lessons from the debt deflation theory of sudden stops this paper reports results for a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with credit constraints that can account for some of the empirical regularities of the sudden stop phenomenon of recent emerging markets crises in these models credit constraints set in motion irving fisher s debt deflation mechanism and they bind as an endogenous equilibrium outcome when agents are highly indebted the quantitative predictions of these models yield three key lessons 1 sudden stops can occur as an endogenous response to typical realizations of adverse shocks to fundamentals in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of sudden stops into account 2 credit constraints cause output declines during sudden stops when collateral constraints limit debt to a fraction of the market value of capital when there are limits on access to working capital or when debt deflation lowers the value of the marginal product of factors of production 3 the debt deflation mechanism has significant quantitative effects in terms of the amplification asymmetry and persistence of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to standard shocks and in the occurrence of sudden stops as infrequent events nested within regular business cycles precautionary saving rules out the largest sudden stops from the stochastic stationary state but sudden stops remain a positive probability event in the long run this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

market equilibrium with hidden knowledge and self selection the problem of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in models with hidden knowledge and self knowledge has been discussed previously by m rothschild and j e stiglitz 1976 c a wilson 1977 and j g riley 1979 recent analyses of such models by i cho and d kreps 1986 and riley argue for a particular outcome the pareto dominant separating zero profit one the authors prove the existence of such an outcome under very general conditions and generalizing the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by riley they prove this outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium copyright 1987 by the econometric society

efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection do walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection in particular is their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable this paper addresses these questions in the context of a rothschild stiglitz insurance economy we identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality consequently we show that competitive equilibria always exist but are not typically incentive efficient however as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities markets for consumption rights can be designed to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection with such markets competitive equilibria exist and incentive constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems hold

uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security this paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime share deathrelated risks when annuity markets operate a non discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources in the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities such a program will lead to a non optimal intragenerational allocation of resources however the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a pareto improving role for a mandatory non discriminatory social security program

insurance self control and contract flexibility we study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures when contracts are long term and inflexible such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low risk consumers the competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low risks naive consumers choose the same tariff but later switch to full insurance and become high risks if there are sufficiently many naive consumers they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers so that high risks subsidize low risks in contrast there are no such transfers when contracts are short term the model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements

signalling to experts we study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers in terms of the classic spence 1973 the quarterly journal of economics 87 355 374 model of job market signalling firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types in addition to observing their education firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information i e their expertise in equilibrium some high type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better informed firms which make positive profits workers education decisions and firms use of their expertise are strategic complements allowing for multiple equilibria that can be pareto ranked we characterize wage dispersion and the extent of signalling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms our model can also be applied to a variety of other signalling problems including securitization corporate financial structure insurance markets or dividend policy

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

nash equilibrium in competitive insurance i formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly i formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well known rothschild stiglitz allocation is efficient

competitive pooling rothschild stiglitz reconsidered we build a model of competitive pooling which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join in equilibrium pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price even though each household s deliveries are the same at all pools the rothschild stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case we show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it does not and is unique

on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments i introduction laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in economics and increasingly they have been used to examine specific public policy issues there is much to be gained from careful laboratory experiments they offer a low cost means of testing and replicating policy innovations and they generate precise data on individual behavior thereby allowing estimation of behavioral responses importantly they allow many policy innovations to be introduced singly and exogenously in a controlled environment and as a result laboratory experiments are typically seen as having a high degree of internal validity brewer 2000 campbell and stanley 1966 shadish cook and campbell 2002 because the causal relation between variables can be properly demonstrated however as emphasized by plott 1987 using laboratory experiments can allow more general inferences regarding human behavior only when the setting implemented in the laboratory parallels what is observed in the naturally occurring world even beyond this requirement of parallelism is the need for generalizing behavioral observations from the laboratory to the field or external validity internal validity can be demonstrated through the evaluation of the design however external validity can only be verified empirically and only with respect to the specific setting being investigated this paper investigates the external validity of laboratory experiments and does so in the context of experiments on tax compliance behavior tax evasion is central to many important policy questions current estimates report the tax gap or difference between taxes owed and taxes paid in the united states to be 450 billion annually internal revenue service 2012 beyond these massive revenue losses evasion creates major misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes its presence requires that government expend resources to detect noncompliance to measure its magnitude and to penalize tax evasion evasion alters the distribution of income in arbitrary unpredictable and unfair ways and it may contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law more broadly it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of tax evasion laboratory methods have been used to examine a wide range of policies that may affect the compliance decision policies that have not always proven amenable to either theoretical analyses or empirical analyses with field data however laboratory studies of compliance are sometimes viewed with skepticism the most common criticism is that the student subjects typically used in experiments may not be representative of taxpayers undergraduates may have little experience with filing tax returns and their economic and demographic backgrounds may differ from those of taxpayers another criticism is that the context of laboratory compliance experiments does not closely enough resemble the context in which actual compliance decisions are made as a result there is a concern that experimental results on policy innovations that rely upon student subjects in laboratory compliance experiments cannot be generalized to the population it is this issue that we examine here building on previous research we present several types of evidence on the external validity of experiments on individual compliance decisions a first question examines whether behavior of laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world that is do participants in laboratory experiments exhibit different patterns of behavior than individuals in a similar naturally occurring setting to answer this question we utilize a special data set from the u s internal revenue service irs assembled as part of its national research program nrp

competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints abstract ever since the seminal work by rothschild and stiglitz q j econom 90 1976 629 on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non existence of equilibrium in pure strategies has received much attention in the literature we extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints which might be due to limited capital we show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists where every consumer obtains his appropriate rothschild stiglitz contract

constrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types abstract we prove the existence of the constrained efficient miyazaki 1977 wilson 1977 spence 1978 equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection when the distribution of unobservable types is continuous our existence proof applies under extremely general assumptions about individual preferences when we restrict preferences to have the widely used in the selection markets literature quasilinear form we characterize the properties of this equilibrium by developing a simple and computationally efficient numerical method for constructing it applying this method we show in a natural setting how one would compute the equilibrium allocation potentially facilitating empirical work using the mws equilibrium we illustrate this empirical application in the context of policy interventions and show that the welfare implications of a coverage mandate critically hinge on whether the market implements a constrained efficient allocation like the mws equilibrium or a constrained inefficient allocation like in azevedo and gottlieb 2017

non discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market abstract a variant of the rothschild stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm s customers such non discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome this outcome is that of miyazaki and spence i e the incentive compatible pair of zero profit contracts if efficient and the incentive compatible zero profit pair of contracts maximizing low risk utility otherwise

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

competitive markets without commitment in the presence of a time inconsistency problem with agency contracts we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that pareto dominate those achieved by a benevolent government and they induce more effort we analyze a model with moral hazard and a two sided lack of commitment after agents have chosen their work firms can modify contracts and agents can switch firms if the ex post market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and sufficiently separates individuals it is pareto superior to a government s allocation with a complete breakdown of incentives moreover competitive markets without commitment implement more effort in equilibrium under general conditions

a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection the paper describes a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome equilibrium exists under standard conditions it is shown that under certain conditions a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria for generic models there exists a stable outcome that is all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome these ideas are applied to markets with one sided and two sided uncertainty under standard monotonicity conditions it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers

constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search abstract this paper studies constrained efficiency in guerrieri et al s 2010 model of adverse selection and directed search buyers post contracts and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade if the guerrieri shimer wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not ex ante constrained efficient under certain conditions the planner achieves an allocation that even pareto dominates the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient under other conditions the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best cross subsidization is the key to these results