optimal price and inventory adjustment in an open economy model of the business cycle this paper presents a macroeconomic model containing optimizing inventory holding firms that is consistent with a number of prominent empirical regularities concerning fluctuations in output exchange rates relative prices and money prices are sticky but they are not predetermined still our model is consistent with exchange rate overshooting in the sense of dornbusch typical sticky price models allow a divergence between current production and current demand but this divergence is never allowed to feed back into the model our optimal inventory adjustments reconcile divergences between current demand and production and the inventory stock movements provide expected future dynamics

claim timing and ex post adverse selection many health care treatments are not urgent and may be delayed if patients so choose because insurance coverage is typically determined by the treatment date individuals may have incentives to strategically delay treatments to minimize out of pocket costs the strategic delay of treatment a particular form of moral hazard can be an important source of subsequent adverse selection in which ex ante identical individuals select insurance coverage based on their differing accumulation of previously delayed treatments this article investigates these forces empirically in the context of the missing market for dental insurance using rich claim level data my analysis reveals that approximately 40 of individuals strategically delay dental treatments when incentivized to do so and this flexibility in delaying treatment can explain why the market for dental insurance has largely unraveled more generally the counterfactual analysis suggests features such as open enrolment periods and contracting on pre existing conditions may be helpful tools in overcoming adverse selection in insurance contexts where the timing of uncertainty is not contractible

adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance can dynamic data help to distinguish a standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard we show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables in the presence of moral hazard experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims we discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are typically available finally we argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse selection even if it is based on asymmetric learning jel d82 g22 c41 c14

cohort mortality risk or adverse selection in annuity markets abstract we show that tests for adverse selection in annuity markets using prices are not identified within the uk annuity market different annuity products create the potential for a rothschild stiglitz separating equilibrium as different risk types could choose different annuities empirical analyses using the money s worth suggest that prices are indeed consistent with this explanation however we show that this pattern of annuity prices would also result from the actions of regulated annuity providers who must reserve against cohort mortality risk annuity products that might attract different consumer risk types also have different risks for the provider

preference heterogeneity and insurance markets explaining a puzzle of insurance the textbook approach to insurance markets emphasizes the role of private information about risk in determining who purchases insurance in the classic adverse selection model of michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz 1976 individu als with higher expected claims buy more insur ance than those with lower expected claims who may be out of the market entirely this basic prediction of asymmetric information models of a positive correlation between insurance cov erage and accident occurrence has been shown to be robust to a variety of extensions to the stan

beggar thy neighbour exchange rate regime misadvice from misapplications of mundell 1961 and the remedy economists invoke mundell 1961 in arguing for the general policy of a flexible exchange rate regime as a means of restoring equilibria after shocks but there is a discrepancy between the intent of the general policy and attempts at its implementation as identified by specific changes in exchange rates when we assemble the set of specific changes called for by distinct economists operating as advocates for individual countries these are uniformly in the form of beggar thy neighbour advice i e travesties of objectively identifying disequilibria and a menace to international cooperation and peace this paper traces the unintended travesties to problems of complexity and uncertainty problems that implicitly are assumed absent in mundell 1961 rendering the situation so simple that equilibria are transparent the problems remained essentially unaddressed when economists extended mundell 1961 via expected utility theory since this theory also ignores the impossibility of maximising and the complexities of central bankers private firms and others in doing the evaluation stage in reaching decisions the problems can be overcome by modelling within skat the stages of knowledge ahead theory this paper points to experimental evidence in support of the view that under all sorts of disequilibrating shocks currency unions outperform flexible currencies by eliminating the inefficiencies generated by exchange rate uncertainty

expectations life expectancy and economic behavior this study analyzes responses to a questionnaire designed to elicit subjective expectations and probabilities of survival people do extrapolate past improvements in longevity when they determine their subjective horizons and they are fully aware of levels of and movements within todays life tables the subjective distribution has greater variance than its actuarial counterpart and the subjective variance decreases with age the implications of these findings for optimal social security for the construction of annuities for the analysis of savings behavior and for evaluating lifetime earnings are discussed the data were collected in the united states from a sample of 411 white male economists and a sample of 363 white males in a midwestern smsa excerpt

international transmission of anticipated inflation under alternative exchange rate regimes this paper studies the international transmission of anticipated inflation a two country two good two currency cash in advance model is used to examine analytically and numerically the consequences of changes in a country s inflation rate domestic monetary policy influences real activity at home through an inflation tax channel these real effects are transmitted to the foreign country via fluctuations in the real exchange rate under a flexible nominal exchange rate inflation is a beggar thy neighbor policy under a fixed nominal exchange rate each country suffers a welfare loss when one country inflates the quantitative results are fairly insensitive to variations in the cash credit mix used to finance investment expenditures 2001 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

uncertain medical expenses and precautionary saving near the end of the life cycle this paper introduces a dynamic structural model of household consumption decisions in which elderly families consider the effects of uncertain future medical expenses when deciding current levels of consumption the model with uncertain medical expenses implies a potentially important role for precautionary saving incentives to explain slow rates of dissaving among elderly americans during retirement rather than just simulating the stochastic dynamic model preference parameters are estimated using panel data on health wealth and expenditures for retired families the health uncertainty model predicts consumption levels closer to observed expenditures than a life cycle model with uncertain longevity however elderly families typically dissave their financial assets more slowly than even the baseline health uncertainty model predicts is optimal

the family as an incomplete annuities market families can self insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members although family annuity markets are incomplete even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities given adverse selection and transaction costs family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities in the absence of public annuities these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation

macroeconomic policy with a floating exchange rate and a unionized nontraded sector this paper considers the effect of a unionized nontraded sector on welfare and policy in an open economy in equilibrium there are endogenous wage and price setting there may be unemployment and non walrasian policy effects nominal wages and prices become pegged to the price of tradables with direct government employment the multiplier is unity irrespective of financing with direct government expenditure on nontradables the multiplier is less than unity in both cases an increase in government expenditure reduces welfare

new evidence on altruism a study of tiaa cref retirees this paper investigates the role in household wealth accumulation of saving for bequests it employs data from a 1988 survey of tiaa cref annuitants designed to measure pension and other net worth as well as lifetime earnings about half of the households in the data plan to leave estates and the authors find that their behavior conforms with theoretical altruistic models for the same families the amount of wealth that the authors attribute to estate building is large nevertheless altruism towards one s children does not seem to be the major explanation of saving in the overall sample copyright 1996 by american economic association

how general are risk preferences choices under uncertainty in different domains we analyze the extent to which individuals choices over five employer provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401 k investment decision exhibit systematic patterns as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences we provide evidence consistent with an important domain general component that operates across all insurance choices we find a considerably weaker relationship between one s insurance decisions and 401 k asset allocation although this relationship appears larger for more financially sophisticated individuals estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains

redistribution by insurance market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities we illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation we calibrate and solve a model of the united kingdom s compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender based pricing restrictions we find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous social security like annuity contracts our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis

equilibria in health exchanges adverse selection versus reclassification risk this paper studies equilibrium and welfare in a class of regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges we use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual level i projected health risk and ii risk preferences we combine the estimated distributions of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict allocations and prices

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

health and mortality delta assessing the welfare cost of household insurance choice we develop a pair of risk measures health and mortality delta for the universe of life and health insurance products a life cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products we estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance annuities including private pensions and long term care insurance in the health and retirement study for the median household aged 51 to 57 the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3 2 of total wealth

optimal choice of health and retirement in a life cycle model abstract we examine within a life cycle model the simultaneous choice of health care and retirement together with consumption health tends to have an impact on retirement through morbidity determining earnings and the disutility of work and through longevity determining the need to accumulate retirement wealth conversely the age of retirement drives the demand for health care through the value of survival and the value of morbidity reductions we characterise the optimal relationship between health expenditure and retirement and apply our model to analyse the effects of moral hazard in the annuity market while moral hazard always induces excessive health investments and an excessive duration of working life it also triggers an excessive level of consumption if the impact of health on the disutility of work is sufficiently large we examine a transfer scheme and mandatory retirement as policies towards curtailing moral hazard numerical analysis illustrates the role of moral hazard in shaping the life cycle allocation

politics institutions and trade lessons of the interwar era recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions using a new data set that consists of about 35 000 observations on the trade of fifty four nations between 1919 and 1938 we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in world war ii in this study we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers however our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express we argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great power hubs the political military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade as a result measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added

bequest and tax planning evidence from estate tax returns i study bequest and wealth accumulation behavior of the wealthy subject to the estate tax shortly before death the onset of a terminal illness leads to a very significant reduction in the value of estates reported on tax returns fifteen to twenty percent with illness lasting months to years and about five to ten percent in the case of illness reported as lasting days to weeks i provide evidence suggesting that these findings cannot be explained by real shocks to net worth such as medical expenses or lost income but instead reflect deathbed estate planning the results suggest that wealthy individuals actively care about disposition of their estates but that this preference is dominated by the desire to hold on to their wealth while alive

adverse selection in the annuity market and the role for social security i study the role of social security in providing insurance when there is adverse selection in the annuity market i calculate welfare gain from mandatory annuitization in the social security system relative to a laissez faire benchmark using a model in which individuals have private information about their mortality i estimate large heterogeneity in mortality using the health and retirement study despite that i find small welfare gain from mandatory annuitization social security has a large effect on annuity prices because it crowds out demand by high mortality individuals welfare gain would have been significantly larger in the absence of this effect

estimating the benefits of contractual completeness i provide a revealed preference based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts i use a rational expectations based panel estimator of covenant prices which does not require quasi experimental variation to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices i find that firms surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan leverage and interest rate covenants produce the largest benefits lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants once covenants are chosen the benefits from fine tuning them are small thus rationalizing boilerplate covenants i conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

monopolistic competition relative prices and output adjustment in the open economy abstract this paper explains price and output dynamics in an open economy characterized by a monopolistic competitive market structure in which pricing decisions incur costs this leads producers to pre set the price path for several periods the paper derives an optimal pricing rule including the optimal pre setting horizon it does so for a rational expectation equilibrium characterized by staggered unsynchronized price setting for which the degree of staggering is endogenously determined

private information and insurance rejections across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets applicants are rejected based on observable often high risk characteristics this paper argues that private information held by the potential applicant pool explains rejections i formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk i first derive a new no trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections i then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no trade condition can explain rejections the methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs i apply this approach to three nongroup markets long term care disability and life insurance consistent with the predictions of the theory in all three settings i find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected i find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance and i show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected the results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets publication abstract

which early withdrawal penalty attracts the most deposits to a commitment savings account previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets we study how people divide money between two accounts a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is randomly assigned in a between subject design to have either a 10 early withdrawal penalty or a 20 early withdrawal penalty or not to allow early withdrawals at all i e an infinite penalty when the liquid account and the commitment account pay the same interest rate higher early withdrawal penalties attract more commitment account deposits this pattern is predicted by the hypothesis that some participants are partially or fully sophisticated present biased agents such agents perceive that higher penalties generate greater scope for commitment by disincentivizing penalized early withdrawals the experiment also shows that when the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account the positive empirical slope relating penalties and commitment deposits is flattened suggesting that naive present biased agents or agents with standard exponential discounting are also in our sample across all of our experimental treatments higher early withdrawal penalties on the commitment account sometimes increase and never reduce allocations to the commitment account

open economy macroeconomics under imperfect competition a two country model abstract this paper constructs a two country macroeconomic model where prices are set by imperfectly competitive firms and wages by trade unions unemployment benefit is nominally rigid in at least one country the effects of monetary expansion under both fixed and flexible exchange rates and exchange rate changes under fixed rates are considered the results change significantly if it is assumed that in one country unemployment benefit is fully indexed

genetic adverse selection evidence from long term care insurance and huntington disease abstract individual personalized genetic information is increasingly available leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time particularly in individual payer insurance markets we use data on individuals at risk for huntington disease hd a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity to estimate adverse selection in long term care insurance we find strong evidence of adverse selection individuals who carry the hd genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long term care insurance this finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for hd to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the hd risk population with and without the hd mutation

borrowing costs and the demand for equity over the life cycle abstract we construct a life cycle model that delivers realistic behavior for both equity holdings and borrowing the key model ingredient is a wedge between the cost of borrowing and the risk free investment return borrowing can either raise or lower equity demand depending on the cost of borrowing a borrowing rate equal to the expected return on equity which we show roughly matches the data minimizes the demand for equity alternative models with no borrowing or limited borrowing at the risk free rate cannot simultaneously fit empirical evidence on borrowing and equity holdings

moral hazard and selection among the poor evidence from a randomized experiment not only does economic theory predict high risk individuals to be more likely to purchase insurance but insurance coverage is also thought to crowd out precautionary activities in spite of stark theoretical predictions there is conflicting empirical evidence on adverse selection and evidence on ex ante moral hazard is very scarce using data from the seguro popular experiment in mexico this paper documents patterns of selection on observables into health insurance as well as the existence of non negligible ex ante moral hazard more specifically the findings indicate that i agents in poor self assessed health prior to the intervention have all else equal a higher propensity to take up insurance and ii insurance coverage reduces the demand for self protection in the form of preventive care curiously however individuals do not sort based on objective measures of their health

a new perspective on the gold standard inflation as a population phenomenon abstract the purpose of this paper is to contribute a new model of the gold standard focusing on the interaction between resource scarcity and demographics in a dynamic micro founded model we find that i prices and equilibrium gold holdings increase with population a scale effect but decrease with the population growth rate ii that the gold standard implies deflation unless extraction resources outstrip population growth and iii there is no optimal quantity of money the predictions of the model are examined using a structural var our results also shed light on debates about the viability of a return to the gold standard and more generally on the interaction between policy variables and scarce resources

bargaining and wage resistance in an open macroeconomic model this paper develops a model of an open economy in which wages and employment are determined by bargaining between firms and unions it can be regarded as an extension of an earlier paper ellis and fender 1985 to an open economy this allows us to investigate a number of contemporary issues in particular we shall explore some aspects of wage resistance the tendency for nominal wages to rise so as to offset either partially or totally any rise in the aggregate price level empirical evidence on wage resistance has been produced by sachs i980 who also shows that the assumption of real as opposed to nominal wage rigidity reverses the conclusions about the relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy in the fleming mundell model a number of other papers have incorporated wage resistance sometimes due to wage indexation see for example gray 1976 for analysis in a closed economy context and marston i982 modigliani and padoa schioppa 1978 and eichengreen i983 for open economy models in all these papers however wage resistance is assumed rather than derived from more basic assumptions about agents behaviour however some work has appeared recently which attempts to endogenise wage resistance in a closed economy by modelling union employer bargaining see for example mcdonald and solow i98i and ellis and fender i985

selection on moral hazard in health insurance economic analysis of market failure in insurance markets tends to analyze selection and moral hazard as distinct phenomena in this paper we explore the potential for selection on moral hazard in insurance markets by this we mean the possibility that moral hazard effects are heterogenous across individuals and that individuals selection of insurance coverage is affected by their anticipated behavioral response to coverage we examine these issues empirically in the context of employer provided health insurance in the united states specifically we break down the general

flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models in this paper we specify and estimate a flexible parametric proportional hazards model the model specification is flexibly parametric in the sense that the baseline hazard is non parametric while the effect of the covariates takes a particular functional form we also add parametric heterogeneity to the underlying hazard model specification we specify a flexible parametric proportional competing risks model which permits unrestricted correlation among the risks unemployment duration data are then analysed using the flexible parametric duration and competing risks specifications we find an important effect arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance and significantly different hazards for the two types of risks new jobs and recalls

false diagnoses pitfalls of testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets established tests for asymmetric information in insurance markets are examined the most commonly used that information is symmetric if high and low cover contracts have the same loss rate is inconsistent with standard assumptions that imply that under symmetric information all contracts o er full cover incomplete cover and symmetric information can be reconciled if there are claim processing costs but now existing tests fare badly partly due to the divergence between marginal and average selection effects ignoring the nature of loading factors may cause recent studies to mismeasure the welfare costs of asymmetric information but these problems are remedial

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices we provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection we then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance such variation together with quantity data allows us to estimate the demand for insurance the same variation together with cost data allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price the slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and the nature of selection and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare we illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employerprovided health insurance from one specific company we detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small in both absolute and relative terms

annuities and individual welfare advancing annuity demand theory we present suffcient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness that are substantially less restrictive than those used by yaari 1965 we examine demand with market incompleteness finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely but complete annuitization does not how uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk a new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases

liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending ditions for precisely the population that is most likely to have a difficult time obtaining credit those with low incomes and poor credit histories these consumers who typically cannot qualify for regular bank loans comprise the so called subprime market because the company we study originates subprime loans its loan applications and transaction records provide an unusual win dow into the consumption and borrowing behavior of households that are rationed in primary credit markets moreover we track loan repayments allowing us to analyze the difficulties in lending to the subprime population we begin by documenting the importance of short term liquidity constraints for individuals in our sample we present two pieces of evidence both are based on purchasing behavior and indicate a high sensitivity to cash on hand first we document a dramatic degree of demand seasonality associated with tax rebates overall demand is almost 50 percent higher during tax rebate season than during other parts of the year this seasonal effect varies with household

exchange rate pass through when market share matters the authors investigate the pass through from exchange rates to import prices when firms future demands depend on their current market shares they show that profit maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar appreciates temporarily i e the pass through may be perverse and that current import prices may be more sensitive to expected future exchange rates than to current exchange rates they present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling recent behavior of u s import prices copyright 1989 by american economic association

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

true and spurious duration dependence the identifiability of the proportional hazard model lancaster and nickell 1980 have argued that in the proportional hazard model the effects of time dependence true duration dependence and unobserved sample heterogeneity spurious duration dependence cannot be distinguished we show that both effects can be distinguished if the model allows for observed explanatory variables in the hazard we also discuss the application of our result to practical situations

optimal mandates and the welfare cost of asymmetric information evidence from the u k annuity market much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected once detected however there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs to do so we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the u k annuity market the model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options we focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities the results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about 127 million per year or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth we also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed mandates could achieve the first best allocation however we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest

excess capacity monopolistic competition and international transmission of monetary disturbances analyzes the excess capacity monopolistic competition and international transmission of monetary policy disturbances in the united states sheds light on the international impact of monetary policy emphasis on the spillover effects of monetary disturbances similarity of framework used with open economy macroeconomics

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

constrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types abstract we prove the existence of the constrained efficient miyazaki 1977 wilson 1977 spence 1978 equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection when the distribution of unobservable types is continuous our existence proof applies under extremely general assumptions about individual preferences when we restrict preferences to have the widely used in the selection markets literature quasilinear form we characterize the properties of this equilibrium by developing a simple and computationally efficient numerical method for constructing it applying this method we show in a natural setting how one would compute the equilibrium allocation potentially facilitating empirical work using the mws equilibrium we illustrate this empirical application in the context of policy interventions and show that the welfare implications of a coverage mandate critically hinge on whether the market implements a constrained efficient allocation like the mws equilibrium or a constrained inefficient allocation like in azevedo and gottlieb 2017

new evidence on the money s worth of individual annuities this paper presents new information on the expected present discounted value of payouts on individual life annuities the annuity we examine is the single premium immediate life annuity an insurance product that pays out a nominal level sum as long as the covered person lives in exchange for an initial lump sum premium this annuity offers protection against the risk of someone outliving his saving given uncertainty about longevity for reasonable estimates of behavioral parameters we calculate that individual annuities are currently priced so that retirees without bequest motives should find these policies of substantial value in configuring their portfolios to smooth retirement consumption we also find that the expected present discounted value of payouts relative to the initial cost of the annuity has increased over the last decade these findings bear on the policy debate regarding the role of individual choice and self reliance in retirement planning this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

an examination of the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks in the pre world war i and interwar periods we test whether monetary shocks had asymmetric output effects before world war ii ball and mankiw 1994 show that expectations of persistent inflation under fiat money can explain why negative monetary shocks had larger effects than positive shocks after world war ii consistent with this explanation we find such asymmetry in the interwar period following the abandonment of the gold standard and before it when agents arguably anticipated this development we find no monetary asymmetry before world war i which is consistent with ball and mankiw 1994 because under a credible gold standard agents do not expect persistent inflation jel e31 es2

private pensions mortality risk and the decision to annuitize abstract this paper examines household decisions about whether or not to annuitize retirement resources a life cycle model of consumption implemented with the use of dynamic programming techniques is used to construct a utility based measure of annuity value for individuals and couples in the health and retirement survey variation in the calculated annuity equivalent wealth arises from differences in mortality risk marital status risk aversion and the presence of pre existing annuities such as social security i find that a one percentage point increase in the annuity equivalent wealth leads to nearly a one percentage point increase in the ex ante probability of annuitizing balances in defined contribution pension plans however because much of the variation in the expected annuity decision is left unexplained by the life cycle model other factors are also analyzed health status and an individual s time horizon for financial decision making are significant determinants of the decision there is no evidence that bequest motives are an important factor in making marginal annuity decisions

adverse selection and an individual mandate when theory meets practice we develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms an individual mandate using data from massachusetts we estimate the parameters of the model in the individual market for health insurance we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate we find an annual welfare gain of 4 1 per person or 51 1 million annually in massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection we also find smaller post reform markups

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association