sustainable corporate finance this paper presents and illustrates the concept of sustainable corporate finance sustainability is a well established concept in the disciplines of environmental economics and business ethics the paper uses a broader definition of what is called the firm to pinpoint sustainability to the finance literature the concept of sustainable finance is compared to traditional and behavioral finance four criteria are used to systematically analyze the basic differences first on the order is the theory of the firm the definition of the firm is reconsidered by integrating behavioral aspects and by expanding financial analysis to a three dimensional goal setting secondly a closer look is taken at the assumed behavior of economic agents and its consequences for the applied methodology the shareholders paradigm is discussed against the background of growing stakeholder importance finally the fourth criterion deals with the different ethical framework and its implication for financial behavior

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

strategic voting in the 1996 japanese general election japan s new electoral system may or may not be good for japanese democracy but it is almost ideally designed for the study of strategic voting no other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single member districts smd and proportional representation pr votes using candidate level aggregate data i find strong evidence for strategic voting candidates with a good chance of winning receive more smd than pr votes and those with little chance of winning receive more pr votes strategic voting explains not only the basic pattern but also several exceptions to the rule in addition i find that a realistic but relatively inaccurate ex ante prediction of a candidate s probability of victory produces a superior explanatory model than does a perfect ex post prediction calculated from the final electoral results these results support the hypothesis that voters base their strategic voting calculations on simple cues available to them befo

measuring the impacts of teachers ii teacher value added and student outcomes in adulthood abstract are teachers impacts on students test scores value added a good measure of their quality this question has sparked debate partly because of a lack of evidence on whether high value ad

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

asset specificity and economic organization abstract this paper examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization in which both production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset specificity in general markets enjoy advantages by aggregating the demands of many buyers thereby realizing economies of scale or scope such production cost savings need to be assessed in relation to the transaction cost advantages that internal organization sometimes enjoys over markets in adapting to changed circumstances as it turns out both production cost economies and the transaction cost differences between firm and market organization vary systematically with the characteristics of the investments this paper employs a unified framework to assess the choice of organization form the condition of asset specificity is featured

a statistical model for multiparty electoral data we propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty district level aggregate election data this model can be used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon economic conditions neighborhood ethnic compositions campaign spending and other features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas we also provide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration model evaluation and substantive interpretation although the model applies more generally we use it to help resolve an important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in great britain contrary to previous analyses which are all based on measures now known to be biased we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful we also find that it differs substantially across the parties about half a percent for the conservatives 1 for the labor party and 3 for the liberal party and its successors also contrary to previous research we show that these effects have not grown in recent years finally we are able to estimate from which party each party s incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn

redistributing income under proportional representation although majoritarian decision rules are the norm in legislatures relatively few democracies use simple majority rule at the electoral stage adopting instead some form of multiparty proportional representation moreover aggregate data suggest that average income tax rates are higher and distributions of posttax income flatter in countries with proportional representation than in those with majority rule while there are other differences between these countries this paper explores how variations in the political system per se influence equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions a three party proportional representation model is developed in which taxes are determined through legislative bargaining among successful electoral parties and the economic decision for individuals is occupational choice political economic equilibria for this model and for a two party winner take all majoritarian system are derived and compared

human capital and the supply of religion abstract we study the role of labor inputs in religious attendance using data on oklahoma methodist congregations from 1961 to 2003 pastors play a significant role in church growth replacing a 25th percentile pastor with a 75th percentile one increases annual attendance growth by 3 a pastor s performance in his or her first church largely the result of random assignment predicts future performance suggesting a causal effect of pastors on growth the deployment of pastors by the church indicates efficient use of labor low performing pastors are more likely to be rotated or exit the sample and high performing pastors are moved to larger congregations

interaction effects in mixed member electoral systems theory and evidence from germany japan and italy the past decade has witnessed a surprising growth in the popularity of mixed member electoral systems under these systems voters choose representatives simultaneously under both proportional representation pr and single member district plurality smdp rules it is widely accepted that smdp rules tend to winnow competition down toward two large parties and evidence from mixed systems suggests that this duvergerian gravity reduces the number of parties surviving smdp competition under mixed systems as well nevertheless we argue simultaneous balloting under pr rules softens this winnowing effect operating as a centrifugal force that prevents duvergerian gravity from reducing competition to the degree it does under pure smdp systems thus these newsystems produce effects unanticipated by their designers to test for the presence of this centrifugal force we examine elite level electoral strategies in germany japan and italy and compare district level smdp election results from pure systems w

duverger s law and the meaning of canadian exceptionalism duverger s law is an unusually simple and specific elaboration on exactly how political institutions matter it proposes that plurality rule elections result in two party competition canada is commonly thought to violate the law at the national level but to match its predictions at the district level and thus not to constitute a genuine counterexample in fact analysis of a vast data set of canadian election returns reveals that these elections are multicandidate events district by district year after year an explanation for this multipartyism may lie in the complicating factor of federalism because canadian provinces often feature strikingly different national and provincial party systems generally the canadian case illustrates that theories relating party systems to electoral law but not to other institutions are unrealistically parsimonious

the church versus the mall what happens when religion faces increased secular competition recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation an unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation in this paper we identify a policy driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on sunday known as blue laws many states have repealed these laws in recent years raising the opportunity cost of religious participation we use a variety of data sets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls and that church donations and spending fall as well these results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change nor do we see comparable declines in membership in or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws we then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the nlsy we find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws the effect is economically significant for example the gap in heavy drinking between religious and nonreligious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed

religion and economy religion has a two way interaction with political economy with religion viewed as a dependent variable a central question is how economic development and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs with religion viewed as an independent variable a key issue is how religiosity affects individual characteristics such as work ethic honesty and thrift and thereby influences economic performance in this paper we sketch previous studies of this two way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with international data

strategic voting equilibria under the single nontransferable vote previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single member districts i shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system what appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the m 1 rule according to which strategic voting in m seat districts produces exactly m 1 vote getting candidates in equilibrium any others having their support totally undercut this result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for reed s recent extension of duverger s law to the japanese case the model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the m 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium i test these hypotheses with japanese data finally the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts i use japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting

was weber wrong a human capital theory of protestant economic history max weber attributed the higher economic prosperity of protestant regions to a protestant work ethic we provide an alternative theory protestant economies prospered because instruction in reading the bible generated the human capital crucial to economic prosperity we test the theory using county level data from late nineteenth century prussia exploiting the initial concentric dispersion of the reformation to use distance to wittenberg as an instrument for protestantism we find that protestantism indeed led to higher economic prosperity but also to better education our results are consistent with protestants higher literacy accounting for most of the gap in economic prosperity

voter uncertainty and failure of duverger s law an empirical analysis real world simple plurality elections rarely bear out the strong duvergerian prediction that in equilibrium only two competitors receive votes recent advances in strategic voting theory demonstrate that voter uncertainty about competitors true support levels in the constituency may lead to limited strategic voting and hence incomplete desertion of trailing parties this is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact of uncertainty on incentives to vote strategically calibrating a model of strategic voting to voting results from simple plurality elections in german constituencies it is found that strategic voters operate under high levels of uncertainty these results support the proposition that uncertainty about party support impedes formation of duvergerian equilibria

church attendance in great britain an ordered logit approach the church attendance decision of individual economic agents is analysed within a becker style allocation of time framework using an ordered logit model with data derived from the british household panel study bhps separate attendance equations are estimated for males and females the empirical results in line with previous north american studies suggest that labour income variables do account for some of the variation in attendance in addition attendance is found to be correlated with factors such as denominational affiliation educational attainment and intensity of belief

on the theory of strategic voting many analyses of plurality rule elections predict the complete coor dination of strategic voting and hence support for only two candidates here i suggest that stable multi candidate support will arise in equilibrium a group of voters must partially coordinate behind one of two challenging candidates in order to dislodge a disliked incumbent in a departure from existing models the popular support for each challenger is uncertain this support must be inferred from the private observation of informative signals such as the social communication of pref erences throughout the electorate or the imperfect observation of opinion polls the uniquely stable voting equilibrium entails only limited strategic voting and hence incomplete coordination this is due to the surprising presence of negative feed back an increase in the degree of strategic voting by others reduces the incentives for an individual to vote strategically the incentive to vote strategically is lower in relatively marginal elections after controlling for the distance from contention of a trailing preferred challenger a calibration of the model applied to the uk general election of 1997 is consistent with the impact of strategic voting and the reported accuracy of voters understanding of the electoral situation it suggests that nearly 50 seats may have been lost by the conservative party due to strategic voting 1 plurality rule elections and strategic voting 1 1 strategic voting and duverger s law plurality rule elections where the winner is the candidate who receives the largest number of votes are vulnerable to strategic voting a voter might well switch away from her preferred candidate and toward a perceived leader in the hope of exerting a greater influence over the outcome of the election this phenomenon has long been the focus of both economic and political scientific study in an influential essay riker 1982b cited droop s 1871 eloquent exposition of the strategic voting problem 1 i oer my grateful thanks to the many friends colleagues seminar participants referees and editors who have oered insightful comments during the long gestation of this paper its antecedents and companion work special thanks go to steve fisher whose empirical analysis of strategic voting raised many of the questions that i seek to answer in this paper and to chris wallace this particular paper brings together much of the analysis previously circulated in the papers a new theory of strategic voting strategic voting under the qualified majority rule and idiosyncrasy information and the impact of strategic voting

stability and coordination in duverger s law a formal model of preelection polls and strategic voting this paper investigates the dynamics of the wasted vote phenomenon and duverger s law i construct a theoretical model in order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate the results shed light on how public opinion polls can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election specifically i show that in a bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive votes in the limit these equilibria require extreme coordination however and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from them to one of the duvergerian equilibria thus non duvergerian equilibria are unstable while two party equilibria are not in addition i describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used by voters to coordinate on a duvergerian outcome

star turnover and the value of human capital evidence from broadway shows theater shows routinely turn over actors in lead roles otherwise the show stays the same including the director the script other actors and the physical theater environment even the lines pe

estimating incumbency advantage without bias in this paper we prove theoretically and demonstrate empirically that all existing measures of incumbency advantage in the congressional elections literature are biased or inconsistent we then provide an unbiased estimator based on a very simple linear regression model we apply this new method to congressional elections since 1900 providing the first evidence of a positive incumbency advantage in the first half of the century incumbency advantage is the most frequently studied factor in the last 15 years of congressional elections research discovery of the increase in incum bency advantage has sparked controversy over its origins historical pattern cur rent magnitude and electoral democratic and policy consequences even the most basic descriptive information about incumbency advantage is flawed be cause every previous measure based on aggregate data in this literature is plagued by selection bias inconsistencies and inefficiencies we prove this result and also propose a new unbiased and statistically efficient measure that is very easy to calculate congressional elections from 1900 to the present fit our theoretical model our empirical reanalyses do not challenge the existing scholarly consen sus that incumbency advantage is much larger than it once was however we do challenge the prevailing belief that incumbency advantage was nonexistent and the evidence that it was negative in house elections during the first half of this century alford and brady 1988 we show instead that the average advantage of incumbency in these elections was about two percentage points in section 1 of this paper we define incumbency advantage and section 2 gives an intuitive sense of the problems identifying it even in ideal electoral sys tems section 3 formally proves that sophomore surge and retirement slump are biased estimates of incumbency advantage and section 4 briefly reveals the flaws