disentangling the college wage premium estimating a model with endogenous education choices this article proposes and empirically implements a structural model of education choices and wage determination to quantitatively evaluate the contributions of productivity enhancement and ability signaling in the college wage premium the model is estimated under various distributional parameterizations using 1990 u s census 5 public use micro sample under these parameterizations i find that college education enhances attendees productivity by about 40 and productivity enhancement accounts for close to two thirds of the college wage premium

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

using employer hiring behavior to test the educational signaling hypothesis this paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis if employers use education as a signal in the hiring process they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants we nd that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal more informative recruitment channel is used so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process

natural natural experiments in economics the recent literature exploiting natural events as natural experiment instruments is reviewed to assess to what extent it has advanced empirical knowledge a weakness of the studies that adopt this approach is that the necessary set of behavioral market and technological assumptions made by the authors in justifying their interpretations of the estimates is often absent the methodology and findings from twenty studies are summarized and simple economic models are used to elucidate the implicit assumptions made by the authors and to demonstrate the sensitivity of the interpretations of the findings to the relaxation of some of these assumptions

education and invention abstract modern growth theory puts invention on the center stage inventions are created by individuals raising the question of whether we can increase the number of inventors to answer this question we study the causal effect of msc engineering education on invention using data on u s patents finnish inventors and the distance to the nearest technical university as an instrument we find a positive effect of engineering education on the propensity to patent and a negative ols bias our counterfactual calculation suggests that establishing three new technical universities resulted in a 20 increase in the number of uspto patents by finnish inventors

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi hyperbolic discounting and no commitment this paper examines a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which the government cannot commit to its future tax policy and individuals are quasi hyperbolic discounters who cannot commit to future consumption plans the government has both paternalistic and redistributive objectives and therefore uses its taxation powers to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that reflects individuals true long run preferences under first best taxation quasi hyperbolic discounting exerts no effect on the level of social welfare attainable under second best taxation quasi hyperbolic discounting increases resp decreases the level of social welfare attainable when separating resp pooling taxation is optimal in stark contrast to previous studies this result implies that some individuals can actually be better off in the long run as a result of their short run impatience

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

social culture and economic performance the connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as social culture in the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology i show that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some cultural activity the society can partially overcome an informational free riding problem therefore social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy jel p17 z1 what is social culture what is the role of social culture in economic performance in a provocative article kenneth arrow 1971 argued that norms of social behavior including ethical and moral codes are reactions of society to compensate for market failure somewhat surprisingly this idea of the role of social culture has not been further pursued in the literature in this paper i take arrow s viewpoint seriously and construct a simple model to examine the possibility that social culture may alleviate market failure i consider a society that is deciding whether to adopt a new technology three important assumptions are made about the economy first adoption decisions are made by entrepreneurs or firms but the operators of the new technology are workers second the new technology can be successfully operated only when the worker has invested in some imperfectly observable requisite skills and third it is costly for the workers

human capital versus sorting the effects of compulsory attendance laws under the educational sorting hypothesis a state compulsory school attendance law will increase the educational attainment of high ability workers who are not directly affected hy the law under the human capital hypothesis such laws affect only those individuals whose hehavior is directly constrained we find that compulsory attendance laws do increase enrollment rates in age groups they do not affect directly thus our results contradict the human capital hypothesis and are consistent with the sorting hypothesis i introduction the last decade has seen considerable debate between supporters of the human capital and sorting models of education the former assert that the effect of education on wages reflects increased productivity the latter maintain that it reflects at least in part correlation between education and unobserved ability workers use education to signal their ability while employers use education to screen workers despite the importance of the debate no fully convincing tests of the hypotheses have been developed in fact many members of the profession maintain at least privately that these hypotheses cannot be tested against each other and that the debate must therefore be relegated to the realm of ideology in this paper we show that the models can be tested against each other by examining the effects of state compulsory school attendance laws we show that under the human capital hypotheis such laws will affect the educational attainment only of those who in the absence of the law would have left school prior to the minimum school leaving age on the other hand under the sorting hypothesis the effects of the law will percolate through the system increasing educational attainment even among workers not directly constrained by the law our results are consistent with the predictions of the sorting model

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

educational opportunity and income inequality affordable higher education is and has been a key element of social policy in the united states with broad bipartisan support financial aid has substantially increased the number of people who complete university generally thought to be a good thing we show however that making education more affordable can increase income inequality the mechanism that drives our results is a combination of credit constraints and the signaling role of education first explored by spence 1973 when borrowing for education is difficult lack of a college education could mean that one is either of low ability or of high ability but with low financial resources when government programs make borrowing easier or tuition more affordable high ability persons become educated and leave the uneducated pool driving down the wage for unskilled workers and raising the skill premium

does the human capital educational sorting debate matter for development policy if education increases human capital subsidizing education can generate economic growth and combat poverty estimates of its return suggest that education is a good social investment in sorting models the return reflects in part the information about productivity revealed by the worker s education thus the social and private returns diverge it might appear that if we believe the sorting model we should be less swayed by evidence that estimated returns to education exceed the social discount rate and therefore less likely to support education based development policies this conclusion is shown to be incorrect this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

financial aid borrowing constraints and college attendance evidence from structural estimates the idea that borrowing constraints may preclude low income youth from attending college is widespread here i will review some recent work on the importance of borrowing constraints and the impact of financial aid programs i e guaranteed student loans and tuition subsidies designed to counteract them this work suggests that borrowing constraints have little effect on college attendance decisions there is evidence that tuition subsidies play a modest role in reducing inequality in schooling and earnings most inequality however appears to be driven by unequal human capital accumulation prior to college going age empirical work on college attendance decisions has consistently produced two findings i parents income helps predict college attendance even conditional on other observed characteristics of youth and ii the effect of tuition on the probability of college attendance is greater for children from low income families there is some mixed evidence that iii the rate of return to education is higher for low income youth these findings are commonly viewed as strong evidence for borrowing constraints recent work by stephen cameron and james heckman 1998 challenges these findings furthermore other recent work keane and kenneth wolpin 2001 shows that they are compatible with a model in which liquidity constraints have a negligible impact on college attendance rates to understand this work it is useful to consider a very simple discrete choice model of college attendance decisions the model has the following features

semiparametric reduced form estimation of tuition subsidies the goal of this paper is to use a semiparametric reduced form model to estimate the effects of various tuition subsidies this approach expands on the tuition subsidy example in ichimura and taber 2000 in a number of dimensions it has become common practice in the empirical literature to refer to any nonstructural empirical analysis as reduced form this is not the traditional sense of the phrase a classic reduced form analysis see e g marschak 1953 first specifies a structural model and then derives the reduced form parameters in terms of the structural parameters while many recent studies have asserted to taking a reduced form approach the structural parameters while many recent studies have asserted to taking a reduced form approach the structural model which the reduced form model should correspond is rarely specified we explicitly specify a structural model and use the implied reduced form structure to estimate the effect of tuition subsidy policies specifying the underlying model has the advantage of being explicit about the assumptions that justify the analysis this avoids rosenzweig and wolpin s 2000 criticism of work on natural natural experiments that often leaves these conditions implicit our structural model is based on the model studied by keane and wolpin 1999 it is highly nonlinear and allows for more unobserved heterogeneity than the typical simultaneous equations framework that most previous work has used in reduced form estimation using hte specified structural model we examine the assumptions discussed in ichimura and taber 2000 to justify reduced form estimation of the policy effects this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

entry collusion and capacity constraints it is arguably true that no single topic has held more of a fascination for students of industrial organization than the issue of entry deterrence this issue has been analyzed from many perspectives including the role of advertising and imperfect information in deterring entry 1 14 18 19 incentives confronting a monopoly seller of durable goods 3 4 incentives in the context of sequential entry 2 9 dynamic aspects of entry deterrence 10 13 and the role of excess capacity in deterring entry 22 23 dixit 5 6 discussed the incentives for an incumbent firm to deter entry in the presence of sunk costs in his models a firm must sink some capital prior to entering the industry and this sunk cost creates an entry barrier any potential entrant must pay the sunk costs prior to entering and the incumbent can deter entry by reducing the stream of profits sufficiently so that the entrant s post entry profit flow cannot cover its sunk cost ware 24 adapted dixit s work by allowing for a three stage game following the incumbent s decision the entrant decides upon entry in stage two paying the sunk costs at that time in stage three if entry occurred the firms play a quantity choosing game formby and smith 7 argue that rather than deterring entry the incumbent firm often has an incentive to allow entry and then collude with the entrant in this context the post entry cartel is asymmetric with the incumbent producing the larger amount and realizing the higher profits

concurrent renting and selling in a durable goods monopoly under threat of entry this article analyzes the choice of contract sales or rental of a durable goods monopolist facing a threat of future entry although in the absence of such a threat a monopolist would prefer to rent his entire output we show that the threat of entry alters that preference there is an optimal preentry contract mix involving both rental and sales if both firms behave as cournot duopolists after entry the optimal choice of preentry contracts enables the erstwhile monopolist to gain the same profits as he would if he behaved as a von stackelberg leader

signaling in higher education the effect of access to elite colleges on choice of major i introduction it is a well established fact that more educated individuals earn higher wages there are two primary theories for the source of this education wage premium the first is the human capital accumulation or full information model in which education directly enhances productivity and thereby increases an individual s wages the second is the signaling model of the labor market first proposed by spence 1973 wherein the monetary returns to schooling are partially explained by information asymmetries between individuals and employers these two models lead to strikingly similar labor market predictions which has made testing between them difficult i provide a new test of the signaling model against the full information model using individuals choices of college major this test is novel in that it focuses on the quality of an individual s education as a potential signal rather than the quantity of education furthermore while other tests have focused on high school students or other specific groups e g general education diploma takers in tyler et al 2000 and mba students in hussey 2012 this test sheds light onto the decision making process of college going students in a full information model productivity is costlessly observed by both the individual and the employer each individual chooses her optimal level of education to improve productivity and wages given her ability and the marginal cost of schooling in the signaling framework information is asymmetric such that employers cannot perfectly observe individual ability or true productivity employers use education levels to infer expected productivity while each individual chooses her level of schooling to signal a higher innate ability and potential productivity to employers the equilibrium result in both models is that higher ability individuals obtain more education and accordingly earn higher wages while the equilibria in both models appear similar the extent to which individuals sort on ability depends on the amount of information asymmetry in the labor market under the signaling model the individual s social and private returns to education do not necessarily coincide the private return is a combined effect of the social return from increased productivity and the signaling effect of being identified perhaps falsely as a high ability individual this disparity between private and social returns could lead to an inefficient allocation of schooling in the competitive labor market the implication that investment in schooling might lead to a deadweight loss for society has prompted many attempts to distinguish between these two theories bedard 2001 hussey 2012 lang and kropp 1986 riley 1979 wolpin 1977 and to measure what portion of the returns to schooling is attributable to signaling effects altonji and pierret 1997 2001 clark and martorell 2014 fang 2006 tyler et al 2000 however the empirical evidence differentiating the two models has been fairly limited and testing between the full information and signaling models of education has proven difficult i propose a new model applying the signaling framework of spence 1973 to the postsecondary environment in this model major field of study can be used by individuals to signal unobserved ability and productivity to employers i show that this leads to a prediction that geographic areas with high access to elite colleges result in fewer science technology engineering and mathematics stem majors among lower ability students at nonelite colleges this is distinct from the prediction of a full information model where the level of access to elite schools should only affect those high ability individuals who are eligible to attend an elite school using data from the national center for education statistics baccalaureate beyond survey and the geographic variation in access to elite schools across the united states i find evidence that is consistent with the signaling model prediction

carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution a differential game approach abstract we study the strategic behavior of two countries facing transboundary co2 pollution under a differential game setting in our model the reduction of co2 concentration occurs through the carbon capture and storage process rather than through the adoption of cleaner technologies furthermore we first provide the explicit short run dynamics for this dynamic game with symmetric open loop and a special markovian nash strategy then we compare these strategies at the games steady states and along some balanced growth paths our results show that if the initial level of co2 is relatively high state dependent emissions reductions can lead to higher overall environmental quality hence feedback strategy leads to less social waste

dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements abstract in terms of the number of signatories one observes both large and small international environmental agreements the theoretical literature based on game theory discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions the conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances under farsightedness both large and small stable coalitions can occur this theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments this paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement

effect of secondary school fees on educational attainment in this study the heterogeneity of the fee abolition process in west german secondary schools is used to identify the effect of school fees on educational attainment and to obtain an estimate of the price elasticity of upper secondary education the analysis is based on representative individual level data from three annual surveys of the german mikrozensus while coefficients cannot be estimated precisely the results suggest that on average upper secondary school attainment increased by at least 8 percent in response to the fee abolition the educational attainment of females appears to be more price sensitive than that of males

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain abstract this paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer the environmental consequence of this inefficiency which emerges in a non cooperative vertical setting governed by a single parameter contract is overlooked in the literature on pollution control in the setup of a two stage game we investigate the impact of double marginalization for non cooperative equilibrium to check whether there are differences between dynamic and strategic effects of double marginalization on pollution accumulation both the open loop and feedback nash equilibria are derived over a finite time horizon with the cooperative solution as a benchmark

estimates of the economic returns to schooling from a new sample of twins this paper uses a new survey to contrast the wages of genetically identical twins with different schooling levels multiple measurements of schooling levels were also collected to assess the effect of reporting error on the estimated economic returns to schooling the data indicate that omitted ability variables do not bias the estimated return to schooling upward but that measurement error does bias it downward adjustment for measurement error indicates that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12 to 16 percent a higher estimate of the economic returns to schooling than has been previously found copyright 1994 by american economic association

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings we establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws we estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education the instrumental variables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates every developed country in the world has a compulsory schooling requirement yet little is known about the effect these laws have on educational attainment and earnings 1 this paper exploits an unusual natural experiment to estimate the impact of compulsory schooling laws in the united states the experiment stems from the fact that children born in different months of the year start school at different ages while compulsory schooling laws generally require students to remain in school until their sixteenth or seventeenth birthday in effect the interaction of school entry requirements and compulsory schooling laws compel students born

higher education elite institutions and inequality abstract we develop a model of higher education to analyze the effects of elite institutions on individual educational decisions and aggregate labor market outcomes elite institutions allow the most talented of a given population to separate themselves from the larger pool of agents enrolled in higher education and to earn the associated wage premium in the labor market as elite institutions engage in cream skimming the returns to publicly accessible education decrease and enrollment in public higher education declines the resulting effect on income inequality is ambiguous since elite education increases income dispersion at the top of the income distribution and decreases income dispersion at the bottom

the common pool bargaining and the rule of capture firms producing from a single oilfield face the common pool problem how to divide production and profits among themselves the rule of capture creates competition among them to produce the oil before anyone else does and a tendency for overproduction private bargaining among the firms can avoid the wasteful production practices associated with the rule of capture and increase joint profits this paper explores the structure and expected outcome of the common pool problem and demonstrates that smaller producers hold a bargaining advantage that is not easily overcome by larger producers or neutral arbitrators

the taste for leisure career choice and the returns to education abstract we develop a simple methodology to estimate the returns to education despite heterogeneous labor leisure preferences the labor supply behavior of doctors and physician assistants is consistent with people choosing between the two careers based on differing tastes for leisure

the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game abstract we study the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game i e the ability of a country to control its emissions taking into account the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages we show that when all countries are myopic i e choose the laisser faire policy their payoffs are smaller than when all countries are farsighted i e non myopic however in the case where one myopic country becomes farsighted we show that the welfare impact of foresight on that country is ambiguous foresight may be welfare reducing for the country that acquires it this is due to the reaction of the other farsighted countries to that country s acquisition of foresight the country that acquires foresight reduces its emissions while the other farsighted countries extend their emissions the overall impact on total emissions is ambiguous moreover our results suggest that incentive mechanisms that involve a very small possibly zero present value of transfers can play an important role in inducing a country to adopt a farsighted behavior and diminishing the number of myopic countries these incentives would compensate the myopic country for the short run losses incurred from the acquisition of foresight and can be reimbursed by that country from the gains from foresight that it enjoys in the long run

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel abstract in this paper we study a dynamic two player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price we consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price one of the model s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price i e its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses deal vs sacrifice resulting from buying a cheap or an expensive product this dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price our objective is to investigate the impact of retailer s myopia on the pricing strategies and payoffs of channel members in this context a myopic retailer is an agent that disregards the effects of its pricing strategy on the evolution of the perceived brand quality and the reference price

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis abstract this paper develops a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis as advanced by spence et al the approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions an application of the method to a recruitment by the swedish auto manufacturer volvo is presented

prisoner s dilemma on behavioral choices in the presence of sticky prices farsightedness vs myopia abstract when making decisions in a dynamic environment myopic supply chain members tend to ignore the future effects of their decisions on the evolution of state dynamics by contrast far sighted decision makers consider about the impacts of current decisions on both current profits and future profits in order to study how behavioral choices affect the operation decisions and profits of supply chain members we develop a differential game with sticky prices where one manufacturer purchases components from one supplier and makes final products for end customers the supplier decides on its wholesale price while the manufacturer sets its production quantity either of supply chain members has two behavioral choices myopia and farsightedness we derive and compare equilibrium solutions under four different behavioral combinations our analysis shows that there always exists a prisoner s dilemma caused by behavioral choices farsightedness is a dominant strategy for either the supplier or the manufacturer but both to act myopically makes both of them better off furthermore comparing with other scenarios the whole supply chain obtains the highest profit when both players are myopic in addition we introduce a revenue sharing contract with static wholesale price to mitigate the adverse impacts of the prisoner s dilemma

the effect of statistical discrimination on black white wage inequality estimating a model with multiple equilibria this article presents the structural estimation of the parameters of a statistical discrimination model although the model is capable of displaying multiple equilibria an estimation strategy that identifies both the model parameters and the equilibrium selected by the economic agents is developed and empirically implemented a comparison between the selected equilibria and the other potential equilibria reveals that the decline in wage inequality experienced in the u s economy cannot be attributed to changes in the equilibrium selection nonetheless a counterfactual experiment shows that in a color blind society blacks wage would have been on average more than 20 higher

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

the rising college premium in the eighties return to college or return to unobserved ability the changes in the distribution of earnings during the 1980s have been studied extensively the two most striking characteristics of the decade are a a large increase in the college high school wage gap and b a substantial rise in the variance of wage residuals while this second phenomenon is typically implicitly attributed to an increase in the demand for unobserved skill most work in this area fails to acknowledge that this same increase in demand for unobserved skill could drive the evolution of the measured college premium in its simplest form if higher ability individuals are more likely to attend college then the increase in the college wage premium may be due to a increase in the relative demand for high ability workers rather than an increase in the demand for skills accumulated in college this paper develops and estimates a dynamic programming selection model in order to investigate the plausibility of this explanation the results are highly suggestive that an increase in the demand for unobserved ability could play a major role in the growing college premium the changes in the distribution of earnings during the 1980s have been studied extensively the two most striking characteristics of the decade are a a large increase in the college high school wage gap and b a substantial rise in the variance of wage residuals while this second phenomenon is typically implicitly attributed to an increase in the demand for unobserved skill most work in this area fails to acknowledge that this same increase in demand for unobserved skill could drive the evolution of the measured college premium in its simplest form if higher ability individuals are more likely to attend college then the increase in the college wage premium may be due to an increase in the relative demand for high ability workers rather than an increase in the demand for skills accumulated in college this paper develops and estimates a dynamic programming selection model in order to investigate the plausibility of this explanation the results are highly suggestive that an increase in the demand for unobserved ability could play a major role in the growing college premium there are at least two reasons to be interested in this topic first for policy makers intent on helping the american workforce adjust to the changing wage structure this distinction is crucial if the value added of attending college truly rises they may consider policies aimed at subsidizing the skills learned in college however if it results from an increase in the payoff to other types of skills then policies focused on skill acquisition earlier in life would be more appropriate second it will also aid in understanding the

dynamic cournot competitive harvesting of a common pool resource a variant of the classical harvesting game where a number of competing agents simultaneously harvest a common pool natural resource is analysed the harvesting at each time is a cournot competition the critical assumption made in the present analysis is that most or all individual participants maintain a perspective which is wholly myopic three cases are analysed 1 the case of aggressive myopic cournot competition 2 co operation and 3 competition when there is an incumbent player the development in the number of active participants is outlined and stability criteria for a dynamic cournot competitive game are given the exact deadweight loss due to lack of co operation is calculated 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

mismatch in human capital accumulation this article studies the allocation of heterogeneous agents to levels of educational attainment the goal is to understand the magnitudes and sources of mismatch in this assignment both in theory and in the data the article presents evidence of substantial mismatch between ability and educational attainment across 21 oecd countries with a main focus on germany italy japan and the united states model parameters are estimated using a simulated method of moments approach the main empirical finding is that measured mismatch arises largely from noise in test scores and does not reflect borrowing constraints taste shocks play a minor role in explaining mismatch

could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels a game theoretic analysis abstract we identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel a channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers purchasing decisions a differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices we start by examining a bilateral monopoly and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level the competing manufacturers play a la nash and can be both myopic both farsighted or one myopic while the other is farsighted we show that for a bilateral monopoly myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough this remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

fostering educational enrolment through subsidies the issue of timing summary the purpose of this paper is to build a dynamic structural model of educational choices in which cognitive skills shape decisions the model is estimated by maximum likelihood using cohort data where individuals are observed from birth to the middle of their working life these data are unique in that they include cognitive skills test scores collected as early as age 7 we then investigate how alternative policies foster educational enrolment in particular we simulate the effect of two subsidies different in the timing of disbursement the first consists of grants assigned directly to individuals aged between 16 and 18 the second is assigned to the parents earlier on when the cohort is still in its childhood the latter subsidy affects cognitive skills accumulation and in turn educational choices our results suggest that a grant fosters enrolment at the lowest cost but the parental income subsidy generates more welfare as measured by a class of social welfare functions nevertheless these differences in costs and welfare are small overall the results reinforce the view that government investments in cognitive skill accumulation during childhood are worthwhile however the results also indicate that such investments should be well structured to ensure a high return copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way