trade migration and integration evidence and policy implications this paper takes as its point of departure the unique position recently adopted by swedish policymakers emphasizing migration as a tool to increase trade we attempt to empirically scrutinize this

the export effect of immigration into the usa much has been written on the connection between migration and international trade human history provides important examples of migrations leading to increased trade activity with perhaps the most well known example of the overseas chinese this study investigates the trade related importance of chinese and other immigrants into the usa previous studies may have underestimated or overestimated the relationship between trade and migration with nations treated as featureless plains rather than as varied landscapes this study contends that an understanding of the immigration trade relationship can be improved upon by examining the specific pattern and destination of immigration into specific us states using state level export data to 28 immigrant source countries in 1993 a strong immigration trade link is found reinforcing conclusions made by previous research using country level data the compelling connection between immigration and trade found in this study and others suggests that future change

immigrant trade links transplanted home bias and network effects macro level data for the us and 73 trading partners spanning the years 1980 to 2001 is used with a gravity specification to investigate the influence of immigration on bilateral trade prior research has identified immigrant stocks as a significant determinant of trade however this study indicates that the us immigrant trade link is driven by immigration from relatively low income countries a 10 increase in the immigrant stock is found to generate respectively 4 7 and 1 5 increases in domestic imports from and exports to the typical low income home country the observed link is decomposed into two hypothesized channels network effects and transplanted home bias considerable variation in per immigrant trade effects is found across home countries imports from the typical low income home country are estimated to increase by up to 2057 due to transplanted home bias and by as much as 2967 as a result of network effects while exports rise by up to 910 as a result of networks

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

piracy on the internet accommodate it or fight it a dynamic approach abstract this paper uses a dynamic stochastic model to solve for the optimal pricing policy of music recordings in the presence of p2p file sharing networks eroding their sales we employ a policy iteration algorithm on a discretized state space to numerically compute the optimal pricing policy the realistically calibrated model reflects the real world figures we observe and provides estimates of the optimal pricing policy as well as comparative statics figures the pricing policy is such that for a given p2p network size prices are increasing in the number of buyers of the product and for a given number of buyers of the product prices are non monotonic in the p2p network size surprisingly in the presence of p2p networks increases in production costs and decreases in the valuation of the product increase the consumer and total surplus a higher valuation of the product leads to a lower steady state price increased switching costs have a negative effect on prices and profits so the long term incentive to attract new consumers dominates the short term incentive to harvest loyal consumers the full enforcement of intellectual property rights has adverse effect on both consumer surplus and total welfare

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

migration and trade theoretical and empirical research in economics suggests that bilateral migration triggers bilateral trade through a number of channels this paper assesses the functional form of the impact of migration on trade flows in a quasi experimental setting we provide evidence that the relationship is not log linear in particular at small levels of immigration stocks the elasticity of trade to migration is quite high and it declines to zero at about 4 000 immigrants if immigration stocks exceed such a level the evidence suggests that trade will not increase anymore this suggests that for cross country network and other effects flowing from immigration to materialise at a significant level for trade a high enough level of immigrant stocks is necessary but there appears to be satiation as immigrant numbers increase

immigration and trade creation econometric evidence from canada immigrants may expand trade with their country of origin owing to superior knowledge of or preferential access to market opportunities the authors test this proposition using canadian trade data with 136 partners from 1980 to 1992 in an augmented gravity equation they find that a 10 percent increase in immigrants is associated with a 1 percent increase in canadian exports to the immigrant s home country and a 3 percent increase in imports they also find that among the primary categories of immigrants independents have the greater influence on trade immigration via the entrepreneur class appears to have less impact on trade than all other classes except refugees

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

the learning curve market dominance and predatory pricing sufficient conditions for id and iid are given in the case of two step learning in which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve after just two sales however examples are also constructed for the two step learning case in which neither id nor iid holds it is also shown that in equilibrium iid implies that learning is privately disadvantageous although it is socially advantageous finally introducing avoidable fixed costs and possible exit into the model yields a new theory of predatory pricing based on the learning curve hypothesis

intraconnectivity and interconnectivity when value creation may reduce profits this paper analyses firms decisions to provide connectivity to their customers we distinguish between intraconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect to each other and interconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect with another firm s customers the profitability implications of allowing connectivity are not a straightforward consequence of the consumer value of connectivity because connectivity affects not only the customer value but also the intensity of competition by creating or changing network externality we find that if sales are driven by brand switching rather than by category expansion a firm may find it optimal not to provide intraconnectivity even if providing it is not costly and may find it optimal to provide interconnectivity even at a cost exceeding the consumer value of connectivity on the other hand if category expansion is possible providing intraconnectivity may be profitable in this case either the equilibrium intraconnectivity provision may be asymmetric or both firms may find it individually optimal to provide intraconnectivity under certain conditions in the latter case the firms choice of intraconnectivity is a prisoner s dilemma game

avoiding market dominance product compatibility in markets with network effects as is well recognized market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network effects a firm with a larger installed base offers a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage such a setting is investigated here but with the main difference that firms have the option of making their products compatible when firms have similar installed bases they make their products compatible in order to expand the market nevertheless random forces could result in one firm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger firm may make its product incompatible we find that strategic pricing tends to prevent the installed base differential from expanding to the point that incompatibility occurs this pricing dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and avoid the emergence of market dominance

do converters facilitate the transition to a new incompatible technology a dynamic analysis of converters abstract this paper analyzes the process of transition in standards between incompatible technologies when converters are available contrary to a common presumption that converters facilitate the transition from an old technology to an otherwise incompatible new technology i find circumstances in which the possibility of transition is blockaded by the existence of converters in the welfare analysis of converters a distinction is made between ex ante and ex post efficiency effects finally i also analyze the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome

dynamic auction environment with subcontracting this article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints we demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12 and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20 the article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability

network effects aftermarkets and the coase conjecture a dynamic markovian approach this paper investigates the expansion of the network of a monopolist firm that produces a durable good and is also involved in the corresponding aftermarket we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the continuous time dynamic game played by the monopolist and the forward looking consumers under the assumption that consumers benefit from the subsequent expansion of the network the paper contributes to the theoretical discussion on the validity of the coase conjecture analyzing whether coase s prediction that the monopolist serves the market in a twinkling of an eye remains valid in our setup we conclude that the equilibrium network development may actually be gradual contradicting coase s conjecture we find that a necessary condition for such a result is the existence of aftermarket network effects that accrue at least partly to the monopolist firm

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

bridging trade theory and labour econometrics the effects of international migration this paper surveys current theoretical and empirical research on international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between trade theory and labour empirics

trade blocs currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s we analyze the impact of commercial and financial policies on the reorientation of trade in the 1930s we report evidence that commercial policies attenuated prior connections between income growth and trade and that exchange rate instability marginally discouraged international trade in contrast the tendency toward regionalization commonly ascribed to the formation of trade and currency blocs was already evident to a considerable extent prior to the regional policy initiatives of the 1930s this reorientation is more properly attributed to ongoing historical forces such as commercial and financial links between countries forged over many years

immigrant links to the home country empirical implications for u s bilateral trade flows immigrants ties to their home countries can play a key role in fostering bilateral trade linkages immigrant ties include knowledge of home country markets language preferences and business contacts that have the potential to decrease trading transaction costs empirical results for the united states suggest that immigrant links have historically been important in increasing bilateral trade flows with immigrants home countries copyright 1994 by mit press

trade diaspora and migration to new zealand this paper examines the hypotheses that a greater stock of migrants in new zealand from a particular country leads to more trade between that country and new zealand and a greater stock of new zealanders living overseas in a particular country leads to more trade between that country and new zealand it also examines the relationships between migration diaspora and tourism exports the literature suggests that migrants can stimulate trade by lowering transaction costs and by bringing with them preferences for goods produced in their home country our approach is to apply panel data techniques within the framework of a standard gravity model of trade to a dataset consisting of information on 233 countries in each of the 26 years between 1981 and 2006 we estimate a random effects panel sample selection model using correlated random effects our results indicate that migration does indeed stimulate trade in our benchmark specification merchandise exports from and imports to new zealand both have a statistically significant relationship with numbers of migrants in new zealand imports also have a statistically significant relationship with numbers of new zealanders overseas our results also suggest that migration stimulates imports more than exports

the provision of two way converters in the transition process to a new incompatible technology this paper analyzes the dynamic provision of converters in the transition process between two incompatible technologies i derive the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome i find that there can be two types of market inefficiency in the provision of converters first converters can be supplied by the wrong group second the timing of provision may be too late since the providers of converters ignore the positive externality that their provision would confer on the users of the rival technology

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

ethnic networks and trade intensive versus extensive margins abstract ethnic networks have been associated with increased international trade although studies have not differentiated between entry into foreign markets and trade expansion we find that ethnic networks increase trade on the intensive margin but not on the extensive margin

redistribution and affirmative action abstract the paper develops an integrated political economy model in which individuals are distinguished by earning ability and an ascriptive characteristic race the policy space is a transfer payment to low income workers financed by a flat tax on wages and an affirmative action constraint on firms hiring decisions the distribution of income and the policy are endogenous with the latter being the outcome of a legislative bargaining game between three legislative blocs the model provides support for the common claim that racial divisions reduce support for welfare expenditures even when voters have color blind preferences we show that relatively advantaged members of both the majority and minority group benefit from the introduction of a second dimension of redistribution while the less advantaged members of the majority are the principal losers

snowball a dynamic oligopoly model with indirect network effects abstract allowing for innovation dynamics in the software market this paper studies the conditions under which standardization in the hardware market arises and persists over time in the model software firms repeatedly invest in quality upgrades compete in the product market and make exit as well as entry decisions the results show that in general excess inertia does not occur a platform becomes the standard in a market only if it is better than the competing platforms furthermore low overall rates of innovation always lead to variety conversely the higher the speed of innovation the more likely standardization is

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

dynamic price competition with network effects i consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices i derive a series of results pertaining to a existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria b monotonicity of the pricing function e g larger networks set higher prices c network size dynamics increasing dominance vs reversion to the mean and d firm value how it varies with network effects finally i apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications i consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics

long run market configurations in a dynamic quality ladder model with externalities abstract we study the impact of standard setting by introducing an externality that increases product compatibility in the presence of asymmetric returns to investment in a dynamic quality ladder type model we classify the long run multi modal probability distributions over different market structures that arise from this model in some cases the lagging firm may remain in the market in the long run depending on the strength of the externality in the case where only the laggard invests in compatibility it is possible that the laggard becomes a monopolist if the leader has a relatively low r d capability and the two firms are almost symmetric in this same regard this variety of multi modal long run distributions may have important consequences for the estimation and the simulation of this class of dynamic models

network effects market structure and industry performance abstract this paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods we prove existence of non trivial fulfilled expectations equilibrium we formalize the concept of industry viability investigate its determinants and show that it improves with more firms in the market and or by technological progress these results enlighten some well known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature we also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance which depart substantially from ordinary markets the approach relies on lattice theoretic methods supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis

cultural distance and the us immigrant trade link using data from the world and the european values surveys we calculate cultural distances between the us and 54 immigrant home countries and examine the influences of cultural distance and immigrant populations on us imports from and exports to immigrants home countries during the years 1997 2004 our study indicates that for both us imports and exports the trade enhancing effect of immigrants partially offsets the trade inhibiting effect of cultural distance further decomposing our measure of cultural distance into two component dimensions and revisiting the immigrant trade relationship we find significant variation in the extent to which immigrants counter the trade inhibiting influences of the underlying dimensions of culture for both us imports and exports our findings have the implication that by countering the trade inhibiting influences of cultural differences between their home and host countries immigrants exert pro development effects

research among copycats r d spillovers and feedback strategies abstract we study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate r d efforts and production at different times we discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets for all possible asymmetries in production costs between firms while an increase in spillovers may improve the likelihood of a competitive market it may at the same time reduce the level to which a technology is developed we show that the effects of spillovers on investments and surpluses crucially depend on the stage of technology development considered in particular we show that high spillovers are not necessarily pro competitive as they can make it harder for the laggard to catch up with the technology leader

how do switching costs affect market concentration and prices in network industries i investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option i find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option without a viable outside option high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects but with a viable outside option switching costs increase market concentration furthermore switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option but generally raise prices otherwise

capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm size empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries we propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts the model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry in particular if firms compete in prices and the rate of depreciation is large then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one small firm industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race contrary to the usual intuition this preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible

gravity models a reformulation and an application to discriminatory trade arrangements gravity models are used to estimate trade flows from 162 countries into 11 major importing countries for 1976 counting the ec as one the main theories underlying gravity models are reviewed and a new gravity model is derived from a linear expenditure system a major innovation of this model is that both tariffs and dummy variables for discriminatory arrangements are incorporated price variables are also explicitly included in the model the tariff and the dummy variables are found to be statistically significant and this indicates that previous gravity model studies which used dummies to estimate the trade benefits of preferential tariffs may not have accurately estimated the effects of the preferences the price variables generally are also found to be statistically significant which casts doubt on the homogeneous goods assumption underlying the purchasing power parity hypothesis some significant differences in the estimates were found when separate equations were regressed for the eec and the us