control rights in complex partnerships this paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership that is a partnership which produces impure public goods we show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors the parties valuations of the goods produced and the degree of impurity of these goods when the degree of impurity is large control rights should be given to the main investor irrespective of preference considerations there are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party s investment is more important than the other party s if the parties investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low valuation party if the importance of the parties investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small the low valuation party should receive sole authority we analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible we check for robustness of our results in several dimensions such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships including those involving schools and child custody jel d02 o23 h41 l31

transaction costs and the robustness of the coase theorem this paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the coase theorem in particular we identify and investigate the basic hold up problem which arises whenever the parties to a coasian negotiation have to pay some ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place we then show that a coasian solution to this hold up problem is not available this is because a coasian solution to the hold up problem typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex ante costs and hence with a new hold up problem

labour supply and saving under uncertainty this article examines how variations in labour supply can be used to self insure against wage uncertainty and the impact of such self insurance on precautionary saving the analytical framework is a two period model with saving and labour supply decisions where preferences are consistent with balanced growth the main findings are that i labour supply flexibility raises precautionary saving when future wages are uncertain and ii uncertainty about future wages raises current labour supply and reduces future labour supply

variance stabilizing transformations for electricity spot price forecasting most electricity spot price series exhibit price spikes these extreme observations may significantly impact the obtained model estimates and hence reduce efficiency of the employed predictive algorithms for markets with only positive prices the logarithmic transform is the single most commonly used technique to reduce spike severity and consequently stabilize the variance however for datasets with very close to zero like the spanish or negative like the german prices the log transform is not feasible what reasonable choices do we have then to address this issue we evaluate 16 variance stabilizing transformations within a comprehensive forecasting study involving two model classes regression models neural networks and 12 datasets from diverse power markets we show that the probability integral transform combined with the standard gaussian distribution yields the best approach significantly better than many of the considered alternatives

why does trend growth affect equilibrium employment a new explanation of an old puzzle that the employment rate appears to respond to changes in trend growth is an enduring macroeconomic puzzle this paper shows that in the presence of a return to experience a slowdown in productivity growth raises reservation wages thereby lowering aggregate employment the paper develops new evidence that shows this mechanism is important for ex

a note on the normalization of spanish electricity spot prices merit order of renewable generation has produced an increasing relevant number of zero values in spanish electricity spot prices since 2010 in contrast with the rest of markets which rarely present zero values this letter shows that existing methodologies for normalizing the price distribution fail to yield a proper normalization this letter proposes a new algorithm based on nataf transformation which addresses this issue and ensures a correct normalization numerical results validate the proposed algorithm

two views of inequality over the life cycle data on the life cycle profiles of inequality in wages earnings hours worked and consumption contain precious information for answering questions about the ability of households to insure labor market risk and about the sources of this risk this paper demonstrates that the choice of whether to control for cohort effects or for time effects has a drastic impact on the estimated age profiles for inequality and thus on the answers to those questions it also shows that time effects are required to account of the observed trends in inequality in 30 years of u s data whereas there is no evidence that cohort effects have been important jel c13 d31 d91 j22 j31

changes in labor force participation in the united states the labor force participation rate in the united states increased almost continuously for two and a half decades after the mid 1960s pausing only briefly during economic downturns the pace of growth slowed considerably during the 1990s however and after reaching a record high of 67 3 percent in the first quarter of 2000 participation had declined by 1 5 percentage points by 2005 this paper reviews the social and demographic trends that contributed to the movements in the labor force participation rate in the second half of the twentieth century it also examines the manner in which developments in the 2000s reflect a break from past trends and considers implications for the future

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm the standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations we explore the implications of such transaction costs prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned a party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure intuitively an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable because it implies large gains from trade such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs

labor supply and taxes a survey i survey the male and female labor supply literatures focusing on implications for effects of wages and taxes for males i describe and contrast results from three basic types of model static models especially those that account for nonlinear taxes life cycle models with savings and life cycle models with both savings and human capital for women more important distinctions are whether models include fixed costs of work and whether they treat demographics like fertility and marriage and human capital as exogenous or endogenous the literature is characterized by considerable controversy over the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in wages and taxes at least for males it is fair to say that most economists believe labor supply elasticities are small but a sizeable minority of studies that i examine obtain large values hence there is no clear consensus on this point in fact a simple average of hicks elasticities across all the studies i examine is 0 30 several simulation studies have shown that such a value is large enough to generate large welfare costs of income taxation for males i conclude that two factors drive many of the differences in results across studies one factor is use of direct vs ratio wage measures with studies that use the former tending to find larger elasticties another factor is the failure of most studies to account for human capital returns to work experience i argue that this may lead to downward bias in elasticity estimates in a model that includes human capital i show how even modest elasticities as conventionally measured can be consistent with large welfare costs of taxation

intertemporal labour supply with search frictions starting in the 1970 s wage inequality and the number of hours worked by employed u s prime age male workers have both increased we argue that these two facts are related we use a labour market model with on the job search where by working longer hours individuals acquire greater skills since job candidates are ranked by productivity greater skills not only increase worker s productivity in the current job but also help the worker to obtain better jobs when job offers become more dispersed wage inequality increases and workers work longer hours to obtain better jobs as a result average hours per worker in the economy increase this mechanism accounts for around two thirds of the increase in hours observed in data part of the increase is inefficient since workers obtain better jobs at the expense of other workers competing for the same jobs copyright oxford university press

recent advances in electricity price forecasting a review of probabilistic forecasting abstract since the inception of competitive power markets two decades ago electricity price forecasting epf has gradually become a fundamental process for energy companies decision making mechanisms over the years the bulk of research has concerned point predictions however the recent introduction of smart grids and renewable integration requirements has had the effect of increasing the uncertainty of future supply demand and prices academics and practitioners alike have come to understand that probabilistic electricity price and load forecasting is now more important for energy systems planning and operations than ever before with this paper we offer a tutorial review of probabilistic epf and present much needed guidelines for the rigorous use of methods measures and tests in line with the paradigm of maximizing sharpness subject to reliability the paper can be treated as an update and a further extension of the otherwise comprehensive epf review of weron 1 or as a standalone treatment of a fascinating and underdeveloped topic that has a much broader reach than epf itself

arima models to predict next day electricity prices price forecasting is becoming increasingly relevant to producers and consumers in the new competitive electric power markets both for spot markets and long term contracts price forecasts are necessary to develop bidding strategies or negotiation skills in order to maximize benefit this paper provides a method to predict next day electricity prices based on the arima methodology arima techniques are used to analyze time series and in the past have been mainly used for load forecasting due to their accuracy and mathematical soundness a detailed explanation of the aforementioned arima models and results from mainland spain and californian markets are presented

nature of human capital technology and ownership of public goods abstract besley and ghatak 2001 show that a public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good the most irrespective of technological factors in this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and we show that the relative valuations are not the sole determinant of an optimal ownership structure but also the nature of human capital and technology matter

the boundaries of the firm revisited why do firms exist what is their function and what determines their scope these remain the central questions in the economics of organization they are also central questions for business executives and corporate strategists the worldwide volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 6 trillion in 1997 it is hard to imagine that so much time effort and investment bankers fees would be spent on adjusting firm boundaries unless there was some underlying economic gain indeed the exceptional levels of merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades are a strong indication that economically significant forces do determine organizational boundaries the study of firm boundaries originated with the famous essay by coase 1937 who raised the question of why we observe so much economic activity inside formal organizations if as economists commonly argue markets are such powerful and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources coase s answer was in terms of the costs of transacting in a world of imperfect information when the transaction costs of market exchange are high it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal organization than through a market in large part thanks to the work of williamson 1975 1985 recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in coase s fundamental insight that firm boundaries can be explained by efficiency considerations our understanding of firm boundaries has been sharpened by identifying more precisely the nature and sources of transaction costs in different circumstances in the process the focus of

government versus private ownership of public goods the role of bargaining frictions abstract the government and a non governmental organization ngo can invest in the provision of a public good who should be the owner of the public project in an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions the party that values the public good most should be the owner regardless of technological aspects however under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties valuations we show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought

redefining the merit order of stochastic generation in forward markets this letter proposes a new merit order for the dispatch of stochastic production in forward markets e g day ahead markets the proposed merit order considers not only the marginal cost of the stochastic generating unit which is often very low or zero but also the projected cost of balancing its energy deviations during the real time operation of the power system we show through an illustrative example that the proposed merit order leads to increased market efficiency as the penetration of stochastic generation in the electricity market grows

optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs a non governmental organization ngo can make a non contractible investment to provide a public good only ownership can be specified ex ante so ex post efficiency requires reaching an agreement with the government besley and ghatak 2001 argue that the party with the larger valuation should be the owner we show that when transaction costs have to be incurred before the bargaining stage can be reached ownership by the government can be optimal even when the ngo has a larger valuation our finding also contrasts with the standard private good setup where the investing party i e the ngo should always be the owner