america and trade liberalization the limits of institutional reform among scholars delegation of power to the us president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years according to conventional wisdom delegation to the president sheltered congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the us economy and the emergence of the united states as a world power this article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurred through a close study of the us tariff schedule between 1928 and 1964 focusing on highly protected products we examine which products were subject to liberalization and at what time after 1934 delegation led to a change in trade policy not because congress gave up their constitutional prerogative in this domain but because presidents were able to target the potential economic dislocation that derives from import competition to avoid the creation of a congressional majority willing to halt the trade agreements program

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

government policy and the firm s capital structure abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of commonly observed forms of government intervention on the firm s capital structure we show that since market claims against the firm are always properly priced the firm is forced to take market claimants interests into account on the other hand since government claims are usually not adjusted for risk the firm can take advantage of the government it does so by choosing strategies that extract maximum value minimum cost from these policies in particular the firm uses its capital capital structure to maximize the value of the policy thus leading to a determinate capital strucure

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

setting efficient incentives for agricultural research lessons from principal agent theory a conceptual analysis of important issues in the organization and management of academic research is presented principal agent theory is applied to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists when they differ in ability risk aversion cost of effort and reservation utility and to show the optimal trade off between institutional risk and scientists abilities implications for an efficient organization of research are derived including how scientists incentives should be structured to elicit optimal research efforts and direction whether research direction should be centralized or decentralized and whether the organization of research should be through external competitive grantsor program and institutional funding copyright 2000 oxford university press

a note on macleod s treatment of contestability a model by macleod seeks to correct contestability theory s neglect of strategic interaction among market participants however the model reverses a central assumption of that theory viz that the incumbent s price response lag is longer than the entry lag also the analysis is incomplete and as a result emphasizes internal market conditions rather than entry conditions the focus of contestability theory modifications demonstrate the interaction of internal and entry conditions in determining equilibrium

the smoot hawley tariff a quantitative assessment in the two years after the imposition of the smoot hawley tariff in june 1930 the volume of u s imports fell over 40 to what extent can this collapse of trade be attributed to the tariff itself versus other factors such as declining income or foreign retaliation partial and general equilibrium assessments indicate that the smoot hawley tariff itself reduced imports by 4 8 ceteris paribus although the combination of specific duties and deflation further raised the effective tariff and reduced imports an additional 8 10 a counterfactual simulation suggests that nearly a quarter of the observed 40 decline in imports can be attributed to the rise in the effective tariff i e smoot hawley plus deflation

economic principles and incentives structure management and funding of agricultural research in the united states the problems faced by public agricultural research and land grant system in the us is discussed in the context of its response to public pressure and criticism several proposals are put forward to address these problems which are related to the following issues grant funding versus formula funding breakdown of organized science in agriculture privatization of the land grant system harnessing the efficiencies of competition in public agricultural research and long term social productivity modelling

gradualism in free trade agreements a theoretical justification a notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual rather than immediate reduction of trade barriers in this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non cooperative environment we show that specialization capacity irreversibility and the development of trade partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease over time the lowest obtainable self enforcing tariff by increasing the penalty of future defection sunk costs ensure that the self enforcing trading relationship starts slowly but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve

budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority the divestiture of the house appropriations committee in the1880 s has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature this paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators this framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority the conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized it is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees in addition the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined

a dynamic analysis of university agricultural biotechnology patent production this article examines the factors that account for agricultural biotechnology patenting success among universities using a dynamic count data model it builds a theoretical and econometric model to capture the inherently dynamic and nonlinear process of technological innovation wherein a feedback mechanism from previous success partially determines current patent counts the econometric estimates reveal the importance to agricultural biotechnology patent production of land grant infrastructure quality faculty patent oriented technology transfer offices as well as dynamic feedback effects the advent of exclusive property rights for university research specifically the bayh dole act has created the potential for major changes in the missions of u s universities especially among land grant universities lgus as well as in the overall system of technology creation and distribution in agriculture at the same time new genetic and cloning technologies along with the recently created ability to patent plants and living organisms are profoundly changing the range of agricultural technologies that are likely to be available in the united states and internationally indeed as zilberman yarkin and heiman argue these new agricultural biotechnologies ag biotech and their associated intellectual property rights appear to be creating a new paradigm a veritable revolution in the organization and interaction of university research and the agricultural sector under this new paradigm universities emphasize patenting innovations and then granting at times

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

voting and paying for public goods an application of the theory of the core abstract let any coalition with a majority of all voters have the power to choose the quantities of public goods under rule i a majority coalition bears a cost of its decision that is proportional to its size under rule ii it must bear the whole cost of its decision thus rule i imposes costs on minorities although they have no power to choose the quantities of public goods while rule ii allows goods to have some attributes of semiprivate goods it is shown that a nonempty core under rule i implies a nonempty core under rule ii but not conversely necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the properties of the von neumann morgenstern characteristic function are given

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

tariffs and growth in the late 19th century the paper estimates the correlation between tariffs and economic growth in the late 19th century in the context of three types of growth equation unconditional convergence equations conditional convergence equations and factor accumulation models it does so for a panel of ten countries between 1875 and 1914 tariffs were positively correlated with growth in these countries during this period economic theory is ambiguous as regards the relationship between trade policy and growth the growth literature of the past decade has produced an impressive array of models in which protection can either increase or reduce long run growth rates grossman and helpman 1991 rivera batiz and romer 1991 stokey 1991 young 1991 such theoretical ambiguity invites empirical research while new growth theory is ambiguous on the subject the new empirical growth literature has produced a consensus that free trade is positively associated with growth based on evidence from the late 20th century but see rodrlguez and rodrik 1999 for a sceptical review of the literature the clear

tariff structure trade expansion and canadian protectionism 1870 1910 canada s trade policy at the end of the 19th century is commonly viewed as protectionist and extremely costly in this paper we employ the anderson neary trade restrictiveness index to re examine this view based on product level customs data we show that canadian trade policy between 1870 and 1910 was more restrictive than previously understood but created smaller welfare losses than previously believed these results are primarily driven by high tariffs on inelastic non competing import goods although canada s tariff structure becomes more restrictive over the period our findings indicate it was not as protectionist or as costly as once thought structure tarifaire expansion du commerce et protectionnisme canadien entre 1870 et 1910 la politique commerciale canadienne a la fin du 19e siecle est habituellement consideree comme protectionniste et extremement couteuse dans ce memoire on emploie l indice de restriction du commerce de anderson neary pour reexaminer ce point de vue a partir de donnees du service des douanes au niveau du produit on montre que la politique commerciale canadienne entre 1870 et 1910 a ete plus restrictive que ce qu on avait pense autrefois mais qu elle a cree des pertes de bien etre moindres que ce qu on avait cru anterieurement ces resultats sont d abord engendres par des droits de douanes eleves sur des biens d importation qui ne concurrencent pas les biens domestiques et dont la demande est inelastique meme si la structure tarifaire du canada devient plus restrictive au cours de cette periode les resultats montrent qu elle n est ni aussi protectionniste ni aussi couteuse qu on l a deja pense

delegation ratification and u s trade policy why divided government causes lower tariffs recent research on executive legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation i find that divided government leads to lower u s

entry sunk costs and market structure typically models that study the role of sunk costs suppose that incumbent firms face entry by a single firm each period in this paper the set of equilibrium market structures that result when all firms are free to enter or exit and set prices each period are characterized the effect of sunk costs on the market structure is examined and it is shown that sunk costs can take on various forms each having a different effect on the set of equilibrium market structures costs that are sunk due to the existence of product specific capital do not in general deter entry rather entry deterrence is a necessary outcome only when costs are sunk due to the time it would take to leave the market

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

us monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s the paper provides a survey of fiscal and monetary policies during the 1930s under the hoover and roosevelt administrations and how they influenced the policies during the recent great recession the discussion of the causal impacts of monetary policy focuses on papers written in the last decade and the findings of scholars using dynamic structural general equilibrium modelling the discussion of fiscal policy shows why economists do not see the new deal as a keynesian stimulus describes the significant shift toward excise taxation during the 1930s and surveys estimates of the impact of federal spending on local economies the paper concludes with discussion of the lessons for the present from 1930s monetary and fiscal policy

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

veto points veto players and international trade policy much of the literature on foreign economic policy focuses on the preferences of societal groups to explain policy decisions here however the author emphasizes the effects of domestic political i

assessing public priorities for experiment station research contingent value and public preferences for agricultural research laws concerning government accountability mandate that agencies weigh constituent interests in setting priorities this study extends literature on the value of research by considering the public s stated preferences for scientist effort allocated across an agricultural experiment station s research portfolio over 75 of respondents expressed a willingness to pay exceeding 20 per household for allocations of at least 139 scientist months the mean household is willing to pay about 25 for a 25 increase in effort marginal analysis identifies topic areas where an additional scientist month provides above or below average benefits the distribution of effort across research topics significantly affects respondents values

contestability a revisionist view many claims have been made about the significance of the contribution of contestability theory to industrial organizat ion this paper concludes that contestability theory leaves unanswere d questions about the identity of entrants and the source of their re sources a modification to the theory is proposed rather than as a h indrance to potential entry sunk costs are viewed as being of key si gnificance for the disciplining of oligopolists through potential ent ry with the proposed modification the analysis of the costs of mult iproduct firms may be more easily integrated with recent developments in industrial organization copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

contestability vs competition analyzes the ultra free entry as normative contribution to industrial organization ultra free entry in context of the evolving field of industrial organization assessment of the conceptual validity of william baumol elizabeth bailey john panzar and robert willig s analysis in representing the nature of competition empirical issues in measuring and testing ultra free entry ebsco

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

import prices and the political economy of tariffs evidence from germany japan and the united states 1954 1994 abstract endogenous protection theory suggests that macroeconomic conditions affect tariffs through policy responses to political pressure however import prices affect average tariffs even in the absence of policy changes i examine the effects of import prices and macroeconomic conditions in postwar germany japan and the united states finding strong evidence for the effect of import prices but little evidence consistent with endogenous protection theory

grand missions of agricultural innovation abstract this paper discusses three related examples of mission oriented agricultural institutional innovations associated with substantial crop yield increases in the 20th century it begins with the implementation of the united states land grant system and then discusses in turn the planning and implementation of the two grand missions that led successively to the yield increases in wheat and rice that heralded the onset of the green revolution it notes the remarkable role of the rockefeller foundation in identifying these two missions and selecting personnel developed within the land grant system to execute them with remarkable effectiveness

the rise of us anti dumping activity in historical perspective empirical studies of anti dumping activity focus almost exclusively on the period since 1980 this paper puts recent us anti dumping experience in historical context by studying the determinants of annual case filings over the past half century the conventional view that few anti dumping cases existed prior to 1980 is not correct although most did not result in the imposition of duties the increased number of cases in recent decades largely reflects petitions that target multiple source countries the number of imported products involved has actually fallen since the mid 1980s the annual number of anti dumping cases is influenced by the unemployment rate the exchange rate import penetration closely related to the decline in average tariffs and changes in the anti dumping law and its enforcement in the early 1980s

the structure of protection and growth in the late 19th century there is a vast literature on the relationship between trade policy and growth including several papers on the late 19 th century experience e g o rourke 2000 clemens and williamson 2004 however standard trade models suggest that the structure of protection rather than the overall average tariff level should matter for resource allocation and hence for growth this paper assembles a database of agricultural manufacturing and revenue tariffs for 10 countries between 1875 and 1913 and asks what the relationship was between each of these variables and a aggregate b sectoral growth

measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy this article provides an introduction to the trade restrictiveness index tri which equals the uniform tariff that is welfare equivalent to a given pattern of trade protection unlike standard measures of trade restrictiveness the tri has a solid theoretical basis can incorporate both tariffs and quantitative restrictions and can be adapted to construct the trade policy equivalent of domestic distortions the article compares a number of applications and describes procedures for operationalizing the tri on a personal computer the authors conclude that the tri has considerable potential in empirical work

the political economy of farmland ownership regulations and land prices one of the most ubiquitous forms of agricultural regulation is a restriction on farmland ownership one canadian example of a farmland ownership restriction is the saskatchewan farm security act fsa passed in 1974 the purpose of this article is to explain using a political economy framework why the fsa was implemented and to estimate the effect of the fsa on saskatchewan farmland values a present value pv model is used to estimate the relationship between land values rents and the regulation the hausman endogeneity test reveals that the regulation variable is endogenous with the land price the sign of the regulation variable is negative which fits with the theory i e the more stringent the regulation the lower the land value we estimate that the regulation lowered saskatchewan farmland prices by an average of 4 to 34 us acre depending on whether ordinary least squares ols or two stage least squares tsls is employed in the estimation over the period of 1974 2001