mathematical structure of a bilevel strategic pricing model abstract this paper is concerned with the characterization of optimal strategies for a service firm acting in an oligopolistic environment the decision problem is formulated as a leader follower game played on a transportation network where the leader firm selects a revenue maximizing price schedule that takes explicitly into account the rational behavior of the customers in the context of our analysis the follower s problem is associated with a competitive network market involving non atomic customer groups the resulting bilevel model can therefore be viewed as a model of product differentiation subject to structural network constraints

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

agency conflict and corporate strategy the effect of divestment on corporate value among the various stakeholders of a firm senior managers are the most likely targets for private and public political pressures other stakeholder groups are less visible and may be perceived as less influential in corporate strategy formulation and implementation in some situations consequently senior executives may adopt corporate strategies in response to political pressures even if these strategies may be costly to shareholders in this study a special case is examined the effect of divestment of south african business units on firm value using data from 1984 through 1990 we examine the impact that announcements of divestments have upon the stock return behavior of publicly traded firms our results indicate that significant and negative excess returns accrue to shares of companies announcing divestments of south african operations these results are supportive of the premise that noneconomic pressures may influence managerial strategies rather than value enhancement goals 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

corporate environmental responsibility this paper offers directions for the continuing dialogue between business ethicists and environmental philosophers i argue that a theory of corporate social responsibility must be consistent with if not derived from a model of sustainable economics rather than the prevailing neoclassical model of market economics i use environmental examples to critique both classical and neoclassical models of corporate social responsibility and sketch the alternative model of sustainable development after describing some implications of this model at the level of individual firms and industries i offer an ethical justification of the sustainability alternative that is derived from the same values that underlie traditional market economics

leadership by example in the weak link game we investigate the effects of leadership in a four player weak link game a weak link game is a coordination game with multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria we wanted to see whether leadership by example in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group could help groups do better our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success specifically in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders we did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned

an empirical examination of institutional investor preferences for corporate social performance this study investigates the pattern of institutional shareholding in the u k and its relationship with socially responsible behavior by companies within a sample of over 500 uk companies we estimate a set of ownership models that distinguish between long and short term investors and their largest components and which incorporate both aggregated and disaggregated measures of corporate social performance csp the results suggest that long term institutional investment is positively related to csp providing further support for earlier studies by johnson and greening 1999 academy of management journal 42 564 576 and graves and waddock 1994 academy of management journal 37 1034 1046 disaggregation of csp into its constituent components suggests that the pattern of institutional investment is also related to the form which csp takes investigation of the impact of investment screens on the selection of stocks suggests that long term institutional investors select primarily through exclusion rejecting those firms which have the worst csp

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

quality and competition between public and private firms abstract we study a multistage quality then price game between a public firm and a private firm the market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations the public firm aims to maximize social surplus whereas the private firm maximizes profit in the first stage both firms simultaneously choose qualities in the second stage both firms simultaneously choose prices consumers quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution each firm s unit production cost is an increasing and convex function of quality there are multiple equilibria in some the public firm chooses a low quality and the private firm chooses a high quality in others the opposite is true we characterize subgame perfect equilibria equilibrium qualities are often inefficient but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution equilibrium qualities are first best various policy implications are drawn

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

product differentiation cost reducing mergers and consumer welfare cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two firm merger and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post merger market we show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre merger empirical estimates indeed we further show that in such markets two firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger s cost savings jel classifica tion l10 l41 differentiation des produits fusions pour reduire les couts et bien etre du consommateur les synergies de couts sont une justification explicitement reconnue pour la fusion de deux firmes et il existe des techniques empiriques vastement utilisees pour mesurer l impact des fusions visant areduire les couts sur les prix et le niveau de bien etre dans le marcheapres la fusion on montre que si la fusion se produit dans un marchede produit differencieintegreverticalement alors la fusion reduit l even tail de produits ce qui limite l utilitedes estimations empiriques faites avant la fusion de plus on montre que dans de tels marches les fusions de deux firmes finissent par engendrer des prix plus eleves quelles que soient les reductions de couts auxquelles on en arrive

an evolutionary interpretation of van huyck battalio and beil s experimental results on coordination this paper proposes an adaptive interpretation of the results of some recent experiments with repeated tacit coordination games these experiments revealed several behavioral regularities including a systematic discrimination between strict nash equilibria in certain games that appear to be driven by strategic uncertainty and are not explained by traditional equilibrium refinements the observed patterns of discrimination correspond closely to predictions based on maynard smith s notion of evolutionary stability an adaptive model in the spirit of the evolutionary dynamics but recognizing the important differences between learning in human populations and evolution promises to yield a unified explanation of the results journal of economic literature classification numbers 020 026

market segmentation and non uniform shariah standards in islamic finance abstract this paper proposes a new answer to a controversial paradox in islamic finance described by el gamal 2002 despite the long development of uniform standards for islamic finance the market remains largely segmented we explain market segmentation as a separating equilibrium in which finance premiums serve as a socially beneficial although costly signaling mechanism market segmentation under a uniform standard of shariah compliance occurs when the shariah boards of two islamic finance institutions ifis use different degrees of stringency even though they agree on a common set of minimum requirements to comply with shariah law heterogeneous degrees of stringency chosen by different ifi shariah boards translate into different premiums paid by different customers one ifi targets the moderately pious consumer segment while the other targets the highly pious segment the ifi that targets highly pious consumers voluntarily offers a more limited set of investments and financing products by allowing for multiple muslim communities with distinct group identities and correspondingly variable willingness to pay to signal piety types the model provides an explanation for market segmentation

corporate social responsibility ownership structure and political interference evidence from china prior research suggests that ownership structure is associated to corporate social responsibility csr in developed countries this article examines whether and how ownership structure affects csr in emerging markets using chinese firms social responsibility ranking our empirical evidences show that for non state owned firms corporate ownership dispersion is positively associated to csr however for state owned firms whose controlling shareholder is the state this relation is reversed we attribute the reversed relationship to political interferences and further test this hypothesis by demonstrating that regional economic development is negatively related to csr for state owned firms due to decreased political interference in more developed areas this study is the first to directly examine the relationship between the dispersion of corporate ownership and csr in emerging markets and our results depict that it is important to consider ownership type in assessing csr in emerging market where state ownership is still prevalent such as china the results also reveal that firm size profitability employee power leverage and growth opportunity affect csr in china

does ownership always matter abstract the objective of this paper is to explain and illustrate the complex relationship between ownership arrangements and enterprise performance it is commonly argued that efficiency will be lower in the public sector than the private because enterprise objectives deviate from maximisation of profits and because monitoring arrangements are inadequate due to the absence of capital market discipline we argue that public ownership does make the owner manager relationship more complicated because the chain of principals and agents is expanded objectives are politically determined and these are conveyed by a policy making administrative structure to management but the relative efficiency of public as against private ownership actually depends on the efficacy of capital market monitoring on the political and constitutional system on the information and sanctions available to policy makers and on the nature of the management market variation in these factors can help to explain the different natures and roles of the public sector between countries

coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players we study a class of large group noncooperative iterated market entry games with complete information binary choices and asymmetric players in which the incentive of each player to enter the market decreases the larger the number of entrants experimental results from two different studies show remarkable coordination on the aggregate level which is accounted for successfully by the nash equilibrium solution the equilibrium solution is less successful in accounting for the differences among types of players with differential entry costs or differences among players of the same type rather the behavioral patterns observed on the aggregate level are accounted for by a reinforcement based learning model postulating an initial distribution of individual cutoff points these cutoff points are assumed to change over time at a decreasing rate as a joint function of the decision and outcome of the preceding period journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d5 d8 2002 elsevier science usa

competition of newspapers and the location of political parties in this paper we suggest a model for an analysis of how newspapers and political parties determine their ideological orientation and how both decisions depend on each other quite naturally dissemination of information plays an important role the model is set up as a two stage game because elements of horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation are present in this model location patterns in ideology space exhibit in general neither maximal nor minimal differentiation although we keep quite close to the downs model with information as the most important distinguishing feature furthermore the model shows by way of example that economic theory can be a useful tool to investigate issues which are central to communication science

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

a public and private choice model of broadcasting this paper has established a framework for the analysis of program diversity and audience shares under different regimes of ownership regulation and channel quality the model is one of comparative statics and lends itself to analytical solutions it can serve as a tool to clarify programming decision making and the impact of various institutional arrangements the audience maximization of commercial broadcasting leads to program quality similar to that of a direct democratic process to create a bias towards quality alternative mechanisms had to be introduced that together with the potential for the propaganda use of broadcasting and the potentially large rents of controlling a scarce channel made questions of broadcast policy extraordinarily hard fought especially in european countries however the emergence of alternative distribution channels and payment mechanisms has moved television programs much more into the mainstream of economic transactions in consequence the need to use the political arena to assure the supply of certain programs has declined the marginal losses to incumbent channels has successively decreased and the propaganda reach has been reduced by the spread of programs over the distribution therefore liberalization is less resisted because the stakes have become lower

a critique on the theory of financial intermediation abstract this comment discusses the review by franklin allen and anthony santomero of the theory of financial intermediation in the 20th anniversary special issue of the journal of banking and finance we do not fully agree with their view that risk management is only of recent importance to the financial industry and with putting central the concept of participation costs we suggest how the theory of financial intermediation might be developed further in order to understand present day phenomena in the financial services sector

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

state enterprise relation local economic priority and corporate environmental responsibility this paper empirically investigates how the state enterprise relation and local government s economic priority affect corporate environmental responsibility in a sample of chinese polluting enterpr

do lenders value corporate social responsibility evidence from china drawing on risk mitigation theory this article examines whether the improvement of firms social performance reduces debt financing costs cdfs in china the world s largest emerging market employing both the ordinary least square ols and the two stage instrumental variable regression methods we find that improved corporate social responsibility csr reduces the cdf when firms csr investment is lower than an optimal level however this relationship is reversed after the csr investment exceeds the optimal level firms with extremely low or extremely high csr are subject to a higher cdf the results also suggest that the optimal csr level for small firms is higher than that for large firms this study is the first to document a u shaped relationship between csr and cdf and also the first to investigate this relationship within an emerging market context

social surplus and profitability under different spatial pricing policies one of the most controversial parts of the u s antitrust laws is the robinson patman act posner has argued it should be discarded entirely 34 bork has called it the misshapen progeny of intolerable draughtsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory 10 382 the robinson patman act is an amendment passed in 1936 to section 2 of the clayton act in the words of its co sponsor its purpose was to prevent discrimination between competing customers of a seller so that any price differentials should be limited to the sound economic differences in costs 33 5 because of its concern with price discrimination it is the robinson patman act that is relevant to the spatial pricing policies of firms however the precise limitations the law imposes on spatial prices are not exactly well defined one point is relatively clear that no question of unlawful price discrimination would arise so long as the f o b price is 1 uniform and 2 available to all customers on a nondiscriminatory basis no legal requirement exists that the alternative f o b price be of any particular amount or computed in any particular way 85 f t c 1174 1176 1 49 while f o b mill pricing is legally unassailable the legal status of uniform delivered pricing where firms charge the same price at all points of sale is somewhat ambivalent see dunn 16 for a discussion what is certain is that firms charging neither mill nor uniform prices may be open to successful prosecution especially if they set price schedules which have bumpdip changes for example in the utah pie case see breit and elzinga 12 for more details firms were found guilty of price discrimination since their delivered prices were lower in the local utah market than at points closer to their plants

learning information and sorting in market entry games theory and evidence previous data from experiments on market entry games n player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure nash equilibria here we show that in this class of game learning theory predicts sorting that is in the long run agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the market and some permanently out we conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions than in previous work in order to test this prediction we find that when subjects are given minimal information only after close to 100 periods do subjects begin to approach equilibrium in contrast with full information subjects learn to play a pure strategy equilibrium relatively quickly however the information which permits rapid convergence revelation of the individual play of all opponents

the gains from merger or collusion in product differentiated industries a merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the market power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes such a merger makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper by shifting each in the direction of the industry demand curve 2 the extent of this increase in market power depends upon the own elasticity of demand for each merging firm s product as well as the cross elasticity of demand for each with all other firms products as a result evaluating the effect of a merger between two firms with n 2 other competitors would seem to require the estimation of at least n2 parameters all of the price elasticities of demand a formidable task that extremely difficult estimation task is unnecessary however the necessary information is contained in the slopes of the two single firm residual demand curves before the merger and the extent to which the merged firm will face a steeper demand curve for example suppose a merger between two u s brewing firms say pabst and anheuser busch were proposed it is not particularly important to determine whether it is competition from miller or competition from stroh or from heileman or which puts the most effective brake on anheuser busch s pricing only the total effect of these other firms and the particular effect of competition from pabst are of interest this paper proposes econometric procedures for estimating the demand system that merger partners will face based only on pre merger data the key to the procedures is that the effects of all other firms in the industry are summed together formally we start with a model of an n firm product differentiated industry manipulation of the model removes the prices and quantities of all but two firms this reduces the dimensionality of the problem to manageable size rather than an n firm demand system we estimate a two firm residual demand system in this way the technique extends our econometric method for

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

the only game in town stock price consequences of local bias abstract theory suggests that in the presence of local bias the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region using data on u s states and census regions we find clear cut support for this proposition most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita regions with low population density e g the deep south are home to relatively few firms per capita which leads to higher stock prices via an only game in town effect

vertical product differentiation with entry abstract this paper examines the non cooperative behaviour of established firms that compete in product quality and prices while foreseeing the effects of their rivalry on the decisions made by the later entrants we prove an existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and show that the dominant firms engage in maximal product differentiation i e select the highest and lowest technologically feasible qualities later entrant however always selects an intermediate quality moreover we show that the equilibrium configuration is identical to that generated by perfect foresight equilibrium in a model of sequential entry furthermore the profits earned by each firm are ranked in the same order as the qualities implifying that the later entrant despite being the last mover ends up with higher profits and larger market share than one of the incumbents

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

market efficiency with combinable products abstract we allow consumers to combine products to obtain a mix of their characteristics we show there is a unique sub game perfect equilibrium in a product location price game such that all consumers are able to attain their desired product mix this solution is the socially optimal one in stark contrast to location models where combinability is debarred by assumption

the m form hierarchy and china s economic reform for 13 years from 1979 to 1991 economic reforms in china have generated a significant growth its gnp grew at an average annual rate of 8 7 or at 7 37 for per capita gnp 1 the chinese economic performance is in contrast to that of eastern europe and the former ussr the average growth rate of gdp in hungary was 1 8 between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989 in poland the average gdp growth rate was less than 2 between 1981 and 1989 from both theoretical and policy perspectives china s outstanding reform performances and associated differ ent reform strategies from those of eastern europe and the ussr are particularly interesting and puzzling there are two popular views in explaining the differences between china and eastern europe the first view states that china was at a much lower development stage than eastern europe and the ussr 3 the second view argues that china has followed a gradual and piecemeal approach as

innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation abstract this paper analyzes the strategic decisions of two identical duopolists who determine both the timing and the quality of their innovation through their research and development activities the product market is vertically differentiated and the firms choose the prices of their innovations in bertrand competition the firms interact in a two stage non cooperative game where they first decide on the quality and innovation date and then choose the prices in the second stage appropriately the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies is analyzed it is shown that the firms have an incentive to form a research joint venture and to share their research know how even when research results are certain and there are no spillover effects and that cooperation is not socially desirable

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

expert information and majority decisions this paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double edged sword for collective decision making we present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members in theory there are bayesian nash equilibria where the committee members voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision however there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information in the laboratory the majority decisions and the subjects voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria we found a large efficiency loss due to t he presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large we suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

morals or economics institutional investor preferences for corporate social responsibility this article presents the results of a study that analysed whether social responsibility had any bearing on the decision making of institutional investors being that institutional investors prefer socially aligned organizations this study explored to what extent the corporate actions and or social environmental investments influenced their decisions our results suggest that there are specific variables that affect the perceived value of the organization leading to decisions to not only invest but whether to hold or sell the shares and therefore having a consequential impact on the capital market s valuation

equilibrium play in large group market entry games coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games featuring symmetric players complete information zero entry costs and several randomly presented values of the market capacity once the market capacity becomes publicly known each player must decide privately whether to enter the market and receive a payoff which increases linearly in the difference between the market capacity and the number of entrants or stay out payoffs for staying out are either positive giving rise to the domain of gains or negative giving rise to the domain of losses the major findings are substantial individual differences that do not diminish with practice aggregate behavior that is organized extremely well in both the domains of gains and losses by the nash equilibrium solution and variations in the population action strategies with repeated play of the stage game that are accounted for by a variant of an adaptive learning model due to roth and erev 1995

models a la lancaster and a la hotelling when they are the same abstract consumer behaviour in differentiated product markets can be specified following the lancastrian characteristics approach or following hotelling s approach of spatial competition in the case of unit demand i present a class of models of heterogeneous consumer behaviour which can be written as models a la lancaster as well as models a la hotelling

competitive bluffing an examination of a common practice and its relationship with performance bluffing a common and consequential form of competitive behavior has been comparably ignored in the management literature even though misleading one s rivals is suggested to be an advantageous skill in a multifaceted and highly competitive environment to address this deficiency and advance scholarship on competitive dynamics our study investigates the moral reasoning behind competitive bluffing and using a simulated market entry game examines the performance effects of bluffing findings suggest that decision makers views on the ethicality of bluffing competitors differ from their beliefs on the ethicality of misleading other organizational stakeholders analysis also indicates that decision makers who view competitor bluffing as more ethical less unethical are more willing to engage in competitive bluffing finally while bluffing is often thought to be an effective business practice results show that in the context of repeated interaction bluffing is not conducive to high levels of performance and in fact can have undesirable consequences

event studies in management research theoretical and empirical issues we examined the use of event studies in management research and found that there was inadequate attention paid to theoretical and research design issues this lack of attention may lead to false in

institutional interest ownership type and environmental capital expenditures evidence from the most polluting chinese listed firms this study empirically examines whether firms environmental capital expenditures impact institutional investors investment decisions in the chinese market we particularly examine the impact of ownership type on the relationship of environmental capital expenditures and the behavior of different types of institutional investors by classifying institutional investors into two categories short term and long term investors in addition this study further investigates whether environmental capital expenditures related to ownership type increase firm value we find that long term institutional investors tend to invest in state owned firms soes making environmental capital expenditures results also indicate that with governmental backing and encouragement the market value of soes making more environmental capital expenditures is likely to increase however no similar results are found for non soes

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

horizontal and vertical differentiation the launhardt model we show how the spatial duopoly proposed by launhardt in 1885 where firms have access to different transportation technologies allows one to model in a simple and elegant way the two major types of product differentiation i e horizontal and vertical we consider the cases where firms are located near the market end points or near the market center launhardt s analysis of price determination is then extended by allowing firms to choose strategically their transportation rates subgame perfect nash equilibria involve minimum maximum vertical product differentiation when horizontal product differentiation is large small enough

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

to steal or not to steal firm attributes legal environment and valuation data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within country variation that decreases with the strength of investors legal protection a simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation investment opportunities external financing and ownership structure using firm level governance and transparency data from 27 countries we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets all relations are stronger in less investor friendly countries demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

two stage perfect equilibrium in hotelling s model hotelling i 929 suggests that his spatial competition model can be used to describe a wide range of differentiation problems he points to the selection of product variety within an industry as a potential application most of the subsequent work in his tradition has taken the equivalence of the two problems for granted in this note we look more closely at this equivalence we distinguish between two types of differentiated products according to the variety of preferences assumed with respect to those products building on this distinction we recognize that the demand faced by a firm locating on hotelling s line is analogous to the demand faced by a firm selecting a horizontally differentiated product it should be emphasized thus that the equivalence between the geographical and the product selection problem is by no means general and relies on specific assumptions about consumers preferences next we formulate a small model close to hotelling s one in which firms select a horizontally differentiated product within this model it will be shown that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists for every pair of products this statement is to be contrasted with the results of d aspremont et al i979 who have shown that in the original hotelling s setting an equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close together 1 in addition we will examine the product selection problem faced by firms in a two stage game in the first stage each firm selects a product in the second stage the firm defines a price for its product we will seek the existence of a perfect equilibrium in this game a perfect equilibrium in this context can be viewed as a nash equilibrium in a game in which firms select a product aware of the non cooperative price equilibrium that will occur for each of their choices it will be shown that contrary to hotelling s principle the two firms will maximise their differentiation i e firms will locate at opposite ends of the market

trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation we first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality second we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading third there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low finally we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition but not on social welfare

the corporate social performance financial performance link strategic managers are consistently faced with the decision of how to allocate scarce corporate resources in an environment that is placing more and more pressures on them recent scholarship in strategic management suggests that many of these pressures come directly from sources associated with social issues in management rather than traditional arenas of strategic management using a greatly improved source of data on corporate social performance this paper reports the results of a rigorous study of the empirical linkages between financial and social performance corporate social performance csp is found to be positively associated with prior financial performance supporting the theory that slack resource availability and csp are positively related csp is also found to be positively associated with future financial performance supporting the theory that good management and csp are positively related 1997 by john wiley sons ltd