investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries we examine investment by firms in 24 chemical product industries to determine whether firms invest preemptively to achieve persistent increases in market share or whether there is evidence of behavior to maintain market share the data indicate that investment reduces the probability that rival firms will expand capacity but the effect is temporary large firms tend to maintain market share while smaller firms tend to invest simultaneously with rivals the role of preemptive investment is limited to that of permitting a firm to invest with a lower probability of redundant investment by rivals preemption does not allow a persistent increase in market share but instead acts as a means by which firms may coordinate capacity investment to help avoid episodes of industry overcapacity

grading minimum quality standards and the labeling of genetically modified products we relate the labeling of genetically modified gm products to the theory of grading and minimum quality standards the model represents three stages in the supply chain assumes a vertical product differentiation framework allows for the accidental commingling of non gm products and treats regulation as a purity threshold for non gm products we find that a non gm purity level that is too strict leads to the disappearance of the non gm product and that some quality standard benefits farmers indeed the standard that is optimal from the perspective of producers is stricter than what is optimal for consumers and for societal welfare

on mqs regulation innovation and market coverage abstract we revisit maxwell s 1998 analysis to show that his results are incompatible with the assumption of full market coverage as a consequence the effects of mqs regulation on the high quality firm s incentive to adopt a more efficient technology cannot be assessed in this model

stimulating different types of eco innovation in the uk government policies and firm motivations in this paper we adopt a recent oecd framework and examine the role of external policy tools and internal firm specific factors for stimulating three different types of eco innovations that range on a spectrum of lower to higher technological and environmental impacts end of pipeline pollution control technologies integrated cleaner production technologies and environmental r d using a novel firm level dataset from a defra survey we estimate a tobit model which provides empirical evidence showing that these eco innovations are motivated by different external policy tools and internal firm specific factors our findings indicate that end of pipeline technologies and integrated cleaner production technologies are mainly driven by equipment upgrade motives with a view of improving efficiency while environmental regulations are effective in stimulating the end of pipeline technologies and environmental r d interestingly alongside government induced regulations we find that market factors mainly motivated by cost savings are effective in driving environmental r d finally iso14001 certification is effective in strengthening the positive impact of environmental management systems on both end of pipeline technologies and environmental r d while csr policies have no significant impact on motivating any of the eco innovations

excess capacity as a barrier to entry an empirical appraisal this paper examines excess capacity barriers to entry and investment dynamics in a sample of thirty eight chemical product industries logit and log linear models of investment behavior are estimated and specific case examples are considered the results show that incumbents rarely built excess capacity pre emptively in an effort to deter entry in general entrants and incumbents exhibited similar investment behavior

on the importance of the supply side in demand side management we discuss how the structure of market supply affects the evaluation of policies to promote energy efficiency in household appliances if competitive markets offer the levels that consumers demand product standards inefficiently restrict choice if suppliers price discriminate minimum standards can restrict the inefficient use of energy intensity to segment consumers we also compare the effects of average intensity standards energy prices and innovation and consider what the different behavioral predictions imply for empirical studies of energy efficiency good policymaking requires knowing not only how consumers value energy efficiency in their decision making but also how producers respond to those values

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

capacity signals and entry deterrence abstract if potential entrant firms are well informed they will generally not believe incumbent s threats to expand output when experiencing entry but this expectation underlies most excess capacity models we demonstrate an asymmetric information equilibrium in which potential entrants rationally fear output expansion by oligopolists with excess capacity less effective collusive oligopolies may be destabilized expanding output upon entry one symptom of less effective collusion is excess capacity hence excess capacity becomes a signal of the potential for output expansion in a rational expectations equilibrium this signal may also be mimicked by oligopolies which would not otherwise carry excess capacity

spatially correlated exit strategies in the baking industry this article uses a unique data set to analyse economic factors that explain firm exit and the interrelation across firms in space when exiting results show the effectiveness of modelling spatial correlation in a logit exit model indeed in our application reliable statistical results could only be drawn from our data when including spatial correlation in the model

intra plant diffusion of new technology role of productivity in the study of steel refining furnaces abstract this paper examines intra plant diffusion of new technology in the japanese steel industry the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace bof was the greatest breakthrough in steel refining in the last century using unique panel data the paper estimates total factor productivity by technology type and associates the estimates with intra plant diffusion the paper finds that intra plant diffusion accounts for about a half of the industry productivity growth large plants are likely to adopt the new technology earlier but retain the old technology longer than their smaller counterparts

excess capacity and entry some empirical evidence recent articles by spence i977 dixit i979 and schmalensee i98i have elaborated on wenders i97i1 proposition that excess capacity can act as a barrier to entry the intent of all of these treatments is to suggest that firms may rationally invest in excess capacity with the expectation that excess capacity will be seen by potential entrants either as a signal of aggressive intent or as a credible threat 2 when excess capacity does not lead to creation of a credible threat it may still act as a barrier to entry by shifting the risk return perceptions of potential entrants enough to divert the potential entrants investments into other industries 3 alternatively investment in excess capacity by incumbent firms may reduce the prospects of an active market for the used equipment of a defunct entrant and thereby help to convert fixed costs into sunk costs consequently raising entry barriers 4 this paper represents an exploratory effort to investigate empirically the prevalence and efficiency of excess capacity in deterring entry first a simple and traditional model of entry is presented this is followed by the description of the data used to explore the excess capacity investment concept a combined results and comments section follows the description of the data

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation abstract most models of minimum quality standards do not deal with the dynamic nature of regulation this note shows that presence of minimum quality standards may reduce firm incentives to innovate leading to a lower level of social welfare under regulation

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

rank stock order and epidemic effects in the diffusion of new process technologies an empirical model in this article we construct a general duration model of technology adoption that incorporates the main factors discussed in different theories of diffusion of new process technologies the model is applied to data on diffusion of cnc in the uk engineering industry although we find strong evidence in support of rank and endogenous learning effects there seems to be little evidence in support of the stock and order effects the main factors affecting the diffusion of cnc are found to be endogenous learning firm size industry growth rates the cost of the technology and expected changes in the cost of the technology

the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies the study of intra firm diffusion has largely been neglected and the limited extant literature overwhelmingly relies upon uncertainty reduction via information spreading or epidemic learning as the main driver in this paper an alternative approach is taken whereby the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies reflects the profitability of new technology adoption as proxied by firm characteristics the approach is tested using data relating to the diffusion of computer numerically controlled machine tools within firms in the uk engineering and metalworking sectors the empirical analysis does not reject the hypothesis that profitability considerations are important with a number of firm characteristics being isolated as of special relevance including firm size and the use of complementary technologies and managerial techniques however there is little support for the traditional epidemic effect

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

noncooperative entry deterrence uncertainty and the free rider problem previous authors who have considered the issue of noncooperative entry deterrence have not found the free rider problem to be a significant factor these authors however have only considered models in which the exact investment needed to deter entry is known with certainty in this paper i add uncertainty to the models investigated by these previous authors and demonstrate that the free rider problem can be significant but is not so in all cases that is for certain types of entry deterring investments the introduction of uncertainty causes the oligopoly to underinvest in entry deterrence however for other types no underinvestment result arises

import competition product quality reversal and welfare abstract we investigate product quality in an import competing country using the framework of vertical product differentiation comparison of three polices suggests that the quality based r d subsidy brings quality reversal leading to a win win win equilibrium in consumer surplus domestic profit and social welfare

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

innocuous minimum quality standards abstract the present note shows that innocuous minimum quality standards namely below the lowest quality level in a market may have effects on equilibrium outcomes such a mqs reduces the incentive to invest in r d by the quality leading firm

interdependences in the intrafirm diffusion of technological innovations confronting the rational and social accounts of diffusion this article investigates the intrafirm diffusion of technological innovations and the interdependences that exist among rival firms in this process previous research has offered two potential explanations for these interdependences social accounts in which they result from institutional pressures and rational accounts in which firms are interdependent as a result of how adoption by rivals affects expectations about the profitability of the technology the article offers two contributions first we propose a competitive interaction mechanism that is consistent with the fundamentals of rational accounts of diffusion second the empirical analysis shows the dominance of the proposed rational mechanism over social accounts of innovation diffusion in the generation of interdependences in the process of intrafirm diffusion

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

entry industry growth and the microdynamics of industry supply entry is widely discussed but rarely subjected to empirical study this study develops a competitive theory of entry with primary focus on the relationship between entry and industry growth the main ingredients are adjustment costs to firms already in the industry and the distribution of fixed entry cost to potential entrants the theory suggests sufficient conditions under which the entry rate is an increasing convex function of the industry growth rate a regression model correcting for severe heteroscedasticity is applied to data from swedish manufacturing industries the results are consistent with the theoretical prediction for growth and other key variables expected to influence entry significantly

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

inter and intra firm effects in the diffusion of new process technology using primarily the example of computerised numerically controlled machine tools cnc in the uk metalworking and engineering industry it is shown that even many years after the date of first use of a new technology although the larger proportion of firms may be using that technology because the extent of intra firm diffusion is limited the proportion of total industry output produced on that technology may be quite small using backward projection techniques it is further shown that intra firm diffusion tends to lag behind inter firm diffusion over the whole of the diffusion process and inter firm diffusion patterns and extent may thus be poor indicators of overall diffusion although intra firm diffusion is therefore crucial to the understanding of overall diffusion patterns the existing literature relating to it has severe limitations and there are no associated policy results it is argued that much greater emphasis should be placed on intra firm issues in future diffusion research it is also suggested that discussions of intra firm policy could usefully proceed within the context of already established general diffusion policy principles

firm size and the adoption of flexible automation data on the diffusion of flexible automation systems in the italian metalworking industry are used to point out the role of size for the adoption of complex systemic innovations plant and firm sizes turn out to be positively correlated to adoption rates moreover adoption is more likely ceteris paribus in plants which are part of large industrial groups this pattern applies in general and is particularly remarkable for more advanced solutions in this light guidelines for industrial policies that focus on financial support the diffusion of industrial standards and the correction of asymmetries in the availability of know how and skills are proposed

e business usage across and within firms in the uk profitability externalities and policy using data from the third uk community innovation survey we model the usage of e business across and within firms in the uk in the year 2000 as a single observation upon an integrated process of inter and intra firm diffusion the intra firm dimension is a significant extension to standard analysis the model estimates indicate that the pattern of e business usage reflects the heterogeneity of firms in terms of size other innovative activity and labour force skills generating differences in the payoffs to use as well as market and non market intermediated externalities the policy implications of the findings are discussed c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the welfare loss due to strategic investment in excess capacity abstract this paper explores a linear model of excess capacity as a barrier to entry the resultant welfare cost is compared with that of a simple monopolist who does not face an entry threat the threat of entry may actually reduce social welfare when potential consumer surplus is high economies of scale have a non linear effect reducing social cost if there is exces capacity but having the opposite effect when limit pricing is optimal empirical measures of the social cost of monopoly power are found to be poor proxies in the presence of strategic behaviour

capacity and entry under demand uncertainty this paper examines the decision to enter into a sector dominated by a monopoly if demand is random at entry time given a two period world the monopolist enters initially and enjoys an uncontested monopoly for one period while the entrant may enter and compete during the second period demand is random one period earlier and independently distributed in both periods and enitry corresponds to an irreversible capacity choice made under certain deimand all other production decisions take place after demand has been revealed risk neutrality is assumed on both sides if entry occurs then there is a cournot duopoly in the second period it is shown that concurrently with this cournot production game there is a separate stackelbergtype game with capacities as decision variables entry deterrence conditions are derived under general demand and cost assumptions it is shown that demand uncertainty changes several of the results of similar certain demand models

inventory holding as a strategic weapon to deter entry recent papers by dixit 1980 and eaton and lipsey 1981 have explored the strategic use of committed product specific capital by an incumbent firm in order to influence a post entry equilibrium and in some cases make entry unattractive by committing or sinking part of the production costs prior to entry the incumbent creates a credible shift in its own reaction function if entry should occur in this way the payoffs in the post entry equilibrium can be influenced to the incumbent s advantage the entry game thus consists of two stages the first in which the incumbent is able to strategically commit itself prior to entry and the second or post entry period in which a duopoly equilibrium is realized the more costs that are put up front by the incumbent the greater is the post entry output it will wish to sell for a given output of the entrant and the lower will be the resulting equilibrium price if the set up or fixed costs of entry are sufficiently high entry may be rendered unprofitable this paper extends the idea in a natural way all the production costs of a quantity of output can be sunk or committed by stockpiling inventory of the product the stock of inventory held by the incumbent firm represents a credible shift in its reaction function in response to entry in the following way the inventory is a stock that can be sold off over time in a way consistent with intertemporal profit maximization constrained by the presence of the entrant moreover the threat to sell off the inventory in response to entry is credible since given that entry has occurred the opportunity cost of the inventory is zero it seems reasonable to require that any strategic asymmetry between incumbent and entrant should be restricted to commitments made by the former prior to entry conditional on such commitments the post entry game should give neither firm a strategic advantage this requirement is the same as the game theoretic concept of perfectness 1 entry can be credibly deterred because the entrant knows that were entry to take place it would be in the incumbent s own interest to follow the anticipated sales programme of inventory in order to demonstrate that entry may be deterred by holding a stock of inventory that is sufficiently large that deterrence can be made the perfect equilibrium of the complete entry game the properties of the equilibrium with entry must be derived the post entry equilibrium is modelled here as a pair of nash strategies in sales programmes if the sales programme anticipated by the entrant in the post entry equilibrium implies a negative present value entry will be deterred thus successful entry deterrence implies that the equilibrium with entry is never realized the incumbent can then continue to receive monopoly profits less the holding cost of the inventory which serves as a credible deterrent to entry but is never sold

impacts of minimum quality standards imposed through marketing orders or related producer organizations we analyze the impacts of minimum quality standards mqs imposed by producers acting collectively through a producer organization such as a marketing order mqs imposed in a competitive market can never enhance social welfare because in general an mqs creates two deadweight losses one due to inefficient enhancement of product quality and a second due to wastage of the low quality product any mqs that a competitive industry implements based upon a profit criterion causes all consumers in the market to be harmed however an mqs may be preferred relative to supply control as a second best instrument for transferring income to producers