a positive effect of human capital on growth abstract recent studies have found that economic growth appears to be unrelated to increases in educational attainment in this note i show that there is a correlation in one dataset but it is typically hidden by unrepresentative observations

the rule of law and economic growth where are we summary it is widely assumed that the rule of law is essential for economic growth however the rule of law is clearly a multidimensional concept encompassing a variety of discrete components from security of person and property rights to checks on government and control of corruption we review the theory underlying these different causal mechanisms linking the rule of law to economic growth and provide an introduction to some outstanding measurement issues we find that the correlation among different components of the rule of law concept are not tight among developing countries and that some inferences about the effects of property rights protection may not be warranted

when registration barriers fall who votes an empirical test of a rational choice model it is well known that those with higher ses characteristics tend to vote at higher rates in u s elections over the past several decades many proponents of eased voter registration requirements have predicted that liberalizing voter registration laws will significantly improve turnout especially among the least well educated and the poor in this article we offer a rational choice model of turnout that leads us to expect the greatest turnout gains from virtually eliminating voter registration costs will instead accrue to those with medium income and education we test this prediction longitudinally over the period 1972 1992 using a vast survey and a natural experiment comparing voters in states that adopted election day registration edr with those residing in states maintaining more traditional closing dates contrary to much of the literature citizens with medium education and medium income voted more under edr as the model predicts we conclude that the methods used here better capture and empirically identify the curvilinear relationship between voter registration laws and the turnout probabilities at various ses levels

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

the economics of development a survey i the subject our definition of the subject will be the use of economic analysis to understand the economies of poor or developing countries this includes in particular how standards of living in the population are determined and how they change over time and further how policy can or should be used in the influence of these processes the definition contains in principle much or most of analytical methods in economics insofar as they can be put to use in the examination of the issues of interest this is as it should be but it poses a problem for a survey in a journal a comprehensive treatment is infeasible so we shall follow a different route the survey will focus on what i take to be the major themes and approaches which characterise the productive aspects of the subject there is therefore no pretence at being exhaustive the purpose is rather to highlight some of the advances many of these have been of real substance there are a number of possible purposes for a survey and it is important to be clear at the outset for whom it is intended what it is and what it is not this survey is addressed to economists and students of economics who know the tools of their trade but not necessarily how they have been applied to and fashioned for the analysis of the economics of developing countries it is a description of the ways in which problems can be productively formulated and approached in terms of examples chosen for their intrinsic importance and interest the vastness of the subject means that we have to be highly selective it does not seek to provide a summary evaluation of the current view of the appropriate response to immediate policy questions it is not a history of thought nor a research manifesto nor an attempt to adjudicate or settle the major debates where they arise naturally from the major purpose some judgements on these subjects will be offered but they do not themselves constitute the primary intent of this survey there are three lines of enquiry or sets of questions which have i suggest been distinctive of the most fruitful work in development economics they will

electoral uncertainty fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract in this paper we study the link between elections fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations the setup is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both technology and political re election shocks the latter are incorporated via a two party model with elections the main theoretical prediction is that forward looking incumbents with uncertain prospects of re election find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies and that this hurts capital accumulation our econometric estimation using u s data finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments and in turn macroeconomic outcomes

political reputations and campaign promises we analyze conditions under which candidates reputations may affect voters beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election we develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological we analyze an equilibrium in which voters strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates we characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate s reputation jel d8

yield curve movements and fiscal retrenchments abstract we analyze the term structure of interest rates when markets anticipate a fiscal policy change in the near future if the anticipated change consists of spending cuts a fiscal retrenchment interest rates of all maturities increase but short rates increase more than longer rates the yield curve therefore becomes inverted if however there is uncertainty on the type of the fiscal policy change the prediction of the model can be radically different provided agents attach a positive probability to an increase in public spending the yield curve may become steeper in anticipation of a reform

economics of development and the development of economics the purpose of this paper is to restore some historical perspective by highlighting the many contributions of development economics to the rest of economics we will point out to the younger generations how some of the glittering ideas they currently play with originally came from that now neglected field and how in some cases they have rediscovered with great fanfare insights that were well known in the development literature familiarity with which would have enriched their own work

inside the hybrid iron cage political origins of hybridization this paper examines how social movement type political interactions between conflicting parties within an organization influence the adoption of a hybrid practice we argue that a hybrid practice is likely to be adopted when power balance between challengers and incumbents is achieved to shed light on conditions for organizational settlement based on such power balance we focus on three factors structures actors and processes of social movement type political interactions within organizations by studying changes in the presidential selection systems of korean universities between 1988 and 2006 this paper illustrates how organizational settlement resulted in the adoption of a hybrid system by combining elements of two previous competing presidential selection systems appointment and direct voting systems the general implications for the understanding of hybridization organizational settlement and organizational heterogeneity are discussed

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

what is considered development economics commonalities and differences in university courses around the developing world we use a combination of surveys of instructors and data from course syllabi to examine how the subject of development economics is taught at the undergraduate and master s level in over 200 courses

the downsian voter meets the ecological fallacy this paper presents evidence that voter participation does not depend on the probability that one vote is decisive an extensive summary of the empirical participation literature is provided which shows that most but not all studies have found that turnout in an electoral district is higher when the race is closer individual level vote regressions for the 1979 and 1980 canadian national elections are estimated using objective measures of closeness as opposed to self reported measures the main finding is that a citizen is no more likely to vote in a close election than in a lands lide election district level turnout regressions for the same elections are also estimated and a significant relation between closeness and turnout is observed this suggests that aggregation bias may generate a spurious closeness turnout relation in district level regressions

globalization and its challenges rudi was born and grew up in krefeld germany he was an undergraduate at the university of geneva and completed his ph d at the university of chicago in 1971 which is where we met he was a student of robert mundell and both the subject matter the development of the mundell fleming model and the elegance and insights of his early work reflected mundell s influence he taught at the university of rochester and at the university of chicago before accepting an offer from mit in 1975

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

analyzing the turnout competition link with aggregate cross sectional data numerous papers by public choice oriented scholars and others have sought to test the hypothesis inspired by downs 1957 that ceteris paribus turnout should be higher when elections are close most look in cross sectional terms at variations in turnout at the constituency level for elections of a given type by and large the results have been disappointing see e g foster 1984 we are skeptical of these weak findings and argue that a complete portrait of the turnout competition link requires us to examine that link for at least three different types of turnout turnout among potential eligibles turnout among registrants and turnout for a given office relative to other offices such as top of the ticket and to take into account longitudinal changes in turnout for recent off year elections to the u s senate and also for off year elections to the u s house of representatives in states where there was no gubernatorial or senatorial contest on the ballot we find strong evidence for higher turnout among eligibles in close contests for these elections to the u s senate we also find evidence for an ecological effect that leads to turnout being maximized at values of competition other than 50 50 moreover when we look at turnout for office relative to top of the ticket voting in the california assembly and the u s senate in presidential years we again find some evidence for an ecological effect in which turnout is maximized at a value of republican vote share above 50 percent and find further strong evidence for a clear link between competition and turnout for office among those at the polls

what s the big idea the third generation of policies for economic growth economists and reform minded policymakers in latin america are asking themselves and are being asked hard questions these days the broad consensus is that two decades of reform have had too little toshow for it sporadic and sputtering economic growth and stagnant real wages especially for the unskilled is not what was expected this paper puts the latin american experience in the global context and examines the processes that brought the region to this point we look at the trends in policy advice on economic growth and how they were formed and we address the question of what economists can do now to help the region move in restoring economic growth

dynamic parties and social turnout an agent based model1 the authors develop an agent based model of dynamic parties with social turnout built upon developments in different fields within social science this model yields significant turnout divergent platforms and numerous results consistent with the rational calculus of voting model and the empirical literature on social turnout in a simplified version of the model the authors show how a local imitation structure inherently yields dynamics that encourage positive turnout the model also generates new hypotheses about the importance of social networks and citizen party interactions

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

development paradigm failures over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly we provide an explanation for this poor performance in our model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner these choices affect domestic production and aid inflows production is high when productive capacity is high and when the policy is appropriate in the country specific circumstances and implemented honestly aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm in equilibrium countries with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions follow the paradigm more closely hence our model suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries that would fail anyway we provide empirical evidence in support of the main assumptions and results

democracy as an equilibrium observation shows that while democracy is fragile in poor countries it is impregnable in developed ones to explain this pattern i develop a model in which political parties propose redistributions of incomes observe the result of an election and decide whether to comply with the outcome or to launch a struggle for dictatorship democracy prevails in developed societies because too much is at stake in turning against it more income can be redistributed in developed than in poor countries without threatening democracy limits on redistribution arise endogenously so that constitutions are not necessary for democracy to endure a democratic culture characterizes the equilibrium

the long term effects of africa s slave trades can part of africa s current underdevelopment be explained by its slave trades to explore this question i use data from shipping records and historical documents reporting slave ethnicities to construct estimates of the number of slaves exported from each country during africa s slave trades i find a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from a country and current economic performance to better understand if the relationship is causal i examine the historical evidence on selection into the slave trades and use instrumental variables together the evidence suggests that the slave trades have had an adverse effect on economic development

the institutional foundations of public policy documento de trabajo 90 presidential address to the latin american and caribbean economic association lacea paris november 2005 titulo tomado de la pantalla de presentacion visto 12 de septiembre de 2011 noviembre 2005 incluye referencias bibliograficas

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

navigating institutional change the accord rogernomics and the politics of adjustment in australia and new zealand this article uses a transactions approach to examine the ability of governments to develop and sustain negotiated solutions to major economic challenges where actors are embedded in long term repeated interaction have long time horizons and invest in monitoring and enforcement technologies effective political exchange is more likely in good transactions environments policy bargains will be more easily renegotiated and therefore more flexible and durable to examine the expectations the author looks to the puzzle posed by events in australia and new zealand 1983 1996 facing similar macroeconomic crises and with historically similar wage bargaining institutions and levels of union density both elect labor governments which then make opposite choices a negotiated solution emerged in australia but not in new zealand relying on the secondary literature and interviews with key actors the author finds support for the transactions approach findings here point to ways in which to broaden the study of

factor endowments inequality and paths of development among new world economies whereas traditional explanations of differences in long run paths of development across the americas generally point to the significance of differences in national heritage or religion we highlight the relevance of stark contrasts in the degree of inequality in wealth human capital and political power in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions evolved over time we argue moreover that the roots of these disparities in the extent of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments dating back to the era of european colonization we document through comparative studies of suffrage public land and schooling policies systematic patterns by which societies in the americas that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members of elite classes and disadvantaging the bulk of the population by providing them with more political influence and access to economic opportunities the clear implication is that institutions should not be presumed to be exogenous economists need to learn more about where they come from to understand their relation to economic development our findings not only contribute to our knowledge of why extreme differences in the extent of inequality across new world economies have persisted for centuries but also to the study of processes of long run economic growth past and present

public spending and the paradox of supermajority rule this article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending we propose a simple conjecture if rent seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators demands for rent seeking activities are price inelastic a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending other things equal using data from u s state legislatures 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures

turnout in gubernatorial and senatorial primary and general elections in the south 1922 90 a rational choice model of the effects of short run and long run electoral competition on relative turnout using data on non presidential year elections for governor and u s senators in eight southern states over the period 1922 1990 we provide a rational choice inspired model of the factors that should be expected to affect the relative levels of turnout in primaries as compared to general elections both v o key and anthony downs have argued that voters will be more likely to participate in the elections in which they can most expect to be decisive v o key 1949 proposed that when general elections are usually lop sided because of one party dominance of a state s politics the primary of the dominant party of the state should have a higher turnout than the general election downs argued that turnout should be higher in competitive elections our modelling combines these ideas we use as our dependent variable the ratio of primary to general election turnout in each year we posit that this ratio will increase 1 the greater the degree of within party competition in the primary especially that within the dominant party of a state if there is one and 2 the weaker the degree of between party competition in the general election in addition to election specific effects we also posit long run effects such that the ratio for the offices of governor and u s senator will be affected not merely by the degrees of competition within and between parties specific to any given election but also by the long run trends in party competition this hypothesis leads us to expect that 3 in the south with the rise of the republican party the ratio of primary to general election turnout should decline over time all of our expectations about the links between turnout and competition are strongly supported we argue that rational choice models of turnout perform quite well when we view them in a comparative statics perspective rather than using them to make predictions about who will and who will not vote in any given election

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

procedural choice in majoritarian organizations a puzzling feature of self governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive seemingly nonmajoritarian procedures e g chairs and committees this article provides a theory of self enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures we ask 1 why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place 2 why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter and 3 with what policy consequences in the model a risk averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency i e reduce the procedural uncertainty of free for all bargaining an equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive generating nonmajoritarian policy bias still a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty

on dynamic compromise abstract most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal so why don t legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority we show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient and initial allocations are not too unequal the compromise is only sustainable if starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise we find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases in this sense compromise is easier in larger legislatures

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics we develop a novel model of campaigns elections and policy making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators this generates a distinction between policy rhetoric and policy reality and introduces an important role for party discipline in the policy making process we identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics when trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens i introduction in a democracy the majority rules often this means that the policies enacted by elected governments reflect the preferences of some citizens more than those of others this feature of democracy commonly known as tyranny of the majority arises in institutional settings in which elected officials represent disproportionately the interests of their own constituents and electees who represent the minority have limited means to influence policy in this paper we argue that tyranny of the majority imparts a protectionist bias to democratic politics this is so even when the average citizen covets free trade and when every citizen has an equal probability of being represented in the policy making process by protection we mean policies that favor quasi fixed factors of production thus protection in our parlance refers both to tariffs that shield import competing industries from foreign competition and subsidies that promote exports the bias refers to the average or expected policy outcome we focus on majoritarian systems in which elected legislators represent geographic regions the existence of a protectionist bias requires only that i national party leaders cannot fully commit their candidates to adopt particular policies if elected ii mem

narrow and scientific replication of the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa summary nunn and wantchekon 2011 argue that slave trades led to a culture of mistrust in africa they regress self reported trust from the 2005 afrobarometer surveys on ethnicity specific historic slave exports individuals from ethnic groups that experienced high levels of slave exports are less trusting causality is demonstrated by instrumenting slave exports using the historic distance of each ethnic group to the coast our narrow replication yields identical results the scientific replication repeats the analysis with afrobarometer survey data from 2008 which includes two new countries and more ethnic groups our replication confirms the results of nunn and wantchekon copyright 2012 john wiley sons ltd

constitutions politics and economics a review essay on persson and tabellini s the economic effects of constitutions in this essay i review the new book by torsten persson and guido tabellini the economic effects of constitutions which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules i also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy

specialization and non renewable resources ricardo meets ricardo abstract the one demand hotelling model fails to explain the observed specialization of non renewable resources we develop a model with multiple demands and resources to show that specialization of resources according to demand is driven by ricardian comparative advantage while the order of resource use over time is determined by ricardian absolute advantage an abundant resource with absolute advantage in all demands must be initially employed in all demands when each resource has an absolute advantage in some demand no resource may be used exclusively the two by two model is characterized resource and demand specific taxes are shown to have significant substitution effects

barriers to investment in polarized societies i present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short sighted policies the relative price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over taxation investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition in the long run this results in output consumption and welfare being inefficiently low the larger is the degree of polarization the greater is the inefficiency political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth retarding policies

climate and the slave trade african societies exported more slaves in colder years lower temperatures reduced mortality and raised agricultural yields lowering slave supply costs our results help explain african participation in the slave trade which predicts adverse outcomes today we use an annual panel of african temperatures and port level slave exports to show that exports declined when local temperatures were warmer than normal this result is strongest where african ecosystems are least resilient to climate change cold weather shocks at the peak of the slave trade predict lower economic activity today we support our interpretation using the histories of whydah benguela and mozambique

does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited i consider a risk sharing game with limited commitment and study how the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self enforcing in the long run depends on agents risk aversion and the riskiness of their endowment when agents face no aggregate risk a mean preserving spread may destroy the sustainability of perfect risk sharing if each agent s endowment may take more than three values with aggregate risk the same can happen with only two possible endowment realizations with respect to risk aversion the intuitive comparative statics result holds without aggregate risk but it holds only under strong assumptions in the presence of aggregate risk in simple settings with two endowment values i also show that the threshold discount factor co moves with popular measures of risk sharing

the unintended consequence of an export ban evidence from benin s shrimp sector summary the inability of benin to comply with eu standards led to a ban on its shrimp exports we show that the ban had a negative impact on the income of fishmongers and fishermen in the short run but also several years after it was lifted the impact persisted because exports to the eu did not revive and the local shrimp demand could not fully compensate for the loss of the eu market a small number of local actors coped with the ban by moving out of the sector but the large majority were locked in the local fishery sector

the performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections in an economic theory of democracy downs hypothesized that rational utility maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting as opposed to abstaining altogether and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost this hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior but is counterintuitive even if the utility increment is plausibly large the probability of casting a pivotal tie breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting and no rational person will vote nevertheless a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote even though that probability may be small this article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968 1972 1976 and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election pooled data least squares dummy variable lsdv regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible the empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak unstable or nonexistent in all of the models tested

the dynamics of aggregate partisanship despite extensive research on party identification links between partisanship at the individual and aggregate level have largely been ignored this leaves a gap in our understanding of the dynamics of aggregate partisanship to remedy this we identify a set of ideal types that capture the essential arguments made about individual level party identification we then combine the behavioral assumptions for each type with existing results on statistical aggregation to deduce the specific temporal pattern that each type implies for aggregate levels of partisanship using new diagnostic tests and a highly general time series model we find that aggregate measures of partisanship from 1953 through 1992 are fractionally integrated our evidence that the effects of a shock to aggregate partisanship last for years not months or decades challenges previous work by party systems theorists and students of macropartisanship our arguments and empirical evidence provide a conceptually richer and more precise basis for theories of issue evolution or endogenous preferences in which partisanship plays a central role

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

keeping it in the family lineage organization and the scope of trust in sub saharan africa we present evidence that the traditional structure of society is an important determinant of the scope of trust today within africa individuals belonging to ethnic groups that organized society using segmentary lineages exhibit a more limited scope of trust measured by the gap between trust in relatives and trust in non relatives this trust gap arises because of lower levels of trust in non relatives and not higher levels of trust in relatives a causal interpretation of these correlations is supported by the fact that the effects are primarily found in rural areas where these forms of organization are still prevalent

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

bicameral legislatures and fiscal policy john stuart mill s observation in the mid 19th century is clearly outdated the two chamber question receives scant attention in modern political economy the absence of continued debate might simply reflect a general satisfaction with the dual chambered structure as a desirable democratic institution most developed democracies and all but one of the american states have adopted a bicameral legislative structure in this paper we stress the many variations in bicameralism even among the american states and the effects these variations have on policy making and fiscal outcomes put simply bicameralism is not an all or none institution instead bicameralism is a variable institution that alters the identity of the median legislator within each chamber and determines the similarity of the dominant coalitions between the two chambers in this perspective the impact of bicameralism on policy comes principally from the different bases of representation across the two chambers moreover the analysis stresses that the degree of bicameralism changes regularly as a consequence of the redistricting process the remainder of the paper is organized as follows section 2 reviews the main conceptual arguments underlying the function of a bicameral organization section 3 examines implications for fiscal policy using data from the american states we develop several measures of bicameralism using detailed constituency data on economic and demographic characteristics at the level of state legislative districts we then use these measures to examine the effect of interdistrict constituent homogeneity on total state government spending as well as on the major com