efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

the political economy of corporate control and labor rents in a democracy a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital we argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors the model is consistent with the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century we offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system

exchange rate regimes and national price levels this paper explores the role of exchange rate regimes in explaining deviations from the classic theory of purchasing power parity examining a broad panel of countries i find that developing countries with fixed exchange rate regimes have national price levels that are 20 percent higher than those with flexible regimes for industrial countries the relation between regimes and price levels is qualitatively similar but weaker i investigate several explanations for this pattern and find that exchange rate overshooting in floats inflation inertia in pegs and expansionary policies can explain only 5 percentage points of the observed differences i also show that even though the observed pattern could be the outcome of a class of open economy models pioneered by obstfeld and rogoff the data provides limited empirical support for the predictions of this model

stock market development and cross country differences in relative prices abstract we document a positive correlation between stock market capitalization and price levels wages within the group of countries with poorly developed stock markets and a negative correlation between these two variables within the group of countries with more developed stock markets this paper argues that there is a causal relationship behind these correlations stock markets initially stimulate growth pushing the demand for nontradables and increasing prices and wages stock markets also promote a shift toward more capital intensive technologies in the tradable sector increasing the migration of workers to services and eventually putting downward pressure on wages and prices

international evidence on tradables and nontradables inflation abstract using 1970 1985 sectoral data for the oecd we find that inflation in nontradable goods exceeds inflation in tradables we identify a demand shift towards nontradables and faster growth of total factor productivity in the tradable goods sector as the prime causes of the differential inflation in addition disinflation attempts and the exchange rate regime appear to have exerted significant influence on the relative inflation rate

an alternative model of pro cyclical absenteeism abstract current economic models of absenteeism derive pro cyclical properties from cyclical variations in the costs and consequences of absence through an extension of the household production model this paper proposes a complementary approach based on variations in forgone earnings associated with work commodity itself

all stage strong correlated equilibrium abstract a strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature one major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation before ex ante or after ex post the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile in this paper we show that an ex ante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages thus the set of ex ante strong correlated equilibria of moreno wooders games econ behav 17 1996 80 113 is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria

financial markets the pattern of industrial specialization and comparative advantage evidence from oecd countries due to underlying technological and organizational differences industries differ in their need for external finance since services provided by the financial sector are largely immobile across countries the pattern of industrial specialization should be influenced by the level of financial development among oecd countries we find a strong causal effect of the financial sector on industrial specialization further the financial sector is a source of comparative advantage in a way consistent with the hecksher ohlin vanek model results are also presented on which aspects of financial systems are important for specialization and comparative advantage

declining organizational size and increasing unemployment rates predicting employee absenteeism from within and between plant perspectives the impact of increasing unemployment rates and decreasing organizational size on absenteeism was assessed for pooled monthly data from 17 plants over a five year period as the organizations becam

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

why are services cheaper in the poor countries in their important work on international comparisons of national incomes and of comparative price structure kravis heston and summers i982 p 8 have noted that services are much cheaper in the relative price structure of a typical poor country than in that of a rich country this phenonomen has been documented now fairly systematically by the data gathered under their guiding hand of the united nations international comparison icp which covers 34 countries table i reproduced from their work i982 and fig i based on rows 3 and ii 13 indeed show this tendencyfor the relationship between relative service prices and real per capita gdp in this kravis heston summers 34 country 6 group sample the tendency is strongly evident except for the intermediate groups iii and iv

an investigation of the relationship between unemployment and absenteeism a multi level approach the article discusses research pertaining to the relationship between unemployment and absenteeism at the national level the regional level and or the organizational level data on monthly absent

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

a formalisation and test of the factor productivity explanation of international differences in service prices this paper extends and integrates previous models of the determinants of international differences in the prices of services relative to tradable commodities the authors provide a model capable of identifying the effects of differences in total factor productivity on service price differences separately from the effects of factor endowment differences they propose a method for measuring these factor productivity difference effects and apply this to a sample of sixty countries in 1980 the authors results provide support both for the endowment difference and productivity difference explanations suggesting that in this context at least the two hypotheses are complements rather than competitors copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the coalition proofness of the pareto frontier of the set of nash equilibria abstract this article shows that the pareto efficient frontier of the nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition proof under the following conditions 1 the game has three players or alternatively a player s payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum but not on the composition of other players strategies 2 an increase in a player s strategy either raises all other players payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically and 3 each player s payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy under these conditions the pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition proof nash equilibrium refinement journal of economic literature classification number c72

stages of diversification this paper studies the evolution of sectoral concentration in relation to the level of per capita income we show that various measures of sectoral concentration follow a u shaped pattern across a wide variety of data sources countries first diversify in the sense that economic activity is spread more equally across sectors but there exists relatively late in the development process a point at which they start specializing again we discuss this finding in light of existing theories of trade and growth which generally predict a monotonic relationship between income and diversification

structural determinants of real exchange rates and national price levels some empirical evidence contrary to the long held notion of purchasing power parity ppp economists have found systematic evidence that the general level of prices across countries at a point in time varies dramatically irving b kravis alan w heston and robert summers 1982 for example report that some countries national price levels are no more than one third the u s price level extensions of this work show that such departures from ppp have persisted for decades recently efforts have been made to explain systematically these persistent or structural departures from ppp pioneering work by kravis and robert e lipsey 1983 1987 1988 has demonstrated that a positive correlation between the price level and real per capita gross domestic product is robust across numerous cross sectional specifications for instance using data from kravis et al 1982 table 6 12 87 percent of the variation in national price levels pl of 21 countries in 1975 is explained by per capita gdp y and a constant

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

bilateral trade flows the linder hypothesis and exchange risk bilateral trade flows are used to examine the linder hypothesis and the effect of exchange rate variability in a gra vity type trade model derived from an underlying demand and supply mo del a behavioral model is used to justify examining these issues joi ntly the model performs well empirically using a sample of seventeen countries for the period 1974 82 the authors find overwhelming supp ort for the linder hypothesis and this version of the gravity model moreover they find strong support for the hypothesis that increased exchange rate variability affects bilateral trade flows copyright 1987 by mit press

the external wealth of nations measures of foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries abstract although capital flows are closely monitored surprisingly little is known about the accumulated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held by various countries especially in the developing world this paper constructs estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and their equity and debt subcomponents for a sample of 67 industrial and developing countries it characterizes the stylized facts of international balance sheets and asks whether there are trends in net foreign asset positions and shifts in debt equity ratios over time finally it explores the sensitivity of estimated stock positions to the treatment of valuation effects not captured in balance of payments data

coalition proof correlated equilibrium a definition a coalition proof correlated equilibrium of a game is a pair consisting of a correlation device and a coalition proof nash equilibrium of the game extended by the device a direct coalition proof correlated equilibrium is a canonical device such that the obedient strategy is a coalition proof nash equilibrium of the canonical extended game the revelation principle may not hold even for two person games direct coalition proof correlated equilibrium may fail to exist for games with more than two players for any game a pure coalition proof nash equilibrium is a direct coalition proof correlated equilibrium c 1996 academic press inc

coalition proof equilibrium we characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can communicate prior to play but they cannot reach binding agreements a coalition proof equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no coalition has an improving and self enforcing deviation we show that any correlated strategy whose support is contained in the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and weakly pareto dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set is a coalition proof equilibrium consequently the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game is coalition proof journal of economic literature classification

coalition proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities abstract the ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are coalition proof we show that the existence of a pareto best element in the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies implies the existence of a coalition proof correlated equilibrium for any specification of coalitional communication possibilities that always permits individual deviations such an element exists in games with strategic complementarities if either 1 there is a unique nash equilibrium or 2 each player s payoff is nondecreasing in the others strategies journal of economic literature classification number c72

correlated equilibria incomplete information and coalitional deviations this paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way when players deviate at the interim stage coalition proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two player games however coalition proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions c 2008 elsevier inc all rights reserved

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

coalition proof nash equilibria ii applications abstract in bernheim peleg and whinston coalition proof equilibria i concepts j econ theory 42 1987 1 12 we proposed the notion of coalition proof nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition proof nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments this paper undertakes applications to several economic problems including the behavior of cournot oligopolists oligopolistic entry deterrence cooperation in finite horizon games and social choice rule implementation

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed