wage stagnation rising inequality and the financial crisis of 2008 the most widely embraced explanations of the financial crisis of 2008 have centered upon inadequate regulation stemming from laissez faire ideology combined with low interest rates although these widely acknowledged causal factors are true beneath them lie deeper determining forces that have received less notice wage stagnation and a dramatic increase in inequality in the u s over the preceding 35 years wage stagnation and heightened inequality generated three dynamics that made the economy vulnerable to systemic dysfunction the first is that they constrained consumption reducing profitable investment potential in the real economy and thereby encouraging an every wealthier elite to flood financial markets with credit helping keep interest rates low encouraging the creation of new credit instruments and greater indebtedness and fueling speculation the second dynamic is that consumption externalities were generated forcing individuals to struggle harder to find ways to maintain the welfare of their families and maintain their relative social status the consequence was that over the preceding three decades household saving rates plummeted households took on ever greater debt and worked longer hours the third dynamic is that as the rich took larger shares of income and wealth they gained more command over ideology and hence politics reducing the size of government cutting taxes on the rich and reducing welfare for the poor deregulating the economy and failing to regulate newly evolving credit instruments flowed out of this ideology

rising inequality as a cause of the present crisis the article argues that the economic imbalances that caused the present crisis should be thought of as the outcome of the interaction of the effects of financial deregulation with the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality in this sense rising inequality should be regarded as a root cause of the present crisis i identify four channels by which it has contributed to the crisis first rising inequality creates a downwards pressure on aggregate demand since poorer income groups have high marginal propensities to consume second international financial deregulation has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits and for longer time periods thus in reaction to potentially stagnant demand two growth models have emerged a debt led model and an export led model third in the debt led growth models higher inequality has led to higher household debt as working class families have tried to keep up with social consumption norms despite stagnating or falling real wages fourth rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate as richer households tend to hold riskier financial assets than other groups the rise of hedge funds and of subprime derivatives in particular has been linked to rise of the super rich

the dynamic efficiency of capitalism abstract variants of lancaster s original model on the inefficiency of capitalism have continued to interest scholars in a slight extension of the original finite horizon model of lancaster the possibility of more or less completely efficient outcomes is shown in the present paper such results are effected by the introduction of standard trigger strategies and soft trigger strategies defined in the present paper

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism abstract this paper examines two noncooperative open loop solution concepts in a simple model of economic growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers who may save or consume and capitalists who may consume or invest it is demonstrated that both players prefer the stackelberg game to the nash game furthermore it is shown that under fairly realistic assumptions about the parameters of the model both workers and capitalists would prefer to act as the follower in the stackelberg game this means that capitalism is in a stalemate i e in a position where neither class wants to take the initiative and announce its strategy first the result is interpreted as an explanation of the difficulties met in designing and implementing incomes policies and social contracts

what money canʼt buy efficient mechanism design with costly signals i study the ex ante efficient allocation of a set of quality heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk neutral agents agents have independent private values which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality the designer faces a trade off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening because the cost sustained is wasted the optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distributes objects to higher ranked agents the ranking is independent of the scarcity of objects or the extent of their heterogeneity if the hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing agents are ranked according to their expected values if hazard rates are decreasing and agents are symmetric the objects are allocated to the agents that sustain the highest costs in general optimal mechanisms combine both pooling and screening of values

on the dominance of capitalists leadership in a feedback stackelberg solution of a differential game model of capitalism abstract this paper deals with a modified version of the lancaster model of capitalism where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players workers versus capitalists and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers it is shown that a feedback stackelberg solution with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period is a solution dominating the feedback nash solution the paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the feedback stackelberg solution a concept not so often used by economic modelers

efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism abstract one considers a differential game of capitalism a la lancaster feedback nash equilibria and pareto optimal solutions are characterized under the assumption that the planning horizon is infinite it is then shown that by combining a pareto optimal solution with the nash feedback equilibrium strategy pair which plays the role of a threat one can obtain an efficient equilibrium which is also subgame perfect in the sense of selten this result modifies sensibly the previous interpretation of the inherent inefficiency of capitalism

information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition when bidders valuations are derived from a downstream market in which they may compete the allocation to the firms with the lowest costs can differ from the allocation that maximizes the ex post valuations of the bidders i consider the problem of auctioning two goods to bidders whose valuations for a good flexibly depend on their and their rival s costs as well as the identity of the rival i show that revealing the identities of winners through a sequential auction procedure leads to allocations in which bidders tend to have higher ex post valuations but also higher costs when compared to a simultaneous auction

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

auctions and information acquisition sealed bid or dynamic formats the value of an asset is generally not known a priori and it requires costly investments to be discovered in such contexts with endogenous information acquisition which selling procedure generates more revenues we show that dynamic formats such as ascending price or multistage auctions perform better than their static counterpart this is because dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the selling procedure thus even if competition appears strong ex ante it may turn out to be weak along the dynamic format thereby making the option to acquire information valuable this very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction just to learn about the state of competition both effects boost revenues and our analysis provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed bid ones

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

why countries with the same technology and preferences can have different growth rates abstract a standard ak model of endogenous growth has been extended to allow for an intertemporal conflict between capitalists and workers for the dynamic game thus obtained an equilibrium solution in feedback nash markovian strategies have been computed however many equilibria in trigger strategies can dominate the former there are dominating strategies that depend on the country specific bargaining power of the workers versus capitalists they are both pareto optimal and subgame perfect this provides an explanation why countries which are completely identical in preferences technology and factor endowments can experience different long term growth rates

entry by takeover auctions vs bilateral negotiations firms often enter new markets by taking over an incumbent we analyze a potential entrant s choice of target under two exogenously given takeover mechanisms i auctions where other incumbents can bid for the target against the entrant and ii bilateral negotiations between the entrant and the target the entrant s choice of target depends on the mechanism and it may not maximize its ex post profit nor consumer welfare in an auction the entrant pays a higher price to take over a target with higher synergies because these impose stronger negative externalities on incumbents and increase their willingness to pay for preventing entry auctions increase the price obtained by the target but reduce welfare compared to negotiations because they may discourage the entrant from acquiring a target with higher synergies

stackelberg versus cournot a differential game approach abstract we propose an infinite horizon differential oligopoly game where at each point in time m stackelberg leaders and n m stackelberg followers exploit a common pool renewable resource and sell their harvest in the marketplace at a price that depends on total harvest we derive a feedback generalized stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium a generalization of the feedback stackelberg equilibrium nesting feedback stackelberg and feedback cournot as special cases we proceed with a comparison between the feedback stackelberg and the feedback cournot equilibria and find a number of interesting results in contrast with static oligopoly theory as to the relative efficiency of the two equilibria we show that the cournot equilibrium can be more efficient than the stackelberg equilibrium this holds true in the short run at the steady state and in terms of discounted welfare

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

the feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism abstract the feedback equilibria of a capitalistic game described by kelvin lancaster are derived under concave utility functions with a constant degree of absolute risk aversion and standard production function it is shown that the equilibrium solution is unique if the rate of time preference and the constant degree of absolute risk aversion are sufficiently great some properties of the equilibrium solution are reported

inequality credit and financial crises in the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 09 income inequality rose across much of the developed world this has led to a vigorous debate as to whether widening inequality was somehow to blame for the crisis by driving private sector credit booms despite growing interest empirical evidence on an inequality fragility relationship is limited based on a panel analysis of 18 oecd organisation for economic co operation and development countries for the years 1970 2007 this study provides evidence of a positive relationship between income concentration and private sector indebtedness once other traditional drivers are controlled for if confirmed the implications of this result are as follows i the view that the distribution of income is irrelevant to macroeconomic stability as implicit in mainstream approaches needs further investigation and ii in order to make the financial system more robust policy makers should cast the net wider than monetary policy and regulatory reforms and consider the effects of changes to distributive patterns

non cooperative entry deterrence in license auctions dynamic versus sealed bid we examine the impact of potential entry on incumbent bidding behavior in license auctions in both dynamic and sealed bid formats unlike sealed bid auctions dynamic auctions reveal information about the identities of potential winners and allow bidders to revise their bids this helps incumbents to coordinate their entry deterrence efforts if entry is sufficiently costly for each incumbent only the dynamic auction has an equilibrium where entry is deterred for sure numerical calculations suggest that regardless of how costly entry is for each incumbent sealed bid auctions can generate a higher probability of entry as well as a more efficient allocation

auctioning countermeasures in the wto we offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the wto we show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats if the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it then the possibility of auction failure arises whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders if the violating country is instead permitted to bid then auction failure is precluded and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired we evaluate these different auction formats from normative revenue compliance efficiency standpoints

does the inequality credit crisis nexus exist an empirical re examination rajan claims that rising inequality led to financial crises through credit booms in the u s kumhof and ranciere provide a theoretical formulation for this hypothesis however their assertions are

does inequality lead to a financial crisis abstract the recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality credit booms and financial crises rajan 2010 and kumhof and ranciere 2011 propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the us in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms instead low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set anecdotal evidence from us experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality credit crisis nexus rather it points back to a familiar boom bust pattern of declines in interest rates strong growth rising credit asset price booms and crises

auctions with quantity externalities and endogenous supply abstract this paper studies the design of license auctions when the number of licenses allocated in the auction determines structure of the post auction market i first show that a sequence of conditional reserve prices that specify minimum acceptable bid at each supply level can be used to determine supply endogenously then i construct a static auction called multi dimensional uniform price auction and a dynamic auction called walrasian clock auction that allow the auctioneer to condition reserve price on supply and allow bidders to condition bids on supply i show that both proposed auctions can implement the efficient market structure that maximizes total surplus in the post auction market in a dominant strategy equilibrium i next characterize the optimal auction and show that the two proposed auctions can yield the optimal revenue under a sequence of optimal reserve prices

an optimal auction with identity dependent externalities we analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands private information and identity dependent externalities we derive the seller s optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties we show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys also the seller s allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient as an illustration we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non anchor stores we show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough

standard auctions with identity dependent externalities i analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending bid auction with identity dependent externalities with reciprocal externalities the allocation is determined by bidders consumption values alone with large nonreciprocal externalities the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed bid auctions the progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff reducing externalities the associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price and relative to sealed bid auctions bidders experience less ex post regret

efficiency in auctions with crossholdings we study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats the ascending auction is not equivalent to the second price auction in a class of examples the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format

note on nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism abstract pohjola 1983 derives open loop stackelberg solutions for the lancaster 1973 model of capitalism and compares the outcomes with the open loop nash outcome due to a shortcoming in the analysis only one open loop stackelberg solution with the workers as leader was found this note shows that there are in fact infinitely many solutions furthermore these solutions can be derived with standard optimal control techniques

financial crisis and global imbalances its labour market origins and the aftermath the objective of this paper is to articulate how the 2007 09 economic crisis is rooted in the uneven income distribution and inequality caused by the current finance led model of growth the process of financialisation that took place in the 1980s in the usa and then in the european union was coupled with labour flexibility wage moderation and soaring profits the flexibility agenda of the labour market and the end of wage increases along with the contraction of indirect wages i e public social expenditure diminished workers purchasing power this was partly compensated with increased borrowing opportunities and the boom of credit consumption all of which helped workers to maintain unstable consumption capacity however in the long term unstable consumption patterns derived from precarious job creation job instability and poor wages have weakened aggregate demand hence labour market issues such as flexibility uneven income distribution poor wages and the financial crisis are two sides of the same coin both have a direct impact on the economic crisis and the current global imbalances copyright the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

capital accumulation and income distribution as the outcome of a dynamic game abstract this paper presents a model of an economy with two representative agents a capitalist and a worker who play an infinite horizon dynamic game about income distribution we consider three types of equilibria which correspond to joint price taking walrasian equilibrium and to wage setting by either the capitalist capitalistic equilibrium or the worker laborist equilibrium for the last two of them an inefficient feedback stackelberg solution is first analyzed afterwards we apply a version of the folk theorem and obtain a wide range of sustainable efficient equilibria one of which coincides with the nash bargaining solution

license auctions when winning bids are financed through debt we study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market higher bids imply higher debts which affects product market competition when debt induces firms to compete more aggressively retail prices are lower than in a model without debt as are auction revenues when debt induces firms to compete less aggressively retail prices are higher than in a model without debt and the effect on auction revenues is ambiguous net firm profits are always higher than in a model without debt due to endogenous credit rationing

theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities abstract we investigate a private value auction in which a single entrant on winning imposes a negative externality on two regular bidders in an english auction when all bidders are active regular bidders free ride exiting before price reaches their values in a first price sealed bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist limiting free riding compared to the english auction we find substantial though incomplete free riding in the clock auction in first price auctions regular bidders bid more aggressively than the entrant and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality predictions regarding revenue efficiency and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied

the risk of financial crises is there a role for income inequality abstract could macroeconomic factors such as income inequality be the real root cause of financial crises we explore a broad variety of financial and macroeconomic variables and employ a general to specific model selection process to find the most reliable predictors of financial crises in developed countries over a period of more than 100 years our in sample results indicate that income inequality has predictive power beyond loan growth and several other financial variables out of sample forecasts for individual predictors show that their predictive power tends to vary considerably over time but income inequality has predictive power in each forecasting period