efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

a spatial model of international conflict 1 he model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function international coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis the two nation model is analyzed in detail and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved the two main conclusions of the two nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise because scientific understanding arises from theories the explication of theories is essential for the development of scientific understanding to understand international conflictthat is the resolution of disputes between nations by coercion or the threat of coercion a theory that can explain such conflict is needed this paper will present a model drawn from rational choice theory specifically game theory that explains national actions in conflicts as strategic choices made in order to gain preferred resolutions of the international issues in dispute compared to existing game theory models of international conflict the model presented here provides an explicit description of how each nation s evaluation of the issues in dispute affects its desire to pursue compromise or conflict a more detailed sequence of escalation allowing for the detailed study of escalation strategies and a framework that can explain the timing and extent of third party interventions into ongoing crises

uncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining game free analysis of international conflict we study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict among our results we show that under some weak conditions there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war we also show that while uncertainty about the other side s cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations uncertainty about the other side s strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes along the way we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well known relationship between uncertainty the incentive to misrepresent and costly war we find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important

national animosity and cross border alliances we extend the cross border strategic alliance knowledge base by introducing dyad specific antagonism animosity between nation pairs and hold that the formation and the type of firm level cross border alliances are nontrivially impacted by conflicting relations and animosity between their home nations we examine the formation of alliances between firms among nation dyads with and without a history of conflicts the frequency and magnitude of conflicts increase the perception of likelihood of opportunism and dyad specific risks materially affect the context in which firms make alliance decisions as animosity between two nations increases the number and the probability of forming alliances within the dyad the nations form decreases conditional on the expected number of alliances increased antagonistic actions of nations outside the dyad and dissimilarity in the historical conflicts that each nation has engaged in outside the dyad i increase the number of equity alliances and ii decrease the number of nonequity alliances as a proportion of total alliances we find positive main effects of learning to contract through prior experience only for equity vs nonequity alliances the reputation effects of antagonism based on relationships with nations outside of the dyad negatively moderate the positive learning effects of prior equity alliance experience abstract from author

electricity shortages and firm productivity evidence from china s industrial firms unreliable inputs to production particularly those that are difficult to store can significantly limit firms productivity leading them to react in a number of ways this paper uses a panel of 23 000 energy intensive chinese firms from 1999 to 2004 to examine how firms responded to severe power shortages in the early 2000s our results suggest that in response to electricity scarcity chinese firms re optimize among inputs to production by substituting materials for energy both electric and non electric sources a shift from make to buy of intermediate inputs to production while outsourcing can be costly chinese firms were able to avoid substantial productivity losses by doing so as a result of the increase in electricity scarcity from 1999 onward we find that unit production costs increased by eight percent

an efficiency explanation for why firms second source firms facing research costs and demand uncertainty may engage in second sourcing in which potential suppliers agree to pool production facilities i show how sellers and buyers both can benefit from the practice second sourcing allows firms to meet a wider range of possible rates of demand and often to supply a given rate of demand at a lower total cost than under non cooperation buyers benefit through a reduced probability of stock outs and frequently a lower purchase price semiconductor industry data are found to be consistent with the paper s predictions i introduction the practice of second sourcing is frequently observed among firms facing technological and demand uncertainty second sourcing encompasses agreements between buyers and sellers requiring that a firm license its proprietary technology to rivals as well as agreements among potential suppliers to pool production facilities the first type of agreement is often explained as guaranteeing buyers a secure supply at a fair price in this type of second sourcing agreement control over production and pricing decisions resides with each supplier the second arrangement where the owner of the production technology controls production and pricing has largely been overlooked by the literature despite its adoption by firms in a wide range of technologically dynamic industries including semiconductors robotics and biotechnology a primary motivation for this second form of secondsourcing i will argue is to achieve a more efficient matching between the industry s productive capacity and market demand this paper indicates how second sourcing of this form may benefit both purchasers and suppliers and identifies the conditions making second sourcing profitable for firms the existing literature has offered two explanations for second sourcing according to the first explanation second sourcing is sought by prospective buyers purchasers may require that a developer license alternative suppliers to force revelation of private cost information in the contract bidding process or to discipline the eventual supplier s pricing behavior examples of this line of reasoning are found in riordan and sappington 1989 anton and yao 1987 demski sappington and spiller 1987 and rob 1986 if this motivation is correct however it is sufficient for firms to compete at the contract bidding stage demsetz 1968 in contrast we often observe competition at the production stage with active second sourcing and a large number of licensed alternative suppliers in a single industry see section v this explanation s exclusive focus on the gains to buyers from second sourcing also is inconsistent with swann s 1987 observation that many manufacturers have actually sought second sources the literature s alternative explanation suggests that second sourcing may be preferred by producers farrell and gallini 1988 and shepard 1987 show how a monopoly supplier can use second sourcing as a commitment not to raise price or lower product quality in the future either of which would debase the value of sunk investments made by prospective purchasers if credible this commitment may stimulate industry demand sufficiently to yield higher profits for the former monopolist despite increased product market competition an important shortcoming of this second explanation is its apparent incongruity with the existence of five six or more second sourced suppliers in a single industry shepard 1987 for example shows that a single licensed alternate supplier will provide the monopolist with its desired credible commitment to future price and quality this paper suggests an alternative explanation that is consistent with observed trends in second sourcing i depart from the existing literature s focus upon principal agent problems to analyze secondsourcing in a market flamework the paper indicates why sellers may secondsource voluntarily explains why multiple second sources will be preferred and shows how both sides in the agreement may benefit

the armed peace a punctuated equilibrium theory of war according to a leading rationalist explanation war can break out when a large rapid shift of power renders unbelievable a rising state s promise to compensate its declin ing opponent causing the latter to attack preventively this mechanism does not provide a complete and coherent explanation of war because it does not specify how inefficient fighting resolves this commitment problem we present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settle ment arise throughout the very desirability of peace creates a commitment problem that undermines its likelihood because players have incentives to settle as soon as possible they cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent launches a surprise at tack this decreases the expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail fighting s sheer destruction improves the credibility of these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the war equilibrium fighting may involve escalating costs that exceed the value of the stakes by the time peace is negotiated and that leave both players worse off than when the war began

nuclear brinkmanship with two sided incomplete information a brinkmanship crisis with two sided incomplete information is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary s resolve the sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve misperception and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability the description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis a state may be less not more likely to prevail the greater its resolve and a states expected payoff may be less not more the greater its resolve moreover reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis surprisingly increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely finally crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

does household electrification supercharge economic development author s lee kenneth miguel edward wolfram catherine abstract in recent years electrification has re emerged as a key priority in low income countries with a particular focus on electrifying households yet the microeconomic literature examining the impacts of electrifying households on economic development has produced a set of conflicting results does household electrification lead to measurable gains in living standards or not focusing on grid electrification we discuss how the divergent conclusions across the literature can be explained by differences in methods interventions potential for spillovers and populations we then use experimental data from lee miguel and wolfram 2019 a field experiment that connected randomly selected households to the grid in rural kenya to show that impacts can vary even across individuals in neighboring villages specifically we show that households that were willing to pay more for a grid electrification may gain more from electrification compared to households that would only connect for free we conclude that access to household electrification alone is not enough to drive meaningful gains in development outcomes instead future initiatives may work better if paired with complementary inputs that allow people to do more with power

eliciting discount functions when baseline consumption changes over time abstract many empirical studies on intertemporal choice report preference reversals in the sense that a preference between a small reward to be received soon and a larger reward to be received later reverses as both rewards are equally delayed such preference reversals are commonly interpreted as contradicting constant discounting this interpretation is correct only if baseline consumption to which the outcomes are added remains constant over time the difficulty with measuring discounting when baseline consumption changes over time is that delaying an outcome has two effects 1 due to the change in baseline consumption it changes the utility from receiving the outcome and 2 it changes the factor by which this utility is discounted in this paper we propose a way to disentangle the two effects which allows us to draw conclusions about discounting even when baseline consumption changes over time

does electricity reliability matter evidence from rural viet nam abstract using a three round panel dataset of more than 3 000 households the paper estimates the impacts of electricity reliability improvement on the welfare and economic decisions of rural vietnamese households the number of days without power outages in communes per annum is used to proxy for electricity reliability we employ a fixed effect regression with an instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity issue led by the simultaneous causal relationship between the reliability of electricity and household outcomes along with the unobservable variables we use the similar electricity quality variable but measured in other communes within the same province as an instrumental variable results from this model show that an improvement in electricity reliability plays an important role in enhancing incomes durable consumption access to credit and land investment decisions of rural households

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

non hyperbolic time inconsistency the commonly used hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic discount functions have been developed to accommodate decreasing impatience which is the prevailing empirical finding in intertemporal choice in particular for aggregate behavior however these discount functions do not have the flexibility to accommodate increasing impatience or strongly decreasing impatience this lack of flexibility is particularly disconcerting for fitting data at the individual level where various patterns of increasing impatience and strongly decreasing impatience will occur for a significant fraction of subjects this paper presents discount functions with constant absolute cadi or constant relative crdi decreasing impatience that can accommodate any degree of decreasing or increasing impatience in particular they are sufficiently flexible for analyses at the individual level the cadi and crdi discount functions are the analogs of the well known cara and crra utility functions for decision under risk

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

uncertainty shifting power and appeasement great britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state if those aims are limited then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state s demands rather than go to war to oppose them if however the rising state s demands are unlimited then the declining state prefers fighting and given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war this situation creates a trade off the earlier a state stands firm the stronger it will be if war ensues but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war in equilibrium the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions

are small firms willing to pay for improved power supply evidence from a contingent valuation study in india abstract this paper provides new estimates on indian small scale manufacturing firms willingness to pay wtp for reliable power supply almost half of indian manufacturing lies in the small scale sector and its productivity is severely affected by power outages however there is a surprising paucity of research on small firms wtp for avoiding outages we conduct a double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation experiment with a random sample of 260 small scale firms in the region around hyderabad we find that on average firms are willing to pay approximately 20 more for uninterrupted power supply the wtp estimates and the explanatory factors for the firms decisions were tested for robustness using both probit and bivariate probit models in addition a two step heckman correction was used to control for selection bias induced by protest responses our results are vital to understand behavior of small firms which are crucial to india s economic growth further the government s continued emphasis on power sector reforms makes the paper even more important as it provides realistic estimates for designing tariffs while keeping in mind the preferences of the small scale industry

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

a firm level analysis of outage loss differentials and self generation evidence from african business enterprises abstract this study examines the outage loss differential between firms that engage in backup generation and those that do not unmitigated outage losses were estimated to be us 2 01 23 92 per kwh for firms engaging in self generation and range from us 1 54 to 32 46 per kwh for firms without self generation we also find that firms engaging in self generation would have suffered additional 1 183 outage losses had they not invested in self generation on the other hand firms without self generation would have reduced their outage losses by around 6 46 if they had engaged in self generation further analyses however reveal that although engagement in self generation reduced outage losses a firm engaging in self generation may still suffer a greater unmitigated outage loss relative to a firm without a backup generator the relative outage losses depend on the relative vulnerability of the operations of the two sets of firms to power interruption and the relative generating capacity of a self generating firm to its own required electricity loads policy reforms that allow firms whose operations are highly vulnerable to outages to make a binding contract with utilities in order to get preferential supply are recommended

when do power shifts lead to war we present and test a choice theoretic model of war decisions during shifts in power the model assumes a rising state that overtakes a declining state in capabilities in equilibrium the declining state yields at a critical point in the transition war can occur only before that critical time power shifts are more likely to lead to war as the challenger becomes more risk acceptant the declining state more risk averse the expected costs of war decrease the rising state s dissatisfaction with the status quo increases and during periods of equality between the two sides the rate of growth of the rising state s capabilities and the transition point do not affect the probability of war all these hypotheses are supported by an empirical analysis of all major power dyads since 1815 we also find that expected support from allies must be included in the calculation of a nation s capabilities the implications of the model for theories of hegemonic decline and war are discussed

climate change adaptation a study of fuel choice and consumption in the us energy sector abstract using cross sectional data this paper estimates a national energy model of fuel choice by both households and firms consumers in warmer locations rely relatively more heavily on electricity rather than natural gas oil and other fuels they also use more energy climate change will likely increase electricity consumption on cooling but reduce the use of other fuels for heating on net american energy expenditures will likely increase resulting in welfare damages that increase as temperatures rise for example if the us warms by 5 c by 2100 we predict annual welfare losses of 57 billion

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world abstract with the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community this paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries in a situation of asymmetric information in which the policy maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not we also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy maker additionally the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

guns butter and anarchy a state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power i formalize this guns versus butter problem in a simple infinite horizon model in which two states must continually decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack the other state the analysis establishes sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which neither state attacks shows that there is a strictly pareto dominant pair of peaceful equilibrium payoffs characterizes the unique peaceful markov perfect equilibrium that yields them and describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocations more broadly the analysis also suggests that the notion of anarchy has little if any substantive significance distinctively related to international politics and that the problem of absolute and relative gains is superfluous

coping with poor public capital abstract despite recent successes in stabilization and structural reforms in many developing countries the private investment response to date has been mixed even among the strongest reformers this disappointing result can be partly explained by the continued poor provision of public capital and services we test this hypothesis using unique firm level data on investment and provision of public infrastructure services the results suggest that poor complementary public capital significantly reduces private investment however firms can substitute for deficient public services by investing in complementary capital themselves but this comes at a cost less productive capital will be installed

the economics of early warfare over land abstract we investigate the incidence of early warfare among foragers and farmers in prehistory our focus is specifically on conflict over land food is produced using inputs of labor and land and the probability of victory in a conflict depends on relative group sizes the group sizes are determined by individual migration and malthusian population dynamics both factors result in larger populations at better sites which deters attack there are two necessary conditions for warfare high enough individual mobility costs and large enough shocks to the relative productivities of the sites together these conditions are sufficient in particular technological or environmental shocks that alter the productivities of sites can trigger warfare but only if individual agents do not change sites in response these results are consistent with evidence from archaeology and anthropology

power transitions and great power war from westphalia to waterloo this study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era it improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain unlike the original power transition theory the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era this study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period the data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war that is when the challenging great power with its allies support catches up with the dominant power great power war is most likely

absolute and relative gains in international relations theory the problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism the former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation the latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states preferences using a simple game theoretic model this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states behavior the feasibility of cooperation and especially the states concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model

monopolizing violence and consolidating power governments in weak states often face an armed opposition and have to decide whether to try to accommodate and contain that adversary or to try to consolidate power and monopolize violence by disarming it when and why do governments choose to consolidate power and monopolize violence how fast do they try to consolidate power when does this lead to costly fighting rather than to efforts to eliminate the opposition by buying it off we study an infinite horizon model in which the government in each period decides how much to offer the opposition and the rate at which it tries to consolidate its power the opposition can accept the offer and thereby acquiesce to the government s efforts to consolidate or it can fight in an attempt to disrupt those efforts in equilibrium the government always tries to monopolize violence when it has coercive power against the opposition where roughly coercive power is the ability to weaken the opposition by lowering its payoff to fighting whether the government consolidates peacefully or through costly fighting depends on the size of any contingent spoils which are benefits that begin to accrue from an increase in economic activity resulting from the monopolization of violence and the higher level of security that comes with it when contingent spoils are small the government buys the opposition off and eliminates it as fast as is peacefully possible when contingent spoils are large the government tries to monopolize violence by defeating the opposition militarily jel codes d02 d74 h1 copyright 2013 oxford university press

bargaining in the shadow of war when is a peaceful resolution most likely this article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war should it take place i show that the aggressor s demand curve can be below the defender s offer curve that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war a simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

power alliance and the escalation of international conflict 1815 1965 a considerable amount of the internationalpolitics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations there are however divergent views of this linkage one view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects

military capabilities and escalation a correction to bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict i show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions and i offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games

estimation of urban residential electricity demand in china using household survey data abstract this paper uses annual urban household survey data of sichuan province from 2007 to 2009 to estimate the income and price elasticities of residential electricity demand along with the effects of lifestyle related variables the empirical results show that in the urban area of sichuan province the residential electricity demand is price and income inelastic with price and income elasticities ranging from 0 35 to 0 50 and from 0 14 to 0 33 respectively such lifestyle related variables as demographic variables dwelling size and holdings of home appliances are also important determinants of residential electricity demand especially the latter these results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests the research findings imply that urban residential electricity demand continues to increase with the growth of income the empirical results have important policy implications for the multistep electricity price which been adopted in some cities and is expected to be promoted nationwide through the installation of energy efficient home appliances

introduction unipolarity state behavior and systemic consequences the united states emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global unipolar state this extraordinary imbalance has triggered global debate governments and peoples around the world are struggling to understand to how an american centered unipolar system operates and to respond to it what is the character of domination in a unipolar distribution to what extent can a unipolar state translate its formidable capabilities into meaningful influence will a unipolar world be built around rules and institutions or be based more on the unilateral exercise of unipolar power scholars too are asking these basic questions about unipolarity and international relations theory the individual contributions develop hypotheses and explore the impact of unipolarity on the behavior of the dominant state on the reactions of other states and on the properties of the international system collectively they find that unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics international relations under conditions of unipolarity force a rethinking of conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power the meaning of alliance partnerships the logic of international economic cooperation the relationship between power and legitimacy and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states

stability in anarchic international systems can stability emerge solely from the competition and self interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of anarchy or does stability depend on restraints from the complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and its associated institutions we suppose some infinitely divisible resource that all nation states are endowed with and maximize and that enables them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict we offer a noncooperative extensive form model of international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions balance of power and collective security ensure the sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems we conclude that there exists at least one world albeit an abstract one in which anarchy yields stability

hyperbolic discounting and the standard model eliciting discount functions abstract experiments on static intertemporal choice find evidence of particularly extreme impatience toward immediate rewards while this is often taken as support for hyperbolic discounting it could also arise because the most likely participants in experiments may be those with the most immediate need for money we conduct a calibration exercise and find that the extreme impatience observed in experiments can be accommodated by a standard exponential discounting model with no discounting and expectation of a small increase in the base consumption level the calibration uses existing estimates of curvature of utility

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

decreasing impatience a criterion for non stationary time preference and hyperbolic discounting despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi hyperbolic functional forms the paper revives an earlier proposal in prelec 1989 that the key property is prattarrow convexity of the log of the discount function which corresponds to decreasing impatience di at the level of preferences di provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater di is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two stage decision problems as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments or as unintended reversals of preference by naive agents

persistent fighting and shifting power three striking features about both interstate and civil war are 1 there are often periods of persistent fighting 2 fighting commonly ends in negotiated settlements as well as in militarily decisive outcomes and 3 fighting sometimes recurs this article links these features to shifts in the distribution of power and to the fact that one of the functions of fighting is to forestall adverse shifts the analysis centers on a simple model of state consolidation the equilibrium displays these features fighting occurs when the distribution of power is shifting rapidly the factions avoid fighting and cut deals when the distribution of power shifts slowly or is stable fighting resumes if the distribution of power again begins to shift rapidly the analysis also shows that state consolidation can occur without fighting if the process is sufficiently slow fighting now rather than later can also reduce the total cost of fighting

reason and war a new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system treats thirdparty choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies more fully represents the expected costs of conflict and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size by assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders expectations of gain we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war intervention violence and peace the revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in europe between 1816 and 1970 in this essay

a model of spoils politics accounts of state failure in the developing world frequently highlight a logic of spoils politics in which a government and an opposing faction vie for control of the state and the accompanying spoils attempts to buy the opposition off play a key role in this logic and an informational problem often complicates these efforts because of limited transparancy the government generally has a better idea about the actual size of the spoils than the opposition does we formalize this aspect of spoils politics as a signaling game in which the government has private information about the size of the spoils and tries to co opt the opposition by offering a share of the spoils the opposition can accept the offer or reject it by fighting consistent with the strong empirical finding that the probability of civil war is higher when income is low the probability of breakdown increases as the size of the spoils decreases we also study the effects of uncertainty the opposition s military strength the cost of fighting and power sharing agreements on the probability of fighting

the power industry reform in china 2015 policies evaluations and solutions abstract more than a decade ago in china s electric power industry the investment for generation side and power grids was inadequate and the gap between power supply and demand kept enlarging in order to relief the problems above power industry reform has been carried out in 2002 under the guidance of no 5 document by the central government the reform in 2002 has made a series of achievements including the enhancement of operation efficiency of power industry and the fulfillment of power demand all over the country during the past decade as the rapid development of the society and economy the external environment of china s power industry has changed greatly however the pricing and planning mechanism of china s power industry still operates following the requirements of no 5 document this has led to a number of problems including twisted pricing mechanism irrational power system planning inefficient utilization of renewable energy and so on these problems have not only hindered the development of power industry in china for quite a long time but also brought negative influence on the business operation of upstream and downstream industries therefore chinese government has issued no 9 document in 2015 and launched a new round of power industry reform policies were carried out to form new pricing mechanism new policies about renewable energy generation and power system planning process to solve the problems mentioned above this paper has reviewed the history of reform in 2002 and summarized the existing problems of china s power industry besides the main policies of no 9 document were deeply analyzed and their significance as well as backwards were illustrated at last solutions were proposed accordingly and these solutions have considerable theoretical and practical significance to china s electric power industry reform in the future

conflict war and redistribution this article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war in the first period both countries can either consume or build arms whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the use of force to reallocate resources if both countries are fully informed then there will be no war but rather a voluntary redistribution of resources in a situation of asymmetric information however in which one country is fully informed and the other is not a war can occur if the uninformed country uses a separating equilibrium strategy precommitting itself to a positive probability of war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

estimating time preferences from convex budgets experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what seems reasonable for economic decision making such high rates are often attributed to present biased discounting a well known bias of standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion to identify concavity researchers find reasonable discounting but at the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature we present a new methodology for identifying time preferences both discounting and curvature from simple allocation decisions we find reasonable levels of both discounting and curvature and surprisingly dynamically consistent time preferences jel c91 d12 d81 understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists marketers and policy makers consumers decide how much to invest in savings education real estate and life insurance how much to diet exercise and smoke whether to marry when to have children and what to leave in their wills while there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data 1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory environments 2 among the many laboratory techniques employed recent studies have favored multiple price lists mpl with monetary payments 3 with mpls individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future the interest rate increases monotonically in a price list such that the point where an individual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval

economic consequence analysis of electric power infrastructure disruptions general equilibrium approaches abstract we develop a stylized two sector analytical general equilibrium model that elucidates mechanisms of adjustment to widespread long duration electric power disruptions algebraic solutions illustrate the relative importance of resilience through producer and consumer input substitutability and mitigation investment in backup infrastructure capacity in moderating the economy wide costs of outages simulations of the impacts of a two week power outage on california s bay area economy using both the analytical model and a computational general equilibrium model yield welfare losses that are substantially smaller than stated preference estimates of willingness to pay results highlight the role of resilience in moderating consequences of energy supply shocks

power and interdependence revisited ten years ago we published power and interdependence 1 the passage of a decade makes this an appropriate time to reread and reevaluate that book and to take stock of the research program to which it contributed in doing this we hope to deepen and enrich scholarly understanding of the politics of interdependence and to stimulate reflection on directions for the field of international relations over the next decade 2 such a reappraisal seems particularly opportune given the changes in world politics and especially in american policy that have marked the intervening years stanley j michalak commented in 1979 that the authors may cringe from the analogy but power and interdependence may well become the politics among nations of the 1970s 3 but from the perspective of the late 1980s the world may look different while the 1970s were seen as the decade of interdependence many observers regard the use of force and concern for security as characteristic of the 1980s indeed the view is widespread in some circles that the 1980s resemble the 1950s more than the 1970s and that hans j morgenthau s work is more relevant to contemporary issues of world politics than power and interdependence

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

electricity demand elasticities and temperature evidence from panel smooth transition regression with instrumental variable approach abstract this study applies a non linear model i e the recently developed panel smooth transition regression pstr model and takes into account the potential endogeneity biases to investigate the demand function of electricity for 24 oecd countries from the period 1978 2004 our empirical results demonstrate that there is a strongly non linear link among electricity consumption real income electricity price and temperature a result that is new to the literature as real income rises electricity consumption rapidly increases first and after the level of real income exceeds approximately us 2500 its increasing rate turns slow down an increase in electricity price has a negative or no influence on electricity consumption evidence of a u shaped relationship between electricity consumption and temperature is supported and the threshold value of temperature is approximately 53 f which is endogenously determined furthermore the estimated elasticities of time dynamic indicate that electricity demand is income inelastic price inelastic and temperature inelastic as time goes on the absolute elasticities of electricity demand gradually decrease with respect to real gdp and electricity price whereas they gradually increase with respect to temperature suggesting that the impact of temperature on electricity demand is becoming more important in recent years

politics at the water s edge parties voters and the use of force abroad this article examines the effects of party politics and presidential election cycles on u s recourse to force abroad i analyze a game theoretic model to generate predictions about these effects in the unique time consistent equilibrium outcome of the one shot game policy varies across political parties in a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated game the use of force is invariant to the partisan composition of government in neither case does policy respond to the electoral cycle an empirical analysis supports the predictions of the repeated game between 1870 and 1992 u s recourse to force abroad responds neither to partisan politics nor to the domestic political calendar it responds only to changes in u s power status and to the advent of general wars

risk and preference reversals in intertemporal choice abstract this paper argues that observations of non stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual s discount function as we show the observed preference reversals in intertemporal choice are consistent with constant discounting and can alternatively be explained by decreasing absolute risk aversion together with the individual s risk perception this risk may concern the size of the actual outcome or the endowment consumption stream to which the outcome is added both types of uncertainty naturally appear in the context of intertemporal choice we show how relative degrees of changes in risk over time can determine choices