political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

the calibration of incomplete demand systems in quantitative analysis an easily implemented and flexible calibration technique for partial demand systems is introduced combining recent developments in incomplete demand systems and a set of restrictions conditioned on the available elasticity estimates the technique accommodates various degrees of knowledge on cross price elasticities satisfies curvature restrictions and allows the recovery of an exact welfare measure for policy analysis the technique is illustrated with a partial demand system for food consumption in korea for different states of knowledge on cross price effects the consumer welfare impact of food and agricultural trade liberalization is measured

modelling time of day substitution using the second moments of demand time of day tod rates are a commonly used method for peak load pricing of many services such services as electricity communications transportation shared computer facilities and computer networks i e the internet either use or will use some form of tod pricing however tod rates do not ensure a movement towards economic efficiency unless the patterns of tod substitution are known the model presented here provedes a method for estimating tod substitution without the need for rate experiments that have proven to be both costly and limited by sample selection bias problems this model employs the estimated second moment of demand to estimate a matrix of relative own and cross price elasticities and it can estimate elasticities even when there is no apparent tod price variation the low level of computations required for the estimates allows the application of a bootstrap procedure to estimate the covariance matrix of the elasticities two applications of this model are presented a case of a

does the fed contribute to a political business cycle in contrast to findings of other studies evidence is presented to support the existence of a federal reserve induced political monetary cycle that corresponds to the u s presidential election cycle using various taylor rules we find support for the view that fed policy turns significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election but only when the fed chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations

what starts inflation evidence from the oecd countries we use a pooled cross country time series framework to study the factors associated with the start of 73 inflation episodes in oecd countries since 1960 we find that policy makers pursuit of high real growthtargets and national elections were important factors in initiating inflation episodes u s inflation turns out to be a triggering event for simultaneous outbreaks of inflation across countries several other explanations for inflation starts including increases in the natural rate of unemployment oil price shocks changes in the political orientation of governments and government debt policy are not supported by the data

the impact of government deficits on money growth in developing countries abstract this paper investigates the relationship between government budget deficits and money growth in the developing countries for which reliabile data exist it is sometimes suggested that it is more likely that money growth follows debt growth in developing countries due to the embryonic state of capital markets and because the central bank generally comes under direct control of the minister of finance our results provide only mixed support for this contention however in the majority of countries in our sample there is no evidence that government deficits affect money growth for high inflation years there seems to be more support for a relationship between deficits and money growth

macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries some stylized facts this paper documents the main stylized features of macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycle regularities for a group of 12 developing countries cross correlations between domestic industrial output and a large group of macroeconomic time series including government revenue and expenditure wages inflation money velocity private sector credit international trade and exchange rates are presented the effects of industrial country economic conditions on output fluctuations in these countries are also analyzed the robustness of the results is examined using three detrending procedures a modified hodrick prescott filter the baxter king band pass filter and a nonparametric technique overall the results show some similarities between macroeconomic fluctuations in developing and industrial countries e g procyclical real wages and counter cyclical variation in government expenditure but also some important differences in business cycle characteristics e g countercyclical variation in the velocity of monetary aggregates

an integrated test for electoral cycles in the u s economy this paper offers the first integrated test of the electoral model of business cycles the test begins with unrestricted estimates of presidential electoral patterns in u s economic outcomes real gnp unemployment and inflation and policies money growth and the adjusted budget surplus these estimates are then used to determine whether the estimated electoral patterns in macropolicy yield predicted electoral patterns for macro outcomes that are consistent with estimates of both actual electoral patterns in outcomes and voting behavior the results indicate that four year electoral cycles in macroeconomic outcomes and policies are strongly significant for the united states for the period 1951i to 1986ii copyright 1989 by mit press

some simple but flexible differential consumer demand systems abstract three differential consumer demand systems are proposed each of which has some particular advantages over the well known rotterdam model in each demand equation only two explanatory variables are used real income and the relative own price the features of the most preferred model are piglog working leser engel curves a limited number of parameters while no preference independence is assumed and easy estimation by iterated ols taking into account all theoretical restrictions even in case of a large number of commodities

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies the effect of increased capital mobility on the national control of macroeconomic policy continues to be a topic of debate empirical contributions to this debate share the assumption that domestic macroeconomic policy is driven by either partisan or countercyclical motivations and that the effects of international financial flows have roughly similar effects in all countries this article reevaluates the integration hypothesis in a framework in which manipulations of the macroeconomy derive from opportunistic motivations the article emphasizes the ways in which prior institutional choices effect the way these motivations are translated into actions evidence from individual country and pooled time series tests suggests that opportunistic cycles are less likely to occur when 1 a government maintains a fixed exchange rate in the presence of highly mobile capital or 2 when the central bank enjoys above average independence

the matrix approach to evaluating demand equations as there is a plethora of demand models which one should be used to estimate income and price elasticities the paper sheds light on this important practical problem by developing a matrix approach to simulating mas demand equations to analyse their performance under idealized circumstances artificial data on the dependent variable are generated by one model and these are then used for the estimation of another model as an illustrative application using four popular models a 4 4 matrix is generated which gives all pair wise comparisons the performance of the models is then evaluated on the basis of the quality of the income and own price elasticity estimates

are sunspots learnable an experimental investigation in a simple macroeconomic model abstract we conduct experiments with human subjects in a model with a positive production externality in which productivity is a nondecreasing function of the average level of employment of other firms the model has three steady states and a sunspot equilibrium that fluctuates between the high and low steady states steady states are payoff ranked low values give lower profits than higher values we investigate whether subjects can learn a sunspot equilibrium we observe coordination on the extrinsic announcements in our experimental economies cases of apparent convergence to the low and high steady states are also observed

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

elections and the fed is there a political monetary cycle to understand the political causes of macroeconomic policy it is necessary to examine the institutions that actually make such policy and the incentives those institutions face an explanation of the political causes of united states monetary policy must treat the various institutions that are influential in the monetary policy process which are at a minimum the federal reserve fed and the executive including the president the treasury department and other advisors in the executive office of the president the reelection motive has proven useful in modeling presidential incentives in this article i investigate whether electoral incentives associated with the theory of the political business cycle pbc can help to explain the behavior of the fed over the last quarter century the political business cycle has had a curious hold on modern political economy while the empirical evidence in favor of the cycle is far from overwhelming its theoretical importance leads to continuing empirical

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

an even simpler differential demand system abstract keller 1984 proposed three simple variants of the well known rotterdam demand model this paper proposes an even simpler differential demand system which has some attractive properties and is easy to estimate the new model is estimated with dutch and british data

the impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations this paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections we do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks we do find evidence however in developing countries that lack central bank independence furthermore we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election related fiscal expansions this suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed