laboratory tests of equilibrium predictions with disequilibrium data we examine a common practice used within previous studies of laboratory markets testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium we examine the effect of this practice when it is applied to some laboratory markets where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium our data suggest that for our markets significantly different equilibrium test results would be obtained when using all data available in market periods analysed in previous studies rather than using only equilibrium data for our markets choices made in disequilibrium are quite different from those in equilibrium this paper is primarily concerned with examining one common practice used in previous studies of laboratory markets this practice is testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium the data set used typically consists of all available laboratory data from the last period an average of the last few periods an average of all periods or from the nth period for some fixed n i know of no attempt at least formally to assure all data were from markets in equilibrium markets where market choices have stabilized recently some laboratory markets were run where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium could the use of disequilibrium data significantly affect the results of tests we might make of some equilibrium models for these laboratory markets this practice would be desirable if the disequilibrium data provided a useful estimate of the behaviour that would have been observed if an equilibrium had been obtained on the other hand if some disequilibrium behaviour is qualitatively different from the behaviour that would be observed in an equilibrium this practice could produce misleading results within this paper we examine the effect of this practice when it is used on our laboratory data

attracting attention cheap managerial talk and costly market monitoring we provide a theory of informal communication cheap talk between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders the analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market s attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value the theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock based compensation the presence of informed trading and the liquidity of the stock our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events e g stock dividends name changes recent regulations such as the sarbanes oxley act stress the importance of providing timely and accurate information to investors in practice firm information can be concealed and is often difficult to substantiate moreover there is likely to be fundamental disagreement between managers and shareholders with respect to the firm s disclosure policy managers can be reluctant to disclose information because for example it may reflect prior poor managerial decisions and hence question their performance inducing managers to disclose information is therefore an essential component of managerial incentives as a result a firm s disclosure and compensation policies are intrinsically related aspects of corporate governance that cannot be considered in isolation this paper develops a theory of information disclosure that incorporates the following two elements first managers who become informed through the course of everyday operations are unwilling to disclose their private information when it reflects poorly on them in this sense the theory explores the trade offs that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders create on information disclosure second apparently innocuous corporate actions such as andres almazan is with the university of texas at austin sanjay banerji is with the university

what makes cheap talk effective experimental evidence in some environments a player only learns the choice of another player if he or she undertakes a risky choice while costless preplay communication cheap talk has been found to be effective in experimental coordination games participants have typically learned both own payoffs and the other player s action are both of these components necessary for cheap talk to be effective in our 22 stag hunt game the safe choice always yields the same payoff so that information about payoffs does not always identify the other player s action we vary whether information is provided about the other person s play and whether costless one way messages can be sent before action choices are made we find that information provision about the other person s play increases coordination when there are messages but otherwise has no effect d 2004 published by elsevier b v

collusion facilitating and collusion breaking power of simultaneous ascending and descending price auctions this article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a collusion incubator environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction theories of collusion producing behavior along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions these theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion the experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator then once the tacit collusion developed changing to the descending auction the change moved prices from collusive levels to near competitive levels

avoiding an ecological regime shift is sound economic policy we extend the shallow lake model by adding the capital stock of an industry a government can mitigate the effects of pollution arising from industrial activities by imposing the requirement to abate emissions within this framework two scenarios are examined in the social optimal benchmark the social planner optimally allocates investment in the competitive equilibrium market forces determine the investment in capital but the government can still abate emissions we find that irreversible environmental regime shifts are avoided in the competitive equilibrium by means of a static level of abatement when it is socially optimal to do so

stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers the regular case abstract we analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication e g vincent p crawford joel sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 and optimal delegation e g bengt holmstrom on the theory of delegation in m boyer r e kihlstrom eds bayesian models in economic theory north holland 1984 pp 115 141 a principal agent model with hidden information no monetary transfers and single peaked preferences we demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent s bias the optimal mechanism is deterministic we also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

the effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer markets abstract we report the results of six posted offer market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path to competitive equilibrium the posted offer experiments are compared with twelve double auction experiments reported by smith and williams 1982 results differ markedly across trading institutions unlike trading under double auction rules we cannot reject the proposition that contract price convergence paths are unaffected by the distribution of consumer and producer surplus posted offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from above regardless of the distribution of the exchange surplus

comparative advantage in demand and the development of rice value chains in west africa summary national rice development strategies in africa are often supply focused and implicitly assume that consumers will readily substitute imported for domestic rice however due to increasing import dependency urban consumer preferences for rice have become biased toward asian export quality standards against which african rice has difficulties to compete anecdotal evidence suggests that this import bias is higher in cities close to the port and remote from the geographical centers of cultural heritage where african rice was domesticated more than 3 000 years ago we purposely select a sample of five west african urban markets which are supplied by both foreign and domestic rice value chains and which are located at varying distances from the nearest ports and centers of cultural heritage and conduct framed field experiments based on auctions to analyze the drivers of urban demand for domestic rice with upgraded quality characteristics we find that west african rice has increasing difficulties competing against imported rice on urban markets the more consumers appreciate characteristics of imported asian rice the closer to the port and the further the geographical and genealogical distance from rice cultural heritage these challenges provide crucial insights into value chain upgrading in policy makers struggle to achieve rice self sufficiency in west africa our findings suggest that the optimal portfolio of investment in value chain upgrading is a function of the targeted end market and its distance from the port and rice cultural heritage the closer the end market is located toward the port the more investment is needed in lifting demand of domestic rice through quality upgrading branding and promotion to enable it to compete against imported rice proximity to centers of cultural heritage on the other hand endows rice value chains with a comparative advantage in demand requiring less investment in demand lifting and leaving more room for supply shifting investments

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

contractual responses to the common pool prorationing of crude oil production this paper examines bargaining among firms to mitigate rent dissipation following the major oil discoveries of 1926 35 because of high bargaining costs firms chose prorationing instead of consolidation and unitization and success varied the analysis also shows that prorationing took the form it did because concession such as per well quotas were required to draw in small operations and the quotas led to predictable responses regarding rent dissipation prorationing despite its costs controlled total field production and costs conserved natural reservoir energies and lengthened field life when private agreements failed the parties successfully appealed for state enforcement since similar heterogeneities influnce regulations elsewhere in the economy detailed analysis of bargaining among firms is essential for insight into the emergence of various institutional forms 33 references 3 tables

fines leniency and rewards in antitrust this article reports results from an experiment studying how fines leniency and rewards for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices subjects use costly fines as punishments leniency improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports leniency with rewards prices fall at the competitive level overall our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well run leniency and reward schemes these findings may also be relevant for similar white collar organized crimes such as corruption and fraud

the effects of group composition in a strategic environment evidence from a field experiment abstract recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision making this line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision making environment potentially miss critical features this study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally our experimental laboratory is large open air markets where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations this permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions and show that deviations from nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership

communication and coordination in a two stage game we study the impact of communication on behavior in a two stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs we test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head to head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies in particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict avoidance take turn strategy can emerge first our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game second many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs third communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate

collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions we study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle in experimental multi object ascending auctions in these institutions low price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff inferior equilibria achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation we provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication the results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment auctions for timber cars oil drilling rights and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultaneously in multi object ascending auctions the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked in these auctions bidders can profit by splitting the markets by acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects the bidders lower the price they must pay as opposed to the sealed bid auction the ascending auction format provides bidders with the opportunity to coordinate tacitly on dividing markets and to punish non collusive bidding thus low price collusive equilibria co exist along with high price competitive equilibria even in a non repeated setting brusco and lopomo 2002 if there are complementarities in bidder values across objects and auctions are repeated bidders may further benefit by splitting the markets over time and taking turns in buying packages at low prices these opportunities make the multi object ascending auction an ideal institution for the study of equilibrium selection assuming that communication between the bidders is limited to the bidding any splitting of the markets must be tacitly coordinated in the early stages of the auction thus achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation while such tacit coordination is possible in theory it is an empirical question of whether it may be achieved in practice

competitive behavior in market games evidence and theory we explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game introduced by shubik 1972 market games obtain pareto inferior strict nash equilibria in which some markets are closed we find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic nash equilibria but favor more efficient nash equilibria in which all markets are open as the number of subjects participating in the market game increases the nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy motivated by these findings we investigate theoretically whether evolutionary forces lead to walrasian outcomes in market games we introduce a strong version of evolutionary stable strategies sess f orfinite populations our concept requires stability against deviations by coalitions of agents a small coalition of trading agents is sufficient for pareto improving trade to be generated in addition provided that agents lack market power nash equilibria corresponding to approximate competitive outcomes constitute the only approximate sess

intraplay communication in repeated games the paper examines repeated games where players have the possibly costly option of initiating bargaining over continuation payoffs between plays of the stage game a solution concept for these augmented games renegotiation perfectness is used to characterize concepts like subgame perfectness and pareto perfectness in the underlying repeated game and to extend pareto perfectness to infinite horizon games when bargaining is costly renegotiation may be indispensable off the equilibrium path for supporting renegotiation perfect outcomes sufficient conditions for a renegotiation perfect profile to support payoffs which are not supported by and not dominated by some subgame perfect profile are developed in the infinite horizon case journal of economic literature classification number c70

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

the effects of discounting opportunities in laboratory posted offer markets abstract this experiment isolates the effects of allowing sellers to offer private discounts from posted prices although discounting was pervasive when permitted it did not always improve performance high prices and low efficiencies were observed in half of the discount markets

the effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade abstract mindful of the market structure conduct performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance we compare posted offer markets where sellers but not buyers are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups 1 posted offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities 2 double auction markets with conspiratorial opportunities and 3 posted offer markets with true single seller monopolists the basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are 1 seller conspiracies in posted offer markets tend to raise prices but not profits relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies 2 posted offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices but not profits than double auction conspiracies and 3 posted offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits but not prices then posted offer conspiracies

we will be right with you managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service oriented systems how delay announcements can influence customers in service systems is a complex problem that depends on both the dynamics of the underlying queueing system and on the customers strategic behavior we examine this problem of information communication by considering a model in which both the firm and the customers act strategically the firm in choosing its delay announcement while anticipating customer response and the customers in interpreting these announcements and in making the decision about when to join the system and when to balk we characterize the equilibrium language that emerges between the service provider and her customers the analysis of the emerging equilibria provides new and interesting insights into customer firm information sharing we show that even though the information provided to customers is nonverifiable it improves the profits of the firm and the expected utility of the customers the robustness of the results is illustrated via various extensions of the model in particular studying models with incomplete information on the system parameters allows us also to highlight the role of information provision in managing customer expectations regarding the congestion in the system further the information could be as simple as high congestion low congestion announcements or it could be as detailed as the true state of the system we also show that firms may choose to shade some of the truth by using intentional vagueness to lure customers

do meetings in smoke filled rooms facilitate collusion the sherman act prohibits firms from discussing prices in meetings traditional thought suggests that this prohibition makes it harder for firms to collude and economists have concluded that the sherman act operates in the public interest i provide an alternative explanation for the act that also accounts for the small sanctions chosen by the legislature when firms interact in a dynamic environment in which the law helps them to prevent renegotiation the firms may benefit from the law that makes it costly but not very costly to meet to discuss prices the sherman act may help firms to collude

endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games an explorative experimental study this paper explores experimentally the effects of costly communication possibilities in market entry games it is shown that these effects depend on whether entry costs are symmetric or asymmetric in the former but not the latter case communication possibilities increase coordination success substantially and are likely to generate inferior outcomes for consumers furthermore cost asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue that is robust to changes in the game and is used by experienced players as a substitute to communication it is also shown that although communication opens up for aggressive market domination strategies such strategies are not used often successful

papers in experimental economics competitive market institutions double auctions vs sealed bid offer auctions consider a market with the following characteristics 1 privacy that is each agent knows only his own valuation or cost conditions 2 exchange follows the rules of the oral double auction that is buyers freely announce bids or accept offers and sellers freely announce offers or accept bids 3 aggregate market supply and demand per trading period is stationary for at least two to three periods and 4 there are at least four buyers and as many sellers the literature reporting the results of a large number of experimental markets with these characteristics documents what appears to be a remarkably rapid convergence to a competitive equilibrium ce however any claim of double auction da convergence to the ce can only have meaning in one of three senses i the ce is attained immediately ii after t periods of trading some measure of the market s state such as mean price is nearer relative to experimental sampling variability to a ce than to some distinct alternative equilibrium such as a monopoly or nash equilibrium iii after t periods of trading this measure is nearer to a ce in da experimental markets than in markets organized under a different institution of contract for example a sealed bid auction since everything from electrons and the stars to rats and people yield state measures subject to error or random variation the deterministic criterion i can have no serious scientific standing by such criteria any hypothesis can be rejected and there could be no science of physics biology or economics 2 with the exception of certain very simple markets such as single object auctions or certain idealized markets such as the cournot quantity adjuster model economics has only two concepts of equilibrium monopoly and competitive the only formal model of da trading that has been proposed see david easley and john ledyard p 6 predicts stochastic convergence in finite time with probability one to a ce hence the only test alternative to the ce research hypothesis in da markets is a monopoly or monopsony equilibrium experimentalists have not reported statistical tests of the ce professor department of economics university of arizona assistant professor department of economics indiana university instructor department of economics university of arizona and sandia national laboratories albuquerque nm respectively we are indebted to the national science foundation for research support and to art denzau and mort kamien for helpful comments there is an early and recently growing body of experimental evidence for convergence to a competitive equilibrium under double auction rules the earliest evidence contained in experiments initiated in january 1956 is reported in smith 1962 1964 1965 1976 however these early experiments used between twenty and fifty or so participant buyers and sellers because in keeping with prevailing professional beliefs it was thought that a ce was unlikely to be approached unless numbers were quite large using large numbers was not unreasonable since it is a good beginning procedure to give a theory whatever is believed to be its best shot more recent evidence using six buyers six sellers and two traders in speculative da markets with cyclical demand is reported by r m miller charles plott and smith and williams 1979 for evidence from a comparison of oral and computerized da experiments with four buyers and four sellers see williams 1980 for further evidence in the context of the study of price controls see m isaac and plott 1981b and smith and williams 1981b in the context of a conspiracy study see isaac and plott 1981a in the context of comparisons between da and posted offer pricing see jon ketcham smith and williams in the context of a study of four variations on da rules see smith and williams 1980 all of these more recent papers report double auction experiments using no more than four buyers and four sellers 2as frederick mosteller once noted if you wanted to reject the inverse square law of attraction try tossing a sheet of paper out the window

price controls and the behavior of auction markets an experimental examination price ceilings and price floors are common in all market systems the ancient greeks and hellenistic era egyptians are known to have utilized price controls see h michele p 272 and j p levy p 41 and numerous public policy questions today involve them apparently for as long as price controls have existed their effects have been debated for example diocletion s favorable view of his price ceilings was disputed by the religious philosopher lactantius who charged that the policy led to scarcity and low grade articles p 145

climate threshold financial hoarding and economic growth we use an iterative finite difference method to establish theoretical models that reflect the relationships among climate threshold financial hoarding and economic growth we build a simultaneous equations model to conduct an empirical analysis based on china s statistical data from 1979 to 2012 our study yields the following results china s climate threshold has shown a zigzag shaped rising trend since 1979 the main reasons for the rapid expansion of financial hoarding were high savings rate savings leakage higher marginal efficiency of financial hoarding compared to capital efficiency or higher internal creativity of the financial sector there were positive cumulative effects between financial hoarding and economic growth which were significantly inhibited by climate threshold the climate threshold had discrepant influences on different industries to achieve a balanced economy more money should be invested in the real sector to appropriately reduce the rate of savings leakage the financial s

teaching tools a public goods experiment for the classroom teaching tools a public goods experiment for the classroom george stigler wrote in the american economic review twenty seven years ago that the typical student in an introductory college economics course would memorize a few facts diagrams and policy recommendations and ten years later be as untutored in economics as the day he entered the class 1963 657 and later in the journal of economic education stigler argued that economics belongs in everyone s education once we have learned how to teach it 1970 80 as we enter the nineties academic economists continue groping for methods and techniques that will improve the way in which principles courses are taught the proliferation of commercially available materials in the form of textbooks workbooks software telecourses e g economics usa and transparencies provides evidence of the increasing interest and expenditure aimed at improving the teaching of economics however there exists at least one very promising teaching technique that continues to see relatively limited action in the typical economics classroom while experimental economic methods have become quite familiar to academic economists as a legitimate and powerful research tool their usefulness for the economics classroom has not yet been generally recognized 1 in this article i describe a simple yet powerful public goods experiment for use in microeconomics or public finance courses since it is likely that many instructors in economics are reluctant to use experimental methods without sufficient preparation 2 enough detail on experiment administration and suggested post experiment discussion is provided to assist even the novice experimenter with getting started instructors interested in additional information on experimental economics or experiments for the classroom should consult the references listed in the concluding section i experiment description 3 a theoretical concept that introductory students often find hard to understand is the vertical summation of individual demand curves to obtain the market demand for a public good the typical student also fails to fully appreciate how a free rider can cause underinvestment in public goods the experiment outlined below provides a simple yet powerful technique to teach not only the vertical addition and the free rider problems but also an ideal way to construct a prisoner s dilemma game and discuss the resulting underinvestment in the public good students are placed into n teams where a team may be as few as one person each team is endowed with t tokens and must choose in each of the decision making rounds whether to invest these tokens in the private account or the group account the private account will pay the team 0 30 per token invested each round the group account will earn for the entire society 0 50 per token invested each round from the group account each team will then receive 0 50 g sub i n where g sub i equals the total number of tokens invested in the group account in round i by all n teams note that regardless of how many tokens any single team places into the group account all n teams receive the same payout from the group account teams must invest all t tokens in each round and tokens cannot carry over from one round to the next finally earnings from previous rounds are not allowed to be reinvested in the future ii example experiment assume a representative class of sixty students 4 assume the instructor divides the class into twenty teams n 20 of three students each each team is endowed with t 25 tokens per round the teams read the instructions overhead transparency while the instructor distributes to each team i the team record sheet and ii the team decision ballots one for each round 5 for each round once all the team ballots have been submitted the instructor sums the tokens invested in the group account and reports this number and the dollar payout per team to the entire class

discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism abstract this paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal agent relationship with moral hazard the key aspect is that rewards have informational content when the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent s performance she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent in accordance with the often observed compression of ratings we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent s interim performance imperfectly i e she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance furthermore we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent s effort provided that the principal s stake in the project is small

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

price dispersion in the lab and on the internet theory and evidence price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook bertrand competition we show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion a variety of statistical tests based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models suggest that bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well evidence is also presented to suggest that the models are consistent with data from a leading internet price comparison site

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets the paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous continuous ascending price auctions we design and implement a collusion incubator environment based on a type of public symmetrically folded and item aligned preferences tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment once tacit collusion developed it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game theoretic model the only successful remedy was a non public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically folded and item aligned patterns of preferences creating head to head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a maverick

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

renegotiation proof equilibria in repeated prisoners dilemma abstract in this note it is shown that the requirement of weak renegatiation proofness does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated prisoner s dilemma specifically it is demonstrated that when players are sufficiently patient any feasible and individually rational outcome can be sustained by means of an equilibrium in which the punishing player always profits by carrying out the punishment

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

collusion in procurement auctions an experimental examination bart j wilson i introduction questioning the value of efforts to enforce federal anticonspiracy laws raises spirited debate among antitrust economists although everyone recognizes the welfare costs of successful conspiracies commentators such as armentano 1990 and cohen and scheffman 1989 argue that conspiratorial arrangements are pervasively ineffective and thus that social resources spent prosecuting cob lusion are wasted others including marvel et al 1988 express more ambivalence about the seriousness of conspiracies as a social problem but believe that the government manages to detect only the most ineffective arrangements still other economists clearly believe in the effectiveness of current government efforts see e g werden 1989 and froeb et al 1993 ultimately the pervasiveness of conspiratorial behavior and the magnitude of the consequent damages are empirical issues however the illegality of collusion complicates the collection of relevant data tip offs or complaints frequently expose conspiracies but good reasons exist for suspecting that conspiracies detected in this fashion tend to be the least profitable a conspirator likely rats on co conspirators only if he or she is disenchanted with the scheme suggesting that the conspiracy is about to collapse anyway similarly suspect are conspiracies that are sufficiently clumsy to raise the protests of buyers the detection problem would be vastly simplified if conspiracies could be identified in the absence of a smoking gun posner 1969 argues that such explicit evidence of conspiratorial behavior is unnecessary because conspiring firms exhibit identifiable patterns of activity that are alone sufficient to determine illegality kuhlman 1969 and gallo 1977 go still further and advocate the continuous computerized monitoring of pricing and sales data to detect conspiracies however as marshall and muerer 1998 observe a potentially condemning defect of any attempt to detect collusion via behavior is that depending on underlying conditions virtually any suspect pattern of behavior can be generated as a noncollusive nash equilibrium identical prices for example are often cited as an indication of coordinated activity e g mund 1960 1 but in games such as the one modeled by anton and yao 1992 agents submit identical bids in a nash equilibrium in the absence of collusion furthermore some evidence from collusion cases prosecuted by the department of justice suggests that identical prices are rarely part of collusive arrangements except when the industry is not very concentrated comanor and schankerman 1976 market rotations a second pricing scheme that is typically cited as a suspect pattern may also be consistent with a subgame perfect noncooperative nash equilibrium zona 1986 for example identifies a number of approximate equilibria involving contract rotations when sellers have steeply increasing cost structures also lang and rosenthal 1991 characterize a noncooperative static equilibrium for a multiproduct contracting environment where sellers both divide the market and submit noncompetitively high bids in the market where they do not expect to win 2 still other pricing patterns are possibly suspect porter and zona 1993 report evidence of bid rigging in procurement auctions from the pattern of losing bids the intuition is that in a competitive environment bids should be correlated with costs when prices are fixed however this correlation breaks down this article reports a laboratory experiment designed to explore the relationship between suspect behavior and collusion we focus on coordinated behavior in procurement auctions a context where collusion is often suspected and has been frequently observed 4 two environments are examined a set cost regime that contains some features critical to standard government procurement auctions for goods and an endogenous cost regime which exhibits some critical elements of procurement bidding for construction contracts

a comparison of posted offer and double auction pricing institutions this paper presents an experimental study of a computerized posted offer pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the u s posted offer market performance is evaluated relative to double auction market performance using two supply and demand designs subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable the market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted offer pricing relative to double auction however the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions when feasible the predictive power of competitive nash and limit price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

market games as social dilemmas abstract in an experimental exchange market based on shapley and shubik 1977 two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange in this context although the nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare going a step forward we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same horizontal and opposite vertical sides of the market overall we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect

monopoly behaviour decentralized regulation and contestable markets an experimental evaluation this study provides a comparative experimental evaluation of several alternative approaches to the single product monopoly problem we contrast incentive compatible decentralized regulatory mechanisms with notions of market contestability in a decreasing cost environment the decentralized regulatory mechanisms are found to be significantly more effective at restraining monopoly power than is allowing direct contestability but the regulatory mechanisms examined require that the regulatory agency know the market demand curve though not the industry cost curve since this is significantly more information than is required to implement direct contestability an interesting tradeoff is suggested does the greater efficiency in monopoly restraint provided by the regulatory mechanism relative to direct contestability outweigh the former s greater informational requirements

pollution the cost of public funds and endogenous growth abstract theories of endogenous growth are used to investigate the effect of environmental policy on the rate of economic growth and the provision of public goods in a second best market outcome pollution gives rise to a negative environmental externality and is modeled as an inevitable by product of production the government faces the dual task of on the one hand internalising environmental externalities and on the other hand raising public funds to finance public spending a tougher environmental policy reduces the rate of economic growth improves environmental quality raises the optimal tax rate and changes the composition of public spending away from productive government spending towards public consumption and abatement the marginal cost of public funds falls rises if productive government spending is negligible substantial relative to public consumption and abatement

cooperation spillovers and price competition in experimental markets i introduction both competition and cooperation are important for the successful functioning of many economic systems for example firms compete in markets but they also cooperate with one another through arrangements such as research joint ventures lobbying cooperative marketing agreements and strategic alliances in this paper we use experiments to examine how competitive interactions affect agents propensity to cooperate we are interested in studying spillovers that may involve cooperation in one domain such as a research joint venture and competition in another such as in a market 1 cooperation could weaken competition perhaps promoting collusion or market competition could reduce incentives for non market cooperation these behavioral spillovers could go in either direction they are distinct from another type of spillover through knowledge externalities that occur in research and development r d when the innovator cannot fully appropriate the gains to innovation leading potentially to a socially inefficient level of research debondt 1996 2 as discussed below behavioral spillovers have been shown in experiments to increase cooperation in otherwise competitive environments for example through establishing cooperative precedents a large body of theoretical research has focused on firms cooperating in research joint ventures and how this impacts competition in output markets for example cooper and ross 2009 examine the mechanism by which agreements to cooperate in one market can have negative effects on competition in other markets even in situations when these markets are not linked via costs or demand cabral 2000 shows that product market prices are affected by r d agreements between firms caloghirou ioannides and vonortas 2003 lambertini poddar and sasaki 2003 and poyago theotoky 2007 also discuss the impact of forming research joint ventures on product markets and cartel formation 3 empirical work using field data has provided creative indirect evidence on the collusive potential of research joint ventures by exploiting natural policy experiments although the extent of this evidence is limited goeree and helland 2010 for example show that research joint ventures facilitate collusion because they became less popular following an enforcement policy change leniency that made collusion less attractive policy experiments such as these are often required since systematic collusion often goes undetected by authorities duso roller and seldeslachts 2010 also examine the link between research joint ventures and collusion using data from the u s national cooperation research act that granted certain research joint ventures milder antitrust scrutiny they find that horizontal research joint ventures lead to more collusion than vertical joint ventures our work provides complementary and more direct evidence since in the laboratory we can observe the level and sustainability of tacit and explicit collusion and can therefore circumvent the measurement and endogeneity issues that are often prevalent in field data the specific research goals of this study are the following first we wish to examine if agents take advantage of available gains from cooperation in the presence of payoff uncertainties that arise from stochastic innovation success second we are interested in learning if a behavioral spillover of cooperation can lead to collusion in markets or whether competition in markets reduces non market cooperation these notions of cooperation concern contributions to joint r d projects or collusion in price setting and are defined independently of any communication opportunities therefore our third goal is to determine how this interaction between cooperation and competition is affected by the introduction of non market communication opportunities finally we will measure the externalities from r d cooperation to non innovators in the market

tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories experimental evidence from competitive markets abstract a basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax by contrast policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence using competitive laboratory markets i test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies for sufficiently large markets the results show strong support for both theories there is little to no evidence even in the short run of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence in smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets

collusion in private value ascending price auctions we investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication we find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well motivated bidders collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements abstract this paper formulates a continuous time information transmission model in which an altruistic sender privately observes a stochastic state variable and incurs a communication cost when she broadcasts a message we characterize the sender s optimal announcement strategy using an ordinary differential equation we prove the optimality of the sender s strategies using a martingale verification argument and show that the sender s optimal strategy involves sending discrete messages furthermore we apply the model to the timing decision of credit rating announcements and provide a framework to study various aspects of rating announcements such as the probability of rating reversals and the expected time before a rating change

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

some experimental testing of the cournot nash hypothesis in small group rivalry situations abstract this study parallels a previous study by friedman and hoggatt 1980 but uses more realistic information conditions in addition to confirming the central tendency results of friedman and hoggatt we find that in the three to six corporation range the number of corporations in the experiment seems to have no effect on the tendency to grope towards the cournot nash solution on the other hand it seems clear that convergence to cournot nash is more likely if the subjects are experienced and less likely the higher the cournot nash markup over unit cost overall there is a strong tendency to converge to cournot nash

economic growth and global warming a model of multiple equilibria and thresholds abstract we presume a simple endogenous growth model where global warming affects economic growth and analyze the dynamics of the competitive economy and of the social optimum our regulatory instrument is an emission tax rate we demonstrate that for certain values of the emission tax ratio the competitive economy exhibits multiple equilibria and a threshold may exist that separates the domains of attraction for the growth paths there exist paths to high growth rates and low temperature and low growth rates and high temperature for the planner s problem the long run equilibrium is unique unless the damage of global warming is very small

cartel formation and pricing the effect of managerial decision making rules we experimentally investigate how the managerial decision making process affects choices in a bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non binding cartels to do so we compare the effects of three decision making rules for the firm decisions by ceos majority rule and consensus to each other and to decisions in a benchmark consisting of single individual firms it has been argued elsewhere that groups behave more competitively than individuals in this setting this predicts that for all three decision making rules we should observe fewer cartels and lower prices this is not what we find for the formation of cartels there are no differences across treatments for prices asked we find that first cartels lead to higher prices in all treatments despite the fact that they are non binding second the decision making rules strongly affect the prices asked one thing that stands out is that firms run by ceos ask higher prices i e defect less often from the cartel than observed in the other treatments

spatial and temporal efficiency in climate policy applications of fund fund is an integrated assessment model of the interactions between climate and economy nine world regions emit greenhouse gases and suffer damages from climate change a number of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies are compared including optimal and cost effective strategies strategies with early and late abatement and strategies with and without international co operation the analyses confirm that co operation matters resulting in substantially lower costs or higher welfare the real commitments of policy targets based on an absolute level e g 1990 emissions are hard to estimate because of the uncertainties in the baseline postponing action conflicts with minimising costs and maximising welfare but so does sharp emission reduction at the short term as proposed in the kyoto protocol

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

the impact of collusion on price behavior empirical results from two recent cases abstract we use extended arch and garch models to examine the differences in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusive and competitive phases of two recently discovered conspiracies citric acid and lysine according to our results the conspirators managed to raise prices by 9 and 25 cents per pound in the short run relative to non collusive periods also the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower and the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy was higher than during more competitive periods the proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and prosecution purposes

communication in vertical markets experimental evidence abstract an upstream monopolist supplying competing downstream firms may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically we build on previous experimental studies of this well known commitment problem by introducing communication allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the cournot level observed in the absence of communication halfway toward the monopoly level allowing all firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them a simple structural model of nash in nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well using third party coders unsupervised text mining among other approaches we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes we conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets

food sovereignty and agricultural trade policy commitments how much leeway do west african nations have the 2008 food crisis has challenged the political legitimacy and economic efficiency of the liberalization of international agricultural trade an alternative vision defended by the food sovereignty movement is that longterm food security cannot rely on dependency on food imports but must be built on the development of domestic production with enough barrier protection to shelter it from world price fluctuations and unfair trading the purpose of this paper is to look into whether the west african nations can achieve food sovereignty given their various trade commitments and other external constraints the particularity of our approach is to combine a historical economic analysis with a political approach to food sovereignty and trade commitments our results suggest that external brakes on the development of food sovereignty policies are marginal as the countries still have unused room for manoeuvre to protect their smallholder agriculture under the terms of draft world trade organization agreements and economic partnership agreements and under the international financial institutions recommendations rather the international environment seems to be instrumented by west african states that do not manage to secure a national political consensus to drive structural reforms deemed vital and further the food security of the urban populations over the marginalized rural populations recently the regional integration process has made headway with a common agricultural support and protection policy project that could herald an internal political balance more conducive to food producing agriculture

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade an experimental study a study is a limited exploration into the relationship between the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade and the resulting market performance laboratory experimental methods are applied to separate competing theories the competitive model predicts well relative to cartel models nevertheless when measurements are taken relative to the performance of markets where conspiracies are not possible the effects of attempted conspiracies can be determined

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

reflections on food crises past abstract world food crises are relatively rare events occurring roughly three times a century but they also tend to be regular events every three decades or so suggesting there is an underlying cyclical cause if so far sighted donor and government investments in raising agricultural productivity and policies on behalf of stable food production and prices might go a long way to preventing food crises in the future preventing food crises rather than trying to cope after the fact with their impact on the poor is the only way to avoid substantial perhaps permanent damage to the welfare of poor households lessons from the world food crises in 1972 73 and in 2007 08 especially lessons from how the world rice market functioned point the way toward improved food policy management at national and international levels in the future

natural monopoly and contested markets some experimental results a firm may become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the product reaches a minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the entire market at a price that is profitable in a situation of this sort if there is more than one firm producing the product each must be producing at a higher thanminimum level of average cost each may be inclined to cut the price to increase its output rate and reduce its average costs the result is likely to be economic warfare and the survival of a single victor the monopolist

tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact in the european monetary union tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact borrowing from the experience of environmental markets this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the european monetary union having chosen an aggregate target for the union and an initial distribution of permits emu countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation the scheme exploits countries incentives to minimize their costs is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of europe wide recessions in addition it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to gdp ratios finally the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance lending credibility to the stability pact s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run alessandra casella

side communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions the two items case we analyze an ascending auction with anonymous item prices when there are two items that are substitutes this popular auction format entails increased opportunities for bidders to coordinate bids as the bidding process is longer and since bidders see the other bids and can respond to various signaling this has happened in many real auctions e g in the netherlands 3g telecom auction and in the fcc auctions in the us

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games costless pre play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with pareto ranked equilibria we report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest link contest by expending costly efforts allowing intra group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication on the other hand allowing inter group communication leads to less destructive competition as a result intra group communication decreases while inter group communication increases payoffs our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency this contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

secrecy two sided bias and the value of evidence abstract we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and or a pooling equilibrium as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling we also characterize all nonseparating equilibria and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price