can multinational enterprises light up developing countries evidences from the access to electricity in sub saharan africa summary this paper examines the role that multinational enterprises mnes and foreign direct investments fdi can have in enhancing the access to electricity for local communities in developing countries based on the quality of home and host institutions access to electricity is a marker for development but it is far from being universal in developing countries the shortage of electricity is mainly the consequence of inability of governments in planning financing and developing necessary electricity infrastructure in this context investments from other actors can be essential particularly we focus on the role of fdi and mnes we claim that when mnes invest in developing countries they are incentivized to solve the lack of electricity infrastructure mainly for two reasons to guarantee their business activities and to gain legitimacy with their local stakeholders in addition we argue that mnes and fdi from institutionally underdeveloped countries will be more prone to develop infrastructure for the provision of electricity to local population as generally they suffer from a negative stereotype for this study we rely on 1 547 observations composed of pairs of 83 home countries and 15 host countries in sub saharan africa observed from 2005 to 2011 due to the nature of the database we adopt panel data techniques i e system gmm and corrected least square dummy variable estimators we find that fdi promotes access to electricity in developing countries with weak institutions and this is more likely true when fdi come from institutionally underdeveloped countries these results are far from obvious as they controvert common idea among institutional scholars that a regulatory authority is essential in the provision of infrastructure in conclusion with this paper we partially rehabilitate the image of mnes investing in developing countries by demonstrating that under certain conditions they could contribute to energy poverty alleviation of local population

evidence on changes in aid allocation criteria have donors changed their aid allocation criteria over the past three decades toward greater selectivity a frequently stated goal of the international development community using data on how 22 donors allocated their bilateral aid among 147 countries over 1970 2004 the article finds that after the fall of the berlin wall in 1989 and especially in the late 1990s bilateral aid responded more to poverty and the quality of the policy and institutional environment in the recipient countries furthermore the sensitivity of aid allocation to the country s size and its debt burden has declined over time these results are robust to different samples and model specifications various econometric techniques and alternative measures of institutional quality while the specific factors causing these changes cannot be identified these presumably include geopolitical and economic concerns and the many changes in the international aid architecture donors still differ greatly in their selectivity this suggests that further multifaceted reforms are needed to ensure even greater selectivity of aid

catalyzing aid the imf and donor behavior in aid allocation the international monetary fund imf has often asserted that its programs encourage aid by signaling policy credibility commonly referred to as aid catalysis our study investigates this claim for sector specific aid and for bilateral and multilateral donors using data on 136 recipient countries for the 1986 2009 period we employ a two part quantitative model to match the donor decision making process consisting of a first stage recipient selection equation and a second stage allocation equation on selected recipients we find strong support that imf programs catalyze aid on aggregate but the evidence varies across different types of aid aid catalysis is stronger and more robust in sectors linked to the imf s core competency areas namely debt related relief and general budget support but weaker and less robust for infrastructure production multisector and humanitarian aid and non existent for health and education across donors imf programs are associated with increases in aid by countries with larger voting shares in the imf such as the united states and japan but less so by countries with few votes or for multilateral agencies this finding is consistent with research in international political economy arguing that the imf s powerful stakeholders drive the organization s decisions and policies taken together our findings emphasize the imf s multi dimensional impact on the global development agenda an erstwhile overlooked factor in studies of aid allocation while refuting the purported positive effects of imf programs on aid for social policy

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

motivations for aid to developing countries abstract this paper attempts to identify the underlying principles of aid allocation and particularly the balance of motivations as between the needs of recipient countries and the interests of donor countries two alternative models are fitted by cross country regressions to bilateral and multilateral aid flows to some 80 developing countries in 1969 1970 and 1978 1980 the first recipient need model assumes that all aid is given to compensate for shortfalls in domestic resources this model provides a reasonable explanation for the distribution of multilateral aid but it is clearly not applicable for bilateral aid flows the second donor interest model assumes that all aid serves only donor interests defined to cover political security investment and trade interests this model gives generally good explanations of bilateral aid but is a poor fit for multilateral aid the relative importance of the various donor interests differs sharply among donors the paper ends with an analysis of the shift in the balance of aid over the 1970s towards the recipient need element and with a reference to the sharp change in policy in the 1980s towards increasing emphasis on donor interest aid

the effect of foreign aid on corruption a quantile regression approach abstract this paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regression method we show that foreign aid generally reduces corruption and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries moreover this effect is different by different donor countries

a statistical model for multiparty electoral data we propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty district level aggregate election data this model can be used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon economic conditions neighborhood ethnic compositions campaign spending and other features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas we also provide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration model evaluation and substantive interpretation although the model applies more generally we use it to help resolve an important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in great britain contrary to previous analyses which are all based on measures now known to be biased we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful we also find that it differs substantially across the parties about half a percent for the conservatives 1 for the labor party and 3 for the liberal party and its successors also contrary to previous research we show that these effects have not grown in recent years finally we are able to estimate from which party each party s incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

revenue management approach to stochastic capacity allocation problem abstract to formulate stochastic capacity allocation problems in a manufacturing system the concept and techniques of revenue management is applied in this research it is assumed the production capacity is stochastic and hence its exact size cannot be forecasted in advance at the time of planning there are two classes of frequent and occasional customers demanding this capacity the price rate as well as the penalty for order cancellation caused by overbooking is different for each class the model is developed mathematically and we propose an analytical solution method the properties of the optimal solution as well as the behavior of objective function are also analyzed the objective function is not concave in general however we prove it is a unimodal function and by taking advantage of this property the optimal solution is determined

budget support versus project aid a theoretical appraisal should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid to answer this question we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality we show that budget support is preferable to project aid when the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned and when assistance is small relative to the recipients own resources furthermore when donors cannot observe the recipient s type they may impose higher levels of conditionality to separate committed governments from uncommitted ones

debt relief and governance quality in developing countries summary in this paper we empirically discuss whether or not debt relief has been economically rational in the past 15 years from analyzing the determinants of debt relief our results suggest that governance quality did not play a role in the decision of creditor countries to forgive debt in the 1990s furthermore even the actual debt burden of highly indebted poor countries was not crucial in deciding whether or not debt forgiveness was granted rather debt relief followed a strong path dependence those countries whose debt had been forgiven in the first half of the 1990s were also granted debt forgiveness in the second half of the decade however this allocation pattern changed at the beginning of the 21st century when path dependence diminished and some dimensions of governance quality were taken into account by donor countries

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs we investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the aid are different and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most effective policies intuitively our model shows that donors should stay in control of how their aid is spent when their own private information is more important than the private information of the recipient less obviously an increase in the difference of preferences between donors and recipients can increase rather than decrease the leeway that donors should grant the recipients as the recipients information gains in importance relative to those of the donors and recipients become less likely to communicate truthfully we test the model using dyadic data for 28 bilateral aid donors and 112 recipients over the 1995 2010 period our proxy for centralized aid is project aid while budget aid leaves more leeway to the recipient and thus proxies for decentralized aid in line with the model misaligned interests and informational asymmetries indeed influence the shares of aid given as budget and project aid jel c23 d82 f33 o1

barriers to political analysis in aid bureaucracies from principle to practice in dfid and the world bank summary politics has become a central concern in development discourse and yet the use of political analysis as a means for greater aid effectiveness remains limited and contested within development agencies this article uses qualitative data from two governance leaders the united kingdom department for international development and the world bank to analyze the administrative hurdles facing the institutionalization of political analysis in aid bureaucracies we find that programing management and training practices across headquarters and country offices remain largely untouched by a political analysis agenda which suffers from its identification with a small cross national network of governance professionals

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

aid dependence and the quality of governance cross country empirical tests aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance and public sector institutions by weakening accountability encouraging rent seeking and corruption fomenting conflict over control of aid funds siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions analyses of cross country data in this paper provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality corruption and the rule of law these findings support the need for donors to develop less costly and less intrusive ways of disseminating state of the art knowledge on public sector reform in developing countries

public information and performance the role of spatial dependence in the worldwide governance indicators among african countries summary the worldwide governance indicators wgi provide transparent and comparable country statistics for different dimensions of governance linked to under development yet does the public availability of governance data actually enhance performance if investors donor agencies and citizens are made aware of relative governance performance competition for inward investment such as fdi and oda and domestic legitimacy become plausible mechanisms for diffusion of good governance we test whether such mechanisms operate using the wgi for africa and find evidence for spatial diffusion of democracy rule of law and corruption control there is no evidence for diffusion of regulatory quality and government effectiveness

joint ventures and offshore oil lease sales alternative explanations of joint bidding for offshore oil tract leases are examined the models suggest that firms undertake joint bids 1 to reduce risk by spreading ownership across tracts 2 to share technical expertise including information and 3 to ameliorate financial constraints these hypotheses are examined empirically using the multiple logit technique and other tests with data constructed from the baltimore canyon sale of 1976 the results suggest that firms behaviors are consistent with the explanations of diversification and sharing of expertise explanations based on financial constraints are shown to be consistent with the data in the risk averse case but not in the risk neutral case implications of these results for research and policy are discussed

improving governance for the post 2015 sustainable development goals scenario forecasting the next 50 years covering three fundamental governance transitions historically characteristic of modern states the provision of security the building of capacity and the deepening of inclusion we offer a pioneering forecast of the future of domestic governance through the year 2060 for 183 countries utilizing a long term dynamic integrated global futures modeling system while our base case forecast anticipates global gains in security capacity and inclusion extended scenario analysis suggests that timely and effective interventions to strengthen governance and implement pro poor development policies will result in much greater advances on the post 2015 sustainable development goals

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

25 years of aid allocation practice whither selectivity the 4p framework poverty population policy and proximity is introduced as a way of understanding a donor s aid allocation we use the two part model and examine the period 1982 2006 the results indicate that recent conclusions of increasing selectivity are misplaced for the seven major donors analyzed who together represent the majority of development aid indeed the effect of each of the commonly mentioned time trends selectivity the end of the cold war and the commencement of the global war on terror is much smaller than the role of donor heterogeneity which appears sizeable and entrenched

the role of governance in determining foreign aid flow composition summary we hypothesize that selective donors will use types of aid over which they have more control when providing assistance to poorly governed countries we use an original classification of project purpose codes in the aiddata dataset to categorize aid flows from the period 2004 to 2010 results from fixed effect and compositional data models provide evidence of selectivity in terms of overall aid flows a tradeoff between technical assistance and programmatic lending and a tradeoff between social sector and infrastructure projects

aid fragmentation or aid pluralism the effect of multiple donors on child survival in developing countries 1990 2010 while most policy makers and researchers stress the negative impact of aid fragmentation on development outcomes in recipient countries we argue that the greater diversity of perspectives entailed by higher multiplicity of donors can help select better policies we hypothesize a u shaped relationship countries with a moderate number of donors fare better than countries with either few or many donors the hypothesis is supported by a generalized method of moments gmm analysis of the relationship between health aid donors and child survival in 110 low and middle income countries during 1990 2010

political conditionality and foreign aid this article argues that a new generation of political conditionalities has emerged during the last decade this requires an expansion of the original definition and research agenda beyond the traditional questions of use and effectiveness however there is also a need to dig deeper into the dynamics surrounding political conditionalities particularly the bargaining processes and outcomes along the aid chain from domestic donor politics donor harmonization fora policy dialog spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor coping strategies because they influence the set up use follow up purpose and effectiveness of pcs

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

more dollars than sense refining our knowledge of development finance using aiddata summary in this introductory essay to the special issue we introduce a new dataset of foreign assistance aiddata that covers more bilateral and multilateral donors and more types of aid than existing datasets while also improving project level information about the purposes and activities funded by aid we utilize that data to provide a brief overview of important trends in foreign aid contributors to this special issue draw on aiddata as well as other sources to analyze aid transparency new donors not previously described or analyzed aid allocation and aid effectiveness our recurring theme in this introductory essay is that aiddata and these initial academic projects refine rather than revolutionize our understanding of aid the database has added significant numbers of new projects dollar amounts donors and details about those projects though there is much more yet to add we worry that aid debates have been driven by too little information and that many claims are based on limited or very poor evidence rectifying these problems will not be instantaneous refining knowledge takes a lot of time and hard work the common feature of the papers in this special issue is their careful attention to nuance and detail in spite of what some recent authors have claimed aid is neither a simple solution nor a sufficient cause of most problems in developing countries its motivations distribution and effects are complex and shifting capturing this complexity requires detailed data careful thought and sophisticated methods that allow scholars to make conditional causal and descriptive inferences 2011 elsevier ltd all rights reserved