the phillips curve the persistence of inflation and the lucas critique evidence from exchange rate regimes comment we present evidence from the united states and the united kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed exchange rate regimes than under gold based fixed exchange rate regimes these differences are also reflected in expectations augmented phillips curves we use a two country macro model with forward looking price setters to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence the evidence does not contradict this hypothesis it supports the hypothesis of forward looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the lucas critique jel e31 e42 f33

an appraisal of alternative blueprints for international policy coordination this paper examines two schemes for the international coordination of macroeconomic policy using a world econometric model the national institute global econometric model the first is the extended target zone scheme proposed by j williamson and m miller 1987 which involves targeting fundamental equilibrium exchange rates using monetary policy and using fiscal policy to control domestic demand the second uses fiscal policy to target the current account and monetary policy to stabilize domestic demand both schemes are parameterized using optimal control techniques on the national institute global econometric model and the welfare gains in using these schemes compared to historical experience from 1974 to 1986 are assessed

the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

firm balance sheets and monetary policy transmission the functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates facilitates a novel identification strategy of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy we look at small subsidiary banks that are affiliated with the same holding company but operate in different geographical areas these banks face the same marginal cost of funds due to internal capital markets but face different borrowers as they concentrate their lending with small local businesses exploring cross sectional variation in local economic conditions across these subsidiaries we investigate whether borrower creditworthiness influences the response of bank lending to monetary policy our results are consistent with a demand driven transmission mechanism that works through firm balance sheets and is independent from the bank lending channel

securitization and the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission abstract this paper shows that the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission is stronger for us banks that securitize their assets this finding is different in spirit from the widely found negative relationship between financial development and the strength of the lending channel of monetary transmission focusing on the balance sheet channel and using bank level observations we find that securitizing banks are more sensitive to borrowers balance sheets and that monetary policy has a greater impact on this sensitivity for securitizing banks the optimality conditions from a simple partial equilibrium framework suggest that the positive effects of securitization on policy effectiveness could be due to the high sensitivity of security prices to policy rates

bank integration and state business cycles we investigate how integration of bank ownership across states has affected economic volatility within states in theory bank integration could cause higher or lower volatility depending on whether credit supply or credit demand shocks predominate in fact year to year fluctuations in a state s economic growth fall as its banks become more integrated via holding companies with banks in other states as the bank linkages between any pair of states increase fluctuations in those two states tend to converge we conclude that interstate banking has made state business cycles smaller but more alike i introduction the united states banking system was once anything but united until 1978 every state in the union barred banks from other states so instead of one national banking system we had more like 50 little banking systems one per state 1 once states opened their borders to out of state banks bank holding companies marched in and bought up or merged with banks all over the country in 1975 just 10 percent of the bank assets in the typical state were owned by a multistate bank holding company by 1994 this interstate bank asset ratio had risen to 60 percent figure i our paper investigates how the advent of interstate banking integration in the united states has affected economic volatility within states with the united states balkanized banking system the fate of a state and its banks were closely tied as went the state so went the banks the farm price deflation in the early 1980s bankrupted many farmers and many farm banks falling oil prices in the mid 1980s wiped out a lot of texans and a lot of texas banks shocks to commodity prices probably caused these contractions but frictions in the banking sector may have aggravated them by allowing a freer flow of bank capital and lending among states we maintain that interstate banking will reduce the drag that banking frictions can have on economic contractions

german dominance in the ems evidence from interest rates abstract the paper presents an empirical analysis of german dominance and asymmetries in the ems based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates the hypothesis of strict german dominance of the ems is rejected however there are some noticeable asymmetries in the ems germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system since 1983 german independence has diminished in contrast france throughout and italy in the early phase of the ems have been relatively weak players in the system

conservative central banks and nominal growth exchange rate and inflation targets a framework is developed in which inflation biases with different target variables are compared a nominal growth target measured in consumer prices may yield less stabilization bias than a nominal income growth target exchange rate and inflation targets result in less stabilization bias than an income growth target the more important the terms of trade stabilization persistence in output causes excessive stabilization of productivity shocks and of shocks to the terms of trade under discretion an inflation weight conservative central bank is more likely under an inflation target than under an exchange rate target and less likely under a nominal income growth target

the determinants of global bank lending evidence from bilateral cross country data this paper finds that factors determined outside of a country at the quarterly frequency and especially after 2008 are more closely related to the global bank loans it receives these loans are generally more stable when global banks face more competition and have a higher presence in the recipient country we obtain our results by using bilateral lending data from 15 countries and a unique methodology to identify and compare the independent effects of external and internal factors we identify theoretical mechanisms that can explain our empirical findings and draw more detailed inferences for competition and global bank presence by solving a simple model of global banking

what drives bank securitisation the spanish experience abstract this paper analyses the reasons why spanish banks securitised in the period 2000 2007 on such a large scale that spain has become the european country with the second largest issuance volume after the uk the results obtained by applying a logistic regression model to a sample of 408 observations indicate that liquidity and the search for improved performance are the decisive factors in securitisation we find no evidence to support hypotheses regarding credit risk transfer and regulatory capital arbitrage our study also presents a more detailed analysis that differentiates between asset and liability securitisation programmes

the identification of monetary policy disturbances explaining the liquidity puzzle abstract this paper examines recent work on the identification of monetary policy disturbances its main finding is that the empirical anomalies found in the literature reflect a failure to properly address the federal reserve s policy of accommodating reserve demand shocks a new method of identifying monetary policy using nonborrowed reserves is proposed using this specification policy has a strong persistent liquidity effect regardless of subsample policy granger causes output even in the presence of interest rates explaining approximately 49 of the variance in output at a two year horizon and the residual explanatory power of interest rates for output is negligible

liquidity and the dynamic pattern of asset price adjustment a global view abstract global liquidity expansion has been very dynamic since 2001 contrary to conventional wisdom high money growth rates have not coincided with a concurrent rise in goods prices at the same time however asset prices have increased sharply significantly outpacing the subdued development in consumer prices we investigate the interactions between money and goods and asset prices at the global level using aggregated data for major oecd countries our var results support the view that different price elasticities on asset and goods markets explain the observed relative price change between asset classes and consumer goods

pegged exchange rate regimes a trap this paper studies the empirical and theoretical association between the duration of a pegged exchange rate and the cost experienced upon exiting the regime we confirm empirically that exits from pegged exchange rate regimes during the past two decades have often been accompanied by crises the cost of which increases with the duration of the peg before the crisis we explain these observations in a framework in which the exchange rate peg is used as a commitment mechanism to achieve inflation stability but multiple equilibria are possible we show that there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative not only in order to mitigate the inflation bias from the well known time inconsistency problem but also to steer the economy away from the high inflation equilibria these gains however come at a cost in the form of the monetary authority s lesser responsiveness to output shocks in these circumstances using a pegged exchange rate as an anti inflation commitment device can create a trap whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti inflation credibility but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large welfare losses to the economy we also show that the more conservative is the regime in place and the larger is the cost of regime change the longer will be the average spell of the fixed exchange rate regime and the greater the output contraction at the time of a regime change

the international monetary system an analysis of alternative regimes abstract this is an exercise in the positive economics of alternative monetary regimes the behavior of output and prices is compared using a stochastic specification which allows asymptotic variances to be obtained without difficulty free floating of exchange rates together with national money supply targets is analyzed first with and without the presence of fads in the exchange rate two alternatives for monetary coordination are then considered first is mckinnon s proposal to fix nominal exchange rates and stabilize aggregate monetary growth or average inflation second is williamson s system of target zones for stable real exchange rates complemented by nominal income targets for fiscal policy

exchange rate behaviour under the ems regime was there any systematic change abstract most empirical studies fail to detect any systematic effects of the ems regime on the economic performance of member countries this reveals the difficulty of constructing controlled experiments which can distinguish what is due to the ems from that due to common external pressures we argue that the crucial step is to examine the exchange rates distribution since no performance improvements will appear if exchange rate behaviour does not change within the ems we find that there are changes in the third and fourth moments which imply that ems currencies have become more fragile and susceptible to shocks particularly negative shocks relative to non ems currencies

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

on becoming more flexible exchange rate regimes in latin america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines the shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes among countries in latin america and the caribbean in contrast to most traditional approaches the one followed here recognizes that fixed rates can be and often are adjusted but argues that policy makers incur a political cost from devaluation at the same time flexible exchange rates even managed ones may be very volatile with persistent misalignment a stylized model of regime choice is developed based on the perceived losses from exchange rate misalignment incurred under fixed versus more flexible regimes the model is estimated for a sample of 24 countries over the period 1978 1992 and empirical results are quite supportive misalignments proxied by current account deficits and moderate to high rates of inflation were associated with a move to more flexible rates during 1978 1986 misalignment indicators appear to have mattered less during 1987 1992 however there appears to have been a major reduction in the perceived difficulty of managing flexible rates during this period the paper then cautions against attributing differences in economic growth between groups of countries to their exchange regime the central point here is that the endogeneity of regime choice introduces selection biases into the samples of countries with fixed and with more flexible exchange regimes

capital controls and balance of payments crises abstract the theory of balance of payments crises shows that under perfect foresight a system of fixed exchange rate is not sustainable in the presence of diverging economic policies in this paper it is shown how and why capital controls succeed in maintaining the principle of a fixed but adjustable parity both cases of a devaluation and a revaluation are considered and a condition for a parity change to be credible is presented

delegation in international monetary policy games abstract in this paper we show that delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in a multi country framework with monetary spillovers among countries even in the absence of time inconsistency credibility issues we also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to the case of coordination of monetary policies

bank size and macroeconomic shock transmission does the credit channel operate through large or small banks in this paper i use u s call report data to construct a larger panel dataset with bank level observations i find that larger banks lending is considerably more sensitive to the strength of their borrowers and their own balance sheets compared to smaller banks and that the sensitivities to borrower balance sheets are larger in magnitude compared to lender balance sheets when i incorporate various macroeconomic shocks identified by an estimated dsge model into the empirical model i similarly find that the transmission of shocks to the real economy operates mostly through large bank lending and borrower balance sheets

credibility and disinflation in the european monetary system analysis of interest differentials in the european monetary system has suggested a widespread lack of credibility of the exchange rate mechanism in the sense that in most countries the implicit expected rate of devaluation was significant and not far short of inflation differentials vis a vis the deutschmark we present and test a model in which prices reflect expectations of exchange rate behaviour the results provide mixed evidence that price setting in countries which participated in the erm was influenced by the exchange rate discipline

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

policy bargains and the problem of model selection abstract parameter uncertainty and disagreements about model specification pose a particular difficulty for economic policy design frankel and rockett argue that if model uncertainty is not explicitly taken into account policy coordination is as likely to decrease welfare as increase it this paper therefore looks at the scope for reducing errors by making strategic model choices part of the overall policy selection procedure it shows that alternative definitions of the policy bargain produces decisions which are robust against disagreements about the correct model while alternative choices of model produce policies which are robust against model uncertainty hence fixed i e model free policy rules are no substitute for making strategic model choices

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice the empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions which factors may induce a de facto peg why do countries enforce a peg but do not announce it why do countries break their promises we show that a stable socio political environment and an efficient political decision making process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to it challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability in the face of adverse economic and socio political fundamentals

the effectiveness of monetary policy anchors firm level evidence analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange rate pegs inflation targets and central bank independence can help anchor private sector inflation expec tations yet there are few direct tests of this argument we offer cross national micro level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private sector inflation concerns using firm level data from eighty one countries approximately 10 000 firms we find evidence that international anchors exchange rate commit ments correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private sector concerns about inflation while domestic anchors inflation targeting and central bank inde pendence do not our conjecture is that private sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange rate anchors because they are more transparent more con straining and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements the literature on monetary policy highlights the role of monetary institutions in stabilizing private sector inflation expectations central bank independence cbi inflation targeting it and fixed exchange rates pegs are widely viewed as insti tutions that have the capacity to mitigate private sector concerns that policymak ers will exploit them after they have locked in their price wage and investment decisions while other empirical research explores the institutional correlates of inflation and its variability yielding mixed results we use firm level data in our study to directly assess the impact of monetary anchors on private sector inflation concerns we find evidence that pegs mitigate firm owners concerns with infla tion but that domestic anchors such as it and cbi are uncorrelated with our micro indicators of inflation expectations considerable research has investigated the use of it cbi and pegs as institu tions that establish monetary policy credibility whereas these anchors are expected

competition in banking and the lending channel evidence from bank level data in asia and latin america abstract this paper examines how banking competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel we apply a two step estimation procedure using bank level panel data for commercial banks in 10 asian and 10 latin american countries during the period from 1996 to 2006 in the first step we measure the degree of banking competition by applying the methodology proposed by panzar and rosse 1987 in the second step we estimate a loan growth equation where the explanatory variables include the panzar rosse measure of banking competition the estimation results provide consistent evidence that increased competition in the banking sector weakens the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel this is especially true for banks in latin american countries and banks of small size low liquidity and low capitalization we also discuss the policy implications of the main findings of this paper

credibility and exchange rate management in developing countries abstract the paper discusses the role of credibility factors in the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries the analysis is based on a simple framework in which policymakers are concerned about inflation and external competitiveness price setters in the nontradable sector of the economy engage in a strategic game against the authorities the model generates a devaluation bias which undermines the credibility of a fixed exchange rate the role of reputational factors signaling considerations and joining a currency union as possible solutions to this bias is examined

business cycle convergence in emu a first look at the second moment we analyse the dynamics of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks as well as of the demand component of gdp across countries in the european monetary union emu this analysis allows us to evaluate the patterns of cyclical comovement in emu and compare them the cyclical performance of the new members of the eu and other oecd countries we make use of sigma convergence methods to identify synchronization patterns in business cycles the eurozone has converged to a stable lower level of dispersion across business cycles during the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s the new eu members have also experienced a strong pattern of convergence from 1998 to 2005 when a strong divergence trend appears an enlargement of the emu to 22 members would not significantly decrease its optimality as a currency area there is evidence for some europe specific characteristics as compared to global comovements in business cycles authors abstract

labour markets and monetary union a strategic analysis this paper shows that the effects of a monetary union depend on several labour market features in particular the switch from national monetary policies to a common monetary policy usually affects both inflation and unemployment even when all structural parameters of the economy and of unions and policymakers preferences remain the same the benchmark case of a monetary union between identical countries suggests that the switch to a monetary union is likely to make labour unions more aggressive increasing unemployment qualifications to this result are provided under alternative institutional scenarios like cross country asymmetries pre union erm membership and wage leadership

seigniorage and the case for national money in countries with high rates of inflation there is typically movement away from the use of the local currency the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of using a local currency with emphasis on the seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money even if it should be desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate it still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own money the case for using a foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed on domestic policymakers by removing their control over the money supply alternative methods of imposing discipline are discussed estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by different governments are presented seigniorage amounts in some cases to about 10 percent of government revenue estimates are also presented of both the annual flow and one time stock costs of giving up use of domestic currencies and instead using the dollar the flow cost is typically about 1 percent of gnp and the stock cost is around 10 percent of gnp

systemic conflict and regional monetary integration the case of europe existing explanations of european monetary integration emphasizing economic interdependence issue linkage institutions and domestic politics take a predominantly regional approach in the international monetary thesis developed here i argue that u s policy disturbances transmitted through the international monetary system created compelling incentives for european states to cooperate on exchange rate and monetary policy i develop a general theory of macroeconomic power based on open economy macroeconomics and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration this article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the european union by examining four periods in which the united states acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system european governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the united states supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption the evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

loan commitment contracts terms of lending and credit allocation this paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters lenders offer borrowers a set of loan packages from which the latter may choose that package found to be most appealing borrowers may trade off changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments the borrower at this time may purchase a larger credit ration for a price supporting empirical evidence is presented recently researchers have begun to study the determinants of loan commitment or line of credit contracts such contracts play an extremely important role in bank credit allocation according to the federal reserve bulletin over 70 of u s commercial and industrial loans are made under loan commitment contracts given the central importance of the institution it is not surprising that it is the subject of a growing literature loan commitment contracts have importance both at the micro level in terms of the bank customer relationship and at the marco level in terms of the channels of operation of monetary policy in this paper we seek to present and test empirically an analytic model of loan commitment contracts our paper differs from most previous work in that we include empirical analysis of credit allocation moreover most previous theoretical work on the subject has concentrated on the specific issue of pricing of the contracts often using an approach based on option theory and not on the quantity allocation of credit and its determinants we are particularly interested in the determinants of the quantitative allocation of credit to bank customers and in the composition of and trade offs among the various parameters comprising such a loan commitment package our model helps explain how contract terms are established in the market and will illuminate the institutional framework of commercial lending a view of the credit contract as a package of loan terms has been implied recently in connection with the credit rationing problem studies by azzi and cox 21 arzac schwartz and whitcomb 11 and koskela 81 show that the

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

fiscal leadership and central bank design this article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives it is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously further it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies jel classification e52 e61 f42

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank abstract this paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions the analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation indexed debt if delegation of monetary policy is viable the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt this increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks evidence on central bank independence debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content

on the quantitative importance of market completeness abstract this paper quantitatively compares allocations in calibrated large overlapping generations growth models that only differ in their market structures for insuring against aggregate risk the findings are that the equilibrium behavior of aggregate variables is very similar across all market structures there are only minor differences the ratio of the volatility of aggregate consumption relative to that of investment is higher in complete market economies due partly to the higher volatility of consumption of older people it was also found that the risk premia in complete markets economies is basically zero therefore we can conclude that we can for the most part abstract from the issue of whether there exist markets for aggregate risk

anxious periods and bank lending we examine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods the main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations about economic conditions worsen for economic agents even though the economy is not in a recession we identify distinct periods of anxiety for consumers ceos firms and analysts subsequently we study the lending behavior of us banks during the anxious quarters from 1985 to 2010 using bank level data the results show that banks lending falls when consumers and analysts are anxious and this effect is more pronounced when banks hold a higher level of credit risk these effects are more pronounced in anxious periods that were followed by recessions and in these periods loan growth also responds negatively to the anxiety of ceos yet these effects are quite less prevalent in the period after 2001

the role of policymakers reputation in the ems disinflations abstract it is frequently argued that the ems itself in connection with the high anti inflation reputation of the german bundesbank is responsible for the inflation reduction and convergence which member countries have experienced based on the game theoretical model of backus and driffill 1985 american economic review 75 530 538 an empirical measure of the government s reputation for fighting inflation is derived by using a bayesian learning approach time varying estimates of these counterinflation reputation measures are computed for the original ems member countries and for a control group of major non ems countries the paper finds that only the smaller ems participants have gained anti inflation reputation during the ems period

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

credibility may require discretion not rules abstract we reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion rules limit the actions of agents restricting observations of the agents preferences or types in a second best world where rules cannot be everlasting a regime of discretion in some periods may produce superior credibility and dominate a regime of rules

exchange rate regimes and inflation only hard pegs make a difference abstract using data from a large sample of developing countries from 1985 to 2001 we confirm that hard pegs currency boards or a shared currency reduce inflation and money growth there is no evidence that soft pegs confer any monetary discipline after other factors are controlled for inflation triggers regime switches under hard pegs monetary growth is unaffected by fiscal deficits or by inflation shocks under soft pegs as under floats increased fiscal deficits and positive inflation shocks are associated with higher monetary growth the apparently slower per capita output growth under hard pegs is explained by their geographical distribution jel classification f41

target zones and international policy coordination the contrast between the necessary and sufficient conditions for success abstract this paper distinguishes between the necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting exchange rate target zones for improving macroeconomic performance the necessary conditions are easily satisfied but it is much more difficult to design a targetting system which satisfies the sufficient conditions when the exchange rate is an intermediate target on that criterion the gains may be smaller than previously estimated however target zones have important practical advantage they are effective in promoting stability and as a simple but uncontroversial way of securing the coordination necessary to prevent policy makers adopting inefficient or competitive policies

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy while it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution it is less obvious that a real world incumbent facing short term partisan or electoral pressures would do so in this article i model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival maximizing incumbent it turns out that a wide range of survival maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy while political pressures do not in general discourage monetary commitments they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence i highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes in so doing i provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume

the credit effects of monetary policy evidence using loan commitments in addition to the usual channels monetary policy may affect spending by changing the supply of bank loans and the creditworthiness of borrowers this paper tests for these credit effects using a contractual difference across commercial bank loans the author finds that bank loans not made under a commitment slow after tight policy while loans under commitment accelerate or are unchanged this divergence coincides with reports of tighter credit by lenders and by small firms suggesting the divergence reflects a reduction in the supply of credit to the firms without commitments rather than a reduction in their demand for loans

eco industrial park initiatives in the usa and the netherlands first lessons abstract since the introduction of the industrial ecology concept by frosch and gallopoulos in 1989 and the apparent success of the kalundborg industrial symbiosis project attention to planned eco industrial park eip development projects has grown all over the world this article includes data from six of these eip development projects three of the projects discussed are located in the netherlands and three in the us this article compares the differences in project approach and results on a national level the approach suggested is derived from the available eip development literature initial research indicates that the dutch eip projects are more successful than their us counterparts this difference in success can be mostly attributed to the fact that the us projects are initiated by local and regional governments that see the project as a way to improve the local regional economy with access to substantial government funds because of this heavy government involvement us companies are in general not interested in the project the more successful dutch projects on the other hand are mostly initiated by the companies themselves with financial and advisory support from the local and regional government

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

to be or not to be in monetary union a synthesis article i nfo monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks but it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union in this paper we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements we produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low modest levels of inflation bias 2 3 as long as business cycles are not too a synchronized across countries

how did bank holding companies prosper in the 1990s abstract this paper examines the improved performance of us bank holding companies bhcs from 1991 to 1997 analysis of cost and profit functions using several alternative output specifications suggests that the gains were primarily due to productivity growth and changes in scale economies various econometric methodologies yield productivity growth of about 0 4 per year and the optimal size seems to have increased in the 1990s era of deregulation technological change and financial innovation estimates of both productivity growth and economies of scale are robust across traditional and non traditional output specifications despite the overall success however substantial cost and profit inefficiency existed for bhcs of all sizes in the 1990s these efficiency estimates are particularly sensitive to the output specification and failure to account for non traditional activities like off balance sheet obs items leads profit efficiency but not cost efficiency to be understated for the largest bhcs

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

international policy design and the sustainability of policy bargains events of the past decade and the persistence of the worldwide recession have underlined the interdependence of the major economics competitive devaluations first illustrated the dangers of unilateral decisions and politicians have regularly called for concerted policies since the bonn economic summit in 1978 economic theory has shown that coordinated policies can bring gains but the question of whether those gains will be significant and how they will be distributed remains unanswered remarkably few empirical results on how interdependence should affect policy design or even on the signs of spillovers between economies have been produced this paper estimates the costs of uncoordinated policies to the us and eec economies and also the potential gains and risks in cooperation it focuses particularly on the process of determining rational policy bargains and whether in an international context such bargains are likely to be sustainable

can equilibrium models explain nominal exchange regime non neutrality evidence from the european monetary system abstract in a recent paper alan stockman argues that the finding that real exchange rate variability id higher under flexible nominal exchange rate systems than under fixed nominal exchange rate systems typically interpreted as evidencee of price stickiness is consistent with equilibriu models stockman s theory we argue predicts that the formation of the european monetary system should have had no effect on the real exchange rate variability of its members we test this prediction and interpret our findings as evidence in support of stockman s theory although not as evidence that equilibrium models can account for nominal exchange regime non neutrality jel f31

on the imperfect substitutability of policy regimes exchange rate targetting vs policy coordination abstract exchange rate targetting is always an imperfect substitute for explicit policy coordination but succeeds when economies are either structurally dissimilar with symmetric shocks or structurally symmetric with dissimilar shocks a joint commitment then generates economies of scale in interventions

bank funding modes securitization versus deposits abstract we examine a bank s choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors with common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking we find that the choice is irrelevant with asymmetric information but without government intervention we find that better quality assets will be sold securitized and poorer quality assets will be funded with deposits public regulation can influence the bank s choice subsidies can cause a bank to favor deposit funding but mutual funds and third party insurers may mitigate the effects of governmental subsidies

a long run view of the european monetary system abstract this papaer analyzes the exchange rates and consumer price indices of six countries participating in the european monetary system ems during the entire period of floating exchange rates the analysis shows that most of these real exchange rates have unit roots even when one allows for the possibility of a structural break at the time of the advent of the ems further proces and exchange rates are not co integrated during the ems period the data suggest that the 12 realignments of the ems have not served fully too offset the member countries inflation differentials

industrial symbiosis and the policy instruments of sustainable consumption and production abstract industrial symbioses iss and eco industrial parks eips are key concepts of industrial ecology ie the aim of iss and eips is to minimise inefficient material and energy use by utilising local by product and energy flows industrial symbioses tend to develop through spontaneous action of economic actors for gaining of economic benefit but these systems can be designed and promoted via policy instruments as well a literature review showed that national programmes for eco industrial parks can be found in different parts of the world in the action programmes and other sustainable consumption and production scp policy documents of the eu on the other hand industrial symbioses gain less recognition as a path to enhanced sustainable production in this article we consider this and also analyse how the evolution and environmental performance of an industrial symbiosis system centred on a finnish pulp and paper mill have been affected by scp policy instruments with regard to the system forming the subject of the case study and finnish industrial systems in general policy instruments have succeeded in reducing emissions but not in systematically encouraging operators toward symbiosis like activities all in all few studies exist on the overall impact of policy instruments promoting design of eco industrial parks it is not self evident that symbiosis like production systems would be sustainable in every case as the background assumptions for political promotion of eips suggest we concluded that industrial symbioses should be analysed and developed on a life cycle basis with documentation of the real environmental benefits due to efficient resource use and decreased emissions in comparison to standalone production iss can then bring eco competitiveness to companies in relation to scp tools such as environmental permits ecolabels and future product regulation based on the ecodesign directive in europe indirect encouragement of symbiosis through land use regulation and planning in such a way that material fluxes between companies are possible both in operations and in financial terms may prove effective the same holds for waste policies that encourage increased reuse of a company s waste by other enterprises

fixed versus flexible exchange rates which provides more fiscal discipline abstract conventional wisdom holds that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates in this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority the claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg hence under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well the difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate hence bad behavior today leads to punishment today if fiscal authorities are impatient flexible rates by forcing the costs to be paid up front provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent the recent experience of sub saharan countries supplies evidence that matches the predictions of the model

a long run view of german dominance and the degree of policy convergence in the ems i introduction when the european monetary system ems was established in march 1979 the member countries agreed to gradually move to a european monetary union emu at the maastricht summit on december 9 10 1991 the member nations signed an agreement outlining the requirements and a timetable for monetary union building upon the framework specified in the 1989 delors report the maastricht agreement outlines a three stage transition to a common european monetary policy 1 the achievement of a high degree of monetary policy convergence among the member countries is crucial if a common monetary policy is to be initiated the ems already provides a framework in which monetary policy actions can be coordinated but have member nations actually coordinated their actions or have they conducted independent policies some have claimed that the bundesbank has dominated monetary policy in the ems one explanation is that by tying domestic monetary policy to that of germany other countries policymakers enhance their own credibility for instance giavazzi and pagano 1988 have argued that because the bundesbank is known to follow a consistent credible anti inflation policy tying policy to that of germany should enhance one s reputation a natural question to ask therefore is to what degree have monetary policies in the ems converged to that conducted by germany a finding of complete convergence among ems monetary policies would imply that the member countries have converged to one common monetary policy in studies examining the credibility hypothesis which clearly is linked to the notion of monetary policy convergence fratianni and von hagen 1990c and burdekin westbrook and willett 1993 rejected this hypothesis 2 to consider the prospects for the success of emu one must know whether and to what degree there has been a transmission of policy actions within the ems the question of whether germany has set the direction of monetary policy for the ems is a natural focus and has been the subject of recent study fratianni and von hagen 1990a 1990b 1990c von hagen and fratianni 1990 and kutan 1991 1992 all reject the hypothesis that german monetary policy actions dominate the monetary policy decisions of other ems countries 3 while germany is found to be an important player in setting monetary policy its actions are not independent of other members in contrast to this conclusion karfakis and moschos 1990 and macdonald and taylor 1991 argue that non german ems members policies are related closely to german policy changes and that german policy actions do not respond to those taken by the central banks of other ems countries this study tests for policy convergence among ems countries within a long run framework using cointegration procedures using both short term interest rates and the monetary base as measures of monetary policy our aim is to determine the number of shared common stochastic trends among ems monetary policies and test whether a complete convergence of policies has been achieved in the ems rejection of complete convergence a finding of two or more shared common trends indicates that some countries policies are set independently at least in the long run if this is true then the notion that the bundesbank dominates ems policy is rejected such a result also suggests that any credibility gain from tying policy to that of germany is probably outweighed by other considerations such as domestic growth or international competitiveness looking ahead our results indicate that ems monetary policies have not converged we also investigate the short run connection among policy measures using a longer sample than in previous work our results from this analysis indicate that while german policy actions influence monetary policy in other ems countries in the short run there is substantial policy interaction among ems members the format of the paper is as follows section ii discusses some methodological issues concerning the use of interest rates and the monetary base as indicators of policy actions

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

open economy macroeconomics developments in theory and policy this paper views developments in open economy macroeconomics through the lens of the debate over european monetary unification the empirical tendency for nominal exchange rate regimes to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike can be rationalized by sticky price theories or models of asset market liquidity effects but plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence to match the data thus the macroeconomic stabilization costs of forgoing the exchange rate realignment option seem pertinent it is argued that our theories of efficiencies due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory despite recent advances the paper concludes by reviewing theories of currency crisis

approaches and policies for promoting industrial park recycling transformation iprt in china practices and lessons abstract industrial park recycling transformation iprt was one of the major circular economy construction demonstration programs in the 12th five year plan issued by the china state council in 2012 it comprised of 7 major tasks to transform traditionally high resource and energy intensive production into high efficiency and low pollutant production by 2017 129 industrial parks had been approved for iprt by the national development and reform commission ndrc this paper presents a thorough review on iprt content policies and practices with some lessons and suggestions for further development six types of projects were supported by national funds which included industrial chain extension and complementary projects water conversion and recycling projects energy saving projects pollution prevention projects platform construction projects and infrastructure construction sharing projects case studies show success for each case however deficiencies in industrial development management policy making and information sharing also emerged two suggestions were put forward first investment should be diverted from traditional industries to new industries past cases have shown that traditional industries have a greater risk of obsolescence failure in one park has already created a cascading effect on other enterprises in the park secondly the government led model should be transformed into a government and market co led model the government could establish more effective incentive and restraint mechanisms to attract participation from enterprises and or social capital information sharing platforms for example benefit enterprises by increasing awareness for circular economy projects to both private and public actors

fewer monies better monies in the aftermath of emerging market crises from russia to asia and latin america there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis proof fixed rates are out flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting but there is of course the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together this paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up the case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment this paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment moreover countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and as a result only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility on the contrary they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting