optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

sticky prices and monetary policy evidence from disaggregated us data this paper disentangles fluctuations in disaggregated prices due to macroeconomic and sectoral conditions using a factor augmented vector autoregression estimated on a large data set on the basis of this estimation we establish eight facts 1 macroeconomic shocks explain only about 15 of sectoral inflation fluctuations 2 the persistence of sectoral inflation is driven by macroeconomic factors 3 while disaggregated prices respond quickly to sector specific shocks their responses to aggregate shocks are small on impact and larger thereafter 4 most prices respond with a significant delay to identified monetary policy shocks and show little evidence of a price puzzle contrary to existing studies based on traditional vars 5 categories in which consumer prices fall the most following a monetary policy shock tend to be those in which quantities consumed fall the least 6 the observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power 7 prices in sectors with volatile idiosyncratic shocks react rapidly to aggregate monetary policy shocks 8 the sector specific components of prices and quantities move in opposite directions

sequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for walrasian equilibrium allocation are weakly preferred to those obtainable from the initial endowments by means of the given set of net trades these conditions are similar to ones studied by schmeidler and vind 1972 and vind 1978 but here they are thought of as characterizing the set of net trades available in steady state equilibria of market games like those studied by douglas gale 1984 1985 1986a 1986b and 1986c the characterization result is used as a key step in the proof of results like gale s the allocations induced by steady state equilibria are walrasian for the economy given by the constant flow of new agents into the market our approach generalizes the one followed in gale 1986c and allows us to dispense with assumptions made in previous treatments for example gale s 1986a assumption of dispersed characteristics is dropped we also demonstrate that such a result depends on the assumption that agents cannot observe the past behavior of agents with whom they trade

information and incentives the agency information problem this paper considers the use of imperfect information for risk sharing and incentive purposes when perfect observation of actions and outcomes is impossible making complete contracting infeasible the incentive insurance problem is defined to consist of two parts the choice of an information system and the design of a sharing rule based on the information system a generalized agency model is formulated to analyse this problem the agency models of ross 1973a b wilson 1968 stiglitz 1974 mirrlees 1976 harris and raviv 1979 holmstrom 1979 a o appear as special cases of the generalized model the analysis focuses on the value of information in the agency information problem the set of information systems which are valuable i e improve risk sharing and incentives in a pareto sense is characterized a problem independent ranking of information systems for the agency information problem is then characterized under the assumption that the agent s preferences are additive in money and actions the ranking may be viewed as a generalization of blackwell s ranking of information systems for decision problems to this particular game when the agent s risk preferences depend on his choice of action on the other hand it is shown that the blackwell ranking may be invalid randomized incentive schemes are shown to be efficient when the incentive effect of risk is positive and sufficiently large relative to the absolute risk aversion of the partners

monetary union price level convergence and inflation how close is europe to the usa abstract the pattern of price dispersion across european and us cities from 1990 to 2004 is documented there is a striking decline in dispersion for traded goods prices in europe most of which took place prior to the launch of the euro dispersion in the euro area is now quite close to that of the usa this evidence provides useful facts for future work assessing the importance of various developments in europe harmonization of tax rates convergence of incomes and labor costs liberalization of trade and factor markets and increased coherence of monetary policy

a survey of agency models of organizations abstract in recent years neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information the paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization this essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

tastes and technology in a two country model of the business cycle explaining international trade on international financial markets allows people to insure country specific risk and smooth consumption intertemporally equilibrium models of business cycles with trade on global financial markets typically yield international consumption correlations near one and excessive volatility of investment the authors incorporate nontraded goods in the model and find that the implications for aggregate consumption investment and the trade balance are consistent with business cycle properties of industrialized countries however the model driven by technology shocks alone yields counterfactual implications for comovements between consumption and prices at the sectoral level taste shocks produce price quantity relationships more consistent with the data copyright 1995 by american economic association

an expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty abstract in economies where agents bear some risk the analysis would often be facilitated by the assumption that the risks are i i d and disappear in the aggregate a formal appeal to the law of large numbers requires the consideration of a sequence of finite economies in an economy with a continuum of agents there are countable families of sets for which it is impossible for a law of large numbers to be valid with countably many agents and a finitely additive measure independence is compatible with the law of large numbers

bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model in an infinitely repeated version of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without diamond and dybvig s assumption of no side trades the bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits the latter cause which cannot occur in diamond and dybvig s one generation model implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

higher order expectations in asset pricing we examine formally keynes idea that higher order beliefs can drive a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on expected future payoffs we call this the higher order wedge which depends on the difference between higher and first order expectations of future payoffs we analyze the determinants of this wedge and its impact on the equilibrium price in the context of a dynamic noisy rational expectations model we show that the wedge reduces asset price volatility and disconnects the price from the present value of future payoffs the impact of the higher order wedge on the equilibrium price can be quantitatively large

potential pitfalls for the purchasing power parity puzzle sampling and specification biases in mean reversion tests of the law of one price the ppp puzzle is based on empirical evidence that international price differences for individual goods loop or baskets of goods ppp appear highly persistent or even nonstationary the present consensus is these price differences have a half life that is of the order of five years at best and infinity at worst this seems unreasonable in a world where transportation and transaction costs appear so low as to encourage arbitrage and the convergence of price gaps over much shorter horizons typically days or weeks however current empirics rely on a particular choice of methodology involving i relatively low frequency monthly quarterly or annual data and ii a linear model specification in fact these methodological choices are not innocent and they can be shown to bias analysis towards findings of slow convergence and a random walk intuitively if we suspect that the actual adjustment horizon is of the order of days then monthly and annual data cannot be expected to reveal it if we suspect arbitrage costs are high enough to produce a substantial band of inaction then a linear model will fail to support convergence if the process spends considerable time random walking in that band thus when testing for ppp or loop model specification and data sampling should not proceed without consideration of the actual institutional context and logistical framework of markets

membership in citizen groups we analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits the public good and the benefits are jointly produced so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good with asymmetric information about the cost of provision the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee we show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group however in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members we show that in the ex ante optimal contract offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group despite the heterogeneity in valuations created

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

slow information diffusion and the inertial behavior of durable consumption this paper studies the aggregate dynamics of durable and nondurable consumption under slow information diffusion sid due to noisy observations and learning within the permanent income framework we show that sid can significantly improve the model s predictions on the joint behavior of income durable consumption and nondurable consumption at the aggregate level specifically we find that sid can significantly improve the model s predictions for i smoothness in durable and nondurable consumption ii autocorrelation of durable consumption and iii contemporaneous correlation between durable and nondurable consumption furthermore we discuss that incorporating a fixed cost into our sid model does a better job of reproducing the infrequent adjustments of durable consumption at the individual level and the slow adjustments at the aggregate level

in search of a euro effect big lessons from a big mac meal we investigate whether the adoption of the euro was accompanied by an increase in prices in member countries and whether it promoted goods market arbitrage in the form of faster convergence to a common price by comparing the experience of eurozone countries to non euro european countries in a difference in differences specification we net out effects on prices unrelated to the euro we conclude that a there is no evidence of significant price increases associated with the adoption of the euro even for food items and b there is little systematic evidence of a significant improvement in goods market integration following the euro s introduction

information risk sharing and incentives in agency problems this paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems when the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome in this case information systems are ranked only according to their informativeness about the agent s action when the outcome is noncontractible however the principal has to rely on imperfect information not only for incentives but also for risk sharing under the rst order approach this paper characterizes a problem independent ranking of information systems relaxing gjesdal s 1982 criterion we also nd sucient conditions justifying the rst order approach when output is noncontractible

the wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets abstract insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets the swiss government for example paid out chf 4 26 billion or 0 72 of the swiss gdp for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011 analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market other consequences of premium subsidies however have mostly been neglected by the literature we show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses this leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market the effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation using two alternative models we show that providing state dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect depending on which state subsidies are paid we argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured s behavior depends on the market structure

lotteries sunspots and incentive constraints we study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities we establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold to establish these results we introduce the concept of the stand in consumer economy which is a standard convex finite consumer finite good pure exchange economy with decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities we prove that no lotteries are actually used in equilibrium we provide a simple numerical example with increasing absolute risk aversion in which lotteries are necessarily used in equilibrium we also show how the equilibrium allocation in this example can be implemented in a sunspot equilibrium

signal jamming in new credit markets this paper develops a simple two period model in which a lender s credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers repayment capabilities this information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period

on transparency in organizations when is it best for the principal to commit to not disclosing all that he she knows in moral hazard interactions i show that whenever the agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states then full transparency can generically be improved upon this implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the principal exceeds the dimension of the agent s action in a simple class of problems i make further progress on the best disclosure policy assuming the principal can either disclose fully the state or remain silent

taxes and marriage a two sided search analysis this article analyzes the effects of differential tax treatment of married and single individuals in the united states on marriage formation and composition divorce and labor supply we develop a marriage market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that is sufficiently rich to capture key elements of the problem under consideration we then calibrate the model and use it to evaluate the quantitative effects of several tax reforms aimed at making the tax law neutral with respect to marital status we find that these reforms i systematically increase the labor supply of married females with changes ranging from 0 3 to 10 1 percent ii have substantial effects on the correlation of spouses incomes which changes from 0 2 to values between 0 185 and 0 334 iii can lead to either an increase or decrease in the fraction of people married with changes that range from 0 6 to 2 4 percent

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

robust comparative statics in large dynamic economies we consider infinite horizon economies populated by a continuum of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks this framework contains models of saving and capital accumulation with incomplete markets in the spirit of works by bewley aiyagari and huggett models of entry exit and industry dynamics in the spirit of hopenhayn s work and dynamic models of occupational choice and search models as special cases robust and easy to apply comparative statics results are established with respect to exogenous parameters as well as various kinds of changes in the markov processes governing the law of motion of the idiosyncratic shocks

ppp strikes back aggregation and the real exchange rate we show the importance of a dynamic aggregation bias in accounting for the ppp puzzle we prove that the aggregate real exchange rate is persistent because its components have heterogeneous dynamics established time series and panel methods fail to control for this using eurostat data we find that when heterogeneity is taken into account the estimated persistence of real exchange rates falls dramatically its half life for instance may fall to as low as eleven months significantly below the consensus view of three to five years

futures markets a consequence of risk aversion or transactions costs a two period model of an industry of risk neutral processors who have nonlinear production costs and who face transact ions costs in the spot and futures markets is put forth as a countere xample to the models of commodity markets in which processors risk a version plays the major role the model s equilibrium exhibits the sa lient endogenous features of actual commodity markets namely that t he futures price is below the current spot price that processors hol d inventories despite this opportunity cost that those holding inven tories are short in futures and that processors as a group hold an u nbalanced usually net short position in the futures market copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

preference representation and randomization in principal agent contracts abstract conditions on an agent s preferences that induce a demand for ex ante randomization are derived when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but additive separable preferences in wealth and effort optimal contracts often require randomization under additive separability the principal can use randomization to exploit the interaction between incentive considerations and the agent s outside opportunities however when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but multiplicative separable preferences participation and incentive considerations separate hence optimal contracts do not exhibit ex ante randomization

the optimum quantity of money in a stochastic economy individuals in a monetary economy face both economy wide and individualspecific risks friedman s 1969 assertion that the price level should fall at the rate of time preference must be modified when such risks are present bewley s 1983 conjecture that the modified deflation should proceed at a rate greater than the rate of time preference is demonstrated to be true in special cases but false in general moreover the indeterminacy of equilibrium bewley found is eliminated by the inclusion of a transactions demand for money

the micro macro disconnect of purchasing power parity abstract this paper reconciles the persistence of aggregate real exchange rates with the faster adjustment of international relative prices in microeconomic data error correction model estimates indicate that a different mix of shocks drives international price deviations at the microeconomic level and that dynamic adjustment works through arbitrage in the goods market rather than the foreign exchange market when half lives are estimated conditional on a common set of estimated macro shocks we find that micro relative prices exhibit every bit as much persistence as aggregate real exchange rates these results challenge theories of real exchange rate persistence based on sticky prices and heterogeneity across goods

efficiency in a pure currency economy with inflation individuals who are buffeted by stochastic shocks will wish to substitute consumption intertemporally to effect this substitution they can enter into insurance contracts or they can use money this paper investigates the connection between optimum insurance and friedman s 1969 concept of the optimum quantity of money using a simplified version of lucas s 1980 pure currency economy monetary efficiency and efficient insurance are equivalent here an example is presented in which an efficient monetary equilibrium exists contrary to bewley s 1983 conjecture in the example the efficient rate of return on real balances is less than the internal rate of discount

explaining time variation in geographic price dispersion the pattern of price dispersion significantly varies over time and across locations using a detailed dataset with product level retail prices we examine the role of time varying factors in shapin

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

a dual characterization of incentive efficiency we show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information because these welfare effects may generate non convexities incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived

global versus local shocks in micro price dynamics a number of recent papers point to the importance of distinguishing between the price reaction to macro and micro shocks we emphasize instead the importance of distinguishing between global and local shocks we exploit a panel of 276 micro price levels collected on a semi annual frequency over two decades in 59 countries around the world that enables us to distinguish between different types global and local of macro and micro shocks we find that global macro and micro shocks are always associated with a slower response of prices than the respective local shocks focusing on structural monetary macro shocks we show that prices reach their long run value much slower in response to a global macro shock as compared to the time it takes for prices to reach their long run value in response to a local macro shock

a prism into the ppp puzzles the micro foundations of big mac real exchange rates we match big mac prices with prices of its ingredients as a unique prism to study real exchange rates rers this approach has several advantages first the levels of the big mac rer can be measured meaningfully second as the exact composition of a big mac is known the contributions of its tradable and non tradable components can be estimated relatively precisely third the dynamics of the rer can be studied in a setting free of several biases inherent in cpi based rers finally a large cross country dimension allows us to overturn the engel result on what drives rers in most economies the exchange rate is the single most important relative price one that potentially feeds back into a large range of transactions obstfeld and rogoff 2000

price convergence in the emu evidence from micro data abstract the establishment of the european monetary union emu was widely expected to cause price convergence among member states in an investigation of this claim the present study avoids problems of comparability and representativeness by using an extremely detailed and comprehensive scanner database on washing machine prices and sales volumes for 17 european countries a hedonic regression yields country specific time series for quality adjusted price differentials statistically and economically significant deviations from the law of one price emerge log t tests firmly reject price convergence among emu countries small convergence clusters can be identified but they are unrelated to emu membership

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

conditional ppp and real exchange rate convergence in the euro area abstract while economic theory highlights the usefulness of flexible exchange rates in promoting adjustment in international relative prices flexible exchange rates also can be a source of destabilizing shocks we find that when countries joining the euro currency union abandoned their national exchange rates the adjustment of real exchange rates toward their long run equilibrium surprisingly became faster to investigate we distinguish between differing rates of purchasing power parity ppp convergence conditional on alternative shocks which we refer to as conditional ppp we find that the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism after the introduction of the euro was more than compensated by the elimination of the exchange rate as a source of shocks in combination with faster adjustment in national prices these findings support claims that flexible exchange rates are not necessary to promote long run international relative price adjustment

barriers to price convergence this paper investigates the existence of convergence clubs in the cross country price mechanism for 96 individual goods retail price levels across 40 countries available semi annually for 1990 2010 using a nonlinear factor model and threshold regression tools to our knowledge this is the first paper to find strong evidence for club convergence of retail prices these clubs emerge due to the interaction of traded and non traded factors for example countries that are physically closer to potential trade partners converge faster than countries in the high distance regime as long as they have low initial labor productivity or low initial income moreover being behind the technology frontier appears to be more conducive to price convergence for countries with relatively small physical distance from potential trade partners we interpret our findings as evidence of a local law of one price due to barriers to price convergence that influence the duration of the effect of price shocks

on aggregation of information in competitive markets the dynamic case abstract this article examines in the spirit of hellwig 1980 how a dynamic competitive security market aggregates and communicates information between various market participants at every instant it employs a continuous time economy consisting of a large number of heterogeneous agents who are endowed with noisy private signals about the risky asset payoff of differing precision it yields a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in which at every instant the agents use information contained in the market prices without rendering their private information redundant it shows that the market price reflects only that part of private information which is common to many signals and thus extends hellwig s single period results to a multi period model

stock flow matching this paper develops and quantifies the implications of the stock flow matching model for unemployment job vacancies and worker flows workers and jobs are heterogeneous so most worker job pairs cannot profitably match leading to the coexistence of unemployed workers and job vacancies productivity shocks cause fluctuations in the number of active jobs which in turn cause fluctuations in labor market outcomes we derive exact expressions for employment and worker transition rates in a finite economy and analyze their limiting behavior in a large economy a calibrated version of the model is consistent with the co movement of labor market variables observed in u s data and can explain about one third of their volatility

damage measures and incomplete contracts i present a model of two party contracts that allows for incomplete specification of future states and actions i examine various damage measures under the assumption that courts protect only reasonable reliance expenditures so that parties make efficient reliance choices the expectations damage measure is preferred to the alternative damage measures no matter what the contractual terms are

a short history of price level convergence in europe we study the evolution of price level dispersion in europe by combining time series information on harmonized indices of consumer prices hicps with occasional observations of absolute price levels we find that european price levels converged over much of the last 40 to 50 years in the united states our benchmark price level dispersion is more or less stable a back of the envelope calculation suggests that indirect tax rate harmonization convergence of nontraded input costs and convergence of traded input costs in the form of exchange rate stability and increased openness are all important in explaining european price level convergence

the value of information in a principal agent model with moral hazard the ex post contracting case abstract in a principal agent model with moral hazard a signal about the principal s technology the stochastic mapping from the agent s action to the outcome is observed before the contract is offered the signal is either uninformative null information informative and observed only by the principal private information or also observed by the agent public information we show that from an ex ante standpoint before the signal is observed i the agent prefers private to both null and public information ii the principal sometimes prefers null to both private and public information and iii when the principal prefers public to null information she prefers public to private information whereas the agent prefers private to public information in this last situation we also show that iv for any separating equilibrium with private information there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer

f o b pricing versus uniform delivered pricing a welfare analysis in a stochastic environment abstract under imperfect information but otherwise competitive assumptions spatial market equilibria are examined for two pricing structures under f o b pricing buyers face a price that reflects exactly the transportation cost between sellers and themselves under uniform delivered pricing u d p the seller charges the same price to all buyers inclusive of delivery under both buyers know only of sellers from whom they received ads sent randomly by sellers it is found that u d p equilibria may exist when f o b equilibria do not but not conversely also f o b equilibria are not always welfare superior to u d p ones these equilibria are not robust a new firm often succeeds in penetrating a market using a different pricing structure

private investment in higher education comparing alternative funding schemes this paper uses an overlapping generations framework to analyse the implications of different financing regimes in the education sector for human capital formation and economic welfare agents privately invest in education after they have received a noisy information signal about their abilities the incentives of individuals to invest in education are determined by the financing regime under which the economy operates we analyse and compare three financing regimes under each regime the payback obligation of an educational loan is contingent to some extent on an individual s future income

managerial discretion in the choice among financial reporting alternatives abstract this paper considers the role of an agent choosing among reporting alternatives when that choice is unobserved by the principal and the agent s compensation contract is optimal the agent is allowed to take post outcome costly actions which lead to more precise reports of actual profits than would be yielded by less precise but costless conventional translations of outcomes e g gaap the extent to which the principal allows the agent this discretion depends upon the improvement in profits as an indicator of the agent s pre outcome effort when post outcome actions take place versus the attendant cost of these actions

demographic structure and capital accumulation this paper develops an overlapping generations olg model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate we first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long run capital per capita exists then we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that i it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal ii it is associated to an efficient steady state iii it increases with compulsory transfers from younger to older generations finally we explain why standard olg models do not exhibit such a growth rate

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

pay for performance and beyond incentives are often associated with narrow financial rewards such as bonuses or executive stock options but in general such rewards are just a small part of the design of incentives properly designed incentive systems have to take into account the full portfolio of activities that the agent can engage in the array of instruments many nonfinancial that are available to influence individuals and consider the factors that motivate them in different settings thinking about incentives as a system of interacting instruments and influences has been a major advance in the economics of incentives in recent years in this lecture i will describe the path from pay for performance to the broader view of incentive systems

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

money with idiosyncratic uninsurable returns to capital abstract this paper extends the income fluctuations problem to an economy with endogenous growth individuals instead of owning a stream of endowments accumulate capital with an investment irreversibility constraint and face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks to the return to capital money provides both a risk diversification and a liquidity role balanced growth paths exist despite the increasing dispersion of the wealth distribution the return to money cannot be equated to the social return to capital unless the government owns the entire capital stock with idiosyncratic risk and it is capable of operating this stock as efficiently as private agents can journal of economic literature classification numbers e31 e42 e58

a general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination we study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium the interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium the dominant group gains from discrimination rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination the model is also consistent with reverse discrimination as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity

understanding post euro law of one price deviations we put together a unique panel of thousands of good level prices before and after the euro to compare the determinants and understand the evolution of goods price dispersion across europe over time we find that tradeability and nontraded inputs play a significantly smaller role for cross country price dispersion after the adoption of the euro and for eurozone economies as compared to european union ones we then compare the distributions of law of one price lop deviations over time to understand how the degree of integration across european economies changed after the euro our tests reveal that the distributions after the euro are typically significantly different from those before consistent with a greater degree of integration utilizing our unique panel data set to trace the location of individual goods in the distribution of lop deviations we ask how the price advantage or disadvantage evident in these price distributions evolves over time and whether goods characteristics play a role for the persistence of these lop deviations lop deviations for these goods are highly correlated over 5 or 10 year horizons and correlations remain significantly high over longer horizons these correlations are greater for homogeneous as compared to differentiated goods and vary across countries finally for most of these european economies and goods price advantage is typically revealed to be more persistent than price disadvantage

direct versus intermediated finance an old question and a new answer we consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank we show that the bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualifications if the asymmetric information concerns only the success probability then we observe adverse selection while if it concerns only the expected return bad types are driven out of the market

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

the free rider problem and a social custom model of trade union membership the literature on public good provision by groups has traditionally emphasized the free rider problem if it is assumed that a group forms to provide or to lobby for the provision of a good that is collective to potential members then the major conceptual problem to the formation of such a group is that individuals can enjoy the benefits of group action without incurring the costs by doing this they free ride in small groups the free rider problem is not generally considered insurmountable however the larger the number of potential beneficiaries the more difficult it is to overcome the free rider problem due to exclusion and surveillance difficulties and the less likely is optimal collective good provision or any collective good provision in the extreme the free rider hypothesis has a long history in economic thought as early as 1848 the free rider potential of any group of workers was perceived by j s mill however it appears that it was not until 1965 that an attempt was made to explain why large groups providing collective goods manage to exist despite the free rider problem olson 1965 proposed the following explanation if a large group exists it must have formed either because membership is compulsory or because the group provides private goods and services accessible only to its members with ancillary provision of the collective good as a byproduct the literature that developed from olson s work has focused primarily on the suboptimal provision of the collective good the difficulties of getting members to contribute in proportion to the benefits received and preference revelation incentives see for example groves and ledyard 1977 however there are problems with both of the solutions proposed by olson to overcome the free rider problem facing large groups first if coercion is looked at as a solution to the free rider problem the question arises as to how the coercion itself is financed guttman 1978 this is unlikely to be costless the second problem concerns the byproduct solution private good pro

affirmative action in a competitive economy abstract we consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium in the presence of two distinguishable but ex ante identical groups of workers an affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may fail in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently however the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy the welfare effects are ambiguous it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group

efficiency welfare and political competition we study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences our framework covers models of income taxation public goods provision or publicly provided private goods politicians are vote share maximizers they can propose any policy that is resource feasible and incentive compatible they can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate we prove two main results first the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus maximizing and hence first best pareto efficient second there is a surplus maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare maximizing policy thus in our model policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible jel codes c72 d72 d82 h21 h41 h42

transactions costs and nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates an empirical investigation eolquilibrium models of real exchange rate determination in the presence of transactions costs imply a nonlinear adjustment process toward purchasing power parity ppp conventional cointegration tests which ignore the effect of transactions costs may be biased against the long run ppp hypothesis our results using both monthly data for the interwar period and annual data spanning two centuries clearly reject the linear framework in favor of an exponential smooth transition autoregressive process the systematic pattern in the estimates of the nonlinear models provides strong evidence of mean reverting behavior for ppp deviations and helps explain the mixed results of previous studies

income distribution in the dynamic two factor trade model the issue of the effects of trade on personal income distribution has remained largely unexamined this paper describes an overlapping generations 2 x 2 model with a bequest motive and heterogeneous agents in order to examine the problem in this dynamic setting trade leads to both short run and long run reductions increases in inequality in labor capital abundant countries if the investment good is capital intensive if the consumption good is capital intensive the short run effects continue to hold but the long run effects are ambiguous copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

foundation of competitive equilibrium with non transferable utility abstract this paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two sided incomplete information with no entry where each agent is endowed with non transferable utility the economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents buyers and sellers who have private information about their own valuations of the object in each period buyers and sellers in the pool are matched to draw randomly a pair of expected payoffs which will realize if the long term relationship is formed each player decides whether or not to agree to form a long term relationship conditioned on his private information if both parties agree then they leave the pool receiving the expected payoff in each period while the long term relationship continues the existing long term relationship is terminated either by will or by a random shock upon which both parties return to the respective pools of agents we quantify the amount of friction by the time span of each period we demonstrate that as the friction vanishes any sequence of stationary equilibrium outcomes in which trade occurs with a positive probability converges to the competitive equilibrium under a general two sided incomplete information about the private valuation of each agent

redistribution by means of lotteries a government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their preferences the second best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the awards are deterministic we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome the condition requires that the citizens with large social weights have low risk aversion and that the left tail of the distribution of risk aversion be sufficiently dispersed

risk sharing and information in village economies arrangements for achieving efficient risk sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy the usual euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction but not the euler equation full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions we look at an environment in which it seems likely that long term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information three village economies in south india the evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions other households consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis

multi period information markets abstract this article examines the single shot decision problem of a monopolistic information seller selling a flow of information in a dynamic framework in a generalized version of wang s 1993 economy it shows that the profit maximizing strategy of the seller is to sell his information as is but only to a fraction of traders it argues that this strategy of selling information is different from that in a static model mainly due to the very different nature of constraints faced by the information seller in a dynamic framework

unbiased estimation of the half life to ppp convergence in panel data three potential sources of bias introduce complications for panel data estimation of the half life of purchasing power parity deviations they are bias induced by inappropriate cross sectional aggregation of heterogeneous coefficients small sample estimation bias of dynamic lag coefficients and bias induced by time aggregation of commodity prices all of these biases have been addressed individually in the literature in this paper we address all three biases in arriving at our estimates using an annual panel data set of cpi based real exchange rates for 21 oecd countries from 1973 to 1998 we obtain a point estimate of the unbiased half life of 3 0 years with a 95 confidence interval of 2 3 4 2 years

optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information abstract the problem of designing optimal incentive schemes arises if information is asymmetrically distributed among individuals the existence and the welfare properties of optimal incentive schemes are discussed for cases where the information asymmetry refers either to the quality of a product or to the behaviour of an individual

bertrand and walras equilibria under moral hazard we consider a simple model of competition under moral hazard with constant return technologies we consider preferences that are not separable in effort marginal utility of income is assumed to increase with leisure especially for high income levels we show that in this context bertrand competition may result in positive equilibrium profit this result holds for purely idiosyncratic shocks when only deterministic contracts are considered and extends to unrestricted contract spaces in the presence of aggregate uncertainty finally these findings have important consequences on the definition of an equilibrium we show that in this context a walrasian general equilibrium a la prescott townsend may fail to exist any equilibrium must involve rationing

rationalizable foresight dynamics abstract this paper proposes and studies the rationalizable foresight dynamics a normal form game is repeatedly played in a random matching fashion by a continuum of agents who make decisions at stochastic points in time a rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which each agent takes an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff against another path which is in turn a rationalizable foresight path we consider a set valued stability concept under this dynamics and compare it with the corresponding concept under the perfect foresight dynamics

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research