the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

term limits and pork barrel politics abstract we develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re election decisions we characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare contributions of our paper include we detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes pork provision transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents especially incumbents in small or poor districts pork provision can explain why re election probabilities in congress exceed those for governors term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision we characterize the welfare of all voters not just the median voter

incorporating model uncertainty in cost effectiveness analysis a bayesian model averaging approach recently several authors have proposed the use of linear regression models in cost effectiveness analysis in this paper by modelling costs and outcomes using patient and health centre covariates we seek to identify the part of the cost or outcome difference that is not attributable to the treatment itself but to the patients condition or to characteristics of the centres selection of the covariates to be included as predictors of effectiveness and cost is usually assumed by the researcher this behaviour ignores the uncertainty associated with model selection and leads to underestimation of the uncertainty about quantities of interest we propose the use of bayesian model averaging as a mechanism to account for such uncertainty about the model data from a clinical trial are used to analyze the effect of incorporating model uncertainty by comparing two highly active antiretroviral treatments applied to asymptomatic hiv patients the joint posterior density of incremental effectiveness and cost and cost effectiveness acceptability curves are proposed as decision making measures

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

setting the agenda electoral competition commitment of policy and issue salience by committing policy an incumbent in effect disowns an issue when she maintains policy flexibility the issue remains electorally salient electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multi dimensional issue space into a low dimensional space of electorally salient issues

on the feasibility of unpopular policies under re election concerns 1 introduction a common concern about political decision making is that re election motives lead incumbent politicians to select policies that although popular among the electorate are inferior to available less popular alternatives this concern reflected in the notions such as demagogy and mob rule implies that politicians may be penalized for choosing policies that they believe to be the best but ironically are rewarded for choosing popular policies that they do not necessarily believe to be the best in this paper i study this common concern through a series of models 1 for the main model that i will study politicians differ only in utility from holding office the main result is that strong re election motives on the part of the incumbent politicians in general do not render efficient and unpopular policies infeasible in fact i will show that under very general conditions voters voting decisions do not depend on whether the incumbents have chosen popular policy options nor are incumbents policy decisions responsive to policy popularity we may call this result the irrelevance or neutrality of policy popularity note that voters only have limited information and there is a possibility that the unpopular policy may be superior to its alternatives voters would take their policy opinions as tentative and be willing to revise them upon the arrival of new information then an incumbent s re election chances will not deteriorate simply because of her choice of unpopular policies foreseeing this incumbents with even strong re election motives will not find it beneficial to choose popular but inefficient polices 2 to convey the above ideas i will examine an infinite horizon political agency model along the line pioneered by barro 1973 there are two important ingredients in this model first politicians are of two types strong and weak both types of politicians are concerned about both social welfare and the utility gained from holding office whereas the strong type puts a smaller weight on the latter each politician s type is the politician s private information if the politicians were homogeneous the choice between different incumbents would be inconsequential if their heterogeneity were public information voters would not need the politicians past records to infer their preferred future policies in either case the question of policy manipulation would no longer exist in section 6 i will introduce a third type of politicians the second ingredient is a proper modelling of a policy that could be unpopular but potentially superior a policy is popular when more voters think that the policy will yield a welfare greater than those of its alternatives such a policy s popularity reflects its ex ante efficiency as perceived by the electorate the incumbent politician nevertheless observes an additional imperfect information signal about the likely efficacy of the policy 3 therefore a popular policy might be interim inefficient whereas an unpopular policy might be interim efficient one crucial assumption for the policy popularity irrelevance result is that the only difference among politicians is their utility derived from holding office this suggests that for policy popularity to be relevant other sorts of heterogeneity among politicians are needed suppose for instance that the public believes with some probability that the incumbent is ignorant in the sense that she knows about different policy options even less than the public does then a choice of an unpopular policy might signal the incumbent s ignorance an incumbent who is informed but with a strong re election motive might then reject the unpopular policy even if it is interim efficient the rest of the paper is organized as follows section 2 introduces the model section 3 prepares preliminaries for later sections section 4 establishes the efficient perfect bayesian equilibrium under the assumption that voters vote for the candidate who has a greater probability of being strong

sequential elections and overlapping terms voting for us senate abstract this paper presents a model in which voters attempt to balance the ideological positions of their senate representatives candidate positions are determined endogenously through a primary system the median voter theorem is applied in each election to determine winning platforms based on voter preferences which may differ from their individual bliss points contrary to the original median voter theorem the main implications of this model are that i convergence on platform positions is not achieved in the general election and ii extremist candidates defeat moderates in the stable long run equilibrium

extremism campaigning and ambiguity this paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform we find that the farther away parties are from each other on average the less resources are spent on campaigning on average thus if parties are extreme less information is supplied than if parties are moderate we also show that if a public subsidy is introduced we have policy convergence given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy

party polarization in legislatures with office motivated candidates we develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties median legislators as long as election outcomes are sufficiently predictable the only stable equilibria exhibit policy divergence between the parties if the degree of uncertainty about election outcomes decreases and if voters place less weight on local candidates valence polarization between the parties increases furthermore a systematic electoral shock makes the party favored by the shock more moderate while the disadvantaged party becomes more extreme finally we examine data on state elections and the ideological positions of state legislatures and find patterns that are consistent with key predictions of our model

the dynamic effects of money combining short run and long run identifying restrictions using bayesian techniques this paper proposes a bayesian approach to incorporating specification and identification uncertainty into a var analysis of the dynamic effects of money supply shocks on the macroeconomy the approach follows poirier 1991 in averaging over discrete model specifications in forming posterior densities of the dynamic responses to such shocks two distinct means of identifying money supply shocks are considered here one that imposes contemporaneous restrictions and one that imposes long run monetary neutrality i estimate bounds on dynamic responses that account for specification and parameter uncertainty and find strong evidence of short run real effects of money on the economy including a liquidity effect for both long term and short term interest rates furthermore some results differ substantially across identifying restrictions if model uncertainty is ignored

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

corporate campaign contributions repeat giving and the rewards to legislator reputation abstract are politicians who follow a strategy of reputational development rewarded with high levels of corporate campaign contributions reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to greater campaign contributions from favored interests alternatively such clarity could alienate those who disagree and prevent the politician from obtaining contributions from groups on both sides of an issue we outline an approach that considers conditions under which a politician would or would not prefer reputational development and policy stance clarity and consistency in the context of repeat dealing with special interests our proxy for reputational development is the percentage of repeat givers to a legislator using data on corporate political action committee pac contributions to members of the u s house during the seven electoral cycles from 1983 84 to 1995 96 we explore a variety of alternative hypotheses and find that greater reputational development is rewarded with g

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

money demand revisited an operational subjective approach summary this paper proposes a method of data analysis founded on the philosophy and understanding of uncertain knowledge developed by bruno de finetti specifically the paper investigates the informational content of interest rates for the prediction of ml this empirical application replicates that of cooley and leroy 1981 and mcaleer pagan and volker 1985 but the procedures and their interpretation follow the operational subjective approach the issue of an autocorrelated error structure is recast in the operational subjective context methods are developed to assess the interest sensitivity of the demand for money in this context this paper illustrates an operational method of data analysis in the context of linear models the procedures advocated are founded on the subjective theory of probability originated by bruno definetti 1974 1975 and enhanced by l j savage 1954 this foundational position denies the existence of a true model and its concomitant parameters the function of a model is its assistance in generating predictive distributions of observable unknown quantities a model s performance at prediction is empirically observable this proposed method of econometric analysis is illustrated with an applied example taking advantage of a previous well known application confronting the appropriateness of econometric practices the example concerns money demand as measured by ml with particular emphasis on the informational content of interest rates for the forecasting distribution of ml cooley and leroy 1981 examined the estimation of money demand employing the bayesian method of extreme bounds analysis developed in leamer 1978 although bayesian in approach the method focuses on parameter estimation and retains the conviction of standard techniques in the reality of the model and in the reality of the model parameters mcaleer pagan and volker 1985 re examine the same model and data from a frequentist approach yielding an appropriate example with which to contrast the method presented here and its interpretation

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

medical interventions among pregnant women in fee for service and managed care insurance a propensity score analysis this paper extends earlier research on the effect of managed care on the receipt of four medical interventions for pregnant women ultrasound induction stimulation of birth electronic fetal monitor and caesarean delivery propensity score methods are used to account for sample selection issues regarding insurance choice managed care enrollees are more likely to receive an ultrasound which may be indicative of receiving better prenatal care managed care plans reduce the rate of caesarean deliveries but such limitations may be beneficial given the substantial medical evidence that caesarean deliveries are over utilized the results indicate that insurance coverage does influence treatment intensity but that utilization controls and provider financial incentives do not adversely affect care for pregnant women

valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models spatial models of two party or two candidatecompetition almost never have pure strategy nashequilibria when the issue space has more than onedimension this paper shows that the introduction ofvalence issues can create conditions where equilibriaexist even in a multidimensional setting we derivesufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria and characterize the spatial locations of twocompeting parties or candidates when such equilibriaexist the party with the advantage on the valencedimension will generally take a moderate position onthe positional issues we consider the implications ofthese results for public perceptions of the parties incumbency advantages and realigning elections

a new approach to the spatial theory of electoral competition in his unidimensional model of electoral competition downs argues that voters use party ideology as an informational short cut for forecasting the policies that a party will pursue if elected parties are perceived by voters as points on an ideological axis in the davis hinich multidimensional model on the other hand the axes are real issues and the principal actors are politicians who are modeled as points in the multi issue space this paper reformulates spatial voting theory in terms of a model that connects what we call predictive dimensions with political issues that are salient during a given election campaign this model is both a synthesis and an extension of the downs and davis hinich spatial models we obtain a median voter result for one predictive dimension that is similar to the downs result but with important differences we also obtain results showing the electoral advantage of incumbency and the tendency for incremental change when there is a great deal of heterogeneity in voter perceptions about the candidates

a bayesian view of nominal money and real output through a new classical macroeconomic window this study investigates the empirical evidence on the effects of unanticipated changes in nominal money on real output in 47 countries when viewed through a window i e likelihood function that assumes the neutrality of anticipated changes using a bayesian predictivist approach it provides a pedagogical bayesian analysis of generated regressor models in the face of specification uncertainty involving among other things multiple unit roots and trend stationary alternatives

candidate quality in a downsian model with a continuous policy space abstract this paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy nash equilibrium in a one dimensional downsian model of two candidate elections with a continuous policy space where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non policy advantage over the other candidate we show that if voters utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution there is a mixed strategy nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point of the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it existence conditions require the variance of the distribution to be small enough relative to the size of the advantage

party loyalty as habit formation in most democracies at least two out of any three individuals vote for the same party in sequential elections this paper presents a model in which vote persistence is partly due to the dependence of the utility on the previous voting decision this dependence is termed habit formation the model and its implications are supported by individual level panel data on the presidential elections in the usa in 1972 and 1976 for example it is found that the voting probability is a function of the lagged choice variable even when the endogeneity of the lagged variable is accounted for and that the tendency to vote for different parties in sequential elections decreased with the age of the voter furthermore using structural estimation the effect of habit is estimated while allowing unobserved differences among respondents the structural habit parameter implies that the effect of previous votes on the current decision is quite strong the habit model fits the data better than the traditional party identification model copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

a critique of the proposed tests of the natural rate rational expectations hypothesis the failure of the governments of most industrialised countries over the past decade to deal successfully with the problems of rising unemployment and high and often accelerating rates of price and wage inflation has revived interest in the pre keynesian macro economics of sound money and has renewed the controversy of the 1930 s over what governments should or should not do if they wish to achieve full employment with reasonable price stability in democratic societies keynesian economics has come under attack both by those who primarily oppose interventionist policies on ideological grounds and by the so called new classical macro economists who adhere to the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis nrh advanced by phelps i967 and friedman i 968 and the hypothesis of rational formation of expectations reh originally due to muth i96i armed with this joint natural rate rational expectations nr re hypothesis the new classical macro economists have argued that in a world capable of being represented by linear or log linear relations with a unique and stable equilibrium and no information discrepancy between the government and the private sector no government macro economic policy whether monetary or fiscal no matter how ingeniously formulated and how effectively implemented can have any systematic or lasting impact upon the level of output or the rate of unemployment 2 clearly this fundamental policy

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

imposing inequality restrictions efficiency gains from economic theory abstract econometricians may feel that imposing inequality restrictions improves statistical efficiency but no real empirical evidence exists the results of a monte carlo experiment show that imposing the curvature conditions on a system of demand equations improves the mses on estimated elasticities from 3 to 50 depending on the signal to noise ratio and the sample size

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

incumbent challenger and open seat elections in a spatial model of political competition in groseclose am j political sci 45 862 886 2001 candidates with asymmetric valence scores and varying degrees of policy motivation simultaneously choose divergent policies i take a version of the groseclose model with policy motivated candidates and extend it to allow for sequential policy announcements this may be a suitable approach for incumbent challenger elections because the incumbent s policy is typically known before the challenger s i show that policy divergence is greater when candidates announce policies sequentially as opposed to simultaneously i also show that policy motivated incumbents benefit from a first mover advantage

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

real effects of anticipated and unanticipated money some problems of estimation and hypothesis testing abstract the paper addresses two issues that arise in estimation and testing of the real effects of anticipated and unanticipated money first it is shown that identification of the effects of unanticipated or unperceived monetary growth on real output is possible only if the a priori restriction is imposed that monetary growth does not depend on unanticipated or unperceived output second the existing empirical work of barro and others does not allow for three known channels through which money can affect real variables these are 1 past and present anticipations of future monetary growth the inflation tax channel 2 expectations of monetary growth in a given period conditioned at various preceding dates the fischer phelps taylor effect and 3 past and present revisions in forecasts of future monetary growth the presence of the first of these would mean that alternative open loop monetary growth rules have real effects the presence of the other two implies that monetary feedback rules can have real effects omission of the first channel can lead to biased estimates of the effects of past anticipated monetary growth potentially serious observational equivalence problems are associated with the other two

would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation abstract we investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation we do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account namely strategic voting endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates we consider two classes of voting rules one class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally weighed votes for the different candidates the other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank orders the candidates we identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation we also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one or several of the conditions is not satisfied finally we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the borda count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders however this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria where approval voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the borda count

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

tests of rationality neutrality and market efficiency a monte carlo analysis of alternative test statistics abstract this paper examines the small sample properties of three testing strategies used to analyze the rationality monetary neutrality and market efficiency hypotheses we focus on the original two step barro test of the mre hypothesis formed entirely from ols results a test that employs the correct variance covariance formulae for these two step estimates and mishkin s fimle testing framework each test is examined under likely model respecifications the findings highlight the extensive bias incurred by drawing inferences from simple unadjusted two step estimates and reveal the relative power of all tests in identifying alternatives to the null hypotheses

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

competence and ideology we develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence voters observe an incumbent s valence and policy choices but only know the challenger s party our model provides a rich set of novel results in contrast to existing predictions from static models we prove that dynamic considerations make higher valence incumbents more likely to compromise and win re election even though they compromise to more extreme policies consequently we find that the correlation between valence and extremist policies rises with office holder seniority this result may help explain previous empirical findings despite this result we establish that the whole electorate gains from improvements in the distribution of valences in contrast fixing average valence the greater dispersion in valence associated with a high valence political elite always benefits the median voter but can harm a majority of voters when voters are sufficiently risk averse we then consider interest groups igs or activists who search for candidates with better skills we derive a complete theoretical explanation for the intuitive conjectures that policies are more extreme when igs and activists have more extreme ideologies and that such extremism reduces the welfare of all voters

an institutional theory of divided government and party polarization this paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government in the basic model two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices the legislature and the executive parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy outcomes when parties are risk averse competition for the two offices leads to a prisoner s dilemma the parties can jointly improve on the one shot nash equilibrium in which they adopt convergent positions several extensive form election games are shown to allow the parties to solve their prisoner s dilemma in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in such an equilibrium parties adopt widely separated positions and divided government and splitticket voting occur with high probability unlike typical voting models in the basic model there is no tendency for electoral equilibrium to produce the expected median voter s ideal policy outcome these results are robust to a variety of extensions including significant sincere voting multiple policy dimensions and defections by incumbent candidates

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences in campaigns candidates often avoid taking positions on issues concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected this paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns it develops a model of candidate competition in which policy motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters it applies eyster and rabin s econometrica 73 5 1623 1672 2005 concept of cursed equilibrium which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type policy preference and strategy whether to announce if voters updated according to bayes rule they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference in equilibrium only the most extreme candidates those located furthest from the median voter s position would choose to take no position however if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non announcement unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

are moderates better representatives than extremists a theory of indirect representation few if any elected representatives are capable of unilaterally implementing their platforms rather they choose between options generated by other actors and or external events we present a theory of voters preferences over representatives who will cast votes on their behalf and show that in this setting voters preferences over candidates platforms will not look like voters preferences over policies we demonstrate that these induced preferences for representation tend to favor more extreme representatives and we present two models of electoral competition in which induced preferences over representatives lead to elite polarization

income taxation uncertainty and stability abstract this paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules it is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo a tax policy is stable if it is a condorcet winner it is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare we show however that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo it is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels

dynamic estimation of ideal points for the us congress theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment because of the difficulty of obtaining bridge votes most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time we propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using project vote smart s national political awareness test to construct bridge votes we use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change to measure individual level change and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of house candidates and members of congress we demonstrate that while the republican party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office we also find that the congruence between elected members of congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate nonetheless we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances we find that competitiveness midterm elections and sharing the president s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness conversely retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness we find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers finally we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district s ideology

the dynamic responses of crop and livestock prices to money supply shocks a bayesian analysis using long run identifying restrictions the impact of monetary policy on agriculture has been much debated this study examines the dynamic responses of u s agricultural prices to money supply shocks using three innovations first the variables responses are identified by long run money neutrality restrictions instead of the more common contemporaneous ordering second a bayesian approach to model uncertainty is used to add robustness to the estimation process third agricultural prices are disaggregated into crop and livestock components the empirical results find that both agricultural sectors benefit in the short run from positive money supply shocks with agricultural prices increasing relative to the general price level

flip flopping ideological adjustment costs in the united states senate models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two candidate election such convergence is at odds with empirical observation in this paper i undertake a study of candidate positioning in the united states senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by senators using over 50 years of roll call voting data i use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for u s senators the ndings support a model in which senators face convex costs to changing position with the best tting model being one with linear costs of adjustment the model thus predicts severe punishments for ip opping senators those who make large changes in position as a result of the signi cant costs associated with adjusting position the empirical validity of the median voter theorem which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost is called into question

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

cross regime evidence of macroeconomic rationality rational expectations macromodels predict that the short run effects of monetary shocks on real output x should be negatively related across policy regimes to the variability of such shocks this paper presents cross regime tests of this and related propositions based on a sample of 47 countries the within regime estimates reveal a consistent pattern of positive short run real output effects with neutrality of money holding in the long run the cross regime tests show that x is negatively related to the variance of monetary shocks positively related to the variance of real output shocks negatively related to the variance of velocity shocks and unrelated to either the mean or variance of anticipated money growth

income taxes and entrepreneurs use of labor we investigate the effect of entrepreneurs personal taxes on their use of labor analyze the tax returns of sole proprietors before and after the tax reform act of 1986 and determine how the substantial reductions in marginal tax rates affected their hiring decisions and wage bills individual income taxes exert a statistically and quantitatively significant influence on the probability of hiring workers raising the entrepreneur s tax price by 10 raises the mean probability of hiring by about 12 further taxes influence total wage payments to workers the tax price elasticity of the median wage bill is about 37

a structural model of electoral accountability this paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the eects of electoral ac countability we estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection eects using data on u s governors for 1982 2012 we nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi cant incentive for incumbents to exert eort we also nd a selection eect although it is weaker in terms of its eect on average governor performance according to our model the widely used two term regime improves voter welfare by 4 2 compared to a one term regime and nd that a three term regime may improve voter welfare even further

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

returns to schooling and bayesian model averaging a union of two literatures abstract in this paper we review and unite the literatures on returns to schooling and bayesian model averaging we observe that most studies seeking to estimate the returns to education have done so using particular and often different across researchers model specifications given this we review bayesian methods which formally account for uncertainty in the specification of the model itself and apply these techniques to estimate the economic return to a college education the approach described in this paper enables us to determine those model specifications which are most favored by the given data and also enables us to use the predictions obtained from all of the competing regression models to estimate the returns to schooling the reported precision of such estimates also account for the uncertainty inherent in the model specification using u s data from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy we also revisit several stylized facts in the returns to education literature and examine if they continue to hold after formally accounting for model uncertainty

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

economic policy economic performance and elections this paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy by assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office it is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income copyright 1993 by american economic association

the effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium an experimental study when two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median there are three main effects first the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate second the equilibrium is statistical in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome third the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter we test these three predictions using laboratory experiments and find strong support for all three we also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by quantal response equilibrium

resource allocation and voter calculus in a multicandidate election this paper links campaign resources and voter calculus through a microeconomic optimization framework i assume that candidate policy positions are fixed while personal valence scores and the salience of issue dimensions are malleable low valence candidates with many proximate competitors in the policy space will focus on building valence high valence candidates who are relatively unclustered in the policy space will focus on manipulating issue salience resources devoted to diminishing others valence scores will increase as the number of viable candidates decreases the model s results are tested where feasible using data from the democratic party primary of 2004

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

campaign advertising and political ambiguity this paper develops a model to explain candidates strategic decisions to provide or withhold information about policy positions in the course of an election campaign the analysis treats this problem as a game of imperfect information attention is focused on modeling voter suspicion of candidates whose positions are ambiguous specific numerical examples illustrate that candidate decisions about providing information via informative advertising depend upon candidate policy preferences campaign fund endowments partisan reputations and incumbency status the model also provides theoretical underpinnings for empirical findings regarding the effects of campaign advertising

the disadvantaged incumbents estimating incumbency effects in indian state legislatures this paper estimates the incumbency effects using a large dataset on state legislative elections in india during 1975 2003 i use a regression discontinuity design rdd that estimates the causal effect of incumbency by comparing candidates in closely fought elections i find that there is a significant disadvantage to incumbency in indian state legislative elections and the adverse effect of incumbency has increased after 1991 also the incumbency disadvantage is higher in states that have lower availability of public goods such as health centers and lower employment poverty and per capita income

physician behavioural responses to variation in marginal income tax rates longitudinal evidence the longitudinal component of the young physicians surveys 1987 1991 is used to examine the impact of changes in marginal tax rates on key indicators of physician behaviour following the federal tax reform act of 1986 many states marginal income tax rates changed this variation is used to estimate the responsiveness of work hours hmo contracting and practice size to changes in taxes

on the nature of equilibria in a downsian model with candidate valence abstract i analyze mixed strategy equilibria in a downsian model with two office motivated candidates in which one candidate is endowed with a sufficiently large valence advantage that a voter might prefer this candidate even if the voter strictly prefers the other candidate s policies there is a discrete one dimensional policy space and the preferences of the median voter are uncertain i show that there is a range of moderate policies with no gaps that are optimal for the advantaged candidate there is also a range of liberal policies with no gaps and a corresponding range of conservative policies with no gaps that are optimal actions for the disadvantaged candidate the upper and lower bounds on these ranges of policies vary in predictable ways with the size of the advantaged candidate s advantage

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

does anticipated monetary policy matter an econometric investigation a heated debate has arisen over the policy ineffectiveness proposition associate with the work of lucas sargent and wallace it postulates that anticipated aggregate demand policy will have no effect on business cycle fluctuations so that one deterministic feedback policy rule is as good as any other from the point of view of stabilizing the economy this paper develops a methodology for empirically analyzing rational expectations models displaying this neutrality result and then applies it to the important question of whether anticipated monetary policy matters to the business cycle

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

groups in rational turnout models a model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented if candidates choose different positions positive turnout is possible in partial equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality nevertheless if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique general equilibrium exists the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality but if candidates care about both policy and winning they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout this turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality group rationality alone cannot explain positive turnout in a general equilibrium theory of elections it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior

optimal local taxation and french municipal tax distortions this article presents both theoretical and empirical findings in the field of optimal local taxation i e neutral in locational decision this topic should throw light on the question of tax policy and tax reform we extend wildasin s 1987 model including mobile capital in this way we include his marginal cost of congestion taxation rule relating to mobile households proposition 1 this extension provides us with a new rule proposition 2 the optimal share out of taxes among household residents and firms in municipalities to illustrate these results we discuss the french municipal tax system properties and we pick out its main distortions

evidence on electoral accountability in the u s senate are unfaithful agents really punished many have questioned whether voters are able to hold incumbent officials electorally accountable through a retrospective voting strategy we examine u s senate elections from 1962 to 1990 in forty one states explaining which incumbents ran for reelection and their success in seeking reelection we find that an incumbent s deviation from her state party platform decreases the probability that she will run for reelection and win if she runs furthermore the electoral mechanism is found to be more efficient when voters are better informed finally we find that our divergent party platform model provides a better fit than the median voter model

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls this paper demonstrates that the existence of public opinion polls amplifies the effects of shifts in the distribution of the public s preferences over the issue space on the election s results voters evaluate candidates by their positions on the issue space and by a valence or general ability dimension some individual s the informed have more precise information about the relative abilities of candidates than others the uninformed since public opinion polls reflect the information of the informed high approval for a candidate at the polls signals to the uninformed that he is more likely to be abler however high approval may also reflect changes in the distribution of the public on the issue space as a result the uninformed partly confuse the two effects and public opinion polls tend to reinforce the effects of shifts in the public s ideological preferences on election results a shift to the right that shows up as more support for the right wing candidate at the polls is partly interpreted as a higher efficiency of this candidate as a result he wins with a higher margin than the margin he would have won with in the absence of polls or under perfect information

incumbency effects in political campaigns in this paper we examine two effects of incumbency first an incumbent may have an advantage in creating a favorable image in the eyes of the voters second the incumbent may have to chose a position before the challenger this second aspect of incumbency is modelled as stackelberg leadership in the model two candidates run for election by choosing a position in an ideological spectrum voters care about candidates chosen positions as well as non policy attributes of candidates which we call charisma charismata are not known when candidates choose policy positions they are only revealed on election day so that winning is not usually a certain prospect candidates care about the probability of winning but they also dislike compromising their own ideals

third parties in equilibrium under standard assumptions equilibria with three parties normally do not exist in spatial models of electoral competition in this paper i show that such equilibria are possible if it is assumed that voters are uncertain about the exact policies parties will adopt once elected substantive predictions can be derived from the model explaining some features of three party competition first the least risk party will always take the most moderate position second this position is also winning third the two riskier parties are always on opposite sides of the median voter and also of the moderate party

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes