bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the european central bank evidence from a panel sample selection model abstract this paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations ltros of the european central bank we investigate how banks bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs interest rate expectations market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin size and experience a specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time therefore we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank s endogenous participation decision we find that bidding strategies depend on the banks attributes yet different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success there is evidence for the winner s curse effect in ltros indicating a common value component in banks demand for longer term refinancing

trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying abstract this paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a free trade agreement fta it uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously the effect of foreign lobbying under the fta is examined empirically using canadian industry level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin the analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy the heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important the presence of an organized lobbying group in an fta partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the fta is associated with less protection

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

import penetration and the politics of trade protection abstract in this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of political economy models of trade policy namely that trade protection should be higher in sectors characterized by lower import penetration we call this the standard prediction the existing empirical evidence offers little support for this prediction in this paper we argue that the standard prediction depends critically on the assumptions that trade taxes are the only policy instruments and that the government has access to non distortionary taxation we analyze a model in which the government can use quotas and vers in addition to trade taxes and raising public funds may be costly under a simple sufficient condition our model predicts that the protection level increases with import penetration both in sectors that are protected with tariffs and in sectors that are protected with quantitative restrictions

the execution of monetary policy a tale of two central banks money markets and at the inception of economic and monetary union emu an open question was whether execution of monetary policy by the eurosystem could effectively stabilize liquidity and short term interest rates potential problems could arise from the central bank s limited knowledge of the new euro area market s response to shocks and from market participants limited understanding of the monetary authorities policy execution framework which minimizes the central bank s presence in the market and assigns a key liquidity stabilization role to standing facilities and to depository institutions own reserve management we find that the euro area money market has displayed a remarkable degree of stability since the inception of emu overnight euro rates have behaved very similarly to us federal funds rates which are managed much more actively by the us federal reserve recent operational changes by both the eurosystem and the federal reserve are leading to convergence in style of policy execution on the two sides of the atlantic and may foster even closer similarity in the next few years leonardo bartolini and alessandro prati

the empirical performance of the ecb s repo auctions evidence from aggregated and individual bidding data abstract we analyze the empirical performance of the ecb s fixed rate tenders by estimating bid functions using aggregated and individual bidding data the intention of the study is twofold first in view of the ecb s emphasis on the principle of equal treatment we employ the aggregated data to compare the bidding behavior of german and non german banks specifically we investigate banks overbidding and its response to opportunity cost and interest rate expectations second we use the individual bidding data of german banks and estimate panel data models to investigate the impact of a bank s type on its bidding the results indicate that large banks bid more informed or sophisticated than smaller banks with regard to interest rate expectations however there is no evidence for a size effect in banks overbidding behavior

paying the price final goods protection in oecd countries this paper presents new measures of final goods trade protection in eight developed countries the analysis exploits detailed comprehensive and careful price comparisons to derive estimates that it is argued reliably capture all kinds of barriers the results show extensive protection japan s average tariff equivalent is 57 those of the european countries range from 48 to 55 and that of the united states is lowest at 12 an applied general equilibrium analysis of this protection is conducted the results include the following japan s barriers impose large costs on itself japanese and u s barriers greatly burden poorer countries the united states would benefit significantly from multilateral but not unilateral opening

why did the banks overbid an empirical model of the fixed rate tenders of the european central bank abstract this paper tests two alternative hypotheses for the overbidding behavior of the banks in the fixed rate tenders conducted by the european central bank ecb from january 1999 until june 2000 one hypothesis attributes the overbidding to the expectations of a future tightening of monetary policy while the other attributes it to the liquidity allotment decisions of the ecb the model is estimated with individual bidding data of the spanish banks and also with aggregate bidding data of all spanish banks and all banks in the euro area the empirical results provide support for the second hypothesis

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

evidence and explanation for the tariff lobbying paradox endogenous tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises recent empirical evidence suggests that u s protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while u s trade barrier fell we find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries be

protection for sale an empirical investigation comment do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient are lobbies net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents we estimate the influence driven grossman and helpman 1994 and the tariff function findlay and wellisz 1982 models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models we find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale the important new result is however that not only the existence of lobbies matters but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions using j tests to compare the power of the models directly we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the influence driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the tariff function model

lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting abstract this paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates cooperative behavior and lobbying governments use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying contributions and general welfare governments do not use export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import competing lobbies in setting tariff levels in a symmetric model cooperation between governments is sustained by threats of punishment in future periods unless governments place too much weight on the future the result is a cooperative tariff otherwise the result is a reciprocal import subsidy

the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s tariff preferences granted to latin america abstract this paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market to this end the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment the predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the united states and latin american countries the results suggest that latin american exporters and us importers lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the united states more interestingly these findings also show that u s importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences these results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries

a positive theory of fixed rate funds supplying operations in an accommodative financial environment abstract this paper studies bidding behaviors in fixed rate funds supplying auctions using a simple game theoretic model while the existing literature argues that such auction schemes are vulnerable to the overbidding problem the bid to cover ratio for the bank of japan s current fixed rate operations has remained stable after reviewing the stylized repo game and the mechanism of overbidding under the fixed rate operations we argue that the current framework of fixed rate funds supplying auctions operated by the bank of japan and the recent accommodative financial environment make bidders loss functions locally satiated given this argument it is shown that any stable bid to cover ratios other than either undersubscription or overbidding can be supported by an equilibrium finally we empirically find that the ratio under the bank of japan operations has been influenced by such financial conditions proxied by market interest rates and term spreads

overbidding in fixed rate tenders the role of exposure risk abstract the fixed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies while academic research has largely dismissed the procedure owing to its tendency to encourage overbidding central banks such as the ecb and the bank of england have continued using it we investigate this apparent conflict by considering an auction theoretic setting with private information about declining marginal valuations since overbidding entails exposure risk an equilibrium may exist even if bids are costless and the intended volume is pre announced in fact the allotment quota may be strictly below one with certainty also with adaptive expectations overbidding need not escalate however the resulting allocation is typically inefficient empirical proxies of exposure risk are significant in both euro and sterling operations our findings have implications in particular for the potential reintroduction of pro rata allotment in the main refinancing operations of the eurosystem

interest on reserves and the flexibility of monetary policy in the euro area this paper shows that remunerating required reserves can increase the flexibility of monetary policy the remuneration at the current policy rate implies constant net marginal interest costs of holding required reserves this allows the central bank to change the policy rate also within a reserve maintenance period without inducing a problematic reserve shifting on behalf of the banks in the euro area required reserves are remunerated at an average rate therefore the way in which reserves are remunerated has to be changed in order to make use of the advantage of a higher flexibility of monetary policy

semi parametric estimation of simultaneous equations with limited dependent variables a case study of female labour supply we propose a general strategy to estimate semi parametrically simultaneous equations with limited dependent variables first each reduced form rf is estimated with various semi parametric methods second the specification of each rf is tested to select an appropriate method third the structural form sf equations are estimated using minimum distance methods and the restrictions among the sf and rf parameters a case study of female labour supply is presented

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

substitutability and protectionism latin america s trade policy and imports from china and india this article examines the trade policy response of latin american governments to the rapid growth of chinese and indian exports in world markets to explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in china and india the protection for sale model is extended to allow for region specific degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties of a good the results suggest that more protection toward chinese and indian goods can be explained by the higher substitutability of chinese and indian goods with domestic varieties the data support the model which performs better than the original protection for sale framework in explaining latin america s structure of protection

scale economies in electricity distribution a semiparametric analysis we estimate the costs of distributing electricity using data on municipal electric utilities in ontario canada for the period 1993 5 the data reveal substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale with minimum efficient scale being achieved by firms with about 20 000 customers larger firms exhibit constant or decreasing returns utilities which deliver additional services such as water sewage have significantly lower costs indicating the presence of economies of scope our basic specifications comprise semiparametric variants of the translog cost function where output enters non parametrically and remaining variables including their interactions with output are parametric we rely upon non parametric differencing techniques and extend a previous differencing test of equality of non parametric regression functions to a panel data setting copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

structural holes in social networks we consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction e g exchange goods or information creates a unit surplus a transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection if the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus thus individuals form links with others to create surplus to gain intermediation rents and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation first we show that in the absence of capacity constraints on links it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs second we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links in this case distances between players must be long which induces players who are far off to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents a cycle network then emerges payoffs being equal across all players

protection for sale or surge protection this paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential grossman and helpman protection for sale pfs model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting a model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges but only for organized industries is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework this suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought

overbidding in fixed rate tenders an empirical assessment of alternative explanations abstract this paper investigates various theories explaining banks overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the european central bank ecb using auction data from both the bundesbank and the ecb we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding this implies that the proposed new rules by the ecb aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged

can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the protection for sale model in the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous trade protection sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare we empirically investigate this model using u s and turkish data our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies additionally we assume all specific factor owners to be organized into different lobbies these changes validated by hypothesis tests yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government s concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies peut on obtenir des calibrations realistes des parametres du modele de protection en vue d augmenter les ventes dans le modele de protection commerciale endogene de grossman helpman 1994 des lobbys sectoriels tentent d influencer un gouvernement en place qui maximise une somme ponderee des contributions politiques et du bien etre collectif les auteurs utilisent ce modele pour analyser les donnees pour les etats unis et la turquie on specifie le modele d une maniere qui serre de plus pres la theorie que ce qui a ete le cas dans les etudes anterieures de plus on assume que tous les proprietaires de facteurs de production specifiques sont organises en lobbys differents ces changements valides par des tests d hypotheses engendrent des estimations plus realistes des parametres de la fonction d interet du gouvernement pour le bien etre collectif et pour la fraction de la population organisee en lobbys

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

forward looking behavior in ecb liquidity auctions evidence from the pre crisis period abstract using data from the pre crisis period we investigate banks joint bidding behavior in the ecb s main refinancing operations mro and longer term refinancing operations ltro we test whether banks bid at lower rates in mros before the ltro and at higher rates after the ltro compared to other operations we motivate this by findings from the auction literature suggesting that agents bidding behavior is forward looking and takes sequences of future auctions into account we offer two findings first we find that in general banks bid in the mro before the ltro at lower rates as compared to other mros moreover mro participants that also bid in the following ltro bid at even lower rates compared to peers not bidding in the ltro these findings support the hypothesis that banks view obtaining liquidity from the two operations as a substitute second we find that banks generally bid more aggressively in the mro after the ltro banks that participated also in the ltro preceding the mro bid at substantially higher rates these findings reflect that short banks with potentially large net liquidity needs in the mro after the ltro bid more aggressively although size plays a considerable role for bidding behavior the conclusions are valid for banks of different sizes

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item