demand for money in open economies abstract the demand for real cash balances deduced from an underlying portfolio model of the financial market is shown to depend upon domestic variables and foreign monetary developments the model is estimated using quarterly postwar data for canada germany uk and us there is clear evidence that demand for money is affected not only by changes in domestic variables such as permanent income domestic interest rate and price expectations but also by fluctuations in exchange rate expectations and foreign interest rates the conclusion that domestic monetary policy is fairly ineffective and domestic financial markets are highly vulnerable to changes in foreign financial and monetary developments need to be modified in light of the results presented in this paper

limited commitment and the demand for money understanding money demand is important for our comprehension of macroeconomics and monetary policy its instability has made this a challenge common explications for the instability are financial regulations and financial innovations that shift the money demand function we provide a complementary view by showing that a model where borrowers have limited commitment can significantly improve the fit between the theoretical money demand function and the data limited commitment can also explain why the ratio of credit to m1 is currently so low despite that nominal interest rates are at their lowest recorded levels this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the form of incentive contracts agency with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability the analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability we introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state the form of the contract is debt a capped bonus when the critical ratio is increasing decreasing in the state an increasing critical ratio in the state space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced form distribution of output which we term the decreasing hazard rate in effort property dhrep the critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection

re examining the buffer stock model of money this paper critically examines recent papers in the buffer stock or supply side disequilibrium models of money the paper first investigates the assumptions at the m icroeconomic level and concludes that even with these assumptions aggregate behavior does not necessarily follow buffer stock models in which excess cash balances are held involuntarily in a simple model with uncertain cash flows it is shown that in the aggregate short run involuntary cash holdings are negligible if the buffer stock story is applicable it is to a broader definition of money than used in most empirical work the second part of the paper examines empirical work and argues that the buffer stock idea cannot be implemented using single equation techniques and that when viewed appropriately current empirical result s refute the buffer stock idea as it is currently modeled copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the demand for money in developing countries assessing the role of financial innovation traditional specifications of money demand have commonly been plagued by persistent overprediction implausible parameter estimates and highly autocorrelated errors the authors argue that some of these problems stem from the failure to account for the impact of financial innovation they estimate money demand for ten developing countries using various proxies for financial innovations they also assess the relative importance of this variable finding financial innovation can be better modeled as a stochastic random walk trend rather than a deterministic time trend financial innovation plays an important role in determining fluctuations of the demand for money the importance of this role increases with the rate of inflation

effects of financial innovations on the money demand function a canadian evidence a money demand function for the candian economy has been estimated to explore if recent financial innovations have caused any significant change in the structural relationship between the demand for money and its determinants two sets of estimation results have been analysed the first set is obtained by estimating a standard money demand function for several overlapping sample periods and the other set is obtained by estimating a modified version which included a dummy or a ratchet variable to capture the effects of innovations the estimated equations have been used to generate ex post simulations and forecasts the results suggest that innovations have displaced the money demand function in the early 1980s it also appears that the incorporation of approriate innovation variables improves the predictive performance of the money demand function

can agents be better off with pay caps a popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers pay using a small extension of the standard principal agent model we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose because the agent might be better off with a pay cap specifically we show that given a fixed effort level to be implemented the agent s expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent s reward the effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized while an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps

modelling money demand in open economies over the modern floating rate period the role of open economy factors in influencing domestic money demand in major industrial countries over the modern floating rate period is examined the theoretial model for the empirical analysis is derived from a general two country portfolio balance framework that determines the demand for domestic and foreign monetary and non monetary assets in each country the ecm estimates indicate that capital mobility plays an important role in the money demand function in all seven counteries considered currency substitution in contrast is not an important phenomenon

existence and non existence in the moral hazard problem abstract we provide a new class of counter examples to existence in a simple moral hazard problem in which the first order approach is valid in contrast to the mirrlees example unbounded likelihood ratios on the signal technology are not central rather our examples center around the behavior of the utility function as utility diverges to negative infinity for any utility function such as ln w in which utility diverges to negative infinity at a finite wealth level existence will fail for some specifications of the agent s cost of effort when utility diverges to negative infinity only as wealth does as well existence holds for all specifications of the agent s cost of effort if and only if the agent continues to dislike risk as wealth diverges to negative infinity when there is a finite lower bound on utility existence is assured for those cases where existence fails we characterize the limit of near optimal contracts

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

moral hazard in strategic decision making abstract this paper develops a theory of moral hazard in which the agent takes the role of strategic decision maker career concerns give rise to preferences over risk which in turn create an incentive for the agent to manipulate the project s risk return tradeoff to the disadvantage of the principal the resultant moral hazard can be ameliorated by an incentive contract the optimal non decreasing wage involves granting in the money options in the context of academic tenure the optimal tenure standard requires the agent to exceed expectations and lies within one standard deviation of the expected outcome

optimal monitoring design this paper considers a principal agent model with hidden action in which the principal can monitor the agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost the principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost the main result of the paper is that the optimal information acquisition strategy is a two threshold policy and consequently the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the agent this result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single bonus wage contracts

estimating money demand functions the question of which functional forms of money demand regression equations are useful for empirical work is addressed here specifically it is argued that a functional form that focuses attention on the ability of the growth rate of nominal money to predict the inflation rate is a useful way of summarizing empirical evidence on the existence of a stable money demand function the results of estimating and simulating this functional form as well as standard functional forms are presented in the final part of this paper a typical equation expressing the public s demand for real money balances m is as follows

the identification of monetary policy disturbances explaining the liquidity puzzle abstract this paper examines recent work on the identification of monetary policy disturbances its main finding is that the empirical anomalies found in the literature reflect a failure to properly address the federal reserve s policy of accommodating reserve demand shocks a new method of identifying monetary policy using nonborrowed reserves is proposed using this specification policy has a strong persistent liquidity effect regardless of subsample policy granger causes output even in the presence of interest rates explaining approximately 49 of the variance in output at a two year horizon and the residual explanatory power of interest rates for output is negligible

nominal costs and the demand for real transactions balances the standard specification of constant real transactions costs assumes that over the sample period transactions costs move in lock step with the gnp deflator our model assumes that transactions costs move negligibly compared to the gnp deflator that is nominal transactions costs are assumed constant here rather than real transactions costs as in other estimates of money demand we find with this nominal transactions cost specification that the real money demand function is more stable in terms of the stability of the coefficients and the accuracy of out of sample predictions than indicated by earlier studies

us business credit sources demand deposits and the missing money abstract this study accounts for much of the missing money in the us through compensating balances business lending by banks affects demand deposit growth standard money demand models include variables that likely pick up income and interest rate effects on the transactions demand for demand deposits and on compensating balance requirements provided that bank lending to firms is stable however during the missing money period business shifted toward nonbank sources of short term credit causing a decline in compensating balances empirical finding support this hypothesis as a partial explanation for the missing money using the federal reserve board s demand deposit model

deindustrialization a global perspective recent studies show that within countries manufacturing labor productivity growth has outstripped aggregate labor productivity growth putting significant downwards pressure on national manufacturing employment shares we compile the first nearly global database of national manufacturing employment and output levels over time and use it to document two facts seemingly at odds with these results 1 the manufacturing sector s share of global employment did not fall between 1970 and 2010 and 2 manufacturing and aggregate labor productivity at the global level grew at similar rates we show that these trends occurred because rapid within country manufacturing productivity growth was counterbalanced by a shift of manufacturing jobs towards lower productivity economies

money demand instability has it ended abstract some researchers suggest that much of the seeming instability in the post 1973 money demand occurred because of financial innovation and deregulation money demand was in transition further unprecedented declines in the income velocity of circulation during 1985 and 1986 indicate that this hypothesized transition continues have the effects of financial innovation and deregulation run their course do additional unexpected shifts in velocity loom in the near future or has the transition come to a halt these questions are examined using the methodology of hafer and hein 1982 as modified by miller 1986 no evidence of structural shifts exists beyond 1986 m1 growth may have become a reliable monetary aggregate target again further the missing money has more than returned more money is held today than predicted by the pre 1973 money demand function since m1 now includes interest bearing transactions accounts and incorporates a saving motive the finding is not counterintuitive

notes on the microfoundations of monetary economics it is important to keep two closely related distinctions in mind when discussing the microeconomics of money that between the social arrangement known as monetary exchange and those assets known as money and that between what patinkin 1957 called the market experiment and individual experiment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

which road leads to stable money demand this paper denies that the demand for money function is any more unstable than other demand functions and maintains that the controversies regarding unstable money demand are produce by poor methodology that is not shared by other areas of the field of economics when investigating demand function properties this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cross country estimates of the demand for money and its components the demand for money aggregates m1 m2 and their components currency demand deposits and time deposits are estimated using a sample of 103 countries at two time periods money demand is found to be affected by age literacy industrial development and political structure as well as income and inflation this expanded demand function helps to explain the considerable changes in money demand that have occurred over long periods and the large variation in money demand found across countries the knowledge thus gained is useful for understanding differences in monetary and taxation policies across countries

structural changes and the us money demand function previous literature on the stability of the us money demand function suggests mixed results in this article we study the stability of the money demand function from the standpoint of structural changes in the function we first investigate if a stable money demand function can be found for the us for the period from the first quarter of 1959 to the fourth quarter of 2000 the results show that a stable long run money demand function does not exist for the sample period under consideration we then estimate unknown structural break points in the variables of the money demand function using bai and perron s 1998 method and test if there is a stable relationship in each sub sample period of the break points the results show that a stable relationship exists for each sub sample period the estimated income elasticity and interest rate semi elasticity are relatively smaller than ball s 2001 estimates but consistent with his argument

modeling the demand for narrow money in the united kingdom and the united states abstract despite the importance of well specified empirical money demand functions for inference forecasting and policy problems in modeling have arisen concerning the economic theories of money demand the data institutional frameworks financial innovation and econometric implementation by developing constant data coherent m 1 demand equations for the u k and the u s we investigate these issues and explain such puzzles as missing money the great velocity decline and the recent explosion in m 1 the endogeneity of money the lucas critique and the non invertibility of our m 1 models are also discussed

information risk sharing and incentives in agency problems this paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems when the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome in this case information systems are ranked only according to their informativeness about the agent s action when the outcome is noncontractible however the principal has to rely on imperfect information not only for incentives but also for risk sharing under the rst order approach this paper characterizes a problem independent ranking of information systems relaxing gjesdal s 1982 criterion we also nd sucient conditions justifying the rst order approach when output is noncontractible

wealth effects and agency costs abstract we analyze how the agent s initial wealth affects the principal s expected profits in the standard principal agent model with moral hazard we show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets probability distributions and disutility of effort then the agent s utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income thus strengthening the sufficiency result of thiele and wambach 1999 also we prove that there is no condition on the agent s utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents moreover we show that for an interesting class of problems the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent s wealth is sufficiently large finally we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent s outside option affects the principal s preferences for agent s wealth

the scourge of the monetarists kaldor on monetarism and on money nicolas kaldor s critique of monetarism from 1970 until his death is described and evaluated it is argued that subsequent events as well as empirical research vindicate his critique kaldor s critique of john maynard keynes s monetary theory is then seen as an extension of his radcliffe views and this paper argues that in this matter kaldor was mechanical in his modeling of the endogeneity of money supply it is suggested that the work of hyman minsky and victoria chick has the potential for further work in this area copyright 1989 by oxford university press

agency models with frequent actions the paper analyzes dynamic principal agent models with short period lengths the two main contributions are i an analytic characterization of the values of optimal contracts in the limit as the period length goes to 0 and ii the construction of relatively simple almost optimal contracts for fixed period lengths our setting is flexible and includes the pure hidden action or pure hidden information models as special cases we show how such details of the underlying information structure affect the optimal provision of incentives and the value of the contracts the dependence is very tractable and we obtain sharp comparative statics results the results are derived with a novel method that uses a quadratic approximation of the pareto boundary of the equilibrium value set

optimal compensation and pay performance sensitivity in a continuous time principal agent model this paper studies the optimal contract between risk neutral shareholders and a constant relative risk aversion manager in a continuous time model several interesting results are obtained first the optimal compensation is increasing but concave in output value if the manager is more risk averse than a log utility manager second when the manager has a log utility a linear contract is optimal when there is no explicit lower bound on the compensation and an option contract is optimal when there is an explicit lower bound third optimal effort is stochastic state dependent fourth consistent with empirical findings and contrary to standard agency theory predictions the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and firm performance and that between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk can be nonmonotonic this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

new concepts of aggregated money the federal reserve board s recent redefinition of its monetary aggregates followed three years of intensive board staff research on monetary aggregation while the new aggregates ultimately were selected along conventional lines some of the staff s research was oriented towards more fundamental changes in monetary aggregation methods this paper reviews such proposals which are based upon the rigorous application of index number and aggregation theory and of principal components analysis in the construction of economic monetary aggregates the usefulness of aggregation and index number theory in acquiring price indices is widely known the theory of the true cost of living index is an application of aggregation theory examples of applied index number theory include the commerce department s implicit price deflator which is a paasche index and the labor department s consumer price index which is a laspeyres index somewhat less well known is the fact that dual to the theory of economic price aggregates and indices is a theory of economic quantity aggregates and indices an example of a highly reputable quantity index is the divisia quantity index the monetary aggregates traditionally are thought to measure the supplied quantity of an economic good called money whenever monetary aggregates are used in the context of economic theory rather than as simple accounting identities the theory of economic quantity aggregation is specifically applicable however published monetary aggregates in all countries have always been computed as simple sums but as fisher 1922 p 29 observed in the conclusion to his classic treatise on index number theory the simple arithmetic average produces one of the very worst of index numbers and if this book has no other effect than to lead to the total abandonment of the simple arithmetic type of index number it will have served a useful purpose with an example of the simple sum index fisher 1922 p 363 found that the bias alone reaches 36 percent although index number theory has not yet found its way into the monetary theory literature all of the literature on index number theory and aggregation theory for the past half century supports the result long ago deduced by fisher 1922 p 361 that the simple arithmetic index should not be used the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the board of governors of the federal reserve system this research was partially supported by national science foundation grant soc 76 84459 we are deeply indebted to the conference session s discussant of this paper w erwin diewert for volunteering to cede his allocated journal space to us so that the paper could take its current extended form federal reserve board washington d c

entrepreneurial skills technological progress and firm growth using cross country establishment level data i show that employment profiles over a firm s life cycle are flatter in fast growing economies than in slow growing economies the difference in average employment over the firm s life cycle increases with plant age i propose a frictionless overlapping generations model with exogenous technological progress firm productivity also depends on entrepreneurs skills entrepreneurs can increase their skills over their life cycle but the growth of the vintage component of younger cohorts skills is higher in fast growing economies than in slow growing economies this model is able to explain most of the differences observed in the sample between fast growing and slow growing economies

the search for a stable money demand function a survey of the post 1973 literature phe question of whether the demnand function for money is stable is one of the most important recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy what is being sought in a stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank s control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy as such the notion of a stable demand function appears to involve three key elements e g john t boorman 1976 p 317 and david e w laidler 1977 pp 34 35 first the demand for money relation should be highly predictable in a statistical sense as measured by the usual goodness of fit statistics precision of estimated coefficients and presumably its ability to forecast accurately out of sample second a stable demand function for money has relatively few arguments a relationship that requires knowledge about a large number of variables in order to pin it down is in effect not predictable finally the variables that appear as arguments in the function should represent significant links to spending and economic activity in the real sector in sum a stable demand function for money means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy the importance of a stable money demand function for monetary policy can be illustrated with the standard is lm model in which interest rates and gnp are the endogenous variables in this context a stable demand function for money translates into a well defined relationship between money interest rates and gnp

wage floors imperfect performance measures and optimal job design we analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement due to cost advantages of specialization assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient a sufficiently high wage floor however induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking but may increase profit under specialization we further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design

cointegration and structural change an application to the u s demand for money wankeun oh i perform the cointegration tests for the trivariate model of real monetary aggregates real personal income and short term interest rate i find the existence of a long run relationship among these three variables to check the stability of a long run money demand relationship i implement a rank constancy test and cusum test the test results show that real mi is relatively more stable than other aggregates but structural change occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s this is consistent with prior research on money demand jel e41 i introduction incorporating structural change when performing tests on the properties of stochastic processes is important because structural breaks may cause misspecification problems most tests of structural change consider the stability of the parameters over time tests for structural breaks and parameter stability have been studied extensively a partial list includes chow 1966 brown et al 1975 harvey and collier 1977 king 1987 ploberger et al 1989 in the context of unit root processes perron 1989 showed that the presence of a one time change in the level or slope of the trend function can severely distort the results of unit root tests and it is natural to ask how structural change can distort the results of cointegration tests 1 traditional tests of parameter stability ask if the parameters of the model are constant in contrast quintos 1993 proposed a test for stability of the long run relationship s in a cointegrating regression the test is based on johansen s 1988 framework and the test statistic is simply the weighted sum of the likelihood ratio test as given in johansen 1988 quintos s rank test is very different from the traditional cusum and chow tests for parameter stability because her rank test checks for stability of the cointegrating relationship between variables in other words the rank test checks whether cointegration holds for the full period the traditional cusum and chow tests assume that cointegration holds for the full period or does not hold for the full period and tests simply whether the cointegration vector changes for example if there is cointegration from 1960 1990 between revenues and expenditures with cointegrating vector 1 1 then the cusum and chow tests check whether the cointegra ting vector 1 1 is stable throughout the period the rank constancy test checks whether the cointegration rank is stable throughout the period not whether the cointegrating vector is stable at 1 1 in other words the rank test will check whether for example there is cointegration from 1960 1980 and no cointegration from 1980 onward the chow and cusum tests are not designed to check for this the structural stability of money demand relationships has been the issue of a substantial number of empirical studies 2 in general structural stability means stability of the underlying behavioral equations 3 this term includes parameter stability and stability of functional form friedman s 1990 research on the money demand function assumes that a long run equilibrium relationship exists between real money balances real income or real wealth and the opportunity cost of holding real money balances recently there has been strong evidence of cointegration between real income real money balances and a nominal interest rate for instance engle and granger 1987 dickey et al 1991 hafer and jansen 1991 hoffman and rasche 1991 mehra 1993 miller 1991 fischer and nicoletti 1993 and baba et al 1992 report on cointegration among variables in u s aggregate money demand jain and moon 1994 report on cointegration in u s sectoral money demand yashiv 1994 and engsted 1993 on money demand in a high inflation country and hoffman et al 1995 report on international money demand comparison this article asks if long run money demand relationship is stable and if so for which measure of money is it stable over time

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

finance capital in dynamic factor demand models the lagged partial adjusment money demand function has been studied theoretically and empirically for the aggregate economy this paper focuses on a sectoral analysis of two partial adjustment functions one for optimal money demand and another for optimal loans demand the two partial adjustment equations are derived employing a representive firm approach a dynamic factor demand model with internal costs of adjustment is utilized to generate euler equations for the demand for money and short term business loans these euler equations parallel the aggregate partial adjustment money demand equations typically employed in applied monetary research the significant difference between the ad hocderivation and the microtheoretic derivation employed here is that desired money and loan holdings are found by solving the euler equations these particular definition of desired money and loan holding are model consistent and depend upon the predetermined and exogeneous variables of the model empirical analysis ge

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

on the moral hazard problem without the first order approach abstract we study the moral hazard problem without the first order approach or other common structure we present sufficient conditions under which the shadow value of simultaneously tightening the minimum payment and individual rationality constraints has a simple and intuitive expression we then show how this expression can be used to perform comparative statics exercises in which we study i the effect of a change in the agent s wealth on the well being of the principal and ii the effects of the outside option and minimum payment on the effort level optimally implemented

recent instability of the demand for money an international perspective aggregate money demand functions once an apparent bulwark for macroeconomic research have had to be re examined in the light of the events and discoveries of the 1970s following goldfeld s extensive analysis it now is widely recognized that the demand for mi balances in the united states cannot be explained satisfactorily by standard functions apparently because of shifts occurring in the early 1970s similar reservations see below have been expressed with respect to m3 balances in the united kingdom where the demand relationships appear to have been upset by the introduction of regulatory reforms in 1971 in both cases part of the problem can be traced to specific events but the possibility remains that a more general instability may be present the rapid inflation experienced by all major industrial countries after 1973 the concurrent collapse of the bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates and the attempts by most major central banks to control growth in domestic money stocks may all have altered the responses of the demand for money to the standard functional arguments this paper presents a range of stability tests for a set of demand functions estimated for two monetary aggregates in each of six countries in order to determine whether money demand functions more generally have been stable over the recent period and to attempt to identify the nature and causes of any observed instabilities the major conclusions are that none of the other functions examined displays instabilities as severe as those of the mi function for the united states and that the latter may be unstable in a more persistent and fundamental way than has heretofore been recognized the equations estimated for this study are based on a variant of goldfeld s log linear real balances function the deflated value of money balances is related to real income interest rates and inflation with lagged adjustments introduced via a simple koyck transformation this function obviously is in a simplified form especially with respect to the lag struc

short run money demand abstract the conventional wisdom holds that the short run demand for money is unstable this paper challenges the conventional view by finding a stable demand for m1 in u s data from 1959 through 1993 the approach follows previous work in interpreting long run money demand as a cointegrating relation and it uses goldfeld s partial adjustment model to interpret short run dynamics the key innovation is the choice of the interest rate in the money demand function most previous work uses a short term market rate but this paper uses the average return on near monies the savings accounts and money market mutual funds that are close substitutes for m1 this choice helps rationalize the behavior of money demand in particular the increase in the volatility of velocity after 1980 is explained by increased volatility in the returns on near monies

regression direction and weak exogeneity abstract the absence of testing for weak exogeneity in money demand has often led to stark conditioning claims regarding the validity of price equations this paper uses the johansen procedure to explore the conditioning properties of money demand systems for nonborrowed reserves m1 and m2 our results show that irrespective of the specification of the cointegrating relation a feedback mechanism enters the equation for money the opposite however is not true for the price equations the results also cast a warning for single equation models of money demand in that weak exogeneity is sensitive to how the system is defined

macroeconomic disequilibrium structural changes and the household savings and money demand in china abstract this paper presents an empirical study of the chinese personal money demand and savings in an economy of disequilibrium and structural changes we propose specifications capable of encompassing and testing the two competing hypotheses which have been advanced to explain the case of the chinese household money demand and savings based on the national and provincial data we find that both repressed inflation and structural changes are significant suggesting the need to capture both the possible disequilibrium and structural shifts further statistical evidence shows that there might have been multiple regime shifts during the post 1949 period which is at variance with the conventional approach of exclusive focus of the effects of the recent reforms nesting the competing hypotheses appears to be the key in providing an adequate account of the savings and money demand of the chinese household sector the evidence seems to favor the repressed inflation hypothesis

participation in moral hazard problems two principals engage in hotelling competition for an agent s services under incomplete information as to her outside option location this renders the agent s participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade off between participation probability and incentives rent and effort are inversely related and non monotonic in the agent s transport cost and so in market structures they increase decrease with competition uncertainty as to the agent s location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information this correspondingly harms or benefits principals

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems abstract consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m this paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent we present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agent s utility under which when m increases induced effort and hence productivity falls we also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level varies in m we present an efficient algorithm for numerically calculating optimal contracts for given parameters and show that induced effort falls when m is increased in many cases even when our sufficient conditions fail

on the reinterpretation of money demand regressions a stylized fact concerning estimated money demand relationships is that lagged dependent variables have high explanatory power and large estimated coefficients which is hard to explain at a theoretical level marvin s goodfriend 1985 suggests that this may be due to the presence of serially correlated measurement errors in the independent variables the author demonstrates how consistent estimates of the short run demand function can be obtained even if the goodfriend hypothesis is accepted and also how the hypothesis might be tested application of the suggested test using the goldfeld 1973 data set leads to decisive rejection of the hypothesis copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

the role of money supply shocks in the short run demand for money abstract previous money demand models are either inconsistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the price level to expected changes in the nominal money supply or imply implausible interest rate fluctuations in response to innovations in nominal money we propose a shock absorber money demand model in which money supply shocks affect the synchronization of asset transactions and so engender a temporary increase or decrease in desired money holdings expected changes do not engender such fluctuations in real money inventories in simultaneous estimates for eight industrial countries the shock absorber model proved empirically superior

manufacturing matters but it s the jobs that count we assemble a large database of countries manufacturing employment and output shares for 1970 2010 we ask whether increased global competition and labor displacing technological change have made it more difficult for countries to industrialize in employment and whether there are alternative routes to prosperity we find that 1 all of today s rich non oil economies enjoyed at least 18 manufacturing employment shares in the past and often did so before becoming rich 2 manufacturing employment peaks at lower incomes and shares today typically below 18 than in the past often over 30 3 although manufacturing labor productivity grew faster than non manufacturing labor productivity within countries they grew at similar rates globally because factory jobs moved to less productive countries and 4 manufacturing s global employment share has not declined during the last 40 years industrialization has become more difficult not because the sector has eliminated labor globally but because of heightened international competition

on cash in advance models of money demand and asset pricing this paper shows how a cash in advance model of money can be written in a way that combines a simple yet empirically defensible money demand function with an asset pricing equation that is similar to the standard barter economy euler equations return premia are determined as in the barter exchange model except that a short term risk free nominal interest rate enters into the first order conditions in special cases asset prices satisfy the barter economy euler equations exactly in the empirical analysis the interest rate factor adds some explanatory power but both the barter and the monetary asset pricing model perform rather poorly copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

unstable money demand and the monetary model of the exchange rate in this paper the authors investigate the importance for the monetary model of exchange rate determination of j frankel 1979 of allowing unrestricted dynamics and of accounting for shifts in the demand for money due to financial innovation based on estimation and simulation results for the canada u s bilateral exchange rate over the 1970 85 period the aut hors find strong evidence in favor of a generalized approach to dynamic specification but find that the shif t adjustment of official money supply data has only minor implications for the empirical results moreover neither modification is sufficient to generate a monetary model that is well supported by the data

sweep programs the fall of m1 and rebirth of the medium of exchange this paper investigates the effect of sweep programs on m1 using dynamic simulations of money demand over 1994 2000 the postsample period constitutes when sweep programs have been in effect all models generate predictions systematically above reported m1 using data on newly initiated programs test findings indicate that sweeps account for the overprediction within the conventional money demand model with a long term interest rate we construct a medium of exchange measure m1s equal to m1 plus estimated holdings of sweep balances m1s velocity compares favorably with that of broader aggregates evidence indicates cointegration within m1s money demand

u s money demand instability a flexible least squares approach this paper uses a jle rrhle leust squares fls time varying linear regression technique to investiaate coefficient stabilitv for the goldfeld u s money demand model over the period 1959 62 to 19x5 q3 time paths traced out by the fls coefficient estimates exhibit shifts in 1974 and 1983 but these shifts are small relative to a persistent downward trend in the estimated coefficient for the inflation rate indicating potential model misspecitication the fls estimates also indicate that the unit root nonstationarity problem reported by ols money demand studies disappears if the coefficient estimates are allowed to exhibit even small amounts of time variation

caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy does society benefit from the delegation of monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers we offer a critical view on the delegation literature and relax seemingly innocuous assumptions about uncertainty and preferences first caution improves credibility but does not obviate the need for central bank conservatism second previous models of delegation have focused on suboptimal forms of conservatism we derive optimal concepts of conservatism that mitigate or eliminate any residual problem of credibility third we rationalize why credible monetary policy may be conducive to stable inflation and output

an empirical examination of the inventory theoretic model of precautionary money demand abstract this study examines the empirical contents of precautionary demand for transactions money balances panel data are utilized to construct estimates of income variance regression results indicate that income uncertainty has a positive effect on precautionary money demand but the magnitude of the elasticity of income variance falls far short of those suggested by economic theories

delegated information acquisition with moral hazard abstract we analyze a principal agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return and hires an agent to evaluate available options the agent s effort affects the informativeness of a signal about an option s return based on the information provided by the agent the principal decides whether to exercise the option at hand we derive properties of the optimal contract in both static and dynamic versions of the problem we show that there are intermediate values of the prior probability that the option is of high quality at which positive effort cannot be sustained we also show that if the prior is below a threshold then the agent is rewarded for delivering bad news about the option s quality we derive distortions relative to the first best on the implemented effort level and optimal stopping decision for some parameter values it is optimal for the principal to commit to an ex post suboptimal stochastic decision to exercise an option

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

are price equations really money demand equations on their heads it is often argued that the dependent variable in money demand functions is really the price level the money stock itself being exogenous a recent approach which stresses the theme is the buffer stock hypothesis in which money supply shocks explicitly appear in the demand for money function because prices and interest rates do not adjust rapidly enough to bring about short run equilibrium in the money market although this approach has been adopted by a number of authors it is not been subjected to much econometric testing in this paper we outline the economic and econometric issues involved in testing the exogenous money buffer stock hypothesis and subject it to a variety of tests using three different data sets none of our results supports the hypothesis fundamental restrictions are rejected at very high levels of significance and a reasonably good money demand equation is seen to be badly misspecified if interpreted as a price equation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the persistence of interest rate effects on the demand for currency note since the end of world war ii there has been a trend decline in the demand for real currency balances part of the decrease is due to the rise in interest rates to unprecedented heights yet this is not the complete answer since a trend term included in a simple and conventional currency demand equation that already includes an interest rate still emerges with a significant negative coefficient for example using quarterly data from 1950 i to 1981 iii a demand for currency equation can be estimated as

a closer look at long run u s money demand linear or nonlinear error correction with m0 m1 or m2 i introduction the stability of money demand has been a long standing issue 1 lucas 1988 informally analyzes the stability of a log linear m1 money demand function and concludes that real money demand is a stable function and he supports earlier findings of meltzer 1963 with an income or wealth elasticity of around unity 2 with the development of cointegration methods engle and granger 1987 numerous empirical studies have applied these techniques to long run u s money demand examples are baba hendry and starr 1992 haferand jansen 1991 hoffman and rasche 1991 and miller 1991 who find support for a cointegrated money demand model with either m1 or m2 3 king et al 1991 also find support for cointegration with m2 and a short term interest rate in contrast to these studies others have argued against a stable u s money demand function in the postwar period for example friedman and kuttner 1992 do not find support for cointegration particularly when the period march 1970 to april 1990 is considered similarly miyao 1996 studies the behavior of the m2 money demand function over the period from 1959 to 1993 with quarterly data and various interest rates in levels and in logs miyao concludes that m2 is not a useful intermediate target for monetary policy in the 1990s 4 however carlson et al 2000 reach the conclusion that m2 does have predictive content for nominal economic activity and that the real m2 money demand function is stable but only after accounting for financial innovation in the first half of the 1990s two recent papers ball 2001 and stock and watson 1993 focus on especially long data sets for the united states and m1 stock and watson 1993 analyze various estimation methods for cointegrating relationships and illustrate their performance for money demand functions with annual data from 1900 to 1987 they pay particular attention to the postwar period and use monthly data in addition to annual data for this period they employ a semi log linear real m1 money demand model with real net national product and the level of the 6 mo commercial paper rate for the postwar period they also consider the 90 day treasury bill rate and the 10 yr treasury bond rate they compare and contrast their results to those of various others they also carry out recursive estimations to check their results for stability stock and watson 1993 conclude that a long span of data is needed to estimate long run money demand functions precisely their overall evidence is in favor of a stable long run money demand function with an income elasticity near one and an interest rate semielasticity near 0 10 however the postwar data are found to be not very informative a lack of low frequency variation in the postwar data as suggested by lucas 1988 does not allow a disentangling of the effects of output and interest rates on money demand for this time period estimates are imprecise and sensitive to subsample specifications due to substantial colinearity ball 2001 revisits the m1 money demand model of stock and watson 1993 using the same data set but extended through 1996 he applies the same array of estimation techniques as stock and watson did ball obtains precise estimates over the postwar period for his extended data set an income elasticity of approximately 0 5 and a semielasticity of 0 05 for the interest rate he does not find support for a velocity specification the m1 model is not stable over the period 1900 1996 lutkepohl terasvirta and wolters 1999 apply a nonlinear error correction model with smooth transition adjustment to capture instabilities in the linear cointegration model the long run equilibrium is described by a linear cointegrating relation and the adjustment to this long run equilibrium is nonlinear they analyze german m1 money demand granger and terisvirta 1993 terasvirta 1998 and van dijk terasvirta and franses 2002 provide details on the econometric theory for estimating and testing such nonlinear models

on the markov switching welfare cost of inflation abstract this paper uses the markov switching approach to account for instabilities in the long run money demand function and compute the welfare cost of inflation in the united states in doing so it circumvents the problem of data mining of some earlier seminal contributions on these issues allowing for complicated nonlinear dynamics and sudden changes in the parameters of the money demand function moreover it extends the sample period and investigates the robustness of results to alternative money demand specifications monetary aggregation procedures and assumptions regarding dynamics aspects of the money demand specification

the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour part i principal agent models are studied in which outcomes conditional on the agent s action are uncertain and the agent s behaviour therefore unobservable for a model with bounded agent s utility conditions are given under which the first best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes for general models it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent s first order conditions as constraint general conditions of lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite dimensional 1 the moral hazard situation

a comparison among partial adjustment rational expectations and error correction estimates of the canadian demand for money starting from a dynamic optimization principle the currently most popular approaches to modelling money demand functions are derived the partial adjustment adaptive expectations rational expectations and error correction mechanism formulations are then estimated using a common data set the error correction mechanism equation is found to dominate the others either because their implicit restrictions are rejected rational expectations or by employing the encompassing principle partial adjustment adaptive expectations surprisingly all three forms have similar long run solutions since the short run dynamics differ substantially the results have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy

moral hazard with bounded payments we study the moral hazard problem with general constraints on how little or much the agent can be paid as a function of output we provide a characterization and existence result using only very simple methods in the dual problem of minimizing costs for a given effort level a constraint that harms the principal will always result in a contract that pays according to the constraint on some range of outcomes for the case of a simple fixed minimum feasible payment the resultant contract will be option like we show how the strike price and intensity of incentives once the strike price is exceeded vary in the minimum payment and the outside option of the agent when the principal can also choose the effort to induce then even if the constraint harms the principal he may optimally choose a contract that never pays the minimum or maximum we show that this can only occur if the problem without the payment constraints fails a form of concavity

the impact of surges in net private capital inflows on manufacturing investment and unemployment abstract we use local projection methods to examine the dynamic response of surges in net private capital inflows on the output and employment shares of manufacturing the investment output ratio and the unemployment rate high income countries are studied separately from emerging economies both from asia and latin america our sample covers the years from 1970 to 2010 we find that surges in high income countries do not magnify the trend toward deindustrialization however the persistent decline in the investment to gdp ratio and the rise in the overall unemployment rate suggest that surges may negatively affect longer run growth prospects and employment opportunities in these countries in middle income asian countries surges tend to induce deindustrialization in both output and employment in the medium run but they do not lower the investment to gdp ratio in middle income latin america surges speed up deindustrialization lower investment and raise economy wide unemployment

moral hazard and capital structure dynamics we base a contracting theory for a start up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort and renegotiable contracts two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed the entrepreneur must be given limited liability and the investor s earnings must not decrease in the realized profi to f thefirm all message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria and no third parties are considered within this class of contracts equilibria and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur s incentives to exert effort these contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation if the investor has the bargaining power the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort in the latter case a non debt simple contract achieves efficiency the non contractibility of effort does not lower welfare thus when the non contractibility of effort matters our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics an early use of debt claims followed by a switch to equity like claims

an experimental test of the baumol tobin transactions demand for money historically generated data do not allow a clean test of any particular money dema nd theory by creating the artificial environment analyzed by william baumol and james tobin s work on the transactions demand for money one can observe how real people pursuing real rewards behave in that environment baumol and tobin assumed people were sufficiently rational to learn four axioms of rational behavior the authors subjects learned only three however trial and error methods plus subjects limited rationality did produce results similar to the baumol tobin predictions this supports the need to weaken the definition of rationality in the manner suggested by herbert simon copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity in a principal agent model with unobservable effort and possible renegotiation contracts are assumed to satisfy two natural restrictions limited liability for the agent and monotonicity of payments for the principal the main result is that if the agent has the renegotiation bargaining power any contract is weakly pareto dominated by a debt contract journal of economic literature classification numbers d820 l140 o261

international evidence on misspecification of the standard money demand equation abstract this paper tests the proposition that the interest rate in the standard money demand equation acts as a proxy for the expected change in interest rates if this is true the interest elasticity in the standard equation will depend on the expectations process for interest rates using cross country data we find that there does exist a relationship between the observed interest elasticity in the standard equation and the predictability of future interest rates from current interest rates

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties