consistent modeling of s p 500 and vix derivatives abstract this study introduces a model that identifies relationships between stylized features on s p 500 vix and derivatives on vix the paper considers a specification with discontinuous correlated jumps in stock prices and stock price volatility with state dependent arrival intensity and examines how these factors impact vix option pricing and hedging the paper finds strong evidence for jumps in volatility and jumps in returns implicit in vix option data

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

hedging the black swan conditional heteroskedasticity and tail dependence in s p500 and vix the recent financial crisis has accentuated the fact that extreme outcomes have been overlooked and not dealt with adequately while extreme value theories have existed for a long time the multivariate variant is difficult to handle in the financial markets due to the prevalent heteroskedasticity embedded in most financial time series and the complex extremal dependence that cannot be conveniently captured by a single structure moreover most of the existing approaches are based on a limiting argument in which all variables become large at the same rate in this paper we show how the conditional approach of heffernan and tawn 2004 can be implemented to model extremal dependence between financial time series we use a hedging example based on vix futures to demonstrate the flexibility and superiority of the conditional approach against the conventional ols regression approach

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

how to win the political contest a monopolist vs environmentalists this paper sheds light on the political economy of local energypolitics both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective first a case study of a small town in southern germany schonau is presented where environmentalists have won thepolitical contest against the regional energy monopolist and havefounded an energy supply firm themselves the different stagesof the political process are explained and analysed second apolitical economy model is developed where environmentalists anda monopolistic utility firm confront each other both on thepolitical and on the energy market in the lobbying equilibriumthe probability of the environmentalists winning the gamedepends on the monopoly rent and the perceived social costs ofenergy production it is shown that it is optimal for themonopolist to reduce his output below the monopolistic output finally the winning strategy in the schonau case is discussedin the light of the theoretical results of the paper

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

jump and volatility risk premiums implied by vix abstract an estimation method is developed for extracting the latent stochastic volatility from vix a volatility index for the sp 2 the jump and volatility risks are priced 3 the popular square root stochastic volatility process is a poor model specification irrespective of allowing for price jumps or not our simulation study shows that statistical inference is reliable and not materially affected by the approximation used in the vix index construction

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

would you trust lobbies we consider the regulatory problem to approve or to ban a new product technology in the context of scientific controversy about its detrimental environmental and or health effects we formalize the regulator s decision making process as a tullock contest towards a theory of the rent seeking society texas a m university press texas 1980 the contestants being an industrial lobby representing the economic agents who have developed the new product technology and an environmental lobby representing the economic agents who will be harmed by the product or technology assuming that the industrial lobby has private information about the unfavorable environmental and or health effects but can be held liable for damage ex post we derive the equilibrium properties of the contest in particular we derive conditions under which it is socially preferable for the regulator to decide according to the contest s outcome rather than according to an ex ante cost benefit analysis using his prior beliefs we find that the contest outperforms the ex ante cost benefit analysis only if the risk of judgment proofness is not too high

the dependency of islamic bank rates on conventional bank interest rates further evidence from turkey the nexus between islamic banks returns on term deposits participation accounts and conventional banks cbs interest rates on term deposits is one of the controversies with regard to islamic finance the obvious correlation between two sides is considered a convergence of islamic banking to the conventional mode and the breach of the risk sharing the underlying principle of islamic finance the aim of this study is to econometrically investigate the long term relationship between cbs term deposit rates tdrs and participation banks pbs tdr in turkey we undertake an elaborate analysis of the dependency of each pbs in turkey on interest rates utilizing the most recent econometric techniques including maki cointegration tests with multiple breaks and frequency domain causality tests findings show that tdrs of three pbs are significantly cointegrated with those of cbs while one is not in addition permanent causality is found from cbs to all pbs

energy consumption and economic growth for selected oecd countries further evidence from the granger causality test in the frequency domain abstract this paper aims to reexamine the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for 20 oecd countries to that end we employ a granger causality test in the frequency domain which allows us to distinguish short temporary and long run permanent causality the empirical results could be summarized as following first in terms of causality running from gdp to energy consumption there is a temporary relationship for australia austria canada italy japan mexico the netherlands portugal the uk the usa and a permanent relationship for austria belgium denmark germany italy japan the netherlands norway and the usa second in terms of causality running from energy consumption to gdp there is a temporary relationship for austria denmark italy the netherlands norway and portugal and a permanent relationship for belgium finland greece italy japan and portugal the main implication of our finding is that the energy policies should take into consideration not only the causality direction between economic growth and energy consumption but also whether it is temporal or permanent and furthermore authorities must design policy actions accordingly

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

impact of interest rates on islamic and conventional banks the case of turkey identifying the impact of the interest rates upon islamic banks is a key to understand the contribution of such institutions to the financial stability designing monetary policies and devising a proper risk management applicable to these institutions this article analyses and investigates the impact of interest rate shock upon the deposits and loans held by the conventional and islamic banks with particular reference to the period between december 2005 and july 2009 based on vector error correction vec methodology it is theoretically expected that the islamic banks relying on interest free banking shall not be affected by the interest rates however in concurrence with the previous studies the article finds that the islamic banks in turkey are visibly influenced by interest rates

futures price variability a test of maturity and volume effects a number of previous studies have examined the contemporaneous relation between asset price variability and volume traded for example clark 1973 cornell 1981 and tauchen and pitts 1983 have investigated this relation for futures markets and epps and epps 1976 harris 1984a 1984b and smirlock and starks 1984 for the stock market underlying this empirical research is a theoretical framework that suggests that price variability or the absolute change in prices and volume traded should be positively correlated according to this theoretical framework the so called mixture of distributions hypothesis mdh 1 the correlation between price variability and volume should be positive because of joint dependence on a common directing variable or event this study uses contract disaggregated data on futures prices to obtain evidence on the relation between price variability and volume of trading strong positive contemporaneous correlations between trading volume and price volatility are documented consistent with the mixture of distributions hypothesis it is concluded that maturity is not a suitable surrogate for the common directing variable specifically while maturity has a strong effect on volume no such relation is found for price variability finally while in the majority of cases price variability and trading volume are contemporaneously correlated there are a significant number of cases in which a sequential relation appears to be present an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1984 meeting of the european finance association in manchester england and at southern methodist university the university of wisconsin madison duke university mcgill university and the university of toronto we wish to thank the seminar participants and an anonymous referee from this journal for constructive comments and criticism all remaining errors are of course our responsibility we would also like to thank the columbia center for the study of futures markets and the interactive data corp for providing some of the data used in the study 1 see clark 1973 and harris 1984a 1984b

gmo standards endogenous policy and the market for information the paper develops a composite index of gmo standards restrictiveness for 60 countries assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions using this index and its components we empirically investigate the political and economic determinants of gmo regulations for 55 countries controlling for spatial autocorrelation results show that many of the determinants highlighted in the theoretical literature such as the structure of the agricultural sector and the institutional environment are important determinants of the restrictiveness of the gmo regulation as a key result there emerges a prominent role of the market for information showing that the structure of domestic mass media public vs private is an important driver of gmo standards

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed