stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

spurious volatility in historical unemployment data this paper shows that the stabilization of the unemployment rate between the pre 1930 and post 1948 eras is an artifact of improvements in data collection procedures prewar methods are used to construct postwar unemployment data that are consistent with the historical data the constructed postwar series is nearly as volatile as the pre 1930 unemployment data the constructed postwar data are systematically more volatile than the actual postwar data because the cyclical behavior of the labor force and productivity are misspecified in the construction procedures the relationship between the actual and constructed postwar unemployment series is used to construct new historical data

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

the fisher hypothesis and the forecastability and persistence of inflation abstract for the period 1860 to 1939 the simple correlation of the u s commercial paper rate with the contemporaneous inflation rate is 0 17 the corresponding correlation for the period 1950 to 1979 is 0 71 this paper attributes this apparent change in the fisher relation to differences in the stochastic process of inflation rather than a change in any structural relationship between interest rates and expected inflation contrary to recent claims in the literature there is little evidence of inflation non neutrality in data from the pre world war i period

erratum to why has u s inflation become harder to forecast the article journal of money credit and banking supplement to vol 39 no 1 february 2007 contains errors in figures 2 4 and tables 4 5 associated with a coding error in our program for estimating the uc sv model we thank ling hu of platinum grove asset management for finding this error and bringing it to our attention the corrected uc sv rows for tables 4 and 5 are given below corrected versions of figures 2 4 and corrected replication files can be found at http www princeton edu mwatson

capital budgeting and delegation abstract as part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it in our model delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects therefore it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations this delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower level manager s preferences are assumed to be similar though not identical to those of the higher level

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

effective use of survey information in estimating the evolution of expected inflation the evolution of the term structure of expected u s inflation is modeled using survey data to provide timely information on structural change not contained in lagged inflation data to capture shifts in subjective perceptions the model is adaptive to long horizon survey expectations however even short horizon survey expectations inform shifting endpoint estimates that capture the lag between inflation and the perceived inflation target which anchors inflation expectations results show movements of the perceived target are an important source of inflation persistence and suggest historical u s monetary policy was not fully credible for much of the postwar sample

measuring price level uncertainty and instability in the united states 1850 2012 abstract we measure price level uncertainty and instability in the united states over the period 1850 to 2012 major outbreaks of price level uncertainty and instability occur both before and after world war ii alternating with three price level moderations one near the turn of the twentieth century another under bretton woods and a third in the 1990s there is no evidence that the price level was systematically more stable or less uncertain before or after world war ii moderations sometimes involved links to gold but the experience of the 1990s proves that a well managed fiat regime can achieve the same outcome

public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy a survey public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s since then the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned this article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy following early public choice economists many economists are researching how individuals interact without government from non public interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government although the economics of politics receives more attention the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice

investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes under inflation targeting estimates of the indexation parameter in hybrid new keynesian phillips curves are either equal to zero or very low in the united kingdom canada sweden and new zealand analogous results hold for the euro area under the european monetary union and for switzerland under the new monetary regime under stable regimes with clearly defined nominal anchors inflation appears to be purely forward looking these results question the notion that the intrinsic inflation persistence found in post wwii u s data is structural in the sense of lucas carnegie rochester conference series on public policy 1 1976 19 46 and suggest that hardwiring inflation persistence in macroeconomic models is potentially misleading

collusion and noncontrollable cost allocation controllability is often alleged to be an important consideration in constructing a managerial accounting system for performance evaluation practically all cost accounting textbooks recommend that a manager s evaluation should be confined to performance aspects that he can directly influence in the time period under consideration in contrast to this recommendation however firms allocate fixed and other joint costs to various departments even though such costs are apparently not controllable by department heads for example reece and cool indicated that 40 of 594 surveyed companies calculated income the same way for both internal decision and control purposes and for external reporting purposes and more than half of the remaining 60 also allocated corporate administrative expenses to calculate income for managerial purposes 2 not much is known about why companies continue to allocate those seemingly noncontrollable costs for internal decision and control purposes even though such allocations are apparently inconsistent with the concept of responsibility accounting 3 this study provides one possible

anniversary article a perspective on asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation the paper asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation by harris kriebel and raviv was published in the june 1982 issue ofmanagement science in this article written as part of this journal s 50 year anniversary celebration we highlight the significance of the harris et al paper for research in managerial accounting we first formulate and solve a continuous version of the harris et al model to illustrate the key assumptions and findings of their paper we then review several strands of the resource allocation literature in managerial accounting that have taken their inspiration either directly or indirectly from the work of harris et al

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

is deflation costly after all the perils of erroneous historical classifications i estimate average economic activity during periods of inflation and deflation while accounting for measurement errors in 19th century prices these measurement errors lead to underestimation overestimation of economic activity during periods of inflation deflation by exploiting multiple deflation indicators it is possible to recover the true relationship the shortfall of us industrial production growth during periods of deflation ranges from 4 5 pp to 7 6 pp instead of 2 pp i also find a negative relationship between deflation and real activity in the uk i then examine the cross country variation in the estimates for eleven countries the patterns are consistent with stronger biases for countries with more serious measurement errors in prices

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

cooperation in the budgeting process in this article i analyze the role of cooperation between firm divisions in the budgeting process i study a setting in which cooperation is a necessary condition for information sharing among division managers which in turn benefits the principal the results in this article can help reconcile the differing views between practitioners and academic researchers on the desirability of cooperation in the budgeting process the results also have implications for some common budgeting processes observed in practice including bundling budgeting and bottom up budgeting

foldvary fred public goods and private communities the market provision of social services brookfield vt ashgate publishing 1994 288 pp 59 95 do public goods and services such as streets parks and dams have to be provided by government in public goods and private communities fred foldvary s innovative application of public choice and social choice theory to questions of urban economics shows how collective goods can be provided by agents in a market process rejecting the market failure hypothesis dr foldvary argues that an entrepreneur can provide collective goods by consensual community agreements instead of studying particular services as previous studies have done this book concerns itself with entire private communities a series of case studies demonstrate how real world communities such as walt disney world the reston association in virginia and the private neighbourhoods of saint louis are in fact financing their own public goods and services in accordance with this theory for such communities to rise and prosper the author contends government must eliminate zoning and many other restrictions as well as the taxation of private services after considering the implications of his work for urban economies at a time when many of america s cities are plagued by decay violence and poverty dr foldvary argues that prosperity can be restored to cities if private communities are allowed to develop as an original response to an urgent contemporary problem this well written book will be welcomed by social scientists policy makers and business leaders seeking solutions to problems of urban decay

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies