how do market reforms affect china s responsiveness to environmental policy a large percentage of total investment in china is allocated by the central government at below market interest rates in pursuit of non economic objectives this has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non performing loans threatening the future health of the chinese economy as a result reform of capital markets is a high priority of the chinese government at the same time the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues in this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax this allows us to assess how china s willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by china s current efforts to reduce investment subsidies we compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy we find that in the subsidized economy the tax interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy importantly we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy in fact for lower levels of reductions the carbon tax is actually welfare improving these results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition the carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies however the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies

cost versus control understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals for profit hospitals in california contract out services much more intensely than either private nonprofit or public hospitals to explain why we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade off between cost and control since nonprofit firms are more restricted in how they consume net revenues they experience more rapidly diminishing value of a dollar saved and they are less attracted to a low cost but low control outsourcing opportunity than a for profit firm is this difference is exaggerated in services where the benefits of controlling the details of production are particularly important but minimized when a fixed cost shock raises the marginal value of a dollar of cost savings we test these predictions in a panel of california hospitals finding evidence for each and that the set of services that private non profits are particularly interested in controlling physician intensive services is very different from those than public hospitals are particularly interested in labor intensive services these results suggest that a model of public or nonprofit make or buy decisions should be more than a simple relabeling of a model derived in the for profit context

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

physician induced demand for surgery following up the earlier findings by fuchs on surgeon induced demand this paper makes numerous data and econometric improvements in conducting a test of neoclassical and inducement theories a simultaneous equation model is used to estimate physician demand and equilibrium fees for surgery from a sample of 350 psus over the 1969 76 period the results provide definite support for the notion of competitive market failure particularly in large metropolitan areas other things equal fees and utilization are higher in surgeon rich areas although our estimated shift elasticities were only about one third those found by fuchs a statistically significant albeit small price elasticity of demand for surgery was also obtained in contrast to fuchs increasing monopoly and disequilibrium models are also tested without altering the basic findings where surgeons were in short supply their availability significantly affected surgery rates although a small supply effect was found in plentiful areas as well

the death of the pigovian tax policy implications from the double dividend debate recently economists appear to have abandoned a central precept of environmental policy optimal environmental taxes are equal to marginal environmental damage med as a consequence of labor market distortions optimal environmental taxes are now generally argued to typically lie below med and given realistic policy constraints on optimal tax reform sometimes well below med this new consensus is reflected in over a dozen papers published without rebuttal in prestigious economics journals in important survey articles and in policy oriented manuscripts how was it possible that such a radical transformation of economic thinking occurred with essentially no debate in the literature

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

public versus private governance a study of incentives and operational performance abstract this study explores incentives and performance in organizations governed by publicly elected boards of directors and subsidized by taxes such organizations are likely to underpay chief executive officers ceos resulting in selection and incentive problems and hence poor operating performance we compare municipal district hospitals to private nonprofit hospitals ceo compensation in district hospitals is significantly lower than in the nonprofits operating margins in district hospitals are lower and deteriorate more rapidly over time we rule out a number of other factors that could explain differences in performance we conclude that the weak governance structure hampers district hospitals

optimal demand bidding for time shiftable loads time shiftable loads have recently received an increasing attention due to their role in creating load flexibility and enhancing demand response and peak load shaving programs in this paper we seek to answer the following question how can a time shiftable load that itself may comprise of several smaller time shiftable subloads submit its demand bids to the day ahead and real time markets so as to minimize its energy procurement cost answering this question is challenging because of the inter temporal dependencies in choosing the demand bids for time shiftable loads and due to the coupling between demand bid selection and time shiftable load scheduling problems nevertheless we answer the above question for different practical bidding scenarios and based on different statistical characteristics of practical market prices in all cases closed form solutions are obtained for the optimal choices of the price and energy bids the bidding performance is then evaluated in details by examining several case studies and analyzing actual market price data

comment on m hoel emission taxes versus other environmental policies the choice of the appropriate instrument in environmental policy is not only a question of theoretical importance it is also of considerable political relevance while environmental taxes are sometimes used to control pollution quotas and direct controls dominate in practice if this observed bias is only due to the nature of policymaking and not supported by economic reasoning politicians are not well advised to use quotas and direct controls instead of environmental taxes hoel discusses popular arguments that are often used by politicians in favour of direct controls and concludes that the results are typically not clear cut in this comment i would like to focus on the employment effects of revenue raising and nonrevenue raising instruments politicians as well as special interest groups often claim that emission taxes increase the cost of production thereby harming employment clearly in the face of high rates of unemployment in many industrialized countries potentially negative employment effects of environmental regulation raise political resistance to green policy the ongoing debate has put

the stability of power system markets market equilibrium conditions can be derived from more general dynamic equations describing the marketplace dynamic equations provide insights into the behavior and stability of markets which are not available from static models for example markets with a single supplier with declining linear costs economies of scale may or may not be stable depending on specific cost characteristics markets with more than one supplier with declining linear costs are always unstable this paper illustrates a situation where the removal of congestion makes a market unstable

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

what do not for profit hospitals maximize abstract massive structural change is occurring in health care provision in the united states significantly reducing the number of not for profit suppliers this trend is fueled in part by government policies to evaluate these policies one must know about the motives of not for profit health care providers the theory of not for profit hospitals suggests buyers may prefer dealing with sellers who are not acting out of avarice yet this theory does not imply the absence of rent seeking motives we formulate a test of not for profit hospitals goals and apply it to hospitals in virginia modeling average revenues as a function of caseload private medicare medicaid charity we identify prices as latent variables by analyzing the response of the estimated private price to exogenous differences in medicare medicaid and charity caseload we reject the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals maximize profits i e maximize rents for a set of agents who control the hospital we also reject pure welfare output maximization these results combined with other evidence we discuss are consistent with the hypothesis that these hospitals consider both profits and output as objectives current us government policies treat all not for profit hospitals as if they were profit maximizers these policies appear to be biased towards reenforcing the trend towards less health care provision from not for profits and our results suggest that this may not be entirely beneficial to consumers

optimal gasoline tax in developing oil producing countries the case of mexico this paper uses the methodology of parry and small 2005 to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less developed oil producing country the relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less developed countries ldcs and industrial countries we argue that lawless roads general subsidies on gasoline poor mass transportation systems older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in ldcs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world we find that the optimal gasoline tax is 1 90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized in contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in mexico and more generally in ldcs

nonprofit hospital mergers and the exercise of market power government challenges to mergers within the hospital industry have become more frequent many of those mergers involve nonprofit organizations rather than the for profit firms that are the norm in most other industries this difference in ownership has made no apparent difference in the antitrust agencies approach to proposed hospital mergers in this article i test the proposition that nonprofit and for profit hospitals price differently in response to the structure of the markets in which they compete based on a cross sectional analysis of california hospitals i find that estimated merger effects on hospital prices do vary by type of ownership in response to either higher market share or to the joint combination of higher share and higher market concentration private nonprofit hospital prices are statistically significantly lower than for profit hospital prices and on balance in this sample there is no evidence of any systematic price increasing effect on private nonprofit hospitals

price and concentration in hospital markets the switch from patient driven to payer driven competition perhaps the most widely accepted paradigm of industrial organization i o is that competition lowers prices or alternatively that price cost margins are lower in less concentrated markets 1 the applicability of this paradigm for hospital markets has been questioned for example in united states vs carilion health system and roanoke valley hospital the district and appellate courts accepted evidence that hospital prices are lower in more concentrated markets and thereby approved a merger between the two largest hospitals in a three hospital market 2 the view that competition has a weak or perverse effect on hospital prices is shared by a number of researchers 3 is a common theme in newspaper stories

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

nitrogen land substitution in corn production a reconciliation of aggregate and firm level evidence in this paper we seek to reconcile low farm level substitution elasticity between nitrogen fertilizer and land with larger industry level values for the corn sector this is accomplished with a micro simulation model which identifies twenty three heterogeneous groups of corn farmers based on survey data for indiana after controlling for soil quality slope crop rotation and natural nitrogen sources considerable variation in fertilizer application rates remains model simulations indicate that the estimated substitution elasticity at the state level 1 15 is consistent with very low farm level substitutability the difference is attributable to compositional changes in the wake of relative price shocks these compositional effects are potentially very important but they are ignored in most policy analyses

generator bidding in oligopolistic electricity markets using optimal control fundamentals and application in this paper optimal control is applied to study generator bidding in an oligopolistic electricity market the repeated bidding process in hourly based real time electricity markets is modeled as a dynamic feedback system an optimal control problem is then formulated to explore individual generator s long term multiperiod optimization behavior particularly in our formulation the periodic property of the system demand is considered several lemmas are included for concerning system stability based on the necessary conditions for optimality from the pontryagin maximum principle a sweeping method is proposed and an optimal state feedback control rule is then obtained via backward induction numerical results suggest that the generator who unilaterally applies optimal control for generation decisions will obtain more profits a sensitivity analysis is also performed identifying these market factors that affect the performance of optimal control

energy taxation and the double dividend effect in taiwan s energy conservation policy an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model abstract faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes the taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption as well as mitigate co2 emissions through an adequate pricing system this study utilizes a cge model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft energy tax bill and its complementary fiscal measures under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment and consequently mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime the double dividend effect is less significant however when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure nevertheless all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption which means they have delivered at least the first dividend in the sense of co2 emissions control it has been verified in this study that having adequate public finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect

the marginal efficiency effects of taxes and subsidies in the presence of externalities a computational general equilibrium approach abstract using 1983 data we develop a 19 sector computational general equilibrium model incorporating producer producer externalities and producer consumer externalities simulation results indicate that when additional government expenditure is financed by pigouvian taxes the marginal cost of public funds is substantially below one labor sales and output taxes also affect the output of the polluting industries and thus have indirect pigouvian effects which tend to reduce the associated marginal costs of public funds pigouvian taxes are usually more efficient than pigouvian subsidies since the tax revenue can be used to reduce other taxes

welfare impacts of alternative public policies for agricultural pollution control in an open economy a general equilibrium framework a general equilibrium approach is used to evaluate the welfare impacts of alternative policies for reducing agricultural pollution in an open economy with preexisting distortions caused by income taxes and agricultural subsidies the policies examined here include the removal of distortionary agricultural subsidies we find that even though these distortions are small compared to others in the economy removing them and imposing nitrogen reduction subsidies and or output taxes can enhance welfare and reduce nitrogen pollution thereby leading to a substantial double dividend the relative efficiency of the alternative policies examined here depends on the level of the nitrogen reduction target copyright 2008 oxford university press

pricing by non profit institutions the case of hospital cost shifting abstract this paper shows that a hospital whose objective function includes output as well as profits may raise price to private paying patients in response to cuts in the price it receives for madicaid or medicaid patients evidence is presented to show that hospitals in illinois cost shifted in this manner in response to substantial reductions in medicaid payments in the early 1980s as private sector pricing becomes more competitive however the ability and willingness of hospitals to cost shift will wane

competition among hospitals the traditional view of hospital competition has posited that hospitals compete primarily along quality dimensions in the form of fancy equipment to attract admitting physicians and pleasant surroundings to entice patients price competition among hospitals is thought to be non existent this paper estimates the effects of various hospital market characteristics on hospital prices and expenses in an attempt to determine the form of hospital competition the results suggest that both price and quality competition are greater in markets that are less concentrated although the net effect of the two on prices is insignificant it appears therefore that despite important distortions hospital markets are not immune to standard competitive forces

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the double dividend hypothesis in a cge model specific factors and the carbon base abstract we use a computable general equilibrium model to empirically examine the double dividend dd hypothesis using the gtap model data for australia we examine three environmental taxes on the production of energy goods following bento and jacobsen 2007 we examine the role played by specific factors in the production of energy goods our results provide support for the existence of a strong dd in australia when revenue is recycled through reductions in consumption taxes the strong dd is larger when the share of specific factors is higher and is much more pronounced when carbon taxes are charged on the production origin based accounting rather than the usage destination based accounting of carbon these results draw attention to the importance of the definition of the carbon base and have implications for the scale of carbon leakage

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues the concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed it is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes the annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from 0 63 to 3 05 billion if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue and from 1 to 4 87 billion if substituted for corporate income tax revenue expressed in 1982 dollars thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded

environmental regulation in an open economy abstract environmental regulation by a large trading country affects the world price of traded commodities a series of second best environmental taxes are derived which explicitly incorporate trade effects for cases which depend on the type of externality the regulating country s commodity trade balance and the presence or absence of trade taxes in the regulated market a coordinated policy solution using both tax and tariff instruments also is derived the practical implications for domestic environmental policy making which emerge from the theoretical results are evaluated

induced bias of technical change in agriculture the united states and japan 1880 1980 because of extreme differences in factor endowments and price ratios among factors between the united states and japan both countries have experienced sharply different patterns of factor use and productivity growth in agriculture for the past 100 years of modern economic growth in this study the method of testing the hicksian hypothesis of induced innovation was developed using the two level ces production function the model was applied to the historical data of u s and japanese agricultural development for 1880 1980 the results were consistent with the hypothesis that different patterns of technical change in the two countries were induced by differences in the levels and the movements in relative factor prices

profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals this paper proposes two tests of the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals the profit variability test states that the profits of an nfp will be less variable over time than profits of a for profit hospital if the nfp maximizes utility subject to a profit constraint the second test examines whether nfp profits respond less to change in exogenous factors such as medicare reimbursement rates than profits of for profit hospitals both tests performed on panel data from 1983 to 1988 support the hypothesis that nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals

substituting pollution taxation for general taxation some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation abstract earlier papers have recognized that nonenvironmental benefits will be realized if pollution taxes are substituted for other taxes which impose efficiency losses on society the purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of these nonenvironmental benefits for the design of an efficient pollution tax it is found that the efficient tax may be higher or lower than that conventionally defined as optimal and that the net benefit from unrestrained pollution can have important implications for the size of the tax

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

hospital mergers who merges with whom merger pairings are categorized based on the ownership status teaching status hospital size caseload severity and geographical distance of merging hospitals to determine the types of hospitals that tend to merge with each other the results show that mergers between two non teaching nonprofit or for profit hospitals occur more often but that only ownership status not teaching status affects the propensity to merge after controlling for other merger pair characteristics this paper also finds that hospitals are more likely to merge with a partner of similar size and close geographical proximity but not necessarily the closest candidate however ownership status not distance between hospitals is the dominant determinant of merger pairs

bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double sided auctions in this paper the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double sided auctions is studied we model electricity double sided auctions as dynamic systems and use nash cournot strategies for the market participants generating firms and load serving entities through simulation studies we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double sided auctions to those of electricity supplier only auctions using the developed bidding strategies

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

is hospital competition wasteful stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0741 6261 28199222 2923 3a2 3c247 3aihcw 3e2 0 co 3b2 zthe rand journal of economics is currently published by the rand corporation your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals rand html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgfri jan 4 14 10 49 2008

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha