stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

return migration uncertainty and precautionary savings this paper presents a life cycle model where migrants determine re migration and consumption simultaneously in a stochastic environment whether precautionary savings of migrants are above or below those of natives is ambiguous in general the sign depends on the risk in host and home country labor markets and on the correlation of labor market shocks furthermore the effect of an uncertain environment on migration and re migration plans cannot be unambiguously signed for the general case it depends on the size of the wage differential as well as the relative risk the migrant exhibits in the two labor markets

the impacts of international migration on remaining household members omnibus results from a migration lottery program this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the impacts of international migration on remaining household members omnibus results from a migration lottery program conducted in 2002 in tonga the study observed the impact of migration lottery program on the remaining household members of tongan emigrants on the individual and intra household level income falls rapidly by 22 to 25 percent with a rise in remittances failing to offset a large fall in labor earnings ownership of livestock durable and access to financial services is lower for the remaining household members diets change to be less nutritious and more rice and root crops immigration has a negative impact on household size there is no significant impact of migration on labor supply for men nor women funding for the study derived from the world bank stanford university the waikato management school and mardsen fund

impact of internal in migration on income inequality in receiving areas a district level study of south africa abstractthe impact of internal migration on regional income inequality of the receiving areas has hitherto gone largely unstudied this dearth of literature is especially surprising because income inequality and in migration into urban centres of growth are two issues that many developing economies are faced with and tackling these issues effectively involves understanding the interactions between these two related phenomena this study is therefore a first attempt to analyse the impact of internal in migration on receiving areas and is placed in the context of south africa based on a conceptual analysis the study argues that in migration into the formal sector of the receiving areas will in general reduce inequality while in migration into the informal or unemployed sector increases inequality using individual panel data the study further tests empirically at the district level the impact of in migration and finds that rising urban inequality in urban areas can be attributed at least in part to rural

labour migration and social networks participation in southern mozambique this paper investigates how social networks in poor developing settings are affected by migration using a unique household survey from southern mozambique we test the role of labour mobility in shaping participation in groups and interhousehold cooperation by migrant sending households in village economies at origin we find that migration cum remittances boosts household engagement in community based social networks our findings are robust to alternative definitions of social interaction and to endogeneity concerns suggesting that stable migration ties and higher income stability through remittances may decrease participation constraints and increase household commitment in cooperative arrangements in migrant sending communities

economic reform and armed conflict in mozambique abstract this paper discusses the evolution of the mozambican economy in the 1980s particular emphasis is placed on the effects of the policy reform package implemented by the government beginning in 1987 this reform centered around the restoration of economic incentives to the agricultural sector is an example of a structural adjustment package pursued under extremely adverse conditions the new strategy has yielded some favorable results but also illustrates some of the limits of price policy in sub saharan africa

remittances and inequality in this paper the authors propose a framework and develop techniques for analyzing the impact of migrant remittances on the distribution of rural income by size and subsequently its impact on rural welfare household data are used to assign numerical coefficients to the impact of net remittances from both internal and international migrants on income inequality in 2 mexican villages the impact of migrant remittances on the distribution of rural income by size depends critically on the degree to which migration opportunities become diffused through the village population on the returns to human capital embodied in remittances and on the distribution of potentially remittance enhancing skills and education across village households our empirical findings demonstrate that in a village where many households contain internal migrants but few have experience migrating to the u s remittances from mexico to us migrants have an unequalizing impact on village incomes while remittances from internal migrants have a favorable effect on the village income distribution by contrast in a village with a long historyh of sending migrants to the us and hence a more ready access to us labor markets us to mexico remittances have an equalizing impact on incomes remittances from internal migrants in this village however embody a large human capital component and are highly correlated with household income hence internal migrant remittances account for a comparatively large share of inequalities in the 2nd village the overall effect of remittances on income inequality is favorable in both villages migration type migration stage and interaction terms all appear to play a role in this context the effects of small changes in remittances upon income inequality and rural welfare in the 2 villages are explored and some implications for migration and rural development policy are considered authors modified

emigration to south africa s mines this paper presents a simultaneous econometric model of both the determinants of international migration to the south african mines and of some of the economic consequences for each of the labor supplying countries not only are the short run effects of labor withdrawal on traditional crop cultivation and the domestic wage labor markets considered but also the long term effects of savings from mine earnings invested in crops and cattle in the home countries the experiences of botswana lesotho malawi mozambique and the south african homelands are compared it is shown that emigration to the south african mines has reduced crop production in the subsistence sectors of botswana lesotho malawi and the south african homelands in the short run but the results also suggest that earnings of migrants have enhanced both crop productivity and cattle accumulation in the longer run except in lesotho excerpt

migration and income diversification evidence from burkina faso this paper uses limited dependent variable methods and new data from burkina faso to test the impact of inter continental and continental migration on activity choice and incomes in rural households econometric evidence supports our theoretical expectation that the impact of emigration varies both by migrant destination and production activity we find no evidence of either positive or negative effects of continental migration on agricultural or livestock activities and only a small negative impact on non farm activities however inter continental migration which tends to be long term and generates significantly larger remittances stimulates livestock production while being negatively associated with both staple and non farm activities

information extraction and norms of mutual protection abstract we study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with several agents in these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full information extraction when side trades between agents can be restricted when instead side trades cannot be restricted the ability of the principal to extract information from the agents is severely hampered in this context side trades take the form of informal contracts which can be directly interpreted as norms of mutual protection which are indeed quite common among extended family members as well as inside various social political and religious groups

brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries winners and losers using new data on emigration rates by education level we examine the impact of brain drain migration on human capital formation in developing countries we find evidence of a positive effect of skilled migration prospects on gross human capital formation in a cross section of 127 countries for each country of the sample we then estimate the net effect of the brain drain using counterfactual simulations countries combining relatively low levels of human capital and low emigration rates are shown to experience a beneficial brain drain and conversely there are more losers than winners and the former tend to lose relatively more than what the latter gain

remittances and chain migration longitudinal evidence from bosnia and herzegovina abstractmost of the literature on remittances focuses on their implications for the welfare of family members in the country of origin and disregards their role as facilitator of chain migration we address this issue with the use of longitudinal data from bosnia and herzegovina one of the primary exporters of migrants and recipients of remittances in the world we find that remittances have a significant positive impact on the migration prospects of their recipients better endowed people are most likely to migrate which highlights a potential negative implication of migration and remittances

guestworker migration remittances and the extended family evidence from pakistan the paper places migration in the context of the extended family it models informal loans between migrant and extended family for financing the costs of international labor migration to show repayments to extended family is important we trace the effects of such loans on migrant savings and remittance to the immediate family we employ a standard life cycle approach which predicts that the demand for extended family financing rises with migration costs and falls with pre migration wealth remittance to the immediate family and savings retained abroad both fall with the pre migration loan these hypotheses are tested using data from a survey of return migrants to pakistan carried out in 1986

migration transfers and economic decision making among agricultural households an introduction abstract the increasing volume of remittances and public transfers in rural areas of the developing world has raised hopes that these inflows may serve as an effective mechanism for reducing poverty in the long term by facilitating investments and raising productivity particularly in agriculture where market failures are most manifest the seven papers in this special issue systematically test the relationship between transfers and productive spending amongst rural households in six different countries overall the studies embrace a less optimistic view of the role of migration and public and private transfers on agriculture with migration as facilitating a transition away from agriculture or to models of less labour intensive agriculture

altruism and beyond an economic analysis of transfers and exchanges within families and groups 1 introduction 2 altruism transfers and wellbeing 3 the timing of intergenerational transfers an implication 4 an exchange implication of transfers the demonstration effect 5 transfers by migrants a strategic motive for remittances 6 exchange with recognition costs an explanation of migrants performance 7 intrafamilial transfers and exchanges forming and sustaining altruism

the shadow value of migrant remittances income and inequality in a household farm economy this article offers econometric evidence that income remittances sent home by family migrants stimulate household farm incomes indirectly by relieving credit and risk constraints on household farm production a high but unequally distributed shadow value of migrant remittances appears to reinforce an equalising direct effect of remittances on the income distribution across a sample of household farms in rural mexico

brain drain and economic growth theory and evidence we focus on the impact of migration prospects on human capital formation and growth in a small open developing economy we assume that agents are heterogeneous in skills and take their educational decisions in a context of uncertainty regarding future migrations we distinguish two growth effects an ex ante brain effect migration prospects foster investments in education because of higher returns abroad and an ex post drain effect because of actual migration flows the case for a beneficial brain drain bbd emerges when the first effect dominates i e when the average level of human capital is higher in the economy opened to migrations than in the closed economy we derive the theoretical conditions required for such a possibility to be observed using cross section data for 37 developing countries we find that the possibility of a bbd could be more than a theoretical curiosity

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

productive efficiency in public and private firms abstract this paper compares the degree of x inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms using a straightforward principal agent model with two possible states of the world it establishes the rather surprising result that in the good state of the world public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

remittances and the changing composition of migration remittances are seen as a sustainable source of funding for developing countries during recent decades the level of remittances has increased dramatically and the recent financial crisis has scarcely affected the trend in the same period the structure of international migration flows has changed these flows are now characterised by a growing feminisation and by increasing skill levels in this article we establish a link between these two facts and assess the effect of the change in the structure of migration on the level of remittances we use a recent data set on bilateral remittances and estimate a gravity model in which the gender and education background of migration flows are accounted for we find that remittances are positively associated with the share of female and college educated migrants in particular we argue that the rising share of college educated women has had a significant impact on the increase in remittances

unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents in this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions we distinguish two cases i when actions are mutually observable among agents ii when actions are not observable at all in i there is a mechanism in which the first best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium in ii we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules however we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi stage mechanism that has a unique second best perfect bayesian equilibrium

motivations to remit evidence from botswana in this article a theory of motivations to send remittances is described and tested with data from botswana altruism is one of the motivations tested and found to be an insufficient explanation for remittances among migrants in botswana a refinement of the model stipulates a modified altruism or enlightened self interest in this model the relationship between the migrant and family is tempered by an implicit understanding of mutual benefit the household strategy may be to encourage some members to migrate as a means of spreading risk and sharing gains the household strategy is similar to an insurance policy where migration is to places where market potential is high the risks incurred might be high the example is given of migration during a drought in botswana migrant remittances were greater in households with more cattle or households with more to lose drought alone was not statistically related to remittances increases in remittances were related to increased levels of education it is suggested that repayment was the motive for parents investment in migrants education migrants gains are identified as the potential for an inheritance the security of channeling investments through a trusted family member and security in having a home to return to it is pointed out that the altruism and family remittances from urban migration were strategies that bridged the simple dynamic of either urban development or rural development impacting on family welfare it is suggested that household models of economy adopt some measure to express the relationship of household wealth to remittances from urban migrants

does migration raise agricultural investment an empirical analysis for rural mexico the effect of remittances on capital accumulation remains a contested topic this paper uses a panel data set from rural mexico to investigate the impact of remittances on agriculture and livestock investments after controlling for the endogeneity of migration through an instrumental variable estimation our empirical results show that international migration has a significantly positive effect on the accumulated agricultural assets but not on livestock capital this suggests that households use the capital obtained from international migration only to overcome liquidity constraints for subsistence production whereas migration itself seems to be the superior investment option compared to other productive activities such as livestock husbandry

migration and the sending economy a disaggregated rural economy wide analysis abstract most economic research on migration impacts focuses on the households that send the migrants and get the remittances ignoring linkages with others in the sending economies this paper offers an alternative disaggregated economy wide perspective on migration and its impacts data from the 2003 mexico national rural household survey are used to calibrate a series of interacting rural household models nested within a general equilibrium model of the whole rural economy simulations reveal that the impacts of international migration and remittances on sending areas depend critically on the ways in which local markets transmit influences among households

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

migration and rural welfare the impact of potential policy reforms in europe summary this paper uses an agricultural household model in an imperfect market environment and data from burkina faso to explore the impact of potential immigration policy reforms in europe on the welfare of rural households simulation results demonstrate that in contrast to continental migration increased intercontinental migration has strong positive household welfare effects similarly an increase in the stay abroad of intercontinental migrants impacts positively on welfare of the migrant sending household results of these simulations lend support to the introduction of a tmp which would in addition to facilitating migration control in host economies improve the welfare of sending households by allowing for increased engagement in intercontinental migration the temporary nature of such a program would ensure that dutch disease effects would be mitigated through eventual migrant return

do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries summary few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world this paper fills this lacuna by constructing and analyzing a new data set on international migration remittances inequality and poverty from 71 developing countries the results show that both international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level depth and severity of poverty in the developing world after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration and controlling for various factors results suggest that on average a 10 increase in the share of international migrants in a country s population will lead to a 2 1 decline in the share of people living on less than 1 00 per person per day after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances a similar 10 increase in per capita official international remittances will lead to a 3 5 decline in the share of people living in poverty

mines and migrants in south africa between 1971 and 1978 wages of more than one half million nonwhite laborers in the south african mines tripled in real terms in the same period the nonwhites employed in the mines switched from being 62 percent foreign to 62 percent domestic these changes followed a period from 1911 to 1971 during which real wages of black gold miners did not rise and terminated almost a century of reliance on foreign labor reserves for the majority of such labor 2 these dramatic events are examined here in the context of an econometric model of the demand for labor by the south african mining sector from 1946 to 1980 this affords an unusual opportunity to study the demand side of a market for internal and international migrants in a society where racial discrimination is formalized in the apartheid system where powerful mining houses wield potential monopsony power and where political factors in the region are major determinants of economic behavior to comprehend the derived demand for workers in this sector it is essential to outline at least certain aspects of the industry s organization and that of the market for labor this is undertaken in section i section ii develops a stylized model which is then estimated from data described in section iii for the gold diamond coal and other minerals sectors separately in section iv i organization of the mine labor market

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring abstract this paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation no other partner has any additional information in such a model whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d7 d8 l2

moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts we study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored or are not contractible upon we fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for such economies as well as discuss their welfare properties depending on the parameters of the economy either the optimal action choice is not sustained in equilibrium or if it is agents necessarily enter into multiple contractual relationships and intermediaries make positive profits even under free entry conditions the main features and implications of these environments are consistent with several stylized facts of markets for unsecured loans

the economics of career concerns part ii application to missions and accountability of government agencies the paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies officials incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions a lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy the paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives last the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on government bureaucracies 1999 the review of economic studies limited

on decentralization and life satisfaction abstract we empirically analyze the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on subjective well being in a cross section of 60 000 individuals from 66 countries more spending or revenue decentralization raises well being while greater local autonomy is beneficial only via government consumption spending

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

the limits of bureaucratic efficiency bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently but a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints but this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint i show that when this incentive is important bureaucracies efficiently respond by i ignoring legitimate consumer complaints ii monitoring more in situations in which it is not needed iii delaying decision making too long and iv biasing oversight against consumers i also show that bureaucracies are used only when consumers cannot be trusted as a result observed bureaucracies are always inefficient

the effect of skilled emigration on real exchange rates through the wage channel abstract building on an analytical model we provide cross country empirical evidence that net skilled emigration appreciates bilateral real exchange rates through the wage channel in source countries chains of causality in the presence of the law of one price run through the spending effect and the resource allocation effect analogous to the remittance based dutch disease effect a pricing to market model allows pass through for both traded and nontraded prices when the law of one price is violated the skilled emigration elasticity of real exchange rate is estimated to be in the range of between 0 6 and 0 8 with internal prices playing a dominant role alternative model specifications show robust outcomes

international migration remittances and schooling evidence from el salvador abstract we examine the effect of remittances from abroad on households schooling decisions using data for el salvador following the massive war related emigration of the 1980s remittances became a significant source of household income throughout the 1990s we use the cox proportional hazard model to examine the determinants of school attendance measuring income from a source that is uncorrelated with parental schooling remittances we find that remittances have a large significant effect on school retention we estimate that while household income net of remittances has a small though significant impact on the hazard of leaving school in rural and urban areas remittances have a much larger impact on the hazard of leaving school in urban areas the effect of remittances is at its smallest 10 times the size of the effect of other income in rural areas the effect of remittances is about 2 6 times that of other income our finding is of interest in that it suggests that subsidizing school attendance particularly in poor areas may have a large impact on school attendance and retention even if parents have low levels of schooling

a political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments one of the main themes of partisan dispute in the recent past and doubtless in the foreseeable future is whether or not the value of detailed governmental regulation of the economy exceeds the cost this is exactly the kind of dispute that might be resolved by raising it from the level of mere partisan interest to the level of economic and political science unfortunately however it has not been raised because we do not have the necessary intellectual apparatus namely a theory about the motivation for the operation of and the consequences of regulation as a result most of the discussion consists of biased ad hoc explanations of particular cases with little effort to formulate and test alternative generalizations we have therefore nothing but unresolved and unresolvable disputes about a more or less random collection of stories and some contradictory recipes about cause and effect

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

migration amongst the batswana the present study undertakes analysis of the effects of employment probabilities and wage alternatives on migration decisions in the context of botswana adopting micro level data both to estimate a multinomial migration function and to develop prediction equations for wages and likelihood of employment data are from the 1978 1979 national migration survey the factors that influence rural batswana adults to remain at home migrate to town on a short or long term basis move to another rural area or emigrate to south africa are examined consideration is given to the effects of employment alternatives on the rate of internal migration and the selectivity of movements with respect to personal household and locational factors excerpt

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

decentralization and collusion abstract we consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project share information not available to the principal and can collude due to limited liability the coase theorem does not apply the distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard the optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way decentralization without using message games journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l14 l22

investment opportunities in the source country and temporary migration this paper examines how attractive investment opportunities available to temporary migrants in their country of origin aect their saving behavior and the optimal duration of stay abroad the model predicts an inverse u shaped relationship between migration duration and the expected rate of return on repatriated savings a higher rate provides an incentive to go back earlier and consume less abroad while it can also trigger emigration aimed at generating the savings required for investment after return at a more general level the paper illustrates how the behavior of temporary migrants re ects the interaction between their preferences and the opportunities available in the labor and capital markets of both countries

migration remittances and agricultural productivity in china in our paper we have used the new economics of labor migration framework to trace the complex linkages that exist among migration remittances and agricultural productivity in china constraints in the operation of on farm labor and capital or insurance markets or institutions provide households with a motivation to migrate and distort on farm operations when labor leaves in our household sample the net impact of migration and remittances on maize production is negative excerpt

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

migration unemployment and development a dynamic two sector analysis abstract a time minimizing problem of attaining a full employment state is solved in a dual economy model with harris todaro migration mechanism and with a positive level of urban unemployment in the starting period it appears that the optimum solution lies in the specialization of investment in the urban sector at least in the initial stage of development if the per capita capital stock in the urban sector is very small in the starting period

contracting problems and regulation the case of the fishery the inefficiencies of common property fisheries are of continuing concern to economists the early work by scott gordon 1954 and anthony scott 1955 outlined the problem and later studies by james crutchfield and giulio pontecorvo 1969 and frederick bell 1972 provided empirical estimates of the losses that result those studies were followed by the dynamic models of colin clark 1976 and james quirk and vernon smith 1970 of optimal harvest rates and the use of corrective taxes or quotas to achieve them but in spite of a large and growing literature and the persuasiveness of the outlined efficiency criteria most fisheries retain common property aspects with overcapitalization and excessive labor input why those conditions persist and the failure of the regulatory response to them are the issues addressed in this paper we examine a number of fisheries but focus on the texas shrimp industry which is one of the nation s most valuable fisheries for a single species and which shares the common property characteristics observed elsewhere it is considered overcapitalized and catch per unit of effort is falling 2 examination of the fishery reveals the many margins along which rent dissipation occurs and the nature of the regulations necessary for controlling fishing effort to avoid those losses the regulatory environment in texas is complicated by conflict within the fishery between inshore and offshore fishermen the latter assert that bay shrimping reduces the number of shrimp that successfully migrate to the gulf the inshore fishery is highlighted by another issue the recent resettlement of some 30 45 000 vietnamese refugees including many fishermen along the texas coast marine advisory service paul starr their entry has been met by hostility and violence from existing shrimpers who recognize that they are in an environment characterized by the absence of property rights bay shrimpers have lobbied the texas legislature for broad limits on new entrants yet ironically the sale of additional boats by individual shrimpers to the vietnamese has facilitated entry of the refugees into the fishery regulations in the texas shrimp and other fisheries are incomplete leaving many options for rent dissipation uncontrolled because of high contracting costs among fishermen and political factors that mold government actions contracting costs are high among heterogeneous fishermen who vary principally with regard to fishing skill 3 montana state university and texas a m university respectively we benefitted from comments by terry anderson raymond c battalio gardner brown oscar burt micha gisser wade griffin john r moroney anthony d scott peter temin and participants in workshops at texas a m university and the university of washington research assistance was provided by scott barnhart and phil mizzi funding was provided by sea grant texas a m university throughout this paper we use the terms common property and open access interchangeably here the terms describe a situation where no property rights group or individual exist s for the resource 2catch per unit of effort in the inshore texas gulf and federal gulf waters is presented for 1963 77 by w l griffin c g tydlacka and w e grant they show catch per unit of effort generally falling in inshore and offshore waters while catch per unit of effort fluctuates from year to year it falls from approximately 360 kg shrimp per unit of effort to 220 kg from 1963 to 1977 the common property nature of the fishery is reflected in the following statistics since 1975 the number of vessels has grown by 23 percent nelson swartz for fish houses the record of entry is similar between 1970 a d 1977 the number of firms grew from 259 to 287 though during that period many left the industry as others entered the number of fish houses was calculated from license data supplied by the texas parks and wildlife department the record of entry by fish houses suggests that monopsony as discussed by colin clark and gordon munro is absent in the fishery 3there may be minor differences in labor leisure choices and capital but our statistical evidence and discussions with fishermen indicate that catch variations are largely due to skill government regulations in the texas bays restrict capital and our empirical evidence shows boats to be relatively homogeneous

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82

a critical comment on niskanen s model niskanen s model has been largely criticized but it still remains a standard explanation of bureaucracy s behaviour in this paper we criticize the monopoly power that niskanen assigns to the bureaucracy a bilateral monopoly between bureaucrats and politicians might be a much more adequate framework for explaining the bureaucracy s behaviour than niskanen s original formulation of a perfect discriminating bureaucracy in a bilateral monopoly model in no case the type of relationship which holds between the sponsor and the bureau leads to an oversupply of output should an excess output occur it would be a consequence of the political decision making mechanisms this result stands in sharp contrast to the niskanen s model but at the same time it is coherent with the fact that when the sponsor introduces control and monitoring mechanisms the sponsor does not pretend to decrease the output but rather to supervise and to reduce the costs of producing the output

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

effect of remittances on poverty and financial development in sub saharan africa summary this paper assesses the effect of the steadily growing remittance flows to sub saharan africa though the region receives only a small portion of the total recorded remittances to developing countries and the volume of aid flows to sub saharan africa swamps remittances this paper finds that remittances which are a stable private transfer have a direct poverty mitigating effect and promote financial development these findings hold even after factoring in the reverse causality between remittances poverty and financial development the paper posits that formalizing such flows can serve as an effective access point for unbanked individuals and households

moving forward looking back the impact of migration and remittances on assets consumption and credit constraints in the rural philippines abstract this paper investigates the impact of migration and remittances on asset holdings consumption expenditures and credit constraint status of households in origin communities using a unique longitudinal data set from bukidnon philippines taking into account the endogeneity of the number of migrants and remittances received a larger number of migrant children reduces the values of nonland assets and total expenditures per adult equivalent however remittances have a positive impact on housing consumer durables nonland assets total expenditures per adult equivalent and educational expenditures enabling asset accumulation and investment in human capital neither migration nor remittances affects current credit constraint status