theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions this paper reports the results of controlled experiments designed to test the harrisraviv generalization of the vickrey theory of bidding in multiple unit discriminative auctions the paper also discusses further development of the theory in a way suggested by the experimental results to include bidders with distinct risk preferences in a well known paper vickrey 20 formulated a nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in single unit auctions this analysis was subsequently extended in numerous papers vickrey 21 generalized his original model to include multiple unit auctions in which each of n risk neutral bidders can bid on one out of a total of q homogeneous items up for auction where 1 c q n in both of the vickrey papers individual values for the auctioned object s were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution holt 12 and riley and samuelson 19 for single unit auctions and harris and raviv 11 for multiple unit auctions have extended the vickrey model to the case in which valuations are from a general distribution function and all agents have identical concave utility functions this paper reports the empirical properties of individual bidding behavior and seller revenue for a group of 28 laboratory experiments designed to test the harris raviv generalization of the vickrey hereafter vhr model of nash equilibrium behavior in multiple unit discriminative auctions in section i we summarize briefly the theoretical results of the vhr model which form the basis for the hypotheses that we test section ii describes the experimental design that we use section iii describes the experimental results and various tests based on the bidding behavior of individual subjects and on aggregate market seller revenue data the results from six of the ten n q parameter designs reported

electronics and growth cycles in singapore with the help of spectral and structural time series analyses it is found that the demand for electronics in the usa goes through a cycle with a period of about four to five years because of the synchronized nature of the electronics market the global demand for electronics is likely to follow a similar cycle the electronics cycle is unlikely to be caused by a regular business cycle the major cause of the electronics cycle appears to be a product cycle which results from the introduction of new products to the market as a result countries like singapore which depend heavily on electronics exports may face roller coaster rides especially in their manufacturing growth product diversification is the best solution to the problem

bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

bidding behaviour in multi unit auctions an experimental investigation we present laboratory experiments of five different multi unit auction mechanisms two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units we test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed bid uniform price auctions we also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the ausubel the vickrey and the discrim inatory sealed bid auction furthermore we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units auctions play a more and more important role in everyday business life an increasing number of important markets are organised as auctions and auction design is probably one of the most successful applications of economic theory to practice among the prominent examples are the spectrum auctions in the us and in europe treasury auctions in the us the design of electricity spot markets oil and timber sales as well as the massive use of procurement auctions both by the public sector and by private firms the spectrum auctions across the world have demonstrated that carefully designed auctions raise high revenues and often succeed in implementing efficient allocations

market structure and buyer behaviour price adjustment in a multi object progressive oral auction abstract working within the framework of an english or progressive oral auction with multiple unit trading the study addresses the question of the effect on price behaviour of variations in market size in the sense of the number of equal sized market competitors prices are shown to converge to near competitive equilibrium levels upon replication whatever the market size however by extending the focus of the study beyond equilibrium to the market behaviour revealed during the adjustment or disequilibrium phase of the market it is possible to advance some conjectures on the nature of the equilibrating processes

inflation controlled by energy prices abstract the inflation experienced in the world economy over the last decade could have been considerably reduced if the world had been less dependent upon energy imports reduction of imports by an average of half reduces worldwide inflation by more than 30 countries supplying their own energy may benefit by having lower inflation than energy importing countries a low inflation rate is most easily achieved if the price of domestically produced energy follows the national price index in most countries some alternative energy sources may be competitive to imported energy when all the economic benefits of domestic energy production are taken into consideration

impact of energy price rises on costs a thermodynamic analysis abstract the standard of living in an industrialized country depends on the quantity of energy available and the efficiency with which it is utilized changes in the price of energy will for a time influence the choice of goods and services and so affect the world economy until the balance between prices for goods and energy is restored if we could control the economy during this time interval there is no reason why increases in energy prices should reduce our standard of living if renewable energy sources are to be more expensive than oil today by implication we need to invest much more capital to be able to utilize these sources we should therefore be willing to accept a smaller increase in standard of living and use the difference for investment in equipment to convert renewable energy sources to useful work only through new technology can the price of energy from such sources be reduced relative to the price of energy from oil increases in oil prices will not change the price ratio

anomalies risk aversion economists ubiquitously employ a simple and elegant explanation for risk aversion it derives from the concavity of the utility of wealth function within the expected utility framework we show that this explanation is not plausible in most applications since anything more than economically negligible risk aversion over moderate stakes requires a utility of wealth function that is so concave that it predicts absurdly severe risk aversion over very large stakes we present examples of how the expected utility framework has misled economists and why we believe a better explanation for risk aversion must incorporate loss aversion and mental accounting

experimental comparison of impact of auction format on carbon allowance market abstract carbon allowances auctions are a good way to achieve the carbon allowance allocations under international agreements to address global climate change based on an economic experiment this paper compares three possible carbon allowance auction formats uniform price auction discriminatory price auction and english clock auction with heterogeneous bidders coal power plants and gas power plants from four perspectives carbon price auction efficiency demand withholding and fluctuations in power supplies possibilities of collusion among bidders and impacts of allowance banking and penalty price on bidders behaviors under different auction formats are also examined the results show that 1 when there are relatively more bidders and there are no obvious communications between them despite there being some tacit collusion efficiency of english clock auction is greater than the other two formats 2 when there are relatively fewer bidders and there are obvious communications between them explicit collusions are observed under english clock auction in this case discriminatory price auction helps prevent collusion to some extents 3 in the banking scenario more speculations are observed while penalty price exacerbates price volatility

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

revenue and efficiency in multi unit uniform price auctions abstract this paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform price multi unit auction with a positive reservation price i demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency or welfare in multi unit uniform price auctions i show that the higher the reservation price is the higher is the seller s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi unit uniform price auction the reservation price increases the bidder s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform price auction thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats e g the reservation price decreases efficiency in the vickrey auction and single unit auctions with symmetric bidders therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single unit single dimensional context to the multi unit multi dimensional one

collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions we study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle in experimental multi object ascending auctions in these institutions low price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff inferior equilibria achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation we provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication the results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment auctions for timber cars oil drilling rights and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultaneously in multi object ascending auctions the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked in these auctions bidders can profit by splitting the markets by acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects the bidders lower the price they must pay as opposed to the sealed bid auction the ascending auction format provides bidders with the opportunity to coordinate tacitly on dividing markets and to punish non collusive bidding thus low price collusive equilibria co exist along with high price competitive equilibria even in a non repeated setting brusco and lopomo 2002 if there are complementarities in bidder values across objects and auctions are repeated bidders may further benefit by splitting the markets over time and taking turns in buying packages at low prices these opportunities make the multi object ascending auction an ideal institution for the study of equilibrium selection assuming that communication between the bidders is limited to the bidding any splitting of the markets must be tacitly coordinated in the early stages of the auction thus achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation while such tacit coordination is possible in theory it is an empirical question of whether it may be achieved in practice

a reexamination of the role of thermodynamics for environmental economics abstract as the discussion about the role of thermodynamics in environmental economics has not led to a conclusion yet a more fundamental approach seems to be necessary which also takes into consideration the relationship between economics and the natural sciences in general to this end value theory is chosen as a starting point because it is the centerpiece of every economic theory it is shown that neoclassical environmental economics suffers from serious deficiencies because of its value concept heedlessly copied from classical mechanics thermodynamics can be expected to be helpful to redress these defects because the economy can be thought of as a dissipative structure dependent on its environment the obvious way to integrate thermodynamics consists in the formulation of thermodynamic constraints to complement neoclassical environmental economics but this approach remains unsatisfactory because the neoclassical mechanical hardcore is incompatible with the entropy law and its implications evidently the neoclassical paradigm and its value concept have to be given up but the alternative of the energy theory of value must be rejected because its determinism cannot be reconciled with the richness of human behaviour as thermodynamic analogies offer no solution either there is a dilemma between the necessity and the apparent impossibility of adequately integrating thermodynamic concepts it turns out that a normative inconsistency is responsible which is due to the demand for intergenerational justice therefore the integration of thermodynamics into environmental economics hinges on a meta economic value decision if sustainability is adopted as the guiding principle the insights of thermodynamics call for a macro economic environmental policy setting absolute limits to the economy but this macro policy is incompatible with neoclassical economics so that a social reconstruction of economics based on a social theory of value becomes necessary in sum thermodynamics is important for environmental economics besides fulfilling a general heuristic function it also fulfils a decisive conceptual and an analytical function insofar as it helps to justify sustainability and to operationalize macro economic environmental policy

a lifetime portfolio of risky and risk free sexual behaviour and the prevalence of aids abstract a lifetime portfolio of risky and risk free sexual activities is conceptually constructed in this paper people s time allocation between risky and risk free sexual activities affects and is affected by the prevalence of aids a small satisfaction differential between risky and risk free sex can lead to a significant prevalence of aids numerical simulations suggest that the reduction in the prevalence of aids generated by a 1 improvement in the sensual quality of freely distributed condoms can be 0 855 when the initial satisfaction differential between risky and risk free sex is 50 or 0 464 when the initial satisfaction differential is 100

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

a micro econometric analysis of risk aversion and the decision to self insure this study estimates a von neumann morgenstern utility function using market data and micro econometric methods we investigate the decision whether to purchase insurance against the risk of telephone line trouble in the home using the choices of approximately 10 000 residential customers we determine the shape of the utility function and the degree of risk aversion we find that risk aversion varies systematically in the population and varies with the level of income and that the observed choice behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization we are unable to detect the presence of ambiguity effects or over weighting of low probability events

oil price and inflation abstract an oil price rise would be expected to result in an immediate reduction by about 20 in the standard of living of the oil importing countries and a corresponding increase in that of the oil exporters since the price rises experienced during recent years have not been reflected in wage reductions the result has been high long lasting inflation which this paper shows will increase in the coming years to more than 20 measures taken by the oil importers include energy saving which results in a still lower standard of living if instead the industrialized countries increase production by increasing energy consumption and improving production efficiency the effect of a rise in oil price will be compensated for in a few years

multiunit pay your bid auction with one dimensional multiunit demands an arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction the bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two step functions that depend on a single parameter we characterize the symmetric bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness we compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single unit first price and second price auctions we examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package we study the impacts that variations of the relative supply have on the equilibrium on the bidders average payoffs per unit and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

is the yen dollar exchange rate really responsible for east asia s export and business cycles a commentary on mckinnon and schnabl 2003 in a paper published in the world economy ronald mckinnon and gunther schnabl claim that fluctuations in the nominal yen dollar exchange rate are the principal causal factor behind the export and business cycles in east asian countries mckinnon and schnabl 2003 their econometric work however suffers from at least two important difficulties first while mckinnon and schnabl preclude industry shocks as an explanation for the east asian countries macroeconomic fluctuations cyclical fluctuations in the global electronics industry have a significant impact on their short run export and output dynamics second although mckinnon and schnabl assume that the relative industrial competitiveness of japan and other east asian countries moves in tandem with fluctuations in the nominal yen dollar exchange rate the empirical validity of this assumption is not indisputable once these two issues are taken into account properly it becomes very difficult to make a convincing case for the yen dollar exchange rate being the main driver of east asia s macroeconomic instability a brief critique will also be made of another paper that has appeared recently in the world economy doraisami 2004 which models malaysia s pre crisis export dynamics using the nominal yen dollar exchange rate as a proxy for the country s export competitiveness

a comparison of multiple unit all pay and winner pay auctions under incomplete information this article examines the properties of independent private value all pay and winner pay auctions when there are multiple units sold we study bidding behavior efficiency and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions our data show that the all pay auction and the winner pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral bayesian equilibrium our evidence also suggests that the winner pay auction is more likely to lead to a pareto efficient allocation than the all pay auction

was china the first domino assessing links between china and other asian economies abstract several commentators have suggested that competition from china in particular its 1994 devaluation and strong export performance during 1994 95 may have contributed to the asian crisis of 1997 98 we provide evidence against this view we show that the devaluation was not important in economic terms and china s strong export performance in 1994 95 was matched by other asian economies we also show that the period 1993 and 1996 was marked by relative stability in the export shares of china and other asian economies in various geographical regions and industries the paper concludes by outlining channels through which the asian crisis could affect china

auctions with endogenous quantity this article studies auctions in which several sellers compete for the right to sell to a market characterized by a negatively sloped demand curve in this environment the quantity traded becomes endogenous this effect leads to three results concerning the outcomes of open versus first price sealed bid auctions first an open auction yields a higher expected price than does sealed bidding second and more important the open auction captures less of the potential gains from trade than does the sealed bid auction third for broad classes of demand curves the efficiency gains from switching to sealed bids from an open auction accrue to both sellers and the buyer so that all concerned parties would agree to the change a direct application of the theory is to procurement the heavy use of sealed bidding in procurement is seen as rational in light of these results auction models with endogenous quantity could be an alternative to price setting oligopoly models for the study of price formation in general for the latter impose strong information requirements on agents and yield only equilibrium price vectors not equilibrium processes for determining prices

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

speculation and demand reduction in english clock auctions with resale many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants from the original auction the existence of such transactions may initially appear counter intuitive however this paper will show that active inter bidder resale results from payoff maximizing decisions in the auction that take into account the incentives of a resale opportunity specifically i examine how the existence of an inter bidder resale opportunity impacts bidder behavior in an english clock auction and to what extent altering the bargaining power of the final buyer and reseller in the resale market determines the strategies followed in the initial auction in an attempt to understand the existence of these inter bidder transactions theoretical and behavioral analysis is used to develop hypotheses of speculation bidding above value and demand reduction bidding below value which are directly tested in a controlled experimental setting while value bidding is a dominant strategy in a standard english clock auction without resale when resale is allowed this theoretical claim is weaker demand reduction is observed when the bargaining power is shifted to the final buyer in resale and when the bargaining power is shifted toward the reseller speculation is observed the revenue achieved in the initial auction depends on the behavior observed in the auction regardless of bargaining power revenue is shown to decrease below what would have been earned in an english auction without resale due to demand reduction when the reseller has the bargaining power and speculation is observed this loss in revenue is somewhat mitigated by increased speculation

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

seller beware supply and demand reduction and price manipulation in multiple unit uniform price auctions we experimentally compare under revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two sided price clock auctions we find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers behavior is consistent across clock directions as a result the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral

a general equilibrium impact study of the emissions reduction fund in australia by using a national environmental and economic model abstract several climate change policies such as emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes have been implemented in many countries and regions around the world however the current coalition government in australia does not prefer such methods and has argued that these policies would substantially increase the electricity price and weaken the australian competitiveness and the whole economy subsequently the government replaced the carbon tax policy in july 2014 with its emissions reduction fund which fundamentally uses the government budget of a 2 55 billion to buy emission abatements from polluters there are major arguments among the australian public about the efficiency and the effects of this approach but the economic effects are still unidentified this study aims to examine the economy wide effects of this policy on the australian economy by employing a national environmental and economic general equilibrium model so that australians and international audience would be aware of the impacts and how the reverse auction and carbon subsidy work as a policy to reduce emissions at large scales across all sectors in a country results show that australia only experiences relatively small impact on its economy real gdp only declines by 0 3 0 4 over all scenarios industrial and private sectors also experience relatively small unfavourable impacts but the output and export level of the agricultural commodity will decline substantially the renewable sectors are expanded to compensate output reductions in fossil fuel electricity generation sectors though the expansion is insufficient to compensate for the losses

demand reduction in multi unit auctions with varying numbers of bidders theory and evidence from a field experiment recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform price auctions the present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play we experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform price and vickrey auction formats

implementing efficient multi object auction institutions an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents abstract we study three alternative implementations of the vickrey multi unit demand auction vickrey s original static sealed bid auction and two dynamic ausubel auctions with and without public dropout information reported during the auction although implemented by a weaker solution concept behavior in the dynamic vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes significantly closer to the theoretical prediction of sincere bidding bidding one s valuations than either the static vickrey auction or the dynamic auction without dropout information this suggests a possible tradeoff between the simplicity and transparency of a mechanism and the strength of its solution concept when agents are still learning and or when players are not fully rational drawing on results from related single unit and multi unit demand auctions and the results of a new single unit demand auction experiment we provide important insights into the behavioral mechanism underlying the superior performance of the ausubel auction with feedback information

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

collusion and information revelation in auctions abstract the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings however such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behaviour we experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first price auctions the results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first price mechanism failed collusion attempts distort bidding behaviour resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency moreover the first price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second price mechanism we conclude that while the features of the first price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behaviour make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism

how not to run auctions the european 3g telecom auctions abstract there were enormous differences in the revenues from the european third generation 3g or umts mobile phone license auctions from 20 euros per capita in switzerland to 650 euros per capita in the uk though the values of the licenses sold were similar poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants the sequencing of the auctions was also crucial we discuss the auctions in the uk netherlands germany italy austria switzerland belgium greece and denmark

revenue equivalence in multi object auctions abstract the theory of auctions suggests that under certain conditions seemingly different methods for auctioning a single object will result in the same expected price this result extends quite easily to the case of more than one object

trade causes of the asian crisis the malaysian experience prior to the onset of the asian financial crisis there was a deterioration in the external trade position of most countries that were affected by the asian currency crisis however little is known about why this occurred this paper aims to identify the causes of a slowdown in export growth in malaysia while misaligned exchange rates have been widely cited as a cause of the slowdown in east asia in the malaysian context at least a vulnerability to the downturn in the electronic cycle could also be a major factor leading to poor export performance using the us yen dollar rate as a proxy for exchange rate misalignment and us total new orders for electronics as a proxy for global electronics demand cointegration analysis was used to establish the likely causes of a slowdown in malaysia s export performance the empirical evidence suggests that the coincidence of exchange rate misalignment with a downturn in the global electronics demand cycle was responsible for the sharp deterioration in export performance

experimental comparisons of auctions under single and multi unit demand i introduction the study of multiple unit auctions is important because of their widespread use and the high value of goods sold examples include auctions of u s treasury debt cut flowers wine foreign exchange and other financial and monetary instruments moreover since auctions are often proposed by economists as a method of sale for other goods as in mcmillan 1994 the use of auctions can be expected to increase in the future many different auction rules are used to sell these diverse commodities and auction rule changes are often suggested usually with the intention of increasing revenue or improving the allocations and thus there is a considerable and increasing number of known auction formats evaluating new or comparing different auction mechanisms using field tests can be very costly and risky however experimental methods can and have been used by economists to study the behavioral characteristics of different auction procedures kagel 1995 provides a recent comprehensive survey most experimental studies consider the behavior of auctions when there is a single unit to be sold a few studies such as cox et al 1984 1985 and mccabe et al 1990 1991 study multiple unit auctions in environments in which each bidder demands at most one object from a set of identical objects being sold the studies of smith 1967 belovicz 1979 miller and plott 1985 and burns 1985 consider multi unit demand environments these are environments in which bidders have demand for multiple identical units and are permitted to purchase multiple units of the commodity sold the extension to multi unit demand is important since the presence of multi unit demand is a characteristic of many auctions in the field including all of the examples above in this study we consider the behavior of two types of multi unit auction under both single unit and multi unit demand we construct a laboratory environment which we use to study an english clock ec which is a special type of english auction and a sealed bid auction with lowest accepted bid pricing sb in the sb each bidder pays a per unit price equal to the lowest accepted bid the ec was chosen because it is known to provide highly efficient allocations in auctions of single unit goods and therefore is likely to be suggested for many field applications the sb was chosen because of its widespread use which makes its outcomes a useful basis of comparison for the outcomes of the english clock auction 1 however we do not attempt to represent a particular field situation here instead since our interest is in understanding the basic properties of the auctions we chose an experimental design that enables us to make simple comparisons across treatments and with previous and possibly future studies the design enables us to perform simple testing of game theoretic models in some of the treatments in our view the difference between single and multi unit demand is critical as we discuss in section ii many of the results of auction theory that are valid in single unit demand environments no longer apply in multi unit demand environments suggesting that the observed behavior of auctions might also differ between the two environments therefore we isolate the effects of multi unit demand by conducting single unit demand experiments under identical market demand and supply conditions as the multi unit demand experiments these and other aspects of the experimental design are described in detail in section iii the results and a discussion are given in sections iv and v respectively ii institutions theory and previous studies the english clock auction this variant of the english auction was modeled by milgrom and weber 1982 and studied by mccabe et al 1990 1991 in our version the auction begins with all bidders publicly and simultaneously announcing their initial quantity demanded at price zero if there is excess demand the price is increased by a small increment and the bidders then announce new quantities demanded

efficiency in auctions with failed resale abstract the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi object uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders we theoretically show that when the exogenous probability of a resale market is sufficiently low final efficiency is lower than in an auction without resale our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the probability that bidders participate in a resale market resale always increases efficiency compared to the auction allocation but it also induces demand reduction by high value bidders which reduces auction efficiency consistent with theory and in contrast to what is usually argued the possibility of resale may reduce final efficiency and changes in the probability of resale have a non monotonic effect on efficiency we also analyze bargaining chat data to provide insights into the functioning of resale markets

first order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle abstract this paper integrates yaari s dual theory of choice under uncertainty into a multiperiod context and examines its implications for the equity premium puzzle an important property of these preferences is that of first order risk aversion which implies in our model that the risk premium for a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation rather than the variance since the standard deviation of the growth rate in aggregate consumption is considerably larger than its variance the model can generate both a small risk free rate and a moderate equity premium

on money pumps abstract the question of whether money pump arguments justify standard consistency assumptions about behavior has remained unresolved partly because of the absence of an appropriate analytical framework we present a new framework which fills this gap provide a formal definition of invulnerability to money pumps and formulate a requirement of maximal opportunism we show that behavior which satisfies none of the standard consistency assumptions can be both invulnerable and maximally opportunist we present two conditions which combined with maximal opportunism imply the existence of a choice function rationalized by an ordering and satisfying the sure thing principle journal of economic literature classification numbers b41 c73 d81