the effect of unions on productivity u s surface mining of coal the purpose of this paper is to compare the abilities of two competing analytical techniques mathematical programming and statistical regression to shed light on the union nonunion productivity differential in u s surface coal mining the programming approach has the virtues of being nonparametric and thus extremely flexible and of being able to provide a decomposition of productivity differentials into three components differences in technical efficiency differences in scale efficiency and differences in congestion identification of these three components provides an aid to management in its search for the sources of and remedies for productivity gaps the econometric approach on the other hand is neither flexible nor does it provide such a decomposition its chief virtue lies in the fact that being stochastic it allows for the presence of noise and measurement error that plagues most if not all empirical data thus the two approaches have complementary virtues the two techniques are used to investigate productivity in two samples of u s surface coal mines the programming approach finds a large and significant positive union nonunion productivity differential this differential is due primarily to greater congestion occurring in the smaller nonunion mines in one sample and to scale inefficiency in the smaller nonunion mines in the other sample the econometric analysis finds nearly the same union nonunion productivity differential but sheds no light on the composition of and thus the cure for the differential

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry a contradiction in a recent article in this journal hall 1988 examined productivity shocks at the industry level derived from constant returns to scale production functions in which firms were assumed to be competitive hall had two important conclusions first he showed that productivity shocks i e solow residuals were correlated with aggregate demand variables implying that the former are not exogenous impulses second his results implied that firms persistently charge prices above marginal costs making inappropriate the constant returns to scale competitive production function assumed in many theoretical frameworks because of the importance of hall s findings the article has led to many extensions evans 1992 confirms the empirical finding of significant correlations between productivity shocks and aggregate demand variables burnside eichenbaum and rebelo 1993 show that this correlation can be explained by introducing labor hoarding into a theoretical model with competitive firms and constant returns to scale production functions the markups above marginal cost are explained by eden and griliches 1991 and galeotti and schiantarelli 1991 by modifying the theoretical production function caballero and lyons 1992 using the hall data and methodology examine the possibility of external economies in the aggregate manufacturing production finally waldmann 199 1 argues in this journal that the

the effects of unions and strikes on the rate of growth of total factor productivity in canada there is a substantial amount of literature regarding the effects or potential effects of trade unions on various measures of productivity brown and medoff 1978 clark 1980 but less information is available on the effects on the rate of growth of productivity measures mansfield 1980 and kendrick 1973 except for tangential references no sources were noted which discussed the effects of strike activity on productivity growth this paper is concerned with the latter two issues there are four main sections i a discussion of the theoretical issues involved ii a discussion of measurement options and problems iii presentation of empirical results and discussion of estimation problems and iv intepretation of the empirical results

labor unions and the adoption of new technology the paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor saving techniques this is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms some of which are unionized we find that unionization can actually encourage the adoption of labor saving technology provided that the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficiently high or demand elasticity sufficiently low if there is an effective threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage demands then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology even at low levels of demand

the inverted pyramid a neo ricardian view on the economy environment relationship abstract in ecological economics natural resources which may contribute only a small amount to gdp are viewed as fundamental to the functioning of the economy they are sometimes pictured as sitting at the base of an inverted pyramid with the rest of the economy balanced on top of them in this paper we show that when prices are set by markup a standard heterodox assumption then the inverted pyramid picture of the economy emerges naturally in a neo ricardian model we demonstrate the use of the model with brief applications to biophysical economics the paper is one of a growing number that use heterodox macroeconomics to address questions in ecological economics

bargaining and the timing of investment the joint determination of the timing of investment and wage bargaining is modelled two cases are considered a there is an alternating offer bargaining game over binding wage contracts and production is possible only when agreement is reached b there are no binding contracts so revenue is divided in period by period bargaining post investment investment can occur earlier in case b than in case a and the equilibrium in case b can pareto dominate the equilibrium with binding contracts these conclusions depend on players discount factors

trade unions and firms product market power a production function model with efficient bargaining between oligopolistic firms and unions is developed to distinguish between product market power and union power in capturing economic rents the model is formalised using the generalized nash bargaining solution and is empirically tested on four belgian manufacturing sectors the conclusions are that product market power is significantly eroded by wage rents but firms retain most of their power during negotiations also the restrictions imposed on the data do not reject the hypothesis that wage erosion arises from efficient bargaining in accordance with other empirical findings for belgian manufacturing

a theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining this paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play although the bargaining phase is cheap talk following a generalized alternating offer protocol sharp predictions arise from three axioms two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan the third embodies a theory of disagreement that play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct all equilibria generate the same welfare optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol the theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions

productivity and distribution effects of codetermination in an efficient bargaining model codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is derived that is suited to empirical testing the empirical test is based on german data and includes years before and after the extension of german codetermination law in 1976 the estimates determine the productivity of labor and relative bargaining power of capital and labor it turns out that codetermination does not affect productivity but leads to a significant increase in workers bargaining power and the distribution of rents

import price elasticities reconsidering the evidence recent economic geography and trade empirical studies based on monopolistic competition suggest high levels of trade price elasticities between 3 and 1 1 however price elasticity estimations in trade equations using unit values as price proxies usually lead to lower values of around unity we show that those inconclusive results may be due to some misspecification in these equations as well as measurement errors in prices when suit able instrumental variables are used within a panel of industrialized countries we obtain high price elasticities the majority ranging from i to 13 the highest estimates correspond to industries producing homogeneous goods jel classification c2 c3 and f 1

corporate governance and innovation a survey abstract the traditional economics of innovation inspired by schumpeter and more recent advances on his work seem unable to explain why firms with similar external conditions may show greatly different performance in innovation contrastingly the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity to the extent that such literature examines the economic effects of different modes of coordination between firm members the process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central to the dynamics of corporate innovation this paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue we start by discussing how various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological innovation we then describe three main channels corporate ownership corporate finance and labour through which a system of corporate governance shapes a firm s innovation activity finally we examine the relationship between country level institutional settings national patterns of corporate governance and the aggregate innovation activity of corporations we conclude by suggesting that future research should focus more deeply on the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and on their joint effect on firm innovation

product value as a determinant of opec s official crude oil prices additional evidence the rate of imitation of a capital embodied process innovation economica 44 feb 1977 63 69 sahal devendra patterns of technological innovation reading ma addison wesley 1981 saxonhouse gary r estimated parameters as dependent variables american economic review 66 mar 1976 178 183 theil henri on the estimation of relationships involving qualitative variables american journal of sociology 76 july 1970 103 154 principles of econometrics new york wiley sons 1971 walker david an analysis of financial and structural characteristics of banks with retail eft machines working paper 79 1 fdic 1979

do unions reduce investment evidence from canada the authors test for a link between unionization and net investment rates in canadian manufacturing analysis of data on 18 industries for the years 1967 87 reveals a negative non linear relationship the presence of unions appears to have reduced investment when the percentage of firms in the industry that were unionized was between 0 and approximately 50 with a plateau or slight positive marginal effect above this level in an industry moving from no unions to the mean level of unionization net investment and gross investment are predicted to fall by 66 74 and 18 25 respectively

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

cyclical productivity in europe and the united states evaluating the evidence on returns to scale and input utilization this paper studies procyclical productivity growth at the industry level in the united states and three european countries france germany and the netherlands industry specific demand side instruments are used to examine the prevalence of non constant returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization for the aggregate us economy unmeasured input utilization seems to explain procyclical productivity however this correction still leaves one in three us industries with procyclical productivity this failure of the model can also be seen in europe and is mostly concentrated in services industries

union wage differentials product market influences and the division of rents this paper examines the extent to which product market conditions limit the ability of trade unions to establish wage differentials over nonunion pay the mean union pay differential is estimated to be of the order of 8 percent to 10 percent in establishments with some degree of product market power but zero in establishments facing competitive product market conditions when competitive conditions are faced a preentry closed shop and high union coverage of the industry are both required it is estimated that only 5 percent of the establishments in which there are significant differentials over nonunion pay face generally competitive product market conditions copyright 1990 by royal economic society

the union impact on profits evidence from industry price cost margin data this paper uses industry price cost margin data to estimate the extent to which unions reduce profits estimates allowing for the endogeneity of union status are contrasted with estimates that assume union status is exogenous and not determined in part by either profitability or industry structure endogeneity is found to be an important consideration in estimating the union impact on profits two stage estimates are considerably larger than ols estimates the final section explores the total estimated redistribution from capital to labor in the manufacturing sector an important conclusion is that unions raise prices less than was previously believed

structural change and financing constraints abstract in a multi industry growth model firms need external funds for productivity enhancing r d and face financing constraints the cost of research differs across industries so financing constraints hinder industry productivity growth unevenly equilibrium industry dynamics map into a differences in differences regression specification where industry growth depends on the interaction between country financial development and industry r d intensity the paper provides a framework for interpreting several empirical results that rely on industry growth data in terms of r d induced technology transfer and identifies a new channel for finance to encourage aggregate growth the reallocation of resources towards sectors with rapidly expanding technological frontiers

the competitive conditions in the oecd manufacturing industry the goal of this study was to assess the intensity of competition in the oecd manufacturing industry by using the panzar and rosse index over the period 1970 2011 for this purpose we use the fully modified ols method and second generation unit root analysis to investigate the level of competition across two digit manufacturing sectors the results are robust and consistent with similar studies leading to the rejection of perfect collusion and perfect competition while providing evidence in favour of monopolistic competition similarly to other empirical studies h statistics are shown to be heterogeneous across manufacturing sectors we argue that more concentrated sectors such as food and beverages motor vehicles and furniture have low levels of h statistic being thus less competitive than other industries i e computers transportation equipment printing and chemicals where the h statistic is closer to unity lastly our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural micro economic

efficient wage bargaining as a repeated game this paper builds a bridge between the two existing approaches for wage and employment determination in a unionized market the monopoly union model and the efficient bargaining model both fail to capture the dynamic aspects of wage bargaining when the repeated nature of the wage bargaining process is considered the equilibria are neither as inefficient as the monopoly union model predicts nor as fully efficient rather the two models can be regarded as particular cases with certain discount rates we apply our model to issues such as the endgame interpretation of the u s steel industry wage concessions and featherbedding

panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections summary consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of hall s framework for estimating price cost margins we show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue which can be characterized by a joint market imperfections parameter using an unbalanced panel of 10 646 french firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978 2001 we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market by far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market ic eb followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right to manage bargaining in the labor market ic pr and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market pc mo for each of these three predominant regimes we assess within regime firm differences in the estimated average price cost mark up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters following the swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion to assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime ic eb we also relate our industry and firm level estimates of price cost mark up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm specific variables respectively copyright 2011 john wiley sons ltd

the value of public information in monopoly the logic of the linkage principle of milgrom and weber 1982 extends to price discrimination a non linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information a liated to the valuation of the buyer

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

efficient bargains and the mcdonald solow conjecture this article explores the mcdonald and solow 1981 conjecture that the outcome from a bargain over wages and employment can be approximately achieved by a bargain over wages and the labor capital ratio the crew size where the latter can be argued to be more representative of the real world i derive a crew size contract curve and show that this conjecture is not generally true a test to determine which model is generating real world data is suggested the wage rigidity results derived by mcdonald and solow for their contract curve do not apply to this crew size contract curve

can imperfect competition explain the difference between primal and dual productivity measures estimates for u s manufacturing it is well known that under the assumptions of constant returns to scale perfect competition and the absence of factor hoarding primal and dual productivity measures should be highly correlated the apparent lack of correlation is usually attributed to fixed factors of production in this paper i propose an alternative explanation by relaxing the assumption of perfect competition by controlling for the presence of a markup component i demonstrate that both productivity measures are in fact highly correlated for u s manufacturing the analysis also provides an alternative method of estimating a markup of prices over marginal cost that avoids certain difficulties inherent in some existing methods of estimation

labour markets bargaining and innovation much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on rd ii under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off we survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that r d is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another we show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned thus when firms and unions can enter into long term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase decrease r d spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise respectively fall however when r d falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off when firms and unions engage in short term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause r d to fall when bargaining is over wages alone however when bargaining takes place over wages and employment then if unions care a lot about employment the relationship between union strength and r d is inverse u shaped

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

rent sharing and wages evidence from company and establishment panels a central question in labor economics and macroeconomics is whether the textbook competitive model provides an adequate representation of the labor market using longitudinal data on companies and establishments this article suggests that it may not as predicted by rent sharing models of the labor market changes in profitability are shown to feed through into long run changes in wages these are not temporary wage effects and are not driven by the unionized workplaces in the data the article s estimates imply that for rent sharing reasons alone lester s range of wages is approximately 16

effects of seller s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post auction investment abstract we consider a moral hazard issue inherent in the equity auctions of assets such as oil and gas leases and corporate takeovers after the auction the winning bidder decides whether to make follow up investments in the acquired asset and makes the equity payment out of the revenue from it according to the auction outcome before the auction the seller holds private information about the possible returns on that investment and must decide whether to disclose it larger equity payments undermine incentives to invest reducing the impact of information revealed by the seller on expected values of the asset to a winning bidder thus information disclosure makes bids less aggressive in expectation expected seller revenues may be higher when she does not disclose her private information than when she commits to publicly announcing it regardless of whether it is good or bad

bargaining structures and delay in innovation it is sometimes argued that fears about the employment consequences of introducing new technology may lead unions to wish to delay innovations and this may reduce incentives for firm to carry out r d we explore these issues in a model of two countries that compete over both market share and r d and we restrict attention to cases where unions would wish to delay innovation we show that allowing unions to bargain over the timing of innovation need not reduce the possibility of a firm successfully competing for r d however simulations suggest that for a particular model allowing unions to delay innovation does not help a firm compete over r d

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

optimal auctions with endogenous budgets we study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets before bidding a bidder decides how much money she will borrow bidders incur a cost to borrowing we show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first price second price and all pay auction the all pay auction gives higher revenue than the first price auction which gives higher revenue than the second price auction in addition when the distribution of values satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition the revenue maximizing auction is implemented by an all pay auction with a suitably chosen reserve price

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

scale effects time varying markups and the cyclical behaviour of primal and dual productivity this paper presents estimates of the degree of returns to scale using nonparametric measures of primal and dual productivity for 2 digit us manufacturing industries as part of the analysis the cyclical behaviour of primal and dual productivity measures are considered time varying markups are allowed for and the small sample properties of the instrumental variables estimator used to derive the estimates from the primal and dual relations examined both the primal and dual estimates indicate the existence of increasing returns to scale for the durable goods industries the simulation results indicate there is a slight tendency for the dual equation estimates to overestimate the degree of returns to scale however small sample bias appears to be most severe for the non durable goods industries

estimation of price cost margins and union bargaining power for belgian manufacturing abstract this paper extends hall s 1988 hall r e 1988 the relationship between price and marginal cost in us industry journal of political economy 96 921 947 methodology to analyze imperfections in both the product and the labor market for firms in the belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988 1995 we investigate the heterogeneity in price cost mark up and workers bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry as well as the relationship between both parameters using a sample of more than 7000 firms our gmm results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labor market leads to an underestimation of the price cost margin evaluated at perfect competition in the labor market these findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis sectors with higher workers bargaining power typically show higher price cost margins

the impact of union management cooperation on productivity and employment this study examines the effects of union management cooperative programs on productivity and employment the author collected productivity and employment data for each of nine manufacturing plants at monthly time intervals over a period of four to five years from two years before to at least two years after the introduction of the cooperative program regression analysis of these time series data is supplemented by qualitative data from personal interviews and relevant records the results show that after introduction of the cooperative programs productivity increased in six of the eight firms in which it could be measured and employment remained stable in eight of the nine firms

the dynamics of industrial mark ups in two small open economies does national competition policy matter abstract in this paper we investigate the impact of competition policy on the level and the dynamics of firm price cost margins in two european countries belgium and the netherlands we study three questions i did the changes in the competition law and policy that took place in belgium in 1993 have an effect on the level and the evolution of the price cost margins of firms ii are price mark ups in the netherlands where there was no strict competition policy until recently higher than in belgium iii is openness import competition sufficient to discipline firm behaviour we find that the introduction of a new competition policy in belgium did not have any effect on the price mark ups in belgium we also find that mark ups in the netherlands are higher than those in belgium finally we find that import competition does not lead to lower price cost margins we offer a number of explanations and implications

unions and investment in british industry this paper presents an empirical analysis of investment in british industry using data at the industry level and focusing on union effects the authors find that the rate of investment is around 28 percent lower in firms that recognize unions and have an average union density relative to those in which unions are not recognized this is the gross effect holding wages product prices and productivity constant if we take account of union effects on these as well the overall effect is an investment reduction of 16 percent in competitive firms and 3 percent in noncompetitive firms copyright 1992 by royal economic society

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry an examination of data on output and labor input reveals that some u s industries have marginal cost well below price the conclusion rests on the finding that cyclical variations in labor input are small compared with variations in output in booms firms produce substantially more output and sell it for a price that exceeds the costs of the added inputs the paper documents the disparity between price and marginal cost where marginal cost is estimated from annual variations in cost it considers a variety of explanations of the findings that are consistent with competition but none is found to be completely plausible

budget constraints and demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions the possibility even if arbitrarily small of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders values unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero

bargaining power fear of disagreement and wage settlements theory and evidence from u s industry the paper develops and estimates a theoretical model of wage determination and union nonunion wage differentials in order to overcome the institutional ctiticisms of the formal bargaining literature the paper generalizes the nash zeuthen harsanyi model by linking the solution to the institutional concepts of bargaining power and fear or cost of disagreement and by making the outcome depend not only on endogenous but also on exogenous factors an operational specification of bargaining power and fear of disagreement allows the model to be estimated with data covering twelve companies and trade unions during the period from mid 1950 s to the late 1970 s while giving limited support to the nashzeuthen harsanyi solution the empirical analysis indicates that the bargaining outcome usually deviates from the nash zeuthen harsanyi point and in accordance with the institutionalist claim that it varies significantly with exogenous factors contrary to the traditional labor economics view the results do not support the general conclusion that the bargaining solution lies on the marginal revenue product curve of labor instead the relevant coefficients suggest that for many firms and unions the outcome might be better characterized by the efficient contract vertical contract curve

endogenous scope of firm union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons abstract there is strong evidence that employees motivation and incentives in the workplace are affected by vertical pay comparisons in a stylized cournot duopoly model with firm specific unions that institutionalize workers vertical fairness concerns we show that universal wage employment w e bargaining may arise as the equilibrium scope of bargaining institution we thus propose that intra firm vertical fairness concerns may resolve the mismatch between recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market institutions and the predictions of traditional models that universal w e bargaining will never arise in equilibrium the scope of bargaining puzzle we derive a number of testable hypotheses that address the recent shift towards more decentralized bargaining institutions the decline in unions bargaining power and the prevalence of w e bargaining

labor hoarding and the business cycle this paper investigates the sensitivity of solow residual based measures of technology shocks to labor hoarding behavior using a structural model of labor hoarding and the identifying restriction that innovations to technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations in government consumption we estimate the fraction of the variability of the solow residual that is due to technology shocks our results support the view that a significant proportion of movements in the solow residual are artifacts of labor hoarding behavior specifically we estimate that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than that implied by standard real business cycle models in addition our results suggest that existing real business cycle studies substantially overstate the extent to which technology shocks account for the variability of postwar aggregate u s output

union firm efficient bargaining and test of oligopolistic conduct this paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfection in product and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination based on a translog function defined at the firm level estimates for the belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of product market power which is significantly eroded by union wage rents

equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders the two bidder case we study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders we prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions comparative static results are provided journal of economic literature classification number d44

the war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information we provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue our example suggests that information non revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact

estimating the degree of market power in the beef packing industry a technique for assessing the degree of monopoly power developed by appelbaum 1979 1982 is extended here to permit measurement of monopsony power as well data from the u s beef packing industry are examined the results reveal small but statistically significant monopoly monopsony price distortions in slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets but in spite of a recent trend toward heightened concentration in the industry give no indication that performance has become appreciably less competitive of late this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

productivity shocks and real business cycles abstract productivity shocks play a central role in real business cycles as an exogenous impulse to macroeconomic activity however measured solow prescott residuals do not behave as an exogenous impulse rather econometric evidence provided in this paper indicates that 1 money interest rates and government spending granger cause these impulses and 2 a substantial component of the variance of these impulses between one quarter and one half is attributable to variations in aggregate demand these results are robust to a number of econometric issues including measurement errors specification of the production function and certain forms of omitted real variables

raw materials profits and the productivity slowdown a factor price frontier framework is used to clarify the analogy of an increase decrease in raw material prices with autonomous technological regress progress factor price profiles are estimated for the manufacturing sector of the united states the united kingdom germany and japan the production model in conjunction with estimates obtained from the factor price frontier attributes much of the slowdown in manufacturing productivity to the rise in relative raw material prices part of the apparent productivity riddle may have to do with the use of double deflated national accounting measures of value added which have an inherent measurement bias

labour markets and innovation ex post bargaining abstract there is considerable interest in how labour market conditions affect innovation lying behind much of the existing work on this question is a simple model of a single union bargaining with a single firm in which in the absence of binding contracts the union reduces the returns to innovation without bearing any of the costs this misses an important feature of some rd with efficient contracts there are cases where being faced with a stronger union will help a firm to win a patent race it would otherwise have lost

on the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders abstract this paper provides a class of examples of two bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value we show that the seller s expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy the intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows in the presence of financial constraints the bidders upward response in their bids to the seller s good signals is limited by their financial constraints while their downward response to bad signals is not

the strategic choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda abstract this article analyzes the optimal choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda i e right to manage versus efficient bargaining under possible market entry it is shown that agreement by both the union and the incumbent firm about efficient bargaining emerges as equilibrium in nash strategies even more so under non blockaded entry for deterrence motives this is consistent with the common empirical findings that unionized firms do not behave according to the prediction of the right to manage model that employment will be on the labor demand curve the entry deterrence effect highlighted in this paper also suggests that labor market organization should not be overlooked as a component of the welfare analysis of product market competition

determinants of official opec crude prices the hypothesis of this paper is that crude oil like any other unfinished commodity is valued for the products derived from it the purpose is to offer an empirical explanation for changes in the crude price charged by the members of opec the model results show that the market clearing prices reported to prevail for petroleum products on the principal petroleum spot market at rotterdam are the primary determinants of changes in official crude prices a systematic relationship between offical and spot prices is argued to have prevailed since 1974 an appendix clarifies five types of data required for the model 13 references 4 tables

the value of an informed bidder in common value auctions abstract i compare two information structures in a common value first price auction with two bidders in one each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object and in the other one of the bidders learns his opponent s signal as well gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the bidders signals and better off if it is supermodular if the value is supermodular then the seller s revenue tends to be lower with the informed bidder than without

implausible results or implausible data anomalies in the construction of value added data and implications for estimates of price cost markups in a recent article in this journal robert hall 1988 argued that many american industries charge prices well above marginal costs suggesting either that firms fail to maximize profits or that the possession of substantial market power by firms is the rule rather than the exception hall found price exceeding marginal cost not only in manufacturing where high concentration and the plausible existence of important economies of scale suggest the importance of market power but in relatively unconcentrated nonmanufacturing industries as well subsequent research has confirmed hall s claim that price exceeds marginal cost in u s manufacturing industries domowitz hubbard and petersen 1988 applied hall s method to a more detailed and complete manufacturing data set and rejected the null of price equal to marginal cost at high levels of significance hall however analyzes nonmanufacturing industries as well since theories of the causes of markups can be tested more easily with a larger sample of industries and since further work to uncover the determinants and welfare effects of the market power apparently possessed by u s firms would

the joint estimation of bank level market power and efficiency the aim of this study is to provide a methodology for the joint estimation of efficiency and market power of individual banks the proposed method utilizes the separate implications of the new empirical industrial organization and the stochastic frontier literatures and suggests identification using the local maximum likelihood lml technique through lml estimation of market power of individual banks becomes feasible while a number of restrictive theoretical and empirical assumptions are relaxed the empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of emu bank data market power estimates indicate fairly competitive conduct in general however heterogeneity in market power estimates is substantial across banks the latter result suggests that the practice of some banks deviates from the average fairly competitive behavior a finding that has important policy implications finally efficiency and market power present a negative relationship which is in line with the so called quiet life hypothesis

opec in world financial markets oil prices and interest rates abstract this article examines the relationship between the real rate of interest in world financial markets and the price of oil if opec cannot be viewed as a small participant in world financial markets and should its savings and portfolio behavior differ from that of the rest of the world then wealth shifts to or from opec would affect world interest rates subsequently this paper examines the magnitude of oil price changes required to elicit a significant interest rate change our empirical results shed light on opec s behavior which at times may differ from a pure profit maximizing cartel the short run price elasticity of the world demand for oil is 0 04 and the long run elasticity is 0 10 opec itself as expected faces higher elasticities of 0 08 and 0 36 respectively the demand elasticity of oil with respect to world gnp is 0 8 a major objective of this paper has been to determine the effect of changes in oil prices on world interest rates and vice versa our results imply that only very large oil price increases will have a significant impact on world interest rates however oil prices show a non negligible sensitivity to changes in world interest rates