local government structure and public expenditures the law of 1 n postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theunited states at both the state andnational level and across countries fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures using a sample of georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures indicating support for the law of 1 nat the local level

districting and government overspending theories of government spending driven by a common pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government this paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the united states the main finding is that when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity the results also show that at large electoral systems do not and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do break this relationship

bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

the effect of legislature size on public spending evidence from a regression discontinuity design what is the effect of legislature size on public spending an answer to this question is provided by weingast et al j polit econ 89 4 642 664 1981 whose law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects but only bear a fraction of the costs projects are financed from the common tax base fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives in this paper i test the validity of the law of 1 n using a dataset of 9325 german municipalities between 2008 and 2010 through the application of a regression discontinuity design many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for german municipalities can be determined the results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies which generally supported the implications of the law of 1 n for the years 2008 2010 i find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in german municipal councils

growth via external public debt and capital controls this paper analyzes strategies for economic growth in a small open overlapping generations economy that has access to perfect international capital markets and is characterized in autarky by multiple locally stable stationary equilibria the study designs a growth scheme consisting of external public debt and controls on private capital outflows this policy permits the economy to move from a low to a high output stationary equilibrium the policy may be pareto welfare improving if it is gradualistic and if the economy s rate of convergence to the better equilibrium is faster than the rate of debt accumulation copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

supermajority rule and the law of 1 n this paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1 n which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government our analysis suggests that supermajority rule despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending increases the 1 n effect because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members using data from us states from 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust worsening effect on the fiscal commons problem identified by the law of 1 n

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle this paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain using panel data from the american states i find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle that is while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year this pattern does not exist in states with strict no carry rules neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

local government type and municipal bond ratings what s the relationship abstractthere is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local u s government jurisdictions this has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two however the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form this article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the united states overall the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings and thus lower borrowing costs which may lend support that this form of administration is on some margin relatively more efficient than others these re

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

the law of 1 n revisited distributive politics legislature size and the costs of collective action the foundational model of distributive politics predicts a positive relationship between the number of legislative districts and the level of inefficiency of projects approved by the legislature weingast shepsle and johnsen s law of 1 n this relationship has been tested extensively in the empirical literature with mixed results this article presents a model wherein passing the omnibus legislation typical of distributive politics is a costly process the model predicts a nonlinear relationship between legislature size and spending as increasing the size of the legislature also increases the costs of collective action results from an empirical exercise based on u s state legislatures 1962 2014 are consistent with the proposed model showing a 1 n effect which diminishes at the margin as the legislature s size increases especially in the lower chamber

investor heterogeneity market segmentation leverage and the equity premium puzzle abstract financial economists for the past two decades have attempted to explain why the equity premium is so high now known as the equity premium puzzle epp we model investor heterogeneity market segmentation and optimal leverage using the time separable standard power utility market completeness and ignoring transaction costs to explain the epp we explain both the epp and the related risk free rate puzzle without resorting to preference modification furthermore we show a unique interior equilibrium for the debt ratio contrary to the work by f modigliani m h miller the cost of capital corporation finance and the theory of investment american economic review 48 1958 261 297 corporate income taxes and the cost of capital american economic review 53 1963 433 443 and s c myers presidential address the capital structure puzzle journal of finance 39 1984 575 592 our simulations show the relevance of our models

self fulfilling expectations speculative attack and capital controls this paper examines the endogenous implementation of capital controls in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime it is shown that if there exists a nonzero probability that the policymaker s response to a significant decrease in official foreign reserves will be the introduction of controls a speculative attack may occur even when current and expected monetary policy is consistent with a permanently viable control free fixed exchange rate regime consequently capital controls may be the outcome of self fulfilling expectations rather than the result of imprudent economic policies copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do this paper is the first a to apply a clean empirical design to study whether t

separation of powers and political budget cycles political budget cycles pbcs arise when the electorate is imperfectly informed about the incumbent s competence and the incumbent has discretion over the budget focusing on the second condition we study how separation of powers affects pbcs in the composition of government spending we find that the details of the budget process namely the bargaining rules the status quo s location and the degree of compliance with the budget law are critical for the existence and the amplitudes of pbcs in particular when the status quo is determined by the previous budget and there is high compliance with the budget law separation of powers acts as a commitment device which solves the credibility problems that drive pbcs

concurrent elections and turnout causal estimates from a german quasi experiment conventional wisdom suggests that scheduling elections concurrently with other contests increases turnout however causal empirical evidence in favor of this claim is scarce at best moreover it is a priori unclear whether theory would predict a higher turnout if two low office elections are combined instead of a combination of a low office election and a major electoral race using a quasi experiment and a difference in differences estimation approach at the german municipality level i provide evidence that combining two low office elections significantly increases turnout

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

capital flight north south lending and stages of economic development why capital does not necessarily flow from capital rich countries to capital poor countries as conventional international trade theory would predict this paper studies this question in a dynamic model that incorporates an asymmetric information structure similar to the structure in gertler rogoff as long as the degree of asymmetric information in the capital market is identical between the north and the south then both regions will converge to a steady state with the same capital intensity and the income gap between them will be eventually eliminated however if the asymmetric information exists only in the south the income discrepancy between the north and the south will be magnified by international capital movements and the timing of capital market liberalization in the south needs to be decided with extreme caution authors

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

habit persistence and the nominal term premium puzzle a partial resolution i introduction the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm has become the dominant paradigm in asset pricing theory because of its intuitive characterization of asset risk that is unlike expectations based asset pricing theories e g the present value model of stock prices which inherently assume risk neutrality the ccapm is predicated upon risk averse agents attempting to achieve a smooth consumption profile through the trading of assets from this perspective the risk of an asset is captured by the covariance of the asset s return with agents marginal utility of consumption or more broadly agents intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of wealth with this characterization the ccapm extends the results of the standard capm i e the risk of an asset is reflected in the covariance of the asset s return with the market portfolio to a general equilibrium setting however this intuitively appealing theory has not found much empirical support perhaps the most famous demonstration of inconsistency between the theory and data was rajnish mehra and edward prescott s 1985 analysis of the equity premium i e the difference between the average return on equity and that on government bonds using calibration methods rather than a formal statistical approach they showed that a standard ccapm severely underpredicts the size of the risk premium on equity the important implication of this finding is that the basic ccapm incorrectly models the covariance structure between the return on equity and asset holders intertemporal marginal rate of substitution economists response to this empirical rejection has been to either identify new sources of risk e g that implied by a particular monetary environment as in labadie 1989 or define alternative preferences toward risk e g the use of non expected utility theory as presented in weil 1989 and epstein and zin 1989 the potential for this research was illustrated recently by george constantinides s 1990 resolution of the equity premium puzzle in a model that included habit formation in consumption by relaxing the standard ccapm s assumption of time separable preferences constantinides demonstrated that a relatively smooth consumption profile and large risk premium on equity are consistent with equilibrium in a complete markets rational expectations framework 1 i use this insight to study another risk premium puzzle specifically the behavior of the nominal term premium the existence of a nominal term premium puzzle was demonstrated in papers by backus gregory and zin 1989 and salyer 1990 in which the term structure implications within a lucas 1982 type cash in advance cia economy were studied while some equilibrium characteristics of this model were consistent with the data both papers demonstrated that the model predicts the wrong sign of the term premium the theory implies the term premium should be negative while based on quarterly data for yields of three and six month u s treasury bills over the period 1959 1 1989 4 the observed term premium is positive similar to the equity premium puzzle as posed by mehra and prescott 1985 the prediction of a negative average term premium signals a critical discrepancy between the risk associated with nominal bonds as perceived by market participants and as captured by the models moreover this term premium puzzle is in some sense a stronger rejection of the underlying asset pricing model than that embodied by the equity premium puzzle to see this recall that within the consumption based asset pricing model the sign of the risk premium on any asset depends on the sign of the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and that asset s return applying this reasoning to the case of the equity premium suggests that while the discrepancy in size between the observed equity premium and that generated within the model is troubling the model s prediction of a positive equity premium implies that the basic payout structure of equity within the model is consistent with that in the data e

democrats republicans and taxes evidence that political parties matter i estimate the influence of political parties on state tax burdens over a forty year period 1960 2000 holding constant a large number of state and voter characteristic variables i find that i tax burdens are higher when democrats control the state legislature compared to when republicans are in control ii the political party of the governor has little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the state legislature i explain how both findings are consistent with median voter theory my results suggest that after five years of democratic control of the legislature state government would be approximately 3 to 5 percent larger than if republicans controlled the legislature during that same period with the better specifications producing estimates in the higher end of this range

selection on observed and unobserved variables assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools in this paper we measure the effect of catholic high school attendance on educational attainment and test scores because we do not have a good instrumental variable for catholic school attendance we develop new estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables we also propose an informal way to assess selectivity bias based on measuring the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required if one is to attribute the entire effect of catholic school attendance to selection bias we use our methods to estimate the effect of attending a catholic high school on a variety of outcomes our main conclusion is that catholic high schools substantially increase the probability of graduating from high school and more tentatively attending college we find little evidence of an effect on test scores

crash states and the equity premium solving one puzzle raises another abstract this paper examines the behavior of asset returns as predicted by the consumption based capital asset pricing model within an artificial economy that includes a low probability crash state in consumption and dividends it is demonstrated that the behavior of agents intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in such an economy is consistent with the hansen and jagannathan 1991 frontier even though the consumption process in the model is calibrated to actual data preferences are time separable and agents relative risk aversion is restricted to moderate levels moreover as demonstrated by rietz 1988 the crash state economy can replicate the mean of excess returns on equity i e the equity premium however the model severely underpredicts the volatility of excess returns

elected or appointed how the nomination scheme of the city manager influences the effects of government fragmentation abstract empirical research on the causal effect of government fragmentation derives diverse results one reason for this diversity might be that studies are typically settled in a variety of institutional environments to assess the extent to which the local political system might shape the effects of fragmentation this study measures the causal effect of a change in the nomination scheme of the city manager on the council size effect i combine a regression discontinuity design with a difference in differences approach in a large panel dataset of german municipalities the study finds that when the manager is appointed by council there is no significant council size effect but that there is a negative effect when the manager is elected by voters for those expenditure categories over which the manager has the most discretion these findings suggest that the nature of the political system does indeed matter

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

tests of institutional versus non institutional models of local public expenditure determination are institutional or non institutional factors more important determinants of local public expenditure decisions employing data that allows us to directly identify the entire distribution of voter expenditure demands we estimate models of deviations of actual expenditures from the expenditure demand of defensible benchmarks namely the median voter s expenditure demand and the mean of voters expenditure demands three competing paradigms are employed to specify these models namely a non institutional model the reform government movement s explanation of how institutions affect local government decisions and a transactions cost model of this same phenomenon predictions from these three competing models differ in many respects comparisons of results from estimating models of expenditure deviations are found to be generally more consistent with the non institutional model than with either of the two institutional models these results suggest that a competitive local public service market helps limit the ability of governments to tax and spend in excess of the demands of the median or mean voter

do constitutions matter evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level this paper asks if it does matter for taxes and government spending whether the mayor is elected and recalled by direct election or by the municipal council it thus contributes to the economic literature on the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes the effects are identified based on reforms of the municipal constitutions that were exogenous from the point of view of the municipalities in content and timing each year quasi randomly selected groups of municipalities introduced the new constitution this setup helps overcome endogeneity and identification issues that are common to many studies in the field using country level data using a new panel dataset of the 686 municipalities in three german states this paper shows that direct mayoral election and recall through referendum only as opposed to election and recall through the municipal council reduce tax rates and increases spending on government employees

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

does the size of the legislature affect the size of government evidence from two natural experiments this paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government the results indicate a negative effect i e the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government this runs counter to conventional wisdom one potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy i present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism

divided government versus incumbency externality effect quasi experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions abstract this paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections we ask 1 does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter s decision in subsequent town council elections 2 do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election the analysis mainprod type flply relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for germany we find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election moreover voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections throughout the paper we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government

deviations from constituent interests the role of legislative structure and political parties in the states this paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960 1990 recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state s legislature this is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like we also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure but do influence the composition of spending in particular democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

the choice of municipal government structure and public expenditures numerous empirical studies have attempted to measure the effect of varying government structures on public expenditures i argue that these prior may have produced biased estimates as they are predicated on the assumption that government structures are exogenous

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

municipal residency laws and local public budgets prior research has shown that residency laws increase the productivity of municipal employees which tends to reduce per unit operating cost however this gain in efficiency appears to have been lost when one considers that public employee groups tend to be high demanders who have a greater tendency to vote in local elections and to support expenditure increases bennett and orzechowski 1983 our results tend to provide additional evidence to support the findings of previous studies that public employee groups tend to exert a disproportionate impact on local budgetary decisions

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

political budget cycles and divided government abstractpolitical budget cycles and divided government regional studies this study empirically examines the effect of divided governments on the existence of political budget cycles it uses a setting at the german municipality level where divided governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system in this setting the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections the study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative under divided government policy manipulation is significantly smaller

city level analysis of the effect of political regimes on public good provision this paper uses u s city level data on five public expenditure categories to test empirically whether the form of local government affects the amount of public good provision this also serves as an empirical test of a theory of national politics that predicts higher provision of public good in parliamentary than in presidential regimes the robust results indicate that at the city level the mayor council form of government provides significantly more public good than the council manager form of government for two of the public expenditure categories and at the national level presidential regimes provide more public good than do parliamentary regimes

legislative organization and government spending cross country evidence abstract the law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact the law of 1 n has received only limited empirical scrutiny and the existing evidence for the american states provides mixed support for the thesis this paper examines the law of 1 n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross section of democratic countries the results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures but bicameralism dampens the 1 n effect relative to unicameralism

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

democracy redistribution and political participation evidence from sweden 1919 1938 in this paper we compare how two different types of political regimes direct versus representative democracy redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation most importantly we exploit the existence of a population threshold which partly determined a local government s choice of democracy to implement a regression discontinuity design the results indicate that direct democracies spend 40 60 percent less on public welfare our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite s potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization

parental leave and mothers careers the relative importance of job protection and cash benefits parental leave regulations in most oecd countries have two key policy instruments job protection and cash benefits this paper studies how mothers return to work behavior and labor market outcomes are affected by alternative mixes of these key policy parameters exploiting a series of major parental leave policy changes in austria we find that longer cash benefits lead to a significant delay in return to work and that the magnitude of this effect depends on the relative length of job protection and cash benefits however despite their impact on time on leave we do not find a significant effect on mothers labor market outcomes in the medium run neither of benefit duration nor of job protection duration to understand the relative importance and interaction of the two policy instruments in shaping mothers return to work behavior we set up a non stationary job search model in which cash benefits and job protection determine decisions of when to return to work and whether or not to return to the pre birth employer despite its lean structure the model does surprisingly well in matching empirically observed return to work profiles the simulation of alternative counterfactual regimes shows that a policy that combines both job protection and benefits payments succeeds to induce mothers to spend some time with the child after birth without jeopardizing their medium run labor market attachment

hierarchical accountability in government abstract this paper studies a setting where a relatively uninformed voter holds a policymaker accountable through an informed intermediary in equilibrium the voter uses the intermediary to insulate the policymaker from pandering incentives when the voter s policy expertise is low or the policymaker s congruence is high the voter can thus enjoy the benefits of bureaucratic expertise without forfeiting electoral responsiveness we examine the model s predictions using u s city level data and find that hierarchically accountable managers reduce popular city employment and adjust it more flexibly than electorally accountable mayors the estimated incentive effects are smaller in cities with high voter expertise and larger during election years and are robust to instrumentation by precipitation shocks that influenced early 20th century manager government adoptions for reasons obsolete today

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

the impact of government structure on local public expenditures though the relationship between local government structure and expenditure has received considerable attention there is little consensus as to how the features of representative government affect local expenditure an exception is city council size which has consistently been found to be positively related to spending previous results rely on cross sectional estimation which may be subject to omitted variable bias this paper analyzes three components of municipal governments the form of government the size of the city council and the election method of city councilors once fixed effects estimation is employed the positive relationship between city council size and expenditure disappears

politicians bureaucrats and targeted redistribution abstract the paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats it uses the example of patronage jobs in the u s local governments to provide empirical support for this claim it shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives this difference is stronger in public services with bigger private public wage differential and it increases during election years it also finds that the number of public employees increases with the age of bureaucrats while there is no such relationship in the case of politicians which is consistent with younger bureaucrats having stronger career concerns

making rules credible divided government and political budget cycles political budget cycles pbcs can result from the credibility problems office motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances we analyze the role of rules that limit public debt because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate pbcs since the legislature must typically authorize new debt divided government can make these fiscal rules credible commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law which can help explain why pbcs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies when divided government affects efficiency voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence