the effects of fiscal policies when incomes are uncertain a contradiction to ricardian equivalence this paper shows that when future earnings are uncertain the substitution of deficit fin ance for tax finance or the introduction of an unfunded social secur ity program can raise consumption even if all bequests reflect inter generational altruism an operative bequest motive therefore need not imply ricardian equivalence this conclusion follows from the result derived in the paper that the uncertainty of future income makes t he existence of a future bequest uncertain to the prospective donor copyright 1988 by american economic association

laboratory tests of equilibrium predictions with disequilibrium data we examine a common practice used within previous studies of laboratory markets testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium we examine the effect of this practice when it is applied to some laboratory markets where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium our data suggest that for our markets significantly different equilibrium test results would be obtained when using all data available in market periods analysed in previous studies rather than using only equilibrium data for our markets choices made in disequilibrium are quite different from those in equilibrium this paper is primarily concerned with examining one common practice used in previous studies of laboratory markets this practice is testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium the data set used typically consists of all available laboratory data from the last period an average of the last few periods an average of all periods or from the nth period for some fixed n i know of no attempt at least formally to assure all data were from markets in equilibrium markets where market choices have stabilized recently some laboratory markets were run where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium could the use of disequilibrium data significantly affect the results of tests we might make of some equilibrium models for these laboratory markets this practice would be desirable if the disequilibrium data provided a useful estimate of the behaviour that would have been observed if an equilibrium had been obtained on the other hand if some disequilibrium behaviour is qualitatively different from the behaviour that would be observed in an equilibrium this practice could produce misleading results within this paper we examine the effect of this practice when it is used on our laboratory data

competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts we study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers can subsequently receive discounts with some probability such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing even though bargainers receive reductions off the posted prices the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure in the market thus raising all prices and increasing profits welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts which generates some misallocation of products to consumers stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation

are the discounts on closed end funds a sentiment index in investor sentiment and the closed end fund puzzle charles lee andrei shleifer and richard thaler 1991 claim to solve not one but two longstanding puzzles discounts on closed end funds and the small firm effect both according to lee et al are driven by the same waves of small investor sentiment killing two such elusive birds with one stone would be a neat trick indeed if lee et al could bring it off but they can t measured properly the comovement between fund discounts and small firm returns is neither strong enough nor robust enough to support their common sentiment story the case of lee et al rests mainly on their key table iv in which monthly returns for 10 separate size grouped portfolios are regressed on monthly changes in the discount of a value weighted portfolio of closed end funds avwd and the monthly return on a value weighted portfolio of nyse firms vwny for their twenty year sample period running from july 1965 to december 1985 lee et al find changes in the value weighted discount holding market returns constant to be positively related to the returns of the largest firms decile 10 but negatively related to those of all other size deciles the negative coefficient is largest for the very small firms in decile 1 leading lee et al to conclude that when individual investors become optimistic about closed end funds and smaller stocks these stocks do well and discounts narrow and when individual investors become pessimistic about closed end funds and smaller stocks smaller stocks do badly and discounts widen pp 94 95 could the observed relation between fund discounts and small firm returns be just a chance sampling fluctuation lee et al checked for robustness by dividing their sample in half and rerunning their regressions on each half separately their table vii they found the coefficient of avwd in the decile 1 regression dropped in the second subperiod by 80 percent and in absolute size fell to barely one standard error from zero similar attenuation in size and significance was noted for all other size groups the virtual disappearance of the relation between the discounts and small firm returns after 1975 might have led other researchers to abandon a common sentiment hypothesis but not lee shleifer and thaler they see

the effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer markets abstract we report the results of six posted offer market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path to competitive equilibrium the posted offer experiments are compared with twelve double auction experiments reported by smith and williams 1982 results differ markedly across trading institutions unlike trading under double auction rules we cannot reject the proposition that contract price convergence paths are unaffected by the distribution of consumer and producer surplus posted offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from above regardless of the distribution of the exchange surplus

return seasonality in stocks and their underlying assets tax loss selling versus information explanations results of tests contrasting tax loss selling with intertemporal information variation as explanations of the january seasonal in stock returns are reported closed end fund shares display the typical size related january seasonal while their net asset values do not interpreting the net asset value return as a proxy for information about underlying assets this result indicates information variation is not a necessary condition for the january effect in stocks the share returns at the turn of the year are negatively related to their mean preceding year returns and positively related to the standard deviations of their preceding year returns these results are consistent with tax loss selling article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

discussion of a laboratory investigation of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship the first question concerned the assumption of risk neutrality of both the principals and agents in the models specifically given this assumption it was not clear what element s in the modeling or experimental design precluded the principal s from simply selling or renting the firm to the agent s more important the risk neutrality assumption has a direct effect on the predictions of the models the experimental results and their interpretation finally it was suggested that new experimental techniques such as those developed by berg et al forthcoming might be used to induce specific risk preferences given a particular model to be tested and its attendant experimental design although these techniques have not been fully tested using them may reduce the need to make assumptions about subjects risk preferences and thereby overcome the kinds of questions raised on this issue a second issue dealt with why the experimental study of the moral hazard problem in the principal agent relationship was carried out in a market setting with several principals and agents rather than following

collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions we study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle in experimental multi object ascending auctions in these institutions low price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff inferior equilibria achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation we provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication the results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment auctions for timber cars oil drilling rights and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultaneously in multi object ascending auctions the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked in these auctions bidders can profit by splitting the markets by acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects the bidders lower the price they must pay as opposed to the sealed bid auction the ascending auction format provides bidders with the opportunity to coordinate tacitly on dividing markets and to punish non collusive bidding thus low price collusive equilibria co exist along with high price competitive equilibria even in a non repeated setting brusco and lopomo 2002 if there are complementarities in bidder values across objects and auctions are repeated bidders may further benefit by splitting the markets over time and taking turns in buying packages at low prices these opportunities make the multi object ascending auction an ideal institution for the study of equilibrium selection assuming that communication between the bidders is limited to the bidding any splitting of the markets must be tacitly coordinated in the early stages of the auction thus achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation while such tacit coordination is possible in theory it is an empirical question of whether it may be achieved in practice

the effects of group composition in a strategic environment evidence from a field experiment abstract recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision making this line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision making environment potentially miss critical features this study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally our experimental laboratory is large open air markets where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations this permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions and show that deviations from nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership

communication and coordination in a two stage game we study the impact of communication on behavior in a two stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs we test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head to head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies in particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict avoidance take turn strategy can emerge first our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game second many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs third communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate

the exercise of market power in laboratory experiments douglas d davis and charles a holt march 1998 introduction many aspects of antitrust policy are influenced by the possibility that sellers in concentrated markets may have the power to raise prices above competitive levels of course anyone can raise price so the issue is whether a change in structure e g a merger will allow one or more sellers to raise price profitably a price increase by one seller diverts sales to others so a firm is more likely to have market power when its competitors have limited capacity to expand their sales thus a merger that reduces competitors capacity may create market power in laboratory experiments any treatment that reassigns units of capacity from one seller to another may create or destroy market power even if the aggregate supply curve is unchanged for example giving one seller a relatively large endowment of infra marginal low cost units may make it less risky for this seller to raise price and forego the sale of high cost units thus it is not surprising that experiments with apparently similar supply and demand structures may yield different price outcomes as discussed below there are a number of other ways in which structural changes can affect the degree of power that sellers enjoy market power can also be sensitive to the trading institution and this is the context that power issues first arose in experimental economics for example the public posting of uniform prices in a posted offer auction eliminates the incentive to offer discounts on marginal units that arises in a double auction in fact smith 1981 found that even monopolists are sometimes unable to maintain prices above competitive levels in double auctions whereas supra competitive prices are the norm in postedoffer monopolies similarly holt langan and villamil 1986 found that sellers in concentrated double auctions were sometimes able to raise prices but that prices fell to competitive levels in about half of the sessions despite the high concentration of seller capacity davis and williams 1991 replicated the holt langan and villamil results for double auctions and then used the same market

large market shocks and abnormal closed end fund price behaviour abstract this paper investigates the short term price behaviour of closed end funds following eight large market wide shocks the findings from a sample of 63 funds continuously traded on the london stock exchange indicate that prices overreact relative to equilibrium given by net asset values the speed of reversion in discounts following market wide shocks is slower than that following fund specific shocks of a similar magnitude the post shock persistence in discounts is related more to the ease of arbitrage rather than to liquidity as proxied by fund size or to the speed of recovery in the broader market the discount decays more slowly for those funds that are difficult to arbitrage

the effects of discounting opportunities in laboratory posted offer markets abstract this experiment isolates the effects of allowing sellers to offer private discounts from posted prices although discounting was pervasive when permitted it did not always improve performance high prices and low efficiencies were observed in half of the discount markets

the impact of institutional investors on mergers and acquisitions in the united kingdom abstract in this paper we investigate the impact of institutional ownership on uk mergers and acquisitions we employ a comprehensive sample of m as conducted by uk acquirers from 2000 to 2010 thus including a full cycle of peak and trough in m a waves we find that institutional investors increase the likelihood of an m a to be a large cross border deal opting for full control moreover institutional ownership concentration and foreign institutional ownership increase the likelihood of cross border m as in addition we assess the influence of institutional shareholders investment horizon and find that while investment horizon have a negative influence in encouraging cross border m as the presence of long term investors encourages larger m as finally even after controlling for the 2007 08 financial crisis the market reacts negatively to the announcement of cross border m as

the effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade abstract mindful of the market structure conduct performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance we compare posted offer markets where sellers but not buyers are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups 1 posted offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities 2 double auction markets with conspiratorial opportunities and 3 posted offer markets with true single seller monopolists the basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are 1 seller conspiracies in posted offer markets tend to raise prices but not profits relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies 2 posted offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices but not profits than double auction conspiracies and 3 posted offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits but not prices then posted offer conspiracies

optimal stock trading with personal taxes implications for prices and the abnormal january returns abstract the tax law confers upon the investor a timing option to realize capital losses and defer capital gains with the tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half the short term rate the law provides a second timing option to realize losses short term and gains long term if at all our theory and simulation over the 1962 1977 period establish that taxable investors should realize long term gains in high variance stocks and repurchase stock in order to realize potential future losses short term tax trading does not explain the small firm anomaly but predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices the january anomaly only if investors are irrational or ignorant of the price seasonality

seasonal fluctuations in industrial production and stock market seasonals february and august peaks in the growth rates of the seasonally unadjusted industrial production index follow the stock market peaks documented by rozeff and kinney 1976 by one month coefficients on one month lead growth rates in industrial production for small firms are positive and significant in time series regressions even in the presence of the market factor moreover whereas returns on large firms stocks unidirectionally gran ger cause i e predict future growth rates in industrial production at least six months in advance returns on small firms stocks reflect one month lead as well as past growth rates in industrial production for these reasons we argue that seasonal real growth provides a partial explanation for the january stock seasonal among small firms

mergers and investment incentives this paper explores the effects of mergers on the investment incentives of the levered firm and on levered firm value under a fairly broad set of assumptions it is shown that most firm combinations improve investment incentives bringing about a reduction in the agency costs of underinvestment associated with risky debt the effect of the merger on debt and equity claim values is also explored if not properly anticipated the merger may create a wealth transfer from equity holders to bondholders such a wealth transfer includes but is not limited to the coinsurance effect

information sophistication and foreign versus domestic investors performance abstract using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity we study foreign and domestic investors trading activities and investment performance ahead of open ending events of taiwanese closed end funds simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open ending generates large abnormal returns all information required to execute this strategy is made public so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade holding constant access to information foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open endings more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large and forego large abnormal returns the results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

optimal trading with mean reverting prices switching between foreign stocks and closed end country funds we develop a model based on options theory which shows the optimal trading strategy for switching between two similar assets when the difference in their prices is mean reverting statistical tests indicate that most closed end country funds discounts are mean reverting using empirical estimates of the volatility and rate of mean reversion of these funds we derive the optimal switch points and simulate the trading profits associated with switching between country funds and their foreign equities and vice versa whenever the optimal switch points are reached

the hayek hypothesis in experimental auctions institutional effects and market power the hayek hypothesis in experimental auctions institutional effects and market power we report twelve market experiments utilizing a seller market power supply and demand structure where two of five sellers can unilaterally increase their profit by withholding supply the data indicate that both the double auction and posted offer institutions result in traders extracting the bulk of the potential gains from exchange in the market however prices generally occur above the competitive equilibrium prediction market power in the form of strategic supply withholding does not appear to be responsible for the supra competitive prices i introduction one important result arising from experimental market research is that the information flows and contracting rules which define the institutional structure of a market can exert a pronounced influence on market performance such institutional features may be more important than some traditional structural characteristics in determining whether market outcomes will correspond to the predictions of the competitive model in particular a large and growing body of experimental data suggests that markets can generate efficient outcomes even when there are a relatively small number of buyers and sellers with incomplete information on the underlying structure of the market based on evidence from a wide variety of experimental double auction markets vernon smith 1982 167 has expressed this more formally as the hayek hypothesis markets economize on information in the sense that strict privacy together with the public messages of the market are sufficient to produce efficient ce competitive equilibrium outcomes in this statement however the notion of an efficient ce outcome could be interpreted as 1 a simple efficiency claim that all exchange surplus will be extracted or 2 a price claim that all exchange surplus will be extracted via trades at the competitive equilibrium price a recent study by holt langan and villamil 1986 hereafter hlv examines the validity of the hayek hypothesis using the double auction institution and a market structure designed to provide a rather difficult test for the competitive model hlv s market power design provides a subset of sellers with an incentive to unilaterally generate a price increase via the strategic withholding of supply the resulting price deviation from the competitive equilibrium is substantial but results in a relatively small loss of market efficiency thus the price interpretation of the hayek hypothesis is violated in this design if holders of market power recognize their position and successfully affect prices to their advantage the efficiency interpretation however will still hold approximately even with the successful exercise of market power in fact the price interpretation of the hayek hypothesis tends to break down in hlv s markets but the efficiency interpretation tends to hold hlv report deviations from the competitive equilibrium price consistent with the exercise of market power in three of five seller market power experiments they also conjecture that deviations from the competitive equilibrium may increase as participants become more experienced with the trading institution this paper reports the results of twelve experiments that build on hlv s research our experiments compare market performance in hlv s seller market power smp design using both the double auction and posted offer trading institutions our purpose in conducting these experiments is twofold first we are interested in examining the effects of changes in trading institutions on deviations from the competitive equilibrium price in the smp design second to the extent that competitive equilibrium price deviations are observed we are interested in assessing whether the exercise of market power in the form of strategic withholding is the source of these deviations

misspecification of capital asset pricing this study documents empirical anomalies which suggest that either the simple one period capital asset pricing model capm is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient in particular portfolios based on firm size or earnings price e p ratios experience average returns systematically different from those predicted by the capm furthermore the abnormal returns persist for at least two years this persistence reduces the likelihood that these results are being generated by a market inefficiency rather the evidence seems to indicate that the equilibrium pricing model is misspecified however the data also reveals that an e p effect does not emerge after returns are controlled for the firm size effect the firm size effect largely subsumes the e p effect thus while the e p anomaly and value anomaly exist when each variable is considered separately the two anomalies seem to be related to the same set of missing factors and these factors appear to be more closely associated with firm size than e p ratios

abnormal returns from merger profiles several studies indicate the presence of large abnormal returns accruing to shareholders of merged firms in the period immediately before the merger for example mandelker 18 reports that stockholders of acquired firms earn abnormal returns of approximately 14 percent in the seven months preceding merger franks broyles and hecht 15 find abnormal returns of 26 percent for british firms during the four months prior to merger elgers and clark 11 report 43 percent abnormal returns accruing over two years before merger to shareholders of acquired firms

identifying the interaction between stock market returns and trading flows of investor types looking into the day using daily data abstract this paper introduces a new method for identifying the simultaneity between returns and trading flows the proposed method enables us to identify the intraday interaction using daily data and provides measures of the information content of trading flows and their instantaneous response to public information and information revealed by market prices applying this method to daily data on investor types from the korea stock exchange we find significant intraday bi directional interaction between flows and returns and their latent common drivers altering some of the results of the previous literature based on cholesky assumptions thus we obtain a number of new insights concerning the behavior of investor types

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

dividend distributions and closed end fund discounts abstract empirical support for the hypothesis that closed end fund discounts are related to overhanging tax liabilities has been mixed we introduce a new approach to testing this hypothesis by examining changes in discount levels following distributions of dividends and capital gains since distributions reduce future shareholder tax liabilities the tax liability hypothesis implies that closed end fund discounts should decline following distributions focusing on changes in discounts isolates this tax effect by eliminating the impact of other fund specific factors on discount levels our results support the tax liability hypothesis showing that short run fluctuations in discounts are directly affected by taxable distributions

impact of exchange rate uncertainty on commodity trade between us and sweden previous studies that investigated the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on the trade flows of sweden employed aggregate trade data either between sweden and the rest of the world or at bilateral level between sweden and her major trading partners in this article we disaggregate the trade data and employ the import and export data from 87 industries that trade between sweden and the us we find that exchange rate volatility has significant short run effects on the trade flows between the two countries in almost two third of the industries however the short run effects are translated into the long run effects in one third of the cases furthermore the real depreciation of krona against the dollar was found to have favourable effects on the overall trade balance between the two countries

collusion in procurement auctions an experimental examination bart j wilson i introduction questioning the value of efforts to enforce federal anticonspiracy laws raises spirited debate among antitrust economists although everyone recognizes the welfare costs of successful conspiracies commentators such as armentano 1990 and cohen and scheffman 1989 argue that conspiratorial arrangements are pervasively ineffective and thus that social resources spent prosecuting cob lusion are wasted others including marvel et al 1988 express more ambivalence about the seriousness of conspiracies as a social problem but believe that the government manages to detect only the most ineffective arrangements still other economists clearly believe in the effectiveness of current government efforts see e g werden 1989 and froeb et al 1993 ultimately the pervasiveness of conspiratorial behavior and the magnitude of the consequent damages are empirical issues however the illegality of collusion complicates the collection of relevant data tip offs or complaints frequently expose conspiracies but good reasons exist for suspecting that conspiracies detected in this fashion tend to be the least profitable a conspirator likely rats on co conspirators only if he or she is disenchanted with the scheme suggesting that the conspiracy is about to collapse anyway similarly suspect are conspiracies that are sufficiently clumsy to raise the protests of buyers the detection problem would be vastly simplified if conspiracies could be identified in the absence of a smoking gun posner 1969 argues that such explicit evidence of conspiratorial behavior is unnecessary because conspiring firms exhibit identifiable patterns of activity that are alone sufficient to determine illegality kuhlman 1969 and gallo 1977 go still further and advocate the continuous computerized monitoring of pricing and sales data to detect conspiracies however as marshall and muerer 1998 observe a potentially condemning defect of any attempt to detect collusion via behavior is that depending on underlying conditions virtually any suspect pattern of behavior can be generated as a noncollusive nash equilibrium identical prices for example are often cited as an indication of coordinated activity e g mund 1960 1 but in games such as the one modeled by anton and yao 1992 agents submit identical bids in a nash equilibrium in the absence of collusion furthermore some evidence from collusion cases prosecuted by the department of justice suggests that identical prices are rarely part of collusive arrangements except when the industry is not very concentrated comanor and schankerman 1976 market rotations a second pricing scheme that is typically cited as a suspect pattern may also be consistent with a subgame perfect noncooperative nash equilibrium zona 1986 for example identifies a number of approximate equilibria involving contract rotations when sellers have steeply increasing cost structures also lang and rosenthal 1991 characterize a noncooperative static equilibrium for a multiproduct contracting environment where sellers both divide the market and submit noncompetitively high bids in the market where they do not expect to win 2 still other pricing patterns are possibly suspect porter and zona 1993 report evidence of bid rigging in procurement auctions from the pattern of losing bids the intuition is that in a competitive environment bids should be correlated with costs when prices are fixed however this correlation breaks down this article reports a laboratory experiment designed to explore the relationship between suspect behavior and collusion we focus on coordinated behavior in procurement auctions a context where collusion is often suspected and has been frequently observed 4 two environments are examined a set cost regime that contains some features critical to standard government procurement auctions for goods and an endogenous cost regime which exhibits some critical elements of procurement bidding for construction contracts

a comparison of posted offer and double auction pricing institutions this paper presents an experimental study of a computerized posted offer pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the u s posted offer market performance is evaluated relative to double auction market performance using two supply and demand designs subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable the market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted offer pricing relative to double auction however the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions when feasible the predictive power of competitive nash and limit price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

do domestic investors have an information advantage evidence from indonesia using transaction data from the jakarta stock exchange i find three pieces of evidence which indicate that domestic investors have an information advantage over foreign investors first foreign investors systematically buy at higher and sell at lower intra day prices than domestic investors second foreign investors tend to sell prior to large positive returns finally the permanent impact of foreign purchases is smaller than that of domestic purchases over time prices at which foreign investors trade have worsened while foreign selling prior to positive returns has disappeared

asymmetric surplus distribution and the price convergence path in posted offer markets a note abstract we report results from five posted offer experiments with firm specific quotas the average contract price converges from below the competitive equilibrium thus the independence of the contract price convergence path from surplus distribution is questioned in our results

institutions and the turn of the year effect evidence from actual institutional trades abstract using a large proprietary database of institutional trades we investigate whether institutional investors drive the turn of the year toy effect institutions that engage in window dressing tax loss selling or risk shifting will contribute to the toy effect by selling small poorly performing stocks at the end of december and or buying those same stocks at the beginning of january we find abnormal pension fund selling in small stocks with poor past performance during the final trading days in december providing some support for the window dressing hypothesis however we find little evidence that institutional tax loss selling or risk shifting trading strategies contribute to toy returns furthermore stocks with no institutional trading around the year end exhibit considerably stronger toy return patterns than stocks in which institutions trade taken together our results suggest that institutions play a limited role in driving the toy effect

monopoly behaviour decentralized regulation and contestable markets an experimental evaluation this study provides a comparative experimental evaluation of several alternative approaches to the single product monopoly problem we contrast incentive compatible decentralized regulatory mechanisms with notions of market contestability in a decreasing cost environment the decentralized regulatory mechanisms are found to be significantly more effective at restraining monopoly power than is allowing direct contestability but the regulatory mechanisms examined require that the regulatory agency know the market demand curve though not the industry cost curve since this is significantly more information than is required to implement direct contestability an interesting tradeoff is suggested does the greater efficiency in monopoly restraint provided by the regulatory mechanism relative to direct contestability outweigh the former s greater informational requirements

advance production in experimental markets the effects of advance production in posted offer and double auction markets are investigated previously observed differences between these institutions in mean contract prices and in the distribution of producers and consumers surpluses under the production to demand condition disappear when sellers make output decisions and incur production costs prior to the start of trading the double auction institution remains more efficient under advance production the results suggest that the differential effects of alternative trading institutions on market outcomes may be partially offset by the production conditions characterizing a market

closed end fund shares abnormal returns and the information content of discounts and premiums closed end funds discounts contain information in the sense that they can be used to construct portfolios that earn returns exceeding those predicted by the two factor capital asset pricing model the precise nature of the information contained in a discount is not clear however this paper provides evidence that the information contained in a discount is an incomplete prediction of the fund s likelihood of being open ended profitably thompson 18 investigated the extent to which closed end funds share price discounts and premiums relative to net asset value convey useable information about future rates of return on the funds shares he found that an ad hoc strategy of investing in portfolios of stocks selling at discounts significantly outperformed the returns predicted by the black 3 two factor asset pricing model in other words closed end fund discounts and premiums do contain information about future returns in addition to that captured by the benchmark model the precise nature of the information contained in the discounts and premiums is a mystery however this paper presents and tests a model of the information content of closedend fund discounts and premiums based upon the prospects for a form of organizational restructuring known as open ending the term open ending refers to a set of techniques for forcing a closed end fund s share price to its traditionally higher net asset value converting the fund to an open end fund merging the fund with an open end fund or liquidating the fund s assets and distributing the proceeds to the shareholders while both brauer 4 and brickley and schallheim 5 have shown that actual open endings involve significant benefits to shareholders the focus of this paper is on the valuation effects of the potential for open ending the analysis shows that the probability of profitably open ending a fund should affect the fund s market value that the discount is only one element in a larger information structure about the probability of openending and that changes in this probability are not fully and immediately reflected in the share price section i introduces a straightforward model of the effect of open ending potential on closed end fund value the model provides a compact expression for

managerial ability compensation and the closed end fund discount this paper shows that the existence of managerial ability combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry implies that the closed end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature we evaluate the model s ability to match the quantitative features of the data and find that it does well although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained the role of delegated portfolio managers in financial markets has puzzled

competitive equilibrium convergence in a posted offer market with extreme earnings inequities abstract we present the results of five laboratory posted offer experiments in which the competitive equilibrium model predicts that all exchange profits are received by one side of the market thus defining a boundary condition price converges to the prediction more slowly when buyers rather than sellers receive the exchange surplus apparently due to the increased market power of sellers in this trading mechanism a model of the seller s decision in this market is developed to explain this result we also observe costly signalling and tacit collusion in our experiments

price formation in double auctions abstract we develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer similarly buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted these beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data including frequencies of asks bids accepted asks and accepted bids then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus the trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve transaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d8

arbitrage in stock index futures the textbook description of arbitrage suggests that it is a straightforward matter of taking offsetting positions in different securities and realizing the arbitrage profit such descriptions however typically ignore the transaction costs that give rise to the arbitrage opportunity in the first place taking proper account of these transactions costs may considerably complicate the problem particularly when as is usually the case the arbitrage potential is restricted this article is concerned withoptimal arbitrage strategies with transaction costs when the arbitrage potential is restricted by position limits the particular case we shall analyze is the standard and poor s sp the corresponding figure for the s p 500 portfolio for the same period was

cooperation spillovers and price competition in experimental markets i introduction both competition and cooperation are important for the successful functioning of many economic systems for example firms compete in markets but they also cooperate with one another through arrangements such as research joint ventures lobbying cooperative marketing agreements and strategic alliances in this paper we use experiments to examine how competitive interactions affect agents propensity to cooperate we are interested in studying spillovers that may involve cooperation in one domain such as a research joint venture and competition in another such as in a market 1 cooperation could weaken competition perhaps promoting collusion or market competition could reduce incentives for non market cooperation these behavioral spillovers could go in either direction they are distinct from another type of spillover through knowledge externalities that occur in research and development r d when the innovator cannot fully appropriate the gains to innovation leading potentially to a socially inefficient level of research debondt 1996 2 as discussed below behavioral spillovers have been shown in experiments to increase cooperation in otherwise competitive environments for example through establishing cooperative precedents a large body of theoretical research has focused on firms cooperating in research joint ventures and how this impacts competition in output markets for example cooper and ross 2009 examine the mechanism by which agreements to cooperate in one market can have negative effects on competition in other markets even in situations when these markets are not linked via costs or demand cabral 2000 shows that product market prices are affected by r d agreements between firms caloghirou ioannides and vonortas 2003 lambertini poddar and sasaki 2003 and poyago theotoky 2007 also discuss the impact of forming research joint ventures on product markets and cartel formation 3 empirical work using field data has provided creative indirect evidence on the collusive potential of research joint ventures by exploiting natural policy experiments although the extent of this evidence is limited goeree and helland 2010 for example show that research joint ventures facilitate collusion because they became less popular following an enforcement policy change leniency that made collusion less attractive policy experiments such as these are often required since systematic collusion often goes undetected by authorities duso roller and seldeslachts 2010 also examine the link between research joint ventures and collusion using data from the u s national cooperation research act that granted certain research joint ventures milder antitrust scrutiny they find that horizontal research joint ventures lead to more collusion than vertical joint ventures our work provides complementary and more direct evidence since in the laboratory we can observe the level and sustainability of tacit and explicit collusion and can therefore circumvent the measurement and endogeneity issues that are often prevalent in field data the specific research goals of this study are the following first we wish to examine if agents take advantage of available gains from cooperation in the presence of payoff uncertainties that arise from stochastic innovation success second we are interested in learning if a behavioral spillover of cooperation can lead to collusion in markets or whether competition in markets reduces non market cooperation these notions of cooperation concern contributions to joint r d projects or collusion in price setting and are defined independently of any communication opportunities therefore our third goal is to determine how this interaction between cooperation and competition is affected by the introduction of non market communication opportunities finally we will measure the externalities from r d cooperation to non innovators in the market

bargaining versus posted price competition in customer markets abstract we compare posted price and bilateral bargaining or haggle market institutions in 12 pairs of laboratory market sessions each session runs for 50 75 periods in a customer market environment where buyers incur a cost to switch sellers costs evolve following a random walk process coasian and new institutionalist traditions provide competing conjectures on relative market performance we find that efficiency is lower sellers price higher and prices are stickier under haggle than under posted offer

collusion in private value ascending price auctions we investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication we find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well motivated bidders collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high

the distribution of wealth and welfare in the presence of incomplete annuity markets this paper examines the implications of the absence of complete annuity markets on the distribution of wealth and welfare of agents whose saving decisions are obtained under uncertainty regarding the length of their life the absence of annuities is shown to yield a unique nondegenerate intragenerational distribution of wealth which is fully characterized this characterization is then used to evaluate the pareto desirability of an annuity system alternative welfare criteria that can be used when the proposed change has differential impacts on the initial state of subsequent generations are considered

international investment restrictions and closed end country fund prices some closed end country funds trade at large premiums relative to their net asset values this paper examines whether international investment restrictions raise country fund price net asset value ratios by segmenting international capital markets we test whether a relation exists between announcements of changes in investment restrictions and changes in these ratios using weekly data from may 1981 to january 1989 the results provide evidence that some foreign markets are at least partially segmented from the u s capital market

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

evidence on tax motivated securities trading behavior tax loss selling by investors in common stocks near the end of calendar years has been proposed as an explanation for the turn of the year effect in stock returns past analyses of this hypothesis have relied on inferential data we provide here some direct data from a compilation of over 80 000 actual common stock investment round trips by a sample of 3000 individual investors we find strong evidence of a concentration of loss taking trades late in the year and milder evidence of a concentration just prior to the dates when investments become eligible for long term tax treatment the question as to whether and in what manner the impostion of a tax on realized capital gains affects the securities trading behavior of investors who are subject to the tax has been a longstanding topic of research in the financial ecomonics literature the original attention devoted to the matter was motivated primarily by a concern about resource allocation and federal tax revenue consequences and was directed toward the phenomenon of what has been termed the lock in effect of a gains tax that issue has remained an important public policy one and continues today as part of the ongoing debate about appropriate strategies for reducing the federal budget deficit particular additional interest in the topic has emerged in recent years however because securities transactions undertaken systematically for tax reasons have also been proposed as part of the explanation for certain observed anomalies in historical common stock returns most prominently the well documented turn of the year effect our purpose here is to provide some new evidence that decisions by investors as to the timing of the realization of capital gains and losses from their common stock investments are significantly affected by tax considerations this evidence indicates that a difference in the tax rates applicable to realizations classified as short and long term influences the timing of individual investors trades and further that there is a clear tendency for trades by individuals which give rise to losses to be concentrated near the end of calendar which for them are also tax years while we cannot conclude that

some experimental testing of the cournot nash hypothesis in small group rivalry situations abstract this study parallels a previous study by friedman and hoggatt 1980 but uses more realistic information conditions in addition to confirming the central tendency results of friedman and hoggatt we find that in the three to six corporation range the number of corporations in the experiment seems to have no effect on the tendency to grope towards the cournot nash solution on the other hand it seems clear that convergence to cournot nash is more likely if the subjects are experienced and less likely the higher the cournot nash markup over unit cost overall there is a strong tendency to converge to cournot nash

how sensitive is commodity trade flows between us and india to currency depreciation previous studies that investigated the impact of real depreciation of the rupee on indian trade balance used aggregate trade data and provided no support for real depreciation to be effective in improving india s trade balance in this article we disaggregate the indian trade data by commodity and consider the sensitivity of each industry s inpayments export value and outpayments import value to real rupee dollar exchange rate annual data over the period of 1962 to 2004 from 40 industries that trade between the two countries as well as bounds testing approach are used to show that while in half of the industries real depreciation of rupee has short run effects on inpayments and outpayments the short run effects do not last into the long run in majority of the cases

advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments i introduction for years the federal trade commission ftc has attacked unfair and deceptive advertising recently it has turned its attention to errors of omission rather than commission by challenging agreements among sellers to limit advertising even when it is truthful one reason for eliminating advertising restrictions is to stimulate competition in the advertised dimension of the good or service for example price advertising may result in more price competition on the other hand professional associations argue that price competition causes product quality to deteriorate because sellers of high quality services are forced to match the lower prices of sellers of low quality products and through their codes professional associations have implicitly or explicitly discouraged some forms of advertising including price advertising restrictions of this nature still exist in some local markets although they have become the subject of ftc litigation 1 the quality deterioration argument of professional associations is plausible only when buyers are unable to observe quality prior to purchase 2 when buyers cannot distinguish quality moral hazard invites sellers to lower cost by providing lower quality adverse selection can result from price advertising causing lower cost products to drive out higher cost products as argued by akerlof 1970 the opposite point of view is that even when quality cannot be determined prior to purchase price advertising may enable sellers to signal quality and develop reputations 3 moreover transactions repeatedly involving the same buyers and sellers may enable buyers to form expectations about seller quality based on their experience that can make it worthwhile for a seller to provide higher quality the series of laboratory experiments described here permits the evaluation of market performance when buyers have very limited information the claim to be investigated is that price advertising prevents quality deterioration and improves market efficiency reputation formation through advertising is emphasized instead of other mechanisms such as warranties that may prevent quality deterioration 4 so that quality can be kept relatively neutral and easily understood by subjects we represent it as the grade of a commodity the structure underlying the experiments is based on holt s model of the determination of industry quality which is summarized in schmalensee 1979 demand is induced through the values for which buyers can redeem their purchases value is linearly related to grade so that no difference between average and marginal valuation of quality can arise to cause nonoptimal quality as it did in spence 1976 the production cost for each seller is quadratic in the grade selected by the seller therefore the efficient grade level is unique the most closely related experimental work on product quality decisions is reported in lynch miller plott and porter 1986 in their experiments sellers chose one of two quality levels prices were determined in an oral double auction efficient price and quality outcomes resulted when prospective buyers were given full information about quality removing the identities of sellers and allowing only post purchase quality information sometimes resulted in a lemons outcome in which sellers offer a low quality product even though the market would be more efficient with the production and sale of a high quality product private information tended to yield less efficient outcomes than full public information the posted offer experiments reported in this paper differ from the oral double auction experiments in lynch miller plott and porter because one of our objectives was to examine the effect of advertising restrictions on market efficiency in our experiments price advertising is implemented in a standard posted offer auction

a heterogeneous model of disposition effect a portfolio choice model is provided to illustrate the disposition effect under irrational belief in mean reversion assumption higher cognitive reference stronger irrational belief in mean reversion magnitude and less risk aversion all strengthen the disposition effect in the model the equilibrium market interest rate is priced after the market clearing condition is employed the grater disposition effect reduces the capital mobility from the stock market to the bond market and thus mitigates the dropping of the market interest rate

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

the impact of collusion on price behavior empirical results from two recent cases abstract we use extended arch and garch models to examine the differences in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusive and competitive phases of two recently discovered conspiracies citric acid and lysine according to our results the conspirators managed to raise prices by 9 and 25 cents per pound in the short run relative to non collusive periods also the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower and the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy was higher than during more competitive periods the proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and prosecution purposes

trade and employment efects in the united states of multilateral tariff reductions this paper summarizes certain aspects of my research into the trade and employment effects in the united states of a significant multilateral reduction in tradedistorting measures by the world s major trading nations the study differs from earlier investigations into this question such as those by giorgio basevi 1968 stephen magee 1973 robert stern 1964 and beatrice vaccara and walter salant 1960 in that the industry breakdown is much more detailed and the consequences of a multilateral tariff reduction on both u s export and import competing industries is taken into account by estimating not only the net trade and employment effects of a significant tariff reduction in over 350 industries but also in the 50 states and on some 14 occupational groups it is hoped that the results will be useful for those who are now embarked on the so called tokyo round of trade negotiations within the framework of the general agreement of tariffs and trade gatt another novel feature of the study is the estimation of the net employment effects of multilateral tariff cuts under the assumption of flexible exchange rates

rewarding trading skills without inducing gambling this paper develops a model of active portfolio management in which fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputation and attract more funds we show that such trading strategies may expose investors to severe losses and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient their trading skills are scalable and generate higher prot per unit of risk we study investment management contracts that deter this behavior if investors are short lived then the manager must leave rents to investors in order to credibly commit not to gamble if investors are long lived contracts that increase but defer expected bonuses after an outstanding performance implement the rstbest our model can explain a number of observed dierences

communication in vertical markets experimental evidence abstract an upstream monopolist supplying competing downstream firms may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically we build on previous experimental studies of this well known commitment problem by introducing communication allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the cournot level observed in the absence of communication halfway toward the monopoly level allowing all firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them a simple structural model of nash in nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well using third party coders unsupervised text mining among other approaches we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes we conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets

differential information and security market equilibrium we propose a simple model of equilibrium asset pricing in which there are differences in the amounts of information available for developing inferences about the returns parame ters of alternative securities in contrast with earlier work we show that parameter uncer tainty or estimation risk can have an effect upon market equilibrium under reasonable conditions securities for which there is relatively little information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk when that risk is properly measured ceteris paribus the initially very limited model is shown to be robust with respect to relaxation of a number of its principal assumptions we provide theoretical support for the empirical examination of at least three proxies for relative information period of listing number of security returns observations available and divergence of analyst opinion

location matters an examination of trading profits the electronic trading system xetra of the german security exchange provides a unique data source on the equity trades of 756 professional traders located in 23 different cities and eight european countries we explore informational asymmetries across the trader population traders located outside germany in non german speaking cities show lower proprietary trading profit their underperformance is not only statistically significant it is also of economically significant magnitude and occurs for the 11 largest german blue chip stocks we also examine whether a trader location in frankfurt as the financial center or local proximity of the trader to the corporate headquarters of the traded stock or affiliation with a large financial institution results in superior trading performance the data provide no evidence for a financial center advantage or of increasing institutional scale economies in proprietary trading however we find evidence for an information advantage due to corporate headquarters proximity for high frequency intraday trading

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

a cultural explanation of the foreign bias in international asset allocation abstract this paper examines the foreign bias in international asset allocation following extant literature in behavioral finance we argue that a society s culture and the cultural distance between two markets play an important role in explaining the foreign bias in particular we hypothesize that the degree of a nation s uncertainty avoidance affects the foreign bias more uncertainty avoiding countries allocate less to foreign markets as does the degree of a country s individualism in individualistic countries performance is more directly attributed to a person and less to teams causing these individuals to be more aggressive in their foreign asset allocations we further expect that the degree of cultural distance between two countries affects the amount of money allocated to that market based on extensive robustness analyses we find support for our hypotheses on the role of culture in international asset allocation

the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade an experimental study a study is a limited exploration into the relationship between the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade and the resulting market performance laboratory experimental methods are applied to separate competing theories the competitive model predicts well relative to cartel models nevertheless when measurements are taken relative to the performance of markets where conspiracies are not possible the effects of attempted conspiracies can be determined

tax loss selling and the january effect evidence from municipal bond closed end funds this paper provides direct evidence supporting the tax loss selling hypothesis as an explanation of the january effect examining turn of the year return and volume patterns for municipal bond closed end funds which are held mostly by tax sensitive individual investors we document a january effect for these funds but not for their underlying assets we provide evidence that this effect can be largely explained by tax loss selling activities at the previous year end moreover we find that funds associated with brokerage firms display more tax loss selling behavior suggesting that tax counseling plays a role among the numerous stock return anomalies probably none has generated more interest than that of the turn of the year or january effect the phenomenon in which small capitalization stocks realize unusually high returns in early january 1 the literature offers a number of hypotheses to explain this phenomenon including the tax loss selling hypothesis the window dressing hypothesis the insider trading information release hypothesis and the seasonality of the risk return relation hypothesis given existing evidence in some support for the first two hypotheses the debate continues with respect to which of these the tax loss selling of individual investors or the window dressing of

the j curve evidence from commodity trade between uk and china in testing the short run j curve effect and the long run effects of currency depreciation on the trade balance many researchers have used either trade data between one country and the rest of the world or between one country and another trading partner both groups are said to suffer from aggregation bias to reduce the bias in this article we consider trade data between one country the us and her trading partner china disaggregated by commodity we use imports and exports of 88 industries 2 digit and 3 digit classifications and cointegration analysis to show that the trade balance of at least 34 of the industries react favourably to real depreciation of the dollar the j curve effect is detected in 22 industries furthermore most of these industries that are sensitive to currency depreciation are durable commodity groupings

capital immobility and the reach for yield abstract i build a model in which financial intermediation slows down capital flows investors optimally learn from intermediary performance to allocate capital toward profitable intermediaries intermediaries reach for yield i e they invest in high tail risk assets in an attempt to drive flows and reduce liquidation risk intermediaries with strong opportunities face a trade off between choosing a portfolio that maximizes profitability and choosing one that maximizes the speed at which capital flows in equilibrium reaching for yield is stronger among intermediaries with weak opportunities resulting in a reduction in the informativeness of performance investors thus take longer to learn and capital flows become less responsive to performance capital becomes slow moving because the reach for yield dampens learning the model predicts capital immobility to be stronger when tail risk is high when tail risk is under priced and in asset classes with large cross sectional variation in tail risk exposures

an empirical examination of the structural stability of disaggregated u s import demand we present three related types of evidence on u s import demand first aggregate import demand is reestimated for comparison with previous research second we provide updated estimates of import demand for five economic classes crude foods crude materials manufactured foods semi manufactures and finished manufactures finally each of these import demand functions is tested for any evidence of structural instability and in those cases where instability is detected the demand equations are reestimated along the lines suggested by the stability tests copyright 1989 by mit press

natural monopoly and contested markets some experimental results a firm may become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the product reaches a minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the entire market at a price that is profitable in a situation of this sort if there is more than one firm producing the product each must be producing at a higher thanminimum level of average cost each may be inclined to cut the price to increase its output rate and reduce its average costs the result is likely to be economic warfare and the survival of a single victor the monopolist

the impact of bargaining on markets with price takers too many bargainers spoil the broth in this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given the list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers so the higher the list price the more the firms can extract from bargainers we find that an increase in the proportion of consumers seeking to bargain can lower consumer surplus overall even though new bargainers receive a lower price the reason is that the list price for those who do not bargain and the bargained prices for those who were already bargaining rise sellers have a greater incentive to make the bargainers outside option less attractive reducing the incentive to compete for price takers competition authority exhortations to bargain can therefore be misplaced we also consider the implications for optimal seller bargaining

communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games costless pre play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with pareto ranked equilibria we report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest link contest by expending costly efforts allowing intra group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication on the other hand allowing inter group communication leads to less destructive competition as a result intra group communication decreases while inter group communication increases payoffs our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency this contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes

the j curve malaysia versus her major trading partners currency depreciation is said to worsen the trade balance before improving it hence the j curve phenomenon since introduction of cointegration and error correction modelling researchers have tried to distinguish the short run effects of currency depreciation from its long run effects a few studies that have investigated the experience of malaysia have relied upon aggregate trade data and have found no strong support for a significant relation between the real value of the ringgit and the malaysian trade balance in this article we disaggregate the data by country and consider malaysia s bilateral trade balance with her 14 largest trading partners using bound testing approach to cointegration and error correction modelling we provide some support for the j curve hypothesis

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price