some macroeconomic implications of alternative compensation systems a basic theme of this paper is the idea that some structural reform of employee compensation arrangements is necessary to make reasonable price stability compatible with reasonably full employment in this view even the best designed macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to get at the heart of the stagflation problem the ultimate solution involves going inside the workings of a modern capitalist economy and correcting the underlying structural flaw directly on the level of the individual firm stagflation represents an especially intractable policy dilemma for macroeconomics without a decisive tendency of the economic system to remain near full employment there is a strong prima facie case for fighting recessions by exogenously stimulating aggregate demand but the usual keynesian expansionary policies tend to impart an inflationary inertia that is difficult to choke off and of course the basic strategy for fighting inflation is to cool down the economy by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy thereby increasing unemployment and closing the viscous circle because the practical macroeconomic policies for dealing with unemployment and inflation are so diametrically opposed stagflation is a pervasive structural problem when for whatever reason there is basically an unfavourable short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation economic policy tends to vacillate between expansion of demand to fight unemployment and restriction of demand to fight inflation polarising the electorate and distracting society from dealing effectively with its underlying real economic problems even the difficulty of attaining external balance in foreign accounts is largely a spillover into the international payments arena of an inability to achieve an acceptable internal balance between full employment and price stability this paper takes what might be called a comparative systems approach to the problem of stagflation at the heart of modern industrial capitalism is an incredibly complicated system of overlapping monopolistic competitors 2 a starting point for the paper is the realisation that the coordination difficulty which can cause some systems to suffer involuntary unemployment is not inherent in laissez faire private enterprise per se it is closely tied to one particular property of a conventional wage payment system namely compensation of each firm s employees is stuck to an outside numeraire whether money or a cost of

outcome based accountability theory and evidence abstract a firm s payoffs can often depend on whether it exceeds a threshold of performance in a principal agent setting we demonstrate that the optimal contract induces efficient effort by basing firing decisions solely on whether the agent was successful even though the absolute level of performance is more informative we test the predictions of our model using thirty seasons of nfl data we find that a coach is 6 percentage points more likely to be fired after a close loss beyond this the margin of victory has no significant impact on firing probabilities despite being more informative about future success also consistent with the predictions of our model coaches maximize team effort by playing their best players when doing so has the largest impact on the probability of winning

capital market development in china abstract this paper examines why and how capital markets have developed in a low income socialist country it shows that the development is the response of economic agents operating under a more market oriented economic environment with a highly regulated and inefficient banking system this development has presented new policy challenges and opportunities the paper argues that the developmental effects of the emergence of capital markets in china can be as important as its impact on improving allocative efficiency and resource mobilization

interlinked contracts and moral hazard in investment abstract in agricultural tenancy arrangements the tenant is often required to undertake effort aimed at maintaining and improving the productive stocks this paper investigate the design of contracts which induce optimal investment of such effort it is found that a long term contract which interlinks tenancy with a credit agreement is optimal in equilibrium the tenant obtains credit from the landlord at a rate of interest below the market and is perpetually indebted to the landlord

modelling the joint determination of household labour supplies and commodity demands in addition to choosing the allocation of total expenditure between commodities households may also be able to make decisions over the allocation of their time between market work and leisure in both theoretical and empirical work it has often been the case that these decisions have been analysed separately in this paper we stress the theoretical attractions of considering the joint determination of the allocation of time between work and leisure and the allocation of total expenditure between commodities in a utility maximising framework using a sample of individual households we attempt to evaluate the empirical importance of the joint determination model over the separate determination of labour supplies and commodity demands our approach follows that of abbott and ashenfelter i976 phlips i978 barnett i979 deaton and muellbauer i980 and atkinson and stern i980 here we pay particular attention to the following four important aspects of household decision making over commodity demand and labour supply the first concerns the commonly assumed restriction on the household s preferences of weak separability between goods and leisure this assumption allows the estimation of commodity demand systems and engel curves that exclude wage rate variables in cross section household budget data with large variation in wage rates across the sample the invalidity of this assumption would involve a serious mis specification any correlation between the excluded wage variable and the included price income and demographic variables would lead to biased parameter estimates and hence biased estimated elasticities similarly this assumption allows the estimation of labour supply curves that exclude relative price variables and its invalidity could produce biased labour supply elasticities a second aspect of household decision making which we wish to highlight arises from the suspicion commonly alluded to in labour economics texts that primary male workers may not be free to choose their hours of work thus we estimate a matched pair of rationed and unrationed systems following the work of neary and roberts i 980 and deaton and muellbauer i 979 the separability restriction is not unrelated to this point since without it we will see that the rationed hours of work enter demand systems in a complex fashion in effect

optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage in many industries firms affect the environment in two distinct types of ways firstly they emit routine anticipated volumes of flow pollutants secondly they can potentially inflict catastrophic environmental damage liability for which may be overhanging or limited by the law operaters of chemical plants nuclear power stations and oil tankers are three examples if an emissions tax or charge is to be levied on the flow pollutants in these cases how should it be set we use simple dynamic programming techniques to characterise second best optimality we identify contexts in which the tax should be raised above its pigovian level to take account of the catastrophic potential and others where it should be set below that level the analysis has significant implications for how policymakers should go about calibrating ecological taxes in a number of high profile industries

vertical coordination financial structure and the changing theory of the firm developments for evaluating these changes including the relationships to financial structure the theoretical developments include contributions from the economics of organizations stiglitz 1991 agency relationships jensen and meckling transactions cost economics williamson 1979 1985 incomplete contracting hart 1988 asymmetric information and financial contracting 1 these theoretical developments provide rich opportunities to apply new interesting concepts toward understanding and evaluating the changing managerial and organizational environment in agriculture

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

measuring the costs of children an alternative approach abstract the cost of a child or the general equivalence scale as it is more commonly known is a concept of considerable importance in matters relating to public policy and welfare it has played a crucial part in numerous theoretical and empirical studies relating to poverty income distribution dietary needs income maintenance programs supplementary and child benefits and other forms of social security payments in a welfare state and in assessing the horizontal equity of income taxation in spite of a long tradition of estimating the scale from observed household budget data there remain severe problems in estimation and interpretation of the scales this paper proposes a new methodology for calculating the scale using a framework which is consistent with utility theory and which overcomes the identification problem without having to enforce the arbitrary prior assumptions of recent studies the proposed method allows easy calculation of not only the basic scale parameter but also how it varies with price and reference utility we illustrate the usefulness of the procedure by estimating on u k budget data at two different levels of aggregation and employing two sets of quite different functional forms the results are plausible compare favourably with one another and hence confirm the robustness and usefulness of the proposed procedure

profitability and profit sharing claims that profit sharing is a purely distributive wealth confiscation scheme without incentive effects due to free rider problems are based on neglect of cooperation and interaction in the workforce when these activities are difficult to monitor directly group incentives such as profit sharing can increase efficiency and maintain a superior nashequilibrium with strictly individual optimization with simultaneous wls tobit estimates we find here strong effects of profit sharing and worker ownership shares on residual owners return on capital in medium sized metal working firms in west germany complementing earlier results on productivity

financial constraints and firm post entry performance abstract firms finance production by internally generated funds and external loans the benefits of leverage however come with a cost this cost is related to the uncertainty banks face about the firm s quality and output price as time evolves banks learn about the firm and adjust the terms of the loan contract because of this firms do not have equal access to credit small young firms face greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well known prospects the firm survival rate as well as the firm rate of growth are therefore important issues in analyzing firm post entry performance

incrementality of sme loan guarantees in many countries loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small and medium sized enterprises smes if loan guarantee schemes are to be effective a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources a property known as incrementality or additionality this paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality this work uses a two stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the canada small business financing csbf program first a logistic regression based model of loan outcomes essentially a credit scoring model is estimated based on a large representative sample of smes the resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness of fit the model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme incremental loans ought to be classified as turndowns by the model hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality for the csbf loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated with 95 confidence as 74 8 9 0

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

additional information for comments on alternative models of demand for automobiles by charlotte wojcik abstract in a recent paper in this journal econ lett 68 2000 113 wojcik argues that the nested logit is likely to be superior to demand specifications we and others have used in recent empirical work we review the relevant models and their uses consider her application and find that her conclusions are incorrect

on the economics of household composition 1988 on the economics of household composition applied economics vol 20 no 10 pp 1401 1418

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

unemployment long term employment relations and productivity growth using an effort regulation type of efficiency wage model it is demonstrated that a firm may respond to slackening labor markets by acting to increase the intensity with which workers work the magnitude of this work intensity effect depends on the structure of employment relations where long term employment relations are prevalent the effect of labor market slack on work intensity may be diminished these propositions are tested empirically by estimating the effects unemployment and long term employment have on productivity growth in two digit manufacturing industries copyright 1987 by mit press

an analysis of offer functions of banks and credit unions in guatemala economists have sought to identify institutions which might fill the gap in household access to credit arising from rationing by formal lenders credit unions have been identified as institutions which might use informational and monitoring advantages to fill that gap using information on household perceptions of their access to credit this article analyses the impact of certain credit unions on the access to credit of households in guatemala regression results indicate that credit unions serve markets unserved by formal lenders and that information on household perceptions of their access to credit is important in making inferences about lender lending activities

equivalence scales in a rank 3 demand system abstract in the context of a rank 3 demand system equivalence scales measuring the cost of demographic characteristics independently of the base utility level can be identified from cross section data without demographic separability restrictions although this can also be achieved with a rank 2 demand system that contains a nonlinear log expenditure term in its budget shares tests performed in a nested framework suggest that the rank 3 demand system approach is empirically superior the informative structure of the rank 3 demand system is used to estimate a detailed pattern of demographic costs including the cost of single parenthood and economies of scale within the family

credit rationing concessionary lending and debt maturity abstract a firm raises capital for a two period investment while creditors observe the project status midstream unobservable managerial perks may consume capital each period when the firm is unfortunate early on short term financing results in either concessionary lending or costly liquidation rolling over short term debt may be problematic because the high risk premium creditors demand when asset value is low relative to debt impares managerial motivation precisely when the incentive to defer perk consumption is weakest long term financing may reduce total agency costs be enabling lenders to charge higher initial premia in effect shifting loan repayments to states in which incentive constraints are non binding

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

consumer behaviour theory and empirical evidence a survey this survey is designed to emphasize the relationship between empirical a nd theoretical considerations in the analysis of consumer behavior a lthough it focuses primarily on analysis at the individual or micro l evel it tries where possible to draw implications for the estimati on of aggregate relationships the importance of micro level analysis stems from the rapid expansion in available panel and survey data se ts this development has generated its own theoretical and empirical issues many of which are raised in this survey copyright 1988 by royal economic society

revealed community equivalence scales abstract this paper estimates the equivalence scale revealed by discretionary community allocations of welfare benefits to poor households i apply the proposed approach to a subsidized rice program in indonesia in which villages designated program beneficiaries and estimate the equivalence scale implicit in the beneficiaries they selected i find that the revealed community equivalence scale for this program lies much closer to per capita expenditure than traditional demand based equivalence scales particularly in the poorest communities this suggests that per capita expenditure may be closer to how poor communities actually compare households when allocating aid than previously thought

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard this paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions i contracts are subject to renegotiations ii the agent s action has long term effects the action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or type renegotiation proof contracts that implement various actions including random ones are characterized under appropriate conditions the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action therefore the equilibrium has standard properties of adverse selection models

the incentive effects of dismissals efficiency wages piece rates and profit sharing the relation of several incentive schemes to productivity is studied with a particular emphasis on the effects and determinants of dismissals dismissals turn out to be positively but in a nonlinear way associated with productivity similarly profit sharing raises productivity wages and piece rates are insignificant profit sharing decreases the number of dismissals made by firms copyright 1991 by mit press

collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information the authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered the principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts specifically some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept two somewhat surprising results emerge first high quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits second high quality borrowers may put up more collateral this paper explores the allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications we model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium under both banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits however under the first concept of equilibrium ti as in jaffee and russell 11 all rents accrue to borrowers whereas under the second concept t2 all rents accrue to depositors as in stiglitz and weiss 17 our research makes two main points first we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations specifically one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of stiglitz and weiss 17 and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used for instance

alternative models of demand for automobiles abstract this paper uses data on automobile purchases to compare two alternatives to the multinomial logit model the results indicate that the nested logit model is likely to be superior to the more general berry levinsohn pakes model for applications using aggregate level data

cereal price shocks and volatility in sub saharan africa what really matters for farmers welfare the lack of information as well as some misperceptions about the distinction between the welfare consequences of higher versus more volatile cereal prices has limited the effectiveness of policy interventions during the recent food crises in many developing countries this article proposes an integrated empirical strategy to investigate and compare the different effects of these two phenomena and tests it using nationally representative household survey data from four sub saharan countries results show that the negative impacts of a cereal price increase substantially outweigh the effects of price volatility on household welfare across the entire income distribution the amplitude and the distribution of those effects depend heavily on specific factors such as the weight of food consumption over total expenditure the budget share devoted to cereals the substitution effect among food groups and the relative number of net sellers versus net buyers accessing the market we also show that volatility mainly harms the poorest quintile of the population

is work special justice and the distribution of employment i investigate from an egalitarian welfarist standpoint the issue of whether state guaranteed employment should be offered as a matter of right to able bodied poor citizens who suffer chronic or persistent unemployment an affirmative answer is defended one consideration supporting this right to work is that provision of transfer aid in the form of jobs rather than cash screens nonneedy bohemians from the class of beneficiaries the main conclusion of the essay is defended from one objection based on efficiency wage models of the labor market and from another based on the alleged impossibility of maintaining the self respect and self esteem of able bodied individuals who fail to earn their own keep independently in a market economy

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

cnild labors child schooling and their interaction with adult labor using data from peru and pakistan this article tests two hypotheses there is a positive association between hours of child labor and poverty and there is a negative association between child schooling and poverty both of these hypotheses are confirmed by the pakistani data but not by the peruvian data the reduction in poverty rates due to income from children s labor is greater in pakistan than in peru the nature of interaction between adult and child labor markets varies with the gender of the child and the adult in peru rising men s wages significantly reduce the labor hours of girls whereas in pakistan there is a strong complementarity between women s and girls labor markets both data sets agree on the positive role that increasing adult education can play in improving child welfare

household equivalence scales and welfare comparisons abstract the ratio of cost functions of different households facing the same prices and attaining the same utility level is a true cost of demographic characteristics index this index is independent of a base level of income or utility ib if and only if it equals a ratio of household equivalence scales that are themselves ib applied cost index and equivalence scales specifications are usually ib this paper describes the general restrictions on cost functions and social welfare functions required for ib scales and for their use in welfare analysis

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

analysis of food demand in vietnam and short term impacts of market shocks on quantity and calorie consumption a complete demand system for vietnam was estimated using household survey data results showed that demand for rice with respect to prices and expenditure is relatively inelastic compared to other foods demand for food in general tends to be less elastic at higher levels of income and for urban households in the short term a market shock such as a 10 decrease in income or a 30 increase in rice prices forces households to spend a larger portion of their expenditure on rice at the expense of other foods low income households face a higher risk of undernourishment as their daily calorie intake is more negatively affected by the shocks than high income households the results suggest the importance of policies that provide necessary safety net programs for the poor

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

household equivalence scales theory versus policy researchers agree that household equivalence scales are intended to measure the variation in income needed to bring households of different composition to the same welfare level researchers do not agree however about how the term household welfare is to be defined this article traces the historical and philosophical development of three distinct definitions when the conceptual bases of several popular methods for the estimation of equivalence scales are explored it becomes clear that advances in theoretical rigor have not always worked to bring the literature closer to answering questions of policy concern

are smallholder farmers better or worse off from an increase in the international price of cereals citation nakelse t dalton t j hendricks n p hodjo m 2018 are smallholder farmers better or worse off from an increase in the international price of cereals food policy 79 213 223 https doi org 10 1016 j foodpol 2018 07 006

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

the economy of high wages an agency problem latitude with respect to the effort they supply and monitoring of effort and output is costly in this paper we examine the agency problem that arises in these circumstances the agent employee is assumed to maximize expected utility which depends on wages and effort a bad we assume that output is a deterministic function of effort that either effort or output can be accurately monitored and that monitoring is costly the firm s problem is to select a level of monitoring and a compensation package that will minimize the cost of obtaining a desired level of effort given the cost of monitoring the agent s preferences and the agent s opportunity cost of accepting employment with the firm his labour supply constraint the firm chooses a compensation scheme from the set in which compensation is contingent on effort if the agent is monitored and is equal to a standard

short term contracting and strategic oil reserves the effect of short term contracting on resource extraction is studied in a two country model of international trade in oil countries planners are assumed to be fully rational with perfect information and perfect foresight contracts are assumed perfectly enforceable and complete except that short term contracts do not allow commitments to actions taken beyond the contract period we show that short term contracting limits countries opportunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing reducing their collective tolerance for temporal variation in consumption this tends to make them extract more slowly than in the efficient plan that results from long term contracting contractual relationships often outlive the contracts that govern them it is therefore common for a long term relationship to be governed by a sequence of short term contracts when these contracts allow complete control of the organization of the relationship within each contract period any outcome that can be achieved in a long term contract covering the entire life of the relationship is also feasible with a sequence of short term contracts short term contracting can nevertheless have significant effects on resource allocation because each contract must be voluntarily negotiated in the environment created by its predecessors an allocation that is acceptable to both parties as a long term contract might not be voluntarily negotiable as a sequence of short term contracts because short term contracting is so prevalent it is worth asking what sorts of relationship can be organized efficiently only by long term contract and what kinds of distortion are caused by short term contracting two kinds of answers to these questions have been given in the literature one important line of investigation considers the use of memory in contracts designed to control parties incentives under asymmetric information baron and besanko 1985 rubinstein and yaari 1983 sanchez and zapater 1985 stiglitz and weiss 1983 tirole 1986 and townsend 1982 among others have shown how parties can use

information institutions and banking sector development in west africa i introduction banks and other financial intermediaries can perform an important developmental function especially in africa where alternative sources of finance are limited or nonexistent by providing firms with essential finance they help them to take advantage of productive investment opportunities which may not otherwise materialize by screening loan applicants they can help to address adverse selection in the credit market and channel funds toward productive uses by monitoring borrowers they can contain moral hazard behavior for example excessively risky investment activity that could undermine a borrower s ability to repay a loan through long term bank borrower relationships well established banks can address both adverse selection and moral hazard this not only helps banks to remain solvent but also ensures that bank finance is channeled toward productive and sound investments there is a large body of empirical evidence which suggests that the development of banking systems goes hand in hand with economic development see e g levine 2004 although the evidence on causality is mixed see e g demetriades and hussein 1996 there is broad consensus that well functioning banking systems promote economic growth demetriades and andrianova 2005 it is therefore a puzzle that so many countries remain financially underdeveloped this is particularly true of sub saharan africa which remains one of the most financially under developed regions in the world a recent study by the world bank has shown that african banking systems lack depth compared to other regions in the world but are also excessively liquid honohan and beck 2007 according to the world bank banks themselves complain that there is a lack of creditworthy borrowers while at the same time households and firms find finance to be a major constraint the evidence presented by the world bank also suggests that the least developed banking systems are also the most liquid suggesting that excess liquidity is a common feature of financial under development this article aims to shed light on these features of financial under development in africa utilizing a panel data set comprising the banks operating in the west african economic and monetary union uemoa during 2000 2005 the uemoa provides a uniform financial system across eight countries the structure of this system has changed little in the last 15 years therefore we can be sure that the variations in bank behavior we observe within the uemoa are not because of variations in the nature of public financial institutions which the banks face this makes feasible the identification of the institutional sources of the variations in bank behavior which are not correlated with variations in the quality of public financial institutions our data set includes balance sheet information on each bank in the uemoa including bank characteristics such as age and ownership type profitability and the number of urban and rural branches we also utilize country level data on loan defaults which provides information on the average quality of borrowers we use this as a proxy for the severity of information problems faced by banks in the credit market we combine this information with macroeconomic data including institutional quality indices constructed by the world bank our data set enables us to examine the extent to which informational and institutional factors and interactions between different factors can explain a bank s loans to assets ratio which is an inverse measure of bank liquidity our data set is also used to examine the microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the total volume of assets of an individual bank which is a good micro level indicator of overall banking sector development our results suggest that to a large extent financial under development including excess liquidity and low banking sector development can be attributed to severe informational problems

competing lending platforms endogenous reputation and fragility in microcredit markets this paper shows that market fragility and mass default can arise in microcredit markets as a result of the strategic interaction between a microlender using a reputation based mechanism and a traditional lender using physical collateral in our model borrowers solve a dynamic programming problem which induces an endogenous equilibrium distribution of reputational capital because the quality of each lender s pool of borrowers is affected by both lenders interest rates lender reaction curves are non monotonic and discontinuous this can result in knife edge equilibria and mass default on the microlender precipitated by minor parametric perturbations fragility is exacerbated by borrower screening and sovereign risk but ameliorated when microlenders have social welfare goals our results highlight the importance of studying the entire credit market rather than microfinance in isolation

child labor child schooling and their interaction with adult labor empirical evidence for peru and pakistan using data from peru and pakistan this article tests two hypotheses there is a positive association between hours of child labor and poverty and there is a negative association between child schooling and poverty both of these hypotheses are confirmed by the pakistani data but not by the peruvian data the reduction in poverty rates due to income from children s labor is greater in pakistan than in peru the nature of interaction between adult and child labor markets varies with the gender of the child and the adult in peru rising men s wages significantly reduce the labor hours of girls whereas in pakistan there is a strong complementarity between women s and girls labor markets both data sets agree on the positive role that increasing adult education can play in improving child welfare

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

cost of characteristics indices and household equivalence scales abstract the ratio of cost functions of demographically different households is a true cost of demographic characteristics index this index is independent of a base level of income or utility ib if and only if it equals a ratio of household equivalence scales that are themselves ib this paper analyzes the restrictions on cost functions and commodity specific equivalence scales required for the existence of ib scales and indices since scales can be price dependent the restrictions on behavior are far less severe than for ordinary engel style household scales connections between ib scales and other techniques for incorporating demographic effects into demand systems are described

budget share demographic translation and the aggregate almost ideal demand system abstract this paper introduces budget share demographic translation in the almost ideal demand system aids and explores its implications for aggregation over consuming units it os shown that under certain conditions the joint distribution of expenditure and demographic characteristics plays an explicit role in the aggregate aids empirical evidence based on italian data is provided and the implied expenditure pattern for a number of combinations of expenditures and household characteristics derived from the estimated aggregate aids the empirical results suggest that the usual rejection of the homogeneity restriction in aggregate demand systems might have to do with the improper treatment of the aggregation issue

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through

equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture it is often argued that externally imposed contractual restrictions lead to inequitable credit rationing this paper argues that unrestricted laissez faire markets may also inequitably ration credit a formal model which grants borrowers autonomy in credit application and use demonstrates that adverse incentive and selection effects may cause banks to endogenously impose interest rate restrictions and ration small farms out of the credit market consequently liberalization of financial markets may be insufficient to guarantee small farms access to credit

the estimation of a rank 3 demand system with demographic demand shifters from quasi unit record data of household consumption abstract alternative versions of a preference consistent rank 3 complete demand system have been estimated from quasi unit record budget data of new zealand households of different demographic profiles also computed are the equivalence scales required by households of different composition to attain equivalent levels of utility and the expenditure elasticities