collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

trade liberalization antidumping and safeguards evidence from india s tariff reform abstract this paper is the first to use product level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political economic pressure we focus on the case of india a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions we first estimate structural determinants of india s import protection using the grossman and helpman 1994 model and provide evidence from its pre reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory we then re estimate the model on the indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that india s 1991 1992 imf arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to india s tariff policy however when we re estimate the model on data from 2000 2002 that more completely reflects india s cross product variation in import protection by including both its post reform tariffs and its additional non tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection the significance of the grossman and helpman model determinant estimates is restored we interpret these combined results as evidence that india unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political economic pressure the estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with india s use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform finally we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on india s micro level development

market access for sale abstract this paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the united states government to exporters in the rest of the americas we first develop a simple framework based on grossman and helpman grossman g helpman e 1994 protection for sale american economic review 84 4 833 850 to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the united states market we then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the united states the structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the united states government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences thus our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it

the value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures an argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that by committing to free trade a government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies but several existing models of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing interest group pressures since governments derive rents from the political process we develop a small country model in which factors are sector specific in the short run but mobile in the long run we show that in this setting a government may be worse off in the political equilibrium than under commitment to free trade and hence it may value a trade agreement

a quantile based test of protection for sale model this paper proposes a new test of the protection for sale pfs model by grossman and helpman 1994 unlike existing methods in the literature our approach does not require any data on political organization we use quantile and quantile iv regressions to do so using the data from gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 surprisingly the results do not provide any evidence favoring the pfs model we also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it

protection for sale the case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors in grossman helpman s 1994 canonical protection for sale pfs model political competition among industry lobbies is driven purely by their interests as consumers this paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into the pfs framework to address the rivalry among lobbies stemming from product substitutability it shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions this may explain why empirical tests of pfs find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government s trade policy decision the paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect the industry decision to organize resume proteger les ventes le cas de la concurrence oligopolistique et des secteurs interdependants dans le modele canonique de grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale pfs la concurrence politique entre lobbyistes est purement alimentee par leurs interets en tant que consommateurs ce texte presente dans ce cadre d analyse les enchainements de la demande et la concurrence oligopolistique pour prendre en compte la rivalite entre lobbyistes qui derive de la substituabilite des produits on montre qu une substituabilite accrue reduit l incitation des groupes d interets a faire du lobbying et reduit les distorsions tarifaires cela peut expliquer pourquoi les tests empiriques du modele pfs ont decouvert un impact etonnamment faible des lobbies sur les decisions des gouvernements dans le monde des politiques commerciales le texte analyse aussi la formation endogene des lobbies suggerant que les enchainements de la demande peuvent affecter negativement la decision de s organiser

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

asset returns and government budgets in a small open economy empirical evidence for canada abstract in this paper we test the validity of the ricardian equivalence hypothesis by examining the relationship between the term structure of asset returns and macroeconomic policy variables our study extends the work of plosser 1982 1987 to the canadian case adapting his analysis to the small open economy the empirical results we obtain are consistent with the debt neutrality proposition of the ricardian equivalence hypothesis

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

trade barriers as bargaining outcomes whether bilateral trade barrier data conform with the grossman helpman 1995 model s predictions about trade talks is examined in this article a simple form of the prediction from the model is tested bilateral us japan and us eu data from the 1990s are employed the results are the first in the literature

information for sale in the european union abstract this paper empirically explores the role of informational lobbying in shaping the eu trade policy to this purpose we construct an original dataset by collecting information on the participation of national and international organizations in the european commission consultations on trade issues and by merging it with newly released data on non tariff measures aggregated at the tariff line level between 1999 and 2007 our results suggest that european lobbies exert a major influence on policy makers drawing upon the panel structure of the dataset we find that participation in consultation meetings increases the probability of a protectionist policy even after controlling for product fixed effects and a number of control variables moreover actual attendance turns out to be more effective than simple registration and organizations representing more than one industrial category are more likely to obtain protection than single sector organizations these findings are interpreted in light of a political economy model of lobbying with possibly endogenous costs

do trade agreements increase food trade in addition to multilateral trade agreements under the world trade organization wto the world has seen a remarkable proliferation of regional trade agreements rtas in the last two decades this study investigates whether these multilateral and regional trade institutions increase food trade and bring the world into a freer flow of food the gravity model of international trade is used for the empirical analysis the model is developed in a large panel data setting and attempted to address some potential problems in the estimations including multilateral trade resistances zero trade values and endogeneity the results suggest that both the wto and rtas have delivered significant positive effects on trade among the participant countries but not food only rtas are found to have increased food trade among the participant countries however although on average the wto is found to have negative implications on food trade it facilitates the developing countries more than the developed countries

reconsidering the empirical evidence on the grossman helpman model of endogenous protection the emergence of the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous protection as the preeminent model in the political economy of trade literature has been significantly advanced by the finding that its predictions about the cross industry pattern of protection are broadly consistent with the data however in their empirical implementation of the grossman helpman model researchers have assumed the presence of multiple policy instruments and extraneous political factors we argue that incorporating these assumptions into the theory significantly changes its predictions about the cross industry pattern of protection jel classification f1 l emergence du modele de protection endogene de grossman helpman en tant que modele le plus important dans la litterature sur l economie politique du commerce international a ete confirmee de maniere significative quand on a decouvert que ses predictions quant au pattern de protection a travers les industries se trouvaient generalement confirmees par les donnees cependant dans leur verification empirique du modele de grossman helpman les chercheurs ont postule la presence de multiples instruments de politique publique et de certains facteurs politiques on suggere que l ajout de ces postulats change de maniere significative les predictions du modele quant au pattern de protection dans les divers secteurs

foreign influence and welfare how do foreign interests inuence the policy determination process what are the welfare implications of such foreign inuence in this paper we develop a model of foreign inuence and apply it to the study of optimal taris we develop a two country voting model of electoral competition where we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically aect the electoral outcome in the other country we show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare and we study the determinants of this weight we show that although foreign inuence is zero in equilibrium its threat may be welfare enhancing from the point of view of aggregate world welfare this is because foreign inuence helps alleviate externalities arising from cross border eects of policies the threat of foreign inuence can however prove harmful in the presence of large imbalances in inuence power across countries we apply our model of foreign inuence to the study of optimal trade policy we derive a modied formula for the optimal import tariand show that a country s import tariis more distorted whenever the inuenced country is small relative to the inuencing country and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are small

the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s tariff preferences granted to latin america abstract this paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market to this end the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment the predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the united states and latin american countries the results suggest that latin american exporters and us importers lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the united states more interestingly these findings also show that u s importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences these results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries

reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy abstract using the menu auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner s trade policies we find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country intuitively unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import competing lobby there for lower protection

us non tariff barriers as privately provided public goods abstract the endogenous theory of protection is empirically investigated in a different light rather than emphasizing the determinants of the supply of protection the present study emperically investigates the micro level demand side behavior of firms predictions from bergstrom et al journal of public economics 1986 2 25 49 about the private provision of public goods provide a theoretical foundation for such a demand side econometric investigation if rational lobbies are observed to behave in a manner consistent with the theory of the private provision of public goods then it must be the case that they are able to influence trade policy the econometric specification is also consistent with the special interest models of olson the logic of collective action public goods and the theory of groups harvard university press 1965 stigler bell journal of economics and management science 1971 2 137 146 baron quarterly journal of economics 1989 1 45 72 and grossman and helpman american economic review 1994 84 833 850 hence evidence presented in this study from the demand side behavior of firms has the deeper implication that it validates the theory of endogenous protection an issue that is still controversial among trade theorists

how trade politics affect invasive species control abstract trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally which constitutes a market failure rooted in international trade unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero the external costs may justify a tariff in this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into grossman and helpman s gh well known political economy model we show that our measure of disguised protectionism the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game is equal to the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade policy the informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public goods protection are formidable

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

labour taxation in a unionised economy with home production this paper investigates the impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare in a model with household production and union firm wage bargaining it turns out that unemployment most likely fal

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

substitutability and protectionism latin america s trade policy and imports from china and india this article examines the trade policy response of latin american governments to the rapid growth of chinese and indian exports in world markets to explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in china and india the protection for sale model is extended to allow for region specific degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties of a good the results suggest that more protection toward chinese and indian goods can be explained by the higher substitutability of chinese and indian goods with domestic varieties the data support the model which performs better than the original protection for sale framework in explaining latin america s structure of protection

protection for sale or surge protection this paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential grossman and helpman protection for sale pfs model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting a model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges but only for organized industries is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework this suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought

the political economy of non tariff measures over the last decades non tari measures ntms have seen an important upsurge how ever little research has focused on the political economy of non tariff protection and the existing studies are mainly based on a single country or a specific type of measures this paper seeks to fill the gap by empirically evaluating the determinants of ntms in several countries both developed and developing overall results show certain protectionist purposes behind the adoption of ntms this conclusion is reinforced for restrictive measures i e subject to trade concerns but does not hold for non restrictive measures suggesting the legitimate goal of several ntms furthermore transnational lobbying defined as the influence exerted by national business groups during the ministerial conferences the highest authority of the world trade organization wto increases the probability of adopting ntms in both developed and developing countries

can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the protection for sale model in the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous trade protection sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare we empirically investigate this model using u s and turkish data our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies additionally we assume all specific factor owners to be organized into different lobbies these changes validated by hypothesis tests yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government s concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies peut on obtenir des calibrations realistes des parametres du modele de protection en vue d augmenter les ventes dans le modele de protection commerciale endogene de grossman helpman 1994 des lobbys sectoriels tentent d influencer un gouvernement en place qui maximise une somme ponderee des contributions politiques et du bien etre collectif les auteurs utilisent ce modele pour analyser les donnees pour les etats unis et la turquie on specifie le modele d une maniere qui serre de plus pres la theorie que ce qui a ete le cas dans les etudes anterieures de plus on assume que tous les proprietaires de facteurs de production specifiques sont organises en lobbys differents ces changements valides par des tests d hypotheses engendrent des estimations plus realistes des parametres de la fonction d interet du gouvernement pour le bien etre collectif et pour la fraction de la population organisee en lobbys

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

china trade policy review a political economy approach chinese trade policy has experienced great reversal in the year of 2008 a series of constraining measures taken previously have been loosened eventually we investigate this situation using a political economy approach unlike in democratic countries where interest groups play a crucial role in trade policy change in china given the political reality leaders will and trade partners pressure are the determinant factors we call this top down and outside in trade policy actually the idea of harmonious society and scientific development emphasised by top leaders in october 2006 paved the road for the following trade policy adjustment i e reducing tax rebate limiting processing trade compressing the catalogue for foreign investment etc however with the shock of a global financial tsunami these measures get coastal areas relying on foreign trade heavily into trouble the economic downturn in pearl river delta even astonished the decision making body calling on a quick reversal in foreign trade policy if interest groups had been allowed to express their demand formally and adequately from the very start the cycle of taking up first but giving up last in policy design would have not taken place in other words the bottom up and inside out trade policy should be more stable although flexibility is necessary in the face of uncertainty frequent and discretionary trade policy change usually produces effects of pro government not pro market this is unfavourable for the transformation in china the constraining trade policy in mid 2007 to mid 2008 has been a part of the government s desire to seek healthier development however with the inside and outside surroundings getting worse the structural adjustment long run objective has had to concede to the economic growth short run objective

protectionism versus risk in screening for invasive species abstract i examine the extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity import restriction us border inspections for foreign pests and diseases is used as a protectionist trade barrier the parameters of a structural model of border inspection are estimated using a detailed dataset documenting the outcome of us agricultural border inspections i find that inspections are conducted in a manner that places an implied welfare weight on domestic producers relative to consumers ranging from 1 to 1 63 i also find evidence that the inspection agency takes terms of trade into account when inspecting agricultural imports these results suggest that border inspections are used as a protectionist non tariff barrier

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies