corrective taxes under oligopoly with inter firm externalities pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes when the externalities are substantial and or the number of polluters is large the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss consequently the second best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution a more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output

production externalities and investment caps a welfare analysis under uncertainty abstract in markets where production has adverse externalities policy makers may wish to increase welfare by imposing a cap on the aggregate industry output in this paper we examine the implications that the cap has on the firms investment equilibrium policy and on social welfare in the presence of market uncertainty in contrast with previous literature we explicitly model the present externality and then let the social planner choose the cap level maximizing welfare we find that i if the consideration of market uncertainty triggers investment at price above the social marginal cost of production then it is optimal to have no cap at all ii otherwise the cap should be set at the current aggregate industry output and a ban on further market entries should be announced

pigouvian taxes under imperfect competition if consumption depends on emissions the paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way under monopoly two instruments are always required for first best the pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

environmental policy intra industry trade and transfrontier pollution the paper discusses effects of domestic environmental policy on foreignemissions and on transboundary pollution we use a dixit stiglitz typemodel of monopolistic competition with an endogenous number of firms production generates environmental externalities which spill over to theother country it is shown that environmental policy has an impact onmarket structure at home and abroad these market structure effectsinduce changes in emissions abroad in contrast to what has been derivedin earlier contributions it turns out to be possible that tighterenvironmental standards at home lead to less emissions abroad the paperderives these results and provides the economic intuition behind them finally conditions for optimal environmental policies are derived

environmental policy under oligopoly with endogenous market structure emission taxes under both fixed number oligopoly and endogenous market structure which are the most relevant market structures for policy issues are examined in the latter case and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition the optimal tax could exceed marginal external damages which implies that externalities generated by oligopolistic firms could be optimally controlled by overinternalizing environmental damages under endogenous market structure a scheme consisting of a license fee and a second best underinternalizing emission tax can increase social welfare as compared to the use of a single emission tax exceeding marginal damages copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

asymmetric information signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly abstract this paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty while third parties the rival firms and the regulator have only a subjective perception about this fact consequently there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information and each firm can strategically manipulate both the competitor s and the regulator s priors in this context we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator s ecological conscience is sufficiently high we also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative subsidies and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty finally taxes are below environmental marginal damage both under symmetric and asymmetric information and signaling reinforces such under taxation

endogenous international joint ventures and the environment abstract this paper examines the welfare effects of emission taxes under a choice between an international joint venture jv and a full ownership fdi foreign direct investment by parent firms from a developed country the north and a developing country the south as well as their location and share decisions if the south has a poor abatement technology its best policy is to impose a relatively high emission tax to attract a full ownership fdi if it has a good abatement technology the best policy is to impose a relatively low emission tax to attract the jv furthermore deregulation of foreign ownership of the jv improves the quality of the environment

energy transition poverty and inequality in vietnam this paper investigates energy transition energy poverty and energy inequality in vietnam employing a longitudinal dataset of a nationally representative household survey we use the data on residential energy expenditure of more than 9 000 households over the period 2004 2016 we find a transition from traditional energy to modern energy but this transition varies across regions between ethnic and welfare groups and between rural and urban population the poor and ethnic minority households still rely heavily on traditional energy sources such as coal and biomass to meet their energy demands electricity poverty has decreased but energy cost poverty has increased in addition energy inequality tends to decrease at a more significant rate than income and consumption inequalities we propose a national program for energy poverty alleviation be established to devise policies to lower households energy costs further assistance to the poor and ethnic minority households is also recommended so that they can afford a higher level of electricity consumption

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

equity externalities and energy subsidies the case of kerosine in indonesia abstract this paper examines two arguments used to justify the subsidy provided kerosine the primary commercial fuel of indonesian households one argument holds that the subsidy reduces deforestation externalities resulting from wood gathering econometric analysis of a large cross section of households finds that firewood kerosene substitution is very limited in java where the deforestation problem is most severe so that kerosene subsidy is not an effective means of alleviating the problem the second argument holds that social equity requires the subsidization of basic needs such as kerosene it is found that the kerosene subsidy disproportionately benefits urban and wealthier households

dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations and nonlinear supply and demand the price quantity dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations and nonlinear supply and demand curves is analysed we prove that chaotic dynamical behaviour can occur even if both the supply and demand curves are monotonic the introduction of adaptive expectations into the cobweb model leads to price quantity fluctuations with a smaller amplitude however at the same time the price quantity cycles may become unstable and chaotic oscillations may arise we present a geometric explanation why chaos can occur for a large class of nonlinear monotonic supply and demand curves

multiproduct firms and environmental policy coordination the literature that analyzes the coordination of environmental taxes by governments considers that firms produce a single good at a single plant however in practice firms tend to produce several goods at various production plants multiproduct firms these firms may organize themselves in a centralized or decentralized fashion for purposes of decision making this affects their output and pollution levels this paper sets out to analyze the coordination of environmental taxes considering multiproduct firms we find that the organizational structure chosen by the owners of the firms depends on whether or not governments coordinate with one another in setting taxes and on whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements social welfare is greater if a supranational authority sets taxes in all countries in this case joint welfare is never lower if the authority is constrained to set the same tax in all countries

energy savings in nigeria is there a way of escape from energy inefficiency abstract this study estimates the transition probabilities for different energy use states in nigeria using the markov switching regression technique according to the results both energy efficient and energy inefficient states are less persistent but comparatively the energy inefficient state is more persistent thus in nigeria it is much difficult to escape from the energy inefficient state than the energy efficient state several reasons may explain this phenomenon and they include inefficient regulatory system poor institutional structure high corruption proliferation of second hand goods undeveloped markets high incidence of poverty and inefficient pricing in the energy sector pricing policies should be combined with institutional improvement and infrastructural development if nigeria wants to achieve a sustainable energy efficient state in the long term

optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms this study explores an optimal pre committed or ex ante environmental tax policy in a three stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate we show not only that the optimal emission tax is non decreasing with the declining cost of relocation e g setup or fixed costs or else the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country causing the resulting welfare to decline as a consequence the domestic welfare varies in a non monotonic way we also show that such a counterintuitive non monotonic relationship does not arise under time consistent ex post emission taxes

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

who benefit most from fuel subsidies evidence from nigeria abstract the paper studies the benefit incidence of fuel subsidies in nigeria household sector combining annual subsidy estimates with the households expenditure data from the 2009 10 harmonized living standard survey we investigate how the benefits from fuel subsidies are accrued to each income groups in nigeria the results show that while the kerosene subsidy is more evenly distributed across income groups petrol subsidy is concentrated to high income groups in aggregate the top 20 households enjoy twice as much the benefit of fuel subsidies as the bottom 20 households we also examine the concentration and progressivity of fuel subsidies using gini coefficient measures and lorenz concentration curves and find both fuel subsidies are more regressive than the per capita expenditure

border adjustments supplementing nationally determined carbon pricing as agreed on in the paris agreement each country determines its own contribution to combat climate change on a voluntary basis there is no mechanism to force a country to comply with its own nationally determined contributions this bottom up approach builds on unilateral actions and yields a kind of carbon pricing which is not necessarily identical across countries as a consequence these nationally determined climate policies have drawbacks in terms of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness for firms producing in high carbon price countries to reduce these negative effects border adjustments bas may be appropriate subsequent to more stringent environmental regulation we model a three stage game involving carbon price competition in the first stage the introduction of bas in the second stage and oligopolistic competition between firms in the third stage strategic trade theory suggests that the qualitative results about the optimal ba policy may vary with the underlying type of competition namely bertrand and cournot competition however our results are similar for both types of competition we conclude that bas are suitable for supporting a more stringent environmental policy moreover we find that anticipation of the implementation of bas in the second stage yields higher average carbon prices in the first stage since high carbon price countries increase their carbon prices whereas the other countries partially offset

environmental innovation policy and international competition we consider one polluting industry in an open economy the national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions the emission reducing innovations are developed through firm specific costly investments under different hypotheses on market structure perfect competition bertrand and cournot oligopoly international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation the appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure if information is asymmetric the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms

environmental tax in a green market we examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed we show that the emission tax improves welfare thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation the higher the marginal environmental damage is the higher the optimal tax will be the optimal tax however becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large finally when marginal environmental damage is not too low the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly

cooperative and noncooperative r d in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative r d whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit maximizing level of r d in a precompetitive stage but remain fierce competitors in the product market vis a vis noncooperative r d socially first best r d and socially second best r d in the presence of sufficiently large r d spillovers neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second best r d levels in the absence of spillover effects however while the cooperative r d level remains socially insufficient the noncooperative level may overshoot first and second best levels of r d copyright 1992 by american economic association

environmental policy in a green market this paper studies the impact of some frequently used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods when consumers differ in their environmental awareness a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium the higher the average willingness to pay for the good the lower are variants unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents a maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants but boosts firms sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions as a result social welfare may be reduced we also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges including differentiation of charges

can agents learn their way out of chaos abstract in an olg model with adaptive learning forecast errors of the agents are analyzed in regions where the resulting dynamical system behaves chaoticly agents think they are living in stochastic world it is shown that they cannot reject the hypothesis that mean and autocorrelation coefficients of their forecast errors are 0 thus they have no incentive to switch to another learning rule predictions cannot be unmasked as being wrong because of the limited statistical tools the agents possess bounded rationality these phenomena occur in the olg model even with a cobb douglas utility function

strategic r d with spillovers collusion and welfare the author considers a two stage r d then output or price duopoly game in which r d spills over so reducing the marginal cost of both the investing firm and its rival the author compares the noncooperative regime to three collusive regimes joint venture collusion on r d price fixing collusion at the price or output stage and merger collusion at both stages and evaluates under what circumstances a collusive regime improves welfare if spillovers are sufficiently large all three regimes are beneficial although mergers are more likely and price fixing less likely to produce specific benefits than are joint ventures copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

the effect of production versus consumption based emission tax under demand uncertainty abstract emission tax is an instrument widely adopted by countries and regions to incentivize emission abatement by emission intensive firms including manufacturers however policies differ in how they allocate emission responsibilities among stakeholders for example the chile emission tax directly penalizes manufacturers for the emissions they generate during their production production based emission tax whereas the sweden electricity emission tax penalizes the consumption of electricity rather than its production consumption based emission tax these two methods have potentially varying implications on manufacturers profits their emission abatement decisions as well as the resulting emission levels especially when demand uncertainty is involved in this paper we investigate the impact of the two distinct methods by studying a profit maximizing manufacturer facing stochastic demand under either production or consumption based emission tax the manufacturer s optimal decisions on its selling price production quantity and emission abatement investment are derived perhaps surprisingly we show that under either tax it is possible for an increase in the emission tax to discourage the manufacturer from investing in emission abatement the impact of tax rate abatement technology efficiency and demand uncertainty on the manufacturer s profitability and abatement decision are also studied interestingly higher demand uncertainty may motivate the manufacturer to invest more in emission abatement under production based emission tax using a numerical example of an electricity power generator we offer further insights into the comparison between the two taxes and find that there exist cases for either tax to dominate the other in terms of both profit and emissions

incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms the direction and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs we establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement negligence may however induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases increases marginal abatement costs for low high levels of abatement

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

property transfers and environmental pollution incentive effects of alternative policies this paper considers how trans ferring some or all future responsibility for cleanup of a contaminated site affects the cur rent owner s incentives to reduce contamina tion given that he anticipates selling his prop erty in the future the results depend on the probabilities that the parties will be judgment proof the distribution of surplus and whether there is joint and several liability contrary to popular belief we show that transferring liabil ity can actually increase the seller s incentive to invest in pollution abatement furthermore abatement incentives are at least as great and generally greater with joint and several liability than without it jel q2

the organization of r d and environmental policy abstract we consider a setting where firms undertake emission reducing r d and the regulator who sets the emission tax is unable to commit credibly firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction we examine two regimes with respect to the organization of r d independent r d and an environmental r d cartel erc environmental r d is higher in the erc compared to independent r d for small damages and also for large damages when r d is efficient in contrast when damages are large and r d is inefficient the opposite is true the same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare

distributional impacts of investment subsidies for residential energy technologies abstract this study analyses the distributional impacts of investment subsidies paid to households that install residential energy technologies based on renewable energy sources the subsidies covering a significant part of the total investment play a considerable role in households energy decisions depending on their design support measures may provide the most benefits to certain groups of society and thus may cause increasing inequality the potential distributional impacts of the investment subsidies are determined by the combination of technologies targeted and their costs household income support intensity subsidy design restrictions and the availability of additional measures this study examines the support system for residential renewable energy technologies in the lithuanian case by employing a microsimulation model this analysis of existing measures provides more general results and highlights the policy features that cause distributional impacts therefore the results are applicable in other countries as well the analysis shows that although the support is efficient from an energy point of view it provides the most benefits to households with higher income and thus increases inequality moreover the subsidies fail to reduce energy poverty due to the poorest households low capacity to invest to obtain a flatter distribution of benefits the design of support measures should consider the current situation of lower income households and affordability issues

cournot competition and green innovation an inverted u relationship we examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and r d aims to reduce emissions green innovation we present an n firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in green r d when environmental taxation is exogenous aggregate r d investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator committed or time consistent with the aim to maximise social welfare we show that an inverted u relationship exists between aggregate r d and industry size under reasonable conditions and is driven by the presence of r d spillovers

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

prevention and treatment in environmental policy design abstract in many environmental contexts the damages that result from some externality generating activity can be reduced either through prevention prior to the occurrence of the event or treatment after that occurrence the existing literature has focused on the use of prevention only polinsky and shavell 11 consider explicitly the use of mitigation but their analysis is limited to the case of pareto efficiency in reality policymakers often pursue other objectives such as minimizing damages subject to a budget constraint or minimizing the cost of maintaining a certain safety level this paper provides an analytical framework for examining the choice of prevention vs treatment in the context of these alternative behavioral assumptions it considers first the case where the effectiveness of treatment is known at the time that the allocation decision must be made we then extend the analysis to the case where the effectiveness of treatment is uncertain and develop a framework for addressing the tradeoff between prevention and treatment under a safety rule in both cases we examine the factors that influence the allocation of resources between prevention and treatment and show that these factors can affect the second best allocations of resources in ways that are contrary to the effect under the pareto efficient allocation

reducing subsidies on household fuels in india how will it affect the poor kerosene and lpg are widely used in households in india for lighting and cooking these fuels have historically been subsidized as part of the restructuring of the energy sector the government is committed to limiting these subsidies this paper examines the impact of reducing energy subsidies on the welfare of the poor the paper uses data from nationally representative surveys of over 100 000 households the paper concludes that the case for reducing lpg subsidies is strong although the kerosene subsidy is an inefficient means of subsidizing fuel use by the poor reduction in it will need to be supported by other policies that would limit the adverse impacts

pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame abstract this paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies the analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment even when this lowers their production costs

poverty measurement with contaminated data a robust approach we examine the sensitivity of poverty indices to data contamination using the concept of the influence function and demonstrate that an important commonly used subclass of poverty measures will be robust under data contamination this is illustrated using simulations in this respect poverty and inequality indices have fundamentally different robustness properties we investigate both the case where the poverty line is exogenously fixed and where it must be estimated from the data

genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model this paper presents the cobweb model in which competitive firms in a market for a single good use a genetic algorithm to update their decision rules about next period production and sales the results of simulations show that the genetic algorithm converges to the rational expectations equilibrium for a wider range of parameter values than other algorithms frequently studied within the context of the cobweb model price and quantity patterns generated by the genetic algorithm are also compared to the data of experimental cobweb economies it is shown that the algorithm can capture several features of the experimental behavior of human subjects better than three other learning algorithms that are considered

the effects of environmental quality misperception on investments and regulation abstract this paper analyzes whether consumers misperception on the quality of the product influences firms investment choices we examine a setup with horizontal and vertical green differentiation where consumers are heterogeneous in the exogenous perception of environmental quality demands true qualities and profits are increasing in the perception of higher quality while the investment in green quality is high for high and low degrees of product substitutability we further consider the introduction of either an emission tax or an environmental standard both interventions increase the investment in green quality we show that for low marginal damages the environmental standard increases quality while taxation is more effective when the environmental damage is large

incidence and impact the regional variation of poverty effects due to fossil fuel subsidy reform since fossil fuel subsidy reforms can induce significant distributional shifts and price shocks effective compensation and social protection programs are crucial based on the statistical simulation model by araar and verme 2012 this study estimates the regional variability of direct welfare effects of removing fuel subsidies in nigeria uncompensated subsidy removal is estimated to increase the national poverty rate by 3 4 on average however uniform cash compensation that appears effective at the national average is found to fail to mitigate price shocks in 16 of 37 states thus putting livelihoods and public support for reforms at risk states that are estimated to incur the largest welfare shocks coincide with hotspots of civil unrest following nigeria s 2012 subsidy reform attempt the study illustrates how regionally disaggregated compensation can be revenue neutral and maintain or reduce pre reform poverty rates in all states overall it highlights the importance of understanding differences in vulnerability and designing tailored social protection schemes which ensure public support for subsidy reforms

tariffs and environmental taxes in the presence of environmental r d it is generally held that trade liberalization results in less stringent environmental regulations which suggests that policies regulating trade and the environment are positively correlated this paper examines whether this monotonic relationship still holds true when pollution reducing environmental research and development erd ii an environmental tax instrument only and iii both regulatory instruments to correct for distortions relating to trade and the environment we find that if it is not possible to abate pollution completely through er d then the monotonic relationship between tariffs and environmental taxes is sustained however if it is possible to fully abate pollution through er d then the optimal tariff environmental tax may not increase monotonically with taxes tariffs when both environmental taxes and tariffs are employed these two policies may be strategic substitutes a positive relationship between tariffs and environmental taxes may not be applicable

green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry oecd countries reduce or eliminate certain taxes when they introduce new environmental taxes the purpose of this paper is to analyze the incidence of such green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry the paper shows that a rise in taxes could result in the expansion of the aggregate pollution in the presence of a large technology gap the paper further shows that the government loses tax revenue as a result of the green tax reform if it continues to apply the same environmental standard this implies that the government needs to raise environmental standards to keep the existing level of public spending after a green tax reform

impacts of removing fuel import subsidies in nigeria on poverty abstract the petroleum sector contributes substantially to the nigerian economy however the potential benefits are diminished due to the existence of significant subsidies on imports of petroleum products subsidies on imported petroleum products are considered to be an important instrument for keeping fuel prices and hence the cost of living low the costs of these subsidies however has risen dramatically in recent years due to increased volatility in world petroleum and petroleum product prices and increased illegal exportation of subsidized petroleum products into neighboring countries removing the subsidy on fuel is one of the most contentious socio economic policy issues in nigeria today in this paper an economy wide framework is used to identify the impact of removing the fuel subsidy on the nigerian economy and investigates how alternative policies might be used to meet socio economic objectives related to fuel subsidies the results show that while a reduction in the subsidy generally results in an increase in nigerian gdp it can have a detrimental impact on household income and in particular on poor households accompanying the subsidy reduction with income transfers aimed at poor households or domestic production of petroleum products can alleviate the negative impacts on household income

heterogeneous beliefs and the non linear cobweb model abstract this paper generalizes the evolutionary cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs of brock and hommes 1997 econometrica 65 1059 1095 to the case of non linear demand and supply agents choose between a simple freely available prediction strategy such as naive expectations and a sophisticated costly prediction strategy such as rational expectations and update their beliefs according to an evolutionary fitness measure such as past realized net profits it is shown that for generic non linear monotonic demand and supply curves the evolutionary dynamics exhibits rational routes to randomness that is bifurcation routes to strange attractors occur when the traders sensitivity to differences in evolutionary fitness increases

environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes the effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental r d joint ventures rjvs environmental rjvs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts threetypes of environmental rjv are discussed inthis paper r d cartelization in which firmschoose r d efforts to maximize the jointprofit rjv competition in which firms sharethe r d fruits to maximize their own profits and rjv cartelization in which firms share r dfruits and maximize the joint profit an r dcartelization minimizes output quantities maximizes the total emission and minimizes thesocial surplus an rjv cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes r d efforts minimizes the totalemission and maximizes the social surplus

efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists abstract we show that there exists a time independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path the optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low a surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output this subsidy however induces firms to produce less than they would under laissez faire

fundamentalists vs chartists learning and predictor choice dynamics abstract in a simple forward looking univariate model of price determination we investigate the evolution of expectations dynamics in the presence of two types of agents fundamentalists and chartists in particular we combine evolutionary selection among heterogeneous classes of models through predictor choice dynamics based on a logit model with adaptive learning in the form of parameters updating within each class of rules we find that for different parameterizations it can happen that fundamentalists drive chartists completely out of the market or vice versa and also that heterogeneous equilibria in which fundamentalists and chartists coexist are possible interestingly though only equilibria in which fundamentalists outperform chartists turn out to be adaptively learnable by agents

welfare impact of electricity subsidy reforms in pakistan a micro model study abstract electricity subsidies in developing countries have always been debated in economics circles despite their popular appeal of providing relief to the poor the research has proven otherwise they increase the magnitude of deadweight loss and taper consumer welfare however complete withdrawal of a subsidy will make electricity unaffordable for the underprivileged therefore in the context of developing countries there is a need to determine the optimal level of subsidy which will have the least economic impact and benefit the maximum number of users pakistan has been marred by deep energy crises and the government is forced to provide very large subsidies for electricity using pakistan as a case study this study uses a uniform and non uniform price increase to determine the optimal level of electricity subsidies this study employs a micro model technique for the calculation of deadweight and welfare losses when the price of electricity is increased uniformly or non uniformly across different consumption groups this study also introduces a targeted subsidy approach for curbing the mounting deadweight loss due to immense electricity subsidies our research has identified that the targeted subsidy approach not only generates fiscal savings but also improves the welfare of the vulnerable in society

strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management empirical evidence from accident and spill data abstract this paper examines whether strict liability imposed on polluters has reduced uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment we fit regressions relating spills of selected chemicals to the type of liability in force in a state and to state manufacturing activity for some chemicals spills are more numerous in states imposing strict liability this could be due to unobserved state characteristics with small firms being responsible for a disproportionate number of spills regardless of the liability structure alternatively separate regressions for the two liability regimes suggest that only under strict liability are small firms responsible for a disproportionate number of spills

carbon taxation and market structure a cge analysis for russia abstract russia is one of the world s major sources of carbon based energy as well as one its most intensive users introducing carbon taxes can lead to a reduction in emissions and encourage investment in energy efficiency we investigate the economic effects of carbon taxes on the russian economy under perfect competition and a cournot oligopoly in output markets the main findings are i substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes can yield a strong double dividend in russia however welfare gains strongly depend on the labour supply elasticity and elasticities of substitution between capital labour and energy ii under the assumption of a cournot oligopoly with homogenous products and symmetric firms in the markets for natural gas petroleum and chemical products metals and minerals welfare costs of the environmental tax reform can be higher than under perfect competition this is because introducing carbon taxes leads to a reduction in already sub optimal output thereby exacerbating pre existing distortions arising from imperfect competition iii furthermore increases in energy costs can result in higher mark ups in some markets because of less competition resulting from firms exit

environmental taxation and strategic commitment in duopoly models in this paper we address the issue of optimalenvironmental taxation under imperfect competition the problem is analysed for three different types ofduopoly models the cournot open and closed loopmodels and the stackelberg model we explicitlyanalyse the role of strategic behaviour each firm hasto make a choice of output level and of the level ofa strategic variable the choice of this strategicvariable affects both marginal cost and emissions wecompare the properties of these three duopoly models and derive and compare optimal environmental taxes weshow that whether the optimal tax is lower or higherthan marginal environmental costs depends on theinformation transmission and the effect of thestrategic variable on marginal costs in addition thedifferences in market shares and the influence of thetax on the cost structure play important roles indetermining optimal emission taxes

market power in the eco industry polluters incentives under environmental liability law this paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco industry under strict liability polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement but socially optimal output given abatement under negligence with firm specific abatement standards polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output under negligence with industry wide abatement standards the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal second best considerations are offered for each case under strict liability negligence these apply to the level of liability the behavioral standard

the impact of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies on the low carbon transition abstract there is growing consensus on the fact that fossil fuel subsidies provided by governments in high income countries represent a misalignment on emissions reduction with the global climate agenda in addition a discussion emerged on the negative socio economic and environmental externalities associated with fossil fuel subsidies nevertheless pathways for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in high income countries and their implications on the low carbon transition have not yet been assessed with the aim to narrow this knowledge gap we extend the eirin stock flow consistent behavioral model to study the implications on sustainable development of the gradual phasing out of fossil fuels subsidies whose revenues could be used by the government to subsidize energy investments in green capital e g solar panels either via fiscal policies or green bonds we assess the effects on green growth employment credit and bonds market as well as the distributive effects across heterogeneous households and sectors a smooth phasing out of fossil fuels subsidies contributes to improve macroeconomic performance to decrease inequality and helps the government to find fiscal space to support stable renewable energy policies renewable energy subsidies contribute to foster the low carbon transition but could imply distributive effects depending on the way in which they are implemented

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

household welfare implications of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in developing countries abstract with over 200 countries reaching an agreement with the stated aim of restricting global warming to well below 2 c above pre industrial levels the most comprehensive climate change agreement was recently signed though most of the hard work lies ahead it marks an important first step for the collective global community to address climate change fossil fuels continue to remain one of the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions and for many developing countries high levels fossil fuels continues to enable an overconsumption of fossil fuels given the sensitivity of governments to subsidy reforms this study examines the household welfare implications of the removal of fossil fuel subsidies it finds that while welfare implications are unambiguously positive for government the results are mixed for private households although in an overwhelming majority of cases the results are positive however even in the cases where the welfare implications are negative for private households we find that it is possible for governments to carry out the reforms in such a way as to be welfare improving to households incomes by compensating them with some of the fiscal savings gained from the subsidy reform

when does environmental regulation facilitate entry deterring practices abstract this paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry we consider complete and incomplete information settings where potential entrants use the regulator s tax policy and the incumbent s output decisions in order to infer the incumbent s cost structure when the regulator is absent we show that firms entry deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information hence under certain conditions environmental regulation becomes more beneficial in incomplete than in complete information contexts our results therefore identify under which cases an under or over estimation of the welfare benefits of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which firms interact we also examine how this estimation error increases as firms become more symmetric in their production costs

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

new economic theories this paper analyses some of the most important spillovers of recent developments of economic theory into environmental economics attention is given to the anlaysis of sustainable economic development paths where endogenous growth models are used the implications of environmental dumping and more generally of policies concerning global environmental issues where new trade theories are very useful and the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive where industrial organisation theory is employed the paper does not only note recent developments in environmental economics but also relates these to the previous environmental economics literature thus it can be assessed whether new results actually improve our knowledge of crucial economic and environmental issues

taxing incumbent monopoly to foster entry abstract this paper investigates whether it is welfare enhancing to tax the output of a monopoly in order to foster cost inefficient entry this question is of particular concern in the energy markets dominated by cartel like affiliations opec and oil russia s gas exports to europe and the interest and practice to stimulate the development of alternative fuels making the realistic assumption that none of the players can commit to future policies subsidies are not a viable strategy for the government a tax cannot be first best but can be second best if the government cannot force the incumbent monopoly to sell its output at no profit and if the incumbent s profit is discounted however stimulating supply by improving the conditions for entry is not the prime concern of taxation after all it lowers aggregate supplies and may even lower the entrant s supply but to accrue parts of the monopoly rent

adaptive learning and roads to chaos the case of the cobweb abstract we investigate the dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations a linear demand curve and a nonlinear s shaped increasing supply curve both stable periodic and chaotic price behaviour can occur we investigate how the dynamics of the model depend on the parameters both infinitely many period doubling and period halving bifurcations can occur when the demand curve is shifted upwards the same result holds with respect to the expectations weight factor

when panic makes you blind a chaotic route to systemic risk abstract we present an analytical model to study the role of expectation feedbacks and overlapping portfolios on systemic stability of financial systems building on corsi et al 2016 we model a set of financial institutions having value at risk capital requirements and investing in a portfolio of risky assets whose prices evolve stochastically in time and are endogenously driven by the trading decisions of financial institutions assuming that they use adaptive expectations of risk we show that the evolution of the system is described by a slow fast random dynamical system which can be studied analytically in some regimes the model shows how the risk expectations play a central role in determining the systemic stability of the financial system and how wrong risk expectations may create panic induced reduction or over optimistic expansion of balance sheets specifically when investors are myopic in estimating the risk the fixed point equilibrium of the system breaks into leverage cycles and financial variables display a bifurcation cascade eventually leading to chaos we discuss the role of financial policy and the effects of some market frictions as the cost of diversification and financial transaction taxes in determining the stability of the system in the presence of adaptive expectations of risk

feed in subsidies taxation and inefficient entry we study energy markets with dirty production and lumpy entry costs of clean production renewables for intermediate entry costs markets yield inefficient production and inefficient entry a mix of three popular regulatory instruments polluter taxation feed in subsidies for renewables and consumption taxation cannot correct these market failures for larger entry costs the instruments are imperfect because they affect marginal incentives whereas entry is a lumpy fixed cost problem whenever the first best is implementable feed in subsidies and consumption taxes are redundant the second best requires feed in subsidies or consumption taxes in addition to a pollution tax and overshoots first best levels given production levels the instruments do not affect the regulator s budget

global kerosene subsidies an obstacle to energy efficiency and development summary it is widely agreed that energy subsidies impede the efficient functioning of markets the resulting distortions in prices work at odds with policies to improve energy efficiency and reduce the cost of energy services and associated externalities such as health and environmental damages the analysis developed in this article finds that kerosene is used in 173 countries at a cost to consumers of 43 4b y 60 3b y including direct economic subsidies and 77 2b y including certain externalities despite low world oil prices direct economic subsidies for kerosene were 18 4b in 2013 and 34 7b including environmental externalities these values correspond to 72 and 56 of total kerosene costs being passed through to consumers respectively when excluding advanced economies the pass through values fall to 40 and 35 approximately 52 of the global kerosene supply receives direct subsidy or 63 when externality costs are considered the cooking end use receives 2 0b y in direct kerosene subsidies lighting 7 1b y and heating and other residual uses 9 3b y or 76 per over all households each year defining subsidies at this level of granularity is useful for pinpointing policy issues and opportunities promoting a transition to energy efficient off grid energy services is one of the most cost effective ways of reducing dependency on subsidies however the very presence of subsidies undercuts this process by diluting market price signals and rendering energy efficiency investments less cost effective while competing with other social and development focused budgetary needs kerosene subsidies are additionally counterproductive because the emerging technologies they impede e g improved lighting and cook stoves also improve productivity safety and quality of life forty five countries many in the developing world have priced kerosene such that there are no direct subsidies and twenty two have done so even when accounting for environmental externalities suggesting the practice is economically and politically feasible

the economics of attribute based regulation theory and evidence from fuel economy standards in many countries fuel economy standards mandate that vehicles meet a certain fuel economy but heavier or larger vehicles are allowed to meet a lower standard this has the perverse implication of allowing automakers to meet standards either by improving fuel economy or by increasing weight which lowers fuel economy and increases externalities related to accidents this is but one example of an attribute based regulation in which the regulation imposed on a product depends on both the externality it creates and some other attribute attribute basing potentially motivates rms and individuals to strategically alter the attribute thereby endogenously altering the stringency of the regulation this paper develops a theory of attribute basing to demonstrate the costs and benets of its use the paper then empirically examines the consequences of attribute based fuel economy standards in japan where fuel economy standards are a notched attribute based function of vehicle weight we use cross sectional and panel techniques to demonstrate that attribute based regulation has signicantly altered the distribution of vehicle weight in japan where 10 of vehicles bunch at weight notches for cars whose weight is altered in response to the policy we estimate that the alteration generates a welfare loss from the exacerbation of weight related externalities of 1 500 per unit sold which translates into a 700 million annual loss across the japanese auto market

indivisible toxic torts the economics of joint and several liability cost effective or efficient pollution control has traditionally devoted most of its attention to analyzing the effects of legislative or regulatory policy instruments such as emission taxes or marketable emission permits recent contributions have expanded this focus to include the effects of monitoring and enforcement policies 2 with a few noteworthy exceptions 3 however the role of the court system in general and liability law in particular have not received analytical attention among environmental economists in proportion to their importance in resource allocation

on the consistency of backward looking expectations the case of the cobweb in dynamic models of economic fluctuations backward looking expectations with systematic forecasting errors are inconsistent with rational behaviour in non linear dynamic models exhibiting seemingly unpredictable chaotic fluctuations however simple habitual rule of thumb backward looking expectation rules may yield non zero but nevertheless non systematic forecasting errors in a chaotic model expectational forecasting errors may have zero autocorrelations at all lags even for rational agents patterns in these forecasting errors may be very difficult to detect especially in the presence of small noise backward looking expectations are then not necessarily inconsistent with rational behaviour we investigate whether simple expectation schemes such as naive or adaptive expectations can be consistent with rational behaviour in the simplest of all non linear dynamic economic models the non linear cobweb model

imperfect foresight and chaos an example of a self fulfilling mistake abstract we consider an overlapping generations economy with a single production sector and a government first we assume that the households have imperfect foresight in the sense that they cannot distinguish between the trajectories of a deterministic chaotic system and a stochastic process it is shown that mistaking a deterministic chaotic system for a stochastic one is a self fulfilling mistake because the possibility of making this mistake arises only when it is made the unique perfect foresight equilibrium is proved to exhibit simple dynamics for most parameter values finally we show that when agents apply simple econometric models to build their expectations the resulting dynamics resemble the chaotic dynamics of the imperfect foresight equilibrium under certain parameter constellations while they are close to the simple dynamics of the perfect foresight equilibrium for other parameter values

carl s nonlinear cobweb abstract this essay surveys some of my work on expectations learning and bounded rationality within the classical cobweb model following early inspiring ideas from carl chiarella in particular i focus on the role of nonlinear dynamics learning and heterogeneity within the cobweb framework and how price fluctuations in the cobweb theory fit with observations of individual and aggregate behaviour from laboratory experiments with human subjects

cobweb dynamics under bounded rationality this paper discusses recent work on expectation formation in the familiar cobweb hog cycle model a convenient feature of the model is the fact that it has a unique rational expectations equilibrium ree attention will be focused on whether this unique ree can be learned under bounded rationality with agents using simple habitual rule of thumb forecasting rules or whether other approximate rational expectations equilibria can arise where forecasts are although not perfect approximately correct in particular the possibility of chaotic equilibria under bounded rationality will be discussed both the homogeneous agent case and the heterogeneous case with evolutionary competition between different forecasting rules will be discussed recent experimental work on expectations formation in the cobweb economy suggests excess volatility and endogenous possibly chaotic price fluctuations driven by the interaction of competing boundedly rational agents