state and time contingent switches of exchange rate regime abstract recent papers have analysed the effects of britain s return to gold in 1925 one line of argument has been that the return to gold was a state contingent regime switch an alternative view is that it was time contingent this paper shows that these approaches are not mutually exclusive the solution for the exchange rate is derived in a model where a switch to a fixed rate takes place either when a state contingent trigger is reached or at a fixed time whichever is the sooner state contingent and time contingent elements are thus combined within the same model

price discrimination and investment incentives abstract we examine a model of a monopolist selling to two segments of consumers with different preferences for quality we show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments then there is less investment in quality we find that both consumer segments and society overall may suffer if the firm is unable to price discriminate we extend the model to duopoly competition and find that our results still hold

policy rivalry among industrial states what can we learn from models of strategic trade policy the economic theory of international trade has changed dramatically over the last decade by admitting into its mainstream a body of literature that focuses on the implications of monopolistic and oligopolistic elements in international markets by applying the tools of the new industrial organization in an international context two new classes of models have emerged models of intra industry trade and models of strategic trade policy the policy implications of models of strategic trade policy were quite disturbing for the economics profession since these models demonstrated that the classical harmony between national and cosmopolitan welfare maximization does not exist if one assumes opportunities for strategic manipulation of oligopolistic international industries this article reviews two prominent models of strategic trade policy the brander spencer model and the krugman model and relates them to more familiar earlier concepts such as stackelberg s asymmetrical duopoly solution and the venerable infant industry argument for government intervention the primary purpose of this article however is to provide a synopsis of the large literature addressing the question of whether models of strategic trade policy can give guidance for government policy

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

the gains debate framing state choice the theoretical bifurcation of international relations theory into neo realist and neo liberal camps has resulted in a gains debate that says little about an empirical world in which states exhibit both relative and absolute gains pursuit this article deploys prospect theory in an attempt to move beyond the gains debate the intent here is synthetic by bringing the predictions of both perspectives under a single theoretical umbrella we can model a broader set of state behavior the thesis developed demonstrates that states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse while states in a losses frame pursue relative gains and are risk acceptant this hypothesis is assessed against the behavior of the european community in the formation of the montreal protocol a regime intended to protect the earth s protective ozone shield the new model accurately predicts the timing and content of shifts in ec preferences suggesting that a synthesis of realist and liberal approaches is possible

market power price discrimination and allocative efficiency in intermediate goods markets we consider a monopolistic supplier s optimal choice of two part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric we find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms competitiveness firms that are larger either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals this increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms in contrast we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms as a result consumer surplus industry profits and welfare are lower

entrenching the yoshida defense doctrine three techniques for institutionalization japan s level of defense expenditure relative to tbe size of its economy bas long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries as of 1995 japan s expenditures stood at 0 96 percent of gross domestic product gdp even adding to this tbe approximately 0 3 percent of gdp devoted to pensions for retired personnel the level of spending is considerably less than that of major westem states such as tbe united states united kingdom france and germany as well as industrialized asian states such as south korea taiwan malaysia and singapore furthermore these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over tbe past few decades see table 1 defense expenditure as a percentage of gdp or gnp gross national product often referred to simply as defense burden has over tbe past few decades become the standard benchmark for measuring a state s relative contribution to international security because of this tbe appropriateness and consequences of japan s relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense bave been hotly debated botb in japan and abroad critics accuse japan of unfairly exploiting a defense free ride to build its economic success and others worry that japan s lack of military capabilities prevents it from becoming a normal state whose political role is commensurate

unionised labour market and strategic production decision of a multinational i show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment fdi and export and this decision depends on the size of the product market it happens irrespective of whether the labour market in the domestic country or in the foreign country is unionised unlike the existing works focusing on risk diversification in presence of demand or cost uncertainty i explain the co existence of fdi and export in a world with certainty the endogenous determination of the wage rate plays an important role for my results my analysis shows the effects of the fixed cost of fdi and competition in the product market on the production strategy of the foreign firm

discriminatory nonlinear pricing fixed costs and welfare in intermediate goods markets abstract we investigate the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in input markets when nonlinear wholesale tariffs are feasible after accepting their respective wholesale contracts two downstream firms have to pay a fixed cost in order to become active in the downstream market if the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has significantly higher fixed cost uniform pricing leads to lower marginal wholesale prices for all downstream firms and thus higher quantities of the final product being produced this in turn implies that banning price discrimination improves welfare and consumer surplus if the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has only weakly higher or even lower fixed cost banning price discrimination deteriorates welfare and consumer surplus

third degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality this paper analyzes third degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served the model features the business passenger and leisure passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation and a less price elastic demand than leisure passengers our main result is the identification of the time valuation effect of price discrimination which can work in the opposite direction as the well known output effect on welfare this time valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output

reexamining the effect of the most favored nation provision in input prices on r and d incentives abstract we examine the effect of the most favored nation provision in input prices on downstream firms r and d incentives contrary to the previous literature we show that the effect depends on the extent of substitutability between downstream firms if they compete in two part tariffs when a downstream firm lowers its marginal cost it entails two conflicting effects on the upstream firm s pricing for inputs the standard elasticity effect of penalizing the low cost firm and the market share effect of rewarding it if substitutability between downstream products is high enough the latter dominates the former and thus downstream firms will choose a higher marginal cost technology under the mfn provision

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

volatility regime switching in european exchange rates prior to monetary unification abstract several theoretical models suggest that the mere announcement of entering a currency union in the future triggers instantaneous changes in exchange rate volatility first this paper develops a markov switching framework by which in fact volatility regime switching in foreign exchange rates can be detected for all currencies in the run up to the european monetary union emu second the paper attributes the currency specific volatility regime switches to decisive economic institutional and political factors prior to emu all in all the empirical results suggest that for future emu accession countries volatility regime switching models provide a useful tool for a broad range of financial applications e g for the pricing of currency options or for the construction of emu probability calculators

quality differences third degree price discrimination and welfare we propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences in each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets local firms produce higher quality goods than the global firm if the quality levels of the local firms products are the same price discrimination is never welfare decreasing if they differ discrimination is welfare increasing if quantity increases because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination jel d43 d60

bounding the relative profitability of price discrimination we derive bounds on the ratio of a monopolist s profit from third degree price discrimination to that from uniform pricing if the monopolist serves n independent markets demand is continuous and the cost function is superadditive then the profit ratio is bounded by n a linear demand example is provided coming arbitrarily close to this bound we provide examples showing the profit ratio can be unboundedly large when marginal cost is decreasing demand is discontinuous or fixed cost is positive if the monopolist has access to certain demand rationing strategies under uniform pricing we can bound the profit ratio even for discontinuous demand functions and multiproduct cost functions

exchange rate dynamics under state contingent stochastic process switching this paper offers a closed form solution of a process switching problem i e switching the exchange rate regime from free floating to a completely fixed one an example of such regime change is the adoption of the euro in contrast to previous studies on the subject this paper analyzes a specific case when foreign exchange market participants consider both the euro locking rate and locking date as uncertain preceding the locking the exchange rate is determined by three factors fundamental market expectations for the euro locking rate and date the model is used to examine the conditions under which the exchange rate volatility is mitigated by the prospect of locking

cost pass through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition this paper provides two characterizations of the retailer s markup relative to the manufacturer s markup in vertical relationships with homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous retailers we first show that retailer s relative markup is equal to the ratio of the retail pass through to the wholesale pass through multiplied by the number of manufacturers relative to the number of retailers we then provide its expression in terms of the inverse demand curvature

absolute and relative gains in international relations theory the problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism the former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation the latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states preferences using a simple game theoretic model this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states behavior the feasibility of cooperation and especially the states concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model

the security dilemma revisited robert jervis s article cooperation under the security dilemma is among the most important works in international relations of the past few decades in it jervis develops two essential arguments first he explains that the security dilemma is the key to understanding how in an anarchic international system states with fundamentally compatible goals still end up in competition and at war the security dilemma exists when many of the means by which a state tries 1 to increase its security decrease the security of others it provides the rational foundation for what jervis termed the spiral model which describes how the interaction between states that are seeking only security can fuel competition and strain political relations 2 second jervis explains that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables the offense defense balance and offense defense differentiation 3 as a result the security dilemma can vary across space and time although states exist in a condition of international anarchy that does not vary there can be significant variation in the attractiveness of cooperative or competitive means the prospects for achieving a high level of security and the probability of war

speculative anticipations of sterling s return to gold was keynes wrong the view held by keynes that there was a speculative appreciation of sterling prior to its return to the gold standard has been challenged by gregor smith and todd smith who argue that expectations of return must have weakened the currency the authors demonstrate that the positive but decreasing trend displayed in the exchange rate data is consistent with a pattern of autoregressive convergence in fundamentals and that this continues to be true when there is a positive speculative element based on expectations of an early return hence the key features of the data seem compatible with keynes s views copyright 1994 by royal economic society

price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets abstract this paper examines the welfare implication of banning price discrimination in the intermediate goods market in which a monopolistic supplier contracts with asymmetric downstream retailers we demonstrate that the supplier has a strong incentive to manipulate the interdependent demand structure through sequential contracting whether price discrimination is banned or not and allowing price discrimination improves social welfare and consumer surplus when sequential contracting is implemented by the supplier

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition when two markets are vertically related the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels this paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations we consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them in order to mitigate pollution the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant we show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax we further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax we argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government it will certainly increase social welfare

exchange rate dynamics in anticipation of time contingent regime switching modelling the effects of a possible delay abstract the procedure of fixing a currently floating exchange rate at a given and publicly announced future date has a broad range of applications based on a continuous time monetary exchange rate model with flexible prices this paper analyzes exchange rate dynamics during the transition from floating to fixed rates in a situation in which market participants are uncertain about adherence to the fixing date and in which they take account of a possible delay in the regime switch the closed form solutions derived here allow us to quantify announcement effects as well as effects on the exchange rate variance caused by news that significantly changes the market s assessment of uncertainty

price discrimination in input markets quantity discounts and private information we consider a monopolistic supplier s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs under discriminatory pricing downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs under uniform pricing the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms in contrast to the extant literature on price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts often improves welfare this also holds if the manufacturer is not an unconstrained monopolist moreover uniform pricing increases downstream investments in cost reduction in the long run

timing of investments and third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets abstract this paper studies the discriminatory pricing of an intermediate good and compares two models with a different timing of investments undertaken by the downstream firms before or after the upstream monopolist sets the input prices when the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher price than the less efficient firm in the first model in the second model when investments are made after input prices are set it may be charged a lower price due to the additional indirect effect of input prices on derived demands via the change of investment incentives it is illustrated that with linear market demand and quadratic investment cost whether a lower or higher price is charged to the more efficient firm depends on the ratio of the linear and quadratic coefficients in the cost function

input price discrimination when buyers operate in multiple markets this paper revisits third degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations the typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency and welfare by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms when buyers serve multiple markets price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand when lower demand markets also have less competition price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets

scraps of paper agreements and the durability of peace in the aftermath of war what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes and what can be done to foster durable peace drawing on theories of cooperation i argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives reduce uncertainty about intentions and manage accidents a counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption i test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis controlling for factors including the decisiveness of victory the cost of war relative capabilities and others that affect the baseline prospects for peace i find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace in particular measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones explicit third party guarantees peacekeeping and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace agreements are not merely scraps of paper rather their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts

do intergovernmental organizations promote peace a basic debate in world politics involves the impact of intergovernmental organizations igos on international conflict liberals functionalists and others see igos as capable of transforming global anarchy while realists emphasize the essential irrelevance of igos in managing such fundamental processes as war and peace recent quantitative studies also yield disparate conclusions depending on particular econometric assumptions implying variously that igos foster pacific relations among states have no impact on dispute behavior or even increase dispute propensity at least part of the problem is a lack of theoretical and empirical specificity the authors apply bargaining theory to develop a middle path between the realist and liberal perspectives only some igos those with security mandates and the most sophisticated institutional structures are likely to influence dispute behavior the authors combine the theory with two improvements in research design first igos vary in capability mandate and cohesion the authors construct a dataset of igo institutional heterogeneity and member cohesiveness second states join igos for reasons that are not unrelated to why states fight the authors control for the level of international involvement among countries and find support for their arguments in initial tests

input price discrimination with downstream cournot competitors abstract this paper addresses third degree price discrimination in input markets i decompose the upstream monopolist s profit into two parts one that depends on average input prices and one that depends on their distribution this decomposition is useful in comparing the welfare properties of price discrimination against uniform pricing under reasonable assumptions input price discrimination negatively affects both consumer surplus and total welfare

raising rivals cost through buyer power we re examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power this argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms profits and the uniform input price assuming different input efficiencies among downstream firms we derive a necessary and sufficient condition such that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms in such instances consumers may be better off if discriminatory pricing is feasible

price discrimination in input markets we analyze the short and long run implications of third degree price discrimination in input markets in contrast to the extant literature which typically assumes that the supplier is an unconstrained monopolist in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand side substitution in our model the more efficient buyer receives a discount a ban on price discrimination thus benefits smaller but hurts more efficient larger firms it also stifles incentives to invest and innovate with linear demand a ban on price discrimination benefits consumers in the short run but reduces consumer surplus in the long run which is once again the opposite of what is found without the threat of demand side substitution

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

third degree price discrimination in input markets output and welfare if price discrimination is realized the economy shifts from one equilibrium to another it clearly involves welfare effects the price discriminator clearly gains some consumers may also gain from the price cut but others may lose faced with higher prices etc traditionally the change in social welfare is known to be closely related to the change in total output in the case of third degree price discrimination it is well known that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement richard schmalensee 1981 proves this fact in a model in which the monopolist with constant marginal cost can perfectly separate markets further hal r varian 1985 extends this result to the case of interdependent markets permnitting increasing marginal cost of the monopolist and finally the assumption of nondecreasing marginal cost is eliminated by marius schwartz 1990 roughly speaking this proposition says that if there is a welfare gain from price discrimination there has to be some gain to offset the distortion involved on the other hand the vast majority of legal and other policy disputes over the price discrimination concern input markets not final good markets thus it seems important to investigate the situation in which a discriminating monopolist is not a final good supplier but an input supplier and the buyers of the input are downstream producers of a final good as is assumed in this paper if the downstream firms have different technologies their input demand functions will be different and thus the monopolist has an incentive to price discriminate in this scenario michael l katz 1987 and patrick degraba 1990 study the effect of inputmarket price discrimination and show that price discrimination always lowers welfare because it involves the distortion that a lower cost downstream firm is assigned a higher price unfortunately in their simple settings on the technology of downstream industry price discrimination can never change total output of the input or of the final good 1 thus we must say that welfare effect of input market price discrimination remains open to question if it has some effect on total output in particular we are curious as to whether we can obtain some close relationship between the changes in welfare and total output as we have obtained in the final good market settings with this motivation we will construct a model which involves change in total output of the final good in the next section the model and assumptions are provided in section ii after we extend the result of katz 1987 and degraba 1990 we find a relationship between the changes in welfare and total output strikingly it states that an increase in the total output of the final good is a sufficient condition for welfare deterioration this result contrasts with that obtained by schmalensee 1981 varian 1985 and schwartz 1990 from usual models of price discrimination in a final good market section iii concludes the analysis

welfare and output in third degree price discrimination a note abstract one main result on the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement this note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms in these examples price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm this induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination

friction in related party trade when a rival is also a customer there are many circumstances in which manufacturers provide inputs to wholesale customers only to subsequently compete with these wholesale customers in the retail realm such dual distribution arrangements commonly suffer from excessive encroachment in that the manufacturer s ex post retail aggression is harmful ex ante because it undercuts potential wholesale profits this paper demonstrates that with dual distribution a manufacturer can benefit from decentralized control and the use of transfer prices above marginal cost although these arrangements often create coordination concerns a moderate presence of such concerns permits the manufacturer to credibly convey to its wholesale customer that it will not excessively encroach on its retail territory this in turn permits the manufacturer to reap greater wholesale profits we also note that this force can point to a silver lining in arm s length parity requirements on transfer pricing in that they can solidify commitments to a particular retail posture

power and interdependence revisited ten years ago we published power and interdependence 1 the passage of a decade makes this an appropriate time to reread and reevaluate that book and to take stock of the research program to which it contributed in doing this we hope to deepen and enrich scholarly understanding of the politics of interdependence and to stimulate reflection on directions for the field of international relations over the next decade 2 such a reappraisal seems particularly opportune given the changes in world politics and especially in american policy that have marked the intervening years stanley j michalak commented in 1979 that the authors may cringe from the analogy but power and interdependence may well become the politics among nations of the 1970s 3 but from the perspective of the late 1980s the world may look different while the 1970s were seen as the decade of interdependence many observers regard the use of force and concern for security as characteristic of the 1980s indeed the view is widespread in some circles that the 1980s resemble the 1950s more than the 1970s and that hans j morgenthau s work is more relevant to contemporary issues of world politics than power and interdependence

the relative gains problem for international cooperation modern realism claims that the fear that others will enjoy relatively greater benefits frequently impedes international cooperation recent articles in this review by duncan snidal and robert powell modeled conditions under which the impact of relative gains varied joseph grieco criticizes snidal s model as based on assumptions that allow him to avoid rather than confront the realist arguments he also argues that powell s model while constructive ignores important additional sources of sensitivity to relative gains in response powell discusses the value of alternative assumptions about preferences and constraints in international relations snidal defends his analysis and presents an additional proof to support the independence of his central result the diminishing impact of relative gains with increasing numbers of states from assumptions of concern to grieco both responders emphasize their work as contributing to a contextually rich theory of international politics that builds on elements of both realism and neo liberalism

monopolistic third degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation this paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous the results provide rich implications for antitrust policy

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

input price discrimination in the presence of downstream vertical differentiation abstract this paper investigates the competitive effects of input price discrimination ipd in a setting in which an upstream monopolist produces an essential input supplied to the downstream market where there is competition between two vertically differentiated retailers two different input pricing regimes are investigated i the uniform pricing regime in which third degree input price discrimination is prohibited and i i a discriminatory pricing regime under which the upstream monopolist may charge different prices to the two downstream firms we find that despite favoring the low quality firm ipd is welfare enhancing if and only if the quality gap is sufficiently high