spectrum auction designs and revenue variations this study examines a sample of 93 national 3g spectrum auctions for the period 2000 2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations an implied reduced form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid per mhz per million populations values to regulator determined auction design characteristics auction competitiveness mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents the analysis reveals that among other factors all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3g spectrum auction revenues

optimal interest rate rules asset prices and credit frictions we study optimal taylor type interest rate rules in an economy with credit market imperfections our analysis builds on the agency cost framework of carlstrom and fuerst 1997 agency costs net worth and business fluctuations a computable general equilibrium analysis american economic review 87 893 910 which we extend in two directions first we embed monopolistic competition and sticky prices second we modify the stochastic structure of the model in order to generate a countercyclical premium on external finance this is achieved by linking the mean distribution of investment opportunities faced by entrepreneurs to aggregate total factor productivity we model monetary policy in terms of simple welfare maximizing interest rate rules we find that monetary policy should respond to increases in asset prices by lowering interest rates however when monetary policy responds strongly to inflation the marginal welfare gain of responding to asset prices vanishes within the class of linear interest rate rules that we analyze a strong anti inflationary stance always attains the highest level of welfare

empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models we describe an algorithm for calculating second order approximations to the solutions to nonlinear stochastic rational expectations models the paper also explains methods for using such an approximate solution to generate forecasts simulated time paths for the model and evaluations of expected welfare differences across different versions of a model the paper gives conditions for local validity of the approximation that allow for disturbance distributions with unbounded support and allow for non stationarity of the solution process

a non expected utility model and its application in practical auctions this article presents a non expected utility decision model which is nonlinear in the winning probabilities the model not only explicitly expresses bidders attitudes to risk but also addresses t

asset prices in affine real business cycle models abstract i describe a tractable way to study macroeconomic quantities and asset prices in a large class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models the proposed approximate solution is analytical log linear and adjusted for risk therefore it is well suited to investigate economic mechanisms describe the time series properties or estimate the model and deal with stochastic volatility i explain the pitfalls encountered by previous attempts to use simple approximation techniques in particular with models featuring recursive preferences finally i show the theoretical relationship between my solution and higher order perturbation methods

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

the european umts auctions abstract in this paper we review and draw some lessons from the umts auctions that have taken place in europe during 2000 and 2001 we address several design issues and in particular focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion an outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high but the design issues perhaps somewhat more complex

second order approximation of dynamic models with time varying risk abstract this paper provides first and second order approximation methods for the solution of non linear dynamic stochastic models in which the exogenous state variables follow conditionally linear stochastic processes displaying time varying risk the first order approximation is consistent with a conditionally linear model in which risk is still time varying but has no distinct role separated from the primitive stochastic disturbances in influencing the endogenous variables the second order approximation of the solution instead is sufficient to get this role moreover risk premia evaluated using only a first order approximation of the solution will be also time varying

monetary shocks and sticky wages in the u s great contraction a multi sector approach abstract we quantify the role of contractionary monetary shocks and nominal wage rigidities in the u s great contraction in contrast to conventional wisdom we find little increase in the economy wide real wage over 1929 33 although real wages rose significantly in some industries in the context of a two sector model with intermediates and nominal wage rigidities in one sector contractionary monetary shocks account for only a third of the fall in gdp intermediate linkages play an important role as the output decline without intermediates is almost a third larger at the trough the role of nominal wage rigidities beyond their interaction with monetary shocks is limited

a test that discriminates between two models of the dutch first auction non isomorphism abstract previous experiments reject the hypothesis that the dutch and first auctions are isomorphic two alternatives to the standard normal form analysis of the dutch auction are formalized 1 bidders violate bayes rule 2 bidders experience a utility of suspense that is additive with the utility of monetary reward paired comparisons of bidding behavior between groups in which the treatment is to triple the payoff of the baseline group yields no significant effect of this treatment we therefore reject the utility of suspense model

empirical and policy performance of a forward looking monetary model in this paper we consider the implications of a fully specified dynamic general equilibrium model developed by smets and wouters 2003 this is a relatively large scale forward looking model which was shown to provide a good fit to the data we show that systematically accounting for prior uncertainty may lead to substantially different parameter estimates however many of the qualitative features of the model remain similar under the alternative estimates that we find we then formulate and analyze optimal policy rules in the model focusing on a simple loss function which is commonly used and is independent of the estimates we determine the optimal equilibrium dynamics for our estimates as well as those of smets and wouters and find that they imply largely similar behavior we then analyze simple policy rules finding that these rules perform relatively well and are robust to our different sets of parameter estimates overall our results suggest that the model may be relatively robust in its ability to capture certain aspects of the data however some caution should be exercised in basing inference on the structural estimates as these seem to be only weakly identified copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models several papers have documented spurious welfare reversals incompletemarkets economy produces a higher level of welfare than the completemarkets economy this paper first demonstrates how conventional linearization can generate approximation errors that can result in welfare reversals using a two country production economy we argue that spurious welfare reversals are not only possible but also plausible under reasonable values for model parameters this paper then proposes an approximation method that modifies the conventional linearization by a bias correction this method can be easily implemented and approximates welfare as accurately as a second order perturbation method

monetary policy choices in emerging market economies the case of high productivity growth we develop a general equilibrium model of an emerging market economy where productivity growth differentials between tradable and non tradable sectors result in an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate the so called balassa samuelson effect the paper explores the dynamic properties of this economy and the welfare implications of alternative policy rules we show that the real exchange rate appreciation limits the range of policy rules that with a given probability keep inflation and exchange rate within predetermined numerical targets we also find that the b s effect raises by an order of magnitude the welfare loss associated with policy rules that prescribe active exchange rate management

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

theory experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions abstract the fcc uses the simultaneous multi round auction sma to assign spectrum licenses congress mandated that the sma be compared to an auction that allows combinatorial bids we review the theoretical and experimental evidence relevant to the sma procedures and their inherent defects results from experiments evaluating the sma in comparison to a combinatorial auction designed by charles river and associates show that several of the sma rules hinder efficiency and create a trade off between efficiency and auction length the combinatorial auction outperforms the sma when license values are superadditive but requires more time to complete and is not robust

the uncertainty multiplier and business cycles abstract i study a business cycle model where agents learn about the fundamentals by accumulating capital during recessions agents invest less and this generates noisier estimates of macroeconomic conditions and an increase in uncertainty the endogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty further reduces economic activity and thus gives rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies aggregate fluctuations to discipline learning dynamics i parametrize the model so that it matches not only standard business cycle moments but also survey data on macroeconomic forecasts i find that the uncertainty multiplier amplifies output standard deviation by 16

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

assessment of post merger coordinated effects characterization by simulations abstract this paper aims at evaluating the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers by simulating their impact on firms critical discount factors we consider a random coefficient model on the demand side and heterogeneous price setting firms on the supply side results suggest that mergers strengthen the incentives to collude of the merged firm but weaken the incentives of non merging parties with the former effect being stronger to assess the magnitudes of these effects we introduce the concepts of asymmetry in payoffs and change in payoffs effects which allow us to identify appropriate screening tools according to the relative pre merger payoffs of merging parties

environmental policy and macroeconomic dynamics in a new keynesian model this paper studies the dynamic behavior of an economy under different environmental policy regimes in a new keynesian model with nominal and real uncertainty we find the following results i an emissions cap policy is likely to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations ii staggered price adjustment alters significantly the performance of the environmental policy regime put in place iii the optimal environmental policy response to shocks is strongly influenced by the degree to which prices adjust and by the monetary policy reaction

labor market dynamics when un employment is a social norm this paper proposes a new keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market that can account for the cyclicality and persistence of vacancies unemployment job creation inflation and the real wage after a monetary shock motivated by evidence from psychology unemployment is modeled as a social norm the norm is defined here as the belief that individuals in society prioritize or should prioritize the search for gainful employment whereas those who do not are perceived as outside the norm and consequently stigmatized households pressure the unemployed to find jobs the fewer unemployed workers there are the more supporters the norm has and therefore the greater the pressure and psychological cost experienced by each jobseeker as this psychological cost is procyclical it hinders the wage from absorbing most of the effect of the shock thus the model is able to capture the high volatility of vacancies and unemployment observed in the data accounting for the shimer puzzle the paper also departs from the literature by introducing price rigidity in the labor market inducing additional inertia and persistence in inflation and the real wage after a monetary shock the model s responses after a monetary shock are in line with the responses obtained from a var on us data

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

international portfolios a comparison of solution methods we compare the performance of the perturbation based local portfolio solution method of devereux sutherland 2010a 2011 with a global solution method as a test suite we use model specifications that broadly capture features of international financial trade between advanced economies and between advanced and emerging economies we consider both symmetric country setups and asymmetric setups that capture important empirical facts such as differences in macroeconomic volatility differences in portfolio composition and high equity premia we find that the local method performs well at business cycle frequencies both in the symmetric and asymmetric settings while significant differences arise at long horizons in asymmetric settings

euro area inflation persistence in an estimated nonlinear dsge model abstract we estimate the approximate non linear solution of a small dsge model on euro area data using the conditional particle filter to compute the model likelihood our results are consistent with previous findings based on simulated data suggesting that this approach delivers sharper inference compared to the estimation of the linearised model we also show that the non linear model can account for richer economic dynamics the impulse responses to structural shocks vary depending on initial conditions selected within our estimation sample

field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions more magic on the internet i present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first price sealed bid auctions the auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the internet for collectible trading cards from the game magic the gathering i examine a number of outcomes including the number of participating bidders the probability of sale the levels of individual bids and the auctioneer s revenues the benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric risk neutral bidders with independent private values the results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding many bidders behave strategically anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others bids

inflation stabilization and welfare the case of a distorted steady state this paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy in a microfounded model with staggered price setting rotemberg and woodford 1997 and woodford 2002 have shown that under certain conditions a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in a model of this kind is related inversely to the expected discounted value of a conventional quadratic loss function in which each period s loss is a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation and an output gap measure from their optimal values zero however those derivations rely on an assumption of the existence of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically competitive price setters so that the steady state under a zero inflation policy involves an efficient level of output here we show how to dispense with this unappealing assumption so that a valid linear quadratic approximation to the optimal policy problem is possible even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary extent allowing for tax distortions as well as market power and when as a consequence it is necessary to take account of the effects of stabilization policy on the average level of output we again obtain a welfare theoretic loss function that involves both inflation and an appropriately defined output gap though the degree of distortion of the steady state affects both the weights on the two stabilization objectives and the definition of the welfare relevant output gap in the light of these results we reconsider the conditions under which complete price stability is optimal and find that they are more restrictive in the case of a distorted steady state we also consider the conditions under which pure randomization of monetary policy can be welfare improving and find that this is possible in the case of a sufficiently distorted steady state though the parameter values required are probably not empirically realistic

wage or price based inflation alternative targets in optimal monetary policy rules abstract in this paper the optimality of a specific variant of monetary policy rules a la taylor is tested within a general equilibrium monetary model with both nominal and real rigidities the traditional taylor rule is amended by the inclusion of the growth rate of nominal wage or wage inflation nominal rigidities are inserted via quadratic adjustment costs for both prices and wages a la rotemberg 1982 sticky prices in the united states journal of political economy 90 1187 1211 and kim 2000 constructing and estimating a realistic optimizing model of monetary policy journal of monetary economics 45 329 359 cost of capital adjustment together with a positive steady state inflation rate allow the model to match the main empirical facts about us economy the model is solved by using a second order approximation around the non stochastic steady state as in kim et al 2008 calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models journal of economic dynamics and control 32 11 3397 3414 the welfare metric is offered by the second order expansion of the utility function conditional to the non stochastic steady state the results show that wage inflation targeting is welfare improving when coupled with inflation targeting moreover optimal monetary rules include also a positive coefficient for output targeting as the need to smooth out quantity adjustments induced by real and nominal rigidities similar results occurs when both targets are in expected value one period ahead the model shows good in sample and out of sample properties

fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union abstract this paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes a tractable linear quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules in the optimal equilibrium monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules conversely the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions

auction theory with private values for many centuries auctions have been a common form of selling procedure although auction methods vary across country and product the two most frequently observed are the open ascending bid or english auction and the sealed bid auction recent theoretical research has led to a theory of equilibrium bidding in these two auctions and a wide range of alternatives as well as a result it has been possible to compare the revenue extracted by the seller under different auction methods and even to characterize the revenue maximizing auction the revenue equivalence theorem see for example william vickrey 1961 roger myerson 1981 and riley and william samuelson 1981 asserts that when each bidder s reservation price for a unit of an indivisible good is an independent draw from the same distribution and bidders are risk neutral the sealed bid auction generates the same expected revenue as the open auction much recent research has involved weakening each of the main hypotheses risk neutrality identically distributed values and independence of values in turn we shall illustrate some of the principal conclusions of this work by considering the properties of open and sealed bid auctions in a model of two bidders whose reservation prices can assume only two values and by comparing these auctions to the optimal or revenuemaximizing auction i revenue equivalence

when is discretion superior to timeless perspective policymaking the monetary policy literature assumes increasingly that policy is formulated according to the timeless perspective woodford 1999a however by treating appropriately the auxiliary state variables that characterize the timeless perspective equilibrium when evaluating policy performance this paper shows that discretionary policymaking can be superior to timeless perspective policymaking and identifies model features that make this outcome more likely using standard new keynesian dsge models discretion is found to dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the price wage phillips curves are relatively flat due perhaps to firm specific capital or labor and or kimball 1995 aggregation in combination with nominal rigidities these results suggest that studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to discretion paying careful attention to how policy performance is evaluated

computing second order accurate solutions for rational expectation models using linear solution methods this paper shows how to compute a second order accurate solution of a non linear rational expectation model using algorithms developed for the solution of linear rational expectation models the result is a state space representation for the realized values of the variables of the model this statespace representation can easily be used to compute impulse responses as well as conditional and unconditional forecasts

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare this article investigates the consumer welfare consequences of the recent code share agreement between continental airlines and northwest airlines we develop a discrete choice model based on individual flight characteristics this structural model recognizes that consumers i may have heterogeneous preferences for flight attributes and ii may face different prices for the same flight the empirical methodology also deals with the measurement error problem stemming from the absence of consumer level data on prices the estimation results suggest that whereas the code share agreement did not impact consumers significantly on average it increased the average surplus of connecting passengers but decreased the average surplus of nonstop passengers interestingly the magnitude of our welfare results may be attributed in large part to changes in product characteristics other than prices

estimation of random coefficient demand models two empiricists perspective we document the numerical challenges we experienced estimating random coefficient demand models as in berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 using two well known data sets and a thorough optimization design the optimization algorithms often converge at points where the first and second order optimality conditions fail there are also cases of convergence at local optima on convergence the variation in the values of the parameter estimates translates into variation in the models economic predictions price elasticities and changes in consumer and producer welfare following hypothetical merger exercises vary at least by a factor of 2 and up to a factor of 5

the yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics we show that microfounded dsge models with nominal rigidities can be successful in replicating features of bond yield data including sizeable term premia and volatile long term yields which have previously been considered puzzling in general equilibrium frameworks at the same time sample moments of consumption growth and inflation can be fit relatively well the improved model performance does not arise directly from the presence of nominal rigidities however this feature introduces short run monetary non neutrality so that monetary policy affects consumption dynamics and bond prices a high degree of interest rate smoothing in the policy rule is essential for our results at the core of dynamic macroeconomic models we find equilibrium relationships which describe the allocation of quantities e g consumption and investment and when imperfect competition prevails the setting of prices these equations are typically valid across time and across states of nature and financial assets form the tool that is supposed to ensure their validity financial assets are therefore an integral part of macroeconomic models any well specified model should be able to match financial data as well as macro data it is therefore problematic that microfounded models have had a hard time explaining key features of asset prices the most famous example of this difficulty is the equity premium puzzle but various features of bond yield data have also been char acterised as puzzling in the literature a number of papers including backus et al 1989 donaldson et al 1990 den haan 1995 and chapman 1997 have con cluded that general equilibrium models cannot generate term premia of a magnitude comparable to what we observe in actual data and may not even be capable of producing positive term premia for equity one could argue that fundamentals the expected future profitability of individual firms are unobservable and difficult to evaluate equity prices may therefore be thought to be subject to fluctuations disconnected from the real economy information acquisition fads etc and one could hope that the inability of macroeconomic models to match equity prices does not represent a signal of misspecification this argument is more difficult to construct for bonds bond yields should ultimately reflect expectations of future monetary policy decisions which at least in recent years are arguably more predictable than equity fundamentals thus the ability of macroeconomic models to explain bond prices represents an important test of their empirical performance in this article we revisit the relationship between bond prices and macroeconomic fundamentals contrary to the papers cited above that rely on flexible price models we

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

pennies from ebay the determinants of price in online auctions this paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible united states one cent coins at the ebay web site starting with an initial data set of 20 000 auctions we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value we have three major findings first a seller s feedback ratings reported by other ebay users have a measurable effect on her auction prices negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do second minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price in particular minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder as predicted by theory third when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days this significantly increases the auction price on average

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

yield curve in an estimated nonlinear macro model this paper estimates a sticky price macro model with us macro and term structure data using bayesian methods the model is solved by a nonlinear method the posterior distribution of the parameters in the model is found to be bi modal the degree of nominal rigidity is high at one mode sticky price mode but is low at the other mode flexible price mode i find that the degree of nominal rigidity is important for identifying macro shocks that affect the yield curve when prices are more flexible a slowly varying inflation target of the central bank is the main driver of the overall level of the yield curve by changing long run inflation expectations in contrast when prices are more sticky a highly persistent markup shock is the main driver the posterior probability of each mode is sensitive to the use of observed proxies for inflation expectations ignoring additional information from survey data on inflation expectations significantly reduces the posterior probability of the flexible price mode incorporating this additional information suggests that yield curve fluctuations can be better understood by focusing on the flexible price mode considering nonlinearities of the model solution also increases the posterior probability of the flexible price mode although to a lesser degree than using survey data information

when to exit a product evidence from the u s motion picture exhibition market when is it optimal for a multi product firm to exit a product we analyze strategic product exit using data on motion pictures exhibition choices in a major metropolitan first run market to estimate the survivor function for films at a given theatre this analysis indicates that a film s survival at a particular theatre is affected by intra firm relative performance and interfirm competitive pressures we find that theatres within chains avoid business stealing preliminary analysis further suggests that theatres compete for market share with neighboring theatres by increasing the time to exit when the competing theatre is owned by a different chain this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fifth order perturbation solution to dsge models abstract this paper derives a fifth order perturbation solution to dsge models the paper develops a new notation that reduces the notational complexity of high order solutions and yields a faster code the new notation consists of new matrix forms of high order multivariate chain rules and a new representation of the model as a function of one vector variable the algorithm that implements the new notation is between 3 and 55 times faster than dynare depending on model size and solution order

the changing transmission of uncertainty shocks in the u s this article investigates if the impact of uncertainty shocks on the u s economy has changed over time to this end we develop an extended factor augmented vector autoregression var model that simultaneously allows the estimation of a measure of uncertainty and its time varying impact on a range of variables we find that the impact of uncertainty shocks on real activity and financial variables has declined systematically over time in contrast the response of inflation and the short term interest rate to this shock has remained fairly stable simulations from a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model suggest that these empirical results are consistent with an increase in the monetary authorities antiinflation stance and a flattening of the phillips curve supplementary materials for this article are available online

patience persistence and welfare costs of incomplete markets in open economies abstract we investigate the welfare implications of alternative financial market structures in a two country endowment economy model we obtain an analytic expression for the expected lifetime utility of the representative household when sovereign bonds are the only internationally traded asset and we compare this welfare level with that obtained under complete asset markets the welfare cost of incomplete markets is negligible if agents are very patient and shocks are not very persistent but this cost is dramatically larger if agents are relatively impatient and shocks are highly persistent for realistic cases in which agents are very patient and shocks are highly persistent the welfare cost of incomplete markets is highly sensitive to the specific values of these parameters

international capital flows abstract the surge in international asset trade since the early 1990s has lead to renewed interest in models with international portfolio choice we develop the implications of portfolio choice for both gross and net international capital flows in the context of a simple two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model we focus on the time variation in portfolio allocation following shocks and resulting capital flows endogenous time variation in expected returns and risk which are the key determinants of portfolio choice affect capital flows in often subtle ways the model is consistent with a broad range of empirical evidence an additional contribution of the paper is to overcome the technical difficulty of solving dsge models with portfolio choice by developing a broadly applicable solution method

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

the un importance of unemployment fluctuations for the welfare cost of business cycles abstract this paper studies the cost of business cycles within a real business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market we endogenously link both the cyclical fluctuations and the mean level of unemployment to the aggregate business cycle risk the key result of the paper is that business cycles are costly fluctuations over the cycle induce a higher average unemployment rate since employment is nonlinear in the job finding rate and the past unemployment rate we show this analytically for a special case of the model we then calibrate the model to u s data for the calibrated model too business cycles cause higher average unemployment the welfare cost of business cycles can easily be an order of magnitude larger than lucas s 1987 estimate the cost of business cycles is the higher the lower the value of nonemployment is or equivalently the lower is the disutility of work the ensuing cost of business cycles rises further when workers skills depreciate during unemployment

causes of nonlinearities in low order models of the real exchange rate abstract this paper investigates the extent to which modern dsge models which feature local currency pricing home bias nontraded goods and incomplete markets can generate nonlinear real exchange rate dynamics that are consistent with those found in the time series literature using data from the current floating period our key findings are as follows first if the true model can be appropriately characterized as a set of linear equations then linearity tests that utilize univariate autoregressions of the real exchange rate suffer from an omitted variables problem which leads them to overestimate the true incidence of nonlinearity consequently studies that fail to control for this problem may spuriously find evidence of nonlinearities in the data despite the fact that the data generating process may be linear second we propose a strategy that can largely eliminate this distortion finally we find that dsge models solved using higher order approximations are capable of generating true structural nonlinearities in real exchange rates both asymptotically and in short samples

downward wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a monetary union this paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity nominal or real for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra union terms of trade whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness in response to asymmetric productivity shocks there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism

awarding telecom licences the recent european experience this paper analyses the procedures used by different european countries for awarding spectrum licences to potential operators of third generation 3g mobile telephone networks we contrast market based methods such as auctions with bureaucratic methods such as beauty contests they have been used for decisions about two major questions 1 how many licences should be awarded and how much spectrum should each licence give access to 2 which companies should receive which licences and how much should they pay for their licences most countries used a bureaucratic process to answer the first question however germany austria and greece were different and constructed auctions in which the number and size of licences were determined by the auction itself as for the second question there was much variation between countries and both auctions and beauty contests were popular methods we have four main findings first the bureaucratic procedure used by most countries to answer the first question led to companies concealing relevant information from the authorities second while firms may have tried to manipulate the procedures used in germany austria and greece to deter entry to their markets they were surprisingly unsuccessful in this third the traditional economic criticisms of beauty contests seem to apply to some but not to all those that were conducted finally the bidding strategies adopted by the telecom companies were often more complex than those predicted by economic theory

how much to share welfare effects of fiscal transfers recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a scal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries using a simple labor production economy model we rst derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of scal transfers in this economy scal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with scal transfers closer to the social planner s solution we then extend the model to a dsge setting with capital formation

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

how not to run auctions the european 3g telecom auctions abstract there were enormous differences in the revenues from the european third generation 3g or umts mobile phone license auctions from 20 euros per capita in switzerland to 650 euros per capita in the uk though the values of the licenses sold were similar poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants the sequencing of the auctions was also crucial we discuss the auctions in the uk netherlands germany italy austria switzerland belgium greece and denmark

the purchasing power parity debate originally propounded by the 16th century scholars of the university of salamanca the concept of purchasing power parity ppp was revived in the interwar period in the context of the debate concerning the appropriate level at which to re establish international exchange rate parities broadly accepted as a long run equilibrium condition in the post war period it first was advocated as a short run equilibrium by many international economists in the first few years following the breakdown of the bretton woods system in the early 1970s and then increasingly came under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s accordingly over the last three decades a large literature has built up that examines how much the data deviated from theory and the fruits of this research have provided a deeper understanding of how well ppp applies in both the short run and the long run since the mid 1990s larger datasets and nonlinear econometric methods in particular have improved estimation as deviations narrowed between real exchange rates and ppp so did the gap narrow between theory and data and some degree of confidence in long run ppp began to emerge again in this respect the idea of long run ppp now enjoys perhaps its strongest support in more than 30 years a distinct reversion in economic thought

effects of seller supplied prices on buyers product evaluations reference prices in an internet auction context a field experiment investigated the impact of two external reference points under the seller s control on the final price of an auction when an item s seller specified a high external reference price a reserve price the final bid was greater than when the seller specified a low external reference price a minimum bid when the seller provided both high and low reference prices the reserve influenced the final bid more the low reference price led to a lower outcome compared to when the seller did not communicate any reference price the number of bidders influenced outcomes in the absence of seller supplied reference prices

where s the risk the forward premium bias the carry trade premium and risk reversals in general equilibrium abstract this paper builds a two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macro model to understand three empirical facts about international currency returns they are the downward forward premium bias the carry trade return and the long run risk reversal cross country heterogeneity in unit root productivity levels generates the systematic risk priced into currency returns the risk can be magnified through monetary policy both a complete markets and an incomplete markets model are qualitatively consistent with these facts quantitatively the incomplete markets model performs better

solving endogenous regime switching models abstract this paper solves rational expectations models in which structural parameters switch across multiple regimes according to state dependent endogenous transition probabilities assuming small shocks and smooth transition probabilities we apply a perturbation approach we first provide for conditions under which a unique bounded equilibrium exists we then compute first and second order approximations in a new keynesian model with monetary policy switching we document new effects of monetary policy switching when transition probabilities depend on inflation

bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders values and private signals this poses a challenge when bids are observed from rst price common value auctions i bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure using data from u s municipal bond auctions i nd rst price and second price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing rst price formats the number of bidders has a more signi cant impact on revenues in optimal auctions i also nd invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal sp auctions

sealed bid versus open auctions the evidence data from u s forest service timber auctions are used to test vickrey s original proposition that sealed bid and open auctions yield equal revenue models for the high bid in an auction are specified and estimated using three different procedures ordinary least squares two stage least squares and maximum likelihood the second two procedures include a second equation which accounts for the forest service s auction choice and therefore control for selection bias these two procedures which unlike ordinary least squares yield consistent estimators imply a statistically and economically insignificant difference in high bids between sealed bid and open auctions

low revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending bid auctions low revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market these outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending bid multiunit auctions we show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted we argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions and discuss potential remedies to eliminate low revenue equilibria

asymmetric information and collusive behavior in auction markets we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the behavior of a bidder s cartel in a multiperiod auction market in which the purchaser is relatively uninformed our work establishes a tentative connection between the economics of information and collusion by concentrating on the cartel s informational monopoly and its ability to both increase profits and mask its presence by passing misinformation to the purchaser in the models we develop costs are assumed to be stochastic and projects awarded in adjacent periods to be substitutes for one another as a result the purchaser will have incentive to intertemporally reallocate his demand buying more or less of the current period s project depending upon whether the current market price is lower or higher than the price which he expects to prevail in the future a purchaser who needs to form such price expectations yet is ignorant about production costs and market structure will be particularly attracted to the auction mechanism because the data contained in past auctions bids can apparently be incorporated into an explicit structural model of expected future price in fact such a purchaser may hold auctions frequently merely to acquire information such pleasant appearances are deceiving once the auction s bidders become aware of the informational use to which their bids are being put they will have incentive to form a cartel thereby extracting a premium for their knowledge by misinforming the purchaser and skewing his intertemporal decision making to their advantage in some respects the mechanics of our model resemble the case of a multiproduct monopolist selling goods that are substitutes for one another what is unique to our analysis is the dependence of one of the goods future demand on price expectations which are an information resource we are suggesting that information that is distributed asymmetrically among market participants is susceptible to the inefficiencies of collusion in some ways the implications of our work are considerably stronger than this because our cartel never reveals its true knowledge and thus our market may be more inefficient than more standard monopolies in which the good is always traded albeit at noncompetitive prices furthermore by explicitly modeling the purchaser s rational structural approach to price forecasting we point out that complete rational expectations models may be more susceptible to exploitation by informational cartels than simpler forecasting techniques we have tested the implications of our model in a case study of north carolina highway construction cartels the highway construction industry is an auction market characterized by government procurement agencies who are uninformed relative to suppliers and comes complete with a substantial record of known collusion in recent years thus it seems an ideal hunting ground for verification of our theoretical findings our paper proceeds as follows in section i we model a multiperiod competitive auction market and describe a bayesian mechanism through which the purchaser uses past data to improve the accuracy of his price expectations section ii establishes theoretical results for the bidders cartel which has incentive to form in this market we describe massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02109 and university of arizona tucson az 85721 respectively nold was formerly of rhodes associates and is now deceased we thank richard schmalensee and the participants of the economic and legal organization workshop at the university of chicago for valuable suggestions part of this research was supported under research grant 81 ij cr0062 from the national institute of justice

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

fiscal federalism and monetary unions a quantitative assessment abstract in this paper i provide a quantitative analysis of three different forms of fiscal federalism in monetary unions fully decentralized regional fiscal authorities as the benchmark fiscal equalization with nominal tax revenue sharing and a common central fiscal authority i assess the capability of the different arrangements to stabilize regional consumption output and employment over the business cycle i also study the implications for interregional income consumption risk sharing and welfare from this analysis the following results emerge first a central fiscal authority stabilizes consumption fluctuations and increases the scope of interregional income and consumption risk sharing second fiscal equalization destabilizes consumption fluctuations and also reduces the scope of interregional income and consumption risk smoothing third a central fiscal authority leads to welfare gains whereas fiscal equalization leads to welfare losses

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices