market in financial instruments directive mifid stock price informativeness and liquidity abstract the paper examines the impact of mifid on stock price informativeness and liquidity in 28 eu countries we find that post mifid the stock prices reflect greater firm specific information and the market becomes more liquid consistent with the catch up hypothesis our evidence shows that the impact of mifid in terms of price informativeness is greater for countries that have weaker quality of regulation we find that regulation with enforcement improves market efficiency our results are robust with respect to the choice of price informativeness and liquidity proxies as well as the control sample

disadvantageous oil tariffs and dynamic consistency a large importer who places relatively greater weight on future than current oil consumption will import less oil in the future than if it were able to commit itself in advance to future tariffs and may find itself worse off than if it were unable to impose tariffs at all futures markets and storage modify these adverse effects and may avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency copyright 1990 by american economic association

dynamic asset allocation with event risk major events often trigger abrupt changes in stock prices and volatility we study the implications of jumps in prices and volatility on investment strategies using the event risk framework of duffie pan and singleton 2000 we provide analytical solutions to the optimal portfolio problem event risk dramatically affects the optimal strategy an investor facing event risk is less willing to take leveraged or short positions the investor acts as if some portion of his wealth may become illiquid and the optimal strategy blends both dynamic and buy and hold strategies jumps in prices and volatility both have important effects

ambiguity attitudes in a large representative sample using a theorem showing that matching probabilities of ambiguous events can capture ambiguity attitudes we introduce a tractable method for measuring ambiguity attitudes and apply it in a large representative sample in addition to ambiguity aversion we confirm an ambiguity component recently found in laboratory studies a insensitivity the tendency to treat subjective likelihoods as 50 50 thus overweighting extreme events our ambiguity measurements are associated with real economic decisions specifically a insensitivity is negatively related to stock market participation ambiguity aversion is also negatively related to stock market participation but only for subjects who perceive stock returns as highly ambiguous this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

preference reversals for ambiguity aversion this paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant the reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context dependent weightings of attributes we offer an explanation based on sugden s random reference theory with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

ambiguity in criminal punishment abstract there has been substantial prior field research on how the incidence of criminal behavior responds to changes in the probability of punishment the results of this research are at best mixed in regards to its conformance to the predictions of standard expected utility theory one possible cause for these mixed results is that punishment probabilities in the field are typically unknown making the choice environment one of ambiguity rather than uncertainty the presence of this ambiguity could in part explain some of these conflicting results as a step towards investigating this link we conduct an experiment framed as being on tax compliance intended to try to understand how individuals respond to ambiguous punishment probabilities and in particular to how they respond to shifts in ambiguous versus known probabilities we find that when probabilities are known and shift the standard model works well to explain the response when the probabilities are ambiguous and shift the behavioral response is minimal we also use these experiments as a means of testing whether ambiguity aversion might be present in sufficient degree to be exploitable in how enforcement procedures are advertised to increase their effectiveness at minimal cost we find at best weak evidence in favor of ambiguity aversion and thus little support for the notion that enforcement regimes could take advantage of ambiguity aversion

opaque trading disclosure and asset prices implications for hedge fund regulation we construct a rational expectations equilibrium model to investigate the effect of ambiguity about hedge fund strategies on market efficiency and aggregate welfare in our model some traders mutual funds view the equilibrium trading strategies of other traders hedge funds as ambiguous this ambiguity limits the ability of mutual funds to infer information from prices and affects the market performance we use this analysis to investigate the implications of regulations that affect the amount of ambiguity about hedge fund strategies or the cost of operating a hedge fund our analysis demonstrates how regulations affect asset prices and welfare through their influence on opaque trading

incomplete preferences and equilibrium in contingent markets this paper shows that betting or speculative trading between agents with incomplete preferences is likely to occur if agents have access to convex choice sets this contrasts sharply with endowment economy models where preference incompleteness often hinders betting speculative trading or mutually beneficial insurance arrangements our results imply that decision makers with identical tastes and identical feasible sets will potentially gain from speculative trade for generic status quo allocations we also develop a framework for endogenizing the status quo allocations of decision makers that are treated exogenously in the existing literature finally we provide a tractable differential representation of status quo allocations equilibria and conditions where speculative trade may or may not emerge

rollover risk and market freezes the debt capacity of an asset is the maximum amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral we model a sudden collapse in the debt capacity of good collateral we assume short term debt that must be frequently rolled over a small transaction cost of selling collateral in the event of default and a small probability of meeting a buy to hold investor we then show that a small change in the asset s fundamental value can be associated with a catastrophic drop in the debt capacity the kind of market freeze observed during the crisis of 2007 to 2008 one of the many striking features of the crisis of 2007 to 2008 was the sudden freeze in the market for the rollover of short term debt from an in stitutional perspective the inability to borrow overnight against high quality but long term assets was a market failure that effectively led to the demise of a substantial part of investment banking in the united states more broadly it led to the collapse in the united states the united kingdom and other countries of banks and other financial institutions that had relied on signifi cant maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and in particular on the rollover of short term wholesale debt in the asset backed commercial paper abcp and overnight sale and repurchase repo markets in this paper we are interested in developing a model of a sudden collapse in the ability to borrow short term against long lived assets in the absence of obvious problems of asymmetric information or fears about the value of col lateral we refer to this phenomenon as a market freeze more precisely a market freeze occurs when the debt capacity the maximum amount of collat eralized borrowing that can be supported by an asset is a small fraction of the fundamental value the economic value measured by the net present value npv of the stream of future returns an extreme form of a market freeze occurs when the fundamental value is close to the maximum possible value of the asset whereas the debt capacity is close to the minimum possible value of the asset

tail risk and robust portfolio decisions this paper formulates a portfolio choice problem in a multiasset incomplete market characterized by ambiguous jumps and arbitrary tail assumptions we derive the optimal portfolio in closed form th

social interaction and stock market participation we propose that stock market participation is influenced by social interaction in our model any given social investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate we test this theory using data from the health and retirement study and find that social households those who interact with their neighbors or attend church are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non social households controlling for wealth race education and risk tolerance moreover consistent with a peer effects story the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock market participation rates are higher

ambiguity and nonparticipation the role of regulation we investigate the implications of ambiguity aversion for performance and regulation of markets in our model agents decision making may incorporate both risk and ambiguity and we demonstrate that nonparticipation arises from the rational decision by some traders to avoid ambiguity in equilibrium these participation decisions affect the equilibrium risk premium and distort market performance when viewed from the perspective of traditional asset pricing models we demonstrate how regulation particularly regulation of unlikely events can moderate the effects of ambiguity thereby increasing participation and generating welfare gains our analysis demonstrates how legal systems affect participation in financial markets through their influence on ambiguity the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

keynes meets markowitz the trade off between familiarity and diversification we develop a model of portfolio choice to nest the views of keynes who advocates concentration in a few familiar assets and markowitz who advocates diversification we use the concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to formalize the idea of an investor s familiarity toward assets the model shows that for any given level of expected returns the optimal portfolio depends on two quantities relative ambiguity across assets and the standard deviation of the expected return estimate for each asset if both quantities are low then the optimal portfolio consists of a mix of familiar and unfamiliar assets moreover an increase in correlation between assets causes an investor to increase concentration in familiar assets flight to familiarity alternatively if both quantities are high then the optimal portfolio contains only the familiar asset s as keynes would have advocated in the extreme case in which both quantities are very high no risky asset is held nonparticipation this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

benchmarking superannuation funds based on relative performance in this article we assess fund performance using data envelopment analysis dea for each inefficient fund dea provides a set of role model funds whose best practices may be emulated for performance improvement we find that the role models of most inefficient funds consist entirely of funds different from their own type to overcome this situation we suggest a multi step dea procedure the procedure starts by categorizing funds on a hierarchical basis we establish the hierarchy based on the frequency of efficient funds that belong to each fund type thereafter a set of role model funds for each inefficient fund is found by pooling the funds in its own category and the funds that belongs to the categories at the lower levels in the hierarchy and applying dea this procedure is repeated by augmenting the pool with funds at the next higher level and so on until all the sampled funds are included at each step a set of role models is identified an inefficient fund can thus reach the efficient frontie

selection into auctions for risky and ambiguous prospects we study experimentally the selection into first price sealed bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders a control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes jel c91 d44 d81

microstructure and ambiguity a goal for stock exchanges is to increase participation by firms and investors we show how specific features of the microstructure can reduce perceived ambiguity and induce participation by both investors and issuers we develop a model with sophisticated traders who we view as expected utility maximizers with rational expectations and unsophisticated traders who we view as rational traders facing ambiguity about the payoffs to participating in the market we show how designing markets to reduce ambiguity can benefit investors through greater liquidity exchanges through greater volume and issuing firms through a lower cost of capital

deposit insurance and wealth effects the value of being too big to fail this paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the comptroller of the currency s announcement that some banks were too big to fail and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided using an event study methodology we find positive wealth effects accruing to tbtf banks with corresponding negative effects accruing to non included banks we demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size we also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the wall street journal and not that actually intended by the comptroller the role of deposit insurance has become a topic of increasing debate advocates argue that by removing the incentive to run deposit insurance protects individual financial institutions from instability in the intermediation process thereby providing stability to the financial system as a whole 1 the recent rise in bank failures and the concomitant crises in the s l industry however demonstrate that this stability is not guaranteed moreover critics note that deposit insurance may introduce incentive problems and wealth effects into the financial system both of which can impede the effective functioning of any deposit insurance system these problems have prompted concern about the structure of the current deposit insurance system and have led to numerous proposals regarding its restructuring 2 this paper investigates one aspect of this debate by analyzing the effect on bank equity values of the policy decision to insure completely some banks but not others specifically in september 1984 the comptroller of the currency testified before congress that some banks were simply too big to fail tbtf and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided while not explicitly naming the banks the comptroller admitted that this policy would apply to the eleven largest banks using an event study methodology we analyze