buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

oil and natural gas prospects in south america can the petroleum industry pave the way for renewables in brazil abstract a large share of brazil s current investments is concentrated in the development of petroleum resources in new frontiers perspectives for large offshore pre salt fields are particularly good however challenges are also huge on one hand pre salt resources development will draw vast amounts of economic and human resources and pose significant macroeconomic risks on the other hand the petroleum industry can generate multiplicative effects into the country s economy and even more importantly generate rents that can be diverted towards the promotion of renewable energy sources this paper simulates the rent generation of brazil s petroleum development up to 2030 according to the country s current fiscal regime projections of petroleum supply and a probability analysis of brent price evolution and assesses how these economic resources if properly allocated can pave the way for an increased use of renewables in brazil findings show that an ambitious energy innovation program based on a target oriented agency plus a program for solar development would cost less than half the minimum average annual petroleum rent free for investing in renewables between 2013 and 2030 the remaining budget could improve the security of ethanol fuel supply by avoiding the negative impacts of sugar prices spikes on brazil s ethanol production

evaluating the economic impact of planning controls in the united kingdom some implications for housing this paper explores some implica tions for the housing market of the operation of the land use planning system in the united king dom drawing out the relevance of the methodol ogyfor other forms of land use regulation in con trast to the american zoning system the u k system ensures enough land is released to meet foreseeable housing needs by national allocation however the u k system is implemented and mediated locally in response to political and other pressures neo classical comparative stat ics combined with a more behavioral approach enables us to examine the interface between three related sub markets in a rapidly growing region jel r20

pricing decision for substitutable products with retail competition in a fuzzy environment abstract this paper studies the pricing problem of substitutable products in a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competitive retailers the consumer demands and manufacturing costs are of uncertainty which are described by fuzziness based on different market structures one centralized pricing model and three decentralized pricing models are developed and the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions are obtained using the game theoretic approach finally numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results and to gain additional managerial insights

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

the future of oil and bioethanol in brazil abstract this work compares the return on investments roi of oil versus biofuels in brazil although several renewable energy sources might displace oil the country s forte is sugarcane biofuels in our analysis we carry out simplified benefit cost analyses of producing oil fields pre salt oil fields without and with enhanced oil recovery a business as the usual ethanol scenario and a high ethanol scenario excluding the roi from existing oil fields which is the highest when the discount rate is 4 or more the roi of the high ethanol scenario is greater than that of the roi of pre salt oil considering a us 40 t co2 tax the high ethanol scenario s roi is greater than the pre salt oil s roi if a discount rate of 2 or more is adopted moreover the high ethanol scenario throughput up to 2070 compares to 97 of the pre salt oil reserve without eor and demands 78 of its investment pre salt oil production declines beyond 2042 when the country might become a net oil importer in contrast ethanol production reaches 2 1 million boe per day and another 0 9 million boe of fossil demand is displaced through bioelectricity yielding a total of 3 million boe 62 of the country s oil demand

the impact of land use planning and tax subsidies on the supply and price of housing in britain this article presents new empirical estimates of the impact of two types of policy intervention tax subsidies and land use planning on the housing market in britain the estimates are derived from a set of models representing the demand and supply sides of the market for the new private housebuilding which include an explicit land supply element the models are fitted to cross sectional data at the inter urban local authority level and then employed in medium period simulations of alternative policies modelling at this level enables estimates to be made of the extent of variation between local markets in the elasticity of supply and also in the impacts of policy measures including the capitalisation of tax subsidies

research note quantity discounts in differentiated consumer product markets in this paper we extend the standard hotelling model of product differentiation to incorporate a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity that relates to the quantity of the product consumers wish to buy this extension allows us to derive optimal nonlinear pricing rules chosen by competing sellers when offering differentiated products in the marketplace it also permits us to assess whether sellers find it optimal to offer quantity discounts in such a setting and the implications of such discounts on their profitability we find that offering quantity discounts corresponds indeed to equilibrium behavior the extent of discounting declines the less differentiated the products surprisingly when sellers offer to consumers a choice between two different sized packages their profits are at most as high as when such a choice is unavailable moreover when utilizing nonlinear pricing rules is not feasible the profits of the sellers actually decline when they offer consumers a choice between different sized packages a limited empirical investigation supports the comparative statics we derive in our theoretical model

active and passive behaviour in land ownership in recent years empirical studies of the motives and behaviour of landowners have helped enlighten theoretical understandings of the process of land supply for urban development structuralist and behaviourist approaches have both been used in empirical work this paper presents the results of recent research on the involvement of landowners in the local planning process the research points to a much greater variety of landowner behaviour than either acknowledged by structuralist typologies or contained within behaviourist characteristics involvement in the local planning process would however appear to be an early indicator of later activity by the landowner in the development process such early warnings may be useful in enabling landowner behaviour to be predicted

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

the marketing channel as an equilibrium set of contracts nash bargaining theory and recent developments in economic contract theory are employed in the analysis of the marketing channels individual dyadic contracts involving payment schedules between members of a simple 3 level channel are investigated with particular reference to monitoring problems and intrachannel power relations the interrelations between individual contracts are examined and the equilibrium set of contracts constituting the channel derived the performance of the channel in terms of risk sharing allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains is then evaluated it is found that the risk aversion of channel members and the cost of monitoring and enforcement affect channel efficiency and that under certain types of interdependencies and externalities the nature of the power structure is crucial to channel efficiency

housing price land supply and revenue from land sales in a recent study peng and wheaton empirically examine the effect of restrictive land supply on hong kong house prices however we argue that the impact of the supply of new land by the hong kong government is not as important as they maintain in accounting for the volatile house prices in hong kong we show that there is no causal relationship between land supply and housing prices our estimations based on the annual data of hong kong s public land sales find that the government acts to maximise land revenue maximisation of revenue from land sales is however consistent with the efficient allocation of resources we also show that the amount of land sales by the government and land in developers land banks tend to decrease when market interest rates increase land banking behaviour is governed by economic conditions long term land holding costs should cover interest costs

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

emissions reduction scenarios in the argentinean energy sector in this paper the leap tiam ecn and gcam models were applied to evaluate the impact of a variety of climate change control policies including carbon pricing and emission constraints relative to a base year on primary energy consumption final energy consumption electricity sector development and co2 emission savings of the energy sector in argentina over the 2010 2050 period the leap model results indicate that if argentina fully implements the most feasible mitigation measures currently under consideration by official bodies and key academic institutions on energy supply and demand such as the probiomass program a cumulative incremental economic cost of 22 8 billion us 2005 to 2050 is expected resulting in a 16 reduction in ghg emissions compared to a business as usual scenario these measures also bring economic co benefits such as a reduction of energy imports improving the balance of trade a low co2 price scenario in leap results in the replacement of coal by nuclear and wind energy in electricity expansion a high co2 price leverages additional investments in hydropower by way of cross model comparison with the tiam ecn and gcam global integrated assessment models significant variation in projected emissions reductions in the carbon price scenarios was observed which illustrates the inherent uncertainties associated with such long term projections these models predict approximately 37 and 94 reductions under the high co2 price scenario respectively by comparison the leap model using an approach based on the assessment of a limited set of mitigation options predicts an 11 3 reduction the main reasons for this difference include varying assumptions about technology cost and availability co2 storage capacity and the ability to import bioenergy an emission cap scenario 2050 emissions 20 lower than 2010 emissions is feasible by including such measures as ccs and bio ccs but at a significant cost in terms of technology pathways the models agree that fossil fuels in particular natural gas will remain an important part of the electricity mix in the core baseline scenario according to the models there is agreement that the introduction of a carbon price will lead to a decline in absolute and relative shares of aggregate fossil fuel generation however predictions vary as to the extent to which coal nuclear and renewable energy play a role

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

estimates of ghg emission reduction potential by country sector and cost abstract in this study emission reduction potentials in greenhouse gases ghg are assessed by country sector and cost using a ghg emission reduction assessment model with high resolutions with respect to region and technology and high consistency in terms of assumptions interrelationships and solution principles model analyses show that large potential reductions can be achieved at low cost in developing countries and power sectors in addition cost efficient emission reductions were evaluated for some international emission reduction targets that have been derived on the basis of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities among developed and developing countries if 1 emission reduction measures at negative costs and below 50 tco 2 for developed countries 2 intensity improvement measures for selected sectors at negative costs and below 20 tco 2 for major developing countries and 3 all emission reduction measures with negative costs for other developing countries in 2020 are adopted then emission reductions of 8 9 14 8 and 27 7 gtco 2 eq yr compared to the technology frozen case can be expected in developed countries major developing countries and globally corresponding to a 11 decrease 40 increase and 17 increase from 2005 levels respectively large scale emission reductions can be achieved even if co 2 intensity targets for major sectors are assumed for major developing countries

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

firm strategies in the mid tail of platform based retailing while millions of products are sold on its retail platform amazon com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them most of these products are sold by third party sellers who pay amazon a fee for each unit sold empirical evidence clearly suggests that amazon tends to sell high demand products and leave long tail products for independent sellers to offer we investigate how a platform owner such as amazon facing ex ante demand uncertainty may strategically learn from these sellers early sales which of the mid tail products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell the platform owner s cherry picking of the successful products however gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level unobserved by the platform owner we analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game theoretic model with two types of sellers one with high demand and one with low demand we show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller s demand interestingly the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller s product whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner s threat of entry the platform owner s entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period although it increases consumer surplus in the later period we also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

direct marketing indirect profits a strategic analysis of dual channel supply chain design the advent of e commerce has prompted many manufacturers to redesign their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct sales the model conceptualizes the impact of customer acceptance of a direct channel the degree to which customers accept a direct channel as a substitute for shopping at a traditional store on supply chain design the customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an indepent manufacturer would open a direct channel to compete with its own retailers here direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though it is inefficient on its own and surprisingly it can profit the manufacturer even when so direct sales occur specifically we construct a price setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer direct marketing which indirectly increases the flow of profits through the retail channel helps the manufacturer improve overall profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization while operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer s pricing behavior the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction this combination of manufacturer pull and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium finally we show that the mere threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer s negotiated share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other business practices

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

leaving oil underground in ecuador the yasuni itt initiative from a multi criteria perspective abstract the ecuadorian proposal to keep 846 million barrels of crude oil in the yasuni national park underground for the purposes of avoiding co2 emissions and to protect both the biological diversity and the indigenous peoples in isolation who inhabit this area of the amazon is evaluated from a multi criteria analysis the main purpose of the paper is to compare this policy option with other alternatives across different values an analytical framework is used that recognises the inherent complexity of a problem of this nature in which the financial values are indeed relevant for policy but other values are also relevant the economic in a broad sense social environmental cultural and political the results confirm that from a financial standpoint extracting the oil is preferable but by incorporating the non monetary values into the multi criteria decision process one can plausibly defend the yasuni itt initiative as the most desirable policy option indeed the social and environmental benefits or criteria signalling an economic transition towards a model based on renewable sources of energy along with the protection of critical environmental and social capital make up for the financial gap

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

note channel of distribution profits when channel members form conjectures it is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral manufacturer reseller monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits they take each other s decisions as given i e adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximizing decisions consequently there is an economic justification for 1 vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or 2 contracts that change channel members incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits this paper investigates the possibility that coordination might take place without formal arrangements like vertical integration or contracts the reason for this contention is the casual observation that channel members are often acutely aware of the interdependencies between channel participants we might thus expect that they will form conjectures about other channel members reactions to their own actions we show that rational conjectures lead profit maximizing channel members to adopt modified decisions rules can such conjectural decision making create at least partially channel coordination or cooperation in other words can channel members deviate from the nash equilibrium and thus achieve greater profits the answer given in this paper is a conditional yes

the impact of competitive entry in a developing market upon dynamic pricing strategies this paper analyzes dynamic pricing strategies for new durable goods in a two period context the first period is characterized as a monopoly market structure for a new product having dynamic demand the second period begins when a new firm enters the market and thereby changes the market structure to a duopolistic one we begin by analyzing the pricing strategies of three types of monopolists nonmyopic myopic and surprised a nonmyopic monopolist is a first entrant who perfectly predicts the competitive entry a myopic monopolist totally discounts the duopolistic period and a surprised monopolist is a first entrant who has the longer time horizon of the nonmyopic monopolist but who does not foresee the competitive entry our results indicate that the nature of these pricing strategies may be quite different it is optimal for the nonmyopic firm to price its product at a higher level than the myopic monopolist additional results indicate under what circumstances the surprised monopolist will p

energy contribution to latin american indcs analyzing sub regional trends with a times model central and south america and the caribbean countries share energy and climate features that are quite different from the rest of the world including a highly renewable energy mix and very high renewable energy potentials along with high deforestation and degradation rates which call for regional answers to regional issues this paper assesses the impact of national contributions to the united nations framework convention on climate change using an energy prospective model from the markal times family this approach enables a bottom up comparison between past pledges nationally appropriate mitigation actions and the nationally determined contributions ndcs agreed on at cop21 long term economic optimization leads to decarbonizing the power sector even in the absence of climate constraints stringent climate policies as modeled here achieve emission reductions of 40 below the current baseline by 2050 ndcs produce stronger emission reductions than namas at regional scale however the first contributor to emission reductions in absolute terms in latin america is the agriculture forestry and other land use afolu sector not energy

the environmental paradox in generation how south america is gradually becoming more dependent on thermal generation there has been an increasing focus on global warming emission of green house gases ghg and the problems this might create in this article we review the trend in sustainable and renewable electricity generation in south america where the generation portfolio increasingly depends on thermal generation in particular gas south america is a region that has relatively low emissions but the current development is not desirable in environmental terms we analyze the underlying reasons for this development which is related to security of supply deregulation and the cost of renewable energy we review and discuss the policies to promote renewables in the region we analyze the potential advantages and drawbacks of different types of market interventions such as direct subsidies that create potentially strong market distortions more sophisticated market interventions that might be less intrusive but not necessarily as effective as e g firm energy markets we also review market based solutions such as the clean market mechanism and its potential and the use of renewable electricity in non interconnected zones which might be one of the most economically attractive applications of renewables however without a stronger and more aggressive intervention from the governments in the region it is unlikely that the increase in thermal generation can be stopped

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

price and lead time decisions in dual channel supply chains abstract manufacturers today are increasingly adopting a dual channel to sell their products i e the traditional retail channel and an online direct channel empirical studies have shown that service quality we focus on the delivery lead time of the direct channel even goes beyond product price as one of the major factors influencing consumer acceptance of the direct channel delivery lead time has significant effects on demand profit and pricing strategy however there is scant literature addressing the decision on the promised delivery lead time of a direct channel and its impact on the manufacturer s and retailer s pricing decisions to fill this gap we examine the optimal decisions of delivery lead time and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual channel supply chain using the two stage optimization technique and stackelberg game and analyze the impacts of delivery lead time and customer acceptance of a direct channel on the manufacturer s and retailer s pricing behaviours we analytically show that delivery lead time strongly influences the manufacturer s and the retailer s pricing strategies and profits our numerical studies reveal that the difference between the demand transfer ratios in the two channels with respect to delivery lead time and direct sale price customer acceptance of the direct channel and product type have great effects on the lead time and pricing decisions

a note on competitive supply chains with generalised supply costs abstract this note generalises models from two influential papers in the theory of supply chain outsourcing under competition mcguire and staelin 1983 cachon and harker 2002 the first paper studies the impact of competitive intensity on the outsourcing decision from the supplier s point of view for linear supply cost the second paper examines the impact of supply economies of scale from the retailer s point of view when selling perfectly substitutable products by considering competitive intensity and supply economies of scale simultaneously we find that equilibrium channel structures are primarily determined by the competitive intensity which is true even under supply diseconomies of scale the key message in the second paper of scale economies driving retailer s outsourcing supply decision is highly dependent on the assumption of perfect substitutes our finding has no qualitative difference when either the suppliers or the retailers are modeled as the channel leader and make the outsourcing decisions

competition and cooperation between supply chains in multi objective petroleum green supply chain a game theoretic approach petroleum supply chain is one of the most important and sophisticated managing missions in both developing and developed countries nowadays environmental pollution is another critical factor in designing the petroleum supply chain this importance encourages the governments to minimize the amount of environmental pollution and maximize their obtained profit simultaneously by enacting required legislations on the transportation modes and the refineries considering maximizing the job creation and each stakeholder s profit and minimizing the emission of co2 and other greenhouse gases at the same time is called sustainable petroleum supply chain which has been paid little attention despite its significance therefore the modelling of petroleum supply chain considering sustainability and pricing issues is investigated for the first time in this work and a sustainable competitive petroleum supply chain scpsc model is developed to minimize pollution while maximizing the profits and job creation this problem is a two level model the first level in scpsc is the competition between the supply chains of the government and the private sectors which is modelled by the game theory approach including nash and stackelberg equilibria the optimal price and demand for each supply chain determined in the first level are considered as the second level parameters in the second level the optimal values of the decisions in designing the petroleum supply chain will be obtained by solving mixed integer linear programming milp under the mentioned three objective functions finally the proposed model is applied to a real world case in the national iranian oil company nioc based on the results of the stackelberg equilibrium the government profits increase by 11 12 while that of the private sector decreases by 25 4 and 28 11 increasing in the government profit is due to increased demand provided by government the results show that the whole profit of the petroleum supply chain in nash equilibrium is 9 8 more than that in the stackelberg equilibrium

the determination of the price of land received theories of the land market are inadequate since they ignore the supply of land it is known that occupiers of land are usually unwilling to sell at the market price but require compensation for being forced to move incorporating this as a theory of supply into land market theory allows us to explain or predict that a urban sprawl will occur in the absence of planning controls b a development gains tax will slow down the rate of development of land and increase its price c whether land is owner occupied or occupied by tenants will affect its development and d powers of compulsory purchase may be necessary for certain kinds of development but may cause social costs

coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain abstract this paper studies coordination mechanisms in a supply chain which consists of two suppliers with capacity uncertainties selling differential yet substitutable products through a common retailer who faces price sensitive random demand of these two products we develop in a noncompetitive setting three coordination models revenue sharing return policy and combination of revenue sharing and return policy and contrast them with a basic and uncoordinated model we are able to establish the ordinal relationship among the retailer s ordering and pricing decisions and analytically compare the performances between certain models when two suppliers are identical we find that the retailer s ordering and pricing decisions in the model with return policy in the case of identical suppliers are independent of demand or supply uncertainty our numerical results reveal that the performances of coordination models in the case of nonidentical suppliers resemble those in the case of identical suppliers we find that the retailer will place a larger order quantity in models where her average cost per unit sold is smaller we also find that product substitutability and uncertainties have different effects on chain performances

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

introduction of a second channel implications for pricing and profits in this paper we study the optimal pricing strategies when a product is sold on two channels such as the internet and a traditional channel we assume a stylized deterministic demand model where the demand on a channel depends on prices degree of substitution across channels and the overall market potential we first study four prevalent pricing strategies which differ in the degree of autonomy for the internet channel for a monopoly we provide theoretical bounds for these pricing strategies we also analyze the duopoly case where an incumbent mixed retailer faces competition with a pure retailer and characterize price equilibria finally through a computational study we explore the behavior price and profits under different parameters and consumer preferences for the alternative channels

a stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry abstract we consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader follower type move each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm we show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally we then devise a simple to implement information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off we also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results

manufacturer s revenue sharing contract and retail competition this paper investigates a revenue sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers the manufacturer as a stackelberg leader offers a revenue sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season under the offered contract terms the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season the process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the bayesian nash game on the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers the manufacturer designs the revenue sharing contract adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods the study finds that the provision of revenue sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price only contract however the benefits earned under the revenue sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price sensitivity factors the paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers lastly it investigates how the competition between retailers factor influences the decision making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability