carbon tax and opec s rents under a ceiling constraint we study the markov perfect nash equilibrium mpne of a game between oil importing countries who seek to maintain the atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling and oil exporting countries the oil importing countries set a carbon tax and the oil exporting countries control the producer price we obtain implicit feedback rules and explicit non linear time paths of extraction carbon tax and producer price consumers are always able to reap some share of the scarcity and monopoly rents whereas producers partially pre empt the carbon tax only if the marginal damage under the ceiling is small we compare the mpne to the efficient open loop and cartel without tax equilibria

energy conservation expectations and uncertainty this paper investigates consumers decisions about a single and lumpy conservation project accounting for uncertainty and expectations rational versus myopic rational expectations take into account that the profitability of individual conservation measures will affect fuel prices here set by cartelized supply ignorance of this interdependence between conservation and price leads to premature investments the interplay between demand and supply creates an incentive for a consumer cartel to initiate conservation strategically which advances conservation compared with rational consumers but not always ahead of individually myopic decisions

trade s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution abstract this study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the u s mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs public health damages and trade benefits noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages results show trade liberalization leads mexico to curtail pollution in both games cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the united states from mexico s pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game

green electricity policies in the united states case study while there has been interest in promoting the use of renewable energy in electricity production for a number of years in the united states the market share of non hydro renewable energy sources in electricity production has remained at about 2 percent over the past decade the paper reviews the principal energy resources used for electricity production considers the changing regulatory environment for the electricity industry and describes government policies that have been used to promote green electricity in the united states with an emphasis on measures adopted by state governments factors influencing the development of green power markets are also discussed including underlying economic issues public policy measures the regulatory environment external costs and subsidies without significant increases in fossil fuel prices much more stringent environmental regulations or significant changes in electricity customer preferences green electricity markets are likely to develop slowly in the united states

environmental constituent interest green electricity policies and legislative voting abstract research in political economy has traditionally sought to disentangle the effects of legislative ideology and constituent interest in explaining policy decisions frequently proxy variables are used to measure constituent interest however these measures do not adequately reflect true constituent interest which is based upon the costs and benefits of the policies under consideration incorporating the scope of the policies using haiku a detailed model of the us electricity sector and taf an integrated assessment model of pollution pathways and valuation i construct economic measures of constituent interest at the state level as well as for federal policy i then use these measures to analyze state adoption of more stringent green electricity policies and congressional roll call voting on federal environmental policy previous studies that use proxy measures of constituent interest typically find that the legislator ideology matters more while my study shows that both ideology and constituent interest are significant factors

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic noncompetitive energy pricing abstract the literature on energy and carbon taxes is by and large concerned about the derivation of globally efficient strategies in contrast this paper considers the dynamic interactions between cartelized energy suppliers and a consumers government that collectively taxes energy carriers for pigouvian motives two different kinds of external costs are associated with energy consumption flow e g acid rain and stock externalities e g global warming the dynamic interactions between a consumers government and a producers cartel are modeled as a differential game with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in linear and nonlinear markov strategies the major implications are that the nonlinear solutions are pareto inferior to the linear strategies and energy suppliers may preempt energy taxation and thereby may raise the price at front however this effect diminishes over time because the producers price declines while taxes increase

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

oil exploration under climate treaties abstract in this paper we focus on how an international climate treaty will influence the exploration of oil in non opec countries we present a numerical intertemporal global equilibrium model for the fossil fuel markets the international oil market is modelled with a cartel opec and a competitive fringe on the supply side following a nash cournot approach an initial resource base for oil is given in the non opec region however the resource base changes over time due to depletion exploration and discovery when studying the effects of different climate treaties on oil exploration two contrasting incentives apply if an international carbon tax is introduced the producer price of oil will drop compared to the reference case this gives an incentive to reduce oil production and exploration however the oil price may increase less rapidly over time which gives an incentive to expedite production and exploration in fact in the case of a rising carbon tax we find the last incentive to be the strongest which means that an international climate treaty may increase oil exploration in non opec countries for the coming decades and reduce opec s market share

can carbon tax eat opec s rents abstract we consider the optimal emission tax for a stock pollutant when the pollutant flow is also regulated by a resource exporting cartel we consolidate clarify and generalize a set of previous results to obtain clear isolation of the pigouvian and trade policy components of the tax because of the trade policy component the tax can shift more rents from the cartel than the pollution causes damage related costs this leads to the possibility that the pollution problem accompanied by the coordination of taxation can bring about net benefits at the expense of the cartel

energy efficiency rebounding to a sound analytical perspective abstract recent controversy suggests that energy efficiency policies used to reduce carbon emissions might actually increase overall energy consumption the result would be an unintended increase in carbon emissions this paper examines the underlying issues of this so called rebound effect from both a historical perspective and through the results of a recent macroeconomic analysis completed for the united states depending on the assumptions of income and price elasticities as well as the supply demand interactions within a macroeconomic model the rebound effect might reduce overall savings by about 2 3 compared to a pure engineering analysis in other words an economy wide cost effective engineering savings of 30 might turn out to be only a 29 savings from a macroeconomic perspective despite the impact of a rebound effect the net result of energy efficiency policies can be a highly positive one

provision of a public good with multiple dynasties carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations these externalities depend on the degree of contemporaneous cooperation and intergenerational altruism i study the relative importance of these features in determining equilibrium climate policy by imbedding an olg framework with intergenerational altruism into a differential game among dynasties each representing a coalition of nations there is an isomorphism between pure and paternalistic altruism i illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria using an analytic linear in state model equilibrium steady states are more sensitive to small changes in cooperation than altruism consideration of large changes in altruism and cooperation can reverse this ranking

leviathan governments and carbon taxes costs and potential benefits abstract this paper addresses positive aspects of the global warming debate that so far has been concerned by and large with normative issues the paper considers a consumers government that appreciates tax revenues as such leviathan in addition to conventional measures of welfare i e carbon taxes serve the dual purpose of correcting for externalities here global warming or more generally a stock externality from energy use and of raising revenues this government faces either a competitive or a perfectly cartelized supply the major findings are 1 i consumers may benefit from a leviathan government that appropriates some of the monopoly rent by deterring preemption to some extent 2 ii the leviathan motive raises initial taxes and thereby lowers initial emissions but increases the long run stock externality in a play with linear strategies 3 iii there exists a continuum of equilibria in nonlinear markov strategies which are however pareto inefficient compared with the linear strategies 4 iv but in case of a binding resource constraint nonlinear strategies are the only feasible ones

global warming prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view abstract this paper investigates how the choices of the instruments affect the interactions in a stock externality game global warming between cartelized fossil fuel suppliers and consumers more precisely the paper studies the equilibria in markov strategies in a dynamic game with each player choosing either the quantity or the price strategy including short run first mover advantages indeed opec and its opponent iea have tried both instruments in the past and play currently in quantities given such a non competitive setting both players should prefer the price instrument therefore both players are expected to switch back to price and tax policies if global warming will be treated effectively

pigouvian taxation in tourism the paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists accommodations first a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered in each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit linear perfect markov strategies are derived for both the non cooperative and the public monopoly case in equilibrium a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly furthermore the more the monopolist discounts the future the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced second the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure the tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use however its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota induces the optimal level of resource use

strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement carbon taxes versus cap and trade abstract this paper provides a first analysis of a policy bloc of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy faces a non policy fringe of other fuel importers and an exporter bloc and purchases offset from the fringe we compare a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme for the policy bloc in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe the policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap the optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price the domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small when the policy bloc is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower

strategic pigouvian taxation stock externalities and polluting non renewable resources este trabajo propone una extension del modelo de wirl y dockner 1995 disenado para analizar la interdependencia bilateral a largo plazo entre un cartel exportador de un recurso y una coalicion de paises importadores en primer lugar se incorporan los efectos agotamiento al analisis de las propiedades intertemporales de un impuesto pigouviano en segundo lugar se calculan los equilibrios feedback de stackelberg los resultados muestran que la dinamica del impuesto depende criticamente del nivel del dano medioambiental marginal ademas tambien demuestran que el impuesto definido por el equilibrio de nash perfecto de markov es un impuesto pigouviano neutral en el sentido que solo corrige la ineficiencia causada por la externalidad del stock sin embargo para el equilibrio feedback de stackelberg el impuesto es ventajoso para los paises importadores ya que la imposicion pigouviana estrategica reduce el poder de mercado del cartel

taxing incumbent monopoly to foster entry abstract this paper investigates whether it is welfare enhancing to tax the output of a monopoly in order to foster cost inefficient entry this question is of particular concern in the energy markets dominated by cartel like affiliations opec and oil russia s gas exports to europe and the interest and practice to stimulate the development of alternative fuels making the realistic assumption that none of the players can commit to future policies subsidies are not a viable strategy for the government a tax cannot be first best but can be second best if the government cannot force the incumbent monopoly to sell its output at no profit and if the incumbent s profit is discounted however stimulating supply by improving the conditions for entry is not the prime concern of taxation after all it lowers aggregate supplies and may even lower the entrant s supply but to accrue parts of the monopoly rent

strategic behavior and efficiency in the common property extraction of groundwater groundwater has always been regarded as a common property resource where entry is restricted by land ownership and private exploitation is inefficient in 1980 gisser and sanchez presented a first estimation of this inefficiency cornparing socially optimal exploitation with private competitive exploitation using a model with linear water demand average extraction cost independent of the rate of extraction and linearly decreasing with respect to the water table level they characterized the private exploitation of the aquifer assuming that farmers are myopic and choose their rate of extraction to maximize their current profits whereas optimal exploitation is obtained by maximizing the present value of the stream of aggregate profits their results show that if the storage capacity of the aquifer is relatively large the difference between the two systems is so small that it can be ignored for practical consideration this result has been called the gisser sanchez rule by nieswiadomy 1985 and it has and important policy implication regulation of the resource does not seem justified since the profits it brings are not very high 1

joint implementation strategic reactions and possible remedies this paper investigates the promising proposal of joint implementation ji to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions this was ultimately the only concrete outcome of the conference on climate change in berlin albeit restricted to a pilot phase the basic idea given the public s awareness of global warming sounds economically plausible the industrialized countries the only ones required to stabilize and lower carbon emissions can search for cheaper reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries and economies in transition however this proposal leads to strategic reactions by developing countries reinforced by the fact that this cheating coincides with the interest of the industrialized country in short this proposal will lead to cheating given asymmetric information and will thus produce largely faked reductions in emissions on the constructive side an efficient mechanism retaining the spirit of ji is derived which deters strategic reactions this differs from a usual principal agent problem through an additional hierarchical layer a global authority e g the conference of parties on climate change an industrialized country and a developing country the unavoidable loss that is even associated with an optimal scheme due to strategic behavioural reality the first best optimum is unattainable except at the top leads of course to much less glamorous predictions in emission reductions moreover the implicit subsidization scheme focuses and favours on already efficient partners

global warming with green and brown consumers in this paper i investigate how much green polluters mitigate the familiar dynamic tragedy of the commons global warming green consumers feel penalized pain for any consumption in excess of the social optimum this can arise for example from kant s categorical moral imperative interplays among and between green and brown consumers are investigated as differential games green preferences the heterogeneity of consumers and the irreversibility of emissions lead to discontinuous strategies associated with these are a number of non trivial and even puzzling features e g the possibility of another green paradox

competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising abstract this paper develops a differential duopolistic game where price is sticky and firms can invest in market enlarging promotional activities which have a public good nature one finding indicates that advertising and not output as in fershtman and kamien econometrica 55 1987 1151 1164 is responsible for the higher stationary price found in the open loop equilibrium relative to the linear feedback one that is free riding is more intense when firms play linear markov feedback strategies however the collusive outcome can be approximated and opportunism eliminated if firms can engage in preplay negotiations where they select a nonlinear markov perfect strategy for output and advertising achieving the collusive outcome requires as in the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games the discount rate to be sufficiently small

the exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes a dynamic game approach this paper considers efficient and monopolistic extraction of non renewable energy resources when the resource consumption leads simultaneously to a stock externality global warming the case of monopolistic supply leads to a dynamic game between cartelised producers and a consumers government for this game we compute linear markov perfect strategies that are characterized by preemption of the tax at the wellhead when compared with the open loop solution unfortunately the general asymmetric two state variable model does not allow for an explicit analytical solution therefore a simplified version with one state variable neglecting depreciation of the stock of the pollutant is studied and a numerical example is presented it turns out that the simplified and analytically solved framework provides a good approximation of the initial phase of the transient behaviour but not of the long run