equity valuation using multiples we examine the valuation performance of a comprehensive list of value drivers and find that multiples derived from forward earnings explain stock prices remarkably well pricing errors are within 15 percent of stock prices for about half our sample in terms of relative performance the following general rankings are observed consistently each year forward earnings measures are followed by historical earnings measures cash flow measures and book value of equity are tied for third and sales performs the worst curiously performance declines when we consider more complex measures of intrinsic value based on short cut residual income models contrary to the popular view that different industries have different best multiples these overall rankings are observed consistently for almost all industries examined since we require analysts earnings and growth forecasts and positive values for all measures our results may not be representative of the many firm years excluded from our sample

when does communication improve coordination we study costless pre play communication of intentions among inexperienced players using the level k model of strategic thinking to describe players beliefs we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 2 games one way communication weakly increases coordination on nash equilibrium outcomes although average payoffs sometimes decrease two way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 2 games we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination jel c72 d83

combining value estimates to increase accuracy the estimates provided by discounted cash flow the method of comparables and market prices usually disagree combining two or more of these value estimates makes sense because every bona fide estimate provides information and because relying on one estimate ignores the information content of the others how then should financial analysts combine different value estimates to form a more accurate estimate than that provided by any one method drawing from bayesian decision theory the delaware block method and forecasting research this article suggests five rules of thumb for combining two or more value estimates into a superior value estimate

the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

leadership by example in the weak link game we investigate the effects of leadership in a four player weak link game a weak link game is a coordination game with multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria we wanted to see whether leadership by example in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group could help groups do better our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success specifically in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders we did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned

communication and coordination in a two stage game we study the impact of communication on behavior in a two stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs we test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head to head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies in particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict avoidance take turn strategy can emerge first our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game second many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs third communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate

growth and value hybrid valuation model based on mean reversion abstractthis article proposes a novel valuation model growth and value hybrid model to estimate the stock price this proposed model combines the essence of the asset based approach the income based approach and the principle of mean reversion to develop the theoretical closed form formula consisting of three coefficients value coefficient value support coefficient and growth coefficient regression analysis is employed to fit market data to determine these coefficients moreover this study proposes the double sorting method to build the quantile regression models of the formula to estimate the stock price at a specific quantile the results show that the predictive capability of the hybrid valuation model is superior to the model without using value support coefficient which supports the assumption that the pbr is not associated with the roe when the roe is less than a threshold in different time periods of the stock market no significant difference exists on the value support coefficient howe

valuation of bankrupt firms this study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management s published cash flow projections we estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value we find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value but the dispersion of valuation errors is very widethe sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20 to greater than 250 cross sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders incentives to overstate or understate the firm s value

a political economy theory of the soft budget constraint why do soft budget constraints exist and persist in this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness we develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal we show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do this encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival in consequence even when information is complete politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future we show that maybe somewhat surprisingly dictators who are less likely to lose power are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

does hometown advantage matter the case of institutional blockholder monitoring on earnings management in korea this study uses a large sample of korean firms to examine institutional blockholders influence on corporate earnings management the korean market is an interesting setting to study institutional monitoring because it is dominated by chaebols which are characterized by ineffective internal governance mechanisms we find evidence that institutional blockholders deter opportunistic financial reporting and such activities are the most evident among domestic institutional blockholders foreign institutional blockholders especially those with short term investment objectives lead to more discretionary reporting our findings are robust to various empirical models and endogeneity checks moreover this study offers new insight into the proximity advantage of domestic institutional investors with regard to monitoring information it also highlights institutional investors roles in shaping corporate governance in emerging markets in which sound corporate governance has become increasingly important for firms long term sustainability one important policy implication is that regulatory authorities should aim to promote institutional investors participation in these markets

nonmonetary sanctions and rewards in an experimental coordination game abstract a growing body of experimental research documents that nonmonetary sanctions and rewards may be important instruments for enforcing efficient behavior this study contributes to this literature by reporting results from a laboratory experiment the experiment is designed to test whether nonmonetary sanctions or rewards alone can yield the optimal level of efficiency in a game with pareto ranked equilibria performance based disapproval and approval ratings assigned by group members are used as proxies for nonmonetary sanction and reward respectively although these ratings are costless and payoff neutral results show that expression of disapproval facilitates coordination on the most efficient equilibrium in contrast statement of approval induces subjects to converge towards the most inefficient outcome we conclude that induced approval and disapproval ratings have asymmetric behavioral effects on coordination

is oil supply choked by financial market pressures abstract since the late 1990s financial analysts have focused strongly on short term profitability for benchmarking and valuation of international oil and gas companies the increasing pressure for strict capital discipline among oil and gas companies may have reduced their willingness to invest for future reserves and production growth the current high oil price is partly due to low exploration activity in the oil industry the last decade we present and discuss the background for this development based on previous academic research industry trends and current valuation practices an estimated econometric model of stock market valuation among oil and gas companies suggests that analysts and companies have put exaggerate weight on short term earnings and accounting profitability we therefore expect that the attention will shift back to long term reserve and production growth

valuing and pricing ipos abstract this paper investigates how underwriters set the ipo firm s fair value an ex ante estimate of the market value using a unique dataset of 228 reports from french underwriters these reports are issued before the ipo shares start trading on the stock market and detail how underwriters determined fair value we document that underwriters often employ multiples valuation dividend discount models and discounted cash flow dcf analysis to determine fair value but that all of these valuation methods suffer from a positive bias with respect to equilibrium market value we also analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for ipo pricing we report that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price part of the intentional price discount can be recovered by higher price updates we find that controlling for other factors such as investor demand part of underpricing stems from this intentional price discount

the effect of the set of comparable firms on the accuracy of the price earnings valuation method the price earnings pie valuation method estimates a firm s stock price as the product of its earnings and the pie multiple determined from a set of comparable firms this paper studies empirically the accuracy of the pie valuation method when comparable firms are selected on the basis of industry risk and earnings growth the effect of adjusting earnings for cross sectional differences in leverage is also examined

promises in contract design in this paper we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency if deviating from one s own words induces a self imposed moral burden the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract to whoever has the residual right to break such promise in the spirit of grossman and hart 1986 and hart and moore 1990 to study whether a worker s own promise of effort level governs his real choice of effort in a gift exchange game we implement four treatments in our experiments by varying two factors 1 who the firm or the worker takes the position of the proposer to propose the contract and 2 whether the proposed contract includes a nonbinding specification of the worker s effort level our key finding is that when it is the worker who proposes the contract and the contract includes the worker s promised effort level both the worker s actual effort choice and the aggregate profits are significantly higher than in each of the

is cash flow king in valuations contrary to the common perception that operating cash flows are better than accounting earnings at explaining equity valuations recent studies suggest that valuations derived from industry multiples based on reported earnings are closer to traded prices than those based on reported operating cash flows the question addressed in the article is whether the balance tilts in favor of cash flows when the following are considered 1 forecasts rather than reported numbers 2 dividends rather than operating cash flows 3 individual industries rather than all industries combined and 4 companies in non u s markets in all cases studied earnings dominated operating cash flows and dividends ndustry multiples are used often in practice both to provide stand alone quick and dirty valuations and to anchor more complex discounted cash flow valuations to obtain a company valuation one simply multiplies a value driver such as earnings for the company by the corresponding multiple which is based on the ratio of stock price to that value driver for a group of comparable companies choices for value drivers include various measures of cash flow book value earnings and revenues but earnings and cash flows are by far the most commonly used in the study reported here we compared the valuation performance of earnings multiples with the performance of multiples based on two measures of cash flow operating cash flow and dividends for a large sample of companies drawn from 10 national markets valuation performance in our study does not refer to picking mispriced stocks 1 we focused

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

durable coalitions and communication public versus private negotiations abstract we present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next we study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote we compare committees with no communication committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send a private message to any other committee member we find that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact on outcomes and coalitions when communication is public there are more universal coalitions and fewer majoritarian coalitions with private communication there are more majoritarian coalitions and fewer universal coalitions with either type of communication coalitions occur more frequently and last longer than with no communication the volume and content of communication is correlated with coalition type these findings suggest a coordination role for communication that varies with the mode of communication

should i stay or should i go bandwagons in the lab abstract we experimentally investigate the impact of strategic uncertainty and complementarity on leader and follower behavior using the model of farrell and saloner 1985 at the core of the model are endogenous timing irreversible actions and private valuations we find that strategic complementarity strongly determines follower behavior once a subject decides to abandon the status quo the probability that other players jump on the bandwagon increases sharply however there is a reluctance to lead when leading is a conditional best response we explain this deviation from the neo classical equilibrium by injecting some noise in the equilibrium concept we also find that cheap talk improves efficiency

election goals and income redistribution recent evidence from albania this paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub federal levels of government we model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decision makers and at a deeper level by the institutions within which they nd themselves operating we contrast two political objective functions that yield di erent empirical predictions of the ways in which politics should a ect scal policy lessons learned here may prove important in understanding limits on the types of redistribution possible via block grants given the institutional framework in both developing and developed countries 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation h1 h7 o1

the impact of management incentives in intergroup contests abstract in intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group s members her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members i test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager s efforts in the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment the results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only however group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

coordination with endogenous groups abstract the endogenous choice of groups can have an important effect on coordination behavior but it is an underexplored area of research in this study i examine how endogenous group choice affects coordination in a laboratory setting using the minimum effort game most studies on coordination use randomly assigned groups with some showing that successful coordination can be achieved if the subjects have some social interaction this study shows that an alternative strategy to improving coordination behavior and equilibrium play is to allow subjects some choice over their group membership

leadership beliefs and coordination an explorative discussion although recent economics contributions represent important strides forward in the understanding of leadership behavior the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of the phenomenon have attracted virtually no interests from economists and game theorists i argue that an understanding of these dimensions may be founded on coordination games particularly to the extent that these illustrate interactive belief formation in this context leadership is defined as the taking of actions that coordinate the complementary actions of many people through the creation of belief conditions that at least substitute for common knowledge and where these actions characteristically consists of some act of communication directed at those being led the concept of common knowledge or its approximation by means of notions of common belief is argued to be particularly important to understanding leadership thus leaders may establish common knowledge conditions and assist the coordination of strategies in this way or make decisions in situations where coordination problems persist in spite of common knowledge acknowledgments

the impact of advice on women s and men s selection into competition we conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice by a more experienced and better informed person affects an individual s entry into a real effort tournament and the gender gap our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action policies overall advice improves the entry decision of subjects in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down the improvements are mainly driven by increased entry of strong performing women who also become more confident and reduced entry of weak performing men we find that the overall gender gap persists even though it disappears among low and strong performers the persistence is due to an emerging gender gap among intermediate performers driven by women men following more the advice to stay out of enter the tournament in this performance group this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

expectations network centrality and public good contributions experimental evidence from india do individuals in a position of social influence contribute more to public goods than their less connected partners can we motivate these influential individuals by disclosing how others expect them to act to answer these questions we play a public good game on a star network the experimental design is such that efficiency and equality considerations should motivate central players to contribute more than others using a subject population familiar with contributions to public goods on social networks we find that central players contribute just as much as the average of other players leading to a large loss of efficiency when we disclose the expectations of other players we find that central players often adjust their contributions to meet the expectations of the group expectations disclosure leads to higher contributions in groups that have weak social ties outside of the experiment in groups where ties are strong it has no significant effect this evidence casts doubt on the idea that individuals who by their social position can contribute more effectively to the public good rise to the challenge by contributing more than others in some but not all social groups these individuals can be motivated to increase contributions by disclosing the expectations of others

endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination we examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously this positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay we decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic anticipation we use a reverse sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is sufficiently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay yielding coordination at high effort levels in spite of low incentives

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

let s talk how communication affects contract design we study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency andeffectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers canadjust trade quality after observing a post contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyertransfer in the absence of communication we find that rigid contracts are more frequent andlead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller by contrast in the presence of communication flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive both for buyers andsellers also both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communicationthan rigid without communication our results show quite strongly that communication a normalfeature in contracting can remove the potential cost of flexibility disagreements caused byconflicting perceptions we offer an explanation based on social norms

are we taxing ourselves how deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes abstract we let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets we test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers i e on voters themselves even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax shifting in the market we show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax shifting bias that experience is an effective de biasing mechanism but that pre vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy to interpret facts are needed to de bias voters

the long run effects of communication as a conflict resolution mechanism abstract the paper studies an experimental conflict in a repeated game and tests the robustness of communication as an intermediate conflict resolution instrument the results show a strong and persistent impact of communication most conflict parties refrain from conflict expenditures even after the opportunity for communication has expired third party involvement with punishment options does not enhance this effect while contesting one prize rather than multiple prizes reduces it conflict resolution is less successful even in the long term if initial conflict intensity is rather high

attracting attention in a limited attention world exploring the causes and consequences of extreme positive earnings surprises we investigate why extreme positive earnings surprises occur and the consequences of these events we posit that managers know before analysts when extremely good earnings news is developing but can have incentives to allow the earnings news to surprise the market at the earnings announcement in particular managers can use an extreme positive earnings surprise to attract investor attention when they believe their stock is neglected and future performance is expected to be strong analysts who must allocate scarce resources across many firms can also be inattentive and miss signals that suggest good performance is going to be announced using various proxies for extreme positive earnings surprises management expectations for future performance and desire for attention and analyst neglect we find evidence that an extreme positive earnings surprise is a predictable event these findings are incremental to controlling for a firm s information environment earnings volatility and operating leverage finally we show that extreme positive earnings surprises are a successful method for attracting attention with significant increases in the number of institutional owners the number of analysts and trading volume during the subsequent three years this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

an experimental study on the relevance and scope of nationality as a coordination device in a period marked by extensive cross national interactions nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on this study uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device we let subjects from japan korea and china play coordination games in which we vary information about their partner the results show that nationality serves as a coordination device if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects the strength of this device is nationality dependent and diminishes when participants are provided with additional information about their partner we also find that subjects are likely to coordinate on the pareto dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown jel c91 c92 z1 z13

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

stick to the fundamentals and discover your peers the use of industry as a criterion for selecting peers for multiples based valuation rests on the notion that companies operating in the same industry are more likely to share fundamental value drivers i e profitability growth and risk however such companies may not have similar characteristics in terms of these drivers and thus should not be traded at the same multiple we analyze this issue by developing the sum of absolute rank differences sard approach the sard approach can account for an infinite number of proxies for profitability growth and risk while remaining independent of industry classifications our results indicate that the sard approach yields significantly more accurate valuation estimates than the industry classification approach

the timing of elections in federations a disciplining device against soft budget constraints we introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints specifically we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse with synchronized elections i e simultaneous central and regional office terms or with staggered elections i e terms of office that do not coincide we find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare