duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

collaborate or consolidate assessing the competitive effects of production joint ventures we analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger under standard regularity conditions the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger though the effect on prices quantities and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition in light of our results regarding profits we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge imperfect information cost synergies and organizational asymmetries we further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture i e by delegation of input pricing jel l13 l23 l42

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

comparing policies to confront permit over allocation abstract instability in cap and trade markets particularly with respect to permit price collapses has been an area of concern for regulators to that end several policies including hybrid price quantity mechanisms and the newly introduced market stability reserve msr systems have been introduced and even implemented in some cases i develop a stochastic dynamic model of a cap and trade system parameterized to values relevant to the european union s emission trading system eu ets to analyze the performance of these policies aimed at adding stability to the system or at least at reducing perceived over allocations of permits results suggest that adaptive allocation mechanisms such as a price collar or msr can reduce permit over allocations and permit price volatility in a more cost effective manner than simply reducing scheduled permit allocations however it is also found that the performance of these adaptive allocation policies and in particular the msr are greatly affected by assumed discount rates and policy parameters

structural workshop paper discrete choice models of consumer demand in marketing marketing researchers have used models of consumer demand to forecast future sales to describe and test theories of behavior and to measure the response to marketing interventions the basic framework typically starts from microfoundations of expected utility theory to obtain an econometric system that describes consumers choices over available options and to thus characterize product demand the basic framework has been augmented significantly to account for quantity choices to accommodate purchases of several products on a single purchase occasion multiple discreteness and multicategory purchases and to allow for asymmetric switching between brands across different price tiers these extensions have enabled researchers to bring the analysis to bear on several related marketing phenomena of interest this paper has three main objectives the first objective is to articulate the main goals of demand analysis forecasting measurement and testing and to highlight several considerations associated with these goals our second objective is to describe the main building blocks of individual level demand models we discuss approaches built on direct and indirect utility specifications of demand systems and we review extensions that have appeared in the marketing literature the third objective is to explore a few emerging directions in demand analysis including considering demand side dynamics combining purchase data with primary information and using semiparametric and nonparametric approaches we hope researchers new to this literature will take away a broader perspective on these models and see the potential for new directions in future research

implicit understandings in channels of distribution formal agreements can be used to achieve coordination among channel members these agreements work by exerting explicit control over the members who make the agreements however implicit understandings can be used as a partial substitute for more formal agreements in this paper we show that implicit understandings can develop as channel members learn about each other s behavior we show that this learning leads to the use of the implicit influence each channel member has over the other s behavior the learning leading to an implicit understanding requires some form of experimentation or historical observation this learning results in an oscillating retail price when only one channel member learns the other s behavior both channel members obtain greater profits than when neither member learns and both channel members obtain less profits than when both members learn however the member who does not learn obtains more profits than the member who learns we also show that implicit understandings r

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

on the informational superiority of quantities over prices in the presence of an externality in this study we investigate the convexity of the profit function of a regulated firm with respect to the random shocks in the marginal costs and the demand intercept and its implications regarding information disclosure when these shocks are revealed to the firm at a future stage we illustrate that information disclosure is attained when the firm is regulated through the use of a quantity rather than a price instrument to do so we argue that increased convexity obtained under complete information is a sufficient condition as a policy implication we suggest a new argument which favors the use of quantities over prices these implications are more pronounced once we allow for multiple firms

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

corruption centralization and the shadow economy in their pioneering work on corruption shleifer and vishny 1993 find that a centralized bureaucracy results in lower bribes our paper extends the analysis to economies with formal and informal sectors when corrupt officials operate in both sectors bureaucratic centralization is beneficial when confined to the formal sector however we show that crosssector centralization can result in higher bribes and lower welfare furthermore contrary to choi and thum 2005 we demonstrate that depending on the organization of the bureaucracy and the productivity of the informal sector the presence of the shadow economy may have adverse effects on corruption and welfare

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

menus of price quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation abstract many authors have proposed mechanisms to induce regulated polluting firms to truthfully reveal their private information this paper proposes an alternative scheme in which the regulator offers each firm a menu of linear price quantity contracts faced with this menu each firm s dominant strategy is to truthfully report its private information and self select the contract that is ex post efficient the proposed menu schedule that is more elastic than the firm s residual marginal damage function engenders a positive quantity effect thereby counterbalancing the firm s incentive to misreport prompted by the linearity of price due to its built in price quantity structure the scheme performs as designed regardless of the elasticities of marginal damage and demand functions

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

understanding the demand side issues of international corruption in global business business organizations and their representatives frequently encounter corruption and may be the perpetrators victims or simply participants in such acts while international corruption has existed in multiple forms for several years many individuals companies nations and international organizations are currently attempting to reduce or eliminate corrupt acts because of their harmful effects on local economies and the quality of life of citizens several of these corruption curtailment efforts have been directed toward the supply side of corruption i e those who make corrupt payments in developing an understanding of corruption however and formulating strategies for its reduction consideration must also be given to the demand side of corruption i e those who demand and accept corrupt payments accordingly this study examined the demand side of corruption and several related factors in the categories of government economy and poverty education geography and culture analysis of these factors employed the corruption perceptions index cpi formulated annually by transparency international ti and other sources several factors in each of the five categories were found to correlate significantly with perceived corruption and strategies for addressing these issues were developed and discussed

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

prices versus quantities in a second best setting the choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions the first proceeds from weitzman s partial equilibrium sto chastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve the second utilises deter ministic general equilibrium models with pre existing distortionary taxes it concludes that non revenue raising instruments e g grandfathered tradable permits are costlier than rev enue raising ones e g a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits to build a bridge between these two traditions we introduce in weitzman s model a positive cost of public funds due to pre existing distortionary taxes the tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits as compared to weitzman s classical result then we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden this may require a transfer to firms in the form of freely allocated permits or lump sum tax rebate it turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced quantitatively even if the marginal benefit function is 50 more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function the price instrument should be preferred we also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum the superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first best

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

prices rise faster than they fall output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases this tendency is found in more than two of every three markets examined it is found as frequently in producer goods markets as in consumer goods markets in both kinds of markets the asymmetric response to cost shocks is substantial and durable on average the immediate response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock and that difference is sustained for at least five to eight months unlike past studies which documented similar asymmetries in selected markets gasoline agricultural products etc this one uses large samples of diverse products 77 consumer and 165 producer goods accordingly the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory as a start on filling this gap the study finds no asymmetry in the resonse of an individual decision maker a supermarket chain to its costs but it finds above average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a fragmented w

own brand and cross brand retail pass through in this paper we describe the pass through behavior of a major u s supermarket chain for 78 products across 11 categories our data set includes retail prices and wholesale prices for stores in 15 retail price zones for a one year period for the empirical model we use a reduced form approach that focuses directly on equilibrium prices as a function of exogenous supply and demand shifting variables the reduced form approach enables us to identify the theoretical pass through rate without specific assumptions about the form of consumer demand or the conduct of a category pricing manager thus our measurements of pass through are not constrained by specific structure on the underlying economic model the empirical pricing model includes costs of all competing products in the category on the right hand side not only the cost of the focal brand and yields estimates of both own brand and cross brand pass through rates our results provide a rich picture of the retailer s pass through behavior we find that pass through varies substantially across products and across categories own brand pass through rates are on average more than 60 for 9 of 11 categories a finding that is at odds with the claims of manufacturers about retailers in general importantly we find substantial evidence of cross brand pass through effects indicating that retail prices of competing products are adjusted in response to a change in the wholesale price of any given product in the category we find that cross brand pass through rates are both positive and negative we explore determinants of own brand and cross brand pass through rates and find strong evidence in multiple categories of asymmetric retailer response to trade promotions on large versus small brands for example brands with larger market shares and brands that contribute more to retailer profits in the category receive higher pass through we also find that trade promotions on large brands are less likely than small brands to generate positive cross brand pass through i e induce the retailer to reduce the retail price of competing smaller products on the other hand small share brands are disadvantaged along three dimensions trade promotions on small brands receive low own brand pass through and generate positive cross brand pass through for larger competing brands moreover small share brands do not receive positive cross pass through from trade promotions on these larger competitors we also find that store brands are similarly disadvantaged with respect to national brands

tax versus emissions trading scheme in the long run in this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty we show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs while under a linear emission tax scheme depending on parameters market entry can be either excessive or insufficient our long run analysis thus contrasts with spulber s 1985 equivalence result and also modifies weitzman s result in favor of an ets in that the superiority of a tax over an ets is not guaranteed even when the weitzman condition favors a tax we also show that an ets is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large

corruption top down or bottom up this article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government in particular we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption we show that when the after tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption by contrast for high enough public wages and or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level in the process total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

the value of marketing expertise this paper has three objectives 1 to construct a theoretical model that aids in evaluating marketing expertise 2 to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the value of marketing expertise and 3 to empirically test the model by observing how different market conditions influence whether companies emphasize marketing expertise we accomplish these objectives as follows first we use decision theory to find an expression for the expected value of marketing expertise we do not use decision analysis in the normative tradition nor do we assume that firms actually use formal decision analysis rather we assume that firms are rational and that decision theory describes their actions given that assumption we predict how firms should evaluate marketing here marketing expertise helps a firm make better marketing decisions at least on average hence the value of marketing expertise increases as marketing decisions become more important second consistent with decision theory

pollution control by options trading abstract for pollution control with imperfect information about aggregate abatement costs we propose a combination consisting of free permits and a menu of call options for additional permits with different striking prices by appropriately choosing permits and corresponding striking prices the regulator can approximate the marginal damage function arbitrarily well

combining price and quantity controls under partitioned environmental regulation abstract this paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems etss under partitioned environmental regulation when firms abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain we show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only address emission uncertainty using a numerical stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints for the european carbon market we find that introducing hybrid policies in eu ets reduces expected excess abatement costs of achieving targeted emission reductions under eu climate policy by up to 89 we also find that under partitioned regulation there is a high likelihood for hybrid policies to yield sizeable ex post cost reductions

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

output based allocations in pollution markets with uncertainty and self selection we study pollution permit markets in which a fraction of permits are allocated to firms based on their output output based allocations which are receiving increasing attention in the design of carbon markets around the world e g europe california new zealand are shown to be optimal under demand and supply volatility despite the output distortions they may create in a market that covers multiple sectors the optimal design combines auctioned permits with output based allocations that are specific to each sector and increasing in its volatility when firms are better informed about the latter or must self select the regulator resort to some free i e lump sum allocations to sort firms out numerical exercises illustrate the policy relevance of our results the gains from considering output based allocations can be substantial

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

excessive retailing at the bertrand equilibria in oligopolistic markets where competition is in prices producers may prefer to be represented by agents that sell their products even if those agents do not provide any direct services to promote the sale of the product and even if contracting is costly contracting with the agents serves as a medium to relieve competitive pressures in the product market the benefit that a single firm derives from contracting is an increasing function of the number of firms that have already contracted with agents hence if the contracting cost is relatively low there exists a unique equilibrium where all firms contract with agents

the strategic value of partial vertical integration we investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration namely partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods the partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration this information vertical effect translates into a competition horizontal effect the partially integrated hierarchy s commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price which strategically relaxes competition our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

emissions trading systems with cap adjustments abstract emissions trading systems etss with fixed caps lack provisions to address systematic imbalances in the supply and demand of permits due to changes in the state of the regulated economy we propose a mechanism which adjusts the allocation of permits based on the current bank of permits the mechanism spans the spectrum between a pure quantity instrument and a pure price instrument we solve the firms emissions control problem and obtain an explicit dependency between the key policy stringency parameter the adjustment rate and the firms abatement and trading strategies we present an analytical tool for selecting the optimal adjustment rate under both risk neutrality and risk aversion which provides an analytical basis for the regulator s choice of a responsive ets policy

implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits abstract this paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information each firm s income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm s own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit these shares of total expected output lower a firm s tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market by employing this scheme the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first best outcome relative to a traditional cap and trade approach the system increases expected social welfare

firm strategies in the mid tail of platform based retailing while millions of products are sold on its retail platform amazon com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them most of these products are sold by third party sellers who pay amazon a fee for each unit sold empirical evidence clearly suggests that amazon tends to sell high demand products and leave long tail products for independent sellers to offer we investigate how a platform owner such as amazon facing ex ante demand uncertainty may strategically learn from these sellers early sales which of the mid tail products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell the platform owner s cherry picking of the successful products however gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level unobserved by the platform owner we analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game theoretic model with two types of sellers one with high demand and one with low demand we show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller s demand interestingly the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller s product whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner s threat of entry the platform owner s entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period although it increases consumer surplus in the later period we also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome

corruption competition and democracy abstract this paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition it is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms this corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

product positioning and competition the role of location in the fast food industry this paper examines optimal product positioning strategies of asymmetric firms in the context of retail outlet locations in the fast food industry the relationships between profits and product differentiation reveal that both mcdonald s and burger king are better off avoiding close competition if the market area is large enough however in small market areas mcdonald s would prefer to be located together with burger king rather than have the two outlets be only a slight distance apart in contrast burger king s profits always increase with greater differentiation offsetting these incentives is the desirability of locating centrally to appeal to the most customers the equilibrium depends on the market s size in small markets mcdonald s locates near the center of the market and burger king locates to the side of the market in larger markets mcdonald s and burger king choose locations on opposite sides of the market although mcdonald s locates closer to the optimal central location than burger king i also show that the role of price competition on product positioning is fundamentally different under asymmetric competition than under symmetric competition price competition unambiguously induces symmetric firms toward differentiation in contrast with asymmetric firms price competition shifts burger king s incentives toward locating closer to mcdonald s even while price competition increases mcdonald s desire for differentiation as a result equilibrium locations with asymmetric firms are approximately the same regardless of whether prices adjust with location

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se

environmental policy a la carte letting firms choose their regulation under uncertainty the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the technology of the regulated firms which is often private information we consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices versus quantities decision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit trading such an approach is currently used in swiss climate policy we provide a detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit trading regime we demonstrate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite substantial informational constraints and that all firms gain from the introduction of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single instrument policies furthermore we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be preferable to a hybrid regulation

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

on a fundamental advantage of permits over taxes for the control of pollution we extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate in our model pollution is not uniformly mixed and the regulator is uncertain about the polluting firms abatement costs we determine the optimal permit supply functions and the optimal pollution tax functions using these functions we show that permits lead unambiguously to lower total expected costs than taxes we analyze the magnitude of this difference for a simple model of climate change by relating the optimal permit supply functions to weitzman am econ rev 68 683 691 1978 we provide a new interpretation of his results

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

efficiency in pollution control in the short and long runs a system of rental emission permits efficiency in pollution control in the short and long runs a system of rental emission permits author s robert a collinge and wallace e oates source the canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique vol 15 no 2 may 1982 pp 346 354 published by blackwell publishing on behalf of the canadian economics association stable url http www jstor org stable 134787 accessed 05 05 2008 21 07

vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers inference with limited data in this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared demand estimates are used to compute price cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed the purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non nested competing models the models considered are 1 a simple linear pricing model 2 a vertically integrated model and 3 a variety of alternative strategic supply scenarios that allow for collusion non linear pricing and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the u s the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain this is consistent with non linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

channel pass through of trade promotions packaged goods manufacturers spend in excess of 75 billion annually on trade promotions even though their effectiveness has been hotly debated by academics and practitioners for decades one reason for this ongoing debate is that empirical research has been limited mostly to case studies managerial surveys and data from one or two supermarket chains in a single market in this paper we assemble a unique data set containing information on prices quantities and promotions throughout the entire channel in a category our study extends the empirical literature on pass through in three important ways first we investigate how pass through varies across more than 1 000 retailers in over 30 states second we study pass through at multiple levels of the distribution channel third we show how the use of accounting metrics such as average acquisition cost rather than transaction cost yields biased estimates of pass through and therefore overstates the effectiveness of trade promotions we find that mean pass through elasticities are 0 71 0 59 and 0 41 for the wholesaler retailer and total channel respectively more importantly at each level of the channel we observe large variances in pass through estimates that we explain using various measures of cost and competition surprisingly we find that market structure and competition have a relatively small impact on pass through we conclude by showing how the profitability of manufacturer and wholesaler deals can be improved by utilizing detailed effectiveness estimates for example a manufacturer using an inclusive trade promotion strategy might offer a 10 off invoice deal to all retailers on every product this strategy would decrease manufacturer and wholesaler profits for 56 of product store combinations whereas retailers experience a profit boost in 96 of cases manufacturers and wholesalers can avoid unprofitable trade deals for specific products and retailers by utilizing estimates of pass through consumer price elasticity and margins compared to the inclusive strategy such a selective trade promotion strategy would improve deal profitability by 80 and reduce costs by 40

introduction of a second channel implications for pricing and profits in this paper we study the optimal pricing strategies when a product is sold on two channels such as the internet and a traditional channel we assume a stylized deterministic demand model where the demand on a channel depends on prices degree of substitution across channels and the overall market potential we first study four prevalent pricing strategies which differ in the degree of autonomy for the internet channel for a monopoly we provide theoretical bounds for these pricing strategies we also analyze the duopoly case where an incumbent mixed retailer faces competition with a pure retailer and characterize price equilibria finally through a computational study we explore the behavior price and profits under different parameters and consumer preferences for the alternative channels

marketing production coordination in channels of distribution abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of functional horizontal decentralization by a channel member on the performance of an industrial channel of distribution we use the model of eliashberg j steinberg r 1987 management science 33 981 1000 which describes a channel of distribution consisting of a manufacturer and a value adding distributor we allow the distributor to decentralize decision making between his marketing and production functions our results show that functional decentralization at the distributor level increases the price sensitivity of the distributor concerning the price he faces from the manufacturer causes a shift in the distributor s demand curve increases the distributor s inventory activities in terms of both quantity and time frame and under certain conditions increases the manufacturer s inventory as expected the decentralized distributor has a less coordinated pricing policy vis a vis the production policy using numerical means we show that functional decentralization can improve the overall channel profitability i e for both manufacturer and distributor this counter intuitive result suggests that in our non repeated perfect information game setting functional decentralization can yield a pareto dominant equilibrium outcome where both the distributor and manufacturer are better off even though it is only the distributor who is changing his organizational decision making

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game abstract this paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat a lobby and the public there is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat who is averse to letting the public down we study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time with time varying beliefs corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are updated fast

reply to managing channel profits comment we welcome moorthy s comment moorthy k s 1987 managing channel profits comment marketing sci 6 fall 375 379 it provides an opportunity to clarify several issues raised in our 1983 paper that paper was motivated by one concern channel coordination we believed that channel members benefit from coordination and that many institutional arrangements such as quantity discounts are actually coordinating mechanisms we developed a simple model to demonstrate our belief for historical accuracy mcguire and staelin cited by moorthy had already independently developed a useful model of duopolistic channel competition being unaware of their working paper our model not surprisingly differed from theirs both papers provide important but different insights into channel management

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

interactions between members of a marketing production channel under seasonal demand abstract key decisions in a marketing production channel faced with a seasonal demand include production and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and processing and pricing decisions for the retailer in such situations a variety of contracts are possible including contracts under which the manufacturer charges a constant price throughout the season or the retailer processes at a constant rate throughout the season also possible are channel structures in which the manufacturer and retailer cooperate to make decisions jointly the main objective of the present paper is to compare optimal policies under all the situations described above we show that having a constant manufacturer s price or a constant processing rate does not have a significant impact upon the retailer s price or inventory decisions however if the demand is not highly seasonal a constant processing rate contract will result in higher production and processing rates and a lower manufacturer s price compared to a constant manufacturer s price contract also a centralized channel involving joint decision making will lead to a lower price at the retail level and higher production and processing rates hence issues such as channel coordination and contracts between manufacturers and retailers which have received significant attention in the marketing literature have implications for the production area as well

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

optimal trading ratios for pollution permit markets abstract we demonstrate a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by optimizing the exchange of emissions through trade under full information it is optimal for emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal damages under asymmetric information we derive necessary conditions for the marginal damage trading ratios to be optimal illustrate that the marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal and show how to improve efficiency using optimal trading ratios we calculate the optimal trading ratios for a global carbon market the gains from using optimal trading ratios rather than marginal damage trading ratios range from substantial to trivial which suggests the need for careful consideration of asymmetric information when designing permit markets

multiple discreteness and product differentiation demand for carbonated soft drinks for several of the largest supermarket product categories such as carbonated soft drinks canned soups ready to eat cereals and cookies consumers regularly purchase assortments of products within the category consumers often purchase multiple products and multiple units of each alternative selected on a given trip this multiple discreteness violates the single unit purchase assumption of multinomial logit and probit models the misspecification of such demand models in categories exhibiting multiple discreteness would produce incorrect measures of consumer response to marketing mix variables in studying product strategy these models would lead to misleading managerial conclusions we use an alternative microeconomic model of demand for categories that exhibit the multiple discreteness problem recognizing the separation between the time of purchase and the time of consumption we model consumers purchasing bundles of goods in anticipation of a stream of consumption occasions before the next trip we apply the model to a panel of household purchases for carbonated soft drinks