interpreting economic time series this paper explores some of the implications for econometric practice of the principle that people s observed behavior will change when their constraints change in dynamic contexts a proper definition of people s constraints includes among them laws of motion that describe the evolution of the taxes they must pay and the prices of the goods that they buy and sell changes in agents perceptions of these laws of motion or constraints will in general produce changes in the schedules that describe the choices they make as a function of the information that they possess until very recently received dynamic econometric practice ignored this principle the practice of dynamic econometrics should be changed so that it is consistent with the principle that people s rules of choice are influenced by their constraints this is a substantial undertaking and involves major adjustments in the ways that we formulate estimate and simulate econometric models

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

taylor rules in a model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis the authors analyze the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce real indeterminacy into the economy they conduct this analysis in a flexible price economy and a sticky price model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy in the sticky price model is that there must be nominal and real determinacy in the corresponding flexible price model this arises if and only if the taylor rule responds aggressively to lagged inflation rates

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

timing and real indeterminacy in monetary models an increasingly common approach to the theoretical analysis of monetary policy is to ensure that a proposed policy does not introduce real indeterminacy and thus sunspot fluctuations into the model economy policy is typically conducted in terms of directives for the nominal interest rate this paper uses a discrete time money in the utility function model to demonstrate how seemingly minor modifications in the trading environment result in dramatic differences in the policy restrictions needed to ensure real determinacy these differences arise because of the differing pricing equations for the nominal interest rate

rational expectations in agricultural economics research and policy analysis despite recognition by agricultural economists that price expectations are important in agricultural decision making few changes in the way price expectations appear in economic models of agriculture have been made during the past two decades for example in the major proportion of existing supply response studies it has been assumed that price expectations are formed adaptively for an illustration of the extent that this assumption has been used see askari and cummings that is expected price is assumed to be a weighted average of past prices with the weights declining geometrically over time in other supply response studies it is assumed that a polynomial distributed lag on product prices provides an adequate representation of the system s dynamic structure see for example meilke zwart martin or fisher however as muth p 315 noted there is little evidence to suggest that the presumed relations bear a resemblance to the way the economy works although data on anticipations are collected in many ways only a few studies have tried to determine how individual decision makers actually form expectations heady and kaldor turnovsky and fisher and tanner katona in calling for more research of this kind also identifies some difficulties in studying the psychology of individuals learning processes until psychologists make more progress in this area economists who incorporate anticipations in their models will have to use another approach however there are few choices the popular adaptive expectations hypothesis is inadequate not because it implies that the forecast of a particular variable is a distributed lag of its own past values but because it implies that the distributed lag parameters are restricted in an ad hoc way in general assuming that price expectations are formed adaptively is ad hoc because the parameter restrictions in the distributed lag are not the result of an optimization process alternative formulations such as the assumption that expectations are naive or generated by some other simple autoregressive form are inadequate for similar reasons the rational expectations hypothesis

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules for a country that chooses not to permanently fix its exchange rate through a currency board or a common currency or some kind of dollarization the only alternative monetary policy that can work well in the long run is one based on the trinity of i a flexible exchange rate ii an inflation target and iii a monetary policy rule while not often put into this threepart format the desirability of such a monetary policy in an open economy is in my view the clear implication of three corresponding strands of recent monetary research i research on fixed exchange rates regimes including the influential 1995 article the mirage of fixed exchange rates by maurice obstfeld and kenneth rogoff and the many analyses of the breakdown of fixed exchange rate regimes in the late 1990 s ii research on the practical success with inflation targeting by ben bernanke et al 1999 and iii research on the benefits of simple monetary policy rules see e g taylor 1999a this clear policy implication however does not end the debate about how exchange rates should be taken into account in formulating monetary policy even if one excludes capital controls and sterilized exchange market intervention from consideration because they are not effective or attractive ways to de link exchangerate movements from the domestic interest rate a crucial question remains how should the instruments of monetary policy the interest rate or a monetary aggregate react to the exchange rate should policymakers avoid any reaction and focus instead on domestic indicators such as inflation and real gdp or is the rule of thumb that a substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate furnishes a prima facie case for relaxing monetary policy as characterized by obstfeld and rogoff 1995 p 93 a better monetary policy rule or perhaps policymakers should heed the obstfeld rogoff warning that substantial departures from ppp purchasing power parity in the short run and even over decades make such a policy reaction to the exchange rate undesirable more generally if one accepts the trinity concept of monetary policy in an open economy then what is the role of the exchange rate in the monetarypolicy rule

optimal monetary policy in open versus closed economies an integrated approach in clarida et al 1999 hereafter cgg we presented a normative analysis of monetary policy within a simple optimization based closedeconomy framework we derived the optimal policy rule and among other things characterized the gains from commitment also we made precise the implications for the kind of instrument feedback rule that a central bank should follow in practice in this paper we show how our analysis extends to the case of a small open economy openness complicates the problem of monetary management to the extent the central bank must take into account the impact of the exchange rate on real activity and inflation how to factor the exchange rate into the overall design of monetary policy accordingly becomes a central consideration here we show that under certain conditions the monetary policy design problem for the small open economy is isomorphic to the problem of the closed economy that we considered earlier hence all our qualitative results for the closed economy carry over to this case openness does affect the parameters of the model suggesting quantitative implications though the general form of the optimal interest rate feedback rule remains the same as in the closedeconomy case for example how aggressively a central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to inflationary pressures depends on the degree of openness in addition openness gives rise to an important distinction between domestic inflation and consumer price inflation as defined by the cpi to the extent that there is perfect exchange rate pass through we find that the central bank should target domestic inflation and allow the exchange rate to float despite the impact of the resulting exchangerate variability on the cpi kosuki aoki 1999 gali and tommaso monacelli 2000

a positive theory of discretionary policy the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution we offer an explanation of government s preference for discretionary policy action the main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects discretionary policy imposes a social cost we show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government an optimal state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government s opportunities to exploit its informational advantage rules of this kind and constitutional restrictions are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

a rational expectations model for the poultry sector in greece poultry meat production became systematic and business oriented from 1960 onwards especially during the period 1965 75 meat production showed a marked rise being increased nearly fivefold as a result of this increase in production greece has reached self sufficiency levels covering about 20 of total meat production compared to 7 in the early 1960s so far very little work has been done in analysing the rational expectations hypothesis in the context of a market model in this paper an attempt is made to examine the rational expectations hypothesis for the poultry meat sector within the framework of a simultaneous equations model that describes the factors affecting demand and supply as well as the link between farmers prices and consumers prices moreover in this study a rational expectations mechanism is integrated into the model and the hypothesis is tested it may be noted that poultry is a characteristic case of the operation of free market forces the structural equations of the model are e

dynamic equilibrium in markets for perennial crops a dynamic equilibrium model for perennial crop markets is formulated price expectations are formed according to perfect foresight and both the age composition of the crop and the optimal rotation are determined endogenously the model is applied to the california alfalfa market the calculated long run equilibrium acreage is quite close to average acreage over the base period the results also exhibit cyclical fluctuations in acreage with a six percent coefficient of variation thus cyclical behavior can arise from technical characteristics of the production process as well as from imperfectly formed expectations or random exogenous shocks

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

electoral accountability and responsive democracy we consider a canonical two period model of elections with adverse selection hidden preferences and moral hazard hidden actions in which neither voters nor politicians can commit to future choices we prove existence of electoral equilibria and we show that office holders mix between taking it easy and going for broke in the first period even in the presence of a finite horizon we establish that increasing office motivation leads to arbitrarily high expected policy outcomes we conclude that the mechanism of electoral accountability has the potential to achieve responsiveness of democratic politics when electoral incentives are sufficiently large

dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade the j curve the authors provide a theoretical interpretation of two features of international data the countercyclical movements in net exports and the tendency for the trade balance to be negatively correlated with current and future movements in terms of trade but positively correlated with past movements they document the same properties in a two country stochastic growth model in which trade fluctuations reflect in large part the dynamics of capital formation the authors find that their general equilibrium perspective is essential the relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade depends critically on the source of fluctuations copyright 1994 by american economic association

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

the problem of the persistent hog price cycle a chaotic solution a persistent hog corn price ratio has been known to exist since the early 1930s and many attempts have been made since then to model its dynamics that these models have been ineffectual as forecasting tools is apparent by the fact that the hog cycle has persisted to this day in this paper i propose that increased forecasting accuracy can be obtained by adjusting traditional forecasting models so that they account for deterministic nonlinear processes with improved forecasts the costs of countercyclical production will decrease dampening and perhaps even eliminating the cycle the chaotic dynamics of the hog corn price cycle is confirmed and chaotic models of this system are developed the analysis provides the framework for developing a function to forecast the dynamics of the hog corn price ratio

the perils of taylor rules abstract since john taylor s 1993 carnegie rochester conf ser publ policy39 195 214 seminal paper a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules that is rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one for one increase in the nominal interest rate are stabilizing in this paper we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences specifically we show that even if the steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilibrium typically there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge to a liquidity trap that is a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is near zero and inflation is possibly negative journal of economic literature classification numbers e52 e31 e63

two roles for elections disciplining the incumbent and selecting a competent candidate this paper presents a political economy model in which the voterswant to control moral hazard on the part of the incumbent andselect a competent candidate to be in office we focus on electionswhich take place repeatedly as the basic disciplinary and screeningmechanism it is shown that incomplete information of the votersabout the economic competence of the incumbent helps to overcomethe lame duck effect of a government with foreseeable end asecond finding is that economic performance strongly influences thereelection of the incumbent in particular in stationary perfectbayesian equilibrium if economic performance is bad theincumbent will not be reelected we also prove that having thepossibility of reelecting a government increases the welfare of thevoters to the no reelection benchmark

decomposition of structural and exogenous changes 1989 decomposition of structural and exogenous changes applied economics vol 21 no 1 pp 125 137

the robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the european central bank abstract this paper examines the implications of recent research on monetary policy rules for practical monetary policy making with special emphasis on strategies for setting interest rates by the european central bank ecb the paper draws on recent research and new simulations of a large open economy model to assess the efficiency of a simple benchmark rule in comparison with other proposed rules further it stresses new results on the robustness of monetary policy rules in which each rule that is optimal or good according to one model or researcher is tested for robustness by other researchers using different models because of the large increase in the number of economists focussing on econometric evaluation of monetary policy rules for the interest rate instrument and because of the parallel increase in the variety of models being developed for this purpose much more evidence is becoming available on the robustness of simple monetary policy rules for the interest rate than ever before

the political economy of dynamic elections accountability commitment and responsiveness we survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians we define stationary electoral equilibrium which encompasses notions used by barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 banks and sundaram 1998 and others we show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions term limits however attenuate the responsiveness finding we also touch on related applied work and we point to areas for fruitful future research including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

limits on price analysis in a recent book sir peter medawar distinguishes between those questions that scientific research can and cannot answer my paper has a more modest goal price analysts have never pretended to answer deep philosophical questions but rather have tried to understand agricultural markets the general objective of price analyses is to make forecasts and simulations that assist private and public decision makers progress has been made toward this general goal but limitations clearly exist to obtaining precise forecasts and useful simulations this paper is about the progress that has been made and the limitations that exist examples from the supply demand and marketing margin literature are used to illustrate the progress and limitations in particular i contrast the progress that has been made in supply analysis with the progress in demand analysis i then suggest ways in which some of the problems might be addressed space constraints however do not permit an exhaustive discussion of these topics

interest rate rules and transitional dynamics in an endogenously growing open economy abstract this paper sets up an endogenous growth model of an open economy in which the monetary authority implements a gradualist interest rate rule with targets for both inflation and economic growth we show that under a passive rule a monetary equilibrium exists and is unique moreover the equilibrium is locally determinate by contrast an active rule implies either two equilibria one high growth and one low growth or none in the case of two equilibria the high growth equilibrium is locally determinate while the low growth equilibrium is a source besides the stabilization and growth effects of alternative target policies are also explored in this study moreover in departing from the existing literature we turn to focus on the analysis of transition with a particular emphasis on the case of imperfect credibility

inflation band targeting and optimal inflation contracts in this paper we provide a theoretical treatment of how inflation target ranges cope with the time inconsistency problem arising from incentives for the monetary policymaker to exploit the short run trade off between employment and inflation to pursue short run employment objectives as in a barro gordon 1983 model inflation band targets are able to achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy

does trade openness matter for aggregate instability abstract this paper presents a cash in advance model of a small open economy and shows that whether an inflation targeting interest rate rule introduces aggregate instability depends in general on the degree of openness to international trade this result emerges regardless of whether prices are sticky or flexible in a closed economy as the monetary authority responds to movements in inflation the resulting changes in interest rates affect aggregate consumption through an intertemporal substitution effect and an inflation tax effect in a small open economy this policy also induces changes in the terms of trade which depending on the degree of openness can generate counteracting effects on consumption as a consequence the implications of interest rate rules on macroeconomic stability in an open economy differ from those in a closed economy