profit maximising goes global the race to the bottom we explore four decades of cyclical and long run dynamics in income distribution and economic activity for a panel of 13 oecd countries as measured by the wage share and output gap when modeled as predator prey dynamics economic activity in oecd countries is weakly profit led convergence to a long run equilibrium is relatively slow delaying the profit squeeze stage for many years our race to the bottom model suggests that the oecd countries have been engaged in undercutting each other s real unit labour costs an extension of the model shows that the long run equilibrium has been shifting south west towards a lower wage share it may even be that this race has the undesirable consequence of decreasing economic activity

why do manufacturers issue coupons an empirical analysis of breakfast cereals we explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers coupons for 25 readyto eat breakfast cereals we find that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available this result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions we present evidence that is inconsistent with both dynamic theories of price discrimination and explanations of couponing based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers we find support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings as well as suggestions that firmwide incentives may induce managers to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously finally lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

positively sloping marginal revenue ces utility and subsistence requirements the possibility that marginal revenue may possess a positive slope has long been recognized as important in her classic the economics of imperfect competition joan robinson 14 accorded considerable significance to the possibility and investigated it at length despite robinson s insights upward sloping marginal revenue functions remained largely a curiosity widely regarded as an overly stringent perversity unlikely to occur in reality considerable doubt was cast on this view when in 1980 a a walters 20 reported the presence of positively sloping marginal revenue in the pricing policies of the port of singapore the case for upward sloping marginal revenue was furthered by formby layson and smith s 8 straightforward demonstration that upward sloping marginal revenue schedules are very easily produced and can never be ruled out because simple parallel shifts in strictly convex demand and or rotations always transform demand schedules with downward sloping marginal revenue into ones with positively sloping schedules this strongly suggests that no theoretically reasonable restrictions can be placed on the behavior of marginal revenue because to do so would rule out such simple transformations as parallel shifts or rotations in demand such restrictions would be too stringent to be acceptable upward sloping marginal revenue has found important application in such diverse topics as catastrophe theory 3 third degree price discrimination 13 dual equilibria and monopolistic competition 11 specific taxes and quality 2 and international trade 7 2 the significance of non monotonic marginal revenue functions is further underscored by the fact that the presence of upward sloping marginal revenue significantly affects the sign of comparative static results for example see 18 260 15 16 2 a shortcoming of previous analyses lies in the fact that they draw conclusions from consideration of slope level and curvature of the demand schedule alone the behavior of marginal revenue derived directly from the more fundamental basis of utility theory has not been examined this paper takes up this question employing wold s theorem to analyze marginal revenue

pareto optimality and competition there is a general consensus that u s financial markets are very competitive and efficient with prices quickly reflecting the available information there is also a widespread belief that these competitive and efficient markets enable the efficient allocation of scarce capital among alternative investment opportunities this belief is not based on direct observation it is virtually impossible to obtain the data concerning the joint probability distribution of returns to all possible projects which would be required for a direct assessment of the efficiency of the resource allocations to which the market gives rise rather it is based on the well known result that perfectly competitive markets generate pareto efficient resource allocations the object of this paper is to question that conclusion to show that even with apparently competitive and efficient markets resource allocations may not be pareto efficient

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

third degree price discrimination with interdependent demands this paper analyzes the price output and welfare effects of third degree price discrimination for a monopolist who sells in two interdependent markets the case where the two goods sold by the monopolist are complements is analyzed as well as the more typical case where the two goods are substitutes the economic effects of price discrimination are shown to depend on the type and strength of demand interdependence the curvature of the demands and the slope of marginal cost the circumstances under which price discrimination causes both market prices to either rise or fall are also analyzed

third degree price discrimination under economies of scale there has long been a controversy in economics about whether or not a firm with monopoly power should be allowed to exploit its monopoly power by engaging in third degree price discrimination the effect of third degree price discrimination on welfare is two fold 1 output under price discrimination is misallocated because different groups are charged different prices but 2 if total output is different under price discrimination than under uniform pricing this will also affect welfare 2 schmalensee 8 varian 11 12 and schwartz 9 have shown that price discrimination must decrease welfare if output under price discrimination is the same or less than output under uniform pricing this fundamental result is quite robust and holds regardless of the number of sub markets or the behavior of marginal cost rising constant or falling it also holds even if the sub market demands are interdependent a necessary but not sufficient condition for price discrimination to be beneficial is that it increase total output perhaps the most common situation in which price discrimination will be beneficial is the case where only one sub market is served under uniform pricing but two or more sub markets are served under price discrimination in this case hausman and mackie mason 3 have pointed out that price discrimination will result in a pareto welfare improvement if marginal cost is constant or falling even when price discrimination does not open up new markets hausman and mackie mason 3 and nahata ostaszewski and sahoo 5 have shown that price discrimination can result in a pareto improvement by lowering prices in all sub markets hausman and mackie mason 3 257 argue that price discrimination is most likely to be beneficial when economies of scale are present 3

a stochastic aggregate production planning model in a green supply chain considering flexible lead times nonlinear purchase and shortage cost functions in this paper we develop a stochastic programming approach to solve a multi period multi product multi site aggregate production planning problem in a green supply chain for a medium term planning horizon under the assumption of demand uncertainty the proposed model has the following features i the majority of supply chain cost parameters are considered ii quantity discounts to encourage the producer to order more from the suppliers in one period instead of splitting the order into periodical small quantities are considered iii the interrelationship between lead time and transportation cost is considered as well as that between lead time and greenhouse gas emission level iv demand uncertainty is assumed to follow a pre specified distribution function v shortages are penalized by a general multiple breakpoint function to persuade producers to reduce backorders as much as possible vi some indicators of a green supply chain such as greenhouse gas emissions and waste management are also incorporated into the model the proposed model is first a nonlinear mixed integer programming which is converted into a linear one by applying some theoretical and numerical techniques due to the convexity of the model the local solution obtained from linear programming solvers is also the global solution finally a numerical example is presented to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model

third degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality this paper analyzes third degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served the model features the business passenger and leisure passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation and a less price elastic demand than leisure passengers our main result is the identification of the time valuation effect of price discrimination which can work in the opposite direction as the well known output effect on welfare this time valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output

cartels and antitrust the role of fines in deterring violations at the margin the potential benefits of effective antitrust action include both increased economic efficiency through the expansion of output and improved equity through the redistribution of income from monopolies to consumers a large and growing literature is devoted to empirically testing and documenting the economic consequences of antitrust casebringing activity a second empirical literature is focused on the role which economic variables play in the determination of casebringing activity by the united states department of justice 2 what separates these two bodies of literature are the behavioral linkages between anti

monopoly price discrimination and demand curvature this paper presents a general analysis of the eects of monopolistic third degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served su cient conditions involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the dierent mar kets are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive eects on

economic welfare price and profit the deterrent effect of alternative antitrust regimes this paper critically examines the deterrent effect of price fixing statutes under alternative antitrust regimes a regime is defined by the litigation strategy which the antitrust agency employs in detecting cartels and in determining whether prosecution is warranted and by the basis upon which courts estimate damages the results of the analysis suggest that antitrust policy may actually induce cartels to further restrict output increasing welfare loss above the level imposed by an unthreatened perfect monopoly litigation strategy and damages should be founded upon consideration of welfare loss measures to avoid this possibility

the law of demand positive sloping marginal revenue and multiple profit equilibria this paper demonstrates that the conditions for a positively sloping marginal revenue curve are much less stringent than is generally recognized simple transformations of any well behaved convex demand function can easily result in a demand for which marginal revenue is positively sloping for this reason positively sloping marginal revenue functions must be considered whenever convex demand functions are analyzed the existence of positively sloping marginal revenue makes multiple profit equilibria for the firm a very real possibility

financialisation and the new swedish model most studies of swedish political economy are too optimistic about the condition and prospects of the reformed swedish model e g bergh 2014 steinmo 2010 indeed the swedish economy has responded to the global financial crisis gfc in what appears to be a successful manner this comparativist literature nevertheless omits in depth analysis of the impact of financialisation partly due to its neglect of long term dialectical processes of change cf ogden et al 2014 there is a small literature on financialisation in sweden e g belfrage 2008 forslund 2008 kallifatides et al 2010 ryner 2013 belfrage 2015 andersson and jonung 2015 kallifatides 2016 however it has not clarified what the dynamics contradictions and crisis tendencies of the resulting finance dominated accumulation regime in sweden are drawing on document analysis and statistics and based on regulation theory e g aglietta 1979 this paper does just that it thus corrects an overly idealised picture of swedish economy and society as well as more broadly holding the swedish case up as a critical case study for the sustainability of the finance dominated growth regime in europe we argue that there is a looming crisis in the swedish economy today as the acceleration of financialisation following the gfc is shifting the economy away from being export led to becoming debt led and asset based and thus moving the economy closer to the uk and us economies as such the swedish case suggests that the finance dominated growth regime may be unsustainable in europe more generally

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

bounding the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under pigouvian third degree price discrimination a profit maximizing monopolist typically charges different groups of customers different prices resale between groups is assumed to be impossible these differences in price entail a loss of efficiency because marginal valuations of the output are not equal across buyers the net welfare effect of allowing price discrimination is ambiguous though because the total output under discrimination may exceed that under uniform pricing nevertheless under quite general conditions third degree price discrimination by a monopolist can increase static welfare only if total output is greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing richard schmalensee 1981 hal r varian 1985 marius schwartz 1990 although there has been much analysis of whether price discrimination raises or lowers total output or welfare the size of these effects has remained largely unexplored varian 1985 compares discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing for a monopolist and provides some bounds for the change in welfare in terms of market prices and outputs but these relationships give little sense of the relative size of welfare changes resulting from third degree price discrimination i address this issue by asking what can be said about the ratio wd wu where wd and wu denote welfare under discriminatory and uniform pricing respectively welfare is measured as the sum of producer surplus and marshallian consumer surplus section i provides two examples showing that this ratio can range from zero to infinity in these examples all markets are served under uniform pricing and demand in one of the markets is strictly convex considering a two market model in which a monopolist with constant marginal cost serves two independent markets under uniform pricing i show in section iii that if demands in both markets are concave then wd w is bounded below by 2 the assumptions of constant marginal cost and independent demands allow producer surplus and consumer surplus to be identified separately for each market separability across markets is central to the approach taken in this paper following joan robinson 1933 i call a market strong weak if the discriminatory price in that market is at least as great as no greater than the profit maximizing uniform price surprisingly the key to bounding wd wu is that the demand function in the weak market be concave if one market is strong the other is weak and demand in the weak market is concave then wd w can be bounded above by 2 5 or even 1 75 or 1 6 with additional assumptions on the demand functions these bounds arise for several reasons first the monopolist s profit under uniform pricing must be at least as large as the profit in the weak market under discrimination moreover if at all prices demand in the strong market is as great as in the weak market then profit under uniform pricing must be at least twice as great as profit in the weak market under discrimination otherwise the monopolist could do better by charging the monopoly price for the weak market second this relationship between profits in the two markets is useful in bounding welfare because welfare in each market can be related to profit in that market section ii shows that if demand is con department of economics and a b freeman school of business tulane university new orleans la 70118 i thank marius schwartz and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper

third degree price discrimination consumption externalities and social welfare this paper analyses monopolistic third degree price discrimination in the presence of consumption externalities within two separate markets assuming linear inverse demands we investigate an associated change in social welfare the sum of the consumers surpluses and the producer s profit with the regime change from uniform pricing to price discrimination when both markets are open under either regime it is shown that social welfare can improve even if total output is unaffected by the regime change moreover it is possible that the sum of the consumers surpluses also increases

taxation and the output and welfare of third degree price discrimination the literature on third degree price discrimination dates back to the work by pigou 14 and joan robinson 15 over half a century ago the subsequent works on the output effect can be seen in edwards 3 silberberg 19 battalio and ekelund 1 greenhut and ohta 7 finn 4 smith and formby 20 formby et al 6 and shih mai and liu 18 the welfare effect by yamey 26 was expanded and generalized by schmalensee 16 varian 24 and schwartz 17 in addition nahata ostaszewski and sahoo 12 demonstrate a sufficient condition for price changes that guarantees a welfare increase with the twice differentiable and monotonically decreasing demand functions previous work on third degree price discrimination has not addressed the issue of taxation governments often levy excise taxes on firm s sales under conditions of third degree price discrimination such taxes can have depending upon the form of the tax quite different output and welfare effects this paper investigates the joint effects of third degree price discrimination and excise taxation in several different ways first in a fashion analogous to suits and musgrave s analysis of simple non discriminating monopoly 22 we consider the effects of ad valorem and unit specific excise taxes at a constant level of output but in a third degree price discrimination environment second in a similar manner we compare cost and demand ad valorem taxes and the so called musgravian transformation 11 27 under discriminatory conditions finally we compare the output and welfare effects of a specific cost ad valorem and demand ad valorem excise tax that generate the same level of revenues in a third degree price discrimination environment

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

a bi objective stochastic programming model for a centralized green supply chain with deteriorating products in recent years consumers and legislation have been pushing companies to design their activities in such a way as to reduce negative environmental impacts more and more it is therefore important to examine the optimization of total supply chain costs and environmental impacts together however because of the recycling of deteriorated items the environmental impacts of deteriorating items are more significant than those of non deteriorating ones the objective of this paper is to develop a stochastic mathematical model and to propose a new replenishment policy in a centralized supply chain for deteriorating items in this model we consider inventory and transportation costs as well as the environmental impacts under uncertain demand several transportation vehicles producing various greenhouse gas ghg levels are considered the best transportation vehicles and inventory policy are determined by finding a balance between financial and environmental criteria in this way we develop a linear mathematical model and present a numerical example from the real world to demonstrate its applicability and effectiveness we then perform a sensitivity analysis and provide some managerial insights finally more promising directions are suggested for future research

differential pricing when costs differ a welfare analysis this article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important but largely neglected case where costs of service differ across consumer groups cost based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens we discuss why cost based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand based counterpart third degree price discrimination we also provide sufficient conditions for welfare improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups

coordinating price reductions and coupon events abstract in this article the authors use an economic model to show that it may be optimal to lower the retail price during a coupon event when marginal consumers have moderate hassle costs of coupon redemption results from the model offer predictions on the relationships among coupon redemptions shelf price and coupon face value the authors test these predictions on a large data set of hundreds of coupon events across six packaged goods categories the data show that when a small coupon face value is offered the shelf price is likely to be reduced they also find that coupon efficiency increases when there is a lower retail price the results are of interest to managers planning a promotion calendar and deciding whether to coordinate price promotions with coupon events and they contribute to economic theory when a firm moves from uniform pricing e g no coupons to second degree price discrimination e g coupons all consumers may face a lower price this finding has public policy implication

a multi objective robust optimization model for multi product multi site aggregate production planning in a supply chain under uncertainty abstract manufacturers need to satisfy consumer demands in order to compete in the real world this requires the efficient operation of a supply chain planning in this research we consider a supply chain including multiple suppliers multiple manufacturers and multiple customers addressing a multi site multi period multi product aggregate production planning app problem under uncertainty first a new robust multi objective mixed integer nonlinear programming model is proposed to deal with app considering two conflicting objectives simultaneously as well as the uncertain nature of the supply chain cost parameters of the supply chain and demand fluctuations are subject to uncertainty then the problem transformed into a multi objective linear one the first objective function aims to minimize total losses of supply chain including production cost hiring firing and training cost raw material and end product inventory holding cost transportation and shortage cost the second objective function considers customer satisfaction through minimizing sum of the maximum amount of shortages among the customers zones in all periods working levels workers productivity overtime subcontracting storage capacity and lead time are also considered finally the proposed model is solved as a single objective mixed integer programming model applying the lp metrics method the practicability of the proposed model is demonstrated through its application in solving an app problem in an industrial case study the results indicate that the proposed model can provide a promising approach to fulfill an efficient production planning in a supply chain

modeling an inventory routing problem for perishable products with environmental considerations and demand uncertainty the transition to sustainable food supply chain management has brought new key logistical aims such as reducing food waste and environmental impacts of operations in the supply chain besides the traditional cost minimization objective traditional assumptions of constant distribution costs between nodes unlimited product shelf life and deterministic demand used in the inventory routing problem irp literature restrict the usage of the proposed models in current food logistics systems from this point of view our interest in this study is to enhance the traditional models for the irp to make them more useful for the decision makers in food logistics management therefore we present a multi period irp model that includes truck load dependent and thus route dependent distribution costs for a comprehensive evaluation of co2 emission and fuel consumption perishability and a service level constraint for meeting uncertain demand a case study on the fresh tomato distribution operations of a supermarket chain shows the applicability of the model to a real life problem several variations of the model each differing with respect to the considered aspects are employed to present the benefits of including perishability and explicit fuel consumption concerns in the model the results suggest that the proposed integrated model can achieve significant savings in total cost while satisfying the service level requirements and thus offers better support to decision makers

capital vintage time trends and technical change in the electric power industry beginning with tinbergen in 1942 economists have employed a time trend in cost or production functions to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced into the production unit in sufficiently flexible models of the production process the time trend may be used to obtain estimates of the rate as well as direction of technical change the use of the time trend is generally defended on pragmatic grounds as no theoretical justification exists for assuming that new technology is introduced at a steady rate that is independent of a firm s investment in r d education capital of a more recent vintage etc in recent years alternatives to the traditional time trend have been sought to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced research in this area has been concentrated in the telecommunications industry where the stock of r d or the percentage of calls completed by direct dialing or modern switching facilities have been employed as technological indices by nadiri and schankerman 32 denny et al 14 and christensen et al 7 the latter two studies indicate that explicit technological indices provide a better representation of the pace of innovation than the time trend this conclusion must remain tentative however as it is not possible to determine what is the true direction of technical change in these studies this shortcoming is overcome in a recent study by kopp and smith 24 who compare the performance of time trends and explicit technological indices in a study using pseudo data generated by process analysis models their results unambiguously support the use of technologically explicit indicators of technical change and indicate that the use of a time trend may not provide a consistent estimate of the direction of technical change this study does not however shed any light on the ability of a time trend to accurately reflect the rate of technical change the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of alternative technological indices on the estimated rate and direction of technical change in the electric power industry the performance of a time trend is compared with that of a vintage index computed as the average age of a firm s steam generating capacity this latter index is consistent with the notion that new technology is embodied in newly constructed capital an assumption sup

cost efficiency of electric grid utilities in china a comparison of estimates from sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls with the purpose of estimating the range of cost efficiency levels of the power grid sector in china we assembled a data set including 23 provincial power grid companies spanning from 2005 to 2009 and conducted an empirical study based on the sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls methodologies empirical results show that the average values of efficiency from different models vary from 0 85 to 0 92 depending especially on the assumptions underlying inefficiency content further results demonstrate that there is exogenous technical progress during the sample period and per capita gdp of the province is negatively related to the costs of the electric grid company located in the corresponding province we hope this empirical study will contribute to the debate on an efficiency based regulation scheme which was introduced to the chinese electric grid sector on a pilot base in 2014

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

economic growth and welfare state a case study of sweden in this article we analyse the relation between the dynamics of economic growth and the welfare state using the swedish experience as a case study we defend three theses concerning the swedish experience that the deep economic crisis of 1990 93 constituted the definite breaking point for the accumulation pattern in force since the 1950s and in crisis since the mid 1970s that the new accumulation pattern eroded the long standing symbiotic relationships between economic growth and the welfare state and that the welfare state has suffered retrenchments and qualitative changes of great importance which can be fundamentally explained by the transformations in the accumulation pattern we conclude that the changes introduced in sweden have continued to subordinate the welfare state s main goals giving priority to the new accumulation pattern

issues in price discrimination a comment on and addendum to teaching price discrimination by carroll and coates there is a large variety of treatments of the topic of price discrimination in the most widely used undergraduate principles and intermediate microeconomic textbooks as well as industrial organization texts in a recent southern economic journal article carroll and coates 1999 set out to bring into focus the issues that ought to be discussed and made clear when teaching price discrimination to undergraduates their paper concludes with a list of six points that instructors should follow to spark students interest and create as little confusion as possible when covering the topic while in several ways their article is an improvement over many a textbook discussion i think their contribution can also be improved upon as it contains some misconceptions and mistakes specifically there are two concerns regarding the coverage of price discrimination in general and both of these affect the paper by carroll and coates in particular the first is mostly technical but has led to widespread misconceptions about the relationship between the price elasticity of demand and third degree price discrimination the other is mainly pedagogical and concerns what can or should actually be taken away from the classroom after a discussion of price discrimination especially regarding implications of price discrimination on economic efficiency

a note on third degree price discrimination with interdependent demands by incorporating symmetric interdependency into linear demands this note shows that monopolistic third degree price discrimination can improve social welfare even if total output remains the same a result that counters one of the main results presented in layson this journal 1998 it is also shown that this positive change in social welfare benefits the monopoly side but that consumers surplus decreases as a whole

regulated equity returns a puzzle abstract based on a database of u s electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return this growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset pricing models often in direct contrast to regulators stated intent we suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance public policy public choice and the behavioral economics literature however absent some normative justification for this premium it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms

welfare increasing third degree price discrimination when demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means conditions exist such that third degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution related to the pareto in general whether discrimination increases total output depends on demand being more convex in markets in which prices fall with discrimination than in those in which prices rise

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

a hybrid l shaped method to solve a bi objective stochastic transshipment enabled inventory routing problem abstract recently greenness has become a very much needed condition in the transportation industry in this study we develop a green transshipment enabled model for the inventory routing problem irp in a many to one distribution network where demand for each product is realistically assumed to be uncertain the proposed framework is a bi objective stochastic programming model the first objective function aims to minimize the expected value of the supply chain costs including inevitable shortage costs the second objective function aims to minimize the total quantity of the greenhouse gas ghg emission produced by the vehicles and disposed products we introduce a very practical innovative application of transshipment option to control transportation cost reduce ghg emissions and absorb the uncertainty in order to solve the proposed model an efficient hybrid algorithm combining l shaped method a sort of decomposition approach for stochastic optimization and compromise programming a well known approach for multi objective optimization is proposed the results show that how companies can make a reasonable tradeoff between the cost and environmental concerns and emphasize the role of transshipment option as a lever to improve both economic and environmental performance and absorb the demand fluctuations

dual equilibria and discontinuous response in monopolistic competition with two classes of consumers the possibility of a convex industry demand function s leading to two local profit maxima for a monopolist supplier is found to extend to a model of monopolistic competition where two classes of consumers are distinguished by their relative demand for the industry s products a long run free entry industry equilibrium is defined and discontinuous responses to changes in parameters are analyzed some applications are given and the existence of dual equilibria is shown to be a possibility

subsistence substitutability and sustainability in consumption we propose a representation of individual preferences with a subsistence requirement in consumption and examine its implications for substitutability and sustainability specifically we generalize the standard constant elasticity of substitution ces utility specification for manufactured goods and environmental services by adding a subsistence requirement for environmental services we find that the hicksian elasticity of substitution strictly monotonically increases with the consumption of environmental services above the subsistence requirement and approaches the standard ces value as consumption becomes very large whether the two goods are market substitutes depends on the level of income we further show that the subsistence requirement may jeopardize the existence of an intertemporally optimal and sustainable consumption path our results have important implications for growth development and environmental policy

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

the limits of price discrimination we analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers tastes beyond the prior distribution the additional information can be used to charge dierent prices to dierent segments of the market i e carry out third degree price discrimination we show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combi nation of consumer and producer surplus such that i consumer surplus is non negative ii producer surplus is at least as high as pro ts under the uniform monopoly price and iii total surplus does not exceed the e cient gains from trade as well as characterizing the welfare impact of price discrimination we examine the limits of how prices and quantities can change under price discrimination we also examine the limits of price discrimination in richer environments with quantity discrimination and limited ability to segment the market

third degree price discrimination and consumer surplus this paper considers the effects of monopoly third degree price discrimination on aggregate consumer surplus discrimination is likely to reduce surplus relative to that obtained with a uniform price but surplus can rise under reasonable conditions if the ratio of the pass through coefficient to the price elasticity at the uniform price is higher in the market with the higher price elasticity then surplus is larger with discrimination for a large set of demand functions the relatively high pass through coefficient implies a large price reduction in this market with logit demand functions surplus is higher with discrimination if pass through is above 0 5

prices and living standards evidence for rwanda abstract we review the explanations of the statistical relationship between spatial price indices and real living standards then using data from several seasons in rural rwanda we show that these variables are negatively associated hinting at price discrimination against the poor in that case policies permanently improving of market functioning may simultaneously improve efficiency and equity moreover under a hypothesis of weak association of nominal living standards and price indices we derive simplified formulae for social welfare indicators these formulae depend only on a small number of sample statistics obtainable from separate publications for prices and living standards

welfare effects of price discrimination by a regulated monopolist should a multiproduct monopolist whose average price is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in third degree price discrimination if the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm but if perhaps more realistically it is the firm s average revenue that is capped then consumers prefer uniform pricing in this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed which increases welfare but marginal utilities differ across markets which is inefficient and the overall effect is ambiguous a small amount of discrimination is desirable however it is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost the consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

multi dimensional price discrimination we examine the profitability and welfare implications of price discrimination in a multi dimensional model first when firms price discriminate on one and the same dimension uniform price lies in between discriminatory prices and price discrimination raises profits relative to uniform pricing this is in contrast to common findings in existing one dimensional models featuring best response asymmetry suggesting that price discrimination can have qualitatively different implications in one and multi dimensional models second price discrimination on one and the same dimension is the likely outcome when price discrimination decisions are endogenized using a two stage discrimination then pricing game correspondingly an observation of one dimensional price discrimination in practice does not necessarily indicate that the underlying model should be one dimensional