the acid rain differential game this paper considers an acid rain differential game countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil countries face a trade off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not this paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open loop and markov perfect nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game it will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady state levels of the buffer stocks differ the theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between great britain and ireland finally some results are given for the whole of europe

the econometrics of damage control why specification matters the contribution of damage control agents to production differs fundamentally from that of standard inputs lands labor capital this paper develops an econometric model based on the key characteristics of damage control agents and examines its properties it demonstrates that standard production function specifications overestimate damage control agent productivity and have erroneous implications for the evolution of damage control agent productivity and use in response to changing environments e g the spread of pest resistance it also proposes several alternative specifications and discusses methods for estimating them

dyke maintenance and other stories some neglected types of public goods the orthodox summation model of a pure nonexcludable public good assumes that each individual consumes a quantity of public good defined as the sum of all individuals contributions to that good recently hirshleifer 1983 1985 has analyzed models that do not fall within this class at one extreme is the weakestlink in which the total quantity available to each consumer equals the smallest individual contribution at the other is the best shot in which the total quantity available equals the largest individual contribution hirshleifer s example of the weakest link case concerns a circular region of which each citizen owns a pie shaped slice the perimeter is marked by a dyke floods may penetrate the weakest point of the dyke and cause damage equally throughout the region each citizen decides the height and state of repair of that section of the dyke adjoining his piece of land its maintenance constituting his contribution to the public good thus the level of protection enjoyed by all is determined by the least well maintained section of the dyke an example of the best shot case concerns a number of antimissile batteries ringing a city firing at an incoming icbm all that matters is the accuracy of the best shot bliss and nalebuff 1984 discuss dragon slaying as another example of a best shot situation section ii of this paper introduces a class of functions of which the summation weakest link and best shot are examples section iii analyzes the properties of equilibrium when consumers have identical tastes and incomes section iv analyzes the implications of income redistribution in the summation case the equilibrium is unaffected by the initial redistribution over a range and outside that range transfers help the recipient and hurt the donor within the broader class of models however the invariance property does not generally hold and there may be opportunities for paretoimproving income redistribution i give an example similar to the weakest link case in which a pareto improving redistribution is

the control of invasive species on private property with neighbor to neighbor spillovers invasive pests cross property boundaries property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion each property manager has a right to future use of his own property but his property may abut others properties enabling spread of an invasive species the incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention we consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated discrete control activities we find that higher rates of dispersal associated with proximity to neighboring properties reduce the private incentives for control controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker link public good problem in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity future use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of coase like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects a tax with a strong income effect e g failure of effective revenue recycling can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one s own property

collective reputation and quality firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem we show that for an experience good without firm traceability individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub optimal for the group these results support minimum quality standards trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem finally the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of washington apples specialty regional authentic and local food products have become a more important part of consumer purchases in recent years firms have responded by marketing food products that come from specific geographic areas this trend in consumers preferences has led the european union to introduce protected designations of origin labels and protected geographical identification labels which provide protection of food names on a geographical or traditional basis ranging from parmesan cheese to such lesser known items such as galician veal in the united states there are popular state products that carry labels such as washington apples idaho potatoes

distribution of potential gains from international environmental agreements the case of the greenhouse effect abstract international negotations between countries will be needed to reach a pareto efficient solution for global environmental problems such as the enhanced greenhouse effect we try to quantify how the potential gains derived from cooperation would be distributed among countries a weighted sum of all countries welfare functions is used as the global welfare function and three different cooperative solutions are considered thefirst best fb thenash bargaining nb and thekalai smorodinsky ks the main result obtained from the simulation of the theoretical model is that although at the world level gains from cooperation are quite similar in all three cooperative solutions distribution of these gains between countries is very different in the fb solution compared to the nb and the ks solutions

trade dependency bargaining and external debt abstract this paper analyzes the welfare effects of a conditional debt relief in the presence of partial defaults even for an economy in a state of partial default external finance for investment in highly trade dependent sectors may be warranted a marginal relief of the present debt service conditional on an equivalent increase in investment in the trade dependent sectors will benefit the debtor and will increase the future repayment investment targeted towards highly productive trade dependent sectors will benefit both creditors and debtors the investment can be implemented by a marginal relief of the present debt service or through direct investment

a voting architecture for the governance of free driver externalities with application to geoengineering abating climate change is an enormous international public goods problem with a classical free rider structure however it is also a global free driver problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril this exploratory paper develops the main features of a free driver externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type i and type ii errors i propose a social choice decision architecture embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties

global disease eradication an infectious disease can only be eradicated globally if it is eliminated in every country but does this require only international coordination or does it require cooperation using a model that blends epidemiology economics and game theory this paper shows that coordination will not always suffice even when the global benefits of eradication exceed the costs in general eradication will require strong international institutions jel h41 i18 k33 o19

private eradication of mobile public bads we consider analytically the non cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad such as an invasive weed species infectious disease fire or agricultural pest the stock of the public bad can grow and disperse across a spatial domain of arbitrary size in this setting we characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate and determine how this decision depends on property specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners we show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control but when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large we find that complete eradication may be privately optimal despite the lack of consideration of others welfare in these cases eradication arises in the non cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is in effect no externality finally when property harboring the bad is not owned or is owned in common we derive the side payments required to efficiently control the mobile public bad

tax subsidy policies toward vector borne infectious diseases abstract vector borne diseases especially rife in poor countries pose sectoral tax subsidy issues preventions and therapies mitigate these diseases in a numerical optimization model combining dynamic epidemiology and economics the medical distinction between prevention and therapy does not distinguish economic properties of preventions and therapies some interventions increase and others decrease moving to the steady state depending on the utility function the targeting of interventions and the disease process interventions display negative own price but indeterminate cross price effects juxtaposing the social planner s with decentralized choices quantifies externalities and shows how subsidies implement the first best one prevention and the therapy are equally subsidized

a 4 stated dice quantitatively addressing uncertainty effects in climate change we introduce a version of the dice 2007 model designed for uncertainty analysis dice is a wide spread deterministic integrated assessment model of climate change climate change long term economic development and their interactions are highly uncertain the quantitative analysis of optimal mitigation policy under uncertainty requires a recursive dynamic programming implementation of integrated assessment models such implementations are subject to the curse of dimensionality every increase in the dimension of the state space is paid for by a combination of exponentially increasing processor time lower quality of the value or policy function approximations and reductions of the uncertainty domain the paper promotes a state reduced recursive dynamic programming implementation of the dice 2007 model we achieve the reduction by simplifying the carbon cycle and the temperature delay equations we compare our model s performance and that of the dice model to the scientific aogcm models emulated by magicc 6 0 and find that our simplified model performs equally well as the original dice model our implementation solves the infinite planning horizon problem in an arbitrary time step the paper is the first to carefully analyze the quality of the value function approximation using two different types of basis functions and systematically varying the dimension of the basis we present the closed form continuous time approximation to the exogenous discretely and inductively defined processes in dice and we present a numerically more efficient re normalized bellman equation that in addition can disentangle risk attitude from the propensity to smooth consumption over time

bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a patchy environment abstract this paper presents a model of renewable resource exploitation that incorporates both intertemporal dynamics and spatial movement the model combines the h s gordon vernon smith hypothesis of a rent dissipation process with ricardian notions that resources are exploited across space in a pattern dependent upon relative profitabilities the population structure is characterized in a manner consistent with modern biological ideas that stress patchiness heterogeneity and interconnections among and between patches generally we find the equilibrium patterns of biomass and effort across the system to be dependent upon bioeconomic conditions within each patch and the nature of the biological dispersal mechanism between patches we use simple examples to illustrate how the distribution of effort throughout the system reflects the heterogeneity and the spatial biological linkages

incentive equilibrium in an overlapping generations environmental game we consider two overlapping generations that want to coordinate their strategies of working consuming and controlling pollution since the cooperative solution is not an equilibrium and hence is not a self enforcing contract a mechanism is required to sustain it we show how incentive strategies and the resulting incentive equilibrium could provide such a mechanism we also derive the conditions that ensure the credibility of these strategies

financing vs forgiving a debt overhang abstract this paper examines the tradeoffs facing creditors of a country whose debt is large enough that the country cannot attract voluntary new lending if the country is unable to meet its debt service requirements out of current income the creditors have two choices they can finance the country lending at an expected loss in the hope that the country will eventually be able to repay its debt after all or they can forgive reducing the debt level to one that the country can repay the post 1983 debt strategy of the imf and the us has relied on financing but many current calls for debt reform call for forgiveness instead the paper shows that the choice between financing and forgiveness represents a tradeoff financing gives the creditors an option value if the country turns out to do relatively well creditors will not have written down their claims unnecessarily however the burden of debt distorts the country s incentives since the benefits of good performance go largely to creditors rather than itself the paper also shows that the tradeoff itself can be improved if both financing and forgiveness are made contingent on states of nature that the country cannot affect such as oil prices world interest rates etc

externalities and compulsary vaccinations abstract this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that because of the free rider problem a case can be made for compulsary vaccination against infectious disease for a very general class of models requiring that all individuals be vaccinated is strictly dominated by free choice the market allocation is not optimum and in the full information optimum some individuals would be compelled to be vaccinated this allocation can be achieved by taxes and subsidies however the government can exploit the revelation properties of vaccination and achieve an even better allocation than the full information optimum

economic activity and the spread of viral diseases evidence from high frequency data viruses are a major threat to human health and given that they spread through social interactions represent a costly externality this article addresses three main questions i what are the unintended consequences of economic activity on the spread of infections ii how efficient are measures that limit interpersonal contacts iii how do we allocate our scarce resources to limit the spread of infections to answer these questions we use novel high frequency data from france on the incidence of a number of viral diseases across space for different age groups over a quarter of a century we use quasi experimental variation to evaluate the importance of policies reducing interpersonal contacts such as school closures or the closure of public transportation networks while these policies significantly reduce disease prevalence we find that they are not cost effective we find that expansions of transportation networks have significant health costs in increasing the spread of viruses and that propagation rates are pro cyclically sensitive to economic conditions and increase with inter regional trade jel codes i12 i15 i18 h51 c23

closure and divestiture by foreign entrants the impact of entry and post entry strategies we analyze the longevity of foreign entrants explicitly considering two possible ways of exit firm closure and capital divestiture we find that entry and post entry strategies affect the longevity of firms and of foreign equity holdings but in different manners while the ownership arrangements and organizational structure affect the likelihood of divestment they exert no significant effect upon closure the entry mode exerts opposite effects on the two modes of exit greenfield entrants being more likely to shutdown but less likely to be divested only human capital affects closure and divestment in the same manner firms with large endowments of human capital are less likely to exit irrespective of the exit mode considered copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way