bilateral trade and shocks in political relations evidence from china and some of its major trading partners 1990 2013 abstract an extensive number of studies investigate the effects of political relations on trade by estimating a gravity model using annual or quarterly data we argue that the use of low frequency data introduces an aggregation bias because the cycle of moderate political shocks is much shorter measured in weeks using monthly data from 1990 through 2013 for china we estimate a model of political relations and conclude that political shocks are short lived narrative evidence from two case studies illustrates the transitory nature of these shocks a var model shows that although political shocks influence exports to china the effects largely vanish within two months a comparison of the monthly and annual frequency gravity equation regressions illustrates the effects of temporal aggregation

national animosity and cross border alliances we extend the cross border strategic alliance knowledge base by introducing dyad specific antagonism animosity between nation pairs and hold that the formation and the type of firm level cross border alliances are nontrivially impacted by conflicting relations and animosity between their home nations we examine the formation of alliances between firms among nation dyads with and without a history of conflicts the frequency and magnitude of conflicts increase the perception of likelihood of opportunism and dyad specific risks materially affect the context in which firms make alliance decisions as animosity between two nations increases the number and the probability of forming alliances within the dyad the nations form decreases conditional on the expected number of alliances increased antagonistic actions of nations outside the dyad and dissimilarity in the historical conflicts that each nation has engaged in outside the dyad i increase the number of equity alliances and ii decrease the number of nonequity alliances as a proportion of total alliances we find positive main effects of learning to contract through prior experience only for equity vs nonequity alliances the reputation effects of antagonism based on relationships with nations outside of the dyad negatively moderate the positive learning effects of prior equity alliance experience abstract from author

a test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to the bell system stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0002 8282 28198409 2974 3a4 3c615 3aatfsot 3e2 0 co 3b2 rthe american economic review is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon jul 2 16 52 19 2007

conflict cooperation and commerce the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows the public choice approach to political economy is employed to gain insight into the connection between international politics and trade flows a model is constructed in which importers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers who seek to satisfy international security as well as economic welfare objectives this model of bilateral trade flows reflects contemporary theory in the field of international economics and it explicitly incorporates the general foreign policy orientation of importers among its determinants the model is tested in 16 annual crosssectional estimations 1960 75 for a complete network of 25 countries the findings show considerable support for the hypothesis that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad political relations of amity and enmity between nations the author concludes that nations adjust trade ties to satisfy security as well as economic welfare goals and that a formal political economy of trade should reflect this fact

behavioural development economics lessons from field labs in the developing world abstract explanations of poverty growth and development depend on the assumptions made about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in strategic behaviour economic experiments especially those conducted in the field have begun to paint a picture of economic agents in developing communities that is at variance with the traditional portrait we review this growing literature with an eye towards preference related experiments conducted in the field we also offer lessons on what development economists might learn from experiments we conclude by sharing our thoughts on how to conduct experiments in the field and then offer a few ideas for future research

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

an examination of the equilibrium specification and structure of production for canadian telecommunications multiple output models of canadian telecommunications production are estimated under different production equilibria a specification test is conducted between the short and long run equilibrium models and the long run equilibrium is rejected in order to capture the nature of the disequilibrium a dynamic cost of adjustment model is estimated for bell canada there are significant adjustment costs and it is estimated that for 1 00 of marginal capital costs the carrier must incur an additional cost of 0 30 to install the new capital into the production process

the politics of japan china trade and the role of the world trade system the large and rapidly growing trade relationship between japan and china has occurred against a backdrop of political tensions this study measures performance of the trade relationship benchmarking it against other trade flows worldwide and examines the impact of the politics on bilateral trade performance to do this a frontier gravity model is estimated using core determinants of trade this gives a benchmark against which to measure trade performance explained using resistances to trade while the economic relationship is not independent from the politics an important conclusion is that trade has not been diminished or disturbed by politics to a significant extent china s commitment to the global trading system from the mid 1980s and its accession to the wto in 2001 has meant that tensions in the political relationship with japan from time to time have not derailed but rather have increasingly come to be dominated by the economic relationship

modelling cost structure the bell system revisited this paper analyses a recent public policy decision and the crucial role played by the choice of the functional form the break up of the bell system is indeed a classic case of anti trust settlement and constitutes one of the most prominent and controversial applications of microeconomics to public policy it is argued that demanding multi output cost properties such as economies of scope for this is the considerable robustness problem displayed by the tranlog cost functional form the reason for this is the considerable able to robustness problem displayed by the translog cost function which is the source underlying many of the expert disagreements it is suggested that the non robustness is due to what ils termed the flip flop property and it is shown that the available empirical evidence from the pre divestiture bell system supports this argument to obtain robust results we propose that the analysis is constrained to the proper region of the cost function we propose that the analysis is con

the concentration of capabilities and international trade over the course of the previous two decades political scientists have become increasingly interested in the relationship between international politics and global trade much of the literature on this topic centers on the effects of a hegemonic distribution of power on commerce hegemonic stability theorists argue that hegemony is a necessary condition for the existence of a liberal economic order and that in the absence of a hegemon a liberal international economy is particularly difficult to establish and maintain however a growing number of theoretical and empirical critiques have been leveled against the gemonic stability theory and the issue of whether hegemony helps shape patterns of global trade continues to be the topic of heated debate

scale economies and cost complementarities in commercial banks on and off balance sheet activities abstract bank off balance sheet obs activities have grown dramatically and have become significantly important especially at large banks we investigate whether failure to incorporate obs products may lead to a misspecification problem models that exclude deposits from the output specification suggest economies of scale which vanish when deposits are included we find that inclusion of obs products has little effect on the scale economies measures with only a few exceptions the results provide no evidence of cost complementarities in joint production the tremendous growth of bank obs activities in the 1980s may be explained by the very small approximately zero pecuniary cost of these activities

the measurement of vertical economies and the efficient structure of the electric utility industry in this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integration the utility of this measure is then demonstrated by estimating the vertical cost structure of the electric utility industry and by carrying out the calculations necessary to determine the magnitude of vertical economies in this industry the results provide empirical evidence of the existence of significant economies of vertical integration between the generation and transmission distribution stages of electricity supply copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

does economic diplomacy work a meta analysis of its impact on trade and investment we review the literature on economic diplomacy and provide a meta analysis of 32 empirical studies published in 1986 2011 that deal with the trade and investment impact of economic diplomacy embassies consulates other diplomatic facilities investment and export promotion offices trade and state visits controlling for differences in research design methodology time frame and manner of data we find a positive and significant effect of economic diplomacy on international economic flows with the exception of state visits and that this is true in a sample of 627 t statistics analysed with ols and for a larger sample of 963 reported significance levels analysed with logit thus illustrating robustness with respect to sample and estimation technique our analyses show that reported effects of economic diplomacy on trade and investment in individual studies are sensitive to model specification the primary studies that investigate only one source country are less likely to report significant positive effects compared to other sciences economic studies are less likely to report significantly positive effects of economic diplomacy primary studies lump embassies and consulates general into one indicator miss that these instruments differ significantly embassies consulates and agencies should thus be included as separate instruments in future research

technical efficiency and economies of scale in state owned enterprises the hellenic telecommunications organisation abstract in this paper we propose methodologies for assessing the relative efficiency of state owned enterprises that operate under monopolistic conditions irrespective of the ownership structure private or public monopolistic operation is often given unclear conflicting operating objectives by their principals or regulators and thus efficiency should be assessed using alternative objectives such as cost production and revenue on the methodological side the paper employs parametric functional forms using ordinary least squares and goal programming methods of estimation a secondary estimation stage was also pursued with the input output variables of the models being corrected for technical inefficiency the methodology was applied to examine the technical efficiency and economies of scale of the hellenic telecommunications organisation over the period 1971 1993

the political determinants of international trade the major powers 1907 1990 we test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows the first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads and the third that trade flows are greater between allies we examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990 this period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically we estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad but alliances generally do not even when controlling for polarity of the system

productivity growth in canadian telecommunications canadian telecommunications firms do not price proportionately to marginal cost the prices of toll services tend to be above marginal costs whereas the prices of basic local services are typically set below marginal costs by regulators in such circumstances estimates of tfp growth using the conventional tornqvist divisia formula which weights outputs by revenue shares in determining the rate of growth of aggregate output is theoretically incorrect and needs to be replaced by a formula which uses cost elasticity weights empirically the conventional tornqvist index yields a very distorted picture of efficiency gains in the two largest canadian telephone companies during the 1980s for bell canada i calculate the upward bias to be approximately 75 percent over the period 1980 89 and 80 percent over the period 1985 89 for b c tel a similar calculation yields an upward bias of 37 percent over the period 1980 89 and 48 percent over the period 1985 89

testing efficiency hypotheses in joint production a parametric approach n recent years a great deal of research has been directed to the modelling and measurement of technical and allocative efficiency in production with few exceptions this research has been restricted to single product firms however recent developments in duality theory have facilitated the extension of this research to multi product firms the main purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the multiproduct firm in which the possibilities of both technical and allocative inefficiency are incorporated in an econometrically useful way the first model we develop includes a nonneutral2 type of technical inefficiency and three distinguishable types of allocative inefficiency output mix input mix and scale each type of inefficiency is costly to the firm in the sense that each causes a reduction in profit beneath the maximum value attainable under full efficiency the cost of each type of inefficiency depends on the magnitude of the inefficiency and the structure of the underlying production technology in the second model we develop technical inefficiency remains nonneutral but allocative inefficiency is not generally decomposable into output mix input mix and scale components however both technical and allocative inefficiency remain costly to the firm the cost of each type of inefficiency depending on its magnitude and the structure of the underlying production technology we model the technology of a competitive profit maximizing multi product firm with the dual profit function this enables us to use hotelling s lemma to generate a system of profit maximizing output supply and input demand equations these equations are then modified to allow for the possibility of technical and three types of allocative inefficiency a virtue of using the profit function to represent production technology is that it permits a straightforward comparison of maximum profit under full efficiency with actual profit and with the profit that would result from any combination of the four types of inefficiency this enables us to allocate the cost of inefficiency to each of four components our model of inefficiency is parametric and is embedded in a generalized leontief profit function although any flexible specification of the profit function can be used the model is developed in sections ii iv estimation of the model is considered in section v an empirical example designed to illustrate the workings of the model is discussed in section vi section vii concludes

grand strategy and foreign economic policy british grand strategy in the 1930s variation in the need for military and political support from military allies affects the degree to which foreign economic policies will discriminate in favor of military allies and against adversaries and other countries powers in need of such support will pursue discriminatory foreign economic policies in order to change the configuration of domestic interests to favor not only closer economic relations but also closer political relations by strengthening domestic support for an alliance policymakers make it more difficult for their allies to renege on alliance commitments stronger political relations in turn reinforce the deterrent effect of the alliance because the net strategic benefits from closer relations in their case are lower powers that can go it alone without support from allies will refrain from discriminatory policies shifts in strategic need make it possible to explain variation in the links between security considerations and foreign economic policies within alliances over time and also across alliances british grand strategy in the 1930s illustrates how shifts in strategic need influence the degree to which foreign economic policies discriminate in favor of potential military allies

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

how did wars dampen trade in the mena region abstractthe article investigates the impact of wars on trade in the middle east and north african region using an augmented gravity model that controls for the endogeneity problem in our estimation we introduce a war variable and distinguish between different types of conflicts the results show that wars have a significantly negative impact on exports imports and trade civil conflicts hinder exports imports and trade significantly the disaggregated version of the gravity model shows that non state conflicts have a detrimental effect on bilateral trade flows in manufacturing and that none of the conflicts do affect trade in services we also find that on average a conflict is equivalent to a tariff of 5 of the value of trade

alliances preferential trading arrangements and international trade c oncerns about the stability of the international trading system have become widespread in recent years many observers feel that the relatively liberal system forged after world war ii is being undermined by the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements these concerns have spawned a great deal of empirical research much of which has found that such arrangements exert a substantial effect on trade flows yet these studies have neglected the role political military alliances play in shaping patterns of commerce this omission is important because there is ample reason to expect that alliances guide trade flows and preferential trading arrangements often are comprised of allies as a result extant analyses risk confusing the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on commerce and systematically overstating the effects of the latter in this study we analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows both factors are likely to promote trade among members but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce the combination of an alliance which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade and a commercial institution which liberalizes trade among members is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both 1

on the choice offunctional forms in agricultural production analysis empirical results obtained by an analyst may depend on prior choice of functional form three alternative parametric specifications of the cost function are considered these are generalized leontief translog and normalized quadratic functions performance of these functional forms is evaluated by allen elasticities of substitution biases in technical change and some theory based hypotheses all three parametric specifications yielded mixed results together empirical results reinforce the need for model specification searches

economic integration among developed developing and centrally planned economies a comparative analysis we examine six integration schemes and decompose their ability to increase inter member trade into environmental policy and system effects environmental factors caused the greatest variation in trade creation with inter member distance the most important environmental variable the cacm and efta have followed more effective integration policies than the eec lafta and the andean pact although integration can thus benefit developed and developing countries alike for some such as those in latin america inter member distances severely limit its effectiveness while the combination of policy and system has kept the cmea fromrr achieving its full potential for increasing inter member trade its effectiveness does not differ from that of unions among market economies

does trade still follow the flag t he economic ties between any two nations are frequently affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations but there is little to be found in modern economics or political science that helps us understand the connections between international politics and commerce the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political underpinnings or consequences would have been quite alien to mercantilist thinkers in the eighteenth century or to the critics or advocates of imperialism in the nineteenth that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken as a matter of course indeed trade follows the flag was central to these people s understanding of world politics and international economics intellectual trends over the past century radically changed this worldview the ascendancy of liberalism in economic thought brought with it a compartmentalization of disciplines that may now be eroding but we are left with theories of international politics and economics that are very weakly bridged the objective of this study is to map one of the many connections between international politics and commercial ties specifically i seek to identify and measure the effect of changes in state to state diplomatic relations on trade flows between those nations theoretical underpinnings of my effort are in the tradition of public choice political economy frey 1984 because i treat importers as rational utility maximizers and their behavior as determined by preferences pursued within a context of specified constraints the model i put forward is wholly consistent with contemporary neoclassical trade theory but i extend the economists notion of welfare and contend that importers take account not only of the price and quantity of goods and services but of the place of origin of these products and the political relationship between the importing and the exporting nation they do so essentially for traditional security reasons that is importers are motivated to manage their trade relations in ways that minimize risks of disruption in supply or the possibility of hurting friends or

competing for capital the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties 1960 2000 over the past forty five years bilateral investment treaties bits have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment the proliferation of bits during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal these intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute how can we explain the widespread adoption of bits we argue that the spread of bits is driven by international competition among potential host countries typically developing countries for foreign direct investment we propose a set of hypotheses that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of competitive pressures on the host to sign bits the evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign bits when their competitors have done so we find some evidence that coercion and learning play a role but less support for cultural explanations based on emulation our main finding is that the diffusion of bits is associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment we are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development for useful comments on earlier drafts of this article we thank bill bernhard bear braumoeller frank dobbin robert franzese jeffry frieden geoffrey garrett tom ginsburg jude hays lisa martin bob pahre mark ramsayer steven ratner susan rose ackerman and john sides for research assistance we thank elizabeth burden raechel groom and alexander noonan

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

the relationship between political tensions trade and capital flows in asean plus three we estimate the effects of political tension on trade and capital flows in asean plus three countries in the framework of a gravity model we quantify political tension through text parsing software reading daily reuters articles from 1990 to 2013 and exclude brunei and laos due to sparsity of news coverage regarding bilateral trade we find that political conflict measured by negative reports in reuters articles seems to only affect bilateral trade between countries that are not both members of the world trade organization wto for these countries a 1 per cent rise in the tension score results in a 0 05 per cent decline in trade there is weaker evidence that improvement in bilateral relationship measured by positive reports in reuters articles is associated with more trade as for capital flows while long term capital flows measured by foreign direct investment appear to be unaffected by short term tensions both a non democratic government and a history of war negatively affect fdi

collateral damage trade disruption and the economic impact of war abstract conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of economic activity especially international trade we study the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870 using the gravity model we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and neutrals controlling for other determinants of trade as well as the possible effects of reverse causality we find large and persistent impacts of wars on trade national income and global economic welfare we also conduct a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise that indicates costs associated with lost trade might be at least as large as the conventionally measured direct costs of war such as lost human capital as illustrated by case studies of world wars i and ii

rejoinder natural monopoly and the bell system response to charnes cooper and sueyoshi our study of the bell system cost function shows that it is possible to reject the hypothesis that at t was a natural monopoly our study is based on a regression analysis of a translog cost function estimated on 1947 1977 data charnes cooper and sueyoshi charnes a w w cooper t sueyoshi 1988 a goal programming constrained regression review of the bell system breakup management sci 34 1 26 claim that they reverse our conclusion when they use goal programming estimators of a translog cost function estimated on exactly the same data that we use this claim is false there is no basis for comparing our estimates with their estimates because they in fact use different data than we use and estimate a different cost function than we estimate moreover when goal programming estimates and regression estimates based on the same data and similar cost function specifications are compared they yield similar estimates and produce the same inference about natural monopoly

trade and thy neighbor s war abstract this paper is the first to examine the spillover effects of regional conflicts defined as internal or external armed conflicts in contiguous states on international trade our empirical findings based on different measures of regional conflict constructed using alternate definitions of contiguity and types of conflict for 145 countries over 1948 2006 reveal a significant negative effect of both intrastate and international conflicts on the bilateral trade of neighboring countries that may not be directly involved in any conflict the impact increases with conflict duration and is persistent on average it takes bilateral trade 3 5 years to recover after the end of a regional conflict

the impact of leadership turnover on trading relations between states we test how domestic political institutions moderate the effect of lead ership turnover on relations between states deriving hypotheses from recent theo retical work bueno de mesquita et al and mcgillivray and smith we examine how leader change affects trading relations between states using dyadic trade data con sistent with hypotheses we find that large winning coalition systems such as democ racies are relatively immune from the vagaries of leadership change in such systems trade remains relatively constant whether leader change occurs or not in contrast when winning coalition size is small as in autocratic states leadership change pro foundly alters relations causing a decline in trade finally we examine instances of poor relations measured by a significant decline in trade compared to historical lev els as predicted instances of poor relations are less common between pairs of democ racies than other dyadic pairings further leadership turnover in autocratic systems restores trading relations between states the effect of leadership change in democ racies is much less pronounced since first drafting this article the united states has invaded iraq and deposed its leader saddam hussein for more than a decade iraq experienced harsh economic sanctions with hussein s removal these sanctions have been lifted and iraq is in the processes of being reinstated into the international community although it was the iraqi people who bore the costs of the sanctions the sanctions were aimed at hussein s regime with hussein removed the prospects for improved relations between iraq and western states look strong while iraq offers an extreme example this article assesses how the turnover of leaders affects relations between states as measured by trade flows in partic ular drawing on recent theoretical developments we examine how domestic insti tutions and leadership turnover affect dyadic trade flows consistent with the theoretical arguments we find that trade flows between states depend on the inter action of institutions and leader turnover

survey of economic implications of maritime and territorial disputes drawing on studies on the economics of conflict this paper reviews the literature on maritime and territorial disputes and it examines an array of economic implications associated with territorial and maritime disputes these include adverse effects on certain economic and development outcomes arising from possible armed confrontation with some of these possibly lingering in the aftermath of conflict there are also various economic disruptions and costs associated with these disputes emphasizing how they also affect the livelihoods of resource users in the disputed areas a clearer understanding of these economic links could help inform and motivate policymakers on mitigating the risks of conflict based on the review of evidence herein the economic implications of conflict in terms of foregone average trade among the country pairs considered in the west philippine sea south china sea in 1985 dollars which differ in important ways but hint at some common channels of impact could range from us 909 3 million to us 98 8 billion more broadly the impacts on a disrupted global production chain can easily amplify these results even further affecting global growth prospects for many decades according to experience

the hidden costs of nudging experimental evidence from reminders in fundraising abstract we document the hidden costs of a popular nudge and show how these costs distort policy making when neglected in a field experiment with a charity we find reminders increasing intended behavior donations but also increasing avoidance behavior unsubscriptions from the mailing list we develop a dynamic model of donation and unsubscription behavior with limited attention we test the model in a second field experiment which also provides evidence that the hidden costs are anticipated the model is estimated structurally to perform a welfare analysis not accounting for hidden costs overstates the welfare effects for donors by factor ten and hides potential negative welfare effects of the charity

a goal programming constrained regression review of the bell system breakup the recently implemented court decision to break up bell american telephone telegraph co to accord with u s anti trust laws represents a highly significant policy decision which is proving to be influential in other countries as well as the u s the telecommunication industry is of such size and importance that even relatively small economies that might be lost with bell s breakup as a natural monopoly could involve substantial welfare losses to consumers and producers studies commissioned by the u s justice department that approached this topic by econometric methods reported that the evidence failed to support the contention that bell was a natural monopoly here a goal programming constrained regression as developed in the management science literature uses the same functional form and the same data but nevertheless reverses the main findings of the econometric studies in every one of the 20 years covered this kind of difference in results obtained by two different methods of analysis poi

labour and capital saving technical change in telecommunications the australian telecommunications sector is being improved and extended through substantial recent investment in intelligent technology such as digital switching fibre optics satellite and cellular transmission and the internet these technologies are being progressively integrated with technology from the broadcasting computer and electronics industries providing a unified information infrastructure for information transmission and processing technological progress embodied in new equipment has the effect of increasing the efficiency of the factors of production such efficiency increases can be biased towards a particular factor for instance the impact of labour augmenting technical change is a decline in the cost of labour per unit of production when such biases are apparent the relativity between the costs of labour and capital per unit of production is changed in the longer term technical change can impact on the rate of employment growth and also on the rate of capital accumulation in th

the effect of sanctions on u s foreign direct investment for years the united states has imposed economic sanctions to com pel countries to alter their behavior an important concern is whether government sanctions influence private foreign direct investment fdi decisions the largest source of foreign capital in the first study to assess empirically the relationship between economic sanctions and fdi we consider whether u s sanctions influence u s fdi inflows into targeted countries using panel data for 171 countries from 1965 to 2000 we find strong evidence that u s investors pull out of countries targeted for u s sanctions prior to their imposition this disinvestment is not permanent and invest ment tends to return after the sanctions are imposed the results provide support for fdi studies that show the effect of risk on investor decision making the use of economic sanctions by the united states to compel countries to alter their behavior has increased in recent years at the same time u s foreign direct investment fdi has expanded with u s multinational corporations mncs rep resenting the largest share of global fdi despite the growth of u s fdi and the u s government s imposition of sanctions no empirical work has considered the relationship between sanctions and u s investor decisions how do u s mncs react to the use of u s sanctions and does u s fdi make sanctions more or less effective in this article we analyze the impact of u s sanctions on investment decisions made by u s mncs building on investors risk calculations that are critical to the fdi literature 1 we propose several reasons why risk linked to economic sanctions influences fdi flows we hypothesize that u s firms significantly draw down their investment in tar geted countries prior to the imposition of sanctions as risk levels are most height ened however after sanctions have been in place long enough for investors to understand their specific restrictions uncertainty surrounding the amount of risk decreases and u s fdi is expected to return to levels near the pre sanction period

business as usual economic responses to political tensions do political tensions harm economic relations theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange looking at two major economies we show that negative events have not hurt u s or japanese trade or investment flows we then examine specific incidents of tensions in u s french and sino japanese relations over the past decade two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations in an era of globalization actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations we argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments firms and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes d o political tensions have economic consequences the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict has been a central debate in international relations leading scholars contend that states with good relations should have more trade than states with poor relations and import decisions of firms will respond to the climate of friendliness orhostilitythatexistsbetweentheimporterandexporter morrow siverson and tabares 1998 650 pollins 1989b 739 analysis of trade and conflict in a simultaneous equations model concludes that political relations are driving commerce not the other way around keshk pollins and reuveny 2004 1175 we reexamine these arguments in the current globalization era to show that sunk costs reduce incentives for state and private actors to link political and economic relations 1

the bell system divestiture deregulation and the efficiency of the operating companies abstract a variety of casual evidence has been offered in measurement of the efficiencies and inefficiencies thought to flow from the bell system divestiture and accompanying state regulatory reforms to address several questions in this regard we estimate a regulated cost function for local exchange services using panel data on the divested bell operating companies bocs divestiture and regulatory reform are found to have produced significant efficiencies as of 1993 saving about 20 percent in cost relative to what would have obtained in the absence of these events more specifically to 1993 the divestiture yielded savings of 115 4 billion and state level regulatory reform yielded a slightly smaller 96 7 billion in savings both measured in 1993 dollars output augmentation factor bias and allowed rate of return effects contribute in identified ways to these overall results

do people avoid opportunities to donate a natural field experiment on recycling and charitable giving abstract we use a natural field experiment to investigate the hypothesis that generosity is partly involuntary by examining whether individuals tend to avoid opportunities to act generously in sweden new recycling machines for bottles and cans with an option of donating the returned deposit to charity were gradually introduced in one of the largest store chains we find a substantial decline in recycling the month these new machines were introduced and a further decline in the following months these results indicate that individuals avoid opportunities to act generously and corroborate findings from both lab and field studies supporting the claim that generous behavior is partly involuntary

guilt in games a clear conscience is a good pillow why does this old proverb contain an insight the emotion of guilt holds a key psychologists report that the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm loss or distress on a relationship partner roy baumeister arlene m stillwell and todd f heatherton 1994 245 june price tangney 1995 moreover guilt is unpleasant and may affect behavior to render the associated pangs counterfactual baumeister stillwell and heatherton state if people feel guilt for hurting their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations they will alter their behavior to avoid guilt in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship avoided guilt is the down of the sound sleeper s bolster how can guilt be modeled how are human interaction and economic outcomes influenced we offer a formal approach for providing answers start with an extensive game form which associates a monetary outcome with each end node say that player i lets player j down if as a result of i s choice of strategy j gets a lower monetary payoff than j expected to get before play started player i s guilt may depend on how much he lets j down player i s guilt may also depend on how much j believes i believes he lets j down we develop techniques to analyze equilibria when players are motivated in part by a desire to avoid guilt the intellectual home for our exercise is what has been called psychological game theory this framework originally developed by john geanakoplos david pearce and ennio stacchetti 1989 and recently extended by battigalli and dufwenberg 2005 henceforth b d allows players utilities to depend on beliefs about choices states of nature

free to trade democracies autocracies and international trade trade relations we address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy in a formal model of commercial policy we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy we test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990 the results of this analysis accord with our argument democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs t he effects of domestic political institutions on trade policy have long been a source of controversy among social scientists despite the widespread interest that this debate has prompted however remarkably few studies have addressed the links between political regime type and commercial policy 1 most work on the political economy of trade policy that examines institutional factors focuses only on variations in policy among democracies and avoids comparing democracies with other types of regimes moreover many analyses of trade barriers especially those by economists ignore the effects of domestic political

efficiency technical change and returns to scale in large us banks panel data evidence from an output distance function satisfying theoretical regularity abstract this paper provides parametric estimates of technical change efficiency change economies of scale and total factor productivity growth for large banks those with assets in excess of 1 billion in the united states over the period from 2000 to 2005 this is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a bayesian framework we find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and or cost shares which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth our results from the regularity constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large us banks grew at an average rate of 1 98 over the sample period however our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components technical change efficiency change and economies of scale indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline

is generosity involuntary abstract we estimate the distribution of exit reservation prices in a dictator game the mean exit reservation price equals 82 of the dictator game endowment and only 36 of subjects have exit reservation prices consistent with selfish or social preferences