estimates of effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes this chapter describes a method of calculating summary measures of effective factor income tax rates in the united states using readily available data the numbers resulting from application of this method in a study are reported in the chapter and some of their possible uses are discussed the estimated factor income tax rates behave over time in a manner quite consistent with the behavior of other broad measures of federal tax policy the postwar movement in the tax rate on income from labor relative to that on income from capital or more accurately the relevant components of these tax rates provides suggestive support for the miller scholes hypothesis that the federal personal income tax has been moving in the direction of a pure consumption tax the tax rates reported in the chapter are consistent with other studies that show a decrease since the 1950s in rates of taxation at the corporate level of income from corporate held capital they are also consistent with the view that rates of taxation of such income at the noncorporate level have risen but not quite sufficiently to offset the decline in the corporate tax burden

the ex dividend day behavior of canadian stock prices tax changes and clientele effects with some simple assumptions the ex dividend day price drop and the associated dividend can be used to measure the market s marginal tax rate previous research has estimated the implied tax rate for the u s this paper extends the analysis to canada where the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains is completely different from that in the u s the paper also presents estimates from 1970 80 to include four distinct periods when the tax treatment was different hence we include an implied test of market efficiency as well as those for the relevance of taxes and the existence of tax based dividend clienteles

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

evidence on changes in aid allocation criteria have donors changed their aid allocation criteria over the past three decades toward greater selectivity a frequently stated goal of the international development community using data on how 22 donors allocated their bilateral aid among 147 countries over 1970 2004 the article finds that after the fall of the berlin wall in 1989 and especially in the late 1990s bilateral aid responded more to poverty and the quality of the policy and institutional environment in the recipient countries furthermore the sensitivity of aid allocation to the country s size and its debt burden has declined over time these results are robust to different samples and model specifications various econometric techniques and alternative measures of institutional quality while the specific factors causing these changes cannot be identified these presumably include geopolitical and economic concerns and the many changes in the international aid architecture donors still differ greatly in their selectivity this suggests that further multifaceted reforms are needed to ensure even greater selectivity of aid

the perception of man and the conception of society two approaches to understanding society the social sciences offer two distinct approaches to understanding society one originated with the scottish moral philosophers and shaped the discipline of economics the other emerged from the french enlightenment and influenced the study of sociology the two approaches are based on radically different perceptions of man and man s relation to society this paper explores these alternative hypotheses and examines some major implications it concludes that the hypothesis reaching back to the scottish philosophers provides the basis for a unified approach in the social sciences

are bilateral and multilateral aid for trade complementary using the first comprehensive estimates of ad valorem tariff equivalent bilateral trade costs spanning the time period 2002 10 we examine whether the aid for trade aft inflows reduce bilateral trade costs facing aid recipients if so we ask whether the trade costs reduction effects of aft from bilateral and multilateral sources are complementary by showing the extent to which the observed trade cost reduction effects of aft from bilateral multilateral sources correlate with the magnitudes of aft disbursements from multilateral bilateral sources we present plausible explanation for the cross country variations in the extent to which aft promotes trade flows our findings have thus important policy implications for shaping future discourses on the coordination of disbursements for enhancing the effectiveness of aft

samaritan agents on the strategic delegation of aid policy abstract should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the samaritan s dilemma it is facing i show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients this is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post they therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves

an econometric analysis of charitable giving with interdependent preferences in practice we are in a situation where one s own contribution is expected to influence the contributions of others a will expect that b and c may also be induced by his gifts to the same or similar objectives vickrey 1962 p 40 the estimates provide no support for the view that the total amount that an individual contributes is a function of the amount that is given by others although these results are clearly not definitive evidence against the notion of such interdependence among individuals we believe that the burden of proof now rests with those who support a theory of interdependent giving feldstein and clotfelter 1976 p 19 i introduction it is widely believed that one person s charitable contributions can be significantly influenced by the contributions of others the national survey of philanthropy for instance indicates that a sizable fraction of the population believes that people pay attention to what others give when determining their own contribution 1 fundraisers also feel that large leadership contributions by wealthy individuals can be influential in encouraging more and larger contributions by others bakal 1979 moreover interdependence among givers is central to social scientists outside of economics who study altruistic or charitable behavior psychologists for instance have learned that those who have recently witnessed an altruistic act are more likely to be altruistic and that people will be more altruistic the more others contribute 2 sociologists studying reference groups have shown that choices individuals make often depend on the choices of others who are similar in age education social status and other characteristics and that such reference groups appear to be important in determining altruistic and charitable activity 3 economic theorists have also made interdependent preferences the focus of their theoretical models of giving in some of the earliest writing on philanthropy vickrey 1962 gives an extensive discussion of the role of neighborhood effects on contributions formal models of altruism beginning with becker 1974 also assume any one contributor s choice depends on the contributions of all others largely because of the public goods aspect of charity 4 other models have generalized becker s approach to include impurely altruistic motives for giving such as a desire for acclaim status or simply a warm glow from giving where the impure altruism also depends on the contributions of others andreoni 1989 1990 outside of the literature on charity there is a long history beginning with duesenberry 1949 of economic models that assume the consumption choices of one agent are directly affected by the choices and characteristics of other agents 5 yitzhaki 1982 stark 1990 and stark and yitzhaki 1988 have shown the importance of relative deprivation in understanding economic phenomena and in related reasoning frank 1984 1985a b has shown that there is a theoretical and empirical basis for assuming that individuals care about how their consumption ranks relative to some group of peers in addition manski 1993a has shown the importance of role models and reference groups in the study of dynamic choice despite this emphasis on interdependent preferences elsewhere the empirical literature on charitable giving has been unsuccessful at finding any empirical relevance of interdependence feldstein and clotfelter 1976 are the only economists who have attempted to include variables to capture the interdependence of preferences their effort was unsuccessful as a result a large literature has developed in which equations for charitable contributions have been estimated without accounting for interdependence this method has led to a consensus that the tax price of charitable contributions and donor s income are both important in determining gifts

accrual equivalent marginal tax rates for personal financial assets this paper shows that the appropriate approach to calculating accrual equivalent marginal tax rates for nonaccrual taxes on personal financial investments is the relative reduction in the internal rate of return approach which equates the present values from the after tax returns from an investment under an accrual and a nonaccrual tax detailed comparisons are made with alternative approaches proposed by boadway bruce and mintz 1984 and by king and fullerton 1984 for the capital gains tax both find accrual tax rates that equate the present values of accrual and actual tax revenues fundamental problems are found with both alternative approaches

basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance abstract i analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt i show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare however with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs private lenders profits multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit

dancing to the donors tune policy choice in aid dependent countries current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients own plans in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies i show that when recipients have private information policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime however generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case study evidence moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid seeking in the least needy countries in summary optimal aid policies are highly context specific and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity

a positive theory of discretionary policy the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution we offer an explanation of government s preference for discretionary policy action the main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects discretionary policy imposes a social cost we show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government an optimal state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government s opportunities to exploit its informational advantage rules of this kind and constitutional restrictions are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public

parental altruism and self interest child labor among late nineteenth century american families intergenerational relationships within late nineteenth century industrial families are analyzed using several large scale contemporary household surveys nonaltruistic behavior by parents was pervasive even among families with positive assets child labor was common in certain industrial settings suggesting that child labor or nonschooling did not simply reflect parental borrowing constraints neither did physical asset transfers offset human capital losses among working youth a quantitative estimate of parental nonaltruism is derived from an equilibrium labor market model approximately 90 percent of all child earnings was implicitly competed away through lower adult wages as families migrated to areas with abundant child labor opportunities

proliferation and fragmentation transactions costs and the value of aid abstract the problem of the proliferation of the number of aid donors and aid channels continues to worsen it is widely and plausibly believed that this significantly reduces the value of aid by increasing direct and indirect transactions costs we contribute to the existing literature by a categorising the apparent adverse effects of proliferation b producing a reliable and fair indicator of the relative degree to which the main bilateral donors proliferate or concentrate their aid c giving some explanation of why some donors proliferate more than others d constructing a reliable measure of the extent to which recipients suffer from the problem of fragmentation in the sources of their aid and e demonstrating that the worst proliferators among the aid donors are especially likely to be suppliers of aid to recipients suffering most from fragmentation there are significant implications for aid policy

george stigler s contribution to the economic analysis of regulation george stigler changed the way economists analyze government regulation this enormous legacy is essentially embodied in two articles his 1962 analysis of electricity rates with claire friedland and his 1971 theoretical piece there were to be sure precursors and successors in his own work but none of them so profoundly affected the course of intellectual inquiry as these two the importance of both articles rests more i believe with the questions each posed than with the answers even by the standards of the day neither piece evinced the sort of technical sophistication that the profession has come to admire neither produced conclusions that were impervious to all serious subsequent challenges but both produced insights that have altered the course of research in the area to this day to understand stigler s contribution it is best to proceed chronologically and to begin with the state of the field around 1962 there is room here only for caricature rather than extensive survey however i think it is fair to say that the field derived its main energy from the normative economics of marginal cost pricing the proper role of government was to correct the private market failures that prevented attainment of marginal cost pricing applied economic analysis of regulation was then largely descriptive and its main tendency was to show how the regulatory institutions constrained departures from marginal cost pricing monopoly was viewed as the main barrier to marginal cost pricing and the natural monopoly occupied center stage in the economics of regulation the prime examples of natural monopoly were sup1 man made monopolies were the main subject matter of industrial organization stigler s profound influence on this field is summarized by harold demsetz s article in this issue

marginal federal personal and corporate income tax rates in the u s 1909 1975 abstract in this article i first report and describe the construction of two new statistical series on the marginal federal income tax rates for corporations and private individuals in the united states since the inception of those taxes and then analyze the behavior of these series over time several results on the determination of tax rates are derived these generally are not consistent with barro s theory of deficit finance

the political realities of african management abstract amidst the outburst of concern for public management in africa there is frequently a failure to distinguish among its components policy making leadership general internal administration and bureaucratic hygiene accounting procurement the merit system etc each of these four areas is different in the importance that it has for project performance the knowledge base that is available for improving it and the way in which it is affected by african political and social structures as a consequence those seeking to improve public management on the continent frequently are mistaken in the priorities that they establish and import inappropriate management technologies

how burdensome are capital gains taxes abstract this paper uses capital gain realization data from individual tax returns to evaluate recent claims that sophisticated portfolio strategies permit investors to avoid capital gains taxes the results suggest important investor heterogeneity twenty percent of taxpayers with capital gains or losses face binding loss offset constraints another significant group of investors evades the capital gains tax prior to recent legislative changes forty percent of capital gains were unreported finally about forty percent of capital gains accrue to investors who report capital gains and face significant tax burdens as the traditional analysis of the capital gains tax suggests

monetary policy taxes and the business cycle this paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations we find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains a tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation monetary policy reform around 1980 led to better control and with more stable inflation the effect of the interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become negligible

some indirect evidence on effective capital gains tax rates this paper presents estimates of effective marginal tax rates on capital gains excluding housing between 1960 and 1978 in the united states concern that the inflation of the 1970s may have worked through the tax system to reduce incentives to produce and save has focused attention on the effective marginal tax rates that apply to various sources of income joines 1981 sheds light on this issue by calculating the historical effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes for the united states part of the recent debate however has focused specifically on capital gains taxes and the desirability of reducing them to enhance incentives for saving and investment the effective marginal tax rate on capital gains henceforth emtg may be the most difficult rate to measure in addition to the usual problems of how to attribute deductions exclusions and tax credits further adjustment must be made because investors pay taxes only when they realize their capital gains 1 the expected emtg this paper reports estimates of effective marginal tax rates on capital gains by comparing reported capital gains with total capital gains on an annual basis the estimates show that the effective marginal tax rates on capital gains fluctuated between 3 4 and 6 6 between 1960 and 1978 and that capital gains are held on average between 24 and 31 years before they are reported

tax motivated trading by individual investors we study the stock trades of a large number of individual investors to investigate how tax incentives affect the realization of capital gains and losses we compare investors realization behavior in their taxable and tax deferred accounts and thereby identify the effect of taxes on trading decisions we reach four conclusions first we find clear evidence of a lock in effect for capital gains in taxable accounts relative to tax deferred accounts we find evidence of the disposition effect the tendency for investors to hold losses and sell gains in both types of accounts and especially at short holding periods the lock in effect is stronger for large stock transactions than for small ones second we find tax loss selling throughout the calendar year though it is most pronounced in december tax loss trading is more pronounced among investors who have realized capital gains elsewhere in the portfolio during the year third we observe substantial heterogeneity in individual investors propensity to trade controlling for this heterogeneity however does not alter the relation between a stock s past performance and the realization decision finally we find that relatively few investors repurchase stocks that they have sold at a loss even after the 30 day wash sale holding period has expired

globalization and the confidence game abstract we show that governments in developing countries have an incentive to play the confidence game wherein the need to win the confidence of the international capital market can actually prevent a country from following otherwise sensible policies and force it to follow policies that it would normally consider perverse this incentive arises because of a combination of a conformity bias and good news bias in governmental decision making in an open economy which results in inefficient outcomes which increases rather than decreases the threat of devaluation while institutions that encourage greater transparency and the public revelation of information may often mitigate this inefficiency on some occasions increased transparency may even exacerbate the inefficiency

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

market valuation of tax timing options evidence from capital gains distributions we examine a distribution that is taxed as a capital gain rather than as a dividend since the distribution induces a realized capital gain while the price change is an unrealized gain ex day return behavior provides evidence of the value of tax timing capital gains we show that investors are compensated 7c in unrealized gains for each dollar of realized capital gains that is 1 of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93c of unrealized gains an investor with a tax rate on realized gains of 15 has an effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains of 8 6 capital gains taxes can be deferred until assets are sold this feature provides the investor who purchases a security with an option regarding the timing of the realization of capital gains and losses this option can be used to lower one s expected tax liability even if capital gains tax rates remain constant for different holding periods an investor who delays the realization of a gain effectively enjoys compound returns on the postponed taxes if capital losses are tax deductible or partially tax deductible tax timing is even more valuable since investors can follow the strategy of selling stocks with capital losses early while postponing the sale of winners recent evidence lends support to the contention that some investors respond to this tax timing option for example odean 1998 shows that u s investors are more likely to sell losers in december than other months similarly grinblatt and keloharju 2002 show that at the end of the tax year finnish investors are more likely to realize losses than gains this type of tax motivated trade seems to affect market returns as shown by poterba and weisbenner 2001 who demonstrate that end of year tax loss selling is related to return variation in the month of january

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

effects of capital gains taxation on life cycle investment and portfolio management we examine the impact of capital income taxation both accrual forms of taxation and taxation of realized capital gains on total savings and the demand for corporate financial instruments we find that investors may hold both debt and equity in the face of effective collection of capital gains taxation even in a flat tax system we also find that the two taxes will have substantially different effects on saving and consumption behavior making it unlikely that the tax structure can be summarized by any single equivalent accrual tax rate this paper examines the impact of income taxation on the demand for various corporate financial instruments focusing on unique features due to taxation of realized capital gains we take a life cycle view of investment behavior and examine how accrual and realization taxation jointly affect an individual s allocation of intertemporal resources we shall consider the impact on his demand for debt and equity showing that taxation of realized capital gains generates an intrapersonal tax clientele effect at any one point of time an individual will strictly prefer either to buy debt or equity but that choice may be different at different ages therefore many individuals will simultaneously hold both debt and equity we also find that any attempt to measure the effective capital gains tax rate will be difficult and that existing approaches appear flawed since they do not correspond to the pattern of distortions which we find in this explicit model of asset demand and saving this analysis deviates from earlier work on capital gains taxation in several substantial dimensions whereas much of the capital gains taxation literature focuses on how capital gains tax regulations generate arbitrage opportunities in perfect capital markets the analysis used below essentially assumes effective enforcement of the intent of capital gains taxation this is desirable since contrary to the perfect capital market implication capital gains tax revenues are nontrivial therefore in examining the nature of asset demand and choice it is reasonable to assume somewhat effective collection of the capital gains tax liabilities our analysis will assume completely effective enforcement to highlight the impact of capital gains taxation it will be clear that several types of leakages will not substantially alter the qualitative conclusions

in search of the holy grail policy convergence experimentation and economic performance we consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country s own circumstances but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little policy experimentation corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation corruption and economic performance as a function of a country s location vis aa vis successful leaders in particular it predicts a u shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics close neighbors should do very well distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance and intermediate countries worst of all an empirical test with the experience of post socialist countries provides supportive results

the non equalization of true gift and estate tax rates abstract before 1976 the affluent transferred most of their wealth to their heirs through bequests not gifts even though gifts faced lower statutory tax rates this suggests the affluent were not acting altruistically however bequests had the advantage that unrealized capital gains were forgiven at the moment of transfer taking this into account i derive true marginal gift and estate tax rates contrary to previous research i find that the affluent failed to equalize these true rates both before and after 1976 this represents stronger evidence that the large transfers made by the affluent were not motivated by altruism

company interests and foreign aid policy playing donors off against one another abstract the evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works and sometimes does not work we suggest that third parties to the donor recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement the halt in aid that should follow non compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement we use a multi agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties like companies and others influence the disbursement decision failing to take account of third parties role yields the opposite result conditionality becomes successful

economic development as self discovery in the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated we develop a general equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues we highlight two failures of the laissez faire outcome there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante and too much production diversification ex post optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante but to rationalize production ex post we provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model

environmental regulation whose self interests are being protected special interest can explain why environmental policy limits economic activity in areas where air quality is above minumum standards locational competition among region helped create a policy that raised factor mobility cost from slower to faster growing regions analysis of votes shows greater support for this policy was received from northern urban constituencies and the greatest opposition came from the south and the west pollution abatement costs per unit of output are higher in areas with higher not lower air quality

capital gains taxation and the cost of capital evidence from unanticipated cross border transfers of tax base abstract in a cross border takeover the tax base associated with future capital gains is transferred from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders cross country differences in capital gains tax rates enable us to estimate the discount in target valuation on account of future capital gains we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the value of equity by around 0 3 which suggests that the capital gains tax significantly raises firms cost of capital furthermore we find that the implied capital gains tax burden is higher at times of high economic growth and low stock market valuation

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

difference systems in financial futures markets many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts differences in commodities parlance to the futures price the rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system this paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use the major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security in order to increase deliverable supply many financial futures markets allow the delivery of a variety of grades issues of securities in fulfillment of a financial futures contract the par grade of security on which the futures contract is based is deliverable at the futures price various other grades of securities are deliverable at premiums or discounts to the futures price in commodities parlance these premiums and discounts are called differences and the rule that establishes the set of premiums and discounts is called a difference system see hoffman 2 chapter xv for an excellent discussion of difference systems in commodity futures contracts there are two types of difference systems currently in use in financial futures markets both are based on security yields the first is called variable rate or yield maintenance pricing under this system nonpar securities are deliverable at the futures price times a factor which is the price of the delivered security relative to the par security where both are discounted by the yield of the par security selling at the futures price the second is called fixed rate or factor pricing under this system nonpar securities are deliverable at the futures price times a factor which is the price of the delivered security relative to the par security where both are discounted at the yield of the par security selling at par this paper first characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yieldbased difference systems and then investigates theoretically and empirically the particular characteristics of factor pricing and yield maintenance pricing the major finding is that currently used differences systems produce financial futures prices which systematically understate the spot market price of the par security vice president chicago mercantile exchange this research was conducted while the author was economist financial studies section board of governors of the federal reserve system the opinions in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the board

does the samaritan s dilemma matter evidence from u s agriculture the samaritan s dilemma posits a downside to charity recipients may rely on free aid instead of their own efforts anecdotally the expectation of free assistance is thought to be important for decisions about insurance and risky behavior in numerous settings but reliable empirical evidence is scarce we estimate whether the samaritan s dilemma exists in u s agriculture where both private crop insurance and frequent federal disaster assistance are present we find that bailout expectations are qualitatively and quantitatively important for the insurance decision furthermore aid expectations reduce both expenditure on farm inputs and subsequent crop revenue jel d72 h84 q18

why economic reforms fail in the soviet system a property rights based approach jan winiecki why do economic reforms fail in soviet type systems despite the obvious interest of ruling groups in improving the performance of their ailing economies the author applies a property rights based analysis stressing modes of rent maximization by ruling groups as a crucial explanatory variable party apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats particularly benefit from persistent interference in the economic sphere and consequently are most interested in maintaining the status quo the author surveys the impact of these motivations on the content of economic reforms outlines the strategies of counterreformers and predicts the future of reforms in soviet type economies 1 introduction in analyzing the disequilibrium characteristics of contemporary western economies mancur olson 1982 1984a 1984b agrees with the neoclassical macroeconomists in finding that given the tendencies of markets to clear and given the rational expectations of economic agents any disequilibrium indicates that all mutually advantageous transactions have not been consummated having made this point however he asks what can make agents ignore the potential gains from unconsummated transactions and turns his attention toward the structure of incentives and thus of institutions and policies olson insists and rightly so that a satisfactory static and dynamic macroeconomic theory has to explain who among key actors has the incentive to generate economic growth and equilibrate the economy and who does not furthermore no government even an authoritarian one has an incentive to generate serious recessions or disequilibria olson 1984a 637 writes that even in dictatorial systems the dictator has an incentive to make the economy of the country he controls work better since this will generate more tax receipts he can use as he pleases and usually also reduce dissent olson s arguments about incentives institutions and disequilibria offer an ideal basis for an inquiry into why reforms fail in soviet type economies stes in olson s theories of incentives the old roman principle of criminal law cui prodest who gained is applied to modem economies and the results suggest that contrary to widespread opinion it is not necessarily the small but powerful group of high and highest leaders that stands to gain most in terms of power and privilege from the preservation of the existing order a powerful political elite could satisfy its desires for both power and privilege through an alternative undemocratic system one which involves authoritarian don ts rather than totalitarian do s in that perspective the inefficient system of economic control typical in stes involving centrally planned production goals and input rationing would not be a condition sine qua non of an authoritarian solution since totalitarian command and control systems persist however one must seek groups other than the powerful and privileged few which have incentives to resist reforms and keep the economy inefficient the following sections identify the membership and motives of groups having strong incentives to keep the stes inefficient and prevent successful i e market oriented reforms we show how those groups operate and analyze their effects on the economic performance of their countries first the incentives for these groups to prevent decentralized management in the state sector are spelled out then their incentives to prevent the expansion of the more efficient private sector are outlined third having identified who benefits from the status quo and why the paper discusses when and how market oriented reforms are aborted limited or reversed by those who stand to gain from the reforms failure the last two sections consider the prospects of current attempts at economic reform in three specific countries poland the ussr and china and the prospects for economic reform in stes more generally

aid intensity in africa abstract aid to sub saharan africa ssa is falling rapidly after reaching historically high levels in the early 1990s we provide a critical review of aid data and place the resource intensity of current flows in crosscountry and intertemporal perspective aid to ssa is not unusually high given the structural characteristics of african countries but it rose more rapidly than predicted until the mid 1990s we introduce the concept of transactions intensity and show that by some measures the management costs accompanying each dollar of aid to africa are comparatively high

taxes capital structure and bondholder clienteles despite much recent progress financial theory has yet to explain the connection if any between the u s tax code and many observed characteristics of corporate bonds empirically why is there no single tax rate equating yields on corporate bonds with yields on tax exempt municipal bonds of apparently identical risks and maturities 2 specifically why does the spread in yields between corporate and municipal bonds divided by the yield on corporates a conventional measure of the marginal tax rate on corporates decrease with increasing risk and maturity more generally why are different types of bonds evidently held by clienteles of investors in tax clienteles for corporate bonds are identified in a competitive financial equilibrium under an asymmetric corporate income tax with interest preceding principal state contingent bonds with higher coupon yields are issued by firms with higher pretax cash inflows per dollar of nondebt tax shield purchased by investors in lower tax brackets and implicitly priced at lower marginal tax rates on these bonds all investors earn tax induced surpluses by contrast all other bonds have implicit tax rates typically equal to the corporate rate and yield for many investors no tax induced surpluses we gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of george constantinides kose john merton miller jim scott marti subrahmanyam and participants in seminars at baruch chicago columbia houston michigan nyu rutgers usc washington wharton the american finance association the western finance association and the johnson symposium on taxes and finance at wisconsin george constantinides was especially helpful 1 the most notable contribution is miller 1977 other recent papers include chen and kim 1979 kim lewellen and mcconnell 1979 deangelo and masulis 1980a 1980b taggart 1980 kim 1982 auerbach and king 1983 and talmor haugen and bornea 1985 black 1971 anticipates an equilibrium with clienteles 2 schaefer 1982a identifies tax induced clienteles of bondholders in the british gilt market van horne 1982 reports that implicit tax rates vary over time as the supply of discount bonds changes additional evidence is cited in trczinka 1982

political models of the business cycle should be revived political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive this paper addresses the second issue demonstrating for u s real gnp unemployment and inflation that electoral cycles persistent patterns across electoral terms are significant but apparently only for republican incumbents and that partisan cycles persistent differences between parties are also significant these findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

institutions transaction costs and economic growth this essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth these obstacles are examined in the context of the political economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth the essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth

aid investment and incentives promoting productive investment and economic growth are among the key objectives of most aid organizations operating in poor countries however it is not possible to conclude from existing empirical evidence that aid contributes positively to growth in this paper it is shown that those rather negative results may be explained by important incentive problems built into the aid system itself the recipient countries own efforts to contribute to investment and growth may in reality be undermined and the result may be aid dependency

international charity for the poor i introduction charities transfer billions of dollars annually to help people in other countries survive famines and other hardships due to natural and man made disasters such as droughts and civil wars in this article we address the difficulties charities have ensuring the survival of the life threatened poor overseas without exacerbating income inequality encouraging free riding or undermining recipient countries incentives to invest in the kinds of public works that could reduce their needs international charitable activities are subject to moral hazard principal agent and adverse selection problems due to information asymmetries thus too little charity can go to the truly needy and too much to countries that exaggerate their needs and or shirk indeed the empirical literature is rich with evidence of these effects for example lele and jain 1991 ruttan 1993 kanbur et al 1994 maren 1997 and the world bank 1998 document the disincentive effects of aid alesina and weder 1999 show that more aid goes to countries that are more corrupt cashel cordo and craig 1997 provide empirical evidence that the more aid a country receives the less it taxes cashel cordo and craig 1997 found statistically significant evidence of an inverse relationship between the amount of soft aid grants received and the amount of tax revenues subsequently collected by recipient governments in addition to this evidence of shirking they also found significant evidence of fungibility in which the recipient government spends released funds on other nontargeted budget items furthermore they show that donors appear to be complicit in this fungibility larger soft aid is associated with higher institutional spending such as for public administrators salaries inflows of hard aid loans targeted explicitly to economic development or public works projects show up in expanded spending on social services not expanded investment in public works alesina and weder 1999 found statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship between the share of aid in a government s budget and corruption they argued that high corruption may imply that domestically raised public resources are low and that a higher fraction of public resources are covered by foreign aid 14 also according to tornell and lane s 1999 voracity effect when power over redistributive mechanisms is highly concentrated aid encourages shirking by recipient governments thus in this article we model charities that expect recipients to reallocate revenues but not to reduce tax collections or spending on public works to formally analyze this international income transfer problem we apply the mechanism design techniques of laffont and tirole 1986 that have proven very useful in the design of domestic income maintenance programs there is a long tradition of optimal tax income maintenance program design literature about how aid encourages personal choices that are socially inefficient or self enriching see for example mirlees 1971 besley and coate 1992 or crane 1996 the key issue is that participants may reduce work effort or migrate to qualify for more benefits the impacts of information asymmetries on domestic program costs and implementation are also well known as in besley and coate 1991 1995 but with the exception of besley and coate 1998 the emphasis in that literature is on the design of domestic policies with respect to the incentives of individuals in this article we focus on charity with respect to the incentives of national governments our work on this problem is motivated by the desire to design programs that can address acute life threatening poverty defined as the inability to acquire the level of consumption goods necessary for life as in sen 1985 or ravaillon 1997 we assume that the charitable objective is that everyone has at least a minimum income

us food aid and civil conflict we study the effect of us food aid on conflict in recipient countries our analysis exploits time variation in food aid shipments due to changes in us wheat production and cross sectional variation in a country s tendency to receive any us food aid according to our estimates an increase in us food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts but has no robust effect on interstate conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts we also provide suggestive evidence that the effects are most pronounced in countries with a recent history of civil conflict jel d74 f35 o17 o19 q11 q18 we are unable to determine whether our aid helps or hinders one or more parties to the conflict it is clear that the losses particularly looted assets constitutes a serious barrier to the efficient and effective provision of assistance and can contribute to the war economy this raises a serious challenge for the humanitarian community can humanitarians be accused of fueling or prolonging the conflict in these two countries medecins sans frontieres amsterdam 1

what explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments such as roads and dams to promoting policy reform this change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment after nearly 20 years experience with policy based or conditional lending there have now been many studies of adjustment lending most of which take a case study approach many conclude that policy based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform the authors examine a database of 220 world bank supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail they find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time variables under the world bank s control resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions have no relationship with an adjustment program s success or failure what development agencies must do then is select promising candidates for adjustment support when the candidates is a poor selection devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform to improve its success rate with adjustment lending the world bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not that is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers to become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending

on the construction of marginal federal personal and social security tax rates in the u s abstract in this article i correct and extend my earlier series on marginal federal personal income tax rates i also construct a measure of the marginal social security tax rate and add this to the income tax rate to obtain a measure of the effective marginal tax rate on income due to federal taxes finally i compare my series on marginal income tax rates and its method of construction with those of barro and sahasakul

measuring the average marginal tax rate from the individual income tax the economic effects of taxation depend on the configuration of marginal tax rates we consider here the appropriate measure of a marginal tax rate for the federal individual income tax which has a graduated rate structure and allows for numerous legal and illegal deductions from total income our conclusion is that the explicit marginal rate from the tax schedule is the right concept for many purposes hence we construct approximately weighted averages of these marginal tax rates for 1916 80 when weighted by adjusted gross income the arithmetic average of marginal tax rates is 5 in 1920 2 in 1930 6 in 1940 20 in 1950 23 in 1960 24 in 1970 and 30 in 1980 we also discuss the dispersion of marginal tax rates as well as the behavior of average tax rates and deductions from taxable income one noteworthy result concerns the fraction of adjusted gross income that accrues to families that face a marginal tax rate of at least 35 this fraction quadruples from 1964 to 1980 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the welfare costs of rationing by waiting with price controls and rationing by waiting rational consumers increase the quantity boughtperpurchase this individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss this cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls i e the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself this point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent trangerred the efficiency of the price system is often illustrated lby pointing to the obvious wastes associated with alternative allocation mechanisms for example the queues that accompany price controls and first come first served allocations although rationing by waiting wastes resources in a dramatically visible fashion the magnitude of the waste and the factors that determine it seldom have been examined empirically moreover existing theory on the subject is incomplete unless the first come first served rule is precisely specified consumers will compete for available supplies in ways other than waiting in the model developed below queues cause consumers to compete by increasing amounts bought per trip to the market the analysis demonstrates that such individually rational adjustments only increase the welfare cost of rationing by waiting and thus are socially self defeating the theoretical model is illustrated empirically by estimating the welfare costs of a market wide ceiling on gasoline prices this application was motivated by the availability of two key pieces of information the value of time spent in gasoline queues and the effect of waiting lines on amounts bought per purchase this information was obtained from a survey of motorists conducted during the era of federal gasoline price regulations to focus on competition among consumers one of the inefficiencies that results from price controls is ignored the supply reduction leading to the

empirical advances in political economy editor s note i wish to thank coeditor mark zupan who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section on behalf of all the editors i also would like to express thanks to carolyn williams editorial coordinator for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files the symposium on public choice was held at lake tahoe during the 1993 we a meetings the many efforts of authors referees editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year s economic inquiry offerings