fiscal shocks and budget balance persistence in the eu countries from central and eastern europe this article analyses the time series properties of the fiscal balance in the 10 eu countries from central and eastern europe the persistence of the fiscal balance is analysed by means of unit root tests that account for possible nonlinearities and structural changes the linear and nonlinear unit root tests find only mild evidence in favour of the stationarity hypothesis with asymmetric effects present in a few cases after controlling for structural changes in the data generation processes dgps the results point to stationarity of the series thus in spite of relatively steady headline figures the budget balance processes in the eu countries from central and eastern europe exhibit substantial instability

common trends the government s budget constraint and revenue smoothing abstract the requirement that the government s budget be balanced in present value terms is shown to be equivalent to the condition that government expenditures inclusive of interest tax receipts and seignorage be cointegrated the condition is in fact stronger requiring that the deficit inclusive of interest be stationary stationarity of the net of interest deficit is neither necessary nor sufficient for intertemporal budget balance however it does have implications for barro s tax smoothing hypothesis data for the period 1890 1986 are consistent with intertemporal budget balance but not with tax smoothing

rational ponzi games when can a government run a rational ponzi game i e issue debt and never pay back any interest or principal the transversalit y condition of each individual implies that such schemes require an i nfinity of lenders given this horizons are unimportant ponzi games cannot be ruled out by assuming that agents have infinite horizons the authors point out both the basic similarity of and some key diff erences between rational ponzi games and asset price bubbles or fiat money regarding international debt the analysis implies that what matters for the feasibility of rational ponzi games are conditions in the lenders not the borrowers economy copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

some tests of the government s intertemporal budget constraint using us data us monthly data for the period 1951 1984 are used to test a key element of the ricardian equivalence doctrine namely the government s intertemporal budget constraint it is demonstrated that the us empirical evidence is not supportive of this constraint some explanations for this finding are noted

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

bubble finance and debt sustainability a test of the government s intertemporal budget constraint this paper tests whether the government s budget is intertemporally balanced in a number of ec countries by applying a method first developed to detect speculative bubbles in financial markets the test aims to establish whether the government can engage in buble finance and is based on a comparison between two sets of estimates the first is obtained directly by regressing the stock of outstanding debt on a distributed lag of the primary surplus the second is obtained indirectly from a pair of equations one relating the current debt stock to next period s primary surplus and debt stock the other specifying an ar process for the primary surplus in the presence of a bubble only the first set of estimates is inconsistent and hence the two sets differ it is found that the null of no bubble can be rejected in the cases of italy germany denmark and greece implying that the government is not intertemporally solvent in these countries the other ec member states appear to be on a sustainable path

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

bargaining one dimensional social choices we analyze bargaining over the one dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes q 2 stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol we provide a monotonicity condition satisfied by all single peak strictly quasi concave and concave utilities that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player s utilities are symmetric around the peak without symmetry the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities q n 2 provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition

bidding for the surplus a non cooperative approach to the shapley value abstract we propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero monotonic environments with transferable utility the mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the shapley value payoffs we extend our results to implement the weighted shapley values finally we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments the modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure and implements the shapley values of the super additive cover of the environment journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the shapley shubik index abstract in this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule assuming complete information we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria we show how the shapley shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of bargaining power that appear in this light as limit cases

cooperative bargaining foundations of the shapley shubik index abstract in a recent paper we provide an interpretation of the shapley shubik index as a measure of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee negotiating in search of consensus it is assumed that negotiation takes place under the condition that every winning coalition can impose any agreement in this paper we further investigate the axiomatic foundations of this interpretation of the shapley shubik index to this end a wider framework admitting random voting rules is considered

the ricardian approach to budget deficits persistent budget deficits have increased economists interest in theories and evidence about fiscal policy this paper develops the ricardian approach and contrasts it with standard models the discussion considers from major theoretical objections to ricardian equivalence finite lifetimes imperfect capital markets uncertainty about future taxes and incomes and the distorting effects of taxation the paper then considers empirical evidence on interest rates consumption and saving and current account deficits the conclusion is that the ricardian approach is a useful first order approximation and that this approach will probably become the benchmark model for assessing fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

bargaining in committees as an extension of nash s bargaining theory abstract this paper addresses the following issue if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives in the shadow of a voting rule that is any agreement can be enforced if a winning coalition supports it what general agreements are likely to arise in other words what influence can the voting rule used to settle possibly nonunanimous agreements have on the outcome of consensus we model the situation as an extension of the nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity in this setting a natural extension of nash s solution is characterized

individual and collective time consistency this paper reconsiders the strotz pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame perfectness such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on greenberg s theory of social situations the properties of this refinement are investigated and illustrated a unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one person planning as a problem of individual time consistency and renegotiation proofness as a problem of collective time consistency are captured through the same general concept

tie breaking in games of perfect information abstract the paper suggests that ties in an extensive form game have strategic implications if they represent credible threats or promises we consider a subset of subgame perfect nash equilibria obtained by breaking ties according to their strategic implications and show that the subset is nonempty for finite extensive form games of perfect information journal of economic literatureclassification number 026

on the limitations of government borrowing a framework for empiricaltesting this paper seeks to distinguish empirically between two views on the limitations of government borrowing according to one view nothing precludes the government from running a permanent budget deficit paying interest due on the growing debt load simply by issuing new debt an alternative perspective holds that creditors would be unwilling to purchase government debt unless the government made a credible commitment to balance its budget in present value terms we show that distinguishing between these possibilities is mathematically equivalent to testing whether a continuing currency inflation might be fueled by speculation alone or is instead driven solely by economic fundamentals empirical tests which have been developed for this economic question lead us to conclude that postwar u s deficits are largely consistent with the proposition that the government budget must be balanced in present value terms this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one dimensional policies under super majority rules article history we consider negotiations selecting one dimensional policies individuals have instanta neous preferences represented by continuous concave and single peaked utility functions and they are impatient decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and super majority approval ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and we provide its explicit characterization the uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of pareto optimal voting rules for symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred ma jority rule

von neumann morgenstern stable sets discounting and nash bargaining we establish a link between von neumann morgenstern stable set and the nash solution in a general n player utility set the stable set solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay we show that a stable set exists and if the utility set has a smooth surface any stable set converges to the nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero

cointegration and government borrowing constraints evidence for the united states testable implications are derived in a present value borrowing constraint model for the u s federal government critical values for unit root and cointegration tests are calculated with monte carlo studies cointegration techniques are employed to determine whether the government has been involved in perpetual debt financing in recent years the data reject this assertion

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

coalitional bargaining games with random proposers theory and application abstract we consider a non cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference we characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core the model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient

on the convergence to the nash bargaining solution for action dependent bargaining protocols we consider a non cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action dependent bargaining protocol that is the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected an important example is the frequently studied rejector becomes proposer protocol we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player we consider the limit as the bargaining friction vanishes in case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized otherwise equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted nash bargaining solution where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on one s own rejection

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

sustainability and comovement of government debt in emu countries a panel data analysis we investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 19 european monetary union emu countries over the period 1970 2016 panel unit root tests in the presence of cross section dependence show that the government debt series is stationary indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for these countries this confirms the effectiveness of the austerity measures implemented by these member states moreover an unobserved common factor drives the comovement of government debt in the eurozone

one dimensional bargaining we study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the unit interval the acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions the focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies as the players become infinitely patient we show that along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria the social acceptance set collapses to a point this point called the limit of bargaining equilibria is independent of the sequence of equilibria and is uniquely determined by the set of players the utility functions the recognition probabilities and the acceptance rule the central result of the paper is a characterization of the limit of bargaining equilibria as a unique zero of the characteristic equation

uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one dimensional model of bargaining abstract we prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities for an arbitrary common discount factor for general concave utilities we prove existence and uniqueness of a minimal stationary equilibrium and of a maximal stationary equilibrium we provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave nonquadratic utilities

persistent deficits and the market value of government debt summary this paper investigates whether postwar canadian public financial policy satisfies a borrowing constraint direct tests of the present value relation suggested by this constraint shed light on the sustainability of current policy we examine monthly data on canadian federal government finances using tests for cointegration the finding is that the joint behaviour of real debt and real surpluses is inconsistent with intertemporal budget balance for the government one interpretation of this finding is that the government is systematically paying real returns to bondholders by issuing further debt alternatively bondholders may expect the government to finance future interest payments from a source other than primary surpluses e g the sale of physical assets much empirical macroeconomics is concerned with the effects of public financial policies numerous studies have examined whether such policies affect interest rates inflation or national income and its components these examinations raise the question of the efficacy of government budget deficits they generally assume that a borrowing constraint holds in the public finances some positive theories of public debt creation also make this assumption examples include barro s 1979 history of us federal deficits and sargent s 1986 rationalizations of recent us budgetary policy lucas and stokey s 1983 discussion of optimal taxation also involves this assumption hansen roberds and sargent 1987 outline the testable implications of present value budget balance and hamilton and flavin 1986 investigate the feasibility of recurring deficits by directly testing the us federal government s borrowing constraint such tests seem natural given both the recent boom is testing more complicated first order difference equations in macroeconomics and the widespread discussion of current deficits this paper tests the present value borrowing constraint using recently constructed data on the market value of outstanding canadian federal government debt we use monthly rather than annual as in hamilton and flavin data and conduct tests of univariate integration and of bivariate cointegration to investigate the joint time series properties of debt and deficits one finding is that real debt and real surpluses are integrated processes evidence of their cointegration is mixed and point estimates of the cointegrating vector suggest that the expected real rate of return on debt is negative moreover the surplus measured to include interest payments as government spending is nonstationary these findings are inconsistent

bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities abstract we consider a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game where partial breakdowns such as the rejecter of a proposal exiting from the game take place with a positive probability and externalities accompany the formation of coalitions we present an example in which there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium sspe such that a bargaining delay occurs we also show that under no partial breakdowns or no externalities delay does not occur in any sspe

a neoclassical perspective on budget deficits i n the 1988 presidential campaign virtually every serious candidate spoke of the urgent need to trim government budget deficits public opinion polls have identified federal deficits as a key economic issue second only to unemployment while many economists are relieved by what they perceive to be a long overdue political response to a critical economic problem others regard the fuss as much ado about nothing it is indeed remarkable that economists can disagree so severely over an issue which commands such a uniform reaction from laymen of widely different ideologies and political affiliations generally speaking there are three schools of thought concerning the economic effects of budget deficits neoclassical keynesian and ricardian before proceeding further it is useful to review the basic structure and implications of each paradigm the neoclassical paradigm envisions farsighted individuals planning consumption over their own life cycles budget deficits raise total lifetime consumption by shifting taxes to subsequent generations if economic resources are fully employed increased consumption necessarily implies decreased saving interest rates must then rise to bring capital markets into balance thus persistent deficits crowd out private capital accumulation in the current economic environment most economists would agree that these consequences would be highly detrimental