production flexibility as a motive for multinationality this paper examines how uncertainty in future operating costs at the time of undertaking long lived and irreversible capital investment projects may provide an incentive for multinational production this incentive may be present even if firms are risk neutral as long as they face a downward sloping demand curve the lower the international correlation between marginal cost shocks and the lower the elasticity of demand the greater the benefit to establishing plants in different countries however even if cost fluctuations are perfectly correlated internationally there may still be gains from multinational production

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

compensating differentials and self selection an application to lawyers this paper models individual choice between two types of jobs as dependent on the difference in potential earnings and on preferences for nonpecuniary the model leads to simultaneous estimation of earnings and job choice functions in a manner that takes account of self selection of individuals into the sector of highest utility an application to lawyers choosing between private and public interest law casts doubt on the notion that public interest lawyers are accepting substantially lower earnings by virtue of their choice an impression derived from estimation of earnings functions without accounting for self selection the estimation technique also takes proper account of the choice based nature of the sample which appears to be important

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

does health insurance reduce illness related worker absenteeism the objective of this article is to examine whether having health insurance reduces illness related absenteeism among older workers a nationally representative sample of 1780 workers in the united states aged 52 64 are drawn from the 2004 2006 health and retirement study hrs binary logistic regressions and censored tobit models are estimated for workers likelihood of missing work days due to illness and the number of illness related work days missed respectively while explicitly addressing the possibility of insurance selection effects the findings suggest that over a 12 month period older workers without health insurance are as likely as insured workers to miss work days due to illness and there are no differences in the number of days missed between insured and uninsured workers however there is strong evidence that poor baseline health onset of new diseases and longer hospitalization significantly increase an older worker s absenteeism at work these results suggest that having health ins

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

multinational corporations and trade structure first a model of horizontally and vertically integrated firms is developed these firms are then embedded in a general equilibrium model of trading countries it is shown how multinational corporations emerge as a result of differences across countries in factor compositions intersectoral intraindustry and intrafirm trade can coexist and intrafirm trade takes place in invisibles headquarter services and intermediate inputs it is shown how the various trade components depend on the structure of the world economy the model predicts trade patterns which are close to observed trade patterns the importance of multinational corporations in the conduct of foreign trade has been recognized for many years nevertheless there exists no well articulated theory that explains the conditions for their emergence and predicts under these conditions a structure of trade that comes close to observed trade patterns i have developed in helpman 1984 a theory which is designed to fill in this gap and it is the purpose of this paper to extend it in order to make it better fit reality my earlier work builds on the standard theory of monopolistic competition in differentiated products in which every firm produces a single variety the distinguishing feature of that study is the interpretation of the technology so as to allow for specialized inputs which service plants that are geographically separated from the location of the inputs employment in particular those inputs can be located in one country and service plants located in other countries management and product specific rd multinational corporations have often production facilities in several countries see for example u s tariff commission 1973 chapter iii moreover in my earlier work all intra firm trade consisted of trade in the services of the specialized inputs i e in headquarter services while empirically a large part of intra firm trade takes place in intermediate inputs see buckley and pearce 1979 hence there is a need to extend the theory in order to take account of these missing features and in order to evaluate their contribution to the explanation of trade patterns this task is undertaken in the following sections by incorporating the model of the horizontally and vertically integrated firm from helpman 1983 into the theory of

absenteeism as a mechanism for approaching an optimal labor market equilibrium an empirical study this research examines absence as a response to a non optimal labor market equilibrium its basic premise is that workers may be using absenteeism to move themselves closer to an optimal equilibrium in situations where due to greater than desiredwork hours the workers marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure mrs is less than the wage rate for the last hour worked this notion is tested for a sample of workers using tobit analysis with individual data from company records on absence and wages and an empirical measure of each worker s mrs the results indicate a significant positive relationship between absence and the difference between a worker s mrs and wage

transaction cost economics the comparative contracting perspective abstract gregory dow s assessment of transaction cost economics is both thoughtful and provocative although we agree on many matters these remarks focus on our differences i begin with a brief sketch of the framework out of which transaction cost economics operates i then examine the purported bias of transaction cost economics in favor of capital managed as against labor managed firms and my alleged failure to deal with downward opportunism dow s claim that transaction cost economics is given to functionalist excesses is considered next concluding remarks follow

the elusive wage benefit trade off the case of employer provided health insurance this study shows that standard regressions estimated to measure a trade off between wages and health insurance are misspecified by insufficiently accounting for establishment and firm size an interactive size corrected specification is more likely to reveal a trade off furthermore because insurance decisions are typically made by firms and wages set by establishments the insurance constraint on establishments in multi establishment firms weakens the trade off we use model generated data to show that both factors contribute to the failure in previous research to identify a trade off and data from a cross section of northern californian establishments to test for a trade off in multi establishment and single establishment firms

linking the insights of smith marx young and hirschman on the division of labour implications for economic integration and uneven development this article distinguishes between two types of division of labour discussed by smith the final product specialisation type has been adopted as the basis of mainstream trade models that champion the benefits of free trade the division of production operations type can be extended through the works of marx transition to modern industry based on forms of manufacture young industrial differentiation and hirschman linkages through this some countries started reaping more benefits from increasing returns engendering incipient uneven development that aggravates under unrestricted economic integration between them and the trailing countries in the modern era the leading countries trans national corporations have further shaped the international division of production operations resulting in different forms of enclave development when their activities are unregulated under recently reached multi lateral agreements that limit the use of subsidies and investment measures and strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights uneven development would be sustained some future research directions are considered

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

dynamic implications of absence behaviour this paper analyses the absence behaviour of workers in the context of a two period model the theoretical results that emerge highlight the potential benefits of analysing absenteeism within a multi time period model as opposed to a single time period model which has generally been adopted by the theoretical models of absenteeism to date workers are employed under a two period contract which is characterized by an experience rated sick pay scheme the theoretical results of the model indicate that if a worker faces such a sick pay scheme the theoretical results of the model indicate that if a worker faces such a sick pay scheme then the probability of absence in the current period is reduced the empirical analysis explores the absence rates observed from a set of workers who face an experience rated sick pay scheme the empirical results present some support in favour of the predictions which arise from the theoretical model

the optimal timing of a foreign direct investment analyses of the optimal timing of foreign direct investment fdi decisions have been curiously lacking in the general literature on multinational enterprises cf buckley 1979a b although comparative static analyses exist comparing exporting to the host country with market servicing from a production unit sited in the host country horst 1971 hirsh 1976 the only attempt to predict the timing of the switch from exporting to foreign based production is that of aliber 1970 although vernon 1966 gives a cost based rationale for the switch this chapter attempts to fill this gap in the theory of fdi section 2 1 outlines and criticises previous attempts to deal with the problem sections 2 2 4 present a simple model which ignores set up costs and sections 2 5 and 2 6 give a more detailed analysis including such costs further extensions of the theory are considered in section 2 7 and the conclusions are summarised in section 2 8 the problem emerges as being more complex than had previously been appreciated

optimal contracting with endogenous social norms research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers within an agency framework we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent s cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent s peer group we show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents sensitivities to social norms are unobservable

cooperation in the liberalization of international trade after hegemony what nations dwell in perpetual anarchy for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests because as states they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises the possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off yet at other times states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy

licensing versus direct investment a model of internalization by the multinational enterprise a firm must decide whether to serve a foreign market by exporting building a foreign branch plant or licensing the production to an existing foreign producer the existence of reputations implies that any licensing agreement must provide a licensee with the incentive to maintain the reputation this creates a motive for the firm to internalize transactions by building a branch plant i e by becoming a multinational the model reflects a more general notion that the inability of the firm to control a licensee s agent s actions can provide incentives for multinational activity the paper explores the determinants of the firm s mode of operation as well as the consequences of certain government policies

moral hazard and sickness insurance abstract we study if the replacement level in the swedish national sickness insurance which replaces foregone earnings due to temporary illnesses affects work absence behavior we use micro data and estimate the effects of a major reform whereby the replacement level during the first 90 days in each absence spell was reduced on work attendance to separate out the effect of the reform from any trend in work absence we distinguish between the implications on the incidence of work absence i e the frequency of spells and the duration of the spells we also use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effects on the prevalence of work absence finally we estimate elasticities with respect to the replacement level in the sickness insurance

stock related compensation and product market competition this dissertation consists of four self contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers as revealed by the available empirical evidence in supergame theoretic analyses of long term competition between oligopolistic firms the first essay ownership control and collusion considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on income smoothing and when managerial compensation has the low pay performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies in a similar fashion the second essay stock related compensation and product market competition deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price e g stock options which have become increasingly common in the u s on long term oligopolistic competition in the third paper debt as a credible collusive device shareholders commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with conservative incentives are considered these forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the agency cost of debt finance this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms capital structure and product market competition the fourth paper multimarket contact concavity and collusion addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies it explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers and extends the results to non oligopolistic supergames

trade and the environment from a southern perspective the relationship between free trade and the environment is one of the main issues of contention between environmental and ecological economics environmental economics assumes a positive relationship between free trade economic growth and environmental policies environmental externalities may cause important damage however trade is not to be blamed for this instead the fault lies with policy inadequacies at the national level on the other hand some ecological economists criticise the assumptions of environmental economics especially the immobility of production factors and the positive correlation between income and environmental quality they plead for measures to prevent deterioration of northern environmental standards in a race to the bottom due to ecological dumping from the south in this paper we argue that neither environmental economics nor northern ecological economics take into account the structural conditions determining the international trade system based on some new empirical evidence on material flows we stress the notion of environmental cost shifting if physical and political ecology perspectives are adopted a southern approach to the trade and environment issue may arise 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

absenteeism predictors least squares rank regression and model selection results this paper examines the determinants of absenteeism using ols rank based re gressions and a model selection procedure the results show that personal attributes are the most important determinants of long term absences for total working days lost the penalty factors are the most significant predictors the results also show that absenteeism tends to be lower among firms with more part time workers unionization on the other hand increases the total days lost due to absenteeism

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

the effect of unionism on fringe benefits this study analyzes the impact of unionism on fringes paid to production workers using data on individual establishments it compares fringe expenditures in establishments having the same level of compensation per hour and finds that unionism raises the share of compensation allotted to fringes particularly to pensions vacation pay and life accident and health insurance in addition since unionism also raises the straight time wage rate itself a prime determinant of expenditures on fringes unionism has a very sizeable impact on total fringe expenditures as well as on the fringe share of compensation the union fringe effect exceeds in percentage terms the union wage effect and is sufficiently large to suggest that standard union wage studies understate the union effect on total compensation the study also compares the fringe expenditures of production and non production workers within the same establishment controlling for within establishment pay policies the findings suggest that the pres

healthy bodies and thick wallets the dual relation between health and economic status there is abundant evidence of a quantitatively large association between many measures of economic status including income and wealth and a variety of health outcomes such as mortality or morbidity however considerable and often heated debate remains especially across disciplines about the direction of causation and about why the association arises although medical scientists are often convinced that the dominant if not exclusive pathway is that variation in socioeconomic status produces health disparities they are increasingly debating among themselves about why low economic status might lead to poor health at least for modern industrial countries 1 the old standby arguments the less well to do have access to less or lower quality medical care or a stronger pattern of deleterious personal behaviors have been rejected as insufficient instead a series of intriguing competing theories have arisen that emphasize long term impacts of early childhood or even inter uterine environmental factors the cumulative effects of prolonged exposures to individual stressful events or reactions to macro societal factors such as rising levels of income inequality a common link is that each theory attempts to document the physiological processes through which low economic status leads to poorer health while these scientific questions are extremely important this research has taken place with little input from economists economists are now making contributions about the alternative pathway the impact poor health may have on economic resources poor health may restrict a family s capacity to earn income or to accumulate assets by limiting work or by raising medical expenses at a minimum this work should provide a caution against exaggerating the magnitude of causation from economic status to health outcomes but the potential contribution runs deeper as people age the evolving variation in individual health outcomes may offer additional statistical information to estimate parameters of household savings and consumption behavior that so far have proven to be somewhat elusive thus incorporating health uncertainty and risk into economic models should eventually enrich our understanding of basic tenets of household behavior the first section of this paper documents the size of the association between health and one prominent economic status measure household wealth section two deals with how health influences economic status by sketching out reasons why health may alter household savings and eventually wealth and then providing estimates of the empirical magnitude of these effects section three shifts attention to the alternative pathway the links between economic status and health and summarizes 2major controversies and evidence surrounding these issues

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

takeover threats and managerial myopia this paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long term interests in order to boost current profits if stockholders are imperfectly informed temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price hence the managerial concern with current bottom line the magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

intra firm trade abstract the study analyses intra firm trade that is the estimated one third of world trade which is transacted between affiliated parties as firms realize the increasing potential for integrating their operations throughout the world they are contributing to significant shifts in the patterns of interntional trade and industrial development as emphasized here international trade is inextricably linked to the growing and substantial share of transactions between affiliated parties conveyed through multinational enterprises

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

intra industry specialization in a multi country and multi industry framework the paper tests alternative hypotheses as to the factors determining the extent of intra industry trade defined as the share of this trade in total trade in a multi country and multi industry framework the empirical results show that the extent of intra industry trade in a particular industry between any two countries depends on the characteristics of the industry and the countries concerned the explanatory power of the regressions for the entire group of countries exporting manufactured goods as well as for trade among the developed countries is relatively high and practically all the hypotheses concerning the impact of industry trade are supported by the empirical results lower coefficients of determination have been obtained for trade between developed and developing countries and for trade among developing countries but the estimates generally support the hypotheses put forward in the paper in these cases also

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

ceo pay firm size and corporate performance evidence from canada executive compensation of 755 canadian firms is examined over the period 1991 95 and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies ceo pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance in addition executives in utilities earn lower pay and their compensation is less responsive to performance than is true for their counterparts in other industries some novel findings are also documented first the sales elasticity of ceo compensation is greater in larger firms second while ceo turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm s stock performance the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms jel classification g35 j33 salaire des pdg taille de l entreprise et performance des societes resultats pour le canada en etudiant le salaire des pdg de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la periode 1991 95 l auteur confirme certains resultats d etudes anterieures le salaire du pdg croit avec la taille de l entreprise et il est liea la performance de l entreprise il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux ecarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs on met aussi a jour certains resultats inedits d abord il semble que l elasticite du salaire du pdg par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises ensuite alors que la probabilite de roulement est en general co reliee negativement a la performance des actions en bourse de l entreprise la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcee dans les petites entreprises

overstatement and rational market expectation abstract when an agent overstates his her true performance a rational market can still correctly guess the true performance this paper shows however that such rational market expectation and a profit maximizing principal can exacerbate the lack of productive effort by the agent

search for nonwage job characteristics a test of the reservation wage hypothesis previous structural models of job search behavior have been based upon the reservation wage property this article provides estimates of a more general search model that nests models with the reservation wage property the estimates lead to rejection of the reservation wage property the model includes hours of work in the utility function but other nonwage job characteristics can be included as well an experiment based on the estimated parameters indicates that a significant proportion of job offers would be mistakenly predicted to be accepted or rejected under the restrictions implied by the reservation wage property

substitution between wage and nonwage benefits you gotta be kidding ollie you re just robbing yourself schuylkill mutual offers a terrific deal on keogh and we could plug you in in fact we advise plugging you in on the corporate end so not a nickel comes out of your personal pocket it comes out of the corporate pocket and there s that much less for uncle to tax these poor saps carrying their own premiums with no company input are living in the dark ages there s nothing shady about rigging it this way we re just using the laws the government has put there they want people to take advantage it all works to up the gross national product you know what i mean by keogh don t you you re looking kind of blank john updike p 296