the classification and performance of alternative exchange rate systems abstract owing to dissatisfaction with the imf s de jure classification of exchange rate regimes a substantial literature has emerged presenting de facto classifications of exchange rate systems and using the latter classifications to compare performances of alternative regimes in terms of key macroeconomic variables this paper critically reviews the literature on de facto regimes in particular the paper 1 describes the main methodologies that have been used to construct de facto codings 2 surveys the empirical literature generated by de facto regime codings and 3 lays out the problems inherent in constructing de facto classifications the empirical literature is found to yield few robust findings we argue that the as yet unfulfilled objective of this literature and the major research agenda for the future in this area lies in the need of a more thorough investigation of the degree of monetary policy independence without relying exclusively on movements in exchange rates an agenda the attainment of which is made especially challenging because of the lack of comprehensive and reliable data on reserves and interest rates

assessing market dominance abstract we propose a new measure to assess market dominance contrary to concentration measures such as the herfindahl hirschman index that characterizes the concentration of an industry our dominance measure suggests an approach that classifies when an individual firm has a dominant position in our measure the criterion for dominance is relaxed as the intensity of existing competition increases or as entry barriers are lowered we apply the dominance measure to a number of well known competition cases

testing the efficient redistribution hypothesis an application to japanese beef policy we discuss and model the structure of the political economy of japanese beef markets and we apply bullock s statistical test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis to our model to study the pareto efficiency of japanese beef policy in 1990 and 1991 we found that under the hypothesis that our modeled political economy adequately reflects the true japanese beef political economy we could not reject at the 5 significance level that japanese beef policy was inefficient in 1990 and in 1991 however we could reject inefficiency in 1991 at a 7 level of significance

farmers and the u s congress rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy abstract an assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that as farm numbers decline in a democratic government farm policy attention from rule makers will decline as well this assumption despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics is often voiced in federated governing units especially the u s where constituents are locally organized and the commitment of rule makers to nationwide policy is limited while significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest group theory this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule makers the findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the u s congress instead unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seek favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts however these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of contituents legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the ease with which they can marginally adjust a large base of u s farm programs thus a kind of neo majoritarianism emerges these results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the european union east europe in north america through free trade agreements and with the gatt they indicate that farmers will continue despite shrinking numbers to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base

eu agri environmental programs and the restaurant table effect the share of agricultural area enrolled in eu agri environmental programs varies significantly between eu member states these national differences are explained based on a model that reflects both that these programs internalize externalities and the political economy we identify six factors that affect the extent to which agri environmental programs are implemented environmental benefits opportunity costs of participation budgetary pressure the share of program expenditures financed by the eu the political weight attributed to farmers at the national and the political influence of each country at the eu level in addition we demonstrate that if the policy decision making process is noncooperative at the eu level countries that contribute less to the eu budget will ceteris paribus implement more programs using data of four years and feasible generalized least square methods we are able to confirm our theoretical results including a noncooperative behavior of eu member states

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

wage effects of non wage labour costs we study wage effects of two important elements of non wage labour costs firing costs and payroll taxes we exploit a reform that introduced substantial reduction in these two provisions for unemployed workers aged less than 30 and over 45 years who got a permanent job a matching model with heterogeneous workers predicts positive wage effects of reducing firing costs but ambiguous wage effects of reducing payroll taxes for both new entrant and incumbent workers difference in differences estimates and simulation of the model show positive wage effects for both new entrant and incumbent workers the reduction in firing costs accounts for up to half of the overall wage increase for new entrants but only 10 for incumbents

redistributing income back to european community consumers and taxpayers through the common agricultural policy a multiple policy instrument generalization of gardner s surplus transformation curve analysis is applied to an empirical model of the ec wheat sector to compare welfare effects of policy change proposals a production quota support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making relatively small transfers from ec agriculture to consumers taxpayers a coresponsibility levy support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making larger transfers the importance of accounting for income transfer size distortions in related markets and the structure of markets when comparing welfare effects of policy change proposals is demonstrated

downward nominal and real wage rigidity survey evidence from european firms downward nominal and real wage rigidity it has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little especially downwards to shocks that hit their employer this paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms we analyse which firm level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity our results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models e g efficiency wage theory insider outsider theory we also find that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity measured on the basis of wage indexation downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

unemployment and productivity in the long run the role of macroeconomic volatility abstract this paper presents a new empirical regularity between the volatility of productivity growth and long run unemployment for a given level of long run productivity growth a theoretical framework based on asymmetric real wage rigidities is shown to have the potential to rationalize this finding the model tends to fit u s long run unemployment better than a specification based on long run productivity growth only especially during the great moderation and the great recession

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments a general framework and an example abstract since most agricultural programs employ two or more policy instruments simultaneously it is notable that little research has attempted to find optimal instrument combinations and no research exists which evaluates the social costs unrealized benefits of combining instruments suboptimally in our paper we report a simple and feasible method to find optimal policy instrument combinations and we provide the first general formal approach to measuring the social costs of suboptimal policy instrument combinations our approach is illustrated in an analysis for five major u s crops corn feed grains wheat rice cotton the simple model we employ for the illustration suggests that except for the feed grains program the observed programs combined policy instruments quite suboptimally we conclude that agricultural economics research now can and should begin placing increased emphasis on studying optimal policy instrument combinations

endogenous price policies and international wheat prices comment in a 1983 article in this journal sarris and freebairn claim to model international wheat prices as cournot equilibrium prices resulting from the interaction of national excess demand functions national pricing policies are determined so as to maximize a domestic welfare function specified as a weighted sum of producer and consumer surplus government revenue and a price variability measure the function is maximized subject to the pricing policies of all other countries in the sarris and freebairn model each country assumes that any pricing policy which it implements such as the imposition of a tariff will not affect the world price we contend that this assumption is not consistent with the usual determination of a cournot equilibrium in the cournot oligopoly model each firm takes account of the price implications of the output it sets therefore we reformulate sarris and freebairn s model to account for the impact of policies on the world price and recalculate the implicit welfare weights for wheat trading countries in the traditional cournot oligopoly model each firm takes account of production levels set by it and other firms although each naively expects no response from its rivals the cournot nash equilibrium is a point at which no trader acting unilaterally can do better than playing its optimal strategy given that all other traders are playing their optimal strategies interaction between the traders leads to convergence to an equilibrium from which none would want to move in contrast to the traditional model sarris and freebairn derive their solution on the simplifying assumption that every trading country takes the world price as given this implies that each country is concerned with domestic objectives and is not concerned with other countries reactions to its policies in other words we posit a cournot oligopoly problem p 215 in fact sarris and freebairn posit zero conjectural variations i e each trader conjectures that its rivals will not vary their policies as in a cournot model but assume no effect on world prices this latter assumption is not consistent with a cournot model in a cournot nash model traders assume that rivals do not respond to their policies although these zero conjectures are subsequently found to be incorrect although unanticipated retaliation does occur and by imposing the assumption of a given world price and that market power remains unused sarris and freebairn are led to conclude that with equal weights on all components of the welfare function the optimal policy for the country is a free trade one p 216 this conclusion is consistent with the simplifying small country assumption however it is unlikely that countries with market power will ignore it in setting tariffs after dropping this assumption our calculations presented in table 1 show that the optimal policies are nonzero even if weights are equal the method used here for obtaining the cournot nash solution involves calculating the firstorder conditions to maximize a weighted welfare function for each country the reaction functions showing how each country reacts to tariffs imposed by others can then be derived the functions can be solved simultaneously to obtain the cournotnash solution 2 consider a homogenous product traded between n countries with linear demand and supply curves

endogenous price policies and international wheat prices vanzetti and kennedy s herein vk comment on our earlier paper sarris and freebairn gives us the opportunity first to clarify the differences in the models to present a generalization of the analysis that includes their results as well as ours as special cases and then to point out some salient features of our model that seem to have been unnoticed by them consider our model of a homogenous commodity produced consumed and traded by n countries which are characterized by the following linear demand and supply curves notation follows vk except that we maintain the additive random variables and hence keep the time subscript

the political economy of u s wheat legislation bruce a babcock colin a carter and andrew schmitz both taxpayer subsidies to u s wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the u s wheat program adopted in 1985 a calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy becker s theory of competition among interest groups and peltzman s theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of affected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms i introduction every five years congress drafts new farm legislation dictating the provisions of commodity programs for cotton and the major food and feed grains for the subsequent five years from 1973 through 1985 the primary features of the commodity programs were guaranteed farm prices and government stockholding activities deadweight losses from the programs during this time were minimal market prices were generally higher than the government defended price floors because of a booming export market legislated increases in commodity support prices combined with a severe drop off in the demand for agricultural exports beginning in 1982 increased the economic costs of the commodity programs the u s price floor became the world price for wheat cotton and corn grain stocks accumulated while government payments to u s farmers grew to unprecedented levels most agricultural interest groups in 1984 agreed that an overhaul of agricultural policy was necessary supporters of large levels of production and exports wanted to stimulate the demand for exports by eliminating price floors others felt that the united states should reduce budgetary costs by using direct supply controls to raise farm prices the clear winners in the new 1985 farm bill were the proponents of maintained production levels and expanded exports the new policy froze the relatively high supply prices received by farmers while simultaneously lowering price floors becker 1983 argues that two forces mainly determine the outcome of policy debates the first following stigler 1971 and peltzman 1976 is the relative efficiency with which interest groups exert political pressure interest groups that are efficient in exerting political pressure can increase the subsidization or decrease the tax burden of their constituents the second force is the extent of deadweight losses associated with proposed policies those policies with lower deadweight losses are ceteris paribus more likely to be adopted for the simple reason that less tax needs to be collected from losing interest groups for given transfers to winning groups gardner 1987 finds empirical evidence that both the ability to redistribute efficiently and the effectiveness of political organizations help explain which farm commodities have received the most government support since 1930 his study provides little insight however into which force is more important in determining the type of redistribution policies that are ultimately adopted for a given commodity an examination of the wheat program adopted in the 1985 farm bill and alternative policies that were rejected provides an opportunity to determine whether the efficiency of programs or the political prowess of interest groups is more important in determining policy outcomes this task requires a calculation of the magnitudes and the distribution of costs and benefits of the chosen policy and alternative policies costs and benefits are calculated for 1 a continuation of the 1981 farm bill policies through 1986 1990 2 the adopted 1985 farm bill policies and 3 mandatory production controls all three alternatives are examined relative to a laissez faire policy whereby the u s government has no direct involvement in agriculture

price support to the ec agricultural sector an optimal policy politicians in all developed countries including the ec countries have consistently chosen to support the farmers through the market and thus slowed down the adaptation of the agricultural sector to lower prices which would otherwise have taken place the main principle of ec agricultural policy which was formulated in the 1960s was to guaran tee farmers prices significantly above world market prices for a number of key products to secure the income of farmers at a reasonable level

unemployment insurance and labor contracts under asymmetric information theory and facts the paper provides evidence to show that many u s labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision a model of an optional contract under asymmetric information with no private unemployment insurance is presented underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist copyright 1986 by american economic association

loss aversion and the asymmetric transmission of monetary policy there is widespread evidence that monetary policy exerts asymmetric effects on output over contractions and expansions in economic activity while price responses display no sizeable asymmetry to rationalize these facts we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where households utility depends on consumption deviations from a reference level below which loss aversion is displayed state dependent degrees of real rigidity and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption generate competing effects on output and inflation contractions face the central bank with higher responsiveness of output to interest rate changes as well as a flatter aggregate supply schedule

consequences of discretion in the formation of commodities policy abstract in a simple model of endogenous primary commodity price support policy i policy is affected by private inventories and ii private inventories are affected by speculative attempts to forecast policy the interaction between these two forces is rich yielding bubbles and extrinsic volatility thus helping to explain some odd episodes observed in commodity markets in addition under some conditions a government that wishes to support the price but is unable to commit to future action may be impotent and a government that does not want to support the price may be trapped into doing so by speculative activity

contractual wages and the wage cushion under different bargaining settings how does a typically european bargaining system with collective bargaining and national minimum wage coexist with low unemployment and high wage flexibility a unique data set on workers firms and collective bargaining contracts in portugal is used to analyze the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion difference between contractual and actual wages the results indicate that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes whereas it shrinks the returns to union power therefore firm specific arrangements partly offset collective bargaining granting firms certain freedom when setting wages contractual wages reflect trade unions egalitarian policy

wage rigidity inflation and institutions we study the possible existence of downward nominal wage rigidity dnwr at wage growth rates different from zero in aggregate data even if dnwr prevails at zero for individual workers compositional effects might lead to falling aggregate wages while changes in relative wages combined with dnwr might lead to positive aggregate wage growth we explore industry data for 19 oecd countries over the 1971 2006 period we find evidence for a floor on nominal wage growth at 6 percent in the 1970s and 1980s at 1 percent in the 1990s and at 0 5 percent in the 2000s furthermore we find that dnwr is stronger in country years with strict employment protection legislation high union density centralized wage setting and high inflation

determinants of the u s wheat producer support price do presidential elections matter the paper s focus is on the determinants of the u s wheat producer support price the results of the time series analysis suggest that this price is largely determined by the previous price the expected u s share in world exports and expected program costs presidential elections also influence u s wheat price policies all other things being equal the support price tends to be lower in election years than in other years this suggests that small interest groups relative political economic power may be less pronounced in election years if they do not succeed in positioning themselves on the political economic market such that they contain the potentially decisive voter

stop and go agricultural policies with a land market this article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers productivity a government objective to insure farmers a minimum parity income an endogenous land rent and diminishing returns on alternative nonprogram crop land uses in this setting acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy although compensated acreage limits are when there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation or buyout program in which high cost producers participate and low cost producers do not copyright 2003 oxford university press

bubbles wage rigidity and persistent slumps abstract we embed downward wage rigidity into a rational bubble model we analytically characterize how the collapse of bubbles can interact with wage rigidity to generate deep and protracted recessions with involuntary unemployment such as those in japan or spain

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

on the welfare and cyclical implications of moderate trend inflation abstract the welfare and cyclical implications of moderate trend inflation are addressed in an augmented medium scale dsge model increasing trend inflation from 2 to 4 percent generates a consumption equivalent welfare loss of about 4 percent welfare costs of this magnitude are driven by staggered wage contracts trend growth extended borrowing a roundabout production structure and the interaction between trend inflation and shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment mei a sticky price model abstracting from these features generates much smaller losses moderate trend inflation also has important business cycle implications interacting much more strongly with mei shocks than with productivity or monetary shocks

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

the political ideology of food abstract using data from a survey of over 700 americans we sought to measure and investigate the nature of citizen s political ideologies in relation to food results reveal that a majority of respondents can be classified as food statists desiring more government action in the realm food and agricultural relative to the status quo people s ideologies with regard to food were multidimensional falling along lines related to food health and quality food safety and farm subsidies respondents were most in favor of additional government action related to food safety food ideology was related to conventional measures of political ideology with for example more liberal respondents desiring more government involvement in food than more conservative respondents but the relationship was far from determinative suggesting food ideology represents a unique construct in its own right

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

when risk generates chaos abstract with risk averse producers the traditional linear cobweb model becomes nonlinear the currently produced quantity is an homographic function of previous years quantities this may result in the market generating chaotic price and quantity series especially if demand is rigid hedging facilities are unable to reduce the magnitude of fluctuations which are socially detrimental especially from the consumers point of view this might justify public intervention on markets such as staple food commodities or health cares

what drives china s new agricultural subsidies summary china s agricultural policy has undergone a fundamental transformation in the four decades since the introduction of market reforms in 1978 and now involves a wide array of policy instruments that range from output and input subsidies to public infrastructure expenditures this article analyzes the political economic determinants of china s agricultural subsidy changes using producer subsidy equivalents pses drawn from annual data from 1984 to 2015 on 16 agricultural commodity sectors that include multiple policy instruments empirical results indicate that national factors such as high rates of economic growth and a lower share of agriculture in the economy have been the primary drivers of increases in pses and that larger more geographically concentrated agricultural sectors are more likely to be subsidized at a higher pse rate finally china s joining the world trade organization in december 2001 led to significant increases in pses that were not already explained by internal national or commodity specific factors in essence china s agricultural subsidy programs and levels increasingly resemble those of developed countries primarily as a result of economic transformation and the ability to structure agricultural policies within the wto rules moreover this article predicts that agricultural subsidies will trend slightly upward in the next decade and that the strongest opportunities to export to china will be in animal products or grains that are utilized for feed or processed foods where the levels of subsidies are predicted to increase but remain lower than for traditional food crops

properties of lot sizing rules under lumpy demand when a lot sizing problem is viewed from a context of buyer supplier relationships an important phenomenon frequently encountered by the supplier is a so called lumpy demand however there has been very little attention devoted to study the behaviour and performances of lot sizing rules under the situation of lumpy demand this paper presents both analytical and experimental studies of lot sizing rules for lumpy demand situations the analytical study is based on the assumption that constant demand occurs for every fixed number of periods in the experimental study both the quantity of and the time between demands are allowed to vary the studies show that analytical results provide good insights in understanding the behaviour and performances of lot sizing rules when more realistic situations are addressed in the experimental study the paper also confirms that the results of lot sizing studies under the situation of non lumpy demand cannot be entirely generalised to the situation with lumpy demand r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

a critical assessment of the political preference function approach in agricultural economics abstract the policy preference function ppf approach has become popular with economists seeking to explain the origin of government policies in this paper a distinction between positive and normative work with the ppf concept is made positive work is shown to suffer from a variety of shortcomings including the misspecification of traditional ppfs and the failure to consider the importance of institutions constraints and the interaction between different commodity policies these weaknesses are reflected in the counter intuitive results of a simple ppf model designed to reflect the interaction between the ec s wheat and barley policies furthermore it is demonstrated that ppf weights change as a result of both political preferences and market parameters hence changes in ppf weights cannot be attributed to changes in preferences alone test of the axioms of revealed preference theory are used to demonstrate that even though ppf weights derived for the ec s wheat and barley markets have fluctuated considerably since the early 1970s we are not able to conclude that there has been a shift in political preferences the paper concludes with some comments about the use of ppfs in a normative framework the underlying assumption that policy makers optimise seems not surprisingly often to lead practitioners to the conclusion that observed policies are not so bad after all economists should also beware of the tendency to overlook possible differences between the ppf and the social welfare function

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

a roll call analysis of the endangered species act amendments public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers the lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group thereby maximizing their rent from the political market this article examines endangered species act esa amendments from a public choice perspective congressional voting on the esa amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology the results show that the lawmakers voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation ideology and several characteristics of their home state such as number of endangered species proportion of urban population contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product and geographical location copyright 2001 oxford university press

the theory of reform and indian indirect taxes abstract given a set of value judgements an initial state and a model of the economy one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare we do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the i th good the inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum if no such welfare weights exist then a pareto improvement is possible we illustrate the concepts and results using data from the indian economy for 1979 1980 directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for pareto improvements are presented

intervention bias in agricultural policy abstract this paper re examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes a model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support even when one accepts the government s income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference it is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal the source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation caused by the government s inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial

the political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture an empirical study the paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture we use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures pari the empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses the analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers but also to invest in public agricultural research furthermore the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision making on pari is non linear and conditional on other factors regarding the impact of political institutions the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers agricultural protection nor to lower investment in public goods pari

the cotton influence index an examination of u s cotton subsidies given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton we introduce a cotton influence index to capture legislators influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the farm security and rural investment act of 2002 regression analyses reveal a relationship between cotton influence index and campaign contributions cotton farmland party affiliation and ideology tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different actions and participations by representatives to advance the interest of cotton that is components of this index and their future cotton political action committees pacs contributions to them copyright 2006 oxford university press

a benefit cost analysis of u s agricultural trade promotion subsidies for nonprice export promotion can harm domestic consumers by increasing price in the domestic market and by diverting funds from domestic market promotion taking these consumer impacts into account we find that federal expenditures for nonprice export promotion of farm products may be too high

why is the doha development agenda failing and what can be done a computable general equilibrium game theoretical approach we use a world computable general equilibrium model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the doha development agenda dda inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the nash solution of cooperative games the solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators when real income is the objective and services are excluded or when optimising terms of trade is the objective the nash solution is the status quo trade liberalisation is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or gross domestic product gdp our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a gdp below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process regardless of the governments objective formation of coalition such as the g20 constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members we also find that side payments may be a solution but represent a very high share of the global income gain

the fable of the bees revisited causes and consequences of the u s honey program abstract in his 1973 paper steven cheung discredited the fable of the bees by demonstrating that markets for beekeeping services exist and function well although economists heeded cheung s lessons policy makers did not the honey program has operated for over 50 years supporting the price of honey through a variety of mechanisms its effects were minor before the 1980s but then became important with annual government expenditures near 100 million for several years reforms of the program in the late 1980s reduced its market effects and budget costs returning it to its original role as a minor commodity program although the 1996 farm bill formally eliminated the honey program it was reinstated in the 2002 farm bill we measure the historical welfare effects of the program during its various incarnations examine its frequently stated public interest rationale the encouragement of honeybee pollination and interpret its history in light of economic theories of regulation

the grain sector of the european community policy formation price determination and implications for trade a coresponsibility levy was added to high domestic prices and export subsidies in the ec levels for policy instruments could result from negotiations which favor producers but are acceptable to the public higher domestic prices and levies but lower export subsidies would occur if levy exemptions cover domestic marketings if exemptions are excluded low domestic prices producer subsidies and export taxes would occur with exemptions improved farm income and treasury surpluses would be achieved without injury to the public exemptions might be excluded because producers are better off and public cost is about the same with either program but producer subsidies require expanded public financing export reductions would occur under either program given prevailing market conditions

inventory performance under pack size constraints and spatially correlated demand abstract motivated by a problem facing a large retailer we consider the impact of pack size on the performance of a periodic review inventory system in the presence of spatial i e between retailers correlation of demand which we model using an equicorrelated multivariate poisson distribution employing simulation we utilise a full factorial experiment to provide support for decisions on product and supplier selection and whether or not packs should be split during distribution we consider variables such as pack size correlation and the number of branches and discuss how they and their interactions impact performance metrics such as inventory and shortage levels and the bullwhip effect

the economic effects of supply controls the simple analytics of the u s peanut program a gricultural commodity programs employ a wide variety of policy tools to regulate u s agriculture price supports are the most common form of intervention but rights to sell at the supported price are allocated very differently under different commodity programs under recent feed grain programs for example the right to sell at the supported price is linked to acreage set asides agreements not to produce on certain acres in other programs sales by individual farmers are controlled under marketing orders sponsored by the u s department of agriculture usda 2 a third method is through permanent maketing quotas that directly limit output only two major commodity programs those for tobacco and peanuts currently allocate the right to sell in this way the peanut program is the subject of this article 3

a policy preference function for government intervention in the u s wheat market this paper estimates a policy preference function that explains the government s choices of target prices government held wheat stocks and public wheat research funding the policy preference function depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures an important innovation in this paper is the inclusion of interactions between public research expenditures and other public policy variables results indicate that the government places a premium of 25 to 45 on the welfare of wheat producers of relative to budget expenditures while wheat consumers welfare is discounted as much as 50 relative to budget expenditures the purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of government commodity programs stock accumulations and research expenditures in the u s wheat sector the explanation is based on a policy preference function ppf that depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures it is assumed that target prices reductions in or additions to government stocks and public research expenditures are chosen to maximize the policy preference function the central contribution of the paper is the estimation of a function that is consistent with the observed government interventions in the u s wheat market that is the paper explains the observed target prices government sales and public research expenditures as rational behavior by a government which seeks to maximize the estimated policy preference function the approach in this paper is based on the political interest group theories of peltzman and becker applications of these ideas to agriculture include rausser and freebairn s description of the beef industry gardner s 1985 analysis

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

the costs of price stability downward nominal wage rigidity in europe in most european countries the prevailing terms of employment including the nominal wage can be changed only by mutual consent this legal feature gives workers a strategic advantage in wage negotiations when employers push for a nominal wage cut the upshot is a long run trade off between inflation and unemployment for low levels of inflation in spite of all agents being rational and with no expectational errors specifically downward nominal wage rigidity and excess unemployment at zero inflation are related to three factors the coverage of collective agreements the legal framework at contract renewal and the strictness of the employment protection legislation for non union workers

why firms avoid cutting wages survey evidence from european firms firms very rarely cut nominal wages even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks this paper uses a unique survey of fourteen european countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages the paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in western european eu 15 countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in the new eu member states in central and eastern europe

downward wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a monetary union this paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity nominal or real for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra union terms of trade whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness in response to asymmetric productivity shocks there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism

environmental regulations transfers and trade theory and evidence abstract this paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations we show that the existence of transfers can give counter intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows in particular the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output and consequently on trade flows this may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns the theory is tested using agricultural sector data the evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers are positively correlated

how strong is the macroeconomic case for downward real wage rigidity we explore the existence of downward real wage rigidity drwr at the industry level based on data from 19 oecd countries for the period 1973 1999 the results show that drwr compresses the distributions of industry wage changes overall as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods but there are not many real wage cuts that are prevented more important however drwr attenuates larger real wage cuts thus leading to higher real wages there is stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for drwr real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density

evaluating the behavior of international cartel members some phenomena of interest in international trade can be understood by looking at only one country pushing others into the background sometimes though to preserve the essence of a problem one must attempt to take explicit account of the interaction of nations this viewpoint invites one to treat a collective body in this case a group of countries as a deciding unit there is no shortage of applications that call for such thinking among them are the gatt negotiations and nafta international commodity agreements and international cartels in each of these the idea of treating the collective as an organic decision maker is alluring and to be sure much has been gained in this fashion there are also dangers that attend adopting such a modeling strategy our purpose is to lay out these dangers their source and effects and then to introduce briefly some remedies that have become available lately does a group optimize the essence of the methodology of economics inheres in the treatment of decision makers as optimizers attributing to them an objective criterion and the impulse to behave optimally can this methodology be used in studying group decision making arrow showed that in a certain formal sense it can

aftershocks of monetary unification hysteresis with a financial twist abstract in the 1990s it was widely agreed that neither europe nor the united states satisfied the conditions for constituting an optimum currency area although the u s came closer bayoumi and eichengreen 1993 moderating this concern about europe was the fact that it was possible to distinguish a regional core and periphery using updated data we confirm that the united states remains closer to an optimum currency area more intriguingly the euro area shows striking changes in correlations and responses we interpret these as reflecting hysteresis with a financial twist in which the financial system causes aggregate supply and demand shocks to reinforce each other an implication is that the euro area needs vigorous coordinated regulation of its banking and financial systems by a single supervisor that monetary union without banking union will not work

implicit policy preferences and the assessment of negotiable trade policy reforms abstract formal multilateral trade negotiations increase the pressure brought to bear on protectionist economies by foreign interests this paper explores the hypothesis that successful negotiations yield mixes of policy reforms which contribute to internationalist objectives but which minimally disturb the prior domestic political market equilibrium this disturbance is measured using weighted objective functions the weights in which embody revealed policy preferences governments are assumed to reflect these preferences in a strategic trade policy formation process which uses empirically based conjectures as to the responses of other governments and private agents the approach is applied to the negotiations on agricultural trade policy and in particular to the protectionist common agricultural policy of the european community

downward nominal wage rigidity in services direct evidence from a firm survey abstract the paper uses a new german employer survey on wage setting to analyze incidence and sources of nominal wage rigidity in services vs manufacturing mainly for fear of excess worker turnover wage cuts are significantly less frequent in services

market power and cartel formation theory and an empirical test abstract antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most attempts to form cartels are blocked or kept secret however federal laws allow u s produce growers to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders these cartels use quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices of fresh produce some growers have adopted marketing orders and others have not this paper develops and tests a positive theory of the adoption of marketing orders the theory suggests that growers in a region are more likely to adopt a marketing order if the demand for fresh produce is inelastic the growers market share in the fresh market is large there are barriers to entry and expansion the fraction of the output the growers ship to the fresh market is not too large or too small growers are homogeneous and large cooperatives exist probit analyses support these hypotheses

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

from senators to the president solve the lumber problem or else we use key events associated in the two decade long u s canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between u s congress and the administration in the formation of international trade policy we find that the executive branch of the u s government responded quickly to several letters from a group of u s senators demanding a solution to the lumber problem a roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing senators willingness to sign these letters and pressure the president on behalf of the u s lumber industry the results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a senator s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a senator less likely to sign these letters

a simulation framework for forecasting uncertain lumpy demand abstract managing uncertainty when the demand is irregular and sporadic i e lumpy is a complex issue as well as an unexplored one this study analyses the behaviour of forecasting techniques when dealing with lumpy demand at the master production scheduling level in particular three forecasting techniques exponentially weighted moving average early sales and order overplanning are considered it is argued that demand lumpiness is a multidimensional phenomenon generated by different market characteristics namely numerousness of customers heterogeneity of customers frequency of order placing variety of each customer s request and correlation between customers behaviour hence the performances of the three forecasting methods are compared through simulation experiments with different values of the sources of lumpiness a framework is then proposed that indicates the domain of applicability of each forecasting technique according to the prevailing source of lumpiness in the market

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

an approach to evaluate the impact of interaction between demand forecasting method and stock control policy on the inventory system performances abstract usually in stock control studies demand data are considered as an input to the model without explicitly considering that they are the results of a demand forecasting system stock control system is examined independently of the demand forecasting system and it is assumed that demand data or forecast errors have been properly modelled however the interactions that may exist between demand forecasting methods and stock control systems in terms of their effects on global system performances are not considered in the paper an approach for evaluating these interactions based on a comparative simulation test of global system costs using historical data is presented the approach is explained through a real case the replenishment from different suppliers of a central depot of tinned food which supplies more than 700 items to warehouses at the lower echelon results of the simulation study show that traditional measures of forecast errors cannot be taken as sole indicators for the choice among different demand forecasting methods these methods on the contrary have to be evaluated on the basis of total costs and service level of the global inventory control system

explaining state bans on corporate farming state laws banning corporate farming present a puzzle for a rent seeking explanation of political outcomes since family farmer proponents may receive no direct benefit from these bans an explanation developed here is that these farmers benefit indirectly forestalling corporate entry preserves the farm political coalition structured around those cooperatives patronized by family farmers and so indirectly preserves federal subsidies and supply restrictions that the incidence of state bans is positively related to the importance of federal farm programs the importance of cooperatives and the homogeneity of farmers within a state is consistent with this indirect rent seeking explanation

interest group competition over policy outcomes dynamics strategic behavior and social costs this paper analyzes a two period model of interestgroup competition between two groups to affect thepolicy outcome the paper characterizes the subgameperfect equilibrium and considers the welfareimplications of the model the subgame perfectequilibrium to this game is allocatively efficient ifand only if the initial equilibrium is allocativelyefficient and interest groups are equally adept atproducing political pressure when rent seeking isconstitutionally protected the notion of rent seekingconstrained efficiency is defined as the cooperativesolution to the rent seeking game it is shown that arent seeking constrained efficient equilibrium isattainable by forcing winners in political competitionto fully compensate losers

the impact of immigration on the labor market the literature on the impact of immigration on the labor market is highly controversial the aim of this paper is to review the existing literature and draw some general conclusions on how wages and employment respond to immigration economic studies indicate that the impact of immigration on the average wage and employment of native workers is null or slightly positive however because adjustments take time the immediate labor market effects of unexpected as opposed to expected migration episodes can be detrimental immigration also can have distributional consequences in particular the skill composition of immigrants matters in determining their impact on native labor market outcomes an inflow of immigrants will tend to reduce the wages of competing native workers with skills similar to those of the migrants and increase those of complementary workers with skills that complement those of immigrants by affecting the skill composition of the workforce immigration can create winners and losers among native workers via changes in the wage structure

an optimum currency area odyssey abstract the theory of optimum currency areas was conceived and developed in three highly influential papers written by mundell 1961 mckinnon 1963 and kenen 1969 those authors identified characteristics that potential members of a monetary union should ideally possess in order to make it feasible to surrender a nationally tailored monetary policy and the adjustment of an exchange rate of a national currency we trace the development of optimum currency area theory which after a flurry of research into the subject in the 1960s was relegated to intellectual purgatory for about 20 years we then discuss factors that led to a renewed interest into the subject beginning in the early 1990s milton friedman plays a pivotal role in our narrative friedman s work on monetary integration in the early 1950s presaged subsequent optimum currency area contributions mundell s classic formulation of an optimal currency area was aimed in part at refuting friedman s strong case for floating exchange rates and friedman s work on the role of monetary policy had the effect of helping to revive interest in optimum currency area analysis the paper concludes with a discussion of recent analytical work using new keynesian models which has the promise of fulfilling the unfinished agenda set out by the original contributors to the optimum currency area literature that is providing a consistent framework in which a country s characteristics can be used to determine its optimal exchange rate regime

stochastic dominance and uncertain price prospects since the seminal and simultaneous publications of hadar and russell 6 and hanoch and levy 8 there has been a virtual explosion of papers investigating implications of stochastic dominance rules for decisions under uncertainty dominance principles have important applications to portfolio choice capital budgeting and financial intermediation stochastic dominance can also be applied to investment and production decision problems under uncertainty in these areas both overall and marginal impacts of uncertainty have received wide attention 2 the emphasis in consumer welfare analysis under uncertainty has been on the ranking of different price prospects ranking of price prospects is more complicated than that of income prospects for two related reasons first due to differences in ordinal preferences among consumers the second degree stochastic dominance rule on price prospects does not yield a unanimous ranking among risk averse consumers thus waugh 17 massell 12 and samuelson 14 have focused on the ranking of price prospects for a single consumer or consumers with identical ordinal preferences second there is no a priori reason for income risk averse consumers to exhibit aversion to fair price risks specifically the indirect utility function of an income risk averse consumer is neither concave nor convex in prices indirect ways of comparing consumer welfare under alternative price prospects via expected consumer surplus expected compensating variation or expected equivalent variation have thus been investigated in the literature expected consumer surplus ecs has been particularly popular for ranking certain and uncertain price prospects 3 however turnovsky shalit and schmitz 16 showed that the ranking

on the political economy of state highway expenditures some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models this paper explores the extent to which the public demand for roads and or power of special interest groups determines road expenditures at the state level using an extension of the methodology developed in congleton and shughart 1990 reduced form models of median voter demand special interest group equilibria and a combined model are estimated using cross sectional state data from the united states we generally find support for the hypothesis that voting matters the pure median voter models have a better fit than the pure special interest group models moreover in our combined model we find that variables from the median voter model can not be dropped without significantly reducing the combined model s fit

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed