ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction abstract the private valuation assumption found in most trading mechanism design papers rules out markets whose valuation structure generates externalities between traders this paper characterizes the set of ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms for a large class of markets that do admit such externalities and for bilateral trade markets establishes the impossibility of a first best solution across a class of trading problems employing uniform priors and linear valuation structures this paper also compares levels of market efficiency for varying numbers of traders

boundedly rational nash equilibrium a probabilistic choice approach we propose an equilibrium for n person finite games based on bounded rationality using the legit model of discrete choice theory at equilibrium each player uses appropriate choice probabilities given those used by the others rationality is parameterized on a continuum from complete rationality to uniform random choice results on the existence of equilibrium and on convergence to nash as rationality becomes perfect are similar to results due to mckelvey and palfrey we identify conditions such that for a given rationality parameter range the path of choices over time when the players use fictitious play converges to equilibrium c 1997 academic press

nash equilibrium efficiency wage distributions this paper extends the shirking model of efficiency wages by introducing worker heterogeneity with respect to the disutility of effort heterogeneity leads to a problem of adverse selection in addition to the moral hazard problem that is present in the original model as a result of adverse selection an equilibrium in which all firms offer the same efficiency wage cannot exist rather a continuously differentiable distribution of wages will be offered in equilibrium we demonstrate this equilibrium by construction and derive it explicitly in the case of a uniform distribution of the effort aversion parameter

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

a model of competition between unemployed and employed job searchers an application to the unemployment outflow rate in britain this paper proposes a model to explain the allocation of new jobs to workers the central innovation is the analysis of the competition for jobs between employed and unemployed job searchers it is argued that the endogeneity of the fraction of the employed engaging in search is a crucial determinant of the unemployment outflow rate the model is applied to the unemployment outflow rate in britain the model fits the data well and encompasses its main rival copyright 1993 by royal economic society

raiding opportunities and unemployment this article studies the impact of raiding opportunities in a labor market in which worker abilities differ recruiting firms can either raid an elsewhere employed worker of known ability by bidding up his wage or go through costly search to find a good worker among the unemployed in equilibrium all types of workers experience unemployment high ability workers involuntarily the raiding opportunities give rise to involuntary unemployment without changing the basic properties of the competitive model and thus suggest new implications of various institutional parameters on unemployment in particular unemployment compensation minimum wages wage taxation and search requirements

involuntary layoffs in a model with asymmetric information concerning worker ability this paper examines the contract between a risk neutral firm and its risk averse employees assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm such as the number of workers it lays off the threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels a seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

selling procedures with private information and common values the seller posted price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies we analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common value elements in a model of two sided private information we characterize the fully revealing perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller we also characterize equilibrium behavior under two other pricing procedures a sealed bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism finally we examine the efficiency of these procedures and show that as the degree of common values increases fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained

theory ahead of language in the economics of unemployment this paper discusses from the perspective of modern theories of unemployment several unemployment concepts that have been used over the years it argues that many of these concepts are of limited value and are dominated by a few simple concepts that are basic in the analysis of stochastic general equilibrium models

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

excessive labour raiding final version received 24 july 2006 labour raiding refers to rms recruiting and hiring employed workers the literature on labour raidingsupports the idea that raiding sorts workers into their most productive positions i present a model wherean outside rm decides whether or not to pay to learn the match quality of an employed worker and theemployer decides whether or not to pay its worker a high wage that pre empts the raiding i show that theemployer may pay a low wage and gamble that it will not be raided rather than use a pre emptive wage this leads to an excessive amount of raiding

competing for talents abstract two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking the peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership equilibrium is asymmetric with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per rank high quality agents are present in both organizations while low quality agents receive no resources from either organization and are segregated by quality into the two organizations a stronger peer effect increases the competition for high quality agents resulting in both organizations concentrating their resources on fewer ranks with steeper increases in resources per rank and yields a greater equilibrium difference in average quality between the two organizations

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

competition between employed and unemployed job applicants swedish evidence we use the swedish applicant database to investigate empirically whether being unemployed per se reduces the probability of getting contacted by a firm all searchers looking for a new job are invited to submit their personal details to this database over the internet since we have access to exactly the same information as the firms we can minimize the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity our results show that an unemployed applicant faces a lower contact probability than an otherwise identical employed applicant thus supporting the notion that firms view employment status as a signal of productivity

prospect theory and liquidation decisions we solve a liquidation problem for an agent with preferences consistent with the prospect theory of kahneman and tversky econometrica 47 1979 263 291 we find that the agent is willing to hold a risky project with a relatively inferior sharpe ratio if the project is currently making losses and intends to liquidate it when it breaks even on the other hand the agent may liquidate a project with a relatively superior sharpe ratio if its current profits rise or drop to the break even point our results capture the spirit of the disposition effect and the break even effect documented in empirical and experimental studies

efficiency wage models of unemployment keynesian economists hold it to be self evident that business cycles are characterized by involuntary unemployment but construction of a model of the cycle with involuntary unemployment faces the obvious difficulty of explaining why the labor market does not clear involuntarily unemployed people by definition want to work at less than the going wage rate why don t firms cut wages thereby increasing profits

public finance solutions to the european unemployment problem public finance solutions a tax shift away from low paid labour may fight unemployment unemployment in europe is heavily concentrated among low skilled workers it has therefore been suggested that structural unemployment could be reduced by shifting the tax burden away from low skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services which are intensive in the use of such labour this paper finds that a tax shift away from low paid labour may raise aggregate employment and welfare but only if wage formation is sufficiently responsive to changing tax incentives the analysis also suggests that non negligible employment and welfare gains could be reaped by offering tax concessions or subsidies to those parts of the consumer service sector which compete most directly with low productivity home production and with underground economic activity peter birch sorensen

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

learning to reoptimize consumption at new income levels a rationale for prospect theory this paper provides a theoretical rationale for three experimental results of prospect theory risk preferences are over gains and losses loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity we consider a boundedly rational decision maker who does not e nd her new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when she is faced with a new income level this alters her indirect utility function and makes her more risk averse at her current reference income level and less risk averse for a range of incomes below her reference income level jel d11

breeding and raiding a theory of strategic production of skills abstract some of the skills that firms require are obtained only through on the job training this paper concentrates on the strategic production of skills within the firm firms obtain high quality workers either by training their own breeding or by using the open market to bid away workers trained by other firms raiding even when all firms have access to the same technology of production training and breeding it will typically be the case that both breeding and raiding will be pursued with equal profitability in equilibrium thus we explain raiding behavior as part of an equilibrium theory this paper also studies the effect of the decision to train workers on the optimal firm size and the distribution of income

improving incentives in unemployment insurance a review of recent research abstract this paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved we are particularly concerned with three instruments i e the duration of benefit payments or more generally the time sequencing of benefits monitoring in conjunction with sanctions and workfare our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid a growing number of empirical studies including randomized experiments are in line with this conclusion