corporate social responsibility and profit volatility theory and empirical evidence corporate social responsibility csr implies extra care for the well being of stakeholders different from shareholders in our theoretical model we show that when this principle implies that more csr oriented companies incorporate stakeholders well being constraints it translates into higher sensitivity of profits to economic shocks our empirical analysis finds support for this hypothesis showing that csr attributes which relate to positive contributions to stakeholders well being significantly and positively affect idiosyncratic profit volatility our findings remain robust when controlled for endogeneity with instrumental variable estimates

repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs abstract we develop a dynamic principal agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff relevant parameters agency conflicts and the agent s implicit incentives to influence the principal s posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts we make a methodological contribution to the literature by solving the continuous time contracting problem using a discrete time approximation approach we obtain a simple characterization of optimal renegotiation proof contracts in terms of the solution to a nonlinear ordinary differential equation ode we then exploit the properties of the ode to derive a number of novel implications for the dynamics of long term contracts that alter the intuition gleaned from the previous literature optimism has a first order impact on incentives investment and output that could reconcile the private equity puzzle consistent with empirical evidence the interaction between asymmetric beliefs risk sharing and adverse selection costs could cause the time paths of the agent s incentive intensities to be increasing or decreasing our results also suggest that the incorporation of imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs could potentially reconcile empirical evidence of an ambiguous relation between risk and incentives and a non monotonic relation between firm value and incentives permanent and transitory components of risk have differing effects on incentives which suggest that empirical investigations of the link between risk and incentives should appropriately account for different components of risk

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

wall street occupations many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses and hard to monitor effort we analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting we show that finance jobs feature high compensation up or out promotion and long work hours and are more attractive than other jobs moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms even though pay increases employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage

an adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance abstract we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population we adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in shavell and weiss 1979 supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents job opportunities our main theoretical contribution is a quasi recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem including a geometric characterization of the state space our main economic result is that optimal contracts for bad searchers tend to be upward sloping due to an adverse selection effect this is in contrast to the well known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for good searchers in our model

knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

ambiguous incentives and the persistence of effort experimental evidence abstract when the assignment of incentives is uncertain we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes influence participation and effort we contrast three incentive schemes in a real effort experiment in which individuals decide when to quit a continuous incentive scheme and two intermittent ones fixed and random in all treatments we introduce a regime shift by withdrawing monetary rewards after the same unknown number of periods in such an ambiguous environment we show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort intermittent incentives lead to a greater persistence of effort while continuous incentives entail exit as soon as payment stops randomness increases both earlier and later exiting this selection effect in terms of ability and risk attitudes combined with the impact of intermittent rewards on persistence lead to an increase in mean performance after the regime shift when incentives are intermittent

the repricing of executive stock options abstract we examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options these repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm specific performance in which the average firm loses one fourth of its value no other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made and many firms reprice more than once without repricing a majority of the options would have been at the money within two years we find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen firms with greater agency problems smaller size and insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice

breakthroughs deadlines and self reported progress contracting for multistage projects we study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects staged financing pervasive in both venture capital and research grants arises as a feature of the optimal contract the nature of progress plays an important role when progress is tangible incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time early progress in one stage gives the agent more time and funding to complete the next one when progress is intangible unverifiable progress reports are used despite the fact that the information in the report has no social value the optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date if the agent reports progress at that date then the principal gives him a relatively short deadline to complete the project if not then a probationary phase begins in which the project is terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported we explore the implications for welfare and optimal project design

dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning abstract this paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product individual learning generates ex post heterogeneity which affects the buyers purchasing decisions the monopolist s pricing strategy and efficiency when learning occurs through good news signals buyers receive a rent because of the possible advantageous belief caused by short lived deviations if a good news signal arrives the price can instantaneously increase or decrease depending on the arrival time of this signal the equilibrium is inefficient because the monopolist s incentive to exploit known buyers leads to inefficient early termination of exploration when learning occurs through bad news signals ex post heterogeneity has no such effect since only homogeneous unknown buyers purchase the experience good

agency and optimal investment dynamics agency problems limit firms access to capital markets curbing investment firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems what are the implications for investment we present a theory of a firm s investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long term financial contracts we derive results relating firms investment decisions current and past cash flows firm size capital structure and dividends among the results optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time after controlling for investment opportunities these results hold for a range of agency problems jel g30 g31 g32 g35 d82 d86 d92 copyright 2007 oxford university press

inducing environmental disclosures a dynamic mechanism design approach this paper studies the design of voluntary disclosure regulations for a firm that faces a stochastic environmental hazard the occurrence of such a hazard is known only to the firm the regulator if finding a hazard collects a fine and mandates the firm to perform costly remediation that reduces the environmental damage the regulator may inspect the firm at any time to uncover the hazard however because inspections are costly the regulator also offers a reward to the firm for voluntarily disclosing the hazard the reward corresponds to either a subsidy or a reduced fine depending on whether it is positive or negative thus the regulator needs to dynamically determine the reward and inspection policy that minimizes expected societal cost in the long run we model this problem as a dynamic adverse selection problem with costly state verification in continuous time despite the complexity and generality of this setup we show that the optimal regulation policy follows a very simple cyclic structure which we fully characterize in closed form specifically the regulator runs scheduled inspections periodically after each inspection the reward level decreases over time until a subsequent inspection takes place if a hazard is not revealed the reward level is reset to a high level restarting the cycle in contrast to the reward level the mandated remediation level is constant over time nonetheless when subsidies are not allowed in the industry we show that the regulator should dynamically adjust this remediation level which then acts as a substitute for a subsidy our analysis further reveals that optimal inspection frequency increases not only when the inspection accuracy decreases but also when the penalty for not disclosing the hazard increases

optimal dynamic capital budgeting i study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects and headquarters can audit projects at a cost under certain conditions a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal headquarters 1 allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time 2 set a threshold such that projects below it are financed from the account while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit further analysis studies when co financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects

the impact of wages and unemployment on youth enrollment and labor supply various aspects of the school enrollment labor supply decision have been examined in earlier studies including those of bowen and finegan 1969 cohen rea and lerman 1970 duncan 1965 katz 1973 korbel 1966 and lerman 1972 although these authors were aware of the joint nature of the school work decision typically they used an ordinary least squares ols framework with dichotomous dependent variables to analyze enrollment conditional on the labor supply decision or labor supply conditional on enrollment several more recent studies such as antos and mellow 1978 stephenson 1978 and ehrenberg and marcus forthcoming use multinomial logit to analyze the joint determination of labor supply and enrollment mallar 1976 uses a bivariate probit model to deal with the simultaneous relation between school and work but none of these studies considers both the wage offers and job availability there is still available no single set of estimates which considers the roles of both job availability and the wage on the joint enrollment labor supply decision consider what the interrelation between wages and job availability implies for estimation of the labor force participation school enrollment decision to the extent that downwardly rigid wages prevent the youth labor market from clearing one would expect both wages and job availability to influence labor supply if one of these measures is not included in explaining labor supply the coefficient estimated for the other measure may for reasons well known be biased for example if the wage is omitted but the unemployment variable included and if wages and unemployment are negatively correlated then the magnitude of the coefficient of the unemployment variable will be increased it is also unclear on a priori grounds how job availability affects school enrollment on the one hand if jobs are readily available to young people youth from poor families may be able to enroll in school supporting themselves through part time work with no jobs available some may be unable to afford school expenditures and may drop out bowen and finegan 1969 p 404 on the other hand readily available employment opportunities for youth may simply raise the probability of dropping out of school and working full time our findings will help to determine how young people react to this influence and to other influences of the market from the viewpoint of public policy there are a number of reasons why it is important that the enrollment labor supply decisions be understood and that the separate responses to wage and job availability be isolated for one thing there is a tendency to discount the welfare importance of unemployment or poor labor participation for young people enrolled in school feldstein and ellwood 1979 however the joint nature of the enrollment labor supply decisions suggests that a high enrollment rate may not be simply a cause of low participation rates but may be an additional symptom of adverse labor market conditions indeed our results for nonwhite males support an interpretation of this kind second the joint nature of the decisions also implies that public programs such as the received for publication january 31 1980 revision accepted for publication december 11 1980 both authors are with dartmouth college and the national bureau of economic research the research reported here was supported by the division of technical systems in the office of technical and analytic systems office of the assistant secretary for planning and budget u s department of education and is part of the nber s research program in labor studies any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the national bureau of economic research or of the department of education we would like to thank gary fields meir kohn robert plotnick martin segal and participants in the labor seminars at harvard and at cornell for their helpful comments

optimal contract to induce continued effort we consider a basic model of a risk neutral principal incentivizing a risk neutral agent to exert effort to raise the arrival rate of a poisson process the effort is costly to the agent is unobservable to the principal and affects the instantaneous arrival rate each arrival yields a constant revenue to the principal the principal therefore devises a mechanism involving payments and a potential stopping time to motivate the agent to always exert effort we formulate this problem as a stochastic optimal control model with an incentive constraint in continuous time over an infinite horizon although we allow payments to take general forms contingent on past arrival times the optimal contract has a simple and intuitive structure which depends on whether the agent is as patient as or less patient than the principal toward future income this paper was accepted by manel baucells decision analysis

optimal contracts with shirking i explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a standard continuoustime agency setting where the agent has a shirking action my solution generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature both contracts include phases when the agent frequently shirks in one contract the shirking phases are relaxation periods rewarding the agent for good performance in the other the shirking phases are suspension type arrangements punishing the agent for poor performance in addition i also explore the relationships between optimal contracting and taxes bargaining and renegotiation

sh a r p shelf allocation for retailers profit shelf space is the retailer s scarcest resource space management tools are thus badly needed for that purpose commercial computer packages and optimal allocation models have been developed building on the work of corstjens and doyle we elaborate a general theoretical shelf space allocation model which focuses on the demand interdependencies prevailing across and within product groups rules of thumb are compared to the derived optimal allocation the sh a r p model is introduced as a simplified yet realistic variant and validated against data collected in a dutch supermarket chain subsequently the feasibility of its implementation has been experimented in various belgian chains case studies demonstrate the profit potential of sh a r p

modeling response to advertising and pricing changes for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice this paper is based on a series of studies undertaken for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice over a five year period the studies were a consequence of management questions regarding the effectiveness of a new advertising campaign the best media mix for this campaign and the apparent wear out of the advertising copy the studies included controlled experimentation estimation of advertising response functions and exploration of price sensitivity following major price increases by v 8 it was found that the short term response to advertising was s shaped and that the new creative approach rather than expenditure levels alone accounted for by far the largest component of the impact of advertising on sales it was also found that for a short period following the major price increases v 8 became extremely price sensitive however after about six months the marginal impact of price returned to historical levels the application of results at campbell soup company their relationship to the literature and their implications for both researchers and practitioners are discussed

the relationship between firm growth size and age estimates for 100 manufacturing industries this study uses a sample of all firms operating in 100 manufacturing industries to examine some aspects of firm dynamics it finds that firm growth the variability of firm growth and the probability that a firm will fail decrease with firm age it also finds that firm growth decreases at a diminishing rate with firm size even after controlling for the exit of slow growing firms from the sample gibrat s law therefore fails although the severity of the failure decreases with firm size copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

monitoring for worker quality much nonmanagerial work is routine with all workers having similar output most of the time however failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly and consequently easily detected while challenges handled well pass unnoticed we analyze job assignment and worker monitoring for such guardian jobs if monitoring costs are positive but small monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm s belief about the probability that a worker is good the model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets low use of performance pay seniority pay rare demotions wage ceilings within grade and wage jumps at promotion

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model with an application to deposit insurance abstract we consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs the insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level we characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents we then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance our results suggest in a deposit insurance context that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on and to make deposit insurance payments only later or not at all

moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler s incentive to minimize expected costs of moral hazard rents for high officials we consider a dynamic moral hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises to minimize costs a governor s rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay in the long run we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring a soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

resolution of financial distress under agency frictions abstract we introduce in a dynamic contracting framework with moral hazard the possibility of recapitalization as an alternative to liquidation when a firm is distressed this is achieved by considering a risk averse agent and by allowing but not requiring the latter to inject additional capital into the firm when necessary we show that firm recapitalization may arise in an optimal long term contract as a consequence we find that there are two mechanisms at a firm s disposal so as to deal with financial difficulties one corresponds to a recapitalization process the other to a liquidation one the choice of mechanism is based on a cost benefit analysis

taming systemically important financial institutions we model a systemically important financial institution sifi that is too big or too interconnected to fail without credible regulation and strong supervision the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk we propose a solution to this problem showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard the solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers including the control of bankers compensation packages during crisis periods

altering the terms of executive stock options abstract we examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously issued executive stock options we identify properties of reset options develop a model for valuing resettable options and characterize the firms that have reset options we find the vast majority of options are reset at the money resulting on average in the strike price dropping 40 our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex ante value of an option award but the ex post gain can be substantial finally we find resetting has a strong negative relation with firm performance even after correcting for industry performance

dynamic security design convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications an entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project an agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers we first study the optimal contract in discrete time this contract can be implemented by cash reserves debt and equity the latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold to provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash we then study the continuous time limit of the model we prove the convergence of the discrete time value functions and optimal contracts our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices stock prices follow a diusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at zero their volatility as well as the leverage ratio of the firm increase after bad performance stock prices and book tomarket ratios are in a non monotonic relationship a more severe agency problem entails lower price earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk

repeated moral hazard with a time inconsistent agent abstract i consider a repeated principal agent model with moral hazard in which the agent has preferences which are widely used to capture time inconsistency i analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting i characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time consistent benchmarks the marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the marginal benefit of delaying these rewards until tomorrow in this sense the principal does not smooth the agent s rewards over time when facing a sophisticated agent it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time consistent agent

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility abstract we study a firm s internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility the principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use but the agent has private control over both project volatility and resource intensity and may misallocate resources to obtain private benefits the optimal contract can yield either overly risky or overly prudent project selection it can be implemented with a constant pricing schedule i e a static decentralized linear mechanism giving the agent control over the resource quantities project risk and agent s equity share the implementation rationalizes the use of hurdle rates above a firm s cost of capital and transfer prices above marginal cost while showing that hurdle rates or transfer prices may not vary with the agent s risk choice

collateral taxes and leverage we quantify the importance of collateral versus taxes for firms capital structures we estimate a dynamic model in which a taxable firm seeks financing for investment and a dynamic contracting environment motivates endogenous collateral constraints optimal leverage stays a safe distance from the constraint balancing the tax benefit of debt with the cost of lost financial flexibility we estimate this flexibility cost to be 7 2 of firm assets a percentage that is comparable to the tax benefit models with different tax rates fit the data equally well and leverage responds to the tax rate only when taxes are low

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

measuring the efficiency of trade shows a spanish case study abstract trade shows are an important industry in the spanish economy which contribute positively to regional development however the cost of attending a trade show is very high for exhibiting firms and so knowledge of trade shows efficiency is necessary in order to define the decision making process for the exhibiting firm with the aim of evaluating the efficiency indexes of operating trade shows this study applies a multi stage methodology for oriented dea models and a nonparametric test to analyze the differences in efficiency levels driven by specific variables and organizational forms the sample is made up of 45 trade shows at ifema madrid s fair institution the results show significant differences in efficiency across ifema the nonparametric tests reveal differences in efficiency levels driven by the sector and the type of trade show moreover the evidence allows provide managerial implications and future developments

optimal contracts for experimentation this paper studies a model of long term contracting for experimentation we consider a principal agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent s ability dynamic moral hazard and private learning about project quality we find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives and it is only their interaction that generally precludes efficiency our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts

analytical models of competition with implications for marketing issues findings and outlook the authors review a representative cross section of analytical models of competition using a framework for competitive analysis developed from a marketing perspective models are classified by the

yuliy sannikov winner of the 2016 clark medal yuliy sannikov is an extraordinary theorist who has developed methods that offer new insights in analyzing problems that had seemed well studied and familiar for example decisions that might bring about cooperation and or defection in a repeated play prisoner s dilemma game or that affect the balance of incentives and opportunism in a principal agent relationship his work has broken new ground in methodology often through the application of stochastic calculus methods the stochastic element means that his work naturally captures situations in which there is a random chance that monitoring communication or signaling between players is imperfect using calculus in the context of continuous time games allows him to overcome tractability problems that had long hindered research in a number of areas he has substantially altered the toolbox available for studying dynamic games this essay offers an overview of sannikov s research in several areas

a model of moral hazard credit cycles this paper considers a simple model of credit cycles driven by moral hazard in financial intermediation financial agents or bankers must earn moral hazard rents but the cost of these rents can be efficiently spread over an agent s entire career by promising large late career rewards if the agent has a consistently successful record dynamic interactions among different generations of financial agents can create credit cycles with repeated booms and recessions in recessions a scarcity of trusted financial intermediaries limits investment and reduces employment under such conditions taxing workers to subsidize bankers may increase employment enough to make the workers better off

optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric brownian motion this paper studies a continuous time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric brownian motion firm size the changing firm size generates partial incentives analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff when the agent is as patient as investors performance based stock grants implement the optimal contract our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms that the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the ceo s historical performance rather than current performance lends support to our model

dynamic moral hazard and risk shifting incentives in a leveraged firm i develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders with the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the manager an optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager and this contract s flexibility allows shareholders to relax the manager s incentive constraint following a good profitability shock thus the optimal contract amplifies the upside and thereby increases shareholder appetite for risk shifting whereas some empirical studies find a positive relation between risk shifting and leverage others find a negative relation this model predicts a non monotonic relation between risk shifting and leverage and can reconcile these contradictory empirical findings

dynamic managerial compensation a variational approach abstract we study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash flows changes stochastically with time and is his private information we show that distortions aka wedges under optimal contracts may either increase or decrease over time in particular when the manager s risk aversion and ability persistence are small distortions decrease on average over time for sufficiently high degrees of risk aversion and ability persistence instead distortions increase on average with tenure our results follow from a novel variational approach that permits us to tackle directly the full program thus bypassing some of the difficulties of the first order approach encountered in the dynamic mechanism design literature

an empirical study of re enrolement behaviour for male high school dropouts to understand further the behaviour of high school dropouts during their periods away from school this paper studied empirically the decisions of male dropouts on whether to return to school we applied the bivariate probit multinomial logit and waiting time models to analyse this issue the estimation results from all three models indicate that the armed forces qualification test score age experience of using drugs local labour market situation and the duration of the period out of school had significant effects on a male dropout s return decision family background variables contrary to what we expected had little effect on this decision

minimum wages and teenagers enrollment employment outcomes a multinominal logit model this paper tests the hypothesis that the effect of minimum wage legislation on teenagers education decisions is asymmetrical across family income classes with the legislation inducing children from low income families to reduce their levels of schooling and children from higher income families to increase their educational attainment we use data from the national longitudinal surveys nls and exploit the fact that although the minimum wage is fixed at a point in time its value relative to adult wages varies across areas multinomial logit models of teenagers enrollment employment outcomes are estimated the hypothesis appears to be confirmed for white teens however the evidence for nonwhites is more ambiguous

large risks limited liability and dynamic moral hazard we study a continuous time principal agent model in which a risk neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs in the optimal contract investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring then if good performance continues the agent is paid as soon as a loss occurs payments to the agent are suspended and so is investment if further losses occur accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing we derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows without bounds

dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion abstract we explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous time principal agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors the principal when the manager agent has loss averse preferences our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers

dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection we study a novel dynamic principal agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection persistent as well as repeated in the model an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks one after the other upon arrival of each task the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known the agent s effort level is his private information we characterize optimal contracts and show that the per period utility of the agent approaches his per period utility when his skills are publicly known as the discount factor and the time horizon increase

a theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics there is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival in this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing lending relationship with asymmetric information we show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long term lending contract and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower s claim to future cash flows increases we also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics in agreement with the empirical evidence as age and size increase mean and variance of growth decrease and firm survival increases

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

the equivalence of lending equilibria and signalling based insurance under asymmetric information i present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them any insurance institution must therefore rely on self reporting of income innovations two ways of achieving incentive compatible self reporting are presented the first is a debt market with an explicit lending restriction the second is an insurance contract that linearly filters a signal transmitted by individuals the two are then demonstrated to be identical equilibrium consumption fluctuates in a random walk which is inefficient given the physical potential for complete insurance but is efficient given the information constraints the results are complementary to those of green 1987 but permit more general stochastic processes of income to be analyzed serial correlation of income reduces the efficiency of the insurance

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

a three stage model of industrial trade show performance trade shows are an important but under researched component of the promotion mix for most industrial products in this paper we develop a three stage model of trade show performance relying on different indices of performance at each stage attraction contact and conversion efficiency we model the impact of preshow promotion booth space use of attention getting techniques competition number and training of booth salespeople on the extent of attraction contact and conversion the results from an empirical application using data from 85 firms that participated in a major trade show in 1991 suggest significant and different impact of these variables in addition we illustrate how the model can be used to evaluate trade offs among different decision variables finally we develop some general results implied by our model concerning the optimal allocation of trade show resources

the cost of job loss this article identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and endogenous quit turnover in a labour market with on the job search where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning by doing and lose skills while unemployed optimal contracting implies the wage paid increases with experience and tenure indirect inference using german data determines the deep parameters of the model the estimated model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages and earnings following job loss a new structural decomposition finds foregone human capital accumulation while unemployed is the worker s major cost of job loss

extended stay at university an application of multinomial logit and duration models in brazil few studies have been devoted to proving the existence of and evaluating the internal inefficiencies of state universities such work however is highly important because state higher learning is free and a great amount of resources is involved in its maintenance the objective of this study is to develop empirical models to permit an evaluation of the factors related to the decision to complete or abandon the course and to verify whether the duration of the connection to the university is also related to the same factors among the results obtained the most important is that the prolonged stay at a state university favours students whose families could afford their schooling

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

a theory of political and economic cycles abstract we develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined these cycles are driven by three political economy frictions policymakers are non benevolent they cannot commit to policies and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents our first main result is that in the most favorable equilibrium to the households distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run this result is driven by the interaction of limited commitment and private information on the side of the policymaker since in the absence of either friction there are no long run distortions to production our second result is that if the variance of private information is sufficiently large there is equilibrium turnover in the long run so that political cycles never disappear finally our model produces a long run distribution of taxes distortions and turnover where these all respond persistently to temporary economic shocks

managerial incentives and the role of advisors in the continuous time agency model we explore a continuous time agency model with double moral hazard using a venture capitalist vc entrepreneur relationship where the vc both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering ipo we show that optimal ipo timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard our results also indicate that the manager s compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard we derive several comparative static results notably that ipo timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the vc is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

a continuous time version of the principal agent problem this paper describes a new continuous time principal agent model in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent s unobserved effort the risk averse agent receives consumption continuously the optimal contract based on the agent s continuation value as a state variable is computed by a new method using a differential equation during employment the output path stochastically drives the agent s continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement quitting replacement or promotion the paper explores how the dynamics of the agent s wages and effort as well as the optimal mix of short term and long term incentives depend on the contractual environment the understanding of dynamic incentives is central in economics how do companies motivate their workers through piece rates bonuses and promotions how is income inequality connected with productivity investment and economic growth how do financial contracts and capital structure give incentives to the managers of a corporation the methods and results of this paper provide important insights to many such questions this paper introduces a continuous time principal agent model that focuses on the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision we identify factors that make the agent s wages increase or decrease over time we examine the degree to which current and future outcomes motivate the agent we provide conditions under which the agent eventually reaches retirement in the optimal contract we also investigate how the costs of creating incentives and the dynamic properties of the optimal contract depend on the contractual environment the agent s outside options the difficulty of replacing the agent and the opportunities for promotion our new dynamic insights are possible due to the technical advantages of continuous time methods over the traditional discrete time ones continuous time leads to a much simpler computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential equation this equation highlights the factors that determine optimal consumption and effort the dynamics of the agent s career path are naturally described by the drift and volatility of the agent s pay offs the geometry of solutions to the differential equation allows for easy comparisons to see how the agent s wages effort and incentives depend on the contractual environment finally continuous time highlights many essential features of the optimal contract including the agent s eventual retirement in our benchmark model a risk averse agent is tied to a risk neutral principal forever after employment starts the agent influences output by his continuous unobservable effort input the principal sees only the output a brownian motion with a drift that depends on the agent s effort the agent dislikes effort and enjoys consumption we assume that the agent s utility function has the income effect that is as the agent s income increases it becomes costlier to compensate him for the effort also we assume that the agent s utility of consumption is bounded from below

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

incentives for research agents and performance vested equity based compensation abstract this paper studies the agency problem between a firm and its research employees in a dynamic optimal contracting setting we implement the optimal contract by a risky security which can be created using the equity of the firm and a sequence of performance based holding requirements this result provides a rationale for using performance vested equity based compensation in r d intensive start up firms

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

calibrated incentive contracts this paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability moral hazard and adverse selection the paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible due to limited liability constraints the resulting dynamic contracts are detail free and satisfy robust performance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns which need not be i i d or even ergodic publication abstract

managerial short termism turnover policy and the dynamics of incentives i study managerial short termism in a dynamic model of project development with hidden effort and imperfect observability of quality the manager can complete the project faster by reducing quality to preempt this behavior the prin cipal makes payments contingent on long term outcomes i analyze the dynamics of the optimal contract and its implications for the level of managerial turnover i show that optimal contracts might be stationary and entail no termination in general i show that the principal reduces the manager s temptation to behave myopically by reducing the likelihood of termination and deferring compensation the model predicts a negative relation between the rate of managerial turnover and the use of deferred compensation that is consistent with evidence of managerial compensation contracts received may 23 2016 editorial decision may 27 2017 by editor francesca cornelli

reward for luck in a dynamic agency model this paper studies a continuous time principal agent problem of a rm whose cash ows are determined by the manager s unobserved eort the rm s cash ows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager s control while standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally lter out these shocks empirical evidence suggests otherwise in line with this evidence our model predicts that the manager is rewarded for luck

getting it done dynamic incentives to complete a project a principal wants an agent to complete a project the agent undertakes unobservable effort which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed we characterize the contracts that the principal sets with and without commitment with full commitment the contract involves the agent s value and wage declining over time in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent s wage declining over time while the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant wage and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium the best weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant wage that maximizes the principal s payoff conditional on wages being constant we compare these solutions to the efficient outcome

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research