premuneration values and investments in matching markets we analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus the agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus mailath postlewaite and samuelson 2013 showed that when investments are unobservable equilibrium investments are generally inecient in this paper we work with a more structured model that is suciently tractable to analyze the nature of the investment ineciencies we provide conditions under which investment is ineciently high or low and conditions under which changes in the pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus will be pareto improving as well as examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market aects investment eciency

corporate conservatism and relative compensation this paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating discontinuities in compensation when performance is low because of firings lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark depending on type in particular very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

on multiplicity of consistent conjectures in free entry oligopoly abstract if we allow free entry into oligopoly we should take into account the fact that the number of firms is variable therefore we should include it in the arguments of the conjectural variation functions and consider a conjectural variation for the change in the number of firms we will show that for such conjectural variation functions there exist multiple consistent conjectures equilibria in free entry oligopoly

delegated portfolio management abstract a problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered for the case of risk averse agents and large principals an approximately optimal solution is constructively characterized under the assumption that payoffs are normally distributed a significant extension of the definnetti savage probability elicitation result is developed under this extension knowledge of agent preferences is not required when the underlying conditional distributions are symmetric and this fact is exploited to solve the screening problem in a mean variance formulation

macroeconomic forecasts and microeconomic forecasters in the presence of principal agent problems published macroeconomic forecasts by professional economists may not measure expectations forecasters may use their forecasts in order to manipulate beliefs about their ability i test a cross sectional implication of models of reputation and information revelation i find that as forecasters become older and more established they produce more radical forecasts since these more radical forecasts are in general less accurate ex post forecast accuracy grows significantly worse as forecasters become older and more established these findings are consistent with reputational factors at work in professional macroeconomic forecasts

moral hazard and the portfolio management problem this paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information in addition the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully we analyze three contracting regimes 1 first best where effort is observable 2 linear with unobservable effort and 3 the optimal contract within the bhattacharya pfleiderer quadratic class we find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager this underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts these contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk tolerant principals

analyst forecasts and herding behavior the use of analyst forecasts as proxies for investors earnings expectations is commonplace in empirical research an implicit assumption behind their use is that they reflect analysts private information in an unbiased manner as demonstrated here this assumption is not necessarily valid there is shown to be a tendency for analysts to release forecasts closer to prior earnings expectations than is appropriate given their information further analysts exhibit herding behavior whereby they release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts even when this is not justified by their information these results are shown to have interesting empirical implications article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

love and taxes and matching institutions we study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family everyone prefers a partner that has high income and is a perfect emotional match but compromises must often be struck a high income earner may abstain from marrying a low income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally because the highincome earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the marriage redistributive income taxation may ease this problem income matching institutions that secure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution so that optimal redistribution is reduced we also introduce a divorce option redistributive taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

efficient estimation of structural hedonic systems when a product or job is not homogeneous but instead embodies several different characteristics it is difficult to use price information about the product to learn anything about the structure of the supply and demand for the embodied characteristics s rosen 1974 highlighted this problem and suggested that the estimated slope of the price characteristic relation the marginal price could be used instead of standard prices in otherwise standard estimation of the supply and demand system however recently brown and h rosen 1982 brown 1983 and mendelsohn 1985 have pointed out that this method is applicable only when the marginal price depends on variables not found in the supply and demand equations in this paper we show that since the hedonic system matches consumers with high demand for the characteristic to firms with low costs of producing it exogenous variables from the supply equation are not valid instruments in the demand equation and vice versa therefore even when the brown rosen mendelsohn brm condition holds estimation of the identified system by standard simultaneous equations techniques will produce inconsistent estimates we then show that the system can be identified despite the absence of the standard instruments and develop an efficient estimator for the identified system since cross equation constraints make estimation of hedonic systems particularly vulnerable to specification error we also consider some specification tests in this section we consider a simple model with only one characteristic the extension to several characteristics is straightforward the basic model developed by rosen can be described as follows firms with different technologies produce products which provide consumers with varying levels of some characteristic z each consumer buys one unit of the good the product is such that an amount of z from two units of the good provides less utility than the same amount of z embodied in a single unit e g acceleration in a car safety in a job consumers

pre matching gambles abstract this paper investigates pre matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble matching concerns examples of pre matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market college major choices before the labor market and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market i show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market a fundamental and unique feature of the competitive matching market which i call the competitive matching effect induces gambling the paper also illustrates the relationship between social efficiency and inequality in this setting and shows how progressive taxation eliminates social inefficiency reduces inequality and generates government revenue

why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising in india in contrast to most dowry oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization those in india have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades this paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste the theoretical model contrasts caste and non caste based societies in the former there exists an inherited component to status caste that is independent of wealth and in the latter wealth is the primary determinant of status modernization is assumed to involve two components increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status or caste groups the paper shows that in caste based societies the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments whereas in non caste based societies increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline

one signal two opinions strategic heterogeneity of analysts forecasts we present a model of investors acquiring forecasts from a group of investment analysts investors may pick an analyst based on his past performance in the literature it is typically assumed that agents rewards depend solely on the type they are perceived to be which leads to typical herding results in contrast here analysts rewards not only depend on their own reputation but also on the number of analysts with a similar reputation there exist two interesting types of equilibria in the first type it is optimal for investors to ignore analysts past performance even though analysts make predictions according to their best knowledge in a second type investors do use past performance to select analysts however this induces analysts to predict strategically i e some analysts knowingly make wrong predictions

life expectancy and human capital investments evidence from maternal mortality declines longer life expectancy should encourage human capital accumulation since a longer time horizon increases the value of investments that pay out over time previous work has been unable to determine the empirical importance of this life expectancy effect due to the difficulty of isolating it from other effects of health on education we examine a sudden drop in maternal mortality risk in sri lanka between 1946 and 1953 which creates a sharp increase in life expectancy for school age girls without contemporaneous effects on health and which also allows for the use of boys as a control group using additional geographic variation we find that the 70 reduction in maternal mortality risk over the sample period increased female life expectancy at age 15 by 4 1 female literacy by 2 5 and female years of education by 4 0 authors

rational herding in financial economics abstract this paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets some models can predict perfect herding in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities negative externalities in bank runs positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition principal agent problems based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation or informational learning cascades the paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research

bounded rationality dynamic oligopoly and conjectural variations abstract we propose a dynamic model of n firm oligopoly that provides a logically consistent reinterpretation of conjectural variations each firm solves a dynamic optimization problem believing that the other firms will alter their future choices in proportion to its own current change these beliefs adapt in light of observed behavior we show that steady state equilibria can range from complete cooperation to predatory play and provide conditions under which the firms behavior and beliefs converge to a steady state the sufficient conditions for stability are more easily satisfied the smaller the cross effects among firms through demand or belief parameters they are also more easily satisfied in a price setting than in a quantity setting differentiated products model

marriage specialization and the gender division of labor we consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition in our formal model agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market we show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor this division is not pareto improving both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase

marriage squeeze marriage age and the household savings rate in china abstract recent influential papers claim that single men s saving competition for marriage intensified by an increase in the male to female ratio in the pre marital cohort explains 60 percent of the rise of china s aggregate household savings rate in this paper we analyze whether the marriage competition remains a first order effect on saving when another margin of adjustment to sex ratio imbalance men s postponement of marriage is considered we construct a theoretical and quantitative life cycle model with a frictionless marriage market where a single man s rank is determined by his wealth and age by calibration we find that with the option to postpone marriage the response of the aggregate savings rate to the rising sex ratio is dampened by 45 percent moreover the model generates an unusual downward sloping age savings rate profile with young households saving more than their middle aged counterparts as observed in the data

rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts do professional forecasters provide their true unbiased estimates or do they behave strategically in our model forecasters have common information confer actively and thus know the true pdf of future outcomes intensive users of economic forecasts monitor forecasters performance closely occasional users are drawn to the forecaster who fared best in the previous period in the resulting nash equilibrium even though economists have identical expectations they make a range of projections that mimics the true probability distribution of the forecast variable those whose wages depend most on publicity produce forecasts that differ most from the consensus empirical evidence supports the model

are rational conjectures rational the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures are critically reviewed it is shown that their operation depends crucially on an invisible non optimizing deus ex machina hence these concepts are not really suitable for understanding competition among optimizing firms in addition the widely claimed fact that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations is shown to be erroneous the message of this paper should be plain from the title it reflects a disillusionment with the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures for helping us understand economic interactions under imperfect competition on the face of it these concepts seem to offer the economic modeller some useful tools hence this paper is in some sense intended as a friendly warning to other economic modellers there are inherent conceptual weaknesses in these concepts that do not become apparent until one begins to penetrate their inner logic to make plain the weaknesses of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures we shall concentrate on the simplest application of the ideas to duopoly and we shall illustrate our points using the classical cournot example of duopolists facing a common linear demand curve and having the same constant marginal cost the reader may know that this example figures prominently in the rational conjectures literature it being shown that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations we shall see in section vi that this claim is not really valid although widely asserted but our real message is on a different plane and pertains to the usefulness of the concepts in general

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

truthtelling in matching markets we analyze a search and matching model with non transferable utility and asymmetric information randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase at the end of which they discover each other s types and choose to match or not before deciding to enter this phase agents can communicate through cheap talk we provide conditions for this communication to be informative and we examine how it affects agents welfare we show that communication is pareto improving only when the matching is assortative in the absence of communication and left unchanged by information transmission

the bargaining family revisited we suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non cooperatively in a first stage while day to day allocation of time is determined later through nash bargaining but with non cooperative behaviour as the fall back one finding is that overinvestment in education may be even more of a problem in such a semi cooperative model than in a fully non cooperative one even though both the semi cooperative model and the fully non cooperative model predict overinvestment in education policy conclusions that follow from the two models are distinctly different jel classification d13 j24 les auteurs suggerent un modele de famille qui marchande ou les decisions d investissement en capital humain sont prises de maniere non cooperative dans un premier temps alors que l allocation du temps au jour le jour est determinee plus tard par un marchandage a la nash mais avec un comportement noncooperatif comme choix de second ordre on decouvre que le surinvestissement dans l education peut etre encore plus problematique dans un tel modele de semi cooperation que dans un modele de non cooperation meme si les deux modeles prevoient un surinves chtissement dans l education les conclusions au plan de la politique publique qui decoulent de ces deux modeles sont fort differentes

beauty vs earnings gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model abstract i develop a model of marriage matching where males and females care about two distinct characteristics of their spouse beauty and earnings each individual s beauty is exogenous but earnings depend on human capital investments made by each individual prior to entering the marriage market i show that even if males and females constitute ex ante identical populations with identical underlying preferences and equal access to human capital investment and labor market opportunities there can still exist an equilibrium where on average one gender invests more in human capital than the other and moreover members of one gender are more likely to prioritize beauty over earnings in a spouse while members of the other gender are more likely to prioritize a potential spouse s earnings over beauty

quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing if firms in a homogeneous duopoly game can respond with negligible delay to their rival s price changes equilibrium is unique at the monopoly price

why are professional forecasters biased agency versus behavioral explanations professional forecasters may not simply aim to minimize expected squared forecast errors in models with repeated forecasts the pattern of forecasts reveals valuable information about the forecasters even before the outcome is realized rational forecasters will compromise between minimizing errors and mimicking prediction patterns typical of able forecasters simple models based on this argument imply that forecasts are biased in the direction of forecasts typical of able forecasters our models of strategic bias are rejected empirically as forecasts are biased in directions typical of forecasters with large mean squared forecast errors this observation is consistent with behavioral explanations of forecast bias

the inconsistency of consistent conjectures abstract conjectural variation models have been criticized because firms are right for the wrong reasons and because possible equilibria are abundant lately several papers have attempted to meet these difficulties by some condition of consistency or rationality on the conjectural variation this paper shows that stronger versions of such conditions lead into paradoxes while the weaker forms are of little use in solving the conceived problems the original cournot assumption actually satisfies consistency enterions the problems with consistent conjectures illuminates fundmental problems with too demanding information assumptions like perfect foresight such assumptions may create non trivial structures of self reference

a spillover based theory of credentialism i propose a model in which credentials such as diplomas are instrumentally valuable to workers the model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker s wage to their output a worker s productivity is influenced by the skills of their co workers where such skills arise from an ability augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co workers credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market thereby allowing them to match with high skill co workers in equilibrium despite the positive externality associated with a worker s investment i show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium

on relative performance contracts and fund manager s incentives abstract for pension schemes mutual funds banks and other financial intermediaries large portfolio decisions are increasingly delegated to fund managers recently there has been growing concern that these managers seem to adopt extremely similar investment strategies one possible explanation for this phenomenon may be found in reward schemes based on relative performance we show how relative performance reward schemes may arise as optimal contracts our focus is the fund owners fund manager relationship in which the manager before making a portfolio decision on behalf of the owners may acquire at some cost information that is not available to the owners payment schemes based on relative performance afford the owners tighter control of their manager s activities however if two managers of different funds both accept contracts that depend on their relative as well as absolute performances then there may exist equilibria in the managers subgame that result in undesirable outcomes for the owners

in the name of the son and the daughter intergenerational mobility in the united states 1850 1940 this paper estimates historical intergenerational elasticities between fathers and children of both sexes in the united states using a novel empirical strategy the key insight of our approach is that the information about socioeconomic status conveyed by first names can be used to create pseudo links across generations we find that both father son and father daughter elasticities were flat during the nineteenth century increased sharply between 1900 and 1920 and declined slightly thereafter we discuss the role of regional disparities in economic development trends in inequality and returns to human capital and the marriage market in explaining these patterns jel d63 j12 j16 j24 j62 n31 n32 the degree to which economic status is passed along generations is key to under standing differences across societies and over time in the extent of inequality a low degree of intergenerational mobility can undermine the notion of equality of opportunity and may lead to persistent inequality recent research reveals that today intergenerational mobility in the united states is lower than in most other developed countries corak 2013 this finding stands in contrast with the national ethos of the united states as the land of unlimited opportunity was this view ever justified in this paper we provide a new perspective on the evolution of intergenerational mobility in the united states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries we extend the existing literature by looking at the intergenerational elasticity in economic status between fathers and children of both sexes focusing only on father son cor relations may miss part of the picture daughters should be included if we want to know how the average well being of a generation correlates with that of their parents

rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly abstract the paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals reactions which characterises the traditional non cooperative theory of oligopoly a general definition of these equilibria is given and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model the standard models of perfect competition monopoly limit price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

competing premarital investments this paper studies premarital parental investments in children s wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage by investing in their children s wealth parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry in large marriage markets the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition but equilibrium investments are not efficient

women s liberation what s in it for men the nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women given that these changes took place long before women gained the right to vote they amounted to a voluntary renouncement of power by men in this paper we investigate men s incentives for sharing power with women in our model women s legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives we show that men face a tradeoff between the rights they want for their own wives namely none and the rights of other women in the economy men prefer other men s wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women s rights increases educational investments in children we show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital we corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women s rights in england and the united states

the feedback effect in two sided markets with bilateral investments abstract agents in a finite two sided market are matched assortatively based on costly investments besides signaling privately known complementary types the investments also directly benefit the match partner the bilateral external benefits induce a complex feedback cycle that amplifies the agents signaling investments our main results quantify how the feedback effect depends on the numbers of competitors on both sides of the market this yields detailed insights into the equilibria of two sided matching contests with incomplete information in particular for markets of small or intermediate size it also allows us to shed some new light on the relationship between finite and continuum models of pre match investment

investment in schooling and the marriage market we present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns the labor market return resulting from higher wages and a marriagemarket return defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles this asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses when the labor market returns to schooling rises home production demands less time and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken more women may invest in schooling than men

human capital accumulation and the expansion of women s economic rights abstractbetween 1850 and 1920 most u s states enacted laws expanding the rights of married women to own and control their separate property and to own their market earnings the economic approach to property rights implies that as married women gain economic rights the incentive to invest in girls human capital will rise this prediction is tested by examining the impact of these legal changes on girls school attendance rates relative to boys state level census data are used to examine the effects of these changes on school attendance among all school aged children integrated public use microdata series data are used to examine their effect on school attendance among children ages 15 19 who are just beyond compulsory schooling ages consistent with hypothesized effects the empirical analysis shows that expanding women s economic rights resulted in higher relative rates of school attendance by girls and had the largest effect on the 15 19 age group

directed search on the job and the wage ladder we model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers search using wage offers and employment probabilities applicants observe all offers and face a trade off between wage and employment probability there is wage dispersion among workers even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous equilibrium wages form a ladder as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time this is because low wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage with a lower chance of success

innis lecture hedonic equilibrium this paper describes hedonic equilibrium and shows how and why the concept has to be modified when characteristics of traders on both sides of the market are endogenous cet article decrit l equilibre hedonique et montre comment et pourquoi le concept doit etre modifie quand les caracteristiques des agents des deux cotes du marche sont endogenes

conjectural variations as a reduced form abstract the conjectural variations solution is usually seen as the reduced form of the equilibrium of an unmodeled dynamic game we show that in linear oligopolies and for an open set of values of the discount factor this correspondence holds exactly for a quantity setting repeated game with minimax punishments during t periods

reputation and performance among security analysts members of the institutional investor all american research team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance this contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage all americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that all americans impact prices more than other analysts however there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions nevertheless the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance and assuming that all americans are better paid pay and performance

herding and anti herding a model of reputational differentiation abstract we analyze a model related to the strategic herding literature where a second expert maximizes his expected second period value by conforming with a first expert herding in contrast to the herding literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent if the value of being the only smart agent is sufficiently large the second expert always opposes its predecessor s report otherwise herding may result

the evolution of consistent conjectures in this paper we model the evolution of conjectures in an economy consisting of a large number of firms which meet in duopolies the duopoly game is modelled by the conjectural variation cv model an evolutionary process leads to more profitable conjectures becoming more common payoff monotonic dynamics under this class of selection dynamics convergence occurs to a small set of serially undominated strategies containing the consistent conjecture this set can be made arbitrarily small by appropriate choice of the strategy set if the game is dominance solvable then the dynamics converge globally to the unique attractor

conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games abstract a family of constant conjectural variations strategies is defined and examined in the natural context of infinitely repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting it is shown that any pair of linear reaction functions in the family gives rise to a unique pair of quantities in stationary equilibrium as the conjectures and discount parameter vary the sum of the stationary quantities will vary anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly outcomes equilibrium is strongly stable and credible in the sense of exhibiting a variation of selten s subgame perfection provided that firms can react quickly enough to one another s actions

investment and competitive matching we study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching additional equilibria may arise in this sunk investment setting even though our matching market is competitive these equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures all allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition we identify sufficient conditions most notably quasiconcave utilities for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions most notably a single crossing property for agents to be matched positive assortatively with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations

specialization and competition in marriage models abstract i present a marriage model that includes pre marital investments in human capital individuals expect the future role specialization in marriage the specialization effect but at the same time before marriage individuals have the incentive to invest in order to make themselves more attractive the competition effect the interaction of two effects generates multiple equilibria no equilibria are ex ante efficient when the benefits of role specialization exist the competition effect is a source of coordination failure in the match formation this result stands in contrast to those of other models in which the competition effect leads to efficiency in some equilibrium

education matching and the allocative value of romance societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non market goods such as marital partnerships we explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples we consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt these generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy while marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market the analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes

pre match investment with frictions the paper explores an environment in which agents are motivated to make unproductive investments with the sole aim of improving their matching opportunities in contrast to existing work i add frictions by allowing the investment to be imperfectly observed the analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the trade off inherent in related models investments waste resources but facilitates more efficient matching patterns i show that greater frictions i do not always lead to inferior matching patterns and ii can force the economy into to a pareto preferred equilibrium

female migration for marriage implications from the land reform in rural tanzania summary using the longitudinal household panel data drawn from rural tanzania 1991 2004 this study investigates impacts of the land reform on women s marriage motivated relocation during the period under study several villages that initially banned a widow s land inheritance abolished this discrimination taking a differences in differences approach this study finds that the probability of males marrying in a village increased by altering its customary land inheritance rule in favor of widows in the light of the traditional system favoring exogamous and patrilocal marriage this finding indicates that females relocate at marriage in response to the favorable land tenure system at the destination

herding among security analysts the paper shows that the buy or sell recommendations of security analysts have a signi cant positive in uence on the recommendations of the next two analysts this in uence can be traced to short lived information in the most recent revisions in contrast the in uence of the prevailing consensus is not stronger if the consensus accurately forecasts subsequent stock price movements this indicates consensus herding consistent with models in which analysts herd based on little information the consensus also has a stronger in uence when market conditions are favorable the resulting poorer information aggregation could cause bull markets to be intrinsically more fragilea e g bikhchandani et al j political economy 100 5 1992 992 1026 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classixcation g11 g14 g24

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

the timing of education we study an assignment with investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before ex ante system and after ex post system matching on the labor market the ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches we further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems at high degrees of transferability they are equivalent but when transferability is very low the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system although with moderate transferability the reverse is true jel i21 i28 j31 j42

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

the economics of consanguineous marriages the institution of consanguineous marriage a marriage contracted between close biological relatives has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world this paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom when marriage contracts are incomplete dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage when these transactions are costly however consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost the paper s model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions it also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity an empirical analysis using data from bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

gender based price discrimination in matching markets this paper develops a new model to analyze price discrimination in matching markets where agents have private information about their respective qualities on the basis of signals car clothing club membership etc purchased from profit maximizing firms men and women form beliefs about each other s qualities the matching must then be stable in the following sense there cannot be a man and woman who are unmatched and who both believe they would be better off if they were matched with one another the model enables an analysis of the impact of third degree or gender based price discrimination on welfare when third degree price discrimination is not feasible the cost of eliciting private information is higher but a monopoly intermediary may have stronger incentives to implement an efficient allocation i show that gender based price discrimination is more likely to have a positive impact the more symmetric the matching environment is

the escape from conjectural variations the consistency condition in duopoly theory from bowley to fellner the paper covers the 1924 1949 debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopoly theory and focuses on the evolution of economists views about the imposition of a consistency condition on the firms conjectures the main point is that although the consistency condition entailed a notion of interactive equilibrium that resembled the modern correct conjectures equilibrium most neoclassical economists of the time refused to apply it because of the excessive requirements it imposed upon the firms forecasting abilities and because of its failure to encompass an explanation of the equilibrating process