employment impacts of eu biofuels policy combining bottom up technology information and sectoral market simulations in an input output framework this paper analyses the employment consequences of policies aimed to support biofuels in the european union the promotion of biofuel use has been advocated as a means to promote the sustainable use of natural resources and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions originating from transport activities on the one hand and to reduce dependence on imported oil and thereby increase security of the european energy supply on the other hand the employment impacts of increasing biofuels shares are calculated by taking into account a set of elements comprising the demand for capital goods required to produce biofuels the additional demand for agricultural feedstock higher fuel prices or reduced household budget in the case of price subsidisation price effects ensuing from a hypothetical world oil price reduction linked to substitution in the eu market and price impacts on agro food commodities the calculations refer to scenarios for the year 2020 targets as set out by the recent renewable energy roadmap employment effects are assessed in an input output framework taking into account bottom up technology information to specify biofuels activities and linked to partial equilibrium models for the agricultural and energy sectors the simulations suggest that biofuels targets on the order of 10 15 could be achieved without adverse net employment effects

retaliation bargaining and the pursuit of free and fair trade that domestic political economic factors are important determinants of a nation s trade barriers has been empirically well established however the question of how effective strategically retaliatory trade barriers are in deterring foreign protectionism has received far less systematic empirical attention in this article we use bilateral nontariff barrier ntb data between the united states and five developed partner countries japan france germany italy and the united kingdom to systematically examine the effectiveness of strategic retaliation we employ a simultaneous tobit model where the home and foreign ntb levels are determined endogenously in a bilateral game the model provides estimates of deterrence coefficients that is the reduction in foreign trade barriers as a result of u s retaliation which we use to characterize the nature of bilateral ntb games our hope is that the empirical results presented here which have realistic though controversial implications will inform u s trade policy

assessing china s exchange rate regime the imf articles of agreement forbid a country from manipulating its currency for unfair advantage the us treasury has been legally required since 1988 to report to congress biannually regarding whether individual trading partners are guilty of manipulation one part of this paper tests econometrically two competing sets of hypothesized determinants of the treasury decisions 1 legitimate economic variables consistent with the imf definition of manipulation the partners overall current account gdp its reserve changes and the real overvaluation of its currency and 2 variables suggestive of domestic american political expediency the bilateral trade balance us unemployment and an election year dummy the econometric results suggest that the treasury verdicts are driven heavily by the us bilateral deficit though other variables also turn out to be quite important in 2005 china announced a switch to a new exchange rate regime the exchange rate would be set with reference to a basket of other currencies with numerical weights unannounced allowing a movement of up to 0 3 within any given day although this step was originally accepted at face value in public policy circles scepticism is in order the second econometric part of the paper evaluates what exchange rate regime china has actually been following we use the technique introduced by frankel and wei 1994 1 one regresses changes in the value of the local currency in this case the rmb against changes in the values of the dollar euro yen and other currencies that may be in the basket we find that within 2005 the de facto regime remained a peg to a basket that put virtually all weight on the dollar subsequently there has been a modest but steady increase in flexibility with some weight shifted to a few non dollar currencies but not those one might expect in any case the weight on the dollar was still fairly heavy in 2006 the paper tests whether the decline in the implicit weight on the dollar is related to the pressure from us officials it also considers whether the increase in flexibility that we have seen small though it is has been gradually accelerating at a rate that would suggest the likelihood of some genuine flexibility in the not so distant future jeffrey a frankel and shang jin wei 1 ref 18

delegated portfolio management abstract a problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered for the case of risk averse agents and large principals an approximately optimal solution is constructively characterized under the assumption that payoffs are normally distributed a significant extension of the definnetti savage probability elicitation result is developed under this extension knowledge of agent preferences is not required when the underlying conditional distributions are symmetric and this fact is exploited to solve the screening problem in a mean variance formulation

moral hazard and the portfolio management problem this paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information in addition the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully we analyze three contracting regimes 1 first best where effort is observable 2 linear with unobservable effort and 3 the optimal contract within the bhattacharya pfleiderer quadratic class we find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager this underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts these contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk tolerant principals

impact of switching production to bioenergy crops the switchgrass example this paper reports the results from simulations that evaluate the general equilibrium effects of substituting switchgrass a biomass for crude oil in usa petroleum production the new production process is less efficient and usa gdp declines slightly as switchgrass production expands usa agriculture contracts and the world price of cereals increases the world price of crude oil falls as usa import demand declines the net effect of the price and income changes is a general decline in economic welfare moreover the declines in welfare are proportionately greater for developing countries who produce small quantities of agricultural commodities whose prices increase

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

should we regulate financial information regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payoff relevant information to potential buyers sound like obvious measures to increase investor welfare but in many cases such regulations harm investors in an equilibrium model asset returns compensate investors for risk by making payoffs less uncertain disclosure reduces risk and therefore reduces return as high risk high return investments disappear investor welfare falls of course information is still valuable to each individual investor but acquiring information is like a prisoners dilemma each investor is better off with the information but collectively investors are better off if they remain uninformed the only cases in which providing information improves investors welfare are ones where there would otherwise be severe asymmetric information using a model of information markets the paper explores when such outcomes are likely to arise when we extend the model so that financial markets with information allocate the real capital stock more efficiently these conclusions do not change disclosure improves efficiency but more efficient firms do not have more risk and therefore do not offer investors higher return instead they simply command a higher price which only benefits the asset issuer since the efficiency gains are fully internalized by asset issuers who can choose to disclose without disclosure being mandatory the efficiency argument is not a logical rationale for regulation

chasing phantoms the political economy of ustr trade barriers though usually considered welfare reducing are globally ubiquitous in light of the enormous clash between what is and what ought to be researchers have begun addressing the question of why countries so consistently pursue such apparently counterproductive policies

credit rating inflation and firms investments we analyze credit rating effects on firm investments in a rational bond financing game that features a feedback loop the credit rating agency cra inflates the rating providing a biased but informative signal to creditors creditors response to the rating affects the firm s investment decision and thus its credit quality which is reflected in the rating the cra might reduce ex ante economic efficiency which results solely from its strategic effect the cra assigns more firms high ratings and allows them to gamble for resurrection we derive empirical predictions on the determinants of rating standards and inflation and discuss policy implications

the reductionist gamble open economy politics in the global economy international political economy ipe should transition to third wave scholarship because open economy politics oep which dominates current american ipe scholarship can generate inaccurate knowledge oep can produce inaccurate knowledge because it studies domestic politics in isolation from international or macro processes this methodological reductionism is often inappropriate for the phenomena ipe studies because governments inhabit a complex social system as a result the political choices that oep strives to explain are typically a product of the interplay between domestic politics and macro processes when oep omits causally significant macro processes from empirical models the models yield biased inferences about the domestic political relationships under investigation although scholars tolerated such errors when the gains from oep were large these errors are less tolerable now that oep has matured consequently the field should transition toward research that is nonreductionist problem driven and pluralistic

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

ratings quality over the business cycle credit rating agencies cras have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior the value of reputation however depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle in a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies we find that ratings quality is countercyclical specifically a cra is more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee income is high competition in the labor market for analysts is tough and securities default probabilities are low persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results while mean reversion exacerbates them the presence of naive investors reduces overall quality but quality remains countercyclical finally we demonstrate that competition among cras yields similar results

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

asian growth and trade poles india china and east and southeast asia summary using a global general equilibrium trade model this study analyzes the impact on developing countries of 1 the dramatic expansion of trade by india china and an integrated east and southeast e se asia trade bloc and 2 productivity growth in the region china is an integral member of the e se asia bloc with strong links through value chains and trade in intermediate inputs while india is not a part of any trade bloc the analyses consider the importance of their different degrees of integration into regional and global economies focusing on potential complementarities and competition with other developing countries

product differentiation and the treatment of foreign trade in computable general equilibrium models of small economies this paper examines the treatment of exports and imports and external closure rules adopted in recent single country computable general equilibrium models of small economies the paper presents a simple one sector analytic model which captures the major features of the multi sector counterpart used in applied models the paper derives graphical and algebraic solutions to the model and shows that unlike some earlier external closures this one gives rise to a well behaved price taking economy the model is also useful to illustrate the role of elasticities in popular trade theoretic models that include traded and non traded goods

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

strategic interaction and trade policymaking formal analysis and simulation this paper introduces a simple game theoretic model and a monte carlo simulation of trade negotiations with the aim of identifying the nature of the selection bias that may threaten valid inference from empirical tests relying on data from trade disputes insights from the formal model are used to critically engage recent empirical analyses this model is applied more specifically to the american use of section 301 as an instrument to prise open foreign markets the results of the game theoretical model and the monte carlo simulation demonstrate that despite significant statistical results models of trade negotiations might potentially suffer from misspecification due to non random selection effects

implementing a biofuel economy in the eu lessons from the sustoil project and future perspectives for next generation biofuels abstract the aim of this article is to illustrate main economic and environmental ghg emission reductions effects of implementing a biofuel economy and to discuss the potential of establishing advanced biofuels in the european union the study is based on the recently completed eu fp7 sustoil research project the main question addressed is the eu policy objective of achieving 20 ghg emission reductions using 20 of renewables by the year 2020 to contribute to the achievement of this policy we run and execute through a computable general equilibrium model a simulation experiment of implementing a bio based economy using biorefineries in the production process main results suggest that a biorefineries working from oil seeds and their by products will lead to a large increase in the amount of this crop grown particularly in eastern europe b this increase will be accompanied by a decrease in sectoral gdp in several other areas c oil and electricity prices will generally fall in across the eu with a particularly notable trend in eastern europe and d a reduction in carbon emissions is achieved but this will be insufficient to meet the eu 20 target this latter result would suggest to speed the technological process towards the use of next generation biofuels in the eu furthermore these results advocate for a leading role expected to play by eastern eu countries over the next years the expected increase in the cultivation of energy crops could conflict with the availability of land for food crops the potential for establishing next generation biofuels in the eu with adequate support policies would be essential for guaranteeing energy and food security in the long run

the hidden hand of economic coercion why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft game theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects when the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions the bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed this contradicts the recent literature on sanctions which assumes that sanctions rarely if ever work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons if the game theoretic argument is correct the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented a statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the gametheoretic argument these results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

contracting to compete for flows abstract we present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital we find that they make their contracts depend on public information e g credit ratings or benchmark indices as a way to attract flows rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems as has been emphasized in the literature unfortunately asset managers competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient this inefficiency arises because contracting on public information prevents risk sharing

testing in models of asymmetric information this paper explores the role of testing in models of asymmetric information we demonstrate conditions under which testing for underlying characteristics can overcome adverse selection problems and lead to a full information competitive equilibrium this paper provides a more general statement of mirrlees result on the optimal use of infinite fines where testing cannot fully resolve the problems associated with asymmetric information we outline the source of the difficulties our results developed in the context of a labour market can be directly extended to other environments in problems with asymmetric information testing to discover an agent s chosen action or underlying characteristics may significantly reduce the cost of moral hazard and adverse selection

endogenous punishments in agency with verifiable ex post information the article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible imperfect signal on the agent s type is revealed ex post the agent is wealth constrained which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction e g the volume of trade first we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem e g whether the agent is in a buyer or a seller position second the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available finally the signal can actually serve to increase the agent s informational rents

does it all add up benchmarks and the compensation of active portfolio managers in this article the authors examine theoretically the use of benchmark portfolios in the compensation of privately informed portfolio managers they find that the use of a benchmark and particularly the types of benchmarks often observed in practice cannot be easily rationalized specifically commonly used benchmark adjusted compensation schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal risk sharing and do not lead to the choice of an optimal portfolio for the investor moreover benchmarks do not help in solving potential contracting problems such as inducing the manager to expend effort or trying to screen out uninformed managers copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

portfolio performance and agency the evaluation and compensation of portfolio managers is an important problem for practitioners optimal compensation will induce managers to expend eort to generate information and to use it appropriately in an informed portfolio choice our general model points the way towards analysis of optimal performance evaluation and contracting in a rich model optimal contracting in the model includes an important role for portfolio restrictions that are more complex than the sharing rule the agent s compensation gives the agent approximately to a benchmark return plus an incentive fee equal to a portfolio measure that is approximately the excess of return above the benchmark this measure is often used by practitioners but is simpler than the jensen measure and other measures commonly recommended in the academic literature in addition to the excess return above the xed benchmark the manager is given some additional incentive to take a position that deviates from the benchmark to remove an incentive to tend towards being a closet indexer ecient contracting involves restrictions on what portfolio strategies can be pursued and prior communication of the information gathered

information reliability and welfare a theory of coarse credit ratings abstract an enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies cras use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare we model a cheap talk game in which a cra assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors the cra wishes to inflate ratings but prefers an unbiased rating to one whose inflation exceeds a threshold ratings coarseness arises in equilibrium to preclude excessive rating inflation we show that competition among cras can increase ratings coarseness we also examine the welfare implications of regulatory initiatives