the public choice of superior sanctions this paper analyzes the public choice of specific forms of sanctions current sanctions are essentially quantity constraints q sanctions which are like quotas in that they might bestow benefits on certain special interest groups in the target country revenue sanctions r sanctions may be able to recapture such benefits in the form of sender government revenue which could either compensate for the costs of sanctions to the sending country or finance other sanction enhancing activities aimed at the target country hence r sanctions may be superior to q sanctions in general or on the basis of target efficiency however public choice analysis suggests that q sanctions will generally be chosen over r sanctions by democratic countries

political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market abstract this paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand there exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier we study both the centralized and decentralized systems in the decentralized system a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed the supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price we present both the supplier s and the retailer s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty we find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings under certain conditions reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance from the numerical study we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain

price indexes inequality and the measurement of world poverty i discuss the measurement of world poverty and inequality with particular attention to the role of purchasing power parity ppp price indexes from the international comparison project global inequality increased with the latest revision of the icp and this reduced the global poverty line relative to the us dollar the recent large increase of nearly half a billion poor people came from an inappropriate updating of the global poverty line not from the icp revisions even so ppp comparisons between widely different countries rest on weak theoretical and empirical foundations i argue for wider use of self reports from international monitoring surveys and for a global poverty line that is truly denominated in us dollars

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

free to trade democracies autocracies and international trade trade relations we address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy in a formal model of commercial policy we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy we test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990 the results of this analysis accord with our argument democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs t he effects of domestic political institutions on trade policy have long been a source of controversy among social scientists despite the widespread interest that this debate has prompted however remarkably few studies have addressed the links between political regime type and commercial policy 1 most work on the political economy of trade policy that examines institutional factors focuses only on variations in policy among democracies and avoids comparing democracies with other types of regimes moreover many analyses of trade barriers especially those by economists ignore the effects of domestic political

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

supply contracts profit sharing switching and reaction options a common theme in the studies of flexible supply contracts has been the producer s profit maximization problem without regard to the suppliers reactions however suppliers do react and protect their downside against producer s operating policies by revising their strategies in a manner consistent with their profitmaximization objectives this fact motivates our work using a real options contingent claims approach we analyze and value supply contracts in a setting characterized by exchange rate uncertainty supplier switching options order quantity flexibility profit sharing and supplier reaction options we also use basic diversification concepts from portfolio theory to analyze risk reduction in a unique framework given this setup we explicitly model how flexibility can be mutually beneficial to both the producer and the suppliers using this model we concurrently solve and examine the dual optimization problem for the suppliers and the producer our approach also endogenizes the extent and degree of profit sharing through the resulting optimal policies we also analyze what induces the producer and the suppliers to accept flexibility in their contracts

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

instruments randomization and learning about development there is currently much debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid and about what kind of projects can engender economic development there is skepticism about the ability of econometric analysis to resolve these issues or of development agencies to learn from their own experience in response there is increasing use in development economics of randomized controlled trials rcts to accumulate credible knowledge of what works without overreliance on questionable theory or statistical methods when rcts are not possible the proponents of these methods advocate quasirandomization through instrumental variable iv techniques or natural experiments i argue that many of these applications are unlikely to recover quantities that are useful for policy or understanding two key issues are the misunderstanding of exogeneity and the handling of heterogeneity i illustrate from the literature on aid and growth actual randomization faces similar problems as does quasi randomization notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary i argue that experiments have no special ability to produce more credible knowledge than other methods and that actual experiments are frequently subject to practical problems that undermine any claims to statistical or epistemic superiority i illustrate using prominent experiments in development and elsewhere as with iv methods rct based evaluation of projects without guidance from an understanding of underlying mechanisms is unlikely to lead to scientific progress in the understanding of economic development i welcome recent trends in development experimentation away from the evaluation of projects and toward the evaluation of theoretical mechanisms jel c21 f35 o19

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

on measuring child costs with applications to poor countries the theoretical basis for measuring child costs is discussed and detailed consideration is given to two straightforward procedures for calculation engel s food share method and rothbarth s adult good method each of these methods embodies different definitions of child costs so that the same empirical evidence can generate quite different estimates depending on the method used it is shown that true costs are generally overstated by engel s method and understated by rothbarth s procedure although the latter unlike the former can provide a sensible starting point for cost measurement our estimates from sri lankan and indonesian data suggest that children cost their parents about 30 40 percent of what they spend on themselves

what do we learn about consumer demand patterns from micro data the aim of this paper is to assess the importance of using micro level data in the econometric analysis of consumer demand to do this we utilize a time series of repeated cross sections covering some 4 000 households in each of 15 years employing a number of different aggregation procedures we conclude that aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable estimates of structural price and income coefficients however once certain aggregation factors as well as trend and seasonal components are included an aggregate model is not necessarily outperformed across all demand equations in terms of forecasting ability jel d12 c52 c31 the purpose of this paper is to develop a complete consumer demand system based on a time series of individual household data and to use it to measure the biases introduced into the study of consumer de mand behavior when aggregate data are used in place of the appropriate microeco nomic data we assess the suitability of ag gregate data through the impact on income and price elasticities and by evaluating the ability of both micro and aggregate based models to forecast aggregate consumer de mand the biases introduced by the use of aggregate data depend upon the way that household characteristics interact with in come and price effects and on departures of demand systems from linearity we explore the structure of microeconomic demand sys tems and the role of household characteris tics in the behavior of consumer demand both for the light this may shed on the pattern of future demands and for the im plications this behavior has for issues of aggregation consumer demand patterns typically found in micro data sets vary considerably across households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income we model this variability by making intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of our demand sys tem depend on household characteristics and by allowing for nonlinear total log expenditure terms in fact in theory consistent demand systems it is total ex penditure rather than disposable income that is allocated across goods we find that this general framework leads to a well specified data coherent demand system which is a quadratic extension of the popu lar almost ideal model of angus s deaton and john muellbauer 1980 the micro level estimates are shown to be sensitive to the treatment of endogeneity of total expen diture and to the specification of interaction terms with household characteristics in ad dition this specification is also shown to possess many attractive features for the evaluation of aggregate models

price and quantity controls as facilitating devices abstract this letter examines three cases in which a regulation imposed on one of two duopolists can increase the profit levels of both firms the regulations examined include a price floor an output quota and a sales tax

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

ec trade protection law produmping or antidumping this paper argues that the anticipation of protection can have astimulating effect on exports instead of the commonly claimed effect of harassment if protection serves market cartelization by fixing export quantities or prices exporters may have an incentive to increase their sales abroad in order to secure a large share of the expected rent which is brought about by the anticipated import restriction this may even result in sales below marginal costs or dumping the effect of the protectionist threat may then be the reverse of what is intended it can raise the speed of import penetration and it can provoke dumping a formal model and a supportive institutional analysis of ec trade protection is supplemented by preliminary empirical evidence

understanding the mechanisms of economic development in this paper i advocate the investigation testing and modification of mechanisms as a progressive empirical research strategy for the field of economic development and other areas of applied economics i discuss three lines of work that have elucidated mechanisms that are relevant for development 1 connections between saving and growth 2 the determinants of commodity prices which are a key source of income for many developing countries and 3 some unexpected puzzles that arise in considering the linkages between income and food consumption in each case my discussion illustrates the positivist approach to the hypotheticodeductive method in this approach mechanisms are proposed key predictions derived and tested and if falsified the mechanisms are rejected or modified if the predictions of a mechanism are confirmed if they are sufficiently specific and if they are hard to explain in other ways we attach additional credence to the mechanism albeit provisionally since later evidence may undermine it sometimes the falsifications can be repaired by changing supplementary assumptions and sometimes they involve long steps backwards where the model is abandoned and often there is disagreement about which is the correct response but the end result is an accumulation of useful knowledge and understanding

measuring poverty in a growing world or measuring growth in a poor world the extent to which growth reduces global poverty has been disputed for 30 years although there are better data than ever before controversies are not resolved a major problem is that consumption measured from household surveys which is used to measure poverty grows less rapidly than consumption measured in national accounts in the world as a whole and in large countries particularly india china and the united states in consequence measured poverty has fallen less rapidly than appears warranted by measured growth in poor countries one plausible cause is that richer households are less likely to participate in surveys but growth in the national accounts is also upward biased and consumption in the national accounts contains large and rapidly growing items that are not consumed by the poor and not included in surveys so it is possible for consumption of the poor to grow less rapidly than national consumption without any increase in measured inequality current statistical procedures in poor

research on the energy saving and revenue sharing strategy of escos under the uncertainty of the value of energy performance contracting projects abstract under the uncertainty of the value of energy performance contracting projects epcps this paper develops a revenue sharing bargaining model between an energy service company esco and an energy using organization eu based on the model the paper analyzes the impacts of energy prices risk adjusted discount rates and accidents on the esco s bargaining strategies the research shows that the greater the probability of adverse circumstances is the higher is the revenue share of the eu and the more disadvantageous is the esco s position in the game furthermore we design a forecast commitment contract between an esco and an eu and analyze the optimal product s energy savings commitment strategy of the esco to cope with uncertain energy savings and contract risk the research illustrates that by introducing penalties and commitments the contract can eliminate the impact of the uncertain energy savings on the contract execution to a certain extent when the eu takes a greater commitment risk the esco is willing to provide a higher commitment thus enhancing the strategy value of the bilateral relationship and reducing the contract risk finally the policy recommendations about improving shared savings contract standard third party energy savings measurement and verification mechanism and arbitration mechanism of epcs are provided

capacity allocation and scheduling in supply chains we consider a multiple product supply chain where a manufacturer receives orders from several distributors if the orders cannot all be met from available production capacity then the manufacturer allocates that capacity and a set of resubmittable orders among the distributors the distributors may share their allocated capacity among themselves before submitting revised orders finally the manufacturer schedules the revised orders to minimize its cost we consider three practical coordination issues first we estimate the benefit to the manufacturer from considering scheduling costs and constraints in making capacity and order allocation decisions second we estimate the additional profit that the distributors achieve when they share their allocated capacity third we estimate the value of coordination between the manufacturer and the distributors our work is among the first to consider all three issues simultaneously we model scheduling costs and constraints within the manufacturer s capacity allocation problem we model the distributors capacity sharing problem as a cooperative game that has properties that are unique within cooperative game theory finally we develop optimal algorithms for all the models defined by the three coordination issues our exact evaluation of decisions about the appropriate coordination level improves managers ability to make those decisions

risk sharing in supply chains using order bands analytical results and managerial insights abstract this work generalizes and extends a number of basic production inventory models we study a periodic review non stationary markovian production inventory model with stochastic demand and holding and penalty costs all state dependent where goods can be procured from up to two suppliers each supplier quotes a state dependent minimum order quantity moq order capacity c and unit price we concentrate on a base stock policy that is defined by a vector of numbers one for each lead time indexed by the states of the markov chain in certain cases our policy is optimal for the general case we show that there is no simple optimal policy we use infinitesimal perturbation analysis to compute inventory levels within this class for an application motivated by international trade for this application we find that the imposition of minimum and or maximum order quantities provides an effective mechanism for risk sharing the customer guarantees the supplier a minimum order every period at an increased unit price and in exchange the supplier grants an increase in capacity this can more effectively match supply with demand making the entire supply chain more profitable

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

the process of socialist economic transformation in this paper we consider the reform process in those central and east european countries that have made the decision to move from a more or a less planned socialist system to a private market economy one in which private ownership predominates and most resources are allocated through markets because the reform process is both complex and intertwined with political factors especially the shift towards representative democracy and because there are substantial differences among the reforming countries no single detailed road map can guide the way to the new systems rather the paper sets out general considerations that provide a framework for reform and relates the choices to some initial conditions of the various reforming countries the framework applies also to the soviet union or in the event of its disintegration to its successor states as they move to market systems

looking for boy girl discrimination in household expenditure data the ability to test for discrimination in the allocation of goods between boys and girls is hampered by a lack of data on intrahousehold distribution the analysis presented here allows inferences about intrahousehold allocation to be made from householdlevel expenditure data for a given level of income families with children will spend less on adult goods in order to purchase children s goods if household purchasing favors boys over girls smaller expenditures on adult goods would be made by families with boys as compared with those with girls a method for determining adult goods is described and the procedure for detecting gender bias is applied to data from c6te d lvoire and thailand the data show no evidence of discriminatio n between boys and girls in c6te d lvoire and a small and statistically insignificant bias in favor of boys in thailand how commodities are allocated among the members of a household has recently occasioned a good deal of interest assessments of poverty and income distribution based on household incomes or expenditures will be misleading if allocation within the household is unequal the position of women and girls has been of particular concern and there is a considerable amount of empirical evidence much of it from the indian subcontinent that documents discrimination against females see in particular bhagwati 1973 sen 1984 sen and sengupta 1983 miller 1981 bardhan 1982 and kynch and sen 1983 as well as survey papers by behrman 1987 and harriss 1987 much of the evidence is concerned with measurements of nutritional outcomes mortality and health status rather than with the direct allocation of goods by gender the difficulty in trying to determine the intrahousehold allocation of goods is that household budget surveys the obvious source of data record consumption not of individuals but of households and while attempts can be made to the author is a professor of public affairs and of economics and international affairs at princeton university and is a consultant to the population and human resources department of the world bank the author thanks dwayne benjamin who provided for excellent research assistance he is grateful to him and to members of the economic growth center at yale university for helpful comments this is a revised and shortened version of living standards measurement study working paper 39 the allocation of goods within the household adults children and gender june 1987 the results from thailand were not included in the working paper 1989 the international bank for reconstruction and development the world bank

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

stabilization and growth in transition economies the early experience this paper analyzes the growth and stabilization experience in 26 transition economies in eastern europe the former soviet union and mongolia for the period 1989 1994 inflation rates have declined significantly in most countries following an inflation stabilization program growth resumes after stabilization occurs typically with a lag of about two years reducing inflation thus appears to be a precondition for growth an econometric analysis of the short run determinants of inflation and growth illustrates the key roles of fixed exchange rates improved fiscal balances and structural reforms in spurring growth and lowering inflation and confirms that inflation stabilization programs have been beneficial for growth even after controlling for structural reforms

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

microeconomic issues in the transition to a market economy evidence from developing countries suggests that a one sided preoccupation with macroeconomic issues may be unfortunate as macro stabilization programs tend to unravel in the presence of an inadequate micro adjustment for example kiguel and liviatan 1990 this finding is important because the socialist system introduced microeconomic distortions that probably transcend those observed in the third world the recent developments in poland yugoslavia and the soviet union also support the hypothesis that macro stabilization will be difficult to achieve in the transforming socialist economies in the absence of adequate micro adjustments in this paper i address what i consider to be the most important micro issues related to the transition from socialist to market economies i first summarize the initial microeconomic conditions and then describe the main changes that have taken place in the early stages of the transition finally i discuss the micro policy agenda that needs to be addressed if the transition is to be successful

the contributions of angus deaton angus deaton was awarded the 2015 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of consumption poverty and welfare this article reviews his contributions to economics

supplier commitment and production decisions under a forecast commitment contract manufacturing firms in capital intensive industries face inherent demand volatility for their products and the inability to change their capacity quickly to cope with these challenges manufacturers often enter into contracts with their customers that offer greater certainty of supply in return for more predictable orders in this paper we study a forecast commitment contract in which the customer provides a forecast the supplier makes a production commitment to the customer based on the forecast and the customers minimum order quantity is a function of the forecast and committed quantities we provide a complete analysis of the suppliers decisions when there is a single customer facing uncertain demand we first show that the supplier has two dominant commitment strategies committing to the forecast or committing to the production quantity we then characterize the jointly optimal commitment and production strategy for the supplier and extend the results to consider a capacity constraint we show that the proposed contract can moderate the suppliers motivation to underproduce and due to the structure of the contract and the form of the suppliers optimal strategy also limits the customers incentive to overforecast we also provide results for a capacitated two customer example which show that the suppliers choice of production quantity for each customer is not necessarily nondecreasing in the total available capacity

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

political reform and trade policy abstract the welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import competing industries in return for tariff protection ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare worsening particularly if the contributor elasticity is high because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also worsen welfare because candidates respond by increasing contributions and tariff protection for each active contributor the results suggest that the ability of candidates to circumvent partial restrictions may eliminate any potential benefits

political competition rent seeking and the choice of environmental policy instruments comment in this comment i analyze damania s political economy model environmental and resource economics 13 415 433 1999 correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities i arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument standards or taxation and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign inequilibrium both parties choose the same platform so that both have anequal probability of winning the election

the political economy of transition the overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform what are the main insights from that theory how does it reflect the transition reality what have we learned and what do we still need to learn the present article will attempt to answer those questions

why is consumption so smooth for thirty years it has been accepted that consumption is smooth because permanent income is smoother than measured income this paper considers the evidence for the contrary position that permanent income is in fact less smooth than measured income so that the smoothness of consumption cannot be straightforwardly explained by permanent income theory the paper argues that in postwar u s quarterly data consumption is smooth because it responds with a lag to changes in income

europe 1992 and the western pacific economies the main stimulus to completing the integration of the economies of the european community under the i992 programme has been the ec s relatively slow economic growth during the past two or three decades while japan s share of world gdp has trebled since the early i96os to about one sixth the eci 2 s share has fallen slightly to around one quarter many expect or at least hope that the removal of remaining barriers to movements of goods services people and capital within the ec not only will provide a one off boost to ec output cecchini et al i988 but will set ec incomes on a permanently higher growth path baldwin i989 numerous non europeans worry however that the trade diverting consequences of the ec reforms together with possible enlargements of ec membership and changes in ec preferential trading arrangements will be much more significant than any external trade creation and may make some excluded economies worse off this paper seeks to assess the effects of the ec92 programme and related changes currently underway in europe on the trade and growth prospects of a particularly vulnerable group namely the western pacific economies the next section of the paper explains why the western pacific region defined to include northeast and southeast asia plus australia and new zealand is a natural grouping of economies for considering external effects of european policy changes 2 the subsequent section summarizes the likely effects of those changes on the volume and commodity composition of europe s external trade and hence on the trade and welfare of different western pacific economies the fourth section examines possible responses by that region to these developments and their likely repercussions for europe the paper concludes that while the western pacific economies are likely to respond positively to whatever changes take place in europe welfare there in europe

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

timing is everything elections and trade liberalization in the postcommunist world in the wake of the soviet bloc s collapse various postcommunist countries rushed to gain greater access to foreign markets many of them have made substantial progress in liberalizing commerce but the movement toward free trade has been by no means universal one prominent view is that the establishment of democratic institutions has stimulated economic reform in thepostcommunist world the authors conduct one of the first studies on this topic and find that democracies are indeed more likely to liberalize trade than nondemocracies they also find that the electoral calendar has a potent influence on the timing of commercial reform in postcommunist democracies controlling for a range of factors politicians are most likely to reduce trade barriers immediately after voters go to the polls trade liberalization is much less likely to occur at other points in a democracy s electoral calendar and elections have no effect on commercial reform in nondemocracies

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

economies of scale household size and the demand for food household scale economies are plausibly attributed to shared household public goods that make larger households better off at the same level of per capita resources larger households should therefore have higher per capita consumption of private goods such as food provided that they do not substitute too much toward the effectively cheaper public goods the evidence shows exactly the opposite data from rich and poor countries indicate that at constant per capita total expenditure the per capita demand for food decreases with household size and that it does so most in the poorest countries where substitution should be the least

optimally uniform commodity taxes taste differences and lump sum grants abstract optimal commodity taxes for an economy with many households should be at a uniform proportional rate under certain conditions these include i linear and parallel engel curves with intercepts dependent on household composition ii separability between goods and labour and iii optimal demogrants

capacity allocation using past sales when to turn and earn consider a supplier selling to multiple retailers demand varies across periods but the supplier s capacity and wholesale price are fixed if demand is high the retailers needs exceed capacity and the supplier must implement an allocation mechanism to dole out production we examine how the choice of mechanism impacts retailer actions and supply chain performance in particular we analyze turn and earn allocation a method commonly used in the automobile industry this scheme bases current allocations on past sales and thus enables retailers to influence their future allocations they compete for scarce capacity even if they do not compete for customers we show that turn and earn induces the retailers to increase their sales when demand is low and the supplier s capacity is otherwise underutilized supplier profits thus increase the impact on the supply chain depends on how restrictive capacity is with mildly tight capacity the retailers higher sales rate does not significantly lower their profits but does reduce the cost of idle capacity supply chain performance improves with extremely tight capacity the retailers intense competition dissipates more profits than the supplier gains and supply chain performance suffers consequently turn and earn does not generally coordinate the system it is best characterized as a means for the supplier to increase her profits at the expense of the retailers and potentially even the supply chain furthermore these results hold even if the retailers can hold inventory in anticipation of scarce capacity

the sensitivity of consumption to transitory income estimates from panel data on households we investigate the stochastic relation between income and consumption specifically consumption of food within a panel of about 2 000 households our major findings are 1 consumption responds much more strongly to permanent than to transitory movements of income 2 the response to transitory income is nonetheless clearly positive 3 a simple test independent of our model of consumption rejects a central implication of the pure life cycle permanent income hypothesis the observed covariation of income and consumption is compatible with pure life cycle permanent income behavior on the part of80 percent of families and simple proportionality of consumption and income among the remaining 20 percent as a general matter our findings support the view that families respond differently to different sources of income variations in particular temporary income tax policies have smaller effects on consumption than do other more permanent changes in income of the same magnitude this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal taxes and the structure of preferences if optimal tax theory is to be the basis for calculating tax rates a close understanding is required of the relationship between the structure of preferences and the configuration of optimal tax rates otherwise hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience may completely determine the results independently of measurement this paper explores the relationship between various types of separability particularly weak and implicit separability and optimal tax rates in the various models discussed in the literature the use of distance functions and the antonelli matrix provides a significant unification of previously disparate results in the final analysis optimal tax theory should be the basis for actual calculation of tax rates although recently there have been great advances in theoretical results and in our understanding of their meaning we are still some way from a working knowledge of whether uniform commodity taxes are in practice optimal or if not which commodities should be discriminated against present theoretical formulae do not yield clear cut results except in special cases and it has recently become clear that optimal rates depend crucially on the detailed structure of consumer preferences for example atkinson and stiglitz 3 show that with an optimal nonlinear income tax discriminatory commodity taxes are only necessary to the extent that individual commodities are not weakly separable from leisure more recently deaton 6 has shown that a similar result holds for what is perhaps the most interesting of the standard models that where there are many consumers and only a linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes are allowed in this case separability between goods and leisure together with linear engel curves for goods removes the need for differential commodity taxation in consequence nothing can be learned about commodity taxes from consumer demand studies in which commodity demands are explained conditionally on total expenditure and commodity prices and which assume linear engel curves all such studies require separability from leisure as a maintained hypothesis and so are consistent with uniform commodity taxation these results suggest that the prospects for meaningful empirical calculations of tax rates are bleak econometricians estimating commodity demand and labor supply equations make generous use of separability assumptions to enable estimation at all in consequence it is likely that empirically calculated tax rates based on econometric estimates of parameters will be determined in structure not by the measurements actually made but by arbitrary untested and even unconscious hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience to remedy this situation and as a prelude to fruitful empirical work it is necessary to have a more explicit understanding of how preference structure affects optimal tax rates such is the object of this paper three different

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

rice prices and income distribution in thailand a non parametric analysis rice is a staple crop in thailand significantly entering both household production and consumption this paper examines the effect of rice prices on the distribution of real income across households taking into account household characteristics and geographical location the data set is a large scale survey of 11 893 households simple nonparametric techniques for regression and density estimation are used these methods depend on few assumptions and generate flexible graphical results that are directly informative about the problem at hand the main results are that higher rice prices should benefit all rural households but the largest benefits accrue to rural households in the middle of the income distribution copyright 1989 by royal economic society

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

competitive storage and commodity price dynamics by buying cheap and selling dear risk neutral commodity speculators can smooth commodity prices and induce serial dependence in price even when none would exist under a simple process of supply and demand commodity prices are variable and strongly positively correlated from one year to the next the variability is often explained by supply factors and the autocorrelation by the activities of speculators we show that this explanation is not consistent with the evidence speculation can substantially increase autocorrelation for prices that are weakly autocorrelated in its absence but not to the high levels that are observed in the data

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

tariff protection in developed and developing countries a cross sectional and longitudinal analysis four political models the international system rational domestic economic policy intragovemmental politics and interest group influence may explain the cross national structure of average nominal levels of tariffs on manufactures using available data measuring or approximating the explanatory variables for the time periods 1902 and 1971 selected hypotheses were tested in regression equations the 1971 tariff levels are best predicted by rational economic policy variables while for 1902 international power variables provide the best predictions of the tariff in general the causal forces influencing the cross national pattern of tariff levels appear to have shifted in the 20th century from those indicating international power to those measuring domestic politico economic development these results provide evidence relevant to some of the general propositions about size and development suggested by the contemporary political economy literature they also lend support to those who argue that a rising level of international interdependence has resulted in long term changes in the pattern of influences on national public policies

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

functional forms for labor supply and commodity demands with and without quantity restrictions one of the most important current questions in economic analysis is whether or not labor markets clear in the short run to answer this it is necessary to be able to distinguish between restricted and unrestricted behavior by consumers supplying labor this paper investigates the forms of preferences which lie behind linear models of labor supply and derives the functional forms for commodity demands which accompany them both with and without quantity restrictions in the labor market simple linkages between restricted and unrestricted demands are also considered as is the question of perfect aggregation over consumers in the presence of quantity restrictions

a welfare comparison between vers and tariffs under the gatt economic theory suggests that tariffs are welfare superior to voluntary export re straints vers in the presence of perfect competition however with imperfectly competitive markets some authors have found that vers may be welfare superior to tariffs we reconsider the comparison between a ver and a tariff in the context of gatt based constraints using a model of perfect competition we show that a ver can welfare dominate a tariff increase that is accompanied by a compensatory reduction in the tariff on another good or if the tariff is matched with a retaliatory tariff on domestic exports une comparaison des effets de bien e tre des restrictions volontaires a 1 exportation et des tarifs douaniers dans le cadre du regime du gatt la theorie economique suggere que

the demand for food and calories we investigate nutrition and expenditure in rural maharashtra in india we estimate that the elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to total expenditure is 0 3 0 5 a range that is in accord with conventional wisdom the elasticity declines only slowly with levels of living and is far from the value of zero suggested by a recent revisionist literature in these indian data the calories necessary for a day s activity cost less than 5 percent of the daily wage which makes it implausible that income is constrained by nutrition rather than the other way around

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

running out of steam a political incentive perspective of fdi inflows in china drawing on the sociological literature of state bureaucracy we develop a political incentive perspective on fdi inflows we argue that political term as a core feature of career advancement in state bureaucracy influences the incentives of newly appointed government officials and in turn their efforts toward achieving the state s goal of attracting fdi due to the mandatory retirement age which limits the career advancement officials in their first terms perceive that they have better chances of promotion and hence have stronger incentives to work toward advancement than those continuing to serve in the current position for the following term we test this argument by examining chinese city government leaders and fdi inflows in their cities from 2003 to 2010 using a difference in differences design the results show that first term leaders who are newly appointed after political turnover attract more fdi inflows than continuing leaders the difference is smaller when the new leaders are close to retirement but greater if they are appointed to cities with low prior gdp performance this study offers a new perspective on intra country fdi variations and extends the literature on the role of political institutions by investigating the political incentives of government officials

optimal soft order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information abstract demand patterns for products with short life cycles or seasonal demand do not follow a discernible pattern for individual sales events and seasons due to uncertainty associated with effectiveness of product promotions willingness of major retailers to carry product and their support competition and other unforeseen marketplace events factors these atypical demand patterns can be volatile and unsuitable for traditional demand forecasting in such cases buyers utilize market signals to regularly update demand forecasts under these settings sharing early soft order i e order forecast with the supplier reduces buyer s risk of supply shortages in this study we propose an optimal order revision policy for a buyer facing atypical demand and supply uncertainty for a single selling season based on a stochastic dynamic program we demonstrate the value of soft orders as well as supplier s inventory position information for the buyer we make several key contributions i we introduce a decision model for buyer to optimally revise soft orders under supply uncertainty with or without supplier s inventory position information under a deposit scheme ii we characterize the relationship between the optimal soft order and final firm order under demand forecasts and revisions demonstrating that optimal orders may be aggressive conservative or match the demand forecast iii we identify settings under which inventory position information of the supplier is beneficial to the buyer iv we offer a mechanism for identifying the minimum unit deposit cost that will lead to truthful soft orders from the buyer a detailed analysis explores the structure of the optimal ordering policies as well as the effect of cost parameters and sources of uncertainty on buyer performance

commodity prices and growth in africa a frican economies export primary commodities and most export little else policymakers as well as economists and historians of african economic development have seen these exports as both a hope and a curse the following parable tells the story once upon a time a servant of the ruler discovered a miraculous plant which grew readily in that country and whose seeds could be woven into fine cloth so desirable was this fabric that it became prized all over the world and fetched a high price after two score years the plant accounted for most of the country s trade with the world the ruler ordered the peasants to grow the plant paid them only a fraction of its price and he and his nobles became fabulously wealthy because the ruler wished to be remembered as a great ruler and as the father of his country he used his wealth to build a great army and brought machines from foreign countries to make the fine goods that previously could only be obtained from foreign merchants but the machines often broke down and the goods that they made were of poor quality and after the ruler died they were left to rust under the ruler s successor there was a war in a foreign land where the plant also grew so that there was a great shortage and its price increased threefold in only three seasons the new ruler spent his newfound riches on fantastic extravagance while immense sums were expended on public works after the manner of the east and on productive works carried out in the wrong way or too soon not even the threefold increase in prices could support these expenditures and the country soon found itself deeply in debt when the war ended and the price fell the country could no longer pay the interest on its debt or borrow more money even after it had sold its only useful public work to a foreign power so that power sent a mission to the country the publication of whose report from which the above

opening the window for reform mandates crises and extraordinary policy making under what conditions are governments within established democratic political systems willing and able to launch ambitious reform programs in other words what conjunctural factors generally serve to open the window for reform the central argument of this article is that extraordinary policy making generally becomes possible only when a macro window is opened by a government s achievement of an impressive mandate and or by the onset of a severe socioeconomic crisis the mandate reform hypothesis is tested with data from britain france and the united states then the significance of both mandates and crises is demonstrated through an analysis of eight reform government case studies ranging from the new deal to thatcher s britain

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

international trade and environmental policy in the postcommunist world this article examines whether commercial openness has affected environmental policy in the postcommunist countries of central and eastern europe and the commonwealth of independent states during the cold war these countries had closed trade regimes combined with little environmental regulation and poor environmental quality since the fall of the berlin wall and the breakup of the soviet union many postcommunist countries have engaged in extensive trade liberalization some countries however have been slower to open their markets and others have maintained highly protectionist trade policies have countries that opened up to global markets improved their environmental policies or has increasing exposure to the international trading system undermined efforts to improve environmental policy the results indicate that trade openness undermined a key element of environmental policy in the region by reducing governments ability to collect environmental taxes and support environmental investments

cleaning up while cleaning up pollution abatement interest groups and contingent trade policies this paper analyzes the political economy of environmental policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection we argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing the preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers

quadratic engel curves and consumer demand this paper presents a model of consumer demand that is consistent with the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys and is also able to provide a detailed welfare analysis of shifts in relative prices a nonparametric analysis of consumer expenditure patterns suggests that engel curves require quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure while popular models of demand such as the translog or the almost ideal demand systems do allow flexible price responses within a theoretically coherent structure they have expenditure share engel curves that are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure we derive the complete class of integrable quadratic logarithmic expenditure share systems a specification from this class is estimated on a large pooled data set of u k households models that fail to account for engel curvature are found ro generate important distortions in the patterns of welfare losses associated with a tax increase

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

antidumping duties undertakings and foreign direct investment in the eu we study the effects of eu antidumping policy when foreign firms can jump antidumping duties through foreign direct investment fdi in the eu we show that duty jumping or duty pre empting fdi occurs if the eu administration has broader objectives than protecting eu industry s profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad the expectation of price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in fdi and may even discourage fdi as long as products are not too differentiated the results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping fdi

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes