frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

price dispersion and seller heterogeneity in retail food markets price dispersion i e a homogeneous product being sold at different prices by different sellers is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics the paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores alongside large supermarkets the extent of observed price dispersion is quite high when prices in an urban area where the spatial concentration of sellers is higher are compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition do not yield lower prices other counteracting factors including differences in seller costs and consumer incomes make prices on average higher in the urban area for 11 of the 14 products considered for many but not all the products supermarkets proved to be less expensive than traditional retailers although average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low finally the results of the study provide evidence that retailers have different pricing strategies and these differences also emerge for supermarkets belonging to the same chain the results presented in the paper suggest that a variety of factors play a role in explaining price dispersion in addition to differences in seller costs the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers in terms of services provided and consumers in terms of search costs and preferences makes the emergence of monopolistic competition possible as well as allowing small traditional food retailers to remain in business

network models and financial stability abstract systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability in this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system we construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by interbank linkages we then vary the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system including its level of capitalisation the degree to which banks are connected the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system and analyse the influence of these parameters on the likelihood of knock on defaults first we find that the better capitalised banks are the more resilient is the banking system against contagious defaults and this effect is non linear second the effect of the degree of connectivity is non monotonic i e initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect but after a certain threshold value connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks third the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of knock on default even if banks hold capital against such exposures fourth more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk all else equal in an extension to the main analysis we study how liquidity effects interact with banking structure to produce a greater chance of systemic breakdown we finally consider how the risk of contagion might depend on the degree of asymmetry tiering inherent in the structure of the banking system a number of our results have important implications for public policy which this paper also draws out

cost of being poor retail price and consumer price search differences across inner city and suburban neighborhoods this research undertakes a carefully designed and detailed empirical study to gain insights into 1 the extent of price differentials between wealthy and poor neighborhoods 2 what induces such differentials especially the nature and intensity of competitive environments including mass merchandisers like wal mart and 3 their relative impacts it finds a price differential of about 10 15 for everyday items even after controlling for store size and competition prices are found to be 2 5 higher in poor areas it also finds that it is not the poverty level per se but access to cars that acts as a key determinant of consumers price search patterns

competition and the number of firms in a market are duopolies more competitive than atomistic markets this paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of an increase in the number of firms if marginal search costs increase with the number of searches then the demand curve facing any firm will be kinked with the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases being less than with respect to price increases prices may not change in response to changes in marginal costs as the number of firms increases the maximum price that is consistent with equilibrium increases to the monopoly price but the minimum price decreases on the other hand if marginal search costs decrease with the number of searches equilibrium if it exists is characterized by a

the consumption function and intertemporal spillover effects the fact that consumers save more or consume less as long as they expect pessimistically that labor supply constraint will be binding in the future is speculated all the time however no theoretical works are developed satisfactorily without taking the intertemporal spillover effects into account in this paper an explicit solution to the consumer s intertemporal optimization problem is derived by taking account of the intertemporal spillover effects in addition it is shown that the extrinsic uncertainty of labor supply rationing induces people to save more money thus this model is an extension of clower s and barro grossman s models

strategic price complexity in retail financial markets abstract there is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous also despite the large number of firms in the market prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter in a non cooperative oligopoly pricing model i show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market in the model as competition increases firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response rather than make their disclosures more transparent because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets such practices have important welfare implications

sales and collusion in a market with storage sales are a widespread and well known phenomenon documented in several product markets this paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity or on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price fluctuations the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple repeated price competition model and establishes that firms must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large the largest equilibrium profits are characterized at any market size a trade off between the size of the industry and its profits arises sales foster collusion by magnifying the inter temporal links in consumers decisions

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

the formation of networks with transfers among players we examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links we vary three aspects of the game i whether players can only make transfers to and receive transfers from players to whom they are directly linked or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in ii whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself and iii whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links we characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs

market model stationarity of individual public utilities the search for an economically sound procedure for estimating an appropri ate rate of return on equity consistent with the supreme court s ruling in the hope case 13 has ied many economists financial experts and public service commissions to estimate the rate of return on equity with the capital asset pricing model capm see 30 19 and 21 the popularity of the capm in regu latory proceedings was reported by harrington 15 who in a survey of public service commissions found that 38 states were considering or had seen the capm used two jurisdictions preferred the capm oregon required the capm and south carolina would require the capm in all future cases hence given the popularity of the capm and the tremendous economic impact that out comes of regulatory proceedings have on the financial well being of both the regulated firm and the consumer it is critical that if the capm is used in regula tory proceedings that it be applied in the best manner possible and that any limitations associated with the capm be recognized fully a prime factor in the application of the capm is the estimation of the mar ket model 29 to obtain an estimate of the ex ante beta p the systematic risk of both the regulated firm in question and comparable nonregulated firms since the market model usually is estimated on the basis of ex post data a necessary condition for an accurate estimate of 3 is that the market model is stationary or unchanging over time hence the ability to assess systematically and accurately the stationarity of the market model is critical to the proper application of the capm the objectives of this study are 1 to use a more powerful statistical test the cusum of squares of recursive residuals to determine the stationarity of the market model of individual securities in a specified time period 2 to provide empirical evidence of the stationarity of the market model for regulated firms 3 to provide empirical evidence concerning the stationarity of the market model by industry and 4 to use quandt s log likelihood ratio for identifying when a secu

how do banks respond to shocks a dynamic model of deposit taking institutions abstract this paper proposes a dynamic model of the optimal choices of a bank that benefits from market power and takes into account the impact of the deposit generation process interbank lending borrowing emerges as a buffer that assists the bank in smoothing intertemporal adjustments in interdependent loan and deposit choices the bank smooths the impact of interest rates shocks on its customers to minimize the adjustments over time of the stocks of deposits and loans it does not however provide insurance against negative shocks of real origin that increase its expected default costs the predictions of the model help to shed light on the available empirical evidence and to analyze some recent developments of the banking industry

the effects of interbank networks on efficiency and stability in a macroeconomic agent based model we develop a macroeconomic agent based model that consists of firms banks unions and households who interact on labour goods credit and interbank markets the model endogenises pricing decisions by firms wage setting by unions and interest rate setting by banks on both firm and interbank lending banks also set leverage targets and precautionary liquidity buffers on the basis of internal risk models our model produces endogenous fluctuations driven by the pricing behaviour of firms and the wage setting behaviour of unions fluctuations lead to loan defaults which are exacerbated as lenders reduce lending and charge higher interest rates inducing a credit crunch we also study how making the inter banking network more connected affects the key outcomes of the economy and find that while the flow of funds from surplus banks to firms can be increased the latter effect is soon dominated by increasing instability in the real sector as firms default at higher rates while the banking sector experiences fewer defaults as a whole losses on the interbank market increase as a source of bank defaults

price dispersion over the business cycle evidence from the airline industry this study provides empirical evidence documenting how price dispersion moves with the business cycle in the airline industry performing a fixed effects panel analysis on seventeen years of data covering two business cycles we find that price dispersion is highly pro cyclical this effect is especially pronounced for legacy carriers relative to low cost carriers we show that our empirical result is consistent with firms implementing second degree price discrimination tactics

trading in networks theory and experiments intermediation is a prominent feature of economic production and exchange two features of intermediation are salient coordination among traders between the source and the destination and competition between alternative combinations of intermediaries we develop a simple model to study these forces and we test the theoretical predictions in experiments our theoretical analysis yields a complete characterization of pricing equilibrium in networks there exist both ecient and inecient equilibria suggesting a key role of coordination among intermediaries strategic interaction leads to either buyer and seller retaining all surplus or intermediaries extracting all surplus we develop conditions on network structure under which these di erent extremal outcomes arise respectively laboratory experiments show that eciency prevails in almost all cases so traders are successful in coordination subjects coordinate on extreme surplus division finally experiments highlight the role of network structure in determining pricing and the

an experimental study of price dispersion in an optimal search model with advertising abstract this paper reports a laboratory experiment to study pricing and advertising behavior with costly buyer search sellers simultaneously post prices and may incur a cost to advertise this price in the unique symmetric equilibrium sellers either charge a high unadvertised price or randomize in an interval of lower advertised prices increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and equilibrium advertising intensity decreases with lower search costs and higher advertising costs our experimental results support these comparative static predictions and sellers also post high unadvertised prices as predicted in all treatments however sellers advertise more intensely than in equilibrium

search unemployment in an overlapping generations setting this paper constructs an overlapping generations model in which the steady state equilibrium is characterized by the existence of search unemployment this dynamic general equilibrium model captures the possible existence of search unemployment in the long run despite the absence of exogenous shocks furthermore it allows for the wage offers distribution to be determined endogenously the effect of partial revelation of information on the existence of search unemployment in the long run is examined it is shown that search unemployment may be eliminated in the long run despite the persistence of the state of imperfect information this paper develops an overlapping generations model in which the steady state equilibrium is characterized by search unemployment 2 unemployment is created via a rational rejection of available wage offers in favor of further search for potentially more attractive offers the proposed dynamic general equilibrium model allows for the existence of long run search unemployment despite the absence of exogenous shocks and permits the presence of an endogenously determined nondegenerate wage offer distribution 3 the paper analyzes the trade off between revelation of information and the level of search unemployment in the long run in the absence of external disturbances the level of search unemployment would be expected to decrease as information becomes available in particular if information is fully revealed search unemployment is naturally eliminated exploring the likelihood of the existence of long run search unemployment in a deterministic world this study provides an example of partial revelation of information which eliminates search unemployment in the long run despite the persistence of the state of imperfect information 4 the proposed model presents a discrete infinite time horizon world where economic activity is conducted under imperfect information in every period a single homogeneous good is produced using two factors capital and labor in the production process the aggregate endowment of labor is exogenously given in

a network model of financial system resilience abstract we examine the role of macroeconomic fluctuations asset market liquidity and network structure in determining contagion and aggregate losses in a stylized financial system systemic instability is explored in a financial network comprising three distinct but interconnected sets of agents domestic banks overseas banks and firms calibrating the model to advanced country banking sector data this preliminarily model generates broadly sensible aggregate loss distributions which are bimodal in nature we demonstrate how systemic crises may occur and analyse how our results are influenced by firesale externalities and the feedback effects from curtailed lending in the macroeconomy we also illustrate the resilience of our model financial system to stress scenarios with sharply rising corporate default rates and falling asset prices

demand uncertainty and sales a study of fashion and markdown pricing the theory of clearance sales is expanded and applied to explain why markups markdowns and the frequency of sales of merchandise sold by department stores have increased dramatically in recent years and why they differ across merchandise groups tha major theme of the paper is that the growing role of fashion and product variety is an important reason for these increases and for the differences between merchandise groups the growing importance of fashion is illustrated by documenting the declining use of whites and the increasing use of colors and prints estimates of the effects of imports and technological and demographic changes on markups and markdowns are presented copyright 1988 by american economic association

competition and regulation in the taxi industry abstract a simple model of the taxi industry suggests that deregulation of fares and entry may not be optimal the conditions of competition do not hold in the industry even approximately a model of search where drivers and riders search for each other is presented for the cruising taxi market this indicates that equilibrium of a deregulated industry does not exist price regulation is essential and entry regulation may be useful in addition viewing the medallion as a bond for appropriate performance provides another possible rationale for regulation

timing decisions and the behavior of mutual fund systematic risk the investment performance of professionally managed portfolios in general and mutual funds in particular has been the subject of considerable attention in finance fama 9 has suggested that overall portfolio performance be broken down in such a manner that the individual sources of performance can be identified two basic sources are 1 the ability of the portfolio manager to forecast price movements of individual common stocks relative to stocks in general selectivity or microforecasting and 2 the ability to forecast the direction of the stock market relative to fixed income securities timing or macroforecasting

measuring the effects of search costs on equilibrium prices and profits abstract this paper assesses the effects of search costs on equilibrium prices and profits using an estimated model of demand and costs in a laundry detergent market i find that some firms profits initially rise and then fall with search costs overall the magnitude and direction of the search costs effects on prices and profits are heterogeneous this is because search costs create conflicting incentives for a firm to reduce prices to attract the attention of searching consumers yet also raise prices to harvest profit from consumers who are unaware of competing products these effects can vary with the relationship between the firms actual prices and the consumers pre search beliefs about prices

dynamics of networks if everyone strives for structural holes when entrepreneurs enter structural holes in networks they can exploit the related benefits evidence for these benefits has steadily accumulated the authors ask whether those who strive for such structural advantages can maintain them if others follow their example burt speculates that they cannot but a formal demonstration of this speculation is lacking using a game theoretic model of network formation the authors characterize the networks that emerge when everyone strives for structural holes they find that the predominant stable networks distribute benefits evenly confirming that no one is able to maintain a structural advantage in the long run

intertemporal pricing and consumer stockpiling we study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns e g household items staple foods consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future consumption but they incur inventory holding costs we model this situation as a dynamic game over an infinite time horizon in each period the seller sets a price and each consumer chooses how many units to buy we develop a solution methodology based on rational expectations by endowing each player with beliefs we decouple the dynamic game into individual dynamic programs for each player we solve for the rational expectations equilibrium where all players make optimal dynamic decisions given correct beliefs about others behavior in equilibrium the seller may either charge a constant fixed price or offer periodic price promotions at predictable time intervals we show that promotions are useful when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more for the product than are occasional shoppers we also develop several model extensions to study the impact of consumer stockpiling on the seller s inventory production and rationing strategies

sales and consumer lock in this paper examines the dynamically consistent price path for a new product monopolist unable to commit to future prices when consumers must incur setup costs of adopting the product the authors find that setup costs give rise to a price path with introductory sales along the path periods of high prices during which only locked in or captive customers buy the product alternate with sales low price periods during which new customers adopt the product as the stock of captive customers increases over time sales become less frequent after the customer base reaches some critical level no further sales take place they show that the monopolist may hold a sleeping patient in which initial sales of the product are postponed to avoid locking into a high pricing strategy that ignores new customers copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

sales and monetary policy this paper analyses the efiect of monetary policy in a model where sales occur in equilibrium some consumers are loyal to a particular brand of a good others are bargain hunters as a result producers flnd it optimal to sell their goods at a normal price through some retailers and at a sale price through others the margin of adjusting the amount sold on sale is potentially very important if producers can adjust the fraction sold on sale with sticky prices and wages money is approximately neutral if we ignore the reasons behind sales but that result changes dramatically when we consider that producers optimally choose to sell some of their goods on sale owing to strategic substitutabilities in the sales decision money has strong procyclical efiects

peak load pricing in competitive markets the paper offers an explanation for temporal price dispersion temporal price dispersion in the model is due neither to exogenous shifts in demand nor to price discrimination motives as shown in other papers in this paper the explanation relies on peak load pricing in the model presented consumers decide to purchase a given product in a certain time period according to the satisfaction they derive from the product at that time and to the prices and number of customers they expect at each firm and period the demand in each period is controlled by sellers through prices by offering different prices in different periods sellers motivate consumers to spread themselves across periods in a profitable way therefore the demand and price in each time period is determined endogeneously

dynamics of a retail market with search processes in spite of the existence of many stimulating publications the study of market dynamics still lacks rigour and coherence the paper develops a family of models in which i buyers and sellers have initially no information on the conditions prevailing on the market but acquire progressively this information out of their own observations ii buyers look for retailers in order to buy at the lowest possible price iii every seller chooses at the beginning of a period the quantity he will put on sale and at which price the interest of the paper is to give precise conditions under which the market converges towards a stable state and to show that depending on some assumptions these stable states exhibit very different properties since they may be multiple or unique and characterized by a price dispersion or by a single price this price being the monopoly price the perfect competition price or a price in between

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times policy advices from an agent based model abstract the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent global recession triggered a wide spread economic and political debate on the proper policy combination to deal with the crisis and to prevent similar ones in the future probably the main dispute has been around the use of fiscal instruments in order to foster growth while keeping public debt under control the european union for instance endorsed austerity measures for fiscal consolidation but has been sharply criticized by several scholars this paper aims at contributing to the current debate by presenting the outcomes of a computational study performed with the eurace agent based model we set up an experiment with two base policy scenarios i e stability and growth pact and fiscal compact incrementally enriching them with complementary policies which relax fiscal rigidity and introduce quantitative easing results show that budgetary rigour performs well if and only if some mechanisms of fiscal relaxation and monetary accommodation are considered during bad times thus confirming in a richer and more realistic model setting the fundamental tenet of keynesian economics about the importance of sustaining aggregate demand during recessions

price dispersion in an automobile insurance market from automobile insurance data for alberta over the period 1974 81 we find thatpremiums are highly correlated across driver classes in a given year but that premiums for a given driver class are not correlated over a period of more than 5 years firms relative market shares among drivers over age 25 and married males under 25 are inversely related to their deviations from the mean premiums in these driver classes the variance of real premiums decreases with the numberof firms in the market and increases with the real loss cost per car insured and the number of cars insured from these results we conclude that the price dispersion in automobile insurance in alberta is based on costly consumer search

rules of thumb for social learning this paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use we analyze two learning environments one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them in both environments players use exogenously specified rules of thumb that ignore historical data but may incorporate a tendency to use the more popular technology in some cases these naive rules can lead to fairly efficient decisions in the long run but adjustment can be slow when a superior technology is first introduced

a network analysis of the italian overnight money market the objective of this paper is to analyse the network topology of the italian segment of the european overnight money market through methods of statistical mechanics applied to complex networks we investigate differences in the activities of banks of different sizes and the evolution of their connectivity structure over the maintenance period the main purpose of the analysis is to establish the potential implications of the current institutional arrangements on the stability of the banking system and to assess the efficiency of the interbank market in terms of absence of speculative and preferential trading relationships

a theory of clearance sales clearance sales are widely used by firms as an intertemporal selling policy in particular in markets where firms face demand uncertainty and need to choose capacity in advance clearance sales consist in charging a high price initially but then lowering the price in the sales period high valuation consumers purchase the good at the high initial price so as to avoid rationing at the low price while low valuation consumers wait for the price to drop we develop a simple model of intertemporal monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty and show that clearance sales may be the optimal intertemporal selling policy

r d networks we develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition firms incentives to invest in r d and the architecture of collaboration networks in the absence of firm rivalry the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable industry profit maximizing and efficient by contrast under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint this suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links

the contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics in the e eld of economics perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information it is now recognized that information is imperfect obtaining information can be costly there are important asymmetries of information and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals this recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand i introduction the century coming to a close has seen vast changes in economics in both ideas and methodology upon ree ection it is remarkable however how many of the seeds of advances in this century were sowed in the previous i would argue that perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information the recognition that information is imperfect that obtaining information can be costly that there are important asymmetries of information and that the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals has had profound implications for the wisdom inherited from the past and has provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand in this essay i wish to argue that information economics has had directly and indirectly a profound effect on how we think about economics today eighteenth and nineteenth century antecedents to be sure marshall and other nineteenth century economists talked about problems of imperfect information but with one exception discussions of information were obiter dicta caveats at the end of the analysis they were never at the center

a test of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty abstract a test of the predictions of dana s 2001 model of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty using ticket price data from major league baseball shows that ticket price dispersion changes systematically with demand uncertainty verifying the predictions of the model

coupons and everyday low prices price competition with multiple instruments abstract a simple two stage game is examined where firms compete in prices by chosen pricing instruments those considered include a simple uniform pricing technology and a promotional pricing technology like an advertised discount coupon consumers are separated by types informed and uninformed therefore a motive for price competition exists for the purpose of separating the two types of consumers it is shown that the sustainability of an asymmetric choice of pricing instrument between the two firms will prevail in a duopoly market in equilibrium consequently the coexistence of two different pricing schemes is viable even when firms are otherwise symmetric jel classification l1 l13 coupons et bas prix tous les jours concurrence par les prix a l aide de multiples instruments ce memoire examine un simple jeu a deux etapes dans lequel des entreprises se concurrencent par les prix a l aide d un instrument particulier les instruments consideres incluent une simple technologie de prix uniforme et une technologie de prix de promotion sous la forme de l annonce d un coupon d escompte on divise les consommateurs en deux groupes ceux qui sont informes et ceux qui ne le sont pas un des motifs pour ce genre de concurrence est de separer les deux types de consommateurs on montre qu on peut soutenir un choix asymetrique d instrument de tarification entre les deux entreprises dans un marche de duopole en equilibre en consequence la coexistence de deux strategies de prix differentes est viable quand les entreprises sont symetriques sous tous les autres rapports

the effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and common shocks abstract this paper proposes a dynamic multi agent model of a banking system with central bank banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves according to their risk return and liquidity preferences they are linked via interbank loans and face stochastic deposit supply comparing different interbank network structures it is shown that money centre networks are more stable than random networks evidence is provided that the central bank stabilizes interbank markets in the short run only systemic risk via contagion is compared with common shocks and it is shown that both forms of systemic risk require different optimal policy responses

a shifting regimes approach to the stationarity of the market model parameters of individual securities recent studies indicate that the widespread assumption of parameter stationarity in empir ical applications of asset pricing models may be inappropriate this paper investigates the feasibility of modeling parameter instability as a sequence of persistent stable regimes reeursive residual and log likelihood techniques are combined to detect and locate shift points the results indicate that regime shifts are widespread frequent and often large enough to significantly effect empirical findings the nature of the shifts appears to be a rotation of the regression line indicating that correction of both alpha and beta parameters is required

decentralized dispersed exchange without an auctioneer abstract we stimulate exchange among geographically dispersed agents who face real costs of communication along with bounds to rationality and calculation exchange is entirely decentralized it is initiated by individual agents who broadcast costly messages indicating their interest in trade it is accomplished by bilateral bargaining between pairs of agents agents use the information gained from previous attempts at local trade to calculate their search strategies for succeeding rounds this decentralized mechanism can achieve a substantial improvement in the allocation of resources and the average welfare of agents in comparison with a randomized initial endowment but in comparison with walrasian equilibrium agents who begin with endowments of equal value end up with substantially unequal wealth although the initial inequality of utility is reduced

price dispersion in the grocery market this paper provides an exploratory study of price dispersion in the grocery market and checks for the consistency of the evidence on this price dispersion with the existing theories of price dispersion due to costly consumer search competition and consumer heterogeneity in the context of the grocery market three dimensions of price dispersion are studied price dispersion for a certain brand across stores price dispersion within a category in a store across brands and price dispersion over time for a certain brand the results show that the standardized price dispersion is positively correlated with consumer search costs competition and consumer heterogeneity

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

a simple model of price dispersion abstract this article considers a simple stock flow matching model with fully informed market participants unlike the standard matching literature prices are assumed to be set ex ante when sellers pre commit themselves to sell their products at an advertised price the unique equilibrium is characterized by price dispersion due to the idiosyncratic match payoffs in a marketplace with full information this provides new insights into the price dispersion literature which instead commonly assumes that buyers are not perfectly informed and engage in a costly search

liaisons dangereuses increasing connectivity risk sharing and systemic risk the recent financial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises endogenously and what architecture can make the financial system more resilient to global crises this paper shows that a financial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification and not when this is maximal as generally thought so far this finding holds in the presence of the financial accelerator i e when negative variations in the financial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on the agent s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent s counterparties 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

general equilibrium wage and price distributions this paper extends models of search market equilibrium to incorporate general equilibrium considerations the model we treat is one with a single product market and a single labor market an equilibrium distribution of prices and wages is the result of optimal price and wage setting behavior by firms in conjunction with optimal search by individuals we prove the existence of a degenerate equilibrium and of a two point dispersion equilibrium

word of mouth model of sales in this paper i develop a model of the dynamic pricing of a monopolist while information about its product is diffusing through word of mouth individuals who purchase the product engage in word of mouth with their friends the main result establishes that prices optimally fluctuate over time a monopolist sets prices over time to balance extracting profits in the short term with increasing information diffusion through word of mouth and thereby the population of potential consumers in the future the key state variable for determining this tradeoff is the distribution of valuations of the individuals on the edge of the diffusion this distribution of valuations is determined by the history of prices and changes over time our analysis reveals that prices must move up and down infinitely often

a theory of channel price promotions manufacturers can stimulate sales by a temporary wholesale price reduction for the retailer a rebate directed toward consumers or a combination of both the trade offs between these price promotions are analyzed providing insights about their roles profitability and welfare properties retailers rebates are also studied while price discrimination is a common explanation for rebates to consumers when a product is sold through a distribution channel the manufacturer may also use rebates to motivate retail participation in the promotion this explains why rebates may be offered even when all consumers use them and price discrimination does not occur copyright 1991 by american economic association

equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs this study seeks to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly consumer search by examining retail prices for prescription drugs posted prices in two geographically distinct markets are shown to vary considerably across pharmacies within the same market even after one controls for variation due to pharmacy differences pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third of the observed price dispersion the empirical analysis hinges on the observation that consumers incentives to price shop depend on characteristics of the drug therapy cross sectional patterns in price distributions across drugs are consistent with the predictions of a search model prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions for which the expected benefits of search are highest exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price cost margins

strategic pricing consumer search and the number of firms discover prices there are three distinct price dispersed equilibria characterized by low moderate and high search intensity the effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour expected prices price dispersion and welfare are sensitive i to the equilibrium consumers search intensity and ii to the status quo number of firms for instance when consumers search with low intensity an increase in the number of firms reduces search does not affect expected price leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare in contrast when consumers search with high intensity increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms a question that has received much attention in economic theory is how the number of competitors and market outcomes are related despite the existence of work showing the contrary see e g satterthwaite 1979 rosenthal 1980 the prediction that emerges from a market where firms interact in a cournot fashion has come to dominate economic thought namely that an increase in the number of competitors leads to larger aggregate production lower market price and improved market performance measured in terms of some social welfare criterion ruffin 1971 this paper challenges the generality of this belief by presenting an oligopoly model with consumer search where the equilibrium expected price may be constant increasing or nonmonotonic in the number of firms we present an economy with two types of consumers consumers who search for prices at no cost fully informed and consumers who must pay a fixed search cost for each price quotation they observe less informed 1 all buyers have the same willingness to pay for the good and buy either a single unit or nothing at all on the supply side of the market there are n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost we analyse a one shot simultaneous move game firms set prices and consumers decide how many prices to search for at the same moment in time our model is essentially an oligopolistic version of burdett and judd 1983 where some consumers search costlessly in this model consumers search using a fixed sample size search strategy i e they choose the number of prices to observe before receiving any offer nonsequential search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather price information quickly morgan and manning 1985 this occurs when the search outcome is observed with delay and delay is costly for instance an mba graduate looking for a job 1 the presence in the model of consumers who search costlessly captures the fact that some people have a

trust and social collateral this paper builds a theory of trust based on informal contract enforcement in social networks in our model network connections between individuals can be used as social collateral to secure informal borrowing we define network based trust as the largest amount one agent can borrow from another agent and derive a reduced form expression for this quantity which we then use in three applications 1 we predict that dense networks generate bonding social capital that allows transacting valuable assets whereas loose networks create bridging social capital that improves access to cheap favors such as information 2 for job recommendation networks we show that strong ties between employers and trusted recommenders reduce asymmetric information about the quality of job candidates 3 using data from peru we show empirically that network based trust predicts informal borrowing and we structurally estimate and test our model

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

an examination of risk return relationship in bull and bear markets using time varying betas security behavior in bull and bear markets has received some attention in recent years fabozzi and francis 5 first documented evidence that security betas are not influenced by the alternating forces of bull and bear markets their subsequent study of mutual fund betas also indicated that mutual funds generally respond indifferently to bull and bear market conditions using the concept of bull and bear market variations kim and zumwa1t 9 developed and tested the risk premiums associated with the upside and the downside portions of returns variation they concluded that investors expect to receive a risk premium for downside risk and pay a premium for upside variation of returns from their results kim and zumwalt 9 suggested that the down market beta measuring downside risk downside variation of returns may be a more appropriate measure of portfolio risk than the single beta in the market model

financial regulations and bank credit to the real economy we present a new agent based model focusing on the linkage between the interbank market and the real economy with a stylised central bank acting as lender of last resort using this model we address the tradeoff between stability and economic performance for different structures of the interbank market we also explore the efficacy of recent regulatory reforms using our richer model our results suggest that the effects of regulatory leverage ratios on the banking sector s performance can vary in a complex and non monotonic way with the state of the economy the degree of connectivity of the interbank market and the amount of information available to market participants on bank risks

the impact of collusion on price behavior empirical results from two recent cases abstract we use extended arch and garch models to examine the differences in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusive and competitive phases of two recently discovered conspiracies citric acid and lysine according to our results the conspirators managed to raise prices by 9 and 25 cents per pound in the short run relative to non collusive periods also the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower and the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy was higher than during more competitive periods the proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and prosecution purposes

risk decomposition and portfolio diversification when beta is nonstationary a note the process of diversification and the subsequent reduction in portfolio risk have received considerable attention in the financial literature 5 7 9 10 14 16 25 king 9 in his pioneering work on diversification used multivariate statistical methods to decompose risk on a sample of 63 nyse firms from six industries over the period 1927 to 1960 from this sample he concluded that on the average about half of a stock s variance could be explained by market behavior later evans and archer 5 examined the effect of naive diversification on portfolio risk using semi annual data for the period 1958 to 1967 they examined diversification among 470 securities listed in the standard and poor s index by constructing 60 randomly selected portfolios which varied in size from 1 to 40 stocks they then calculated the portfolio return s mean standard deviation and estimated the level of systematic or undiversifiable risk by estimating the asymptote to which the mean standard deviation decreased the results of heir study showed that the majority of risk reduction is accomplished through randomly diversifying among only 10 securities while these studies served to define the speed and limits of random diversification other studies 7 10 14 16 have shown that systematic attempts to select stocks can result in inefficiencies in diversification as the capm has gained in popularity it has become increasingly common to examine the level of diversification and decompose risk through the use of ordinary least squares o l s regressions in which the variability explained by the market is designated systematic risk and the variability of the error term is used as a measure of unsystematic risk inherent in this dichotomization is the assumption that the beta or relationship between the market s returns and the individual stock s returns is stationary in the present study we shall show that while the use of o l s to partition risk is commonplace it can lead to incorrect conclusions due to error introduced by the violation of this assumption that is the nonstationarity of security betas the existence of instability of beta coefficients has been pointed out in studies by altman jacquillat and levasseur 1 baesel 2 fabozzi and francis 6 levitz 11 levy 12 and roenfelt griepentrog and pflaum 19 fabozzi and francis 6 for example found that many beta coefficients move randomly through time rather than remaining stable as assumed by the o l s model the result of this nonstationarity is that the o l s technique not only provides an inefficient estimate of systematic risk but it also allows the nonstationarity of beta to be reflected in the estimate of unsystematic risk thus the o l s

structural holes in social networks we consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction e g exchange goods or information creates a unit surplus a transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection if the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus thus individuals form links with others to create surplus to gain intermediation rents and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation first we show that in the absence of capacity constraints on links it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs second we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links in this case distances between players must be long which induces players who are far off to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents a cycle network then emerges payoffs being equal across all players

intertemporal substitution and storable products storable products allow consumers to time their purchases to exploit price fluctuations it has been documented that during promotions consumers buy more the additional purchases are potentially intended not only for current use but to be stockpiled for future consumption this paper discusses the predictions of a consumer inventory model and reviews the available evidence we then discuss the implications for demand estimation and present estimates of jel lo l4 dl d4 the economic magnitude of the dynamic effect of storability jel lo l4 dl d4 jel lo l4 dl d4

collusion with intertemporal price dispersion we develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion dispersion clouds consumer price awareness encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price for less patient firms monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales the most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble edgeworth cycles low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions however for sufficiently low attentiveness price rises are also a concern

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

basel iii capital surcharges for g sibs are far less effective in managing systemic risk in comparison to network based systemic risk dependent financial transaction taxes in addition to constraining bilateral exposures of financial institutions there exist essentially two options for future financial regulation of systemic risk first regulation could attempt to reduce the financial fragility of global or domestic systemically important financial institutions g sibs or d sibs as for instance proposed by basel iii second it could focus on strengthening the financial system as a whole by reducing the probability of large scale cascading events this can be achieved by re shaping the topology of financial networks we use an agent based model of a financial system and the real economy to study and compare the consequences of these two options by conducting three computer experiments with the agent based model we find that re shaping financial networks is more effective and efficient than reducing financial fragility capital surcharges for g sibs could reduce systemic risk but they would have to be substantially larger than those specified in the current basel iii proposal in order to have a measurable impact this would cause a loss of efficiency

price dispersion and stockpiling by consumers this paper presents a model of equilibrium price dispersion in which buyers do not search however they are able to store the non durable commodity for future use such behaviour implies sellers demand curves are endogenously generated by the observed price distribution equilibrium is shown to exist although more than one price may be charged in equilibrium the monopoly price will occur with positive probability comparative static results are derived with a linear version of the model some of which are perverse this paper demonstrates that the possibility of stockpiling of a commodity by consumers can cause equilibrium price dispersion in the market for that commodity this dispersion may occur even when all consumers are identical all firms have identical cost functions and no search takes place thus the stockpiling model presented here provides an alternative explanation of phenomena explained by the more familiar search models of course one expects that storage and search both occur in many markets salop and stiglitz 1982 develop a simple stockpiling model similar to the one presented here and discuss the role that search might play the main point developed here also emphasized in salop and stiglitz 1982 is that price dispersion may occur despite the complete symmetry among sellers and among buyers most search models rely on differences among buyers or among sellers to generate multiple price equilibria the stockpiling model demonstrates such heterogeneity is not necessary each firm has the same cost curve and faces the same demand curve in equilibrium firms choose a price where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost curve thus for there to be price dispersion more than one such tangency must exist that may be the case when stockpiling occurs for then the demand curves are endogenous they are generated by the stocks of goods held by buyers which themselves depend on the observed price distribution and under reasonably weak assumptions a property of the equilibrium price distribution is that the demand curves it generates be tangent to sellers cost curves at several points in section 1 of this paper optimal storage rules for buyers are developed section 2 uses these rules to derive market demand curves in section 3 conditions for equilibrium are presented and in section 4 the possibility of that equilibrium involving only one price is discussed section 5 proves an equilibrium must exist section 6 gives examples of two price equilibria and presents some comparative statics with a simple linearized version of the model some of these comparative results are quite surprising and show the policy implications of stockpiling models may differ from alternative models of price dispersion prior to the formal analysis a brief discussion of the assumptions of the model seem in order buyers are assumed to visit exactly one seller in each period they live forever and consume exactly one unit of the commodity in each period if its price does not

loss leader pricing and rain check policy loss leader pricing and rain check policies are common in retail markets yet research on these topics is surprisingly scarce in this paper we study the effects of leader pricing and rain check policy on stores profits and market outcomes suppose stores can accurately predict demand might they still run out of stock we investigate whether such a result is plausible when stores can offer rain checks the paper also helps resolve an issue that has recently attracted much attention should the ftc repeal its rule prohibiting stock outs of advertised sale items

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

wine retail price dispersion in the united states searching for expensive wines similar to other markets in which deviations from jevons law of one price is the norm rather than the exception the retail wine market in the united states is characterized by large price dispersions drawing on a large sample of retail prices from wine searcher com we find an average per wine coefficient of variation of 23 percent some of this is due to differential market conditions especially state regulations our evidence suggests that dispersion also depends positively on price levels after controlling for consumer market and state heterogeneity

the effects of social networks on employment and inequality we develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts we show that employment is positively correlated across time and agents moreover unemployment exhibits duration dependence the probability of obtaining a job decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed finally we examine inequality between two groups if staying in the labor market is costly and one group starts with a worse employment status then that group s drop out rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group

farsighted network formation this paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted players evaluate the desirability of a current move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs we define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents we show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists we also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks we then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes

a laboratory study of duopoly price competition with patient buyers i introduction two extreme forms of pricing behavior sometimes called the bertrand paradox and the diamond paradox emerge from a single distinguishing assumption bertrand 1883 assumes that a buyer knows ex ante the prices of all sellers and notes that with homogeneous goods a single competitive price emerges even among a small number of sellers because at any slightly higher price at least one seller can increase his profit by engaging in undercutting in diamond s 1971 model on the other hand a buyer first chooses a seller and then receives the price quote ex post even with infinitesimal search cost in equilibrium a buyer searches only one seller and all sellers charge the monopoly price the only difference between the two formulations is whether sellers price ex ante or ex post 1 intuitively however there is no strong rationale for preferring either assumption for when price information is acquired this is especially so since the law of one price is known to fail and persistent price dispersion is widely observed even in essentially homogenous goods markets e g baye morgan and scholten 2004 brynjolfsson and smith 2000 sorensen 2000 most of the theoretical literature that models price dispersion has employed costly buyer search e g salop and stiglitz 1977 1982 stahl 1989 1996 stigler 1961 or costly seller advertising butters 1977 robert and stahl 1993 to generate dispersed prices 2 gale 1988 on the other hand models price dispersion in a rather stark form using only two sellers and one buyer this can provide a modeling foundation for some types of multilateral bargaining such as in concentrated intermediate goods markets sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving price offers from both ex ante pricing or one ex post pricing of them at any given time if the buyer s sample contains both offers with a positive but not certain probability gamma a unique dispersed price equilibrium exists that shifts systematically with gamma extending this static model to multiround pricing with time discounting gale examines the impact of greater buyer patience modeled as a higher discount factor on the equilibrium price level and price dispersion this is intended to approximate market conditions with many buyers where trade continues over time as can occur also in durable goods settings as buyers become more patient sellers must compete not only with the other seller but also with their own future price offers consequently the equilibrium price distribution becomes concentrated at lower prices this article presents the first laboratory experiment that studies the interaction of buyer patience and search with multiround pricing by competing sellers specifically we focus on prices posted by competing sellers in a noisy search environment where buyers can wait for more price offers this enables us to explore how the timing of buyer s purchase decisions influences sellers pricing strategy which is not captured by the stationary equilibrium of the theoretical model the experiment includes both a static treatment where agents have only one opportunity to trade each period and a dynamic treatment where trading opportunities may continue for future rounds of price offers with a positive and known probability 3 one interpretation of these single round trading and multiple round trading treatments is that the former refers to a disposable goods and the latter to a durable goods environment the model s predictions that prices decrease if the buyer is more patient or is more likely to receive both price offers are intuitive but the available evidence from previous durable goods and bargaining experiments provides only weak support for theory furthermore implications of multiple price offers from competing sellers have never been studied previously in experiments with durable goods and multiple round trading which have focused on single seller environments

consumer stockpiling and competitive promotional strategies an examination of brand prices in several categories reveals that the distribution of prices is multimodal with firms offering shallow and deep discounts another interesting feature of these distributions is that they may have holes in the interior of the support these pricing distributions do not occur in extant theoretical models of price promotions we develop a dynamic model of competition in which some price sensitive consumers stockpile during periods of deep discounts a game theoretic analysis of our model generates a multimodal pricing distribution with a hole in the interior of the support consumer stockpiling in our model also gives rise to negative serial correlation in prices this is consistent with our empirical observation of the pricing distribution of several brands across multiple categories in the iri marketing data set we generate several interesting insights into firms optimal promotional strategies and their interplay with the clientele mix market structure and other market factors we find that in equilibrium stockpiling by price sensitive consumers neither harms nor benefits firms when they adopt equilibrium strategies interestingly when price sensitive consumers stockpile even increased consumption as a result of stockpiling does not lead to higher profits for firms

sales and consumer inventory temporary price reductions sales are common for many goods and naturally result in a large increase in the quantity sold we explore whether the data support the hypothesis that these increases are at least partly due to demand anticipation at low prices consumers store for future consumption this effect if present has broad economic implications we test the predictions of an inventory model using scanner data with two years of household purchases the results are consistent with an inventory model and suggest that static demand estimates may overestimate price sensitivity

price competition under stockpiling and flexible consumption abstract conventional wisdom suggests that the main effect of price promotion is on brand switching i e secondary demand however some recent studies demonstrate that the primary demand expansion effect can be considerably larger than previously believed a significant driver of this primary demand effect is consumer stockpiling in response to price promotions indeed experimental studies have shown that additional inventory on hand can lead to an endogenous increase in consumption the authors develop a model of price competition between firms in response to the stockpiling and subsequent consumption dynamics of consumers in this setting the flexible consumption effect causes more intense price competition deeper promotions and an increase in the frequency of promotions the authors use two years of scanner panel data from eight product categories and 4313 stockkeeping units to test three implications of the theoretical model they find strong support for each

the formation of a core periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks recent empirical evidence suggests that nancial networks exhibit a core periphery network structure this paper aims at giving an economic explanation for the emergence of such a structure using network formation theory focusing on intermediation benets we nd that a core periphery network cannot be unilaterally stable when agents are homogeneous the best response dynamics converge to a unique unilaterally stable outcome ranging from an empty to denser networks as the costs of linking decrease a core periphery network structure can form endogenously however if we allow for heterogeneity among agents in size we show that our model can reproduce the observed core periphery structure in the dutch interbank market for reasonable parameter values

storable good monopoly the role of commitment we study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time the literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive for consumers the key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling this stockpiling motive can be present in the case of standard durables as well in environments unmodeled in the prior literature we show that if the monopolist cannot commit then prices are higher in all periods and social welfare is lower than in the case in which the monopolist can commit this is in contrast with the durable goods analysis in the literature on the coase conjecture