multidimensional bargaining under asymmetric information a buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade depending on parameter values a high valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value in the first case equilibrium trades are efficient in the second case the low valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity and there can be a one period delay in trade the quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero there exist equilibria that are independent of the seller s prior beliefs

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation abstract we study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely repeated screening model with long term contracts we propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist s profit is maximized after every history we show that the monopolist sequentially screens high type consumers and characterize second degree price discrimination policies the monopolist s ability to extract rent from high type consumers by distorting the allocation of low type consumers vanishes as all parties become more patient as a result all distortions disappear and the allocation becomes efficient

bargaining and the right to remain silent this paper analyzes a class of alternating offer bargaining games with one sided incomplete information for the case of no gap if sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity monotonicity pure strategies and no free screening we establish the silence theorem when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating offer bargaining games a class of parametric examples suggests that the time interval required to assure silence is not especially brief as a byproduct of the analysis we also prove under the same set of assumptions a uniform version of the coase conjecture when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the initial serious offer by either party in an alternating offer bargaining game must be less than e times the highest possible buyer valuation for an entire family of distribution functions

community perspectives of wind energy in australia the application of a justice and community fairness framework to increase social acceptance decisions concerning the siting of infrastructure developments or the use of natural resources have the potential to damage a community s social well being if the outcomes are perceived to be unfair justice is accepted as central to the well functioning of society with fairness being an expectation in day to day interactions outcomes that are perceived to be unfair can result in protests damaged relationships and divided communities particularly when decisions are made which benefit some sections of the community at the perceived expense of others through empirical research using a wind farm pilot study community perceptions of a community consultation process are explored using procedural justice principles to evaluate fairness findings from the pilot study indicate that perceptions of fairness do influence how people perceive the legitimacy of the outcome and that a fairer process will increase acceptance of the outcome a key research finding was that different sections of a community are likely to be influenced by different aspects of justice namely by outcome fairness outcome favourability and process fairness based on this finding a community fairness framework was developed which has potential application in community consultation to increase social acceptance of the outcome

the rebound effect for heavy industry empirical evidence from china abstract energy efficiency improvement will reduce the effective price of energy services and hence at least partially mitigate original expected energy conservation therefore the magnitude of rebound effect is important for the design and timing of an effective energy conservation policy under the framework of translog cost share equations we estimates the direct rebound effect for heavy industry in china for the first time by conducting an empirical research on the relationship between the direct rebound effect and the ease with which energy services can substitute for other inputs additionally asymmetric price responses are specified in the model for the rebound effect estimation empirical results in our paper indicate that the rebound effect for heavy industry in china is about 74 3 this reveals that energy efficiency improvement can save energy to a certain degree since the rebound effect is less than 100 back fire but most of the expected reduction in heavy industry energy consumption is mitigated these findings prove that energy pricing reforms and energy taxes should be further implemented to achieve effective energy conservation in china s 12th five years plan

dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information we analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product both firms are impatient and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached the buyer is privately informed about his type which can be high or low the high type s demand is stochastically larger than the low type s in the dynamic negotiation process the seller can screen whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers and the buyer has an endogenous and type dependent reservation profit with rational assumptions on the seller s belief structure we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game interestingly we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms relative patience and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first or with both simultaneously furthermore we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability we find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer s forecasting accuracy is low however once the buyer s forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast this observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one shot principal agent model in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win lose outcome for the two firms and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

factors influencing willingness to pay for the energy star label abstract in the united states nearly 17 of greenhouse gas emissions come from residential energy use increases in energy efficiency for the residential sector can generate significant energy savings and emissions reductions consumer labels such as the us environmental protection agency s energy star promote conservation by providing consumers with information on energy usage for household appliances this study examines how the energy star label affects consumer preferences for refrigerators the results of an online survey of a national sample of adults suggest that consumers are on average willing to pay an extra 249 82 349 30 for a refrigerator that has been awarded the energy star label furthermore the results provide evidence that respondent willingness to pay was motivated by both private energy cost savings and public environmental benefits

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

doing well by doing good green office buildings this paper provides the first credible evidence on the economic value of the certification of green buildings in the commercial sector value derived from impersonal market transactions rather than engineering estimates we match publicly available information on the addresses of energy star and leed rated office buildings to a commercial data source detailing the characteristics of u s office buildings and their rental rates we analyze the micro data on 694 certified green buildings and on 7489 other office buildings located within a quarter mile of the certified buildings we find systematic evidence that rents for green offices are about two percent higher than rents for comparable buildings located nearby effective rents i e rents adjusted for the occupancy levels in office buildings are about six percent higher in green buildings than in comparable office buildings nearby at prevailing capitalization rates conversion of the average non green building to an equivalent green building would add more than 5 million in market value these results are robust to the statistical models employed

social acceptance of renewable energy innovation an introduction to the concept this paper introduces the special issue on social acceptance of renewable energy innovation it is a collection of best papers presented at an international research conference held in tramelan switzerland in february 2006 while there are ambitious government targets to increase the share of renewable energy in many countries it is increasingly recognized that social acceptance may be a constraining factor in achieving this target this is particularly apparent in the case of wind energy which has become a subject of contested debates in several countries largely due to its visual impact on landscapes this paper introduces three dimensions of social acceptance namely socio political community and market acceptance factors influencing socio political and community acceptance are increasingly recognized as being important for understanding the apparent contradictions between general public support for renewable energy innovation and the difficult realization of specific projects the third dimension market acceptance has received less attention so far and provides opportunities for further research particularly from management scholars

inventory returns and special sales in a lot size system with constant rate of deterioration abstract the problem of returning or of selling the inventory excess to optimal stock level is considered for deteriorating items two inventory models viz the infinite and the finite horizon models are developed in which the deterioration is assumed to be a constant fraction of the on hand inventory both the models are developed under the assumptions of instantaneous delivery and no shortages when there is no deterioration the developed models are related to the corresponding inventory models for non deteriorating items examples are given to illustrate the derived results

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the role of social processes for sustainable consumption abstract rethinking the role consumption plays in individual well being and societal development is key for addressing pressing environmental problems we perceive the need to envision consumption as a social activity which requires the active engagement of consumers in order to better enhance their quality of life the paper focuses on the framework of product service systems one particular programme for more sustainable consumption after reviewing the potential benefits and limitations of this programme we explore the opportunities to learn from participatory and community based strategies like lets

negotiation analysis a characterization and review negotiation analysis seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties it generally emphasizes the parties underlying interests as distinct from the issues on the table and the positions taken alternatives to negotiated agreement approaches to productively manage the inherent tension between competitive actions to claim value individually and cooperative ones to create value jointly as well as efforts to change perceptions of the game itself since advice to one side does not necessarily presume the full game theoretic rationality of the other side s negotiation analysts often draw on the findings of behavioral decision analysts and economists further this approach does not generally assume that all the elements of the game are common knowledge thus the negotiation analytic approach tends to de emphasize the application of game theoretic solution concepts or efforts to find unique equilibrium outcomes instead to evaluate possible strategies and

bargaining over a menu of wage contracts we investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions quality and wage the worker has private information about his type only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality wage contracts instead of single one we show that for all discount factors the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period our result shows that in multi dimensional bargaining the coase conjecture holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period but it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

an approximation to the continuous review inventory model with perishable items and lead times a continuous review perishable inventory model based on approximations to the expected outdating the expected shortage quantity and the expected inventory level is developed to determine a best q r ordering policy under a positive order leadtime when the total expected average cost per unit time is minimized the approximation method is simple and verified by a comparison with the weiss model the results reveal that the mean absolute deviation from the optimal total expected average cost per unit time is only 0 58 this paper also compares the proposed model to the conventional model with no perishability a value is given to the item lifetime indicating when an approximate answer approaches closely to the conventional ordering policy finally a simulation model written in simscript ii 5 is used to validate the approximate results

social problems of green buildings from the humanistic needs to social acceptance abstract in the past few decades scholars have conducted research and held discussions on green building to highlight their vital significance in addressing environmental economic and social challenges it is recognized that public attitudes and views towards green building may affect its application in daily lives although studies on consumers cognition are rarely carried out the social problems related to green building such as consumers basic understanding purchase intention social and humanistic needs public attitudes and behaviors rebound effects and furthermore social acceptance are therefore studied based on three research methods including literature review questionnaire and inductive analysis through the analysis following results can be obtained i green building s sustainable design has quite important influence over consumers decision making process the general public maintains a high regard for the advantages of green building where better ventilation and lighting is a major benefit saving energy and water are the second rated and then land and construction material saving ii although the general public is not being familiar with the concept of green building the majority of participants would pay more for green buildings over the standard building when they know the environmental impacts of them iii green building should not only be limited to energy performance oriented but also be user oriented the social and humanistic needs model is thus well established based on maslow s hierarchy of needs in the life cycle of green building social and humanistic needs show a trend of dynamics which means social processes with consumer engagement and participation needs to be considered in aspects of conceptual design planning and design operation and maintenance to improve users happiness and productivity iv current user oriented solutions to green building are always based on a hypothesis that consumers are readily motivated or prefer expensive goods for reducing energy use to really reflect preference and influenced actions social acceptance should be analyzed to fully gauge interest and perspective of the people v rebound effects of post occupant building performance including energy performance human comfort indoor environmental quality greenhouse gas emission and workplace productivity can be divided into two stages at present it is necessary to establish appropriate samples methods and parameters for an unbiased and valid post occupant evaluation system in addition the social acceptance of green building framework is established based on wustenhagen et al triangular model for renewable energy innovation all the explorations to social problems of green building in this article are expected to provide a healthy social basis for the development of this green strategy

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

the economics of green building we analyze the economics of green building finding that recent increases in the supply of green buildings and the volatility in prop erty markets have not affected the returns to green buildings we then analyze a large cross section of office buildings demonstrating that eco nomic returns to energy efficient buildings are substantial finally we relate the economic premiums for green buildings to their relative effi ciency in energy use the attributes rated for thermal efficiency as well as sustainability contribute to premiums in rents and asset values among green buildings increased energy efficiency is fully capitalized into rents and asset values

social acceptance of low carbon energy and associated infrastructures a critical discussion the promotion of low carbon energy and associated infrastructures for tackling climate change is a central task for governments worldwide however public and mainly local opposition to those infrastructures may slow down or even halt that process thus in the last few years a body of research has developed specifically to understand the social acceptance of technologies such as wind turbines or bioenergy plants we argue that the use of acceptance in this literature should be further discussed we contend that using the word acceptance may present some constraints for the theoretical advancement of this area of research and to the implications that may be taken from it to the wider society this is further highlighted through the presentation of findings from surveys conducted with nationally representative samples from the uk and norway which examined their acceptance of and support for new high voltage power lines we conclude by suggesting that the literature on public responses towards low carbon energy and associated infrastructures should be more critical in the conceptualisation of its research agenda become empirically more consistent and transparent and examine other types of relations between people and energy infrastructures besides acceptance or opposition

signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships this paper examines how the possibility of renegotiation affects contractual outcomes in signaling games when an infinite number of rounds of renegotiations are allowed before contracts are executed the main results of the paper are 1 contracts may still contain distortions 2 the popular efficient separating equilibrium outcome is never an equilibrium outcome with renegotiation 3 incentive compatibility constraints can be generalized to incorporate renegotiation 4 equilibrium outcomes can be separating and nevertheless depend on the uninformed player s prior and 5 renegotiation in signaling games may lead to outcomes similar to equilibrium outcomes of screening games in which multiple contract purchases are allowed copyright 1993 by the econometric society

an inventory model for perishable items in a lot size system with quantity discounts abstract an inventory model continuous in units and time is developed for perishable items in a lot size system that allows partially backlogging and partially lost saling the model is developed under deterministic demand instantaneous delivery with quantity discounts and any well behaved probability distribution for the time to perishables an example is given to illustrate the model

social acceptance of renewable energy sources a review of contingent valuation applications abstract this paper presents a literature review addressing the public acceptance of renewable energy as a replacement for fossil fuels in electricity production this review was motivated by the global tendency for a substitution of conventional fuels by renewable energy sources res during the global financial crisis it studies research on the preferences and attitudes of local communities towards investments in renewable energy projects and their perception of the use of new energy technologies in their daily lives through various case studies worldwide an effort is made to identify the parameters that influence consumers energy behaviour together with their interest or lack thereof in the environmental impact of using fossil fuels to produce energy and their willingness to reduce it applications of contingent valuation are examined which are employed to analyse public attitudes towards the use of res for electricity production willingness to pay is observed to be correlated to socioeconomic characteristics including education interest in environmental issues and knowledge of res finally the profile of a typical green energy consumer and appropriate policy paths for the penetration of res into the energy market are outlined

issues of social acceptance on biofuel development alongside with biofuel development social acceptance issues have been underestimated while social acceptance can emerge as powerful barrier for biofuel development this article provides discussion on social acceptance in biofuel context an acceptance framework based on life cycle biofuel production had been referred for a better understanding on social acceptance issues malaysia has been referred for the discussion as the country has faced with acceptance issue in their biofuel program the discussion point out different societal groups will demand specific consideration for either support or oppose biofuel this paper concludes that biofuel development will be constraint if social acceptance issues remain neglect

the transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining a non technical discussion transit oil and gas pipelines are growing in relevance and face a number of topical problems one of such issues is the problem of potential disruption from a number of sources notably post construction behaviour of the transit country present and future pipelines face the risk of continuous conflict over legal economic and political issues once the pipeline is built and in operation the threat of disruption of the pipeline by the transit country over disputed transit terms exists this is due to two key problems first a shift in bargaining powers to the transit country upon construction and operation of the pipeline and second changes in the value of the throughput imply price changes that can affect the behaviour of the transit country this paper discusses the role of basic bargaining principles in cross border oil and gas pipelines involving transit through one or more countries it finds that the motive behind the pipeline plays a key role in the prevention of potential disruptions to the pipeline due to rent squeezing also although the potential of such disruptions does exist there are a number of factors that could serve to mute the consequences of shifts in bargaining power to the transit countries

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

damaged durable goods i analyze a durable goods monopolist s incentives to introduce a damaged good a stripped down version of the original good in an infinite horizon framework the damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the coasian time inconsistency problem however it may lead to a welfare reduction low valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low quality damaged good early rather than buy the high quality original good later and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions this welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small