unanimous rules in the laboratory we study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory in line with theoretical predictions we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule we also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior finally we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects veto s welfare properties

the effects of unions on investment and innovation evidence from wirs the above is representative of much popular discussion of the effects of unions on investment and innovation in the professional literature the view that unions deter investment by expropriating quasi rents is also commonplace see e g simons i944 baldwin i983 grout i984 in addition it is argued that union foisted restrictive work practices might make investment a more costly process see e g denny and nickell i989 in recent years the above theoretical notions have appeared to receive some empirical support in that in the united states the level of the investment capital ratio does appear to be lower in union firms see hirsch i988 and references therein in this paper we use information contained in the i 984 workplace industrial relations survey in order to investigate the actual impact of unions on investment the rest of the paper is organised as follows in section i i we informally review the alternative channels through which unions might affect investment section i 2 contains a simple theoretical model of investment which embodies all the alternative channels our results are to be found in section ii and finally some conclusions are contained in section iii

voting on majority rules political economy models usually take as given the rules which govern the political decision making with the simple majority rule being the most popular model in this paper we develop a simple yet powerful positive model where the majority rule governing future elections is itself chosen in an election we observe a large variety of majority rules governing elections in the real world on the one side referenda are usually decided by a simple majority at the other extreme many international organizations require unanimity in votes among the member states in the european union s council of ministers some proposals require only a simple majority some a supermajority of about 71 62 votes out of 87 and some require unanimous consent 1 explicit supermajorities 2 are required in most countries for a change of the constitution but in some u s states also for a tax raise even more important could be what we might call implicit supermajorities in parliamentary systems with a strong committee organization a legislative proposal usually needs the support of both the respective committee and the house in parliamentary systems with two chambers certain legislative proposals need the support of both chambers 3 previous rationalizations of qualified majority rules focus on the problem of condorcet cycles under simple majority rule in n dimensional elections and on commitment problems see our literature review below our model presents a new rationale for rules requiring qualified majorities in elections we analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on reform opportunities which we model as similar to investment projects at first there is a cost and then there are benefits since voters have a finite lifetime old voters will be less keen on reforms

political bias and war we examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the comparison between how much their pivotal decision makers have at risk and how much they stand to gain from a war how this ratio compares to the country at large is what we term political bias if there is no political bias then there are always payments that one country would like to make to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of commitment or enforceability of peace treaties if there is a bias on the part of one or both countries then war can result and in some cases cannot be prevented by any transfer payments we examine how war technology and relative wealth levels interact with political bias in determining whether countries make transfers go to war and form alliances our results shed some new light on the uneven contender paradox and the interpretation of the democratic peace

make and buy balancing bargaining power abstract we analyze the optimal procurement of labor which can be supplied either internally based on wage negotiations or acquired at terms negotiated with an external subcontractor the novel feature of our model is that the subcontractor s bargaining power is a function of the proportion of output outsourced we demonstrate analytically how multiple sourcing emerges as an organizational mechanism to balance cost advantages associated with outsourcing against a subcontractor s increased bargaining power we find that the optimal proportion of outsourcing is lower with sequential negotiations than with simultaneous negotiations if the supplier to first negotiate can foreclose subsequent negotiations

majority rules and incentives a club s majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers it also determines the incentives to invest in order to become a winner of anticipated projects if the required majority is large members invest too little because of a holdup problem if it is small members invest too much in order to become a member of the majority coalition to balance these opposing forces the majority rule should increase in the project s value and the club s enforcement capacity but decrease in the heterogeneity in preferences externalities can be internalized by adjusting the rule with heterogeneity in size or initial conditions votes should be appropriately weighted or double majorities required

the returns from schooling in a diversified rural economy controlling for the endogeneity of activity choice and considering both household head and family schooling we findevid ence of high returns from schooling in both crop andnoncrop activities as schooling levels increase the returns from schooling shift away from crop production failure to control for activity selection andfamily schooling is likely to result in biasedestimates of the returns from schooling in individual activities copyright 2000 oxford university press

the impact of education in rural ghana examining household labor allocation and returns on and off the farm most of the human capital literature pertaining to developing countries focuses on the returns to education in either farm work or wage work few studies examine how education affects the allocation of time between these activities this paper estimates the returns to education in farm and off farm work and consequently the role of education in determining the allocation of labor the results from this study show that off farm work has a much higher return to education than does farm work and suggest that this divergence in returns affects the allocation of labor in farm households between farm and off farm work

does human capital raise farm or nonfarm earning more new insight from a rural pakistan household panel this study explores how human capital affects farm household earnings using two tools to refine measurement of human capital effects first it employs a two sector model to allow the allocation of family labor between farm and nonfarm activities second it accounts for village fixed effects to evaluate whether results from panel data differ meaningfully from a cross sectional data analysis with local binary variables the results show that education has a negligible effect on farm earnings instead experience appears to be the principal channel by which human capital affects agricultural performance in a traditional rural setting our results also suggest that prior models that fail to separate nonfarm activities spuriously exaggerated the effect of education to the farm sector in addition typical cross sectional analyses that ignore fixed effects may cause the effects of education on rural household earnings to be significantly overstated the fact that panel data regressions accounting for village level fixed effects found only one instance of education raising earnings the effect of literacy on nonfarm income suggests that considerable heterogeneity may have been ignored in cross sectional data analyses especially ones that omitted village level effects

unionised labour market and strategic production decision of a multinational i show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment fdi and export and this decision depends on the size of the product market it happens irrespective of whether the labour market in the domestic country or in the foreign country is unionised unlike the existing works focusing on risk diversification in presence of demand or cost uncertainty i explain the co existence of fdi and export in a world with certainty the endogenous determination of the wage rate plays an important role for my results my analysis shows the effects of the fixed cost of fdi and competition in the product market on the production strategy of the foreign firm

the size distribution of innovating firms in the uk 1945 1983 a survey of 4 378 significant innovations shows that firms with fewer than 1 000 employees commercialized a much larger share than is indicated by their share of r and d expenditures innovations per employee have been consistently above average in firms with more than 10 000 employees and have become so in firms with fewer than 1 000 intersectoral variation in the size distribution of innovating firms can be explained as a function of r and d based technological opportunities and of technological ease of entry by user firms with principal activities outside the sector copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

on the justice of decision rules which decision rules are the most efficient which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax we study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives a key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined particularly simple and well known the class of scoring rules we provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration utilitarianism efficiency maximin and maximax the optimal utilitarian scoring rule depends crucially on the probability distribution of the utilities the optimal maximin respectively maximax scoring rule takes the optimal utilitarian scoring rule and applies a factor that shifts it towards negative voting respectively plurality voting

voting for voters a model of electoral evolution we model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote we adopt a number of simplifying assumptions the founders and the candidates are fixed the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period one vote is sufficient for admission and voters can support as many candidates as they wish voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society while they belong to it in spite of these simplifications we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem the vote for friends may be postponed and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies we discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies

collusion and price rigidity we consider an in nitely repeated bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period we focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe wherein any punishments are borne equally by all rms we identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each rm is strictly increasing in its cost level such fully sorting schemes offer efficiency bene ts as they ensure that the lowest cost rm makes the current sale but they also imply an informational cost distorted pricing and or equilibrium path price wars since a higher cost rm must be deterred from mimicking a lower cost rm by charging a lower price a rigid pricing scheme where a rm s collusive price is independent of its current cost position sacri ces efficiency bene ts but also diminishes the informational cost for a wide range of settings the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires i the absence of equilibrium path price wars and ii a rigid price if rms are sufficiently impatient however the rigid pricing scheme cannot be enforced and the collusive price of lower cost rms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat when the model is modi ed to include i i d public demand shocks the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a rm s lower cost realization may occur only when current demand is high

voting blocs party discipline and party formation abstract i study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly coalitions form voting blocs acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome in an assembly with two exogenous parties i show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents the sizes of the parties and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences in a game of fully endogenous party formation i find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc two blocs and multiple blocs

a volatility based theory of fiscal union desirability abstract heterogeneous countries may rationally choose to form a currency union first and a fiscal union later we find and illustrate empirically for the emu countries reasonable volatility conditions under which this sequencing in the deepening process is indeed rationalizable changes in the distribution of expected income shocks require a reassignment of political weights to restore unanimous support for an added fiscal dimension the bargaining space depends on countries relative income size and cross correlation of shocks

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

the determinants of nonfarm activities and incomes of rural households in mexico with emphasis on education abstract this paper presents the main results of a study of the effects of education as well as other household assets on the choice of activities and incomes of rural mexican households our study examines the various income sources as well as the education of the household s head and its members implications are drawn for rural education and development policies to promote rural nonfarm incomes and employment

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

self enforcing voting in international organizations some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule some others by a majority system still others have moved from one system to the other over time the existing voting models have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system we present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision or in other words the voting system must be self enforcing the model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance both across organizations and over time we thank james anderson matt jackson francois maniquet guido tabellini and jean tirole for very helpful comments arnaud costinot provided excellent research assistance we also bene

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

a comment on farmer education and farm efficiency a survey in a widely acknowledged study marlaine e lockheed dean t jamison and lawrence j lau presented a meticulous survey of studies investigating the effect of farmer education on farm efficiency in less developed countries in summarizing 18 different studies in 13 countries they concluded that education has a positive effect on efficiency and that on average 4 years of education results in a 7 4 improvement in output generally lockheed et al s study confirms a widely accepted view that education has a positive effect on farm productivity however a careful analysis of the empirical foundation of their study suggests the need for some skepticism about the conclusions drawn the estimated coefficients for the education variables in the production functions presented often are not statistically significant and in some cases show that education has a negative effect on farm efficiency for example if statistical significance is calculated at the 05 level only 22 of 39 equations 56 4 reported in lockheed et al s table 2 estimate a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the education variable the remaining 44 are either not significantly different from zero or are negative 2 separating the studies by geographic area reveals another interesting pattern in the studies namely how the expected result varies across regions latin america and asia are well represented in the sample with 13 and 22 studies respectively but only two of the studies are from africa 3 of the 13 latin american studies only three 23 1 are positive and significant at the 05 level for asia on the other hand over 77 3 17 of 22 show the expected result as for the two studies for africa one finds a negative effect of education on productivity and the other finds no significant effect this indicates that while there is evidence supporting the beneficial effect of education on productivity

efficiency in games with markovian private information we study repeated bayesian games with communication and observable actions in which the players privately known payoffs evolve according to an irreducible markov chain whose transitions are independent across players our main result implies that generically any pareto efficient payoff vector above a stationary minmax value can be approximated arbitrarily closely in a perfect bayesian equilibrium as the discount factor goes to 1 as an intermediate step we construct an approximately efficient dynamic mechanism for long finite horizons without assuming transferable utility publication abstract

union bargaining power subcontracting and innovation we show that if a firm can subcontract production to an informal sector an increase in union power may either increase or decrease innovation an increase in union power makes the firm worse off irrespective of its effect on innovation however in contrast to the usual belief an increase in union power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting innovation thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful an increase in union power may create an ambiguous effect on social welfare our analysis provides new insights to the relation between union power and innovation

incomplete social contracts there is a long normative social contract tradition that attempts to characterize ex post income inequalities that are agreeable to all behind a veil of ignorance this paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision making procedures it is shown that quite generally some form of majority voting is preferred to unanimity behind a veil of ignorance whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers deviations from unanimity or ex post pareto optimality are ex ante efficient to the extent that they economize on costly compensating transfers put another way the optimal decision rule trades off the benefits of minority protection and those from greater flexibility jel h11 g33 g34 d63 p16 p48

union rent seeking intangible capital and market value of the firm abstract this study considers the effect of unions on intangi ble capital investment and profitability within the context of a market value rather than a more traditional accounting based approach theory is provided suggesting unions are able to affect profitability by sharing in the economic returns to firm specific intangible capital in support of this hypothesis we find unionization reduces the returns to r d and produces a corresponding limiting influence on r d investment at the firm level i introduction a n extensive literature in economics has ex amined the determinants of profitability with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure only recently however have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed ths is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitabil ity in recent studies freeman 1983 and karier 1985 report a significant limiting influence of unions on price cost margins in high concentra tion manufacturing industries using firm level data and the market based tobin s

explaining institutional change policy areas outside options and the bretton woods institutions i propose and test a theoretical framework that explains institutional change in international relations like firms in markets international institutions are affected by the underlying characteristics of their policy areas some policy areas are prone to produce institutions facing relatively little competition limiting the outside options of member states and impeding redistributive change in comparison institutions facing severe competition will quickly reflect changes in underlying state interests and power to test the theory empirically i exploit common features of the bretton woods institutions the international monetary fund and world bank to isolate the effect of variation in policy area characteristics the empirical tests show that despite having identical membership and internal rules bargaining outcomes in the bretton woods institutions have diverged sharply and in accordance with the theory

good times bad times and vertical upstream integration abstract we consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input downstream firms can produce the input themselves yet do not trade it upstream firms produce the input to sell it through a walrasian market to downstream firms efficient pooling of capacities requires the input to be produced by upstream firms and traded in the market yet downstream firms will always vertically integrate by producing some of its own input needs a downstream firm cuts down on aggregate input demand thus depressing prices in the market

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

power control and the logic of substitution in institutional design the case of international climate finance how do powerful states control international organizations ios in contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design we propose that funding rules are equally important our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an io are used are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states perspective whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power govern voting and representation rights at the io focusing on the domain of climate finance we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions icfis associated with multilateral development banks but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at icfis within the united nations system where egalitarian norms are strong in this way powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies in addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at ios our framework offers insight into forum shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas

access to water women s work and child outcomes abstractpoor rural women in the developing world spend considerable time collecting water do women living in places where more time is needed for water collection tend to participate less in income earning market based activities do the education outcomes of their children tend to be worse we use micro data for nine developing countries to help address these questions our primary aim is to describe the patterns in the data rather than to infer causality although we do treat the household level access to water as endogenous assuming that community level access is exogenous conditional on a wide range of geographic factors better access to water is not found to be associated with greater off farm paid work but is associated with less unpaid work for women in countries where substantial gender gaps in schooling exist both boys and girls enrollments also tend to be better

economic liberalization and indian economic growth what s the evidence india s growth and poverty performance over the last three decades has been a subject of great curiosity unlike the east asian countries india s growth spurt is not associated with exceptionally high domestic savings or foreign capital inflows or manufacturing exports so what triggered the change in the growth trajectory did the market liberalization policies of the 1990s help how have the initial conditions shaped the process and how has the indian model impinged on india s central problem of mass poverty this paper surveys the literature and offers its own assessment of the drivers of change jel i32 o13 o14 o15 o21 o47

the determination of r d empirical evidence on the role of unions abstract this paper examines the empirical evidence of the role of union bargaining on innovation we review the existing empirical evidence and emphasis some of the problems with the theoretical assumptions we outline a simple model of strategic rd b the union bargains only over wages

economic reform and informal wage a general equilibrium analysis abstract we attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets wage differential vertical linkage and restricted capital movement in particular we show that the informal wage representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment this also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers

on 64 majority rule introduction d une definition de consensus social base sur deux restrictions une sur les preferences individuelles et l autre sur la distribution des preferences dans ce cas de consensus une regle de majorite a 64 presente de nombreuses proprietes interessantes par opposition aux regles de super majorite possedant des proprietes paradoxales comme les regles electorales americaines

centralized fiscal spending by supranational unions we study fiscal spending by supranational unions where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget since decisions are made by unanimity bargaining power over the allocation becomes a function of contributions which generically causes inefficiency in the presence of income asymmetry between member nations this link between the budget allocation and contributions explains patterns of inefficient spending in the eu e g why resources are diverted to low productivity projects in high income countries the option of veto creates a trade off between efficiency on the contributions margin and efficiency on the allocation margin

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

strategic delegation and voting rules abstract the selection of political representatives depends on the political system principals such as voters or districts may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves while a status quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition a larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation and hence a status quo bias a poor minority protection does the opposite through strategic delegation the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial

unionization incomplete contracting and capital investment this article examines empirically the hypothesis that incomplete contracts and resulting opportunistic behavior over the return to sunk assets reduces investment union firm contracts are incomplete because they 1 do not prevent all actions aimed at changing the existing contract 2 cover a relatively short time period and 3 do not extend to union members yet to be hired the primary response of firms is to reduce investment in specific durable assets and also to reduce employment growth and increase debt the authors find fairly strong evidence of these effects in a sample of large publicly traded firms using firm specific measures of unionization copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security this paper analyzes the issue of security provision by an alliance against the threat of a rogue nation proactive security effort by an alliance member is assumed to be non rival and non excludable so the results of the effort jointly accrue to every other member this effort has both positive and negative effects as security measures mitigate the threat but also involve loss of commercial benefits collateral damages and infringement on human rights in this paper i suggest an institutional structure for the alliance which would lead to the achievement of the efficient level of world security through multilateral participation

labour markets bargaining and innovation much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on rd ii under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off we survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that r d is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another we show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned thus when firms and unions can enter into long term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase decrease r d spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise respectively fall however when r d falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off when firms and unions engage in short term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause r d to fall when bargaining is over wages alone however when bargaining takes place over wages and employment then if unions care a lot about employment the relationship between union strength and r d is inverse u shaped

abiding by the vote between groups conflict in international collective action we analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome we study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote we identify two organizational types with endogenous coercive enforcement and find that neither is unambiguously preferable like the solutions to the traditional prisoners dilemma these forms require long shadows of the future to sustain we then show that cooperation can be sustained through a noncoercive organization where actors delegate execution to an agent even though this institution is costlier it does not require any expertise by the agent and is independent of the shadow of the future and thus is implementable when the others are not