the effect of reporting restructuring charges on analysts forecast revisions and errors abstract the frequency and magnitude of restructuring charges have drawn the attention of various groups of users of accounting information prior studies on restructuring charges have focused on the market s response to the announcement of the charge in contrast we examine the charges from the perspective of financial analysts we provide evidence that analysts expect declining performance for restructuring firms in the short run but possible improvement over the longer term when we examine forecast errors in the year following the charge we find evidence that the analysts accuracy has declined and despite the downward revision analysts are still optimistically biased

employment rents and the incidence of strikes a new measure of labor market tightness on workers behavior the employment rent is modeled as a determinant of workplace conflict an empirical estimate of the employment rent workers expected cost of job loss is calculated it is argued that the cost of job loss affects strike incidence this relationship is tested by estimating an econometric model of strike incidence for the united states from 1955 to 1983 the cost of job loss is shown to explain a large percentage of the variation in strike incidence the cost of job loss is a far superior explanatory variable than the unemployment rate which is commonly used in strike models copyright 1987 by mit press

information in prices about future earnings abstract stock return over a period reflects the market s revision in expectation of future earnings accounting earnings over the same period however have limited ability to reflect such revised expectations therefore returns anticipate earnings changes and the earnings response coefficient from a regression of returns on contemporaneous earnings changes is biased toward zero we reduce this bias by including leading period returns in price earnings regressions the resulting estimated earnings response coefficient magnitudes suggest that the capital market on average views earnings changes to be largely permanent this is consistent with the random walk time series property of annual earnings

performance changes around bank mergers revenue enhancements versus cost reductions this paper examines operating performance around commercial bank mergers we find that industry adjusted operating performance of merged banks increases significantly after the merger large bank mergers produce greater performance gains than small bank mergers activity focusing mergers produce greater performance gains than activity diversifying mergers geographically focusing mergers produce greater performance gains than geographically diversifying mergers and performance gains are larger after the implementation of nationwide banking in 1997 further we find improved performance is the result of both revenue enhancements and cost reduction activities however revenue enhancements are most significant in those mergers that also experience reduced costs

corporate governance through the proxy contest evidence and implications the current literature concerning proxy contests provides little evidence that shareholders suffer materially from sub par performance prior to a contest furthermore no study has thoroughly examined the long term performance of targeted firms subsequent to a proxy contest using a sample of ninety seven election contests during the period 1968 87 the authors find negative abnormal returns and deteriorating operating performance prior to the announcement of a contest following the contest negative abnormal returns are observed these negative returns are driven by cases in which dissident shareholders successfully acquire board seats the results for accounting based operating performance measures confirm these findings copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

competitiveness through management of diversity effects on stock price valuation this study s premise is that firms that can lower their costs and enhance their differentiation through the effective management of their human resources have a competitive advantage using data fr

issuing costs to existing shareholders in competitive and negotiated underwritten public utility equity offerings abstract this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of whether there is any difference in the cost incurred by public utilities if they issue new equity through a negotiated or competitive underwriting we conclude that the expected cost of a competitive offer is less than the expected cost of a negotiated offer but that the variance of the cost is substantially greater with a competitive offer these results are interesting because most public utilities use negotiated underwriting unless forced by regulation to use competitive offers this paper is also an addition to the growing agency theory literature

good times bad times postwar labor s share of national income in capitalist democracies this article returns to a classic question of political economy the zero sum conflict between capital and labor over the division of the national income pie a detailed description of labor s shar

loss allocation in energy transmission networks abstract in this paper we study a cost allocation problem that is inherent to most energy networks the allocation of losses in particular we study how to allocate gas losses between haulers in gas transmission networks we discuss four allocation rules two of them have already been in place in real networks and two others that are defined for the first time in this paper we then present a comparative analysis of the different rules by studying their behavior with respect to a set of principles set forth by the european union this analysis also includes axiomatic characterizations of two of the rules finally as an illustration we apply them to the spanish gas transmission network

sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with leontief technologies abstract in this paper we deal with production situations where a cap or limit to the amount of greenhouse gas emissions permitted is imposed fixing a tax for each ton of pollutant emitted is also considered we use bankruptcy rules to define cooperative games with externalities associated with these situations and analyze the existence of coalitionally stable allocations of the emission permits we prove that the constrained equal awards cea rule provides stable allocations and as a direct mechanism it is incentive compatible these two facts have interesting managerial implications to control pollution emissions

a game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects this paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan if the project is expedited a reward arises analogously a penalty arises if the project is delayed this paper considers the case of arbitrary nondecreasing reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay respectively attention is focused on how to divide the total reward penalty among the activities the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward penalty in the definition of project games surplus cost sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward penalty function at hand it turns out that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games this relation allows us to establish nonemptiness of the core of project games

international relocation firm and industry determinants this article is the first to explore the determinants of international relocation of a firm it is found that labour intensive firms in a highly industrialized and open economy such as belgium tend to relocate more to other countries than their highly productive capital intensive counterparts access to a global network firm size and the rate of innovation have a positive effect on the probability of relocation uncertainty has a negative impact on the probability of relocation the positive effect of firm size and profitability on the relocation decision is clearly distinct from its effect on the exit decision of a firm

proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations abstract analysis of 60 proxy contests for seats on the boards of exchange listed firms during 1978 1985 shows that three years after the contest less than one fifth of the sample firms remain independent publicly held corporations run by the same management team proxy contests are typically followed by managerial resignations even when dissidents fail to obtain a majority of board seats and are often followed by sale or liquidation of the firm the average stockholder wealth gains associated with proxy contests are largely attributable to gains by companies in which dissident activity leads to sale or liquidation

stock market reaction to capital investment decisions evidence from business relocations we investigate the stock market reaction to 447 announcements of business relocation decisions in the 1978 1990 period we find that the stock market reaction to such decisions is tied to the motive for the relocation and the implied prospects for the firm with the type of facility being relocated playing an insignificant role our finding reconciles several results in the literature concemmg the stock market reaction to announcements of capital investment decisions

communication costs information acquisition and voting decisions in proxy contests this article synthesizes some recent progress in the theories of corporate control and political lobbying to model the proxy campaign as a political campaign the model yields a number of testable implications only some of which have been examined in the literature for example if the loss from voting for a bad dissident exceeds the gain from voting for a good dissident the model predicts that as communication costs fall the number of proxy fights increases announcement day returns decrease and the fraction of dissident wins first increases and then decreases article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the timing of option repricing we investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company s stock price for a sample of 236 repricing events we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20 day period following the repricing date in addition repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date these findings suggest that ceos opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date

corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm abstract this paper is an event time study of the common stock prices of a sample of 658 corporations around the dates on which they publicly announced their future capital expenditure plans for industrial firms announcements of increases decreases in planned capital expenditures are associated with significant positive negative excess stock returns for public utility firm neither increases nor decreases in planned capital expenditures are associated with significant excess stock returns we interpret the evidence as being consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek to maximize the market value of the firm in making their corporate capital expenditure decisions

investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions abstract in this study we argue that share price reaction to a firm s capital expenditure decisions depends critically on the market s assessment of the quality of its investment opportunities we postulate that announcements of increases decreases in capital expenditures positively negatively affect the stock prices of firms with valuable investment opportunities contrarily we predict that announcements of increases decreases in capital spending negatively positively affect the share prices of firms without such opportunities our empirical results are generally consistent with these predictions overall empirical evidence supports our conjecture that it is the quality of the firm s investment opportunities rather than its industry affiliation which determines the share price reaction to its capital expenditure decisions

internal corporate restructuring abstract firms that alter their divisional configurations on average increase shareholder wealth gains appear to come from information about investment opportunities and increases in efficiency performance before the restructurings suggests poorly organized firms are motivated by market pressures to change their organizations change also occurs in healthy firms as part of the growth process restructuring often occurs where there is no evidence of takeover threats while stock prices increase around the restructurings there is a contemporaneous decline in earnings due to increased expenses these findings appear inconsistent with the contention that the market pressures managers into focusing on short run earnings

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

changes in organizational structure and shareholder wealth the case of limited partnerships this paper analyzes the consequence for shareholders of a change in organizational form the conversion of a corporation or the spin off of a unit into a limited partnership theory suggests that prior to the tax reform act of 1986 the tax benefits of conversion to a limited partnership and the creation of a new entity separate from the parent corporation should have a positive effect on shareholder wealth on the other hand the increase in agency costs of such an organizational change should decrease the wealth of shareholders empirical results lend support to hypotheses that predict an increase in stock price at the announcement of the conversion but cannot identify the source of the gain

political uncertainty and asset valuation evidence from business relocations in canada abstract quebec s drive for sovereignty from canada has been the source of political uncertainty for decades in canada this paper studies empirically stock market s reaction to the announcements of business relocations from the province of quebec to other provinces within canada similar announcements about toronto are used for control empirical results show that the market s reaction to the announcements of business relocations a from quebec is positive b from toronto is negative and c to toronto is positive the difference in abnormal returns between the quebec and toronto samples is positive and significant

the social construction of market value institutionalization and learning perspectives on stock market reactions this study advances a social constructionist view of financial market behavior the paper suggests that the market s reaction to particular corporate practices such as stock repurchase plans are not as financial economists contend simply a function of the inherent efficiency of such practices rather stock market reactions are also influenced by the prevailing institutional logic and the degree of institutionalization of the practice the theory first predicts that the emergence of the agency perspective on corporate governance in the mid 1980s represented a powerful new institutional logic that would lead the market to reverse its prior aggregate reaction to stock repurchase plans in the united states the paper then considers the potential for institutional decoupling of repurchase plans and develops competing hypotheses about how the market value of these policies might have changed as more firms formally adopted but did not implement the plans over time in contrast to a financial economic pers

the outsourcing of r d through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry abstract we examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns these returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position a unique desperation index is employed to determine the current status of a firm s internal productivity we find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines

voluntary corporate liquidations abstract this paper examines possible motives for and consequences of voluntary corporate liquidations specifically the procedural and tax differences between voluntary liquidations and other control changing transaction devices are analyzed an empirical investigation of successful liquidations shows that the announcement of liquidation reduces the risk of liquidating shares that the shareholders receive substantial gains from successful liquidations and that the average gains to the acquiring shareholders are not significantly different from zero these findings suggest that the liquidating firms assets have been underutilized before liquidation and that voluntary liquidations lead to higher valued reallocations of corporate resources

the effect of private antitrust litigation on the stock market valuation of the firm the authors study the implications for shareholder wealth of interfirm antitrust litigation and how the costs of the dispute affect the propensity to settle upon filing defendants experience significant wealth losses that are ten million dollars larger than the wealth gains of plaintiffs financial distress behavioral constraints and follow on suits are sources of wealth leakage and influence settlement behavior since the threat of a monetary transfer has little power to explain either wealth effects or the likelihood of settlement the central concern of defendants may be the potential prohibition of profitable business practices copyright 1995 by american economic association

egalitarian equivalent cost sharing of a public good in an economy with one public and one private good egalitarian equivalent cost sharing consists of finding the highest public good level x such that consuming x for free yields a feasible utility distribution the corresponding feasible allocation typically unique called egalitarian equivalent is in the core of the economy conversely any cost sharing method satisfying pareto optimality cost monotonicity nobody suffers a utility loss if the production technology improves upon ceteris paribus and individual rationality no single agent coalition objects or no private transfers no agent receives a positive amount of private good must select an egalitarian equivalent allocation in every economy copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

why regulate insider trading evidence from the first great merger wave 1897 1903 we use event time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900 for mergers with prospective disclosures similar to today s we find substantial value gains at announcement implying participation by outside shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints furthermore preannouncement stock price runups relative to total value gain are no more than those observed for modern mergers insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders with the inside information pricing function and related gains shifting to external information specialists other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure i e insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment

empirical evidence on on vertical foreclosure i introduction prior to the 1980s the united states department of justice and the federal trade commission actively challenged vertical mergers on the theory that such mergers foreclosed unintegrated rivals in the downstream market from access to inputs supplied by the merged firm this policy changed when critics of the foreclosure theory claimed that vertically integrated firms have no incentive to transfer products between the upstream and downstream markets at a price other than the market price and therefore vertical mergers have no effect on the price charged to consumers 1 the arguments against attacking vertical mergers were also supported by research that demonstrated that vertical integration can enhance efficiency 2 as a result vertical mergers currently receive very little if any attention from the enforcement agencies recent contributions by ordover saloner and salop 1990 krattenmaker and salop 1986 and salinger 1988 1989 have reopened the debate about the competitive effects of vertical mergers they each use theoretical models to show that vertical foreclosures can raise costs to unintegrated rivals and lead to higher prices for consumers although these models demonstrate that foreclosure can be a profitable strategy that injures competition to date these theories have not been tested empirically if vertical foreclosure rarely occurs or if it occurs only in a narrow set of circumstances changes in current policy on vertical mergers may not be justified a necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive foreclosure is that the vertical merger cause the unintegrated rivals to be less profitable this result from previous theoretical work is tested here on a sample selected from all vertical merger cases challenged by the justice department and the federal trade commission during the period 1963 to 1982 we find no evidence of anticompetitive market foreclosure for the sample of cases challenged by the antitrust agencies one possible explanation for our results is that the tests over the entire sample are significantly affected by a few weak cases brought by the government during a period of aggressive antitrust enforcement we test this by examining variables that have been identified by krattenmaker and salop 1986 and the department of justice merger guidelines as being conducive to foreclosure such as barriers to entry and industry concentration even the cases with high industry concentration and barriers to entry which potentially should exhibit substantial market power provide no evidence of foreclosure while this does not preclude anticompetitive foreclosure as a possibility it does call into question the cases brought by the antitrust agencies during the 1960s and the 1970s until the proponents of the more rigorous economic version of the foreclosure theory provide clearer guidelines about the conditions under which vertical mergers are likely to injure competition continuation of the current policy of not contesting these mergers seems justified ii theory of anticompetitive foreclosure the foreclosure arguments used to challenge vertical mergers during the 1950s and 1960s were easily discredited because no formal theory was used to support them more recent attempts to reconstruct the foreclosure theory have used economic models to demonstrate that vertical foreclosure can reduce competition the key to each of these models is that foreclosure raises the costs to the unintegrated rivals of the merged firm and this under certain conditions raises the price of the final product to the consumer the legal definition of foreclosure focuses on the ability of unintegrated firms to buy from or sell to integrated rivals while the economic definition of anticompetitive foreclosure focuses on whether prices to consumers increase salinger 1988 has provided a model that demonstrates the conditions under which anticompetitive foreclosure will occur

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

security price reactions around corporate spin off announcements abstract we examine security price reactions around the announcements of 123 voluntary spin offs by 116 firms between 1963 and 1981 involving a pro rata distribution of the common stock of a subsidiary to the stockholders of the parent firm the median spin off in the sample is 6 6 of the original equity value and is associated with an abnormal return of 7 0 from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spin off no evidence is found to indicate the gains to stockholders represent wealth transfers from senior securityholders over the entire event period we find positive gains for firms engaging in spin offs to facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating units but negative returns to firms responding to legal and or regulatory difficulties in the two day interval surrounding the first press announcement we find positive average excess returns for all groups

plant closing decisions and the market value of the firm abstract we investigate the underlying causes and the announcement effects of plant closings the closing in our sample do not appear related to takeover activity instead they appear motivated by declining firm profitability firms announcing closings have lower earnings than market or industry medians earnings typically improve slightly after the announcement we find a negative stock market reaction to plant closing announcements

the effect of pre emptive right amendments on shareholder wealth abstract pre emptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase a new offering of shares before the general public this paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of removing pre emptive rights from corporate charters two hypotheses are constrasted 1 shareholder wealth maximization suggests that management uses this extra degree of freedom to pick the least cost method for raising new equity hence the amendment increases shareholder wealth 2 management welfare maximization holds that management will use the passage of the amendment to maximize their own welfare sometimes to the detriment of shareholders hence the amendment decreases shareholder wealth the evidence indicates that the amendment decreases shareholder wealth

why are losses less persistent than profits curtailments vs conservatism it is well documented that losses are less persistent than profits and that stock prices anticipate the lower persistence of losses yet the underlying explanation for these results is unclear one explanation lies in the abandonment option whereby firms with losses are more likely to curtail operations e g hayn hayn c 1995 the information content of losses j accounting econom 20 2 125 153 another explanation involves timely loss recognition stemming from conservative accounting e g basu basu s 1997 the conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings j accounting econom 24 1 3 37 we provide direct evidence that curtailments are an important factor contributing to the lower persistence of losses an implication of our results is that popular measures of conservatism such as the measure proposed by basu also reflect curtailments this paper was accepted by suraj srinivasan accounting

a reexamination of the conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s an internal capital markets view one possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less developed capital markets examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s we find the highest bidder returns when financially unconstrained buyers acquire constrained targets this result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing we also find that bidders generally retain target management suggesting that management may have provided companyspecific operational information while the bidder provided capital budgeting expertise

the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth sell off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets e g a segment a division etc but continues to exist in essentially the same form this study investigates the effect of voluntary sell offs on stock returns from a sample of over 1000 sell off events first public announcements the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions the excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers there is also evidence that sell off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers on average performed poorly prior to their sell off activities substantial research has been undertaken in recent years on mergers acquisitions tender offers capital structure changes and other financial planning topics this research has considerably expanded our knowledge about the association of these decisions with the welfare of the stockholders involved in these transactions selling a portion of the firm s assets is another important financial planning decision 2 this paper investigates the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth a sell off is defined as selling part of a firm s assets e g a segment a division etc while the firm continues to exist in essentially the same form as that prior to the sell off this study does not examine the effects of involuntary ordered by the government sell offs and other similar activities such as spin offs leveraged buy outs liquidations reorganizations etc 3