bidding behavior at sequential first price auctions with out supply uncertainty a laboratory analysis abstract we report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on bidding behavior and prices in sequential first price auctions with private independent values and unit demands supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold i e the length of the sequence we observe an important overbidding in all but the last stage of a sequence no matter whether supply is certain and a non monotone behavior when supply is certain yet the data qualitatively support most stage to stage bid predictions and the price trend predictions for risk neutral bidders

how to set minimum acceptable bids with an application to real estate auctions in a general auction model with affiliated signals common components to valuations and endogenous entry we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price this lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods we illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions

sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk decreasing and increasing price sequences a large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds this article introduces a tractable form of risk aversion called aversion to price risk and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk when there are informational externalities there is a countervailing effect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction even if bidder s signals are independent the article shows how to decompose the effect of aversion to price risk from the effect of informational externalities

the probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties this paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently the empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price reserve and opening bid the findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself factors such as auction participation the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications

optimal growth with many consumers abstract a method is described for constructing all pareto optimal allocations for a dynamic economy with many heterogeneous consumers under certainty in which both the technology and consumer preferences are recursive but preferences need not be additively separable over time optimal perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are obtained through the study of a dynamic program for an economy with one consumption good sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a unique interior stationary distribution of consumption and wealth for a two person exchange economy sufficient conditions are given for the global asymptotic stability of the unique interior stationary point

on the equilibrium properties of locational sorting models abstract important to many models of location choice is the role of local interactions or spillovers whereby the payoffs from choosing a location depend in part on the number or attributes of other individuals or firms that choose the same or nearby locations in equilibrium this paper develops the equilibrium properties of a broadly applicable and readily estimable class of sorting models that allow location decisions to depend on both fixed local attributes including unobserved attributes and local interactions describes the conditions under which equilibria exist and are unique and provides a test for uniqueness in empirical analyses of sorting equilibrium

sequential auctions price trends and risk preferences abstract we analyze sequential auctions in a general environment where bidders are heterogeneous in risk exposures and exhibit non quasilinear utilities we derive a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium for the sequential dutch and vickrey auctions respectively with an arbitrary number of identical objects for sale when bidders are risk averse preferring the equilibrium price sequences must be downward upward drifting the declining price anomaly is thus evidence of bidder risk aversion in this general environment these results derive from a key assumption that bidders marginal utilities are log supermodular in payment and type

meta analysis in model implementation choice sets and the valuation of air quality improvements this research illustrates how the methods developed for meta analysis can serve to document and summarize voluminous information derived from repeated sensitivity analyses our application is to the sensitivity of welfare estimates derived from discrete choice models to assumptions about the choice set these assumptions affect welfare estimates through both the estimated parameters of the model and conditional on the parameters the substitution among alternatives in our specific application the evaluation is in terms of estimated benefits of air quality improvements in los angeles based on discrete choices of neighborhood and housing copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

congestion games with player specific payoff functions a class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described the payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the

winner s curse without overbidding abstract we report the results of a series of second price auction experiments where each bidder s signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error while bidders values differ in one treatment they are the same in another which allows for a direct test of the winner s curse irrespective of confounding factors bidders may also fall prey to a news curse when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated we find that the effects of the winner s curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion

testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions this paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in new jersey at the auction every unit was hammered down but unknown to the 2 348 registered bidders 40 of the sales fell through prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiations resulted in identical units selling for 13 less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units hammered down early in the auction these results are inconsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of common value auctions and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a winner s curse which generated considerable profit for the seller this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from ano this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a model of anonymous influence with anti conformist agents we study a stochastic model of anonymous influence with conformist and anti conformist individuals each agent with a yes or no initial opinion on a certain issue can change his opinion due to social influence we consider anonymous influence which depends on the number of agents having a certain opinion but not on their identity an individual is conformist anti conformist if his probability of saying yes increases decreases with the number of yes agents in order to consider a society in which both conformists and anti conformists co exist we investigate a generalized aggregation mechanism based on ordered weighted averages additionally every agent has a coefficient of conformism which is a real number in 1 1 with negative positive values corresponding to anti conformists conformists the two extreme values 1 and 1 represent a pure anti conformist and a pure conformist respectively and the remaining values so called mixed agents we consider two kinds of a society without mixed agents and with mixed agents who play randomly either as conformists or anti conformists for both cases of the model we deliver a qualitative analysis of convergence i e find all absorbing classes and conditions for their occurence

pure strategy nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities abstract this paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with positive externality which admit a pure strategy nash equilibrium since in general a nash equilibrium may fail to exist in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium we impose two additional assumptions anonymity and order preservation the proof of our main result is carried out by constructing for a given game g a potential function over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of yields a nash equilibrium in pure strategies of g journal of economics literature classification numbers c72 d62 h73

the declining price anomaly in dutch dutch rose auctions in symmetric independent private value auctions of a single object with risk neutral bidders the english second price auction has strategic simplicity it is optimal for bidders to reveal their valuation of the object and make bids accordingly in that case the auction is won by the person with the highest valuation who pays a price equal to the second highest valuation in a dutch first price auction this simplicity vanishes here winning bidders have to pay their bid to make a profit they shade their bids and bid below their valuation of the object somewhat loosely one may state that an english auction is truth revealing whereas a dutch auction requires strategic behavior the simple structure of the one unit english auction vanishes if two identical objects are auctioned sequentially now in the first round it is optimal for bidders to shade their bids to account for the option value of participating in the subsequent second round robert j weber 1983 bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher option value therefore they shade their bids in the first round by a greater amount than do bidders with a lower valuation as the auction proceeds the number of bidders decreases over the sequence of auctions the number of objects decreases as well the first fact has a negative effect on the competition for an object and the second has a positive effect both effects cancel out and prices follow a martingale as a result all gains to waiting are arbitraged away and the expected prices in both rounds are the same the latter result also holds for sequential auctions of more than two objects and does not depend on whether the auction is english or dutch this neat theoretical result is not supported by empirical research which usually finds price declines orley ashenfelter 1989 found a mild price decrease in sequential auctions of identical units of wine mcafee and daniel vincent 1993 also present empirical evidence on sequential wine auctions they found that on average the second unit of wine was sold at a price 1 4 percent lower than the price of the first unit victor ginsburgh 1998 uses data from wine auctions in which the auctioneer acted as an agent for bidders who were not present at the auction he found price declines but apparently the absent bidders entered bids that did not fit with the theory empirical studies by ashenfelter and david genesove 1992 see also jean jacques laffont 1997 and alan beggs and kathryn graddy 1997 concern heterogeneous objects they also detected price declines because of the contradiction between theory and empirical studies the declining price phenomenon is regarded to be an anomaly

sequential auctions theory and evidence from the seattle fur exchange we develop a model that incorporates salient features of the seattle fur exchange identical lots of furs are auctioned sequentially bids must be raised by specified increments and the winner of a lot has the privilege of beginning the bidding on the subsequent lot predictions of the theory are consistent with the data revenue implications of the theory are also explored

a multinomial choice model of neighborhood effects this paper provides a model of individual decisionmaking in the presence of neighborhood effects by neighborhood effects we refer to interdependencies between individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of others within a common neighborhood as such neighborhood effects are forms of social interactions in fact the terms would seem to be interchangeable in many contexts within economics there has developed an increasing recognition that neighborhood effects play a possibly major role in explaining a range of individual behaviors rich empirical and theoretical literatures have developed a failing of much of this work is the absence of strong connections between theory and empirics this paper addresses this limitation by providing a model of multinomial choice with neighborhood effects the model represents a generalization of the binary choice model of william brock and steven durlauf 2001a b the model is econometrically implementable and so has the potential of allowing for structural estimation of neighborhood effects section i outlines a basic choice model with neighborhood effects section ii specializes the structure using a multinomial logit framework section iii considers econometric implementation section iv discusses some limitations of the framework and proposes some research directions proofs of all theorems may be found in brock and durlauf 2001c

estimating ethnic preferences using ethnic housing quotas in singapore there are many policies around the world aimed at integrating groups gender ethnic national in education employment immigration and housing in the case of housing since prices may not internalize externalities in residential location choices we need to know preferences for welfare analysis this paper estimates people s taste for living with own ethnic groups ethnic preferences using unique policy variation from the ethnic housing quotas in singapore my approach combines policy induced variation commonly used in reduced form settings with a non parametric identi cation strategy in a structural demand estimation framework a la berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 i nd that all groups have strong preferences to live with at least some other

second best taxation as a game second best theory usually lies in the realm of normative analysis it focuses attention on the best solutions which still can be obtained in problems where constraints of various natures forbid the attainment of first best pareto optimal situations its central concern is the characterization of such second best solutions and a large part of the literature concentrates on the optimal design of taxes or of policies of public firms taking a second best problem we try in this paper to shift the emphasis from normative to positive considerations the solution we are interested in is not optimal with respect to some a priori given social welfare function embodying justice objectives but it is supposed to reflect the power of the different agents in a negotiation process clearly the conceptual tools required for such an analysis are to be found in game theory and it is actually a game theoretical approach that we follow here the model we are looking at is presented in section ii it formalizes one of the simplest second best problems that can be imagined we have a twogood economy with one private good and one public good agents have different wealth in private good and the public good is financed through a wealth tax this latter fiscal system is clearly not flexible enough to adjust contributions with marginal willingnesses to pay so that we actually face a second best situation there is one decision variable in the society the tax rate which determines the public good production about which the agents have conflicting desires to this problem we associate a game which provides a precise framework for the analysis of the power of the agents the positive outcomes of the negotiation process are supposed to belong to the core of this game sections iii and iv concentrate on the analysis of the core the results strongly contrast with those obtained in the classical studies of the core of 67 0022 053 l 81 040067 25 02 00 o

equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy abstract this paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi linear preferences jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax we show that under a proportional income tax scheme a nash equilibria may fail to exist under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but in general nash equilibria violate a very weak efficiency condition we conclude by commenting on the stabilizing effect of zoning policies journal of economic literatureclassification number c71

efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities abstract in the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by barbera and bevia self selection consistent functions j econ theory 105 2002 263 277 locating public facilities by majority stability consistency and group formation games econ behav 56 2006 185 200 we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

dynamic pricing behavior in perishable goods markets evidence from secondary markets for major league baseball tickets sellers of perishable goods increasingly use dynamic pricing strategies as technology makes it easier to change prices and track inventory this paper tests how accurately theoretical models of dynamic pricing describe sellers behavior in secondary markets for event tickets a classic example of a perishable good it shows that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe very accurately both the pricing problem faced by sellers and how they behave explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically by 40 percent or more as an event approaches the estimates also imply that dynamic pricing is valuable raising the average seller s expected payoff by around 16 percent

the cost effectiveness of the u s export enhancement program bonus allocation mechanism the u s export enhancement program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism the current mechanism resembles a discriminatory price common value auction however auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons this article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative uniform price auction estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the current format and simulations suggest that adopting a uniform price auction format for bonus allocation may yield considerable savings to the treasury by eliminating incentives to pad bids and increasing participation in the auction

strong equilibrium in congestion games abstract 6 introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a nash equilibrium in pure strategies here we obtain conditions for the existence of a strong equilibrium in this class of games as well as for the equivalence of nash and strong equilibria we also give conditions for uniqueness and for pareto optimality of the nash equilibrium except for a natural monotonicity assumption on the utilities the conditions are expressed only in terms of the underlying congestion game form it turns out that avoiding a certain type of bad configuration in the strategy spaces is essential to positive results journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 d62

output effects of government purchases the theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases under plausible conditions the temporary case involves an output response that is positive less than one to one with the change in government purchases and larger than that generated by an equal sized but permanent shift in purchase the equilibrium real rate of return rise in the temporary case but changes little in the permanent one defense purchases are divided empirically into permanent and temporary components by considering the role of temporary wars no temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases the results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory

the formation of risk sharing networks this paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural philippines we find that geographic proximity possibly correlated with kinship is a major determinant of mutual insurance links among villagers age and wealth differences also play an important role in contrast income correlation and differences in occupation are not determinants of network links reported network links have a strong effect on subsequent gifts and loans gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to differences in health status from this we conclude that intra village mutual insurance links are largely determined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversification of income risk the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dyadic models

sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects abstract we consider sequential second price auctions in which heterogeneous objects are sold to bidders with unit demand and a single dimensional type we show that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists if objects are ordered in terms of dispersiveness of value distributions equilibrium price declines when objects are equivalent on average and additional conditions hold

temporary and permanent government spending in an open economy some evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper investigates the effects of government spending changes on a small open economy in an intertemporal substitution framework if agents internalize the government s budget constraint temporary and permanent spending have different implications for wealth and consequently different effects on output and the balance of trade estimation of these effects isolates the different channels through which government spending can influence economic activity main findings for the united kingdom are that government spending i crowds out private spending ii is directly productive and iii when rising permanently leads to a negative wealth effect which induces a large rise in work effort

catalogue vs order of sale effects in sequential auctions theory and evidence from a rare book sale we examine bidding in a rare book sequential auction that has features of a natural experiment lots were arranged in alphabetical order the reserve set non strategically and half the bids placed by mail in bidders we distinguish between the effects induced by the print order of the catalogue from those by the sequential nature of the sale we document the existence of distinct catalogue effects on prices number of bids and price variability and determine their causes we demonstrate that these catalogue effects also influence floor bidder behaviour we derive a theoretical model that generates key aspects of floor bidder behaviour copyright 2004 royal economic society

the bidder s curse traditional explanations for the popularity of auctions are efficiency and revenue maximization we argue that another reason is the potential for overbidding i e buyers bidding above their willingness to pay outside the auction the auction mechanism ensures that even if only few buyers overbid they affect prices and allocations we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field comparing auction prices to simultaneous fixed prices for identical items on the same ebay webpage we argue that fixed prices provide an upper bound for auction bids in a detailed data set of board game auctions we find that the final price exceeds the simultaneous fixed price in 42 percent of the auctions the result is not explained by differences in item quality shipping costs or seller reputation prior auction experience does not eliminate overbidding the finding replicates in a second broad data set of a cross section of auctions 48 percent overbidding the substantial fraction of overbid auctions is induced by a small number of bidders only 17 percent ever bid above the fixed price using a simple model of second price auctions with alternative fixed prices we show that transaction costs of switching between auctions and fixed prices cannot explain the results given that even the expected auction price is higher than the fixed price consistent with limited attention the closer the fixed price is listed relative to an auction the less likely are overbids this effect is strongest for bidders first bids when they are likely to examine the auction and fixed price listings more closely

peers at work we study peer effects in the workplace specifically we investigate whether how and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team using high frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain we find strong evidence of positive productiv ity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him but not workers who do not see him additionally workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact we conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free riding externalities that are built into many workplaces jel j24 l81 m54

estimating house price indexes in the presence of seller reservation prices we analyze a bias in transaction based price indexes due to the presence of seller reservation prices we develop a model in which the ratio of sellers reservation prices to the market value affects trading volume and biases of observed transaction prices when trading volume decreases increases index returns are estimated with an upward downward bias we propose a new econometric procedure to mitigate the bias and use simulations to demonstrate the effectiveness of the procedure we construct a reserve conditional unbiased index for the los angeles housing market which substantially differs from a traditional repeat sale index

retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles we analyse an independent private value model where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second price auctions in this heterogeneous game bidders may have differently distributed valuations and some have multi unit demand with decreasing marginal values retailers others have a specific single unit demand consumers by examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect the study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders nous analysons un modele a valeurs privees independantes dans lequel des encherisseurs heterogenes sont en concurrence pour des objets vendus lors d encheres sequentielles au second prix dans ce jeu heterogene les encherisseurs tirent leurs evaluations de distributions qui peuvent differer et certains les revendeurs ont des demandes multi unitaires avec des evaluations marginales decroissantes alors que les autres les consommateurs ont une demande individuelle specifique l examen des strategies d equilibre et des sequences de prix montrent que la presence de consommateurs conduit en moyenne a des encheres plus agressives de la part des revendeurs et que la presence d encherisseurs heterogenes constitue une explication plausible a la decroissance des prix l etude de l esperance du revenu du vendeur confirme l interet des commissaires priseurs a inviter differentes categories d acheteurs

bidders choice auctions raising revenues through the right to choose sales of multiple real estate properties are often conducted via a sequence of ascending auctions giving the winner at each stage the right to choose one of the available lots we show that when bidders are risk averse such bidders choice auctions raise more revenues then standard simultaneous or sequential ascending auctions we also report the results of laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of bidders choice auctions vis a vis the simultaneous ascending auction the revenue superiority of the bidders choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data finally we compare observed bidders choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data finally we compare observed bidding behavior in the experiments with theoretically predicted bids to estimate a common risk aversion parameter from the data

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms i study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to decrease their costs before competing on the market according to previous analyses only the grand coalition forms at the nash equilibrium of such games i show that this result hinges on the assumption of symmetric firms i therefore introduce asymmetric firms in a game where only two associations can form i demonstrate that there exists a coalition proof nash equilibrium coalition structure in this game and that when the equilibrium involves two associations all the members of an association have a higher taste for this association than all nonmembers do journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 l13

network externality an uncommon tragedy economists have defined network externality and have examined putative inframarginal market failures associated with it this paper distinguishes between network effects and network externalities where the latter are market failures the authors argue that while network effects are important network externalities are theoretically fragile and empirically undocumented some network externalities are merely pecuniary network ownership or transactions among network participants can internalize some network effects the type of market failure that has been associated with these externalities is a transition problem that has little to do with externality

stock markets adjustment costs and the international transmission of shocks this paper studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks it uses an analytically tractable two country one good model where intertemporal optimizing behaviour of infinitely lived agents endogenously determines the rate of capital accumulation and the current account it is shown that the presence of adjustment costs and stock markets provide new insights concerning the channels through which supply shocks are internationally transmitted

right to choose in oral auctions abstract oral right to choose auctions raise higher revenue when buyers are risk averse when standard sequential and right to choose auctions allocate the objects in the same fashion this means that sellers prefer the latter

absentee bidders and the declining price anomaly in wine auctions the anomaly is concerned with the observation that in multiple item auctions of identical objects prices tend to decline over time i show that in the case of wine auctions which have been analyzed frequently the anomaly is likely to be caused by the fact that most bids are entered by absentees who use nonoptimal bidding strategies therefore wine auctions can hardly be used to illustrate the standard multiple object auction model

gale nikaido debreu and milgrom shannon communal interactions with endogenous community structures abstract this paper examines nash jurisdictional stability in a model with a continuum of agents whose characteristics are distributed over a unidimensional interval communal benefits and costs of each individual depend on her identity and the composition of the community which she belongs to since the framework is too general to yield an existence of nash equilibrium we introduce the essentiality of membership in one of the communities for all individuals we highlight the border indifference property bip when all individuals located on a border between two adjacent jurisdictions are indifferent about joining either of them and show that bip is a necessary condition for yielding a nash equilibrium we invoke the celebrated gale nikaido debreu lemma to guarantee the existence of a partition that satisfies bip we then proceed to demonstrate that bip is not sufficient to yield a nash equilibrium the equilibrium existence under bip is rescued when we use the milgrom shannon monotone comparative statics conditions

temporary and permanent government spending in a small open economy abstract this paper studies a dynamic optimizing small open economy model that emphasizes the supply side responses of labor and capital to changes in fiscal policy the model used generates results that are consistent with a number of empirical regularities in small open economies furthermore temporary fiscal shocks are shown to have permanent positive effects on output and negative effects on consumption and welfare the strength of these effects are shown to depend on intertemporal elasticities of substitution and the persistence of policies

scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions we analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects either economies or diseconomies of scale we show that economies of scale give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices whereas the converse is not generally true moreover first and second price auctions are not always revenue equivalent economies of scale make second price auctions more profitable for the seller whereas revenue equivalence may be preserved in the case of diseconomies

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

on the coalition proofness of the pareto frontier of the set of nash equilibria abstract this article shows that the pareto efficient frontier of the nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition proof under the following conditions 1 the game has three players or alternatively a player s payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum but not on the composition of other players strategies 2 an increase in a player s strategy either raises all other players payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically and 3 each player s payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy under these conditions the pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition proof nash equilibrium refinement journal of economic literature classification number c72

equilibria in a model with partial rivalry abstract in this paper we show that a non cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals preferences satisfy independence of irrelevant choices anonymity and partial rivalry moreover if any of these assumptions is violated then even a pure strategy nash equilibrium may fail to exist further more we demonstrate that even with a continuum of players the same three assumptions yield the existence of a pure strategy strong nash equilibrium and in addition the equivalence of the sets of nash and strong nash equilibria in pure strategies journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62

sequential auctions with delay costs a two period model we examine the outcome of a two round second price auction of stochastically equivalent objects where players face delay costs if they decide to stay for the subsequent round in our model agents decide whether to stay for the next round after seeing their valuations for the good we describe an equilibrium involving a screening level such that only those bidders with values bigger than that amount decide to stay for the last period we also provide an example where expected prices are decreasing

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

auctions and the price of art the value of most important works of art is established by public auction either directly by an actual sale or indirectly by reference to other sales how the auction system works is thus a critical determinant of how the public s preferences are translated into the evaluation of artistic work the auction system is central in the determination of the incentives for artistic work and the efficiency of the auction system is a key determinant of the cost of creating and distributing works of art this paper contains a review of the burgeoning new research of the last decade that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system actually works what it indicates about price formation and how well it performs we begin our discussion in section 2 with a short description of the mechanics of the auction system and then organize the remainder of our discussion around two major topics the first topic concerns how auction prices can be used to determine and compare overall price movements within the art market and other markets and the second topic concerns how the auction mechanism influences prices we

the culture of private negotiation endogenous price anchors in simple bilateral bargaining experiments abstract using bilateral bargaining data from laboratory experimental markets this paper demonstrates how common knowledge about price averages from past bargains impacts current negotiated prices this common information creates an endogenous and declining anchor for bargaining agents the culture of private negotiation leads parties to agreements below the anchor currently negotiated prices below the anchor cause reported averages in the next period to fall the relation between the endogenous anchor and the negotiating culture leads to a downward drift in negotiated prices through at least 20 periods of bargaining relative earnings are distributed toward buyers and away from sellers

learning to bid in sequential dutch auctions abstract we propose an agent based computational model to investigate sequential dutch auctions with particular emphasis on markets for perishable goods and we take as an example wholesale fish markets buyers in these markets sell the fish they purchase on a retail market the paper provides an original model of boundedly rational behavior for wholesale buyers behavior incorporating learning to improve profits conjectures as to the bids that will be made and fictitious learning we analyze the dynamics of the aggregate price under different market conditions in order to explain the emergence of market price patterns such as the well known declining price paradox and the empirically observed fact that the very last transactions in the day may be at a higher price the proposed behavioral model provides alternative explanations for market price dynamics to those which depend on standard hypotheses such as diminishing marginal profits furthermore agents learn the option value of having the possibility of bidding in later rounds when confronted with random buyers such as occasional participants or new entrants they learn to bid in the optimal way without being conscious of the strategies of the other buyers when faced with other buyers who are also learning their behavior still displays some of the characteristics learned in the simpler case even though the problem is not analytically tractable

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

natural catastrophe insurance when should the government intervene this paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes in contrast to conventional models of insurance the insurer has a non zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks the premium rate and the amount of capital in the company when the insurer is insolvent each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims thus generating negative pecuniary externalities our model shows that government provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders however when heterogeneous risks are introduced a government program may be less attractive in safer areas which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately

strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain abstract we investigate the existence and give a partial characterization of a strong tiebout equilibrium which consists of an endogenously formed partition of the individuals into disjoint jurisdictions with each jurisdiction producing and financing its own public goods and moreover there exists no group of individuals who can all benefit by establishing their own community in particular no single individual finds it desirable to migrate from his equilibrium jurisdiction the existence proof makes use of the notion of consecutive games which we introduce and show that for such games there always exists a partition with a nonempty core

withdrawable bids as winner s curse insurance when bidders have a common value or strongly affiliated values for an object or contract being auctioned by sealed bids it is possible that the maker of a rational and apparently winning bid would upon learning the competing bids prefer losing the auction to honoring his bid the ability to withdraw a bid perhaps at a cost in such circumstances provides a form of winner s curse insurance bidding with such insurance is analyzed obtaining the general condition for rational bid withdrawal and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with more aggressive bidding next we define a compensation penalties bid withdrawal penalty scheme and show that with it the bid taker is better off on the average than if bid withdrawal is impossible finally we find equilibrium bidding and withdrawal strategies in a multiplicative model as a function of the magnitude of the bid withdrawal penalty and of the bid taker s likelihood after a withdrawal of honoring the second best bid this model has

complements and substitutes in sequential auctions the case of water auctions we use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are com plements or substitutes a sequential english auction model determines the estimating structural equations when units are complements one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units when units are substitutes different bidders win the units with positive probability paying prices similar in magnitude even when the same bidder wins all units we re cover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with non cooperative behavior demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features

games of social interactions with local and global externalities abstract in this paper we present a result on the existence of pure strategies nash equilibrium which covers a large class of games with local and global social interactions the result highlights common features of well known games analyzed in the literature

does selling state silver generate private gold neighbourhood impacts of state house sales this paper utilises two politically determined natural experiments affecting state provided social housing to examine the impact that housing tenure status has on neighbourhood outcomes from 1990 new zealand s national government sold a substantial number of state houses either to existing tenants home buys or to other purchasers vacant sales from 1999 the labour government ended home buys reduced vacant sales and increased acquisitions while vacant sales had no material effects on local outcomes a higher prevalence of home buys led to increased local house price appreciation despite demographic trends that would otherwise have led to falling relative house prices in those communities

auctioning and bargaining an econometric study of timber auctions with secret reservation prices this article considers a first price sealed bid auction at which the seller s reservation price is not announced in advance we allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round we characterize the bidders and seller s bayesian nash equilibrium strategies the distributions of the buyers and seller s private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing timber while solving numerically the differential equations characterizing the seller s and buyers equilibrium strategies the performance of the estimated model is then compared to a model in which the players behave myopically

a universal construction generating potential games abstract strategic games are considered where each player s total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain facilities all players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior if a trimness condition is satisfied by every facility then the game admits an exact potential conversely if a facility is not trim adding it to a potential game may destroy that property in both congestion games and games with structured utilities all facilities are trim under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum which is a nash equilibrium of the game

the social multiplier aggregate data is often used to make inferences about individual level behavior if there are social interactions in which one person s actions influence his neighbor s incentives or information then these inferences are inappropriate the presence of positive social interactions or strategic complementarities implies the existence of a social multiplier where aggregate relationships will overstate individual elasticities we present a brief model and then estimate the size of the social multiplier in three areas the impact of education on wages the impact of demographics on crime and group membership among dartmouth roommates in these contexts there is a significant social multiplier jel ho jo co

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

habit formation adjustment costs and international transmission of fiscal policy abstract the paper studies the effects of fiscal policy in an integrated world economy the setup is one with habit forming endogenous rates of time preference and adjustment costs in investment most of the predictions of the model are in line with the recent empirical literature on fiscal policy for instance in response to a balanced fiscal expansion we obtain positive long run output multipliers long run increases in employment short and medium run increases in wages and decreases in investment our results suggest that short run government spending multipliers are smaller than tax multipliers most importantly we show that the model can generate positive short and medium run consumption responses to a positive fiscal shock this is relevant as negative consumption responses are considered to be one of the main challenges facing neo classical models of fiscal policy

proportional taxation nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good abstract guesnerie and oddou j econom theory 25 1981 67 91 raised the open question whether an economy in which the production of a public good is financed via proportional taxation has a stable structure by means of the first example a negative answer to this question is provided the second example shows that a stable structure may fail to exist even if all the individuals have the same initial endowments in private good

fiscal policy in general equilibrium this paper studies four classic fiscal policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model the authors main findings are as follows 1 permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short run and long run output multipliers that exceed one 2 permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes 3 the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases and 4 public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment these findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

signal jamming in a sequential auction abstract in a sequence of first price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction we characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices

sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects abstract we show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values prices will on average have a downwards trend

weighted congestion games with separable preferences abstract players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences e g the benefit they get from using a specific resource their contribution to congestion or both in many cases of interest intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are additively or multiplicatively separable this paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure strategy nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium it is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity

on the existence of a pure strategy nash equilibrium in group formation games abstract this paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation the use of potentials allows for a characterization of such an equilibrium

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

the stability of hedonic coalition structures we consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings i e where each player s payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition we first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings we then focus on a weaker stability condition individual stability where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition we show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single peaked preferences or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences then there exists an individually stable coalition partition examples show that without these conditions individually stable coalition partitions may not exist we also discuss some other stability concepts and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 a14 d20

stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives abstract we identify a class of economic and political environments that admit an s equilibrium where both free mobility and free entry are allowed we further study the relationship between the set of s equilibria and the sets of strong and coalition proof nash equilibria in the noncooperative coalition formation game which is closely related to the one originally studied by j von neumann and o morgenstern theory of games and economic behaviour princeton univ press princeton nj 1944 we also show that the set of s equilibria induces a proper subset of the coalition structure core of the corresponding characteristic function form journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

correlated equilibria incomplete information and coalitional deviations this paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way when players deviate at the interim stage coalition proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two player games however coalition proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions c 2008 elsevier inc all rights reserved

habit formation and fiscal transmission in open economies in this paper we analyze the ability of an open economy version of the neoclassical model to account for the time series evidence on fiscal policy transmission revisiting the evidence we find that i government spending raises output while inducing a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account and ii the responses of output and investment are more muted in more open economies while current account deficits tend to be larger turning to the model we explore the role of habit formation for fiscal policy transmission specifically we show that the model can account for the evidence if consumption behavior is characterized by habit formation and the terms of trade adjust endogenously

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel