tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

models of health plan choice this paper considers alternative approaches to accounting for consumer heterogeneity in econometric models of health plan choice in particular we compare and contrast approaches used by health economists and marketing researchers to explicitly allow for consumer heterogeneity in assessment of plan provider quality and characteristics as a result we are able to identify conditions under which approaches utilized by health economists are preferred over those utilized by marketing researchers and vice versa for example we find that in the absence of data on prior year choice which is often the case of models estimated in the health economics literature it would be valuable to estimate random coefficient models which have not been estimated in such works and in the presence of data on prior year choice which is often the case of models estimated in the marketing literature a model wherein consumer characteristics simply interact with plan specific constants and premium and which has not been estimated in that literature offers better fits than random coefficient semi parametric random coefficient and latent class models which have been previously estimated in that literature the model offers important managerial insights useful for targeting benefits of various plans to different customer segments

endogenous price leadership with an essential input abstract the hamilton slutsky endogenous timing methodology is applied to differentiated duopolies where motivated by access pricing literature one firm owns an essential input sold wholesale to the rival both firms then set retail prices for their differentiated goods the scenario and results are different from standard endogenous timing duopolies encompassing three prices one wholesale two retail rather than two with unique timing game equilibrium which always entails retail price leadership by the input owner thus providing a new and powerful rationalisation for stackelberg the results call into question the generic access pricing assumption that simultaneous moves determine retail downstream prices

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

on the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy decisions this paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make or buy decisions because of strategic downstream considerations entrants may always undertake efficient make or buy decisions regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers

endogenous role in mixed markets a two production period model in this paper i investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly where private and state owned public firms compete by allowing two production periods i find that many equilibria exist including the cournot type equilibrium and one stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower however another stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist if small inventory costs are introduced the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower

a framework for investigating habits the hand of the past and heterogeneity in dynamic brand choice in this paper we develop a general class of dynamic brand choice models called lightning bolt lb models which are consistent with the theory of random utility maximization of consumer choice behavior the underlying random utility process is markov and the inter temporal evolution of the utility maximizing brand choice process is also markov the models permit parsimonious parameterizations of the random utility process in brand choices with the resulting switching probabilities being functionally related to explanatory variables the model allows for structural state dependence feedback habit persistence inertia and unobserved heterogeneity the theoretical development shows that several well known stochastic brand choice models can be deduced from random utility maximization theory from a managerial perspective the usefulness of the proposed model stems from its ability to separate out the effects of habits state dependence and heterogeneity strong state dependence effects imply incentives for inducing trial of a brand e g product sampling in contrast with state dependence a strong habit persistence effect may be indicative of buyer behavior where inducement of trial of a different brand may not be sufficient to maintain a sustained defection of the consumer from the habitually purchased brand to the trial brand failure to distinguish between these two effects has important implications for example a model that only accounts for state dependence effects would in the presence of only habit persistence incorrectly attribute it to state dependence based on this the manager could decide to embark on an expensive sampling program that might prove ineffective due to the absence of state dependence it is also important to distinguish between the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in the absence of true state dependence failing to account for unobservable variations across households such as differences in price sensitivities results in the temporally persistent unobservable elements showing up as state dependence in the model hence a manager may incorrectly opt for sampling as the appropriate marketing action whereas a couponing or price promotion strategy should have been preferred we estimate the model parameters using the ac nielsen household scanner panel data set on catsup purchases further we investigate empirical techniques for overcoming the initial conditions problem that affects many dynamic models of brand choice through simulation analysis using the estimated parameters we show that the calculated profitability of a promotion must take into account the multi period impact due to state dependence further we demonstrate how ignoring heterogeneity can result in spurious state dependence thereby making marketing tactics such as product sampling appear far more attractive than they actually are specifically the model that accounts only for habit persistence and state dependence effects predicts a share increase of 2 4 points through sampling for one of the brands in the empirical analysis once the effects of unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for however this number drops precipitously to 0 3 while even this low number might fulfill the objectives of the brand manager it ensures that expectations are not eight times that number it is important to note that this paper is a first attempt at analyzing the three fundamental dimensions of dynamic brand choice behavior our formulation represents a reduced form approach as opposed to a structural approach other limitations of the model include our focus on time invariant choice sets extensions of the model to situations where choice sets vary over time are possible but are difficult another limitation is the dependence on multivariate extreme value distributions an alternative would be to use multivariate normal distributions i e a probit like structure which has certain useful properties a comparison of the two approaches would be useful empirical extensions of the model to allow for higher order processes and nested logit type model structures could also be fruitful explicitly incorporating variety seeking behavior in the model would further enrich the theoretical framework proposed in this paper

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

vertical integration as a source of hold up while vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold up problem this article highlights instead that it can generate hold up problems for rivals we consider a successive duopoly where downstream firms invest and then secure support from an upstream supplier we first show that vertical integration generates ex ante incentives to create hold up problems an integrated supplier is willing to pre commit itself to appropriating or dissipating part of its customer s profits to expose the independent rival to being held up by the other supplier and discourage in this way the rival s investment we then show that even in the absence of any pre commitment vertical integration also creates hold up problems ex post when degrading the quality of the support provided to one downstream firm benefits its rival we also provide illustrations in terms of standard industrial organization models and of antitrust cases and discuss the robustness of the insights

accounting for heterogeneity and nonstationarity in a cross sectional model of consumer purchase behavior when calibrating a brand choice model cross sectionally a measure of brand loyalty is often introduced into the utility function to account for differences in utility across households and over time one of the most widely used measures of brand loyalty proposed by guadagni and little 1983 is an exponential smoothing model of past choice behavior by the household in this study we argue that the exponential smoothing model of brand loyalty cannot properly distinguish between sources of variation in utility due to heterogeneity across households and sources of variation due to nonstationarity within household over time we introduce a new measure of brand loyalty derived from a nonstationary dirichlet multinomial choice model in which heterogeneity and nonstationarity are handled distinctly

sanctions and civil conflict using a formal general equilibrium framework this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict it is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries moreover sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance the likelihood of success rises as this income increases

pricing and quality decisions and financial incentives for sustainable product design with recycled material content under price leadership abstract design for recycling has been promoted by companies and governments around the world as one of the most important practices for achieving sustainability the success or failure of such a practice however depends heavily on the financial incentives for firms to design products with more recycled or recyclable material contents an interesting phenomenon that can be observed in many markets with products made predominately from either virgin or recycled materials is the existence of price leadership in this paper we utilize an interdisciplinary approach with both theoretical and empirical analyses to study the pricing and design decisions for products with virgin and recycled material contents in a duopoly market consisting of both the environmentally conscious green and non environmentally conscious brown consumers under price leadership our analytical results show that the brown segment s efficient quality provides an anchor product position for the price leader regardless of whether the price leader is a brown or green firm the price follower s financial incentive for becoming a green or brown firm will then lead to different cases of price leadership with very different environmental consequences specifically the arrangement where the brown and green firms are the price leader and follower respectively leads to more environmentally friendly design decisions than those under the other arrangement where the duopolists switch their pricing roles in addition we conduct an empirical analysis to explore the specific types of price leadership in the markets of aluminum cardboards and pet based on the equilibrium pricing and quality decisions we analyze the financial incentives for the more environmentally friendly case of price leadership to be realized and derive important insights to formulating strategies and policies to implement the practice of design for recycling from the interdisciplinary perspective

modeling a household s choice among food store types a household s choice among the different types of food stores to patronize depends on characteristics of both the stores and the household store characteristics include prices and promotional deals two types of household characteristics are important the household s specific purchase history and demographics this study proposes a new multinomial logit model to account for these choice determinants in an empirical application to fluid milk we find that store characteristics and both household demographics and purchase history are significant determinants of a household s store type choices and must all be included in a choice model copyright 2012 oxford university press

the timing of a rate request by a regulated firm the rate of return review is an integral part of the relationship between a regulated firm and its regulatory agency traditionally the agency has been portrayed as the aggressor demanding a rate review whenever the firm s earned rate of return exceeded the agency s authorized rate of return 2 13 15 although this approach has been widely criticized 7 12 9 11 evans and garber 8 argue that its primary advantage is in the tractability of the regulatory constraint alternative methodologies have been suggested but none has received general acclaim although baily and coleman 3 and bawa and sibley 4 have refined the role of the regulatory agency by modeling the enforcement of the rate of return constraint in a probabilistic sense the agency is still responsible for initiating rate review and the firm is still assumed to maximize expected profits subject to a rate of return constraint although the rate of return constraint has been diluted the roles of the agency and the firm are unchanged in a seminal article joskow 10 questioned whether the regulatory agency was the aggressor in the rate review process he argued that the firm initiates the process triggering a review to raise the level or change the structure of their rates further he suggests that the regulatory agency is concerned with price and not profit or rate of return data throughout the 1970s and 1980s supports joskow s argument that the firm is the aggressor in the rate review process further evidence in support of joskow s hypothesis is provided by burness montgomery and quirk 5 in a study of the electric power industry s acquisition of capital to explain industry actions they contrasted the predictive power of the averch johnson type model to that of a joskow type model and found joskow s model to be a better predictor of industry behavior if it is the firm that initiates the review process what causes the firm to set the process in motion again joskow 10 argued that the firm would file for rate review to keep earned rates

cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games abstract we reconsider the cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by milgrom and shannon we generalize novshek s existence result derive the associated uniqueness result give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry and provide conditions making a cournot oligopoly into a log supermodular game with the natural order on the action sets we also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best responses are widely regarded as being typical for the cournot model with production costs several illustrative examples are provided journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 l10 l13

stackelberg versus cournot oligopoly equilibrium abstract we compare an m firm cournot model with a hierarchical stackelberg model where m firms choose outputs sequentially the stackelberg equilibrium price is lower so output and total surplus are higher total profits are lower while the first mover in a stackelberg duopoly earns more than a cournot duopolist this is not necessarily true for m 2 we find a surprisingly simple relation which determines whether cournot profit exceeds the stackelberg leader s finally we consider a game with firms choosing whether to reveal their outputs which includes stackelberg and cournot as possible outcomes the equilibrium is stackelberg

stackelberg and marshall this paper advocates a generalized n firm stackelberg model as a plausible testable alternative description of oligopoly a pure strategy equilibrium must exist for this model the main result is that efficiency obtains in the limit as the scale of each firm is shrunk relative to demand this is demonstrated for the case of u shaped average cost and also for that of natural monopoly copyright 1990 by american economic association

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

endogenous price leadership and the strategic acquisition of information we model a differentiated bertrand duopoly in which a firm s earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading in such a setting with second mover advantage we then study the firms incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game both i neither firm acquiring information and ii one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome even if information is free information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition

the effects of cross ruff coupons on sales and profits cross ruff coupons are obtained at the time of purchase of a carrier brand and may be redeemed at a later date on a target brand these coupons therefore have the ability to link consumer purchases across different brands as well as shopping trips we model the effects of cross ruff coupons on consumer choice behavior and derive the conditions under which cross ruff coupons can lead to higher sales and profits than other types of package coupons the model also provides insights into the selection of appropriate carrier and target brands and on how the choice of an appropriate carrier or a target brand is affected when the categories that these brands belong to are demand complements or substitutes we conduct an empirical analysis using data from 195 different cross ruff coupon campaigns observed in grocery stores in a major u s city over a three month period the data are consistent with the key insights provided by the model

on the competitive effects of vertical integration by a research laboratory abstract an independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry that produces differentiated goods we analyze whether the laboratory prefers to license the innovation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry licensing the innovation as an internal patentee under linear demand and cournot competition we show first that the vertical merger is profitable only in the case of small innovations whereas a merger increases welfare only for significant innovations second all profitable vertical mergers reduce welfare however some profitable mergers are welfare improving under price competition

modeling multiple sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit models methodological and managerial issues we offer a framework to specify and estimate various sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit brand choice models we let each brand specific intercept and each parameter of the explanatory variable vector vary randomly across households in addition we distinguish loyal households from the rest our results suggest that incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity improves the model fit and suggests higher impact of marketing mix elements on brand choice we highlight the importance of incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity the model we implement yields valuable managerial insights

a model of brand choice and purchase quantity price sensitivities many consumer decisions involve a discrete choice and a continuous outcome examples of such decisions are whether to own a home or rent one and how much to spend which brand of orange juice to buy and how many ounces to buy in cases like these the choice decision is typically modeled separately say using a logit model and the continuous outcomes modeled separately using regression analysis however the continuous outcomes may not be independent of the discrete choice and vice versa and modeling the two decisions independently can lead to inefficient choice parameter estimates and biased and inconsistent regression parameter estimates in this paper we present a methodology from the limited dependent variable literature to model the dependence between the choice and quantity decisions our substantive interest is in the role of price in the choice and quantity decisions when choosing among alternatives we argue that consumers consider prices of all the competitive brands in the quantity decision on the other hand only the price of the chosen alternative is expected to impact how much of the alternative is purchased the analysis of three brands using disaggregate level panel data strongly supports our hypothesis about the role of competitive prices in the choice and quantity decisions

environmental taxes and first mover advantages this paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies to analyze this question i assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously when taxes are set sequentially an effect denoted as the sequential setting effect arises that raises the equilibrium taxes i show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners when this overspill is low enough taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting however the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower in this case governments set taxes sequentially when the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously in this case each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game abstract it is shown that competitive equilibrium can be seen as the limit of some hierarchical game in which the rights or information of the players can be strictly ordered

modeling heterogeneity and state dependence in consumer choice behavior in frequently purchased consumer goods markets consumer brand choices exhibit substantial persistence across purchase occasions in this article i estimate a choice model that admits of both heterogeneity in preferences and true state dependence as sources of this persistence using nielsen scanner data on ketchup i find evidence for true state dependence in the choice process even after controlling for a rich heterogeneity structure simulation of the model indicates that the long term effect of a promotion induced purchase on future purchase probabilities is positive but small

cost of delay and endogenous price leadership abstract we study the effects of discounting in a standard endogenous price leadership model we show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the leader with any cost of delay or discounting however small by analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes firms with shorter reaction times will be more likely to become the price leader as will firms with lower cost of delay if the firms reaction times are similar

products with branded components an approach for premium pricing and partner selection an increasing number of products are being sold with components that themselves are brand names examples are personal computers with intel microprocessors and diet soft drinks that use the nutrasweet formulation branded components may alter consumers valuation of the bundle necessitating changes in the ways firms identify and price such bundled products surprisingly the existing marketing literature is silent on this issue the purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical approach that helps marketers of products with branded components make optimal pricing and partner selection decisions our managerial objectives are twofold a to the seller of the bundled product we suggest the optimal bundled product offering optimal selling prices of alternative products revenues and profits and b to the branded component manufacturers we indicate the most favorable alliance partners and payoff gains losses of aligning with other branded components instead of unbranded alternatives our analytical approach is also likely to be helpful to academics researching bundling and ingredient branding issues the specific problem modeled assumes the bundled product has two components that are consumed jointly furthermore each component can be either a brand name or unbranded in this model the consumer has no control over the choice of the components in the bundle the seller decides what form of bundle components i e branded or unbranded to offer we assume that the product that is marketed eventually enjoys a monopoly drawing from research in signaling and brand alliance we posit each branded component may either enrich or suppress the value of the partnering component in the bundle as perceived by the consumers our approach has three methodological stages first we build an individual level model to assess the valuation of alternative products and their principal components at the level of a randomly drawn consumer to do so we rely primarily on the theory of reservation prices and weber s theory on price value changes second we aggregate such valuation across consumers to assess the market s overall valuation for this purpose we invoke parametric distributions based on integral transform theory third we develop payoff functions based on market valuation of alternative products and supply side costs the managerial objectives are met based on results from this stage our approach was successfully applied to the context of a university bookstore that intends to sell windows based laptop computers the two principal components of the laptop computer bundle are the microprocessor chip and the personal computer platform on which the chip is implanted the seller may choose either compaq with intel inside or a simpler bundle featuring one of these with an unbranded complementary component or an entirely unbranded bundle we used data collected from 192 potential consumers via a survey included in the survey were measures of consumers perceptions of functional aspects of the components and their reservation prices for alternative bundled products the approach identified the most profitable bundle for the seller and its optimal price it also provided estimates of the revenue impact of the gain or loss for each branded component by partnering the other branded component instead of the unbranded alternative as such the model facilitates the determination of the optimal price price premium and profits for products with branded components as well as the identification of the ideal partner for each branded component manufacturer it is apt to caution that products with branded components need not always lead to price premiums or lead to win win outcomes reasons such as incongruity between the branded components or domination of one of the components over the other may drive potential consumers away thus hurting profits implications of the results to negotiate component prices are discussed in the paper the study limitations and directions for future research are also presented

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly abstract endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing for choosing their quantities the results are strikingly different from those obtained in a corresponding oligopoly with all profit maximizing firms

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

on the nash bargaining solution with noise abstract suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus as in the nash demand game or remain silent and wait until the surplus was observed adding the strategy to wait results in two strict equilibria in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus provided uncertainty is small if commitments concern only who makes the first offer the more balanced nash bargaining solution is approximately restored in all cases commitment occurs in equilibrium despite the risk of breakdown of negotiations

combining the endogenous choice of price quantity and timing abstract this paper builds a theory of endogenous role distribution leader follower and nash player and of endogenous choice for the type of competition strategy price and quantity in a product differentiated duopoly model we examine an extended game by adding a pre play stage in which duopoly firms simultaneously decide whether to select a price contract or a quantity contract and also whether to move in the first period or in the second period before market competition we demonstrate that the unique equilibrium outcome is simultaneous quantity competition if the goods are substitutes and simultaneous price competition if the goods are complements

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

public utility regulators are only human a positive theory of rational constraints positive models of public utility regulation should capture personal incentives of regulators a regulatory objective function is specified by appea l to standard human concerns coupled with politics and processes pecu liar to public utility regulation constraints a rational regulator w ould impose on the firm are thereby derived and connections between regulatory objectives and regulatory rules illuminated results inclu de theoretical rationales for rate of return regulation in a worl d of certainty and a largely neglected type of rate of return re gulation under symmetric uncertainty other forms of regulation sho uld also be explicable in terms of personal motives of human regulato rs copyright 1988 by american economic association

regulation in the european community all governments regulate economic activity in their own countries the single european market will involve a significant transfer of regulatory activity from member states to the european community as well as the initiation of regulatory activity in certain areas that have not previously been subject to regulation at all including the activities of member states themselves as in taxation or the provision of subsidies to industry why should governments wish to make such a transfer of powers what do they have to gain

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

modeling loss aversion and reference dependence effects on brand choice based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory s value function tversky and kahneman 1991 we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains loss aversion we sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice we develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference dependent choice model calibrating it using scanner data in addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model the model s coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion as hypothesized we also discuss the implications of a reference dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics and examine other implications for competitive strategy

endogenous stackelberg leadership abstract we consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so to that end we study a two stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2 we show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten 1988 allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous stackelberg leader journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

patents licensing and market structure in the chemical industry abstract the strategies of rent appropriation and industry structure are inter dependent how firms use patents depends upon industry structure and in turn affects industry structure in the 19th century market leaders in the chemical industry combined patents and secrecy to deter entry within cartels patents were used to stabilize cartels and organize technology licensing the role of patents changed in the less concentrated post world war ii markets in bulk organic chemicals and petrochemicals chemical producers use licensing as an important means of generating revenue from process innovations the increased importance of technology licensing is closely related to the emergence of a class of specialized process design and engineering firms that have played an important role in the development and diffusion of process innovations

stackelberg versus cournot a differential game approach abstract we propose an infinite horizon differential oligopoly game where at each point in time m stackelberg leaders and n m stackelberg followers exploit a common pool renewable resource and sell their harvest in the marketplace at a price that depends on total harvest we derive a feedback generalized stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium a generalization of the feedback stackelberg equilibrium nesting feedback stackelberg and feedback cournot as special cases we proceed with a comparison between the feedback stackelberg and the feedback cournot equilibria and find a number of interesting results in contrast with static oligopoly theory as to the relative efficiency of the two equilibria we show that the cournot equilibrium can be more efficient than the stackelberg equilibrium this holds true in the short run at the steady state and in terms of discounted welfare

endogenous timing in strategic environmental policymaking in this paper we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two country model of strategic environmental policy we consider a timing game in which two policymakers non cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates we show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages when the damages are insignificant the tax rates are strategic substitutes and the simultaneous move policymaking emerges in equilibrium in contrast when the damages are significant the tax rates are strategic complements and sequential move policymaking emerges we also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries when the differences are large the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader in the case where multiple equilibrium emerges the risk dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads

endogenous sequencing of firm decisions abstract when firms are symmetrically informed a stackelberg leader prefers to be leader rather than a cournot duopolist however when the leader has superior information about demand the leader may earn lower ex ante profits than it would earn if it was choosing quantities simultaneously with the follower in this paper i give the firm with superior information the option of delaying its quantity decision until the decision period of the less informed firm so that decisions are made simultaneously surprisingly in the unique stable outcome the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

von stackelberg and cournot duopoly choosing roles under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von stackelberg duopoly model a key determinant is the slope of the firms reaction function in either price or quantity space the duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward sloping reaction functions each will prefer to be the leader they will also disagree if they have upward sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions each will prefer that the other be the leader preferences between von stackelberg and cournot outcomes are also considered

parameter bias from unobserved effects in the multinomial logit model of consumer choice abstract over the past two decades validation of choice models has focused on predictive validity rather than parameter bias in real world validation of choice models true parameter values are unknown so examination of parameter bias is not possible in contrast the main focus of this study is parameter bias in simulated scanner panel choice data with known parameter values study of parameter bias enables the assessment of a fundamental issue not addressed in the choice modeling literature the extent to which the logit choice model is capable of distinguishing unobserved effects that give rise to persistence in observed choices e g heterogeneity and state dependence although econometric theory provides some information about the causes of bias the extent of such bias in typical scanner data applications remains unclear the authors present an extensive simulation study that provides information on the extent of bias resulting from the misspecification of four unobserved effects that receive fr

the 1 5th mover advantage there has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games however one assumption usually goes unquestioned namely that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover in many cases this is not realistic since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree partial commitments an example is the announcements of price changes i analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized in the case of strategic complements a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly she chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover which gives her a 1 5th mover advantage

access to bottleneck inputs under oligopoly a prisoners dilemma we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market first two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept if any second firms compete on salop s circle the firms may be asymmetrically located on the circle to reflect differences in consumer shares for some levels of asymmetry the incumbents face a prisoners dilemma with respect to conceding access to their bottleneck inputs entry by a downstream firm may lead to lower retail prices however entry may also lead to higher retail prices for the access provider and for the entrant we also consider the cases where there are several incumbents and where the entrant makes the access price offers

leadership games with convex strategy sets a basic model of commitment is to convert a two player game in strategic form to a leadership game with the same payoffs where one player the leader commits to a strategy to which the second player always chooses a best reply this paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets we apply them to mixed extensions of finite games which we analyze completely including nongeneric games the main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that as a set the leader s payoffs in equilibrium are at least as high as his nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game we also consider leadership games with three or more players where most conclusions no longer hold

simultaneous vs sequential price competition with incomplete information abstract we compare equilibria with sequential and simultaneous moves under homogeneous good bertrand competition when unit costs are private information under an alternative interpretation we examine the consequences of awarding a right of first refusal in a first price procurement auction with endogenous quantity

oligopoly games and the cournot bertrand model a survey traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable output cournot or price bertrand alternatively a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price also known as the cournot bertrand model when the choice of strategic variable is endogenous the established dominant strategy is output competition a growing body of work demonstrates however that the cournot bertrand outcome can be a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries observations of real world markets consistent with cournot bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications we lay out the roots of the cournot bertrand model and explore a number of model developments we categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions in particular some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous altogether this research identifies when cournot bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions we also review the cournot bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics industrial organization labor and public economics we expect the literature to continue to expand in the future

when do changes in consumer preferences make forecasts from choice based conjoint models unreliable forecasting the sales or market share of new products is a major challenge as there is little or no sales history with which to estimate levels and trends choice based conjoint cbc is one of the most common approaches used to forecast new products sales however the accuracy of forecasts based on cbc models may be reduced when consumers preferences for the attributes of products are labile despite this there is a lack of research on the extent to which lability can impair accuracy when the coefficients estimated in cbc models are assumed to be constant over time this paper aims to address this research gap by investigating the prevalence of lability for consumer durable products and its potential impact on the accuracy of forecasts there are reasons to expect that lability may be particularly evident where a product is subject to rapid technological change and has a short product life cycle we carried out a longitudinal survey of the preferences of 161 potential consumers relating to four different types of products we established that for both functional and innovative products i the cbc models vary significantly over time indicating changes in consumer preferences and ii such changes may cause large differences in forecasts of the probabilities that consumers will purchase particular brands of products hence employing models where coefficients do not change over time can potentially lead to inaccurate market share forecasts for high tech short life cycle products that are launched even a short time after the choice based modelling has been conducted

a nonparametric density estimation method for brand choice using scanner data nonparametric density estimation using a kernel method is proposed to model consumer brand choice recent availability of large scanner panel data allows the use of nonparametric approach which has few or at least fewer underlying assumptions and affords greater structural flexibility by removing as many assumptions as possible the author constructs the ultimate nonparametric model radically departing from the traditional approaches to highlight the differences in implementation and performance the proposed model does not involve either parameters that approximate certain distributions as in stochastic models or latent concepts such as utility as in utility maximization models the performance criteria include prediction of market response and brand choice share tracking and robustness under violation of various assumptions involved in parametric choice models such as correlated disturbance and misspecification the method is compared with a popular parametric counterpart the multinomial logit model on simulated and actual scanner panel data the paper emphasizes the conceptual importance of the nonparametric approach by discussing its advantages limitations and its complementary role in developing refining and diagnosing parametric models this perspective affords insight to modeling philosophy and suggests the possibility of a hybrid approach

incentives for input foreclosure we analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in contrast to the extant literature our model allows for upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs as the integrated firm decides on the degree of foreclosure through the scale of its continued participation in a merchant market the model can be applied also to cases where the foreclosed input is not essential as well as to cases where foreclosure is not complete we find that incentives to foreclose are much lower than in existing models with upstream cournot competition if there is also cournot competition downstream there will never be complete foreclosure in the case of linear demand potentially more important for practical purposes is our criticism of some explicit assertions made in the european commission s 2007 non horizontal merger guidelines we find that pre merger margins on the up and downstream markets are not necessarily good predictors of the incentives for subsequent i e post merger foreclosure

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

stackelberg leadership as a natural solution under cost uncertainty this paper analyzes a differentiated duopoly model with cost uncertainty in an environment where information sharing is prohibited the duopolists can commit themselves to be a stackelberg leader or follower at the time when they know the distribution but not the actual values of their own and the rival s costs in a natural stackelberg situation the firms agree on the assignment of roles and neither prefers the bayesian nash equilibrium an natural stackelberg situation is shown to be possible under quantity but not price competition total expected welfare is higher in the natural stackelberg situation than in the nash equilibrium copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games this paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game as they arise in sequential play with the nash payoff in simultaneous play if the game is symmetric has a unique symmetric nash equilibrium and players payoffs are monotonic in the opponent s choice along their own best reply function then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff or even lower than in the simultaneous game this gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing

backward induction algorithm for a class of closed loop stackelberg games abstract in the paper a new deterministic continuum strategy two player discrete time dynamic stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed loop information structure the considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource where one player called leader is a superior authority choosing strategy first and another player called follower chooses after in case of convex payoff functions and certain parameter values we give a new particular backward induction algorithm which can be easily realized to find a leader follower equilibrium of the game in a certain sequential equilibrium realization from the last step towards the first one with respect to the current strategy choices of the players considerations on uniqueness and game regulation i e setting parameters of the game to achieve a predefined equilibrium are also provided the finite version of the game with finite strategy sets is also given along with its simplification and solution method several practical examples are shown to illustrate the comprehensive application possibilities of the results

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the asymmetric information model of state dependence marketing researchers and practitioners are interested in consumer loyalty because of its managerial consequences previous empirical studies find that consumers are loyal not only to a brand but also to a firm umbrella brand that is even when firms offer new products consumers tend to continue to purchase from the same firm this repeat purchase behavior might result from state dependence or from heterogeneity the meaning of state dependence is that the current choice behaviorally depends on the previous one the traditional model of state dependence assumes that the previous choice affects the current utility this study suggests another source of state dependence the previous choice affects the current information set specifically the model assumes that the consumer a knows the attributes of the new product offered by the firm from which he she purchased in the previous period b is uncertain about the attributes of the new products offered by the other firms c can obtain full information about the attributes of all the products through a costly search and d if the consumer decides not to search he she purchases the new product offered by the firm from which he she purchases in the previous period it is shown that state dependence can result either from the effect of previous choices on the current utility or from its effect on the current information set this theoretical result raises the following question what kind of data does a researcher need in order to distinguish between the two sources of state dependence this study shows that the two sources can be distinguished with a standard panel data set in other words although the new source of state dependence is based on the search activity of consumers there is an identifying factor that enables a researcher to detect such activity even without direct data on search the empirical distinction is possible because the behavioral implications of the two sources of state dependence are different they differ in the effect of product attributes on the repeat purchase probability the following example partially illustrates this result there are two firms a and b the consumer purchased a product from firm a in period t 1 the only product attribute is x and the utility is a linear function of x one aspect of our findings is that in the traditional model of state dependence a change in both x a and x b that leaves the difference between them x a x b unchanged neutral change hereinafter has no effect on the repeat purchase probability however such a change does affect the repeat purchase probability in the asymmetric information model of state dependence this is only one aspect of the finding the implications of the models differ in a more general fashion the intuition of this result is the following a neutral change has no effect on the repeat purchase probability in the traditional model of state dependence because it does not affect the difference between the utilities from both alternatives in the asymmetric model of state dependence the consumer s decision process consists of two stages first he decides whether to search for information about the other alternative or not then if he searches for information he chooses the alternative that maximizes his utility in the second stage a neutral change has no effect on choices since such a change does not affect the difference between the utilities from the two alternatives in the first stage the consumer knows x a but does not know x b it turns out that in this stage a neutral change does affect the search decision when for example both x s decrease and the utility is a positive function of x the probability of search increases and thus the repeat purchase probability decreases the proposed source of state dependence is examined using structural estimation and panel data on television viewing choices in the united states controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity it is found that the suggested source is more important in creating repeat purchase than the traditional one for most of the population 71 this indicates that what was considered by previous studies to result from the dependence of consumer utility on their previous choices is at least partially due to the effect of the previous choices on consumers information set the distinction between the two sources of repeat purchase is important because ignoring the informational explanation may lead to incorrect theoretical and empirical conclusions for example price discounts to induce trial are more important for consumers whose utility depends on previous choices while advertising is more effective for those whose information set depends on previous choices

being a leader or a follower this paper deals with the analysis of conflicts in duopoly situations in particular with the distribution of roles in the von stackelberg framework which firm will be the leader which firm the follower under what circumstances will firms find a mutually advantageous distribution of roles will they fight for leadership or followship in von stackelberg s analysis of duopoly either firms do not choose their respective roles or they fight for leadership this situation is due to the particular strategy space namely the quantity to produce of an homogeneous good we extend here the strategy space to price quantity pairs we show that if costs are identical or similar then both firms will prefer the role of follower if there is a significant cost differential between the firms then the non cooperative equilibrium can only be of two types either the less efficient firm will act as the leader selling a limited quantity at a low price and the more efficient firm as the follower selling to the residual demand at a higher price or the more efficient firm acting as leader will drive the less efficient firm out of the market by adopting a limit pricing strategy but in so doing that firm makes less profits than if it acts as follower we suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that firms in a duopoly framework will tend to coordinate on their mutually advantageous role distribution even if they compete in a non cooperative strategic way in terms of both prices and quantities

upstream competition between vertically integrated firms we propose a model of two tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms we show that even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input the bertrand logic may collapse and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient we discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market

investigating heterogeneity in brand preferences in logit models for panel data in analyzing panel data the issue of heterogeneity across households is an important consideration if heterogeneity is present but is ignored in the analysis it will result in biased and inconsi

removing heterogeneity bias from logit model estimation this paper introduces a new estimation procedure for the logit model that is an extension of a conditional estimation procedure developed by chamberlain chamberlain g 1978 on the use of panel data working paper harvard university 1 52 chamberlain g 1980 analysis of covariance with qualitative data rev econom stud 47 225 238 the method eliminates heterogeneity bias which is present in the estimates produced by traditional estimation techniques it improves the goodness of fit and explanatory power of these models while incorporating purchase event feedback

firms timing of production with heterogeneous consumers i revisit endogenous timing in a quantity setting duopoly game in the basic model i show that given strong heterogeneity in consumers willingness to pay wtp and a moderately small consumer segment with low wtp sequential moving outcomes can appear in equilibrium with the follower enjoying second mover advantage owing to consumer heterogeneity in wtp there is a local property that a firm s aggressive behaviour may lead to a competitor responding more aggressively hence the sequential moves can restrict firms total outputs to avoid a price collapse and result in firms strategic choices that pareto dominate those under the simultaneous move i further generalize my results and show that although firms compete in quantity under some conditions of the demand function features of strategic complements can appear

continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions abstract we consider a discounted stochastic game of common property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players bounded one period extraction capacities and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition we show that the infinite horizon problem has a markov stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that every finite horizon truncation has a unique markovian equilibrium both in consumption functions which are continuous and nondecreasing and have all slopes bounded above by 1 unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model journal of economic literature classification codes c73 o41 q20

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

when should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual channel supply chains abstract applying an observable delay game framework developed in noncooperative game theory we investigate the timing problem concerning when a manufacturer managing dual channel supply chains consisting of a retail channel and a direct channel should post its wholesale price and direct price conventionally operational research models describing dual channel supply chains examine price competition where the retailer and the manufacturer simultaneously determine the retail and direct prices respectively in contrast to this conventional setting our model demonstrates that such simultaneous price competition never arises if the manufacturer and retailer can choose not only the level of the price but also the timing of pricing if the manufacturer sets the direct price after setting the wholesale price to the retailer the retailer accelerates the timing of retail pricing prior to the direct price setting by the manufacturer our findings suggest that the manufacturer should post the direct price before or upon but not after setting the wholesale price for the retailer this upfront posting of the direct price not only constitutes the subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game between channel members but also maximizes the profits for a manufacturer employing multichannel sales strategies

endogenous price leadership we consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow while the follower role is most attractive for each firm we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten a general theory of equilibrium selection in games mit press cambridge ma 1988 allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader

an alternative explanation for lower repeat rates after promotion purchases several authors have observed that average repeat rates are lower after a promotion purchase one interpretation of this result is that a media coupon or cents off promotion undermines the consumer

the theory of state owned enterprises in market economies abstract four topics are covered the circumstances under which state owned enterprises soes are more effective than private firms the different approaches to modelling public and private firms the performance of soes and strategies including privatization to limit their more damaging effects it is argued that ideological or development motives are important in their genesis but that if efficiency and innovation are key considerations the normative case for their existence is more doubtful various types of soe model are identified deriving from the variety of circumstances in which they operate and the theoretical perspective of the modeller these include the property rights school the public choice tradition neoclassical behavioural and budget maximizing approaches all models assume the existence of monitoring problems created by informational asymmetry the consequences can include high non pecuniary benefits for managers a concentration on monitored activities and lower innovation levels and efficiency than private firms curiously this is not necessarily reflected in higher prices or costs possible remedial strategies include a change of ownership a change of objectives the introduction of incentive compatible payment schemes improved performance indicators and privatization

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

how to compete cournot versus bertrand in a vertical structure with an integrated input supplier we study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and its retail competitor in a differentiated duopoly using a similar vertical structure arya et al 2008 show that bertrand competition is more profitable than cournot competition which contrasts with conventional wisdom in this article we first demonstrate that such a result is robust to the endogenous determination of the type of contract second by introducing managerial incentives in the model we find that delegation to managers may lead each firm to choose a quantity contract and as long as products are sufficiently differentiated entails conflicting choices causing nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies significantly high product substitutability reconciles firms objectives under delegation leading unique or multiple equilibria with symmetric types of contracts to arise

consumer learning brand loyalty and competition in several markets consumers can gain further information regarding how well a product fits their preferences only by experiencing it after purchase this could then generate loyalty for the products tried first this paper considers a model in which consumers learn in the first period about the product they buy and then make choices in the second period about the competing products given what they learned in the first period the paper finds that if the distribution of valuations for each product is negatively positively skewed a firm benefits is hurt in the future from having a greater market share today the brand loyalty characteristic with negative skewness two effects are identified on one hand marginal forward looking consumers are less price sensitive than myopic consumers and this is a force toward higher prices on the other hand forward looking firms realize that they gain in the future from having a higher market share in the current period and compete more aggressively in prices for similar discount factors for consumers and firms the latter effect dominates the paper also characterizes the importance of consumer learning effects on the market outcome

on the effects of entry in cournot markets in the framework of symmetric cournot oligopoly this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that as the number of firms increases the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to i decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per firm output and ii increasing industry price and decreasing per firm output in both cases per firm profits are decreasing the analysis relies crucially on lattice theoretic methods and yields general unambiguous and easily interpretable conclusions of a global nature as a byproduct of independent interest new insight into existence of cournot equilibrium is developed

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production