bubbles and experience an experiment we investigate the occurrence of bubble crash pricing patterns in laboratory financial markets with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced traders we find that even with a minority of experienced traders bubbles are substantially abated

was the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 really this costly a discussion of evidence from event returns and going private decisions abstract this paper discusses evidence on the costs of the sarbanes oxley act sox from stock returns and going private decisions zhang 2007 economic consequences of the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 journal of accounting and economics doi 10 1016 j jacceco 2006 07 002 analyzes returns around legislative events and concludes that sox imposes significant costs on firms engel et al 2007 the sarbanes oxley act and firms going private decisions journal of accounting and economics doi 10 1016 j jacceco 2007 02 002 examine going private decisions and point to unintended consequences both studies are carefully conducted and deserve praise for tackling an important issue however as my discussion highlights several key findings may not be attributable to sox and we should exercise caution in interpreting the evidence while it is not implausible that one size fits all regulation imposes substantial costs on firms we presently do not have much sox related evidence to support this conclusion

bubbles and total factor productivity evidence shows that asset price bubbles typically precede financial crises and financial crises are accompanied by the collapse of bubbles in addition stock market booms and busts are typically associated with credit market booms and busts the recent us housing and stock market bubbles and the subsequent great recession that began in late 2007 provide an example the stock market booms in the early 1990s and the subsequent asian financial crisis in 1997 provide another example there are also many other related episodes of financial crises in emerging economies motivated by these observations miao and wang 2011a propose a theory of credit driven stock price bubbles we show that a positive feedback loop mechanism generates stock price bubbles when firms borrow against the stock market value of their collateralized assets to finance investment we assume that firms face stochastic investment opportunities and bubbles improve investment efficiency we also study stochastic bubbles and policy implications in the present paper we apply the theory developed by miao and wang 2011a to an environment in which firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and credit constraints we show that both bubbleless and bubbly equilibria bubbles and financial crisis

are price limits really bad for equity markets despite widely documented criticisms price limit rules are present in many equity markets around the world using a game theoretic model we argue that if the cost of monitoring a market is high price limit rules are beneficial empirical tests based on a cross section of 43 equity markets across five continents support our theoretical prediction we find that the probability of the existence of price limit rules is greater in markets that incur higher monitoring costs due to poorer business disclosure more corruption and less efficiency in legal regulatory and technological environments

the development of securities law in the united states given the existence of contract property fraud and company law what is the purpose of securities laws broadly speaking they can serve either of two functions or some mix of both the first is to facilitate contracting among entrepreneurs managers shareholders and financial intermediaries by providing a standardized set of rights and obligations la porta et al 2005 such laws are motivated by the desire to reduce transaction costs where contracting parties are widely dispersed and both writing complete contracts ex ante and renegotiating ex post are difficult a second possible function is to restrict contracting by limiting the set of legally available terms such laws reflect the view that securities markets are beset by market failures stemming from externalities or investor irrationality coffee 1984 fox 1999 langevoort 2002 for the sake of simplicity we can call the first a contracting paradigm and the second a regulatory paradigm

thar she bursts reducing confusion reduces bubbles to explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of smith suchanek and williams 1988 we vary the fundamental value process constant or declining and the cash to asset value ratio constant or increasing we observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing c a ratio a questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant running the experiment with a different context stocks of a depletable gold mine instead of stocks significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion jel c91 d14 g11 g12

do regulations work a comprehensive analysis of price limits and trading restrictions in experimental asset markets with deterministic and stochastic fundamental values abstract we examine how traders react to two prominent stock market regulations under a constant fundamental value fv process price limits and trading restrictions significantly reduce the price level and mispricing size when traders are inexperienced under a markov process fv there is no evidence for these regulations to reduce mispricing the novel markov process also serves as a testbed for several financial hypotheses related to the regulations we find that price limits do not improve reactions to market news and the binding of price limits magnifies the momentum in the price movements these findings suggest that the scope of these regulations is limited and that they can backfire in some market environments

monitoring costs managerial ethics and corporate governance a modeling approach this article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation in particular the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 sox in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests it discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value this article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders choices of best corporate governance mechanisms taking into account the influence of managerial ethics effectiveness and costs of monitoring we suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types monitoring efficiency and effectiveness of ethics education we conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value when managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

bubble formation and in efficient markets in learning to forecast and optimise experiments this experiment compares the price dynamics and bubble formation in an asset market with a price adjustment rule in three treatments where subjects 1 submit a price forecast only 2 choose quantity to buy sell and 3 perform both tasks we find deviation of the market price from the fundamental price in all treatments but to a larger degree in treatments 2 and 3 mispricing is therefore a robust finding in markets with positive expectation feedback some very large recurring bubbles arise where the price is three times larger than the fundamental value which were not seen in former experiments

classroom games speculation and bubbles in an asset market this paper describes a classroom exercise in which students trade assets of uncertain value in a sequence of market periods assets pay one dollar dividends at the end of each period but once the dividend is paid there is fixed probability that the asset will be destroyed dividends and probabilities are chosen so that the fundamental value is constant over time speculative bubbles can be caused by divergent expectations about other traders valuations of the asset this exercise provides an interactive framework that facilitates discussions of discounting rational expectations and backward induction

price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets abstract price bubbles relative to intrinsic dividend value are observed using a call market trading institution market prices tend to track intrinsic value only when the same group of highly experienced traders participate in three consecutive 15 round markets

a unique t 1 trading rule in china theory and evidence abstract unique to the world china adopts a t 1 trading rule which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day we develop a dynamic price manipulation model to study the effects of the t 1 trading rule compared to the t 0 trading rule which allows investors to buy and sell the same stocks during the same day we show that the t 1 trading rule reduces the total trading volume and price volatility and improves the trend chasers welfare when trend chasing is strong an empirical test using data on china s b share stock market supports the model s theoretical predictions

beware of the watchdog rethinking the normative justification of gatekeeper liability one of the prevailing explanations of the corporate scandals of the enron era and the recent financial crisis is the failure of professional gatekeepers such as auditors corporate lawyers and securities analysts to detect and disrupt corporate misconduct the alleged solution to this failure typically proposed and justified on consequentialist grounds is to impose legal liability on professionals the purpose of this paper is to critically examine the normative foundations of gatekeeper liability in the course of this paper i shall defend the claim that gatekeeper liability may be morally objectionable not only on grounds of fairness but also on consequentialist grounds the expected contribution of this paper is threefold first it systematizes the framing and moral justification of gatekeeping duties second it calls into question the normative underpinnings for targeting intermediaries instead of primary wrongdoers third it anticipates some negative and often overlooked results of gatekeeping strategies in the accounting profession specifically in the realm of clientele selection the expectation gap and auditor compensation

the goals and promise of the sarbanes oxley act the primary goal of the sarbanes oxley act was to fix auditing of u s public companies consistent with its full official name the public company accounting reform and investor protection act of 2002 by consensus auditing had been working poorly and increasingly so the most important and most promising part of sarbanes oxley was the creation of a unique quasi public institution to oversee and regulate auditing the public company accounting oversight board pcaob in controversial section 404 the law also created new disclosure based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s in exchange for these higher costs which have already fallen substantially sarbanes oxley promises a variety of long term benefits investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft and benefit from more reliable financial reporting greater transparency and accountability public companies will pay a lower cost of capital and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth sarbanes oxley remains a work in progress section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation by pcaob rather than for repeal of the legislation itself

investor attention overconfidence and category learning abstract motivated by psychological evidence that attention is a scarce cognitive resource we model investors attention allocation in learning and study the effects of this on asset price dynamics we show that limited investor attention leads to category learning behavior i e investors tend to process more market and sector wide information than firm specific information this endogenous structure of information when combined with investor overconfidence generates important features observed in return comovement that are otherwise difficult to explain with standard rational expectations models our model also demonstrates new cross sectional implications for return predictability

thar she blows gender competition and bubbles in experimental asset markets do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets our results from an asset market experiment show a marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles mixed markets show intermediate values and a meta analysis of 35 markets from different studies confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market women s price forecasts also are significantly lower even in the first period implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed jel d14 d81 g01 g11 j16

to see is to believe common expectations in experimental asset markets abstract we experimentally manipulate agents information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present namely the asset market experiments introduced by smith et al 1988 recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion which can be reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value we reconsider this view and propose that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred this may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common expectations our design disentangles the direct effect of training from the indirect effect of its public knowledge and our results demonstrate a distinct and statistically significant effect of public knowledge over and above that of training alone

market and political regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals not surprisingly the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting we do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political regulatory processes operate independently and the events are recent and not well researched so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural this paper offers conjectures on issues such as what caused the scandalous behavior why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time who killed arthur andersen the securities and exchange commission or the market did fraudulent accounting kill enron or just keep it alive for too long what is the social cost of financial reporting fraud does the united states in fact operate a principles based or a rules based accounting system was there market failure or was there regulatory failure or both was the sarbanes oxley act a political and regulatory overreaction does the united states follow an ineffective regulatory model

technology adoption under price uncertainty abstract the paper examines the impact of changes in the variance of output prices on the bias and intrafirm diffusion rate of technological change the results indicate that a reduction in the variance of output prices will increase the rate of adoption and the intrafirm diffusion speed of yield increasing technologies the opposite is true for cost reducing technologies

institutional and legal context in natural experiments the case of state antitakeover laws we argue and demonstrate empirically that a firm s institutional and legal context has first order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification a priori the size and direction of a law s effect on a firm s takeover protection depends on i other state antitakeover laws ii preexisting firm level takeover defenses and iii the legal regime as reflected by important court decisions in addition iv state antitakeover laws are not exogenous for many easily identifiable firms we show that the inferences from nine prior studies related to nine different outcome variables change substantially when we include controls for these considerations

underreaction to fundamental information and asymmetry in mispricing between bullish and bearish markets an experimental study abstract in contrast to existing literature we implement experimental asset markets with fluctuating fundamental values following a stochastic process therefore we can measure traders behavior in both bullish and bearish markets we observe underreaction of price changes to changes in fundamental value which induces overvaluation in bearish and undervaluation in bullish markets we also find an asymmetry between markets with bullish fundamental values and those with bearish ones as the former markets show a higher degree of informational efficiency the reason for the observed underreaction lies in the relatively large volatility of the underlying fundamental value process

the keynote papers and the current financial crisis one hesitates to write history as it happens or to draw policy lessons from current events the conference took place in may 2008 after the government assisted takeover of bear stearns but before a capital market downturn fueled a system wide liquidity crisis with successive insolvencies at indymac fannie mae freddie mac lehman aig wamu and as i write citigroup but it would be odd to comment on capital market regulation without mentioning the events of the last three months i am first to acknowledge that anything i might have written in may would not have foreseen the crisis or linked capital market regulation to financial institutions which in the us have been conventionally treated as discrete in discourse and institutions e g u s treasury 2008 leuz and wysocki 2008

investment cash flow sensitivity under changing information asymmetry abstract empirical studies on whether investments are sensitive to cash flows in imperfect markets often report conflicting results and have been criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds our study mitigates some of these problems using a research design that relates changes in investment cash flow sensitivity to changes in the bid ask spread measure of information asymmetry surrounding i implementation of the sarbanes oxley sox act and ii deregulation of firms in the transportation telecommunication and petroleum and natural gas industries consistent with our hypotheses we find that information asymmetry decreases following sox and that there is a corresponding decrease in the investment cash flow sensitivity pre to post sox further greater decreases in information asymmetry following sox are associated with greater decreases in investment cash flow sensitivity the results for the deregulation sample are also consistent with our hypothesis wherein we observe an increase in information asymmetry and corresponding increase in the investment cash flow sensitivity following deregulation

the effect of short selling on bubbles and crashes in experimental spot asset markets a series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets but does not induce prices to track fundamentals we argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner a simulation model based on delong et al 1990 generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data asset market bubbles are persistent deviations of prices from fundamentals to the extent that bubbles exist they can influence investment levels and the allocation of capital and thereby have considerable economic effects in recognition of their potential importance the question of the existence and pervasiveness of bubbles has been a focus of extensive empirical investigation see e g shiller 1981 blanchard and watson 1982 diba and grossman 1988 and west 1988 these studies yield mixed results regarding the empirical relevance of bubble phenomena one source of the differences in conclusions may be that because the fundamental value of the assets cannot be observed tests of the presence of bubbles are joint tests with the particular specification of the process guiding the evolution of fundamentals also being tested the availability of short selling is widely believed to make bubble formation less likely one rationale for such a belief is the notion that the cause of asset market bubbles is a constraint on the ability of traders to speculate on future downward price movements see e g miller 1977 jarrow 1980 diamond and verrecchia 1987 or figlewski and webb 1993 in the absence of short sales traders may sell only the shares in their portfolios the availability of short sales relaxes this constraint in this paper we study empirically the effect of allowing short sales on both the incidence and magnitude of market bubbles we choose a setting in which the fundamental value of the asset is clearly and unambiguously defined and known at all times and bubbles typically occur namely we use the experimental environment that smith suchanek and williams 1988 introduce while

rational asset pricing bubbles this paper provides a fairly systematic study of general economic conditions under which rational asset pricing bubbles may arise in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium framework our main results are concerned with nonexistence of asset pricing bubbles in those economies these results imply that the conditions under which bubbles are possible including some well known examples of monetary equilibria are relatively fragile this paper is concerned with the conditions under which asset prices in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium are equal to the present value of the streams of future dividends to which each asset represents a claim according to a central result of the theory of finance this is very generally true in the case of economies with trading at only a finite sequence of dates as long as there are no restrictions upon transactions other than that associated with possible incom pleteness of the set of securities that are traded the result is sometimes called the fundamental theorem of asset pricing here we consider the extent to which such a result continues to be valid in the case of trading over an infinite horizon it has often been observed in the econometric literature on asset pricing bubbles that it is possible in principle for the price of a perpetuity and the dividends on that security to satisfy at all times a present value relation for one period holding returns while the security s price nonetheless does not equal the present value of the stream of dividends expected over the infinite future in such a case the price of the perpetuity is said to involve a bubble component 2 joint stochastic processes for which this component is nonzero are sometimes argued to characterize existing assets for a recent example see froot and obstfeld 1991 but such an inference depends upon aspects of the stochastic

nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets lack of common knowledge of rationality vs actual irrationality we report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets in a setting in which speculation is not possible bubbles and crashes are observed the results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation in markets where speculation is possible is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment

the federal reserve and panic prevention the roles of financial regulation and lender of last resort this paper surveys the role of the federal reserve within the financial regulatory system with particular attention to the interaction of the fed s role as both a supervisor and a lender of last resort the institutional design of the federal reserve system was aimed at preventing banking panics primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window this new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s after which the fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create stigma for window borrowing policies that contributed to the panics of the great depression the legislation of the new deal era centralized fed power in the board of governors and over the next 75 years the fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks nevertheless prior to the recent crisis the fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort with the latter role weakened further by stigma the fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly as the fed begins its second century there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention

price limit performance evidence from the tokyo stock exchange price limit advocates claim that price limits decrease stock price volatility counter overreaction and do not interfere with trading activity conversely price limit critics claim that price limits cause higher volatility levels on subsequent days volatility spillover hypothesis prevent prices from efficiently reaching their equilibrium level delayed price discovery hypothesis and interfere with trading due to limitations imposed by price limits trading interference hypothesis empirical research does not provide conclusive support for either positions we examine the tokyo stock exchange price limit system to test these hypotheses our evidence supports all three hypotheses suggesting that price limits may be ineffective

asset holdings caps and bubbles in experimental asset markets abstract we report the results of an experiment designed to study the effect of individual asset holdings restrictions on the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets bubbles and crashes are a quite robust phenomenon in experimental settings motivated by demand control policies employed in the chinese real estate market we explore the effects of permanent and short term caps on individual asset holdings we find that permanent caps greatly reduce positive bubbles but tend to generate negative bubbles in later periods under short term caps on the other hand neither positive nor negative bubbles are observed our results indicate that asset holdings caps can be effective in eliminating bubbles if properly designed

executive overconfidence and compensation structure we examine the impact of overconfidence on compensation structure our findings support the exploitation hypothesis firms offer incentive heavy compensation contracts to overconfident chief executive officers ceos to exploit their positively biased views of firm prospects overconfident ceos receive more option intensive compensation and this relation increases with ceo bargaining power exogenous shocks sarbanes oxley act of 2002 sox and financial accounting standard fas 123r provide additional support for the findings overconfident non ceo executives also receive more incentive based pay independent of ceo overconfidence buttressing the notion that firms tailor compensation contracts to individual behavioral traits such as overconfidence

speculative markets and the effectiveness of price limits abstract the aim of this paper is to study the effectiveness of price limits in speculative markets we construct a nonlinear stochastic asset pricing model in which traders rely on technical and fundamental analysis to determine their orders the dynamics of the model mimic stylized facts such as the emergence of bubbles excess volatility fat tails for returns or volatility clustering quite well using this model as a laboratory we find that price limits have the potential to reduce both volatility and deviations from fundamentals the more traders lend themselves to trend extrapolating behavior the better price limits work

the london stock exchange s aim experiment regulatory or market failure a discussion of gerakos lang and maffett abstract the conference paper by gerakos lang and maffett 2013 provides reliable descriptive evidence on the post ipo performance of firms listing on the london stock exchange s alternative investment market aim their findings are consistent with both a failure of private sector regulation and incorrect market expectations about aim s investor protections in this discussion of gerakos et al 2013 i highlight the strengths and limitations of their conference paper summarize how various regulatory and market factors could produce the observed systematic under performance of aim offerings and outline paths for future research on the topic

forcing firms to talk financial disclosure regulation and externalities we analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation in our model disclosure is costly it has private and social value and its precision is endogenous we show that i a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy ii the nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient iii regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare iii the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures and iv neither regulation method dominates the other article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

price bubbles gender and expectations in experimental asset markets abstract this paper reports results of laboratory markets for a risky asset with a flat fundamental value that equates expected dividends to the return on a safe asset subjects were sorted by gender in an unobtrusive manner and bubbles in this setting are pervasive and of comparable magnitude for both genders in contrast a robustness check done with a declining fundamental value did generate larger bubbles for groups of males elicited price forecasts tend to trail share prices as they rise and exceed prices as they fall a pattern that is tracked by a double adaptive forecasting model

thar she blows can bubbles be rekindled with experienced subjects we report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and error elimination among participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles our answer to the title question is yes we impose a large increase in liquidity and dividend uncertainty to shock the environment of experienced subjects who have converged to equilibrium and this treatment rekindles a bubble however in replications of that same challenging environment across three experience levels we discover that the environment yields a rare residual tendency to bubble even in the third experience session therefore a caveat must be placed on the effect of twice experienced subjects in asset markets in order for price bubbles to be extinguished the environment in which the participants engage in exchange must be stationary and bounded by a range of parameters experience including possible error elimination is not robust to major new environment changes in determining the characteristics of a price bubble jel c91 d83

a review of bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets this paper discusses the literature on bubbles and crashes in the most commonly used experimental asset market design introduced by smith et al it documents the main findings based on the results from 41 published papers 3 book chapters and 20 working papers

recession depression mental health effects of the 2008 stock market crash do sudden large wealth losses affect mental health we use exogenous variation in the interview dates of the 2008 health and retirement study to assess the impact of large wealth losses on mental health among older u s adults we compare cross wave changes in wealth and mental health for respondents interviewed before and after the october 2008 stock market crash we find that the crash reduced wealth and increased feelings of depression and use of antidepressant drugs and that these effects were largest among respondents with high levels of stock holdings prior to the crash these results suggest that sudden wealth losses cause immediate declines in subjective measures of mental health however we find no evidence that wealth losses lead to increases in clinically validated measures of depressive symptoms or indicators of depression

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991

a theory of price limits in futures markets abstract the existence of price limits in certain futures markets is explained by demonstrating that price limits may act as a partial substitute for margin requirements in ensuring contract performance their effectiveness is a decreasing function of the amount of information available to traders about the equilibrium futures price which is unobservable in the event of a limit move and the theory predicts that no limits will exist in the markets for financial futures actual limits are broadly consistent with the theory his interpretation plausible as it was was totally misleading with the dangerous verisimilitude of a theory which will fit all or nearly all the facts and yet more entirely miss the truth by a mere accident then would a frank perplexity heritage v sackville west