on the exclusion of assets from tests of the mean variance efficiency of the market portfolio this paper presents an analysis of the testability of the mean variance efficiency of a market index when the returns on some components of the index itself are not perfectly observable the results are basically not supportive of the notion that mean variance efficiency is testable on a subset of the assets bounding the market share of the missing asset and its expected return is not sufficient to produce a valid test when the variance of the missing asset is bounded and the amount of wealth that might be missing is small it is possible in principle to reject correctly the mean variance efficiency of a market index in his famous critique of the asset pricing theory tests roll 7 concludes that the only testable hypothesis associated with the generalized two parameter asset pricing model of black 1 is that the market portfolio is mean variance efficient it has been emphasized by ross 10 and roll 7 that the mean variance efficiency of the market portfolio is mathematically equivalent to a positive linear relation between expected returns and the betas calculated against such a portfolio roll 7 deduces that the theory capm is not testable unless the exact composition of the market portfolio is known and used in the tests this implies that the theory is not testable unless all individual assets are included in the sample errors of type one or two might occur when a market proxy is used instead of the true market portfolio even if the ex ante true expected returns and the covariance variance matrix of the returns on all the assets are used these errors are the result of the choice of the portfolio and as roll puts it even a small misspecification of the proxy s composition can lead to the wrong conclusion the market proxy might be mean variance efficient while the true market portfolio is not and vice versa in principle however there are cases in which the above two conditions are not both necessary to reject the theory one such exception presented by roll 7 is the case in which no totally positive portfolio is efficient if any totally positive market proxy is used a large sample would reject the null hypothesis unambiguously while the market portfolio identification problem constitutes a severe limitation to the testability of the theory the question of the mean variance efficiency of a particular market index with respect to a subset of assets is a typical problem of statistical inference the mean variance efficiency can be tested directly or by

mimicking portfolios and exact arbitrage pricing we characterize the sets of mimicking positions with returns that can serve in place of factors in an exact k factor arbitrage pricing relation for a set of n assets all of the sets are k dimensional nonsingular linear transformations of each other we interpret three examples of such transformations and discuss empirical considerations we provide conditions under which the mimicking positions can be expressed as portfolios and we characterize the relation between mimicking portfolios and the minimumvariance frontier

time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation evidence from a panel of german jurisdictions abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the tax base effects of local capital taxation using a large panel of german municipalities it tests whether both the local tax rate and the tax rate in adjacent jurisdictions affect the local tax base the results obtained from a spatial gmm approach confirm a strong negative impact of the local tax rate whereas the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities proves insignificant only if interacted with the relative population size of neighbors a significant positive impact is found indicating that externalities from taxing decisions of adjacent jurisdictions are experienced only by relatively small municipalities

forward exchange bias hedging and the gains from international diversification of investment portfolios abstract the gains to the us investor from international diversification of investment portfolios are examined for portfolio strategies that hedge and strategies that do not hedge exchange rate risk via the interbank forward market using the sharpe performance index and stochastic dominance as performance measures almost all the unhedged strategies outperformed the hedged strategies for 1985 1988 the opposite held for 1981 1984 the results are explained by the biasedness of forward rates in predicting future spot rates jel f30

the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series a quick computational method this note describes a much simpler computational method for carrying out the beveridge and nelson decomposition of economic time series into permanent and cyclical components

bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

in or out centralization by majority vote we present a positive theory of centralization of political decisions voters choose centralization or decentralization depending on their forecast of the political organization that will favor the policies they prefer we study the induced preferences for centralization as well results of different forms of referenda

using generalized method of moments to test mean variance efficiency this paper develops tests of unconditional mean variance efflciency under weak distributional assumptions using a generalized method of moments framework these tests are potentially more robust than commonly employed tests which rely on the assumption that asset returns are normally distributed and temporarily i i d using returns for size based portfolios from 1926 to 1988 we show that the conclusion concerning the mean variance effilciency of market indexes can be sensitive to the test considered the application of multivariate statistical techniques in financial economics has become common practice in recent years much of the development has been in the area of testing asset pricing models the assumption that asset returns follow a time invariant multivariate normal distribution permits tests of restrictions on model parameters in a pooled time series cross section framework these tests can be interpreted as tests of the mean variance efficiency of a portfolio or combination of portfolios gibbons 1982 jobson and korkie 1982 stambaugh 1982 shanken 1985 1987 kandel and stambaugh 1987 mackinlay 1987 and gibbons ross and shanken 1989 are examples of work presenting multivariate tests of the capital asset pricing model connor and korajczyk 1988 and lehmann and modest 1988 present multivariate tests of the arbitrage pricing model breeden gibbons and litzenberger 1989 present multivariate tests of the consumption based capm although these papers assume the normality of asset returns little analysis has been conducted to understand the sensitivity of the inferences to violations of this assumption 2 3

new tests of the life cycle and tax discounting hypotheses abstract we first test a version of the permanent income consumption function recently suggested by barro the results support the theory except that consumption expenditures show sensitivity to transitory income next we use the consumption model to test the tax discounting hypothesis which is strongly supported this support for tax discounting disagrees with results from some earlier studies using more traditional specifications of the consumption function however we show that when certain obviously inadequate estimation procedures are corrected the traditional models also support tax discounting this uniform support for tax discounting suggests that the sensitivity of consumption to transitory income is not due to liquidity constraints

corruption in america abstract we use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the u s to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption more educated states and to a smaller degree richer states have less corruption this relationship holds even when we use historical factors like congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today the level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization and uncorrelated with the size of government there is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state these results echo the cross country findings and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions

fiscal federalism and redistributive politics abstract we consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems we examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system we examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers we analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants we also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility

dynamic tax externalities and the u s fiscal transformation abstract we propose a theory of tax centralization in politico economic equilibrium taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are internalized at the federal but not at the regional level the political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government complementarities on the spending side decouple the equilibrium composition of spending and taxation and create a role for inter governmental grants the model provides an explanation for the centralization of revenue introduction of grants and expansion of federal income taxation in the u s around the time of the new deal quantitatively it accounts for approximately 30 of the federal revenue share s doubling in the 1930s and for the long term increase in federal grants

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

secession with natural resources we look at the formation of new indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources we argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources we describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post breakup local outcomes

decentralization and political career concerns abstract politicians career paths often start at some subnational governments and end at the national one allocation of authorities among national and subnational governments affects i how tempting the prospects of taking national offices are and hence how strong bureaucrats political career concerns are and ii whether the incentives generated by these political career concerns can be put into productive use at subnational governments we illustrate this tradeoff in determining the optimal degree of decentralization using china as a case study we also compare the equilibrium degree of decentralization in autocracy and in democracy

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

does centralization increase the size of government abstract are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally rather than locally in a prospective federation we abstract completely from well understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization for fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population such as redistributive transfer schemes social insurance and general government consumption centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument for fiscal programs with localized benefits such as provision of local public goods centralization creates opportunities for rent seeking which increases the size of government

the rise of the states u s fiscal decentralization in the postwar period article i nfo article history one of the most dramatic changes in the fiscal federalism landscape during the postwar period has been the rapid growth in state budgets which almost tripled as a share of gdp and doubled as a share of government spending between 1952 and 2006 we argue that the greater role of states cannot be easily explained by changes in tiebout forces of fiscal competition such as mobility and voting patterns and are not accounted for by demographic or income trends rather we demonstrate that much of the growth in state budgets has been driven by changes in intergovernmental interactions restricted federal grants to states have increased and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized state own source spending particularly in the areas of education health and public welfare these outside pressures moderate the forces of fiscal competition and must be taken into account when assessing the implications of observed revenue and spending patterns

a new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle abstract this paper introduces a general procedure for decomposition of non stationary time series into a permanent and transitory component allowing both components to be stochastic the permanent component is shown to be a random walk with drift and the transitory or cyclical component is a stationary process with mean zero the decomposition methodology which depends only on past data and therefore is computable in real time is applied to the problem of measuring and dating business cycles in the portwar u s economy we find that measured expansions and contractions are of roughly equivalent duration and that our dating of cyclical episodes tends to lead the traditional nber dating and to a lesser extent the growth cycle chronology of zarnowitz and boschan 1977

communication in federal politics universalism policy uniformity and the optimal allocation of fiscal authority the paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy relevant information depending on the type of policy under consideration communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible this generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending universalism and uniformity building on these findings i develop a theory of fiscal de centralization which revisits the work of oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication empirical results from a cross section of us municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

permanent and transitory components of colombia s real gdp abstract cuddington s 1986 over consumption hypothesis is revised by exploring how sensitive the results are to different methods of real gdp decomposition using a different model selection procedure we adopt an arima specification which leads to have a real gdp decomposition that lends no support to the over consumption hypothesis however cuddington s model also used in recent jde paper cuddington and urzua 1989 could be chosen for avoiding hypersensitivity of the permanent income how to balance trade offs between statistical and theoretical criteria in decomposition is an issue that requires further research

the protestant fiscal ethic religious confession and euro skepticism in germany during the european sovereign debt crisis most countries that ran into fiscal trouble had catholic majorities whereas countries with protestant majorities were able to avoid fiscal problems we find that christian conservative members of the german parliament from constituencies with higher shares of protestants were more likely to vote against a third bailout for greece survey data show that views on the euro differ between german protestants and non protestants at the individual level too among protestants concerns about the euro have compared to non protestants increased during the crisis we show that this increase in concern is linked to a reduction of protestants subjective well being we use the timing of survey interviews and news events in 2011 to account for the endogeneity of euro concerns emphasis on moral hazard concerns in protestant theology may thus still shape economic preferences jel d72 e00 i31 z12

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies abstract this paper investigates the desirability of international fiscal policy coordination in the presence of a domestic political distortion the domestic distortion results from the inability of the current policymaker to enter into a binding agreement with future policymakers about the composition of public spending this distortion generates a bias towards budget deficits international coordination can exacerbate the deficit bias and thus reduce social welfare at home and abroad the reason is that international coordination reduces the cost of running budget deficits and thus enhances the adverse effects of the domestic political distortion

on the jensen measure and marginal improvements in portfolio performance a note the marginal performance contribution made by new assets in a portfolio is identified the maximum change in a portfolio s sharpe performance from the addition of new assets is a simple function of a generalized jensen index and the unexplained covariances from a multivariate market model deviations from a higher dimension market line may be used to rank the desirability of asset additions to an existing portfolio statistical tests for the equality of the performance contributions by new assets is possible the portfolio performance measures of treynor 11 and jensen 12 are based on the systematic or beta measure of risk when originally developed it was advocated that these measures of performance were useful for comparing and ranking performances of various portfolios after many years of use in this area it was demonstrated by roll 7 and ross 8 that it is theoretically inappropriate to use these performance measures for this purpose since differences in portfolios performance indicate only inefficiency in the index used for the computation of beta dybvig and ross 1 subsequently proved that a portfolio can be improved by adding or shorting a small investment in another asset if the asset lies above or below the security market line a potentially important use of the market line was therefore preserved the purpose of this note is the development of a procedure which identifies the exact performance contribution made by one or more assets when they enter the investor s optimal portfolio of assets it is demonstrated that the change in squared sharpe 10 performance is a simple function of a generalized jensen index and the unexplained covariances from a multivariate market model new assets may be ranked according to the magnitude of their performance contribution the improvements in a portfolio are easily computable from the same linear regression employed to calculate an asset s jensen measure thus the appeal of the security market line as a useful financial tool may be preserved the first section briefly establishes the efficient set algebra required to develop the marginal contribution made by new assets in a portfolio section ii presents the performance contribution dependent on the number of new assets and whether partial or full optimal adjustment of the portfolio weights are permitted section iii concludes the note

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

public education reform community or national funding of education abstract i use a political economy model of public funding of education to evaluate the welfare implications of a move from a community to a nation wide funding policy broadening the scope of education finance has intragenerational redistribution effects as well as intergenerational effects previous studies have emphasized the intragenerational redistribution effects of moving from local to state financed systems while holding factor prices fixed the model in this paper includes a social security system and allows factor prices to vary endogenously i examine the welfare effects of broadening the scope of financing from a community to a nation wide system and find that there are very large welfare gains as voters internalize the effect of the education policy on both factor prices and social security benefits i also focus on the intergenerational distributional effects finding that significant welfare gains occur despite the displacement of the median voter to an older agent that cares less about children s well being

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

potential performance and tests of portfolio efficiency abstract the potential performance of an asset set may be obtained by choosing the portfolio proportions to maximize the sharpe 1966 performance measure if a portfolio has a sharpe measure equivalent to the potential performance of the underlying set of assets then it is efficient multivariate statistical procedures for comparing potential performance and testing portfolio efficiency are developed and then evaluated using simulations two likelihood ratio statistics are then used to compare stock and bond indices against sets of 20 and 40 portfolios the procedures are also compared to the gibbons 1982 methodology for testing financial models

canadian economic growth random walk or just a walk this paper analyses the role of shocks in canadian economic growth since 1870 it uses a nonparametric technique to evaluate the degree of presistence of an innnovation in long run gnp it is found that a one percent shock to canadian gnp changes the long run forecast of this variable by appproximately the same amount which is characteristic of a random walk process it is also shown that in important periods of canadian economic growth its gnp evolved as a random walk with constant drift with the exception of the period 1929 42 no evidence of business cycles is found these results lead to the conclusion that movements and oscillations in the gnp of canada since 1870 have been primarily driven by the accumulation of shocks rather than by cyclical movements

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

cross holdings estimation issues biases and distortions cross holding occurs when listed corporations own securities issued by other corporations we analyze the effect of cross holdings on market capitalization and return measures as well as implications for econometric testing of asset pricing theories we show that cross holdings generally distort standard market return and risk measures the magnitudes of such distortions are calculated for simulated economies by using a variety of crossholding patterns in addition cross holdings are shown to induce nonstationarity in the covariance matrix of security returns we examine the effect of this nonstationarity for estimating efficient frontiers and factor structures we also discuss the implications for risk return estimates in equilibrium asset pricing models article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

school decentralization helping the good get better but leaving the poor behind abstract the decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation the main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability however decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences in this paper we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on educational quality in argentina we find that decentralization had an overall positive impact on student test scores the decentralization gains however did not reach the poor thus although bringing decisions closer to the people may help the good get better the already disadvantaged may not receive these benefits

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

size structure and administrative overheads an empirical analysis of english local authorities the relationship is analysed between size local government structure and administrative overheads in english local authorities size and structure effects are tested while controlling for a range of other variables including the relative prosperity of the local population and the diversity of their service needs the empirical results show that population size consistently has a linear negative effect central administrative costs are lower in larger local authorities the results also show that controlling for size administrative overheads are higher for councils in the lower tier of the existing two tier system the analysis provides support for arguments that economies of scale might be achieved by amalgamating smaller councils into larger units and by combining counties and districts into unitary authorities

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

the demand for bad policy when voters underappreciate equilibrium effects most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians motives to supply bad policy but voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy in this article we posit that voters may systematically err when assessing potential changes in policy by underappreciating how new policies lead to new equilibrium behaviour this biases voters towards policy changes that create direct benefits welfare would rise if behaviour were held constant even if those reforms ultimately reduce welfare because people adjust behaviour conversely voters are biased against policies that impose direct costs even if they induce larger indirect benefits using a lab experiment we find that a majority of subjects vote against policies that while inflicting direct costs would help them to overcome social dilemmas and thereby increase welfare subjects also support policies that while producing direct benefits create social dilemmas and ultimately hurt welfare both mistakes arise because subjects fail to fully anticipate the equilibrium effects of new policies more precisely we establish that subjects systematically underappreciate the extent to which policy changes will affect the behaviour of other people and that these mistaken beliefs exert a causal effect on the demand for bad policy

political centralization and government accountability boffa acknowledges financial support from the free university of bolzano ww82 piolatto from the spanish ministry of science and innovation eco 2012 37131 and the government of catalonia 2014 sgr 420 ponzetto from the spanish ministry of science and innovation jci 2010 08414 and eco 2011 25624 the spanish ministry of economy and competitiveness ryc 2013 13838 the government of catalonia 2009 sgr 1157 and 2014 sgr 830 the barcelona gse and the bbva foundation through its first grant for researchers innovators and cultural creators

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

production subsidies and redistribution abstract who gains from stimulating output we explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension wealth there are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population first poorer agents gain from a rise in wages since to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply they work harder second because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future thus lowering real interest rates poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income we examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population we show that if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth then output stimulation and hence redistribution will only occur at time zero after that subsidies are zero a byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median voter theorem with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero the sequence preferred by the median wealth consumer is the unique outcome we also study lack of commitment since interest rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency we analyze this case formally by looking at the markov perfect time consistent equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers e g the median agent here subsidies persist they are constant over time and are more distortionary than under commitment moreover whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially in favor of the consumer who decides on policy it does not under lack of commitment

international investment restrictions and closed end country fund prices some closed end country funds trade at large premiums relative to their net asset values this paper examines whether international investment restrictions raise country fund price net asset value ratios by segmenting international capital markets we test whether a relation exists between announcements of changes in investment restrictions and changes in these ratios using weekly data from may 1981 to january 1989 the results provide evidence that some foreign markets are at least partially segmented from the u s capital market

shrouded costs of government the political economy of state and local public pensions abstract why do public sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits this paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers and government employees votes by promising compensation packages but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promised compensation if pension packages are shrouded so that public sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers then compensation will be highly back loaded in equilibrium the welfare of public sector workers could be improved holding total public sector costs constant if they received higher wages and lower pensions centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity more state level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs and that reduces pension generosity but a larger share of public sector workers will vote within the jurisdiction which increases pension generosity a short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states california and pennsylvania and two centralized states massachusetts and ohio suggests that centralization appears to have modestly reduced pensions but as the model suggests this is unlikely to be universal

decentralization and fuel subsidies abstract this paper explores the role of decentralization in explaining variation in fuel subsidies across countries using panel data over the period 1998 2008 and for 108 countries it emerges that the effect of decentralization taken to be an increase in the number of government levels broadly decreases both diesel and gasoline subsidies with this effect being more pronounced when the level of political accountability is low for developing countries for which political accountability is low decentralization decreases gasoline and diesel subsidies by at least 6 98 and 12 99 respectively for developed countries for which political accountability is high decentralization does not have any impact on both gasoline and diesel what this evidence points to is that in developing economies where voters are poorly informed and accountability is low decentralization appears to be associated with lower fuel subsidies

television and voter turnout i use variation across markets in the timing of television s introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout the estimated effect is significantly negative accounting for between a quarter and a half of the total decline in turnout since the 1950s i argue that substitution away from other media with more political coverage provides a plausible mechanism linking television to voting as evidence for this i show that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys i also show that both the information and turnout effects were largest in off year congressional elections which receive extensive coverage in newspapers but little or no coverage on television

federal mandates by popular demand this paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality public health highway safety and the provision of local public goods voters have single peaked preferences along a single policy dimension there are two levels of government federal and local the federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum or maximum policy localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate we show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict which leads to excessively severe mandates we show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public provided good is more efficient than local provision

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

assessing the importance of tiebout sorting local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 this paper argues that long run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods the tiebout hypothesis we develop an extension of the tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must weakly increase given the secular decline in mobility costs these predictions can be evaluated using historical data we find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across i a sample of u s municipalities 1870 1990 ii all boston area municipalities 1870 1990 and iii all u s counties 1850 1990

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

the dynamics of government abstract we model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations we find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment the difference is larger the lower is the political influence of young agents the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations and the lower is risk aversion furthermore there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium finally smooth preference aggregation as under probabilistic voting produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria which occur under majority voting aggregation

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

american government finance in the long run 1790 to 1990 government in america has gone through three distinct fiscal systems in the last two hundred years each system utilized a dominant revenue source and had a distinctly active level of government the changing structure of government by level seems to be related to changing revenue structures when new taxes become important the relative importance of each level of government changes on the other hand growth in the overall size of government is not directly related to the structure of revenues or the distribution of activity by level of government government growth is the result of long term commitments to provide education transportation social welfare services old age security and military forces

block holding and keiretsu in japan the effects of capital markets liberalization measures on the stock market abstract long term block holding among large industrial corporations and financial institutions is prevalent in japan little is known about the implications of such business practice on portfolio returns we document the portfolio relationships of parent firms sub firms and specific industry portfolios and we hypothesize that these relationships have changed substantially in japan using certain measures for evaluating portfolios and mean variance spanning we test the hypothesis our empirical results suggest that market efficiency and integration of the japanese stock market may have been greatly enhanced by the japanese government s capital markets liberalization measures implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s

distributive politics and the costs of centralization this paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting with centralization regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region specific projects the outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within region benefits the number of projects funded may be non monotonic in the strength of project externalities the efficiency gains from decentralization and the performance of constitutional rules such as majority voting which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

trends and cycles in colombia s real gdp and fiscal deficit abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold the first is methodological we review the beveridge nelson technique for decomposing economic time series and illustrate its usefulness for examining the cyclical and secular movements in real gdp in colombia second we examine government expenditures and revenues in order to assess the extent to which the sharp increase in the fiscal deficit in the early 1980s should be viewed as a cyclical rather than a secular phenomenon