business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms abstract we investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller more informationally opaque riskier and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions the improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability and depends on the sharing of firms payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office the value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office furthermore in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength

the supply and demand side impacts of credit market information abstract we utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes a guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it one year later we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender this pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game the credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones increasing economic differentiation

semi autonomous planning using linear programming in the chilean general treasury abstract the chilean general treasury is the governmental institution that among other functions is in charge of collecting debts from taxes credits and fees until now the central office in santiago has performed the planning which has caused inefficiencies due to the lack of knowledge of the local realities of 35 offices across the country in order to allow for more independence and yet not lose control we develop a system in a spreadsheet that allows each office to perform its own planning the system consists of a multi period linear program that considers a combination of parameters that depend on each region the primal optimal variables provide the production goals for each period that allow an objective performance appraisal while the dual variables allow comparing the marginal benefit of allocating additional resources to the different offices

depreciation of housing an empirical consideration of the filtering hypothesis a ssumptions regarding the depreciation ax rate for housing play an important role in the urban economics literature 1 the notion that houses filter down from higher to lower quality is prevalent in both academic and policy discussions of the nature of urban problems yet there has been no attempt to specify which depreciation rates are appropriate to these discussions and little empirical investigation of depreciation in housing this paper presents estimates of depreciation rates for housing which are appropriate to consideration of the filtering hypothesis estimates of these depreciation rates must be pursued differently from estimates of the depreciation rates for the aggregate capital stock of housing a brief review of previous studies which points out some of the difficulties which confound observation of depreciation rates is presented in section i section ii discusses specification and section iii describes the data and estimation technique used results are presented in section iv section v is a brief conclusion

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

filtering city change and the supply of low priced housing in canada this paper examines the filtering process and shows the extent of the forces that are gentrifying canadian cities the 1996 census micro data are used to develop rent and price age profiles of dwe

can good governance lower bank intermediation costs this paper argues that better governance practices can reduce the costs risks and uncertainty of financial intermediation our sample covers 100 high middle and low income countries during 1996

sharing default information as a borrower discipline device abstract creditors often share information about their customers credit records besides helping them to spot bad risks this acts as a disciplinary device if creditors are known to inform one another of defaults borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders this increases their incentive to perform however sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect borrowers incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information in some instances by fine tuning the type and accuracy of the information shared lenders can raise borrowers incentives to their first best level

residential hedonic models a rational expectations approach to age effects abstract this paper develops a rational expectations framework for interpreting the coefficient on age in a standard hedonic model the model demonstrates that there are two components to the age coefficient a pure cross sectional depreciation component and a demand side component that changes over time we also show that a constant quality price index with age constant can be estimated by using any repeat sales database that contains the year of construction or property age when fairfax county data are fitted to the model the time series of age coefficients is non stationary they change from negative in the early 1980s to positive in the late 1980s we infer that the demand side component dominated in the latter period

bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure evidence from surveys of commercial lending abstract this paper seeks to test two tenets that underlie the current practice of antitrust analysis in banking the first is the view that bank commercial loan markets are local in nature and the second is the view that banks in more concentrated markets are more likely to engage in some form of noncompetitive behavior tests of both of these tenets are conducted using an extensive set of loan specific survey information not previously employed to address these issues results consistent with the existence of local banking markets and the dominance of competitive differences as an explanation for observed differences in loan rates are found

are private markets and filtering a viable source of low income housing estimates from a repeat income model while filtering has long been considered the primary mechanism by which markets supply low income housing direct estimates of that process have been absent this has contributed to doubts about the viability of markets and to misplaced policy i fill this gap by estimating a repeat income model using 1985 2011 panel data real annual filtering rates are faster for rental housing 2 5 percent than owner occupied 0 5 percent vary inversely with the income elasticity of demand and house price inflation and are sensitive to tenure transitions as homes age for most locations filtering is robust which lends support for housing voucher programs jel r21 r31 r38

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

signal jamming in new credit markets this paper develops a simple two period model in which a lender s credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers repayment capabilities this information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

asymmetric information and the structure of the banking industry abstract we analyze the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi period model of spatial competition in the process of lending incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients acquiring an advantage over potential entrants we show that these informational asymmetries are important determinants of the industry structure and of banks strategic behavior contrary to traditional models of horizontal differentiation the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of exogenous fixed costs in addition less concentrated industry structures may be associated with higher interest rates

measures of effectiveness for governmental organizations for organizations whose objective is not necessarily the maximization of a financial quantity there is little written in the economics and management literature about methods that quantify their effectiveness potential users of such methodologies are typically governmental organizations and agencies to whom congress allocates funding periodically but may also include many nonprofit organizations such research is importantly needed because government is no longer making outlay allocations on a merely historical basis but is using as a criterion how effectively an organization uses its resources in meeting its objectives in this paper we analyze the maritime safety program of the u s coast guard uscg which is responsible for monitoring the quality of vessels that sail in u s waters and present measures of effectiveness moes for the program we do this at two levels of activity at an overall program level level i and at a component activity level level ii poisson models are used to construct the moes using data on maritime casualties accidents between 1990 1993 from the real time marine safety management system msms database maintained by the coast guard a feature of the empirical methodology is the bayesian imputation of missing data the moes constructed here have at least four important uses first as the name suggests they perform the function that financial quantities such as returns on equity or returns on sales perform for private sector organizations that is they are indicators of efficiency second they can be used as inputs into allocative decisions within the organization for example the level ii moes can be used as inputs into a programming problem that determines the optimal allocation of resources among component activities third internal performance evaluation across uscg programs or across port units called marine safety offices can be based on their respective level i moes fourth and possibly the most important long run consideration moes provide the basis for better regulation by the government without moes the nature of regulation is probably suboptimal by adopting these moes as criteria it will be easier for the government to redesign those aspects of its regulation of the coast guard which curtail incentives

old homes externalities and poor neighborhoods a model of urban decline and renewal abstract this paper investigates urban decline and renewal in the united states using three panels that follow neighborhoods on a geographically consistent basis over extended periods of time findings indicate that change in neighborhood economic status is common averaging roughly 13 percent per decade roughly two thirds of neighborhoods studied in 1950 were of quite different economic status fifty years later panel unit root tests for 35 msas indicate that neighborhood economic status is a stationary process consistent with long running cycles of decline and renewal in philadelphia county a complete cycle appears to last up to 100 years aging housing stocks and redevelopment contribute to these patterns as do local externalities associated with social interactions lower income neighborhoods appear to be especially sensitive to the presence of individuals that provide social capital many of the factors that drive change at the local level have large and policy relevant effects

does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article publisher s version available at http dx doi org 10 1016 j jbankfin 2014 02 010

information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching abstract we analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition in the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition since the poaching activities can be targeted towards more creditworthy borrowers we find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits and therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets

career concerns matching and optimal disclosure policy raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers quality when workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency long term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive the optimal short term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained these conditions are not only sufficient but also almost necessary for full disclosure partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed

of religion and redemption evidence from default on islamic loans we compare default rates on conventional and islamic loans using a comprehensive monthly dataset from pakistan that follows more than 150 000 loans over the period 2006 04 to 2008 12 we find robust evidence that the default rate on islamic loans is less than half the default rate on conventional loans islamic loans are less likely to default during ramadan and in big cities if the share of votes to religious political parties increases suggesting that religion either through individual piousness or network effects may play a role in determining loan default

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

on the utilization of resources perspectives from the u s telecommunications industry the issue of resource utilization is important in the resource based stream of work since the ability of firms to utilize resources is a key indicator of their competitive abilities this paper specifies why some firms might be better at utilizing resources than others thereafter it demonstrates how to empirically ascertain differences in resource utilization patterns between firms using the u s telecommunications industry as a context the data envelopment analysis procedure dea which is a firm level resource utilization measure is used this procedure can be useful for the resource based approach research agenda since performance is measured in resource terms dea is applied to measure variations in different dimensions of resource utilization for the firms making up the local operating sector of the telecommunications industry the use of dea to guide empirical research and address theoretical issues within the resource based paradigm is illustrated using the resource utilization index for the telecommunications firms as the measure of strategic performance 1998 john wiley sons ltd

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

the value of private sector business credit information sharing the us case this paper investigates the value added by private information exchanges that share information on business payment performance we discuss how this information is collected and disseminated by the worlds largest private information broker dun bradstreet we provide the first empirical examination of the importance of this information at the lending decision level our findings indicate that exchange generated information provides significant explanatory power in failure prediction models controlling for other credit information that is easily available to lenders our study complements the work of jappelli and pagano information sharing lending and defaults cross country evidence centre for economic policy research discussion paper 2184 1999 who find in cross country macro level tests that information exchanges add value 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the number and the closeness of bank relationships abstract we analyze a firm s optimal choice over the number of creditors and the extent of information disclosed to them by dealing with many creditors and disclosing essential confidential information a firm can keep its cost of credit low this however is associated with a relatively high probability that valuable information leaks to competitors leading to lower expected net returns from product market operations the importance of these two countervailing effects varies with size time industry and the form of the financial sector which yields a number of empirically testable hypotheses

what happens when we forget the effect of removing adverse information on access to credit in a world with asymmetric information past information helps borrowers establish reputation and credibility however can less information be beneficial using a panel of nationally representative sample of borrowers credit bureau information we investigate the impact of the removal of adverse credit information for long time delinquent borrowers in thailand on their access to credit the removal is a deliberated effort by policymakers to allow borrowers to reenter formal credit markets contrary to theoretical prediction we find no evidence of a subsequent expansion in credit

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption