remaking macroeconomic policy after the global financial crisis a balance sheet approach this paper describes the origins of the global financial crisis and how the prevailing new keynesian macroeconomic orthodoxy failed to anticipate its severity this failure we argue stemmed from an incomplete understanding of the pivotal role of financial institutions in the amplification of the crisis and its transmission to the wider economy low global interest rates and a consequent search for yield in the pre crisis period encouraged financial institutions to build highly leveraged balance sheets which in turn generated extremely large asset price movements when a small event the downturn in the us sub prime mortgage market triggered the crisis the paper then briefly describes the element of the broadly successful and coordinated macroeconomic policy response to the crisis before turning to the medium term challenges facing policymakers in sustaining global recovery at the national level we focus on the resolution of fiscal imbalances which contributed in part to the crisis and which then worsened because of the policy actions which have been taken to deal with it at the international level we emphasise the need to rectifying the imbalances between savings and investment in many significant countries this will require greater coordination of macroeconomic policy across the world s major economies it will also involve strengthening the role and the governance of the international monetary fund

inflation and elections theory and evidence for six oecd economies i introduction political business cycle pbc models feature the idea that governments stimulate demand prior to elections in order to improve election prospects while the first generation of pbc models developed by nordhaus 1975 and macrae 1977 assume that voters are naive and retrospective rogoff and sibert 1988 and rogoff 1990 have developed a rational pbc rpbc model where voters are rational and forward looking most empirical studies of political business cycles examine whether unemployment falls the growth rate increases or fiscal and monetary policies become more expansive prior to elections 1 to my knowledge only alesina and roubini 1992 and alesina cohen and roubini 1992 have studied election cycles on inflation based on a large number of elections in 18 oecd countries the authors find evidence of a post election surge in the inflation rate lasting for 3 5 quarters this paper examines whether the existence of election cycles on inflation can be interpreted as supportive evidence of the rpbc theory by focusing on the theory s implications for the relation between post election inflation and the government s re election chances prior to the election in the theoretical part of the paper it is shown that the rpbc theory does not produce unambiguous predictions the functional form of the relation depends on the government s preferences and the election date if electoral terms are fixed or the election takes place close to the mandatory election date average post election inflation will be higher the closer is the election race provided the government always cares about the social costs of election cycles in the empirical part of the paper i generate estimates of the incumbent s election win probability for a sample of 50 elections in six oecd countries three alternative probability series are generated the probability estimates are interacted with dummies turned on after each election and included as regressors in panel data regressions on inflation the three probability series produce the same conclusion the relation between post election inflation and the incumbent s election win probability is hump shaped if the election race is close the inflation rate increases by 0 014 0 018 during the first year after an election i find no indication of an upward jump in inflation after elections when the incumbent s win probability is close to zero or one as noted in the theoretical part of the paper these results are consistent with the rpbc theory the paper is organized as follows the theoretical model is developed in section ii section iii presents the data sample election win probabilities are computed in section iv section v presents the panel data regressions section vi concludes ii theoretical model the theoretical framework is the signalling game developed by persson and tabellini 1990 extended to accommodate the fact that governments always face some uncertainty about the election outcome i first examine a two period game with fixed electoral terms where the election takes place at the end of period one i then consider a three period game where the incumbent chooses whether to call an election in the first or in the second period the output level and the inflation rate in each period t are denoted x sub t and pi sub t respectively pi sub t is determined by the policymaker output is given by the following supply function 1 mathematical expression omitted where mathematical expression omitted are inflation expectations and mu sub t is the policymaker s competence mu sub t is private information for the policymaker and follows a ma 1 process mu sub t eta sub t eta sub t 1 mathematical expression omitted theta with probability 0 5 eta sub t theta with probability 0

a model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility abstract cannibalization is a major concern for a firm when designing a product line in addition external options from outside the firm s product line may also play a significant role in this paper we investigate the impact of external options represented by reservation utility on product line design and introduction sequence we find that a heterogeneous reservation utility defines the relative attractiveness of segments and corresponding product line b reservation utility makes it more favorable to introduce products sequentially rather than simultaneously c aggregating segments is an effective way to mitigate cannibalization when it becomes too difficult to manage with different values of reservation utility across multiple segments and d introducing products in a non monotone order of quality can improve profit from simultaneous introduction when the value of reservation utility of a middle segment is particularly high

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

integrated markup rules for optimal pricing decisions in expanding markets for organic produce in expanding markets firms face uncertainty about demand response to changing conditions and the appropriate pricing response inclusion of retail demand factors in explaining markup decisions by wholesalers is crucial to accurate evaluation of the effects of price and market changes on profitability we apply an integrated demand and markup model to markets for organic broccoli and carrots where wholesalers set markups facing retail demand the estimated integrated system includes crossequation restrictions on organic and conventional prices received from retail publicity about food safety scares and availability of a competing certification programme the results show that organic wholesalers behave strategically in response to observable demand factors as they expand into fresh produce markets wholesalers arbitrage markups across items to increase market share combining crop specific and overall market information to decide on appropriate responses wholesalers also attempt to moderate markups in r

taxation and political business cycles in eu economies this paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the european union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles opportunistic or partisan the empirical evidence based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period does not support this hypothesis rather it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies

neglected method of separating demand and supply in time series regression this article argues that in many markets quantity is demand determined in the short run but price is supply determined and that the dynamic restrictions between price and quantity implied by the model have been widely neglected in empirical research two examples illustrate our point the demand and supply relationships between inflation and unemployment and between the terms of trade and the trade balance in both specifying quantity as a function of lagged prices in demand and price as a function of lagged quantities in supply rather than concentrating on exogenous shift determinants is sufficient to separate demand and supply

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

unemployment and inflation consequences of unexpected election results the empirical evidence toward rational partisan theory of business cycles is mixed and thus inconclusive this is due to the enormous heterogeneity of the existing empirical studies only a few of these test explicitly for the central theoretical innovation that post electoral blips in economic activity depend on the degree of the electoral surprise using polling data we present empirical evidence in favor of rational partisan theory for a panel of oecd countries

evaluating prior beliefs in a demand system the case of meat demand in canada an almost ideal demand system for meats is estimated using canadian data a bayesian approach is used to impose inequality restrictions on substitution elasticities via monte carlo integration and importance sampling in order to conform with prior beliefs about curvature and monotonicity restrictions and substitution relationships results are more consistent with the concavity and monotonicity restrictions from demand theory than with the added restriction that all meats are substitutes

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

impact of the terms of trade on the u s trade balance a reexamination the right conclusion could be that there is a strong connection between the spectral components with specified periods a possible economic interpretation could identify a strong long term in the sense of the specified periods connection between both series but that would still not allow us to say anything concerning the size and direction of the time delay between the two series for such an analysis we would have to at least consider the phase angles between the components because of the ambivalent meaning of the phase angle in relation to the direction and number of periods the final answer could come only from the time domain analysis however the fact that only spectral components with longer periods i e smaller frequencies show coherency suggests something else in order to influence the balance of trade the changes in the terms of trade should be durable enough mathematical formalization of this concept of durability would therefore be helpful i would propose that further research be done in this respect

on the importance of the supply side in demand side management we discuss how the structure of market supply affects the evaluation of policies to promote energy efficiency in household appliances if competitive markets offer the levels that consumers demand product standards inefficiently restrict choice if suppliers price discriminate minimum standards can restrict the inefficient use of energy intensity to segment consumers we also compare the effects of average intensity standards energy prices and innovation and consider what the different behavioral predictions imply for empirical studies of energy efficiency good policymaking requires knowing not only how consumers value energy efficiency in their decision making but also how producers respond to those values

unemployment and the democratic electoral advantage this article calls into question the conventional wisdom that incumbent parties are rewarded when unemployment is low and punished when it is high using county level data on unemployment and election returns for 175 midterm gubernatorial elections and 4 presidential elections from 1994 to 2010 the analysis finds that unemployment and the democratic vote for president and governor move together other things being equal higher unemployment increases the vote shares of democratic candidates the effect is greatest when republicans are the incumbent party but democrats benefit from unemployment even when they are in control the explanation for these findings is that unemployment is a partisan issue for voters not a valence issue and that the democratic party owns unemployment when unemployment is high or rising democratic candidates can successfully convince voters that they are the party best able to solve the problem

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

price relationships between qualitatively differentiated agricultural products organic and conventional wheat in germany organic agriculture which produces commodities that can be qualitatively differentiated from conventional food products has grown into an important market in many countries the dynamics of commodity prices in both sectors are partly interdependent but are also shaped by independent determinants and have rarely been studied we analyze organic food markets and their interdependencies with conventional markets in the context of wheat markets in germany which have been subject to a number of fundamental changes during the last two decades based on institutional market characteristics we suggest a flexible markov switching asymmetric time series model we find a pronounced temporal sequence of market phases that differ in their asymmetric dynamics and the extent to which the organic price is influenced by the conventional price organic wheat prices tend to be increasingly connected to prices of conventional wheat

supply and demand factors for organic produce although the organic produce industry is growing dramatically little is known about market structure we estimate a system of reduced form equations to evaluate supply and demand factors that influence equilibrium farm price and quantity in wholesale markets for organic broccoli carrots and lettuce in the long run demand factors dominate supply factors reduced wholesaling costs increased margins by which organic wholesale price exceeds nonorganic price and higher consumer income stimulate both farm price and output increasing the nonorganic farm price decreases equilibrium quantity of organics market expansion strategies should target consumers and wholesalers

willingness to pay for natural organic and conventional foods the effects of information and meaningful labels vague food labels and distorted product claims have persisted in the natural food industry while organic claims can be certified by the u s department of agriculture usda using experimental methods and a sample of randomly selected subjects we test food label and information treatment effects on subjects willingness to pay wtp for organic natural and conventional foods random nth price auctions are used to elicit wtp after subjects received one of five randomly assigned information treatments we find large information effects including asymmetric cross market effects for natural and organic foods perhaps surprising is that organic premiums increase in response to subjects seeing the natural foods industry s perspective on its products demographics effects are also important the results have practical implications for natural and organic food marketing and valuing products where there are vague claims about their attributes

does there exist a political business cycle a box tiao analysis theories of the political business cycle are by now common they range from the elegant theoretical work of nordhaus 1975 to the essentially empirical work of tufte 1978 they all assume that politicians manipulate the economy to aid their reelection efforts in particular politicians manipulate macroeconomic policy to create a boom just before election day golden and poterba 1980 provide an excellent review of this literature both tufte and nordhaus provide casual evidence for the existence of a political business cycle using inflation and unemployment rates as indicators of macroeconomic outcomes tufte and nordhaus predict at a minimum that unemployment should be decreasing before election day if presidents are really manipulating the economy very well then unemployment should be at a minimum in the october before the election and hence should be rising after the election in the nordhaus version the economy pays for the pre election boom with a post election surge in the inflation rate nordhaus also suggests that the president should engineer a recession early in his term to reduce inflationary expectations tufte 1978 20 presents graphs of the unemployment series and claims that visual examination shows them to be generally consistent with the hypothesis however he provides no statistical tests of the hypothesis nor does he estimate the quantitative impact of elections on unemployment tufte does not examine the inflation series nordhaus restricts himself to comparing unemployment rates in the two years preceeding and following an election with a simple nonparametric test supporting the hypothesis the literature provides several good empirical tests of the political business cycle hypothesis both paldam 1979 and mccallum 1978 test for the existence of four year cycles and find none however they do not test for discontinuous changes in the series around election day golden and poterba examine whether the use of policy instruments changes near election day and

multiproduct nonlinear pricing with multiple taste characteristics we analyze optimal multiproduct nonlinear prices in the case where consumer tastes are characterized by more than one taste parameter we present conditions under which the optimal nonlinear price schedule can be computed by finding optimal price schedules separately for each market if so they are unbundled if not they are bundled bundling is weakly superior to unbundling and is strictly superior when a condition that we term uniform ordering of demand curves is weakly violated with uniform ordering of demand curves multiproduct nonlinear prices have the same features as single product ones without this condition it is easy to construct examples that contradict some well known results from the standard literature in mechanism design

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

testing the satisficing version of the political business cycle 1905 1984 this paper develops a test of the satisficing version of the political business cycle previous tests have focused on maximizing models of political behavior and are not sufficiently general to test for satisficing behavior using annual u s data for the period 1905 to 1984 we find evidence supporting the satisficing version of the political business cycle model but we reject the maximizing version in accordance with the satisficing hypothesis we find that increasing inflation or unemployment and decreasing monetary base growth in the third year of a presidential term are followed typically by reversals during the election year

comment on a neglected method of separating demand and supply in time series regression by stephen e haynes and joe a stone this article examines some difficulties associated with the haynes stone model and attempts to clarify how the model can be justified as representing the hypothesis that quantity is demand determined and price is supply determined it also argues that the applications of such a model as was done by haynes and stone might not have resolved the controversies related to the phillips curve and the supply function of exports or imports

partisanship theory macroeconomic outcomes and endogenous elections recently there has been a surge of interest in partisanship theories of macroeconomic political interaction unlike political business cycle theory in which economic policy is motivated only by reelection concerns partisanship theory maintains that policy is motivated along ideological lines political parties differ with respect to economic policy and consequently economic performance may differ as well indeed not only is there evidence that political parties in the united states have quite different policy priorities but that this difference in policy priorities is translated into differences in economic outcomes 2

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

on the existence of a political monetary cycle this paper examines electoral influence on monetary policy as measured by ml money growth i find a significant four year electoral cycle in money growth even when controlling for the influence of interest rates income and budget deficits further the residual electoral cycle produces the income and inflation movements associated with the political business cycle when it is used in simulations of simple reduced form macro models the paper concludes by discussing the difficulties in rationalizing cyclical monetary policy with rational expectations

animal spirits and fiscal policy abstract in this paper we study the effects of government spending with a behavioral macroeconomic model in which agents have limited cognitive capabilities and use simple heuristics to form their expectations however thanks to a learning mechanism agents can revise their forecasting rule according to its performance this feature produces endogenous and self fulfilling waves of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs animal spirits this framework allows us to show that the short run spending multiplier is state dependent the multiplier is stronger under either extreme optimism or pessimism and reduces in periods of tranquility furthermore the more the central bank focuses on output gap stabilization the smaller the multiplier we also show that periods of increasing public debt are characterized by intense pessimism while intense optimism occurs in periods of decreasing debt this allows us to show that governments face a trade off between the stabilization of the animal spirits and the stabilization of public debt then we show that the existence of this trade off has implications also for the stabilization of the output gap

is the political business cycle really dead a decade ago in this journal mccallum 26 proclaimed the theory of the political business cycle 30 25 17 to be dominated by the emergence of the rational expectations literature 23 24 34 clearly the two theories are inconsistent when a strong view of rational expectations sees governments unable to manipulate real variables to create booms in election years since then new developments in macroeconomics have occasioned serious doubts as to whether the strong version of rational expectations is supported by the data 28 2 1 31 12 furthermore new advances in the political business cycle literature 36 4 have attempted to reconciliate the two theories by emphasizing that expectation errors may result from the presence of party dependent policy reaction functions and uncertainty about election outcomes the purpose of this paper is to step back and reconsider whether or not the empirical evidence presented by mccallum favoring rational expectations for the u s was really that strong and could be generalized to other countries here the u k given that the rational expectations hypothesis has been rejected at least in the strong mccallum and sargent version 26 34 it

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

business cycles and the political process the interrelationship between the political sector and the macroeconomy in democratic societies has been examined extensively in recent years research in this area has generally been concerned with two issues first following the lead of kramer 16 various authors have examined the impact of economic conditions on congressional 1 13 21 24 and presidential elections 4 5 the results at the congressional level have been mixed but it is reasonably safe to conclude that economic conditions do affect presidential elections the second issue and the one of primary concern in this study has dealt with the development of models of politico economic interaction the basic concept in these models is that an administration s popularity and therefore the probability of staying in power depends critically on economic conditions knowing this the administration seeks to manipulate the economy in order to maintain power the use of economic tools for political goals by governments is well established in the literature theoretical contributions by nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 have demonstrated the potential for a politically motivated business cycle in a world of politico economic interaction empirical support for the existence of such a cycle is provided by the work of frey and schneider 7 8 9 the main purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the political business cycle that generates empirically testable proposition the goal is to integrate the theoretical conclusions of a formal model similar to the nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 framework with the empirical support provided by frey and schneider 7 8 9 the possibility of a political business cycle is important for several reasons in macroeconometric models government policy that is endogenous to the system is usually treated as if it were exogenous this may cause serious misspecification errors further forecasts of the future course of economic events which depend heavily on government action will be inaccurate unless the political motivations of governments are considered

us presidential elections and real gdp growth 1961 2004 in this paper i show that since 1960 an electoral cycle in us output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables that is controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes inflation money growth energy prices lagged output growth government spending or its growth and temporary partisan effects the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real gdp growth

strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions an empirical investigation this paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary fiscal policy interactions in three countries the uk the us and sweden we specify a small scale structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using bayesian methods we assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non cooperative policy game and compare different leadership regimes we find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the uk and sweden while in the us the nash or non strategic regime dominates we assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences

market segmentation by price quality schedules some evidence from automobiles discrimination among heterogeneous buyers of a product is possible through the use of multiple quality variants this article quantifies various implications of the standard mussa rosen model of price quality discrimination as applied to the u s automobile industry it demonstrates that the price quality variants of a major manufacturer indeed segment the market as predicted by the model distortions in the range and nature of products offered in their prices and in the resulting consumer surplus in the automobile market are measured and shown to be significant copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

contractual distortions in a market with frictions abstract this paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions while principals e g firms have all contractual power their market power is constrained as agents e g workers can choose to wait and search for better offers we find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents utilities with type independent costs of search and waiting equilibrium contracts are always first best if agents are impatient and discount future payoffs however distortions vanish only gradually in the latter case we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities both of which are absent in the case of type independent costs of search

defects in disneyland quality control as a two part tariff this paper shows that firms endowed with monopoly power can utilize an optional service contract form of guarantee as an instrument for effecting a surplus extracting two part tariff the monopolist finds it optimal to produce guarantee and replace defective units even if a zero defect rate could be achieved at no additional production cost it is also shown that the price per unit is greater than the effective marginal cost it may even be higher than the pure monopoly price moreover the monopolist is unable to extract all of the consumers surplus thus that optional service contract policy can provide an effective yet defensible form of price discrimination as an alternative to possible illegal tie ins quantity discounts and simple two part tariffs a guarantee is a risk sharing insurance contract tailored to the risky or uncertain flow of consumption services from a commodity see heal 1976 guarantees provide for full or partial replacement repair or refund for expected and unexpected short falls in service indeed appelbaum and scheffman 1978 have provided an example in which the refund exceeds the purchase price the guarantee may come into force in a variety of circumstances ranging from specifically named contingencies to general promises of satisfaction guaranteed or your money back guarantees may be offered as a mandatory tie in with purchase or may be optional we refer to the latter as service contracts they may be priced on a per unit basis or offered at a fixed fee invariant of number of units purchased

electoral and partisan cycles between us economic performance and presidential popularity empirical voting popularity research examines parameters that relate economic performance to voting and popularity not the interaction of these parameters with movements in economic performance which is what actually influences voting and popularity this paper examines that interaction for the usa from 1953 1 1990 4 by decomposing the response of popularity to economic performance by both political party and the quarter of the electoral term averaged over the electoral term economic performance increases the popularity of democrats but decreases it for republicans whereas near the election the opposite occurs overall the results appear consitent with a mix of partisan and electoral influences so that no single approach seems fully adequate

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

does organic command a premium when the food is already local the emergence of community supported agriculture csa farms has been recognized as a new way for small farms to remain competitive while engaging in their local community through direct marketing in this study we report on first revealed preference valuation of csa attributes using data on share prices and csa characteristics for the summer 2012 growing season using data covering 453 csa farms in michigan new york ohio and pennsylvania we develop a hedonic model based on firm level prices to reveal consumer valuations of csa attributes including various types of organic certification we also test for competition in the csa market using a model of firm entry to evaluate whether firms appear perfectly competitive which is a requirement when using firm level prices in our hedonic analysis our results reveal a price premium of approximately 7 for usda organic certification although this value is heterogeneous across states we find no premium associated with competing certified naturally grown programs finally we find that csa farms exhibit little market power and appear to act competitively even with few market entrants

endogenous elections electoral budget cycles and canadian provincial governments the existence of manipulative electoral budget cycles and opportunistic election setting is examined in the framework of a parliamentary democracy empirical tests are conducted using a pooled time series cross section data set derived from canadian provincial governments over the 1962 1992 period evidence in support of the electoral budget cycle hypothesis but not the opportunistic election timing hypothesis is obtained

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

specification of supply behavior in international trade supply behavior in international trade has been notoriously difficult to capture empirically indeed so few published supply studies exist that stern francis and schumacher s 1976 bibliographical survey of price elasticities in international trade devotes over 350 pages to demand estimates but barely 10 pages to supply estimates in recent years only goldstein and khan 1978 and dunlevy 1980 using simultaneous equation estimation techniques have reported estimates of supply behavior in international trade exogenous shocks to demand and supply for traded goods in general influence both quantity and price for supply estimates it is unclear a priori whether the response is more appropriately specified with quantity or price as the dependent variable however if supplying firms in an uncertain world pursue pricing strategies based on past market performance as in zabel 1981 the appropriate specification is a supply price equation in this case prices respond to lagged quantities which implies that the traditional supply quantity specification with present and past prices as explanatory variables cannot capture the dynamic supply behavior in this study we explore the hypothesis that previous attempts to estimate supply behavior have generally failed not only because of the well known problem of simultaneity bias but also because quantity rather than price was specified as the dependent variable section ii presents and discusses traditional supply quantity equations based on quarterly data for aggregate exports and imports for the united kingdom and the united states from 1947 to 1979 section iii briefly discusses the theoretical rationale of a supply price specification and presents estimates of supply price equations based on the same data section iv evaluates the empirical evidence to determine whether a supply quantity or supply price formulation is more appropriate and compares estimates of long run price elasticities of supply based on the two approaches a final section summarizes the conclusions

the seasonal cycle and the business cycle almost all recent research on macroeconomic fluctuations has worked with seasonally adjusted or annual data this paper takes a different approach by treating seasonal fluctuations as worthy of study in their own right our results show that seasonal fluctuations are an important source of variation in all macroeconomic quantity variables but are small or entirely absent in both real and nominal price variables the timing of the seasonal fluctuations consists of increases in the second and fourth quarters a large decrease in the first quarter and a mild decrease in the third quarter the paper demonstrates that with respect to each of several major stylized facts about business cycles the seasonal cycle displays the same characteristics as the business cycle in some cases even more dramatically than the business cycle that is we find that at seasonal frequencies as well as at business cycle frequencies output movements across broadly defined sectors move together the timing of production and the

party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes although the nature of the differences between parties in democratic electoral politics is an enduring question in political science surprisingly little is understood about the subject but substantial progress has been made in recent years most notably in understanding party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes the first breakthrough was douglas hibbs s 1977 analysis of party related differences in the unemployment rate in his time series analysis for the united states hibbs modeled the path of unemployment as an autoregressive moving average process subject to a dummy variable intervention term indicating party of the president his analysis indicated that democratic administrations were associated with lower unemployment than republicans by 2 36 points after eight years in office and even larger differences in long run equilibrium a subsequent article by nathaniel beck 1982 addressed the same issue and found the party differences less sharp when administration specific policy differences are considered the techniques employed by hibbs and beck focus directly on an outcome unemployment rather than on the policy instruments that are presumably responsible for altering outcomes this approach can be misleading when there are long lags between implementation of policies and ultimate effects or when shocks occasionally intrude upon the regular connections between instruments and outcomes macroeconomic theories can provide information about constraints linking macroeconomic variables but hibbs and beck fail to incorporate theoretical constraints such constraints could help determine what kinds of outcomes are feasible and sustainable and to what extent outcomes are induced by policies as opposed to shocks our purpose here is to consider how one might go about estimating party differences in a framework that takes advantage of some insights offered by macroeconomic theories and to report some preliminary results a more complete description of the analysis is provided in our working paper available upon request

an integrated test for electoral cycles in the u s economy this paper offers the first integrated test of the electoral model of business cycles the test begins with unrestricted estimates of presidential electoral patterns in u s economic outcomes real gnp unemployment and inflation and policies money growth and the adjusted budget surplus these estimates are then used to determine whether the estimated electoral patterns in macropolicy yield predicted electoral patterns for macro outcomes that are consistent with estimates of both actual electoral patterns in outcomes and voting behavior the results indicate that four year electoral cycles in macroeconomic outcomes and policies are strongly significant for the united states for the period 1951i to 1986ii copyright 1989 by mit press

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

market power information and efficiency the link between solutions and equilibrium distortions the extent of competition generally determines both the location and the extent of distortions due to information asymmetries when agents have private information increased competition raises agent welfare at the expense of uninformed principals nevertheless increased competition among principals may lower total surplus the losses sustained by principals as a group exceed the benefits realized by agents as a group when there is a sufficiently large proportion of agents with high cost of agent effort these results are independent of the correlation between the agent s marginal cost and the principal s marginal benefit of agent effort copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

the relative effects of demand and supply on output growth and price change this study demonstrates an analytical model for evaluating the relative importance of demand and supply factors in determining output growth and price change empirical analysis of the 1947 80 data shows that for most industry groups demand effects are more dominant in determining output growth whereas supply effects are more dominant in determining price change the conclusion remains the same when the effects of uncontrollable variables such as taste and technology are excluded the study provides useful information for analyzing the effectiveness of demand and supply management policies in affecting output growth and price change introduction recently the stability and validity of the phillips curve and the effectiveness of demand management policies to deal with stagflation have been questioned by many economists evidence has been accumulated e g eckstein 1984 to suggest that variations in aggregate supply price were the predominant influences on the general price level of the u s economy but little is known about whether demand or supply factors were more dominant in determining economic growth studies on the relative importance of demand and supply factors at the industry level have been very few but the recent studies by houthakker 1979 and 1981 suggested the importance of supply shifts and or economies of

monetary and fiscal policies interaction in monetary unions in this paper the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed by adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty policy makers preferences and targets then the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed the analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix as a final step the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union all the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the european monetary union

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

political models of the business cycle should be revived political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive this paper addresses the second issue demonstrating for u s real gnp unemployment and inflation that electoral cycles persistent patterns across electoral terms are significant but apparently only for republican incumbents and that partisan cycles persistent differences between parties are also significant these findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives

the interactions between fiscal policy and monetary policy this paper studies the interactions of fiscal policy and monetary policy when they stabilize a single economy against shocks in a dynamic setting if both policy makers are benevolent then in our model the best outcome is achieved when monetary policy does nearly all of the stabilization if the monetary authorities are benevolent but the fiscal authority discounts the future or aims for an excessive level of output then a nash equilibrium will result in large welfare losses after an inflation shock there will be excessively tight monetary policy excessive fiscal expansion and a rapid accumulation of public debt however if in these circumstances there is a regime of fiscal leadership then the outcome will be very nearly as good as when both policy makers are benevolent

business cycle durations and postwar stabilization of the u s economy average postwar expansions are twice as long as prewar expansions and contractions are one half as long this paper investigates three possible explanations the first explanation is that shocks to the economy have been smaller in the postwar period the second explanation is that the composition of output has shifted from very cyclical sectors to less cyclical sectors the third explanation is that the apparent stabilization is largely spurious and is caused by differences in the way that prewar and postwar business cycle reference dates were chosen by the national bureau of economic research the evidence presented in this paper favors this third explanation copyright 1994 by american economic association

increasing quality sequence when is it an optimal product introduction strategy in this paper we analyze the optimal introduction timing of a seller s products targeted at segments that differ in their willingness to pay for quality past studies suggest that an introduction sequence of a high quality product followed by a lower quality version of the product may mitigate the cannibalization effects of the low quality product on profits from the high quality product we show that if customers who value quality more possess an outside option such as a substitute product as may be the case with replacement buyers a seller may find it optimal to follow a low quality product with a higher quality one the latter being targeted at replacement buyers furthermore the ability of the seller to commit to future qualities accentuates the sequential increase in quality in the presence of such buyers thus we show that conditions other than uncertainty or technological improvements occurring over time may justify a seller adopting a strategy of sequentially increasing quality this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

networks and compatibility implications for antitrust in this paper we draw crucial parallels between the concepts of compatibility and networks and the more traditional concepts of complementarity and vertical relationships we also develop the important distinctions between two way networks and one way networks we then apply our framework to a number of current antitrust issues

bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information this paper analyzes bundling decisions of a rnultiproduct monopolist facing uncertain demand the monopolist sells his products using an auction mechanism and the market is analyzed as a game with incomplete information in which the buyers as well as the seller are strategic agents with a small number of buyers a profit maximizing seller will bundle all his output this makes buyers uniformly worse off compared to the case where the same monopolist does not bundle in the sense that any buyer is worse off regardless of his demand for the monopolist s outputs with a larger number of buyers the seller will have a tendency to unbundle his output and high demand buyers are worse off than they would be if the monopolist bundled his output low demand buyers on the other hand are always better off when the monopolist unbundles his output regardless of the number of competing buyers despite the fact that high demand buyers are the typical purchasers of the monopolist s output the net effect of increasing the number of buyers is greater market efficiency since bundling creates market inefficiencies both ex post and ex ante

the cyclical component of u s economic activity quarterly data on industrial production and deflated gross national product in the united states from 1947 through 1985 are decomposed into independent nonstationary trend and stationary cycle components using kalman filtering and smoothing techniques estimates of the model parameters imply that at least half of the quarterly innovation in u s economic activity can be attributed to a stationary cyclical component that persists over periods of time as long as five years this finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that most of the apparent variation in u s economic activity can be attributed to a nonstationary trend component

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

political parties and the variable duration of business cycles a number of recent studies explore how political factors influence real economic activity with electoral models economic performance peaks near the election as in the retrospective model of nordhaus 30 electoral cycles also emerge at least in fiscal policy in the rational expectations model of rogoff and sibert 34 and rogoff 33 with partisan models economic activity differs systematically by party as in both the ideological model of hibbs 26 and the rationalexpectations model of alesina 1 economic activity surges after election of democratic presidents and recedes after election of republican presidents although recent tests of the electoral approach are supportive 21 22 24 25 the partisan approach enjoys the more compelling support 2 3 9 10 23 26 27 the electoral and partisan views are not mutually exclusive as the possibility of conflict between ideology and the desire to be reelected as the election approaches is well recognized indeed our evidence here is consistent with a combined electoralpartisan model the macroeconomic literature at large however has been slow to absorb accumulating evidence that the party affiliation of the incumbent president together with the timing of the electoral period are linked to real economic activity in this study we gauge the significance of these links for the united states and relate them to two important strands of the macroeconomic literature one strand the time series literature investigates the statistical properties of measures of real economic activity finding that these measures often exhibit nonconstant means and heteroscedastic variances in autoregressive integrated moving average arima models the conditional mean is a function of past innovations while the conditional variance is constant applications of arima and related models beginning with nelson and plosser 29 suggest that real economic activity for the united states exhibits near random walk behavior in autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic arch models the conditional variance is a function of past squared innovations while the conditional mean is constant applications of arch and related models beginning with engle 17 suggest that real activity exhibits heteroscedastic variances

quality distortion by a discriminating monopolist the standard model of monopolistic imperfect quality discrimination involving consumer self selection has shown that no distortion occurs at the highest quality level while all lower quality levels are degraded in order to maintain profitable market segmentation this result flows from the assumption that consumers with a higher total utility of quality also have a higher marginal utility of quality the paper develops a reasonable model in which the standard assumption is not satisfied and this alternative model yields vastly different conclusions regarding the form of quality distortion in particular quality may be enhanced not degraded to maintain profitable market segmentation copyright 1989 by american economic association

on the international harmonization of bank regulation this paper offers a three way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category for economic regulation the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers the latter efforts should be encouraged for prudential regulation national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking harmonization efforts e g the basle accord may offer only modest help but the accord may offer indirect help by limiting national governments competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks risk taking activities finally for information regulation national regulation appears to be adequate and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary copyright 1994 by oxford university press

automobile quality choice under pollution control regulation in this paper we develop a modified quality choice model to study the effects of various mobile source air pollution control regulations we have a single producer that supplies a fixed number of car types two but faces a spectrum of consumers differing in their valuation of car quality the car manufacturer chooses the quality levels of the two car types as well as the sales mix between the two types and the size of the market it wishes to supply by endogenizing both the sales mix and the market size while still allowing quality to be a choice variable we are able to more completely analyze the impact of any car pollution control regulation existing studies of this impact either focus on the model line adjustment response shifts in the quality array or on the price adjustment response changes in the sales mix and market size in allowing for both the model line and the price adjustment options we find that the corporate average fuel efficiency cafe standard is unambiguously welfare superior to the low emission vehicle quantity constraint lev and zero emission vehicle zev programs we also show that the effects of the cafe standard are not equivalent to those of a fuel tax as previously found and that for a given car pollution target the former is preferred to the latter

a partisanship theory of fiscal and monetary regimes this paper indicates that income redistribution motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort thi s suggests that newly elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income estimated reaction from function s support these predictions a measure of income redistribution the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to gnp has a positive significant effect on money growth in addition when the presidency changes from conservative to liberal there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

opinion polls and political business cycles theory and evidence for the united states the paper shows that the frey schneider schultz hypothesis that there is a negative relation between the government s popularity and the government s incentives to engineer political business cycles is consistent with rational forward looking voting provided one makes appropriate assumptions about the incumbent s preferences the empirical part of the paper presents evidence favourable to the hypothesis using quarterly data on us money growth

monetary and fiscal policy in the great moderation and the great recession in this paper we argue for a new approach to monetary and fiscal policy during the great moderation the inflation targeting regime worked well central banks used the interest rate to stabilize inflation and subject to inflation being controlled stabilized the level of demand fiscal policy exerted discipline over the public sector deficits thereby indirectly managing the level of public debt such fiscal housekeeping worked well because the monetary authorities were stabilizing the economy but once private sector deleveraging led to the great recession and interest rates hit their zero bound the outcome could no longer be managed by monetary policy recovery depended on the automatic stabilizers output and tax revenues have fallen public debt has been created and assets have been created which a deleveraging private sector wishes to hold but the effect has been very gradual recovery would have been faster if fiscal policy had been responsible for the restoration of full employment in an environment which tolerated the necessary rises in public debt conversely policies of austerity designed to reduce public debt have slowed the recovery growth will not be resumed until the private sector begins to invest strongly again creating the financial assets which the private sector wishes to hold thereby enabling public debt to be retired this has not yet happened because the private sector correctly does not believe that macroeconomic policy is capable of sustaining a strong recovery

contract design and bargaining power abstract it is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take it or leave it proposal in contrast this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions

the monopolist is not the best environmentalist s best friend an example this letter addresses the second degree price discrimination issue when a monopolized product is tied with environmental quality the monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers

empirical advances in political economy editor s note i wish to thank coeditor mark zupan who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section on behalf of all the editors i also would like to express thanks to carolyn williams editorial coordinator for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files the symposium on public choice was held at lake tahoe during the 1993 we a meetings the many efforts of authors referees editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year s economic inquiry offerings

public expenditures in canadian provinces an empirical study of politico economic interactions it is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures however frey and schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals and when popularity is low energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election data draw from the canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis the findings support the frey and schneider explanation

electoral and partisan cycle regularities in canada in this paper following recent politico institutional approaches to the theory of economic policy the authors present a methodology for identifying political cycle regularities and test for electoral and partisan cycles in canadian target variables and monetary and fiscal policy instruments using annual data from 1926 to 1994 the empirical evidence suggests the absence of political cycles in canada