duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

managing supply uncertainty under supply chain cournot competition abstract we study the cournot competition between two supply chains that are subject to supply uncertainty each supply chain consists of a retailer and an exclusive supplier which has random yield we examine how the levels of supply uncertainty and competition intensity affect the equilibrium decisions of ordering quantity contract offering and centralization choice we show that a retailer should order more if its competing retailer s supply becomes less reliable or if its own supply becomes more reliable a supply chain with reliable supply can take great advantage of the high supply risk of its competing chain furthermore for decentralized chains we characterize the optimal wholesale price contracts with linear penalty under different supply risks and competition scenarios finally we show that supply chain centralization is a dominant strategy and it always makes the customers better off nevertheless if the supply risk is low and the chain competition is intensive centralization could actually decrease the supply chain profit compared with the case where both chains do not choose centralization this results in a prisoner s dilemma on the other hand if the supply risk is high and or the competition level is low centralization always increases the supply chain profit the desirability of supply chain centralization is enhanced by high supply uncertainty or low chain competition

price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains we consider price competition with a linear demand function and compare two cases in the first case each distribution channel is vertically integrated while in the second decentralised case the manufacturers and retailers act independently we explore the effect of varying the level of price competition on the profits of the industry participants and demonstrate the important role played by the spread of underlying market shares the coefficient of variation of these market shares determines whether decentralised supply chains can outperform integrated supply chains with an appropriate level of competition

keeping organizational secrets protective institutional mechanisms and their costs the notion that firms generate rents from proprietary knowledge is widely accepted however the mechanisms that firms as institutions can differentially deploy to protect their knowledge form appropriation by rivals are not well understood this paper examines three broad classes of protective mechanisms that firms coon deploy to keep their knowledge secret rules compensation schemes and structural isolation the paper concludes that keeping organizational secrets through the deployment of protective mechanisms is both difficult and costly economizing considerations can therefore be expected to bear strongly on this aspect of firm organization copyright 1997 by oxford university press

equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance abstract this paper investigates the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one or two stage stackelberg non cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced equal decision making power in this paper we relax this assumption and formulate game theoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the stackelberg leader consequently we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications thus a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others i e less prone to power reconfigurations at both agent and group level we find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear regardless of product competition it develops that neither the manufacturer stackelberg nor the retailer stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance

vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs in deciding on whether and when to outsource component production firms should consider the trade off between total production costs and the ability to horizontally differentiate products we study the outsourcing decision in a duopoly under decreasing but uncertain market rates for components given that outsourcing increases the substitutability of the final products we find that there is at least one firm that eventually outsources component production because it cannot differentiate its product enough by in house production to justify the eventually higher costs the follower outsources at a lower market rate or may even remain vertically integrated the follower thus incurs the eventually much higher in house component costs longer while the low substitutability is enjoyed by both firms under endogenous roles firms thus engage in a preemption game to be the first to outsource we also find that firms generally outsource at lower market rates if uncertainty is higher but seek to preempt at remarkably higher market rates if substitutability remains low

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

asymmetric wholesale pricing theory and evidence asymmetric pricing or asymmetric price adjustment is the phenomenon where prices rise more readily than they fall we offer and provide empirical support for a new theory of asymmetric pricing in wholesale prices wholesale prices may adjust asymmetrically in the small but symmetrically in the large when retailers face cost of price adjustment such retailers will not adjust prices for small changes in their costs manufacturers then see a region of inelastic demand where small wholesale price changes do not translate into commensurate retail price changes the implication is asymmetrica small wholesale price increase is more profitable because manufacturers will not lose customers from higher retail prices yet a small decrease is less profitable because it will not lower retail prices hence there is no extra revenue from greater sales for larger changes this asymmetry in the behavior of wholesale price vanishes as the price adjustment cost is compensated by the increase in retailers revenue resulting from correspondingly large retail price changes we present a formal economic model of a channel with forward looking retailers and cost of price adjustment test the derived propositions on the behavior of manufacturer prices using a large supermarket scanner data set and find that the results are consistent with the predictions of our theory we then discuss the implications for asymmetric pricing channels and cost of price adjustment literatures as well as public policy

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain on contractual form and coordination it is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers how then should the firms manage their contract negotiations the supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many possibly competing retailers we find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer we allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer s business using one of three types of contracts a wholesale price contract a quantity discount contract or a two part tariff it is well known that the latter two more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms more importantly they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit however we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale price contracts and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off in other words although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two part tariffs a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers we conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer

adoption transfers and incentives in a franchise network with positive externalities we study franchise arrangements that allow franchisees with exclusive territories to own their customers this permits franchisees to benefit from positive externalities in the franchise network through interfranchise transfers based on the purchases by their customers at other franchises on the network using the structure of a single franchisor and many franchisees we show that in general interfranchise transfers between franchisees and incentives for franchisee investment in the expansion of their customer base are critical both to the size and to the benefits derived from the franchise network specifically we find that when individual franchisees make investments in marketing effort to increase their customer base the franchisor s setting of the interfranchise transfer trades off the positive effects on network size with the negative effects of removing franchisee incentive for investment this result is due to the fact that interfranchise transfers encourage adoption but discourage full investment in marketing effort as compared to first best franchisee investment use of the royalty and the inter franchise transfer directly dissipates franchisee profits and indirectly dissipates franchisee profits through less than universal adoption thereby causing franchisees to underinvest as compared to traditional franchise systems however use of the interfranchise transfer results in franchises making greater investments than they otherwise would

co op advertising models in manufacturer retailer supply chains a game theory approach abstract in the literature of cooperative co op advertising the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers this relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing based on this new market phenomenon we intend to explore the role of vertical co op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments local advertising expenditures and sharing rules of advertising expenses three co op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game in a leader follower noncooperative game the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co op subsidization policy the retailer as a follower then decides on the local advertising level in a noncooperative simultaneous move game the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently in a cooperative game the system profit is maximized for every pareto efficient co op advertising scheme but not for any other schemes all pareto efficient co op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses the best pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members risk attitudes into account utilizing the nash bargaining model we discuss two situations that a both members are risk averse and b both members are risk neutral our results are consistent with the bargaining literature

signaling through private equity placements and its impact on the valuation of biotechnology firms abstract this paper investigates how young publicly held technology firms contend with information asymmetry and the hazards it introduces to acquire the capital necessary for future growth we ascribe to the view that firms issuing private equity signal the marketplace that managers believe their growth opportunities are undervalued consistent with this view we find significant positive abnormal returns to announcements of private equity placements we develop theory suggesting that returns are determined by the timing of previous signals we also argue that the characteristics of the private placement signal specifically whether private equity is bundled with research partnerships influence the strength of the signal our results largely support our expectations

the risk concept for entrepreneurs reconsidered new challenges to the conventional wisdom abstract this paper explores the entrepreneurial risk construct focusing on how the decision to launch a new venture may entail risks different from what is found in established firms opportunities often emerge from the creation of specialized knowledge in start ups this knowledge is characterized by concerns for rent appropriation and information asymmetry we suggest that traditional measures of risk do not properly account for these concerns hence an illusion of greater risk taking attaches itself to entrepreneurs especially if the specialized knowledge is difficult to observe we suggest alternative measures that better capture these concerns including the dilution of control when issuing equity cash burn rates etc

a general theory of pass through in channels with category management and retail competition i provide a general formulation of the channel pass through problem as a comparative static of the retail price equilibrium and i analyze the impact of category management and retail competition on pass through focusing on brand and retailer differences and the nature of the cost change being passed through whether it is brand specific retailer specific both or neither with category management a retailer s response to a brand specific cost change is not limited to that brand in general a retailer will also change the prices of other brands the cross brand effect can be positive or negative and depending on its sign it either enhances or attenuates pass through i explain the cross brand effect as an interaction between two forces a demand substitution force that pushes for a negative cross brand effect and a strategic complementarity force that pushes for a positive cross brand effect retail competition adds another layer of strategic complementarity causing other retailers to respond even for retailer specific cost changes and increasing pass through of categorywide cost changes but its effect for brand specific cost changes is ambiguous i apply the theory to two commonly used demand functions linear demand and nested logit and show that they have significantly different pass through properties the paper concludes with a discussion of how the theory relates to the empirical literature including the companion piece by besanko et al besanko d j p duba s gupta 2005 own brand and cross brand retail pass through marketing sci 24 1 123 137

dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel abstract in this paper we study a dynamic two player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price we consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price one of the model s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price i e its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses deal vs sacrifice resulting from buying a cheap or an expensive product this dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price our objective is to investigate the impact of retailer s myopia on the pricing strategies and payoffs of channel members in this context a myopic retailer is an agent that disregards the effects of its pricing strategy on the evolution of the perceived brand quality and the reference price

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

benefits of channel discord in the sale of durable goods minimizing strife through vertical integration is commonly seen as the holy grail for long term success in product distribution in this paper we take a different slant showing that sometimes a separated channel that embodies a degree of discord can be helpful particularly when a long term view is taken this result is shown in the context of durable goods manufacturing the quandary of durable goods production is that once demand for a certain time frame is met there is a subsequent temptation to flood the market with additional goods as such consumers are reluctant to buy immediately instead opting to wait for discounted prices this problem can be alleviated by a degree of channel discord high wholesale prices ensure future sales will slow to a trickle

process innovation product differentiation and channel structure strategic incentives in a duopoly in this paper we analyze the joint implications of two effects a inserting independent profit maximizing retailers into thechannel system provides buffering to the manufacturers from price competition when their products are highly substitutable and intrachannel contracts are observable as shown by mcguire and staelin 1983 under the assumption of constant marginal production costs and b lack of channel coordination results in a reduction in manufacturer s incentives to invest in efforts to reduce production costs as shown by jeuland and shugan 1983 for the case of bilateral monopoly we show that both these results are robust in the sense that the first holds even in the presence of the vertical externality of manufacturer s effort reduction in a noncoordinated channel and the second holds regardless of the degree of substitutability between the competing channel s products specifically we analyze a four stage game with two manufacturers and two retailers where the intrachannel contracts are linear and observable and manufacturers make investments in process improvements to reduce their production costs we find that the optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters the degree of substitutability between products and the level of investments required to achieve production cost reduction these parameters represent what have been widely interpreted in the management literature as the two primary generic strategies that most organizations follow in order to gain competitive advantage cost leadership and product differentiation porter 1980 thus our analysis brings out the strategic and interdisciplinary nature of the channel structure decision that can significantly affect firm profitability our main results are as follows first we find that decentralized noncoordinated channels appear as more profitable equilibrium than integration or perfectly coordinated channels at high product substitutability even when process innovation dimension is accounted for in agreement with the literature however the range of substitutability over which decentralization is an equilibrium strategy is smaller the easier it is to reduce production costs intuitively the easier the cost reduction the larger the cost penalty that the channel incurs as a result of not coordinating investment and pricing decisions between channel members and thus smaller the range over which decentralization is an equilibrium this implies that there is an explicit tradeoff between efficiency and strategic incentives in distribution channel design second we show that decentralized manufacturers invest less in process innovation than integrated manufacturers do regardless of the structure of the competing channel and the degree of substitutability between products consequently a decentralized channel has higher costs charges higher prices and produces lower quantities than an integrated channel does moreover these differences get larger the easier the cost reduction the effect on manufacturer profits however is not that clear manufacturers make higher profits by decentralizing if products are highly substitutable inagreement with mcguire and staelin 1983 and coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 however we also find that the relative profitability of decentralization at high substitutability and of integration at low substitutability increases the easier the cost reduction moreover the range of substitutability over which decentralization is more profitable than integration is itself larger the easier the cost reduction though decentralization is an equilibrium strategy over a smallerrange thus process innovation accentuates the profit difference between integrated and decentralized channels andmakes the prisoner s dilemma situation worse in the choice of distribution channel structure finally we analyze two examples of coordinated decision making in a channel a divisional integrated system and franchising in the first case we find that decentralization can emerge as a unique and more profitable equilibrium at high product substitutability in contrast to mcguire and staelin 1983 in the second case we find that decentralization is not always a unique equilibrium and it is not always more profitable than integration in sharp contrast to the results by coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 thus franchising does not provide a sure way of achieving channel coordination when marginal production costs are not constant in sum this paper highlights the importance of simultaneously considering both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of interorganizational relations on one hand and on the other paying attention to cross functional interactions across marketing and operational decisions to better understand the underlying incentives that shape firm and market structures conventional focus of marketing on demand side effects and of operations on cost side effects can lead to suboptimal decisions

research note the effects of costs and competition on slotting allowances we consider the optimal two part tariff contract between a manufacturer and a retailer we show that retail competition in the presence of either fixed costs or bargaining power may lead to slotting allowances in an optimal contract even with a monopoly manufacturer and no information asymmetry on the other hand slotting allowances do not arise with a monopoly retailer and no information asymmetry whether the manufacturer is a monopoly or not we also show that more intense retail competition higher retail bargaining power larger retailer fixed costs lower marginal costs of retailing as well as larger relative retailer size whether coming from a location or operating advantage have a positive impact on the incidence and the magnitude of slotting allowances the opposing effects of the fixed and marginal operating costs on slotting allowances as well as the impact of competition and bargaining power on profits underscore the importance of careful definitions of these variables in empirical research

interactions between members of a marketing production channel under seasonal demand abstract key decisions in a marketing production channel faced with a seasonal demand include production and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and processing and pricing decisions for the retailer in such situations a variety of contracts are possible including contracts under which the manufacturer charges a constant price throughout the season or the retailer processes at a constant rate throughout the season also possible are channel structures in which the manufacturer and retailer cooperate to make decisions jointly the main objective of the present paper is to compare optimal policies under all the situations described above we show that having a constant manufacturer s price or a constant processing rate does not have a significant impact upon the retailer s price or inventory decisions however if the demand is not highly seasonal a constant processing rate contract will result in higher production and processing rates and a lower manufacturer s price compared to a constant manufacturer s price contract also a centralized channel involving joint decision making will lead to a lower price at the retail level and higher production and processing rates hence issues such as channel coordination and contracts between manufacturers and retailers which have received significant attention in the marketing literature have implications for the production area as well

the paradox of openness appropriability external search and collaboration a b s t r a c t to innovate firms often need to draw from and collaborate with a large number of actors from outside their organization at the same time firms need also to be focused on capturing the returns from their innovative ideas this gives rise to a paradox of openness the creation of innovations often requires openness but the commercialization of innovations requires protection based on econometric analysis of data from a uk innovation survey we find a concave relationship between firms breadth of external search and formal collaboration for innovation and the strength of the firms appropriability strategies we show that this concave relationship is stronger for breadth of formal collaboration than for external search there is also partial evidence suggesting that the relationship is less pronounced for both external search and formal collaboration if firms do not draw ideas from or collaborate with competitors we explore the implications of these findings for the literature on open innovation and innovation strategy 2013 the authors published by elsevier b v all rights reserved

how complex do movie channel contracts need to be the motion picture industry is characterized by a dynamic market environment limited shelf space and product category management and consequently complex channel contracts specifying the split of box office revenue between distributors and exhibitors although such a contracting practice creates a considerable administrative effort and channel conflict it is not clear whether such complexity is necessary for superior channel performance this study investigates this question by analyzing the impact of movie contract structure on movie scheduling and channel member profitability we develop and analyze a game theoretic model using the genetic algorithm approach and a decision support system silverscreener to capture strategic behaviors of channel members in a complex market environment we find that simpler two part tariff or 50 50 split contracts perform as well as the current contracts thus the complexity of the market environment need not be reflected in the complexity of the channel contracts channel contract structure has significant impact on channel member profitability and the exhibitor s movie scheduling behavior in particular our results indicate that the flat rate contract structure represents an attractive alternative to the current practice for distributors

determination of safety stocks for cyclic schedules with stochastic demands abstract this paper considers the problem of scheduling the production of multiple items each with random demand on a single facility we show how the variance in demand during lead time can be estimated and present a model for determination of safety stocks and order up to levels for a fixed cyclic sequence both with and without idle time for systems with idle time we present a control model to make the decision to produce next item in sequence or idle the facility the performance of the model is tested in a simulation study

manufacturers channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products abstract manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision namely whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary to address this issue extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing equally substitutable products however in reality many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity in this paper we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products following some recent studies we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function based on this model we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains cournot quantity competition bertrand price competition and bertrand cournot competition we find that brand equity substitutability as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures specifically in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity moreover when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability manufacturers tend to sell directly our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and bertrand competition

spillovers and governance an analysis of knowledge and reputational spillovers in information technology investigating spillovers potential costs and benefits to a firm that extend beyond an individual transaction i integrate transaction cost theory and the knowledge based view of the firm in an effort to better understand the efficient governance of knowledge contracts with detailed task descriptions were associated with transactions with the potential to generate new and reusable knowledge the risk of a firm s technology spilling over to others and the risk of reputation impairing spillovers were associated with suppliers using their own employees rather than subcontractors thus results suggest that the creation and protection of knowledge are key factors in understanding governance decisions

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty abstract substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination the majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains moreover a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain this paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty we consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies vertical integration vi manufacturer s stackelberg ms and bargaining on the wholesale price bw is the bargaining parameter over a single or infinitely many periods we show that in contrast to earlier literature using vivi vi in both chains is the unique nash equilibrium over one period decision while using msms or bw bw may be nash equilibrium over infinitely many periods

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier abstract this paper investigates an organizational design problem concerning whether duopolistic firms competing in a product market should vertically integrate or separate their marketing channels in a dynamic noncooperative game setting previous operational research models have shown that the separation of the marketing channel with the adoption of a two part tariff contract is the dominant strategy compared with integration for each firm if the two firms face retail price competition and thereby constitutes the subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne contrary to this previous insight this paper demonstrates that if exogenous parameters that characterize fixed costs product substitutability and a demand function fall into a specific region marketing channel integration dominates the separation strategy when one of the two firms is the incumbent firm while the other is a potential entrant in other words the well known result in the price setting game can be reversed when we take entry threats into consideration specifically we show that upfront vertical integration of the marketing channel enables the incumbent to deter the entry of the potential competitor and to monopolize the market in the spne this result has operational implications for a firm confronting the threat of potential rivals entering the market in that the firm can use this apparently inferior strategy as a commitment device which creates a virtual entry barrier

product line pricing in a supply chain a vertically integrated channel would prefer to coordinate the pricing of its products in this paper we investigate drivers of product line pricing decisions in a bilateral monopoly where a manufacturer produces and sells two substitutable or complementary products to a retailer in a two stage game each firm commits credibly in the first stage to a pricing scheme within its own organization product line pricing plp or nonproduct line pricing nplp in the second stage depending on the relative balance of power in the supply chain the firms engage in either a nash or a leader follower pricing game we study the equilibrium of the two stage game under a general symmetric demand function with strategic interaction between firms a firm may choose nplp as the equilibrium pricing strategy in particular when the second stage is a leader follower game the price leader chooses plp and the follower may choose nplp only if the inefficiency of using nplp empowers the follower by increasing the demand sensitivity to the leader s margin when the second stage is a vertical nash game whether nplp occurs in equilibrium depends on the nature of coupling between demand interdependence and vertical strategic dependence nplp can be an equilibrium onlyif products are demand substitutes complements and vertical strategic dependencies are complementary substitutable we find that prisoner s dilemma exists in the first stage for both types of second stage pricing games in those cases one firm may have the incentive to commit to a pricing scheme in the first stage prior to its channel partner and steer the supply chain away from prisoner s dilemma

organizational design and the intensity of rivalry we analyze the effect of managerial compensation schemes and organizational structure on competitive behavior in imperfectly competitive product markets previous research suggests that in cases of strategic substitutability firms tend to choose organizational structures and compensation systems that commit the firm to behaving aggressively in the product market reducing firm and industry profits in contrast we show that while compensation and structure in isolation lead to excessive aggressiveness the combination of these two internal choice variables may reverse the outcome organizational design can be used as a commitment device to reduce competitive rivalry finally we find that in equilibrium firms may choose to be different one firm is decentralized and uses incentives that commit it to being aggressive while the other is centralized and uses incentives that commit it to being soft hence endogenous firm heterogeneity in the form of organizational differentiation allows firms to avoid a mutually detrimental outcome

leveraging research and development assessing the impact of the u s advanced technology program this paper examines the factors that affect a firm s chances of winning an award from the advanced technology program atp and the subsequent impact of the award on a firm s success in raising additional funds for its research and development rd the halo effect from the award increases the success of these firms in attracting additional funding from other sources our conclusion is that the atp is leveraging activities that have a strong potential for broad based economic benefit

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

chain to chain competition on product sustainability this paper studies the game model of two sustainable supply chains under competition in product sustainability derives the equilibrium structures of the two chain system and generates the managerial insights when the supplier and manufacturer within the reverse supply chain are competitive the sustainability degrees demands and profits under three structures of this two chain system are analyzed it is found that although vertical integration is always a nash equilibrium it is pareto optimal only when the competition degree is low on the other hand a more generalized case for the former model is investigated when the supplier and manufacturer are cooperative in bargaining the wholesale price and the effects of bargaining power to the sustainability degrees demands and chain member profits are studied it is further shown that the structure of vertical integration channels is not an equilibrium unless the two sustainable supply chains are independent

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

reply to managing channel profits comment we welcome moorthy s comment moorthy k s 1987 managing channel profits comment marketing sci 6 fall 375 379 it provides an opportunity to clarify several issues raised in our 1983 paper that paper was motivated by one concern channel coordination we believed that channel members benefit from coordination and that many institutional arrangements such as quantity discounts are actually coordinating mechanisms we developed a simple model to demonstrate our belief for historical accuracy mcguire and staelin cited by moorthy had already independently developed a useful model of duopolistic channel competition being unaware of their working paper our model not surprisingly differed from theirs both papers provide important but different insights into channel management

cyclical schedules vs dynamic sequencing replenishment dynamics and inventory efficiency abstract this paper addresses the efficiency of fixed sequence cyclical scheduling systems relative to that of dynamically sequenced order point methods of production control the criterion for comparison is the aggregate inventory required to achieve a target fill rate taking into account the alternative replenishment dynamics arising under the respective systems a simulation analysis demonstrates that cyclical scheduling may have smaller aggregate inventory requirement when the production process is highly utilized and when this utilization is due to demand for a small number of items having large setup times

analysis of order up to level inventory systems with compound poisson demand abstract we analyse a single echelon single item inventory system where the demand and the lead time are stochastic demand is modelled as a compound poisson process and the stock is controlled according to a continuous time order up to out level policy we propose a method for determining the optimal out level for cost oriented inventory systems where unfilled demands are backordered we first establish an analytical characterization of the optimal out level the actual calculation is based on a numerical procedure the accuracy of which can be set as highly as desired by means of a numerical investigation we show that the method is very efficient in calculating the optimal out level we compare our results with those obtained using an approximation proposed in the literature and we show that there is a significant difference in accuracy for slow moving items our work allows insights to be gained on stock control related issues for both fast and slow moving stock keeping units skus

advertising in a distribution channel conventional wisdom suggests that one of the goals of manufacturer advertising is to reduce the cross price elasticity between products make one s own and rivals products appear to be less substitutable in the eyes of consumers conventional wisdom also suggests that all else being equal retailers will be able to obtain better terms of trade from manufacturers the more substitutable are the manufacturers products it follows that retailers should be opposed to advertising that has the effect of reducing cross price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict we show that these conventional wisdoms need not hold when only some consumers are exposed to the advertising messages using a hotelling model of demand we show that 1 manufacturers can be worse off from advertising that reduces the cross price elasticities between their products 2 channel conflict need not arise even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect cross price elasticities and 3 depending on its bargaining power a retailer can be better off when the manufacturers products are perceived to be less substitutable

research note channel structure with knowledge spillovers we study two main questions in this paper 1 how do spillovers of knowledge created by manufacturers investments in process innovation affect channel structure and effort investment incentives 2 what are the interactions between organizational incentives to form joint ventures and strategic alliances with competitors and coordinate decisions vertically with downstream channel members we focus on situations where spillovers are involuntary firms innovative activities are nonoverlapping and firms benefit directly from the results of competitors innovations under these conditions we find that spillovers in process knowledge increase the likelihood of observing decentralized channel structures surprisingly decentralized manufacturers invest more in process innovation than perfectly coordinated manufacturers do when spillovers are large moreover in industries where large spillovers exist horizontal cooperation among manufacturers induces higher levels of process innovation investments than channel coordination does from a public policy perspective however the desirability of such cooperative arrangements among competitors depends on channel structure joint ventures among decentralized manufacturers are more likely to meet the regulators criteria of raising effort investments than cooperation among integrated manufacturers would be investment incentives are best provided when firms share their process knowledge and are buffered from subsequent price competition by independent retailers

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

the bright side of having an enemy conventional wisdom suggests that more intense competition will lower firms profits the authors show that this may not hold in a channel setting with exclusive retailers they find that a manufac

von stackelberg and cournot duopoly choosing roles under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von stackelberg duopoly model a key determinant is the slope of the firms reaction function in either price or quantity space the duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward sloping reaction functions each will prefer to be the leader they will also disagree if they have upward sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions each will prefer that the other be the leader preferences between von stackelberg and cournot outcomes are also considered

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

when good news about your rival is good for you the effect of third party information on the division of channel profits the internet has led to a large number of third party sources that offer high quality information about firms s products at little or no cost to consumers as a result many of these sources have grown in popularity extending well beyond the usual reach of traditional third parties such asconsumer reports andkelly s blue book for example the online version ofedmunds offers at no cost to consumers information about new products existing products long term tests and buyers guides all relating to the automotive industry avweb com delivers weekly aviation news and new product reviews to its readers and a large number of websites follow developments on computer platforms such as the apple macintosh in this paper we analyze how the provision of third party information affects the division of profits in a multiproduct distribution channel to illustrate consider the competition between microsoft and apple in the operating systems os market and their channel relationship to compusa a retailer that sells both macs and windows based pcs consider two pieces of thirdparty information first suppose that cnet an internet technology site reviews the newest upgrade of the macos and writes that the new user interface is even easier to use than previously second suppose that an article in the technology section of thewall street journal notes that changes in apple s networking support now enable macs to be better integrated into pc networks these two pieces of information are similar in the sense that they both express good news about the macos and thus they both can be expected to benefit apple by increasing consumer demand for macs one might also expect that in both cases compusa will capture some of the gains that come from the increased demand for macs and that microsoft will lose because the good news about the macos will induce some consumers to choose macs over windows based pcs however we will show that this intuition is incorrect the two reviews can have surprisingly different implications for the profits of microsoft and compusa the reason is that the two reviews differ on one crucial dimension the group of customers for whom they are primarily relevant the cnet review talks about improvements in the customer interface precisely what apple score consumers care about thewall street journal review talks about compatibility with prevailing pc standards important to consumers who care relatively more about compatibility and who are thus more likely to prefer windows apple snoncore consumers we show that good news about the macos that is more relevant to apple s core consumers the cnet review benefits microsoft but harms compusa while good news about the macos that is more relevant to apple s noncore consumers thewall street journal review has the opposite effect it harms microsoft but benefits compusa stated more generally our main result is that when third party information affects consumers product valuations the type of information that induces the change is critical to understanding which firms gain and which firms lose in particular depending on the type of third party information we find that 1 a retailer can be harmed by good news about a product that it carries 2 a manufacturer can gain from good news about a rival s product and 3 good news about a product category need not benefit all the manufacturers in that category there are three novel features of the analysis first we derive the equilibrium division of profit among firms when a retailer sells the products of competing manufacturers and we have done so while placing few restrictions on the feasible set of contracts second we show how this equilibrium division of profit lends itself to a simple graphical interpretation that depicts which firms gain and which firms lose from third party information third we provide a taxonomy of information types and identify the key features of each type that cause profit incentives to vary in particular we conceptualize information as having three components namely 1 the products to which the information pertains 2 whether the information is positive or negative and 3 the consumers to whom the information is relevant we show that all three information components play a role in determining the change in each firm s profit our framework can also be used to analyze a variety of other settings of interest for example it can be used to analyze profit incentives when the retailer has bargaining power when there is downstream competition and when there are non information based changes in consumers valuations in addition our framework may be used both to analyze the effects on profits of persuasive advertising and to predict advertising content

marketing production coordination in channels of distribution abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of functional horizontal decentralization by a channel member on the performance of an industrial channel of distribution we use the model of eliashberg j steinberg r 1987 management science 33 981 1000 which describes a channel of distribution consisting of a manufacturer and a value adding distributor we allow the distributor to decentralize decision making between his marketing and production functions our results show that functional decentralization at the distributor level increases the price sensitivity of the distributor concerning the price he faces from the manufacturer causes a shift in the distributor s demand curve increases the distributor s inventory activities in terms of both quantity and time frame and under certain conditions increases the manufacturer s inventory as expected the decentralized distributor has a less coordinated pricing policy vis a vis the production policy using numerical means we show that functional decentralization can improve the overall channel profitability i e for both manufacturer and distributor this counter intuitive result suggests that in our non repeated perfect information game setting functional decentralization can yield a pareto dominant equilibrium outcome where both the distributor and manufacturer are better off even though it is only the distributor who is changing his organizational decision making

the profit benefits of category management the practice of category management i e empolying a single decision maker who is responsible for a firm s product line has been advocated as a superior alternative to brand management i e in

distribution channel strategies in a mixed market abstract this paper studies equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed market with a public firm and a private firm the public firm is concerned with social welfare while the private firm aims to maximize its own profit each firm decides whether to adopt an integrated or a decentralized channel we examine two standard market competition modes bertrand and cournot within each competition mode we consider two typical vertical contracts wholesale price and two part tariff contracts our results suggest that equilibrium channel structures depend on the market competition mode the vertical contract form and the level of product substitutability specifically the channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract form under a two part tariff contract the private firm always chooses decentralization under a wholesale price contract the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for highly substitutable products under bertrand competition i e under very intense competition the channel strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode under bertrand competition the public firm always chooses decentralization under cournot competition the public firm always chooses the opposite of the private firm s strategy

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

when not all conflict is bad manufacturing marketing conflict and strategic incentive design researchers and managers broadly agree that coordination and harmony between manufacturing and marketing improve firm performance by eliminating suboptimal practices within the firm in this paper we present a contrasting view of the manufacturing marketing interface we model a duopoly in which the firms compete on price and quality dimensions the manufacturing and marketing managers within each firm are presented with conflicting incentives focused on cost minimization and revenue maximization respectively these managers bargain with each other before arriving at compromise decisions regarding price and quality while frequently encountered in practice this conflicting objectives puzzle is surprising because one expects that centralized coordination by the owners of the firm towards profit maximization would lead to higher profits in this paper we resolve the conflicting objectives puzzle and demonstrate that surprisingly the firm s resulting profits in this setting of conflict can be higher than those obtained when the decisions of the managers are perfectly coordinated we also analyze the equilibrium in incentive plans when the owners can choose between compromise and perfect coordination our results offer a new interpretation of manufacturing marketing conflict as a strategic tool that can enhance firm profits

chapter 4 competitive marketing strategies game theoretic models publisher summary this chapter reviews the key developments in the understanding of competitive marketing strategies product price advertising and distribution competition are all addressed while the emphasis is on models the chapter surveys the empirical literature as well there is a significant amount of empirical work to report but the ratio of theoretical to empirical work is nevertheless unpleasantly large much progress has been made in the last ten years or so in the study of competitive marketing strategies most of this chapter has been theoretical using simple models of firm and consumer behavior these models serve the function of demonstrating rigorously the existence of certain effects factors which need to be considered in analyzing real world competition

scheduling the production of several items with random demands in a single facility consider the problem of scheduling the production of several items in a single facility that can produce only one item at a time this problem occurs since it is often economic to produce several items in a single facility the objective is to reduce the long run average holding backorder and setup costs we assume that demands are random with constant expected rates we allow backorders and charge holding and backlogging costs at linear time weighted rates items are produced at continuous constant rates setup times and setup costs are item dependent constants these parameters however are independent of the order of setups a real time scheduling tool is developed in three steps first with demands replaced by their expectations we compute an optimal or near optimal target cyclic schedule next we study the problem of scheduling the facility after a single disruption perturbs the inventories the goal is to recover the target cyclic schedule at minimal excess over the average cost of the cyclic schedule we formulate this as a control problem and obtain a linear recovery policy that is optimal for a large configuration of disruptions finally we select safety stocks to minimize the long run average cost of following the target schedule with the recovery policy we show that optimal safety stocks are unique and have the property that in the long run the proportion of time that an item is in stock is the ratio of backorder to holding plus backorder cost we present an example that integrates the cyclic schedule the control policy and the safety stocks

implicit understandings in channels of distribution formal agreements can be used to achieve coordination among channel members these agreements work by exerting explicit control over the members who make the agreements however implicit understandings can be used as a partial substitute for more formal agreements in this paper we show that implicit understandings can develop as channel members learn about each other s behavior we show that this learning leads to the use of the implicit influence each channel member has over the other s behavior the learning leading to an implicit understanding requires some form of experimentation or historical observation this learning results in an oscillating retail price when only one channel member learns the other s behavior both channel members obtain greater profits than when neither member learns and both channel members obtain less profits than when both members learn however the member who does not learn obtains more profits than the member who learns we also show that implicit understandings r

integrating distribution strategy and tactics a model and an application designing distribution systems requires two decisions one strategic i e the number of levels between the producer and the customer and the other tactical i e channel management policies such as trade discounts and rebates while the modeling literature focuses on one or the other evidence from the field indicates that the two decisions are in fact interactive in this paper we develop and then apply an integrated model that solves the strategic issue of channel levels and the tactical issue of price rebates simultaneously

price competition for retailers with profit and revenue targets abstract price competition for retailers has been extensively studied in the literature assuming the objective of expected profit maximization in this paper we make a major contribution by studying price competition for retailers with both profit and revenue targets consequently each retailer maximizes her profit and revenue probability namely the probability of achieving the profit and revenue targets simultaneously more specifically we analyze a scenario where two competing retailers purchase a perishable product from a common supplier and sell to a common market employing the isoelastic demand model we derive the closed form solutions of the optimal order quantity the optimal selling price and the maximal profit and revenue probability for each retailer it is shown that when revenue is a relevant performance measure positive and non positive salvage values lead to different optima for competing retailers moreover as price elasticity and or price competition intensity becomes higher the optimal retail price decreases and the optimal order quantity increases for each retailer

quasi fixed cyclic production schemes for multiple products with stochastic demand abstract in this paper we present an approach to generate cyclic production schemes for multiple products with stochastic demand to be produced on a single production unit this scheme specifies a fixed and periodic production sequence called a cycle where each product may occur more than once in the sequence in order to stabilize the cycle length alternative control strategies are introduced these strategies keep the cycle length close to a target length by means of adding idle time to the cycle cutting production short or overproduction on basis of the selected control strategy as well as a base stock policy target inventory levels are determined for each production run in the cycle demand can be backlogged but a certain service level is required setup times are sequence dependent and the storage is capacitated employing the developed strategies we investigate the tradeoff between stability of cycle length and total cost induced by the production schedule in a computational study based on both real world data and random test instances

individual team incentives and managing competitive balance in sports leagues an empirical analysis of major league baseball abstract major league baseball and other professional sports leagues have long been concerned with competitive imbalances caused by differences in local revenues the fear is that in the absence of salary caps or other regulatory mechanisms smaller market teams will be unable to remain competitive this research uses a structural dynamic programming model to analyze ownership s payroll investment decisions this model estimates the relationship between optimal payrolls and local market populations and the influence of long term customer equity dynamics on payroll investments in addition the author analyzes the impact of a recent policy intervention that implemented revenue transfers from high local revenue markets to low local revenue markets the statistical results indicate that market population has a significant impact on the value of a team s payroll investments for example optimal payrolls double as the population increases from 2 5 million to 7 5 million furthermore rather than improving com

bertrand supertraps we study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms firms whose products interact in the profit function specifically we focus on the impact of intrafirm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits this impact may be decomposed in two different ways a a direct effect keeping the competitors actions fixed plus a strategic effect i e through the competitors actions or alternatively b a competitive advantage effect change in firmi only plus an imitation effect change in all other firms we derive conditions such that a the strategic effect more than outweighs the direct effect and conditions such that b the imitation effect more than outweighs the competitive advantage effect bertrand supertraps for example an increase in the degree of economies of scope would increase profits if prices were fixed or if the change were limited to firmi s cost function however if all firms increase the degree of economies of scope then all firms receive lower profits a variety of other applications is considered including learning curves core competencies demand synergies systems competition compatibility bundling network effects switching costs durable goods long term contracts

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

simulation based sequencing and lot size optimisation for a production and inventory system with multiple items abstract we investigate the following decision problem a manufacturing unit has to meet a random demand for n items at the same time only one item can be manufactured manufacturing times are random whereas set up times are known positive constants but different for different items finished production is stored in a warehouse with finite capacity the availability of raw material is always guaranteed demand that cannot be satisfied by items in the warehouse will be backordered in a queue with given capacity demand that meets a full backorder queue is lost we assume cost for manufacturing items for production switches for holding items in the warehouse for waiting and lost demand for sold items a given reward is earned the problem now is to define such a manufacturing policy i e a sequencing rule and a lot size rule which maximises the expected profit per time unit since that problem is too complex for an analytical solution we restrict our search for an optimal policy to simple structured policies which can be described by a few parameters to find optimal parameter values we use simulation optimisation where a simulator for the system is combined with a genetic algorithm as an optimiser the paper is finished with some numerical examples to show the applicability of the proposed approach

excessive retailing at the bertrand equilibria in oligopolistic markets where competition is in prices producers may prefer to be represented by agents that sell their products even if those agents do not provide any direct services to promote the sale of the product and even if contracting is costly contracting with the agents serves as a medium to relieve competitive pressures in the product market the benefit that a single firm derives from contracting is an increasing function of the number of firms that have already contracted with agents hence if the contracting cost is relatively low there exists a unique equilibrium where all firms contract with agents

the strategic use of capacity slack in the economic lot scheduling problem with random demand growing interest in designing systems with capacity slack as one form of flexibility raises many questions about its use and its usefulness in the framework of the economic lot scheduling problem with stochastic demand we develop on optimization based model that considers capacity slack safety stock and overtime explicitly and has the objective of minimizing the expected cost per unit time of inventory overtime and where applicable setup costs the solution is a continuous time production plan that consists of a time dependent inventory trajectory for each of the parts including the placement of planned idle time in the schedule we consider schedule stability to be desirable because of potential effects on upstream and downstream operations in multistage production settings thus the plan also has certain characteristics that contribute to achieving stability our results on the relative merits of capacity slack and safety stock indicate that capacity slack in the form of planned idle time is

firm strategies in the mid tail of platform based retailing while millions of products are sold on its retail platform amazon com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them most of these products are sold by third party sellers who pay amazon a fee for each unit sold empirical evidence clearly suggests that amazon tends to sell high demand products and leave long tail products for independent sellers to offer we investigate how a platform owner such as amazon facing ex ante demand uncertainty may strategically learn from these sellers early sales which of the mid tail products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell the platform owner s cherry picking of the successful products however gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level unobserved by the platform owner we analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game theoretic model with two types of sellers one with high demand and one with low demand we show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller s demand interestingly the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller s product whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner s threat of entry the platform owner s entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period although it increases consumer surplus in the later period we also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome

sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies this paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale we consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer with the retailers engaging in cournot or bertrand competition for cournot retail competition we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when 1 the production diseconomy is large and 2 either competition is less intense or at least one retailer s information is less accurate a supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information for bertrand retail competition we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when 1 the production diseconomy is large and 2 either competition is less intense or information is more accurate under bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information which is never the case under cournot competition information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under cournot competition but may be beneficial under bertrand competition this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

equilibrium returns policies in the presence of supplier competition the pioneering pasternack returns policy model analyzed channel coordination with a single supplier catering to a retailer facing stochastic demand for a perishable product with a fixed price and the model showed that giving partial returns of unsold stock to the retailer is the optimal policy for the entire supply chain the result thus begs the question as to why manufacturers of perishable commodities widely accept full returns of unsold stock as the norm we model the environment as one where two capacity constrained manufacturers compete for shelf space with the same retailer and we show that a complete credit returns policy is in fact the only possible equilibrium of the game our results obviate the need for knowing the exact functional form of the demand distribution in order to compute the returns credit as pasternack s results would require from a retailer s standpoint we establish a simple procurement strategy and show that it is optimal the same game with price only contracting has a pure strategy equilibrium when the supplier capacities are below a threshold value and a mixed strategy equilibrium when the supplier capacities cross this threshold but are still so limited that no single supplier can with certainty supply all the quantity demanded

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

a game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co op advertising in manufacturer retailer supply chains vertical cooperative co op advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs this paper considers vertical co op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement four game theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members comparisons and insights are developed these embrace three non cooperative games including nash stackelberg manufacturer and stackelberg retailer and one cooperative game in the latter case both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level subsequently the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit

unintentional unavoidable and beneficial knowledge leakage from the multinational enterprise knowledge leakage as an undesirable outcome for mnes is an accepted view in ib literature we challenge this view and argue that knowledge leakage is often unintentional unavoidable and beneficial for the mne in a highly networked and information rich society knowledge leakage from mnes 1 happens naturally due to interfirm relationships interactions and socialization 2 is unavoidable due to employee mobility and 3 facilitates knowledge inflows due to the reciprocity nature of knowledge exchange and hence is beneficial for mnes in addition the costs of protecting knowledge incurred by an mne will often outweigh the benefits

competition and cooperation between supply chains in multi objective petroleum green supply chain a game theoretic approach petroleum supply chain is one of the most important and sophisticated managing missions in both developing and developed countries nowadays environmental pollution is another critical factor in designing the petroleum supply chain this importance encourages the governments to minimize the amount of environmental pollution and maximize their obtained profit simultaneously by enacting required legislations on the transportation modes and the refineries considering maximizing the job creation and each stakeholder s profit and minimizing the emission of co2 and other greenhouse gases at the same time is called sustainable petroleum supply chain which has been paid little attention despite its significance therefore the modelling of petroleum supply chain considering sustainability and pricing issues is investigated for the first time in this work and a sustainable competitive petroleum supply chain scpsc model is developed to minimize pollution while maximizing the profits and job creation this problem is a two level model the first level in scpsc is the competition between the supply chains of the government and the private sectors which is modelled by the game theory approach including nash and stackelberg equilibria the optimal price and demand for each supply chain determined in the first level are considered as the second level parameters in the second level the optimal values of the decisions in designing the petroleum supply chain will be obtained by solving mixed integer linear programming milp under the mentioned three objective functions finally the proposed model is applied to a real world case in the national iranian oil company nioc based on the results of the stackelberg equilibrium the government profits increase by 11 12 while that of the private sector decreases by 25 4 and 28 11 increasing in the government profit is due to increased demand provided by government the results show that the whole profit of the petroleum supply chain in nash equilibrium is 9 8 more than that in the stackelberg equilibrium

the stochastic economic lot scheduling problem cyclical base stock policies with idle times in this paper we discuss stochastic economic lot scheduling problems elsp i e settings where several items need to be produced in a common facility with limited capacity under significant uncertainty regarding demands production times setup times or combinations thereof we propose a class of production inventory strategies for stochastic elsps and describe how a strategy which minimizes holding backlogging and setup costs within this class can be effectively determined and evaluated the proposed class of strategies is simple but rich and effective when the facility is assigned to a given item production continues until either a specific target inventory level is reached or a specific production batch has been completed the different items are produced in a given sequence or rotation cycle possibly with idle times inserted between the completion of an item s production batch and the setup for the next item an optimal strategy within the class can be determined and all relevant performance measures can be evaluated in just a few cpu seconds using a 486 based pc we also derive a number of easily computable lower bounds for the optimal cost value and establish a comparison with deterministic elsps

implementable mechanisms to coordinate horizontal alliances unprecedented changes in the economics of interaction mainly as a result of advances in information and telecommunication technologies such as the internet are causing a shift toward more networked forms of organizations such as horizontal alliances that is alliances among firms in similar businesses that have positive externalities between them because the success of such horizontal alliances depends crucially on aligning individual alliance member incentives with those of the alliance as a whole it is important to find coordination mechanisms that achieve this alignment and are simple to implement in this paper we examine two simple coordination mechanisms for a horizontal alliance characterized by the following features i firms in the alliance can exert effort only in their local markets to increase customer demand for the alliance ii customers are mobile and a customer living in a given alliance member s local area may have a need to buy from some other alliance member and iii the coordination rules followed by the alliance determine which firms from a large pool of potential member firms join the alliance and how much effort each firm joining the alliance exerts in its local market in this horizontal alliance setup we consider the use of two coordination mechanisms i a linear transfer of fees between members if demand from one member s local customer is served by another member and ii ownership of an equal share of the alliance profits generated from a royalty on each member s sales we derive conditions on the distribution of demand externalities among alliance members to determine when each coordination mechanism should be used separately and when the mechanisms should be used together

french firms strategies for protecting their intellectual property in attempting to protect their innovations firms can choose from a range of mechanisms which may be either non statutory trade secrets design complexity and lead time advantage over competitors or statutory patent design registration trademark copyright yet little is known about how firms do actually make their choices from among these different appropriability mechanisms the aim of this paper is to determine how french firms use of intellectual property protection mechanisms relates to the type of innovation the characteristics of the market sector in which they operate the firms characteristics and their human resources strategies our empirical model draws on four french databases covering the period 2001 2004 our results show that the choice of a means of protection matters and emerges out of a complex strategy our results also reveal that the different statutory and non statutory means of protection are complementary within their own categories but hardly so between categories

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se