sorting and the output loss due to search frictions we analyze a general search model with on the job search ojs and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs for given values of nonmarket time the relative efficiency of ojs and the amount of search frictions we derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate mismatch and wage dispersion we estimate the latter two from standard micro data our methodology accounts for measurement error which is crucial to distinguish true from spurious mismatch and wage dispersion we find that without frictions output would be about 9 5 higher if firms can commit to pay wages as a function of match quality and 15 5 higher if they cannot noncommitment leads to a business stealing externality which causes a 5 5 drop in output

the right man for the job this paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types free entry and transferable utility we apply a second order taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium derive the cost of search and show that it is decreasing in the substitutability of worker types this cost of search is then decomposed into three components unemployment vacancy costs and mismatch our contact technology rules out congestion effects between different worker types and therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale one third of those increasing returns in contacts are shown to be absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy the resulting equilibrium is not efficient unemployment benefits can reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy numerical simulations of the model show that our taylor expansions are quite accurate 2004 the review of economics studies limited

assortative matching with explicit search costs in this paper i analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility composed of heterogeneous agents i explore whether becker s assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search in an economy with explicit additive search costs complementarities in joint production supermodularity of the joint production function lead to assortative matching this is in contrast to previous literature which had shown that in a search economy with discounting assortative matching may fail even when the joint production function is supermodular

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sorting and decentralized price competition we investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to sorting of heterogeneous agents there are two aspects of value creation the match value when two agents actually trade and the probability of trading governed by the search technology we show that positive assortative matching obtains when complementarities in the former outweigh complementarities in the latter this happens if and only if the match value function is root supermodular that is its nth root is supermodular where n reflects the elasticity of substitution of the search technology this condition is weaker than the condition required for positive assortative matching in markets with random search

frictional wage dispersion in search models a quantitative assessment we propose a new measure of frictional wage dispersion the mean min wage ratio for a large class of search models we show that this measure is independent of the wage offer distribution but depends on statistics of labor market turnover and on preferences under plausible preference parameterizations observed magnitudes for worker flows imply that in the basic search model and in most of its extensions frictional wage dispersion is very small notable exceptions are some of the most recent models of on the job search our new measure allows us to rationalize the diverse empirical findings in the large literature estimating structural search models

equilibrium search with continuous productivity dispersion theory and nonparametric estimation in this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market we characterize equilibrium derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model we develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution we estimate the model using french longitudinal survey data on labor supply and we compare the results with those from a french panel data set of firms the results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions

job matching and the wage distribution this paper brings together the microeconomic labor and the macroeconomic equilibrium views of matching in labor markets we nest a job matching model a la jovanovic 1984 into a mortensen and pissarides 1994 type equilibrium search environment the resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis we obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality first learning about match quality and worker turnover map gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape unimodal skewed with a paretian right tail second high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting and reduces wage inequality the equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows quits to unemployment and to other jobs displacements hires provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form

overconfidence in the markets for lemons we extend akerlof s 1970 market for lemons by assuming that some buyers are overconfident buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale overconfident buyers do not update according to bayes rule but take the noisy signal at face value the main finding is that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection this stabilization however comes at a cost rational buyers are crowded out of the market

unemployment vs mismatch of talents reconsidering unemployment benefits we develop an equilibrium search matching model with risk neutral agents and two sided ex ante heterogeneity unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment but also helps workers to get a suitable job we show through calibrations how the mere difference on unemployment insurance when countries experience a common skilled biased technological shock may result in differences in unemployment productivity growth and wage inequality these results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in europe and the united states in the last twenty five years the model is used to address some political economy issues

semiparametric estimation of the binary choice model for contingent valuation this paper is concerned with the estimation of the binary choice model without imposing any parametric structure on the distribution of the stochastic term we adapt the distribution free maximum l

on the job search mismatch and efficiency this paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two sided heterogeneity and on the job search besides the well known congestion externalities we show that on the job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a business stealing externality in the absence of congestion effects this leads to excessive vacancy creation under wage setting with commitment this externality is absent because when posting a wage firms take into account the expected productivity of future workers in their current jobs if firms are able to make and respond to counteroffers then they will not have to pay no quit premia and this also leads to excessive vacancy creation

structural and frictional unemployment in an equilibrium search model with heterogeneous agents we specify and estimate an equilibrium search model with between market heterogeneity in the productivity levels the model allows for two types of unemployment unemployment due to search frictions and unemployment due to wage floors wage floors may exist because of large unemployment benefits or a binding mandatory minimum wage using data on labour market histories for a sample of dutch workers we decompose the total unemployment rate in a structural and frictional unemployment rate we also discuss the effect of changes in the minimum wage

the wage distribution in a model of the assignment of skills to jobs this paper discusses a general equilibrium model of the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs both jobs and workers are measured along a continuous one dimensional scale the c

on the job search and strategic bargaining abstract this paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs the axiomatic nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex i instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment i show that if workers and firms are homogeneous there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if firms are heterogeneous i characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages i compare the quantitative predictions of this model with burdett and mortensen s 1998 wage differentials employer size and unemployment international economic review 39 257 273 wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions

comparative advantage relative wages and the accumulation of human capital i apply ricardo s principle of comparative advantage to a theory of factor substitutability in a model with a continuum of worker and job types highly skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs the model satisfies the distance dependent elasticity of substitution dides characteristic substitutability between types declines with their skill distance i analyze changes in relative wages due to human capital accumulation the concept of a complexity dispersion parameter or compression elasticity is introduced empirical studies suggest its value to be equal to two a 1 percent increase in the stock of human capital reduces the mincerian return by 2 percent

identifying sorting in theory assortative matching between workers and rms provides evidence of the complementarities or substitutes in production the presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to achieve the optimal allocation of resources for example unemployment insurance we argue that using wage data alone it is virtually impossible to identify whether assortative matching is positive or negative even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting we can identify the strength i e the magnitude of the cross partial and the associated welfare loss we show rst that the wage for a given worker is non monotonic in the type of his employer this is due to the fact that in a sorting model wages reect the opportunity cost of mismatch we show analytically that this non monotonicity prevents standard rm xed eects to correlate with the true type of the rm we then propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions knowing the strength of sorting facilitates the measurement of the output loss due to mismatch

an empirical equilibrium search model of the labor market in structural empirical models of labor market search the distribution of wage offers is usually assumed to be exogenous however because in setting their wages profit maximizing firms should consider the reservation wages of job seekers the wage offer distribution is essentially endogenous we investigate whether a proposed equilibrium search model in which the wage offer distribution is endogenous is able to describe observed labor market histories we find that the distributions of job and unemployment spells are consistent with the data and that the qualitative predictions of the model for the wages set by employers are confirmed by wage regressions the model is estimated using panel data on unemployed and employed individuals we distinguish between separate segments of the labor market and we show that productivity heterogeneity is important to obtain an acceptable fit to the data the results are used to estimate the degree of monopsony power of firms further the effects of changes in the mandatory minimum wage are examined

education growth and income inequality estimates of the effect of education on gdp the social return have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return to schooling we present a simple explanation combining two ideas imperfect substitution and endogenous skill biased technological progress and use cross country panel data on inequality and gdp to test these ideas a one year increase in the level of education reduces the private return by 2 percentage points consistent with katz murphy s 1992 elasticity of substitution we find no evidence for reversal of this initial effect as in acemoglu 2002 in the short run the social return equals the private return

how large are search frictions textabstractthis paper presents strong evidence for the concavity of wages in job and worker characteristics by adding second order terms to a mincerian earnings function for 6 oecd countries under a standard normality assumption this concavity cannot be attributed to unobserved components in those characteristics an assignment model with search frictions provides a parsimonious explanation for our findings this model yields two restrictions on the coefficients which fit the data very well the impact of search frictions on wages is large our results relate to the literature on industry wage differentials on structural identification in hedonic models and on wage posting versus nash bargaining in search models