reaction or interaction spatial process identification in multi tiered government structures abstract this paper models horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a multi tiered structure of government and implements maximum likelihood and instrumental variables estimation techniques to identify the source of spatial dependence in english local government expenditures the results show that when vertical fiscal externalities among upper tier county authority and lower tier district authority expenditures are explicitly taken into account the estimated magnitude of inter district fiscal interactions is substantially reduced the observed positive spatial autocorrelation among district expenditures can consequently be attributed to a large extent to common reaction to county fiscal policies rather than to actual strategic interaction

the cyclicality of international public sector borrowing in developing countries does the lender matter abstract the paper shows that international government borrowing from multilateral development banks is countercyclical while international government borrowing from private sector lenders is procyclical the countercyclicality of multilateral development bank mdb lending is mostly driven by the behavior of the world bank borrowing from regional development banks tends to be acyclical the paper also shows that mdb lending to latin america and east asia is more countercyclical than mdb lending to other regions private sector lending is instead procyclical in all developing regions while the cyclicality of mdb lending does not depend on domestic or international conditions private lending becomes particularly procyclical in periods of limited global capital flows by focusing on both borrower and lender heterogeneity the paper shows that the cyclical properties of international government debt are mostly driven by credit supply shocks demand factors appear to be less important drivers of procyclical international government borrowing the focus on supply and demand factors is different from the traditional push and pull classification as push and pull factors could affect both the demand and the supply of international government debt

interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation evidence from a panel of german jurisdictions abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the tax base effects of local capital taxation using a large panel of german municipalities it tests whether both the local tax rate and the tax rate in adjacent jurisdictions affect the local tax base the results obtained from a spatial gmm approach confirm a strong negative impact of the local tax rate whereas the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities proves insignificant only if interacted with the relative population size of neighbors a significant positive impact is found indicating that externalities from taxing decisions of adjacent jurisdictions are experienced only by relatively small municipalities

cyclical ratcheting in government spending evidence from the oecd this paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government spending gdp ratios in the oecd countries an empirical framework that includes both long run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering 1975 1998 the main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending gdp ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions the long run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2 of gdp also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending government consumption transfers and subsidies and capital expenditure as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness

on sraffa s standard commodity is its price invariant with respect to changes in income distribution in his 1960 book sraffa suggested using a composite commodity which he called the standard commodity to solve ricardo s search for an invariable measure of value i e a standard capable of isolating the price movements of any other commodity induced by changes in income distribution the absence in sraffa s book of an explicit proof of the invariance property of this standard gave rise to many misunderstandings about its meaning and its role as an invariable measure of value in order to clear up these questions bellino on sraffa s standard commodity cambridge journal of economics vol 28 121 32 2004 has proposed a proper definition of an invariable measure of value showing that sraffa s standard commodity does fulfil the requirements of this definition he claims that the fulfilment of this property but not the constancy of its nominal price qualifies the standard commodity as an invariable measure of value in this paper a proof of the invariance of the price of the standard commodity with respect to changes in income distribution is given and the equivalence of this property with bellino s definition of invariance is shown

fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

local government efficiency determinants and spatial interdependence we analyse the determinants of local government efficiency taking into account the presence of spatial interactions among neighbouring municipalities to do so first we estimate an efficiency inde

the conventional wage share vs full employment implications for the development of growth theory traditionally classical theorists assume a constant conventional share of wages in gross output this assumption together with fixed proportions creates endogenous growth via an ak style model pasinetti explored this model when the wage is allowed to adjust to ensure full employment we use cointegration analysis to explore the empirical tractability of each specification full employment suggests productivity growth and per capita growth should be cointegrated in the alternative no relationship exists because per capita growth is driven by the growth rate of capital while labour productivity follows its own path this suggests a simple test of each specification consequences for future development of the classical approach are explored

corporate taxation in the oecd in a wider context against the background of increased globalisation statutory corporate tax rates have shown a clear downward trend over the last two decades the sharp decline in these rates was accompanied by substantial tax base broadening and a comparable reduction in personal income tax rates only until the early 1990s this suggests that corporate tax competition is of increasing importance so far corporate tax revenues remain fairly stable but an analysis of corporate taxation in the context of the overall tax systems shows that a substantial shift towards value added taxes has taken place while the trends so far have been driven by smaller european countries recent tax reforms indicate that increasing tax competition is inducing a shift towards consumption even for larger economies

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

spatial patterns in local taxation tax mimicking or error mimicking this paper tests for mimicry in local tax setting by using a panel data set of the english non metropolitan districts in the 1980s when property tax rate variability across districts was highest the results confirm the presence of large and significant spatial interactions among districts even after allowing for district specific and time effects a district appears to be significantly affected by its neighbours policies a 10 increase in the local property tax rate of a district s neighbours leads to an increase of 4 5 in its own property tax rate on the other hand the absence of correlation in tax rates between lower tier district authorities and upper tier county authorities suggests that the spatial pattern in district tax rates is not simply driven by spatially auto correlated shocks

on the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods abstract this paper contends that a measurement problem the zoo effect has led to upwardly biased estimates of the degree to which local public goods are subject to congestion the suggestion is that the observed positive correlation between public expenditure and population size reflects in large measure the wider range of services provided in more populous jurisdictions not simply a high propensity of these goods to become congested

redistribution and non consumption smoothing in an open economy this paper presents a model where income distribution and redistributive fiscal policy interact to affect the budget deficit and the pattern of net borrowing of a country according to the standard representative agent paradigm a small open economy should smooth consumption by borrowing from lending to the rest of the world when its income increases declines over time the simple model of this paper delivers exactly the same predictions in the absence of income dispersion when income distribution is not degenerate however the same model gives rise to a surprising wealth of results in particular poor economies with high inequality may exhibit completely counter intuitive patterns of fiscal policy and external borrowing the country s production path declines over time because the more mobile agents leave the country to escape taxation yet the country might end up having a budget deficit and borrowing from abroad thereby reinforcing rather than smoothing the asymmetry in consumption between the two periods an important feature of this outcome is that it is backed by both the poor and the rich who gain from the fiscal system at the expense of the middle class

sraffa labor theories of value and the economics of real wage rate determination the labor theory of value and the question of whether or not a real wage rate versus profit rate trade off exists have been topics debated since the times of ricardo and marx more recently these topics have been investigated using sraffa s standard commodity approach it is argued here that such approaches are basically flawed however it also is shown that there are situations consistent with perfect competition for which negatively sloped real wage rate versus profit or interest rate trade offs do exist thus despite perfect competition genuine bargaining situations may arise between workers and owners of the capitalistic means of production

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

eco dumping capital mobility and international trade a small open economy s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution the country produces traded as well as non traded goods is it in the country s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded good sector the answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country however if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded good sector the opposite of ecological dumping

understanding the marxian notion of exploitation a summary of the so called transformation problem between marxian values and competitive prices the ending in the second part of the article the author examines the so called problem of transformation first he analyze certain contradiction faced by marx in the third volume of capital in studying the question of how to transform the cost into the price then he turns to the problem of inverse transformation and argues that marx procedure works only in a single case equal organic composition of capital the third part of the article bibliography provides an overview of the work on the analysis of marx s theory

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

fiscal policy and monetary integration in europe fiscal policy economists policy makers and the media often argue that the maastricht treaty and the stability and growth pact make it difficult for governments of emu countries to stabilize their economies with appropriate fiscal policy and to provide adequate public investment our empirical analysis offers little support to this view discretionary budget deficits have actually become more counter cyclical in emu countries after the maastricht treaty as well as in the other eu and non eu industrialized countries we study and while public investment has declined recently in emu countries a similar tendency is apparent in other countries and started well before the maastricht treaty was signed jordi gali and roberto perotti

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

actual labor values in a general model of production in contrast to counterfactual linear programming definitions of labor values this chapter introduces an at least equivalent definition of such values for the general case of joint production which is exclusively based on actual data this task is accomplished by extending marx s concept of individual values from multiple activities to joint production by means of certain price ratios at those points where production data are insufficient to ensure the positiveness of embodied labor time our approach generalizes the simple formula that relates labor values to monetary input output tables and it reformulates the labor theory of value in such a way that the theoretical priority of the case of a uniform composition of capital is reaffirmed in the concluding pages of his book marx s economics it is suggested by morishima that marxian economists ought radically to change their attitude towards the labor theory of value since in general the value system of the methods of production actually adopted in a capitalistic economy may be determined to be negative indefinite or even contradictory to the postulate of the uniform rate of exploitation morishima 1973 p 193 he then continues by proposing that optimal labor values the shadow prices of certain linear programming problems which minimize the amount of labor needed to produce given bundles of net output should take the place of actual labor values when production models of a more general kind than the simple leontief model are to be considered an interpretation of labor values which has been worked out in detail in morishima 1974 and has become a widely accepted approach to labor values and the labor theory of value for all types of multiple production systems

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

the political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians in the public finance literature the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable public choice arguments in contrast suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess political distortions may lead to a waste of taxmoney according to this view tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector the present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework the government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians it turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions the effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

road tax interactions among local governments a spatial panel data analysis of the french case over the period 1984 2000 abstractthis article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments via an indirect local tax on vehicles such as th

the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy evidence from the oecd this paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in scal policy in particular we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across oecd countries in line with leading theories of scal cyclicality we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical scal policies wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect scal cyclicality

decentralisation as an incentive scheme recent changes have introduced more decentralization in a number of traditionally centralized countries 1 in the case of france it is sometimes claimed that the 1982 1983 reform of subcentral government is of historical importance although the principles of that reform are not contested any more by the new majority elected in 1986 opinions still differ on a number of policy issues some of the issues are presented in this introductory section but the main purpose of this paper is not to expose or discuss in detail the problems of decentralization in france as argued in the second part of the introductory section the theoretical framework in which the policy issues of decentralization are usually discussed by economists is somewhat unsatisfactory in particular when applied to unitary states such as britain or france the bulk of the paper is devoted to the exploration of a different approach to decentralization it is not purported however that this approach could completely replace the more traditional one consequently when in the concluding section we return briefly to the policy issues identified here this is to be read as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the relevance of the reasoning developed in the paper

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

social spending and automatic stabilizers in the oecd the macroeconomic literature on automatic stabilization tends to focus on taxes and dismiss the relevance of government expenditure except for unemployment compensation our results go sharply contrary to this view we engage in an empirical analysis of 21 oecd countries from 1982 to 2003 and find that age and health related social expenditure as well as incapacity and sick benefits all react to the cycle in a stabilizing manner while possibly new in the macro literature this conforms to many results in studies in labour economics the policy implications are broad since much previous analysis of discretionary fiscal policy rests on official figures for automatic stabilization there are also major implications for efforts to incorporate automatic fiscal policy in simulation models julia darby and jacques melitz

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries some stylized facts this paper documents the main stylized features of macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycle regularities for a group of 12 developing countries cross correlations between domestic industrial output and a large group of macroeconomic time series including government revenue and expenditure wages inflation money velocity private sector credit international trade and exchange rates are presented the effects of industrial country economic conditions on output fluctuations in these countries are also analyzed the robustness of the results is examined using three detrending procedures a modified hodrick prescott filter the baxter king band pass filter and a nonparametric technique overall the results show some similarities between macroeconomic fluctuations in developing and industrial countries e g procyclical real wages and counter cyclical variation in government expenditure but also some important differences in business cycle characteristics e g countercyclical variation in the velocity of monetary aggregates

is social spending procyclical evidence for developing countries summary this paper studies the cyclical behavior of public spending on health and education in 145 countries during 1987 2007 it finds that spending on education and health is procyclical in developing countries and acyclical in developed countries in addition education and health expenditures follow an asymmetric pattern in developing countries they are procyclical during periods of positive output gap and acyclical during periods of negative output gap furthermore the degree of cyclicality is higher the lower the level of economic development

sraffa leontief lange the political economy of input output economics abstract the fields of political economy and input output economics are commonly unrelated due to the discrepancy between the qualitative and quantitative analysis in economic science with the aim to overcome this separation this paper relates the basic model of production of commodities by means of commodities to the paradigm of planning as the substitute for the market by sketching the logical historical development of input output economics the model of sraffa the leontief matrices and the political economy of marxist tradition represented by oskar lange are strongly associated so that the typical qualitative concepts of planning law of value and historical development of the capitalist system can be connected to the quantitative framework of matrix programming and mathematical formalization

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

the contemporary relevance of a cambridge tradition economics as political economy political economy as social theory and ethical theory in this review essay i set out key aspects of nuno martins the cambridge revival of political economy in so doing i also provide some comments on the current state of economics since these provide some context for an appreciation of what martins is trying to achieve martins is focused on making the positive case for classical political economy cpe as a form of theory that is quite different from the modern mainstream for martins that difference is based on its approach to the distribution of a surplus expressed through a social ontology that is based on historical open systems and in which the key aspect of open systems is the institutional and hence deliberative activity by which the surplus is decided which is ultimately an issue for ethics it is through a cambridge tradition focusing on sraffa keynes lawson and sen that cpe a classical social theory and ethical deliberation are brought together bringing them together is an act of synthesis and i conclude by providing a constructive critique of the terms of this synthesis

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

the effects of politics on local tax setting evidence from france this paper investigates the hypothesis that local politics has an impact on local taxation in the french public sector by using a cross sectional dataset on departments in 1999 political variables are included in a tax setting equation to provide empirical evidence whether local governments in france adopt business taxation behaviour closer to the leviathan government hypothesis with higher tax rates when political competition decreases or to the partisan government hypothesis with differences in tax rates according to partisan variables it is shown that the wider the seat s margin the lower the tax rates and that this cut is weaker in the case of a left wing local majority than a right wing majority it is therefore concluded that the partisan government hypothesis is more supported by the french data than the leviathan one even after controlling for tax interdependencies between departments

fiscal policy in good times and bad in the 1980s several countries with large government debt or deficit implemented substantial and in some cases drastic deficit cuts contrary to widespread expectations in many cases private consumption boomed rather than contracted this paper shows that in times of fiscal stress shocks to government revenues and especially expenditure have very different effects on private consumption than in normal times

the volatility effect of diaspora s location remittances can transmit volatility from host to home countries for some common patterns of diaspora s geographical distribution in a migration portfolio model the overall risk of volatility of any set of diaspora location is decomposed into a contagion and a concentration risks a diaspora located in more volatile destinations induces a higher contagion risk while a diaspora located in few destination countries increases the concentration risk a series of estimations on a large panel of developing countries over 1995 2015 provide evidence for these two risks estimation of a structural model confirms that the geography of diaspora has an indirect impact on the origin country s aggregate instability through remittances

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

how a race to the bottom can make you fat abstractthis article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the united states through education and health spending we hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms r

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

foreign investment incentives and international cross hauling of capital this note shows how international tax competition can give rise to special tax breaks for foreign investment discriminatory tax treatment of outside investment can give rise to socially harmful cross flows of international investment paradoxically an increase in the costs associated with foreign investment can increase welfare

on sraffa s standard commodity the necessity of expressing the relative price of a commodity in terms of another commodity makes it impossible to distinguish that part of any change that can be ascribed to the characteristics of the commodity itself from the part of that change that is to be ascribed to the characteristics of the commodity of reference i e the numeraire ricardo 1817 was the first to point out this problem and the need to find an invariable measure of value but he was not able to solve the problem in 1960 sraffa suggested using a bundle of commodities that he called standard commodity to accomplish this function claiming that it was a standard of value invariant with respect to changes in the distribution of income but in sraffa s book there is no explicit proof of this claim this gave rise to many misunderstandings about the standard commodity and its role as invariable measure of value this paper proposes a proper definition of an invariable measure of value and then proves that the sraffa standard commodity does fulfil the requirements of this definition copyright 2004 oxford university press

identifying strategic interactions in swedish local income tax policies abstract this paper uses data on swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting we make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms using such additional predictions of the theories serves a twofold purpose first it helps us establish if the spatial coefficient is due to strategic interactions or merely reflecting spatial error correlation and second it helps identify the source of interaction the analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among swedish local governments moreover we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates

tax competition among local governments evidence from a property tax reform in finland this paper uses a finnish policy intervention to study tax competition among local governments changes in the statutory lower limits to the property tax rates are used as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the responses of municipalities to tax rates in their neighboring municipalities i do not find evidence of interdependence in property tax rates among finnish municipalities the results are in contrast to the earlier empirical literature using data from other countries that has mainly found positive interdependence in tax rates i compare the causal estimates based on the policy change to the commonly used spatial lag estimates and spatial instrumental variables estimates which are based on highly restrictive assumptions the comparisons suggest that the standard spatial econometrics methods may have a tendency to overestimate the degree of interdependence in tax rates

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

sraffian indeterminacy a critical discussion this paper is aimed at discussing mandler s interpretation of sraffa s price theory in particular we will analyse mandler s idea that an institutional determination of distribution suggested by sraffa could be solidly advanced only in the case of equilibrium price indeterminacy in intertemporal sequential models first it will be shown that this kind of indeterminacy arises from an arbitrary use of the tendency to a uniform rate of return on the supply prices of capital goods second it will be remarked that when sraffa s contribution is placed as it should within the classical theory of value and distribution no price or sraffian indeterminacy will result finally we will argue that mandler s emphasis on the non arbitrariness of the capital goods endowments which is at the root of his indeterminacy result naturally leads to refer to those normal positions of the economy whose only possible consistent determination is sraffa s price theory copyright the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

burmeister on sraffa and the labor theory of value a comment in a recent contribution to this journal burmeister 1984 formulated several objections to sraffa s concept of the standard commodity and concluded that it is basically flawed similar criticism has been put forward by burmeister on several other occasions cf burmeister 1975 1980a 1980b according to burmeister sraffa aimed at the invention of a different labor theory of value 1984 p 509 by constructing a new wage measure such that the linearity of the relationship between the rate of profit and the wage rate remains valid even when there is not equal organic composition of capital by this token all the marxian analysis that is based on the linearity can proceed free of the objectionable equal organic composition of capital assumption p 514 in this comment burmeister s interpretation and criticism of the standard commodity and his view of the relationship between it and the labor theory of value are scrutinized and it is shown that many of his claims are untenable the structure of the paper is as follows section ii prepares the ground for the subsequent discussion by explaining the labor theory of value the role of the standard of value in

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects