the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment abstract tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards the tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels one would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements despite this the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down performance requirements are as popular as ever we explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms in equilibrium municipalities choose performance requirements which maximize joint surplus from investment competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies

content vs advertising the impact of competition on media firm strategy media firms compete in two connected markets they face rivalry for the sale of content to consumers and at the same time they compete for advertisers seeking access to the attention of these consumers we explore the implications of such two sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms one main conclusion we reach is that media firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly this happens because competition for advertisers can reduce the return per customer impression from the ad market making each firm less willing to underprice content to increase demand greater competitive intensity may thus increase content profits and decrease ad profits these findings are in sharp contrast to those in a regular one sided product market in which competition typically lowers product prices and profits we extend the framework to examine competition across different media e g between magazines and cable tv and show that firms in a duopolistic medium may benefit from more intense competition from a monopolist in another medium we characterize the conditions for each firm in the duopoly medium to bundle more ads and earn greater total profits than the rival firm in the monopoly medium

market provision of broadcasting a welfare analysis this paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry advertising levels may be too low or too high depending on the nuisance cost to viewers the substitutability of programs and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers market provision may allocate too few or too many resources to programming and these resources may be used to produce programs of the wrong type monopoly ownership may produce higher social surplus than competitive ownership and the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus

spatial price equilibrium with information asymmetry in quality and minimum quality standards abstract a spatial price equilibrium model with information asymmetry in quality is developed in both static and dynamic versions producers at the supply markets are aware of the quality of their products whereas consumers located at the demand markets are aware only of the average quality of the products that are shipped to their demand markets minimum quality standards are also captured in order to assess the impacts of such policy interventions we establish qualitative results in the form of existence uniqueness and stability analysis an algorithm is proposed along with a convergence proof it is then utilized to compute solutions to a spectrum of spatial price equilibrium numerical examples in order to explore the impacts of information asymmetry under different scenarios the numerical examples which are of quite general functional forms reveal that as the number of supply markets increases the anonymizing effect leads to a decrease in the average quality on the other hand as the number of demand markets increases the pressure to improve quality increases and the average quality increases finally we demonstrate that after the imposition of minimum quality standards the average quality at the demand markets increases and the prices also increase

negotiations and exclusivity contracts for advertising exclusive advertising on a given media outlet is usually profitable for an advertiser because consumers are less aware of competing products however for such arrangements to exist media must benefit as well we examine conditions under which such exclusive advertising contracts benefit both advertisers and media outlets referred to as stations by illustrating that exclusive equilibria arise in a theoretical model of the media advertisers and consumers who participate in both the product and media markets in the model stations sell advertising space to advertisers and broadcast advertising messages to consumers conditions leading to higher equilibrium levels of advertising can be unprofitable for advertisers because high levels of advertising make consumers better informed and thus lead to fiercer product price competition as a result media stations may be less profitable as well because their payoff is determined as a fraction of the advertiser surplus generated in the product market stations mitigate this effect by offering advertisers exclusive advertising contracts with such contracts consumers are less informed about competing products yielding higher producer surplus it is profitable for stations to offer exclusivity when commercial advertising is an important means for advertisers to inform consumers about their products

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters this paper shows that the analysis of liu et al 2004 contains a substantive error the asserted pure strategy nash equilibrium leading to their theorems 1 and 2 is really not an equilibrium we show that in their model either pure strategy nash equilibria do not exist or unlike their asserted main result when a pure strategy equilibrium exists increasing the number of commercial television broadcasters does not result in lower quality programs possible modifications of liu et al s model that may help restore the desired result are discussed

on the uniqueness and stability of equilibrium in quality speed competition with boundedly rational customers the case with general reward function and multiple servers abstract in this paper we extend the service speed competition game with boundedly rational customers considered in li et al 2016 to the case with general reward function and multiple servers the n servers make strategic decisions on their service rates sequentially and repeatedly since the competing servers payoff functions can only be expressed by an implicit function set we propose a matrix method to derive the uniqueness of the equilibrium service rates and we establish the stability of the equilibrium through a tatonnement scheme by conducting a sensitivity analysis regarding the number of competing servers and the demand density we find that the server competition benefits the customers by improving their utilities as well as getting more customers to be served furthermore for a fixed demand density the equilibrium service rate increases in the market size and converges to a certain level when the market size is large enough

commitment efficiency and footloose firms the authors consider dynamic competition between a small number of local governments to attract a single large plant the surplus available in each location is unknown when the initial location decision is made two cases are considered if all agents can commit to second period actions and if they cannot without commitment initially the firm will discriminate against the region with the lower set up costs if first period productivity is low the firm may relocate and receive an ex post subsidy from a second region commitment decreases the expected total surplus and if fixed costs are small favors the firm copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

media concentration and consumer product prices i introduction recent debates about concentration in the broadcast media industry have provoked concerns about the consequences for programming and advertising levels what is not so obvious is how media concentration can affect the prices of advertised products by some accounts over two thirds of advertising expenditures in the united states are channeled through commercial media such as radio and television leading national advertisers advertising age 2002 and 2003 this fact suggests that the structure of the media industry and decisions taken within play an important role not only in the market for advertising but also in the competition for advertised products the purpose here is to examine the interaction of commercial media and advertisers who are linked not only through an advertising market but also through a set of consumers who make choices in the media market and in the product market specifically i ask how does concentration in the media industry affect the prices of advertised products and consequently the profits of advertising firms common intuition suggests that advertisers should object to concentration in the media industry because it typically means higher prices for advertising 1 my analysis challenges this notion by suggesting that media concentration may actually benefit producers of branded consumer products despite higher advertising prices if concentration in the media industry makes it less likely for consumers to avoid persuasive advertising messages then advertisers are more effective at differentiating their products and consequently enjoy higher prices for their products it is thus possible for these producers to benefit from media concentration if higher product revenues offset the higher advertising prices this result is somewhat surprising in contrast to typical notions of vertical relationships which suggest that less upstream competition leads to higher wholesale prices advertising prices in this case and lower profits for downstream firms the distinction in the present context lies in the view that agents here are related in a circular way rather than vertically consumers participate in both the media industry through the choice of say a tv station and the advertiser s product market to illustrate the result i employ an equilibrium model of the media industry in the model competing media firms referred to as stations provide some service news music entertainment etc to a set of consumers and sell commercial advertising space to producers these producers compete for the sale of advertised products to consumers stations receive their revenues from advertising sales and enjoy higher advertising prices when they have a large audience however consumers in the model dislike advertising because they have presumably tuned in to a station for its programming stations choose an amount of advertising to sell keeping in mind this trade off stations can in addition attract audiences by making investments in programming quality an important aspect of the model is that advertising is used by a firm to differentiate its brand from that of its rivals much of the advertising seen on tv or heard on radio contains messages that are intended to associate an image with the product the new product is then the physical product along with the associated image such images seem most prominent for conspicuously consumed products like soda beer or automobiles which are the most heavily advertised products leading national advertisers advertising age 2002 and 2003 broadcast media can be seen as vehicles for these images in the form of commercials interspersed throughout regular programming viewers or listeners tune in for the programming and are subject to the effects of advertising the strength of these effects depends on a variety of factors which are emphasized in the model

investment decisions under first and second price auctions a seller of an indivisible object faces multiple buyers whose valuations are a function of their unobservable prior investments a second price auction generates efficient investment but the seller prefers a first price sealed bid auction which induces inefficient investment

cross market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty implications for competitive advantage a cross market network effect exists in many industries e g newspaper publishing media software in which a seller sells both a primary and a secondary product e g a newspaper publisher sells newspapers to readers and advertising space to advertisers and the value of the secondary product depends on the size of the user base of the primary product this paper examines the competitive implications of asymmetric customer loyalty in such markets in traditional markets an advantage in customer loyalty generates a profit advantage we show here however that in the presence of a cross market network effect a midlevel of loyalty advantage in the primary product market can lead to an overall profit disadvantage this surprising result is derived from the interdependence of the two markets whereby a profit in one market may be gained at the cost of the other and by the positive relationship between a larger loyalty segment and a higher opportunity cost of price competition in the product of the primary market extending our model to a two period entry game also shows that under certain conditions the entrant with disadvantage in customer loyalty can outperform the incumbent in profit and market share this result suggests that asymmetry in customer loyalty can be a source of first mover advantage or disadvantage

is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters competitive behavior in commercial television broadcasting is modeled to examine program choice and the effects of more channels being available on firm strategy specifically broadcasters compete by selecting both the type and quality level of a program to offer but do not compete on price we obtain five major results first a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets indicates that broadcasters in an industry with a larger number of competitors may provide programs of lower quality compared to broadcasters in an industry with a smaller number second in terms of viewer welfare having more channels available is not necessarily better third broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the types of programs they provide resulting in a counterprogramming strategy in other words avoidance of price competition is not required for competitors to differentiate themselves from each other fourth if one broadcaster starts the evening with a higher quality higher rated program than its competitor its second program should also be of higher quality finally a broadcaster s first program should be of equal or higher quality than its second program put another way it always behooves a broadcaster to lead with its best

optimal service speeds in a competitive environment this is a study of the economic behavior of vendors of service in competition a simple model with two competing exponential servers and poisson arrivals is considered each server is free to choose his own service rate at a cost per time unit that is strictly convex and increasing there is a fixed reward to a server for each customer that he serves the model is designed to study one specific aspect of competition namely competition in speed of service as a means for capturing a larger market share in order to maximize long run expected profit per time unit a two person strategic game is formulated and its solutions are characterized depending on the revenue per customer served and on the cost of maintaining service rates the following three situations may arise i a unique symmetric strategic nash equilibrium in which expected waiting time is infinite ii a unique symmetric strategic equilibrium in which expected waiting time is finite and iii several nonsymmetric strategic equilibria with infinite expected waiting time an explicit expression for the market share of each server as a function of the service rates of the two servers is also given

equilibrium pricing and lead time decisions in a competitive industry pricing and lead time are two crucial decisions to a success in today s competitive markets this paper examines the equilibrium pricing and lead time decisions in a duopoly industry consisting of two large and several smaller firms with competition we solve the sufficient karush kuhn tucker kkt optimality conditions for the nash equilibrium solution we characterize the existence and uniqueness of the nash equilibrium solution of pricing and lead time decisions for both homogenous and heterogeneous firms our case study provides important managerial insights about firms behavior under price and lead time competition in a semiconductor manufacturing industry

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

selective reporting of factual content by commercial media the authors study the market for factual content and examine whether competition increases or decreases its provision factual content is supplied by commercial media firms which observe a set of facts depicting the state of the world and selectively decide how to report them consumers value content that matches their opinion which incentivizes media firms to slant their reports by omitting certain facts novel features in the authors model include consumers ability to anticipate the media s incentives for slant and the requirement that all media stances must be supported by facts furthermore consumers find reports with more facts to be more convincing despite consumers ability to detect slant and their demand for factual support the research shows that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and being unable to update their prior beliefs about the state of the world the authors also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media and that polarized report

strategic customer behavior facing possible stockout an experimental study abstract this paper studies strategic customer behavior in a monopolistic seller system given the stock quantity and the selling prices a customer chooses either to buy at the full price to certainly obtain a product or to wait for a discount with the risk of stockout we model the behavior of strategic customers as a customer game it is shown that the customer game may have multiple nash equilibria specifically in the condition of weak incentive compatibility the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is all wait which is inconsistent with the all buy assumption in the literature we conduct laboratory experiments to investigate behavior of strategic customers the results show that customers behaviors exhibit a deviation from nash equilibria using a framework of quantal response equilibrium we develop behavioral models to effectively characterize the behavior of strategic customers

on the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise one of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but in the absence of incentives the multinational s preferred location is the other more advanced region the paper shows that subsidies by making the multinational switch location may increase aggregate welfare if the multinational exports in the absence of incentives the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment which otherwise would not take place in one of the two regions further it intensifies competition in the market the paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified but also that the competition effect by hurting domestic firms may cancel out any other positive role of incentives

recent developments in dynamic advertising research a variety of continuous time differential functions have been developed to investigate dynamic advertising problems in business and economics fields since major dynamic models appearing before 1995 have been reviewed by a few survey papers we provide a comprehensive review of the dynamic advertising models published after 1995 which are classified into six categories i nerlove arrow model and its extensions ii vidale wolfe model and its extensions iii lanchester model and its extensions iv the diffusion models v dynamic advertising competition models with other attributes and vi empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems for each category we first briefly summarize major relevant before 1995 models and then discuss major after 1995 models in details we find that the dynamic models reviewed in this paper have been extensively used to analyze various advertising problems in the monopoly duopoly oligopoly and supply chain systems our review reveals that the diffusion models have not been used to analyze advertising problems in supply chain operations which may be a research direction in the future moreover we learn from our review that very few publications regarding dynamic advertising problems have considered the supply chain competition we also find that very few researchers have used the diffusion model to investigate the dynamic advertising problems with product quality as a decision variable and the pricing decision has not been incorporated into any extant lanchester model the paper ends with a summary of our review and suggestions on possible research directions in the future

industrial blackmail dynamic tax competition and public investment a dynamic model of intergovernmental competition for a large plant is presented when local productivity is uncertain one firm determines the location of its plant in each period by conducting an auction soliciting bids from local governments equilibrium subsidies from the local governments are derived the author also consider a two stage game where local governments first choose a level of costly infrastructure then participate in the sequential auction even when costs are identical across locations investing in different levels of infrastructure is a nash equilibrium moreover when infrastructure is endogenous in this manner it is chosen efficiently

price structure in two sided markets evidence from the magazine industry we present and estimate a model of competition in a two sided market the market for magazine readership and advertising using data on magazines in germany we find evidence that magazines have properties of two sided markets the results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are subsidized and that magazines make all their money from advertisers consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices

business models for media firms does competition matter for how they raise revenue the purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like tv channels raise revenue a media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue by direct payment from the viewers or the readers if we consider newspapers or by both we show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes this implies that the less differentiated the media firms content the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising a media firm s scope for raising revenues from ads on the other hand is constrained by how many competitors it faces we should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products