strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

profit sharing and productivity microeconomic evidence from the united states profit sharing has often been suggested as a potential solution to principal agent problems in the workplace the relationship between productivity and profit sharing is examined using a panel dataset drawn from 2 976 publicly held companies over the 1971 85 period alternatively using firm intercept and first difference specifications the regression results indicate that the adoption of profit sharing is associated with a 2 5 4 2 percent increase in productivity in addition the size of the effect increases with the proportion of employees participating in profit sharing these results hold under a variety of specifications and do not appear to be explained by accompanying changes in management or personnel policies copyright 1992 by royal economic society

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

wage bargaining with time varying threats we study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm s willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired as strikers find temporary jobs and as inventories or strike funds run out we find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary if dispute costs increase in the long run then dispute durations are longer settlement rates are lower and wages decline more slowly during the short run and may even increase the settlement wage is largely determined from the long run threat rather than the short run threat

taking stock a critical assessment of recent research on inventories empirical and theoretical aspects of inventory behavior became hot topics in the 1950s and early 1960s no one seemed to notice the tension that was developing between the emerging macroeconomic and microeconomic views of inventories macroeconomists routinely thought of inventories as a destabilizing factor yet the prevailing micro theory viewed inventories as a stabilizing factor it was a fascinating question that was barely explored instead somewhat inexplicably interest in inventories dried up as if inventories were of minor economic significance and little intrinsic interest by the early 1980s then economists once again knew something they had known in the 1950s that inventory investment is of first order importance in business cycles but they were also beginning to realize that the standard production smoothing buffer stock model of inventories was in deep trouble this paper focuses on developments since that realization

strikes wages and private information private information models of strikes suggest that the strike is used as an information revealing device by the union in the presence of asymmetrical information a testable prediction of these models is that there is a negative relationship between strikes and the unpredicted component of the wage this paper finds evidence of such a relationship in a large sample of u s labor contracts the real wage falls by about 3 percent after a strike lasting one hundred days copyright 1989 by american economic association

controlling for endogeneity of strike variables in the estimation of wage settlement equations this article analyzes wage changes with an unbalanced panel from the spanish collective bargaining in large firms survey central to the analysis are the joint determination of strike and wage outcomes and in particular the estimation of the slope of the wage concession curve i control for the possible endogeneity of strike variables in the wage equation and suggest two sets of instruments lagged strike outcomes or reduced form predictions of the strike variables when controlling for endogeneity a negative relationship between strike duration and the size of the wage change arises however short strikes still produce higher wage changes

union vs nonunion wage norm shifts empirical investigations of wage determination have often produced autocorrelated residuals from time series wage equations runs of overor underprediction have usually been regarded as weaknesses in specification to be corrected or explained away in 1980 however george perry suggested that such runs represent an important if neglected characteristic of american wage setting he argued that norms of wage change develop in the labor market these norms according to perry change discretely there are periods of more or less wage pushiness aggregate wage indexes can be influenced even if norm shifts are not fully reflected everywhere providing those sectors that are affected have sufficient weight in the indexes an obvious division in the labor market is between the union and nonunion sectors there is reason to believe that while there has been a downward shift in wage norms recently the impact has been concentrated in the union sector see my 1985 article indeed the union sector is probably inherently more prone to norm shifts than the nonunion

profit sharing and employment stability this paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed time based wage the theory is tested on two data sets one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors the characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the theoretical requirements for stabilizing employment and the authors do find evidence in both samples to support the hypothesis the evidence however is of borderline statistical significance and is therefore more suggestive than definitive

logit estimates of strike incidence from canadian contract data logit estimates of strike incidence are made based on a unique and comprehensive data set of 2 437 collective agreements the appropriate level of aggregation since that is where bargaining occurs the results are interpreted through a theoretical framework emphasizing that strikes are more likely when the joint costs of using the strike mechanism are low relative to the cost of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same purposes such functions of strikes are to generate information elicit truth telling establish reputations provide catharsis and solve intraorganizational conflict

strategic delay in bargaining with two sided uncertainty the role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite horizon alternating offer model of bargaining a buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly an equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer a bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and hence makes concessions earlier on trade occurs whever gains from trade exist but due to the private information only after costly delay panmunjom korea upi the american general and the north korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut maj gen james b knapp negotiator for the united nations command unc was waiting for maj gen ri choonsun of the democratic people s republic of north korea to propose a recess they sat there arms folded for 42 hours not a word finally gen ri got up walked out and drove away evening bulletin philadelphia 11 april 1969

cyclical fluctuations in strike durations canadian data on strikes between 1946 and 1983 are used to estimate linear regression models for the logarithm of completed duration a thorough investigation of the influence of the business cycle reveals strong support for the hypothesis that strike durations are countercyclical the cyclical effect is shown to be robust to both the choice of cyclical variable and the econometric specification and the magnitude of the effect is quite substantial experimentation with different representations of the cycle reveals that it is difficult to improve on a simple formulation involving a single continuous variable

efficient relocation of spectrum incumbents changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient to address this problem the fcc has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders often it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency in particular giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent we examine the experience of broadband pcs entrants in relocating microwave incumbents we conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum

profit related pay prose discovered this paper estimates that in 1984 43 percent of british private sector establishments had some form of profit related pay regression results do not show that these establishments had statistically significant better financial performance cross ta bulations do not suggest that the establishments with income sharing schemes had noticeably greater employment growth or better industrial relations copyright 1988 by royal economic society

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

an empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining these models can be applied to contract negotiations yielding an economic theory of strikes to date however few empirical tests of these models have been carried out in this paper a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm s future profitability these predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major u s contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

strategic bargaining with firm inventories this paper characterizes how a firm s opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers in equilibrium the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration this outcome is equivalent to a nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents expected payoffs should a strike last forever we also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories the wage increases when demand is high conversely given demand the wage falls as inventories rise

profit sharing employment stability and wage growth the authors conjecture that profit sharing reduces turnover and thus increases expected returns to firm specific human capital investments so that the optimal levels of skill acquisition and investment in firm specific skills rise and ultimately increase productivity empirical evidence from nlsy data on white men in nonunion jobs between 1988 and 1994 supports this hypothesis employees participating in profit sharing plans were less likely than non participants to separate from their jobs they also received training more frequently and for longer durations finally the authors show that profit sharing was related to higher wage growth indicating a faster rate of skill accumulation

partial bandwagon effects and local interactions we consider partial bandwagon properties in the context of coordination games to capture the idea of weak network externalities we then study a local interactions model where agents play a coordination game following a noisy best reply process we show that globally pairwise risk dominant strategies are selected in arbitrary 3 3 coordination games but not necessarily in larger games a comparison with the global interactions benchmark shows that the nature of interactions might alter the long run results themselves and not only the speed of convergence we also illustrate that the simultaneous coexistence of conventions is possible for games with at least 5 strategies 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved

union wage concessions in the 1980s the importance of firm specific factors this paper evaluates the effects of firm performance and firm characteristics on concession outcomes over the years 1980 87 across similar firms the author finds concessions were inversely related to stock price and employment growth concessions were also most likely in small firms in firms paying high wages and in firms with relatively low union coverage the effect of firm performance and firm characteristics on the likelihood of concessions was uniform across concessions of differing severity and was stable in magnitude over the eight year period

lump sum payments and profit sharing plans in the union sector of the united states economy lump sum payments and profit sharing plans became increasingly prevalent in union contracts in the u s economy in the 1980s this paper analyzes the relationship between lump sums profit sharing labor costs and employment in firm level panel data for the union sector of the u s economy in general the firm level data suggest that profit sharing has a statistically significant effect of lowering labor cost growth profit sharing also appears to increase employment growth and reduce employment variability but these results are not statistically significant this evidence is generally consistent with hypotheses regarding the introduction of performance related pay weitzman 1984 and 1985 the effects of lump sums on the other hand are not consistent with hypotheses regarding performance related pay lump sums do not appear to lower labor cost growth or increase employment growth and increase rather than decrease employment variability copyright 1993 by royal economic society

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect