partnerships lemons and efficient trade we analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership a crucial role is played by the sign of the derivatives that measure how valuation functions depend on others signals if valuations are increasing functions of other agents signals it is more difficult to achieve efficient trade with interdependent values than with private values where the respective derivatives are zero in contrast if valuations are decreasing functions of other agents signals it is easier to achieve efficient trade with interdependent values our results unify and generalize the insights of cramton et al 1987 myerson and satterthwaite 1983 and akerlof 1970

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

bargaining in the shadow of power abstract often a bargainer can use some form of power legal military or political to impose a settlement how does the outside option of being able to impose a settlement albeit at some cost affect the bargaining and how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers these questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to rubinstein s game of dividing a pie each actor can accept an offer make a counteroffer or try to impose a solution imposing a settlement is however costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost journal of economic literatureclassification number c72

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

delay and settlement in litigation delay in litigation is a policy concern in many jurisdictions little evidence is available on the causes of such delay however we present a version of spier s 1992 bargaining model of litigation and derive directly a functional form for the conditional probability of case settlement we then estimate this and test predictions about the effects of legal costs and uncertainty over damages and liability on the conditional probability of settlement using data from negligence claims against several nhs trusts our results provide a direct test of the model and shed light on the causes of settlement delay in england

pre empted patents infringed patents and firms participation in markets for technology abstract in recent years firms have increasingly contributed to and been confronted with a patent landscape characterized by numerous but marginal inventions overlapping claims and patent fences as a result firms risk their patent applications to be pre empted or to be infringed upon by rivals while both aspects constitute major challenges for the appropriation of returns to inventive activity extant literature suggests that participation in the market for technology might actually resolve or at least alleviate these problems in this paper we investigate the effect of pre empted and infringed patents on firms engagement in in and cross licensing based on a sample of more than 1100 german manufacturing firms our results show that firms engage in in licensing as a reaction to pre empted patents and in cross licensing if their protected ip was infringed upon however these effects vary depending on the fragmentation of technology fields and whether the firm operates in a discrete or complex product industry

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

pretrial bargaining with asymmetric information unilateral versus bilateral payoff relevance author affiliation amy farmer amyf walton uark edupaul pecorino ppecorin cba ua edu acknowledgment we would like to thank akram temimi and two anonymous referees for providing helpful comments on the article 1 introductionasymmetric information is a leading explanation for bargaining failure and the role of asymmetric information has been extensively analyzed in the civil litigation literature 1 most of this literature concerns information that has bilateral payoff relevance in the sense that the information in question affects the expected payoff at trial of both the plaintiff and defendant when there is bilateral payoff relevance trials may be predicted in the equilibrium of the bargaining game regardless of whether the informed or uninformed party makes the offer in this article we analyze information that has unilateral payoff relevance meaning that it affects the expected payoff of one of the two parties to the dispute but not the other as an example suppose the plaintiff has private information on her risk preferences this affects her expected payoff at trial but not the defendant s when there is unilateral payoff relevance there are never inefficient trials in the equilibrium of the game where the informed party makes the offer 2 however there may still be costly disputes in the equilibrium of the game in which the uninformed party makes the offer examples of information with bilateral payoff relevance include information on the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial and information on the amount of the judgment to be awarded at trial in the event the plaintiff is victorious in both cases the information clearly affects the expected payoff of both the plaintiff and defendant at trial and these are the types of informational asymmetry considered most often in the literature what type of information has only unilateral payoff relevance one example mentioned above is information on risk preferences farmer and pecorino 1994 swanson and mason 1998 and heyes rickman and tzavara 2004 all examine asymmetric information on risk preferences within the context of the screening model in which the uninformed party makes the offer 3 in each case trials are predicted in the equilibrium of these models as long as trials are not too costly for the participants however other types of information also have only unilateral payoff relevance a large literature on the ultimatum game has provided convincing evidence that under certain circumstances individuals will express a preference for being treated fairly 4 this preference may be expressed specifically by the percentage of her own court costs a player is willing to concede to her opponent via his settlement offer 5 since this preference is not observable and presumably differs across individuals the proposer in a screening game must decide how much of the joint surplus of settlement he will attempt to extract without knowledge of how low he can go before triggering a rejection suppose the judgment is 100 000 and the plaintiff s court costs are 30 000 a plaintiff without a taste for fairness will accept an offer of 70 000 rather than proceed to trial a plaintiff with a taste for fairness might as an example accept no less than 90 000 the defendant then must choose between an offer of 90 000 and 70 000 without knowledge of whether the other party has a taste for fairness or not the defendant will make the low offer if he believes it will be accepted with a sufficiently high probability if the plaintiff does indeed have a taste for fairness she will reject the low offer and a trial will result presumably a mechanism along these lines explains the persistence of disputes in ultimatum game experiments another example of information with unilateral payoff relevance is the degree of litigiousness which can be modeled as differences in perceived court costs on the part of the plaintiff eisenberg and farber 1997

efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs abstract this paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible when trader beliefs can be statistically dependent allowing for dependent beliefs produces equilibrium and comparative statics behavior that differs qualitatively from that observed in bilateral trade models in which traders have independent beliefs

patenting in the shadow of competitors this article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs i show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards particularly those of firms with low litigation costs this pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation these results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations

the role of patent rights in mergers consolidation in plant biotechnology few micro level empirical papers have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure using firm level patent data for public and private firms in plant biotechnology we develop a measure of patent enforceability duration models show that patent statistics are a useful predictor of the timing of merger activity we find that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of mergers mergers in plant biotechnology may be partially motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies some of the merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology as exemplified in the case of roundup ready corn

patent damages and spatial competition this paper analyzes price competition between a spatially difierentiated product patentee and an imitator anticipating the possibility of future patent damages we compare the performance of three damage regimes the reasonable royalty regime the only one that yields symmetric equilibrium pricing maximizes static welfare and yields the highest incentives to innovate when patent enforcement is nearly certain the lost proflts regime the only one that may deter infringement yields the highest incentives to innovate when patent enforcement is less than certain and product value is su ciently high the unjust enrichment regime is weakest our results ofier an e ciency argument for abandoning it we also describe new insights into the hypothetical negotiation that the courts use to construct

bargaining with asymmetric information an empirical study of plea negotiations this paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining the analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by bebchuk 1984 i provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model propose a consistent nonparametric estimator and implement it using data on criminal cases from north carolina employing the estimated model i evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases my results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts but may increase conviction rates in contrast the broader use of non incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time i also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains depending on the case characteristics over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden

contributory infringement rule and patents abstract the contributory infringement rule assesses liability to a third party that contributes to the infringement of a patent not only are firms that directly infringe liable but those that indirectly contribute are also liable we investigate how this rule affects the creation of a network of members e g an e commerce network we find that the enforcement of indirect liability does not induce more trials in equilibrium firms settle out of court but because of the threat of trial the network size decreases and the social welfare is reduced surprisingly we find that if the compensation paid by the indirect infringers is high the rule does not benefit the patentholder and may not even give enough r d incentives ex ante it is possible to find a direct compensation for the patentholder that is socially preferable

taking a financial position in your opponent in litigation before filing suit a plaintiff can take a financial position in a defendant firm a short position benefits the plaintiff by transforming a negative expected value claim into a positive expected value one and by enhancing the claim s settlement value if the capital market is less than strong form efficient the plaintiff also benefits directly from the decline in the defendant s stock price when the defendant is privately informed about the case s merits bargaining failures can arise while aggressive short selling benefits the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant moderate levels of short selling can benefit the defendant and raise the settlement rate

firm reputation and incentives to milk pending patents abstract in this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation by only applying for a patent whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated firms have a short run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents as well as potential rents from pto mistakes in granting patents we provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist in particular we analyze the merits of different patent systems

are estimates of calorie income fxelasticities too high a recalibration of the plausible range abstract the wide range of calorie income elasticities in the literature results in large part from the particular calorie and income variables used for estimation elasticities across four estimation techniques and four calorie income variable pairs for a sample of philippine farm households ranged from 0 03 to 0 59 estimates associated with calorie availability are biased upwards first because random errors in measuring food purchases are transmitted by construction both to calorie availability and total expenditures and second because the residual difference between family calorie intake and household calorie availability will often increase with income the calorie intake total expenditure variable pair gives the preferred elasticity estimate in the 0 08 0 14 range

productivity health and inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of food in low income countries a model is formulated incorporating linkages among nutrition labor market productivity health heterogeneity and the intrahousehold distribution of food and work activities in a subsistence economy empirical results based on a sample of households from bangladesh indicate that despite considerable intrahousehold disparities in calorie consumption households are averse to inequality furthermore consistent with the model the results also indicate that both the higher level and greater variance in the calories consumed by men relative to women reflect in part the greater participation by men in activities in which productivity is sensitive to health status copyright 1990 by american economic association

plea bargaining with the irs abstract the purpose of this paper is to propose a new evasion counteracting policy and to prove its welfare improving property the new fatota policy allows a target group of businesses to choose between the following two options paying a fixed amount of taxes thus exempting themselves from tax audits or paying only the amount they choose to pay and subject to possible tax audits it is shown that fatota is very similar to the plea bargaining system of the u s criminal proceedings and our results can be treated as an extension of the grossman katz analysis to the crime of tax evasion

how elastic is calorie demand parametric nonparametric and semiparametric results for urban papua new guinea this article seeks further evidence on the elasticity of calorie demand with respect to household resources the case presented is for urban areas of papua new guinea where just over one half of the population appear to obtain less than the recommended amount of dietary energy the relationship between per capita calorie consumption and per capita expenditure in urban areas of papua new guinea is not consistent with the view that income changes have negligible effects on nutrient intakes the unconditional calorie demand elasticity is approximately 0 6 for the poorest half of the population using parametric and semiparametric estimation to control for a wide range of other influences on calorie consumption does not materially reduce the size of the elasticity therefore these results are not supportive of growth pessimism and instead suggest that policies that increase urban household incomes will also act to reduce undernutrition

programs for the poorest learning from the igvgd program in bangladesh abstract this article examines a program that seeks to reach bangladesh s hardcore poor by combining elements of livelihood protection food aid with livelihood promotion skills training and microfinance bangladesh rural advancement committee s income generation for vulnerable group development program has deepened the outreach of its poverty reduction activity and achieved impressive results detailed local level fieldwork revealed however that program practice differed markedly from program plans this is found to have important implications for both future program design and the understanding of who does not benefit from such innovative programs we conclude that while such programs mixing livelihood protection and promotion should be a major focus for anti poverty strategies there will remain a role for more traditional social welfare schemes

food aid and child nutrition in rural ethiopia abstract this paper uses a unique panel data set from ethiopia to examine the determinants of participation in and receipts of food aid through free distribution fd and food for work ffw results show that aggregate rainfall and livestock shocks increase household participation in both fd and ffw ffw also seems well targeted to asset poor households the probability of receiving fd does not appear to be targeted based on household wealth but fd receipts are lower for wealthier households the effects of fd and ffw on child nutritional status differ depending on the modality of food aid and the gender of the child both ffw and fd have a positive direct impact on weight for height households invest proceeds from fd in girls nutrition while earnings from ffw are manifested in better nutrition for boys the effects of the gender of the aid recipient are not conclusive

settlement in tax evasion prosecution it is often argued that even if optimal ex post settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante we analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing ex ante to a settlement strategy we show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers true tax liability the more informative the signal the larger the additional expected revenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool

litigation and settlement an empirical approach litigants in civil lawsuits involving monetary damages often find an out of court settlement preferable to a trial most theoretical models of settlement choice employ an expected utility maximizing framework that emphasizes the importance of risk preferences litigation costs and the distribution of trial awards an empirical model of settlement choice is used to examine whether the variables prominent in the theoretical literature are statistically useful in explaining the occurrence and monetary value of settlements estimates from a sample of civil filings provide new empirical evidence of how the legal system affects the behavior of litigants during the settlement process copyright 1989 by mit press

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion a model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented the prosecutor s private information consists of the strength of the case while the defendant s private information consists of h is guilt or innocence in equilibrium a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant in the remaining cases the prosecutor s offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case it is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality copyright 1988 by american economic association

the settlement of patent litigation in this article i develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity the patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take it or leave it settlement offer to a single potential rival an essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out of equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately the model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation

credible commitments contract enforcement problems and banks intermediation as credibility assurance abstract we consider contract enforceability problems in credit transactions and justify a bank as an organizational solution to market breakdown due to unenforceable contracts specifically we explain i why loan commitments exist and ii why banks exist to sell such commitments a loan commitment resolves moral hazard more efficiently than any combination of inside equity and spot credit however the market breaks down if commitment sellers are individuals because their promises to honor contracts are not credible with a large bank a perfect sequential equilibrium is obtained in which credibility is restored

the costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress abstract this study provides the first large sample analysis of the stock market reactions to interfirm litigation when a suit is filed the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1 while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains for the average pair of firms the combined drop in value upon filing is 21 million much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled the findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

an economic analysis on overbilling incentives and auditing programs an institutional auditing program typically consists of the following steps a sample audit the decision to move to the full audit a settlement offer and the full audit statistical sampling techniques are often used to estimate the overbilling percentage and amount this paper discusses the optimal settlement offer the net recovery through auditing the condition for the auditors to move to the full audit and how an auditing program can be truly cost effective this paper provides an evaluation for the statistical sampling techniques to an auditing program the economic incentives of a contractor to overbill are also identified finally it presents the key metrics and the managerial implications for auditing managers to design or enhance their auditing programs

pretrial bargaining and the design of fee shifting rules legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation or fee shifting rules provide powerful incentives for settlement within the context of a direct revelation mechanism the fee shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court s award to the pretrial announcements this mechanism resembles rule 68 of the federal rules of civil procedure and other offer based rules in a simple extensive form game if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages probability of prevailing then rule 68 increases decreases the settlement rate

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

a sequential concession game with asymmetric information the essence of the situation to be studied here is this two players are involved in a conflict that can be resolved in only two possible ways each player favors a different outcome during the bargaining phase which lasts until some finite time to each player has the option to concede if none concedes the game ends at time t in a way that is known to one of the players from the beginning of the game the other player is uncertain about the outcome time is valuable but each player prefers to receive his favored outcome at m than to concede immediately thus the game analyzed here is characterized by the asymmetric information about the outcome at the end point i e at time to whereas one player is perfectly informed about the possible outcome the other is compelled to deduce the information from the actions of his informed opponent the latter in turn can try to exploit his initial advantage by manipulating the flow of information for example the informed player may adopt a tough stance in order to create the impression that he is not afraid of forcing the resolution of the conflict at to and thereby builds his reputation at the same time the uninformed player by not conceding can test the opponent s resolve this brief description suggests that the problem analyzed here is a variant of the game of attrition 2 however our problem differs from the standard game of attrition in two respects first we formulate the game in discrete time which has important analytic consequences these are fully developed in hendricks and wilson 1985 second and more important perhaps we study

licensing weak patents in this paper we revisit the issue of licensing weak patents under the shadow of litigation departing from the seminal paper by farrell and shapiro 2008 we consider innovations of any size and not only small innovations and we allow the number of licensees to be less than the number of firms in the downstream industry it is shown that the optimal two part tariff license from the patent holder s perspective may either deter or trigger litigation and conditions under which each case arises are provided we also reexamine the claim that the licensing revenues from weak patents overcompensate the patent holder relative to what a natural benchmark would command finally we suggest two policy levers that may alleviate the harm raised by the licensing of weak patents

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

patent pools and cross licensing in the shadow of patent litigation this paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable it analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives it shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges this result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other s patents if litigation costs are not too large

early settlement in european merger control we analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties and the european commission over remedies that remove concerns of anticompetitive effects this extends the previously narrow range of econometric literature on early settlement consistent with the theory of early settlement our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty measured by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger we also find a non monotonic effect of agency resourcing which raises questions about the commission s efficiency in times of high case load econometrically we select a sample of merger decisions in which the european commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects and our selection model provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the commission conclusions are drawn for public policy

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

litigation liability and incentives for care abstract in this paper potential injurers are subject to a negligence standard and differ in cost of taking care in the event of accident the injurer s degree of care is private information in litigation that follows award of damages for pain and suffering will lead to a general increase in care and hence reduce the likehood of accident a tighter negligence standard will lead some potential injurers to take more care and others to take less adoption of a rule under which the loser at trial must pay the litigation costs of the winner will reduce the pressure for punitive damages

negative expected value suits in a signaling model we extend the 1986 signaling model of reinganum and wilde by allowing for the possibility of negative expected value nev suits if filing costs are zero the equilibrium consistent with the dl refinement implies that settlement offers face a rejection rate of 100 if filing costs are positive an equilibrium with settlement can be restored in this equilibrium plaintiffs with nev suits choose not to file but settlement rates fall below the level in the model without nev suits this fall in settlement rates may be substantial in addition by making the filing decision endogenous we are able to derive new insights into the effects of fee shifting in the signaling model bargaining failures can be extremely costly when a plaintiff and defendant find themselves in trial after failing to negotiate a settlement the presence of asymmetric information is the most prominent explanation of this type of bargaining failure reinganum and wilde 1986 is one of the two canonical information based models of pretrial bargaining theirs is a signaling model in which an informed plaintiff makes an offer to an uninformed defendant reinganum and wilde rw assume that all plaintiffs have a credible threat to proceed to trial we relax this assumption and in the process endogenize the plaintiffs filing decision this is a realistic extension of the rw model which has some very important implications first if we add plaintiffs with negative expected value nev suits to the rw model and make no other changes the equilibrium of the model will require that all submitted offers be rejected at a rate of 100 to restore an equilibrium with settlement it is necessary to assume that the plaintiff incurs a fee at the time that suit is filed in this amended model we find that all plaintiff offers are rejected with a higher probability when compared to the model without nev suits this higher rate of rejection is a necessary part of the equilibrium as it discourages potential plaintiffs from filing nev suits thus no nev suit is filed in the equilibrium of the

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

systematically biased beliefs about economics robust evidence of judgemental anomalies from the survey of americans and economists on the economy differences between the general public s positive economic views and economists resemble other judgemental anomalies laypeople and experts systematically disagree i analyse this puzzle using data from the survey of americans and economists on the economy the paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists self serving bias then it examines whether economists political ideology and party loyalties explain the disagreement if anything this slightly increases their magnitude the effect of economic training clearly falls but remains large after adding education to the set of control variables apparent biases robustness suggests that the anomaly is real

litigation and settlement under two sided incomplete information this paper deals with a simple game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information parties are assumed to have the choice between settling their dispute out of court or resorting to costly litigation the set of sequential equilibria is characterized and conditions are given under which an efficient equilibrium does exist efficient equilibria however will be ruled out by various tests of refinement a comparative statics analysis is carried out with respect to the quality of private information which parties are assumed to receive before any moves have to be made

rational moralists the role of fairness in democratic economic politics in this paper we empirically test for the influence of fairness considerations on the willingness to redistribute income in private and in democratic decisions in contrast to standard explanations of income redistribution our theory takes into account that prices shift decisively as we move from the sphere of private contributions to politics at the polls it is nearly costless to observe social norms therefore we expect individuals to behave more fairly in the political sphere than in the market place we present experimental evidence which is consistent with this hypothesis in distributive struggles social norms moderate the inclination of human beings to behave like gangsters

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

how strong are weak patents economists usually conceive of patents as property rights that prevent others from practicing the patenting technology unless they first obtain a license from the patent holder even for ironclad patents i e for patents that are certain to be valid the existing literature has shown that the analysis of equilibrium licensing contracts is surprising subtle and complex 1 for example the analysis is quite different depending upon whether one firm s licensing contract is observable to the other firms likewise equilibrium outcomes are quite different if royalties must be linear than in the case where two part tariffs and other non linear royalties are permitted in that literature a downstream firm that refuses to sign a contract with the upstream supplier either exits the industry in the case that the upstream supplier controls an essential input or must rely on more costly inputs in the case of a non essential input in other words the downstream firm s threat point is to use some backstop technology in practice however patents are issued after a brief examination by the patent office to see if they meet the statutory requirements for novelty and non obviousness mounting evidence indicates that many weak patents i e patents unlikely to be found valid if challenged in court are issued by the u s patent and trademark office uspto 2 some observers view this with great alarm arguing that uspto is handing out undeserved monopolies others by contrast have suggested that these weak patents are of little concern because they will have little commercial impact because they will be licensed at commensurately low royalty rates or not enforced at all we study the commercial impact of weak patents more precisely we define a patent s strength as the probability that it will be found valid if challenged in court and we examine the relationship between a patent s strength and the royalties that it can command the distinctive

vertical coordination antitrust law and international trade this paper demonstrates that vertically aligned private or public organizations are capable of generating strategic trade advantage similar to that acquired through direct government export subsidization the model considers two forms of vertical coordination that lead to advantageous trade positions in international markets upstream vertical restraint and downstream equity sharing such practices are commonly employed both by state trading agencies and by private firms in nations with lenient antitrust laws the finding has important implications under new world trade organization wto rules intended to reduce government intervention in international transactions recent reforms in the wto favor nations that sanction highly refined vertical linkages between firms while nations with stringent antitrust legislation have an incentive to negotiate for greater harmonization of international laws

patent litigation with endogenous disputes the recent explosion of patenting and patent disputes has sparked a growing literature on the economics of patent litigation generally models in this literature take the existence of a dispute as given this assumption is troubling because it hampers the interpretation of empirical studies of patent litigation and the assessment of many patent policy reforms disputes would not arise if all technology adopters obtained ex ante licenses from patent owners this suggests that two stories could explain the origin of patent disputes in one the technology adopter observes a patented technology but chooses to imitate inventing around and or hiding the infringement in the other the adopter develops his own technology and is unaware of another firm s putative patent rights this kind of innocent infringement occurs because patent rights often have uncertain boundaries or questionable validity in addition the sheer number of patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite burdensome furthermore patent claims are often hidden sometimes strategically until after firms have made technology investments these two accounts suggest that a model of disputes should consider the decisions of patent owners to invent to patent and to monitor use of the patented technology by others and the decisions of potential infringers to monitor extant patents and develop and adopt new technology claude crampes and corinne langinier 2002 endogenize disputes by focusing on a patent owner s monitoring activity and imitative behavior by potential infringers our model includes this behavior but it also includes defendants who invent around a patent and defendants who are unaware of the patented technology we find that this richer model generates testable implications that better match empirical evidence on patent litigation

does better nutrition raise farm productivity household level data from sierra leone are used to test whether higher caloric intake enhances family farm labor productivity this is the notion behind the efficiency wages hypothesis which has found only weak empirical support a farm production function is estimated accounting for the simultaneity in input and calorie choice instruments include prices household demographic characteristics and farm assets the latter two sets of instruments are later dropped to explore the robustness of the results to different specifications of exogeneity the exercise shows a highly significant effect of caloric intake on labor productivity providing solid support for the nutrition productivity hypothesis the marginal effect on productivity falls drastically as calorie consumption rises but remains positive at moderately high levels of intake one result is a fall in the effective price of food a decline that is larger for households that consumer fewer calories

delay in contests abstract why is there delay in contests in this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of carl von clausewitz to explain delay for a given contest technology delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate and if the additional cost of investment in future strength is low

a test of racial bias in capital sentencing this paper proposes a test of racial bias in capital sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors in lower courts we model the behavior of the trial court as minimizing a weighted sum of the probability of sentencing an innocent and that of letting a guilty defendant free we de ne racial bias as a situation where the relative weight on the two types of errors is a function of defendant and or victim race the key prediction of the model is that if the court is unbiased ex post the error rate should be independent of the combination of defendant and victim race we test this prediction using an original dataset that contains the the race of the defendant and of the victim s for all capital appeals that became nal between 1973 and 1995 we nd robust evidence of bias against minority defendants who killed white victims in direct appeal and habeas corpus the probability of error in these cases is 3 and 9 percentage points higher respectively than for minority defendants who killed minority victims

estimating the average treatment effect of social safety net programmes in bangladesh since the famine in 1974 the bangladesh government and some national and international agencies have been providing food or cash or both to poor households through the social safety net programmes i seek to estimate how much these programmes affect the well being of poor households most previous studies have estimated impacts of these programmes on calorie consumption simply computing the raw differential however both observed and unobserved characteristics bias this treatment effect using fuzzy regression discontinuity rd design i control for these selection effects

near sighted justice chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court we identify conditions where the court should sometimes err in determining which firms should be liquidated such errors affect actions by both good and bad entrepreneurs we first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation when creditors and debtors can renegotiate to circumvent an error riven court for one class of actions a blind court that ignores all information is optimal for another class the court should place the burden of proof on the entrepreneur the robust feature is that the court should sometimes err chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court it is often unclear whether it is socially optimal for a bankrupt firm to be reorganized as a continuing entity or whether it should be liquidated and the proceeds from liquidation distributed if creditors and debtors cannot reach a settlement then the bankruptcy court may impose one this paper asks the following questions is it always optimal for the court to make the right decision if liquidation is efficient should the court always mandate liquidation if the bankrupt firm could be a profitable entity should the court always allow it to restructure under the existing management and continue or is it optimal for the court to sometimes make mistakes how does the possibility of negotiated settlements affect the optimal design of the court at one level the answers to these questions are straightforward in a world where more accurate appraisals of a firm s quality are more costly the optimal allocation by a court of resources to evaluate the bankrupt firms will always reflect trade offs between the marginal costs of better appraisals and the marginal benefit of decision making based on more accurate appraisals in this paper we show that a court should also consider how the probability that it misidentifies the quality of a bankrupt firm affects the ex ante behavior of management and hence the probability that the firm becomes bankrupt

patent enforcement a review of the literature without the confidence that patent rights can be enforced quickly and efficiently when needed the patent system will not stimulate innovation for this reason governments academics international institutions and the private sector have poured significant resources into gathering and analysing statistics on patent enforcement over the last two decades this paper reviews these studies and finds that while infringement is relatively common much enforcement occurs informally and less than 1 2 of patents incur litigation new strategic uses of the enforcement system especially by nonpracticing entities are the major emerging enforcement issue especially in the united states while the old problem of litigation costs attracts the lion s share of empirical attention it has produced remarkably few solutions to date

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

independent and competing agencies an effective way to control government controlling government is a primary focus of the politico economic literature recently various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective most importantly balanced budget rules fiscal federalism and direct democracy however one type of institution has been neglected so far elected competitors to the government such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the swiss local level where finance commissions compete with the government in some parts of switzerland local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda which are then voted on by the citizens thus they become strong competitors to the government we econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 swiss cantons we find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures

comparative analysis of litigation systems an auction theoretic approach a simple auction theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court the court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys this framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems the british rule continental rule american rule and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

the economics of a centralized judiciary uniformity forum shopping and the federal circuit abstract in 1982 the u s congress established the court of appeals for the federal circuit cafc as the sole appellate court for patent cases this court was created ostensibly to eliminate inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of patent law across federal courts and thereby mitigate the incentives of patentees and alleged infringers to forum shop for a preferred venue we perform the first econometric study of the extent of nonuniformity and forum shopping in the pre cafc era and of the cafc s impact on these phenomena we find that in patentee plaintiff cases the pre cafc era was indeed characterized by significant nonuniformity in patent validity rates across circuits and by forum shopping on the basis of validity rates we find weak evidence that the cafc has increased uniformity of validity rates and strong evidence that forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceased several years prior to the cafc s establishment

antitrust settlements and trial outcomes risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome the authors find that a one percent increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0 13 percent they also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs copyright 1996 by mit press