efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities how do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities and what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed for example by economic statistics policy announcements or news in the media we first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information an increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility nevertheless as long as there is no value to lotteries welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information hence full transparency is optimal this is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination which is valuable from a social perspective on the other hand when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium in this case constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

a simple model of sectoral adjustment despite the significance of limited labour mobility across sectors few attempts have been made to produce dynamic models of sectoral adjustment which are consistent with perfect foresight and yet flexible enough to allow for a variety of dynamic experiments this paper proposes a simple perfect foresight model of two sector economies in which aggregate sectoral movement of labour takes place through the process of demographic change the model is tractable enough that one can easily examine the effects of intertemporally complicated relative price shocks both exogenous and endogenous under a variety of assumptions on technology

bond pricing and the term structure of interest rates a new methodology for contingent claims valuation this paper presents a unifying theory for valuing contingent claims under a stochastic term structure of interest rates the methodology based on the equivalent martingale measure technique takes as given an initial forward rate curve and a family of potential stochastic processee for its subsequent movements a no arbitrage condition restricts this family of processes yielding valuation formulae for interest rate sensitive contingent claims which do not explicitly depend on the market prices of risk examples are provided to illustrate the key results in relation to the term structure of interest rates arbitrage pricing theory has two purposes the first is to price all zero coupon default free bonds of varying maturities from a finite number of economic fundamentals called state variables the second is to price all interest rate sensitive contingent claims taking as given the prices of the zero coupon bonds this paper presents a general theory and a unifying framework for understanding arbitrage pricing theory in this context of which all existing arbitrage pricing models are special cases in particular vasicek 1977 brennan and schwartz 1979 langetieg 1980 ball and torous 1983 ho and lee 1986 schaefer and schwartz 1987 and artzner and delbaen 1988 the primary contribution of this paper however is a new methodology for solving the second problem i e the pricing of interest rate sensitive contingent claims given the prices of all zero coupon bonds the methodology is new because i it imposes its stochastic structure directly on the evolution of the forward rate curve ii it does not require an inversion of the term structure to eliminate the market prices of risk from contingent claim values and iii it has a stochastic spot rate process with multiple stochastic factors influencing the term structure the model can be used to consistently price and hedge all contingent claims american or european on the term structure and it is derived from necessary and more importantly sufficient conditions for the absence of arbitrage the arbitrage pricing models of vasicek 1977 brennan and schwartz 1979 langetieg 1980 and artzner and delbaen 1988 all require an iformerly titled bond pricing and the term structure of interest rates a new methodology

arbitrage and the expectations hypothesis this paper shows that all traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage if markets are incomplete a key implication is that the validity of the expectations hypothesis is purely an empirical issue the expectations hypothesis cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds one of the oldest and best known models in finance is the expectations hypothesis of the term structure introduced by fisher 1896 more than a century ago the expectations hypothesis has become a standard framework for explaining how yields of different maturities are related and it provides an important empirical benchmark from a theoretical perspective however the expectations hypothesis is not generally viewed as a viable model of the term structure in particular cox ingersoll and ross 1981 show that the traditional expectations hypothesis is actually a set of mutually exclusive propositions and offer a proof that most forms of the expectations hypothesis admit arbitrage recently mcculloch 1993 and fisher and gilles 1998 present counterexamples to the cox et al proof showing that the traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage they acknowledge however that their counterexamples are somewhat contrived and view them as economically implausible these results leave the impression that the expectations hypothesis is only consistent with the absence of arbitrage in pathological cases of little practical interest in this paper we argue that the expectations hypothesis is much more theoretically defensible than commonly believed an important point often overlooked is that the cox et al 1981 results are developed in an economic setting where bonds are redundant securities in the more realistic case where bond prices display security specific variation and there is mounting evidence of this traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can hold quite generally without arbitrage only weak conditions guaranteeing the existence of an equivalent martingale measure need be satisfied for the various forms of the expectations hypothesis to hold without arbitrage a key

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

public information and uninformed trading implications for market liquidity and price efficiency abstract we develop a rational expectations equilibrium model in which noise trading comes from discretionary liquidity traders the equilibrium quantity of aggregate noise trading is endogenously determined by the population size of liquidity traders active in the financial market by improving market liquidity public information reduces the expected trading loss of liquidity traders and thus attracts more such traders to the market which negatively affects information aggregation analyzing an alternative setting that models noise trading as coming from hedgers yields similar insights in a setting with endogenous information public information can harm information aggregation both through crowding out private information and through attracting noise trading

fees eat diversification s lunch although diversification is often spoken of as the only free lunch in investing the authors show that it is not free and that it must be considered in light of its costs they also show that fees on diversifying asset classes are high relative to their risk adjusted diversification benefit with the more exotic asset classes carrying higher price tags because there is meaningful cross sectional variation fees need to be considered when making strategic asset allocation decisions

the dynamics of the forward interest rate curve a formulation with state variables the objective of this paper is twofold first the paper develops a class of models of the term structure of interest rates in the heath jarrow and morton 1992 framework with dynamics characterized by the evolution of a small set of state variables second the paper exploits this characterization of the dynamics of the term structure in an estimation exercise that makes use of both the time series and cross section of bond prices in this way our class of models bridges the gap between traditional models such as cox ingersoll and ross 1985 and vasicek 1977 that emphasize the dynamics of interest rates and the models of heath jarrow and morton 1992 that stress fitting the cross section of bond prices

indeterminacy and increasing returns abstract we investigate properties of the one sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms the first involves input externalities the second involves monopolistic competition we show for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of business fluctuations driven by self fulfilling beliefs in our first class of models growth is generated by exogenous increases in factor productivity in the second class the marginal product of capital is large enough for endogenous growth journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 o40

a dynamic model for the forward curve this article develops and estimates a dynamic arbitrage free model of the current forward curve as the sum of i an unconditional component ii a maturity specific component and iii a date specific component the model combines features of the preferred habitat model the expectations hypothesis et and affine yield curve models it permits a class of low parameter multiple state variable dynamic models for the forward curve we show how to construct alternative parametric examples of the three components from a sum of exponential functions verify that the resulting forward curves satisfy the heath jarrow morton hjm conditions and derive the risk neutral dynamics for the purpose of pricing interest rate derivatives we select a model from alternative affine examples that are fitted to the fama bliss treasury data over an initial training period and use it to generate out of sample forecasts for forward rates and yields for forecast horizons of 6 months or longer the forecasts of this model significantly outperform those from common benchmark models jel c53 e43 e47 the structure of forward rates for fixed maturity loans to begin at various dates in the future can be inferred from the prices of treasury securities or directly observed from the extremely active eurodollar futures market the constellation of these rates or of the related yields plays a central role intheallocationofcapital therandombehaviorofthis yieldcurve or the relationship between the yields and the term to maturity is a subject of considerable theoretical and empirical study

a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options 1990 a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options financial analysts journal vol 46 no 1 pp 33 39

term structure movements and pricing interest rate contingent claims this paper derives an arbitrage free interest rate movements model ar model this model takes the complete term structure as given and derives the subsequent stochastic movement of the term structure such that the movement is arbitrage free we then show that the ar model can be used to price interest rate contingent claims relative to the observed complete term structure of interest rates this paper also studies the behavior and the economics of the model our approach can be used to price a broad range of interest rate contingent claims including bond options and callable bonds

arbitrage opportunities in arbitrage free models of bond pricing mathematical models of bond pricing are used by both academics and wall street practitioners with practitioners introducing time dependent parameters to fit arbitrage free models to selected asset prices we show in a simple one factor setting that the ability of such models to reproduce a subset of security prices need not extend to state contingent claims more generally we argue that the additional parameters of arbitrage free models should be complemented by close attention to fundamentals which might include mean reversion multiple factors stochastic volatility and or nonnormal interest rate distributions

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

learning about others actions and the investment accelerator a general equilibrium model of investment is constructed in which the pay offs of firms depend on each other s actions it is shown that when these actions are unobservable but aggregate output is in the information set of the agents it acts as a signal the implication is that output will lead investment over the business cycle this gives a theory of the rational expectations investment accelerator learning also changes the cyclical behaviour of the endogenous variables and leads to a loss of output and efficiency the inefficiency depends on the amount of noise in the system thus reducing fluctuations can have first order welfare effects it is also shown that the introduction of a stock market will not alter the qualitative conclusion of the paper the intuition of this paper for the investment accelerator also suggests that an employer accelerator might exist an economic investigation of the us and uk data gives support to these accelerators also the model predicts investment is less responsive to output when its conditional variance is higher

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

heterogeneous information quality strategic complementarities and optimal policy design abstract the beauty contest framework of morris and shin 2002 is extended to allow sub groups within the population of agents to differ in the quality i e precision of their private information we discuss the inefficiency of the resulting model s equilibrium and assess the relative effectiveness in remedying this inefficiency of i a pigouvian tax scheme ii direct policy intervention by means of an instrument which can modify the state of the world the disclosure policy implications of each of these two policy approaches are also analyzed

a reexamination of traditional hypotheses about the term structure a comment an example of a continuous time economy is given whose general equilibrium term structure of interest rates obeys the expectations hypothesis for continuously compounded interest rates and returns contradicting the 1981 claim by cox ingersoll and ross that such an economy is mathematically impossible this example does not generate exploitable arbitrage opportunities of the type cox ingersoll and ross claim must arise the logarithmic expectations hypothesis as we call it it therefore an acceptable benchmark from which to measure term premia in continuous time term structure modeling the expectations hypothesis eh broadly construed postulates that expected returns on risk free bonds of different maturities are equal or equivalently that appropriately calculated forward interest rates equal expected future spot interest rates in comparing the expected returns on two bonds of different maturities however the returns may be compounded in any of four natural ways continuously to the shorter bond s maturity to the longer bond s maturity or to the nearest available future date it has long been understood that if the eh holds in terms of any one of these methods and if interest rates are stochastic jensen s inequality will in general preclude it from holding in terms of any of the other three in practice the convenience and simplicity of continuously compounded interest rates and returns have led many researchers e g roll 1970 mcculloch 1975 fama 1984 to use the first method and therefore what

imperfect common knowledge staggered price setting and the effects of monetary policy this paper studies the consequences of a lack of common knowledge in the transmission of monetary policy by integrating the woodford 2003a imperfect common knowledge model with taylor calvo staggered price setting models the average price set by monopolistically competitive firms depends on their higher order expectations about not only the current state of the economy but also about the states in the future periods in which prices are to be fixed this integrated model provides a plausible explanation for the observed effects of monetary policy it shows analytically how price adjustments are delayed and how the response of output to monetary disturbances is amplified

closed form solutions for term structure derivatives with log normal interest rates we derive a unified model that gives closed form solutions for caps and floors written on interest rates as well as puts and calls written on zero coupon bonds the crucial assumption is that simple interest rates over a fixed finite period that matches the contract which we want to price are log normally distributed moreover this assumption is shown to be consistent with the heath jarrow morton model for a specific choice of volatility closed form solutions for interest rate derivatives in particular caps floors and bond options have been obtained by a number of authors for markovian term structure models with normally distributed interest rates or alternatively log normally distributed bond prices see for example jamshidian 1989 1991a heath jarrow and morton 1992 brace and musiela 1994 geman el karoui and rochet 1995 these models support black scholes type formulas most frequently used by practitioners for pricing bond options and swaptions unfortunately these models imply negative interest rates with positive probabilities and hence they are not arbitrage free in an economy with opportunities for riskless and costless storage of money briys crouhy and schobel 1991 apply the gaussian framework to derive closed form solutions for caps floors and european zero coupon bond options to exclude the influence of negative forward rates on the pricing of zero coupon bond options they introduce an additional boundary condition as shown by rady and sandmann 1994 these pricing formulas are only supported by a term structure model with an absorbing boundary for the forward rate at zero where the absorbing probability is not negligible which for a term structure model is a quite problematic assumption

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

the more we know about the fundamental the less we agree on the price i allow trading horizon heterogeneity across groups in a standard differential information model of a financial market this approach can explain the well established phenomenon that after a public announcement trading volume increases more private information is incorporated into prices and volatility increases in such environments public information has the important secondary role of helping agents learn about the information of other agents therefore whenever the correlation between the private information of different groups is sufficiently low a public announcement increases disagreement among short horizon traders regarding the expected selling price even as it decreases disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset additional testable implications are also suggested

can more public information raise uncertainty the international evidence on forward guidance abstract central banks have used different types of forward guidance this paper reports cross country evidence showing that in general forward guidance mutes the response of government bond yields to macroeconomic news however calendar based guidance with a short horizon counter intuitively raises it using a stylized model where agents learn from market signals it shows that the public release of more precise information about future rates lowers the informativeness of market signals and as a consequence may increase uncertainty and amplify the reaction of expectations to macroeconomic news

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

around and around the expectations hypothesis we show how to construct models of the term structure of interest rates in which the expectations hypothesis holds mcculloch 1993 presents such a model thereby contradicting an assertion by cox ingersoll and ross 1981 but his example is gaussian and falls outside the class of finite dimensional markovian mode ls we generalize mcculloch s model in three ways i we provide an arbitrage free characterization of the unbiased expectations hypothesis in terms of forward rates ii we extend this characterization to a whole class of expectations hypotheses and iii we show how to construct finite dimensional markovian and non gaussian examples in one form or another the expectations hypothesis has played a central role in the analysis of the term structure of interest rates perhaps the most common form of the expectations hypothesis is the so called unbiased expectations hypothesis u eh which asserts that forward rates equal the conditional expectations of future spot rates but other forms exist as well cox ingersoll and ross cir 1981 characterize a number of mutually incompatible forms of the expectations hypothesis besides the u eh including the local expectations hypothesis l eh under which the expected rate of return on all zero coupon bonds on all assets in fact equals the short term risk free rate see jarrow 1981 for a similar analysis of the various expectations hypotheses they consider cir claim that only the l eh is consistent with general equilibrium in continuous time models as well as in discrete time models with continuous compounding of yields mcculloch 1993 provides a counterexample to cir s claim his example is in the spirit of heath jarrow and morton hjm 1992 in the sense that it does not admit a representation in terms of a finite number of markovian state variables the setting in cir indeed mcculloch suggests that cir s claim may be true within their setting as we show it is not there is a weak version of the u eh according to which forward rates are biased predictors of future spot rates but the bias or term premium is a constant that only depends on the forecast horizon a regression of future spot rates on current forward rates produces a slope coefficient equal to fisher is with the board of governors of the federal reserve system and gilles is with bear stearns co the views expressed herein are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the board of governors or the federal reserve system we thank greg duffee and huston mcculloch for extensive comments and an anonymous referee for suggesting improvements in the exposition

financial prices and information acquisition in large cournot markets abstract in the context of a large cournot market with dispersedly informed firms we show that while output decisions are strategic substitutes private information acquisition decisions can be strategic complements the reversal of incentives operates through the informational role played by the price of a financial asset whose payoff depends on firms output decisions our results rely on a novel mechanism whereby holding fixed the private information of financial traders when firms become more privately informed the financial asset price becomes less informative

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

pricing interest rate derivative securities this article shows that the one state variableinterest rate models of vasicek 1977 and cox ingersoll and ross 1985b can be extended sothat they are consistent with both the current termstructure of interest rates and either the currentvolatilities of all spot interest rates or the currentvolatilities of all forward interest rates theextended vasicek model is shown to be very tracta ble analytically the article compares option pricesobtained using the extended vasicek model withthose obtained using a number of other models