the environmental kuznets curve environmental protection policy and income distribution abstract the effect of economic growth on pollution emissions differs substantially among high income countries i address this issue by analyzing public environmental policy decisions individual heterogeneity relative income effect and the political framework in which policy decisions are taken determine the emergence of the downward sloping segment of the environmental kuznets curve ekc income inequality produces a gap between the country s ability to pay for environmental protection and a country s willingness to pay i test this result by using oecd data on public r d expenditure for environmental protection the conclusion is that contrary to the ek hypothesis moments of the income distribution function other than the mean may be important for the emergence of a virtuous path of sustainable growth in high income countries

long live the doge death as a term limit on venetian chief executives can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime appointed chief executive to enforce binding informal term limits informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure length costs while also providing a strictly binding term limit death we provide a detailed historical case study of venice from 1172 to 1797 when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive the doge relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates

land consumption and income in italy a case of inverted ekc abstract the ekc hypothesis postulates that the relationship between economic growth and environmental deterioration is represented by an inverted u shaped function its validity has been questioned from several perspectives and a need for public policies has been expressed this paper uses a heuristic approach to analyze the relationship between per capita income and land consumption as proxied by the number of building permits issued by public authorities using data from the italian regions we run a panel data regression model to test whether the ekc hypothesis holds results confute it evidencing a u shaped relationship in the authors opinion the combined effect of market conditions lifestyle evolution and institutional and political factors have produced an adverse effect on environment on this basis the paper claims that when social and intergenerational aspects are involved a balanced mix of market policies and institutional architecture is needed

growth and environmental quality testing the double convergence hypothesis abstract this paper discusses the double convergence hypothesis dch that the uncritical analysis of the so called environmental kuznets curve ekc implicitly implies according to the ekc empirical evidence would support the hypothesis that economic growth through a deterministic sequence of phases would produce cross country convergence in per capita output and as a by product convergence in the demand for environmental quality however factual analysis seems to reject the general hypothesis of convergence in per capita output limiting the validity of such an assessment to the case of homogeneous groups of countries this is why to test the dch the paper focuses on the original group of oecd countries for which the economic convergence turned out to be true this allows us to verify whether green and convergence follows as a consequence of economic convergence the paper also tests for a more equitable distribution of protection policies among countries unlike other studies which do not make the dch explicit and have focused on pollutant emissions this research explicitly tests for the double convergence using as a proxy for the demand for environmental quality the territory set aside for protected areas the results confirm that for the selected homogenous group of countries growth has accompanied the demand for environmental quality this happens both in terms of conditional and stochastic convergence

term limits and electoral accountability abstract periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable from this perspective term limits which restrict voters ability to reward politicians with re election appear counterproductive we show that despite the disciplining effect of elections term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters by reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences such truthful behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents we characterize under which circumstances two term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters

planning delay and the responsiveness of english housing supply there is growing international interest in the impact of regulatory controls on the supply of housing most research focuses on the supply impacts of prescribed limits on land use but housing supply may also be affected by the process of planning monitoring and approval but this is hard to measure in detail the uk has a particularly restrictive planning regime and a detailed and uncertain process of development control linked to it but does offer the opportunity of detailed site based investigation of planning delay this paper presents the findings of empirical research on the time taken to gain planning permission for selected recent major housing projects in southern england the scale of delay found was far greater than is indicated by average official data measuring the extent to which local authorities meet planning delay targets hedonic modelling indicated that there is considerable variation in the time it takes local authorities to process planning applications housing association developments are processed more quickly than those of large developers and small sites appear to be particularly time intensive these results suggest that delays in development control may be a significant contributory factor to the low responsiveness of uk housing supply to upturns in market activity

policy variability and economic growth this paper explores the effect of policy variability or frequency of regime switching on economic growth and welfare we study a one sector growth model where investment can be subsidized at either a positive rate or not subsidized at all we find that the lack of persistence in policies per se need not be welfare reducing and that it is likely to decrease growth higher variability implies more frequent changes in consumption and investment but by creating a stronger intertemporal link across regimes variability reduces the fluctuation in investment rates thus decreasing the magnitude of changes in consumption and increasing welfare

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

political parties and political shirking using ada roll call voting scores for the 1947 2006 period i find that senators shirk in their last term the degree of shirking is limited by political parties which constrain the politician in his last term and varies by post senate career choices the results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics

valuing investment projects under interest rate risk empirical evidence from european firms abstractin this article we perform an empirical investigation of the effect of the interest rate uncertainty on the valuation of investment projects the analysis is carried out by employing a real option approach and by considering a set of firms that operate in various production sectors in the euro area in particular the revenues generated by the investment projects are modelled using a geometric brownian motion whereas the interest rate is specified as a stochastic process of vasicek type moreover using the volatility of the equity return as a proxy the volatility of the revenues is calibrated to real firm data while the parameters of the interest rate model are estimated by fitting the euribor time series to this aim an ad hoc calibration procedure is developed which is based on the maximum likelihood principle and thus has the merit of being simple fast and suitable for practical purposes our study reveals that the interest rate uncertainty reduces the valuation of investment projects h

party politics governors and economic policy in this article we evaluate the role of elections in governors state tax policy making does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a democrat or republican and whether she is eligible for re election or faces a binding term limit using a regression discontinuity design and a panel of u s states we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent s eligibility for re election re electable democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated republicans yielding divergence between party policy positions however governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference resulting in a movement of policy back together

confronting the environmental kuznets curve t he environmental kuznets curve posits an inverted u relationship between pollution and economic development kuznets s name was apparently attached to the curve by grossman and krueger 1993 who noted its resemblance to kuznets s inverted u relationship between income inequality and development in the first stage of industrialization pollution in the environmental kuznets curve world grows rapidly because people are more interested in jobs and income than clean air and water communities are too poor to pay for abatement and environmental regulation is correspondingly weak the balance shifts as income rises leading industrial sectors become cleaner people value the environment more highly and regulatory institutions become more effective along the curve pollution levels off in the middle income range and then falls toward pre industrial levels in wealthy societies the environmental kuznets curve model has elicited conflicting reactions from researchers and policymakers applied econometricians have generally accepted the basic tenets of the model and focused on measuring its parameters their regressions typically fitted to cross sectional observations across countries or regions suggest that air and water pollution increase with development until per capita income reaches a range of 5000 to 8000 when income rises beyond that level pollution starts to decline as shown in the conventional ekc line in figure 1 in developing countries some policymakers have interpreted such results as conveying a message about priorities grow first then clean up numerous critics have challenged the conventional environmental kuznets curve both as a representation of what actually happens in the development process and as a policy prescription some pessimistic critics argue that crosssectional evidence for the environmental kuznets curve is nothing more than a

dynastic political privilege and electoral accountability the case of u s governors 1950 2005 i introduction political dynasties which pass on public offices and other political privileges from family member to family member have been important in the united states throughout its history this paper investigates whether dynastic political privilege enhances incumbent accountability to voters as incumbents with family political capital work to maintain favorable reputations even in the incumbents last period this would mitigate last period problems in contrast with earlier empirical results in which incumbents in their last period in office deliver inferior economic results we test the hypothesis that dynastic political privilege increases accountability using data for 1950 2005 on u s governors including a new data set on the family relationships of politicians the constitution of the united states embodies the political ideals of the founders whose goal was to establish a republican national government that was responsible to the nation s people that specified the powers of the federal government that recognized the rights of the states and that incorporated checks and balances which would limit governmental power this new government was to be a direct contrast to and repudiation of monarchy in one of the most explicit repudiations of monarchy the constitution forbids the grant of titles of nobility by both the federal government and the states constitution of the united states article i sections 9 and 10 see the federalist papers number 39 for james madison s statements on the most decisive importance of the ban on titles of nobility library of congress 1961 242 interestingly however the constitution does not directly forbid hereditary office provided that the inheritor of the office is elected to it or appointed to it by constitutional means for example early in the nineteenth century the nation elected john quincy adams son of the second president as its sixth president dal bo dal bo and snyder 2009 carefully examine u s congressional dynasties from 1789 to 1996 and find that political power in the united states is self perpetuating this seems not only contrary to our nation s fundamental political principles but it also seems to hand over opportunities for rent seeking to relatives of successful politicians furthermore it is inefficiently anticompetitive because under such a system many highly qualified candidates are frozen out of office for reasons other than qualifications and anticipated productivity in office thus at first glance this process of family privilege in politics appears repugnant and contrary to the republican principles of our national political system there are however at least two other views of inherited political privilege which see it as socially useful first it is possible that political skills are actually inheritable so that dynastic political privilege may be socially productive that is relatives of office holders may gain special access to knowledge and skills that is only available to other potential office holders at much higher cost if at all the second and perhaps more important way in which inherited political privilege could be socially productive is that it may mitigate public sector principal agent problems the political system of the united states presents substantial principal agent problems as the voters cannot directly control the behavior of incumbent officials this gives office holders opportunities to act against the voters interests through corruption shirking on the job consumption at public expense promoting narrow ideology and others dynastic political privilege may make these behaviors more costly the possibility that opportunistic behavior in office may damage other family members political prospects disciplines current office holders making them more likely to exercise care in serving their constituents interests the main mechanism for voters to discipline incumbents is through elections

testing the kuznets curve hypothesis for qatar a comparison between carbon dioxide and ecological footprint abstract this paper explores the validity of the environmental kuznets curve ekc using two different environment indicators the carbon dioxide emissions co2 and the ecological footprint ef in qatar over the 1980 2011 period to this end we investigate the impact of real gross domestic product rgdp the square of rgdp the energy use the financial development and the trade openness on the co2 emissions and the ef we employ the autoregressive distributed lag ardl model with the presence of unknown structural breaks in order to study short run and long run elasticity between the variables the findings infer that there is a long run relationship among the selected variables with a shift in the cointegration vector in 1991 and 2000 the empirical result indicates that the inverted u shaped hypothesis is not valid in qatar when we use the co2 emissions whereas the inverted u shaped held when using the ef furthermore the error correction results confirm that the convergence towards the long run equilibrium will mostly occur within one year after a short run shock generally the findings suggest that qatar should invest more in efficient energy and continue sustained its growth moreover more efforts are needed for diversification particularly in technology intensive and environment friendly industries to improve environmental quality

housing bubbles and busts the role of supply elasticity existing studies of the relationship between housing price dynamics and housing supply which have relied upon questionable proxies for supply elasticity have yielded highly mixed results in this paper we provide new evidence on this relationship based on actual estimates of the price elasticity of supply for local markets in florida intermarket differences in housing supply elasticity are found to explain much of the variation in housing price movements and new construction during the most recent boom bust cycle additionally we find that variance in the elasticity of housing supply can be attributed to differences in land availability and the local fiscal and regulatory environment jel r14

hysteresis effects under cir interest rates most decision making research in real options focuses on revenue uncertainty assuming discount rates remain constant however for many decisions revenue or cost streams are relatively static and investment is driven by interest rate uncertainty for example the decision to invest in durable machinery and equipment using interest rate models from cox et al 1985b we generalize the work of ingersoll and ross 1992 in two ways firstly we include real options on perpetuities in addition to zero coupon cash flows secondly we incorporate abandonment or disinvestment as well as investment options and thus model interest rate hysteresis parallel to revenue uncertainty in dixit 1989a under stochastic interest rates economic hysteresis is found to be significant even for small sunk costs

time inconsistency and fiscal policy empirical analysis of u s states 1969 89 abstract we offer an extensive and robust test of the time inconsistency theory of fiscal politics we employ data of u s states from 1969 to 1989 and the results of our tests indicate the variables such as legislative stability and executive term limits have strongly predictable impacts on the volatility of various measures of fiscal policy

the effects of logrolling on congressional voting the theoretical public choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading these models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology this study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology the empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables the results reflect the presence of vote trading coalitions on some votes but not on others the results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators copyright 1992 by american economic association

an alternative analysis of apparent ekc type transitions abstract the hypothesis of the environmental kuznets curve ekc depends upon the assumption that countries pass through a similar environmental impact trajectory as they experience income growth implying that income levels determine pollution levels the authors present evidence that this is not representative of the way many individual country s pollution emission trajectories evolve and question the emphasis on income determinism by the ekc the study proposes that nonlinear dynamic systems analysis provides a more complete description of individual country pollution trajectories in the case of co 2 emissions the nonlinear time trajectories show abrupt transitions that occur contemporaneously with historical events and over a broad range of incomes

veterans interests and the transition to government growth 1870 1915 civil war veterans were the first interest group to use their political power to obtain substantial monetary transfers from the u s treasury veterans supported the republican party and in exchange republicans provided increasingly generous veterans benefits placing a strain on the treasury that led toward a demand for increased taxes veterans also established a precedent that other groups could follow to petition the goverment for economic benefits shaping the transformation of american government in the progressive era which led to the substantial growth of the federal government in the 20th century

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

reexamining the empirical evidence for an environmental kuznets curve this paper uses an updated and revised panel data set on ambient air pollution in cities worldwide to examine the robustness of the evidence for the existence of an inverted u shaped relationship between national income and pollution we test the sensitivity of the pollution income relationship to functional forms to additional covariates and to changes in the nations cities and years sampled we find that the results are highly sensitive to these changes and conclude that there is little empirical support for an inverted u shaped relationship between several important air pollutants and national income in these data

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

self imposed term limits in reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits dick and lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent seeking there is an inefficient tendency to re elect incumbents in their model term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative however many term limits are unilaterally self imposed in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents terms to two and their model cannot explain these limits in this comment i suggest that term limits may be self imposed by risk averse voters who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once and for all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate the market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter

the environmental kuznets curve ekc theory part a concept causes and the co2 emissions case abstract the main purpose of this study is to capture the main features of the environmental kuznets curve ekc concept according to the ekc theory the process of economic growth is expected eventually to limit the environmental degradation created in the early stages of development the ekc concept leads many researchers from the early 1990s to assume that each economy should focus on its growth and any environmental problems will be eventually eliminated by the process of economic growth several studies attempt to test empirically the ekc hypothesis using data on many countries and examining various types of environmental degradation while other studies examine the underlying factors that may drive such a relationship this article reviews the evolution of the ekc concept and the possible causes of an ekc pattern like the distribution of income the international trade pollution haven hypothesis structural changes technical progress and improvements in energy efficiency institutions and governance and consumer preferences as co2 emissions are a pollutant with global effects several studies deal with the possible ekc pattern for co2 emissions and these studies are discussed separately the various critiques on the ekc concept are reviewed in the second article of this work

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model abstract it appears to be widely accepted in the real options literature that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on investment our article demonstrates that the notion of a negative uncertainty investment relationship is not always correct we show that in certain situations an increase in uncertainty can actually increase the probability of investing and thereby have a positive impact on investment

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

economic growth and environmental degradation the environmental kuznets curve and sustainable development abstract in this paper we critically examine the concept of the environmental kuznets curve ekc it proposes that there is an inverted u shape relation between environmental degradation and income per capita so that eventually growth reduces the environmental impact of economic activity the concept is dependent on a model of the economy in which there is no feedback from the quality of the environment to production possibilities and in which trade has a neutral effect on environmental degradation the actual violation of these assumptions gives rise to fundamental problems in estimating the parameters of an ekc the paper identifies other econometric problems with estimates of the ekc and reviews a number of empirical studies the inference from some such ekc estimates that further development will reduce environmental degradation is dependent on the assumption that world per capita income is normally distributed when in fact median income is far below mean income we carry out simulations combining ekc estimates from the literature with world bank forecasts for economic growth for individual countries aggregating over countries to derive the global impact within the horizon of the bank s forecast 2025 global emissions of so 2 continue to increase forest loss stabilizes before the end of the period but tropical deforestation continues at a constant rate throughout the period

congressional voting on term limits between 1990 and 1995 twenty three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations tocongress in 1995 the house ofrepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of congress only weeks later thesupreme court struck down the individualstate laws in 1997 the house againbrought the issue to a vote which alsofailed this paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents the game foremost predictsthat members from term limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote the empirical section employsprobit multinomial logit and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses among otherresults in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a yea on thefirst vote and a subsequent nay on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self imposedterm limits the results are robust tomodel specification estimator andalternative sampling implications areproposed in the concluding comments

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

is the income elasticity of environmental improvements less than one we estimated the income elasticity of environmental improvements for a number of european data sets the value of this parameter is consistently found to be less than one with few exceptions our findings are compared with state of the art contingent valuation studies from other countries we also compared our findings with those reported in the literature on charitable donations and corporate donations these studies show a similar pattern donations decrease as a percentage of income as income increases

wicksellian theory of forest rotation under interest rate variability abstract we apply the wicksellian single rotation framework to cover the unexplored case of variable and stochastic interest rate we provide a mathematical characterization of the two dimensional optimal stopping problem and show in the presence of amenity valuation that increased interest rate volatility lengthens the optimal rotation period and increases the value of the optimal policy by modelling the interest rate as a mean reverting process and forest value as a geometric brownian motion and abstracting from amenity valuation we present an explicit solution for the problem numerical illustrations indicate that interest rate volatility has a significant and non linear impact on optimal rotation

optimal sequential investment when capital is not readily reversible when investment opportunities arrive one at a time and are reviewed sequentially a corporation s optimal policy differs from a standard net present value rule if the corporation exercises control over an industry state variable and control is costly the first condition presupposes a degree of market power for the firm the second occurs if corporate investment decisions are imperfectly reversible to address the problem of optimal investment in this context a firm s investment decisions are modeled as a markov reward process the causes of economic irreversibility are discussed and general propositions concerning the optimal investment policy are derived these propositions are then applied to the optimization of an exploration program by an oligopolistic firm a price leader under particular demand and distributional assumptions solutions for the optimal decision rule and the value of the exploration program are obtained and their properties examined current investment may affect future opportunities by creating growth opportunities as defined by myers 16 see also spence 25 or by reducing the value of an existing opportunity set despite the known potential for these interactions capital budgeting techniques such as net present valuation scenario planning and monte carlo simulation focus exclusively on the stand alone value of an investment the capacity for modeling interactions is present in the multiperiod models of merton 16 bogue and roll 5 and others the absence of applications however is evidence that actual economic interactions between current and future opportunities are not well understood this paper develops a model of a firm facing a sequence of interdependent growth opportunities opportunities have positive net present values because the firm exercises market power in its product market current investment changes the value of future opportunities through its effect on a product market variable the model is used to examine the impact of demand industry structure and technology on optimal investment rules and on the value of aggregate growth

have air pollutant emissions converged among u s regions evidence from unit root tests previous studies of income distribution have found evidence indicating that incomes across u s regions have converged supporting the prediction of the neoclassical growth model a potential shortcoming in these studies is that only one measure of well being is considered a measure of wealth linked to incomes or production this paper examines whether income convergence was accompanied by air pollutant emission convergence results from unit root tests provide some evidence that indicators of environmental quality have converged across u s regions during the 1929 1994 period

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

term limits time horizons and electoral accountability term limits have been known to reduce electoral accountability by removing the possibility of reelection thus affecting economic policy choices i e the lame duck effect we show that the magnitude and statistical significance of this effect is influenced by the expected length of a future career by using incumbent age as a proxy for expected career length we find that the lame duck effect is statistically observable only among those politicians with long careers ahead using data on us governors from 1950 to 2005 we find evidence that the influence of term limits is heterogeneous primarily influencing young incumbents who hope to have long careers and thus have stronger incentives to remain accountable to voters indeed we find little evidence of a lame duck effect among older incumbents suggesting that their already shortened time horizons may offset the term limit effect

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

irreversible investment under interest rate variability some generalizations we study the impact of interest rate and revenue variability on the decision to carry out irreversible investment we provide a mathematical characterization of the two dimensional optimal stopping problem and show that interest rate variability has a decelerating or accelerating impact on investment depending on whether the current interest rate is below or above the long run steady state allowing for interest rate volatility decelerates investment by raising both the required exercise premium of the investment opportunity and the value of waiting finally increased revenue volatility is shown to strengthen the negative impact of interest rate volatility and vice versa

economic growth trade and energy implications for the environmental kuznets curve abstract the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis asserts that pollution follows an inverted u path with respect to economic growth the ekc has been explained in terms of structural changes in the composition of economic output and increased environmental regulation at higher income levels while some authors have incorporated the impact of trade policy orientation on the ekc the impact of the actual movement between countries of goods that embody pollution has not been considered this paper attempts to econometrically quantify the effect using pooled cross country and time series data the ekc hypothesis is examined with respect to commercial energy consumption the source of many serious environmental problems it was found that while both industrializing and industrialized countries have added to their energy requirements by exporting manufactured goods the growth has been substantially higher in the former at the same time industrialized countries have been able to reduce their energy requirements by importing manufactured goods exports of manufactured goods by industrialized countries has thus been an important factor in generating the upward sloping portion of the ekc and imports by industrialized countries have contributed to the downward slope

information access income distribution and the environmental kuznets curve abstract recent empirical studies have tested the hypothesis of an environmental kuznets curve ekc focusing primarily on the relationship between per capita income and certain types of pollutant emissions given the stock nature of many pollution problems emissions only partially account for the environmental impacts moreover almost all of the studies have given consideration to little more than income levels as explanatory variables this paper empirically tests the hypothesis of the ekc existence for a stock sensitive indicator that is the percentage of protected area pa within national territory it does theorize that economic growth is a necessary condition in order to better address environmental issues but it also stresses that other variables income distribution education information accessibility may play a fundamental role in determining environmental quality contrary to other studies that mainly focus on the calculation of the income level corresponding to the transition point this paper is more concerned with the calculation of environmental quality corresponding to that transition point that is the minimum level of environmental quality that a country is willing to accept this paper highlights the idea that if the transition point is determined primarily by income level social policies determine the level of environmental quality corresponding to that point

on the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship understanding the effects of uncertainty over any decision variable has fascinated economists for a long time risk aversion and incomplete markets are likely to make the investment uncertainty relationship negative e g roger craine 1989 joseph zeira 1989 what happens in the absence of risk aversion and incomplete markets is however ambiguous richard hartman 1972 and andrew b abel 1983 1984 1985 found that in the presence of symmetric convex costs of adjustment mean preserving increases in price uncertainty raise investment of a competitive firm as long as the profit function is convex in prices on the other hand the recent literature on irreversible investment e g robert s pindyck 1988 giuseppe bertola 1988 has shown that increases in uncertainty lower investment all these results have been derived under either risk neutrality or complete markets intuition suggests that the explanation for such a difference lies with the asymmetric nature of adjustment costs in the irreversible investment case as compared with the symmetry of the adjustment cost mechanisms proposed by abel and hartman although this intuition is confirmed in this paper asymmetric adjustment costs are shown not to be sufficient to explain why the results differ in fact a more hidden but at least as important difference between these two literatures is that the former assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale whereas the latter assumes either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both 2 the purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of the decreasing marginal return to capital assumption due to either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both in determining the effects of adjustment cost asymmetries on the sign of the response of investment to changes in uncertainty under risk neutrality for this the paper develops a simple model with a cost of adjustment mechanism general enough to consider both symmetric convexity and irreversibility as special cases one of the most important findings is the lack of robustness of the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty under asymmetric adjustment costs3 to changes in the degree of competition in fact when firms are nearly competitive the conclusion of hartman and of abel holds no matter how asymmetric adjustment costs are studying adjustment cost mechanisms has a central role in understanding the dynamics of investment and its business cycle implications but conclusive results about the sign of the instantaneous relationship between uncertainty and investment should not be department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 i am grateful to giuseppe bertola prajit dutta glen hubbard anil kashyap richard lyons and the referees for their useful comments 1the financial literature on investment has considered risk aversion through a premium in the discount rate determined by the capm capital asset pricing model intertemporal capm or consumption capm however often this discount rate is left unchanged when studying the response of investment to uncertainty changes e g pindyck 1988 pp 974 5 thereby omitting the effect of changes in uncertainty on investment due to risk aversion and incomplete markets 2in the typical version of the irreversible investment problem there is no cost of upward adjustments thus imperfect competition and or decreasing returns to scale are required to bound the size of the firm 3in this paper asymmetric adjustment cost refers to the case in which it is more expensive to adjust downward than upward certainly the opposite case is a trivial extension of the case studied in this paper

the environmental kuznets curve ekc theory part b critical issues according to the environmental kuznets curve ekc theory the process of economic growth is expected to limit the environmental degradation created in the early stages of development the first article of this study reviews the empirical studies examining various factors other than income that may lead to an ekc pattern the current article reviews in the first part the major critiques on the ekc speculation which relate to the following issues the normal distribution of world income the feedback from environmental degradation to economic growth the characteristics of the pollutant in question various econometric issues the evolution of consumption when income rises and the assumption about a common developmental pattern in all countries the second part discusses additional matters reported indirectly in the literature and or must be further examined there are doubts whether the gdp series captures the transition of production to the three productive sectors in empirical estimations and whether services are less polluting compared to industry activities finally the original kuznets theory which laid the groundwork for the ekc concept does not seem to solve income inequality problems

favorite sons intergenerational wealth transfers among politicians in this paper we investigate the degree of occupational following in politics and its impact upon the career success and behavior while in office of both sons and fathers we find that sons follow into their politician fathers footsteps to a degree surpassed in the general population only among farmers and self employed proprietors there is substantial indirect evidence which suggests that following is motivated to a large extent by the transfer of valuable name recognition and voter loyalty

investment under uncertainty irreversibility and the arrival of information over time in this paper we consider a risk neutral competitive firm which is uncertain about the true state of demand we build upon arrow by demonstrating that the irreversibility of investment in physical capital together with the anticipation of receiving information and of learning the state of demand lead to 1 cautious investment behaviour and hence to lower investment levels than otherwise since the firm cannot disinvest if market conditions turn out to be less favourable than currently anticipated 2 a time varying risk premium or marginal adjustment cost which is shown to arise endogenously and to be positively related to the investment level and to the anticipation of greater information in the sense of blackwell 1951 1953 3 a gradual adjustment of the capital stock to the desired level defined as the optimal capital stock corresponding to the true state of demand

local taxation and urban development testing for the side effects of the italian property tax land is an essential yet limited natural resource its current unsustainable use asks for a better understanding of the main determinants of urban expansion a heuristic approach is used to analyze urban development in italy in particular the paper estimates an econometric model to test the impact of the italian property tax ici on the local authorities behavior and in particular on urban planning and development it tests whether its introduction has fostered rather than dampened construction activity the hypothesis put forward is that because of the concurrent market conditions the introduction of the tax has facilitated urban development the structure of the tax and the devolution process that began in the 90s induced local municipalities to adopt less tight accommodative urban policies to offset budgetary needs a more elastic urban policy reduces price volatility however its overall welfare effect is not clearly determined indeed ceteris paribus geographical areas with more elastic housing supply witness larger land consumption the land use changes we witnessed in the last decades could be the combined effect of financial and fiscal aspects if this is so careful attention should be given to the issue of whether leaving urban planning and the power to levy property taxes under the same jurisdiction

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

understanding the clayton act of 1914 an analysis of the interest group hypothesis the trusts issue culminated in the passage of the clayton act in1914 which conventional wisdom holds was a response to theperceived ineffectiveness of the sherman antitrust act of 1890 using ordered and multinomial logit analysis we were able todetect economic interest variables that explain the senators votes the empirical findings strongly support the wealth transferhypothesis and the regression results clearly show that senatorsresponded to interest groups while we also found some support forthe ideological perspective it is clear that there was much moreto the vote than the conventional story would suggest

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

waiting to invest investment and uncertainty the textbook analysis that accepts all projections with positive net present values as positive is quite generally wrong the ability to delay a project means that almost every project competes with itself postponed with uncertain interest rates even the simplest of projects has an option value the effect of interest rate uncertainty on the optimal delay of investment is sizable this implies that the rate of aggregate investment will depend on both the level of the real interest rate and the degree of interest rate uncertainty furthermore it is not necessarily true that investment rises with a fall in interest rates copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

term limitation in a dynamic model of partisan balance in november 1992 voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of congress all fourteen propositions passed ten received more than 60 support bringing the total number of states with congressional term limits to fifteen much of the discussion of term limitation has focused on issues of representation the strength of parties and the functioning of congress after the adoption of limits benjamin and malbin 1992 will 1992 this paper explores an important but less discussed consequence of term limitation its impact on the partisan balance of legislatures we inquire how electoral dynamics incumbent advantage and voluntary retirement interact with a term limit to produce a new balance between parties in a two party legislature which party is favored by the introduction of term limits how does the length of the term limit matter are there conditions such that one party will be favored by any limit regardless of how restrictive

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

a further inquiry into the pollution haven hypothesis and the environmental kuznets curve abstract empirical research on the relationship between economic growth and its impact on the environment often tests the environmental kuznets curve ekc a hypothesis that rising national output leads to increases in pollution emissions until an economy reaches a certain size and decreases thereafter this paper addresses a branch of ekc literature focused on the role international trade plays in shaping this relationship in particular we test the pollution haven hypothesis which posits that emission reductions observed in developed nations are partly the result of shifting dirty production to developing nations with lax environmental standards we estimate ekcs for seven oft studied pollutants and find little evidence that pollution havens play a significant role in shaping the ekc we also find that confidence intervals around ekc turning points are very wide often including values well above the range of the data this leads us to be skeptical of the optimistic view that economic growth naturally leads to improvements in environmental quality

term limits and electoral competitiveness evidence from california s state legislative races california s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures real expenditures during the three general elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower than in even 1976 this drop has occurred at the same time that races have become closer contests and more candidates are running for office by any measure term limits have coincided with large changes in the level of political competition even before term limits have forcibly removed a single politician from office the changes are so large that more incumbents are being defeated races are closer more candidates are running and fewer single candidate races than occur at any other time during our sample period from 1976 to 1994

income inequality and pollution a reassessment of the environmental kuznets curve abstract improvements in some measures of air and water quality can accompany rising per capita income as illustrated by the so called environmental kuznets curve for pollution variables which show such a relationship we hypothesize that a more equitable distribution of power contributes to these outcomes by enhancing the influence on policy of those who bear the costs of pollution relative to the influence of those who benefit from pollution generating activities an empirical analysis of international variations in seven indicators of air and water quality supports this hypothesis literacy political rights and civil liberties are found to have particularly strong effects on environmental quality in low income countries

taking the u out of kuznets a comprehensive analysis of the ekc and environmental degradation unlike most environmental kuznets curve ekc studies which focus on narrow measures of pollution as proxies for environmental quality we test the validity of the ekc using the ecological footprint ef a more comprehensive measure of environmental degradation we find no empirical evidence of an ekc relationship between the ef and economic development and only limited support for such a relationship among the components of the ef in addition we discover that energy is largely responsible for the lack of an ekc relationship and that energy consumption levels would have to be cut by over 50 in order for a statistically significant ekc relationship to emerge from the data overall these results suggest that growth alone will not lead to sustainable development

self interest agency theory and political voting behavior the ratification of the united states constitution two hundred years ago the united states constitution replaced the articles of confederation as the fundamental law of the land when new hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the constitution on june 21 1788 the document represented the successful culmination of a movement to strengthen the national government scholars long have debated the possible causes for this important change in political institutions see james hutson 1984 a change which was to have major consequences for the development of the nation douglass north 1981 ch 14 despite the intense debate few scholars have either offered any theoretical model of the delegates voting behavior or employed formal statistical analysis to test their hypotheses about voting behavior at the 13 state ratifying conventions these omissions are surprising particularly since charles a beard 1913 long ago stated that the contest over ratification represented the ultimate test of the role of economic interests in the making of the constitution a test he never conducted given the recent interest exhibited by economists in explaining political behavior the absence of a rigorous analysis of voting at the 13 ratifying conventions is even more surprising economists and economic historians have all but ignored the ratification process in a progress report on our study of the making of the constitution we robert mcguire and robert ohsfeldt 1984 recently provided a tentative theoretical model and summarized preliminary indications drawn from incomplete data of delegates voting behavior during the drafting and ratification of the constitution more recently we mcguire and ohsfeldt 1986 mcguire 1988 presented the final results of our econometric studies of the voting behavior during the drafting of the constitution at the federal convention of 1787 in the present paper we offer a principalagent model and econometric tests of voting behavior during the ratification of the constitution at the 13 state conventions an analysis of voting at the ratification stage allows for a stronger test of the factors influencing voting behavior than an analysis of the federal convention of 1787 because of a greater number of delegates over 1200 versus 55 and a more straightforward voting process the paper not only addresses an important and controversial issue in economic history the role of economic interests in the ratification of the constitution it also advances our general understanding of polit

predicting the institutional effects of term limits in this paper we develop a model to predict the seniority turnover and transition consequences of term limit reforms for any institution with a regularized procedure for rotating membership with this model we can predict the number of members who will be serving in their last term at any given time once an institution reaches a stable state under term limit reforms for example our results show that for the u s senate current term limit proposals will result in a substantial increase in the number of lame duck members and a significant reduction in average seniority we make no claims as to the public policy effects of term limit proposals however our model can be used to design a proposal that will maximize any benefits or minimize any public policy effects found to be associated with term limit reforms

a consumption based approach to environmental kuznets curves using the ecological footprint indicator recent research suggests that consumption based measures offer an insightful perspective on the debate on the relationship between economic growth and the environment in this article we deepen the

is there an environmental kuznets curve for sulfur abstract most existing estimates of the environmental kuznets curve ekc for sulfur which use samples of mainly high income countries indicate a maximum emissions turning point at middle to lower high income levels of gdp per capita we use a larger and more globally representative sample than previous sulfur ekc studies we find that sulfur emissions per capita are a monotonic function of income per capita when we use a global sample and an inverted u shape function of income when we use a sample of high income countries a model estimated in first differences results in a monotonic ekc when estimated with both high income and global samples reductions in emissions are time related rather than income related

is environmental degradation an inevitable consequence of economic growth tunneling through the environmental kuznets curve abstract economywide reforms often contribute simultaneously to economic social and environmental gains however unintended adverse side effects occur in many cases when such growth inducing reforms are undertaken while neglecting other policy market or institutional imperfections the remedy does not generally require reversal of the original economywide reforms but rather the ex ante implementation of additional complementary measures that remove such imperfections the ekc approach seeks to relate the state of the environment to the stage of development developing countries could learn from the experiences of industrialized nations and restructure growth and development to tunnel through any potential ekc thereby avoiding going through the same stages of growth that involve relatively high and even irreversible levels of environmental harm an environmentally adjusted measure of national income could significantly change the shape of the development environment relationship recommendations for decision making include actively seeking win win policies that simultaneously yield both economic and environmental gains pre empting environmental harm through ex ante remedial measures and fine tuning reform policies to avoid severe environmental damage the adoption of more sustainable policies will facilitate the attainment of higher levels of development at a lower environmental cost

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district

the effect of growth and corruption on soil sealing in italy a regional environmental kuznets curve analysis this paper analyses and looks more closely at the empirical debate regarding the income elasticity hypothesis postulated in relation to the environmental kuznets curve and the impact of corruption on the relationship between growth and environmental impact measured in terms of soil sealing as proxied by the number of building permits issued by public authorities it postulates that when current private rent is high compared to perceived social costs and a large enough minority benefits from the rules the ekc does not emerge and public intervention fails to perceive social optimality to validate this hypothesis we run a panel data regression model based on data from all italian regions results confirmed the hypothesis evidencing a u shaped relationship i e a detrimental relationship between income and environmental impact quality it also demonstrated that this is contingent on the level of corruption the latter affects the position and the shape of the inverted ekc speeding up the exploitation process it shows that the higher the income the higher the effect of corruption on the environment therefore it advocates caution against any simplistic inference from ekc