truthful bundle multiunit double auctions we address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers each buyer demands some bundle s of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity to design truthful double auction mechanisms we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget to the best of our knowledge this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy proof individually rational budget balanced and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment furthermore these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle single unit mechanisms with higher efficiency lower buying prices and higher selling prices

non monotonic effects of market concentration on prices for residential solar photovoltaics in the united states abstract emerging renewable energy markets may become more concentrated over time as the most efficient firms accumulate market share the effects of this market concentration on prices are tested using a rich dataset of residential solar photovoltaic pv systems in the united states a novel hypothesis is explored that the effects of market concentration may be non monotonic prices may decline in market concentration due to efficiency gains associated with returns to scale but increase in concentration in already concentrated markets due to increasing market power the results of an econometric model provide evidence to support the non monotonic hypothesis however the data suggest that the relationship between prices and firm scale is nuanced and that both large and small scale pv installers may wield efficiency advantages

pricing in multiple item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost in a sealed bid multiple item procurement auction bidders may incur a fixed cost which is common to all items the paper develops pricing methods which ensure that a preset percentage profit level is always realized and the fixed cost is completely recovered even if the eventual order is for some of the items at reduced quantities one approach sets constraints and determines acceptable orders another alternative is to provide appropriate discounts finally a third method considers fixed prices and imposes constraints that address the exposure problem of recovering the fixed cost these methods may also be used for pricing combinatorial auctions

a disaggregated structural analysis of retirement by race difficulty of work and health intergroup differences in retirement rates by race major occupation and health status are examined and allocated to differences in budget sets and indifference curve parameters in addition comparisons indicate that average retirement rates for groups may at times be misleading indicators of marginal responses to incentives it is predicted that all groups will respond to the work incentives in the 1983 social security amendments even those ill health and difficult jobs and the resulting increases in earnings are predicted to amount to from one sixth to over one half of the reductionin lifetime benefits created by the amendments this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the winner s curse experiments with buyers and with sellers this paper explores the winner s curse phenomena as it was studied experimentally by kagel and levin experiments with the winner s curse are complicated by the fact that subjects can lose money and the experimenter has only a limited means of collecting it from them thus subjects enjoy only limited liability which has theoretical implications for behavior in the kagel and levin experiments subjects were removed from the bidders competition after losses reached a predetermined value this experimental procedure has unknown implications for the results so ambiguity exists about whether the winner s curse was actually observed in this study their results were replicated in an environment in which subjects were not removed the case in which competitors are sellers is also studied bankruptcy cannot be a problem in sellers competition in both cases the winner s curse is observed thus the limited liability cannot be an explanation for the phenomenon reported by kagel and levin in addition the paper examines the bidding behavior of all individuals and shows that this behavior does not fit any of the tested theories either on the aggregate or individual level the winner s curse did not disappear over time during the conduct of the research

second sourcing and the experience curve price competition in defense procurement we examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve asymmetric cost information and the availability of a higher cost alternative system we model acquisition as a two stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production we characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information when high costs are revealed these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

how do retirement tests affect the labour supply of older men abstract we analyze the sequential elimination of retirement earnings tests from canada s public pension plans our empirical framework potentially overcomes the obstacles encountered analyzing the tests within the context of a national social security system our results indicate that the removal of the tests were associated with relatively large shifts from part year full time to full year full time work we are unable to reconcile these results within the context of a traditional labour supply model instead they are consistent with a model which incorporates fixed costs of work or labour market rigidities which preclude continuous reductions in labour supply around retirement

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

ces production functions and economic growth we examine inconsistencies and controversies related to the use of ces production functions in growth models first we show that not all variants of ces functions commonly used are consistently specified second using a simple growth model we find that a higher elasticity of substitution leads to a higher steady state and makes the emergence of permanent growth more probable it is also pointed out that the effect of a higher elasticity of substitution on the speed of convergence depends on the relative scarcity of the factors of production finally we discuss possible explanations of variations in the elasticity of substitution jel classification o41 o11

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

protecting the winner second price versus oral auctions abstract in oral auctions unlike sealed bid second price auctions the winner never reveals his reservation price we investigate bidders strategies in the two auctions when third parties can exploit information revealed by the auction when exploitation is likely oral auctions are more efficient than sealed bid second price auctions and preferred by all participants

the dynamics of hours worked and technology the response of hours worked to technology shocks in the postwar us economy has increased over time we offer a structural interpretation of this important time varying macroeconomic moment the time varying patterns captured by a structural var are consistent with those obtained from a parsimonious rbc model with a less than unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labour the observed changes in the response of hours are attributable to increases in the magnitude of the degree of capital labour substitution finally we conjecture that the observed time variation in is related to changes in the skill composition of the work force and biases in technological change

new evidence on earnings and benefit claims following changes in the retirement earnings test in 2000 abstract this paper examines the labor force activity and timing of benefit claims of workers aged 65 69 in response to the removal of the retirement earnings test in 2000 we use the 1 sample of longitudinal social security administrative data that covers the period from 4 years before to 4 years after the removal of the test using a reduced form quantile regression method we find that effects on earnings are limited to workers with earnings just around the test threshold and above as predicted by economic theory our estimated effects suggest that labor supply elasticities with respect to the net of tax rate are approximately 0 05 0 07 for working primary beneficiaries aged 65 69 whose earnings are between the median and the 80th percentile further results show that applications for social security benefits following the earnings test removal accelerated by 2 to 5 percentage points among individuals aged 65 69 and by 3 to 7 percentage points among those reaching age 65

in quest of the slutsky diamond the slutsky equation can be constructed as a parallelogram a diamond the area of which is proportional to the elasticity of substitution this construction permits to show immediately that demand functions become concave on an interval if the elasticity of substitution increases sufficiently also the diamond sheds light on the fact that the production level increases with the elasticity of substitution as an application the author shows that the elasticity of substitution has a direct bearing not only on the rate of growth of an economy but also on the very existence of sustained growth copyright 1989 by american economic association

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

conservation auctions should information about environmental benefits be made public most bid evaluation systems in conservation auctions consider both the proposed payment and the environmental attributes when auctioneers have a more comprehensive understanding of the conservation benefits than bidders do information becomes a central element of the auction design concealing information about conservation benefits may be the optimal strategy when entry decisions are not relevant however disclosing information may motivate landholders whose lands are associated with high environmental benefits to participate in an auction the present study demonstrates that revealing information about conservation benefits can be an optimal strategy if it enhances an auction s participation rate when bid acceptance rates are high copyright 2013 oxford university press

revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders an important managerial question is the choice of the pricing rule we study whether this choice depends on the uncertainty about the number of participating bidders by comparing expected revenues under discriminatory and uniform pricing within an auction model with affiliated values stochastic number of bidders and linear bidding strategies we show that if uncertainty about the number of bidders is substantial then the discriminatory pricing generates higher expected revenues than the uniform pricing in particular the first price auction might generate higher revenues than the second price auction therefore uncertainty about the number of bidders is an important factor to consider when choosing the pricing rule we also study whether eliminating this uncertainty i e revealing the number of bidders is in the seller s interests and discuss the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium

two level ces production technology in the solow and diamond growth models the two level ces aggregate production function that nests a ces into another ces function has recently been used extensively in theoretical and empirical applications of macroeconomics this paper examines its theoretical properties and establishes existence and stability conditions of equilibria under the solow and diamond growth models in addition it examines the efiect of changes in substitution parameters on transitional growth and steady states it is shown that in the solow model the su cient condition for a steady state is fulfllled for a larger range of substitution parameter values than with the basic ces function in the diamond model an increase in substitution parameters results in higher transitional growth under weaker conditions than with the basic ces function

implicit cost allocation and bidding for contracts the question of how or even whether indirect costs should be allocated for pricing decisions has been controversial and unresolved this paper takes a step toward answering this question by examining the special case of a firm that must incur incremental fixed costs to complete any or all of the several projects for which it is submitting simultaneous bids an independent private values bidding model is employed to endogenously determine an optimal cost allocation we term such a cost allocation implicit the optimal implicit fixed cost allocation is shown to fully allocate fixed costs ex ante although the fixed costs may be under over or exactly allocated ex post

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

joint bidding in the name your own price channel a strategic analysis in this paper we study the name your own price nyop channel we examine theoretically and empirically whether asking consumers to place a joint bid for multiple items rather than bid one item at a time as practiced today can increase nyop retailers profits relatedly we also examine whether allowing consumers to self select whether to place a joint bid or itemwise bids increases retailers profits and consumers surplus we construct a dynamic model that incorporates both demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty to address these issues our theoretical analysis identifies the conditions under which joint bidding can increase both nyop retailers profits and consumers surplus we find that some consumers might bid more for the very same items when they place joint bids the increase in bid amount is related to the fact that joint bidding reduces the chance of mismatch between nyop retailers costs and consumer bids we conducted a laboratory study to assess the descriptive validity of some of the

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

reserves regret and rejoicing in open english auctions auction sellers usually must set a reserve which is the lowest auction price that they will accept i propose that anticipated regret and rejoicing affect reserves regret occurs when the highest bid exceeds the seller s value for the property but is still below the reserve rejoicing occurs when the reserve forces the winning bidder to pay a higher price the impact of regret and rejoicing can be observed by examining sellers learning over sequential auctions particularly when they use a frequency heuristic results from an auction experiment with simulated bidders support the impact of anticipated regret and rejoicing on reserves

economic growth and the elasticity of substitution two theorems and some suggestions at the beginning of the twentieth century the work of the swedish economist knut wicksell 1901 marked an important advance in our understanding of the relationship between the structure of production functions and income distribution wicksell had asked the following question among many others suppose that the marginal productivities are equal to the remuneration rates of each factor what then should be the form of the corresponding production function he pointed out p 125 that the general integral of the partial differential equation implied by this relationship was of the form y lf kil which meant in turn that the product y was necessarily a homogeneous of degree one function of capital k and labor l as an example he gave a function where the shares of k and l in y were constant and wrote down the function which would be rediscovered decades later by charles w cobb and paul h douglas 1928 however it is only half a century later in robert m solow s nobel prize winning 1956 essay that implications between the structure of the production function and long run equilibrium or disequilibrium of the economy were drawn in his classic article a contribution to the theory of economic growth solow had considered three cases analytically other cases were also discussed geometrically using a phase diagram he had labeled the two first cases 1hlarrod domar and cobb douglas respectively and he referred to the third type of production function as offering a bit of variety it was y ak 2 l 2 2 a particular case of y akp lp 1p in those early days solow had not pointed out to the reader that his cases could have been numbered 0 1 and 2 following the elasticity of substitution of the corresponding production function it would be only five years later in 1961 that with his coauthors kenneth j arrow et al he would find the general form of the two factor constant elasticity of substitution ces production function by integrating the differential equation corresponding to the observed relationship between output per capita and the wage rate solow s third case was indeed highly interesting since it allowed the possibility of everincreasing income per head even without any technical progress indeed solow showed that due to the efficiency of the system entailed by the particular production function he had chosen there existed a threshold for the savings rates s to generate investment per head large enough for income per head to grow forever that threshold was s nla2 where n is the growth rate of the population it was then natural to ask whether one could express that threshold in terms of the elasticity of substitution a the value of that threshold was determined by de la grandville 1989 to be equal to s no3 or where a is k s coefficient in a normalized ces function equal to a in solow s third case where u 2 for any s and n values this relationship gives also the threshold value in implicit form by the solution of ao1 1 log 3q or ilog nls by totally differentiating the last relationship one could observe that the threshold for the elasticity of substitution to entail ever sustained growth was an in klump faculty of mathematics and economics university of ulm helmholtzstrasse 20 d 89081 ulm germany de la grandville department of economics university of geneva 102 boulevard carl vogt ch 1211 geneva 4 switzerland we gratefully acknowledge the comments of seminar participants at stanford university and at the universities of stuttgart hohenheim and munich where parts of the paper were presented also we would like to thank without implicating in any way robert solow for his insightful remarks and an anonymous referee for very helnfuil supgestions wicksell cobb and douglas would no doubt burst with pride if they knew that one of our first year students wrote in a paper of his of course we recognize here a kirk douglas production function

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

on optimal reservation prices in auctions the theory of auction design examines how various factors affect the outcome of an auction most of the existing literature focuses on how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects the bid taker s expected revenue when all other factors remain constant this paper studies how the bid taker s expected revenue varies with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number of bidders and in turn the bidders maximum value for the object being sold specifically we examine how varying the reservation price or screening level affects the bid taker s expected revenue though its effect on the number of bidders for two simple examples the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any benefits that nontrivial reservation prices might have had in models with an exogonously set number of bidders

auctions with bidder determined allowable combinations abstract combinatorial auctions are desirable as they enable bidders to express the synergistic values of a group of assets and thus may lead to better allocations compared to other types of auctions they keep bidders from being exposed to risks of receiving only parts of combinations that would be valuable to them or from being overly cautious in order to minimize such risks however computation time needed to determine the set of optimal winning combinations in a general combinatorial auction may grow exponentially as the auction size increases and this is sometimes given as a reason for not using combinatorial auctions to determine the winning allocation in a reasonable time a bid taker might try to limit the kinds of allowable combinations but bidders may disagree on what combinations should be allowed and this may make limiting the allowable combinations politically infeasible this paper proposes and tests successfully a new approach to managing the computational complexity of determining the set of winning combinations the main idea is to let bidders themselves determine and prioritize the allowable combinations using bidder determined combinations has two nice properties first by delegating the decision on what is biddable to the bidders who know what combinations are important to them the bid taker is able to be and appear fair second since bidders know their economics and have the incentive to get important combinations included bidder prioritization of combinations will tend to assure that the most economically important combinations are included in determining the winning set of bids if the bid taker is not able to consider all of the combinations submitted by bidders the proposed auction process is useful in situations such as government auctions in which the bid taker is reluctant to limit the allowable combinations

steady state growth and the elasticity of substitution in a neoclassical economy with endogenous capital and labor augmenting technical change the steady state growth rate of output per worker is shown to increase in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor this confirms the assessment of klump and de la grandville 2000 that the elasticity of substitution is a powerful engine of economic growth however unlike their findings my result applies to the steady state growth rate moreover it does not hinge on particular assumptions on how aggregate savings come about it holds for any household sector allowing savings to grow at the same rate as aggregate output

explicating factors for companies inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management an exploratory study in germany abstract the literature on corruption is rich in works focusing on individual and organizational aspects however existing research is void in studies that specifically deal with factors for a company s inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management the present paper fills this gap by explicating why some firms are more prone to corruption than others within this context it is our objective to explore the structural and organizational bases for companies especially their purchasing units to engage in corrupt business practices grounding our work in principal agent theory and the fraud triangle we suggest that the factors of organizational complexity corporate culture internationality and functional complexity all influence a firm s inclination towards corruption which in turn should manifest itself in the presence or absence of corruption control and prevention mechanisms this framework is tested with data collected from 104 purchasing managers in germany and implications for both theory and practice are highlighted

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

modeling and analysis of an auction based logistics market we consider a logistics spot market where the transportation orders from a number of firms are matched with two types of carriers through a reverse auction in the spot market local carriers compete with in transit carriers that have lower costs in order to analyze the effects of implementing a logistics spot market on these three parties firms local carriers and in transit carriers and also the effects of various system parameters we develop a two stage stochastic model we first model the auction in a static setting and determine the expected auction price based on the number of carriers engaging in the auction and their cost distributions we then develop a continuous time markov chain model to evaluate the performance of the system in a dynamic setting with random arrivals and possible abandonment of orders and carriers by combining these two models we evaluate the performance measures such as the expected auction price price paid to the carriers distribution of orders between local and in transit carriers and expected number of carriers and orders waiting at the logistics center in the long run we present analytical and computational results related to the performance of the system and discuss operation of such a logistics spot market in turkey

ex post information in auctions assumptions maskin and riley 1984 show that when the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the auctioned object is not independent of his wealth expected revenue tends to be lower under open bidding in contrast milgrom and weber 1982 relax the assumption that valuations are independent and assume instead that buyers private estimates of the item s value are affiliated a buyer with a high estimate then tends to believe that other buyers will have higher estimates as well maintaining the other assumptions milgrom and weber show that expected revenue is higher in the open ascending bid auction the intuition behind this result is that in sealed high bid auctions a buyer s bid is determined not only by his own beliefs but via their bids by the beliefs of those with lower estimates a buyer with a low estimate believes that others are more likely to have low estimates as well he therefore bids less aggressively it follows that a buyer can beat all opponents who have lower estimates with a bid which is lower than it would be if beliefs were independent 2 milgrom and weber also show that if the seller purchases and then publicly reveals information which is positively linked to buyers valuations this also raises expected gross revenue from an auction the intuition here is that this helps to reduce the difference in bidders willingness to pay 3 that such a reduction should raise expected revenue is easily understood for the limiting case in which the seller s information includes all the buyers private information for then all buyer asymmetry is eliminated and so expected buyer profit is bid away to zero the seller therefore reaps the entire surplus in the following pages the implications of correlated signals are further explored while milgrom and weber emphasized the potential gains to a seller who reveals information ex ante the focus here is on ex post information in section 2 it is shown that under weak assumptions the sealed high bid auction is dominated by any auction

allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources an experimental approach we identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply unresponsive supplies no inventories and fixed capacities and significant demand indivisibilities rigidities examples of such problems include scheduling job shops airports or supercomputers zero inventory planning and the allocation and pricing of nasa s planned space station using experimental methods we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem markets and administrative procedures can perform at very low efficiencies 60 65 efficiency in a seemingly robust example thus there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments we develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single dimensional goods these new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures

negotiation analysis a characterization and review negotiation analysis seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties it generally emphasizes the parties underlying interests as distinct from the issues on the table and the positions taken alternatives to negotiated agreement approaches to productively manage the inherent tension between competitive actions to claim value individually and cooperative ones to create value jointly as well as efforts to change perceptions of the game itself since advice to one side does not necessarily presume the full game theoretic rationality of the other side s negotiation analysts often draw on the findings of behavioral decision analysts and economists further this approach does not generally assume that all the elements of the game are common knowledge thus the negotiation analytic approach tends to de emphasize the application of game theoretic solution concepts or efforts to find unique equilibrium outcomes instead to evaluate possible strategies and

analysis and design of business to consumer online auctions business to consumer online auctions form an important element in the portfolio of mercantile processes that facilitate electronic commerce activity much of traditional auction theory has focused on analyzing single item auctions in isolation from the market context in which they take place we demonstrate the weakness of such approaches in online settings where a majority of auctions are multiunit in nature rather than pursuing a classical approach and assuming knowledge of the distribution of consumers valuations we emphasize the largely ignored discrete and sequential nature of such auctions we derive a general expression that characterizes the multiple equilibria that can arise in such auctions and segregate these into desirable and undesirable categories our analytical and empirical results obtained by tracking real world online auctions indicate that bid increment is an important factor amongst the control factors that online auctioneers can manipulate and control we show that consumer bidding strategies in such auctions are not uniform and that the level of bid increment chosen influences them with a motive of providing concrete strategic directions to online auctioneers we derive an absolute upper bound for the bid increment based on the theoretical upper bound we propose a heuristic decision rule for setting the bid increment empirical evidence lends support to the hypothesis that setting a bid increment higher than that suggested by the heuristic decision rule has a negative impact on the auctioneer s revenue

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

capital labor substitution structural change and the labor income share abstract recent work has documented declines in the labor income share in the united states and beyond this paper documents that this decline was more pronounced in manufacturing than in services in the u s and in a broad set of other industrialized economies and shows that a model with cross sectoral differences in productivity growth and in the degree of capital labor substitutability is consistent with these trends we calibrate the model exploiting additional information on the pace of structural change from manufacturing to services on which the model also has predictions we then conduct a decomposition to establish the relative importance of several potential drivers of changes in factor income shares and structural change that have been proposed in the literature this exercise reveals that differences in the degree of capital bias of technical change across sectors combined with differences in substitution possibilities are key determinants of the observed patterns

equilibria in open common value auctions abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness of nash equilibrium in second price common value auctions is identified we establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit common value auctions for the case of two bidders we provide plausible sufficient conditions under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium an example in which the auctioneer s revenue at the symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction is strictly greater than the revenue at many asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding irrevocable exit auction is provided

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

a model of auction contracts with liquidated damages abstract this paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller in the event of a default on the auction contract the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit when renegotiation is possible increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller s payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder under these conditions the seller s payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit journal of economic literature classification number d44

early claiming of social security benefits and labor supply behavior of older americans the labor supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the united states social security old age benefits program are of growing importance as the normal retirement age nra increases to 67 and the labor force participation of older americans starts to increase these incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the nra but continue to work or return to the labor force to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the nra is reached benefits received before the nra can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming consistent with these incentives estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labor force exit and claiming hazards using data from the health and retirement study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labor force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labor force

the solow model with ces technology nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity this paper examines whether nonlinearities in the aggregate production function can explain parameter heterogeneity in the solow growth regressions nonlinearities in the production technology are introduced by replacing the commonly used cobb douglas cd aggregated production specification with the more general constant elasticity of substitution ces specification we first justify our choice of production function by showing that cross country regressions favour the ces over the cd technology then by using an endogenous threshold methodology we show that the solow model with ces technology is consistent with the existence of multiple regimes copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

guarantees in auctions the auction house as negotiator and managerial decision maker the multimillion dollar price guarantees that an auction house can offer for paintings have already had a large impact on auction house profits and place new demands on the auctioneer s decision making and negotiating skills yet auctioneers have not been studied as independent entities and decision makers to create a price guarantee the auction house and the seller must negotiate both the guarantee amount and the extra commission the seller pays if the auction price exceeds the guarantee we present a normative model of negotiations and find the frontier of guarantee and commission that is the nash bargaining solution we also determine the optimal reserve that the auctioneer should place on guaranteed property we find that guarantees decrease the auction house s expected revenue compared to a conventional auction but do allow it to attract business which might otherwise be lost guarantees benefit sellers increasing the expected value and lowering the variance of their auction revenue the auctioneer s optimal strategy depends not only on the distribution of the artwork s auction price but also the price it will bring if it fails to sell at auction in the latter case the auction house must pay the seller the guarantee and then sell the artwork which it now owns in a private secondary market where buyers regard the property as damaged goods and lower their offers although all points on the frontier produce equal expected revenue several frequently used decision making rules suggest that both parties may prefer a guarantee arrangement where the seller pays no additional commission and the guarantee has the lowest value on the frontier

economic growth technical change biases and the elasticity of substitution a test of the de la grandville hypothesis a recent development in microeconomic theory suggests that the size of the elasticity of substitution between factors is relevant to economic growth this study undertakes an empirical investigation of this proposition comparing two economies the united states and south korea the authors test results support the de la grandville hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution is a potent explanatory variable of economic growth this inquiry also provides a clue to the puzzle that the u s elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is well below unity whereas that of south korea is close to unity nonetheless the u s factor shares have tended to remain fairly stable whereas the distributive shares of south korea seem to have changed in favor of capital their findings indicate that a high elasticity of substitution is a bad signal for the distribution of income under the paradigm of modern technology copyright 1991 by mit press

withdrawable bids as winner s curse insurance when bidders have a common value or strongly affiliated values for an object or contract being auctioned by sealed bids it is possible that the maker of a rational and apparently winning bid would upon learning the competing bids prefer losing the auction to honoring his bid the ability to withdraw a bid perhaps at a cost in such circumstances provides a form of winner s curse insurance bidding with such insurance is analyzed obtaining the general condition for rational bid withdrawal and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with more aggressive bidding next we define a compensation penalties bid withdrawal penalty scheme and show that with it the bid taker is better off on the average than if bid withdrawal is impossible finally we find equilibrium bidding and withdrawal strategies in a multiplicative model as a function of the magnitude of the bid withdrawal penalty and of the bid taker s likelihood after a withdrawal of honoring the second best bid this model has

endogenous aggregate elasticity of substitution abstract in the literature studying aggregate economies the aggregate elasticity of substitution aes between capital and labor is often treated as a constant or deep parameter this view contrasts with the conjecture put forward by arrow et al 1961 capital labor substitution and economic efficiency review of economics and statistics 43 225 250 that aes evolves over time and changes with the process of economic development this paper evaluates this conjecture in a simple dynamic multi sector growth model in which aes is endogenously determined our findings support the conjecture and in particular demonstrate that aes tends to be positively related to the state of economic development a result consistent with recent empirical findings

privatization as an agency problem auctions versus private negotiations abstract this paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization options our objective is to explain the striking diversity of mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently sub optimal privatization mechanism private negotiations we develop a simple model in which privatization is to be carried out by a government agent who plays favorites among bidders but is potentially disciplined by losing his private benefits of staying in office if the political environment is such that the privatization agent himself aims at raising the fair value for the company then privatization auctions and private negotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues if however political considerations distort the agent s incentives it may be that a seemingly transparent auction will raise less revenue than opaque private negotiations we also show that information disclosure laws may have negative welfare implications they may help the privatization agent to collude with some of the bidders to the disadvantage of non colluding bidders

iterative combinatorial auctions with bidder determined combinations in combinatorial auctions multiple distinct items are sold simultaneously and a bidder may place a single bid on a set package of distinct items the determination of packages for bidding is a nontrivial task and existing efficient formats require that bidders know the set of packages and or their valuations in this paper we extend an efficient ascending combinatorial auction mechanism to use approximate single item pricing the single item prices in each round are derived from a linear program that is constructed to reflect the current allocation of packages introduction of approximate single item prices allows for endogenous bid determination where bidders can discover packages that were not included in the original bid set due to nonconvexities single item prices may not exist that are exact marginal values we show that the use of approximate single item prices with endogenous bidding always produces allocations that are at least as efficient as those from bidding with a fixed set of packages based on package pricing a network resource allocation example is given that illustrates the benefits of our endogenous bidding mechanism

the effect of the social security earnings test on male labor supply new evidence from survey and administrative data despite numerous empirical studies there is surprisingly little agreement about whether the social security earnings test affects male labor supply in this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of the labor supply effects of the earnings test using longitudinal administrative earnings data and more commonly used survey data we find that the response to the earnings test in survey data is obfuscated by measurement error and labor market rigidities accounting for these factors our results suggest a consistent and substantial response to the earnings test especially for younger men

slow dutch auctions theorists have long believed that dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to standard sealed bidding however in recent controlled experiments with actual dutch and sealed bid internet auctions of collectibles the dutch auctions produced significantly more revenue we believe that this happened in part because the internet dutch auctions are a slow process in which bidders incur incremental transaction costs if they delay bidding this paper presents models of slow dutch auctions that include these costs and explain this belief we first present a decision theoretic model of a slow dutch auction while simple the decision theoretic model is fairly general and provides the basic intuition underlying our revenue results we then develop a game theoretic model of a slow dutch auction we derive two symmetric payoff equivalent equilibria of the game in the absence of a cost of return and then consider the more general case of costly return when the cost of return is in an appropriate range the seller s expected revenue is an increasing function of that cost

sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects abstract we show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values prices will on average have a downwards trend

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

on the output effects of barriers to trade we study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a hecksher ohlin trade model into an optimal growth framework the model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity furthermore there is a selective development trap to which countries may or may not converge depending on policy income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase hence cross country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per capita income observed across countries the effects are quantified and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of tfp and long run income differentials across countries we study the effects of international trade policy on output to do so we analyze a standard neoclassical growth model where countries can trade intermediate goods the markets of these goods are structured as in the also standard hecksher ohlin trade model thus trade happens owing to comparative advantage which emerges from differences in factor endowments across countries 2 we focus on the case of a small price taking economy one can solve for equilibrium sequentially first each period s output and trade can be treated as a static problem and its solution can be summarized by a mapping from capital and labor to the output of the final good then using that endogenous mapping as if it were an exogenous production function one can solve the intertemporal decisions of agents in the economy in that way a potentially complex dynamic trade problem is avoided it turns out that the equilibrium mapping linking inputs and final output is affected by tariffs as the gains from trade impact not only welfare but also the availability and price of intermediate inputs and hence productivity

what determines the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor a literature review this paper provides the first comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor our focus is on the two input constant elasticity of substitution ces production function we start by presenting four concise observations that summarize the empirical literature on the estimation of motivated by these observations the main part of this survey then focuses on potential determinants of capital labor substitution we first review several approaches to the microfoundation of production functions where the elasticity of substitution eos is treated as a purely technological parameter second we outline the construction of an aggregate elasticity of substitution aes in a multi sectoral framework and investigate its dependence on underlying intra and inter sectoral substitution third we discuss the influence of the institutional framework on the extent of factor substitution overall this survey highlights that the effective elasticity of substitution ees which is typically estimated in empirical studies is generally not an immutable deep parameter but depends on a multitude of technological non technological and institutional determinants based on these insights the final section identifies a number of potential empirical and theoretical avenues for future research

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

the 1983 social security reforms and labor supply adjustments of older individuals in the long run a structural life cycle retirement model with an improved specification over previous models is used to analyze and compare the long run effects on the labor supply of older workers of the 1983 social security reforms the effects of separate provisions from the 1983 amendments are examined these include the raising of the normal retirement age to 67 the increase in the delayed retirement credit to 8 and the lowering of the reduction rate for earnings over the test amount to 1 00 for every 3 00 of earnings

a structural retirement model the life cycle model analyzed here constrains most work on the main job to be full time partial retirement entails a wage reduction and frequently a job change maximum likelihood estimates of utility function parameters are designed to incorporate information on the age of leaving full time work and the age of full retirement the model closely tracks retirement behavior including peaks in retirement activity at 62 and 65 the paper explores the relation of these peaks to nonlinearities in the budget constraint created by various retirement programs policy analyses based on this and on earlier models with simpler structures are compared the retirement choice is one of the more prominent manifestations of life cycle behavior the decision is the result of an interplay between an individual s preferences and a set of incentives which change in complicated ways as the individual progresses through his or her late 50 s and 60 s the purpose of this study is to formulate and estimate a structural model which incorporates in a fundamental way this interplay between lifetime preferences and incentives and to illustrate how such a model may be used to investigate retirement behavior a structural model of this type is essential for analyzing potential policy changes which can be expected to affect incentives in varying ways over a number of years in the life cycle the current study incorporates two structural features which have frequently been omitted from previous studies first the model requires that an individual who wishes to reduce work effort below full time must accept a reduced hourly wage rate in order to do so this reflects empirical evidence from micro data sets which indicates that around one third of older individuals engage in part time work at one time or another and that regardless of whether or not these older workers change jobs to obtain part time work they usually take wage cuts as compared to their previous full time work 2 the fact that an individual is willing to accept a lower wage rate in return for the opportunity to work fewer than full time hours contains important information about the preferences of the

factor substitution and factor augmenting technical progress in the united states a normalized supply side system approach abstract using a normalized ces function with factor augmenting technical progress we estimate a supply side system of the u s economy from 1953 to 1998 avoiding potential estimation biases that

split awards procurement and innovation in many procurement settings it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers in this article we develop a model of split award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous we characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing agents in an environment in which suppliers are fully informed about each other s costs split award equilibria simultaneously exhibit strong collusive features and cost efficiency properties despite the former property of the equilibria upstream investment considerations may lead a buyer to prefer a split award auction format to a winner take all auction format

on the robustness of non linear personalized price combinatorial auctions abstract though the vcg auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature there are a number of reasons for favoring iterative combinatorial auctions icas several promising ica formats were developed based on primal dual and subgradient algorithms prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution ibundle 3 dvsv and ascending proxy auction result in vcg payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies buyer submodularity and bidders bid straightforward which is an ex post nash equilibrium in this case ibea and creditdebit auctions do not even require the buyer submodularity and achieve the same properties for general valuations often however one cannot assume straightforward bidding and it is not clear from the theory how these non linear personalized price auctions nlppas perform in this case robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is a critical issue for any application we conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of nlppas with respect to different bidding strategies and valuation models we compare nlppas with the vcg auction and with icas with linear prices such as alps and the combinatorial clock auction while nlppas performed very well in case of straightforward bidding we observe problems with revenue efficiency and speed of convergence when bidders deviate

changing the social security rules for work after 65 this paper simulates the effects of proposed changes in the social security rules including the elimination of the retirement earnings test for men who work after normal retirement age a policy change that was given serious consideration by the social security administration in 1988 89 and that is similar to other proposals made in congress and elsewhere since then is projected to raise long run costs by 43 billion net of taxes and to induce an increase of 3 5 in the number of full time male workers between the ages of 65 and 69 the outcome especially in the short run is greatly affected by the timing of workers decisions to apply for benefits