performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision abstract this paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends by lessening local information spill overs to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto correlation among local government expenditures it analyses local government expenditures on personal social services in the uk before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system sspr social services performance rating that would attribute a rating to each local authority the empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the sspr has reduced local yardstick competition

unemployment rates and political outcomes an incentive for manufacturing a political business cycle in recent years the interdependence of politics and economics has received an increasing amount of attention by both economists and political scientists the explanation for this interest lies in the rediscovery of political economy and may be at least partly due to the recent experiences that governmental advisors have had with simultaneously increasing inflation and unemployment conventional macroeconomic approaches have failed to pin point causes for the stagflation and to provide methods for solving the problem the traditional economic policies may have failed in part because these traditional solutions were simply not plausible in the political environments in which they were proposed it is the intent of a growing body of work to develop macromodels with endogenous political sectors the inference made in this literature is that 1 the economy can be manipulated or affected by a political sector and that 2 there is an incentive for the political sector to manipulate the economy this literature has however just begun to formalize the interaction of the political and economic sectors and empirical work is virtually nonexistent the purpose of this paper is to present some evidence on these two inferences in section 1 the first inference is examined in section ii literature on which the first inference is based is reviewed and evidence on the possible incentive to create such a cycle is presented in section iii concluding remarks are offered

exchange rates and the fiscal theory of the price level abstract this paper addresses exchange rate determination under a nominal interest peg in a two country cash in advance model under two types of cash in advance constraints if both governments peg the nominal interest rate on domestic bonds there is a continuum of equilibria each consistent with different nominal exchange rates and real resource allocations the well known finding of equilibrium uniqueness under a nominal interest rate peg in a closed economy does not survive in a multi country multi currency setting

decentralization and intra country transfers in the great recession the case of the european union empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government viewing the great recession or recessions in general as a shock it is found that a

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

cyclical and political influences on the size distribution of income in the us 1959 1989 the quesion of whether the size distribution of income is subject to cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and inflation has been investigated in several studies in these studies however the fact that unemployment inflation and distribution may be influenced intentionally by policy makers is ignored in order to investigate whether any political influence on the size distribution of income actually exists a model is formulated in which the distribution not only depends on unemployment and inflation but also on a variable representing the political process the model is tested using time series data pertaining to the case of the us in the period 1958 to 1989 the results indicate that inequality tends to be negatively influenced by democratic administrations

income redistribution in a common labor market when households are mobile among jurisdictions income redistribution by individual jurisdictions creates fiscal externalities a model of interjurisdictional migration is used to study the nature of this redistributive externality analysis of optimal redistribution and optimal corrective subsidies from higher level governments shows that benefit levels for the recipients of income transfers and tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across jurisdictions a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market can achieve welfare improvements through coordination of domestic redistributive policy or through the intervention of a higher level government copyright 1991 by american economic association

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

macroeconomic features of the french revolution this paper describes aspects of the french revolution from the perspective of theories about money and government budget constraints we describe how unpleasant fiscal arithmetic gripped the old regime how the estates general responded to reorganize france s fiscal affairs and how fiscal exigencies impelled the revolution into a procession of monetary experiments ending in hyper inflation

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

interest rates and currency prices in a two country world abstract this paper is a theoretical study of the determination of prices interest rates and currency exchange rates set in an infinitely lived two country world which is subject both to stochastic endowment shocks and to monetary instability formulas are obtained for pricing all equity claims nominally denominated bonds and currencies and these formulas are related to earlier closely related results in the theories of money finance international trade

welfare reform and the race to the bottom theory and evidence economists have argued that welfare migration leads to a race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits although a system of federal matching grants can remedy this problem the recent welfare reform law replaced the existing matching grant structure with block grants a policy change that appears undesirable to judge whether this critique of welfare reform is justified this paper evaluates the evidence in favor of a race to the bottom after explaining the theoretical effects of welfare migration the paper surveys the empirical evidence on the occurrence of such migration concluding that the evidence is mixed the discussion also considers recent empirical tests for strategic interaction which show that benefit levels in nearby states affect a given state s benefit choice the most plausible source of such interaction is a concern about welfare migration which leads policymakers to look at benefits in neighboring states when making their own choices judging that the evidence appears consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom the paper concludes that the demise of matching grants may be undesirable from a policy perspective

a game theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level the goal of this paper is to probe the validity of the fiscal theory of the price level by modelling explicitly the market structure in which households and the government make their decisions i describe the economy as a game and i am thus able to state precisely the consequences of actions that are out of the equilibrium path i show that there exist government strategies that lead to a version of the fiscal theory in which the price level is determined by fiscal variables alone these strategies are however more complex than the simple budgetary rules usually associated with the fiscal theory and the government budget constraint cannot be merely viewed as an equilibrium condition

fiscal consequences for mexico of adopting the dollar dollarization implies a reduction in the menu of assets available to the government and to the private sector in managing risk whatever the gains from dollarization the costs of reducing the asset menu need to be weighed against them this paper presents models one a simple generalization of a well known model of tax smoothing by ba1ao in which these costs are explicit along the way it suggests that there is likely to be no reduction in interest costs to the government from dollarization recently economists have been paying increasing attention to a dynamic general equilibrium approach to the theory of the price level that is often called the fiscal theory of the price level or ftpl this way of thinking emphasizes the role of fiscal and monetary policy in determining the risk and return properties of government liabilities it is particularly useful in analyzing proposals for large scale institutional changes that imply shifts in monetary and fiscal policies when dollarization is considered from this perspective some disadvantages are brought to light that may not be so apparent from other points of view section 1 below lays out the main ideas of ftpl section 2 displays a model that extends an earlier one of barro s to argue that optimal fiscal policy will use surprise inflation to achieve lower deadweight tax loss than would otherwise be possible section 3 considers the composition of government liabilities along the lines of the theory of corporate finance asking if dollarization will reduce the cost of funds section 4 presents annual estimates of the unanticipated returns to holders of u s government debt to show that these are substantial and are to some extent timed to match legitimate periods of fiscal stress as the optimality theory of section 2 would suggest section s discusses the lendel of last resort function and its connection to these fiscal issues section 6 briefly discusses some alternatives to pure dollarization in our concluding section 7 we sum up finding much to worry about in the prospect of dollarization

migration and income redistribution responsibilities this study examines whether afdc benefits determine or discourage state to state migration flows in the united states a pooled cross section time series model is developed to estimate afdc benefits in a state and recipients and whether benefits in one state affect benefits in other states a second model using data from the 1980 census and the panel study of income dynamics estimates migration of afdc recipients and the level of benefits in in migration and out migration states both models indicate that small but statistically significant amounts of migration occur which may be quite important but only in the long run movers although small in number are much more likely to move to a state with higher benefits states perceive this migration as important indicating that states should have less control and the federal government more control over income redistribution

the effect of welfare and wage levels on the location decisions of female headed households abstract this paper develops and estimates a model designed to calculate the impact of welfare benefit levels wages and tax rates on the location choices of female headed households the empirical model assumes that women simultaneously choose both where they will live and whether or not they will participate in the welfare system based on their expected income and expected hours of work for each location participation possibility these income and hours expectations depend in turn on the welfare benefits wage and tax rates facing each household in each location it is found that both regional welfare levels and wage rates have a significant effect on the location decisions of this population the probability of a typical female headed household with little outside income leaving an area with low welfare payments and low wages can be as much as 12 points higher over a 4 year period than the probability of leaving a high welfare high wage area

do states play welfare games abstract this paper uses a panel of state level annual data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous united states and the district of columbia to explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare benefits using instrumental variables estimation we find substantial empirical evidence that is supportive of the notion of welfare competition furthermore we find that state responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be significantly larger in magnitude as their responses to neighbor benefit increases our results therefore have potential implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare reform of 1996

the spillover effects of state spending abstract this paper estimates the extent to which state spending is influenced by the spending of neighboring states examining several different metrics of neighborliness in order to better identify the channels for interstate spillovers it improves on previous studies by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to state medical spending to abstract from correlated local conditions and by allowing for spatial autocorrelation focusing on mandated increases in medical spending the analysis shows that each dollar of state spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by almost 90 cents the most predictive measure of neighborliness is the degree of population mobility between states suggesting that rational concerns about adverse migration may drive the interdependence of state spending policy

interest rates and inflation a consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary policy ought to be the short term interest rate that policy should be focused on the control of inflation and that inflation can be reduced by increasing short term interest rates at the center of this consensus is a rejection of the quantity theory such a rejection is a difficult step to take given the mass of evidence linking money growth inflation and interest rates increases in average rates of money growth are associated with equal increases in average inflation rates and interest rates these observations need not rule out a constructive role for the use of short term interest rates as a monetary instrument one possibility is that increasing short term rates in the face of increases in inflation is just an indirect way of reducing money growth sell bonds and take money out of the system another possibility is that while control of monetary aggregates is the key to low long run average inflation rates an interest rate policy can improve the short run behavior of interest rates and prices the shortrun connections among money growth inflation and interest rates are very unreliable so there is much room for improvement these possibilities are surely worth exploring but doing so requires new theory the analysis needed to reconcile interest rate policies with the evidence on which the quantity theory of money is grounded cannot be found in old textbook diagrams

optimal fiduciary monetary systems abstract in a fiduciary monetary system there is a social agreement to quote prices and denominate financial instruments in terms of a specific paper liability of the government what are the best terms for this paper instrument i investigate a system where the terms involve not only paying market interest rate on the monetary instrument as proposed by many economists earlier but also indexing the returns to the price level the result is a homeostatic monetary system with a highly stable price level in the face of shifts in money demand and other disturbing influences the paper examines the performance of the new fiduciary standard in equilibrium and disequilibrium models

indeterminacy bubbles and the fiscal theory of price level determination abstract the recently developed fiscal theory of price level determination contends that there is an important class of policy rules in which there exists a unique rational expectations solution that shows the price level to be dependent upon fiscal policy and independent of monetary variables the present paper argues however that there is an alternative solution to these models that has entirely traditional or monetarist properties this latter solution is arguably more plausible since it is the solution that is typically regarded as the bubble free fundamentals solution the paper s analysis involves the specification of feasible instrument variables

assistance to the poor in a federal system abstract this paper explores the roles of different levels of government in assisting the poor using a model incorporating utility interdependence the paper first presents some theoretical results indicating how levels of poor relief vary with the extent of mobility of the poor under both centralized and decentralized systems of support it then provides a survey of the empirical work on migration of the poor along with a brief historical discussion of the experience under the english poor laws the concluding section turns to normative issues and contends that mobility of the poor is a basic source of inefficiency in wholly decentralized systems of support this inefficiency along with certain other equity considerations establishes a role for the central government in assistance to the poor

money as stock abstract the fiscal theory determines the price level from the value of nominal government debt as a claim to government primary surpluses just as private stock is valued as a claim to corporate profits valuation equations are not constraints so this theory does not mistreat the government s intertemporal budget constraint i anchor the analysis in a simple cash in advance model when money demand falls to zero i show that the price level can still be determined by the government debt valuation equation

monetary fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus abstract increases in government spending trigger substitution effects both inter and intra temporal and a wealth effect the ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate this paper estimates markov switching policy rules for the united states and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior when the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new keynesian model government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized the paper reports the model s predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the american recovery and reinvestment act s implied path for government spending under alternative monetary fiscal policy combinations

a model of welfare competition with evidence from afdc in this paper we test empirically for strategic behavior among the states using the cash support program aid to families with dependent children afdc to motivate the empirical work we adapt wildasin s model of income redistribution 1991 american economic review 81 757 773 to a model of interjurisdictional welfare competition although welfare competition may be generated from different frameworks we choose wildasin s model to illustrate how welfare benefit interdependence is genereated in the context of welfare migration we estimate a representative reaction function for afdc using both cross sections and pooled cross section data after controlling for other determinants of afdc benefit levels and for spatial error autocorrelation we find evidence showing competition 2000 academic press

do local government fiscal spillovers exist evidence from counties municipalities and school districts abstract numerous theories posit that the fiscal decisions of one jurisdiction influence the fiscal decisions of its neighbors the main contribution of this paper is to address empirical difficulties in testing for spillovers using a regression discontinuity design on a newly collected dataset i utilize close elections from this large dataset of local referenda in ohio to isolate the effect of exogenous increases in taxation and spending of one jurisdiction on neighbors fiscal decisions for all jurisdictional types and referenda revenue sources bonds income property and sales tax there is no evidence of spillovers and relatively small effects can be ruled out

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

rational asset pricing bubbles this paper provides a fairly systematic study of general economic conditions under which rational asset pricing bubbles may arise in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium framework our main results are concerned with nonexistence of asset pricing bubbles in those economies these results imply that the conditions under which bubbles are possible including some well known examples of monetary equilibria are relatively fragile this paper is concerned with the conditions under which asset prices in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium are equal to the present value of the streams of future dividends to which each asset represents a claim according to a central result of the theory of finance this is very generally true in the case of economies with trading at only a finite sequence of dates as long as there are no restrictions upon transactions other than that associated with possible incom pleteness of the set of securities that are traded the result is sometimes called the fundamental theorem of asset pricing here we consider the extent to which such a result continues to be valid in the case of trading over an infinite horizon it has often been observed in the econometric literature on asset pricing bubbles that it is possible in principle for the price of a perpetuity and the dividends on that security to satisfy at all times a present value relation for one period holding returns while the security s price nonetheless does not equal the present value of the stream of dividends expected over the infinite future in such a case the price of the perpetuity is said to involve a bubble component 2 joint stochastic processes for which this component is nonzero are sometimes argued to characterize existing assets for a recent example see froot and obstfeld 1991 but such an inference depends upon aspects of the stochastic

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

decentralized welfare will there be underprovision abstract this paper develops an asymmetric nash equilibrium model of welfare provision by states when the benefit payment is a local public good and a fixed population of welfare recipients distributes itself between states with logistic migration function the model shows that state size is an important demand shifter across states because it alters the supply elasticity of recipients the model provides estimates of how the degree of benefit under provision varies with this migration elasticity other demand instruments such as taxpayer resources and generosity likewise generate positive correlation between benefits and recipients while supply shifters generate negative correlation between benefits and recipients the model s predictions are closely matched empirically when examining the reduced form impact of these instruments on the pattern of welfare benefits and recipients across states using these impacts to assign the instruments to either supply or demand sides of the model it is possible to estimate the model s structural elasticities these turn out to be high enough so that simulated solutions to the model generate considerable welfare underprovision and thus raise concern about a race to the bottom with decentralized control over afdc

the negative income tax and the evolution of u s welfare policy the negative income tax proposed by milton friedman represents one of the fundamental ideas of modern welfare policy however the academic literature has raised two difficulties with it one challenging its purported work incentives and the other suggesting the possible superiority of work requirements in addition work requirement approaches have gained ground in actual u s welfare policy over the last 30 years and the number of different programs has proliferated another development counter to the negative income tax on the other hand the earned income tax credit has produced a negative income tax like program on a vast scale

is there a race to the bottom in the setting of welfare benefit levels evidence from a policy intervention abstract in this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels we solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a policy intervention more specifically we use a centrally geared exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group refugees among swedish municipalities as an instrument the iv estimates indicate that there exists a race to the bottom and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level by 100 sek a municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 41 sek this result is robust to several alternative model specifications

the fiscal theory of the price level a critique abstract this paper argues that the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl has feet of clay the source of the problem is a fundamental economic misspecification the ftplconfuses two key building blocks of a model of a market economy budgetconstraints which must be satisfied identically and market clearing or equilibriumconditions the ftpl asssumes that the government s intertemporal budgetconstraint needs to be satisfied only in equilibrium this economic misspecification has far reaching implications for the mathematicalproperties of the equilibria supported by models that impose the structure of theftpl it produces a rash of contradictions and anomalies jel classifications e31 e41 e51 e52 e62 e63 key words fiscal theory of the price level ricardian fiscal financial monetaryprogrammes government budget constraint price level indeterminacy author willem h buiter european bank for reconstruction and development oneexchange square london ec2a 2jn uktel 44 20 73386805fax 44 20 73386110 6111e mail buiterw ebrd comweb page http www nber org wbuiter index htm

empirical evidence of political influence on the size distribution of income in the united states 1959 1991 abstract political influence on the size distribution of income is tested in a statistical model using annual u s data for 1959 1991 we present empirical evidence that both democratic administration and reelected president appear to have significant downward redistributive effects

income distribution and tax structure empirical test of the meltzer richard hypothesis abstract the meltzer richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research but little empirical support the empirical literature has concentrated on cross country studies and the size of the public sector and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality this analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution here tax structure new data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in norway are exploited we show how the multi dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences in the econometric analysis instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution the estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution

long term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory of the price level the fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses i analyze long term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory i find that the maturity structure of the debt matters for example it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation when long term debt is present the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short term debt the maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a budget constraint determining which periods price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone in addition debt policythe expected pattern of future state contingent debt sales repurchases and redemptionsmatters crucially for the effects of a debt operation i solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation i find cases in which long term debt helps to stabilize inflation i also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to u s surplus and debt time series to understand the data i must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks rather than causing price level disturbances by policy induced shocks shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level this is consistent with the stabilization of u s inflation after the gold standard was abandoned

games the states don t play welfare benefits and the theory of fiscal federalism fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price while the tax price itself changes because of welfare induced migration this paper tests these propositions on afdc in the united states for a panel from 1982 88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio the tax price and composite neighbors the data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification copyright 1995 by mit press

optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices this paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices the theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy without capital the government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes printing money and issuing one period nominally risk free bonds the main findings of the paper are first for a miniscule degree of price stickiness i e many times below available empirical estimates the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero this result stands in stark contrast with the high volatility of inflation implied by the ramsey allocation when prices are flexible the finding is in line with a recent body of work on optimal monetary policy under nominal rigidities that ignores the role of optimal fiscal policy second even small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates third sluggish price adjustment raises the average nominal interest rate above the one called for by the friedman rule finally an interest rate feedback rule whereby the nominal interest rate depends on inflation and output fits well the data emanating from the ramsey economy however the fitted rule is not of the taylor type for the implied inflation coefficient is less than one and close to zero and the output coefficient is negative jel classification e52 e61 e63

an empirical investigation of interstate afdc benefit competition claims that states which offer generous welfare benefits attract the poor and that some states pay low benefits intending to drive the poor away are neither uncommon nor entirely un founded this paper employs a two player state generalized game to model states choice of a benefit level in the aid to families with dependent children afdc program migration by the poor in response to interstate differentials in earnings and welfare opportunities and the subse quent changes in afdc caseloads drive this game estimation of the model using 1979 data suggests that states within approximately 750 miles of each other do engage in a benefit setting game the rival s initial number of poor and preference for non afdc consumption appear to be the more influential rival characteristics these findings while derived from a different methodological approach are consistent with previous studies which indicate that welfare recipients tend to move toward higher benefit states such migration may impede the efficient spatial allocation of labor the results also indicate that states will tend to offer lower benefits given recipient migration than would be the case otherwise state jurisdiction over benefits consequently leads to underprovision of afdc federalization of the afdc program would improve efficiency in terms of the spatial allocation of labor and the provision of afdc

the backing of government bonds and monetarism abstract this paper examines the implications of the fiscal backing of government bonds for the effects of conventional macroeconomic policies and in particular for certain monetarist propositions it shows that the validity of some basic monetarist hypotheses requires a considerable degree of accommodation by the fiscal authority relative to the central bank otherwise government bonds may matter in a manner as described in the traditional literature e g mundell 1971 patinkin 1965 though some differences arise of perhaps independent interest the framework developed in the analysis is an intertemporal general equilibrium model with all the descriptive features of the conventional flexible price is lm model

immigration and welfare magnets this article investigates if the location choices made by immigrants when they arrive in the united states are influenced by the interstate dispersion in welfare benefits income maximizing behavior implies that foreign born welfare recipients unlike their native born counterparts may be clustered in the states that offer the highest benefits the empirical analysis indicates that immigrant welfare recipients are indeed more heavily clustered in high benefit states than the immigrants who do not receive welfare or than natives as a result the welfare participation rate of immigrants is much more sensitive to changes in welfare benefits than that of natives

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis