a theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns this paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance i present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure cash holdings dividends and default while facing cash flows with long term uncertainty and short term liquidity shocks the model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice these interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows the optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows i also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads

monitoring liquidation and security design by identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed bank finance in a moral hazard context we characterize the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uninformed market finance is optimal and explain why bank debt is typically secured senior and tightly held we also show that the effectiveness of mixed finance may be impaired by the possibility of collusion between the firms and their informed lenders and that in the optimal renegotiation proof contract informed debt capacity will be exhausted before appealing to supplementary uninformed finance article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

why is bank debt senior a theory of asymmetry and claim priority based on influence costs this theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior consistent with the presence of conflict lawyers and absolute priority violations in financial distress better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior because deterrence can reduce creditors total expenses in a priority contest the ex post stronger lobbyist litigant should be senior ex ante for equivalent reasons the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and or implicit contracts and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule apr this article further shows that chapter hi creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

can the trade off theory explain debt structure we examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tradeoff model where banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy flexible bank debt offers a superior tradeoff between tax shields and bankruptcy costs ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity however optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively strong firms lever up to their lower bank debt capacity augment with market debt and place the bank senior therefore the tradeoff theory offers an explanation for i why young small firms use bank debt exclusively ii why large mature firms employ mixed debt financing and iii why bank debt is senior the tradeoff theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence in countries where the bankruptcy regime entails soft tough enforcement of contractual priority bank debt capacity is low high implying greater less reliance on market debt

informative fund size managerial skill and investor rationality abstract this paper considers the nature of returns to scale in active management following pastor et al 2015 who fail to establish diseconomies of scale at the fund level using an enhanced empirical strategy we find a significant negative impact of fund size on performance this empirical evidence indicates that fund alpha and fund size are not independent entities consequently skill rather than being measured by the fund alpha should be measured by the value that a fund extracts from capital markets we also show that there exist sophisticated investors who correctly exploit positive net present value investment opportunities

scale and skill in active management abstract we empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management we find strong evidence of decreasing returns at the industry level as the size of the active mutual fund industry increases a fund s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines at the fund level all methods considered indicate decreasing returns though estimates that avoid econometric biases are insignificant we also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time this upward trend in skill coincides with industry growth which precludes the skill improvement from boosting fund performance finally we find that performance deteriorates over a typical fund s lifetime this result can also be explained by industry level decreasing returns to scale

optimal financial policy and firm valuation since the classic work of miller and modigliani 1961 laid down the principles for the valuation of firms under conditions of certainty some two decades ago academic interest in the problem of valuing the individual firm has waned yet in addition to the obvious importance of this problem for security analysts investors and acquirers of corporations the issue of firm valuation is fundamental to much of the theory of corporate finance what determines the risk of the firm how the rate of return required by investors may be inferred from capital market data the influence of financing policy on firm value and other issues of central concern to the theory of financial management this almost total neglect of firm valuation is attributable perhaps to the overwhelming influence of the research programme initiated by the development of the capital asset pricing model only three years after the publication of the above mentioned paper by miller and modigliani in its primary form the capital asset pricing model is a statement about the equilibrium rates of return on securities rather than about the equilibrium values of securities it is straightforward to transform the model into a statement about the dependence of current equilibrium values upon an exogenously specified distribution of end of period values however in this form the model is inherently unsatisfactory since it fails to take account of the fact that in reality the distribution of end of period firm values is not exogenously given but is determined as part of a subsequent capital market equilibrium attempts to iterate the single period capital asset pricing model over several periods in order to avoid the need to take the distribution future security values as exogenous have been unsuccessful for the most part since not being able to derive they have been forced to assume both the requisite normality of the distribution of subsequent security prices and the legitimacy of ignoring endogenously determined shifts in the individual investor s investment

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

the mismatch between mutual fund scale and skill i demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds active mutual funds with positive factor related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform i also show that the negative aggregate benchmark adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

liquidity investment style and the relation between fund size and fund performance using stock transactions data along with detailed stockholdings for a comprehensive sample of u s actively managed equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2002 this paper empirically examines the effect of liquidity and investment style on the relation between fund size and fund performance consistent with chen hong huang and kubik 2004 i find a significant inverse relation between fund size and fund performance further this inverse relation is stronger among funds that hold less liquid portfolios the inverse relation between fund size and fund performance is also more pronounced among growth and high turnover funds that tend to have high demands for immediacy overall this paper s findings suggest that liquidity is an important reason why fund size erodes performance

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

how big is the tax advantage to debt this paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question what magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios we incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income we conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms when it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms moreover if the tax advantage to debt is small the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt to firm value ratios the observed range of debt to firm value ratios in the u s economy is roughly speaking from zero to 60 percent traditional explanatory models of capital structure have focused on the tradeoff between the tax shield and bankruptcy costs arising from the use of debt finance 2 9 10 18 19 other

transactions costs and agricultural household supply response we develop and estimate a model of supply response when transactions costs create a situation where some producers buy others sell and others do not participate in markets we present two rationales for why producing households may have different relationships to the market proportional and fixed transactions costs using data on mexican corn producers we estimate an empirical model that allows for separate tests of the significance of both types of transactions costs revealing that both fixed and proportional transactions costs matter for the estimation the results provide consistent estimates of supply elasticity and measures of the relative importance of factors determining both proportional and fixed transactions costs

zero leverage and the value in waiting to have debt abstract this paper documents that the real option to have debt motivates some firms to remain debt free even when standard trade off theory predicts that these firms should have leverage the real option has a first order effect similar to the effect of bankruptcy costs in addressing the zero leverage puzzle the observation that many firms seemingly forgo sizable debt benefits by remaining debt free the debt free firms value includes the option whose value is derived from future debt benefits and hedging bankruptcy costs this paper proposes an optimal timing model for having debt and finds support for the model s predictions through calibrations and simulations

optimal priority structure capital structure and investment we study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions because debt priority serves as a dynamically optimal contract examining the relative efficiency of priority rules observed in practice we develop several predictions about how firms adjust their priority structure in response to changes in leverage credit conditions and firm fundamentals notably financially unconstrained firms with few growth opportunities prefer senior debt while financially constrained firms with or without growth opportunities prefer junior debt moreover lower rated firms are predicted to spread priority across debt classes finally our analysis has a number of important implications for empirical capital structure research including the relations between market leverage book leverage and credit spreads and tobin s q the influence of firm fundamentals on the agency cost of debt and the conservative debt policy puzzle the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

debt valuation renegotiation and optimal dividend policy the valuation of debt and equity reorganization boundaries and firm s optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants two formulations of reorganization are presented debt equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions we study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity induced defaults from strategic defaults we derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies the debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized

resolution of financial distress under chapter 11 abstract we develop a contingent claims model for a firm in financial distress with a formal account for renegotiations under the u s bankruptcy procedure known as chapter 11 shareholders and two classes of creditors senior and junior alternatively propose a reorganization plan subject to a vote the bankruptcy judge can intervene in any renegotiation round to impose a plan the multiple stage bargaining process is solved in a non cooperative game theory setting the calibrated model yields the liquidation rate the duration of chapter 11 and the frequency of deviations from the absolute priority rule which are consistent with empirical evidence

debt and seniority an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management we argue that long term debt has a role in controlling management s ability to finance future investments a company with high widely held debt will find it hard to raise capital since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors conversely for a company with low debt we show there is an optimal debt equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments we derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior

ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy a basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects in contrast this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice increasing the equityholders incentive to favor risky projects as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions