campaign spending and senate elections 1978 84 this paper uses a sample of recent senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts and incumbent spending helps incumbent re election while both types of spending have diminishing returns the effects are asymmetrical challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers these results can explain why senate incumbents spend money why they typically outspend their challenger and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing

corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

incomplete contracts and privatization the paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization furthermore a simple model of privatization to an owner manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency in this model privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint

groundwater management efficiency and equity considerations abstract groundwater has the characteristics of commonly owned property and its use is likely to be inefficient in the absence of regulation several management tools can be used to regulate groundwater withdrawals with no one tool dominating the others in terms of efficiency of water use however the welfare distributional effects of various management schemes on individual users who vary in their derived demands for groundwater might be quite substantial and different users may find considerably different schemes attractive the equity problems associated with the division of management benefits may dominate the decisions about support of or opposition to groundwater management and hence they must be undertaken with considerable care and resolved by consensus among users although the negotiations are expected to be extensive and complicated there is a substantial basis for agreement because all users stand to gain the question is who will gain the most

building and managing facilities for public services abstract we model alternative institutional arrangements for building and managing facilities for provision of public services including the use of the private finance initiative pfi by exploring the effects on innovative investment activity by providers the desirability of bundling the building and management operations is analyzed and it is considered whether it is optimal to allocate ownership to the public or the private sector we also examine how the case for pfi is affected by the voluntary or automatic transfer of ownership from the private to the public sector when the contract expires asset specificity and service demand risk play critical roles

pareto improving water management over space and time the honolulu case we model welfare gains from efficient allocation of groundwater over space and time relative to the status quo policy of financial cost recovery in order to promote political feasibility an intertemporal compensation plan is devised that renders the reform pareto improving gainers from the reform finance the compensation in proportion to their benefits through a block pricing scheme for the honolulu case only 7 of the 441 million in gains to winners is needed to compensate losers from the reform future winners from the reform also repay the deficit created by the compensation package much as state and local governments finance capital improvements copyright 2009 oxford university press

competition among officials and the abuse of power traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption however empirical evidence does not yet support this view in this paper i show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself while competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government corruption at the higher level of government is increased to avoid widespread theft from the central authority competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist hence even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus it may reduce welfare

does emigration reduce corruption we study the effects of emigration on bribery experience and attitudes towards corruption in the migrants countries of origin using data from the gallup balkan monitor survey and instrumental variable analysis we find that having relatives abroad reduces the likelihood of bribing public officials renders bribe taking behavior by public officials less acceptable and reduces the likelihood of being asked for bribes by public officials receiving monetary remittances does not change the beneficial effects regarding bribe paying and attitudes toward corruption however remittances counteract the beneficial effect on bribe solicitations by public officials overall our findings support the conjecture that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination to source countries

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

corruption is bad for growth even in the united states we estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in u s states we improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption we find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states

the economics of conjunctive groundwater management with stochastic surface supplies abstract groundwater management with stochastic surface flows and artificial recharge is considered theoretical analysis characterizes the decision rules and establishes conditions for convergence of socially optimal and common property withdrawals and pumping lifts to limiting probability distributions an empirical application to kern county california finds that optimal withdrawals are generally increasing in hydraulic head and decreasing in surface flows however nonmonotone behavior is observed in some instances artificial recharge is not observed in the limiting distribution due to an interaction of several factors optimal management implies relatively small gains over unregulated groundwater use when preferences are risk neutral

optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered consider a non governmental organization ngo that can invest in a public good should the government or the ngo own the public project in an incomplete contracting framework with split the difference bargaining besley and ghatak 2001 argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner we demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split the difference rule is replaced by the deal me out solution our finding is in contrast to the private good results of chiu 1998 and de meza and lockwood 1998 who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split the difference rule or the deal me out solution is used

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

the demand for irrigation water in the high plains of texas 1957 80 a new method of calculating groundwater pumpage is used to estimate water demand these results are used via the gisser sanchez model to show that pumpage regulation is unlikely to be beneficial in the texas high plains a sensitivity analysis is performed on present value profits under optimal control and competitive schemes using different water demand slope and intercept values the results indicate that the gisser sanchez rule is useful in determining the divergence in pumpage time paths and percentage difference in profits under the two schemes but it is not insightful in determining the nominal difference in profits

bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks abstract this paper investigates the principal s bundling decision during a procurement auction for a project consisting of two sequential tasks in which task externality exists and information arrives sequentially we show that although increasing the number of bidders in the market for the second task always tilts the principal s choice toward unbundling increasing the number of consortiums that can perform both tasks tilts the principal s preference toward bundling if the externality is negative

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

asset ownership and contractibility of interaction in a property rights framework i study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives the model nests standard property rights and hold up models as special cases i admit general message dependent contracts but provide conditions under which noncontingent contracts are optimal first the article contributes to the foundation of the property rights theory i characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible second i study how the optimal use of the incentive instruments depends on the environment finally the model offers a new perspective on the classic fisher body case and produces implications that are empirically testable

cadillac desert revisited property rights public policy and water resource depletion to alleviate arizona s dependence on groundwater the federal government subsidized construction of the central arizona project cap to import water from the colorado river in exchange for the subsidy arizona reformed its groundwater law to eliminate common property pumping and to ban groundwater mining after the year 2025 we build a model of water resource development in which imported water is a capacity constrained backstop the model is applied to quantify the welfare effects of alternative cap construction dates and arizona groundwater laws we reach two general conclusions first cap was completed 86 years too early in 1987 at a deadweight loss of 2 612 billion ironically construction in 1987 yielded lower surplus than never constructing cap second the political exchange of reform for subsidy introduced a greater loss 2 612 billion than it corrected 0 810 billion the exchange was worse than doing nothing at all

bargaining position bargaining power and the property rights approach in the property rights approach to the theory of the firm hart 1995 parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non contractible investments have been made most contributions apply the regular nash bargaining solution we explore the implications of using the generalized nash bargaining solution a prominent finding regarding the suboptimality of joint ownership turns out to be robust however in contrast to the standard property rights model it may well be optimal to give ownership to a party whose investments are less productive provided that this party s ex post bargaining power is relatively small

empirical determinants of corruption a sensitivity analysis many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption this paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set a global sensitivity analysis based on the leamer s extreme bounds analysis gives a clear answer five variables are robustly related to corruption corruption is lower in richer countries where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period and the population is mainly protestant corruption is instead higher where political instability is a major problem finally a country s colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption

benefits from groundwater management magnitude sensitivity and distribution empirical estimates of benefits from groundwater management are reported for an area in california with heavy reliance on groundwater supplies benefits are quite sensitive to the water demand schedule and interest rate but less sensitive to other parameters however in all cases considered the increases in welfare from groundwater management are less than ten percent tax revenues received under a system of pump taxes are four to five times as large as the benefits from management thus groundwater users gain under a system of quotas but may suffer substantial welfare losses under pump taxes

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

can corruption foster regulatory compliance the legal and economic literatures overwhelmingly support the notion that regulatory compliance is always less in the presence of corruption this paper departs from those literatures and shows that whenever public officials are paid fixed wages an increase in corruption may actually foster compliance the conditions that make this possible are laid down in a theoretical model empirical evidence that corroborates the theoretical findings is provided using firm level data for 26 transition economies

income distributional effects of using market based instruments for managing common property resources in this article the authors show the trade offs between efficiency and equity that arise from the application of market based instruments to a heterogenous population of agents drawing from a natural resource pool using the example of groundwater they find that there are overall losses in allocative efficiency when the centralized planner is constrained by equity considerations and that the distribution of gains or losses to management becomes skewed asymmetrically across agents these results demonstrate the importance of considering both efficiency gains and disparities in distributional inequity when designing policy instruments that create winners and losers with potentially serious sociopolitical ramifications

using tradable water permits in irrigated agriculture the present paper examines both theoretically and empirically the environmental and economic benefits of introducing a policy to optimally manage groundwater used in irrigated agriculture and the efficiency potential of allowing trading of water permits we confirm the results appearing separately in the literature on optimal resource management and tradable permits that both tradable water permits and non tradable quotas provide the basic mechanism for sustainable water use and yield substantial economic benefits and that allowing trading of water permits improves efficiency in order to derive the above results we develop a discrete time model to realistically describe farmer s myopic behavior while using a continuous time model to describe optimal management we also incorporate into the analysis the economic effect of sea water intrusion in the aquifer and we estimate the cost of water overexploitation under myopic behavior the empirical part of the paper is based on simulations using data from an agricultural region in northern greece the main contribution of the paper is the introduction of heterogeneity in crops production and market characteristics we show that the more diverse are the crops in technology and market prices and the stricter is the water constraint the higher are the benefits from using a tradable water permit system

on partial contracting this paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor s and the receiver s incentives to cooperate in the future we define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible contractible control actions or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible transferable control actions under incomplete information when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

groundwater use under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in a two cell aquifer under incomplete information a novel assumption is that individual users have incomplete knowledge of the speed of lateral flows in the aquifer although a user is aware that his neighbor s water use has some influence on his future water stock he is uncertain about the degree of this impact we find that the lack of information may either increase or decrease the rate of water use and welfare in a two period framework the relevant characteristic is the ratio of the periodic marginal benefits of water use depending on whether this ratio is convex or concave the average speed with which the aquifer is depleted decreases or increases when users learn more about the local hydrologic properties of groundwater in principle welfare may decrease even in cases when the groundwater allocation is closer to the efficient groundwater allocation

the determinants of corruption in transition economies abstract this paper examines the determinants of corruption in transition economies we found that the progress of structural reform comprising marketization rule of law and democratization had a crucial impact on the extent of corruption control in former socialist countries

fiscal consequences of public corruption empirical evidence from state bond ratings empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention we empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the united states on state bond ratings which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt after controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt

current issues in the economics of groundwater resource management the issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource in this article we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity we present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels in particular we critically review economic models of groundwater use examine the potential for groundwater management discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use allocation of this resource finally we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms

quality and outside capacity in the provision of health services abstract this paper studies the effects of non contractibility of investment on the choices made by a health authority and a hospital which supplies a specific service non contractibility determines inefficiencies compared with any pareto efficient outcome the quality of the service chosen by the hospital is too low and the health authority relies too much on outside providers

the effects of well management and the nature of the aquifer on groundwater resources we compare groundwater use under collective well management in china where village leaders allocate water among households and under private well management where farmers either pump from their own wells or buy water from wells owned by other farmers villages are divided into connected or isolated groups depending on whether there are lateral groundwater flows between aquifers underlying a village and neighboring ones in rural china households under collective well management use less water even under collective management households located in connected villages use more water indicating that the connectedness of the aquifers may undermine leaders incentives to conserve water

competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource the groundwater case abstract in this paper socially optimal and private extraction of a common property aquifer are compared open loop equilibrium and feedback equilibrium in linear strategies have been computed to characterize private extraction the use of these two equilibrium concepts allows us to distinguish between cost and strategic externalities as long as the open loop solution captures only the cost externality and the feedback solution captures both the results show that strategic behaviour increases the overexploitation of the aquifer compared to the open loop solution however if the groundwater storage capacity is large the difference between the socially optimal and private extraction the latter characterized by a feedback equilibrium is negligible

limited contract enforcement and strategic renegotiation this paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation in this theory suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past the authors develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motivate renegotiation copyright 1988 by american economic association

public versus private ownership quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks abstract the government wants a certain good or service to be provided should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed building on the incomplete contracting approach we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can have important effects on investment incentives which has been neglected in the literature so far we also study how the tasks of investing in quality improvements and cost reductions should be assigned we show how the optimal contracts and governance structures depend on the exogenous parameters of the model such as the nature of the investments and the parties bargaining powers

nature of human capital technology and ownership of public goods abstract besley and ghatak 2001 show that a public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good the most irrespective of technological factors in this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and we show that the relative valuations are not the sole determinant of an optimal ownership structure but also the nature of human capital and technology matter

a dynamic approach to pes pricing and finance for interlinked ecosystem services watershed conservation and groundwater management a theory of payment for ecosystem services pes pricing consistent with dynamic efficiency and sustainable income requires optimized shadow prices since ecosystem services are generally interdependent this requires joint optimization across multiple resource stocks we develop such a theory in the context of watershed conservation and groundwater extraction the optimal program can be implemented with a decentralized system of ecosystem payments to private watershed landowners financed by efficiency prices of groundwater set by a public utility the theory is extended to cases where land is publicly owned conservation instruments exhibit non convexities on private land or the size of a conservation project is exogenous in these cases conservation investment can be financed from benefit taxation of groundwater consumers while volumetric conservation surcharges induce inefficient water use a dynamic lump sum tax finances investment without distorting incentives since the optimal level of conservation is generated as long as payments are correct at the margin any surplus can be returned to consumers through appropriate block pricing the present value gain in consumer surplus generated by the conservation induced reduction in groundwater scarcity serves as a lower bound to the benefits of conservation without explicit measurement of other benefits such as recreation biodiversity and cultural values

corruption and growth under weak identification i introduction the purpose of this paper is to revisit mauro 1995 and re examine his results as a consequence of recent research that cautions against making traditional types of inference in the presence of weak instruments early work done by nelson and startz 1990a 1990b demonstrates that the distribution of the two stage least squares 2sls estimator and the t statistic is poorly approximated by the asymptotic representation when instruments are weak more formally staiger and stock 1997 model the coefficients on the instruments in the first stage equation in the n sup 1 2 neighborhood of zero in which they show that the 2sls estimator loses consistency resulting in a nonstandard distribution for the t statistic in fact they show that under the local to zero framework the distribution of the t statistic depends on the level of endogeneity strength and the number of instruments thus the true size of the t statistic can differ substantially from its perceived size when instruments are weak therefore 95 confidence intervals based on asymptotic approximations such as or 1 96se are no longer reliable as a rough rule of thumb staiger and stock 1997 suggest a first stage f stat of 10 on the excluded instruments as an indication of acceptable instruments in terms of point estimation bound jaeger and baker 1995 show that the 2sls estimator is biased in the same direction as the ordinary least squares ols when using irrelevant instruments hahn and hausman 2002 illustrate a detailed expression for the 2sls bias showing that it is monotonically decreasing in the instrument strength while monotonically increasing in the degree of endogeneity cruz and moreira 2005 verify these results through monte carlo simulations also showing that the classic bias corrected 2sls estimator of nagar 1959 provides a poor correction when instruments are very weak given that the theory and techniques mentioned above were discovered and developed after mauro wrote his qje paper we attempt to reproduce his results and analyze them in light of these recent findings from the early work of left 1964 and huntington 1968 corruption in government has been of great interest to economists these studies argue that corruption could be positively correlated with economic performance in the presence of a thick and cumbersome bureaucracy corruption in this view greases the wheels of bureaucracy thus increasing the efficiency in which transactions occur leading to a positive effect on the economic performance of a country on the other hand rose ackerman 1978 murphy shleifer and vishny 1991 1993 and shleifer and vishny 1993 provide theoretical arguments that corruption deteriorates economic growth through the misallocation of talent and other resources mauro 1995 being the first to introduce instrumental variables ivs in the cross country growth literature contributes to this debate by examining empirically the relationship between two measures of corruption and investment and economic growth his results suggest that corruption has a negative impact on investment and economic growth the significance of his results varies with model specifications but the results appear to be robust when correcting for the endogeneity of corruption using the ethnolinguistic fractionalization elf index as an iv he employs 2sls estimation to correct for endogeneity created by the two measures of corruption mauro 1995 s work has been of great value in the corruption literature and has had profound influence on the direction of policy making the paper is one of the most cited papers not just in the literature on corruption but in economics in general 1 given the impact that the paper has undoubtedly had on the direction of research we find it necessary and relevant to revisit the paper in light of the recent developments in the field of econometrics

additional incumbent spending really can harm at least some incumbents an analysis of vote share maximization the literature on the effects of campaign expenditures on electoral outcomes implicitly suggests that incumbent spending cannot have a negative marginal impact on the incumbent s vote share indeed that literature has spent a great deal of effort finding positive and significant effects of incumbent spending this paper shows that there are circumstances under which theory predicts zero and even negative impacts of incumbent spending estimating equations derived from the theory provide strong support for the base model though only weak support for the extensions which predict nonpositive marginal products for incumbents

global economic crisis and corruption we study the effects of the 2008 2009 global economic crisis on the household experience of bribing public officials the data come from the life in transition 2 survey conducted in 2010 in 30 post socialist economies of central and eastern europe and central asia we find that households hit by crisis are more likely to bribe and among people who bribe crisis victims bribe a wider range of public officials than non victims the crisis victims are also more likely to pay bribes because public officials ask them to do so and less likely because of gratitude the link between crisis and bribery is stronger in the poorest countries of the region our findings support the conjecture that public officials misuse sensitive information about crisis victims to inform bribe extortion decisions

what determines corruption international evidence from microdata this paper uses a microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals who live in those countries in addition it investigates the determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual level the results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery examples are gender income education marital status the city size the country s unemployment rate average education and the strength of the institutions in the country jel k4 d73 p16

government versus private ownership of public goods the role of bargaining frictions abstract the government and a non governmental organization ngo can invest in the provision of a public good who should be the owner of the public project in an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions the party that values the public good most should be the owner regardless of technological aspects however under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties valuations we show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought

information and the coase theorem abstract some economists think the coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez faire others see it as a mere tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient the coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely of course we can attribute inefficiencies to bargaining imperfection but it may not be useful to do so such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason this article gives one economist s reasoned view it discusses the coase theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting it considers mechanism design for revealing private information and describes the problems of centralization should the coase theorem should be viewed as a second best result property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative does the coase theorem recommend an institution or make

joint quantity quality management of groundwater economic literature on groundwater managementhas traditionally been split into two areas there are papers that evaluate different schemes of dynamicaquifer management considering that pumping costs vary with stock but ignoring water quality on the other hand there are papers that considercontamination problems caused by specificpollutants this paper presents two alternative models for joint quantity quality management and it shows that existing models are in fact special cases of these the framework isdynamic and considers both the stock of waterquantity and a stock measure of water quality optimal taxes are derived and shown to be different from those in existing quantity only or quality only models implementationproblems are briefly discussed

strategic behavior and efficiency in the common property extraction of groundwater groundwater has always been regarded as a common property resource where entry is restricted by land ownership and private exploitation is inefficient in 1980 gisser and sanchez presented a first estimation of this inefficiency cornparing socially optimal exploitation with private competitive exploitation using a model with linear water demand average extraction cost independent of the rate of extraction and linearly decreasing with respect to the water table level they characterized the private exploitation of the aquifer assuming that farmers are myopic and choose their rate of extraction to maximize their current profits whereas optimal exploitation is obtained by maximizing the present value of the stream of aggregate profits their results show that if the storage capacity of the aquifer is relatively large the difference between the two systems is so small that it can be ignored for practical consideration this result has been called the gisser sanchez rule by nieswiadomy 1985 and it has and important policy implication regulation of the resource does not seem justified since the profits it brings are not very high 1

sweet and sour changes in trade regimes sugar is an important export for a number of developing countries especially in the african caribbean and pacific regions in many of these countries preferential access to the eu market has been a key factor to develop their sugar sectors the recent and proposed changes to the international sugar trade regimes particularly in the eu are threatening this preferential access we study the possible implications of such changes on acp countries sugar production and exports by using a spatial price equilibrium model specifically developed for the sugar market the results suggest that the effects of these changes are likely to vary according to the prevailing level of world sugar market price and according to whether acp countries are current exporters to the eu

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

campaign contributions and congressional voting does the timing of contributions matter theoretical and empirical studies do not address whether campaign contributions from more than one election cycle are important for congressional voting behavior further they do not address whether campaign contributions from different periods have different effects on legislative voting behavior this paper analyzes the cumulative effect of campaign contributions over two time periods moreover this paper studies the importance of the timing of contributions for legislative voting behavior ten roll call votes on price supports and quotas for various farm commodities in 1981 and 1985 are analyzed most of the estimated contribution coefficients are statistically significant the results show that without campaign contributions farm interest would have lost in five of the seven votes that were won moreover contributions that were given at approximately the same time as the vote have a larger impact on voting behavior than contributions that the legislator received one or two years prior to the vote copyright 1995 by mit press

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

on the individual decisions to commit corruption a methodological complement this paper contributes to the analysis of corruption by complementing two different methodologies to determine the behavior of citizens who participate in corruption acts focusing in mexico a quantitative analysis combined with a survey and econometric techniques is used to determine sociodemographic and institutional factors affecting such behavior and complemented by focus groups collecting some knowledge on how informal institutions and norms could promote or block corrupt behavior it is shown that there is a trade off between perceptions social dynamics and individual incentives for corrupt behavior within an institutional framework creating a kind of vicious circle difficult to break up