dynamic behavior of co2 spot prices co2 emission allowances are traded nowadays over the counter otc and on exchanges across the european union eu it thus becomes increasingly important for traders of these emission certificates to have a valid co2 spot price model to value potential derivatives in addition co2 emitting companies require an adequate co2 spot price model in order to better assess their production costs and support emissions related investment decisions however sufficient price history is still lacking for the european union emission trading scheme eu ets we therefore present a tractable stochastic equilibrium model reflecting stylized features of the eu ets and analyze the resulting co2 spot price dynamics our main findings are that co2 prices do not have to follow any seasonal patterns discounted prices should possess the martingale property and an adequate co2 price process should exhibit a time and price dependent volatility structure a brief empirical examination regarding market efficiency complements our analysis

market structure and buyer behaviour price adjustment in a multi object progressive oral auction abstract working within the framework of an english or progressive oral auction with multiple unit trading the study addresses the question of the effect on price behaviour of variations in market size in the sense of the number of equal sized market competitors prices are shown to converge to near competitive equilibrium levels upon replication whatever the market size however by extending the focus of the study beyond equilibrium to the market behaviour revealed during the adjustment or disequilibrium phase of the market it is possible to advance some conjectures on the nature of the equilibrating processes

carbon prices and fuel switching a quasi experiment in electricity markets within the pennsylvania new jersey maryland electricity market delaware and maryland participate in the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi but other states do not providing a quasi experimental setting to study the rggi program using a difference in difference framework we find that overall the rggi program led to 6 22 million short tons of co2 reduction per year in delaware and maryland or about 19 10 of the average total potential annual emissions in these two states from 2009 to 2013 counterintuitively however the reduction is mainly achieved through reduction of coal inputs and emission leakage instead of fuel switching from coal to natural gas or from fossil fuel coal and natural gas to non fossil fuel

allocating priority with auctions an experimental analysis there are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex ante must be rationed ex post two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper priority service see chao and wilson american economic review 77 1987 and wilson econometrica 57 1989 and proportional rationing see spulber international economic review 33 1992 an experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well known institutions the english and the uniform price sealed bid auctions under two different information conditions we find that priority service generates more efficient allocations than proportional rationing and the sealed bid auction performs better than the english both mechanisms and rationing rules are more efficient when there is a lack of common information

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

carbon capture and storage investment strategies for the future abstract the following article deals with real options modeling for investing into carbon capture and storage technologies herein we derive two separate models the first model incorporates a constant convenience yield and dividend for the investment project in the second model the convenience yield is allowed to follow a mean reverting process which seems to be more realistic but also increases the model s complexity both frameworks are to be solved numerically therefore we calibrate our model with respect to empirical data and provide insights into the models sensitivity toward the chosen parameter values we found that given the recently observable prices for carbon dioxide an investment into c o2 storage facilities is not profitable

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

on the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emissions allowances optimal decisions of a firm facing the option of retrofitting its plant to reduce pollution and thereby eliminate the need to purchase emissions allowances are analysed the decision is treated as a real option with the price of pollution permits following a known stochastic process the model is formulated as a set of one dimensional partial differential equations at discrete points in time the firm owner makes optimal decisions about the retrofit including whether to mothball temporarily the model is used to analyse a firm s decision to instal a scrubber as a result of the 1990 u s clean air act jel classification q25 d81 g31 sur la possibilite d investir dans le controle de la pollution dans un regime de permis d emission de pollution echangeables commercialement ce memoire examine les decisions optimales d une entreprise face a la possibilite d adapter ses installations pour reduire la pollution et ce faisant d eliminer le besoin de se procurer des permis d emission de pollution sur le marche le decision est traitee comme une option reelle ou le prix des permis resulte d un processus stochastique connu le modele est formule sous forme d un ensemble d equations differentielles partielles a une dimension a des points discontinus dans le temps le proprietaire de l entreprise prend des decisions optimales de mise a niveau des installations y compris la possibilite de les fermer temporairement le modele est utilise pour analyser une decision d installer un epurateur suite a la mise en place de la loi americaine de 1990 clean air act

environmental regulation technological diversity and the dynamics of technological change inducing technological progress is an important objective of environmental regulation we investigate under which conditions regulation induced technological progress pursues the best technological option we analyze a setting with vertical and horizontal technological progress cost uncertainty time limited patent protection and a case that is typical for some emissi4on intensive industries like electricity generation or the chemical industry under taxes and standards only the current least cost technology is used and developed implying a lock in into a possibly inferior technology tradable permits yield slower progress but can facilitate the simultaneous development of technologies rendering lock ins less likely

attitudes toward risk and compliance in emission permit markets we investigate the effects of uncertainty and concomitant risk aversion as they impact the incentive structure and subsequent operation of an emissions permit market modeled after the u s s02 market our theoretical results suggest that uncertainty dulls incentives to achieve cost savings through permit trading and inhibits efficient allocation of abatement efforts by firms we test hypotheses in an experimental laboratory setting and find that the irreversibility of investment in abatement technology may present countervailing incentives for potential sellers of permits resulting in a wait and see attitude toward adoption of efficient levels of abatement technology

a symmetric safety valve abstract how to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap and trade program for carbon dioxide with a safety valve that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level we find two significant problems both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase one is that most important examples of price volatility in cap and trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked but instead when allowance prices collapsed second a single sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment we illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one sided approach

cap and trade a sufficient or necessary condition for emission reduction influenced by the success of emission trading in the us for sulphur dioxide so 2 some economists have argued for an upstream economy wide cap and trade scheme as the primary tool for achieving the required reduction in greenhouse gas ghg emissions this paper addresses that argument and concludes that cap and trade will need to be accompanied by complementary regulatory measures while it is a necessary component in a climate mitigation programme it is unlikely to be sufficient by itself to accomplish the desired emission reductions the paper reviews the evidence on how so 2 emissions were reduced and the extent to which actual emission trading was responsible for the reduction as opposed to other innovations it also identifies differences between the past regulation of so 2 and other air pollutants and the challenges presented by the regulation of ghg emissions what actually happened in the us with so 2 emission trading deviated in several significant respects from what would be predicted based on the conventional theoretical analysis while there was a dramatic reduction in so 2 emissions it occurred because of several factors some of which are unlikely to apply for ghg emissions and others of which argue for an activist regulatory policy by the government as a complement to the functioning of an emissions market for ghgs copyright 2010 oxford university press

market efficiency and the u s market for sulfur dioxide allowances focusing on the u s sulfur dioxide so2 allowance market from its inception in 1994 to 2009 we model allowance prices to determine the influence of market fundamentals on allowance price level and volatility we find evidence that the so2 market operates in ways that are not inconsistent with an efficient market prices that reflect marginal abatement costs after the first few years of the program but before a court decision that introduced significant uncertainty into the market in mid 2008 our empirical analysis finds that the so2 market similar to other emission markets studied in the literature can remain relatively inefficient for several years after launch we also find that market volatility increases in response to all types of communications from the administrator suggesting that the development of a formal communication strategy possibly similar to that used by central banks would reduce price volatility and increase the efficiency of the market

prices vs quantities the effects on technology choice abstract it is well known that price and quantity based regulation approaches provide different investment incentives but usually only the effect on the level of investment is studied in this paper we show that under uncertainty they also lead to the adoption of different technologies due to the disparate risks that a regulated firm is exposed to different regulatory instruments induce different technologies and this effect cannot be compensated by varying the design of the instruments furthermore price based instruments lead to the adoption of a socially suboptimal technology so that the inclusion of technology choice provides a bias in favor of a quantity based regulation compared with weitzman s weitzman m l 1974 prices vs quantities review of economic studies 41 477 491 criterion

environmental policy government and the market environmental policy is made in a context of both market failure and government failure on the one hand leaving environmental protection to the free market relying on notions of corporate social responsibility and altruistic consumer and shareholder preferences will not deliver optimal results on the other hand nationalizing the delivery of environmental protection is likely to fail because nation states rarely have the depth and quality of information required to instruct all the relevant agents to make appropriate decisions thus as for many areas of policy appropriate models of environmental intervention will lie between these two extremes while it is impossible to specify general rules concerning the precise form of intervention in part because the type of intervention depends upon value judgements this paper sets out some of the considerations that are particular to environmental policy and explores several principles for policy design including information coordination and principal agent problems with a particular focus on the international context

equilibrium price dynamics of emission permits this article presents a stochastic equilibrium model for environmental markets that allows us to study the characteristic properties of emission permit prices induced by the design of today s cap and trade systems we characterize emission permits as highly nonlinear contingent claims on economy wide emissions and reveal their hybrid nature between investment and consumption assets our model makes predictions about the dynamics and volatility structure of emission permit prices the forward price curve and the implications for option pricing in this market empirical evidence from existing emissions markets shows that the model explains the stylized facts of emission permit prices and related derivatives

emissions trading with profit neutral permit allocations this paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme ets on equilibrium emissions output price market concentration and profits in a generalized cournot model we develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ets we show that its profit impact is usually limited in a cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry s herfindahl index

cap and trade policy challenges a tale of three markets cap and trade policy instruments have been applied to a number of environmental problems with varying success this article examines cap and trade programs for so2 allowances fishery quotas and water rights design and implementation of cap and trade mechanisms involves challenging policy tradeoffs accommodating equity concerns balancing use levels with resource conditions facilitating transactions accounting for externalities assuring adequate monitoring and documenting welfare gains efficient trading mechanisms are more readily implemented when there is a strong political or legal mandate to cap resource use and trades are perceived as a means to ease adjustment to use limits

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

the benefits of spatially differentiated regulation the response to acid rain by u s states prior to the acid rain program location is a crucial driver of both the marginal abatement and damage costs of sulfur dioxide emissions by u s coal fired power plants before the start of the acid rain program in 1995 old boilers were subject to emission rate standards set by individual states we investigate how individual states adjusted their sulfur regulation laws in response to acid rain and whether they accounted for differences in marginal abatement costs vulnerability to agricultural damages special industry interests or inter state externalities the welfare gain compared to a uniform reduction in emission rate standards is estimated to be 21 million in 1995 dollars annually

sellers hedging incentives at epa s emission trading auction cason 1993 argued thattheauction theepaused in order to start the market for sulfur allowances is not efficient the set up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance in this paper we show that the sellers incentives are even more perverse than cason suggested in particular we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid it is not possible to derive the nash equilibrium for this set up if such an equilibrium exists sellers either set only a positive ask price or an ask price equal to zero and a positive bid as well

emissions trading and transaction costs analyzing the flaws in the discussion abstract although emissions trading lowers the costs of climate change mitigation transaction costs e g to find a trading partner may reduce its cost effectiveness some economists claim that transaction costs for joint implementation ji and clean development mechanism cdm projects will be higher than for international emissions trading iet transfers arguing that projects require advance approval whereas permit transfers can be automatically registered and checked annually however this article demonstrates the incompleteness of their views by both analyzing empirical data and discussing the theoretical conditions under which transaction costs decrease for ji and cdm and increase for iet

how do behavioral assumptions affect structural inference evidence from a laboratory experiment we use a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect that assuming rational expectations has on structural inference on a dynamic discrete choice decision problem our experimental design induces preferences up to each subject s subjective rates of time preference leaving unrestricted only this parameter and the decision rule that the subject uses in solving the problem we analyze the data under the assumption that all subjects use the rational expectations decision rule and also under weaker behavioral assumptions that allow for heterogeneity in the way people form decisions we find no evidence that assuming rational expectations distorts inferences about the cross sectional distribution of discount rates

a simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators e g cost of pollution abatement this paper proposes a simple mechanism that implements the first best for any number of firms a uniform price sealed bid auction of an endogenous number of transferable licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms paybacks which rapidly decrease with the number of firms are such that truth telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non cooperatively or collusively the mechanism also provides firms with incentives to invest in socially optimal r d jel d44 d62 d82 q28 regulatory authorities generally find that part of the information they need for implementing an efficient regulation is in the hands of those who are to be regulated regulating externalities such as access to common resources e g clean air water streams fisheries etc is a good example environmental regulators for example know little about firms pollution abatement costs so without communicating with firms they would be unable to establish the efficient level of pollution a number of mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for different reasons

permit price dynamics in the u s so2 trading program a cointegration approach the aim of this paper is to study empirically the determination and the dynamic behavior of the so2 permit prices previous research focused on ex post market price analysis without taking weather conditions into account therefore this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the so2 price evolution and its interactions with macroeconomic variables microeconomic variables and climate variables using monthly data from january 1995 to december 2006 our estimation results indicate the existence of a long term relationship between so2 permit price scrubbing costs industrial production and weather conditions in the short run so2 permit price is affected by scrubbing costs energy prices and weather conditions policy makers and private investors could benefit from the findings of this study that provides useful information on the characteristics of the so2 market and may plan their strategy

the effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking an experimental test myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally 1 investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often 2 if all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses investors will accept more risk in a task in which investors learn from experience both predictions are supported the investors who got the most frequent feedback and thus the most information took the least risk and earned the least money language en

when to pollute when to abate intertemporal permit use in the los angeles nox market we study intertemporal trading of nitrogen oxides permits in southern california s reclaim program we model reclaim s distinct intertemporal features two overlapping permit cycles and two overlapping compliance cycles in the model competitive equilibrium is cost effective and firms have an incentive to delay abatement from 1994 to 2006 reclaim facilities traded intertemporally by using permits of the opposite cycle we test two theoretical propositions delayed abatement and trading across cycles with a difference in differences estimator and show weak though inconclusive support of the theory the theoretical and empirical results are relevant to cap and trade programs with potential for overlapping permit cycles jel q58

income risk of eu coal fired power plants after kyoto coal fired power plants enjoy a significant advantage relative to gas plants in terms of cheaper fuel cost this advantage may erode or turn into disadvantage depending on co2 emission allowance price financial risks are further reinforced when the price of electricity is determined by natural gas fired plants marginal costs we aim to empirically assess the risks in eu coal plants margins up to the year 2020 parameter values are derived from actual market data monte carlo simulation allows compute the expected value and risk profile of coal plants earnings future allowance prices may spell significant risks on utilities balance sheets

environmental and resource economics a canadian retrospective the paper reviews research contributions to environmental and resource economics by scholars in canada we focus mainly on work from the past 25 years but also highlight earlier pathbreaking work we begin by looking at broad trends in research both internationally and within canada we then review canadian contributions to various topics in the field canadians have played a leading role in the development of the field especially in resource economics international environmental economics and the valuation of environmental amenities

sulfur allowance trading and the regional clean air incentives market a comparative design analysis of two major cap and trade permit programs this paper investigates in detail the design parameters of the two mostprominent us cap and trade permit program the us epa sulfur allowancetrading program and the south californian regional clean air incentivesmarket reclaim in contrast to expectations the two programs turn out to be rather different in several important design parameter choices common elements emerge primarily in the existence of an ambitious quantifiedenvironmental target mandatory use of stringent emission monitoring methodsand stiff penalties for non compliance coexisting command and controlregulations the creation of a competitive permit market structure andsome distributional concessions in the initial permit allocation generalizing from these common features we find that provisions to assurepolitical acceptance functional interdependencies and overlapping regulation are the most important influences on the design of applied cap and trade permit programs

tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets the paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous continuous ascending price auctions we design and implement a collusion incubator environment based on a type of public symmetrically folded and item aligned preferences tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment once tacit collusion developed it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game theoretic model the only successful remedy was a non public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically folded and item aligned patterns of preferences creating head to head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a maverick

irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties tradable emission permits and emissions charges abstract a major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge however under efficient permit trading the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies we develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits we compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges after controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly we find that firms investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties but more so under emissions charges than under permits therefore tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms investment incentive under uncertainty

the clean development mechanism stochastic permit prices and energy investments abstract we analyze the impact on energy investments stemming from different emission permit classes by considering permits that are allocated inside the european emission trading scheme and secondary certified emission reduction scer permits originating from the clean development mechanism one price taking firm which is subject to emission regulation has the choice to invest in gas or wind power plant the firm faces uncertainty regarding stochastically evolving permit prices while it receives a premium on the electricity price for wind energy as a first step we determine the value of the option to invest into a gas power plant over time then we calculate the investment probability of a gas power investment in a range of policy scenarios we find that allowing the usage of scer permits in the present policy framework has a positive impact on gas power investment decoupling the price processes has a similar effect if the quota of scer permits is doubled the decrease in the investment probability for wind power is large we carry out sensitivity tests for different parameter values and find that investment behavior changes significantly with differing interest rates the wind energy premium and volatility

market design in cap and trade programs permit validity and compliance timing abstract cap and trade programs have considerable heterogeneity in permit validity and compliance timing for example permits have different validities across time e g banking borrowing and seasons and space e g zonal restrictions and compliance timing can be annual in overlapping cycles or in multi year periods we discuss nine prominent cap and trade programs along these dimensions and construct a general model of permit validity and compliance timing we derive sufficient conditions under which abatement is invariant to compliance timing i e compliance timing cannot smooth abatement cost shocks under these conditions i expected compliance costs are invariant ii the variance of compliance costs increases with the delayed compliance iii equilibrium prices may not be unique and iv the delayed compliance equilibrium may rely on degenerate prices not determined by marginal abatement costs we demonstrate the model s broad applicability by illustrating different types of temporal permit validity

the advancedness of knowledge in pollution saving technological change with a qualitative application to so2 cap and trade this paper investigates the extent to which advanced knowledge and technology played a role in the so2 compliance process in electric power plants under the us so2 cap and trade program it investigates the hypothesis that advanced knowledge and technology dedicated to pollution abatement played a minor role in that process while relatively unadvanced forms of knowledge and technology played the main role new qualitative evidence in this somewhat well known case is considered interviews with electric power plant r d managers plant level compliance data and the changes undergone by boiler manufacturer coal mining and railroad companies in the supply chain advanced knowledge dedicated to pollution abatement like the type now being emphasised for carbon capture and storage ccs played a minor role while unadvanced knowledge and technology played the main role while there are clearly limits to how far this unadvanced knowledge and technology finding can be generalised to ghg emission control the specific aspects of the so2 case that might be broadly informative of the response to ghg emissions are elaborated in any case the paper shows how innovation in pollution control can be inexpensive and effective without involving very much advanced knowledge and technology for pollution control

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

considering risks in early stage investment planning for emission abatement technologies in large combustion plants fossil fuels will continue to be the most important energy source for electricity generation in most parts of the world for the next decades therefore emission abatement technologies in large combustion plants are an important measure to reduce the emission of pollutants and to lower the negative effects thereof for humans animals and the environment investment decisions for emission reduction measures are however facing various kinds of risks and uncertainties caused by political technological economic and legal influences the consideration of these risks in early stage investment planning is often complex yet important for investors this paper investigates the possibilities to consider risks and uncertainties in early stage investment and cost calculation methodologies of different complexity the real options analysis is presented as well as less complex methods such as monte carlo or sensitivity analyses that lower the calculation effort the application of a specifically developed risk portfolio is recommended before quantitatively investigating risks this portfolio helps to identify the most critical risks and to focus on them reducing again the calculation effort the presented approach is not only of interest for investors but also for policies especially if data is scarce or uncertainties exist regarding specific plant parameters or cost and price components the content of this paper is presented using the example of nitrogen oxide emission reduction measures it is however possible to transfer the results to other pollutants or technologies in a related context

almost efficient information transmission in elections abstract we study a model in which two parties compete by announcing their policies after receiving conditionally independent private signals about the true state of the world parties are both office and policy motivated our model can explain radically different policy positions even when parties receive identical signals and have unbiased preferences this holds in an asymmetric equilibrium in which both parties reveal their private information to the voters and the implemented policy is almost first best for all possible realizations of parties signals in this equilibrium one party adopts extreme and the other one moderate policy positions

the effect of transport policies on car use evidence from latin american cities abstract in an effort to reduce air pollution and congestion latin american cities have experimented with different policies to persuade drivers to give up their cars in favor of public transport this paper looks at two of such policies the driving restriction program introduced in mexico city in november of 1989 hoy no circula hnc and the public transport reform carried out in santiago in february of 2007 transantiago ts based on hourly concentration records of carbon monoxide which comes primarily from vehicles exhaust we find that household responses to both hnc and ts have been not only ultimately unfortunate more cars on the road and higher pollution levels but also remarkably similar in two important aspects on how policy responses vary widely among income groups and on how fast households adjust their stock of vehicles when they do

intertemporal links in cap and trade schemes in a two period general equilibrium model i study the effects of intertemporal emission permit trading in a cap and trade scheme when firms investments in abatement have long term effects to meet their caps firms optimally choose levels of trading and investment in each period by equalizing the marginal benefit of abatement to the marginal cost of abatement in each period the fact that investments have long term effects introduces new effects investments in period 1 have both an additional benefit the reduction of emissions in period 2 and an additional cost the decrease in abatement opportunities in period 2 this changes the standard condition of equalization of marginal costs across periods for cost effectiveness without intertemporal trading some investments in period 1 are entirely driven by second period abatement needs in that case allowing intertemporal trading may reduce investment in period 1 as some long term investments are substituted by intertemporal permit trading descriptive evidence from the eu emissions trading system ets illustrates this potential effect

the political economy of market based environmental policy the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program enacted in 1990 gave valuable tradable sulfur dioxide emissions permits called allowances to electric utilities we examine the political economy of this allocation though no senate or house votes were ever taken hypothetical votes suggest that the actual allocation would have beaten plausible alternatives while rent seeking behavior is apparent statistical analysis of differences between actual and benchmark allocations indicates that the legislative process was more complex than simple models suggest the coalition of states that produced and burned high sulfur coal both failed to block acid rain legislation in 1990 and received fewer allowances than in plausible benchmark allocations some of these states may have received additional allowances to cover 1995 99 emissions by giving up allowances in later years and some major coal producing states seem to have focused on benefits for miners and on sustaining demand for high sulfur coal

a comparison of multiple unit all pay and winner pay auctions under incomplete information this article examines the properties of independent private value all pay and winner pay auctions when there are multiple units sold we study bidding behavior efficiency and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions our data show that the all pay auction and the winner pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral bayesian equilibrium our evidence also suggests that the winner pay auction is more likely to lead to a pareto efficient allocation than the all pay auction

income distributional effects of using market based instruments for managing common property resources in this article the authors show the trade offs between efficiency and equity that arise from the application of market based instruments to a heterogenous population of agents drawing from a natural resource pool using the example of groundwater they find that there are overall losses in allocative efficiency when the centralized planner is constrained by equity considerations and that the distribution of gains or losses to management becomes skewed asymmetrically across agents these results demonstrate the importance of considering both efficiency gains and disparities in distributional inequity when designing policy instruments that create winners and losers with potentially serious sociopolitical ramifications

modeling co2 emission allowance prices and derivatives evidence from the european trading scheme this paper studies the three main markets for emission allowances within the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets powernext nord pool and european climate exchange ecx the analysis suggests that the prohibition of banking of emission allowances between distinct phases of the eu ets has significant implications in terms of futures pricing motivated by these findings we develop an empirically and theoretically valid framework for the pricing and hedging of intra phase and inter phase futures and options on futures respectively

allowance price drivers in the first phase of the eu ets abstract in the first phase of the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets the price per ton of co 2 initially rose to over 30 the price then collapsed to essentially zero by mid 2007 by deriving a structural model of the allowance price under the assumption of efficient markets i examine the extent to which this variation in price can be explained by marginal abatement costs i then gradually relax the model by allowing for delayed adjustment of price to fundamentals as well as by introducing lagged lhs variables the pattern of results suggests that while prices were not initially driven by marginal abatement costs this inefficiency was largely corrected after the accounting of 2005 emissions in april 2006

mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market we propose an estimation method to bound bidders marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid level data and apply the method to data from the turkish treasury auction market using estimated bounds on marginal values we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or vickrey auction we conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue moreover such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0 02 percent

voluntary compliance with market based environmental policy evidence from the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities sulfur dioxide so2 emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources i observe significant voluntary participation albeit with small impact on the so2 market mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations an ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh savings from shifts in emissions reductions from high cost affected sources to low cost nonaffected sources further utilities voluntary participation is well explained by economic variables which provides new evidence of cost effective compliance strategies and low transaction costs

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

emissions trading ercs or allowances emissions trading takes place from two alternative baselines 1 emission reduction credits ercs in which the baseline is existing regulations which are often activity based or 2 cap and trade which specifies the total allowable emissions this paper examines the effects of these two tradable permit systems on marginal and average costs for the firm using electricity generation as an example the erc system subsidizes the activity level to which it is tied and fails to incorporate the full cost of external harm into the product price if the permit limit is chosen ef ficiently the cap and trade system is more effi cient

population policy through tradable procreation entitlements one of the first tradable rights proposal is boulding s the meaning of the twentieth century london george allen and unwin ltd 1964 dealing with overpopulation we discuss both tradable procreation allowances and exemptions domestically and globally to address underpopulation as well we focus on three effects notably the rights tradability entails that whereas exemptions or expensive enough allowances benefit the poor cheap allowances benefit the rich a natalist policy also worsens the average education level of the next generation whereas population control enhances it also if procreation rights are grandfathered to countries the scheme redistributes further our analysis suggests that procreation entitlements may be efficient in controlling population without being necessarily anti redistributive

european co2 prices and carbon capture investments we assess the option to install a carbon capture and storage ccs unit in a coal fired power plant operating in a carbon constrained environment we consider two sources of risk namely the price of emission allowance and the price of the electricity output first we analyse the performance of the eu market for co2 emission allowances specifically we focus on the contracts maturing in the kyoto protocol s first commitment period 2008 to 2012 and calibrate the underlying parameters of the allowance price process then we refer to the spanish wholesale electricity market and calibrate the parameters of the electricity price process we use a two dimensional binomial lattice to derive the optimal investment rule in particular we obtain the trigger allowance prices above which it is optimal to install the capture unit immediately we further analyse the effect of changes in several variables on these critical prices among them allowance price volatility and a hypothetical government subsidy we conclude that at current permit prices immediate installation does not seem justified from a financial point of view this need not be the case though if carbon market parameters change dramatically carbon capture technology undergoes significant improvements and or a specific governmental policy to promote these units is adopted

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

the optimal size of a permit market regulating the emissions of non uniformly mixed pollutants with a permit market carries the risk of hot spot formation which can be reduced by dividing the regulation area into trading zones the trading zone approach has been extensively discussed for the full information case we consider incomplete information concerning the emitters abatement costs their locations and pollution dispersion we derive the optimal number of trading zones and the optimal number of permits per zone and analyze under which conditions a system of independent trading zones is superior to other policy measures our results show that appropriately sized permit markets are well suited to regulating non uniformly mixed pollutants under informational constraints if firms are not too heterogeneous only for substantial heterogeneity and a highly non linear damage function can it be optimal to use command and control strategies

a two level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between russia china and annex b countries this paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between russia and developing countries dcs mainly represented by china on the international market of emission permits created by the kyoto protocol the model uses a formulation of i a demand function for permits from annex b countries and ii marginal abatement costs mac in russia and china provided by two detailed models gemini e3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate annex b demand for permits and macs in russia poles is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain mac curves for china the competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only russia is allowed to play strategically the impact of allowing dcs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

emission permit banking pollution abatement and production inventory control of the firm abstract in this paper we present a dynamic model modified with emission permit banking and pollution abatement and investigate the effect of emission permit banking and pollution abatement on the production inventory strategy of the firm after introducing emission permit banking and pollution abatement the cost function consists of the inventory holding and production costs the cost of investment in abatement capital goods and the emission procurement selling cost furthermore the inventory holding costs are linear production costs are non decreasing and convex functions of the production level and the costs of investment in abatement capital goods are increasing and convex functions of the investment level we compare the optimal production inventory strategy before emission permit banking and pollution abatement and thereafter the mathematical investigation is based on the arrow karlin model

growth pollution policy abstract we investigate long run patterns in pollution flows in an optimally regulated growing economy in which consumption and environmental quality are imperfectly substitutable and pollution is a by product of production we show that by production implies that a scale effect will always drive increasing pollution when productivity is sufficiently low on the other hand if a clean technology exists it will always be chosen in the long run hence emissions will approach zero because for any strictly positive flow of pollution willingness to pay to reduce that flow grows without bound as consumption grows without bound whereas the cost of switching is bounded we clarify the intuition using a specified model in which pollution arises as a by product of the use of natural resource inputs

do transaction costs influence firm trading behaviour in the european emissions trading system this study is one of the first to empirically investigate firm trading behaviour and the importance of permit trading transaction costs such as information costs and search costs in the first phase of the european union s emissions trading system eu ets the signs and significance of our constructed transaction costs proxy variables indicate for a presence of these costs in the initial years of the eu ets in particular this paper shows that ets firms with the smaller number of installations and with less trading experience were less likely to participate in the european emissions trading market and traded the lower quantities of permits furthermore these firms chose to trade permits indirectly via third parties this study also supports the concerns that transaction costs could be excessive for smaller participants and firms operating in the new eu member states

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

optimal design of a phase in emissions trading program abstract this paper studies a phase in emissions trading program with voluntary opt in possibilities for non affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs the regulator faces a trade off between production efficiency minimization of control costs and information rent extraction reduction of excess permits allocated to opt in firms the first best equilibrium can be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt in firms otherwise a second best equilibrium is implemented the latter is sensitive to uncertainty in control costs and benefits

governance of the commons a role for the state the paper examines property regimes and common pool resources using examples and case studies the relative merits of private community and state based rights are detailed the insights from the case studies and an analysis of institution costs provide a tentative framework for understanding the role of the state in the governance of the commons

heterogeneity irreversible production choices and efficiency in emission permit markets abstract this paper investigates a class of market mechanisms for environmental regulation based on the clean air act tradable discharge permit program laboratory market experiments capture some of the more salient institutional features and focus on issues of firm technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment regarding the operation of the permit market experimental results suggest that higher degrees of abatement cost heterogeneity may lead to reduced trade volume while the implications of increased cost heterogeneity regarding price volatility are mixed finally increased cost heterogeneity appears to result in decreased laboratory efficiency

investing in finite life carbon emissions reduction program under risk and idiosyncratic uncertainty this paper aims at emphasizing the ability of new frameworks of real option model to highlight key characteristics of industrial carbon emissions reduction program investment decision we develop both theoretical arguments and numerical simulations with structural parameters calibrated on real life data we find that both radical uncertainty and risk lead to speed up green investments compared to the predictions of real option models that are normally used in green investment literature the conventional wait and see attitude questioned in recent developments of the real option theory is not validated in conclusion our results should foster companies to implement green investments and help governments to define appropriate incentives to encourage green investments of particular note the paper highlights that finance theory is not necessarily an obstacle to green investment decisions

tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact in the european monetary union tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact borrowing from the experience of environmental markets this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the european monetary union having chosen an aggregate target for the union and an initial distribution of permits emu countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation the scheme exploits countries incentives to minimize their costs is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of europe wide recessions in addition it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to gdp ratios finally the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance lending credibility to the stability pact s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run alessandra casella

enforcing transferable permit systems in the presence of market power we derive an enforcement strategy for a transferable permit system in the presence of market power that achieves complete compliance in a cost effective manner we show that the presence of a firm with market influence makes designing an enforcement strategy more difficult than enforcing a perfectly competitive system we also re consider hahn s 1984 suggestion that a firm with market influence should be allocated permits so that it chooses to not participate in the permit market when enforcement and its costs are taken into account hahn s suggestion does not hold except in a very special case the presence of market power will limit the extent to which transferable emissions permit systems can fulfill their theoretical promises hahn 1984 was the first to show that permit trading in the presence of market power cannot be expected to result in a distribution of emissions that minimizes aggregate abatement costs furthermore the distribution of emissions will never be completely independent of the initial allocation of permits modeling a transferable permit system in which one firm has market power while the rest are perfect competitors a dominant firm competitive fringe model hahn demonstrated that aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when the dominant firm is allocated exactly the number of permits it will choose to hold in equilibrium simply aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when a firm that can manipulate the permit price does not because it chooses to not trade permits like most of the theoretical literature on transferable permit systems hahn ignored the fact that compliance in a permit system must be enforced recognizing this important omission van egteren and weber 1996 extended hahn s work to

political measures for strategic environmental policy with external effects this paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem we first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following ohyama and tsujimura 2005 when we consider a model of strategic agents we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent s environmental policy implementation then to improve and resolve these external effects we examine three alternative political measures comprising an environmental subsidy an environmental tax and an emission trading system the results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy however they do not create an incentive to be the leader on the other hand an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership

experimental comparisons of auctions under single and multi unit demand i introduction the study of multiple unit auctions is important because of their widespread use and the high value of goods sold examples include auctions of u s treasury debt cut flowers wine foreign exchange and other financial and monetary instruments moreover since auctions are often proposed by economists as a method of sale for other goods as in mcmillan 1994 the use of auctions can be expected to increase in the future many different auction rules are used to sell these diverse commodities and auction rule changes are often suggested usually with the intention of increasing revenue or improving the allocations and thus there is a considerable and increasing number of known auction formats evaluating new or comparing different auction mechanisms using field tests can be very costly and risky however experimental methods can and have been used by economists to study the behavioral characteristics of different auction procedures kagel 1995 provides a recent comprehensive survey most experimental studies consider the behavior of auctions when there is a single unit to be sold a few studies such as cox et al 1984 1985 and mccabe et al 1990 1991 study multiple unit auctions in environments in which each bidder demands at most one object from a set of identical objects being sold the studies of smith 1967 belovicz 1979 miller and plott 1985 and burns 1985 consider multi unit demand environments these are environments in which bidders have demand for multiple identical units and are permitted to purchase multiple units of the commodity sold the extension to multi unit demand is important since the presence of multi unit demand is a characteristic of many auctions in the field including all of the examples above in this study we consider the behavior of two types of multi unit auction under both single unit and multi unit demand we construct a laboratory environment which we use to study an english clock ec which is a special type of english auction and a sealed bid auction with lowest accepted bid pricing sb in the sb each bidder pays a per unit price equal to the lowest accepted bid the ec was chosen because it is known to provide highly efficient allocations in auctions of single unit goods and therefore is likely to be suggested for many field applications the sb was chosen because of its widespread use which makes its outcomes a useful basis of comparison for the outcomes of the english clock auction 1 however we do not attempt to represent a particular field situation here instead since our interest is in understanding the basic properties of the auctions we chose an experimental design that enables us to make simple comparisons across treatments and with previous and possibly future studies the design enables us to perform simple testing of game theoretic models in some of the treatments in our view the difference between single and multi unit demand is critical as we discuss in section ii many of the results of auction theory that are valid in single unit demand environments no longer apply in multi unit demand environments suggesting that the observed behavior of auctions might also differ between the two environments therefore we isolate the effects of multi unit demand by conducting single unit demand experiments under identical market demand and supply conditions as the multi unit demand experiments these and other aspects of the experimental design are described in detail in section iii the results and a discussion are given in sections iv and v respectively ii institutions theory and previous studies the english clock auction this variant of the english auction was modeled by milgrom and weber 1982 and studied by mccabe et al 1990 1991 in our version the auction begins with all bidders publicly and simultaneously announcing their initial quantity demanded at price zero if there is excess demand the price is increased by a small increment and the bidders then announce new quantities demanded

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

does money illusion matter in intertemporal decision making abstract to examine the degree to which price fluctuations affect how individuals approach an intertemporal decision making problem we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects spend their savings to purchase only one commodity over 20 periods in the control treatment the commodity price is constant across all periods in the small large price fluctuation treatment the price rate of change is always 1 20 regardless of the treatment the commodity price and subjects savings change at the same rate over time therefore the optimal amount of consumption is the same in all three treatments our main findings are twofold first the magnitude of misconsumption i e the deviation from optimal consumption is significantly high with the large price fluctuation treatment being the highest followed by the small price fluctuation treatment and then the control treatment second regardless of the presence of price fluctuations subjects exhibit underconsumption oversaving behavior and price fluctuations strengthen this tendency

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

u s equity markets and environmental policy the case of electric utility investor behavior during the passage of the clean air act amendments of 1990 we examine electric utilityinvestor reaction surrounding twenty twomilestones associated with the passage of theclean air act amendments of 1990 resultssuggest that investors did not react sharply tothe passage of the amendments to the extentthat statistically significant effects wereobserved we interpret the results as moreindicative of investor concern over resolutionof uncertainty surrounding the politicalprocess and resulting provisions than ofconcern over the expected costs of compliancefollowing passage of the amendments weobserved little if any difference betweenutilities subject to phase i restrictions andthose not subject to phase i finally changesin monthly excess returns appear to haveresulted from changes in u s interest ratesand investor concern over power industryderegulation we view our results as importantbecause any wealth effects due to environmentalregulations represent a real economic costassociated with their implementation in thissense we view the results as good news foru s environmental policy makers

prices vs quantities technology choice uncertainty and welfare technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain while it is well known that price and quantity based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention this paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty i show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent even in terms of expected values moreover a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced finally the firms technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits but not under an emissions tax

ex post evaluation of an earmarked tax on air pollution in this paper we do an ex post evaluation of the french tax on air pollution the revenues of this tax were redistributed to polluters in the form of subsidies to abatement technologies and the policy is a typical example of an earmarked tax we use a two stage estimation procedure on an unbalanced panel data set of 226 plants from three industrial sectors that are some of the main contributors to nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions the results indicate that the overall environmental effectiveness of this particular tax subsidy scheme can be questioned