theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions this paper reports the results of controlled experiments designed to test the harrisraviv generalization of the vickrey theory of bidding in multiple unit discriminative auctions the paper also discusses further development of the theory in a way suggested by the experimental results to include bidders with distinct risk preferences in a well known paper vickrey 20 formulated a nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in single unit auctions this analysis was subsequently extended in numerous papers vickrey 21 generalized his original model to include multiple unit auctions in which each of n risk neutral bidders can bid on one out of a total of q homogeneous items up for auction where 1 c q n in both of the vickrey papers individual values for the auctioned object s were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution holt 12 and riley and samuelson 19 for single unit auctions and harris and raviv 11 for multiple unit auctions have extended the vickrey model to the case in which valuations are from a general distribution function and all agents have identical concave utility functions this paper reports the empirical properties of individual bidding behavior and seller revenue for a group of 28 laboratory experiments designed to test the harris raviv generalization of the vickrey hereafter vhr model of nash equilibrium behavior in multiple unit discriminative auctions in section i we summarize briefly the theoretical results of the vhr model which form the basis for the hypotheses that we test section ii describes the experimental design that we use section iii describes the experimental results and various tests based on the bidding behavior of individual subjects and on aggregate market seller revenue data the results from six of the ten n q parameter designs reported

equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

bias in the post ipo earnings forecasts of affiliated analysts evidence from a chinese natural experiment investment banks and issuers of chinese domestic ipos became fully responsible for ipo offer prices only on june 10 2009 before this regulatory reform the optimistic bias in post ipo earnings forecasts is highly comparable across affiliated and unaffiliated analysts afterward the forecasts of affiliated analysts are 33 percentage points more positively distorted on average in the first 90 days after an ipo this relative forecast bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges further when the issuer s stock price drops in the aftermarket affiliated analysts distort especially their forecasts for fiscal years further away from the forecast release date

using first price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses abstract this paper considers three alternative ways to sell heterogeneous licenses via a first price format when there is single unit demand it has been suggested that incorporating a first price element may bolster competition in this case klemperer paul d 2002 what really matters in auction design journal of economic perspectives 16 169 189 in a controlled laboratory setting we compare the performance of the simultaneous first price auction the sequential first price auction and the simultaneous descending auction with that of the simultaneous ascending auction the experiments involve several bidding environments of varying complexity we find that the simultaneous ascending auction achieves the highest levels of efficiency but also has drawbacks i its revenues are low and variable ii per license profits vary and iii the incidence of winner s curse outcomes is high seller s revenues are highest when the licenses are sold in a sequential first price auction in decreasing order of quality

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity abstract there is a general perception that the large trading volume in initial public offerings is mostly due to flippers that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them on average however flipping accounts for only 19 of trading volume and 15 of shares offered during the first two days of trading institutions do more flipping than retail customers and hot ipos are flipped much more than cold ipos institutions do not quickly flip cold ipos to take advantage of price support activities by the underwriter explicit penalty bids are rarely assessed against flippers

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types we prove that a variant of the second price auction for the sale of a single good through a bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes expected revenue of the seller is optimal when the type space is discrete moreover we show that this variant is related to the widely used generalized second price auction mechanism in keyword auctions for advertising thus providing a theoretical justification for a practical tool

risk reputation and ipo price support immediately following an initial public offering underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing offerings in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price using proprietary nasdaq data i study the price effects and determinants of price support some of the key findings are 1 stabilization is substantial inducing price rigidity at and below the offer price 2 i find no evidence that stocks with larger information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly 3 larger underwriters stabilize more perhaps to protect their reputations with investors and 4 investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other banks inconsistent with the view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors

effects of farm size education and off farm income on productive efficiency of dairy farmers in utah a stochasitc frontier approach this study is primarily concerned with investigating the technical allocative and scale inefficiency of owner operators of dairy farms in utah a stochastic production frontier has been applied to analyze these inefficiencies the results indicate that there is positive association between years of education and productivity of labor and capital productivity is also found to be negatively related to off farm income regarding the effects of farm size on efficiency it is found that large farms are the most efficient of all sizes considered separate estimates of technical allocative and scale inefficiencies indicate that large and medium sized farms are technically more efficient than small farms large farms on average are found to be performing much better than medium sized and small farms so far as allocative and scale inefficiency are concerned copyright 1989 by mit press

multi unit pay your bid auctions with variable awards abstract multi unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit in an independent private values pay your bid auction where bidders may win up to two units we show that first order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability this behavior is not found in multi unit uniform price auctions it also contrasts with asymmetric first price auctions of a single good whose first order conditions are superficially similar a uniform distribution example is analyzed numerically journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 c72

a point decision for partially identified auction models this article proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models such as haile and tamer 2003 using data on transaction prices from english auctions the article employs gilboa and schmeidler 1989 for inference that is robust with respect to the prior over unidentified parameters it is optimal to interpret the transaction price as the highest value and maximize the posterior mean of the seller s revenue the monte carlo study shows substantial gains relative to the revenues corresponding to a random point and the midpoint in the haile and tamer interval

differential payments within a bidder coalition and the shapley value bidder coalitions at english auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or knockout when coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting the nested knockout s characteristics are investigated within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the shapley value incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first and second price auctions abstract we analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values we show that the seller s optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion and more so in the first price auction the reserve price also decreases in the buyers risk aversion in the first price auction thus greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions especially that of the first price auction at the interim stage the first price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval as well as by the seller

a learning approach to auctions we analyze a repeated first price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round it is proved that if every player is using either a belief based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme then for sufficiently large time the players bids are in equilibrium in the one shot auction in which the types are commonly known

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

analysing the technical efficiency of the spanish football league first division with a random frontier model this article analyses technical efficiency of football clubs in the spanish football league division 1 primera liga from the seasons 1995 1996 to 2004 2005 with an unbalanced panel data the random frontier model is used allowing the identification of random variables in the cost frontier it is concluded that the price of capital investment the number of points won and attendance are heterogeneous variables therefore no common public policy aiming to improve efficiency can embrace all of the clubs so that policies by clusters are required

why do ipo underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back i argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering ipo i show that when there is weak demand it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position the issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price this is in spite of the fact that in equilibrium allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand

the expected stop out price in a discriminating auction abstract optimal bidding strategies and expected seller revenues in price discriminating auctions have been derived in previous studies we extend this research by characterizing the behavior of the expected stop out price for such auctions

perfect equilibria in budget constrained sequential auctions an experimental study this article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the nash equilibrium concept we find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices

optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers abstract we study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation both valuation and budget are private information we derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting we show an implementation via a modified all pay auction the highest bidder need not win the good outright or stated differently the auction has pooling despite the usual regularity conditions subsidizing low budget buyers cannot increase revenue from a technical standpoint we contribute to auction design with multidimensional private information by working directly with reduced form allocation rules

stabilization syndication and pricing of ipos we argue that in the after market trading of an ipo the underwriting syndicate by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price price stabilization compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for ipos this domi nates ex ante compensation by underpricing the reason is that stabilization exploits ex post information about investor demand whereas underpricing must be based on ex ante infor mation however liquidity and syndication costs constrain the use of stabilization which in equilibrium generates some underpricing as well we develop a model that formalizes this intuition and generates several empirical implications

asymmetry of information regulatory lags and optimal incentive contracts theory and evidence procurements the procurement process and the equilibrium bidding behavior is modelled in sections ii and iii and the effect of contract parameters and other structural variables on expected procurement costs are explicitly derived the existing models are enriched by incorporating a technology for cost reduction where the investment in cost reduction made by the contractor is unobservable to the utility in the presence of such informational asymmetry the optimal incentive parameter to be used is derived in terms of information available to the utility in section iv the effects of changing contractual parameters and other structural variables number of contractors bidding the riskiness of the production process etc on equilibrium bidding behavior and ex post cost reduction incentives are derived in section v we relate some of the implications of our model to a sample

on strategic quantity bidding in multiple unit auctions standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders quantity decisions using a simple equilibrium model of bidding the author analyzes bidders incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions the main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower valuing bidders enter the set of winners this prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions copyright 1997 by blackwell publishing ltd

incentive contracts and competitive bidding an increasing segment of economic activity is taking place in nonmarket situations in which economic agents act outside the traditional markets or create markets to deal with specific resource allocation problems one such problem involves the selection by a buyer of a contractor using a competitive bidding process competitive bidding is used extensively by the government for the selection of suppliers of goods and services and for the sale of resources such as offshore oil leases firms may use competitive bidding for the selection of certain suppliers of factor inputs and may attempt to sell certain products in markets in which competitive price quoting is the established market mechanism this paper is concerned with a bidding process in which a firm has an opportunity to bid on a project under the terms of an incentive contract incentive contracts

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

efficient allocation with continuous quantities abstract the inefficiency of allocation mechanisms in the presence of bilateral asymmetric information is reconsidered in an environment with continuous quantities the result of myerson and satterthwaite is proved in this environment under the condition that zero trade is efficient if the highest cost seller or the lowest value buyer appears in addition if this condition fails there may exist mechanisms implementing efficient allocations the problem of hidden endowments is considered where any agent may be either a buyer or seller depending on the realization of the privately observed information in this environment it is often possible to arrange efficient trades ex ante asymmetries rather than interim asymmetries tend to prevent efficient allocations

the empirical identification of heterogeneous technologies and technical change when different technologies are present in an industry we assume that a homogeneous technology will lead to misleading implications about technical change and inefficient policy recommendations in this article a latent class modelling approach and flexible estimation of the production structure is used to distinguish different technologies for a representative sample of eu dairy producers as an industry exhibiting significant structural changes and differences in production systems in the past decades the model uses a transformation function to recognize multiple outputs separate technological classes based on multiple characteristics a flexible generalized linear functional form a variety of inputs and random effects to capture firm heterogeneity and measures of first and second order elasticities to represent technical change and biases we find that if multiple production frontiers are embodied in the data different firms exhibit different output or input intensities and changes associated wi

an optimal auction for complements abstract this paper considers the optimal selling mechanism for complementary items when buyers are perfectly symmetric the optimal procedure is to bundle the items and run a standard auction in general however bundling the items is not necessarily desirable and the standard auctions do not maximize revenue moreover the optimal auction allocation may not be socially efficient since the auction must discriminate against bidders who have strong incentives to misrepresent their true preferences journal of economic literature classification number d44

investment bank reputation information production and financial intermediation we model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market either directly or using an investment bank investment banks who interact repeatedly with the equity market evaluate entrepreneurs projects and report to investors in return for a fee setting strict evaluation standards unobservable to investors is costly for investment banks inducing moral hazard investment banks credibility therefore depends on their equity marketing history investment banks evaluation standards their reputations underwriter compensation the market value of equity sold and entrepreneurs choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously

price stabilization in the market for new issues abstract this study examines price stabilization in new equity issues stabilizationtruncates the distribution of post issue prices at a floor price lowering the risk of adverse price moves and hence in a competitive dealer market reducing the bid ask spread using 1 523 nasdao traded firm commitment initial public offerings issued between 1982 and 1987 we find that spreads narrow when the market price is close to the offer price and stabilization is most likely moreover significant negative returns are documented after the hypothesized termination of stabilizing activities suggesting that stabilization and its cessation affect market prices

dairy farm efficiency measurement using stochastic frontiers and neoclassical duality this paper presents a stochastic efficiency decomposition model based on kopp and diewert s deterministic methodology the stochastic model is used to analyze technical economic and allocative efficiency for a sample of new england dairy farms the results suggest that mean economic efficiency for the farmers in the sample is about 70 and that on average there is little difference between technical 83 0 and allocative 84 6 efficiency analyses of the relationship between efficiency and four socioeconomic variables farm size education extension and experience reveal that despite some statistically significant associations efficiency levels are not markedly affected by these variables

who benefits from secondary market price stabilization of iops abstract initial public offerings that receive secondary market price support from their underwriters are characterized by severely attenuated selling by small quantity presumably retail traders and more aggressive selling by large quantity presumably institutional traders the increase in institutional trading is concentrated in the first day of trading while the attenuation of retail trading persists this pattern exists in spite of the likelihood that retail investors receive relatively large initial allocations of fully priced stabilized offers thus the evidence is consistent with institutional investors being the primary beneficiaries of price stabilization efforts and with the use of penalty bids to constrain retail selling activity

market deregulation trade liberalization and productive efficiency in bangladesh agriculture an empirical analysis the impact of trade liberalization and of market deregulation in general on the performance of agriculture remains contentious and empirical issue in the literature following the random coefficient frontier modelling framework this paper attempts to contribute to this debate by computing the farm specific productive efficiency indices in bangladesh agriculture before and after reform it also examines the impact of some farm specific and policy variables on productive efficiency the empirical results show that there are wide variations in productive efficiency across farms and regions and the average efficiency of all regions increased modestly by 8 percentage points from the pre reform to post reform period the efficiency differentials are largely explained by farm size infrastructure households off farm income and the reduction of government anti agricultural bias in relation to trade and domestic policies the implication of these results suggests the need for further policy reform to augment p

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

semiparametric estimation of first price auctions with risk averse bidders in view of the non identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders this paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for the risk aversion parameter s and the latent distribution of private values specifically we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identification under a conditional quantile restriction of the bidders private value distribution and a parameterization of the bidders utility function we develop a multistep semiparametric method and we show that our semiparametric estimator of the utility function parameter s converges at the optimal rate which is slower than the parametric one but independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables thereby avoiding the curse of dimensionality we then consider various extensions including a binding reserve price affiliation among private values and asymmetric bidders the method is illustrated on u s forest service timber sales and bidders risk neutrality is rejected

bidding in private value auctions with uncertain values abstract auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante laboratory auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18 and 27 of bids above the expected value of the item in private value first price and english auctions respectively risk seeking preferences as measured on an individual decision task cannot explain overbidding and the first price auction results suggest that risk aversion may not be a good explanation for bidding behavior observed with certain values several candidate explanations fail to explain overbidding rather it appears to stem from some bidders who are prone to overbidding relative to first price auctions the size and frequency of overbids are significantly larger in english auctions while more english auctions are won by overbidders differences between the formats appear to be driven by the dynamic nature of english auctions which is consistent with popular notions of auction fever

underwriter price support and the ipo underpricing puzzle abstract this paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings ipos investigation of the distribution of initial returns following ipos shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left negative tail moreover most ipos with zero one day returns subsequently fall in price suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial ipo returns even if offering prices are set at expected market value this paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial ipo returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing

semiparametric estimation of the optimal reserve price in first price auctions the optimal reserve price in the independent private value paradigm is generally expressed as a functional of the latent distribution of private signals which is by nature unobserved this feature has limited the implementation of the optimal reserve price in practice in this article we consider first price auctions within the general affiliated private values paradigm we show that the seller s expected profit can be written as a functional of the observed bid distribution we propose a semiparametric extremum estimator for estimating consistently the optimal reserve price from observed bids as an illustration we consider the outer continental shelf ocs wildcat auctions

buybacks with costly participation abstract posted price offers and first price auctions along with the multi unit discriminatory auction extension are two widely used mechanisms for allocating conservation contracts the choice between the two typically hinges on the trade off between the posted price s simplicity and the potential revenue gains of the auction in this paper we introduce a novel mechanism that attempts to bridge the gap between the performance of posted price offers and auctions a two price and lottery schedule combines the simplicity of the former with some of the flexibility of the latter using a model that incorporates agents cognitive and information costs of bidding we analyze how the ranking of allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness between the mechanisms varies as the wedge of participation costs increases when the number of bidders is endogenously determined by participation costs bid shading associated with a lack of competition in the auction compromises its cost effectiveness vis a vis the posted price and the lottery schedule we use data from three recent buybacks for fishing licenses conducted in maryland to calibrate our model and identify conditions under which the two price schedule outperforms the other mechanisms

public information ipo price formation and long run returns japanese evidence the price formation process of jasdaq ipos is more transparent than in the united states the transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the ipo literature why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information and why adjustments are related to initial returns the evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter s commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and or disclosing information offer prices reflect pre ipo market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket copyright c 2009 the american finance association

resolving uncertainty about the number of bidders in independent private value auctions an experimental analysis results from first price sealed bid auctions in which there is uncertainty regarding the number of bidders are reported consistent with recent theoretical findings concealing information regarding the number of bidders raises more revenue for the seller than revealing information individual bids show that 1 narrowly interpreted the nash equilibrium bidding theory underlying these theoretical predictions is rejected as less than 50 of all bids satisfy the strict inequality requirements of the theory but 2 a majority of the deviations from these inequality requirements favor the revenue raising predictions of the nash model and in a large number of cases involve marginal violations of the theory

premium auctions and risk preferences abstract in a premium auction the seller offers some payback called premium to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction this paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders risk preferences we analyze a two stage english premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders risk tolerance a net premium effect is key to this result

managing exchange rate crises evidence from the 1890s abstract this paper investigates the effectiveness of the monetary authority s borrowing policies in resolving exchange rate cises it shows why obtaining loans or lines of credit in foreign currency may avoid at least temporarily the devaluation of a fixed rate and discusses the problem of the optimal size of the loan and or the line of credit the analysis focuses on a particular episode of foreign exchange rate pressure during the troubled years between 1894 to 1896 the results suggest that the borrowing policy followed by the us treasury in those years was effective in avoiding the collapse of the united states gold standard and that the amount of the borrowing undertaken by the treasury might have been optimal

estimating technical efficiency of australian dairy farms using alternative frontier methodologies technical efficiency is estimated and examined for a cross section of australian dairy farms using various frontier methodologies bayesian and classical stochastic frontiers and data envelopment analysis the results indicate technical inefficiency is present in the sample data also identified are statistical differences between the point estimates of technical efficiency generated by the various methodologies however the rank of farm level technical efficiency is statistically invariant to the estimation technique employed finally when confidence credible intervals of technical efficiency are compared significant overlap is found for many of the farms intervals for all frontier methods employed the results indicate that the choice of estimation methodology may matter but the explanatory power of all frontier methods is significantly weaker when interval estimate of technical efficiency is examined

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

risk attitudes in first price auction experiments a bayesian analysis non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral this paper constructs an explicit bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results it finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents archetypical of this result is the nash equilibrium prediction for first price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral in this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results we find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion however when one allows for risk loving subjects as well observed behavior is inconsistent with nash predictions thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes in section i we consider a specific nash equilibrium ne bidding model due to cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1988 that clearly illustrates the risk sensitivity of the theoretical predictions in section ii we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by harrison 1986a this evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of constant relative risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section i in section iii we reconsider the evidence from the first price fp experiments reported in cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1983a 1983b i a specific bidding model cox roberson and smith 1982 hereafter crs present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i ui y y 1 received for publication august 31 1987 revision accepted for publication december 18 1989 university of south carolina i am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments although they are not responsible for my conclusions

optimal reserve prices in sealed bid auctions with reference effects abstract the reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed bid auctions the buyer s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller s optimal reserve price are derived for the first price and second price sealed bid auctions in both auction mechanisms the seller s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point we compare the seller s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions the results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second price auction compared to the first price auction further we extend the model to the gain seeking case and endogenize the reference point as the ex ante expected price of the item in equilibrium in contrast to the loss averse case the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second price auction compared to the first price auction if the buyers are gain seeking with an endogenous reference point similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

a general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments we consider the class of bayesian environments with independent types and utility functions which are both quasi linear in a private good and linear in a one dimensional private value type parameter we call these independent linear environments for these environments we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints we also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization together with the appropriate incentive taxes we illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision

assessing the impact of economic liberalization across countries a comparison of dairy industry efficiency in canada and the usa this paper examines and compares the technical efficiency measures of ontario and new york dairy producers for the period 1992 to 1998 a nonparametric stochastic frontier model is introduced to estimate technical efficiency the backfitting algorithm of breiman and friedman is used to estimate the frontier empirical results indicate that during the period of study new york dairy farmers produced milk more efficiently than ontario dairy producers but the magnitude of the difference was small the estimated mean technical efficiency for the former group is 0 602 as compared to 0 532 for the latter the results also indicated that over time dairy farms in both regions improved their level of technical efficiency furthermore no correlation was found between farm size and estimated technical efficiency

estimating total factor productivity growth in singapore at sectoral level using data envelopment analysis trends in total factor productivity growth tfpg are examined in the ten major sectors of singapore data are drawn from the yearbook of statistics singapore various issues and economic survey of singapore series ranging from the year 1985 to 2000 due to the heterogeneous characteristic of each sector and non availability of reliable input price data this study uses a non parametric frontier methodology known as data envelopment analysis dea to obtain the malmquist productivity index at the sectoral level the results can help singapore identify the best practice sector and laggards in three aspects efficiency change technical change and tfpg which is the qualitative productivity improvements needed for long term economic growth the three sets of productivity estimates are adjusted for effects of inflation and business cycles so that they are more reliable for policy implications this exercise will provide a platform for more detailed study on the determinants of tfp growth in different s