the spread of municipal reform temporal spatial and social dynamics the adoption of commission and managerial administrative structures and their subsequent abandonment by the 267 largest american cities during the period 1900 1942 is studied using event history methods full period equations show no significant direct effect of percentage catholic culture clash or population size hierarchical diffussion and only a modest impact of city age modernization a strong effect from average annual manufacturing wages is found but in a direction contrary to that posited by the class conflict hypothesis the variable affecting transition rates most strongly appears to be regional adoption percentages an indicator of neighborhood diffusion these findings suggest revisions of the conventional image of the municipal reform experience

bureaucracy infrastructure and economic growth evidence from u s cities during the progressive era recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish i hypothesize that establishment of such a bureaucracy will lengthen the period that public decision makers are willing to wait to realize the benefits of expenditures leading to allocation of a greater proportion of government resources to long gestation period projects such as infrastructure this hypothesis can be tested using data generated by a natural experiment in the early part of this century when a wave of municipal reform transformed the governments of many u s cities controlling for city and time effects adoption of civil service is found to increase the share of total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment other estimates imply that this increased share raises the growth rate of city manufacturing employment by one half percent per year this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the price of innovation new estimates of drug development costs the research and development costs of 68 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms these data were used to estimate the average pre tax cost of new drug development the costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval the estimated average out of pocket cost per new drug is us 403 million 2000 dollars capitalizing out of pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11 yields a total pre approval cost estimate of us 802 million 2000 dollars when compared to the results of an earlier study with a similar methodology total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7 4 above general price inflation 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

agglomeration adjustment and state policies in the location of foreign direct investment in the united states abstract using u s state level data we show that agglomeration externalities influence the level of foreign invested capital in a location our empirical model allows the separation of agglomeration effects from the rate of capital stock adjustment two forces that previous research has conflated we estimate an agglomeration elasticity of investment of 0 11 to 0 15 with respect to same source country investment lower than previous estimates we also investigate the influence of state policies and find that although general investment incentives do not affect the location of fdi targeted policies such as unitary taxation and state foreign offices influence investment

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

on the licensing of a technology with unknown use abstract we consider the problem facing the patentee of a technology that may be used to reduce the costs of firms in an industry the technology s ability to cut costs depends on a use for it being discovered and the patentee has the option of trying to discover the use before licensing the technology to the firms should the patentee try to answer this question we model the interaction between the patentee and the firms as a game in extensive form the first move in the game belongs to the patentee deciding whether to carry a trial next there is a licensing stage followed by cournot competition involving licensees and nonlicensees we show that if a failure leads to the belief that the technology is most likely useless to the firms then not trying to discover the use is optimal even if a trial is free of pecuniary costs

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

the u s patent system in transition policy innovation and the innovation process abstract this paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the u s and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change it also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few possible reasons for these limited results are discussed and possible avenues for future research are suggested

optimizing inventory s contribution to profitability in a regulated utility the averch johnson effect the averch johnson effect is a well known economic phenomenon through which regulated utility companies prefer a capital resource input combination that differs from an efficient level through dynamic network data envelopment analysis ndea this paper first investigates the existence of this effect on a dynamic input that is inventory the analysis was performed for a group of public electric utilities from 2005 to 2014 the result implies that these firms procure a significant extra amount in inventory materials and supplies beyond their efficient levels in order to explore the connection of this effect to profit motives we construct an analytical model of the inventory policy controlling the extra buying of material and supplies that will be inventoried and added to the firm s rate base the model is based on maximizing the net present value of total profits in the deterministic case two results are observed i the firm could achieve a finite optimum by adding a finite amount of inventory above the normal base level which assumes no impact of inventory on the rate hearing and ii the firm could theoretically achieve infinite optimum under the unconstrained model the primary contribution of this paper is the special case of extending typical inventory replenishment models to including the impact on prices and in turn profits in a regulated supply chain

estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals a case study of quinolones in india under the trips agreement wto members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals the debate about the merits of this requirement has been extremely contentious many low income economies claim that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines with adverse consequences for the health and well being of their citizens on the other hand research based global pharmaceutical companies argue that prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes in this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims central to the ongoing debate is the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where because health insurance coverage is so rare almost all medical expense are met out of pocket using a detailed product level data set from india we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply side parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub segment of the systemic anti bacterials i e antibiotics segment of the indian pharmaceuticals market we then use these estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices profits and consumer welfare would have been had the fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in india as they were in the u s at the time our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of trips may have some basis we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing the total annual welfare losses to the indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub segment would be on the order of u s 450 million or about 73 of the sales of the entire systemic anti bacterials segment in 2000 of this amount foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly 50 million or 11 the overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare in contrast the profit gains to foreign producers in the absence of any price regulation are estimated to be only around 53 million per year

single item optimal lot sizing under continuous unit cost decrease abstract an important characteristic of high tech industries is decreasing component unit cost over time in this paper we develop an inventory model for products experiencing continuous decrease in unit cost unlike earlier models which were restricted to equal cycle times we allow cycle times of varying length we develop a fast algorithm for identifying an optimal or near optimal solution to the model and test the performance of the algorithm we illustrate the models with numerical examples

do economic effects justify the use of fiscal incentives the community of location this presumption serves as the basis for the granting of lucrative economic development incentives to footloose businesses this article examines whether large mobile firms generate significant net benefits for the region of location panel data and nonrandom estimation techniques are applied to a primary database of large firms that made location decisions in the 1980s to explore the impact of location on regional economic performance the empirical analysis explores different treatment regions both effects within the county and the metropolitan statistical area msa of location and different control regions the results show that large firms fail to produce significant net benefits for their host communities calling into question the high stakes bidding war over jobs and investment

environmental policy and the international diffusion of cleaner energy technologies technology transfer is an important channel of technological change and sustainable development for countries with less innovative ability than technological leaders this paper studies whether domestic environmental policies affect the inward technology transfer of cleaner innovation from abroad we focus specifically on the power sector for its important role in the decarbonization process by looking at zero carbon renewable and carbon saving efficient fossil technologies for energy production using data on cross country patent applications we provide evidence that environmental policy contributes to attracting foreign cleaner technology options to oecd markets but not to non oecd markets we show that this is due to the nature of the implemented policy instruments market based approaches positively impact technology transfer to both oecd and non oecd economies while non market based approaches have at best only a weak effect in oecd countries domestic environmental policies may provide too weak a signal for foreign innovators in countries off the technological frontier this calls for a strengthening of policy incentives for technology transfer in light of pressing climate change objectives

entrepreneurial finance and innovation an introduction and agenda for future research the increasingly large role played by financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists and angels in nurturing entrepreneurial firms and in promoting product market innovation has led to great research interest in the area of entrepreneurial finance and innovation this paper introduces the special issue of the review of financial studies dedicated to entrepreneurial finance and innovation and highlights some of the promising topics for future research in this area the special issue combines papers presented at the june 2010 entrepreneurial finance and innovation efic conference which was jointly sponsored by the kauffman foundation and the review of financial studies with other related papers

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

light emitting diodes and the lighting revolution the emergence of a solid state lighting industry emergence of new industries from evolving technologies is critical to the global economy yet has been relatively understudied due to the paucity of available data this study draws lessons on industry emergence by analyzing how a solid state lighting ssl industry grew out of light emitting diode led technologies that evolved for half a century with participation by tens of thousands of researchers in universities national laboratories and firms using data on publications patents and firms combined with business history we trace the evolution of ssl through a succession of market niches at times a few researchers with unorthodox research approaches made breakthroughs that greatly advanced particular technology trajectories and pushed led research in unexpected directions a succession of led market niches advanced the technology and provided profits to incentivize continuing research while reducing cost and improving efficacy of leds innovating firms developed a thicket of patents and captured substantial profit but were embroiled in extensive litigation that was ultimately resolved through cross licensing a major new generation of lighting products is now disrupting the traditional lighting industry although the leading incumbent lighting firms all invested early and heavily in ssl the industry s future leadership is uncertain

rent seeking and innovation innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development innovations are less socially useful but more profitable for the innovator when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist for this reason rent seeking both public and private plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations this paper examines the political economy of intellectual property analyzing the trade off between private and public rent seeking while it is true in principle that public rent seeking may be a substitute for private rent seeking it is not true that this results always either in less private rent seeking or in a welfare improvement when the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally we may experience the worst of public and private rent seeking together

a dynamic model of open source vs proprietary r d abstract we propose a dynamic model in which firms compete to produce sequential and cumulative innovations and in which the more firms do research in one sector the more likely it is that one of them innovates firms choose research effort and whether to patent innovations or to use an open source license like the general public license we show that i patents generate a larger stationary reward but foreclose research within a sector and that ii open source generates a smaller stationary reward but allows everyone to use the technology and therefore by attracting firms to the sector it induces a faster pace of innovation we characterize all the equilibria of the model and show that in equilibrium an open source sector appears only after a proprietary sector we also find conditions under which the model has a unique equilibrium in which a proprietary and an open source sector coexist and compete in the short run but the open source sector dominates the industry in the long run we use our model to study whether patents are inefficient and to explain firms behavior in the software and the biomedical industry

optimal ordering strategies for announced price increases the familiar model for determining the optimal ordering strategy given an announced price increase assumes that the buyer has an opportunity to place an order at the end of the next economic order quantity cycle before the price increase takes effect this paper extends the price increase model by relaxing the requirement on the timing of the price increase specifically we develop optimal ordering strategies for situations where the price increase becomes effective at any future specified time we also calculate savings for alternate ordering strategies

evaluating the impact of investment incentives the case of italy s law 488 1992 abstract italy s law 488 1992 allows firms willing to invest in lagging areas to receive a public subsidy by comparing subsidized firms with firms with rejected applications this paper evaluates whether the program made investments possible that otherwise would not have been made we find evidence that financed firms brought forward investment projects originally planned for the post intervention period to take advantage of the incentives we also find some support that subsidized firms may have taken some of the investment opportunities that unsubsidized firms would have exploited in the absence of incentives

joint dynamic pricing and lot sizing under competition abstract we study the joint dynamic pricing and lot sizing problem when firms operate in a competitive environment bearing in mind that a dynamic pricing strategy is successful when customers understand it we assume each firm selects prices from a discrete set the problem corresponds to a bertrand model so the pricing strategies of the firms should constitute a nash equilibrium given the combinatorial nature of the decisions computing the equilibrium in a tractable time may not be feasible for larger instances in order to compute the equilibrium efficiently we propose a framework consisting of solving iteratively mixed integer programming formulations the framework reduces the complexity of the problem by using the fact that pricing and inventory planning remain stable to marginal variations in competitors prices

how do patent laws influence innovation evidence from nineteenth century world fairs studies of innovation have focused on the effects of patent laws on the number of innovations but have ignored effects on the direction of technological change this paper introduces a new dataset of close to fifteen thousand innovations at the crystal palace world s fair in 1851 and at the centennial exhibition in 1876 to examine the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation the paper tests the following argument if innovative activity is motivated by expected profits and if the effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries then innovation in countries without patent laws should focus on industries where alternative mechanisms to protect intellectual property are effective analyses of exhibition data for 12 countries in 1851 and 10 countries in 1876 indicate that inventors in countries without patent laws focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important while innovation in countries with patent laws appears to be much more diversified these findings suggest that patents help to determine the direction of technical change and that the adoption of patent laws in countries without such laws may alter existing patterns of comparative advantage across countries jel d2 k11 l51 no 014

leaders and followers perspectives on the nordic model and the economics of innovation abstract what kinds of social and economic systems are most conducive to innovation we formulate a simple model in which countries can close the gap with the technological leader but where the cost of doing so may be so high that the country chooses to remain laggards observed disparities in productivity may be the result of a recognition that the cost of closing the gap exceeds benefit and there may therefore exist an international equilibrium in which there are leaders and followers even if it is granted that the united states is the leader and scandinavia are followers there are theoretical grounds for arguing that the nordic model may in fact be better for innovation suggesting that if the us adopted some of the nordic institutions innovations would be higher and societal welfare would be improved even more

one time only incentives and inventory policies abstract this paper presents a review of the literature available on inventory policies under incentives on a one time only basis it is quite a common industrial practice to offer special incentives to motivate the buyer to order in larger than regular order quantities such special deals are available for a limited time only the literature on inventory policies under conditions of incentives has been classified by the nature of incentives such as price discount and credit period a situation of announced price increase which is very similar to price discount is also reviewed the policy implications of various scenarios are highlighted and areas of future research are identified

optimal ordering policies under conditions of extended payment privileges this paper develops optimal order quantities for firms that are offered a one time opportunity to delay payment for an order of a commodity such delayed payments result in a reduction of the effective purchase cost which is a function of the return available on alternative investments the number of units of the commodity ordered and the length of the extended period optimal order quantities are developed for extended payment privileges that occur at a reorder point of between reorder points six suppliers extended payment scenarios are evaluated a simulation analysis is conducted to determine the sensitivity of derived models to changes in the various input parameters the simulation with realistic parameter values reveals that the additional discounted order quantity is insensitive to large changes in the ordering cost and unit price sensitive to changes in the carrying cost and return rate of funds but without significantly affecting the total cost and extremely sensitive to the annual demand

the case against patents evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity unless productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equiboth theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on librium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects strong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generstrong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from ally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with

dynamic lot sizing with price changes and price dependent holding costs abstract this paper proposes a new formulation of the dynamic lot sizing problem with price changes which considers the unit inventory holding costs in a period as a function of the procurement decisions made in previous periods in section 1 the problem is defined and some of its fundamental properties are identified a dynamic programming approach is developed to solve it when solutions are restricted to sequential extreme flows and results from location theory are used to derive an o t 2 algorithm which provides a provably optimal solution of an integer linear programming formulation of the general problem in section 2 a heuristic is developed for the case where the inventory carrying rates and the order costs are constant and where the item price can change once during the planning horizon permanent price increases permanent price decreases and temporary price reductions are considered in section 3 extensive testing of the various optimal and heuristic algorithms is reported our results show that in this context the two following intuitive actions usually lead to near optimal solutions accumulate stock at the lower price just prior to price increase and cut short on orders when a price decrease is imminent

optimal eoq for announced price increases in infinite horizon in this paper we consider an infinite horizon economic order quantity eoq model with single announced price increase with an option of placing a special order just before the price increase takes effect we extend earlier work where it is assumed that the special order is an integral multiple of the new eoq quantity in the process we show that when the assumption of integrality is not valid the earlier approach of minimizing the cost difference over a finite horizon is no longer valid and establish the periodicity of cost difference function next we show that the cesaro limit of the function exists and utilize that to derive the optimal special order quantity we find that the optimal special ordering policy is of s s type

intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation experimental evidence abstract in this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment we introduce a novel scrabble like word creation task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process we use this task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to impose license fees on their innovations we find intellectual property to have an adverse effect on welfare as innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated introducing communication among innovators does not reduce this detrimental effect introducing intellectual property results in more basic innovations with subjects failing to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths subjects act more self reliant and non optimally in order to avoid paying license fees our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovation especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes

economic policy economic performance and elections this paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy by assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office it is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income copyright 1993 by american economic association

recombinant innovation and the boundaries of the firm abstract recombinant innovation the combination of existing ideas is important for technological progress we want to understand how important market frictions are in stifling the transmission of ideas from one firm to another although the theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of these frictions direct empirical evidence on them is limited we use comprehensive data on patent applications from the european patent office and a multiple spells duration model to provide estimates that suggest that they are substantial it is around 30 more costly to successfully discover and utilize new ideas created in another firm than in your own this compares to the increased costs of accessing new ideas across national borders of around 7 and across technologies of around 20 these result point towards substantial imperfections in the market for technology

collective invention during the british industrial revolution the case of the cornish pumping engine in this paper we argue that together with individual inventors and firms what robert c allen 1983 has termed as collective invention settings that is settings in which rival firms freely release each other pertinent technical information were also a crucial source of innovation in the industrial revolution period until now this has been very little considered in the literature this paper focuses on one of these cases the cornish mining district in cornwall during the early nineteenth century a notable collective invention setting gradually emerged this case is particularly remarkable because it was capable of generating a continuous and sustained flow of improvements in steam pumping technology which in the end greatly contributed to improve the thermodynamic efficiency of the steam engine in this paper we study in detail the specific economic circumstances that led to the formation of this collective invention setting and we analyses its consequences for the rate of technological innovation

the life cycle of a competitive industry firm numbers first rise then later fall as an industry evolves this nonmonotonicity is explained using a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry and relative failure to innovate prompts exit equilibrium time paths for price and quantity also share features of the data the model is estimated using data from the u s automobile tire industry a particularly dramatic example of the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers

running out of steam a political incentive perspective of fdi inflows in china drawing on the sociological literature of state bureaucracy we develop a political incentive perspective on fdi inflows we argue that political term as a core feature of career advancement in state bureaucracy influences the incentives of newly appointed government officials and in turn their efforts toward achieving the state s goal of attracting fdi due to the mandatory retirement age which limits the career advancement officials in their first terms perceive that they have better chances of promotion and hence have stronger incentives to work toward advancement than those continuing to serve in the current position for the following term we test this argument by examining chinese city government leaders and fdi inflows in their cities from 2003 to 2010 using a difference in differences design the results show that first term leaders who are newly appointed after political turnover attract more fdi inflows than continuing leaders the difference is smaller when the new leaders are close to retirement but greater if they are appointed to cities with low prior gdp performance this study offers a new perspective on intra country fdi variations and extends the literature on the role of political institutions by investigating the political incentives of government officials

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

competing for global capital or local voters the politics of business location incentives the competition for global capital has led to interjurisdictional competition between countries states and cities as to who can offer the most attractive incentives to firms in this study we examine the domestic politics of this competition by focusing on incentive use in the united states from 1999 to 2012 we define incentives as the targeted tax deductions or exemptions that are used to lure businesses into a locality drawing on data from municipal incentive programs we examine how electoral competition shapes the use and oversight of targeted incentives we find evidence that cities with elected mayors provide larger incentives than non elected city managers by taking advantage of exogeneity in the assignment of city government institutions and a database of over 2000 investment incentives from 2010 to 2012 we also find that elected mayors enjoy more lax oversight of incentive projects than their appointed counterparts our results have important implications for the study of interjurisdictional competition and the role of electoral institutions in shaping economic policy

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

secrecy the patent puzzle and endogenous growth abstract endogenous growth models typically assume that innovations are protected solely by patents consequently they predict that strengthening patent protection stimulates innovation by increasing the private return to r d this contrasts with empirical evidence that 1 firms routinely employ a combination of patents and secrecy and 2 stronger patent regimes have been associated with increased patenting but not increased innovation a finding referred to as the patent puzzle in this paper i develop a novel model of endogenous growth that is consistent with this evidence successful innovators choose an appropriation strategy in the form of a patent secrecy mix both protection methods are imperfect and innovators face a trade off between secrecy s superior protection against imitation and patenting s protection against rival innovation i demonstrate that growth oriented policy changes generate important economic effects through their impact on the endogenous appropriation strategies of innovators

location taxation and governments an exchange theory of intellectual property abstract the standard economic model of intellectual property is an efficient property rights solution to a market failure problem of investment in a non rival and non excludable good we propose an exchange theory of intellectual property based on a contracting approach in the context of market making and enforcement of economic rights in exchange for monopoly taxation rights we use a hotelling 1929 type spatial model to show the relationship between location and pricing decisions of innovating firms under differing intellectual property institutional quality and taxation regimes