efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

multiple communities and controlling corruption corruption presents an assurance problem to businesses all businesses are best off if none act corruptly but in the event that corruption occurs are better off if they act corruptly than if they do not and because there is no assurance that other actors are not cheating a business does not know how to act the usual solution to an assurance problem criminal sanctions imposed on cheaters does not work in a corrupt system integrative social contract theory suggests a solution to the assurance problem application of integrative social contract theory to corruption demonstrates that in the case of corruption it has advantages over international law and that the theory s elegance lies in its recognition of norms generated by multiple communities

corruption south african multinational enterprises and institutions in africa we examine the responses of south african multinational enterprises mnes to corruption in african markets in the context of institutional voids corruption is a source of uncertainty and additional transactional costs for mnes and it necessitates a strategic response the research employs a qualitative study of a sample of mnes with experience in internationalising into africa the results indicate that corruption in african markets is pervasive and closely associated with the institutional voids in these countries mnes see themselves as institution takers responding to countries institutional makeup at the organisational and individual level but fail to fully appreciate their impact on institutions both positively and negatively rather mnes focus on strategic responses at the organisational level to address corruption operationally in the host country we add to the existing literature by providing a dynamic framework of the complex webs of association between institutions mnes and corruption in conditions of economic underdevelopment the research suggests that mnes do not need to get caught in a vicious cycle whereby they perpetuate corruption in conditions of underdevelopment and institutional voids but instead can contribute towards a virtuous cycle through which they institutionalise ethical foundations

optimal bidding strategies and modeling of imperfect information among competitive generators the emerging electricity market behaves more like an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market due to special features such as a limited number of producers large investment size barrier to entry transmission constraints and transmission losses which discourage purchase from distant suppliers this makes it practicable for only a few independent power suppliers to service a given geographic region and in this imperfect market each power supplier can increase its own profit through strategic bidding the profit of each supplier is influenced to varying extents by differences in the degree of imperfection of knowledge of rival suppliers a new framework to build bidding strategies for power suppliers in an electricity market is presented in this paper it is assumed that each supplier bids a linear supply function and that the system is dispatched to minimize customer payments each supplier chooses the coefficients in the linear supply function to maximize benefits subject to expectations about how rival suppliers will bid a stochastic optimization formulation is developed and two methods proposed for describing and solving this problem a numerical example serves to illustrate the essential features of the approach and the results are used to investigate the potential market power

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

on the strategic role of outside options in bilateral bargaining this paper studies a model of the situation in which two players are bargaining face to face over the partition of a unit size cake and moreover one of the players can choose to temporarily leave the negotiating table to search for an outside option a main conclusion is that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on whether a bargainer is allowed within the game form to choose to return to the negotiating table to resume bargaining after having searched for some finite time moreover it is shown that our strategic bargaining search game approximately implements an appropriately defined nash bargaining solution

taxation in a two sided search model abstract this paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits if unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income then a wage tax decreases unemployment it also decreases the wage thereby overshifting the tax burden profit tax effects depend upon job entry in the short run with a fixed number of jobs filled jobs plus vacancies a profit tax decreases unemployment it also raises the wage again overshifting the tax in the long run the converse holds

search and collusion in electronic markets we examine the impact of reduced search costs on prices of commodity products in electronic marketplaces conventionally reduced consumer search costs may be expected to engender stronger price competition between firms resulting in lower prices and improved consumer welfare this notion was formalized in stahl 1989 oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search american economic review vol 79 no 4 pp 700 712 in a model of static firm competition in this paper we show that these standard welfare conclusions may be neutralized or reversed in a dynamic environment we focus on self enforcing collusion by firms and characterize the conditions under which collusive equilibria exist we show that less costly consumer search can facilitate firms abilities to collude resulting in higher prices and reduced consumer welfare even with imperfect or no monitoring by sellers of each other s prices if the same technology that eases consumer search also allows firms to monitor each other s prices more easily then firms can more easily detect cheating on a collusive price arrangement allowing an even greater scope for collusion this raises antitrust concerns with respect to the electronic marketplace and suggests that at least some of the anticipated competitive gains from electronic market systems may be difficult to realize

to reveal or not to reveal strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation abstract within the bargaining literature it is widely held that negotiators should never reveal information that will lead to disclosure of their reservation prices we analyze a simple bargaining and search model in which the informed buyer can choose to reveal his cost of searching for an outside price which determines his reservation price to the uninformed seller we demonstrate that buyers can be made better off by revealing their search cost more interestingly we also find that depending on the assumed distribution of search costs sometimes buyers with relatively low search costs should reveal their private information whereas in other cases buyers with relatively high search costs should do so we then test our model experimentally and find that subjects behavior is not entirely consistent with theoretical predictions in general bargainers behavior is better explained by a bounded rationality model similar to fictitious play

optimal integrated generation bidding and scheduling with risk management under a deregulated daily power market in the deregulated power industry a generation company genco sells energy and ancillary services primarily through bidding at a daily market developing effective strategies to optimize hourly bid curves for a hydrothermal power system to maximize profits becomes one of the most important tasks of a genco this paper presents a unified framework for optimizing energy and reserve bidding strategies under a deregulated market in view of high volatilities of market clearing prices mcp the hourly mcps and reserve prices are modeled as discrete random variables whose probability mass functions are predicted with a classification based neural network approach the mean variance method is applied to manage bidding risks where a risk penalty term related to mcp and reserve price variances is added to the objective function to avoid buying too much power from the market at high prices a genco may also require covering at least a certain percentage of its own customer load this self scheduling requirement is modeled similar to the system demand in traditional unit commitment problems the formulation is a stochastic mixed integer optimization with a separable structure an optimization based algorithm combining lagrangian relaxation and stochastic dynamic programming is presented to optimize bids for both energy and reserve markets numerical testing based on an 11 unit system in new england market shows that the method can significantly reduce profit variances and thus reduce bidding risks near optimal energy and reserve bid curves are obtained in 4 5 minutes on a 600 hz pentium iii pc efficient for daily use

dynamic production teams with strategic behavior abstract we analyze if intergenerational teams reveal workers productivities some uncertainty on agents productivities persists when i each agent must work independently or ii technological shocks are agent specific in compulsory teams however when technological shocks are team specific in compulsory teams each worker s productivity is revealed when agents choose to work independently or in teams that problem falls in the class of dynamic games elective teams are preferred by high productivity young workers when the technological shocks are agent specific and maximize the expected utility of a young worker when shocks are team specific

the effects of firm optimizing behaviour in matching models this paper considers a matching model of which the search behaviour of jovanovic 1979 and albrecht and jovanovic 1984 are special cases the nature of the generality is that each unemployed worker has more information than firms about his average productivity this results in wage offers falling over the length of an unemployment spell because a long spell is a signal of lower than average productivity the results of the paper are similar to the scarring effect of heckman and borjas 1980 and greenwald 1986 and the discouraged worker effect of schweitzer and smith 1974

bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers this paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model incorporating five features two sided incomplete information with potentially information revealing strategies an infinite horizon uncertainty concerning the potential gains from trade an illumination of interesting qualitative bargaining issues and plausible free from arbitrarily specified out of equilibrium conjectures equilibria these features motivated in the paper have powerful implications a nash equilibrium exists and is generically both unique and sequential comparative static implications of variations in the game s specifications are developed we find that natural indications of bargaining strength emerge from the model and establish the intuitive result that an increase in a player s relative bargaining strength makes that player more likely to capture the gains from bargaining

the stability of power system markets market equilibrium conditions can be derived from more general dynamic equations describing the marketplace dynamic equations provide insights into the behavior and stability of markets which are not available from static models for example markets with a single supplier with declining linear costs economies of scale may or may not be stable depending on specific cost characteristics markets with more than one supplier with declining linear costs are always unstable this paper illustrates a situation where the removal of congestion makes a market unstable

bargaining and strategic search abstract this paper specifies an alternative type of switching friction in a model of sequential bargaining to that suggested by shaked and sutton 1984 an imperfect and costly search technology gives the current insider a bargaining advantage over alternative partners for the firm where all potential partnerships generate the same rent search has a purely strategic value

nash equilibrium bidding strategies in a bilateral electricity market this paper examines bidding strategies in a bilateral market in which generating companies submit bids to loads a load accepts electricity delivery from the generator with the lowest bid at its bid price as long as this price is not higher than the load s willingness to pay necessary and sufficient conditions of nash equilibrium ne bidding strategy are derived based on a generic generating cost matrix and the loads willingness to pay vector the study shows that in any ne efficient allocation is achieved furthermore all nash equilibria are revenue equivalent for the generators based on the necessary and sufficient conditions this problem is formulated as an optimal assignment problem network optimization techniques are applied to calculate ne bid prices for the generators

search bargaining money and prices the goal of this paper is to extend existing search theoretic models of fiat money which until now have assumed that the price level is exogenous by explicitly incorporating bilateral bargaining this allows us to determine the price level endogenously and leads to additional insights concerning the role of money for example we find that monetary equilibria are generally inefficient in the sense that output and prices differ from the solution to a social planner s problem although the difference can become small as the discount rate or search friction vanishes we also find that there exist nonstationary inflationary equilibria

an ordinal optimization based bidding strategy for electric power suppliers in the daily energy market the deregulation and reconstruction of the electric power industry worldwide raises many challenging issues related to the economic and reliable operation of electric power systems traditional unit commitment or hydrothermal scheduling problems have been integrated with generation resource bidding but the development of optimization based bidding strategies is only at a very preliminary stage this paper presents a bidding strategy based on the theory of ordinal optimization that the ordinal comparisons of performance measures are robust with respect to noise and modeling error and the problems become much easier if the optimization goal is softened from asking for the best to good enough solution the basic idea is to use an approximate model that describes the influence of bidding strategies on the market clearing prices mcp a nominal bid curve is obtained by solving optimal power generation for a given set of mcps via lagrangian relaxation then n bids are generated by perturbing the nominal bid curve the ordinal optimization method is applied to isolate a good enough set s that contains some good bids with high probability by performing rough evaluation the best bid is then selected by solving full hydrothermal scheduling or unit commitment problems for each of the bids in s using ordinal optimization approach we are able to obtain a good enough bidding strategy with reasonable computational effort numerical results using historical mcps from the california market and a generation company with 10 units show that the ordinal optimization based method is efficient

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

matching search and bargaining abstract first the paper incorporates search for alternative opportunities into a model of strategic bargaining second this search and bargaining model is embedded in a market matching model the solutions are presented in a manner that clarifies the role of the search abilities and the details of the bargaining procedure in the determination of the outcomes the predictions of the model are contrasted with the related literature the main accomplishment is the attainment of a manageable model which is still rich enough to grasp important differences between environments which are not captured by the standard matching models

the role of external search in bilateral bargaining we consider the problem of bargaining between two individuals who can also search for possible alternatives to each other s offers we explicitly incorporate the search activity into the process of bargaining a disagreement in bargaining will lead each individual to search for an outside offer in the hope of improving his future bargaining position and attaining a more favorable outcome we model the interlaced phases of bargaining and search over time as an extensive noncooperative game we characterize the associated subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and strategies finally we show that superior search ability yields an individual a more favorable outcome and hence represents a greater bargaining strength

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

real time pricing control on generation side optimal demand tracking model and information fusion estimation solver this paper develops the information fusion based pricing control ifpc scheme for the generation side in the liberalized wholesale electricity market the market mechanism is described by a feedback system in which the independent system operator iso interacts with generation companies gencos via proposing and responding to real time nodal prices the linear constrained quadratic optimal tracking problem is formulated and the solution nodal price sequence is repeatedly computed by fusing the recently available information with backward manner and updated over the receding preview horizon so that the total supply dynamically tracks the demand the price is stationarized and each genco gains the maximal profit for the given price numeric results on a 118 bus network validate ifpc s effectiveness and flexibility on incorporating various line rating constraints as well as wind power fluctuation uncertainties comparative study demonstrates that ifpc outperforms the negotiated predictive dispatch but elapsing heavier computations the irrational behavior analysis verifies the convergence to equilibrium and speculation behavior of gencos in the real market is also discussed along with the rapid development of smart grid ifpc is practically enabled by the information and communication technology ict its significance and potentials for renewable energy sources res integration would be realized and exploited

estimating house price indexes in the presence of seller reservation prices we analyze a bias in transaction based price indexes due to the presence of seller reservation prices we develop a model in which the ratio of sellers reservation prices to the market value affects trading volume and biases of observed transaction prices when trading volume decreases increases index returns are estimated with an upward downward bias we propose a new econometric procedure to mitigate the bias and use simulations to demonstrate the effectiveness of the procedure we construct a reserve conditional unbiased index for the los angeles housing market which substantially differs from a traditional repeat sale index

optimal electricity supply bidding by markov decision process the bidding decision making problem is studied from a supplier s viewpoint in a spot market environment the decision making problem is formulated as a markov decision process a discrete stochastic optimization method all other suppliers are modeled by their bidding parameters with corresponding probabilities a systematic method is developed to calculate transition probabilities and rewards a simplified market clearing system is also included in the implementation a risk neutral decision maker is assumed the optimal strategy is calculated to maximize the expected reward over a planning horizon simulation cases are used to illustrate the proposed method

bargaining and search with recall a two period model with complete information two standard results of previous bargaining models state that delay is generally not expected to occur under complete information and bargaining outcome depends crucially on the bargainers intrinsic characteristics that determine their reservation prices and in general bargainers with better reservation prices tend to get better outcomes this paper considers a bilateral bargaining problem with complete information in which one of the bargainers the buyer is allowed to search while bargaining more importantly we assume that the buyer is allowed to recall past outside offers we find that quite contrary to the standard results of previous complete information bargaining models complete information renders no guarantee for immediate resolution of bargaining and the effect of changing the buyer s search cost on each player s bargaining outcome is unpredictable the major driving force of these two results is the assumption that the buyer can recall past outside offers

catalyzing corporate commitment to combating corruption this article considers what policy reforms may help catalyze corporate commitment to combating corruption the starting point for this discussion is a voluntary corporate principles approach to self regulation such an approach should seek to encourage corporations to implement effective compliance and ethics programs and to disclose information related to their anti corruption activities to relevant stakeholders although a corporate principles approach is a private initiative there is a significant role for the public sector this article discusses some of the ways that the public sector can support and further the goals of a corporate principles approach to combating corruption the reforms discussed in this article include amnesty programs for corporations that self disclose corrupt payments the use of corporate monitors in the enforcement of anti corruption laws expanding the definition of corruption in criminal laws sustainability reporting indicators related to bribery and the implementation of multi stakeholder initiatives to support a corporate principles approach

a continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets this article presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as poolco where participants especially generating entities maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies i e bidding prices and bidding generations in this article the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a noncooperative game with complete information where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the nash equilibrium idea in order to provide more apprehensible analysis we suggest a new hybrid solution approach employing a two dimensional graphical approach as well as an analytical method finally the proposed approach is demonstrated on a sample power system

estimating the effect of racial discrimination on first job wage offers in this paper we develop and implement a method for bounding the extent to which labor market discrimination can account for racial wage differentials the method is based on a two sided search matching model that formally accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and unobserved offered wages we find that racial differences in offered wages are proportionately twice three times as large as racial differences in accepted wages for high school dropouts high school graduates the results indicate that discrimination could account for the entire racial wage offer differential for high school dropouts and for high school graduates i e the bound on the extent of discrimination is not informative

bidding of price taker power generators in the deregulated turkish power market abstract in deregulated power markets power firms bid into the day ahead power market either with buy offers or sell offers the auction mechanism and competition determine the equilibrium price and quantity for each hour if the bid price of a company is below the market clearing price then the offer of the company is accepted and rewarded with the market price a company can be a price maker or price taker depending on the capacity it offers to the market a price taker unit must determine the right offer that will maximize their profit given price uncertainty and blind auction rules this paper first examines power supply in the turkish electricity market and bidding process then a marginal cost based monte carlo method is developed to determine hourly and block bidding strategies of price taker units historical market prices are then implemented in a normal distribution to generate hourly price scenarios a solution methodology is developed that maximizes the expected profit of each hourly and block bidding strategy over price scenarios the generator is able to both evaluate the hourly bidding and block bidding strategies and find the best bidding strategy that will be submitted to the market using the proposed methodology the model is illustrated for two coal units in turkish power market and the results are presented

generator bidding in oligopolistic electricity markets using optimal control fundamentals and application in this paper optimal control is applied to study generator bidding in an oligopolistic electricity market the repeated bidding process in hourly based real time electricity markets is modeled as a dynamic feedback system an optimal control problem is then formulated to explore individual generator s long term multiperiod optimization behavior particularly in our formulation the periodic property of the system demand is considered several lemmas are included for concerning system stability based on the necessary conditions for optimality from the pontryagin maximum principle a sweeping method is proposed and an optimal state feedback control rule is then obtained via backward induction numerical results suggest that the generator who unilaterally applies optimal control for generation decisions will obtain more profits a sensitivity analysis is also performed identifying these market factors that affect the performance of optimal control

search frictions and market power in negotiated price markets we provide a framework for empirical analysis of negotiated price markets using mortgage market data and a search and negotiation model we characterize the welfare impact of search frictions and

a dynamic equilibrium model of search bargaining and money abstract this paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching strategic bargaining and money equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation when we embed this characterization into the monetary economy the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic nash bargaining solution as has been done in the past journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d83 e31

the long side of the market and the short end of the stick bargaining power and price formation in buyers sellers and balanced markets the determinants of bargaining power and price formation in a dynamic exchange market where new traders enter randomly over time are studied when agents on the long side of the market possess the option to wait for the arrival of future partners the terms of trade in the spot market must honor the value of this option the equilibrium terms of trade are expressed in intuitive closed form equations that highlight the distinct influences of short run spot market conditions and long run market demographics i introduction few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick that is they receive little or none of the gains from trade consider for instance the classic setting in which b identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogeneous good face s identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale it is well known that in a broad class of one shot trading games all of the surplus in this setting goes to the short side of the market in equilibrium that is if b s buyers bid the price up to their reservation value often it is only when b s that market institutions the rules of the game have any bearing on the equilibrium division of surplus this classic result is somewhat brittle because of the discontinuity in the terms of trade when moving from positive to negative levels of excess demand its logic is familiar however from bertrand competition and it is very compelling the option value to an agent frozen out of a trade in a one shot market game is his reservation payoff of zero any outcome that confers nonzero surplus to a long side agent cannot be sustained in equilibrium because all of the long side agents who would otherwise be frozen out possess a strict incentive to undercut

fluidity of regulation csr nexus the multinational corporate corruption example corporate social responsibility csr is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations one difficulty is the possible inexactness of csr another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area this is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure the consequence is the stultification of independent development of csr by tying social issues to financial performance this attitude might not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying csr and defining its scope the underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish instrumental and pure ethical csr this article demonstrates that ethical csr highlights the role of regulation and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical csr the article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of pure csr is required for delineating the scope of csr as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation it argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation csr relationship the current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is arguably a demonstration of the position that regulation and csr are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts this article submits that recognition and application of this ethical and instrumental csr distinction is fundamental to the development of csr and resolution of connected questions of regulation

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

corporate reputation s invisible hand bribery rational choice and market penalties drawing upon rational choice and investor attention theories we examine how accusations of corporate bribery and subsequent investigations shape market reactions using event study methodology to measure loss in firm value for public firms facing bribery investigations from 1978 to 2010 we found that total market penalties amounted to 60 61 billion we ran moderated multiple regression analysis to examine further the degree to which the unique characteristics of bribery explain variations in market penalties companies committing bribery in less corrupt host countries and with the involvement of compromised executives experienced greater market penalties than did other companies after partitioning share value losses into components for regulatory penalties class action settlements and loss to reputation we found that reputational penalties account for 81 8 of every dollar of share value loss omission of reputational penalties in rational choice calculus underestimates bribery costs by 4 5 times the results suggest that firms should not underestimate the importance of market imposed reputational penalties by merely considering regulator imposed fines and sanctions

a model of job and worker flows we develop a model of gross job and worker flows and use it to study how the wages permanent incomes and employment status of individual workers evolve over time and how they are affected by aggregate labor market conditions our model helps explain various other features of labor markets such as the size and persistence of the changes in income that workers experience due to displacements or job to job transitions the length of job tenures and unemployment duration and the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation we also examine the effects that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross flows as well as on the resulting wage distribution employment and aggregate output in the equilibrium from a theoretical point of view we study the extent to which the competitive equilibrium achieves an efficient allocation of resources

immigration reform and farm labor markets farmers throughout the united states report a shortage of workers at the same time there are proposals to strengthen the enforcement of existing immigration laws in this paper we develop an equilibrium approach to examine the impact of removing undocumented workers from the california agricultural labor market and to infer whether there is evidence of shortages using individual worker data we find evidence that is consistent with a persistent shortage in some sub sectors of the california farm labor market further we conduct counter factual policy simulations over a range of possible policy alternatives and find that removing 50 all undocumented farm workers from the state would lead to an increase in wages of over 22

bargaining under two sided incomplete information the unrestricted offers case chatterjee and samuelson chatterjee k l samuelson 1987 bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers rev econ stud 54 175 192 recently examined a noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model with two sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon results were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents strategies this paper examines the model without these restrictions by doing so we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model and hence might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work we find that the basic results generalize as with the restricted model we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages a terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows compar

bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options abstract this paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search at a cost for an outside option the outside option cannot be credibly communicated and the seller s offer is recallable by the buyer for one period there are essentially two equilibrium regimes for sufficiently high search cost the game ends immediately otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option the seller is worse off and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost i e less equilibrium delay c72

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

endogenous availability in search equilibrium bargaining power by shopping at two firms and then bringing those firms into competition with one another knowing this firms adjust quoted prices to keep customers from exercising this option we compare equilibrium prices and availability firm profits and customer welfare under duopoly with those that would obtain under monopoly wefind that for low levels of exogenous customer search costs duopolists provide lower prices and lower availability while for high customer search costs duopolists provide the same price but greater availability than would a monopolist

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

duration to first job and the return to schooling estimates from a search matching model this paper investigates the properties of the joint distribution of the duration to the first post schooling full time job and of the accepted wage for that job within a search matchingbargaining theoretic model the model provides an interpretation of the observations on duration to first job and accepted wages that differentiates between behavioural influences and market fundamentals in determining the accepted wage schooling relationship the return to schooling is appropriately measured by differences in the wage offer distribution which depends only on market fundamentals we use data from the 1979 youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys of labor market experience to follow several school leaving cohorts of young males a model which allows for five types of heterogeneous workers within schooling race groups fits the duration and wage data well for all such groups offer probabilities for all groups are estimated to be close to one mean offered wages are about 1000 less than mean accepted wages and the internal annual rate of return for attending college relative to graduating from high school is 32 for blacks and 17 for whites this paper investigates the properties of the joint distribution of the duration to the first post schooling full time job and of the accepted wage for that job within a search matching bargaining model it is a well established empirical regularity that hazard rates are decreasing with the duration of search unemployment it is also true for the data we use that the sample mean of the accepted wage associated with the first job is not increasing with duration these findings hold for both black and white male youth at all levels of schooling conditional on schooling however the time between leaving school and working at the first full time job is longer for blacks and their accepted mean wage is lower conditional on race the time between leaving school and working at the first full time job is shorter for those with higher levels of schooling and their accepted mean wage is higher interestingly blacks display a similar pattern of duration and accepted wages to whites who are one level of schooling below e g black high school graduates and white high school dropouts

stationarity rationalizability and bargaining strategies for the seller and the buyer which are weakly stationary we demonstrate that any initial offer from the seller induced by a strategy rationalized by a weakly stationary acceptance rule for the buyer must entail the coase property our result does not presume the selection of a particular equilibrium and follows directly from the weak stationarity assumption of the buyer s acceptance rule and the rational behaviour of the players

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double sided auctions in this paper the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double sided auctions is studied we model electricity double sided auctions as dynamic systems and use nash cournot strategies for the market participants generating firms and load serving entities through simulation studies we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double sided auctions to those of electricity supplier only auctions using the developed bidding strategies

bargaining search costs and equilibrium price distributions this paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store in the market equilibrium the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game in this game the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller differences between the sellers types create price dispersions typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs the market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small

asymmetry imperfectly transferable utility and the role of fiat money in improving terms of trade abstract we modify the kiyotaki and wright 1991 j economic theory 53 215 235 1993 amer econom rev 83 63 77 framework so that there is a universal double coincidence of wants in all barter matches we also introduce divisible service sidepayments into the model and allow agents to bargain over bundles of goods services and money in bilateral matches in asymmetric matches the agent that values the other s good more dearly will typically have to make a substantial service sidepayment to complete the bargain when sidepayments transfer utility imperfectly the general equilibrium is inefficient agents barter too much when barter is inefficient a robust monetary equilibrium may exist which improves welfare both robust monetary equilibria and welfare improving monetary equilibria require asymmetric matches imperfectly transferable utility and monetary exchange yields better expected terms of trade than barter in contrast to other search models money does not speed up trade