information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

efficiency and information aggregation in auctions the tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects the k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k first highest bid we find conditions under which in the limit objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

on the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions we establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first price auctions with asymmetric bidders interdependent values and affiliated one dimensional signals by extending a monotonicity result due to milgrom and weber 1982 we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational we avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second price auctions

equilibrium search models and the transition from school to work this paper applies the burdett mortensen 1998 equilibrium search model to study the school to work transitions of u s high school graduates we consider the case of discrete firm heterogeneity and provide a computational method to obtain the mle our results show that unemployed blacks receive fewer offers than whites and employed blacks are more likely to lose their jobs importantly employed blacks and whites receive job offers at the same rate assigning the whites search parameters to the blacks and re solving reveals that 75 percent of the observed wage differential is explained by the job destruction rate differences

information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts we consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions boom or bust from the information disclosed after a trading round the disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry in particular when only winning bids are publicly disclosed learning is more rapid in a bust

the sullying effect of recessions previous work has established that recessions involve a cleansing effect so that in downturns only high productivity jobs remain but empirical evidence suggests job quality is procyclical jobs created in recessions are likely to be low paying and temporary this paper modifies previous models by adding on the job search which leads to an additional sullying effect calibration of the model suggests this offsetting sullying effect is likely to be much larger than the cleansing effect and can account for the procyclical match quality we observe in the data

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

residential broadband subscription demand an econometric analysis of australian choice experiment data the recent roll out of fibre optic cable suggests that the willingness of households in passed communities to subscribe to networked services is an important issue this paper studies the determination of the demand for network subscription through a discrete choice model the effect of installation and rental price on the likelihood of subscription is analysed the logit regression is based on choice experiment stated preference subscription data obtained from a national survey of households limitations of this preliminary work and suggestions for future research are discussed

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

on the job search and the wage distribution the article structually estimates an on the job search model of job separations given each employer pays observably equivalent workers the same but wages are dispersed across employers an employer s separation flow is the sum of an exogenous outflow unrelated to the wage and a job to job flow that decreases with the employer s wage using data from the danish integrated database for labour market research the empirical results imply as predicted by theory that search effort declines with the wage furthermore the estimates explain the employment effect defined as the horizontal difference between the distribution of wages earned and the wage offer distribution

equilibrium search with continuous productivity dispersion theory and nonparametric estimation in this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market we characterize equilibrium derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model we develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution we estimate the model using french longitudinal survey data on labor supply and we compare the results with those from a french panel data set of firms the results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions

information inequality and broadband network access an analysis of australian household data there has been considerable debate in australia concerning the social and economic effects of telecommunications carrier investment in broadband network infrastructure whether particular groups within networked communities are unable or unwilling to subscribe to broadband services is an important policy issue this paper sets out to identify metropolitan households that are less likely to subscribe to services and examines whether there exists a systematic link between subscription interest and measures of social disadvantage analysis of stated preference subscription intentions data obtained from an australia wide survey of 715 households shows that there is potential for the new communication technology to create information inequality

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

the determinants of black white differences in early employment careers search layoffs quits and endogenous wage growth this paper studies the transition from school to full time employment and subsequent labor mobility during the first five postschooling years for several recent cohorts of black and white male terminal high school graduates using unique data from the 1979 youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys of labor market experience a constrained optimization model of labor force dynamics is implemented empirically integrating features of models previously described in the literature the estimates of the model provide quantitative evidence on underlying structural differences in labor market constraints faced by blacks and whites for example while blacks have overall a substantially smaller wage return to work experience and face a less disperse wage offer distribution blacks face a higher probability of receiving job offers

what the seller won t tell you persuasion and disclosure in markets imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a firm s shares the firm s officers make a presentation that includes an audited financial statement an earnings forecast reviewed by its prestigious investment bankers and an impressive demonstration of its new technology or suppose that you are buying a new furnace to replace an old one that is not working well the salesman displays a chart showing that the projected total life cycle cost of one particular model including capital costs and fuel usage over the projected lifetime of the furnace is lower than that of some competing models you have considered this paper reviews the theoretical arguments about how sellers disclose information in an attempt to encourage buyers and the potential role for regulation in encouraging efficient disclosure of information how well does a system of private reporting work when should we expect all the relevant information to be reported if testing and reporting by the seller are costly will too little testing and reporting be done or too much when some information is withheld what sort of information is withheld how do rational buyers respond to such withholding how are prices and welfare affected what role is there for laws and regulations to improve the functioning of markets we address these questions by studying the theory of persuasion games games in which one or more sellers provide verifiable information to buyers to influence the actions they take

job search bargaining and wage dynamics this article constructs and estimates a model of wage bargaining with on the job search to explore three different components of wages general human capital match specific capital and outside options as the workers find better job opportunities the current employer has to compete with outside firms to retain them this between firm competition results in wage growth even when productivity remains the same the model is estimated by a simulated minimum distance estimator and data from the 1979 national longitudinal study of youth the results indicate that the improved value of the outside option raises wages by 14 16 in the first 5 years

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

search and nonwage job characteristics this paper quantifies the importance of nonwage job characteristics to workers by estimating a structural on the job search model the model generalizes the standard search framework by allowing workers to search for jobs based on both wages and job specific nonwage utility flows within the structure of the search model data on accepted wages and wage changes at job transitions identify the importance of nonwage utility through revealed preference the estimates reveal that utility from nonwage job characteristics plays an important role in determining job mobility the value of jobs to workers and the gains from job search

news management and the value of firms the literature on asymmetric information has been concerned mainly with the problem of the informed party lying to the uninformed parties however in many cases the informed party will stop short of lying but will seek to gain from private information by managing the disclosure of news this article examines the pricing of a firm when there is such manipulation of news i model this situation as a variant of the persuasion game of milgrom and roberts 1986 in which i can parameterize the notion of the degree of credence placed by the market on the disclosures of the informed party an empirical hypothesis thrown up by the theory is that for otherwise identical firms a low price earnings ratio will be associated with a greater degree of positive skewness of the disclosure strategy

tenure experience human capital and wages a tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics we develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers allowing for human capital accumulation employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks wage growth is decomposed into contributions of human capital and job search within and between jobs human capital accumulation is largest for highly educated workers the contribution from job search to wage growth both within and between job declines over the fi rst ten years of a career the job shopping phase of a working life after which workers settle into high quality jobs using outside o ffers to generate gradual wage increases thus reaping the bene fits from competition between employers

unemployment vs mismatch of talents reconsidering unemployment benefits we develop an equilibrium search matching model with risk neutral agents and two sided ex ante heterogeneity unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment but also helps workers to get a suitable job we show through calibrations how the mere difference on unemployment insurance when countries experience a common skilled biased technological shock may result in differences in unemployment productivity growth and wage inequality these results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in europe and the united states in the last twenty five years the model is used to address some political economy issues

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

wages and job mobility of young workers this paper presents a discrete time version of jovanovic s model of worker firm matching descriptive evidence is presented that supports the notion that unobserved worker firm heterogeneity is an important component in the intertemporal structure of wages for young workers a structural econometric model of wage dynamics under worker firm sorting is developed and estimated finally a formal test of the matching model is carried out and the matching structure on intertemporal covariances of wages is not rejected my results indicate the necessity of jointly considering processes of turnover and wage growth when analyzing the labor market experiences of young workers

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

multidimensional private value auctions we consider parametric examples of symmetric two bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent s private valuation we show that in such environments the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions spas breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking while the spa is always efficient allocatively the first price auction fpa may be inefficient equilibria may fail to exist for the fpa we also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents valuation

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

the dynamics of dual job holding and job mobility this article concerns dual job holding and its link to job mobility we present evidence from u s data on patterns of dual job holding hours changes and job mobility we find that workers move into and out of second jobs frequently that these movements are associated with large changes in work hours and that hours constraints may prompt workers to take second jobs second we review theories of dual job holding and present a stochastic dynamic model of dual job holding and job mobility in which decisions to take second jobs and or change main jobs are made simultaneously

twenty years of rising inequality in u s lifetime labour income values in this paper we study the evolution of lifetime labour income inequality by constructing present value life cycle measures that incorporate both earnings and employment risk we find that even though lifetime income inequality is 40 less than earnings inequality the total increase in lifetime income inequality over the past 20 years is the same as earnings inequality while the total increase is the same the pathways there differ with earnings inequality experiencing a steady increase and lifetime income inequality increasing in spurts particularly in the latter half of the 1990s finally we find the changes in lifetime income inequality are primarily driven by changes in earnings mobility and changes in the earnings distribution itself changes in employment risk and the composition of the sample such as the shift toward attaining more education and the ageing population do not play a large role 2004 the review of economics studies limited

revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy based expectations this paper studies the effects of analogy based expectations in static two player games of incomplete information players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent s state contingent strategy they bundle states into analogy classes and play best responses to their opponent s average strategy in those analogy classes we provide general properties of analogy based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games we characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information rubinstein a 1989 the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge amer econ rev 79 385 391 we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in crawford and sobel s cheap talk games crawford v p sobel j 1982 strategic information transmission econometrica 50 1431 1451 and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

hindsight foresight and insight an experimental study of a small market investment game with common and private values we experimentally test an endogenous timing investment model in which sub jects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return subjects overinvest relative to nash we separately consider whether subjects draw inferences in hindsight and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity in contrast to nash cursed equilibrium and level k predictions behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief based theories we offer an explanation in terms ofboundedly ratio nal rules of thumb based on insights about the game which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium jel c72 d82 d83 gil

network competition and the provision of universal service as providers of basic infrastructure services telecommunications providers have traditionally been required to provide services and to serve customers that would not provide a reasonable return on investment in an unregulated marketplace today there are still important telecommunications policy goals that are unlikely to be achieved through competition alone a successful transition from monopoly to competition requires the development of new mechanisms for achieving these goals that do not impede competition in services and in geographic areas where it would otherwise be feasible this paper examines the problem of providing basic telephone service to low income households in urban areas large enough to support two or more competing providers of telephone service it shows that there are plausible circumstances under which even without public support low income households unwilling to pay the cost of connection to the public network will still be provided service by telephone companies who want to make them available to other subscribers willing to pay more this can happen if there is a mechanism that allows service providers to accurately distinguish me and high income subscribers copyright 1995 by oxford university press

the contributions of search and human capital to earnings growth over the life cycle abstract this paper presents and estimates a unified model where both human capital investment and job search are endogenized this unification enables us to quantify the relative contributions of each mechanism to life cycle earnings growth while investigating potential interactions between human capital investment and job search within the unified framework the expectation of rising rental rates of human capital through job search gives workers more incentive to invest in human capital in addition unemployed workers reduce their reservation rental rates and increase their search effort to leave unemployment quickly to take advantage of human capital accumulation on the job the results show both forces are important for earnings growth and the interactions are substantial human capital accumulation accounts for 50 of total earnings growth job search accounts for 20 and the remaining 30 is due to the interactions of the two

modeling earnings dynamics in this paper we use indirect inference to estimate a joint model of earnings employment job changes wage rates and work hours over a career we use the model to address a number of important questions in labor economics including the source of the experience profile of wages the response of job changes to outside wage offers and the effects of seniority on job changes we also study the dynamic response of wage rates hours and earnings to various shocks and measure the relative contributions of the shocks to the variance of earnings in a given year and over a lifetime we find that human capital accounts for most of the growth of earnings over a career although job seniority and job mobility also play significant roles unemployment shocks have a large impact on earnings in the short run as well as a substantial long term effect that operates through the wage rate shocks associated with job changes and unemployment make a large contribution to the variance of career earnings and operate mostly through the job specific error components of wages and hours

job selection and wages over the business cycle we consider a model with on the job search where current wages depend only on current aggregate labor market conditions and idiosyncratic match specic productivities we show theoretically that the model replicates the ndings in bils 1985 and beaudry and dinardo 1991 on the history dependence in wages we develop a method to measure match qualities in the data and show empirically that various variables summarizing past aggregate labor market conditions have explanatory power for current wages only because they are correlated with match qualities they lose any predictive power once match qualities are accounted for

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

human capital accumulation and labor market equilibrium the objective of this paper is to analyse an equilibrium search model with on the job search and human capital accumulation in our model wages are disperse because firms pay workers of the same productivity different wages and workers of different productivies earn different wages new entrants to the labour market increase their wages mainly through on the job search as workers gain more experience and move up the offer distribution job to job transitions become less frequent and human capital accumulation dominates wage growth this interaction generates a wage distribution that exhibits a density with a unique mode and a long and decreasing right tail as observed in the data

on the job search and strategic bargaining abstract this paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs the axiomatic nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex i instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment i show that if workers and firms are homogeneous there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if firms are heterogeneous i characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages i compare the quantitative predictions of this model with burdett and mortensen s 1998 wage differentials employer size and unemployment international economic review 39 257 273 wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

equilibrium search and tax credit reform an empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting is developed to analyze the labor market impact of uk tax reforms the model allows for a rich characterization of the labor market with hours responses accurate representations of the tax and transfer system and both worker and firm heterogeneity the model is estimated with pre reform longitudinal survey data using a semi parametric estimation technique and the impact of actual tax reform policies is simulated the model predicts that the british working families tax credit and contemporaneous reforms increased employment with equilibrium effects found to play a relatively minor role

identification of search models using record statistics this paper shows how record value theory a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables can be used to recover features of the wage offer distribution in conventional search models using national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy wage data i show that the data are not compatible with specifications for the offer distribution characterized by extreme negative skewness in addition i show that my approach can be used to construct a bound on the returns to job seniority my results suggest that job seniority plays only a minor role in the wage growth of the workers surveyed in the nlsy copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

an empirical equilibrium search model of the labor market in structural empirical models of labor market search the distribution of wage offers is usually assumed to be exogenous however because in setting their wages profit maximizing firms should consider the reservation wages of job seekers the wage offer distribution is essentially endogenous we investigate whether a proposed equilibrium search model in which the wage offer distribution is endogenous is able to describe observed labor market histories we find that the distributions of job and unemployment spells are consistent with the data and that the qualitative predictions of the model for the wages set by employers are confirmed by wage regressions the model is estimated using panel data on unemployed and employed individuals we distinguish between separate segments of the labor market and we show that productivity heterogeneity is important to obtain an acceptable fit to the data the results are used to estimate the degree of monopsony power of firms further the effects of changes in the mandatory minimum wage are examined

informational size and efficient auctions we develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents signals are correlated we provide conditions under which a modification of the vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome furthermore we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small the efficiency of market processes has been a central concern in economics since its inception auction mechanisms constitute a very important class of market processes yet the analysis of auctions has typically focused on their revenue generating properties rather than their efficiency properties this is partly due to the fact that for many of the problems typically studied efficiency is trivial when bidders have private values a standard vickrey auction guarantees that the object will be sold to the buyer with the highest value for the object in the case of pure common values that is when all buyers have the same value for the object any outcome that with probability one assigns the object to some bidder will be efficient the intermediate case in which bidders values are not identical but may depend on other bidders signals is more problematic when bidders values are interdependent in this way any single bidder s value may depend on the information of other agents and hence he may not even know his own value it is not clear what it would mean for an agent to bid his true value even before we ask if it is optimal for him to do so several papers have studied efficient auctions with interdependent values and independent types 1 while this is a natural place to begin the independence assumption is not compelling for many problems a prototypical problem is one in which an object is to be sold and individual bidders have private information about the object say the quantity or quality of oil in a tract to be sold that affects other agents values for the object when bidders types include information about objective characteristics of the object being sold their types will typically not be independent when agents types are statistically dependent we show that there exist efficient auction mechanisms for interdependent value auction problems that are essentially vickrey auctions augmented by payments to not from the agents most importantly we link the

labour market structure and inequality a comparison of italy and the u s markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian using a model of off and on the job search and event history individual level data for italy and the u s we show that while the cross sectional wage distributions of young italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white u s males the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the u s than it is in italy our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of long run welfare in the u s and a high level of cross sectional inequality

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the job search productivity shocks and the individual earnings process individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex highly persistent dynamics we investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with i i d productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics such as the covariance structure of earnings the evolution of individual earnings mean and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment or the distribution of year to year earnings changes specifically we show within an otherwise standard job search model how the combined assumptions of on the job search and wage renegotiation by mutual consent act as a quantitatively plausible internal propagation mechanism of i i d productivity shocks into persistent wage shocks the model suggests that wage dynamics should be thought of as the outcome of a specific acceptance rejection scheme of i i d productivity shocks this offers an alternative to the conventional linear arma type approach to modelling earnings dynamics structural estimation of our model on a 12 year panel of highly educated british workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure which is remarkably consistent with the data