sharing the burden for climate change mitigation in the canadian federation dividing the burden for greenhouse gas abatement amongst the provinces has proven challenging in canada and is a major factor contributing to canada s poor historic performance on greenhouse gas abatement as the country aims to achieve substantial cuts to emissions over the next decade and by mid century such burden sharing considerations are likely to be elevated in importance this paper uses a calibrated multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium model to compare a number of archetypal rules for sharing the burden of a joint commitment amongst members for the case of greenhouse gas reductions in canada because of the substantial heterogeneity amongst canadian provinces these different burden sharing rules imply signifcantly different relative abatement effort amongst provinces and also signifcantly different welfare implications when emission permits are allocated on an equal per capita basis welfare is increased in ontario british columbia quebec and manitoba and signifcantly reduced in alberta and saskatchewan in contrast when emission permits are allocated based on historic emissions alberta and saskatchewan are made better off and ontario british columbia quebec and manitoba are made worse off we compare these archetypal burden sharing rules to existing provincial emission reduction commitments and find that none of the standard burden sharing rules comes close to existing commitments we argue that the debate on burden sharing of greenhouse gas abatement in canada could be objectified if informed by coherent quantitative analysis such as the one presented here

computation techniques for intertemporal allocation of natural resources application of optimal control theory to applied problems is limited by the difficulty of numerical solutions typically terminal values for the production period price or production level have been assumed rather than optimized the use of an objective functional with explicit discounting gives direct solution values for n y t p t and rent or consumer surplus for continuous or discrete problems the method is usable for numerical solutions to problems with linear demand cost trend or expropriation risk it is illustrated with fisher s widely used discrete problem and with application to parameters representing remaining world oil resources for competitive and monopolistic assumptions

crop insurance policies and purchases in france while many crop insurance systems have been reformed around the world few academic researches have addressed the determinants of the decision on crop insurance at the farm s micro level in this article both the financial and the agricultural literature lead to the identification of many rationales for the crop insurance decision using data from the period 2003 2006 on a representative survey of french farms fadn rica we investigate the different factors that incite farmers to insure against crop risk we emphasize that the highest risk farms are more likely to have insurance and this decision is positively related to the past amount of claims insurance is subscribed by larger farms because insurance appears too expensive for smaller farms which are indeed naturally less diversified interestingly financial variables such as capital structure or return on investment do not significantly determine the insurance decision

opec and the international oil market can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development abstract the opec cartel was formed to promote two economic goals one microeconomic low oil market volatility the other macroeconomic promotes economic development of its members these goals create a tension since the cartel s single tool is output quotas using this dual micro macro perspective we analyze oil exporting countries behavior we find that the effects of the cartel s choices will be reflected in oil market stability long term macroeconomic development and international oil market structure if an oil producing country cares about both oil industry profits and macroeconomic stability the goal of output stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership

on agreements in a nonrenewable resource market a cooperative differential game approach abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource duopoly with economic exhaustion we characterize the set of pareto efficient equilibria we show that when firms are sufficiently patient there exists no pareto efficient agreement that yields short run gains with respect to the noncooperative equilibrium given a pair of stocks there exists a unique interior pareto efficient agreement we characterize the set of stocks where a pareto efficient agreement results in larger discounted sum of profits for both players we show that social welfare under the interior pareto efficient agreement is smaller than under non cooperation despite the gains from a more cost effective extraction of the resources under an agreement

limit pricing and the in effectiveness of the carbon tax we present a theory of limit pricing monopoly in non renewable resource production facing a very inelastic demand an oil monopoly seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand unlike the conventional hotellian analysis the monopoly tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high potential ones with limit pricing policy induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic for example oil taxes have no effect on current oil production extraction increases when high potential substitutes are promoted but can be effectively reduced by supporting ordinary substitutes the carbon tax not only applies to oil it also penalizes its ordinary carbon substitutes whose market shares are taken over by the monopoly thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long term oil production and carbon emissions

the political economy of opec abstract we develop a conceptual model that captures opec pricing behavior and apply it to explain the large gap observed between domestic fuel prices in opec countries and prices in the rest of the world we model opec as a cartel of nations not firms and assume that politicians use two instruments production quotas and domestic fuel consumption subsidies the cartel of nations model suggests that introduction of alternatives to petroleum products may lead opec to reduce exports and increase domestic fuel consumption the empirical analysis suggests that when opec sets production quotas it places similar weights on consumer and producer surplus but when opec countries set domestic fuel subsidies on average 6 more weight is given to consumer surplus with some of the opec countries pursuing very aggressive domestic cheap fuel policies

the outlook for us oil dependence abstract oil dependence is defined as a dynamic problem of short and long run market power the potential monopoly power of an oil cartel depends on its market share and the elasticities of oil supply and demand while the economic vulnerability of oil consuming states depends most directly on the quantity of oil imported and the oil cost share of gross domestic product gdp of these factors only the market share of the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec cartel and the rate of growth of world oil demand are clearly different than they were 25 years ago opec still holds the majority of world oil and in the future will regain market share a hypothetical 2 year supply reduction in 2005 2006 similar in size to those of 1973 1974 or 1979 1980 illustrates the potential benefits to opec and harm to the us economy of a future oil price shock opec s revenues are estimated to increase by roughly 0 7 trillion while the us economy loses about 0 5 trillion strategic petroleum reserves seem ineffective against a determined multi year supply curtailment increasing the market s price responsiveness by improving the technologies of oil supply and oil demand can greatly reduce the costs of oil dependence each element of this interpretation of the oil dependence problem is well supported by previous studies this paper s contribution is to unite these elements into a coherent explanation and to point out the enormously important implications for energy policy

taxation of petroleum products theory and empirical evidence the domestic taxation of petroleum products is an important source of revenue in most countries however there is a wide variation of tax rates on petroleum products across countries which cannot be explained by economic theory alone this paper surveys different considerations advanced for taxing petroleum and presents petroleum tax rate data in 120 countries

testing the monetary model of exchange rate determination new evidence from a century of data abstract we test the long run monetary model of exchange rate determination for a collection of 14 industrialized countries using data spanning the late nineteenth or early twentieth century to the late twentieth century interestingly we find support for a simple form of the long run monetary model in over half of the countries we consider for these countries we estimate vector error correction models to investigate the adjustment process to the long run monetary equilibrium in the spirit of meese and rogoff journal of international economics 14 1983 3 24 we also compare nominal exchange rate forecasts based on monetary fundamentals to those based on a naive random walk model

the monetary approach to the exchange rate in this paper the monetary approach to the exchange rate is re examined for three key currencies using data for the recent experience with flexible exchange rates two important findings are reported in the paper first it is demonstrated using a multivariate cointegration technique that an unrestricted monetary model is a valid framework for analysing the long run exchange rate second we find inter alia that the proportionality of the exchange rate to relative money supplies is valid for the german mark

advancing the design of a dynamic petro dollar currency basket this study offers organization of petroleum exporting countries opec member nations a crude oil pricing currency basket based on currency liquidity in contrast with prior emphasis on opec trading patterns motivating the search for an alternative us dollar pricing of crude oil is the significant and inverse relationship r 0 82 p 0 01 between the us dollar major currencies index and crude oil price over the period january 1999 march 2009 a dynamically weighted petro dollar currency basket is proposed based on the five currency claims us dollar euro british pound japanese yen and swiss franc and their varying proportions of foreign exchange reserves held by central banks the major currencies us dollar index is compared against the proposed petro dollar index to reveal an average us 8 1 billion annual gain in favor of the petro dollar currency basket offering opec members a revenue stream of diversified and highly liquid currencies to transition away from complete dependence on the us dollar crude oil pricing the proposed petro dollar crude oil pricing schema offers opec a crude oil price dynamically denominated in currencies reflecting the global use and importance of crude oil this paper concludes with implementation issues facing a move toward the dynamically weighted petro dollar crude oil pricing schema

iranian oil free zone and international oil prices abstract one of the main elements of economic sanctions against iran due to its nuclear and military programs is crude oil exportation restrictions in addition to investment in iranian energy related projects senders of such sanction are interested in understanding the impacts of such embargos on international oil prices we apply unrestricted vector autoregressive var model using impulse response functions irf and variance decomposition analysis vda tools with annual data from 1965 to 2012 to analyze the dynamic response of international oil prices to iranian oil export sanction controlling for the supply of non iranian oil the world gdp per capita and post islamic revolution exogenous dummy variables we show that international oil prices respond negatively and statistically significant to increasing shock in absolute negative changes of the iranian oil exports our proxy of iran oil sanctions following the first 2 years after shock the main reason is the positive response of the non iranian oil supply to negative shocks in iranian oil exports filling the missing supply of iranian oil in international markets

modelling long term oil price and extraction with a hubbert approach the lopex model abstract the lopex l ong term o il p rice and ex traction model generates long term scenarios about future world oil supply and corresponding price paths up to the year 2100 in order to determine oil production in non opec countries the model uses hubbert curves hubbert curves reflect the logistic nature of the discovery process and the associated constraint on temporal availability of oil extraction paths and world oil price path are both derived endogenously from opec s intertemporally optimal cartel behaviour thereby opec is faced with both the price dependent production of the non opec competitive fringe and the price dependent world oil demand world oil demand is modelled with a constant price elasticity function and refers to a scenario from acropolis poles lopex results indicate a significant higher oil price from around 2020 onwards compared to the reference scenario and a stagnating market share of maximal 50 to be optimal for opec

crude oil price fluctuations and saudi arabia s behaviour this study attempts to explain why crude oil prices fluctuate the main cause being the quota regime which characterises the opec agreements given that the saudi oil supply is inelastic in the short term a shock in the oil market is accommodated by an immediate price change by contrast a dominant firm behaviour in the long term causes an output change which is accompanied by a smaller price change this explains why oil prices overshoot the results of a general equilibrium model applied to saudi arabia support this analysis they also indicate that saudi arabia does not have any incentive for altering the crude oil market equilibrium with either positive or negative supply shocks as its welfare declines and that it has an incentive disincentive for intervening if a negative positive demand shock hits the crude oil market a second set of simulations is designed to understand what kind of oecd policy might help to bring down prices a tax cut would worsen the situation whereas policies that can increase the price elasticity of demand seem to be very effective

on the predictive power of monetary exchange rate model the case of the malaysian ringgit us dollar rate the predictive power of the monetary model for the malaysian ringgit us dollar rm usd rate is analysed using quarterly data ending in 2006 q3 we find compelling evidence of a long run relationship between exchange rates and the economic fundamental determinant macroeconomic factors systematically affect the long run movement of the rm usd rate additionally the rm usd rate was overvalued by about 10 several quarters before the 1997 crisis after the crisis rates fluctuated close to the equilibrium value the out of sample forecasts demonstrate that the monetary model outperforms the naive random walk model the monetary and purchasing power parity ppp models do well at the four to eight quarters horizon

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

the effects of transport regulation on the oil market does market power matter instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes biofuel requirements and fuel efficiency standards however the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary if market power is present in the oil market the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market as a result the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage in particular reduced oil consumption as a result of increased fuel efficiency standards will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly

oil exploration under climate treaties abstract in this paper we focus on how an international climate treaty will influence the exploration of oil in non opec countries we present a numerical intertemporal global equilibrium model for the fossil fuel markets the international oil market is modelled with a cartel opec and a competitive fringe on the supply side following a nash cournot approach an initial resource base for oil is given in the non opec region however the resource base changes over time due to depletion exploration and discovery when studying the effects of different climate treaties on oil exploration two contrasting incentives apply if an international carbon tax is introduced the producer price of oil will drop compared to the reference case this gives an incentive to reduce oil production and exploration however the oil price may increase less rapidly over time which gives an incentive to expedite production and exploration in fact in the case of a rising carbon tax we find the last incentive to be the strongest which means that an international climate treaty may increase oil exploration in non opec countries for the coming decades and reduce opec s market share

will opec lose from the kyoto protocol a range of energy economy models forecast losses to members of the organisation of petroleum exporting countries opec should the kyoto protocol come into force these forecasts are a powerful influence in the united nations framework convention on climate change negotiations they are used by opec to advance the agenda on the impacts of response measures covertly arguing for compensation for lost oil revenues arising from implementation of the protocol this paper discusses this issue and explores the key assumptions of these models and their uncertainties assumptions about carbon leakage future availability of oil reserves substitution innovation and capital turnover are considered the paper suggests that losses will not affect opec countries equally and that these losses are not likely to be as substantial as the models forecast a range of policy measures are proposed to lessen any impact the protocol may have on opec

gains from cartelisation in the oil market in this paper we ask whether opec still gains from cartelisation in the oil market despite low producer prices and a modest market share we apply two intertemporal equilibrium models of the global oil market one consisting of a cartel and a fringe and one describing a hypothetical competitive market comparing the outcome of these models we conclude that there are positive cartelisation gains of about 18 percent in the oil market in comparison with what pindyck 1978 found for the 1970s this may be considered as quite modest moreover we study whether the cartelisation gains to opec are altered by different moves by non opec producers or consumer countries generally we find that the relative cartelisation gains are unchanged one exception is exploration activities where we find that a major increase in non opec reserves could remove the cartelisation gains to opec completely in this case the opec countries could find themselves better off without the cartel

modeling opec behavior economic and political alternatives the predominant approach to modeling opec behavior depends upon the assumption that economic self interest provides the best predictor of the cartel s price and production strategy with rational monopoly behavior the exogenous characteristics of the oil market determine an optimal price path for the group but opec members have diverse economic as well as political goals and uncertainty about oil market responses provides substantial leeway to argue about what is optimal an examination of the five key opec price decisions since 1973 shows that an operational code of advancing political priorities on arab israeli issues while deflecting security challenges better explains saudi arabia s decision making than the economic optimizing approach moreover no economic formula alone is consistent with saudi behavior the balance of internal and external forces of a political or security character on saudi leadership suggests more of a tilt toward price hawkishness than pure considerations of economic self interest would indicate this tilt is reinforced by a systematic weakness on the part of the u s government to exercise a sustained countervailing influence on the kingdom on behalf of moderation

cartel formation and oligopoly structure a new assessment of the crude oil market while economic theorists regard opec as a perfect example of a long lasting cartel energy economists strongly deny such view applying the ideas of new empirical industrial organization a market description is derived cartel theory and empirical evidence fit together well stable long lasting cartels can be explained only for subclasses of market models and exactly such type of model is obtained here a variety of different market models is tested opec and the market for crude oil is best described by a price leader model

why do oil prices jump or fall this paper discusses theories that can explain the zig zags of oil prices in general and in particular the recent jump more precisely the following explanations are discussed homo oeconomicus pure profit maximization if demand is dynamic and convex price reaction function price increases and respectively declines depend on capacity utilization cartelization contingent on output or revenues of which the latter can lead to backward bending supply segments and multiple equilibria statistical descriptions mean reversion homo politicus i e arguments for price hikes that are rational public choice despite the long run economic loss finally two approaches are presented that emphasize demand uncertainty one extending the above mentioned dynamic demand framework and the other considers a dynamic game of non competitive suppliers with lumpy investments summing up a demand shock seems to be the most suitable explanation of today s high prices indeed a shock given that international energy agency iea and department of energy doe were promising just a couple of years ago that we are going to have lots of oil at low prices while others and in particular politics have surprisingly little or no explanatory power

does oilrig activity react to oil price changes an empirical investigation in this paper we analyze how oilrig activity in different non opec regions is affected by the crude oil price we estimate relationships between oilrig activity and crude oil prices using dynamic regression models augmented with latent components capturing trend and seasonality the results generally show a positive relationship between oilrig activity and the crude oil price but the strength of the relationship differs across regions overall there seems to be a clear relationship between the oil industry structure in the region and the oilrig activity s reaction to price changes on average the long run price elasticity for oilrig activity in non opec countries is around unity

the empirical role of the exchange rate on the crude oil price formation this paper adopts a novel empirical approach to the crude oil price formation for the purpose of understanding the price reactions of opec member countries to changes in the exchange rate of the us dollar against other major currencies and prices of other members the results are broadly consistent with the view of the absence of a unified opec determined price in the international crude market literature in addition the results also highlight a cross regional dimension of the crude oil market

does opec still exist as a cartel an empirical investigation the aim of this paper is to determine if opec acts as a cartel by testing whether the production decisions of the different countries are coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices relying on cointegration and causality tests in both time series and panel settings our findings show that the opec influence has evolved through time following the changes in the oil pricing system while the influence of opec is found to be important just after the counter oil shock our results show that opec is a price taker on the majority of the considered sub periods finally by dividing opec between savers and spenders we show that it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members

protectionist oil policies a dynamic comparison for the usa rising us oil imports have spawned a variety of policies for increasing energy security we provide a qualitative comparison of policies using a dynamic optimal control model thirty year price and output paths for opec and the usa are simulated assuming that us producers are competitive and opec is a dominant firm we find that the policies have quite different effects on imports and welfare the tariff reduces imports the most followed by the gasoline tax a per unit tariff and gasoline tax are costly in terms of us welfare whereas an ad valorem tariff can both lower imports and enhance us welfare

u s oil dependence 2014 is energy independence in sight abstract the importance of reducing u s oil dependence may have changed in light of developments in the world oil market over the past two decades since 2005 increased domestic production and decreased oil use have cut u s import dependence in half the direct costs of oil dependence to the u s economy are estimated under four u s energy information administration scenarios to 2040 the key premises of the analysis are that the primary oil market failure is the use of market power by opec and that u s economic vulnerability is a result of the quantity of oil consumed the lack of readily available economical substitutes and the quantity of oil imported monte carlo simulations of future oil market conditions indicate that the costs of u s oil dependence are likely to increase in constant dollars but decrease relative to u s gross domestic product unless oil resources are larger than estimated by the u s energy information administration reducing oil dependence therefore remains a valuable goal for u s energy policy and an important co benefit of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions

estimating and forecasting the real prices of crude oil a data rich model using a dynamic model averaging dma approach given that oil price fluctuations have been of great interest for macroeconomics in the recent years due to its important implications for future inflation economic growth and policy making the aim of this paper is to estimate and forecast west texas intermediate wti crude oil prices using a large monthly dataset that covers the period from march 1983 to december 2011 to achieve this aim forecasting with factor models offers a usual approach that utilizes large datasets however a forecasting model which simply includes all factors in state space equation and does not allow for time varying may be not suitable with a highly volatile market such as oil market to overcome these limitations an approach that accounts both for parameter and model uncertainty is employed in particular this study uses the dynamic model averaging dma approach suggested by koop and korobilis 2012 the key element of the dma approach is that it allows both for model and parameter to vary at each point of time by doing so the dma is robust to structural breaks empirical findings show that dma approach outperforms any other alternative model used in the forecasting exercise results also show that there is model but not parameter variation in this oil price forecasting exercise finally the findings suggest that the dma approach provides a better proxy of expected spot prices than future prices

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

risk management determinants affecting firms values in the gold mining industry new empirical results abstract the goal of this article is to isolate the significant determinants that affect the decision of non financial firms to hedge their risks our application is for the north american gold mining industry the random variable considered is the selling price of an ounce of gold we show that several factors related to maximizing the firm s value significantly affect the decision to hedge the price of gold

the monetary exchange rate model as a long run phenomenon abstract pure time series based tests fail to find empirical support for monetary exchange rate models in this paper we apply pooled time series estimation on a forward looking monetary model resulting in parameter estimates which are in compliance with the underlying theory based on a panel version of the engle and granger engle r f granger c w j 1987 co integration and error correction representation estimation and testing econometrica 55 251 276 two step procedure we find that the residuals of the panel based estimated monetary model are stationary this indicates that on a pooled time series level there is cointegration between the exchange rate and the macroeconomic fundamentals of this monetary model

reinsurance and corporate taxation in the united kingdom life insurance industry there are two main tax related arguments regarding the use of reinsurance the income volatility reduction and the income level enhancement arguments the income volatility reduction argument contends that firms facing convex tax schedules have incentives to hedge in order to reduce the volatility of their annual taxable income and thereby lower expected tax liabilities smith c w stulz r m 1985 optimal hedging policies journal of financial and quantitative analysis 19 127 140 the income level enhancement argument advanced by adiel adiel r 1996 reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property casualty insurance industry journal of accounting and economics 22 207 240 is more specific to hedging via reinsurance this perspective holds that reinsurance enhances current reported earnings via the receipt of reinsurance commissions and so increases tax liabilities consequently insurance firms with high marginal tax rates should use less reinsurance than those with low marginal tax rates if tax matters prior studies using data on financial derivatives have produced mixed results on the validity of the first argument while adiel 1996 finds the second argument insignificant in his study of the use of reinsurance by a sample of united states us property liability insurance firms this study tests the two tax related arguments using 1992 2001 data for a sample of united kingdom uk life insurance firms we find that uk life insurers with low before planning marginal tax rates tend to use more reinsurance in contrast tax convexity is found to have no significant impact on the purchase of reinsurance and so the volatility reduction argument is not supported

opec and cheating revisiting the kinked demand curve abstract given a formal or tacit group agreement by an oligopoly such as opec it is still necessary to understand what pricing and output decisions individual members actually make the well known kinked demand curve model of oligopoly behaviour is useful in this regarg the model is usually applied to a price and market share fixing oligopoly in a deterministic world with appropriate modifications it can be applied to opec as a price fixing cartel with varying degrees of cohesion from 1973 1986 and as a quantity fixing cartel since 1986 operating in an uncertain world

opec the seven sisters and oil market dominance an evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling approach abstract a methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling is used to study opec and the seven sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s an evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations energy specific variables and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem an agent based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model

opec and the u s oil import tariff open loop nash extraction plans of exhaustible resource producers in which producers take the plans of others as given are time consistent but proposed open loop oil import tariffs are almost always time inconsistent the paper derives a time consistent open loop nash tariff that can be readily computed for both competitive and a nash cournot specification of the oil market the authors illustrate the time sequence of the optimal import tariff for a simple model of the united states facing a duopolistic version of opec and a comparative fringe of oil producers and compare the outcome with the competitive equilibrium copyright 1991 by royal economic society

opec behavior a test of alternative hypotheses since interpretations of past and future oil price patterns depends on the model chosen the author tests and compares alternative theories of opec as a first step in validating the choice on any one model the results show that among opec countries the partial market sharing cartel model is the only model not rejected by at least some of the 11 members and gives the best explanation of production in comparison with 11 non opec countries the competitive model could not be rejected for 10 of the 11 non opec producers this raises the question of why if opec is a cartel friedman s predictions have not come true and introduces new questions for future research 19 references 3 tables

an analysis of factors affecting price volatility of the us oil market abstract this paper studies the price volatility of the crude oil market by examining the market structure of opec the stable and unstable demand structure and related elasticity of demand in particular the impacts of prosperity and recession of the world economy and the resulting demand shift on crude oil price are investigated the error correction model is used to estimate the demand relations and related elasticity the income effect on demand functions is evaluated to shed light on future prices a simulation of potential oil prices under different scenarios on a cut of one million barrels per day by opec is evaluated from our simulation given the 4 cut in opec production the oil price is expected to increase unless the recession is severe the magnitude and scope of a price hike would be diminished if non opec or domestic production were greatly expanded

how do oil producers respond to oil demand shocks abstract this paper analyzes the response of international oil producers to demand induced changes in the price of crude oil during 1975 2011 focusing on potential differences between opec and non opec countries the goal is to derive consistent estimates of the short run price elasticity of crude oil supply at the country level i find that oil producers hardly respond to demand shocks within the same month and that the corresponding impact price elasticities of supply are statistically indistinguishable from zero while there is little evidence of differences in the dynamic responses to a typical flow demand shock on average over the sample period opec members seem to curtail production in response to a speculative demand shock whereas non opec production expands significantly flow and speculative demand shocks account for a nontrivial fraction of the total variability in country level crude oil supply

the use of nonlinear hedging strategies by us oil producers motivations and implications abstract this paper investigates the motivations and value effect of nonlinear hedges using a new dataset on the hedging activities of 150 u s oil producers we present empirical evidence that nonlinear hedging strategies are motivated by sensitivities of firm s investment expenditures and revenues to oil price fluctuations and quantity price correlation we also find a non monotonic relationship between the use of nonlinear hedges and financial constraints investment opportunities production uncertainty and changes in oil prices and volatilities also play a significant role in hedging strategy choice controlling for bias related to omitted variables and self selection in the estimation of marginal treatment effects of hedging strategy choice we find that oil producers with a higher propensity to use pure nonlinear hedging strategies tend to have higher marginal firm value

clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis abstract this paper studies the target pricing zone tpz hypothesis for crude oil by examining price clustering in the dollar digit it is hypothesized that price clustering occurs within an established tpz if opec is able to defend the upper and lower bounds through output changes the results show that prices strongly cluster around the dollar digit value of 9 within the tpz sub periods but not outside the sub periods furthermore the degree of clustering declines when production capacity utilization is high and when production significantly exceeds quotas consistent with opec s inability to defend the zone nine centered clustering also results in lower contemporaneous and next day volatility these results support the target pricing zone hypothesis of crude oil

monetary compensations in climate policy through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment the case of oil exporting countries this paper investigates the compensations that major oil producers have claimed for since the kyoto protocol in order to alleviate the adverse impacts of climate policy on their economies the amount of these adverse impacts is assessed through a general equilibrium model which endogenizes both the reduction of oil exportation revenues under international climate policy and the macroeconomic effect of carbon pricing on middle east s economy we show that compensating the drop of exportation revenues does not offset gdp and welfare losses because of the time profile of the general equilibrium effects when considering instead compensation based on gdp losses the effectiveness of monetary transfers proves to be drastically limited by general equilibrium effects in opened economies the main channels of this efficiency gap are investigated and its magnitude proves to be conditional upon strategic and policy choices of the middle east this leads us to suggest that other means than direct monetary compensating transfers should be discussed to engage the middle east in climate policies

on the economic determinants of oil production theoretical analysis and empirical evidence for small exporting countries abstract in this paper decisions regarding production in oil exporting countries are studied by means of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation in particular we aim at describing the relationship between oil production levels and changes in the world oil demand and prices intertemporal production decisions by a representative oil producer are modeled by means of a partial equilibrium model in this theoretical model oil producers are subject to exogenous shocks in world oil consumption and prices oil companies can change output levels only by incurring a fixed cost results from the simulation of this model show a strong relationship between oil production and changes in world oil consumption on the contrary the effects of changes in real oil prices on oil production decisions seem to be much lower results from the simulation of the theoretical model are then empirically investigated using time series econometric techniques the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that oil producing countries are characterized by different responses to changes in world oil demand and in real oil prices for many countries production rapidly adjusts to changes in consumption whereas responses of oil production to innovations in real oil prices are found to be not statistically significant in addition when non linearities in the relationship between world oil demand prices and output levels are allowed for evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks to exogenous variables on output levels is found for some countries

heterogeneous noncompliance with opec s oil production cuts abstract in this study we explore the heterogeneous noncompliance behavior among ten member nations of the organization of the petroleum countries opec overall we find that the three top oil producers saudi arabia iran and venezuela and the four relatively low oil producers libya indonesia algeria and qatar exhibit higher cheating frequencies and magnitudes while they tend to offset their peers conduct conversely the three mid oil producers uae nigeria and kuwait display much lower frequencies and magnitudes of noncompliance with opec s administered quotas while they largely demonstrate herding behavior among their peers the volatilities of the respective cheating magnitudes are rather similar across the three clusters though this study contributes to the economic literature by further illuminating the operational mode of opec and by exposing its three main subsets its interdependent structure and its members customary behavioral patterns

oil production responses to price changes an empirical application of the competitive model to opec and non opec countries abstract falling oil prices over the last decade accompanied by over production by some opec members and the growth of non opec supply warrant further empirical investigation of the competitive model to ascertain production behavior a supply function based on a modification of griffin s model is estimated using data from 1973 1997 the sample period unlike griffin s however includes phases of price increase 1970s and price decrease 1980s 1990s thus providing a better framework for examining production behavior using the competitive model the opec results do not support the competitive hypothesis instead a negative and significant price elasticity of supply is obtained this result offers partial support for the target revenue theory for most of the non opec members the estimates support the competitive model opec s loss of market share and the drop in the share of oil based energy should signal adjustments in price and quantity based on a competitive world market for crude oil

a dynamic network analysis of the world oil market analysis of opec and non opec members abstract we characterize the dynamic network structure of major oil producing countries we examine the oil production coordination of 13 organization of the petroleum exporting countries opec and 17 non opec members we construct the dynamic network structure using the network connectedness measure of diebold and yilmaz 2009 we investigate the structural changes in connectedness of opec and non opec members additionally we study how the influence of opec members non opec countries and major oil producers evolve we find that the network structure of major oil producing countries changes significantly over time specifically the impact of changes in oil production of all opec members on global oil production declines whereas the impact of non opec on global oil production increases opec s increase decisions have a significant and positive impact on opec and non opec coordination however cut decisions do not affect coordination we find that opec countries and developing countries have significantly higher levels of connectedness additionally countries with high oil production levels have significantly more influence the empirical results provide intuition about the recent developments in global oil production

aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition abstract we consider a competitive version of the traditional aggregate production planning model with capacity constraints in the general case multiple products are produced by a few competing producers oligopoly with limited capacities production quantities prices and consequently profits depend on production and allocation decisions of each producer in addition there is competition for the raw material whose supplies are limited and where prices reflect these limitations such situations have recently occurred in several process industry settings including petro refining petrochemicals basic chemicals cement fertilizers pharmaceuticals rubber paper food processing and metals we use a successive bertrand cournot framework to address this problem and to determine optimal production quantities prices and profits at the producers and at the raw material supplier our analysis allows a new way to understand and evaluate the marginal value of additional capacity when there is competition for the market and raw materials

tests of the different variants of the monetary model in a developing economy malaysian experience in the pre and post crisis periods this study examines the validity of four different variants of the monetary model of exchange rate determination for malaysia covering both the pre and post crisis periods using the vector error correction models the findings demonstrate that for both periods the variables used are cointegrated tests tend to suggest that of the four variants of monetary model the sticky price model holds in both periods and the flexible price model holds only in the post crisis period the proportionality between the exchange rate and relative money does not hold in any period the plotted actual and fitted exchange rates for both sub samples show that the models are able to track the actual exchange rate trend quiet well

are biofuels the culprit opec food and fuel the food commodity price boom of 2003 2008 was the most notable in the past several decades having a substantial impact on global economic activity it affected developing nations by impacting real output the balance of payments government budgetary positions and most important the well being of the very poor high commodity prices also affected developed countries by transmitting business cycle disturbances and creating inflationary pressures several recent studies tried to identify and quantify the factors that caused the food commodity price boom of 2003 2008 see for instance isabel vansteenkiste 2009 these studies suggest that one key factor is growth in demand which since the 1980s has outpaced growth in supply other studies argued that biofuel is the culprit since it increases demand for staple crops see for instance donald mitchell 2008 all these studies however assumed competitive markets and did not consider the impact of biofuel on energy costs to farmers moreover they ignored the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec these studies leave us perplexed regarding the true impact of biofuel on food commodity prices was it or was it not an important contributor to the recent food commodity boom we believe that to answer this question the interactions between energy and food must be modeled and opec introduced and the impact of biofuels compared with other factors that are argued by the literature to be important this paper aims to analyze the multiple contributions of energy and biofuels to the increase are biofuels the culprit opec food and fuel

opec and demand response to crude oil prices abstract this paper investigates demand response to crude oil price movements before and after the recent global financial and economic crisis it employs several market power indices to structurally estimate price elasticities a newly developed market power index for crude oil markets is implemented in this approach opec is the central player and acts as a dominant producer in the global oil market we quantify how a change in market structure such as changes in marginal cost of production would contribute to market power exercise of opec and have an ultimate impact on price elasticity of demand for oil our price elasticity predictions fall in a range reported in the literature however estimates for pre crisis deviate from the post crisis ones in fact demand response to crude oil prices has almost doubled during the crisis this severe change in price response can be associated with record price levels caused by supply shortages and surge in alternative renewable energy resources the key advantages of this methodology over the existing literature are that it is simple to use and estimates price elasticity using a competition framework without specifying demand supply function s and utilizes commonly observable market variables that can be applied to any admissible data frequency

investment and operating choice oil and natural gas futures prices and drilling activity abstract we present evidence that changes in oil and natural gas field investment measured by drilling rig use respond positively to changes in the futures prices of oil and natural gas consistent with predictions based upon value maximizing behavior these results hold for world regions dominated by private independent oil companies but not national oil companies in those cases where futures price changes are identified as drivers the role of spot prices is either absent or weak the results are robust to several alternative specifications including controls for changes in rig productivity

determinants of opec production implications for opec behavior we estimate models that identify the economic and organizational determinants of crude oil production by individual opec nations to clarify the interpretation of econometric results we model production with specifications that resolve the statistical ordering of variables and estimate models with techniques that can cope with stochastic trends in the time series we also analyze the short run dynamics for asymmetries that may carry important insights about opec behavior results indicate that quotas are an important determinant of production and their effects generally are symmetric which implies that opec is an organization that influences production and ultimately prices real prices generally have a positive effect on production and the size of this effect may depend on spare capacity which implies that opec behaviors also embody competitive elements finally all nations other than saudi arabia show some form of production sharing behavior which may imply that opec shares mismatches between the call for opec production and opec quotas

the market power of opec 1973 2001 we apply a multi equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of opec as a whole or different sub groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973 2001 our results indicate that the producers outside opec can be described as competitive producers taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits the opec members do not fit the behaviour of price taking producers our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for opec underpin the potential market power of the producer group and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies on the other hand our findings indicate that neither opec nor different sub groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973 1994 however we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit opec core as from 1994 thus although opec clearly has affected the market price the producer g

tax policy can change the production path a model of optimal oil extraction in alaska we model the economically optimal dynamic oil production decisions for seven production units fields on alaska s north slope we use adjustment cost and discount rate to calibrate the model against historical production data and use the calibrated model to simulate the impact of tax policy on production rate we construct field specific cost functions from average cost data and an estimated inverse production function which incorporates engineering aspects of oil production into our economic modeling producers appear to have approximated dynamic optimality consistent with prior research we find that changing the tax rate alone does not change the economically optimal oil production path except for marginal fields that may cease production contrary to prior research we find that the structure of tax policy can be designed to affect the economically optimal production path but at a cost in net social benefit

do opec announcements influence oil prices abstract this paper investigates the effect of opec production decisions increase cut maintain on both wti and brent crude oil prices between q1 1991 and q1 2015 by employing the event study methodology and by using two indices as benchmarks bci and s p gsci we employ an egarch model to take into account the high volatility of oil prices and some stylized facts characterizing this volatility we find that the impact of opec s announcements on oil prices i evolves over time and among decisions ii is more significant for production cut and maintain iii is different for wti and brent prices and iv is sensitive to the benchmark index moreover opec s decisions depend on the exploration and extraction cost of more expensive unconventional oil resources

oil demand shocks reconsidered a cointegrated vector autoregression abstract we reconsider the conclusions about the importance of oil demand shocks and the unimportance of supply shocks reported by kilian 2009 we investigate whether the proxy for worldwide real economic activity dry bulk maritime freight costs represents anything more than transportation costs by analyzing the relation between these costs and oil prices the meaning of this variable is critical because transportation costs appear on both sides of the equations estimated by kilian directly as dry bulk maritime freight costs and as part of the measure for oil prices we also investigate the effects of representing oil supply with an aggregate of opec and non opec production because they likely use different criteria to chose output finally we investigate kilian s use of the first difference of supply while the other variables in his model are represented as levels the results suggest that opec and nonopec nations use different criteria to set output and that reductions increases in opec production raise lower oil prices the elements of the cointegrating relations their loadings and impulse response functions suggest that the positive relation between dry bulk maritime freight costs and oil prices simply represents the effect of higher oil prices on transportation costs sensitivity analyses suggest that these differences are caused by including transportation costs in the measure of oil prices aggregating opec and non opec productions and using a very long lag length to estimate the var together these results suggest that conclusions about the importance of demand shocks and the unimportance of supply shocks are not robust to alternative specifications that are consistent with many empirical findings about the world oil market

testing the hypothesis of collusive behavior among opec members abstract this paper presents a test to discriminate among collusive and competitive behavior by producers of exhaustible resources in contrast to previous studies griffin 1985 jones 1990 which are based on static models our approach is based on of the dynamic implications of the optimization problem faced by a competitive producer we use this framework to test the hypothesis of collusive behavior within opec between 1983 and 1991 the existence of future markets allows us to sidestep the difficult issues related to the estimation of future prices and demand

opec and other commodity cartels a comparison abstract the economic literature provides specific characteristics for cartels although the theory of international cartels is not well developed in the literature and every cartel is unique some of these characteristics exist in each cartel this study investigates the existence of these characteristics in six known commodity cartels including opec in addition it compares the oil companies cartel the seven sisters to opec and summarizes the findings of opec econometric models developed in the literature in the last 25 years and concludes that the results do not support cartel or competitive models for opec although other cartels are more successful than opec many books and articles in economics use opec as a cartel example neither statistical tests nor theory support the popular use of opec as a cartel example indeed this article concludes that opec is composed of saudi arabia the dominant world producer plus several distinct sub groups and that separate models are required to explain the behavior of each assigning the power of some opec members to opec has caused confusion about its behavior recent opec success is attributed to political natural and technical capacity limitations in the oil fields that prevented countries from cheating on their quota in other words opec adherence to the quota except for saudi arabia is anything but voluntary

the world price of coal a significant increase in the seaborne trade for coal over the past 20 years has unified formerly separate coal markets into a world market in which prices move in tandem by virtue of its large domestic market the usa has become the residual supplier and price setter in the world coal market changes in multifactor productivity have been the primary cause of the long term fluctuations in coal prices that have been observed in the usa since the end of the second world war and in the world coal market

dynamic corporate risk management motivations and real implications abstract we investigate the dynamics of corporate hedging programs used by us oil producers and examine the effects of hedging maturity choice on firm value we find evidence of a concave relationship between hedging maturity and the likelihood of financial distress and oil spot prices we further investigate the motivations of the early termination of outstanding hedging contracts using the essential heterogeneity approach we evaluate the causal effects of hedging maturity on firm value marginal firm value increases with short term hedging maturity the causal effects vary across oil producers with different hidden attributes

estimation of user s cost for a depletable resource such as oil abstract this paper presents an attempt to derive an empirically tractable definition of the user s cost for a depletable resource such as oil it is shown that in an intertemporal optimization framework the user s cost can be measured by the marginal replacement cost mrc of the resource defined as the cost of adding one unit to the stock of the resource this definition is applied to data for the middle east based on an econometric analysis of the proven reserves production process the user s cost is estimated for that area for the period 1960 76 the empirical results show that the user s cost is but a small fraction of the market price of crude oil for the period under consideration

the monetary model of the exchange rate long run relationships short run dynamics and how to beat a random walk abstract the monetary model is re examined for the sterling dollar exchange rate first it is demonstrated using a multivariate cointegration technique that an unrestricted monetary model is a valid framework for analyzing the long run exchange rate second we find once proper account has been taken of the short run data dynamics that an unrestricted monetary model outperforms the random walk and other models in an out of sample forecasting contest jel f31

opec s optimal crude oil price abstract in march 2000 opec decided to stabilise oil prices within a range of 22 28 us dollar barrel of crude oil such an oil price level is far beyond the short and long run marginal costs of oil production beyond even that in regions with particularly high costs nevertheless opec may achieve its goal if world demand for oil increases substantially in the future and oil resources outside the opec are not big enough to accordingly increase production in this case opec which controls about 78 of world oil reserves has to supply a large share of that demand increase if we assume opec will behave as a partial monopolist on the oil market which takes into consideration the reaction of the other producers to its own sales strategy it can reach its price target lower prices before 2020 are probable only if the opec cartel breaks up higher prices are possible if production outside opec is inelastic as assumed by some geologists but they would probably stimulate the production of unconventional oil based on oil sand or coal crude oil prices above 30 us dollar barrel are therefore probably not sustainable for a long period

identifying linear restrictions on the monetary exchange rate model and the uncovered interest parity cointegration evidence from the canadian u s dollar in this paper the long run validity of the monetary model for the canadian u s dollar is reexamined the time series properties of the variables are examined with the use of nonseasonal and seasonal unit root and stationarity tests and it is shown that they are i 1 processes with no seasonal effects two significant cointegration vectors are discovered using johansen s methodology but the system is found to be overidentified and hence the authors are unable to assign the monetary model with either vector parameter stability of johansen s results is tested using the recursive methodology developed by h hansen and s johansen 1993

the equilibrium price range of oil economics politics and uncertainty in the formation of oil prices abstract this paper attempts to clarify the articulation between economic and political factors in the formation of petroleum prices it begins with defining the political factors then it gives a definition of the dynamic equilibrium price of a mineral commodity market the essential point is that when actors control significant low cost reserves and will not or cannot adopt behaviour of a substantial economic rationality then the economic analysis does not allow a unique dynamic equilibrium price to be determined however it does permit definition of an equilibrium price range within which political preferences may be expressed finally the paper draws some conclusions on what could be discussed within the scope of a new oil producer consumer dialogue

will disruptions in opec oil supply have permanent impact on the global oil market abstract opec has long been a major stakeholder and strong player in the global energy market especially in the petroleum sub sector in recent time however there have been questions over the influence of opec in the sub sector due to changing petroleum production landscape specifically as a result of the discovery of unconventional energy resources in north america and emergence of non opec petroleum producing and exporting countries this development could have significant effect on the global energy market and the macro economy of opec member countries the stationarity or otherwise of opec oil production supply has important implications for determining whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect using the zivot andrews structural break stationarity test and production data of opec member countries from 1980 to 2011 this paper investigates whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect the empirical analysis shows that for only 5 opec members nigeria saudi arabia ecuador kuwait and uae is the hypothesis of unit root rejected this implies that for the five 5 opec members the effects of shocks to oil production are not permanent and future pattern of oil production can be predicted following past trend the practical implication of this finding is that opec production quota strategy may not have long term impact on the global oil market thus the cartel needs to improve oil production policy coordination among members and ensure strict adherence to production quota while also stressing the need for diversification in member countries

modeling opec behavior theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions abstract theories of opec such as price leadership cartel or game theoretic models suggest an incentive for opec members to expand their production capacity well above current levels in order to maximize revenues yet individual opec members consistently explore for and develop oil fields at a level well below their potential the cause of low oil exploration and development efforts among opec members and even some non opec members may have to do with risk aversion this paper describes an alternative theory for opec behavior based on risk aversion using a two piece non neumann morgenstern utility function similar to fishburn and kochenberger 1979 decision science 10 503 518 and friedman and savage 1948 journal of political economy 56 the model shows possible low oil production behavior

imperfect cartelization in opec a model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by opec countries we define a measure for the degree of cooperation analogous to the market conduct parameter of cyert et al 1973 geroski et al 1987 lofaro 1999 and symeonidis 2000 this parameter is used to assess the incentives of different opec members to collude we find that heterogeneity in opec and the supplies of the non opec fringe create strong incentives against collusion more specifically opec s supply strategy although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a cournot nash oligopoly is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel the strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers as if to bribe their participation in the cartel this is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas furthermore we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic this observation provides another structural explanation for why opec behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel our study points to multiple headwinds that limit opec s ability to mark up the oil price 2016 elsevier b v

on the determinants of corporate hedging finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes expected costs of financial distress or other agency costs this paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm s use of forwards futures swaps and options combined with computstat data on firm characteristics of 169 firms in the sample 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986 the data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions have less coverage of fixed claims are larger have more growth options in their investment opportunity set and employ fewer hedging substitutes