a dynamic analysis of licensing the boomerang effect and grant back clauses this article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on r d competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant back clauses of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant back clause can mitigate this distortion i also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee s incentive to engage in r d and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets

an overview of experimental u s consumer price indexes the consumer price index cpi has come under intense scrutiny in recent years to help assess potential differences between what the cpi measures and how it is used for various purposes the bureau of labor statistics has created a series of experimental price indexes this article contrasts how the cpi is currently constructed with those experimental indexes specifically experimental cpps have been constructed for two population groups older americans and poor americans in addition experimental geometric mean and superlative indexes have been developed that move the cpi away from its traditional fixed market basket concept

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

determinants of inter firm technology licensing in the eu this article investigates the determinants of technology licensing focusing on how country specific characteristics affect technology holders incentives to sell their proprietary technologies through licensing alliances an empirical examination of licensing is done using a unique panel data set of licensing transactions involving companies in the eu the strength of intellectual property rights ipr protection the degree of economic freedom the level of country risk and the number of patent granted in the country are found to be important determinants of inter firm technology licensing in addition firms with prior independent experience as a licensor and public companies tend to license technology more

sorting equilibrium in a multi jurisdiction model abstract this paper analyzes a general model of an economy with heterogeneous individuals choosing among two jurisdictions such as towns or political parties each jurisdiction is described by its constitution where a constitution is defined as a mapping from all possible population partitions into the possibly multidimensional policy space this study is the first to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sorting equilibria in a two jurisdiction model for a policy space of an arbitrary dimension

build or buy strategies in the local loop we provide a dynamic model to study how the presence of the option to buy the incumbent local exchange carrier s ilec facilities via local loop unbundling affects the competitive local exchange carriers clecs incentives to build alternative infrastructures we show that an unregulated incumbent sets a rental path for its local loop which delays technology adoption compared to the case in which there is no unbundling we also characterize the equilibrium rental path set by the unregulated incumbent it is prohibitively high at the initial phases when there is no effective threat of entry with alternative technologies and it is decreasing over time in later phases the decrease in the rental price follows the rise of the entrant s opportunity cost of leasing lines we also argue that neither allowing higher prices for unbundled elements over time nor setting a sunset clause would suffice to induce facility based competition by studying the unregulated ilecs decision regarding unbundling we challenge the implicit assumption behind the sunset clauses which is that the ilec would either deny unbundling or charge too high a price for its network elements in the absence of regulation we claim that the ilecs that initially resist unbundling requirements would tend to charge attractive access prices relative to the entrants alternatives for their infrastructure which become less essential over time this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

royalties vs fees how do firms pay for foreign technology abstract the theoretical determinants of technology licensing contracts have been extensively studied but empirical evidence is scarce we assemble a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in india between 1989 and 1993 industry firm and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts our findings support theoretical arguments licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts we also find that firms are more likely to use output based payments to control the sale and diffusion of r d or brand intensive know how to unaffiliated firms

indexing government programs for changes in the cost of living this article presents social cost of living indexes constructed from an econometric model of aggregate consumer behavior the econometric price index has the same average inflation rate as a tornqvist price index over the period 1947 1995 but rises less rapidly after 1973 group cost of living indexes are presented for white and nonwhite male and female headed and elderly and nonelderly households elderly households have experienced a slightly higher rate of inflation than the nonelderly since 1980 we recommend indexing government programs such as social security by social and group cost of living indexes rather that the consumer price index

size r d productivity and decision styles we extend the size innovation debate by incorporating decision making style as a relevant factor in the innovation process we propose that the size of firms affects the scale and quality of product innovation through the adoption of different decision making styles using the literature on cognition we conceptualize decision making style as the degree to which firms rely on analytical information for decision making during the r d process using longitudinal data of spanish firms we show that as firms increase in size they rely more extensively on analytical decision tools for the innovation activity additionally we show that the size of firms is negatively related to product innovation productivity in terms of scale and positively related to the quality and that these relationships are mediated by firms reliance on analytical decision making style we discuss theoretical and managerial implications for innovation research and practice

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

the variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 canadian election formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean recent research has found no evidence of such convergence in order to explain non convergence the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election that is the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions we introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties an electoral survey of the 2004 election in canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions quebec and the rest of canada the survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space the variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share we find that in the local nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence the liberals and conservatives locate at the national electoral mean and the bloc quebecois with the highest competence valence locates at the quebec electoral mean the new democratic party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean the greens with lowest competence valence locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share

the shapley value of resale proof trades abstract this paper studies the shapley value of transferable utility games associated with resale proof trades of information is in the core iff there is exactly one minimal resale proof set a simple expression for is obtained for symmetric games and some bounds are given for in non symmetric cases

entry and strategic information display in credit markets in many countries lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries a recent world bank survey reveals that the display of a lender s own borrower information is often not reciprocated that is access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data we argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons the reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem this prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent s profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

international technology licensing monopoly rents transaction costs and exclusive rights as firms increasingly use licensing to exploit knowledge based assets in global technology markets appropriate structuring of these agreements has become an important line of research inquiry one area that has received less attention is the nature of rights granted in inter firm licensing relationships although it is an important clause that has implications for profit generation from licensing of proprietary assets conceptualizing licensing rights in terms of number of licenses granted and exclusivity rights given to a licensee in a foreign market this paper examines the determinants of these rights based on monopoly rents and transaction costs associated with different types of licensing contracts hypotheses are empirically tested through two studies one based on large us manufacturing firms and the other on a cross national sample of medium sized firms actively involved in international technology licensing results from both studies show a greater propensity to use non exclusive multiple licensing when the licensed technology has greater potential to produce differentiated products or when there is greater threat of substitutive technologies entering the market on the other hand innovative technologies and a higher degree of asset specific investments required of the licensee for the technology are related to the use of single exclusive licensing agreements

an analysis of substitution bias in measuring inflation 1959 851 we analyze the substitution bias in laspeyres type price indexes such as the cpi using 1959 1985 nipa consumption data for 101 commodities we employ two methodological approaches to calculation of the bias first we construct the tightest theoretical bounds on the col by applying nonparametric methods using algorithms developed by afriat and by varian second following diewert we construct superlative price index formulas namely tomqvist and fisher s ideal indexes under a chain as well as a fixed base specification homothetic preferences are found to be consistent with the data and sensitivity tests indicate that this result is not vacuous if the hypothesis of homotheticity is maintained the col bias has upper and lower limits of 0 22 and 0 14 percent per year respectively using the superlative indexes as the measure of the col the bias is about 0 18 percent per year for the period 1959 85 this estimate is somewhat larger than found in earlier studies our use of more disaggregated data is found to be responsible for part of the difference with the size of the estimated bias directly related to the extent of the aggregation

on the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions we provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric rst price auctions connecting their equilibria to the concavity of the underlying type distributions and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions we apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which as is common in practice one seller is given an advantage re ecting for example better reliability or quality we show conditions under which for any given rst price handicap auction there is a second price auction with bonuses that outperforms it with most of our results involving ex post dominance

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

possibility of relicensing and patent protection abstract we examine the effects of patent protection paying attention to its role of prohibiting relicensing we focus on two questions first whether does the innovator have an incentive of licensing the concealable easily kept secret if not licensed innovation in the case where patent protection is absent second what effects does patent protection have upon the innovator s payoff and the consumers welfare principal findings include the following in the case of nondrastic innovations in the sense of arrow the innovator has an incentive of licensing even without patent protection patent protection generally benefits the innovator but may cause damage to the consumers for large innovations for drastic innovations patent protection has no influence on licensing licensing never takes place regardless of whether it is provided or not

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

international technology transfer under potential threat of entry a cournot nash framework abstract this paper analyses the possibility of technology transfer from a technologically advanced foreign firm to a domestic firm of a less developed country when the product market is characterized by cournot nash competition the foreign firm is not allowed to enter the home market by a prohibitive tariff but the backward firm may not face any such resistance in the foreign markets this means that technology transfer under this situation involves potential threat of competition from the latecomer it is shown that by designing a suitable payment policy the host country government can induce the foreign firm to transfer the best technology however there are possible equilibria where worse than the best technologies are transferred

drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies abstract considering the licensing of a drastic cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n firm cournot oligopoly we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties there are either n 1 or n optimal licensing policies

impact of licensing on investment and financing of technology development technology innovations continue to be one of the greatest drivers of economic growth realizing the value of such innovations however requires substantial follow on investments in development and commercialization the value of these investments is difficult to capture because of uncertain demand and potential competition this often leads to difficulties in obtaining outside financing for these investments in this paper we explore how licensing contracts can both dissuade other firms from developing alternative technologies and alleviate the financing problem we develop a model in which a firm that invests in the development efforts of an innovation can license its technology to a potential competitor a variety of licensing possibilities is considered including fixed fees royalty schedules and two part licenses consisting of an up front payment and a capped royalty schedule when the firm has no financial constraint a royalty schedule that depends on realized demand dominates a fixed fee per license when investment funds are constrained a royalty cap license with an up front payment can serve as a source of financing we also study the investment problem conditional on the licensing and financing decisions

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

imitative innovation and international joint ventures a dynamic analysis abstract in this paper we deal with some dynamic issues of international joint venture in the context of a developing country we provide a rationale for international joint venture formation as well as its subsequent instability where instability is interpreted as payoff readjustments between the partners in the venture although the joint venture is formed in response to government restrictions on foreign equity holdings in the first period its subsequent instability is caused by both the change in government policy as well as the outcome of imitative technological innovation undertaken by the host partner it is also shown that uncertainty about the government policy in the second period plays an important role in the formation of joint venture in the first period

the behavior of the real rate of interest this paper presents new facts regarding the behavior of the ex ante real rate of interest these facts are notably different from conventional wisdom about the cyclical properties of the real rate in particular we find that the ex ante real rate is contemporaneously positively correlated with gdp and positively correlated with lagged cyclical output there is also evidence that high real rates are associated with strong cyclical output one quarter into the future our results generally are not sensitive to the estimation methodology but are quite sensitive to the price series used this sensitivity is especially true for the consumer price index thus we find evidence of specification uncertainty we also find that real rate behavior varies over different sample periods and that the cyclical properties of the ex ante and ex post real rates are not identical therefore inferring ex ante real rate behavior using ex post data is inappropriate this paper presents new facts regarding the behavior of the ex ante real rate of interest these facts are notably different from conventional wisdom about the cyclical properties of the real rate in particular we find that the ex ante real rate is contemporaneously positively correlated with gdp and positively correlated with lagged cyclical output there is also evidence that high real rates are associated with strong cyclical output one quarter into the future stylized facts presented in stock and watson 1999 are exactly the opposite and we investigate the reasons for these differences we do this by looking across a wide variety of constructed real rate series these series are obtained by using a number of different methodologies for estimating expected inflation using several different price series and looking over different time periods our results generally are not sensitive to the estimation methodology but are quite sensitive to the price series used this sensitivity is especially true for the consumer price index cpi thus we

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

cross licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device this paper hypothesizes that when their products are imperfect substitutes firms can promote collusion by cross licensing their competing patents cross licensing is shown to enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm s product the paper then examines the consistency of the theory developed with the available evidence antitrust implications of the practice of cross licensing of competing patents are discussed

the variability of inflation rates across household types it is well known that the consumer price index cpi measures the changing cost of the fixed market basket of an average consumer it is an aggregate economic indicator of changes in retail prices and in the process of averaging across individuals subsumes the variability in consumption patterns inherent in a modetn economy it is thus evident that the use of a single index in adjusting the incomes of broad groups of individuals has an automatic distributional impact individuals whose own price index rises more slowly than the index used to adjust their incomes experience a windfall benefit while those whose price index rises more rapidly experience a relative loss such variability in actual price experience relative to the average measured change in prices is soon to be of great importance to taxpayers throughout the income distribution the economic recovery tax act of 1981 calls for adjustments in tax tables so that inflation will not result in tax increases beginning not later than december 15 1984 12 public law 97 34 calls for using the official consumer price index for all urban con

estimating the true cost of living for households with different incomes using data from taiwan this empirical study investigates why the true costs of living for different income groups in taiwan as measured by the superlative tornqvist price index have grown dissimilarly over the sample period specifically it shows that using the aggregate cost of living col estimates for the entire households as is commonly practiced would produce noticeable group bias effect in measurement also the magnitude of the commodity substitution bias in the conventional consumer price index cpi is found to be positively related to household income in general because of the presence of these two biases the true col for households belonging to the two ends of the income spectrum is found to be over estimated this article is therefore in full agreement with arrow s proposition that an alternative and separate set of price index be constructed

formula bias and within stratum substitution bias in the u s cpi in 1978 bls adopted an estimator for u s cpi component indexes that incorporates scientific samples of outlets and varieties and that allows the calculation of reliable standard errors consumer substitution of outlets and varieties offering better values could cause bias in these indexes a more important source of bias is however a tendency to give excessive weight to items whose initial price is temporarily low the empirical evidence is striking average price series and matched food cpis grew at almost the same rate before 1978 but between 1980 and 1992 the cpis average about 1 4 per year more growth for unleaded gasoline the discrepancy averages 0 8 per year

minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems abstract consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m this paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent we present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agent s utility under which when m increases induced effort and hence productivity falls we also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level varies in m we present an efficient algorithm for numerically calculating optimal contracts for given parameters and show that induced effort falls when m is increased in many cases even when our sufficient conditions fail

weak entrants are welcome abstract this paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and strong entrant in a differentiated market suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself then the incumbent may allow entry of the weak firm and use it to alter the strong firm s entry decision the present paper formalizes this idea and it sheds new light on the fact that domestic firms are sometimes able to block strong foreign firms after trade liberalization the idea also explains why a dominant firm lets fringe firms be in the market

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

the impact of direct taxes on the cost of living in this paper we define a cost of living index including direct taxes we show its relationship to the traditional index and demonstrate how nonconsumption costs are properly treated we then define a fixed weight approximation a tax and price index tpi using federal state local and social security tax rates for 1967 85 we construct annual tpi series based on household data we find that inclusion of direct taxes has sizable impacts on the estimated rate of inflation partitioning our household sample we find that recognition of taxes significantly alters inflation rate differentials estimated using consumption prices alone

milestone payments or royalties contract design for r d licensing we study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee s valuation of the innovation and limited control over the licensee s development efforts a licensing contract typically contains an up front payment milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase and royalties on sales we use principal agent models to formulate the licensor s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee s valuation of the innovation as the licensee s valuation increases the licensor s optimal level of involvement in the development directly or through royalties should decrease only a risk averse licensor should include both up front and milestone payments moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor s value but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract

unbundling the local loop abstract we study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure we use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete service based and or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete facility based given the rental price we show that the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops hence the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective the distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type quality of the new technology to be adopted we also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes a sunset clause does not improve social welfare

trust and the market for technology abstract conditional on the decision to enter the market for immature technology we test for the effects that trust proxied by the context in which the negotiating parties first met has on the likelihood that these negotiations are successful using survey responses from 860 university firm and firm firm technology transactions we find that trust matters parties with high levels of trust i e know each other from a previous business are between 6 and 23 per cent more likely to conclude a transaction compared with those with low levels of trust i e cold callers we also find that patents can effectively substitute for a lack of trust and that trust is more important in upstream stages basic or applied science

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

the consumer price index a research agenda and three proposals this paper argues that dealing with current concerns about the cpi within the framework of economic theory requires developing the theory of the cost of living index under more general assumptions than have thus far been standard it examines three neglected but critical issues that should rank high on the research agenda because of their practical implications for index number construction whose cost of living index why shop and what is a good it concludes by discussing the intersection between the technical problems of constructing the cpi and the political problems of indexing taxes and transfers

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

cooperating with competitors patent pooling and choice of a new standard abstract i examine the efficiency of patent pooling in a setting that allows for the interplay between the standards process in which owners of essential intellectual property ip develop a new product and the subsequent pooling decision in which ip prices are coordinated if one of the ip owners is also the incumbent of a product that employs the current competing standard referred to as overlapping ownership then the relationship among the ip owners will be both vertical through their ip and horizontal through their competing interests in the final products consumers are better off when ip owners cooperate even when these owners are effectively competitors because of lower prices and greater product variety consumers prefer however that the agreements not admit firms with overlapping ownership these results inform antitrust policy on cooperative agreements among competitors

near optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions consider a setting with n sellers having i i d costs with log concave density f from cumulative f and a buyer who puts a premiumi on procuring from seller i we show how for any given 1 n a sim ple second price bonus auction can be chosen which comes surprisingly close to giving the auctioneer the same surplus as an optimal mecha nism the bonuses depend only on the magnitude and monotonicity of the slope of virtual costs given f we show that these in turn depend only on fairly coarse information about f we explore how this result generalizes to asymmetrically distributed costs abstract

risk aversion and the choice between risky prospects the preservation of comparative statics results most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty the primary example which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk it is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty the paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty

cooperation in r d the case of patent infringement agreements abstract this paper provides an insurance based argument behind patent infringement agreements pia such agreements constitute a form of cooperation in an otherwise non cooperative environment we develop a model where firms initially hold certain patents and undertake further r d by pursuing the latter they face a positive probability of infringing the patents held by the other a prior infringement agreement generates a binding contract so that such infringements would go unpunished if the infringing probability is not too low firms would have incentive to sign an agreement and sacrifice the monopoly option but this depends on the information structure about the patent infringement and search costs such a prior agreement is then compared and contrasted with a suitably designed ex post contract

strategic disclosure of meaningful information to rival i study a model of strategic disclosure of a private signal to a rival in the presence of a payoff externality in the model two agents forecast the unknown true state of a future period specifically the quality of the signal is also private information hence which quality of signal is revealed for which incentive is the main question of interest i show that even when disclosure is costly the revealing equilibrium where an agent voluntarily reveals his signal can exist and it should be a monotone equilibrium asymmetry between the penalty for an incorrect forecast and the reward for a correct forecast is a necessary condition for the existence of this revealing equilibrium if the penalty is larger than the reward the unique revealing equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where only the low quality signal is disclosed in order to induce the rival s imitation on the other hand if the reward is much larger than the penalty the unique revealing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where the signal is always revealed in order to induce the rival s deviation if the reward is not much larger than the penalty no revealing equilibrium is robust to a costly disclosure jel d81 d82

the substitution bias of the laspeyres price index an analysis using estimated cost of living indexes the most commonly used measure of the cost of living the consumer price index cpi published by the bureau of labor statistics is essentially a laspeyres price index it is well known however that a laspeyres price index provides an upward biased estimate of the cost of living because in keeping the same base period basket of goods as weights it does not take into account substitution among commodities induced by relative price changes the magnitude of the bias is an empirical question which is the focus of this study an estimate of the substitution bias may be obtained by taking the difference between the laspeyres price index and an estimated true cost of living index the true cost of living index cli is based on the theory of consumer demand it is the ratio of the minimum expenditures under two different price regimes necessary to maintain a constant level of utility as opposed to the constant basket of goods in the laspeyres index the size of the bias depends on two factors 1 the size of consumption substitution elasticities if there is no commodity substitution then the cli and laspeyres index coincide regardless of changes in relative prices and 2 the magnitude of relative price changes if all prices move together then the cli and laspeyres index again coincide regardless of the size of substitution elasticities in order to compute a true cli it is necessary to specify a particular utility function and estimate the parameters of the resulting system of demand equations see for example louis phlips p 135 several estimates of the magnitude of the substitution bias have appeared in the literature but all previous studies suffer from a common weakness they are all based on a very small number of commodities essentially because of econometric problems involved in estimating large systems of demand equations in one group of studies demand models have been estimated using highly aggregated data in which total consumption is grouped into four to nine aggregate commodites such as housing durables or clothing arthur goldberger and theodore gamaletsos for example estimate the linear expenditure system les demand model using data on five aggregate goods for several european countries and compare the resulting cli for one of the countries greece to the corresponding laspeyres price index tran van hoa estimates costof living indexes for six australian provinces using data on nine aggregate goods phlips cites work by r sanz ferrer who computed a cli for belgium from data on eight aggregate commodities in such studies using highly aggregated data the estimate of the substitution bias may be understated because the aggregation obscures substitution in consumption within categories which is perhaps more prevalent than substitution between gross aggregates another shortcoming of these three aggregate studies is the fact that they use only a single demand system and hence do not explore the sensitivity of the cli to a priori u s bureau of labor statistics the groundwork for this study was my dissertation i would like to thank the chairman and members of my committee r robert russell llad phillips and robert deacon for their support and helpful suggestions and jack triplett robert pollak richard j mcdonald and a referee for valuable comments on an earlier version the views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the bureau of labor statistics for a theoretical discussion of cost of living indexes see robert pollak 1971b and paul samuelson and subramanian swamy

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

technology licensing r d and welfare this paper sets up a three stage r d technology licensing and output oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost reducing r d and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two part tariff i e a per unit royalty and an upfront fee contract it is found with surprise that if the licensor firm s r d efficiency is high the availability of licensing subdues the firm s r d incentive leading to a lower social welfare level this result implies that a government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among firms

sampling frequency and the comparison between matched model and hedonic regression price indexes matched model price indexes generally overestimate quality adjusted prices because the price performance ratio of models sold in consecutive periods is worse than that of new models this unrepresentativeness of the sample potentially might be reduced by obtaining higher frequency data thus increasing the fraction of models that are matched we propose a set of comformable indexes to test this hypothesis using computer prices from the buy direct press we find contrary to initial expectations that the bias in the matched model price index increases with the sampling frequency the bias is reduced if the high frequency index is constructed using only long lived models these results suggest that models that last for only a brief time are models for which the price performance ratio has deteriorated very rapidly thus increasing the sampling frequency without purging short lived models actually increases the selection bias

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

getting prices right what should be done much of the profession accepts that the cpi likely overstates the rate of increase of the cost of living it is less clear that there are sound and feasible steps that the bls can adopt to improve matters in the short run there are unresolved conceptual and identification problems in the measurement of quality superlative price indexes are not feasible and feasible approximations are not superlative and may not even be better the need for a single index that aggregates over heterogeneous consumers with different incomes tastes and needs casts serious doubt on the cost of living approach

optimal patents with compulsory licensing this paper examines the use of compulsory lincensing as a policy to combat the monopoly problem associated with the patent system it introduces the notion of an optimal patent one where the patent life and the licensing royalty rate are both determined optimally under certain simplifying assumptions it is shown that the optimal patent will have an indefinite life for both process and product innovations some preliminary calculations suggest that the use of compulsory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements even if the patent life is left unchanged at 17 years

the implications of demographic specific inflation rates for trends in real educational wage differentials we use data from consumer expenditure surveys to investigate the impact on trends in real wage differentials of using group specific price indexes we find that inflation rates decrease monoton ically with the education of the household head throughout the 1970s and early 1980s and real educational wage differentials calculated using education specific price indexes widened somewhat more than nominal differentials we also find that differences by education level in fuel and energy consumption whose relative prices increased during the 1970s account for the majority of the educational index differences

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

shirking sharing risk and shelving the role of university license contracts abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard risk sharing and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties the potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm this supports the rationale for bayh dole march in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts

optimal patenting and licensing of financial innovations recent court decisions starting with the state street decision in 1998 allow business methods to be patentable and now give financial institutions the option to seek patent protection for financial innovations this new patentability paradigm and the heterogeneity of characteristics associated with financial innovations pose an immediate decision problem for senior management what to patent we present a parsimonious decision framework that answers this question we show that for innovations with certain characteristics it is optimal not to patent even if the option of patenting and licensing is available our model emphasizes the role of embedded real options that arise from certain types of financial innovations the model provides an explanation of observed patenting behavior of financial institutions and the success of a wide class of innovations including swaps credit derivatives and pricing algorithms

reputational spillovers innovation licensing and entry abstract adoption of a new product by a multiproduct finn may affect all its sales by altering its reputation as an innovator if adopting a success has a halo effect that enhances the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit exceeds monopoly profit from the new product if adopting a failure has a black eye effect that damages the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit is maximized by a fixed fee not an auction when both effects are present an inventor licenses new products that are likely to succeed but enters with those that are likely to fail