market frictions a unified model of search costs and switching costs it is well known that search costs and switching costs can create market power by constraining the ability of consumers to change suppliers while previous research has examined each cost in isolation this paper demonstrates the benefits of examining the two types of friction in unison the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important differences in their effects upon consumer behaviour competition and welfare in addition the paper also illustrates a simple empirical methodology for estimating separate measures of both costs while demonstrating a potential bias that can arise if only one cost is considered

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

behavioral heterogeneity in dynamic search situations theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper presents models for search behavior and provides experimental evidence that behavioral heterogeneity in search is linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences observed search behavior is more consistent with a new model that assumes dynamic updating of utility reference points than with models that are based on expected utility maximization specifically reference point updating and loss aversion play a role for more than a third of the population the findings are of practical relevance as well as of interest for researchers who incorporate behavioral heterogeneity into models of dynamic choice behavior in for example consumer economics labor economics finance and decision theory

sorting equilibrium in a multi jurisdiction model abstract this paper analyzes a general model of an economy with heterogeneous individuals choosing among two jurisdictions such as towns or political parties each jurisdiction is described by its constitution where a constitution is defined as a mapping from all possible population partitions into the possibly multidimensional policy space this study is the first to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sorting equilibria in a two jurisdiction model for a policy space of an arbitrary dimension

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

hand in the cookie jar an experimental investigation of equity based compensation and managerial fraud the use of equity based compensation is an increasingly popular means by which to align the incentives of top management with those of the shareholders however recent theoretical and empirical research indicates that the use of equity based compensation has the unintended consequence of creating the incentive to commit managerial fraud of the type being reported in the press this paper reports experimental evidence that shows that the amount of fraud committed by subjects is positively correlated with the level of equity as is the level of effort in addition the amount of fraud that is committed is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and subjects risk aversion the experimental design permits the identification of causal relations in the directions just noted

retail competition in electricity markets abstract the introduction of competition into retail electricity supply gave rise to great expectations however to date its performance has proven less than stellar owing primarily to the theoretical concepts underpinning this reform which draw heavily on the austrian school neither consumers decision processes nor this sector s technical paradigm were adequately accounted for leading to an uncorrect estimation of the expected impact of opening to competition short and medium term prospects for the evolution of retail markets must be reconsidered from the perspective of greater stability not a generalization of competition but rather a persistent segmentation between active and inactive clients not a large and rapid diffusion of radical innovations in commercialisation with the potential for undermining the incumbents positions

the variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 canadian election formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean recent research has found no evidence of such convergence in order to explain non convergence the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election that is the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions we introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties an electoral survey of the 2004 election in canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions quebec and the rest of canada the survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space the variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share we find that in the local nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence the liberals and conservatives locate at the national electoral mean and the bloc quebecois with the highest competence valence locates at the quebec electoral mean the new democratic party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean the greens with lowest competence valence locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share

gibrat s law for all cities reply this reply refutes the objection raised by levy 2009 about the fit of the upper tail of the city size distribution in eeckhout 2004 i show that the method on which his conclusion is based is unsubstantiated the visual interpretation of the fit on log log plots is misleading in addition the methodology used to estimate a truncated subsample of the distribution while testing its significance against a distribution with prespecified parameters is ill founded the main conclusion is that gibrat s law holds city sizes follow proportionate growth thus giving rise to a lognormal size distribution tail included jel r11 r12 r23

household internal and external electricity contract switching in eu countries abstractusing a representative sample of more than 13 000 households from eight countries in the european union eu this article empirically studies the factors related to household electricity c

are rich people smarter abstract we formulate a general stochastic process of wealth accumulation by capital investment and analyze the conditions required to ensure convergence to the empirically observed pareto wealth distribution while homogeneous investment talent leads to the pareto distribution under very general conditions even a mild degree of differential investment talent results in a non pareto wealth distribution this finding suggests that chance rather than differential investment talent is the dominant factor in the process of wealth accumulation by financial investment our findings conform with market efficiency and may have implications regarding the origins the economic significance and the social desirability of wealth inequality at the high wealth range

contests as selection mechanisms the impact of risk aversion abstract we investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two player tullock contest our theoretical model yields two main predictions first an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage second if the prize money is sufficiently large a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent in a laboratory experiment we confirm both the non monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

information characteristics and errors in expectations experimental evidence we design an experiment to test the hypothesis that in violation of bayes rule some people respond more forcefully to the strength of information than to its weight we provide incentives to motivate effort use naturally occurring information and control for risk attitude we find that the strength weight bias affects expectations but that its magnitude is significantly lower than originally reported controls for non linear utility further reduce the bias our results suggest that incentive compatibility and controls for risk attitude considerably affect inferences on errors in expectations

gibrat s law for all cities comment jan eeckhout 2004 reports that the empirical city size distribution is lognormal consistent with gibrat s law we show that for the top 0 6 percent of the largest cities the empirical distribution is dramatically different from the lognormal and follows a power law this top part is extremely important as it accounts for more than 23 percent of the population the empirical hybrid lognormal power law distribution revealed may be characteristic of other key distributions such as the wealth distribution and the income distribution this distribution is not consistent with a simple gibrat proportionate effect process and its origin presents a puzzle yet to be answered jel r11 r12 r23

do the world s largest cities follow zipf s and gibrat s laws we examine whether the size distribution and the growth process of the world s largest cities follow zipf s law and gibrat s law the parametric results of the size distribution analysis reject zipf s law for all sample sizes and also show the zipf exponent systematically declines as the sample size increases the growth process analysis confirms gibrat s law and yields a local zipf exponent of one for cities with a normalized population less than 0 53 which includes about 95 of the total observations the deviations from zipf s law occur at the extreme upper tail and are likely a result of restricted mobility of population across countries however given that gibrat s law holds we can expect the size distribution to converge to zipf s law with a decline in the barriers to immigration

on the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions we provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric rst price auctions connecting their equilibria to the concavity of the underlying type distributions and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions we apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which as is common in practice one seller is given an advantage re ecting for example better reliability or quality we show conditions under which for any given rst price handicap auction there is a second price auction with bonuses that outperforms it with most of our results involving ex post dominance

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

gibrat s law for all cities two empirical regularities concerning the size distribution of cities have repeatedly been established zipf s law holds the upper tail is pareto and city growth is proportionate census 2000 data are used covering the entire size distribution not just the upper tail the nontruncated distribution is shown to be lognormal rather than pareto this provides a simple justification for the coexistence of proportionate growth and the resulting lognormal distribution an equilibrium theory of local externalities that can explain the empirical size distribution of cities is proposed the driving force is a random productivity process of local economies and the perfect mobility of workers

decision support for retirement portfolio management overcoming myopic loss aversion via technology design as firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee managed retirement plans tremendous demands are being placed on the decision making proficiency of future retirees as reflected in the equity premium puzzle individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time consequently there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement given that most retirement plans can now be managed online a potential solution lies in designing a web based decision support system dss that helps future retirees make more profitable portfolio management decisions this paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30 year period using a psychological approach toward designing the dss myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios armed with this knowledge three design features information horizon system restrictiveness and decisional guidance are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors willingness to take calculated risks the results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the dss presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons in contrast short term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors however when confronted with short term information horizons risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a dss to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation these findings carry important implications for theory and practice

consumer myopia imperfect competition and the energy efficiency gap evidence from the uk refrigerator market abstract the empirical literature on the energy efficiency gap concentrates on demand inefficiencies in the energy using durables markets and finds evidence that consumers underestimate future energy costs when purchasing a new appliance we take a broader view and also consider the impact of imperfect competition using data on the uk refrigerator market 2002 2007 we find that the average energy consumption of appliances sold during this period was only 7 2 higher than what would have been observed under a scenario with a perfectly competitive market and non myopic consumers one reason for this small gap is that market power actually reduces energy use

are you risk averse over other people s money decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others such as in the typical corporate structure does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences we examine this question in two simple settings lottery choices and sealed bid auctions using controlled laboratory experiments we find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion this reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others this result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

risk attitudes randomization to treatment and self selection into experiments randomization to treatment is fundamental to statistical control in the design of experiments however randomization implies some uncertainty about treatment condition and individuals differ in their preferences towards taking on risk since human subjects often volunteer for experiments or are allowed to drop out of the experiment at any time if they want to it is possible that the sample observed in an experiment might be biased because of the risk of randomization on the other hand the widespread use of a guaranteed show up fee that is non stochastic may generate sample selection biases of the opposite direction encouraging more risk averse samples into experiments we directly test these hypotheses that risk attitudes play a role in sample selection our results suggest that randomization bias does affect the overall level of risk aversion in the sample we observe but that it does not affect the demographic mix of risk attitudes in the sample we show that the common use of non stochastic show up fees can generate samples that are more risk averse than would otherwise have been observed

exploring the diffusion of low energy houses an empirical study in the european union abstract diffusion of low energy houses is an important part of energy and climate policy in the european union eu and in individual eu countries key barriers to the adoption of low energy houses include additional construction costs and uncertainty surrounding actual energy and cost savings in this paper we econometrically analyze determinants of low energy house adoption including time and risk preferences we rely on original data from a large survey conducted among households in eight eu countries to our knowledge this is the first empirical study of low energy building adoption to rely on a demographically representative sample our set of covariates includes parameters of time and risk preferences that were elicited via state of the art incentivized multiple price list experiments and via self assessment scales we find mixed results for the effects of time discounting on low energy house adoption risk preferences do appear to matter as risk proneness increases so does the adoption of zero net or energy plus building but not passive houses consistent with the low cost hypothesis about environmental attitude and action we find no results for environmental attitudes and social norms

the value of private versus public risk and pure altruism an experimental economics test in 1996 johannesson et al published a paper entitled the value of private safety versus the value of public safety based on the preliminary evidence from a hypothetical contingent valuation study for public and private safety these authors argue that consumers behave as pure altruists who consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they determine their maximum willingness to pay for public safety programs the authors conclude that further empirical research in this area is warranted this article presents a set of laboratory economics experiments to test johannesson et al s conjecture under controlled conditions in which participants face an actual risk of financial loss the laboratory results extend those of johannesson et al s providing strong evidence of pure altruism in coercive settings involving public risks

the influence of serotonin deficiency on choice deferral and the compromise effect abstractpsychological and physiological states such as mood hunger stress and sleep deprivation are known to affect decision making processes and therefore crucially influence consumer behavior a possible biological mechanism underlying the observed variability of consumer behavior is the context sensitive variation in the levels of neuromodulators in the brain in a series of four experimental studies the authors pharmaceutically reduce the levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain to diminish the availability of subjects cognitive resources in doing so they study how serotonin brain levels influence 1 subjects tendency to avoid buying and 2 consumers preference for product options positioned as a compromise in a given choice set rather than for more extreme alternatives i e the compromise effect using realistic product choice scenarios in a binding decision framework they find that a reduction of brain serotonin levels leads to choice deferral and decreases the compromise

zipf s law and maximum sustainable growth abstract zipf s law states that the number of firms with size greater than s is inversely proportional to s most explanations start with gibrat s rule of proportional growth but require additional constraints we show that gibrat s rule at all firm levels yields zipf s law under a balance condition between the effective growth rate of incumbent firms which includes their possible demise and the growth rate of investments in entrant firms under the additional assumption that firms do not consume more resources than available we show that zipf s law is the signature that firms grow at the maximum reachable long term rate

assessing farmers risk preferences and their determinants in a marginal upland area of vietnam a comparison of multiple elicitation techniques we examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in vietnam using these measures we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression analysis whereby unlike previous studies we include several proxies of social capital such as social networks and norms data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in a random sample of 300 households although correlations between most of the various risk preference measures are all statistically highly significant most are weak on average respondents have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics gender age idiosyncratic shocks education social norms network reliance with extended family and connections to local authorities are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods whereas others the household s dependency ratio wealth and covariate shocks are significant in a few methods only the explanatory power of the models is limited indicating that other factors are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences the results can help target safety nets encourage investments and lead to the development of more applicable methods for assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries

individual preferences and the exponential growth bias abstract the exponential growth bias egb refers to individuals underestimation of the effects of exponential growth and has been shown to affect important financial decisions such as retirement savings we develop and test a novel experimental design to evaluate the magnitude of the egb based on multiple price lists our design simultaneously elicits the egb as well as subjects utility curvatures and time preferences allowing for non linear utility we structurally estimate the magnitude of the egb as about half as large as when linear utility is assumed these results shed light on the relationship between individual preferences and the egb

elicitation formats and the wta wtp gap a study of climate neutral foods we conduct a field valuation experiment where we vary the valuation method contingent valuation vs inferred valuation as well as the payment format dichotomous choice vs payment card willingness to accept and willingness to pay valuations are elicited in a within subjects design for foods with climate neutral labels we find a similar gap for valuations elicited with the contingent or the inferred valuation method however we also find that the gap can be muted by using a payment card elicitation format

heterogeneous preferences and the individual change to alternative electricity contracts abstract based on data from a large scale computer based survey among more than 3700 citizens in germany this paper empirically disentangles the determinants of the general change of electricity contracts and the specific change from any green or non green to current green electricity contracts within the last ten years our econometric analysis reveals a strong relevance of behavioral factors and individual values and norms for example patience which was measured by an incentivized experiment included in the survey has a significantly positive effect on both general switches to alternative electricity contracts and specific switches to green electricity contracts furthermore trust and less robust social preferences also measured by an incentivized experiment have additional significantly positive effects on the specific change to green electricity contracts our estimation results also imply an important role of political identification i e an ecological policy orientation is strongly significantly positively correlated with the change to green electricity contracts furthermore several household specific factors like relocation decisions as well as socio demographic and socio economic variables like household income are also relevant the empirical analysis thus provides new explanation patterns for the phenomenon that relatively few households regularly change their electricity contracts and specifically switch to green electricity contracts although they have high stated preferences for such changes our insights suggest several directions for policy and electricity suppliers to increase these switching rates for example the high importance of trust for the change to green electricity contracts suggests transparency initiatives of electricity suppliers to decrease concerns against renewable energies

learning for a bonus how financial incentives interact with preferences this paper investigates the effect of financial incentives on student performance and analyzes for the first time how the incentive effect in education is moderated by students time preferences to examine this effect we use real labor market incentive programs that we combine with data from experiments on time preferences we find not only that students who are offered financial incentives for better grades have on average better first and second year grade point averages but also more strikingly that highly impatient students respond more strongly to financial incentives than relatively patient students this finding suggests that financial incentives are most effective at the beginning of an educational program when real labor market benefits are in the distant future

a review of international green power markets recent experience trends and market drivers green power marketing the act of differentially selling electricity generated wholly or in part from renewable sources has emerged in more than a dozen countries around the world almost two million customers worldwide buy green power today this paper reviews green power marketing activity in australia canada japan the us and in a number of countries in europe to gain an understanding of consumer demand for electricity generated from renewable sources it also examines key factors that influence market penetration of green power products such as product designs pricing incentives marketing strategies policies and product certification 2002 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems abstract consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m this paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent we present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agent s utility under which when m increases induced effort and hence productivity falls we also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level varies in m we present an efficient algorithm for numerically calculating optimal contracts for given parameters and show that induced effort falls when m is increased in many cases even when our sufficient conditions fail

the area and population of cities new insights from a different perspective on cities the distribution of city populations has attracted much attention in part because it constrains models of local growth however there is no consensus on the distribution below the very upper tail because available data need to rely on legal rather than economic definitions for medium and small cities to remedy this difficulty we construct cities from the bottom up by clustering populated areas obtained from high resolution data we find that zipf s law for population holds for cities as small as 5 000 inhabitants in great britain and 12 000 inhabitants in the us we also find a zipf s law for areas jel r11 r12 r23

zipf s law for cities an explanation zipf s law is a very tight constraint on the class of admissible models of local growth it says that for most countries the size distribution of cities strikingly fits a power law the number of cities with populations greater than s is proportional to 1 s suppose that at least in the upper tail all cities follow some proportional growth process this appears to be verified empirically this automatically leads their distribution to converge to zipf s law

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

promotion turnover and compensation in the executive labor market this paper develops a generalized roy model with human capital accumulation moral hazard and career concerns we identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives the structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm size pay gap we find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size certainty equivalent pay decreases with firm size in larger firms and for more highly ranked executives weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums this risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm size gap in total compensation larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives finally the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant but their collective effect on firm size pay differentials nets out

near optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions consider a setting with n sellers having i i d costs with log concave density f from cumulative f and a buyer who puts a premiumi on procuring from seller i we show how for any given 1 n a sim ple second price bonus auction can be chosen which comes surprisingly close to giving the auctioneer the same surplus as an optimal mecha nism the bonuses depend only on the magnitude and monotonicity of the slope of virtual costs given f we show that these in turn depend only on fairly coarse information about f we explore how this result generalizes to asymmetrically distributed costs abstract

risk aversion and incentive effects comment charles a holt and susan k laury 2002 develop an experimental design to determine the risk attitude of an individual they use their observations to argue that increased incentives appear to change risk attitudes leading to greater risk aversion popular utility functions that do not allow for such effects are therefore misspecified building on this finding they estimate a flexible utility function that characterizes their aggregate data well but that does not assume constant absolute or relative risk aversion the basic holt and laury 2002 hl design should become an important tool for the interpretation and design of experiments in which risk attitudes could play a role however their most important result showing the effect of scaling up the stakes of the lottery choice task is confounded by a possible order effect an order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task the primary methodological contribution of experiments in economics is to enhance control ideally such control makes the explanatory variables of interest in this case scale orthogonal to other explanatory variables such as order allowing clearer inferences about behavior than one could get from field econometric data we argue that not controlling for order effects results in a misspecification of utility functions that is as important as that of scale the subjects in the hl design were given sequences of three or four tasks as shown in table 1 task 1 involved choices over lotteries with a baseline level of prizes which we will refer to as the 1 scale task 2 involved hypothetical choices over prizes with a scaled up level of prizes either 20 50 or 90 task 3 repeated task 2 but with choices that involved real payoffs task 4 was a return to the baseline task with real 1 prizes in some sessions subjects were not given task 2 or task 3 what could one infer from the comparison of measured risk attitudes in the 1 and 20 tasks in hl unfortunately any observed difference could be due either to the scale of the prizes involved or the task order or some combination of both thus the effect of scale is intrinsically confounded with the possible effect of task order this is a logical flaw in their design which

risk aversion and the choice between risky prospects the preservation of comparative statics results most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty the primary example which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk it is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty the paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

consumer inequality aversion and risk preferences in community supported agriculture abstract in community supported agriculture csa consumers face a tradeoff between i the desire to support a csa farmer and obtain environmentally friendly goods and ii the risk associated with a long term commitment we elicit inequality aversion and risk preferences of a sample of 162 french csa consumers using incentivized field experiments we find that csa consumers are concerned about payoff inequalities while we obtain evidence of advantageous inequality aversion toward csa farmers we also find disadvantageous inequality seeking we find that csa consumers are risk averse and loss averse and distort probabilities we also observe that inequality and risk preferences in the loss domain might complement each other to strengthen consumers support for csa farmers

new evidence on gibrat s law for cities the aim of this work is to test empirically the validity of gibrat s law in the growth of cities using data on the complete distribution of cities without size restrictions or a truncation point in three countries the us spain and italy for the entire 20th century for this we use different techniques first panel data unit root tests tend to confirm the validity of gibrat s law in the upper tail distribution and second we find mixed evidence in favour of gibrat s law in the long term in general size affects the variance of the growth process but not its mean when using nonparametric methods that relate the growth rate to city size moreover the lognormal distribution works as a good description of city size distribution across the whole century when no truncation point is considered

attitudes towards large income risk in welfare states an international comparison using survey data and the instrument developed by barsky et al we estimate the distribution of attitudes towards income risk in a country where many employment and health related risks are generously covered by a tax financed social insurance system norway in 2006 under a constant relative risk aversion assumption the sample average for the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 3 8 with standard deviation 2 3 this number is then contrasted to that for five other oecd countries where risk attitudes have been measured using the same instrument and also prior to the financial crisis chile france italy the netherlands and the usa when we relate this distribution for stated relative risk aversion to that for generosity of social insurance and the risks related to employment and health expenditure a picture emerges suggesting that more extensive welfare states induce higher risk tolerance for foreground risks a relationship that is in line with the theory on risk vulnerability

risk incomprehension and its economic consequences abstractalmost all theoretical and empirical studies implicitly assume that every economic agent understands the concept of risk we exploited a unique feature of the indonesian family life survey and argued that this assumption may not apply to the developing world a third of working men failed to understand the concept of risk and this incomprehension did not result from a mistake or a preference for simple answers moreover after applying ols we found that relative to risk comprehensive men risk incomprehensive men earned 11 9 per cent less and possessed household assets worth 9 8 per cent less

high stakes behavior with low payoffs inducing preferences with holt laury gambles abstract kahneman and tversky 1979 argued that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices yet results by holt and laury 2002 suggest that questionnaire responses and decisions in hypothetical and low monetary payoff environments do not well predict decisions in higher monetary payoff environments this raises the question of whether investigating decision making in high stakes environments requires using high stakes here we show that one can induce preferences using the binary lottery reward technique e g berg et al 1986 in order to study high stakes decision making using low stakes in particular we induce preferences such that decisions in a low stakes environment reflect well the choices made in the high stakes environment of holt and laury 2002 this finding is of interest to anyone interested in studying high stakes decision behavior without paying high stakes

human capital divergence and the size distribution of cities is gibrat s law obsolete this article studies how the changing geographic distribution of skilled workers in the us affects theoretical models that use gibrat s law to explain the size distribution of cities in the empiri

is the wealth of the forbes 400 lists really pareto distributed abstract a number of researchers have studied the wealth distribution of the forbes 400 lists for example klass et al 2006 they argue that the wealth is pareto distributed we ask the question does the pareto distribution really give a statistically adequate fit we find other distributions giving statistically adequate fits

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

loss aversion under prospect theory a parameter free measurement agrowing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory can explain a variety of field and experimental data quantifications of loss aversion are however hindered by the absence of a general preference based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously this paper proposes such a method and uses it to measure loss aversion in an experimental study without making any parametric assumptions thus it is the first to obtain a parameter free elicitation of prospect theory s utility function on the whole domain our method also provides an efficient way to elicit utility midpoints which are important in axiomatizations of utility several definitions of loss aversion have been put forward in the literature according to most definitions we find strong evidence of loss aversion at both the aggregate and the individual level the degree of loss aversion varies with the definition used which underlines the need for a commonly accepted definition of loss aversion