the effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development abstract a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents with respect to wealth and ability shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice firm size credit output and income inequality counterfactual experiments are performed for latin american european transition and high growth asian countries with empirical estimates of each country s financial frictions and united states values for all other parameters the results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the united states and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

the labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality abstract unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies this paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality we build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction on the job search and intersectoral flows where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs we calibrate the model for mexico and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs even if they obtain informal jobs can lead to an increase in formality in the economy while also producing small increases in unemployment the exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits we also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market in particular combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality such as lower employment taxes and firing costs can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation

on the demographic composition of colleges and universities in market equilibrium achieving diversity in the racial and ethnic makeup of the student body is one of the objectives that a college pursues in making decisions about admission and financial aid there has been a tremendous amount of debate about policies that colleges should adopt or be proscribed from adopting with respect to diversity rather than join this largely normative debate we adopt a positive focus investigating how colleges quests for ethnic and racial diversity affect admission and financial aid policies the college quality hierarchy and the distribution of whites and nonwhite students across colleges of differing qualities we provide a theoretical framework for investigating the effects of preferences for diversity augmented with results from a parallel computational model calibrated to u s data the effects of efforts to achieve diversity in colleges depend not only on the weight that colleges give to diversity but also on the value that prospective students place on diversity diversity may be of concern to no one only to colleges to both colleges and students or to colleges and a subset of students we first describe a baseline model without preferences for diversity and then examine three alternatives in which preferences for racial diversity are present

investor protection and equity markets we present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders the model incorporates elements of becker s j political econ 106 1968 172 crime and punishment framework into a corporate finance environment of jensen and meckling j financial econ 3 1976 305 we examine the entrepreneur s decision and the market equilibrium the model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance it also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the informal sector and the political economy of development this paper takes an initial step in integrating insights from two sets of literature which have focused on central aspects of development with unfortunate independence it highlights politically valuable resources which are identified in the political economy literature and shows that the informal sector literature provides ample evidence that these resources in general are i scarcely available to informal entities ii poorly valued in their possession and iii more often collectively unexploited by them overall there seems to be an important though neglected bias in how the political system in less developed countries formulates crafts and implements policy

the analytics of the pricing of higher education and other services in which the customers are inputs many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser higher education is the premier example others are legion we provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services prices that charge customers for what they get on net output minus input from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other few examples of such prices exist in the real world

early decision and financial aid competition among need blind colleges and universities abstract this paper presents a stylized theoretical model of competition among need blind colleges and universities that implement early decision admissions under need blind admissions an applicant s financial aid status cannot affect their likelihood of admission in the model a need blind school can use early decision admissions as a screening mechanism to indirectly identify a student s ability to pay while superficially maintaining a need blind policy as a result in equilibrium non financial aid students are more likely to be admitted than financial aid students of comparable quality

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

why doesn t technology flow from rich to poor countries what determines the technology that a country adopts while there could be many factors the e ciency of the country s nancial system may play a signi cant role to address this question a dynamic contract model is embedded into a general equilibrium setting with competitive intermediation the ability of an intermediary to monitor and control the cash ows of a rm plays an important role in a rm s decision to adopt a technology can such a theory help to explain the

tax evasion the underground economy and financial development abstract we study the relationship between the underground economy and financial development in a model of tax evasion and bank intermediation agents with heterogeneous skills seek loans in order to undertake risky investment projects asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders implies a menu of loan contracts that induce self selection in a separating equilibrium faced with these contracts agents choose how much of their income to declare by trading off their incentives to offer collateral against their disincentives to comply with tax obligations the key implication of the analysis is that the marginal net benefit of income disclosure increases with the level of financial development thus in accordance with empirical observation we establish the result that the lower is the stage of such development the higher is the incidence of tax evasion and the greater is the size of the underground economy

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

informal work networks we present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers in addition to formal income taxation and enforcement individuals labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good more connected social networks e g wheel complete feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks e g star empty average income may be non monotonic in tax enforcement on presente un modele d allocation du temps entre l offre de travail formel et informel dans le cas ou les travailleurs apprennent l existence de possibilites de travail informel de leurs pairs en plus de dependre de l imposition des revenus formels et de la rigueur de ce processus les decisions des individus dans leur offre de travail dependent du nombre des pairs qui ont du travail informel et de la force des liens sociaux les travailleurs allouent plus de temps aux activites informelles quand l application de la loi fiscale est rel chee et que la transmission de l information a propos du travail informel est bonne des reseaux sociaux mieux connectes e g roue complet se traduisent par un revenu moyen plus bas mais par une utilite moyenne plus elevee que des reseaux sociaux plus pauvrement connectes e g etoile vide le revenu moyen peut avoir un lien non monotone a la nature de l application de la loi fiscale

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

barriers to capital accumulation and aggregate total factor productivity i develop a growth model where a single good can be produced with a traditional and a modern technology the traditional technology features low total factor productivity tfp and a low share of reproducible capital in this framework barriers to capital accumulation affect technology use and therefore aggregate tfp the theory thus connects recent models of factor accumulation and of tfp the model is calibrated by interpreting traditional production as agriculture and nonreproducible capital as land the theory implies that barriers are associated with large agricultural shares as supported by cross country and time series evidence the required tfp differences needed in the model to account for a given income disparity are reduced by 1 2 relative to the standard model that abstracts from technology choice

what explains the industrial revolution in east asia evidence from the factor markets this paper presents dual estimates of total factor productivity growth tfpg for east asian countries while the dual estimates of tfpg for korea and hong kong are similar to the primal estimates they exceed the primal estimates by 1 percent a year for taiwan and by more than 2 percent for singapore the reason for the large discrepancy for singapore is because the return to capital has remained constant despite the high rate of capital accumulation indicated by singapore s national accounts this discrepancy is not explained by financial market controls capital income taxes risk premium changes and public investment subsidies jel o11 o16 o47 o53

law enforcement and firm financing theory and evidence this paper investigates the economic effects on firms policies of differences in law enforcement we find that in judicial districts where trials are longer bank financing is more costly and firms are smaller however we do not find any significant relation between law enforcement and firms leverage ratio we rationalize our results within a two region dynamic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information and collateralized credit contracts we find that a stronger enforcement of creditors rights not only improves credit conditions partial equilibrium effect but also fosters individual capital accumulation general equilibrium effect in line with this theoretical prediction we find a positive relation between individual savings and quality of legal enforcement

informal firms in developing countries entrepreneurial stepping stone or consolation prize the potential dynamic benefits of a firm having the option to adopt informal status are analysed informality may be a stepping stone without which formality may never be achieved this result is obtained for a broad range of realistic parameter values suggesting a potential dynamic case for government support of informal firms informality may alternatively play a converse role as a consolation prize with a firm only entering an industry formally because it recognizes that if profitability is disappointing it can switch to informality however this result is obtained for a range of parameter values so narrow as to be of no practical significance

tax rates governance and the informal economy in high income countries i introduction informal economic activity was long thought to be a feature of developing countries formalization of business was supposed to go hand in hand with economic development however even among high income countries a large part of economic activity is informal according to schneider 2002 16 7 of gross domestic product gdp in high income oecd organisation for economic cooperation and development countries was informally produced in 2001 2002 the author defines the informal economy as all economic activities which would generally be taxable were they reported to the state tax authorities p 4 in this sense both the informal economy and tax evasion are measures of the same phenomenon while tax evasion refers to the amount of forgone tax revenues the term informal economy encompasses the amount of production that escapes taxation 1 schneider s 2002 estimates of the informal economy of 21 high income oecd countries are reproduced in figure 1 2 these numbers have been obtained by the so called currency demand approach which estimates currency demand as a function of interest rate per capita income proportion of wages and salaries in aggregate output and tax rates excess demand of currency caused by a rise in tax rates is attributed to an increase in the informal economy 3 thus while the currency demand approach establishes a relationship between increasing tax rates and increasing informality within a country it does not imply any built in relationship between tax rates and the size of the informal economy across countries figure 1 omitted numbers in figure 1 show that there are large differences in the size of the informal economy even across high income countries in greece the informal economy amounted to 28 5 of gdp while in the united states the estimate was 8 7 4 put differently the production of legal final goods and services worth 892 billion about 3 090 per capita went untaxed in the united states while in greece 49 billion about 4 380 per capita escaped taxation given these large differences in the size of the informal economy even across high income countries the following two questions arise what are the driving forces behind informal economic activity in high income countries and to what extent can differences in these driving forces account for cross country differences in informality a paper by davis and henrekson 2005 suggests a natural answer to the first question across 14 high income oecd countries the authors find a positive and significant relationship between tax rates and the size of the informal economy figure 2 replicates their results and shows the relationship between tax rates on income and consumption and social security contributions and the size of the informal economy however despite a positive relationship between tax rates and informality countries with equally high tax rates have strikingly different estimates of their informal economies in 1995 1996 spain and the netherlands had similar total tax rates on income and consumption and social security contributions of around 67 the netherlands informal economy was estimated to amount to 13 7 of gdp while the estimate for spain was 22 4 apart from tax rates additional forces seem to drive informality in high income countries low institutional quality and corruption are possible suspects their close relationship to the size of the informal economy has been highlighted by various empirical studies friedman et al 2000 chong and gradstein 2007 and johnson kaufmann and zoido lobaton 1998 all find a positive relationship between low institutional quality a large regulatory burden corruption and the size of the informal economy the relationship between institutional quality and informality also holds across the sample of 21 high income countries figure 3 shows the negative relationship between the size of the informal economy and the commonly used world bank governance indicators on government effectiveness regulatory quality rule of law and control of corruption

a general equilibrium analysis of state and private colleges and access to higher education in the u s abstract we develop a general equilibrium model of the market for undergraduate higher education that captures the coexistence of public and private colleges the large degree of quality differentiation among them and the tuition and admission policies that emerge from their competition for students a quantitative version of the model matches well estimates of enrollment elasticities variation in need based and merit based institutional aid with respectively student income and ability and aggregate characteristics of u s higher education including college attendance in public and private schools tuition levels and the provision of federal aid predictions about the provision of federal aid and the distribution of students across colleges by ability and income match the empirical counterparts well we use the model to examine the consequences of federal and state aid policies a one third increase in the maximum federal aid increases college attendance by 6 of the initial college population most of the increase being in state colleges and mainly of poor students elite private colleges reduce institutional aid and use the net funding gain to spend more on educational inputs and to substitute some highly able poor students for less able rich students reductions in federal or state aid result in substantially reduced attendance mainly by poor students reductions of support to state colleges induce private colleges to increase enrollments modestly and improve in quality as demand shifts toward them

new evidence on altruism a study of tiaa cref retirees this paper investigates the role in household wealth accumulation of saving for bequests it employs data from a 1988 survey of tiaa cref annuitants designed to measure pension and other net worth as well as lifetime earnings about half of the households in the data plan to leave estates and the authors find that their behavior conforms with theoretical altruistic models for the same families the amount of wealth that the authors attribute to estate building is large nevertheless altruism towards one s children does not seem to be the major explanation of saving in the overall sample copyright 1996 by american economic association

the united states higher education antitrust exemption and college enrollment this study examines the effect of the higher education antitrust exemption on enrollment of financial aid applicants at highly selective private colleges the antitrust exemption used since 2002

homeownership informality and the transmission of monetary policy cross country aggregate data exhibits a strong positive relationship between the size of the informal employment and aggregate homeownership rates we investigate this empirical observation using a cash in advance model with housing markets and argue that the rate of inflation is important in explaining the nexus between informality and homeownership rates specifically we uncover a novel monetary transmission mechanism and show that households with informal employment desire to economize on their short term cash usage and avoid periodic rental payments when i informality is associated with constrained business investment finance and ii inflation expectations are high our empirical and theoretical findings highlight an important interaction between the conduct of monetary policy and the performance of housing markets

cross sectoral variation in the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks we estimate the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks in u s manufacturing we measure the variation in revenue total factor productivity not explained by either industry or economy wide factors or by establishments characteristics we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate shocks accounting for about 80 of the overall uncertainty faced by plants plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile we provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater

a competitive model of the informal sector abstract in developing nations formal workers tend to be more experienced more educated and earn more than informal workers these facts are often interpreted as evidence that low skill workers face barriers to entry into the formal sector yet there is little empirical evidence that such barriers are important this paper describes a model where in equilibrium the characteristics of formal and informal workers differ systematically even though labor markets are perfectly competitive the informal sector emphasizes low skill work as in the data because informal managers have access to less outside financing and choose to substitute low skill labor for physical capital

are there cultural effects on saving some cross sectional evidence why are there such large differences in saving rates across countries conventional economic analyses have not been successful in explaining international saving differences so economists have sometimes suggested that national saving differences may be explained by cultural differences this paper tests the hypothesis that cultural factors influence saving by comparing saving patterns of immigrants to canada from different cultures using data from the canadian survey of family expenditures we find no evidence of cultural effects on saving

creditor protection laws debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle we examine how legal creditor rights are related to debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle using firm level data from 40 countries we find that creditor rights are associated with greater debt financing and investment during economic downturns but creditor rights have a significantly smaller effect during expansions the beneficial effects of creditor rights during recessions are stronger for firms that are more likely to have severe shareholder bondholder agency problems we also find that during recessions relative to expansions strong creditor rights are associated with a smaller decline in net capital flows our findings are consistent with credit market frictions increasing during recessions and with stronger creditor rights decreasing the negative effects of these frictions overall the results suggest that better creditor protection laws help moderate the decline in debt financing and investment during recessions

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

foreign entry and bank competition abstract foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent s informational advantage both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low cost outside competitors into credit markets the entrant s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency cost advantage this paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises the results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets

start up costs limited enforcement and the hidden economy abstract this paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs and enforcement of financial contracts it constructs and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogenous agents occupational choices over formal and informal businesses financial frictions and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal firms the benefit from formalization is better access to outside finance the quantitative exercises suggest that i regulation costs and not the level of enforcement account for differences in the size of the informal sector between united states and mediterranean europe ii for a developing country like peru however contract enforcement and regulation costs are equally important in accounting for the size of the informal sector and iii regulation costs and contract enforcement do not account for most of the income differences observed among countries

homework in development economics household production and the wealth of nations we introduce home production into the neoclassical growth model and examine its consequences for development economics in particular we study the extent to which one can account for international income differences with differences in policies that distort capital accumulation in models with home production such policies not only reduce capital accumulation but also change the mix of market and nonmarket activity hence these models can generate larger differences in output than standard models for a given policy differential we also show how the welfare implications change when we incorporate home production

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

the shadow economy as an equilibrium outcome abstract we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping in some markets cash trade using cash to avoid taxes is the shadow economy in our model we then calibrate our model using money interest rate and gdp data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of countries and compare our measures to traditional reduced form estimates

tax on name abstract how to tax the name we answer this question by introducing a name market in the sense of tadelis 1999 into an endogenous growth model in which an informational asymmetry exists between capital producing borrowers and lenders we show a name market endogenously arises to screen the borrowers but at the cost of crowding out investment we derive the optimal name price that trades off the screening effect and the crowding out effect and show this optimal price decreases with the investor protection level an optimal tax scheme should tax the name to this optimal price and reimburse the tax revenue to the name buyer when the investor protection level is low the net worth could be lower than the optimal name price so capital income tax shall be allowed to subsidy the name purchase to activate the name market overall we show the optimal tax scheme in the presence of a name market depends crucially on the country s investor protection level

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

modelling the informal sector formally abstract the theoretical characterization of formal informal sector dualism by labor market dualism is integrated with its empirical characterization by size dualism by supposing that the minimum formal sector wage is only enforced for firms greater than a certain size a firm s size varies directly with the talent of its enterpreneur manager and the choice between formal and informal sector entrepreneurship is determined endogenously it is then shown that the size gap between the smallest formal sector firm and largest informal sector firm varies directly with the formal informal sector wage differential which in turn is shown as expected to increase the further is the minimum wage above the market clearing wage the comparative statics of changes in the size of the firm above which the minimum wage is enforced are also examined

informal sector and economic development the credit supply channel i introduction a popular idea in policy circles holds that granting potential entrepreneurs access to formal credit markets by improving public institutions and specific regulations is an important condition for economic development in particular reforms allowing economic agents to formalize and therefore gain better access to formal credit markets should naturally lead them to invest more and increase their productivity ultimately the benefits of higher overall growth would ensue such reforms typically include strengthening property rights on land and housing and reducing burdensome registration procedures 1 this article examines in a general equilibrium framework the chain of causality behind that line of thinking it does so by modeling individual agents decisions to become formal in relation to their access to a credit market plagued by moral hazard and examining the effect of these decisions on the size of the formal sector and the level of output the main insight is that while better property rights and less burdensome regulations under certain conditions may facilitate agents access to formal loans such reforms interact with the characteristics of the credit market and its environment in ways that crucially shape the ultimate magnitude of the effect on formality and output in a nutshell the modeling strategy relies on an overlapping generations model where economic agents when young undertake productive projects deciding whether to work in the formal or informal sector these decisions depend on the trade off between the costs of entry and the benefits of accessing the formal credit market which itself is a function of the quality of enforcement and property rights that allow for efficient loan recovery by lenders entrepreneurs save part of their profits for future consumption and these savings constitute the next period s supply of credit in the economy in this context the equilibrium interest rate that results from the interaction between the supply of lendable funds and the demand for credit is a key variable in determining the equilibrium level of formality indeed lower entry costs and better contract enforcement unambiguously imply a larger formal sector a higher demand for credit and higher output as long as an infinitely elastic supply of funds is available at the prevailing interest rate e g an open economy with no barriers to international capital flows and a competitive banking sector however absent these conditions an increase in demand resulting from a higher rate of formality increases the interest rate which weakens the links among reform formality and output finally we present empirical evidence related to the implications of our model we find that countries with lower entry costs or a higher quality of enforcement tend to have larger credit markets and smaller informal sectors and that this relationship is stronger when the banking sector is more competitive and the economy is more open to international capital flows using industry level measures of financial dependence and controlling for country fixed effects we show that the results on credit supply also hold in a cross and within industry setting a related literature the argument above is composed of two parts first is the link between better regulations and access to credit at the individual level which results in increased incentives to enter formality and second is the link between these individual decisions and output or growth it is relatively well understood how light registration procedures and strong property rights interact to provide the necessary conditions to access the credit market as de soto 1990 showed in the case of peru and further documented by djankov et al 2002 for 85 countries firms first face significant entry costs in the form of registration and license fees to be able to operate formally

courts and banks effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance we document this point with reference to the credit market in a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts according to the model improvements in judicial efficiency should reduce credit constraints and increase lending with an ambiguous effect on interest rates that depends on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform these predictions are supported by panel data on italian provinces in provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials credit is less widely available

corruption and entrepreneurship evidence from brazilian municipalities we estimate the effect of corruption on business activity in brazilian municipalities we employ a new measure of corruption based on data from random audits of municipal governments our results suggest that higher levels of corruption are generally associated with reductions in the number of business establishments furthermore we find that these effects become larger over time suggesting that corruption is particularly detrimental over the long run however we also find that the effect of corruption on business activity can be insignificant or even positive conditional on institutional quality being very poor this is consistent with the grease the wheels hypothesis which argues that corruption provides entrepreneurs with means to avoid burdensome regulations and taxes

informal sector the credit market channel abstract we build a model of firms choice between formality and informality complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the participation in the formal credit market possible in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements the model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality

what can explain the apparent lack of international consumption risk sharing recent research in international business cycles finds that international consumption comovements do not match the risk sharing predictions of standard complete markets models in this paper i ask whether two different types of explanations can help explain this result 1 nonseparabilities between tradables and nontradable leisure or goods and 2 the effects of capital market restrictions on consumption risk sharing i find that risk sharing cannot be resolved by either explanation alone however when i allow for both nonseparabilities and certain market restrictions risk sharing among unrestricted countries cannot be rejected this evidence suggests that a combination of these two effects may be necessary to explain consumption risk sharing across countries

on the determinants of slum formation we construct a simple model of a city with heterogeneous agents and housing choice to explain the determinants of slums home to about one third of the urban population in developing countries the model supports the main empirical evidence regarding slum formation and is able quantitatively to assess the role of each determinant of slum growth we show that urban poverty inequality and rural urban migration explain much of the variation in slum growth in brazil from 1980 to 2000 ex ante evaluation of the impacts of policy interventions shows that removing barriers to formalisation has a strong impact on slum reduction

enterprise inequality and economic development we characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interaction of the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distribution of entrepreneurial skills when efficient entrepreneurs are relatively abundant a traditional development process emerges in which the evolution of macroeconomic variables accord with empirical regularities and income inequality traces out a kuznets curve if instead efficient entrepreneurs are relatively scarce the model generates long run distributional cycles driven by the endogenous interaction between credit constraints entrepreneurial efficiency and equilibrium wages

competition human capital and income inequality with limited commitment we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition such as re strictions to business start up aect the incentive to accumulate hu man capital we show that a lack of contract enforceability ampli es the eect of barriers to competition on human capital accumulation high barriers reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital by lowering the outside value of skilled workers while low barriers can result in over accumulation of human capital this over accumulation can be socially optimal if there are positive knowledge spillovers a calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for signif icant cross country income inequality

the impact of business environment reforms on new registrations of limited liability companies panel data for 91 countries are used to study how the ease of registering a business and the magnitude of registration reforms affect new registrations of limited liability companies llcs the costs days and procedures required to start a business are found to be important predictors of new llc registration panel regressions also show important synergies in multiple reforms of two or more business environment indicators these results are consistent with the intuition that to be effective reforms should be sufficiently large so that the costs of registration are lower than the expected benefits in addition countries with relatively weaker business environments prior to reforms require relatively larger reforms to impact the number of newly registered llcs

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

international risk sharing and economic growth international risk sharing which diversifies away income risk will reduce saving with constant relative risk aversion if growth arises from the external effects of human capital accumulation then reducing saving will reduce growth welfare also may fall with risk sharing because endogenous growth with external effects of capital accumulation typically implies a competitive equilibrium growth rate already less than the optimal growth rate we demonstrate these results in a standard representative agent economy diversifying away rate of return risk also will reduce saving and growth rates if relative risk aversion exceeds one but this diversification always increases welfare this paper studies the effects of international risk sharing portfolio diversification in a world economy in which growth rates of income are endogenous growth is based upon the spillover effects of human capital accumulation as in lucas 1988 and romer 1986 there are positive economy wide spillovers of human capital intensity on individual labour productivity in section 2 we construct a multi country growth model with an infinitely lived representative agent in each country each country faces income risk but there is no aggregate uncertainty at the world level we focus on two market structures in the first structure there are no markets which allow for international diversification of country specific income risk in the second structure there are complete international markets for risksharing with no aggregate world uncertainty this completeness allows full diversification of country specific risk the paper has two central results first growth rates in all countries are lower in the equilibrium with full diversification second in this same structure welfare of each country may be lower than in an equilibrium without risk sharing the reasoning is as follows with external effects of capital accumulation the compet

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

international capital flows and credit market imperfections a tale of two frictions the nancial crisis of 2007 08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in nancial markets this friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of nancial imperfections however which have focused almost exclusively on the eects of limited pledgeability in this paper we ll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection our main results are that by fostering unproductive investment adverse selection i leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate and ii it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate under nancial integration we show how this translates into excessive capital inows and endogenous cycles we also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist we conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the eects of adverse selection

should business groups be dismantled the equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets abstract we analyze the relationship between conglomerates internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy wide capital allocation and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection conglomerates that engage in winner picking stein 1997 internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources journal of finance 52 111 133 find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects even when other firms in the economy have higher productivity projects that are in need of additional capital this bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital we also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development in such countries a high degree of conglomeration generated for example by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups could decrease the efficiency of the capital market our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates these predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

optimal financial aid policies for a selective university our paper provides a model of optimal financial aid policies for a selective university the model implies that the financial aid package to be offered to each category of admitted applicants depends on the elasticity of the fraction who accept offers of admission with respect to the financial aid package offered them the propensity of the category to enroll the elasticity of the category s average quality with respect to the number admitted and the relative weight the university assigns them in the utility function while the latter must be determined subjectively the former parameters are subject to empirical estimation we conclude with a study of one institution s data and illustrate how they may be estimated these estimates are then applied to illustrate what the optimal financial aid policy would be for the university

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

how much do distortions affect growth abstract this paper presents a simple endogenous growth model with two types of capital which can display sizeable long run growth effects of distortionary policies the model applies to many different types of distortions of relative prices common in developing countries such as differential taxes and tariffs black market exchange rates and price controls the model shows that a subsidy to one type of capital financed by a tax on another capital good lowers growth a measure of the variance of relative prices of investment goods across sectors has a negative and statistically significant effect on growth

taxes inequality and the size of the informal sector abstract in this note we develop a simple heterogeneous agent model with incomplete markets to explain the prevalence of a large low productivity informal sector in developing countries in our model taxes levied on formal sector agents are used to finance the provision of a productive public infrastructure which creates a productivity premium from formalization our model offers endogenous differentiation of rich and poor countries complete formalization is an equilibrium only in countries with the appropriate initial conditions we discuss the existence of this equilibrium and highlight the ambiguous effect of taxes

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

merchants of corruption how entrepreneurs manufacture and supply bribes summary we wondered how corruption endemic in nigeria is experienced by a specific and understudied set of actors entrepreneurs semi structured interviews with founders ceos of firms in three industries associated with high levels of corruption revealed entrepreneurs rather than victims of bribe demanding government agents are themselves active perpetrators of bribery adopting a set of bribery best practices governed by a well embedded set of social norms rules routines and power relations to deliberately subvert formal state budgetary systems while reforming institutions is a key focus of anti corruption policies in many sub saharan african countries our results suggest a bottom up approach to remediation based on understanding the practice from the perspective of those who actively engage in it

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

admission tuition and financial aid policies in the market for higher education we present an equilibrium model of the market for higher education our model simultaneously predicts student selection into institutions of higher education financial aid educational expenditures and educational outcomes we show that the model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges that differ by the educational quality provided to the students we also develop a new estimation procedure that exploits the observed variation in prices within colleges identification is based on variation in endowments and technology it does not rely on observed variation in potentially endogenous characteristics of colleges such as peer quality measures and expenditures we estimate the structural parameters using data collected by the national center for education statistics and aggregate data from peterson s and the national science foundation

diversification and ownership concentration abstract if controlling shareholders can divert profits equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation a higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non controlling shareholders the empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection

on finance as a theory of tfp cross industry productivity differences and economic rents we develop a theory of capital market imperfections to study how the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different productivities and across industries with different needs for external financing the theory implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the use of inefficient technologies low aggregate tfp large differences in labor productivity across industries and large employment shares in industries with low productivity these implications are supported by the empirical evidence the theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement

short long and spatial dynamics of informal employment di caro p and nicotra g short long and spatial dynamics of informal employment regional studies this paper analyses regional shadow labour markets cross regional migration flows are introduced in a stochastic two sector model used to study the effects of regional interactions on informality empirical results show that informal activities across italian regions are driven by the inefficient provision of public goods and high taxes regional connections are found to be significant place specific reactions of informal employment to national shocks in the official economy are investigated finding that the informal sector can act as a complement to or a substitute for formal activities the summary of the results and policy conclusions are then discussed

returns to physical capital in ethiopia comparative analysis of formal and informal firms summary this paper investigates returns to capital in the formal and informal sectors in ethiopia using parametric and semi parametric regression techniques results show that there is a higher annual median return to capital in the informal sector 52 140 than the formal sector 15 21 however informal firms might benefit from working formally as their capital stock gets larger marginal returns in the informal sector increase with firm size access to reliable markets market uncertainty and owners labor supply on the other hand marginal returns to capital and overall profitability decrease with capital stock contrary to the poverty trap hypothesis

cross sectoral variation in the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks we estimate the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks in u s manufacturing we measure the variation in revenue total factor productivity not explained by either industry or economy wide factors or by establishments characteristics we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate shocks accounting for about 80 of the overall uncertainty faced by plants plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile we provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

optimal self employment income tax enforcement abstract most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or solely remunerates labor neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable inputs this paper outlines a model to optimally monitor self employed entrepreneurs when in addition to reported profits the tax collection agency also observes the number of workers employed or any other input variable at each firm we show that by conditioning the monitoring strategy only on labor input it is optimal for the irs to audit firms in a way that generates some empirical regularities like the missing middle we also show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by an indirect monitoring strategy that is consistent with actual irs practices in particular the irs calculates inputted income as function of labor whenever an entrepreneur reports profits that are lower than inputted income she is randomly monitored finally we formalize a model of optimal presumption taxation in which inputted income is the tax base to compare revenue collection across tax systems

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

informality and bank stability while financial development fd has been widely studied in the literature as a determinant of informal sector size there has been no focus on the role of financial stability we find that the stability of the banking sector has a significant and robust negative effect on informality across countries using a recently available testing methodology based on a heteroskedasticity robust lasso we also find strong support for rule of law as a key determinant of informal sector size and some evidence for the effect of fd

entry regulation and business start ups evidence from mexico the authors estimate the effect on business start ups of a program that significantly speeds up firm registration procedures the program was implemented in mexico in different municipalities at different dates authors estimates suggest that new start ups increased by about 4 percent in eligible industries and the authors present evidence that this is a causal effect most of the effect is temporary concentrated in the first 10 months after implementation the effect is robust to several specifications of the benchmark control group time trends the authors find that the program was more effective in municipalities with less corruption and cheaper additional procedures