a comment on neudeck and podczeck s adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets abstract using the grossman equilibrium concept neudeck and podczeck journal of health economics 15 1996 387 show that imposing a minimum standard on a perfectly competitive insurance market can result in anti competitive effects decreased welfare with some insurers earning positive profits however the grossman concept precludes an insurer from offering two separating cross subsidizing health plans when an insurer can offer multiple plans as under both the nash and miyazaki wilson equilibrium concepts i show that minimum standards result in a doubleton equilibrium never allow positive total profits and increase welfare this is of interest since in 1997 more than half of establishments in the us offering choice of multiple plans did so through a single insurer

racing to the bottom and racing to the top the crucial role of firm characteristics in foreign direct investment choices this study builds on the pollution haven and induced innovation arguments as explanations for firm behavior with regard to international environmental management and argues both need to be integrated this implies that foreign direct investment is capable of facilitating a race to the bottom and a race to the top simultaneously using novel and detailed data we test whether environmental capabilities and weaknesses and other characteristics affect us firms foreign direct investment choices in chinese provinces with more or less stringent environmental regulation this enables a more detailed analysis by allowing country regulation to vary spatially and over time our study finds that heterogeneity in capabilities and firm size jointly determine foreign direct investment and in doing so shows the simultaneity of a race to the bottom and to the top specifically firms with environmental capabilities invest in more stringently regulated regions and firms with weaknesses are less likely to target such regions these diverging effects are both moderated by firm size which further amplifies each of them our findings underscore the need to integrate pollution haven and induced innovation arguments in a joint analysis they furthermore show the relevance of methodological choices when testing hypotheses integrating the above arguments empirically

the economic growth effect of offshore banking in host territories evidence from the caribbean summary following the success of renowned caribbean offshore centers several small islands have enacted offshore banking policies as a strategy for increasing economic growth several empirical studies have assessed the growth effect of such policies but none accounts for sector size when estimating its growth impact this study contributes to this literature by estimating the magnitude of offshore activity in each territory and using this estimate as a continuous variable in an economic growth model the results provide support for the hypothesis that facilitating offshore banking stimulates economic growth in host islands and that the benefit is proportional to sector size

competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre paid health plans however most of the literature on adverse selection considers extreme cases either perfect competition or monopoly if instead health plans are horizontally differentiated then i profits derived from each low risk are higher than from each high risk and ii when the profits derived from each high risk are negative cross subsidization a health authority as informed as the health plans can implement a pareto improvement both local and global deviations from cross subsidization are addressed within a nash equilibrium framework

profit shifting and investment effects the implications of zero taxable profits abstract recent empirical research documents a tendency of multinational enterprise affiliates to bunch around zero reported profit we set up a theoretical model of multinational firm behavior in which we allow for corner solutions in the choice of the optimal transfer price due to insufficient profits or losses of affiliates such constraints in the choice of the transfer price induce bunching and generate investment effects in the low tax as well as the high tax country in equilibrium affiliates might overinvest and the investment effects generate a tendency for too high profit taxes the analysis provides a micro foundation for the investment effects that result from transfer pricing the finding stands in contrast to the existing literature where transfer pricing choices are unconstrained

governments as owners state owned multinational companies the globalization of state owned multinational companies somncs has become an important phenomenon in international business ib yet it has received scant attention in the literature we explain how the analysis of somncs can help advance the literature by extending our understanding of state owned firms soes and multinational companies mncs in at least two ways first we cross fertilize the ib and soes literatures in their analysis of foreign investment behavior and introduce two arguments the extraterritoriality argument which helps explain how the mnc dimension of somncs extends the soe literature and the non business internationalization argument which helps explain how the soe dimension of somncs extends the mnc literature second we analyze how the study of somncs can help develop new insights of theories of firm behavior in this respect we introduce five arguments the triple agency conflict argument in agency theory the owner risk argument in transaction costs economics the advantage and disadvantage of ownership argument in the resource based view rbv the power escape argument in resource dependence theory and the illegitimate ownership argument in neo institutional theory after our analysis we introduce the papers in the special issue that collectively reflect diverse and sophisticated research interest in the topic of somncs

a simple tax structure for competitive equilibrium and redistribution in insurance markets with asymmetric information in their influential paper rothschild and stiglitz 6 demonstrated that the existence of nash equilibrium is not a general property of insurance markets when buyers have private information about their riskiness and firms face free entry and exit conditions this paper presents a simple and implementable system of taxes and subsidies applied to firms which permits a nash equilibrium always to exist we also show that more than one nash equilibrium is open to the regulator in particular government can effect risk discriminating redistribution without a priori knowledge of any individual buyer s riskiness hence it is not the case that the inability to distinguish between types of buyers rules out compensation risk discriminating transfers even in principle as claimed by schmalensee 7 442 finally we show that even when a nash equilibrium exists without government intervention there are always alternative and under some circumstances pareto superior equilibria open to the regulator since these alternative equilibria entail cross subsidization from low risk to high risk buyers our results suggest that the well known cross subsidization enforced through current regulatory practices is consistent with economic efficiency we conclude that the informational asymmetry assumed by rothschild and stiglitz poses distinct efficiency and distribution problems as do more conventional non informational situations of market failure and that regulators can influence the allocation of insurance through conventional instruments of intervention without assuming dictatorial control of the market

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

minimum standards insurance regulation and adverse selection evidence from the medigap market abstract this paper examines the implications of minimum standards for insurance markets i study the imposition of binding minimum standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly the central estimates suggest that the introduction of the standards was associated with an 8 percentage point 25 decrease in the proportion of the population with coverage in the affected market with no evidence of substitution toward other unregulated sources of insurance coverage to explore possible factors contributing to the impact of the minimum standards i develop comparative static predictions of the impact of imposing minimum standards in an insurance market with adverse selection the observed changes in market equilibrium associated with the minimum standards are broadly consistent with these predictions providing evidence of the existence of adverse selection in this insurance market more importantly they suggest that the presence of adverse selection which in principle may provide an economic rationale for minimum standards in practice may have exacerbated the declines in insurance coverage associated with the minimum standards

outward fdi and domestic investment in two industrialized countries abstract using cointegration techniques we find that in the us outward fdi has positive long run effects on domestic investment in germany this complementary relationship exists only in the short run in the long run outward fdi substitutes for german domestic investment

adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets abstract in this paper we look at various ways to regulate the health insurance market and ask whether they provide an answer to the problem of adverse selection to avoid inefficiency government policy must either effectuate some cross subsidization of insurance policies within the state sector or grant private insurance firms an exclusive right to serve certain groups of the population recent reforms in the netherlands and germany and president clinton s proposals for the us could be adapted to fulfil these requirements efficiency cannot be achieved on the other hand if the regulator tries to prescribe cross subsidization within the private sector

health economics worldwide i issues in health insurance 1 pricing and imperfections in the medical care market place 2 how can we prevent cream skimming in a competitive health insurance market the great challenge for the 90s 3 the impact of utilization review on costs and utilization 4 the normative and positive economics of minimum health benefits ii criteria for allocating health care resources 1 cost effectiveness analysis of strategies for screening prostatic cancer 2 the validity of the mimic health index some empirical evidence 3 welfare economics and cost utility analysis iii administrative and market allocation in health care 1 excess demand and patient selection for heart and liver transplantation 2 non price allocative procedures scottish solutions to a national health service problem 3 priorities among waiting list patients 4 consumer information price and nonprice competition among hospitals iv health care in the political arena 1 cost containment in health care justification and consequences 2 political economy of hospital financing 3 a pooled cross sectional analysis of the health care expenditure of the oecd countries 4 is there a sisyphus syndrome in health care 5 deaths from gastrointestinal cancer in mexico probable cause for water sampling index of names index of subjects

cross border tax effects on affiliate investment evidence from european multinationals recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs like marketing patents etc then a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm in this paper we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent s capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad using micro data on european multinational firms we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5 6 decrease in the affiliate s capital stock from a welfare point of view this cross border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well known positive externality due to profit shifting

premium subsidies for health insurance excessive coverage vs adverse selection the tax subsidy for employment related health insurance can lead to excessive coverage and excessive spending on medical care yet the potential also exists for adverse selection to result in the opposite problem insufficient coverage and underconsumption of medical care this paper uses the model of rothschild and stiglitz r s to show that a simple linear premium subsidy can correct market failure due to adverse selection the optimal linear subsidy balances welfare losses from excessive coverage against welfare gains from reduced adverse selection indeed a capped premium subsidy may mitigate adverse selection without creating incentives for excessive coverage

consequences of offshoring to developing nations labor market outcomes welfare and corrective interventions our parsimonious two country developed country and developing country model of offshoring provides nuanced results these include cases where wages monotonically improve as well as where wages exhibit an inverted u relationship with offshoring cost reductions we identify conditions under which these relationships hold since global welfare always rises with improvements in offshoring technology we find that there is a role for a minimum wage alternatively wage tax in the developing country we derive such a policy s optimal level there is also the possibility of a developed country optimal offshoring tax for extracting terms of trade benefits we finally analyze the two country nash equilibrium in policies jel f11 f13 f16 f66 o19 o24

foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes abstract governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment fdi focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes this paper examines the impact of indirect non income taxes on fdi by american multinational firms using affiliate level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of american companies estimates imply that 10 higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7 1 lower affiliate assets which is similar to the effect of 10 higher income tax rates affiliate output falls by 2 9 as indirect taxes rise by 10 while higher income taxes have more modest output effects high corporate income tax rates depress capital labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates whereas high indirect tax rates do not these patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect fdi

setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care minimum variance optimal risk adjustment abstract risk adjustment refers to the practice of paying health plans a premium per person or per family based on a formula using risk adjusters such as age or gender and weights on those adjusters one role of risk adjustment is to make sure plans have an incentive to accept all potential enrollees another role at least as important in our view is to lead health plans to choose the efficient level of quality of care for the various services they offer most of the research and policy literature on risk adjustment focuses on the first problem this paper proposes a new way to calculate weights in a risk adjustment formula that contends with both problems for a given set of adjusters we identify the weights that minimize the variance in plan predictable health care costs that are not explained by risk adjustment addressing the access problem subject to the payments satisfying conditions for an optimal risk adjuster making sure plans provide the efficient quality we call the formula minimum variance optimal risk adjustment mvora

multinational firms mitigate tax competition an increase in the taxation of foreign affiliates reduces domestic investment as has recently been empirically shown in becker and riedel 2012 this paper investigates the implication of this finding for tax competition it is shown that an increase in the number of multinational firms in contrast to purely national firms may actually mitigate tax competition counter to the popular opinion that multinational firms undermine the national capacity to levy source based taxes

foreign direct investment and the domestic capital stock this paper evaluates evidence of the impact of outbound foreign direct investment fdi on domestic investment rates oecd countries with high rates of outbound fdi in the 1980s and 1990s exhibited lower domestic investment than other countries which suggests that fdi and domestic investment are substitutes u s time series data tell a very different story however years in which american multinational firms have greater foreign capital expenditures coincide with greater domestic capital spending by the same firms one dollar of additional foreign capital spending is associated with 3 5 dollars of additional domestic capital spending in the time series implying that foreign and domestic capital are complements in production by multinational firms this effect is consistent with cross sectional evidence that firms whose foreign operations expand simultaneously expand their domestic operations and suggests that interpretation of the oecd cross sectional evidence may be confounded by omitted variables this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the long run relationship between outward fdi and domestic output evidence from panel data abstract we find for 14 industrialized countries over the period 1971 2005 that outward fdi has positive long run effects on domestic output our results suggest that increased outward fdi is both a cause and a consequence of increased domestic output

change in domestic network centrality uncertainty and the foreign divestment decisions of firms abstract we investigate the role of domestic interfirm networks for the foreign divestment decisions of firms we argue that firms foreign operations risk being divested when a firm becomes more central in its domestic network positive changes in firm centrality at home facilitate access to information about new business opportunities but they may also lead firms to consider reconfiguring their value chain activities and resources across locations the resulting opportunity costs of maintaining foreign operations could subsequently lead to their divestment moreover we argue that the positive association between an increase in firm centrality in the domestic network and foreign divestment is stronger under higher uncertainty as pursuing new business opportunities at home becomes more appealing we distinguish between firm specific uncertainty and domestic market uncertainty we test and get support for our hypotheses using foreign subsidiary data from u s firms in the ict industry

redistributive income taxation under outsourcing and foreign direct investment this paper deals with optimal income taxation under international outsourcing and fdi we show how the joint effect of outsourcing and fdi on the optimal marginal income tax rates depends on whethe

the 45 years of foreign direct investment research approaches advances and analytical areas what are the main tenets associated with foreign direct investment fdi what research has been performed in the area of fdi to date which direction should research in this field proceed in the days to come as there is no article with comprehensive coverage of all the studies on fdi we review empirical research in this area between the years 1970 and 2014 as an attempt to answer these questions we identify the advances and analytical areas of fdi research list out the impactful research papers and authors theoretical and methodological approaches leading journals and variables of interest that exist in the area of fdi research as the research into the fdi has advanced significantly over the last two decades we have also tried to point out the gaps in the literature taken together our paper highlights the heterogeneous nature of fdi across countries and firms

organizing the health insurance market this paper presents a new approach to organizing universal health insurance first the government divides the entire population into many large groups then the government creates a federal health insurance system healthfed modeled on the federal reserve system to fill the role now played by the benefits office of a large firm the healthfed would create a short menu of alternatives solicit bids for insuring the entire group and price alternatives there would be redistribution between groups and pricing of alterna tives to reflect optimal social insurance principles there would be no connection between health insurance and employment it may seem odd that this presidential address is my first publication in health economics at the time when i might have been working on an alternative address i was chair of an expert panel for the advisory council on social security looking at issues in both retirement income and medical care 2 in the process of this work i have come up with a new approach to organizing universal health insurance that is the subject of this paper before starting on health insurance i will say a few words about a wider context offering what i will say as an example in that setting 3 a great deal of attention has been focused on the exciting issue of reorganizing economies dropping central planning commonly economists from those countries em brace capitalism or more specifically laissez faire competition with an enthusi asm which exceeds that ofwestern economists although not necessarily western businessmen yet laissez faire capitalism has received little serious support in the west for a very long time we all know the fundamental welfare theorem which shows many ways that capitalism can be imperfect we have also seen a growth in discussion and analysis of the many ways governments can mess up resource allocation the real question is the design of arrangements that try to integrate the things that each type of institution does better this is hard for two reasons one is that it is in the realm of second best with many constraints the more the constraints the harder the analysis the second is that we do not have good positive theories of government behavior good examples yes good theories no thus the analysis is more intuitive less theory driven than in our picture of private markets but also in our private market analyses we have been greatly complicating our picture recognizing all sorts of information imperfec tions that affect the way that private markets work so i will present to you a proposal for universal health insurance meant to combine something that