monotone equilibrium of two bidder all pay auctions redux abstract in this paper we revisit the two bidder asymmetric all pay auction of amann and leininger 1996 by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals both values and signals are distributed on continuous supports we provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse and constructively characterize the mpse when it exists we find that given the marginal distributions of the signals the equilibrium allocation is solely determined by how bidders values depend on their signals in particular the equilibrium allocation does not depend on how bidders signals are correlated

migrants in a guest worker system a utility maximizing approach this paper examines the behavior of utility maximizing migrants in a system of guest worker migration their pattern of leisure and commodity consumption at home and abroad is analysed and related

two bidder all pay auctions with interdependent valuations including the highly competitive case abstract we analyze symmetric two bidder all pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria we show how the search problem this construction faces can be complex in equilibrium randomization can take place over disjoint intervals of bids equilibrium supports can have a rich structure and non monotonicity of the equilibrium may result in a positive probability of allocative inefficiency when the value of the prize is not common particular attention is paid to the case in which an increase in a bidder s posterior expected value of winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase for the other bidder such environments are highly competitive in the sense that the bidder s higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively

economic development and income inequality further evidence on the u curve hypothesis abstract internationally comparable data on inequality and income are utilized to reassess the empirical status of kusnets u curve hypothesis the hypothesis seems well supported when both developed countries dcs and less developed countries lcds are included in the sample however the position changes rather dramatically if the sample is restricted to lcds and very small support for the hypothesis is then observed also a simple comparison indicates that some of the support reported in earlier studies may have been due to the use of conventional gross domestic product per capita in general results based on gini coefficient seem less favorable to the hypothesis than those derived from household income shares

on the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions we establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first price auctions with asymmetric bidders interdependent values and affiliated one dimensional signals by extending a monotonicity result due to milgrom and weber 1982 we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational we avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second price auctions

on the effective use of stigma as a crime deterrent abstract stigma affects convicted offenders if employers reduce their wage current research considers this kind of informal sanctioning as an effective means for reducing crime and proposes its fostering by the government in this article i first show that increasing stigma may even enhance crime while stigma enhances deterrence of an unconvicted offender it may drive a stigmatized ex convict towards recidivism secondly i provide a solution for guaranteeing stigma s effectiveness notably a harsh er punishment for repeat offenders is required finally with the theoretical analysis as a background stigmatization policies pursued in the states switzerland and spain are compared

rational bidding in a procurement auction with subjective evaluations in practice procurement auctions often involve subjective evaluations of bids especially when consisting of quality or design parameters which are hard to quantify we formally define a notion of subjectivity in an auction environment and analyze the implications for rational bidding behavior our findings explain some observed bidding behaviors that are inconsistent with standard equilibrium predictions finally we examine the way subjectivity facilitates the practice of favoritism on part of the auctioneer

existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions we show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions including the first general existence result for double auctions the set of equilibria is invariant to the tie breaking rule the model incorporates multiple unit demands all standard pricing rules reserve prices entry costs and stochastic demand and supply valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed for double auctions we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade the existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous bayesian games

the impact of incarceration on wage mobility and inequality a life course perspective on crime indicates that incarceration can disrupt key life transitions life course analysis ofoccupations finds that earnings mobility depends on stable employment in career jobs these two lines of research thus suggest that incarceration reduces ex inmates access to the steady jobs that usually produce earnings growth among young men consistent with this argument evidence for slow wage growth among ex inmates is provided by analysis of the national longitudinal survey of youth because incarceration is so prevalent one quarter of black non college males in the survey were interviewed between 1979 and 1998 while in prison or jail the effect of imprisonment on individual wages also increases aggregate race and ethnic wage inequality

revenue and efficiency in multi unit uniform price auctions abstract this paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform price multi unit auction with a positive reservation price i demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency or welfare in multi unit uniform price auctions i show that the higher the reservation price is the higher is the seller s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi unit uniform price auction the reservation price increases the bidder s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform price auction thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats e g the reservation price decreases efficiency in the vickrey auction and single unit auctions with symmetric bidders therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single unit single dimensional context to the multi unit multi dimensional one

a disequilibrium model of public spending abstract this paper proposes a disequilibrium model of public spending empirical results show that public spending is constrained by the supply side for low per capita income countries and the demand side forhigh income countries

asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information the two player case abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of bayesian equilibrium for a class of generally asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information due to its importance in applications some prominence is given to the first price all pay auction for which a detailed characterization of equilibrium and an approximation to equilibrium of its well studied complete information version are supplied furthermore we relate our uniqueness result to the well known multiplicity of equilibria in the war of attrition second price all pay auction which emerges as a limit point of the class of two player auction games considered journalof economic literature classification numbers d44 c62 c72

bid costs and endogenous bid caps we study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids and moreover bids may be capped we show that regardless of the number of bidders if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid on the other hand if agents have convex cost functions i e an increasing marginal cost then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders

comparative productivity of korean manufacturing 1967 1987 this paper compares productivity levels in south korean manufacturing with those in the usa for 13 manufacturing branches the comparison is based on specific industry of origin purchasing power parities value added per hour worked in korean manufacturing rose from only 4 5 percent of the us level in 1967 to more than 18 percent in 1987 total factor productivity rose from only 9 percent in 1967 to 26 percent of the us level in 1987 at a more detailed level especially the leather metals and machinery industries have reached high productivity levels some of which approach levels in european manufacturing the considerable labour productivity gap between korea and the united states can partly be explained by capital intensity structural effects size effects and levels of education

comparative productivity the ussr eastern europe and the west this paper compiles comparative measures of output per worker in 1975 in four socialist and seven western market economy wme countries and explores sources of observed differences between the two groups of countries in that regard such differences seem explicable only partially by reference to differences in per worker capital stock and farm land a residual disparity of 25 to 34 percent in favor of wme countries appears to testify to superior efficiency in the latter copyright 1987 by american economic association

the shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle abstract the analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism for the general symmetric model introduced by milgrom and weber p milgrom r weber a theory of auctions and competitive bidding econometrica 50 1982 1089 1122 we characterize the full set of separating equilibria that are symmetric among buyers and with a strategic seller being able to bid in the same way as any buyer through a so called shill bidding activity the revenue ranking between first and second price auctions is different from the one arising in milgrom and weber the benefits from the highlighted linkage principle are counterbalanced by the shill bidding effect

youth unemployment and crime in the english regions and wales this paper investigates the relationship between unemployment and crime in england and wales taking account of both age and gender in the unemployment measures the study is for 1985 95 and is disaggregated to the regional level we allow for different types of crime and the deterrence effects of detection and punishment we also consider the relationship between ethnicity and crime in the light of the contentious public debate on this issue our results indicate that there is a systematic positive relationship between burglary rates and male unemployment regardless of age however we find that while youth unemployment is consistently and positively related to criminal damage and robbery rates there is no systematic evidence of a relationship between adult male unemployment and these specific crimes instead our evidence supports a positive link between adult unemployment and theft we find no compelling evidence of a link between ethnicity and crime

a study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel this paper examines bidding in over 1 700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel or ring of stamp dealers in the 1990s the knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by daniel graham robert marshall and jean francois richard 1990 following a reduced form examination of these data damages induced inefficiency and the ring s benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of emmanuel guerre isabelle perrigne and quang vuong 2000 a notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers

bargaining over perfect complements owned separately with experimental test this paper considers the situation in which two perfect complements belong to different owners we calculate the bayesian nash equilibrium in the mechanism of k 1 price bargaining with private value and did experiment to test the theory

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

all equilibria of the vickrey auction abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in the second price sealed bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders in addition we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness

efficiency and competition in the long run the survival of the unfit abstract in a dynamic contest the current incumbent competes against a randomly assigned entrant in a private value all pay auction each period we focus on equilibria where the beliefs about the incumbent s type and the employed strategies are stationary we show that inefficient types survive even if the entrants arrive very frequently because the entrant plays more aggressively than the incumbent allowing a low type entrant to win against a high type incumbent in an example we show that if the incumbent is challenged more often then the equilibrium type of the incumbent is higher on average when the value of the prize is the same for all players the case studied in the public choice literature the equilibrium rent of the bidders is fully dissipated as the incumbent is challenged infinitely often the technical contribution lies in showing the existence of stationary equilibrium in an incomplete information game

what impact does the choice of formula have on international comparisons in this paper an empirical comparison of a number of alternative multilateral index number formulae is undertaken the magnitude of the effect of choosing one formula over another is ascertained using an appropriate cross sectional data set constructed under the auspices of the eurostat oecd purchasing power parity programme to this end a new indicator is proposed that facilitates the measurement of the difference between two sets of bloc consumption shares each computed using a different multilateral comparison method jel classification c31 c43 c81 e31 f31 o57 quel impact est ce que le choix des formules a sur les comparaisons internationales ce memoire propose une comparaison empirique d un certain nombre de formules de nombres indices multilateraux on tente de jauger la magnitude de l impact du choix d une formule plutot qu une autre en utilisant une base de donnees transversales appropriee construite sous l egide du programme de parite du pouvoir d achat eurostat ocde on propose un nouvel indicateur qui facilite la mesure de la difference entre deux ensembles de patterns de consommation chacun calculea l aide d une methode de comparaison multilaterale differente

adult labour market implications of antisocial behaviour in childhood and adolescence findings from a uk longitudinal study while antisocial behaviour in younger age groups is largely viewed as a public externality issue there are also reasons for expecting less favourable life course outcomes for those individuals who follow antisocial developmental pathways data from a uk longitudinal study of delinquent development in a cohort of working class boys are used to model the adult labour market implications of different antisocial developmental pathways to age 32 a series of probit estimations suggests that children identified as troublesome by peers and teachers at an early age and who subsequently engaged in delinquent behaviour throughout their adolescence had a significantly higher probability of experiencing long periods of time out of the workforce prior to age 32 and lengthy periods of unemployment and or low paid work at both age 18 and at age 32 a heckman selectivity model estimated on weekly earnings at age 32 does not provide evidence that antisocial development in children and adolescents is associated with a l

wagner s hypothesis in time series and cross section perspectives evidence from real data for 115 countries internationally comparable data on income and government expenditure for 115 countries covering the period 1950 80 are used to assess the validity of wagner s hypothesis individual country time series data and several intercountry cross sections are studied besides a tremendous diversity in the position for various countries the results indicate that while there is support for the hypothesis in some time series data sets such support is lacking in most cross section estimates much of the support for the hypothesis reported in many earlier studies therefore was probably due to either use of limited samples or inadequate data comparability across the observations studied copyright 1987 by mit press

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

intercountry inequalities in income and index of net social progress evidence from recent data abstract intercountry income inequality is computed from real gdp data that became available recently from phase iv of international comparisons project similar inequality measures are also calculated for index of net social progress proposed by estes 1983 and for conventional gnp per capita although the three indicators are strongly and positively correlated intercountry inequality indices derived from these are rather dramatically different

k price auctions abstract in this paper we analyze the equilibria structure of k price auctions k 3 under the independent private value assumption we discuss agents with an arbitrary attitude toward risk that is agents may be risk averse or risk seeking or they may have an alternating attitude toward risk we provide a characterization of a continuous symmetric equilibrium prove that there exists at most one such equilibrium and show that every such equilibrium is differentiable and increasing we also show some additional general properties of the equilibrium strategies in these auctions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d83

uniqueness in symmetric first price auctions with affiliation abstract the first price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

economic information versus quality variation in cross country data data quality in the penn world tables varies systematically across countries that have different growth rates and are at different stages of economic development thus intro ducing measurement error correlated with variables of economic interest we explore this problem with three examples from the literature showing that the problem appears to be minor in growth convergence regressions but serious in estimating the effect of income volatility on growth and in a cross country lest of the permanent income hypothesis the results suggest at the least a need for performing appropriate sensitivity tests before draw

comparing evidence on wagner s hypothesis from conventional and real data abstract conventional and internationally comparable data for 34 countries are utilized to assess the relationship between general government expenditure and income while the conventional data can be deemed as mildly supportive of wagner s hypothesis evidence from the icp data suggests a decline in the share of general government as income per capita rises

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

another perspective on changes in international inequality from 1950 to 1980 abstract real income data derived from the third phase of the international comparisons project are used to compute theil s population weighted indices of intercountry inequality for several years between 1950 and 1980 contrary to some recently reported results a substantial increase in inequality is observed internationally comparable consumption data indicate consumption inequality increased more than income inequality

tariffs transfers and the real exchange rate the deviation of exchange rates from purchasing power parities ppp s has recently become the subject of theoretical and empirical attention the massive body of data collected and presented by the international comparisons project icp under the direction of kravis heston and summers khs 9 11 has permitted new empirical investigation of an old topic and has stimulated the construction of theoretical models to account for observed patterns in the icp project and the related literature the focus is on the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp the concept of this ratio is closely related to the concept of the real exchange rate which is defined as the actual exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of an index of foreign prices to an index of domestic prices the term real exchange rate a term widely employed in both economics journals and in the financial press is frequently used to describe changes over time in a particular country and its calculation requires only time totime changes in exchange rates and price indexes the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp on the other hand refers to a comparison of the levels of the exchange rate and the ppp at a moment in time and its calculation requires the availability of a ppp survey of the kind performed by the icp the purpose of the present paper is to analyze the effects of tariffs and transfers on the real exchange rate of a small country in this theoretical endeavor we shall hold constant the prices in foreign countries in this context it can easily be seen that the real exchange rate and the ratio of the exchange rate to the ppp are identical concepts provided that the expenditure weights used in the index of domestic prices are the same as those used in the calculation of the ppp

uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two player bidding games we apply our results to the first price auction the combination of first and second price auctions the war of attrition the all pay auction as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms we also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality our results deal with the asymmetric affiliated common values environment in the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria when signals are not independent our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria journal of economic literature classification number d44

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

equilibria existence and characterization in auctions achievements and open questions establishing existence and characterizing equilibria is a fundamental step in the study of auctions theoretical characterizations and empirical predictions are well accepted only to the extent that they are based on equilibria however despite the fact that auctions have been extensively studied there are still many problems regarding equilibrium existence and characterization waiting for resolution in this survey we review the landmark results and highlight open questions in addition we review the standard assumptions underlying these results and discuss the suitability of the nash equilibrium solution concept we focus our review on single object auctions but also review results in multi unit divisible combinatorial and double auctions

impatience reputation and offending reconviction rates for offenders are high despite sentence severity increasing with the number of convictions the standard one shot model of crime provides little scope for exploring persistence effects although recent papers by emons and others have sought to put offending decisions into a more dynamic setting this article develops a simple two period model of offending in which criminal convictions act as an adverse signal in labour markets ordinary and multinomial logistic regression modelling is used to test the predictions of the theoritical model and explore the link between unemployment and convictions the empirical results which are based on longitudinal data from the national child development study ncds in the uk strongly support the view that ceteris paribus individuals with previous convictions are at higher risk of being unemployed

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

asymmetric all pay auctions with interdependent valuations abstract i show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two player all pay auction with a discrete signal structure correlated signals and interdependent valuations the proof is constructive and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics i also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced

myopia and addictive behaviour we present a theory of addictive behaviour which can account for addicts apparent disregard for the future consequences of their current actions the discounting of future utility is increasing in past consumption indicating increasingly myopic behaviour as consumption increases the intertemporal complementarity generated by the endogenous discounting produces multiple steady states which can account for the simultaneous existence of myopic addicts and non myopic non addicts within a time consiste nt expected utility framework the theory also accounts for the probabilistic incidence of addiction and successful rehabilitation and the possibility of recurrence

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

semiparametric estimation of first price auctions with risk averse bidders in view of the non identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders this paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for the risk aversion parameter s and the latent distribution of private values specifically we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identification under a conditional quantile restriction of the bidders private value distribution and a parameterization of the bidders utility function we develop a multistep semiparametric method and we show that our semiparametric estimator of the utility function parameter s converges at the optimal rate which is slower than the parametric one but independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables thereby avoiding the curse of dimensionality we then consider various extensions including a binding reserve price affiliation among private values and asymmetric bidders the method is illustrated on u s forest service timber sales and bidders risk neutrality is rejected

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

an extended cross country time series analysis of the volume and quality of consumption abstract the approach of finke and theil 1985 is extended to include four countries ireland japan luxembourg and west germany for which consumption data are available at a less detailed level

illicit drug use and labour market achievement evidence from the uk this study using data from the british crime survey bcs examines the effect of drug use on occupational achievement it starts by attempting to overcome the identification problem that results from the limited set of drug use questions presented in the bcs taking this into account and allowing for the endogeneity of drug use in equations for unemployment and labour market outcomes that a mild positive association with soft drugs and occupational achievement is observed that diminishes with age this relationship holds for males but not for females in contrast it is also found that past use of hard drugs significantly increases the likelihood of current unemployment although it appears to be unrelated to occupational success conditional on achieving employment

equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders the two bidder case we study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders we prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions comparative static results are provided journal of economic literature classification number d44

a new cross country tabulation of the quality index of consumption abstract cross country data are used to tabulate a quality index of consumption for each of 30 countries ranging in affluence from the u s to india as well as the real income relative price and residual components of the quality index

accounting for u s regional real exchange rates we examine the relationship between the relative price of nontradables and real exchange rate movements for fixed exchange rate regimes using bls cpi data we show that purchasing power parity holds strongly for tradables across u s regions as a result nontradables play a central role in u s regional real exchange rate movements indeed changes in the relative price of nontradables explain up to 80 of regional real exchange rate changes over medium and long run horizons we also argue that nontradables can account for a large portion of real exchange rate changes internationally with high nontradables expenditure shares

dollar gnp estimates for central and eastern europe 1970 90 a survey and a comparison with western countries abstract in this paper a survey of the dollar gnp estimation methods used in the last 20 years for centrally palnned economies is made none of the different approaches is deemed to be fully satisfactory an explanation is offered as to why the construction of a better method would be impossible at this time the most realistic 1990 per capita gnps for practical use are indicated varying between about 4000 for romania 8000 for czechoslovakia in addition by examining the structure of the economy in terms of contribution to gdp of agriculture industry and services and comparing east and west in this respect the hypothesis is put forward that the technological and organizational evolution of eastern economies basically stopped in the early 1970s

premium auctions and risk preferences abstract in a premium auction the seller offers some payback called premium to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction this paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders risk preferences we analyze a two stage english premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders risk tolerance a net premium effect is key to this result

world food demand long term projections of global food demand are heavily dependent on which functional form of the food demand equation is used given that real incomes can change substantially over the long term key elements are the dependence of the income elasticity on income which ensures that the food budget share always lies within the 0 1 range and the role of income inequality this article analyzes these issues proposes a new functional form that deals with them and presents estimates of income and price elasticities for food in 138 countries copyright 2012 oxford university press

first price auctions with general information structures implications for bidding and revenue we explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions for a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria the information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values we also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative auction mechanisms

pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values we prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands interdependent values and independent types the assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder s type the payments can be a function of all bids thus we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders the generality of our setting requires the use of special tie breaking rules we present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial that is they have zero probability of trade this is related to akerlof s market for lemmons example and to the winner s curse establishing a connection between them however we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non trivial equilibrium existence

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

level of aggregation variable elasticity and wagner s law abstract this paper contends that income elasticities of all types of u s government expenditures but one are constant and less than unity the u s non defense government expenditure is the only one that supports wagner s law as it suggests this expenditure grows faster than income

participation in auctions participation preparing offers in auction and procurement games e g bidding for spectrum rights or for control of corporations is very costly which calls for analyzing participation no less than how to play the games as part of equilibrium the result is a model with bi dimensional distribution of types as in jackson m o 1999 nonexistence of equilibria in auctions with both private and common values mimeo http www stanford edu jacksonm nonexist pdf and endogenous distribution of participants players with low production but high participation costs may decide not to participate forcing the auctioneer to pay higher than necessary prices to mitigate this phenomenon auctioneers may consider partially reimbursing participants for the costs they incur in preparing offers restricting attention to symmetric games we prove that the game we consider has a unique symmetric equilibrium with and without the reimbursement mechanism

aggregate demand shifts income distribution and the linder hypothesis the intraindustry trade literature emphasizes nonhomothetic preferences and incomes as important determinants of aggregate demand and trade patterns the authors provide evidence for such preferences particularly that the structure of income driven demand shifts is related to indices of linder type product characteristics and that income distribution is a significant factor in determining aggregate expenditures these results imply that as general income levels rise the relative volume of trade in manufactured consumer goods should rise and the total volume of trade should rise independent of changes in the intercountry difference between income levels copyright 1996 by mit press

subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders i introduction the literature on optimal law enforcement typically assumes that the government can commit to sanction schemes 1 this means the government can use any set of threats to penalize wrongdoers in particular if a crime occurs the government actually sanctions the wrongdoers even though ex post it may have no incentive to do so potential wrongdoers believe that the government will carry out the threat at any cost and therefore do not engage in the act in the first place in this article i give up the assumption that the government can commit to whatever sanction scheme i consider the analysis of optimal sanctions without the possibility to commit important because judges often have a lot of discretion as to the size of the penalty they may for example adjust sanctions to the financial possibilities age education and so on of the wrongdoer accordingly i allow only for sanctions that the government actually wishes to implement should a crime have occurred ruling out full commitment changes the optimal enforcement schemes suppose for example the government does not care about the sanction as is typically assumed in the literature then it will not enforce the penalty if a crime has happened given that there is say a small cost of doing so the rational criminal will anticipate the ex post enforcement behavior of the government therefore she will commit the crime because the threat of being sanctioned is not credible once one drops the commitment assumption the typical deterrence equilibria of the law enforcement literature between potential wrongdoers and the government are based on empty threats in the language of game theory the equilibria are not subgame perfect or time consistent i study the problem of subgame perfect sanctions using the framework of emons 2003 agents may commit a crime twice the act is inefficient the agents are thus to be deterred the agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the possible sanction for the second offense and vice versa the agents may follow history dependent strategies that is commit the crime a second time if and only if they were were not apprehended the first time the government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension ignoring the government s commitment problem it is optimal to set the sanction for the first offense equal to the entire wealth of the agents while the sanction for the second offense equals zero the intuition is as follows a money penalty imposed for the second offense reduces the amount a person can pay for the first offense because the wealth available to pay penalties is assumed to be fixed over the two periods for that reason a higher probability event namely a first offense that is detected will be more effective use of the scarce money penalty resource than a lower probability event namely a second detected offense why is the probability of detection lower for the second rather than for the first crime simply because an agent faces the possibility of being sanctioned for the second crime if and only if he or she has already been sanctioned the first time for further results it is important to note that the optimal probability of apprehension increases with the benefit from the crimes this decreasing sanction scheme raises of course the issue of time consistency will the government really charge the agent the entire wealth when she was apprehended for the first crime knowing that then she will commit the second act for sure isn t it better for the government to renege and charge little for the first act so that the agent still has sufficient wealth to pay a sanction that deters the second crime given that the first act has been committed anyway that way the government can at least deter the second act to study this problem i consider a rent seeking government

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

ranking disclosure policies in all pay auctions in this paper we study information disclosure policies in all pay auctions with incomplete information two symmetric players have either high or low private value the contest organizer observes players values ex post and can commit ex ante to four different symmetric information policies exhaustively she can fully disclose or conceal the players types and she can disclose their types if and only if when both are high or if and only if when both are low we characterize the unique equilibriums and completely rank the four policies by various criteria we find the full concealment policy extracts highest aggregate expected effort followed by the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are high the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low induces least aggregate expected effort players enjoy highest expected payoffs under the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low the other three policies yield the same expected payoffs to players in terms of prize allocation efficiency the full concealment policy is ranked highest and the full disclosure policy is ranked lowest in between the other two policies rankings depend on the probability of high type jel c72 d44 d82 d83 j48

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press

the ussr before the fall how poor and why this essay appraises the scholarly findings on the level of consumption and output in the ussr compared with that in the west such aggregative calculations are onerous for any country and not very surprisingly have encountered particular difficulty where such a strange society as soviet communism has been in question predictably the results have been controversial but properly viewed they still provide illuminating perspective on the extraordinary events that have lately transpired in the ussr

handicaps in incomplete information all pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders abstract in many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be advantageous examples include affirmative action and biased procurement policies in this paper however i show that some of the supposed beneficiaries may in fact become worse off when the favored group is diverse the reason is that the other favored contestants become more aggressive which may outweigh the advantage that is gained over contestants who are handicapped the contest is modeled as an incomplete information all pay auction in which contestants have heterogenous and possibly non linear cost functions