sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture we consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized we introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue bubbles up in the hierarchy the family is flexible enough to accommodate a no transfer rule where no revenue bubbles up and a full transfer rule where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization our benchmark model refers to the case of linear hierarchies but we also extend the analysis to the case in which hierarchies may convey a general tree structure and include joint ownerships

smart grid investments regulation and organization worldwide but in particular in north america and europe the grid infrastructure managers are facing demands for reinvestments in new assets with higher on grid and off grid functionality in order to promote energy efficiency and low carbon conversion of the energy sector to meet societal policy objectives in terms of carbon dioxide emissions both the composition of the generators in favor of distributed energy resources der and the load promoting integration with downstream energy useage will change in this paper we chararcterize some of the effects of new asset investments policy on the network tasks assets and costs and contrast this with the assumptions implicit or explicit in current economic network regulation the resulting challenge is identified as the change in the direction of higher asymmetry of information and higher capital intensity combined with ambiguities in terms of task separation to provide guidance we present a model of investment provision under regulation between a distribution system operator dso and a potential investor generation the results from the model confirm the hypothesis that network regulation should find a focal point should integrate externalities in the performance assessment and should avoid wide delegation of contracting billing for smart grid investments

the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

transaction taxes in a search model of the housing market abstract we incorporate transaction taxes in a housing market search model with endogeneous house prices and show that these taxes unambiguously create lock in effects that reduce welfare the lock in effects are larger at low vacancy rates seller taxes raise prices and buyer taxes lower them and this asymmetry helps to explain the differences in the welfare effects of the two taxes lock in effects are smaller with a buyer tax since the price reduction dampens the negative effect on search effort caused by the tax

the demand for monitoring technologies the case of trucking this paper examines the demand for on board computers in trucking distinguishing between their incentive and resource allocation improving capabilities i find that monitoring s incentive benefits are high when perquisite taking is attractive to drivers driver effort is important and verifying drivers actions to insurers is valuable these results are consistent with agency theory and suggest that networking applications will raise the productivity and pay of difficult toevaluate workers i also find that monitoring s benefits are disproportionately resource allocation related when managerial decisions are least constrained this suggests that networking applications monitoring capabilities raise the returns to delegation when resource allocation decisions are routine and lower them when they are not

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

toward an economic model of the japanese firm i owe a great deal to professor moses abramovitz who suggested that i write this article i appreciate his constant encouragement and guidance which aided me throughout its preparation i am also indebted to three anonymous referees of the journal and to professors ryutaro komiya and michael riordan for their critical comments and helpful suggestions needless to say i am solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper

decentralization hierarchies and incentives a mechanism design perspective separation of ownership from management multidivisional firm organizations delegation of production decisions to worker teams delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to retail franchisers reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance and distribution of regulatory authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate and distribute decision making authority instead of centralizing it this paper reviews literature on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination it starts by describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ one class of models pertain to contexts where the classical revelation principle applies i e where costs of contractual complexity information processing or communication are absent agents do not collude and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence of information and incentives sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be mitigated entirely include risk neutrality top down contracting and monitoring of transfers or production assignments between subordinates the next class of models introduces communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility which has to be traded off against possible control losses of delegation finally consequences of collusion among agents is discussed which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal second best outcomes the paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations where delegated decision making plays an important role adoption of innovative human resource management practices new information technologies and retail franchising

trading between agents for a better match this paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post i show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract this causes principals to offer agents piece rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece rates they would offer if trading was not allowed although trading reduces an agent s effort and could increase the agent s outside option of rejecting a principal s ex ante contract principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes

contract renegotiation a simple framework and implications for organization theory this paper provides a unifying framework for studying renegotiation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information we show that interim renegotiation does not constrain the set of contracts attainable with full commitment regardless of whether renegotiation offers are made by the informed or the uninformed agent ex post renegotiation however does constrain the set of attainable contracts these constraints depend on the identity of the agent making the renegotiation offer we then show how the theory of contract renegotiation can provide insights for organization theory specifically we show how decentralization of decision making can be an optimal response to the threat of ex post renegotiation finally we show that our framework can be used to analyse the trade off between internal and external markets

collusion delegation and supervision with soft information this paper derives an equivalence principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities we consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent s type in a centralized organization the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent however these two agents can collude against the principal in a decentralized organization the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub contracts with the agent we show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome we discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the e ciency of supervisory structures

personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony abstract we analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs when the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers leading to a posted price when demand is sufficiently concave convex this price is lower higher than the classical monopsony price in the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the classical monopsony price therefore our model provides a decentralized micro foundation for monopsony

noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality with a nonlocalized pollution externality different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement in the case of acid rain these groups are respectively consumers in the midwest and pollutees in the northeast these groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator we analyze a model in which the environmental protection agency acting as a von stackelberg leader regulates pollution and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives we characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium a nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies a relevant example is acid rain which is believed to be caused in part by coal fired electricity generating plants these emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity a number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in ohio will likely be borne in large part by ohio consumers and utilities while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the northeast and canada the control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator the environmental protection agency epa and the public utility commission the former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement the latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control one possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation the public utility commission for example has an interest in avoiding abate

control and contract design in research collaborations a complete contract perspective abstract incumbent firms especially in high tech industries often contract and collaborate with small research units on single projects a delicate resulting contracting decision thus is how to allocate control this paper considers the incumbent s problem to design a research contract that specifies the allocation of control the unit s research input and its monetary compensation contracting is complicated by the unit s private information about its technological skills research outputs also are not verifiable control affects the distribution of the private benefits from research and can be shared from a complete contract perspective an allocation of control that is contingent on the unit s reported information provides the incumbent an additional instrument for designing the incentives control can generate countervailing incentives and mitigate the limitations of contracts in research environments to the point of extracting the full surplus the analysis further clarifies when control is centralized by the incumbent when it is shared between the parties and when it is delegated to the unit

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

unobservables in consumer choice residential energy and the demand for comfort a model of consumption of residential energy in dwellings is developed distinguishing between attributes of housing that provide direct benefits to consumers and attributes that serve as inputs in the production of final goods for example the thermal comfort of dwellings empirical estimates are made of the mode based upon the annual housing survey and the results are used to calculate the effects of changes in energy prices on the consumption of housing residential energy and other goods the analysis suggests that the adjustment process within the housing market permits a great deal of substitution in response to energy price changes copyright 1989 by mit press

can the theory of incentives explain decentralization this survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision making within organizations based on private information and incentives renegotiation collusion and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal cet article presente dans un cadre unifie un survol de trois theories de la decentralisation de la prise de decision dans les organisations ces theories reposent sur la presence d information privee et des incitations qui en decoulent la renegociation la collusion et les limites a la communication representent trois conditions suffisantes pouvant expliquer l optimalite de la decentralisation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

does flattening government improve economic performance evidence from china this paper examines a causal relationship between the flattening of a government hierarchy and economic performance by exploiting a panel data set on government reorganization in china from 1995 to 2012 delayering has led to increases in revenue and inter governmental transfers for county governments but the associated enlarged span of control makes it difficult for upper level governments to coordinate and monitor local ones this has led to a reduction in county governments total public expenditure and pro growth expenditure as well as an increase in land corruption overall the flattening of the government hierarchy has a negative effect on economic performance

the quality and efficiency of public service delivery in the uk and china abstractthe quality and efficiency of public service delivery in the uk and china regional studies this paper examines the efficiency of public service delivery at a regional level in both the uk and china using a method based on data envelopment analysis dea that measures aggregate country level inefficiency this country level inefficiency is then decomposed into three components 1 lack of best practices at a regional level 2 quality of the public service delivery and 3 potential efficiency gains realizable via reallocation of expenditure across regions the empirical results indicate that most uk inefficiency comes from the reallocation effect while most chinese inefficiency is attributable to lack of best practices quality explains more of the expenditure variations in the uk relative to china the paper speculates about fiscal de centralization as a possible explanation for such differences

the firm as a communication network this paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information when these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm it is shown that efficient networks involve centralization that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items

on some agency costs of intermediated contracting abstract this paper identifies a new agency cost of intermediated contracting a non productive intermediary can extract some rents when a the productive agent has some private information and b the intermediary s sub contract with the productive agent is not directly controlled by the top principal we show that the intermediary s informational rent is an increasing and concave function of the productive agent s own informational rent

optimal design of peer review and self assessment schemes a principal must decide whether or not to implement a project that originated with one of her employees several employees have information about the quality of the project a successfully implemented project raises the inventor s chance of promotion at his peer s expense but a failed project ruins the inventor s career an employee who has a relatively good reputation and therefore is happy with the status quo must be encouraged to promote new ideas an employee who has a relatively bad reputation and therefore wants to change the status quo must be prevented from exaggerating the quality of new ideas we study incentive compatible and renegotiation proof mechanisms and we find that self assessment without any peer reports is optimal copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

decentralization and collusion abstract we consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project share information not available to the principal and can collude due to limited liability the coase theorem does not apply the distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard the optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way decentralization without using message games journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l14 l22

the organization of supplier networks effects of delegation and intermediation in a one principal two agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal s interest if the agents supply substitutes it can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

communication complexity and mechanism design the curse of the revelation principle is that it leads us to focus on unrealistic mechanisms in which agents report all private information to the principal who then makes all decisions centrally this is not true when communication costs are introduced in that case partial communication of information sequential back and forth conversations and decentralization of decisions become part of optimal mechanisms this paper looks at the interplay between the incentive constraints and the communication constraints when can they be separated so that for example one can separately study the incentive compatibility of a social choice rule and the minimum cost communication protocol that realizes the social choice rule jel d82 c72

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

delegation to encourage communication of problems we study a principal s choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems we find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent s actions or to provide stronger incentives delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high we find that increases in the principal s penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal s expected payoff owing to optimal organizational responses in addition catastrophic risk the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit or product may be greater under centralization than under delegation furthermore catastrophic risk can be increased by well intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by for example increasing the agent s penalties for failing to take a corrective action because the organizational structure may change