money deficit and public debt in the united states this study estimates the underlying parameters in a dynamic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities over the determination of public debt these estimates reveal the policymakers attitude towards the goal of stabilizing the time path of public debt the central finding is that in the united states during the 1955 85 period this goal has been pursued by the fiscal authority but not by the central bank monetary policy has not monetized the stock of public debt outstanding whereas cyclically adjusted net of interest fiscal deficits have been reduced to offset increases in the stock of debt in circulation copyright 1989 by mit press

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

financialisation income distribution and aggregate demand in the usa this paper investigates the effects of financialisation and functional income distribution on aggregate demand in the usa by estimating the effects of the increase in rentier income dividends and interest payments and housing and financial wealth on consumption and investment the redistribution of income in favour of profits suppresses consumption whereas the increase in the rentier income and wealth has positive effects a higher rentier income decreases investment without the wealth effects the overall effect of the changes in distribution on aggregate demand would have been negative thus a pro capital income distribution leads to a slightly negative effect on growth i e the usa economy is moderately wage led

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

the constitution of economic policy one of the most exciting intellectual moments of my career was my 1984 discovery of knut wicksell s unknown and untranslated dissertation finanztheoretische untersuchungen buried in the dusty stacks of chicago s old harper library only the immediate post dissertation leisure of an academic novice allowed for the browsing that produced my own dramatic example of learning by serendipity wicksell s new principle of justice in taxation gave me a tremendous surge of self confidence wicksell who was an established figure in the history of economic ideas challenged the orthodoxy of public finance theory along lines that were congenial with my own developing stream of critical consciousness from that moment in chicago i took on the determination to make wicksell s contribution known to a wider audience and i commenced immediately a translation effort that took some time and considerable help from elizabeth henderson before final publication this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

financial factors and investment in belgium france germany and the united kingdom a comparison using company panel data we construct company panel data sets for manufacturing firms in belgium france germany and the united kingdom covering the period 1978 1989 these data sets are used to estimate empirical investment equations and to investigate the role played by financial factors in each country a robust finding is that cash flow and profits terms appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more significant in the united kingdom than in the three continental european countries this is consistent with the suggestion that financial constraints on investment may be relatively severe in the more market oriented u k financial system

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

political stability and fiscal policy time series evidence for the swiss federal level since 1849 this paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time series analysis over 158 years at the swiss federal level we argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office because the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office enjoys a politically powerful position towards the administration parliament and interest groups in contrast frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister

financial development and financing constraints international evidence from the structural investment model this article provides evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment the financing constraints are inferred from the investment euler equation by assuming that the firm s stochastic discount factor is a function of the firm s financial position specifically the stock of liquid assets the magnitude of the changes in the cost of capital is twice as large in a country with a low level of financial development as in a country with an average level of financial development the size effect business cycles and legal environment effects are also considered copyright 2003 oxford university press

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

a note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints abstract an important agrument in the current debate over european monetary integration is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states budgetary powers to reduce the common monetary authority s risk of having to bail out insolvent member governments this note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the united states nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance without however preventing extreme outcomes fiscal restraints induce substitution of nonrestricted for restricted debt instruments

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

consequences of debt capitalization property ownership and debt versus tax choice public debts capitalize into property prices thus they are a burden to the present generation who owns the devalued property this largely neglected fact has important consequences for the tax versus debt choice property owners suffer more from the debt burden and thus have a stronger preference for tax financing of government spending than tenants as a consequence of the resulting democratic struggle between property owners and tenants higher property ownership rates in a jurisdiction lead to less debt financing we provide empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing a cross section of the 171 communities in the swiss canton of zurich in the year 2000

time inconsistency and fiscal policy empirical analysis of u s states 1969 89 abstract we offer an extensive and robust test of the time inconsistency theory of fiscal politics we employ data of u s states from 1969 to 1989 and the results of our tests indicate the variables such as legislative stability and executive term limits have strongly predictable impacts on the volatility of various measures of fiscal policy

