estimation of a taiwan monetary reaction function with time varying parameters this paper employs a nonlinear kalman filter to examine the time varying responses of taiwan s monetary policy in the presence of a limited dependent variable the kalman filtered parameters reveal that the responses are not constant but change over time furthermore a counter cyclical reaction function is identified and a stronger than usual discretionary policy during the recessions is found

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

does the federal reserve respond to errant money growth evidence from three monetary regimes this paper tests the hypothesis that the federal reserve responds to deviations between actual and targeted money growth with a corrective adjustment in their policy instrument the authors divide the sample period of 1975 87 into three monetary regimes their results suggest that the fed responded to errant money growth in the pre 1979 and the 1979 82 subperiods however the authors find no evidence that the fed responded to errant money growth in the post 1982 subperiod these results yield some insights into the source of the money supply announcement puzzle by lending support for what has been termed the policy anticipation effect copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

time varying response of monetary policy to macroeconomic conditions we reject the hypothesis that the federal reserve s response to the macroeconomy over the period of 1953 1994 can be accurately represented with a fixed parameter discrete choice model thus we model the fed s time varying response with a nonlinear kalman filter the estimated time paths of the reaction function coefficients suggest that the fed has responded countercyclically to movements in the price level except for the middle 1970s when it accommodated inflation the fed has generally responded countercyclically to unemployment and output during recessions however it has not maintained a countercyclical policy during nonrecessionary times until the 1980s a reaction function empirically relates a monetary policy indicator often the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate to the macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy usually national output inflation and unemployment assuming that the underlying macroeconomy is stable estimated coefficients from a reaction function reveal information about the monetary authority s response to macroeconomic conditions chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 1993 beyond the assumption described above most reaction function studies further assume that the federal reserve s response function is linear in the sense that it contains fixed coefficients see the survey by barth sickles and weist 1982 and more recently chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 1993 that is most studies implicitly assume that the fed responds to a change in inflation for example with the same vigor regardless of whether the level of inflation is unusually high or low and regardless of the timing of the response with respect to the business cycle elections and so on although it is generally recognized that a fixed coefficient estimate of the fed s reaction function overly homogenizes the fed s actual response to macroeconomic conditions solutions to the problem have been ad hoc studies that seek to expose a political business cycle impose structural break points on the fed s reaction function based on pre and postelections periods and then estimate a fixed coefficient reaction function within each subperiod hakes 1988a chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 1993 gamber and hakes 1997 other studies impose structural break points based on political or policy regimes and then estimate a fixed coefficient

the effect of changes in the federal reserve s policy rule on the stochastic structure linking reserves interest rates and money in october 1979 the federal reserve announced a fundamental reform in its monetary control procedures 2 the alleged rationale for abandoning the old procedures utilized more or less continuously since 1970 was to improve the fed s control over the growth of the monetary aggregates the so called intermediate policy targets as often accompanies political and social reform the spectrum of criticism of the fed s alteration in procedures was wide this criticism ranged from the charge that the fed had gone too far or alternatively had regressed to ironically the charge that nothing had changed such competing contentions are in this case largely generated by the lack of incontrovertible evidence that monetary control improved after 1979 and the considerable increase in the volatility of interest rates which ensued

conservatism and debt abstract despite the unquestionable influence of conservatism disagreement remains about what economic demands lead to financial reporting conservatism research examining lenders demands for reporting conservatism has been questioned for ignoring conservative contract modifications we document that these modifications exist but are not ubiquitous we find contract modifications are more likely when agency costs are higher and litigation tax and equity demands for conservatism are lower however we find a positive association between unexplained reporting conservatism and contract modifications suggesting contractual modifications alone do not fulfill lenders demands for conservatism

discussion of accounting standards and debt covenants has the balance sheet approach led to a decline in the use of balance sheet covenants abstract demerjian this issue argues that a shift by u s standard setters towards the balance sheet approach reduces the usefulness of balance sheet numbers for contracting consistent with this argument he provides evidence of a decline in the use of balance sheet based covenants in debt contracts a useful finding nevertheless i argue that the evolution of standard setting is more complex than this argument implies and evaluate the economic basis of demerjian s arguments for how debt contracts respond to changes in accounting rules one conclusion that emerges is that there are still some important open issues regarding the economic determinants of debt contracts

time varying discrete monetary policy reaction functions a novel dynamic ordered probit model with time varying parameters is proposed to estimate a monetary policy reaction function with narrative based monetary indicators the estimation and inference are carried out using the bayesian simulation based approach empirically these are the following findings first there is strong evidence in support that the central bank in taiwan responds counter cyclically to inflation but weaker if any evidence to economic growth secondly the persistence and consistence in policy making of the monetary authority is confirmed by the significance of the positive autoregressive coefficient although not all the estimates of the tvp dop model provide at least partial support of time varying parameters finally the results indicate that studies of the discrete monetary policy reaction functions without explicitly considering the possible dynamics inherent in the time series data and time variations in model parameters may be inappropriate if not incorrect

the foundations of trust macro and micro this comment on beugelsdijk s 2006 critique of trust and its measurement argues that it misses the mark and that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical foundation for thinking that the macro and micro foundations of trust or its measurement are different from each other generalised trust is more than a simple illusion hiding behind institutional structures

the objectives and priorities of monetary policy under different federal reserve chairmen this paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives estimates of this reaction function over the post accord period suggest that the burns period was unique while the martin and volcker periods were extremely similar the burns period was structurally distinct from both the martin and volcker periods further model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different fed chairmen copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

the choice of call provision terms evidence of the existence of agency costs of debt an examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm a substantial number of firms however also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate the additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities informational asymmetry and the risk incentive problem using a sample of newly issued bonds statistical tests are performed to show that there are in fact differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption this paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs one of the decisions which a firm must make when it floats a bond issue concerns the use of a call provision if a call provision is included in the bond then the terms of the call provision must be specified such as the years to the first call the initial call price the call price in subsequent years and the circumstances under which a call provision can be used previous work in the area of call provisions focused on fluctuations in interest rates as the reason for their existence it was shown by krause 12 however that in an efficient capital market any call provision decision based on interest rate uncertainty is irrelevant recent work in agency theory has shown that the existing contractual relationships between bondholders and stockholders may not be a zero sum game under these circumstances such financing decisions as capital structure debt maturity and call provisions may not be irrelevant an examination of the call provisions of currently outstanding bond issues reveals an institutional feature which is often overlooked many bonds have a standard call provision which restricts the firm from calling the issue for a stated number of years followed by a period during which firms have the option to call the bond at a stated call price another group of bond issues however contain a two tiered type of call provision which allows the corporation to call the bond for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate during the initial years of the life of the bond after this initial period the firm has the option of calling the bond issue for any purpose

implications for gaap from an analysis of positive research in accounting based on extant literature we review the positive theory of gaap the theory predicts that gaap s principal focus is on control performance measurement and stewardship and that verifiability and conservatism are critical features of a gaap shaped by market forces we recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets but caution against expanding fair values to financial reporting more generally we conclude that rather than converging u s gaap with ifrs competition between the fasb and the iasb would allow gaap to better respond to market forces

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

the influence of the federal advisory council on monetary policy the federal advisory council consists of twelve bankers elected by federal reserve bank directorates who advise the federal open market committee every three months on their desired direction for monetary policy this paper tests the conjecture that the council s directives to the committee contain information that predicts subsequent changes in interest rates and committee directives regression equations and granger causality tests do not disprove the conjecture this is the first hard evidence of private interest group influence on monetary policy copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

negotiated accounting rules in private financial contracts abstract this paper explores how private contracts tailor gaap and whether tailoring reflects the characteristics of the contracting parties the analysis reveals that contracts of bank and insurance lenders are different with bank agreements closer to public debt tailoring is one of several characteristics associated with insurance lending agreements the extensive tailoring of gaap income in insurance contracts enforces dividend and payout restrictions that are consistent with the interest of long term insurance lenders in contrast bank lenders deal with borrowers default risk by negotiating shorter maturities security sinking funds and loan syndication

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

permanent versus transitory components of annual earnings and estimation error in earnings response coefficients abstract previous research has generally estimated unexpected earnings as the change relative to the previous year assuming that shocks to annual earnings are purely permanent in the presence of transitory components of annual earnings we predict that using earnings changes as a proxy for unexpected earnings causes earnings response coefficients to be understated and the estimation error to be negatively cross sectionally correlated with persistence the negative correlation causes the association between earnings response coefficients and persistence to be overstated we use the ima 1 1 model to capture transitory components of annual earnings and obtain results that are consistent with our predictions

the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition we investigate the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition incorporation in reported earnings of gains and losses timely recognition requires accruals when it precedes complete realization of the gains and losses in cash we show that nonlinear accruals models incorporating the asymmetry in gain and loss recognition timelier loss recognition or conditional conservatism offer a substantial specification improvement explaining substantially more variation in accruals than equivalent linear specifications conversely conventional linear accruals models by omitting the loss recognition asymmetry exhibit substantial attenuation bias and offer a comparatively poor specification of the accounting accrual process linear specifications also understate the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows these findings have implications for our understanding of accrual accounting and conservatism as well as for researchers estimating discretionary accruals earnings management and earnings quality

the persuasive power of a committee chairman arthur burns and the fomc this paper investigates persuasion as a means of influence for the federal reserve chairman in meetings of the federal open market committee fomc using textual records of fomc meetings federal funds rate targets have been recorded for committee members who served in the arthur burns era 1970 1978 results show that burns member differences in stated funds rate targets were lower when burns made recommendations early in the meeting consistent with the hypothesis that the chairman is persuasive additional results show that members tendencies to respond to burns s recommendations were related to their personal and political loyalties

the investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice abstract this paper provides evidence on the cross sectional relation between firms investment opportunities their debt and compensation contracts their size and financial leverage and their accounting procedure choices this evidence is important because previous studies hypothesize that the link between firms investment opportunities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on the size debt equity and bonus plan hypotheses however while i find that firms investment opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts i also find that the traditional explanations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set

the impact of seniority and security covenants on bond yields a note theoretical research on the rational pricing of covenants in corporate bonds has examined seniority and security covenants black and cox 1 and ho and singer 8 use the option pricing model to show that senior debt should have a higher price than subordinated debt recent studies by smith and warner 10 11 and warner 13 document the widespread use of security covenants and argue that security reduces yield despite the broad concensus that seniority security covenants should reduce bond yields ceteris paribus empirical tests have failed to provide strong support for this view rather prior studies 2 3 have shown that security may actually increase the yield to maturity on debt the research cited relied on multivariate statistical techniques to examine various factors affecting yields or prices within specific rating categories contrary findings regarding security were attributed to differences in risk among bonds in the same rating category the present note is a refinement of past empirical studies by relying on a different test design we alleviate difficulties inherent in bond ratings specifically we study matched pairs of nonconvertible bonds issued by the same company that have similar features except for seniority security covenants our results support the view that seniority security covenants are rationally priced the next section discusses our test design and data and section ii summarizes our findings

institutional differences and international private debt markets a test using mandatory ifrs adoption institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross border private loans this study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international cross border versus domestic private debt markets using mandatory ifrs adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries i compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after ifrs adoption i find that in the pre ifrs period international loans are associated with a higher credit spread a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower a more diffuse loan syndicate and less reliance on accounting based covenants than domestic loans these results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality resulting in a more arm s length relationship between borrowers and lenders many of these associations attenuate after ifrs adoption suggesting that the pre ifrs differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries my findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts

performance pricing in bank debt contracts abstract performance pricing links bank debt interest rate spreads to a borrower s performance via two options interest decreasing performance pricing reduces spreads if credit quality improves it is more common when prepayment is more likely or costly and when adverse selection costs are higher and is less common when multiple performance measures better predict credit quality interest increasing performance pricing increases spreads if credit quality deteriorates it is more common when lenders reduce interest rates to add this provision when downgrades are more likely and when moral hazard costs are higher we find lower spreads for contracts with interest increasing performance pricing

on the existence of a political monetary cycle this paper examines electoral influence on monetary policy as measured by ml money growth i find a significant four year electoral cycle in money growth even when controlling for the influence of interest rates income and budget deficits further the residual electoral cycle produces the income and inflation movements associated with the political business cycle when it is used in simulations of simple reduced form macro models the paper concludes by discussing the difficulties in rationalizing cyclical monetary policy with rational expectations

accounting information in financial contracting the incomplete contract theory perspective this paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research we argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved by discussing its rich theoretical implications we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

measuring the probability of financial covenant violation in private debt contracts we measure the probability that a borrower will violate financial covenants in private debt contracts we analyze hand coded data and specify standard covenant definitions using compustat data that minimize measurement error for all individual dealscan covenants we use these definitions to create a measure of aggregate probability of violation which can be used across all covenants in a loan or among covenant subsets of interest we provide evidence that our aggregate probability measure is superior to alternatives used in prior literature

did the fed raise interest rates before elections the literature on political business cycles focuses on elected incumbents and neglects the incentives of appointed officials we present evidence of rate hikes before elections when the chair of the us federal reserve is from a different party than the incumbent president this finding contrasts with the traditional belief that an inappropriate policy rate bias implies a more expansive pre election policy stance we also find weak evidence that rates are lowered when the chair and president are from the same party the evidence that ideological preferences of the chair matter remains even when we control for career motives

political and economic determinants of interest rate behavior are central banks different i introduction do politicians manipulate the instruments of macroeconomic policy to improve their electoral prospects or in response to the preferences of their own party these questions are addressed but not yet resolved by the literature on political business cycles 1 to generate a political business cycle politicians must control the instruments of macroeconomic policy monetary policy plays an important role in the determination of inflation output and employment the objects of concern to politicians and voters yet politicians do not directly control the instruments of monetary policy in industrialized countries instead these instruments are controlled by the central banks which vary widely across countries in their degree of statutory independence we wish to examine empirically whether monetary policy is influenced by the timing of elections or a change in the party in power after controlling for unexpected changes in economic fundamentals our paper assesses therefore one aspect of independence namely whether a central bank makes monetary policy decisions without measurable political influence 2 in this study we attempt to look at what central banks actually do as opposed to what they are legislated to do to distinguish between the form and substance in discussions of central bank independence as in mayer 1976 3 our paper enlarges and improves on cowart 1978 and woolley 1983 both of whom studied the role of political factors in monetary policy for a sample of industrialized countries our methodology is to compare the responsiveness of interest rate changes to economic and political factors in seventeen countries as we discuss below there are differences in opinion about whether an interest rate variable or a monetary aggregate is a better representation of monetary policy actions we compare the results of qualitative measures of differences in central bank design e g rankings of banks in order of independence as determined by legislative criteria with the results of a quantitative comparison of differences in central bank behavior this exercise should help identify the important qualitative features in the reform of existing central banks or in the design of new central banks 4 in our empirical work the relevant relationships are estimated with a recursive vector autoregression technique to control for temporal instability in the economy between 1960 and 1990 and the endogeneity of the variables in question this methodological innovation has important consequences for the understanding of reaction functions and more generally for measuring the impact of macroeconomic shocks on monetary policy we also stress results for separate subsamples of fixed and flexible exchange rates as well as for the full sample our methodology measures the influence of politics on monetary policy relative to the choices and information actually available to the central bank when the monetary policy decision was made our study does not measure the influence of politics on the instruments of fiscal policy as in alesina et al 1991 our study also does not measure the direct influence of fiscal variables on the instruments of monetary policy although there is some evidence on this issue in for example parkin 1986 and burdekin and wohar 1990 burdekin and wohar estimate the relationships between deficits money base growth and inflation for a sample of countries and time period comparable to ours all these studies find some evidence that central banks do accommodate fiscal policy by financing deficits via money growth especially since the end of bretton woods we return to the issue of fiscal policy in considering the interpretation of our results but stress that the effects of fiscal policy are partly captured in our specifications because we measure monetary policy relative to the state of the economy 5 a brief review of the literature which measures statutory central bank independence is given in section ii

reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the board of governors every new appointment to the board of governors in recent years has triggered speculation as to how the new governor will vote in fomc meetings while several studies have hinted at partisan voting behavior by governors no study has yet attempted to identify reliable and unreliable partisan voting behavior and to pinpoint the background characteristics of governors that distinguish between the two this paper indicates that board members with a background in economics consistently voted in line with the economic ideology of the appointing president noneconomists on the board however displayed no such partisan voting behavior and were seen to be influenced by pressures emanating from the administration and by the monetary environment prior to their appointment over the 1951 to 1987 period most presidents have appointed reliable governors earlier in their presidential terms when the returns from being able to influence subsequent monetary policy are great and have chosen unreliable governors later in their terms when election support from the interest groups that these unreliables represent is important the results of the present paper suggest skepticism toward the recent spate of rational expectations game theoretic models which feature a dictatorial policy maker gaming atomistic market participants whose only political activity voting generates monetary surprises followed by convergence to an equilibrium because of their obsession with the ceremonial formalism of their genre these models ignore a vast complementary literature and as a consequence display conspicuously flimsy institutional and historical premises instead the present paper argues for the greater relevance of models of uncoordinated interaction between multiple political and private principals and federal reserve agents

unanticipated money and the political business cycle six different series of one period forecasts for money growth are generated for each year 1960 through 1984 the prediction errors are analyzed to see whet herthe authorities attempted to expand the economy in election years by unexpectedly raising money growth while there is no evidence of attempts to fool the public throughout the entire 1960 84 period such fooling may have been tried through 1974 it is speculated that the public discussion of expectations formation and of politicians motivations since then may have signaled officials that further attempts to mislead the public would be prohibitively costly copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

negotiated measurement rules in debt contracts this paper investigates contractual definitions of net income and net worth and the cross sectional variation in definitions of net income in a large sample of private debt contracts to shed light on the debt contracting demand for accounting numbers the descriptive evidence indicates that removing transitory earnings is one principal concern in the measurement of earnings but not in the measurement of net worth in the extreme contracts are never written on comprehensive income as an earnings concept whereas accumulated other comprehensive income is included in net worth in most contracts in contrast conservative adjustment in the sense of including certain types of negative earnings but not the corresponding positive earnings does not seem to be a primary consideration in measuring net income and net worth cross sectionally i find that net income is more likely to be defined differently from the gaap when net income plays a more important role in a contract when the loan maturity is longer and when transitory earnings are less useful for debt contracting collectively the evidence shows that debt contracting parties choose contracting variables in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and that transitory earnings are relatively less useful in measuring firm performance for debt contracting

the relation between narrative and money market indicators of monetary policy this paper studies the relation between narrative based indicators of monetary policy and widely used money market indicators of monetary policy three principal findings emerge first changes in monetary policy as measured by the narrative based policy indices are associated with persistent changes in the levels of m2 and the monetary base in contrast changes in the narrative policy indicators lead to transitory changes in short term interest rates nonborrowed reserves and the spread between the six month commercial paper rate and the three month treasury bill rate third these findings are generally robust across different narrative based policy indices

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

the money supply process identification stability and estimation questions regarding the structure and stability of money demand and money supply functions lie at the heart of many unresolved issues in macroeconomics in general and monetary theory and policy in particular general recognition of the problem probably accounts in part for what appears to be an insatiable appetite of the major journals for papers on money demand and money supply among the many issues addressed in the recent literature the stability of money demand has perhaps attracted the most attention an unsettling characteristic of all the tests for stability has been an underlying often implicit assumption that the money supply has been exogenously determined by the central bank the presumed exercise of federal reserve control over the money supply so as to make it statistically independent of disturbances is in turn predicated on the twin premises that the money supply function is in itself structurally stable and in addition is independent of fluctuations in money demand 2

trust between international joint venture partners effects of home countries trust is an important factor in interorganizational relations interorganizational trust in cross border relationships is likely to be influenced by the home countries of both partners using data on 165 international joint ventures ijvs we show that the perceived trustworthiness of an ijv partner is influenced by the general propensity to trust in the trustor s home country moreover the trustworthiness perceived by a focal parent firm is also affected by the home country of the other ijv partner this second effect is mitigated by experience between the partners

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes although the nature of the differences between parties in democratic electoral politics is an enduring question in political science surprisingly little is understood about the subject but substantial progress has been made in recent years most notably in understanding party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes the first breakthrough was douglas hibbs s 1977 analysis of party related differences in the unemployment rate in his time series analysis for the united states hibbs modeled the path of unemployment as an autoregressive moving average process subject to a dummy variable intervention term indicating party of the president his analysis indicated that democratic administrations were associated with lower unemployment than republicans by 2 36 points after eight years in office and even larger differences in long run equilibrium a subsequent article by nathaniel beck 1982 addressed the same issue and found the party differences less sharp when administration specific policy differences are considered the techniques employed by hibbs and beck focus directly on an outcome unemployment rather than on the policy instruments that are presumably responsible for altering outcomes this approach can be misleading when there are long lags between implementation of policies and ultimate effects or when shocks occasionally intrude upon the regular connections between instruments and outcomes macroeconomic theories can provide information about constraints linking macroeconomic variables but hibbs and beck fail to incorporate theoretical constraints such constraints could help determine what kinds of outcomes are feasible and sustainable and to what extent outcomes are induced by policies as opposed to shocks our purpose here is to consider how one might go about estimating party differences in a framework that takes advantage of some insights offered by macroeconomic theories and to report some preliminary results a more complete description of the analysis is provided in our working paper available upon request

an integrated test for electoral cycles in the u s economy this paper offers the first integrated test of the electoral model of business cycles the test begins with unrestricted estimates of presidential electoral patterns in u s economic outcomes real gnp unemployment and inflation and policies money growth and the adjusted budget surplus these estimates are then used to determine whether the estimated electoral patterns in macropolicy yield predicted electoral patterns for macro outcomes that are consistent with estimates of both actual electoral patterns in outcomes and voting behavior the results indicate that four year electoral cycles in macroeconomic outcomes and policies are strongly significant for the united states for the period 1951i to 1986ii copyright 1989 by mit press

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

a note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth this paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differences in economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust i discuss the world values survey wvs measure that is used to operationalise trust at the macro level i hypothesise that there is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and the empirical operationalisation of trust instead of measuring trust the wvs measure may instead proxy the well functioning of institutions i provide circumstantial evidence for this thesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutions and a robustness test of zak and knack s 2001 trust and growth economic journal vol 111 295 321 seminal study on trust and economic growth

performance measures in earnings based financial covenants in debt contracts this paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures i find an earnings based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest tax amortization and depreciation expenses ebitda however my empirical analyses show that ebitda is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses ebit and even the bottom line net income thus measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings based covenants i conjecture that contracting parties choose an ebitda related measure instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses e g ebit to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities which can be controlled through other contractual terms such as a restriction on capital expenditure and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture

collective wage bargaining and the role of institutional stability a cross national comparison of macroeconomic performance since the advent of the economic crisis interest in the efficacy of collective wage bargaining institutions has increased as the labour market was required to bear the burden of economic adjustment and became an important policy field for institutional reform in many countries in this article the role of institutional stability trust and certainty for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems is investigated and their effects on macroeconomic outcomes inflation and unemployment are analysed we argue that stability of the institutional framework of collective bargaining is of major importance for its efficacy as it reduces uncertainty and provides the necessary basis for trust among bargaining actors thus we hypothesise that institutional change and instability are associated with significant transaction costs and have at least temporarily negative effects on economic outcomes the hypotheses are confirmed by an empirical analysis which uses data of 34 industrialised countries from 1965 to 2014

monetary policy and presidential elections a nonpartisan political cycle this paper develops a federal reserve reaction function which relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives pre and postpresidential election estimates of this reaction function for the post accord period of 1953 1984 suggest two conclusions

1979 1982 rules or discretion in monetary policy gregory hoelscher what determined m1 growth from november 1979 through october 1982 a reaction function is developed and tested which ascribes the level of ml to two fed motives one is the fed s desire to hit its money growth targets the other is to carry out a counter cyclical short run monetary policy both motives are found to be significant during the period this evidence is consistent with the contention of some economists that the period was not a valid test of monetarist policy rules i introduction in october of 1979 the federal reserve system announced that it would use a new operating procedure that would allow it to place strong emphasis on controlling ml this policy shift from an interest rate target regime to a non borrowed reserves target regime was widely considered as tacit acceptance of the monetarist doctrine monetarists had been calling for a policy of stable gradually declining and pre announced money growth paths the change in operating procedure was designed to give the fed greater control over ml and to dramatize the fed s commitment to slowing money growth and inflation at the time many expected the new operating policy to result in a more stable money growth path at the expense of some short term interest rate variability the rate of inflation fell from 13 3 percent in 1979 to 3 9 percent in 1982 but the variability of both short term interest rates and of money growth increased substantially ore importantly the economy slipped into a brief recession in early 1980 and a longer and much more severe one in late 1981 by october 1982 the fed announced that it would de emphasize ml as a target variable but would continue to monitor the broader monetary aggregates thus a three year monetarist inspired experiment came to an end benjamin friedman 1984 and bryant 1983 argue that the events of 1979 82 demonstrate that monetarism as a policy guide is inadequate other economists disagree with these criticisms milton friedman 1984 mccallum 1984 and poole 1982 blame the high variance of monthly or quarterly growth rates in m1 for the poor post 1979 performance of the economy this paper assesses formally the determinants of m1 growth during the 1979 82 period if the fed was attempting to use m1 to fine tune the real sector then the argument that the 1979 82 period was not a valid test of the monetarist approach to monetary policy is that much stronger on the other hand if changes in m1 cannot be explained by fine tuning motives then perhaps the period does represent a test of monetarist policies the next section discusses the reaction function used in the paper section iii describes the data and the test results the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the money growth targets and either of two measures of real economic performance the unemployment rate and industrial production were significant determinants of fed policy during the late 1979 to late 1982 period section iv contains conclusions ii methodology the empirical tests use a reaction function the use of a reaction function does not imply that the federal reserve board or the open market committee explicitly acts in accordance with the function the reaction function is instead an as if assumption the fed is assumed to act as if it minimizes a loss function reaction functions have been estimated by a large number of authors barth sickles and wiest 1982 summarize many of the papers published in 1978 and earlier they report that unemployment and to a lesser extent inflation were most commonly cited as significant determinants of federal reserve policy during various portions of the 1952 77 period more recent papers by abrams froyen and waud 1980 levy 1981 allen and smith 1983 bradley 1984 witte 1984a 1984b and bradley and potter 1986 have extended the literature by including additional variables and time periods in the analysis

elections and the fed is there a political monetary cycle to understand the political causes of macroeconomic policy it is necessary to examine the institutions that actually make such policy and the incentives those institutions face an explanation of the political causes of united states monetary policy must treat the various institutions that are influential in the monetary policy process which are at a minimum the federal reserve fed and the executive including the president the treasury department and other advisors in the executive office of the president the reelection motive has proven useful in modeling presidential incentives in this article i investigate whether electoral incentives associated with the theory of the political business cycle pbc can help to explain the behavior of the fed over the last quarter century the political business cycle has had a curious hold on modern political economy while the empirical evidence in favor of the cycle is far from overwhelming its theoretical importance leads to continuing empirical

do liquidation values affect financial contracts evidence from commercial loan contracts and zoning regulation we examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property loan contracts we employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property s permitted uses as a measure of an asset s redeployability or value in its next best use within a census tract more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations lower interest rates and fewer creditors controlling for the property s type sale price and earnings to price ratio these results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure

federal open market committee structure and decisions abstract this paper examines the dissents of federal open market committee members regarding the domestic monetary policy directive it shows that on balance governors appointed by democratic u s presidents dissented significantly on the easier side while governors appointed by republican u s presidents dissented significantly on the tighter side the pattern of dissents for the reserve bank presidents was like that of republican appointees to the board of governors the bank presidents voting did not reflect regional points of view furthermore the timing of the dissents by both the governors and presidents did not seem to be associated with the onset of congressional or presidential elections

deficits politics and money growth the authors examine the linkage between federal deficits and money growth by allowing the fed s resp onse to any given deficit to vary systematically according to how the deficit is generated and the party affiliation of the current presid ent in equations for m1 and monetary base growth the structural def icit is consistently significant and invariant across political chang es while the cyclical component of the deficit or a direct measure of the business cycle is significant only during the tenure of democ ratic presidents copyright 1987 by oxford university press

a partisanship theory of fiscal and monetary regimes this paper indicates that income redistribution motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort thi s suggests that newly elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income estimated reaction from function s support these predictions a measure of income redistribution the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to gnp has a positive significant effect on money growth in addition when the presidency changes from conservative to liberal there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

understanding real business cycles he 1 960s were a time of great optimism for macroeconomists many economists viewed the business cycle as dead the keynesian model was the reigning paradigm and it provided all the necessary instructions for manipulating the levers of monetary and fiscal policy to control aggregate demand inflation occurred if aggregate demand was stimulated excessively and unemployment arose if demand was insufficient the only dilemma faced by policymakers was determining the most desirable location along this inflation unemployment tradeoff or phillips curve the remaining intellectual challenge was to establish coherent microeconomic foundations for the aggregate behavioral relations posited by the keynesian framework but this was broadly regarded as a detail that should not deter policymakers in their efforts to stabilize the economy the return of the business cycle in the 1970s after almost a decade of economic expansion and the accompanying high rates of inflation came as a rude awakening for many economists it became increasingly apparent that the basic keynesian framework was not the appropriate vehicle for understanding what happens during a business cycle nor did it seem capable of providing the empirically correct answers to questions involving changes in the economic environment or changes in monetary or fiscal policy the view that keynesian economics was an empirical success even if it lacked sound theoretical foundations could no longer be taken seriously the essential flaw in the keynesian interpretation of macroeconomic phenomenon was the absence of a consistent foundation based on the choice theoretic framework of microeconomics two important papers one by milton friedman 1968 and the other by robert lucas 1976 forcefully demonstrated examples of

the importance of accounting changes in debt contracts the cost of flexibility in covenant calculations abstract in this paper we examine how the exclusion of voluntary and mandatory accounting changes from the calculation of covenant compliance affects the interest rate charged on the loan after controlling for self selection bias and other factors known to affect loan spreads we find that the rate charged is 84 basis points lower when voluntary accounting changes are excluded and 71 basis points lower when mandatory accounting changes are excluded our results suggest that borrowers are willing to pay substantially higher interest rates to retain accounting flexibility that may help them avoid covenant violations and to avoid duplicate record keeping costs

the federal reserve s response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks evidence of a partisan political cycle the orthodox approach to modeling the fed s response to economic conditions is to employ a monetary policy reaction function most reaction functions are estimated by regressing a policy indicator possibly the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate on variables that describe the state of the economy such as unemployment inflation and growth in output under certain conditions which we discuss below estimated coefficients from a reaction function provide information about the fed s monetary policy priorities moreover extending the model to include election and partisan dummy variables may provide information about the fed s response to political pressures there are two problems with interpreting the coefficients in a standard reaction function as the weights that the fed attaches to its policy objectives first the monetary policy decision may not be represented accurately by an aggregate reaction function one that models the fed as a whole because there are twelve voting members on the fomc chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 10 have recently addressed this issue by employing a disaggregated set of reaction functions the second problem with interpreting reaction function coefficients as the weights the fed places on its policy objectives is that this interpretation implicitly assumes structural stability of the underlying macroeconomy abrams froyen and waud 1 31 acknowledge this shortcoming when they state coefficients from estimated reaction functions do not provide direct information on policymaker utility functions rather than being the solution to an unconstrained optimization dependent only on policymaker preferences reaction functions are the output of a constrained maximization where the constraints are the reduced form equations that characterize

estimating the discount rate policy reaction function of the monetary authority this paper estimates a policy rule that explains the sign and the magnitude of the federal reserve s fed s discount rate changes it sets out a two sided type ii tobit model and develops a procedure for its estimation considering the discrete and censored nature of the changes the results suggest that the fed has conducted discount rate policy counter cyclically to influence output and to curb inflation and that the fed s response to policy indicators varies over monetary regimes furthermore consistency is found between the model prediction of the discount rate change and a classification based on whether the change is technical or non technical copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd