what determines female autonomy evidence from bangladesh abstract this paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country in particular we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women s autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband s farm in a simple theoretical model it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women using data from rural bangladesh empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands farms that contributes to women s autonomy the data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy

state misallocation and housing prices theory and evidence from china this paper examines the equilibrium price effects of the privatization of housing assets that were previously owned and allocated by the state i develop a theoretical framework that shows that privatization can have ambiguous effects on prices in the private market and that the degree of misallocation of the assets prior to privatization deter mines the subsequent price effects i test the predictions of the model using a large scale housing reform in china the results suggest that the removal of price distortions allowed households to increase their consumption of housing and led to an increase in equilibrium hous ing prices jel l33 018 p25 r31 r38 state participation in the housing market occurs in several forms in countries throughout the world the provision of subsidized housing as a welfare benefit to low income households is common throughout the western hemisphere in addition local governments in several cities in the united states have implemented regula tions that limit the increase of rents charged by landlords 1 this paper focuses on a form of state intervention in housing that occurs through the provision of subsidized homes to state employees the economic consequences of this area of research are potentially large as employer provided housing in the state sector is common throughout the developing world particularly in asia and sub saharan africa government regulation of the private market or the creation of a separate mar ket ensures that certain households have access to housing at prices that are below market value state interventions that aim to bring affordable housing to particu lar subsegments of the population can create economic inefficiencies they distort the decisions that individuals make regarding residential mobility joseph gyourko and peter linneman 1989 gordon a hughes and barry mccormick 1987 and employment michael svarer michael rosholm and jakob roland munch 2005 wang forthcoming and they lead to underinvestment in the construction and main

labor market opportunities and women s decision making power within households abstract despite the perceived importance of labor market opportunities in shaping married women s outside option and their bargaining power within households as a result this link has received very little empirical attention using longitudinal data on who makes the decision on a wide range of issues within mexican households and data from the administrative records of the mexican social security institute this paper identifies the effects of relative changes in labor market opportunities for men and women on both working and non working women s decision making power i find that increases in labor market opportunities improve women s decision making power as well as children s health using differential labor demand shocks across mexican industries caused by china s admission to the wto gives similar results

subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation we investigate the incentive and project screening effects of anonymity in a setting of subjective performance evaluation if the review process is blind then the applicant s payoff relevant type is hidden from the reviewer if the process is nonblind or informed then the reviewer observes the applicant s type directly in either case the evaluator receives a noisy signal on the quality of the agent s project and decides whether to accept or reject it we find that if the signal is not verifiable then informed evaluation results in an excessively steep equilibrium acceptance policy the standard applied to low ability applicants is too stringent and the standard applied to high ability applicants is too lenient blind review in which all applicants face the same standard often provides better incentives but it discards valuable information for screening projects we discover that blind review is more likely to be preferred by the evaluator when 1 the applicant pool is skewed toward high ability types 2 the stakes from acceptance are relatively high for applicants 3 both types of errors are relatively less costly or 4 there is little competition among reviewers we also discover that under blind review the evaluator may benefit from a more diverse applicant pool

income and bargaining effects on education and health in brazil abstract this study examines the impacts of the 1991 reform of brazil s rural pension system on schooling and health indicators we conclude that the reform had significant positive effects on schooling especially on literacy for girls co residing with a male pensioner we were unable to find similar results for children living with a female pensioner we further investigated whether these results were driven by bargaining power differences within households our findings suggest that this explanation is plausible

control and ownership of assets within rural ethiopian households this article investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce and on control over assets during marriage using detailed household data from rural ethiopia we show that assets brought to marriage ownership of assets control within marriage and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related productive resources are controlled by the household head disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but control is associated with larger claims upon divorce assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death but matter in case of divorce

does money matter the robustness of evidence from vector autoregressions traditionally empirical macroeconomic research begins with the use of theory to construct a highly restricted structural econometric model the determination of the nature of those restrictions is fraught with difficulty and thus many specification decisions turn out to be largely ad hoc and of dubious validity once these specification issues have been probably inadequately addressed and a structural model constructed it is then estimated using complicated econometric techniques requiring sophisticated computer programs recently an alternative approach to modeling macroeconomic time series has come into wide use this alternative introduced by sims 1980a 1980b suggests the use of vector autoregression var models to analyze time series relationships among macroeconomic variables the fact that the use of this approach has proliferated widely in a relatively brief period of time is due not only to the very persuasive criticisms of traditional methods made by sims see especially sims 1980a but perhaps even more to the perception that specification and estimation problems are greatly simplified the user of the var approach imposes few restrictions and can generally use ordinary least squares estimation procedures the var approach is thus believed to be largely free of the spurious specification assumptions and consequent specification errors necessitated by traditional macroeconometric procedures

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

housing reform in urban china efficiency distribution and the implications for social security we investigate the distribution of a measure of housing consumption among public tenants in cities of two chinese provinces using household survey data we find the resulting distribution roughly consistent with the outcome of a market rental system for fixed supply and ces preferences there is surprisingly little evidence of allocative inefficiency in the present bureaucratic allocation system we estimate the possible effects of market oriented housing reform under alternative assumptions about the system of cash transfers used to compensate for a move to market rents we investigate the distributional impact of reform and the likely need for supplementary cash benefits for low income households

haddad lawrence john hoddinott and harold alderman eds intrahousehold resource allocation in developing countries models methods and policy baltimore md johns hopkins university press 1997 384 pp 55 00 in this volume economists demographers sociologists and anthropologists collaborate in the study of how resources are allocated within households in developing countries and why it matters from a policy perspective surveying a broad range of theory and evidence the contributors examine the many social and cultural factors that influence decisions about the family and household level about the allocation of time income assets and other resources ths contributors show that a more complete understanding of intrahousehold behaviour can increase the likelihood that policies will reach the people they are intended to affect

property rights and intra household bargaining abstract this paper examines whether an individual level transfer of property rights increases the individual s bargaining power within the household the question is analyzed in the context of a housing reform that occurred in china that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that they had been renting from their state employers the rights to each housing unit were granted to a particular employee so property rights were defined at the individual level rather than the household level the results indicate that transferring ownership rights to men increased household consumption of some male favored goods and women s time spent on chores transferring ownership rights to women decreased household consumption of some male favored goods

do husbands and wives pool their resources evidence from the united kingdom child benefit common preference models of family behavior imply income pooling a restriction on family demand functions such that only the sum of husband s income and wife s income affects the allocation of goods and time testing the pooling hypothesis is difficult because most family income sources are not exogenous to the allocations being analyzed in this paper we present an alternative test based on a natural experiment a policy change in the united kingdom that transferred a substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s using family expenditure survey data we find strong evidence that a shift toward greater expenditures on women s clothing and children s clothing relative to men s clothing coincided with this income redistribution

gender and say a model of household behaviour with endogenously determined balance of power the evidence that the same total income can lead a household to choose different consumption vectors depending on who brings in how much of the income has led to an effort to replace the standard unitary model of the household with the collective model which recognizes that the husband and the wife may have different preferences and depending on the balance of power between them the household may choose differently one weakness of this new literature is that it fails to recognize that the household s choice could in turn influence the balance of power once this two way relation between choice and power is recognized we are forced to confront some new questions concerning how to model the household this paper tries to answer these by defining a household equilibrium examining its game theoretic properties and drawing out its testable implications it is shown for instance that once we allow for dynamic interaction a household can exhibit inefficient behavior and that for a certain class of parameters children will be less likely to work in a household where power is evenly balanced than one in which all power is concentrated in the hands of either the father or the mother the paper also draws out the implications for female labor supply

how does intergenerational investment respond to changes in the marriage market evidence from china abstract this paper examines how intergenerational investment responds to changes in the marriage market two major channels are modeled and empirically tested first expecting gender specific impacts on the future marriage market for their children parents adjustments in educational investment differ by the gender of children and second changes in marriage market conditions have contemporaneous impacts on intrahousehold bargaining because they change existing couples remarriage options which affects their educational investment in their children we test our model by exploiting a policy change in favor of local urban men in the urban marriage market in china we find that educational investment by local local couples decreases for sons but changes little for daughters consistent with the decrease in children s educational investment female favored consumption decreases while male favored consumption increases these results provide evidence of interaction between the intrahousehold bargaining and the future marriage prospect effects

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

the profits of power land rights and agricultural investment in ghana we examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in akwapim ghana we show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output the intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual corresponds to that individual s security of tenure over those specific plots and in turn to the individual s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

gatt safeguards and voluntary export restraints what are the interests of developing countries introduction trade in services and the multilateral trade negotiations agriculture in the uruguay round interests of developing countries gatt law agricultural trade and developing countries lessons from two case studies textiles and clothing in a new round of trade negotiations differential and more favorable treatment of developing countries and the international trading system balance of payments and related issues in the uruguay round of trade negotiations gatt safeguards and voluntary exports restraints what are the interests of developing countries international control of subsidies and countervailing duties export promoting subsidies countervailing threats and the general agreement on tariffs and trade

are the representative agent s beliefs based on efficient econometric models abstract no they are not at least not in the uk by examining gdp dynamics we find that over a time span of two decades an easy to perform adaptive expectations model systematically outperforms other standard predictors in terms of squared forecasting errors this should reduce model uncertainty and thereby lead to increased homogeneity in expectations however data collected in surveys show that great variety in expectations persists even in this situation moreover granger tests indicate that the forecasting fitness of the best predictor can be further enhanced by the use of information provided by survey expectations these results based on real time data and robust to both several predictors and nonlinearities weaken the general validity of approaches assuming predictions based on efficient econometric models

entitled to work urban property rights and labor supply in peru this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled entitled to work urban property rights and labor supply in peru new legal rights were issued in 1996 project teams providing titling service through 2003 in peru the study observed that between 1996 and 2003 the peruvian government issued property titles to over 1 2 million urban households the largest titling program targeted at urban squatters in the developing world this paper examines the labor market effects of increases in tenure security resulting from the program pre program squatters in program neighborhoods were significantly more likely to report improved tenure security by 60 percent similarly program participants were 18 8 percentage points less likely to report a high likelihood of eviction or invasion and 18 8 percentage points more likely to report that their dwelling was currently very secure from eviction or invasion the likelihood of working inside the home significantly falls by 11 6 percentage points for the average squatter family with two program periods

credit constraints job mobility and entrepreneurship evidence from a property reform in china this paper provides new evidence on the impact of private property rights on entrepreneurship i explore this issue in the context of a housing reform in urban china that allowed state employees renting state owned housing the opportunity to buy their homes at subsidized prices using the reform as an exogenous change in the capital constraints and mobility costs that inuence individuals entry

property rights for the poor effects of land titling secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development the evaluation of the causal effects of property rights however is a difficult task as their allocation is typically endogenous to overcome this identification problem we exploit a natural experiment in the allocation of land titles in 1981 squatters occupied a piece of land in a poor suburban area of buenos aires in 1984 a law was passed expropriating the former owners land to entitle the occupants some original owners accepted the government compensation while others disputed the compensation payment in the slow argentine courts these different decisions by the former owners generated an exogenous allocation of property rights across squatters using data from two surveys performed in 2003 and 2007 we find that entitled families substantially increased housing investment reduced household size and enhanced the education of their children relative to the control group these effects however did not take place through improvements in access to credit our results suggest that land titling can be an important tool for poverty reduction albeit not through the shortcut of credit access but through the slow channel of increased physical and human capital investment which should help to reduce poverty in future generations

who marries whom in a surging housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of a surging housing market on marital sorting our empirical analysis shows that there is increasing assortativeness on original family background in response to housing price appreciation that is for husbands when the down payment doubles one more year of paternal schooling predicts a marriage in which the father in law s schooling is 0 057 year greater than in a scenario in which the down payment does not increase the rising assortativeness could exacerbate the already expanding inequality caused by the booming housing market in addition to the benchmark analysis we find that a divorce reform which awards assets proportionate to the shares the spouses paid for the initial down payment rather than awarding equal shares upon divorce alleviates assortativeness the evidence suggests that joint investment in housing is likely to be a significant consideration in marital sorting

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

gender property rights and natural resources abstract attention to gender differences in property rights can improve the outcomes of natural resource management policies and projects in terms of efficiency environmental sustainability equity and empowerment of resource users although it is impossible to generalize across cultures and resources it is important to identify the nature of rights to land trees and water held by women and men and how they are acquired and transmitted from one user to another the paper particularly examines how the shift from customary tenure systems to private property in land trees and water has affected women the effect of gender differences in property on collective action and the implications for project design

racial profiling fairness and effectiveness of policing citizens of two groups may engage in crime depending on their legal earning opportunities and on the probability of being audited police audit citizens police behavior is fair if both groups are policed with the same intensity we provide exact conditions under which forcing the police to behave more fairly reduces the total amount of crime these conditions are expressed as constraints on the quantile quantile plot of the distributions of legal earning opportunities in the two groups we also investigate the definition of fairness when the cost of being searched reflects the stigma of being singled out by police

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

statistical discrimination and efficiency this paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure i consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibriumphenomenon it is found that there are potential efficiency gains from discrimination in terms of reduced mismatch between workers and jobs whether the solution to the planning problem involves discrimination depends on the trade off between the informational gains of specialization and the losses in terms of increased investment costs

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

the effect of education on crime evidence from prison inmates arrests and self reports we estimate the effect of high school graduation on participation in criminal activity accounting for endogeneity of schooling we begin by analyzing the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using census data instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high school graduation uncover a significant reduction in incarceration for both blacks and whites when estimating the impact of high school graduation only ols and iv estimators estimate different weighted sums of the impact of each schooling progression on the probability of incarceration we clarify the relationship between ols and iv estimates and show that the weights placed on the impact of each schooling progression can explain differences in the estimates overall the estimates suggest that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration by about 76 percentage points for whites and 3 4 percentage points for blacks we corroborate these findings using fbi data on arrests that distinguish among different types of crimes the biggest impacts of graduation are associated with murder assault and motor vehicle theft we also examine the effect of drop out on self reported crime in the nlsy and find that our estimates for imprisonment and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime we estimate that the externality of education is about 14 26 of the private return to schooling suggesting that a significant part of the social return to education comes in the form of externalities from crime reduction

how much equity does the government hold a central point in the recent debate about social security in the united states has been the extent to which the federal government should take significant positions in the equity market but as this paper shows the government already has a much more significant if implicit position in the u s equity market through its claim to future tax revenues using estimates of the sensitivity of federal tax revenues to stock market returns i calculate the implicit equity position of the federal government defined as the equity position that would be as sensitive to the stock market as the present value of federal revenues although standard errors are large point estimates indicate that the implicit federal equity position exceeds the size of the stock market itself a result that is consistent with the fact that revenues from all sources not just taxes on corporate source income are responsive to stock market returns this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on publication refereeing and working hard we present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous effort to evaluate recent changes in the publication process in economics we analyze the implications of these developments on research output lowering the precision of refereeing signals lowers the effort choices of intermediate ability authors but invites more submissions from less able authors increasing the number of journals stimulates less able authors to submit their papers the editor can improve the journal s quality pool of submitted manuscripts by improving the precision of refereeing but not by lowering acceptance standards the submission strategy of an author is informative of his ability

property rights and investment in urban slums this paper examines the effect of changes in tenure security on residential investment in urban squatter neighborhoods to address the endogeneity of property rights i make use of variation in ownership status induced by a nationwide titling program in peru in a difference in difference analysis i compare the change in housing investment before and after the program among participating households to the change in investment among two samples of nonparticipants my results indicate that strengthening property rights in urban slums has a significant effect on residential investment the rate of housing renovation rises by more than two thirds of the baseline level the bulk of the increase is financed without the use of credit indicating that changes over time reflect an increase in investment incentives related to lower threat of eviction jel o12 o18 p25 p26

women as agents of change female income and mobility in india economic globalization will give many women in developing countries access to steady and relatively remunerative employment for the first time potentially shifting bargaining power within their households and changing the choices that are made for their children this paper exploits a unique setting a group of tea plantations in south india where women are employed in permanent wage labor and where incomes do not vary by caste to anticipate the impact of globalization on mobility across social groups in the future the main result of the paper is that a relative increase in female income weakens the family s ties to the ancestral community and the traditional economy but these mobility enhancing effects are obtained for certain historically disadvantaged castes alone although the paper provides a context specific explanation for why the women from these castes emerge as agents of change the first general implication of the analysis is that the incentive and the ability of women to use their earnings to influence household decisions depends importantly on their social background the second implication is that historically disadvantaged groups may in fact be especially responsive to new opportunities precisely because they have fewer ties to the traditional economy to hold them back

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

women s inheritance rights and bargaining power evidence from kenya abstractthis paper investigates the human capital effects of a legal reform granting kenyan women equal inheritance rights i employ a difference in differences strategy exploiting variation in pr

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

intrahousehold bargaining female autonomy and labor supply theory and evidence from india standard models of labor supply predict that unearned income decreases labor supply we propose an alternative noncooperative household model in which a woman s unearned income improves her autonomy within the household which raises her gains from working and can increase her labor supply we find empirical support for this model using women s exposure to the hindu succession act in india as a source of exogenous variation in their unearned income exposure to the hindu succession act increases a woman s labor supply by between 3 8 and 6 1 percentage points particularly into high paying jobs autonomy increased by 0 17 standard deviations suggesting that control of income is a potential channel for these effects thus policies that empower women can have an additional impact on the labor market which can further reinforce autonomy increases