interest rates and money in the measurement of monetary policy over the last 25 years a set of influential studies has placed interest rates at the heart of analyses that interpret and evaluate monetary policies in light of this work the federal reserve s recent policy of quantitative easing with its goal of affecting the supply of liquid assets appears to be a radical break from standard practice alternatively one could posit that the monetary aggregates when measured properly never lost their ability to explain aggregate fluctuations and for this reason represent an important omission from standard models and policy discussions in this context the new policy initiatives can be characterized simply as conventional attempts to increase money growth this view is supported by evidence that superlative divisia measures of money often help in forecasting movements in key macroeconomic variables moreover the statistical fit of a structural vector autoregression deteriorates significantly if such measures of money are excluded when identifying monetary

self enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets abstract the folk theorem in game theory implies that any outcome that is better for all players than some single period nash outcome can be achieved through noncooperative equilibrium in repeated games with discounting whether the folk theorem holds for a repeated cournot oligopoly as the number of firms n increases without bound is investigated it is shown that the folk theorem holds in the limit iff demand increases at the same rate as the number of firms and the cournot price sequence is bounded strictly above by the supremum of marginal cost for large n

does money matter in the euro area evidence from a new divisia index we create a euro area divisia money dataset and estimate theoretically correct responses to money user cost and interest rate shocks using structural vector autoregressions our findings suggest that money matters for output prices and interest rates while the european central bank can influence monetary developments

collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

estimating the marginal law of a time series with applications to heavy tailed distributions this article addresses estimating parametric marginal densities of stationary time series in the absence of precise information on the dynamics of the underlying process we propose using an estimator obtained by maximization of the quasi marginal likelihood which is a likelihood written as if the observations were independent we study the effect of the neglected dynamics on the asymptotic behavior of this estimator the consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator are established under mild assumptions on the dependence structure applications of the asymptotic results to the estimation of stable generalized extreme value and generalized pareto distributions are proposed the theoretical results are illustrated on financial index returns supplementary materials for this article are available online

measuring quantile risk hedging effectiveness a go garch evt copula approach in this study we propose a new go garch evt copula combined approach to estimate minimum quantile risk hedge ratios we examine the hedging effectiveness of the proposed model in comparison with t

an empirical test of the effect of excess capacity in price setting capacity constrained supergames abstract in a multi period game industry excess capacity may act to deter firms from cheating on a non cooperative oligopoly price a model is developed that translates the deterrrent influence of excess capacity into predictions about the relationship between excess capacity and oligopoly price cost margins the model is tested with time series data from the u s aluminum industry results are consistent with those predicted by the model

endogenous trade policy through majority voting an empirical investigation abstract the median voter approach to trade policy determination within a heckscher ohlin framework as in mayer am econ rev 74 5 1984 970 predicts that an increase in inequality holding constant the economy s overall relative endowments raises trade barriers in capital abundant economies and lowers them in capital scarce economies we find support for this prediction using cross country data on inequality capital abundance and diverse measures of protection we perform certain robustness checks that include controlling for the effects of political rights and schooling as well as using alternative datasets on factor endowments

on the presence and absence of free entry in oligopoly equilibria abstract this note provides sufficient conditions for the presence and absence of free entry at cournot equilibria and some other oligopoly equilibria in a market for a homogeneous commodity

olson s logic of collective action at fifty in the 50 years since its publication mancur olson s logic of collective action has had an enormous impact on the academic literature in both economics and political science in this review essay i discuss olson s work in light of the ensuing research particularly developments in the theoretical literature much of the discussion focuses on the group size paradox as applied to politics i e the extent to which the group size paradox can explain why the interests of some groups are better represented in the political process than others i also discuss selective incentives with an emphasis on the byproduct mechanism under which a firm sells a private good and uses the resulting profits to provide a public good

the effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting abstract the ability to cooperate in the provision of a pubic good is analyzed in a repeated game holding the level of provision fixed with quasi linear utility we find that the critical value of the discount parameter converges to 0 in the limit thus cooperation is feasible in a large market next we allow the level cooperation to be adjusted optimally as the group size increases both for a specific form of quasi linear utility and for cobb douglas utility in each case we find that there are admissible values of the discount parameter such that cooperation may be maintained in the limit

capturing downside risk in financial markets the case of the asian crisis abstract using data on asian equity markets we observe that during periods of financial turmoil deviations from the mean variance framework become more severe resulting in periods with additional downside risk to investors current risk management techniques failing to take this additional downside risk into account will underestimate the true value at risk with greater severity during periods of financial turnoil we provide a conditional approach to the value at risk methodology known as conditional var x which to capture the time variation of non normalities allows for additional tail fatness in the distribution of expected returns these conditional var x estimates are then compared to those based on the riskmetrics methodology from j p morgan where we find that the model provides improved forecasts of the value at risk we are therefore able to show that our conditional var x estimates are better able to capture the nature of downside risk particularly crucial in times of financial crises

robust tests of forward exchange market efficiency with empirical evidence from the 1920s summary this paper provides a robust statistical approach to testing the unbiasedness hypothesis in forward exchange market efficiency studies the methods we use allow us to work explicitly with levels rather than differenced data they are statistically robust to data distributions with heavy tails and they can be applied to data sets where the frequency of observation and the futures maturity do not coincide in addition our methods allow for stochastic trend non stationarity and general forms of serial dependence the methods are applied to daily data of spot exchange rates and forward exchange rates during the 1920s which marked the first episode of a broadly general floating exchange rate system the tail behaviour of the data is analysed using an adaptive data based method for estimating the tail slope of the density the results confirm the need for the use of robust regression methods we find cointegration between the forward rate and spot rate for the four currencies we consider the belgian and french francs the italian lira and the us dollar all measured against the british pound we find support for a stationary risk premium in the case of the belgian franc the italian lira and the us dollar and we find support for the simple market efficiency hypothesis where the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate and there is a zero mean risk premium in the case of the us dollar

from value at risk to stress testing the extreme value approach this article presents an application of extreme value theory to compute the value at risk of a market position in statistics extremes of a random process refer to the lowest observation the minimum and to the highest observation the maximum over a given time period extreme value theory gives some interesting results about the distribution of extreme returns in particular the limiting distribution of extreme returns observed over a long time period is largely independent of the distribution of returns itself in financial markets extreme price movements correspond to market corrections during ordinary periods and also to stock market crashes bond market collapses or foreign exchange crises during extraordinary periods an approach based on extreme values to compute the var thus covers market conditions ranging from the usual environment considered by the existing var methods to the financial crises which are the focus of stress testing univariate extreme value theory is used to compute the var of a fully aggregated position while multivariate extreme value theory is used to compute the var of a position decomposed on risk factors 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

public good provision in a repeated game the role of small fixed costs of participation pecorino 1998 models tariff lobbying in a repeated game and finds that cooperation can be maintained in a large group even though tariff lobbying provides a rival public good to interest group members we add small fixed costs of participation to this model and find that cooperation must break down in large groups by contrast if a fully rival public good directly enters the utility function then cooperation is possible in large groups even with small participation costs thus we find only partial support for olson s 1965 proposition that collective action must break down in large groups

individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games we investigate whether two players in a long run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown specifically we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and or the monitoring structure each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned we show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief free equilibrium we also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples copyright 2014 oxford university press

margin exceedences for european stock index futures using extreme value theory abstract futures exchanges require a margin requirement that ensures their competitiveness and protects against default risk this paper applies extreme value theory in computing unconditional optimal margin levels for a selection of stock index futures traded on european exchanges the theoretical framework focuses explicitly on tail returns thereby properly accounting for large levels of risk in measuring prudent margin levels the paper finds that common margin requirements are sufficient for each contract with the exception of the norwegian obx index in providing equitable costs for traders in addition the paper shows the underestimation bias in margin levels that are calculated assuming normality differing margin requirements reflect the unconditional and conditional trading environments

varying the var for unconditional and conditional environments abstract accurate forecasting of risk is the key to successful risk management techniques using the largest stock index futures from 12 european bourses this paper presents var measures based on their unconditional and conditional distributions for single and multi period settings these measures underpinned by extreme value theory are statistically robust explicitly allowing for fat tailed densities conditional tail estimates accounting for volatility clustering are obtained by adjusting the unconditional extreme value procedure with garch filtered returns the conditional modelling results in iid returns allowing for the use of a simple and efficient multi period extreme value scaling law the paper examines the properties of these distinct conditional and unconditional trading models the paper finds that the biases inherent in unconditional single and multi period estimates assuming normality extend to the conditional setting

determinants of automobile pac contributions to house incumbents own versus rival effects this paper examines pac contributions by the big threeu s automakers and japanese auto dealers to houseincumbents a regression model is estimated where paccontributions are a function of a firm s own ties toan incumbent s district as measured by firmemployment and those of rivals for the big three own and u s rival effects are positive further theresults do not indicate the presence of a free ridereffect employment by a foreign subsidiary has no neteffect on u s contributions for the japanesedealers japanese plant employment has a positiveimpact on contributions and that of the big three anegative

aggregate efficiency market demand and the sustainability of collusion this paper studies the effects of firms aggregate efficiency and the level of demand on collusion collusion is more difficult in markets where aggregate efficiency i e the ability of firms to profitably produce at prices exceeding the cournot price is large relative to the level of demand

estimating the density tail index for financial time series the tail index of a density has been widely used as an indicator of the probability of getting a large deviation in a random variable most of the theory underlying popular estimators of it assume that the data are independently and identically distributed i i d however many recent applications of the estimator have been to financial data and such data tend to exhibit long range dependence we show via monte carlo simulations that conventional measures of the precision of the estimator which are based on the i i d assumption are greatly exaggerated when such dependent data are used this conclusion also has implications for estimates of the likelihood of getting some extreme values and we illustrate the changed conclusions one would get using equity return data

can by product lobbying firms compete abstract olson 1965 argues that some large groups can overcome the free rider problem through by product lobbying the by product firm sells a private good to potential members of the interest group and finances lobbying with its profits others argue that by product lobbying firms cannot survive competition with for profit firms since this would compete away monopoly rents leaving the firm unable to lobby in a model of monopolistic competition i show that the by product firm can enter the market and earn enough profits to exceed the noncooperative level of lobbying this is true despite the free entry of for profit firms

when are cartels stable contracts why do some industry cartels survive for decades while others are quickly undermined by price wars and entry variation in cartels longevity can be explained by differences in their costs of self enforcement and service value to members analyzing legal cartel contracts formed under the webb pomerene export trade act i find that longer lived cartels tended to export to small buyers to have wide industry coverage to operate in periods of stable prices and growing demand and to sell under side agreements with foreign competitors contracts in which the cartel centralized its control through a common sales agency tended to be more stable however cartels usually grew less stable with age and when there was a recent and long history of cartelization in the industry finally cartels whose primary rationale was to fix price tended to be particularly unstable because these contracts invited fringe competition and entry

the effects of reform on china s bank structure and performance abstract this paper investigates the relationship between market structure and performance in china s banking system from 1985 to 2002 a period when this sector was subject to gradual but notable reform using panel data estimation techniques both the market power and efficient structure hypotheses are tested in addition the model is extended to consider issues such as the impact of bank size ownership and whether the big four banks enjoy a quiet life on average x efficiency declined significantly and most banks were operating below scale efficient levels estimation of the structure performance models lends some support to the relative market power hypothesis in the early period the reforms had little impact on the structure of china s banking sector though the joint stock banks became relatively more x efficient there was no evidence to support the quiet life hypothesis probably because strict interest rate controls prevented the state banks from earning monopoly profits thus the ongoing liberalisation of interest rates should be accompanied by reduced concentration overall to improve competitive structure new policies should be directed at encouraging market entry and increasing the market share of the most efficient banks

perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a bounded continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms a sequence net of cournot markets each with a finite number of firms which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a cournot equilibrium and all the cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market

collusion and predation under almost free entry abstract this study investigates the degree of cooperation that firms can support in the absence of significant barriers to entry a free entry subgame perfect equilibrium is defined by q n where q is the collusive output rate and n is the number of active firms such that there is no incentive for an active firm to deviate output from q and there is no incentive for a potential entrant to enter the industry it is shown that for all n 1 if the discount factor is sufficiently high there exists a free entry equilibrium in which active firms sustain a non trivial degree of cooperation cooperation is supported by active firms credibly threatening to respond to entry with a period of aggressive competition

the joint profit maximum as a free entry equilibrium outcome abstract this study investigates the degree of collusion that can be sustained at a free entry equilibrium when the number of active firms is endogenous an increase in the discount factor is found to have two counter acting effects on the incentive for active firms to deviate from the collusive arrangement holding the number of firms fixed a higher discount factor reduces the incentive for cheating according to the standard argument however a higher discount factor also makes entry more profitable since entry entails an initial loss the cost of entry and a future stream of positive profits raising the discount factor then increases the number of active firms which tends to increase the incentive for firms to cheat our analysis shows that the first effect dominates so that the joint profit maximum can be sustained as a free entry equilibrium outcome when the discount factor is sufficiently high

admissible monetary aggregates for the euro area we use the fleissig and whitney fleissig a r whitney g a 2003 a new pc based test for varian s weak separability conditions journal of business and economics statistics 21 1 133 144 weak separability test to determine admissible levels of monetary aggregation for the euro area we find that the euro area monetary assets in m2 and m3 are weakly separable and construct admissible divisia monetary aggregates for these assets we show that real growth of the admissible divisia aggregates enters the euro area is curve positively and significantly for the period from 1980 to 2005 out of sample we show that divisia m2 and m3 appear to contain useful information for forecasting euro area inflation

entry exit and imperfect competition in the long run an infinite horizon stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed simple examples provide insights into 1 the relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration 2 entry when current profits are negative and 3 the relationship between entry and the length of the product cycle a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite horizon equilibria this equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history under very general conditions it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum

subsidizing rent seeking antidumping protection and the byrd amendment abstract this paper argues that a recent u s law which distributes the tariff revenue resulting from successful antidumping petitions to firms that supported the petitions increases the amount of antidumping protection requested by u s firms in two ways first by increasing the total benefits accruing to industries filing successful petitions the law subsidizes rent seeking second by awarding these subsidies only to those firms that actively support the petition it mitigates the free rider problem traditionally associated with collective actions empirical results provide strong evidence that industries have filed more antidumping petitions under the new law moreover the average proportion of firms in the industry filing these petitions increased under the law suggesting that the law at least partially alleviates free riding incentives

what do facilitating practices facilitate an empirical investigation of most favored nation clauses in natural gas contracts long term contracts often include most favored nation clauses mfns which are nondiscrimination guarantees that obligate a buyer or seller to treat all trading partners symmetrically in pricing decisions recent theoretical work has shown that such clauses can facilitate tacit collusion by increasing the cost of selective price changes aimed at attracting new business an alternative view is that mfns serve to facilitate efficient price adjustment in extended exchange relationships we test these competing hypotheses using data from long term natural gas contracts many of which employ mfns our conclusion is that the pattern of mfn adoption in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions lends strong support to the efficiency rationale

polluters and collective action theory and evidence 1 introductionthe seminal theory by olson 1965 predicts that industries with fewer firms have a greater ability to undertake collective action they organize cooperative political action more easily because greater concentration lowers the cost of political action 1 the empirical evidence is inconclusive however andres 1985 masters and keim 1985 heywood 1988 and humphries 1991 find positive effects of industry concentration on the probability of making political action committee pac contributions see also mckeown 1994 pittman 1976 finds that concentrated industries generate greater contribution levels grier munger and roberts 1991 find an inverted u shaped relationship between the level of pac formation and industry concentration with a maximum political participation rate occurring at a four firm concentration ratio around 0 45 esty and caves 1983 and zardkoohi 1985 report ambiguous effects of concentration on pac contributions 2in this paper we suggest an alternative perspective on firms ability to organize collective action which to our knowledge has been ignored so far the novel argument is that industries that face multiple regulations a greater number of policy issues find it easier to overcome collective action problems and sustain lobbying in particular we focus on the difference between firms in polluting and clean industry sectors using a simple repeated game framework similar to spagnolo 2000 we argue that firms in industries that are naturally polluting because of their input requirements and therefore incur pollution abatement costs will face an additional policy battle compared with other industries everything else equal 3 this enables such industries to sustain greater cooperation and lobbying this is because firms seeking to form a lobby group face a free riding problem due to a limited amount of enforcement power available to punish deviation and ensure cooperation firms that face multiple areas of regulation have an advantage in the formation of lobby groups because they have a greater amount of enforcement power available to reallocate between policy issues when joint lobbying gives large gains in environmental policy this surplus can be reallocated to trade policy for example free riding behavior on trade policy lobbying may more easily be disciplined the prediction that emerges from our theoretical model is that polluting industries are relatively less affected by the free riding problems involved in organizing political action and we thus expect the level of political contributions to be higher in these sectors 4we evaluate this prediction using a cross section data set of u s manufacturing industries our empirical model builds on a multiple equation model by gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 who test the well established theory of grossman and helpman 1994 on the pattern of protection their theory takes lobby group formation as given we augment gawande and bandyopadhyay s model with an additional equation for environmental policy stringency 5 the empirical results lend support to our theory industry pac contributions and thus the level of lobby group cooperation are greater in industries with larger pollution abatement costs this result is robust to several measures of lobby group formation and environmental policy the present paper contributes to the recent literature on the formation of lobby groups in the area of pollution taxation damania and fredriksson 2000 argue that collusive industries may more easily form lobby groups that oppose such taxes using a related setup damania and fredriksson 2003 discuss the effect of exogenous trade liberalization on environmental policy formation when lobby group formation is endogenous pecorino 1998 and mitra 1999 discuss the formation of trade lobby groups 6 neither of these papers explore the relationship between collective action and the number of policy instruments however

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

costly distribution and the non equivalence of tariffs and quotas when governments impose a quota or tariff on imports it is well known that the resulting rents and revenues trigger costly rent seeking and revenue seeking activities which are welfare reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the protectionist induced resource misallocation repeated interaction among firms can eliminate wasteful rent and revenue seeking expenditures through cooperation we show that while aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises the conditions under which cooperation arises differ by policy this difference arises because a firm must incur additional cost to physically import and distribute the goods associated with additional quota licenses whereas there is no such cost when it comes to consuming additional tariff revenue thus quotas and tariffs are non equivalent we provide a simple sufficient condition under which cooperative elimination of rent seeking under quotas is easier than cooperative elimination of revenue seeking under tariffs and therefore a quota is the preferred policy whenever the policy admits cooperation

efficiency properties of large dynamic markets this paper considers an infinitely repeated cournot market with discounting it studies the asymptotic properties of stationary perfect equilibria in such a market when the demand and production sectors are replicated indefinitely specifically the paper establishes 1 necessary and sufficient conditions for the approximate competitiveness and efficiency of stationary perfect equilibria 2 necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of excessive competition and for the presence of limited competition at some stationary perfect equilibria and 3 conditions for approximately competitive stationary perfect equilibria to be approximately efficient the analysis focuses on the case where the market discount factor is close to unity copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

solving the price puzzle with an alternative indicator of monetary policy we identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables in vars using the divisia m4 measure of money as the policy indicator variable we obtain theoretically sensible responses whether or not a commodity price index is included thus we eliminate the well known empirical puzzles from the var by a novel choice in a policy variable rather than the usual attachment of an ad hoc variable

a new methodology linking concentration dynamics to current and steady state profits examining korean industrial policy during take off abstract we model the dynamics of industrial structure and market power using korean manufacturing data during the take off period 1978 82 structure conduct performance scp methodologies have been criticized for using accounting data and because a few superior firms may have greater shares and greater profits both are argued to present possible spurious correlations between concentration and profits this paper follows earlier work which shows that market structure responds to observed accounting profits as if these were accurate indices of real profits and not as if leading firms are perceived to have unmatchable advantages the methodological contribution of this model is a new latent variable for steady state profits derived from the speed of structural adjustment long run profits are identified by the hypothesis that structural adjustment will be more rapid when industries are farther from steady state levels we analyze the long run profits latent variable finding strong support for this hypothesis the speed of adjustment is greater for positive and negative deviations from steady state structure we show that the profits and structural adjustment relationship is non monotone the scp criticisms above are based on spurious correlations which are monotone in profits and structure positing spurious correlations which are at the same time monotone in structure and non monotone in structural adjustment seems less plausible than accepting the scp results which are consistent with both our analysis also is new in that it is the first direct econometric analysis of korean industrial policy during its take off years we note that in korea unlike elsewhere industrial policy was hypothesized to lead to concentration and market power in the popular press and by professional economists ours is the first direct econometric analysis of this hypothesis and we find it supported

the political economy of the european customs classification customs classification is an important element in a country s trade policy how a good is classified can affect the rate of duty that applies the coverage of non tariff barriers and the formulation and application of rules of origin reclassifications can occur because of the introduction of a new product but also because of protectionist motives this paper is the first attempt at explaining these reclassifications focusing on the european union i examine whether the number of tariff lines in an industry result from the introduction of new products or from protectionist lobbying the analysis focuses on 90 manufacturing industries over 12 years results suggest that protectionist lobbying does play a role in explaining changes in the eu s customs classification

is there a free rider problem in lobbying endogenous tariffs trigger strategies and the number of firms there are two reasons we expect moreconcentrated industries to have advantages over less concentrated industries in playing the lobbying game one is that in a noncooperative setting as the number firms rises we expect the free rider problem to become worse this is the finding of rodrik 1986 the second is that we expect that the ability to maintain a cooperative outcome deteriorates as the number of firms in the industry rises the classic reference is mancur olson 1965 also see russell hardin 1982 and todd sandler 1992 among others in contrast with the second intuition this paper shows that there is no general presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of firms in the industry rises the ability of an industry to overcome the free rider problem is analyzed in a re peated tariff lobbying game where cooperation may be maintained through the use of a simple trigger strategy 2 the difficulty of maintaining cooperation is measured by the critical value of the discount parameter all values above this critical value are consistent with cooperation and all values below the critical value imply that cheating will prevent maintenance of the cooperative outcome there is no presumption that this critical value rises with the number of firms a separate but related question involves asymptotic results standard intuition suggests that as industry structure approaches perfect competition it becomes impossible to maintain cooperation in the context of this paper this intuition corresponds to the critical value of the discount factor converging to i as the number of firms increases to infinity in the general case it is shown that the critical value of the discount parameter converges to a value less than 1 in the limit as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large if the actual discount parameter lies above this value then cooperation may be maintained even with an infinite number of firms though the framework here is quite simple it provides results which contrast sharply to our standard intuition about how industry structure affects the ability to maintain cooperation there are two ways to interpret the results of this paper one is to assert that standard intuition is wrong and that there is in fact no presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number

dynamic collusion in an open economy abstract this paper provides an example of how opening a country to trade may decrease competition in an industry this result counter to conventional theory occurs when one considers multi period games

statistical distributions and the identification of currency crises abstract we use extreme value theory to identify periods of currency crisis for a broad cross section of asian european and latin american countries we argue that our methodology improves upon the more conventional methodology for defining currency crises because fewer parametric assumptions need to be satisfied we compare the incidence of currency crises using the conventional method with the incidence obtained using our method we conclude that identifying currency crises using extreme value theory is a good alternative to the conventional method

consumer theory and the demand for money the following sections are included introductionthe definition of moneythe microeconomic theory of a monetary economythe aggregation theoretic approach to money demandindex number theorythe links between aggregation theory index number theory and monetary theoryunderstanding the new divisia aggregatesthe optimal level of monetary subaggregationeconometric considerationsapproximating the monetary services subutility functionan exampleempirical dimensionsempirical comparisons of index numbersempirical results for the demand system approachextensionsconclusions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

point process models for extreme returns harnessing implied volatility forecasting the risk of extreme losses is an important issue in the management of financial risk there has been a great deal of research examining how option implied volatilities iv can be used to forecast asset return volatility however the role of iv in the context of predicting extreme risk has received relatively little attention the potential benefit of iv in forecasting extreme risk is considered within a range of models beginning with the traditional garch based approach along with a number of novel point process models univariate models where iv is included as an exogenous variable are considered along with a novel bivariate approach where extreme movements in iv are treated as another point process it is found that in the context of forecasting value at risk the bivariate models produce the most accurate forecasts across a wide range of scenarios

how relevant is volatility forecasting for financial risk management it depends if volatility fluctuates in a forecastable way volatility forecasts are useful for risk management hence the interest in volatility forecastability in the risk management literature volatility forecastability however varies with horizon and different horizons are relevant in different applications moreover existing assessments of volatility forecastability are plagued by the fact that they are joint assessments of volatility forecastability and an assumed model and the results can vary not only with the horizon but also with the assumed model to address this problem we develop a model free procedure for assessing volatility forecastability across horizons perhaps surprisingly we find that volatility forecastability decays quickly with horizon volatility forecastability although clearly of relevance for risk management at the short horizons relevant for say trading desk management may be much less important at longer horizons

constitutional prohibitions in a rent seeking model i extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying fora constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers i examinetwo issues 1 the ability of special interests withsignificant political capacity to block constitutional change and 2 the effect of adding a constitutional stage on totallobbying expenditures defeating a prohibition on wealthtransfers is a public good for rent seekers success inconstitutional politics merely allows them to lobby for wealthtransfers the resulting collective action problem for rentseekers in constitutional politics offsets the generalinterest s free rider problems reducing the probability oftransfers and expected total lobbying expenditures compared tothe traditional rent seeking contest introduction of aconstitutional stage also reverses several comparative staticsresults from the rent seeking game an increase in the numberof rent seekers or the general interest s consumers abilityto organize increase lobbying in the rent seeking game butgenerally reduce expected lobbying in the constitutionalprohibition game

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

endogenous trade policy and lobby formation an application to the free rider problem abstract this paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous by introducing bargaining between the industry and the government the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature applied to the free rider problem the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult