the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

sectoral transformation and labour market flows in this chapter we examine the dynamics of adjustment in the labour market and in particular the movement of workers between industries it is often assumed that the speed with which the labour market must adjust has increased due to globalisation and or technological change if this is the case then these forces may be responsible for greater instability in the workplace the displacement of growing numbers of especially unskilled workers from declining sectors longer periods of unemployment and wage losses

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

job displacement and the transitions to re employment and early retirement for non employed older workers abstract despite the relatively higher frequency of job displacement among older workers in europe little is known about its effect on the work retirement decision employing individual data from the european community household panel for a number of countries with differences in their institutional environments the effect of job displacement for non employed workers is identified separately for the transitions into re employment and retirement the findings suggest that in countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance provisions for the older unemployed which offer a pathway to early retirement older displaced workers exhibit lower re employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non displaced these results are robust to dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity and to the endogeneity of displacement

setting efficient incentives for agricultural research lessons from principal agent theory a conceptual analysis of important issues in the organization and management of academic research is presented principal agent theory is applied to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists when they differ in ability risk aversion cost of effort and reservation utility and to show the optimal trade off between institutional risk and scientists abilities implications for an efficient organization of research are derived including how scientists incentives should be structured to elicit optimal research efforts and direction whether research direction should be centralized or decentralized and whether the organization of research should be through external competitive grantsor program and institutional funding copyright 2000 oxford university press

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

flexible pensions for politicians it may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term to solve this problem we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets flexible pensions and democratic elections an information market is used to predict the potential reelection chances of the politician pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner we show that on balance the triple mechanism increases social welfare finally we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

the gender gap in early career wage growth in the uk the gender pay gap on entry to the labour market is approximately zero but ten years after labour market entry there is a gender wage gap of almost 25 log points this article explores the reason for this gender gap in early career wage growth considering three main hypotheses human capital job shopping and psychological theories human capital factors can explain about 11 log points job shopping about 1 5 log points and the psychological theories up to 4 5 log points depending on the specification but a substantial unexplained gap remains women who have continuous full time employment have had no children and express no desire to have them earn about 8 log points less than equivalent men after 10 years in the labour market

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

the threat from within account managers concern about opportunism by their own team members it is well known that transaction specific investments tsis made in customers by account managers makes them vulnerable to opportunism by customers i e the targets of the investments the present research shows that tsis made in customers by account managers can also lead them to be concerned about internal opportunism by nontargets of the investments e g information technology or finance specialists in their own teams furthermore it shows that concern about internal opportunism leads account managers to engage in internal blocking of their own team members i e restricting their access to customers and to customer information which results in lower performance with customers this phenomenon is a conundrum in that account managers interested in stronger performance with customers appear to block the very functional specialists who can help them attain better performance this research also identifies two types of continuities account manager customer continuity and specialist customer continuity that moderate the relationship between tsis and concern about internal opportunism building on the literature in economics and organization theory our research suggests that cross functional teams that are designed to bring different functional areas together are more complex to manage than previously believed this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

racial disparity in unemployment abstract in the united states black workers earn less than their white counterparts and have higher rates of unemployment empirical work indicates that most of this wage gap is accounted for by differences in cognitive skills that emerge at an early age in this paper we demonstrate that the same is not true for black white disparity in unemployment a large unexplained unemployment differential motivates the paper s second contribution a potential theoretical explanation this explanation is built around a model that embeds statistical discrimination into the subjective worker evaluation process that lies at the root of the efficiency wage theory of equilibrium unemployment

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

earnings losses of displaced workers revisited recent literature reviews conclude that job displacement results in sustained earnings losses bruce c fallick 1996 lori g kletzer 1998 and that estimates of the size of those reductions vary with the type of data used in the analysis the industry within which displacement occurs and business cycle conditions the largest estimated losses were obtained using administrative data from pennsylvania during the 1970s and 1980s louis s jacobson robert j lalonde and daniel g sullivan 1993a the data covered a period of high unemployment in a heavily indus trialized state characterized by disproportionate job losses in manufacturing thus the ability to generalize those results to more favorable economic times and states with a greater reliance on service sector employment has been questioned to address these issues administrative data are used to similarly examine the impact of job displacement on earnings losses of workers in connecticut from 1993 to 2004 the work of jacobson lalonde and sullivan jls also provided important methodologi cal advancement by adapting analytical techniques developed for program evaluation james j heckman and v joseph hotz 1989 to the context of job displacement the same techniques fixed effects and time trend estimators as those used in the original jls publication are initially employed here then the methods are extended to include matching estimators developed since their publication both nearest neighbor estimators of average treatment on the treated att and differenced average treatment on the treated datt are adapted to the context of this study heckman hidehiko ichimura and petra todd 1997 heckman et al 1998 and rajeev h dehejia and sadek wahba 1999 2002 the results presented here for connecticut differ in some ways from those found in the work of jls using data from pennsylvania in the period immediately following job loss regardless of the technique employed earnings reductions for workers displaced through mass layoff range from 32 percent to 33 percent jls reported immediate losses of more than 40 percent six years later using the same estimators as jls earnings reductions in connecticut range from 13 percent to 15 percent they report sustained losses in pennsylvania of 25 percent the smaller long term impacts in connecticut demonstrate that under more ordinary economic times esti mated losses from administrative data lie within the range observed using other data sources this finding resolves a long standing conflict among the results of high quality studies that have used differing data sources to study earnings reductions following job loss 1 using two different matching estimators earnings losses six years after mass layoff are 12 percent the matching estimators compare those who experienced mass layoff to compari sons with the same ex ante probability of the event these smaller losses are consistent with the

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

applicant screening and performance related outcomes a fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees most economic models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking but there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring we might therefore expect employers who screen candidates more intensively to monitor them less using data from a national sample of us employers we find that employers who screen applicants more intensively for factors that should predict work ethic also monitor employees less and also make greater use of systems such as teamwork where monitoring by supervisors is more difficult this screening is also associated with higher wages higher employee productivity and lower involuntary turnover rates screening for other attributes such as work experiences and academic performance does not produce these results jel codes m51 m54 j30

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

unsecured debt with public insurance from bad to worse abstract in u s data income interruptions the receipt of public insurance and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related the central contribution of this paper is to evaluate bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other our analysis delivers two striking conclusions first we find that u s personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier that prevents the public insurance system from improving welfare second contrary to popular belief we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more not less bankruptcy

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

vested interests and technology adoption this paper incorporates asymmetric interest group formation into a political economy model of barriers to technology adoption with many small industries coalitions of workers skilled in incumbent technologies lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of superior technologies the model naturally generates concentrated benefits to vested interests and diused costs of barriers to technology adoption for reasonable parameter values this smallness of industry lobbies leads to barriers to the adoption of technologies that would make all workers more productive higher government corruption can lead to lower levels of tfp and per capita output the

performance pay and teachers effort productivity and grading ethics this paper presents evidence about the effect of individual monetary incentives on english and math teachers in israel teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improving their students performance in high school matriculation exams the main identification strategy is based on measurement error in the assignment to treatment variable that produced a randomized treatment sample the incentives led to significant improvements in test taking rates conditional pass rates and mean test scores improvements were mediated through changes in teaching methods enhanced after school teaching and increased responsiveness to students needs no evidence was found of manipulation of test scores by teachers

incentives for lawyers moving away from eat what you kill the authors study an international law firm that changed its compensation plan for team leaders to address a multitasking problem team leaders were focusing their effort on billable hours and not spending sufficient time on leadership activities to build the firm compensation was changed to provide greater incentives for the leadership activities and weaker incentives for billable hours the effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm s team leaders was large and robust team leaders increased their non billable hours and shifted billable hours to team members the firm s new compensation plan combining an objective formula with subjective evaluations is the fastest growing compensation system among law firms today

incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal agent model several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the current financial crisis using a principal agent model this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent s and principal s behavior specifically we show how bonus taxes affect the agent s incentives to exert effort and the principal s decision regarding the composition of the compensation package fixed salary and bonus rate we find that surprisingly a bonus tax can increase the bonus rate and decrease the fixed salary if the agent is highly risk averse additionally a bonus tax can induce the principal to pay higher bonuses even though the agent s effort unambiguously decreases nevertheless a bonus tax reduces the overall salary of the agent further results are derived with respect to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a general effort cost function

limited liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects i examine a principal agent model with multiple projects where a risk neutral manager is protected by limited liability the analysis has several interesting implications i incentive problems are shown to be a natural source of economies of scope as combining multiple projects under the management of a single manager relaxes the limited liability constraint ii as a result managers may be overloaded with work and exert inefficiently high effort and iii the analysis has implications for the optimal allocation of projects to different managers copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

jobs jobs jobs a new perspective on protectionism this paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions in this environment jobs generate rents whose access depends on the level of trade protection by raising the domestic price of a good a government may attract more firms in a particular industry this raises the probability that workers will find jobs in this sector and in turn will benefit from the associated rents though simple this channel may help explainavarietyofstylizedfactsonthestructureoftradeprotectionandindividualtrade policy preferences jel f130 f160

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

motivation and markets many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it this paper incorporates such pay with the following results performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply more capital intensive industries pay more than less capital intensive industries as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage the model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover wages growth and unemployment copyright 1998 by american economic association

performance pay and workplace injury panel evidence using panel survey data we show cross sectional evidence of an elevated risk of workplace injury for those paid piece rates and bonuses while consistent with adam smith s behavioural conjecture this could simply reflect sorting across workers or firms in response we successively control for a risk proxy for worker fixed effects and for worker with employer match fixed effects no previous examination has controlled for such fixed effects or examined us survey data the estimates indicate that injury risk increases substantially when blue collar manual workers become paid by piece rates and bonuses

beauty contests and iterated expectations in asset markets in a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived and prices are noisy asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow s price thus iterating this relationship the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation of the date 3 price this will not in general equal the date 1 average expectation of the date 3 price we show how this failure of the law of iterated expectations for average belief can help understand the role of higher order beliefs in a fully rational asset pricing model and explain over reaction to noisy public information

on the imperfect substitutability of policy regimes exchange rate targetting vs policy coordination abstract exchange rate targetting is always an imperfect substitute for explicit policy coordination but succeeds when economies are either structurally dissimilar with symmetric shocks or structurally symmetric with dissimilar shocks a joint commitment then generates economies of scale in interventions

occupational specificity of human capital we find that returns to occupational tenure are substantial everything else being constant 5 years of occupational tenure are associated with an increase in wages of 12 20 moreover when occupational experience is taken into account tenure with an industry or employer has relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives this finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific

heterogeneous agents and uninsurable idiosyncratic employment shocks in a linearized dynamic general equilibrium model this paper proposes an analytical solution method for a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and uninsurable idiosyncratic employment shocks the solution method yields an approximate balanced growth path which depends on the unemployment rate and the unemployment risk but which is independent of the ever changing wealth distribution

changes in job security and their causes an empirical analysis for france 1982 2002 abstract in this paper we analyze the changes in the risks of involuntary job loss in france between 1982 and 2002 we find that these risks are higher in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s we develop an econometric analysis to separate the effects of institutional changes from the effects of new technologies our estimates show that the rise in job loss rates is significantly more pronounced in industries that have the largest share of r d workers and the largest rate of new technologies users these findings suggest that technological changes contribute to decreasing the incentive to keep workers for long period of time and to increasing job insecurity

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

it s about time implications of the period length in an equilibrium search model empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month i analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous time model with bilateral meetings whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers in this environment i show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes including the unemployment rate unemployment duration and the cross sectional wage distribution