the bear s lair index credit default swaps and the subprime mortgage crisis during the recent financial crisis abx he index credit default swaps cds on baskets of mortgage backed securities were a benchmark widely used by financial institutions to mark their subprime mortgage portfolios to market however we find that prices for the aaa abx he index cds during the crisis were inconsistent with any reasonable assumption for mortgage default rates and that these price changes are only weakly correlated with observed changes in the credit performance of the underlying loans in the index casting serious doubt on the suitability of these cds as valuation benchmarks we also find that the aaa abx he index cds price changes are related to short sale activity for publicly traded investment banks with significant mortgage market exposure this suggests that capital constraints limiting the supply of mortgage bond insurance may be playing a role here similar to that identified by froot 2001 in the market for catastrophe insurance the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

technology adoption consumer inattention and heuristic decision making evidence from a uk district heating scheme this paper contributes to the debate on the energy efficiency paradox according to which consumers fail to adopt cost effective energy efficient technologies over less efficient technologies and therefore fail to reduce energy consumption both traditional and behavioural theories are used to investigate the decision making process of residential consumers with empirical evidence based upon a specially designed quasi experimental survey of 784 households on the decision to connect to a district heating system a more energy efficient alternative to individual heating systems the results suggest an internal discount rate of around 36 per cent for homeowners a signal that consumers undervalue future energy costs we also find the household s decision to be negatively affected by years of payback up to around 7 8 years our findings suggest that neglecting consumer inattention and heuristics can lead to biases which cast doubt on the existence of the energy efficiency paradox we believe that these results help to explain why some consumers are unlikely to invest in energy efficient technology particularly those on low incomes

can the new forms of investment substitute for the old forms a transaction costs perspective this paper uses transaction costs theory is used to explain the features of the new contractual alternatives to foreign direct investment the new forms to assess their efficiency and to forecast their future development

international technology transfer in services this study examines the nature of technology and the process of its transfer in five service industries from parent companies to foreign affiliates three principal research questions are posed what is the key technology in each industry what are the main methods for transferring this technology how and why do technology and transfer methods differ across firms industries and countries the empirical analysis shows that key technologies were generally knowledge of experience in the industry and methodology for producing the service transfer of the technology was mainly done through the training and transfer of experts and organizational forms were wholly owned subsidiaries and international partnerships more technology transfer occurred when firms were more international when affiliates were more recently established and when parent ownership was lower in the affiliate some evidence exists that more firm specific jointly produced technology leads to higher ownership percentage and greater transfer to affiliates

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

shrouded attributes and information suppression evidence from the field we use eld and natural experiments in online auctions to study the revenue eect of varying the level and disclosure of shipping charges our main ndings are 1 disclosure aects revenues for low shipping charges a seller is better odisclosing 2 increasing shipping charges boosts revenues particularly when these charges are hidden and 3 the level and disclosure of the shipping charge have little eect on the number of bidders attracted to an auction

pricing of commercial real estate securities during the 2007 2009 financial crisis we study the relative and absolute pricing of cmbx contracts commercial real estate derivatives during the recent financial crisis using a structural cmbx pricing model we find little systematic mispricing relative to reit equity and options we do find short term deviations from this relative pricing relationship that are statistically and economically significant in particular the cmbx market temporarily overreacts to news announcements we provide evidence that this temporary mispricing is caused by price pressure due to hedging activities finally an absolute pricing analysis provides no substantial evidence that cmbx contracts traded at fire sale levels during the crisis

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

pricing stock and bond options when the default free rate is stochastic we derive formulas for the valuation of call options on stocks and bonds when the defaultfree rate is stochastic the formulas highlight the role of the correlation between the unanticipated returns on the underlying security and the changes in the short term rate in determining the options value our numerical analysis indicates that option prices predicted by the proposed formula differ from those predicted by the black and scholes formula when this correlation is relatively large and the short term rate s instantaneous variance is relatively large as well moreover the proposed formula predicts higher lower stock option prices than those predicted by the black and scholes formula for correlation values that are lower higher than some positive critical value

can bait and switch benefit consumers we present a model that leads to an equilibrium with characteristics similar to the following stylized facts observed in retail markets a retailers advertise only selected brands b often low priced advertised brands are understocked c in store promotions are biased towards more expensive substitute brands together these practices constitute illegal bait and switch is this phenomenon necessarily harmful to consumers and to the economy we show that bait and switch can benefit consumers because utility is created through in store promotions and price competition is enhanced this suggests that the ftc investigate further its ban on bait and switch

ruthless prepayment evidence from multifamily mortgages abstract estimates of a prepayment function for multifamily mortgages are reported in this paper these are among the first attempts to estimate such a function most previous work along these lines focuses on single family mortgages a further distinguishing aspect of the paper is its attempt to incorporate the impact of unobservable factors on the mortgage refinancing decision a variant of the maximum likelihood procedure first developed by meyer ph d thesis mit 1987 is employed the results indicate an overall positive duration dependence for the conditional prepayment rate the estimated response of prepayments to a change in the market rate of interest is significant with the expected sign it is also larger once the effect of unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account nonetheless the magnitude of the response is substantially less than that predicted by the ruthless option pricing model

exploring the role of households hurdle rates and demand elasticities in meeting danish energy savings target abstract the eu s energy efficiency directive eed sets a binding target for energy savings in eu member states the eed further requires member states to perform ex ante evaluations of energy efficiency policies implemented to achieve these savings however ex ante evaluation of energy efficiency policies is difficult as it requires detailed modelling of end users investment and energy demand behaviour this paper details the danish interact modelling approach for ex ante evaluation of energy efficiency policies directed at residential heating interact integrates the energy system model times dk into a computable general equilibrium framework the paper explores the potential for meeting denmark s eed target through a policy induced increase in households investments in energy efficiency retrofits the paper considers the effect of energy efficiency policies on households investment behaviour by applying different levels of hurdle rates on households investments in energy efficiency retrofits the paper shows that reducing the hurdle rate from 25 to 4 could meet more than a third of danish energy saving requirements for the period 2021 2030 this result includes a direct rebound effect of 31 finally the paper demonstrates that reducing the hurdle below 10 has a substantial negative impact on households disposable income making such policy less viable from a policy perspective

prices versus nudges what matters for search versus purchase of energy investments abstract we report the results of a field experiment where we exogenously vary the use of social comparison nudges and subsidies for participation in an in home energy audit program we follow subjects through to subsequent purchase of durable goods we therefore can compare the causal effect of financial incentives and nudges along two margins audits which we liken to search and purchase of durables using data on nearly 100 000 households we document that both prices and nudges cause a statistically significant increase in audits comparing point estimates effective nudges are worth roughly 50 70 however we find that neither nudges nor subsidies do not significantly impact installations

valuing commercial mortgages an empirical investigation of the contingent claims approach to pricing risky debt this paper empirically investigates a contingent claims model of commercial mortgage pricing we find that the magnitude of the observed default premia for a sample of nonprepayable fixed rate bullet mortgages can be explained by the contingent claims model in addition the model explains a significant proportion of the period to period changes in the default premia however given an assumed negative correlation between building value changes and interest rate changes the model s risk structure tends to increase less steeply with increasing maturity than the observed risk structure since the seminal work of black and scholes 1973 corporate liabilities have been modeled as options on the total value of the firm this contingent claims approach to bond pricing was refined by merton 1974 to allow for cash dispersals prior to the bonds maturities and by brennan and schwartz 1980 and ingersoll 1987 to allow for interest rate uncertainty although variants of these bond pricing models are currently being used extensively on wall street they have not been tested extensively moreover empirical studies have not successfully accounted for the observed spread between the rates on risky and default free debt jones mason and rosenfeld 1984 empirically investigate a model that assumes a nonstochastic term structure of interest rates while ramaswamy and sundaresan 1986 examine a model with stochastic interest rates to price floating rate notes in both cases the models could not explain the observed default premia the relative lack of empirical analysis is due partly to the complicated nature of corporate bonds major corporations generally have a large number of different bond issues outstanding that have different priorities in the event that the firm goes bankrupt moreover the bonds can have a variety of covenants specifying sinking fund provisions conditions under which technical default will occur and other restrictions that can have an impact on their value although these complications do not preclude pricing various bond issues on a case by case basis they make it difficult to test systematically the accuracy of the pricing model

the effect of price on electricity contract choice i explore how households switch between fixed price and variable price electricity contracts in response to variations in price and temperature conditional on previous contract choice using panel

the crash of ʼ87 was it expected the evidence from options markets transactions prices of s p 500 futures options over 1985 1987 are examined for evidence of expectations prior to october 1987 of an impending stock market crash first it is shown that out of the money puts became unusually expensive during the year preceding the crash second a model is derived for pricing american options on jump diffusion processes with systematic jump risk the jump diffusion parameters implicit in options prices indicate that a crash was expected and that implicit distributions were negatively skewed during october 1986 to august 1987 both approaches indicate no strong crash fears during the 2 months immediately preceding the crash attempts to explain what caused the stock market crashes around the world in october 1987 have suffered from the paucity of major economic developments occurring around that time that could have triggered the crashes shifting expectations regarding monetary policy foreign investors fears of a dollar decline increasing riskiness of assets none of these appeared major enough if present at all to explain the magnitude of the crashes and although portfolio insurance strategies could conceivably magnify the effects of a jump in fundamentals the initiating jump in fundamentals appears to be lacking

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

the other commercial real estate boom and bust the effects of risk premia and regulatory capital arbitrage abstract in the 2000 s u s commercial real estate cre prices experienced a boom and bust as dramatic as the more widely analyzed swings in house prices and contributed significantly to bank failures we model short run and long run movements in capitalization rates rent to price ratio and risk premia for office building and apartments in the mid 2000s boom cre prices were mainly driven by declines in required risk premia that stemmed from a weakening of capital requirements in the bust cre price declines were initially driven by a jump in general risk premia and later by a tightening of effective capital requirements on commercial mortgage backed securities cmbs from the dodd frank act the subsequent recovery in cre prices was induced and sustained by unusually low real treasury yields we conclude that macro prudential regulation of leverage may help limit asset price booms by preventing sharp declines in risk premia

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

price competition in multimarket duopolies in this article we analyze the pricing strategies offirms that compete for the demand of an assortment of goods in a complete information static framework in particular we model the competition between two symmetric firms in a market that consists of two types of consumers each of which may buy one unit of both goods sold by the two firms we show that all nash equilibria are such that neither firm charges the same price for both goods interestingly under certain conditions thefirms jointly price discriminate between the two types of consumers and may even achieve the same level of profits as if they maximized joint profits for another set of conditions the unique equilibrium is such that the price for one of the goods and the price for the bundle are the same as the price of the good in a standard hotelling model with one good finally we show that if these equilibria exist both firms prefer to sell both goods rather than specialize in either one of them these results are a direct consequence of the interplay between the multimarket rivalry and the existence of more than one market segment as modelled in this article

a pecuniary reason for income mixing abstract empirical studies have found a high degree of income mixing in american neighborhoods we give a new explanation of this phenomenon that is based on consumer search a low price for a given good benefits high valuation buyers more than low valuation buyers but with search the probability of obtaining a low price is increasing in the proportion of low valuation buyers this gives high valuation buyers an incentive to live near low valuation buyers with many goods a buyer has an incentive to live near neighbors whose valuations are uncorrelated with hers

the credit crisis conjectures about causes and remedies what caused the financial crisis that is sweeping across the world what keeps asset prices and lending depressed what can be done to remedy matters while it is too early to arrive at definite answers to these questions it is certainly time to offer informed conjectures and these are the focus of this paper this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rational inattention and energy efficiency abstractthis paper argues that it will often be rational for consumers to pay limited attention to energy efficiency when choosing among energy consuming durable goods like automobiles or home appliances the reason is that the proper valuation of energy efficiency requires time and effort but differences in efficiency across products will rarely be pivotal to choice when consumers have strong preferences regarding other product attributes the paper first explains why proper valuation of efficiency is difficult even in the presence of government energy labels it next develops a model that shows how to value additional information about energy efficiency in a discrete choice context it then uses data on automobiles to show that consumers experience only small welfare losses when forced to choose a car without detailed information about fuel costs finally the paper discusses the implications of rational inattention for both economic research and public policy

limited attention and the residential energy efficiency gap abstract inattention may be an important contributor to the energy efficiency gap and may be particularly acute in residential buildings where many different features will determine a home s energy

loss leader pricing and rain check policy loss leader pricing and rain check policies are common in retail markets yet research on these topics is surprisingly scarce in this paper we study the effects of leader pricing and rain check policy on stores profits and market outcomes suppose stores can accurately predict demand might they still run out of stock we investigate whether such a result is plausible when stores can offer rain checks the paper also helps resolve an issue that has recently attracted much attention should the ftc repeal its rule prohibiting stock outs of advertised sale items

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

the pricing of multiclass commercial mortgage backed securities this paper considers the pricing of multiclass commercial mortgage backed securities a contingent claims pricing methodology that overcomes state variable dimensionality problems is developed to examine mortgage pools with many distinct underlying assets and whose loan cash flow values are subject to interest rate uncertainty security structure and the correlation structure of collateralizing assets within a pool are found to be important determinants of tranche price and required yield spread by disentangling default loss risk from default related call risk we show it is possible that mezzanine investment classes may require lower yield spreads than higher priority investment classes of particular interest is the finding that reduced cash flow volatility obtained through pool diversification may actually decrease the value of the first loss junior tranche when examining the relationship of pool size and tranche value we find that five to 10 distinct mortgages are required to realize most of the effects of asset diversification