exchange rate policy union wage index and credibility abstract optimal exchange rate regimes for small open economies with economy wide wage setting and privately optimal wage indexation schemes are analysed a fully discretionary exchange rate regime a managed float offers flexibility while a credible fixed exchange rate regime offers price stability due to the time inconsistency problem optimal wage indexation under a managed float may imply complete indexation of wages to prices a managed float is shown to be unambiguously superior to a binding fixed exchange rate regime if wage setters value price stability as high as the policy maker does

the human firm in the natural environment a socio economic analysis of its behavior abstract new realities are leading an increasing number of businesses to discard their old managerial perspectives and practices with regard to the natural environment as desirable as the new approaches are the environmental behavior pollution pollution prevention etc of these firms cannot be explained by the neoclassical model thus this paper develops a socio economic model of the firm s environmental behavior that incorporates managerial social environmental and ethical realities not found in the neoclassical model in contrast to short term oriented opportunistic approaches managements are increasingly setting high environmental goals integrating environmental management with other aspects of management developing environmentally oriented strategies that harmonize economic and environmental interests and utilizing system wide approaches along with socially responsible decision making this cannot be explained by the neoclassical model in which the firm s environmental behavior is an outcome of economic incentives from 1 product and resource markets and 2 regulators the socio economic model adds four important new elements 1 the firm s internal organizational capability 2 environmental opportunities 3 society s environmental concerns awareness and demands and 4 influences from extra firm institutions therefore the firm s environmental behavior is an outcome not only of economic incentives but of 1 the firm s capacity to take advantage of opportunities and 2 the external social influences on it

markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

bubbles crises and policy in many recent cases financial liberalization has led to a bubble in asset prices the bursting of the bubble results in a banking crisis and recession it is suggested such bubbles are caused by an interaction of the risk shifting problem arising from agency relationships in intermediaries and uncertainty concerning the expansion of credit two important policy objectives are identified the first is the prevention of bubbles in asset prices the second is minimizing the impact of spillovers on to the real economy during post bubble banking crises the different policy approaches taken in norway and japan are compared copyright 1999 by oxford university press

openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of descretionary monetary policy temple 2002 concludes however that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross country data our analysis of the same cross country data considered by temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness and the sacrifice ratio in addition increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio

joint management of emission abatement and technological innovation for stock externalities we investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions in the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions conversely technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology it is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach the optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period the usual pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument a numerical application to the greenhouse effect is provided

the merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted the performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa this interaction is studied for a type of innovation where a new technology reduces emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time causes a new type of damage if the new pollutant associated with this technology is sufficiently different from existing ones such that marginal damage is increasing in each of them but additive across pollutants a diversification of the pollution portfolio is socially desirable in a situation where the incentives to develop such a technology are created by patents the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent holding firm this result carries over to other types of innovation the performance of taxes is limited by either the inability to implement specific pollution mixes or monopoly pricing for constant returns to scale at the industry level the combined use of taxes and permits ensures the first best mix of technologies and provides positive research incentives

a political economy model of implementing pollution laws abstract a model of the implementation process as applied in pollution control is developed it differs from previous bureaucracy models in that it subjects the control agency to pressures from both firms and procontrol citizen groups each of these three actors maximizes utility over environmental quality and some other variable environmental quality may be in the actor s preference function or it may represent derived demand working through the agency budget and other policy variables each actor constrains another actor s attempts to move policy in preferred directions this results in movement toward a concensus environmental quality not necessarily the efficient quality several institutional changes are analyzed to demonstrate the workings of the model

the economics of enforcing pollution taxation abstract the efficient structure of pollution tax policy is examined when it is recognized that enforcing compliance will be costly there are two components of this cost 1 the direct cost of enforcement and 2 the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement considering only the first cost the efficient pollution policy calls for a tax in excess of that conventionally recommended as efficient t but with little enforcement once avoidance cost is recognized the efficient policy can be substantially altered requiring a tax lower than t but with greater enforcement even when direct enforcement cost is zero it is shown that there is no unique advantage to t in the absence of avoidance cost

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

livestock emissions regulation with unknown damages and strategic technology adoption livestock emissions have been identified as a contributor to greenhouse gas build up yet have remained unregulated in the us a game theoretic model in the style of tarui and polasky 2005 was analysed where the dairy industry strategically chooses to abate air emissions with technology adoption and herd size decisions while a regulator chooses a tax rate on emissions to satisfy the desires of competing interest groups this model allows the effects of potential air emission regulation on the dairy industry to be evaluated results demonstrate that dairy farms react to the increased cost of air regulation by decreasing herd size rather than investing in air emission abatement technology in the short run this suggests that incentives may need to be put in place to induce adoption in emissions abatement technology at the livestock level in the long run

potential for private cost increasing technological innovation under a tax based economic incentive pollution control policy a criticism of the current pollution control policy is its lack of incentive for technological innovation the author argues that the implementation of a tax based economic incentive policy may have its pay off in terms of lower real control outlays but this makes it possible for total private compliance costs resource costs and tax or transfer costs to actually increase upon the introduction of some new less expensive control technologies he presents a numerical illustration of this phenomenon then derives the conditions under which such cost increases may occur cost increasing technological innovations could generally be avoided if the tax incentive is coupled with a net revenue lid for the pollution control authorities 4 references 3 tables

second best energy policies for heterogeneous firms this paper investigates second best issues in the regulation of external costs of energy use by heterogeneous firms the efficiency of regulatory energy policies depends in general on the policy incentives given for both output reduction and input substitution the resulting endogeneity of firms supply functions appears to lead to complicated policy rules in contrast to earlier efforts the analysis considers an arbitrarily large number of non identical price taking firms in a joint market a large variety of possible production functions including varying levels of economies of scale and possibilities for input substitution and elasticities of market demand which may vary from completely elastic to completely inelastic two second best instruments are considered namely output taxes and energy efficiency standards and are compared to the benchmark of first best energy taxes the underlying market factors determining the relative efficiency of these second best instruments when used optimally are identified

openness exchange rate regimes and the phillips curve abstract recent research suggests that the phillips curve slope measured using sacrifice ratios from the period 1961 88 is positively related to trade openness contradicting the romer 1993 openness and inflation theory and evidence quarterly journal of economics 108 869 903 hypothesis that disinflations are less costly in open economies in this paper i consider sacrifice ratios and output inflation trade offs from 1981 98 and allow their dependence on openness to vary with the exchange rate regime sacrifice ratios are weakly negatively related to openness but the strength of the relationship does not increase with exchange rate flexibility output inflation trade offs are negatively related to openness and the strength of the relationship increases with exchange rate flexibility

a nonparametric method to estimate a technical change effect on marginal abatement costs of u s coal power plants the literature usually assumes that technical change reduces marginal abatement cost however recent results suggest that precisely the opposite occurs this paper proposes a nonparametric method to determine the effect of technical change on marginal abatement cost the method decomposes nox marginal abatement cost changes in 2000 2004 and in 2004 2008 for 325 boilers operating in 134 u s bituminous coal power plant into technical and non technical change effects we find that technical change reduces the nox marginal cost about 28 3 in 2000 2004 and 26 5 in 2004 2008 however more stringent regulations enacted the nox budget program results in lower nox emission levels as plant operators install more advanced nox abatement equipment which in turn causes an overall increase in marginal abatement cost

exchange rate pass through openness and the sacrifice ratio abstract considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about whether and how globalization affects the inflation output trade off and suggests that the ultimate effect of openness on the output inflation relationship is influenced by a variety of factors in this paper we consider the impact of exchange rate pass through and examine how pass through conditions the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio we develop a simple theoretical model showing how the extent of both pass through and openness can interact to influence the output inflation relationship next we empirically explore the nature of these two variables and their interaction results indicate that greater pass through increases the sacrifice ratio that there is statistically significant interaction between pass through and openness and once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside other factors that affect the sacrifice ratio such as central bank independence openness fails to exert an empirically robust effect on the sacrifice ratio

does globalisation discipline monetary policymakers abstract this paper analyses globalisation using a small general equilibrium model it concludes that whether increased openness a reduction in the costs of international trade helps to discipline monetary policy in large open economies depends on the type of trade costs moreover to the extent that globalisation induces stronger competition in the goods market this may also have an adverse effect on monetary policy discipline the latter is due to international expenditure switching which becomes a more forceful channel as competition intensifies thus the answer to the question in the title is not necessarily affirmative

openness and the effects of monetary policy abstract economic theory suggests that an economy s openness reduces the ability of monetary policy to affect output while increasing its effects on inflation using annual data from the 1953 1990 period for a panel of 38 countries the paper s empirical results support the theoretical predictions the more open the economy the smaller larger the output inflation effects of a given change in the money supply this finding is robust across all the different specifications and estimation methods examined

learning about environmental damage implications for emissions trading in this paper the impact of adjusting the supply of tradeable emission permits on incentives for cleaner technology adoption is examined two policy rules for adjusting the supply of permits are considered open market operations and a proportional adjustment rule under which the regulator expropriates permits from individual firms in proportion to their existing permit holdings adjustment via open market operations is neutral with respect to cleaner technology investment decisions but may be politically difficult to implement the proportional adjustment rule is also neutral with respect to investment decisions and at the same time allows more flexibility from a political perspective

technical change and the marginal cost of abatement abstract we address one aspect of the treatment of technical change in the environmental economics literature how technical change impacts the marginal cost of abatement we review a selection of papers that employ a variety of representations of technical change and show that these representations have quite different and sometimes surprising effects on the marginal costs of pollution reductions we argue that these varied representations in fact correspond to a variety of different technology options we then present results indicating that this representation matters the impacts of technical change on the marginal cost of abatement can crucially impact policy analysis

the problem of the commons still unsettled after 100 years the problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when katharine coman led off the first issue of the american economic review as the us and other economies have grown the carrying capacity of the planet in regard to natural resources and environmental quality has become a greater concern particularly for commonproperty and open access resources the focus of this article is on some important unsettled problems of the commons within the realm of natural resources there are special challenges associated with renewable resources which are frequently characterized by open access an important example is the degradation of openaccess fisheries critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality a key contribution of economics has been the development of market based approaches to environmental protection these instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty first century global climate change jel q15 q21 q22 q25 q54

incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms the direction and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs we establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement negligence may however induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases increases marginal abatement costs for low high levels of abatement

evidence on nominal wage rigidity from a panel of u s manufacturing industries we provide a set of stylized facts on the response of industry nominal wage growth to aggregate and industry specific influences using annual data for 450 u s manufacturing industries over the period 1958 to 1989 we find support for the canonical wage contracts model the response of nominal wage growth to expected inflation is estimated to be between 0 6 and 0 8 this estimate holds for several sectors within manufacturing the response of nominal wage growth to unexpected inflation is around 0 1 indicating a striking departure from the classical assumption of full indexation we also find support for the multisector wage indexation models the estimated profit sharing elasticity is positive as hypothesized in these models the instrumental variable estimates of the profit sharing elasticity are typically between 0 1 and 0 2 copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

is equilibrium indexation efficient this paper investigates the welfare properties of equilibrium indexation in a decentralized economy if indexation is costless so all firms index then the equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient but if indexation is costly and this leads some firms not to index equilibrium indexation is inefficient because indexation has externalities for nonindexed firms firms choose too little indexation if labor demand is more responsive to movements in real money than to movements in real wages the results do not depend on the relative importance of real and nominal shocks

trade openness and inflation the role of real and nominal price rigidities the paper revisits the long standing question of the impact of trade openness on the inflation output trade off by accounting for the effects of product market competition on price flexibility the study develops a new keynesian open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with non constant price elasticity of demand and calvo price setting in which the frequency of price adjustment is endogenously determined it demonstrates that trade openness has two opposing effects on the sensitivity of inflation to output fluctuations on the one hand it raises strategic complementarity in firms pricing decisions and the degree of real price rigidities which makes inflation less responsive to changes in real marginal cost on the other hand it strengthens firms incentives to adjust their prices thereby reducing the degree of nominal price rigidities and increasing the sensitivity of inflation to changes in marginal cost the study explains the positive relationship between competition and the frequency of price adjustment observed in the data it also provides new insights into the effects of global economic integration on the phillips curve

openness inflation and the phillips curve a puzzle models of open economies with nominal rigidities are often thought to predict a correlation between openness to trade and the slope of the output inflation trade off or phillips curve using a variety of measures of the trade off and a standard measure of openness this paper argues that the direct evidence for a correlation is not strong in turn this calls into question the usual explanation for the negative correlation between openness and inflation that was documented by romer 1993 the paper considers some alternative explanations for the romer evidence

designing climate mitigation policy this us paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs damage valuation policy instrument choice technological innovation and international climate policy the authors begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be both under cost effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or pigouvian emissions pricing the remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation issues in policy instrument choice complementary technology policy and international policy architectures

grand corruption instead of commitment reconsidering time inconsistency of monetary policy abstract this paper suggests that inflation may be affected differently by grand corruption compared to its positive nexus with petty corruption in an extended barro and gordon 1983a model grand corruption may serve as a quasi commitment device a cheating expropriating government may actually deter a monetary authority from cheating reneging furthermore rogoff s 1985 conservative central banker has an unambiguously beneficial effect she reduces the inflationary bias even more while also rendering fiscal policy more effective the model nests the standard fiscal monetary interaction logic with and without expropriation as well as the diametrical symbiosis result obtained by dixit and lambertini 2003a

pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain abstract this paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer the environmental consequence of this inefficiency which emerges in a non cooperative vertical setting governed by a single parameter contract is overlooked in the literature on pollution control in the setup of a two stage game we investigate the impact of double marginalization for non cooperative equilibrium to check whether there are differences between dynamic and strategic effects of double marginalization on pollution accumulation both the open loop and feedback nash equilibria are derived over a finite time horizon with the cooperative solution as a benchmark

abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the eu ets we use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over allocation that took place across european countries during the pilot phase 2005 2007 of the european union emission trading scheme using a dynamic panel data model we estimate the counter factual business as usual emissions scenario for eu member states comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions we find that both over allocation and abatement occurred along with under allocation and emissions inflation over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over allocation of approximately 280 million euas and total abatement of 247 mt co2 however we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 mt co2 also occurred possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features

biodiversity and optimal policies towards r d and the growth of genetically modified crops in this paper we provide a simple model illustrating the possible nature ofgovernment policy with regards to genetic modification taking into accountits impact on the environment we show that it is necessary not only tointervene in the growing of crops but also to intervene in r d througha tax on the adoption of new gm technology without intervention at bothlevels both the cultivation of gm crops and the rate of innovation in gm willexceed their socially optimal levels

pollution accumulation and firm incentives to accelerate technological change under uncertain private benefits the paper explores the relationships between the design of public incentives and the policy maker s desired timing of abandonment of a polluting technology when this requires an irreversible private investment and the firm faces uncertain appropriable benefits from the technological change two regulatory approaches are examined firstly we consider the quite common one of lowering the private investment cost through a subsidy in order to bridge the gap between the private and the policy maker s desired timing of environmental innovation secondly we consider a policy scenario where the regulator instead of simply lowering the investment s rental price also stimulates abandonment of the polluting technology by reducing through appropriate announcements the uncertainty surrounding the technological switch s private profitability we then compare the two approaches and show the latter s benefits in terms of the policy s effectiveness and or budgetary savings

openness the sacrifice ratio and inflation is there a puzzle abstract the standard time inconsistency based explanation for the negative correlation between openness and inflation requires an inverse relationship between the sacrifice ratio and openness but daniels et al 2005 openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio journal of money credit and banking 37 2 371 379 have provided evidence that controlling for central bank independence reveals a positive relationship this paper embeds the time inconsistency approach within a model of a multisector imperfectly competitive open economy in this setting greater openness raises the sacrifice ratio but reduces the inflation bias thus failure to observe an inverse relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio does not necessarily imply that the time inconsistency approach is irrelevant to understanding the openness inflation relationship

investment in risky r d programs in the face of climate uncertainty we analyze how the socially optimal technology rd and that uncertainty in damages interacts with uncertainty in the returns to rd and r d that reduces the emissions to output ratio and argue that this is a good representation of r d into fossil fuel technologies for r d programs into non carbon technologies optimal investment is higher in riskier programs our empirical model indicates that the optimal investment in a risky program is about 3 1 2 times larger than in a program with certain returns for r d programs aimed at reducing emissions in fossil fuel based technologies our results show that qualitatively investment is higher in less risky programs under most uncertain damage scenarios our empirical model shows however that the risk profile of fossil fuel based r d programs generally has little quantitative impact on optimal investment the exception is that when the probability of a catastrophe inducing full abatement is very high investment is about twice as high in risky programs compared to programs with certain returns

credibility may require discretion not rules abstract we reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion rules limit the actions of agents restricting observations of the agents preferences or types in a second best world where rules cannot be everlasting a regime of discretion in some periods may produce superior credibility and dominate a regime of rules

clean technology innovation and environmental regulation the development and diffusion of clean technologies has an important role to play in preventing pollution government must address the issue of how firms can be given the necessary incentive to develop environmentally sound production techniques and products this paper focus on how subsidies can under certain restrictive conditions stimulate innovation subsidization is usually assumed to involve unit subsidies for pollution reduction unit subsidies have little to do with the subsidy schemes in actual use our focus is on subsidy schemes specifically designed to promote the development of clean technologies through the use of grants financial aid based on data from the development projects initiated through the danish clean technology programme we analyze how environmental innovations take place when the polluters their suppliers and consultants are actively engaged in the development processes the main merit of subsidy schemes like the danish one is its direct focus on the innovation processes and the active incorporation of the network of firms surrounding the polluters our findings lead us to conclude that when it comes to subsidization the role of government should be redefined government can act as a matchmaker by providing firms with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding more efficient technological solutions to specific environmental problems

a paler shade of green environmental policy under induced technical change conventional wisdom argues that environmental policy is less costly if it induces the development of cleaner technologies in contrast to this argument we show that once the second best nature of actual economies is taken into account the cost of environmental policy may well be larger with induced technical change itc than without thus itc may lower both the emissions reductions and the welfare gains associated with environmental policy in an endogenous policy framework itc may reduce the desired stringency of the policy

inflation targeting and output inflation tradeoffs abstract this article assesses whether the adoption of inflation targeting it helps reduce the output inflation tradeoff we address the self selection problem of it policy adoption by the endogenous switching regressions and show that the output inflation tradeoffs are significantly lower in it countries not only over the whole sample but also across the developed and developing country subsamples in addition we also find strong evidence supporting the positive selection hypothesis i e countries have higher probability of adopting it are exactly those who benefit more larger reduction of output inflation tradeoff from the implementation of it additional results reveal that economies with higher trade openness lower financial openness and less flexible exchange rate regime are associated with larger tradeoff between output and inflation but the effects are only statistically significant in the it regime

environmental regulation a value theoretic and class based analysis following a value theoretic and class based approach it is argued in this paper that ecological problems are inseparably linked to the process of extracting surplus value in capitalism and owing to their adverse impacts instigate struggles over the appropriation of nature these struggles fought within and outside the state by competing agents shape environmental regulation in particular taxes permits command and control measures and subsidies affect prices profits and rents and have class and other social implications evidence of current environmental regulation shows that it takes places under the great influence of capitalist concerns

impacts of alternative allowance allocation methods under a cap and trade program in power sector emission trading is considered to be a cost effective environmental economic instrument for pollution control however the policy design of an emission trading program has a decisive impact on its performance allowance allocation is one of the most important policy design issues in emission trading not only for equity but also for policy performance in this research an artificial market for sulfur dioxide so2 emission trading was constructed by applying an agent based model the performance of the jiangsu so2 emission trading market was examined under different allowance allocation methods and transaction costs the results showed that the market efficiency of emission trading would be affected by the allocation methods when the transaction costs are positive the auction allowance allocation method was more efficient and had the lowest total emission control costs than the other three allocation methods examined however the use of this method will require that power plants pay for all of their allowance and doing so will increase the production costs of power plants on the other hand output based allowance allocation is the second best method

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control comment following on from an analysis by milliman and prince this article considers further the relative incentives for technical change provided by different pollution control instruments the comments involve the recognition that emission targets are typically chosen fairly arbitrarily because of regulators lack of knowledge of abatement cost schedules there is also a more detailed discussion of the practicability of auctioning emissions permits as these have been less thoroughly covered in the literature than the other instruments

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

capital account liberalization and inflation abstract evidence from over 100 countries suggests a strong link between capital account openness and lower inflation in particular widespread capital account liberalization during the early 1990s appears to have contributed to the world wide disinflation observed during that decade alternative indices of capital account openness including those of quinn and toyoda measuring international financial openness and closure department of political science georgetown university washington dc 1996 mimeo yield similar results

has greater competition restrained u s inflation this paper shows how increased goods market competition affects the behavior of inflation in a multisector economy by raising the price elasticity of demand increased goods market competition theoretically lowers inflation and makes the aggregate price level less sensitive to aggregate demand shocks we find that proxies for the aggregate degree of goods market competition are statistically and economically significant in short run phillips curve models of core inflation evidence indicates that heightened goods market competition has flattened the slope of the short run expectations augmented phillips curve and slightly lowered the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu

intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies and the choice of policy instruments environmental benefits only unfold if green environmentally friendly technologies are widely diffused and intensively deployed within a firm we investigate how different types of policies directly and in combination affect the number of different green energy technologies adopted by a single firm intra firm diffusion using data from a dedicated survey on the diffusion of green energy technologies of 1200 swiss firms and applying well identified econometric models we found that energy taxes are a very effective policy instrument for the intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies even more important however are non political measures that show the largest effect among all tested instruments additional analyses show that a time consistency in policy making is more important for energy tax regimes than for regulations and b no evidence for complementarities between the policy types could be identified

on reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs investment subsidies are widely used to induce adoption of new technologies that can lower the marginal cost of reducing emissions to economize on these subsidies governments would like to distinguish between firms that need to receive a subsidy to adopt a new technology and firms that would adopt that technology even without subsidies we show that policies consisting of a menu of emission taxes and investment subsidies can potentially induce firms to self select

monetary policy games inflationary bias and openness abstract when a country s central bank has higher output objectives than those of wage setters the noncooperative nash equilibrium contains an inflationary bias which is higher the flatter the economy s aggregate supply curve an economy s openness from the input side is an exogenous observable characteristic that provides a direct way of testing the theory when the imported intermediate goods displace capital labor in production a higher degree of openness flattens steepens the economy s aggregate supply curve and increases decreases the inflationary bias

globalization the output inflation tradeoff and inflation abstract this paper provides comprehensive evidence on the relation between inflation and globalization defined here as trade and financial openness using a large cross section of 91 countries over the period 1985 2004 we establish two main empirical regularities both higher trade and financial openness i reduce central banks inflation bias yielding lower average inflation and ii are associated with a larger output inflation tradeoff this evidence is at odds with the standard barro gordon framework which would require globalization to have a negative effect on the output inflation tradeoff to yield lower equilibrium inflation but it is consistent with a recent strand of new keynesian models emphasizing the role of imperfect competition and nominal rigidities our findings also support the relevance of the time inconsistency hypothesis which underlies the theoretical models predicting a relation between globalization and inflation for the oecd subsample however we do not find an effect of openness on inflation the output inflation tradeoff suggesting that these countries have created an institutional framework for central banks that eliminates distortions due to the time inconsistency problem

a regulatory framework for a policy of sustainability lessons from the neo liberal school abstract in this paper targets institutions and policy measures for describing and implementing sustainable development are evaluated in terms of their conformity with the economic framework of a market system from the viewpoint of neo liberal economic thinking as conceived by the german freiburg school of economists a general set of criteria is developed it includes issues of operationalization and legitimation of goals as well as institutional and instrumental issues on this basis general rules for designing an ecological framework guaranteeing the greatest possible degree of conformity with a market system are derived the concrete application of these rules leads to recommendations for a policy of sustainability with respect to the setting of goals the establishment of institutions as well as the use of appropriate instruments

a comparison of emission taxes and permit markets for controlling correlated externalities this paper provides an answer to the question are emission taxes an efficient and self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated externalities we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions this mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection we find that unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self enforcing

rushing the impatient allowance reserves and the time profile of low carbon investments postponing the issue date of allowances in a cap and trade scheme by e g a reserve mechanism impacts the time profile of low carbon investments if the postponement constrains intertemporal arbitrage short term investments increase but long term investments are deterred this effect aggravates the shortage of long term investments at least partially attributed to firms impatience the cancellation of allowances agreed for phase iv of the eu ets is suitable to counteract the negative effects of cap neutral postponement on long term investments by making the reserve redundant all effects crucially depend on how firms form expectations about future allowance prices

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

the effects of climate policy on corporate technological upgrading in energy intensive industries evidence from china abstract the innovation effect is an important component when measuring the performance of environmental policy instruments based on a questionnaire survey this research has examined corporate energy conservation and emission reduction efforts in energy intensive industries in china under the pressure of different climate policies and in particular looked into their adoption of those technological innovation and diffusion activities the results show a large variety of corporate adoption of energy saving practical activities in general climate policies have played a greater role in promoting the adoption of managerial energy saving activities in respondent companies while comparatively their influences on the adoption of technology upgrading activities are relatively weak regulatory measures have exerted greater pressure and influence on corporate short term behavioural change as stated by the respondent companies however market based instruments show greater incentive effect in promoting adoption of energy conservation and emission reduction activities that refer to corporate long term oriented strategic planning or adjustment for instance they exert a significant incentive effect on increasing long term research and development investment for technological innovation and also play an important role in optimising corporate organisational structure the econometric analysis further proves the influences of market based instruments in promoting corporate adoption of technological innovation and diffusion activities

linking induced technological change and environmental regulation evidence from patenting in the u s auto industry a b s t r a c t this article uses a carefully screened patent database in automobile emission control technologies and a detailed regulatory action analysis to examine firms innovation in response to u s technology forcing auto emissions standards enacted between 1970 and 1998 the study finds that under the performance based technology forcing pbtf auto emissions regulations both automakers and compo nent suppliers innovated and introduced more advanced emission control technologies for automobile applications the study also shows that stringent pbtf regulation temporarily induced domestic u s firms to become more innovative than foreign firms that operated in the local u s market during the early phase of the regulatory regime findings of this research strongly imply that government intervention in the form of technology forcing regulation can drive firms to invest in technological innovation

the potential of environmental regulation to change managerial perception environmental management competitiveness and financial performance abstract this research presents an overview of where the gaps in the literature exist in relation to the link between environmental regulation and proactive environmental management and competitiveness and incorporates them in a whole model different papers have highlighted only partial aspects of these relationships specifically this research evaluates the relationship between managerial perception and the different styles of environmental regulations command and control versus voluntary norms the mediator role of environmental management in the link between environmental regulations and competitiveness the effect of competitiveness on financial performance and the two way relationship between proactive environmental management and financial performance finally this paper uses statistical evidence to test and estimate causal relationships through a structural equation modelling of 208 firms affected by ippc law in spain there is a lack of systematic statistical evidence on this topic in the literature which mainly focuses on case studies the results show that when environmental regulation stems from command and control legislation its influence on managerial perception and proactive environmental management is not significant however when environmental regulation stems from voluntary norms its effects are positive moreover investment in proactive environmental management contributes to increasing the competitiveness of the firm cost and differentiation competitive advantage have a positive impact on financial performance finally the link between proactive environmental management and financial performance may follow different paths 1 neither direct nor single because it can depend on competitive advantage and 2 direct because there is a significant two way relationship between these variables proactive environmental management influences financial performance and financial performance influences proactive environmental management

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

designing call auction institutions is double dutch the best this paper is an exercise in the institutional design of call markets schwartz i988 whitcomb i985 using the experimental laboratory as a test bed we evaluate the comparative performance1 of three new institutions for exchange when all trades are simultaneously executed at a uniform price call markets have been used on many european and israeli stock exchanges and for the daily opening on the new york american and tokyo stock exchanges in all outstanding listed issues in some versions the bids offers are verbal in others written in some cases the procedure is walrasian orders may be modified after a trial price is given whitcomb i985 also see jarecki i976 for the walrasian mechanism implemented with a unanimity stopping rule in the london bullion market in france new issues are offered in fixed quantity using modified uniform price sealed bid auction rules mcdonald and jaquillat i974 the rules of trading on all these exchanges are subject to incremental adjustment in the light of experience in recognition of this continuing adaptation the chicago mercantile exchange publishes its consolidated rules as a loose leaf three ring notebook these considerations motivate our interest in examining three potential new exchange mechanisms as their names suggest these institutions are generalisations of auctions which already exist in the field 2 double dutch dd is a generalisation of the dutch auction double english ee a generalisation of the english auction and dutch english de a special form of tatonnement using a single clock which is a dutch clock to buyers and an english clock to sellers our generalisations make the supply quantity endogenous thus broadening the scope of english and dutch auctions to markets in which both buyers and sellers are active in the exchange process two cited disadvantages of sealed bid offer call markets schwartz i988 pp 442 6 are corrected by

technology diffusion with market power in the upstream industry this paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry second best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs the second best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry the ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal in addition it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology

inflation in open economies abstract this paper relates the time consistent inflation rate to the degree of trade openness of an economy the mechanism linking the welfare effects of monetary surprises and hence the incentives to inflate to openness does not rely on a large country terms of trade effect but rather is due to imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the non traded sector the empirical evidence supports the main predictions of the model 1997 elsevier science b v

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

optimal management of durable pollution abstract we study an incompletely informed regulator s problem of inducing a firm producing durable pollution to manage its pollution optimally we show the existence of an optimal regulatory contract our principal qualitative result is that the optimal contract in this setting induces an inefficiently large amount of emission relative to the outcome under pigovian regulation or full information our sparse yet flexible model of the firm can be applied directly in concrete settings as it is stated in terms of statistical parameters moreover it generates useful information about the firm that has to be assumed in an abstract regulatory model

advanced solar r d combining economic analysis with expert elicitations to inform climate policy the relationship between r d investments and technical change is inherently uncertain in this paper we combine economics and decision analysis to incorporate the uncertainty of technical change into climate change policy analysis we present the results of an expert elicitation on the prospects for technical change in advanced solar photovoltaics we then use the results of the expert elicitations as inputs to the minicam integrated assessment model to derive probabilistic information about the impacts of r d investments on the costs of emissions abatement

designing more efficient markets lessons from los angeles smog control market based approaches for environmental protection are beginning to take root around the world this article attempts to improve our understanding of the performance of environmental markets by constructing and evaluating an information base on trades in los angeles which includes the first detailed data on trading prices the analysis suggests that trading activity has been shaped by the detailed regulations governing the market in addition transaction costs have played a crucial role we argue that the move toward adopting market based approaches for environmental protection needs to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to assess the properties of these systems as they are actually implemented

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

the strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards this paper investigates the welfare consequences of strategic behavior by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face environmental regulation often attempts to force an industry to develop cleaner technology but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard this lack of regulatory commitment induces firms to choose innovation strategically it is well known that firms have incentives to suppress innovation to induce the regulator to ratchet down the standard and this strategic behavior lowers welfare this paper explores a countervailing incentive in oligopoly settings firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals costs in equilibrium the incentive to raise rivals cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment also a regulator who is unable to commit ex ante to the stringency of a regulatory standard can induce more clean technology than a regulator with a commitment mechanism

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

regional industrial dynamics under the environmental pressures in china abstract this study investigates how air pollution affects industrial path creation and industrial dynamics in china moving beyond existing literature that pays more attention to environmental effects of industrial development this paper focuses on how industrial development path changes due to environmental pollution using the data from chinese customs trade statistics ccts which covers the export trade data of prefecture level cities in china during 2002 2006 and 2012 to 2016 this paper probes into the effect of air pollution on industrial dynamics econometric model and instrumental variable iv regression are used in empirical analysis given the potential endogeneity issue results suggest that the interaction term between air pollution and density is negatively related to new industries entry it means that air pollution can reduce the effect of relatedness on industrial diversification and lead to path breaking further a channel for how air pollution affects industrial dynamics is examined in order to respond to air pollution local government conducts environmental regulation to lower the negative influence of air pollution which can lead to path breaking during industrial diversification process finally this paper seeks to bridge two strands of literature environmental economic geography and evolutionary economic geography