prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

towards an attention based view of the firm the central argument is that firm behavior is the result of how firms channel and distribute the attention of their decision makers what decision makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on what issues and answers they focus on depends on the specific situation and on how the firm s rules resources and relationships distribute various issues answers and decision makers into specific communications and procedures the paper develops these theoretical principles into a model of firm behavior and presents its implications for explaining firm behavior and adaptation 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

nonparametric estimation of sample selection models sample selection models provide an important way of accounting for economic decisions that combine discrete and continuous choices and of correcting for nonrandom sampling nonparametric estimators for these models are developed in this paper these can be used for estimating shapes and important economic quantities as in standard nonparametnc regression endogeneity of regressors of interest is allowed for series estimators for these models are developed which are useful for imposing additivity restnctions that arise from selection corrections convergence rates and asymptotic normality results are derived an application to returns to schooling among australian young females is given

day of the week effects and asset returns the number of empirical studies using daily stock returns is rapidly increasing researchers generally assume that the distribution of stock returns is identical for all days of the week a convenient statistical assumption but not a necessary condition of market equilibrium nevertheless there are reasons to suspect that the distribution of returns may vary according to the day of the week the most obvious is the impact of weekends on monday s return since monday s return is calculated over three instead of one calender day the mean and variance may well be higher on monday compared with any other daily return perhaps three times as large previous research has examined the daily distribution of stock returns for a monday effect while fama 1965 does not compare daily mean returns he does report that monday s variance is about 20o greater than other daily returns with a traditional distributional assumption regarding the returns on a financial asset specifies that the expected returns are identical for all days of the week contrary to this plausible assumption this paper discovers that the expected returns on common stocks and treasury bills are not constant across days of the week the most notable evidence is for monday s returns where the mean is unusually low or even negative several explanations of the results are investigated but none proves satisfactory aside from documenting significant day of the week effects the implications of the results for tests of market efficiency are examined while market adjusted returns continue to exhibit day of the week effects these effects are no longer concentrated on monday during the last year we have had many conversations with our colleagues throughout the professions we are particularly thankful to the participants at sessions of the western and american finance associations where preliminary versions of this paper were presented special thanks are due to gene fama gailen hite jon ingersoll robert jarrow merton miller clifford smith and rex thompson the expert research assistance of frank rabinovitch and youngsup yun is gratefully acknowledged 1 the list of papers using daily stock returns is too long to name recent examples include charest 1978 dodd 1980 banz 1981 and reinganum 1981

testing for affiliation in first price auctions using entry behavior in this article we show that affiliation among potential bidders private information either private signals or entry costs leads to affiliation among their entry decisions we propose a test for affiliation among potential bidders private information based on the implication of affiliation on the entry behavior which is general and widely applicable to various scenarios the test is implemented using the simulation based method we then apply our method to timber sales in the oregon department of forestry and find a small but strongly significant level of affiliation among all timber companies

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

business group affiliation and firm search behavior in india responsiveness and focus of attention this paper investigates the effects of organizational form on problemistic search we contrast how indian firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms evaluate performance and react by adjusting their internal technology search and external market search we propose that compared with unaffiliated firms business group affiliated bg affiliated firms are more externally oriented in setting aspiration levels and more likely to respond to low performance in the market domain we find support for an external orientation of bg affiliated firms and find that group affiliation determines the responsiveness to performance feedback in different search domains the findings suggest a need to add considerations of organizational form and governance to the theory of organizational search

balancing search and stability interdependencies among elements of organizational design we examine how and why elements of organizational design depend on one another an agent based simulation allows us to model three design elements and two contextual variables that have rarely been analyzed jointly a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates an incentive system that rewards subordinates for departmental or firm wide performance the decomposition of an organization s many decisions into departments the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions and limits on the ability of managers to process information interdependencies arise among these features because of a basic general tension to be successful an organization must broadly search for good sets of decisions but it must also stabilize around good decisions once discovered an effective organization balances search and stability we identify sets of design elements that encourage broad search and others that promote stability the adoption of elements that encourage broad search typically raises the marginal benefit of other elements that provide offsetting stability hence the need to balance search and stability generates interdependencies among the design elements we pay special attention to interdependencies that involve the vertical hierarchy our findings confirm many aspects of conventional wisdom about vertical hierarchies but challenge or put boundary conditions on others we place limits for instance on the received wisdom that firm wide incentives and capable subordinates make top level oversight less valuable we also identify circumstances in which vertical hierarchies can lead to inferior long term performance

competition based environmental policy an analysis of farmland preservation in maryland policy makers have turned to competition based voluntary enrollment programs as a cost effective way to achieve preferred land uses this paper studies bidder behavior in an innovative auction based program in which farmers compete to sell and retire the right to develop their land we derive a reduced form bidding model that includes private and common values this model allows us to estimate the role of bidder competition winner s curse correction and the underlying distribution of private values we estimate that the auction enrolled as many as 3 000 acres 12 more than a take it or leave it offer would have enrolled for the same budgetary cost

a transactions data analysis of the variability of common stock returns during 1980 1984 abstract using transactions data for a large sample of nyse stocks for six months in 1971 1972 and calendar year 1982 wood mcinish and ord 1985 wmo show that the graph of the variability of index returns across days against time of day has a crude u shaped pattern this study demonstrates that relatively high variability of returns at the beginning and end of the trading day also occurs during calendar years 1980 1981 1983 and 1984 in addition the variability of intra minute returns across stocks is shown to have a crude u shaped pattern when plotted against time of day a model is developed and tested that explains this pattern of variability of intra minute returns in terms of variability of market returns over the trading day the empirical results are consistent with this explanation

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

mitigating procurement hazards in the context of innovation this paper extends the transaction cost economics framework to examine the contractual hazards that arise in the course of technological innovation we identify three main strategic hazards related to future technological opportunities that may develop in business transactions loss of technological pacing possibilities on the technological frontier loss of technological control at or behind the frontier and design omissions in examining these hazards we focus on the increasingly common phenomenon of vertically integrated firms supplying downstream competitors we then analyze how constellations of safeguards particularly relational safeguards can augment transaction specific safeguards in many instances to ensure high powered incentives are maintained we also consider under what conditions downstream divestiture is a desirable economizing option supportive illustrations are drawn from the desktop laser printer and telecommunications industries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

unbundling the structure of inertia resource versus routine rigidity i work to unbundle the structure of inertia into two distinct categories resource rigidity failure to change resource investment patterns and routine rigidity failure to change organizational p

misspecification of capital asset pricing this study documents empirical anomalies which suggest that either the simple one period capital asset pricing model capm is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient in particular portfolios based on firm size or earnings price e p ratios experience average returns systematically different from those predicted by the capm furthermore the abnormal returns persist for at least two years this persistence reduces the likelihood that these results are being generated by a market inefficiency rather the evidence seems to indicate that the equilibrium pricing model is misspecified however the data also reveals that an e p effect does not emerge after returns are controlled for the firm size effect the firm size effect largely subsumes the e p effect thus while the e p anomaly and value anomaly exist when each variable is considered separately the two anomalies seem to be related to the same set of missing factors and these factors appear to be more closely associated with firm size than e p ratios

the affiliation effect in first price auctions we study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliated private value models of first price sealed bid auctions and prove the existence of a large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n we moreover decompose the effect of a change in n on the bid level into a competition effect and an affiliation effect the latter suggests to the winner of the auction that competition is less intense than she had thought before the auction since the affiliation effect can occur in both private and common value models a negative relationship between the bid level and n does not allow one to distinguish between the two models and is also not necessarily only due to bidders taking account of the winner s curse

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

testing for common costs in the city of helsinki bus transit auctions abstract i study the effects of competition in the city of helsinki bus transit market by conducting two tests for common costs in these first price sealed bid procurement auctions i introduce bidder asymmetry and pooling to the tests i also discuss the need for robustness checks for some arbitrary choices in these tests the information environment seems to be that of common costs the bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common elements than those whose garages are further away more competition does not necessarily lower procurement costs and the city should not necessarily implement costly policies to induce more competition a recent merger of two public companies cannot be criticized from a competition perspective

an investigation of transactions data for nyse stocks using transactions data the behavior of returns and characteristics of trades at the micro level is examined a minute by minute market return series is formed and tested for normality and autocorrelation evidence of differences in return distributions is found among overnight trades trades during the first 30 minutes following the market opening trades at the close and trades during the remainder of the day the latter distribution is found to be normal unusually high returns and standard deviations of returns are found at the beginning and the end of the trading day when the beginningand end of the day effects are omitted autocorrelation in the market return series is reduced substantially a number of patterns in trading are reported this paper empirically investigates the nature of the return generating process and the characteristics of trade size price changes trading frequency and trading interval at the level of individual trades for a large sample of nyse stocks previous studies of market indices have used daily weekly or monthly

adaptation as information restriction the hot stove effect individuals and social systems are often portrayed as risk averse and resistant to change such propensities are characteristically attributed to individual organizational and cultural traits such as risk aversion uncertainty avoidance discounting and an unwillingness to change this paper explores an alternative interpretation of such phenomena we show how the reproduction of successful actions inherent in adaptive processes such as learning and competitive selection and reproduction results in a bias against alternatives that initially may appear to be worse than they actually are in particular learning and selection are biased against both risky and novel alternatives because the biases are products of the tendency to reproduce success that is inherent in the sequential sampling of adaptation they are reduced whenever the reproduction of success is attenuated in particular when adaptation is slowed made imprecise or recalled less reliably the propensity to engage in risky and new activities is increased these protections against the error of rejecting potentially good alternatives on inadequate experiential evidence are costly however they increase the likelihood of persisting with alternatives that are poor in the long run as well as in the short run

estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed bid auctions the case of timber auction data estimating bidders risk aversion in auctions is a challeging problem because of identification issues this paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders utility function within a private value framework in particular ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values while first price sealed bid auction data allow us to recover the bidders utility function this leads to a nonparametric estimator an application to the us forest service timber auctions is proposed estimated utility functions display concavity which can be partly captured by constant relative risk aversion

organizational structure and performance feedback centralization aspirations and termination decisions this study examines the effects of organizational structure and performance feedback on termination decisions in particular product phaseout using quarterly product level data on the major mobile handset manufacturers for the period 2004 2009 we analyze how product level feedback affects product phaseout and how these decisions are conditioned by organizational structure the extent to which decision making is centralized we argue that such structure affects termination in two ways directly through coordination and indirectly by shaping the interpretation of performance feedback our baseline models indicate that as performance increases above aspirations the rate of phaseout decreases we find that as performance declines below aspirations the rate of phaseout decreases but then increases when the product falls below a certain sales threshold we also find evidence that centralization amplifies the feedback effect above aspirations but attenuates it below aspirations this study links two pillars of the carnegie school aspiration levels and hierarchy to explain the complexity of phaseout following perceived success or failure we thereby augment the growing scholarship on performance feedback by considering some important conditional effects imposed by a centralized structure our focus on centralization expands the scope of theory concerning organization design by linking structure and cognition to explain firm behavior especially termination decisions

changes in beef packers market power after the livestock mandatory price reporting act an agent based auction controversy remains about the effectiveness of the 1999 livestock mandatory price reporting act mpra we determine the likely changes in beef packers market power after the mpra by using an agent based first price common value auction past research has employed cournot models but we use an auction model which more closely resembles the actual cattle procurement process we find that feeders benefit from the mpra regardless of whether price uncertainty decreases for packers and or feeders if the packers price uncertainty is reduced the feeder benefits from an increase in competition between the packers if the feeder s price uncertainty is reduced the feeder benefits from imposing more accurate reserve prices copyright 2013 oxford university press

when should sellers use auctions the simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit offers from buyers a simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make offers sequentially if it is costly for buyers to participate the sequential mechanism will tend to be more efficient than the simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation decisions on earlier bids however the sequential mechanism s greater efficiency may not produce higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead early bidders to bid aggressively the fact that later firms might be deterred will tend to reduce revenues the relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend on whether the threat of potential future competition which can raise bids in the sequential mechanism is more valuable to the seller than actual competition which will tend to be greater in the simultaneous auction the relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications for how assets should be sold in the case of how to structure the sale of corporations this question has attracted attention from practitioners and commentators since the delaware supreme court s 1986 revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a company with the duty of getting the best price for the stockholders revlon v mcandrews and forbes holdings 1986 in practice

auctions versus posted price selling the case of correlated private valuations two popular selling methods are compared in a one period correlated private values model the seller of an object has to decide whether to sell it by posting a fixed price or by an auction without auctioning costs an auction with a reserve price is always preferable with positive auctioning costs the authors find that an auction is still preferable when the distribution of buyers valuations is sufficiently dispersed or when the object value is sufficiently high the relations between these and previous results are also discussed

information trading and stock returns lessons from dually listed securities this paper compares the intra day patterns on the nyse and amex of volatility trading volume and bid ask spreads for european and japanese dually listed stocks with american stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility it is shown that the intra day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day in the early morning all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day but this phenomenon is most pronounced for japanese stocks and affects american stocks the least we argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior

an analysis of transactions data for the toronto stock exchange abstract using transactions data for all stocks traded on the toronto stock exchange this study shows that returns and number of shares traded have a u shaped pattern when plotted against time of the trading day these results confirm that the findings of wood mclnish and ord 1985 harris 1986 mclnish and wood 1988 and jain and joh 1989 for the new york stock exchange nyse also hold for both another exchange and another country and are not due to peculiarities of united states securities markets further evidence is provided to support the view of harris 1989 and terry 1986 that these relatively high end of day returns are due at least in part to an increase in the proportion of trades at the ask relative to trades at the bid

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

variable organizational risk preferences tests of the march shapira model march and shapira s 1987 1992 model of managers risk preferences allows for shifts in attention between survival and aspiration levels our study provides initial empirical tests of their model

are internal capital markets efficient using segment information from compustat we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm s other segments but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow the investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single segment firms the sensitivity of a segment s investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm s other segments

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

an examination of stock market return volatility during overnight and intraday periods 1964 1989 this paper examines the variance of hourly market returns during 1964 89 results indicate that return volatility falls from the opening hour until early afternoon and rises thereafter and is significantly greater for intraday versus overnight periods market variance is also shown to change significantly over time rising after nasdaq began in 1971 rising after trading in stock options began in 1973 falling after fixed commissions were eliminated in 1975 rising after trading in stock index futures was introduced in 1982 and falling after margin requirements for stock index futures became larger in 1988 copyright 1990 by american finance association

a transaction data study of weekly and intradaily patterns in stock returns abstract weekly and intradaily patterns in common stock prices are examined using transaction data for large firms negative monday close to close returns accrue between the friday close and the monday open for smaller firms they accrue primarily during the monday trading day for all firms significant weekday differences in intraday returns accrue during the first 45 minutes after the market opens on monday mornings prices drop while on the other weekday mornings they rise otherwise the pattern of intraday returns is similar on all weekdays most notable is an increase in prices on the last trade of the day

letting the market work for you an evolutionary perspective on product strategy managers must choose to allocate scarce resources either to the maintenance of a range of products tailored to heterogeneous consumer preferences or to the efficient production of a small number of products in addition managers must choose the degree to which they periodically cull the product line vigorous selection removes poor performers from the product line but this action simultaneously impairs the firm s ability to monitor changes in consumer preferences empirical evidence from the computer workstation industry reveals that the ideal choice of product variety depends on the competitive ecology of the industry product variety becomes less valuable as the total number of products on the market increases but it increases in value as uncertainty makes the accurate prediction of demand difficult copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

reserve price effects in auctions estimates from multiple regression discontinuity designs i introduction online auctions are an important trading mechanism in modern economies ebay alone has 81 million active users worldwide and auctions a billion objects annually ebay 2009 as data from auction settings has become accessible especially from online auction environments there has been a surge in empirical analysis testing whether the behavior of buyers and sellers is consistent with auction theory bajari and hortacsu 2004 we contribute to this empirical literature by presenting evidence from 260 000 online auctions of second hand cars that took place between january 2003 and november 2008 we identify the impact of a common feature of online and offline auctions public reserve prices on a rich set of auction outcomes 1 to establish causality we present evidence from multiple regression discontinuity rd research designs an empirical method that has not been used in the earlier literature to test the predictions of auction theory guided by theory we first identify the impact of reserve prices on various standard margins of bidder s behavior such as their entry into auctions bidding behavior within the auction and ultimately the winning bid we then combine these estimates to shed light on whether the reserve prices set by the auctioneer indeed maximize her ex ante expected revenue at a final stage we exploit our rich data to provide new insights that have not previously been documented in the empirical auctions literature such as the impact of reserve prices on i bidder s search behavior and ii the composition and characteristics of bidders this new evidence helps shed light on how to best characterize this environment in terms of whether bidders endogenously enter auctions and whether they hold symmetric valuations or not our analysis has broad relevance in three regards first car sales through auctions form an important share of the market the value of cars sold via auction in the united states was 89 billion in 2007 and used car dealers filled over 30 of their inventory via auctions roberts 2013 second the auction mechanism used in our setting an open ascending second price auction that allows proxy bidding is widely suggested to be the most prevalent online auction format bajari and hortacsu 2004 third the specific auction design feature we study reserve prices is commonly observed in online and offline formats the first set of outcomes we study are motivated by the theoretical auction literature these relate to the impact of reserve prices on winning bids the number of entrants that is the number of bidders that place at least one bid and the probability the object is sold 2 theory suggests reserve price impacts on these margins depend on three factors i whether bidders have private or common valuations of the auctioned object ii whether bidder entry is exogenous or endogenous and iii whether the reserve price signals the auctioneer s private information on the true value of the auctioned object in exogenous entry models predictions about the impact of reserve prices on these outcomes are robust with regard to whether bidders have private affiliated or common values for the object milgrom and weber 1982 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 and to whether the reserve price conveys a signal of the object s value to buyers cai riley and ye 2007 as is intuitive in this class of exogenous entry models a higher reserve price discourages entry of marginal bidders decreases the likelihood the object is sold and increases winning payments conditional on sale theoretical predictions on reserve price impacts are less clear cut in endogenous entry models levin and smith 1994 tan and yilankaya 2006 analogous to exogenous entry models a higher reserve price discourages entry of both potential and actual bidders and decreases the probability of sale however a higher reserve price might decrease winning payments through its adverse impact on entry

volume and turn of the year behavior abstract this paper studies the trading characteristics of listed companies by size and year end behavior there were no transactions on nearly 25 of the days for the smallest decile even at the turn of year which is an active trading period for small companies as a result of low levels of trading and the regulations governing exchange specialists transaction prices and quotations of small listed companies may require several days to fully reflect equilibrium price changes the data confirm the existence of a year end seasonal pattern in rates of return for small companies and suggest that there may be a seasonal pattern for large companies as well

autocorrelation of daily index returns intraday to intraday versus close to close intervals abstract first order autocorrelation coefficients of 1 daily equally weighted open to open returns 2 daily equally weighted intraday to intraday returns terminating at each of 23 successive 15 minute intervals of the trading day beginning at 10 15 a m and 3 daily equally weighted and value weighted close to close returns interval 24 are examined a number of findings concerning the behavior of these autocorrelations are reported first order autocorrelation is shown to follow a crude u shaped pattern when plotted against the time of the trading day but there is no significant difference in the behavior of autocorrelations based on open to open returns and 24 hour returns terminating at 10 15 a m evidence that intraday patterns in autocorrelation cannot be explained fully by trading delays also is presented

the bidder exclusion effect we introduce a new simple to compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric conditionally independent private values the test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics this object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers we illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent

testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance the determinants of organizational risk taking and its impact on economic performance are critical issues in strategic management using a model that included risk performance performance expecta