a new model of the gold standard this paper presents a new model of the gold standard that enables the authors to disentangle the different monetary functions of gold it builds in the sensible condition that the easiest gold will be mined first and takes seriously the constraint implied by the irreversibility of gold mining this constraint generates important asymmetries between the effects of rises and falls in exogenous variables the authors model also handles gold and the demand for it at an explicit primitive level and thus enables them to carry out a wide range of interesting conceptual experiments

speculative investor behavior and learning as traders learn about the true distribution of some asset s dividends a speculative premium occurs as each trader anticipates the possibility of reselling the asset to another trader before complete learning has occurred small differences in prior beliefs lead to large speculative premiums during the learning process this phenomenon helps explain a paradox concerning the pricing of initial public offerings the result casts light on the significance of the common prior assumption in economic models

quantity competition with access fees abstract we analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm in a nash equilibrium of the game played by firms the per unit prices equal marginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus as the number of firms increases access fees fall below net consumer surplus and toward zero existence is guaranteed if marshallian consumer surplus is not too concave with open entry quantity competition with access fees may be less efficient than without access fees

competitive non linear pricing and bundling we examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly when consumers buy all their products from one firm the one stop shopping model nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare but often lower consumer surplus than linear pricing by contrast in a unit demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus in a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects compared with linear pricing nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when i demand is elastic ii there is substantial product differentiation iii there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand iv consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm and v a consumer s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when i ii iv and v hold but iii does not

competitive nonlinear tariffs abstract this paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs i e those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased to the case of a symmetric oligopoly competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a cournot framework various equilibria are obtained which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors strategies buyers are classified by type each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff the phenomena of buyer self selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in cournot models both appear in the results

a varma test on the gibson paradox we applied the varma test to examine the dynamic relation between prices and interest rates the dynamic relation which is important to characterize the nature of the gibson paradox provides economists new insight in discriminating against competing theories in light of our empirical findings all theories in the literature lose their persuasiveness we found some evidence of unidirectional relation from prices to interest rates but we found no evidence of unidirectional relation from interest rates to prices hence the business cycle explanations advanced by wicksell 1907 keynes 1930 lee and petruzzi 1986 and barsky and summers 1988 are especially in jeopardy a century and a half after its birth this paradox is more puzzling than ever copyright 1990 by mit press

effects of financial innovations on market volatility when beliefs are heterogeneous abstract consider a model with two logarithmic utility maximizer agents that observe aggregate consumption but disagree about its expected rate of change markets are incomplete we first show that volatility of the interest rate in an economy with additional information is higher in a complete markets economy with no additional information there are two differences in volatility with the previous the first one due to the increase in volatility of the wealth share of the individuals is always positive the second difference is the change in covariance between the components of the interest rate volatility and can be positive or negative

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

the gibson paradox and the monetary standard this paper analyzes the gibson paradox a strong positive correlation between prices and interest rates over the past 250 years the phenomenon of gibson s paradox is significant in britain but not significant in the united states however there is a significant correlation between british interest rates and u s price levels the price movements show a strong characteristic of random walk under the gold standard but appear not to be random walk under the non gold standard based on a the price random walk assumption and b the real return arbitrage assumption this paper constructs a simple model to explain the above interesting empirical results

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

convergence trading with wealth effects an amplification mechanism in financial markets abstract i study convergence traders with logarithmic utility in a continuous time equilibrium model in general convergence traders reduce asset price volatility and provide liquidity by taking risky positions against noise trading however when an unfavorable shock causes them to suffer capital losses thus eroding their risk bearing capacity they liquidate their positions thereby amplifying the original shock in extreme circumstances this wealth effect causes convergence traders to be destabilizing in that they trade in exactly the same direction as noise traders this situation is consistent with the near collapse of long term capital management in 1998

heterogeneous expectations and bond markets this paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions the heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation the relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena including the excessive volatility of bond yields the failure of the expectations hypothesis and the ability of a tent shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

have increases in federal reserve transparency improved private sector interest rate forecasts yes this paper shows that since the late 1980s u s financial markets and private sector forecasters have become 1 better able to forecast the federal funds rate at horizons out to several months 2 less surprised by federal reserve announcements 3 more certain of their interest rate forecasts ex ante as measured by interest rate options and 4 less diverse in the cross sectional variety of their interest rate forecasts we also present evidence that strongly suggests increases in federal reserve transparency played a role for example private sector forecasts of gdp and inflation have not experienced similar improvements over the same period indicating that the improvement in interest rate forecasts has been special

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

gibson s paradox and the gold standard this paper contributes a new element to the explanation of the gibson paradox the puzzling correlation between interest rates and the price level seen during the gold standard period a shock that raises the underlying real rate of return in the economy reduces the equilibrium relative price of gold and with the nominal price of gold pegged by the authorities must raise the price level the mechanism involves the allocation of gold between monetary and nonmonetary uses our explanation helps to resolve some important anomalies in previous work and is supported by empirical evidence along a number of dimensions

optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process abstract we consider a consumption portfolio problem in continuous time under uncertainty a martingale technique is employed to characterize optimal consumption portfolio policies when there exist nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth we also provide a way to compute and verify optimal policies our verification theorem for optimal policies involves a linear partial differential equation unlike the nonlinear partial differential equation of dynamic programming the relationship between our approach and dynamic programming is discussed we demonstrate our technique by explicitly computing optimal policies in a series of examples in particular we solve the optimal consumption portfolio problem for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility functions when the asset prices follow a geometric brownian motion the optimal policies in this case are no longer linear when nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth are included by these examples one can see that our approach is much easier than the dynamic programming approach

intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs abstract we examine the behaviour of the interest rate asset prices and asset holdings in an economy with heterogeneous rationally updated beliefs about the expected rate of production growth the equilibrium interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates that would prevail in economies populated by homogeneous agents with the beliefs of the respective agents in the heterogeneous model the weights are given by the fractions of total wealth held financial innovation affects the dynamics of allocations and prices but preserves the aggregate output process and the structure of equilibrium asset prices also display the wealth weighted average characterization journal of economic literature classification numbers c60 d52 d91 g12

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

mixing goods with two part tariffs abstract we consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la hotelling and show how tariff structures affect consumers profits and location decisions as compared to linear pricing when firms charge two part tariffs they make higher profits while consumers are worse off the resulting allocation is not efficient since firms choose extreme locations and too little mixing occurs still under competition in flat subscription fees only there is no mixing at all and the outcome is pareto dominated by competition in the other types of tariffs results are discussed with a particular emphasis on the media industry

competition and two part tariffs monopoly power of some sort is thought to have viewed two part tariffs as price discrimibe a necessary condition for a firm to have the nation devices empower to price discriminate for example a firm ployed exclusively by prefers to use a two part tariff see oi 1971 firms with market rather than charge a single price for output power this paper ofhowever a competing firm could always charge fers an explanation for the use of such price a single price that consumers would prefer and schedules by firms in earn nonnegative profits thus it seems that the highly competitive marexistence of competition in a market would result kets such as health in the elimination of any two part tariff howclubs it is argued that ever the existence of two part tariffs in many in a world with buyer markets that are or appear to be competitive uncertainty about future demands they can belies this standard assumption this paper exprovide insurance for plains why monopoly power is not required for risk averse buyers the the existence of a two part tariff i show circumfixed entry fee finances stances in which price discrimination using a a marginal price below marginal cost it is two part tariff is preferred by consumers to a sinshown that the benefits gle price and therefore why this pricing method from this lower price will be found in competitive markets such pricwill under certain ing occurs in environments with uncertainty bespecified conditions cause two part tariffs act as a form of insurance outweigh the costs of ex ante consumers plan consumption however the entry fee there is a random component to their consump

on the anti competitive effects of quantity discounts abstract we analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly we find that for a sizeable set of parameter values quantity discounts harm the smaller firm and reduce consumers surplus they can even decrease social welfare i e the sum of producers and consumers surpluses however the circumstances in which quantity discounts may decrease social welfare are limited and difficult to identify in practice

two part tariff competition in duopoly abstract this paper develops two models of two part tariff competition when consumers are differentiated a la hotelling equilibrium prices equal marginal cost if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer equals the average demand entry fees are socially optimal in a symmetric equilibrium if all consumers participate in the market two part tariffs tend to result in lower prices higher profits and social welfare relative to uniform pricing in the logit model marginal cost pricing holds but entry fees are higher than socially optimal and two part tariffs lead to lower aggregate net consumer surplus but higher profits than uniform pricing

nonuniform bertrand competition the feasibility of bertrand undercutting with nonuniform prices is established and properties are derived for bertrand equilibrium in nonuniform price strategies with free entry equilibrium entails zero profit minimum average cost production if there is more than one producing firm all prices collapse to a minimum average cost uniform price an existence condition is compared to conditions from uniform price theory without free entry equilibrium prices may not collapse to a uniform price positive profit may occur but all firms earn equal profit and incur equal marginal cost while consumers pay average outlay no greater than marginal cost copyright 1992 by the econometric society

interest rates uncertainty and the livingston data the observed relationship between the standard deviation of forecasts and past forecast errors as found in the livingston survey suggests the interpretation of the standard deviation as a measure of inflation uncertainty the mean and the standard deviation for the inflation rate forecast found in the livingston survey furthermore are used as regressors in a reduced form interest rate equation the results indicate a large negative effect of such uncertainty on interest rates the inclusion of the uncertainty measure and commonly omitted lagged values of all variables in our analysis of data leads to more theoretically plausible estimated effects of money growth and expected inflation on interest rates than do standard estimates

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

bond yields and the federal reserve bond yields respond to policy decisions by the federal reserve and vice versa to learn about these responses i model a high frequency policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrage free bond market in continuous time the fed s target is a pure jump process jump intensities depend on the state of the economy and the meeting calendar of the federal open market committee the model has closed form solutions for yields as functions of a few state variables introducing monetary policy helps to match the whole yield curve because the target is an observable state variable that pins down its short end and introduces important seasonalities around fomc meetings the volatility of yields is snake shaped which the model explains with policy inertia the policy rule crucially depends on the two year yield and describes fed policy better than taylor rules