industry characteristics and interest group formation an empirical study the role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics however few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics in cross sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation we discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy

the futile quest for a grand explanation of long run government expenditure this paper carries out a critical reappraisal of the two contending theories purporting to explain long run government spending wagner s law and different variants of the ratchet effect we analyze data spanning from the early 19 th century until the present day in sweden and the united kingdom hence in contrast to previous studies we evaluate the validity of wagner s law and the ratchet effect hypothesis over a very long time period starting at the beginning of industrialization cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long run relationships between government expenditure and gdp focusing on sub periods and structural breaks moreover we test the ratchet effect hypothesis by estimating models which allow for asymmetric adjustment according to our main results wagner s law does not hold in the long run although the data are consistent with wagner s law between roughly 1860 and the mid 1970s this can be traced to the formation of the modern public sector including the introduction of public education health care and so forth yet wagner s law did not hold during the initial industrialization phase before 1860 and in recent periods gdp only affects the government spending share when we control for population age structure finally we find some evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the uk particularly in the post wwii period however the ratchet effect is not a general cause of the growth of government spending

interest groups and the rise and decline of growth interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth a la olson 1982 it is unknown however what impact if any groups exert on the volatility of growth an important hindrance to development in this article we first consider what impact we should expect olson groups to have on the volatility of growth we then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a cross country panel using system generalized method of moments the findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability in addition the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies

wagner s hypothesis evidence from kuwait using cointegration tests this paper investigates the relationship between public expenditure and a number of socioeconomic variables including the level of income in kuwait a general form of the public expenditure function is formulated and recent developments in time series econometrics including unit roots and cointegration tests and an error correction model are used given the characteristics of the economy alternative measures for each variables are used the analysis in the paper is based on time series data covering the period from 1969 70 to 1994 95 in general the findings lend little support to the existence of long run equilibrium relationship between public expenditure and the socioeconomic variables and the evidence does not lend support to the validity of wagner s law in kuwait

a test of the wagner s hypothesis for the fiji islands in this article we examine wagner s law for fiji for the period 1970 to 2002 using the johansen 1988 test for cointegration we find one cointegration relationship between national output and government expenditure using five different long run estimators we find robust results on the impact of national income on government expenditure the elasticity ranges from 1 36 to 1 44 implying that a 1 increase in income leads to a 1 36 1 44 increase in government expenditure moreover we find that in the long run national income granger causes government expenditure while these results are consistent with wagner s law we warn policy makers that because fiji s total debt stands at around 69 of gdp in future the bulk of expenditure will go towards debt financing at the expense of productive sectors

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

technical note note on myopic heuristics for the random yield problem bollapragada and morton 1999 present several well performing heuristics for solving the periodic inventory problem with random yield and demand their approach is essentially based on a transformation of the single period problem into a standard newsvendor problem with deterministic yield and random demand which however is supply dependent in our note we show that their evaluation of the respective optimality condition is not correct this explains the steady deterioration of their myopic heuristics for parameter constellations that correspond to increasing service levels some computational investigations reveal that the performance of the heuristics can become quite poor if service levels are high and exceed those values for which results are reported in the original study nonetheless up to now these heuristics are still the best ones available for solving the joint random yield problem

analysis of tailored base surge policies in dual sourcing inventory systems we study a model of a firm managing its inventory of a single product by sourcing supplies from two supply sources a regular supplier who offers a lower unit cost and a longer lead time than a second emergency supplier a practically implementable policy for such a firm is a tailored base surge tbs policy allon g van mieghem ja 2010 global dual sourcing tailored base surge allocation to near and offshore production management sci 56 1 110 124 to manage its inventory under this policy the firm procures a constant quantity from the regular supplier in every period and dynamically makes procurement decisions for the emergency supplier allon and van mieghem describe this practice as using the regular supplier to meet a base level of demand and the emergency supplier to manage demand surges and they conjecture that this practice is most effective when the lead time difference between the two suppliers is large we confirm these statements in two ways first we show the following analytical

pressure groups and redistribution abstract the simple pressure group model of political redistribution can predict more with less restrictive assumptions instead of ready made pressure groups composed of individuals who vote their pocketbooks we posit heterogeneous agents each of whom decides which group to join and how much effort to expend on political activity our model then examines social affinity conditions that foster pressure group formation political sympathies based on social affinity imply testable effects of growth rate and income distribution on progressive transfers effects that prove substantial in pooled time series cross section regressions for 13 oecd countries 1960 1981

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

immigration redistribution and universal suffrage the effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated this paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations which are that i immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people s higher levels of xenophobia and that ii immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote since the demand for redistribution depends on the expected gap between median voter income and mean income immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because as non citizens they do not change the median voter s income but as economic stakeholders they do affect the mean income four empirical consequences of i and ii are tested at the individual level evidence from the european values survey in 45 countries confirms ii showing that immigrants expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high in contrast i is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used

on the endogeneity of cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria games of accumulation abstract we characterize equilibria of games with two properties i agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur but ii they can only add to their initial amounts the equilibrium set consists of just the cournot nash outcome one or both stackelberg outcomes or a continuum of points including the cournot nash outcome and one or both stackelberg outcomes a simple theorem that uses agents standard one period reaction functions and the one period cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set applications include contribution oligopoly and rent seeking games

local government service production the politics of allocative sluggishness a partial adjustment model with endogenous speed of adjustment is developed to analyze how pressure from interest groups and mass media influence the adjustment process of local governments a survey questionnaire to the local politicians is used to measure the pressure indicators based on a combined cross section and time series data base for norwegian local governments the sluggishness of the adjustment process is estimated the dynamics of the adjustment process is shown to reflect the activity of interest groups and media pressure pressure groups related to primary education explain an important part of the sluggishness observed pressure groups promoting kindergartens and health care care for the elderly stimulate reallocations

backward induction algorithm for a class of closed loop stackelberg games abstract in the paper a new deterministic continuum strategy two player discrete time dynamic stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed loop information structure the considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource where one player called leader is a superior authority choosing strategy first and another player called follower chooses after in case of convex payoff functions and certain parameter values we give a new particular backward induction algorithm which can be easily realized to find a leader follower equilibrium of the game in a certain sequential equilibrium realization from the last step towards the first one with respect to the current strategy choices of the players considerations on uniqueness and game regulation i e setting parameters of the game to achieve a predefined equilibrium are also provided the finite version of the game with finite strategy sets is also given along with its simplification and solution method several practical examples are shown to illustrate the comprehensive application possibilities of the results

the structure of periodic review policies in the presence of random yield this work provides a comprehensive analysis of a general periodic review production inventory model with random variable yield existence of an order point whose value does not depend on yield being random is proved in the single period case without specifying the yield model and using a very general cost structure when yield is a random multiple of lot size the nonorder up to optimal policy is characterized for a finite horizon model the finite horizon value functions are shown to converge to the solution of an infinite horizon functional equation and the infinite horizon order point is shown to be no smaller than when yield is certain

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

an approximate policy for a dual sourcing inventory model with positive lead times and binomial yield this paper studies the inventory system of a retailer who orders his products from two supply sources a local one that is responsive and reliable but expensive and a global one that is low cost but less reliable the deliveries from the global source only partially satisfy the quality requirements we model this situation with a dual sourcing inventory model with positive lead times and random yield we propose a dual index order up to policy dop based on approximating the inventory model with an unreliable supplier by a sequence of dual sourcing models with reliable suppliers and suitably modified demand distributions numerical results show that the performance of this heuristic is close to that of the optimal dop moreover we extend the heuristic to models with advance yield information and study its impact on the total inventory costs

an investigation of the public deficts and government spending relationship evidence for greece this paper tests the validity of the buchanan wagner hypothesis for greece that increases in public spending are the result of the tolerance of large deficits over the period 1961 1994 to test this hypothesis three unit root pretests the dickey fuller phillips perron and kwiatkowski et al and maximum likelihood estimation techniques of cointegrating vectors and a vector error correction model are employed a long run relationship is found to exist among government spending deficit income wages and adult population and the importance of short run deviations are presented the empirical evidence suggests that buchanan and wagner hypothesis seems to find support for greece in the long run and the short run further productivity in the public sector is lower than in the private sector and the growth of income is not an important determinant of the increase in the relative size of public spending

dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such fields as economics management politics and behavioral sciences stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization problem there exists extensive literature about static bilevel optimization problems however the studies on dynamic bilevel optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally in this paper we consider discrete time dynamic stackelberg games with feedback information dynamic programming algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with multiple players both for independent followers and for dependent followers when the followers act dependently the game in this paper is a combination of stackelberg game and nash game

on price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel fringe game abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members we show that i the outcomes of the closed loop and the open loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers the cartel fringe game a la salant 1976 coincide and ii when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop cartel fringe game thus the outcome of the cartel fringe open loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium however the interpretation of the cartel fringe model where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing nash cournot does not extend to the case where firms can use closed loop strategies

the provocative public sector domestic political protest and public sector growth in the oecd 1965 1982 the results shown in tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that gg is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross national comparisons of dpp or predicting intra national variations over time therefore hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed the confirmation of hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that taking into account public sector size government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio economic change i e where the public sector is small government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long established i e where the public sector is large

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

wagner s hypothesis in time series and cross section perspectives evidence from real data for 115 countries internationally comparable data on income and government expenditure for 115 countries covering the period 1950 80 are used to assess the validity of wagner s hypothesis individual country time series data and several intercountry cross sections are studied besides a tremendous diversity in the position for various countries the results indicate that while there is support for the hypothesis in some time series data sets such support is lacking in most cross section estimates much of the support for the hypothesis reported in many earlier studies therefore was probably due to either use of limited samples or inadequate data comparability across the observations studied copyright 1987 by mit press

a bound testing analysis of wagner s law in nigeria 1970 2006 this study tests wagner s law the tendency for government activities to expand along with economic expansion for nigeria using annual time series data between 1970 and 2006 it adopts the bounds test approach proposed by pesaran et al 2001 based on unrestricted error correction model uecm and toda and yamamoto s 1995 granger noncausality tests empirical results from the bounds test indicate that there exists no long run relationship between government expenditure and output in nigeria in addition toda and yamamoto s 1995 causality test results show that wagner s law does not hold for more than the period being tested rather we found a weak empirical support in the proposition by keynes that public expenditure is an exogenous factor and a policy instrument for increasing national income

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

political competition and pork barrel politics in the allocation of public investment in mexico this paper examines the effect of political competition in local elections in re gional allocation of public investment the study employs data on mexican elections covering the period 1990 95 characterised by an increase in electoral competition and coupled with increasing demands for decentralisation throughout the states empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that regional allocation of public investment by central government was driven by political opportunism and local pork barrel politics a positive relationship was found between the regional allocation of public investment and support for the central ruling party this might indicate that local spending inefficiencies were partially explained by the specific support for the incumbent party

the curious attraction of wagner s law wagner s law of increasing state activity has recently been subjected to intensive use of recondite econometric testing procedures an examination of the relevant articles reveals ignorance both of wagner s definition of state activity and of his insistence that he was not engaged in prediction consequently the omission of public enterprises contained in wagner s definition leads to a model misspecification and the object of testing his hypothesiss remains obscure

political competition and state government size do tighter elections produce looser budgets we test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size usingdata from u s states we find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand or revenues growth is mixed the democraticparty is associated with bigger government but onlywhen party representation in both the governor shouse and the legislature is strong the flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion

wagner s law revisited cointegration and causality tests for new zealand wagner s law states that the share of government expenditure in gross national product gnp will increase with economic development many associated empirical studies substitute gnp with gross domestic product gdp this article presents an empirical investigation into the validity of wagner s law for new zealand over the period 1960 to 2007 and compares the results obtained using these two measures of output application of the autoregressive distributed lag ardl bounds test suggests a cointegrating relationship between either output measure and the share of government spending and further application of general to specific gets engle and granger eg phillip hansen s fully modified ordinary least squares fmols and johansen s time series techniques illustrate statistical robustness and an income elasticity between 0 56 and 0 84 the results suggest that output measures granger cause the share of government expenditure in the long run thereby providing support for wagner s law and these resul

persistence in government spending fluctuations new evidence on the displacement effect in spite of peacock and wiseman s 1961 nber study demonstrating the displacement effect simplistic theoretical and empirical distinctions between temporary and permanent spending are common in this paper impulse response functions from arma models as well as cochrane s non parametric method support peacock and wiseman s conclusion by showing 1 government spending in the aggregate displays strong persistence to temporary shocks 2 simple decomposition methods intended to yield a temporary spending series have a weak statitistical foundation and 3 persistence in spending has increased during this century also as a basic fact of government spending behavior the displacement effect lends support to interest group and bureaucracy models of government spending growth

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

the line item veto and public sector budgets evidence from the states abstract the paper examines the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that in the short run the item veto s potency is contingent upon the political setting in certain circumstances governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion these results suggest that state budgets have not been importantly altered as a result of the existence of the line item veto and shed doubt on the use of the line item veto to reduce federal government spending

testing wagner versus keynes using disaggregated public expenditure data for canada this paper attempts to test wagnerian versus keynesian hypotheses by examining the relationship between national income and total public expenditure as well as its various components for canada during the period 1950 1995 engle and granger s two step cointegration and error correction techniques are employed to test these two hypotheses the results of this study support both the hypotheses when tested with broader aggregate expenditure data i e total government current expenditure ce and total current expenditures on goods and services cegs although the results of this study do not support the existence of any long run relationship between gdp and the disaggregated public expenditure variables they do support the existence of short run causation implying that national income may be causing or caused by a component of the total government current expenditure in the short run

the population ecology of gucci gulch or the natural regulation of interest group numbers in the american states theory the theory of population ecology in contrast to economic theories of groups is used to predict the number of interest groups in the united states hypotheses interest group density is a function of potential constituents potential government goods and services the stability of the political system government age and government size methods regression analysis of u s state data for interest groups in construction agriculture manufacturing welfare the environment and local governments results interest group density conforms to the predictions based on population ecology constituents government goods and services and political stability but not those based on economic theories of group mobilization

on noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader follower game abstract in this paper we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities to this end we consider a two stage game of complete and perfect information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers the stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game existence and uniqueness are more difficult to handle in this framework insofar as the presence of several leaders and followers displays a richer set of strategic interactions then to prove existence we notably provide a new procedure to determine the conditions under which the optimal behavior of the followers may be written as functions of the sole strategy profile of the leaders some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions

the size of government most research on the causes of growth in government expenditure has focused on the demand for government services in this paper we argue that in fact this growth may have occurred because of changes in supply changes in technology leading to increased specialization and thus increased opportunity costs of self production have led to increased market production and increased record keeping also female labor force participation has increased both of these factors serve to reduce the efficiency cost of collecting taxes if the demand for government spending has not changed this increase in supply would lead to a larger public sector we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for the period 1929 1970 incorporating this hypothesis and the results are consistent with the theory we are able to explain virtually all of the growth of government increases in female labor force participation seems to be a very important variable in this explanation

the growth of government in italy evidence from 1861 to 1979 that the public sector has grown both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the economy is an undisputable fact that both growth rates have accelerated in recent history is also an unchallenged fact more cautious must we be about why these trends have occurred and are persisting we have tested three partially competing theories of government growth using italian annual data from 1861 to 1979 and assessed that the redistribution model explains the facts better than either the public goods model or the specialized interest hypothesis although the latter tells the most convincing story about the causes underlying transfers to firms we have also tried to discriminate between two competing views of a politician the value free intermediary found in the median voter literature and the entrepreneur emphasized in the theory of agency costs the bits of evidence we gathered are more consistent with a politician entrepreneur than a politician intermediary

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

myopic heuristics for the random yield problem we consider a single item periodic review inventory problem with random yield and stochastic demand the yield is proportional to the quantity ordered with the multiplicative factor being a random variable the demands are stochastic and are independent across the periods but they need not be stationary the holding penalty and ordering costs are linear any unsatisfied demands are backlogged two cases for the ordering cost are considered the ordering cost can be proportional to either the quantity ordered e g in house production or the quantity received e g delivery by an external supplier random yield problems have been addressed previously in the literature but no constructive solutions or algorithms are presented except for simple heuristics that are far from optimal in this paper we present a novel analysis of the problem in terms of the inventory position at the end of a period this analysis provides interesting insights into the problem and leads to easily implementable and highly accurate myopic heuristics a detailed computational study is done to evaluate the heuristics the study is done for the infinite horizon case with stationary yields and demands and for the finite horizon case with a 26 period seasonal demand pattern the best of our heuristics has worst case errors of 3 0 and 5 0 and average errors of 0 6 and 1 2 for the infinite and finite horizon cases respectively

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

on line computation of stackelberg equilibria with synchronous parallel genetic algorithms this paper develops a method to compute the stackelberg equilibria in sequential games we construct a normal form game which is interactively played by an arti1cially intelligent leader ga l and a follower ga f the leader is a genetic algorithm breeding a population of potential actions to better anticipate the follower s reaction the follower is also a genetic algorithm training on line a suitable neural network to evolve a population of rules to respond to any move in the leader s action space when gas repeatedly play this game updating each other synchronously populations converge to the stackelberg equilibrium of the sequential game we provide numerical examples attesting to the e7ciency of the algorithm 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

new policies for the stochastic inventory control problem with two supply sources we study an inventory system under periodic review in the presence of two suppliers or delivery modes the emergency supplier has a shorter lead time than the regular supplier but the unit price he offers is higher excess demand is backlogged we generalize the recently studied class of dual index policies veeraraghavan s a scheller wolf 2008 now or later dual index policies for capacitated dual sourcing systems oper res 56 4 850 864 by proposing two classes of policies the first class consists of policies that have an order up to structure for the emergency supplier we provide analytical results that are useful for determining optimal or near optimal policies within this class this analysis and the policies we propose leverage our observation that the classical lost sales inventory problem is a special case of this problem the second class consists of policies that have an order up to structure for the regular supplier here we derive bounds on the optimal order quantity from the emergency supplier in any period and use these bounds for finding effective policies within this class finally we undertake an elaborate computational investigation to compare the performance of the policies we propose with that of dual index policies one of our policies provides an average cost saving of 1 1 over the best dual index policy and has the same computational requirements another policy that we propose has a cost performance similar to the best dual index policy but its computational requirements are lower

a periodic review inventory system with emergency replenishments this paper proposes and analyzes a periodic review inventory system with two replenishment modes regular orders are placed periodically following a base stock policy on inventory position and arrive at the stocking location after a deterministic lead time the location also has the option of placing emergency orders characterized by a shorter lead time but higher acquisition cost in case of imminent stockouts thus at some appropriate time in the replenishment cycle the necessity and size of an emergency order is determined according to a base stock policy on net stock the timing of the emergency order is such that this order arrives and can be used to satisfy the demand in the time period just before the arrival of a regular order when the likelihood of a stockout is highest an approximate cost model is developed which can easily be optimized with respect to the order up to parameters this model is used as the basis for a heuristic algorithm which leads to solutions that are very close to the exact optimal solutions determined through simulation it is shown that the proposed system offers substantial cost savings relative to a system without the emergency replenishment option

a causal relationship between government spending and economic development an empirical examination of the greek economy during the past few years in many countries both developed and developing there has been a tendency to increase government spending this article intends to examine this tendency of the public sector as well as the existing relationship between the extent of government spending and economic development the data used cover a time period between 1960 and 2001 an effort is made to determine causal relationships between spending and economic development through the use of wagner s theory

economic growth regressions for the american states a sensitivity analysis i introduction researchers motivated by a variety of questions turn to data on the economic performance of the american states to analyze their ideas empirically the appeal of cross state empirical analysis derives from the fact that while states differ in relevant dimensions they are not so different as to make omitted variables an overwhelming source of error for example the state economies operate under the same monetary regime the federal reserve comparable legal institutions the u s constitution and borders open to the flow of productive factors knowledge and products cross state analysis avoids the myriad structural differences that encumber cross national empirical analysis thus investigators feel secure in considering a relatively small number of control variables in attempting to establish a statistical relationship between state economic performance and a particular variable of interest the availability of uniform and accurate time series data for the states adds to the appeal of cross state regression models despite the advantages associated with evaluating institutionally similar economies researchers who rely on state regressions find little systematic guidance concerning which variables to include and other basic specification issues for instance do demographic and geographic characteristics vary sufficiently across states to require independent controls do cultural or climatic conditions affect growth or are these variables correlated with other factors that may affect growth such as labor force participation rates or education levels a review of the extensive literature reveals that few studies control for the variables analyzed by other researchers these specification differences make it hard to evaluate and compare the results of existing studies bartik 1991 and phillips and goss 1995 illustrate this problem as they attempt to garner the effect of taxes on state economic development from dozens of studies that employ alternative specifications and methodologies they use meta regression analysis mra to test whether specification changes and alternative variables significantly affect the estimated elasticity of state growth with respect to taxes the mra technique focuses on the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients for state tax variables to model variation in this paper we employ a technique to assess the sensitivity of numerous control variables identified in the state growth literature we also introduce several new control variables the approach identifies which variables are robust to small changes in the conditioning information set our procedure closely follows that in levine and renelt 1992 which for its part relies on the extreme bounds analysis eba suggested by learner 1983 1985 1 the main difference is that we employ annual panel data on the american states pooling cross sectional and time series data whereas levine and renelt employ cross country data averaged over 20 year or even longer time intervals the cross country studies such as those assessed in levine and renelt that average long time periods generally seek to identify factors associated with long run steady state growth the u s state studies using annual panel data do not share a comparable unifying purpose relationships estimated from yearly data reveal short term responses and pick up business cycle effects which confounds drawing implications about growth theory with this qualification in mind the results presented below indicate which variables included in past studies are robust and provide a set of core variables as a starting point for future research that relies on state growth regressions and annual panel data finally the findings demonstrate that several important conclusions in the literature depend on how variables are measured for example the relationship between state growth and government size reverses sign depending on whether we denominate government size in per capita terms or as a share of state income

special interest groups and growth this paper explores empirically the relation between special interest groups and economic growth our analysis exploits new data on the number of groups observed across countries and time in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies also in contrast to earlier work we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth capital accumulation and technological change in addition to the impact of groups on output growth the findings are consistent with olson s the rise and decline of nations the political economy of economic growth stagflation and social rigidities new haven yale 1982 claim that societies with greater numbers of interest groups grow slower accumulate less capital and experience reduced productivity growth relative to others

testing the buchanan wagner hypothesis european evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests according to the buchanan wagnerhypothesis public deficits reduce theperceived price of public goods to thecurrent generation of voters who in turn increase the demands for such socialservices several recent studies haveattempted to test this proposition in thispaper we apply modern time seriestechniques organized around panel unit rootand panel cointegration to draw sharperconclusions from the short time series thatare typically available we find that thereis a long run positive relationship betweengovernment spending and government deficitsfor each country individually as well asfor the panel as a whole this providessupport for the bw hypothesis we alsoanalyze the implications for the relativeproductivity performance of the public andprivate sector the existence of scaleeconomies in the provision of publicservices as well as the extent of crowdingout effects

the political economy of centralization and the european community since 1972 the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries in an international cross section analysis it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in gdp the actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed the dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds popitz law of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the ec commission high ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states the voters attitudes toward european unification are analyzed in a pooled regression

partisan politics and public finance changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies 1955 1989 this paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels the analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 oecd countries the results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model of special note is the distinction between the electorate and the government ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays the results also suggest contrary to conventional wisdom that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy

ethnic diversity public spending and individual support for the welfare state a review of the empirical literature we review the empirical literature that studies the effect of ethnic diversity on public spending and on individual support for the welfare state the survey puts a particular focus on the fast growing literature that uses experiments to study the effects of ethnic diversity many of these studies have appeared since the pioneering survey by alesina and la ferrara and have not been covered by a survey before

pressure politics and government spending in belgium in this article we tried to offer an explanation for the evolution in belgian government spending over the period 1961 1984 this explanation was based on a demand model featuring the median voter and a supplement with a political module in the traditional part of the model price income and population variables were used for the political module we called upon the pressure group theory of mueller and murrell 1983 while we also developed our own theory

technical note linear inflation rules for the random yield problem analysis and computations in this paper we propose a simple heuristic approach for the inventory control problem with stochastic demand and multiplicative random yield our heuristic tries to find the best candidate within a class of policies that are referred to in the literature as the linear inflation rule lir policies our approach is computationally fast easy to implement and intuitive to understand moreover we find that in a significant number of instances our heuristic performs better than several other well known heuristics that are available in the literature

is the median voter a clear cut winner comparing themedian voter theory and competing theories in explaining localgovernment spending this paper attempts to test the power of the median model againstthe respective strength of other alternate models based onredistributive political institutional and interest group theoriesin explaining the demand for public spending in new york statecounties during 1990 1980 and 1970 to execute the comparison ofthe performance of median voter model with that of each of thenonmedian voter ones various nonnested tests such as j and jatests n tilde w and encompassing tests have been employed results of the study show that although the median voter model hasa marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternativetheories it may not be relied upon solely when many otherinstitutional redistributive and interest group factors are alsorelevant for explaining public spending the results of this studydiffer from those in congleton and bennett 1995 we do not findthat interest group models are substantially weaker than the medianvoter model

testing wagner s law using disaggregated public expenditure data in the case of greece 1958 93 the factors that have influenced the growth of public expenditures have been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research the validity of wagner s law in the case of greece is tested using disaggregated public expenditure data for the period 1958 93 the methodology employed is that of cointegration and the related notion of error correction results reported here suggest that in the case of greece only the growth of defence expenditure may be explained in terms of wagner s law

on stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market abstract in a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity stackelberg games provide some new results with price stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games in the price stackelberg game we show there is a unique spne where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower but both get equal payoffs we prove that generally quantity stackelberg games are less competitive than price stackelberg games however we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result

explaining the growth of government in sweden a disequilibrium approach previous studies aimed at explaining the growth of government in a particular country have failed to distinguish between explanatory variables acting on the supply and demand side respectively alternatively they have tested one explanation at a time implying explanatory equations that are misspecified in addition no allowance has been made for the fact that the interaction between supply and demand can hardly be assumed to be a self equilibrating process where the price of public goods and services adjusts to equate the two instead a framework of disequilibrium seems more appropriate for the analysis of the growth of government

concepts for safety stock determination under stochastic demand and different types of random production yield abstract we consider a manufacturer s stochastic production inventory problem under periodic review and present methods for safety stock determination to cope with uncertainties that are caused by stochastic demand and different types of yield randomness following well proven inventory control concepts for this problem type we focus on a critical stock policy with a linear order release rule a central parameter of this type of policy is given by the safety stock value when non zero manufacturing lead times are taken into account in the random yield context it turns out that safety stocks have to be determined that vary from period to period we present a simple approach for calculating these dynamic safety stocks for different yield models additionally we suggest approaches for determining appropriate static safety stocks that are easier to apply in practice in a simulation study we investigate the performance of the proposed safety stock variants

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

federalism and the size of government over the last few decades the size of the public sector in both absolute and relative terms has increased in all of the western economies this has led to considerable investigation of the factors determining government size factors considered have included income elasticity of voter demand for public goods i e wagner s law relative price changes threshold effects e g wars or depressions interest group demands e g public sector employees or unions 17 productivity differentials 1 and redistributional motivations 18 10 one factor which has received little more than passing interest is government structure that is centralization of government activities as opposed to decentralization or federalism authors such as fratianni and spinelli 7 musgrave and musgrave 12 beck 2 and buchanan 4 make no mention of government structure as a factor in the determination of government size when considered the impact of government structure on government size is treated more as an afterthought for example mueller and murrell 11 incorporate a centralization variable in only two of their twenty two regression equations and then only in their two stage least squares equations and offer little analysis of its expected impact on government size exceptions to this standard treatment of federalism include brennan and buchanan 3 oates 15 nelson 13 14 and marlow 9 brennan and buchanan consider the structure of government and its impact on public sector size in the context of a revenue maximizing government model they argue that with mobile voters and local public goods decentralization of government taxing and expenditure powers would serve to constrain the size of the public sector in a tiebout like world any attempt on the part of one jurisdiction to exploit its citizenry would result in instantaneous and complete migration on the part of the citizenry to an alternative nonexploitive jurisdiction this competition among jurisdictions for the patronage of the citizenry limits the extent of fiscal exploitation possible and as such the size of the public sector brennan and buchanan note however that w ithin a constitutionally designed federal structure one would predict that there would be constant pressures by competitive lower level governments to secure institutional rearrangements that would moderate competitive pressures 3 182 these institutional rearrangements would take the form of collusive agreements between the central and lower level governments which assign to the central government what were previously lower level revenue raising powers subject to the revenues being returned to the lower level governments by

competencies cracks and conflicts regional mobilization in the european union over the past 5 years a new and unexpected form of interest representation has developed in the european union subnational governments that mobilize directly in brussels the authors propose explanations for this phenomenon drawing on theories of public choice resource mobilization and multilevel governance the first set of hypotheses is concerned with the material and cultural resources that may induce a subnational government to organize in the european arena the second set of hypotheses explains regional representation as an outcome of overlapping competencies tensions and conflicts in a system of multilevel governance logistic analysis of the probability of regional representation provides support for the second set of hypotheses the authors find that subnational representation is positively associated with the degree of overlap between the competencies of subnational and supranational governments and with the political distinctiveness of a region and the relative strength of citizens regi

a logistic growth theory of public expenditures a study of five countries over 100 years this paper offers a new theory and empirical testing of long term trends of public expenditures for five countries while wagner s law would imply an exponential growth process of the ratio between public expenditures and national income g y the law should be rejected both on theoretical and empirical grounds because it disregards the role of ever increasing distortionary taxation however under some conditions the combination of wagner s law and the pigou s conjecture that the excess burden of taxation constrains the growth of public expenditures can be captured by a non linear first order differential equation the equation is the verhulst s logistic originally invented to model malthusian predictions on population growth the integration of a verhulst equation generates an s shaped curve this analytical framework combines intuitions from a welfare economics and a public choice perspective and potentially offers a new research strategy on the dynamics of government expenditures we offer preliminary econometric estimates on long run trends around 1870 1990 of g y in u s u k france germany italy these estimates confirm a pattern of similar trajectories in spite of different national parameters and suggest that the logistic view of growth of government is consistent with observed data

rent seeking and political tenure first estimates this paper computes a measure of rent seeking based on costs of tenure within a political tenure type model a new incumbency variable is introduced and a variant to existing datasets is presented consistent ml rent seeking estimates are computed for our sample of oecd democracies the statistical advances in limited dependent variable models in particular the decomposition of the tobit estimates enabled us to compute rent seeking estimates as costs of tenure the tobit partial derivatives and to compute the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of being above the limit which we interpret as the probability of tenure

public expenditure growth in greece and portugal wagner s law and beyond in the tradition of wagner s law this study examines the relationship between aggregate income and public expenditures in greece and portugal during the years 1958 85 unlike more conventional specifications our analysis focuses on the movement of different componenets of public expenditures permanent income relative prices stabilization policy and socio political factors emerge as thomain determinants of public expenditures while the results reveal significant difference in responses to these determinants across components of expenditures and between the two countries

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

tax and spend or spend and tax empirical evidence from greece spain portugal and ireland the paper examines empirically the relationship between government revenues and expenditures in four european countries greece spain ireland and portugal in relative terms all four may be considered as the poorest members of the european union yet they present a fairly diverse picture as far as their macroeconomic performance and fiscal position is concerned the empirical findings from cointegration and causality tests that are reported here indicate that in the case of greece and ireland tax and spending decisions are taken simultaneously by the fiscal authority the tax and spend hypothesis is supported in the case of spain while absence of any causal ordering between government expenditure and tax revenues has been established for portugal

exact and heuristic linear inflation policies for an inventory model with random yield and arbitrary lead times abstract we investigate a periodic review inventory system for a single item with stochastic demand and random yield since the optimal policy for such a system is complicated we study the class of stationary linear inflation policies where orders are only placed if the inventory position is below a critical stock level and where the order quantity is controlled by a yield inflation factor we consider two different models for the uncertain supply namely binomial and stochastically proportional yield and we allow positive and constant lead times as well as asymmetric demand and yield distributions in this paper we propose two novel approaches to derive optimal and near optimal numerical values for the critical stock level minimizing the average holding and backorder cost for a given inflation factor first we present a markov chain approach which is exact in case of negligible lead time second we provide a steady state analysis to derive approximate closed form expressions for the optimal critical stock level we conduct an extensive numerical study to test the performance of our approaches the numerical experiments reveal an excellent performance of both approaches since our derived formulas are easily implementable and highly accurate they are very valuable for practical application

an examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in oecd countries perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests those which can be readily rejected because no test results support them and those upon which one should remain agnostic because the test results are not consistent in the first group are population pop decentralization of government dcnt and length of time of modernization date one can state quite confidently that these three variables are determinants of interest group activity in the second group are the variables measuring characteristics of the political system poly dem1 dem2 pfrc one can with ease reject the hypotheses to which these variables are relevant there is a large group of variables which stand in the middle group however for these variables there are gradations of success in the tests the variables on socioeconomic development inc agri news and number of industries and political subdivisions nind regp are only significant in the one variable tests especially important is their failure to obtain the correct signs in the tests reported in table 3 the variables on ethnic fractionalization efrc and olson s hypothesis on destruction of groups ndfo have the correct signs in table 3 and are significant in table 1 thus it is more difficult to reject efrc and ndfo as determinants of interest group activity than inc nind and regp finally it should be mentioned that once appropriate simultaneous equations techniques are applied government size is no longer supported as a significant variable this paper will conclude with comments of a more conjectural nature on the implications of the results in the case of three specific variables first the results on hypothesis 3 suggest that population affects the number of interest groups independently of indirect effects through other variables this direct effect occurs because groups become proportionately smaller and more homogeneous as population increases hence one can expect the political economy of larger countries to be significantly different from that of smaller countries the results suggest that larger countries will have a denser array of interest groups and that these groups because of their homogeneity will find it easier to decide on and pursue policies in the narrow interests of their members secondly the results support olson s claim that there will be a gradual accumulation of interest groups in developed democracies given that olson attributes to interest groups a large role in determining the economic fortunes of a country the fact that his accumulation hypothesis is supported is a result of some significance finally if one accepts the two stage least squares results it has been shown that changes in government size do not induce changes in interest group activity an important conclusion can be reached when this result is taken in combination with the results of other studies which show that interest groups induce changes in the size of government mccormick and tollison 1981 and mueller and murrell 1983 these results do not support the capture theory of government that governmental institutions are created perhaps in the public interest and then dominated by interest groups rather the results support the theory that the institutions themselves are the creatures of interest group activity

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

dual sourcing in the age of near shoring trading off stochastic capacity limitations and long lead times abstract we model a periodic review inventory system with non stationary stochastic demand in which a manufacturer is procuring a component from two available supply sources the faster supply source is modeled as stochastic capacitated with immediate delivery while the slower supply source is modeled as uncapacitated with a longer fixed lead time the manufacturer s objective is to choose how the order should be split between the two supply sources in each period where the slower supply source is used to compensate for the supply capacity unavailability of the faster supply source this is different from the conventional dual sourcing problem and motivated by the new reality of near shoring options we derive the optimal dynamic programming formulation that minimizes the total expected inventory holding and backorder costs over a finite planning horizon and show that the optimal policy is relatively complex we extend our study by developing an extended myopic two level base stock policy and we show numerically that it provides a very close estimate of the optimal costs numerical results reveal the benefits of dual sourcing under near shoring where we point out that in most cases the manufacturer should develop a hybrid procurement strategy taking advantage of both supply sources to minimize its expected total cost

public expenditure and economic growth in the gulf cooperation council countries this article uses a dynamic model calibrated to the gulf cooperation council gcc countries data to examine the nature of the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth the article finds that national income is a predictive factor of the expanding role of government as postulated by wagner empirical investigations do not support the hypothesis of public expenditure causing national income as proposed by the keynesian theory