rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

the demographic transition and the position of women a marriage market perspective we present international evidence on the marriage market implications of cohort size growth and set out a theoretical model of how marriage markets adjust to imbalances since men marry younger women secular growth in cohort size in the second phase of the demographic transition worsens the position of women this e ect has been substantial in many asian countries earlier and continues to be true in sub saharan africa with fertility decline cohort are now shrinking in east asia improves the position of women these demographic trends can explain the increase and spread in dowries in south asia and the persistence of polygyny in sub saharan africa we show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances even though it accommodates transitory shocks jel categories j12 j13 j16

marriage market divorce legislation and household labor supply this paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply in our approach the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors these factors are defined as variables that affect the household members bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set we extend the collective labor supply model developed by chiappori to allow for distribution factors we show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process the model is estimated using psid data for the year 1988 our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model also the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects

labor supply of husbands and wives a simultaneous equations approach labor supply functions for married men and women are formulated as a dynamic simultaneous equations system which is estimated using panel data controlling for fixed individual effects allows marginal labor supply responses to be disentangled from permanent patterns in hours worked due to assortative mating the results suggest that the labor supply of husbands and wives without pre school children is not jointly determined in the short run while families with young children exhibit strong interactions in work hours and negative cross earnings effects neither the joint utility model of family labor supply nor an ad hoc traditional family model is supported by these results the data are for the united states and concern 381 couples from the denver income maintenance experiment excerpt

did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates a reconciliation and new results application of the coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across us states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization i show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock i find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade but that this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade that said this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century both administrative data on the flow of new divorces and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion these results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage with an eye to their partner s divorce threat

how do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets evidence from america s second generation sex ratios i e relative numbers of men and women can affect marriage prospects labor force participation and other social and economic variables but the observed association between sex ratios and social and economic conditions may be confounded by omitted variables and reverse causality this paper uses variation in immigrant flows as a natural experiment to study the effect of sex ratios on the children and grandchildren of immigrants the flow of immigrants affected the second generation marriage market because second generation marriages were mostly endogamous i e to members of the same ethnic group the empirical results suggest that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on female labor force participation perhaps surprisingly the marriage rates of second generation men appear to be a slightly increasing function of immigrant sex ratios higher sex ratios also appear to have raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children the empirical results are broadly consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the marriage market

intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting the two literatures on targeting and on intrahousehold inequality have developed rapidly over the past 15 years but largely independent of each other the literature on targeting concerns itself with the design of tax and transfer programs for poverty alleviation in the presence of limited information on who the poor are the literature on intrahousehold inequality arose out of a dissatisfaction with unitary models of the household especially in explaining inequality in consumption and achievements of different household members even after allowing for relevant differences among them the authors begin to forge the link between the two literatures so they can address issues policymakers face around the world after a brief reprise of the key features of the two literatures they indicate how the presence of intrahousehold inequality and allocation mechanisms could affect the standard analysis of targeting theory they conclude with a list of policy questions for further research this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

estimating consumption economies of scale adult equivalence scales and household bargaining power how much income would a woman living alone require to attain the same standard of living that she would have if she were married what percentage of a married couple s expenditures are controlled by the husband how much money does a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart we propose and estimate a collective model of household behaviour that permits identification and estimation of concepts such as these we model households in terms of the utility functions of its members a bargaining or social welfare function and a consumption technology function we demonstrate generic non parametric identification of the model and hence of a version of adult equivalence scales that we call indifference scales as well as consumption economies of scale the household s resource sharing rule or members bargaining power and other related concepts copyright 2013 oxford university press

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

from common fish to rights based fishing fisheries management and the evolution of exclusive rights to fish abstract since the second world war the international law of the sea has been altered fundamentally an exclusive economic zone eez extending 200 nautical miles from baselines has been established in which the coastal states have practically full sovereignty over natural resources including fish this development appears explicable in the light of the economic theory of property rights due to increased scarcity of fish and lower costs of supporting claims to fish resources the eez has major implications for the efficient utilization of fish resources through its limitation of free access in some cases it amounts to the establishment of national property rights to fish resources while in others the number of parties with a legitimate claim to access has been restricted in the wake of this fisheries management by total allowable catches tacs has become widespread this method of management has a potential for increasing the efficiency of fisheries given that a single state or a group of states are able to control the fishery how should this be done to ensure efficiency four methods are discussed i privatization of the resources ii taxes on landings or fishing activity iii fishing licences and iv individual transferable quotas itqs some questions related to itqs are discussed i fixed itqs versus shares in the tac ii stable versus variable itqs and iii how the tac should be set for each particular year the economic theory of property rights predicts the emergence of private property rights to fish stocks or fishing rights in the present situation recent cases of such rights emerging are discussed

how important is intra household risk sharing for savings and labor supply abstract while it is recognized that the family is a risk sharing institution little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply in this paper we present a model where workers females and males are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete a household is formed by a female and a male who decide on consumption savings and labor supplies in a calibrated version of our model we find that intra household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth poor households while the wealth rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells wealth poor households rely on spousal labor supply for instance for low wealth households average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8 higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands this response in wives hours makes up 9 of lost family income we also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household

who marries whom and why this paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market the model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects it rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations the model was used to estimate u s marital behavior in 1971 72 and 1981 82 the marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

efficient intra household allocations a general characterization and empirical tests the neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members this paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member we make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts all we assume is that however decisions are made outcomes are efficient we refer to this as the collective setting we show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the slutsky matrix we also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made we apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from canada the tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two person households but not for one person households we also show that income pooling is rejected for two person households we then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data none of the collective setting restrictions are rejected we conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior

waiting for mr right rising inequality and declining marriage rates abstract this paper demonstrates that women search longer for their first or second husband in cities with higher male wage inequality and examines several alternative explanations a causal link is established by controlling for city fixed effects and city specific time trends and by using inequality in the woman s state of birth as a proxy for local male inequality increasing inequality explains about 25 of the marriage rate decline over the last few decades and this is not due to the endogenous moving or labor force decisions of women nor to the marital decisions of men in reaction to changes in their own wages

parental wealth and adult children s welfare in marriage abstract many studies find that parental resources importantly determine children s human capital schooling returns and earnings the collective household approach suggests that in addition parental resources of marital partners may importantly affect resource distributions within marriage this paper presents empirical results consistent with this framework they suggest that parental wealth continues to play roles in augmenting welfare of children into adulthood beyond provision of human capital in early life cycle stages or direct financial aid during adulthood and that actual transfers from parents to adult children do not fully measure influences of parental wealth on behaviors and welfare of adult children

collective household labor supply nonparticipation and income taxation in this paper we adopt the usual assumptions of the collective approach i e individualism and efficiency to study household labor supply the theoretical innovation is 2 fold first we incorporate the decision to participate in the labor market in the initial setting second we abandon the assumption of linearity of the budget constraint we show that i structural elements such as preferences or the outcome of the decision process can be recovered and ii testable restrictions are generated from the observation of the household labor supplies we also examine for this model how to simulate the incidence of fiscal reforms

a test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply this paper tests the unitary and the collective household labour supply models within a structural framework a nonlinear unrestricted household labour supply system is postulated and the set of parametric restrictions imposed by each model is derived our results generally reject the income pooling restrictions embodied in the unitary model also the symmetry of cross wage effects is rejected however the collective model is not rejected for groups with no pre school children

gender of children bargaining power and intrahousehold resource allocation in china abstract based on the prevalent son preference in china this paper proposes a new measure of relative bargaining power within the household using data from china health and nutrition survey we show that a woman with a first born son has a 3 9 percentage points greater role in household decision making than a woman with a first born daughter having a first born son improves the mother s nutrition intakes and reduces her likelihood of being underweight while thinking of these impacts as being channeled through intrahousehold bargaining power we cannot fully rule out other possible direct effects of a first born son on the outcomes

marriage and divorce informational constraints and private contracting the relationship between divorce rates in the united states and laws regulating divorce are analyzed using data from a special current population survey undertaken in 1979 with particular reference to the adoption by many states of no fault divorce laws the author utilizes a contract theoretic framework to examine the impact of both legal and informational constraints on several aspects of the marriage relationship 1 the probability of divorce 2 compensation at divorce i e the terms of the divorce settlement 3 the probability of entering marriage and 4 incentives for investment in marriage specific capital two different models are developed the first assumes that ex post information about the value of each spouses opportunites at divorce is symmetric and that since divorce would only occur if the joint benefits outweigh the joint costs the law has no effect on the divorce rate the second model asserts that the existence of asymmetric information results in a fixed wage marriage contract and that divorce would be higher in states that allow unilateral divorce the evidence supports the first of these hypotheses excerpt

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

intra family distribution of paid work time this article analyses the intra family distribution of paid work time in five european countries france germany italy spain and the uk to that end we formulate a collective model which allows us to characterize the efficient labour supply decisions of each spouse this two equation model is then simultaneously estimated by using national panel data drawn from the european community household panel echp 1994 2001 empirical results clearly show that in all sample countries the labour supply of wives is affected by own wages household and own nonlabour incomes and the number of children whereas evidence for husbands differs across countries

unilateral divorce and the labor force participation rate of married women revisited two recent articles in this review by h elizabeth peters 1986 and william r johnson and jonathan skinner 1986 address an anomaly recently observed by labor economists james p smith and michael p ward 1985 have noted that real wage growth explains most of the increase in the female labor supply between 1950 and 1980 however in the period after 1970 the female labor supply growth rate rose while the real wage growth rate fell robert t michael 1985 provides a partial explanation by identifying the effect of divorce on the labor market decision of married women in that article a lagged relationship is observed between increases in the divorce rate and increases in the labor force participation rate lfpr of married women with young children during the post world war ii period since the divorce rate rose in the period after 1960 it could explain part of the increase in the growth rate of the lfpr of married women observed after 1970 the articles by peters and by johnson and skinner provide additional insights into this anomaly they recognize that the introduction of no fault grounds for divorce after 1970 may have contributed to the increase in the labor supply of married women after that date the no fault grounds for divorce created what has been called unilateral divorce the shift in female labor supply also could explain the slower real wage growth using 1979 data peters concludes that residence in a unilateral divorce state had a statistically significant positive influence on whether a married woman was in the labor force johnson and skinner use 1972 data to conclude that being in a unilateral divorce state in that year had a negative effect on the labor supply of married women unilateral divorce was introduced in the united states in 1970 when california adopted its no fault divorce statute therefore peters s data are probably more useful for testing the impact of unilateral divorce laws on married women s labor force participation in her article the lack of compensation for marriage specific investment at divorce creates an incentive for married women to increase their more general market capital during marriage by entering the labor force 2 a lack of compensation for marriage specific investment implies that women are not being compensated for being good housewives and mothers given the range of commodities produced by housewives and mothers marriage specific investment should not necessarily vary with characteristics of women such as age race or education if the impact of unilateral divorce on the lfpr of married women is due to the lack of compensation for mar regents professor of management robert 0 anderson schools of management university of new mexico albuquerque nm 87131 i thank michele blazek steve cauley dwight grant ron johnson rod lievano sam peltzman john schatzberg david weeks nelson woodard douglas young and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments the anderson schools of management provided research funding for this project ibefore 1970 most states had grounds for divorce that were based on fault such as adultery or mental cruelty between 1970 and 1985 all the american jurisdictions enacted some form of no fault divorce the no fault divorce statutes generally make either irretrievable breakdown or incompatibility the sole ground for divorce or add one of them to the fault grounds while no fault divorce is often called unilateral divorce that is not technically correct since some states require mutual consent to the no fault grounds see doris j freed and timothy b walker 1990 2while it was recognized by peters p 443 that women who invest in marriage may face lower wages in the future based on gary s becker 1981 p 15 marriage specific investment has value based on its ahilitv to increase houiehold nrodiution

renewable electricity production costs a framework to assist policy makers decisions on price support abstract despite recent progress the production costs for renewable electricity remain above those for conventional power expectations of continuous reductions in production costs typically underpin governments policies for financial support they often draw on the technology focused versions of the experience curve model this paper discusses how national contextual factors also have a strong influence on production costs such as geographic infrastructural institutional and resource factors as technologies mature and as they reach significant levels of diffusion nationally sustained increases in production costs might be recorded due to these nationally contextual factors poorly accounted for in policy making decisions for price support the paper suggests an analytical framework for a more comprehensive understanding of production costs based on this it recommends that the evolution of specific cost levels and factors be monitored to locate sources of changes the paper also suggests policy instruments that governments may use to facilitate cost decreases whenever possible the application of the framework is illustrated for the diffusion of wind power in spain during the past three decades

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth