an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

estimating the effect of campaign spending on senate election outcomes using instrumental variables o examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending 7 i reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate s ability to raise campaign funds such as candidate wealth levels hhen the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal in contrast to previous research showing that because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending the incumbent s spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates this article shows that in an average senate election the incumbent s spending advantage yields a 6 increase in the incumbent s vote share that incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform my findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers in american congressional elections incumbents routinely win reelection even in the 1994 republican landslide change in the partisan makeup of congress occurred mainly through open seats switching from the democrats to the republicans a common explanation for high congressional reelection rates is the large campaign spending advantage enjoyed by incumbents it is widely believed that challenger spending is very important but there is surprisingly little evidence in the academic literature that incumbent campaign spending has an important effect on congressional election outcomes in light of the substantial effort incumbents devote to fundraising as well as some nagging methodological questions about existing academic studies the effect of incumbent spending on election outcomes remains an unresolved issue accurately measuring how incumbent spending leads to votes is of obvious importance politicians want to win elections and so if money matters then this will influence their behavior if campaign spending effects are trivial then concerns about politicians being

moral rules the moral sentiments and behavior toward a theory of an optimal moral system how should moral sanctions and moral rewards the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue be employed to govern individuals behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare in the model that we examine guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility we also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use we show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well we also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

why do parents socialize their children to behave pro socially an information based theory we present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children dierently from existing models of cultural transmission of values such as bisin and verdier 2001 and tabellini 2008 we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children s material welfare if parents coordinate their educational choices a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries with whom she may interact a parent may thus choose to instil prosocial values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted this implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare even if their children s material welfare is all they care about jel codes d64 d82 h41 z13

the discrete charm of the bourgeoisie quantum and continuous perspectives on innovation and growth this paper discusses the relative merits of discrete versus continuous perspectives on innovation technical change and economic growth it discusses the innovation time series literature in some detail to extract the continuous and clustering properties of the historical record on innovation it then proposes a mosaic avalanche model based on percolation theory and self organized criticality to address this question

structure behavior and voter turnout in the united states electoral participation in the united states is examined to provide a clearer account of the effect of the registration requirement on individual voting behavior pooling nes data from 1980 1984 and 1988 i first model with traditional and selection bias techniques the full electorate to distinguish among three groups nonregistrants registered nonvoters and voters analyses limited to recent movers then reported to understand more fully the forces associated with the actual decision calculi of registering and voting the influences of many factors commonly accepted as important determinants of voting are disentangled and their effect at each stage is ascertained factors yielding inconsistent effects in previ research or believed to be unimportant such as race gender attitudes toward the candidates and trust government are shown to deserve closer scrutiny by electoral scholars

the social basis of interdependent preferences abstract most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an important aspect of many economic problems there has traditionally been a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there are few if any restrictions on equilibrium behavior and hence such models would have little or no predictive power in this paper we discuss how reduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend in part on relative standing there are several advantages of modelling concern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even when there is no similar concern in the deep preferences it provides structure and constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility and further it can yield testable implications about the way that changes in the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concerns in this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relative standing can affect savings investment and labor choice decisions

a theory of tolerance abstract we propose a theory of tolerance where endogenous lifestyles and exogenous traits are invested with symbolic value by people value systems chosen by parents for their children affect the esteem enjoyed by individuals in society intolerant individuals attach all symbolic value to a small number of attributes and are irrespectful of people with different ones tolerant people have diversified values and respect social alterity we study the formation of values attached to various types of attributes and identify circumstances under which tolerance spontaneously arises policy may affect the evolution of tolerance in distinctive ways and there may be efficiency as well as equity reasons to promote tolerance an empirical investigation of tolerance of homosexuality demonstrates that our theory helps to shed light on survey data of endorsed values

a statistical model for multiparty electoral data we propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty district level aggregate election data this model can be used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon economic conditions neighborhood ethnic compositions campaign spending and other features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas we also provide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration model evaluation and substantive interpretation although the model applies more generally we use it to help resolve an important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in great britain contrary to previous analyses which are all based on measures now known to be biased we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful we also find that it differs substantially across the parties about half a percent for the conservatives 1 for the labor party and 3 for the liberal party and its successors also contrary to previous research we show that these effects have not grown in recent years finally we are able to estimate from which party each party s incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn

voter response to congressional campaigns new techniques for analyzing aggregate electoral behavior scholarship on congressional elections typically analyzes either the sum or the division of the major party vote at the district level our main innovation is to model the votes received by each candidate as a separate dependent variable utilizing statistical methods developed to analyze multiparty elections because we are dealing with a substantive area in which endogeneity problems are rampant we synthesize an instrumental variables approach with a compositional data model this approach allows one to study the mobilizing and persuasive effects of congressional campaigns at the aggregate level

embracing morals in economics the role of internal moral constraints in a market economy abstract economists who adhere to the assumptions of homo economicus typically focus on altering external constraints through laws or regulations as the means of eliminating bad behavior reaching the optimal solution is simply a matter of having government adjust the price of unwanted behavior through punishments or fines but adam smith highlighted the importance of another type of constraint the internal moral constraint in recent years behavioral experimental and other economists have documented that people often do not act according the assumptions of the homo economicus model and instead appear to incorporate moral constraints into their decision making process in light of this growing body of research this article argues that many economists have placed too much emphasis on external constraints and that more emphasis should be placed on internal moral constraints after discussing possible sources of internal moral constraints the paper describes how these constraints can help strengthen cooperation in the short and long run

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

is there a hold up problem most literature on the hold up problem starts from the assumption that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs we argue that this approach is unsatisfactory if the bargaining procedure is relatively symmetric it typically admits multiple perfect equilibria some of which give the investor a high enough payofi to sustain e cient investment even if the bargaining procedure is asymmetric and rigged against the investor there may be investment if agents are driven by moral concerns or if communication creates commitment laboratory experiments indicate that communication is necessary and su cient for agents to coordinate on e cient outcomes when the bargaining game is symmetric when the bargaining game is rigged against the investor the hold up problem is mitigated but not eliminated by moral behavior communication is quite credible and we flnd that promises are more believable than threats

on being honest and behaving honestly abstract this paper deals with markets with asymmetric information where transactions are repeated infinitely it adds to the standard analysis the requirement that the equilibrium be renegotiation proof rp we show that when there are just one buyer and one seller there is no price that supports an rp equilibrium when there are many buyers and sellers the minimum of the price that supports a no cheating rp equilibrium approaches infinity as the probability that an entering firm will find buyers approaches 1 nonetheless the market is saved if the probability that a particular seller is honest is strictly positive the core of honest sellers imposes honest behavior on everybody else

negative externalities and welfare improving preference changes when the over consumption of open access resources and congestible public goods generate negative externalities and social welfare losses many individuals and environmental advocacy organizations offer as an alternative nongovernmental solution the adoption of new ecology sustaining preferences this paper shows that exogenously inducing a change in preferences and the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences which increase an individual s marginal rate of substitution between a private good and a good whose consumption imposes external costs on others not only reduces the aggregate output of the negative externality but also produces an economic state that is socially superior to the initial state because it is based on both the initial and new preferences the social superiority welfare criterion makes possible meaningful welfare comparisons of economic states generated by preference changes a computational general equilibrium model is then used to simulate preference changes and to calculate the resulting allocative and welfare effects the computer simulations reveal that important factors in the attainment of a socially superior state include i the particular characteristics of an individual s negative externality reaction function ii the magnitude of the preference change and iii the number of individuals changing preferences

egalitarianism and incentives abstract a group of agents is collectively engaged in a joint productive activity each agent supplies an observable input and output is then collectively shared among the members a bergson samuelson welfare function defined on individual utilities describes the social values of the agents however individual actions are taken on a selfish basis the collective decision cannot be precommitted and is made after inputs are chosen to maximize welfare conditional on the input decisions this leads to inefficiency the aim of this paper is to show formally that contrary to popular belief the degree of inefficiencydecreasesin the extent of egalitarianism embodied in the social welfare function journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d30 d63 p13

from rational actor to efficient complexity manager exorcising the ghost of homo economicus with a unified synthesis of cognition research it is now commonplace to note that economics canonical model of humans as rational self interested utility maximizers homo economicus is both descriptively misleading and often insufficiently predictive however certain outdated assumptions tied to homo economicus persist often influencing discourse and research design even in sustainability oriented fields we argue this ghost of homo economicus endures because the diversity of findings that confound the canonical model has surfaced across multiple behavioral and cognitive sciences each with its own terminology and focus area as such a unified accessible synthesis of this new information has yet to emerge in this paper we review recent insights from across the behavioral and cognitive sciences and propose an efficient complexity manager ecm model homo efficens as the best synthesizing option the crux of this model is that our species works within biological limits to efficiently filter massive environmental complexity this is achieved largely through analogical or case based reasoning we explain this synthesized model using a series of accessible metaphors finally we speculate on how this model may enrich future sustainable development research insofar as it points to fruitful units of analysis can stimulate methodological innovation and provide a more explicit theoretical foundation for the field

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

getting out the vote participation in gubernatorial elections scholarship on electoral turnout has long emphasized two main themes explanations of nonvoting in terms of individual characteristics and in terms of contextual variables these investigations have deeply enriched our understanding of electoral participation but their limitations have also sensitized us to the remaining problems of explanation perusal of the work on american politics exposes a rather striking tendency in studies of participation to ignore or soft pedal the effects of active political mobilization in this article we formulate two models of electoral turnout socioeconomic and political mobilization and apply them to aggregate data on voting in gubernatorial elections of 1978 and 1980 the socioeconomic model of turnout includes such influences as income age and educational attainment to assess the effects of political mobilization we have considered campaign spending partisan competition electoral margin and the presence or absence of a simultaneous race for the united states senate both of the models perform quite well individually producing significant and meaningful coefficients and adequate fits yet in the final analysis we demonstrate that quite apart from major sources of variation in gubernatorial turnout such as region and presidential versus nonpresidential years the mobilizing influences of campaign activism and competitiveness have a strong impact on electoral participation electoral law i e closing date of registration retains a small but significant effect on voting for governor and socioeconomic characteristics included in a fully specified model have little to contribute independently to an explanation of electoral turnout these findings are very much in the same vein as related cross national investigations which emphasize the crucial role of electoral law and political parties and downplay individual characteristics as determinants of electoral participation on the basis of the research reported here we argue that scholars need to pay more attention to political mobilization as an explanation of electoral turnout in the presidential election between cox and harding in 1920 only half of the eligible voters participated this relatively low turnout together with the historically minimal rates of participation in state and local elections created deep concern among those who believed that reasonably high levels of political involvement are crucial in maintaining a healthy democratic politics it was in this atmosphere of worry about low electoral turnout that charles e merriam and harold f gosnell 1924 conducted in the city of chicago the first systematic study of nonvoting subsequently gosnell 1927 went even further and executed the first experimental study in modern political science demonstrating conditions that could stimulate electoral turnout we too worry about low participation in elections today at every level of government and we believe these classic studies

equilibria in campaign spending games theory and data we present a formal game theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that makes it difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending in u s house elections the model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates which implies that the simultaneity problem should not be present in close races and should be progressively more severe in the range of safe races that are empirically observed this is confirmed by comparing simple ols regression of races that are expected to be close with races that are not using house incumbent races spanning two decades

sophistication and the persistence of cooperation abstract sophistication is costly in an evolutionary framework using replicator dynamics this fact is instrumental in explaining the persistence of cooperation in joint venture situations with prisoner s dilemma characteristics without relying on any reciprocity argument moreover the asymptotically stable equilibrium is symbiotic with co existence of cooperation defection and cautious cooperation very much like what we observe in reality

social status and economic performance a survey abstract this survey combines ideas and results from sociology and economics recognizing that economic decisions are often shaped by social concerns and influences based on the sociological literature we define social status and describe its measurement we then describe the role of social status in economic analysis of saving and consumption wages and economic growth we review recent work on status determination in equilibrium including evolutionary models we conclude with some remarks on the need for further interaction between sociology and economics

social organization status and savings behavior abstract we develop a model of status seeking in the presence of incomplete information and derive its implications for aggregate savings status seeking endogenously takes the form of conspicuous consumption its impact on savings depends on the scheduling of the contests for status over the life cycle if individuals engage in conspicuous consumption when old aggregate savings are increased we also study the role of social segmentation while social segmentation reduces the inequality across status seekers and fuels social rivalry under complete information we show that under incomplete information social segmentation weakens the incentive to strive for greater status

the evolution of cooperation through imitation we study evolutionarily stable outcomes for a class of games that admit cooperation and conflict as possible nash equilibria we make use of two ideas existing strategies are more likely to be imitated than new strategies are to be introduced players are able to identify opponents behavior prior to interaction the long run evolutionary limit is efficient for the case of perfect recognition of opponents behavior for the case of imperfect recognition efficiency is not achieved and long run outcomes are more efficient the more accurate is the information strategies that emerge in the long run are those where players reward opponents who are likely to play the same way and punish opponents who are likely to play differently

interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure this article shows by example that when workers care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers the equilibrium distribution of wages within firms must be less dispersed than the corresponding distribution of marginal products an implicit market for within firm status is shown to produce welfare gains by sorting workers among firms in accordance with how much they are willing to pay for high rank the resulting equilibrium pareto dominates allocations in which each worker is paid his marginal product

the esteem theory of norms when esteem is costless to supply does it provide an effectivemeans of enforcing norms for public goods production i examine thebasic mechanics of an enforcement through esteem model whileesteem may enforce norms to considerable degree systematicunderenforcement remains the general result even in very basicsettings with a minimum of transactions costs i also examine whyesteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be producedcostlessly i e why esteem remains scarce and what collectiveaction problems plague the supply of esteem

the economic role of a work ethic abstract this paper explores the extent to which a cultural work ethic can improve the performance of an economy it argues that a variety of technological and institutional features of labor markets tend to cause pareto sub optimal amounts of labor to be supplied to the economic nexus as a consequence a proper work ethic can improve economic efficiency as well as material well being a man does not by nature wish to earn more and more money but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose wherever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labor by increasing its intensity it has encountered this leading trait of pre capitalistic labor max weber the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism 1904 1984 p 60 sacred to the city however is the work ethic office workers think nothing of leaving for work at 6a m and staying on to 9 or 10 at night that rather than economic management is the explanation for the brazilian miracle of the past 40 years the economist april 25 1987 p 22 1

misconceptions and political outcomes a large literature shows that strategic interactions among actors with conflicting objectives can cause the political process to produce outcomes that lower welfare this paper investigates an alternative explanation of such outcomes if individuals errors in assessing the likely effects of proposed policies are correlated democratic decisionmaking can produce welfare reducing outcomes even in the absence of conflicting objectives under plausible assumptions choosing candidates from among the best informed individuals does not remedy the problems created by such errors but subsidising information and exposing representatives to information after their election do concentration of power has ambiguous effects

thou shalt not covet prohibitions temptation and moral values abstract this paper proposes a theory of the relationship between prohibitions and temptation in the presence of self control problems moral values may increase individual material welfare and utility by serving as a self commitment device the model investigates the relationship between morality and temptation the individual gains from morality the interaction between external sanctions and moral self punishment and the spread and strength of individually optimal moral values the empirical analysis based on survey data for a large set of countries documents a hump shaped pattern of morality in social class which supports the theoretical predictions of the model

economic interactions and social tolerance a dynamic perspective we propose an evolutionary game to analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents we show that i intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance ii a fully tolerant society assures prosperity iii cultural integration should precede economic integration

economic man as a moral individual first there is the broadly ethical question how should one live to emphasize this connection is not the same as asserting that people will always act in ways they will themselves morally defend but only to recognize that ethical deliberations cannot be totally inconsequential to actual human behavior sen 1988 3 4 i introduction it is a plausible proposition that some people s behavior is affected significantly by moral considerations a growing literature in economics and related disciplines reviewed and analyzed in earlier work by two of the authors goldfarb and griffith 1991a griffith and goldfarb 1991b explores the possibility and desirability of incorporating these moral considerations into the economic analysis of individual behavior 1 a variety of approaches to introducing moral considerations into economic analysis have been put forward by contributors within economics including sen 1974 1977 1988 hirschman 1985 phelps 1975 vanberg 1988 brunner 1987 frank 1987 1988 hirshleifer 1985 mueller 1986 and schotter 1981 among others among related disciplines the philosophers gauthier 1986 and ulman margalit 1977 the sociologists coleman 1987 and etzioni 1986 1988 and the political scientist axelrod 1984 all present relevant analyses as our earlier review indicated these authors pursue three competing approaches introducing moral values as part of preference functions introducing moral norms or rules as constraints and introducing such norms as decision rules for coping with strategic interaction gaming situations we propose here a concrete method for including moral values in the economist s model of preferences our method maintains the standard economic framework of an agent maximizing his or her utility subject to constraints but modifies the utility function so that the enjoyment or utility from consuming a given set of goods varies in a lumpy or discontinuous way depending on the concurrent moral content of the individual s behavior moreover it offers an analytical representation of the linkage between preferring to act morally and the individual s being faced with possibly significant differences in constraints because of such moral considerations 2 the paper proceeds as follows section ii indicates where our approach fits in the existing literature incorporating moral values into preference functions section iii sets forth our approach to specifying these utility functions section iv suggests some extensions section v presents further discussion and conclusions ii relation to the literature while not directly inspired by the occupational choice literature our approach can be usefully viewed as an application of the economic model of occupational choice to modelling moral preferences 3 this approach helps fill an analytical gap between hochman and rodgers 1969 small modification of the standard microeconomic framework and the more extensive departures suggested by etzioni 1986 and sen 1974 1977 our model helps fill this gap by providing what we think is an intuitively appealing treatment of the discontinuous or lumpy content of important classes of moral decisions hochman and rodgers 1969 present an analysis of the possible relationship between moral and other values in the context of charitable transfers their analysis is now a standard ingredient in intermediate microeconomics textbooks 4 their interdependent utility approach puts impoverished individual y s income or utility into individual x s utility function one then analyzes the conditions under which individual x will either himself transfer resources to individual y or vote for a government program to make such a transfer this approach allows transfers that vary continuously from zero to very large amounts of money with decisions involving trade offs at the margin for our purposes this marginal trade off feature so useful for analyzing charitable transfers presents a very significant limitation when attempting to apply the model to a wider range of moral behavior

trust trustworthiness and the consensus effect an evolutionary approach abstract people often form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes the so called consensus effect we study the implications of this for trust and trustworthiness in an evolutionary model where social preferences are endogenous trustworthy individuals are more optimistic than opportunists and are accordingly less afraid to engage in market based exchanges where they may be vulnerable to cheating depending on the distribution of social preferences in the population the material benefits from greater participation may compensate for the costs of being trustworthy by providing an explicit account of how individuals form and revise their beliefs we are able to show the existence of a polymorphic equilibrium where both trustworthiness and opportunism coexist in the population we also analyze the effect of enforcement distinguishing between its role as deterrence of future misbehavior and as retribution for past misbehavior we show that enforcement aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior has ambiguous effects on social preferences it may favor the spreading of trustworthiness crowding in but the opposite crowding out may also occur by contrast crowding out never occur when punishment is merely intended as retribution

evolution of preferences1 we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

are people sometimes too honest increasing decreasing and negative returns to honesty we show that sender honesty can hurt receivers in simple signaling games the receiver faces a trade off between its ability to work with senders and the quality of information it can get and use from them our example also contradicts recent work suggesting that returns to honesty should be increasing positive increasing returns are restored in our model if the receiver can precommit

social rewards externalities and stable preferences this paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities the focus of this paper is on the circumstances under which social rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations in particular social mechanism is effective only in a society in which individuals who care about their standing in the society can survive in the long run we show that the nature of economic interaction between matched players influences whether the socially minded individuals survive in the long run and restricts the effectiveness of social rewards however circumstances exist where the socially minded survive even though relative fitness is determined only by economic payoff 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

status and incentives this article introduces status as reflecting an agent s claim to recognition in her work this is a scarce resource increasing an agent s status requires that another agent s status be decreased higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money better paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status the results are consistent with actual management practices i egalitarianism is desirable in a static context ii in a long term work relationship juniors compensation is delayed and iii past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization s hierarchy

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

does structure influence growth a panel data econometric assessment of relatively less developed countries 1979 2003 neo schumpeterian streams of research emphasize the close relationship between changes in economic structure in favor of high skill and high tech branches and rapid economic growth they identify the emergence of a new technological paradigm in the 1970s strongly based on the application of information and communication technologies icts arguing that in such periods of transition and emergence of new techno economic paradigms the intermediate development countries and the countries which are not at the technological frontier have higher opportunities to catch up although this debate is theoretically well documented the empirics seem to lag behind the theory in this article we contribute to this literature by adding enlightening evidence on the issue more precisely we relate the growth experiences of countries which had relatively similar economic structures in the late 1970s with changes occurring in these countries structures between 1979 and 2003 the results reveal a robust relationship between structure and labor productivity growth and lend support to the view that producing though not user ict related industries are strategic branches of economic activity copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

rebuttal to jacobson s new evidence for old arguments in salvation for the spendthrift incumbent green and krasno 1988 we argue that incumbent spending has a sizable effect on the house vote this stands in direct contrast to professor jacobson s well known view that campaign spending by incumbents is not related to how well they do at the polls jacobson 1983 42 emphasis in the original in his rebuttal jacobson criticizes our findings on three grounds first he argues that the instrument we use in our twostage least squares model for incumbent spending is invalid second he complains that our model fails to account for diminishing marginal returns finally jacobson asserts that our findings for the 1978 election do not hold for subsequent years in this paper we briefly respond to these criticisms using data drawn from the 1976 86 elections we demonstrate that incumbent spending has a substantial influence on the vote we then critique the assumptions underlying jacobson s individual level analysis in the end we find little empirical support for jacobson s contention that the effects of incumbent spending are substantively small and statistically insignificant much of jacobson s essay focuses on the question of whether incumbent spending is as effective as challenger spending this comparative question however occupies a minor place in our salvation essay our main objective was to show that incumbent spending has more than a trivial influence on electoral outcomes we do not disagree in fact with jacobson s position that the marginal effect of challenger spending exceeds that of incumbent spending but this is not the only way to gauge the relative importance of incumbent and challenger spending another way would be to compare the yield the number of votes purchased by challengers and incumbents in each district this standard takes into account the fact that incumbents typically outspend their opponents data from 1976 86 indicate that the yield from incumbent spending is both considerable and on par with the yield from challenger expenditures in sum access to financial resources represents one of the important advantages of incumbency for the spendthrift incumbent is able to offset the effects of campaign expenditures by the opposition

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

the role of altruism in economic interaction abstract this paper considers environments in which the population consists of a mix of altruists and egoists and asks under what situations do altruists have a disproportionately large effect on equilibrium and under what situations is it the egoists we begin by presenting a general framework for answering this question we then apply the framework to the analysis of three economic environments 1 the classic problem referred to as the prisoner s dilemma 2 a world where agents decide whether or not to pollute the environment and 3 a world where agents decide whether or not to donate blood

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

raising taxes through equalization a simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers to test this i examine canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972 2002 period consistent with the theory provinces respond to expansions of equalization transfers by increasing their own tax rates i estimate that on average tax rates in grant receiving provinces were substantially and significantly higher as a consequence of the transfer formula jel classification h21 une theorie simple suggere qu une forme usuelle d octrois federaux de perequation horizontale devrait entrainer les gouvernements sub nationaux a imposer de plus hauts taux d imposition modifiant ainsi les bases de fiscalite locale et ce faisant accroissant les transferts federaux pour mettre au test cette hypothese on examine les politiques fiscales des provinces canadiennes pour la periode entre 1972 et 2002 d une maniere qui semble supporter l hypothese les provinces ont repondu a un accroissement des transferts de perequation en accroissant leur propre taux d imposition on estime que les taux moyens d imposition dans les provinces qui recoivent des transferts sont plus eleves de maniere substantielle et significative en raison de la formule de transferts

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

are there schumpeterian waves of innovations this paper responds to a recent criticism of the empirical evidence of bunching of innovations an examination of various long run innovation samples shows that there is indeed very poor evidence of innovation waves in the time before the mid 19th century thereafter however two long waves of major innovations occur both having a lead of approximately 10 15 years over the economic long wave as identified in an earlier study a t test confirms that these waves can be clearly distinguished from random fluctuations in the final section some suggestions for further research are outlined

the rise of clusters of innovative industries in belgium during the industrial epoch abstract this article presents the notion of cluster of innovative industries in order to analyse long term techno industrial change in belgium this notion accounts for strong and dynamic techno economic linkages interdependencies and complementarities that may occur between a set of industries for a particular period of time each cluster has its roots in a set of closely related major innovations that link particular industries to each other through a dynamic process of transfer and feedback of technology via various mechanisms we identified a number of 12 clusters of innovative industries that have emerged in the leading industrial countries since the first industrial revolution we also present empirical outcomes concerning the extent to which belgium participated in these clusters during the industrial epoch the belgian case shows that lagging countries are incapable of developing fully these clusters major components of the clusters were either missing or underdeveloped or they emerged with a considerable delay due to first mover advantages among other reasons

beyond ses a resource model of political participation this paper develops a resource model of political participation the resources considered are time money and civic skills those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to political activity these skills are not only acquired early in life but developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life the workplace organizations and churches and synagogues these resources are distributed differentially among groups defined by socioeconomic status a two stage least squares analysis shows these resources have powerful effects on overall political activity thus explaining why socioeconomic status has traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation we disaggregate overall activity into three kinds of acts those that involve giving time those that entail donating money and voting each requires a different configuration of resources resulting in different patterns of stratification across various political acts

the revised theory of surge and decline the status of angus campbell s theory of surge and decline is a matter of considerable controversy while analysis of the composition and voting behavior of presidential and midterm electorates fails to support the theory analysis of aggregate congressional election results yields supporting evidence this research seeks to reconcile these findings by proposing and examining a revised version of the surge and decline theory the analysis finds that in presidential elections there is a surge in turnout among partisans of the advantaged party and a surge in support for the advantaged party among independent voters both surges are proportional to the magnitude of short term forces as measured by the partisan division of the presidential vote in midterm elections both the one sided partisan turnout surge and the independent vote surge for the advantaged party recede

work norms social insurance and the allocation of talent abstract this paper challenges the view that weak work norms make generous welfare states economically unsustainable i develop a dynamic model of family transmitted values that has a laissez faire equilibrium with strong work norms coexisting with a social insurance equilibrium with weak work norms while the former has better incentives the latter induces more intergenerational occupational mobility which improves the allocation of talent and fuels growth strong work norms arise as a way for parents to protect their children from the risk of lacking talent i present evidence from microdata showing that generous social insurance correlates with high intergenerational occupational mobility and that more mobile individuals endorse weaker work norms

real exchange rates in small open oecd and transition economies comparing apples with oranges abstract we find that productivity gains in tradables cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate via both tradable and nontradable prices in the cee 5 and have no affect in the baltic countries while they lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate of tradables in oecd economies that overcompensates the appreciation due to nontradable prices rising net foreign liabilities lead to a real appreciation in the baltic countries instead of the expected depreciation found in oecd and cee 5 countries these differences are due to the different impact of the fundamentals on the real exchange rate depending on the time horizon studied

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

mothers and sons preference formation and female labor force dynamics this paper argues that the growing presence of a new type of man one brought up in a family in which the mother worked has been a significant factor in the increase in female labor force participation over time we present cross sectional evidence showing that the wives of men whose mothers worked are themselves significantly more likely to work we use variation in the importance of world war ii as a shock to women s labor force participation as proxied by variation in the male draft rate across u s states to provide evidence in support of the intergenerational consequences of our propagation mechanism

the relationship between firm investments in technological innovation and political action economic theory recognizes the importance of investments in both technological innovation and political activity in firm behavior and extensive research exists which examines independently these expenditures however surprisingly little attention is devoted to analyzing technological innovation and political action expenditures jointly technological innovation and political action are two of the options firms face regarding how to achieve lower costs or market power the characteristics of these choices not only affect the degree to which each is used but also have widely divergent normative and policy implications for society furthermore many forms of technological innovation require regulatory approval so that firms may use the two forms of investment in conjunction with each other in addition to treating them as separate investment alternatives this paper investigates the relationships between firm investments in technological innovation and political activity both forms of investment seek to lower costs and or create market advantage but economists have long recognized the social importance of technological innovation to economic growth while treating most firm political activity as inefficient growing social concerns surrounding declining innovation productivity and growth and increasing firm political activity suggest that these are timely dimensions to explore jointly in the next section i discuss the relationship between firm investments in technological innovation and political action this discussion motivates the subsequent empirical modelling presented in section iii because of the possibility of simultaneity between firm spending in research and development rd these results hold true to various degrees over industries and industry groups section vi offers conclusions and suggestions for further research

a framework for mapping and comparing behavioural theories in models of social ecological systems formal models are commonly used in natural resource management nrm to study human environment interactions and inform policy making in the majority of applications human behaviour is represented by the rational actor model despite growing empirical evidence of its shortcomings in nrm contexts while the importance of accounting for the complexity of human behaviour is increasingly recognized its integration into formal models remains a major challenge the challenges are multiple i there exist many theories scattered across the social sciences ii most theories cover only a certain aspect of decision making iii they vary in their degree of formalization iv causal mechanisms are often not specified we provide a framework mohub modelling human behavior to facilitate a broader inclusion of theories on human decision making in formal nrm models it serves as a tool and common language to describe compare and communicate alternative theories in doing so we not only enhance understanding of commonalities and differences between theories but take a first step towards tackling the challenges mentioned above this approach may enable modellers to find and formalize relevant theories and be more explicit and inclusive about theories of human decision making in the analysis of social ecological systems

wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy abstract we model slack season wages in a village economy in the presence of involuntary unemployment our model draws its inspiration from sociological notions of everyday peasant resistance in particular labourers can react to employers who pay low slack wages by refusing to work for them in the relatively tight peak season such refusals however are not automatic and are modelled endogenously a continuum of equilibrium wage configurations is obtained these configurations barring one involve wages exceeding reservation wages despite the presence of involuntary unemployment several qualitative observations follow these are examined with respect to available empirical data in particular the village survey of palanpur

labor economics and the psychology of organizations this essay is a discussion of how economists are attempting to understand institutions within the organizations of the labor market the institutions and issues discussed include mandatory retirement discontinuous jumps in wages pay compression rights of tenure up or out hierarchies timing of raises promotions and evaluations the existence of partnerships the use of bonuses vs penalties and pay as a motivator

the effects of campaign spending in house elections new evidence for old arguments the question of how campaign spending affects election results remains open because the simultaneity problem has proven so intractable green and krasno s 1988 recent attempt to solve the problem and to demonstrate that marginal returns on spending are as great for incumbents as for challengers again comes up short a panel feature of the abc newslwashington post congressional district poll conducted during the 1986 elections offers a fresh perspective on the question analysis of changes in voting intentions during the final six weeks of the campaign shows that as the tainted ols studies have invariably suggested the amount spent by the challenger is far more important in accounting for voter s decisions than is the amount spent by the incumbent

the commitment effect in belief evolution abstract in this note we establish that rational demand expectations will typically not evolve in an evolutionary model in an evolutionary model beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive behavior this commitment effect has the same direction for strategic substitutes and complements and fades away in large markets

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

rationality and the market for human blood abstract this paper presents a theoretical model of blood supply illustrating an argument advanced by titmuss that it is better to rely on voluntary donation than on the market to obtain whole human blood for transfusion the model incorporates a social custom in the manner of akerlof which causes different equilibria to occur depending on whether the custom of giving blood prevails or not since preferences differ across equilibria the pareto criteria cannot be used to compare them several other possible criteria are proposed but these criteria imply that some preferences are more rational or are preferable to other preferences

instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two sided matching with non transferable utility in this paper we apply the instrumental approach to social preferences in order to distinguish among various shapes of preferences for social status in particular we consider the shape of reduced preferences that emerge in the equilibrium of a twosided matching model with non transferable utility cole et al 1992 1995 show that under full observability of potential mates attributes instrumental concerns for social status are ordinal i e only one s own rank in the distribution of attributes matters we show that when we depart from full observability instrumental concerns for social status become cardinal i e also other features of the distribution of attributes matter we also show that the actual shape of cardinal concerns depends on how individuals can deal with the informational asymmetry alternatively leading to upward concerns i e making comparisons with higher rank people downward concerns i e making comparisons with lower rank people or bidirectional concerns i e being both upward and downward

the ethical wealth of nations michael porter argues that some nations manifest a competitive advantage deriving from key elements of their economic structure some nations are thus disposed by structure to possess what porter calls a competitive advantage of nations porter 1990 in this paper i examine the prospect of an ethical advantage of nations and in particular of a set of advantages that extend far beyond the simple dimension of trust so often discussed i consider further how such a range of ethical features would be structured and what the implications of those features would be three conclusions are reached 1 morality may create economic advantages for nations in ways that extend beyond the notion of an idealized market 2 in order for ethics to drive economic advantage ethical concepts must rise to the status of intrinsic value and 3 if claims for national ethical success factors are true then nations should attend to the issue of moral education

do we punish high income criminals too heavily many critics believe that since high income criminals can afford to purchase better legal services they are less severely punished than poor criminals who commit equivalent crimes others are concerned that the penalties imposed on criminals are too small this paper shows that ignoring the effect conviction has on later earnings dramatically underestimates the total monetary penalty paid by those convicted and that the penalty structure is extremely progressive where evidence on the probability of conviction is available it shows that the highest income criminals face the highest expected penalties

is tolerance good or bad for growth we investigate how tolerance as measured by attitudes toward different types of neighbors affects economic growth in a sample of 54 countries unlike previous studies by richard florida and others we find that tolerance toward homosexuals is negatively related to growth for tolerance toward people of a different race we do not find robust results but the sign of the estimated coefficients is positive suggesting that inclusion of people irrespective of race makes good use of productive capacity we propose mechanisms to explain these divergent findings which clarify why different kinds of tolerance may be of different economic importance

the aversion to lying abstract we experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one sided asymmetric information a seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message four different treatments are compared one without communication one with free form communication and two treatments with pre specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength our results suggest that individuals have an aversion towards lying about private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes