multinationals productivity advantage scale or technology this study decomposes the productivity advantage of foreign multinationals into a technology and a scale effect and analyses the causal relationship between foreign ownership and these two components this is done by analyzing the effects of an acquisition of a domestic establishment by a foreign multinational using a combined propensity score matching and difference in differences estimation the main results show that any positive impact of acquisition is predominantly due to changes in technical efficiency and not in scale and that the preacquisition productivity of the target plays a role in mediating the rate of technology transfer from the multinational jel f23 l22

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

do r d tax credits work evidence from a panel of countries 1979 1997 this paper examines the impact of fiscal incentives on the level of r d investment an econometric model of r d investment is estimated using a new panel of data on tax changes and r d spending in nine oecd countries over a 19 year period 1979 1997 we find evidence that tax incentives are effective in increasing r d intensity this is true even after allowing for permanent country specific characteristics world macro shocks and other policy influences we estimate that a 10 fall in the cost of r d stimulates just over a 1 rise in the level of r d in the short run and just under a 10 rise in r d in the long run

taxation of outbound direct investment economic principles and tax policy considerations this paper reviews economic principles for optimality of the taxation of international profit from both a global and national perspective it argues that for traditional systems based on the residence of the investor or the source of the income nothing less than full harmonisation across countries can achieve global optimality the conditions for national optimality are more difficult to identify but are most likely to imply source based taxation however source based taxation requires an allocation of the profits of multinational companies to individual jurisdictions this is not only very difficult in practice but in some cases is without any conceptual foundation the taxation of interest income on a residence basis is also hard to justify if the aim of the tax system is to tax only the income arising from economic activity in a given country

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

ranking auctions with risk averse bidders this paper ranks first and second price independent value auctions with risk averse bidders when entry is endogenous unless bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion dara the fixed n ranking of first price over second price is sustained however when bidders exhibit dara we show that the effect of entry sometimes reverses the ranking we discuss how elements of the auction environment such as the relative magnitude of entry costs the number of potential bidders and the degree of risk aversion affect the ranking journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82 c72

notes and comments the amsterdam auction the amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the dutch capital for centuries by awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder the amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of myerson s 1981 optimal auction in a series of experiments we compare the standard first price and english auctions the optimal auction and two variants of the amsterdam auction with strongly asymmetric bidders the second price amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction

how risk sharing may enhance efficiency of english auctions we investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an english auction in a setting that extends maskin and riley 1984 econometrica 52 1473 1518 in three aspects i the seller can be risk averse ii the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences and iii the auction can have a binding reserve price our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue which in general benefits risk averse bidders when the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder a condition often verifiable by deduction prior to the auction the premium also benefis the seller and therefore leads to a pareto improvement of the english auction the advantage of such premium tactics is directly related to a the seller s degree of risk aversion b the reserve price c the riskiness of the object for sale d the degree of heterogeneity in risk preferences among the bidders and e the number of the potential bidders

english auctions and the stolper samuelson theorem we prove that the english auction with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations has an efficient ex post equilibrium we establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained we also prove two versions of the stolper samuelson theorem one for economies with n goods and n factors and one for non square economies similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results

are stated preferences convergent with revealed preferences empirical evidence from nigeria abstract the debate on the relevance of monetary valuation of environmental goods has often hinged around the convergence of stated and revealed preferences and in turn the actual money choices of respondents in this paper we report two separate experiments conducted in southeastern nigeria to compare irrigators stated willingness to pay for a river basin restoration scheme designed to mitigate soil and water pollution problems in their farms with their actual expenditures to mitigate the same pollution problems we found that the farmers stated and revealed preferences were significantly correlated but yielded significantly different means at 5 level while econometric analysis reveals a systematic association between key socioeconomic variables and farmers stated wtp lending credence to the cvm within its theoretical framework analysis of the qualitative follow ups reveals inconsistencies in some farmers stated and revealed preferences that cannot be satisfactorily explained on the basis of economic theory alone while individual utility maximisation was a dominant driver of both stated and revealed preferences for most farmers lack of environmental awareness information complexity risk aversion and peer pressure were seen to limit the ability and willingness of the least educated segment of the sample to make apparently rational economic decisions in both markets overall the results question the use of convergent and or theoretical validity arguments for justifying and or criticising the use of stated preference experiments in environmental policy

estimating willingness to pay with exaggeration bias corrected contingent valuation method estimates of the prices customers are willing to pay for new products or services using responses from survey questionnaires are notoriously biased on the high side an approach to obtaining more realistic estimates is suggested here called the exaggeration bias corrected contingent valuation method ebc cvm the method is an alternative to conventional contingent valuation methods cvms that have been used in economics and to a lesser extent in marketing two experiments and one field study are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method in each case the proposed method outperformed conventional cvms in comparison with real choices or more realistic price estimates

risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first and second price auctions abstract we analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values we show that the seller s optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion and more so in the first price auction the reserve price also decreases in the buyers risk aversion in the first price auction thus greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions especially that of the first price auction at the interim stage the first price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval as well as by the seller

hypothetical versus real willingness to pay in the health care sector results from a field experiment abstract we conducted a field experiment comparing hypothetical and real purchase decisions for a pharmacist provided asthma management program among 172 subjects with asthma subjects received either a dichotomous choice contingent valuation question or were given the opportunity to actually enroll in the program three different prices were used us 15 40 and 80 in the hypothetical group 38 of subjects said that they would purchase the good at the stated price but only 12 of subjects in the real group purchased the good p 0 000 we cannot however reject the null hypothesis that definitely sure hypothetical yes responses as identified in a follow up question correspond to real yes responses we conclude that the dichotomous choice contingent valuation method overestimates willingness to pay but that it may be possible to correct for this overestimation by sorting out definitely sure yes responses

multinationals and industrial policy are there benefits to the host country from multinational investments does potential value from these investments make active industrial policy worthwhile we answer the first question affirmatively having reviewed economic principles and evidence concerning the effects of projects locating in or not being off shored from a country on the second policy can have a limited effect in influencing location decisions but it is doubtful that it is cost effective implementation faces lack of information risk of capture and in many cases non rigorous processes competition between jurisdictions means that much policy is investment diversion not investment creation there is a case for supra national controls as with eu state aid regulations for policy to be used only for well defined market failures and for better implementation and more rigorous ex ante appraisal and ex post evaluation copyright 2013 oxford university press

auction form preferences of risk averse bid takers we analyze the preferences of a risk averse seller over the class of standard auctions with symmetric and risk neutral bidders assuming that buyers private signals are independently distributed we find that a sealed bid first price auction with an appropriately set reserve price is preferred by all risk averse sellers to any other standard auction in first and second price auctions the more risk averse a seller the lower the seller s optimal reserve price given two first price auctions with reserve prices and entry fees such that both have the same screening level all risk averse sellers prefer the auction with the lower entry fee

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

wasteful public spending and state aid control the conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers however competition policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing wasteful spending regardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved although it is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid control but rather for better domestic political accountability this paper argues that wasteful spending may be a by product of accountability not a symptom of its absence specifically we describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence and voters rationally reward them for this we discuss implications for the role of state aid control mechanisms 2006 by the european economic association

government and business an introduction this article considers the apparent renewal of interest in interventionist industrial policies among oecd governments asking just what if anything is new with particular reference to the uk it outlines the theoretical justifications for such interventions and discusses issues concerning intangibles innovation and infrastructure it describes the special emphasis placed on re balancing the structure of production the central role accorded to human capital and the salience of spatial aspects of policy it stresses the potential for government and administrative failure just as much as market failure copyright 2013 oxford university press

asymmetric english auctions abstract this paper studies equilibria of the n bidder single object english or open ascending price auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders maskin in h siebert ed privatization institut fur weltwirtschaften der universitat kiel kiel 1992 pp 115 136 showed that if the values satisfy a single crossing condition then the two bidder english auction has an efficient equilibrium in this paper two extensions of the single crossing condition the average crossing condition and the cyclical crossing condition are introduced the main result is that under either of these conditions the n bidder english auction has an efficient equilibrium

taxing the multinational enterprise on the forced redesign of global value chains and other inefficiencies the taxation of the multinational enterprise mne has been a continuing concern for policymakers we argue that the changing nature of the mobile mne e g its improved ability to fine slice the value chain and disperse it geographically makes it increasingly important to rethink current tax policies first there should be more focus on the inefficiencies that arise when taxation leads to the inefficient location of mne activities thus mnes may shift activities to low tax jurisdictions that offer lucrative pecuniary and non pecuniary incentives but do not enable their investments to maximize their contribution to global value creation second international tax regimes should ensure that mnes pay for their consumption of local public goods and public finance scholars have long known that the taxation based distortions are minimized when the tax objects are immobile however the bulk of current tax policies are aimed at corporate profits that are both poor proxies for the consumption of local public goods as well as extremely mobile integrating theory from international business public finance and economic geography our analysis demonstrates that moving the incidence of taxation from corporate profits to dividends and consumption would unambiguously improve both wealth creation and efficiency

spiders and snakes offshoring and agglomeration in the global economy abstract global production sharing is determined by international cost differences and frictions related to the costs of unbundling stages spatially the interaction between these forces depends on engineering details of the production process with two extremes being snakes and spiders snakes are processes whose sequencing is dictated by engineering spiders involve the assembly of parts in no particular order this paper studies spatial unbundling as frictions fall showing that outcomes are very different for snakes and spiders even if they share some features both snakes and spiders have in common a property that lower frictions produce discontinuous location changes and overshooting parts may move against their comparative costs because of proximity benefits and further reductions in frictions lead these parts to be reshored predictions for trade volumes and the number of fragmented stages are quite different in the two cases for spiders a part crosses borders at most twice the value of trade increases monotonically as frictions fall except when the assembler relocates and the direction of parts trade is reversed for snakes the volume of trade and number of endogenously determined stages is bounded only by the fragmentation of the underlying engineering process and lower frictions monotonically increase trade volumes

universal health insurance in the clinton plan coverage as a tax financed public good the financing arrangements embodied in the clinton health reform plan involve some important differences in the way in which public goods are usually financed the subsidies to small low wage firms mandated to provide benefits distort markets in both labor and products and offer incentives for the creation of small firms in addition the financing scheme implicitly envisions a head tax on families at modest income levels but offers a possible rationale for it nevertheless the main reason for many of the financing features appears to be an attempt to hold down the apparent budgetary cost of universal coverage

foreign direct investment and host country productivity the american automotive component industry in the 1980s although several studies have shown that inward foreign direct investment fdi often leads to greater host country productivity researchers have yet to determine the relative importance of direct technology transfer and competitive pressure to assess the relative importance of the two channels we examine the us auto component industry between 1979 and 1991 during this period japanese automobile assemblers began to produce vehicles in north america and began to purchase inputs from us auto component manufacturers those us manufacturers that sold components to japanese transplants would be the direct recipients of any technologies transferred from the japanese although we find that the direct investment by japanese assemblers was associated with overall productivity improvement in the us auto component industry we find little evidence of direct technology transfer the productivity growth of us suppliers affiliated with japanese assemblers was no greater than that of other non affiliated us suppliers further we find that the japanese assemblers tended to purchase components from less productive us suppliers and moreover that low productivity suppliers that sold goods to japanese assemblers had a higher survival rate than low productivity suppliers that did not sell to japanese firms the results suggest that increased competitive pressure in the auto sector was the main cause of overall productivity improvement at least during the initial stages of fdi of the 1980s

the contingent valuation debate why economists should care t he contingent valuation method involves the use of sample surveys questionnaires to elicit the willingness of respondents to pay for generally hypothetical projects or programs the name of the method refers to the fact that the values revealed by respondents are contingent upon the constructed or simulated market presented in the survey a spirited and occasionally mean spirited battle over such methods is currently being waged involving competing factions within the federal government economists and lawyers representing business and environmental groups and interested academics as well at issue is a seemingly quite specific question should environmental regulations currently under development at both the department of the interior and the department of commerce sanction the use of the contingent valuation method in estimating the damage done by spills of oil chemicals or other substances covered by federal law more generally the debate raises broad questions about what economists have to say about the values that individuals place on public or private goods the two papers that follow this one make cases for and against the use of the contingent valuation method my aim here is to provide an overview of the technique and the debate surrounding it i also want to suggest why this debate should matter to economists both professionally and in their roles as citizens and consumers

valuing health care using willingness to pay a comparison of the payment card and dichotomous choice methods this paper compares willingness to pay wtp estimates generated from the dichotomous choice dc and payment card pc approaches in a split sample wtp experiment concerned with allocating scarce health care resources across three health care interventions the dc approach is shown consistently to generate larger welfare estimates than the pc observed difference between pc and dc experiments cannot be explained by the inclusion of non demanders or methods of statistical analysis but may be partly explained by yea saying no evidence of range bias or mid point bias was found with pc responses data were also collected on respondents ordinal rankings of the three interventions and person trade offs ptos neither of these approaches converged with wtp future work must address the decision heuristics individuals employ when responding to valuation experiments

corporate tax elasticities a reader s guide to empirical findings corporate taxes exert a variety of effects on business behaviour a wealth of empirical evidence assesses the magnitude of these behavioural margins of taxation this article offers an up to date review and aims to provide common ground by computing for each distortion the semi elasticity of the corporate tax base we pay particular attention to international investment where it is not a priory clear whether marginal investment decisions or discrete locations are most important using anextension of the meta analysis of de mooij and ederveen 2003 we explore the extent to which existing studies reveal differences in effect size between the intensive and extensive margins of international investment

auctions with contingent payments an overview i survey a literature on auctions with contingent payments that is auctions in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex post verifiable variable such as revenues in oil lease auctions based on demarzo et al 2005 i describe a partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms pricing rules and seller commitment and why the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply even in an independent private values setup i discuss models that incorporate adverse selection moral hazard competition between auctioneers common values and the sale of multiple units

exploring preference anomalies in double bounded contingent valuation double bounded dichotomous choice dbdc contingent valuation offers increased efficiency of willingness to pay wtp estimates compared with the single bounded format however evidence suggests dbdc generates anomalous respondent behaviour this paper provides the first investigation and explanation of these anomalies in health results suggest the incentives for truthful preference revelation are altered in the presence of a follow up question this result is found using both regression techniques and analysis of raw responses although findings suggest very certain respondents exhibit less anomalous behaviour inconsistencies remain across bounds the results of this study question the use of iterative valuation formats

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

multinationals cross border acquisitions and wage dispersion we examine the impact of cross border acquisitions on intra firm wage dispersion using a detailed swedish linked employer employee data set including data on all firms and about 50 of the swedish labour force with information on job tasks and education foreign acquisitions of domestic multinationals and local firms increase wage dispersion but so do also other types of cross border acquisitions hence it is the acquisition itself rather than foreign ownership that increases wage dispersion the positive wage effect is concentrated to ceos and other managers whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

are hypothetical referenda incentive compatible a comment in a recent article in this journal cummings al 1997 offer experimental evidence rejecting the hypothesis that a hypothetical referendum is an incentive compatible mechanism for obtaining the social value of or willingness to pay for changes in the allocation of environmental goods and services while cautions in offering a blanket rejection of hypothetical referenda as a means of measuring economic values on the basis of their findings the authors do suggest that at least in experimental settings respondents appear to behave differently when real money is changing hands wheather hypothetical situations adequately mimic real market situations has been debated in the contigent valuation literature since its inception see cummings brookshire and schulze 1986 cummings et al s finding of incentive incompatibility appears to offer strong evidence for the critics of hypothetical referenda

are firms that received r d subsidies more innovative this paper looks at the effectiveness of r d grants for canadian plants that already benefit from r d tax credits using a non parametric matching estimator we find that firms that benefited from both policy measures introduced more new products than their counterparts that only benefited from r d tax incentives they also made more world first product innovations and were more successful in commercializing their innovations

how bidder s number affects optimal reserve price in first price auctions under risk aversion this paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments the seller s optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first price auctions when the seller and or buyers are risk averse

risk aversion and the choice between risky prospects the preservation of comparative statics results most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty the primary example which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk it is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty the paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty

premium auctions and risk preferences abstract in a premium auction the seller offers some payback called premium to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction this paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders risk preferences we analyze a two stage english premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders risk tolerance a net premium effect is key to this result

measurement of health state utilities for economic appraisal health status measurement for use in economic appraisal of health care programmes is reviewed in this paper with particular emphasis on utility measurement a framework for economic appraisal is presented displaying the various components that must be measured and showing how the three forms of analysis cost effectiveness analysis cost benefit analysis and cost utility analysis relate to the framework and to each other one of the components in the framework is health status it can be measured using ad hoc numeric scales willingness to pay receive or health state utilities the determination of health state utilities is reviewed covering the following issues alternative sources of utilities health state descriptions multi attribute utility approach determination of appropriate subjects utility aggregation and accuracy three measurement techniques for health state utilities are described in detail rating scale standard gamble and time trade off the use of these methods is described for both chronic and temporary health states and for both health states considered better than death and those considered worse than death

evaluating the validity of the dichotomous choice question format in contingent valuation hypothetical and actual cash willingness to pay wtp for an art print were elicited with dichotomous choice and open ended question formats comparing hypothetical and actual dichotomous choice responses using both a likelihood ratio test and the method of convolutions suggests we reject equality at the 0 05 but not the 0 01 level hypothetical wtp was roughly two times actual wtp with the dichotomous choice format there were no significant differences between the open ended and dichotomous choice question formats when both were used to estimate hypothetical wtp or both used to estimate actual wtp

monotone comparative statics under uncertainty this paper analyzes monotone comparative statics predictions in several classes of stochastic optimization problems the main results characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold based on properties of primitive functions that is utility functions and probability distributions the results apply when the primitives satisfy one of the following two properties i a single crossing property which arises in applications such as portfolio investment problems and auctions or ii log supermodularity which arises in the analysis of demand functions affiliated random variables stochastic orders and orders over risk aversion

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

precautionary bidding in auctions we analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky we show that when the risk in the valuations increases dara bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium ceteris paribus buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price second price and english auctions with affiliated common interdependent values this precautionary bidding effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly we also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make dara bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk neutral or cara bidders would be indifferent thus the potential for a winner s curse can be a blessing for rational dara bidders

fighting collusion in auctions an experimental investigation the danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers in this paper we compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions the english auction and the first price sealed bid auction and a lesser known format the amsterdam second price auction in the amsterdam auction the highest losing bidder earns a premium for stirring up the price we study two settings in one all bidders can collude and in another only a subset is eligible the experiments show that the amsterdam auction triggers less collusion than the standard auctions we compare experimental results to theoretical predictions and provide an explanation where they differ

firm location decisions regional grants and agglomeration externalities we examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments we find that a region s existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas but importantly we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry this suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms location decisions in the face of countervailing co location benefits