why initial public offerings are underpriced evidence from switzerland abstract the underpricing of initial public offerings is a well documented phenomenon for almost every equity market that has been examined in switzerland for a sample of 42 stocks that were issued in the market between 1983 and 1989 a 35 8 percent average initial return between the offering price and the closing price on the first trading day is found in switzerland the excess returns from offering price persist for at least three years however if the purchase is made at the first day s closing price then the three year returns are negative the paper discusses special institutional settings in the swiss stock market and provides some explanations implying that underpricing can be regarded as an equilibrium situation

privatization public offerings and political objectives this paper empirically analyses the political and economic objectives underlying privatization on the stock market particularly the factors of sips underpricing are explained and the study analyses whether the change of political parties in government play a role on the issue the paper has two main findings first larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization second the change of government from left wing to right wing did not lead to significantly higher levels of underpricing the results show that governments are quite pragmatic with respect to underpricing maximizing proceeds from sips shows to be more important than ideological differences between parties in government

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

intergovernmental fiscal transfers international lessons for developing countries abstract this paper reviews the central issues that arise in designing intergovernmental transfers and surveys the approaches adopted in a number of countries with special emphasis on developing countries since circumstances and objectives differ from country to country no simple uniform pattern of transfers is universally appropriate but experience around the world makes it clear that if services are to be efficiently provided transfers must be designed so that those receiving them have a clear mandate adequate resources sufficient flexibility to make decisions and are accountable for results

confidence building and politics in privatization some evidence from spain abstract this paper analyzes privatization on the stock market and has two main findings first sips underpricing is consistent with the confidence building hypothesis derived from political risk under asymmetric information larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization which is consistent with the hypothesis that governments use underpricing to be credible privatizators second evidence gives support to the hypothesis that explicit political motives influence the design of privatization which is affected by the political majority

trends and prospects in state and local finance abstract this article reviews trends in the national total of the expenditures of state and local governments for the period of 1929 1982 the principle conclusions are that growth of federal grants has played a significant role in the growth of these expenditures and that even after allowing for the effects of relative price income and federal grants a relatively large unexplained positive residual remains part of this upward drift in expenditures especially for the period of 1950 1970 can be accounted for by the growth in school age population the article ends with a brief discussion of future prospects for subnational governments

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference evidence from intergovernmental transfers in india abstract one area of fiscal policy in which several countries have delegated responsibility to an independent agency is the distribution of national resource transfers across regional and local governments such delegation is expected to promote equity and efficiency and mitigate distortions created by political incentives this paper tests whether delegation to an independent agency indeed makes a difference by contrasting the impact of partisan politics on two types of fiscal transfers to states in the indian federation over a period of time 1972 1995 the pattern of evidence shows that while the transfers that are determined by the central political executive are indeed distributed to favor particular states that are politically important for the central ruling party the transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain such partisan impact

deciding to provide local decisions on providing social welfare fiscal federalism predicts local governments will avoid social welfare expenditures owing to capital mobility across local jurisdictions yet census of governments data consistently show that many local governments provide one or more social welfare functions and moreover many jurisdictions provide these functions without federal or state intergovernmental support this article finds evidence that while local expenditures are largely driven by fiscal capacity and federal and state assistance local decisions on providing social welfare functions and participating in intergovernmental revenues are primarily affected by degree of capital mobility and by local political factors consequently local governments exercise much greater autonomy over social welfare policymaking than fiscal federalism suggests

an empirical examination of models of contract choice in initial public offerings this study examines initial public offering contract choice decisions in best efforts offerings minimum sales constraints allow issuers to precommit to withdraw the offering if a fixed minimum number of shares is not sold in firm commitment offerings the over allotment option allows the underwriter to increase sales when demand is strong two theories of contract choice benveniste and spindt 1989 and ritter s 1987 extension of rock 1986 offer predictions about the role of these contract features we find that the 1977 1982 evidence is consistent with benveniste and spindt 1989 the evidence is less supportive of the ritter 1987 hypothesis that minimum sales constraints serve to reduce the winner s curse of the riskier issuers

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

distributive politics and the allocation of federal grants understanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of federal grant programs that have achieved a prominent place in nearly all areas of domestic policy the theoretical literature on distributive politics however focuses almost exclusively on a centralized top down view of policy distribution by examining the role of presidents legislators and bureaucrats scholars have ignored participants who have become key actors in the distribution of federal expenditures the recipient jurisdictions this analysis of the allocation patterns under six federal programs shows that local governments exert important influences on the distribution of federal grants and that the distributional patterns and their determinants vary over time the analysis also points out the importance of disaggregation by focusing on programs and recipient jurisdictions as opposed to total federal expenditures and regions states or congressional districts

lost in the mail a field experiment on crime crime in the mail sector can hamper the development of elec tronic markets we use a field experiment to detect crime and measure its differential impacts we subtly and realistically manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households and detect high levels of shirking and stealing eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its des tination and even more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope our study demonstrates that privatization has been unable to extricate moral hazard and that crime is strategic and not equally distributed across the population

explaining intergovernmental grants australian evidence the dodo suddenly called out the race is over and they all croded round it panting and asking but who has won lewis carroll alice s adventures in wonderland

perverse incentives labor market regulation and performance in the public sector we test the link between labor market regulations and job performance in the public sector using a novel outcome variable namely the number of days it takes the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance we find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables regardless of the labor regulation measure employed changes in specification and even unlikely endogeneity considerations which suggest that this finding may be causal

election goals and income redistribution recent evidence from albania this paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub federal levels of government we model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decision makers and at a deeper level by the institutions within which they nd themselves operating we contrast two political objective functions that yield di erent empirical predictions of the ways in which politics should a ect scal policy lessons learned here may prove important in understanding limits on the types of redistribution possible via block grants given the institutional framework in both developing and developed countries 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation h1 h7 o1

primary versus secondary pricing of high yield bonds previous research has found systematic underpricing of newly floated securities vis a vis secondary market levels this conclusion is based on the observation that primary issues provide superior risk adjusted returns in the period immediately following issuance those returns however are not known at the time of pricing to gauge whether a new issue is offered at a premium or a concession to the secondary market investors must use standard valuation benchmarks in the case of high yield bonds an analysis based on agency ratings and yields to maturity indicates that new issues are priced richer than seasoned issues in some periods and cheaper in other periods using regression analysis the authors model the magnitude of the premium or concession prevailing in a given period the regressions explain 64 percent of the variance in the primary secondary yield spread through proxies for supply demand and liquidity of the high yield sector

political determinants of intergovernmental transfers in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime evidence from china this article examines the political determinants of the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in the context of china in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime a government marked by political centralization and fiscal decentralization intergovernmental transfers are employed by politicians as instruments to achieve political goals using china s provincial data from 1994 to 2009 we find that the officials political power is an important factor in the distribution process a party secretary s replacement facilitates an increase in transfers especially if the replacement comes from the central government if a party secretary is a member of the central politburo the province receives more conditional transfers than others the central government allocates the transfers in such a way that the province with a high proportion of the minority population receives more transfers than others

anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock initial public offerings of common stocks ipos are typically underpriced in this paper the author develops and tests the hypothesis that underpricing serves as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations of investment bankers the empirical results based on samples of ipos that were brought to the market before and after the securities act of 1933 provide considerable support for the implicit insurance hypothesis specifically gross underpricing and market segmentation between prestigious and fringe investment bankers in originating unseasoned new issues appear to be peculiar to the post 1933 era a number of studies have documented that unseasoned common stocks typically garner large positive abnormal returns during a short period following the initial offering in his recent review of the empirical evidence on the initial returns of common stock offerings smith 36 concluded that the returns from offer price to after market price have exceeded fifteen percent his calculations did not include some of the earlier results obtained by mcdonald and fisher 23 and logue 20 when their samples are combined with those in smith s review the initial returns of unseasoned equity offerings appear even larger over seventeen percent these results imply that underwriters consistently offer the securities at substantial discounts from their values that are set in the after market in other words initial public offerings ipos appear to be underpriced what is even more puzzling is the fact that in some time periods underpricing appears to be systematically larger than in other periods ibbotson and jaffe 15 and ritter 29 have documented that during the postwar era there have been a number of periods in which the initial returns of common stocks have been extremely high ritter for example reported that the average return from the offer price to the first after market price was over forty eight percent for ipos in 1980 and 1981 1 similarly the initial returns of unseasoned issues of common stock brought to the market in 1950 1951 1961 and 1968 were unusually large these periods in which ipos were grossly underpriced are referred to as the hotissue markets why do investment bankers underprice ipos why do issuers

empirical estimates of beta when investors face estimation risk we examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets we find such a decline over the first geveral periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings there is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement this paper examines several empirical implications of security return models involving differential information these models formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the research relates to two streams of literature the first revolves around the new issues and new listings market it begins with ibbotson 1975 and includes for example ritter 1984 beatty and ritter 1986 mcconnell and sanger 1987 and muscarella and vetsuypens 1989 the second is the literature dealing with the effects of differential information on the risk assessment of low information firms this second literature is exemplified by the work of klein and bawa 1976 1977 and barry and brown 1984 1985 in our examination we focus on how increased risk associated with low information firms henceforth called estimation risk manifests itself in observed return data we explore how observed security returns to low information firms appear to researchers in relation to how they appear ex ante to investors who base their predictive distribution of security returns on incomplete information about the parameters of the return generating process we also examine data on new listings and new issues to exemplify some of the relationships the data support the most obvious and direct implication of the differential information model that the expected systematic risk of low information firms decreases as time passes and information increases our evidence as in ibbotson that risk declines with seasoning rejects a restrictive null hypothesis that information risk is diversifiable and the under

pricing initial public offerings evidence on the pricing of initial public offerings is presented for germany a data set of 92 going publics over the years 1961 1987 is analyzed on average the initial return from the offer price to the first day of trading adjusted for market movements is more than 15 o tests of several hypotheses indicate that underpricing is related to ex ante uncertainty about the value of the shares

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

signalling by underpricing in the ipo market abstract empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue markets for initial public offerings in certain periods and in certain industries new issues are underpriced and rationing occurs this paper develops a model consistent with this observation which assumes the firm itself best knows its prospects in certain circumstances firms with the most favorable prospects find it optimal to signal their type by underpricing their initial issue of shares and investors know that only the best can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

underwriter price support and the ipo underpricing puzzle abstract this paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings ipos investigation of the distribution of initial returns following ipos shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left negative tail moreover most ipos with zero one day returns subsequently fall in price suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial ipo returns even if offering prices are set at expected market value this paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial ipo returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing

intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument empirical evidence from swedish municipalities are grants to swedish municipalities tactical in this essay i derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 swedish municipalities 1981 1995 in order to decide which regions that are politically powerful both election results and survey data from the swedish election studies are used the results although somewhat ambiguous support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes

giving the people what they want the distribution of earmarks in the u s house of representatives the common wisdom in journalistic accounts of earmarking is that congress distributes earmarks on a purely political basis without any consideration for the demand for federal spending academic accounts similarly argue that factors internal to congress are preeminent in determining where earmarks go even more than for other types of pork barrel spending using earmarks appearing in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bills i search for both chamber based and demand side determinants of the distribution of earmarks i find that both types of factors are significantly related to the number of earmarks that a house member receives this result indicates that even while earmarking members of congress are at least minimally responsive to voter preferences and calls into question whether earmarks should be treated as an outlier within the universe of spending allocation mechanisms

a simple test of baron s model of ipo underpricing abstract this paper tests baron s 1982 model of initial public offering ipo underpricing that model relies on information asymmetries between issuers and underwriters and predicts that offer prices will be lower than would prevail in the absence of asymmetric information we examine the initial public offerings of 38 investment banks that went public in the period 1970 1987 and participated in the distribution of their own securities we find that contrary to the implication of baron s model such self marketed offerings are characterized by statistically significant underpricing comparable to that of other ipos

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

the allocation of federal aid monies the synthesis of demand side and supply side explanations previous research on the distribution offederal aid monies has been dominated by the donor s perspective different distribution formulas political influence of congressional representatives bureaucrats and individual aid recipients have been studied as the sole determinants of aid allocations each explanation however fails to examine the question of aid allocations from a demand side perspective this omission assumes that all governmental units are equally desirous of federal assistance and that any bias in the distribution of federal aid is a function of supply side conditions identifying a linkage between demand side and supply side determinants of aid allocations this article proposes and tests hypotheses derived from an integrated model of federal aid allocations

litigation risk intermediation and the underpricing of initial public offerings we formally examine the role of litigation risk in initial public offering ipo pricing the underwriter s pricing decision trades off current revenue against expected future litigation costs both of which are increasing in the ipo price given a time consistency constraint and rational expectations on the part of investors however the standard litigation risk argument does not lead to equilibrium underpricing we develop a richer model that provides sufficient conditions under which there is equilibrium underpricing the issuer s choice of employing an underwriter versus floating the ipo on its own is examined and various testable implications of the model are developed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the costs of going public abstract this paper presents evidence regarding the two quantifiable components of the costs of going public direct expenses and underpricing together these costs average 21 22 of the realized market value of the securities issued for firm commitment offers and 31 87 for best efforts offers for a given size offer the direct expenses are of the same order of magnitude for both contract types but the underpricing is greater for best efforts offers an explanation of why some firms choose to use best efforts offers in spite of their apparent higher total costs is given

the pricing of initial public offerings a dynamic model with information production this paper presents an information theoretic model of ipo pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the ipo and the secondary market have private information about their firm s prospects and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm high value firms knowing they are going to pool with low value firms induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information the information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity giving a higher expected stock price for high value firms