competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

nonrenewable resource scarcity nonrenewable resource theory often is summarized by hotelling s rule this paper reviews theoretical extensions and empirical investigations of resource extraction models observed data are often inconsistent with the hotelling rule suggesting that other characteristics of nonrenewable resource supply including exploration heterogeneous ore quality technological progress and capital investment are important determinants of the dynamic behavior of resource prices given the persistent recurrence of concern about nonrenewable resource scarcity measures of nonrenewable resource scarcity and the empirical evidence for the time trends of those measures are reviewed finally the implications of nonrenewable resource scarcity for economic growth are examined

flexibility as a source of value in the production of alternative fuels the ethanol case there is typically a high degree of flexibility associated with the production of alternative fuels due to the ability to source from different input raw materials or to produce different output products based on market conditions in this paper we consider the particular example of ethanol and seek to quantify the incremental value from flexibility in its production from sugarcane in brazil we accomplish this by first jointly modeling the stochastic processes for the prices of the two relevant commodities sugar a food commodity and ethanol an energy commodity in discrete time as a bivariate lattice this framework allows us to value the option to switch output products based on the respective price signals of the two commodities however unlike the usual assumption of geometric brownian motion stochastic processes we use the more realistic case of mean reverting commodity price processes we estimate the parameters for these processes by applying a regression based procedure to empirical sugar and ethanol data collected during a period from 1998 through 2008 our results show that the option to switch outputs has significant value even under the assumption of mean reverting prices which has implications for both producers and policy makers alike

risk aversion exchange rate uncertainty and the law of one price insights from the market for online air travel tickets we argue that risk aversion driven by exchange rate uncertainty causes a wedge between the domestic and foreign prices of a homogeneous good we test our hypothesis using a unique micro data set from a market with minimum imperfections the empirical findings validate our hypothesis as accounting for exchange rate uncertainty we are able to explain a significant proportion of deviations from the law of one price overall our analysis suggests the possibility of a new solution to the purchasing power parity puzzles

stochastic convenience yield and the pricing of oil contingent claims this paper develops and empirically tests a two factor model for pricing financial and real assets contingent on the price of oil the factors are the spot price of oil and the instantaneous convenience yield the parameters of the model are estimated using weekly oil futures contract prices from january 1984 to november 1988 and the model s performance is assessed out of sample by valuing futures contracts over the period november 1988 to may 1989 finally the model is applied to determine the present values of one barrel of oil deliverable in one to ten years time

colluding on relative prices firms sometimes agree to limit the discounts they offer a class of customers i e they collude on the price differences across consumer classes why courts have struck down agreements to limit discounts as violations of the laws against price fixing are these collusive agreements in fact efficient this article addresses these questions in a multiproduct duopoly model under one interpretation the incentive to collude on relative prices can be traced to heterogeneity in consumers time costs under fairly general conditions total surplus increases with the collusion this efficiency effect is most striking in the case where collusion raises the prices faced by all consumers over which firms compete

why do manufacturers issue coupons an empirical analysis of breakfast cereals we explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers coupons for 25 readyto eat breakfast cereals we find that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available this result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions we present evidence that is inconsistent with both dynamic theories of price discrimination and explanations of couponing based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers we find support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings as well as suggestions that firmwide incentives may induce managers to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously finally lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase

does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

price discrimination and retail configuration the hypothesis that price discrimination based on willingness to pay for quality can occur in multifirm markets is confirmed using microdata on gasoline retailing a test that discriminates between price structures associated with discrimination and with cost driven competitive differentials is developed and implemented with controls for variation in outlet and market characteristics a second test based on profitability variation rejects a competitive peak load pricing explanation for the observed price dispersion the data suggest that price discrimination at the retail level adds at least 9 a gallon to the average price of full service gasoline

price discrimination in the airline market the effect of market concentration we test the hypothesis that price discrimination increases with competition in the airline market using a large cross section of tickets offered by several carriers on various routes we approximate price discrimination with marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions that carriers typically use to price discriminate saturday night stayover re quirements and advanced purchase discounts we find that the restrictions are associated with lower airfares but that the discounts are smaller on routes with higher market concentration the results suggest that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases as markets becomemore competitive

the dynamics pattern of price dispersion in retail fuel markets abstract this paper empirically investigates the dynamics of price dispersion in retail fuel markets as a response to the corresponding wholesale price changes for this purpose we take advantage of a daily dataset of prices fixed by gas stations in two spanish regions it is consistently found that retail price dispersion is temporarily enlarged as a consequence of wholesale price increases while it is reduced due to decreases the presence of asymmetries in the short run dynamics is also revealed the impact of positive changes in the wholesale price is in the first days of adjustment clearly greater the dynamics pattern could be explained at least in part by the faster response of prices in the stations associated with the two vertically integrated companies that have the largest market share i e repsol and cepsa

habit formation and exhaustible resource risk pricing abstract this paper studies the risk pricing implications of introducing habit formation in consumption in a model that encompasses growth with nonrenewable resources and capital markets it is shown that the expected return on nonrenewable resource stocks incorporates both short run and long run risk factors the short run risk factor is associated with shocks to current surplus consumption growth the long run risk factor reflects the investor s desire to hedge against long run shocks to future surplus consumption prospects long run habit risk premium the model is tested using energy commodities index and us aggregate real per capita consumption data and the results confirm that habit enters significantly in the pricing equation by entertaining a long run time varying risk coefficient compared to results obtained with a no habit formation model time separable preferences we found that long run future prospects of surplus consumption constitute a forward looking risk factor to be taken into account in explaining the dynamics of energy prices under uncertainty

antidumping protection and r d competition in recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world evidence shows that antidumping often targets r d intensive sectors raising a con cern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in r d we investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two stage game in which two firms first choose r d levels and then compete in prices we find that when a single government institutes antidumping law the protected firm decreases investment in r d while the constrained firm invests more when both governments engage in antidumping actions both firms invest more in r d than under free trade jel classification f12 f13

empirical evidence of news about future prospects in the risk pricing of oil assets abstract this empirical paper investigates the relevance of long run risks associated with uncertainty shocks to future growth prospects news about future prospects for explaining the risk pricing of oil stocks an econometric method that incorporates dynamic factor analysis is used for estimating the pricing equation of oil stocks the results indicate that oil investors care about long run risks associated with future growth prospects long run risks account for almost half of the total risk premium of oil stocks long run risks associated with future growth prospects are significantly shaped by latent factors related to the labor market the price indices and financial markets moreover our estimated model captures some historical events including the oil crisis of the seventies the economic crisis of the mid eighties the stock market crash of 1987 and the economic crises of 1998 and 2000

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

spatial differentiation and price discrimination in the cement industry evidence from a structural model we estimate a structural model of the cement industry that incorporates spatial differentiation and price discrimination focusing on the us southwest over 1983 2003 we leverage the structure of the model to obtain consistent estimates of the underlying parameters using data on market outcomes that are substantially aggregated our results indicate that transportation costs around 0 46 per tonne mile rationalize the data this friction enables relatively isolated plants to obtain higher prices from nearby customers we further find that disallowing price discrimination would create 30 million in consumer surplus annually and show how the model can identify suitable divestitures in merger analysis

market power and collusion in the ocean shipping industry is a bigger cartel a better cartel i introduction the ocean shipping industry enjoys certain conditions that are extremely favorable for collusion such as antitrust immunity for explicit pricing agreements known as conference agreements and enforcement of those agreements by the u s government consequently studies 1 purporting to show evidence of price discrimination in ocean shipping were considered by some proof of the obvious the ocean shipping industry exercises market power due to its unique regulatory environment policymakers presume that collusive behavior pervades the industry as evidenced by senator metzenbaum s statement that the american people simply can t afford to give ocean shipping conferences unbridled discretion to raise prices reduce capacity neutralize low cost competitors and eliminate services to ports or other customers 2 thus the conventional view is that liner conferences act as effective cartels if this view is correct then the cartels should become more effective as they face less competition from outsiders that have refrained from joining the cartel we test this hypothesis by examining how liner conferences behave as their competitive position changes ocean shipping has a truly unique regulatory structure reflecting fears about destructive competition and excess capacity that have existed since the late 1800s at that time joint price setting behavior among ocean carriers became a common practice antitrust immunity for joint pricing agreements has been formally provided by u s legislation since 1916 policymakers granted that immunity in exchange for active regulatory supervision 3 under the current regulatory structure defined in the shipping act of 1984 each route contains a conference that consists of all carriers choosing to participate in an explicit joint pricing agreement which is free from antitrust action 4 some carriers typically choose to remain outside the pricing agreement these carriers are known as independent carriers conferences must be open so that any carrier may join or exit a conference with limited notice and without explicit penalties both conferences and independent carriers are required to file their rates with the federal maritime commission fmc an agency of the u s government the fmc is charged with monitoring and enforcing the published rates when the fmc detects secret discounting from published rates by either a conference or independent carrier it punishes those parties involved by assessing fines 5 however conference members are allowed to publicly deviate from the conference rate by publishing their own freight rate on a particular transaction after notifying the conference of their intention to do so with few exceptions to be discussed later conferences prohibit their members from independently entering into contractual arrangements with shippers although the ocean shipping industry s regulatory structure appears conducive to collusion other aspects of the industry are not hospitable to anticompetitive behavior first the absence of statutory restrictions on entry implies that carriers are free to transfer ships from one route to another or to enter the industry de novo secondly many countries subsidize shipbuilding which industry participants claim results in substantial excess capacity lastly the heterogeneity of both carriers and shippers may impede collusive behavior 6 previous empirical studies have argued that liner conferences effectively collude based purely on their finding that freight rates increase as the value of the cargo increases since ocean shipping is now widely containerized i e diverse commodities are shipped in uniform boxes that are handled in a largely uniform manner these value based rate differences are considered evidence of price discrimination by an effective cartel the major flaw in these tests of collusive market power is that they do not account for costs that may be positively related to the product s value such as implied damage liability costs or costs related to the quality of service

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

third degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality this paper analyzes third degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served the model features the business passenger and leisure passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation and a less price elastic demand than leisure passengers our main result is the identification of the time valuation effect of price discrimination which can work in the opposite direction as the well known output effect on welfare this time valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output

a real options model to evaluate the effect of environmental policies on the oil sands rate of expansion abstract canadian oil sands hold the third largest recognized oil deposit in the world while the rapidly expanding oil sands industry in western canada has driven economic growth the extraction of the oil comes at a significant environmental cost it is believed that the government policies have failed to keep up with the rapid oil sands expansion creating serious challenges in managing the environmental impacts this paper presents a practical yet financially sound real options model to evaluate the rate of oil sands expansion under different environmental cost scenarios resulting from governmental policies while accounting for oil price uncertainty and managerial flexibilities our model considers a multi plant multi agent setting in which labor costs increase for all agents and impact their optimal strategies as new plants come online our results show that a stricter environmental cost scenario delays investment but leads to a higher rate of expansion once investment begins once constructed a plant is highly unlikely to shut down our model can be used by government policy makers to gauge the impact of policy strategies on the oil sands expansion rate and by oil companies to evaluate expansion strategies based on assumptions regarding market and taxation costs

airline pricing behavior under limited inter modal competition this paper empirically analyzes airline pricing for short haul flights in contexts with no credible threat of inter modal competition to this end we explore the southern italian market since it is less accessible by other transport modes and thus fares are the direct outcome of air related competition we show in fact that market power matters depending on the level of intra modal competition and that airlines apply differentiated mark ups besides consistent with the implementation of inter temporal price discrimination ipd we find a non monotonic inter temporal profile of fares with a turning point included in the interval of the 43rd to 45th days before departure finally we provide evidence that in more competitive markets airlines are more likely to engage in ipd jel l11 l13 l93

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

the pricing of oil and gas some further results the hotelling valuation principle hvp implies that the unit value of an exhaustible natural resource can be written as a function of its current price net of extraction costs other variables such as interest rates have no additional explanatory power the results of earlier tests using data from 1979 1981 strongly support the hvp this paper presents a series of follow up tests using time series cross section data covering the period august 1981 to december 1983 because the variance of petroleum prices in this period was substantially less than in the earlier period the follow up sample proved generally noninformative the sample also contains some observations on oil and gas royalty trusts tests of the hvp using these trust data yielded generally satisfactory results although given the limited sample size the results must be viewed with caution the purpose of this paper is to present follow up tests of the hotelling valuation principle hvp for exhaustible resources the hvp and the earlier tests are described in detail in an earlier paper miller and upton 5 and we will limit ourselves here to a brief summary the principle that the unit price of an exhaustible natural resource less the marginal cost of extraction will tend to rise at the rate of interest was first stated by harold hotelling 2 it follows from intertemporal profit maximization on the part of a price taking owner of an exhaustible natural resource if the unit price of resources net of extraction costs is expected to rise by less than the rate of interest why not extract it now and if it will rise by more why extract any today the hotelling principle has become the standard paradigm for natural resource economics although perhaps more from the absence of any viable alternative than from strong empirical validation earlier tests of the hotelling principle generally based on time series of resource prices have yet to provide convincing support

a simple dynamic general equilibrium model abstract we analyse a single sector economy with h 1 infinitely lived agents that operate in a continuous time framework utility functions are recursive but not additive both efficient and perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are considered the existence and stability of such allocations are investigated locally i e in a neighbourhood of steady state allocations the model is shown to be useful for explaining the distribution of wealth and consumption across agents and for analysing the way in which wealth redistribution can affect the dynamics of aggregate economic variables

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

gaussian estimation of single factor continuous time models of the term structure of interest rates this article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models a range of one factor continuous time models of the short term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by chan karolyi longstaff and sanders 1992a hereafter ckls whereas the volatility of short term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the united states it is not in the united kingdom the econometric estimation of continuous time models of the short term interest rate has been a relatively recent development in empirical finance see for example brown and dybvig 1986 melino and turnbull 1986 barone cuoco and zautzik 1991 babbs 1992 abken 1993 chen and scott 1993 das 1993 gibbons and ramaswamy 1993 pearson and sun 1994 lund 1994 pfann schotman and tschernig 1995 ait sahalia 1995 and broze scaillet and zakoian 1995 1 in an important study chan karolyi longstaff and sanders 1992a hereafter ckls develop a general framework to estimate and compare a range of different single factor term structure models for the short term interest rate their major conclusion is that term structure models with volatilities more highly sensitive to the level of interest rates than more generally used models have a closer empirical fit to the data in addition the functional form of the drift with or without mean reversion is of secondary importance to the correct specification of the conditional heteroskedasticity in ckls the continuous time models of the term structure are estimated using a discrete approximation we present in this article an alternative

a theory of quality related differences in retail margins why there is a premium on premium gasoline this paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality the difference in price cost margins between the high and low quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor s closest rival these predictions are largely supported using an extensive station level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the los angeles basin area from 1992 1995

fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination we investigate the effect of a ban on third degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion we build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups two cases are analyzed i best response symmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed ii best response asymmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed in both price discrimination scenarios firms discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim trigger strategies than under uniform pricing

the global stability of efficient intertemporal allocations this paper describes a continuous time model of an economy with finitely many infinitely lived consumers and a finite number of capital goods two objectives are achieved first recursive nonadditive utility functionals are formulated and analyzed second these preference functionals are applied to analyze the nature of efficient allocations in a dynamic economy two classes of global turnpike propositions are proven which provide the basis for a model of the long run distribution of wealth these propositions also provide new perspective regarding existing stability literature based on additive utilities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

a model of search with price discrimination abstract we introduce observable heterogeneity across buyers into a model of simultaneous search buyers differences are informative about their willingness to search giving rise to price discrimination even if they all have the same willingness to pay we analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes when price discrimination is allowed and when it is not we find that the price comparison across consumers as well as the effects of banning price discrimination critically depend on the elasticity of the search cost distribution interestingly for normally distributed search costs there is an inverted u shape relationship between prices and buyers size similarly a ban on price discrimination hurts small and large buyers to the benefit of the medium size ones

the rate of time preference and dynamic economic analysis strong restrictions on the structure of preferences are a central feature in the received theory of intertemporal allocation in fact most of the modern literature concerned with capital theoretic problems represents preferences by a functional in which an additive utility function is discounted by a constant rate of time preference this specification is attractive because it is analytically tractable in dynamic models and it clearly delineates how tastes and opportunities interact to determine an economy s household s paths of consumption and capital formation however its rigid structure constancy of time preference severely limits the conclusions and explanatory power of the corresponding models this paper considers a class of utility functionals in continuous time which have the appealing feature that the rate of time preference depends systematically on an index of aggregate future consumption the more flexible structure embodied in these functionals leads to important generalizations and

dynamic price discrimination with asymmetric firms this paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor consumers past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms products price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if it does not cause the weaker firm to exit otherwise it can harm consumers the effect of price discrimination also depends on firms cost differences market competitiveness and consumers time horizon the stronger firm may price below cost in the presence of consumer switching costs with the purpose and effect of eliminating competition

price discrimination in oligopoly evidence from regional newspapers recent theoretical work has shown that the incentive to target rival firms customers with low prices can increase price discrimination and that the strength of the incentive depends on a firm s market position using data on swedish newspaper subscriptions we find strong support for these predictions newspapers with a local competitor sell a larger part of their circulation at a discount than monopoly newspapers moreover in competitive markets the use of discounts is inversely related to the newspaper s market share we find no evidence that price discrimination based on observable and exogenous characteristics is influenced by the market structure

portfolio selection in a data rich environment we model portfolio weights as a function of latent factors that summarize the information in a large number of economic variables this approach hereafter diffusion index approach offers the opportunity to exploit a much richer information base to improve portfolio selection we use factor analysis to estimate the space spanned by the factors this provides consistent estimates for the optimal weights as the number of economic variables and sample size go to infinity we consider an empirical application to illustrate the practical usefulness of our approach the results indicate that the diffusion index approach helps to improve the portfolio performance

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

antitrust transaction costs and merger simulation with nonlinear pricing abstractthis article explores the relationship between transaction costs and antitrust it makes three points first the usual antitrust analysis can be seriously misleading as a guide to consumer or society welfare because it assumes that pricing is linear and uniform but the type of pricing endogenously depends on transaction costs including information costs second two key issues in any antitrust analysis are whether transaction costs change as a result of the action under scrutiny and regardless of whether they change how the existence of nonlinear pricing alters the usual antitrust analysis we develop a merger simulation model with nonlinear pricing to illustrate how misleading the standard analysis can be third since transaction costs influence the ability of various coalitions of consumers distributors and manufacturers to form cooperative game theory can provide a unifying perspective into what situations might give rise to the creation and exploitation of market power

the efficiency of advance purchase discounts in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty abstract the pricing behavior of two airlines is examined one is operated by a welfare maximizing social planner the other by an unregulated monopolist total capacity is fixed and aggregate demand is uncertain it is shown that advance purchase discounts can assist in attaining an efficient allocation of capacity when it is not feasible to operate a spot market on the day of the flight it is further shown that the planner may offer larger or smaller discounts than the monopolist

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

non discrimination clauses in the retail energy sector the british energy regulator will soon review a non discrimination licence condition which it imposed to ensure that energy retailers charge the same mark up in different regions many consumers are loyal to incumbent firms necessitating heavy discounting by entrants to attract customers which had led to regional price discrimination matching characteristics of the energy market to models of discrimination we identify the necessary conditions for the licence condition to have a positive effect for consumers and explore whether the policy has helped potentially vulnerable consumers we conclude that the most likely effect of the licence condition is to reduce competition in the mainstream energy markets and welcome the regulator s latest review of the retail market

price discrimination in australia s retail electricity markets an analysis of victoria southeast queensland when capital intensive monopoly industries are restructured and deregulated consumer prices commence a natural drift from regulated uniform average cost tariffs to competitive differential prices and this can raise problems for policymakers deep discounts are welcomed high standing offers are not but price discrimination is unremarkable in economics indeed in industries where fixed sunk costs represent a significant portion of total cost discriminatory pricing is usually welfare enhancing conversely theory predicts and empirical evidence confirms that regulatory efforts to cherry pick differential prices in asymmetric markets will damage consumer welfare in this article we analyse differential retail electricity offer prices in the australian states of victoria and queensland and contrast these with industry average total cost and the marginal cost of retail supply we find deregulated victoria displays high price dispersion with standing offer tariffs 10 above industry average total cost and marginal offers at break even prices i e 20 below average total cost in the semi regulated southeast queensland market where a regulated price cap exists there is lower dispersion but marginal offers include a 6 7 retail mark up efficient pricing requires the marginal unit produced to be priced at marginal cost and victoria meets this criteria but we identify an episode of inter consumer misallocation due to high standing offers we conclude policy initiatives designed to help firms shift vulnerable households from standing offer tariffs is desirable

resource extraction with a carbon tax and regime switching prices exercising your options this paper develops a model of a profit maximizing firm with the option to exploit a non renewable resource choosing the timing and pace of development the resource price is modelled as a regime switching process which is calibrated to oil futures prices a hamilton jacobi bellman equation is specified that describes the profit maximization decision of the firm the model is applied to a problem of optimal investment in a typical oils sands in situ operation and solved for critical levels of oil prices that would motivate a firm to make the large scale investment needed for oil sands extraction as well as to operate mothball or abandon the facility regime shifts can have an important effect on the optimal timing of investment and extraction the paper examines the effect of several carbon tax schemes on optimal timing of construction production and abandonment a form of green paradox is identified

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

welfare increasing third degree price discrimination when demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means conditions exist such that third degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution related to the pareto in general whether discrimination increases total output depends on demand being more convex in markets in which prices fall with discrimination than in those in which prices rise

exhaustibility and risk as asset class dimensions a social investor approach to capital resource economies this paper develops a framework in which asset class dimensions are extended to include both risk and exhaustibility for explaining the evolution of shadow prices of marginal units of exhaustible natural resources in capital resource economies it is shown that the pricing kernel function required for socially valuing marginal units of exhaustible resource hereafter called the exhaustion stochastic discount factor combines a factor that discounts for risk and another factor that discounts for resource exhaustion over time the social rate of return on the marginal unit of resource stock adds to the risk premium an exhaustion premium that accounts for the resource depletion over time in this setting the principle of no arbitrage holds by extending asset class dimensions to include not only a risk dimension but also an exhaustibility dimension

monetary policy in a data rich environment abstract most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been confined to frameworks in which the federal reserve is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount of information despite the fact that the fed actively monitors literally thousands of economic time series this article explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information sets into the analysis both positive and normative of fed policymaking we employ a factor model approach developed by stock j h watson m w diffusion indices journal of business economic statistics 2002 20 2 147 forecasting inflation 1999 journal of monetary economics 44 2 293 that permits the systematic information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few estimated factors with this framework we reconfirm stock and watson s result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy and we show that this result does not seem to depend on the use of finally revised as opposed to real time data we estimate policy reaction functions for the fed that take into account its data rich environment and provide a test of the hypothesis that fed actions are explained solely by its forecasts of inflation and real activity finally we explore the possibility of developing an expert system that could aggregate diverse information and provide benchmark policy settings

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

first degree price discrimination goes to school personalized pricing is widely discussed but seldom observed making studies of its efficacy rare yet first degree price discrimination is common in the pricing of higher education and i use data on prices and the characteristics of students admitted to a professional graduate program at a public university to estimate a matriculation demand function i then derive linear pricing functions that maximize revenue for a target number of students by allowing these functions to depend on progressively richer sets of observables i explore the effect of personalization of pricing on profit tailoring prices to a one dimensional measure of student quality would raise revenue by 2 2 per cent above the revenue with uniform pricing pricing based on both student quality and state residency raises revenue by 8 4 per cent and further tailoring based on available observables raises prices 9 0 per cent above the maximum revenue under uniform pricing pricing that obeys current statutory tuition limits raises revenue less but still by just over half as much i also infer the welfare weights that the pricing process implicitly attaches to student characteristics

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

principal components at work the empirical analysis of monetary policy with large data sets the empirical analysis of monetary policy requires the construction of instruments for future expected inflation dynamic factor models have been applied rather successfully to inflation forecasting in fact two competing methods have recently been developed to estimate large scale dynamic factor models based respectively on static and dynamic principal components this paper combines the econometric literature on dynamic principal components and the empirical analysis of monetary policy we assess the two competing methods for extracting factors on the basis of their success in instrumenting future expected inflation in the empirical analysis of monetary policy we use two large data sets of macroeconomic variables for the usa and for the euro area our results show that estimated factors do provide a useful parsimonious summary of the information used in designing monetary policy copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

evidence of directional price discrimination in the u s airline industry abstract this paper explores possible determinants that may affect an airline s decision to charge passengers different roundtrip fares depending on trip origin a case of directional price discrimination such fare differences cannot be the result of differences in cost as the cost of flying a roundtrip passenger does not significantly differ depending on direction it is argued that directional fare differences result from airlines recognizing that passenger price elasticities differ between route endpoints a price discriminating airline will then charge a higher roundtrip fare at the endpoint where the passenger price elasticity of demand is comparatively lower evidence is found suggesting that airlines do use differences in income to price discriminate when setting roundtrip fares fares are found to be 0 18 0 43 higher on average for each 1000 difference in average per capita income between origin and destination metro areas this finding is sensible assuming that higher incomes reduce the price elasticity of demand for air travel with richer passengers being less sensitive to the cost of travel

dynamic oligopoly pricing evidence from the airline industry we explore how pricing dynamics in the european airline industry vary with the competitive environment our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination first the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled travel date is decreasing in competition supporting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price discriminate second the sensitivity to competition is substantially increasing in the heterogeneity of the customer base reecting further that restraints on price discrimination are only relevant if there is initial scope for price discrimination these patterns are quantitatively important explaining about 83 percent of the total within ight price dispersion and explaining 17 percent of the observed cross market variation of pricing dynamics

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

a test of the hotelling valuation principle time series tests of the hotelling r percent rule for natural resource prices have not been strongly supportive but the tests and the data are subject to serious difficulties we propose here an alternative testing strategy based on another but less widely known implication of the hotelling model we test this implication which we call the hotelling valuation principle by regressing the market values of the reserves of a sample of u s domestic oiland gas producing companies on their estimated hotelling values we find that the estimated hotelling values account for a significant portion of the observed variations in market values and that the hotelling measures are better indicators of the market values of petroleum properties than two widely cited publicly available alternative appraisals

welfare and output in third degree price discrimination a note abstract one main result on the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement this note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms in these examples price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm this induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in a differentiated oligopoly this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is verified however that consumer surplus is never improved social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms profits in the case of linear demands jel d43 l11 l13 i introduction this article examines the welfare effects of oligopolistic third degree price discrimination explicitly considering product differentiation as a source of market power and strategic interaction product differentiation is one of the main reasons why firms can enjoy market power it enables them to sell products that are no longer perfect substitutes for example coca cola and pepsico sell similar types of soda although it is arguable that they differ in taste each firm thereby attracts some consumers over another as a form of price discrimination coca cola was once reported to be testing a vending machine that would automatically raise prices in hot weather 1 although the plan triggered nationwide controversy and coca cola had to abandon the project as a result it could have changed the regime of uniform pricing to one of price discrimination in the soda market how would the resulting change affect consumer welfare and firms profits in other words is third degree price discrimination good or bad answering this question is important because it helps us to evaluate price discrimination under oligopoly in this article we focus on horizontal product differentiation to consider substitutability as well as complementarity 2 by assuming a linear quadratic utility function of a representative consumer and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game we characterize the conditions relating to such demand properties as substitutability and complementarity required for price discrimination to improve social welfare more specifically we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is also shown that aggregate output must increase for price discrimination to improve social welfare we verify however that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimination welfare improvement from price discrimination is solely owing to an increase in firms profits in the example above the degree of substitution would be higher in the strong market i e when the temperature is high because consumers care less about which brand when it is hot weather our analysis below implies that social welfare might improve in this case the degree of substitution can vary across markets even if consumers in each market face exactly the same products because consumers taste depends on various market specific factors such as geographical and natural conditions if the strong market is where consumers demand a product more eagerly caring less about which brand in the above example individuals demand soda more eagerly in hot weather then our results suggest that price discrimination has large potential to improve social welfare 3 why does allowing price discrimination improve social welfare notice that there are two forces that determine equilibrium prices in price setting oligopoly a larger market size raises the price whereas a larger substitutability parameter lowers the price for price discrimination to raise social welfare it is necessary that a high degree of substitutability mitigates an increase in the discriminatory price in the larger market

the dominant firm advantage in multiproduct industries evidence from the u s airlines in many industries the largest firms are most successful in entering and competing in individual markets or submarkets while this success is often attributed to cost or quality differences it may also reflect reputation advantages or marketing strategies that benefit firms selling a wider variety of products in the industry i present an approach to estimating the advantages of a dominant firm in the airline industry that allows one to effectively control for cost and quality heterogeneity results using data from 1986 indicate that an airline with a dominant presence at an airport will have a significant advantage in attracting customers whose trips originate at that airport regardless of the specific route on which the customer is traveling

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

research note consumer heterogeneity and competitive price matching guarantees price matching guarantees are widely used in consumer and industrial markets previous studies argue that they are a marketing tactic that facilitates implicit price collusion this is because once a store adopts this marketing tactic its rivals can no longer steal its customers by undercutting its price and hence they have little incentive to initiate price cuts while a store with price matching guarantees has no fear of losing customers to rivals price cuts it has every incentive to raise its own price to charge a higher price to its loyal consumers a growing body of legal literature uses this argument today to justify calls for antitrust actions against stores employing this marketing tactic however this theoretical conclusion baffles practitioners and industry experts in practice sellers typically embrace this marketing tactic in response to heavier competition and a growing bargain consciousness among shoppers the introduction of price matching guarantees by a store is frequently interpreted by industry observers as the initiation of a price war rather than a signal of price collusion this assertion is supported in many instances by the fact that stores that introduce price matching guarantees also roll back their prices and typically suffer subsequent loss of profits most ironically the favorite examples used by researchers to illustrate how price matching guarantees can enforce price collusion crazy eddie and nobody beats the wiz have subsequently either gone bankrupt or filed for federal bankruptcy protection in this study we show that price matching guarantees can indeed facilitate competition the expected prices and profits can be strictly lower when all stores adopt price matching guarantees than when they are not allowed to this is because the adoption of price matching guarantees generates not only a competition dampening effect which has been recognized in the literature but also a competition enhancing effect this latter effect comes from the fact that price matching guarantees encourage price search by those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities these consumers will have incentives to obtain the rival store s price when their favorite store offers price matching guarantees to avail themselves of the lowest possible price at their favorite store as a result price matching guarantees reduce the number of purchases at the store from those consumers who would have paid the full price and thus prompt a store to price more aggressively to bid for more incremental sales this competition enhancing effect can more than offset the competition dampening effect in markets where consumers differ in their price search costs and store loyalty thus our study casts doubt on the advisability of blanket prohibition on price matching guarantees our argument relies only on consumer segmentation and on the phenomenon of periodic sales both of which are common in retail markets we arrive at our conclusion by incorporating bargain shoppers and opportunistic loyals into the standard sales promotion models in contrast the past literature on price matching guarantees ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of sales in retail markets and overlooks those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are alert to saving opportunities as a result it is troubled by two awkward conclusions on the one hand price matching guarantees simply remove rivals incentives to undercut in price and hence also their incentives to run sales this implies that the adoption of price matching guarantees in a market will eliminate the phenomenon of sales which is obviously counterfactual on the other hand in equilibrium no consumer actually invokes price matching guarantees as each player has incentives to close any price gap in the market this is obviously false based on our casual observations and our conversations with store managers theoretical research on the subject thus far has been overwhelmingly one sided and empirical or experimental studies are conspicuously lacking we hope that our conclusion will spark further research in both directions a healthy debate will broaden our perspective on an issue of great importance in formulating public policies and in managerial decision making

the impact of spatial price differences on oil sands investments abstract in this article a two factor real options model is developed to examine the impact spatial price differences have on the value of an oil sands project and the incentive to invest large volatile price differences between locations can emerge when demand to ship exceeds capacity limits this may have a significant impact on production investment and policy in exporting regions here we assume the price difference between two locations follows a stationary process implying crude oil markets are integrated as oil prices in different locations move together the investment decision is formulated as a linear complementarity problem that is solved numerically using a fully implicit finite difference method results show the value of an oil sands project and the incentive to invest in a new project will increase when the mean price difference decreases surprisingly the standard deviation of the price difference has very little impact on project value or the incentive to invest