employment rents and the incidence of strikes a new measure of labor market tightness on workers behavior the employment rent is modeled as a determinant of workplace conflict an empirical estimate of the employment rent workers expected cost of job loss is calculated it is argued that the cost of job loss affects strike incidence this relationship is tested by estimating an econometric model of strike incidence for the united states from 1955 to 1983 the cost of job loss is shown to explain a large percentage of the variation in strike incidence the cost of job loss is a far superior explanatory variable than the unemployment rate which is commonly used in strike models copyright 1987 by mit press

social approval values and afdc a re examination of the illegitimacy debate this paper models the fertility decision of individuals who differ in their wage rate and their intensity of preferences for rearing children and whose utility of having a child out of wedlock depends on the level of social approval associated with doing so this social approval in turn is a function of the fraction of individuals in previous generations that chose to have children out of wedlock the model is a straightforward extension of the typical rational choice model that motivates much of the empirical literature a literature that has cast doubt on a strong link between afdc and illegitimacy however the model introduces elements from epidemic models that many have in mind when arguing for such a link as a result the predictions of this extended model are consistent with empirical findings while at the same time linking the rise in illegitimacy solely to government welfare programs specifically a program similar to afdc is introduced into an economy with low illegitimacy rates and a trans

a new test of money income causality this paper investigates the prima facie causal relationship between money and income employing a methodology the multiple rank f test the results of which are invariant to monotonic transformations of all variables and robust over alternative distributions of the errors in contrast to prior functional form dependent parametric analyses evidence of prima facie causality between money and income is found for the 1970 88 time period this evidence is consistent with an elementary theoretical framework in which the direction and strength of causality is dependent upon the definition of money copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

social networks and technology adoption in northern mozambique despite their potentially strong impact on poverty agricultural innovations are often adopted slowly using a unique household dataset on sunflower adoption in mozambique we analyse whether and how individual adoption decisions depend upon the choices of others in the same social networks since farmers anticipate that they will share information with others we expect farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other adopters dynamic considerations however suggest that farmers who know many adopters might strategically delay adoption to free ride on the information gathered by others we present empirical evidence that shows that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of known adopters is shaped as an inverse u in line with information sharing the network effect is stronger for farmers who report discussing agriculture with others the data contains information which is needed to ameliorate the identification issues that commonly arise in this context in particular social networks are precisely identified and in addition we can control for village heterogeneity and endogenous group formation

lag length selection and tests of granger causality between money and income one of the most widely accepred relationships in macroeconomics is the positive relationship between the rate of growth of the money supply and the rate of growth of income a diversity of opinion arises however with the attempt to identify a causal relationship between these variables while friedman and schwartz 1963 initiated the empirical investigation of money income causality sims 1972 made the most significant contribution to this literature with a practical application of the criterion developed by granger 1969 for identifying a causal relationship since the appearance of sims s approach and an alternative one advanced by sargent 1976 many researchers have applied these techniques to the investigation of the causal relationship between money and income l with two exceptions hsiao 1981 and mcmillin and fackler 1984 these researchers have arbitrarily chosen the lengths of their distributed lags the purpose of this paper is to test for granger causality between money and income this paper differs from previous work in that considerably more attention is focused on the effect of the lag specification on the test results in particular we investigate the extent to which rules of thumb arbitrary lag specifications and

social norms and moral hazard the probability of income loss depends on talent and effort effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence the social no

employment and welfare participation among women laurie j bassi the model makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary welfare receipt the findings suggest that among female heads of households the increase in welfare receipt that occurred between 1967 and 1979 was almost completely attributable to an increase in involuntary unemployment and an increase in the proportion of the population that was eligible for welfare due to changes in program parameters the passage of time used as a proxy for changes in the stigma associated with receiving welfare appears to be of secondary importance the labor supply response to welfare programs is small and possibly diminishing over time i introduction during the last thirty years the aid to families with dependent children afdc and food stamp programs experienced phenomenal increases in outlays between 1965 and 1975 the afdc population grew 162 percent and real government spending on benefits more than tripled by 1980 the probability that a family was receiving afdc was four times the probability in 1950 value the food stamp program after its introduction in the late 1960s experienced equally dramatic increases in recipiency rates and outlays these striking increases in welfare costs and participation brought an emerging consensus that the afdc and food stamp programs had failed as charles murray writes in losing ground 1984 146 the popular wisdom is characterized by hostility toward welfare it makes people lazy historian james patterson 1981 179 provides an alternative though not inconsistent explanation of the skyrocketing caseloads despite the hostility of the middle classes to increases in welfare poor americans refused at last to be cowed from applying for aid compared to the past when poor people harassed and stigmatized by public authorities were slow to claim their rights this was a fundamental change both of these explanations of the increase in welfare participation assert changes in people s response to the programs murray claims that program changes in the 1960s induced negative labor supply responses increasing numbers of individuals voluntarily reduced their earned income in order to become eligible for welfare patterson claims that a reduction in the stigma associated with welfare led a greater percentage of those eligible to apply for welfare a theoretical model for evaluating the validity of these two views as descriptions of reality is presented here the model is tested using data on women who headed households at some time between 1967 to 1979 the analysis attempts to identify changes in behavior among female heads of households but does not model the decision to head a family a decision which embodies both marital status and fertility choices the implications of this limitation are discussed at the end of the paper the focus is on developing a tractable theoretical structure that allows for a distinction between voluntary and involuntary welfare participation the model also provides a simple test for whether reported unemployment is a constraint on choice or rather a result of it i e whether unemployment too is involuntary or voluntary the empirical results enable us to dis aggregate the changes in welfare participation into their component parts the findings suggest that the increase in welfare participation rates among female heads of households during the late 1960s and 1970s is attributable to both an increase in involuntary unemployment and to an increase in those eligible for welfare as a result of changes in program parameters the passage of time used as a proxy for a lessening of stigma appears to be of minor importance the labor supply response to welfare programs appears to be small and possibly diminishing over time in section ii a model for determining the effect of redistribution schemes on labor supply and welfare participation decisions is developed

the poverty assistance paradox we present a model of preferences on welfare transfers which incorporates the recipient s wealth as a signal of needs and deservingness we show that a paradox may arise the poorer the recipient is the less transfer he she will get implications might include the negative impact of targeting assistance to the poorest on public support for welfare

optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion expected utility versus prospect theory abstract it is now well known that the predictions of expected utility theory eut applied to tax evasion are quantitatively and qualitatively at variance with the evidence while prospect theory pt makes the correct predictions in this literature the tax rate is exogenous we endogenize the tax rate and require that a successful theory should explain jointly the facts on the tax rate tax gap and the level of government expenditure we find that the data is best described by taxpayers using pt and the government using standard utility theory eut the results are robust to several possible alternative specifications we discuss how our results have a bearing on the debate between liberalism versus paternalism in behavioral economics we also propose an alternative explanation based on the notion of context dependent preferences

the labour supply unemployment and participation of lone mothers in in work transfer programmes in work transfer schemes have recently been suggested as a device for encouraging labour force participation and reducing the severity of the disincentives associated with out of work income support schemes here we estimate a discrete choice labour supply model which allows for endogenous in work welfare programme participation we also allow for involuntary unemployment so as to distinguish between programme non participation and an inability to obtain work and thereby generate an eligibility to the programme

food stamps as money the macroeconomics of a transfer program food stamps represent nearly 11 billion of personal income in the united states the coupons that are issued to provide purchasing power to recipients are also reserves for the commercial banking system this study asks at what rate these coupons are substitutable for what is usually considered money the results based on estimates for 1959 81 suggest that food stamp coupons are substitutable for m1 on a one for one basis and a revised money supply series including food stamp money is included together with other estimates showing that the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamps is higher than that out of ordinary income the results suggest that the food stamp program is an automatic fiscal and monetary stabilizer under its provisions both the money stock and disposable income are increased during a recession

how income transfer programs affect work savings and the income distribution a critical review for helpful comments on earlier drafts we thank without implicating moses abramovitz yves balcer john bishop alan blinder richard burkhauser michael darby irwin garfinkel alan gustman daniel hamermesh martin holmer george jakubson robert lampman paul menchik robert moffitt michael murray joseph quinn timothy smeeding eugene smolensky barbara wolfe and two anonymous referees

child labor cause consequence and cure with remarks on international labor standards although the literature on child labor is enormous it lacks a common theoretical foundation in this paper analytical survey of this field is provided keeping in mind that this is an area where the primary reason for theorizing is ultimately to influence policy overall it is noted that the literature on child labor is an illustration of abundance and anarchy although empirical writings on child labor are numerous they are not usually founded on theory it is argued that there is much that can be done in curbing the issue of child labor several theories were studied in this paper including collaborative intervention such efforts include public action which alters the economic environment such that the parents of their own accord prefer to withdraw the child from labor force another strategy involves the government a legal intervention is enforcing a total ban on the subject although such interventions have good intentions some of them may not be feasible in general it is better to take economy wide measures against child labor and if there is to be a sector specific ban it should be based on the working conditions of that sector rather than the destination of the goods

causality analysis and multivariate autoregressive modelling with an application to supermarket sales analysis abstract this paper describes a modelling methodology for multivariate stochastic processes the concept of multiple causality is discussed and a procedure to detect multiple causality is suggested the data of a major canadian supermarket is analyzed and a multivariate autoregressive model for this supermarket is constructed and estimated several empirical findings are reported

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma based model of tax evasion abstract this paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma based model of tax compliance the paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge precisely multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous because the social coordination effect dominates the individual characteristics effect numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two step audit policies on the part of the tax agency under the presumption that the best or good equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria as a byproduct the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two step audit policy the equilibrium compliance and fiscal revenue is analyzed

a socio economic model of stigma and related social problems abstract recent years have seen a rapid expansion of economic literature on stigma a notion that had been widely studied in sociology in relation to social deviance yet the economic literature overlooks the original sociological intuition that certain consequences of stigmatization could be socially inefficient this paper formalizes this intuition by developing a model of community behavior which mimics a classic sociological setting concerning the rehabilitation of a former criminal offender the conditions under which a socially inefficient equilibrium arises are derived some of those conditions are shown to be consistent with the findings from micro labor studies on crime

preference reversals without the independence axiom the preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of decision theory however recent theoretical papers have demonstrated that the preference reversals that were observed in earlier experiments could be explained by subject violations of the independence axiom or the compound lottery axiom therefore those preference reversals are not known to be inconsistent with generalization of expected utility theory that replace the independence axiom the present paper reports the results of experiments in which a substantial proportion of subject responses violate the asymmetry axiom these results are inconsistent with expected utility theory and its generalizations copyright 1989 by american economic association

estimating the value of an in kind transfer the case of food stamps the value of one in kind transfer food stamps is estimated by evaluating the experience of an actual conversion from stamps to cash in puerto rico in 1982 the evidence indicates that the cashout of the stamps had no detectable influence on food expenditures the explanation partly lies in the distribution of expenditures for the stamps were inframarginal for most recipients however some evidence indicates that trafficking in stamps was widespread as well including indirect evidence from estimation of the piecewise linear constraint model copyright 1989 by the econometric society

understanding welfare stigma taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination abstract welfare stigma is widely regarded to be of central importance in understanding the impact of welfare programs in their goal of alleviating poverty it affects both the decision to take up benefits and the well being of those who actually do this paper develops alternative models of the determinants of welfare stigma we identify two views a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view we discuss how each may be formalized and derive their implications we then examine what they imply about the relationship between stigma and program design

analyzing the length of welfare spells abstract this paper studies the determinants of the length of individual spells of welfare focusing on how the length of a spell affects the probability of its termination the analysis utilizes six years of monthly data on time spent in the afdc program among female household heads a variety of duration dependence models are estimated monthly afdc participation does not show strong evidence of duration dependence two distinct groups appear to utilize welfare one with a very low and constant probability of leaving welfare and a second group which is more affected by time on the program

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

welfare as a cause of poverty a time series analysis since the inception of welfare programs critics have argued that giving aid to the poor dampens their incentive to provide for themselves and their dependents 1 charles murray s losing ground 1984 presents a modern reincarnation of this work disincentive hypothesis he notes that both nominal welfare benefits and caseloads increased during the seventies suggesting that higher benefits cause more people to join the welfare rolls others contend that welfare receipt may be a necessity rather than a matter of personal choice even if the nonworking poor actively sought employment many would not be able to find jobs furthermore many would find only low paying jobs which would not enable them to work their way out of poverty e g abraham 1983 in this view unemployment labor market segmentation and low wages cause poverty which view is correct studies of the effects of welfare typically specify a single model and use regression analysis to test whether the data support its implications in contrast this paper uses the granger 1969 causality test in a system of welfare and employment equations this strategy offers two advantages first regression presumes causality whereas the granger approach tests whether or not causality defined in a technical sense exists second we can use a very general empirical model to test the work disincentive hypothesis as well as the implications of two competing models section 2 presents three models of the welfare caseload and their implied patterns of causality section 3 explains granger s concept of and test for causality in section 4 the test is performed indicating the direction of causality between real afdc benefits the afdc caseload and unemployment we then repeat the exercise using labor force participation rates rather than unemployment rates the paper concludes with a summary of the results and their qualifications

network effects and welfare cultures we empirically examine the role of social networks in welfare participation using data on language spoken at home to better infer networks within an area our empirical strategy asks whether being surrounded by others who speak the same language increases welfare use more for those from high welfare using language groups this methodology allows us to include local area and language group fixed effects and to control for the direct effect of being surrounded by one s language group these controls eliminate many of the problems in previous studies the results strongly confirm the importance of networks in welfare participation

corruption tax evasion and social values we provide a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into we address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents citizens and politicians citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate we show that multiple self fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities indicating that corruption may corrupt furthermore we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria instead policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium

do welfare benefits cause the welfare caseload analyses of the welfare system generally examine one of five competing models 1 the work disincentive model 2 the human capital model 3 the macroeconomic model 4 the public choice model or 5 the cost of job loss model this paper employs the granger causality concept and the multiple rank f statistic to test the implications of all five of these models simultaneously the results offer modest support to all but the macroeconomic model the relationships among welfare benefits caseloads and labor market conditions appear to be too complex to be fully captured by a single model

geographical targeting for poverty alleviation an introduction to the special issue in the face of rising public deficits and shrinking public resources geographical targeting may be a viable way to allocate resources for poverty alleviation in developing countries efficiency can be increased and leakage to the non poor reduced substantially by targeting increasingly smaller areas this article and more generally the symposium on geographical targeting for poverty alleviation proposes several techniques for augmenting data to produce more detailed poverty maps it focuses on practical considerations in the design of geographically targeted poverty alleviation programs in particular it assesses the advantages and disadvantages of geographical targeting and describes how geographic information systems can be applied to improve poverty mapping

takeup social multipliers and optimal social insurance abstract this paper examines the optimal provision of unemployment insurance ui in a framework that accounts for behavioral responses along both the intensive and extensive margins two formulations of takeup are considered in the first individuals face a takeup cost that is exogenous in the second the cost depends endogenously on the takeup rate such endogenous costs to takeup lead to a social multiplier a reduced form parameter summarizing the strength of social interactions this paper derives a formula for the optimal replacement rate in terms of the takeup and duration elasticities and the social multiplier the formula is applied by estimating the social multiplier using policy variation in ui benefit levels the results suggest that social multiplier effects account for 35 of the total effect of ui on takeup and yield an optimal replacement rate around 60 of pre unemployment wages 20 higher than previous estimates

conspicuous conservation the prius halo and willingness to pay for environmental bona fides abstract this paper develops a theory of conspicuous conservation a phenomenon related to conspicuous consumption in which individuals seek status through displays of austerity amid growing concern about environmental protection we identify a statistically and economically significant conspicuous conservation effect in vehicle purchase decisions and estimate a mean willingness to pay for the green signal provided by the distinctively designed toyota prius in the range of 430 4200 depending upon the owner s location results are related to the growing literature on green markets and suggest that policy should target less conspicuous conservation investments that will be under provided relative to those that confer a status benefit

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

welfare programs in the rent seeking society over the past fifteen years the interest group theory of government behavior has shown itself to be an empirically rich and powerful explanatory tool applications have included environmental regulation 14 17 federal trucking regulation 15 the output of state legislatures 12 and numerous other government programs and activities but one important subset of government programs has been consistently neglected in the literature meanstested transfer programs as a group the poor are not well organized for political lobbying they are dispersed and consequently face high organization costs further as a potential lobbying group the poor face potentially overwhelming free rider problems i e all of the poor stand to benefit from poverty programs that some subset of the poor achieve via lobbying for this reason the interest group theory of government seems to offer meagre explanatory power in the case of poverty programs many who otherwise typically interpret governmental activity from the perspective of rent seeking analysis make an exception when it comes to welfare programs and argue that here ideology mostly egalitarian ideology has for some unexplained reason dominated the political process there is sometimes a reference to the imperialism of the welfare bureaucracy which benefits indirectly from any expansion of the poverty program system and admittedly this seems to be a plausible partial explanation for the rapid recent growth of welfare spending finally tullock 19 has adopted a radical reinterpretation arguing that the welfare state does not really transfer net wealth to the poor at all but actually represents a thinly disguised system of net transfers to better organized middle class interest groups the tullock hypothesis is designed mainly to explain major patterns of government transfer spending it represents an attempt to reinterpret the net effect of transfer spending on the wealth positions of different income groups and does not attempt to explain specific welfare programs from an interest group perspective while this approach has merit an interest group analysis of specific welfare programs must concern itself with the functional consequences of particular programs and the interest groups which benefit from them both directly and indirectly but such an analysis should not necessarily presuppose that the poor themselves are the most important politically relevant interest group involved in the lobbying process or even that they play a major role very substantial transfers to the poor or to any other recipient group may ultimately be the result of interest group pressure in the

optimal redistribution with endogenous social norms in this paper we examine the effect of social norms on redistributive policies where social norms are reflected in the degree of work participation among the different skill classes participation is driven both by the material incentives and heterogeneous preferences for leisure of each skill class and by an endogenous social norm results for optimal redistributive taxation show that when the social norm enters as a benefit or cost for participants participation taxes are generally lower than in its absence multiple participation equilibria can occur and an engineered shift from a low to a high participation equilibrium can be pareto improving in the long run

social norms and welfare state dynamics the paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance if the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise we also discuss welfare state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of benefi