walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part i mixed strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and the noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms following earlier work of novshek and sonnenschein we allow for set up cost and permit a minimal form of mixed strategies we depart from them by requiring that the aggregate production set exhibits some degree however small of decreasing returns contrasting with their results it is shown that a regular walrasian equilibrium of a limit economy can always be approximated by a sequence of noncooperative equilibria for the tail of the approximating finite economies thus there is a surprising qualitative discontinuity when one passes from the novshek sonnenschein case of aggregate constant returns to scale of the decreasing returns case of this paper

returns to regionalism the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade this article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their partners including credibility signaling bargaining power insurance and coordination it assesses the necessary conditions for each possible channel to work gives stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable examines cases where the explanation might be relevant and discusses their overall plausibility it concludes by examining the north american free trade agreement and the europe agreements

the silent success of customs unions an earlier version of this paper is part of arevik gnutzmann mkrtchyan s thesis essays on the economics of trade agreements 2014 http hdl handle net 1814 34561

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements abstract in a bargaining model of endogenous protection i introduce fixed costs of political organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying unlike maggi and rodriguez clare j pol econ 106 3 1998 575 intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed nevertheless i am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis a vis the import competing lobby precommits to a free trade agreement further with high fixed organizational costs the government prefers to stay out of such agreements its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse v shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs

the economics of investor protection isds versus national treatment abstract investor state dispute settlements isds are supposed to protect foreign investors against domestic policies causing unjustified harm this paper scrutinizes the effects of isds and national treatment provisions in a two period model where foreign investment is subject to a hold up problem it shows that isds may increase welfare but comes with additional regulatory distortions in the first period a national treatment provision avoids these regulatory distortions but implies entry distortions because it makes the hold up problem also apply to domestic firms if the domestic regulatory framework applies to many domestic firms a national treatment provision welfare dominates isds

trade liberalization antidumping and safeguards evidence from india s tariff reform abstract this paper is the first to use product level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political economic pressure we focus on the case of india a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions we first estimate structural determinants of india s import protection using the grossman and helpman 1994 model and provide evidence from its pre reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory we then re estimate the model on the indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that india s 1991 1992 imf arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to india s tariff policy however when we re estimate the model on data from 2000 2002 that more completely reflects india s cross product variation in import protection by including both its post reform tariffs and its additional non tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection the significance of the grossman and helpman model determinant estimates is restored we interpret these combined results as evidence that india unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political economic pressure the estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with india s use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform finally we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on india s micro level development

endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system i evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas ftas on the world trading system i use an oligopolistic political economy model where the external tariffs of fta members as well as the decision to form ftas are endogenously determined in this context i show that ftas are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system this conclusion is based first upon the finding that ftas induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between fta members and non members while this ensures gains for the latter in general fta members may not gain i show however that governments will endorse only welfare improving arrangements in spite of their political motivations as a result fta members benefit from ratified arrangements as well finally i find that ftas by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments trade regime decisions also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level

a political economy theory of trade agreements we develop a model where trade agreements in addition to correcting terms of trade externalities help governments to commit vis a vis domestic industrial lobbies the model allows us to explore how the characteristics of the political environment aect the structure of the trade agreement and the extent of trade liberalization the model also highlights the role of intersectoral capital mobility in determining trade liberalization in a dynamic extension of the model we explore the extent to which trade liberalization occurs gradually and how its speed depends on the fundamentals of the problem

a bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution policies when two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed we address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups sigs in a two stage model in the first stage the set of constraints on policy instruments is chosen in the second stage the government and sigs bargain over the level of the available transfer policies restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which sigs and governments can bargain there is however an offsetting effect not generally recognized in models of inefficient redistribution an improvement in the government s bargaining position which allows it to capture a larger share of the surplus we show that this positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative first stage mechanisms for policy selection such as the election of policymakers or in some cases bargaining between sigs and the government jel classification d7 f13 c70 h23

global supply chains and trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis the collapse in trade and the contraction of output that occurred during 2008 9 was comparable to and in many countries more severe than the great depression of the 1930s however it did not give rise to the rampant protectionism that followed the great crash the idea that the rise in the fragmentation of production across global value chains vertical specialization may be a deterrent against protectionism is under appreciated in the literature institutions also played a role in limiting the extent of protectionist responses world trade organization discipline raises the cost of using trade policies for member countries and has proved to be a stable foundation for the open multilateral trading system that has been built over the past 50 years using tradeand protection data for seven large emerging market countries that have a history of active use of trade policy the influence of these and other factors on trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis are empirically examined an instrumental variables strategy is used to identify their impact participation in global value chains is found to be a powerful economic factor determining trade policy responses

general equilibrium theory with imperfect competition abstract this survey is organized as follows i introduction ii the main issues iii negishi s model iv objective demand in the cournot nash framework v objective demand in the bertrand nash framework vi the assumption of quasi concavity of the profit functions vii compromises between the conjectural and the objective approach viii insights into the notion of perfect competition ix conclusion

the value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures an argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that by committing to free trade a government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies but several existing models of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing interest group pressures since governments derive rents from the political process we develop a small country model in which factors are sector specific in the short run but mobile in the long run we show that in this setting a government may be worse off in the political equilibrium than under commitment to free trade and hence it may value a trade agreement

policy choice theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements abstract why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose we address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups sigs by focusing on a set of important policies tariffs and non tariff barriers ntbs in our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient ntbs commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic sigs using detailed data we find support for several of the model s predictions including i tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of ntbs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions ii tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a sig thus the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

wto accession and tariff evasion abstract this study documents some unintended consequences of the world trade organization wto membership by providing evidence on displacement of tariff evasion driven by the wto accession process the analysis focuses on the wto customs valuation agreement cva which limits the discretion of customs officials when it comes to assessing the price of imports while prior to the wto accession customs officials are free to use their own judgment or apply minimum or reference prices after their country joined the wto they are mandated to accept the invoice price issued by the exporter if customs officials enjoy discretion with respect to assessing the import price they may assist importers with tariff evasion in exchange for bribes removing such discretion limits their ability to facilitate misrepresentation of import prices using data on 15 countries which joined the wto between 1996 and 2008 we find a positive relationship between underreporting of import prices and the tariff rate which is expected as the incentive to evade increases with the tariff rate importantly this relationship disappears after a country joins the wto this result is consistent with the cva closing one channel for corrupt behavior however we also find that changes to customs valuation procedures induce importers to seek alternative ways of tariff evasion such as underreporting of quantities and product misclassification the overall level of evasion remains unchanged

trade conflict and political integration explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements many historians argue that the main goal of european trade integration was the preservation of peace this paper investigates whether this reasoning is relevant for the eu and other regional trade agreements rtas i provide empirical evidence that customs unions and common markets deep rtas do reduce the probability of war between members partial scope and free trade agreements shallow rtas however have no effect on war probabilities accordingly international insecurity has a differential impact on incentives to create rtas deep rtas are signed between countries that are involved in many interstate disputes and that have low trade costs with the rest of the world whereas the opposite is true for shallow rtas

walrasian and marshallian stability abstract it is well known that there is no direct relation between stability of the walrasian t tonnement process and stability of the marshallian quantity adjustment process it is shown that if short run walrasian t tonnement with a given number of firms is distinguished there is under the assumption of no joint production local stability of the short run walrasian adjustment process if and only if there is local stability of the long run marshallian adjustment process with exit and entry of firms according to profit levels

the efficiency of monopolistically competitive equilibria in large economies commodity differentiation with gross substitutes abstract a general model of commodity differentiation is developed using two different approaches to the theory of demand it is shown that a local version of bertrand s argument holds under reasonable conditions if all commodities are sustitutes and sunk costs are small there is never too little commodity differentiation relative to the optimum under the same conditions monopolistically competitive equilibria are approximately perfectly competitive if the optimal collection of commodities is sufficiently rich

trade policy flexibilities and turkey tariffs antidumping safeguards and wto dispute settlement trade policy commitments to lower import tariffs and to maintain tariffs at low levels entail short and long run political economic costs and benefits empirical work examining the relationship between such commitments and the exercise of trade policy flexibilities is still relatively nascent especially for emerging economies this paper provides a rich empirically based assessment of ways that turkey exercised trade policy flexibilities during the global economic crisis of 2008 11 first and despite multilateral and customs union commitments that might limit changes to applied tariffs turkey made changes to both its applied most favored nation and preferential tariffs that cumulatively affect nearly 9 percent of manufacturing imports and 10 percent of import product lines second turkey s cumulative application of temporary trade barrier ttb policies antidumping safeguards and countervailing duties are estimated to impact by 2011 an additional 4 percent of imports and 6 percent of product lines other surprising results on turkey s use of flexibilities include extending the duration of previously imposed antidumping and safeguards beyond expected removal dates removing one ttb policy over a set of products and immediately reapplying a different ttb policy covering lengthy upstream and downstream segments of important industries and deepening discriminatory preference margins already inherent in existing preferential trade agreements

anti dumping use and its effect on trade liberalisation evidence for the european union in this paper we examine the hypothesis that anti dumping actions may contribute to trade liberalisation by serving as a safety valve for protection seeking pressures using microlevel trade and tariff data at the hs 8 digit level for the european union we investigate whether the use of anti dumping measures has acted as a catalyst in subsequent multilateral tariff negotiations our findings suggest that anti dumping policies may have reduced the resistance of domestic protectionist forces towards major tariff reforms as they show significantly larger tariff cuts for products previously involved in an anti dumping investigation

conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries we consider a small open economy that faces a commitment problem in trade liberalization we examine how the relationship with a large trading partner affects the ability of the small countrys government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism if the small country s government is patient enough it can overcome its domestic commitment without the help of the large country unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country s dynamic incentives liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country however if capacity in the import competing sector can only be reduced gradually a conditional reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions with the large country liberalizing before the small country

a comparison of optimal tariffs and welfare under no lobbying domestic lobbying and domestic foreign lobbying whether and what type of the lobbying induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare we show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying the domestic foreign lobbying may achieve the lowest tariff and may also realise the highest welfare for the domestic country our finding provides a theoretical explanation to the prevalent lobbying competition between asian firms and us firms in usa recently we argue that the domestic foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in the domestic country and lobbying competition may be one of the strongest forces pushing for trade liberalisation

lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting abstract this paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates cooperative behavior and lobbying governments use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying contributions and general welfare governments do not use export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import competing lobbies in setting tariff levels in a symmetric model cooperation between governments is sustained by threats of punishment in future periods unless governments place too much weight on the future the result is a cooperative tariff otherwise the result is a reciprocal import subsidy

an alternative test of the hedonic theory of housing markets abstract in this paper the hedonic theory of housing markets is used to generate a multinomial logit model of household behavior in an urban housing market application of hedonic theory to housing markets is by now fairly familiar and a link to multinomial logit has also been established however by emphasizing more heavily the bid price interpretation of hedonic theory this paper develops a new connection to econometric estimation that essentially involves running the usual logit equations in reverse one advantage of this approach is that the link between the logit equations and hedonic theory involves bid price rather than utility functions and this in turn permits the empirical results to be given an extremely clear interpretation furthermore in contrast to the standard logit model the extreme value distribution required to justify the estimation technique emerges endogenously as part of the analysis

rent destruction and the political viability of free trade agreements this paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements ftas the key element of the analysis is the rent destruction that these arrangements induce by eliminating intrabloc trade barriers an fta lowers the incentives of import competing industries to lobby for higher external tariffs thereby inducing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process using a conventional competitive model i show that the prospect of rent destruction can critically undermine and in some cases rule out entirely the political viability of welfarereducing ftas this result contrasts sharply with findings from the earlier regionalism literature

a limiting joint choice model for discrete and continuous housing characteristics a simultaneous discrete and continuous random utility model for housing demand is presented household utility depends on three characteristics of hou sing a discrete number of bedrooms and continuous measures of hous i ng quality and distance to the central business district empirical r esults for a sample of renter households from san francisco are compa red for a univariate structure in which each choice variable has its own utility or disutility function a simultaneous structure assuming a discrete continuous analog of the independence of irrelevant alter natives and one for which this assumption is relaxed the results in dicate that the third structure is most appropriate copyright 1988 by mit press

feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism recent research has underlined the efficiency of the gatt wto rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium such an equilibrium is however economically inefficient global free trade in particular is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world provided that governments have distributive motivations in such a context we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare superior equilibrium the reason is that as members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another they are induced to reduce their multilateral tariff sa s well once we account for these endogenous changes and only then we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative but political world we also find however that members are likely to gain too much from regional integration thereby harming outsiders

the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s tariff preferences granted to latin america abstract this paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market to this end the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment the predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the united states and latin american countries the results suggest that latin american exporters and us importers lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the united states more interestingly these findings also show that u s importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences these results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

the effect of the canada us free trade agreement on canadian multilateral trade liberalization in this paper show that the canada us free trade agreement cusfta tariff preferences have triggered a decline in canadian external tariffs explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998 next we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the us firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in canada this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the us and canada finally we estimate the effect of the cusfta on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity resume l effet de l accord de libre echange canada u s sur la liberalisation multilaterale du commerce canadien dans ce texte on montre que les preferences tarifaires de l accord de libre echange canada us alecus ont declenche un declin dans le niveau des droits de douane externes canadiens et expliquent une reduction de deux points de pourcentage dans le tarif moyen entre 1989 et 1998 ensuite on decouvre que les industries qui generent le moins de rentes des exportations vers les etats unis font l experience de reduction de tarifs plus importante au canada ce resultat revele une cooperation dans les politiques commerciales entre canada et etats unis enfin on evalue l effet de l alecus sur l intensite du lobbying industriel a propos de la politique commerciale au canada et on decouvre qu il n existe pas de relation entre la liberation preferentielle du commerce et l intensite de l activite de lobbying

domestic policies in self enforcing trade agreements abstract if all cross country externalities travel through the terms of trade efficient trade agreements may simply target the terms of trade and ignore domestic policies this argument has been advanced by several prominent studies simply put it reads terms of trade agreements are efficient i show that this result breaks down if the following two standard conditions are met first a self enforcement requirement constrains the agreement and second production possibilities are intertemporally linked these conditions imply that a country s current policy mix affects future production possibilities and thus impacts payoffs under potential defection since a terms of trade agreement does not specify a country s policy mix it effectively invites countries to manipulate their own defection temptation to be self enforcing terms of trade agreement must ensure that no country while optimizing its policies on the iso terms of trade schedule will abandon its zone of voluntary cooperation this requirement implies that terms of trade agreements are inefficient and can be improved upon by agreements that target policies directly

eu anti dumping and tariff cuts trade policy substitution the world trading system in its current form aims at reducing multilateral trade barriers across the board indeed the last successfully concluded multilateral trade negotiations led to substantial tariff concessions on the part of most developed economies what however happened to other forms of import protection have substantial tariff concessions subsequently been replaced by the use of alternative forms of import protection in this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between negotiated external tariff cuts and the subsequent use of anti dumping actions by the eu evidence is found for larger uruguay round tariff cuts increasing the probability of subsequent anti dumping investigations

combining revealed and stated data to examine housing decisions using discrete choice analysis abstract this paper uses stated preference and revealed preference data separately and jointly to examine individuals housing choices in particular it combines an established revealed preference approach discrete choice analysis of actual housing purchases and a relatively new stated preference approach choice based conjoint analysis of hypothetical housing purchases to provide us with a better understanding of the factors driving housing decisions these methods are appropriately combined since they reflect the same decision process households select the dwelling that provides the best combination of attributes from the feasible set of alternatives in total this paper analyzes three data sets only actual housing purchases only hypothetical housing purchases and both types of purchases combined analysis finds that actual and hypothetical housing purchases are similar decision processes with respect to some attributes yet are dissimilar with respect to other attributes nevertheless combining the two types of data improves identification of both categories of attributes journal of economic literature classification number r21

economic integration and corruption abstract we study the link between corruption and economic integration integration is modeled by a common regulation for public procurement we show that integration resolves a term of trade driven prisoner s dilemma and will always take place in the absence of corruption corruption may destroy the incentives for integration if the propensities to corruption are too different the more honest country which benefits less from integration will not be willing to join the union this difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency we also show that integration has the positive effect of reducing corruption

why do some countries get better wto accession terms than others the process by which countries accede to the world trade organization wto has become the subject of considerable debate this article takes a closer look at what determines the concessions the institution requires of an entrant in other words who gets a good deal and who does not i argue that given the institutional design of accession proceedings and the resulting suspension of reciprocity accession terms are driven by the domestic export interests of existing members as a result relatively greater liberalization will be imposed on those entrants that have more valuable market access to offer upon accession something that appears to be in opposition to expectations during multilateral trade rounds where market access functions as a bargaining chit the empirical evidence supports these assertions looking at eighteen recent entrants at the six digit product level i find that controlling for a host of country specific variables as well as the applied protection rates on a given product prior to accession the more a country has to offer the more it is required to give moreover i show how more democratic countries in spite of their greater overall depth of integration exhibit greater resistance to adjustment in key industries than do nondemocracies finally i demonstrate that wealth exhibits a curvilinear effect on the one hand institutionalized norms lead members to exercise observable restraint vis a vis the poorest countries on the other hand the richest countries have the greatest bargaining expertise and thus obtain better terms the outcome as i show using a semi parametric analysis is that middle income countries end up with the most stringent terms and have to make the greatest relative adjustments to their trade regimes

inefficient foreign borrowing a dual and common agency perspective studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate it then revisits the original sin debate analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment international portfolio diversification domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries access to international lending the paper thereby relates a country s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings their location the extent of control rights held by political authorities and the interests of dominant domestic political forces

perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a bounded continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms a sequence net of cournot markets each with a finite number of firms which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a cournot equilibrium and all the cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market

approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry this paper considers the existence and properties of approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry price setting firms produce a homogeneous product with weakly convex costs the main results are that a given e 0 an e equilibrium exists if the industry is large enough b if the e is small enough and the industry large enough any e equilibrium is approximately competitive these results depend on how contingent demand is specified

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

do we really know that the wto increases trade comment in a recent article in the american economic review andrew k rose 2004 finds that countries belonging to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and its successor the world trade organization wto did not trade more than countries that abstained from membership a vast literature on the gatt and the wto presupposes that these organizations were important but until rose there were few systematic efforts to test the assumption that membership increased trade rose s contribution is striking because he assembles a large dataset performs a myriad of analyses and uncovers scant evidence that the gatt and the wto had any impact rose describes his negative findings as an interesting mystery 112 the solution to this mystery lies in understanding who actually participated in the gatt we show that rose has overlooked a large proportion of countries to which the agreement applied and mistakenly classified them as nonparticipants when in fact they had rights and obligations under the agreement this causes a downward bias in his estimates of the gatt s effect on trade because his gravity regressions

when to initiate an international vertical merger the impact of negative demand shock this paper develops an extended hotelling type product and technology differentiated model with two upstream and two downstream firms the us upstream respectively downstream firm is technologically more advanced than the chinese upstream respectively downstream firm the locations of the upstream firms and the us downstream firm are fixed and the chinese downstream firm chooses its product location the downstream firms compete with each other in us market we aim to explore the conditions under which an international vertical merger between the chinese downstream firm and the us upstream firm occurs and its welfare implications we show that the incentive for the chinese downstream firm to initiate a technology acquiring international vertical merger crucially depends on the market conditions of the united states as compared to exporting or domestic vertical merger international vertical merger is by no means an optimal choice for the chinese downstream firm when there is no negative demand shocks to us market this result remains to hold when the us downstream firm also has the option of initiating a merger with the us upstream firm nevertheless in the case of a negative demand shock a profitable international vertical merger may occur however such mergers worsen the social welfare of the united states

multilateral trade cooperation what next this paper first briefly describes the role of the wto and its history it then lays out a simple bargaining model of international negotiations which can be used for understanding the doha round of talks this simple framework is used to distil and discuss a number of potential explanations for the difficulties that have arisen in concluding these talks as well as a number of systemic questions that confront wto members a key question is whether the wto should concentrate primarily on market access or on further expanding its coverage to deal with regulatory issues or with other domestic policies that may have an impact on trade given the difficulties that arise in agreeing on behind the border disciplines we argue that a continued focus on market access and enforcement of market access commitments is likely to prove most fruitful

institutions in international relations understanding the effects of the gatt and the wto on world trade the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and the world trade organization wto have been touted as premier examples of international institutions but few studies have offered empirical proof this article comprehensively evaluates the effects of the gatt wto and other trade agreements since world war ii our analysis is organized around two factors institutional standing and institutional embeddedness we show that many countries had rights and obligations or institutional standing in the gatt wto even though they were not formal members of the agreement we also expand the analysis to include a range of other commercial agreements that were embedded with the gatt wto using data on dyadic trade since 1946 we demonstrate that the gatt wto substantially increased trade for countries with institutional standing and that other embedded agreements had similarly positive effects moreover our evidence suggests that international trade agreements have complemented rather than undercut each other an earlier version of this article was presented at the 99th annual meeting of the american political science association philadelphia august 28 31 2003 we thank tim buthe joanne gowa miles kahler andrew rose arthur stein richard steinberg and seminar participants at stanford university the university of chicago pipes the university of california los angeles the university of california san diego and the university of virginia for many helpful comments we especially thank claire adida ashley conner moonhawk kim erin krampetz james morrison mike nardis natan sachs rachel rubinfeld and jessica weeks for excellent research assistance we are grateful for financial support from the national science foundation career grant ses 0548285 to tomz the stanford center for international development and the vice provost for undergraduate education at stanford

managed trade with imperfect information central to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt agreement signed in 1947 by 23 nations was the reduction of tariffs this had the direct result of bringing down the average ad valorem tariff on industrial goods from over 40 in 1947 to under 4 by the time of the uruguay round in 1995 furthermore following the kennedy round of 1969 the objectives of the gatt and of its successor the world trade organization wto were expanded so as to help bring down nontariff barriers as well remarkably these reductions were achieved in the absence of any external enforcement mechanism intended to punish gatt wto violators commitments were kept only as long as nations continued to view adherence to the agreements as being in their mutual interest 2 it is precisely because the contracting parties of the gatt wto have made it their top priority to reduce trade distortions that the subject of safeguards as an exception to the general rule of liberalizing trade comes into play when governments know they can increase tariffs temporarily in the event of a surge in import volume they agree to negotiate a more substantial tariff reduction during the negotiation stage 3 the move toward special protection is motivated in part by the fact that volatility in trade flows has become a more important source of domestic disruption these special protection policy tools are typically used to limit the rate of import or export expansion from that which would occur in the absence of intervention they are aimed at mitigating the underlining changes in trade flows where the basic insight developed in the literature is consistent with different government objectives to this end corden 1974 has argued that countries rarely initiate protection for the purpose of capturing the terms of trade gains presumably because of the fear of future retaliation by their trading partners countries

tariff binding and overhang theory and evidence abstract most market access commitments under the wto are in the form of bindings on applied tariff rates we observe two important regularities in the data first applied tariffs are often lower than the bound tariffs providing governments with substantial policy flexibility second the extent of flexibility varies substantially across sectors and countries in a sharp contrast to the prediction of standard trade agreement models we observe a strong negative correlation between tariff commitments and measures of import market power we model the trade off between discipline and flexibility in the design of trade agreements and argue that recognizing this trade off is the key to explain the observed patterns in the tariff binding commitments and applied tariffs under the wto

lobbying multisector trade and sustainability of free trade agreements this paper is concerned with the sustainability of free trade agreements fta fta sustainability is influenced by governments valuations of political contributions discount factors the lobbying position of the specific interest groups in the intra industry trade sectors and the sectoral coverage of the fta i find that i under certain conditions the fta under protectionist lobbying could be more sustainable than the fta under no political pressure ii the lobby supported fta is more sustainable than the lobby opposed fta and the fta under no political pressure and iii multisector trade enhances fta sustainability jel classification f12 f13 f15 lobbying commerce multisectoriel et durabilite des accords de libre echange ce memoire examine la durabilite des arrangements de libre echange ale celle ci est influencee par les evaluations par les gouvernements des contributions politiques les facteurs d escompte la position de lobbying des groupes d interet specifiques dans les secteurs de commerce intra industriel et la couverture sectorielle de l accord de libre echange l auteur trouve que i sous certaines conditions l ale pourrait etre plus durable s il y a lobbying protectionniste que si pression politique il n y a pas ii l ale supporte par du lobbying est plus durable que l ale oppose au lobbying et sans pression de lobbying et iii le commerce multisectoriel ameliore la durabilite de l ale

should the us allow prescription drug reimports from canada as a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in canada congress passed legislation that would allow these drugs to be imported into the us the lower canadian prices reflect price regulation opponents of allowing these imports have argued that the us will import canadian price controls and that profits of pharmaceutical companies will be hurt in this paper a model is developed in which a good sold in the foreign country is subject to a negotiated price which is determined in a nash bargaining game when imports back into the home country are allowed this negotiated price also becomes the domestic price this causes the home firm to make fewer price concession in the nash bargaining game home firm profits are found to rise under the reimport regime for both of the demand functions analyzed in this paper

the environmental bias of trade policy author s shapiro joseph s abstract this paper documents a new fact then analyzes its causes and consequences in most countries import tariffs and non tariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries where an industry s dirtiness is defined as its carbon dioxide co2 emissions per dollar of output this difference in trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to co2 emissions in internationally traded goods and so contributes to climate change this global implicit subsidy to co2 emissions totals several hundred billion dollars annually the greater protection of downstream industries which are relatively clean substantially accounts for this pattern the downstream pattern can be explained by theories where industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized a quantitative general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty goods global co2 emissions would decrease and global real income would change little

national treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities we analyze the role of national treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy a social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good we show that whether national treatment of standards interferes with welfare maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker consumption or emissions tax and differences in the cost of complying with the standard we also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal this asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare maximizing policy to violate national treatment on analyse le role du principe de traitement identique des entites domestiques ou importees dans la reglementation des normes environnementales dans une economie ouverte un gouvernement utilise des normes pour controler les emissions decoulant de la consommation d un produit transige internationalement on montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interferer avec l objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien etre va dependre de l ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l architecte des politiques une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les emissions et des differences dans les couts a encourir pour se conformer aux normes on souligne aussi l incidence asymetrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importes quand les taxes sont sous optimales cette incidence asymetrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien etre soit en violation du principe de traitement identique

the customs union issue why do we observe so few of them the number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully edged customs unions this paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas in a three country setting a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine the tarifis to be applied on imported goods under a customs union the necessity to coordinate tarifis leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist representatives contrary to most of the existing literature we show that strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase welfare compared to customs unions moreover the model also indicates that free trade areas are more likely to be politically viable than customs unions

is the gatt wto s article xxiv bad the gatt wto article xxiv prevents a customs union cu from raising its common external tariff in this paper we compare cu formation with and without this article xxiv constraint we show in a multi country oligopoly model that for a given cu structure article xxiv improves world welfare by lowering trade barriers however we also show that article xxiv has a composition effect on cu formation it affects the endogenous choice of cus by encouraging more symmetric cus article xxiv causes more trade to be subject to trade barriers as a result article xxiv may be bad for world welfare 2012 elsevier b v

taking stock of antidumping safeguards and countervailing duties 1990 2009 this article examines the evolving cross country use of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duty policies temporary trade barriers ttbs over the period 1990 2009 i construct two new measures of imported products subject to the combined use of these ttbs before applying these measures to new data drawn from the world bank s temporary trade barriers database i then establish a number of facts regarding trends in historical use to benchmark against policy activity during the global economic crisis of 2008 09 the 2008 09 economic shock mostly accentuates patterns and trends already visible in the precrisis data e g while the major users of such policies overall combined to increase the product lines subject to ttbs by 25 per cent during the crisis this was driven almost entirely by developing economies which increased their product coverage by 40 per cent perhaps surprisingly recession affected high income economies increased their stock of product coverage by only 5 per cent during the crisis a muted policy response consistent with earlier trends in which major developed economies like the united states and eu reduced the stock of imported products they subject to ttbs to 2007 levels that were only 50 per cent as high as their within period peak furthermore a previously unidentified feature of the data is that a much larger share of china s exported products to other developing economies is subject to foreign imposed antidumping than its exports to developed economies the evidence confirms this feature is shared by a number of other major developing economy exporters deepening concern that these discriminatory trade barriers are increasingly a south south phenomenon finally i also clarify emerging trends in countervailing duty anti subsidy use across countries

on the economic success of gatt wto dispute settlement what features of the dispute settlement process help governments live up to their trade liberalization commitments exploiting data on gatt wto trade disputes initiated and completed between 1973 and 1998 this paper identifies economic and institutional determinants that help defendant governments commit to liberalizing trade we find substantial evidence consistent with the theory that power measures including threat of retaliation by the plaintiff yield credibility to allow defendant governments to live up to their commitments we find only limited evidence however that particular procedural or institutional features beyond the basic gatt wto dispute settlement forum itself contributed to the successful economic resolution of trade disputes

why special economic zones using trade policy to discriminate across importers tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product not the identity of the importer however special economic zones are a common economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers i show this is motivated by policymakers desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods i find the form composition and size of us zones are consistent with the theory

the protectionist bias of duty drawbacks evidence from mercosur in a political economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying it is shown that full duty drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production this in turn decreases their incentives to counter lobby against high tariffs on their inputs in equilibrium higher tariffs will be observed on these goods the creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium duty drawbacks will be eliminated on intra regional exports which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra regional exporters evidence from mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty drawbacks for intra regional exports led to increased counter lobbying by users of intermediate products in its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3 5 percentage points 25 percent higher

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

discrete choice models and the housing price and travel to work elasticities of location demand abstract multinomial logit and nested logit models of mode choice in travel to work and housing location choice are estimated from 1970 u s census data aggregated to small zones of the chicago smsa the estimated models are then used to derive the housing rent travel time and travel cost elasticities of location demand the effects of sampling variation sample size attribute inclusion model specification and estimation method on the estimated elasticities are evaluated and found to be important the elasticities are also compared and found to agree with those obtained from other discrete choice models and in the case of housing rent with estimates obtained from models based on other theoretical structure

time inconsistency of protectionist programs protectionist trade policies have long been advocated as second best instruments to achieve certain national objectives in situations where there is a market imperfection in essence protection provides time and resources for firms to undertake cost reducing investments recently there has been an emergence of new arguments to justify the implementation of a national industrial policy to encourage investment and to ensure the competitiveness of targeted industries also at the theoretical level a new argument known as strategic trade policy has emerged according to this argument protectionism gives domestic firms strategic advantage against foreign firms to capture a greater share of export markets where rents are not competed away actually the performance of protectionist programs has been grim industries have not adapted and protection has had to be renewed again and again arguments justifying protection have avoided this issue by implicitly assuming that authorities can credibly precommit to eliminate protection this is a very strong assumption in fact government actions are not exogenous but they are rather the result of an optimization process or they are best responses to political pressures as stressed in the public choice literature 2 therefore if authorities capitulate to protectionist pressures in the present they are unlikely to resist them in the future in the event that the targeted firm would not have adapted the inability of authorities to precommit to the unconditional elimination of protection generates a trade off for the firm if during the program the firm does not invest sufficiently in cost

north south negotiations on emission reductions a bargaining approach this article models north south negotiations on emission reductions where the north provides side payments in exchange for the south s adoption of a more stringent emission standard we find that depending on where firms compete strong asymmetry among regions the two regions different valuations of side payments and climate change damage can produce self enforcing cooperative agreements moreover the south s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases i e either the cleanest or the dirtiest irrespective of the continuum of standards available the results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the south s emission tax

a theory of trade policy under dictatorship and democratization abstract this paper develops a new model of trade policy under dictatorship and democratization the paper makes two contributions one is to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between political institutions and economic efficiency by studying the endogenous interaction between the form of government and trade policy the paper s second contribution is to show how a dictatorship can manipulate trade policy to maintain its grip on power in the face of permanent world price shocks thus opening the door to a re examination of trade policy responses to technology shocks the model is used to explain an interesting episode of trade policymaking between 1815 and 1846 during which time britain substantially liberalized trade while prussia on the other side of the grain market significantly increased protectionism

walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part ii pure strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms nonconvex production sets decreasing returns in the aggregate and endogenous determination of the number of active firms are allowed a walrasian equilibrium is a limit of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria only if a condition loosely analogous to downward sloping demand in the partial equilibrium constant returns to scale case holds the condition is also sufficient to guarantee the existence of a robust sequence of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria which converges to the walrasian equilibrium

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

anti lobbying gains from international agreements abstract i argue that an important potential benefit of international agreements is to reduce wasteful rent seeking activities by domestic and foreign special interest groups through a reduction in policy discretion the presence of foreign lobbying generates a novel type of international externality by inviting wasteful rent seeking by foreign lobbies the presence of policy discretion itself generates a negative international externality i examine the potential anti lobbying effects of three salient types of international rules exact policy commitments policy bounds and non discrimination rules unlike exact policy commitments which remove policy discretion and hence shut down ex post lobbying policy bounds may invite ex post lobbying and hence may forego part or all of the potential anti lobbying gains i also find that policy bounds may lead to mixed strategy equilibria of the rent seeking game a non discrimination rule can reduce rent seeking by foreign lobbies by injecting a free rider problem in the strategic interaction between these lobbies and under some conditions can achieve all the potential anti foreign lobbying gains

trade diversion and declining tariffs evidence from mercosur abstract this paper empirically examines the alternative posed by richardson j intern econ 34 1993 39 to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies richardson s hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion and trade creation may actually cause tariffs to decline the hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments objective functions a cross sectionally rich data set on trade and tariffs from the mercosur pact countries primarily argentina is used the evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of endogenous tariff determination in models of trade integration

the value of making commitments externally evidence from wto accessions abstract this paper studies the value of external commitment to policy reforms in the case of wto gatt accessions the accessions often entail reforms that go beyond narrowly defined trade liberalization and have to overcome fierce resistance in the acceding countries as reflected in protracted negotiations we study the growth and investment consequences of wto gatt accessions with attention to a possible selection bias we find that the accessions tend to raise income but only for those countries that were subject to rigorous accession procedures policy commitments associated with the accessions were helpful especially for countries with poor governance

reevaluating the role of trade agreements does investment globalization make the wto obsolete abstract international ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries regardless of the underlying cause whether foreign direct investment international portfolio diversification cross country mergers or multinational firms international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs at the same time however foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment host countries which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices the basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access

endogenous trade policy and lobby formation an application to the free rider problem abstract this paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous by introducing bargaining between the industry and the government the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature applied to the free rider problem the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult