cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

competition between telecommunications operators abstract many observers of the telecommunications industry predict that regulation will soon give way to competition policy the paper analyzes unregulated network competition both in the mature and the transition phase of the industry it considers competition in linear or nonlinear prices for customers and also considers both nondiscriminatory pricing and termination based discriminatory pricing the paper investigates whether freely negotiated access charges are compatible with effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and do not erect barriers to entry in the transition towards competition last it analyzes the meaning and impact of the efficient component pricing rule in the context of network competition

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

labor market returns to two and four year college the paper examines labor market returns to a two and four year college education analysis of the 1972 national longitudinal survey of youth observation that the average person who attended a two year college earned about 10 percent more than those without any college education comparison with the wages of those who attended a four year college education

opec and the international oil market can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development abstract the opec cartel was formed to promote two economic goals one microeconomic low oil market volatility the other macroeconomic promotes economic development of its members these goals create a tension since the cartel s single tool is output quotas using this dual micro macro perspective we analyze oil exporting countries behavior we find that the effects of the cartel s choices will be reflected in oil market stability long term macroeconomic development and international oil market structure if an oil producing country cares about both oil industry profits and macroeconomic stability the goal of output stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership

price cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment this article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare maximizing regulation of price and quantity regulated firms invest in smaller more frequent increments than social planners with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate and at higher levels when they are substantial when quantity is also regulated the average cost of building capacity increases but the price cap decreases immediately after firms make their initial investment regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap to induce additional investment

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

industry and firm specific factors of innovation novelty this article investigates the underlying factors that might shape the firm s choices with respect to degrees of innovation novelty using a sample of 2983 firms observed under the portuguese community innovation survey we assess the relative relevance of a set of firm and industry specific factors in explaining firms choices about incremental or radical innovation the results indicate that both the firm s idiosyncratic historical factors giving rise to heterogeneous r d capabilities and the industry context have power to shape the firm s innovation choices even though firm specific factors appear to be more powerful the estimated impacts on firm s innovation novelty are nonetheless significantly moderated by the type of firm and industry

the welfare effects of different pricing schemes for electricity distribution in finland the main components of electricity prices can be divided into the wholesale price the price of network operations and taxes even if the wholesale price is determined efficiently total welfare can be significantly disturbed if network operations are priced inefficiently in this study we calculate network prices based on four alternative methods these are marginal cost pricing ramsey pricing fdc pricing and optimal two part tariffs the welfare effects on the prevailing pricing system are compared we show that potentially significant improvements in welfare can be achieved by using marginal cost prices or optimal two part tariffs also ramsey pricing indicates that prevailing prices are inefficient

network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers abstract this paper analyses two way access pricing in a telecommunications market where consumers are heterogeneous in their demand for calls and firms are allowed to use non linear tariffs we first investigate how the presence of access charges affects the tariffs offered by firms in symmetric equilibrium next we show that under certain conditions each firm s profit is independent of the level of reciprocal access charge and therefore collusion using access charges is not sustainable this result suggests that efficient call allocations can be achieved under a minimal regulatory intervention i e recommending firms set access charges equal to call termination cost

access price regulation investment and entry in telecommunications abstract we consider a model with a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who faces rival operators in the retail market we examine the network operator s incentives for infrastructure investment we find that investments are below the social optimum even when there is no regulation and access price regulation further reduces investment incentives we show that the underinvestment problem may have negative effects on the viability of competition access price regulation does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of foreclosure and in the presence of regulation rivals are most likely to be foreclosed when they would bring highest benefits to consumers

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain this paper studies optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks with large sunk costs and uncertain revenues using techniques from the option pricing literature we show that the optimal access price corresponds to a risk free form of the efficiency component pricing rule ecpr that is where the opportunity cost is based on the risk free rate of return we also show that at levels of revenue above the optimal level that triggers entry the entrant should pay a premium above risk free ecpr that rewards the incumbent for relinquishing his rights to the risky cash flows at the higher revenue level

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

the effect of attending the flagship state university on earnings a discontinuity based approach abstract this paper examines the effect of attending the flagship state university on the earnings of 28 to 33 year olds by combining confidential admissions records from a large state university with earnings data collected through the state s unemployment insurance program to distinguish the effect of attending the flagship state university from the effects of confounding factors correlated with the university s admission decision or the applicant s enrollment decision i exploit a large discontinuity in the probability of enrollment at the admission cutoff the results indicate that attending the most selective state university causes earnings to be approximately 20 higher for white men

the access pricing problem with deregulation a note this note extends the analysis of m armstrong c doyle and j vickers 1996 to the case of retail price deregulation it is shown that the optimal access price may be above below or in the linear case equal to marginal cost that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the efficient component pricing rule and that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price rather than the margin is regulated

capital structure and investment in regulated network utilities evidence from eu telecoms this article analyzes the relationship between firm financial and investment decisions and regulatory outcomes in network industries where regulatory opportunism is often viewed to lead to underinvestment we develop a model to describe the effect of an increase in leverage on regulated rates retail as well as wholesale and company investment we then test the model s predictions using a panel of 15 eu public telecommunication operators ptos over the period 1994 2005 our results show that the data cannot reject the model s predictions that leverage positively affects regulated wholesale and retail rates as well as the ptos investment rate moreover since leverage does affect wholesale charges that alternative operators pay to access to the incumbent s network infrastructure we also find that an increase in leverage is followed by a decrease in the number of competitors and by an increase of the incumbent s market share this suggests that the use of debt to discipline the regulator s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network industry may somewhat impair or delay retail market competition but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem

innovation and industry evolution the theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents by contrast we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are challengers moreover we consider a sequence of innovations so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after but only until the next better innovation is developed we begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the schumpeterian process of creative destruction that is a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger the essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods the new methods of production or transportation the new markets the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates schumpeter 1942 pp 82 83

price regulation of access to telecommunications networks abstract without access of networks to each other competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system wide monopolist one way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants while two way access concerns the interconnection between networks whereas one way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power two way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities among the numerous pricing rules discussed none clearly dominates this article provides a roadmap vis a vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation

promoting competition in the presence of essential facilities this paper addresses how to use simple access pricing to promote entry in the presence of spillovers and essential facilities an inherent dilemma is that the greater the spillover the greater is the benefit of attracting good entrants but the harder it is to exclude low quality entrants because they can free ride on the quality of good entrants we show that the inability to discriminate between entrants has the effect of discouraging access prices that enable the low quality entrant to enter generates a time consistency problem and provides incentives for good quality entrants to limit their competitiveness

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

do family wealth shocks affect fertility choices evidence from the housing market abstract this paper uses wealth changes driven by housing market variation to estimate the effect of family resources on fertility decisions using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that a 100 000 increase in housing wealth among home owners causes a 16 to 18 increase in the probability of having a child there is no evidence of an effect of msa level housing price growth on the fertility of renters however we also present evidence that housing wealth growth increases total fertility and that the responsiveness of fertility to housing wealth has increased over time commensurate with the recent housing boom

the effect of liquid housing wealth on college enrollment this article uses short run housing wealth changes to identify the effect of housing wealth on college attendance i find that households used their housing wealth to finance postsecondary enrollment in the 2000s when housing wealth was most liquid each 10 000 in home equity raises college enrollment by 0 7 of a percentage point on average the effect is localized to lower resource families for whom a 10 000 increase in housing wealth increases enrollment by 5 7 percentage points these estimates imply that the recent housing bust could significantly negatively affect college enrollment through reduction in the housing wealth of families with college age children

housing wealth property taxes and labor supply among the elderly we investigate the relationship between housing wealth property taxes and elderly labor supply using longitudinal data from the health and retirement survey spanning the recent boom bust housing cycle when combined with msa specific house price indexes the data provide plausibly exogenous variation in housing wealth identified through within msa renter homeowner comparisons our findings suggest that elderly households respond to variation in housing wealth and property taxes in the predicted opposing directions that wealth influences labor supply to a lesser extent than factors like health and marital status and that the effect of housing wealth on labor supply varies by gender and age

distribution access pricing application of the oftel rule to a yardstick competition scheme the paper formulates an access pricing model applied to electricity distribution based on the uk office of telecommunications oftel model originally structured to price telecommunications monopolistic essential facilities the aim is to achieve an optimal access price charge in an environment where a distribution network monopoly serves both regulated and nonregulated customers the nonregulated market faces competition so that the competitors must use the network to reach their customers a usage based hybrid model is proposed to couple with a tariff scheme for regulated customers that uses yardstick competition a way to set appropriated opportunity costs by the use of the oftel model is introduced finally the paper focuses on properly recognizing both regulated distribution and competitive supply costs the scheme is assessed within the chilean regulatory scheme proposing a way to establish marginal and fixed distribution costs for distribution companies

strategic behaviour in contests evidence from the 1992 barcelona olympic games analyses of strategic behaviour in contests conclude that the manner in which a contest participant exerts effort over time is systematically related to her status as a pre race underdog or favourite recently baik and shogren 1992 extented dixit s 1987 original work by incorporating endogenous order of moves by the race participants they conclude that it is always in the best interest of the underdog to move first while the favourite s optimal strategy is to wait moving second the particular economic context in which this work was framed e g research and development races makes it extremely difficult to subject the game theoretic conclusions to empirical scrutiny we solve this problem by applying the theoretical hypotheses to the track and field events held during the 1992 barcelona olympics using a fixed effects estimation procedure we find ample support for the conclusions of baik and shogren that favourites tend to start slowly in races and increase effort as the event transpires whi

quantile treatment effects of college quality on earnings we use administrative data from texas to estimate how graduating from a state flagship or a community college relative to a nonflagship university affects the distribution of earnings we control for the selection of students across sectors using a rich set of observable ability and background characteristics and find evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the returns to quality returns increase with earnings among ut austin graduates but decline among texas a m graduates for community colleges returns are negative for lower earners but go to zero for higher earners our estimates also point to differences in the distribution of returns by race ethnicity

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

the effect of housing wealth on college choice evidence from the housing boom we use nlsy97 data to examine how home price variation affects the quality of postsecondary schools students attend we find a 10 000 increase in housing wealth increases the likelihood of public flagship university enrollment relative to nonflagship enrollment by 2 0 percent and decreases the relative probability of attending a community college by 1 6 percent these effects are driven by lower income families predominantly by altering student application decisions we also find home price changes affect direct quality measures of institutions students attend furthermore for lower income students each 10 000 increase in home prices leads to a 1 8 percent increase in the likelihood of completing college

housing wealth and labor supply evidence from a regression discontinuity design abstract this paper uses the discontinuity in house size generated by chinese housing policies to identify the effect of housing wealth on labor supply the analysis finds a substantial deterrent effect of housing wealth on labor supply much of the housing wealth effect comes from the labor participation decision with the effect on employed workers being ambiguous females young generation and households with high repayment capacity are more responsive to gains in housing wealth

access pricing and competition abstract in many industries electricity telecommunications railways the network can be described as a natural monopoly a central issue is how to combine the necessary regulation of the network with the organization of competition in activities which use the network as an input and are potentially competitive generation of electricity value added services road transportation in this paper we derive access pricing formulas in the framework of an optimal regulation under incomplete information first we study how access pricing formulas take into account the fixed costs of the network and the incentive constraints of the natural monopoly over the network second we examine the difficulties coming from the accounting impossibility to disentangle costs of the network and costs of the monopoly s competitive goods third the analysis is extended to the cases where governmental transfers are prohibited where the competitors have market power and where competitors are not regulated fourth the possibility some consumers bypass the network is taken into account finally the role of access pricing for inducing the best market structure is assessed the conclusion summarizes our results and suggests avenues of further research

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

technological diffusion with social learning this paper attributes the slow diffusion of innovations to an informational externality in the adoption process the profitability of new technologies is uncertain but firing can learn progressively through observing the adoption experience of others given this prospect of social learning every firm would prefer that other firms adopt before it does in the absence of explicit coordination the firms could end up in a sequence of waiting contests this results in staggered adoptions even when all firms are ex ante identical the pace of diffusion is determined endogenously and shown to depend on the characteristics of the innovation copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

does it pay to attend an elite private college cross cohort evidence on the effects of college type on earnings although a substantial and rising labor market premium is associated with college attendance in general little is known about how this premium varies across institutions of different types and across time in this paper we explicitly model high school students choice of college type characterized by selectivity and control based on individual and family characteristics including ability and parental economic status and an estimate of the net costs of attendance we estimate selectivity corrected outcome equations using data from both the national longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 and high school and beyond which permit us to determine the effects of college quality on wages and earnings and how this effect varies across time even after controlling for selection effects strong evidence emerges of a significant economic return to attending an elite private institution and some evidence suggests this premium has increased over time

sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality abstract in this paper we examine how the timing of investment affects the levels of quality chosen by firms we show that in a model with vertical quality differentiation a game with sequential quality choice induces both firms to make smaller quality investments than they would in a game with simultaneous quality choice furthermore we show that while aggregate profit is higher both consumer and social surplus are lower under sequential quality choice

access to bottleneck inputs under oligopoly a prisoners dilemma we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market first two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept if any second firms compete on salop s circle the firms may be asymmetrically located on the circle to reflect differences in consumer shares for some levels of asymmetry the incumbents face a prisoners dilemma with respect to conceding access to their bottleneck inputs entry by a downstream firm may lead to lower retail prices however entry may also lead to higher retail prices for the access provider and for the entrant we also consider the cases where there are several incumbents and where the entrant makes the access price offers

asymmetric information acquisition and behavior in role choice models an endogenously generated signaling game the authors employ a static homogeneous good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods the model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behavior asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern the informed uninformed firm chooses to assume the leader s follower s role moreover if information is costly the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information thus identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially this is the unique refined equilibrium outcome copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

strategic pricing of grid access under partial price caps electricity distribution in england and wales abstract it is perceived in public debate that monopolistic network operators who are vertically integrated into competitively organised activities would raise excessive access charges to derail competition by newcomers economic reasoning however suggests that the level of access charges is at least in a simple setting irrelevant for the intensity of entry by newcomers in a setting where access charges are price cap regulated theoretical considerations and empirical findings for the case of electricity distribution in england and wales even suggest that inefficiently high access charges correspond with intense market entry efficiency concerns remain nonetheless if regulated by a practicable partial price cap the network operator may enforce monopolistic access charges in certain market segments access charges in other segments may be lowered strategically and may even be cross subsidised

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

second mover advantage and entry timing we describe a model of entry timing assuming that a second mover can benefit from observing the experience of a first mover we focus on how market attractiveness characteristics such as size and cost affect the time until first entry the effects depend on whether the number of participants is exogenous or endogenous in the former case a more attractive market leads to earlier entry in the latter case it leads to later entry treating the number of firms as an integer free entry leads to non monotone but testable effects of market attractiveness on entry timing

credit constraints and demand for higher education evidence from financial deregulation abstract we use staggered banking deregulation across states in the united states to examine the impact of the resulting increased credit supply on college enrollment from the 1970s to the early 1990s our research design produces estimates that are not confounded by wealth effects due to changes in income or housing wealth we find that lifting banking restrictions raises college enrollment by about 2 6 percentage points 4 9 we rule out alternative interpretations by examining results for different income groups and bankrupt households we also find similar effects for two year or four year college completion and supporting evidence in household educational borrowing

optimal bypass and cream skimming this paper develops a normative model of regulatory policy toward bypass and cream skimming it analyzes the effects of bypass on second degree price discrimination on the rent of the regulated firm and on the welfare of low demand customers it shows that pricing under marginal cost may be optimal for the regulated firm excessive cream skimming occurs if access to the bypass technology is not regulated and the prohibition of bypass may increase or decrease the regulated firm s rent jel 026 613 the regulation of natural monopolies is often associated with policies toward competition including restrictions on entry this paper is concerned with a common form of competition which threatens the regulated firm on its most lucrative markets examples abound in the telecommunications industry the development of microwave radio and communication satellites in the 1960 s introduced the possibility that big telecommunication customers might bypass the major common carrier att and the 1978 natural gas policy act in the united states has created the possibility for industrial plants to bypass the local distribution utilities by building direct connections to the pipelines gas producers or intermediaries

house prices wealth effects and labour supply we examine the impact of house prices on labour supply decisions using uk microdata we combine household survey data with local level house price measures and controls for local labour demand our microdata also allow us to control for individual level income expectations we find significant house price effects on labour supply consistent with leisure being a normal good labour supply responses to house prices are concentrated among young married female owners and older owners this finding suggests that house prices affect the decisions of marginal workers in the economy our estimates imply that house prices are economically important in the participation decisions for these workers

cohort crowding how resources affect collegiate attainment abstract analyses of college attainment typically focus on factors affecting enrollment demand including the financial attractiveness of a college education and the availability of financial aid while implicitly assuming that resources available per student on the supply side of the market are elastically supplied the higher education market in the united states is dominated by public and non profit production and colleges and universities receive considerable subsidies from state federal and private sources because consumers pay only a fraction of the cost of production changes in demand are unlikely to be accommodated fully by colleges and universities without commensurate increases in non tuition revenue for this reason public investment in higher education plays a crucial role in determining the degrees produced and the supply of college educated workers to the labor market using data covering the last half of the twentieth century we find strong evidence that large cohorts within states have relatively low undergraduate degree attainment reflecting less than perfect elasticity of supply in the higher education market that large cohorts receive lower public subsidies per student in higher education explains this result indicating that resources have large effects on degree production our results suggest that reduced resources per student following from rising cohort size and lower state expenditures are likely to have significant negative effects on the supply of college educated workers entering the labor market

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

pricing access forward looking versus backward looking cost rules abstract regulators across many different jurisdictions and industries have recently adopted the practice of setting access prices based on the current costs of providing the relevant facilities though widely regarded as being efficient the efficiency implications of using current costs instead of historical costs have not been formally analyzed our analysis shows that given stochastic costs forward looking access prices retard investment and are generally dominated by access prices determined by historical cost whenever investment is desired

price and access charge discrimination in electricity distribution an application to the chilean case this paper presents and analyzes a model of electricity distribution in chile with three alternative regulatory pricing contract schemes for assigning a common capacity cost to final customers and competitive energy sellers the first scheme involves ramsey pricing while under the second and third schemes the monopoly chooses final prices and access charges subject either to a peak load physical cap or a total revenue price cap constraint in addition we consider circumstances in which the regulator does not know consumer demand the monopoly cannot price discriminate beyond a range defined by the marginal cost as a floor and the stand alone cost as a ceiling and access charges are set at the fully distributed cost allocation level currently in force the model is calibrated with chilean data and demonstrates that in terms of social welfare the fully distributed cost contract scheme currently in effect can be improved by discriminatory pricing complemented by certain of the analyzed constraints

defending against rival innovation we analyze how an incumbent defends its competitive advantage with a focus on the under examined methods of actively defending against the threats posed by rival innovation we describe delineate and analyze the set of such defenses and their likely effects the set of such defenses differs substantially from many standard defenses such as those aimed at defeating the threat of imitation the further study of these pre emptive innovation defenses is important because these defenses are different and because they can substantially affect the sustainability of firm profits and the pace of different of types of innovation

regulating vertically integrated utilities when transfers are costly but revenues are beneficial this paper considers regulating a vertically integratedutility under asymmetric information about efficiency gainsdue to integration the benchmark case benevolentregulation implies a divestiture of a technically efficientintegration unless the cost savings due to integrating aresubstantial this highlights how private information causes adeviation from the standard perfect information framework this result is at odds with the worldwide experience withpublic utilities that remained integrated almost throughoutthe 20th century despite that integration offered meager or nosavings as now becomes evident of course this divergencebetween normative analysis and facts is no surprise for publicchoice indeed a rather mild kind of a leviathan motive regulators dislike transfers to the utility and by symmetry like revenues coupled with the secrecy only integrationoffers due to private information explains why a regulator hasan interest to keep even economically inefficiently integratedfirms integrated this is in line with crew and rowley 1988 that public regulation serves to milk rather than to imposeefficiency

the impact of housing markets on consumer debt credit report evidence from 1999 to 2012 we estimate the response of consumer debt portfolios to pronounced housing market swings from 1999 to 2012 using equifax sourced credit report data and a variety of identification approaches we find i the extraordinary climb in home equity debt from 2002 to 2006 is an expression of a stable longer term relationship between house price growth and home equity borrowing ii all preboom homeowners and older and prime postboom homeowners demonstrate near dollar for dollar substitution between expensive credit card and cheap home equity debt in response to home equity changes and iii little evidence of substitution between home equity and student loan debt

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

endogenous diffusion of technology abstract this paper presents a positive theory of diffusion of technology it examines a two period model strategic firms are confronted by a process technology with an uncertain reduction in marginal costs the uncertainty is automatically resolved between the two periods adoption in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not adopt while simultaneous adoption by firms results in a cournot equilibrium the firms strategies are both production quantities and adoption timings these decisions are made at the same time thus firms face a trade off between early adoption and possibly reaping first mover advantages on one hand and deferring the adoption decision until after all the uncertainty is resolved but face the possibiity of being a follower in the market interestingly an endogenously determined diffusion rate is obtained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium of this game this means that while adoption and diffusion of technology results with probability one diffusion of a bad innovation is also possible it is also shown that in a market with one large firm and a nonatomic continuum of small firms there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the large firm adopts first and is a stackelberg leader and all the small firms decide whether or not to adopt after the uncertainty is resolved the implication of this result is simply that the diffusion of technology is to some extent determined by the relative size of firms in the industry

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

the access pricing problem a synthesis the baumol willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider the authors analyze the relevant notion of opportunity cost under various assumptions about demand and supply conditions including product differentiation bypass and substitution possibilities which all reduce opportunity cost compared to the benchmark case they show that the ramsey approach to access pricing developed by j j laffont and j tirole 1994 is closely related to the efficient component pricing rule provided opportunity cost is correctly interpreted

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

not whether but where pell grants and college choices abstract pell grants are the largest financial aid vehicle in the united states and yet their role in shaping students college choices is not clear drawing on the enrollment decisions of four cohorts of tennessee high school graduates and quasi experimental pell eligibility derived from federal formulas we find little evidence that marginal pell eligibility affects whether or where students enroll in college inframarginal estimates suggest that students sort into colleges with 11 6 cents higher tuition per dollar of pell aid although other measures of college quality do not significantly improve over the counterfactual an investigation into mechanisms that might be muting student responses to pell favors the application process itself over grant size or institutional aid flexibility

energy and depletable resources economics and policy 1973 1998 abstract this paper reviews the impact of the literature in depletable resources and energy economics over the period 1973 1998 particularly the initial period of publication of the journal of environmental economics and management 1974 1998 a discussion of prominent policy issues in this arena is provided along with an indication of what academic economics papers have contributed to that debate this is followed by a citation analysis of contributions in the fields of energy and exhaustible resource economics for each of these two fields a list of the top papers in each five year period from 1974 to 1998 is presented along with a list of the top journals in each decade based on average citations per article the top ten cited articles in the fields in the journal of environmental economics and management are also presented

the effect of legalizing retail marijuana on housing values evidence from colorado does legalizing retail marijuana generate more benefits than costs this paper provides a first step toward addressing that question by measuring the benefits and costs that are capitalized into housing values we exploit the time series and cross sectional variations in the adoption of colorado s municipality retail marijuana laws rmls and examine the effect on housing values with a difference in differences strategy our estimates show that the legalization leads to an average 6 increase in housing values indicating that the capitalized benefits outweigh the costs in addition we find suggestive evidence that this relatively large housing value appreciation is likely due to rmls inducing strong housing demand while having no discernible effect on housing supply finally we show that the effect of rmls is heterogeneous across locations and property types jel k20 r28

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below

access pricing and exclusionary behavior abstract when a regulated upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream a price squeeze or non price discrimination becomes a concern the access pricing rule that protects against this type of exclusionary behavior is unique and is a form of the efficient component pricing rule