the cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking1 abstract we present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline moody s downgrades indicators of increasing risk are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank s reliance on insured deposits moreover banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk these findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment more generally our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries

default correlation an empirical investigation of a subprime lender in recent years subprime lending has grown substantially as an important sector of the credit markets this paper is concerned with the risk management of subprime loan portfolios and the importance of default correlation in measuring that risk using a large portfolio of residential subprime loans from an anonymous subprime lender we show that default correlation is substantial for this lender in particular the significance of default correlation increases as the internal credit rating declines our results suggest that lenders and regulators would be well served investing in the understanding of default correlation in subprime portfolios

credit and market risks measurement in carbon financing for chinese banks abstract this paper concerns the risk analysis of six chinese banks which are involved in carbon financing factor copula is introduced to simulate the corresponding carbon finance credit risk and market risk by latent variables in an indirect method in short the four common factors in carbon financing exchange rates interest rates cer price and brent oil prices are analyzed and explored in factor copula approach that incorporates kmv garch models in two steps the kmv and garch models are used to generate data that reflects the overall credit and market risk associated with each bank both normal copula and t copula functions are used to simulate the parameter estimations for comparison in a new way the value at risk for each of the six banks is calculated through a monte carlo simulation and compared additionally we calculate shock estimates for each factor to explore the changes in both credit risk and market risk given economic shocks also make a hypothetical analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on common factors overall our findings reveal that exchange rates and oil prices are the key factors to consider in carbon financing ping an bank is facing the most risk of all the banks in the sample while the industrial and commercial bank of china is carrying the least risk the results of this analysis gave provide some insight into domestic carbon trading and carbon markets connectivity

economic and regulatory capital allocation for revolving retail exposures abstract we present two internal capital allocation models and compare the capital ratios they generate with those prescribed by the latest revision of basel s new capital accord proposal for advanced retail portfolios which allows for explicit future margin income recognition given a test portfolio of credit card exposures that we assemble we find that basel s ratios are closer to those generated by our models for low credit risk segments we attribute the discrepancies to the different ways basel and our models account for future margin income to basel s assumptions about asset correlations and to one model taking macroeconomic conditions into account

the asymmetric behavior and procyclical impact of asset correlations abstract this paper examines the behavior of asset correlations with the market returns in the asymptotic single risk factor asrf approach of the basel ii accord on regulatory capital requirement over a sample period from 1988 to 2007 we find that asset correlations are positively related to firm size but negatively related to firm default probability asset correlations are also industry specific as firms in media transportation pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries exhibit higher asset correlations than those in retail and consumer staples most importantly asset correlations are asymmetric and have a procyclical impact on the real economy after controlling for these effects they tend to rise during economic downturns but decline during economic upturns the average magnitude of the rise is larger than that of the decline these findings suggest that asset correlations may be underestimated during economic downturns and may provide policy implications for the capital requirement framework

the emergence of market monitoring in japanese banks evidence from the subordinated debt market abstract this paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring the results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates moreover i find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to moody s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the japanese government allowed a large city bank hokkaido takushoku bank to fail and passed the financial reform act and the rapid revitalization act in the late 1990s these results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring in addition i find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile

an approximation method for analysis and valuation of credit correlation derivatives abstract this paper presents a model for approximating the value of a basket of default correlated assets and analyzes subordinate tranches in securitized debt obligations the model is calibrated to an intensity based simulation of correlated defaults and represents an alternative computation method to full monte carlo simulation timing of individual obligor defaults are driven by intensity processes and collateral value is modeled with a jump diffusion process where the number of jumps corresponds to the total number of defaults in the asset pool this approach allows decomposition of subordinate obligations in terms of a collection of simpler securities and yields useful risk management information

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

liquidity effects and the monetary transmission mechanism several recent papers provide strong empirical support for the view that an expansionary monetary policy disturbance generates a persistent decrease in interest rates and a persistent increase in output and employment existing quantitative general equilibrium models which allow for capital accumulation are inconsistent with this view there does exist a recently developed class of general equilibrium models which can rationalize the contemporaneous response of interest rates output and employment to a money supply shock however a key shortcoming of these models is that they cannot rationalize persistent liquidity effects this paper discusses the basic frictions and mechanisms underlying this new class of models and investigates one avenue for generating persistence we argue that once a simplified version of the model in christiano and eichenbaum 1991 is modified to allow for extremely small costs of adjusting sectoral flow of funds positive money shocks generate long lasting quantitatively significant liquidity effects as well as persistent increases in aggregate economic activity

regulatory implications of credit risk modelling abstract this introduction places in context the papers on credit risk modelling contained in the special issue we explain why credit risk modelling has become such a focus of interest for practitioners and financial supervisors even though as we explain the current modelling technologies have significant weaknesses they offer the possibility of major changes in the ways banks are managed and regulated the main impediment to greater use of these models especially by regulators is the difficulty involved in back testing the risk measures they produce we suggest some thoughts on how back testing and other types of model assessment might be performed

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

liquidity flows and fragility of business enterprises abstract this paper develops a macroeconomic model in which funds are channeled to entrepreneurs through long term relationships between entrepreneurs and lenders the flow of funds to a relationship may be low causing it to break up due to insufficient liquidity multiple pareto ranked steady states emerge from complementarity between financial intermediation reflected by the number of relationships and households incentives to provide funds this complementarity also serves as a mechanism for propagating aggregate shocks financial collapse may become inescapable if a shock destroys sufficiently many relationships

credit risk drivers evaluating the contribution of firm level information and of macroeconomic dynamics abstract understanding if credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic firm characteristics or by systematic factors is an important issue for the assessment of financial stability by exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments we observe that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency towards excessive risk taking using an extensive dataset with detailed information for more than 30 000 firms we show that default probabilities are influenced by several firm specific characteristics when time effect controls or macroeconomic variables are also taken into account the results improve substantially hence though the firms financial situation has a central role in explaining default probabilities macroeconomic conditions are also very important when assessing default probabilities over time

a comparative analysis of current credit risk models the new bis 1998 capital requirements for market risks allows banks to use internal models to assess regulatory capital related to both general market risk and credit risk for their trading book this paper reviews the current proposed industry sponsored credit value at risk methodologies first the credit migration approach as proposed by jp morgan with creditmetrics is based on the probability of moving from one credit quality to another including default within a given time horizon second the option pricing or structural approach as initiated by kmv and which is based on the asset value model originally proposed by merton merton r 1974 journal of finance 28 449 470 in this model the default process is endogenous and relates to the capital structure of the firm default occurs when the value of the firm s assets falls below some critical level third the actuarial approach as proposed by credit suisse financial products csfp with creditrisk and which only focuses on default default for individual bonds or loans is assumed to follow an exogenous poisson process finally mckinsey proposes creditportfolioview which is a discrete time multi period model where default probabilities are conditional on the macro variables like unemployment the level of interest rates the growth rate in the economy which to a large extent drive the credit cycle in the economy 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the liquidity effect and money demand abstract i suggest a liquidity effect model in which financial intermediation costs are determined by aggregate economic activity an expansionary monetary shock leads to a persistent contraction in the loan deposit rate spread a persistent liquidity effect and a persistent real expansion a feature of this expansion is that nominal prices respond sluggishly to monetary shocks as an equilibrium outcome

estimating systemic risk in the international financial system this paper develops three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system we examine a sample of 334 banks representing 80 of global bank equity in 28 countries around five global financial crises our results suggest statistically significant but economically small increases in systemic risk although policy responses are endogenous the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers regulators and politicians about the events we study could be overstated and that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events

monetary and financial interactions in the business cycle this paper develops a computable general equilibrium model in which endogenous agency costs can potentially alter business cycle dynamics the model resembles the influential theoretical work of ben bernanke and mark gertler 1989 two sources of shocks are considered productivity shocks and monetary shocks the model is parametrized to match key features of u s aggregate activity the principal result of the analysis is that agency costs add very little to the basic business cycle dynamics copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

job destruction and propagation of shocks this paper considers propagation of aggregate shocks in a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching and endogenous job destruction cyclical fluctuations in the job destruction rate magnify the output effects of shocks as well as making them much more persistent interactions between capital adjustment and the job destruction rate play an important role in generating persistence propagation effects are shown to be quantitatively substantial when the model is calibrated using job flow data incorporating costly capital adjustment leads to significantly greater propagation

human capital investments and labor mobility this article integrates human capital theory with a theory of information accumulation and labor mobility a model is constructed for the determination of human capital accumulation job matching and mobility that accounts for heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market the model provides explanations for observable relationships between earnings mobility age and job tenure it also provides comparative static results of how the labor market equilibrium is affected by changes in the economic environment

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

credit mismatch and breakdown abstract this paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by i borrowers endogenous market entry and exit decision entry frictions and ii time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities search frictions a key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions in the form of moral hazard with entry and search frictions we find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive based equilibrium credit rationing more generally entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown

liquidity effects monetary policy and the business cycle this paper presents a flexible price quantitative general equilibrium model with the property that a positive money supply shock drives the nominal interest rate down and aggregate employment output and the real wage up these implications are broadly consistent with postwar u s data the two key features of the model that are responsible for its properties are 1 money shocks have a heterogeneous impact on agents and 2 ex post inflexibilities in production give rise to a very low short run interest elasticity of money demand in our model the extent of the drop in the interest rate after a positive money supply shock depends on the degree to which production is ex post inflexible given sufficient ex post inflexibility the model conforms well with the view widely held within the u s federal system that the short run interest rate elasticity for total reserves is very close to zero copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

transaction services inflation and welfare this paper is motivated by empirical observations on the comovements of currency velocity inflation and the relative size of the credit services sector we document these comovements and incorporate into a monetary growth model a credit services sector that provides services that help people economize on money our model makes two new contributions first we show that direct evidence on the appropriately defined credit service sector for the united states is consistent with the welfare cost measured using an estimated money demand schedule second we provide estimates of the welfare cost of inflation that have some new features

risk based deposit insurance an incentive compatible plan deposit insurance provided by the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic violates a basic principle of insurance premiums are not adjusted for bank risk thus banks have the incentive to take on more risk increasing the insurer s liability but not the banks costs see keeton 1984 this incentive is heightened further by the fdic s timidity in closing failed banks if uninsured depositors and other creditors were able and willing to evaluate bank risk and demand risk adjusted returns on investments the incentive for risk taking would be weakened since in such a world deposit insurance could be fairly priced see thomson 1987 when asymmetric information concerning both bank risktaking and insurer behavior characterizes the banking market as crane 1976 avery belton and goldberg 1988 keeton and morris 1987 and brewer and lee 1986 all suggest to be the case other remedies must be sought

the informational content of subordinated debt and equity prices in the presence of bankruptcy costs the paper extends the contingent valuation framework of black and cox j finance 31 2 1976 351 to value subordinated debt by explicitly incorporating bankruptcy costs in the model we show that the information from subordinated debt prices is complementary to the information from the equity prices only when the bankruptcy costs are taken into account in fact the joint use of equity and subordinated debt prices can provide information on magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs knowing the magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs is necessary for calculating variables underlying policy objectives in particular it is illustrated that the value of expected liability of a deposit insurer would be underestimated if the bankruptcy costs were not taken into account

search financial market frictions and monetary transmission this paper evaluates the implications of search and matching frictions in the financial market for the bank lending channel of monetary policy borrowers and lenders participate in a decentralized loan market for the purpose of establishing long term credit relationships and the provision of loanable funds to productive firms locating credit relationships is costly in terms of time and real resources and the interest rate is negotiated via a bargaining mechanism this structure is incorporated into an otherwise standard monetary business cycle framework and used to study how such frictions in the credit market contribute to explaining the contemporaneous impact and propagation of monetary growth shocks and inflation while anticipated inflation negatively impacts real activity it can also increase loan market participation and the inflow of newly established credit relationships it is shown that i bargaining and costly search mitigates the traditional inflation tax effect of monetary injections and ii the existence of long term lending relations tends to dampen liquidity effects monetary shocks in this environment lead to larger liquidity effects relative to the frictionless case and are capable of generating persistence in the nominal interest rate labor consumption and output it can also explain the excess volatility of credit creation relative to output and the observation that overall credit creation can lead output over the business cycle

cyclical correlations credit contagion and portfolio losses abstract we model aggregate credit losses on large portfolios of financial positions contracted with firms subject to both cyclical default correlation and direct default contagion processes cyclical correlation is due to the dependence of firms on common economic factors contagion is associated with the local interaction of firms with their business partners we provide an explicit normal approximation of the distribution of portfolio losses we quantify the relation between the variability of global economic fundamentals strength of local firm interaction and the fluctuation of losses we find that cyclical oscillations in fundamentals dominate average losses while local interaction causes additional fluctuations of losses around their average the strength of the contagion induced loss variability depends on the complexity of the business partner network

gross loan flows we present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time bank size and region we define loan creation as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased loans since last quarter loan destruction is similarly defined as the absolute value of the change in loans at all banks that decreased loans the gross flow akin to what the labor literature calls reallocation is the sum of creation and destruction

evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields 1983 1991 we examine debenture yields over the period 1983 1991 to evaluate the market s sensitivity to bank specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government s policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major u s banking firms an increasingly important issue in the regulation of financial institutions concerns the extent to which market investors can will recognize and control the risks of banking firms although the banking act of 1933 replaced some private risk bearing with federal deposit insurance legislators were reluctant to displace market discipline very extensively flood 1992 by the early 1980s however u s regulators had come to protect virtually all bank liability holders from credit losses most visibly at large banks which were deemed too big to fail sprague 1986 o hara and shaw 1990 this extension of the government safety net largely reflects a skepticism on the part of regulators that normal market forces could adequately identify and control bank risks while u s regulators have recently shown an increased willingness to let some bank investors bear default losses an official suspicion of the efficacy of market discipline remains widespread by contrast some prominent academic economists argue that market investors in bank debentures could provide timely and effective control over banking firms risk exposures and that the social cost of supervising banks would be lower if regulators ceded greater

evaluating systemic risk using bank default probabilities in financial networks in this paper we propose a novel methodology to measure systemic risk in networks composed of financial institutions our procedure combines the impact effects obtained from stress measures that rely on feedback centrality properties with the default probabilities of institutions we also present new heuristics for designing feasible and relevant stress testing scenarios that can subside regulators in financial system surveillance tasks we develop a methodology to extract banking communities and show that these communities have a relevant effect on systemic risk we find that these communities are mostly composed of non large banks suggesting that regulators should also broaden their surveillance efforts to these banking communities other than to the usual sifis and large banks finally our results provide insights and guidelines for policymakers

job matching with finite horizon and risk aversion the consequences of introducing risk averse workers with a known finite retirement age into a simple job matching framework are explored the job matching model includes two jobs in the primary job workers and firms learn about the worker s productivity by observing his output over time in the secondary job productivity of any worker is known with certainty at the outset workers start off in the primary job but based on their observed performance may choose to switch to the secondary job the model is developed in two stages first the finite retirement age is introduced while the usual assumption of risk neutral workers is retained in this model it is shown that all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record denoted r by a certain age denoted t will thereafter remain in the primary job until retirement those who do not achieve r by age t switch to the secondary job at or before age t and remain there second risk aversion is introduced along with finite retireme

integrated models of capital adequacy why banks are undercapitalised with the majority of large uk and many us banks collapsing or being forced to raise capital over the 2007 9 period blaming bankers may be satisfying but is patently insucient basel ii and federal oversight frameworks also deserve criticism we propose that the current methodological void at the heart of basel ii pillar 2 is filled with the recommendation that banks develop fully integrated models for economic capital that relate asset values to fundamental drivers of risk in the economy to capture systematic eects and inter asset dependencies in a way that crude correlation assumptions do not we implement a fully integrated risk analysis based on the balance sheet of a representative eurobank using an economic scenario generation model calibrated to conditions at the end of 2007 our results suggest that the more modular correlation based approaches to economic capital that currently dominate practice will have led to an undercapitalisation of banks a

selecting an optimal portfolio of consumer loans by applying the state preference approach abstract internal models like creditmetrics and kmv implemented by banks to manage credit risk and assess regulatory capital are significant examples of how practitioners apply modern portfolio theory mpt to the management of bank loan portfolios from a theoretical perspective there are several reasons suggesting to be careful in extending mpt to the case of bank loan portfolios selection in order to avoid misleading results specifically loans log returns are non normally distributed random variables furthermore decision makers not necessarily perform a quadratic utility function because both of those reasons the traditional mean variance approach is inadequate in building up optimal loan portfolios such a conclusion is even more relevant if specific categories of loans are considered in our paper we deal with the problem of selecting optimal portfolios of consumer loans by developing a state preference model it allows us not to explicitly consider the distributional properties of loans log returns the model is a static one having the objective to select the loan portfolio maximizing the expected utility of wealth allocated by the bank managers subject to a number of constraints accounting for fundamental strategic choices implemented by the bank managers our results show that flexibility is the main characteristic of our model in fact adding constraints gives new optimal portfolios without reducing the expected utility of the decision maker we will explain that such a result does not depend on constraints misspecification but on the risk structure implied in the state preference approach

debt priority structure market discipline and bank conduct we examine how debt priority structure affects bank funding costs and soundness leveraging an unexplored natural experiment that changes the priority of claims on banks assets we document asymmetric effects that are consistent with changes in monitoring intensity by various creditors depending on whether creditors move up or down the priority ladder the enactment of depositor preference laws which confer priority on depositors reduces deposit rates but increases non deposit rates importantly subordinating non depositor claims reduces bank risk taking consistent with market discipline this insight highlights a role for debt priority structure in the regulatory framework

liquidity loanable funds and real activity abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of two traditional explanations of the monetary black box linking money and real activity the liquidity effect and the loanable funds effect these effects are modeled with a monetary production economy in which central bank injections of cash are funnelled into the economy through the credit market since only borrowers have direct access to the newly injected cash monetary injections cause nominal interest rates to fall if firms are borrowers then monetary injections also increase current and future real activity

monetary policy regimes and beliefs this paper investigates the role of beliefs over monetary policy in propagating the effects of monetary policy shocks within the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in this model monetary policy periodically switches between low and high money growth regimes when individuals cannot observe the regime directly they must draw inferences over regime type based on historical money growth rates the authors show that for an empirically plausible money growth process beliefs evolve slowly in the wake of a regime change as a result their model is able to capture some of the observed persistence of real and nominal variables following such a regime change

incorporating equity market information into supervisory monitoring models we examine whether equity market variables such as stock returns and equity based default probabilities are useful to u s bank supervisors for assessing the condition of domestic bank holding companies we develop a model of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and equity market information we find that the model s forecasts anticipate supervisory rating changes by up to four quarters relative to simply using supervisory variables the inclusion of equity market variables in the model does not improve forecast accuracy however we argue that equity market information should still be useful for forecasting supervisory ratings and should be incorporated into supervisory monitoring models

on the use of portfolio risk models and capital requirements in emerging markets a portfolio based model creditrisk of credit suisse first boston and recent central bank of argentina credit bureau data are used to estimate whether current capital and provisioning regulations match actual risks arguing that provisions should cover expected losses and that capital requirements should cover potential losses beyond expected losses subject to some statistical level of tolerance the article assesses how well actual capital and provisioning requirements match the estimated requirements given by the model actual provisioning requirements were found to be close to implied levels of expected losses the estimate of potential losses was found to be highly sensitive to the assumptions of the model especially the parameter relating the volatility of a loan s rate of default to its mean value this volatility parameter cannot be estimated accurately with the credit bureau data because of the short time span covered so proxy data were used to estimate it and two values around that estimate

gross credit flows the paper estimates gross credit flows for the u s banking system between 1979 and 1999 and shows that sizable gross flows coexist at any phase of the cycle even within narrowly defined loan categories bank size categories and regional units to investigate the macroeconomic dimensions of gross credit flows the paper studies the cyclical behavior of aggregate credit flows and documents three key cyclical facts first excess credit reallocation is countercyclical for any given rate of change of net credit gross flows are larger in a recession than in a boom second gross credit flows are highly volatile with a cyclical volatility which appears more than an order of magnitude larger than gdp volatility third credit contraction is more volatile than credit expansion furthermore the behavior of gross flows over the 1991 recession suggests that persistent and historically high credit contraction is a key feature of the relatively mild cyclical downturn the results lends some support to aggregate models that emphasize the asymmetric behavior of credit expansion and credit contractions

the interaction between the financial and investment decisions of the firm the case of issuing warrants in a levered firm abstract in this paper we analyze the value of warrants and stock in a firm that has both equity and debt in its capital structure and assume that the proceeds from exercising the warrants are reinvested in the firm the effect of potential future scale investment on the firm s stock debt and warrants are investigated the warrants in our analysis are european in this framework there are two sources for the nonstationarity of the rate of return on any kind of financial claim the first stems from changes in the firm s capital structure and the second is due to the potential scale increase in the value of the firm should the warrants be exercised the effect of a potential transfer of wealth from equity holders to debt holders at time of exercise is analyzed when warrants are exercised and the proceeds are reinvested in a scale expansion project the probability of default may decrease it follows therefore that ceteris paribus debt is likely to appreciate in value at the expense of equity the method of pricing by arbitrage as proposed by harrison and kreps is used to derive values for claims on the firm problems associated with measuring the volatility of equity are discussed

the collateral value of fine art in this paper we examine the effect of implicit seller reserves on the estimation of value at risk based on historical asset sales data we direct our examination toward how and whether fine art might prove an appropriate form of loan collateral for banks and other financial institutions using a data set of french impressionist paintings brought to auction from 1985 to 2001 we control for the effect of works that are bought in house to construct a distribution of potential sale values that corrects for sample selection bias it turns out that the downside risk surrounding deviations of auction prices from expert presale estimates depends critically on how buy ins are incorporated if downside risk is assessed solely on historical experience with successful auction sales the data appear to support loan to value ratios between 50 and a 100 larger than loan to value ratios that countenance the existence of seller reserves the auction process however is quantifiable and can reveal the necessary risk information required for loan consideration

bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework abstract the barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank the regulator insurer of a bank owns a down and in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost raising the regulatory barrier critical asset level triggering bank closure leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk empirical tests on a sample of 152 one bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to tier 1 leverage ratios

the macroeconomics of labor and credit market imperfections labour market frictions are not the only possible source of high unemployment credit market imperfections driven by microeconomic frictions and influenced by macroeconomic factors could also be to blame to develop this idea in a simple and tractable macroeconomic model we treat credit and labour market imperfections in a symmetrical way accordingly we introduce specificity in credit relationships and assume that credit to potential entrepreneurs is rationed due to endogenous search frictions in the spirit of diamond 1990 these imperfections mirror job search frictions in the labour market we study the determination of equilibrium unemployment in the presence of credit market frictions both with exogenous and endogenous wages we explore a number of possible extensions endogenous destruction monetary policy and the short run effects of financial liberalization

a coupled markov chain approach to credit risk modeling we propose a markov chain model for credit rating changes we do not use any distributional assumptions on the asset values of the rated companies but directly model the rating transitions process the parameters of the model are estimated by a maximum likelihood approach using historical rating transitions and heuristic global optimization techniques we benchmark the model against a glmm model in the context of bond portfolio risk management the proposed model yields stronger dependencies and higher risks than the glmm model as a result the risk optimal portfolios are more conservative than the decisions resulting from the benchmark model

an integrated pricing model for defaultable loans and bonds abstract in recent years credit risk has played a key role in risk management issues practitioners academics and regulators have been fully involved in the process of developing studying and analysing credit risk models in order to find the elements which characterize a sound risk management system in this paper we present an integrated model based on a reduced pricing approach for market and credit risk its main features are those of being mark to market and that the spread term structure by rating class is contingent on the seniority of debt within an arbitrage free framework we introduce issues such as the integration of market and credit risk the use of stochastic recovery rates and recovery by seniority moreover we will characterize default risk by estimating migration risk through a mortality rate actuarial based approach the resultant probabilities will be the base for determining multi period risk neutral transition probability that allow pricing of risky debt in the trading and banking book

heterogeneous borrowers liquidity and the search for credit abstract we develop a general equilibrium model of credit formation where borrowers and lenders must search for matches and where the composition of borrowers adjusts to satisfy equilibrium entry conditions when market liquidity dries up as a result of fundamental shocks to the system fewer borrowers will participate in the credit market with low quality borrowers suffering disproportionately because of a flight to quality however less liquid credit markets need not be associated with lower social output because the effect of higher average quality may outweigh that of reduced market participation depending crucially on the source of the liquidity shock

trade credit for supply chain coordination abstract trade credit is a seller s short term loan to the buyer allowing the buyer to delay payment of an invoice it has been the largest source of working capital for a majority of business to business firms in the united states numerous theories have been proposed to explain trade credit mainly from finance perspectives it has also been an important issue in supply chain management surprisingly most literature in supply chain management has examined the retailer s stocking policies given a supplier s trade credit this paper attempts to shed light on trade credit from a supplier s perspective and presents it as a tool for supply chain coordination specifically we explicitly assume firms financial needs for inventory following a newsvendor framework we assume that the supplier grants trade credit and markdown allowance given the supplier s offer the retailer determines order quantity and the financing option for the inventory either trade credit or direct financing from a financial institution our result shows that the supplier s markdown allowance alone cannot fully coordinate the supply chain if the retailer employs direct financing positive financing costs call for trade credit in order to subsidize the retailer s costs of inventory financing using trade credit in addition to markdown allowance the supplier fully coordinates the retailer s decisions for the largest joint profit and extracts a greater portion of the maximized joint profit

an empirical examination of the relationship between mining employment and poverty in the appalachian region we empirically examine the relationship between the share of employment in the mining sector and poverty rates in appalachian counties of the united states using panel data we decompose the effect of an increase in a sector s employment share i e mining manufacturing agriculture services and construction to identify an immediate and lag effect with regard to the mining sector the empirical results suggest that the immediate effect reduces poverty rates while the lag effect is associated with increases in the poverty rate we assess these results in the context of previous literature that examines the relationship between resource intensive economies and economic development

market discipline and bank subordinated debt note a lengthy literature in banking has addressed the question of whether the market prices of liabilities respond to individual bank risk taking activity that is whether any market disciplines exists however despite the obvious importance of this question the current record has led to no consensus on the issue results have been contradictory in this journal alone hannan and hanweck 1988 conclude that the market does extract at least some price for risk taking while avery belton and goldberg 1988 find no such evidence in this study we argue that this line of inquiry has a serious f law in that it fails to use theoretical models of bank instrument valuation to determine the appropriate testing of market discipline therefore the empirical models have lacked the necessary exactness to isolate the appropriate null hypotheses to redress this shortcoming and advance the methodology of this area of the literature we use a pricing model which comes to the banking area from the options pricing literature to look at the yield spread on bank liabilities using this model it is clear that the value of large uninsured bank liabilities cannot be described as a linear monotonic function of risk moreover current bank regulation affects the assumed role risk measures play in the pricing of such debt instruments both of these complications mean that simple regressions are not likely to adequately address the relationship between the value of debt and underlying risk in the final section we empirically investigate the presence of market discipline using contingent claims pricing we find that accounting measures of bank risk still have little predictive value in explaining yield spreads and therefore offer little evidence of meaningful market discipline

the effects of estimation error on measures of portfolio credit risk abstract this paper uses monte carlo simulations to assess the impact of noisy input parameters on the accuracy of estimated portfolio credit risk assumptions about input quality are derived from the distribution of historical sample statistics commonly used in default risk modelling the resulting estimation error in the distribution of portfolio losses is considerable losses that are judged to occur with a probability of 0 3 may actually occur with a probability of 1 the paper also shows that estimation error leads to biases in value at risk estimates and significance levels of backtests the biases can be corrected by analysing predictive distributions which average over the unknown parameter values

banks as monitors of other banks evidence from the overnight federal funds market this study provides evidence that banks are effective monitors of their peers by showing that the interest rate paid on federal funds transactions reflects differences in credit risk across borrowers in addition the size and relative importance in the funds market of the trading institutions are shown to affect the rates charged for overnight borrowing thereby providing insight into the nature of competition in the federal funds market transaction volume and size of transaction effects are uncovered as is evidence of relationship banking between banks these results are made possible by unique data identifying individual federal funds transactions copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

on the profitability and cost of relationship lending abstract we provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks we derive bank specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates and then estimate cost and profit functions to examine how smoothing affects bank costs and profits our results suggests that in general loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part of an optimal long term contract between a bank and its borrower while loan rate smoothing in response to an interest rate shock is

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks this paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests to propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly this paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness in our economy agents own assets and make occupational choices banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy as the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents we show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

does the debt market assess large banks risk time series evidence from money center cds abstract uninsured bank liabilities should offer a promised yield that compensates depositors for their expected default losses however the conjectural guarantees available to large u s banking firms makes it questionable whether large depositors should or do feel themselves exposed to credit risk prior papers have evaluated the determinants of bank risk premia using cross sectional data with relatively inconclusive results this paper investigates the same issue in a methodologically independent fashion using time series data on specific banks daily offering rates during the period may 1982 through july 1988 we find that cd rates paid by large money center banks include significant default risk premia

deposit insurance market discipline and off balance sheet banking risk of large u s commercial banks abstract the market discipline of off balance sheet banking activities obsas is examined by employing contingent claims valuation techniques to derive implied asset variances from bank equity and from risk premia for bank subordinated debt specifically implied asset variances have been calculated from market and on and off balance sheet information using options pricing techniques theoretically these implied asset variances are better than equity variance or risk premia in proxying bank risk because they capture portfolio effects as well as the non linear nature of contingent claims model and the impact of closure rules empirical results suggest the existence of market discipline of obsas market participants price these obsas as risk reducing

the domino effect of credit defaults test of asymmetric default correlations using realised default data using the research framework of a domino effect in firms we first make theoretical contributions by addressing several testable hypotheses regarding asymmetrical default correlations we then employ lucas s method to provide empirical evidence based on realised historical default data in the united states from 1992 to 2013 our empirical results are consistent with the following notions first default correlations increase with the time horizon second firms with low credit quality small size illiquidity and a high beta exhibit higher default correlations credit risk management without considering asymmetrical default correlations could underestimate portfolio risk due to default clustering

var and expected shortfall in portfolios of dependent credit risks conceptual and practical insights in the first part of this paper we address the non coherence of value at risk var as a risk measure in the context of portfolio credit risk and highlight some problems which follow from this theoretical deficiency in particular a realistic demonstration of the non subadditivity of var is given and the possibly nonsensical consequences of var based portfolio optimisation are shown the second part of the paper discusses var and expected shortfall estimation for large balanced credit portfolios all standard industry models creditmetrics kmv creditrisk are presented as bernoulli mixture models to facilitate their direct comparison for homogeneous groups it is shown that measures of tail risk for the loss distribution may be approximated in large portfolios by analysing the tail of the mixture distribution in the bernoulli representation an example is given showing that for portfolios of lower quality choice of model has some impact on measures of extreme risk 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

standby letters of credit and bank capital evidence of market discipline abstract market discipline if it exists and is important should link bank decisions together and have an impact on the way decisions are made the relationship between the issuance of standby letters of credit and primary capital is modeled in the context of market discipline and then estimated the hypothesis that market discipline causes a joint relationship between bank capital and standby letter of credit decisions for banks that are active participants in the standby market or that rely heavily on purchased funds is tested and cannot be rejected

the cyclical behavior of household and business investment in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper focuses on a monetary explanation of two business cycle regularities i business and household investment are positively correlated and procyclical and ii business investment tends to lag household investment over the cycle our general equilibrium framework is essentially a standard cash in advance economy where households purchase both non durable and durable consumption goods and businesses accumulate productive capital financial intermediaries provide interest bearing deposits to households and loanable funds to finance business investment it is shown that the adaptation of particular interest rate rules by the monetary authority provides a mechanism to capture both the timing and direction of business and household investment the results are then discussed within the context of recent limited participation models which emphasize the liquidity effects of monetary shocks

sorting out risks using known apt factors arbitrage pricing theory apt differs from the capital asset pricing model capm in hypothesizing that actual and expected security returns are sensitive not to just one type of nondiversifiable risk i e beta or market risk but to a variety of different ypes of risk prior testing has shown the capm to be inferior to an apt model that incorporates unanticipated changes in five macroeconomic variables default risk the term structure of interest rates inflation or deflation the long run expected growth rate of profits for the economy and residual market risk it is possible to estimate the sensitivities of individual securities or portfolios to these five risk factors such measurements allow one to explore variations in sensitivities to different types of risk across both equity market sectors and industries the resulting risk exposure profiles do not depend on any particular market index apt risk profiles may be used for either active or passive portfolio management passive managers wishing to reduce their portfolios systematic risk characteristics might consider a technique termed risk sterilization here assets with different risk profiles are combined so as to negate or sterilize exposure to selected riskfactors alternatively active managers can attempt to achieve excess returns by constructing portfolios in accordance with their forecasts of risk factor realizations

bank ratings what determines their quality this paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks by the three largest rating agencies we interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of creditworthiness and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks expected default frequencies our results suggest that on average large banks receive more positive bank ratings particularly from the agency to which the bank provides substantial securitization business these competitive distortions are economically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of too big to fail banks we also show that overall differential risk weights recommended by the basel accords for investment grade banks bear no significant relationship to empirical default probabilities harald hau sam langfield and david marques ibanez

subordinated debt market discipline and bank risk this paper demonstrates that subordinated debt subdebt thereafter regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks by reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value destroying actions to benefit themselves subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk moreover subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks moral hazard problems to make subdebt regulation effective regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank s equity when the government provides assistance to the bank

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

risk based capital requirements for mortgage loans abstract we contribute to the debate over the reform of the basel accord by developing risk based capital requirements for mortgage loans held in portfolio by financial intermediaries our approach employs simulation of both economic variables that affect default incidence and conditional loss probability distributions results indicate that appropriate capital charges for credit risk vary substantially with loan characteristics and portfolio geographic diversification hence rules that offer little risk differentiation including the current basel i regime and standardized approach proposed in basel ii result in significant divergence between regulatory and economic capital these results highlight the incentive problems inherent in simplified methods of capital regulation

a multi attribute comparative evaluation of relative risk for a sample of banks abstract this paper proposes a comparative analysis of five different attributes of commercial banks liabilities that may be thought of as either directly measuring the default risk or are perceived by the market as impacting upon that default risk two of these attributes are credit ratings assigned by moody s and standard and poor s to debt issues the third attribute that we consider is yield to maturity which is typically assumed to be positively related to default risk the fourth attribute that is proposed is the fair value risk adjusted deposit insurance premium derived from option theoretic modeling and estimated from the daily data on equity prices finally we propose a term structure adjusted difference in yield between the risky debt and default free government debt as a more precise and theoretically sound measure of the default risk premium and develop a methodology for eliciting it on a composite basis for a given bank from the market prices of its various bond issues this term structure adjusted risk premium provides an analytical approximation to the valuation of corporate bonds call features and sinking fund provisions in view of the ordinality of the credit ratings given by the investment agencies spearman s rank correlation coefficient is employed as an analytical tool the analysis

human capital in multinational enterprises does strategic alignment matter this research proposes a strategic human capital alignment framework to examine whether the alignment between subsidiary strategy i e export oriented vs local market oriented strategy and human capital i e parent firm vs local specific human capital is positively related to subsidiary performance in multinational enterprises mnes we further explore two important exogenous i e foreign exchange rate change and endogenous i e mne international experience boundary conditions since they may adjust the positive effect of strategic human capital alignment on performance the analysis based on 5604 subsidiary observations of 423 mnes from 1990 to 2012 confirms the positive synergic effect of aligning subsidiary strategy and human capital and shows the moderating effects of foreign exchange rate change and mne international experience by presenting the importance of subsidiary strategy global staffing alignment and the roles of external economic environments and internal organizational capabilities as boundary conditions the strategic human capital alignment framework suggests that what makes human capital valuable for the firm is its alignment with strategic orientation thus managers should carefully deploy the appropriate type of human capital to fulfill the requisite organizational strategy and take into account changing external and internal contextual conditions in applying the framework

market discipline and deposit insurance cross country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking internationally deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage funding and management this reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured to inform this debate we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline

interest risk sensitive deposit insurance premia stable ach estimates abstract the parameters of interest rate uncertainty are estimated by maximum likelihood for the period 1952 1982 and used to evaluate bank or thrift deposit insurance as a function of duration mismatching capital asset ratio and the recent history of interest rate forecasting errors homoskedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of adaptive conditional heteroskedasticity ach even after removing this heteroskedasticity normality gives much lower likelihood than paretian stable distributions with characteristic exponent in the range 1 614 to 1 714 the conditional deposit insurance values fluctuate by factors in excess of 300 for some duration gaps over the past three decades

credit risk models and agricultural lending credit risk models are developed and used to estimate capital requirements for agricultural lenders under the new basel capital accord the study uses credit value at risk methods to calculate probability of default loss given default and expected and unexpected losses two applied models creditmetrics and moody s kmv are estimated using farm financial data the results show that the necessary capital for agricultural lenders under the new basel accord varies substantially depending on the riskiness and granularity of the portfolio

inflation and financial sector size abstract traditionally the cost of expected inflation has been seen as the shoeleather cost of going to the bank more often this paper focuses on the other side of these transactions i e on the increased production of financial services i construct a model in which households must make purchases either with money or with costly transactions services produced by firms in the financial services sector in the model a higher inflation rate leads households to substitute purchased transactions services for money balances thereby boosting the size of the financial services sector a test of the model using cross sectional data finds that the size of a nation s financial sector is strongly affected by its inflation rate the empirical results provide an alternative way to measure the costs of inflation these costs appear to be large

a multi factor credit migration model for sovereign and corporate debts abstract this paper develops a multi factor markov chain model for rating migrations and credit spreads that is applicable to both sovereign and corporate debts the model s central feature is to allow transition matrices to be time varying and driven by rating specific latent variables which encompass economic factors like the business cycle there are three main contributions first the model incorporates well documented empirical properties of transition matrices such as their dependence on business credit cycles and it also allows for inter rating variations in credit quality changes second instead of focusing solely on empirical modeling of rating transitions the paper also shows how the empirical model can be implemented for actual valuations third the estimation and calibration procedures are easy to follow and implement

market discipline of subordinated debt in banking the case of costly bankruptcy abstract this paper extends the contingent claim valuation framework of subordinated debt by explicitly incorporating bankruptcy cost in the model the model is then used to investigate the role of subordinated debt in alleviating the moral hazard problem in banking the incorporation of bankruptcy cost in the framework of the analysis provides new evidence about subordinated debt the reaction of subordinated debt prices can completely remove risk shifting incentives of equityholders only when bankruptcy costs are accounted for the extent of subordinated debt s discipline is shown to depend critically on the relative magnitude of subordinated debt senior debt and bankruptcy costs

a closed form solution to the risk taking motivation of subordinated debtholders abstract black and cox 1976 claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk when the firm s value is low we show using closed form solution that the junior debt s value is hump shaped this has interesting implications for the market discipline role of banks junior debt