international bargaining in the presence of global environmental change this model deals with the greenhouse effect that is to say with a problem of international pollution through a description of the bargaining process it aims to determine the different forms that may be taken by cooperation agreements between the countries involved we demonstrate in particular that under some conditions it is always possible for the countries to reach an agreement such agreements are the work of a group of so called leader countries characterized by their commitment in favour of cooperation these leader countries use transfers to induce other countries to join them but they can be insufficiently attractive to convince all the countries to cooperate so as we show in the discussion the cooperation is not necessarily total therefore the key of a common problem can be a partial cooperation and not necessarily a common cooperation

an n person pure bargaining game abstract we propose an n person pure bargaining game which generalizes rubinstein s two person bargaining game and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome the solution approaches the n person nash solution as defined by chae the n person nash bargaining solution with time preference econ lett 41 1993 21 24 in the time preference framework as the time lapse between bargaining rounds goes to 0 journal of economic literature classification number c78

agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining abstract we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda in the procedure proposals must be made on only one issue at a time although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table when bargaining frictions are small there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements including ones with delay however equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium this multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues

negotiating an agreement on global warming a theoretical analysis abstract the outcome of international negotiation on combatting global warming is derived and analyzed using a two country bargaining model it is shown that while side payments between countries will generally be part of an agreement some of these payments are made purely as a result of asymmetry in bargaining power and have nothing to do with the polluter pays principle or the victim pays principle factors affecting the outcome of negotiation include a country s size of population the welfare level at the disagreement point and the order of making offers the enforcement issue is also discussed

issue by issue negotiations the role of information and time preference abstract the alternating offers bargaining game with two pies and incomplete information has a bargaining sequential equilibrium where the strong type of the informed player restricts his offer to one pie leaving it to the other player to make an offer on the second pie an offer on both pies comes only from the weak type of informed player hence an issue by issue negotiation agenda may arise from signaling considerations journal of economic literatureclassification number c78

do side payments help collective decisions and strategic delegation i investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation on the one hand allowing side payments may be necessary when one party s participation con straint otherwise would be violated on the other with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less because this increases her bargaining power reluctant agents in turn implement too few projects i show that side payments are bad if the hetero geneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large with a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments but delegation becomes more strategic as well and cooperation decreases in either case jel c78 d78 f53 h77

the role of non economic endowments introduction to the special section on what we know and what we should know about international knowledge sourcing recent developments in the pattern of international knowledge sourcing have highlighted a new international division of labor in knowledge production which now is affecting emerging as well as advanced countries the source of this division of labor has been identified as residing in the changing economic endowments of these countries we extend this by suggesting that the new international allocation of knowledge related activities is related strongly to a country s non economic endowments our arguments provide context to the papers in this special section

entry mode organizational learning and r d in foreign affiliates evidence from japanese firms this paper develops hypotheses concerning the role of entry mode and experience based organizational learning as determinants of the r d intensity of foreign affiliates and tests these hypotheses on a sample of 420 japanese manufacturing affiliates abroad entry mode has a major impact on r d activities the r d intensities of acquired affiliates substantially exceed those in wholly owned greenfield affiliates while the r d intensities of minority owned ventures are higher if japanese parent firms lack strong r d capabilities at home for greenfield operations support is found for an incremental growth pattern of foreign r d as a function of organizational learning and affiliate capability building the results are consistent with the view that part of the explanation for japanese firms relative lack of involvement in overseas r d must be sought in their status as latecomers in the establishment of overseas manufacturing networks at the same time a number of japanese firms have actively used foreign acquisitions and joint ventures to gain access to overseas technology and to establish overseas r d capabilities at a faster pace copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

new perspectives on the innovation strategies of multinational enterprises lessons for technology policy in europe abstract the aim of this contribution is to learn more about changes in the innovation strategies of large multinational corporations whereby one focus is on internationalization aspects as sources for our analyses we reviewed the main empirical studies and gathered information and insights from 21 corporations our results show firstly that the internationalization of research and technology is still characterized by triadization involving companies from the us the european union and japan secondly qualitative motives are increasingly driving r d location decisions like learning from technological excellence and lead markets and dynamic interactions within the value chain thirdly the process of internationalization in research and technology has been accompanied by an increasingly selective focus on a very few locations and the concentration of innovation activities on worldwide centers of excellence we conclude that these changes in the innovation strategies of large multinational companies put several topics on the agenda for technology policy in europe 1 a stronger focus on extra european collaboration and mobility 2 strengthening the attractiveness of the european union to foreign r d investment and 3 the absorptive capacities of r d organizations in europe 4 a stronger integration of different policy areas and of indirect policy measures 5 as well as the establishment of a transparent and global framework for policy coordination and priority setting worldwide

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

international corporate entrepreneurship and firm performance the moderating effect of international environmental hostility abstract globalization of the world economy has encouraged u s companies to leverage their resources and skills by expanding into existing or new foreign markets u s companies have also acquired new capabilities by locating important functional activities overseas and joining with foreign partners in new markets through alliances and joint ventures these opportunities however are tempered by the constraints imposed by the competitive forces that exist in international environments aggressive government intervention technological changes and fierce local rivalries all contribute to hostile international environments for u s firms global expansion success in global business operations requires resourcefulness and entrepreneurial risk taking the activities of u s companies in foreign markets therefore provide a unique opportunity to examine the effects of international corporate entrepreneurship ice efforts on company performance ice is defined as the sum of a company s efforts aimed at innovation proactiveness and risk taking these efforts offer an important means of revitalizing and renewing established companies and improving their performance few studies have empirically examined the effects of ice activities on companies financial performance this study used data from 98 u s companies to 1 determine the impact of ice efforts on firm performance and 2 explore the moderating effect that the perceived hostility of the international environment has on the relationship between ice and company performance the results showed that ice was positively associated with a firm s overall profitability and growth as well as its foreign profitability and growth those firms that aggressively pursued ice in international environments with higher levels of hostility had higher return on assets roa but did not achieve significantly higher levels of growth however as hostility in the international environment continued to intensify roa rose and then fell as companies increased their ice activities thus there was a point of diminishing returns to a company s aggressive pursuit of ice under excessive environmental hostility the results highlight both the rewards and risks of pursuing ice companies benefit from ice activities by achieving higher overall performance as well as foreign profits and growth in revenue however the aggressive pursuit of ice does not always guarantee superior performance our results show that the payoff from ice is moderated by executives perceptions of the hostility of their firm s international business environment our findings highlight the importance of ice for organizational success both overall and in foreign markets yet the results compellingly suggest that there are upper limits to the potential gains a firm achieves from its aggressive pursuit of ice when the international environment in which it competes is hostile

national politics and international agreements abstract in this paper we set up a political economy model of a two country world economy where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross border externalities such as environment protection subject to feasibility efficiency and equity constraints has to be negotiated by two elected national delegates we prove that any international agreement involves higher public good provisions through higher contributions in both countries than in the case of no agreement if feasible an ia may generate losers in either country under an equal tax rate rule an international agreement may or may not be reached unlike under an equal gain rule turning to the election stage depending on the type of equity rule imposed on the ia the choice of delegates depends crucially on distributive characteristics both between and within countries this is due to the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country s taxpayers

patterns of internationalisation of corporate technology location vs home country advantages given the trends towards increasing globalisation of markets and of production the globalisation of technology remains a subject of considerable interest to analysts and policy makers in the 1990s this paper provides some new empirical observations for debate and discussion on the patterns of technological activities of large firms outside their home countries it is based on a systematic analysis of the us patenting activities of 220 of the most internationalised firms in terms of their technology in the 1990s although firms are active outside their home countries in the high technology fields such as computers pharmaceuticals telecommunications image and sound and materials quite a sizeable proportion of their foreign activities are concerned with process and machinery technologies moreover a comparison of the technological advantage of the company at home and the advantage of the location shows that in a large majority of cases firms tend to locate their technology abroad in their core areas where they are strong at home these results suggest that adapting products and processes and materials to suit foreign markets and providing technical support to off shore manufacturing plants remain major factors underlying the internationalisation of technology they are also consistent with the notion that firms are increasingly engaging in small scale activities to monitor and scan new technological developments in centres of excellence in foreign countries within their areas of existing strength however there is little evidence to suggest that even these most internationalised firms routinely go abroad to compensate for their weakness at home

localised production of technology for global markets given the trends towards increasing globalization of markets and of production the globalization of technology remains a subject of considerable interest to analysts and policymakers in the 1990s the main conclusion of this paper is that there is no systematic evidence to suggest that widespread globalization of technological activities occurred in the 1980s the evidence based on the u s patenting activities of 569 of the world s largest firms based in 13 countries and covering 17 product groups shows that for an overwhelming majority of them technology production remains close to the home base the analysis also shows the dangers of generalizing on the basis of anecdotal evidence from a small sample of firms from a particular country or sector c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

delegation and threat in bargaining abstract two principals nations appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good two institutional set ups are studied each with a different level of authority given to the agents here authority means the right to decide the own side s provision if negotiations break down in equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own the low authority equilibrium pareto dominates with regard to the principals the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously autarchy the high authority equilibrium is pareto dominated by the low authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 and c72

auctions with toeholds an experimental study of company takeovers we run experiments on english auctions where the bidders already own a part toehold of the good for sale the theory predicts a very strong explosive effect of even small toeholds while asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry it is not nearly as strong as predicted we explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless this is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria which makes them fail when human players are involved our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails moreover we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring

perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration abstract we consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement the main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator who can only become active with the consent of both parties in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome we compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options journal of economic literature classification number c78

multi issue bargaining with endogenous agenda abstract the first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues the agenda matters even if players become arbitrarily patient this result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues it is found that simultaneous bargaining over packages should be a prevailing phenomenon but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay journal of economic literature classification number c78

the importance of the agenda in bargaining abstract this paper discusses a multi issue bargaining game in which the players set up an agenda and negotiate on the issues sequentially according to this agenda we demonstrate that the agenda might play an important role in the bargaining and discuss the relationship between the agenda and the final outcome of the bargaining game assuming that players have conflicting evaluations regarding the importance of the issues under negotiation we identify the type of agenda each player prefers we also show that in such cases the outcome of the bargaining game need not to be efficient by demonstrating the strategic use of the agenda the paper explains the phenomenon of bargaining on the agenda

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

institutions supporting technical advance in industry elsewhere 1982 economists beliefs that modern capitalism is a fine innovation generating machine have no intellectual grounding in contemporary neoclassical theory the twin theorems take technologies as given the apparent effectiveness of capitalism in this arena must reside in characteristics and mechanisms other than those featured in the microeconomic theory textbooks in our book we attempt to analyze these it also is true that the capitalist engine is a much more complicated one than many economists seem to think i presently am

national scientific capacity and r d offshoring abstract this paper presents new evidence regarding the role of national scientific capacity in driving patterns of r d offshoring using a larger and more comprehensive dataset than has hitherto been used and applying it in a gravity model framework our results unambiguously support the importance of inventor country scientific capacity in attracting offshored r d as expected the home country s scientific capacity is also found to play a positive role we find that in fact on average firms source technology from less technologically advanced nations suggesting that firms offshore to access niche skills

regionalization of r d activities dis economies of interdependence and inventive performance abstract this paper examines the impact of the extent of the regionalization of mnes r d activities on their inventive performance by joining the regionalization theory with the recombinant view of invention we challenge the implicit assumption that all foreign knowledge seeking activities will necessarily offer new knowledge to the firm we introduce the dis economies of interdependence defined as the dis advantages that the firm derives due to the interdependence among countries within a region as a new theoretical mechanism explaining the benefits and costs of regionalization our analysis of global pharmaceutical firms shows that an inverted u shaped relationship exists between the number of regions in which a firm has r d activities and its inventive performance our results also indicate that a firm s recombinant capability moderates the inverted u shaped relationship in such a way that when a firm s recombinant capability is high it reaches its turning point in a larger number of regions and the inverted u shaped relationship is flatter these results underscore that recombinant capability significantly influences the firm s ability to derive benefits and reduce costs from the regionalization of its r d activities our findings suggest that it is through the consideration of the dis economies of interdependence that offers the essential reasoning needed to unwind the inferred assumption that all foreign knowledge seeking activities will offer access to new knowledge

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way

the role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations abstract we develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation depending on the nature of the conflict we distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict peacekeeping and negotiations inside the conflict peacemaking in these contexts we study the role of a mediator who tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the final sharing we show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation even if that implies costs we also find how the player with a weak bargaining position in a conflict can strategically profit from the mediator s quest for equality finally we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one

agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining ii unrestricted agendas we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous unrestricted agenda in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding issues we find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement

the biodiversity bargaining problem we employ cooperative bargaining theory and nash s rational threats idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem the problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier we discuss the importance of both efficiency bargaining frontier and fairness recognition of characteristics of bargainers in the choice of the appropriate contract we show that the incremental cost contract used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the south to the production of cooperative surplus a rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

a note on multi issue two sided bargaining bilateral procedures abstract this note considers a two sided multi issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same side may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues the note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield in particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity conflicting priorities may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement the different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures moreover the conflict over procedure can be substantial among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players journal of economic literature classification number c7

on the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities abstract the set of technological opportunities in a given industry is one of the fundamental determinants of technical advance in that line of business we examine the concept of technological opportunity and discuss three categories of sources of those opportunities advances in scientific understanding and technique technological advances originating in other industries and in other private and governmental institutions and feedbacks from an industry s own technological advances data from the yale survey on industrial research and development are used to measure the strength of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern interindustry differences in the importance of these sources we find that interindustry differences in the strength and sources of technological opportunities contribute importantly to explanations of cross industry variation in r d intensity and technological advance

transnational firms and the changing organisation of innovative activities it is suggested that a transition is taking place towards new modes of organising transnational corporations innovative activities first different units of multinational firms including foreign based subsidiaries are increasingly involved in the generation use and transmission of knowledge secondly multinationals are developing external networks of relationships with local counterparts through which foreign affiliates gain access to external knowledge sources and application abilities as a result of this evolutionary process multinationals organisation is subject to both centripetal and centrifugal forces considerable efforts are then necessary to innovate coordination procedures and mechanisms in order to enhance the generation circulation and use of knowledge a number of empirical works are reviewed providing some evidence of the evolutionary process discussed in the paper 1 transnational companies as networks of innovators economists have long viewed innovation as being primarily generated by firms in their home countries classic contributions in the economics of multinational corporations have consolidated this view referring mainly to the us based multinationals vernon 1966 kindleberger 1969 and stopford and wells 1972 theorised a quasi colonial relationship between the parent company and foreign subsidiaries wherein the latter are in charge of replicating the former s activities abroad with strategic decisions including r d and innovation strategies being rigidly centralised particularly vernon emphasised that coordinating international innovative activities would be too costly owing to the difficulties of collecting and controlling relevant information across national borders host countries and foreign subsidiaries would then play a role almost exclusively in the adoption and diffusion of centrally created technology this view was supported mainly by us economists and based on us evidence from the early post world war ii period but it was very influential for the development of studies on the economics of transnational companies tncs and the internationalisation of

bargaining and international environmental agreements this article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to an international environmental agreement most of the papers considered apply bargaining theory although other approaches have been considered as well among other issues the papers considered analyze the burden sharing rule that will result from a negotiation over a global public good the role of information asymmetries the impact of unilateral commitments delegation and ratification whether or not countries are going to form groups during the negotiation process and the influence of the expectation of a future bargaining process on investment decisions the basic bargaining model is optimistic as it predicts that countries will reach an efficient agreement immediately however all the developments of this model surveyed afterwards are rather pessimistic and even the basic model has perverse incentives for pre negotiation signals

strategic delegation of environmental policy making a common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making however there is little empirical support that noncooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes we develop a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself by doing so she mitigates the race to the bottom in environmental taxes in contrast if environmental policies are determined cooperatively with other countries the median voter has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares less for the environment than she does herself so as to free ride on international environmental agreements

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

the globalisation of technology a new taxonomy book synopsis international management of research and development brings together the most influential contributions to managing organising and coordinating r d and innovation on a global scale in addition to papers on the fundamental principles trends and drivers of international r d it covers strategies and operations of global r d it also provides an introduction to modern concepts such as knowledge networks open innovation and virtual innovation it is a key reference collection for professors researchers and practitioners

knowledge seeking and location choice of foreign direct investment in the united states to what extent do firms go abroad to access technology available in other locations this paper examines whether and when state technical capabilities attract foreign investment in manufacturing from 1987 1993 we find that on average state r d intensity does not attract foreign direct investment most investing firms are in lower tech industries and locate in low r d intensity states suggesting little interest in state technical capabilities in contrast we find that firms in research intensive industries are more likely to locate in states with high r d intensity foreign firms in the pharmaceutical industry value state r d intensity the most at a level twice that of firms in the semiconductor industry and four times that of electronics firms interestingly not only firms from technically lagging nations but also some firms from technically leading nations are attracted to r d intensive states this suggests that beyond catching up firms use knowledge seeking investments also to source technical diversity

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

climate policy negotiations with incomplete information we analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited we ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome we find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that in turn this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements

climate contracts a game of emissions investments negotiations and renegotiations the paper presents a dynamic game where players can contribute to a public bad invest in technologies and write incomplete contracts despite the n 1 stocks in the model the analysis is tractable and the symmetric markov perfect equilibrium unique the framework helps to analyze emissions investments and international environmental agreements if only the emission levels are contractible then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration date to encourage investments the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date and for countries with small investment costs if renegotiation is possible such an incomplete contract implements the rst best the results have important lessons for how to design a climate treaty

international environmental agreements and strategic voting two anonymous referees have provided very valuable comments and suggestions we have also benefited from discussions at seminars at the universities of bonn dortmund and dresden and at the conferences of euresco the european economic association and the verein fur socialpolitik this paper was partly written while haupt was visiting the economics department at the university of colorado at boulder he is very grateful to the members of the department particularly to eckhard janeba for their hospitality and for stimulating discussions and to the fritz thyssen stiftung for funding his research visit we also thank the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft dfg for financial support

the globalization of r d results of a survey of foreign affiliated r d laboratories in the usa abstract this paper examines the globalization of innovation and the phenomenon of foreign direct investment fdi in research and development to do so it draws from a survey of foreign affiliated r d laboratories in the united states while the literature on foreign direct investment has emphasized the role of markets in driving off shore investments the main conclusion of this research is that the globalization of innovation is driven in large measure by technology factors of particular importance is the objective of firms to secure access to scientific and technical human capital

north south climate change negotiations a sequential game with asymmetric information this article determines the conditions under which thesouthern countries should act together or separately whilenegotiating with the north about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future southern engagement the papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework results showthat depending on their characteristics the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement

foreign direct investment in industrial research in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries results from a survey of multinational firms abstract this paper examines motives location characteristics inter temporal characteristics and modes of entry for foreign direct investment fdi in research and development r d the paper is based on a detailed empirical survey of laboratory sites established by 32 large multinational companies domiciled in 5 countries findings indicate that fdi in r d has risen considerably over the last 40 years and that firms invest in r d sites abroad in order to augment their knowledge base or in order to exploit it the former motive leads to establishment of facilities primarily close to universities while the latter type leads to establishment of facilities close to existing manufacturing facilities and markets the paper also finds that greenfield investments are the dominant mode of entry and that firms establish multiple r d sites in their home countries before investing in such sites abroad

the returns to foreign r d extant research on research and development r d internationalization has not examined how effective foreign r d investments are in generating positive returns for the investing firms in particular in comparison and conjunction with the effects of domestic r d investments we examine the effectiveness of international knowledge sourcing through foreign r d in an empirical analysis of the productivity effects of foreign and domestic r d investments in a large panel of firms based in the netherlands we argue that foreign and domestic r d will exhibit complementarity in their effects on productivity but that the roles of domestic and foreign r d depend on the relative position of the home country with respect to the global technology frontier and the related relative opportunities for knowledge sourcing abroad we estimate a dynamic panel data model derived from a knowledge stock augmented production function framework allowing for productivity convergence and declining returns to r d we confirm that for firms active in industries in which the home country is behind the global technology frontier foreign r d provides positive returns and has a complementary relationship with domestic r d for industries at the global technology frontier in contrast domestic r d is the primary source of productivity growth

regulating global biodiversity what is the problem we distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones where international cooperation is required global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands the basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted and those that have not we demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by nash rubinstein and others there are benefits from global land conversion and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual benefit sharing agreements prior informed consent clauses or very extreme incremental cost contracts the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved for this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date

ratification requirement and bargaining power when a large group of people is affected by a bargaining outcome practical reasons often require that the group be represented by an agent in the bargaining this paper addresses the issue of how the group ensures that the agent reaches an agreement that satisfies the group the authors show that by adopting a super majority ratification rule the group may improve its bargaining position and obtain a larger share of the bargaining surplus however a super majority ratification rule also involves the risk that a beneficial agreement is rejected by a minority of the group copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change this model deals with the problem of the greenhouse effect a problem of transfrontier pollution it consists of determining through the description of a bargaining process the conditions under which it is preferable for the developing countries to speak with a united voice and those conditions under which it is preferable for them to negotiate separately one from the other in particular it is shown that the agreements arising from the bargaining cannot be equitable and for that reason they include only a limited number of countries

the principal agent model with multilateral externalities an application to climate agreements we consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present the motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness to pay wtp for emissions abatement due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and thus can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading moreover optimal contracts can include a boundary part i e the endogenous type dependent participation constraint is binding which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract compared to this outside option a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low wtp and reduce her payoff for high types subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal

offshoring of r d looking abroad to improve innovation performance the offshoring of knowledge services has become a phenomenon of increasing importance for firms but many of its implications are yet to be discussed thoroughly this paper analyzes whether r d offshoring contributes to enhancing firms innovation capabilities specifically the study distinguishes between two governance models of offshoring captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing and two types of innovation outcomes product and process innovations we suggest that r d offshoring has different impacts depending on the innovation results and governance models considered the study empirically tests these relationships using the spanish technological innovation panel this survey contains information on a large sample of firms from diverse sectors for the period 2004 2007 the empirical findings allow us confirm our hypotheses and highlight the strategic importance of r d offshoring the empirical evidence reveals a positive relation between offshoring and innovation performance with a greater effect on product than on process innovations the results for different governance models show that captive offshoring has a greater effect on innovation outcomes than offshore outsourcing these findings lead us to conclude that firms that look overseas can benefit from location specific and specialization advantages to improve innovation performance

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

north south negotiations on emission reductions a bargaining approach this article models north south negotiations on emission reductions where the north provides side payments in exchange for the south s adoption of a more stringent emission standard we find that depending on where firms compete strong asymmetry among regions the two regions different valuations of side payments and climate change damage can produce self enforcing cooperative agreements moreover the south s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases i e either the cleanest or the dirtiest irrespective of the continuum of standards available the results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the south s emission tax

how firms innovate through r d internationalization an s curve hypothesis abstract this article examines the effects of r d internationalization and organizational slack on innovation performance we suggest that there is an s shaped relationship between r d internationalization and innovation performance innovation performance increases in the decentralization stage decreases in the transition stage and increases again in the recentralization stage in addition organizational slack is hypothesized to have a negative moderating effect on the s shaped relationship longitudinal data on 210 taiwanese firms in the information technology sector during a 10 year period is collected to test the hypotheses the findings support our prediction managerial implications and future research directions are discussed

the drivers of foreign direct investment into research and development an empirical investigation this paper examines the determinants of foreign direct investment fdi in research and development laboratories by 32 multinational enterprises in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries the paper applies a dichotomous set of motives for fdi results from an econometric analysis of 136 laboratory investments show that relative market size and relative strength of a country s science base determine whether fdi in research and development is carried out in order to exploit existing firm specific advantages or in order to build up new firm specific advantages this holds true in similar form for japanese european and u s firms and across the two industries

identifying technology transfer in foreign direct investment influence of industry conditions and investing firm motives firms have different motives for investing abroad most notably to exercise existing capabilities but also to build new capabilities by accessing knowledge located abroad recognizing this heterogeneity helps determine whether foreign investments transfer technology to their host industries using host industries initial level of competition to differentiate when each of these dichotomous motives is more likely i examine change in productivity resulting from inward fdi in us manufacturing industries for 1987 through 1991 while controlling for change in industry competition i find that relatively uncompetitive industries experience productivity growth while competitive industries experience productivity stagnation from fdi this differential outcome is consistent with heterogeneous investment motives

large firms in the production of the world s technology an important case of non globalisation us patenting by 686 of the world s largest manufacturing firms shows that their share of the world s production of technology is less than their share of r d activities and varies greatly amongst sectors in most cases the technological activities of these large firms are concentrated in their home country the characteristics of which influence the volume and trends in their technological activities much more strongly then the international component of these activities at the same time these large firms are major elements in the volume and the pattern of sectoral specializations in their home countries technological activities

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

game theoretic models for climate change negotiations abstract negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere are modeled as extensive games of perfect information various solution concepts such as nash equilibrium reaction function equilibrium correlated equilibrium and bargaining solutions are applied analyzed and computed special reduction techniques are used when the size of the game tree becomes excessive a new solution concept the tree correlated equilibrium is also introduced main features of an excel add in designed to compute various solutions are briefly described and a sample policy analysis for a special negotiating scenario is discussed

incomplete information and incentives to free ride on international environmental resources abstract this paper studies free riding incentives on common environmental resources in an incomplete information repeated game where abatements are perishable and perfect substitutes two contrasting types of perfect bayesian equilibria emerge for high discount factors or low discount factors but pessimistic prior beliefs the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of abatements otherwise the countries attempt to use their private information strategically and the game becomes a war of attrition this generates an outcome where the pessimistic country unilaterally abates forever and another which involves delay until the first abatement if both countries are optimistic

the design of stable international environmental agreements economic theory and political economy international environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement international environmental agreements must be self enforcing game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation therefore environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics moreover interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement

leadership and free riding decomposing and explaining the paradox of cooperation in international environmental agreements this paper decomposes the canonical model of international environmental agreements barrett in oxf econ pap 46 878 894 1994 into three effects externality cost effectiveness and timing the externality and timing effects are countervailing forces on abatement levels of greenhouse gases the paradox of cooperation in the three stage stackelberg game is explained by showing that when the gains to cooperation are small the timing effect dominates the externality effect and large coalitions are stable the timing effect has the greatest impact when the high benefit nations have low abatement cost the cost effectiveness effect arises from asymmetry and generates the need for an agreement with transfers the cost effectiveness effect is largest when the high benefit nations are high cost this creates a larger difference in the marginal abatement cost of the last unit of abatement in the absence of an agreement numerical examples illustrate how the parameters and effects interact to result in outcomes ranging from no to full participation