on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

out of step out of office electoral accountability and house members voting does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll call decisions we investigate the relationship between incumbents electoral performance and roll call support for their party controlling for district ideology challenger quality and campaign spending among other factors through a series of tests of the 1956 1996 elections the tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting first in each election an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party second this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants third a member s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party and this relationship holds for not only marginal but also safe members

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

to elect or to appoint bias information and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians in this paper we address empirically the trade offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians in order to do this we map institutions of selection and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce we do this by specifying a collective decision making model and exploiting its equilibrium information to obtain estimates of the unobservable types we focus on criminal decisions across us states supreme courts we find that justices that are shielded from voters influence bureaucrats on average i have better information ii are more likely to change their preconceived opinions about a case and iii are more effective make less mistakes than their elected counterparts politicians we evaluate how performance would change if the courts replaced majority rule with unanimity rule

do voters vote ideologically abstract in this paper we address the following question to what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically i e they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically closest to them testable or falsifiable we show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election on the other hand using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested

improving willingness to pay estimates for quality improvements through joint estimation with quality perceptions willingness to pay for quality change may depend on heterogeneous perceived quality levels contingent valuation studies should include measures of quality perceptions as covariates in the willingness to pay model in order to avoid omitted variable bias variation in quality perceptions across respondents leads to a potential endogeneity of quality perceptions i address the potential for endogeneity bias using an instrumental variables approach in which a measure of quality perceptions is included as a determinant of willingness to pay and is simultaneously determined by various exogenous factors the willingness to pay model is estimated jointly with quality perceptions allowing for correlation of the error terms using data on willingness to pay for water quality improvements in the neuse river in north carolina i reject exogeneity of perceived quality correcting for endogeneity improves the measurement of willingness to pay by differentiating willingness to pay among respondents with heterogeneous quality perceptions

representation in municipal government municipal governments play a vital role in american democracy as well as in governments around the world despite this little is known about the degree to which cities are responsive to the views of their citizens in the past the unavailability of data on the policy preferences of citizens at the municipal level has limited scholars ability to study the responsiveness of municipal government we overcome this problem by using recent advances in opinion estimation to measure the mean policy conservatism in every u s city and town with a population above 20 000 people despite the supposition in the literature that municipal politics are non ideological we find that the policies enacted by cities across a range of policy areas correspond with the liberal conservative positions of their citizens on national policy issues in addition we consider the influence of institutions such as the presence of an elected mayor the popular initiative partisan elections term limits and at large elections our results show that these institutions have little consistent impact on policy responsiveness in municipal government these results demonstrate a robust role for citizen policy preferences in determining municipal policy outcomes but cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reforms enhance responsiveness in municipal governments

the impact of parental income on early schooling transitions a re examination using data over three generations abstract this paper applies new semi parametric techniques to estimate the effects of parental income on the probability of being held back in elementary school in france we use information on grandparents past socioeconomic status and parents education level to separate the parental income effects from the effects of the unmeasured determinants of children s performance at school that are correlated with parental income when considering the probability of being held back in elementary school we find that the effects of parental poverty are much larger than the effects of a child s sex or age age within his her class or of the parents education level our findings suggest that policy decisions that increase income transfers to relatively poor families have a potentially very large impact on children s early performance at school

the analysis of committee power an application to senate voting on the minimum wage a widely noted empirical regularity of congressional behavior is that standing committees exert disproportionate influence on congressional choices the observed phenomenon has a number of labels committee influence committee power and from the parent chamber s perspective deference to committees and a large body of theoretical and empirical research has sought to determine when and why it exists this paper takes as given only the weakest form the observation namely that committee power exists sometimes it does not directly address the questions of when and why committee power exists although much of the relevant literature is reviewed rather it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution of disputes about committee power how can committee power be assessed empirically section i reviews three classes of explanations and identifies obstacles to convincing empirical tests of the accounts section ii introduces an econometric approach for analyzing committee power section iii applies the technique to a sequence of votes on minimum wage legislation in the senate in 1977 section iv extends the technique to multi dimensional choice spaces section v is a discussion and summary

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great or even greater in competitive seats as in non competitive ones basic downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two candidate elections common journalistic wisdom moreover leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close yet the available evidence from the us congress disconfirms this prediction to explain this counterintuitive result we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition partisan loyalties and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office seeking candidates especially candidates in close elections to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter

towards an understanding of the role of standard setters in standard setting abstract we investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of fasb members and sec commissioners predict the accounting reliability and relevance of proposed standards notably we find fasb members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease reliability and increase relevance partly due to their tendency to propose fair value methods we find opposite results for fasb members affiliated with the democratic party although only when excluding financial services background as an independent variable jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter

estimating willingness to pay for improved drinking water quality using averting behavior method with perception measure this paper suggests an application of an averting behaviormethod to reconcile inconsistent public activity with objectiveenvironmental risk in korea an historically polluted watersupply has created citizen resistance to using tap water koreansperceive low quality levels for tap water although objectivelymeasured data show that the pollution levels are lower than theacceptable risk we hypothesized that the irrational aversion tousing tap water is a consequence of inconsistencies between theobjectively measured and perceived pollution levels we introducethe perception averting behavior method in which we add aperception measure unit to the conventional averting behaviormethod we found that the perception measure provided a validexplanation for citizens aversion to using tap water in korea

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

spatial models of legislative effectiveness spatial models of policymaking have evolved from the median voter theorem through the inclusion of institutional considerations such as political parties committees and various voting and amendment rules such models however implicitly assume that no policy is more effective than another at solving public policy problems and that all proposers are equally capable of advancing proposals we relax these assumptions by modeling proposal quality and the effort needed to make better proposals the resulting legislative effectiveness model lem offers three main benefits first it can better account for policy changes based on the effectiveness or popularity of the status quo changing our understanding of how to overcome gridlock in polarized legislatures second it generalizes canonical models of legislative politics such as median voter setter negative agenda setting and pivotal politics models all of which emerge as special cases within the lem third the lem offers significant new empirical predictions some of which we initially test and find support for within the u s congress

public investment and the risk premium for equity analysis of the equity premium puzzle has focused on private sector capital markets however the existence of an anomalous equity premium raises important issues in the evaluation of public sector investment projects these issues are explored below we begin by formalizing the argument that an equity premium may arise from uninsurable systematic risk in labour income and show that other things being equal increases in public ownership of equity will improve welfare up to the point where the equity premium is eliminated finally we consider policy implications and the optimal extent of public ownership

comparing features of convenient estimators for binary choice models with endogenous regressors abstract we discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of four types of convenient estimators of binary choice models when regressors may be endogenous or mismeasured or when errors are likely to be heteroscedastic for example such models arise when treatment is not randomly assigned and outcomes are binary the estimators we compare are the two stage least squares linear probability model maximum likelihood estimation control function estimators and special regressor methods we specifically focus on models and associated estimators that are easy to implement also for calculating choice probabilities and regressor marginal effects we propose the average index function aif which unlike the average structural function asf is always easy to estimate

constituency opinion and congressional policy making the reagan defense buildup representatives votes on a series of defense budget roll calls in the first year of the reagan administration s pentagon buildup are related to constituency opinions on defense spending during the 1980 election campaign the strong aggregate constituency demand for increased defense spending in 1980 is estimated to have added almost 17 billion about 10 to the total fiscal year 1982 pentagon appropriation the impact of constituency opinion was largely independent of specific political circumstances differential responsiveness in districts with partisan turnover intense districtlevel competition and strong presidential coattails together accounted for less than 1 billion in additional appropriations with the remaining 16 billion attributable to across the board responsiveness by even the most safely incumbent representatives t he appeal of representative democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of their constituents given the theoretical and practical significance of the connection between constituents opinions and their representatives legislative activities it is remarkable that the large and in some ways quite sophisticated empirical literature addressing this connection includes so few direct estimates of the relationship between constituency opinion and specific legislative outcomes 1 my aim here is to provide one such estimate the policy issue i have chosen to examine is the level of total pentagon spending in the first fy 1982 defense appropriations bill of the reagan administration that bill the first in a series of annual appropriations resulting in a 40 real increase in defense spending during reagan s first five years in office is of obvious political significance but the issue of defense spending is also especially interesting from a broader theoretical perspective because the strong public demand for a defense spending increase at the beginning of the reagan era provides unusual analytical leverage for assessing the potential impact of public opinion on the making of public policy i shall describe some alternative mechanisms of congressional responsiveness to constituency opinion briefly characterize the politics of defense at the beginning of the reagan era present my analysis of representatives preferences regarding fy 1982 defense appropriations relating those preferences to constituency opinions on the defense spending issue and to other political characteristics of the representatives and their districts extend the analysis of fy 1982 defense appropriations from the individual to the aggregate level in an attempt to estimate the impact of congressional responsiveness on the total level of pentagon appropriations and finally touch upon some of the implications of my analysis for the study of linkages between public opinion and public policy

the statistical analysis of roll call data modern studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship among the policy preferences of legislators institutional arrangements and legislative outcomes in spatial models of legislatures policies are represented geometrically as points in a low dimensional euclidean space each legislator has a most preferred policy or ideal point in this space and his or her utility for a policy declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point see davis hinich and ordeshook 1970 for an early survey the primary use of roll call data the recorded votes of deliberative bodies 1 is the estimation of ideal points the appeal and importance of ideal point estimation arises in two ways first ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures the distribution of ideal points estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation or region or become more polarized over time e g mccarty poole and rosenthal 2001 roll call data serve similar purposes for interest groups such as americans for democratic action the national taxpayers union and the sierra club to produce ratings of legislators along different policy dimensions second estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior for instance roll call analysis has been used in studies of the u s congress both contemporary and

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

bayesian inference for comparative research rv egression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables we describe a bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems this approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization a widely used tool in quantitative comparative politics is the linear regression model estimating relationships between institutional and economic variables observed for a set of countries constituting some population of interest a brief survey of recent comparative research finds no shortage of work of this type for instance remmer 1991 identifies economic crisis as a source of electoral volatility in latin american countries in the 1980s robertson 1990 presents evidence that institutions moderating the transaction costs of negotiations between capital and labor reduce industrial conflict and golden 1993 finds that union wage moderation in industrialized democracies results from coordinated collective bargaining although the methodological advantages are well documented jackman 1985 we identify two distinct problems of statistical inference endemic to this type of quantitative comparative research first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second because data sets tend to be small and collinear the effects of explanatory variables are estimated imprecisely in most applications the first problem is generally ignored and the second is solved by imposing restrictions on the regression model to obtain sensible results the bayesian model of statistical inference provides a unified solution to these two distinct problems of quantitative comparative research two features of bayesian inference are important in this context first probability is conceived subjectively as characterizing a researcher s uncertainty about the parameters of a statistical model this subjective probability concept seems particularly useful in comparative settings where the data are typically convenience samples not generated by a known probability mechanism such as random sampling second bayesian inference allows the inclusion of other information in addition to the quantitative sample information again this seems useful in the comparative context where rich historical material is commonly available sparking ideas for researchers but formally discarded in the final analysis in the bayesian approach this historical material can be formally incorporated into the analysis we begin by detailing why the nonstochastic and weak data typical of comparative research are problematic for conventional linear regression analysis we next introduce some ideas about bayesian inference and describe bayesian regression analysis these ideas are applied to a comparative analysis of unionization the subject of a recent exchange in the american political science review between michael wallerstein and john stephens stephens and wallerstein 1991 wallerstein 1989 the bayesian regressions we present are supplemented with a sensitivity analysis that investigates how our conclusions depend upon the sample data and our prior beliefs although we survey some ideas in bayesian statistics a full introduction to the bayesian approach to statistical inference is beyond our scope here good book length treatments are pollard 1986 lee 1989 and at a slightly higher level press 1989 our intention here is to spotlight problematic but ignored issues of statistical inference in a common area of application the bayesian alternative that we present represents just one way forward to address these inferential problems

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

can words get in the way the effect of deliberation in collective decision making we quantify the effect of deliberation on the decisions of us appellate courts we estimate a model in which strategic judges communicate before casting their votes and then compare the probability of mistakes in the court with deliberation with a counterfactual of no communication the model has multiple equilibria and preferences and information parameters are only partially identified we find that there is a range of parameters in the identified set when judges tend to disagree ex ante or their private information is imprecise in which deliberation can be beneficial otherwise deliberation reduces the effectiveness of the court

the complex relationship between households climate change concerns and their water and energy mitigation behaviour climate change will require commitment by all levels of the community but there is still uncertainty surrounding the best way to influence individual mitigation behaviour this study analyses household survey data on water and energy climate change mitigation behaviour from eleven oecd countries in 2011 and provides new evidence of a form of maladaptation namely a complex rebound relationship between climate change attitudes and mitigation behaviour first results confirm other studies that climate change concerns and economic incentives in terms of electricity and water charges positively influence mitigation behaviour second we find that the more costly in terms of time and or money are the mitigation actions of a household the more likely undertaking such actions directly lessens respondents climate change concerns this negative rebound effect is more likely to occur in environmentally motivated households who are more likely to have stated they believe human actions can help mitigate climate change conversely economic incentives in driving energy and water pro environmental behaviour work better in non environmentallymotivated households this highlights that a portfolio of policies is needed to drive mitigation behaviour

uncovering evidence of conditional party government reassessing majority party influence in congress and state legislatures temporary american legislatures our use of a new analytic technique a grid search program for characterizing the uncovered set enables us to begin with a better model of legislative proceedings that abandons the simple one dimensional spatial models in favor of the more realistic two dimensional version our conclusions are based on the analysis of real world data rather than on arguments about the relative merits of different theoretic assumptions our analysis confirms that when legislators preferences are polarized outcomes will generally be closer to the majority party s wishes even if the majority party leadership does nothing to influence the legislative process this conclusion notwithstanding our analysis also shows that at the margin of the majority party s natural advantage agenda setting by the majority party remains a viable and efficacious strategy in the debate over party organizations in the american congress one side e g aldrich and rohde 1998 2001 argues that the majority party can influence the outcome of legislative proceedings through agenda control or the ability to determine which proposals are considered the other side e g krehbiel 1999 2000 argues that agenda control conveys no power and that the majority party s apparent influence

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

the value of information in the court get it right keep it tight one should always subordinate his own personal views whether they be economic social political or whatever they may be because when you are talking about your own views you are only one of millions of individuals in the country when you are interpreting the law perhaps you have a special skill and special training that does give you the right to pass on these questions i have to confess that in this open area sometimes inevitably a man is the product of his own background and he may be somewhat influenced but i will do my very best to subordinate those considerations because i think that is the duty of any judge justice john stevens in his senate confirmation hearing

the hunt for party discipline in congress ttt e analyze party discipline in the house of representatives between 1947 and 1998 the effects of 1 v party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes adding a second cutting line makes at best a marginal improvement over the standard single line model analysis of legislators who switch parties shows however that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator s ideal point in contrast to our approach we find that the snyder groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects

asset pricing in a lucas fruit tree economy with the best and worst in mind this paper studies a lucas 1978 fruit tree economy under the assumption that the agents are choquet expected utility ceu rather than standard expected utility decision makers more speci cally the agents non additive beliefs about the economy s dividend payment process are modelled as neo additive capacities so that the agents decision behavior emphasizes the best respectively worst possible economic scenarios in contrast to existing models of lucas type economies with ambiguity averse agents epstein and wang 1994 which ensure dynamic consistency through heavy restrictions on admissible ambiguity attitudes my ap

averting expenditure and the cost of pollution the paper considers the relationship between the willingness to pay for environmental quality and averting expenditures that is the costs of measures undertaken in efforts to counteract the consequences of pollution the models used assume perfect mobility among locations with different levels of environmental quality the major results are i averting expenditures are not in general a good measure of willingness to pay 2 averting expenditures are not always even a lower bound on willingness to pay 3 even when averting expenditures are a lower bound the difference between the level of such expenditures and willingness to pay carmot be attributed to the unavertible aesthetic consequences of pollution for almost every kind of environmental unpleasantness we face there are averting expenditures we can make to reduce and sometimes completely remove the damage for air pollution house paint air conditioners soap for water pollution wells bottled water purifiers for noise pollution storm windows thicker walls economists have long been aware that averting behavior is both possible and practiced and they have often suggested that expenditures on such behavior can be used as a measure of the costs imposed on society by various forms of pollution the literature on this subject is difficult to characterize but to the extent that a consensus has been reached it is that averting expenditures provide a lower bound estimate of the total costs imposed by pollution and the divergence between averting expenditures and the total costs of pollution arises from the fact that some consequences of pollution e g the simple unpleasantness of breathing dirty air cannot be averted 2 3 in this note we develop two simple models of the response of utility maximizing consumers to small changes in the level of pollution which they face in the first model we assume that environmental quality is desired solely because it reduces the need for averting expenditure we show that 1 the level of averting expenditure may be either a lower bound or an upper bound estimate of the consumer s

the impact of perceptions in averting decision models an application of the special regressor method to drinking water choices households monetary valuation of water quality is a prerequisite for efficient water resource management and the valuation of water quality protection policies individuals are commonly questioned about their perception of risk in valuation surveys based on stated preference methods and revealed preference methods such as averting behavior models these subjective and often discrete measures are commonly used to explain individuals actions to protect themselves against these risks perceptions appear as endogenous variables in traditional theoretical averting decision models but quite surprisingly endogeneity of perceived risk is not always controlled for in empirical studies in this article we argue that perceptions have to be treated as endogenous to averting decisions in order to produce accurate and reliable measures of households valuation of water quality improvements we present various binary averting decision models featuring an endogenous discrete variable such as risk perception in particular we compare the traditional bivariate probit model with the special regressor model which is less well known and relies on a different set of assumptions in the empirical illustration using household data from australia canada and france we study how the perceived health impacts of tap water affect a household s decision to drink water from the tap individuals perceptions are found to be endogenous and significant for all models but the estimated marginal effect is sensitive to the chosen model our empirical application also includes some tests of the special regressor estimator s sensitivity to underlying assumptions

how can we estimate the ideology of citizens and political elites on the same scale estimating the ideological positions of political elites on the same scale as those of ordinary citizens has great potential to increase our understanding of voting behavior representation and other political phenomena there has been limited attention however to the fundamental issues both practical and conceptual involved in conducting these joint scalings or to the sensitivity of these estimates to modeling assumptions and data choices i show that the standard strategy of estimating ideal point models using preference data on citizens and elites can suffer from potentially problematic pathologies this article explores these issues and presents a technique that can be used to investigate the effects of modeling assumptions on resulting estimates and also to impose restrictions on the ideological dimension being estimated in a straightforward way abstract from author

testing explanations of strategic voting in legislatures a reexamination of the compromise of 1790 a difficult yet prevalent problem in legislative politics is how to assess explanations when observable actions may not represent true and unobserved legislator preferences we present a method for analyzing the validity of theoretical historical accounts that unifies theory history and measurement we argue that approaches to testing accounts of legislative behavior which are theoretically and historically agnostic are not always best and present an approach which 1 forms an explicit explanation of behavior here a simple dynamic voting game that yields estimable parameter constraints and 2 tests these constraints using a customized empirical model that is as consistent as possible with the explanation we demonstrate the method using legislative voting data from the first congress 1789 1791 using the idea of sophisticated equivalents from voting theory we subject the traditional account of the compromise of 1790 to a statistical test and find that there is reason to doubt the claim that legislators of the time believed the specified log roll was taking place the results suggest that the capital location and assumption issues were resolved independently

formation of risk beliefs joint production and willingness to pay to avoid skin cancer this paper uses a survey of risk beliefs about skin cancer to provide new evidence on how people view risky situations empirical results presented are based on a measure of risk beliefs held at the time of the survey key findings are that risk beliefs about skin cancer account for factors including skin type complexion and sunlight exposure history also the connection between risk beliefs and willingness to pay is explored by using reservation prices for a sun protection product a new method for treating joint production in a household production framework is developed to support this analysis copyright 1996 by mit press

estimating ideal points in the british house of commons using early day motions this article develops a new method for estimating the ideological preferences of members of the british house of commons existing methods produce implausible results due to high levels of party cohesion and strategic voting on the part of opposition parties to circumvent these problems this article estimates mp preferences using early day motions edms as an alternative to roll call votes the bayesian ideal point model for the decision to sign an edm takes into account both policy preferences and signing costs the estimates obtained have greater face validity than previous attempts to measure preferences in the house of commons recovering the expected order of parties and of members within parties the estimates successfully predict voting behavior in the house of commons as with other bayesian ideal point methods this approach produces natural uncertainty estimates and allows for easy calculation of quantities of interest such as member ranks

beyond the median voter preferences district heterogeneity and political representation despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts however all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter we utilize a unique data set consisting of individual level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences we find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

candidate valence evidence from consecutive presidential elections this article develops and estimates a dynamic spatial model of voting the distribution of voters policy positions and candidates valence are recovered using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections the estimated model is used to provide an equilibrium interpretation of observed individual voting profiles and aggregate electoral outcomes as well as to conduct counterfactual experiments that assess the impact of candidates policy positions valence and voters information on electoral outcomes

moral hazard imperfect risk sharing and the behavior of asset returns abstract this paper develops a model of endogenous idiosyncratic risk in a simple two period general equilibrium setting and examines its implications for the behavior of asset returns the model readily generates empirically plausible idiosyncratic risk in consumption and yields more realistic behavior of asset returns than comparable models with perfect insurance the most dramatic effects of imperfect risk sharing however are not on the spreads between asset returns but on their absolute levels overall the results suggest allowing for incomplete markets can contribute to a resolution of the equity premium puzzle

valuing the incremental benefits of groundwater protection when exposure levels are known both economic theory and psychological research indicate that benefit functions for reductions in health risk exposures may be conditional on current exposures using nitrates found in household wells it is demonstrated that perceptions of health risks across exposure levels are affected by the individual s current exposure level thus providing support for a conditional benefits function approach functions of conditional incremental benefits are estimated from a contingent valuation study of households that had been informed of their water test results incremental benefits reach a peak at an intermediate level of nitrates and then decline possible explanations for this non convexity are provided

a state contingent production approach to principal agent problems with an application to point source pollution control two basic representations of principal agent relationships the state space and parameterized distribution formulations have emerged although the state space formulation appears more natural analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success this paper develops a state space formulation of the moral hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty a closed form solution for the agency cost problem is derived comparative static results are deduced next we solve the principal s problem of selecting the optimal output given the agency cost function the analysis is applied to the problem of point source pollution control c 1998 published by elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the dynamics of state policy liberalism 1936 2014 applying a dynamic latent variable model to data on 148 policies collected over eight decades 1936 2014 we produce the first yearly measure of the policy liberalism of u s states our dynamic measure of state policy liberalism marks an important advance over existing measures almost all of which are purely cross sectional and thus cannot be used to study policy change we find that in the aggregate the policy liberalism of u s states steadily increased between the 1930s and 1970s and then largely plateaued the policy liberalism of most states has remained stable in relative terms though several states have shifted considerably over time we also find surprisingly little evidence of multidimensionality in state policy outputs our new estimates of state policy liberalism have broad application to the study of political development representation accountability and other important issues in political science abstract from author

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

the interaction between the equity premium and the risk free rate abstract the equity premium arises from the interaction between the atemporal risk premium for equity the risk free rate of intertemporal substitution and the impact of risk on the precautionary motive for saving depending on parameter values the equity premium may either be increased or reduced by the presence of undiversifiable background risk

a structural model of turnout and voting in multiple elections this paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections the theoretical setting combines an uncertain voter model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior we apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in u s presidential and congressional elections we structurally estimate the model using individual level data for the 2000 elections and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens ideological preferences information and civic duty we then use the estimated model which replicates the patterns of abstention selective abstention split ticket voting and straight ticket voting observed in the data to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior

the risk premium for equity implications for the proposed diversification of the social security fund any meaningful reform of the us social security system must deal with the system s current outstanding accumulated unfunded liabilities we model these as a once off financial liability payble tomorrow we show that if the equity premium puzzle arises from adverse selection problems which prevent risk spreading through market transactions then the government can improve the welfare of the young today by acquiring equity today to assist in financing its obligations to meet social security payments to the old tomorrow

spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election the theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory however has not been possible with existing data using a novel survey design this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions the results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and furthermore that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in congress these ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory as information levels increase we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory

self interest altruism and health risk reduction an economic analysis of voting behavior while classical economic theory suggests that the demand for private goods is motivated by economic self interest a growing body of literature suggests that the demand for public goods is driven both by self interest and by altruistic motives the political arena has been a major testing ground for this hypothesis recently a number of studies have tried to empirically isolate and determine the importance of economic versus ideological factors in explaining political choices by representatives kau and rubin 1979 peltzman 1984 kalt and zupan 1984 while congressional voting records have provided a rich source of data for empirical analysis a consensus opinion on the importance of self interest versus altruism has not been reached and remains controversial altruistic motivations have also been

joint production and averting expenditure measures of willingness to pay do water expenditures really measure avoidance costs a multinomial selection model of averting behavior in response to water contamination risks is estimatedfor georgia resid ents measures of non health relatedwater quality taste od or and appearance are incorporated into the model to account for joint production of utility and health the mod el examines the choice between bottled filteredtap andunfilteredtap water results of the estimation ind icatedthat perceivedrisk from tap water concern about water quality taste od or andappearance of tap water race andage are the most important d eterminants of bottled water selection information regarding current or prior problems with tap water perceived risk from tap water and income are the most important determinants of water filter selection adjusting for quality d ifferences between tap andbottledwater we show that averting costs estimates using bottledwater expend itures wouldleadto an overstatement of avoid ance costs by about 12

on measuring partisanship in roll call voting the u s house of representatives 1877 1999 on measuring partisanship in roll call voting the u s house of representatives 1877 1999 we propose a method of assessing party influence based on a spatial model our method provides the first test of whether observed values of the widely used rice index of party dissimilarity are consistent with a partyless null model it also avoids problems that beset previous estimators substantively we find evidence of party influence in all but one congress since 1877 moreover our indicator of party pressure is systematically higher for the sorts of roll calls that party theorists believe are more pressured procedural organizational and label defining votes our results refute the widespread notion that parties in the house have typically had negligible influence on roll call voting behavior they also document important changes in party influence associated with the packing of the rules committee in 1961 and the procedural reforms of 1973

the effect of overcrowded housing on children s performance at school this paper provides estimates of the causal effect of living in an overcrowded home on performance at school in france our identification strategy relies on the fact that the size and housing conditions of families vary with the sex composition of the siblings in particular large families in which the two youngest children are by descending age a boy and a girl tend to live less often in overcrowded housing than the other families french parents seem to be more reluctant about bringing up their children in the same room when they are not of the same sex especially when the youngest one is a girl we build on these results to develop several econometric analyses of the effect of overcrowding on schooling outcomes using variables describing the sex composition of the siblings as instrumental variables these different strategies reveal that the very strong statistical relationship between housing conditions and academic failure is plausibly one of cause and effect children in large families perform much less well than children in small families but our iv estimates suggest that this is mostly due to the fact that they live in more overcrowded homes

campaign war chests as a barrier to entry in congressional races i introduction issues surrounding the nature and degree of competition in political races have been examined extensively in both the economic and political science literature with most attention focused on the interplay between incumbent and challenger expenditures and electoral success this study extends our understanding of political competition by investigating the impact of an incumbent s war chest on a challenger s decision to mount a campaign 1 for this purpose a war chest is defined as a pool of unencumbered funds accumulated prior to the start of a campaign for elective office 2 sorauf 1988 182 has observed that early receipts even without early spending discourage competition in the primary and attractive challengers in the general election jacobson 1985 26 has argued the most effective strategy for keeping a seat in congress is to avoid serious opposition contemporary critics and reformers of campaign financing practices use such words as frighten intimidate and overpower to describe the role of an incumbent s war chest 3 despite this kind of attention little is actually known about the degree to which war chests diminish entry or reduce the quality of a challenge we present three alternative mechanisms to explain how an incumbent s war chest might deter entry each is based upon a war chest serving as a credible commitment to spend heavily if challenged specifically war chests may either represent excess capacity in financing a campaign or serve as a signal of non observable incumbent characteristics that define a formidable opponent aside from determining whether an incumbent is challenged a war chest might also affect the quality of the challenger for example potential candidates with prior political experience may be unwilling to risk their political capital on a long shot proposition to test for these effects on entry into house races a trichotomous logit model is estimated the choices are uncontested race contested by an ordinary challenger and contested by an experienced challenger although the empirical model is not sufficiently rich to fully distinguish among competing mechanisms the regression results are robust incumbent war chests negatively affect the likelihood of a contested race and the quality of the challenger ii war chests as a barrier to entry becker 1958 106 in comparing economic and political competition observed i n an ideal political democracy competition is free in the sense that no appreciable costs or artificial barriers prevent an individual from running for office in the theory of the firm entry occurs when the expected postentry stream of profits minus the cost of entry is positive analogously an individual will enter a political race when the expected gain from holding office is positive expected gain as defined by baron 1989 is a function of campaign costs the probability of winning and the personal valuation placed by the candidate on the office the first two determinants are partly endogenous depending upon the strategic interplay of the candidates the third aside from its direct effects indirectly affects the first two for example persons hungry for office may be committed to expending greater effort and funds on their campaigns thus increasing their probability of winning similarly as lott has emphasized nontransferable brand name capital would be another factor creating a commitment to aggressively pursue office thereby affecting campaign costs and the probability of winning 4 that some challengers are deterred however need not imply the existence of a political market failure in a contestability sense the lack of a viable challenger on the ballot does not imply a lack of competition good representation will discourage entry similarly the fact that some incumbents will aggressively seek re election frightening away potential challengers is not a sign that competition is lacking

non binding linked issues referenda analysis and an application non binding referenda petitions are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle this paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non binding referenda so called linked issues petitions it analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and eastern enlargement of the european union

separating economic from political influences on government decisions abstract the public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former testing the sophisticated theory s predictions is problematic however when public interest is coincident with an interest group s interests a four step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives applying the method to the national forest service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest

an examination of the effect of ownership on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities the behavior of privately and publicly owned water utilities is examined by estimating a generalized variable cost function containing the regular characteristics of the neoclassical cost function without requiring that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis assuming that unobserved shadow prices reflect the regulatory environment of the water industry tests for cost minimization are obtained by deriving shadow prices as functions of market prices the empirical results provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than private utilities on average but are more widely dispersed between best and worst practice

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

earning through learning in legislatures this inquiry applies gary becker s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions in particular the u s congress in the process we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental value of human capital derived from congressional training we identify four factors that structure legislators post elective wages pre congressional salary year of entry tenure and variables closely related to general training in congress specifically assignment to powerful legislative committees acquisition of broad skill packages investment in expanding skill set proficiencies and to a lesser extent life cycle driven declines in such investments