the proximity of nations to a socially sustainable steady state economy abstract there has been increasing interest in new economic models that aim to improve quality of life without increasing consumption this article provides the first empirical analysis of how close modern day economies are to the concept of a steady state economy and explores whether there is any relationship between a country s proximity to such an economy and its social performance the analysis is carried out using the degrowth accounts a set of 16 biophysical and social indicators that are derived from herman daly s definition of a steady state economy and the social goals of the degrowth movement these indicators are applied to 180 countries over a 10 year period the analysis reveals that the majority of countries in the world are biophysical growth economies there are only a small number of countries where resource use is relatively constant from year to year e g denmark france japan poland romania and the us and only four countries experiencing biophysical degrowth germany guyana moldova and zimbabwe there are no countries that achieve a true steady state economy defined as an economy with a stable level of resource use maintained within ecological limits however a few countries come relatively close including colombia cuba kyrgyzstan romania and south africa in general countries with stable resource use perform better on many social indicators than countries with either increasing or decreasing resource use this finding runs contrary to conventional economic thought however social performance is also higher in countries with greater per capita resource use overall these findings suggest that a steady state economy can be socially sustainable but countries need to become much more efficient at transforming natural resources into human well being if all seven billion people on earth are to lead a good life within ecological limits

the entrepreneur s idea and outside finance theory and evidence about entrepreneurial roles abstract we study the problem faced by the entrepreneur seeking outside support to turn an entrepreneurial idea into a successful innovation specifically a successful technological innovation resulting from research and development the paper develops and tests the hypothesis that as an entrepreneur s innovative idea becomes more complex the entrepreneur will find it more difficult to obtain outside finance and then outside support more generally for the commercialization of the idea consequently the entrepreneur will be more likely to take on additional roles beyond providing the essential idea the evidence supports the hypothesis that other things being the same an entrepreneur with a more complex idea will have greater difficulty obtaining outside finance and will be more likely to take on the additional roles of development production marketing and distribution that are necessary for successful innovation

consensus building how to persuade a group many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups the paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal adopting a mechanism design approach to communication it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others the paper unveils the factors such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor and the size and governance of the group that condition the sponsor s ability to maneuver and get his project approved

a new look at the returns and risks to pharmaceutical r d this study investigates the returns to r d for 100 new drugs introduced into the united states during the decade of the 1970s in contrast to prior studies it incorporates several significant structural changes that have occurred in the pharmaceutical industry during the 1980s these include higher real drug prices and a greater degree of generic competition a major finding is that the return on r d for the average new drug is approximately equal to the 9 percent industry cost of capital however the performance of new drugs introduced during the latter half of the 1970s was markedly better than that of early 1970s introductions this latter finding is consistent with the more rapid rate of industry growth in real r d expenditures the study also finds that the variation in returns is highly skewed with only the top 30 drugs covering mean r d costs on a fully allocated basis finally it is shown that real drug price increases in the 1980s were necessary for the average new drug introduction to recover its r d costs

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement savings plans in 1995 40 percent of working men and 32 percent of working women were covered by a defined contribution dc plan a distinguishing characteristic of these plans is that workers can generally choose how their assets are invested using data from the 1992 and 1995 surveys of consumer finances scf this paper examines whether workers differ systematically by gender in the allocation of assets in dc plans previous researchers have reported that many workers tend to invest their retirement assets too conservatively and in particular that women are less likely than men to invest in risky assets such as stocks in the presence of an equity premium a lower propensity by women to invest in stocks could translate into large differences in the accumulation of financial wealth for retirement we establish that gender differences in investment decisions exist though they are more complicated than previous studies have suggested we show that these differences are not completely explained by differences in individual or household characteristics a few studies have examined gender differences in investment decisions vickie l bajtelsmit and jack l vanderhei 1997 richard p hinz et al 1997 these studies use administrative data and report that women tend to invest their retirement funds in less risky vehicles than men michael haliassos and carol c bertaut 1995 use the 1983 scf to examine why such a large fraction of households do not own any stock they report that gender does not have a significant effect on the probability of owning stock though gender differences are not the focus of their paper what these data sources lack haliassos and bertaut being the exception is a rich set of demographic and other variables on households that theory predicts should affect investment behavior this paper adds to the literature by examining gender differences in investment decisions conditioning on such variables the results highlight the importance of including marital status risk aversion measures and the portfolio of assets held outside dc plans when examining gender differences in investment decisions in these plans

green goals and full employment are they compatible abstract two empirical correlations are studied one between economic growth and environmental impacts and the other between the lack of economic growth and unemployment it is demonstrated that at a global level economic growth is strongly correlated with environmental impacts and barriers to fast decoupling are large and numerous on the other hand low or negative growth is highly correlated with increasing unemployment in most market economies and strategies to change this lead to difficult questions and tradeoffs the coexistence of these two correlations which have rarely been studied together in the literature on green growth degrowth and a growth justifies ambivalence about growth to make key environmental goals compatible with full employment the decoupling of environmental impacts from economic output has to be accompanied by a reduction of dependence on growth in particular strategies to tackle unemployment without the need for growth several of which are studied in this article need much more attention in research and policy

the shapley value of resale proof trades abstract this paper studies the shapley value of transferable utility games associated with resale proof trades of information is in the core iff there is exactly one minimal resale proof set a simple expression for is obtained for symmetric games and some bounds are given for in non symmetric cases

why are some independent inventors heroes and others hobbyists the moderating role of technological diversity and specialization abstract despite a substantial body of research investigating the market significance of inventions by independent inventors relatively little attention has been devoted to understanding their technological significance a recent study conducted by dahlin k taylor m fichman m 2004 today s edisons or weekend hobbyists technical impact and success of inventions by independent inventors res policy 33 1167 1183 on the tennis racket industry shows that independent inventors are a heterogeneous group which includes both heroes who contribute substantially to technological progress and hobbyists who make only a marginal contribution what is not asked and therefore not explained is why this distinction arises in this paper we focus on the type of prior technological knowledge in terms of technological specialization and diversity applied by independent inventors and their corporate counterparts as a factor explaining differences in technological impact our empirical setting is the field of medical equipment technology we find that independent inventors are more sensitive to the negative effects of technological diversity than their corporate counterparts furthermore our study reveals that technological specialization pays off more for independent inventors than for their corporate counterparts therefore those independent inventors who apply low degrees of diversity and high degrees of specialization are capable of reaching the same level as or even outperforming their corporate counterparts thus becoming heroes based on our findings we discuss implications for research and corporate practice

collective memory cultural transmission and investments memory plays a crucial role in the transmission of cultural and national identity in every soci ety and every country the collective memory1 transmitted to the young by the older generation through a variety of channels e g school textbooks the media monuments and commemora tive rituals influences their perception of their cultural identity and values and their willingness to invest in them with major economic as well as political and social consequences this natu rally raises two questions first what would be the socially optimal transmission of collective memory to the young is it the case as intuition might suggest that the older generation should strive to be as unbiased accurate and comprehensive as possible in communicating its collec tive memory to the younger generation if not why and how should it depart from this objec tive second is collective memory transmission in practice likely to differ from what would be socially optimal and if so how these questions are at the heart of many current debates including those over education policy e g how history should be taught the level of control the state should have over school textbooks and curriculum 2 over the media e g the role of the corporation for public broadcasting cpb in the united states or the british broadcasting corporation bbc in the united kingdom 3 and over cultural integration e g centralized ver sus decentralized institutions in the european union legislation affecting freedom of speech in the united kingdom 4

viewpoint decision making in committees this article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision making a committee consists of self interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre specified decision rule we focus on costly information acquisition strategic information aggregation and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision making process such as over cautiousness voting and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems cet article passe en revue certains developpements recents dans la theorie de la prise de decision en comite un comite est defini comme un groupe de membres qui ont des interets particuliers et qui prennent une decision publique en agregeant une information imparfaite et dispersee a travers le groupe selon une regle de decision pre etablie les auteurs portent leur attention sur l acquisition couteuse d information l agregation de l information strategique et les regles et procedures qui accroissent la qualite de la decision en comite ce qui apparait comme des inefficacites du processus de prise de decision en comite sur precaution votes delais s avere etre des remedes partiels aux problemes d incitation

are women more risk averse we find that single women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men using u s sample data we examine household holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in financial risk taking as wealth increases the proportion of wealth held as risky assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single men gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age race and number of children greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation for women s lower levels of wealth compared with men s jel j16 d81 g11

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

making the hidden visible the importance of caring activities and their principles for any economy abstract in this paper we emphasize the interrelation of the monetary free enterprise sector of the economy and its maintaining basis the current discussion on sustainability has so far placed too little attention on this circumstance to us this interrelation is fundamental it is one important key to understanding present day economics and economies by concentrating on this interrelation we question the widely accepted dualism between the public and the private between the officially acknowledged economic and the invisible economic by this we create our own specific approach to the question of how to reform economic thought and action in order to achieve a naturally and socially sustainable living

affirmative action programs and business ownership among minorities and women affirmative action programs are commonly used as a means to level the playing field for minority and women owned firms in public procurement markets and therefore may be a positive factor in business entry and survival to the extent that affirmative action programs also apply to traditional labor markets however they may alter the opportunity cost of starting a business we utilize the elimination of affirmative action in california and washington states through voter initiatives to identify the effect of affirmative action on minority and female self employment rates in our base specifications we find evidence of modest increases in self employment among minorities and women in both california and washington after elimination of affirmative action consistent with the hypothesis that the opportunity cost of starting a business fell due to restricting opportunities in the traditional labor markets the sign of the estimated effect however is not uniformly positive when considering specific race gender groups and the statistical significance of the main results is somewhat sensitive to the choice of control states

should degrowth embrace the job guarantee degrowth should consider the right to work a job guarantee jg as a way of making a smaller economy more just and socially sustainable economic shrinkage in richer countries is accompanied by increased unemployment a bad enough problem in itself but also a barrier to voters acceptance of the degrowth path since being out of work is distinct from being poor anti poverty income policies should be approached separately the jg is one of several paths to full employment including reduced working time this essay only briefly mentions some real world jg programs and some technical objections the main suggestion is to move employment from being a matter of economics particularly economic growth to being a political right a right to work is necessarily effective and would avoid sacrificing the ecological and social goals of degrowth on the altar of full employment

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

possibility of relicensing and patent protection abstract we examine the effects of patent protection paying attention to its role of prohibiting relicensing we focus on two questions first whether does the innovator have an incentive of licensing the concealable easily kept secret if not licensed innovation in the case where patent protection is absent second what effects does patent protection have upon the innovator s payoff and the consumers welfare principal findings include the following in the case of nondrastic innovations in the sense of arrow the innovator has an incentive of licensing even without patent protection patent protection generally benefits the innovator but may cause damage to the consumers for large innovations for drastic innovations patent protection has no influence on licensing licensing never takes place regardless of whether it is provided or not

trust coordination and the industrial organization of political activism we study political activism by several interest groups with private signals when their ideological distance to the policymaker is small a low trust regime prevails agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted taking advantage of the cone rmation provided by others activism conversely the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure when ideological distance is large a high trust regime prevails lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers and the policymaker s response threshold is correspondingly lower within some intermediate range both equilibria coexist we then study the optimal organization of ine uence activities contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate jel d72 d78 d82

university spin out companies and venture capital abstract the creation of university spin out companies that create wealth is a major policy objective of governments and universities finance is a catalyst of this wealth creation yet access to venture capital is a major impediment faced by these companies in this article we adopt a finance pecking order perspective to examine the problems faced by those university spin out companies seeking to access venture capital we triangulate evidence from spin out companies university technology transfer offices and venture capital firms in the uk and continental europe to identify the problems and to suggest policy developments for these parties as well as government we compare perceptions of high tech venture capital firms that invest in spin outs with those that do not and also consider vcs views on spin outs versus other high tech firms our evidence identifies a mismatch between the demand and supply side of the market in line with the pecking order theory venture capitalists prefer to invest after the seed stage however in contrast to the pecking order theory ttos see venture capital as more important than internal funds early on we develop policy implications for universities technology transfer offices academic entrepreneurs venture capital firms and government and suggest areas for further research

private investor participation and commercialization rates for government sponsored research and development would a prediction market improve the performance of the sbir programme an objective of the us small business innovation research sbir programme is the private sector commercialization of funded rd our analysis of department of defense dod phase ii awards suggests that the estimated probability of commercialization is only 0 47 we investigate econometrically whether outside private investors have useful information about proposed sbir projects prospects for commercialization our findings suggest that they do thereby providing support for the possibility that a prediction market could improve the performance of the sbir programme

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

an information good market with symmetrical externalities in 3 the author investigated how an information good is supplied from its owner to users through trades in a case where all the traders are located at geographically separated points and thus a transmission of the good implies certain costs and moreover its external effects are negligibly small in general however information goods possess negative external effects as seen from the following suppose a firm possessing a new technology gains a profit by monopolistically utilizing it once this technology is known to and used by other firms the firm can no longer enjoy its monopolistic position and might incur a significant loss of profit the aim of this paper is to analyze how a concealable information good with external effects is diffused from its monopolistic owner to demanders through trades generally information goods have their own peculiar properties among them we suppose in this paper the following typical ones the first one is a possibility of free replication namely each trader can replicate the good as many times as he wants without any cost immediately after he obtains it each replica is supposed to be exactly the same as the original good the second one is an indivisibility which implies that each trader gains a benefit just from one unit of the good the third one is an irreversibility in trading the good in the case of trading ordinary goods it would be possible for a buyer to return the good to a seller by cancelling the trade for information goods however this would not be possible since a buyer may replicate it immediately after he purchases because of free replication namely a seller must refuse a buyer s proposal to return it since a buyer might already have its replica the fourth one is a negative external effect mentioned above namely a benefit brought by the good is affected by how the good is possessed among other traders and if some trader newly gets it then the benefit for each possessor is decreased throughout this paper we further assume that costs for transmitting the good are negligibly small a new process for producing chemical products a new computer program and so on are information goods which we have in mind for further description of information goods refer to 1 2 and 5 here we remark that in the case of trading such an information good it might occur from free replication that once each demander owns the good he will

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

microcredit an answer to the gender problem in funding microfinance institutions mfis target people excluded from the traditional banking system by providing start up capital to these under financed individuals they enable a greater number of women to start their own business particularly in sectors where initial capital requirements are high our study follows a portfolio of 3 640 microcredit applicants in france over the 2000 2006 time period identifying mfi client profiles and bringing to light gender differences in borrowers compared to a wider sample of entrepreneurs this study shows that the male female gap found amongst company creators is also maintained amongst the clienteles of mfis empirical results also suggest that gender is a decisive factor regarding the amount of credit provided to borrowers when comparing with other factors in the borrower and firm profile thus to a certain extent mfis are found to reinforce gender inequalities in france

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

communication networks externalities and the price of information information goods or information for short play an essential role in modern economies we consider a trading framework where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer exerts externalities and can be freely replicated and transmitted through links in a communication network prices paid for information are determined via the asymmetric nash bargaining solution with endogenous disagreement points this decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network we use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre trade network formation stage an application to citation graphs results in eigenvector like measures of intellectual influence

and a vision appeared unto them of a great profit evidence of self deception among the self employed evidence is presented that the self employed expect better financial outcomes than do employees but experience worse realisations this is consistent with theories that entrepreneurship is driven by unrealistic optimism

the economics of degrowth economic degrowth is ecologically desirable and possibly inevitable but under what conditions can it become socially sustainable how can we have full employment and economic stability without growth what will happen to public spending and to public debt how would production be organised in a degrowing economy and under what plausible socio political conditions could such grand changes happen standard economic theories and models ignore these questions for them economic growth is an axiomatic necessity this article reviews recent contributions in the economics of degrowth and identifies research avenues for ecological economists

waiting to imitate on the dynamic pricing of knowledge we study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally imitated imitators may enter the market by imitating the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention the possibility of contracting dramatically affects the need for patent protection our results show that i imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist ii the inventor sells knowledge through contracts that allow resale by the imitators and iii under certain conditions the inventor s payoff increases with the number of imitators

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

leveraging entrepreneurship through private investments does gender matter using project data from a random sample of phase ii research awards from the national institutes of health sbir program we estimate the relative probability that woman owned firms are able to attract private investments to fund the transition of the technology developed under the sponsorship of the sbir program to an innovation to enter the market we find that women owned firms are as much as 16 points less likely to attract private investment dollars compared to male owned firms factors excluding the size of the sbir award held constant women owned firms that received larger awards performed substantially better although the sbir program has a legislated directive to increase the participation of woman owned firms in the program our findings suggest that it might not be sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the profitability of such investments actually bringing a developed technology to market

the informational role of supermajorities abstract we study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically we show that consistent with empirical evidence it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities due to an informational role that we unveil optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions even though more voters are awarded a positive share we also examine consequences in terms of quality of decision making we show that the introduction of a strategic agenda setter can lead to socially suboptimal decisions

the effect of risk sensitivity on a supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and quality investment abstract the paper provides a thorough investigation of the revenue sharing contract format typically used in the mobile applications apps industry the platform provider sets the level of revenue sharing and the app developer determines the investment in quality and the selling price of the app the demand for an app which depends on both price and quality investment is assumed to be uncertain so the risk attitude of the supply chain members has to be considered specifically we focus on how risk sensitive behavior of supply chain members affects chain performance the members equilibrium strategies are analyzed under different attitudes toward risk averse neutral and seeking we show that the retailer s utility function has no effect on the equilibrium strategies and suggest schemes to identify these strategies for any utility function of the developer we find that i the revenue sharing contract circumvents the double marginalization effect associated with vertical competition and therefore yields the best selling price for the customer ii a decentralized supply chain sometimes performs better than a centralized one and iii a risk seeking developer may obtain a higher expected profit than does a risk neutral developer

impact caps why population affluence and technology strategies should be abandoned abstract this paper classifies strategies to reduce environmental impact according to the terms of the i pat formula policies limiting resource depletion and pollution impact by heavily taxing resources or rationing them on a country basis are thus called direct or left side strategies other policies to achieve the environmental goal of lowering impact strive to limit population and affluence or to use technology to lower the ratio of resource inputs to goods and services outputs next it is shown that lowering any of these right side factors causes or at least enables the other two to rise or rebound this has two consequences 1 since i pat does not express these interdependencies on the right side it is more accurately written i f p a t and 2 success in lowering any of the right side factors does not necessarily lower impact rationing or pigouvian taxation of resources or pollution on the other hand necessarily lower impact and are therefore preferable to population consumption and technological environmental strategies finally lifestyle and technology changes towards more sufficiency and efficiency would follow the caps as consumers and producers work to retain the greatest amount of welfare within the limits given

degrowth taking stock and reviewing an emerging academic paradigm degrowth has evolved within a decade from an activist movement into a multi disciplinary academic paradigm however an overview taking stock of the peer refereed degrowth literature is yet missing here we review 91 articles that were published between 2006 and 2015 we find that the academic degrowth discourse occupies a small but expanding niche at the intersection of social and applied environmental sciences the discourse is shaped by authors from high income mainly mediterranean countries until 2012 articles largely constitute conceptual essays endorsed by normative claims more recently degrowth has branched out into modelling empirical assessments and the study of concrete implementations authors tend to agree in that economic growth cannot be sustained ad infinitum on a resource constraint planet and that degrowth requires far reaching societal change whether degrowth should be considered as a collectively consented choice or an environmentally imposed inevitability constitutes a major debate among degrowth thinkers we argue that the academic discourse could benefit from rigid hypotheses testing through input output modelling material flow analysis life cycle assessments or social surveys by analyzing the potentials for non market value creation and identifying concrete well being benefits the degrowth discourse could receive wider public support and contribute to a paradigmatic change in the social sciences

rational debate and one dimensional conflict this paper studies repeated communication regarding a multidimensional collective decision in a large population when preferences coincide but beliefs about the consequences of the various decisions diverge it is shown under some specific assumptions that public communication causes the disagreement between beliefs either to vanish or to become one dimensional at the limit multidimensional disagreement indeed allows for many directions of communication including some that are orthogonal to the conflict along which agents can communicate credibly the possible convergence toward a one dimensional conflict where no further communication takes place may be related to the empirically observed geometry ofthe political conflict in many countries

information aggregation in debate who should speak first abstract privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision each individual wishes to appear well informed for any given order of speech committee members may herd by suppressing their true information with individuals of heterogeneous expertise optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information but not perfectly so it is not always optimal to use the common anti seniority rule whereby experts speak in order of increasing expertise a committee with more able experts may be afflicted by greater herding problems yielding a worse outcome

does patenting help high tech start ups abstract using data on all high and medium tech start ups in the uk in 2000 this paper assesses the effect associated with a firm s decision to patent on a firm s subsequent growth between 2001 and 2005 we propose a new approach to addressing well known issues challenging identification of any patent effect firm heterogeneity simultaneity between firm performance and patenting and sample selection our findings suggest that patentees have higher asset growth than non patentees of between 8 and 27 per annum 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

entrepreneurial learning and the existence of credit markets abstract i explore the economic implications of learning by doing by borrower entrepreneurs who are initially imperfectly informed about their innate abilities it is shown how entrepreneurial learning worsens the adverse effects of moral hazard causing the possible disappearance of otherwise viable credit markets and thereby decreasing social welfare the reason is that learning reduces subjective uncertainty about risky future outcomes thus encouraging excessive risk taking behaviour

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information this article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity in a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables i characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size i show that when effort costs are sufficiently high preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information and thus the optimal committee size and the principal s expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members policy preferences

the return to independent invention evidence of unrealistic optimism risk seeking or skewness loving examining a sample of 1 091 inventions i investigate the magnitude and distribution of the pre tax internal rate of return irr to inventive activity the average irr on a portfolio investment in these inventions is 11 4 this is higher than the risk free rate but lower than the long run return on high risk securities and the long run return on early stage venture capital funds the portfolio irr is significantly higher for some ex ante identifiable classes of inventions the distribution of return is skew only between 7 9 reach the market of the 75 inventions that did six realised returns above 1400 60 obtained negative returns and the median was negative

the optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure in this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some but not all of his information the optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied that is should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion the model is formulated in the spirit of a persuasion game it is demonstrated that under certain circumstances rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

risky innovation the impact of internal and external r d strategies upon the distribution of returns a b s t r a c t external innovation increases the profits of the median firm but also increases dispersion and the kur tosis of the distribution of profits this means that external strategies are risky and may require a very large number of attempts before average returns are obtained this puts smaller firms into a position of disproportionately high risk despite the earlier evidence that the rewards from innovation are positively skewed we find no effect of innovation strategies upon the skewness of the distribution of firms profits

women nature and the social construction of economic man abstract this paper argues that the social construction economic man is the product of a hierarchical dualism in western society that has also created rational man and scientific man women and the natural world form the subordinated half of these dualisms central to this paper is the claim that this dualism is not only a cultural theoretical one but also a material one the social construction of economic man is the product of a bifurcated knowledge system and a materially divided society economic man reflects a society in which the embeddedness and embodiedness of humanity is hidden by the division of mind from body and science culture from the natural world for this reason it is not possible to incorporate women and nature into the economy through the commodity form by according them a value as price it is argued that the economic system can only exist if women and nature remain externalised as women form the bridge between an autonomous individualised man and the biological ecological underpinning of his existence central to this analysis is the distinction between social and natural biological time economic man lives in social time clock time while women are responsible for biological time this is not because women are closer to nature biology in an essential sense rather this relationship is imposed upon them by a male dominated society

overoptimism and the performance of entrepreneurial firms recent theoretical and empirical research on cognitive bias in decision making suggests that overoptimism critically influences entrepreneurs decisions to establish and sustain new ventures we investigate whether such cognitive bias influences entrepreneurial venture performance using data on commercialization efforts for university inventions in contrast to prior studies our results suggest that entrepreneurial overoptimism does not appear to be the determining factor in the decision to found a firm we do find that entrepreneurs continue unsuccessful development efforts for longer periods of time than do established firms which is consistent with entrepreneurial overoptimism in the development of technologies with uncertain market prospects this latter finding is also consistent with rationality based models of decision making behavior however we find that the economic returns associated with many of the technologies in our sample are realized after the start up has been acquired by an established firm suggesting that start ups may serve as a transitional organizational form in the market for technology commercialization

the gender gap in federal and private support for entrepreneurship the role of gender in entrepreneurship has been thoroughly investigated however less is known about gender differences in access to private investment when attempting to develop a new technology in this paper we use data collected by the national research council of the national academies to estimate differences between the probability that a female owned firm and a male owned firm both conducting research funded by the small business innovation research program will receive private investment funding to help to commercialize the funded technology we find that female owned firms are disadvantaged in their access to private investment especially in the west and northeast regions of the usa

movers and shakers most projects in most walks of life require the participation of multiple parties while it is difficult to unite individuals in a common endeavor some people who we call movers and shakers seem able to do it the paper specifically examines moving and shaking of an investment project whose return depends both on its quality and the total capital invested in it we analyze a model with two types of agents managers and investors managers and investors initially form social connections managers then bid to buy control of the project and the winning bidder puts effort into making investors aware of it finally a subset of aware investors are given the chance to invest and they decide whether to do so after receiving private signals of the project s quality we first show that connections are valuable since they make it easier for a manager to move and shake the project i e obtain capital from investors when we endogenize the network we find that while managers are identical ex ante a single manager emerges as most connected he consequently earns a rent in extensions we move away from the assumption of ex ante identical managers to highlight forces that lead one manager or another to become a mover and shaker our theory sheds light on a range of topics including entrepreneurship venture capital and anchor investments

on the market for venture capital we propose a theory of the market for venture capital that links the excess return to venture equity to the scarcity of venture capitalists vcs high returns make the vcs more selective and eager to terminate nonperforming ventures because they can move on to new ones the scarcity of vcs enables them to internalize their social value and the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal moreover the bilaterally efficient contract is a simple equity contract we estimate the model for the period 1989 2001 and compute the excess return to venture capital which turns out to be 8 6 percent finally we back out the return of solo entrepreneurs which is increasing in their wealth and ranges between zero and 3 5 percent

a theory of conservatism a free rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group to alleviate the free rider problem the group can commit to a conservative rule whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group s preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision my result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives

assessing the degrowth discourse a review and analysis of academic degrowth policy proposals abstract debates on ecological and social limits to economic growth and new ways to deal with resource scarcity without compromising human well being have re emerged in the last few years central to many of these is a call for a degrowth approach in this paper a framework is developed to support a systematic analysis of degrowth in the academic literature this article attempts to present a clearer notion of what the academic degrowth literature explores by identifying organising and analysing a set of proposals for action retrieved from a selection of articles the framework is applied to classify proposals according to their alignment to ecological economics policy objectives sustainable scale fair distribution and efficient allocation type of approach top down versus bottom up and geographical focus local national or international a total of 128 peer reviewed articles focused on degrowth were reviewed and 54 that include proposals for action were analysed the proposals identified align with three broad goals 1 reduce the environmental impact of human activities 2 redistribute income and wealth both within and between countries and 3 promote the transition from a materialistic to a convivial and participatory society the findings indicate that the majority of degrowth proposals are national top down approaches focusing on government as a major driver of change rather than local bottom up approaches as advocated by many degrowth proponents the most emphasised aspects in the degrowth literature are related to social equity closely followed by environmental sustainability topics such as population growth and the implications of degrowth for developing nations are largely neglected and represent an important area for future research moreover there is a need for a deeper analysis of how degrowth proposals would act in combination

financial decision making are women really more risk averse 40 males 33 females gain gambling gain domain loss gambling loss domain a contextual frames b abstract gambling frames studies the application of experimental methods provided stronger control of the economic environment in which decisions were made we elicited data which call into question the prevalence of stereotypic risk attitudes in financial decision making first we find that the comparative risk propensity of male and female subjects is strongly dependent on the financial decision setting second and more important we observe no gender differences in risk propensity when subjects face contextual decisions since in practice financial decisions are always contextual our results suggest that the above gender stereotype may not reflect true male and female attitudes toward financial risks i gender specific risk behavior an experimental design our experiment was designed to examine gender specific risk propensity in decisions relevant for investors and managers table 1 gives an overview of the experimental design in the main treatment we implemented risky choices in the form of investment and insurance decisions choice behavior in this treatment henceforth called the context treatment directly measures the risk behavior of male and female subjects in contextual financial decisions we also ran a control treatment in which the same risky choices were presented as abstract gambling decisions this control treatment henceforth called the abstract treatment allows us to validate the risk behavior induced by our experimental procedure in the light of the above mentioned gambling evidence in the context treatment subjects were confronted with risky choices in two different decision contexts subjects first had to complete a series of investment decisions they were then presented with a series of identical choices this time however framed as insur1 wealth effects from income differences outside the laboratory may still affect risk behavior in our experiment they are controlled for in our model 2 experimental instructions are available in german from the authors or in english from our web page www wif ethz ch publikationen htm ance decisions each investment and insurance decision incorporated a choice between a risky lottery and a certain payoff with the series of choices implemented in the two frames we elicited our subjects certainty equivalents for the same four risky lotteries l1 l2 l3 l4 in both contexts we implemented two frames in the context treatment in order to measure the risk propensity of subjects toward both perceived gains and perceived losses in both frames all possible payoffs for each decision were positive in the investment frame these payoffs were also presented as gains while in the insurance frame the same payoffs were presented as losses relative to an initial endowment therefore elicited certainty equivalents in the investment frame measure subjects risk propensities in the gain domain while certainty equivalents in the insurance frame measure risk propensity in the loss domain if in contextual financial decisions female subjects are generally more risk averse than men our results should display ceteris paribus lower female certainty equivalents in both the investment and insurance frames 3 the four lotteries l1 l2 l3 and l4 each had two possible outcomes payoffs in swiss francs 1 sfr a 0 60 and their probabilities were 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 30 sfr 2 10 sfr 2 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 and 50 sfr 2 20 sfr 2 respectively 4 experimental evidence suggests that individual risk propensity will vary systematically between the gain and loss domain daniel kahneman and amos tversky 1979 383 vol 89 no 2 gender and economic transactions 3y16 my68 mp 383 friday dec 10 08 20 am lp aer my68 figure 1 differences in mean certainty equivalents ce between male and female subjects by frame note certainty equivalents and male female differences are measured in swiss francs in the abstract treatment we confronted a different group of subjects with exactly the same risky decisions as those in the main treatment however as mentioned before all choices in this control treatment were framed as abstract gambling decisions again two frames were implemented in the gaingambling and loss gambling frames we measured the risk attitudes of subjects toward gambles in the gain and loss domain respectively subjects in both treatments were told in advance that one of their choices would determine their experimental earnings further all subjects completed a post experimental questionnaire which yielded information on each subject s disposable income this information is necessary to exclude wealth effects due to income differences outside the laboratory as an explanation of gender specific choice behavior

resale proofness and coalition proof nash equilibria abstract this paper studies in detail the notion of resale proofness proposed by nakayama quintas and muto it is shown that in an information trading game with one initial owner of information the following are attained as equilibrium outcomes of the game the perfectly coalition proof nash equilibria due to bernheim peleg and whinston if a set of informed agents is resale proof information never diffuses further the initial owner shares his information with a set of demanders such that the resulting set of informed agents forms one of the minimal resale proof sets and the initial owner gains the whole surplus produced by the information sharing

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

why environmental sustainability can most probably not be attained with growing production the concepts of welfare economic growth production environmentally sustainable national income environmental sustainability environmental function and asymmetric entering are defined because the confusion about these concepts hampers sound information based on these concepts the arguments are enumerated why it is plausible that environmental sustainability most probably cannot be attained with a growing production level national income ni and why broad acceptance of a lower production level meaning de growth of production will make attaining this goal much easier or at least possible some consequences of unsustainable development are provided and the alleged conflict between employment and environment is refuted the conclusion is that our planet is threatened by a wrong belief in a wrongly formulated growth

the growth discourse growth policy and sustainable development two thought experiments abstract this paper addresses three aspects of growth the discourse the policy and the impacts the growth discourse claims that the central factor for social economic political and environmental progress is economic growth it is assumed to create wealth and provide the necessary means for social and environmental purposes on the basis of the growth discourse different growth policies can be derived based on different economic and political ideologies in order to reveal the implications of de facto degrowth two thought experiments are conducted for physical and economic end to growth strategies the latter is capable of meeting environmental objectives but implies significant social tensions and hardships and calls for transition strategies consisting of carefully designed steps

electronic data interchange competitive externalities and strategic implementation policies electronic data interchange edi is an emerging type of standardized inter organizational information system we analyze the impact of edi on the upstream suppliers competitive position in a simple two level hierarchical market structure where the buyer faces a linear demand curve and the competing heterogeneous suppliers have an upward sloping marginal cost function we show that a suppliers adoption of edi can generate positive externalities for the buyer and negative or competitive externalities for other suppliers as a result the buyer provides a price premium to those suppliers who adopt edi and increases their sales volume and market share moreover when the benefits that the buyer can derive from implementing edi are substantial and the suppliers edi adoption costs are high it may be in the buyer s best interest to subsidize the suppliers so as to encourage them to adopt edi instead of mandating them to do so regardless of whether the buyer employs a mandatory or a subsidizing policy the buyer and the end consumers may be the only ones who gain from this new technology consequently a partial adoption by the supplier base may be optimal for the buyer when the suppliers adoption costs are sufficiently high we also show that while edi reduces the transaction costs of the buyer the upstream market tends to become more concentrated as a result of increased cost differentials these results provide one economic explanation of the fact that many companies have actually reduced their supplier base after implementing edi despite a significant reduction in their market transaction costs

a decentralized model of information pricing in networks we propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good the prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents if the information is a homogenous non depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players particularly we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network it is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

innovation procurement as capability building evaluating innovation policies in eight central and eastern european countries abstract after decades of impressive growth the new member states of the european union are once again in transition but this time from imitation to innovation driven competitiveness this paper evaluates the relationship between both public funding and public procurement for innovation ppi and firm level innovation output and outcome additionality in eight central and eastern european countries matching estimates on a sample of 41 623 firms suggest that ppi has a large effect on innovation and output and the highest additionality is sometimes achieved when firms receive both financial support and innovation oriented public procurement we argue that policy makers aiming to strengthen indigenous innovation capabilities should place stronger emphasis on ppi

industry input in policy making evidence from medicare in setting prices for physician services medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry the committee itself comprises members from industry we investigate whether this arrangement leads to regulatory capture with prices biased toward industry interests we find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10 we then evaluate whether employing a biased committee as an intermediary may nonetheless be desirable if greater affiliation allows the committee to extract information needed for regulation we find industry proposers more affiliated with the committee produce less hard evidence in their proposals however on soft information we find evidence of a trade off private insurers set prices that more closely track medicare prices generated under higher affiliation

stable payoffs in resale proof trades of information abstract this paper consider what payoff allocations can be outcomes of resales proof trades of information with a monopolistic seller the concept of resale proofness has been introduced by m nakayama l quintas and s muto 1988 resale proof trades of information discussin paper 776 northwestern university in formulating a trade such that no agent has an incentive to resell when the resale is freely allowed with appropriate modifications we consider the core of such a trade and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the trade to have a single outcome the monopolistic imputation it is also shown that generally the sole seller cannot enjoy the monopolistic position in a resale proof trade