media scrutiny and the quality of public officials i investigate whether attempts by the media to determine a candidate s fitness for office lowers the average quality of public officials what i call the media scrutiny paradox media scrutiny imperfectly signals heterogeneous candidates type but imposes privacy costs and reputational costs on politicians the quality of office holders falls if the selection effect is adverse and outweighs the screening effect a low quality information signal which could result if the media focus on irrelevant aspects of behavior makes the screening effect small and the media paradox more likely to hold individuals of good character might invest more in their reputation and have more at stake from being falsely identified as a rapscallion the actual malice standard established in new york times v sullivan likely increased relatively the cost of candidacy for good people and lowered the quality of officials

term limits and pork barrel politics abstract we develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re election decisions we characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare contributions of our paper include we detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes pork provision transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents especially incumbents in small or poor districts pork provision can explain why re election probabilities in congress exceed those for governors term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision we characterize the welfare of all voters not just the median voter

structural factors in the economic reforms of china eastern europe and the former soviet union reform in china and russia jeffrey sachs and wing thye woo china s experience does not show that gradual reform is superior to the shock therapy undertaken in eastern europe and the former soviet union eefsu differing performance primarily reflects different economic structures prior to reform china was a peasant agricultural society eefsu was urban and overindustrialized in both jobs in state enterprises were so heavily subsidized that workers refused to move to new industries elsewhere even when productivity in the latter was much higher in eefsu the large state sector impeded structural adjustment curtailing subsidies would have produced many losers who used their power to resist this outcome failure to curtail subsidies then cut off the potential supply of labour and other factors to new emerging firms china s state enterprises have not performed as well as the rest of the chinese economy and do not explain its success rapid growth was possible because the large agricultural sector contained vast surplus labour and did not enjoy subsidies and soft budget constraints once constraints on migration across regions and jobs were removed this labour was available to fuel expansion in new industries unlike the distributional conflict in eefsu in china reallocation of labour allowed all groups to gain in both partial liberalization also unleashed macroeconomic pressures manageable in china because of rapid growth and adequate monetary policy but explosive in much of eefsu because of deeper structural problems and gross monetary mismanagement

strikes and political activism of trade unions theory and application to bangladesh the behavior of bangladeshi trade unions is characterized bypolitical activism and momentous strikes called hartalsthere have played a crucial part in most political changes inthis country we offer a theoretical framework for discussingthis fact and we test empirically its main prediction bybringing out the political cycle that characterizes theoccurrence of strikes in bangladesh

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

why haven t developing countries privatized deeper and faster abstract despite a decade of privatization in the developing world the vast majority of state owned enterprise soe assets continue to be in government hands bureaucrats in business world bank 1995 correctly identifies politics as one reason for the slow pace of privatization but it underestimates the role of institutional and economic constraints success stories of privitization are rare in low income countries and the long term promise of privatization in sectors posing regulatory complications remains to be established countries in crisis may reform soes quickly and deeply despite these uncertainties but others may opt for gradual reform which need not be altogether bad if speedy privatization results in poorly conceived schemes the cure can be worse than the illness finally bureaucrats are likely to stay in business for years to come and therefore it is important to improve their effectiveness in the roles they are unlikely to shed in the future a market friendly approach to soe reform need not be government un friendly

term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections abstract i analyze equilibria of a dynamic political agency model of elections with a two period term limit in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in equilibrium office holders policy choices are ordered by type politicians exert positive effort in the first term of office and as politicians become highly office motivated the highest politician type mixes with positive probability between shirking and choosing arbitrarily high policies nevertheless the commitment problem of voters imposes a bound on equilibrium expected effort exerted by politicians that holds uniformly across the level of office benefit and the rate of time discounting in particular when politicians are highly office motivated voters are too demanding in equilibrium and voter welfare would increase if it were possible to commit to a lower cutoff for re election

mass privatization state capacity and economic growth in post communist countries why did the transition from socialism to capitalism result in improved growth in some countries and significant economic decline in others scholars have advanced three main arguments 1 successful countries rapidly implemented neoliberal policies 2 failures were not due to poli cies but to poor institutional environments and 3 policies were counterproductive because they damaged the state we present a state centered theory and empirically demonstrate for the first time one of several possible mechanisms linking neoliberal policies to poor economic performance mass privatization programs where implemented created a massive fiscal shock for post communist governments thereby undermining the development of private sector gover nance institutions and severely exacerbating the transformational recession we performed cross national panel regressions for a sample of 25 post communist countries between 1990 and 2000 and found that mass privatization programs negatively affected economic growth state capacity and property rights protection we further tested these findings with firm level data from a rep resentative survey of managers in 3 550 companies operating in 24 post communist countries within countries that implemented mass privatized programs newly privatized firms were sub stantially less likely to engage in industrial restructuring but considerably more likely to use bar ter and accumulate tax arrears than their state owned counterparts

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

beyond privatization institutional innovation and growth in china s large state owned enterprises abstract this article demonstrates that china s large state owned enterprises soes are not stagnant fossils waiting to die under economic reform policies this sector has undergone large change due to enhanced enterprise autonomy the impact of market forces rapid growth of domestic demand for upstream products strategic integration with the world economy and the state s policy to promote large businesses china s large soes are developing new institutional forms that do not neatly fit into existing patterns china is experimentally changing its institutions through a combination of central policy local initiative and interaction with international investment this presents a challenge to the transitional orthodoxy and to ideas concerning property rights in development economics there is not a universal model of property rights and government action that works best in all circumstances china s experience with the reform of large soes shows the diverse possibilities for effective industrial institutions

scheduling the production of several items with random demands in a single facility consider the problem of scheduling the production of several items in a single facility that can produce only one item at a time this problem occurs since it is often economic to produce several items in a single facility the objective is to reduce the long run average holding backorder and setup costs we assume that demands are random with constant expected rates we allow backorders and charge holding and backlogging costs at linear time weighted rates items are produced at continuous constant rates setup times and setup costs are item dependent constants these parameters however are independent of the order of setups a real time scheduling tool is developed in three steps first with demands replaced by their expectations we compute an optimal or near optimal target cyclic schedule next we study the problem of scheduling the facility after a single disruption perturbs the inventories the goal is to recover the target cyclic schedule at minimal excess over the average cost of the cyclic schedule we formulate this as a control problem and obtain a linear recovery policy that is optimal for a large configuration of disruptions finally we select safety stocks to minimize the long run average cost of following the target schedule with the recovery policy we show that optimal safety stocks are unique and have the property that in the long run the proportion of time that an item is in stock is the ratio of backorder to holding plus backorder cost we present an example that integrates the cyclic schedule the control policy and the safety stocks

determination of safety stocks for cyclic schedules with stochastic demands abstract this paper considers the problem of scheduling the production of multiple items each with random demand on a single facility we show how the variance in demand during lead time can be estimated and present a model for determination of safety stocks and order up to levels for a fixed cyclic sequence both with and without idle time for systems with idle time we present a control model to make the decision to produce next item in sequence or idle the facility the performance of the model is tested in a simulation study

good types in authoritarian elections the selectoral connection in chinese local congresses a new electoral design for subnational congress elections in china allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter s agency relationship with politicians borrowing from the literature on political selection i theorize that authoritarian elections can nonetheless solve the adverse selection problem chinese voters can use their electoral power to select good types with personal qualities that signal they will reliably represent local interests i analyze original data from a survey of 4 071 chinese local congressmen and women including voter nominees and communist party nominees i find that voters do in fact overcome coordination difficulties to nominate and elect good types in contacting politicians about local problems after the elections however voters hedge their bets by contacting regime insiders too at these very local levels congressional representation by means of

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

the incumbency effects of signalling much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re election choosing actions to signal their types to voters we identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling because incumbents only care about clearing a re election hurdle signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re election this generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election we also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit

jockeying for position what it means and why it matters to regional development policy when places compete malecki e j 2004 jockeying for position what it means and why it matters to regional development policy when places compete regional studies38 1093 1112 the realization that places compete for investment has expanded in recent years to encompass competition among places for the attention of migrants tourists and media glow as well as investment the most competitive places have been multidimensional in their attractions and have made the transition to the knowledge based economy the latest priority is being placed on attracting mobile workers and mobile investment creative workers are the core of the knowledge economy and of its geographies such as intelligent places and learning regions knowledge metrics innovation indices and report cards are increasingly common each seemingly developed to sort the list of places in a different order lists or league tables of the best places for business to live retire and visit are key features of economies and societies whose factors of success

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

bureaucrats in business chinese style the lessons of market reform and state entrepreneurialism in the people s republic of china in the 1990s parts of the state bureaucracy in china have been setting up new profit seeking risk taking businesses some of these businesses are entrepreneurial rather than rent seeking and are an unplanned and unanticipated development in china s market oriented economic reforms what are the lessons of this phenomenon for the developing world state entrepreneurialism may create problems such as reduced government control over departmental finance loss of state assets and uneven provision of services it is nevertheless an innovative solution to the politically difficult problem of bureaucratic restructuring and confounds the development orthodoxy fostered by neoliberalism that states will resist market reform it also demonstrates that to understand fully the politics of market reform we must research the activities of subcentral state bureaucrats as well as central leaders and policymakers

large firms and industrial reform in former planned economies the case of china in china s industrial reform alongside the much studied dynamism of small industries there has been a simultaneous powerful growth of large scale state industry state planning has played an important role in this process through heavy protection from international competition and support for selected enterprises which it was hoped would benefit from economies of scale and scope these enterprises have undergone gradual institutional change with growing foreign investment and slow movement towards multiplant operation this process is one in which there are emerging institutions resembling the modern business corporation albeit with specific chinese features c 1996 academic press limited copyright 1996 by oxford university press

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

toward an economic model of the japanese firm i owe a great deal to professor moses abramovitz who suggested that i write this article i appreciate his constant encouragement and guidance which aided me throughout its preparation i am also indebted to three anonymous referees of the journal and to professors ryutaro komiya and michael riordan for their critical comments and helpful suggestions needless to say i am solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper

economic lot scheduling heuristic for random demands abstract an extension to the economic lot scheduling problem is given for a single machine multi product line under random demands the goal is to find the length of production cycles that minimizes the sum of setup and inventory holding costs per unit of time and satisfies the demand for each product at the required service level first the single product finite replenishment inventory model is extended to the case of random demand then a heuristic procedure uses this extension to determine the production cycles for the multi product case computational results and comparisons with other models are reviewed

accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do this paper is the first a to apply a clean empirical design to study whether t

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

privatization in the united kingdom lessons from experience abstract although the reasons for privatization vary across countries in the united kingdom as in other countries it also reflects a renewed belief in market forces the search for policy options that emerges from this renewal however needs to be tempered by an understanding of market as well as regulatory failures although problems facing government enterprises in developed and developing countries may differ the objective of privatization should be to reconstruct these enterprises so as to create conditions that make private sector operations effective and efficient at the same time one should recognize that this may require continued public sector activity in the sector

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

competence and ideology we develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence voters observe an incumbent s valence and policy choices but only know the challenger s party our model provides a rich set of novel results in contrast to existing predictions from static models we prove that dynamic considerations make higher valence incumbents more likely to compromise and win re election even though they compromise to more extreme policies consequently we find that the correlation between valence and extremist policies rises with office holder seniority this result may help explain previous empirical findings despite this result we establish that the whole electorate gains from improvements in the distribution of valences in contrast fixing average valence the greater dispersion in valence associated with a high valence political elite always benefits the median voter but can harm a majority of voters when voters are sufficiently risk averse we then consider interest groups igs or activists who search for candidates with better skills we derive a complete theoretical explanation for the intuitive conjectures that policies are more extreme when igs and activists have more extreme ideologies and that such extremism reduces the welfare of all voters

economic development in shanghai and the role of the state this article examines the economic development process underlying shanghai s rapid urban transformation in the 1990s it analyses the key factors that have contributed to the economic development there and assesses critically the role of the state in this process it concludes that the sheer scale of investment and the national contexts rather than far sighted economic management at the local level are the keys to its economic success the article further argues that the prevailing views regarding the local state market relationship in shanghai need to be revised beneath the facade of a proactive and omnipotent state are numerous instances of failure and ineffectiveness moreover the market is much more than a tool in the state s decision making it is a growing force that the state is trying hard to control but with increasing difficulties

reform in eastern europe how can the new governments of eastern europe succeed in moving from centrally planned to freemarket economies this incisive report identifies and describes the major policy choices to be made and discusses what will work and what will not reform in eastern europe provides a comprehensive easily read statement of reform policy that stands in the mainstream of modern western economics based on their experience with stabilization policies in other countries the authors show how eastern europe can reduce unemployment during the painful adjustment process create effective and socially acceptable mechanisms to subject enterprises to market discipline and replace barter trade under cmea with market based international trade

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

territorial competition in china and the west chien s s and gordon i territorial competition in china and the west regional studies in modern western societies and most other economies to which it has spread territorial economic competition is associated with a combination of competitive electoral politics and private land ownership in mainland china however a very strong form of this competition has emerged without either of these supports in general the development of such local collective action and its particular effects reflect an interaction between materially interested local agents and structural pressures the difference in china is that these agents are principally local government leaders whose career prospects within a still centralized system depend upon performance in terms of economic criteria set from above chien s s et gordon i la competition territoriale en chine et dans l ouest regional studies dans les societes occidentales d aujourd hui et dans la plupart des autres economies auxquelles elle s est etendue la

electoral accountability and responsive democracy we consider a canonical two period model of elections with adverse selection hidden preferences and moral hazard hidden actions in which neither voters nor politicians can commit to future choices we prove existence of electoral equilibria and we show that office holders mix between taking it easy and going for broke in the first period even in the presence of a finite horizon we establish that increasing office motivation leads to arbitrarily high expected policy outcomes we conclude that the mechanism of electoral accountability has the potential to achieve responsiveness of democratic politics when electoral incentives are sufficiently large

the impact of business group affiliation on performance evidence from china s national champions an important aspect of china s economic reforms has been an ambitious policy to develop 100 or so large internationally competitive business groups very little is known about these national champion groups or the benefits to subsidiary firms of belonging to them this study building from insights and methods used in existing literature examines the performance of subsidiaries affiliated to china s national champion groups our results find that they perform comparatively well we discuss possible reasons for this finding and comment more generally on the important role that business groups now play in china s reform and development

the institutional structure of a property market in inland china chongqing this paper contributes to the understanding of china s urban development by examining the institutional structure of a property market in an inland city chongqing data were collected from three recent projects through field reconnaissance and interviews a framework of institutional analysis was used in discussing and interpreting the data our analyses revealed an emerging property market with dynamic and evolving new institutions in inland china in this new market a variety of actors with different roles and interests in the property development process had come into play formal and informal rules governing the development process had been evolving although with a time lag the rapid formation of chongqing s property market was similar to that in the coastal cities nevertheless in contrast to the coastal cities this time lag led to a property market which was more dependent on state involvement chongqing s property market was dominated by government not only because the government formulated d

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

economic liberalization the changing role of the state and wagner s law china s development experience since 1978 summary the paper applies wagner s law of increasing state activity to illustrate the changing function of the state in china as a consequence of economic liberalization wagner s law describes the association between increasing national wealth in progressive states and the rise in state activity and expenditure this indicates that the causes of bureaucratic expansion are to be sought not just in terms of political pressures but the interplay between political considerations and the economic necessities resulting from the emergence of new property rights a simple illustrative model is developed to measure the effects of increasing national wealth and the growth of the public sector this suggests that the patterns of economic development observed by wagner in 19th century europe are not unlike those observed in china today

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

lame ducks and local fiscal policy quasi experimental evidence from portugal i use the introduction of mayoral term limits in portugal to identify how an exogenous variation in eligibility for office affects policy decisions relying on a quasi experimental difference in differences approach i find that term limited incumbents pursue more conservative fiscal policies than those who are eligible for re election heterogeneous effects show that the treatment effects primarily reflect the behaviour of right leaning term limited incumbents results are in line with a model in which right leaning officeholders try to maintain a good reputation by pleasing an electorate prone to redistribution while they are eligible but adopt policies closer to their true preferences when term limited

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

the m form hierarchy and china s economic reform for 13 years from 1979 to 1991 economic reforms in china have generated a significant growth its gnp grew at an average annual rate of 8 7 or at 7 37 for per capita gnp 1 the chinese economic performance is in contrast to that of eastern europe and the former ussr the average growth rate of gdp in hungary was 1 8 between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989 in poland the average gdp growth rate was less than 2 between 1981 and 1989 from both theoretical and policy perspectives china s outstanding reform performances and associated differ ent reform strategies from those of eastern europe and the ussr are particularly interesting and puzzling there are two popular views in explaining the differences between china and eastern europe the first view states that china was at a much lower development stage than eastern europe and the ussr 3 the second view argues that china has followed a gradual and piecemeal approach as

the development of china s solar photovoltaic industry why industrial policy failed this article studies china s central local government relations in the formation and implementation of an industry policy in china the central government is responsible for policy formation and the local governments are responsible for policy implementation where local governments are allowed ample flexibility in the ways to achieve the policy mandate this arrangement is conducive to local competition but there is no built in mechanism in the system to regulate such competition the system is defective in the execution of an industrial policy in that it fails to discipline the recipients of policy favours and to make efficient exit selections because local competition involves policy resources as well as economic resources the outcome of competition is not necessarily consistent with the comparative advantage of the region the more that policy is emphasised in industrial development the more that competition tends to favour large and rich cities after a certain period of hands off local competition the timing of which is unpredictable but will come when the industry runs into troubles the central government holds the ultimate power to determine the winners the central government typically picks the large and strong firms as the winners which are crowned as a national team and became eligible for further policy support this institutional set up produces a rapidly growing industry which often results in over capacity but not necessarily a competitive industry i use the case of china s solar photovoltaic industry to illustrate these points

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

a structural model of electoral accountability this paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the eects of electoral ac countability we estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection eects using data on u s governors for 1982 2012 we nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi cant incentive for incumbents to exert eort we also nd a selection eect although it is weaker in terms of its eect on average governor performance according to our model the widely used two term regime improves voter welfare by 4 2 compared to a one term regime and nd that a three term regime may improve voter welfare even further

employment tenure and earnings profiles in japan and the united states comments the relationship between job tenure and annual earnings in japan has received considerable attention from social scientists examining employment contracts and the japanese compensation system in their widely cited article masanori hashimoto and john raisian 1985 using data for 1980 showed that japanese men have greater job tenure than comparable workers in the united states and that the earnings of japanese men rise more rapidly with increased tenure they found that an additional year of tenure increases earnings in both small and large firms in japan more than does an additional year of general market experience their results for the united states indicate that general market experience increases earnings more than an additional year of job tenure the 1970 s and 1980 s were a period of substantial change in japanese labor markets due to the rapid aging of the population and the restructuring of the economy following the oil crisis the present analysis extends the work of hashimoto and raisian by estimating earnings equations for japanese men for the years 1971 1976 1981 and 1986 specifically we wish to investigate whether hashimoto and raisian s findings have been stable over time or whether changes in the labor market have altered the importance of tenure relative to total labor market experience in the japanese labor market i changes in the labor market

the political economy of dynamic elections accountability commitment and responsiveness we survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians we define stationary electoral equilibrium which encompasses notions used by barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 banks and sundaram 1998 and others we show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions term limits however attenuate the responsiveness finding we also touch on related applied work and we point to areas for fruitful future research including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics

global linkages the chinese high tech community and industrial cluster development the semiconductor industry in wuxi jingsu the development of industrial clusters in china has become a subject of international interest but attention has primarily focused on government efforts to attract fdi to promote industrial clusters and regional development the local process which supports the rise and growth of clusters driven by the domestic firms has been relatively ignored in this debate thus this article considers the analytical framework of strategic coupling and uses a case study of the wuxi semiconductor industry to investigate the cluster formation dynamics and effects driven by domestic rather than fdi firms with the mediating role of the transnational chinese technical community the state and domestic firms it concludes that the rise and growth of the semiconductor domestic led cluster in wuxi is not dependent on fdi but instead results from the dynamic interplay of several elements effects of technology spillover from the government funded research institutions as well as mutual competition and co operation in tech

economic policy economic performance and elections this paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy by assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office it is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income copyright 1993 by american economic association

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

reflections on china s open policy towards foreign direct investment hayter r and han s s 1998 reflections on china s open policy towards foreign direct investment reg studies 32 1 16 china s open policy of kaifang zhengce assumes that foreign direct investment is an essential mechanism by which technological and other forms of know how regarding best practices can be transferred into the chinese economy yet this transfer cannot be assumed to the extent that the know how desired by china simultaneously defines the competitive advantage of multinational corporations kaifang zhengce is china s geopolitical strategy to resolve this paradox its key features involve combining an explicit spatial strategy within china and reliance on investment by overseas chinese especially firms based in hong kong yet these firms are not foreign as conventionally considered and their contribution to the modernization of china is greater than supposed hayter r et han s s 1998 des reflexions sur la politique d ouverture de la chine a l investissement etranger direct reg

spatial models of delegation canonical assumptions this approach may be justified on grounds of tractability but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation consequently the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation we show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion and surprisingly many turn on the ignored though equally canonical technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed relative to policies relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation one that is closer to classical treatments the theory allows us to relate different institutional features commitment specialization costs monitoring multiple principals to delegation s observable properties lthough the practice of delegation dates back to antiquity the book of exodus refers to itonly in the last century has much scholarship examined its causes and effects and only recently has research focused on developing and testing formal theories that explore the logic of delegation 1 despite this recent surge in formal work on delegation scholars have failed to generalize several important properties of the early pathbreaking models instead of revisiting assumptions that were initially imposed for the sake of convenience recent papers tend to maintain and reinforce the cannonical assumptions applying these limited models to ever richer institutional settings although the breadth of understanding about delegation across various settings is impressive this approach has come at a price it has produced an understanding that only partly captures delegation s informational rationale in even the simplest contexts the literature is rich in predictions about delegation in complicated institutional settings when stylized foundational assumptions are satisfied but poor in explanations for and intuitions about why a poorly informed boss chooses to delegate to subordinates with different preferences moreover we lack an understanding of what basic features drive the boss s choice of which agent is given control of policy for example scholars have provided detailed explanations about how separation of power systems affect delegation by legislatures to agencies but the basic question does the informational rationale for delegation hinge on the boss s risk preferences has been ignored despite the analysis of complicated signaling and screening games between bosses with ex post controls and their subordinates we do not yet understand when or why the ally principle the boss picks the most ideologically similar agent as delegatee fails in simple settings we try to put models of delegation on more solid footing by examining a larger more general set of environments we eschew the canonical assumptions of quadratic utility or even risk aversion unidimensional outcome spaces and additive and homogeneous random shocks to policy our analysis focuses first on two basic questions when does delegation occur and to whom does the boss delegate we then consider richer institutionally driven extensions e g the role of commitment and monitoring devices the impact of multiple bosses and the institution in which their preferences are aggregated through a sequence of nested models with varying levels of abstraction the analysis isolates the relations between various assumptions and different findings

energy intensity and investment ownership across chinese provinces abstract the main objective of this paper is to investigate whether openness and investment ownership are key factors in explaining the diffusion of energy saving technologies in china compared with previous studies the novel aspect of this work is the use of a rich dataset at provincial level which allows the high level of regional heterogeneity to be taken into consideration the unbalanced regional growth has been translated into differences in the need for energy resources across the vast territory of china a detailed analysis of these issues may provide new insights into the energy situation in this country the analysis is also disaggregated by type of energy coal electricity and petroleum we estimate the models by panel corrected standard errors developed by beck and katz 1995 over the period 1985 2008 results obtained confirm the hypothesis that both foreign and non state investments play a leading role in the decline of energy intensity across chinese regions whereas there is no evidence of a positive contribution of state investment the findings also reveal differences in energy intensity across regions thus confirming the importance of accounting for the regional dimension when analyzing energy consumption in china

electoral control in new democracies the perverse incentives of fluid party systems how do fiuid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability to address this question the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in poland since 1991 they find that when district level economic outcomes are bad voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party as a result electoral control in poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies however the authors also find that in contrast to mature democracies legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates when they do so their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists these empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control fiuid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability

politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror i present a model of interactions between voters a government and a terrorist organization the model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualization of counterterrorism as divided into tactic specific observable and general unobservable tactics when there is divergence between voters and government preferences strategic substitution among different modes of attack by terrorists and agency problems between the voters and government create a situation in which the politically optimal counterterrorism strategy pursued by the government in response to electoral and institutional incentives is quite different from the security maximizing counterterrorism strategy in particular in response to electoral pressure the government allocates resources to observable counterterror in excess of the social optimum this problem is particularly severe when governments put great weight on rent seeking or care less about counterterror than do voters and when terrorists have a large set of tactics from which to choose voters can decrease the magnitude of the agency problem by increasing the benefits of reelection by for example slackening requirements for nonsecurity related public goods i have received valuable comments and advice from bruce bueno de mesquita randy calvert martin cripps james fearon amanda friedenberg robert powell matthew stephenson and barbara walter i thank the weidenbaum center on the economy government and public policy at washington university for financial support

local governments as industrial firms an organizational analysis of china s transitional economy despite widespread skepticism about government ownership in transitional economies china s rapid industrial growth has been led by public enterprises kornai s theory of soft budbet constraints born of the failure of earlier hungarian reforms fosters such skepticism but it assumes as fixed organizational characteristics that in fact vary widely across government jurisdictions local governments with smaller industrial bases have clearer financial incentives and constraints fewer nonfinancial interests in enterprises and a greater capacity to monitor them in china s vast public sector the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government ownership rights are clearest and most easily enforced which enables officials to manage public industry as a diversified market oriented firm

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

changing land policy and its impact on local growth the experience of the shenzhen special economic zone china in the 1980s having elaborated the transformation of land policy in the wake of chinese economic reform and the background to the formation of a new land policy in the shenzhen special economic zone china thi

shanghai between state and market in urban transformation economic liberalisation has brought fascinating changes to china s urban development by undermining state control and introducing market forces to economic decision making raising the fundamental

the political economy of the privatisation of the land market in shanghai this paper examines a land market in which the authority in china has a monopolistic power in the granting of the use rights of land to developers investors for real estate development purposes by granting land in private treaty mode rather than open market competition to the developers investors the chinese authority is actually distorting the land prices achieved in the emerging market which will subsequently lead to a distortion of normal land price behaviour despite the fact that the authority might have been underpricing land in shanghai they continue to sell land through the same private treaty mechanism one possible explanation for this is the deeply rooted ideology of the concept of cost as value while another is the possible political complications involved in the property rights of various invisible interests in land

privatization not the only answer abstract governments in many developing countries created state owned enterprises soes to produce goods or provide services the private sector seemed unwilling or unable to offer in many cases soes have turned out to be problem children at best inefficient and at worst unable to fulfill their original functions now the recommended solution to the problem of state owned enterprises is privatization but privatization is no more a solution to the problems of soes than soes were a solution to the problems they were created to solve the problem of soes is not ownership but rather a lack of explicit goals and objectives and an absence of organization cultures and systems that support and encourage fulfillment of those goals and objectives in some circumstances privatization may aid in fulfillment of an enterprise s goals and objectives because of the culture and systems it fosters in other cases not

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

learning about challengers we examine a political agency problem in repeated elections where an incumbent runs against a challenger from the opposing party whose policy preferences are unknown by voters we first ask do voters benefit from attracting a pool of challengers with more moderate ideologies when voters and politicians are patient moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians those close to the median voter reduces voter welfare by reducing an extreme incumbent s incentives to compromise we then ask do voters benefit from informative signals about a challenger s true ideology we prove that giving voters informative but sufficiently noisy signals always harm voters because they make it harder for incumbents to secure re election

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout