multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

entrepreneurship human capital and labor demand a story of signaling and matching in contrast to employee qualifications there is no clear evidence that entrepreneurs qualifications positively affect their income in this study we propose that entrepreneurs can benefit from using their qualification as a signal during the process of recruiting employees this is assumed to follow a process of matching equals among equals we confirm a matching of qualification levels for highly skilled employees in denmark and an indication of this in germany partial support for matching among medium skilled employees was only found in germany with no consistent evidence of matching for low skilled employees in neither country this suggests that as skill levels of employees decrease their probabilities of working for different founders converge founders qualifications are the most reliable predictor of recruitment choices over time our findings are robust to numerous control variables as well as across industries and firm age

reward structures in a planned economy some difficulties there is an extensive literature on the socially optimal pricing policy for public firms but much less attention has been paid to the vital question of how managers of public firms can be induced to follow such policies the politicians or planners who seek to control a public enterprise will be less well informed about cost and demand functions than the manager and there is no reason to suppose that managers are altruists thus with asymmetrical information and selfish managers there is a significant control problem recently tam 1981 has suggested an ingenious iterative incentive mechanism designed to surmount this problem this note a argues that her negative price incentive scheme npis will not achieve its objective of guiding managers to price at marginal cost2 and b compares npis with variants of the performance index pi proposed by scott 1952 1978 and finsinger and vogelsang 1980a 1981 tam s proposal is that the manager of a public firm be paid a bonus b each period

mechanisms for incentive regulation theory and experiment this article develops the theoretical properties of a new incentive mechanism for regulating a monopoly seller and reports the results of laboratory experimental tests of its behavioral properties the design of the new mechanism draws upon the results of our earlier experimental research on the behavioral properties of two other mechanisms one by loeb and magat 1979 and a second by finsinger and vogelsang 1981 as with finsinger and vogelsang the new mechanism weakens loeb and magat s requirement that regulators have complete knowledge of market demand the new mechanism however is not subject to the destabilizing profit destroying cycles of nonoptimal behavior observed with finsinger and vogelsang s

when collective bargaining leads to inequality determinants of two tier provisions in canadian collective agreements this study examines two tier provisions a form of labor segmentation in firms that is increasingly formalized in collective agreements drawing on a large population of canadian collective agreemen

accounting for the proliferation of two tier wage settlements in the u s airline industry 1983 1986 this study examines the wave of two tier wage settlements in the u s airline industry that occurred from 1983 through 1986 although two tier plans spread throughout the industry it was the more

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

optimal taxation and firm formation abstract this paper analyzes non linear optimal taxation under asymmetric information in a general equilibrium model with endogenous firm formation it first shows under a weak separability assumption on technologies that output and input taxes are not necessary if profits are optimally taxed it then examines the progressivity or lack of it of the optimal profit tax and describes the corresponding effects on the structure of the production sector relative to the first best solution finally the paper investigates conditions under which the provision of public goods can be decentralized

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

entrepreneurship and organization design we model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents what distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for those who are relatively unmanageable while possibly excellent managers themselves become entrepreneurs entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well paid jobs to others while the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs this result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship

the effect of two tier collective bargaining agreements on shareholder equity this study uses an event time methodology to examine the impact of two tier agreements on shareholder equity from 1981 through 1986 following announcements of two tier agreements about half of the firms in the sample had negative abnormal returns returns with values below the expected market returns and half had positive abnormal returns because the positive returns exceeded the negative returns in absolute value however there was a statistically significant increase in mean firm value the abnormal returns averaged between 2 and 4 over a 10 to 12 week period following the announcement a figure that approximately equals the transactions cost of a stock purchase the authors speculate that this rather low average gain may help explain the marked decline of new two tier agreements during the latter half of the 1980s

socially optimal pricing with rivalry and economies of scale this article examines the nature of economically efficient tariffs when there exists rivalry among firms that produce imperfectly substitutable outputs with economies of scale and that operate under a viability constraint pricing principles are derived and related to the rules developed in the literature for the regulated monopolist for some firms excess profits may prevail at efficient prices and the form of the inverse elasticity rule is altered in markets with rivalry however the standard efficient pricing rules and increased welfare results if regulators are empowered to implement lump sum interfirm payments a numerical example is provided

multitask agency problems focus and task clustering abstract this short paper discusses recent insights of multitask agency theory it considers in turn the issues of effort substitution conflicts between tasks and implicit incentives and mission it concludes by addressing the problem of optimal task clustering

human capital versus sorting the effects of compulsory attendance laws under the educational sorting hypothesis a state compulsory school attendance law will increase the educational attainment of high ability workers who are not directly affected hy the law under the human capital hypothesis such laws affect only those individuals whose hehavior is directly constrained we find that compulsory attendance laws do increase enrollment rates in age groups they do not affect directly thus our results contradict the human capital hypothesis and are consistent with the sorting hypothesis i introduction the last decade has seen considerable debate between supporters of the human capital and sorting models of education the former assert that the effect of education on wages reflects increased productivity the latter maintain that it reflects at least in part correlation between education and unobserved ability workers use education to signal their ability while employers use education to screen workers despite the importance of the debate no fully convincing tests of the hypotheses have been developed in fact many members of the profession maintain at least privately that these hypotheses cannot be tested against each other and that the debate must therefore be relegated to the realm of ideology in this paper we show that the models can be tested against each other by examining the effects of state compulsory school attendance laws we show that under the human capital hypotheis such laws will affect the educational attainment only of those who in the absence of the law would have left school prior to the minimum school leaving age on the other hand under the sorting hypothesis the effects of the law will percolate through the system increasing educational attainment even among workers not directly constrained by the law our results are consistent with the predictions of the sorting model

incentives for monitoring quality we analyze a procurement problem in which the quality of the delivered product can be observed perfectly by the buyer and supplier but may not be verifiable i e may not be observable to any third party we present a set of plausible conditions under which the equilibrium welfare of both the buyer and supplier is higher when quality is verifiable than when it is unverifiable the welfare gain for the privately informed supplier arises even when the buyer has all the bargaining power thus the interests of the buyer and supplier coincide with regard to whether delivered quality should be made verifiable

price caps and output floors a comparison of simple regulatory rules we study in this paper a simple alternative to price cap regulation the mechanism which we label output floor regulation requires the regulated firm to supply a given level of output this rule is as simple as price cap regulation and performs identically when the regulated firm is a natural monopoly however we show that in the presence of a competitive fringe output floor regulation yields lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction its introduction however is likely to be resisted by the industry since it lowers managerial utility and shareholders profits

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information a case study the purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy using data for a coal fired power plant each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum chosen by a regulator we look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission of an announcement of the tax formula of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility and of a tax cum subsidy scheme our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally we also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes the monetary side payments subsidy bonus required and to look for self financing schemes

regulation by price adjustment the regulatory price adjustment process originally proposed by vogelsang and finsinger has been shown to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the regulated firm this article proposes several modifications to that scheme which improve its performance and broaden its applicability inclusion of a monopoly franchise market and the firm s past prices and earnings in the price adjustment constraints are shown to ensure efficient production by the firm and convergence to ramsey prices regardless of the firm s cost structure

intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty this paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power under uncertainty the unconstrained firm waits longer before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry in the certainty case the imposition of an inter temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution by contrast under uncertainty it cannot even if the price cap is optimally chosen under uncertainty the monopoly firm will generally a under invest and b impose quantity rationing on its customers

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

two tier wage structures implications for equity theory this study is an application of equity theory to an examination of the effects of implementing a two tier wage structure using data from 1 935 employees in retail stores we assessed commitment to

estimating the labor market signaling value of the ged this paper tests the labor market signaling hypothesis for the general educational development ged equivalency credential using a unique data set containing ged test scores and social security administration ssa earnings data we exploit variation in ged status generated by differential state ged passing standards to identify the signaling value of the ged net of human capital effects our results indicate that the ged signal increases the earnings of young white dropouts by 10 to 19 percent we find no statistically significant effects for minority dropouts

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

access pricing and competition abstract in many industries electricity telecommunications railways the network can be described as a natural monopoly a central issue is how to combine the necessary regulation of the network with the organization of competition in activities which use the network as an input and are potentially competitive generation of electricity value added services road transportation in this paper we derive access pricing formulas in the framework of an optimal regulation under incomplete information first we study how access pricing formulas take into account the fixed costs of the network and the incentive constraints of the natural monopoly over the network second we examine the difficulties coming from the accounting impossibility to disentangle costs of the network and costs of the monopoly s competitive goods third the analysis is extended to the cases where governmental transfers are prohibited where the competitors have market power and where competitors are not regulated fourth the possibility some consumers bypass the network is taken into account finally the role of access pricing for inducing the best market structure is assessed the conclusion summarizes our results and suggests avenues of further research

whom do new firms hire using the matched employer employee data set for denmark and information on the founders of new firms we analyze the hiring choices of all new firms that entered from 2003 to 2010 we develop a theoretical model in which the quality of a firm s employees determines its average cost a firm s productivity is based on its pre entry experience and persistent shocks and over time firms learn about their productivity the model predicts that more productive firms are larger and hire more talented employees which gives rise to various predictions about how pre entry experience firm growth rates and firm size influence the wages firms pay to their early hires we find that beginning with the time of entry larger firms consistently pay higher wages to their new hires these are firms with greater survival prospects at the time of entry based on the pre entry backgrounds of their founders and that grow at greater rates over time both of which are predictive of the wages paid to new hires from the time of entry onward our findings suggest workers are allocated to firms according to their abilities which can give rise to enduring firm capabilities

reward structures in a planned economy the problem of incentives and efficient allocation of resources this paper considers a reward mechanism for inducing the choice of a socially optimal level of output by a socialist price setting manager under this mechanism the planner is assumed to have no information other than the observed output and price level it thus has informational advantages over other schemes thus far discussed in the literature the other schemes require the additional knowledge of demand elasticities of all the products produced in the economy besides this informational advantage the reward structure suggested here also eliminates other basic weaknesses of those schemes suggested previously

regulation with non price discrimination abstract this paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges and the effect such regulation has on incentives for non price discrimination i show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non price measures optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible since the level of the access charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure furthermore i show that whether the access charge should be used to level or tilt the playing field in favour of the more efficient firm depends on the cost associated with non price discrimination

are nascent entrepreneurs jacks of all trades a test of lazear s theory of entrepreneurship with german data in a recent paper edward lazear proposed the jack of all trades view of entrepreneurship based on a coherent model of the choice between self employment and paid employment he shows that having a background in a large number of different roles increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur the intuition behind this proposition is that entrepreneurs must have sufficient knowledge in a variety of areas to put together the many ingredients needed for survival and success in a business while for paid employees it suffices and pays to be a specialist in the field demanded by the job taken this study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by empirically testing lazear s hypothesis using a large recent representative sample of the german population the empirical estimation takes the rare events nature of becoming a nascent entrepreneur and the regional stratification of the sample into account the results illustrate the statistical significance and economic importance of the jack of all t

retrospectives lange and von mises large scale enterprises and the economic case for socialism in the debates over economic calculation launched by ludwig von mises in 1920 and extending well into the 1940s the central issue concerned the ability of a socialist economy to achieve allocative efficiency von mises emphasized that a collectivist state would have great difficulty in gathering and acting on relevant information therefore under socialism even well intentioned bureaucrats would lack a meaningful system of values on which to calculate defenders of socialism such as oskar lange countered that a market socialism could match demand to supply just as well as capitalism and meet the range of static conditions required for pareto optimality that debate is a rich and interesting story that has been told many times before but in all that has been written an important aspect of the original debate has been lost somewhat oddly both the socialists like oskar lange and the advocates of private ownership like von mises and friedrich hayek maintained that they were defending the progressive tendencies of competitive capitalism against the deadening hand of monopoly power this historic paradox deserves consideration if only because it serves to focus attention on our still incomplete theories of large scale enterprises under socialism and capitalism

the regulation of multiproduct firms part ii applications to competitive environments and policy analysis abstract this paper extends our companion paper part i laffont and tirole 1990 on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions first it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals with or without market power or other distorted pricing it then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects second it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information

monopoly behaviour decentralized regulation and contestable markets an experimental evaluation this study provides a comparative experimental evaluation of several alternative approaches to the single product monopoly problem we contrast incentive compatible decentralized regulatory mechanisms with notions of market contestability in a decreasing cost environment the decentralized regulatory mechanisms are found to be significantly more effective at restraining monopoly power than is allowing direct contestability but the regulatory mechanisms examined require that the regulatory agency know the market demand curve though not the industry cost curve since this is significantly more information than is required to implement direct contestability an interesting tradeoff is suggested does the greater efficiency in monopoly restraint provided by the regulatory mechanism relative to direct contestability outweigh the former s greater informational requirements

competition long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms abstract internal reward structures in firms are often integral parts of their culture and are changed infrequently in comparison to decisions about e g prices this paper investigates how this feature of firm organization provides a mechanism through which product market competition affects firms internal efficiency the design of firms internal organization is modeled as a choice of an incentive structure between a principal and an agent with strategic implications for firm s competitive positions on the product market it is shown that contrary to popular beliefs there may be a negative relation between the competitiveness of the product market and effort incentives

employment stability in newly founded firms a matching approach using linked employer employee data from germany using a linked employer employee dataset and taking the perspective of individuals rather than firms this paper analyzes some effects of joining startups we show that entrants in new firms differ from those joining incumbent firms and we use a matching approach to compare a group of employees joining new firms in 1995 1996 with a control group entering incumbent firms our results indicate that individuals employment stability was higher in incumbent than in newly founded firms while their risk of becoming unemployed was lower in particular in eastern germany joining firms that were older than 6 years improved individuals employment prospects

the economics of career concerns part ii application to missions and accountability of government agencies the paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies officials incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions a lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy the paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives last the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on government bureaucracies 1999 the review of economic studies limited

effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers abstract management incentive schemes leading to welfare optimal pricing and efficient production of public enterprises have so far been mainly concerned with the information advantages that public enterprise managers hold over their supervising government or central planning agency managers under these schemes are induced to improve their firm s performance in adjustment processes which in the limit lead to optimal firm decisions such managers are supposed to be income maximizers disregarding any personal effort which could influence their performance and utility in this paper i show that two incentive schemes recently proposed by tam 1981 and finsinger and vogelsang 1982 can also help to induce managers to provide an optimal level of effort here effort is assumed to reduce managers utility and the firm s costs the result depends crucially on myopic managerial utility maximization once managers maximize the discounted value of future utility levels they will deviate from the optimal behavior under tam s scheme this can hold independent of the optimal effort level under the finsinger vogelsang performance index managers will always show suboptimal effort levels in a steady state equilibrium because the index only rewards welfare improvements effort however has to be rewarded even with no improvement in behavior an improved performance index which provides cumulative rewards is shown to be strategy proof and lead to a welfare optimum this reward structure basically treats managers as if they were private entrepreneurs it looks extremely generous in that it gives managers the fruits of all costs reductions due to increases in effort suggestions are made to mitigate this income distributional impact

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

deregulation and quality abstract this paper analyses within a static model the effect of quality concern on optimal market structure it focuses on cases where industry quality has public good like features and is not contractible it is shown that the introduction of competition raises a free rider problem which depresses quality the smaller producer free rides on its competitor investment which as a result underinvests to encourage the efficient producer to provide quality the regulator diminishes the market share of the opportunistic producer and chooses more often a monopoly however when quality is verifiable the introduction of competition entails no welfare loss whether the regulator observes total quality outcome or individual contributions

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

an incentive scheme of a non linear price schedule for regulating a monopolist with unknown cost abstract we construct a non linear price schedule that serves as an incentive tool under doubly asymmetric information where the regulator has incomplete information about a monopolist s cost parameter while the monopolist cannot identify consumer types

determinants of management compensation with risk averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm abstract the salaries of top managers consist of two parts one part depending on profits the other being constant in a model of management compensation schemes with risk averse agents holmstrom and milgrom 1987 predict that an increasing variance in profits should reduce the profit relatedness of salaries using data from germany we show that indeed a larger variance of profits reduces the pay performance sensitivity moreover we analyze the relative influence of profits as compared to firm size on managerial compensation in general as well as the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and ownership structure

migration and imperfect labor markets theory and cross country evidence from denmark germany and the uk we investigate the labor market effects of immigration in denmark germany and the uk three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states institutions such as collective bargaining minimum wages employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks and hence the labor market effects of immigration we employ a wage setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate albeit imperfectly we find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock in germany immigration involves only moderate wage but large unemployment effects since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility the reverse is true for the uk and denmark

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

a mechanism to induce ramsey pricing for natural monopoly firms this paper considers a model with m independent natural monopoly firms it then proposes a taxation subsidy scheme that the regulator can implement to induce the m price setting firms acting independently to jointly adopt ramsey pricing the scheme has the following desirable features 1 the regulator needs only book keeping data on quantities prices and profits 2 the scheme induces cost minimization behaviour 3 the firms will not behave strategically 4 at each step of the convergence process to optimum each firm earns a non negative return and welfare is improved

entrepreneur human capital endowments and minority business viability this study analyzes the relationship between entrepreneur human capital endowments and minority enterprise profitability the better educated subset of entrepreneurs earns high profits relative to their minority business counterparts and the lines of business in which they are concentrating lie outside the retail and personal service areas that have traditionally dominated minority business activity in addition to fostering industrial diversity by creating and expanding firms in heavy construction manufacturing and skill intensive services the better educated entrepreneur group is found to be utilizing effectively both its financial and human capital inputs

do newly founded firms pay lower wages first evidence from germany using a linked employer employee data set for germany this paper analyses wage setting in a cohort of newly founded and other establishments from 1997 to 2001 while theory provides alternative explanations for higher or lower wages in newly founded firms we show empirically that start ups tend to pay lower wages ceteris paribus on average wages in newly founded establishments are 8 lower than in similar incumbent firms this negative wage differential is substantially smaller in eastern than in western germany the wage differ ential is shown to decline over time as the newly founded firms become more mature

contributions of neoclassical economics to public utili iy analysis neoclassical economics the dominant economics paradigm has influenced and been influenced by developments in regulated industries we identify major theoretical and empirical accomplishments discuss the impactofthese accomplishmentsonpolicydevelopment andlist the channelsthrough which the impacts are madepossible we then discuss regulatorypolitics lack ofresearchperspective an overly narrow focus on economic efficiency and the academic profession as factors limiting the impact of neoclassical economics on public policy

price and access charge discrimination in electricity distribution an application to the chilean case this paper presents and analyzes a model of electricity distribution in chile with three alternative regulatory pricing contract schemes for assigning a common capacity cost to final customers and competitive energy sellers the first scheme involves ramsey pricing while under the second and third schemes the monopoly chooses final prices and access charges subject either to a peak load physical cap or a total revenue price cap constraint in addition we consider circumstances in which the regulator does not know consumer demand the monopoly cannot price discriminate beyond a range defined by the marginal cost as a floor and the stand alone cost as a ceiling and access charges are set at the fully distributed cost allocation level currently in force the model is calibrated with chilean data and demonstrates that in terms of social welfare the fully distributed cost contract scheme currently in effect can be improved by discriminatory pricing complemented by certain of the analyzed constraints

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

determinants and effects of new business creation using global entrepreneurship monitor data this paper is an introduction to the present special issue dedicated to scientific research using data collected as part of the global entrepreneurship monitor gem and considering new venture creation as the hallmark of entrepreneurship after a short description of gem s theoretical and methodological background this introduction highlights the main results of seven papers which were presented at the first gem research conference in berlin from 1 to 3 april 2004 first there is empirical evidence that the role of entrepreneurial activity differs across the stages of economic development in that there appears to be a u shaped relationship between the level of development and the rate of entrepreneurship consequently a positive effect of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth is found for highly developed countries but a negative effect for developing nations second it is shown that different types of entrepreneurship may have a different impact on a nation s innovativeness and economic growth rate in particular potentially high growth business start ups and so called opportunity entrepreneurship enhance knowledge spillovers and economic growth third entrepreneurship is again shown to be a regional event that can only be understood if regional framework conditions including networks and regional policies are taken into consideration

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

the post entry performance of new small firms in german manufacturing industries while recent years have witnessed a growing interest in research on market entry by new firms evidence regarding their postentry performance is scarce this paper uses longitudinal data for small firms that entered german manufacturing industries between 1979 and 1982 and monitors their performance until 1990 entrants face a high risk of failure hazard rates tend to increase during the first years and to decrease afterwards decline of employment in a cohort due to exits and shrinking firms is compensated by growing survivors no clear cut nexus between start up size and probability of survival shows up copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

diversification incentives under price based and cost based regulation this article considers two schemes of regulationforfirms that serve both monopoly markets and markets subjected to substantial competition the first form cost based regulation combines elements of rate of return regulation on monopoly markets with filly distributed cost pricing much like the form of regulation currently in place in the domestic telephone industry the secondform price based regulation would establish rate caps on noncompetitive services and allow the firm to enter into competitive markets and charge whatever prices it might like in those markets models of both forms of regulation are developed and analyzed with respect to incentives for cost misreporting choice of technology cost reducing innovation choices of prices and output levels and diversification into competitive markets

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had