efficiency growth and concentration an empirical analysis of hospital markets taking an evolutionary view of markets harold demsetz hypothesized that firms differ persistently in efficiency and that industry concentration results from growth of efficient firms at the expense of inefficient ones we test the hypothesis with high quality microdata from the us hospital industry an industry of keen policy and scientific interest we measure efficiency by firm in the early 1980s and relate it to subsequent growth of efficient firms to the persistence of profit differences and to changes in the concentration of markets initial hospital efficiency and subsequent growth and profitability are significantly and positively related also greater initial variation in hospital efficiency within local markets is positively related to subsequent growth in market concentration these findings support the logic of demsetz s evolutionary efficiency hypothesis though they cannot confirm the stronger idea that variation in firm efficiency is the dominant explanation for changes in concentration

quality adjusted cost functions and policy evaluation in the nursing home industry proper evaluation of cost quality trade offs inherent in regulatory policy requires identifying the structure of production from the behavioral response of quality to the policy change however estimating the structure of production with endogenous quality is difficult because of both measurement problems and data availability we develop a simple method for identifying and estimating cost functions in the presence of endogenous and unobserved quality using this method we estimate that a quality adjusted cost function for nursing homes treating quality as exogenous yields seriously misleading estimates of marginal cost and economies of scale we then used the parameter estimates to evaluate the cost quality trade off in nursing home regulatory policy

the electoral impact of economic conditions who is held responsible a variety of recent research has dealt with the impact of economic conditions on congressional elections the underlying assumption of this research has been that the effects of economic fluctuations are distributed evenly across members of the president s party by focusing on subgroups of congressional candidates we demonstrate that the importance of economic conditions varies widely specifically we show that the aggregate electoral margins of incumbents are far more responsive to economic conditions than are those for nonincumbents and that among in party incumbents the relationship is stronger among those with higher levels of tenure further we demonstrate that the previous lack of individual level confirmation of the aggregate relationship has been due to a failure to control for the contextual effects implied by our conditional aggregate analysis with controls for district incumbency we find a relationship between retrospective personal financial condition and vote choice that mirrors the aggregate relationship between retrospective performance of the national economy and congressional vote totals

how efficient is the voting market it is by now well established that good macroeconomic conditions benefit the incumbent president and his congressional party confreres at the polls this result is not unanimous see for example stigler or arcelus and meltzer2 and may not be universal 3 however the basic results in kramer 4 the progenitor of the modern literature on the effect of economic conditions on elections seem to have stood the test of time the broad consensus of this literature is that voters in presidential and congressional elections 1 reward income growth and punish unemployment and inflation 2 probably give greater weight to income growth than to unemployment and inflation and 3 myopically ignore any information beyond the recent past say prior to the election year 5 so far however the data have outrun interpretation while economic conditions seem to matter we do not know why they matter or how plausibly to characterize the process by which voters translate information about economic conditions into voting decisions this article tries to fill that gap though it extends the empirical literature to gubernatorial elections its main con

the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on the electoral fortunes of house incumbents the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on house elections is a long debated but still unresolved issue we argue that return rates are theoretically superior to vote shares as measures of electoral acountability and that incumbents not candidates of the president s party are the legislators voters hold responsible we develop and test an incumbent accountability model using incumbent return rates in the u s house from 1916 to 1994 finding a strongly significant effect of both income growth and the misery index however the data reject both our pure incumbency model and the traditional presidential party model indicating that both factors are relevant to voters

conversation information and herd behavior experimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others to exhibit herd behavior is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions the information cascade models of banerjee 1992 and bikhchandani et al 1992 are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior but these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

agent discretion and the choice of insurance marketing system this article argues that different insurance marketing organizations arise as a means to minimize the costs of correctly matching policyholder risks with insurance coverage when policyholders are easily sorted without sales agent participation in screening exclusive dealing will be the preferred marketing organization when agent information is important for risk placement independent agency may be preferred empirical support for our theory is obtained from analysis of compensation contracts and market shares of the different marketing forms exclusive dealers are found to be prevalent in relatively standardized homogeneous product lines and markets and their agents receive less profit based compensation than those of independent agency insurers these findings are consistent with our theory

hedonic cost models and the pricing of milk components to assess likely producer response to milk price reform we examine the technology of protein butterfat and fluid carrier production on 1 924 u s dairy farms a variant of a hedonic cost model is proposed in which the output aggregator is expressed as a function of total output and of the percentage concentrations of its components dairy farmers have responded rationally to artificially low protein prices due to the cow s appetite limit farmers operate in stage i of feed to milk production functions yet protein s marginal cost rises sharply with protein output only modest substitutability is evident among feed inputs or milk component outputs

party polarization and the business cycle in the united states a large literature has studied the trend of greaterpolarization between democrats and republicans in congress this paper empirically examines the extent to which inflationand unemployment explain cyclical movements ofpolarization over time an informal application of thestandard downsian spatial competition model of partiesgenerates the following relationships ceteris paribus 1 inflation should be associated with policy convergence 2 unemployment should be associated with polarization 3 theeffect of unemployment on polarization should be larger inmagnitude than the effect of inflation on convergence and 4 the effect of unemployment on polarization should be strongerin the house than in the senate we estimate the relationshipbetween vote records and business cycle conditions over the1947 1999 period using a gls model with varying lags ourresults are broadly consistent with these business cyclehypotheses of polarization though greater support is found inhouse data than in senate data

presidential and congressional vote share equations three vote share equations are estimated and analyzed in this paper one for presidential elections one for on term house elections and one for mid term house elections the sample period is 1916 2006 considering the three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic variables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail possibilities the resulting three equation model can then be analyzed dynamically which is done in section 4 the main conclusions are briefly 1 there is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways 2 there is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on term house elections the presidential vote share and the on term house vote share are highly positively correlated but this is because they are affected by some of the same variables 3 there is positive serial correlation in the house vote in that the previous mid term house vote share positively affects the on term house vote share and the previous on term house vote share positively affects the mid term house vote share 4 the presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next mid term house vote share the most likely explanation for this is a balance argument where voters are reluctant to let one party become too dominant ruled out as possible explanations for this fourth result is any reversal of a coattail effect since there is no evidence of an effect in the first place and a regression to the mean since the positive serial correlation in the house vote implies no such regression also it is not simply voting against the party in the white house because the presidential variable is a vote share variable not a 0 1 incumbency variable

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

information marketing and pricing in the u s antiulcer drug market introduced into the united states in 1977 tagamet was the pioneer product in the class of antiulcer drugs known as h2antagonists by promoting ulcer healing through inhibiting acid secretion tagamet was able to heal ulcers and treat pre ulcer conditions pharmacologically on an outpatient basis thereby substituting for more costly hospital admissions and surgeries in 1983 another h2 antagonist called zantac entered and by early 1987 u s zantac sales surpassed those of the pioneering tagamet today there are four h2 antagonists sold in the united states tagamet zantac pepcid and axid zantac is now the world s largest selling prescription drug having estimated worldwide sales in 1994 of about 4 billion each of the four h2 antagonists is among the top 100 in world drug sales although tagamet lost u s patent protection on may 17 1994 in this paper we examine empirically the role of information in facilitating and explaining growth of the overall antiulcer drug market as well as in shaping the changing market shares of the four patented products the dissemination of information is due largely to the use of marketing channels such as visits by manufacturers representatives to physicians called detailing advertising in medical journals and most recently by direct to consumer advertising we examine these and also explore pricing policies product differentiation and orderof entry effects

discussion of the influence of elections on the accounting choices of governmental entities kido petacchi and weber 2012 investigate whether the occurrence of a state gubernatorial election is important to understanding the accrual choices of preparers of the state s comprehensive annual financial report central to the authors argument is the idea that voters do not like budget deficits politicians in response have incentives to use accounting choices to mask deficits in the period before elections focusing on a specific accrual the changes in compensated absences liability the authors find evidence that the discretionary part of this accrual is smaller in the period before an election which is consistent with politicians attempting to improve the picture of the state s financial health in addition the authors show that accrual manipulation is positively associated with the vote share of incumbent governors in elections in my discussion i ask two questions 1 how strong are governors political incentives to manipulate accruals in the run up to elections 2 can the association between discretionary compensated absence accruals and elections be explained by forces other than politically motivated accounting manipulation i argue that the incentives to manipulate accruals might well be weak given strong disciplinary mechanisms that induce politicians to transparency what s more i document that elections might produce patterns in state employment as the compensated absences liability is linked to the payroll election induced changes in state employment might be reflected in this accrual evidence of an association between the compensated absences accrual and elections then does not necessarily imply that politicians manage accounting numbers to further illustrate this point i show empirically that gubernatorial elections have little explanatory power for state financial reporting choices that are unaffected by state employment jel classification h70 h72 m41

comment defining health insurance affordability unobserved heterogeneity matters affordability is a vague concept bundorf and pauly bundorf m k pauly m v 2006 is health insurance affordable for the uninsured journal of health economics 25 4 650 673 address this problem by establishing clear working definitions of affordability and they use these definitions to estimate the percent of the uninsured who can afford insurance when they establish their definitions of affordability they use a microeconomic model that omits essential characteristics of the health insurance market this comment suggests alternative definitions that better incorporate the structure of the health insurance market discusses both endogeneity and specification problems that might occur when implementing their econometric model to estimate the fraction of uninsured afforders and then recommends ways to reduce omitted variable bias and endogeneity bias

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

consumption externalities and diffusion in pharmaceutical markets antiulcer drugs we examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs externalities emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value and or conveys information about efficacy and safety to patients and physicians this can affect the rate of market diffusion for a new entrant and can lead to dominance of one drug despite the availability of close substitutes we use data for h2 antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects the model has three components an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug as well as conventional attributes affect brand valuation equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality adjusted prices and marketing levels and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process we find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion and that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level

the marginals never vanished incumbency and competition in elections to the u s house of representatives 1952 82 the average vote margin enjoyed by incumbent candidates for the u s house of representatives increased sharply during the 1 960s despite this and contrary to assumptions common in the literature on recent congressional elections electoral data show that house incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s the marginals properly defined have not vanished the swing ratio has diminished little if at all and competition for house seats held by incumbents has not declined vote margins increased without adding to incumbent security diminishing competition or dampening swings because the heterogeneity of interelection vote swings increased at the same time

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

the 1992 1994 and 1996 elections a comment and a forecast a model of the two way relationship between elections and the economy previously estimated on historical data for 1916 1988 is applied to the united states elections of 1992 1994 and 1996 the 1992 result was a surprise to the model since the economy had performed reasonably well that election year the midterm elections of 1994 were accurately forecast the republicans took control of congress not because of unusual circumstances but because of a normal midterm cycle president clinton s chances in 1996 look dim given the current modest growth rate and an electoral bias favoring republican presidential candidates but an alternative model keyed more to the voters choosing clinton to balance the republican congress gives him a reasonable chance of reelection

votes and regional economic growth evidence from turkey in countries where governments disproportionate power over the bureaucracy is coupled with a strong political polarization can votes for the national incumbent party buy preferential policy treatment and faster regional economic growth the article tests such question on turkey s 81 provinces over 2004 12 results uncover a link between votes and faster regional growth as well as a small influence of preferential allocations in explaining it yet after addressing potential endogeneity economic performance is almost entirely explained by standard drivers primarily human capital endowment results suggest that the impact of electorally motivated distributive politics on regions economic performance is extremely limited

cost function estimation and quality bias the regulated automobile insurance industry this article explores the implications of endogenous product quality and therefore endogenous output in the empirical estimation of cost functions for regulated automobile collision insurance firms it contains a structural model of such a firm and provides an illustration of the types of biases that can result if data on quality of service are unavailable or otherwise omitted the analysis shows how the directions of biases depend on the nature of the variations in the observed nonquality data a new test suggests that such bias is present in insurance cost functions

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

information spillovers margins scale and scope with an application to canadian life insurance a model of the production of life insurance services is developed the focus is on price setting ability and the cost advantages from size and diversity the model characterizes insurers decisions on the face value and number of policies and the number of insurance lines the model is applied to canadian life insurance firms unit revenue cost margins average from 13 per cent to 40 per cent across lines of insurance these margins emanate from information spillovers generated by marketing activities cost advantages due to size are small but are substantial from diversity returns to scale average from 1 13 to 1 40 while returns to scope from offering multiple insurance lines average from 70 per cent to 100 per cent

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

macroeconomic conditions and committee re election rates the traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and house elections follows kramer 1971 and assumes all members of the president s party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes using presidential party return rates from 10 house committees over the time period 1916 1996 i find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee generally committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations contrastingly members of the public works committee and the rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations

no such thing as a free safe lunch the cost of food safety regulation in the meat industry this study develops theoretical and econometric cost function models for the meat industry to test the hypothesis of safety exogeneity i e that product safety does not affect productive efficiency using plant level data from the census of manufactures this hypothesis is rejected estimates of the impacts of food safety regulation on variable cost of production in the beef pork and poultry industries show that the efficiency costs of food safety regulations could plausibly exceed benefits estimated by the u s department of agriculture costs of regulation per pound of meat are found to be size neutral for all but the smallest plants copyright 2000 oxford university press

economic performance and political outcomes an analysis of the turkish parliamentary and local election results between 1950 and 2004 the results of twenty five turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004 are studied turkish voters are found to take government s economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year furthermore they are found to hold the major incumbent party responsible for both growth and inflation but minor incumbent parties only for inflation also they appear to vote strategically especially in local and parliamentary by elections to diffuse power finally all parties exhibit a steady depreciation in their political capital while in office these conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries

production of public safety are socioeconomic characteristics of local communities important factors this paper uses the translog cost function and cross section data from florida to investigate the importance of socioeconomic characteristics sec of local communities in the production of public safety the approach used is noteworthy in four respects 1 the underlying production function is specified as an agem production function 2 sec are treated as non purchased fixed inputs 3 two variables are used to proxy sec in estimation and 4 the paper test for the existence of endogenous quality differences in safety it is shown that exclusion of sec from the production cost function of safety leads to misspecification and hence they provide a misleading guide to policy

partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy in the postwar united states the president s party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election republican administrations exhibit below average and democratic administrations above average economic growth in the first half of each term whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities in presidential elections voters choose between two polarized candidates they then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president s policies by strengthening the opposition in congress since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies our model predicts a spurious correlation between the state of the economy and elections our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election our model performs empirically at least as well as and often better than alternative models

mr smith and the economy the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting this paper estimates the influence of macroeconomic conditions on individual legislator voting over time previous work shows legislator voting to be stable over careers in this paper voting on an ideological issue space ada scores and a fiscal issue space ntu scores from 1976 to 2002 exhibits significant short term cyclicality with economic conditions individual legislators polarize by party in response to rising unemployment and converge in response to rising inflation as legislators accumulate tenure they become more ideologically conservative but more fiscally liberal results are also reported on presidential party divided government and region all results are weaker in the senate than in the house

information and diffusion of new prescription drugs this article examines the role of different product information flows on the diffusion of new pharmaceuticals given the innovative nature of pharmaceutical drugs and their impact on health care expenditure there is a surprisingly small literature devoted to this topic some information flow mechanisms have been examined individually in the literature but very few have captured the simultaneous impact of these mechanisms on up take and diffusion this article uses the up take of statins as an example diffusion of this therapeutical group is expressed as a function of four specific informational channels self experience consumption externalities scientific evidence and marketing in addition to this the influence of economic factors is tested to examine whether they have any role in drug diffusion prescription data from over 130 general practitioners gp practices in the uk during 1991 2004 are used to test the econometric specification applying dynamic panel data methods results suggest individual self experience and clinical evidence are major factors promoting diffusion while there is an inverse relationship with gp practice size and diffusion having controlled for these factors financial incentives and marketing appear to play little role

modelling the effects of promotion expenditures on sales of pharmaceuticals the successful innovation of pharmaceuticals requires a substantial amount of marketing support despite concerns about the effects of these marketing efforts this study considers prior findings that indicate that higher marketing expenditures for a brand reduce its price elasticity of demand which may lead to higher prices in the context of the dutch pharmaceutical market the authors find that parameters are heterogeneous across brands and that marketing effects differ across product life cycle stages they propose a separate analysis of established and new brands for established brands marketing efforts neither have a positive effect on sales nor do they affect the price elasticity for new brands several proposed models might capture their diffusion pattern the diffusion of innovation models provide the best results marketing accelerates the rate of diffusion and leads to a higher baseline level of sales

persuasion or information the economics of prescription drug advertising the economic and welfare effects of advertising have been extensively studied over the last half century however these efforts have not led to a consensus either as to the effects or the value of advertising economists continue to reach polar conclusions that appear to be derived mainly from preconceptions of the social desirability of advertising on the one hand is research that emphasizes promotion s ability to create artificial product differentiation and thereby produce informational confusion 1 this line of research stresses the empirical association of extensive advertising with high concentration and high accounting profits evidence judged to support increased market power and entry barrier effects 2 a contrary body of research emphasizes the value of advertising in providing information and hence in promoting competition 3 the empirical findings most consistent with this view are that prices paid by consumers in selected markets are lower with advertising than without it 4

presidential party incumbency and the effects of economic fluctuations on house elections 1916 1996 there is little professional consensusregarding the effect of economic conditionson house elections we argue that recentwork still uses the paradigm of party toorganize their data and tests given thatrecent developments in the theory ofcongress emphasize the paradigm ofincumbency we investigate the empiricalrelevance of that competing paradigm weshow that 1 incumbency matters in a purepresidential party model of houseelections 2 presidential party mattersin a pure incumbency model 3 once bothparty and incumbency are accounted for economic conditions exert a highlysignificant and temporally stable influenceon house elections 4 return rates aremore affected by economic fluctuations thanare vote shares and 5 not allpresidential party incumbents face the samedegree of electoral accountability foreconomic fluctuations