toward natural implementation the authors identify some fundamental conditions that a natural mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies first they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in nash equilibria by natural mechanisms second they show that the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and two quantity mechanisms is equivalent to the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and allocation mechanisms third the authors find that the no envy correspondence is implementable by a two quantity mechanism and the fair correspondence is implementable by a price quantity mechanism copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

games of fair division abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible our primary normative concept is no envy first we show that there is no non manipulable selection from the no envy solution then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no envy solution the set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy free allocations for the true preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d7l d82

incentives and careers in academia theory and empirical analysis we study career concerns in italian academia we mould our empirical analysis on the standard model of contests formalised in the multi unit all pay auction the number of posts the number of app

misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining pure exchange and public good economies in order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economics when the agents are not informed about their opponents payoffs we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation in pure exchange public good economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption the set of allocations obtained at the linear strategies nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained walrasian lindahl allocations with respect to the agents true utilities without this assumption the result holds for two agent pure exchange economies and under alternative assumptions for public good economies c 2002 elsevier science usa

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

competitive fair division several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players whose bids for the goods determine their prices an equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair division procedure called the gap procedure that ensures 1 nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good 2 pareto optimality though coupled with possible envy 3 monotonicity such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good 4 sincere bids that preclude negative utility and 5 prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid as in a vickrey auction a variety of applications are discussed

large indivisibles an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness an exchange economy is considered in which there are a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and a certain quantity of the divisible good the existence of prices corresponding to pareto efficient allocations is proved it is also shown that this economy possesses fair allocations income fair allocations coalition fair allocations and pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in this study the effect of including large indivisibles in an exchange economy will be analyzed the analysis will be carried out with respect to the existence of price equilibrium and with respect to the existence of different forms of fairness the economy consists of a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good it is assumed that each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and some quantity of the divisible good we may interpret the indivisibles as being professions or houses the relationship between price equilibrium and a pareto efficient allocation is well known and proved in a number of cases under different assumptions about preferences and commodities for a standard economy see e g debreu 5 in case of nonconvexities which may also describe a certain type of indivisibility we may have an exact relationship in economies with a continuum of individuals see e g hildenbrand 11 but otherwise an approximate relationship obtains the degree of approximation depends on the degree of nonconvexities in preferences and not on the number of individuals see e g arrow and hahn 1 we will prove the existence of prices characterizing a pareto efficient allocation in a case where the indivisibles play an essential role and where approximate results would be too approximate the indivisibles may be considered large for the individual compared to his total consumption the theory of fairness has developed considerably during the seventies different kinds of concepts of fairness have been introduced and analyzed see daniel 41 foley 81 pazner and schmeidler 121 and schmeidler and vind 141 among others normally these authors have considered models with divisible goods or an infinite number of individuals for exchange economies the existence of fair allocations an envy free and pareto efficient allocation has been proved in

maximal manipulation of envy free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non quasi linear preferences the purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy free solutions we show that under a certain domain richness condition each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions this maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy free solution if an envy free solution satisfies a mild condition the set of nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy free allocations

climate policies in the u s at the stakeholder level a case study of the national football league this article analyzes how stakeholders are able to influence climate policy making in the u s emphasis is placed upon the most popular sports league in the united states the national football league nfl an empirical analysis of the 32 nfl franchises identifies pioneering clubs that have introduced ambitious green programs that include the utilization of renewable energies the adoption of energy efficiency measures and carbon offsetting policies as well as the facilitation of public transport and electric cars apart from environmental concerns this paper identifies several drivers for pioneering actions economic motives pressure exerted by the local environment public relations and political incentives such as the promotion from the federal government s stimulus package finally this article investigates the role that state actors such as the environmental protection agency and non state actors such as the natural resources defense council play in the innovation and diffusion processes of environmental programs in the nfl

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

let them cheat abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of infinitely divisible goods among a group of agents with classical preferences we propose to measure an agent s sacrifice at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption as a solution we select the allocations at which sacrifices are equal across agents and this common sacrifice is minimal we then turn to the manipulability of this solution in the tradition of hurwicz 1972 we identify under some mild assumptions on preferences the equilibrium allocations of the manipulation game associated with this solution when all commodities are normal for each preference profile each equal division constrained walrasian allocation is an equilibrium allocation conversely each equilibrium allocation is equal division constrained walrasian furthermore we show that if normality of goods is dropped then equilibrium allocations may not be equal division constrained walrasian

rental harmony with roommates abstract we prove existence of envy free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit demands we depart from most of the previous literature by allowing agents preferences over the goods to depend on the entire vector of prices we then show how our theorem may be applied in two related problems existence of envy free allocations in a version of the cake cutting problem and existence of equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible goods and money our proof uses shapley s k k m s theorem and hall s marriage lemma

equilibrium allocations of walrasian preference games following hurwicz 1972 we think of an allocation mechanism as a set of rules governing the behavior of economic agents given the economic environment initial allocations consumer preferences and the technology the behavior prescribed by the allocation mechanism determines future allocations thus we may think of an allocation mechanism as a mapping from a set of economic environments to a set of allocations a question which often comes up in discussions of allocation mechanisms is whether or not there are incentives for the economic agents to follow the prescribed rules is the mechanism incentive compatible this question has received considerable attention in the public finance literature where the concern has been primarily with whether or not consumers will reveal their true prefrences as prescribed by mechanisms designed for the allocation of public goods see for example samuelson 1969 hurwicz 1972 presented a game theoretic structure for the analysis of incentive compatibility the economic agents are the players and their reported characteristics preferences endowments or technologies are the strategy variables when the strategies are played a reported environment is characterized and the allocation mechanism under consideration determines the resulting allocation this allocation as evaluated by the true consumer preferences is the payoff to the strategies played hurwicz calls the mechanism individually incentive compatible if the vector of true characteristics is a nash equilibrium strategy vector for this game hurwicz 1972 first used this structure to investigate the incentive compatibility of the walrasian mechanism he considered pure exchange economies with finitely many consumers in which initial endowments were taken to be known by all and thus not subject to misreporting thus preferences were the only characteristics reported strategically he found that

sincere and sophisticated players in an equal income market abstract we study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents they non cooperatively coordinate on the equal income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are pareto undominated for them within the set of equal income competitive allocations sincere agents are protected to some extent however their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff

the manipulability of resource allocation mechanisms the vulnerability to manipulate behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms is evaluated by determining the nash equilibria of associated manipulation games under manipulation all monotonic correspondences are essentially equivalent to the walrasian correspondence for most non monotonic correspondences of interest the initial position appears at equilibrium to be efficient

state renewable energy electricity policies an empirical evaluation of effectiveness over the past decade state governments have emerged as us energy policy leaders across the country states are adopting policy instruments aimed at carbon mitigation and renewable energy deployment one of the most prevalent and innovative policy instruments is a renewable portfolio standard rps which seeks to increase the share of renewable energy electrification in the electricity market this analysis evaluates the effectiveness of state energy programs with an empirical investigation of the linkage between state rps policy implementation and the percentage of renewable energy electricity generation across states we use a variant of a standard fixed effects model referred to as a fixed effects vector decomposition with state level data from 1998 to 2006 results indicate that rps implementation is not a significant predictor of the percentage of renewable energy generation out of the total generation mix yet for each additional year that a state has an rps policy they are found to increase the total amount of renewable energy generation these findings reveal a potentially significant shortcoming of rps policies political institutions natural resource endowments deregulation gross state product per capita electricity use per person electricity price and the presence of regional rps policies are also found to be significantly related to renewable energy deployment

inefficiency of strategy proof rules for pure exchange economies abstract in his pioneering article in decision and organization c b mcguire and r radner eds pp 297 336 north holland amsterdam 1972 hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences in this article we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods we establish that i there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and individually rational rule on the class of classical homothetic and smooth preferences and ii there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and symmetric rule on the same class of preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d71 c72

fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice a set of n objects and an amount m of money is to be distributed among m people example the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget an elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for m sufficiently large the set of efficient envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure in particular various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of m this is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods