explaining agricultural productivity growth an international perspective this article presents multi output multi input total factor productivity tfp growth rates in agriculture for 88 countries over the 1970 2001 period estimated with both stochastic frontier analysis sfa and the more commonly employed data envelopment analysis dea we find results with sfa to be more plausible than with dea and use them to analyze trends across countries and the determinants of tfp growth in developing countries the central finding is that policy and institutional variables including public agricultural expenditure and proagricultural price policy reforms are significant correlates of tfp growth the most significant geographic correlate of tfp growth is distance to the nearest oecd country

the internal market and hospital efficiency a stochastic distance function approach the uk internal market was one of the first european attempts to introduce a competitive mechanism in the provision of hospital services the assumption was that competition would have led hospitals to increase efficiency in the use of their resources the aim of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of this kind of reform by measuring the changes in technical efficiency of a panel of 52 acute scottish hospitals observed from 1991 92 to 1996 97 the time period covers the whole duration of the internal market and the sample contains a different mix of both trusts and non trusts where the former embed the proper working of the reform the selected model is a stochastic output distance function that includes an interaction dummy variable to allow for parameters to change over time the results show a structural break after which hospitals change not only the way in which they provide their services but also the kind of services they provide favouring the quicker treatment of patients on a day basis

a comment on neudeck and podczeck s adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets abstract using the grossman equilibrium concept neudeck and podczeck journal of health economics 15 1996 387 show that imposing a minimum standard on a perfectly competitive insurance market can result in anti competitive effects decreased welfare with some insurers earning positive profits however the grossman concept precludes an insurer from offering two separating cross subsidizing health plans when an insurer can offer multiple plans as under both the nash and miyazaki wilson equilibrium concepts i show that minimum standards result in a doubleton equilibrium never allow positive total profits and increase welfare this is of interest since in 1997 more than half of establishments in the us offering choice of multiple plans did so through a single insurer

bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

some reflections on insurance pricing we analyse three aspects of the recent evolution of french automobile insurance by use of three simple theoretical models the fantastic development of professional mutuals the growing complexity of tariffs the increasing recourse to product differentiation each of these aspects can be interpreted as a step further in the direction of increasing premiums personalization the question we examine is how far should we go

estimating griliches k shifts griliches k shift a crucial parameter in the welfare evaluation of technological change is shown to be equal to the radial rate of technological change plus a vector of commodity bias parameters obtained from the distance function the analysis permits decomposition of sectoral productivity growth into productivity growth by commodity the k shifts estimated for wheat corn soybeans and beef in u s agriculture indicate a decrease in the marginal cost of production of corn soybeans and wheat during the 1950 1993 years

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

estimating the cost of improving quality in electricity distribution a parametric distance function approach abstract the quality of electricity distribution is being more and more scrutinized by regulatory authorities with explicit reward and penalty schemes based on quality targets having been introduced in many countries it is then of prime importance to know the cost of improving the quality for a distribution system operator in this paper we focus on one dimension of quality the continuity of supply and we estimated the cost of preventing power outages for that we make use of the parametric distance function approach assuming that outages enter in the firm production set as an input an imperfect substitute for maintenance activities and capital investment this allows us to identify the sources of technical inefficiency and the underlying trade off faced by operators between quality and other inputs and costs for this purpose we use panel data on 92 electricity distribution units operated by erdf electricite de france reseau distribution in the 2003 2005 financial years assuming a multi output multi input translog technology we estimate that the cost of preventing one interruption is equal to 10 7 for an average dso furthermore as one would expect marginal quality improvements tend to be more expensive as quality itself improves

hospital transaction prices and managed care discounting for selected medical technologies it is generally assumed that managed care has been successful at capturing discounts from medical providers but the implications have been a matter of debate critics argue that managed care organizations attain savings by reducing intensity of services while others have argued that savings are real and are a consequence of discounts per unit of care rather than reduced intensity because medical services tend to be bundled together into episodes of care separating out prices and quantities can be difficult given available data past studies focused on an average price for the aggregate hospital calculated from total revenue divided by the number of inpatient days or cases e g glenn a melnick et al 1992 emmett b keeler and melnick 1999 david dranove and richard ludwick 1999 caution that these methods provide approximations of actual prices and are subject to measurement error due to unobservable differences in service mix examining treatment episode for acute myocardial infarctions heart attacks david cutler et al 2000 infer that discounts attained by managedcare plans are only partly due to reductions in intensity here we employ data that enable us to observe transaction prices i e actual payments borne by the payer and received by the hospital for major procedures on an unbundled basis our analysis differs from previous studies in several important dimensions among these is the focus on pricing differences between various insurers and employers rather than differences within a single large insurer as a consequence we derive an empirical specification based on the bargaining framework due to john m brooks et al 1997 rather than their insurerbased model moreover to identify pure unit discounts we focus on the narrowly defined procedure like cutler et al we focus on coronary heart disease a leading cause of death we examine a major procedure used to treat this disease one that is costly and relatively common in bypass surgery more fully coronary arterial bypass graft or cabg healthy segments of artery are surgically inserted around the diseased arteries in 2002 about 344 000 cabg s were performed in the united states with expenditures exceeding 21 billion other economists have focused on these procedures to examine market phenomena such as the hospital s entry decision michael chernew et al 2002 or information diffusion dranove et al 2003 yet the pricing decision was not treated fully

the deadweight gain of insurance taxation when risky activities are optional abstract some risky activities are optional for example motoring participation in them is most attractive for good risks creating a tendency for advantageous selection in the associated insurance market taxing insurance consequently yields deadweight gains when type is hidden results are strengthened if optimism is present finally endogenising participation implies that the standard positive correlation test for the presence of policy relevant asymmetric information may fail

measuring the performance of foreign direct investment a case study of china abstract within the new growth framework this paper attempts to investigate the performance of foreign direct investment i e how efficient fdi as one of the factor inputs in an economy has been utilised in the empirical analyses an input oriented distance function approach is employed to estimate the technical efficiency of fdi in china s coastal regions over the period 1983 1995

effects of insurance incentives on road safety evidence from a natural experiment in china we investigate the incentive effects of insurance experience rating on road safety by evaluating the claim frequency following a regulatory reform introduced in a pilot city of china our contribution to the growing literature on moral hazard is to offer a neat identification of a causal effect of experience rating on road safety by employing the differences in differences methodology in the framework of a natural experiment the pre treatment placebo test corroborates the assumption that the pilot city and the control city share the same pre reform time trends in claims we find that basing insurance pricing on traffic violations reduces claim frequency significantly these results are robust to the inclusion of vehicle controls alternative definitions of claim frequency two placebo experiment tests and several robustness checks the effects of basing pricing on past claims are not significant

budget constrained frontier measures of fiscal equality and efficiency in schooling equality and efficiency are key issues in educational reform here the authors analyze the efficiency and equality consequences of various school finance reforms using a cost indirect output distance function this function readily models multiple output production under conditions of budgetary constraint and provides a natural measure of performance that is closely related to farrell type measures of efficiency the analysis suggests that despite school district inefficiency finance reforms can affect student achievement however any potential gains in output from redistribution are dwarfed by the potential gains from increased efficiency more strikingly the analysis demonstrates that budgetary reforms designed to equalize expenditures could actually increase the inequality of student achievement

the impact of the 1999 cap reforms on the efficiency of the cop sector in spain the cereal oilseeds and protein crop sector cop occupies a prominent position within the european union s agricultural sector within spain the cop sector accounts for almost a third of total agricultural guidance and guarantee fund expenses and half of the utilized agricultural area uaa the cop sector is not only relevant because of its physical and economic magnitude but also because of the political attention it receives the common agricultural policy cap reforms that occurred during the 1990s paid special attention to this sector this article aims to determine the impacts of agenda 2000 on a sample of spanish cop farmers production decisions by using an output oriented stochastic distance function the distance function allows for an assessment of the reform motivated changes on total output input used input composition and crop mix it also permits an assessment of the impacts of the reform on farms technical efficiency results show that the reform has shifted the production frontier inward and changed output composition in favor of voluntary set aside land with respect to input composition agenda 2000 induced a decrease in land fertilizers pesticides and other inputs in favor of labor in addition agenda 2000 has had a negative impact on technical efficiency

a simple tax structure for competitive equilibrium and redistribution in insurance markets with asymmetric information in their influential paper rothschild and stiglitz 6 demonstrated that the existence of nash equilibrium is not a general property of insurance markets when buyers have private information about their riskiness and firms face free entry and exit conditions this paper presents a simple and implementable system of taxes and subsidies applied to firms which permits a nash equilibrium always to exist we also show that more than one nash equilibrium is open to the regulator in particular government can effect risk discriminating redistribution without a priori knowledge of any individual buyer s riskiness hence it is not the case that the inability to distinguish between types of buyers rules out compensation risk discriminating transfers even in principle as claimed by schmalensee 7 442 finally we show that even when a nash equilibrium exists without government intervention there are always alternative and under some circumstances pareto superior equilibria open to the regulator since these alternative equilibria entail cross subsidization from low risk to high risk buyers our results suggest that the well known cross subsidization enforced through current regulatory practices is consistent with economic efficiency we conclude that the informational asymmetry assumed by rothschild and stiglitz poses distinct efficiency and distribution problems as do more conventional non informational situations of market failure and that regulators can influence the allocation of insurance through conventional instruments of intervention without assuming dictatorial control of the market

deductible contracts against fraudulent claims evidence from automobile insurance insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource allocation problem in many markets the object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance this type of contract is observed in many markets even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification a higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat particularly when the insured anticipates that the claim has a small probability of being audited to verify this proposition we estimate a loss equation for which one of the determinants is the amount of the deductible using a data set of claims filed for damages following an automobile accident with twenty insurance companies in quebec in 1992 because we have access only to reported losses a higher deductible also implies a lower probability of reporting small losses to isolate the fraud effect related to the presence of a deductible in the contract we jointly estimate a loss equation and a

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

screening with convex menus and optimal flow taxation abstract this paper considers a family of screening problems in which the principal is constrained to offer only convex menus applications include i optimal flow taxation when individuals can substitute consumption and leisure inter temporally ii optimal product design for a linear pricing monopolist iii non exclusive cum linearly priced annuity markets a modified version of a myerson 1979 mirrlees 1971 direct mechanism in which standard incentive compatibility constraints are replaced by no convexification constraints can be used to compute optimal allocations in this family of problems in the flow taxation application the optimal tax schedule necessarily features progressive marginal tax rates typically features distortions at the top and can be analyzed by adapting standard ironing techniques

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

stochastic estimation of firm inefficiency using distance functions econometric estimation of allocative and technical efficiency has frequently been carried out using a shadow cost function and its associated share or demand equations since the problem is formulated in terms of shadow prices the effect of allocative inefficiency on input usage must be computed indirectly from input share or demand equations as an alternative approach we derive and estimate an input shadow distance system comprising the dual shadow input distance function and the price equations derived from the shadow cost minimization problem estimated shadow quantities provide direct estimates of the effect of allocative inefficiency on input usage one can also easily calculate firm and time varying technical inefficiency by decomposing the residuals we also compute returns to scale and the cost savings obtained by eliminating both types of inefficiency our approach is illustrated using a panel of u s railroads both the cost function and the distance function are valid representations of multioutput technologies the arguments of the cost function are output quantities and input prices while the arguments of the distance function are input and output quantities the input distance function measures the extent to which the firm is input efficient in producing a given set of outputs while the cost function assumes cost minimization by a firm which is input efficient the shadow cost function is a generalization of the cost function and depends on output quantities and shadow internal to the firm input prices rather than actual market input prices thus the shadow cost function assumes shadow cost minimization but not actual cost minimization this function has frequently been employed in fixed effects estimation of allocative efficiency ae and technical efficiency te an observed input vector is technically efficient if it is on the isoquant of the observed output vector an input vector is allocatively efficient if the radial contraction of the input vector to the isoquant is cost minimizing identification of parameters that measure ae can be achieved by the estimation of a shadow cost system comprising the actual cost equation and the share or input demand equations which are expressed in terms of shadow prices and output quantities shadow cost systems have been estimated by atkinson and halvorsen 1984 sickles good and johnson 1986 eakin and kniesner 1988 kumbhakar 1992 and atkinson and cornwell 1994 among others given panel data the deviation of shadow from actual input prices can be measured by price specific inefficiency parameters that may vary across firms and over time however the estimation of the effect of

a dual measure of economies of scope a derivative based measure of economies of scope is obtained by exploiting the duality between the shadow cost function and the input distance function this is a useful measure when the econometric estimation of a cost function is not viable

optimal insurance design under narrow framing abstract in this paper we study insurance decisions when the policyholder evaluates insurance with narrow framing we show that due to aversion to risk on the net insurance payoff i e insurance indemnity minus insurance premium narrow framing reduces insurance demand this helps explaining the observed low insurance demand in many insurance markets we also show that the optimal insurance contract involves a deductible and the coinsurance of losses above the deductible when transaction costs depend on the actuarial value of the policy moreover when the policyholder is loss averse over the net insurance payoff a fixed indemnity equal to insurance premium should be paid for a range of intermediate losses

adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets abstract in this paper we look at various ways to regulate the health insurance market and ask whether they provide an answer to the problem of adverse selection to avoid inefficiency government policy must either effectuate some cross subsidization of insurance policies within the state sector or grant private insurance firms an exclusive right to serve certain groups of the population recent reforms in the netherlands and germany and president clinton s proposals for the us could be adapted to fulfil these requirements efficiency cannot be achieved on the other hand if the regulator tries to prescribe cross subsidization within the private sector

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

optimal auditing with scoring theory and application to insurance fraud this article makes a bridge between the theory of optimal auditing and the scoring methodology in an asymmetric information setting our application is meant for insurance claims fraud but it can be applied to many other activities that use the scoring approach fraud signals are classified based on the degree to which they reveal an increasing probability of fraud we show that the optimal auditing strategy takes the form of a red flags strategy which consists in referring claims to a special investigative unit siu when certain fraud indicators are observed the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device and we explain why it requires the commitment of the insurer and how it should affect the incentives of siu staffs the characterization of the optimal auditing strategy is robust to some degree of signal manipulation by defrauders as well as to the imperfect information of defrauders about the audit frequency the model is calibrated with data from a large european insurance company we show that it is possible to improve our results by separating different groups of insureds with different moral costs of fraud finally our results indicate how the deterrence effect of the audit scheme can be taken into account and how it affects the optimal auditing strategy

market equilibrium with hidden knowledge and self selection the problem of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in models with hidden knowledge and self knowledge has been discussed previously by m rothschild and j e stiglitz 1976 c a wilson 1977 and j g riley 1979 recent analyses of such models by i cho and d kreps 1986 and riley argue for a particular outcome the pareto dominant separating zero profit one the authors prove the existence of such an outcome under very general conditions and generalizing the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by riley they prove this outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium copyright 1987 by the econometric society

multilateral productivity comparisons when some outputs are undesirable a nonparametric approach multilateral productivity comparisons of firms producing multiple outputs some of which are undesirable are obtained by making two modifications to the standard farrell approach to efficiency measurement the restriction that production technology satisfy strong disposability of outputs is relaxed to allow for the fact that undesirable outputs may be freely disposable and the efficiency measures are modified to allow for an asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable outputs performance measures that satisfy these requirements are calculated as solutions to programming problems the methodology is applied to a sample of mills producing paper and pollutants

scope economies and technical efficiency of cocoa agroforesty systems in ghana a number of studies have addressed issues relating to the physiological environmental and economic values of trees in cocoa farming systems however to date little has been done to quantitatively examine the effect of crop diversity on cocoa farming efficiency this study therefore sets out to first investigate whether and to what extent crop diversity defined as the mixing of cocoa with other crop species on farmers plots affects productivity on cocoa farms secondly it sought to establish whether there are economies of scope i e cost complementarities from the sharing of farm inputs by crops on the same plots our results indicate that diversified i e multi crop cocoa farms are more efficient than single i e mono crop farms furthermore our estimate for the economies of scope parameter indicates possibilities for cost complementarities between production of cocoa and other crops on the same plot we advocate further investigation on the issue of scope economies to determine which crop combinations offer better cost complementarities and also meet biodiversity conservation objectives

efficiency in the international insurance industry a cross country comparison the purpose of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on frontier efficiency measurement in the international insurance industry a topic of great interest in the academic literature during the last several years a broad efficiency comparison of 6462 insurers from 36 countries is conducted different methodologies countries organizational forms and company sizes are compared considering life and non life insurers we find a steady technical and cost efficiency growth in international insurance markets from 2002 to 2006 with large differences across countries denmark and japan have the highest average efficiency whereas the philippines is the least efficient regarding organizational form the results are not consistent with the expense preference hypothesis which claims that mutuals should be less efficient than stocks due to higher agency costs only minor variations are found when comparing different frontier efficiency methodologies data envelopment analysis stochastic frontier analysis

the effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection abstract this paper studies the effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection and shows that there exists a range of taxes that creates pareto improvements relative to the zero tax market allocation by increasing aggregate investment for sufficiently high taxes an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment

commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third parties the paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment that is commitment against outside parties to the agreement it considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry it assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make pareto improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place under symmetric information the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence if the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information excessive post entry production levels can however be sustained ex post since output reductions may not be incentive compatible while information asymmetries are usually welfare decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing they can thus be welfare improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract the role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed

efficiency in new zealand sheep and beef farming the impacts of regulatory reform in this study we consider the impacts of dramatic regulatory reform during the 1980s on the efficiency of farms in new zealand using unbalanced panel data a translog distance function representing the multiple output and input technology and incorporating nonneutral regulatory impacts is used for the analysis determinants of technical inefficiency including a regulatory variable a time term and a debt equity ratio are also incorporated in a one step model estimated by maximum likelihood stochastic production frontier methods we find evidence of regulatory induced changes in output composition toward beef and deer and away from wool and especially lamb but little associated technical inefficiency these patterns motivated investment in complementary capital land and beef deer livestock inputs firms that were more flexible in their adaptation toward these new mixes adjusted to regulatory changes with less upheaval so any existing inefficiency appears linked to debt equity levels

adverse selection private information and lowballing in insurance markets recent contributions to the adverse selection literature have focused on a multiperiod competitive environment in this setting a clean distinction arises between the predictions of competing models cooper and hayes extend the model of rothschild and stiglitz to multiple periods the result is a self selecting equilibrium characterized by price highballing or systematically overcharging new business kunreuther and pauly suggest that information asymmetries between competing insurance firms render such price quantity policies infeasible their model results in a pooling equilibrium that is characterized by price lowballing or systematically undercharging new business our evidence is consistent with the kunreuther and pauly model and reveals the persistence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

efficient committed budget for implementing target audit probability for many inspectees strategic models of auditor inspectee interaction have neglected implementation details in multiple inspectee settings with multiple inspectees the target audit probability derived from the standard analysis can be implemented with sampling plans differing in the budgets committed to support them overly committed audit budgets tie up unneeded resources that could have been allocated for better uses this paper studies the minimum committed budget required to implement a target audit probability when i the audit sample can be contingent on red flags due to signals of inspectees private information e g from self reporting and ii the number of inspectees is large it proposes an audit rule called bounded simple random sampling srs which is shown to require no more committed budget to support than two other rules naturally generalized from the one to one analysis when the number of inspectees is large enough bounded srs is nearly as good as any efficient audit rule which demands the lowest committed budget necessary to implement the target audit probability the results offer insights on how audit sampling plans may be formulated to reduce inefficiency and what budget usage ratios should be expected accordingly

hardball and the soft touch the economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs abstract we examine an environment of costly state verification in which insureds possess private information about the magnitude of an insurable loss insurers can verify the actual loss suffered only by incurring a positive resource cost and insureds may verification and may lead to more generous settlements optimal insurance contracts are shown to mitigate the incentives to evade by a combination of incentives which include the overpayment of easily monitored losses and undercompensation for claims exhibiting higher verification costs

honesty on the streets a field study on newspaper purchasing many publishers use an honor system for selling newspapers in the street we conducted a field experiment to study honesty in this market finding that a moral reminder increases the level of honesty in payments whereas the same message has no effect on whether one is honest reminding customers of the legal norm has no effect we argue that these results are consistent with a preference for honesty based on an internalized social norm auxiliary evidence suggests that the moral message remains effective when it is posted for longer periods and even when it is removed again authors abstract

optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly inexact verification abstract this paper integrates the often dichotomized models of costly state verification and costly claim falsification it is found that when verification is inexact it is possible for an optimal insurance contract to consist of both positive claim falsification and positive insurer verification provided that falsification cost and verification cost are sufficiently low and the insured is risk averse satisfying constant absolute risk aversion this result certainly contrasts with the common belief that falsification and verification are mutually exclusive in an optimal insurance contract some characteristics of the optimal falsification verification and indemnification profiles including implementability are analyzed

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

us banking efficiency 1984 1995 abstract we estimate the time varying average efficiencies of the us banks during 1984 1995 with four different efficiency estimators using these four series of efficiency estimates we make a multivariate kalman filter analysis to examine the efficiency trend in us banks during this period

the hospital physician interaction in u s hospitals evolving payment schemes and their incentives abstract unlike the case in several european countries where physicians are salaried employees of the hospital in the u s physicians are independent agents who are granted admitting privileges by their affiliated hospitals hospitals and physicians bill separately for their components of inpatient care and patients or insurers compensate them separately this has raised questions about the degree of efficiency and cooperation between the agents in the first part of this paper we review previous models that examined this interaction under cost based and prospective reimbursement in the second part we consider an experimental mechanism price bundling in which payers allow a single payment for an episode of care leaving the physician and the hospital to negotiate over how the fee should be split modelling this as a nash bargaining game we cast doubt on the notion that price bundling can ensure cooperation and efficiency from the perspective of the players and suggest other incentives that may have led hospitals to participate in the experiment

fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers insurance fraud is a major source of inefficiency in insurance markets a self justification of fraudulent behavior is that insurers are bad payers who start nitpicking if an opportunity arises even in circum stances where the good faith of policyholders is not in dispute we relate this nitpicking activity to the inability of insurers to commit to their auditing strategy reducing the indemnity payments acts as an incentive device for the insurer since auditing is profitable even if the claim is not fraudulent we show that optimal indemnity cuts are bounded above and that nitpicking remains optimal even if it induces adverse effects on policyholders moral standards

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets abstract this paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type insurers can at some cost verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out however insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy the paper analyzes the relationship between second best pareto optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework it characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium the individuals contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists

hospital insurer bargaining an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing employers increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insurers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with providers what factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers the hospital insurer interaction is captured in the context of a bargaining model in which the gains from bargaining are explicitly defined appendectomy was chosen because it is a well defined procedure with little clinical variation our results show that certain hospital institutional arrangements e g hospital affiliations hmo penetration and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals bargaining position furthermore hospitals bargaining effectiveness has diminished over time and varies across states

providers affiliation insurance and collusion abstract this paper provides a theoretical analysis of the benefits for an insurance company to develop its own network of service providers when insurance fraud is characterized by collusion between policyholders and providers in a static framework without collusion exclusive affiliation of providers allows insurance companies to recover some market power and to lessen competition on the insurance market this entails a decrease in the insured s welfare however exclusive affiliation of providers may entail a positive effect on customers surplus when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated relationship in particular while insurers must cooperate to retaliate against a fraudulent provider under non exclusive affiliation no cooperation is needed under exclusive affiliation in that case an insurer is indeed able to reduce the profit of a malevolent provider by moving to collusion proof contracts when collusion is detected and this threat may act as a deterrent for fraudulent activities this possibility may supplement an inefficient judicial system it is thus a second best optimal anti fraud policy

measuring and decomposing productivity change measuring productivity change with malmquist indices has become common practice because they are easily computed using nonparametric programming techniques and can be readily decomposed into technical and efficiency change however this approach is nonstochastic and requires a constant returns to scale assumption to construct the reference technology we propose estimating productivity change using a stochastic input distance frontier imposing no restrictions on returns to scale we derive the analogous decomposition of productivity change and develop a generalized method of moments strategy in which outputs or inputs may be endogenous we compare two methods in an application to electric utilities

decent rural employment and farm production efficiency empirical evidence from tanzania and ethiopia promoting decent rural employment by creating new jobs in rural areas and upgrading the existing ones could be one of the most efficient pathways to reduce rural poverty this article systematically investigates the impact of decent rural employment on agricultural production efficiency in ethiopia and tanzania the analysis applies an output oriented distance function approach with an estimation procedure that accounts for different technological demographic socioeconomic institutional and decent rural employment indicators data of the 2011 round of living standards measurement study integrated surveys on agriculture for the two countries are used and a set of indicators is derived to proxy core dimensions of decent rural employment the findings of our analysis show that decent rural employment contributes to agricultural production efficiency

incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection we decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms that is for menus of contracts facing a budget constraint informed individuals purchase lottery tickets to enter mechanisms whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices beyond optimization market clearing and rational expectations an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change or cut prices an equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient an equilibrium can be computed as the solution to a programming problem that selects the incentive efficient outcome preferred by the highest type within an appropriately defined set for two types economies this is the only equilibrium outcome

off farm labour and the structure of us agriculture the case of corn soybean farms while the growing importance of off farm earnings suggests large benefits accrue to farmers from efforts to expand off farm income opportunities economic well being also depends on greater efficiency to comprehensively gauge the economic health of farm operator households off farm income is interpreted as an output along with corn soybeans livestock and other crops to accomplish this task two related methodologies were used first using 2000 data a multi activity cost function was set up to analyse labour allocation decisions within the farm operator household and also to estimate returns to scale and scope second using 1996 2000 data an input distance function approach was followed to estimate returns to scale cost economies and technical efficiency and the relative performance of farm operator households with and without off farm wages and salaries compared the cost function and input distance function results both suggest that off farm outputs and inputs can be modelled in a multi activi

estimating the prevalence and cost of yield switching fraud in the federal crop insurance program producers who manipulate and switch their reported crop yields between separately insured units can increase their insurance indemnities substantially a statistical model that identifies potential yield switching is developed the unrestricted statistical model is singular and is identified by imposing a mixture of system estimable and system nonestimable restrictions lower bound estimates of yield switching fraud incidence and costs are obtained by applying the model to 207 067 multiple unit producers who purchased crop insurance in 1998

mergers and technical efficiency in spanish savings banks a stochastic distance function approach abstract the aim of this paper is to test the temporal variation of technical efficiency of spanish savings banks during the period 1985 1998 furthermore we test whether merged and non merged firms have different levels and temporal patterns of technical efficiency a stochastic output distance function r w shephard theory of cost and production functions princeton university press princeton nj is employed to accommodate multiple output technology the distance function provides the advantage that it does not need information about prices so it can accommodate the multi product nature of the financial sector only using the quantities as data an important point when the assumptions about perfectly competitive markets are unlikely to be met the temporal variation of efficiency is modeled extending the battese and coelli journal of productivity analysis 3 1992 153 169 approach in two ways relaxing the monotonicity of the temporal variation pattern of the efficiency term and allowing for different patterns of efficiency change between merged and non merged firms

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

multi output nonfrontier primal measures of capacity and capacity utilization this article implements an econometric approach for generating primal capacity output and utilization measures for fisheries in situations where regulatory environmental and resource conditions affect catch levels but are not independently identified in the data frontier based capacity models may interpret such impacts as production inefficiency however if such inefficiencies are unlikely to be eliminated the implied potential output increases may be unrealistic we develop a multi output multi input stochastic transformation function framework that permits various assumptions about how output composition may change when operating at full capacity we apply our model to catcher processor vessels in the alaskan pollock fishery

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

workers compensation and moral hazard two types of moral hazard have been determined the first type is related to self prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents the second type relates to the agent s activities whenever the accident occurs the authors objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers compensation market the main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing into two parts the total variation in recovery time with respect to changes in insurance coverage 1 the variation of consumption corresponding to a given level of information and 2 the variation of consumption due to greater asymmetrical information the methodology used in this study separates these two variations copyright 1991 by mit press

auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud the credibility issue abstract this paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims we assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists the insurer policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game in which the insurer decides to audit or not the market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies we show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down we also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

fertilizer subsidy and agricultural productivity in senegal in a consistent effort to raise productivity and unlock the economic and social potential of the agricultural sector the senegalese government has implemented heavy subsidy programs some of which target the use of inputs this paper assesses the potential impact of the fertilizer subsidy on farmers productivity we use data envelopment analysis to generate efficiency scores which are then related to the subsidy program using an endogenous treatment regression model that accounts for potential endogeneity and self selectivity issues the results indicate that the subsidy program appears to be associated with increased efficiency hence providing empirical support to the political will to revamp the program the results also suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of the subsidy program as well as additional policy options to further unlock the agricultural potential

economic efficiency and frontier techniques abstract most of the literature related to the measurement of economic efficiency has based its analysis either on parametric or on non parametric frontier methods the choice of estimation method has been an issue of debate with some researchers preferring the parametric and others the non parametric approach the aim of this paper is to provide a critical and detailed review of both core frontier methods in our opinion no approach is strictly preferable to any other moreover a careful consideration of their main advantages and disadvantages of the data set utilized and of the intrinsic characteristics of the framework under analysis will help us in the correct implementation of these techniques recent developments in frontier techniques and economic efficiency measurement such as bayesian techniques bootstrapping duality theory and the analysis of sampling asymptotic properties are also considered in this paper

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

is honesty the best policy curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts an incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims we demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones the differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss contingent insurance payments

competing vertical structures precommitment and renegotiation we consider a model where two agents privately informed about their own characteristics play a normal form game on behalf of two uninformed principals we analyze the existence of precommitment effects through public announcements of contracts in a model where agency contracts designed ex ante can always be secretly renegotiated at the ex ante and interim stages we show that the existence of precommitment effects depends both on the strategic complementarity of the agents actions and on the direct effect of the opponents actions on each principal s welfare in our model the possibility of renegotiation is crucial for the existence of precommitment effects the results are introduced through an example of cournot and bertrand competition between firms viewed as vertical structures

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts