tests for price effects of new issues of seasoned securities do new issues of seasoned securities cause significant price movements in the neighborhood of the issue day this paper presents an empirical comparison of three competing hypotheses the sec view that a new issue causes a permanent price decline the underwriter view that there is only a temporary price decline during the distribution period and the efficient market hypothesis emh that implies the absence of any price effects several empirical tests of the competing hypotheses using data on new issues of utility stocks traded on the nyse reject the sec and underwriter views in favor of the emh

relationship banking fragility and the asset liability matching problem we address a fundamental question in relationship banking why do banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarily with core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance such loans with purchased money we show that not only are relationship loans informationally opaque and illiquid but they also require the relationship between the bank and the borrower to endure in order for the bank to add value however the informational opacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawal risk that makes the bank fragile core deposits are an attractive funding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidity services to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihood of premature deposit withdrawal thereby facilitating the continuity of relationship loans that is we show that banks will wish to match the highest value added liabilities with the highest value added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizes the bank s fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizes the value the bank adds in relationship lending we also examine the impact of interbank competition on the bank s asset liability matching and extract numerous testable predictions

fdicia after five years at year end 1991 congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts the fdic improvement act this reform followed the failure of more than 2 000 depository institutions in the 1980s many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks this article reviews these changes and evaluates early results

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

in which context is the option clause desirable the option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels it has been used within the diamond and dybvig j pol econ 91 401 419 1983 framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance this literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts it will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt it will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in a free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt related agency problems and b under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self fulfilling prophecies it will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems

consistent estimation of cross sectional models in event studies event studies often include cross sectional regressions of announcement effects on exogenous variables if the event is voluntary and investors are rational then standard ols and gls estimators are inconsistent consistent ml estimators are constructed for a cross sectional model of horizontal mergers relating announcement effects to exgeneous characteristics of firms and industries the ols and ml estimates differ dramatically for bidders but not for targets the evidence suggests that managers of bidders but not targets have valuable private information about the potential synergies from proposed mergers article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

financial contagion and depositor monitoring this paper analyzes market discipline in a many bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact we present a model with differently informed depositors where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks investments it is shown that when banks are undercapitalized and the probability of success of the risky asset is low depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment the results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline

issuing costs to existing shareholders in competitive and negotiated underwritten public utility equity offerings abstract this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of whether there is any difference in the cost incurred by public utilities if they issue new equity through a negotiated or competitive underwriting we conclude that the expected cost of a competitive offer is less than the expected cost of a negotiated offer but that the variance of the cost is substantially greater with a competitive offer these results are interesting because most public utilities use negotiated underwriting unless forced by regulation to use competitive offers this paper is also an addition to the growing agency theory literature

the value of shelf registration for new debt issues the securities and exchange commission sec rule 415 shelf registration allows eligible firms to register securities that they intend to issue in the next two years once the registration is declared effective firms can enter the market instantaneously ineligible issuers however are required to notify the sec at least forty eight hours before entry supporters of the shelf rule contend that the rule provides valuable flexibility in timing issues the authors examine this contention by comparing the market timing performance of shelf and nonshelf debt issues the results indicate that the shelf rule does provide valuable market timing flexibility copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

the rule 415 experiment equity markets rule 415 allows a firm to register all the securities it reasonably expects to sell over the next two years and then at the management s option to sell those securities over these two years whenever it chooses this paper examines whether equity offerings made under rule 415 shelf offerings differ in issuing costs from equity offerings not sold under this rule we find that shelf offerings cost 13 less for syndicated issues and 51 less for nonsyndicated issues we also investigate the empirical relevance of the market overhang argument which suggests that shelf registrations depress the price of the registering firm s shares more than traditional registrations our data does not support the market overhang argument the securities and exchange commission s sec rule 415 which was permanently adopted for large firms in november 1983 allows a firm to register all the securities that it reasonably expects to sell over the next two years and then sell those securities whenever it chooses this procedure is known as shelf registration investment bankers securities regulators and corporate issuers vigorously debate the effect of rule 415 on firms issuing cost for new securities some mostly investment bankers argue that rule 415 increases new issue costs while others mostly issuers argue that rule 415 decreases new issue costs in addition many investment bankers argue that placing common stock on the shelf depresses the price of a firm s outstanding shares of stock most issuers

how excessive is banks maturity transformation we quantify the gains from regulating banks maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long term assets with non tradable debt banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises as in stein 2012 pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short the assessment is based on the calibration of the model to eurozone banking data for 2006 lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2 8 months to 3 3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion

demand for housing attributes in developing countries a study of pakistan the paper has applied a conventional framework of analysis of implicit markets to determine the characteristics of demand for housing attributes of quantity and quality in the urban areas of a larg

housing markets in third world cities research and policy into the 1990s abstract a review of analyses of urban housing markets is timely to suggest directions for research and policy in the next decade the neoclassical approach to housing economics is contrasted with a political economy framework with respect to the production or supply of housing and consumption or demand an argument is advanced for increased attention to the analysis of citywide housing markets using insights from both theoretical approaches and for research into processes of exchange such analyses should form the basis for policies which focus neither on selected income groups or residential areas in isolation from wider housing market processes nor on housing output targets but primarily on ensuring the provision of essential inputs

securitization and bank performance theory suggests that securitization provides financial institutions with an opportunity to lower the cost of funding improve credit risk management and increase profitability in practice however it might lead to adverse consequences through a number of indirect channels therefore the net impact of securitization on bank performance is ambiguous this study aims to evaluate whether banks improve their performance through the use of the securitization market by applying a propensity score matching approach in other words we build a counterfactual group of banks to assess what would have happened to the securitizing banks had they not securitized using us commercial banking data from 2001 to 2008 we first test these hypotheses using univariate analysis and find that securitizing banks are on average more profitable institutions with higher credit risk exposure and higher cost of funding however the propensity score matching analysis does not provide evidence of significant causal effects of securitization on the performance of banks therefore securitization does not seem to outperform alternative funding risk management and profitability improvement techniques used by banks that have ex ante similar characteristics to those securitizing our evidence raises important questions about the motives for banks increasing securitization activities and consequent implications for the banking system

contagion risk in the australian banking and property sectors abstract the australian banking system emerged from the global crisis virtually unhurt with most banks still profitable adequately capitalized and with aa credit ratings are there any risks or vulnerabilities in this success story this paper analyzes australia s systemic banking risk and attempts to determine if this risk increased with the recent global crisis and whether this risk is related to the downturn experienced in the real estate market we use extreme value theory to measure banks and property firms univariate value at risk as well as multivariate intra sector and inter sector contagion risks of the 13 sectors analyzed we find that the property sector exhibits the highest level of extremal dependence with the banking sector the credit crisis significantly increased the probability of a bank or property firm crashing moreover contagion risks significantly increased not only within the banking and property sectors but also between those sectors

bank capital structure regulatory capital and securities innovations since late 1993 nonfinancial corporations have used financial instruments that permit them to treat preferred stock dividends as tax deductible interest bank holding companies bhcs however did not issue these trust preferred securities tps until 1996 when the federal reserve qualified them as tier 1 capital we delineate and test five not mutually exclusive hypotheses by 1 analyzing the stock market s reaction to the fed s ruling and to tps filings and 2 comparing bhcs that issued tps with those that did not we find that regulatory capital requirements tax savings and uninsured sources of funds had significant positive effects on bhcs demand for capital and that the market responded favorably to tps filings our event study findings are contrary to prior empirical results in that we find a positive market reaction to equity offerings

does the stock market affect firm investment in china a price informativeness perspective abstract this paper investigates the empirical relationship between firm level investment and the stock market in china from a price informativeness perspective we find that firm investment does not significantly respond to the stock market valuation because stock prices contain very little extra information about the future operating performance of firms this finding is further supported by the relative investment response test and the relative price information content test based on the informativeness proxy of price non synchronicity combined with firm information transparency

the past and future of commercial banking viewed through an incomplete contract lens commercial banks emerged at a time when contracts were quite incomplete and property rights insecure they typically offered demand deposits made loans on demand and were regulated each of these aspects of the institutional structure were essential in helping the bank provide the twin functions of liquidity and safety i argue that recent theories of banking which i collectively refer to as incomplete contract theories of banking explain well the origins of banking i also claim that they can explain recent changes in banking as th e informational legal and property rights environment has improved there appear to be fewer synergies between various aspects of the traditional institutional structure of the bank it is now time to think whether there is anything special about the institutional form of the bank or whether all that is special is that it is regulated

evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields 1983 1991 we examine debenture yields over the period 1983 1991 to evaluate the market s sensitivity to bank specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government s policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major u s banking firms an increasingly important issue in the regulation of financial institutions concerns the extent to which market investors can will recognize and control the risks of banking firms although the banking act of 1933 replaced some private risk bearing with federal deposit insurance legislators were reluctant to displace market discipline very extensively flood 1992 by the early 1980s however u s regulators had come to protect virtually all bank liability holders from credit losses most visibly at large banks which were deemed too big to fail sprague 1986 o hara and shaw 1990 this extension of the government safety net largely reflects a skepticism on the part of regulators that normal market forces could adequately identify and control bank risks while u s regulators have recently shown an increased willingness to let some bank investors bear default losses an official suspicion of the efficacy of market discipline remains widespread by contrast some prominent academic economists argue that market investors in bank debentures could provide timely and effective control over banking firms risk exposures and that the social cost of supervising banks would be lower if regulators ceded greater

are scale economies in banking elusive or illusive evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure and risk taking into models of bank production abstract this paper explores how to incorporate banks capital structure and risk taking into models of production in doing so the paper bridges the gulf between 1 the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and 2 the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank production without explicitly considering how banks production decisions influence their riskiness various production models that differ in how they account for capital structure and in the objectives they impute to bank managers cost minimization versus value maximization are estimated using u s data on highest level bank holding companies modeling the bank s objective as value maximization conveniently incorporates both market priced risk and expected cash flow into managers ranking and choice of production plans estimated scale economies are found to depend critically on how banks capital structure and risk taking are modeled in particular when equity capital in addition to debt is included in the production model and cost is computed from the value maximizing expansion path rather than the cost minimizing path banks are found to have large scale economies that increase with size moreover better diversification is associated with larger scale economies while increased risk taking and inefficient risk taking are associated with smaller scale economies

information asymmetry valuation and the corporate spin off decision we empirically analyze the information hypothesis that the separation of a rm s divisions into independently traded units through a spin o enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetry about the rm consistent with this hypothesis we nd that rms that engage in spin o s have higher levels of information asymmetry compared to their industry and size matched counterparts and the information problems decrease signi cantly after the spin o the gains around spin o s are positively related to the degree of information asymmetry and this relation is more pronounced for rms with fewer negative synergies between divisions finally rms with higher growth opportunities and rms in need of external capital show a higher propensity to engage in spin o s they also raise more capital following a spin o which is consistent with the view that

the demand for housing and permanent income in indonesia this study reports the results and conclusions derived from a data analysis of urban household expenditure on housing in indonesia the urban households were stratified by income group urban size and urban location in these respects this study is unique household expenditures on housing were computed for each income group and subgroup by urban size and location expenditure on housing is increasing at a faster rate than income except in the very low income groups the proportion of income allocated by the average household to housing ranges from less than 15 per cent to close to 25 per cent the latter being found in the upper income group similarly significant variations in household expenditures on housing are observed for urban size and location in jakarta for example the average household expenditure on housing is almost twice as much as in the small urban localities fewer than 20000 inhabitants this observation however must be mitigated by income distribution average household inc

emerging problems with the basel capital accord regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues in recent years securitization and other financial innovations have provided unprecedented opportunities for banks to reduce substantially their regulatory capital requirements with little or no corresponding reduction in their overall economic risks a process termed regulatory capital arbitrage these methods are used routinely to lower the eaective risk based capital requirements against certain portfolios to levels well below the basel capital accord s nominal 8 total risk based capital standard this paper discusses the principal techniques used to undertake capital arbitrage and the diaculties faced by bank supervisors in attempting to deal with these activities under the current capital framework 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ evidence on specialization in private debt contracting this paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private market corporate lending adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information problematic firms however finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers particularly more leveraged borrowers evidence supports both regulatory and reputation based explanations for this specialization in passing we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies

using market information in prudential bank supervision a review of the u s empirical evidence in principle market and government supervision provide alternative devices for controlling governing any type of corporation most national governments have instituted nonmarket regulatory mechanisms for banking firms on the grounds that market based mechanisms do not adequately discipline banks but what evidence supports this assessment why must governments assure bank solvency but not the solvency of other firms government oversight naturally displaces private efforts to evaluate and control financial firms moreover if the banking business changes over time as it assuredly has in the past decade or two the best combination of government and private supervision may change concurrently this paper reviews and evaluates the growing empirical literature on private investors abilities to assess the financial condition of banking firms the evidence supports the proposition that market investors and analysts could reasonably provide a greater proportion of corporate governance services for large traded u s financial firms

symposium on the slowdown in productivity growth tthe growth slowdown that began in the late 1960s or early 1970s is the most significant macroeconomic development of the last two decades table 1 presents the basic facts for the big seven members of the oecd the significance of the slowdown derives from the power of compound interest when per capita income is growing at 4 percent it doubles every 18 years when it grows at only 2 percent it doubles every 35 years the permanent income defined as the annuity value of expected income of a 25 year old german citizen basing her expectations of income growth on average performance in the period 1955 73 would be 80 percent above her current income that of a 25 year old basing her expectations on the growth rate of income in the 1973 1986 period would be only 22 percent above her current income equivalently taking a generation as 33 years children in italy who might have expected to start out with a standard of living nearly five times the level at which their parents began would on the basis of the lower output growth from 1973 to 1986 expect to start out at less than double the material standard at which their parents began the four papers in this symposium address the question of the causes of the growth slowdown and to a lesser extent what might be done about it the classic empirical result in this area for which among other results robert solow received the 1987 nobel prize in economic science is that technological progress accounts for about half the growth of per capita output correspondingly most of the growth

inside the crisis an empirical analysis of banking systems in distress much of the substantial literature on banking crises focuses on early warning indicators the authors look at what happens to the economy and the banking sector after a banking crisis breaks out much of the theory of banking crises assigns a central role to depositor runs with vulnerability to runs viewed as a basic characteristic of banks as financial intermediaries but banking systems can be financially distressed even when depositors do not withdraw their deposits if other bank creditors rush for the exit or if banks become insolvent are contemporary banking crises characterized by large declines in deposits the authors find that contemporary banking crises are not accompanied by declines in aggregate bank deposits and credit does not fall relative to output but the growth of both deposits and credit does slow down substantially output recovery begins the second year after the crisis and is not led by a resumption of credit growth instead banks including the stronger banks reallocate their asset portfolio away from loans this suggests that protecting deposits during a banking crisis may not be enough to protect bank credit as lack of usable collateral and poor borrower creditworthiness discourage banks from lending however protecting bank credit may not be a priority right after a crisis as the real economy can rebound without it at least while there is substantial under used capacity

corporate compliance with debt covenants in this paper i present and test a model of corporate compliance with the debt covenant requiring payment of a current obligation this study adds to the empirical literature on forecasting financial distress by showing conditions under which debt default may be a rational economic decision by the firm s shareholders this analysis departs from empirical financial distress studies which are often not linked to an underlying economic theory the focus on covenant default also extends the literature which has modeled bankruptcy bulow and shoven 1978 and liquidation decisions titman 1984 but which has not considered a common first symptom of financial distress covenant default briefly the model examines the costs that influence shareholders decision to comply with or violate a particular debt covenant payment of a current obligation these costs include those associated with bondholders reaction to possible default the model predicts that shareholders will default when holding other factors constant i interest rates have declined relative to coupon rates stated in the debt issue ii the probability of paying future obligations is high and iii the cost of obtaining funds to pay the obligation is high the model also predicts when stockholders and bondholders will renegotiate the debt contract and the amount of wealth transferred in the renegotiation finally the

demandable debts as a means of payment banknotes versus checks we examine whether transactable forms of privately issued demandable debt are better used as banknotes or checks the distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use whereas a banknote can circulate we find that the answer to the question depends on the cost of early redemption if this cost is small banknotes will not circulate so the question is moot if this cost is large incentive problems may prevent the circulation of banknotes for intermediate values of the early redemption cost banknotes will be preferred over checks

optimal central bank areas financial intermediation and mexican dollarization this paper argues that the most important effects of mexican dollarization would operate not through the standard optimal currency area channels which involve gains from reducing costs of translating and exchanging currencies or from stabilization of business cycles nor would it operate through possible welfare improvements from dollarization as a commitment device for monetary policy instead it would operate through the effects of dollarization on financial intermediation investment and economic growth in particular dollarization like adoption of the euro would involve not only a change in the currency used to quote prices perform accounting and make transactions but also a change in the centsul bank for mexico with attendant changes in supervision regulation and monetary policies that by affecting incentives of banks and other financial intermediaries would affect the amount of financial intermediation and therefore overall investment and growth examples drawn from various theories of financial intermediation illustrate how the scale of intermediation can be affected by central bank policies and how this affects the costs and benefits of dollarization when one nation considers adopting the money of another nation discussions naturally focus on money howevel that focus may be misplaced if adopting anothel country s money leads ultimately to adoption of its centlal bank and its policies towald financial intermediation in that case the most important long run effects of adopting the money are likely to operate thlough channels of financial intelmediation and its impact on economic growth should mexico adopt the u s dollar the answer to that question involves a wide ange of issues ranging from the details of the convelsion plocess and its distributive effects l thlough standard questions of monetary policy to significantly bloader

leverage across firms banks and countries we present new stylized facts on bank and rm leverage during the period 2000 2009 using internationally comparable micro level data from many countries we document the following patterns a there was an increase in leverage for investment banks prior to the sub prime crisis b there was no visible increase in leverage for the typical commercial bank and non nancial rm c o balance sheet items constitute a big fraction of assets especially for large commercial banks in the us whereas investment banks do not report these items d the leverage ratio is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks in the us e banks in emerging markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experienced signicantly less deleveraging during the crisis the results suggest that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets

structural change in a multisector model of growth we study a multi sector model of growth with differences in tfp growth rates across sectors and derive sufficient conditions for the coexistence of structural change characterized by sectoral labour reallocation and constant aggregate growth path the conditions are weak restrictions on the utility and production functions commonly applied by macroeconomists we present evidence from us two digit industries that is consistent with our predictions about structural change and successfully calibrate the historical shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services we show quantitatively that reasonable deviations from our conditions do not have a big impact on the properties of the model

short term debt and incentives for risk taking abstract we challenge the view that short term debt curbs moral hazard and demonstrate that in a world with financing frictions and fair debt pricing short term debt generates incentives for risk taking to do so we develop a model in which firms are financed with equity and short term debt and cannot freely optimize their default decision because of financing frictions we show that when firms are close to distress the dynamic interaction of operating and rollover losses fuels default risk in such instances shareholders find it optimal to increase asset risk to improve interim debt repricing and prevent inefficient liquidation these risk taking incentives do not arise when debt maturity is sufficiently long

housing consumption and permanent income in developing countries estimates from panel data in el salvador the estimation of the parameters of housing demand equations occupies a prominent place in the urban economics literature of developed countries see de leeuw 4 and mayo 20 for thorough reviews of the state of the empirical art most research has focused on income and price elasticities of housing demand using both aggregated and micro level data the main conclusions of those studies which do not suffer from aggregation or other biases seem to be that a on average for a large segment of the population including both renters and owners permanent income elasticities are well below one b permanent income elasticities for owners ranging mostly from 0 5 to 0 7 in mayo s review are slightly higher than estimates for renters which ranged mostly from 0 3 to 0 5 c as predicted by the theory the permanent income demand elasticity generally exceeds that of current

an empirical analysis of the demand for housing attributes in a third world city this paper presents estimates of the demand for a set of housing attributes using data drawn from the renter and owner occupier housing submarkets for ibadan nigeria the empirical analysis based on an adaptation of rosen s two step model reveals that the most important determinants of the demand for housing attributes are income price of the attribute in question household size and the occupational status of the head of household the paper further indicates that the demand for housing attributes is inelastic since all estimated coefficients are below unity

payment system settlement and bank incentives in this article we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non interest bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems the put option value of default under net settlement can also distort banks investment incentives absent these distortions net settlement dominates gross although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

how do asset encumbrance and debt regulations affect bank capital and bond risk abstract we study how optimal bank capital and bond risk are influenced by asset encumbrance depositor preference and bail in resolution frameworks due to changes in optimal capital structure the net effect on bond debt risk and valuation is small the effects on shareholder value and public sector liability value are significant a gap between optimal and required capital represents a cost to shareholders and increases the risk of regulatory arbitrage the features of bank debt financing we analyze here may explain the stable cross sectional variation in bank capital documented in literature based on a small sample of european banks we find support for the central model predictions

boards of directors ownership and regulation in this paper we examine whether regulation can be used to substitute for internal monitoring mechanisms percentage of outside directors officer and director common stock ownership and ceo chair duality to control for agency conflicts in a firm we find that in general the percentage of outside directors is negatively related to insider stock ownership but is not affected by ceo chair duality ceo chair duality is however less likely when insider stock ownership increases we find these internal monitoring mechanisms to be significantly less related with regulated firms banks and utilities we conclude that to the extent that regulations reduce the impact of managerial decisions on shareholder wealth effective internal monitoring of managers becomes less important in controlling agency conflicts 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

bank holding company capital targets in the early 1990s the regulators versus the markets abstract several studies suggest that the credit crunch was due in large part to banks needs to raise their capital ratios the changes in bank capital ratios may have been in response to financial market or regulatory standards this study develops a model to test the relative impact of the regulators and the financial markets on bank holding companies bhcs capital ratios the results suggest that most bhcs were relatively satisfied with their capital ratios in 1989 however the regulators appear to have placed increased pressure on banks in 1990 1991 and 1992 especially bhcs that were subject to regulatory orders

allocating bank regulatory powers lender of last resort deposit insurance and supervision abstract we examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation we find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance it also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome in the multi regulator arrangement we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer the choice between the unified regulator arrangement and the multi regulator arrangement involves a trade off the multi regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels these results assume the absence of information frictions when banks are better informed than regulators we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information suggesting it is important to consider regulators informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation

direct equity financing a resolution of a paradox when raising new equity capital managers have historically rejected the direct offer method favoring instead the seemingly more expensive underwritten public issue this paper provides a resolution for this equity financing paradox by demonstrating empirically that firms which engage in direct offers enjoy a comparative cost advantage that is more than sufficient to account for the absolute reported cost differences between the two methods of equity financing

contracting productivity growth in this paper we analyze the interactions between growth and the contracting environment in the production sector allowing incompleteness in contracting implies that viable production relationships for firms and workers and therefore the profitability of industries depend on the rates of innovation and growth the speed at which new innovations arrive in turn depends on the profitability of production for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous growth literature we show that these interactions can have important implications which are consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environment in particular we demonstrate that a technological shock increasing productivity of research can through this interaction lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labor market contracts away from firms providing implicit guarantees of lifetime employment and towards shorter term contractor type arrangements we show the consistency of an increase in the proportion of the labor force under short term employment increased relative returns of workers in high productivity sectors and increased income inequality with a productivity slowdown of finite duration

the effect of management s choice between negotiated and competitive equity offerings on shareholder wealth this paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of two events that change management s choice between negotiated and competitive underwritten equity offerings these two events are the suspension and termination of suspension of rule 50 this rule is based on the public utility holding company act of 1935 and requires certain utilities to use the competitive method the results indicate that the shareholders of the affected utilities experience an abnormal negative return on the announcement of the suspension of rule 50 and an abnormal positive return on the announcement of the termination of suspension this evidence is consistent with the joint hypothesis i competitive offerings are less costly than negotiated offerings and ii manager shareholder agency costs are a determinant of the corporate choice between these two methods of raising equity

market discipline in property casualty insurance evidence from premium growth surrounding changes in financial strength ratings analysis of abnormal premium growth surrounding changes in financial strength ratings for a large panel of property casualty insurers generally indicates significant premium declines in the year of and the year following rating downgrades consistent with greater risk sensitivity of demand premium declines were concentrated among commercial insurance which has narrower guaranty fund protection than personal insurance premium declines were greater for firms with low pre downgrade ratings and especially pronounced for firms falling below an a rating there is no evidence of moral hazard in the form of rapid commercial or personal lines premium growth following downgrades of a or low rated insurers

the dark side of sunshine regulatory oversight and status quo bias abstract as the mortgage foreclosure crisis accelerated in the u s in the late 2000s state level policymakers implemented measures designed to protect consumers and stem the tide of foreclosures one form of policy was simply to require lenders to report on foreclosure prevention activities such policies represented a shift from the status quo for mortgage loan servicing firms operating under incomplete information doing nothing with non paying loans while waiting for more information to be revealed to either foreclosing on the borrower or offering the borrower a modification of loan terms using a difference in difference in differences empirical strategy we exploit one policy implemented in maryland for a subset of mortgage servicers and find evidence that firms perform more loan modifications as well as file more foreclosures increasing foreclosure filings was contrary to the intent of the policy suggesting that policymakers should be aware of how firms exhibit systematic biases much like individuals

financial flexibility and the cost of external finance for u s bank holding companies this paper models a bank with access to two segmented capital markets the market for insured deposits and the market for uninsured claims we illustrate how higher costs of accessing either market leads to lower firm values and a greater incentive to carry liquid assets we test our model on a sample of large banking firms and label banks with relatively lower costs of accessing the two markets as more financially flexible our two key findings are 1 banks with greater financial flexibility have greater value and 2 banks with greater financial flexibility devote a smaller percentage of assets to cash and marketable securities consistent with the notion that financial flexibility reduces the sensitivity of firm profits to internal wealth shocks thus reducing the firm s need to carry financial slack

the effect of measurement error on the estimated shape of the world distribution of income abstract this note examines the robustness that two modes exist in the world s density of per capita income our results suggest that this bimodal feature is robust and are arrived at using recently developed nonparametric deconvolution techniques

the demand for housing in developing countries empirical estimates from household data cities in developing countries are growing at extraordinary rates often compressing into decades the urbanization process that has taken centuries in developed countries in coping with this growth public authorities have devised a wide range of policy instruments to influence the rate and character of city expansion to meet the needs of people for shelter and urban services and to allocate resources in ways that redistribute both the costs and benefits of urban growth ideally such policy formulation should be informed by a careful understanding of the behavior of urban markets in fact little information on market behavior is available to the policymakers of developing countries such basic information is needed for improved project design and even more important for improved sector wide policies this paper reports on research conducted at the world bank to increase understanding of developing country housing markets in particular of housing demand behavior while the overall project examines both the demand for housing characteristics and the demand for housing as a composite good this paper addresses only the latter the objectives of this paper are 1 to review briefly previous evidence on housing demand parameters in developing countries 2 to present new evidence on housing demand parameters based on application of standardized models and comparable variable definitions in 16 cities in eight developing countries colombia egypt el salvador ghana india jamaica korea and the philippines and 3 to examine similarities and differences among cities in housing demand and in a preliminary way offer explanations for place to place differences limited comparisons are also made to two u s cities in order to begin comparison of developing and developed country market behavior

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

credit risk in private debt portfolios default loss severity and average loss rates for a large sample of privately placed bonds are presented and compared with loss experience for publicly issued bonds the chance of very large portfolio losses is estimated and some determinants of such losses are analyzed results show ex ante riskier classes of private debt perform better on average than public debt both diversification and the riskiness of individual portfolio assets influence the bad tail of the portfolio loss distribution private placements are similar to corporate loans in that both are monitored private debt the results are thus relevant to management and securitization of private debt portfolios generally more than half of nonfinancial corporate debt finance is iss ued privately and decisions of the financial intermediaries that invest in such debt depend importantly on its credit risk regulators of such institutions are similarly attentive to portfolio credit risk and it is an important consideration in the design of securitizations of pools of private debt in spite of its importance little is known empirically about private debt credit risk especially ex ante risk as a function of portfolio characteristics many studies have examined the loan portfolio performance of banks thrifts and insurance companies but the ex ante risk characteristics of the portfo

dynamic debt maturity a firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically both without commitment via the fraction of newly issued short term bonds equity holders control the maturity structure which affects their endogenous default decision a shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier self enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may coexist with the latter possibly pareto dominating the former the inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the leland problem of the inability to commit to a default policy a self fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise received april 16 2015 accepted february 20 2016 by editor itay goldstein

leveraged network based financial accelerator abstract in this paper we build on the network based financial accelerator model of delli gatti et al 2010 modelling the firms financial structure following the dynamic trade off theory instead of the packing order theory moreover we allow for multiperiodal debt structure and consider multiple bank firm links based on a myopic preferred partner choice in case of default we also consider the loss given default rate lgdr we find many results i if leverage increases the economy is riskier ii a higher leverage pro cyclicality has a destabilizing effect iii a pro cyclical leverage weakens the monetary policy effect iv a central bank that wants to increase the interest rate should previously check if the banking system is well capitalized v an increase of the reserve coefficient has an impact similar to that produced by raising the policy rate but for the enlargement of bank reserves that improves the resilience of the banking system to shocks

stock price effects and costs of secondary distributions abstract this study does not support the view that a large number of shares can be sold at the prevailing market price and at a small cost a significant stock price decrease is observed at the initial announcement of secondary distributions the price declines are greater for offerings by officers and directors and for larger offerings but are significant for all types of sellers and for large and small offerings there is no significant price decline at the offering when secondaries are announced in advance underwriting and other selling costs are substantial and are positively related to relative offering size

a joint model of tenure choice and demand for housing in the city of karachi the paper estimates a joint model of tenure choice and demand for housing for the city of karachi pakistan using a two stage estimation procedure permanent income and demographic variables are included in the analysis the study uses data collected at the household level in the city in 1987 88 results show that ownership rates are high in karachi ownership is more likely with increases in permanent income age household size and residence in the unauthorised areas permanent income transitory income age and education of the head significantly affect the consumption of housing both for renter and owner households results of the analysis and the estimated income elasticities of demand are comparable and consistent with those reported for other developing countries

the effect of pre emptive right amendments on shareholder wealth abstract pre emptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase a new offering of shares before the general public this paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of removing pre emptive rights from corporate charters two hypotheses are constrasted 1 shareholder wealth maximization suggests that management uses this extra degree of freedom to pick the least cost method for raising new equity hence the amendment increases shareholder wealth 2 management welfare maximization holds that management will use the passage of the amendment to maximize their own welfare sometimes to the detriment of shareholders hence the amendment decreases shareholder wealth the evidence indicates that the amendment decreases shareholder wealth

the productivity slowdown is a growing unmeasurable sector the culprit the productivity slowdown of the early 1970s continues to puzzle economists a frequent explanation of this puzzle is that mismeasurement of output has worsened enough to help account for the apparent shortfall of output growth griliches 1994 highlighted one channel through which this worsening measurement could occur he raised the possibility that because output growth in the service sector likely is undermeasured the rising share of services has led to greater undermeasurement of overall economic growth this paper demonstrates that this argument is of little quantitative significance even under assumptions most favorable to the hypothesis the rising share of services has had only a small impact on measurement error these results along with evidence from baily and gordon 1988 make mismeasurement of output an improbable explanation for the productivity slowdown in aggregate data