stability and endogenous formation of inventory transshipment networks this paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple firms in this game firms first make their inventory decisions independently and then decide collectively how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands in modeling transshipment we use networks of firms as the primitive which offer a richer representation of relationships among firms by taking the coalitions used in all previous studies as special cases for any given cooperative network we construct a dual price allocation under which the network is stable for any residual demands and supplies in the sense that no firms find it more profitable to form subnetworks under the allocation based on the marginal contribution of each firm to its network called the mjw value we show that various network structures such as complete hub spoke and chain networks are stable only under certain conditions on residual amounts moreover these conditions differ across network structures implying that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability of a decentralized transshipment system finally we consider the case when firms establish networks endogenously and show that pairwise nash stable networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems

collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries in complex supply chains downstream buyers would often replenish individually from intermediaries instead of directly dealing with original manufacturers although collaborative replenishment from intermediaries might generate benefits significant cost reductions could be achieved when direct replenishments from manufacturers are considered this paper constructs a general model to study collaborative replenishment in multi product chains with alternative sources of supply i e manufacturers and intermediaries a collaborative organization determines the optimal choices of replenishment sources on behalf of its members to minimize collective costs we introduce a class of cooperative games associated with these situations and give sufficient conditions for their concavity we investigate the choice of allocation rule and its effect on supply chain efficiency when buyers strategically participate in the collaborative organization we prove that the shapley value coordinates the supply chain i e it makes complete participation the best strategy for buyers even under asymmetric information this setting is compared with an alternative structure where buyers can only collaborate in source specific replenishment organizations that purchase all requested products either from intermediaries or manufacturers although there are always participation strategies that result in minimum collective cost it is impossible to find allocation rules for source specific replenishment organizations that always motivate the buyers to choose such strategies

accounting rates of return many economic studies provide empirical evidence regarding cross sectional differences in firm profitability in most of these studies firm profitability is measured by an accounting rate of return net income dividend by the book value of assets hereafter arr rather than an economic rate of profit franklin fisher and john mcgowan define the firm s economic rate of profit irr as that interest rate which equates the present value of its net revenue stream to its initial outlay 1983 p 82 fisher and mcgowan examine the analytic relation between a firm s arr and its irr in a series of examples and conclude that the arr is such a bad surrogate for the irr that the results of arr based empirical studies are likely to be totally misleading p 91 william long and david ravenscraft 1984 have criticized the theoretical work of fisher and mcgowan because the nature of the analytic relationship between the arr and the irr in the context of highly simplified hypothetical examples may not be indicative of the nature of the relationship in empirical settings their criticism adopts the utilitarian view that the arr has to be treated as a suitable surrogate for the irr as long as no preferable alternative measure of profitability is available for empirical work this view has merit as long as the measurement error which is contained in the arr is random rather than systematic unfortunately the nature and extent of the measurement error which is contained in the arr in a particular empirical setting can only be determined unequivocally if the irr is unequivocally known in such a case of course there would be no need to rely on the arr at all due to this unhappy circle empirical research on firm profitability has continued to rely on the arr despite the fact that many persons reasonably believe that the results of such research may be totally misleading fisher and mcgowan g c harcourt 1965 while others reasonably believe that the results are reliable enough to form a basis for policy decisions long and ravenscraft recent work by y ijiri 1978 1979 1980 and by myself 1982 has shown that conditional irr estimates can be obtained from data in firms financial statements while these irr estimates are conditional they do abstract from certain extraneous factors that influence arrs and that differ across firms consequently the conditional irr estimates are free from some of the sources of measurement error which are known to contaminate the arr thus the conditional irr estimates can be used to provide evidence on whether these sources of measurement error have or have not affected the outcome of prior studies in which profitability was measured by the arr such evidence can help to objectively resolve the conflict between the opposing views on the reliability of arr based profitability research this paper uses conditional irr estimates to examine the properties of the measurement error in the arr in a study of the relationship between firm profitability and firm size the remainder of the paper is organized as follows in section i the theoretical work of fisher and mcgowan is used professor of accounting university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 i gratefully acknowledge the comments of william albrecht dan dhaliwal gary fethke franklin fisher scott linn william r kinney jr and the participants of a workshop at the university of florida on earlier versions of this paper 1 some authors for example william long and david ravenscraft 1984 have used the sales margin ratio earnings sales as a measure of profitability however if one views profitability as return per unit of sacrifice the sales margin ratio is not a profitability measure since it ignores the sacrifice or investment required to generate a dollar of sales consequently this paper does not attempt to shed any insight into prior studies that have relied on the sales margin ratio as a measure of profitability

operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics abstract given a set of players and the cost of each possible coalition the question we address is which coalitions should be formed we formulate mixed integer linear programming models for this problem considering core stability and strong equilibrium the objective function looks for minimizing the total cost allocated among the players concerned about the difficulties of managing large coalitions in practice we also study the effect of a maximum cardinality constraint per coalition we test the models in two applications one is in collaborative forest transportation and the other one in inventory of spare parts for oil operations in these situations collaboration opportunities involving significant savings exist but for several reasons it may be better to group the players in different sub coalitions rather than in the grand coalition the models we propose are thus relevant for deciding how to partition the set of players we also prove that if the strong equilibrium model is feasible its optimal cost is equal to the optimal cost of the core stability model and consequently a coalition structure that solves one problem also solves the other problem we present results that illustrate this property we also present results where the core stability problem is feasible and the strong equilibrium problem is infeasible setting an upper bound on the maximum cardinality of the coalitions allows us to study the marginal savings of enlarging the cardinality of the coalitions we find that the marginal savings of allowing one more player significantly decreases as the bound increases

surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains a biform game analysis abstract in this paper we use a biform game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives in the first stage of the game firms decide non cooperatively on investments in the second stage the surplus is shared according to the shapley value we find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which however depend on their position in the supply chain cross subsidies for investment costs can mitigate but not eliminate the underinvestment problem vertical integration between at least some firms yields efficient investments but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms we show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

the limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative abstract market value accounting mva might improve market and regulatory discipline on financial institutions unfortunately there are serious conceptual measurement and incentive problems with implementing mva that have not received significant attention these problems are suggested by the theory of asymmetric information and the role intermediaries play in solving information and monitoring problems after analyzing the problems with mva we develop an alternative approach that applies mva principles where they are most feasible and uses a statistical procedure where asymmetric information problems make mva particularly problematic an empirical analysis suggests that this procedure may substantially improve the distribution of regulatory discipline

stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment abstract this paper discusses a family of two stage decentralized inventory problems using a unifying framework taxonomy depicted as a multilevel graph this framework allows us to model and link different problems of competing retailers who independently procure inventory in response to uncertain demand and anticipated inventory decisions of other retailers in this family of problems in the ex post stage the retailers exercise recourse actions in response to the realized demand and competitors chosen procurement levels for example retailers could coordinate inventory transshipment to satisfy shortage with overage based on profit sharing agreements our framework provides a unifying parsimonious view using a single methodological prism for a variety of problems equally importantly as recourse options are laid out our framework clarifies and contributes a modeling connection between problems in a clear taxonomy of models this unifying perspective explicitly links work that appeared in isolation and offers future research directions

cooperation in service systems we consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers this economies of scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady state mean total number of customers in the system the question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system when the individual incoming streams of customers form poisson processes and individual service times are exponential we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers or jobs in the pooled system we show that despite the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave the game and its subgames possess nonempty cores in other words for any subset of servers there exist cost sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition we give an explicit expression for all infinitely many nonnegative core cost allocations of this game finally we show that except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid to join the grand coalition

existence of coordinating transshipment prices in a two location inventory model we consider a two location production inventory model where each location makes production decisions and is subject to uncertain capacity each location optimizes its own profits transshipment at a cost is allowed from one location to another we focus on the question of whether one can globally set a pair of coordinating transshipment prices i e payments that each party has to make to the other for the transshipped goods that induce the local decision makers to make inventory and transshipment decisions that are globally optimal a recent paper suggests for a special case of our model that there always exists a unique pair of coordinating transshipment prices we demonstrate through a counterexample that this statement is not correct and derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which it would hold we show that in some conditions coordinating prices may exist for only a narrow range of problem parameters and explore conditions when this can happen finally we study the effects of demand and capacity variability on the magnitude of coordinating transshipment prices

toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation abstract the design of a supply chain network can be interpreted as a coalition formation problem in a cooperative game theory and formulated as a linear production game lpg the companies that are members of the optimal coalition share their manufacturing assets and resources to produce a set of end products and globally maximize their profits by selling them in a market this paper investigates the possibility of combining the requirement of coalition stability with a fair allocation of profits to the participants it is shown that in general the purely competitive allocation mechanism does not exhibit the property of fairness a technique is proposed to construct a stable and fair allocation system when the core of the game does not exclusively contain a set of competitive allocations

inventory centralization games with price dependent demand and quantity discount consider a distribution system consisting of a set of retailers facing a single period price dependent demand of a single product by taking advantage of the risk pooling effect and the quantity volume discount provided by suppliers or third party carriers the retailers may place joint orders and keep inventory at central warehouses before demand realization and allocate inventory among themselves after demand realization to reduce their operating costs under rather general assumptions we prove that there is a stable allocation of profits among the retailers in the sense that the resulting inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we also show how to compute an allocation in the core

repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations abstract we study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments in every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization after observing the actual demand each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period while in a single shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals we show that it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times we also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers order quantities and discount factors when n is large finally we provide conditions under which a system optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers and develop a contract for achieving a system optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied

a three stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers we present and study a three stage model of a decentralized distribution system consisting ofn retailers each of whom faces a stochastic demand for an identical product in the first stage before the demand is realized each retailer independently orders her initial inventory in the second stage after the demand is realized each retailer decides how much of her residual supply demand she wants to share with the other retailers in the third stage residual inventories are transshipped to meet residual demands and an additional profit is allocated our model is an extension of the two stage model of anupindi et al abz 2001 which implicitly assumes that all residuals enter the transshipment stage we show however that allocation rules in the third stage based on dual solutions which were used in the abz model may induce the retailers to hold back some of their residual supply demand in general we study the effect of implementing various allocations rules in the third stage on the values of the residual supply demand the retailers are willing to share with others in the second stage and the trade off involved in achieving an optimal solution for the corresponding centralized system

stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations this study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers each of them facing a newsvendor problem and a supplier groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by joint ordering and inventory centralization however we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should be dedicated to them in this situation we show that the associated cooperative game has a non empty core afterwards we concentrate on a dynamic situation where several model cost parameters and the retailers dedicated stock levels can change we investigate how the profit division might be affected by these changes we focus on four monotonicity properties we identify several classes of games with retailers where some of the monotonicity properties hold moreover we show that pairs of cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general when changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern

transshipment of inventories among retailers myopic vs farsighted stability the author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized after demand realization retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers this is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing the author addresses the following issue suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit such as the shapley value but may not belong to the core is it likely that in this framework all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable unlike the prior work the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense that is retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions in a symmetric setting with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition the author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues

who benefits from transshipment exogenous vs endogenous wholesale prices this paper studies how transshipments affect manufacturers and retailers considering both exogenous and endogenous wholesale prices for a distribution system where a single manufacturer sells to multiple identical cost retailers we consider both the manufacturer being a price taker and the manufacturer being a price setter in a single period setup under multivariate normal demand distribution in the case of the manufacturer being a price taker we provide several analytical results regarding the effects of key parameters on order quantities and profits in the case of the manufacturer being a price setter we characterize the stackelberg game that arises and provide several insights into how the game dynamics are affected by transshipments specifically we find that risk pooling makes retailers order quantities less sensitive to the wholesale price set by the manufacturer hence in general the manufacturer benefits from retailers transshipments by charging a higher wholesale price while retailers are often worse off the paper captures the effect of demand correlation and the effect of the number of retailers throughout and it illustrates the findings by a numerical example we also provide an interactive web page for numerical experiments

the profitability concentration relation market power or efficiency industrial economists have been studying the relationship between profitability and concentration using cross industry samples for many years now however as sometimes happens once it appeared that some consensus had been achieved with few exceptions market concentration and industry profitability are positively correlated peltzman i977 p 229 people began to question the interpretation of those results in particular demsetz e g i973 i974 and others suggested that rather than concentration market power leading to higher prices and profits the causal direction in fact ran from greater efficiency to both higher profits and incidentally to higher concentration our purpose here is to subject these conflicting hypotheses to cross industry empirical test using u k data in order to do this we first develop a model which is sufficiently general to allow for both alternative explanations of a positive concentration profitability correlation in the light of this model we then examine the implications for the within industry relation between market share and firm level profitability more specifically we explore demsetz s claim that the empirical form of this relationship should signal which of the alternative hypotheses is consistent with the between industry profitability concentration correlation our model suggests that in certain special circumstances this claim is partly justified in that it should be possible to assess the relative strengths of the market power and efficiency effects from the within industry relation more generally however factors such as product differentiation and scale economies may seriously impair the information content of the relation with at least a strong suspicion that the estimates will tend to exaggerate the evidence in favour of the efficiency hypothesis in the event our results tend to confirm that for most industries the within industry data offer little conclusive support for either hypothesis but for a not insignificant minority of industries the evidence suggests some support for the view that both efficiency and market power are at work simultaneously our model is detailed in section ii and estimated on u k data in section iii after which we offer a few comments in section iv first however we drovide a backcloth to the later analysis

strategic investments trading and pricing under forecast updating this paper considers two independent firms that invest in resources such as capacity or inventory based on imperfect market forecasts as time progresses and new information becomes available the firms update their forecasts and have the option to trade their resources the trade contract is determined as the bargaining equilibrium or alternatively as the price equilibrium assuming a fairly general form of the profit functions we characterize the nash equilibrium investment levels which are first best under the price equilibrium trade contract but not under the bargaining equilibrium trade contract to gain additional insights we then focus on firms that face stochastic demand functions with constant price elasticity and have contingent pricing power assuming a general forecast evolution process we characterize the impact of the option to trade and the firms cooperation on equilibrium investments expected prices profits and consumer surplus finally to study the main driving forces of trading we employ a well established and empirically tested forecast updating model in which the forecast evolution process follows a two dimensional geometric brownian motion under this model we prove that the equilibrium investments expected prices profits and consumer surplus are nondecreasing in the quality and timing of forecast revisions in market variability and in foreign exchange volatility but are nonincreasing in market correlation

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

optimal joint inventory and transshipment control under uncertain capacity in this paper we address the optimal joint control of inventory and transshipment for a firm that produces in two locations and faces capacity uncertainty capacity uncertainty e g due to downtime quality problems yield etc is a common feature of many production systems but its effects have not been explored in the context of a firm that has multiple production facilities we first characterize the optimal production and transshipment policies and show that uncertain capacity leads the firm to ration the inventory that is available for transshipment to the other location and characterize the structure of this rationing policy then we characterize the optimal production policies at both locations which are defined by state dependent produce up to thresholds we also describe sensitivity of the optimal production and transshipment policies to problem parameters and in particular explain how uncertain capacity can lead to counterintuitive behavior such as produce up to limits decreasing for locations that face stochastically higher demand we finally explore through a numerical study when the optimal policy is most likely to yield significant benefits compared to simple policies

market structure and price cost margins in a paper that has become a standard reference in the structure conductperformance approach to industrial economics cowling and waterson 1976 developed a theoretical rationale for expecting industry profitability to be positively correlated with the level of concentration their model based on a simple algebraic description of oligopoly behaviour has been interpreted as providing a justification for the common empirical practice of cross industry regression analysis of price cost margins in terms of concentration levels in the present paper we show that on further examination this model implies a joint determination of margins and concentration this provides some interesting comparative static results of relevance to inter industry differences in concentration levels equally however it leads to various cautionary insights concerning the meaning of price cost margin versus concentration regressions

sell the plant the impact of contract manufacturing on innovation capacity and profitability in the electronics industry and others original equipment manufacturers oems are selling their production facilities to contract manufacturers cms the cms achieve high capacity utilization through pooling supplying many different oems meanwhile the oems focus on innovation research and development product design and marketing we examine how this change in industry structure affects investment in innovation and capacity and thus profitability in particular innovation is noncontractible so oems will invest less in innovation than is ideal for the industry as a whole hence although contract manufacturing improves capacity utilization it may reduce the profitability of the industry as a whole by weakening the incentives for innovation contract manufacturing is not the only means to achieve capacity pooling alternatively the oems can pool capacity with one another through supply contracts or a joint venture this may result in underinvestment or overinvestment in innovation and capacity but always increases profitability we find that the sale of production facilities to a cm improves profitability for the industry as a whole if and only if oems are subsequently in a strong bargaining position vis a vis the cm if the oems are indeed very strong the gain from pooling capacity via contract manufacturing is maximized in industries with moderate cost of capacity

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets in this paper we study dynamic alliance formation among agents in competitive markets we look at n agents selling substitutable products competing in a market in this setting we examine models with deterministic and stochastic demand and we use a two stage approach in stage 1 agents form alliances coalitions and in stage 2 coalitions make decisions price and inventory and compete against one another to analyze the stability of coalition structures in stage 1 we use two notions from cooperative games the largest consistent set lcs and the equilibrium process of coalition formation epcf which allow players to be farsighted thus in forming alliances players consider two key phenomena first players trade off the size of the total profit of the system versus their allocation of this total pie and second they weigh the possibility that an immediate beneficial defection can trigger further counter defections that in the end may prove to be worse than the status quo in particular one such example is that of the grand coalition which we show to be stable in the farsighted sense even though players benefit myopically by defecting from it we also provide conditions under which a situation of a few lone players competing against a large coalition is stable we examine the impact of the size of the market n the degree of competition the effect of cost parameters and the variability of the demand process on the prices inventory levels and structure of the market we discuss the possible strategic implications of our results to firms in a competitive market and for new entrants

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

capacity sharing between competitors market competition may lead to mismatch between supply and demand that is overpricing may give rise to underselling and underpricing may yield stockout capacity sharing is a common practice to

collusion versus differential efficiency testing alternative hypotheses the predictions of collusion and efficiency based static equilibrium explanations of interindustry profitability differences are formally developed and tested using appropriate econometric techniques with intraindustry data on seventy u s internal revenue service minor manufacturing industries in 1963 and 1972 none of the explanations has much explanatory power the 1963 data are consistent with collusion based models while the 1972 data are inconsistent with all non null hypotheses considered patterns of profitability are sharply different in the two years in complex ways apparently unrelated to cyclical forces or the phase ii price controls implications of these results are discussed copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

the snowball effect abstract many economists think that dominant positions unprotected by strategic or operating advantages will tend to decay i demonstrate that that intuition is flawed by devising a model of noncooperative duopoly in which the initially larger competitor monopolizes all investment opportunities even though it is no more efficient than its smaller rival as part of an effort to push up output prices i also present an apparent example of this mechanism at work and discuss the implications for public policy

random walks and sustained competitive advantage strategy is concerned with sustained interfirm profitability differences observations of such sustained differences are often attributed to unobserved systematic a priori differences in firm characteristics this paper shows that sustained interfirm profitability differences may be very likely even if there are no a priori differences among firms as a result of the phenomenon of long leads in random walks even a random resource accumulation process is likely to produce persistent resource heterogeneity and sustained interfirm profitability differences a cournot model in which costs follow a random walk shows that such a process could produce evidence of substantial persistence of profitability the results suggest that persistent profitability does not necessarily provide strong evidence for systematic a priori differences among firms nevertheless since the phenomenon of long leads is highly unrepresentative of intuitive notions of random sequences such evidence may still be persuasive