regression discontinuity analysis of gavi s impact on vaccination rates abstract since 2001 an aid consortium known as gavi has accounted for over half of vaccines purchased in the 75 eligible countries with an initial gni below 1 000 per capita regression discontinuity estimates suggest most aid for cheap existing vaccines like hepatitis b and dpt was inframarginal for instance hepatitis b doses sufficient to vaccinate roughly 75 of infants raised vaccination rates by single digit margins these results are driven by middle income countries near the eligibility threshold and do not preclude larger gains for the poorest countries global externalities via vaccine markets or impacts on newer vaccines such as pneumococcal or rotavirus for which income eligibility rules were relaxed

fungibility and the impact of development assistance evidence from vietnam s health sector how can the impact of aid be estimated in the presence of fungibility and how far does fungibility reduce its benefits these questions are analyzed in a context where a donor wants to target its efforts on a specific sector and specific geographic areas a traditional differences in differences method comparing the change in outcomes between the target and nontarget areas before and after the project risks misestimating the project s benefits the paper develops an alternative estimation method in which intersectoral fungibility reduces project benefits insofar as government spending has a smaller impact in the sector to which the funds leak than in the target sector while intrasectoral fungibility reduces benefits insofar as the donor is able to leverage productivity increases in government spending in the target areas the methods are applied to two contemporaneous world bank health projects that set out to target assistance on approximately one half of vietnam s provinces aid is not apparently fungible between vietnam s health sector and other sectors but is fungible across provinces within the health sector differences in differences yield an insignificant impact on infant mortality while the use of the new method yields a statistically significant impact of around 4 per 1000 live births the results however are ambiguous on the costs associated with intrasectoral fungibility

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

foreign aid and fiscal governance in melanesia summary recent research suggests that foreign aid is effective at spurring economic growth in recipient countries but its effectiveness is likely to depend upon a number of factors arguably the most important factor determining aid effectiveness is how recipient governments mediate foreign aid inflows this paper investigates this issue for the melanesian countries of fiji papua new guinea the solomon islands and vanuatu for the period 1989 2002 results suggest that foreign aid has led to increases in developmental expenditures and to falls in tax revenues and borrowing results also suggest a very different response to aid grants versus loans

gratitude conscience and reciprocity models of supplier motivation when quality is non contractible abstract standard game theoretic models that apply principal agent problems to analyse buyer supplier relations have postulated that in a single period game the agent will not choose non contractible quality however evidence exists that suppliers or service providers choose costly quality in non contractible dimensions even in absence of reputation concern if they are offered a premium such actions violate the axiom of individual rationality and are not subgame perfect in standard game theory wherein only material payoffs are considered this paper builds three models of supplier behaviour in a single period stackelberg like buyer supplier game by using the framework of psychological game theory and explains supplier motivations to choose quality on non contractible dimensions in absence of any reputation effect if the buyer offers a price higher than the market price the supplier may be motivated to choose non contractible quality due to a sense of gratitude or because of his conscience or in order to reciprocate kindness the results show that maximum possible quality is chosen by the supplier only in the presence of a sufficiently strong sense of gratitude or a sufficiently strong conscience however the buyer is better off with a fair supplier who is motivated to reciprocate than a supplier having a very poor sense of gratitude or one having a weak conscience because the buyer can choose an optimal premium above market price to ensure that a fair and reciprocal supplier chooses an optimal quality

insurer hospital bargaining negotiated discounts in post deregulation connecticut this paper uses unique data from the state of connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state s hospital industry for the years following deregulation 1995 1998 the data provide a rare opportunity to study payer level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services in addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers payer types and hospital types this study uses matched revenue data to analyze the economic determinants of discount magnitudes payer size appears to affect bargaining power but the economic significance of the effect is small the data exhibit patterns consistent with a bargaining explanation in which discount magnitudes depend critically on payers abilities to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

a panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid the donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military and other expenditures the link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible this article empirically examines the impact of foreign aid on the recipient s public expenditures using cross country samples of annual observations for 1971 90 for the base sample of 14 developing countries it finds that aid is not fungible at the aggregate level and there is no associated tax relief increasing the number of countries however makes aid fungible moreover results based on the main sample indicate that aid is fungible in three out of five sectors examined developing country governments receiving earmarked concessionary loans for agriculture education and energy reduce their own resources going to these sectors and use them elsewhere only loans to the transport and communication sector are fully spent on the purposes intended by donors because most aid appears to be fungible the rate of return on a specific donor funded project tells little about the impact of that assistance a better approach may be to tie foreign aid to an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors

the impact of foreign aid on the fiscal behavior of asian ldc governments a comment on khan and hoshino 1992 abstract khan and hoshino 1992 analyze public sector fiscal behavior in the presence of foreign aid using data for five south and southeast asian countries this paper first questions a critical hypothesis test on which khan and hoshino s conclusions depend it then extends khan and hoshino s analysis making explicit both the direct and indirect effects of aid contained within their fiscal response model it argues that a number of khan and hoshino s conclusions do not hold in the context of this representation

how do value creation and competition determine whether a firm appropriates value how does competition among economic actors determine the value that each is able to appropriate we provide a formal general framework within which this question can be posed and answered and then provide several results chief among them is a condition that is both required for and guarantees value appropriation we apply our methodology to i assess the familiar notion that uniqueness inimitability and competition imply value appropriation and ii determine the value appropriation possibilities for an innovator whose unique discovery is of use to several others who can compete for the right to use it

impact of foreign aid on the fiscal behavior of ldc governments abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of foreign aid on the behavior of the recipient governments specifically we look at a sample of less developed countries in south and southeast asia and study their response to foreign aid received their response is measured in terms of their public investment and consumption as well as taxation our paper attempts to make two new contributions to the literature first we try to estimate the impact of foreign aid on a sample of five south and southeast asian countries secondly we improve on the earlier method of a combination of single equation and two step least squares by estimating the whole system with a nonlinear three step least squares method the results confirm the hypothesis that aid does affect consumption investment and taxation of these governments but they also show that the relationship is a complex one in particular grants and loans have different effects on investment and taxation

capital grants and regional public investment in spain fungibility of aid or crowding in effect the aim of capital grants to subcentral governments is to increase their investment however recipients may try to allocate additional resources to cut saving or deficit generating a crowding out effect on self financed investment using data from the spanish autonomous communities during the period 1984 to 1999 the effect of capital transfers on regional public investment saving and deficit are estimated econometric results demonstrate that capital grants have no relevance when explaining the dynamics of saving however in deficit regressions they are shown to be both significant and negative both results lead us to a partial long run crowding out effect of grants on self financed investment

channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand abstract the supply chain literature analyzing supplier retailer contracts and channel coordination has typically focused on profit or revenue maximization as the members sole objective in such settings it is well known that a simple wholesale price contract is not effective in coordinating the channel due to double marginalization recently cui et al cui t h raju j s zhang z j 2007 fairness and channel coordination management science 53 8 1303 1314 introduced the members fairness concerns into channel coordination assuming a linear demand function the authors show that a coordinating wholesale price contract can be designed when only the retailer or both parties are concerned about fairness in this paper we extend the authors results to other nonlinear demand functions that are commonly used in the literature our analysis reveals that compared to the linear demand the exponential demand function requires less stringent conditions to achieve coordination when only the retailer is fairness concerned

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

when competitive advantage doesn t lead to performance the resource based view and stakeholder bargaining power what if rent from a competitive advantage is appropriated so it cannot be observed in performance measures the resourcebased view was not formulated to examine who will get the rent yet this essay argues that the factors leading to a resource based advantage also predict who will appropriate rent knowledge based assets are promising because firm specificity social complexity and causal ambiguity make them hard to imit ate however the roles of internal stakeholders may grant them a great deal of bargaining power especially relative to investors this essay integrates the resource based view with the bargaining power literature by defining the firm as a nexus of contracts this new lens can help to explain when rent will be generated and simultaneously who will appropriate it in doing so it provides a more robust theory of firm performance than the resource based view alone it is also suggested that this lens might be useful for examining other theories of firm performance

on the welfare effects of vertical integration opportunism vs double marginalization abstract we investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration by an upstream supplier dealing with two downstream firms through secret linear tariffs we show that whether vertical integration is anti or procompetitive depends on the distribution of the bargaining power between firms in the pre integration case in particular when the supplier has all or at least higher bargaining power than downstream firms vertical integration is socially desirable on the contrary when downstream firms have all or at least higher bargaining power than the supplier integration is detrimental to society

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

perfect competition and the creativity of the market from the perspective of the walrasian general equilibrium model entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior many would say no but we argue the contrary indeed we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to rather than a detour from such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives the trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist seeking out profit potentials wherever he can

supply chain performance anomalies fairness concerns under private cost information abstract this work investigates how fairness concerns influence supply chain decision making while examining the effect of private production cost information and touching on issues related to bounded rationality we conduct laboratory work utilizing a supply chain dyad with an upstream supplier feeding a downstream retailer under a simple wholesale price contract we perform human computer h c experiments where human subjects play the role of the supplier paired with the computerized retailer as well as human human h h experiments where human subjects play the role of both supplier and retailer these experiments allow us to isolate other effects like bounded rationality from the effects of fairness concerns on supply chain decision making we find that compared to standard analytical model the bounded rationality slightly reduces overall supply chain profit without changing its distribution between the supplier and the retailer while fairness concerns lead to greater supply chain profits and a more balanced supply chain profit distribution we further illustrate that under private cost information the retailer s fairness concern is suppressed by the lack of reciprocity from not being able to observe her rival s profit information but that the supplier s fairness concern from altruism persists based on our experimental results we modify classical supply chain models to include utility functions that incorporate both bounded rationality and fairness concerns the estimated other regarding coefficients are significantly lower under private information than under public information for the h h experiments and we find no evidence of inequity aversion for the h c experiments

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

the effectiveness of aid on savings and investment in sub saharan africa do volatility and institutional quality matter abstractthe effectiveness of aid is somewhat subject to its volatility this study investigates the impact of aid volatility especially on savings and investment with a particular focus on the role of institutional quality in 45 sub saharan african ssa countries over the period from 1990 to 2013 we used the generalized method of moments gmm technique combined with a measure of volatility namely an averaged data method involving six 4 year sub periods our results suggest that while aid is positively associated with savings and investment its volatility is harmful to savings and investment however when higher quality institutions exist the volatility of aid has a less negative impact on savings and investment the policy implications are diverse first donors and ssa aid dependent countries need to take into account the diversity of shocks to which aid can respond in mitigating its unpredictability secondly ssa countries should be encouraged to establish the conditions for better quality inst

aid the public sector and the market in less developed countries a reply the article in this journal by mosley et al i987 concludes its analysis of aid effectiveness as demonstrating inability of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the third world p 636 this note purports to show that this conclusion which is ostensibly distressing as the authors claim is not warranted the section of the study which is the basis of the conclusion cited and the subject of this note is a cross section regression analysis full details of which are shown in mosley et al table 3 the note is concerned with the relation between the dependent variable specified as the growth rate of real gdp per cent per annum hereafter gdp and aid specified as a percentage of gdp hereafter aid the aid results with only two significant positive coefficients in one subsample certainly give no basis for claiming aid effectiveness in terms of gdp growth the intention in this note is to interpret the results which are assumed to be valid this is made possible by the fact that the authors have helpfully provided the full input set of mean values derived from the raw data from this it is possible to calculate the gdp aid relationship for each country for the second and third period the procedure for deriving these relationships is as follows for each country the mean values of the time series of gdp and aid are extracted from the data for i 960 70 and for i 970 80 using i 960 70 as the base the signs of the change in the levels of the gdp and aid mean values between periods are recorded this is repeated for i980 4 with i970 80 mean values as the base the relationship between the two signs is an indication of the effect of aid on gdp in the period in which the change in levels is effected thus in the case of an increase in aid being combined with a decrease in gdp the latter must have fallen relatively to the former and aid effectiveness is negative mutatis mutandis for the other three sign combinations thus generating the appropriate gdp aid relationship for each country in each period a frequency distribution of the four sign combinations relating to the full sample is presented in table i since the signs of the changes in the levels of gdp and aid are derived by making explicit the arithmetic relationship implicit in the data they form a valid base from which to draw conclusions without requiring any test of

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

brokers and competitive advantage the broker profits by intermediating between two or more parties using a biform game we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically our analysis reveals that if one considers exogenous the relations between actors brokers can enjoy an advantage but only if 1 they do not face substitutes either for the connections they offer or the value they can create 2 they intermediate more than two parties and 3 interdependence does not lock them into a particular pattern of exchange if on the other hand one allows actors to form relations on the basis of their expectations of the future value of those relations then profitable positions of intermediation only arise under strict assumptions of unilateral action we discuss the implications of our analysis for firm strategy and empirical research

does economic analysis improve the quality of foreign assistance the world bank undertakes an annual expenditure of around 60 million on country specific economic analysis and advice for its member developing countries what is the impact of this economic and sector work on the quality of world bank lending it will be useful to know whether past analytical work has generated measurable economic benefits that will justify its continued provision in an environment of increasingly scarce resources this article sets out an idealized model of decision making in which a country manager makes a broad allocation of resources between lending services and economic and sector work given that decision the task manager for each project makes project specific decisions with respect to the allocation of resources between preparation and supervision the analysis indicates that economic and sector work has a significant positive impact on the quality of world bank loans the results provide clear evidence of underinvestment in economic and sector work and the analysis shows that resources can be switched from preparation and supervision to economic and sector work to the benefit of both the quality of programs and level of disbursements

the macroeconomic impact of development aid a critical survey the early literature explained aid s macroeconomic impact in the context of the dual gap model showing a clear link between aid and growth many now believe that the empirical evidence shows there to be no such relationship this paper critically reviews the different theoretical perspectives the dual gap model the savings debate recipient fiscal response and aid as dutch disease and the empirical debates on aid savings and growth the basis for denying a relationship between aid and growth is shown to be weak though more recent areas of research offer promising directions for future work

the nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices abstract we re examine the nash bargaining solution when an upstream and n downstream firms bargain over a linear input price with unobservable contracts we show that the profit sharing rule is given by a simple and instructive formula which depends on the parties disagreement payoffs the profit weights in the nash product and the elasticity of derived demand a downstream firm s profit share increases in the equilibrium derived demand elasticity which in turn depends on the final goods demand elasticity

is foreign aid fungible evidence from the education and health sectors this paper adopts a new approach to the issue of foreign aid fungibility in contrast to most existing empirical studies panel data are employed that contain information on the specific purposes for which aid is given this allows linking aid that is provided for education and health purposes to recipient public spending in these sectors in addition aid flows that are recorded on a recipient s budget are distinguished from those that are not recorded on budget and the previous failure to differentiate between on and off budget aid is shown to produce biased estimates of fungibility sector program aid is the measure of on budget aid whereas technical cooperation serves as a proxy for off budget aid the appropriate treatment of off budget aid leads to lower fungibility estimates than those reported in many previous studies specifically in both sectors and across a range of specifications technical cooperation which is the largest component of total education and health aid leads to at most a small displacement of recipient public expenditures

donor preferences and recipient fiscal behavior a simultaneous analysis of foreign aid we theoretically develop and empirically estimate a preference model determining foreign aid donor behavior aid access and levels are separately determined by endogenous budgetary allocations the international economic environment the distribution of income between countries basic human needs the small country effect and regional bias we find fungibility of aid in recipient budgets is due to donor and recipient preferences despite the importance of other economic influences we find a significant pro poor country bias in aid allocations although little aggregate influence of basic human needs or regional bias the small country effect is significant for two of six donors jel f35 o19 h 77

fiscal effects of foreign aid in a federal system of governance the case of india abstract this paper models fiscal effects of foreign aid in a federal system of governance our main innovation is to incorporate the inter governmental fiscal link in examining economic fungibility of foreign aid the model is applied to the expenditure decisions of the central government of india the two main findings are i foreign aid merely substitutes for spending that the government would have undertaken anyway funds freed by aid are spent on non development activities and ii in passing earmarked external assistance to states the central government makes a reduction in its transfers to states these findings indicate that the central government s expenditure choices are unaffected by external assistance the implication for donors is that even though their development projects may be associated with very high rates of economic return they could be assisting the central government in financing something very different at the margin for the state governments the finding indicates that they may not be reaping the full benefits of externally procured assistance

competitive intensity and its two sided effect on the boundaries of firm performance the new perspective emerging from strategy s value capture stream is that the effects of competition are twofold competition for an agent bounds its performance from below while that for its transaction partners bounds from above thus assessing the intensity of competition on either side is essential to understanding firm performance yet the literature provides no formal notion of competitive intensity with which to make such assessments rather some authors use added value as their central analytic concept others the core added value is simple but misses the crucial for an agent side of competition the core is theoretically complete but difficult to interpret and empirically intractable this paper formalizes three increasingly general notions of competitive intensity all of which improve on added value while avoiding the complexity of the core we analyze markets characterized by disjoint networks of agents e g supply chains providing several insights into competition and new tools f

insurer provider networks in the medical care market i use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers i include a simple profit maximization framework and an additional effect hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers e g those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining i estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers these results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining

learning to contract evidence from the personal computer industry organizational forms involving more detailed contracts than are found in traditional spot market exchanges appear to be increasingly prevalent there has been relatively little analysis however of the extent to which firms learn how to use contracts to manage their interfirm relationships over time in this paper we conduct a detailed case study of a time series of 11 contracts concluded during 1989 1997 between the same two partners both of whom participate in the personal computer industry to explore whether and how firms learn to contract we find many changes to the structure of the contracts that cannot be fully explained by changes in the assets at risk in the relationship and evidence that these changes are largely the result of processes in which the firms were learning how to work together including learning how to contract with each other the nature of this learning appears to have been quite incremental and local that is not very far sighted we suggest how and when contracts might serve as repositories for knowledge about how to govern collaborations and suggest some boundary conditions for this phenomenon our findings also provide implications for the debate about whether contracts have a positive or negative effect on interorganizational trust we conclude with suggestions for future research

exogenous shocks foreign aid and civil war the recent civil war literature suggests that negative economic shocks in low income countries increase the risk of civil war foreign aid can be an effective conflict prevention tool in times of severe economic conditions aid cushions government spending from the downward pressures of economic shocks providing recipient governments with resources they can use to make rebellion a less attractive option for aggrieved domestic groups using official development assistance oda data covering 1990 through 2004 we find that foreign aid appears to be a useful tool for preventing civil wars in the wake of negative economic shocks and as such aid should be assessed by donors with these conflict suppressing aspects in mind

bargaining ability and competitive advantage empirical evidence from medical devices in markets where buyers and suppliers negotiate supplier costs buyer willingness to pay and competition determine only a range of potential prices leaving the final price dependent on other fac

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

creating and capturing value in repeated exchange relationships the second paradox of embeddedness prior empirical studies suggest repeated exchange develops increasing value in buyer supplier relationships a first order implication of this finding is that buyers will concentrate exchange among a relatively small number of suppliers to generate maximum value in relationships however buyers are equally concerned with value capture by distributing rather than concentrating exchange buyers may position themselves to capture more of the value created leaving buyers potentially conflicted concerning the choice we label this dynamic the second paradox of embeddedness distinguishing it from uzzi s uzzi b 1997 social structure and competition in inter firmnetworks the paradox of embeddedness admin sci quart 42 1 35 67 paradox driven by technological uncertainty by examining the procurement activities of a large diversified manufacturing company we then test for supplier and buyer behavior consistent with the conditions that give rise to the second paradox and behaviors that result from it

guilt in games a clear conscience is a good pillow why does this old proverb contain an insight the emotion of guilt holds a key psychologists report that the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm loss or distress on a relationship partner roy baumeister arlene m stillwell and todd f heatherton 1994 245 june price tangney 1995 moreover guilt is unpleasant and may affect behavior to render the associated pangs counterfactual baumeister stillwell and heatherton state if people feel guilt for hurting their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations they will alter their behavior to avoid guilt in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship avoided guilt is the down of the sound sleeper s bolster how can guilt be modeled how are human interaction and economic outcomes influenced we offer a formal approach for providing answers start with an extensive game form which associates a monetary outcome with each end node say that player i lets player j down if as a result of i s choice of strategy j gets a lower monetary payoff than j expected to get before play started player i s guilt may depend on how much he lets j down player i s guilt may also depend on how much j believes i believes he lets j down we develop techniques to analyze equilibria when players are motivated in part by a desire to avoid guilt the intellectual home for our exercise is what has been called psychological game theory this framework originally developed by john geanakoplos david pearce and ennio stacchetti 1989 and recently extended by battigalli and dufwenberg 2005 henceforth b d allows players utilities to depend on beliefs about choices states of nature

is foreign aid fungible the case of indonesia this paper considers whether foreign aid given for specific categories of expenditure is fungible among them and whether aid reduces tax effort by the recipient government models developed to analyze the fiscal relations among different levels of government in the united states are applied to analysis of the impact of foreign aid econometric analysis of data for indonesia reveals that aid is largely spent as the donors intended that aid does not lead to a reduction in tax effort and that aid is not diverted to nondevelopment current expenditures copyright 1990 by royal economic society

are there lasting impacts of aid to poor areas abstract the paper re visits the site of a large world bank financed rural development program in china 10 years after it began and four years after disbursements ended the program emphasized community participation in multi sectoral interventions including farming animal husbandry infrastructure and social services data were collected on 2000 households in project and non project areas spanning 10 years a double difference estimator of the program s impact on top of pre existing governmental programs reveals sizeable short term income gains that were mostly saved only small and statistically insignificant gains to mean consumption emerged in the longer term though in rough accord with the average gain to permanent income the use of community based beneficiary selection greatly reduced the overall impact given that the educated poor were under covered the main results are robust to corrections for various sources of selection bias including village targeting and interference due to spillover effects generated by the response of local governments to the external aid

foreign aid and the question of fungibility this paper analyzes whether the foreign assistance provided for specific categories of expenditure is shifted among them contrary to the wishes of donors it also considers whether aid reduces the tax effort of recipient governments econometric results are presented for the dominican republic that show that the fungibility of aid has resulted in a thwarting of the intentions of donors an attempt is made to account for the observed differences in behavior of individual countries in altering expenditures copyright 1993 by mit press

the fungibility of u s military and non military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients abstract this paper examines the impact of u s military and non military assistance on the allocation of public and private sector spending for eight major recipients over the 1972 1987 period the model assumes that an aid recipient s effective post assistance budget constraint is a priori unknown and must be estimated two versions of the model are tested in version a the data is converted into real u s dollars using official exchange rates in version b the data is converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates provided by summers and heston 1991 major findings are the same for both versions u s aid is highly fungible with a significant portion channeled to the private sector where it finances current consumption relatively more than investment