social networks in the boardroom this paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that 1 social networks may strongly affect board composition and 2 social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance our empirical investigation relies on a unique dataset on executives and outside directors of corporations listed on the paris stock exchange over the 1992 2003 period this data source is a matched employer employee dataset providing both detailed information on directors ceos and information on the firm employing them we first find a very strong and robust correlation between the ceo s network and that of his directors networks of former high ranking civil servants are the most active in shaping board composition our identification strategy takes into account 1 differences in unobserved directors abilities and 2 the unobserved propensity of firms to hire directors from particular networks irrespective of the ceo s identity we then show that the governance of firms run by former civil servants is relatively worse on many dimensions former civil servants are less likely to leave their ceo job when their firm performs badly secondly ceos who are former bureaucrats are more likely to accumulate directorships and the more they do the less profitable is the firm they run thirdly the value created by acquisitions made by former bureaucrats is lower all in all these firms are less profitable on average

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

influence of firm performance and gender on ceo compensation in this article we continue the examination of top executive pay by comparing performance total pay and the influence of ceo gender we analyse compensation differences between male and female ceos using nonparametric analysis we calculate the potential compensation for each executive using two benchmarks first each executive s performance and compensation are evaluated relative to members of the same gender to produce a same gender measure of under compensation each executive s compensation is also benchmarked against the other gender s potential compensation producing an other gender measure of under compensation together both measures allow an analysis of the gender specific potential salaries of each executive while controlling for performance the approach is applied to a sample of male and female executives the results indicate that women are under compensated

extreme wage inequality pay at the very top we provide new evidence on the growth in pay at the very top of the wage distribution in the united kingdom sectoral decompositions show that workers in the financial sector have accounted for the majority of the gains at the top over the last decade new results are also presented on the pay of ceos in the united kingdom we show how improved measurement of pay points to a stronger pay performance link than previously estimated this link is stronger and more symmetric for those firms in which institutional investors play a larger role

the performance effect of managerial ownership evidence from china abstract by examining a sample of non listed chinese firms we provide the first evidence from china for the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance in matching sample comparisons we find that firms of significant managerial ownership outperform firms whose managers do not own equity shares our further results indicate the relation between firm performance and managerial ownership is nonlinear and the inflection point at which the relation turns negative occurs at ownership above 50 compared with previous studies our results are less likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem due to the non list nature of our sample and the unique institutional environment in china

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

top executive pay and firm performance in china the sensitivity of executive pay to share price performance has been the main focus of western executive pay studies reflecting shareholders efforts to reduce agency problems by better aligning the rewards of executives with their own however these studies have ignored motivational effects and possible two way pay performance causation this paper reports chinese executive pay performance sensitivity with international comparisons to examine whether china s unique institutional environment has produced outcomes consistent with those for western market economies this same unique environment makes possible the first estimates of two way causation based on panel data analysis the results show that executive pay and firm performance mutually affect each other through both reward and motivation

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

the exercise and valuation of executive stock options abstract in theory hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments using data on option exercises from 40 firms this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary american option model which introduces random exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options the simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference based model for valuing executive options in practice

revenge of the managers labor cost cutting and the paradoxical resurgence of managerialism in the shareholder value era 1984 to 2001 institutional changes associated with the rise of shareholder value capitalism have had seemingly contradictory effects on managers and managerialism in the united states economy financial critiqu

what explains the rise in ceo pay in germany a panel data analysis for 1977 2009 the compensation of executive board members in germany has become a highly controversial topic since vodafone s hostile takeover of mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009 based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in germany in the period 1977 2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in the literature on executive pay the manager power hypothesis and the efficient pay hypothesis we find support for the manager power hypothesis for germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for we reject however the efficient pay hypothesis as ceo pay and the demand for managers increases in germany in difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks we find further that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the rise in executive pay in germany lastly we show that ceos in the banking sector are provided with incentives for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining devise on ceo pay in germany

the future of personnel economics personnel economics is defined as the application of microeconomic principles to human resources issues that are of concern to most businesses the field now about 20 years old arose for three reasons first those of us who were teaching standard labour economics to business students encountered a disinterested audience business students believe that labour supply and demand unemployment investment in education and other topics which are of primary concern to labour economists are almost irrelevant to their future business careers their boredom with what we had to sell signalled that a change in the product might be warranted second the issues studied by human resources specialists were of interest to economists but the approach taken by the non economist was unsatisfying it was loose unfocused and ad hoc and lacked the general rigorous framework to which economists have grown accustomed the economist s reaction was to enter an industry where it was believed rents existed third the technology of economics changed as a result of some breakthroughs particularly those dealing with agency and contract theory economists were better equipped to tackle problems that had evaded them in the past

testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth we develop a principal agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model s predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables techniques we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk effort increases with ownership and effort increases firm performance the magnitude of the effects in the cross section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

moving closer to the action examining compensation design effects on firm risk we examine the influence of ceo equity based compensation on strategic risk taking by the firm building off the behavioral agency model agency theory and prospect theory we develop arguments about when equity based compensation elements will increase or decrease executive risk propensity and in turn strategic risk taking incorporating a behavioral perspective into our models of incentive alignment provides us with new and potentially more accurate predictions about how individual elements of ceo pay will influence risk selection as well as how equity compensation interacts with cash compensation and with other factors to influence risk preferences in general this study provides evidence that ceo equity based compensation significantly influences strategic risk but that this influence is more nuanced and complex than conventional treatments of executive compensation assume in particular we find that different forms of equity based pay exhibit dissimilar influences on strategic risk and that their influence changes as their value and vesting status change second we find that cash based forms of pay moderate the incentive properties of equity based pay indicating that cash based pay may affect how executives perceive risks associated with equity pay finally we find that stock price volatility and board actions each also moderate the incentive effects of equity based pay in sum our results argue for increased recognition of a behavioral perspective on executive compensation and greater precision in how we measure and model the incentive alignment properties of ceo compensation

stock option grants to target ceos during private merger negotiations abstract unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers ceos are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations in 920 acquisition bids during 1999 2007 over 13 of targets grant them these options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target ceos for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums consequently deal value drops by 62 for every dollar target ceos receive from unscheduled options conversely acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns therefore deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders

promotion turnover and compensation in the executive labor market this paper develops a generalized roy model with human capital accumulation moral hazard and career concerns we identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives the structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm size pay gap we find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size certainty equivalent pay decreases with firm size in larger firms and for more highly ranked executives weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums this risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm size gap in total compensation larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives finally the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant but their collective effect on firm size pay differentials nets out

do ceos encounter within tenure settling up a multiperiod perspective on executive pay and dismissal we consider a central puzzle surrounding ceo accountability what explains the payoffs and penalties that ceos receive invoking fama s concept of settling up we examine how a ceo s entire perfo

investing in socially responsible companies is a must for public pension funds because there is no better alternative with assets of over us 1 0 trillion and growing public pension funds in the united states have become a major force in the private sector through their holding of equity positions in large publicly traded corporations more recently these funds have been expanding their investment strategy by considering a corporation s long term risks on issues such as environmental protection sustainability and good corporate citizenship and how these factors impact a company s long term performance conventional wisdom argues that the fiduciary responsibility of the pension funds trustees must be solely focused on their beneficiaries and therefore their investment criteria must be based strictly on narrowly defined financial measures it is also asserted that well established financial measurements of corporate performance already include long term risk assessment through discounted present value of future flow of earnings consequently all other criteria are contrary to the best interest of the pension funds beneficiaries in this paper we assert that contrary to conventional wisdom pension funds and for that matter other mutual funds must be concerned with the long term survival and growth of corporations these measures are generally referred to socially responsible investing sri and when applied to corporations it is termed socially responsible corporate conduct srcc we demonstrate that current measurement of future risk assessment invariably understates and quite often completely overlooks these long term risks because of the inherent bias towards short run on the part of financial intermediaries whose compensation depends greatly on short term results furthermore there is ample evidence to suggest that these intermediaries have been engaging in self serving practices and thus failing in their duties to serve their clients i e pension funds best interests because of their large holdings in the total market as well as individual companies these funds cannot easily divest from poorly performing companies without destabilizing the companies stock and overall markets hence they must opt for a strategy of emphasizing investment criteria that encourage companies to take into account long term aspects of their operations in terms of their impact on environment sustainability and community welfare to name a few we argue that an exclusionary and even a primary focus on short term financial criteria is no longer a viable option it also calls for the pension funds to encourage greater transparency and accountability of the entire corporate sector through improved corporate governance thus socially responsible investing practices are not merely discretionary and desirable activities they are a necessary imperative which both the corporations and public pension funds and other large institutional holders will ignore at serious peril to themselves finally the paper considers some of the recent developments where corporations have been responding to these challenges and how their actions might be strengthened through greater disclosure and transparency of corporate activities it also makes recommendations for the pension funds to support further research in creating new measurement standards that further refine the concept of socially responsible investing as a necessary ingredient of long term corporate survival and growth in the context of a changing economic environmental and socio political dynamic

are politicians really paid like bureaucrats abstract we provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay using u s data for 1950 90 we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians both across states and over time gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes we estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4 5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states there is evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward for performance the evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of rent extraction motives finally we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay for example voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase tax elasticities of pay

it pays to have friends abstract currently a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the ceo or to the firm we add another dimension social ties using a unique data set we find that 87 of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62 are conventionally and socially independent furthermore firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation exhibit stronger pay performance sensitivity and exhibit stronger turnover performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent our results suggest that social ties do matter and that consequently a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not

ceo stock based compensation an empirical analysis of incentive intensity relative mix and economic determinants the use of stock based compensation for u s ceos has increased significantly throughout the 1990s research interest in particular on stock option compensation has similarly increased yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings therefore we revisit the controversy surrounding stock option awards and we further the understanding of restricted stock grants which have escaped similar research focus using a recent data set we obtain convincing empirical support for most theoretical predictions about stock option awards we also find that restricted stock due to its linear payoffs is relatively inefficient in inducing risk averse ceos to accept risky value increasing investment projects copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment abstract can performance bonuses increase the likelihood that managers coerce their subordinates into exerting high levels of effort when doing so promotes neither efficiency nor equity we consider a laboratory setting in which managers compete to obtain a large bonus at the end of the experiment and the probability of obtaining it depends partly on the effort exerted by the subordinates we find that managers are more than twice as likely to punish subordinates exerting fair levels of effort if they compete for individual bonuses than when there are no bonuses this is not the case when they compete for pooled bonuses giving managers discretionary power over how to share them with their subordinates as most subordinates willingly exert maximal effort a model in which individuals are assumed to care about equity captures subordinates behavior well managers willingness to coerce subordinates into exerting unfairly high levels of effort on the other hand cannot be readily accounted for by any of the existing models of social preferences

ceo compensation and bank efficiency an application of conditional nonparametric frontiers the paper investigates in a dynamic context the effect of chief executive officer ceo bonus and salary payments on banks technical efficiency levels our methodological framework incorporates the latest developments on the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement as introduced by b din et al 2012 we apply time dependent conditional efficiency estimates to analyse a sample of 37 us banks for the period from 2003 to 2012 the empirical evidence reveals a non linear relationship between ceo bonus and salary payments and banks efficiency levels more specifically it is reported that salary and bonus payments affect differently banks technological change and technological catch up levels finally the empirical evidence suggests that higher salary and bonus payments are not always aligned with higher technical efficiency levels

exercise behavior valuation and the incentive effects of employee stock options abstract we use a large database on eso exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of eso values and incentives and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of eso holders

the subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios this paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options the subjective value the value to the holder is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective the objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values this value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount the model which is the black scholes model with modified parameters is simple to use

institutional ownership stability and bhc performance abstract in this study the association between performance of bhcs and institutional ownership stability is investigated and contrasted to those found for the less regulated utility and industrial firms in order to determine whether regulation displaces owner monitoring we employ a simultaneous equations model treating firm performance and institutional ownership stability as endogenous variables several results are obtained first bhc performance is positively associated with institutional ownership stability second this association is weaker for bhcs than for comparable utility and industrial firms possibly because of the substitution of regulation for owner monitoring in banking third this association is stronger in the recent deregulated years and for bhcs with lower likelihood of regulatory intervention

executive option exercises and financial misreporting abstract several recent papers document that the magnitude of potential gains from stock based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of misreporting in a sample of firms that announce restatements of their financial statements from 1997 to 2002 we examine whether managers realize these potential gains occurring from their accounting choices after controlling for diversification needs and stock price impact we find no significant evidence of higher option exercises by executives in the misreported years however for firms that are more likely to have made deliberate aggressive accounting choices we find significant evidence of higher option exercises for these firms option exercises are higher by 20 60 in comparison to industry and size matched nonrestating firms options exercises by executives are also increasing in the magnitude of the restatement as captured by the effect of the restatement on net income these higher option exercises tend to be more pervasive and are not just confined to the ceo and cfo of the firm

compensation and performance an experimental study this paper investigates how compensation structure affects performance in a simple but effort consuming task in this experimental study the subjects were asked to multiply two digit numbers for 40 min and were paid using either a linear with different pay for performance sensitivities or a convex option based compensation mechanism we found that per unit wage has a non linear positive effect on performance whereas increasing per unit compensation from 0 to 0 02 or from 0 05 to 0 15 has virtually no effect on performance an increase from 0 02 to 0 05 results in higher productivity we also found that option based compensation results in better performance

wealth and executive compensation using new data on the wealth of swedish ceos i show that higher wealth ceos receive stronger incentives since high wealth excluding own firm holdings implies low absolute risk aversion this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation to examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power i use lagged wealth typically measured before the ceo was hired and the results remain for one of two incentive measures also the wealth incentive result is not stronger for ceos likely to face limited owner oversight finally wealth is unrelated to pay levels and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill the compensation of chief executives of large listed companies is often largely in the form of risky instruments such as shares and options since share prices are affected by many factors outside management control this exposes ceos to risk according to standard agency theory the risk inherent in incentive compensation should reduce optimal incentives looking across firms the evidence that volatile stock prices reduce incentives in actual compensation has been mixed see e g aggarwal and samwick 1999 core and guay 2001 and prendergast 2002 for different views the importance of risk for incentives is thus in dispute 1 this paper takes another look at ceo incentives exploiting variation in risk aversion rather than risk decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that a wealthy ceo is less risk averse than a similar same coefficient of relative risk aversion but less wealthy ceo wealth should therefore proxy for risk aversion wealth may also be related to ceo skill and power obviously using wealth variation empirically hinges on having adequate data on individual wealth i use swedish tax filings to construct a proxy of wealth in sweden tax authorities provide data on aggregate yearly income

heads i win tails you lose a career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance the paper utilises a novel career perspective to examine managerial theories of organisational control in the context of executive reward principal agent theory managerial power and neo institutionalism are evaluated detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all ftse350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised using both a fixed effects panel and a career based approach rival hypotheses are tested in addition to the payperformance relationship the probability of job loss as a function of performance is also estimated the evidence presented points to the importance of institutional considerations in the standard agency theory and managerial power perspectives and lends support to a social theory of agency the analysis is empirical in nature and an effort is made to draw on qualitative studies to further flesh out the discussion the practical implications of the findings point to the inadequacy of existing arrangements to deliver efficient pay outcomes where performance is poor whilst highlighting dangers of relying on naive policy remedies that ignore the role played by institutional forces in their implementation also highlighted is the distinct advantage of boards adopting a cumulative or career oriented approach when evaluating executive performance from a policy perspective the case is made for truly long term incentives in the form of career shares

performance thresholds in managerial incentive contracts performance thresholds are commonly used in executive compensation contracts we examine the contractual nonlinearity associated with performance thresholds and its incentive implications incorporating a performance threshold into a standard principal agent model of a linear contract we show that pay schemes using a performance threshold are optimal by truncating a linear scheme at poor performance the threshold mitigates agency costs associated with the downside risk of production examining ceo compensation data we find evidence of the role of performance thresholds as a consequence of under threshold performance the tobit estimator is shown to increase pay performance sensitivity notably improving upon the standard ols estimator

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric brownian motion this paper studies a continuous time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric brownian motion firm size the changing firm size generates partial incentives analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff when the agent is as patient as investors performance based stock grants implement the optimal contract our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms that the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the ceo s historical performance rather than current performance lends support to our model

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

swinging for the fences the effects of ceo stock options on company risk taking and performance we unpack the concept of managerial risk taking distinguishing among three of its major elements the size of an outlay the variance of potential outcomes and the likelihood of extreme loss we

managerial incentives and internal capital markets capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm as well as on headquarters assessment of the divisions while corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who consequently are tempted to free ride as the number of divisions increases the free rider problem is aggravated and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives the analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm the industry and the capital market

stock based pay in new economy firms abstract ittner lambert and larcker j accounting economics 2003 this issue present compelling evidence that new economy firms rely more on stock based compensation than do old economy firms based on 1998 and 1999 data from a proprietary sample of companies i complement the ill results by analyzing data over a longer time period 1992 2001 and more importantly document the effect of the 2000 market crash on stock based pay in new economy firms finally i offer evidence supporting the conjecture that differences in pay practices between new and old economy firms reflect accounting considerations perceived costs and competitive inertia

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

does tax policy affect executive compensation evidence from postwar tax reforms abstract the trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy by contrast the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s however the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005 we also find a small short run response of salaries qualified stock options and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following wwii we explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long run and short run correlations between taxes and pay including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research

asymmetric benchmarking in compensation executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad abstract principal agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm s own performance recently it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests that is they can enjoy pay for luck as well as pay for performance we first show that this argument is incomplete the positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk if executives pay is tied to market movements they can only expect to receive the market determined return for risk bearing this argument however assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck if executives can truly influence the setting of their pay they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest namely when the benchmark has fallen using industry benchmarks we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down in which case pay for luck would reduce compensation than when it is up these empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks and they suggest that the average executive loses 25 45 less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck

macroeconomics with endogenous markups and optimal taxation i augment a flexible price dynamic general equilibrium model with any symmetric intratemporal preferences over a variety of goods supplied under monopolistic bertrand or cournot competition to derive implications for business cycle and market inefficiencies endogenous markups can magnify the impact of shocks on consumption and labor supply through intertemporal substitution mechanisms and the optimal fiscal policy requires a variable labor income subsidy and a capital income tax that converges to zero in the long run with an endogenous number of goods and strategic interactions entry also affects markups and the optimal fiscal policy requires also a tax on profits i characterize equilibrium and efficient market structures and derive optimal tax rules for a variety of preferences including a new type of general additive preferences that nest direct indirect implicit and homothetic additivity

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

an analysis of the relation between the stewardship and valuation roles of earnings in this paper we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes we explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation a distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in paul 1992 produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients vecs and compensation earnings coefficients cecs are unrelated our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971 2000 rejects paul s 1992 hypothesis of no relation we also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation specifically we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings

the use of stock based pay for sorting an empirical analysis of compensation for new ceos examining stock based compensation for newly hired ceos this article finds that the sensitivity of stock based pay to performance is higher for new economy young and volatile firms of the components of stock based pay it is option grants that generate such variation across firms it also finds that this cross firm variation in pay performance sensitivity is more pronounced for the ceo s first year in office these findings support the view that firms use stock based pay to new ceos for sorting

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

too much pay performance sensitivity abstract we examine the relation between pay performance sensitivity pps the convexity of managerial compensation vega and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004 higher pps and vega are both associated with lower future stock returns part of this negative relation can be explained by risk averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in pps and vega however even after correcting for lower future risk future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity this finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager owner agency problems

the impact of resource tax reform on china s coal industry abstract contributing to approximately two thirds of primary energy consumption coal usage is the focus of china s energy policies to regulate the resource taxation system and reduce the burden of coal enterprises the chinese government launched a reform of its resource tax system in 2014 for coal introducing the ad valorem system to replace the volume based system that had been in place for the preceding thirty years to assess the impact of the tax reform this paper constructs two stage dynamic game models by taking the coal and coal fired power industries as the players the market situations of shortage and oversupply are investigated separately empirical data are collected to estimate the model parameters for numerical simulations the model results suggest that the tax reform will reduce both coal prices and the coal industry profitability if the tax levied on each ton of coal is maintained at the same level as before the reform regardless of whether the market is in a shortage or an oversupply situation however the increased buyer s power will amplify the effect of the tax reform the numerical simulations also provide an estimation of the tax rate of the ad valorem system that maintains the profit of the coal industry considering the demand and supply situations in china s coal market policy recommendations are provided to guide further reform of china s resource tax system

economic and psychological perspectives on ceo compensation a review and synthesis to many the principal agent model is the obvious lens through which executive pay should be viewed such a sentiment sits uncomfortably with a large number of empirical studies suggesting that the process of determining executive pay seems to be more readily explained by recourse to arguments of managerial power and influence this article investigates the micro underpinnings of boardroom behavior in order to explain this departure from principal agency theory s argument that executive compensation serves to align interests between the owners of the company and its senior managers we find that there are strong interaction effects among social influence variables and the social setting of boardroom activity generous pay awards bearing only a weak connection to corporate performance are explained in the context of the social psychology of the boardroom these results and a review of the empirical research suggest the need for a more comprehensive model of executive compensation that incorporates both economic and psychological determinants copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the income and tax share of very high income households 1960 1995 this paper presents new information on the fraction of adjusted gross income and of wages and salaries that is reported by taxpayers in the top one half of one percent of the income distribution this corresponds to roughly five hundred thousand households in the late 1990s this paper relies on data from the treasury s individual income tax model for the period 1960 1995 the definition of adjusted gross income is standardized so that changes in the tax law do not affect the measured concentration of agi the results suggest that the share of agi reported by the highest income households increased significantly between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s with most of the increase taking place in the years immediately following the tax reform act of 1986 while we find some evidence of transitory changes in the concentration of income around major tax changes which may be the result of income retiming by high income taxpayers re timing does not seem to explain most of the changes since 1986 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

uncertainty risk and incentives theory and evidence uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives we study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager in contrast to the standard negative risk incentive trade off this learning by doing effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives we document empirical support for this prediction this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

when less is more the benefits of limits on executive pay we derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders but not executives having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance contingent contracts this has implications for the ideal composition of the board the analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive compensation reform

has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation we estimate a principal agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60 years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compen sation we find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these secular trends in compensation in our framework exogenous firm size works through two channels first conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are magnified in large firms so optimal compensation plans are now more

understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance comment abstract himmelberg et al j financial econom 53 1999 353 384 argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance i show that managerial ownership while substantially different across firms typically changes slowly from year to year within a company with rational managers maximising long term utility small one year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within year changes in performance by relying on within variation fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists

stocking up executive optimism option exercise and share retention abstract we show that an executive is optimistic about her company s prospects if and only if she retains some of the shares received whenever she exercises company stock options empirically an indicator of optimism based on this idea matches the expected relations between optimism and corporate decision making better than commonly used indicators based on the timing of option exercise this makes sense as our model of an executive s optimal option exercise and portfolio choice demonstrates that the timing of option exercise depends just as much on stock and other executive characteristics as it does on optimism

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

executive compensation and the maturity structure of corporate debt executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices delta and stock return volatility vega large deltas discourage managerial risk taking while large vegas encourage risk taking theory suggests that short maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences we posit and find evidence of a negative positive relation between ceo portfolio deltas vegas and short maturity debt we also find that short maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega and delta related incentives on bond yields overall our empirical evidence shows that short term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

do contracts make them care the impact of ceo compensation design on corporate social performance using the behavioral agency model we analyze how two compensation design characteristics pay performance sensitivity and duration of ceo compensation taking into account multiple vesting periods affect corporate social performance we find that the performance sensitivity of ceo pay is negatively associated with poor social performance but also negatively affects strong social performance these results suggest that pay performance sensitivity increases the relevance of potential negative consequences of poor social performance however the insurance benefits of strong social performance may also become less relevant with respect to the duration of ceo compensation we find that it reduces poor social performance this finding confirms arguments that a long term compensation time horizon increases the perceived threat that the negative effects of poor social performance will become visible with our findings we integrate behavioral agency theory with the traditional stakeholder views

managerial biases and debt contract design the case of syndicated loans we examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance pricing provisions in loan contracts performance sensitive debt psd managers with biased views may issue psd because

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

compensation across executive labor markets what can we learn from cross listed firms there is wide consensus that chief executive officers ceos of us firms earn significantly more than their canadian counterparts using a matched sample we find that the majority of this difference is due to us ceos earning 50 more than ceos of canadian non cross listed firms we find no such us premium for canadian cross listed firms because the use of options allows the cross listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south while firms that list only in canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary cross listed firms appear to be competing directly with their us counterparts for executive talent in investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for canadian cross listed firms we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

managerial expertise private information and pay performance sensitivity this paper characterizes optimal pay performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities the model presumes that the rate at which a manager s opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise i e whether it is general or firm specific the analysis demonstrates that when managerial expertise is largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity is lower higher than its optimal value in a benchmark setting of symmetric information furthermore when managerial skills are largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity decreases increases as managerial skills become a more important determinant of firm performance unlike the standard agency theoretic prediction of a negative trade off between risk and pay performance sensitivity this paper identifies plausible circumstances under which risk and incentives are positively associated in addition to providing an explanation for why empirical tests of risk incentive relationships have produced mixed results the analysis generates insights that can be useful in guiding future empirical research

managerial optimism and earnings smoothing abstract this paper empirically examines how ceo optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises the main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller in absolute value earnings surprises a possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the torpedo effect the innate behavior of optimists and the risk of litigation prosecution for over reporting earnings

optimal long term contracting with learning we introduce uncertainty into holmstrom and milgrom 1987 to study optimal long term contracting with learning in a dynamic relationship the agent s shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent s information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect we characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable in the optimal contract the optimal effort is front loaded and stochastically decreases over time furthermore the optimal contract exhibits an option like feature in that incentives increase after good performance implications about managerial incentives and asset management compensations are discussed

too risky to hold the effect of downside risk accumulated equity wealth and firm performance on ceo equity reduction although the alignment effect of equity ownership is often studied with emphasis on changes in firm strategy the exposure of ceos firm specific wealth to firm risk is more easily controlled by changing their level of equity holdings than by changing firm strategic risk we rely on prospect theory and the behavioral theory of the firm to examine the antecedents of ceo equity reduction and investigate whether it serves to decouple ceo wealth from firm risk given its central role in loss avoidance we underline the effect of the firm s downside risk and distinguish the total loss potential on equity holdings from the loss potential due to firm specific factors allowing for own performance referents we also consider firm performance and the value of a ceo s equity holdings in the analysis based on a sample of 208 u s ceos for the years 1997 1999 we find empirical support for the role of downside risk and firm performance in ceo equity reductions implications on incentive alignment through equity ownership are presented

top executive rewards and firm performance a comparison of japan and the united states this paper studies top executive turnover and compensation and their relation to firm performance in the largest japanese and u s companies japanese executive turnover and compensation are related to earnings stock returns and to a lesser extent sales performance measures the fortunes of japanese top executives therefore are positively correlated with stock performance and current cash flows or with factors contributing to such performance the relations for the japanese executives are generally economically and statistically similar to those for their u s counterparts there is some evidence however that the fortunes of japanese executives are more sensitive to low income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of u s executives

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

the effect of competition on executive compensation and incentives evidence from a quasi natural experiment the research was partially funded by fundacao para a ciencia e a tecnologia through the applied microeconomics research unit nima award no pest oe ege ui3181 2014

the roles of corporate governance in bank failures during the recent financial crisis abstract this paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial crisis of 2007 2010 using a data sample of 249 default and 4 021 no default us commercial banks we investigate the impact of bank ownership and management structures on the probability of default the results show that defaults are strongly influenced by a bank s ownership structure high shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers managers with a chief officer position such as the ceo cfo etc imply a substantially lower probability of failure in contrast high shareholdings of lower level management such as vice presidents increase default risk significantly these findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce outside directors and upper level management to control and reduce risk while greater stakes for lower level management seem to induce it to take high risks which may eventually result in bank default some accounting variables such as capital earnings and non performing loans also help predict bank default however other potential stability indicators such as the management structure of the bank indicators of market competition subprime mortgage risks state economic conditions and regulatory influences do not appear to be decisive factors in predicting bank default

are college chief executives paid like corporate ceos or bureaucrats we study compensation of college chief executives from 1997 to 2004 although presidential salaries have acquired the attention of the media congress and the internal revenue service irs in recent years they are much below those of corporate ceos compared with ceos in corporations with comparable sizes college chief executives earn on average approximately one third of the compensation of their corporate counterparts however ceo compensation is more volatile than that of college chief executives our results show that private college presidential salaries are consistent with the prediction of job complexity and institutional reputation hypotheses presidential compensations of public research universities on the other hand are more consistent with the prediction of job complexity hypothesis only hence our findings do not support the prediction of bureaucrat hypothesis for both private and public institutions

competition for talent under performance manipulation abstract we study the effects of introducing competition for ceos assuming that the talent of ceos is not observable and that they can misreport their performance without competition for talent firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low powered incentive contracts competition for talent removes those inefficiencies but it leads to excessively high powered incentive contracts causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates if misreporting is not a concern however then competition for talent has unambiguously positive effects on efficiency

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is