regional tax competition evidence from french regions reulier e and rocaboy y regional tax competition evidence from french regions regional studies two mechanisms can lead to fiscal strategic interactions between local jurisdictions the first is due to the tax base mobility authorities use fiscal variables to attract new resources the second is related to information asymmetries between the politicians and the constituency to reduce these asymmetries voters can compare their fiscal situation with the one in neighbouring jurisdictions these two channels lead to what can be referred to as mobility led and information led tax competition this paper aims to discriminate between these two tax competition models in the case of the french regions the econometric tests suggest that when taxes are paid by voters the politicians in office seem to be involved in an information led tax competition while in the case of taxes paid by firms the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best way to explain strategic fiscal interactions reulier e et

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas charlot s paty s and piguet v does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas regional studies the main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in french urban municipalities a tax setting model for local business tax is estimated using spatial and panel econometric techniques for the period 1993 2003 controlling for population size it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and as a consequence to increase local business tax rates

constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation the rules under which jurisdictions nations provinces can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best we stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission free mobility admission by majority vote admission by unanimous consent admission by a demand threshold for public goods in a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization abstract we study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods administrative capacity and to raise tax revenues fiscal capacity two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds under partial decentralization regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs under full decentralization marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes we show that the presence of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full decentralization dominance this condition may also be sufficient depending on the projects characteristics some extensions are presented

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

dynamic lotsizing with a finite production rate the dynamic lotsizing problem concerns the determination of optimally produced delivered batch quantities when demand which is to be satisfied is distributed over time in different amounts at di

the rise of the states u s fiscal decentralization in the postwar period article i nfo article history one of the most dramatic changes in the fiscal federalism landscape during the postwar period has been the rapid growth in state budgets which almost tripled as a share of gdp and doubled as a share of government spending between 1952 and 2006 we argue that the greater role of states cannot be easily explained by changes in tiebout forces of fiscal competition such as mobility and voting patterns and are not accounted for by demographic or income trends rather we demonstrate that much of the growth in state budgets has been driven by changes in intergovernmental interactions restricted federal grants to states have increased and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized state own source spending particularly in the areas of education health and public welfare these outside pressures moderate the forces of fiscal competition and must be taken into account when assessing the implications of observed revenue and spending patterns

integrated pricing and lot sizing decision in a two echelon supply chain with a finite production rate abstract in this paper we consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer selling the product manufactured by the supplier in a market in which the demand for the product is decreasing in the price set by the retailer previous research on coordinating the supply chain with price sensitive demand often assumes that either the supplier purchases the product or the supplier has an infinitely large production rate we consider explicitly the supplier s finite production rate in the pricing and lot sizing decision which causes the problem much more challenging we first investigate the optimization problem in the decentralized scenario to find the optimal order quantity and selling price for the retailer as well as the optimal wholesale price and lot size multiplier for the supplier we then solve the joint optimization problem in the centralized supply chain to find the optimal order quantity the selling price and the optimal lot size multiplier we provide two sequential algorithms to solve the joint optimization problem computational experiments show that the algorithms are effective all 448 tested problems are solved optimally and efficient it only takes a few iterations to converge for each tested problem the supply chain coordination mechanism is then designed through an all unit quantity discount policy and a franchise fee

strategic control of growth in a system of cities abstract this paper provides an analysis of the supply restriction model of growth controls growth controls in such a model harm consumers while enriching landowners and they will only be adopted if landowners have political power in the model this power is manifested in the city government s use of a social welfare that takes both landlord and consumer welfare into account since cities cannot be small if the supply restriction inherent in growth controls is to have an impact strategic interactions must be considered in the analysis of city choices a general model is presented and an extended example based on leontief preferences is then considered comparative static analysis of nash equilibria in the leontief case shows that perturbations of preferences or other characteristics of a single city can have important spillover effects that alter the choices of all cities in the region

optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition abstract this paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels on the other hand central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature the optimal degree to which public good provision should be decentralized depends on a tradeoff between these inefficiencies in our main model complete centralization is never optimal regional governments should supply some public goods

eco dumping capital mobility and international trade a small open economy s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution the country produces traded as well as non traded goods is it in the country s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded good sector the answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country however if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded good sector the opposite of ecological dumping

the local distribution of endowments matters modelling tax competition with heterogeneous local residents this study expands on the tax competition literature by incorporating the heterogeneity of resource endowments into the tax competition framework it theoretically elaborates that the local distribution of resource endowments affects both the level of tax rate and the degree of spatial dependence in tax competition and empirically confirms the theory using the data for 60 urban municipalities in the seoul metropolitan area sma korea in the years 2004 2006 a spatial panel model for tax cut confirms the presence of tax competition in the sma and the effects on tax cut of the resource endowment distribution another regression model for local indicators of spatial dependence uncovers the fact that the spatial dependence in tax cut is also determined by the local endowment distribution

corporate tax systems multinational enterprises and economic integration abstract multinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty profits two major principles for corporate taxation are separate accounting sa and formula apportionment fa these two principles have very different qualities when it comes to preventing profit shifting and preserving national tax autonomy most oecd countries use sa in this paper we show that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium corporate taxes under sa but leads to higher taxes under fa from a welfare point of view the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic integration

mergers in fiscal federalism this paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition the merger of regions induces three eects on regional and local tax policies which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically i an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level ii a rise in the regional tax base and iii a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities it is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates this nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions

public education under capital mobility the paper considers a two country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism and investment in human capital we examine in a non stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital market integration first we explore how regimes of education provision public private or mixed arise and how they affect the dynamics of autarkic economies second we study the effects of capital market integration in equilibrium on the optimal provision of education third we show that capital market integration enhances government intervention in the provision of public education to improve the welfare of its constituents and consider various solutions to such a competition

economic theories of the break up and integration of nations abstract this paper surveys the recent political economy literature on the size distribution of nations the main themes of this literature are 1 a the spread of democracy leads to the creation of too many sovereign states 2 b the extent of factor mobility plays a key role in determining the incentives towards separation or integration 3 c economic integration through the development of international trade may require greater political integration to create and effectively maintain a level playing field in international trade at the same time economic integration by reducing the economic costs of separation increases the incentives towards political separation

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

revisiting foundations in lot sizing connections between harris crowther monahan and clark abstract while many review articles exist on deterministic lot sizing models used in the context of price and quantity discounts buyer vendor coordination supply chain management and joint economic lot sizing problems they do not convey the impact of important findings which date back to at least 2002 or in hindsight to 1984 as a result many recent articles still model the financial implications of lot sizing decisions without having the assurance that these models would help the firm s involved in maximising the net present value npv this paper therefore reviews these findings while adding also its own contributions as to convey the general importance to lot sizing theory we show that the underlying principles used in the four key articles that have led to a division in modelling approaches are in fact all in line with npv and argue that therefore there should not be these discrepancies that currently persist in the literature we establish the connections between these four strands of the literature using the solution to a simple variation of harris eoq model deriving thereby results from boyaci and gallego 2002 and beullens and janssens 2011 but showing their general applicability to any type of supply chain structure the breath of implications to deterministic lot sizing theory is illustrated using practical examples we present a stochastic version of the model of crowther 1964 which is arguably the least understood and applied model but on the other hand the most important one in realising how these modelling strands can be unified

the spillover effects of good governance in a tax competition framework with a negative environmental externality we investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource when consumers have more influence than resource owners the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages lobbying contribution and the capital tax rate fall this response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off

public opinion distribution and party competition in us trade policy mass public opinion has generally been presumed to have little or no impact on american trade policy i argue against this presumption i assert that mass public opinion significantly affects us trade policy by shaping the way the two parties compete over that trade policy when public opinion is unbalanced the competition between the parties is likely to resemble a bidding war when public opinion is balanced but split in a partisan manner the competition is likely to descend into manichean conflict when public opinion is balanced but split in a non partisan manner the competition is likely to be characterised by political actors seeking to maintain the support of their core constituencies to examine this relationship i investigate three cases the push to punish china over tiananmen square in 1989 90 the ratification of nafta in 1992 93 and the process through which president bush was granted trade promotion authority in 2001 02

explaining house voting on the north american free trade agreement this paper analyzes representatives voting patterns on nafta the public choice model posits that representatives vote to redistribute wealth to constituents evidence presented here indicates that the heckscher ohlin model is appropriate to represent the redistributional effects of nafta using a three factor variant of the heckscher ohlin model evidence is presented indicating that representatives voted to redistribute wealth to their geographical and electoral constituents the ability of geographically concentrated interests and of special interests to influence representatives votes helps to explain the weak party allegiance demonstrated on the nafta vote

why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration the role of the modern welfare state abstract according to traditional trade theory heckscher ohlin free trade and free migration are equivalent measures of economic integration leading both to an equalization of factor prices this prediction is in sharp opposition to the observed preference of rich countries for free trade over free migration we provide an explanation for this inconsistency the redistribution policies in the countries social welfare in countries with a relatively small number of low skilled native workers is higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income towards immigrating workers

a model of welfare competition with evidence from afdc in this paper we test empirically for strategic behavior among the states using the cash support program aid to families with dependent children afdc to motivate the empirical work we adapt wildasin s model of income redistribution 1991 american economic review 81 757 773 to a model of interjurisdictional welfare competition although welfare competition may be generated from different frameworks we choose wildasin s model to illustrate how welfare benefit interdependence is genereated in the context of welfare migration we estimate a representative reaction function for afdc using both cross sections and pooled cross section data after controlling for other determinants of afdc benefit levels and for spatial error autocorrelation we find evidence showing competition 2000 academic press

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

a model of competing jurisdictions with locally polluting environments and mobile populations in this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated regional states withlocal taxing authority the residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution pollution is local innature and is a by product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution local authorities in the regions can andwill in the interest of local residents engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies the model isused to illustrate that nash equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality the resulting nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the cleanregion will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair

delegation ratification and u s trade policy why divided government causes lower tariffs recent research on executive legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation i find that divided government leads to lower u s

land leasing and local public finance in china s regional development evidence from prefecture level cities by analysing the evolution of local governments roles in different periods of china s growth in transition this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s local land development behaviour is related to china s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements on the basis of panel data covering prefectural level cities from 1999 to 2003 the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing by negotiation versus by auction tender policy implications are drawn from this analysis for the further reform of china s urban land system and fiscal institutions

cumulative staircase considerations for dynamic lotsizing when backlogging is allowed abstract the dynamic lotsizing problem concerns the determination of optimal batch quantities when given required amounts appear at discrete points in time the standard formulation assumes that no shortages are allowed and that replenishments are made instantaneously for the case when no shortage is allowed previously it has been demonstrated that the inner corner condition for an optimal production plan in continuous time reduces the number of possible replenishment times to a finite set of given points at which either a replenishment is made or not the problem is thus turned into choosing from a set of zero one decisions with 2 n 1 alternatives of which at least one solution must be optimal where n is the number of requirement events recently the instantaneous replenishment assumption has been replaced by allowing for a finite production rate which turned the inner corner condition into a condition of tangency between the cumulative demand staircase and cumulative production in this paper we investigate relationships between optimal cumulative production and cumulative demand when backlogging is permitted the production rate is assumed constant and cumulative production will then be a set of consecutive ramps cumulative demand is a given staircase function the net present value npv principle is applied assuming a fixed setup cost for each ramp a unit production cost for each item produced and a unit revenue for each item sold at the time it is delivered among other results it is shown that optimal cumulative production necessarily intersects the demand staircase instead of having 2 n 1 production staircases as candidates for optimality there are 2 n 1 production structures as candidates these are made up of sequences of batches of which the set of batches may be optimised individually also is shown that the npv of each batch has a unique timing maximum and behaves initially in a concave way and ends as convex results for the average cost approach are obtained from a zeroth first order approximation of the objective function npv

social protection and political competition this paper analyses how the level of social protection is determined when its choice depends on political competition first this is done under autarky then the analysis is extended to take account of the existence of an international capital market we show that social protection never increases under international competition and in several circumstances drastically decreases

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

how many parts to make at once reprinted from factory the magazine of management volume 10 number 2 february 1913 pp 135 136 152 interest on capital tied up in wages material and overhead sets a maximum limit to the quantity of parts which can be profitably manufactured at one time set up costs on the job fix the minimum experience has shown one manager a way to determine the economical size of lots

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

a century of evolution from harris s basic lot size model survey and research agenda abstract determining the economic lot size has always represented one of the most important issues in production planning this problem has long attracted the attention of researchers and several models have been developed to meet requirements at minimum cost in this paper we explore and discuss the evolution of these models during one hundred years of history starting from the basic model developed by harris in 1913 up to today following harris s work a number of researchers have devised extensions that incorporate additional considerations the evolution of eoq theory strongly reflects the development of industrial systems over the past century here we outline all the research areas faced in the past by conducting a holistic analysis of 219 selected journal papers and trying to give a comprehensive view of past work on the eoq problem finally a new research agenda is proposed and discussed

an early classic misplaced ford w harris s economic order quantity model of 1915 the familiar square root formula for the optimal economic order quantity was derived originally by harris in 1915 harris f w 1915 what quantity to make at once the library of factory management vol v operation and costs a w shaw company chicago 47 52 since all citations found to harris s paper over the past 35 years are incorrect it seems that no one has been able to locate the paper during this period the paper s apparent misplacement probably stems from an inaccurate citation given by raymond in 1931 raymond f e 1931 quantity and economy in manufacture mcgraw hill new york harris s paper exemplifies skillful presentation of the concepts of management science and still merits reading today s researcher can learn much from harris s modeling approach and would do well to emulate his expositional clarity and motivational effectiveness

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

the importance of local corporate taxes in business location decisions evidence from french micro data determinants of businesses locations are known to be multiple locations of partners and competitors are crucial as well as the territory s local characteristics to consider the importance of local taxes we build a poisson model to explain the number of business creations observed in a given municipality first results suggest that there are unobserved factors driving firm creation that are positively correlated with the level of local taxes to deal with this potential source of endogeneity we present an approach close to regression discontinuity design we find that everything else being equal higher local taxes actually tend to deter firms from setting up in a given zone but the effect is weak

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

how do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism tax vs expenditure optimization previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public flnance while expenditures adjust residually this paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable in particular it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments in uences the way local governments decide on public policy unlike the presumption the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures the result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local flscal efiort the results ofier a new perspective of the e ciency implications of federal policy toward local governments and thereby enable a more precise characterization of local government behavior in flscal federalism

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

taking the bite out of fiscal competition regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality thus segmenting the market for industrial location regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them this places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through tiebout competition it indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration through which regional concentrations arise which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography

ordering and inventory policies for step changes in the unit item cost a discounted cash flow approach this paper considers the problem of determining the optimal ordering quantities of a purchased item where there are step changes in price either up or down other costs incurred include ordering costs associated with each replenishment and holding costs related to capital tied up in inventory and physical stock holding the net present value npv principle is applied explicit expressions for the development of the optimal order quantities over time are presented it is shown that three cases may be distinguished i when the price change is very small ii when an essential price increase occurs and iii when there is an essential price decrease although the optimal last order quantity before a price increase is similar in magnitude to what has been presented in other articles applying average cost approaches in certain respects this paper offers novel results contradictory to those suggested by other authors analysis shows that the average cost model solutions are first order approximations in the discount rate numerical evaluations of a range of price increases and times to the price increase suggest that with certain important caveats the average cost formulae are likely to be acceptable for most practical situations for the infinite horizon situation

adapting inventory models for handling various payment structures using net present value equivalence analysis beullens patrick univ southampton southampton so17 1bj hants england janssens gerrit k univ southampton southampton sch management southampton so17 1bj hants england janssens gerrit k hasselt univ res grp logist b 3590 diepenbeek belgium

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

local government structure and urban residential location the large research literature on the tiebout model has developed with little attention paid to the urban economic structure in which local government functions this paper attempts to examine the theoretical consequences of local jurisdictions functioning within a conventional monocentric urban model it also discusses a mathematical formulation of a two jurisdiction linear city in which the local service level and local property tax rate might be used as strategic variables in a game theory sense it is concluded that for this to happen the local service level has to have more than one element which is intuitively appealing some references are developed to current british local government and possible changes

holding costs under push or pull conditions the impact of the anchor point holding costs are traditionally determined from the investment in physical stock during a cycle an alternative approach instead derives holding costs from net present value npv functions it is known that applying both frameworks to the same system can lead to different holding cost valuations but little explanation has been offered by introducing the anchor point in a model this paper shows for four different systems that traditional holding cost models implicitly assume pull conditions while current npv approaches model push conditions this explains in part the differences between the methods it is shown that the anchor point concept allows the construction of npv models under pull conditions giving results in better correspondence with traditional models the traditional framework is restricted to pull conditions and important considerations could be easily overlooked leading to wrong valuations of holding costs npv seems superior as such considerations are automatically incorporated the application to multi echelon inventory systems provides interesting insights on the roles of echelon stocks and lead times and offers potential for future research

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

determining trade policy do voters hold politicians accountable models of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences while much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied in democratic countries voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate using data from a survey of 36 501 potential voters in the 2006 u s midterm congressional elections this article explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns the article offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the central american free trade agreement relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day the article finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance in voters knowledge of their representatives policy positions and in its effect on voters propensity to vote for the incumbent the low salience of trade policy particularly among highly affected groups calls into question voter driven models of trade policy

bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies this paper considers the problem of bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions about local public goods and head taxes it is shown that delegation to benevolent jurisdictions will in general induce distortions away from efficiency where efficiency means an efficient provision of local public goods and an efficient distribution of consumers this distortion is caused by 1 the divergence between social and jurisdictional objectives and 2 the impossibility for jurisdictions to realize side payments without modifying either the provision of local public goods or the distribution of consumers

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

how tame will leviathan become in institutional competition competition among governments in the provision of public goods this article critically examines thehypothesis of brennan and buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments since leviathan type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors indeed such arule leads to a nash equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor however net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may depending on the same variables evendecrease net income moreover somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium finally applying the rule in a real worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies forthese reasons such a rule will hardly everbe introduced hence competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints whoever is afraid of leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments alone

tax competition among local governments evidence from a property tax reform in finland this paper uses a finnish policy intervention to study tax competition among local governments changes in the statutory lower limits to the property tax rates are used as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the responses of municipalities to tax rates in their neighboring municipalities i do not find evidence of interdependence in property tax rates among finnish municipalities the results are in contrast to the earlier empirical literature using data from other countries that has mainly found positive interdependence in tax rates i compare the causal estimates based on the policy change to the commonly used spatial lag estimates and spatial instrumental variables estimates which are based on highly restrictive assumptions the comparisons suggest that the standard spatial econometrics methods may have a tendency to overestimate the degree of interdependence in tax rates

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

property taxation nash equilibrium and market power abstract differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area following wildasin 4 and bucovetsky 2 the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a nash game in the tax rate the tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references