reducing the mean supply delay of spare parts using lateral transshipments policies lateral transshipment has been studied lately as a promising policy for increasing the performances of multi echelon spare parts inventory system by lateral transshipment spare parts can be moved from one location with excess inventory to another location at the same echelon in shortage with the aim of reducing supply delays of spare parts this paper will examine the relative effectiveness of two lateral shipments approaches in reducing the mean supply delay msd of a non repairable item with respect to a classical policy of no lateral shipments a simulation model of a two echelon supply network has been implemented and an experiment has been performed by varying different parameters of the supply network such as the number of warehouses locations at the lower echelon the supply lead time from the central depot the spare parts demand uncertainty and the size variability of the warehouses results show appreciable reductions of msd when lateral shipments are allowed with respect to the classical policy in almost every network configuration

labor supply of husbands and wives a simultaneous equations approach labor supply functions for married men and women are formulated as a dynamic simultaneous equations system which is estimated using panel data controlling for fixed individual effects allows marginal labor supply responses to be disentangled from permanent patterns in hours worked due to assortative mating the results suggest that the labor supply of husbands and wives without pre school children is not jointly determined in the short run while families with young children exhibit strong interactions in work hours and negative cross earnings effects neither the joint utility model of family labor supply nor an ad hoc traditional family model is supported by these results the data are for the united states and concern 381 couples from the denver income maintenance experiment excerpt

a test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to the bell system stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0002 8282 28198409 2974 3a4 3c615 3aatfsot 3e2 0 co 3b2 rthe american economic review is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon jul 2 16 52 19 2007

optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences with the standard non linear income taxation framework with heterogeneity of preferences in this paper the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined it is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment participation is mandatory and administrative costs are negligible imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals under either case it is never optimal to impose workfare on these individuals it is also shown that non productive workfare can be an e cient policy tool in contrast to the results found in besley and coate 1995 brett 1998 and beaudry and blackorby 1997 jel classification h21 h23 optimalite du workfare en presence de preferences heterogenes l auteur examine l timalite du workfare en tant qu instrument de tamisage a l aide du cadre conceptuel traditionnel d imposition non lineaire des revenus en presence de preferences heterogenes on postule que le workfare n est pas un processus d investissement en capital humain que la participatioun est obligatoire et que les couts d administration sont negligeables quand on postule aussi des utilites cardinales differentes pour les individus il devient possible pour le gouvernement de redistribuer optimalement les revenus en faveur ou au detriment des individus pour qui le travail a une tres grande desutilite dans l un et l autre cas on montre que le workfare n est jamais une politique optimale on montre aussi que le workfare dans des activites non productives peut etre un instrument de politique publique e cient contrairement a ce qu a rment besley et coate 1995 brett 1998 et beaudry et blackorby 1997

optimal tax theory the journey from the negative income tax to the earned income tax credit what lessons do we learn from optimal tax theory for the design of income redistribution programs i modify a standard model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with discrete types to consider differences in both earning ability and the disutility of effort this gives a role for workfare in the optimal tax policy the existence of screening mechanisms can play a role in explaining nonparticipation in cash and in kind redistribution programs including progresa oportunidades lifeline telephone subsidies and the special supplemental nutrition program for women infants and children wic stigma can increase efficiency of a redistribution program by discouraging participation by individuals near the eligibility thresholds the family assistance program proposed in the early 1970s lacked adequate stigma for nonworkers which contributed to a lack of political support in contrast the current earned income tax credit eitc provides greater benefits to workers than to nonworkers thus the eitc does not require any stigma to screen out individuals who do not work from obtaining benefits reasons for separate income support programs for nonworkers and for workers are discussed

applied general equilibrium models of taxation and international trade an introduction and survey we wish to acknowledge the help of three referees and of john pencavel on several earlier drafts as well as the assistance of the modelers whose work is referred to in the paper they corrected our lack of understanding of their work and provided many other helpful comments excellent research and bibliographical assistance have been provided by debbie fretz radwan shaban and janet stotsky helpful comments have been made by charles ballard michael boskin lans bovenberg sylvester damus harvey galper glenn harrison gordon lenjosek jack mutti serena ng t n srinivasan charles stuart and eric toder the authors also acknowledgefinancial support from the national bureau of economic research the national science foundation international business machines and the social sciences and humanities research council ottawa canada

policy watch the marriage penalty many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage for example many couples pay higher income taxes when married than their combined tax liabilities as single filers while many other couples receive a marriage subsidy because their joint taxes fall with marriage likewise most low income couples are eligible for higher welfare benefits if they are separated rather than married this article discusses the marriage penalty with a particular focus on tax and transfer programs why does it exist who faces it to what extent does it affect marriage and labor market behavior what tradeoffs are involved in reducing it

does work pay in france monetary incentives hours constraints and the guaranteed minimum income abstract this paper uses a representative sample of individuals on france s main welfare program the revenu minimum d insertion or rmi to estimate monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients based on the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially offered to each individual we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed manner relating these gains to observed employment we then estimate a simple structural labor supply model we find that potential gains are almost always positive but very small on average especially for single mothers because of the high implicit marginal tax rates embedded in the system employment rates are sensitive to incentives with extensive margin elasticities for both men and women usually below one conditional on these elasticities simulations indicate that existing policies devoted to reducing marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution such as the interessement earnings top up program have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope the negative income tax prime pour l emploi seems to be an exception

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

investigating recent trends in the u s teen birth rate we investigate trends in the u s rate of teen childbearing between 1981 and 2010 focusing specifically on the sizable decline since 1991 we focus on establishing the role of state level demographic changes economic conditions and targeted policies in driving recent aggregate trends we offer three main observations first the recent decline cannot be explained by the changing racial and ethnic composition of teens second the only targeted policies that have had a statistically discernible impact on aggregate teen birth rates are declining welfare benefits and expanded access to family planning services through medicaid but these policies can account for only 12 6 percent of the observed decline since 1991 third higher unemployment rates lead to lower teen birth rates and can account for 16 percent of the decline in teen birth rates since the great recession began

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

transfers in cash and in kind theory meets the data we review theoretical explanations for in kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence after reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self targeting we then discuss the large literature on in kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the samaritan s dilemma pecuniary effects credit constraints asymmetric information amongst agents and political economy considerations our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases political economy considerations must also be part of the story

single mothers and their children evaluating a work encouraging welfare reform abstract using rich administrative data from norway we evaluate a 1998 work encouraging reform targeted at single parents we especially focus on educational performance for the children of the involved single mothers for these children average school grades at age 16 dropped significantly by 0 7 of a standard deviation per additional year that their mothers were exposed to the reform furthermore we find that the reform affected single mothers by increasing their working hours and thereby reducing their time at home we find no average effect on disposable income mothers traded off reductions in benefits with increases in earnings thus reduced parental time at home seems to be the main mechanism for the observed moderate drop in children s grades in line with this we find that the reform increased the use of formal after school care and we find a larger reform effect for children of mothers with no informal network to help with child care

stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment abstract this paper discusses a family of two stage decentralized inventory problems using a unifying framework taxonomy depicted as a multilevel graph this framework allows us to model and link different problems of competing retailers who independently procure inventory in response to uncertain demand and anticipated inventory decisions of other retailers in this family of problems in the ex post stage the retailers exercise recourse actions in response to the realized demand and competitors chosen procurement levels for example retailers could coordinate inventory transshipment to satisfy shortage with overage based on profit sharing agreements our framework provides a unifying parsimonious view using a single methodological prism for a variety of problems equally importantly as recourse options are laid out our framework clarifies and contributes a modeling connection between problems in a clear taxonomy of models this unifying perspective explicitly links work that appeared in isolation and offers future research directions

existence of coordinating transshipment prices in a two location inventory model we consider a two location production inventory model where each location makes production decisions and is subject to uncertain capacity each location optimizes its own profits transshipment at a cost is allowed from one location to another we focus on the question of whether one can globally set a pair of coordinating transshipment prices i e payments that each party has to make to the other for the transshipped goods that induce the local decision makers to make inventory and transshipment decisions that are globally optimal a recent paper suggests for a special case of our model that there always exists a unique pair of coordinating transshipment prices we demonstrate through a counterexample that this statement is not correct and derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which it would hold we show that in some conditions coordinating prices may exist for only a narrow range of problem parameters and explore conditions when this can happen finally we study the effects of demand and capacity variability on the magnitude of coordinating transshipment prices

welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences work requirements in means tested transfer programmes have grown in importance in the us and in some other countries the theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximised here we consider a case where society instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients optimality of work requirements is shown to be possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements numerical simulations show that accuracy must be high for optimality earnings subsidies may also be optimal work requirements in means tested or welfare programmes have seen a resurgence in the last twenty years in the us and in a few european countries these requirements generally stipulate that benefit recipients must work or engage in some work like activity for some minimum number of hours each week most economists who have studied the

modelling cost structure the bell system revisited this paper analyses a recent public policy decision and the crucial role played by the choice of the functional form the break up of the bell system is indeed a classic case of anti trust settlement and constitutes one of the most prominent and controversial applications of microeconomics to public policy it is argued that demanding multi output cost properties such as economies of scope for this is the considerable robustness problem displayed by the tranlog cost functional form the reason for this is the considerable able to robustness problem displayed by the translog cost function which is the source underlying many of the expert disagreements it is suggested that the non robustness is due to what ils termed the flip flop property and it is shown that the available empirical evidence from the pre divestiture bell system supports this argument to obtain robust results we propose that the analysis is constrained to the proper region of the cost function we propose that the analysis is con

repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations abstract we study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments in every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization after observing the actual demand each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period while in a single shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals we show that it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times we also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers order quantities and discount factors when n is large finally we provide conditions under which a system optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers and develop a contract for achieving a system optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied

a three stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers we present and study a three stage model of a decentralized distribution system consisting ofn retailers each of whom faces a stochastic demand for an identical product in the first stage before the demand is realized each retailer independently orders her initial inventory in the second stage after the demand is realized each retailer decides how much of her residual supply demand she wants to share with the other retailers in the third stage residual inventories are transshipped to meet residual demands and an additional profit is allocated our model is an extension of the two stage model of anupindi et al abz 2001 which implicitly assumes that all residuals enter the transshipment stage we show however that allocation rules in the third stage based on dual solutions which were used in the abz model may induce the retailers to hold back some of their residual supply demand in general we study the effect of implementing various allocations rules in the third stage on the values of the residual supply demand the retailers are willing to share with others in the second stage and the trade off involved in achieving an optimal solution for the corresponding centralized system

on reforming the welfare system abstract using a simulation model for a small open economy quebec 1986 various negative income tax nit and workfare schemes are compared from the point of view of efficiency and equity the main finding is that there exist workfare schemes that are superior both to the quebec regime of 1986 and to a nit characterized by a 100 percent implicit tax rate however these workfare schemes are dominated by some nit programs this suggests that it may be necessary to have work requirements that vary across socio demographic classes for a workfare plan to be superior to any nit combining workfare with an nit could also be the prescription

the rate of return to the high scope perry preschool program abstract this paper estimates the rate of return to the highscope perry preschool program an early intervention program targeted toward disadvantaged african american youth estimates of the rate of return to the perry program are widely cited to support the claim of substantial economic benefits from preschool education programs previous studies of the rate of return to this program ignore the compromises that occurred in the randomization protocol they do not report standard errors the rates of return estimated in this paper account for these factors we conduct an extensive analysis of sensitivity to alternative plausible assumptions estimated annual social rates of return generally fall between 7 and 10 with most estimates substantially lower than those previously reported in the literature however returns are generally statistically significantly different from zero for both males and females and are above the historical return on equity estimated benefit to cost ratios support this conclusion

a coordinating contract for transshipment in a two company supply chain we study a supply chain with two independent companies producing an identical product and cooperating through transshipment previous studies of this chain show that only under certain conditions linear transshipment prices could be found that induce the companies to choose the first best production quantities moreover even if such transshipment prices do exist they result in a unique division of total expected profit and thus they cannot accommodate arbitrary divisions of the profit using the generalized nash bargaining solution we derive coordinating transshipment prices that always give rise to a coordinating contract for the chain this contract relies on an implicit pricing mechanism

assistance to the poor in a federal system abstract this paper explores the roles of different levels of government in assisting the poor using a model incorporating utility interdependence the paper first presents some theoretical results indicating how levels of poor relief vary with the extent of mobility of the poor under both centralized and decentralized systems of support it then provides a survey of the empirical work on migration of the poor along with a brief historical discussion of the experience under the english poor laws the concluding section turns to normative issues and contends that mobility of the poor is a basic source of inefficiency in wholly decentralized systems of support this inefficiency along with certain other equity considerations establishes a role for the central government in assistance to the poor

newsvendor models for innovative products with one shot decision theory abstract in this paper newsvendor problems for innovative products are analyzed because the product is new no relevant historical data is available for statistical demand analysis instead of using the probability distribution the possibility distribution is utilized to characterize the uncertainty of the demand we consider products whose life cycles are expected to be smaller than the procurement lead times determining optimal order quantities of such products is a typical one shot decision problem for a retailer therefore newsvendor models for innovative products are proposed based on the one shot decision theory osdt the main contributions of this research are as follows the general solutions of active passive apprehensive and daring focus points and optimal alternatives are proposed and the existence theorem is established in the one shot decision theory a simple and effective approach for identifying the possibility distribution is developed newsvendor models with four types of focus points are built managerial insights into the behaviors of different types of retailers are gained by the theoretical analysis the proposed models are scenario based decision models which provide a fundamental alternative to analyze newsvendor problems for innovative products

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

cost structure and technological change of local public transport the kaohsiung city bus case this study has developed a translog cost function for the kaohsiung city bus kcb to analyse its cost structure and economic characteristics based on monthly data over the time period from january 1996 to december 2000 the empirical results reveal that economies of density in the provision of bus services in kaohsiung do prevail the estimated marginal cost which is less than the average cost but greater than the current bus fare indicates that the subsidy is necessary due to the existence of returns to density rtd the kcb could obtain cost saving benefits by extending its output scale the kcb production technology is also not neutral the effects of technological change on the kcb costs suggest that over the period 1996 2000 technological progress did lead to cost saving the pure productivity growth rate increased from 0 45 in 1998 to 3 in 2000

unnatural monopolies in local telephone we attempt to overcome the serious data problems of past telecommunications cost studies by focusing on local exchange carriers lecs with enough degrees offreedom to yield precise estimates our global subadditivity tests show that the cost function is definitely not subadditive the results suggest that the benefits to breaking up the monopoly outputs of existing lecs substantially outweigh the potential losses in efficiency they also support permitting entry and increasing competition in local exchange markets furthermore given the competitive nature of long distance service it is doubtful that the predivestiture bell system was a natural monopoly

decentralized welfare will there be underprovision abstract this paper develops an asymmetric nash equilibrium model of welfare provision by states when the benefit payment is a local public good and a fixed population of welfare recipients distributes itself between states with logistic migration function the model shows that state size is an important demand shifter across states because it alters the supply elasticity of recipients the model provides estimates of how the degree of benefit under provision varies with this migration elasticity other demand instruments such as taxpayer resources and generosity likewise generate positive correlation between benefits and recipients while supply shifters generate negative correlation between benefits and recipients the model s predictions are closely matched empirically when examining the reduced form impact of these instruments on the pattern of welfare benefits and recipients across states using these impacts to assign the instruments to either supply or demand sides of the model it is possible to estimate the model s structural elasticities these turn out to be high enough so that simulated solutions to the model generate considerable welfare underprovision and thus raise concern about a race to the bottom with decentralized control over afdc

the negative income tax and the evolution of u s welfare policy the negative income tax proposed by milton friedman represents one of the fundamental ideas of modern welfare policy however the academic literature has raised two difficulties with it one challenging its purported work incentives and the other suggesting the possible superiority of work requirements in addition work requirement approaches have gained ground in actual u s welfare policy over the last 30 years and the number of different programs has proliferated another development counter to the negative income tax on the other hand the earned income tax credit has produced a negative income tax like program on a vast scale

a problem with the negative income tax abstract the goal of a negative income tax is to increase the work incentives of welfare recipients this note points out that it may not do so and empirical simulations show that this is a real world possibility

utility based estimation of labour supply functions in the regular and irregular sectors recent theoretical work on labor supply has shown that the tax and transfer system can induce some individuals to work in the irregular labor market models designed to represent such behavior are unable to sign unambiguously the impact of the marginal tax rate as well as many key exogenous parameters on the hours supplied in the irregular market except under strong restrictions on preferences in this paper the authors estimate a simultaneous labor supply model that allows testing some of the more common assumptions found in the literature using a unique data set on the underground economy of the metropolitan area of quebec city canada estimates of elasticities with respect to predetermined variables are presented moreover they test and empirically reject the assumptions of perfect substitution between regular and irregular work activities as well as additive separability of the utility function copyright 1992 by royal economic society

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

optimal policies for inventory systems with lateral transshipments using lateral transshipments can be beneficial in order to improve service levels and to reduce system costs this paper deals with a single echelon inventory system with two identical locations demands are generated by stationary and independent poisson processes in general if a demand occurs at a location and there is no stock on hand the demand is assumed to be backordered or lost however in this paper lateral transshipments serve as an emergency supply in case of stock out in this paper the rule for lateral transshipments is given while the ordering policies for normal replenishments are optimized the transshipment rule is to always transship when there is a shortage at one location and stock on hand at the other first we assume that the locations apply r q policies for normal replenishments and show that the optimal policies are not necessarily symmetric even though the locations are identical this means that one cannot in general assume that the optimal policy is symmetric under symmetric assumptions second we relax the assumption of r q policies and derive the optimal replenishment policy using stochastic dynamic programming

decomposing technical change within the conventional neoclassical framework a distinction is sometimes made between productaugmenting and factor augmenting technical change a parallel distinction is commonly made between embodied and disembodied technical change with the former associated with factor and the latter with product augmentation disembodied change is commonly assumed to arise from increases in the stock of knowledge independently of the characteristics of the inputs used while embodied change relates to increases in the efficiency of inputs that is labor skills or the productivity of physical capital unfortunately this distinction is ambiguous changes in the efficiency of the inputs used are usually accompanied indeed made possible by increases in knowledge and conversely increases in the stock of knowledge often favor some inputs more than others including the capital goods of one vintage relative to those of another notwithstanding the ambiguity the concept of embodiment has intuitive appeal and this partly explains the focus on decomposing the sources of technical change that followed solow s 6 seminal paper but by the late 1960s a reader of the literature might have concluded that such decomposition was impossible for with merely time series data on inputs and output product augmenting and factor augmenting technical change are empirically indistinguishable in an important paper hall 3 showed that with data on used equipment prices and the interest rate embodied technical change and the deterioration function can in principle be calculated however the paucity of data on the price of used capital goods has allowed little progress in this direction the new longitudinal research database created by the u s bureau of the census now permits still another approach to the estimation of embodied technical change associated

labour and capital saving technical change in telecommunications the australian telecommunications sector is being improved and extended through substantial recent investment in intelligent technology such as digital switching fibre optics satellite and cellular transmission and the internet these technologies are being progressively integrated with technology from the broadcasting computer and electronics industries providing a unified information infrastructure for information transmission and processing technological progress embodied in new equipment has the effect of increasing the efficiency of the factors of production such efficiency increases can be biased towards a particular factor for instance the impact of labour augmenting technical change is a decline in the cost of labour per unit of production when such biases are apparent the relativity between the costs of labour and capital per unit of production is changed in the longer term technical change can impact on the rate of employment growth and also on the rate of capital accumulation in th

the design of income maintenance programmes this paper provides a comprehensive treatment of a basic income maintenance problem for a group of individuals who differ in their income generating abilities it stresses the impact that imperfect information about such abilities has on programme design the analysis serves two purposes first we are able to unify the theoretical literature on the income maintenance problem second we examine the impact of allowing the government to impose workfare on recipients of income support in addition to being of policy interest this is a theoretically challenging problem since it requires solving a multi dimensional screening problem the solution that we find is strikingly simple it separates the poor into two categories with the lower income groups subject to workfare while facing a 100 marginal tax rate on earnings the second group does no public work and is offered a benefit schedule which taxes earnings at a lower rate

negative income taxes inequality and poverty we use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit demogrant we show that changing the demogrant to output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income specifically we find that increasing the demogrant to output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty all measured in terms of post tax total income however these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output

work incentives in the afdc system an analysis of the 1981 reforms the road to welfare reform increasingly appears to be one of the rockier paths the united states has traversed indeed by all outward appearances it is not even clear whether the current path runs uphill or downhill as far as work incentives in the welfare system are concerned economists of all political persuasions from milton friedman to james tobin have agreed that the uphill direction is that which leads to lower tax rates i e lower benefit reduction rates however as with free trade the near unanimity of opinion among economists has strangely only occasionally persuaded a majority of the nation s representatives to vote to go uphill the legislative history so illustrates from 1935 when the aid to families with dependent children afdc program was enacted to the 1967 social security amendments the tax rate in the program was 100 percent that is benefits were reduced by one dollar for every extra dollar earned with the 1967 amendments congress lowered the tax rate to 67 percent and in the heady atmosphere of the 1960 s it was expected that further progress in this direction would be made and that the tax rate would be lowered further indeed the family assistance plan subsequently proposed by president nixon would have lowered tax rates however the legislation passed the house but not the senate the ford administration considered welfare reform proposals internally but never proposed legislation while the carter administration proposed a massive welfare reform plan that met with no legislative success welfare reform was finally achieved in 1981 when the omnibus budget reconciliation act obra was enacted but obra increased the tax rate back to 100 percent the level prevailing prior to 1967 in retrospect it appears that 1967 marked the end not the beginning of legislative progress on work incentives in the welfare system in this paper i shall report the results of recent research that complicates the issue considerably by questioning whether lower tax rates do in fact provide work incentives the findings themselves seesaw not unlike the path of welfare reform itself first on a theoretical basis it appears that lower tax rates in a welfare program do not necessarily increase labor supply in the low income population as a whole contrary to the conventional wisdom in fact it also appears that members of the reagan administration were aware of this all along well in advance of the economics profession this theoretical ambiguity has fairly fundamental implications for the work incentive issue in welfare reform second nevertheless the empirical resolution of the ambiguity provided by existing econometric estimates in the labor supply literature and by estimates of the effect of afdc on labor supply indicates that a lower tax rate would indeed increase labor supply in the low income population as a whole and that a higher tax rate would decrease it thus the conventional wisdom is correct even though based upon an incorrect tdiscussants henry aaron the brookings institution and university of maryland harold watts columbia university edward gramlich university of michigan

income inequality and early nonmarital childbearing using individual level data from the united states we empirically investigate the role of lower tail income inequality in determining rates of early nonmarital childbearing among low socioeconomic status ses women we present robust evidence that young low ses women are more likely to have a nonmarital birth when they live in places with larger lower tail income inequality all else held constant we calculate that differences in the level of inequality are able to explain a sizeable share of the geographic variation in teen fertility rates we propose a model of adolescent decision making that facilitates the interpretation of our results

imperfect tagging in social insurance programs abstract this paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or tag imperfectly identifies those unable to work with a two sided classification error the optimal program is a dual work incentive system with a work non work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status it includes premiums to program eligible individuals who work a price missing in the u s social security disability system and in earlier attempts to characterize the optimal disability program

the trade off between equality and efficiency this paper uses a 1976 microdata base to estimate the marginal cost of reducing income inequality with a policy that has distributional effects similar to the present tax transfer system the analysis uses a simulation methodology in which only the labor supply effects are evaluated other behavioral effects are ignored the most striking finding is that marginal cost is quite high even for modest labor supply elasticities for example in the benchmark case with a weighted average economy wide uncompensated wage elasticity of 0 2 and compensated elasticity of 0 31 the disposable money income of upper income quintiles of households is depressed by 9 51 for each dollar increase in the disposable money income of lower income quintiles when income equivalent values that take account of the value of leisure are compared the marginal cost for this case is estimated to be 3 49

growth accounting when technical change is embodied in capital this paper revisits the hypothesis that technical change is embodied in capital it extends old results to make them more relevant to the contemporary debates about the adjustment of investment goods for quality change and about the role of embodied technical change as a source of economic growth it is shown that the failure to adjust capital for quality change has the effect of suppressing the quality effects into the conventional total factor productivity residual and it is found that approximately 20 percent of the residual growth of quality adjusted output could be attributed to embodied technical change copyright 1992 by american economic association

welfare reform and the race to the bottom theory and evidence economists have argued that welfare migration leads to a race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits although a system of federal matching grants can remedy this problem the recent welfare reform law replaced the existing matching grant structure with block grants a policy change that appears undesirable to judge whether this critique of welfare reform is justified this paper evaluates the evidence in favor of a race to the bottom after explaining the theoretical effects of welfare migration the paper surveys the empirical evidence on the occurrence of such migration concluding that the evidence is mixed the discussion also considers recent empirical tests for strategic interaction which show that benefit levels in nearby states affect a given state s benefit choice the most plausible source of such interaction is a concern about welfare migration which leads policymakers to look at benefits in neighboring states when making their own choices judging that the evidence appears consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom the paper concludes that the demise of matching grants may be undesirable from a policy perspective

nit picking the macroeconomic effects of a negative income tax i study a revenue neutral reform of the u s income tax and welfare system that involves the adoption of a negative income tax nit the reform is undertaken in a life cycle economy with individual heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk the optimal nit consists of a 22 rate and a transfer equivalent to 11 of per capita gdp the ex ante average welfare gain is a 2 1 annual increase of individual consumption i show that a nit outperforms a flat tax reform income tax plus deduction by a considerable margin the key consequence of the reform is that high productivity agents increase their relative importance in the labor supply at the expense of low productivity agents