coalitional stability of multi party systems evidence from poland function form game that represents payoffs of electoral coalitions in a multi party system three empirical hypotheses are formulated under the assumption that seat maximizing parties modify coalitional structures to extract gains from coalescing the hypotheses say that party systems under stable voter preferences and electoral law tend to stability with respect to splits and coalescing the partition function is estimated for various coalitional structures for the polish party system with simulation based on district level election results and survey data the estimates show that the polish party system is split stable while the opportunities for gains from coalitions on the right were exhausted between the years of 1993 and 1997 some opportunities for such gains emerged on the left introduction

implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation abstract in a finite trader version of the diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 1983 401 model the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism i e each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader when the model is modified by formalizing the sequential service constraint cf wallace fed reserve bank minneapolis quart rev 12 1988 3 the truth telling equilibrium implements the symmetric ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

party systems and electoral volatility in latin america a test of economic institutional and structural explanations three different theoretical explanations are tested for the exceptionally high level of electoral volatility found in contemporary latin america economic voting institutional characteristics of political regimes and party systems and the structure and organization of class cleavages a pooled cross sectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 58 congressional elections and 43 presidential elections in 16 latin american countries during the 1980s and 1990s institutional variables have the most consistent effect on volatility while the influence of economic performance is heavily contingent upon the type of election and whether the dependent variable is operationalized as incumbent vote change or aggregate electoral volatility the results demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of short term economic perturbations the institutional fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems and relatively fluid cleavage structures

the joint production of confidence endogenous regulation and nineteenth century commercial bank clearinghouses during the nineteenth century deposits increased relative to bank notes c ausing increased information asymmetry problems in banking this pape r describes how bank clearinghouses lowered these costs by monitoring bank activities and establishing mechanisms of managerial control i n effect regulating bank behavior such actions enforced the loca l one to one exchange rate between deposits and specie clearinghouse s increased regulation during financial panics creating and enforcin g a risk sharing device loan certificates for addressing panic rela ted information problems this paper concludes that the market s capacity to control bank managers depends on the banking product mix and more generally on information costs copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

rhetoric on the economy have european parties changed their economic messages abstractthis study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in european party manifestos we examined three main economic domains governmental control of the economy free market capitalism and support for the welfare state as consequences of globalization forces economic conditions partisanship and electoral turnout employing aggregate level comparative manifesto project cmp data from legislative elections in 15 european countries from 1970 to 2010 we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels partisanship of the cabinets regardless of the political orientation counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties economic messages in elections over the last 40 years

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

money credit and banking in monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained this problem creates a role for financial intermediaries such as banks who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans in general financial intermediation improves the allocation the gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers liquidity constraints we also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving

evil is the root of all money plenary talk delivered at the annual meeting of the society for economic dynamics this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

policy and the dynamics of political competition informed discussions of political competition by journalists pundits novelists country specialists or indeed practicing politicians usually describe a system in perpetual motion perpetual motion is seen as a normal state of affairs not a manifestation of chaotic instability and it is usually seen as having an endogenous dynamic what the actors do at cycle c of the political process feeds back to affect the entire process at cycle c 1 these informed discussions thus see politics as a complex dynamic system evolving under its own steam a system unlikely to reach steady state in stark contrast mainstream models of political competition are usually static with key model parameters and rules of interaction fixed exogenously although static models do not necessarily imply equilibrium almost invariably the core intellectual approach is to specify a model and solve for equilibrium authors of such models are typically driven by what cederman describes as a metaphysical conviction that equilibria are always out there waiting to be discovered a conviction that can blind the analyst to the possibility of adjustments never settling cederman 1997 34 35 but if common sense tells us party competition is a complex dynamic process then it also tells us party competition may never achieve equilibrium this paper addresses the striking disjuncture between the static nature of most formal models of party competition and the dynamic way in which informed observers who hardly ever talk about politics in terms of equilibrium think about the political process while many theorists would willingly concede in general terms that real political competition is a complex dynamic process the hard question concerns how to model this in a way that is both theoretically tractable and substantively plausible in what follows i set out

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

price competition in markets for dichotomous substitutes abstract the paper deals with price rivalry between two sellers of a differentiated good each firm occupies one of the two possible locations in the characteristics space considered this resembles real situations like the choice between dichotomous substitutes or examples coming from spatial economics the consumers population is partitioned in two groups according to preferences and the population density is constituted by two atoms transportation costs vary across consumers nevertheless the resulting firms demand functions share the continuity property at a non cooperative equilibrium the prices of the two goods differ and some consumers who rank highest the more popular brand find it convenient to purchase the less expensive alternative higher one firm concentration ratios are found to be consistent with lower equilibrium prices this last feature is verified comparing the non cooperative outcomes stemming from different original population densities

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

communism federalism and ethnic minorities explaining party competition patterns in eastern europe scholarship on east european politics expects that party competition in the region is determined by various communist legacies juxtaposing state centric authoritarianism to a liberal market economy recent empirical evidence however uncovers significant variance of party competition patterns across east european countries to explain this variance this article argues that an interaction between communist institutional framework and partisan responses to ethnic minorities determines party competition structure in the region while experience with communist federalism determines partisan affinities with ethnic minorities tolerance or support for ethnic minorities leads the political actors associated with those minorities to general socially liberal positions consequently and contrary to received knowledge ethnic politics influence the ideological content of party competition and structure party systems in eastern europe

money intermediation and banking the business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that of intermediation yet these two activities are frequently but not always combined together in the form of a banking system we develop a simple model to examine the question when is banking essential there is a role for money due to a lack of record keeping and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private information both money and intermediation are essential when monitoring costs associated with intermediation are sufficiently low the two activities can be separated from one another however when monitoring costs are sufficiently high a banking system that combines these two activities is essential

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

policy positions issue importance and party competition in new democracies this article examines the dynamics of vote redistribution after new party entry in the context of east european democracies contrary to the dominant institutional and sociological approaches the author focuses on the strategic policy choices of the new contestants the author argues that a new party s choice about where to place itself in relation to existing parties and which issues to emphasize can determine its electoral success or failure aggregate and individual level analyses confirm this argument the findings underline the importance of policy based party competition in the region as a broader theoretical contribution the study underscores the relevance of issue importance and not just party issue positions in political competition

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

private money creation and the suffolk banking system while much has been written on the history of the suffolk banking system somewhat surprisingly to our knowledge no attempt has been made to formally model its monetary consequences in this paper we attempt to fill this gap

on the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking such as the ability to undertake more profitable long term investment opportunities and the difficulties associated with it such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders i show that a specific banking arrangement a joint liability scheme provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

unpacking logm toward a more general theory of party system density the standard model of political party system density combines two traditions to explain why some countries have more political parties than others one tradition that emphasizes social cleavages and another that emphasizes electoral institutions especially district magnitude despite its considerable success there are several reasons to be less than fully satisfied with the standard model we examine two of these problems associated with the scope of strategic voting and the functional form of the specification used to test the model in doing so we contrast the standard interpretation with an organizational ecology model that accounts for what the standard model did so well but also accounts for important anomalies it ignores we reexamine some of the key analyses that have been used to test the standard model to assess the severity of its limitations and the utility of the rival organizational ecology account

private money and banking regulation we show that the regulation of lending practices is desirable for the optimal provision of private money in an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors neither an unregulated banking system nor a form of narrow banking in which banks hold 100 in reserves can provide the socially efficient amount of money if bankers provided such an amount then they would prefer to default on their liabilities we show that a regulation that increases the value of the banking sector s assets e g by limiting competition in credit markets will mitigate the commitment problem if the return on the banking sector s assets is made sufficiently large then it is possible to implement an efficient allocation