putting free riding to work a partnership solution to the common property problem the common property problem results in excessive mining hunting and extraction of oil and water the same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in r d and excessive outlays in rent seeking contests we propose a partnership solution to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses each of n players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage under the rules of a partnership each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership s revenue the incentive to free ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems in our two stage game this institutional arrangement can under specified circumstances induce the social optimum in a subgame perfect equilibrium no one has a unilateral incentive 1 to switch to another partnership or create a new partnership in the first stage or 2 to deviate from socially optimal actions in the second stage the game may have other subgame perfect equilibria but the one associated with the partnership solution is strictly preferred by every player we also propose a modification of the first stage which generates a unique subgame perfect equilibrium antitrust authorities should recognize that partnerships can have a less benign use by organizing as competing partnerships an industry can reduce the excessive output of cournot oligopoly to the monopoly level since no partner has any incentive to overproduce in the current period there is no need to deter cheating with threats of future punishments

micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

the ecological economic and social importance of the oceans abstract the oceans have long been recognized as one of humanity s most important natural resources their vastness has made them appear to be limitless sources of food transportation recreation and awe the difficulty of fencing and policing them has left them largely as open access resources to be exploited by anyone with the means however in recent times we have begun to reach the limits of the oceans and must now begin to utilize and govern them in a more sustainable way this paper summarizes emerging information on the interrelated ecological economic and social importance of the oceans and on developing institutions for their sustainable governance in addition to their traditional importance as sources of primary and secondary production and biodiversiy the importance of the oceans in global material and energy cycles is now beginning to be better appreciated integrated models of the global ocean atmosphere terrestrial biosphere system reveal the critical role of the oceans in atmospheric gas and climate regulation and for water nutrient and waste cycling recent estimates of the economic value of the marketed and non marketed ecosystem services of the oceans indicate a huge contribution to human welfare from the functions mentioned above plus raw materials recreational and cultural services the oceans have been estimated to contribute a total of 21 trillion us year to human welfare compared with a global gnp of 25 trillion us with 60 of this from coastal and shelf systems and the other 40 from the open ocean and with the oceans contributing 60 of the total economic value of the biosphere costanza et al 1997 the value of the world s ecosystem services and natural capital nature 387 253 260 the social importance of the oceans for global transportation and as a unifying element in the cultures of many coastal countries cannot be overestimated however the cultural traditions of open access must be replaced with more appropriate property rights regimes and governance structures some alternative sustainable governance ideas are briefly discussed emphasizing the need for an expanded deliberative process to develop a shared vision of a sustainable use of oceans

the design of fishing right systems the nsw experience abstract in 1994 the australian state of new south wales nsw passed legislation to introduce a fishery share system in some ways it is similar to the itq or individual transferable quota fishery management systems found in new zealand iceland australia canada and other countries the focus of the system however is on fisheries rather than species in most of these fisheries a combination of input and output controls are used special design features include allotment of shares in the fishery rather than in quotas and a structure that forces adaptive resource management the system is designed to maximise the probability that fishery use will remain both sustainable and consistent with social objectives as they change through time the system s conceptual framework is of relevance to other fisheries and also many other industries that use natural resources consistent with periodically revised management plans rights to harvest specific amounts of fish or to use certain classes of boats and gear are issued in proportion to the number of shares held in each fishery fishery being flexibly defined by region and habitat with or without further specification by gear type species group or single species the management plan might for example specify a relationship between number of shares and size of boat or net any quotas are allocated in proportion to the number of shares held subject to compliance with periodically reviewed share conditions rights are perpetual and give each fisher a direct financial interest in the future of the fishery shares are mortgageable and fully transferable driven by the management plan structural adjustment is delegated to the market and individual fishers a dual property right structure is used to minimise transfer costs encourage self enforcement and compliance

protected areas local governments and strategic interactions the case of the icms ecologico in the brazilian state of parana various conservation initiatives have been implemented in developing countries with increasing involvement on the part of local governments a concern in entrusting decisions to local governments is that the effectiveness of the conservation instrument can be threatened by interactions among these local governments we examine this concern with respect to an ecological fiscal transfer mechanism the icms ecologico implemented in brazil in the early 1990 s in order to reduce biodiversity loss the mechanism enables states to reward municipalities for the creation and management of protected areas we describe this mechanism present a conceptual framework aimed at understanding the potential sources and consequences of interactions among local governments on the effectiveness of a decentralized mechanism aimed at promoting the creation of protected areas and propose an empirical application using a bayesian spatial tobit model our empirical investigation on the creation of protected areas in the state of parana between 2000 and 2010 reveals strategic substitutability in municipalities conservation decisions this finding also leads us to discuss the issue of identification of a negative spatial lag coefficient when there is a positive spatial error correlation

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

ecological economics and sustainable governance of the oceans abstract this paper is an introduction and synthesis of the papers that appear in this special issue devoted to the sustainable governance of the oceans the special issue contains papers on various aspects of the problem including the ecological and economic importance of the oceans the problems facing the oceans from an ecological economics perspective the links between science and policy the rationale for sustainable ocean governance and examples of sustainable institutions and governance structures we developed the lisbon principles of sustainable governance responsibility scale matching precaution adaptive management full cost allocation and participation as a core set of guidelines for sustainable ocean governance we then describe the major problems facing the oceans in terms of how the principles are violated and evaluate some suggested institutions in terms of how the principles are incorporated

decentralization effects in ecological fiscal transfers a bayesian structural time series analysis for portugal portugal has a unitary system in which the central government transfers funds to lower government levels for their public functions in 2007 portugal introduced ecological fiscal transfers eft where municipalities receive transfers for hosting protected areas pa we study whether introducing eft in portugal incentivized municipalities to designate pa and has led to a decentralization of conservation decisions we employ a bayesian structural time series approach to estimate the effect of introducing eft in comparison to a simulated counterfactual time series quantitative results show a significant increase in the ratio of municipal and national pa designations following portugal s eft introduction which we infer to be a causal consequence the analysis furthermore places emphasis on the importance of relevant municipal conservation competencies for the functioning of the instrument results have important implications for conservation policy making in terms of allocating budgets and competencies in multi level governments

output sharing in partnerships as a common pool resource management instrument many economic environments are susceptible to either free riding or overuse common pool resources cprs fall in the latter category equally sharing the output of a cpr in partnerships introduces a free riding incentive that may offset overuse socially optimal harvesting can be induced by dividing the set of resource users into a number of partnerships in such a way that each resource users tendency to over harvest from the resource is exactly offset by his or her tendency to free ride on the contributions of others we conduct a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of this partnership solution by introducing equal sharing subgroups of size one four and six into a twelve person cpr environment group assignment is either unchanging throughout a 15 period session or randomly mixed each decision round group size significantly affects aggregate effort while group assignment makes no significant difference the distribution of total payoffs is more equitable for randomly mixed groups implications of our results for voluntary and centralized implementations of the partnership solution are discussed

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

the effects of communication on the partnership solution to the commons organizing individual appropriators into output sharing groups has been found to effectively solve the tragedy of the commons problem we experimentally investigate the robustness of this solution by introducing different channels of communication that naturally arise from group competitions in the absence of communication we confirm that output sharing can introduce sufficient free riding to offset over harvesting and results in full efficiency allowing local communication within output sharing groups substantially decreases this efficiency enhancement because it reduces free riding and boosts between group competition yet the efficiency level is still significantly higher than that achieved when global communication is allowed among all appropriators in a conventional common pool resource without output sharing the efficiency reducing effect of local communication is mitigated when random partners instead of fixed partners are sharing output over time and is nearly eliminated when random partners are formed with users who belong to different communication groups

motives behind willingness to pay for improving biodiversity in a water ecosystem economics ethics and social psychology this paper reports on empirical work extending the standard economic approach to valuation by including psychological and philosophical factors more specifically a contingent valuation method survey was applied to biodiversity improvement while simultaneously assessing rights based beliefs consequentialism and the theory of planned behaviour the latter was assessed using measures of attitudes subjective norms and perceptions of control over willingness to pay the results show that standard socio economic explanatory variables are far inferior to those of social psychology and philosophy and that these factors offer a better understanding of the motives behind responses to contingent valuation the implication is that alternative means of measuring an individual s pluralistic values should be taken into account in order to assess the validity and meaning of willingness to pay

challenges for economic policy in sustainable management of marine natural resources the sustainable management of marine natural resources presents particular challenges to the managers of those resources while such management has typically been based on biological considerations it is argued that this has resulted in overexploitation and destruction of important marine assets in industries such as fishing and tourism consequently it is concluded that other approaches are needed with the use of economic concepts and management tools particularly relevant at the same time the human welfare outcomes of the application of various policy instruments must be carefully considered while biological information is critical to the formulation and implementation of successful management regimes it is concluded that the application of economic instruments will become more attractive to resource managers with these instruments underpinned by consideration of property rights and an appropriate allocation of economic rents a greater focus on these economic matters will take resource managers further in the direction of sustainable management of increasingly scarce marine resources the conclusions in the paper are supported by various case studies from fisheries and tourism 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the evolution of preferences why sovereign preferences may not lead to sustainable policies and what to do about it abstract the conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and in the short term this assumption makes sense sustainability is an inherently long term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed and given if preferences are expected to change over time and under the influence of education advertising changing cultural assumptions etc the old assumption of consumer sovereignty is not adequate different criteria of optimality are needed how preferences change how they relate to the goal of sustainability and how they can or should be actively influenced to satisfy the new criteria needs to be determined ecological economics has emphasized the three rank ordered goals of ecological sustainability fair distribution and allocative efficiency this paper examines how preferences evolve and change over time and the implications of this for developing policies that meet these three goals in democratic societies

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

comparing regulations to protect the commons an experimental investigation in a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common pool resource game with heterogeneous users an access fee and subsidy scheme transferable quotas and non transferable quotas we calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users profits compared to free access extraction we compare the regulations according to five criteria resource preservation individual profits profit difference pareto improvement from free access and sorting of the most efficient users one of the main findings is that even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas

public open space conservation under a budget constraint abstract this paper analyzes the fiscal and land value impacts of public open space conservation in a budget constrained city it derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for open space conservation to increase the level of municipal services and the total land value within the city the theoretical results together with the empirical evidence found in the literature suggest that open space conservation can increase the level of municipal services and total land value in a significant share of american cities even if it generates no amenities open space conservation will likely increase total land values and municipal services in metropolitan areas that have stringent land use regulations high development densities and relatively little open space but will likely reduce municipal services and total land values in small lightly regulated cities surrounded by rural land and fiscally constrained in providing essential public goods h4 r3 q2

does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs evidence from bolivia this paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from bolivia empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization these changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need nationally these changes were driven by the smallest poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest priority projects the findings contradict common claims that local government is too corrupt institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve upon central government s allocation of public resources d 2002 published by elsevier b v