financial markets and growth the last five years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth this issue had been extensively studied nearly two decades earlier by goldsmith 1969 mckinnon 1973 shaw 1973 and others who produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates with growth but their work though insightful lacked analytical foundations in traditional growth theory financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but not to their respective growth rates the latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress the recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems mainly from the insights and techniques of endogenous growth models which have shown that there can be self sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth rate can be related to preferences technology income distribution and institutional arrangements this provides the theoretical underpinning that early contributors lacked tinancial intermediation can be shown to have not only level effects but also growth effects the resulting models have offered important insights into the effect of financial development on growth and vice versa they have also provided new impetus to empirical research on these issues this paper reviews the ground covered so far on the theoretical and empirical front and points to some still unresolved issues

a test of independence of discounting from quality of life the quality adjusted life years qaly model assumes quality and quantity of life can be multiplied into a single index and requires quality and quantity to be mutually independent which need not hold empirically this paper proposes a new test for measuring independence of utility of life duration from quality of life in a riskless setting we use a large representative sample of dutch citizens and include two health states generally considered better than dead btd and one health state considered worse than dead wtd independence cannot be rejected when comparing the btd health states but is rejected when comparing the btd states with the wtd state in particular utility of life duration becomes more concave for the wtd state this may suggest that independence holds only for btd health states this has implications for the qaly model and would require using sign dependent utility of life duration functions

the winner s curse problem interest costs and the underpricing of initial public offerings this paper provides the first direct test of the winner s curse problem proposed by k rock 1986 as an explanation to the underpricing of initial public offerings moreover it tests the proposition that the underpricing of initial public offerings in the united kingdom is due to the combined effect of the winner s curse problem and the particular nature of the settlement mechanism applicable in the british new issues market the evidence demonstrates that when these two factors winner s curse problems and interest rate costs are taken into consideration the emerging first day net returns are on average markedly lower than the level of actual underpricing consistently superior performance can only be achieved by predicting the market s response to the individual new issue the results however indicate that such predictive ability is largely unattainable copyright 1990 by royal economic society

privatisation around the world evidence from panel data this paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977 99 period the empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries endowed with deep and liquid stock markets and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints but the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries where shareholders are poorly protected banks powerful and capital markets less developed

measuring discounting without measuring utility we introduce a new method to measure the temporal discounting of money unlike preceding methods our method requires neither knowledge nor measurement of utility it is easier to implement clearer to subjects and requires fewer measurements than existing methods

stock markets and development this paper asks if financial development especially stock market development affects the level and or the growth rate of economic activity it finds a substantial effect on both current wisdom suggests that the growth effects of financial intermediation could be either permanent or transitory for instance the greenwood jovanovic 1990 henceforth gj model has an ak stucture with no diminishing returns to the reproducible factor and a permanent exogenous improvement in financial structure would cause a permanent increase in the rate of growth on the other hand if the returns to the reproducible factor did diminish better intermediation could lead only to level effects since one should not a priori exclude either growth effects or level effects we shall look for both our search for growth effects will use the gj model our search for level effects will rely on an amended version of the mankiw romer and weil 1992 henceforth mrw structure

endogenous growth and the emergence of equity finance abstract this paper characterises the development of equity markets as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by the development of the real sector of the economy in overlapping generations economy borrowers seek funds to run risky investment projects by drawing up contracts which may take the form of either equity or debt issue in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders the optimal contract is determined by trading off information dilution costs against bankruptcy costs significantly the equilibrium choice of contract depends on the state of the economy which in turn depends on the contracting regime based on this analysis the paper provides a theory of the joint determination of real and financial development with the ability to explain the emergence of a stock market along the path of real development

time preference the discounted utility model and health the constant rate discounted utility model is commonly used to represent intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations this paper examines the appropriateness of this model and argues that the model fails both normatively and descriptively as a representation of individual intertemporal preferences for health outcomes variable rate discounted utility models are more flexible but still require restrictive assumptions and may lead to dynamically inconsistent behaviour the paper concludes by considering two ways of incorporating individual intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations that allow for complementarity of health outcomes in different time periods

rare disasters and exchange rates we propose a new model of exchange rates which yields a theory of the forward premium puzzle our explanation combines two ingredients the possibility of rare economic disasters and an asset view of the exchange rate our model is frictionless has complete markets and works for an arbitrary number of countries in the model rare worldwide disasters can occur and affect each country s productivity each country s exposure to disaster risk varies over time according to a mean reverting process ri sky countries command high risk premia they feature a depreciated exchange rate and a high interest rate as their risk premium mean reverts their exchange rate appreciates therefore currencies of high interest rate countries appreciate on average to make the notion of disaster risk more implementable we show how options prices might in principle uncover latent disaster risk and help forecast exchange rate movements we then extend the framework to incorporate two factors a disaster risk factor and a business cycle factor we calibrate the model and obtain quantitatively realistic values for the volatility of the exchange rate the forward premium puzzle regression coefficients and near random walk exchange rate dynamics finally we solve a model of stock markets across countries which yields a series of predictions about the joint behavior of exchange rates bonds options and stocks across countries the evidence from the options market appears to be supportive of the model jel e43 e44 f31 g12 g15

on negative time preferences abstract survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses this holds for monetary and non monetary outcomes these results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non monetary outcomes

do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate takeover market abstract we contrast the winner s curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers the winner s curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover in our empirical estimation we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals controlling for endogeneity we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition we also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding analysis of post takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition as a whole the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner s curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

the fragility of time time insensitivity and valuation of the near and far future we propose that the temporal dimension is fragile in that choices are insufficiently sensitive to it and second such sensitivity as exists is exceptionally malleable unlike other dimensions such as money which are attended by default to test this we axiomatize a constant sensitivity discount function and in four studies we show that the degree of time sensitivity is inadequate relative to the compound discounting norm and strongly susceptible to manipulation time sensitivity is increased by a comparative within subject presentation experiment 1 direct instruction experiment 3 and provision of a visual cue for time duration experiment 4 time sensitivity is decreased using a time pressure manipulation experiment 2 in each study the sensitivity manipulation has an opposite effect on near future and far future valuations increased sensitivity decreases discounting in the near future and increases discounting in the far future in contrast such sensitivity manipulations have little effect on the money dimension

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

strategic timing of adoption of new technologies under uncertainty abstract in this paper we introduce experience effects into a duopoly game of timing of adoption of new technologies which exhibit exogenous technological progress departing from the existing literature with this model we obtain continuous and downward sloping reaction functions we find that a higher level of uncertainty increases the extent of dispersion between the equilibrium timings of adoption furthermore we find that the equilibrium timings are even more dispersed when the leader takes the follower s reaction into account when firm roles are made endogenous we find that if there is an incentive to lead follow the equilibrium timings are more less dispersed finally we show that it is possible for collusive adoption to improve welfare

does prospect theory explain ipo market behavior we derive a behavioral measure of the ipo decision maker s satisfaction with the underwriter s performance based on loughran and ritter 2002 and assess its ability to explain the decision maker s choice among underwriters in subsequent securities offerings controlling for other known factors ipo firms are less likely to switch underwriters when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the ipo underwriter s performance underwriters also extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision makers although our tests suggest that the behavioral model has explanatory power they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in ipo initial returns the primary equity or ipo markets are subject to a variety of well known idiosyncratic patterns not least the tendency for ipos to appear underpriced on the first day of trading the profession has invested heavily in explanations for these patterns see ritter and welch 2002 and jenkinson and ljungqvist 2001 for recent reviews the vast majority of theoretical work in the area builds at least implicitly on the premise that market participants are rational and maximize expected utility subject to the burden of market frictions asymmetric information of one sort or another is the friction most widely examined and there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that such frictions account for at least some of the cross sectional and time variation in the idiosyncratic patterns and yet the question remains whether we can explain more than a small fraction of variation in the data recent events related to the dot corn bubble of the late 1990s lend weight to this concern and lead ritter and welch 2002 to suggest that shifting the focus of the research agenda will lead to

european corporate governance trading off liquidity against control abstract ownership dispersion is a pre requisite for liquid stock markets but it entails a collective action problem individual investors have no incentives to engage in direct monitoring legal devices can provide solutions along three dimensions one they can concentrate or dilute voting power two they can affect liquidity three they can give the right or wrong monitoring incentives this paper shows how these devices are used and how they can depress liquidity legal constraints aimed at strengthening minority protection can reduce the scope for monitoring destroy liquidity and even create incentives for minority abuse for example one share one vote restrictions encourage the formation of pyramidal holding companies the search for solutions that concentrate voting power provide liquidity and protect minorities continues

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

frames of reference and the quality of life asked to choose most people state confidently that they would rather be killed in an automobile accident than to survive a quadraplegic and so we are not surprised to learn that severely disabled people experience a period of devastating depression and disorientation in the wake of their accidents what we do not expect however are the speed and extent to which many of these victims accommodate to their new circumstances within a year s time many quadraplegics report the same mix of moods and emotions as able bodied people do there is also evidence that the blind the retarded and the malformed are no less happy than other people ads for the new york state lottery show participants fantasizing about how their lives would change if they won i d buy the company and fire my boss people who actually do win the lottery report the anticipated rush of euphoria in the weeks after their good fortune followup studies done after several years however indicate that these people are no happier indeed are in many ways less happy than before as a young man fresh out of college i served as a peace corps volunteer in rural nepal my one room house had no electricity no heat no indoor toilet no running water the local diet offered little variety and virtually no meat and yet at no time during my two year stay in nepal did i experience a sense of material deprivation on the contrary my monthly stipend of 40 was much more than most others in my village had and with it i experienced a feeling of prosperity that i have recaptured only in recent years these observations illustrate the critical role of context as a determinant of human satisfaction the neoclassical economic model of choice abstracts from context saying that utility depends only on the level of consumption consumption levels obviously are important and the neoclassical model performs reasonably well in many instances and yet its narrow focus misses something important to predict people s behavior to draw inferences about their well being or to make intelligent policy decisions we must not only know the relevant levels of consumption but also have an appropriate frame of reference within which to evaluate them

the small sample bias of the gini coefficient results and implications for empirical research the gini coefficient is a downward biased measure of inequality in small populations when income is generated by one of three common distributions the paper discusses the sources of bias and argues that this property is far more general this has implications for i the comparison of inequality among subsamples some of which may be small and ii the use of the gini in measuring firm size inequality in markets with a small number of firms the small sample bias has often led to misperceptions about trends in industry concentration a small sample adjustment results in a reduced bias which can no longer be signed this remaining bias rises with the dispersion and falls with increasing skewness of the distribution finally an empirical example illustrates the importance of using the adjusted gini in this example it is shown that controlling for market characteristics larger shipping cartels include a set of firms that is stochastically identical in terms of relative size to those of smaller shipp

decision making over time and under uncertainty a common approach this paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice we begin by demonstrating a one to one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains i e expected utility and discounted utility models we argue that such violations or preference reversals are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice specifically it appears that 1 if we add a constant to all values of an attribute then that attribute becomes less important 2 if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute or if we change the sign of an attribute from positive to negative then that attribute becomes more important the generality of these propositions as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences is discussed

endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility thin equity markets cannot accommodate temporary bulges of buy or sell orders without large price movements the resulting volatility can induce risk averse transactors who face transaction costs to desert these markets thus thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self perpetuating features of an equity market irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals if however appropriate incentive schemes are adopted to encourage entry by additional investors this vicious circle can be broken eventually shifting the market to a selfsustaining superior equilibrium characterized by a higher number of transactors lower price volatility and larger supply of the asset a number of empirical studies cohen et al 1976 telser and higimbotham 1977 pagano 1986 tauchen and pitts 1983 have found that thin speculative markets are ceteris paribus more volatile than deep ones a plausible explanation for this finding is that thin markets are generally characterized by small numbers of transactors per unit time and thus their prices are more sensitive to the impact of individual traders demand shocks conversely in deep markets transactors are so many that the uncorrelated demand shocks experienced by individual traders tend to offset each other and leave market prices largely unaffected while this suggests a rationale for the observed relationship between market size and price volatility it does so by taking market size as the exogenous factor however the volatility of a speculative market may feed back on its size in the sense that the high liquidation risk implied by very volatile prices can induce potential entrants to keep out of the market this paper shows that in a stock market with transaction costs this interaction between thinness and volatility can produce multiple steady state equilibria some characterized by low trade and high volatility and others by high trade and low volatility whether the market will settle in one equilibrium or another depends entirely on the expectations held by economic agents sections 2 and 3 the existence of these multiple bootstrap equilibria can be explained heuristically as follows each additional trader generates a positive externality for other actual or potential traders by decreasing the riskiness of the stock lower risk in turn tends to attract more investors with the effect of raising stock prices and inducing corporations to issue additional equity we thus have a feedback loop between market size and price volatility where market size is measured both along the dimension of the number of traders and along that of the total stock of equities if however investors face transactions costs in the stock market this positive feedback may fail to be operative if the volume of trade is expected to be small investors with relatively high transaction costs will abstain from trading thus the market

emerging stock markets portfolio capital flows and long term economie growth micro and macroeconomic perspectives abstract the paper examines two major components of financial liberalization stock market development and portfolio capital flows in the context of less developed countries the paper considers microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives on their implications for long term development and economic growth it concentrates on 1 a the role of stock markets in financing corporate growth 2 b the implications of stock market volatility for resource allocation and productive efficiency and 3 c the interactions between the foreign exchange and stock markets in the context of economic shocks its policy recommendations are that ldcs should promote bank based systems influence the scale and composition of capital inflows and prevent a market for corporate control from emerging

financial liberalisation stockmarkets and economic development abstract during the 1980s and 1990s many developing countries dcs have been engaged in far reaching reforms of their financial systems liberalising them and making them more market oriented this liberalisation involving inter alia financial de repression has been inspired partly by the work of the mckinnon 1973 and shaw 1973 m s school this paper suggests that in addition to financial de repression there has been a major new element in the development of dc financial systems in recent years the establishment and fast expansion of stockmarkets these markets have played a key role in the internal as well as external financial liberalisation processes in leading dcs further the paper finds that the actual behaviour of these markets in many countries has led to outcomes which undermine the effects of the higher real interest rates arising from financial de repression

the online shadow of offline signals which sellers get contacted in online b2b marketplaces this article extends the understanding of what impels buyers to contact particular sellers in online business to business b2b marketplaces which are typically characterized by sparse social structures and concomitant limitations in observing social cues integrating an institutional perspective with signaling theory our core argument is that offline seller characteristics that are visible online in particular geographic location and legal status convey credible signals of seller behavior because they provide buyers with information on sellers local institutional quality and the institutionally induced obligations and controls acting on sellers using unique data from a large italian online b2b marketplace between the fourth quarter of 1999 and july 2001 we find that both sellers local institutional quality and their legal statuses affect a buyer s likelihood of contacting a seller moreover consistent with the idea that a buyer s own local institutional quality generates a relevant reference point against which sellers are evaluated we find that a buyer is progressively more likely to contact sellers the higher their local institutional quality relative to the buyer jointly our findings imply that in online b2b marketplaces signals conveyed by sellers geographic locations and legal statuses may constitute substantive sources of competitive heterogeneity and market segmentation

pyramidal groups and debt abstract this paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company however when this behavior increases the cost of funds the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent after accounting for standard controls we find that holding companies in italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role these findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

strategic asset allocation in a continuous time var model abstract this paper derives an approximate solution to a continuous time intertemporal portfolio and consumption choice problem the problem is the continuous time equivalent of the discrete time problem studied by campbell and viceira q j econ 114 1999 433 in which the expected excess return on a risky asset follows an ar 1 process while the riskless interest rate is constant the paper also shows how to obtain continuous time parameters that are consistent with discrete time econometric estimates the continuous time solution is the limit of that of campbell and viceira and has the property that conservative long term investors have a large positive intertemporal hedging demand for stocks

privatization political risk and stock market development in emerging economies this paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk we argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights we present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies we conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

risk aversion and the winner s curse this article analyzes an auction in which bidders see independent components of a common prize value the nash equilibrium for two rational bidders is shown to be independent of risk attitudes the information structure allows explicit calculation of an alternative equilibrium in which naive bidders do not correctly discount the value of the prize contingent on winning and thus they suffer the winner s curse subjects in a laboratory experiment clearly fall prey to the winner s curse the data conform most closely to the predictions of the naive model moreover the level of risk aversion implied by fitting the naive model is similar to an independent risk aversion measure obtained in a separate private value bidding exercise

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

learning in common value auctions some initial observations abstract inexperienced bidders in first price common value auctions suffer from a winner s curse losing money on average with experience bidders approximate the nash equilibrium the mechanisms underlying this adjustment are 1 a market selection effect as the most aggressive bidders are less likely to return for subsequent sessions and 2 players who lose money bid less experiential learning and those who would have lost money had they won the auction with the high bidder s signal bid less observational learning

empirical determinants of intertemporal choice abstract we provide new evidence on the empirical determinants of intertemporal financial decisions we use an exogenously imposed choice affecting nearly all croatian retirees to study characteristics associated with choosing a larger deferred stream of payments over a smaller more immediate payment individuals are more willing to defer if they have higher incomes and are not liquidity constrained have a longer time horizon because of better health and longer life expectancy and have stronger bequest motives individuals who expect currency devaluation or political risk to reduce the value of future income are more likely to take the earlier income stream

the decision to go public an overview abstract firms motives for going public are reviewed and significant cross country differences in the propensity to seek a listing are documented and discussed

corporate control and the market for managerial labour on the decision to go public abstract this paper analyses some of the tradeoffs involved in the decision to go public the main point is that entrepreneurs go public in order to fund larger projects but lose discretion over decisions by becoming accountable to outside investors the analysis focuses on succession and recruiting problems and assumes that the major source of private benefits of control is connected with investments in human capital firms control structure influences their decision to search for new managers this creates an externality between firms and equilibria can be pareto ranked such that the emergence of a superior control structure for all firms is inhibited by coordination failure

preplanned exit strategies in venture capital abstract this paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits the investor s initial strategy to sell the investee firm via an acquisition or an initial public offering ipo at the time of initial contract with the entrepreneur legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance we introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental european countries and these data indicate the following first preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights a greater probability that convertible securities will be used and a lower probability that common equity will be used the converse is observed for preplanned ipos second investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of german legal origin relative to socialist scandinavian and french legal origin third more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity

who benefits from secondary market price stabilization of iops abstract initial public offerings that receive secondary market price support from their underwriters are characterized by severely attenuated selling by small quantity presumably retail traders and more aggressive selling by large quantity presumably institutional traders the increase in institutional trading is concentrated in the first day of trading while the attenuation of retail trading persists this pattern exists in spite of the likelihood that retail investors receive relatively large initial allocations of fully priced stabilized offers thus the evidence is consistent with institutional investors being the primary beneficiaries of price stabilization efforts and with the use of penalty bids to constrain retail selling activity

the going public decision and the development of financial markets this paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency the choice between private and public financing and the development of capital markets in emerging economies generally the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire and if investors receive valuable information without cost the value of public firms generally depends on public market size which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public the model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development

diversification and competition financial intermediation in a large cournot walras economy abstract an economy with partially diversified imperfectly competitive cournot intermediaries is replicated the cournot walras equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive equilibrium with no uncertainty despite the convergence the tension between diversification and competition persists when the economy becomes large and is manifested in the rates of convergence of price quantities and per capita welfare to their respective limits to maximize the rate of convergence of per capita welfare resources must be allocated in a particular way that balances the gains from better diversified intermediaries and the gains from more competition in the intermediation sector journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d61 d89 g10 g21 l10 l16 o16

the geography of equity listing why do companies list abroad this paper documents aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies and analyzes their distinctive prelisting characteristics and postlisting performance in 1986 1997 many european companies listed abroad mainly on u s exchanges while the number of u s companies listed in europe decreased european companies that cross list tend to be large and recently privatized firms and expand their foreign sales after listing abroad they differ sharply depending on where they cross list the u s exchanges attract high tech and export oriented companies that expand rapidly without significant leveraging companies cross listing within europe do not grow unusually fast and increase their leverage after cross listing foreign listings are becoming an increasingly important strategic issue for companies and stock exchanges alike as companies become global in their product market and investment strategies direct access to foreign capital markets via an equity listing can yield important benefits at the same time the international integration of capital markets has led to unprecedented levels of competition among stock exchanges in this competitive struggle the winners are the exchanges that manage to attract more foreign listings and the attendant trading volume and business opportunities despite the importance of these issues still little is known about which exchanges succeed in capturing more listings from abroad and why this question is intimately related to a second issue namely which advantages companies expect to get from a foreign listing securing cheap equity capital for new investment allowing controlling shareholders to divest on a liquid market preparing for foreign acquisitions or simply enhancing the compa

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

the stock market as a source of capital some lessons from initial public offerings in italy abstract this paper complements the analysis of the decision to go public contained in pagano et al 1995 we compare a larger set of italian initial public offerings including holding companies with size matched private companies even in this larger sample we find evidence that 1 i the new equity capital raised upon listing is not used to finance subsequent investment and growth 2 ii going public reduces the cost of credit 3 iii it is often associated with equity sales by controlling shareholders and is followed by a higher turnover of control than for other companies a novel finding is that the funds raised are used to purchase stakes in other companies and other financial assets

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

corporate financing an artificial agent based analysis we examine corporate security choice by simulating an economy populated by adaptive agents who learn about the structure of security returns and prices through experience through a process of evolutionary selection each agent gravitates toward strategies that generate the highest payoffs despite the fact that markets are perfect and agents maximize value a financing hierarchy emerges in which straight debt dominates other financing choices equity and convertible debt display significant underpricing in general the smaller the probability of loss to outside investors the more likely the firm is to issue the security and the smaller the security s underpricing

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

umbrella branding as a signal of new product quality an example of signalling by posting a bond i present a signalling model in which a multiproduct firm can use its reputation as a bond for quality by using a brand name for an established product when it introduces a new experience good as out of equilibrium beliefs are specified a false signal may be taken to imply that both the established and the new product are of low quality in contrast the absence of a signal leaves open the possibility that one of the two products is of high quality hence the signal can be credible without excessive sunk costs as long as the bond posted is sufficiently large

pricing shares on a nascent market the nepal stock exchange 1994 96 abstract stimulated by their ability to facilitate privatization and to attract portfolio inflows recent literature on less developed country ldc stock exchanges has focused on relatively well established emerging markets wide international variations in the ratio of market capitalization to gdp however confirm that an important role for equity markets in economic development is not assured this study of early equity pricing in nepal therefore addresses the initial difficulties of establishing a viable exchange it investigates equity pricing in the absence of a trading history identifies favored equity characteristics and provides tentative evidence on the market valuation of liquidity before discussing policy inferences

the flotation of companies on the stock market abstract in some countries the size of the stock market and the number of listed companies have persistently lagged behind the growth of the economy trading externalities can help explain this fact an entrepreneur who goes public increases risk sharing opportunities for others this externality can lead to an inefficiently low number of listed companies and also generate multiple equilibria when flotation decisions are positively correlated across entrepreneurs this happens if these face borrowing constraints and lack liquidity and thus cannot diversify their portfolios unless they go public it also happens if trading shares is costly so that a sufficient number of issues must be listed to lure investors into the market

gain loss asymmetric stochastic differential utility abstract this study examines a gain loss asymmetric utility in continuous time in which the investor discounts their utility gain by more than the utility loss by employing the theory of stochastic differential utility the model allows an endogenously time varying subjective discount rate in addition the model can express various forms of utility functions including a version of the epstein zin utility under the model even if the state variables do not have any jump in their paths the optimal consumption wealth ratio and portfolio weight can change non smoothly

positive time preference the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling unless there is an infinite time horizon with the expectation of unending technological advance combined with what we call drastically diminishing marginal utility this finding holds both in the positive and normative senses a corollary is that savings are interest elastic

financing technology based small firms in europe what do we know this paper reviews the evidence on financing technology based small firms tbsfs in europe european tbsfs finance new investments by relying primarily on internal funds due to capital market failures induced by asymmetric information european venture capital has caught up with us venture capital but this is mainly because of the growth in uk venture investments it is unclear whether european venture capital has been able to certify the quality and enhance the growth of funded companies compared with the nasdaq there is little development of trading in high tech stocks in europe the so called new markets established in the 1990s collapsed in the wake of the internet bubble crash public venture capital and research and development r d tax incentives seem to have positively affected high tech firms

does the alternative investment market nurture firm growth a comparison between listed and private companies the creation of stock market segments with low admission requirements was welcomed in the 1990s as an essential move to release small and medium sized enterprises from their dependency on banks for external funding thereby removing the financial barriers that hinder their growth and competitiveness but does easier access to public equity really translate into superior real performance we explore this issue by focusing on the alternative investment market aim a junior segment of the london stock exchange that has experienced long lasting growth in capitalization

the costs of going public abstract this paper presents evidence regarding the two quantifiable components of the costs of going public direct expenses and underpricing together these costs average 21 22 of the realized market value of the securities issued for firm commitment offers and 31 87 for best efforts offers for a given size offer the direct expenses are of the same order of magnitude for both contract types but the underpricing is greater for best efforts offers an explanation of why some firms choose to use best efforts offers in spite of their apparent higher total costs is given

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

enterprise ownership constraints and the role of equity markets in financial development the long standing controversy of the contribution of equity markets to economic development has been reactivated by the emerging markets phenomenon positive reassessments have emphasised diversification and liquidity gains for investors funding risky long lived projects the present analysis adopts instead the viewpoint of the issuer the owner controlled enterprise typical of ldcs owners wealth is a fundamental constraint on expansion when gearing is limited by bankruptcy risk and minority equity issue eases this constraint it is suggested that equity and debt are thus complementary and that stock markets may improve overall allocative efficiency if equities correctly value firm prospects

reputational spillovers innovation licensing and entry abstract adoption of a new product by a multiproduct finn may affect all its sales by altering its reputation as an innovator if adopting a success has a halo effect that enhances the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit exceeds monopoly profit from the new product if adopting a failure has a black eye effect that damages the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit is maximized by a fixed fee not an auction when both effects are present an inventor licenses new products that are likely to succeed but enters with those that are likely to fail