exploration and extraction in a duopoly exhaustible resource market exploration for an exhaustible natural resource is valuable because it produces information about the resource stock i model a duopoly exhaustible resource industry with imperfect information about stock size as a two period game where each period is made up of an exploration stage and an extraction stage i derive the value of gaining information about stock size prior to committing to an extraction plan both for the exploring firm and for the rival i show that an exploring firm would prefer on average to keep exploration information private but that industry profit is higher when information is made public le processus d e xploration et d extraction dans un marche de ressource naturelle non renouvelable oui il y a un duopole le processus d exploration est utile parce qu il permet de produire des renseignements quant a la taille du stock d une ressource naturelle non renouvelable l auteur examine un modele de duopole dans un jeu a deux p6riodes pour une industrie de ressource naturelle non renouvelable l information est imparfaite quant a la taille du stock de resource et chacune des deux p6riodes a un stage d exploration et un stage d extraction l auteur d6rive la valeur de l information additionnelle qujant a la taille du stock de ressource avant de s etngager dans un plan d extraction a la fois pour l entreprise exploratrice et pour l entreprise rivale on montre que l enterprise exploratrice va pr6f6rer en moyenne garder l information priv6e mais que les profits dans l industrie sont plus 6lev6s quand l information est rendue publique

rules stability and growth abstract this paper examines two systems of fiscal redistribution in the context of a growing economy subject to unexpected shocks rules and discretion under the former system the tax system is in place and is known to households contemplating investment decisions under the second redistribution is decided upon only after the investment decisions have been made i find that rules always lead to faster capital accumulation and growth but political support for them is only likely to occur in a stable economy income inequality adversely affects the likelihood of adopting rules especially so in an unstable economy

information disadvantage in linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products abstract we focus on a class of linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products and prove that whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage depends on firms information setup specifically we show that when the cross effects are common value the uninformed firm that commits to quantity will not have lower ex ante profits than a firm that has complete information about its cross effects this result contrasts to the information advantage that holds in the same duopolies with independent cross effects

information acquisition as business strategy information acquisition activities such as accounting disclosure financial analysis and marketing research are major concerns in moder business administration business enterprises often invest enormous amounts of time and money in obtaining information for the various tasks of decision making a growing literature is devoted to addressing the role of information in the production decision and the market structure however little effort has been devoted to understanding information acquisition as an essential part of business strategy the purpose of this paper is to analyze information gathering as a competition strategy of manufacturing firms and to examine its implications for the welfare of society li mckelvey and page 13 and vives 20 use a two stage game model to study the information acquisition of oligopolistic firms however these authors ignore the strategic aspect of information acquisition in both 13 and 20 firms are symmetric and produce a homogenous good therefore the equilibrium is also symmetric all firms gather the same amount of industrywide information we generalize 13 in several ways we allow firms to produce differentiated products and to use the information they acquire to contest the product market moreover the information in our model can be partly firm specific and partly industry wide we adopt a convex information cost function more general than that of 13 therefore 13 can be interpreted as a special case of the model presented here novshek and sonnenschein 14 gal or 6 vives 19 and li 12 study the possibility of trading or sharing the exogenous industry wide information about demand okada 15 fried 4 li 12 shapiro 18 and seidmann 17 examine the incentive for disclosing exogenous firm specific information about costs in an oligopoly 2 we extend the analysis in this literature

the political economy of public savings and the role of capital mobility abstract this paper explains public saving and investment in economies where many groups compete for scarce public funds we show that there is a collective action problem if there is no strong center then this problem manifests itself in a very low savings and investment rates in the extreme current spending may be determined simply by the current tax income and access to borrowing this explains why in the face of a temporary boom governments may not save but may even borrow more to finance even higher levels of expenditure we deal also with several mitigating factors repetition insiders outsiders interaction elections

the tragedy of the commons and economic growth why does capital flow from poor to rich countries we analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock we show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons we use this model to analyze capital flight in many poor countries property rights are not well defined since safe bank accounts in rich countries the inferior technology are available to citizens of these countries they engage in capital flight we show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare

strategic transparency and informed trading will capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information collection under strategic competition transparency results in higher variability of profits and output thus lenders prefer less transparency since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position while equity holders prefer more market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms thus entry by transparent competitors will improve price informativeness moreover as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque

the role of the family in immigrants labor market activity an evaluation of alternative explanations comment most research on the labor market outcomes of immigrants has studied the behavior of individuals focusing primarily on the wage assimilation process or the excess returns to experience which immigrants obtain in their destination country s labor market e g barry r chiswick 1978 george j borjas 1985 recently however attention has been directed to analyzing immigrant labor market outcomes in a family context an approach which combines information about an individual s own labor market opportunities and the family context in which labor market decisions take place in a previously published paper in this review michael baker and dwayne benjamin 1997 evaluate alternative explanations for the observed labor supply patterns of canadian immigrants in the 1986 1991 period specifically when immigrant husbands arrive in canada they typically work less than comparable natives however immigrant wives work more than natives other things equal with assimilation the labor supply of immigrant husbands eventually catches up to that of natives while immigrant wives labor supply falls relative to comparable natives and is ultimately overtaken by that of natives the authors take these patterns to be most consistent with a family investment model in this scenario upon arrival husbands invest in their human capital while wives work to provide the family with liquidity during this investment period with increased time in canada husbands labor supply increases rapidly due to their growing skills in the canadian labor market while wives labor supply falls off in part because they originally took dead end jobs upon arrival in order to finance their husbands investments in human capital interestingly while most of the findings reported by baker and benjamin are consistent with the family investment model their estimated wage equations are not although they do not comment on this in discussing the appropriateness of the family investment model specifically they find similar rates of wage assimilation for husbands and wives this finding suggests roughly equal propensities to invest in one s own human capital for both groups this is contrary to the family investment hypothesis and does not match their story of dead end jobs for wives and large human capital investments of their husbands an alternative possible explanation for the patterns observed by baker and benjamin involves a simple price model in which the observed labor supply patterns reflect laborsupply responses to each spouse s wages for example the initially high but eventually falling level of wives labor supply relative to comparable natives could be a response to their husbands initially low but rising wages while this reasoning like the family investment model is broadly consistent with the data the authors conclude that the simple price model cannot be the entire explanation since in order to explain the full labor supply patterns of immigrants it would require unrealistically high labor supply elasticities and further that the assimilation patterns noted above remain even when wages of husband and wife are controlled blau school of industrial and labor relations cornell university 265 ives hall ithaca ny 14853 and nber and cesifo kahn school of industrial and labor relations cornell university 264 ives hall ithaca ny 14853 and cesifo moriarty school of industrial and labor relations cornell university ilr graduate student mailboxes ives hall ithaca ny 14853 souza faculdade de economia administracao e contabilidade university of sao paulo avenida professor luciano gualberto 908 cidade universitaria predio fea 1 sao paulo sp 05508 brazil the authors thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions portions of this paper were written while blau and kahn were visiting scholars at the russell sage foundation to which they are grateful for research support

the decision to work by married immigrant women using 1980 census data the authors analyze the labor force participation of married immigrant asian women in the united states by country of origin compared with that of married immigrant women from europe and canada the results suggest the existence of a family investment strategy evidence from both across groups and within groups indicates that a womans decision to work is affected by whether she has a husband who invests in skills specific to the u s labor market and also by the extent of that investment such a family response may help offset the low earnings of immigrant men who initially lack skills for which there is a demand in the american labor market excerpt

efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism abstract one considers a differential game of capitalism a la lancaster feedback nash equilibria and pareto optimal solutions are characterized under the assumption that the planning horizon is infinite it is then shown that by combining a pareto optimal solution with the nash feedback equilibrium strategy pair which plays the role of a threat one can obtain an efficient equilibrium which is also subgame perfect in the sense of selten this result modifies sensibly the previous interpretation of the inherent inefficiency of capitalism

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

information sharing information free riding and capital structure in oligopolies we study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association focusing on the case of cournot competition with demand uncertainty we find that the standard result for all equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed when one firm has better access to information than the other leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free ride on the former firm s information with ex ante symmetric firms a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur

external debt capital flight and political risk abstract this paper explains the simultaneous occurence of large external debts private capital outflows and low domestic capital formation we consider a general equilibrium model in which two government types with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office uncertainty over the fiscal policies of future governments generates capital flight and small domestic investment and induces the government to overaccumulate external debt the model also predicts that left wing governments are more inclined to restrict capital outflows than right wing governments finally we examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium and how debt repudiation may occur after a regime change

voracity vs scale effect in a growing economy without secure property rights abstract this paper extends the standard model of growth with insecure property rights by introducing variable labor supply and increasing returns to scale it is assumed that capital stock is jointly owned by multiple interest groups and that each group participates in production activities by supplying its labor force in this setting there are two opposing factors that affect growth over consumption in the absence of secure property rights and the scale effect due to the presence of increasing returns the growth performance of the economy thus depends on which factor dominates

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

gender and ethnicity married immigrants in britain in this paper we investigate the economic activity of married or cohabiting female immigrants in britain we distinguish between two immigrant groups foreign born females who belong to an ethnic minority group and their husbands and foreign born white females and their husbands we compare these to native born white women and their husbands our analysis deviates from the usual mean analysis and investigates employment hours worked and earnings for males and females as well as their combined family earnings along the distribution of husbands economic potential we analyse the extent to which economic disadvantage may be reinforced at the household level and investigate the extent to which it can be explained by differences in observable characteristics we find that white female immigrants and their husbands have an overall advantage in earnings over white native born both individually and at the household level minority immigrants do less well in particular at the lower end of the husbands economic potential distribution this is mainly due to the low employment of both genders which leads to a disadvantage in earnings intensified at the household level only part of this differential can be explained by observable characteristics

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

licensing a non drastic innovation under double informational asymmetry this paper deals with the problem faced by a patentee owning a new production process whose value is unknown ex ante the patentee must license the new technology to users in order to profit from it and each potential licensee has production costs using the technology that are unknown to everyone until after contracting at which point each licensee gets private information about her own costs moreover the patentee cannot observe outputs of potential licensees and therefore must use lump sum rather than per unit royalty schedules to license the technology in this setting the optimal licensing scheme from both the industry and the innovator viewpoints is defined as well as the socially optimal dynamic industrial structure to market the technology welfare aspects of regulation on patents length are also discussed in this context

real vs financial investment can tobin taxes eliminate the irreversibility distortion abstract in the recent past several developing countries have failed to achieve significant real capital investment despite episodes of large capital inflows although there are real projects with seemingly high returns investors prefer to wait for the correct time to invest in this paper we address this issue by considering a two sector economy where investment in real capital is irreversible and debt financed furthermore the interest rate which is determined in the financial sector is random as a result of volatile expectations in this economy the expected return on real capital is above the expected interest rate this is because the option to wait for lower interest rates has a positive value in the presence of rumors taxes on international financial transactions tobin taxes reduce the variance of the domestic interest rate while leaving its mean unchanged as a result they induce more investment in irreversible real capital the model borrows from the irreversible investment literature a difference with other models is that the source of noise is a mean reverting process not just a geometric brownian motion we solve for the optimal decision rule using the girsanov theorem of the maxims of orthodox finance none surely is more anti social than the fetish of liquidity it forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the society as a whole the introduction of a substantial government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most serviceable reform available with a view to mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise keynes the general theory

changes in the labor supply behavior of married women 1980 2000 using march current population survey data we investigate married women s labor supply from 1980 to 2000 we find a large rightward shift in their labor supply function for annual hours in the 1980s with little shift in the 1990s these shifts account for most of the slowdown in the growth of labor supply during this period a major development was the dramatic decrease in the responsiveness of married women s labor supply to their own and husbands wages their own wage elasticity fell by 50 56 while their cross wage elasticity fell by 38 47 in absolute value

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

a strategic analysis of global warming theory and some numbers we model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases the theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise the first set of results establishes theoretically and then with illustrative numbers the over emissions due to a tragedy of the commons the power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the effect of cost asymmetry finally a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium and it is shown that it has a very simple structure it involves a constant emission rate through time

information sharing between vertical hierarchies abstract when do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information we show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents information with small externalities principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign in this second case principals face a prisoners dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information

intermarriage and the labor market outcomes of asian women the impact of intermarriage with natives on labor market outcomes of immigrants is not homogeneous across ethnic groups wages of asian women are compared with non asians both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates of the effects of intermarriage on the wages of asian women are negative and significant non asian women earn a wage premium that becomes insignificant when controls for selection into marriage are introduced one possible explanation for the intermarriage penalty for asians is an income effect of having a high earning native husband intermarriage penalties rise with husband s education assimilation patterns of intermarried asians indicate that they have lower initial wages market hours and employment but exhibit faster rates of growth over their years of stay the results are robust across asian subgroups and husband s ethnicity jel j16 j12 j31 j61

too much information sharing welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly by using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations we study how oligopolists information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade off in cournot oligopoly on the one hand it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision as the literature shows on the other hand information sharing increases the firms incentives to acquire information and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms information interestingly the latter effect may dominate the former effect

on the effectiveness of capital controls the experience of colombia during the 1990s abstract this paper analyzes the effectiveness of capital controls in colombia the evidence presented points towards a relative inability of the measures adopted to reduce the level of capital inflows nonetheless the evidence suggests that non remunerated deposits have been successful in inducing a recomposition of foreign liabilities in favor of long term maturities it is likely that this is a positive result as it has made the country less vulnerable to a reversal in capital flows in this sense controls may be viewed as an effective way of internalizing the negative externality imposed by short term maturities

the myth of immigrant women as secondary workers evidence from canada the existing literature on the employment choices and trajectories of women in immigrant families is divided some researchers argue that immigrant women are secondary workers that is they join the labor market mostly as a response to family income shocks and become employed mainly in unskilled jobs to support their husbands investment in local skills long 1980 baker and benjamin 1997 worswick 1999 as men assimilate and financial constraints ease their spouses participation in the labor market is expected to drop to levels similar to those of native born women this view is however at odds with findings in blau et al 2003 among others where married immigrant women make labor supply decisions guided by their own opportunities in the labor market as natives do rather than conditional on the needs of their partners blau and khan 2007 1 to determine the patterns of labor participation and earnings of female immigrants in this paper we exploit a sample of over 800 000 women taken from the canadian census for the period from 1991 to 2006 combining it with information on the skill requirements of the jobs women hold besides employing a large data set this paper is the first one to assess the labor market advancement of immigrant women through the changes in the task content of their occupations in line with recent work in the labor field acemoglu and autor 2011 our findings reveal that labor behavior of female immigrants in canada seems to follow a path of assimilation similar to that of men and that at best only relatively uneducated immigrant women in jobs requiring very basic skills may fit the profile of secondary workers as in kim and varasani 2011 more specifically we find first that the participation rate of immigrant women at arrival is much lower than that of similar natives but that it rises steadily over time second immigrant women participate in unskilled occupations at a much higher rate than canadian women do at first glance this seems consistent with the view that immigrant women are secondary workers however immigrant women in low skill occupations have a significantly higher level of education than canadian women in the same occupations third the patterns of skill assimilation of educated immigrant women indicate their increasing integration into the labor force over time a reduction in the need for physical strength and a gradual increase in the relative amount of analytical skills required in their jobs

policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars a two region model abstract we develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two region setup to counteract the overexploitation of the resource the tragedy of commons that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies we compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve or assigns territorial user rights to the players we show that when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and in addition they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players conversely in a context of higher harvesting effort the intervention can help to safeguard the resource preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players

information sharing with capacity uncertainty the case of coffee when faced with uncertain capacity constraints coumot oligopolists face two problems should they share information once it becomes known to them and can quantity collusion be sustained this paper shows that agreeing to reveal information does not always increase expected profits as it does in previous models in which the uncertainty is a constant marginal cost parameter this paper also demonstrates that when collusion is not enforceable and information cannot be reliably shared trigger strategies can support equilibrium profits greater than cournot profits when demand is known and supply is uncertain a situation found in agricultural markets such as coffee partage de l information quand la capacite de production est incertaine le cas du cafe quand ils sont en face de contraintes incertaines sur la capacite de production les oligopoleurs a la coumot font face a deux problemes devraient ils partager l information quand elle devient connue et est ce que la collusion via les quantites est viable ce memoire montre que se mettre d accord pour partager l information n augmente pas toujours les profits anticipes comme c est le cas dans des modeles anterieurs oiu l incertitude est un parametre constant du couft marginal on montre aussi que quand la collusion n est pas vigoureusement policee et que l information ne peut pas etre fiablement partagee des strategies gachettes peuvent enclencher des profits plus grands que ceux que produisent la strategie cournot quand la demande est connue et que l offre est incertaine une situation que l on retrouve justement dans des marches de produits agricoles comme le cafe

trade reform aggregate investment and capital flight on credibility and the value of information abstract in this paper we demonstrate that uncertainty about future policy reversals coupled with irreversible investment confers an option value to foreign exchange and may lead to capital flight and a fall in aggregate investment after a trade reform the analysis focuses on the value of information and the credibility of the policy reform the conclusion points to a potential role for international institutions to prevent such problems

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

assimilation changes in cohort quality and the earnings of immigrants this paper reexamines the empirical basis for two facts that seem to be found in most cross section studies of immigrant earnings 1 the earnings of immigrants grow rapidly as they assimilate into the united states and 2 this rapid growth leads to many immigrants overtaking the earnings of the natives within 10 15 years after immigration using the 1970 and 1980 u s censuses this paper studies the earnings growth experienced by specific immigrant cohorts during the period 1970 80 it is found that within cohort growth is significantly smaller than the growth predicted by cross section regressions for most immigrant groups this differential is consistent with the hypothesis that there has been a secular decline in the quality of immigrants admitted to the united states

incentives for information production and disclosure in a duopolistic environment this paper examines the nature of the equilibrium solution to the duopoly problem under various incomplete information structures and the incentives to produce and disclose information attention is focused on the duopolists cost functions the results indicate that disclosure of such information is generally beneficial to the duopolists

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

on the use of heuristics to approximate competitors private information abstract firms often lack knowledge of the nature of the uncertainty they or their opponents face and use heuristics or approximations to determine their strategy we define and analyze one type of heuristic strategy in which firms choose strategies based on the expectation of their opponents private information rather than the full information about the distribution of that private information we find that in equilibrium the degree to which the heuristic strategy differs from the bayesian strategy depends on 1 the convexity of a firm s marginal profits with respect to their opponents private information and 2 whether firm strategies are complementary or substitutable under certain conditions firms equilibrium profits are greater when all firms use heuristics than when all firms use the full information our results provide insight into incentives firms may have to either facilitate or impede access to industry information

are refugees different from economic immigrants some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the united states this paper analyzes how the implicit difference in time horizons between refugees and economic immigrants affects subsequent human capital investments and wage assimilation the analysis uses the 1980 and 1990 integrated public use samples of the census to study labor market outcomes of immigrants who arrived in the united states from 1975 to 1980 i find that in 1980 refugee immigrants in this cohort earned 6 less and worked 14 fewer hours than economic immigrants both had approximately the same level of english skills the two immigrant groups had made substantial gains by 1990 however refugees had made greater gains in fact the labor market outcomes of refugee immigrants surpassed those of economic immigrants in 1990 refugees from the 1975 1980 arrival cohort earned 20 more worked 4 more hours and improved their english skills by 11 relative to economic immigrants the higher rates of human capital accumulation for refugee immigrants contribute to these findings

wage inequality and family labor supply using the march current population surveys and the 1960 census this article describes earnings and employment changes for married couples in different types of households stratified by the husband s hourly wage while declines in male employment and earnings have been greatest for low wage men employment and earnings gains have been largest for wives of middle and high wage men these findings cast doubt on the notion that married women have increased their labor supply in the recent decades to compensate for the disappointing earnings growth of their husbands

monopoly competition and information acquisition abstract an incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand but can acquire public information at a cost we determine how an entry threat affects the firm s information acquisition if returns to scale are constant and the state contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases then entry reduces information acquisition if however either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns or if the state contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion then entry can increase information finally entry can hurt consumers although entry always increases output it can decrease information consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly

greater wage inequality reduces average hours of work i argue that rising inequality in offered wages lowers average working hours if labour supply is concave in wages a decrease in the working hours of low paid workers is greater than an increase in working hours of high paid workers furthermore due to low market opportunities some low paid workers may leave the labour force using cps morg data for prime age men i find evidence in support of this explanation i establish empirically the concavity of the labour supply and find evidence that after controlling for the average wage wage inequality has a negative effect on labour supply

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

labor supply and marital separation panel data are used to estimate the effect of marital separation on labor supply female labor supply increases substantially and male labor supply declines marginally lending support to the theory of specialization within the household the most interesting finding is that women began to increase their labor supply well before the actualsplit occurs suggesting either that shocks to labor supply change divorce probabilities or that women with a higher likelihood of divorcework more this argument is pursued by constructing and estimating a simultaneous model of labor supply and divorce risk copyright 1986 by american economic association

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

gender source country characteristics and labor market assimilation among immigrants abstract using 1980 2000 census data to study the impact of source country characteristics on married adult immigrants labor supply assimilation profiles we find that immigrant women from countries with high female labor supply persistently work more than those from low female supply countries while both groups of women work less than comparable natives on arrival women from high female participation countries eventually close the gap with natives entirely and women from low female labor supply countries eliminate most of it men s labor supply is unaffected by source country female participation suggesting that the findings on women reflect notions of gender roles

terms of trade shocks and economic performance 1870 1940 prebisch and singer revisited debate over trends in the terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures their causes and their impact has dominated the literature for more than a century classical economists claimed that the terms of trade of primary commodities should improve since land and natural resources are always in inelastic supply following the great depression a new view emerged what came to be known as the prebisch singer thesis was instead that the terms of trade for primary products had deteriorated up to the 1950s the subsequent literature has almost exclusively and obsessively asked whether a deterioration has actually taken place over the 130 years following 1870 nowhere in this literature has the impact of these terms of trade shocks on long run growth been assessed although it is certainly full of lively speculation and debate this paper fills part of this empirical gap by constructing a country specific panel data base 1870 1940 by documenting terms of trade trends by country and region and finally by estimating the impact of the price shocks on long run economic performance we find the impact to have been asymmetric between center and periphery this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item