patents or prizes monopolistic r d and asymmetric information abstract in this paper a model of r d regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as r d incentive instruments when there is a technological leader using the case of full information as a benchmark it is found that the trade off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator s r d costs are private information whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation

the direction of innovation abstract how do innovation policies affect the direction of research is market based innovation too radical or too incremental we construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions that could have been discovered but were not policies which do not do so like patents and prizes may fail to encourage firms to research in the efficient direction even if they obtain the optimal quantity of r d

uk term structure decompositions at the zero lower bound this paper employs a zero lower bound zlb consistent shadow rate model to decompose uk nominal yields into expectation and term premium components compared to a standard affine term structure model it performs relatively better in a zlb setting by capturing the stylized facts of the yield curve the zlb model is then exploited to estimate inflation expectations and risk premiums this entails jointly pricing and decomposing nominal and real uk yields we find evidence that medium and long term inflation expectations are contained within narrower bounds since the early 1990s suggesting monetary policy credibility improved after the introduction of inflation targeting

economic determinants of the nominal treasury yield curve abstract macroeconomic shocks account for most of the variability of nominal treasury yields inducing parallel shifts in the level of the yield curve we develop a new approach to identifying macroeconomic shocks that exploits model based empirical shock measures technology shocks shift yields through their effect on expected inflation and the term premium shocks to preferences for current consumption affect yields through their impact on real rates and expected inflation for both shocks the systematic reaction of monetary policy is an important transmission pathway we find little evidence that fiscal policy shocks are an important source of interest rate variability

worldwide venture capital intellectual property rights and innovation this study based on the historical data of venture capital vc investment and patenting for 99 countries and 83 industries explores the effects of vc investment on firms innovation in different intellectual property rights ipr environments worldwide utilizing large data sets and various empirical models our negative binomial and panel data analysis presents the significant and positive impacts of vc investment and ipr parameters on firms innovation controlling for cultural regulatory and economic and market conditions of the business environment however vc investment is more effective in weaker ipr environments this effect is robust to a number of different specifications for endogeneity among other things the economic effect is pronounced the impact of vc on patents is up to five times more pronounced between the weakest and strongest ipr regime in the sample

the effects of patent regime changes a case study of the european patent office abstract patent system in europe has undergone significant changes during the 1970s around the establishment of the european patent office epo and this paper tries to quantify the influences of such policy changes on the private value of european patents based on the patent renewal records i estimate the private value of patents in germany france and the uk obtained through the epo patenting route during the early 1980s and compare the estimated value with the patent value in the same three countries before the establishment of the epo as estimated by pakes pakes ariel 1986 patents as options some estimates of the value of holding european patent stocks econometrics 54 4 755 784 the average quality and the private value of the epo patents are substantially higher than those obtained through the national route the uniform examination and granting procedure at the epo has effectively eliminated the inter country differences in the patentability standards and the scope of patents and significantly decreased the differences in the patent value across these countries i also find that the extension of the statutory limit to the maximal length of patent life and changes in the renewal fee schedule only had modest effects on the patent value and that the learning process of the epo patents are much longer than that of the national patents

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

shared patent rights and technological progress we study how to reward innovators who build on one another rewards come in the form of patents because patent rights are scarce the optimal allocation involves sharing more than one innovator s patent is in force at a given time we interpret such allocations as patents that infringe one another as licensing through an ever growing patent pool and as randomization through litigation we contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is prohibitively costly avoiding sharing initially slows progress and leads to a more variable rate of technological progress

a dynamic model of open source vs proprietary r d abstract we propose a dynamic model in which firms compete to produce sequential and cumulative innovations and in which the more firms do research in one sector the more likely it is that one of them innovates firms choose research effort and whether to patent innovations or to use an open source license like the general public license we show that i patents generate a larger stationary reward but foreclose research within a sector and that ii open source generates a smaller stationary reward but allows everyone to use the technology and therefore by attracting firms to the sector it induces a faster pace of innovation we characterize all the equilibria of the model and show that in equilibrium an open source sector appears only after a proprietary sector we also find conditions under which the model has a unique equilibrium in which a proprietary and an open source sector coexist and compete in the short run but the open source sector dominates the industry in the long run we use our model to study whether patents are inefficient and to explain firms behavior in the software and the biomedical industry

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents we revisit admati and perry 1991 s model of voluntary contributions to a joint project their main result that equilibrium contributions are small appears not to be robust to the introduction of asymmetries

runner up patents is monopoly inevitable exclusive patents sacrifice product competition to provide firms incentives to innovate we characterize an alternative mechanism whereby later inventors are allowed to share the patent if they discover within a certain time period of the first inventor these runner up patents increase social welfare under very general conditions furthermore we show that the time window during which later inventors can share the patent should become a new policy tool at the disposal of the designer this instrument will be used in a socially optimal mix with the breadth and length of the patent and could allow sorting between more or less efficient firms

core and crust consumer prices and the term structure of interest rates we propose a model for nominal and real term structures of interest rates that includes dynamics for the three main components of total inflation core food and energy these dynamics combine together to produce a measure of expected total inflation that investors use to price nominal treasuries this framework captures different frequencies in inflation fluctuations shocks to core are more persistent and less volatile than shocks to food and especially energy the crust we find that a common structure of latent factors determines and predicts the term structure of yields and inflation our model outperforms popular benchmarks e g arma var and random walk specifications and it is at par with the survey of professional forecasters in forecasting inflation moreover we estimate real rates that agree with inflationindexed bond yields after adjusting for the liquidity premium in these bonds finally inflation and real rate risk premia show a declining pattern consistent with the changing nature of inflation and real rate risks

macro factors and the affine term structure of interest rates this paper formulates an affine term structure model of bond yields from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with observable macro state variables as the term structure factors model implications for the joint macro term structure dynamics are consistent with the empirical patterns from the var estimation model calibration and simulation exercises also provide clear macroeconomic interpretations of the latent term structure factors as found in the finance literature most of the slope factor movement can be explained by exogenous monetary policy shocks and the level factor movement is closely related to the technology shocks

the canadian macroeconomy and the yield curve an equilibrium based approach les auteurs elaborent et estiment un modele d equilibre general de la structure des taux d interet canadiens dans lequel la dynamique des principales variables macroeconomiques est representee sous une forme vectorielle autoregressive et reliee a celle de la structure des taux

market power screens willingness to pay what is the best way to reward innovation while prizes avoid deadweight loss intellectual property selects high social surplus projects optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex ante screening benefit and the ex post distortion it solves a multidimensional screening problem in the private information held by the innovator research cost quality and market size of the innovation the appropriate degree of market power is never full monopoly pricing and is determined by measurable market characteristics the inequality and elasticity of innovation supply making the analysis open to empirical calibration the framework has applications beyond ip policy to the optimal pricing of platforms or the optimal procurement of public infrastructure

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

heuristic thinking and limited attention in the car market can heuristic information processing affect important product markets analyzing over 22 million wholesale used car transactions we find evidence of left digit bias in the processing of odometer values whereby individuals focus on the number s leftmost digits the bias leads to discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10 000 mile odometer thresholds along with smaller drops at 1 000 mile thresholds these findings reveal that information processing heuristics matter even in markets with large stakes and easily observed information we model left digit bias in an inattention framework and structurally estimate the inattention parameter empirical patterns suggest the results are driven by final customers rather than professional agents jel d12 d44 d83 l81

estimating the effect of salience in wholesale and retail car markets we investigate whether the first digit of an odometer reading is more salient to consumers than subsequent digits we find that retail transaction prices and volumes of used vehicles drop discontinuously at 10 000 mile odometer thresholds echoing effects found in the wholesale market by lacetera pope and sydnor 2012 our results reveal that retail consumers devote limited attention to evaluating vehicle mileage and that this drives effects in the wholesale market we estimate the inattention parameter implied by the price discontinuities in addition our results suggest that estimating consumer level structural parameters using data from an intermediate market can give misleading results

knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection abstract we consider the problem of an inventor who discloses knowledge under the threat of a rival who may patent a competing idea disclosure diminishes the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent legal externality but it also decreases the rival s marginal r d cost knowledge externality our results reveal that i when the knowledge externality is large small relative to the legal one an increase decrease in the patentability standard leads to higher disclosure and promotes r d and ii if subsequent research creates positive external effects the patentability standard should be set to promote further disclosure and r d in equilibrium the impact on the equilibrium configuration of changes in market profits is also examined

patents vs trade secrets knowledge licensing and spillover we develop a model of two stage cumulative research and development rd yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high if the extent of leakage is lower more rus choose open sales generating a nonmonotonic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights and aggregate r d expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either du jel d23 o32 o34

1 000 cash back the pass through of auto manufacturer promotions automobile manufacturers frequently use promotions involving cash incentives while payments are nominally directed to either customers or dealers the ultimate beneficiary of the promotion depends on the outcome of price negotiation we use program evaluation methods to compare the incidence of these two types of promotions customers obtain 70 to 90 percent of a customer rebate but only 30 to 40 percent of a dealer discount promotion a 500 difference for a typical promotion our leading hypothesis is that pass through rates differ because of information asymmetries customer rebates are well publicized to customers while dealer discount promotions are not

a joint model for the term structure of interest rates and the macroeconomy we present and estimate a continuous time term structure model that incorporates observable macroeconomic variables and latent variables with a clear macroeconomic interpretation our model is able to accurately describe the joint dynamics for us macroeconomic variables and the yield curve however the observable variables do not explain the long end of the term structure central tendencies of these macroeconomic variables do a much better job in this respect these unobservable factors also play an important role in the description of the interest rate policy rule both observable and non observable factors determine the risk premia and hence bond excess holding returns copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

how valuable is patent protection estimates by technology field i present evidence on the private value of patent rights in france for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal i find that the distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed that patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to r d and that these characteristics vary across technology fields i compute the r d cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights measure the variations in value of time technology fields and nationalities and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions we consider the design of regulatory policy when the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the firm s cost function and the demand function it faces to some extent the optimal policy here is the natural combination of the optimal policies when there is uncertainty only about either demand or cost important qualitative differences also exist however for example it may be optimal to set prices below marginal cost and the pricing authority delegated to the firm may be more limited when there is uncertainty about both cost and demand

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

the central bank as shaper and observer of events the case of the yield spread the yield spread has commonly been employed as a successful predictor of economic growth and recessions although its marginal predictive power has decreased since the 1990s notably the yield spread s declining power to predict us economic activity coincided with its growing power to predict us interest rate changes in my view these phenomena are inevitably linked and share one cause the central bank intended to enhance both its transparency and credibility through greater information disclosure this disclosure improved interest rate predictability but might also have crowded out useful private information formerly in the yield spread that helped predict economic activity

a survey of the economics of patent systems and procedures the last several decades have seen increases in patenting activity worldwide as well as growing issues related to patent quality in response to these quality issues a recent patent literature has emerged that investigates the behavior and incentives of patent examiners applicants and third parties in this paper we provide an overview of patent procedures patent systems and a survey of the new economic literature on patent systems both theoretical and empirical papers are considered policy implications coming from this literature are presented

speculation and the bond market an empirical no arbitrage framework an affine no arbitrage asset pricing framework is developed that allows for agents to have rational but heterogeneous expectations the framework can match both bond yields and the observed dispers

the dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents this article explores new data on the transfer and renewal of u s patents and interprets this new evidence using a model of patent transfers and renewal we find that the proportion of transferred patents is large and differs across technology fields and especially type of patentees we also find that the probability of a patent being traded depends on a number of factors the age of the patent the number of citations received by a given age the patent generality and whether the patent has been previously traded or not these findings are consistent with the predictions of a model of patent transfers and renewals

on the optimality of the patent renewal system the patent system is mainly a renewal system the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees i ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research in such a model i show that renewal mechanisms possibly with subsidies are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on regardless of the objective function under plausible circumstances patents should have a uniform life rather than varying in length as typically occurs under a renewal system

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

price discontinuities in an online market for used cars we study the price setting behavior in a competitive market for used cars and provide empirical evidence for coarse information processing based on detailed field data from one of europe s largest online marketplaces for automotive vehicles we document systematic and sizable price discontinuities at salient car age and mileage thresholds the price difference between two otherwise identical cars across registration years where one was first registered in january and the other in december of the previous year is up to five times larger than that between two cars first registered in any two subsequent months within a registration year a similar pattern can be observed in the mileage dimension at 10 000 km odometer marks which is in line with earlier findings in the literature being able to study discontinuities along two dimensions of the same good allows us to further our understanding toward a more general notion of inattentive behavior while our results are compatible with a behavioral model of l

perceptions of institutional quality evidence of limited attention to higher education rankings abstract rankings of colleges and universities provide information about quality and potentially affect where prospective students send applications for admission we find evidence of limited attention to the popular u s news and world report rankings of america s best colleges we estimate that applications discontinuously drop by 2 6 when the rank moves from inside the top 50 to outside the top 50 whereas there is no evidence of a corresponding discontinuous drop in institutional quality notably the ranking of 50 corresponds to the first page cutoff of the printed u s news guides the choice of college is typically a one time decision with potentially large repercussions so students limited attention to rankings likely represents an irrational bias that negatively affects welfare

feature the price of reconciliation part time work families and women s satisfaction while the gender pay gap has been narrowing for women in full time jobs the pay penalty for the 40 of women who work part time has risen reflecting the growing polarisation of part time jobs in low wage occupations a further dimension is that women often experience downgrading from higher skill full time into lower skill part time occupations as women reorganise their working lives around the presence of children their reported hours and job satisfaction are highest in part time work but life satisfaction is scarcely affected by hours of work this feature explores these issues and their challenge for economic efficiency as well as gender equity

expectation puzzles time varying risk premia and dynamic models of the term structure abstract linear projections of returns on the slope of the yield curve have contradicted the implications of the traditional expectations theory this paper shows that these findings are not puzzling relative to a large class of richer dynamic term structure models specifically we match all the key empirical findings reported by fama and bliss 1987 american economic review 77 4 680 692 and campbell and shiller 1991 review of economic studies 58 495 514 among others within large subclasses of affine and quadratic gaussian term structure models additionally we show that certain risk premium adjusted projections of changes in yields on the slope of the yield curve recover the coefficients of unity predicted by the models key to this matching are parameterizations of the market prices of risk that let the risk factors affect the market prices of risk directly and not only through factor volatilities the risk premiums have a simple form consistent with fama s findings on the predictability of forward rates and are also shown to be consistent with interest rate feedback rules used by a monetary authority in setting monetary policy

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

bias in market r d portfolios abstract based on a simple contest model of product innovation we find that in accordance with conventional wisdom and contrary to much of the previous theoretical literature market competition implies an equilibrium level of risk which is too low from society s standpoint the intuition is that the divergence between private and social marginal benefits from rd and this probability is higher for lower risk projects

international standards for intellectual property protection and r d incentives abstract we examine the effect of alternative standards for intellectual property protection uniform protection based on the gatt principle of non discrimination provides domestic and foreign firms with the same level of protection discriminatory protection based on section 337 of the u s trade laws provides different levels of protection depending upon where the firm is located we show that discriminatory protection may not increase and may decrease domestic r d the effect of asymmetric patent protection depends on whether the rivals have pre existing products on the costs of r d and on the value of the potential innovation

bond yields and the federal reserve bond yields respond to policy decisions by the federal reserve and vice versa to learn about these responses i model a high frequency policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrage free bond market in continuous time the fed s target is a pure jump process jump intensities depend on the state of the economy and the meeting calendar of the federal open market committee the model has closed form solutions for yields as functions of a few state variables introducing monetary policy helps to match the whole yield curve because the target is an observable state variable that pins down its short end and introduces important seasonalities around fomc meetings the volatility of yields is snake shaped which the model explains with policy inertia the policy rule crucially depends on the two year yield and describes fed policy better than taylor rules

your loss is my gain a recruitment experiment with framed incentives empirically labor contracts that financially penalize failure induce higher effort provision than economically identical contracts presented as paying a bonus for success an effect attributed to loss aversion this is puzzling as penalties are infrequently used in practice the most obvious explanation is selection loss averse agents are unwilling to accept such contracts i formalize this intuition then run an experiment to test it surprisingly i find that workers were 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection consistent with the existing literature penalty contracts also increased performance on the job by 0 2 standard deviations i outline extensions to the basic theory that are consistent with the main results but argue that more research is needed on the long term effects of penalty contracts if we want to understand why firms seem unwilling to use them

the goal gradient effect and repayments in consumer credit abstract based on a unique dataset i show that repayments in consumer credit increase with the proximity of a borrower s current debt level to the debt level with the next lower leftmost digit this behavior is consistent with the goal gradient effect the effect is only observed for borrowers who have not committed to monthly minimum repayments

nash implementation a complete characterization the authors extend e maskin s results on nash implementation first they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for nash implementability if there are three or more agents the case covered by maskin s sufficiency result second and more important they examine the two agent case for which there existed no general sufficiency results the two agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining for this case too they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient the authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments copyright 1990 by the econometric society

taxes and borrower behavior evidence from the mortgage interest deductibility limit abstract this paper estimates the behavioral response to mortgage interest tax deductibility by studying the discrete change in the net of tax marginal interest rate that occurs at 1 million in mortgage debt using data on 2004 2016 mortgage originations i estimate excess bunching in the loan distribution based on a counterfactual that accounts for bunching at salient loan amounts findings suggest excess of about 54 000 loans at the deductibility limit or 4 5 of the sample the level of bunching implies an average reduction in borrowing around the 1 million limit of 9 4 percent and mortgage demand elasticities between 0 132 to 0 115 for home purchase loans estimated elasticities imply that from 2004 2016 the mid induced 49 52 billion in deadweight loss in the mortgage market

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

openness open source and the veil of ignorance author s scotchmer suzanne abstract the open source movement evolved in the one industrial context where openness is not required by intellectual property law 1 nevertheless openness itself cannot be the driving force behind the open source movement this is because openness can be achieved in many ways other than the gpl for example with proprietary licenses or licenses that are even more permissive than the gpl such as the bsd license early commentators explained this new development model by focussing on the motives of the programmer such as to demonstrate skills see the survey by stephen m maurer and suzanne scotchmer 2006 but firms also participate in open source collaborations sometimes contributing significant resources joachim henkel 2006 dirk riehle 2009 doing so can be profitable even if the contributors are rivals in the market the quality improvements or cost reductions provided by a rival s open source contributions may outweigh the deleterious effect of empowering the rival to be a better competitor

patent protection in the shadow of infringement simulation estimations of patent value empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas computers textiles combustion engines and pharmaceuticals using new patent data for west germany 1953 1988 patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement the evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10 of related r d expenditure

r d in the pharmaceutical industry a world of small innovations it is commonly argued that in recent years pharmaceutical companies have targeted their research and development r d at small improvements of existing compounds instead of riskier drastic innovations in this paper we show that the bias in the pharmaceutical industry toward small innovations might be driven by the low sensitivity of the demand in particular small innovations get a proportionally larger reward because pharmaceutical firms target them at the inelastic segments of the demand as a consequence firms find it relatively more profitable to invest in small innovations we also study the effect on r d incentives of marketing strategies and regulatory instruments aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure

the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market interest rates in the 1970s abstract this paper examines the influence of monetary policy on interest rates by estimating the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target the federal reserve s policy instrument on market interest rates in the 1970s we find that changes in the target caused large movements in short term rates and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long term rates we hypothesize that the similarity of the reactions of three six and twelve month rates to changes in the target offers a possible explanation for the lack of support for the expectations theory from studies that have tested the theory using these rates

macro factors and the term structure of interest rates this paper presents an essentially affine model of the term structure of interest rates making use of macroeconomic factors and their long run expectations the model extends the approach pioneered by kozicki and tinsley 2001 by modeling consistently long run inflation expectations simultaneously with the term structure application to the u s economy shows the importance of long run inflation expectations in the modeling of long term bond yields the paper also provides a macroeconomic interpretation for the latent factors found in standard finance models of the yield curve the level factor represents the long run inflation expectation of agents the slope factor captures business cycle conditions and the curvature factor expresses a clear independent monetary policy factor

the quality factor in patent systems this article develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in three major patent systems quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with the patentability conditions in a transparent way the methodology consists of a two layer analytical framework encompassing legal standards ls and their operational design od which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process the comparison of patent systems in europe japan and the united states shows that their operational designs differ substantially the european system provides higher quality and more expensive examination services than the united states one while the japanese patent system is in an intermediate position the results illustrate that different system designs lead to different outcomes in terms of backlogs patent propensity and the number of dubious patent rights in force in this respect these findings i provide an empirical validation of the conjecture of a vicious cycle linking the quality of examination and demand for patents and ii highlight the need for a multifaceted convergence of patent systems before mutual recognition is put in place the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information abstract firms reveal private information about the value of investment through their investment decisions as a consequence they may have ex post regret once they see other firms investments we define a notion of rational expectations equilibrium for games which imposes a no regret property in this equilibrium all firms make the same investment decision but despite the absence of ex post regret the investment herd can be inefficient in addition equilibrium might not exist we introduce a notion of probabilistic existence and identify conditions under which if the number of firms is large enough information comes out so that investment herds are first best efficient with high probability and equilibrium exists with high probability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c7 d8

a macro finance model of the term structure monetary policy and the economy this paper develops and estimates a macro finance model that combines a canonical affine no arbitrage finance specification of the term structure with standard macroeconomic aggregate relationships for output and inflation from this new empirical formulation we obtain several interesting results 1 the latent term structure factors from finance no arbitrage models appear to have important macroeconomic and monetary policy underpinnings 2 there is no evidence of monetary policy inertia or a slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate by the federal reserve and 3 both forward looking and backward looking elements play important roles in macroeconomic dynamics

on limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress the effect of patent scope decisions abstract this essay is on the effects of the scope of a patent e g how broad its allowed claims on subsequent inventing in a field it is argued that this depends on the topography of technical advance in a field in particular on how inventions are linked to each other and in the extent to which rapid technical advance requires a diversity of actors and minds as contrasted with being facilitated by express coordination of inventive activity technical advance is examined in several different fields with a focus on how patents influenced the pace and quality of development the authors conclude that allowing and enforcing broad patent claims tends to hinder technical progress

the fed and interest rates a high frequency identification we measure monetary policy shocks as changes in the fed funds target rate that surprise bond markets in daily data these shock series avoid the omitted variable time varying parameter and orthogonalization problem of monthly vars and do not impose the expectations hypothesis we find surprisingly large and persistent responses of bond yields to these shocks 10 year rates rise as much as 8 10 of a percent to a one percent target shock the usual view that monetary policy only temporarily raises long term rates and influences inflation would lead one to predict a negative long rate response this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the term structure of inflation expectations we use information in the term structure of survey based forecasts of inflation to estimate a factor hidden in the nominal yield curve we construct a model that accommodates forecasts over multiple horizons from multiple surveys and treasury real and nominal yields by allowing for differences between risk neutral subjective and objective probability measures we establish that model based inflation expectations are driven by inflation output and one latent factor we find that this factor affects inflation expectations at all horizons but has almost no effect on the nominal yields that is the latent factor is hidden we show that this hidden factor is not related to either current and past inflation or the standard set of macro variables studied in the literature consistent with the theoretical property of a hidden factor our model outperforms a standard macro finance model in its forecasting of inflation and yields

the role of fees in patent systems theory and evidence this paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems two main research questions are usually addressed the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application or pre grant fees and renewal or post grant fees depending on the structural context and policy objectives the paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of 30 patent offices worldwide it is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age 2012 john wiley sons ltd

on platforms incomplete contracts and open source software abstract we analyze investment incentives for a firm a owning a software platform and an application and a firm b deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform while b s entry helps the success of the platform b fears ex post expropriation by a and is hence reluctant to enter and invest we show that different platform governance structures prevalent in the information and communication technology industry integrated proprietary standardized open source platform serve to balance investment incentives for the platform and for the applications

inter industry r d spillovers what difference do they make the analytical framework of d aspremont and jacquemin the american economic review 1988 78 1133 1137 is extended to a two industry two firm perindustry model allowing for r d spillovers to occur within industries as well as between industries in the first part of the paper we analyze the impact of intra and inter industry r d spillovers on the level of strategic r d investments output profits and total welfare when firms compete in both the r d and output stage in the second part we compare the equilibrium outcomes that result from r d cooperation which includes both intra and inter industry r d agreements inter industry r d spillovers have a very important effect on a firm s incentives to invest in r d both directly and indirectly because of their influence on the likely impact of intra industry r d spillovers also r d agreements that cut across industries may be more socially beneficial than cooperatives whose membership comes from a single industry

encouraging private sector research for tropical agriculture summary agricultural needs in poor tropical countries differ significantly from those in temperate rich countries yet little agricultural research is performed on products for the tropics private research is particularly concentrated in rich countries this is a result of significant failures in the market for research and development r d in particular the difficulty of preventing the resale of seed in developing countries to encourage private r d in tropical agriculture traditional funding of research may be usefully supplemented by a commitment to reward developers of specific new agricultural technologies rewards tied to adoption may be especially useful in increasing up take an illustration of how a commitment to reward developers of new agricultural technologies might work is provided

is the general public licence a rational choice open source projects are networks of developers distributors and end users of non proprietary created knowledge goods it has been argued that this form of organization has some advantages over the firm or market coordination i show that for sufficiently convex and modular projects proprietary licences are not able to sustain sequential knowledge production which however can be carried out if the project is run on the open source basis

is there a wage premium for volunteer oss engagement signalling learning and noise abstractvolunteer based open source production has become a significant new model for the organization of software development economics often pictures this phenomenon as a case of signalling individuals engage in the volunteer programming of open source software oss as a labour market signal resulting in a wage premium yet this explanation could so far not be empirically tested this article fills this gap by estimating an upper bound composite wage premium of voluntary oss contributions and by separating the potential signalling effect of oss engagement from other effects although some 70 of oss contributors believe that oss involvement benefits their careers we find no actual labour market premium for oss engagement the presence of other motives such as fun of play or altruism renders oss contributions too noisy to function as a signal

patent office in innovation policy nobody s perfect abstract the number of patent applications and bad patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years based on this trend we study the overload problem within the patent office and its consequences on the firms r d incentives we assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect and that its quality is poorer under congestion depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non obviousness requirement the system may result in a high r d equilibrium in which firms self select in their patent applications or in an equilibrium with low r d opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents multiple equilibria often co exist which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments we investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy

patents imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic r d race abstract rd some may have an advantage in early stages of the r d process while others may have advantages in other stages of the process this paper uses a two firm asymmetric ability multistage r d race model to analyze the effect of patents imitations and licensing arrangements on the speed of innovation firm value and consumers surplus by using numerical analyses to study the mpe of the r d race the paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a weak patent protection regime that facilitates free imitation of any intermediate technology may yield a higher consumers surplus and total surplus than a regime that awards a patent for the final innovation the advantage of imitation may hold even when we allow for voluntary licensing of intermediate technologies

the consumption based capital asset pricing model the paper provides conditions on the primitives of a continuous time economy under which there exist equilibria obeying the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm the paper also extends the equilibrium characterization of interest rates of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 to multi agent economies we do not use a markovian state assumption this work provides sufficient conditions on agents primitives for the validity of the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm of breeden 1979 as a necessary condition breeden showed that in a continuous time equilibrium satisfying certain regularity conditions one can characterize returns on securities as follows the expected instantaneous rate of return on any security in excess of the riskless interest rate the security s expected excess rate of return is a multiple common to all securities of the instantaneous covariance of this excess return with aggregate consumption increments this common multiple is the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion of a representative agent rubinstein 1976 published a discrete time precursor of this result the exis tence of equilibria satisfying breeden s regularity conditions had been an open issue we also show that the validity of the ccapm does not depend on breeden s assumption of markov state information and present a general asset pricing model extending the results of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 as well as the discrete time results of rubinstein 1976 and lucas 1978 to a multi agent environment since the ccapm was first proposed much effort has been directed at finding sufficient conditions on the model primitives the given assets the agents preferences the agents consumption endowments and in a production econ omy the feasible production sets conditions sufficient for the existence of continuous time equilibria were shown in duffie 1986 but the equilibria demonstrated were not shown to satisfy the additional regularity required for the ccapm in particular breeden assumed that all agents choose pointwise interior consumption rates in order to characterize asset prices via the first order conditions of the bellman equation interiority was also assumed by huang 1987 in demonstrating a representative agent characterization of equilibrium an approach exploited here the use of dynamic programming and the bellman equation aside from the difficulty it imposes in verifying the existence of interior 1 financial support from the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged we thank

on the effectiveness of patenting strategies in innovation races which if any of a firm s inventions should it patent should it patent at all many companies engaged in an innovation race seek a patenting strategy that balances protection of their intellectual property against the knowledge spillovers resulting from disclosure requirements not much is known about factors that determine the patenting strategy best able to resolve this trade off although scholars in various management economics and engineering disciplines have researched patents and patenting regimes little work has addressed the normative issues that pertain to forming an appropriate firm level patenting strategy we develop an inventory of real life patenting strategies and integrate them into a coherent framework our simulation model characterizes the optimal patenting choices for different environmental and firm level contingencies while capturing the dynamics between competing firms we identify the firm s research and development strategy as the most salient determinant of its optimal patenting strategy our research contributes to establishing a contingency theory of patenting strategies this paper was accepted by david hsu entrepreneurship and innovation

a theory of grand innovation prizes abstract the past decade has witnessed a resurgence in innovation awards in particular of grand innovation prizes gips which are rewards to innovators developing technologies reaching performance goals and requiring breakthrough solutions gips typically do not preclude the winner also obtaining patent rights this is in stark contrast with mainstream economics of innovation theories where prizes and patents are substitute ways to generate revenue and encourage innovation building on the management of innovation literature which stresses the difficulty to specify ex ante all the technical features of the winning technologies we develop a model in which innovative effort is multi dimensional and only a subset of innovation tasks can be measured and contracted upon we show that in this environment patent rights and cash rewards are complements and that gips are often preferable to patent races or prizes requiring technologies to be placed in the public domain moreover our model uncovers a tendency for patent races to encourage speed of discovery over quality of innovation which can be corrected by gips we explore robustness to endogenous entry costly public funds and incomplete information by gip organizers on the surplus created by the technology

r d spillovers patents and the incentives to innovate in japan and the united states national surveys of r d labs across the manufacturing sectors in the us and japan show that intraindustry r d knowledge flows and spillovers are greater in japan than in the us and the appropriability of rents due to innovation less patents in particular are observed to play a more central role in diffusing information across rivals in japan and appear to be a key reason for greater intraindustry r d spillovers there suggesting that patent policy can importantly affect information flows uses of patents differ between the two nations with strategic uses of patents particularly for negotiations being more common in japan

an economic analysis of deferred examination system evidence from a policy reform in japan we investigate how a deferred patent examination system promotes ex ante screening of patent applications which reduces both the number of granted patents and the use of economic resources for examinations without reducing the return from r d based on a real option theory we develop a model of examination request behaviors exploiting the responses of japanese firms to recent policy reform we find that the shortening of the allowable period for an examination request significantly increases both eventual and early requests controlling for the blocking use of a pending patent application this effect is stronger in technology areas with higher uncertainty these results support the importance of uncertainty for an applicant and of ex ante screening

expectations bond yields and monetary policy through explicitly incorporating analysts forecasts as observable factors in a dynamic arbitrage free model of the yield curve this research proposes a framework for studying the impact of shifts in market sentiment on interest rates of all maturities an empirical examination reveals that survey expectations about inflation output growth and the anticipated path of monetary policy actions contain important information for explaining movements in bond yields estimates from a forward looking monetary policy rule suggest that the central bank exhibits a preemptive response to inflationary expectations while accommodating output growth and monetary policy expectations forecasted gdp growth plays a significant role in explaining time variation in the market prices of risk the sensitivity of long yields is linked to the persistence of expected inflation under the risk neutral measure models of this type may provide traders and policymakers with a new set of tools for formally assessing the reaction of bond yields to shifts in market expectations the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

some simple economics of gm food genetically modified food evaluating the econamic risks public opposition to the genetic engineering of food crops gm food has not been based solely on concern about biological risks economic risks have been widely cited too the fear that the world s food supply will be concentrated in the hands of a few large firms the fear that such firms will engage or are already engaging in anti competitive practices and the fear of the transfer of ownership rights over genetic resources to the private sector are these fears justified we argue that the gm food industry may be on course for further consolidation and this could be anti competitive in fact policymakers face a dilemma a stringent regulatory approval process enhances food safety but at the cost of increasing market concentration we argue also that the integration of seed and agri chemical manufacturers may bias the introduction of gm traits in undesirable directions some business practices such as tie in contracts between seeds and complementary products such as herbicides may have an exclusionary motive that warrants scrutiny on anti competitive grounds while some other practices such as the use of terminator genes appear more benign finally we argue against granting patents on genes or even on gene functions doing so may delay the development of socially beneficial applications dietmar harhoff pierre regibeau and katharine rockett

accounting for a shift in term structure behavior with no arbitrage and macro finance models this paper examines a shift in the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates in the u s during the mid 1980s we document this shift using standard interest rate regressions and using dynamic a ne no arbitrage models estimated for the pre and post shift subsamples the term structure shift largely appears to be the result of changes in the pricing of risk associated with a level factor using a macro nance model we suggest a link between this shift in term structure behavior and changes in the dynamics and risk pricing of the federal reserve s in ation target as perceived by investors

uncertainty spillovers and cooperative r d abstract this paper extends the literature on cooperative r d in an oligopoly with spillovers the model has three new features it introduces uncertainty focuses on spillover of innovation instead of effort spillover and offers a new definition of the research joint venture rjv the rjv is an arrangement to coordinate r d efforts and also to share the innovation firms form an rjv only if the innovation raises flow industry profit but independently of the speed of spillovers and the degree of uncertainty the model is robust when we allow for licensing the single lab endogenous spillovers and r d effort spillovers