the effects of prevailing wage requirements on the cost of low income housing recent california legislation extends the application of prevailing wage regulations to construction workers building subsidized low income residential projects econometric evidence based on micro data covering 205 residential projects subsidized by the california low income housing tax credit since 1996 and completed by mid 2002 demonstrates that construction costs increased substantially under prevailing wage requirements estimates of additional construction costs in the authors most extensive models range from 9 to 37 the analysis controls for variations in cost by geographical location and for differences in project characteristics financing and developer attributes the authors estimate the effect of uniform imposition of these regulations on the number of new dwellings for low income households produced under the tax credit program in california under reasonable assumptions the mid range estimate of the prospective decrease exceeds 3 100 units per year

the value of explicit randomization in the tax code abstract consider individuals who draw income from the same random distribution but who differ in their risk aversion and who decide whether or not to report their income truthfully the government chooses the tax structure including a random tax option audit probabilities and penalties on detected evaders to maximize expected ex post social welfare high income individuals who do not evade then choose to pay either a given amount or draw from a random tax schedule this schedule ensures that everyone complies with more risk averse individuals choosing the deterministic schedule and less risk averse ones choosing the random tax option

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

bargaining on behalf of a constituency abstract we study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf a two phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded with a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties we show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency i e delay in reaching agreements extensions of the model and applications to union firm bargaining are then discussed briefly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d82 j52

the davis bacon act an appraisal of recent studies the intensified controversy in recent years over the davis bacon act which requires the payment of prevailing wages on federally funded construction projects has resulted in several new studies of the effects of that act this invited paper reviews the evidence presented in these recent studies on several aspects of the act including how davis bacon wage determinations compare to local construction wages as measured by sources other than the act s administrators the effects of lags in the act s data gathering process and the savings that would result from calculating the prevailing rate as the arithmetic mean of local wages instead of the current use of the modal rate in most cases the authors conclude that although the cost studies to date have been faulty in several respects it is reasonably clear that davis bacon is unattractive on grounds of economic efficiency alone the question remains however whether these efficiency costs are offset partially or wholly by the possible equity benefits o

ex ante and ex post welfare optimality under uncertainty it is widely believed by economic theorists that if there were no transactions costs and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all then arrow debreu contingent commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation the basis for this belief seems clear we have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that in the absence of external effects any competitive allocation is pareto efficient and that any pareto efficient allocation is competitive provided that appropriate lump sum transfers are made of course there are some reservations that need to be made local satiation and non convexities are well known to cause problems but these are not the problems i wish to discuss here to return to the usual argument the next step involves noticing how with contingent commodity markets the efficiency theorems of welfare economics carry over to an economy with uncertainty as explained for instance in chapter 7 of debreu s theorpj of value the fundamental value judgment that gives these efficiency theorems their normative interest is what may be called consumer sovereignty it is an assumption that the social welfare ordering should respect the preferences that govern consumers market behaviour it is a serious value judgment more serious than most economists have been prepared to concede but its seriousness increases when there is uncertainty we know full well that individuals misperceive the probabilities of certain events assuming that they even perceive any probabilities at all see for example kahneman and tversky 1979 nor are we always willing to accept as appropriate the attitudes to risk of individuals who seem either extremely reckless or extremely cautious societies are often willing to make some gestures towards property owners who have not insured themselves adequately against damage from fire flood or tempest and not just because of imperfect insurance markets or even misperceptions of probabilities in addition the inequalities of income that arise when some individuals take more risks than others are not necessarily seen to be desirable particularly if an individual has undertaken a useful but risky activity and has a very low income as a result of failure such gestures are examples of contingent lump sum transfers it seems clear that if such transfers occur to a sufficient extent they could supplant completely the securities markets which are usually sufficient to bring about pareto efficiency they may even be able to go further and correct the imperfections of an arrow debreu market allocation when individuals do misperceive probabilities or else have wrong attitudes to risk this is the main question i wish to consider here the idea that consumer sovereignty should not always extend to economies with uncertainty is not new it can be found in work by diamond 1967 dr6ze

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

producer surplus and risk this paper examines the welfare economics of producer behavior under risk aversion hicksian marshallian and money equivalent measures are explored it is found that under decreasing absolute risk aversion compensating variation is less than the ordinary marshallian surplus which is less than the money equivalent measure under constant absolute risk aversion all measures coincide finally bounds on compensating and equivalent variations using ordinary producer surplus in a manner analogous to willige approach in consumer theory under certainty are studied similar results hold mutatis mutandis for input demands

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

income disparity inequity aversion and the design of the healthcare system an ex post social welfare function is used to evaluate alternative healthcare systems if a society is averse to inequality and there is some income disparity social welfare under private healthcare insurance is sometimes higher and sometimes lower than social welfare under public healthcare however a third system public healthcare with the option to purchase supplemental healthcare insurance is always socially preferred to private healthcare insurance moreover it is either socially preferred to public healthcare or equivalent to it

on the valuation of uncertainty in welfare analysis thisarticle developsa general model of private and public choice under temporal uncertainty the model incorporatesthe effectsof ris k preferencesand the pros pect of future learning into both the individual and aggregate valuationsof public projects the analys isprovidesnew ins ightson individual valuation itsimplicationsfor benefit cos t analys isand the characterization of paretoefficiency under uncertainty it also resolves some of the confusion in the option value and quasioption value literature private and public decisions typically involve many sources of uncertainty including uncertainty about prices income technology environmental quality health etc temporal uncertainty is also common where some of the risk 1 getsresolved over time due to learning additionally private and public decisions often exhibit some form of irreversibility implying that current choicescan affect the ability of decision makers to be flexible and to adjust their future choices in response to forthcoming information when uncertainty and irreversibility are both present welfare analys isgainscomplexity and importance although considerable progress has been made since weisbrod s seminal article a better understanding of the roles of uncertainty and irreversibility in welfare analys improve our ability aseconomis ts to communicate the importance of risk in project evaluation to public decision makers

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

prevailing wage laws and construction labor markets prevailing wage laws which require that construction workers employed by private contractors on public projects be paid wages and benefits at least equal to those prevailing for similar work in or near the locality in which the project is located have been the focus of an extensive policy debate the authors analyzing current population survey data and census data find that the relative wages of construction workers decline slightly after the repeal of a state prevailing wage law however the small overall impact of law repeal masks substantial differences in outcomes for different groups of construction employees repeal is associated with a sizable reduction in the union wage premium and an appreciable narrowing of the black non black wage differential for construction workers

generalized utilitarianism and harsanyi s impartial observer theorem harsanyi s impartial observer must consider two types of lotteries imaginary identity lotteries accidents of birth that she faces as herself and the real outcome lotteries life chances to be faced by the individuals she imagines becoming if we maintain a distinction between identity and outcome lotteries then harsanyi like axioms yield generalized utilitarianism and allow us to accommodate concerns about different individuals risk attitudes and concerns about fairness requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent as to which individual should face similar risks restricts her social welfare function but still allows her to accommodate fairness requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent between identity and outcome lotteries however forces her to ignore both fairness and different risk attitudes and yields a new axiomatization of harsanyi s utilitarianism

a welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs this paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief neutral ine cient if it is ine cient under any convex combination of agents beliefs while this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations it can identify negative sum speculation in a broad range of prominent models with distorted beliefs

the external costs of nuclear power ex ante damages and lay risks interest has been growing in embedding the external costs of fuel cycles resulting in electricity generation into prices in any attempt to internalize these costs for the nuclear cycle the remost but real possibilities of accidents and the wide gap between lay perceptions and expert assessments of such risks must be taken into account this paper discusses this including the following topics an expected utility model of power plant operations accident risks simulation comparison of experts versus lay risks comparison of experts versus lay risk literature simulation of expert versus lay risks current practice in estimating the damages from accidents at nuclear power plants appear to ignore significant features of the problem from the perspective of economic analysis individual aversion to risk the exante perspective in decision making under uncertainty and lay risk perception are all conceptually important elements of a damage estimate that accords with observation of behavior and the theory that underlies it but that are ignored by common practice 18 refs 1 tab

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

just luck an experimental study of risk taking and fairness choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society this paper reports the results of the first experiment to our knowledge to study fairness views about risk taking specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes we find that even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities most favor some redistribution ex post many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices these findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators

misperceived job hazards and welfare abstract bayesian workers produce chemicals hazardously in one sector of a two sector economy having one safe sector adopting an expected ex post welfare perspective we show workers misperceptions of hazards entail a classic externality we characterise chemicals competitive monopoly and socially efficient outputs assuming workers receive identical wage accident compensation contracts under each the value of information which induces workers to place greater stress on firms safety records or sharpens their priors and extend the standard monopoly welfare loss index for sufficient conditions for monopoly to be preferred to competition in chemicals and for size ranking monopoly and efficient chemical outputs

ex post efficiency and ex post welfare some fundamental considerations ross starr 1973 demonstrates that a competitive equilibrium while ex ante pareto efficient may not be ex post efficient the authors contend that an implicit second best issue requires that this assertion be substantively qualified specifically the ex ante efficiency concept is second best while its ex post counterpart is first best they est ablish the equivalency of first best ex post and ex ante concepts whe never the second best ex ante efficiency conditions hold the second best elements derive from the timing of information flows starr s theorem is shown to concern the social gains from improved information additional results deal with varying concepts of ex post welfare copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

enforcement in informal saving groups abstract informal groups cannot rely on external enforcement to insure that members abide by their obligations it is generally assumed that these problems are solved by social sanctions and reputational effects the present paper focuses on roscas one of the most commonly found informal financial institutions in the developing world we first show that in the absence of an external social sanctioning mechanism roscas are never sustainable even if the defecting member is excluded from all future roscas we then argue that the organizational structure of the rosca itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues the implications of our analysis are consistent with first hand evidence from rosca groups in a kenyan slum

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

chance and justice social policies and the harsanyi vickrey rawls problem the determination of the optimal and just policy in the presence of chance and risk encompasses some of the most important problems of societies and can be seen as comprehending the whole issue of distributive justice the application of the general theory of justice to chance and risk reveals the meanings and implicit assumptions of previous studies and it yields useful and meaningful concepts and conclusions such as the strictly concave evaluation function the meaning of the theories of the original position the theories of the partially original position fundamental insurances and selfascriptions and the general logic of the relations between risk and inequality 1998 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

externality or sustainability economics abstract in an effort to develop sustainability economics baumgartner and quaas 2010 neglect the central concept of environmental economics environmental externality this note proposes a possible connection between the concepts of environmental externality and sustainability in addition attention is asked for other aspects of sustainability economics namely the distinction weak strong sustainability spatial sustainability and sustainable trade distinctive sustainability policy and the ideas of early sustainability economists i argue that both sustainability and externalities reflect a systems perspective and propose that effective sustainability solutions require that more attention is given to system feedbacks notably other regarding preferences and social interactions and energy and environmental rebound the case of climate change and policy is used to illustrate particular statements as a conclusion a list of 20 insights and suggestions for research is offered

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a simple model for merit good arguments abstract in this paper we examine a way of representing merit goods by allowing governments to apply a specific form of correction to consumers preferences the model builds upon an approach to the analysis of taste and quality change due to fisher and shell we look at the first best allocation of resources where this is done we also consider second best policies in which the government must charge the same price to all consumers of the merit good and when optimal lump sum transfers are not available

building risk into the mitigation adaptation decisions simulated by integrated assessment models this paper proposes an operationally simple and easily generalizable methodology to incorporate climate change damage uncertainty into integrated assessment models iams first uncertainty is transformed into a risk measure by extracting damage distribution means and variances from an ensemble of socio economic and climate change scenarios then a risk premium is computed under different degrees of risk aversion quantifying what society would be willing to pay to insure against the uncertainty of the damages our estimates show that the premium for the risk is a potentially significant addition to the standard average damage but highly sensitive to the attitudes toward risk in the last research phase the risk premium is incorporated into the climate change damage function of a widely used iam which shows consequently a substantial increase in both mitigation and adaptation efforts reflecting a more precautionary attitude by the social planner interestingly adaptation is stimulated more than mitigation in the first half of this century while the situation reverses afterwards

limits to the value of external costs based on recent insights from the field of risk analysis this paper examines some of the difficulties encountered in attempts to characterise the environmental effects of energy options as monetary externalities more than 20 different dimensions of environmental appraisal are identified and discussed in relation to the historic literature on risk assessment and a number of recent influential environmental valuation studies a survey is conducted of the results obtained over more than a decade for the external environmental costs of electricity supply options theoretical and methodological criticisms are lent support by the finding that environmental valuation results vary over a very wide range of values yielding a variety of rank orderings for the different generating options in addition the values derived for energy externalities are found to be vulnerable to the possible influence of a price imperative the paper concludes by pointing to approaches to the social appraisal of generating technologies which offer greater transparency rigour and accessibility in addressing plural and intrinsically subjective value judgements concerning the different forms and dimensions of environmental effects

intergenerational exchange mobility and economic welfare the concepts of exchange and structural mobility are introduced and their relationship with the notion of equality of opportunity discussed it is then shown that exchange mobility can have an impact on social welfare when the utility of any one generation is dependent on the consumption levels of overlapping generations whether such consumption interrelationships imply a preference for mobility or the reverse depends on whether the marginal utility of current consumption is raised or lowered by an increase in the consumption level of the associated generation the rest of this paper examines these two cases in the context of a simple two class family model the analysis is concerned with the description of the optimal intergenerational behaviour within this framework in order to be able to say anything substantial however it is necessary to impose some restrictions on the structure of the utility function one restriction which has some appeal and which yields plausible patterns of optimal policy is that intergenerational links through the utility function be not too strong in a sense that is made specific in the paper imposing this condition one can show how intra generational equity is affected both by intergenerational considerations and by the inherited past where intragenerational transfers involve efficiency losses a simple tax model is examined the circumstances under which starting with no taxes the tax rates converge are worked out in both the cases where the utility function has a pro as well as an anti mobility bias finally a specific utility function is taken in which the fathers utility depends not only on his own consumption but also on the average consumption of his son and himself in this case the utility function has a pro mobility bias and one can evaluate the response of the long run tax rate to parameters that measure mobility and equality using a similation model one can also assess the speed of convergence and the sensitivity of the tax rates to the parameters

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

honesty is sometimes the best policy this paper examines two central points in the economics of tax evasion if the taxation authorities have reason to believe that tax is being illegally evaded how far should they go in pursuit of the missing income and what roles should thoroughness of investigation and severity of penalties play in the pursuit of that income previous contributions have examined the positive economics of various control instruments on tax payers behaviouri the degree of threat or the level of policing required to enforce truthful reporting and the desirability of different types of policy in terms of tax payers expected utility some writers have investigated the design of sophisticated investigation schemes to maximise expected government receipts or to enforce truthful reporting at low resource cost the approach adopted here is to examine the desirability of various combinations of policy instruments in the context of an explicit model of social welfare it is not self evident that honesty is desirable from the point of view of the government if honesty is desirable it is not obvious that people should be forced to be completely honest and it is not obvious how they ought to be forced the desirability of an economic policy depends on two major issues which are sometimes left submerged the objectives of the government or its agents and the constraints under which such objectives must be pursued the objective is often assumed to be a simple form of ex ante expected utility this is surprising since value systems other than utilitarianism are frequently invoked in the design of tax systems and so it seems reasonable to

regional heterogeneity migration and shadow prices abstract this paper deals with some spatial influences on social scarcities first the existence of regional goods which usually implies differences in consumer prices second differences in preferences across locations and third a rigid wage in one region which may result in ex post inequalities among migrants who were identical ex ante it is shown that in general the shadow wage depends on regional differences in the cost of living and preferences and that the effect of a shift from ex ante to ex post social welfare on the shadow wage is unclear in this connection the assumption that the marginal product of labor is locally constant proves to be much stronger than is commonly recognized

distributive justice for behavioural welfare economics the incompleteness of behavioural preferences can lead many or even all allocations to qualify as pareto optimal but the incompleteness does not undercut the precision of utilitarian policy recommendations utilitarian methods can be applied to groups of goods or to the multiple social welfare functions that arise when individual preferences are incomplete and policymakers do not need to provide the preference comparisons that individuals are unable to make for themselves the utilitarian orderings that result although also incomplete can generate a unique optimum non separabilities in consumption reduce this precision but in all cases the dimension of the utilitarian optima drops substantially relative to the pareto optima

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

expected poverty under risk induced welfare variability two of the most widely accepted stylised facts about agriculture in south asia sub saharan africa and elsewhere are that income is highly uncertain from one year to another and that deep and widespread poverty exists and yet there has been very little analysis of the joint problems of poverty and risk this paper offers a methodological approach to the issue of how risk affects poverty and applies it to household level data for dry areas of rural india the following questions are addressed under what conditions can one expect an increase in the riskiness of an income or consumption stream to increase poverty how should one measure the contribution of risk to poverty and what long term benefits in terms of reduced poverty can be expected from policies aimed at stabilising incomes of the poor such policies have been widely discussed in the indian subcontinent of late and their effect on rural

ex ante evaluation of health states and the provision for ill health this paper examines the motivation for states to intervene in the provisions that their citizens make for ill health the author examines arguments that relate to imperfect information and a kind of misperception which he calls evaluator relativity he identifies ex post regret as being the force that may justify intervention that helps to sidestep some of the problems that arise when expected utility is invoked as a welfare criterion copyright 1989 by royal economic society

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

social insurance with risk reducing investments a two sector model with sector dependent disability risks is presented working in the low risk sector requires skills that can be obtained by investments in education moral hazard precludes full insurance the labour force allocation is responsive to the incentives created by a social insurance system the rationale for intervention lies in the government s power to cross subsidize between the sectors and it is demonstrated how the responsiveness of the labour force allocation limits cross subsidization the second best policy is time inconsistent the consistent equilibrium is explored and is argued to provide weak incentives to reduce risks ties to live off their own work recently social insurance has come under scrutiny owing to increased pressures to reduce government expenditures one critical view that has been put forward is that a public system that pools work ers with different occupations may cause a significant loss of welfare since different occupations are associated with different levels of risk it is argued that pooled systems while adhering to a general notion of fairness cause an inefficient allocation of the labour force put in simple terms pooled systems implicitly subsidize risky activities and thereby promote excessive undertaking of such activities the purpose of this study is to investigate the problem of social insurance design in a setting where workers can influence the disability risks they are exposed to by choosing a low risk occupation the model presented has two sectors a high risk sector and a low risk sector working in the low risk sector requires some kind of costly investment which we represent as a choice of education although it is clear that any investment undertaken by the work ers e g migration investments leads to precisely the same trade offs the workers choose which sector to enter in response to the incentives created by the social insurance system this allows an analysis of the trade off between the efficiency of the labour force allocation and distributive concerns as well as a characterization of optimal social insurance under various assumptions about the government s ability to cross subsidize and to affect occupational choices following the seminal work by diamond and mirrlees 1978 a moral hazard problem precludes full insurance and creates a second best environment our framework is similar in some respects to that of whinston 1983 in a pure moral hazard framework whinston shows that optimal contracts cross subsidize in favour of more accident prone workers to an extent that makes them better off than less accident prone workers on this point we extend whinston s result by identifying the exact redistributive rule and by providing an interpretation of the result as an instance of tagging whinston further

on the contribution of external cost calculations to energy system governance the case of a potential large scale nuclear accident abstract the contribution of nuclear power to a sustainable energy future is a contested issue this paper presents a critical review of an attempt to objectify this debate through the calculation of the external costs of a potential large scale nuclear accident in the externe project a careful dissection of the externe approach resulted in a list of 30 calculation steps and assumptions from which the 6 most contentious ones were selected through a stakeholder internet survey the policy robustness and relevance of these key assumptions were then assessed in a workshop using the concept of a pedigree of knowledge overall the workshop outcomes revealed the stakeholder and expert panel s scepticism about the assumptions made generally these were considered not very plausible subjected to disagreement and to a large extent inspired by contextual factors such criticism indicates a limited validity and useability of the calculated nuclear accident externality as a trustworthy sustainability indicator furthermore it is our contention that the externe project could benefit greatly in terms of gaining public trust from employing highly visible procedures of extended peer review such as the pedigree assessment applied to our specific case of the external costs of a potential large scale nuclear accident

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

the need for improved financial reporting of a developing country energy utility abstract some consideration has been given to regulatory and institutional reforms to facilitate sustainable development in electricity usage in papua new guinea but little attention has been paid to bringing about full compliance of financial reporting expectations of the country s main energy utility examining documentary evidence of the audit reports of the auditor general s office of papua new guinea this study considers the financial reporting compliance of png power for the period 2007 2013 and the means by which compliant reporting may be improved the results of the study reveal that the financial statements of png power are late and receive disclaimers of opinion from the auditor general s office which suggest that png power s stakeholders are not receiving accurate and reliable financial information to make informed decisions about sustainable development of electricity usage and planning in papua new guinea the study reveals that it would take little resources to improve png power s reporting which in turn could enhance national energy policy decision making and energy utility accountability

living wages protection for or protection from low wage workers living wage laws are touted as anti poverty measures yet they apply to only a small fraction of workers most commonly covering only employers with city contracts the apparent contradiction between broad anti poverty goals and narrow coverage suggests that goals other than poverty reduction may partly underlie living wage campaigns this paper considers the hypothesis that living wage laws act to maintain or increase rents among unionized municipal workers by raising the wages that city contractors would have to pay living wage laws may reduce the incentives for cities to contract out work that would otherwise be done by unionized municipal employees hence increasing the bargaining power of municipal unions and leading to higher wages for their members the evidence presented here from an analysis of cps data for 1996 2000 indicates that the wages of unionized municipal workers are indeed increased as a result of living wage laws covering contractors

the pareto principle of optimal inequality the pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgements in particular it is generally thought that it can accommodate different views on the desirable degree of equality we show that this is generally not true in intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails to do so we formalize the concept of inequality aversion we show that different degrees of inequality aversion are not possible in typical models of time consistent dynamic decision under uncertainty

trust and the transformation of energy systems the author looks at diverse concepts and roles of trust in the challenge of decarbonising energy systems drawing on 25 years of personal experience in the fields of energy and environmental policy research the paper focuses on three issues public trust in science institutional trust in making technology choices and the idea that high trust societies are more sustainable than those exhibiting low trust while trust is a key concept in understanding the public acceptability of technology choices it is only one of a suite of interrelated concepts that must be addressed which also includes liability consent and fairness furthermore rational distrust among competing institutional world views may be critical in understanding the role of social capital in socioeconomic and technological development thus the concept of trust has become a portmanteau carrying a diverse range of ideas and conditions for sustainable energy systems the paper concludes with three emphases for decision makers first the issue is the energy system not particular generating technologies second the energy system must be recognized to be as much a social system as it is a technical one third the system requires incorporation of the minimum level of diversity of engineering technologies and social actors to be sustainable

striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents this paper models the wage contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide in each period whether or not to strike for the duration of that period we show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement although both parties are completely rational and fully informed this has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars debt negotiations and wars in general we characterize the set of equilibria show that strikes can occur in real time and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities copyright 1991 by american economic association

the effect of risk characteristics on the willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions from electric power generation the objective of this study is to estimate willingness to pay wtp for the reduction of mortality risks caused by fossil fuel natural gas coal and oil versus nuclear electric power generation systems and to examine the influence of risk characteristics involved with electric power generation on wtp a choice experiment was conducted to achieve these objectives the attributes for nuclear risks in the experiment included the probability of disasters and the expected losses if a disaster occurs we find evidence of i a baseline effect where wtp is sensitive to hypothetical versus actual baseline expected mortality ii a labeling effect where surprisingly the term nuclear has no effect on wtp but the term fossil fueled power generation results in lower wtp and iii disaster aversion meaning that people focus on the conditional loss from a nuclear disaster not the probability we also find that the wtp for reducing deaths from a nuclear disaster is about 60 times the wtp for routine reducing fossil fuel generation related deaths

unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities an axiomatic approach abstract in this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of social welfare functions for uncertain incomes our most general result is that a small number of reasonable assumptions regarding welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure ex ante as well as pure ex post evaluations any social welfare function that satisfies these axioms should lie strictly between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions we also provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted average of the minimum and the maximum of ex post and ex ante evaluations

assessment of the actual sustainability of nuclear fission power this paper uses 19 criteria to assess whether nuclear fission power can be a part of sustainable development this yes or no qualitative evaluation is due prior to ongoing marketability assessment and promotion of nuclear power by for example the iaea the iea and the uk government the criteria are classified into five groups planet results demonstrate that the incompatibility of nuclear expansion with electricity efficiency and full renewable power deployment largely overshadows the carbon free steam generation of nuclear fission prosperity analyses show that including rolled off costs and risks would raise bills to heights difficult to quantify due to doubts long term invisibility and irreversibility risks may be catastrophic and are not insurable while weaponry proliferation adds a further dimension people analyses reveal that some nuclear power is affordable for present generations when many costs remain unpaid however developing countries cannot afford the capital costs and technology intensity and catastrophes wreak havoc on national economies singling out exposed communities losing their habitats politics assessments demonstrate that nuclear technocracy dominates the scene in many countries the technocrats heavily influence policy makers the media and celebrities speaking out in favor of nuclear we identify the need for an independent global agency and for independent national nuclear regulatory institutions to safeguard the public interest

can union labor ever cost less this paper examines the effect of unions on efficiency by estimating cost function systems over three different sets of construction projects the results show that union contractors have greater economies of scale this gives them a cost advantage in large commercial office buildings but in school and hospital construction nonunion contractors have lower costs at all output levels despite the cost differences profits for nonunion contractors in school and hospital construction are no higher than those for union contractors because the burden of higher union costs is shifted to buyers

the role of ex ante and ex post decisions in the valuation of life abstract this paper examines the use of ex ante and ex post criteria in the evaluation of projects involving the risk of death one issue concerns the appropriate welfare function and it is argued that this should reflect both ex post and ex ante considerations but not in the form of restrictions on the welfare function the second issue concerns the form of compensation the argument in favour of ex post compensation as a means of reducing the cost of risk bearing needs to be modified when risks involve more than a single dimension as they do in projects involving the risk of death

on welfare analysis under temporal uncertainty the implications of uncertainty for costbenefit analysis remain controversial one issue raised in the evaluation of welfare compensation tests has been the appropriate use of observable economic behavior in the measurement of agents willingnessto pay or willingness to receive in the context of surplus measure this question has received considerable attention in the analysis of the welfare impact of price changes under certainty e g willig 1976 chipman and moore 1980 hausman 1981 mckenzie and pearce 1982 moreover the introduction of uncertainty has raised a number of questions about the appropriateness of alternative welfare measures e g schmalensee 1972 1975 graham 1981 for example graham 1981 has argued that there is little basis to recommend either option price or expected surplus for a role of prominence in welfare analysis the issue rather is whether or not there exists a distribution of individual payments or receipts that maximizes aggregate willingness to pay and passes the pareto improvement test i e that leaves no individual worse off and makes at least one individual better off graham 1981 but in the implementation of the pareto improvement test how is the aggregate willingness topay supposed to be measured empirically more specifically what is the influence of uncertainty and its temporal resolution on the validity of agent surplus the welfare triangle given by the area between a compensated choice function and its corresponding price as a welfare measure some progress has been made in this direction by chavas bishop and segerson 1986 in the context of option price however as shown by graham 1981 while option price is the appropriate measure of benefits in situations involving similar individuals and collective risk it may not be the appropriate welfare measure in more general situations therefore there is a need to refine our understanding of how agent surplus can be used as a welfare measure in the general context of a potential pareto improvement test under temporal uncertainty the objective of this paper is to investigate how temporal uncertainty can affect the measurement of willingness to pay in general welfare compensation tests temporal uncertainty corresponds to the situation where new information becomes available over time which resolves at least part of current uncertainty facing economic agents this new information can influence future individual decisions as well as individual willingness to pay particular attention will be given here to the case where income compensation is conditional on the new information that will become available in the future and results in a more efficient allocation of risk among individuals this paper focuses on competitive agents e g households or firms for which welfare changes can be expressed in terms of price changes this includes the analysis of the welfare effects of various government pricing policies this also includes the evaluation of public projects based on the travel cost method which under a weak complementarity condition consists in using price changes of related private goods as an indirect means of measuring the value of a public project maler 1974 the analysis is presented in the context of a general two period model where the agents are uncertain about the state of the world as suggested by graham 1981 it is shown that the option price provides a lower bound on

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

the role of expectations in economic fluctuations and the efficacy of monetary policy we show diverse beliefs is an important propagation mechanism of fluctuations money non neutrality and efficacy of monetary policy since expectations affect demand our theory shows economic fluctuations are mostly driven by varying demand not supply shocks using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold rational belief see kurz 1994 we show that i our economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations in the u s ii under monetary rules without discretion monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect and an aggressive anti inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero iii the statistical phillips curve changes substantially with policy instruments and activist policy rules render it vertical iv although prices are flexible money shocks result in less than proportional changes in inflation hence the aggregate price level appears sticky with respect to money shocks v discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and increases volatility the impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs about future discretionary decisions we study two rationalizable beliefs in one case market beliefs weaken the effect of policy and in the second beliefs bolster policy outcomes and discretion could be a desirable attribute of the policy rule since the central bank does not know any more than the private sector real social gain from discretion arise only in extraordinary cases hence the weight of the argument leads us to conclude that bank s policy should be transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances vi an implication of our model suggests the current effective policy is only mildly activist and aims mostly to target inflation

assessing risky social situations this paper reexamines the welfare economics of risk it singles out a class of criteria the expected equally distributed equivalent as the unique class that avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches such criteria behave like ex post criteria when the final statistical distribution of well being is known ex ante and like ex ante criteria when risk generates no inequality the paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences in the vein of harsanyi s aggregation theorem

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

incentives compensation and social welfare first version received january 1985 final version accepted august 1986 eds alternative wage structures under conditions of moral hazard are analysed from a social welfare standpoint it is argued that ex post equity judgements in an uncertainty context should incorporate a preference for positive correlation of utilities of different individuals in the design of compensation schemes this may give rise to a conflict between ex post equity objectives and the need to provide effort incentives relative performance clauses in compensation schemes that are useful for providing incentives are undesirable from an ex post equity standpoint this is demonstrated by showing a in a context of independent production uncertainties every rankorder tournament is welfare dominated by a set of independent randomized contracts and b welfare optimal compensation schemes in general depend separately on an equity and an incentive component that tend to correlate agent compensations in different directions a central question in welfare economics concerns the design of a system of rewards for productive effort that balances distributive considerations with the provision of effort incentives this issue has usually been studied in the context of a model due to mirrlees 1971 in which the conflict between distribution and incentives arises because the social planner lacks perfect information about the abilities of individuals in this paper we analyse a model in which individual abilities are publicly known a conflict between distribution and incentives arises instead from the existence of uncertainty in production processes and a moral hazard problem stemming from the unobservability of workers effort most analyses of moral hazard have concentrated on the tradeoff between insurance of agents against wage fluctuations and provision of effort incentives the context is generally taken to be a capitalist firm where the self interested planner has a residual claim on workers output in other settings such as public sector or labour managed firms the planner may have preferences over the distribution of ex post welfare among the workers this paper analyses how with such preferences effort incentives under moral hazard are constrained both by insurance and by distributive considerations in section 2 we suggest that a concern for ex post equality of individual welfares can be expressed by a preference for positive correlation among welfare levels we then consider what properties of the ex post welfare function incorporate this preference for correlation welfare functions that are additively separable across individuals are inappropriate no matter how concave with them expected value depends only on the

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

ex post welfare economics and the theory of merit goods in recent years a number of papers have questioned the extension of the main theorems of welfare economics to a world of uncertainty stemming from the work of arrow 1953 and debreu 1959 the arrow debreu extension is based on the idea that consumer preferences may be defined on state contingent commodities as a special but important case these preferences may be represented by von neumann morgenstern utilities with this interpretation of the commodity space the main theorems of weltare economics remain valid in a world of uncertainty a competitive equilibrium is a pareto optimum a pareto optimum can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium and the diagnosis of the causes of market failure remains as before there are several reasons why one may feel uneasy about this construction a good deal of attention has been paid to the assumption of universality of markets necessary to establish the connection between equilibrium and optimum on a deeper level perhaps are the doubts that one may have about the criterion of welfare or efficiency first should social welfare be a function of individuals expected utilities or should the appropriate concept be that of expected welfare second if probability beliefs are not identical across individuals whose probabilities if any should be used for welfare evaluation in the next section we review some concepts and results in the recent literature on ex post welfare economics and in section ii it is argued that this literature can provide the foundations for a more satisfactory theory of merit goods a concept originally introduced by musgrave 1959 this idea is applied in section iii to a model with a complete set of markets in the arrow debreu sense and in sections iv and v to an incomplete markets model which provides the most natural framework for the study of merit goods various remarks on further aspects of the problem are collected in the concluding section of the paper

equality of opportunity and luck definitions and testable conditions with an application to income in france abstract we offer a model of equality of opportunity that encompasses different conceptions expressed in the public and philosophical debates in addition to circumstances whose effect on outcome should be compensated and effort which represents a legitimate source of inequality we introduce a third factor luck that captures the random factors whose impact on outcome should be even handed for equality of opportunity to be satisfied then we analyze how the various definitions of equality of opportunity can be empirically identified given data limitations and provide testable conditions definitions and conditions resort to standard stochastic dominance tools lastly we develop an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity for income acquisition in france over the period 1979 2000 which reveals that the degree of inequality of opportunity tends to decrease and that the degree of risk of income distributions conditional on social origin appears very similar across all groups of social origins

uncertainty and ratification failure i study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo for their agreement to come into effect they need the approval of a third agent the preferences of this third agent is private information but there is communication among agents i study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratification failures i show that under certain assumptions the informational deficiency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse

the choice of a welfare measure under uncertainty use of option price as a welfare measure when conducting a benefit cost analysis under uncertainty is appropriate only if the project under consideration will have no impact on the allocation of risk among individuals use of the willingness to pay locus as a benefit measure is appropriate only if the project will result in an efficient allocation of risk a more general welfare measure is proposed maximum agreeable payment that correctly measures the benefits and costs of any project

open versus closed door negotiations we examine a noncooperative bargaining between two agents one of whom agent 1 represents a constituency under closed door bargaining constituents must approve the final bargaining agreement in the open door case constituents may also terminate bargaining after intermediate offers have been made and rejected a learning effect and a termination effect arise in open door bargaining the former increases and the latter decreases the payoff to agent 2 from rejecting offers the termination effect dominates making agent 2 less likely to reject offers and hence making agent 1 more aggressive in the open door case

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small