a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

managerial quality team success and individual player performance in major league baseball this paper uses 1969 87 major league baseball data to investigate the impact of managerial quality on team winning and individual player performance managerial quality and player performance are measured as predicted pay based on salary regressions these market based measures permit conclusions about costs and benefits of managerial quality there are two major findings first when player inputs are controlled for higher quality managers lead to higher winning percentages second players tend to play better relative to their prior performance levels the higher the manager s quality these findings suggest that as emphasized by the human resource management literature the quality of management makes an important difference in the performance of organizations

measuring managerial efficiency the case of baseball in economic analysis the role of the entrepreneur is paramount to the production process the entrepreneur is engaged in a darwinian game of efficiently transforming scarce resource inputs into outputs in the modern business organization this role is delegated to managers despite the conceptual importance of the role of management in the production function very little is known about the actual effect on output of variations in managerial skill in part this is due to the lack of proprietory data in part it is due to difficulties in measuring the outputs and inputs of complex production processes in a meaningful way a number of investigators have employed the concept of the frontier production function as developed by forsund and hjalmarsson 1 and timmer 6 and more recently by schmidt and lovell 3 to measure the effect on technical and price efficiency of various property rights structures or institutional constraints to our knowledge estimates of managerial efficiency have not been obtained with firm specific data except for some regulated industries in this study we estimate managerial efficiency by manager and by firm managerial marginal revenue product the rate of change in managerial efficiency over years of experience and relative factor price efficiency we use major league baseball teams over the period 1961 1980 as our data source what is particularly appealing about the choice of major league baseball teams as the industry for analysis is that outputs win percent and inputs player skills are unambiguously measured and the production function is simply specified as shown by scully 5 our results indicate that managerial skill in baseball contributes very substantially to the production process the paper will evolve as follows first the concept of the frontier production function is briefly outlined then estimates of managerial efficiency by manager and by team are provided and discussed a managerial efficiency learning curve is estimated an estimate of managerial marginal revenue product provided and the managerial efficiency

coaching for survival the hazards of head coach careers in the german bundesliga this article analyses how long head coaches survive in the clubs of the first german football league bundesliga where the dismissal of a presumably weak coach is a generally adopted procedure in case of a poor sporting performance of the team we use duration models for repeated events to accommodate the correlation within individuals we find that the head coaches of successful teams and those working during the more recent bosman effect period are more likely to survive in the bundesliga moreover the head coaches of clubs with relatively high team wage bills are likely to survive for shorter periods of time

integration and the structure of public spending he voluminous tax competition literature suggests that increased economic integration leads to reduced tax rates and suboptimal levels of government spending as countries compete for mobile factors of production integration may influence not only the size of the government but also the structure of public spending comprehensive studies analyzing the effect of integration on the overall structure of government spending are rare however this article fills this void by providing an empirical analysis of the effects of economic integration on the overall structure of public spending in a number of organisation for economic co operation and development countries using panel data on the different government spending components for the period 1970 to 2002 the authors find that integration negatively influences government consumption and investment but that there is no empirical evidence that transfers are positively or negatively affected by integration as suggested by the compensation and efficiency views respectively less

the impact of managerial change on performance the role of team heterogeneity when a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents as a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change but only when the team is suciently homogenous otherwise a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did we investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the german football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach indeed we nd substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance only in homogenous teams moreover from a methodological point of view we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession eects which might reconcile previous ndings of no or even negative eects with the vast number of dismissals

social protection and economic integration the politics of pension reform in an era of capital mobility in the past two decades of the 20th century governments around the world began to apportion greater responsibility for old age income provision to individuals and market forces through the privati

democratic institutions and exchange rate commitments since the collapse of the bretton woods system countries have been able to choose from a variety of exchange rate arrangements we argue that politicians incentives condition the choice of an exchange rate arrangement these incentives reflect the configuration of domestic political institutions particularly electoral and legislative institutions in systems where the cost of electoral defeat is high and electoral timing is exogenous politicians will be less willing to forgo their discretion over monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate in systems where the costs of electoral defeat are low and electoral timing is endogenous politicians are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime consequently differences in domestic political systems can help account for variations in the choice of exchange rate arrangements we test this argument using constrained multinomial logit and binomial logit on a sample of twenty democracies over the period 1974 95 domestic political institutions have a significant effect on exchange rate regime choice even after controlling for systemic macroeconomic and other political variables

analysing the technical efficiency of the spanish football league first division with a random frontier model this article analyses technical efficiency of football clubs in the spanish football league division 1 primera liga from the seasons 1995 1996 to 2004 2005 with an unbalanced panel data the random frontier model is used allowing the identification of random variables in the cost frontier it is concluded that the price of capital investment the number of points won and attendance are heterogeneous variables therefore no common public policy aiming to improve efficiency can embrace all of the clubs so that policies by clusters are required

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

globalization and taxation challenges to the swedish welfare state many have argued that the increased international mobility of both capital and labor witnessed in recent years will force advanced capitalist democracies to cut taxes and thus ultimately roll bac

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

time matters postindustrialization new social risks and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies western welfare states were built during the postwar years with one key objective to protect family male breadwinners against the consequences of losing their ability to extract an income from

a bayesian stochastic frontier of italian football this study analyses the technical efficiency of serie a italian football clubs during the 2004 2012 seasons with a bayesian stochastic frontier model using unique data extracted from clubs annual reports specifically the focus of the study is on assessing the impact effects on clubs efficiency whether they are big clubs they employ several foreign player they compete in european competitions and their involvement with football scandals in the italian football the empirical results reveal that efficiency varies among the clubs analysed and policy implications are derived

shirking on the court testing for the incentive effects of guaranteed pay prior work on long term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on major league baseball the current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the national basketball association we employed two different measures of player productivity when the nba s measure is used we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior but when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists definition of marginal product the evidence of shirking evaporates jel j41 j44 l83 i introduction

cost efficiency of french rugby clubs this article analyses the cost efficiency of french first league rugby clubs using a stochastic frontier model the frontier estimation confirmed that the model fits the data well with all coefficients correctly signed and in line with the theoretical requirements the results show that one of the clubs is operating efficiently with the majority of clubs clustered around 20 inefficiency policy implications are derived

the brazilian soccer championship an efficiency analysis this article analyses the top brazilian football league from 2003 to 2011 by estimating a cost function and using a stochastic frontier model among the covariates the number of fans per club and club remoteness is taken into account the brazilian clubs are then ranked according to their technical efficiency during the 2000 2011 period based on the results the policy implication is presented and the economic implications arising from the study are also considered

analysing head coach dismissals in the german bundesliga with a mixed logit approach abstract this article analyzes the dismissal of head coaches in the top tier of german professional football the bundesliga a random parameter logit model is used to analyse the characteristics that are associated with the probability of a coach to be dismissed taking into account uncontrolled heterogeneity of the data policy implications are presented

learning from the behavior of others conformity fads and informational cascades learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior for example why do people tend to converge on similar behavior why is mass behavior prone to error and fads the authors argue that the theory of observational learning and particularly of informational cascades has much to offer economics business strategy political science and the study of criminal behavior

a formal model of learning and policy diffusion we present a model of learning and policy choice across governments governments choose policies with known ideological positions but initially unknown valence benefits possibly learning about those benefits between the model s two periods there are two variants of the model in one governments only learn from their own experiences while in the other they learn from one another s experiments based on similarities between these two versions we illustrate that much accepted scholarly evidence of policy di usion could simply have arisen through independent actions by governments that only learn from their own experiences however di erences between the gametheoretic and decision theoretic models point the way to future empirical tests that discern learning based policy di usion from independent policy adoptions

wage disparity and team productivity evidence from major league baseball using data describing baseball teams from 1985 to 1998 it is found that levine s levine d i 1991 cohesiveness productivity and wage dispersion journal of economic behavior and organization 15 237 255 team cohesiveness hypothesis is supported over ramaswamy and rowthorn s ramaswamy r rowthorn e 1991 efficiency wages and dispersion economica 58 501 514 danger potential hypothesis the implication is that teams with greater wage disparity experience a reduction in team performance 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies this article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions in doing so the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics he presents a formal game theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model s predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence

performance evaluation of the english premier football league with data envelopment analysis this paper uses data envelopment analysis dea to evaluate the performance of english premier league football clubs from 1998 99 to 2002 03 combining sport and financial variables the paper evaluates how close the clubs are relative to the frontier of best practices analysing how they manage sport as well as financial results managerial implications of the research are devised

assessing the importance of tiebout sorting local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 this paper argues that long run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods the tiebout hypothesis we develop an extension of the tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must weakly increase given the secular decline in mobility costs these predictions can be evaluated using historical data we find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across i a sample of u s municipalities 1870 1990 ii all boston area municipalities 1870 1990 and iii all u s counties 1850 1990

a bargaining model of tax competition abstract this paper develops a model in which competing governments offer financial incentives to induce individual firms to locate within their jurisdictions equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes there is no misallocation of capital under two of these specifications and there might or might not be capital misallocation under the third this result contrasts strongly with that of the standard tax competition model which does not allow governments to treat firms individually that model finds that competition among governments almost always leads to capital misallocation

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

team effects on compensation an application to salary determination in the national hockey league leo h kahane studies of salary determination largely model pay as a function of the attributes of the individual and the workplace i e employer size job characteristics and so forth this article empirically investigates an additional factor that may influence individual pay specifically coworker productivity data from professional sports are used to evaluate this question because both salary and teammate performance measures are readily available we find that team attributes have both direct effects on an individual s pay and indirect effects through altering the rates at which individual player productive characteristics are valued jel j31 l83 i introduction when complementary exists between labor inputs individual productivity may be poorly measured by treating the individual worker separately from the character of the organization or team within which he works namely individual productivity may vary when working in different settings to the extent that coworkers offer different degrees of assistance 1 if such complementary between human capital inputs is present say a team dynamic it suggests the possible existence of both team and individual effects on productivity and hence compensation empirical analysis of team effects has been hindered by the lack of data on individuals and their coworkers including managers one source though that contains much of this requisite information is data on professional sports teams in this article we exploit this unique attribute of professional sports data in order to empirically assess the effect of complementarities between labor inputs on individual compensation specifically we use a team sport setting to situate the worker in an organizational environment where we can observe the impact of coworkers on individual productivity thereby allowing us to examine the separate effects of individual and team productivity on salary determination the general question asked is whether individual attributes are valued or rewarded differently in different work environments or in our specific case on different teams this study will investigate these questions by empirically assessing the effects of coworker productivity that is the effects of the qual ity productivity of teammates on individual compensation although a number of different highly team oriented sports would serve our purpose such as basketball this particular study uses data from professional hockey to investigate team effects on compensation 2 the remainder of the article is organized as follows section ii outlines the empirical framework used to analyze the posited team effects and discusses some of the theoretical issues relating to team effects on compensation section iii describes the data used in the analysis section iv reports the empirical results and section v reports our conclusions and directions for further work ii team and coworker effects as noted above the goal of this study is to evaluate empirically whether average coworker attributes 1 affect individual salaries 2 affect the rate at which individual attributes are valued by the firm and 3 are complementary inputs to the attributes of individual team members the question arises though as to why we might expect on theoretical grounds that individual players would earn any part of the team s contribution the classic model of alchian and demsetz 1972 suggests that the capitalist manager will reap the returns from any incremental team output as the primary function of the manager is to discover complementarities between inputs and enhance organizational output by optimally combining resources and to monitor effort so as to reduce shirking as a result the manager will capture all of the returns that are not specific to the inputs in which case we would not expect to observe team effects on individual compensation yet although a manager acting as the residual claimant is one solution to the problem of reducing shirking in the context of complementary inputs whose effort is difficult to monitor other models suggest that it may be desirable to compensate team members based on the value of team output in order to provide optimal incentives for effort for example see akerlof 1982

coaching team production coaching team production the actual function of managers is the subject of much debate using data on more than 3000 male college basketball players their coaches and their skill levels we find a positive and significant relation between our ability to replicate an individual coach s allocation of playing time across players and his winning percentage although this result does not answer the central question of just what it is that managers contribute the results do support the property rights paradigm managers are the employees of workers and more generally sports data can be used to help understand related economic processes where quantifiable measures of inputs and outputs are more costly to obtain what is meant by performance input energy initiative work attitude perspiration rate of exhaustion or output sometimes by inspecting a team member s input activity we can better judge his output effect it is not always the case that watching input activity is the only or best means of detecting measuring or monitoring output effects of each team member but in some cases it is a useful way i introduction a major tenet of the alchian demsetz 1972 representation of the firm is that managers are hired by workers to prevent shirking and malfeasance in their own ranks absent overseers individual workers bear only a fraction of the cost of shirking and hence everyone undersupplies labor relative to its opportunity cost in this world the managerial function is to monitor inputs and meter rewards thereby reducing the incentive to shirk and raising each worker s marginal productivity the more dependence there is in the marginal products of laborers the more important the role of management this view of supervision is simultaneously intuitively pleasing and difficult to quantify this paper investigates the role of management in a setting where indisputably there is team production intercollegiate basketball 1 data on 3012 college basketball players across ten years and sixty five teams are used to replicate one aspect of coaching the allocation of playing time next we attempt to link coaching decisions to winning the goal is to determine if coaches who manage well by our standards are successful section ii motivates the paper in section iii the empirical methodology is detailed the monitoring function is estimated and related to coaching success section iv contains a summary and conclusion ii coaching decisions the essence of team production is interdependence and the inherent immeasurability of marginal productivity across workers however this does not mean that proxies for marginal productivity cannot be developed managers monitor worker inputs and deduce marginal products accordingly of course some inputs are more cheaply quantified than others attitude is hard to measure but heart rate is easy sweat is observed cheaply but workers can feign exhaustion in the famous chinese boatpullers fable the coxswain uses his whip to insure that coolies pull efficiently to persuade each worker to give the appropriate effort 2 mcmanus 1975 341 relates a story told by cheung boats are pulled upstream by a team of coolies prodded by an overseer with a whip an american lady horrified at the sight of the overseer whipping the men as they strained at their harness demanded that something be done about the brutality she was quickly informed those men own the rights to draw boats over this stretch of water and they have hired the overseer and given him his duties here the monitor uses his vision intuition and experience to determine shirking counseling the loafers with his whip but employing subjective observation is just one way to monitor

rule changes and competitive balance in japanese professional baseball i introduction since rottenberg s 1956 classic analysis of baseball s reserve clause economists have been interested in whether the rules for initially allocating players among major league baseball mlb teams affect their final allocation el hodiri and quirk 1971 formalized rottenberg s analysis of player allocation rules for a sports league in which each team independently maximizes its profits within the league s institutional constraints 1 consider the effect of a player draft regime and an open bidding regime on the allocation of new players often called rookies if a player draft allows team a to claim initially a particular new player and that player would generate a higher marginal product with team b then the two teams have incentives to make an exchange and send the player to team b alternatively under an open bidding regime the new player signs with the team presenting the highest offer i e team b with which he generates the highest marginal product assuming that transaction costs of exchanging players are zero el hodiri and quirk showed that the final allocation of players across teams will be the same in both regimes this result that the final allocation of players does not depend on the rules governing the initial allocation of players is baseball s version of the coase theorem following coase s 1960 analysis this invariance result vanishes if there are obstacles to exchanging players after the initial allocation in an open bidding regime players are initially allocated to the team with which they have the highest marginal product thereby eliminating the need for player exchanges since the best players are likely to generate the highest marginal product with teams in cities that have a high demand for winning games in an open bidding regime these teams are likely to have higher winning percentages and win more championships than other teams 2 by contrast in a draft regime the best players are often initially allocated to a team located in a city with a low demand for winning games if there are obstacles to player exchange then players will be allocated more evenly across teams under a draft regime and competitive balance should improve both within a given season and over time 3 empirical studies have used performance data from north american mlb to analyze whether changes in the rules for allocating rookies among teams affect competitive balance fort and quirk s 1995 recent study found that mlb s change in 1965 from an open bidding to a draft regime for allocating new players increased competitive balance in the american league and had little effect on competitive balance in the national league the power of statistical tests conducted with the mlb data is however severely limited due to the small number of observations from the draft regime period this article uses a larger data set from japanese baseball to examine the same rule change that economists have analyzed for mlb remarkable as it may seem the japanese professional baseball league jpbl adopted the same rule change from an open bidding to a draft regime for rookies in the same year 1965 as major league baseball our goal is to examine how the rule change in the jpbl affected competitive balance in its two leagues and to compare the outcomes of these two remarkably similar experiments set in two very different cultures ii studies of north american mlb and japanese jpbl daly and moore 1981 compared player allocation in the two regimes for allocating rookies by examining mlb s 1965 switch from an open bidding to a draft regime they used pre and post 1965 performance data from the american and national leagues to examine several measures of competitive balance in the post 1965 draft regime they found substantially more competitive balance in the american league and somewhat more competitive balance in the national league using different tests for competitive balance fort and quirk 1995 1 282 86 also found evidence for more competitive balance in the american league but found no change in competitive balance in the national league

industrial blackmail dynamic tax competition and public investment a dynamic model of intergovernmental competition for a large plant is presented when local productivity is uncertain one firm determines the location of its plant in each period by conducting an auction soliciting bids from local governments equilibrium subsidies from the local governments are derived the author also consider a two stage game where local governments first choose a level of costly infrastructure then participate in the sequential auction even when costs are identical across locations investing in different levels of infrastructure is a nash equilibrium moreover when infrastructure is endogenous in this manner it is chosen efficiently

baseball specific human capital why good but not great players are more likely to coach in the major leagues the career choice of retiring athletes provides an interesting example of a midcareer transition conditioned on specific human capital previous research examines the determination of earnings in professional sports 3 5 14 but does not consider how skills developed during an athlete s playing years affect subsequent opportunities in this paper i test the hypothesis that skills specific to baseball increase the probability a player will choose to coach the empirical work confirms the importance of baseball specific human capital in the decision to coach and provides some of the first formal evidence that the opportunities of star players differ distinctly from players that are marginally less talented in the theoretical section i develop a random utility model in which a retiring player chooses between coaching and non coaching careers on the basis of potential earnings and a random taste component earnings in either career are determined by a vector of career attributes that embody the player s productivity in each if the random taste component is normally distributed the probability a player chooses a coaching career can be estimated using probit the empirical results support the predictions of the model that baseball specific human capital is positively correlated with the probability of a player coaching and that star players are unlikely to coach because their marginal skill advantage is not baseball specific in particular the findings imply that players with long but unexceptional careers are more likely to coach in the major leagues an extension of the empirical model is applied to the issue of discrimination the insignificance of a black dummy variable suggests that black players have the same probability of coaching as comparably skilled white players however a more complex interactive specification suggests that relatively poor opportunities for black stars outside the game leads to their crowding out those black players who if they were white would most likely coach

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination