reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests we analyze reputation effects in two player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests in such games player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff players have equal discount factors with positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history we show that player 1 s payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one this contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature journal of economic literature classification number c71

implications of bid design and willingness to pay distribution for starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we examine starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we investigate 1 the seriousness of the biases for the location and scale parameters of the willingness to pay wtp in the presence of starting point bias 2 whether or not these biases depend on the distribution of wtp and on the bid design and 3 how well a commonly used diagnostic for starting point bias a test of the null that bid set dummies entered in the right hand side of the wtp model are jointly equal to zero performs under various circumstances monte carlo simulations suggest that the effect of ignoring starting point bias depends on the bid design and on the true distribution of wtp a well balanced symmetric bid design may result in very modest biases even when the anchoring mechanism is very strong the power of bid set dummies in detecting starting point bias is low they tend to account for misspecifications in the distribution assumed by the researcher for the latent wtp rather than capturing the presence of starting point bias

semi nonparametric distribution free dichotomous choice contingent valuation abstract we apply a semi nonparametric distribution free estimator for binary discrete response data to the estimation of a dichotomous choice contingent valuation model using this estimator mean and median compensating and equivalent variation can be consistently estimated without making nontheoretically motivated assumptions on consumer preferences the approach is illustrated using a contingent valuation survey of willingness to pay for reduction of risk of premature death due to exposure to hazardous waste we find that a conventional parametric estimator and the proposed estimator give similar estimates of unconditional wtp but that conditional on explanatory variables the estimates are quite different

reputation and experimentation in repeated games with two long run players this paper considers reputation effects in a repeated game between two long run players one of whom is relatively patient and may be committed to a fixed strategy which punishes the opponent for increasingly long periods whenever inappropriate actions are taken by following this commitment strategy the more patient player can induce a sufficiently patient opponent to experiment to see whether the commitment strategy is also being followed off the equilibrium path this can guarantee the more patient player in any nash equilibrium a payoff close to the highest feasible payoff consistent with the individual rationality of the other player for an arbitrary degree of patience of the less patient player a weaker result is established the more patient player is guaranteed an average equilibrium payoff close to the static stackelberg payoff this latter result generalizes that of schmidt 1993 who established the same result for the restricted class of games of conflicting interests

reputation and dynamic stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games abstract the paper studies a repeated game in which a long run player without discounting faces another long run player with strict discounting the game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player s strategy choice she may be a rational player but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies the rational patient player s equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed in particular it is shown that the lower bound on her payoff in the set of extensive form trembling hand perfect equilibria is given by her stackelberg payoff in a dynamics sense journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games abstract we consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one sided incomplete information one player the informed player might be a commitment type playing the pareto dominant action as discounting which is assumed to be symmetric and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d83

generalized additive models for nonmarket valuation via revealed or stated preference methods single site recreation demand and dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses are typically conducted by implementing models containing strong parametric assumptions which are rarely underpinned by theoretical arguments this work illustrates how these assumptions can be relaxed and the estimation conducted semiparametrically by using generalized additive models gams this approach directly estimates the degree of the variables nonlinearities from the data thereby avoiding subjective choices on the smoothing parameters and offering many advantages when compared to the conventional modeling techniques that dominate the environmental economics literature additionally this paper illustrates how gams can be specified to construct theoretically consistent willingness to pay measures jel c14 q51

reputation in long run relationships we model a long run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents in each period the agents play an extensive form stage game of perfect information with either locally non conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests there is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2 s type is commonly known we show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2 s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay off compatible with player 2 s individual rationality in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game copyright 2012 oxford university press

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

maintaining a reputation against a long lived opponent we consider a game between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient opponent player 2 as usual in reputation models we suppose that the patient player s type is private information and that he may be a commitment type who is locked into playing a particular strategy we investigate the extent to which an uncommitted or normal type of patient player can exploit his less patient opponent s uncertainty to maintain a reputation for playing like a commitment type

flexible functional form estimation of willingness to pay using dichotomous choice data abstract this paper introduces fully flexible semi nonparametric methods for calculating willingness to pay wtp bounded between zero and the respondent s income for dichotomous choice contingent valuation a method to estimate median wtp using fully flexible functional forms is also presented finally the numerical illustration demonstrates the importance of considering jensen s inequality in calculating wtp with nonlinear models

rates of return on physical and human capital in africa s manufacturing sector in this paper two sets of issues are addressed using panel data from the manufacturing sector of five african countries first how high are the returns to human relative to physical capital second what is the relative importance of technology and endowments of human and physical capital in determining differences in earnings and productivity across the countries evidence from earnings functions shows that the private returns to both experience and education rise with the level of education private returns rise from 3 per cent at the primary level to 10 per cent at the secondary level and 35 per cent for tertiary evidence from the production function gives lower returns on education than from the earnings function rates of return on physical capital exceed 20 per cent and greatly exceed the average return on human capital data is available on the stocks of human and physical capital across the countries productivity and earnings differentials are shown to be large between cameroon and ghana these differences are due almost entirely to differences in physical not human capital endowments this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests a two person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a commitme nt type who will always play this strategy then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one this result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the folk theorem for games with incomplete information copyright 1993 by the econometric society

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

a comparison of approaches to calculating confidence intervals for benefit measures from dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys this paper compares the performance of four approaches to calculating confidence intervals around dichotomous choice contingent valuation method dc cvm benefit estimates the performance of the approaches is compared using monte carlo simulation techniques for the two most common specifications for the welfare estimate the results indicate that all four methods tended to perform well on average but the methods differed in the frequency with which they performed well the results indicate the best choice depends on the sample size on the distribution of the welfare estimate and on the choice of functional form for the welfare estimate

reputation in the long run with imperfect monitoring abstract we study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game player one monitors the stage game actions of player two imperfectly while player two monitors the pure stage game actions of player one perfectly player one s type is private information and he may be a commitment type drawn from a countable set of commitment types who is locked into playing a particular strategy under a full support assumption on the monitoring structure we prove a reputation result for stage games with a strong stackelberg action if there is positive probability that player one is a particular type whose commitment payoff is equal to player one s highest payoff consistent with the players individual rationality then a patient player one secures this type s commitment payoff in any bayes nash equilibrium of the repeated game in contrast if the type s commitment payoff is strictly less than player one s highest payoff consistent with the players individual rationality then the worst perfect bayesian equilibrium payoff for a patient player one is equal to his minimax payoff

referendum models and economic values theoretical intuitive and practical bounds on willingness to pay innovations in the estimation of referendum type contingent valuation models have led to willingness to pay wtp measures inconsistent with consumer preferences and unbounded from above or below we propose a set of criteria which guarantee a bounded measure of wtp the criteria reject the traditional random utility model with unrestricted error terms in favor of the random wtp model with bounds on wtp once wtp is bounded by zero and income the form of the distribution is less consequential a new model for wtp is developed based on the beta distribution and is compared to previously estimated models

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

statistical approaches to the fat tail problem for dichotomous choice contingent valuation if a cumulative density function esti mated from dichotomous choice data has an unre alistically fat right hand tail mean willingness to pay wtp will be overestimated truncating the range of integration results in a lower bound esti mate of the true mean wtp a normalization pro cedure proposed by boyle welsh and bishop 1988 unnecessarily depresses the estimate further a new statistical approach is presented that allows a best guess estimate of mean wtp because this estimate involves extrapolation beyond the range of the data it tends to be highly variable jel q21

evaluating the effect of alternative risk communication devices on willingness to pay results from a dichotomous choice contingent valuation experiment two versions of a contingent valuation questionnaire that differ only in the device used to communicate risks from hazardous waste were sent to california households both risk communication devices provide wtp functions which vary in a statistically significant fashion with the absolute risk reduction however these empirical results also demonstrate that different risk communication devices produce statistically different logit equations and hence estimates of willingness to pay wtp for reductions in exposure to hazardous waste the pros and cons of using each risk communication device in cvm surveys is also discussed