welfare properties of strategic r d investments in hotelling models abstract in linear city models if firms are allowed not allowed to locate outside the linear city they engage in excessive insufficient r d investments from the normative viewpoint this implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments

product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model abstract we extend the well known spatial competition model d aspremont gabszewicz thisse 1979 to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations we demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the center to delay the follower s entry leading to a non maximum differentiation outcome we also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader s location and firms values and in particular numerically show that the profit of the leader changes non monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter

optimal selection of process mean for a stochastic inventory model abstract it is very common to assume deterministic demand in the literature of integrated targeting inventory models however if variability in demand is high there may be significant disruptions from using the deterministic solution in probabilistic environment thus the model would not be applicable to real world situations and adjustment must be made the purpose of this paper is to develop a model for integrated targeting inventory problem when the demand is a random variable in particular the proposed model jointly determines the optimal process mean lot size and reorder point in q r continuous review model in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty in demand the proposed model is compared with three baseline cases the first of which considers a hierarchical model where the producer determines the process mean and lot sizing decisions separately this hierarchical model is used to show the effect of integrating the process targeting with production inventory decisions another baseline case is the deterministic demand case which is used to show the effect of variation in demand on the optimal solution the last baseline case is for the situation where the variation in the filling amount is negligible this case demonstrates the sensitivity of the total cost with respect to the variation in the process output also a procedure is developed to determine the optimal solution for the proposed models empirical results show that ignoring randomness in the demand pattern leads to underestimating the expected total cost moreover the results indicate that performance of a process can be improved significantly by reducing its variation

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited abstract this article reexamines sequential entry of firms in a hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by neven neven d j 1987 endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model international journal of industrial organization 5 419 434 i show that the pattern of locations is generally asymmetric in the case of a duopoly profits are non monotonic in market size even in the range where the number of firms does not change the firm that bears the burden of entry deterrence gains from lower barriers to entry as long as entry deterrence is possible equilibrium profits of all firms may be larger in situations in which more firms are active

symmetry breaking in two player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity a synthesis abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure strategy nash equilibria these classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game and relies on the theory of supermodular games the underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition to illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach we present some existing models dealing with r d capacity expansion and information provision which motivated this study

the determinants of efficiency and productivity in the swiss insurance industry abstract using state of the art frontier efficiency methodologies we study the efficiency and productivity of swiss insurance companies in the life property casualty and reinsurance sectors from 1997 2013 in this context we provide the first empirical analysis of internationalization strategies of insurance companies a topic of high interest in the business and economics literature but one that has to date not been the focus of efficiency studies in the insurance sector we find that productivity and efficiency have improved with regard to property casualty and reinsurance in the case of life insurance productivity and efficiency diminished however life insurance firms with higher levels of international business exhibit superior efficiency levels we observe that diversification strategies directed to the european market are more beneficial compared to those targeting markets outside of europe

strategic multi store opening under financial constraint abstract this paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm specifically given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open they sequentially determine the number of store openings including their locations to maximize their profits as a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved when firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market the leader chooses segmentation strategy in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower s entry in contrast when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market the leader chooses minimum differentiation strategy where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival s under this strategy the leader necessarily captures just half of the market furthermore we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium

the effect of market segmentation with demand leakage between market segments on a firm s price and inventory decisions abstract in this paper we address the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment in a newsvendor setting when the firm faces demand from two or more market segments in which the firm can set different prices we allow for demand leakage from higher priced segments to lower priced segments and assume that unsatisfied demand can be backlogged we examine the case where the demands occur concurrently without priority and are met from a single inventory we consider customer s buy down behavior explicitly by modeling demand leakage as a function of segment price differentiation and characterize the structure of optimal inventory and pricing policies

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

optimal fences and joint price and inventory decisions in distinct markets with demand leakage abstract this paper evaluates the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment when a firm faces demand from distinct market segments a firm utilizes fences such as advance or nonrefundable payment to maintain separation of its market segments however fences are imperfect and allow a degree of demand leakage from the higher priced to the lower priced market segment we investigate the optimal structure of joint price and inventory decisions with fencing and demonstrate that more segments is not necessarily better especially when demand uncertainty is high in the presence of lost sales we also show the impact of imperfect fences on the firm s profitability and evaluate how fencing costs affect the optimal fencing decision

the optimum target values for a production process with three class screening abstract for situations where an item is sold in one of two markets with different profit cost structures or scrapped economic selections of target values for the mean of the quality characteristic y of interest and the screening specification limits on a correlated variable x which is correlated with y are proposed two profit models based on y and x are constructed which involve four profit cost components profit production inspection and penalty costs assuming that x and y are jointly normally distributed methods of finding the optimal process mean and the screening specification limits on x are presented and an illustrative example is given

joint optimal determination of process mean production quantity pricing and market segmentation with demand leakage abstract the selection of an optimal process mean is an important problem in production planning and quality control research most of the previous studies in the field have analyzed the problem for a fixed exogenous price however in many realistic situations besides product quality product pricing is a paramount factor that determines the purchase behavior in the market in the experts opinion an integrated framework that incorporates pricing as a decision tool could significantly improve a firm s profitability most of the manufacturing firms yield products with distinguishable characteristics and therefore it is desirable to sell these products on the market at differentiated prices whereas the market segmentation achieved using differentiated prices is often imperfect a firm may experience demand leakages thus an optimal price decision must incorporate demand leakage effects for the firm to benefit from its differentiated pricing strategy in this paper these issues are addressed by proposing an optimal framework for joint determination of process mean pricing production quantity and market segmentation using differentiated pricing this research discusses a production process that manufactures multi class grade products based on their quality attribute the products are sold in primary and secondary market at differentiated prices while experiencing demand leakages the nonconforming items are reworked at an additional cost mathematical models are developed to address the problem under both price dependent deterministic and stochastic demand situations we propose a harmony search meta heuristic for solving the models a numerical experimentation is presented to study the significance of the proposed integrated decision framework

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

sequential location games we study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval we show that for certain classes of densities including monotone and under some additional restrictions hump shaped and u shaped ones equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets winner take all competition trade offs between profits in the short and the long run and firms operating multiple outlets

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

racial disparities in life insurance coverage we evaluate the extent to which there are racial disparities in life insurance coverage using multiple years of the survey of income and program participation between 2001 and 2010 we find that african americans hold significantly more life insurance after controlling for other factors especially employer sponsored and whole life insurance we demonstrate that our findings diverge from prior work because we examine all households instead of focusing exclusively on married and cohabitating households the findings on life insurance coverage and composition imply that earnings shocks due to mortality are not a contributing factor to racial disparities in wealth

brand positioning under lexicographic choice rules this paper discusses a brand positioning model in which two brands of a product are to be positioned in a price quality space under a new behavioral assumption this assumption asserts that customers determine the highest quality product within their reservation price and purchase it provided its quality does not fall short of a minimum standard the model also includes producers costs that are incurred for delivering a certain quality we first delineate reaction functions for the optimal location of one brand give a location of its competitor we then show that nash equilibria do not exist as long as price and quality are both variable finally we consider a two phase model in the first phase the duopolists sequentially choose their quality levels under the assumption that both competitors know that in the second phase a nash equilibrium in prices follows single variable mathematical programming formulations are presented to solve the problem a numerical example is also given to illustrate the working of the model

determination of the optimum target value for a production process with multiple products abstract this paper considers the problem of determining the optimum target value of the process meant for a production process where multiple products are processed every outgoing item is inspected and each item failing to meet the specification limits is scrapped the quality characteristics of the products are assumed to be normally distributed with known variances and a common process mean a profit model is constructed which involves selling prices costs of production and inspection and losses due to the scraps the common process mean is determined so that the expected profit is maximized a method of finding the optimum common process mean is presented and an example from electronic device 4l pbga production process is given

joint determination of process mean production run size and material order quantity for a container filling process abstract selection of the mean target value for a container filling process is an important decision to a producer especially when material cost is a significant portion of production cost because the process mean determines the process conforming rate it affects other production decisions including in particular production setup and raw material procurement policies it is evident that these decisions should be made jointly in order to control the production inventory and raw material costs in this paper we incorporate the issues associated with production setup and raw material procurement into the classical process mean problem the product of interest is assumed to have a lower specification limit and the items that do not conform to the specification limit are scrapped with no salvage value the production cost of an item is a linear function of the amount of the raw material used in producing the item a two echelon model is formulated for a single product production process and an efficient algorithm is developed for finding the optimal solution

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition abstract the main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location price games in the case of symmetric triangular density it is shown that no symmetric equilibrium exists however we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies these equilibria are also characterized our secondary purpose is to study the sequential entry of two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space this leads us to uncover a substantial first mover advantage which has been neglected in the literature

spatial competition and price leadership in the stackelberg price leader price follower model each firm is typically better off as a follower than as a leader in this paper we show that introducing the spatial dimension provides a means of endogenising the role of price leadership furthermore the leader follower framework yields existence of a price and location equilibrium in the hotelling spatial model of competition where none exists under the original specification we first analyse the original hotelling model by determining reaction functions for firms this approach allows the model to be fully characterised and affords an intuitive explanation of the non existence of a price equilibrium for certain locations the reaction functions are then used to determine the solution when one firm adopts the stackelberg leadership role contrary to the existing predictions of the simple spatial duopoly model it is found that the outcome is asymmetric in terms of stackelberg equilibrium locations prices and profits with the first firm in the market enjoying higher profits than the subsequent entrant the equilibrium involves one firm locating at the mid point of the market this outcome is also appealing as it corresponds to the entry deterring and monopoly solutions

the competitive effects of price floors using hotelling s model of locational competition we show that a moderate price floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium resulting in minimum differentiation equilibrium prices are lower than prices in the absence of a floor a low price floor can lead to multiple equilibria with both minimum and maximum differentiation as possible outcomes

product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty we investigate hotelling s duopoly game of location then price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations contrary to the individual level random utility models location uncertainty is a differentiation force in equilibrium increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation higher expected equilibrium prices and profits and a greater welfare loss

under pressure how the business environment affects productivity and efficiency of european life insurance companies deregulation and widespread economic changes have fundamentally affected the business environment of european life insurance companies over the last decades we apply multi stage data envelopment analysis to identify the impact of the changing environment on productivity and efficiency of european life insurance companies considering a sample of 970 life insurance companies from 14 european countries we show that general economic capital market and insurance market conditions are important drivers of efficiency although we find no technical change in the european life insurance sector we nonetheless observe an efficiency increase in 2002 2013 that leads to an increase in total factor productivity these trends can be explained by more challenging business conditions in the 2000s our results emphasize the need to control for the business environment in cross country efficiency studies

determining the optimal target for a process with multiple markets and variable holding costs abstract the determination of the quality target for a manufacturing process represents an intricate and fiscally vital decision this study examines methods for process target optimization in industries where several grades of consumer specifications and hence several quality grades of products may be sold within the same market in such situations manufacturers may hold goods that have been rejected by one customer to sell the same goods to another consumer in the same market at a later date the expected profit function for such firms must consider the holding costs as well as the profits associated with this sales strategy this study provides a conceptual and mathematical overview of such situations a method for identifying the optimal process target that reflects holding costs is presented and illustrated in the context of the steel galvanization industry

duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city abstract this paper analyzes a duopoly location model with an asymmetric zoning that prohibits firms from locating to a specific interval in a small open linear city it is shown that the maximum differentiation principle presented in d aspremont et al econometrica 47 1979 1145 is still valid under area zoning regulation moreover a zoning regulation can be seen as a policy instrument to limit firms excess profits and a proper regulation may even reduce the distortion in total transportation costs therefore enhancing social welfare specifically the optimal zoning is about 29 5 percent of the city with no amenity effect finally all the land rents raised by zoning are eventually confiscated by the absentee landowner

product imitation product differentiation and international trade using the hotelling approach to product differentiation this article derives the equilibrium product configurations and prices when two firms enter and sell in two interdependent markets separated by barriers to trade it shows that product imitation and no trade as well as product differentiation with two way or one way trade are all consistent with the equilibrium copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

a mnemonic for the major factors influencing the likelihood of collusion in the typical industrial organization textbook and class and in the courtroom numerous factors are identified as providing a predisposition to a cartel these factors include cost differences product differentiation number of firms technology growth of the industry elasticity frequency of sales number and size distribution of sellers and buyers discount rate type of competition vertical integration cost ratio imports sealed bidding social structure and track record future expectations recognition of interdependence announcements and exchanges of economic information multimarkets etc there are many factors to keep in mind fortunately the accumulated theoretical and empirical work on collusion suggests that we can for all practical purposes focus on the factors contained in the mnemonic word cartel the key factors are concentration additional revenue talk entry likeness

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

sequential entry and deterrence with competitive spatial price discrimination abstract this paper analyzes sequential entry with perfect foresight in a competitive spatial price discrimination model with both an exogenous and an endogenous number of firms the spne locations do not coincide with the social cost minimizing locations

competition and efficiency in the dutch life insurance industry the lack of available prices in the dutch life insurance industry makes competition an elusive concept that defies direct observation therefore this article investigates competition by analysing several factors which may affect the competitive nature of a market and various indirect measurement approaches after discussing various supply and demand factors which may constitute a so called tight oligopoly we establish the existence of scale economies and the importance of cost x inefficiency since severe competition would force firms to exploit available scale economies and to reduce x inefficiencies both scale economies and x inefficiencies turn out to be substantial although more or less comparable to those found for insurers in other countries and to other financial institutions further we apply the boone indicator a novel approach to measuring the effects of competition this indicator points to limited competition in comparison to other sectors in the netherlands further investigations of submarkets should reveal where policy measures in order to promote competition might be appropriate

weak entrants are welcome abstract this paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and strong entrant in a differentiated market suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself then the incumbent may allow entry of the weak firm and use it to alter the strong firm s entry decision the present paper formalizes this idea and it sheds new light on the fact that domestic firms are sometimes able to block strong foreign firms after trade liberalization the idea also explains why a dominant firm lets fringe firms be in the market

product differentiation with multiple qualities abstract we study subgame perfect equilibria of the classical quality price multistage game of vertical product differentiation each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities consumers valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions the unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities we characterize equilibrium prices and the effects of qualities on the rival s equilibrium price in the general model equilibrium qualities depend on what we call the spence and price reaction effects for any equilibrium we characterize conditions for quality differentiation

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

information sharing market competition and antitrust intervention a lesson from the italian insurance sector by means of an application of the rosse panzar methodology we assess the degree of competition in the italian car insurance market in order to evaluate the considerable fine that is imposed on 39 companies by the italian antitrust authority iaa in 2000 for their supposed anticompetitive behaviour due to a longstanding information exchange through a third independent company our results show that this group of firms has earned revenues as if under monopoly or collusive oligopoly conditions therefore endorsing the decision of iaa

evaluating the cost efficiency of the italian banking system what can be learned from the joint application of parametric and non parametric techniques abstract research on bank efficiency has developed in two separate streams econometric studies and data envelopment analysis a linear programming technique these two branches of literature have developed quickly but separately in this paper these two approaches have been tested on a common panel of 270 italian banks and this has suggested the following i econometric and linear programming results do not differ dramatically when based on the same data and conceptual framework ii when differences arise they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of the models moreover some findings on italian banks may be of interest also to the international reader i efficiency scores show a high variance ii the banking system is split in two between northern and southern banks iii there is a direct rather than inverse relationship between productive efficiency and asset quality iv the efficiency of italian banks did not increase over the period 1988 1992

mixed duopoly location choice and shadow cost of public funds we examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly where a welfare maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm we introduce shadow costs of public funding i e the excess burden of taxation the profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs we find that in a mixed duopoly the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare this result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly where the level of product differentiation is too high finally we show that when the shadow cost is high privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare

newspaper differentiation and investments in journalism the role of tax policy many countries levy reduced rate indirect taxes on newspapers with proclaimed policy goals of stimulating investment in journalism and ensuring low newspaper prices however by taking into account the fact that the media industry operates in two sided markets we find the paradoxical result that the consequences of a low tax regime might be quite the opposite we also show that the low tax regime tends to increase newspaper differentiation if the advertising market is relatively small the newspapers might invest too little in journalism and be too differentiated from a social point of view in this case a tax increase will be welfare enhancing

a single vendor single manufacturer integrated inventory model with stochastic demand and variable production rate abstract this paper investigates an alternative way to react to demand uncertainty in an integrated inventory model namely the variation of the production rate that enables the manufacturer to reduce lead times and the corresponding demand uncertainty to investigate the impact of variable production rates on the supply chain this paper considers a single vendor single manufacturer integrated inventory model where the vendor ships finished products in multiples of full truckloads to the manufacturer the objective of the model is to coordinate both production and distribution of the product in such a way that the total costs of the supply chain are minimized a solution procedure is suggested and the behaviour of the model is analysed in numerical examples obviously the total supply chain cost is reduced when the manufacturer s production rate is included as a decision variable in the model these savings can generally benefit both the vendor and the manufacturer however in situations where coordinated decision making is initially not beneficial to the vendor the supply chain members can benefit from a revenue sharing contract that supports the sharing of the total savings the model proposed in the paper at hand supports both the determination of an optimal production rate as well as the distribution of coordination benefits among the supply chain members

explaining efficiency differences among large german and austrian banks cost efficiency scale efficiency and productivity change are estimated by data envelopment analysis and cost efficiency is regressed on explanatory variables no evidence is found for average productivity responding to deregulation over the period studied state owned banks are found to be more cost efficient likely owing to cheaper funds and cooperative banks to be about as cost efficient as private banks increasing economies of scale but decreasing economies of scope provide rationale for m as among banks with similar product portfolios interbank and capital market funding is found to be more cost efficient than deposits when the cost of retail networks is controlled

impact of bank competition on the interest rate pass through in the euro area this article analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by euro area banks to loans during the period 1994 2004 using a novel measure of competition called the boone indicator we find evidence that stronger competition implies significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan market products in line with expectations this result implies that stronger competition causes both lower bank interest rates and a stronger pass through of market rate changes into bank rates evidence of the latter is also presented by our error correction model ecm for bank rates further banks compensate income losses from increased loan market competition by offering lower deposit rates our findings with respect to the loan market rates have important monetary policy implications as they suggest that measures to promote competition in the european banking sector are likely to render the monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective

hotelling s competition with demand location uncertainty abstract firms product variety choices are examined in a differentiated products model where the range of consumers preferences is an unknown strict subset of the range of potential innovations it is found that the firms locating sequentially will follow the basic pattern of locations found by neven international journal of industrial organization 1987 5 419 434 the uncertainty however generally causes a greater more symmetric amount of differentiation among varieties as firms gamble on finding a market niche with less fierce competition for a sufficiently large pool of potential entrants some firms will lose this gamble and will fail

the distribution free newsboy problem with resalable returns we study the case of a catalogue internet mail order retailer selling style goods and receiving large numbers of commercial returns returned products arriving before the end of the selling season can be resold if there is sufficient demand a single order is placed before the season starts excess inventory at the end of the season is salvaged and all demands not met directly are lost since little historical information is available it is impossible to determine the shape of the distribution of demand therefore we analyze the distribution free newsboy problem with returns in which only the mean and variance of demand are assumed to be known we derive a simple closed form expression for the distribution free order quantity which we compare to the optimal order quantities when gross demand is assumed to be normal lognormal or uniform we find that the distribution free order rule performs well when the coefficient of variation cv is at most 0 5 but is far from optimal when the cv is large

a risk tolerance analysis for a joint price differentiation and inventory decisions problem with demand leakage effect abstract price differentiation is a commonly used practice in revenue management rm to improve a firm s profitability however most studies in the literature have considered a risk neutral firm to demonstrate the benefits of price differentiation the main contribution of this paper is in considering several important objectives while determining the optimal product prices and order production quantities for a risk adjusted firm with demand leakage effects in the presence of a price dependent stochastic demand the objectives considered include the maximization of a firm s expected profit and maximizing the probability of exceeding the risk adjusted expected revenue closed form expressions for optimal product prices and production quantities are derived for several of these objectives a numerical study is also presented to calibrate the impact of a firm s risk tolerance and other factors such as demand leakage market demand variability on the firm s profitability and its optimal decision

global and local players in a model of spatial competition abstract we analyze equilibrium configurations of hotelling location games where some players compete on several markets with the same product such global players tend to lower product diversity across markets the model is consistent with recent empirical findings on preference externalities

intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate abstract the effects of intensity of product market competition on r d incentives are analysed in a model capturing the strategic interactions between firms with different cost levels first four axioms are proposed that a measure of intensity of competition should satisfy then the effects of intensity of competition on the value of the innovation are analysed and it is shown that the axioms imply the existence of a non monotone relation between intensity of competition and the value of an innovation

an integrated approach to price differentiation and inventory decisions with demand leakage abstract price differentiation is among widely practiced tools in revenue management rm in which a seller offers same or slightly different products or services at different prices to its customers earlier research studies have shown that the benefits from price differentiation are evident when the market segmentation is assumed to be perfect in a perfect market segmentation customers associated with a market segment do not move between market segments however it is not uncommon to observe that a market segmentation a firm operates in is seldom prefect and due to imperfect segmentation customers move between market segments which is also referred to as demand leakage in addition the firms predominantly experience stochastic demand and thus a firm experiences both the short sales and leftovers due to demand uncertainty this research proposes a model to address the issue of an optimal market segmentation using price differentiation as a tool we also establish an integrated framework for pricing order and production quantity allocation decisions in each market segment when a firm experiences demand leakage from one market segment to another and faces price dependent stochastic demand the model is analyzed to determine an optimal decision framework on pricing order quantity allocation and market segmentation using the proposed price differentiation due to the complexity of the problem both the hierarchical and joint optimization approaches are developed a simplified closed form optimal solution to the problem is outlined in the case of hierarchical approach the model is also analyzed for a situation in which the distribution of the price dependent stochastic demand is unknown and a distribution free approach is utilized to address the problem it is identified that the use of distribution free approach also results in a closed form optimal solution to the problem a numerical study is presented to demonstrate the performance of the model and solution approaches the benefits of the optimal market segmentation using a differentiation price are also highlighted along with the proposed integrated optimal decision framework when a firm experiences demand leakage

pricing patterns as outcomes of product positions prior empirical work shows that different markets are characterized by different pricing patterns such as bertrand nash pricing or stackelberg leader follower pricing the author considers a duopolistic market where ex ante identical firms sequentially position their products prior to competing on prices in a single or multiperiod setting and show that the unique equilibrium outcome involves 1 firms choosing stackelberg pricing over bertrand nash pricing and 2 the positioning first mover acting as the price leader an attractive property of this model is that the ex post larger firm acts as the price leader which is consistent with prior empirical evidence copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

insurance companies in mozambique a two stage dea and neural networks on efficiency and capacity slacks this article analyses the efficiency of mozambique insurance companies using a dea model two dea models are used and a bootstrap approach adopted furthermore the efficiency scores are predicted based on neural networks the results reveal that mozambique insurance companies output increasing potentials are severely constrained particularly in terms of the ceded reinsurance increasing potentials policy implications are derived

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

two stage perfect equilibrium in hotelling s model hotelling i 929 suggests that his spatial competition model can be used to describe a wide range of differentiation problems he points to the selection of product variety within an industry as a potential application most of the subsequent work in his tradition has taken the equivalence of the two problems for granted in this note we look more closely at this equivalence we distinguish between two types of differentiated products according to the variety of preferences assumed with respect to those products building on this distinction we recognize that the demand faced by a firm locating on hotelling s line is analogous to the demand faced by a firm selecting a horizontally differentiated product it should be emphasized thus that the equivalence between the geographical and the product selection problem is by no means general and relies on specific assumptions about consumers preferences next we formulate a small model close to hotelling s one in which firms select a horizontally differentiated product within this model it will be shown that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists for every pair of products this statement is to be contrasted with the results of d aspremont et al i979 who have shown that in the original hotelling s setting an equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close together 1 in addition we will examine the product selection problem faced by firms in a two stage game in the first stage each firm selects a product in the second stage the firm defines a price for its product we will seek the existence of a perfect equilibrium in this game a perfect equilibrium in this context can be viewed as a nash equilibrium in a game in which firms select a product aware of the non cooperative price equilibrium that will occur for each of their choices it will be shown that contrary to hotelling s principle the two firms will maximise their differentiation i e firms will locate at opposite ends of the market