money and capital abstract the effects of money anticipated inflation on capital formation is a classic issue in macroeconomics previous papers adopt reduced form approaches putting money in the utility function or imposing cash in advance but using otherwise frictionless models we follow instead a literature that tries to be explicit about the frictions making money essential this introduces new elements including a two sector structure with centralized and decentralized markets stochastic trading opportunities and bargaining these elements matter quantitatively and numerical results differ from findings in the reduced form literature the analysis also reduces a gap between microfounded monetary economics and mainstream macro

the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

when not all conflict is bad manufacturing marketing conflict and strategic incentive design researchers and managers broadly agree that coordination and harmony between manufacturing and marketing improve firm performance by eliminating suboptimal practices within the firm in this paper we present a contrasting view of the manufacturing marketing interface we model a duopoly in which the firms compete on price and quality dimensions the manufacturing and marketing managers within each firm are presented with conflicting incentives focused on cost minimization and revenue maximization respectively these managers bargain with each other before arriving at compromise decisions regarding price and quality while frequently encountered in practice this conflicting objectives puzzle is surprising because one expects that centralized coordination by the owners of the firm towards profit maximization would lead to higher profits in this paper we resolve the conflicting objectives puzzle and demonstrate that surprisingly the firm s resulting profits in this setting of conflict can be higher than those obtained when the decisions of the managers are perfectly coordinated we also analyze the equilibrium in incentive plans when the owners can choose between compromise and perfect coordination our results offer a new interpretation of manufacturing marketing conflict as a strategic tool that can enhance firm profits

the cyclical behavior of prices abstract the procyclical behavior of prices has been a staple of business cycle lore since the work of the early nber business cycle researchers this paper reexamines that empirical fact the aggregate data do not support procyclical price movements as a stable feature of the business cycle the only episode where it is a robust feature of the data is the period between the two world wars particularly the period of the great depression

on the optimality of the full cost pricing abstract this article is aimed at defining the full cost pricing as a leader follower game in two tier organizations i the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost ii the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost in the cournot oligopoly case the full cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules there exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost for which the full cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules in terms of gross profit

a model of negotiated transfer pricing abstract a large majority of firms employ negotiated transfer pricing yet this method of decentralization remains largely unexplored this study develops a model of negotiated transfer pricing incorporating private divisional information as this is the setting where decentralization is most compelling the firm designs a compensation system utilizing divisional performance evaluation and negotiated transfer pricing a dynamic bargaining model is employed to capture managerial negotiations the study demonstrates that the firm can design managerial compensation schemes and bargaining infrastructures so that the negotiated transfer pricing structure allows it to reach the upper bound on available profits

monetary aggregates and output series title working paper frb title monetary aggregates and output date publication federal reserve bank of cleveland working paper no 9813 author s scott freeman finn kydland type working paper frb topics s us economy

strategic transfer pricing most research into cost systems has focused on their motivational implications this paper takes a different approach by developing a model where two oligopolistic firms strategically select their cost based transfer prices duopoly models frequently assume that firms game on their choice of prices product prices however are ultimately based on the firms transfer prices that communicate manufacturing costs to marketing departments it is for this reason that transfer prices will have a strategic component to them we derive implications for cost system choice and transfer pricing including showing that firms may cross subsidize their products a result consistent with the empirical evidence

response to embodied energy and emergy analyses of a concentrating solar power csp system 2012 while emergy analysis i e emergy synthesis environmental accounting was developed in the early 1980s by h t odum building upon his seminal work outlining the energy basis for man and nature the method is still developing some very important aspects of the method such as the global baseline for renewable emergy and how the emergy yield ratio eyr a critical index for implicating the contribution of a process to society is to be calculated are still under debate in the scientific community this makes it all the more critical that when an emergy analysis is done all methodology is laid bare and justified unfortunately zhang et al 2012 energy policy 42 pp 232 238 is deficient in doing so in the response below i lay out the problems i observed in the paper and propose a revision to their analysis i should note that no issues were found with the embodied energy portion of the analysis and the inconsistencies with accepted methodology were likely due to an unfamiliarity with the emergy method

competition and cooperation within a multidivisional firm the strategic choice of managerial incentives is studied in a multiagent setting using a two stage game in the first stage the principal chooses incentive schemes then agents make their decisions the game models the structure of multidivisional firms divisions agents are managed independently but the general office principal monitors their performance and provides incentives it explains the rationale for establishing either cooperation or competition across divisions if firms face cournot competition if divisions are linked because of technological reasons positive spillovers cooperation should be stimulated if they sell substitute products negative spillovers competition is needed copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

inside money and real output abstract an example shows that anticipated non neutral monetary policy disturbances can result in correlation between real output and lagged inside money that is observationally equivalent to the real business cycle interpretation

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

inside money monetary contractions and welfare this paper presents an explicit physical environment in which optimizing agents choose the composition of their money balances because of their choices changes in the nominal sum of inside and outside money precede changes in output nevertheless changes in the supply of fiat money do not affect subsequent out put moreover an equilibrium with a fixed supply of valued fiat money is pareto optimal despite the cyclical fluctuations of output and of the total money stock monnaie interne contractions monetaires et bien etre ce memoire definit un environne ment physique explicite dans lequel les agents economiques recherchent l optimum en choisissant la composition de leurs actifs monetaires en consequence de leurs choix des changements dans la somme nominale de monnaie interne et de monnaie externe prec dent les changements dans le niveau de production neanmoins des changements dans l offre de monnaie fiduciaire n affectent pas le niveau de production subsequent de plus l equilibre quand l offre de monnaie fiduciaire est fixe est un optimum de pareto malgre les fluctuations dans le niveau de production et dans le stock total

coordinating investment production and subcontracting we value the option of subcontracting to improve financial performance and system coordination by analyzing a competitive stochastic investment game with recourse the manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their capacity investment levels then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production and sales we analyze and present outsourcing conditions for three contract types 1 price only contracts where an ex ante transfer price is set for each unit supplied by the subcontractor 2 incomplete contracts where both parties negotiate over the subcontracting transfer and 3 state dependent price only and incomplete contracts for which we show an equivalence result while subcontracting with these three contract types can coordinate production decisions in the supply system only state dependent contracts can eliminate all decentralization costs and coordinate capacity investment decisions the minimally sufficient price only contract that coordinates our supply chain specifies transfer prices for a small number 6 in our model of contingent scenarios our game theoretic model allows the analysis of the role of transfer prices and of the bargaining power of buyer and supplier we find that sometimes firms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspecified ex ante and agreeing to negotiate ex post also a price focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backfire because a lower transfer price may decrease the manufacturer s profit finally as with financial options the option value of subcontracting increases as markets are more volatile or more negatively correlated

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

hypercompetition in a multimarket environment the role of strategic similarity and multimarket contact in competitive de escalation the effect of intra industry heterogeneity on hypercompetitive escalation and de escalation in a multimarket environment is examined the authors study two critical dimensions of intra industry heterogeneity strategic similarity which captures similarity in competitive orientation and multimarket contact which captures the degree of overlap between rivals in the multiple markets of the industry theory predicts that both variables influence the intensity of rivalry and competitive disruption the predictions in the literature about the effect of strategic similarity on the intensity of rivalry are mixed while strategic group theory proposes that strategic similarity may lead to lower rivalry other theories focusing on product differentiation the resource based view of the firm and hypercompetitive escalation predict that strategic similarity may actually increase rivalry those diametrically opposed propositions are captured as alternative hypotheses of the effect of strategic similarity with r

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

the impact of competition on make or buy decisions evidence from the spanish local tv industry this paper empirically investigates whether changes in product market competition affect firm boundaries exploiting regulation induced shocks to entry barriers and differences in regulation enforcement across cities to obtain exogenous variation in competition we establish a negative causal effect of competition through reduced entry barriers and a larger number of rival firms on vertical integration in the setting of the spanish local television industry between 1995 and 2002 data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2633 this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

organizational design and the intensity of rivalry we analyze the effect of managerial compensation schemes and organizational structure on competitive behavior in imperfectly competitive product markets previous research suggests that in cases of strategic substitutability firms tend to choose organizational structures and compensation systems that commit the firm to behaving aggressively in the product market reducing firm and industry profits in contrast we show that while compensation and structure in isolation lead to excessive aggressiveness the combination of these two internal choice variables may reverse the outcome organizational design can be used as a commitment device to reduce competitive rivalry finally we find that in equilibrium firms may choose to be different one firm is decentralized and uses incentives that commit it to being aggressive while the other is centralized and uses incentives that commit it to being soft hence endogenous firm heterogeneity in the form of organizational differentiation allows firms to avoid a mutually detrimental outcome

inside money output and causality the authors present an explicit general equilibrium model consistent with these observations 1 innovations in the nominal money stock are positively correlated with and precede granger cause innovations in output 2 these innovations in the nominal money stock represent innovations in inside not outside money and 3 when interest rates are included in vector autoregressions their innovations not money s are seen to precede output changes in the money stock represent an endogenous reaction to some third factor and do not cause subsequent changes in output therefore a change in the current fiat money stock will not lead to any change in output copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

economies of scale in banking indeterminacy and monetary policy this paper investigates economies of scale es in financial intermediation as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy consumption in the model can be purchased with currency and deposits and es in intermediation implies that deposit costs are decreasing in aggregate deposits the results suggest that indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of es nor a large intermediation sector but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal interest rates monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise for any degree of es while policies targeting nominal rates eliminates indeterminacy for all degrees of es

on evaluation costs in strategic factor markets the implications for competition and organizational design this paper uses a formal model to study how evaluation costs affect competition for resources in strategic factor markets it finds that relative scarcity may not always benefit resource sellers rather when competition among resource investors passes a certain threshold intensity miscoordination among investors increases to the point that sellers expected profits decline this paper extends the model to consider how investors organize to overcome managerial agency in resource evaluation two organizational designs are considered a incentivization wherein a lower level manager is motivated by an incentive contract to evaluate resources for an investor and b supervision wherein evaluation is either handled directly or closely monitored by headquarters the model suggests that competition among investors will be associated with a greater use of supervision and that investors using supervision will tend to make lower offers this paper also finds that supervision will be more common when valuable resources are rare this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

money and output a test of reverse causation this paper attempts to explain the correlation between money and output at various leads and lags with a model in which money is largely neutral and endogenously responds to output money is endogenous because both monetary policy and deposit creation are endogenous parameters are selected according to the simulated moments estimation technique while the estimated model succeeds along some dimensions in matching properties of postwar u s data its failure to match key patterns of lead lag correlations seems to cast doubt on the ability of endogenous money determination by itself to quantitatively account for the observed money output correlations copyright 1996 by american economic association

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

the seasonal cycle and the business cycle almost all recent research on macroeconomic fluctuations has worked with seasonally adjusted or annual data this paper takes a different approach by treating seasonal fluctuations as worthy of study in their own right our results show that seasonal fluctuations are an important source of variation in all macroeconomic quantity variables but are small or entirely absent in both real and nominal price variables the timing of the seasonal fluctuations consists of increases in the second and fourth quarters a large decrease in the first quarter and a mild decrease in the third quarter the paper demonstrates that with respect to each of several major stylized facts about business cycles the seasonal cycle displays the same characteristics as the business cycle in some cases even more dramatically than the business cycle that is we find that at seasonal frequencies as well as at business cycle frequencies output movements across broadly defined sectors move together the timing of production and the

is there a core of practical macroeconomics that we should all believe with emphasis on the adjective practical and the normative verb should my answer to the question of this session is a resounding yes indeed i spent a good deal of time between january 1993 and january 1996 acting on the belief that there is such a core macro model so i certainly hope it exists this believable core model falls well short of perfection leaves many questions unanswered and is subject to substantial stochastic errors nonetheless it is both useful and extensively used in policy analysis where contact with reality is a necessity and you cannot beat something with nothing it also closely resembles but does not quite match the way macroeconomics is taught to beginning and intermediate but not to graduate students in this short presentation i will describe briefly the main practical elements that i think we should agree on without worrying too much about their theoretical underpinnings then i will turn to two critical failings of the standard macro model which cry out for theoretical and empirical repair my organizing principle is the textbook exposition that has been standard though not universal in teaching intermediate macroeconomics for years the question is how does it differ from the core model used in policy analysis

sticky prices and costly credit we develop a theory of money and credit as competing payment instruments then put it to work in applications agents use cash and credit because the former latter is subject to the inflation tax transaction costs frictions that make the choice of payment method interesting also imply equilibrium price dispersion we derive closed form solutions for money demand and show how to simultaneously account for the price change facts cash credit shares in micro data and money interest correlations in macro data the effects of inflation on welfare price dispersion and markups are discussed as are nonstationary equilibria with dynamics in the price distribution

cost of business cycles with indivisibilities and liquidity constraints it is almost universally agreed that individuals face incomplete insurance markets and cannot perfectly insure against the idiosyncratic risk in this paper simple general equilibrium models with incomplete insurance markets are examined in order to assess the impact of imperfect insurance on the magnitude of the welfare costs of business cycles two versions of incomplete insurance markets are considered and certain statistical properties of the equilibrium stochastic processes in these environments are compared with those of a perfect insurance economy

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

some thoughts on practical stabilization policy this paper argues that the primary objective of monetary policy should be long run price stability or at least a low average rate of in ation but there is also a welfare improving role for monetary policy in helping the economy adjust to nonpolicy shocks this gives rise to a fundamental tension in the conduct of monetary policy understanding this tension is central to interpreting the qualitative properties of actual monetary policy for evaluating its e ects and for thinking about alternative institutions that would lead to better monetary policy is there a core of practical macroeconomics that we should all believe given my limited space constraints i won t try to discuss a top ten list of eternal macro truths nor will i discuss the importance of modelling macro phenomena using quantitative general equilibrium models instead i will approach the question from the perspective of stabilization policy so de ned my answer to the question is yes there is a core of practical macro and as regards stabilization policy most of it has been learned in the past twenty eight years as the profession has collectively struggled with the task of separating the wheat from the cha of milton friedman s presidential address friedman 1968 the net result has been a fundamental shift in methodology and core beliefs about stabilization policy the critical change in methodology was the switch to thinking about stabilization policy as a game theoretic problem rather than a control theory problem the change in substance involved a fundamental shift in the profession s views about the cyclical roles of scal and monetary policy in sharp contrast to the views that prevailed in the early 1960 s there is now widespread agreement that counter cyclical discretionary scal policy is neither desirable nor politically feasible practical debates about stabilization policy revolve almost exclusively around monetary policy to an extent that would have been virtually impossible to predict thirty years ago these debates are grounded in a number of widely agreed upon propositions first excluding anticipated in ation e ects monetary policy is neutral in the long run at the very best the long run phillips curve is neutral more likely it slopes the wrong way so that high rates of in ation are correlated with low growth rates second persistent in ation is always a monetary phenomenon third monetary policy is not neutral in the short run fourth most aggregate economic uctuations aren t due to monetary policy shocks a corollary of the rst two propositions is that the primary objective of monetary policy should be long run price stability or at least a low average rate of in ation a corollary of the last two propositions is that there is a welfare improving role for monetary policy in helping the economy adjust to non policy shocks this is because the kinds of models that have any chance at all of accounting for how the economy responds to a monetary policy shock imply that a k rule for money growth is not optimal taken together these corollaries point to a fundamental tension in the conduct of monetary policy how can we achieve the second objective without compromising the rst understanding this tension is central to interpreting the qualitative properties of actual monetary policy for evaluating its e ects and for thinking about alternative institutions that would lead to better monetary policy to be concrete the fed tries to achieve the rst objective of monetary policy a low rate of in ation by slowing down the growth rate of money when in ation starts to rise indeed there are substantial pressures on policymakers to engage in preemptive strikes against in ation even before actual in ation moves say when the unemployment rate approaches the nairu du jour on the face of it such behavior is di cult to understand if persistent in ation is