reaction or interaction spatial process identification in multi tiered government structures abstract this paper models horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a multi tiered structure of government and implements maximum likelihood and instrumental variables estimation techniques to identify the source of spatial dependence in english local government expenditures the results show that when vertical fiscal externalities among upper tier county authority and lower tier district authority expenditures are explicitly taken into account the estimated magnitude of inter district fiscal interactions is substantially reduced the observed positive spatial autocorrelation among district expenditures can consequently be attributed to a large extent to common reaction to county fiscal policies rather than to actual strategic interaction

tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization abstract this paper explores the impact of intensified tax competition within federal systems characterized by the presence of both horizontal tax externalities between the states and vertical tax externalities between states and federal government it shows that although these push tax rates in opposite directions horizontal towards state taxes that are too low vertical towards state taxes that are too high leaving the net outcome unclear intensified tax competition always worsens their combined effect that is intensified lower level tax competition in the form of an increase in the number of lower level jurisdictions is sure to reduce welfare but this is not because as usually supposed it makes excessively low state taxes even lower rather it is welfare reducing either for that reason or because it makes excessively high state taxes even higher

corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

understanding bank runs the importance of depositor bank relationships and networks we use a unique new database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run we use minute by minute depositor withdrawal data to understand the effectiveness of deposit insurance the role of social networks and the importance of bank depositor relationships in influencing depositor propensity to run we employ methods from the epidemiology literature which examine how diseases spread to estimate transmission probabilities of depositors running and the significant underlying factors we find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs further our results suggest that social network effects are important but are mitigated by other factors in particular the length and depth of the bank depositor relationship depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a bank are less likely to run during a crisis suggesting that cross selling acts not just as a revenue generator but also as a complementary insurance mechanism for the bank finally we find there are long term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications

does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

decentralization and corruption evidence from u s federal transfer programs while some recent evidence suggests that more decentralization is associated with reduced corruption no empirical work has examined whether different types of decentraliz ation have differential effects on corruption the theoretical literature has emphasized that expenditure decentralization will only be effective if accompanied by the devolution of rev enue generation to local governments in this paper we examine this hypothesis empirically by studying the mismatch between revenue generation and expenditure in u s states larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office supporting the theory that soft budget constraints created by federal transfers are potentially problematic

commodity price forecasting with large scale econometric models and the futures market this paper compares the accuracy of major commercial price forecasts for corn wheat soybeans soybean oil soybean meal cotton live cattle and hogs the price forecasting information in futures prices is evaluated by comparison the results among commercial forecasters are mixed but futures prices perform relatively better on average although not universally so these results have important implications for operational risk management

corruption in america abstract we use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the u s to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption more educated states and to a smaller degree richer states have less corruption this relationship holds even when we use historical factors like congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today the level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization and uncorrelated with the size of government there is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state these results echo the cross country findings and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

vertical externalities in cigarette taxation do tax revenues go up in smoke abstract in federal systems where tax bases are joint property the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other this paper examines the interdependence of us federal and state cigarette tax rates our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate thus a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines and indirectly the state tax rate declines

tax structure in a federation abstract does national taxation of a base influence the degree to which the local government will use the same tax base does the tax rate chosen by one local government influence the choices made by another local government the theoretical answer to these questions is often in the affirmative because of vertical and horizontal externalities that result when several governments are operating at the same time in a fiscal system however little empirical information is available this paper estimates the impact of horizontal and vertical externalities on the choice of tax rates by local governments operating in a federation higher national income tax rates and lower poverty rates are found to lead to lower local income tax rates

bayesian persuasion in coordination games regime change games have been studied widely in the economic literature in the contexts of bank runs currency attacks political revolutions and others usually agents need to coordinate an attack against the status quo once sufficiently many agents attack the regime changes and agents who were attacking benefit from their attack otherwise the regime stays and agents who were attacking it have to bear a cost an important angle of coordination games is the transmission of information from the policymaker or the defender of the status quo to the agents who have to make a decision whether to attack the regime the policymaker can attempt to change the information available to agents to increase the likelihood of the survival of the regime in this paper we present a model where the policymaker attempts to transmit information in this spirit specifically we study a model where the policymaker can commit to abandon the regime automatically before agents choose whether to attack or not if the fundamentals determining the strength of the regime are below a certain threshold the benefit of committing to abandon the regime more often is that conditional on the regime not being automatically abandoned agents update their information to account for the fact that the fundamentals are above the threshold and so their inclination to attack decreases the disadvantage is that it directly increases the likelihood that the regime will not survive since it is automatically abandoned analyzing this problem we show that the policymaker finds it optimal to commit to abandon the regime often enough such that when agents see that the policymaker did not abandon it they choose not to attack hence the policymaker chooses to maximize the benefit out of the infor mational transmission channel from the committed policy at the same time the policymaker has no additional benefit in committing to abandon the regime beyond that point as it will cause too frequent abandonment without additional information benefits the commitment ability of the policymaker is key here we show that without commitment ability the policymaker ends up abandoning automatically less often

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

who matters in coordination problems we consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self fullling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky based on their private information agents who have heterogeneous investment incentives form expectations or sentiments about the project s outcome we nd that the sum of these sentiments is constant across dierent strategy proles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives as a result we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the dierent payo types applying this nding we show that agents who benet little from the project s success have a large impact on the coordination process the agents with small benets invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost as the average sentiment is constant a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will free up a large amount of sentiment provoking a large impact on the whole economy intuitively these agents insensitive to the project s outcome and hence to the actions of others are inuential because they modify their

a spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses evidence from canada using a model of interdependent tax choices and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers this paper estimates making use of a spatial econometric framework corporate income tax setting functions for all canadian provincial governments the results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements general federal transfers and the federal corporate income tax a robustness check on the fiscal relationship between ontario and quebec verifies the existence of significant bi directional fiscal interdependencies the paper also introduces u s state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with canadian provinces a l aide d un modele de choix fiscaux interdependants et en tenant compte des paiements de perequation et des transferts generaux ce texte calibre a l aide d un cadre econometrique spatial les fonctions de definition de fiscalite des revenus de societes de tous les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens les resultats montrent qu il y a un effet d interaction positif significatif entre un sous ensemble de provinces et entre les provinces dans leur ensemble et le gouvernement federal les impots sur le revenu des societes des provinces sont co relies negativement avec les paiements de perequation les transferts generaux et l impot federal sur le revenu des societes des tests de robustesse montrent qu il y a relation d interdependance fiscale bidirectionnelle significative entre le quebec et l ontario le memoire introduit les impots sur le revenu des societes aux etats unis comme co variables et examine leur interaction avec ce qui se passe dans les provinces canadiennes

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

the consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households states implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good a vertical fiscal externality reflecting the effect of state policies on federal revenues provides an incentive for state taxes to be too progressive a horizontal fiscal externality causes nonoptimal state taxes and expenditures because of the migration effect the federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states the federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states c 1998 elsevier science s a

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

the determinants of attitudes towards strategic default on mortgages we use survey data to measure households propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them strategic default when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house the willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home equity shortfall our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non pecuniary factors such as views about fairness and morality we also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued

the price forecasting performance of futures markets for live cattle and hogs a disaggregated analysis four hypotheses about the price forecasting performance of live cattle and hog futures are tested using disaggregated data live cattle futures are found to have inadequate forecasting performance for each hypothesis and do not provide better forecasts than lagged cash prices live hog futures perform well for three hypotheses but not when economic conditions are unstable hog futures provide better forecasts than lagged cash prices the analysis does not support the contention that these futures markets are agencies for rational price formation

outlook vs futures three decades of evidence in hog and cattle markets the accuracy of hog and cattle price forecasts from four outlook programs is compared with forecasts derived from futures markets most of the series begin in the mid to late 1970s and end in 2007 root mean squared error rmse comparisons indicate the difference between outlook and futures rmse is relatively small in most cases in directional terms outlook forecasts beat futures prices only 2 out of 11 times in hogs and 1 out of 7 times in cattle however the null hypothesis that futures encompasses outlook is rejected in 5 of 11 cases for hogs and 4 of 7 cases for cattle

vertical versus horizontal tax externalities an empirical test abstract we study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base one can observe two types of externalities a horizontal externality working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum and a vertical externality working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates building on the model of keen and kotsogiannis keen michael j kotsogiannis christos 2002 does federalism lead to excessively high taxes american economic review 92 1 363 370 we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables this test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of swiss municipalities that feature direct democratic fiscal decision making so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent governments of the theory we find that vertical externalities dominate they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition

vertical fiscal externalities in a federation abstract we examine vertical fiscal externalities in a model where a state government provides a productivity enhancing public input and both the state and the central government tax wages and profits previous literature has emphasized the negative tax externality that occurs when two levels of government impose distortionary taxes on the same tax base we show that an increase in the state government s tax rate on wage income can increase federal revenues if the federal government imposes an ad valorem tax on employees wages and the demand for labour is inelastic we also show that an increase in the provision of the public input can either increase or reduce federal tax revenues leading to either under or over provision of the public input by the state government

an analysis of forecasts of livestock prices abstract the paper studies forecasts of u s hog and cattle prices provided by both a commodity expert and organized futures markets some have argued that futures prices should be efficient forecasts of actual cash prices we show that cattle futures prices are outperformed by the expert for hogs futures prices and the expert are about equal analysis of a vector autoregression of the expert s forecasts the futures prices and actual cash prices supports the finding that cattle futures prices are not an efficient forecast of actual cash prices differing supply dynamics may account for the difference

dynamic interventions and informational linkages abstract we model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures we establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure a stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news but also leads to negative conditional updates our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over or under interventions moreover saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs

signaling in a global game coordination and policy traps this paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs while exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria the policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy this result does not rely on the freedom to choose out of equilibrium beliefs nor on the policy being a public signal it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise

legal political and institutional constraints on the financial crisis policy response as the financial crisis manifested itself and peaked in 2007 and 2008 the response of us policymakers and regulators was shaped in important ways by legal and political constraints policymakers lacked certain legal authorities that would have been useful for addressing the crisis notably to use public capital to stabilize the banking sector or to deal with the failure of large financial firms such as insurance companies and investment banks that were outside the scope of bank regulators authority to resolve deposit taking commercial banks legal constraints were keenly felt at the us department of the treasury where i served as a senior official from december 2006 to january 2009 treasury had virtually no emergency economic authority at the onset of the crisis in 2007 with the exception of the treasury s exchange stabilization fund which was intended for use in exchange rate interventions as the systemic risks of the financial crisis became apparent the initial policy response largely fell to the federal reserve which had the authority to act under emergency circumstances there will inevitably be another financial crisis and the response will be shaped by both the lessons learned from recent history and the statutory and political changes in the wake of the crisis the paper thus concludes by discussing changes in constraints since the crisis with a focus on two developments 1 the political reality that there will not in the near future be another wide ranging grant of fiscal authority as was given with the troubled asset relief program and 2 the new legal authorities provided in the wall street reform and consumer protection act of 2010 commonly known as the dodd frank law

forced sales and house prices the market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals this implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions but also by idiosyncratic factors including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house first houses are productive only when people are living in them owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset second houses are fragile assets that need maintenance and are vulnerable to van dalism unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect third short term rental contracts involve high transactions costs resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage fourth houses are expensive indivisible and heterogeneous assets each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer because of the high costs of intermediation in housing this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer fifth most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults the expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006 foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly in a liquid market an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price but

fear of fire sales illiquidity seeking and credit freezes is there any need to clean up a banking system in the midst of a crisis for instance by closing some weak banks and forcing others to sell bad assets or can one wait till the crisis is over we argue that an overhang of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets in the future can increase the private returns to holding illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them anticipating a potential future fire sale cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash which also reduces their incentive to lock up money in term loans the potential for a worse fire sale than necessary as well as the associated decline in credit origination could make the crisis worse which is one reason it may make sense to clean up the system even in the midst of the crisis we discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits

forecasting and hedging an illustration of risk reduction in the hog industry hog producers and first handlers can reduce the risk of unfavorable price fluctuations by combining the information from forecasting models with a selective hedging strategy six quarterly price forecasting approaches econometric arima expert naive and two composites were evaluated over the 1976 82 period using a simple yet pragmatic hedging decision rule the results indicate that relatively modest improvements in prices received by producers or paid by first handlers relative to cash marketing were possible statistically significant reductions in short term risk exposure were achieved by both groups through most of the approaches evaluated

improving the accuracy of outlook price forecasts this study investigates the predictive ability of outlook hog price forecasts released by iowa state university relative to alternative time series and market forecasts under root mean squared error rmse the futures market forecast is most accurate at the first and second horizon but less accurate than iowa outlook and the other forecast methods at the third horizon in terms of the individual time series models some vector autoregressions vars and bayesian vars flexible in specification and estimation and model averaging tend to perform better than iowa outlook forecasts evidence from encompassing tests more stringent tests of forecast performance indicates that many price forecasts can add incremental information to the iowa forecast simple combinations of these models and outlook forecasts are able to reduce forecast errors by economically significant levels overall the results indicate that it is possible to provide more accurate forecasts than iowa outlook at every horizon

forecast performance of wasde price projections for u s corn we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the season average price projections for u s corn as published by the u s department of agriculture s world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde an important issue given reduced resources and increased program scrutiny within the federal government this study is the first in the literature to evaluate the wasde corn projections relative to futures adjusted forecasts throughout the forecasting cycle using a lengthy evaluation period 1980 81 2012 13 we find that wasde projections provide lower rmses relative to futures adjusted forecasts for 9 of the 16 forecast periods 4 of which are statistically different encompassing tests show that wasde projections often provide incremental information not present in the futures adjusted forecasts composite forecasts based on futures adjusted forecasts and wasde projections reduced the rmses over all forecast periods by an average 12 16 favorable average trading profits may be generated for some forecast months using wasde projections overall our results suggest that wasde projections of the u s corn season average price provide useful information to the market and could enhance the efficiency of the agricultural sector

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

quasi rational and ex ante price expectations in commodity supply models an empirical analysis of the us broiler market a statistically optimal inference about agents ex ante price expectations within the us broiler market is derived using futures prices of related commodities along with a quasi rational forecasting regression equation the modelling approach which builds on a hamilton type framework includes endogenous production and allows expected cash price to be decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated components we therefore infer the relative importance of various informational sources in expectation formation results show that in addition to the quasi rational forecast the true supply shock future prices and ex post commodity price forecast errors have at times been influential in broiler producers price expectations copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

forecast encompassing as the necessary condition to reject futures market efficiency fluid milk futures the traditional necessary condition for futures market inefficiency is the existence of alternative forecasting methods that produce mean squared forecast errors smaller than the futures market here a more exacting requirement for futures market efficiency is proposed forecast encompassing using the procedure of harvey and newbold multiple forecast encompassing is tested using chicago mercantile exchange fluid milk futures time series models and usda experts provide competing forecasts results suggest milk futures do not encompass the information contained in the usda forecasts at a two quarter horizon while the competing forecasts generate positive revenues it is unlikely that returns exceed transaction costs in this relatively new market

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure