the entrepreneur s idea and outside finance theory and evidence about entrepreneurial roles abstract we study the problem faced by the entrepreneur seeking outside support to turn an entrepreneurial idea into a successful innovation specifically a successful technological innovation resulting from research and development the paper develops and tests the hypothesis that as an entrepreneur s innovative idea becomes more complex the entrepreneur will find it more difficult to obtain outside finance and then outside support more generally for the commercialization of the idea consequently the entrepreneur will be more likely to take on additional roles beyond providing the essential idea the evidence supports the hypothesis that other things being the same an entrepreneur with a more complex idea will have greater difficulty obtaining outside finance and will be more likely to take on the additional roles of development production marketing and distribution that are necessary for successful innovation

preference heterogeneity in experiments comparing the field and laboratory do laboratory experiments provide a reliable basis for measuring field preferences economists recognize that preferences can differ across individuals but only a few attempts have been made to elicit individual preferences for representative samples of a population in a particular geographical area region or country our primary objective is to directly compare estimates of preferences elicited from a convenience sample and the estimates for the wider population from which that sample is drawn we examine the strengths and weaknesses of laboratory and field experiments to detect differences in preferences over risk and time that are associated with standard observable characteristics of the individual

giving the consumer the choice a methodology for product ecological footprint calculation abstract as global consumption increases we are faced with a major threat exceeding the earth s capacity to create new resources and absorb waste in the present study we develop a self improving market driven process of ecological footprinting of products proposed as a means to give consumers a real choice in actively monitoring and reducing their ecological impact we conduct a small scale case study to illustrate first stage calculations a wider market application of higher accuracy second or third stage calculations changes market information dynamics as ecological information is internalized for consumers potential impacts on purchasing behavior demand and eco technological innovation are discussed

spatial sustainability trade and indicators an evaluation of the ecological footprint the search for frameworks and indicators of sustainable development has taken a prominent place in this journal however some specific aspects have received little or no attention notably the spatial dimension and the role of international trade in indicator development moreover many sustainable development indicators comprise implicit valuations weighting schemes and policy objectives which are insufficiently recognised as such this contribution tries to highlight these issues by means of a review of a recently proposed indicator for ecological economic analysis namely the ecological footprint that has been developed by wackernagel and rees its concept and calculation procedure are criticised on a number of points and it is concluded that the ecological footprint is not the comprehensive and transparent planning tool as is often assumed in explaining our position we will argue that spatial sustainability and regional sustainable development have not been precisely discussed so far neither in the literature on trade and environment nor in that on sustainable development we will defend the view that trade can contribute positively and negatively to environmental unsustainability consequently indicators and models are needed that allow for analysing interactions and trade offs between such opposite effects 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

endogenous market segmentation for lemons information asymmetry between sellers and buyers often prevents socially desirable trade this article presents a new mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry i consider decentralized markets under adverse selection and show that such markets can be endogenously segmented in a way that improves social welfare endogenous segmentation is driven by low quality sellers incentive to attract more buyers by separating from high quality sellers the mechanism helps us understand the roles of several real world institutions such as multiple marketplaces costless advertisements and nonbinding list prices

risk preferences around the world we present results from a large scale international survey on risk preferences conducted in 53 countries in all countries we find on average an attitude of risk aversion in gains and of risk seeking in losses the degree of risk aversion shows significant cross country differences moreover risk attitudes in our sample depend not only on economic conditions but also on cultural factors as measured by the hofstede dimensions individualism and uncertainty avoidance the data may also serve as an interesting starting point for further research on cultural differences in behavioral economics data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1869 this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement savings plans in 1995 40 percent of working men and 32 percent of working women were covered by a defined contribution dc plan a distinguishing characteristic of these plans is that workers can generally choose how their assets are invested using data from the 1992 and 1995 surveys of consumer finances scf this paper examines whether workers differ systematically by gender in the allocation of assets in dc plans previous researchers have reported that many workers tend to invest their retirement assets too conservatively and in particular that women are less likely than men to invest in risky assets such as stocks in the presence of an equity premium a lower propensity by women to invest in stocks could translate into large differences in the accumulation of financial wealth for retirement we establish that gender differences in investment decisions exist though they are more complicated than previous studies have suggested we show that these differences are not completely explained by differences in individual or household characteristics a few studies have examined gender differences in investment decisions vickie l bajtelsmit and jack l vanderhei 1997 richard p hinz et al 1997 these studies use administrative data and report that women tend to invest their retirement funds in less risky vehicles than men michael haliassos and carol c bertaut 1995 use the 1983 scf to examine why such a large fraction of households do not own any stock they report that gender does not have a significant effect on the probability of owning stock though gender differences are not the focus of their paper what these data sources lack haliassos and bertaut being the exception is a rich set of demographic and other variables on households that theory predicts should affect investment behavior this paper adds to the literature by examining gender differences in investment decisions conditioning on such variables the results highlight the importance of including marital status risk aversion measures and the portfolio of assets held outside dc plans when examining gender differences in investment decisions in these plans

durable goods monopoly learning by doing and the coase conjecture abstract the coase conjecture states that if a durable goods monopolist can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently then in equilibrium she will charge the competitive price and the market will be saturated quickly this conjecture is shown to be refuted when production of the durable good is subject to learning by doing for the linear case it is shown that there exist a stationary strategy perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist charges competitive prices but the market is saturated slowly an interesting analogy between bargaining and durable goods monopoly with learning by doing is also pointed out

perceptual and structural barriers to investing in natural capital economics from an ecological footprint perspective this paper argues that perceptual distortions and prevailing economic rationality far from encouraging investment in natural capital actually accelerate the depletion of natural capital stocks moreover conventional monetary analyses cannot detect the problem this paper therefore makes the case for direct biophysical measurement of relevant stocks and flows and uses for this purpose the ecological footprint concept to develop the argument the paper elaborates the natural capital concept and asserts the need of investing in natural capital to compensate for net losses it shows how the ecological footprint can be used as a biophysical measure for such capital and applies this concept as an analytical tool for examining the barriers to investing in natural capital it picks four issues from a rough taxonomy of barriers and discusses them from an ecological footprint perspective it shows why marginal prices cannot reflect ecological necessities how interregional risk pooling encourages resource liquidation how present terms of trade undermine both local and global ecological stability and how efficiency strategies may actually accelerate resource throughput affirming the necessity of biophysical approaches for exploring the sustainability implications of basic ecological and thermodynamic principles it draws lessons for current development

common values unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry in u s offshore oil lease auctions although an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of common values formal evidence has been limited by the problem of auction level unobserved heterogeneity we develop an empiri

decisions error and heterogeneity probabilistic choices or choice errors may play an important supporting role in shaping observed risky choices and a variety of restrictions on such choice probabilities play the role of identifying restrictions in empirical decision research we test six restrictions in the context of common ratio effect data for a general class of theories of risky choice two restrictions one for aggregate and one for individual data are supported but none of the heterogeneity restrictions that make the aggregate data model powerful survive scrutiny nor do estimable parametric versions of the individual data model there is room for new stochastic identifying restrictions in empirical decision research

dynamic adverse selection and the supply size in this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information we obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium moreover we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough we conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero

are women more risk averse we find that single women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men using u s sample data we examine household holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in financial risk taking as wealth increases the proportion of wealth held as risky assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single men gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age race and number of children greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation for women s lower levels of wealth compared with men s jel j16 d81 g11

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

affirmative action programs and business ownership among minorities and women affirmative action programs are commonly used as a means to level the playing field for minority and women owned firms in public procurement markets and therefore may be a positive factor in business entry and survival to the extent that affirmative action programs also apply to traditional labor markets however they may alter the opportunity cost of starting a business we utilize the elimination of affirmative action in california and washington states through voter initiatives to identify the effect of affirmative action on minority and female self employment rates in our base specifications we find evidence of modest increases in self employment among minorities and women in both california and washington after elimination of affirmative action consistent with the hypothesis that the opportunity cost of starting a business fell due to restricting opportunities in the traditional labor markets the sign of the estimated effect however is not uniformly positive when considering specific race gender groups and the statistical significance of the main results is somewhat sensitive to the choice of control states

standard ecological footprint method for small highly specialized economies abstract the negative impact of human endeavour on the biosphere has becoming increasingly clear in recent decades this has spurred a surge in the creation of sustainability indicators one of the most used sustainability indicators of recent years is the ecological footprint ef the ef uses trade flows to estimate environmental impacts of consumption the purpose of this study was to test ef s ability to deal with a small but highly specialized economy for this we used iceland as a case study but the icelandic economy is dominated by strong specialization with fisheries dwarfing all other sectors global footprint network s standard methodology was utilized with only the addition of local data being used where these data proved more robust than international databases the results from the two editions of the gfn calculation models 2008 and 2014 yielded a footprint of 56 59 and 25 26 gha per capita respectively for iceland three main reasons were identified for the drop in the footprint between the two editions all within the fishing grounds footprint a much improved coverage of extraction rates changes in fish species trophic levels and changes to aggregate errors for traded cod and halibut a correction of co2 intensities for exports also had a big impact but resulted in a rise in the ef for the latter edition the study highlighted the rapid development of the methodology as a major strength while the method s main weakness was revealed as the uncertainties associated with the marine footprint local consumption figures from the icelandic directorate of health indicated that a further drop in the marine footprint is in store with increased accuracy of the method mainly to do with accurate allocation between export and consumption footprints although the indicator s accuracy has been much improved in recent years additional improvements are thus still needed the extremes of the icelandic economy highlight errors to the extent that the huge footprint the calculations yielded make the country an outlier in a global context the indicator seems in this respect not accurate enough yet to be able to deal with such a degree of specialization especially where the main sectors are very large in relation to the population at least not when the sector in question is the marine sector the upside of this is that highly specialized economies may in this way be very useful for identifying and correcting inaccuracies within the methodology for their sector of specialization

visual quality and sustainability considerations in tolerance optimization a market based approach during the late stages of product development dimensional tolerances are chosen to balance quality requirements with manufacturing costs designers typically judge how much variation in the product dimensions should be allowed while still maintaining the perception of high quality for the product or brand but this is rarely based on a quantitative understanding of how consumers actually perceive variation and quality likewise environmental sustainability priorities which can also be affected by dimensional tolerances through production waste and product lifespan are often chosen without knowing how such attributes are received by consumers this paper presents a survey based technique for understanding how tolerance and pricing decisions influence market demand and manufacturer profits accounting for consumer perceptions of visual quality and environmental friendliness a case study of a mobile phone design is explored including variation propagation simulation manufacturing cost and environmental impact estimation online choice based conjoint cbc survey design and administration consumer demand model construction and profit maximization for the markets in china sweden and the united states the results show how consumers make trade offs in purchasing decisions when choosing among mobile phone attributes including price environmental friendliness and visual quality and different scenarios are compared based on survey design country of interest and the company s global product strategy

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining we study a one sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer s valuation we show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes in particular second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers we show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay when the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer s value then delay not only can occur but it must occur for a class of equilibria however in all other cases delay will never occur

better later than never an experiment on bargaining under adverse selection a central result in the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information is that the uninformed party buyer can screen the informed party seller over time screening eliminates trade failures that are otherwise common in the presence of adverse selection but the downside of the bargaining institution is the cost associated with repeated offers and time frictions this article reports an experimental test of these predictions we find that rates of trade are substantially higher in the bargaining institution than in control treatments in which we remove the possibility to make repeated offers take it or leave it offer or the time frictions however we also observe a persistent overdelay before agreements are reached that is bargaining takes longer than theoretically predicted this lowers efficiency below its predicted level and below the level observed in the take it or leave it offer institution we identify possible channels for overdelay in the form of fairness preferences and loss aversion concluding that there are important behavioral deviations from the standard model that are detrimental to the efficiency of bargaining under incomplete information

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

university spin out companies and venture capital abstract the creation of university spin out companies that create wealth is a major policy objective of governments and universities finance is a catalyst of this wealth creation yet access to venture capital is a major impediment faced by these companies in this article we adopt a finance pecking order perspective to examine the problems faced by those university spin out companies seeking to access venture capital we triangulate evidence from spin out companies university technology transfer offices and venture capital firms in the uk and continental europe to identify the problems and to suggest policy developments for these parties as well as government we compare perceptions of high tech venture capital firms that invest in spin outs with those that do not and also consider vcs views on spin outs versus other high tech firms our evidence identifies a mismatch between the demand and supply side of the market in line with the pecking order theory venture capitalists prefer to invest after the seed stage however in contrast to the pecking order theory ttos see venture capital as more important than internal funds early on we develop policy implications for universities technology transfer offices academic entrepreneurs venture capital firms and government and suggest areas for further research

strategic delay in bargaining with two sided uncertainty the role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite horizon alternating offer model of bargaining a buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly an equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer a bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and hence makes concessions earlier on trade occurs whever gains from trade exist but due to the private information only after costly delay panmunjom korea upi the american general and the north korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut maj gen james b knapp negotiator for the united nations command unc was waiting for maj gen ri choonsun of the democratic people s republic of north korea to propose a recess they sat there arms folded for 42 hours not a word finally gen ri got up walked out and drove away evening bulletin philadelphia 11 april 1969

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

private investor participation and commercialization rates for government sponsored research and development would a prediction market improve the performance of the sbir programme an objective of the us small business innovation research sbir programme is the private sector commercialization of funded rd our analysis of department of defense dod phase ii awards suggests that the estimated probability of commercialization is only 0 47 we investigate econometrically whether outside private investors have useful information about proposed sbir projects prospects for commercialization our findings suggest that they do thereby providing support for the possibility that a prediction market could improve the performance of the sbir programme

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

microcredit an answer to the gender problem in funding microfinance institutions mfis target people excluded from the traditional banking system by providing start up capital to these under financed individuals they enable a greater number of women to start their own business particularly in sectors where initial capital requirements are high our study follows a portfolio of 3 640 microcredit applicants in france over the 2000 2006 time period identifying mfi client profiles and bringing to light gender differences in borrowers compared to a wider sample of entrepreneurs this study shows that the male female gap found amongst company creators is also maintained amongst the clienteles of mfis empirical results also suggest that gender is a decisive factor regarding the amount of credit provided to borrowers when comparing with other factors in the borrower and firm profile thus to a certain extent mfis are found to reinforce gender inequalities in france

the timing of out of court settlements parties to a lawsuit will frequently delay litigation even in circumstances where a voluntary agreement is eventually reached this article is concerned with what causes legal disputes to be prolonged over time we discuss dynamic models of litigation to illustrate how changes in the bargaining environment might generate empirical hazard functions comparative statics results are then corroborated with empirical estimates of a hazard function adjusted to account for both the heterogeneity of lawsuits and the nonproportional time dependence suggested by theory

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

imperfect competition and efficiency in lemons markets this article studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets more precisely we characterise the second best mechanism i e the optimal mechanism with private information in a stylised lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers we then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second best mechanism and market competitiveness a general message of our results is that increasing competition may not help lemons markets in some circumstances moreover increasing competition beyond a certain degree increases the distance between the first best and second best levels of efficiency

an integrated environmental and fairtrade labelling scheme for product supply chains environmental initiatives such as carbon labelling have been suggested as a driver for achieving sustainable production systems of product supply chains the paper therefore presents a systematic process of developing an environmental labelling framework as an extension of carbon labelling using the fairtrade certification as a platform to facilitate the process using the general theoretical constructs of lifecycle assessments the framework presented provides insight into the formulation of multi regional supply chains which has been specifically characterised in this paper for the uk india rest of the world supply chain the environmental labelling process presented in this paper is based on two key principles quantitative principle in eco labelling and the principle of whole lifecycle perspective and it is used to inform two key stakeholder groups in the supply chain consumers and supply chain partners for consumers a consistent way of presenting the environmental label information is presented highlighting the supply chain impacts across the indicators of co2 eq emissions water consumption and land use in addition to regional contributions to these impacts from a global supply chain perspective additionally communicating the environmental impacts to supply chain partners provides a decision support to take actions to reduce the overall impacts by identifying processes within the global supply chain that needed prioritisation given that fairtrade partnership is based on participatory development and a strict guidelines and standardisation process it is envisaged that synergies can be derived by integrating environmental labelling with the fairtrade scheme to enhance the environmental sustainability of product supply chains

leveraging entrepreneurship through private investments does gender matter using project data from a random sample of phase ii research awards from the national institutes of health sbir program we estimate the relative probability that woman owned firms are able to attract private investments to fund the transition of the technology developed under the sponsorship of the sbir program to an innovation to enter the market we find that women owned firms are as much as 16 points less likely to attract private investment dollars compared to male owned firms factors excluding the size of the sbir award held constant women owned firms that received larger awards performed substantially better although the sbir program has a legislated directive to increase the participation of woman owned firms in the program our findings suggest that it might not be sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the profitability of such investments actually bringing a developed technology to market

selling a lemon under demand uncertainty we consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals assuming that the high quality seller insists on a price we show that the low quality seller s surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers knowledge about the demand state if they are also uncertain about demand then demand uncertainty increases the low quality seller s expected payoff and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time if buyers know the demand state then demand uncertainty does not affect the low quality seller s payoff but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy

selling procedures with private information and common values the seller posted price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies we analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common value elements in a model of two sided private information we characterize the fully revealing perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller we also characterize equilibrium behavior under two other pricing procedures a sealed bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism finally we examine the efficiency of these procedures and show that as the degree of common values increases fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained

bridging the gap bargaining with interdependent values abstract we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values we base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by deneckere and liang 2006 for the gap case we show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time in the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution of values when the uninformed agent s ability to commit to prices disappears so do her rents yet trade still exhibits delay

costly search with adverse selection solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing we analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes a low quality seller benefits more from trade and therefore searches more intensively than a high quality seller this makes a seller s contact carry negative information but a seller s availability become a stronger indicator of high quality in the stationary environment the two effects exactly offset each other and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller in the nonstationary environment the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller

incorporating a stochastic element into decision theories abstract recent papers by harless and camerer 1994 and hey and orme 1994 have employed two rather different models of errors in decision making under uncertainty the present paper develops a third approach and shows how different stochastic specifications of the same deterministic core theory may generate very different and sometimes surprising hypotheses

dynamic trading with developing adverse selection abstract we study a dynamic trading game in which the information asymmetry between the agents develops over time a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good but the seller becomes informed after the game begins we show that this developing adverse selection gives rise to novel trading dynamics in particular if the seller s learning speed is high the equilibrium features collapse and recovery behavior both the equilibrium price and the trade probability first drop and then increase over time while the trade surplus monotonically decreases as the learning speed increases the seller s surplus may change non monotonically

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

sequential bargaining with correlated values the paper analyzes an infinite horizon sequential bargaining game with one sided offers between a buyer and a seller when the buyer s valuation depends on the seller s the seller knows the value of the object and the buyer does not the influence of relative discount factors on the solution is studied it is shown for example that an impasse may result if the buyer offeror is too impatient relative to the seller the buyer makes a single take it or leave it offer

psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings we extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty we show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency we provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

the gender gap in federal and private support for entrepreneurship the role of gender in entrepreneurship has been thoroughly investigated however less is known about gender differences in access to private investment when attempting to develop a new technology in this paper we use data collected by the national research council of the national academies to estimate differences between the probability that a female owned firm and a male owned firm both conducting research funded by the small business innovation research program will receive private investment funding to help to commercialize the funded technology we find that female owned firms are disadvantaged in their access to private investment especially in the west and northeast regions of the usa

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller we analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller the seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game which is unobservable to buyers at the interim stage of the game the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain if i the common discounting is low and ii the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex ante contract under which the trade happens with probability one our result does not depend on whether the offers by buyers are private or public

eliciting von neumann morgenstern utilities when probabilities are distorted or unknown this paper proposes a new method the gamble tradeoff method for eliciting utilities in decision under risk or uncertainty the elicitation of utilities to be used in the expected utility criterion turns out to be possible even if probabilities are ambiguous or unknown a disadvantage of the tradeoff method is that a few more questions usually must be asked to clients also the lotteries that are needed are somewhat more complex than in the certainty equivalent method or in the probability equivalent method the major advantage of the tradeoff method is its robustness against probability distortions and misconceptions which constitute a major cause of violations of expected utility and generate inconsistencies in utility elicitation thus the tradeoff method retains full validity under prospect theory rank dependent utility and the combination of the two i e cumulative prospect theory the tradeoff method is tested for monetary outcomes and for outcomes describing life duration we find higher risk aversion for life duration but the tradeoff method elicits similar curvature of utility apparently the higher risk aversion for life duration is due to more pronounced deviations from expected utility

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

narrow bracketing and dominated choices an experiment by tversky and kahneman 1981 illustrates that people s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately can lead them to choose combinations of choices that are first order stochastically dominated by other available combinations we investigate the generality of this effect both theoretically and experimentally we show that for any decisionmaker who does not have constant absolute risk averse preferences and who evaluates her decisions one by one there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where the decisionmaker will make a dominated combination of choices we also characterize as a function of a person s preferences the amount of money that she can lose due to a single mistake of this kind the theory is accompanied by both a real stakes laboratory experiment and a large sample survey from the general u s population replicating tversky and kahneman s original experiment where decisionmakers with prototypical prospect theory preferences will choose a dominated combination we find that 28 of the participants do so in the survey we ask the respondents about several hypothetical large stakes choices and find higher proportions of dominated choice combinations a statistical model that estimates preferences from the survey results is best fit by assuming people have utility functions that are close to prospect theory value functions and that about 83 of people bracket narrowly none of these results varies strongly with the personal characteristics of participants we also demonstrate directly that dominated choices are driven by narrow bracketing when we eliminate the possibility of narrow bracketing by using a combined presentation of the decisions the dominated choices are eliminated in the laboratory experiment and are greatly reduced in the survey

violations of cumulative prospect theory in mixed gambles with moderate probabilities in a classroom choice experiment with mixed gambles and moderate probabilities we find severe violations of cumulative prospect theory cpt and of markowitz stochastic dominance our results shed new light on the exchange between levy and levy 2002 and wakker 2003 in this journal

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

on the economics of sustainability abstract the purpose of this paper is to work toward reconciliation of the neoclassical consumer choice axiom that more is better and the ecological concern that more is not sustainable the key is to divide the desired more into its rival and nonrival components for it is the consumption of rival goods such as plastic that strains the ecosystem in contrast the consumption of nonrival goods such as bird watching leaves little to no footprint while sustainability can be enhanced through changing preferences a menu of taxes subsidies and or vouchers can also motivate greater nonrival consumption and therefore sustainability without reducing consumer welfare

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

financial decision making are women really more risk averse 40 males 33 females gain gambling gain domain loss gambling loss domain a contextual frames b abstract gambling frames studies the application of experimental methods provided stronger control of the economic environment in which decisions were made we elicited data which call into question the prevalence of stereotypic risk attitudes in financial decision making first we find that the comparative risk propensity of male and female subjects is strongly dependent on the financial decision setting second and more important we observe no gender differences in risk propensity when subjects face contextual decisions since in practice financial decisions are always contextual our results suggest that the above gender stereotype may not reflect true male and female attitudes toward financial risks i gender specific risk behavior an experimental design our experiment was designed to examine gender specific risk propensity in decisions relevant for investors and managers table 1 gives an overview of the experimental design in the main treatment we implemented risky choices in the form of investment and insurance decisions choice behavior in this treatment henceforth called the context treatment directly measures the risk behavior of male and female subjects in contextual financial decisions we also ran a control treatment in which the same risky choices were presented as abstract gambling decisions this control treatment henceforth called the abstract treatment allows us to validate the risk behavior induced by our experimental procedure in the light of the above mentioned gambling evidence in the context treatment subjects were confronted with risky choices in two different decision contexts subjects first had to complete a series of investment decisions they were then presented with a series of identical choices this time however framed as insur1 wealth effects from income differences outside the laboratory may still affect risk behavior in our experiment they are controlled for in our model 2 experimental instructions are available in german from the authors or in english from our web page www wif ethz ch publikationen htm ance decisions each investment and insurance decision incorporated a choice between a risky lottery and a certain payoff with the series of choices implemented in the two frames we elicited our subjects certainty equivalents for the same four risky lotteries l1 l2 l3 l4 in both contexts we implemented two frames in the context treatment in order to measure the risk propensity of subjects toward both perceived gains and perceived losses in both frames all possible payoffs for each decision were positive in the investment frame these payoffs were also presented as gains while in the insurance frame the same payoffs were presented as losses relative to an initial endowment therefore elicited certainty equivalents in the investment frame measure subjects risk propensities in the gain domain while certainty equivalents in the insurance frame measure risk propensity in the loss domain if in contextual financial decisions female subjects are generally more risk averse than men our results should display ceteris paribus lower female certainty equivalents in both the investment and insurance frames 3 the four lotteries l1 l2 l3 and l4 each had two possible outcomes payoffs in swiss francs 1 sfr a 0 60 and their probabilities were 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 30 sfr 2 10 sfr 2 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 and 50 sfr 2 20 sfr 2 respectively 4 experimental evidence suggests that individual risk propensity will vary systematically between the gain and loss domain daniel kahneman and amos tversky 1979 383 vol 89 no 2 gender and economic transactions 3y16 my68 mp 383 friday dec 10 08 20 am lp aer my68 figure 1 differences in mean certainty equivalents ce between male and female subjects by frame note certainty equivalents and male female differences are measured in swiss francs in the abstract treatment we confronted a different group of subjects with exactly the same risky decisions as those in the main treatment however as mentioned before all choices in this control treatment were framed as abstract gambling decisions again two frames were implemented in the gaingambling and loss gambling frames we measured the risk attitudes of subjects toward gambles in the gain and loss domain respectively subjects in both treatments were told in advance that one of their choices would determine their experimental earnings further all subjects completed a post experimental questionnaire which yielded information on each subject s disposable income this information is necessary to exclude wealth effects due to income differences outside the laboratory as an explanation of gender specific choice behavior

decision making under risk in deal or no deal we analyse the choices of 399 contestants in the australian version of the television game show deal or no deal we calculate risk aversion bounds for each contestant revealing considerable heterogeneity we then estimate a structural stochastic choice model that captures the dynamic decision problem faced by contestants to address individual heterogeneity we nest the dynamic problem within the settings of both a random effects and a random coefficients probit model our structural model produces plausible estimates of risk aversion confirms the role of individual heterogeneity and suggests that a model of stochastic choice is indeed appropriate we find mixed evidence of greater risk aversion by females we also examine generalizations to expected utility theory finding that the rank dependent utility model adds non negligible explanatory power and indicates optimism in probability weighting finally we test but are unable to confirm the existence of an endowment effect for lotteries copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

an index of loss aversion to a considerable extent risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature the one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components basic utility probability weighting and loss aversion the index is independent of the unit of payment the main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment abstract bilateral sequential negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal and if the common discount factor is close enough to one journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c78 j52

estimating individual discount rates in denmark a field experiment we estimate individual discount rates with respect to time streams of money using controlled laboratory experiments these discount rates are elicited by means of field experiments involving real monetary rewards the experiments were carried out across denmark using a representative sample of 268 people between 19 and 75 years of age individual discount rates are estimated for various households differentiated by socio demographic characteristics such as income and age our conclusions are that discount rates are constant over the 12 month to 3 year horizons used in these experiments and that discount rates vary substantially with respect to several socio demographic variables hence we conclude that it would be reasonable to assume constant discount rates for specific household types but not the same rates across all households

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

bargaining with endogenous information two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values this paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable three types of inefficiencies can arise if the information cost is in an intermediate range no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information if the information cost is low any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition if the agents face asymmetric information cost the akerlof s lemons problem arises as a self fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

on durable goods markets with entry and adverse selection we investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time the model is a dynamic version of akerlof 1970 identical cohorts of durable goods whose quality is known only to potential sellers enter the market over time we show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade the model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations jel classification d82 a propos des marches de biens durables quand il y a entree de nouveaux commercants et selection adverse les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendres par le mecanisme dynamique des prix dans un marche concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a selection adverse et entree exogene de nouveaux commercants dans le temps ce modele est une version dynamique du modele d akerlof 1970 des cohortes identiques de biens durables dont la qualite est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels arrivent sur le marche dans le temps il semble qu il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prevu par un modele statique en particulier on montre qu il existe un equilibre cyclique ou tous les biens sont transiges a l interieur d un nombre fini de periodes apres leur arrivage et que a chaque phase du cycle l eventail de qualite des biens transiges s accroit les commercants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualite attendent plus longtemps et l imperfection du marche se traduit par la longueur de temps d attente avant la transaction le modele fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marche

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small