on the use of econometric models for policy simulation in marketing abstract in this article the author discusses the properties of useful econometric models for marketing phenomena with particular attention on models for policy simulations the author addresses model diagnostics parameter stability exogeneity and the lucas critique he also presents the results of a search through the 1998 2003 issues of the journal of marketing research finally the author offers practical guidelines

partisanship tax policy and corporate profit shifting in a globalized world economy political science scholarship has found mixed evidence on the impact of partisanship on the taxation of firms in this article i show that although left leaning governments set tax rates at higher

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

the effects of environmental fiscal reform in germany a simulation study this paper presents the first comprehensive model based impact analysis of the german environmental fiscal reform addressing the effects on co2 emissions economic growth employment and personal income distribution both an econometric input output model and a dynamic computable general equilibrium model are applied in order to enhance the credibility of our results the macroeconomic results are linked with a micro simulation model of the household sector so that detailed household data can be used to determine the effect of the environmental fiscal reform on personal income distribution we find a small double dividend in that energy consumption and co2 emissions decrease while employment rises the impact on economic growth is found to be minimal the fear that the environmental fiscal reform might interfere with the goals of social and income distribution policy is found to be largely unjustified

individual option prices for climate change mitigation abstract willingness to pay for climate change mitigation depends on people s perceptions about just how bad things will get if nothing is done individual subjective distributions for future climate conditions are combined with stated choices over alternative climate policies to estimate individual option prices the appropriate ex ante welfare measure in the face of uncertainty for climate change mitigation we find statistically significant sensitivity of estimated option prices to both expected future conditions and uncertainty about future conditions

the institutional roots of american trade policy politics coalitions and international trade the 1934 reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa changed the structure of the making of u s trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs the authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the rtaa was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations the expansion of exports under the rtaa enhanced political support for increasingly lower u s tariffs evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

the political economy of declining industries senescent industry collapse revisited many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection once it is instituted to persist over time this paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment with endogenous protection the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs the more an industry lobbies the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future when the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust however the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection such as that predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 american economic review 76 516 523 in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection finally the paper examines the well documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process

modeling interdependent consumer preferences abstract a consumer s preference for an offering can be influenced by the preferences of others in many ways ranging from social identification and inclusion to the benefits of network externalities in this article the authors introduce a bayesian spatial autoregressive discrete choice model to study the preference interdependence among individual consumers the autoregressive specification can reflect patterns of heterogeneity in which influence propagates within and across networks these patterns cannot be modeled with standard random effect specifications and can be difficult to capture with covariates in a linear model the authors illustrate their model of interdependent preferences with data on automobile purchases and show that preferences for japanese made cars are related to geographically and demographically defined networks

environmental and economic effects of post kyoto carbon regimes results of simulations with the global model ginfors abstract using the extensive and disaggregated global ginfors model consequences of different possible post kyoto regimes on the german and european economy and other major economies in the medium run until 2020 are depicted the approach is very extensive and detailed in comparison to already existing analyses this holds for the number of explicitly modelled countries 50 and 2 regions and 41 economic sectors input output tables the bilateral trade flows the detailed coverage of behavioural parameters the coverage of energy balances and co 2 emissions as well as for the number and precise economic political design of simulation runs global emissions will double until 2030 compared to 1990 levels without the existence of a far reaching climate regime after 2012 a unilateral commitment of the eu would only be a drop in the bucket which solely strengthens the credibility of the eu in international negotiations a stabilisation of global emissions in 2020 compared to 2010 which is consistent with the 2 target of the eu can only be achieved if all developed and at least the large emerging economies participate and if all possible existing market ready reduction technologies are used

supplying trade reform political institutions and liberalization in middle income presidential democracies correcting the relative lack of attention to the supply side of trade policy this article addresses how political institutions channel societal demands for protection i hypothesize that strong presidents with significant legislative powers and strong party leaders empowered through electoral rules that rein in the personal vote can help overcome protectionist biases these arguments compare with two institutional alternatives first that protectionism should decrease as electoral district size grows because elections become more proportional and second that the collective action problems in fragmented party systems thwart trade reform i evaluate these hypotheses empirically using pooled time series cross sectional data involving 18 developing countries from 1971 to 1997 i find that delegation to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization and some evidence suggests that the effective number of parties and the size of electoral districts may also influence levels of protectionism

the partisan paradox and the u s tariff 1877 1934 whereas historical accounts of u s tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects a formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects subsequent time series analysis shows that even after controlling for interest group demands partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff moreover during the period under study the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others thus political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence u s foreign economic policy

using multimarket data to predict brand performance in markets for which no or poor data exist abstract the authors show how multimarket data can be used to make predictions about brand performance in markets for which no or poor data exist to obtain these predictions the authors propose a model for market similarity that incorporates the structure of the u s retailing industry and the geographic location of markets the model makes use of the idea that if two markets have the same retailers or are located close to each other then branded goods in these markets should have similar sales performance other factors being held constant in holdout samples the proposed spatial prediction method improves greatly on naive predictors such as global market averages nearest neighbor predictors or local averages in addition the authors show that the spatial model gives more plausible estimates of price elasticities it does so for two reasons first the spatial model helps solve an omitted variables problem by allowing for unobserved factors with a cross market structure an example of such unobse

the effect of the german and british environmental taxation reforms a simple assessment abstract this article implements a simple econometric approach to assess the effect of the environmental tax reforms introduced in germany and the uk despite the very simple econometric approach adopted in this paper in the case of the energy demand our results do not differ markedly from those obtained from complicated multi sectoral econometric models in the case of the labour demand our results differ from the estimates obtained from econometric models where the employment level is not directly influenced by the energy price on the other hand our results are more similar to those obtained from models where the level of employment is directly influenced by the energy price confirming the findings of bosquet 2000 environmental tax reform does it work a survey of the empirical evidence ecological economics 34 19 32 and oecd 2004 environment and employment an assessment working party on national environmental policy oecd paris we conclude that environmental tax reforms can deliver substantial reductions in energy consumption while having small effects on the level of employment effect which can be positive depending on the size of the reduction in the labour costs and the value of cross price elasticities

testing the endogeneity of tariff policy in the u s abstract endogenous tariff theory suggests tariffs are created in response to self interested political pressure using a varma model covering the period 1890 1970 in the u s we show that macroeconomic variables which proxy political pressure granger cause the tariff

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

modeling dynamic heterogeneity using gaussian processes marketing research relies on individual level estimates to understand the rich heterogeneity of consumers firms and products while much of the literature focuses on capturing static cross sectio

the political economy of nontariff barriers a cross national analysis nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge more attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross national studies of trade policy

misconceptions and political outcomes a large literature shows that strategic interactions among actors with conflicting objectives can cause the political process to produce outcomes that lower welfare this paper investigates an alternative explanation of such outcomes if individuals errors in assessing the likely effects of proposed policies are correlated democratic decisionmaking can produce welfare reducing outcomes even in the absence of conflicting objectives under plausible assumptions choosing candidates from among the best informed individuals does not remedy the problems created by such errors but subsidising information and exposing representatives to information after their election do concentration of power has ambiguous effects

firms governments and wto adjudication japan s selection of wto disputes what explains the selection of cases for wto adjudication this article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the wto adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions it explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment while wto adjudication is seen as costly and slow a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination firms in static industries will invest in wto dispute settlement to achieve these benefits but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication this argument accounts for why there are fewer wto cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures since japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential wto disputes it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth interviews with japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument the authors conclude that the passive attitude toward wto adjudication by japan s largest export industry electronics and the sensitivity of japan s diplomatic relations with china have constrained the cases that japan files these findings suggest that the effectiveness of the wto for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members

market roll out and retailer adoption for new brands this paper proposes a descriptive model of the spatial and temporal evolution of retail distribution for new packaged goods the distribution model postulates separate processes for local market entry by manufacturers and adoption by retailers given entry of special interest is whether retail adoption occurs along a competitive network with retailers as nodes and overlapping trade areas of these retailers as links the model is calibrated on data covering the introduction of two very successful new brands in the frozen pizza category for these brands manufacturers sequentially enter markets based on spatial proximity to markets already entered spatial evolution and on whether chains in these markets adopted previously elsewhere market selection a retail chain adopts new brands based on the adoption timing of competing chains within its trade territory competitive contagion and on the fraction of its trade area in which the new brand is available trade area coverage the effects of market selection and of trade area coverage create dependencies between market entry and retail adoption because of these dependencies the attraction of a particular market as a lead market depends on its location in the geographic structure of the u s retail trade

economic interests and regional trading arrangements the case of nafta this article examines lobbying in the united states on the north american free trade agreement nafta i argue that economies of scale and production sharing across borders create incentives for firms to seek regional trade liberalization statistical analysis demonstrates that sectors with these characteristics were more likely to lobby for free trade in north america these sectors were also exposed to free trade more rapidly under the tariff phasing schedule in the nafta treaty however corporate restructuring to rescale production for the regional market and to increase offshore assembly presented adjustment costs for u s workers which created divisions between labor unions and their employers i conclude that regional arrangements are an attractive mechanism to liberalize trade for firms in need of larger than national markets to take advantage of economies of scale or to develop production sharing networks

access to protection domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies previous institutional explanations of trade policy have focused on the role of proportional representation on the promotion of free trade this explanation generates numerous unsolved anomalies and provides limited guidance in explaining the difference between proportional representation countries and between majoritarian countries as well as within country variation in trade policy this article introduces a more general institutional theory that argues that the number of access points provided by institutions is the crucial institutional feature as increasing the number of access points makes lobbying less costly which benefits protectionists from this i hypothesize that the number of parties in government the number of electoral districts the nature of the vote and other such institutions affect the level of protection and that once these factors are controlled for proportional representation has no impact on trade policy i test this theory on tariff data in the post world war ii developed democracies and find broad support for these hypotheses this article was previously presented at the 2004 annual meetings of the midwest political science association i would like to thank alan deardorff rob franzese matt golder mike hanmer jude hays cherie maestas corrine mcconnaughy will moore james d morrow won ho park and jeff staton for advice and comments and yoshi ono for excellent research assistance all errors of course remain my own

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

hybrid modeling to support energy climate policy effects of feed in tariffs to promote renewable energy in portugal abstract feed in tariffs have been the main policy instrument applied in portugal for the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources under the eu directives on energy and climate regulation in this paper we provide an empirical impact assessment of the economic and environmental effects of portugal s fits policy to promote res e generation impact assessment of policy instruments plays a crucial role on decision making process for numerical simulations we make use of a hybrid top down bottom up general equilibrium modeling approach which represents a reliable tool to analyze the complex interactions between economic energy and environmental issues related to energy policies numerical simulations confirm the empirical evidence that the fits policy implemented by portugal was both an effective and a cost efficient way to increase the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources and thus to achieve the national res e target of 45 in 2010 results show relatively modest macroeconomic impacts indicating potentially low economic adjustment costs from an environmental perspective the deployment of renewable energy source results in significant carbon emissions reductions

the fable of the bees revisited causes and consequences of the u s honey program abstract in his 1973 paper steven cheung discredited the fable of the bees by demonstrating that markets for beekeeping services exist and function well although economists heeded cheung s lessons policy makers did not the honey program has operated for over 50 years supporting the price of honey through a variety of mechanisms its effects were minor before the 1980s but then became important with annual government expenditures near 100 million for several years reforms of the program in the late 1980s reduced its market effects and budget costs returning it to its original role as a minor commodity program although the 1996 farm bill formally eliminated the honey program it was reinstated in the 2002 farm bill we measure the historical welfare effects of the program during its various incarnations examine its frequently stated public interest rationale the encouragement of honeybee pollination and interpret its history in light of economic theories of regulation

how to set the proper level of carbon tax in the context of chinese construction sector a cge analysis abstract under global warming and severe environmental problems the paris agreement urges china to accelerate the pace of the low carbon economy improving the energy efficiency of the construction sector may be an important way to reduce co2 emissions as a reasonable energy policy instrument a carbon tax can effectively improve energy efficiency and reduce co2 emissions in this study a dynamic computable general equilibrium model is developed to explore the possible impacts of different carbon tax conditions on the energy consumption of the construction sector and the macroeconomy of china results show that the appropriate carbon tax is 60 rmb t which cannot only achieve the emission reduction target but also minimize the negative impact on the macroeconomy however the proper level of the carbon tax varies by building stage under the proper carbon tax level the peak of carbon emissions could be reached in 2025 the main purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical basis for the government in formulating different energy policies

trade and the variety of democratic institutions students of comparative politics have long acknowledged the importance of such institutional factors as electoral systems parliamentary versus presidential rule and the strength of parties but they have either regarded the institutions as given or have explained them entirely in domestic terms associating proportional representation for example with the intensity of social cleavages in economically advanced democracies however these institutional aspects can be plausibly linked to dependence on trade proportional representation the parliamentary system strong parties and large electoral districts have survival value for developed democracies exposed to trade that the recently revived agitation for proportional representation in the united kingdom has been cast explicitly in terms of economic necessity and dependence on trade adds force to this argument and suggests the need for further historical research on other cases of institutional adaptation and change

a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics we develop a novel model of campaigns elections and policy making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators this generates a distinction between policy rhetoric and policy reality and introduces an important role for party discipline in the policy making process we identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics when trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens i introduction in a democracy the majority rules often this means that the policies enacted by elected governments reflect the preferences of some citizens more than those of others this feature of democracy commonly known as tyranny of the majority arises in institutional settings in which elected officials represent disproportionately the interests of their own constituents and electees who represent the minority have limited means to influence policy in this paper we argue that tyranny of the majority imparts a protectionist bias to democratic politics this is so even when the average citizen covets free trade and when every citizen has an equal probability of being represented in the policy making process by protection we mean policies that favor quasi fixed factors of production thus protection in our parlance refers both to tariffs that shield import competing industries from foreign competition and subsidies that promote exports the bias refers to the average or expected policy outcome we focus on majoritarian systems in which elected legislators represent geographic regions the existence of a protectionist bias requires only that i national party leaders cannot fully commit their candidates to adopt particular policies if elected ii mem

how states ration flexibility tariffs remedies and exchange rates as policy substitutes a close look at the commitments of world trade organization wto members presents a striking paradox most states could raise their duties significantly before falling afoul of their wto obligations moreover such binding overhang varies between countries some could more than double the amount of trade protection they offer overnight whereas others are tightly constrained what accounts for this variation the author argues that more flexibility is not always better obtaining it and subsequently using it are both costly rather than maximize flexibility states thus seek an optimal amount if they have access to policy space through other means such as currency devaluations and trade remedies they will exercise restraint in seeking binding overhang the same supply side logic holds at the domestic level governments strategically withhold binding overhang from industries that are able to rely on trade remedies despite the fact that these tend to have the greatest political clout

quantitative assessment of tariff endogeneity abstract the paper provides a quantitative assessment of the tariff endogeneity hypothesis in the macro context for the interwar and postwar u s economy there is an almost unidirectional causality running from unemployment and trade deficit to the average tariff rate during the interwar period while more interactive relationships hold in the postwar period compared with the interwar era there is a decline in the dependence of tariff on unemployment and trade deficit but the individual effect of unemployment on tariff has increased and that of trade deficit has decreased furthermore unanticipated shocks exert smaller and less persistent effects of tariff

economic welfare and environmental impact of feed in tariff policy a case study in iran following a particular attention given to environmental issues over the last few decades establishing proper developmental policies to increase electricity production from renewable energy re has not only been an important issue but also a challenge for many countries feed in tariff fit policy is one of the tools that is being used to facilitate the development of re this research evaluated the economic welfare and environmental impact of this policy on iran s economy therefore after developing an economic energy environmental e3 type of hybrid general equilibrium model the effect of fit policy was examined under different scenarios in order to find an optimal condition in which 10 of electrical energy could be produced from renewable resources the comparison between the results showed that the application of subsidies to re and the way the government finances these subsidies can affect the results of fit policy meanwhile regardless of the role considered for the impact of environmental factors our policies under the scenario of technology neutral is the most efficient as it has less impact on the decline of gdp of different sectors and also has less financial cost for government

technological change in economic models of environmental policy a survey this paper provides an overview of the treatment of technological change in economic models of environmental policy numerous economic modeling studies have confirmed the sensitivity of mid and long run climate change mitigation cost and benefit projections to assumptions about technology costs in general technical progress is considered to be a noneconomic exogenous variable in global climate change modeling however there is overwhelming evidence that technological change is not an exogenous variable but to an important degree endogenous induced by needs and pressures hence some environmenteconomy models treat technological change as endogenous responding to socio economic variables three main elements in models of technological innovation are i corporate investment in research and development ii spillovers from r d and iii technology learning especially learning by doing the incorporation of induced technological change in different types of environmental economic models tends to reduce the costs of environmental policy accelerates abatement and may lead to positive spillover and negative leakage

economic implications of alternative allocation schemes for emission allowances political feasibility of emission trading systems may crucially depend on the free initial allocation of emission allowances to energy intensive industries in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects we investigate the potential trade off between such compensation and economic efficiency for alternative allocation rules where emission allowances are based on either emissions or output based on analytical partial equilibrium and numerical general equilibrium analysis we show that in open trading systems the trade off becomes the more severe the higher the international permit price is whenever the permit price can be considered exogenous to firms or industries the output based allocation rule is distinctly less costly than the emission based rule to preserve output and employment in energy intensive sectors the reason is that emission based allocation of allowances not only provides an implicit output subsidy but also lowers the effective price of emission inputs to regulated firms emissionbased allocation is particularly expensive towards higher international permit prices where the implicit subsidies to emission use in energy intensive sectors produce drastic efficiency losses since they imply high expenditures for carbon permit imports rather than high net revenues from efficient carbon permit exports

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

determinants of store level price elasticity using weekly scanner data representing 18 product categories the authors estimated store specific price elasticities for a chain of 83 supermarkets they related these price sensitivities to a com

practice prize winner a nested logit model of product and transaction type choice for planning automakers pricing and promotions we develop a consumer response model to evaluate and plan pricing and promotions in durable good markets we discuss its implementation in the u s automotive industry which spends about 45 billion each year in price promotions the approach is based on a random effects multinomial nested logit model of product e g a vehicle model such as hyundai tucson and transaction type choice transaction types include combinations of acquisition types e g purchase versus lease and pricing instruments cash rebates reduced apr financing lease payment discounts we estimate the model using hierarchical bayes methods to capture response heterogeneity at the local market level we find key characteristics unique to durable good markets first consumers are heterogeneous in both their brand and transaction type preferences second consumers differ in their overall price sensitivity as well as in their relative sensitivity to alternative pricing instruments e g cash discounts reduced monthly payments third the most effective pricing programs tend to be those in which automakers offer consumers a menu of options to choose from e g a choice among a cash discount reduced interest rate financing or a lease payment discount we illustrate the model through an empirical application to a sample of data drawn from j d power transaction records in the entry suv segment and discuss examples of actual implementations

rent seeking protectionism and innovation in the american steel industry trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis using data on the us steel firms we show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance reduces incentives to innovate and frustrates the normal schumpeterian process of creative destruction free trade gives consumers the lowest prices nonetheless protectionism in various guises is pervasive this we show is probably due to political rentseeking by groups that expect to lose as trade patterns adjust to innovation and altered economic conditions these groups invest in political lobbying to secure future returns in trade protection we find empirical evidence that trade protection returns private benefits to the shareholders senior workers and ceo s of lobbying firms perhaps more disturbingly trade protection also appears to reward less innovative firms and may thus frustrate the schumpeterian development of an industry we examine us steelmakers among the most active lobbyers in recent decades steel firms that lobby congress for protection tend to be larger older less diversified and less profitable than non lobbyers they pay their workers and ceos more and their ceos have longer tenure and are more likely to have risen through the ranks of their companies this suggests the owners managers and workers of less dynamic steel firms stand to lose from free trade the announcement of protection raises the stock prices of us steelmakers but by much more for lobbyers than non lobbyers when comprehensive and enduring protection was finally announced lobbyers more than non lobbyers cut jobs while maintaining or possibly increasing wages once comprehensive protection is in place protection also leads to large pay increases for lobbyers ceos this seems consistent with rent seeking and inconsistent with protection helping lobbyers mitigate social consequences of downsizing like unemployment our most striking finding is that high past r d spending is negatively correlated with stock price changes when proteption is announced and positively correlated with subsequent exit from the industry this seems inconsistent with protection providing a hiatus for retooling rather it suggests

democracy and international trade britain france and the united states daniel verdier 1860 1990 princeton university press princeton 1994 pp xx 387 45 00

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

what does europe pay for clean energy review of macroeconomic simulation studies this paper analyses the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in european energy markets on the basis of existing macroeconomic simulation studies the analysis comprises the european emssion trading scheme energy taxes measures in the transport sector and the promotion of renewable energy sources we find that these instruments affect the european economy in particular the energy intensive industries and the industries that produce internationally tradeable goods from a macroeconomic point of view however the costs of environmental regulation appear to be modest the underlying environmental targets and the efficient design of regulation are key determinants for the cost burden

the role of spatial demand on outlet location and pricing abstract in this article the authors consider the problem of outlet pricing and location in the context of unobserved spatial demand the analysis constitutes a scenario in which capacity constrained firms set prices conditional on their location demand and costs this enables firms to develop maps of latent demand patterns across the market in which they compete the analysis further suggests locations for additional outlets and the resultant equilibrium effect on profits and prices using bayesian spatial statistics the authors apply their model to seven years of data on apartment location and prices in roanoke va they find that spatial covariation in demand is material in outlet choice the 95 spatial decay in demand extends 3 6 miles in a region that measures slightly more than 9 5 miles they also find that capacity constraints can cost complexes upward of 100 per apartment as they predict price elasticities and costs are biased downward when spatial covariance in demand is ignored costs a

endogenous trade policy and the gains from international financial markets abstract this paper examines the interaction between international financial markets and trade policy when trade policy is endogenous there is a secondary gain from opening up financial markets in addition to the direct risk sharing benefits by breaking the direct link between the terms of trade and welfare international portfolio diversification can allow for a lower level of trade protection in a tariff game between governments we apply the model to an estimation of the welfare gains from international financial markets our results show that these indirect trade gains from financial markets are likely to be much larger than the direct risk sharing gains in the tariff game with financial markets however there are multiple equilibria while one equilibrium allows for complete diversification and complete free trade there are other equilibria in which there is limited diversification and a high level of average protection

political systems and distortions an empirical study this paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others we find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships but frequent regime changes reduce distortions political systems factional subordinate that encourage redistributive activities rda tend to have more distortions allowing for different effects of rda in democracies and dictatorships there is a positive and significant effect of rda on distortions in dictatorships in democracies distortions destroying lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between rda and distortions can be found

legalization trade liberalization and domestic politics a cautionary note if the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation more may not always be better achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes the global trade regime which aims to liberalize trade has become increasingly legalized over time increased legalization has changed the information environment and the nature of government obligations which in turn have affected the pattern of mobilization of domestic interest groups on trade from the perspective of encouraging the future expansion of liberal trade we suggest some possible negative consequences of legalization arguing that these consequences must be weighed against the positive effects of legalization on increasing national compliance since the weakly legalized gatt institution proved sufficient to sustain widespread liberalization the case for further legalization must be strong to justify far reaching change in the global trade regime

the magic bullet the rtaa institutional reform and trade liberalization the reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences namely by changing the trade policymaking process in the united states the rtaa is held responsible for the dramatic liberalization in u s policy beginning in the 1930s and 1940s this article takes issue with this conventional wisdom i argue that the standard accounts which emphasize the importance of delegation for overcoming logrolling in congress or for facilitating reciprocity in international trade negotiations fail to provide an adequate explanation for just how the institutional innovation was achieved and sustained in the face of protectionist opposition i suggest instead that trade liberalization was driven by exogenous changes in party constituencies and societal preferences that had crucial effects on congressional votes to extend the rtaa authority and liberalize trade after 1945 the preservation of the rtaa program was symptomatic rather than causal as a consequence it may well be abandoned in the future the evolution of u s trade policy has been and will continue to be powerfully shaped by changes in the preferences of societal groups and in the positions taken by parties on the trade issue

import prices and the political economy of tariffs evidence from germany japan and the united states 1954 1994 abstract endogenous protection theory suggests that macroeconomic conditions affect tariffs through policy responses to political pressure however import prices affect average tariffs even in the absence of policy changes i examine the effects of import prices and macroeconomic conditions in postwar germany japan and the united states finding strong evidence for the effect of import prices but little evidence consistent with endogenous protection theory

a positive theory of agricultural protection the present paper analyses the political economy of agricultural protection in a general equilibrium framework rational politicians offer protectionist policies in return for political support from their constituency individuals in the economy have different factor endowments politicians exploit these differences in establishing redistributive policies when maximizing political support changes in economic variables such as the urban rural income gap capital intensity the share of agriculture in total output and total employment and the share of food in consumer expenditures affect the political equilibrium policy the analysis concludes that the observed correlation between economic development and agricultural protection is caused by a multiplicity of factors

economic impacts of the 1997 eu energy tax simulations with three eu wide models in march 1997 the european commission adopted aproposal that increases existing minimum levels oftaxation on mineral oils by around 10 to 25 andintroduces excises for other energy products thispaper analyses the macroeconomic impacts of theproposal it employs three models hermes gem e3 ande3me all models confirm that the proposal will havepositive macroeconomic impacts when the tax revenuesare used to reduce social security contributions paidby employers for the eu as a whole both gdp andemployment are expected to be higher and co2emissions are 0 9 to 1 6 percent lower the positiveeu wide effects can be observed in practically allmember states the sector impacts are modest with theenergy sector expected to face the most negativeimpacts differences between model results are due tothe model type general equilibrium ormacro econometric the eu countries covered and theway tax exemptions were handled crucial assumptionsto obtain the double dividend are the modelling ofthe labour market and the impacts on eu externaltrade the sensitivity of the results for the use oftax revenues tax exemptions and tax rate increases isassessed

who lobbies whom special interest politics under alternative electoral systems why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats we theorize lobbying venue choices and intensityasafunctionofcontractenforceabilitywithpolicymakers politicians orbureaucrats wearguethatorganizational structures of interest groups in particular whether they are centralized or decentralized substantially affect their lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish them when they fail we further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system majoritarian semiproportional single nontransferable vote sntv or proportional representation systems we test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in japan the results lend strong support to our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems

habitual and occasional lobbyers in the u s steel industry an em algorithm pooling approach bernard yeung using u s steel firm data we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit forming to identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms we use an expectation maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group a two pool model emerges occasional lobbyers lobbying depends on their market performance and habitual lobbyers lobbying only depends on past lobbying the latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection dependent firms jel f13 1 introduction rent seeking activities plausibly have dynamic economies to scale past rent seeking experience should reduce the cost of further rent seeking and increase its return thus rent seekers may over time become more prone to further rent seeking and even become dependent on it given the large welfare losses theoretically associated with rent seeking e g bhagwati 1982 1988 and magee et al 1989 a better understanding of actual rent seeking behavior is required in particular empirical verification of the self sustaining nature of rent seeking is of fundamental importance lobbying for protection from import competition is a form of rent seeking this article uses data on lobbying for protection by firms in the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s to show that a habit forming effect does exist in a preliminary investigation we pool all firm level data and find that past lobbying increases the current tendency to lobby however not all firms have the same propensity to lobby to allow heterogeneity among firms dependence on past lobbying we apply an expectation maximization em algorithm approach dempster et al 1977 to a lagged dummy model heckman 1982a 1982b this lets our firms sort themselves into groups according to the determinants of their lobbying activity our statistical results suggest that an acceptable division of our data is a division into two groups occasional lobbyers whose lobbying depends on the firm s market performance and habitual lobbyers whose lobbying is essentially unrelated to the firm s business situation and depends mainly on past lobbying firms that never lobby for protection end up in the first group greater firm size and greater focus in steel production are associated with increased lobbying in both groups but the influence is stronger for occasional lobbyers past sales growth and spending on modern equipment are associated with curtailed lobbying by occasional rent seekers but are unrelated to lobbying by habitual rent seekers changes in cash flow have no influence in either generally habitual lobbyers are larger firms whose business is more concentrated on steel they are naturally more inclined than occasional lobbyers to initiate lobbying however their lobbying appears to have become a habit divorced from their market pe rformance these results are consistent with the presence of economies of scale in rent seeking and with rent seeking being habit forming e g magee et al 1989 in the next section we describe the intensive lobbying for protection in the u s steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s we justify our contentions that lobbying for protection by steel firms in the sample period may be habit forming and that different groups of firms should have dissimilar propensities to lobby for protection in section iii we explain the em algorithm approach we explain the data in the fourth section and report our results in section v section vi concludes ii habitual and occasional lobbying in the u s steel industry in the united states domestic firms under import competition pressure often complain to the government about unfair foreign practice