a note on uniqueness in game theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium riley 1979 s reactive equilibrium concept addresses the problem of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection the game theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in engers and fernandez 1987 yields the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 riley 1979 allocation as an equilibrium allocation however multiplicity of equilibrium emerges in this note we imbed the reactive equilibrium s logic in a dynamic market context with active consumers we show that the riley rothschild stiglitz contracts constitute the unique equilibrium allocation in any subgame perfect nash equilibrium

on the indeterminacy of capital accumulation paths abstract in neoclassical optimal growth models the stability of the accumulation paths depends on the discount parameter we prove that for discount factors small enough the policy function which describes an optimal path can be of any type the result is achieved using the notion of concavity we adopt a constructive approach given any twice differentiable map we show how to construct an optimal growth problem which produces that map as the optimal policy function a consequence is that chaos can appear in these models we also provide bounds on the values of the discount parameter for which indeterminacy is possible

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the optimal performance of the global firm formalizing and extending the integration responsiveness framework with the increasing globalization of business there has been growing interest in how to create and manage a successful international enterprise although researchers and practitioners have grappled with the issue of globalization for some time there is no one model that encompasses the range of phenomena we observe in the global economy nor have those models that do exist been precisely formalized this paper provides an expanded approach to thinking about the organizational forms and linkages that exist in international business operations building on the popular integrationresponsiveness framework of international strategic orientation we develop a more expansive approach that is better able to account for the diversity of organizational forms and strategic choices open to managers by adding a third set of environmental pressures incorporating the beliefs of managers and by employing the idea of efficient frontiers we reformulate the integration responsiveness framework making it more consistent with modern economic models of the firm our integration responsiveness completeness irc model argues that global firms can respond to these fundamental and competing pressures by configuring themselves in a variety of ways rather than normatively prescribing that the transnational form is optimal in addition our model has methodological ramifications its formal structure suggests that empirical techniques that focus on the best rather than average performance are necessary to adequately investigate the performance differences among alternative organizational forms this may explain the paradoxical lack of empirical support for a link between organizational form and performance

monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations this paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness i show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group but group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare not publishing individuals votes raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare if the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers the incentive to build a reputation is greater but expected social welfare may be higher or lower

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

autonomy and procedural justice a framework for evaluating subsidiary strategy using the well supported dimensions of autonomy and procedural justice a four quadrant model of subsidiary strategy is proposed and a four part typology hypothesized partner collaborator militant and vassal subsidiaries a clustering process is used to develop a four group taxonomy that corresponds with the induced model the four groups of subsidiaries are analysed across seven alternative strategic dimensions integration responsiveness coordination configuration market scope product scope and value added scope the external and internal validity of the framework is confirmed and its utility discussed in terms of subsidiary s movement from one strategy state to another

monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences this paper considers monetary policy when policy makers preferences are private information i show that in the first period of a two period term all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less but respond more to shocks than if there were no private information moderately inflation averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most a tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first with t period terms inflation depends solely on the policy maker s time left in office with unchanging preferences and no discounting inflation is lower the longer he has left

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

monetary fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union abstract we consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union if monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets the nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities leadership of either authority is better fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment the optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary fiscal symbiosis yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives for any order of moves without fiscal co ordination and without monetary commitment

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

the politics of redistributive social insurance this paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative individuals differ both in their income and risk the social insurance is compulsory and charges an income related contribution with pooling of risks the private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks however due to the adverse selection problem private insurance companies provide only partial insurance adopting a non expected utility model we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion we also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population lastly we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests

subsidiary expansion contraction during times of economic crisis this paper compares two real options within country growth and across country operational flexibility to examine subsidiary expansion contraction during times of economic crisis specifically we examine how the real options orientations of individual subsidiaries interact with the general characteristics of multinational enterprise networks our main findings are that a economic crises can be detrimental for subsidiaries with stronger within country orientations and advantageous for those with stronger across country orientations and b network characteristics are not the sole determinants of subsidiary expansion contraction what really matters is how the real options orientations of individual subsidiaries mesh with the overall characteristics of the network they belong to

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

dual paths to performance the impact of global pressures on mnc subsidiary conduct and performance over the last decade the international business literature has placed ever greater emphasis on the role that learning and innovation play in determining multinational and multinational subsidiary performance the present research seeks to understand the organizational paths leading to such desirable outcomes as greater learning increased innovation and improved performance using a model tested with data collected through a survey of managers in subsidiaries of multinational firms we find dual independent paths to improved performance one through networking and inter unit learning and the other through subsidiary autonomy and innovation a particular feature of these findings is that they can be shown to be robust after controlling for a wide range of environmental pressures and firm and industry factors however in the absence of environmental controls the dual path finding is rejected these conflicting findings support the imperative to test models that include a diverse range of environmental pressures so that the true effects of organizational factors on learning innovation and performance can be identified

signalling with many signals this paper examines a market with asymmetric information where there are many signals available and where both the costs of signaling and the product value may depend on many privately known characteristics under a weak condition on the relationship between the marginal cost of increasing the signals and the product value a separating set exists whereby the value of every seller s product is inferred from the seller s optimal choice of signals the separating set constructed is pareto dominant and corresponds to recently proposed equilibrium notions in signaling and screening models copyright 1987 by the econometric society

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

equilibria in health exchanges adverse selection versus reclassification risk this paper studies equilibrium and welfare in a class of regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges we use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual level i projected health risk and ii risk preferences we combine the estimated distributions of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict allocations and prices

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

market structure and schumpeterian growth abstract we present a discrete time version of a schumpeterian growth model a natural r d analogue to constant returns to scale implies a poisson production function with diminishing marginal product surprisingly the industry demand for r d inputs does not depend on the number of firms in the r d sector if bertrand competition ensues following ties in contrast demand is higher if ties result in collusion in general equilibrium bertrand competition leads to random switching between monopoly and competitive production under collusion production is always at the monopoly level but there is faster growth numerical simulations suggest that this leads to higher welfare

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

market equilibrium with hidden knowledge and self selection the problem of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in models with hidden knowledge and self knowledge has been discussed previously by m rothschild and j e stiglitz 1976 c a wilson 1977 and j g riley 1979 recent analyses of such models by i cho and d kreps 1986 and riley argue for a particular outcome the pareto dominant separating zero profit one the authors prove the existence of such an outcome under very general conditions and generalizing the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by riley they prove this outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium copyright 1987 by the econometric society

signalling and entry deterrence a multidimensional analysis i consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type profitable entry may be deterred however if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level an equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent may deter profitable entry at a methodological level the article contributes by characterizing the refined equilibria of a signalling model with multiple dimensions of private information and multiple signals

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

an empirical analysis of the integration responsiveness framework u s construction equipment industry firms in global competition in this study businesses competing as part of the global u s construction equipment industry were categorized into three subgroups according to the integration responsiveness framework i r in an attempt to further understand industry pressures confronting businesses that compete internationally the results show that three generic strategies suggested by the i r framework do appear in a single industry context globally integrated locally responsive and multifocal beyond providing additional insight into the nature of competition in a single global industry several broad extensions to the integration responsiveness framework are suggested

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection equilibria with adverse selection we construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection in particular it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and that in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that exist both when withdrawal costs are zero and when they are arbitrarily small but strictly positive we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome of our game this outcome is always constrained efficient and involves cross subsidization from low to high risk agents that is increasing in the share of low risks in the population under weak conditions on risk preferences

neutrally optimal mechanism under adverse selection the canonical insurance problem abstract this paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 we extend the three stage game in hellwig 1987 by allowing firms to endogenously choose whether or not to pre commit on their contractual offers menus we show how this mechanism can deliver the miyazaki wilson spence allocation as the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this allocation is the unique incentive efficient and individually rational maximizer of the utility of the most profitable type in fact given that the informed player has only two types it is the unique core allocation and thus the unique neutral optimum in the sense of myerson 1983

an assessment of the measurement of performance in international business research a sizeable body of international business ib research is devoted to building knowledge about the determinants of organizational performance a key precursor to accurately diagnosing why some organizations succeed in the international marketplace while others struggle is operationalizing performance appropriately yet to date no systematic investigation has considered how well ib research measures performance we examine the measurement of performance in 96 articles published in the academy of management journal administrative science quarterly journal of marketing journal of marketing research journal of international business studies management science organization science a nd thestrategic management journal between 1995 and 2005 the findings reveal that most studies do not measure performance in a manner that captures the multifaceted nature of the construct we describe the implications of these results and offer suggestions for improving future practice journal of international business studies 2008 39 1064 1080

an example of non existence of riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection abstract rothschild and stiglitz 1976 proposed a model of a competitive market with adverse selection and showed that a pure strategy nash equilibrium may not exist among the solutions proposed to deal with this problem a particularly influential one is the notion of riley or reactive equilibrium riley 1979 we give an example that shows that a riley equilibrium may not exist if consumers are not ordered

an empirical analysis of the integration responsiveness framework in global industries in this study businesses competing in global industries were categorized into three groups according to the integration responsiveness framework for conceptualizing industry pressures confronting business competing internationally using this framework contextual conditions associated with each group were examined competitive attributes distinguishing each group were then identified to clarify alternate business level strategies for competing within a global industry context beyond providing additional insight into the nature of competition in global industries several broad extensions to the integration responsiveness framework are suggested

a repeated game model of monetary union given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank s operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation this is modelled as a repeated game and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries incentive compatibility constraints is found the optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level so as to maintain the worse hit country s incentive to abide by the rule

costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets abstract this paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type insurers can at some cost verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out however insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy the paper analyzes the relationship between second best pareto optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework it characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium the individuals contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists

is transparency about central bank plans desirable a central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public s perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation a regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank s preferences and to be non transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation a central bank in the non transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation i find several results about transparent and non transparent regimes some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers in particular i demonstrate that in a non transparent regime increased transparency need not improve the public s ability to infer a central bank s private information i show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency my numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non transparent regimes

social efficiency of bubbles in the grossman and helpman endogenous growth model abstract using a particular specification of the expectation process i show that a weak but permanent over evaluation of financial assets may exist in the grossman and helpman 1991 innovation and growth in the global economy mit press cambridge ma endogenous growth model with horizontal produce differentiation and that the resulting competitive equilibrium is socially optimal

market seeking mnes in an emerging market how parent subsidiary links shape overseas success this study extends research on parent subsidiary links applying new theoretical perspectives those of resource dependence and dynamic capability to the new empirical setting of an emerging market we suggest that parent subsidiary links help to mitigate emerging market threats by reducing external dependence and help to capitalize on emerging market opportunities by enhancing local responsiveness

nash equilibrium in competitive insurance i formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly i formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well known rothschild stiglitz allocation is efficient

managing formalization to increase global team effectiveness and meaningfulness of work in multinational organizations global teams may help to integrate across locations and yet with formalized rules and procedures responsiveness to those locations effectiveness and the team members experiences of work as meaningful may suffer we employ a mixed methods approach to understand how the level and content of formalization can be managed to resolve these tensions in multinationals in a sample of global teams from a large mining and resources organization operating across 44 countries interviews observations and a quantitative 2 wave survey revealed a great deal of variability between teams in how formalization processes were enacted only those formalization processes that promoted knowledge sharing were instrumental in improving team effectiveness implementing rules and procedures in the set up of the teams and projects rather than during interactions and utilizing protocols to help establish the global team as a source of identity increased this knowledge sharing finally we found members personal need for structure moderated the effect of team formalization on how meaningful individuals found their work within the team these findings have significant implications for theory and practice in multinational organizations

market power information and efficiency the link between solutions and equilibrium distortions the extent of competition generally determines both the location and the extent of distortions due to information asymmetries when agents have private information increased competition raises agent welfare at the expense of uninformed principals nevertheless increased competition among principals may lower total surplus the losses sustained by principals as a group exceed the benefits realized by agents as a group when there is a sufficiently large proportion of agents with high cost of agent effort these results are independent of the correlation between the agent s marginal cost and the principal s marginal benefit of agent effort copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

group lending under asymmetric information abstract this paper examines joint liability loan contracts as part of a screening mechanism adopted by lenders using group lending schemes a model and one period game are introduced in order to analyze the type of optimal loan contracts that emerge when lenders have less information than borrowers it is shown that under imperfect information lenders may be able to utilize joint liability contracts as a means of screening agent types by inducing endogenous group formation and self selection among the borrowers

optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking den meisten akademikern und politischen entscheidungstragern zufolge ist transparenz in der geldpolitik wunschenswert ich untersuche diese behauptung anhand eines kleinen theoretischen models das das vorausschauende verhalten des privaten sektors hervorhebt transparenz erleichtert es denjenigen die preise festsetzen auf die kunftigen geldpolitischen absichten der zentralbank zu schliesen wodurch die laufende inflation starker auf stabilitatspolitische masnahmen reagiert dies fuhrt dazu dass die zentralbank sich eher auf die inflation als auf die stabilisierung der produktionslucke konzentriert in diesem fall kann transparenz negative folgen haben sie kann sich sogar als eine die geldpolitik verzerrende zwangsjacke herausstellen wenn die zentralbank sich stabilitatspolitischer glaubwurdigkeit erfreut und eine aktive monetare stabilisierungspolitik benotigt wird

smoking skydiving and knitting the endogenous categorization of risks in insurance markets with asymmetric information we analyze the efficiency and market equilibirum effects of endogenous categorization where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propersities and we show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first best allocations as competitive nash equilibria the optimal insurance premium involves a trade off between the use of categorization to correct moral hazard externalities generated by the consumption of the product and the use of differential consumption to sort heterogeneous consumers thereby mitigating the social costs of adverse selection the efficiency consequences of taxing or subsidizing aggregate as opposed to individual consumption is also considered

a simple model of schumpeterian growth with complex dynamics abstract in this paper we develop a schumpeterian discrete time model of endogenous growth with an explicit market for the resource used for innovation creating investment and study its global dynamics we show among others that the level of investment may fluctuate chaotically for a compact range of model parameters as a consequence of the explicit intermediation and market imperfections temporary monopoly power following an innovation underlying the growth process

credibility and flexibility with independent monetary policy committees independent monetary policy committees are a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role for monetary policy if central bankers types are unknown then for a wide range of parameters an independent committee achieves higher social welfare than either a zero inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker a key reason for the committee s superior performance is that committee members are relatively likely to opt for low inflation and building a reputation when shocks are small when large shocks hit the economy the incentive to react outweighs the reputationbuilding benefit

the economic determinants of technology shocks in a real business cycle model abstract creative destruction due to new technologies causes both long run growth and short run business fluctuations new technologies push the economy on a higher productivity level but also imply partial obsolescence of old production units obsolescence induces an adjustment period during which growth rates gradually fall at some endogenously determined point research for the next technology starts once the new technology is discovered a technology shock occurs and the next cycle starts this is shown in a continuous time rbc model with risk averse agents where savings can be used for financing deterministic capital accumulation and stochastic r d for new technologies

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

competitive markets without commitment in the presence of a time inconsistency problem with agency contracts we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that pareto dominate those achieved by a benevolent government and they induce more effort we analyze a model with moral hazard and a two sided lack of commitment after agents have chosen their work firms can modify contracts and agents can switch firms if the ex post market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and sufficiently separates individuals it is pareto superior to a government s allocation with a complete breakdown of incentives moreover competitive markets without commitment implement more effort in equilibrium under general conditions

repeated signalling games and dynamic trading relationships a seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the position of his demand curve the seller offers a price in each period the buyer chooses a quantity given the price the quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer an equilibrium is characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period this equilibrium uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the cho kreps criterion despite the immediate separation the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game the requirement to signal types can raise the utility of all types of informed players copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search abstract this paper studies constrained efficiency in guerrieri et al s 2010 model of adverse selection and directed search buyers post contracts and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade if the guerrieri shimer wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not ex ante constrained efficient under certain conditions the planner achieves an allocation that even pareto dominates the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient under other conditions the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best cross subsidization is the key to these results

monotone equilibria in signaling games abstract we examine the monotonicity of the sender s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games we show that when the sender s return from the receiver s action depends on her type the spence mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower type we provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone which require that the sender s payoff is decreasing in her action is increasing in the receiver s action and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile we apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling advertising and warranty provision