renegotiation on incomplete procurement contracts abstractthis article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on procurement costs in road construction auctions ex ante contracts in these auctions often fail to specify all of the potential construction contingencies and consequently changes in scope are necessary after construction begins using vermont road construction contract data this study finds evidence that there is a statistically significant difference in costs of firms between auctions with and without extra work adjustments substantial adaptation costs are responsible for the higher procurement outlays in incomplete contract i also find that bidders inflate their bids to incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts however my estimates suggest that this bidding behaviour does not affect their profit margins

reconstituting the state city powers and exposures in chicago s infrastructure leases in the 2000s cities across north america began leasing existing infrastructure to global investment consortia previous evaluations of infrastructure leases focus on the lack of transparency of th

collateral in credit rationing in markets with imperfect information note in their 1981 article joseph stiglitz and andrew weiss analyze adverse selection and incentive effects in the loan market the models considered are based on two crucial assumptions borrowers are subject to limited liability and lenders cannot distinguish borrowers projects of different risk stiglitz and weiss show that a bank that raises its interest rate may suffer adverse selection because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow at the higher rate thus lenders may choose not to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand resulting in the possibility of a credit rationing equilibrium stiglitz and weiss also consider briefly the role of collateral in such credit rationing models they conclude that lenders may choose not to use collateral requirements as a rationing device an increase in collateral requirements like an increase in the interest rate potentially leads to a decrease in the lender s expected return on loans because of resulting adverse incentive and selection effects the purpose of this note is to further investigate the role of collateral in these models stiglitz and weiss discussion in section iii establishes that adverse selection effects can result from increases in collateral when borrowers are risk averse i will show by returning to a model they discussed earlier in section i that the adverse selection effects can also occur when borrowers are risk neutral stiglitz and weiss outline a model to consider the use of collateral as a rationing device section iii in that model all potential borrowers face the same array of risky projects each potential borrower chooses at most one of those projects to undertake the individuals are by assumption risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion and possess different amounts of initial wealth thus choice of project if any to undertake and the method of finance selffinance from initial wealth or loan finance will differ from one individual to the next stiglitz and weiss show that among those who undertake risky projects and who choose borrowing as the method of finance wealthier individuals undertake riskier projects an increase in collateral has two effects on the market for loans those individuals who remain in the market will choose to undertake less risky projects and those individuals who drop out of the market are less wealthy low risk borrowers if the second effect is sufficiently strong then increased collateral requirements will mean decreased expected returns for the lender thus a credit rationing equilibrium may occur since lenders may not choose to use collateral requirements or the interest rate to eliminate excess demand the adverse selection effect just described does not occur in this model if the individuals are risk neutral consequently the potential for a credit rationing equilibrium is limited to cases where borrowers are risk averse to see that increases in collateral requirements can also result in adverse selection if borrowers are risk neutral consider the model stiglitz and weiss used to analyze the adverse selection effects of increases in the interest rate section i pp 395 99 it differs from the section iii model discussed above in three ways first borrowers are risk neutral second all projects ar loan financed the analogy to the section iii model is that no individuals have sufficient wealth to self finance projects third in the section

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

infrastructure and development a critical appraisal of the macro level literature this survey reviews the existing macro level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development outcomes in a critical light after providing a general framework that casts the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed this guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity finally building on related research in particular in contract theory and political economy the paper spells out several promising research avenues

the law of small numbers investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement abstracta commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts however restricted auctions are frequently used among eu member states to procure small contracts in this article we investigate this paradox using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009 we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result to our knowledge this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts

renegotiation of concession contracts in latin america evidence from the water and transport sectors abstract high rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model to attract private participation in infrastructure in developing countries after extending in reduced form a standard regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts we use a unique data set of 307 concessions awarded in latin america from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of transport and water to analyze the determinants of this high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts we look in details at the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession of regulatory institutions institutional features economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves we then derive some policy implications of our work

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

concessions of infrastructure in latin america government led renegotiation this paper analyzes government led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in latin america based on the same sample used in guasch laffont and straub 2003 to examine firm led renegotiations after extending the theoretical framework to a multiple period context in which both pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results while some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing as well as the corruption variables we provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

contracting officer workload incomplete contracting and contractual terms this article estimates the causal effect of retirement induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms in a sample of 150 000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures decrease reliance on firm fixed price contracts increase risk of renegotiation and increase costs these estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting the us federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower this article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

credit markets with imperfect information risk aversion versus pessimism abstract stiglitz and weiss 1981 credit rationing is embedded within rank dependent expected utility theory our results show that sufficient pessimism or sufficient risk aversion by borrowers may eliminate adverse selection moreover lender optimism may eliminate credit rationing even when adverse selection exists

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

the place of entrepreneurship in the economics that might have been it is a familiar observation that entrepreneurship is not easily accommodated within the framework of neoclassical economic theory drawing inspiration from an ancient critique of neoclassicism by veblen q j econ 12 4 373 397 1898 this paper attributes the difficulty to the tension between normative accounts of decision making as in mainstream theory and ideas of causation that are standard in the sciences normative theories naturally privilege the conjectured future over the experienced past in the quest for explanatory factors evolutionary theories elucidate instead the mechanisms of cumulative causation veblen that perpetually produce the present from the past entrepreneurship of the innovative schumpeterian kind seizes opportunities that emerge in complex evolving contexts of technological and institutional change a theory that gives due weight to cumulative causation sheds greater light on these processes than prevailing mainstream theory can and that is a key advantage of an evolutionary theory

a theory of bot concession contracts in this paper we discuss the choice for build operate and transfer bot concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility we show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose bot concessions this result stems from a trade off between the government s shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period the incentives to choose bot concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential bot concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession

an interpretive history of challenges to neoclassical microeconomics and how they have fared contemporary microeconomics has witnessed a resurgence of behavioral institutional and evolutionary critiques of the neoclassical mainstream that came to dominate the field during the 1980s today s critiques and proposals for reform have a long tradition in economics while synthesizing the intellectual history of these challenges this article explores the reasons why such critical strands of microeconomics fared poorly in the past and in contrast what factors may account for their partial acceptance into the mainstream in recent times

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox author s paul a david source the american economic review vol 80 no 2 papers and proceedings of the hundred and second annual meeting of the american economic association may 1990 pp 355 361 published by american economic association stable url http www jstor org stable 2006600 accessed 08 12 2010 01 40

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

dynamic regulation design without payments the importance of timing abstract we consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a firm subject to marginal compliance cost shocks the regulator faces an asymmetric information problem the firm knows current compliance costs but the regulator does not both the regulator and the firm are uncertain about future costs in our basic framework the regulator may not offer payments to the firm we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce the firm to reveal its costs and increase welfare in the optimal mechanism the regulator offers stronger weaker regulation in the first period and weaker stronger regulation in the second period if the firm reports low high compliance costs in the first period low cost firms expect compliance costs to rise in the future and thus prefer weaker regulation in the second period high cost firms expect costs to fall in the future and thus prefer regulation which becomes stricter over time thus the regulator offers the low high cost firms slightly weaker stronger regulation in the second period in exchange for much stronger weaker regulation in the first period thereby timing the regulation if the regulator can make payments then the optimal mechanism to some degree times the regulation as long as a positive marginal cost of funds exists if the marginal cost of funds is high enough then under the optimal mechanism the regulator will not use payments and use our timing mechanism exclusively

contract renegotiation and rent re distribution who gets raked over the coals policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long term contracts which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated we seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design in the face of a substantial policy shock affect the propensity to renegotiate we test our hypotheses using data on u s coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 clean air act amendments contracts are divided into two categories those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated results provide guidance on rent re distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislation

optimization as constraint a comment on mazzoleni and nelson this comment is an in depth exploration of the neoclassical commitment to the idea that economic actors are appropriately modeled as optimizers of profit utility or whatever the robustness of this commitment is a major feature of the intellectual landscape surveyed by mazzoleni and nelson 2013 industrial and corporate change 22 6 and the challengers inability to overthrow it is clearly a key rubric for an answer to the basic mazzoleni and nelson question about explanations for the failures of the successive challenges to neoclassicism the principal thesis here is that the neoclassical commitment to optimizing actors has exacted a high opportunity cost because of its distorting effect on the discipline s priorities the commitment encourages theorists to engage primarily in the construction and analysis of models that are viewed as parables and valued primarily on esthetic grounds and not for the insight into reality that they provide thus the contemporary esthetics of neoclassical theorizing push the economics discipline away from serious engagement with the complexity of economic reality

estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy endogenous regressors applied economists have long struggled with the question of how to accommodate binary endogenous regressors in models with binary and nonnegative outcomes i argue here that much of the difculty with limited dependent variables comes from a focus on structural parameters such as index coefcients instead of causal effects once the object of estimation is taken to be the causal effect of treatment several simple strategies are available these include conventional two stage least squares multiplicative models for conditional means linear approximation of nonlinear causal models models for distribution effects and quantile regression with an endogenous binary regressor the estimation strategies discussed in the article are illustrated by using multiple births to estimate the effect of childbearing on employment status and hours of work

contractual flexibility rent seeking and renegotiation design an empirical analysis of information technology outsourcing contracts this paper examines renegotiation design in contracts for outsourced information technology it services whereas prior literature in information systems has highlighted the likelihood of ex post rent seeking engendered by renegotiation we build upon literature on incomplete contracts to posit that renegotiation can be pareto improving by incorporating contingencies revealed ex post research on contract renegotiation has been hampered by two sets of challenges the lack of appropriate data and empirical challenges in identification we circumvent this problem both by appropriate data collection and by employing an identification strategy to address alternate causal explanations we propose a measure pareto improving amendments to assess renegotiation outcomes that enhance the value from outsourcing by hazard equilibration and by incorporating learning using a unique sample of 141 it outsourcing contracts we examine the role of decision rights delineated ex ante in enabling pareto improving amendments and in resolving the trade off between adaptation and rent seeking we find that flexibility provisions termination for convenience rights and contractual rights whereby vendors are granted rights to reuse know how are associated with pareto improving amendments the results are robust to potential endogeneity of contractual provisions when parties have feasible foresight and to the possibility of adverse selection in the sample we also examine alternate explanations from the literature on contractual breach implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

the role of entrepreneurship in us job creation and economic dynamism the united states has long been viewed as having among the world s most entrepreneurial dynamic and flexible economies it is often argued that this dynamism and flexibility has enabled the us economy to adapt to changing economic circumstances and recover from recessions in a robust manner while the evidence provides broad support for this view the outcomes of entrepreneurship are more heterogeneous than commonly appreciated and appear to be evolving in ways that could raise concern evidence along a number of dimensions and a variety of sources points to a us economy that is becoming less dynamic of particular interest are declining business startup rates and the resulting diminished role for dynamic young businesses in the economy we begin by describing how the concept of entrepreneurship is reflected in existing data on firm age and size the recent addition of firm age to official statistics represents a dramatic improvement in the information available to entrepreneurship researchers we then turn to a discussion of the role of startup firms in job creation business startups account for about 20 percent of us gross total job creation while high growth businesses which are disproportionately young

empirical evidence on satisfaction with privatization in latin america since the 1980s privatization of formerly state owned firms has been extensively implemented by governments across latin america despite the fact that most evaluations of the process fail to find significant adverse efficiency and welfare effects there has been a strong surge in public discontent with such policy in the region this paper performs a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of such dissatisfaction using survey data from latinobarometro covering 17 countries over the period 1998 2008 complemented by country level data on macroeconomic political and institutional aspects as well as data on privatization dissatisfaction appears to respond to absolute and relative welfare effects and the authors find a robust u shaped effect in term of education and income levels with individuals in the middle of such distributions being more critical with the outcome of privatizations

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

on the possibility of credit rationing in the stiglitz weiss model contrary to what is consistently assumed in the literature the return function cannot be hump shaped in the stiglitz weiss 1981 model this has important consequences for the possible occurrence of credit rationing and redlining with a single class of borrowers banks offer credit in two stages demand possibly exceeds supply in stage one but not in stage two with several observationally distinguishable borrower classes the firms in a borrower class are redlined only under circumstances which imply that they would not get credit in a perfect capital market either die rendite funktion kann im stiglitz weiss 1981 modell nicht so wie das in der literatur durchgangig angenommen wird hugelformig sein das hat wichtige implikationen fur die moglichkeit von kreditrationierung einerseits und fur die moglichkeit des ausschlusses ganzer kreditnehmergruppen vom kapitalmarkt andererseits mit nur einer klasse von kreditnehmern erfolgt die kreditvergabe in zwei stufen wahrend auf der ersten stufe eine ubernachfrage vorliegen kann herrscht auf der zweiten stufe marktraumung bei mehreren unterscheidbaren kreditnehmerklassen wird eine klasse nur unter den bedingungen vom kreditmarkt ausgeschlossen bei deren vorliegen sie auch in einem vollkommenen kreditmarkt keinen kredit erhalten wurde

optimal electoral timing exercise wisely and you may live longer using insights from option pricing in finance we explore the electoral timing problem in a flexible term democracy we assume that politic ally heterogeneous voters continuously learn over time about the evolving party merits this yields a mean reverting stochastic process for the support of the parties the incumbent sees its poll support and must call an election within five years o f the last election we assume that it wishes to maximize its expected total time in office so that this resembles the optimal exercise rule for an american financial o ption we characterize how the renewable election option behaves as waiting and stopping values interact we then calibrate our model to the labour tory rivalry in the u k with polling data from 1943 2005 and the 16 elections after 1945 excluding three elections essentially forced by weak governments our maximizing story explains when the elections were called quite well we also measure the value of election options finding that over the long run they should more than double the expected time in power of a fixed term electoral cycle