spatial competition and the theory of differentiated markets an introduction spatial economics has been both in the very center of microeconomic theory and at its periphery it has been at the center to the extent that it has followed a tradition taking its roots in hotelling s classic stability in competition paper 15 and has used spatial concepts to explain by analogy the pricing of differentiated commodities it has been at the periphery to the extent that it has considered spatial pricing as observed in real life situations and tried to rationalize and evaluate observed spatial pricing techniques the former approach focuses on f o b pricing which is apparently taken for granted the latter focuses on discriminatory pricing which appears as the most frequently used technique in the industrial world the purposes of this special issue are to bring those two approaches together and to explore some of their analytical possibilities and limitations the philosophy of this introductory paper is to show the need for an integration of both avenues in an analysis of differentiated markets we begin by discussing the assumptions of what we will call the hotellinglosch approach and their implications in terms of the problems they allow us to tackle several papers in this issue contribute new insights in this respect we then undertake a similar exercise for what may be called the greenhutohta approach focusing on spatial price discrimination to discover the possibilities it may provide for an analysis of quality choice at the outset we note that its spatial approach typically implies partition of the

distinguishing between equilibrium and integration in spatial price analysis this article introduces a new spatial price analysis methodology based on maximum likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution model incorporating price transfer cost and trade flow data this method permits differentiation between market integration and competitive market equilibrium and derivation of intuitive measures of intermarket tradability competitive market equilibrium perfect integration segmented equilibrium and segmented disequilibrium one can also use these estimates to derive semiparametric measures of time varying regime probabilities to track changing market conditions an application to trade in soybean meal among pacific rim economies demonstrates the usefulness of the method copyright 2002 oxford university press

integration of spatial markets studies of spatial market integration draw their implications from a theory which assumes that there are no intraregional transport costs an alternative theory is offered based on the assumptions that buyers and sellers are spatially dispersed and intraregional transport costs are significant this implies that the market is a linked oligopoly or oligopsony and that market integration tests are tests of alternative oligopoly price formation processes for example collusive basing point pricing produces results typically assumed to imply efficiently integrated markets while competitive fob pricing does not the theoretical implications are illustrated with an analysis of hog prices in canada

trade policy in a super size me world abstract when a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through also known as the terms of trade effect however when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different while there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention this result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis if there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types however if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large consequently the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax

export industry policy and reputational comparative advantage abstract country of origin reputations are endogenized in this paper and it is shown that otherwise identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high quality producers these self fulfilling reputations determine not only the average quality of a country s exports but also the type of products in which a country specializes hence the pattern of international trade can be determined by this reputational comparative advantage an inferior country of origin reputation leads to lower national welfare therefore several trade and industrial policies that can improve country of origin reputation are examined

market integration an application to international trade in cotton agricultural commodities are differentiated frequently by quality or country of origin this paper proposes two complementary tests bivariate price regressions and hedonic index estimation as methods to identify whether differentiated products are amenable to treatment as a homogenous commodity these price linkage tests represent necessary rather than sufficient conditions for aggregation and must be supplemented by information on market structure analysis of the international cotton market suggests a distinction between extra long and other staple lengths but not by country of origin after controlling for staple length

spatial competition among multi store firms abstract the paper analyzes spatial cournot competition among multi store firms it demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi store firms can be approximated by a simple one in which each firm behaves as a multi store monopolist in choosing its store locations a firm s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations and in general converge to its monopoly locations as the demand grows larger when the firms have an equal number of stores the stores belonging to competing firms agglomerate at discrete points that coincide with each firm s monopoly store locations

spatial price discrimination in agricultural product procurement markets a computational economics approach significant transport costs and spatially distributed supply and processing create oligopsony power in agricultural markets price discrimination expressed in the form of partial or complete absorption of freight charges by processors is often observed in these environments but we understand little about how these pricing decisions are made analytical approaches are often intractable as an alternative we propose a computational economics approach to analyze a general spatial competition model and study firms choices of spatial pricing policy instead of the commonly presumed free on board pricing we find that buyers choose price discrimination either through uniform delivered pricing or through partial freight absorption

rotten parents and child labor we show that taking into account the consequences of child labor on both childhood welfare and human capital investment instead of focusing exclusively on the human capital dimension brings new insights on the economic analysis of child labor in particular there are new sources of potential inefficiencies that appear when we assume that labor induces some disutility in such a case household decisions regarding child labor may indeed be inefficient even if household members are altruistic transfers are not at a corner and there are no market imperfections also the presence of child labor disutility leads to an equilibrium where the conditions for an exogenous reduction of child labor to be pareto improving are less likely to be fulfilled this paper stresses therefore the fact that economic analysis should not forget one of the most important aspects of child labor namely that it does not make children happy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

green revolution land reform and household income distribution in the philippines income of agricultural households consists of returns to labor capital and land from farming supplemented mainly by labor earnings from nonfarm sources agricultural technology affects farmers income through its effect on factor demands and factor prices which in turn induce changes in the allocation of farmers own resources to different uses income from farming is also affected by village institutions such as land tenure which governs the distribution of income between landlords and tenants as well as resource allocations

quantitative restrictions in the presence of cost based informational asymmetries this study introduces a cost based informational asymmetry into a two period model where a domestic incumbent firm s behavior in the first period affects the entry decision of a foreign firm in the second period the effects of import quota policy within this environment are examined and compared to the standard full information effects when quota quantities are set exogenously the standard effects of quota policy may be significantly altered depending on whether or not policy induces the domestic firm to signal cost structure for example higher quotas may discourage foreign entry because of the induced signaling effects of quota policy recognition that incomplete information is the rule rather than the exception when decisionmakers interact in an international setting has stimulated an emerging literature on the effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures particularly germane to the present study are those papers that introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policy to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firms compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies collie and hviid 1993 qiu 1994 maggi 1995 brainard and martimort 1997 wright 1998 collie and hviid 1994 on the other hand allow for domestic consumption and consider optimal import policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist analysis that focuses on the positive effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures is more limited one such example is a study by hartigan 1994 which considers the effects of antidumping duties to date however there has been no analysis of how and whether the introduction of an informational failure alters the effects of quantitative restrictions to trade the aim of the present study is to extend the existing literature by examining the effects of a quantitative restriction to trade in the presence of a cost based informational asymmetry within a standard two period entry model 2 during the initial time period a domestic firm supplies the home market and

credible collusion in spatially separated markets in an infinitely repeated game sellers employ a trigger strategy of mutual forbearance from invasion of each other s markets stabilized against invasion by the threat of bertrand pricing contrary to conventional static models this article shows stability for a wide range of transportation costs and present value parameters and that increases in transportation costs tend to destabilize the collusive agreement

the role of export subsisies when product quality is unknown abstract we explore the role of export subsidies when foreign goods are initially of unknown quality to domestic consumers absent export subsidies entry of high quality firms may be blocked by their inability to sell at prices reflecting their true quality export subsidies can break this entry barrier and increase welfare moreover even when high quality firms find it possible to signal their quality to consumers through an introductory pricing strategy a rolefor government policy can arise the signal low introductory price transfers surplus from foreign producers to domestic consumers and can be avoided with an appropriate export tax subsidy policy

product variety and competitive discounts abstract a market with free entry monopolistic competition is studied nonlinear pricing is shown to be the bertrand nash equilibrium strategy for firms given small per capita fixed costs the nonlinear pricing equilibrium approaches the perfectly competitive equilibrium with marginal cost pricing nonlinear pricing is associated with greater product variety than linear pricing increased variety leads to efficient pricing

a geometric note on some propositions in spatial pricing policy abstract this note uses a simple geometric device to derive rules for identifying the shape of delivered price schedules it is shown that the predatory pricing is not compatible with profit maximisation in situations where consumers are characterised by identical local demand functions only if demand functions vary over space in particular ways is it likely that predatory pricing can be justified as a profit maximising response

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

infant industry protection reconsidered the case of informational barriers to entry in industries with imperfect consumer information the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis established firms we consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services our model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm s choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry we find that infant industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections

delivered versus mill nonlinear pricing with endogenous market structure abstract this paper discusses a model where consumers differ according to one unobservable preference for quality and one observable characteristic location with nonlinear prices arising in equilibrium the main question addressed is whether firms should be allowed to practice different nonlinear prices at each location delivered nonlinear pricing or should be forced to set a unique nonlinear contract mill nonlinear pricing assuming that firms can costless relocate we show that the free entry long run number of firms may be smaller equal or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing moreover delivered nonlinear pricing yields higher long run welfare when i fixed costs are low and when ii fixed costs are intermediate and consumer types are not very similar

an experimental investigation of equilibria impacts of information the theoretical literature on pricing in a spatial setting where transportation costs exist and both buyers and sellers are geographically distributed has been expanding and developing at a rapid pace indeed it has been shown that the theoretical analysis of differential product markets is equivalent to the spatial framework 21 22 however empirical analysis of implications from these theoretical developments has only recently begun to appear one question that is frequently asked since spatial competition is modeled in an oligopoly framework is which price reaction is most likely 8 905 for f o b price setters in an interdependent spatial market also see 2 5 6 18 among others similarly one might ask which price reaction is most likely in a differentiated product market answers have been proposed on the basis of theoretical and or intuitive arguments but the issue has not been adequately explored empirically the purpose of the study described in the following presentation was to empirically evaluate the various arguments about pricing behavior in spatial or product variety competition perhaps the primary reason for the lack of empirical analysis in regard to pricing behavior when consumers differentiate between sellers for locational or other reasons is lack of a data set

evaluating the integration of contiguous discontinuous markets this paper applies the concepts of structural models of markets market integration and market discontinuity to show that discontinuous markets alter the integration characteristics of continuous markets when analyzing systems of contiguous markets some of which are discontinuous it appears that the continuous markets are less well integrated when the discontinuous markets are operating than when they are not operating

determinants of the commodity structure of u s trade comment theoretical and empirical analyses of international commodity trade patterns have developed in several directions since wassily leontief s article on the validity of the heckscher ohlin theory robert b aldwin s recent article in this review provides a comprehensive survey of the important issues in contemporary trade literature his efforts at location and consolidation of data from many sources have shed new light on several competing hypotheses attempting to explain trade patterns this paper will attempt to improve baldwin s statistical results by combining his data with some developed by gary hufbauer in a parallel study of the industrial characteristics of trade also the relationship between export performance and technological innovation will be explored by a new approach which focuses on actual change in the production function and not merely potential improvement by research development r d efforts finally economic and industry characteristics of several countries other than the united states will be used to provide additional information concerning the relationship of technological change and economies of scale to trade flows

dynamic equilibrium in markets for perennial crops a dynamic equilibrium model for perennial crop markets is formulated price expectations are formed according to perfect foresight and both the age composition of the crop and the optimal rotation are determined endogenously the model is applied to the california alfalfa market the calculated long run equilibrium acreage is quite close to average acreage over the base period the results also exhibit cyclical fluctuations in acreage with a six percent coefficient of variation thus cyclical behavior can arise from technical characteristics of the production process as well as from imperfectly formed expectations or random exogenous shocks

saving dolphins boycotts trade sanctions and unobservable technology consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured i examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter s technology choice even when its technology choice is unobservable boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer import policy can augment this effect but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers concern

is child labor inefficient we build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare we assume that there is a trade off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects this occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect we also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be pareto improving in general equilibrium we show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous

partial agglomeration or dispersion in spatial cournot competition 1 introductionsince the seminal work of hotelling 1929 a rich and diverse literature on spatial competition has emerged location models can be classified into two types one type is shipping or spatial price discrimination model where sellers bear transport costs the other is shopping or mill pricing model where buyers pay for transport for each type one can have either bertrand type price setting or cournot type quantity setting 1most studies on location theory use shopping mill pricing models with bertrand competition although cournot and bertrand types of non spatial models are equally popular the body of literature on spatial competition that uses cournot type models is relatively small economists have recently considered shipping models with cournot competition hamilton thisse and weskamp 1989 and anderson and neven 1991 carry out pioneering works on location models 2 they use linear city models and show that all firms agglomerate at the central point pal 1998 shows that their result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a linear city he investigates a circular city duopoly model3 and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium that is locational dispersion appears 4 matsushima 2001a extends pal s model to an n firm oligopoly and shows another equilibrium where half of the firms locate at one point and the other half locate at the opposite point partial agglomeration these results indicate the multiplicity of equilibria in spatial cournot models with a circular city the multiplicity of equilibria restricts the applicability of the model because the model does not give us a distinct prediction in this article we take a close look at pal 1998 and matsushima 2001a we try to solve this problem by extending their linear transport cost model to one with nonlinear transport cost 5 we consider a simplified model the numbers of firms and markets and so possible locations are four four firms choose location a b c or d see if each of the four firms chooses a different location we call this outcome pal type if two firms locate at a and the other two locate at c we call this outcome matsushima type we find that the pal type equilibrium is much more robust because i pal type equilibrium always exists as long as transport cost is increasing in distance while matsushima type equilibrium fails to exist when the transport cost function is significantly convex or concave proposition 1 ii if firms choose their locations sequentially the unique equilibrium outcome is pal type under nonlinear transport cost functions proposition 2 and iii the profit of each firm in pal type is never smaller than that in matsushima type and the former is strictly larger if the transport cost function is nonlinear proposition 3 we also compare the welfare implications of pal type and matsushima type models if the transport cost function is linear the two outcomes yield exactly the same profits consumer surplus and total social surplus however this equivalence does not hold if the transport cost function is nonlinear either convex or concave in this case pal type yields greater total social surplus and profit of each firm while matsushima type yields greater consumer surplus these results indicate that the welfare implications are sensitive to whether or not the transport cost function is linear anderson and neven 1991 show that in the linear city model a strong concavity in transport cost changes the equilibrium outcome this result is related to our results but we emphasize that our results are different from theirs first we show that both concavity and convexity of the transport cost function affect the results while in anderson and neven 1991 only strong convexity changes the result second in our propositions 2 and 3 even a slight nonlinearity changes the results

a variance components approach to food grain market integration in northern nigeria a variance components methodology is developed for joint tests on a sample of time series of prices for seasonal differences in the price integration of markets the approach requires a statistically adequate number of observations for each market within seasons characterized by constancy of transactions costs among markets the model is applied to eighteen months of weekly grain prices for twenty two villages in northern nigeria results suggest that markets are not well integrated in the six months covering the harvest period implications are drawn for research on market performance in the region

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

spatial pricing with differentiated products this paper generalizes analysis of spatial pricing policies to cases in which oligopolists produce differentiated products it is shown that spatial price discrimination through freight absorption is affected by the number of competitive firms the extent to which their products are substitutes and by the locations such firms adopt in the market it is further shown however that spatial price discrimination may be the consequence of collusive agreements or of attempts to anticipate competitors actions the simple spaceless foundations of current policies on spatial pricing need to be reexamined but this reexamination must take into account interconnections between producers the extent to which their products are differentiated and their locations

spatial competition and spatial price discrimination the analysis of spatial competition under conditions of free entry which derives its major impetus from the seminal work of losch 1954 has been conducted in general on the assumption that the competitive firm will adopt an f o b pricing scheme see for example capozza and van order 1978 and holahan 1978 greenhut 1956 does consider some of the implications of discriminatory pricing within competitive markets but his analysis adopts an essentially short run view and provides little rationale for the choice of such a pricing policy by competitive firms this is in contrast with developments in the analysis of spatial monopoly the early work of singer 1937 and hoover 1937 and subsequent developments by for example greenhut 1956 beckmann 1976 beckmann and ingene 1976 greenhut and greenhut 1977 holahan 1975 and norman 1977 indicate that the spatial monopolist should adopt a discriminatory spatial pricing policy where spatial price discrimination is taken conventionally to mean that delivered prices do not follow an f o b scheme but that all concumers equidistant from a particular supplier pay the same price it is rarely however that the results generated by the analysis of spatial monopoly are reconsidered in the analysis of spatial competition in particular although we know that spatial price discrimination will in general increase a monopolist s profit the assumption that profit maximising spatially competitive firms will adopt f o b pricing schemes has rarely been questioned and has not been questioned within the loschian competitive framework greenhut and ohta 1975a chapter 8 and chapter 8 appendix i are notable exceptions but in both cases they depart from the loschian scheme the first objective of this paper is therefore to show that when loschian competitive firms are allowed the option of discriminatory pricing i e are free of institutional constraints which require f o b pricing they will be forced to exercise that option in order to maintain normal profits secondly we shall show that if competitive conditions change the form of price discrimination will also change and that under certain competitive conditions the degree of discrimination will increase with the degree of competition leading eventually to uniform pricing thirdly we compare two competitive cases with multi plant monopoly and derive the spatial analogue of the conventional spaceless monopoly perfect competition comparison the monopolist s plants will be larger in area and total output than each competitive firm but will supply less per consumer at a higher average price welfare comparisons are less clear cut in that they are dependent upon the type of competition we assume we show however that welfare maximisation requires marginal cost pricing where marginal cost includes transport costs and so requires f o b pricing if there are economies of scale to production it follows that welfare maximisation will require production subsidy

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

on market integration and liberalisation method and application to ethiopia the article suggests further improvements in the methodology to analyse market integration it provides corrections to and methodological extensions of recent work in this journal it also presents a way of applying market integration techniques to the analysis of shocks such as market liberalisation and war the method is applied to the effects of liberalisation and the end of the civil war on food markets in ethiopia the conclusion is that liberalisation had important effects on the long run and short run integration of food markets

tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information when the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand in the signalling equilibrium the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information however it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand the domestic government can avoid the cost of signalling by delegating tariff setting to a revenue maximising agent

on the production efficiency of a location regulated firm this paper evaluates the effect of location regulation on a monopolist s output and examines the desirability of such regulation it is shown that a location regulation can increase the output if the production functions do not exhibit constant returns to scale and that the output level could be higher than the social welfare maximum without intervention if demand curves are sufficiently convex to the origin

spatial monopoly and spatial monopolistic competition with two part pricing this paper develops a model of spatial price discrimination by two part pricing when bearing freight and nonlinear pricing are impossible the two part tariff comprises a membership fee and a price per visit when fixed costs per store are low a monopolist makes membership compulsory and builds stores too close together with higher fixed cost the monopolist offers consumers a choice between membership and nonmembership and builds stores too far apart nearby consumers become members more distant consumers nonmembers competition leads to closer spacing than monopoly and lower welfare except at high levels of fixed cost per store copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

causality tests in livestock markets bivariate time series models and related topics of exogeneity and granger causal orderings have received much attention from economists over the last decade examples in the macroeconomic literature include relationships between money and income sims 1972 feige and pearce money and interest rates pierce and wages and prices geweke 1975 in agricultural markets research in this area includes the sorting out of leads and lags between farm wholesale and retail prices heien miller acreage allotments and acreage supply response weaver and alternative price quotes for eggs bessler and schrader the methods used in these studies are empirical because they allow the data to specify the dynamic relationship between two variables economic theory is used only to suggest the variables to be related often theory is ambiguous on the explicit lead lag relationships between important variables and the variables themselves in such cases one can or must rely on strictly empirical methods burks discusses the complementary relationship between empirical and theoretical methods in scientific investigations agriculturalists interested in explaining producer behavior and forecasting livestock price and quantity movements have long grappled with problems of leads and lags attempts to explain short run movements in live cattle and hog inventories or slaughter levels using price variables have at times yielded unsatisfactory results for example shortrun quantity response to price change was found to be negative for cattle nelson and spreen myers havlicek henderson however a positive relation begins to appear with longer lengths of run the theory of optimal investment under risk explains this type of relationship that is treating cattle as both investment goods and as final products will generate the negative short run response of quantity to price such theory however will not be explicit about the particular lead lag relationships to be encountered most modern theories of decision making under risk suggest that such lags are dependent upon subjective probabilities of individual economic agents if one is unwilling to accept the existence of a rational probability following definetti then he will not be able to specify a priori the explicit leads and lags in a particular investment problem one must look at the data and infer such relationships this paper examines the lead lag relationships between livestock prices and various causal variables suggested by theory it explicitly tests the exogeneity of cattle on feed cattle slaughter and income on live cattle prices and the exogeneity of sow farrowings hog slaughter and income on live hog prices although explicit dynamic multivariate models are not formulated the paper s results do provide background evidence useful for their ultimate construction granger and newbold 1977 chap 7

cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration most theoretical models of spatial competition show a strong tendency toward spatial dispersion of firms yet common observations suggest that firms tend to agglomerate in this paper the authors show that competition between cournot type oligopolists that discriminate over space leads to spatial agglomeration one implication is that firms do not necessarily earn supernormal profits at the free entry equilibrium copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the extent of the market examines the classical theory of the market in this paper authors consider the role of price market determination price movement in competitive and monopolistic markets extension of commodity markets

profit maximizing vs optimal behavior in a spatial setting summary and extensions there exists a rapidly growing body of literature concerning the behavior of firms in a spatial setting to a large extent this work has involved discovering the relationships among monopoly competitive and optimal welfare maximizing behavior in the present paper several aspects of these relationships are discussed the first section presents the underlying assumptions the second summarizes the comparisons that have been made between optimal behavior and various types of profitmaximizing behavior in addition the welfare effect of allowing spatial competitors to earn positive profits is discussed the third section of the paper turns from optimality to efficiency here the efficiency of profit maximizing behavior in a spatial setting is evaluated the last section turns to the question of defining social welfare the effect of the type of welfare function on the distribution of welfare among individuals is examined

price transmission analysis a flexible methodological approach applied to european pork and lamb markets the study of spatial price relationships helps to explain market performance and their degree of integration applying only one method of analysis may not be flexible enough to account for the complex interactions of prices in separated markets this paper complements usual cointegration tests with a description of dynamic features and patterns of causality among price series the method proposed is applied to study spatial pork and lamb prices relationships within the eu in the period 1988 1995 the results indicate that european markets for both commodities are integrated not only in the long run but in the short run as well although the price transmission process is more efficient in the porkmeat industry

the revelation and delegation principles in common agency games in the context of common agency adverse selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi principal games we then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

trade policy with risky investment in quality consider a new export market in which firms can invest in quality but may fail to achieve quality quality of the export good then varies across firms having endogenous whether to invest and exogenous determined by nature aspects previous works suggest that the market outcome and socially optimal policy depend on whether quality is exogenous or endogenous it is shown that the previous differences are driven by the demand and cost parameterizations not by the endogeneity of quality previous works also suggest subsidies to raise welfare subsidies are found to lower welfare while a tax may raise welfare

pricing efficiency in centralized and noncentralized markets pricing efficiency in centralized markets is compared with that in noncentralized markets on the basis of a price formation model centrally discovered prices are hypothesized to adjust more slowly to equilibrium but to have lower unpredictable variability than noncentrally discovered prices these hypotheses are borne out strongly in market experiments mean squared error is found to be lower in centralized than in noncentralized trading suggesting centralized markets are the more price efficient

geographic markets causality and railroad deregulation this paper presents an approach to defining a market using the notion of instantaneous causality the market for which the approach is empirically implemented is the flour market in the united states over the period january 1979 through october 1982 one anomaly over this period was the deregulation of railroad rates in october 1980 the empirical results based on three spatially diffuse cities suggest that the market is national in scope and that after railroad deregulation the price interrelationship between cities was strengthened

spatial price discrimination and mill pricing hypermobile multiplant monopoly for almost two decades a literature has accumulated claiming that a monopolist can have better performance in terms of output price and welfare if it employs spatial price discrimination rather than mill pricing this view is however based on the notion of a spatially isolated firm this paper offers an alternative view of spatial monopoly where firms are contiguous under both pricing schemes and shows how this approach yields findings in favor of mill pricing copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

how integrated is the indian wheat market abstract applying the momentum threshold autoregressive m tar model due to enders and granger enders w and granger c w j 1998 unit root tests and asymmetric adjustment with an example using the term structure of interest rates journal of business and economic statistics 16 3 pp 304 311 this article examines the relationship between the various prices of wheat quoted at different market centres in four indian states we find evidence of m tar asymmetric adjustments of wheat prices indicating that price signals within states are transmitted over time in an asymmetric manner this type of price adjusting behaviour is consistent as to how price differentials may respond to poor dissemination of knowledge regarding market conditions and high transactions costs the results offer important policy implications

anonymous market and group ties in international trade abstract history provides many examples of cohesive groups dispersed over several countries who exploit the ties between their members to gain entry into foreign markets the phenomenon is well established empirically and noteworthy because it suggests the importance of informational barriers in international transactions we present a simple model where output is produced through a joint venture and agents have complete information domestically but are unable to judge the quality of their match abroad a minority of individuals otherwise identical to all others can exploit complete information in international matches between group members if they so choose group ties increase aggregate trade and income but hurt the anonymous market because they deprive it disproportionately of the group s more productive members

possible adverse effects of increasing block water tariffs in developing countries ture in which a commodity is priced at a low initial rate up to a specified volume of use block then at a higher or several increasingly higher rates for additional blocks used the ordinary household municipal water bill in developing countries is often calculated on some sort of ibt structure and donor organizations and consultants continue to recommend this practice for town and city water systems the majority of world bank sponsored water tariff studies conducted since 1970 for example have recommended the use of increasing block water tariffs there are two commonly accepted justifications for using ibts the first based on a rationale of equity is that ibts should assist low income households and ensure an equitable allocation of the costs of water production and distribution the argument in this case is that low income households use less water than high income households because they have fewer water using appliances and are less likely to have large lawns and gardens an ibt results in higher marginal prices to the customer and thus higher average prices for higher income households the price of water in the initial block may be set very low usually at a subsidized rate to ensure that the poor are not discouraged from using the amount of water considered essential for human needs typically estimated at 25 50 liters per capita per day the price of water in the initial block is thus sometimes termed the lifeline rate the second justification for ibt structures is that the higher prices charged beyond the initial block discourage extravagant water use and promote water conservation both these justifications for ibts assume that each household has

product variety and welfare under tough and soft pricing regimes we re examine the economic justification for the regulation of firms price policies existing analysis of the relative benefits of alternative pricing policies by treating market structure as exogenous loses an important trade off price deregulation leading to for example discriminatory pricing on the one hand enhances competition between incumbents but on the other acts as a strong deterrent against entry we illustrate this trade off by analysing the familiar address model of product differentiation and show that product variety is determined by the degree of spatial contestability of the market the ability of entrants to make binding location commitments and by whether firms are free to price discriminate copyright 1996 by royal economic society

the welfare effects of spatial competition under sequential market entry since the papers of holahan 5 and beckmann 2 on the problem of pricing in regional monopoly and spatial competition not only the results regarding output and profit have been considered but the analysis of the welfare effects resulting thereof is reflected as well the welfare effects or social surplus are calculated as the sum of producers and consumers surplus which gives us information about the social superiority of market structure and competition behavior the analysis of spatial competition can be carried out under three alternatives as to conjectural behavior of the firms which are called ldschian competition l hotelling smithies competition hs and greenhut ohta go competition in section ii of this paper these models will be discussed in more detail up to now the welfare effects of these conjectural behaviors were analyzed by holahan 6 for the l competition by norman 11 for the l and go competition and finally by villegas 14 for all three behavioral assumptions common to all of these papers is the fact that they are based on the following assumption newcomers continuously enter a linear spatial market as long as the profit of the industry is not zero the condition for this behavior however is that all firms continuously relocate during the equilibrium process and that they permanently adjust to each new competitive situation until the long run equilibrium is reached this hypermobility of the firms is certainly a strong assumption it can be shown that under this assumption the social surpluses of the competition models are such that go hs l 14 up to now there was no answer to the question of whether this welfare theoretical assessment of alternative competition assumptions is equally valid under sequential market entry since in this case the zero profit hypothesis for long run equilibrium loses its validity it can be supposed that the results of villegas 14 have to be modified in order to give an answer to this question the basic model of spatial competition will be modified in the next section

a theory of consumer boycotts under symmetric information and imperfect competition this article models strategic interactions between non identical duopolistic firms and a public interest environmental organisation eo that promotes green production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against brown producers the article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be green and also when a boycott arises in equilibrium despite symmetric information when a boycott arises it is either a small persistent boycott against the small firm in the industry or a large transitory boycott against the large firm in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly

the economics of child labor comment in a recent paper kaushik basu and pham hoang van bv 1998 develop an important and very interesting model in which a fairly productive economy exhibits multiple equilibria with children working in at least one they identify two assumptions as essential to this result the first which they call the luxury axiom is that a family sends its children to the labor market only if its income from sources other than child labor is very low the second is embodied in their substitution axiom which states that from the point of view of firms child labor is substitutable for adult labor in this comment we show that in addition to these two assumptions about the micro level behavior of households and firms there is also an essential macro level assumption that may be termed the distribution axiom income or wealth from non labor sources must be sufficiently concentrated in the hands of a few agents we establish that if non labor income is distributed with sufficient equality a market equilibrium with child labor cannot exist in the bv model beyond their contribution as an extension of bv s theory our results formalize a proposition implicit in recent policy discussions of child labor christiaan grootaert and ravi kanbur 1995 note that as household level poverty is well known to be the major cause of child labor g eneral economic development equitably distributed is the best and most sustainable way of reducing child labor p 198 emphasis added policy documents from the international labor organization ilo have long conveyed this view and now the world bank appears to as well peter fallon and zafiris tzannatos 1998 there is a growing recognition that while economic development and development policies are necessary to eliminating child labor they are not always sufficient on their own distributional considerations matter indeed in the case in which bv s model yields multiple equilibria th this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous products product heterogeneity is introduced into the context of spatial price discrimination many of the strong properties of the standard homogeneous goods case which are attained as a limit case here are shown to be no longer valid in particular the social optimum is no longer sustainable as a market equilibrium unless products are either identical or else very different

science and technology in united states foreign trade economists generally believe that modern science technology such as the presence of scientists and engineers or research and development is a central factor in the comparative advantage of advanced industrial nations however most discussion of this topic rests on cross industry regressions which leamer and bowen i981 do not provide a valid indication of factor abundance so the overall role of science still remains to be established in addition much remains to be known about the role of different facets of science and innovation in the process of generating comparative advantage there are two fundamentally different ways of understanding technological differences between countries one point of view adopted in the standard neoclassical theory of international trade assumes all countries are on the same production function under these circumstances relative factor abundance determines the factor services which a country exports or imports within this perspective one can make progress towards an understanding of the role of science and technology in international trade by dividing science into many highly specific narrowly defined input factors calculations can then determine the relative abundance of those inputs associated with science technology versus other input factors in a given country or the relative abundance of different elements within the broad area of overall science technology quite another procedure assumes there are substantial differences in the production possibilities faced by different countries for example krugman i979 recently argued that advantages in innovation and lags in the diffusion of knowledge are the basic influences which permit incomes to be higher in the industrialised world than in developing nations this view illustrates the potential economic significance of innovation in advanced countries since the generation of new technologies in industrialised countries and their diffusion to the rest of the world then essentially determines world income distribution and world economic development however empirical implementation of the diffusion viewpoint requires data for many countries which greatly limits the number of facets of technology which can be considered since the present paper is centrally concerned with the effect which a wide variety of technological elements has on international trade we choose to select a framework within which the ample data available on different aspects of technology in the united states can be utilised the first view of technological

reputational comparative advantage and multinational enterprise 1 introduction when cultivating a new export market or attempting to expand its share of an existing market an exporter is likely to find that it has been preceded by its reputation minus a readily identifiable brand name quality reputation may solely reflect the country of origin for example when consumers are presented with a large amount of complex product information they may use the country of origin as a heuristic in forming product impressions without considering other product attributes 1 in this article i show that this heuristic decision making process can affect a firm s quality decision and can therefore become self fulfilling hence any bias that consumers have may be well founded however it is only correct because firms respond rationally to it colombia s garment industry provides an interesting example of a self fulfilling unfavorable quality reputation in international trade as described by morawetz 1981 a single colombian garment firm took a contract for 50 000 men s suits that was beyond its capability the poor quality result so tarnished the american importer s name that other high quality importers become wary of colombian sewn garments with the payoff to high quality production reduced colombian garment firms then concentrated on low quality markets and the newly found unfavorable reputation was justified in the model constructed here consumers see only a noisy signal of the product s quality at the time of purchase therefore their posterior beliefs are based on this noisy signal and the country of origin reputations as will be made clear higher quality firms benefit more from an increase in their country s reputation so that a better reputation generates an increase in the percentage of high quality firms in this way the reputation becomes self fulfilling and ex ante identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high quality producers i next introduce an economy with two sectors one sector produces more complex goods where high quality is not easily verified and is more essential to the product s performance these may be technology intensive products or they may consist of the design and marketing of the goods produced in the other sector in particular high quality production costs and the consumer s value for high quality goods is greater in this sector i show that this sector becomes more profitable as the country of origin reputation increases hence if one country s equilibrium reputation is low and the other country s equilibrium reputation is high then the pattern of specialization and international trade can be determined solely by reputational comparative advantage 2 finally i show that reputational comparative advantage can overshadow a small technological comparative disadvantage in determining the pattern of international trade given this pattern of trade and specialization based on reputational comparative advantage a high reputation firm may expend resources to establish a multinational enterprise mne in the low reputation country for example many mne products require the differing specializations of both the high and low reputation countries although differing in motivation this result accords well with more traditional models of vertical mne 3 however this impetus for mne as well as its more traditional counterparts does not explain why the mne would choose foreign direct investment fdi over a less costly licensing arrangement 4 the quality uncertainty in this model along with the difference in equilibrium reputations allows us to address this question in particular appropriable reputational rents are generated by fdi when the high reputation parent firm procures and internalizes production with a low reputation host firm this fdi breaks the low reputation equilibrium of the host firm and generates reputational rents

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

research and development human capital and trade performance in technology intensive manufactures a cross country analysis abstract this paper comprises an extensive examination of the relationship between commonly utilized policy indicators of national technological capability and observed trade success in technology intensive manufactures across 52 countries in the 1980s a central focus is the relative performance of policy indicators which directly measure innovative activity such as patent output and expenditure and employed scientists and engineers in r d versus those measuring general efforts at increasing national levels of human capital the study design is guided by the inter country intrasectoral approach outlined by dosi et al 19 it emphasizes differences in trade performance based on the notion of international competitiveness but also compares results for conventional revealed comparative advantage indices the large number of countries included and the nature of the policy objectives adopted have necessitated a highly aggregated approach using nation wide attributes and trade in one broad technologyintensive sector as the measure of demonstrated international competitiveness simple correlation and multiple regression techniques are used to assess the association of four main sets of national attributes indicators of direct innovative activity general human capital development physical capital formation and natural resource endowment with technology intensive trade performance the empirical findings provide further support for the importance of national differences in technological capability as a determinant of structural and international competitiveness within the technology intensive sector of production they suggest that policy indicators measuring actual innovative activity and physical capital formation have a much closer link to technology intensive trade than the general educational effort or output indicators demand side measures which proxy the actual employment and application of resources for r d purposes demonstrate the strength of association required for reliable policy evaluation of real national differences in technological capability the poor performance of the general human capital supply variables highlights the need for a careful consideration of the optimality of the allocation of substantial levels of scarce national resources to broad based educational output a number of other significant results concerning the link between technology indicators technology intensive trade and economic performance are discussed

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

dynamic market strategy under threat of competitive entry an analysis of the pricing and production policies open to the multinational company there is extensive evidence indicating that firms price discriminatorily over their market areas where price discrimination is defined to exist when the pattern of delivered prices departs from that which would be generated by f o b pricing see greenhut greenhut and li 8 hwang 10 phlips 16 underlying this evidence is an equally extensive body of theory which attempts to explain why such discriminatory pricing rules should be adopted both in competitive and monopolistic markets see capozza and van order 3 greenhut and greenhut 7 norman 15 one limitation of this theory is that it is essentially static even when competitive reactions and interdependencies are introduced there is no truly dynamic analysis rather the theory concentrates on comparing long run equilibria with perhaps some limited comment on how those equilibria might be achieved the analysis of price changes over time has received some attention notably by gaskins 6 jacquemin and thisse 11 and phlips 17 in these cases however analysis is spaceless while some analogies are drawn between intertemporal and spatial price discrimination these analogies are inevitably weak the major objective of this paper is to treat the spatial and temporal problems simultaneously we ask whether the pricing rules and market choice of a firm operating over a spatially extensive market area will vary when it is placed in a dynamic setting in particular we investigate the pricing behaviour of a firm to which we shall refer as the leading firm when it is subject to the threat of competitive entry in certain of its markets our model owes much to the analysis by gaskins 6 but we show that gaskins analysis applies to only part of the spatial market area once we allow for the costs of distance in particular we show that if the firm enjoys a substantial long run cost advantage in particular markets it will adopt a pricing rule identical to that derived in the static monopolistic case this can be expected to be a very

price discrimination and equilibrium in monopolistic competition modern theories of monopolistic competition have borrowed extensively from techniques developed in location theory and the theory of spatial pricing the monopolistically competitive firm is assumed to choose a location and price for its product a subject that has been of increasing concern in this corpus of theory is that there exists no free entry price location equilibrium in this paper we demonstrate that free entry price location equilibrium exists provided only that producers are allowed to price discriminate among customers in a reasonable manner equilibrium is modelled as a two stage game using the selten concept of subgame perfect nash equilibrium it is shown that the equilibrium discriminatory price system is one initially identified by hoover in addition we show that equilibrium is not unique the precise nature of equilibrium in a particular market will be dependent upon the history of that market

voting spatial monopoly and spatial price regulation voting spatial monopoly and spatial price regulation regulations often require that local public utilities engage in high rates of freight absorption these regulations often mandating uniform pricing are shown to arise logically as a consequence of self interested voting behavior we specifically consider the case of a single plant spatial monopoly which is regulated by consumers distributed around the plant consumers may change their delivered price by voting to require a rate of freight absorption which differs from the profit maximizing rate voting outcomes under a median voter model predict the high rate of freight absorption often observed in practice i introduction while the literature on spatial monopoly is large and research on regulated firms larger still very little attention has been given to the study of regulations affecting the spatial monopolist 1 regulated spatial monopolies could include either public or private production of telephone service natural gas cable television waste removal water sewage service etc indeed the analysis could be adapted to mass transportation systems providing access to an employment center it is common to find that regulations governing the spatial monopolist require uniform delivered pricing in which the firm must absorb most or all transportation costs 2 it appears that regulated freight absorption by the spatial monopolist is one of those cases that everyone knows about but which no one has bothered to analyze in detail an economic analysis of regulated freight absorption requires that the reaction of a spatial monopolist to the full range of requirements for freight absorption from zero to full absorption be available but there is no such treatment in the literature the first objective of this paper is to fill this gap by analyzing the effects of continuous variation in freight absorption on prices output profits consumers surplus and total welfare the results which we obtain are rather surprising for example the unregulated profit maximizing spatial monopolist is found to be a knife edge case in which second order conditions are not satisfied in addition welfare maximization is achieved by regulating the rate of freight absorption so that it lies between zero and the rate practiced by an unregulated firm having determined the effects of alternative freight absorption regulations on the firm we then construct a voting model in which spatially distributed consumer voters choose the rate of regulated freight absorption in this spatial voting model the spatial distribution of consumer surplus is used to generate voter preferences regarding the regulated level of freight absorption this analytical approach which we call spatial surplus surface analysis shows that the median voter prefers a high level of freight absorption this explains the popularity of regulations requiring high rates of freight absorption the regulatory outcome most often observed these results have significant welfare implications consumer voters choose freight absorption regulations with higher required rates of freight absorption than practiced by an unregulated spatial monopolist engaged in spatial price discrimination the voting outcome lowers both total welfare and total consumers surplus below the levels obtained under unregulated spatial monopoly ii model of the spatial monopolist assumptions following the conventional stylized assumptions for single plant spatial monopoly there is a given linear one dimensional market characterized by location along x a subset of infinity infinity with a single plant located at point 0 3 there is a single firm producing and distributing a homogenous product whose quantity is denoted by q to consumers distributed at uniform density across the market

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

optimal export policy for a new product monopoly a new welfare enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new product industry an export subsidy policy promotes the rational perception that a high quality export can be provided at a relatively low price thus an export subsidy generates a first order benefit to welfare by enabling a high quality export to be sold at a less distorted high price the subsidy will also introduce

mill pricing versus spatial price discrimination under bertrand and cournot spatial competition this paper asks two questions about spatial competition first does spatial price discrimination lead to lower prices and higher welfare than mill pricing if firms hold the bertrand conjecture the answer is yes for most values of fixed cost but for the cournot conjecture the opposite is true second does the introduction of space into the oligopoly models of bertrand and cournot change their results the answer is generally no however spatial bertrand prices exceed marginal cost unlike their spaceless counterparts these answers are obtained using models of spatial competition of which the cournot mill pricing models are new in spatial competition significant transport costs and economies of scale bestow market power upon firms this paper addresses two questions about spatial competition first does spatial price discrimination yield lower prices and higher social welfare producer plus consumer surplus than fo b mill pricing under spatial price discrimination differences in the delivered prices charged by a firm bear no necessary relationship to differences in transport costs in contrast a mill pricing firm sets a single price at its plant and customers bear the cost of transport this paper answers this question for the cases in which firms adopt the bertrand or cournot conjectures concerning how rivals will react to price and output changes this question is important because of the superficial appeal of mill pricing which stems from its imitation of the spatial structure of marginal costs the presence of spatial price discrimination by contrast is often considered to be evidence of the presence of market power at least in part for these reasons the us robinson patman antitrust act and great britain s price commission favor mill pricing nevertheless spatial price discrimination remains ubiquitous in the us europe and japan greenhut 1981 the second question is how does the introduction of space into the original oligopoly models of cournot and bertrand change their results cournot

tariff policy and entry with cost based informational asymmetries i introduction how does the presence of incomplete information alter the usual effects of trade policy recognition that incomplete information characterizes most decision making processes that take place within an international setting has stimulated an emerging body of literature which addresses this question particularly germane to the present study are those papers which introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policies to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firm compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies examples include works by brainard and martimort 1997 collie and hviid 1993 maggi 1995 and qiu 1994 another study collie and hviid 1994 allows for domestic consumption and considers optimal import tariff policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist in general optimal trade policy in the presence of informational failures is found to differ from that under complete information the emphasis of the present study is not on the conduct of optimal trade policy but rather on how the introduction of an informational asymmetry alters the realized impact of trade policy on quantities and welfare 1 specifically we examine the effects of import tariff policy within a standard two period model of entry where the costs of the domestic firm are proprietary information the incumbent domestic firm recognizes the threat of a potential foreign rival entering exporting to the domestic market where the latter is uninformed of the cost structure of the domestic firm as is well known from the industrial organization literature the incumbent domestic firm may have an incentive to change its time period one behavior so as to signal information on costs to the foreign firm in an effort to deter entry see milgrom and roberts 1982 in specifying the degree of knowledge possessed by domestic policymakers we adopt the premise that informational deficiencies on the part of policymakers are likely to be quite acute in trade policy formation indeed as brander 1995 notes it is reasonable to suppose that governments are less informed on market conditions and firm characteristics than firms themselves in contrast to previous studies however we also assume that policymakers either cannot acquire information or if they are able to cannot respond by altering policy here the formation of trade policy does not reflect or incorporate full information and thus cannot provide signals to the other uninformed party the foreign firm moreover because policymakers cannot alter policy the foreign firm perceives the tariff rate as credibly fixed the inability to incorporate information into trade policy is especially relevant for situations where policymakers are subject to previously negotiated trade agreements here even should uninformed policymakers subsequently acquire information on domestic cost structure they will be unable to respond our emphasis on the realized effects of tariff policy reflects this information structure to conduct optimal policy government must hold complete information on markets and firm characteristics at the time policy is set as in collie and hviid 1993 1994 or be able to acquire it through signaling or a screening mechanism as in qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 2 when policymakers lack the ability to acquire or respond to such information optimal policy is not a consideration what is of interest to policymakers in this situation is the response of domestic output and imports to a given tariff rate at the outset of the game then there is a tariff rate set previously by domestic policymakers who were uninformed of domestic costs since the foreign firm cannot infer domestic cost structure by merely observing the tariff rate set by uninformed policymakers any signaling that takes place is on the part of the domestic firm

testing market integration a model of spatial price differentials for a tradable good is proposed which avoids the inferential dangers of received methods using static price correlations the proposed method also extracts more information on the causes of price differentials from the same data the method is illustrated using monthly rice price data for postindependence bangladesh including the very substantial regional price shocks during the 1974 famine impediments to market integration are indicated

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social

export subsidies and oligopoly with switching costs abstract i examine export policy using a two period model of oligopolistic competition with switching costs a switching costs model captures the idea that market share in one period affects profits and welfare in future periods if consumers are impatient firms and governments are patient and switching costs are significant then governments subsidize first period exports and tax second period exports otherwise governments tax exports in both periods although governments may subsidize first period exports each country is made worse off when both countries subsidize in addition firms dump p mc under conditions similar to those required for export subsidies

reverse dumping a form of spatial price discrimination this paper generalizes joan robinson s analysis of dumping under a spatial price theory framework the dumping of goods is shown to be a natural form of spatial pricing rather than necessarily an act of predatory design viewed as such dumping neither requires predatory motives nor competition in markets where the goods are to be dumped a simple spatial monopoly model is used to derive the firm s optimal price policy on sales to nearby and to distant customers under different demand and cost conditions the paper then resolves the question of reverse dumping which may or may not benefit the nearby home country customers