trust trustworthiness and information sharing in supply chains bridging china and the united states whether and how trust and trustworthiness differ between a collectivist society e g china and an individualistic one e g the united states generates much ongoing scientific debate and bears significant practical values for managing cross country transactions we experimentally investigate how supply chain members countries of origin china versus the united states affect trust trustworthiness and strategic information sharing behavior in a cross country supply chain we consider a two tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast information from the retailer to plan production but the retailer has an incentive to manipulate her forecast to ensure abundant supply the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the supply chain and supplier s capability to determine the optimal production quantity affect the efficacy of forecast sharing and the resulting profits we develop an experimental design to disentangle these three aspects and to allow for real time interactions b

learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games abstract although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness i e the fulfillment of trust are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts less is known about how the economic environment influences them in this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined stochastic past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships we find that shorter lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow while longer lasting relationships have the opposite effect the effect of stochastic end points declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects gain experience indicating that trust is able to rebound when longer lasting relationships follow shorter lasting ones

behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect and the observed value of inventory information the tendency of orders to increase in variability as one moves up a supply chain is commonly known as the bullwhip effect we study this phenomenon from a behavioral perspective in the context of a simple serial supply chain subject to information lags and stochastic demand we conduct two experiments on two different sets of participants in the first we find the bullwhip effect still exists when normal operational causes e g batching price fluctuations demand estimation etc are removed the persistence of the bullwhip effect is explained to some extent by evidence that decision makers consistently underweight the supply line when making order decisions in the second experiment we find that the bullwhip and the underlying tendency of underweighting remains when information on inventory levels is shared however we observe that inventory information helps somewhat to alleviate the bullwhip effect by helping upstream chain members better anticipate and prepare for fluctuations in inventory needs downstream these experimental results support the theoretically suggested notion that upstream chain members stand to gain the most from information sharing initiatives

types and patterns an experimental east west german comparison of cooperation and solidarity abstract in a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western germany we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a significantly more selfish manner than do western subjects besides that we found that many qualitative results of both data sets are similar since our experiments were conducted in two parts of one nation we present an unusually well controlled cross cultural study by avoiding difficulties that usually arise in multinational settings we conclude that cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of germany

contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information an experimental evaluation exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant the goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal we study a two tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments in the experiments the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end consumer demand than the human supplier the supplier offers either a quantity discount contract with two or three price blocks or a price only contract contracts that are commonplace in practice yet different in complexity results show that contrary to theoretical predictions quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier s profits we also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts these observations can be described with three decision biases the probabilistic choice bias the reinforcement bias and the memory bias and can be modeled using the experience weighted attraction learning model our results demonstrate that simpler contracts such as a price only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations and supply chain management

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

a time series framework for supply chain inventory management we consider a supply chain in which the underlying demand process can be described in a linear state space form inventory is managed at various points of the chain members based on local information that each member observes and continuously updates the key feature of our model is that it takes into account the ability of the members to observe subsets of the underlying state vector and adopt their forecasting and replenishment policies accordingly this enables us to model situations in which the members are privy to certain explanatory variables of the demand with the latter possibly evolving according to a vector autoregressive time series for each member we identify an associated demand evolution model for which we propose an adaptive inventory replenishment policy that utilizes the kalman filter technique we then provide a simple methodology for assessing the benefits of various types of information sharing agreements between members of the supply chain we also discuss inventory positioning and cost performance assessment in the supply chain our performance metrics and inventory target levels are usually presented in matrix forms allowing them to accommodate a relatively large spectrum of linear demand models and making them simple to implement several illustrations for possible applications of our models are provided

contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition we investigate contracting and information sharing in two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer the two supply chains are identical except they may have di

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

exploring the consistency of higher order risk preferences this study measures higher order risk preferences and their consistency we explore the role of country differences the variation of stakes and the framing of lotteries we observe a robust dichotomous pattern of choice behavior in china in the usa and in germany the majority of choices are consistent with mixed risk aversion or mixed risk loving behavior we also find this pattern after a tenfold increase in the stakes finally our results reveal that this pattern is strengthened if the lotteries are displayed in compound rather than reduced form in a follow up study we explore potential explanations for this framing effect

organization and management in the midst of societal transformation the people s republic of china twenty five years of economic reform has propelled china to the center of the world s economic stage based on current trends in the foreseeable future china is likely to become the largest economy in the world china s dramatic growth may be envied by other developing economies but for management scholars it presents an exciting intellectual puzzle in this paper we describe the empirical context of china today review contemporary research on chinese management and organizations and describe the nine papers in this special issue oforganization science the papers provide a close examination of how massive corporate transformation in china has influenced interfirm relationships affected opportunity structures and social processes and modified individual behaviors within firms we identify the many paradoxes in this intellectual terrain and present a guide to the challenging research agenda ahead we recommend that scholars of organizations think deeply about china as a context and consider china as an empirical setting where the boundaries of existing knowledge on organizations can be extended

contract preferences and performance for the loss averse supplier buyback vs revenue sharing prior theory claims that buyback and revenue sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier retailer setting this suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts however the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues i e losses and gains vary significantly between the contracts suggesting the supplier s preference of contract type and associated contract parameter values may vary with the level of loss aversion we investigate this phenomenon through two studies the first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts using a controlled laboratory experiment with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel i e the newsvendor critical ratio in particular a buyback contract is preferred for products wit

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

governments reciprocal exchange and trust among business associates both pearce and molm have conducted research in interpersonal trust here we apply their work to international business by deriving hypotheses from their work some compatible some conflicting we test them with data from managers in china the united states hong kong and thailand using measures from the world bank world competitiveness report and transparency international and managerial interviews we find support for pearce s arguments on the effects of governmental facilitation on managers trust in their business partners and for extensions of molm s work on reciprocal exchange to international field settings for the conflicting hypotheses results support pearce s arguments that the structural assurances of facilitative governments lead to higher levels of trust in business associates

designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers does the framing of the fixed fee matter the format of pricing contracts varies substantially across business contexts a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee payment this paper examines how the use of the fixed fee in pricing contracts affects market outcomes of a manufacturer retailer channel standard economic theories predict that channel efficiency increases with the introduction of the fixed fee and is invariant to its framing we conduct a laboratory experiment to test these predictions surprisingly the introduction of the fixed fee fails to increase channel efficiency moreover the framing of the fixed fee does make a difference an opaque frame as quantity discounts achieves higher channel efficiency than a salient frame as a two part tariff although these two contractual formats are theoretically equivalent to account for these anomalies we generalize the standard economic model by allowing the retailer s utilities to be reference dependent so that the up front fixed fee payment is perceived as a loss and the subsequent retail profits as a gain we embed this reference dependent utility function in a quantal response equilibrium framework where the retailer is allowed to make decision mistakes due to computational complexity the key prediction of this behavioral model is that channel efficiency decreases with loss aversion for sufficiently nash rational retailers consistent with this prediction the estimated loss aversion coefficient is 1 37 in the two part tariff condition significantly higher than 1 27 in the quantity discount condition at the same time loss aversion dominates contract complexity in explaining the data lastly we conduct a follow up experiment to confirm the central role of loss aversion as a behavioral driver in one condition the retailer becomes less loss averse when we temporally compress the fixed fee payment and the realization of retail profits which supports the loss aversion theory in the other condition the retailer s contract acceptance rate does not decline when we reward the manufacturer a higher cash payment for each experimental point earned which rules out the competing hypothesis that the retailer rejects contract offers due to fairness concerns

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

in search of homo economicus behavioral experiments in 15 small scale societies we can summarize our results as follows first the canonical model is not supported in any society studied second there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments third group level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games fourth individual level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups fifth behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies

contracting in supply chains a laboratory investigation the coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically we investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms the wholesale price contract the buyback contract and the revenue sharing contract the simplified setting we consider utilizes a two echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem the supplier has no capacity constraints and delivery occurs instantaneously we compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier results indicate that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts we also find that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance

gaming against managers in incentive systems experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers we examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in china comparing behavior between i students and managers with field experience with this situation ii standard versus increased monetary incentives and iii sessions conducted in context making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers and those without any such references the dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually and incompletely converging on a pooling equilibrium a fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers with minimal impact on students

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

supply chain decision making will shorter cycle times and shared point of sale information necessarily help using a simulated supply chain experiment based on the well known beer game we examine how changes in order and delivery cycles availability of shared point of sale pos information and the pattern of customer demand affect supply chain efficiency we find that speeding up cycle time is beneficial but the sharing of pos information is not necessarily so whether or not the sharing of pos information is beneficial depends on the nature of the demand pattern represented by the pos information if the demand pattern conveys continual change in ultimate downstream customer demand as does an s shaped demand pattern the pos information can distract the upstream decision maker from what is perhaps more immediately relevant information orders placed by the proximate downstream agent and the supply line

trust and the reference points for trustworthiness in gulf and western countries why is private investment so low in gulf compared to western countries we investigate cross regional differences in trust and reference points for trustworthiness as possible factors experiments controlling for cross regional differences in institutions and beliefs about trustworthiness reveal that gulf citizens pay much more than westerners to avoid trusting and hardly respond when returns to trusting change these differences can be explained by subjects gain loss utility relative to their region s reference point for trustworthiness the relation based production of trust in the gulf induces higher levels of trustworthiness albeit within groups than the rule based interactions prevalent in the west

measuring imputed cost in the semiconductor equipment supply chain we consider the order fulfillment process of a supplier producing a customized capital good such as production equipment commercial aircraft medical devices or defense systems as is common in these industries prior to receiving a firm purchase order from the customer the supplier receives a series of shared forecasts which are called soft orders facing a stochastic internal manufacturing lead time the supplier must decide at what time to begin the fulfillment of the order this decision requires a trade off between starting too early leading to potential holding or cancellation costs and starting too late leading to potential delay costs we collect detailed data of shared forecasts actual purchase orders production lead times and delivery dates for a supplier buyer dyad in the semiconductor equipment supply chain under the assumption that the supplier acts rationally optimally balancing the cancellation holding and delay costs we are able to estimate the corresponding imputed cost parameters based on the observed data our estimation results reveal that the supplier perceives the cost of cancellation to be about two times higher and the holding costs to be about three times higher than the delay cost in other words the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment which undermines the effectiveness of the overall forecast sharing mechanism

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

the loser s curse decision making and market efficiency in the national football league draft a question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the biases found in judgment and decision making research remain present in contexts in which experienced participants face strong economic incentives to investigate this question we analyze the decision making of national football league teams during their annual player draft this is a domain in which monetary stakes are exceedingly high and the opportunities for learning are rich it is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest that teams may overvalue the chance to pick early in the draft using archival data on draft day trades player performance and compensation we compare the market value of draft picks with the surplus value to teams provided by the drafted players we find that top draft picks are significantly overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and efficient markets and consistent with psychological research this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behav

testing for the lop under nonlinearity an application to four major eu pork markets this article develops an econometric procedure to test the validity of the law of one price lop under nonlinearity and to distinguish between its strong and its weak version the procedure is applied to four major eu pork markets using weekly prices from 1991 to 2008 the empirical results suggest that the markets are well integrated with deviations from the steady state price differentials corrected nonlinearly the lop is valid for all market pairs and for the pair germany spain it holds in its strong version