learning and wage dynamics we develop a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in a competitive labor market the model produces three testable implications regarding wage dynamics 1 although the role of schooling in the labor market s inference process declines as performance observations accumulate the estimated effect of schooling on the level of wages is independent of labor market experience 2 timeinvariant variables correlated with ability but unobserved by employers such as certain test scores are increasingly correlated with wages as experience increases and 3 wage residuals are a martingale we present evidence from the nlsy that is broadly consistent with the model s predictions

bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

rent seeking and the transformation of employment relationships the effect of corporate restructuring on wage patterns determinants and inequality a key debate in research on corporate restructuring is whether this widespread and extensive transformation process made contemporary employment relationships more open with firms relying largely o

the transition to the knowledge economy labor market institutions and income inequality in advanced democracies the transition from fordism to the knowledge economy in the world s advanced democracies was underpinned by the revolution in information and communications technology ict the introduction and rapid diffusion of ict pushed up wages for college educated workers with complementary skills and allowed top managers and ceos to reap greater rewards for their own talents despite these common pressures income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere income in the anglo saxon countries remains particularly unequally distributed to shed new light on this puzzle the authors carry out a panel data analysis of eighteen oecd countries between 1970 and 2007 their analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective the article examines the extent to which the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labor market institutions the authors find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both the 90 10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1 percent but that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labor market institutions such as coordinated wage bargaining strict employment protection legislation high union density and high collective bargaining coverage the authors provide robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy

methods of pay and earnings a longitudinal analysis using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1988 90 the author investigates the relationship between methods of pay including piece rates and bonuses and the level and variance of wages among men piece rate workers earned a premium compared to other workers but the evidence on bonuses is mixed the author finds evidence that female piece rate workers earned more than other female workers once a control variable for the presence of dependents is interacted with the piece rate variable with controls for the wage effects of schooling and experience unobserved worker productivity is found to have accounted for most of the wage variance among both male and female piece rate workers wage variance among workers not having explicit pay for performance schemes in contrast was predominantly due to other factors

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

inequality fairness and social capital we study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful in a controlled economic experiment we find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions probing the boundaries of this effect we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context if a well off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse off person then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate moreover our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro social attitudes the successful are always more generous groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game

the rise of intra occupational wage inequality in the united states 1983 to 2002 wage inequality has increased dramatically in the united states since the 1980s this article investigates the relationship between this trend and occupational structure measured at the three digit level using the current population survey from 1983 to 2002 we find that the direct association between occupations and wage inequality declined over this period as within occupational inequality grew faster than betweenoccupational inequality we estimate multilevel growth models using detailed occupational categories as the unit of analysis to assess how the characteristics of occupations affect changes in mean wages and levels of wage inequality across this time period the results indicate that changes in mean wages across occupations vary depending on the characteristics of individuals in those occupations and that intraoccupational inequality is difficult to predict using conventional labor force data these findings seem largely inconsistent with the common sociological view of occupation as the most fundamental feature of the labor market correspondingly a more comprehensive approach one that incorporates the effects of organizational variables and market processes on rising wage inequality in the new economy is warranted

bonuses and promotion tournaments theory and evidence standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses we combine classic and market based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles we use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the finnish economy our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature

corruption and trust theoretical considerations and evidence from mexico the growing empirical literature on political corruption shows trust interpersonal and political to be both cause and consequence of corruption a conclusion that largely builds on studies using

competition and the ratchet effect in labor markets the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or by cutting pay we model this effect as a multiperiod principal agent problem with hidden information and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally consistent with our theoretical model we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition which are nearly eliminated when competition is introduced this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers

comparative advantage learning and sectoral wage determination we develop a model in which a worker s skills determine the worker s current wage and sector the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker s skills endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills we show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques we apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual level panel data from the national longitudinal survey of youth we find that high wage sectors employ high skill workers and offer high returns to workers skills

do competitive workplaces deter female workers a large scale natural field experiment on job entry decisions an important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for gender imbalances in labour markets men are more competitively inclined than women whether and to what extent gender differences in attitudes toward competition lead to differences in naturally occurring labour markets remains an open question to examine this we run a natural field experiment on job entry decisions where we randomize almost 9000 job seekers into different compensation regimes by varying the role that individual competition plays in setting the wage and the gender composition we examine whether a competitive compensation regime by itself can cause differential job entry the data highlight the power of the compensation regime in that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings yet there are important factors that attenuate the gender differences including whether the job is performed in teams whether the position has overt gender associations and the age of the job seekers we also find that the effect is most pronounced in labour markets with attractive alternative employment options furthermore our results suggest that preferences over uncertainty can be just as important as preferences over competition per se in driving job entry choices

performance pay competitiveness and the gender wage gap evidence from the united states we show that women in the nlsy79 and nlsy97 are less likely than men to receive competitive compensation the portion of the gender wage gap explained by compensation schemes is small in the nlsy79 but somewhat larger in the nlsy97

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

reducing inequalities toward the development of a market for income inequality abstract the objective of this study is to propose the development of a market for income inequality by specifying a firm s contribution to income inequality and outlining a simple model to find the equilibrium price for a given target of income inequality reduction the paper reviews the concepts of firm heterogeneity and externalities in relation to income inequality it then proposes a model by establishing income inequality reduction targets for a population of firms presenting a marginal income inequality reduction cost curve and matching demand and supply to derive the equilibrium price and ends by simulating a market for income inequality reduction using data from a sample of fifteen firms this paper shifts the focus of income inequality research and policy to the firm and proposes a market based mechanism for firms to reduce income inequality

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

the polarization of the u s labor market this paper analyzes a marked change in the evolution of the u s wage structure over the past fifteen years divergent trends in upper tail 90 50 and lower tail 50 10 wage inequality we document that wage inequality in the top half of distribution has displayed an unchecked and rather smooth secular rise for the last 25 years since 1980 wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution also grew rapidly from 1979 to 1987 but it has ceased growing and for some measures actually narrowed since the late 1980s furthermore we find that occupational employment growth shifted from monotonically increasing in wages education in the 1980s to a pattern of more rapid growth in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middles of the wage education distribution in the 1990s we characterize these patterns as the u201cpolarization u201d of the u s labor market with employment polarizing into high wage and low wage jobs at the expense of middle wage work we show how a model of computerization in which computers most strongly complement the non routine abstract cognitive tasks of high wage jobs directly substitute for the routine tasks found in many traditional middle wage jobs and may have little direct impact on non routine manual tasks in relatively low wage jobs can help explain the observed polarization of the u s labor market this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

skill premium labor supply and changes in the structure of wages in latin america earnings inequality declined rapidly in argentina brazil and chile during the 2000s a reduction in the experience premium is a fundamental driver of declines in upper tail 90 50 inequality while a decline in the education premium is the primary determinant of the evolution of lower tail 50 10 inequality relative labor supply is important for explaining changes in the skill premiums relative demand trends favored high skilled workers during the 1990s shifting in favor of low skilled workers during the 2000s changes in the minimum wage and more importantly commodity led terms of trade improvements are key factors behind these relative skill demand trends

performance related pay and gender wage differences we study the impact of performance related pay prp on gender wage differences using finnish linked employer employee panel data controlling for unobserved person and firm effects we find that bonuses increase women s earnings slightly less than men s but the economic significance of the difference is negligible piece rates and reward rates however tend to increase gender wage differentials thus the nature of a prp plan is important for gauging the impact of prp on gender wage differentials a comparison with ols results shows the importance of controlling for an unobserved person and firm effects

occupational social value and returns to long hours this paper examines the phenomenon of uncompensated long hours in jobs with pro social characteristics and presents evidence that long hour wage premiums and occupational social value are substitutes in compensating salaried workers who supply hours exceeding the standard working week i show that the social value of an occupation in particular the degree to which jobs involve helping or providing service to others is inversely related to long hour pay allowing for heterogeneity in the degree to which workers value their job s helping orientation lets me explore how gender differences in employees attitudes toward pro social behaviour can explain some of the observed occupational sorting trends and gender differences in long hour compensation women tend to be more strongly drawn to helping occupations and at the same time receive lower long hour premiums in these jobs relative to men i offer a theoretical framework to rationalize the empirical trends

contract form wage flexibility and employment we begin with two uncontroversial hypotheses firm productivity is expensive to measure and employment entails relationship specific investments these assumptions imply that firms would optimally choose fixed wage contracts and complement these with bonus pay when measuring employee performance is not too costly these assumptions imply that under an optimal employment contract hours of work is less responsive while total compensation is more responsive to shocks under bonus pay contracts compared to fixed wage contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid where shocks are proxied using the local unemployment rate we find strong support for these two implications

inequality credit and financial crises in the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 09 income inequality rose across much of the developed world this has led to a vigorous debate as to whether widening inequality was somehow to blame for the crisis by driving private sector credit booms despite growing interest empirical evidence on an inequality fragility relationship is limited based on a panel analysis of 18 oecd organisation for economic co operation and development countries for the years 1970 2007 this study provides evidence of a positive relationship between income concentration and private sector indebtedness once other traditional drivers are controlled for if confirmed the implications of this result are as follows i the view that the distribution of income is irrelevant to macroeconomic stability as implicit in mainstream approaches needs further investigation and ii in order to make the financial system more robust policy makers should cast the net wider than monetary policy and regulatory reforms and consider the effects of changes to distributive patterns

a spillover based theory of credentialism i propose a model in which credentials such as diplomas are instrumentally valuable to workers the model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker s wage to their output a worker s productivity is influenced by the skills of their co workers where such skills arise from an ability augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co workers credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market thereby allowing them to match with high skill co workers in equilibrium despite the positive externality associated with a worker s investment i show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

portfolio choices firm shocks and uninsurable wage risk assessing the importance of uninsurable wage risk for individual financial choices faces two challenges first the identification of the marginal effect requires a measure of at least one component of risk that cannot be diversified or avoided moreover measures of uninsurable wage risk must vary over time to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity secondly evaluating the economic significance of risk requires knowledge of the size of all the wage risk actually faced existing estimates are problematic because measures of wage risk fail to satisfy the non avoidability requirement this creates a downward bias which is at the root of the small estimated effect of wage risk on portfolio choices to tackle this problem we match panel data of workers and firms and use the variability in the profitability of the firm that is passed over to workers to obtain a measure of uninsurable risk using this measure to instrument total variability in individual earnings we find that the marginal effect of uninsurable wage risk is much larger than estimates that ignore endogeneity we bound the economic impact of risk and find that its overall effect is contained not because its marginal effect is small but because its size is small and the size of uninsurable wage risk is small because firms provide substantial wage insurance

salaries or piece rates on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops the objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes hourly vs piece rates is systematically related to the workers risk aversion and ability we derive the equilibrium relationship between agents risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives payment scheme in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched the equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice using confidential data from the national agricultural workers survey naws we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs crops they harvest based on workers risk aversion and no matching based on ability when controlling for matching we find strong evidence that high risk averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk averse workers choose piece rates we also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker jel j33 d82 q12

present or future incentives on the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard abstract this paper uses a laboratory experiment to show that principals can defer all incentives for present effort to future payments and thus pay fixed wages and still motivate workers at the least cost whenever outcomes are observable this result contrasts with the prediction of the classical moral hazard model according to which future and present payments must be made contingent on present outcomes to induce effort at the least cost even though risk aversion cannot explain this result i estimate an expectation based reference dependent model to show that it is consistent with loss aversion

the top 1 percent in international and historical perspective world top incomes database at http topincomes parisschoolofeconomics eu and has represented a challenge to the economics profession stories based on the and has represented a challenge to the economics profession stories based on the supply and demand for skills are not enough to explain the extreme top tail of supply and demand for skills are not enough to explain the extreme top tail of the earnings distribution nor is it enough to look only at earned incomes different the earnings distribution nor is it enough to look only at earned incomes different approaches are necessary to explain what has happened in the united states over approaches are necessary to explain what has happened in the united states over the past century and also to explain the differing experience in other high income the past century and also to explain the differing experience in other high income countries over recent decades we begin with the international comparison in the countries over recent decades we begin with the international comparison in the fi rst section and then turn to the causes and implications of the evolution of top fi rst section and then turn to the causes and implications of the evolution of top income shares income shares

incentives and compensation schemes an experimental study when the performances of agents are correlated because of a common random component contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank order tournaments and piece rate schemes although the theoretical advantage of such contracts has long been noticed in the literature the empirical papers that study this question have produced mixed results using a controlled laboratory experiment we shed light on the performance of these contracts we focus on the simplest version of such a contract the relative piece rate rpr and compare its performance with that of the tournament and piece rate schemes we find that when the rprs are imposed on the agents they exert higher effort levels and give the principal weakly higher profits than the tournament and piece rate contracts second we find that agents have little aversion to self select into the rpr scheme when other alternatives are available in our paper we fix the environment agents face and vary only their wage scheme our results support the theoretical predictions and suggest that principals can benefit from using rpr schemes in places where the piece rate and tournament contracts would otherwise be used

estimating the effects of unions on wage inequality in a panel data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom selection this article considers the estimation of the structure of wages in union and nonunion sectors it proposes an estimator that extends standard panel data techniques to the case in which the return to the permanent component of the error term is differently rewarded in the two sectors the econometric model is used to estimate the effect of unions on both the level and the variance of wages in canada the findings indicate that unions increase the average wage of workers and compress the returns to observable measures of skill and to a time invariant unobservable measure of skill

interpreting panel data on job tenure tenure responses in the panel study of income dynamics psid and the national longitudinal surveys are often inconsistent with calendar time these inconsistencies pose special problems in the psid because job changes cannot be identified directly so researchers must infer them from error ridden tenure data we use alternative rules for partitioning psid data into jobs and then estimate several wage and mobility models to assess the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the partitioning method we also assess the importance of replacing raw tenure data with imputed measures that are internally consistent

understanding the gender pay gap what s competition got to do with it a number of researchers have argued that men and women have different attitudes toward and behavioral responses to competition that is women are more likely to opt out of jobs in which performance pay is the norm and to under perform in some competitive situations laboratory experiments suggest that these gender differences are rather large to check these hypotheses and findings against differences in the field the authors use performance pay as an indicator of competition in the workplace and compare the gender gap not only in incidence of performance pay but also in earnings and work effort under these contracts they find that although women are less likely than men to work under performance pay contracts the gender gap is small furthermore the effect of performance pay on earnings is modest and does not differ markedly by gender consequently the authors argue the ability of these competition hypotheses to explain the gender pay gap seems very limited

longitudinal studies of human growth and health a review of recent historical research this paper reviews recent literature using stature and weight as measures of human welfare with a particular interest in cliometric or historical research we begin with an overview of anthropometric evidence of living standards and the new but fast growing field of anthropometric history this literature is always implicitly and often explicitly longitudinal in nature we then discuss i systematic empirical research into the relationship between conditions in early life and later life health and mortality and ii historical evidence on the relationship between body mass morbidity and mortality we conclude with a discussion of the importance of historical sources and understandings to health economics and population health

job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard abstract we consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth constrained workers suffer from moral hazard specifically effort on the job is non contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract higher unemployment benefits affect the workers outside option the latter is improved for low skilled workers hence they receive a larger share of the surplus which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity effects are reversed for high skilled workers moreover raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase

inefficient sorting under output sharing abstract i study sorting in a frictional market asset owners post their terms then workers direct their search when the owners switch from prices to shares the competition between workers is handicapped the unique equilibrium features inefficient positive assortative matching the queue lengths are distorted even though the hosios efficiency condition holds for every pair of types for any distribution of types all workers pair up with better assets the best workers suffer while the weakest workers gain the opposite occurs on the asset side competition drives the asset owners to post flatter contracts it leads to constrained efficiency whenever prices are feasible otherwise handicapped competition results in inefficient sorting

global standardization or national differentiation of hrm practices in multinational companies a comparison of multinationals in five countries drawing on a dataset constructed from a parallel series of nationally representative surveys of multinational companies mncs we compare the performance management pm practices of mncs in the uk ireland canada spain denmark and norway in each country we analyze data relating to mncs from that country and of the foreign affiliates of us mncs we argue that there is evidence of standardization in the nature of practices across countries particularly evident in the analysis of us mncs standardization of practices among mncs is also evident in the rather limited variation in practices between us and indigenous mncs within each country moreover even where there is evidence of variation across and within countries this cannot be fully explained by adaptation to local institutional constraints but rather can be seen as the product of how distinct national contexts can promote the take up of practices

progressive taxation in a tournament economy abstract not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals in particular those who work under different incentives to changes in marginal tax rates we ask whether changes in tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest to examine this potential rationale for a more progressive tax code we first model the effort decisions of workers faced with progressive taxation under tournaments and piece rates because of the difficulty identifying any distortion that may be induced by the tax code in naturally occurring data we then report on the results of a real effort experiment based on this model consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance we find that competitive tournament workers are less sensitive and hint in our discussion at the possible welfare benefits of progressive taxation in tournament economies

ceo pay and firm size an update after the crisis in the size of stakes view quantitatively formalised in gabaix and landier 2008 ceo compensation reflects the size of rms aected by talent in a competitive market the years 2004 2011 were not part of the initial study and oer a laboratory to examine the theory with new positive and negative shocks executive compensation measured ex ante did closely track the evolution of average firm value supporting the size of stakes view out of sample during 2007 2009 rm value decreased by 17 and ceo pay by 28 during 2009 2011 firm value increased by 19 and ceo pay by 22

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

performance pay and wage inequality an increasing fraction of jobs in the u s labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay commissions or piece rate contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non performance pay jobs we also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance pay than in non performance pay jobs we show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due for instance to technological change induce more firms to offer performance pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance thus performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality we conclude that this channel accounts for 21 of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

the contingent effect of management practices this article investigates how the success of a management practice depends on the underlying values articulated by the management a large u s transportation company is in the process of fitting its trucks with an electronic on board recorder eobr to provide drivers with information on their driving performance the company also has commenced a multi year initiative to remake its internal operations the first phase of which focuses exclusively on changing values toward a greater emphasis on teamwork and empowerment in this setting a natural question is whether the optimal managerial practice consists of 1 letting each driver know his or her individual performance only or also 2 providing drivers with information about their performance with respect to other drivers using the eobr provided driver performance data we randomize these practices across sites the main result of our experiment is that 2 leads to better performance than 1 in a particular site if and only if the site has not yet received the values intervention and worse performance if it has the result is consistent with the presence of a conflict between competition based managerial practices and a shift to a cooperation based value system more broadly it highlights the role of intangible factors in determining the optimal set of managerial practices

the determinants of income inequality in oecd countries the objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of the increase in income inequality that oecd countries have experienced over the past two decades my hypothesis is that along with the financialisation of economies that has taken place since 1990 inequality increased because labour flexibility intensified labour market institutions weakened as trade unions lost power and public social spending started to retrench and did not compensate for the vulnerabilities created by the globalisation process using data from 25 high income oecd countries from 1990 to 2013 i empirically evaluate this hypothesis my results clearly suggest that the increase in inequality over the past two decades is caused by an increase in financialisation a deepening of labour flexibility the weakening of trade unions and the retrenchment of the welfare state

performance pay and workplace injury panel evidence using panel survey data we show cross sectional evidence of an elevated risk of workplace injury for those paid piece rates and bonuses while consistent with adam smith s behavioural conjecture this could simply reflect sorting across workers or firms in response we successively control for a risk proxy for worker fixed effects and for worker with employer match fixed effects no previous examination has controlled for such fixed effects or examined us survey data the estimates indicate that injury risk increases substantially when blue collar manual workers become paid by piece rates and bonuses

higher and higher performance pay and wage inequality in germany performance pay is of growing importance to the wage structure as it applies to a rising share of employees at the same time wage dispersion is growing continuously this leads to the question of how is the growing use of performance pay schemes related to the increase in wage inequality german socio economic panel soep data for the years 1984 2009 confirm the large increase in the application of performance pay schemes this in turn led to an upward shift of the wage distribution by about one log point however it did not contribute to the growth in wage inequality even though wage inequality grew within the group of employees who receive performance pay it grew even more so within the group who do not still the wage difference between both wage schemes remained flat over the distribution the empirical analysis employs sequential decompositions in a quantile regression framework

incentive provision when contracting is costly we analyse optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting the analysis shows that there is no monotonic relationship between contracting costs and incentive intensity and that an increase in contracting costs may lead to higher powered incentives moreover we formulate hypotheses about the relationship between legal systems and incentive provision specifically the model predicts higher powered incentives in common law than in civil law systems we also find that better performance measures may induce lower investments in contracting and potentially lead to lower powered incentives

returns to talent and the finance wage premium to study the role of talent in finance workers pay we exploit a special feature of the french higher education system wage returns to talent have been significantly higher and have risen faster since the 1980s in finance than in other sectors both wage returns to project size and the elasticity of project size to talent are also higher in this industry last the share of performance pay varies more for talent in finance these findings are supportive of finance wages reflecting the competitive assignment of talent in an industry that exhibits a high complementarity between talent and scale received october 11 2017 editorial decision september 4 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

pay for performance and compensation inequality evidence from the ecec this article examines the relationship between performance based pay and widening wage inequality using data from the employer costs for employee compensation ecec the results suggest that jobs

the timing of discretionary bonuses effort signals and reciprocity abstract in a real effort experiment we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two period principal agent manager worker setting we vary the timing of the manager s bonus decision in order to examine two main channels reward and trust through which discretionary bonuses may operate average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods since both channels are simultaneously active first period output significantly increases as workers attempt to signal their trustworthiness to managers when the bonus decision is made upfront or at the end average output is no different than in a baseline setting without the bonus mechanism furthermore output after a bonus is not paid decreases substantially consistent with negative reciprocity our main findings are reinforced by using time spent on the available real leisure activity as an alternative measure of subjects effort

growing apart the changing firm size wage premium and its inequality consequences wage inequality in the united states has risen dramatically over the past few decades prompting scholars to develop a number of theoretical accounts for the upward trend this study argues that large firms have been a prominent labor market institution that mitigates inequality by compensating their low and middle wage employees with a greater premium than their higher wage counterparts large u s firms reduced overall wage dispersion yet broader changes to employment relations associated with the demise of internal labor markets and the emergence of alternative employment arrangements have undermined large firms role as an equalizing institution using data from the current population survey and the survey of income and program participation we find that in 1989 although all private sector workers benefited from a firm size wage premium the premium was significantly higher for individuals at the lower end and middle of the wage distribution compared to those at the higher end between 1989 and

workplace compensation practices and the rise in benefit inequality this article aims to explain why inequality in fringe benefits has grown faster than wage inequality over the past four decades we depart from previous income inequality research by studying benef