the bond old bond spread abstract i document the profits on a trade that is long the old 30 year treasury bond and short the new 30 year treasury bond and is rolled over every auction cycle from june 1995 to november 1999 despite the systematic convergence of the spread over the auction cycle the average profits are close to zero the difference in repo market financing rates between the two bonds is a significant cost of carry in this trade i show that variation in the bond old bond spread is driven by the treasury supply of 30 year bonds as well as aggregate factors affecting investors preference for liquid assets

the effects of energy prices on agricultural groundwater extraction from the high plains aquifer we examine the effects of energy prices on groundwater extraction using an econometric model of a farmer s irrigation water pumping decision that accounts for both the intensive and extensive margins our results show that energy prices have an effect on both types of margins increasing energy prices would affect crop selection decisions crop acreage allocation decisions and farmers demand for water our estimated total marginal effect which sums the effects on the intensive and extensive margins suggests that a 1 per million btu increase in the energy price would decrease water extraction by an individual farmer by 5 89 acre feet per year a decrease of 3 6 percent of the average annual extraction rate our estimated elasticity of water extraction with respect to energy price is 0 26

can there be a market for cheap talk information an experimental investigation abstract this paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information we find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes sellers provide low quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff this contributes to the low demand in the market for information moreover we observe the same very low level of activity in the market for information when sellers face no conflict of interest and the noise in the quality of the transmitted information is much lower hence we argue that the collapse of the market for information is a demand phenomenon and even small uncertainty over the quality of information seems to have a large impact

price elasticity of groundwater demand attenuation and amplification bias due to incomplete information measurement errors in both human and natural components of agricultural and environmental systems can be as much a source of estimation bias as omitted variables selfselection simultaneity and reverse causality nonetheless partly because of difficulties in obtaining data there is less literature on measurement error problems than on other endogeneity problems this article examines estimation bias in the price elasticity of groundwater consumption for irrigated agriculture on the intensive margin the price at issue is for the energy used in pumping and pressurizing water for delivery lacking the precise unit irrigation cost previous studies imputed irrigation costs we first consider groundwater irrigation costs and identify factors that can cause measurement errors in the process of imputation under incomplete information about the determinants of irrigation costs we follow this by systematically analyzing the potential bias caused by measurement errors using econometric theory along with monte carlo simulations where appropriate we then quantify actual measurement errors making use of a unique dataset in which energy and groundwater consumption data are matched for individual observations finally we compare regression results using exact irrigation costs as opposed to imputed ones we find evidence of substantial measurement errors resulting in attenuation and amplification bias in the price elasticity of irrigation water consumption on the intensive margin our results indicate that measurement errors in irrigation costs can lead to misleading policy implications related to water and energy pricing as a tool to conserve water we also show that estimating the energy price elasticity of groundwater use is not as straightforward as previously thought

public goods in networks this paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non excludable along social or geographic links we find first that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision in every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride in many networks this extreme is the only outcome second specialization can benefit society as a whole this outcome arises when contributors are linked collectively to many agents finally a new link increases access to public goods but reduces individual incentives to contribute hence overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network

the economics of hubs the case of monopoly in this paper we study the optimization problem of an unregulated air carrier which is given the exclusive right to satisfy demand for air travel between any pair of cities it chooses a network of connections and a set of prices to maximize profits thus both network design and prices are endogenous we characterize the solution to this optimization problem when demands and costs are symmetric our main result is that if there are economies of density in the number of individuals travelling between two directly connected cities the optimal network is either a hub of size n 1 or one in which every pair of cities is connected directly

demand specification for municipal water management evaluation of the stone geary form to specify demand in most water allocation problems researchers face a tradeoff between flexibility and parsimony flexible forms are less constraining on elasticity estimates but require large parameter sets that tend to cause poor out of sample forecasts and computational difficulties using a five year panel of texas municipalities the parsimonious stone geary form yields estimated demand functions that are comparable to flexible form results the stone geary specification also provides an estimate of the portion of water use that may not be responsive to price and is useful in analysing price structures and designing conservation policies

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

network structure and strategic investments an experimental analysis abstract this paper experimentally analyzes the effect of network structures on individuals decisions in a game of strategic substitutes the theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of bramoulle and kranton 2007 as predicted we find that individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria but that coordination strongly depends on the network structure despite frequent coordination failures in graphs of size n 4 equilibrium play seems easier on network architectures with high low density and low high centrality if play converges it almost exclusively does so towards the predicted equilibria theoretical results with respect to welfare are also confirmed next to global graph structural properties we also explore the effects of local and individual factors we find that behavior on networks is affected by the number of direct neighbors but not by individuals risk attitudes apparently the global and the local structure of a network does not leave much explanatory room for individual effects that pertain to risk taking

a discrete continuous choice approach to residential water demand under block rate pricing reply waldman is quite correct in noting that the microeconomic theory of block rate pricing in hewitt and hanemann hh 1995 is given for the general case of a k block rate structure whereas the econometric theory is largely confined to the case of exactly two blocks the extension in waldman to the more general case of k blocks is correct although the extension itself could be even more general if it addressed the nonnegativity of demand as is demonstrated below that no apparent attention was paid to the nonnegativity of demand in hh may be attributed to the fact that the need to do so was negated by a fortuitous assumption in the earlier work although that assumption that the errors are multiplicative and lognormally distributed was only maintained and not tested in hh i now estimate two models with the more common assumptions of linear demand and additive and normally distributed errors both with and without a modification for

a liquidity risk index as a regulatory tool for systemically important banks an empirical assessment across two financial crises we provide an assessment of the imf suggestion based on severo 2012 to use an index of systemic liquidity risk slri that could help to estimate a pigouvian tax on large banks for the externality on the international banking system out of their risk exposure to this end we compute a parsimonious and fully documented slri and investigate its statistical significance in explaining level and variability of stock returns for a group of large international banks during the subprime financial and the eurozone sovereign debt crises the empirical investigation consistently fails to detect within and across the two crises a core group among the systemically important banks listed by the financial stability board and thus supports a sceptical assessment of the proposal

evidence on the validity of cross sectional and longitudinal labor market data this article investigates error properties of survey reports of labor market variables we use the panel study of income dynamics psid validation study a two wave panel survey of workers employed by a large firm that shared its detailed payroll records individuals reports of annual earnings are fairly accurate errors are negatively related to true earnings reducing bias due to measurement error when earnings are used as an independent variable biases are moderately larger for changes in earnings earnings per hour are less reliably reported than annual earnings biases in estimating earnings functions are relatively small but those in labor supply functions may be important

the demand for irrigation water in the high plains of texas 1957 80 a new method of calculating groundwater pumpage is used to estimate water demand these results are used via the gisser sanchez model to show that pumpage regulation is unlikely to be beneficial in the texas high plains a sensitivity analysis is performed on present value profits under optimal control and competitive schemes using different water demand slope and intercept values the results indicate that the gisser sanchez rule is useful in determining the divergence in pumpage time paths and percentage difference in profits under the two schemes but it is not insightful in determining the nominal difference in profits

social hierarchies a laboratory study on punishment patterns across networks we experimentally study punishment patterns across network structures and their effect on cooperation in a repeated public goods setting subjects can only observe and punish their neighbors centralized structures like the star network outperform other incomplete networks and reach contribution levels like the ones observed in a complete network our results suggest that hierarchical network structures with a commonly observed player benefit more from sanctions not because central players punish more but because they follow and promote different punishment patterns while quasi central players in other incomplete architectures like the line network retaliate and get trapped in the vicious circle of antisocial punishment central players in the star network do not punish back increase their contributions when sanctioned by peripheral players and sanction other participants in a prosocial manner our results illustrate recent field studies on the evolutionary prevalence of hierarchical networks we document a network based rationale for this positive effect in an identity free fully anonymous environment jel c72 c91 c92 d90 h41

adaptation to an irrigation water restriction imposed through local governance abstract we estimate how farmers adapted to a water restriction imposed through local governance the restriction imposed a uniform quota on water use with a 5 year allocation and allowed trading of the quota within the restricted area our analysis exploits unique micro level data on irrigated water use irrigated acreage and crops we use a difference in differences econometric strategy that also includes farmer time fixed effects to estimate the response to the restriction where we exploit water rights between 2 and 5 miles of the policy boundary as a control group results indicate that farmers reduced water use by 26 due to the policy with most of the response due to reductions in water use intensity on the same crops rather than through reductions in irrigated acreage or changes in crops the results imply that the short run welfare impact of the policy was smaller than a policy that reduces irrigated acreage

the economic consequences of social network structure we survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks we develop a taxonomy of macro and micro characteristics of social interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning diffusion decisions and resulting behaviors we also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors

principles of network development and evolution an experimental study this paper reports on an experimental investigation of the evolution of networks and the individual decision making processes that guide it inasmuch as there is no history of experimental work on network formation part of the paper is devoted to the formulation of problems that can be examined experimentally the results are that networks composed of decentralized decision makers are capable of overcoming complex coordination and learning problems and converge to stationary when it does not occur significant and persistent inefficiencies can result the models of equilibration based on the principle of nash equilibrium are more reliable than models based on the alternative principles of efficiency seeking or focalness of the network configuration however individual decision making within networks is not in accordance with the simple decision rules of nash best response instead we observed complicated strategies that appear to trade short term profits in order to signal to and teach other agents the strategies required for long term profit maximization

information acquisition and exchange in social networks a central feature of social networks is information sharing the internet and related computing technologies shape the relative costs of private information acquisition and forming links with others this article presents an experiment on the effects of changing costs we find that a decline in relative costs of linking makes private investments more dispersed and gives rise to denser social networks aggregate investment falls but individuals access to investment remains stable due to increased networking the overall effect is an increase in individual utility and aggregate welfare

experiments with network formation abstract we examine how groups of agents form trading networks in the presence of idiosyncratic risk and the possibility of contagion specifically four agents play a two stage finite repeated game in the first stage the network structure is endogenously determined through a non cooperative proposal game in the second stage agents play multiple rounds of a coordination game against all of their chosen neighbors after the realization of a payoff relevant shock while parsimonious our four agent environment is rich enough to capture all of the important interaction structures in the networks literature bilateral marriage local interaction star and uniform matching consistent with our theory marriage networks are the most frequent and stable network structures in our experiments we find that payoff efficiency is around 90 percent of the ex ante payoff dominant strategies and the distribution of network structures is significantly different from that which would result from random play

second degree moral hazard in a real world credence goods market in a field experiment in the market for taxi rides we investigate a phenomenon called second degree moral hazard the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or price of the service our moral hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be reimbursed this has a strong positive effect on the likelihood and the amount of overcharging and consequently increases consumer expenditure our results suggest that second degree moral hazard may have a severe impact on the provision of credence goods

water demand under alternative price structures we estimate the price elasticity of water demand with household level data structurally modeling the piecewise linear budget constraints imposed by increasing block pricing we develop a mathematical expression for the unconditional price elasticity of demand under increasing block prices and compare conditional and unconditional elasticities analytically and empirically we test the hypothesis that price elasticity may depend on price structure beyond technical differences in elasticity concepts due to the possibility of endogenous utility price structure choice observed differences in elasticity across price structures may be due either to a behavioral response to price structure or to underlying heterogeneity among water utility service areas

job contact networks abstract many workers hear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives the aim of this paper is twofold first we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts second we study strategic network formation to this purpose we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents and the process by which information about jobs is obtained and transmitted we show that equilibrium networks always exist and that only moderate levels of network asymmetry can be sustained at equilibrium also we establish a general non monotonicity result on information flow and unemployment with respect to network size in symmetric networks

portfolio choice and risk attitudes an experiment i introduction suppose an investor is faced with a decision concerning how to allocate financial resources between a risky lottery asset with a higher expected return and an asset with a fixed and guaranteed lower return is the choice of portfolio independent of preferences outside the standard neoclassical model in experiments with financial incentives we study how portfolio choice depends on three well documented behavioral phenomena ambiguity aversion the illusion of control and myopic loss aversion we also investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge such preferences pay for more perceived control less ambiguity or more frequent opportunities to change the portfolio based on feedback about its performance while standard finance theory presumes that investors successfully identify and process information relevant to reaching optimal decisions in recent years a body of empirical evidence suggests that there are systematic departures from this behavior behavioral finance is concerned with psychological influences in financial decision making and markets investors make decisions while trying to stay afloat in a sea of uncertainty when predictability is low people may be prone to unjustified beliefs that may survive and even flourish in such an environment 1 people may resort to rules of thumb on a conscious or subconscious level to the extent that psychological influences are present it is economically important to consider which of these actually affect risk attitudes and portfolio choice a key issue is whether any such influences disappear when monetary incentives are present we pursue a systematic experimental comparison of three of the most prominent behavioral phenomena documented in the literature the illusion of control langer 1975 is concerned with greater confidence in one s predictive ability or in a favorable outcome when one has a higher degree of personal involvement even when one s involvement is not actually relevant ambiguity aversion ellsberg 1961 is the desire to avoid unclear circumstances even when this will not increase the expected utility myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 combines loss aversion kahneman and tversky 1979 tversky and kahneman 1992 and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently this combination leads investors to be more willing to invest a greater proportion of their portfolio in risky assets if they evaluate their investments less frequently we show that these phenomena are present with monetary incentives and also investigate whether people are willing to pay money to accommodate such preferences or whether they are closer to the rational model when incentives are present with the procedure we chose the willingness to actually pa for such preferences depends on the preference the great majority of investors pay for less ambiguity or more frequent feedback investment opportunities but fewer than 10 pay to roll a determinative die themselves 2 we then examine how the preferences between lotteries in the different treatments affect portfolio choice we have participants allocate their investment capital between an asset with a sure return and a risky asset with a higher expected rate of return in fact there is very little variation in investment behavior across any of the illusion of control or ambiguity aversion treatments in contrast the results found in previous experimental studies of myopic loss aversion suggest that participants invest less in their preferred option the main conclusion we draw from these findings is that the relation between which procedure or lottery people prefer and how much they are willing to actually invest in this lottery is not trivial at all people are generally unwilling to pay even small amounts of money to indulge the illusion of control and it does not influence their portfolio choice people are generally willing to pay money for less ambiguity but having less ambiguity does not influence their portfolio choice finally in some cases people are willing to pay money for more frequent feedback and opportunities to change their portfolio but again previous studies have shown that people invest less with this additional information and greater flexibility

an econometric estimation of industrial water demand in france this study investigates the structure of industrial water demand byestimating the derived demand for water on a sample of industrialestablishments located in the south west of france productiontechnologies are represented by short term variable cost functions andapproximated by a translog form industrial water use is modeled ashaving three components the quantity of water bought to a waterutility the quantity of autonomous water and the quantity of watertreated prior to use we include in this framework water effluents which are considered as a by product of the production process emittedby firms each of the three water components is treated as a separateinput and all are estimated as a system of simultaneous equations themodel is estimated on a sample of 51 industrial plants in the girondedistrict observed from 1994 to 1996 using seemingly unrelated regression sur and feasible generalized least squares fgls results ofestimations show that industrial firms are sensitive to water priceinputs network water elasticity is estimated at 0 29 it variesfrom 0 10 to 0 79 according to the type of industryconsidered autonomous water price elasticity is not significant elasticity for treated water is evaluated at 1 42 at themean sample and varies from 0 90 to 2 21 according to theindustry considered

networks in labor markets wage and employment dynamics and inequality we present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs we show that both wages and employment are positively associated a strong form of correlation across time and agents we also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out if there are costs to staying in the labor market then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop out rates and there will be a persistent differences in wages between groups according to the starting states of their networks

coordination and local interaction experimental evidence abstract subjects repeatedly played a three player coordination game with a payoff dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff dominant equilibrium while those interacting with their neighbors around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk dominant equilibrium

the effects of social networks on employment and inequality we develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts we show that employment is positively correlated across time and agents moreover unemployment exhibits duration dependence the probability of obtaining a job decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed finally we examine inequality between two groups if staying in the labor market is costly and one group starts with a worse employment status then that group s drop out rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group

experimental games on networks underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection in this paper we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure specifically actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability this framework applies to a wide variety of settings we examine behavior and equilibrium selection the degree of equilibrium play is striking in particular with incomplete information behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique when there are multiple equilibria general features of networks such as connectivity clustering and the degree of the players help to predict informed behavior in the lab people appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs social efficiency but there are forces that moderate this attraction 1 people seem content with in the aggregate capturing only the lion s share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss and 2 uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding but efficient equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information

do residential water demand side management policies measure up an analysis of eight california water agencies abstract to assess the potential of price and alternative demand side management dsm policies as an urban water resource management tool an econometric model of residential demand is formulated and estimated this econometric model incorporates alternative dsm policy instruments such as water allocations use restrictions public education and increasing block pricing schedules the analysis relies on cross sectional monthly time series data for eight water agencies in california representing 24 of the state s population 7 1 million people results suggest that both price and alternative dsm policies were effective in reducing demand however the magnitude of the reduction in demand varied among policy instruments

multicrop production decisions in western irrigated agriculture the role of water price applying a model of the multioutput firm econometric results are reported for irrigated production in four multistate regions of the american west cross sectional microdata from the farm and ranch irrigation survey and limited dependent variable methods are used to estimate crop choice supply land allocation and water demand functions for field crops farm level water demand is decomposed into the sum of crop level water demands and crop level demands are further separated into an extensive margin land allocations and intensive margin short run water use response to water price measured as groundwater pumping cost occurs primarily at the extensive margin

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

network effects on strategic interactions a laboratory approach abstract we examine the effect of interaction structure network on two classes of collective activities herding and shirking respectively referring to the situation where a player s incentive to take a certain action increases and decreases if more of her network neighbors follow the same action in our experiment we find that subjects do not act according to theoretical equilibrium and their frequencies of making the socially beneficial choice in herding and shirking games are inversely influenced by the number of network neighbors they have moreover the observed local network effect is stronger in shirking games while the global network effect is more significantly present in herding games we explain the behavioral regularities through a hybrid learning model which extends sewa learning into a network context as such our learning model provides a foundation for the observed dynamics disequilibrium behavior as well as the local and global network effects

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training