price dependent profit sharing as a channel coordination device we show how an upstream firm by using a price dependent profit sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes with this rule the upstream firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic as a result competing downstream firms will maximize aggregate total channel profit when downstream firms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream firm the same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance price dependent profit sharing may also ensure that the downstream firms undertake efficient market expanding investments the model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

credit and inflation under borrowerʼs lack of commitment here we investigate the existence of credit in a cash in advance economy where there are complete markets but for the fact that agents cannot commit to repay their debts defectors are banned from the credit market but they can use money balances for saving purposes without uncertainty deflation crowds out credit completely the equilibrium allocation however is efficient if the government deflates at the time preference rate efficiency can also be restored with positive inflation for any non negative inflation rate below the optimal level the volume of credit and the real interest rate increase with inflation our results hold when idiosyncratic uncertainty is introduced and households are sufficiently impatient but in one instance efficiency cannot be restored if the deflation rate is nearby the rate of time preference our numerical examples suggest that the optimal inflation rate is not too large for reasonable levels of patience and risk aversion finally we present a framework where the use of money arises endogenously and show that it is tantamount to our cash in advance framework our results hold in this modified environment

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

precommitment in competing vertical chains the design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization hence it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices a precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one s own favor schelling 1960 how these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey jel classification l22 l42 l81

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

heterogeneity redistribution and the friedman rule we study monetary models with nondegenerate stationary distributions of money holdings we find that the friedman rule does not typically maximize ex post social welfare an increase in the rate of growth of the money supply has two effects the standard distortionary or rate of return effect makes money a less desirable asset for all moneyholders a second redistributive effect creates a transfer from one type of agent to the other an increase in the rate of growth of money away from the friedman rule can produce a rate of return effect that dominates the standard effect

vertical control opportunism and risk sharing abstract a manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem she undercuts her own input prices and fails to offset retail competition i show that this problem diminishes when retailers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost the manufacturer can therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce

does market incompleteness matter this paper argues that incompleteness of intertemporal financial markets has little effect on welfare prices or consumption in an economy with a single consumption good provided that traders are long lived and patient a riskless bond is traded shocks are transitory and there is no aggregate risk in an economy with aggregate risk a similar conclusion holds provided traders share the same crra utility function and the right assets are traded examples demonstrate that these conclusions need not hold if the wrong assets are traded or if the economy has multiple consumption goods

returns system with rebates we consider a variant of the newsvendor problem atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand after the orders are filled the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not we show that in this setting a returns system with rebates with previously set buy back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold implements the optimal production and sales strategy attaining maximum expected profit in the channel

field of use restrictions in licensing agreements a widely used clause in license contracts the field of use restriction four precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified when a technology has several distinct applications four allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the lowest cost producer in each field of use this can improve production efficiency with complex technologies however the boundaries of fields of use may be difficult to codify entailing a risk of licensees rights overlapping we explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard framework where the licensor s effort determines the probability of overlap we show that depending on the contracting environment the license agreement may include output restrictions and non linear royalty schemes

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

viewpoint canadian competition policy progress and prospects this paper discusses the state of competition policy in particular the economics of competition policy in canada today and considers its prospects going forward it argues that i the importance of competition policy has become accepted widely in canada and indeed throughout much of the world ii competition policy design and enforcement is in general well done in canada iii economists including many canadians have played a central role in the development of an efficient and effective competition policy in canada and elsewhere and iv competition policy in canada is today facing very serious challenges and economists should be concerned la politique de concurrence au canada progres et prospective ce memoire discute de l etat de la politique de concurrence en particulier l economie de la politique de concurrence au canada aujourd hui et examine ce qui l attend on suggere que i l importance de la politique de concurrence est devenue largement acceptee au canada et dans le gros du reste du monde ii le dessein et l application de la politique de concurrence sont en general bien faits au canada iii les economistes et plusieurs canadiens parmi eux ont joue un role central dans le developpement d une politique de concurrence efficace et effective au canada et ailleurs et iv la politique de concurrence au canada fait face a des defis tres serieux ces temps ci et les economistes devraient s en inquieter

subsidy and tuition policies in public higher education i introduction the much discussed and widely debated recent conditions in public higher education include expanding enrollments flat if not declining public appropriations per resident student and rapid increases in tuition rates 1 to many observers tuition policy in public higher education appears be explained as an attempt to set tuition at whatever level is necessary to compensate for shortfalls between public appropriations and instructional expenditures ehrenberg 2006 asserts that public higher education has been buffeted by a perfect storm in which state appropriations to public higher education institutions have failed to keep pace with per student expenditures in private higher education because of economic recession the priorities placed on alternative uses of state tax revenues such as elementary and secondary education medicaid welfare and criminal justice and efforts to reduce income and sales tax rates a considerable empirical literature examines the relationship between tuition in public higher education and state appropriations koshal and koshal 2000 identify a negative relationship between tuition and state appropriation a study of college costs and prices which is conducted by cunningham et al 2001 identifies an inverse association between tuition rates and annual budget appropriations but finds little evidence of a link between tuition and expenditures on instruction lowry 2001 treats state appropriations as exogenous in a resident tuition equation and discovers a significant negative relationship between state funding and tuition rizzo 2005 finds that increases in tuition are linked to declines in future levels of state funding which hints at a dynamic association rizzo and ehrenberg 2004 in one of the more extensive examination of the topic treat real state appropriations per student as an exogenous variable in their resident tuition equation and find that schools that receive higher state appropriations per student charge lower tuition though the elasticity is far from unity acknowledging the economic and demographic conditions of public higher education and the empirical literature linking appropriations and tuition raises a number of questions what activities are legislatures supporting when they allocate public funds to higher education what are the implied responsibilities for subsidizing residents versus nonresidents how are resident and nonresident tuition rates determined and what are the relationships among tuition rates resident and nonresident enrollments and state appropriations to higher education in particular there appears to be the need to develop a better understanding of the decision processes that determine both the public subsidy and the setting of tuition rates a goal of this article is to develop a conceptual framework for that process there is a widely held notion that residents should pay a lower tuition than nonresidents and as a result of a resident subsidy they do so in nearly all public universities one rationale for favorable treatment is that residents and their parents pay state taxes another claim which receives some support by groen 2004 is that residents are likely to remain in the state after graduation and thus contribute future tax revenues although the public subsidy to higher education is justified for these and many other economic development reasons some argue that the higher education subsidy is simply a payoff to special interest groups who influence legislatures and governors friedman 1968 and goldin and katz 1998 provide a general discussion of the objectives of subsidized higher education for whatever reasons resident students continue to receive a substantial publicfinanced subsidy while nonresidents pay close to full cost there are two basic arrangements for determining tuition rates in higher education 1 institutions determine tuition rates under the direction of an independent governing board and 2 state legislatures who are governed by statues and budget policies make tuition decisions

money credit and banking in monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained this problem creates a role for financial intermediaries such as banks who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans in general financial intermediation improves the allocation the gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers liquidity constraints we also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving

adoption of organic farming in germany and austria an integrative dynamic investment perspective farm level adaptation to changing economic environments is often slower than expected technological innovations for instance are frequently adopted at a later date than the net present value of investment suggests this can be explained by a model of investment under uncertainty which consistently accounts for uncertainty sunk costs and the flexibility of investment timing its essential conclusion is that due to temporal opportunity costs critical incremental cash flows that trigger investments might be higher than those needed for simple cost recovery this accounts for an ostensible reluctance to invest economic hysteresis in this article we demonstrate how slow conversion to organic farming in general and the different rates of conversion in germany and austria in particular can be explained by the new investment theory

the competitive effects of resale price maintenance the competitive effects of resale price maintenance rpm are theoretically diverse rpm can cause allocation distortions or promote productive efficiencies in the distribution process moreover extant cross sectional empirical evidence is incapable of distinguishing among the potentially disparate effects of rpm this paper conducts hypothesis tests of the alternative theories of rpm the empirical framework relates estimates of the effects of rpm for a cross section of observations to necessary conditions of the alternative models this analysis indicates that rpm is used both to foster cartels and promote efficiencies in the distribution process this result is consistent with the growing body of case study analysis that suggests that rpm is used for a variety of reasons this result also questions the current per se illegal status of rpm in the antitrust laws evidence is also provided concerning the strategic interaction between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution process and the use of financial data in analyzing propositions in industrial organization

gift exchange versus monetary exchange theory and evidence abstract we study the lagos and wright 2005 model of monetary exchange in the laboratory with a finite population of sufficiently patient agents this model has a unique monetary equilibrium and a continuum of non monetary gift exchange equilibria some of which pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium we find that subjects avoid the gift exchange equilibria in favor of the monetary equilibrium we also study versions of the model without money where all equilibria involve non monetary gift exchange we find that welfare is higher in the model with money than without money suggesting that money plays a role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device jel c92 d12 e40 z13

seasonality and the effect of advertising on price does advertising make markets more or less competitive this paper lays out an econometric strategy for estimating the effect of advertising on prices that exploits seasonal demand and imperfect targeting of consumers we find mostly negligible effects of advertising on prices at monthly frequency among the 35 of 131 product categories with sufficient advertising seasonality to justify second stage estimation only nine have a significant effect and those are typically small this finding is essentially the result of the much greater seasonality in advertising than price

territorial restrictions in franchise contracts i introduction efficient contracts establish the incentives for contractual parties through the assignment of rights or authority over decisions as well as shares of profit this insight has been widely used to explain the nature of the firm 1 the role of rights assignment in explaining specific business contracts however is relatively unexplored here we analyze contractual rights within franchise systems focusing on the right to add new franchisees to an existing franchise area the choice in a franchise contract is simple either grant the franchisor the right to add new franchisees in the future or allow existing franchisees the right to block the addition of new outlets the literature on vertical restraints assumes that the restraints specified in contracts are enforced and never renegotiated with respect to territorial exclusivity in particular the literature mainly takes two perspectives territorial protection either prevents franchisor hold up behavior the appropriation of franchisee returns from the investment in establishing the local market or it corrects distortions arising from competition among franchisees 2 our model extends the hold up story by recognizing the dynamic nature of contractual relations between parties contracts are always open for renegotiation and the initial contracts are designed with this in mind the key effect in assigning the right to add additional franchisees is on the status quo point in bargaining subsequent to the initial contract the central point is simple the party with the authority to add franchisees can extract a larger portion of the wealth created by investment in the system incentives depend on the appropriated portion of the return to investment therefore the optimal contract assigns the right to the party whose input is more valuable to the system 3 the next section offers a simple model that develops this theme in a subsequent section we examine some facts about franchise systems in place and illustrate alternative assignments of authority ii the model we consider the simplest franchise contract a franchisor f offers to a franchisee g a contract giving the right to collect profits from the use of the franchisor s brand name in a retail territory we assume that the level of economic profits cannot be verified by a third party such as a court this rules out explicit sharing rules for profits between the two parties 4 these profits depend upon the efforts of both the franchisor and franchisee in developing the market the efforts are undertaken immediately after the contract is signed the franchisee s input represents for example local advertising selling effort or quality and the franchisor s input represents for example national advertising or the maintenance of the brand name the profits from the venture are uncertain and depend on the realization of a draw should the system prove sufficiently successful it may be profitable to add another retail outlet the evolution of contracts will respond to any opportunity for profit enhancement and any restrictions in the initial contract preventing this realization will be open for renegotiation the role for territorial constraints in particular may be illustrated within a simple formal model the effort levels of the franchisor and franchisee are denoted by e sub f and e sub g and are measured in dollars the profits earned from the brand name depend upon a stochastic variable e g demand uncertainty denoted by theta which is realized after the efforts are undertaken after the realization of theta there is an opportunity for the franchisor to sell a position in the territory to a second franchisee a product idea that enjoys success warrants an expanded retail network as the market is mature at this point no further investment is required the key element of the contract for our interest is the allocation of authority over the admission of additional retailers to the territory in question does the contract guarantee to the original franchisee exclusive authority to the use of the brand name in the territory

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

the distribution of money balances and the nonneutrality of money recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade given quasi linear preferences this makes the distribution of money degenerate which keeps the models simple but precludes the discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy we generalize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically we show that unexpected symmetric lump sum money injections may increase short run output and welfare whereas asymmetric injections may increase long run output and welfare

do msrps decrease prices abstract the nature of manufacturer s suggested retail prices msrps and whether they increase or decrease prices is poorly understood we exploit a policy experiment in which a ban on msrps was imposed and then lifted a year later and show that msrps decrease prices by 3 6 percent on average there is no indication that msrps lowered prices by acting as binding price ceilings instead we find suggestive evidence that msrps are aimed at consumers possibly providing a benchmark by which consumers can evaluate prices

search bargaining money and prices the goal of this paper is to extend existing search theoretic models of fiat money which until now have assumed that the price level is exogenous by explicitly incorporating bilateral bargaining this allows us to determine the price level endogenously and leads to additional insights concerning the role of money for example we find that monetary equilibria are generally inefficient in the sense that output and prices differ from the solution to a social planner s problem although the difference can become small as the discount rate or search friction vanishes we also find that there exist nonstationary inflationary equilibria

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

who is afraid of the friedman rule in this paper we explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and het erogeneity among agents we study a standard monetary economy with two types of agents in which the stationary distribution of money holdings is non degenerate sans type specific fiscal policy we show that the zero nominal interest rate policy the friedman rule does not maximize type specific welfare it may not maximize aggregate social welfare either indeed one or more surprisingly both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the friedman rule our results suggest a positive explanation for why central banks around the world do not implement the friedman rule

optimal money creation in pure currency economies a conjecture in a pure currency economy money is the only durable object and people have private histories in such economies taxation is not feasible and in some of them trade is enhanced through the use of money for economies of that kind in which a nondegenerate distribution of money part of the state of the economy affects trades and real outcomes and in which trades affect the state at the next date the conjecture is that there are transfer schemes financed by money creation that improve ex ante representative agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money fixed jel codes e52 e58 copyright 2014 oxford university press

unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary bewley aiyagari model abstract we prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium in a bewley aiyagari model with idiosyncratic shocks this is an exchange economy with an infinite horizon and one consumption good and with each agent facing idiosyncratic endowment shocks at each period the agents may trade their endowments for the only asset fiat money the government increases the money supply at a constant growth rate that induces inflation in a stationary monetary equilibrium we identify the necessary and sufficient condition for a stationary monetary equilibrium where money has a positive value and the aggregate real balance is constant over time to exist and when it exists we show that it is unique the argument for uniqueness is based on a new monotonicity result for the average optimal consumption

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

optimal monetary policy what we know and what we don t know in this article i examine the current state of knowledge about optimal monetary policy i distinguish between two literatures basic and applied the basic literature is explicit about the frictions that generate a positive value for money and make it socially beneficial the applied literature is not i describe the recent lessons about monetary policy that we have learned from each literature and discuss how the two distinct approaches may be usefully combined

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry abstract this paper considers forward vertical integration by a monopolist producer of an intermediate good when the downstream industry is monopolistically competitive alternative methods of vertical control are considered in addition to the usual input mark up these include franchise fees royalties and resale price maintenance it is found that these methods in combination achieve perfect or near perfect replication of the outcome under full vertical integration the case where downstream products are differentiated by location in a circular space is studied in detail and alternative outcomes are ranked according to their social desirability

the essentiality of money in environments with centralized trade abstract lagos and wright 2005 introduced an influential model of monetary exchange in which trade alternates between centralized and decentralized markets and money is essential a limitation of their model and of the literature that follows is that they do not provide a microfoundation for the process of exchange in the centralized market in this paper we show that how one models exchange in the centralized market matters for the essentiality of money by describing the centralized market as a strategic market game and studying conditions under which money is essential

money as a mechanism in a bewley economy we study what features an economic environment might possess such that it would be pareto ecient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money we prove a conjecture that is essentially due to bewley 1980 1983 the gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly ecient ex ante in an environment where very patient agents can accumulate large enough money stocks to be completely self insured we also study examples where a nonmonetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to any monetary mechanism at least when the comparison is restricted to stationary equilibria and where an inflationary monetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to a laissez faire or deflationary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient agents j e l classification e31 e42

vertical restraints and producers competition this paper examines the rationale for vertical restraints it shows that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have significant anti competitive effects the paper focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements among the retailers of two products which are imperfect substitutes such arrangements are shown to increase consumer prices under plausible conditions the increase in consumer prices is sufficiently large to more than offset the deleterious effects from double marginalization resulting from reduced competition among retailers the imposition of exclusivity provisions is may be part of a nash equilibrium among producers these results hold whether there are or are not franchise fees this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

foreign direct investment in vertically related markets we study an mne s choice of fdi mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing we show how the market s vertical structure and trading features affect this choice an mne s incentives to expand through cross border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms the opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts instead of two part tariffs are used our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome fdi and should discourage fdi through acquisition investissements exterieurs directs sur les marches verticaux dans cet article nous etudions le choix d une entreprise multinationale de proceder a un investissement exterieur direct dans un marche vertical avec sources d approvisionnement locales nous montrons la facon dont la structure verticale et les caracteristiques commerciales du marche ont une incidence sur une telle decision les mesures incitatives offertes aux entreprises multinationales pour se developper par l entremise d acquisitions transfrontalieres plutot que par l investissement dans de nouvelles installations sont plus fortes sur les marches dotes d un pouvoir de negociation et d une concentration en amont plus eleves ainsi que par des conditions contractuelles non observables l inverse s observe sur les marches ou les contrats a prix de gros sont utilises en lieu et place des tarifs binomes en termes de bien etre notre analyse suggere que le pays hote ne devrait pas toujours accueillir les investissements exterieurs directs et devrait decourager ces memes investissements realises par l entremise d acquisitions

viewpoint a microfoundation of monetary economics in this lecture i explain what the microfoundations of money are about and why they are necessary for monetary economics then i review recent developments of a particular microfoundation of money commonly known as the search theory of money finally i outline some unresolved issues dans cette presentation l auteur explique ce que sont les microfondations de la monnaie et pourquoi elles sont necessaires a l economie monetaire ensuite il passe en revue certains developpements recents d une microfondation particuliere de la monnaie connue sous le nom de theorie de la recherche de la monnaie enfin l auteur fait le tour d un ensemble de problemes qui restent sans solution pour le moment

resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry wide adoption abstract we consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance rpm to dampen competition we find that even though the motive for using rpm is thus anti competitive market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers indeed we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market consumer welfare under a laissez faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which rpm is banned government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry wide adoption of rpm can have adverse welfare effects in the model we further show that proposed guidelines in the united states and europe may come close to minimizing welfare

deterring fraud the role of resale price maintenance the economics of fraud like the economics of information itself enjoys a limited but growing literature while economists since alfred marshall have recognized the importance of brand name capital and reputation in protecting consumers against fraud marshall 1949 4 xi only recently has the profession been able to build rigorous models for analyzing market transactions in which the quality of traded goods is subject to uncertainty and deception in a pioneering paper george akerlof 1970 presented a model in which buyer skepticism about the quality of privately offered used cars becomes so intense that all potential sellers of nonlemon used cars are driven from the market leaving it entirely populated with lemons as analyzed by michael spence 1973 this phenomenon may occur because nonlemon owners lack adequate signaling mechanisms specifically an effective signal would be an activity or characterusing a model like that of klein and leffler s we demonstrate theoretically that a manufacturer s desire to signal relative quality differences by relative retail price differences may be thwarted by the misleading markups of independent retailers resale price maintenance is one instrument that a manufacturer can use to avoid this problem we present empirical evidence from a recent antitrust case in which forcing a manufacturer to drop resale price maintenance did lead to misleading and also higher markups

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

when showrooming increases retailer profit abstractshowrooming the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick and mortar b m store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature it is considered a major threat to the b m retailers and determining how to fight it seems to be the only consideration however the manufacturer s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability the popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel this article analytically shows that when the manufacturer s decisions are considered i e when the manufacturer retailer contract is endogenous consumers ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased rather than decreased profitability for b m retailer s thus retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior m

a model of recommended retail prices manufacturers frequently post nonbinding public price recommendations but neither the rationale for this practice nor its impact on prices is well understood i develop a model in which recommendations signal a manufacturer s production cost to searching consumers who then form beliefs about retail prices increasing search makes consumers reject offers for the manufacturer s and competitors products more often and i show that both consumers and the manufacturer prefer more search when the production cost is low and less search when it is high with incentives thus aligned manufacturer recommendations inform consumers via cheap talk and their removal harms both parties

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings abstract we study the optimal anticipated policy in a pure currency economy with flexible prices and a non degenerate distribution of money holdings the economy features a business cycle and lump sum monetary injections have distributional effects that depend on the state of the cycle we parsimoniously characterize the dynamics of the economy and study the optimal regulation of the money supply as a function of the state under commitment the optimal policy prescribes monetary expansions in recessions when insurance is most needed by the cash poor unproductive agents conversely the optimal policy prescribes monetary contractions during booms so that the inflationary effect of the occasional expansions is undone

technology adoption decisions under irreversibility and uncertainty an ex ante appproach empirical results demonstrate that uncertainty about costs and requirements for environmental compliance is an important determinant of dairy producers investment behavior ex ante forecasting of how uncertainty and irreversibility are likely to affect producers responsiveness to agricultural technologies has implications for the design of environmental policies simulation modeling methods are described the empirical analysis focuses on texas producers propensity to adopt free stall dairy housing free stall investments offer advantages for both productivity augmentation and pollution abatement yet uncertainty and irreversibility are obstacles to adoption implications of this ex ante paradigm for policy design and implementation are discussed

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

efficiencies without economists the early years of resale price maintenance resale price maintenance rpm continues to be a contentious topic both in economics and in antitrust during the 1980s economists derived new efficiency motivations for rpm while the supreme court reaffirmed the decades old per se ban on its use and congress threatened to extend that ban in the 1990s after several years of federal inactivity during the reagan administration the federal trade commission ftc has once again begun bringing rpm cases while economists have proposed a number of different efficiency explanations for rpm such theorizing has been performed largely without the help of businesses that actually use rpm with little practical evidence such hypotheses have been subject to substantial criticism of course since rpm has been per se illegal businesses may be reluctant to admit that they are engaged in the practice which would appear to be a necessary condition for generating an efficiency defense this article seeks to find out why businesses may believe that they benefit from rpm it does so by examining which efficiency rationales were advanced by firms during a critical time for rpm in the united states 1915 to 1917 these rationales drawn largely from previously unexplored materials are then examined in the light of current economic theory there are two basic sources for these rationales the first is three hearings on rpm held in 1915 1916 and 1917 in the u s house of representatives on a bill to legalize certain forms of rpm the second is the transcript of seven days of hearings the ftc held in 1917 to discuss efficiency motivations for rpm section ii explains several economic theories that have been posited for rpm and briefly discusses the critiques of these theories that have arisen in the legal and economic communities section iii examines federal rpm case law prior to 1918 and posits efficiency rationales from section ii to match the products involved in the case law section iii also discusses the uncertainty in the case law during the period 1908 to 1917 and the concepts behind the various judicial decisions section iv presents the efficiency arguments made during this period of legal uncertainty

comment on markets versus governments by acemoglu golosov and tsyvinski one of the oldest and most fundamental debates in economics pertains to the role of markets andgovernment in the allocation of resources there are two dimensions to this debate the rst is inherentlynormative and revolves around the question what role should markets and governments play in the allocationof resources the second dimension is motivated by the varied combinations of markets and governmentsobserved in different economies this leads to a series of positive questions what factors can account for thesedifferent combinations of markets and governments what is the role of political institutions and socialpreferences or culture in shaping the particular combinations that we observe what are the properties of theallocations being implemented by these different arrangements what are the resulting welfare implications this paper seeks to contribute to the normative debate and explores the conditions that make markets moredesirable than governments since markets and governments are viewed as alternative allocation mechanisms the outcome of this comparison depends crucially on the economic environment here the presence ofidiosyncratic risk in labor productivity implies that the ability to enable risk sharing plays a key role in theranking of markets and governments this ability in turn depends on the particular way in which markets andthe government are modelled there are many possible strategies to evaluate the comparative performance of different allocationmechanisms one is to endow the economic environment with a primitive friction such as private informationor limited commitment and ask how close the market and the government can get to the best allocation thatcan be achieved given that friction this paper instead presumes that markets and the government arecharacterized by a different set of frictions in the market setting anonymity or lack of enforcement imply thatthe equilibrium allocation cannot in general sustain full risk sharing on the other hand the government sability to provide insurance is limited by two different frictions first individual abilities are privateinformation second the ruler is not benevolent and can appropriate rents this approach implies that thecomparison of markets and government boils down to a race between frictions the resulting analysisteaches us about the properties of optimal allocations under different sets of frictions but it is silent about theintrinsic comparative advantages of markets and governments since the issue of what government andmarkets can best accomplish is not addressed the question of what role they should play in resource allocationremains open

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance abstract supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents this has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers to understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners performance and consumer surplus we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer a dominant retailer and no single agent dominance under random and price sensitive demand channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party we analyze all problems in a game theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price wholesale price and order production quantity we show that the manufacturer dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity the lowest retail price and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer on the other hand the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance while both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits as we show under the manufacturer dominated structure further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer retailer dominance schemes with the no single agent dominance structure and integrated channel we also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost shortage penalty and salvage value

a model of vertical restriction and equilibrium in retailing one sort of economic behavior that continues to engage the attention of economists is the imposition by some manufacturers of restrictions on their wholesalers and retailers why would manufacturers want to impose minimum retail prices and why would they want to control the locations at which their goods are distributed to consumers an application of simple economic principles suggests that manufacturers with a monopoly in a product this could be a monopoly achieved through patents for exampleshould charge the profit maximizing wholesale price and let retailers fend for themselves and if more stores want to carry the product so much the better because this increases the likelihood that consumers will run across it a widely accepted explanation for the desire of manufacturers to be able to stipulate resale prices is based on the possibility that manufacturers of branded goods often want retailers to provide some joint service that cannot easily be charged for the clearest example is sales or promotional effort the effect of a minimum retail price in these cases is to establish an incentive to provide jointly supplied services that no individual retailer would otherwise provide this model of distribution provides a rationale for restrictions placed on retailers by manufacturers the manufacturer s customers are located uniformly along a road and retailing operations are subject to increasing returns three difficulties arise first retailers acting in concert can earn positive profits at the expense of the manufacturer and consumers second costless relocation free entry and competition will not result in the store density and retail price favored by the manufacturer third store locations fixed in the short run imply that price cutting would undermine the density of stores preferred by the manufacturer

sequential peak load pricing the case of airports and airlines we investigate airport peak load pricing using a vertical structure of airport and airlines we find that a profit maximizing airport would charge higher peak and off peak runway prices and a higher peak off peak price differential than a public airport consequently airport privatization would lead to both fewer total passengers and fewer passengers in the peak period although peak travelling passengers benefit from fewer delays this low level of peak congestion is not efficient suggesting that airport privatization cannot be judged based on its effect on congestion alone we also examine pricing behaviour of a public airport constrained to charge a time independent price on etudie la tarification de pointe dans une structure verticale d aeroports et de compagnies d aviation on decouvre qu un aeroport qui maximise ses profits chargerait des prix plus eleves pour l usage des pistes tant aux heures de pointe qu en autre temps qu un aeroport public ainsi qu un differentiel plus grand entre ces differents moments en consequence la privatisation des aeroports va entrainer a la fois moins de passagers et moins de passagers aux heures de pointe meme si ceux qui voyagent aux heures de pointe vont devoir subir moins de delais cette moindre congestion n est pas efficace voila qui suggere qu on ne doit pas evaluer la privatisation des aeroports seulement a l aune de l impact sur la congestion les auteurs examinent aussi les strategies de tarification d un aeroport public contraint a imposer une tarification qui ne peut varier selon le moment d usage dans le temps

competition policy in the united states an overview this paper provides a summary of the basic policies in the united states that affect the state of competition in u s markets much of the paper focuses on antitrust policy but a substantial fraction of the paper is devoted to regulatory policies for both types of policies the paper explains the basic structures of the policies and also provides discussions of recent developments copyright 1993 by oxford university press

vertical restraints and the law evidence from automobile franchising abstract after a 2002 european commission regulation prohibited the use of dealer exclusive territories automobile franchise contracts in italy introduced price ceilings and standards on verifiable marketing and service inputs such as advertising and salespeople the contracts also imposed quantity floors a practice already in use before the regulatory change the introduction of standards suggests that consistent with a view of vertical restraints as coordination mechanisms manufacturers used exclusive territories to induce desired dealer services and once the use of exclusive territories was prohibited they switched to alternative contractual devices to achieve this goal the introduction of price ceilings despite free intrabrand competition also suggests that car manufacturers tried to prevent some dealers from gaming the quantity floors by selling to other dealers customers while charging monopolistic prices at their own locations

money and prices a model of search and bargaining abstract this paper makes commodities divisible and incorporates bargaining into the search theoretic model of money to determine the purchasing power of money or price it is shown that two monetary equilibria always coexist where fiat money is universally accepted the two equilibria differ in price output welfare and the velocity of money sunspot monetary equilibria exist in which money is universally accepted in all states of the economy multiplicity has novel implications on the effectiveness of currency substitution and exchange market intervention journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e40

incomplete record keeping and optimal payment arrangements abstract we study a random matching absence of double coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag we study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

the two money theorem in this article i consider environments in which all shocks have finite support and any transfer of resources is ex post voluntary consider an allocation that is achievable when potential trading partners know each others histories the one money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using only one money if that money is divisible and money holdings are observable the two money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using two divisible monies even if money holdings are concealable copyright economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

the case for a real options approach to ex ante cost benefit analyses of agricultural research projects the united states agency for international development usaid like many other development agencies and donors increasingly emphasizes evidence based programming this requires assessments of project performance at all stages of implementation comprising ex ante impact assessment monitoring and evaluation and ex post attribution of outcomes ex ante impact assessment in particular involves performing cost benefit analysis cba to determine the expected net present value enpv of the project in question unfortunately the traditional enpv approach has proven inadequate for dealing with uncertainty in the timing of investments and flexibility in future decision making this is especially relevant for research and development r d projects which require several stages of product development and multiple rounds of testing prior to releasing final products as a consequence the real options approach to cba has increasingly been used to evaluate private sector r d projects this paper advocates for the adoption of the real options approach in the evaluation of public investments in agricultural research and illustrates its practical utility with an assessment conducted by usaid to determine the economic viability of a proposed project to develop improved varieties of critical food security crops in uganda

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

capturing strategic rent full line forcing brand discounts aggregate rebates and maximum resale price maintenance this paper examines the implications of a retailer s shelf space stocking decisions on the optimal marketing strategy of an upstream multiproduct monopolist when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is known full line forcing brand discounts and maximum resale price maintenance are sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer s first best profit when these strategies are adopted the retailer s profit is reduced to the scarcity rents obtainable on her shelf space when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown the use of aggregate rebates can act as a screening device to maximize channel profit copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy abstract previous authors have argued that the otimal monetary policy is contractionary if buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se