patents or prizes monopolistic r d and asymmetric information abstract in this paper a model of r d regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as r d incentive instruments when there is a technological leader using the case of full information as a benchmark it is found that the trade off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator s r d costs are private information whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation

increasing dominance with no efficiency effect abstract i uncover a new force towards increasing dominance the property whereby in dynamic games the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms the new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races i assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources i show that in equilibrium the laggard chooses a less promising path in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the leader this results in increasing dominance and holds true even if no joint payoff or efficiency effect is present journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 l1

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with network externalities in this article i explore the problem of sequential and irreversible technology choice in the presence of network externalities when the technologies stochastically evolve over time early potential users are shown to adopt an irreversible technology too early compared to the social optimum the effect of increasing the uncertainty of the technologies on an early potential user s decision is analyzed i find that the sponsor of new emerging technology might choose a research strategy that is too safe i also study the consequences of allowing side payments between generations of consumers and demonstrate that an ex post optimal standardization policy can impair ex ante social welfare

quality and competition in recent years the practitioner literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management it reflects the increased emphasis on quality by u s firms which has been attributed largely to increased competition faced by them the question of how quality is influenced by competitive intensity however has not received much attention either in the practitioner or the academic research literatures the notion of competitive intensity itself has not been defined precisely in this paper we develop formal models of oligopolistic competition to investigate whether equilibrium levels of quality increase as competition intensifies we consider three different competitive settings i asymmetric duopolistic competition where the dominant firm s intrinsic demand potential decreases ii a symmetric duopoly where the firms are precluded from cooperating in setting quality levels and iii symmetric oligopolistic competition where the number of firms increases we find that the relation between equilibrium quality and competitive intensity depends on what is understood by increased competition and in addition the relation is contingent on the values of parameters describing the cost and demand structure for the industry

innovation and communication signalling with partial disclosure this paper introduces a model of feedback effect equilibrium i e equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents this revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms patenting and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues this model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation

the effects of competition on the r d portfolios of multiproduct firms we investigate the r d portfolio choices of multiproduct firms when a firm increases cost reducing r d investment in a given product its rivals will modify their entire r d portfolios by reducing r d investments in that particular product and increasing r d investments in other competing products our analysis demonstrates that r d portfolios will be more specialized when firms face greater competition which will be the case if products become closer substitutes a monopolist begins to face competition from a rival firm or firms compete on price rather than quantity r d cooperation allows firms to internalize the negative externalities of their r d investments in two ways by reducing such investments across all products and by increasingly focusing their r d portfolios on different products firms may completely shut down a subset of their r d projects under r d cooperation if the products concerned are sufficiently close substitutes

the direction of innovation abstract how do innovation policies affect the direction of research is market based innovation too radical or too incremental we construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions that could have been discovered but were not policies which do not do so like patents and prizes may fail to encourage firms to research in the efficient direction even if they obtain the optimal quantity of r d

fear unemployment and pay flexibility the paper uses newly available cross section data to study wage determination in the united kingdom in the 1980s the main results are as follows 1 fear of unemployment substantially depresses pay 2 there is some evidence of a wage ratchet whereby rates of pay are more flexible upwards than downwards 3 the unemployment elasticity of pay averages 0 1 and 4 wages are much more flexible in nonunion workplaces than they are in union workplaces copyright 1991 by royal economic society

the case for permissive patents whatever its shortcomings in practice until very recently patent law has sought to embody the winner takes all principle this paper argues that it is both feasible and desirable to allow multiple prizes indeed it is possible that complete abolition of the patent system by raising the returns to late finishers would yield an improvement on the current situation

herd behavior the penguin effect and the suppression of informational diffusion an analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency this article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption process the analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision moreover herd behavior in this article stems from each agent s desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her rather than from each agent s effort to free ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors

patentability r d direction and cumulative innovation we present a model of cumulative innovation where firms can conduct r d in both a safe and a risky direction innovations in the risky direction produce quality improvements with higher expected sizes and variances as patentability standards rise an innovation in the risky direction is less likely to receive a patent that replaces the current technology which decreases the static incentive for new entrants to conduct risky r d but increases their dynamic incentive because of the longer duration and hence higher reward for incumbency these together with a strategic substitution and a market structure effect result in an inverted u shape in the risky direction but a u shape in the safe direction for the relationship between r d intensity and patentability standards there exists a patentability standard that induces the efficient innovation direction whereas r d is biased towards against the risky direction under lower higher standards the optimal patentability standard may distort the r d direction to increase the industry innovation rate that is socially deficient

how risky should an r d program be abstract this paper presents a two stage model describing the optimal choice of r d risk among r d programs with the same expected outcome it demonstrates that the choice of the highest risk r d program is a dominant strategy under bertrand or cournot competition

entrepreneurial innovations and taxation stimulating entrepreneurship is high on the policy agenda of many countries we study the effects of tax policies on entrepreneurs choice of riskiness or quality of an innovation project and on their mode of commercializing the innovation market entry versus sale limited loss offset provisions in the tax system induce entrepreneurs innovating for entry to choose projects with inefficiently little risk the same distortion does not arise when entrepreneurs sell their innovation in a competitive bidding process to an incumbent before the uncertainty is revealed tax systems which systematically favor market entry of entrepreneurs can thus lead to welfare losses due to inefficient quality choices despite leading to more competition in the product market

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

price and quality competition the effect of differentiation and vertical integration abstract this paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent internet market consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level therefore two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm we show an interesting result not seen in the well known bertrand price competition not only does the differentiation always increase the firms profits but also it can increase the consumer s welfare in a quality sensitive market we further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination purchase with a competitor s product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers

process and product innovation by a multiproduct monopolist a dynamic approach abstract we adopt a dynamic approach to model the behaviour of a multiproduct monopolist investing in process innovation and either product differentiation or product proliferation or both irrespective of the number of activities appearing in the r d portfolio we prove that depending on initial conditions there may exists substitutability between process innovation and either form of product innovation along the optimal path towards the steady state while in the latter only complementarity emerges looking at the threefold investment plan we qualitatively characterise the ranking of r d activities in terms of the consumer reservation price and the extent of the spectrum of varieties

a general model of r d competition and policy this article constructs a model of r d with heterogeneous firms each firm s probability of success is a function of its sunk and recurrent r d expenditures the social gains from an innovation are not fully captured by the successful firm the comparison of the social optimum and the market equilibrium involves balancing spillover and crowding effects pigovian corrective policies as well as strategic policies for a subset of colluding firms are discussed

on union preferences and labour market models insiders and outsiders this paper constructs a model of trade union behavior in which there is a distinction between insiders and outsiders this is used to examine one of the most troublesome issues in macroeconomic theory namely the extent to which a rise in aggregate demand might generate wage increases rather than growth in employment a generalization of the most widely used union utility function is presented the analysis reveals the conditions under which insiders will agree to let outsiders into employment derives two step wage preferences and proves a new result on wage rigidity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the simple economics of research portfolios this article identifies biases in market portfolios of parallel research projects arising from the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations occasioned by those circumstances where the market rewards only the winner and where the winner is awarded the entire social surplus it is shown that under risk neutrality this noncongruence implies that t he market encourages the development of too many discoveries too lar ge a spread in the distribution of the quality of discoveries and an excessive occurrence of multiple discoveries copyright 1987 by royal economic society

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

go for broke or play it safe dynamic competition with choice of variance we consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influence the variance but not the mean of the one dimensional state variable we show that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in stationary markov strategies me exists and has the property that patient players choose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind we also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ahead a situation that ensures a dominant player emerges quickly

overconfidence ceo selection and corporate governance we develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager who sometimes makes value destroying investments has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to ceo under value maximizing corporate governance moreover a risk averse ceo s overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion overconfident ceos also underinvest in information production the board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident ceos finally sarbanes oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors but to reduce project investment

intrafirm trade arm s length transfer pricing rule and coordination failure abstract this paper demonstrates that uniform imposition of the arm s length principle on transfer pricing leads to coordination failure among countries in terms of economic welfare if the countries trade products in the form of intrafirm transactions by multinational firms mnfs to highlight this implication we first show that imposition of the arm s length principle on an mnf induces it to transfer a product among subordinate divisions at marginal cost i e the competitive price which is consistent with the purpose of the principle nonetheless if regulators in each country impose the principle on mnfs all of the following economic welfare measures decrease compared with the situation where the principle is not imposed 1 consumer welfare in each of the trading countries 2 profit of each mnf and thus 3 total world economic welfare this result indicates that it is possible that enforcement of the principle has no positive effect at all in the world because economic welfare of all economic agents deteriorates when the principle is imposed a numerical analysis demonstrates that this possibility arises in a broad range of circumstances even including the situation where a giant economic world power and a small underdeveloped country mutually trade products in these circumstances an agreement among trading countries that no country imposes the arm s length principle may encourage pareto improvement of the world economy

market structure and the allocation of r d expenditures abstract it is shown that as the number of firms increases firms tend to allocate higher budgets for development relative to basic research this is in contrast to the results found in aghion and howitt aghion p howitt p 1996 research and development in the growth process jounal of economic growth 1 49 73

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

strategic differentiation and strategic emulation in games with uncertainty when players who choose a common strategy face a common shock while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks equilibrium choices exhibit differentiation respectively emulation when the sign of the cross partial derivative of the firms profit functions with respect to the realizations of the uncertain variables is negative respectively positive i consider a variety of applications including technology choice brand investments and r d races many of which can be characterized as two stage games in such games i demonstrate that differentiation is more likely to occur when the second stage game is a game of strategic substitutes

a dynamic model of union membership and employment that it recognizes some link between present wage and employment levels and future membership and that it has an interest in the level of membership attained we model membership decisions with stochastic demand and a differential layoff rate for union and non union workers membership dynamics are behavioural in that membership increases when the utility of being a member exceeds the utility of not being a member the model permits a variety of possible relationships between employment and membership in the adjustment to steady state

contractual externalities and systemic risk we study effort and risk taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations ape and rpe respectively to make individually optimal risk return trade offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables this results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when principals put too much weight on ape or rpe due to information frictions relative to the second best if the expected productivity is high risk averse principals over incentivize their own agents triggering a rat race in effort exertion resulting in over investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks the opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low inducing pro cyclical investment and risk taking behaviours

a note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms abstract this paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level therefore two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits the asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers loyalty to each firm that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers price and quality sensitivity in doing so we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition we show that in both the moderately quality sensitive and price sensitive markets higher consumers sensitivity as well as lower consumers loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition resulting in a decrease of both firms equilibrium profits on the other hand in highly quality sensitive market asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy in general this is more beneficial to the larger firm as the smaller firm s profit tends to decline in the worst case the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium

portfolio choice in research and development we analyze the effects of a winner take all patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competingfirms as well as on thefirms incentives to duplicate research projects nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a oneshot simultaneous move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances we show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion

patent races optimal with respect to entry we introduce a patent prize which induces entry at a level which satisfies the basic condition of optimality with respect to the size of the race a second best patent we observe that for the lee wilde model of a patent race the second best prize induces approximately the socially optimal first best outcome the approach of the second best patent provides one explanation for why discoverers should only receive a fraction of the ex post social value of their discovery

rivals search for buried treasure competition and duplication in r d we model an r d race in which each fi rm decides in each period between two research projects only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which there is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search if the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects if neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs in which case there is a bias toward the high cost project or asymmetric success probabilities in which case too little duplication is possible if one firm is informed it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent

the employment real wage relationship an international study the neoclassical and keynesian theories of employment both predict an inverse relationship between employment and real wages in the short run the observed correlation between employment and real wages however has usually failed to conform to this prediction dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 reported a positive correlation between real and money wages which given procyclical movement of money wages was interpreted as evidence against the theoretical prediction the statistical significance of these results was however challenged by ruggles 1940 and tobin 1948 more recent studies by kuh 1966 and bodkin 1969 failed to detect a significant relationship between real wages and employment these findings stimulated a series of contributions by solow and stiglitz 1968 barro and grossman 1971 1976 and others developing alternative models not apparently refuted by the evidence barro and grossman recast macro theory under the assumption that markets did not clear modigliani 1977 argued that the observed relationship between employment and real wages could be accounted for in an oligopolistic model of firm behavior thus both the competitive and equilibrium assumptions of the classical model were diagnosed as the sources of its apparent empirical refutation

do trade unions reduce job opportunities of non members this paper examines the structure of the optimal contract that would be chosen by a self interested trade union that represents the interests of some set of m members when it is assumed that there exists a pool of unemployed workers outside the union whose opportunity cost of working is such that they would at least in some states of demand have been employed in a competitive labor market the authors compare wage and employment levels under such a contract with those that would be observed in competitive markets in particular focusing on the impact of the union on the employment opportunities and welfare of non union members copyright 1989 by royal economic society

risk taking in selection contests abstract we study contests where the strategic variable is the degree of risk taking rather than the amount of effort the selection efficiency of such contests is examined we show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways by having a small number of contestants and by restricting contestant quality

r d portfolio and market structure this article analyses how firms allocate their resources when they compete for multiple patents in heterogeneous research projects simultaneously a simple model shows that firms resource allocation is biased away from risky and basic research even when imitation is not possible and firms are fully rational therefore a market may lack major innovations despite large aggregate research expenditure and strong patent protection this article also shows that as a market becomes more competitive firms invest relatively less in basic research but more in risky research these results provide a novel explanation for an ambiguous empirical relationship between innovation and market concentration

bias in market r d portfolios abstract based on a simple contest model of product innovation we find that in accordance with conventional wisdom and contrary to much of the previous theoretical literature market competition implies an equilibrium level of risk which is too low from society s standpoint the intuition is that the divergence between private and social marginal benefits from rd and this probability is higher for lower risk projects

trade unions and seniority employment rules abstract some but not all trade union and insider outsider models assume that a seniority employment rule is used we investigate when firm and union members gain from such a rule and the consequences of their adopting one generally providing a seniority wage scale is also used they gain if union membership is not too large relative to demand and union bargaining power not too great moreover when outsiders are hired under a seniority employment rule employment is at the competitive level these results might explain why bargaining over employment is relatively uncommon and typically occurs only in industries with declining employment

the effects of sensitization and habituation in durable goods markets abstract we develop a model to study the impact of changes in price sensitivity on the firm as it introduces multiple generations of a durable product where unit costs are a convex function of quality we incorporate the psychological processes of sensitization and habituation into a model of discretionary purchasing of replacement products motivated by past experience when price sensitivity decreases with each purchase sensitization the myopic firm offers a higher quality product at a much higher price with each generation when price sensitivity increases with each purchase habituation the myopic firm engages in price skimming when sensitization is followed by habituation the myopic firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is willing to pay for leading to a steep drop off in sales and profits the actions of the forward looking firm depend on the discount rate a firm with a low discount rate builds its customer base before offering a higher quality and higher priced product in contrast a firm with a high discount rate quickly increases price and quality following the same path to falling profits of the myopic firm these results provide insight into the firm and consumer behaviors underlying the phenomenon of performance oversupply identified in the innovation literature

and the winner is acquired entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations new entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations we provide a new explanation for this phenomenon based on markets for technology it applies in industries where successful entrepreneurial firms or their technologies are acquired by incumbents that then commercialize the innovation to this end we analyze an innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants in the first stage firms compete to develop innovations of high quality they do so by choosing at equal cost the success probability of their rd the bigger the number of entrants the more radical the most radical project generally entrants tend to choose more radical r d approaches and generate the highest value innovation in case of success we illustrate our theoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the electronic design automation industry and derive implications for research and management

market incumbency and technological inertia this paper uses a case study and a simple mathematical model to study the link between the incumbency and incentives to innovate and introduce drastically new products it identifies the conditions under which fears of self cannibalization are particularly likely to lead incumbents to soft pedal such innovations

the role of knowledge in r d efficiency past research has recognized that both demand and capability influence the allocation of r d resources scholars have had an easier time getting a grip on demand than on capability while it has been recognized that knowledge is an important part of capability to date formalization of knowledge and its role in r d activity has been unsatisfactory this paper models the role of knowledge in r d various sources of such knowledge are considered the model throws a different light on analyses that employ a knowledge capital stock and also illuminates the dual private and public nature of technological knowledge

cooperative interconnection settlement among isps through nap abstract this paper studies the settlement problem among internet service providers isps who interconnect with each other through network access point nap a cooperative game framework is adopted for the analysis two commonly adopted allocations i e the non settlement profit allocation and the shapley value based profit allocation are analyzed and compared we check whether these two allocations can encourage isps to interconnect with each other i e in the core of the game and at the same time demonstrate fairness in settlement our results show that the non settlement allocation is not in the core and does not preserve fairness and the shapley value based profit allocation is in the core and demonstrates fairness however the complex structure of shapley value makes it difficult to understand for isps and hard to be implemented at nap especially when isps can only make their pricing decisions independently therefore we propose a characterized profit allocation cpa which is in the core preserves fairness and is easy to interpret we further propose a settlement rule based on cpa which enables the isps to act independently but achieve global optimality we also extend our basic model to incorporate interconnection quality decisions and market competition and show that the proposed settlement rule and its extended form work well in these scenarios numerical experiments confirm that cpa and its corresponding settlement rule can effectively encourage interconnection among isps and motivate isps to expand their networks

is the market biased against risky r d this article analyzes the riskiness of the r d strategies chosen by firms engaged in a winner takes all patent race in contradiction to dasgupta and stiglitz 1980 we show that when the distribution of invention times is symmetric the market equilibrium cannot be safer and may be riskier than is socially optimal we identify the economic reason for the emergence but only if there are few competitors