relational goods and participation incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action theoretical explanations of why rational individuals would participate in politics remain unsatisfactory this paper addresses the problem by developing and analyzing models which include among citizens payoffs relational goods objectives which depend upon interactions among persons the models predict more participation than do the standard approaches for example under some circumstances persons will be more likely to act if they believe others will act contrary to free rider logic more importantly conditions are identified under which leaders could increase mass activity thus a model is provided of mobilization in terms of the preferences and decisions of a rational individual

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

valuing the impact of co2 emissions valuing the impacts of co2 emissions to the atmosphere has been widely debated with various studies suggesting very different costs when expressed in units of dollar per tonne of carbon emitted there are many complex issues involved and it is often difficult to determine the reasons for the wide range of costs proposed in this paper models based on two very different approaches the page and intera models are considered by applying these models to calculating the marginal impact of co2 emissions it is shown that what appear initially to be divergent estimates can be reconciled this process illustrates some of the key issues in this area and a perspective is provided on which marginal costs are appropriate for different policy decisions

social incentives and voter turnout evidence from the swiss mail ballot system this paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior the main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act this incentive is particularly high in small and close knit communities empirically i analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in switzerland optional postal voting decreased the voting costs but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote in spite of the large reduction in voting costs the effect on aggregate turnout was small however voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities this lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people s voting decisions jel h0 z13

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

adam smith and the prisoners dilemma in ordinary life we engage in many transactions with other people in which there is potential profit for both parties from some kind of cheating normally we do not see much of this cheating i have no doubt that the merchant will put in the package the merchandise which i buy or which i ordered even though if he put in something else cheaper it is quite dubious that i would be able to win a lawsuit on my part if i decide i did not like the product and returned it with the remark that it was defective having first damaged it so that it is indeed defective i could get a gain neither i nor the merchant worries particularly about this kind of behavior although the merchant worries more than i do for reasons that will become plain below if we worried about it we would both take precautions with the result that socially we would be worse off by the cost of these precautions we have here what appears to be a prisoners dilemma matrix but the two parties are behaving cooperatively what adam smith called the discipline of continuous dealings takes care of the matter the point of this article is to work out adam smith s insight in the terminology of a modern game theory we shall see that smith was right and there are some cases indeed practically very important cases where what appears to be a prisoners dilemma in fact leads to cooperative behavior consider the prisoners dilemma game shown in figure i it is orthodox that if a and b are playing a single turn of this particular game they will end up in the lower right hand corner with a net loss of one dollar each if we go from a single game to a long series of games played by the same players however there is no agreed upon solution experimental evidence seems to indicate that the players play a mixed strategy with some cooperative plays and some noncooperative plays and the mixture can be modified by changing the payoffs 2 all of these situations are simplifications of the real world and it is a point of this article to suggest that if we make the game more like many real world

technical efficiency in developing country agriculture a meta analysis abstract a meta analysis is performed to review empirical estimates of technical efficiency te in developing country agriculture the objective of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of the factors that influence estimates of mean te a data set of 51 observations of te from 32 studies is used in order to test if specific characteristics of the data and econometric specifications account for systematic differences in the efficiency estimates results using the two limit tobit procedure indicate that factors such as primal versus dual number of fixed inputs and number of variable inputs increase average te estimates on the other hand using the cobb douglas functional form and cross sectional data yields a lower level of te other factors including the number of variables in the model crop type stochastic versus deterministic frontiers and sample size do not seem to significantly affect estimates of te across studies

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

an evidential decision theory of turnout according to the standard analysis which is grounded in causal decision theory the rational decision to participate in mass elections depends on the probability of affecting the outcome the resulting prediction of abstention is clearly mistaken according to the alternative evidential decision theory voters calculate the conditional expected utility of participating rather than its causal consequences a version of this theory is introduced into a game theoretic model of electoral participation under plausible conditions the model yields positive turnout at equilibrium even as the size of the electorate increases without bound the paper also considers the model s utility in explaining group influences on political behavior and the supply of collective goods

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout an empirical test this study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective it reviews the paradox of voting and finds one model which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders to be a promising solution it tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout using an ecological analysis of turnout in five montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections the 1993 canadian federal the 1994 quebec provincial and the 1994 montreal municipal elections data on mobilization are taken from semi directed interviews with association leaders in each community the results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election the overall results are weak indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections in an economic theory of democracy downs hypothesized that rational utility maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting as opposed to abstaining altogether and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost this hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior but is counterintuitive even if the utility increment is plausibly large the probability of casting a pivotal tie breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting and no rational person will vote nevertheless a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote even though that probability may be small this article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968 1972 1976 and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election pooled data least squares dummy variable lsdv regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible the empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak unstable or nonexistent in all of the models tested

your vote counts on account of the way it is counted an institutional solution to the paradox of not voting when we explicitly lay out all its steps we find that the paradox of not voting since the chance of one vote s making a difference is about zero why trouble to vote rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections my solution to the paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed and it yields a rational choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

voter participation and the redistributive state the redistributive theory of the state implies that voter participation rates should be highest among those who have the most to gain or lose or a v shaped relationship between income and voting participation should exist we use a data set that contains nearly 21 000 observations on individual survey responses about voting behavior in the u s between 1972 and 1993 to show that the participation rate generally rises monotonically with income perhaps except at very high income levels it does report other findings consistent with an economic theory of voting based on returns to association and with the hypothesis that public employees vote more