribution according to desert we derive a formula that allows one to recover the willingness to pay for distributive justice from fiscal data and the estimated coefficients of a probit regression using this formula and data from a 1998 gallup social audit we find that on average the monetary value of justice for us households amounts to about one fifth of their disposable income moreover we find evidence of markedly heterogeneous preferences for justice along the lines of race and education

subjective income and employment expectations and preferences for redistribution abstract using probabilistic expectations data from the german socio economic panel we establish a link between self reported expectations of occupational mobility and preferences for redistribution our results provide new evidence on the validity of the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis

redistribution and market efficiency an experimental study abstract we study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority in one setup participants earn their income by trading in a double auction da with exogenous zero or full redistribution in another setup after trading they vote on redistributive tax policies in a majoritarian election with two competing candidates this results in virtually full redistribution even when participants have the opportunity to influence taxes by transferring money to the candidates we find that the high redistribution reduces trading efficiency but not as much as predicted if market participants trade randomly this is because rather than capitulating to the much lower trading incentives many participants respond to redistribution by asking and bidding more conservatively in the da and in this way help to prevent further efficiency losses

the promise of positive optimal taxation normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice abstract a prominent assumption in modern optimal tax research is that the objective of taxation is utilitarian i present new survey evidence that most people reject this assumption s implications for several prominent features of tax policy instead preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective the principle of equal sacrifice i generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting pareto efficiency then i show that optimal policy in this generalized model calibrated to the survey evidence and u s microdata is capable of quantitatively matching several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in the survey and reality including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging together these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

on the economics of philanthropy friedman says that he accepts this argument as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty economists will be familiar with this kind of argument someone takes as a premise that a particular activity is the subject of altruistic concern by individuals he shows that if matters are left to unco ordinated private philanthropy a free rider problem will arise and then he claims that this problem can be solved by some kind of intervention by government this strategy has been used to justify many kinds of intervention including compulsory transfers of income through the tax system hochman and rodgers i969 public policy to stimulate saving and investment marglin i963 sen i967 and the subsidisation or public provision of health care arrow i963 lindsay i969 culyer i976 this whole line of argument rests on a particular theory of private philanthropy which in turn relies on three principal assumptions first there is the publicness assumption the charitable activity in question say the relief of poverty or the provision of health care is a common argument in many individuals utility functions and so is a public good in the theoretical sense samuelson i954 in some cases of private philanthropy it is indisputable that the charitable activity is a public good from which donors derive utility consider for example the case of yachtsmen contributing to the royal national lifeboat institution or potential cancer victims contributing to the cancer research campaign in other cases the assumption takes on a rather different character rich britons contribute towards famine relief in cambodia childless old age pensioners contribute towards the care of handicapped children in such cases one would have to be extremely cynical to believe that the charitable activity furthers the self interest of the donor in any significant way but one might suggest that for purely altruistic reasons the donor derives utility from knowing that less fortunate people are being made better off such an effect will be called an altruistic externality friedman along with all of the other writers quoted in the first paragraph of this paper relies on altruistic externalities to justify the publicness assumption the second assumption is that of utility maximisation each individual s decisions concerning his philanthropic

welfare bounds in the fair division problem to any anonymous division method corresponds a lower and an upper bound function they measure the impact on a given agent s utility of the other agents preferences the highest lower bound is the equal split utility the lowest upper bound is the indirect utility from equal split at a canonical price these two bounds are compatible yet any method with the elqual split lower bound exhibits the growth paradox and any method with the lowest upper bound generates envy we criticize competitive equilibrium from equal split because it puts no finite upper bound on any agent s welfare

the decline of welfare benefits in the u s the role of wage inequality welfare benefits in the u s have experienced a much studied secular decline since the mid 1970s we explore a new hypothesis for this decline related to the increase in wage inequality in the labor market and the decline of real wages at the bottom of the distribution we posit that voters prefer benefits which are tied to low skilled wages we test the hypothesis using a 1969 1992 panel of state level data an additional contribution of our analysis is the use of general social survey data on voter preferences for welfare which we combine with current population survey data to determine the voter in each state who has the median preferred welfare benefit level our analysis reveals considerable evidence in support of a role for declining real wages in the decline of welfare benefits

how accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies evidence from a unique institutional setup opinion polls and other surveys are used to capture public sentiments on a variety of issues if citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences to others surveys may fail to characterize population preferences accurately the innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measure survey biases for a broad range of policies i combine data on 184 referenda held in switzerland between 1987 and 2007 with postballot surveys that ask how the citizens voted for each proposal the dierence between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of survey bias i nd that these biases vary by policy areas with the largest occurring in

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

racism and redistribution in the united states a solution to the problem of american exceptionalism abstract the two main political parties in the united states in the period 1976 1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race we argue that redistributive politics in the us can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition we identify two mechanisms through which racism among american voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain in common with others we suggest that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti solidarity effect that some voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving we suggest a second effect as well that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti redistributive republican party because its position on the race issue is more consonant with their own and this too decreases the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium this we name the policy bundle effect we propose a formal model of multi dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects and estimate the model for the period in question we compute that voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11 18 points the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub effects we also find that the democratic vote share is 5 38 points lower than it would have been absent racism the magnitude of this effect would seem to explain the difference between the sizes of the public sector in the us and northern european countries

sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare abstract we study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare in the first part of the paper we present new evidence from a survey we show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non diligent a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent this preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor such as race nationality and disability more important we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs in the second part of the paper we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution we consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the well being of individuals who exert the most effort we characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements even if wasteful work requirements can be optimal because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not however if the government lacks commitment power the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and possibly a pareto dominated allocation

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

gender gaps in policy making evidence from direct democracy in switzerland this paper uses a unique data set on individual voting decisions to shed new light on gender gaps in policy making our analysis focuses on switzerland the world leader in direct democracy where all citizens directly decide on a broad range of policies at the ballot box analysing all federal votes held between 1981 and 2003 we show that there are large gender gaps in the areas of health environmental protection defence spending and welfare policy the gender gaps typically persist even conditional on socio economic characteristics we also find that female policy makers have a substantial effect on the composition of public spending but a small effect on the overall size of government

efficiency welfare and political competition we study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences our framework covers models of income taxation public goods provision or publicly provided private goods politicians are vote share maximizers they can propose any policy that is resource feasible and incentive compatible they can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate we prove two main results first the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus maximizing and hence first best pareto efficient second there is a surplus maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare maximizing policy thus in our model policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible jel codes c72 d72 d82 h21 h41 h42

social mobility and preferences for redistribution in latin america this paper has two parts the first part presents an overview of the evidence concerning intergenerational mobility in latin america the second part studies the correlation between mobility perceptions and political preferences the results show first that educational mobility is much lower in latin american countries than in the united states and that latin americans are quite pessimistic about their own mobility experiences and social equality in general second the results show that preferences for redistribution are stronger i among poor individuals ii among those who believe that they were unable to surpass their parents socioeconomic status and iii among those who think that market outcomes are unfair a similar result applies with respect to the support for both market outcomes and the privatization of state owned enterprises

social preferences self interest and the demand for redistribution preferences for redistribution may be influenced by values and beliefs about distributive justice as well as by self interest people may prefer more redistribution to the poor if they believe that poverty is caused by circumstances beyond individual control therefore beliefs about the causes of income may affect demand for redistribution alternatively the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences may be spurious if they are correlated with income and self interest is not properly controlled for they may also measure incentive cost concerns using social survey data i find that self interest cannot explain the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

intergenerational conflict and the political economy of higher education funding abstract we examine how a population s age distribution and a growing divide between the ethnic composition of older and young generations is likely to affect support for higher education funding using detailed survey data on voter preferences for higher education funding and precinct level vote returns from locally funded community college bond referenda in california we find that older voters are significantly less supportive of higher education funding than younger voters and that support among older non hispanic white voters is particularly weak when those voters reside in a jurisdiction where the college age population is more heavily hispanic

on resource monotonicity in the fair division problem in the context of the classical fair division problem we show that efficiency and resource monotonicity are incompatible with the following conditional equal split condition if equal split of the collective endowment is efficient it should be among the recommended allocations

group income and individual preferences for redistribution this paper empirically examines the relationship between group income and an individual s preferences for redistribution first i develop a theoretical framework where an individual s identity is strengthened by the status of their group then utilizing data from the us general social survey i find evidence that the average incomes of one s ethnic and religious groups are negatively correlated with one s preferences for redistribution controlling for household income and a number of other individual level characteristics and additional controls i find that a standard deviation increase in the average income of one s social groups correlates to a weakening of an individual s preferences for redistribution by 7 to 8 this result is robust to the inclusion of rich controls and alternate measures of group status as well as a number of robustness checks such as sample restrictions and the use of additional data

the inheritance of inequality how level is the intergenerational playing field what are the causal mechanisms that underlie the intergenerational transmission of economic status are these mechanisms amenable to public policies in a way that would make the attainment of economic success more fair these are the questions we will try to answer

can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior abstract this study examines whether gender differences in some economic behaviors are due to differences in social preferences as measured by dictator allocation decisions we find that compared to men women are significantly more likely to be inequity averters and significantly less likely to be social surplus maximizers these differences in social preferences explain to a large extent why women send less than men in trust games inequity averters can ensure equal payoffs if nothing is returned by sending one fourth of the endowment while surplus maximizers can increase total payoffs by a factor of three for each dollar sent social preferences also help explain the size of gifts in dictator games and choice of compensation method for simple tasks however after controlling for social preference type gender is still influential in these decisions women give significantly more to charity than men even after accounting for our measure of social preferences women prefer egalitarian payment systems both because they are inequity averters and because low self confidence may lead them to believe they will earn more with equal sharing

intergenerational top income mobility in sweden capitalist dynasties in the land of equal opportunity this paper presents new evidence on intergenerational mobility at the top of the income and earnings distributions using a large dataset of matched father son pairs in sweden we find that intergenerational transmission is very strong at the top more so for income than for earnings at the extreme top top 0 1 income transmission is remarkable with an intergenerational elasticity of approximately 0 9 we also study potential transmission mechanisms and find that iq non cognitive skills and education of the sons are all unlikely channels in explaining the strong transmission within the top percentile increases in the income of the fathers if they are related at all are negatively associated with these variables wealth on the other hand has a significantly positive association our results suggest that sweden known for having relatively high intergenerational mobility in general is a society in which transmission remains strong at the very top of the distribution and wealth is the most likely channel

social norms and welfare state dynamics the paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance if the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise we also discuss welfare state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of benefi

generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory this paper proposes to evaluate tax reforms by aggregating money metric losses and gains of different individuals using generalized social marginal welfare weights optimum tax formulas take the same form as standard welfarist tax formulas by simply substitut ing standard marginal social welfare weights with those generalized weights weights directly capture society s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individual utilities suitable weights can help reconcile discrepancies between the welfarist approach and actual tax practice as well as unify in an operational way the most prominent alternatives to utilitarianism such as libertarianism equality of opportunity or poverty alleviation jel d60 d63 h21 h23 i38