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

budget referendums and government spending evidence from swiss cantons vortrag im forschungsseminar der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen fakultat der universitat basel schweiz am 20 november 2000

finance dominated capitalism and re distribution of income a kaleckian perspective in this article a major channel through which financialisation or finance dominated capitalism affects macroeconomic performance is examined the distribution channel empirical data for the following dimensions of re distribution in the period of finance dominated capitalism since the early 1980s is provided for 15 advanced capitalist economies functional distribution personal household distribution and the share and the composition of top incomes based on the kaleckian approach to the determination of income shares the effects of financialisation on functional income distribution are studied in more detail some stylised facts of financialisation are integrated into the kaleckian approach and by means of reviewing empirical and econometric literature it is found that financialisation and neoliberalism have contributed to the falling labour income share since the early 1980s through three main kaleckian channels 1 a shift in the sectoral composition of the economy 2 an increase in management salaries and rising profit claims of the rentiers and thus in overheads and 3 weakened trade union bargaining power

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

financial liberalization private investment and portfolio choice financialization of real sectors in emerging markets abstract using firm level panel data we analyze the impacts of rates of return gap between financial and fixed investments under uncertainty on real investment performance in three emerging markets argentina mexico and turkey employing a portfolio choice model to explain the low fixed investment rates in developing countries during the 1990s we suggest that rather than investing in irreversible long term fixed investments firms may choose to invest in reversible short term financial investments depending on respective rates of returns and the overall uncertainty in the economy the empirical results show that increasing rates of return gap and uncertainty have an economically and statistically significant fixed investment reducing effect while the opposite is true with respect to financial investments

the politics of intergenerational redistribution this paper studies the political economic equilibrium of a two period model with overlapping generations in each period the policy is chosen under majority rule by the generations currently alive the paper identifies a politically viable set of values for public debt any amount of debt within this set is fully repaid in equilibrium even without commitments by issuing debt within this set the first generation redistributes revenue in its favor and away from the second generation the paper characterizes the determinants of the equilibrium intergenerational redistribution and identifies a difference between debt and social security as instruments of redistribution

the demands of finance and the glass ceiling of profit without investment in post keynesian recent works the profit without investment case has made its appearance as a particular accumulation regime one claiming along with two others the contractive and the expansive case that it can account for the different conceivable dynamic patterns at work in financialised capitalism actually profit without investment or rather profit beyond investment is in the very nature of capitalism it is not a special case the dividend channel is an essential component of profit formation we show that its enabling condition and what at the same time limits its width is firms resort to debt beyond a certain point the divorce between dividends and investment is such that firms policies leave their viable domain a domain bounded by their wishes to be self financing past that point any increase in profits runs into a glass ceiling in terms of outlets for those profits it is when the demands of finance i e of shareholders reach this limit that the three regimes identified in the literature make their appearance including the one called profit without investment seen in this light these regimes are therefore all cases of profit without investment ones that take on some reality and some plausibility when finance tries to drag profit without accumulation outside of its viable domain

financial development and economic growth the role of stock markets utilizing time series methods and data from five developed economies we examine the relationship between stock market development and economic growth controlling for the effects of the banking system and stock market volatility our results support the view that although both banks and stock markets may be able to promote economic growth the erects of the former are more powerful they also suggest that the contribution of stock markets on economic growth may have been exaggerated by studies that utilize cross country growth regressions

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the spatio temporal dynamics of ethanol gasoline price ratio in brazil abstract we use an innovative method to analyze the spatio temporal evolution of the ethanol gasoline price ratio to end consumers in brazil this model allows estimating the distribution of prices throughout the country using a continuous space model estimated by bayesian methods we use data from the national petroleum natural gas and biofuels agency s price survey system a weekly sample of 10 of fuel suppliers in brazil to estimate continuous projections of the price ratio for the entire country for the 2007 2014 period we use this model to build an indicator of ethanol advantage in the country and show how this advantage has declined since 2009

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

fiscal effects of reforming local constitutions recent german experiences most german states amended their local constitutions during the 1990s and now allow for the direct election of mayors initiatives and referendums and vote aggregation as well as vote splitting in this paper it is asked whether these reforms had any effects on local fiscal policies it is shown that the direct election of mayors led to lower government spending whereas the introduction of direct democratic elements led to higher expenditures the empirical results concerning direct democracy are substantially different from findings in relation to both switzerland and the us it is argued that this difference may be due to a lack of fiscal referendums in germany

do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt using a unique dataset of the personal characteristics of national finance ministers in western europe 1980 2010 i show that a finance minister s experience affects the national debt to gdp ratio the increase in the debt to gdp ratio is smaller if the finance minister stays in office for an additional year this result is robust to the inclusion of the personal characteristics of prime ministers and a measure of political stability however the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to how finance ministers are selected in the econometric model when more than one minister holds office during a particular year the estimation of interaction terms further reveals that experience particularly matters in election years or in times of negative gdp growth because an experienced finance minister has the power to restrict the usual increase in the debt to gdp ratio in contrast a finance minister s educational background and ideological leaning have no significant impact on the debt to gdp ratio

federalism fiscal restraints and european monetary union a prominent feature of the maastricht treaty on european union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy under the provisions of the excessive deficit procedure or edp the success of member states in avoiding excessive deficits during the transition to economic and monetary union emu is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union once monetary union has begun member states are unconditionally required to avoid excessive deficits a state has an excessive deficit when it is so declared by the european council upon a report by the european commission and a judgment by the monetary committee the edp is set in motion if a country s deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of gdp the justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency if excessive deficits cause a debt crisis the european central bank ecb will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government the bailout could be ex post in which case the ecb would monetize the government s debt or ex ante in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt service burden either way unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ecb will find difficult to resist

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

rationality and the political business cycle the case of local government the empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in section 2 in pre election periods local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels the extent of deviation is approximately 20

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

independent fiscal agencies abstract there has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy however the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called independent fiscal agencies this paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects the motivation for the establishment of such agencies their potential design and the experience with these types of institutions

sticking to fiscal plans the role of institutions the rules based fiscal framework of the emu relies heavily on the development of medium term fiscal plans by the eu governments in this paper i present an empirical analysis of the deviations from the plans presented in the annual stability and convergence programs i focus on projections for real gdp growth and general government balances revenues and spending at different time horizons i show that deviations from the projections presented in these programs since 1999 can be explained by institutional factors i e the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules

the effects of financialization on investment evidence from firm level data for the uk this paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the uk using panel data based on balance sheets of publicly listed non financial companies supplied by worldscope for the period 1985 2013 we find robust evidence of an adverse effect of not only financial payments interests and dividends but also financial incomes on the rate of accumulation the negative impacts of financial incomes from interests and dividends are particularly strong for the pre crisis period our findings support the financialization thesis that the increasing orientation of the non financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical investment hence to stagnant or fragile growth as well as long term concerns for productivity

the influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy we analyze both theoretically and empirically the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies our model suggests that as the extent of direct democracy increases implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector this theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country s shadow economy we also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude an empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model s predictions

do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes this paper focuses on the observed empirical relationship between fiscal rules and budget deficits and examines whether this correlation is driven by an omitted variable namely voter preferences we make use of two different estimation methods to capture voter preferences in a panel of swiss sub federal jurisdictions first we include a recently constructed measure of fiscal preferences second we capture preferences through fixed effects with a structural break as women are enfranchised we find that fiscal rules continue to have a significant impact on real budget balances

municipal debt in switzerland new empirical results switzerland has experienced extensive institutional reforms at the local level that could influence local debt these reforms have included municipal mergers greater inter communal cooperation reformed political decision making mechanisms and the introduction of new public management measures many of these reforms originated at the cantonal level however the institutional diversity among swiss municipalities hardly has diminished a cross sectional analysis for the 137 largest swiss cities and villages in 2004 shows that direct democratic rights and a high degree of fiscal autonomy lead to a lower level of local debt there is no statistical support for the hypothesis that reforms following the new public management guidelines had an effect on debt levels

why financialisation hasn t depressed us productive investment the rate of capital accumulation in the usa has fallen markedly in recent decades works in the financialisation literature have tried to explain this phenomenon by arguing that rising financial payments and purchases have come at the expense of productive investment this article shows that such arguments are not supported by the data it also explains theoretically why rising dividend payments and the growth of corporations portfolio investment are compatible with the fact that corporations productive investment did not decline during the first two decades of neoliberalism in the usa there would necessarily be a trade off between these uses of funds if they were all funded out of current profits but there is no necessary trade off because borrowed funds are an additional source finally the article shows that the fall in us corporations rate of profit rate of return on investment in fixed assets fully accounts for the fall in their rate of capital accumulation

financialisation and the dynamics of offshoring in the usa imports are linked to higher cost mark ups and firm profits and the gains from such non competitive imports the result of offshoring are increasingly associated with the reinvestment of these higher profits our regression analysis of 35 us manufacturing and service industries over the period 1998 2006 supports aggregate and firm level studies showing that offshoring is associated with a higher share of corporate profit in total value added but the dynamic gains from offshoring have not been fully realised because firms have purchased financial assets especially share buybacks and higher dividend payments to raise shareholder value rather than investing in productive assets that raise productivity growth employment and income despite the corporate sector s contribution to national savings over the past decade the offshoring financialisation linkage reduces the capacity of non financial corporations to act as a driver of the recovery from the economic crisis that emerged in 2008

the determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation a case study the principal and agent relationship is important in the public sector there elected or appointed representatives act on behalf of the citizens of their jurisdictions this paper examines the importance of the budget referendum which allows the principals to approve or disapprove the proposal of a set of agents in the context of local public expenditure decisions we test the null hypothesis that the institution of referendum when compared to a nonreferendum institution does not lead to significantly different expenditure behavior

working capital and fixed investment new evidence on financing constraints this article presents new tests for finance constraints on investment by emphasizing the often neglected role of working capital as both a use and a source of funds the coefficient of endogenous working capital investment is negative in a fixed investment regression as expected if working capital competes with fixed investment for a limited pool of finance this finding addresses a criticism of previous research on finance constraints that cash flows may simply proxy shifts in investment demand in addition previous studies may have underestimated the impact of finance constraints on growth and investment because firms smooth fixed investment in the short run with working capital

unemployment and the real wage the economic basis for contesting political ideologies using the keynesian theory of effective demand this paper demonstrates how particular models such as that of cooperative capitalism enunciated by the left keynesian social democrats the marxian model of profit squeeze emphasizing distributive conflict and even the conservative model relying on supply side stimulus fit in as particular variants of a more general theoretical scheme through a reconstruction of the familiar is schedule the argument is weaved around the theme of the relations between unemployment and real wage in the context of both a closed and an open economy to explain the common macroeconomic basis of contesting ideologies copyright 1990 by oxford university press

financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation over the past decades financial investment of non financial businesses has been rising and accumulation of capital goods has been declining the first part of the paper offers a novel theory to explain this phenomenon financialization the shareholder revolution and the development of a market for corporate control have shifted power to shareholders and thus changed management priorities leading to a reduction in the desired growth rate in the second part the link between accumulation and financialization is tested econometrically by means of a time series analysis of aggregate business investment for usa uk france and germany extensive test of robustness are performed for the first three countries evidence that confirms the negative effect of financialization on accumulation is found author s abstract

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

the effect of direct democracy on income redistribution evidence for switzerland there is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income redistribution while the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representative democracy the influence of direct democracy on redistribution has attracted much less attention according to theoretical arguments and previous empirical results government policies of income redistribution are expected to be more in line with median voter preferences in direct than in representative democracies in this paper we find that institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower public spending and revenue particularly lower welfare spending and broad based income and property wealth tax revenue moreover we estimate a model which explains the determinants of redistribution using panel data provided by the swiss federal tax office from 1981 to 1997 and a cross section of representative individual data from 1992 while our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income and actual redistribution is lower inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution this finding might well indicate the presence of efficiency gains in redistribution policies

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism this paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in the german state of bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy in the first part of the paper we establish the relationship between referenda activity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all 2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011 this selection on observables approach however suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application the main part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design rdd to safeguard against co treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simultaneously at the same thresholds we validate our results by extending the rdd approach to a difference in discontinuity did design by studying direct legislation in an archetypical cooperative federation as germany our paper extends the literature to a novel institutional setting the results indicate that in our setting and in contrast to most of the evidence from switzerland and the us direct democracy causes an expansion of local government budgets

the economic case for limits to government in june of 1978 the voters of california approved proposition 13 restricting the rate of local property taxation to no more than 1 percent of 1975 market values in november 1978 the voters of michigan approved the headlee amendment which limited state revenues from own sources to a fixed share of state personal income in november of 1980 massachusetts voters followed the lead of california and required all cities and towns to limit their taxation to a rate of 22 percent of full and fair cash value numerous hypotheses have been advanced and analyzed to explain the emergence of these new restrictions on fiscal choice the results point to two explanations voters feel governments are too big providing more services than what they prefer or governments spend too much on redistributive activities to help the poor and through higher wages to help public employees themselves the response to this perceived failure of government has been to propose and in california michigan and massachusetts to approve absolute limits to government expenditures the question i wish to address here is whether a compelling economic argument can be advanced for such a policy response politics and personalities aside the answer i think is yes but particular preconditions must apply first and perhaps most importantly is the inability of citizens to directly control the provision of public services responsibility for providing public goods is delegated to agents of the voter and these agents be they bureaucrats or elected representatives have their own objectives and an ability to act upon them to the possible disadvantage of the voters second without direct control over public outputs voters must use indirect controls through the manipulation of their appointed agents these indirect controls take two general forms price incentives or quantity restrictions third the choice of either of these indirect controls must take place before the agent acts to provide public goods further voters must often make their choice of a price or quantity control before the benefits or costs of the public service are known to them with certainty agents however can wait to observe true benefits and coststhat is why we use agents and then provide a level of public services in response to costs benefits and the voters chosen control voter uncertainty over benefits and costs can be interpreted as placing the voter within a constitutional perspective where a voter s precise position in society that is his or her benefits and costs are unknown when choosing a control geoffrey brennan and james buchanan ch 1 were the first to really stress this important point fourth if benefit and cost uncertainty is predominantly over the position rather than slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost schedules and if the marginal benefit schedule is relatively steep loosely an inelastic demand curve while the marginal cost schedule is relatively flat an elastic supply curve then quantity controls on agents behavior through tax or spending limitations will be the preferred control these four preconditions strike me as quite plausible rather than just an emotional reaction to a peculiar configuration of political and economic circumstances proposition 13 the headlee amendment and proposition 24 may be perfectly reasoned responses to a failure in the politi professor university of pennsylvania and research associate the national bureau of economic research inc an alternative hypothesis which has been tested and generally rejected attributes voter approval to a desire to alter the tax mix away from property taxation and towards other taxes what approving voters really want it seems is increased government efficiency and less redistribution see the recent studies by jack citrin paul courant edward gramlich and daniel rubinfeld and helen ladd and julie wilson

the impact of cash flows and firm size on investment the international evidence abstract this paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six oecd countries in particular we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and thus should be more affected by the availability of internal funds earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints we first examine all firms regardless of size in each country and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries that is internal financing affects firm investment we then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size contrary to our a priori expectations we find that the cash flow investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group we deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments thus we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm s investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets as do kaplan s zingales l 1997 the quarterly journal of economics 169 215 since small firms are known to have less access to external markets

why does liquidity matter in investment equations that liquidity variables affect investment spending is widely accepted despite important recent empirical work questions remain concerning the interpretation of liquidity variables in investment equations and the sources and economic importance of finance constraints these questions are addressed by estimating a variety of econometric models that exploit distinctive canadian institutional features to identify firms that face relatively severe information problems the initial econometric evidence confirms the existence of finance constraints and identifies their source as the problems faced by firms in credibly communicating private information to outsiders this conclusion is robust to biases from the capitalization of finance constraints into asset prices scale economies or imperfect competition which are accounted for directly in the econometric specifications copyright 1995 by ohio state university press