institutions and the environmental kuznets curve for deforestation a crosscountry analysis for latin america africa and asia abstract the relationship between deforestation and income across 66 countries of latin america africa and asia is examined institutional characteristics as well as macroeconomic policies of each country are hypothesized to impact deforestation results show strong evidence of an environmental kuznets curve ekc relationship between income and deforestation for all three continents institutional structure and macroeconomic policy significantly affect the tropical deforestation process improvements in political institutions and governance significantly reduce deforestation the factors leading to deforestation differ across regions however and there is no one size fits all global policy recommendation for restraining the tropical deforestation process

the power of parties evidence from close municipal elections in norway we show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems using data from norway we find that a larger left wing party leads to more property taxation higher child care spending and less elderly care spending while local public goods appear to be a non partisan issue these effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities and partly due to changes in the left right position of the council keeping the majority constant the estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise but they are consistent with evidence on politicians fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

agriculture and the environment an economic perspective with implications for nutrition abstract agricultural production has harmed environmental quality primarily because of inadequately designed policies and natural resource projects hence most of the harmful side effects of agriculture can be reduced or eliminated by replacing these bad institutions with policies and projects that create financial dis incentives for un desirable behavior provided appropriate policies are followed environmental constraints should not keep people from meeting nutritional standards that emphasize more fruits vegetables and fish nutritional well being can be achieved with policies and projects that give people sufficient access to food that has been produced with methods that minimize adverse impacts on the environment

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

deforestation and the rule of law in a cross section of countries relationships between deforestation and population pressure income growth and insecure property rights are examined with data from 120 countries insecure property rights are hypothesized to arise from two sources government instability or inability to enforce ownership and an absence of government accountability the former source is captured by measures of general lawlessness such as guerrilla warfare revolution and frequent constitutional change the latter is proxied by variables indicating the type of government executive frequency of political purges and the existence of an elected legislature general support is indicated for the property rights hypothesis and for the effects of population growth

fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in american states clear fiscal policy effects appear in american state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992 independent of the effects of incumbency coattails term limits and macroeconomic conditions the results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations which differ for each party net of these expectations republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget democrats do not and indeed may be rewarded for small increases independent of this the incumbent governor s party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance taken together these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels partisan control expectations and institutions

dynamic responses to changing demand a model of the reallocation process in small and large municipalities in norway local government priorities between local services are analysed in a community preference model emphasizing income effects and demographic factors the model is built into a partia adjustment framework with endogenous speed of adjustment to study the dynamic responses of local governments to shifting demand the empirical analysis of the reallocation process separates between small and large municipalities in terms of population size serious sluggishness of the adjustment is documented with large municipalities experiencing stronger inertia than the small the small authorities have been able to respond more effectively to the restructuring pressure from demographic shift

do external grants to district governments discourage own revenue generation a look at local public finance dynamics in ghana summary using rich panel data on all of ghana s districts local public finances over 11 years this paper investigates the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments incentives to collect internally generated revenues and funds igf we find that despite an incentive scheme built into one of the major intergovernmental grants the flow of all grants taken together discourages rather than encourages igf this is reflected both in the depressing effect of transfers on igf levels as well as on igf growth

poverty and environmental degradation in the nicaraguan hillsides abstract this article questions the assumption of poverty as a major cause of environmental degradation examining five environmentally harmful natural resource management practices in the nicaraguan hillsides it shows that the immediate agents of environmental degradation are the nonpoor farmers not the poorest it argues that to analyze the causal links between poverty and environment a distinction between poverty as a state of deprivation and poverty as a relational phenomenon is necessary finally the article warns that the often strategic reference to poverty as the major cause of environmental degradation made by nonpoor and poor farmers may lead to negative environmental impacts

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

soil erosion and labor shortages in the andes with special reference to bolivia 1953ndash 1991 implications for conservation with development abstract many claims in support of soil conservation policies have been flawed by excessively deterministic reasoning and unwarranted spatial overaggregation a case study remedying these flaws demonstrates that soil erosion in the bolivian andes worsened during recent decades 1953 91 due to changes in production as peasants shifted labor from conservation techniques to nonfarm employment these findings reflect in three policy issues concerning sustainable resource management oriented toward development conservation with development are discussed a environmental consequences and economic causes of increased nonfarm employment by part time peasant farmers b environment related aspects of technology innovation and technique modifications in labor scarce peasant production and c the environmental perceptions of peasant farmers in participatory development planning

strategies for sustainable development of less favored areas discussion development based on indicators of change in the natural capital stock alone such as the indicators used by kerr and by pgb e this constrained maximization problem for sustainable development leads to two linked objectives increase in wealth and maintenance of the capital stock especially the natural capital stock returning to our metaphor the elephant must enjoy feeding without trampling and overgrazing the bush through this elephantine lens on sustainable development the disparate research questions of the three articles fit into view fan and hazell explicitly look at changes over time addressing the wealth maximization objective of the sd problem at the district scale within two huge countries they find that agricultural investment in the less favored areas leads not only to higher marginal rates of return but also to sharper declines in poverty incidence they speculate scott m swinton is associate professor in the department of agricultural economics at michigan state university this article was presented in a principal paper session at the aaea annual meeting chicago il august 2001 the articles in these sessions are not subjected to the journal s standard refereeing process

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

mps for sale returns to office in postwar british politics many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence we estimate the returns to serving in parliament using original data on the estates of recently deceased british politicians applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare members of parliament mps with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of conservative mps but had no discernible financial benefits for labour mps conservative mps profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions we show that gaining a seat in parliament more than tripled the probability that a conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly traded firm enough to account for a sizable portion of the wealth differential we suggest that labour mps did not profit from office largely because trade unions collectively exerted sufficient control over the party and its mps to prevent members from selling their services to other clients

economic factors in farmer adoption of agroforestry patterns observed in western kenya abstract a study of agroforestry adoption by 3 000 project participants in siaya and south nyanza districts in kenya supports three hypotheses 1 1 historical increases in tree domestication and management intensity are responses to declining supply of uncultivated tree resources increased subsistence and commercial demand for tree products and perceived risks of ecological degradation adoption of agroforestry is most likely where consistent with economic incentives for land use change 2 2 high variability in individual farmers tree growing strategies reflects differences in resources and livelihood strategies and household level returns to agroforestry relative to alternative options for meeting specific objectives 3 3 farmers reduce risks associated with new agroforestry practices through incremental adoption and adaptation and cost and risk reducing modifications in technology design

agrarian structure and agricultural practice typology and application to western sudan a typology of models that explain patterns of variation in farm endowments and farm practices and yields shows that insecurity in renting land financing constraints and the absence of insurance generate patterns of factor use quite different from the famous inverse relationship caused by labor supervision problems one might expect to observe positive relationships between wealth and yields village level data from western sudan confirm that such positive relationships are not a theoretical curiosity wealthy farmers have higher levels of output per hectare because they use more labor per hectare insurance and financing constraints appear to be the crucial market failures

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

rainfall shocks local revenues and intergovernmental transfer in mali summary this paper explores the implications of rainfall shocks for municipal tax revenues and intergovernmental transfers in mali i found that exogenous phenomena such as weather not under the control of local actors could affect the way de facto decentralization plays out by influencing the fiscal capacity of local governments in a panel data of 692 municipalities from 2000 to 2008 i found that rainfall shocks through the fluctuations they induce in agricultural incomes affect revenue collection of local governments and in turn drive further revenues local governments receive through transfer by the central government

do parties matter for economic outcomes a regression discontinuity approach a long standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies this question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities this article uses a regression discontinuity design namely party control changes discontinuously at 50 of the vote share which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes the method is applied to a large panel data set from swedish local governments with a number of attractive features the results show that there is an economically significant party effect left wing governments spend and tax 2 3 more than right wing governments left wing governments also have 7 lower unemployment rates which is partly due to that left wing governments employ 4 more workers than right wing governments jel c21 d72 d78 h71 h72

constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes we investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies we rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference due to non random selection of these constitutional rules the findings are consistent with our theoretical priors presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections

the private returns to public office we study the wealth accumulation of indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates the annual asset growth of winners is 3 5 percent higher than that of runners up a difference that holds also in a set of close elections the relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions these results are consistent with a rent seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners assets

lobbying political competition and local land supply recent evidence from spain abstract we analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies we use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2 000 spanish municipalities for the period 2003 2007 in spain land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans the main policy variable in these plans and the one analyzed here is the amount of land classified for potential development we measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government this variable is however potentially endogenous since not only do votes affect policy but also policy is expected to affect votes to deal with this problem we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election the results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development this effect is found to be most marked in suburbs in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners and in municipalities governed by the left

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

on the returns to holding political office is it worth it abstract the paper estimates causal effects of being elected in a local election on monetary returns the claim for causality is made in a research design where the income of some candidate who just barely won a seat is compared to that of some other candidate who was close to winning a seat for the same party but ultimately did not this research design is made possible thanks to a comprehensive detailed data set covering all swedish politicians who have run for office in the period 1991 2006 the analysis establishes that monetary returns from local politics are absent both in the short and long run by relating this null result to effects on the future political career the paper provides suggestive evidence that local politicians are not primarily motivated by money

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

electoral politics and monetary policy does the bank of canada contribute to a political business cycle in this paper i apply the work of abrams and iossifov public choice 129 249 262 2006 to monetary policy in canada to see if same political party affiliation is needed to produce evidence of political opportunism after modifying their analysis to maintain the time series consistency of their variables for canada i find that both an error correction model and a taylor rule reformulation of their test generate evidence consistent with same party political opportunism but only weakly so on the other hand i also find the presence of more traditional indicators of political influence in particular the data suggest that the election of a liberal party government a decrease in the degree of political competition and to a lesser extent the election of a minority government all positively influence the expansiveness of canadian monetary policy

political competition and state government size do tighter elections produce looser budgets we test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size usingdata from u s states we find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand or revenues growth is mixed the democraticparty is associated with bigger government but onlywhen party representation in both the governor shouse and the legislature is strong the flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion

the interaction of population growth and environmental quality an important question for policy is whether holding constant per capita income and other relevant factors population pressures have a significant effect upon environmental degradation the authors examine the effect of population pressures upon deforestation in 64 developing countries in an attempt to provide relevant empirical findings data on deforestation were drawn from the food and agriculture organizations production yearbook results suggest that a relationship exists between per capita income and deforestation and that for africa rural population density shifts the relationship upward the increase in the rate of deforestation levels off as income increases the rate of growth in per capita income also has a significant negative impact upon deforestation although the magnitude of the effect is small the authors close in stressing that reducing the rate of population growth is not necessarily the best way to reduce the rate of deforestation deforestation in developing countries is really a problem of market failure since property rights are often neither defined nor enforced there is essentially no private cost of deforestation with no long term stake in the land people have no incentive to use land efficiently this situation must be addressed in conjunction with the problems of poverty and population growth

smallholder wood production and population pressure in east africa evidence of an environmental kuznets curve the incentives for growing fuelwood on small farms are examined using survey data from kenya the analysis finds that tree planting is a competitive activity and that farmers are responsive to incentives to plant trees these incentives vary across households facing different factor availabilities and market opportunities the existence of a persistent fuelwood gap and the notion that population pressure will lead to declining tree cover are not supported by the analysis a simulation model indicates that as land continues to be subdivided tree cover may actually rise a result consistent with other evidence of an environmental kuznets curve

inter regional redistribution through infrastructure investment tactical or programmatic in this paper we study the political economy of the inter regional allocation of investment in infrastructure in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more political clout and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain objective criteria e g income level we use a panel of data from the spanish electoral districts for the period 1964 2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables the results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which i the incumbent s vote margin is low ii few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature iii the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party and iv regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature however the results also show that programmatic politics matter since inter regional redistribution is shown to increase i with the arrival of democracy and european union funds ii under leftist governments and iii the weaker the correlation is between political clout and regional income

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

election goals and income redistribution recent evidence from albania this paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub federal levels of government we model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decision makers and at a deeper level by the institutions within which they nd themselves operating we contrast two political objective functions that yield di erent empirical predictions of the ways in which politics should a ect scal policy lessons learned here may prove important in understanding limits on the types of redistribution possible via block grants given the institutional framework in both developing and developed countries 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation h1 h7 o1

busting the princelings the campaign against corruption in china s primary land market using data on over a million land transactions during 2004 2016 where local governments are the sole seller we find that firms linked to members of china s supreme political elites the politburo obtained a price discount ranging from 55 4 to 59 9 compared with those without the same connections these firms also purchased slightly more land in return the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these princeling firms are 23 4 more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership to curb corruption president xi jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level using a spatially matched sample e g within a 500 meter radius we find a reduction in corruption of between 42 6 and 31 5 in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by xi accordingly this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead

the effects of party competition on budget outcomes empirical evidence from local governments in spain this paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election i e the difference between the vote share and 50 two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper on the one hand the leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector irrespective of the ideology of the party in power on the other hand the partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low i e parties on the left right will increase decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low these hypotheses are tested with information on spending own revenues and deficit for more than 500 spanish local governments over 8 years 1992 1999 and information on the results of two local electoral contests 1991 and 1995 the evidence favors the partisan hypothesis over the leviathan one we found that for left wing governments spending taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases whereas for right wing governments a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables

effects of asymmetric information and reference emission levels on the emissions from deforestation and degradation abstract reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation plus as an important measure to mitigate climate change can effectively reduce the emissions caused by deforestation and degradation in tropical countries it is particularly important in the projects of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation plus that carbon emission monitoring and reference emission levels are tied to the revenues of a country however how do the reference emission levels and information of emissions influence project performance is still uncertain within a theoretical analysis framework this paper considers the confliction among landholder behaviors goals of policymakers as well as the distortion caused by the existence of asymmetric information the theoretical framework reveals two hypotheses through comparing optimal decisions under different scenarios i an increase in reference emission levels can lead to a decrease in landholders efforts and an increase in actual emissions ii information asymmetry caused by the increase of landholder s forest area results in an increase in emissions the empirical study uses panel data for 75 developing countries to test these hypotheses the results show that a monitoring reporting and verification system can help achieve the social optimum level for emissions and the efforts by landholders an increase in the forest areas owned by landholders and in rel will lead to an increase in emissions the empirical results also confirm this point at a global scale as well as regionally in africa latin america the caribbean and asia oceania as solutions for these problems an effective monitoring reporting and verification system is crucial in successful implementation of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation plus

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

effects of demographic and related microeconomic change on land quality in hills and mountains of developing countries abstract more than 70 empirical studies indicate that local population growth and its microeconomic manifestations in hills and mountains of developing countries do not necessarily threaten forest production agriculture livestock production or watershed stability population growth can make the cost of land relative to labor increase as this cost increases people often change their methods of managing economic plants and animals and make land improvements to offset initial declines in productivity that result from more frequent use of land thus the relationship between land productivity and relative land labor costs often resembles a u halting population growth or removing people from well settled areas might not improve productivity or reduce some off site damages

poverty and environment in latin america concepts evidence and policy implications abstract who is responsible for the ongoing degradation of natural resources such as agricultural soils rangeland and forests evidence from across latin america suggests that the nonpoor and the poor are both at fault while the poor lack the means to invest in protecting natural resources both the nonpoor and the poor often lack the incentives for good resource stewardship policies for agricultural intensification and livelihood diversification can alleviate poverty and its capacity constraint but incentive policies for good stewardship are critically needed such policies should be targeted to specific environmental problems and tailored to the motivations of rural decision makers

accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education abstract this paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index ideb basic education development index in 2007 to identify the effect of education accountability on yardstick competition in educational spending among brazilian municipalities an exploratory analysis of the data shows a minor reduction 20 in spatial interaction in public educational spending after ideb disclosure compared with the spatial correlation before disclosure of the index our main results explore a discontinuity around the cutoff of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment after ideb disclosure the estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation and thus yardstick competition is reduced by 52 falsification and robustness tests were performed and suggest that we can claim causality around small bandwidths of the cutoff this finding suggests that the public release of information may decrease the importance of neighbors information on voters decisions

property tax revaluation and tax levy growth abstract jurisdiction wide property revaluation like many administrative reforms may have unintended consequences this paper examines one such potential consequence by pooling 18 year time series for each of 39 massachusetts cities 17 of which revalued and 270 massachusetts towns 202 of which revalued we examine the hypothesis that politicians take advantage of the confusion generated by revaluation and raise property taxes by more than they otherwise would have we observe such a response in cities but not in towns and attribute this difference to differences in their governmental structures

dynastic political rents economic benefits to relatives of top politicians we exploit close elections in swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits we find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors but the

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

deforestation and the environmental kuznets curve an institutional perspective institutions for secure property rights and better environmental policies for moving the system towards a sustainable growth path can reduce the height of an environmental kuznets curve ekc relationship between income and deforestation this study examines the impact of these specific institutional factors on the ekc relationship for deforestation across latin american african and asian countries the factors related to agricultural production population economy and governmental policies of each country are hypothesised to affect deforestation results of the latin american countries show significant evidence of an ekc relationship for deforestation and also relevance of the institutional factors to reduce the rate of deforestation improvements in institutions for secure property rights and better environmental policies can thus significantly reduce the rate of deforestation without hindering the level of economic growth evidence also suggests that the effect of agricultural production on deforestation could be halted by strengthening institutional factors there was found to be complementarity between the institutional factors and forest sector polices and an additive effect between the institutional factors and forest products export promotion policies which could also eventually reduce the rate of deforestation

infrequent assessments distort property taxes theory and evidence abstract economists have long recognized that lags in property reassessment benefit infrequent movers because it reduces their property taxes but in addition reassessment lags can influence the level of property taxes selected under majority rule i show that short delays in community wide reassessment increase property tax collections because it reduces the tax price for a majority of voters however longer delays reduce property tax collections because the aggregate assessed base and thus the tax yield declines so much i formally characterize the cutoff between these regimes and show tax collections are generally above their socially optimal level this theory can help explain why many people believe property taxes are excessive and it also suggests that the american system of taxing capital gains at realization rather than on accrual might result in excessive rates i test this theory on a sample of pennsylvania municipalities in the philadelphia suburbs this is a suitable crucible for such an evaluation because community wide reassessments are infrequently performed in pennsylvania it is not possible to reject the theory s basic predictions and numerical estimates suggest that a 5 year delay in community wide reassessment increases government revenues by 6 however reassessment delays do not impose statistically significant social losses because they benefit infrequent movers

politicians payments in a proportional party system abstract are there monetary returns to politics this question is approached in this paper as one of few to quantify the monetary returns to holding political office in a country with proportional representation system i apply a difference in difference setting with a carefully chosen control group to rich data on candidates to the swedish national parliament both short and long run effects of being elected on different types of income are estimated results show that yes mostly thanks to relatively high remuneration while still in office politics can yield positive monetary returns in the long run however the effect is instead compositional in the sense that ex politicians receive more pension income and work less

redd and forest transition tunneling through the environmental kuznets curve abstract international attention is focused on finding ways to reduce emissions from deforestation because of the emerging concerns over climate change however the causes of deforestation are rooted in current economic and development paradigms the causes of deforestation also vary across different geographical regions and have implications for the forest transition attempts to reach an international agreement on curbing deforestation have achieved little success despite over 30 years of un negotiations new initiatives from redd reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation could provide financial incentives to curb deforestation hence alternative development paths for forest cover changes and forest transition are analyzed for the redd policy within the framework of an environmental kuznets curve ekc for deforestation the ekc models are estimated for geographical regions of latin america africa and asia the results based on the panel data analysis of 43 countries covering the period 1970 1994 provides evidence that an inverted u shaped ekc fits for latin america and africa while a u shaped ekc applies to asia the results also indicate that strengthening agricultural and forestry sector policies are important for curbing deforestation the ekc models estimates could provide guidance for decisions on financing the redd policy as specific to each region

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

globalization and the connection of remote communities a review of household effects and their biodiversity implications abstract the remote regions of the world provide refuge to a disproportionate amount of the earth s biodiversity as globalization continues isolated human communities in these regions are increasingly connected to global market migration and technology networks we review the diffuse literature on the household effects of changing market access migration and technology adoption in remote regions and implications for native biodiversity market access affects biodiversity in remote communities through changes in household economics and social networks migration either to or from remote settlements affects biodiversity through changes in population remittances human capital and social networks finally we consider effects due to production public infrastructure and information and communication technologies there is much ambiguity surrounding these causal pathways and thus we also examine the roles of various ecological household community and institutional mediating factors in determining the impacts of global connection finally we explore the limitations of our current knowledge and research practices and propose directions for future work to address key uncertainties in theory and evidence as well as weaknesses in methodological approaches we recommend a broad and interdisciplinary mode of inquiry as the best means toward clarifying globalization s impacts on human settlements and the biodiversity harbored in the earth s remaining remote regions

a downward spiral research evidence on the relationship between poverty and natural resource degradation abstract many observers have conceptualised the link between rural poverty and environment as a downward spiral with population growth and economic marginalisation leading to environmental degradation recent micro scale empirical research challenges this model showing striking heterogeneity in environmental management by the rural poor their success in adapting to environmental change and the efficacy of policies in influencing outcomes local endowments conditions affecting the adoption of resource conserving technologies and local institutions supportive of the poor are key factors that condition poverty environment interactions and outcomes in relation to agriculture the main strategies to jointly address poverty and environmental improvement are to increase poor people s access to natural resources enhance the productivity of poor people s natural resource assets and involve local people in resolving public natural resource management concerns research is needed to support these strategies particularly to explore poverty environment agriculture interactions develop technologies for poor farmers and partner with local communities for action research on policies and programmes

has leviathan been bound a theory of imperfectly constrained government with evidence from the states this paper develops a formal theory that combines power maximizing leviathan political parties with well defined imperfections in the political process the model implies that both parties tend to make government larger as their likelihood of electoral victory increases empirical tests on state level data confirm this prediction racing the leviathan hypothesis against alternative theories of party motivation indicates that both the leviathan and the contrasting ideologies views have some degree of validity the leviathan motive of politicians to maximize their power is a central assumption of the public choice approach to political economy this approach has been strongly attacked for underestimating the importance of competitive checks on politicians wittman 1989 1995 in particular broadly argues that electoral competition is an effective solution to whatever principalagent problem might exist between politicians and voters yet recent research in political economy dixit and londregan 1995 1996 1998 grossman and helpman 1996 casts renewed doubt on the efficiency of political markets formal models incorporating imperfections in the electoral process show that politicians have the latitude to deviate somewhat from citizen interests although politicians face constraints they retain some measure of monopoly power a conclusion consistent with the public choice literature the main difference between recent political economy and the public choice tradition arises from their assumptions about politicians objective functions the public choice approach tends to view all political parties as power maximizers whereas others see parties as either vote

the dynamics of public support for coalition governments this article investigates the relationship between economic conditions and party support for coalition parties in denmark and the netherlands the article argues that the simple reward punishment model cannot fully account for changes in citizens support for parties given variable economic performance using aggregate public support data for political parties the article shows that citizens differentiate between coalition partners depending on the parties issue priorities instead of blaming or rewarding all coalition parties in a uniform fashion citizens shift support from one coalition party to another depending on the perceived competence of a party to deal with particular economic problems the article finds that the structure of responsibility in parliamentary democracies ruled by coalition governments is more complex than is often assumed therefore it is argued that students of economics and public opinion should pay particular attention to the institutional context in which citizens make ch