the value added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common pool resources abstract this article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies of behavior and outcomes in common pool resource cpr dilemmas aggregate outcomes in cpr dilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non cooperative game theory but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes when exogenous rules are monitored at realistic levels subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimal outcomes if given the opportunity experimental subjects will devise their own rule systems and impose sanctions on each other these findings complement field research on more complex resources and communities by confirming the critical importance of communication and endogenous rule formation

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

out of step out of office electoral accountability and house members voting does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll call decisions we investigate the relationship between incumbents electoral performance and roll call support for their party controlling for district ideology challenger quality and campaign spending among other factors through a series of tests of the 1956 1996 elections the tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting first in each election an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party second this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants third a member s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party and this relationship holds for not only marginal but also safe members

clean up your own mess an experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency although market based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed they often face public resistance we argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations we show that moral responsibility induces participants to take inefficient actions that reduce the earnings of the whole group of participants we discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies

the electoral impact of economic conditions who is held responsible a variety of recent research has dealt with the impact of economic conditions on congressional elections the underlying assumption of this research has been that the effects of economic fluctuations are distributed evenly across members of the president s party by focusing on subgroups of congressional candidates we demonstrate that the importance of economic conditions varies widely specifically we show that the aggregate electoral margins of incumbents are far more responsive to economic conditions than are those for nonincumbents and that among in party incumbents the relationship is stronger among those with higher levels of tenure further we demonstrate that the previous lack of individual level confirmation of the aggregate relationship has been due to a failure to control for the contextual effects implied by our conditional aggregate analysis with controls for district incumbency we find a relationship between retrospective personal financial condition and vote choice that mirrors the aggregate relationship between retrospective performance of the national economy and congressional vote totals

patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the united states house of representatives our most robust findings can be summarized as follows u the spatial location of candidates is important in determining the pattern of campaign contributions many pacs and all pac types except agricultural cooperatives contribute in a manner highly consistent with a simple spatial model there is little giving by an individual pac to candidates at opposite ends of the dimension there is no instance of a pac contributing to incumbents located at each end of the dimension and only to challengers of incumbents in the middle or vice versa contributions against incumbents i e to challengers of incumbents are often spatial mirror images of a pac s giving in favor of incumbents though this statement must be tempered by the fact that the large majority of pacs give relatively little money to challengers few pacs give money to both challenger and incumbent in the same race giving in open seat races is if anything even more spatially consistent than in races where an incumbent is running while many individual pacs exhibit patterns of contributions consistent with the ideological dimension the data for 1980 suggest that there was no particular bias toward one end of the spectrum or the other taking all pacs together essentially eliminates the effect of the location variable in the regressions giving in races with an incumbent on the ballot was overall balanced across the dimension there are however ideological distinctions even among groups as broadly defined as the fec categories for the corporate labor and trade membership health groups the incumbent s location on the ideological dimension is an important explanatory variable even when other factors specific to the incumbent are considered of course ideology matters to nonconnected groups too they just tend to balance each other off in positive money though not in negative on average corporate and trade groups favor conservative incumbents and opponents of liberal incumbents labor pacs do the opposite except for labor pacs party is not an important variable in explaining positive contributions once the incumbent s voting record is taken into account for contributions to challengers however party is significant corporate nonconnected and trade pacs gave to opponents of democrats labor pacs did the opposite the expected closeness of the election is always an important variable both positive money and contributions to challengers increase as the probability of a strong challenge increases this suggests that pacs are sensitive to the potential impact of contributions on electoral outcomes although committee assignments have some importance in explaining campaign contributions by pac categories their net effect is never strong except in the case of cooperatives this is almost certainly because of the diversity of interests represented by pacs in every category except coops which are essentially one giant pac of milk producers we would surmise that competitive forces in the house result in most members having a portfolio of committee assignments that provides maximum advantage vis a vis each member s constituency it would therefore be surprising if overall committee assignments by themselves pointed to significant differences in generating campaign resources being chairman or ranking minority member of a committee has no impact on campaign contributions other things equal seniority as measured by number of consecutive years in office has a complicated role for positive contributions seniority has a nonmonotonic effect with contributions being higher for the most junior and most senior members ceteris paribus than for incumbents with average seniority negative contributions however are not significantly related to seniority

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

breaking up a research consortium inter firm r d collaborations through contractual arrangements have become increasingly popular but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery we provide a rationale for the breakup date in r d collaboration agreements more specifically we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm a with a firm b b has private information about whether it is committed to the project or a free rider we show that under fairly general conditions a breakup date in the contract is a second best optimal screening device for firm a to screen out free riders with the additional constraint of renegotiation proofness a can only partially screen out free riders entry by some free riders makes sure that a does not have an incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post we also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a breakup date adverse selection moral hazard and project non viability

the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on the electoral fortunes of house incumbents the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on house elections is a long debated but still unresolved issue we argue that return rates are theoretically superior to vote shares as measures of electoral acountability and that incumbents not candidates of the president s party are the legislators voters hold responsible we develop and test an incumbent accountability model using incumbent return rates in the u s house from 1916 to 1994 finding a strongly significant effect of both income growth and the misery index however the data reject both our pure incumbency model and the traditional presidential party model indicating that both factors are relevant to voters

appropriation and concern for resource scarcity in the commons an experimental study abstract we use an experimental linear design and a logit probabilistic choice function to model and estimate agents concern for resource scarcity although full appropriation is the dominant strategy of the basic game whatever the resource size we expect that if agents exploiting a common pool resource feel any concern for resource scarcity they would be more likely to alter their appropriation strategy the scarcer the resource stock our results show that this expectation holds and appropriation is restrained when resources are scarce further as this result could be attributed to both agents concern for resource scarcity and calculation errors in the determination of the appropriation strategies we estimate the relevance of both

unequal treatment of identical agents in cournot equilibrium oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation environmental protection and international competition we discuss properties of such models when a cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal cost sum therefore unless the cost of inducing second stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs the private and social optima are asymmetric

from mind to market a global dynamic analysis of r d existing models of rd the path to the saddle point steady state is never globally optimal we also sketch some tentative policy implications of our analysis

can violence harm cooperation experimental evidence abstract in this paper we argue that natural resource conservation is jeopardised by the ability of users to resort to violence to appropriate resources when they become scarce we provide evidence from a lab experiment that participants interacting in a dynamic game of common pool resource extraction reduce their cooperation on efficient levels of resource extraction when given the possibility to appropriate the resource at some cost i e through conflict theoretically cooperation is achievable via the threat of punishment strategies which stop being subgame perfect in the presence of conflict accordingly we argue that the observed reduction of cooperation in the game s early stages in the lab is a consequence of participants correctly anticipating the use of appropriation when resources become scarce

does information matter in the commons experimental evidence abstract common pool resources cprs typically involve interaction where precise information about payoffs is absent however all experimental studies of cprs we are aware of study environments where the payoff structure is known in this paper we address the behavioral consequences of two degrees of information on the mapping between decisions and payoffs we run two treatments one with complete information on the payoff structure and one with none remarkably aggregate behavior is not significantly different between the two treatments in both cases the aggregate tendencies converge to the nash equilibrium furthermore the best reply dynamics organize individual behavior in both treatments remarkably well

markets in equilibrium with firms out of equilibrium a simulation study abstract we explore the effect of the limited ability to process information on the convergence of firms toward equilibrium in the context of a cournot oligopoly with a unique and symmetric nash equilibrium firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm computational experiments show that while market production is close to equilibrium firm production is relatively far from the individual equilibrium level this pattern of firm heterogeneity is not an artifact of random elements built into the decisional process instead it comes from the market interaction of firms with cognitive limitations

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

feedback nash equilibria for non linear differential games in pollution control abstract dynamic problems of pollution and resource management with stock externalities often require a differential games framework of analysis in addition they are represented realistically by non linear transition equations however feedback nash equilibrium fbne solutions which are the desired ones in this case are difficult to obtain in problems with non linear quadratic structure we develop a method to obtain numerically non linear fbne for a class of such problems with a specific example for shallow lake pollution control we compare fbne solutions by considering the entire equilibrium trajectories with optimal management and open loop solutions and we show that the value of the best fbne is in general worse than the open loop and optimal management solutions

on the enforcement of territorial use rights regulations a game theoretic approach territorial use rights commonly known as turfs in the literature consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and or groups to fish in certain geographical locations a requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan mep while thus far the literature on turfs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the mep that the community once granted the fishing use rights have to comply with we formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation the key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism where fishermen monitor and sanction one another we found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community turfs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery we discuss the importance of economic incentives and disincentives in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the mep our results on the

the learning curve predation antitrust and welfare an economic definition of predation is applied to a dynamic model of duopoly competition with learning curves it is shown that rational predation occurs in equilibrium although below cost pricing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of predation a conceptual framework for antitrust analysis of predation shows that a prohibition of predation might help or harm consumer welfare depending on details of market structure although the informational requirements of fashioning an effective legal rule against harmful predation are formidable

the marginals never vanished incumbency and competition in elections to the u s house of representatives 1952 82 the average vote margin enjoyed by incumbent candidates for the u s house of representatives increased sharply during the 1 960s despite this and contrary to assumptions common in the literature on recent congressional elections electoral data show that house incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s the marginals properly defined have not vanished the swing ratio has diminished little if at all and competition for house seats held by incumbents has not declined vote margins increased without adding to incumbent security diminishing competition or dampening swings because the heterogeneity of interelection vote swings increased at the same time

careerism committee assignments and the electoral connection most scholars agree that members of congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection this assumption implies that members of congress adopt institutions rules and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests direct tests of the electoral connection are rare however because significant exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify we develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment property rights we examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major exogenous change in the electoral system the states rapid adoption of australian ballot laws in the early 1890s the ballot changes we argue induced new personal vote electoral incentives which contributed to the adoption of modern congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments we demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892 by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force and earlier than previous studies have suggested

avoiding market dominance product compatibility in markets with network effects as is well recognized market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network effects a firm with a larger installed base offers a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage such a setting is investigated here but with the main difference that firms have the option of making their products compatible when firms have similar installed bases they make their products compatible in order to expand the market nevertheless random forces could result in one firm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger firm may make its product incompatible we find that strategic pricing tends to prevent the installed base differential from expanding to the point that incompatibility occurs this pricing dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and avoid the emergence of market dominance

dynamic r d with spillovers competition vs cooperation abstract we investigate dynamic r d for process innovation in a cournot duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost reducing r d investments by comparing the profit and welfare performances of the two settings in steady state we show that private and social incentives towards r d cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity we also evaluate the whole history of the dynamic system along the transition to the steady state showing that the conflict between private and social incentives does not necessarily emerge

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

the committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem this paper adapts a simple model from the optimal contracting literature to explain the relationship between political parties and non incumbent candidates the model predicts that legislators with a higher opportunity cost of government service will receive better committee assignments using data that spans 12 congresses 97th to 108th i find that when the opportunity cost of senate service is measured by previous occupation freshmen senators with a high opportunity cost for serving those who were lawyers were given good committee assignments while freshmen senators with a low opportunity cost for serving professors and those with relatives already in politics were given worse committee assignments

congressional influence on u s monetary policy abstract congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of federal reserve behavior here i show that changes in the leadership of the senate banking committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth more liberal committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth other factors held constant the result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

the tragedy of the commons revisited identifying behavioral principles abstract the theme of hardin s renowned the tragedy of the commons is that the common pool resource is dissipated to the level where the average value of extraction equals the wage rate in the long run when the number of appropriators is unlimited yet experimental results and rapid deforestation in tropical countries follow a contrasting pattern even though the number of appropriators is limited the common pool resource is dissipated more than the nash equilibrium predicts first given these market or experimental observations we identify two behavioral principles share maximization and difference maximization second we characterize these principles at nash equilibrium

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

noncooperative versus cooperative r d with endogenous spillover rates this paper deals with a general version of a two stage model of r d and product market competition we provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative r d dispensing in particular with ex post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions we also characterize the structure of profit maximizing r d cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide r d expenditure as well as internal spillover levels we establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers and within the context of a standard specification derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover

negative externalities in cropping decisions private versus common land this paper analyzes to what extent the entitlement of property rights affects cropping decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities to that end we implement an experimental study where agents make cropping decisions in two different treatments private and common land the results show that there are no statistically significant differences between the two treatments in the contribution to the negative externality thus revealing that the entitlement of property rights does not affect cropping decision in this context furthermore our findings indicate that the implication of the agents in activities generating negative externalities tends to increase over time thus amplifying its adverse consequences

cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future we study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation finally what classes of strategies do subjects employ we find that first cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings second some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation and third subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

on the dynamic efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria abstract this paper compares bertrand and cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with r d research and development competition it shows that cournot competition induces more r d effort than bertrand competition however the price is lower and output is larger in bertrand than in cournot competition furthermore the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium if either r d productivity is low or spillovers are weak or products are very different if r d productivity is high spillovers are strong and goods are close substitutes then the bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the cournot equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification number l13

socio ecological explanations for crowding out effects from economic field experiments in southern africa abstract economic and psychological literature mentions three conditions under which the crowding out effect of pro social behaviour is likely to occur and to crowd out citizens moral obligations to behave co operatively i use a framed field experiment on joint extraction from a common pool resource cpr where the crowding out effect has already been reported before in combination with the trust game carried out in farming communities of namibia and south africa to replicate these conditions the research design and the cross cultural setting enable to explicitly control for these effects the results of the experiments support that the crowding out effect depends on the nature of the external intervention controlling vs supportive external intervention the degree of participants self determination high vs low self determination in the group a society s norms of trust and reciprocity high vs low trust within the society the results imply that outside regulations aiming to conserve natural resources risk worsening the situation when neglecting democratic legitimization as well as local community norms

innovative strategic groups in multinational industries abstract differences in innovative strategies between groups of domestic and multinational enterprises are analyzed within a two stage game model that incorporates the asymmetries in transaction costs between the two species of enterprises nash and cooperative behaviour is shown to result in different equilibrium r d strategies with the multinational companies doing typically more r d for larger markets and domestic companies focusing on specific market segments survey data from companies operating in eleven high tech multinational industries in belgium provide support for these strategic differences and show how they are related to company performance

macroeconomic conditions and committee re election rates the traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and house elections follows kramer 1971 and assumes all members of the president s party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes using presidential party return rates from 10 house committees over the time period 1916 1996 i find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee generally committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations contrastingly members of the public works committee and the rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations

congressional oversight committee influence on u s monetary policy revisited abstract grier 1991 shows that monetary policy is influenced by congress in that increases in the liberality of the senate banking committee leadership are significantly positively correlated with monetary base growth chopin cole and ellis 1996 claim that the house leadership statistically dominates the senate leadership for predicting money growth but that the direction of the effect is perverse a more liberal house leadership is associated with a lower rate of base growth in this paper i show that chopin cole and ellis s claims are unfounded properly measured both house and senate leadership have a significant positive effect on base growth over grier s 1991 original sample in later periods money growth regressions are not sufficiently stable to support hypothesis tests

payments or persuasion common pool resource management with price and non price measures we use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse we look at a price mechanism specifically a pigouvian subsidy and four non price interventions the non price policies are information alone information with a normative message communication alone and normative messages with communication allowed in all experiment sessions no intervention occurs in the first seven and last seven rounds allowing us to examine the effects of introducing and taking away a policy the subsidy leads to near efficient extraction but surprisingly leads groups that were not over extracting to also reduce extraction this over compliance decreases efficiency although on net the subsidy is the most efficiency enhancing intervention information provision communication normative appeals and normative appeals combined with communication all reduce over extraction though by less than the subsidy without exacerbating over compliance however the effects of information alone and communication alone are small and not robust the non price policies cause a decline in over extraction of from 0 549 information to 11 441 normative appeals with communication these effects are of the same order of magnitude as the effects seen in major field studies of conservation messaging the subsidy has the worst persistence properties after the intervention ceases while normative messages with communication have the best

r d cooperation or competition abstract the economic literature provides empirical evidence of the existence of technological cartels such as research joint ventures or deliberate sharing of technological knowledge our aim is to answer to the questions i is the creation of technological cartels beneficial from a social welfare point of view and ii do the firms have private incentives to form such cartels we depart from the approach adopted in the literature by considering a dynamic model and allowing for the possibility that the firms are asymmetric the results show the importance of the degree of existing technological spillovers and stress the differences between the symmetric and asymmetric cases

dynamic r d with spillovers a comment cellini and lambertini 2009 dynamic r d with spillovers competition vs cooperation j econ dyn control 33 568 582 study a dynamic r d game with spillovers this comment demonstrates that contrary to what is claimed in their paper the game is not state redundant and the open loop nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect

resolving the process vs product innovation dilemma a consumer choice theoretic approach there has been considerable emphasis on the strategic importance of process and product innovation in the management literature what actually constitutes process and product innovation however is a confused issue in the current literature are product and process innovations separate or are they on a continuum the importance of addressing this issue is that research over the past few decades has attributed japan s increasing competitiveness to its propensity to process innovate this paper uses a consumer based approach to distinguish between process and product innovation using a model based on choice theory an empirical illustration of the model is also presented the model is then used to emphasize the need to pursue an integrated strategy of process and product innovation in response to consumer wants the model also helps managers decide on the appropriate mix of process innovation relative to product innovation for r d resource allocation purposes

equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract a model incorporating aspects of a psychological theory of equity is presented as an alternative to the conventional economics model equity theory suggests that people may feel distress if they contribute either larger or smaller shares of their incomes to the public good than the average contribution of others and that people will behave in a way to avoid this distress the nash equilibrium prediction for this model is for high income individuals to undercontribute and for low income individuals to overcontribute relative to the prediction of the conventional model the data support the alternative model over the conventional model

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

product innovation incentives by an incumbent firm a dynamic analysis we employ a dynamic framework to study how product innovation activities of a firm are influenced by its investments in production capacity of an established product and vice versa the firm initially has capacity to sell an established product additionally it also has the option to undertake an r d project which upon completion allows the firm to introduce a new vertically and horizontally differentiated product to the market thereby extending its current product range the breakthrough probability of detecting the new product depends on both the value of the firm s r d stock and its current r d investment it is shown that the initial production capacity for the established product influences the intensity of r d activities of the firm in particular there are constellations such that for large initial production capacity for the established product the firm never invests in r d and the new product is never introduced for small initial capacity the firm keeps investing in r d implying that eventually the new product is always introduced finally for an intermediate range of initial capacity levels the firm initially invests in product r d but then reduces these investments to zero in this scenario the new product is introduced with a positive probability which is however substantially smaller than 1 from a technical perspective this analysis gives the example of a new type of skiba threshold phenomenon in the framework of a multi mode optimization model

common pool resources with free mobility i introduction to date most of the experimental research on common pool resources cpr has been concerned with the overexploitation problem within one community several studies as in casari and plott 2003 visser 2006 and fehr and gachter 2000 emphasize that mutual monitoring and sanctions against excessive use and free riding can be welfare improving in cpr and public good settings furthermore ostrom 1990 and others highlight the importance of clearly defined boundaries for successful self governance in the commons however in and out population migration may be a significant factor in resource use across communities examples include international fisheries or pastureland under extensive grazing the purpose of this study is to consider the effect of migratory pressure on such mobile commons in this article we relax the assumption of no entry and study how an agent s free mobility between communities affects resource use population migration is free in the tiebout 1956 sense we assume that agents mobility is costless our work differs from previous research in that it addresses the mobility issue by looking at multiple localities each with a cpr under either sanctions or open access regime we compare resource extraction behavior under different resource use regimes sanctions vs no sanctions using laboratory experiments conducted in two countries the united states and mongolia examples of commons with multiple locations are widespread in national and world economies extensive livestock production prevalent in mongolia kyrgyzstan niger and mali relies on low forage value grassland which requires movement of herders over large territories subsuming many localities similarly fisheries around international waters involve resource use problems across many localities or even countries for instance pink salmon in the north east pacific is harvested in canadian american and russian waters some localities may have regulations such as sanctions to promote the efficient use of the resource whereas others are still unregulated the alaskan salmon fisheries in chignik were governed at certain times by a cooperative fleet that shared catch equally among members and at other times by an independent fleet in such a way that unregulated fishermen were free to join cooperatives as studied in deacon parker and costello 2008 in new england users move among separately managed resources such as groundfish shellfish and baitfish within single political jurisdictions to reflect the high mobility aspect of such settings we extend the existing experimental laboratory research on cpr to allow for two communities in which citizens are free to choose the place to extract the resource in each community there is a territory with resources for harvesting activity we consider two possible community management regimes for each locality a unregulated community with no rules toward the grazing activity and b decentralized sanctioning mechanism as studied in casari and plot 2003 we consider this sanctioning system as an example of an institution that has a historical precedence and that has been shown to restore the efficiency of the common properties in closed communities the research questions are how does free mobility affect the performance of the sanctioning system if one locality is regulated and the other is not would the sanctioning institution withstand the migratory pressure from the unregulated locality how does the difference in a management regime affect agents decisions on which locality to join we address these questions in an experimental two community cpr framework where participants make decisions regarding the location to harvest and the harvesting level moreover we compare the setting with exogenously imposed institutions to a setting where the institutions in each locality are chosen by majority voting this comparison allows us to consider differences between representative democracy and direct democracy

committee characteristics and re election margins an empirical investigation of the us house models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re election interests of incumbent legislators attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful nevertheless the notion lives on nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system in the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents contrary to this simplifying characterization the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions we suggest here that these realities warrant a re opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member s vote share and that assignment to a narrowly focused specialized committee does not

propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior experimental evidence from australia india indonesia and singapore abstract this paper examines cultural differences in individual decision making in a corruption game we define culture as an individual s accumulated experience shaped by the social institutional and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives based on experiments run in australia melbourne india delhi indonesia jakarta and singapore we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures consistent with the existing corruption indices the subjects in india exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in australia however the subjects in singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected we conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries we also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture specific

varieties of agents in agent based computational economics a historical and an interdisciplinary perspective in this paper we trace four origins of agent based computational economics ace namely the markets origin the cellular automata origin the tournaments origin and the experiments origin along with this trace we examine how these origins have motivated different concepts and designs of agents in ace which starts from the early work on simple programmed agents randomly behaving agents zero intelligence agents human written programmed agents autonomous agents and empirically calibrated agents and extends to the newly developing cognitive agents psychological agents and culturally sensitive agents the review also shows that the intellectual ideas underlying these varieties of agents cross several disciplines which may be considered as a part of a general attempt to study humans and their behavior with an integrated interdisciplinary foundation

decentralized management of common property resources experiments with a centuries old institution for centuries villages in the alps employed a special system for managing their common properties individual users could inspect other users at their own cost and impose a predetermined sanction a fine when a free rider was discovered the fine was paid to the user who found a violator experiments with the institutions demonstrate that this mechanism considerably improves efficiency of resource use the classical model of identical selfish agents does not capture the data as well as a model with heterogeneous and linear other regarding preferences altruism and especially potentially dysfunctional behavior such as spite and mistake play important positive roles

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

optimal r d levels when firm j benefits from firm i s inventive activity abstract we amend the static model of industry structure in dasgupta and stiglitz to include external benefits from a firm s r d now the market can be seen to underinvest in r d relative to the social optimum the work of mansfield suggests that such external benefits are pervasive

cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions we model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non linear stock dependent costs we propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions we show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate resource growth rate harvest price and the number of resource users this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium the strategy profile that we propose which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies

co managing common pool resources do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms abstract we examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common pool resources in particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depend on the prevailing local norms and ecological values held by resource users for this purpose we employ a framed field experiment that is based on a rangeland model for semi arid regions and carried out with communal farmers in namibia and south africa participants could vote for three best practice management rules found in many places around the world that are discussed for implementation in the study area temporary private property rights rotational grazing or limitation of livestock numbers all rules were designed in a way that facilitated cooperation or coordination of actions the focus of this study lies on the interactions between these rules and prevalent ecological norms exhibited in the rounds prior to rule implementation in contrast to previous lab experimental studies we find that democratic voting of rules is not sufficient for high rule compliance and an overall enhancement in cooperation rules turned out to be inefficient if they were in conflict with the prevalent ecological norm

what motivates common pool resource users experimental evidence from the field this paper develops and tests several models of pure nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self interest and other motivations such as altruism reciprocity inequity aversion and conformism we test whether an econometric summary of subjects strategies is consistent with one of these motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of colombia as expected average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a model of pure self interest but are nevertheless sub optimal moreover we find that a model of conformism with monotonically increasing best response functions best describes average strategies our empirical results are inconsistent with models of altruism reciprocity and inequity aversion

endogenous spillovers and the performance of research joint ventures we present a model of r d with endogenous spillovers and demonstrate that noncooperation can produce maximal spillovers the only other noncooperative outcome is minimal spillovers when noncooperation achieves maximal spillovers so does an rjv whereas minimal noncooperative spillovers imply partial but not necessarily maximal spillovers by an rjv partial rjv spillovers are chosen for anti competitive reasons and an rjv may also close a lab for anti competitive reasons the possibility of anti competitive outcomes is precluded in the existing literature on rjvs which focuses on symmetric outcomes our model predicts when anti competitive behaviour by an rjv arises

research among copycats r d spillovers and feedback strategies abstract we study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate r d efforts and production at different times we discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets for all possible asymmetries in production costs between firms while an increase in spillovers may improve the likelihood of a competitive market it may at the same time reduce the level to which a technology is developed we show that the effects of spillovers on investments and surpluses crucially depend on the stage of technology development considered in particular we show that high spillovers are not necessarily pro competitive as they can make it harder for the laggard to catch up with the technology leader

comparing regulations to protect the commons an experimental investigation in a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common pool resource game with heterogeneous users an access fee and subsidy scheme transferable quotas and non transferable quotas we calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users profits compared to free access extraction we compare the regulations according to five criteria resource preservation individual profits profit difference pareto improvement from free access and sorting of the most efficient users one of the main findings is that even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas

presidential party incumbency and the effects of economic fluctuations on house elections 1916 1996 there is little professional consensusregarding the effect of economic conditionson house elections we argue that recentwork still uses the paradigm of party toorganize their data and tests given thatrecent developments in the theory ofcongress emphasize the paradigm ofincumbency we investigate the empiricalrelevance of that competing paradigm weshow that 1 incumbency matters in a purepresidential party model of houseelections 2 presidential party mattersin a pure incumbency model 3 once bothparty and incumbency are accounted for economic conditions exert a highlysignificant and temporally stable influenceon house elections 4 return rates aremore affected by economic fluctuations thanare vote shares and 5 not allpresidential party incumbents face the samedegree of electoral accountability foreconomic fluctuations