summary financial statement measures and analysts forecasts of earnings abstract this study distinguishes between the information in the ou and penman 1989a pr measure and that in analysts forecasts of earnings for cases where analysts forecasts are available trading on pr produces abnormal returns only when the predictions of pr and those of analysts forecasts disagree this is consistent with pr capturing some information not impounded in market prices however abnormal returns to this trading strategy continue for up to 72 months after the release of the data necessary to compute pr this is consistent with pr proxying for the effects of omitted risk factors

on the net impact of europeanization the eu s telecoms and electricity regimes between the global and the national this article examines the outcome of the eu policy process from various comparative perspectives in an effort to distinguish the net effects of eu membership and eu level regimes from more general perhaps global processes of change it argues that the major features of liberalization would have been diffused to most if not all member states even in the absence of the european commission other agents of supranationalism and eu level intergovernmental commitment to liberalize this is not to suggest that europeanization does not matter but that it matters in less obvious and perhaps in less critical ways than is frequently assumed the argument is supported by comparative empirical analysis of the spatial and temporal diffusion of liberalization since the 1980s and of nationalization since the late 19th century

a new statecraft supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation studies of international regimes law and negotiation as well as regional integration near universally conclude that political entrepreneurship by high officials of international organizations supranational entrepreneurship decisively influences the outcomes of multilateral negotiations studies of the european community ec have long stressed their informal agenda setting mediation and mobilization yet the studies underlying this interdisciplinary consensus tend to be anecdotal atheoretical and uncontrolled the study reported here derives and tests explicit hypotheses from general theories of political entrepreneurship and tests them across multiple cases the five most important ec negotiations while controlling for the actions of national governments two findings emerge first supranational entrepreneurship is generally redundant or futile governments can almost always efficiently act as their own entrepreneurs second rare cases of entrepreneurial success arise not when officials intervene to help overcome interstatecollective action problems as current theories presume but when they help overcome domestic or transnational collective action problems this suggests fundamental refinements in the core assumptions about transaction costs underlying general theories of international regimes law and negotiation

structural gaiatsu international finance and political change in japan argues that the principal contributor to changes in japan s political economy is the decline of japanese governmental control over capital flows and foreign exchange rates brought about by structural gaiatsu or direct foreign pressure differs from previous analysis of gaiatsu by arguing that international capital and market forces generate gaiatsu not foreign governments and that its influence has been worldwide as well as deeper and more ongoing than bilateral negotiating sessions and joint communiques related to trade discusses how the change has catalyzed a major increase in foreign direct investment by japanese owned corporations a reduction in government s ability to control corporate behavior a diminution of intra corporate linkages conflict within national economic policies and the increased penetration of the japanese economy by foreign financial institutions describes how the change has resulted in an emerging socio economic gap in japan between individuals groups and organizations demonstrates how the japanese experience suggests the transformative power of global capital markets on national political economies particularly those that have been interventionist in nature

in the shadow of the vote decision making in the european community scholarship on the european community ec focuses particular attention on how formal voting rules and institutional reform condition decision making outcomes the predominant view of ec history holds that decision making remained paralyzed until institutional reforms in 1987 and 1992 restored and expanded adherence to majority voting rules which in turn unblocked and expedited ec legislative efforts in this study i challenge these fundamental assumptions using comprehensive data for 1974 95 and a series of quantitative assessments including event history analysis i show that decision making in the 1970s was anything but paralyzed that the impact of the luxembourg compromise has been greatly overstated that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased the ec legislative process and that institutional effects are mediated by the underlying distribution of member state preferences the findings have important implications for our understanding of the history and future trajectory of european integration and highlight the applicability of standard political science theories and methods to the study of the ec

fundamental analysis and subsequent stock returns abstract this paper re examines the ou and penman 1989 conclusion that fundamental analysis identifies equity values not currently reflected in stock prices and thus systematically predicts abnormal returns their fundamental summary measure pr the estimated probability of an earnings increase also proxies for firm size and capm risk after controlling cross sectional differences in capm beta and firm size no significant incremental predictive ability is attributable to pr the pr measure is interpreted as a proxy for expected return differences rather than as new evidence of a systematic market underreaction to the future earnings signal inherent in current financial statements

third world indebted industrialization international finance and state capitalism in mexico brazil algeria and south korea the past fifteen years have seen two important developments in the international economic system the rapid industrialization of many less developed countries ldcs and their increasing indebtedness to private financial institutions massive bank loans have been used to fund industrial growth in many ldcs international financial markets have replaced multinational corporations as the third world s most important source of private foreign capital in four major borrowing countries mexico brazil algeria and south korea the process of indebted industrialization has its roots in the internationalization of finance the increasing role of the state and the use of funds raised on the international capital markets to finance industrial development the results include rapid expansions of ldc industrial production and ldc exports of manufactured products as well as the formation of an implicit partnership between private financial institutions and state capitalist elites in the third world

power and the control of capital this essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial asia and latin america and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources the stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who or what supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

the institutional roots of american trade policy politics coalitions and international trade the 1934 reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa changed the structure of the making of u s trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs the authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the rtaa was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations the expansion of exports under the rtaa enhanced political support for increasingly lower u s tariffs evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view

interests and the wall of ideas germany s eastern trade policy after unification since 1989 germany s domestic and international environments have experienced significant changes thus it is reasonable to expect that the country s long standing foreign and domestic policies will adapt to novel challenges and pressures this article examines eastern trade policy an area in which one might expect to observe a greater degree of government intervention postunification in fact no such adaptation has taken place this empirical puzzle lends itself to analysis based on the interaction of interests institutions and ideas unification altered the prevailing constellation of material economic interests in germany as well as parliamentary electoral institutions however the events of 1989 to 1990 left untouched dominant ideas that shaped the west german political economy as well as crucial sets of domestic and international institutions linked to those ideas the authors conclude that the absence of an interventionist trade response stems from continuity at the nexus of ideas and insti

do regimes matter epistemic communities and mediterranean pollution control international regimes have received increasing attention in the literature on international relations however little attention has been systematically paid to how compliance with them has been achieved an analysis of the mediterranean action plan a coordinated effort to protect the mediterranean sea from pollution shows that this regime actually served to empower a group of experts members of an epistemic community who were then able to redirect their governments toward the pursuit of new objectives acting in an effective transnational coalition these new actors contributed to the development of convergent state policies in compliance with the regime and were also effective in promoting stronger and broader rules for pollution control this suggests that in addition to providing a form of order in an anarchic international political system regimes may also contribute to governmental learning and influence patterns of behavior by empowering new groups who are able to direct their governments toward new ends

global markets and national politics collision course or virtuous circle increasing exposure to trade foreign direct investment and liquid capital mobility have not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottom among the oecd countries one reason is that there are strong political incentives for governments to cushion the dislocations and risk generated by openness moreover countries with large and expanding public economies when balanced with increased revenues even from capital taxes have not suffered from capital flight or higher interest rates this is because the modern welfare state comprising income transfer programs and publicly provided social services generates economically important collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and that actors are interested in productivity value these range from the accumulation of human and physical capital to social stability under conditions of high market uncertainty to popular support for the market economy itself as a result arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are considerably overdrawn

accounting measurement price earnings ratio and the information content of security prices a number of papers for example beaver lambert and morse 1980 beaver lambert and ryan 1987 collins kothari and rayburn 1987 and freeman 1987 have documented that stock prices lead accounting earnings these investigations have led to the conclusions that prices provide information about earnings ahead of time and that earnings capture events that affect security prices with a lag the study of p e ratios has supported those conclusions and also produced additional insights beaver and morse 1978 have shown that pie ratios not only predict future earnings changes but they also identify transitory aspects of current earnings investors utilize other information in setting prices which provides both a prediction of future earnings and an indication of whether current earnings are representative of future earnings thus a comparison of price to earnings in a p e calculation can indicate the extent to which current earnings are transitory 1 in this paper we show that information in prices that leads future earnings is contained in financial statements while accrual accounting

the political economy of the euro crisis this article introduces the special issue on the political economy of the euro crisis which aims to improve our understanding of the causes consequences and implications of the highly unusual nature of this crisis a financial crisis among developed countries within a supranational monetary union the article provides a brief chronology of the crisis discusses its underlying causes and reviews the ways in which comparative and international political economy can help us understand the crisis the article then discusses the individual and collective contributions of the articles in the special issue and discusses possible future research paths on the political economy of the euro crisis we conclude with a brief discussion of how a political economy perspective informs our understanding of the long term prospects for the eurozone and european integration

financial interdependence and the state international monetary relations at century s end as the twentieth century draws to a close one can find sharply contrasting views among leading scholars on almost every key issue in positive international political economy how strong are international as opposed to domestic influences on policy how important are issues of national security high politics versus economic considerations low politics what role do institutions international and domestic play in influencing and constraining the behavior of governments why is international cooperation rare but not unheard of the list goes on and on

increasing returns to scale in financial intermediation and the non neutrality of government policy a general equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries is constructed and used to study the effects of some standard policy experiments one time increases in the growth rate and in the level of the stock of money have non neutral and sometimes surprising effects on interest rates the quantity of intermediated borrowing and lending the number of intermediary firms inflation and the price level optimal government macroeconomic policy is shown to reflect a tradeoff between public sector frictions and the capital market distortion created by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in private intermediation

ideas versus resources explaining the flat tax and pension privatization revolutions in eastern europe and the former soviet union this article examines the rapid spread of pension privatization and the flat tax in former communist countries to understand why new policy ideas take hold and to elucidate the role played by mater

european union energy policy integration a case of european commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism focusing on gas this article explores the role of the european commission in the process of european union energy security policy development and the extent to which the policy area is becoming increasingly supranational situating the article within the literature on agenda setting and framing it is argued that a policy window was opened as a result of enlargement to include more energy import dependent states a trend of increasing energy imports and prices and gas supply disruptions from the mid 2000s the commission contributed to a shift in political norms successfully framing import dependency as a problem requiring an eu level solution based on the institution s pre existing preferences for a diversified energy supply and internal energy market whilst member states retain significant sovereignty the commission has achieved since 2006 creeping competencies in the internal and to a lesser extent external dimensions of eu energy policy

revisiting the single european act and the common wisdom on globalization the european program of liberalization launched by the single european act sea of 1987 is commonly seen as a powerful instance of globalization trends of economic integration liberalization and international institution building this article revisits the origins of the sea to argue that the extent and success of its liberalizing program depended on a causally distinct push for european institutional reform a retracing of concrete political patterns behind the sea greatly strengthens broader statistical and theoretical challenges to the notion of strong universal trends of globalization

common factors and local factors implications for term structures and exchange rates this paper studies a multi factor two country term structure and exchange rate model when a diversification effect for an international bond portfolio is expected it shows that the diversification gain calls upon certain restrictions on the process of the stochastic discount factor in a factor structured economy existence of local factors is shown to be a necessary condition for the gains from investing in foreign bonds further the exchange rate risk premia are shown to be a function of the differentials of the risk premia of the factors in bond returns empirical results reveal the tendency for investors to respond sensitively to rare shocks which is shown to be a potential solution to the forward premium puzzle

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

a continuous time equilibrium model of forward prices and futures prices in a multigood economy abstract this paper is a theoretical investigation of equilibrium forward and futures prices we construct a rational expectations model in continuous time of a multigood identical consumer economy with constant stochastic returns to scale production using this model we find three main results first we find formulas for equilibrium forward futures discount bond commodity bond and commodity option prices second we show that a futures price is actually a forward price for the delivery of a random number of units of a good the random number is the return earned from continuous reinvestment in instantaneously riskless bonds until maturity of the futures contract third we find and interpret conditions under which normal backwardation or contango is found in forward or futures prices these conditions reflect the usefulness of forward and futures contracts as consumption hedges

the european constitutional settlement this paper argues first that a synthesis of the theories of endogenous policy formation non coercive interstate bargaining theo ry and international regime theory provides a plausible account of the path of european integration with little role for expl anations stressing geopolitical or ideological factors international mediation or political entrepreneurship moreover these theories which embrace economic fundamentals as driving factors help explain the sequencing of the european union especially in regard to successive enlar gements however the paper concludes that the process of european integration appears to have reached an institutiona l platea u for which a constitutiona l compromise appears to be the only plausible equilibrium

earnings surprise research synthesis and perspectives an investigation of the relation between earnings surprise and three empirical anomalies the p e effect the size effect and the value line enigma indicates that the standardized unexpected earnings sue effect appears to be separate and distinct from each of the three the relations between the sue phenomenon and firm risk the appropriateness of the earnings expectations model and the role of transaction costs are also investigated the sue phenomenon is not attributable to inappropriate risk adjustment use of the wrong earnings expectations model or ignoring transaction costs the sue effect may be partly explained by analysts behavior and is both predictable and profitable the sue effect has also been observed in japan

societal preferences partisan agents and monetary policy outcomes if different producer groups have divergent interests concerning macroeconomic policies how do societal preferences translate into state policy outcomes i develop and test a party as agent framework for understanding the importance of societal preferences with regard to monetary policy under capital mobility following the principal agent model political parties function as agents for different societal principals rightist parties tend to represent internationally oriented business groups with preferences for monetary convergence while leftist parties do the same for domestically oriented groups preferring monetary autonomy under capital mobility i present statistical evidence showing that oecd leftist governments have been associated with more monetary autonomy and currency variability than their rightist counterparts even after controlling for basic economic indicators such as inflation the statistical evidence also shows that societal group size tends not to explain either autonomous monetary policy choices or exchangerate stability thus even large and wealthy societal groups may be unable to obtain their preferred policy outcome when their respective partisan agents do not hold government power

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

the demand for international regimes international regimes can be understood as results of rational behavior by the actors principally states that create them regimes are demanded in part because they facilitate the making of agreements by providing information and reducing transactions costs in world politics increased interdependence among issues greater issue density will lead to increased demand for regimes insofar as regimes succeed in providing high quality information through such processes as the construction of generally accepted norms or the development of transgovernmental relations they create demand for their own continuance even if the structural conditions such as hegemony under which they were first supplied change analysis of the demand for international regimes thus helps us to understand lags between structural change and regime change as well as to assess the significance of transgovernmental policy networks several assertions of structural theory seem problematic in light of this analysis hegemony may not be a necessary condition for stable international regimes past patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate to some extent for increasing fragmentation of power

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

de globalization theories predictions and opportunities for international business research de globalization now a distinct possibility would induce a significant qualitative shift in strategies structures and behaviors observable in international business ib coming to terms with this qualitative shift would require ib research to develop a much deeper integration of politics the key driver of de globalization to support such integration this paper introduces two relevant theories of de globalization from political science liberalism and realism both predict de globalization under current conditions but lead to different expectations about the future world economy liberalism suggests a patchwork of economic linkages while realism predicts the emergence of economic blocs around major countries this paper discusses the resulting opportunities in three areas of ib research political strategies and roles of multinational enterprises mnes global value chains and the role of the national context for political strategies and roles there is a need to explore how regular business activities and deliberate political agency of mnes affect the political sustainability of globalization for value chains questions include their future reach and specialization changes in organizational forms and the impact of political considerations on location decisions research opportunities on national contexts relate to their ability to sustain globalization and their connection with economic and military power

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

doctors with borders occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking conclusions that skilled americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants in this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition in practice high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high skill migrants who share their occupation specific skills licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants from a collective action perspective skilled natives can more easily secure sub national occupation specific policies than influence national immigration policy we exploit the unique structure of the american medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations we show that over the 1973 2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and as a consequence received fewer new migrant physicians by our estimates over a third of all us states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements this article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration regulatory rent seeking as a barrier to the cross national mobility of human capital and the public policy implications of such barriers

exchange rate theory and practice this volume grew out of a national bureau of economic research conference on exchange rates held in bellagio italy in 1982 in it the world s most respected international monetary economists discuss three significant new views on the economics of exchange rates rudiger dornbusch s overshooting model jacob frenkel s and michael mussa s asset market variants and pentti kouri s current account portfolio approach their papers test these views with evidence from empirical studies and analyze a number of exchange rate policies in use today including those of the european monetary system

explaining institutional change policy areas outside options and the bretton woods institutions i propose and test a theoretical framework that explains institutional change in international relations like firms in markets international institutions are affected by the underlying characteristics of their policy areas some policy areas are prone to produce institutions facing relatively little competition limiting the outside options of member states and impeding redistributive change in comparison institutions facing severe competition will quickly reflect changes in underlying state interests and power to test the theory empirically i exploit common features of the bretton woods institutions the international monetary fund and world bank to isolate the effect of variation in policy area characteristics the empirical tests show that despite having identical membership and internal rules bargaining outcomes in the bretton woods institutions have diverged sharply and in accordance with the theory

the politics of international regime formation managing natural resources and the environment why do actors in international society succeed in forming institutional arrangements or regimes to cope with some transboundary problems but fail to do so in connection with other seemingly similar problems this article employs a threefold strategy to make progress toward answering this question the first section prepares the ground by identifying and critiquing the principal models embedded in the existing literature on regime formation and the second section articulates an alternative model called institutional bargaining the third section employs this alternative model to derive some hypotheses about the determinants of success in institutional bargaining and uses these hypotheses in a preliminary way to illuminate the process of regime formation in international society to lend empirical content to the argument the article focuses throughout on problems relating to natural resources and the environment

investing in the peace economic interdependence and international conflict research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace still existing understanding of linkages between cone ict and international economics is limited in at least two ways first cross border economic relationships are far broader than just trade global capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy coordination second the manner in which economics is said to inhibit cone ict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war we discuss and then demonstrate formally how interdependence can ine uence states recourse to military violence the risk of disrupting economic linkages particularly access to capital may occasionally deter minor contests between interdependent states but such opportunity costs will typically fail to preclude militarized disputes instead interdependence offers nonmilitarized avenues for communicating resolve through costly signaling our quantitative results show that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade democracy interest and other variables students of world politics have long argued that peace is a positive externality of global commerce theorists like montesquieu and kant and practitioners like woodrow wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction mounting evidence in recent years appears to substantiate these claims multiple studies many identie ed with the democratic peace link interstate trade with reductions in militarized disputes or wars 1 while we concur with the evolving

partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy while it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution it is less obvious that a real world incumbent facing short term partisan or electoral pressures would do so in this article i model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival maximizing incumbent it turns out that a wide range of survival maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy while political pressures do not in general discourage monetary commitments they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence i highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes in so doing i provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

default market microstructure and changing trade patterns in forward markets a case study of north sea oil abstract default or credit risk is a central difference between forward and futures markets empirical tests have found little difference between forwards and futures prices but these tests have been conducted on markets where such risk is minimal e g foreign exchange so that even if default risk is in general an important difference between forward and futures trading they would have been unable to detect its effects in contrast this paper presents a case study of a market for forward delivery of a type of crude oil from the north sea that experienced widespread and well documented defaults when the spot price of the underlying commodity plunged from roughly 30 to roughly 10 per barrel in a short period of time in early 1986 the defaults were by relatively small lightly capitalized trading companies firms that neither produce nor consume the physical commodity because information on defaults in financial markets is scarce the paper describes the circumstances surrounding the default episode in some detail the market survived the default episode with market microstructure unaltered and still flourishes despite the successful introduction of a futures market in the same commodity by the london international petroleum exchange patterns of trade changed however the paper examines the hypothesis that investment banks which entered the market following the default period provided intermediation services to market participants thereby substituting to an extent for a clearinghouse taking advantage of the information on the buyer and seller in each transaction the paper presents nonparametric tests for changing patterns of forward trade

the origins of persistent current account imbalances in the post bretton woods era why do some countries run persistent current account surpluses why do others run deficits often over decades leading to enduring global imbalances such persistent imbalances are the root cause of many financial crises and a major source of international economic conflict we propose that differences in wage bargaining institutions explain a large share of imbalances through their effect on the trade balance in countries with coordinated wage bargaining wage growth in export industries can be restrained to ensure competitiveness leading to persistent trade surpluses we estimate the contribution of these institutions to trade balances in organisation for economic co operation and development oecd member countries since 1977 and find ample support for our hypothesis contrary to much of the literature the choice of fixed or floating exchange rate regimes has only a small effect on trade or current account balances in other words internal adjustment in surplus countries via wage bargaining institutions trumps external adjustment by deficit countries

forward and futures prices evidence from the foreign exchange markets cornell and reinganum 1981 hereafter cr report that price differentials for future contracts and forward contracts are statistically insignificant in foreign exchange markets based on this finding cr conclude that marking to market is insignificant in the formulation of currency futures prices this note identifies two potential concerns with the cr tests one problem relates to the timing of delivery dates for matched contracts a second problem relates to the time period for the cr study we show that correcting for these problems does not affect the overall conclusions of the cr study marking to market does not appear to have a significant effect on currency futures prices

economic actors lobbying influence on the prospects for war and peace political scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process in the past few years a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace all of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not i advance two contrary arguments at least among the advanced states i posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference all of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization in particular i show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras my second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace i posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders

discussion of accounting measurement price earnings ratios and the information content of security prices the paper by ou and penman henceforth op provides an empirical analysis of the association between the accounting numbers in financial statements and the stock price rate of return a critical assumption in the paper is that accounting earnings can be characterized by transitory and permanent components op argue that this transitory component can be identified by financial statement or fundamental analysis the authors combine via logit many of the ratios commonly discussed in financial statement analysis into a probabilistic index denoted pr for predicting one step ahead increases in earnings this pr index which is the primary focus of the empirical analysis is interpreted as having some ability to distinguish the transitory and permanent components of reported earnings thus op provide a novel approach for estimating two components of accounting earnings that in theory have very different associations with the stock price rate of return the results in the paper are based on a large sample of firms obtained from the 1984 annual and research compustat files i e 29 958 firmyears over the time period from 1973 to 1983 op using cross sectional correlation and regression analyses report the following results 1 the pr index exhibits a negative association with the earning toprice e p ratio 2 the pr index as well as the e p ratio has some ability to predict the percentage change in earning per share eps up to approximately three years into the future table 2 3 the pr index exhibits a slightly higher coefficient of determination

information and the coase theorem abstract some economists think the coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez faire others see it as a mere tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient the coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely of course we can attribute inefficiencies to bargaining imperfection but it may not be useful to do so such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason this article gives one economist s reasoned view it discusses the coase theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting it considers mechanism design for revealing private information and describes the problems of centralization should the coase theorem should be viewed as a second best result property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative does the coase theorem recommend an institution or make

international institutions and domestic compensation the imf and the politics of capital account liberalization certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross border movement of capital how can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s we argue that imf stabilizationprogramsprovideawindowofopportunityforgovernmentstoinitiatefinancialreforms butthatpolicymakers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high large loans from the imf shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government s ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms we test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002 we employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in imf programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion the results provide strong support for the interactive effect of imf programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization

asset specificity and the political behavior of firms lobbying for subsidies in norway previous research into endogenous trade policy has described extensively the political incentives of firms with specific assets but no studies have shown directly that firms behave as predicted we adopt insights from transaction costs economics to develop measures of asset specificity and to investigate how variation in these measures affects the political behavior of firms in particular we examine the lobbying choices of norwegian firms in the 1980s given available subsidy funds from norway s oil boom and some government decisions in the 1970s firms with more specific assets faced potentially greater losses from adjusting to new activities in the face of competitive pressures and thus had greater incentives to lobby for subsidies to protect themselves joint contacting of parliament and government on behalf of firm interests by representatives of both management and labor should be particularly likely where firms had specific assets data analysis shows that asset specificity as indicated by r d intensity and job immobility predicts joint contacting independently of plausible alternative explanatory variables like firm size and export orientation

the relation between forward prices and futures prices abstract this paper consolidates the results of some recent work on the relation between forward prices and futures prices it develops a number of propositions characterizing the two prices these propositions contain several testable implications about the difference between forward and futures prices many of the propositions show that equilibrium forward and futures prices are equal to the values of particular assets even though they are not in themselves asset prices the paper then illustrates these results in the context of two valuation models and discusses the effects of taxes and other institutional factors

international macroeconomic policy coordination when policymakers do not agree on the true model the authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model t wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the nash noncooperative solution however the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction these points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models out of 1 000 possible combina tions of models that could represent u s beliefs non u s beliefs and the true model monetary coordination improves u s welfare in on ly 546 cases copyright 1988 by american economic association

national tax systems versus the european capital market capital taxation alberto giovannini the current structure of taxes on capital income across ec countries can be exploited by corporations to reduce tax burdens skilled individuals can indulge in tax avoidance too the liberalization of capital movements stands to turn tax avoidance into a cottage industry this article provides a primer on capital income taxes and describes strategies which reduce the tax burden from a policy perspective the question is how to avoid massive tax evasion after 1992 there is no need to harmonize if the right taxation principle is adopted two principles are contrasted the territorial principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic investment irrespective of the country of residence of the beneficiary and the worldwide principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic savings irrespective of where they are invested it is shown that the worldwide principle involves much fewer distortions than the territorial principle a strict application of this principle would effectively solve the problem of tat evasion in europe without requiring full harmonization of the tax systems its full implementation would require the abolition of withholding taxes the elimination of tax deferrals which are quite pervasive throughout europe and an in depth review of blocking and secrecy laws

class versus industry cleavages inter industry factor mobility and the politics of trade domestic political conflict has been a constant companion to international trade but the nature of that conflict has varied greatly in western democracies over the last two centuries political battles over trade policy appear to have sometimes divided societies along broad class lines and at other times split them into narrow industry based coalitions i argue that this diversity stems from historical and cross national variation in inter industry factor mobility class coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high whereas narrow industry based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low evidence from six western economies for the last two centuries indicates that levels of factor mobility have varied historically and cross nationally in accord with industrialization and regulation this variation corresponds broadly with observable differences in the formation of trade policy coalitions

forward and futures prices evidence from the foreign exchange markets empirical studies of the treasury bill markets have revealed substantial differences between the futures price and the implied forward price these differences have been attributed to taxes transaction costs and the settling up procedure employed in the futures market this paper examines the forward and futures prices in foreign exchange in an attempt to distinguish between the competing explanations empirical studies of the treasury bill market have revealed differences between the futures price or rate and the implicit forward price derived from the term structure of interest rates 1 these differences have generally been attributed to market imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs see for example arak 1 capozza and cornell 2 and rendelman and carabini 6 recently however cox ingersoll and ross 3 henceforth cir derived a model in which forward and futures prices need not be equal even in perfect markets without taxes as long as interest rates are stochastic the significance of the cir effect may be hard to investigate using only data from the bill market because of the potentially complicating effects of taxes and transaction costs unique to this market by using data from the foreign exchange market we are able to eliminate the tax effect and reduce the impact of transaction costs the question we address is whether the discrepancies observed in the treasury bill market are also observed in the foreign exchange market if they are then we have evidence that the differences are due to a combination of the cir effect and the transaction costs common to both markets if they are not then either the magnitude of the cir effect is much less in the foreign exchange market or the treasury bill results are due to the unique tax treatment and transaction costs of that market this paper is organized as follows in section i the trading mechanics of the forward and futures markets in foreign exchange are discussed section ii reviews the explanations for the discrepancies between the forward and futures prices for treasury bills the institutional differences between the foreign exchange and bill markets are also summarized to show which of these explanations cannot apply to the foreign exchange market in section iii the data are decribed and the empirical results are presented the conclusions are summarized in the final section

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

growth volatility and financial liberalization we examine the effects of both equity market liberalization and capital account openness on real consumption growth variability we show that financial liberalization is mostly associated with lower consumption growth volatility our results are robust surviving controls for business cycle effects economic and financial development the quality of institutions and other variables countries that have more open capital accounts experience a greater reduction in consumption growth volatility after equity market openings we also find that financial liberalizations are associated with declines in the ratio of consumption growth volatility to gdp growth volatility suggesting improved risk sharing our results are weaker for liberalizing emerging markets but we never observe a significant increase in real volatility moreover we demonstrate significant differences in the volatility response depending on the size of the banking and government sectors and certain institutional factors

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design