credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor abstract this paper develops an overlapping generations general equilibrium model where inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints it derives a positive relationship between inequality in the distribution of income and the incidence of child labor looking at policy implications it shows how trade sanctions against countries using child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor it discusses some alternative policies to reduce the incidence of child labor

preference based vs market based discrimination implications for gender differentials in child labor and schooling abstract this paper studies the effects of son preference by parents and earnings function bias on child labor and schooling in a model in which parents are altruistic it finds that son preference leads to gender differential in child labor with female children working more than male children but it does not lead to gender differential in schooling except when the bequest constraints are binding on the other hand the earnings function bias results in gender differential in both child labor and schooling dowry and marriage expenses can lead to inefficiently low level of schooling and high level of child labor son preference magnifies gender differential in child labor and schooling in the presence of dowry and marriage expenses

a theory of retail pricing until recently the retail enterprise the shop has been comparatively neglected by economic theorists partly because they assigned little role to retailing the growth of interest in the problem in recent years reflects the development of models of imperfect information and the revival of interest in location theory pricing theory for the retail enterprise however remains a neglected area after surveying existing models of retailing the paper concentrates on the idea that the shop saves its customers costs by assembling goods in one place this introduces an essential non convexity and importantly affects the conditions under which shops compete with each other and the constraints on their price setting under the admittedly unrealistic assumption of full buyer information a theory of retail pricing is developed retail prices are frequently regarded as exceptions both to the law of costs and generally to every rational process of price formation which is all the more remarkable since these prices are the only ones which are of direct interest to the consumer and which are directly influenced by consumption knut wickselt

specific experience household structure and intergenerational transfers farm family land and labor arrangements in developing countries data from indian rural household survey was used to test th hypothesis that the coexistence in traditional rural societies of extended intergenerational families infrequent land sales and high reliance on family members as farm laborers is the result of the economic advantages which accrue from the knowledge gained by farming a particular ploy of land over a long period of time the land specific experience of elderly members of a intergenerational household who farmed the land as a child and then as an adult are expecially critical in adverse weather years most previous investigators attributed the existence of multigenerational households the use of family members rather than hired laboreds and the infrequency of land sales to deficiencies in the market i e labor market imperfections and an absence of capital insurance and asset markets in the present investigations these same characteristics are viewed as having an economic advantages a model for estimating the contribution of the experience of the elderly household members to agricultural profits was developed and applied to data from a 3 year panel study of 2900 indian rural farm households the data was collected between 1968 71 by the national council of applied economic research the survey collected information on farm profits farm inputs demographic characteristics and the effects of weather conditions on profits a major limitation of the study was a lack of information on the duration of land ownership age of household members was substituted as a proxy for duration of ownership findings were consistent withe the hypothesis in poor agricultural years gross returns for households which contained an elderly household member were greater than the gross returns for comparable households which did not contain an elderly member the economic advantages of specific knowledge embodied in the experienced elderly farmer were comparable to the economic advantages which accrued to households whose members were more educated the hypothesis cannot fully explain the existence of intergenerational families since there is a relatively large proportion of such families among nonfarm families in many countries including india findings suggest that intergenerational families may provide for more occupational diversity and thereby reduce income risks the specific experience hypothesis has policy implications if technological changes are introduced the value of specific experience may be lost and the frequency of intergenerational households may decline the hypothesis may also explain why farmers are reluctant to agree to land redistribution and consolidation schemes this reluctance may disappear after sufficient technological change has occurred

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

raising retailers profits on vertical practices and the exclusion of rivals resale price maintenance rpm slotting fees loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers if these retailers were to accommodate entry upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers thus in equilibrium retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent s profits consequently if entry requires downstream accommodation entry can be deterred we discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices jel l14 l22 l25 l42 l81 this paper considers the upstream exclusionary effect of vertical practices that create rents for downstream retailers without carrying a contractual obligation for exclusivity 1 examples of interest include allowing the manufacturer to set the price at which a retailer sells to consumers resale price maintenance or rpm periodic lump sum payments to retailers through slotting fees or loyalty rebates and mar ket division schemes such as the allocation of clients to specific retailers or the use of exclusive territories we explore equilibria that can arise when an upstream incumbent uses a vertical practice of the sort outlined above to share industry profits with retailers we show that if entry by another upstream manufacturer leads to competition that reduces industry profits sufficiently and entry requires accommodation by retailers then equilibria exist in which retailers do not accommodate the entrant this results in exclusion in essence the vertical practice creates a quasi rent that retailers in equilibrium have an incentive to protect

favorite son specialized child laborers and students in poor ldc households abstract though prior theoretical models of child labor nominally contain households with multiple children they treat all children as identical in their returns to labor market and education activities in actuality households with identical twins are the exception and inherent heterogeneity implies different returns for children we construct a theoretical model that allows child heterogeneity and bilateral altruism our model illuminates potential inefficiencies in the time allocation of children across labor market obligations and education opportunities in poor households when intra household talent differentials across children are great an inefficient reverse specialization may arise and partial bans on child labor will increase efficiency

does child labor decline with improving economic status between 1993 and 1997 child labor in vietnam declined by nearly 30 percent while the country s gdp grew by nearly 9 percent per year on average using a simple nonparametric decomposition i investigate the relationship between improvements in per capita expenditure and child labor with a panel data set that spans this episode of growth in vietnam improvements in per capita expenditure can explain 80 percent of the decline in child labor that occurs in households whose expenditures improve enough to move out of poverty this finding suggests a previously undocumented role for economic growth in the amelioration of child labor

child labor and agricultural shocks this paper examines the relationship between household income shocks and child labor in particular we investigate the extent to which transitory income shocks lead to increases in child labor and whether household asset holdings mitigate the effects of these shocks using data from a household panel survey in tanzania we find that both relationships are significant we investigate mechanisms that could account for these results including buffer stocks and borrowing

competition marginal cost tariffs and spot pricing in the chilean electric power sector abstract setting up competitiveness and privatizing the power sector has been an important goal of chilean energy policy since 1974 the new organization of the electric sector includes deconcentration of generating and distributing companies a new marginal cost and spot pricing system coordination of generating companies through an economic load dispatching centre eldc and a scheme for sharing transmission lines this paper describes why and how those tasks were carried out in chile

marginal pricing and supplement cost allocation in transmission open access the application of marginal costing to transmission pricing in open access schemes requires the collection of a supplement to finance the transmission systems the paper describes the application of marginal cost based pricing in the chilean power system and the difficulties faced in allocating the supplement among parties involved alternative methods for defining the allocation are formulated generalized generation and load distribution factors for cost allocation are formulated and implemented the methods are applied to allocate payments for transmission services provided by the transmission network and by a distribution company

nonlinear pricing and exclusion ii must stock products dominant firms often are unavoidable trading partners buyers may consider switching a fraction of their requirements to rival products but that fraction is highly uncertain in rapidly evolving industries nonlinear pricing serves to adjust the competitive pressure placed on rival firms depending on the joint distribution of the buyer willingness to pay for the rival s good and the share of contestable demand concave price quantity schedules erect barriers to entry convex parts in schedules introduce barriers to expansion dominant firms use all units discounts to create high entry barriers for rival firms with intermediate levels of contestable demand

a multiyear dynamic approach for transmission expansion planning and long term marginal costs computation this paper presents a multicriteria formulation for multiyear dynamic transmission expansion planning problems this formulation considers three criteria investment costs operation costs and the expected energy not supplied the solution algorithm adopts an interactive decision making approach that starts at a nondominated solution of the problem this solution is identified transforming two of the three criteria in constraints specifying aspiration levels and using afterwards simulated annealing to deal with the integer nature of investment decisions after obtaining this first solution the decision maker can alter the aspiration levels and run the application again to obtain a new solution once an expansion plan is accepted the algorithm computes long term marginal costs reflecting both investment and operation costs these costs are more stable than short term ones and inherently address the revenue reconciliation problem well known in short term approaches the developed algorithm is tested using a case study based on the portuguese 400 220 150 kv transmission network

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

conditional cash transfers schooling and child labor micro simulating brazil s bolsa escola program a growing number of developing economies are providing cash transfers to poor people that require certain behaviors on their part such as attending school or regularly visiting health care facilities a simple ex ante methodology is proposed for evaluating such programs and used to assess the bolsa escola program in brazil the results suggest that about 60 percent of poor 10 to 15 year olds not in school enroll in response to the program the program reduces the incidence of poverty by only a little more than one percentage point however and the gini coefficient falls just half a point results are better for measures more sensitive to the bottom of the distribution but the effect is never large

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

discounts as a barrier to entry abstract to what extent can an incumbent manufacturer use discount contracts to foreclose efficient entry we show that off list price rebates that do not commit buyers to unconditional transfers like the rebates in eu commission v michelin ii for instance cannot be anticompetitive this is true even in the presence of cost uncertainty scale economies or intense downstream competition all three market settings where exclusion has been shown to emerge with exclusive dealing contracts the difference stems from the fact that unlike exclusive dealing provisions rebates do not contractually commit retailers to exclusivity when signing the contract jel d43 d86 k21 l13 l14 l42 l60

loyalty discounts and price cost tests abstract we analyze by means of a formal economic model the use of the discount attribution test to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts the discount attribution test is a variant of the price cost test where the discount is attributed only to the share of total demand that is regarded as effectively contestable in the model a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses market share discounts to boost the demand for its own products in this framework we show that the attribution test is misleading or at best completely uninformative our results cast doubts on the applicability of price cost tests to loyalty discount cases

exclusionary vertical contracts and product market competition this article considers whether a monopolist is able to deter more efficient entrants through contracting with buyers in the antitrust literature the chicago school s stand is that such contracts cannot be anticompetitive hence vertical contracts should be accorded per se legal status in a four stage game with the following features 1 the incumbent enjoys a first mover advantage 2 the entrant must incur some sunk cost to enter the market and 3 entry is uncertain the author shows that vertical contracts can be anticompetitive if there exists product market competition thus the author advocates caution in treating all contracts as per se legal a three factor repeated measures experiment tested the effect of leadership style charismatic structuring and considerate on performance improvement on a manufacturing task over four trials findings from a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance indicated that individual exposed to considerate leadership had superior initial performance but that this difference faded over time further analysis indicated that self efficacy fully mediated the relationship between leadership style and performance copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

in the same boat but not equals the heterogeneous effects of parental income on child labour this paper examines the impact of parental income on child labour the empirical literature has found conflicting results regarding whether poverty leads parents to send their children to work mos

child labor in the global economy few issues in developing countries draw as much popular attention as child labor this paper begins by quantifying the extent and main characteristics of child labor it then considers the evidence on a range of issues about child labor fundamentally child labor is a symptom of poverty low income and poor institutions are driving forces behind the prevalence of child labor worldwide this study concludes by assessing the policy options to reduce worldwide child labor

the impact of income and non income shocks on child labor evidence from a panel survey of tanzania summary this paper investigates the impact of income and non income shocks on child labor using a model in which the household maximizes utility from consumption as well as human capital development of the child we also investigate if access to credit and household assets act as buffers against transitory shocks our results indicate significant effects of agricultural shocks on the child s overall work hours and agricultural work hours with higher effects for boys crop shocks also have significant adverse effects on school attendance with girls experiencing a more than 70 increase in the probability of quitting schooling the results also indicate that access to a bank account has a buffering effect on the impact of shocks on child hunger having a bank account reduces both male child labor and household work hours of a girl child while assets reduce working hours of girls we do not find it having a significant effect on boys we also do not see assets to act as a buffer against shocks

child labour a review of recent theory and evidence with policy implications in recent years a growing number of authors have turned their attention to the question of why children work the purpose of this paper is to review some of the more recent theoretical and empirical research into the topic of child labour and to illustrate the fact that no one factor on its own can account for the phenomenon of child labour therefore policies aimed at eradicating child labour will need to address the broad range of underlying factors that contribute to the incidence of child labour such as poverty market imperfections and access to education

child labor cause consequence and cure with remarks on international labor standards although the literature on child labor is enormous it lacks a common theoretical foundation in this paper analytical survey of this field is provided keeping in mind that this is an area where the primary reason for theorizing is ultimately to influence policy overall it is noted that the literature on child labor is an illustration of abundance and anarchy although empirical writings on child labor are numerous they are not usually founded on theory it is argued that there is much that can be done in curbing the issue of child labor several theories were studied in this paper including collaborative intervention such efforts include public action which alters the economic environment such that the parents of their own accord prefer to withdraw the child from labor force another strategy involves the government a legal intervention is enforcing a total ban on the subject although such interventions have good intentions some of them may not be feasible in general it is better to take economy wide measures against child labor and if there is to be a sector specific ban it should be based on the working conditions of that sector rather than the destination of the goods

naked exclusion efficient breach and downstream competition previous papers by eric b rasmusen j mark ramseyer and john s wiley jr 1991 and ilya r segal and michael d whinston 2000 argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers we first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages we then show however that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach is possible

is child labor inefficient we build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare we assume that there is a trade off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects this occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect we also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be pareto improving in general equilibrium we show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous

exclusive quality exclusive quality in the case of vertically differentiated products bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high quality rival indeed because of differentiation the incumbent s inferior product is not eliminated upon entry due to the resulting competitive pressure a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent s monopoly rents thus in equilibrium the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion this is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs and with two part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs copyright 2010 the author the journal of industrial economics 2010 blackwell publishing ltd and the editorial board of the journal of industrial economics

exclusive dealing and entry when buyers compete rasmusen et al 1991 and segal and whinston 2000 show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers we show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak under fierce downstream competition if entry took place a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur this result is robust across different specifications of the game jel k21 l12 l42

household income as a determinant of child labor and school enrollment in brazil evidence from a social security reform abstractthis article studies the effects of household income on labor participation and school enrollment of children aged 10 14 in brazil using a social security reform as a source of exogenous variation in household income i find that increased benefits are associated with increases in school enrollment for girls as well as a smaller reduction in their labor participation but i find no effects for boys i also uncover evidence that the gender of the benefit receiver matters for girls labor variables only benefits received by females reduce girls work

economically adapted transmission systems in open access schemes application of genetic algorithms a dynamic transmission planning methodology using a genetic algorithm is formulated for the purpose of determining an economically adapted electric transmission system in a deregulated open access environment transmission investment sensitivity information linked to short term marginal income is used a computer program is developed and applied to obtain a long range adapted transmission grid for the chilean electrical system two open access pricing methodologies are evaluated in a spot price framework as applied to the adapted grid over the time horizon

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure a firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size exclude it from the market and enjoy increased market power this strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers in addition allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the transfer of another firm s profits

the long term impact of transmission pricing transmission pricing has been one of the major issues on the ongoing debate about deregulation and privatization many papers have dealt with the static nature of the tariff using the incremental and the embedded cost approaches however few of them have focused on the dynamic aspects of the tariff and therefore on its impact on the long term expansion planning of both generation and transmission the main target of this paper is to address some interesting topics about the effect of the transmission pricing methods on system cost in this new environment where generation is treated as an open market and transmission as a monopoly some examples with the brazilian power system illustrate the main points shown in this paper

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

exclusive dealing and entry when buyers compete comment in this paper fm s equilibrium analysis is shown to contain some errors fixing these errors changes their conclusions for some of the cases they consider exclusive deals written between an incumbent and competitive downstream buyers will still often arise in equilibrium thereby block ing efficient entry inefficient exclusion arises to protect industry profits from competition the issue centers on how competition works when upstream firms sell to consumers through two com peting downstream buyers in the case upstream firms can offer downstream buyers two part tariffs the analysis of competition in this setting turns out to be surprisingly subtle and the analysis here should be of more general interest to those modeling competition in vertical settings the particular model fm consider is based on the cost specification in segal and whinston 2000 sect iv in which the incumbent faces a potential entrant that has a lower cost of production but faces some fixed cost of entry two identical downstream buyers compete in prices for final consum ers exclusive deals involve the incumbent offering buyers a fixed compensation for agreeing not to purchase from the entrant fm derive their results under two different assumptions on wholesale pricing upstream firms are required to set linear wholesale prices section i and upstream firms are allowed to offer two part tariff contracts section ii since restricting upstream firms to charge linear wholesale prices to buyers seems inconsistent with assuming the incumbent can offer exclu sive contracts with a fixed compensation in the initial stage and since linear wholesale prices can lead to double marginalization problems the focus in this paper is on the less restrictive case consid ered by fm where upstream firms are allowed to offer downstream buyers two part tariffs 1 in this setting correcting fm s analysis shows that entry arises only when scale economies are not too important and the entrant s efficiency advantage is sufficiently large when either

naked exclusion with minimum share requirements we consider a class of contracts in which buyers commit to giving a seller some minimum share of their total purchases we show that such contracts can be used by an incumbent seller to reduce the probability of entry by a rival seller when the incumbent can commit to its selling price as part of the contract we further show that such contracts can be profitable for the incumbent even when exclusive dealing would not be and even when buyers can coordinate their accept or reject decisions the average price paid by the buyers will be higher and welfare will be lower whether or not the incumbent s exclusionary conduct turns out to be successful in preventing entry

school subsidies for the poor evaluating the mexican progresa poverty program abstract this paper evaluates how the progresa program which provides poor mothers in rural mexico with education grants has affected enrollment poor children who reside in communities randomly selected to participate in the initial phase of the progresa are compared to those who reside in other control communities pre program comparisons check the randomized design and double difference estimators of the program s effect on the treated are calculated by grade and sex probit models are also estimated for the probability that a child is enrolled controlling for additional characteristics of the child their parents local schools and community and for sample attrition to evaluate the sensitivity of the program estimates these estimates of program short run effects on enrollment are extrapolated to the lifetime schooling and the earnings of adults to approximate the internal rate of return on the public schooling subsidies as they increase expected private wages

differential taxation and occupational choice we develop a framework to study optimal sector specific taxation where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors because skills are not perfectly transferable the diamond mirrlees theorem according to which the second best entails production efficiency fails social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest at the optimum income taxes balance the marginal losses from inter sector migration with the marginal gains from tailoring tax schedules to the distribution of productivities in each sector tagging a calibrated model indicates that sector specific taxation generates substantive welfare gains when skill transferability decreases with income as it enables the government to increase average taxes on high earners with large wage premia

economic growth a panacea for child labor summary in this paper we test whether economic growth decreases child labor by bringing together data from the national sample survey of india and state level macrodata to estimate a bivariate probit model of schooling and labor our results lead us to conclude that contrary to popular wisdom growth actually increases rather than decreases child labor because it increases the demand for child workers the level of state ndp village wages and household incomes are seen as the conduits through which growth influences the supply side of the child labor market

child labor and the wealth paradox the role of altruistic parents abstract using data from pakistan we study the effect of family wealth on the utilization of child labor we find evidence of a positive relationship between land wealth and child labor only for children in the upper quantiles of the distribution we hypothesize that the so called wealth paradox in child labor is driven by parental preferences

naked exclusion comment the ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature the courts concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion in a provocative article eric b rasmusen et al 1991 henceforth rrw have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions because it can exploit buyers lack of coordination in essence if buyers expect other buyers to sign such provisions then they may see little reason not to do so themselves the rrw argument is potentially an important one because most alleged instances of entry deterrence through exclusionary contracts with customers occur in situations with multiple buyers unfortunately however rrw s two main results contain errors in this note we reconsider the rrw model providing correct characterizations of the likelihood and cost of exclusion for an incumbent firm our results indicate that while the intuition suggested by rrw is valid the equilibrium likelihood and cost of exclusion differ from what rrw derive moreover our analysis illuminates some further aspects of exclusionary contracting with multiple buyers among these issues we focus on how an incumbent can use discriminatory offers to exploit the externalities that exist among buyers in the provision of competition in section i we review the basic assumptions of the rrw model in sections ii and iii we then consider in turn the cases of simultaneous and sequential offers studied by rrw for the simultaneous model we distinguish between settings in which the incumbent can and cannot discriminate in its offers to different buyers this distinction is the source of the problem in rrw s analysis their simultaneous offer model assumes no discrimination but the proof of their proposition 2 assumes at times that discrimination is feasible we show that absent the ability to discriminate the incumbent can exclude profitably only when buyers fail to coordinate on their most preferred continuation equilibrium in contrast we show that when discrimination is possible the incumbent need not rely on a lack of buyer coordination to segal department of economics landau building stanford university stanford ca 94305 e mail ilya segal stanford edu whinston department of economics northwestern university 2003 sheridan road evanston il 60208 e mail mwhinston nwu edu we thank eric rasmusen john wiley and participants in the berkeley stanford iofest the university of copenhagen vertical restraints conference and a seminar at the antitrust division of the u s department of justice for helpful comments we thank federico echenique for excellent research assistance 1 for example a recent department of justice investigation concerned the use of exclusive contracts by the leading provider of computerized ticketing services ticketmaster most major cities have several large concert sports venues in many cities ticketmaster has exclusive contracts with a very large share of these venues 2 the other leading response to the argument that contracts with buyers cannot be a profitable method of exclusion is given in philippe aghion and patrick bolton 1987 section i one factor limiting the applicability of the aghion and bolton theory however is that it involves partial exclusion the contracts signed are not fully exclusionary they involve finite stipulated damages and the profitability of the strategy arises from extracting rents from an entrant when entry occurs indeed in the aghion and bolton model contracts that fully exclude offer no benefits over writing no contract at all in section iii of their paper aghion and bolton also discuss a two buyer version of their model in which externalities arise across buyers in contrast to the analysis here and in rrw they allow the incumbent to make an offer to a buyer i that is conditional on the acceptance decision of the other buyer 3 r innes and r j sexton 1994 also discuss the use of discriminatory offers in the context of a model in which buyers can form coalitions with the entrant

competition with exclusive contracts and market share discounts we analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market share discounts conditional on the seller s share of customers total purchases with incomplete information about demand firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers informational rents however exclusive contracts intensify competition thus reducing prices and profits and in all pareto undominated equilibria increasing welfare market share discounts by contrast produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers we discuss the implications of these results for competition policy jel d43 d83 d86 k21 l14 l42 in this paper we study firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts or mar ket share discounts i e discounts that depend on the seller s share of a customer s total purchases these are common yet seldom studied forms of competition the literature has mainly focused on incumbents use of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts to deter new entrants whilst paying less attention to competitors deploying similar pricing strategies we show that exclusive contracts intensify competition reducing equilibrium prices whereas market share discounts have a double marginalization effect and hence result in higher prices these findings have a bearing on the current lively policy debate 1 fueled by the fact that antitrust authorities view competition by means of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts with some suspicion to say the least the authorities main concern appears to be that a dominant firm can use exclusivity or market share discounts to eliminate not only potential competitors but also existing ones a prime instance of this is the case of intel intel whose main competitor amd has been operating for years in the microchip sector offered electronics manufacturers discounts that depended on their buying a minimum share of their total purchases of microchips from intel some customers to qualify for the discount had to opt for an exclusive supply contract that

the role of birth order in child labour and schooling does when a child was born relative to his or her siblings affect whether the child attends school or participates in child labour we investigate this question by estimating the causal effect of birth order on the probabilities of school attendance and child labour participation to address the potential endogeneity of family size we use instrumental variable approach where the proportion of boys in the family is used to instrument family size using a longitudinal household survey data from ethiopia we estimate unobserved effects bivariate probit instrumental variable model of school attendance and child labour choices the results suggest that the probability of child labour participation decreases with birth order but we find no evidence that suggests birth order affects the probability of school attendance however among children who are going to school hours spent studying increases with birth order results from complementary time use analysis reveal that there is no birth order effect on hour

solving the revenue reconciliation problem of distribution network providers using long term marginal prices in this paper the authors describe an integrated methodology to compute long term marginal prices in distribution networks long term marginal prices are considered the most interesting and economically sound way of allocating network costs to users additionally they inherently deal with the revenue reconciliation problem as they generally do not require other large supplementary tariff terms the proposed methodology uses fuzzy sets to model uncertainties in load forecasts and considers several criteria to guide the identification of solutions at the end there is a final decision making step to select the most adequate expansion plan according to the preferences of the decision maker

nonlinear pricing and exclusion i buyer opportunism we study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price quantity schedules in an aghion bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation we distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price charged by the dominant firm depends on the quantity purchased from the rival firm we find that the supply of rival good is distorted downward moreover given the quantity supplied from the rival the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the dominant firm to pocket quantity rebates we show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing

does amd spur intel to innovate more we estimate an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with durable goods and endogenous innovation to examine the effect of competition on innovation in the personal computer microprocessor industry firms make dynamic pricing and investment decisions while consumers make dynamic upgrade decisions anticipating product improvements and price declines consistent with schumpeter we find that the rate of innovation in product quality would be 4 2 percent higher without amd present though higher prices would reduce consumer surplus by 12 billion per year comparative statics illustrate the role of product durability and provide implications of the model for other industries

child labor child schooling and their interaction with adult labor empirical evidence for peru and pakistan using data from peru and pakistan this article tests two hypotheses there is a positive association between hours of child labor and poverty and there is a negative association between child schooling and poverty both of these hypotheses are confirmed by the pakistani data but not by the peruvian data the reduction in poverty rates due to income from children s labor is greater in pakistan than in peru the nature of interaction between adult and child labor markets varies with the gender of the child and the adult in peru rising men s wages significantly reduce the labor hours of girls whereas in pakistan there is a strong complementarity between women s and girls labor markets both data sets agree on the positive role that increasing adult education can play in improving child welfare

the demand boost theory of exclusive dealing this paper unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct the common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing raising marginal prices above marginal costs we show that with distorted prices exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticom petitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a strong competitive advantage over rivals the dominant firm gains directly rather than in the future or in adjacent markets thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts we discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy

buyer power and intrabrand coordination we analyze the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a contracting situation where rival retailers offer contracts to a manufacturer in contrast to bernheim and whinston 1998 who study the situation in which competing manufacturers offer contracts to a common retailer we find that two part tariffs even if contingent on exclusivity or not do not suffice to implement the monopolyoutcome richer arrangements including e g conditional fixed fees and upfront payments are thus required to internalize all contracting externalities the welfare implications are ambiguous on the one hand richer contracts ensure that no efficient retailer is excluded on the other hand they allow firms to maintain monopoly prices despite intrabrand competition simulations suggest that the latter effect may be more significant

exclusive contracts and market dominance we propose a new theory of exclusive dealing the theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals and that the buyers willingness to pay for the product is private information in this setting the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive we discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases jel d21 d43 d82 d86 k21 l13 l40