iterated regret minimization a new solution concept abstract for some well known games such as the traveler s dilemma or the centipede game traditional game theoretic solution concepts most notably nash equilibrium predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations we introduce a new solution concept iterated regret minimization that exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest including traveler s dilemma the centipede game nash bargaining and bertrand competition as the name suggests iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret

minimum effort coordination games stochastic potential and logit equilibrium abstract this paper revisits the minimum effort coordination game with a continuum of pareto ranked nash equilibria noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function the resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function in the limit as the noise vanishes the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk dominant outcome for 2 2 games in accordance with experimental evidence logit equilibrium efforts decrease with increases in effort costs and the number of players even though these parameters do not affect the nash equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c92

population agglomeration and the effectiveness of enterprise subsidies a chinese analysis this paper investigates the impact of population agglomeration on the relation between government subsidies and firm innovation it constructs a parsimonious model to show that the positive effect

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

international corporate diversification and the cost of equity european evidence abstract this paper analyzes the impact of corporate international diversification cid on domestic and world betas through the notion of psychic distance between countries using a large european sample of 598 firms our findings indicate that this dimension significantly influences corporate risk exposure by isolating three additive components of the foreign sales ratio fsr we obtain the most significant results by geographically partitioning the sample provided that firms are further classified by sector our framework sheds new light on how the cid of firms belonging to sweden and the united kingdom as well as the consumer cyclical consumer non cyclical and information technology sectors sometimes can reduce and sometimes increase firm betas

marginal analysis of welfare costs of environmental policies the case of pesticide regulation we present a methodology for estimating net social welfare costs and their distribution using only information on price quantities elasticities of supply and demand and estimates of cost and or yield effects of policies provided by natural scientists an application to a case of pesticide regulation demonstrates the importance of equity effects simulations show that redistribution of income among producers becomes the dominant effect of pesticide policies when supply elasticities are higher and demand elasticities are lower with changes in supply elasticity having a greater impact than changes in demand elasticity for crops with significant export markets foreign consumers are shown to bear much of the short run cost many cases now exist of legislation and executive orders mandating the use of benefit cost criteria in policy choice to be useful in policy assessments welfare methodologies must meet certain requirements first they must provide estimates of the efficiency impacts of alternative policies measured by changes in net social surplus second estimates of the

product and international diversification among japanese multinational firms this paper examines the relationship of performance with product and international diversification on japanese multinational firms from 1977 to 1993 we show the relationships between diversification and performance change over time through the use of multiple time periods and accounting for keiretsu membership results show that while diversity strategies vary between keiretsu and non keiretsu firms performance is not much different across time periods performance varies considerably but strategies are less variable product diversity has weak effects on firm performance only in one time period while international diversification has negative profitability and positive growth consequences in in some periods these results suggest first that diversification strategies and their effects on performance vary across time periods and generally produce some unexpected findings we do not find strong interactive diversity effects copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

one two three infinity newspaper and lab beauty contest experiments beauty contest is a game in which participants have to choose typically a number in 0 100 the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers we describe and analyze beauty contest experiments run in newspapers in uk spain and germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them despite the uncontrollability of these experiments these results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried we claim that all observed behavior across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools can be interpretedas iterative reasoning level 1 reasoning level 2 reasoning and level 3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples while the equilibrium choice level maximum reasoning is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists the results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject pools and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

games with unique mixed strategy equilibria an experimental study abstract the results of an experiment studying the choices of subjects playing mixed extensions of three variants of simple 2 2 non constant sum strictly competitive games of the same form matching pennies are presented subjects exhibited a variety of behavioral adaptive learning strategies this heterogeneity of individual behavior produced aggregate dynamics whose estimated steady states are quite different from those predicted by the nash equilibria of those stage games with asymmetrical payoff functions the observed aggregative dynamics are well accounted for both by a quantal equilibrium model of mckelvey and palfrey and by a learning model of roth and erev journal of economic literature classification number c72

profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input profits from violating the quota charge and permit market systems are compared the results indicate that for a given permit price the violation profits of the charge and permit market systems are the same and exceed the profits from violating a quota system if the optimal use of inputs in a compliant market is lower than the quota it is also shown that under a permit market system the occurrence of violation decreases the equilibrium price of permits this implies that the profits from violating a permit market are lower than violation profits of a charge system

multinational corporations vs domestic corporations international environmental factors and determinants of capital structure this paper examines whether or not u s based multinational corporations mncs have different capital structures than u s domestic corporations dcs and if so what causes the differences in explaining the difference between the capital structures of mncs and dcs previous studies tended to directly discuss the relationships between international environmental factors e g political risk foreign exchange risk and the capital structure a framework of analysis is proposed in this paper that examines the influence of environmental factors on the firm related capital structure determinants e g agency costs bankruptcy costs that in turn affect the capital structure of the mnc among the determinants that are examined more emphasis is placed on the discussion of agency costs since no previous studies have applied this concept in the international arena empirical tests were conducted to investigate whether mncs are significantly different from dcs regarding agency costs of debt bankruptcy costs and capital structure contrary to conventional wisdom the empirical findings show that mncs do not have lower bankruptcy costs and that they tend to have lower debt ratios than dcs

two little treasure games driven by unconditional regret for traveler s dilemma and minimal effort coordination games the unconditional regret matching urm procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones this supports a claim that the urm procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games

impulse balance in the newsvendor game abstract one striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull to center bias in the newsvendor game facing stochastic demand subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand we show that the impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition predicts the pull to center bias and other more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game

progress in behavioral game theory i s game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not it is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question the seminal book by von neumann and morgenstern the theory of games and economic behavior was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational in more recent work game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise at one extreme highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions at the other extreme adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple modelsmostly developed to describe nonhuman animals in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all when game theory does aim to describe behavior it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing this paper describes an approach called behavioral game theory which aims to describe actual behavior is driven by empirical observation mostly experiments and charts a middle course between over rational equilibrium analyses and under rational adaptive analyses the recipe for behavioral game theory i will describe has three steps start with a game or naturally occurring situation in which standard game theory makes a bold prediction based on one or two crucial principles if behavior differs from interested readers familiar with game theory should read crawford 1997 whose approach is more eclectic than mine he concludes p 236 that most strategic behavior can be understood via a synthesis that combines elements from each of the leading theoretical frameworks traditional game theory evolutionary game theory and adaptive learning with a modicum of empirical information about behavior behavioral game theory adds psychological interpretations to this synthesis

level k mechanism design non equilibrium models of choice e g level k reasoning have significantly different sometimes more accurate predictions in games than does nash equilibrium when it comes to the maximal set of functions that are implementable in mechanism design however they turn out to have similar implications focusing on single valued rules we discuss the role and implications of different behavioural anchors arbitrary level 0 play and prove a level k revelation principle if a function is level k implementable given any level 0 play it must obey a slight weakening of standard strict incentive constraints further the same condition is also sufficient for level k implementability although the role of specific level 0 anchors is more controversial for the sufficiency argument nonetheless our results provide tight characterizations of level k implementable functions under a variety of level 0 play including truthful uniform and atomless anchors

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

cost efficient pesticide reductions a study of sweden the minimum cost for reducing the farmers use of pesticides is calculated the measures include are i a decrease in use of inputs ii an improvement of the insurance system and iii application of an ecotechnology where 5 10 meters along the borders of the fields are left untreated with pesticides the cost of reducing the use of pesticides is measured by means of pesticide demand functions and the cost for improving an insurance system is measured as the risk premium the empirical results indicate that the minimum cost for reducing the use of pesticides by 50 in sweden corresponds to about 6 per cent of farmers incomes from crop production a simple comparison of policy instruments shows that the cost of a quota system is about 40 per cent higher than the costs of the charge and permit market systems the farmers decreases in incomes under a charge system are twice as high as under the other two policy instruments the results are however sensitive to the levels of the pesticide price elasticities

the logit equilibrium a perspective on intuitive behavioural anomalies costs associated with deviations from the nash equilibrium these payoff asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via a logit probabilistic choice function in the resulting logit equilibrium behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that satisfies a rational expectations consistency condition the beliefs that determine players expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying the logit rule to those expected payoffs we prove existence of a unique symmetric logit equilibrium and derive comparative statics results the paper provides a unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which nash equilibrium predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

multinational corporations vs domestic corporations financial performance and characteristics the analysis in this paper is composed of two segments first the financial performance of a sample of multinational corporations mncs is compared with that derived for a control group of domestic corporations dmcs using market based performance measures then the paper presents a comparison of selected financial characteristics of the firms in the two groups the results suggest the dmcs appear to have a significantly superior risk adjusted market based performance are significantly less capitalized and have higher total risk as well as higher systematic risk the fact that mncs are substantially larger than dmcs is not found to be a significant factor in explaining the observed difference between the two groups performance

economic science an experimental approach for teaching and research economics experiments have been used to study theories and policies that are often difficult to evaluate with data from naturally occurring markets this paper is a selective summary of my work in the main areas of experimental economics markets individual decisions games and public choice the discussion pertains both to scientific discoveries and teaching innovations

coordination under limited depth of reasoning this paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information it demonstrates that the main experimental results such as threshold strategies comparative statics and the differences in behavior under public and private information are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models this is in contrast to equilibrium which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information the analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic phenomena like currency attacks and debt crises which are commonly modeled using incomplete information coordinated attack games

attention in games an experimental study abstract a common assumption in game theory is that players concentrate on one game at a time however in everyday life we play many games and make many decisions at the same time and have to decide how best to divide our limited attention across these settings in this paper we ask how players solve this attention allocation problem we find that players attention is attracted to particular features of the games they play and how much attention a subject gives to a given game depends on the other game that the person is simultaneously attending to

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

the measurement of the degree of foreign involvement this paper extends errunza and senber 1984 in assessing the relationship between alternative measures of the degree of foreign involvement dfi and the conditions under which the use of a specific measure will not affect the outcome of empirical studies on corporate international diversification the results suggest that among 21 pairs of seven most widely used series of dfi only three series foreign assets foreign earnings and foreign tax ratios in two pairs are equivalent evidence of constant returns to scale between the ratio of foreign to total assets and the ratio of foreign to total earnings is also discussed

measuring firm size in empirical corporate finance abstract in empirical corporate finance firm size is commonly used as an important fundamental firm characteristic however no research comprehensively assesses the sensitivity of empirical results in corporate finance to different measures of firm size this paper fills this hole by providing empirical evidence for a measurement effect in the size effect in particular we examine the influences of employing different proxies total assets total sales and market capitalization of firm size in 20 prominent areas in empirical corporate finance research we highlight several empirical implications first in most areas of corporate finance the coefficients of firm size measures are robust in sign and statistical significance second the coefficients on regressors other than firm size often change sign and significance when different size measures are used unfortunately this suggests that some previous studies are not robust to different firm size proxies third the goodness of fit measured by r squared also varies with different size measures suggesting that some measures are more relevant than others in different situations fourth different proxies capture different aspects of firm size and thus have different implications therefore the choice of size measures needs both theoretical and empirical justification finally our empirical assessment provides guidance to empirical corporate finance researchers who must use firm size measures in their work

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

platform selection in the lab abstract emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games these games converge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions we replicate the remarkable results of hossain and morgan 2009 in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform next we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out of equilibrium payoffs are introduced the inflated payoffs keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not influence players security levels our design allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance we find that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non rational learning furthermore and contrary to the literature we find that efficiency suffers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly

a test of stability in a linear altruism model linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject s position in the game if the role allocation is randomly determined because subjects in each role have the same preferences ex ante we test and reject this hypothesis

are multinational corporations safer the failure probabilities of a sample of multinational corporations mncs are derived and compared with those of a control group of domestic corporations dmcs the results suggest that the mean insolvency probability of dmcs is significantly higher than that of the mncs it is also observed that mncs are significantly more capitalized and the standard deviation of their equity as well as their average systematic risk are also significantly lower furthermore the average insolvency probability of the dmcs is more sensitive to changes in the values of the parameters than those of the mncs

heterogeneous social preferences recent research has shown the usefulness of social preferences for explaining behavior in laboratory experiments this paper demonstrates that models of social preferences are particularly powerful in explaining behavior if they are embedded in a setting of heteroge neous actors with heterogeneous social preferences for this purpose a simple model is in troduced that combines the basic ideas of inequity aversion social welfare preferences recip rocity and heterogeneity this model is applied to 43 games and it can be shown that its pre dictive accuracy is clearly higher than that of the isolated approaches furthermore it can explain most of the anomalies the contradictions that are discussed in goeree and holt 2001

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

international corporate diversification market valuation and size adjusted evidence errunza and senbet es 7 analyze the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm both at theoretical and empirical levels the theoretical model which is largely heuristic exploits the costly supply adjustment of multinational firms mncs in providing international portfolio diversification services to investors who face differential cost barriers to direct holdings of assets across national boundaries mncs compete as financial intermediaries to undo the barriers so that in equilibrium profits are driven out mncs and pure domestic firms sell at an equivalent risk adjusted return however costly financial intermediation and the associated relative efficiency leads to a positive valuation effect for mncs relative to purely domestic firms further the equilibrium analysis implies that demand side investor barriers to international capital flows alone are inconsequential to the valuation of mncs in their pure financial role but that the interaction with the supply side costs are necessary to produce a valuation effect at the corporate level es subject the theory to an empirical analysis in a value based approach by employing a variant of tobin s 17 qratio the analysis controlling for industrial market power suggests that the relationship between the excess valuation and the degree of international involvement doi has magnified over periods characterized by severe u s government controls vis a vis the more recent periods in this paper we formalize the theoretical argument by viewing indirect portfolio diversification by mncs as a means of completing the international capital market we employ a paradigm in the unanimity literature and formally characterize the equilibrium in which there is a rationale for mnc financial intermediation we then perform an expanded empirical study by employing generalized least squares and maximum likelihood procedures since the positive relationship between excess valuation and doi as suggested in es 7 might be attributed to the so called small firm or size and the p e effects the test methodology controls for such effects also the traditional literature has relied upon foreign sales percentage as a proxy for doi in view of the well recognized limitations of this proxy we employ four different measures of international

the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm theory and evidence this paper investigates the existence of monopoly rents associated with international operations in a market value theoretic framework the benefits of international operations evolve from such factors as 1 imperfections in the product and factor markets 2 differential international taxation and 3 imperfections in the financial markets in this paper these factors are subject to an equilibrium analysis in the context of recent advances in financial theory in particular imperfections in the financial sector arising from corporate international diversification are examined in a framework which allows a supply adjustments by multinational firms and b the interaction of barriers to international capital flows faced by both firms and investors taking the u s capital market and investors as a base we then specify the conditions under which the foregoing imperfections get priced out in an equilibrium these pricing effects cannot be detected empirically through the methodologies employed by the existing studies which examine the effects of corporate international diversification indeed it was an attempt to rescue the limitations of these studies which initially motivated our paper the existing empirical inquiries into this area rely on traditional risk adjusted performance measures e g 7 or international analogs of return generating processes e g 1 8 instead at the empirical level we employ a value based method which is in the same vein of the thomadakis 17 approach developed to identify the monopoly benefits of industrial market structure we conduct the tests over subperiods characterized by differential government controls in an attempt a to separate the pure financial motives for multinationality from other motives and b to detect if the benefits of international operations carry through recent periods

strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games within a class of games that we call blame games we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient strictly dominance solvable equilibrium

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

lowest unmatched price auctions lowest unmatched price auctions lupas specify that the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins they are used in internet trading and tv and radio shows we model lupas as games with minimal restrictions in particular allowing players to place more than one bid since multiple bids have been observed in most actual lupas though lupas are games for which a closed form solution does not seem to exist in general our model generates several testable implications about the type of strategies played in equilibrium and the highest bid in a given lupa our analysis suggests that players follow strategic considerations and arrive at decisions which at least in the aggregate are generally consistent with theoretical predictions yet there are some remarkable deviations

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

an introduction to applicable game theory this paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists i try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts there are four kinds of games static or dynamic and complete or incomplete information complete information means there is no private information the corresponding solution concepts are nash equilibrium in static games of complete information backwards induction or subgame perfect nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information bayesian nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information and perfect bayesian or sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information the main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked as we consider progressively richer games we progressively strengthen the solution concept to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games in each case the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games not for the simpler games

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

ceo pay and firm size an update after the crisis in the size of stakes view quantitatively formalised in gabaix and landier 2008 ceo compensation reflects the size of rms aected by talent in a competitive market the years 2004 2011 were not part of the initial study and oer a laboratory to examine the theory with new positive and negative shocks executive compensation measured ex ante did closely track the evolution of average firm value supporting the size of stakes view out of sample during 2007 2009 rm value decreased by 17 and ceo pay by 28 during 2009 2011 firm value increased by 19 and ceo pay by 22

signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game in an experimental investigation of milgrom and roberts 1992 model play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima followed by an attempt to pool and then if no pooling equilibrium exists separation suggesting myopia rather than a forward looking process when both pure strategy equilibria and separating equilibria exist equilibrium selection is a function of the past history of play an adaptive learning model characterizes the major features of the data and provides predictions of intermediate term behavior that is otherwise lacking in the theory

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

revealed preference rational inattention and costly information acquisition we develop a revealed preference test for optimal acquisition of costly information the test encompasses models of rational inattention sequential signal processing and search we provide limits on the extent to which attention costs can be recovered from choice data we experimentally elicit state dependent stochastic choice data of the form the tests require in simple cases tests con rm that subjects adjust their attention in response to incentives as the theory dictates

are small firms less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers we show an inverted u relation between targetiveness probability of being targeted and firm size however this pattern describes stock offers and is more pronounced during hot markets characterized by higher stock valuations for cash offers we find a negative and monotonic relation these contrasting patterns suggest that small firms in the bottom nyse size quartile are less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers in addition we find that the stock acquirers of small targets are less overvalued than those of large targets and that the announcement returns are less negative for stock acquirers of small targets than for those of large targets

liability and large scale long term hazards this paper analyzes the application of liability to large scale long term hazards the key features distinguishing such hazards are the long temporal separation between exposure to a hazard and disease and the large damages when injuries finally emerge the large scale of damages creates a strong incentive to avoid liability payments and the long temporal separation creates numerous avenues through which parties can avoid paying possible damage awards the analysis focuses on the incentive to avoid paying damages by vertically divesting production tasks associated with serious occupational risks such divestiture can lower liability costs if the small firm operating the risky stage goes out of business before latent injuries emerge or has insufficient assets to pay damages and declares bankruptcy when suits are filed the paper then presents an empirical regression analysis of small firm entry into the u s economy between 1967 and 1980 the period in which liability laws were changing the point estima

an experimental study of jury decision rules we present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury we consider three treatment variables group size three or six number of votes needed for conviction majority or unanimity and pre vote deliberation we find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule a large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence this is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of feddersen and pesendorfer although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision contrary to feddersen and pesendorfer in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule in the case of no deliberation we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium

redistribution and market efficiency an experimental study abstract we study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority in one setup participants earn their income by trading in a double auction da with exogenous zero or full redistribution in another setup after trading they vote on redistributive tax policies in a majoritarian election with two competing candidates this results in virtually full redistribution even when participants have the opportunity to influence taxes by transferring money to the candidates we find that the high redistribution reduces trading efficiency but not as much as predicted if market participants trade randomly this is because rather than capitulating to the much lower trading incentives many participants respond to redistribution by asking and bidding more conservatively in the da and in this way help to prevent further efficiency losses

ceo duality and firm performance what s the fuss rising shareholder activism following poor corporate performance and a subsequent drop in shareholder value at many major u s corporations had rekindled interest in duality and corporate governance despite limited empirical evidence duality chairman of the board and ceo are the same individual has been blamed in many cases for the poor performance and failure of firms to adapt to a changing environment in examining the relationship between duality and firm performance this study considers the announcement effects of changes in duality status accounting measures of operating performance for firms that have changed their duality structure and long term measures of performance for firms that have had a consistent history of a duality structure our results suggest that 1 the market is indifferent to changes in a firm s duality status 2 there is little evidence of operating performance changes around changes in duality status and 3 there is only weak evidence that duality status affects long term performance after controlling for other factors that might impact that performance

the boundaries of the firm revisited why do firms exist what is their function and what determines their scope these remain the central questions in the economics of organization they are also central questions for business executives and corporate strategists the worldwide volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 6 trillion in 1997 it is hard to imagine that so much time effort and investment bankers fees would be spent on adjusting firm boundaries unless there was some underlying economic gain indeed the exceptional levels of merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades are a strong indication that economically significant forces do determine organizational boundaries the study of firm boundaries originated with the famous essay by coase 1937 who raised the question of why we observe so much economic activity inside formal organizations if as economists commonly argue markets are such powerful and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources coase s answer was in terms of the costs of transacting in a world of imperfect information when the transaction costs of market exchange are high it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal organization than through a market in large part thanks to the work of williamson 1975 1985 recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in coase s fundamental insight that firm boundaries can be explained by efficiency considerations our understanding of firm boundaries has been sharpened by identifying more precisely the nature and sources of transaction costs in different circumstances in the process the focus of

abreu matsushima mechanisms experimental evidence abstract abreu matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome we conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games in these games one pure strategy equilibrium is focal we assess the efficacy of abreu matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure strategy equilibrium outcome abreu matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome but more choices reflect the focal outcome moreover strengthening the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a pareto dominated risk dominated equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c7

cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma more than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience as suggested by backward induction remains inconclusive this paper provides a meta analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game we describe forces that affect initial play formation of cooperation and unraveling breakdown of cooperation first contrary to the backward induction prediction the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation we identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect to account for an important part of this effect second despite these initial differences the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations importantly despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round and conditional on establishing cooperation the first defection round moves earlier with experience simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation

a new look at the classical bertrand duopoly abstract the paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure strategy nash equilibrium in the standard bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product the main condition is elementary easy to interpret and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature

common belief and the theory of games with perfect information abstract the statement it is common belief that player i is bayesian rational where bayesian rational means an expected utility maximizer is defined for two person games with perfect information it is shown that in most such games it is not possible for a theory so postulate the bayesian rationality of all players and to be common belief this bears directly upon the salience of standard solution concepts such as subgame perfect and sequential equilibria as well as upon the extensive form rationalizability theories of d bernheim econometrica 52 1984 1009 1028 and d pearce econometrica 52 1984 1029 1050 which rely heavily on the common belief of bayesian rationality journal of economic literature classification number c72

cooperating over losses and competing over gains a social dilemma experiment evidence from studies in international relations the politics of reform collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains to test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation we let experimental subjects play the traveler s dilemma in the gain and loss domain subjects cooperate substantially more over losses furthermore our results suggest that this treatment effect is best explained by reference dependent risk preferences and reference dependent strategic sophistication we discuss the implications of our results and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain

managerial attributes and executive compensation we study the role of firm and manager specific heterogeneities in executive compensation we decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay we then show that in many settings it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias furthermore we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles i e manager fixed effects in corporate policies finally the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

optimism and pessimism in games this paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations it extends the earlier literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity ambiguity is modelled by ceu preferences we propose a new solution concept for players who may express ambiguitypreference then we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity attitude in games with strategic complements this gives a precise statement of the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour

expectation based loss aversion and strategic interaction abstract by extending the equilibrium concepts of k szegi and rabin 2006 k szegi and rabin 2007 this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation based loss averse players for loss averse players with choice acclimating expectations the utility from playing a mixed strategy is not linear but convex in the probabilities they assign to their pure strategies as a consequence they are generally unwilling to randomize and an equilibrium may fail to exist for players with choice unacclimating expectations by contrast randomizing over their pure strategies may indeed constitute a credible best response and an equilibrium always exists building upon these insights we delineate how expectation based loss averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected utility preferences derive novel strategic effects discuss equilibrium selection and derive equilibrium play for some simple games

the 11 20 money request game a level k reasoning study we study experimentally a new two player game each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels nis he receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player he receives an additional 20 shekels level k reasoning is appealing due to the natural starting point requesting 20 and the straightforward best response operation nevertheless almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning using two variants of the game we demonstrate that the depth of reasoning is not increased by enhancing the attractiveness of the level 0 strategy or by reducing the monetary cost of undercutting the other player

endogenous depth of reasoning we introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response unlike standard models of strategic thinking in this framework the player s depth of reasoning is endogenously determined and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent s cognitive bound in our approach individuals act as if they follow a cost benet analysis the depth of reasoning is a function of the player s cognitive abilities and his payos the costs are exogenous and represent the game theoretical sophistication of the player the benet instead is related to the game payos behavior is in turn determined by the individual s depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoning process of the opponent thus in our framework payos not only aect individual choices in the traditional sense but they also shape the cognitive process itself our model delivers testable implications on players chosen actions as incentives and opponents change we then test the model s predictions with an experiment we administer dierent treatments that vary beliefs over payos and opponents as well as beliefs over opponents beliefs the results of this experiment which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games strongly support our theory we also show that the predictions of our model are highly consistent both qualitatively and quantitatively with well known unresolved empirical puzzles our approach therefore serves as a novel unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows for predictions across games

excess market value the multinational corporation and tobin s q ratio the results of this study show that there is a positive and significant relationship between excess market value of multinational corporations and the degree of international involvement as measured by foreign sales percentage however the excess market value is not determined by the number of foreign subsidiaries nor the interaction between foreign sales and the number of foreign subsidiaries the relationship between excess market value and the two frequently used measures of monopoly power concentration ratio and the lerner index was also examined this study found that the lerner index contributes significantly in explaining excess market value but concentration ratio does not furthermore the positive and significant coefficients of advertising and r d intensity serve as evidence that product market imperfections appear to play a bigger role in explaining the excess market value experienced by mncs during our sample period

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

ceo incentives and firm size we develop a model that clarifies how to measure ceo incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms the crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of ceo productivity with respect to firm size we find that ceo marginal products rise significantly with firm size confirming rosen s conjecture that ceos of large firms have a chain letter effect on firm performance and overall ceo incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size we employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation