a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

correlations between biofuels and related commodities before and during the food crisis a taxonomy perspective abstract in this paper we analyze the relationships between the prices of biodiesel ethanol and related fuels and agricultural commodities with a use of minimal spanning trees and hierarchical trees to distinguish between short term and medium term effects we construct these trees for different frequencies weekly and monthly we find that in short term both ethanol and biodiesel are very weakly connected with the other commodities in medium term the biofuels network becomes more structured the system splits into two well separated branches a fuels part and a food part biodiesel tends to the fuels branch and ethanol to the food branch when the periods before and after the food crisis of 2007 2008 are compared the connections are much stronger for the post crisis period this is the first application of this methodology on the biofuel systems

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

an introduction to vote counting schemes t he design of an electoral system is fundamental to any democracy motivation for understanding how electoral system design matters comes from many directions the creation of new constitutions in eastern europe the recent trauma of a three way presidential election in the united states the ongoing debate over u s redistricting and gerrymandering the furor caused by lani guinier s call for a more representative voting system the status quo adds another incentive plurality rule is pervasive even though it is a flawed system fortunately there is no lack of suitable alternatives one of the purposes of this symposium and this paper in particular is to help illustrate and motivate the remarkable variety of alternative mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences to decide an election this overview offers a summary of sixteen distinct methods and demonstrates by example how some of the more complex systems work the shorter papers that follow focus on some of the more popular alternatives including approval voting single transferable vote the maximum likelihood rule and more one can speculate on why alternatives to plurality rule have had such a difficult time being adopted part of the cause may be arrow s general possibility theorem arrow 1951 demonstrates that any voting system applied to an unrestricted collection of voter preferences must have some serious defect we must always choose between flawed alternatives with conflicting theoretical guidance to help select the least flawed option people evaluate a system by its likely effect on the status quo outcome since those in power tend to want to

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

expressive voting and electoral equilibrium there are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition the mainstream instrumental account that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes essentially analogous to a market choice and the expressive account that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options rather like cheering at a football match this paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account we also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics

structure behavior and voter turnout in the united states electoral participation in the united states is examined to provide a clearer account of the effect of the registration requirement on individual voting behavior pooling nes data from 1980 1984 and 1988 i first model with traditional and selection bias techniques the full electorate to distinguish among three groups nonregistrants registered nonvoters and voters analyses limited to recent movers then reported to understand more fully the forces associated with the actual decision calculi of registering and voting the influences of many factors commonly accepted as important determinants of voting are disentangled and their effect at each stage is ascertained factors yielding inconsistent effects in previ research or believed to be unimportant such as race gender attitudes toward the candidates and trust government are shown to deserve closer scrutiny by electoral scholars

foreign lobbies and us trade policy abstract in popular discussion much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy however in a trade policy context this may not be the case if the policy outcome absent any foreign lobbying is characterized by welfare reducing trade barriers foreign lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare using a new data set on foreign political activity in the united states this paper investigates this question empirically tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity

understanding the reductions in us corn ethanol production costs an experience curve approach the us is currently the world s largest ethanol producer an increasing percentage is used as transportation fuel but debates continue on its costs competitiveness and energy balance in this study technological development of ethanol production and resulting cost reductions are investigated by using the experience curve approach scrutinizing costs of dry grind ethanol production over the timeframe 1980 2005 cost reductions are differentiated between feedstock corn production and industrial ethanol processing corn production costs in the us have declined by 62 over 30 years down to 100 2005 tonne in 2005 while corn production volumes almost doubled since 1975 a progress ratio pr of 0 55 is calculated indicating a 45 cost decline over each doubling in cumulative production higher corn yields and increasing farm sizes are the most important drivers behind this cost decline industrial processing costs of ethanol have declined by 45 since 1983 to below 130 2005 m3 in 2005 excluding costs for corn and capital equivalent to a pr of 0 87 total ethanol production costs including capital and net corn costs have declined approximately 60 from 800 2005 m3 in the early 1980s to 300 2005 m3 in 2005 higher ethanol yields lower energy use and the replacement of beverage alcohol based production technologies have mostly contributed to this substantial cost decline in addition the average size of dry grind ethanol plants increased by 235 since 1990 for the future it is estimated that solely due to technological learning production costs of ethanol may decline 28 44 though this excludes effects of the current rising corn and fossil fuel costs it is also concluded that experience curves are a valuable tool to describe both past and potential future cost reductions in us corn based ethanol production

a spatial theory of positive and negative campaigning abstract in order to explore the content of electoral campaigns this paper makes two modifications to hotelling s model of spatial competition first we assume that agents inherit initial locations and engage in costly relocation second an agent s relocation is affected by her rival s actions we investigate how a candidate allocates resources between positive campaigning which influences voters perceptions of her own ideology and negative campaigning which influences her opponent s perceived ideology our theory predicts that the candidate who is perceived as having less attractive personal attributes runs a relatively more negative campaign the theory s implications are illustrated for the 1988 presidential election journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 h0

protection for sale the case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors in grossman helpman s 1994 canonical protection for sale pfs model political competition among industry lobbies is driven purely by their interests as consumers this paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into the pfs framework to address the rivalry among lobbies stemming from product substitutability it shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions this may explain why empirical tests of pfs find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government s trade policy decision the paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect the industry decision to organize resume proteger les ventes le cas de la concurrence oligopolistique et des secteurs interdependants dans le modele canonique de grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale pfs la concurrence politique entre lobbyistes est purement alimentee par leurs interets en tant que consommateurs ce texte presente dans ce cadre d analyse les enchainements de la demande et la concurrence oligopolistique pour prendre en compte la rivalite entre lobbyistes qui derive de la substituabilite des produits on montre qu une substituabilite accrue reduit l incitation des groupes d interets a faire du lobbying et reduit les distorsions tarifaires cela peut expliquer pourquoi les tests empiriques du modele pfs ont decouvert un impact etonnamment faible des lobbies sur les decisions des gouvernements dans le monde des politiques commerciales le texte analyse aussi la formation endogene des lobbies suggerant que les enchainements de la demande peuvent affecter negativement la decision de s organiser

does social capital increase political accountability an empirical test for flemish municipalities social capital has been shown to positively influence government performance boix and posner br j polit sci 28 686 693 1998 suggest a possible explanation social capital makes citizens monitor the government more closely such monitoring will be more explicit to the extent that instrumental voting motivations outweigh expressive considerations we identify social capital as a source that facilitates instrumental voting and thus political accountability we present an empirical test of the boix and posner hypothesis and find a positive link between perceived quality of government and election results of the incumbent parties crucially we find this link to be stronger in municipalities high in social capital

campaign contributions as valence i study how the possibility of voters contributing to candidates in response to the candidates policy proposals affects the equilibrium policy in winner take all political competition more specifically i allow each partisan voter to contribute to her preferred candidate where the amount contributed depends on the relative positions of the two candidates candidates then use the donations to build valence through campaigning which in turn affects the voting decision of impressionable voters since candidates are concerned with raising money as well as picking a policy position preferred by the median voter i show that campaign contributions may lead to divergent equilibria in winner take all elections when politicians are policy motivated albeit only under stylized utility functions and donor densities further under symmetric voter and donor densities if either the donor density is single peaked or the voter utility is concave a unique equilibrium exists in which both candidates propose the ideal policy of the median voter

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

optimal voting rules modern social choice theory following kenneth arrow treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values an earlier view initiated by marquis de condorcet is that voting is a method for aggregating information voters opinions differ because they make errors of judgment absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice the goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability this paper examines maximum likelihood estimation surprisingly the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of arrow s axioms

proportional representation with citizen candidates we construct a simple model incorporating bothcitizen candidates and proportional representation andinvestigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and purepolicy motivations and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences the idea of citizen candidates developedby osborne and slivinski 1996 besley and coate 1997 endogenises the decision to stand as acandidate and allows explicit study of the number andtype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon theidea of proportional representation allows a moreflexible relationship between the pattern of votescast and the final policy outcome and also providesa richer model of political representation ourdiscussion points to the widespread possibility ofequilibria involving non median policy outcomes provides insights into the relationship betweenproportional representation and the equilibrium numberof candidates and also provides an explicit accountof the trade off between candidate benefitsdistributed on a winner take all basis and those thatare mediated through proportional representation

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

the new competition for land food energy and climate change abstract the paper addresses the new competition for land arising from growing and changing demand for food when combined with increasing global demand for transport energy under conditions of declining petro chemical resources and the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the paper starts from the premise of a food energy and environment trilemma tilman et al 2009 where all demands to expand the area of cultivated land present high risks of increasing the carbon footprint of agriculture having reviewed the main drivers of demand for food and for liquid transport fuels the paper weighs the controversies surrounding biofuels arising from food price spikes the demand for land and consequent direct and indirect land use change it suggests that we need a more complex and geographically differentiated analysis of the interactions between direct and indirect land use change the paper then reviews evidence of land availability and suggests that in addition to technical availability in terms of soil water and climate political social and technological factors have significantly shaped the competition for land in different global regions particularly the three major biofuel producing ones of the usa brazil and europe this point is further developed by reviewing the different innovation pathways for biofuels in these three regions the main conclusion of this review is firstly that any analysis requires an integrated approach to the food energy environment trilemma and secondly that strategic political direction of innovation and sustainability regulation are required to bring about major shifts in agriculture leading to sustainable intensification of cultivation royal society 2009 rather than the continued expansion of cultivated area the consequent perspective is one of considerable global variety in technologies agricultural productive systems and use of natural resources this contrasts sharply with the world of a dominant global and integrated technology platform based on petro chemicals to which we have become accustomed

lowering the cost of pollution control versus controlling pollution a comment dwight lee 1999 shows that thecollectivity may be better not worse off when a technically inefficient pollutionabatement technology is adopted thepurpose of this note is twofold first toshow that once rent seeking is incorporatedinto the analysis lee s qualified supportfor a technically inefficient pollutionabatement technology is at bestproblematic and at worst flawed second to demonstrate that it is possible to makea less problematic normative case in favourof the adoption of the technicallyinefficient abatement policy

analysis of democratic institutions structure conduct and performance t s ahe structure of a democratic political system consists of the offices that politicians may seek the constitutional powers associated with these offices and the procedures by which candidates are elected to these offices these structures together form a complex incentive system for politicians determining what kinds of political decisions and strategies will be rewarded thus the constitutional structure of a democracy may influence the conduct of its politicians and the performance of its government in this way political theory confronts a set of questions that have much in common with the classic economic questions of structure conduct and performance in industrial organization this paper develops this economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research economic and political interpretations of a classic model

anatomy of a crisis the causes and consequences of surging food prices although the potential causes and consequences of recent rising international food prices have attracted widespread attention many existing appraisals are superficial and or piecemeal this article attempts to provide a more comprehensive review of these issues based on the best and most recent research as well as on fresh theoretical and empirical analysis we first analyze the causes of the current crisis by considering how well standard explanations hold up against relevant economic theory and important stylized facts some explanations turn out to hold up much better than others especially rising oil prices the depreciation of the u s dollar biofuels demand and some commodity specific explanations we then provide an appraisal of the likely macro and microeconomic impacts of the crisis on developing countries we observe a large gap between macro and micro factors which when identifying the most vulnerable countries often point in different directions we conclude with a brief discussion of what ought to be learned from this crisis

the impact of rising ethanol production on the brazilian market for basic food commodities an econometric assessment the controversial debate on the impacts of rising biofuel production on food commodity markets is of great policy relevance in brazil this paper contributes to the discussion by applying panel data regression models with fixed effects using ols our dataset comprises annual production harvested area data for sugar ethanol and five other staple commodities ranging from 1981 to 2009 for 24 brazilian states our results indicate that rising ethanol production exerts statistically significant positive impacts on sugarcane negative impacts on rice beans and soybeans acreage but no statistically significant effect on the areas for corn and manioc the negative impacts on commodities acreage have implications for the associated prices ceteris paribus rising ethanol production puts some upward pressure on the prices for rice beans and soybeans however the economic implication of these direct land use effects is attenuated due to the moderate scale of any effect

are moderates better representatives than extremists a theory of indirect representation few if any elected representatives are capable of unilaterally implementing their platforms rather they choose between options generated by other actors and or external events we present a theory of voters preferences over representatives who will cast votes on their behalf and show that in this setting voters preferences over candidates platforms will not look like voters preferences over policies we demonstrate that these induced preferences for representation tend to favor more extreme representatives and we present two models of electoral competition in which induced preferences over representatives lead to elite polarization

the paradox of voting intelligently classical economic models predict far less voting than happens in practice expressive voting may partly explain the divergence but some who are generally uninterested in politics and thus unlikely to take elections as an important form of personal expression nevertheless vote one possible explanation is that these voters overestimate the instrumental outcome changing consequences of voting such systematic misperception may be more likely among those with less cognitive capacity analysis of responses to the american national election studies confirms this hypothesis while intelligence and interest both increase the likelihood of voting the combination enhances the likelihood of turnout still further

food energy and environment is bioenergy the missing link abstract we study price linkages between the food energy and bioenergy markets a vertically integrated multi input multi output market model allows us to derive testable hypothesis which we test by applying time series analytical mechanisms to nine major traded food commodity prices along with one weighted average world crude oil price the data consists of 939 weekly observations from january 1993 to december 2010 the empirical findings confirm the theoretical hypothesis that the prices for crude oil and food commodities are interdependent a usd 1 barrel increase in oil prices and food commodity prices increase by between usd 0 09 tonne and usd 1 65 tonne

land use change impacts of biofuels near var evidence from the us abstract the present paper studies the land use change impacts of fuels and biofuels we test the theoretical hypothesis which says that changes in fuel prices cause changes in land use both directly and indirectly and that because of price inter dependencies biofuels reinforce the land use change impacts we apply time series analytical mechanisms to five major traded agricultural commodities the cultivated area of agricultural land and crude oil price our data consists of yearly observations extending from 1950 to 2007 for the us the empirical findings confirm that markets for crude oil and cultivated agricultural land are interdependent an increase in oil price by 1 dollar barrel increases land use between 54 000 and 68 000 ha we also find that the increase of bioenergy sector accelerates land use change in the us i e food commodities are being substituted for bioenergy crops

everyone likes a winner an empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting under instrumental voting closer elections are expected to have higher turnout under expressive voting however turnout may increase with decreasing closeness when voters have a preference for winners an empirical test using data on belgian municipal elections supports this we find that turnout reaches a local maximum when the largest party in the election obtains just over 52 of the seats and then falls supporting the instrumental closeness argument there is however another turning point the presence of a highly dominating party receiving at least two thirds of the votes stimulates turnout despite the fact that dominance implies lower closeness

substitutability and protectionism latin america s trade policy and imports from china and india this article examines the trade policy response of latin american governments to the rapid growth of chinese and indian exports in world markets to explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in china and india the protection for sale model is extended to allow for region specific degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties of a good the results suggest that more protection toward chinese and indian goods can be explained by the higher substitutability of chinese and indian goods with domestic varieties the data support the model which performs better than the original protection for sale framework in explaining latin america s structure of protection

biofuels and land use change sugarcane and soybean acreage response in brazil scientists and economists are increasingly worried that biofuels production is leading to land use changes in the form of competition with food crops or loss of natural ecosystems i estimate acreage conversion in response to shocks in sugarcane a biofuels feedstock and soybean thought to be affected by united states corn ethanol production prices in brazil at a national and regional level using county level data from 1973 to 2005 i consider a dynamic panel data model of input demand for agricultural land conditioning on price changes of other commodities the short run crop price elasticity of sugarcane acreage in brazil is estimated to be approximately zero whereas the elasticity of soybean acreage is 0 9 when both spot and futures prices change the regional estimates for soybeans show considerable variation and are highest in areas of ecological importance such as the cerrado sugarcane estimates are more homogeneous these results should be taken into account in impact assessments of biofuels

anyone for higher speed limits self interested and adaptive political preferences swedish survey evidence indicates that variables reflecting self interest are important in explaining people s preferred speed limits and that political preferences adapt to technological development drivers who believe they drive better than the average driver as well as drivers of cars that are newer and hence safer bigger and with better highspeed characteristics prefer higher speed limits in contrast elderly people prefer lower speed limits furthermore people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others vote on average indicating that we may vote less sociotropically than we believe ourselves one possible reason for such self serving biases is that people desire to see themselves as socially responsible

farm acreage shocks and crop prices an svar approach to understanding the impacts of biofuels the last 10 years have seen tremendous expansion in biofuels production particularly in corn ethanol in the united states at the same time that commodity prices e g corn have experienced significant spikes while supporters claim that biofuels are renewable and carbon friendly concerns have been raised about their impacts on land use and food prices this paper analyzes how us crop prices have responded to shocks in acreage supply these shocks can be thought of as a shock to the residual supply of corn for food using a structural vector auto regression framework we examine shocks to a crop s own acreage and to total cropland this allows us to estimate the effect of dedicating cropland or non crop farmlands to biofuels feedstock production a negative shock in own acreage leads to an increase in price for soybeans and corn our calculations show that increased corn ethanol production during the boom production year 2006 2007 explains approximately 27 of the experienced corn price rise

sustainable and integrated bioenergy assessment for latin america caribbean and africa sibyl lacaf the path from feasibility to acceptability abstract uncertainties in evaluating bioenergy projects have lead policymakers to adopt a restrictive approach or even refuse to evaluate projects when the available information is limited or a clear perception of its benefits and impact is lacking indeed despite its potential advantages a bioenergy system poses several conceptual and operational challenges for academic as well as practical scrutiny because the inherent relationship and the intersection of areas related to energy production and agricultural activity requires a deeply integrated assessment the aim of this paper is to review the available works in this field and propose an approach for supporting policymakers in the taking decision process of deploying sustainable bioenergy systems the sibyl lacaf framework provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the inherent complexity of the subject and its sustainability and acceptability as part of the evaluation process with this approach different and complementary evaluation methods are reviewed and set in a logical and sequential structure to draw a group of indicators used for assessing a given project with the help of a strengths weaknesses opportunities and threats swot matrix when acceptability is identified as an issue a public consultation and communication pc c scheme can complement this process the suggested application for mozambique indicate that an acceptable outcome is possible even when considering the data requirements and constraints of developing countries thus the potential of this integrated approach outweighs such limitations

the impact of biofuels on commodity food prices assessment of findings for years agriculture has provided most of the fuel for vehicular transportation concerns about availability of fuels balance of trade and climate change led to the introduction of biofuel programs in the united states brazil europeanunion eu andothercountries the impacts of these programs and the relationship between the food and fuel markets have become major topics of economic research this paper summarizes the main findings of alternative lines of research on the relationship between the food and fuel markets and identifies gaps and quandaries that warrant further research this is not meant to be a complete survey and it emphasizes several of our studies within the broader literature the paper distinguishes between two bodies of literature one on the relationship between food and fuel prices and another on the impact of the introduction of biofuel on commodity food prices while biofuel prices do not seem to affect food commodity prices we explain why the introduction of biofuel does moreover biofuelshavenotbeenthemostdominant contributor to the recent food price inflation and different biofuels have different impacts

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

the impacts of biofuel targets on land use change and food supply a global cge assessment this study analyzes the long term impacts of large scale expansion of biofuels on land use change food supply and prices and the overall economy in various countries or regions using a global computable general equilibrium model augmented by a land use module and detailed representation of biofuel sectors the study finds that an expansion of global biofuel production to meet currently articulated or even higher national targets in various countries for biofuel use would reduce gross domestic product at the global level however the gross domestic product impacts are mixed across countries or regions the expansion of biofuels would cause significant land re allocation with notable decreases in forest and pasture lands in a few countries the results also suggest that the expansion of biofuels would cause a reduction in food supply although the magnitude of the impact on food supply at the global level is not as large as perceived earlier it would be significant in developing countries like india and those in sub saharan africa agricultural commodities such as sugar corn and oil seeds which serve as the main biofuel feedstocks would experience significant increases in their prices in 2020 compared with the prices at baseline due to the expansion of biofuels to meet the existing targets

the impact of ethanol production on food prices the role of interplay between the u s and brazil abstract food prices have increased rapidly in recent years and so has ethanol production some studies have claimed that there is a connection between the two the main purpose of this paper is to add to this literature by examining the influence that the interplay between brazil and the u s in ethanol production has on food prices specifically and controlling for other variables which have been shown to affect food prices we investigate whether sugarcane ethanol and corn ethanol production have similar impacts on food prices and whether ethanol productivity affects food prices we find a positive significant effect of brazilian market share in world ethanol market on relative food prices we also find that an increase of brazilian cane ethanol area has a negative effect on relative food prices

on hierarchical spatial competition in this paper we consider a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players incumbents and one entrant the incumbents engage in a non cooperative game against each other and act as stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote maximizing entrant we prove that the equilibrium of this game called a hierarchical equilibrium exists and is unique for an arbitrary single peaked distribution of voters ideal points moreover we fully characterize the set of equilibrium strategies and show its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect foresight equilibrium most of the recently developed models of entry in oligopolistic markets and the theory of political competition deal with the case of dominant firms or parties which face a threat of potential entry these models possess a number of features on which they may be compared and contrasted the most important of these features are the ways in which the existing parties or firms compete against each other for votes or profits and types of expectations the incumbents have about the responses of potential entrants to changes in their decisions in most of the cases an electoral or oligopolistic competition is represented by some type of a non cooperative game played by parties or firms in this paper we also consider a non cooperative model of electoral race where the established parties incumbents compete against each other by offering positions ideologies to the population of voters given the profile of voters preferences over the space of ideologies or issue space each of the established parties attempts to maximize its vote share in making their choices the incumbents however anticipate that a new party an entrant will join the electoral race consistent with the other parties objectives the entrant is assumed to maximize its share of voters while taking the incumbents choices as given the resulting non cooperative game possesses therefore a structural hierarchy the established parties behave as nash players with respect to each other whereas acting as stackelberg leaders with respect to the entrant and correctly anticipating its vote maximizing response to their choices in the issue space the main purpose of this paper is to study the properties of the game we described and in particular to characterize its equilibrium which we will call hierarchical equilibrium naturally some assumptions are needed in order to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium we assume that there are two established parties the issue space i is the uni dimensional interval all voters have symmetric single peaked peaked preferences over i and the distribution of the voters ideal points is represented by a quasi concave continuous density function under these rather mild assumptions we are able to prove the existence and uniqueness of the hierarchical equilibrium and to completely

beyond ses a resource model of political participation this paper develops a resource model of political participation the resources considered are time money and civic skills those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to political activity these skills are not only acquired early in life but developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life the workplace organizations and churches and synagogues these resources are distributed differentially among groups defined by socioeconomic status a two stage least squares analysis shows these resources have powerful effects on overall political activity thus explaining why socioeconomic status has traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation we disaggregate overall activity into three kinds of acts those that involve giving time those that entail donating money and voting each requires a different configuration of resources resulting in different patterns of stratification across various political acts

sincere voting in large elections abstract austen smith and banks 1996 showed that sincere informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large here we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a no evidence type the expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small nevertheless if the electorate is large enough then each of the two standard condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type symmetric equilibrium

endogenous trade policy and lobby formation an application to the free rider problem abstract this paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous by introducing bargaining between the industry and the government the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature applied to the free rider problem the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult