residual wage disparity and coordination unemployment how much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms to answer we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high or low productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers calibrated to the u s economy workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms and can conduct on the job search the stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump shaped skewed significantly to the right and with baseline parameters generates residual dispersion statistics 75 90 of those found empirically however the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment

a review of the recent empirical literature on displaced workers this article reviews the empirical literature on job displacement job displacement is widespread and strongly countercyclical tending to peak during economic downturns but concentrated in indus

the turning black tide energy prices and the canadian dollar the authors revisit the relationship between energy prices and the canadian dollar in the amano and van norden 1995 equation which shows a negative relationship such that higher real energy prices lead to a depreciation of the canadian dollar

what have we learned from empirical studies of unemployment and turnover unemployment reminds economists that we have a lot to be modest about twenty years ago robert hall 1972 asked why is the unemployment rate so high at full employment at the time hall wrote male unemployment in the united states had risen to 3 5 percent and it would peak at 4 4 percent in the recession of 1971 since then every cyclical low of unemployment has exceeded the one before it the end of the 1980 s expansion reduced unemployment to about 4 5 percent and unemployment peaked at 7 4 percent of the labor force in the recession that just ended the natural rate of unemployment has evidently risen through time which led lawrence summers 1986 to place a modifier in hall s question why is the unemployment rate so very high in what follows i pose three questions about the causes and consequences of rising joblessness first who are the unemployed i will show that unemployment and nonparticipation are heavily concentrated among the least skilled and more importantly that virtually all of the long term increase in joblessness occurs among low wage men unemployment and nonparticipation among highly skilled men are unchanged since the 1960 s second what factors have caused jobless time to rise there are many theories including changes in labor force demographics social programs that discourage employment and changes in the amount of frictional unemployment caused by sectoral shifts none of these is consistent with the evidence which points instead to a secular decline in the demand for lessskilled workers the data also cast doubt on nonmarket clearing models of rising unemployment wages are demonstrably flexible in the long run and they have fallen dramatically among the unskilled whose jobless rates have risen third what happens to the unemployed in contrast to the view that unemployment spells cause transitory reductions in income recent evidence indicates that job losses have substantial and permanent effects on earning power many of the unskilled who are unemployed or out of the labor force appear to have been high wage workers whose specialized skills have become obsolete

the communications and information economy issues tariffs and economics research areas abstract this survey paper analyses some of the fundamental economic issues concerning the communications and information economy the first highlighted major trends are the balkanisation of the communications networks and the advent of competitive tariffs this leads to a move away from time and distance based charges to tariffs covering bandwidth service and contents use it is noted that very few resources have gone into the analysis of that sector and its inter relations with others the paper advocates for more visibility and research into the unique aspects of the communications and information sector it does so by making an inventory of key economics and computational economics research issues in need of contributions selected from the following areas public communications infrastructure and tariffing principles sales of communications services public access and equal access policies competitive access pricing communications industry finance engineering economic studies information contents macroeconomic issues finally the specific aspects of models of the communications and media sector are addressed in view of modelling work this includes variables pricing and production models for both communications and information contents the most unique contribution is here a formal model for quantifying and pricing knowledge both for consumption and for assets building

foreign and domestic divestment and investment decisions like or unlike the managerial literature on foreign investment and divestment is much less developed than the economic literature on foreign direct investment theory nevertheless surveyed with the purpose of better understanding foreign divestment decisions the research to date reveals some noticeable differences between investment and divestment divisions whether foreign or domestic and even more substantial differences between foreign divestment and domestic divestment decisions additional research however is clearly in order

delegated portfolio management abstract a problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered for the case of risk averse agents and large principals an approximately optimal solution is constructively characterized under the assumption that payoffs are normally distributed a significant extension of the definnetti savage probability elicitation result is developed under this extension knowledge of agent preferences is not required when the underlying conditional distributions are symmetric and this fact is exploited to solve the screening problem in a mean variance formulation

allocation of attention within venture capital firms in this article we use a simple queuing network to model the process through which entrepreneurs receive venture capital funding our model focuses in particular on the allocation of venture capitalists attention between pre and post investment activities and on the degree of selectivity in deciding which ventures to fund based upon this model we develop expressions for the financial performance of the venture capital process both overall and also from the perspectives of the entrepreneurs investors managers and venture capitalists involved for these financial measures we derive the optimal allocation of attention between pre and post investment activities and the optimal proportion of venture proposals to accept further analysis shows how these different financial measures and optimal values respond to changes in the business climate more interestingly our analysis also shows where and to what extent the different parties could be expected to agree or disagree on how best to manage the process

reassessing the relationships between private equity investors and their portfolio companies the scope and purpose of this special issue is to reassess the relationships between private equity pe investors and their portfolio companies in the light of the need for venture capital private equity vc pe firms to adapt their strategies for value creation in the light of the recent financial crisis we particularly focus upon vc pe characteristics that differently contribute to portfolio firm performance the papers presented in this special issue capture this aim in various ways reflecting the heterogeneity of vc pe investors and the firms in which they invest we begin this introductory paper by providing a brief overview of each paper s contribution we articulate themes for an agenda for future research relating to the heterogeneity of investor types and the contexts in which they invest

home country networks and foreign expansion evidence from the venture capital industry we propose that home country network advantages shape firms foreign expansion we argue that a social status advantage is transferable from one market to another as a signal of quality but that a

the value of diffusing information abstract how does the speed by which information diffuses affect its value to a stock market investor in a structural model solved in closed form this speed has two opposing effects on the empirically dominant term of the value of information faster diffusing information means quicker and less noisy profits but also increases competing informed trading impounding more information into prices and eroding profits structural empirical analysis of stock market reaction to drug approvals using media coverage as a proxy for the transmission rate of information finds that the value of information is hump shaped in its future transmission rate moreover the estimated amount of noise trading is small

an examination of firms employment costs the existence of quasi fixed costs of work may affect firms desired employee hours and number of workers which has important implications for the estimation of labour supply parameters firm level data from the 1982 employment opportunity pilot project is used to estimate the importance to firms of employee quasi fixed costs related to searching hiring training and firing specifically this paper examines how these costs affect number of workers and hours per worker turnover and vacancies to the extent that the costs are determined by the firm s presumably exogenous industrial classification an attempt is made to control for biases due to employee heterogeneity as well results show that higher costs are associated with lower turnover fewer vacancies and longer hours as predicted by a model of labour demand

cross border venture capital investments the impact of foreignness on returns against the background of the growing internationalization of venture capital vc investing this is the first global comparison of the returns generated by individual domestic and cross border deals we examine investments worldwide during 1971 2009 and find that cross border investments significantly underperform compared with equivalent domestic investments returns are negatively affected by geographic distances cultural disparities and institutional differences between the home and host countries returns on cross border and domestic deals also decline after the late 1990s international portfolio diversification and the saturation of domestic markets may explain why vc investors make cross border investments despite poor expected returns

the value of recommendations abstract many markets without repeated seller buyer relations feature third party monitors that sell recommendations we analyze the profit maximizing recommendation policies of such monitors in an infinitely repeated game with seller moral hazard and short lived consumers a monopolistic monitor with superior information about the seller s past effort decisions sells recommendations about the seller to consumers we show that the monitor has an incentive to make its recommendations hard to predict which in general leads to inefficient effort provision by the seller these results hold under perfect and imperfect monitoring and in a variety of informational setting when there are multiple competing sellers the conflict between the monitor s profit maximization objective and efficient effort provision is mitigated

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

reservation wage and optimal contract for experts abstract we examine the optimal contract for experts with type dependent reservation wage we show that bhattacharya and pfleiderer 1985 s result the possibility of achieving the truthful revelation of information with full surplus extraction can be achieved with relaxing the restriction on the shape of reservation wage schedules this outcome can be achieved through payoff functions that are affine in a convex transformation of the ex post error our result is applied to the case of multiple experts

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

venture capital investment cycles the impact of public markets abstract it is well documented that the venture capital industry is highly volatile and that much of this volatility is associated with shifting valuations and activity in public equity markets this paper examines how changes in public market signals affected venture capital investing between 1975 and 1998 we find that venture capitalists with the most industry experience increase their investments the most when public market signals become more favorable their reaction to an increase is greater than the reaction of venture capital organizations with relatively little industry experience and those with considerable experience but in other industries the increase in investment rates does not affect the success of these transactions adversely to a significant extent these findings are consistent with the view that venture capitalists rationally respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled by public market shifts

on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy rational expectations models i study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard grossman and stiglitz 1980 and hellwig 1980 models but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay offs and supply and allows for more general signal structures i provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium characterize the price function and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions which are met by both the grossman and stiglitz 1980 models and the hellwig 1980 models with a continuum of investors my solution approach does not rely on the typical conjecture and verify method and i exhibit a number of non normal examples in which asset prices can be characterized explicitly and in a closed form the results presented here open up a broad class of models for applied work to illustrate the usefulness of generalizing the standard model i show that in settings with non normally distributed pay offs shocks to fundamentals may be amplified purely due to learning effects price drifts can arise naturally and the disagreement return relation depends in a novel way on return skewness

productivity gains from unemployment insurance this paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs and by encouraging rms to create those jobs we use a quantitative model to investigate whether this eect is comparable in magnitude to the standard moral hazard eects of unemployment insurance our model economy captures the behavior of the u s labor market for high school graduates quite well with unemployment insurance more generous than the current u s level unemployment would increase by a magnitude similar to the micro estimates but because the composition of jobs also changes total output and welfare would increase as well

strategic choices of quality differentiation and pricing in financial services abstract two financial services firms fsfs produce information on future returns from risky assets incorporate this information in a report and sell the reports to investors the fsfs make strategic choices of the quality differentiation and prices of their reports their optimal strategic choices of quality and differentiation divide the market for the report into three segments each fsf has a monopoly in its own segment and the two compete head to head in a duopoly segment the sizes of the monopoly segments increase with increases in quality and differentiation an increase in differentiation reduces the size of the duopoly market while an increase in quality has an ambiguous effect on the duopoly market for high enough equilibrium differentiation the size of the duopoly market decreases with an increase in quality the non cooperative fsfs pursue niche strategies each focusing on a different related set of risks in order to coordinate the contents of their reports to achieve the equilibrium degree of product differentiation recent years have seen a worldwide wave of financial firm mergers and acquisitions this paper s model suggests that in equilibrium fsfs differentiate their products and develop profitable niches in principle however sufficiently strong economies of scope could lead to a small number of fsfs with little differentiation that dominate all financial services markets

venture capital internationalization synthesis and future research directions research on venture capital internationalization vc has expanded rapidly over the last decade this paper reviews the extant literature on vc internationalization and highlights gaps in our knowledge we identify three major research streams within this literature which revolve around the following questions 1 which vc firms invest across borders and what countries do they target with a macro economic or a micro economic focus 2 how do vc firms address the liabilities of non domestic investing and 3 what are the real effects of international vc investments we provide an overview of the contributions in these research streams discuss the role of public policy and suggest avenues for future research specifically we call for a deeper understanding of 1 the functioning and impact of vc firms modes of internationalization 2 micro level processes such as the functioning and decision making of international investment committees the interaction between headquarters and local offices or the development of international human and social capital 3 the role of country institutions in vc internationalization and its real effects and 4 the interplay of international vc with alternative financing sources

direct sale of information when precision is unobservable this paper studies the incentives of an information seller to produce precise information in a setting where precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price i show that the seller can verify her unknown precision by employing a nonlinear contract proposed by bhattacharya and p eiderer 1985 although precision is not observable buyers can perfectly deduce it from the contract apart from incentives to produce precise information and reveal it truthfully the nonlinear contract also insures against the portfolio risk of information buyers and causes them to trade aggressively for a given precision this increases the extent of information that is built into the equilibrium asset price the seller s equilibrium fee depends on i her inferred precision ii the value of portfolio insurance for buyers and iii the extent of information that leaks from the equilibrium asset price

research note cost uncertainty is bliss the effect of competition on the acquisition of cost information for pricing new products we examine the optimal acquisition of information about a common uncertain cost factor by two competing firms seeking to price a new product we show that existing findings regarding the acquisition of demand information or the acquisition of either cost or demand information related to quantity decisions do not extend to this case for cost information with price competition the information acquisition strategies are strategic substitutes even though the price decisions that are based on the information are strategic complements competition decreases the expected value of cost information moreover when competition is intense and the cost of information low identical firms do not acquire the same amount of cost information even when information is free cost uncertainty acts like a fog that lessens the destructive effect of price competition when products are close substitutes and thus increases expected profits buyers on the other hand are better off when competing firms are informed about cost even though the expected value of cost information strictly decreases with competition the optimal price for industry specific cost information set by an information vendor increases with competition when the firms products are sufficiently substitutable

relative performance of incentive mechanisms computational modeling and simulation of delegated investment decisions this paper evaluates the relative performances of several well known and widely used incentive mechanisms under controlled experimental conditions the scenario utilized is a delegated investment setting where effort and risk aversions contribute to moral hazard among fund managers analytical intractability of the problem requires a computational modeling approach to simulate comparative solutions for specific contracts under different parametric settings through a simulation exercise we consider multiple agents who decide their investment strategy over several consecutive periods agents learn about estimation and market uncertainty through repeated realizations of investment returns in each sequence of periods a number of different incentive mechanisms based on the agent s communication and or outcome are considered results of the computational experiments are presented our results overwhelmingly show the efficacy of the incentive contracts in improving the welfare of the investors in the presence of an estimation risk when agents learn from their past performances the market volatility interacts with the estimation risk that makes risk sharing arrangements such as limited liability overly important paying the agent to assume the risk may no longer lead to the best performance incentives

permanent layoffs in canada overview and longitudinal analysis canadians are increasingly concerned about permanent layoffs since many feel job instability has increased in the 1990s this paper uses a new longitudinal data source on worker separations to address three issues first what are the underlying causes of most permanent layoffs second has there been an increase in the permanent layoff rate in the 1990s third are most permanent layoffs rare events for workers or are they a continuation of a pattern of repeated layoffs the type of postdisplacement adjustment assistance required depends on whether layoffs are rare or frequent events for most workers ordered logistic analysis is used to address this third issue

unemployment and interindustry labour mobility in canada in the 1980s the determinants of interindustry mobility of labour and its relationship to the unemployment rate is examined using micro data on canadian workers from 1980 81 1982 83 and 1985 86 it contrasts the implications of the dynamic reallocation model lilien 1982 in which rising aggregate unemployment is due to in creased dispersion in the net hiring rates of firms implying positive covariance of interindustry mobility and unemployment rates with the older keynesian perspective that high unemployment chills labour market mobility implying a neative relationship qualified support is obtained for the chilling model as well as standard results on the role of job tenure hours worked etc the general moral is the cyclical sensitivity of labour market behaviour i e individuals appear to react to the aggregate unemployment rate

escalation of commitment in venture capital decision making differentiating between domestic and international investors drawing upon an escalation of commitment framework this study investigates how differences between cross border and domestic venture capital investors in emotional social and institutional factors affect their decision to terminate an unsuccessful investment we track the exit outcome of 1060 venture capital investments in 684 european technology companies results show that domestic investors have a high tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action while cross border investors terminate their investments efficiently even when investing through a local branch this is explained by cross border investors having a lower social and emotional involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the local economic and social environment decreasing individual decision biases further they are affected to a lower extent by normative pressures to further invest from their co investment network local branches of cross border investors are also shielded from escalation of commitment we conjecture that their international investment committee acts as an organizational safeguard against individual decision biases domestic investors may hence benefit from mimicking the behavior of cross border investors

brokerage commission schedules it is generally optimal for risk sharing reasons to base a charge for information on the signal realization when this is not possible a charge based on the amount of trading a brokerage commission may be a good alternative the optimal brokerage commission schedule is derived for a risk neutral information seller faced with risk averse purchasers who may differ in their risk aversion revenues from the brokerage commission are compared with those from a fixed charge for information and the optimal mutual fund management fee the brokerage industry is a significant source of information for investors about prospective security returns one indication of this is that of the 11 817 members of the association for investment management and research who listed their occupations as investment management or research in 1991 21 percent worked for brokers and investment dealers another is that since the abolition of fixed commissions a distinction has arisen between full service brokers who provide investors with investment information and discount brokers who charge lower commissions and provide only transaction services 1 the information produced by broker research is typically provided free of charge to investors in the expectation that it will stimulate trade rewarding the brokerage house with commissions 2 this paper compares the sale of investment information in return for a brokerage commission with direct sale for a fixed payment and indirect sale through the provision of investment management services in return for a

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

hyteresis in import prices the beachhead effect this paper shows that temporary real exchange rate fluctuations can have persistent hysteretic effects on trade specifically when market entry costs are sunk sufficiently large exchange rate shocks alter domestic market structure and thereby induce hysteresis this simple result has strong implications for exchange rate theory t rade policy and estimation of trade equations empirical evidence su ggests that the recent dollar overvaluation induced hysteresis in u s import prices namely the aggregate pass through equation of exchange rates to import prices shifted in the 1980s the shift s nature and timing is broadly consistent with the hysteresis hypothesis copyright 1988 by american economic association

measuring investment performance in a rational expectations equilibrium model much research has been concerned with evaluating the performance of managed portfolios e g mutual funds and examining whether portfolio managers display in some sense superior performance superior performance would seemingly turn on the possession of superior information that is utilized in managing portfolios in general a fund s asset holdings or portfolio weights might not be observable to an outsider whether they are or not however they are likely to change over time this happens especially when better performance is a result of superior information since managers will change their portfolio composition on obtaining private information since such changes must be taken into account the problem of measuring performance of managed portfolios is inherently different from that of evaluating the performance of individual assets groups of assets or generally portfolios with constant and known composition

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

markets for information of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies in this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors agents may sell or buy reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt reports are unverifiable cheap talk messages hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders we find that when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold though reports are typically noisy the market for information is in most cases a monopoly and there is underinvestment in information acquisition we also show that regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls only make the inefficiency worse efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information provided entry is blocked

terms of trade and real exchange rates the canadian evidence abstract this paper presents empirical evidence linking the canada us real exchange rate with the terms of trade using recently developed econometric methods for nondashstationary data we find that the real exchange rate is cointegrated with terms of trade variables and that causality runs from the terms of trade to the exchange rate we then construct a simple exchange rate equation that satisfies several specification tests and performs better than a random walk in post sample forecasting experiments the results suggest that much of the variation in the real exchange rate is attributable to movements in the terms of trade and that the influence of monetary factors is secondary

how not to pay for advice a framework for consumer financial protection abstract this paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice when customers are wary of the adviser s incentives contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers if instead customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare however prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser s incentive to acquire information more vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers

price and quality in a new product monopoly in a signal extraction model of consumer behaviour higher prices signal higher quality products for a new product monopoly even without cost asymmetries across different qualities moreover higher quality products earn greater expected profits and the monopolist has an incentive to provide even transient improvements in quality finally the monopolist has a positive incentive to conduct market research about quality and produces more information than is socially optimal

inter industry mobility and the cyclical upgrading of labor we investigate whether a market clearing model is consistent with industry employment and wage patterns related to the cyclical upgrading of labor we demonstrate that roy s 1951 market clearing

on aggregation of information in competitive markets the dynamic case abstract this article examines in the spirit of hellwig 1980 how a dynamic competitive security market aggregates and communicates information between various market participants at every instant it employs a continuous time economy consisting of a large number of heterogeneous agents who are endowed with noisy private signals about the risky asset payoff of differing precision it yields a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in which at every instant the agents use information contained in the market prices without rendering their private information redundant it shows that the market price reflects only that part of private information which is common to many signals and thus extends hellwig s single period results to a multi period model

forecasting the forecasts of others implications for asset pricing we develop a dynamic asset pricing model with heterogeneously informed agents unlike previous research we focus on the general case where differential information leads to the problem of forecasting the forecasts of others and to non trivial dynamics of higher order expectations in particular we prove that the model does not admit a finite number of state variables using numerical analysis we compare equilibria characterized by identical fundamentals but different information structure we demonstrate that the distribution of information has substantial impact on equilibrium prices and returns in particular we show that asymmetric information can generate momentum in returns and high trading volume

the aggregate effects of sectoral reallocations abstract can a one time permanent change in the fundamentals behind the sectoral composition of the economy prompt an aggregate downturn can this downturn be non negligible even if one uses us data to determine the relative size of gross vs net job flows and the importance of job creation costs can one consider the military build down of the 1990s as a plausible cause for the 1990 1991 recession do sectoral reallocations generate responses that are qualitatively similar to productivity shocks we use a variant of the mortensen pissarides 1994 review of economic studies 61 397 415 job creation destruction model calibrate it to us labor market data and run experiments that suggest one can answer yes to all these questions

the design and price of information abstract a data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty he can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller his willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information the data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments we establish the properties that any revenue maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy every experiment is a non dispersed stochastic matrix and every menu contains a fully informative experiment in the cases of binary states and actions or binary types we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments jel d42 d81 d82 d83

information sales and insider trading with long lived information fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good hence the eects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow similarly to a durable goods monopolist a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself this forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders conversely an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information comparing market patterns i show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades

diversification in parametric rational expectations economies abstract it is shown that in large parametric rational expectations models even when investors receive private signals about different subsets of assets all investors hold diversified portfolios

business cycles unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models this paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an rbc economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment the standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies but it cannot do both variable search and separation finite ui benefit duration efficiency wages and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle however either sticky wages or match specific productivity shocks can improve the model s performance by making the firm s flow of surplus more procyclical which makes hiring more procyclical too

lost in transition the costs and consequences of sectoral labour adjustment this paper uses an equilibrium search and matching model to study canada s sectoral labour adjustment in 2002 2006 during an increase in global commodity prices and exchange rate appreciation i estimate economically significant adjustment costs for the aggregate economy in this episode and demonstrate that difficulty in transferring skills between jobs for individual workers can be an important contributor to these aggregate costs the analysis also demonstrates that the level of unemployment benefits impacts the economy s sectoral composition its aggregate productivity and the speed of its adjustment to shocks ce texte utilise un modele d equilibre de la recherche et de l arrimage pour etudier les ajustements sectoriels du travail au canada dans la periode 2002 2006 une periode d appreciation des prix globaux des produits de base et du taux de change j estime que les couts d ajustement sont economiquement significatifs pour l economie agregee au cours de cet episode et que la difficultea transferer les competences entre emplois pour les travailleurs individuels peut etre une source importante de ces couts agreges les analyses montrent aussi que le niveau des prestations d assurance emploi a un impact sur la composition sectorielle de l economie sur la productivite et sur la vitesse des ajustements aux chocs

cross border private equity syndication institutional context and learning abstract private equity pe has become an increasingly international phenomenon but there is a lack of research that looks at the process by which pe firms invest across borders we aim to fill this gap in the literature by examining the role of institutional context and organizational learning as determinants of cross border pe syndication we examine these issues by studying the international expansion by later stage uk pe investors into continental europe over the period 1990 to 2006 our results indicate that institutional context in terms of the number of pe firms in the local environment and the presence of investment bankers in the local market and organizational learning in terms of the pe firm s experience in the host country the pe firm s multinational experience and the number of investment managers per portfolio company but not the presence of local offices are significantly related to the use of cross border syndicates implications for theory and practice are suggested

optimal portfolio choice under incomplete information models of asset pricing generally assume that the variables which characterize the state of the economy are observable however the distributional properties of asset prices that are relevant for portfolio decisions are in general not observable and therefore must be estimated the estimation of expected returns is a particularly difficult problem and estimation errors are likely to be substantial in this light it is reasonable to examine whether the assumption of observability of expected returns and other relevant state variables causes significant mis specification in equilibrium models of asset prices this paper has three main objectives first to derive optimal estimators for the unobservable expected instantaneous returns using observations of past realized returns second to establish that estimation and portfolio choice can be solved in two separate steps third to analyze the impact of estimation error on investment choices the estimators of expected returns are in general not consistent i e the estimation error does not tend to disappear asymptotically the effects of the estimation error therefore cannot be ignored even if realized returns are observed continuously over an infinite time period

stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account this paper analyzes how to provide information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who privately trades on own account the analysis exploits the observation that for a given report the analyst s reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market for every signal the analyst makes the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value given security prices the principal cannot make the analyst strictly prefer to report the true signal the analyst is truthful only when indifferent between the two reports the analyst s information acquisition incentive is driven only by private portfolio considerations he acquires information only if he will be holding a large enough position in the stock he covers the paper also presents a general separation of the optimal report from private information result and illustrates that performance based reward schemes can fail to induce any information revelation when the analyst privately trades

labor demand and the structure of adjustment costs this study examines the costs firms face in adjusting labor demand to exogenous shocks evidence on monthly plant level data shows that adjustment proceeds in jumps employment is unchanged in response to small shocks but moves instantaneously to a new equilibrium if the shocks are large results in the large literature that assumes smooth adjustment are due to aggregation of this nonlinear relation the finding has implications for cyclical changes in productivity for severance pay layoff and plant closing restrictions and for all other policies that affect the cost of adjusting employment copyright 1989 by american economic association

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

aggregate employment dynamics building from microeconomic evidence this paper studies quarterly employment flows of approximately 10 000 u s manufacturing establishments the authors use establishments hours week to construct measures of the deviation between desired and actual employment and use these as the establishments main state variables the main findings are 1 microeconomic adjustment functions are nonlinear with plants adjusting disproportionately to large shortages 2 adjustments are often either large or nil suggesting the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment cost technologies 3 the bulk of average employment fluctuations is accounted for by aggregate rather than reallocation shocks and 4 microeconomic nonlinearities amplify the impact of large aggregate shocks copyright 1997 by american economic association

determinants of venture capital firms preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments abstract competition is intensifying in the venture capital industry in the u s the number of venture capital firms vcfs tripled from 1980 to 1989 supplier power in the form of institutional investors such as pension funds continues to grow foreign venture capital has grown to the extent that commitments to foreign vcfs exceeded domestic commitments in both 1988 and 1989 further alternative sources of financing for entrepreneurs such as individual investors angels corporations and strategic alliances are increasingly viable options vcfs face pressure to seek lower risk investments improve rates of return and provide value to new venture development surprisingly few scholarly studies have begun to investigate the strategies vcfs are aiming to implement in order to deal with this increasing pressure building on the premise that decisions regarding product market scope are a key component of firm strategy hofer and schendel 1978 this study examined 169 domestic vcfs in order to identify factors that might explain variations in preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments the sample drawn from california massachusetts and texas represented about 27 of all u s based vcfs in 1987 the year in which the data were gathered in terms of the total size of investment portfolio the average for these 169 vcfs was 69 8 million which is statistically indistinguishable from the u s average of 65 million results indicate that 1 vcfs specializing in early stage ventures prefer less industry diversity and narrower geographic scope relative to other vcfs 2 corporate vcfs i e those owned by non financial corporations prefer less industry diversity but broader geographic scope relative to non corporate vcfs 3 larger vcfs prefer greater industry diversity and broader geographic scope than do smaller vcfs and 4 provision of small business investment companies sbic financing by the vcf has no impact on preferences regarding industry diversity but is associated with a preference for narrower geographic scope one implication of these results is that vcfs in the u s are not homogeneous as regards the intended product market scope of their portfolios this in turn holds implications not only for vcfs but also for their suppliers limited partners buyers entrepreneurs and policy makers vcfs can no longer rely on haphazard investment schemes they need to attract investors by virtue of the benefits offered by their portfolio strategy and they need to attract superior investments via offering valueadded services and know how potential investors in venture capital will want to examine for example the impact on risk and return of investing smaller amounts in several vcfs at one extreme versus making one large investment in a very diversified vcf at the other extreme the results of this and other studies suggest that outcomes timing magnitude and riskiness of returns of choosing such alternatives will vary widely and will depend in great part on the strategies of the vcfs involved it will not be possible for investors to make wise choices without a full examination of their own objectives and of the profiles of vcfs entrepreneurs with the most attractive ventures have alternative sources of financing to consider and should weigh the benefits of being financed and supported by various vcfs as part of the vcfs portfolios knowing a vcf s preferences regarding product market scope improves their chances of approaching and selecting the right fit and for those entrepreneurs with a narrower set of options such knowledge may make the difference between receiving and not receiving financing in a timely manner finally policy makers may be able to make use of knowledge of the forces that influence the investment strategies of vcfs presently concerns for policy makers may include the gap in seed capital increased foreign presence in the u s market and the export of promising innovative technology via alliances with foreign firms all of these factors are influenced by the strategies pursued by vcfs as they jockey for position in the increasingly competitive venture capital market

viable allocations of information in financial markets abstract we study in the context of a financial market allocations of information that are consistent with endogenous information acquisition we focus on whether information is concentrated within a fraction of the market or is diffuse the aggregation of information in prices tends to make signals more complementary than they would be if considered in isolation favoring concentration of information however the ability to use some signals together with prices to predict other signals may increase the degree of substitutability among signals we present conditions under which each of these effects is particularly strong

intersectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service sector one of the most striking changes in the u s economy over the past 50 years has been the growth in the service sector between 1950 and 2000 service sector employment grew from 57 to 75 percent of total employment however over this time the real hourly wage in the service sector grew only slightly faster than in the goods sector in this paper we assess whether or not the essential constancy of the relative wage implies that individuals face small costs of switching sectors and we quantify the relative importance of labor supply and demand factors in the growth of the service sector we specify and estimate a two sector labor market equilibrium model that allows us to address these empirical issues in a unified framework our estimates imply that there are large mobility costs output in both sectors would have been double their current levels if these mobility costs had been zero in addition we find that demand side factors that is technological change and movements in product and capital prices were responsible for the growth of the service sector

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

optimal contracts in a continuous time delegated portfolio management problem this article studies the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous time principal agent framework optimal contracts are obtained in closed form these contracts are of a symmetric form and suggest that a portfolio manager should receive a fixed fee a fraction of the total assets under management plus a bonus or a penalty depending upon the portfolio s excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio the appropriate benchmark portfolio is an active index that contains risky assets where the number of shares invested in each asset can vary over time rather than a passive index in which the number of shares invested in each asset remains constant over time fund managers compensation schemes in a delegated portfolio management setting have been of special interest to both academics and practitioners academic interest stems in part from the rapid growth of managed funds over the last two decades gompers and metrick 1998 report that by december 1996 mutual funds pension funds and other financial intermediaries held discretional control over more than half of the u s equity market it is thus of importance to study the impact of institutional trading on asset prices and to integrate into one model both asset pricing and delegated portfolio management compensation as advocated by brennan 1993 allen and santomero 1997 and allen 2001 it is also important to understand the relationship between a manager s trading strategies and his implicit incentives or career concerns see e g brown harlow and starks 1996 brown goetzmann and park 1997 chevalier and ellison 1999 and chen and pennacchi 2000 these concerns include internal promotion from a small to a large fund higher outside offers and the flow of money through the fund under management 1 the importance of fund manager compensation is also underscored by congressional passage in 1970 of the amendment to

sale of price information by exchanges does it promote price discovery exchanges sell both trading services and price information we study how the joint pricing of these products affects price discovery and the distribution of gains from trade in an asset market a wider dissemination of price information reduces pricing errors and the transfer from liquidity traders to speculators this effect reduces the fee that speculators are willing to pay for trading therefore to raise its revenue from trading a for profit exchange optimally charges a high fee for price information so that only a fraction of speculators buy this information as a result price discovery is not as efficient as it would be with free price information this problem is less severe if the exchange must compensate liquidity traders for a fraction of their losses this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

the role of information acquisition and financial markets in international macroeconomic adjustment abstract international macroeconomic adjustment to money supply aggregate expenditure and relative demand disturbances is analyzed within a framework which emphasizes the role of information agents are unable to directly observe disturbances and may become fully informed about disturbances only by purchasing information we analyze how relative price and exchange rate adjustment depends on the variances of the underlying disturbances while taking into account the incentive to acquire information we also discuss the conditions which are necessary to preclude a free rider problem whereby uninformed agents are able to extract from observation of financial market conditions the exact information of the information buyers

multi period information markets abstract this article examines the single shot decision problem of a monopolistic information seller selling a flow of information in a dynamic framework in a generalized version of wang s 1993 economy it shows that the profit maximizing strategy of the seller is to sell his information as is but only to a fraction of traders it argues that this strategy of selling information is different from that in a static model mainly due to the very different nature of constraints faced by the information seller in a dynamic framework

firm characteristics and analyst following abstract this paper examines the major determinants of the number of analysts following a firm a simple model of analyst following is proposed and several firm characteristics are suggested that are likely to influence the extent of a firm s analyst following by either affecting the aggregate demand for or supply of analyst services or both for the firm almost all of these characteristics are found to be strongly significant in affecting the extent of analyst following of firms and the empirical results generally accord well with economic intuition

the employment and wage effects of oil price changes a sectoral analysis in this paper we use micro panel data to examine the effects of oil price changes on employment and real wages at the aggregate and industry levels we also measure differences in the employment and wage responses for workers differentiated on the basis of skill level we find that oil price increases result in a substantial decline in real wages for all workers but raise the relative wage of skilled workers the use of panel data econometric techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity is essential to uncover this result which is completely hidden in ols estimates while the short run effect of an oil price increase on aggregate employment is negative the long run effect is in fact positive we find that changes in oil prices induce changes in employment shares and relative wages across industries however we find little evidence that oil price changes cause labor to consistently flow into those sectors with relative wage increases copyright 1996 by mit press

market equilibria with endogenous hierarchical information abstract a competitive industry in which there is both stochastic demand and a production lag is examined all agents observe costless endogenous information prices and informed agents also observe costly exogenous information solutions for market equilibria are found under quite general conditions a number of issues are examined including 1 1 the way in which prices transmit information from the informed to the uninformed 2 2 how the specification of the private information set and of the stochastic processes driving demand influence market equilibria 3 3 whether the equilibrium distribution of information may expected to be hierarchical and 4 4 whether the equilibrium distribution of information is socially optimal

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

job finding and separation rates in the oecd abstract we provide a set of comparable estimates of average monthly job finding and separation rates for over 20 oecd countries that can be used for the cross country analysis of labor markets

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed