the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

intertemporal pricing and price discrimination a semiparametric hedonic analysis of the personal computer market we apply a smooth coefficient semiparametric model to a unique high frequency data set to examine the intertemporal pricing of personal computers furthermore we test whether firms charge differential component prices for their top performance personal computers and whether premium firms charge both a premium for all their computers and a premium for their top performance ones we find nonlinear effects in the pricing of personal computer components we also find that firms in general do not charge differential prices for the components of their top performance computers in addition high quality firms charge higher premia only for their most advanced products copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

theory of tax smoothing in the small open economy abstract we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the martingale like behavior of tax rates the world real interest rate is exogenous to the small domestic economy consumers are risk averse and markets are incomplete the government s loss function is not ad hoc

entry order and pricing over the product cycle the transition from the 486 to the pentium processor abstract using a high frequency data set of advertized prices of personal computers we find that prices of pentium computers of late entrants into this market segment are higher than the contemporaneous prices of their competitors this is true even among firms which have the same price premium for their 486 computers but is more pronounced for high quality firms over time the difference in the pentium computer prices between the early and late entrants declines to the level of the price gap for their 486 computers in contrast the entry prices of the late entrants are lower than the entry prices of the early entrants these results suggest that entry prices of firms are set to extract short run rents from consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for their brand they also suggest a rapidly declining price premium for quality over the product cycle we develop a stylized two period durable goods duopoly model that formalizes this intuition and which produces results consistent with these empirical regularities in light of these findings brand coefficients in hedonic regressions using high frequency data should not be interpreted as capturing unobserved quality only

politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets we analyze a golden rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and most u s states do today we study an overlapping generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period when demographics imply even moderate departures from ricardian equivalence the golden rule substantially improves efficiency examples calibrated to u s demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics

fiscal policy and growth in a small open economy with elastic labour supply endogenizing labour supply leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium structure of the ak growth model of a small open economy the balanced growth equilibrium is described by two tradeoff loci relating the equilibrium growth rate to the fraction of time devoted to leisure the implications of endogenous labour supply for fiscal policy are addressed the effects of distortionary taxes and government expenditure on the equilibrium growth leisure employment tradeoff are analysed the responses contrast with both those of a closed economy having an elastic labour supply and an open economy with fixed labour supply optimal fiscal policy is also characterized jel classification f41 f43 politique fiscale et croissance dans une petite economie ouverte quand l offre de travail est elastique l endogeneisation de l offre de travail entraine des changements fondamentaux dans la structure d equilibre du modele de croissance du type ak d une petite economie ouverte l equilibre de croissance balancee est decrit par deux lieux de relations d equivalence reliant le taux de croissance d equilibre a la fraction du temps allouee au loisir on examine les implications de cette endogen6isation de l offre de travail pour la politique fiscale on analyse les effets de taxes distorsionnantes et des depenses gouvemementales sur la relation d 6equivalence entre taux de croissance et loisir et donc emploi on obtient des reactions differentes de celles qu on obtient en economie ferm6e quand l offre de travail est elastique et en economie ouverte quand l offre de travail est fixe on proc ede alors a la definition de la politique fiscale optimale

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

debt maturity without commitment i analyze how lack of commitment afiects the maturity structure of sovereign debt governments balance beneflts of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default their choice of short versus longterm debt afiects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers the equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that re ect the price impact of these decisions the model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high output low or a cross default more likely these predictions are consistent with empirical evidence

a walrasian theory of money and barter we study a barter economy in which each good is produced in two qualities and no trader can distinguish between the qualities of those goods he neither consumes nor produces we show that in competitive equilibrium there exists a unique good the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest that serves as the medium of exchange this good mediates every trade equilibrium is inefficient because production of the medium would be lower if it were not for its mediating role introducing fiat money enhances welfare by eliminating this distortion however high inflation drives traders back to the commodity medium

pricing and financial resources an analysis of the disk drive industry 1980 88 this paper empirically examines the long purse hypothesis formalized by patrick bolton and david scharfstein 1990 that incumbents may drive out entrants through aggressive pricing the author analyzes the pricing of 733 disk drives between 1980 and 1988 drives that are adjacent to those manufactured by thinly capitalized undiversified rivals are priced lower than other drives during the later years in the sample when little equity financing was available to these firms the results are robust to controls for alternative hypotheses and to other specifications of the hedonic regression copyright 1995 by mit press

money as the mechanism of exchange abstract the existence and use of money remained an embarrassing puzzle for monetary analysis we observe over man s history that social groups without generally accepted media of exchange exhibit poor survival characteristics most social groups do not use assets or commodities at random in the execution of exchanges one observes that a small subset of assets is dominantly used in transactions these transaction dominating assets are usually referred to as money the literature contains many suggestive attempts to explain the emergence and role of money the classic writers made passing references in somewhat pictorial language to the extension markets and increasing labor productivity induced by the use of a general medium of exchange this idea has never been systematically developed however karl brunner 1971

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

the estimation of demand parameters in hedonic price models this paper shows that the econometric problem of estimating hedonic demand parameters is not a standard identification problem caused by demand supply interaction as has been often assumed estimation procedures based on this assumption lead to biased results the hedonic estimation problem is instead caused by the endogeneity of both prices and quantities when households face a nonlinear budget constraint an instrumental variables solution to this problem is suggested using instruments that exogenously shift the budget constraint

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

dynamic inconsistency and the optimal choice of the exchange rate regime abstract in a cash in advance monetary economy facing dynamic inconsistency issues a fixed exchange rate regime may be pareto superior to a flexible regime if it allows for a non zero level of trade in domestic currency denominated assets

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

joint implications of consumption and tax smoothing in this paper the joint hypotheses of consumption and tax smoothing are shown to imply that the present value of expected proportionate declines in government non interest outlays is approximately equal to a log linear function of the budget deficit and private dissaving in this exact linear relation the budget deficit signals declines in future government outlays after controlling for prospective changes in the tax base private dissaving controls for such prospective changes since under the joint hypotheses the present value of expected proportionate rises in tax revenues are approximately equal to a log linear function of private dissaving both exact linear relations are tested in a var framework on annual post world war ii u s data we find considerable empirical support for the theory

comparing the robustness of trading systems to higher order uncertainty this paper compares the performance of a decentralized market with that of a dealership market when traders have differential information trade occurs as a result of equilibrium actions in a bayesian game where uncertainty is captured by a finite state space and information is represented by partitions on this space in the benchmark case of trade with common knowledge of endowments the two mechanisms deliver virtually identical outcomes however with differential information the dealership market has strictly higher trading volume and yields an efficient posttrade allocation in most states in contrast the decentralized market suffers from suboptimal trading volume the reason for this poor performance is the vulnerability of the decentralized market to higher order uncertainty concerning the fundamentals of the market traders may know that mutually beneficial trade is feasible and perhaps know that they know and yet a failure of common knowledge that this is so precludes efficient trade the dealership market is robust to this type of uncertainty

barter and monetary exchange under private information the authors develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information the model is specified so that without private information only high quality commodities are produced and there is no welfare gain from using money with private information there can be equilibria and sometimes multiple equilibria where low quality commodities are produced and money can increase welfare money works by promoting useful production and exchange in efficient monetary equilibria agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high quality output copyright 1994 by american economic association

u s deficits since world war i the tax smoothing theory suggests that deficits would respond particularly to recession temporarily high government spending and anticipated inflation my empirical estimates indicate that a relation of this type is reasonably stable in the u s since at least 1916 in particular the statistical evidence does not support the idea that there has been a shift toward a fiscal policy that generates either more real public debt on average or that generates larger deficits in response to recessions further the deficits for 1982 3 and popular projections formed in 1984 for 1984 5 are consistent with the previous structure the high values of these deficits reflect the customary response to substantial recession interacting with big government and to expected inflation

short and long interest rate targets can both short and long term interest rates be targeted independently can the target of the term structure help solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria that occurs when only the short rate is targeted both questions are addressed and the answer is yes to both

great expectations and the end of the depression what ended the great depression in the united states this paper suggests that the recovery was driven by a shift in expectations this shift was triggered by president franklin delano roosevelt s fdr policy actions on the monetary policy side roosevelt abolished the gold standard and announced an explicit policy objective of inflating the price level to pre depression levels on the fiscal policy side roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending which helped make his policy objective credible the key to the recovery was the successful management of expecta tions about future policy roosevelt s rise to power is modeled as a policy regime change as in thomas sargent 1983 and peter temin and barry wigmore 1990 this paper formalizes temin and wigmore s argu ment in a repeated game setting using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and argues that the regime change can account for the recovery in the model a regime change means the elimination of certain policy dogmas that constrain the actions of the government the regime change generates an endogenous shift in expectations due to a coordination of mon etary and fiscal policy this coordination ended the great depression by engineering a shift in expectations from contractionary i e the private sector expected future economic contrac tion and deflation to expansionary i e the public expected future economic expansion and inflation the expectation of higher future inflation lowered real interest rates thus stimulating demand while the expectation of higher future income stimulated demand by raising permanent income

gaps and triangles we derive principles of optimal short run monetary policy in a real business cycles model with money and prices set in advance the optimal allocation is achieved under the friedman rule however given that policy the allocation is indeterminate we move away from the friedman rule take the interest rate path as exogenous and characterize the optimal money supply policy we identify the conditions under which it is optimal to replicate the allocation under exible prices in general sticky prices provide the planner with tools to improve upon a distorted exible prices allocation

optimal inflation persistence ramsey taxation with capital and habits ramsey models of fiscal and monetary policy featuring time separable preferences and a fixed supply of capital predict highly volatile inflation with no serial correlation in this paper we show that an otherwise standard ramsey model that incorporates capital accumulation and habit persistence predicts highly persistent inflation the result depends on increases in either the ability to smooth consumption or the preference for doing so the effect operates through the fisher relationship a smoother profile of consumption implies a more persistent real interest rate which in turn implies persistent optimal inflation our work complements a recent strand of the ramsey literature based on models with nominal rigidities in these latter models inflation volatility is lower than in the baseline model but continues to exhibit little persistence we quantify the effects of habit and capital on inflation persistence and also relate our findings to recent work on optimal fiscal policy with incomplete markets

optimal taxation without state contingent debt in an economy studied by lucas and stokey tax rates inherit the serial correlation structure of government expenditures belying barro s earlier result that taxes should be a random walk for any stochastic process of government expenditures to recover a version of barro s random walk tax smoothing outcome we modify lucas and stokey s economy to permit only risk free debt having only risk free debt confronts the ramsey planner with additional constraints on equilibrium allocations beyond one imposed by lucas and stokey s assumption of complete markets the ramsey outcome blends features of barro s model with lucas and stokey s in our model the contemporaneous effects of exogenous government expenditures on the government deficit and taxes resemble those in lucas and stokey s model but incomplete markets put a near unit root component into government debt and taxes an outcome like barro s however we show that without ad hoc limits on the government s asset holdings outcomes can diverge in importa

the reeded edge and the phillips curve money neutrality common knowledge and subjective beliefs abstract i present a simple two person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money however the value of a unit of money is uncertain i show 1 a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge 2 if seller and buyer have identical beliefs making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade 3 if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs then monetary revaluations have no net effect 4 when the seller knows the value of money but the buyer does not the expected utilities of both seller and buyer are proportional to 1 1 2 where is the standard deviation of the value of money expressed as a fraction of the mean and 5 when beliefs are subjective monetary policy can improve total gains from trade as in friedman s explanation of the phillips curve and an optimal level of inflation can be determined journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e52

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

dynamic optimal taxation in small open economies abstract this paper examines the effects of perfect capital mobility on the determination of optimal capital taxation it shows that capital movements do not change dramatically the optimal tax path studied for the closed economy in addition the paper provides a counterexample to the standard belief that the worldwide system is the optimal regime of taxation finally it shows that the rate of taxation of the rest of the world is not fundamental to determine the optimal decision of a small economy

aggregate stability and balanced budget rules it has been shown that under perfect competition and a cobb douglas production function a basic real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations when income tax rates are determined by a balanced budget rule bbr this paper introduces in an otherwise standard real business cycle model a more general and data coherent class of production functions namely a constant elasticity of substitution production function we show that the degree of substitutability between production factors is a key ingredient to understanding the de stabilizing properties of a bbr then we calibrate the model consistently with the empirical evidence that is we set the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital below unity we show that compared to the cobb douglas case the likelihood of indeterminacy under a bbr is greatly reduced in the u s the eu and the uk

fiscal policy debt management and exchange rate credibility lessons from the recent italian experience abstract this paper explores some potential determinants of exchange rate credibility with reference to the italian experience of the 1990s the analysis relies on a nonlinear framework emphasizing shifts between credible and non credible states and assuming a significant degree of persistence in the above regimes almost all fiscal and debt management indicators display significant effects on devaluation expectations the main policy implications of the paper are that a restrictive fiscal stance a lengthening of average debt maturity and an increase in the share of foreign denominated debt are crucial to stabilize the lira exchange rate and to qualify italy in the former group of countries which will join emu

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

the spirit of capitalism and optimal capital taxation abstract the paper reexamines the famous chamley judd zero capital tax theorem in model economies where the agents are endowed with the spirit of capitalism it is shown that the limiting capital income tax is not zero in general and depends on the utility specifications rather than the production technology the similar formulas of optimal capital taxes are derived in more general settings with multiple physical capitals or heterogeneous agents capitalists and workers

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

welfare analysis of currency regimes with defaultable debts abstract we modify the cole and kehoe model by including domestic debt according to the original model a speculative attack on a high debt level issued abroad triggers external debt default here it is possible to inflate away the domestic debt to avoid the external debt default we consider two possibilities for domestic debt denomination i local currency and ii common currency in the second case inflation depends on a monetary union decision our numerical results show that to have a debt share denominated in a common currency is optimal when the refinancing risks are highly correlated across union members otherwise the best is to keep the domestic debt denominated in local currency finally the extreme case of having all debt issued abroad and denominated in a foreign currency is suitable when under alternative regimes suboptimal inflation motivated by political factors is likely although the paper was originally developed for emerging market economies it sheds some light on the recent eurozone crisis

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

production subsidies and redistribution abstract who gains from stimulating output we explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension wealth there are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population first poorer agents gain from a rise in wages since to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply they work harder second because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future thus lowering real interest rates poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income we examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population we show that if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth then output stimulation and hence redistribution will only occur at time zero after that subsidies are zero a byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median voter theorem with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero the sequence preferred by the median wealth consumer is the unique outcome we also study lack of commitment since interest rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency we analyze this case formally by looking at the markov perfect time consistent equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers e g the median agent here subsidies persist they are constant over time and are more distortionary than under commitment moreover whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially in favor of the consumer who decides on policy it does not under lack of commitment

volatile policy and private information the case of monetary shocks abstract we study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the presence of asymmetric information and endogenously chosen information structures we consider a model in which in the absence of either feature the equilibria would be efficient the equilibria that we find are inefficient for two reasons first in some cases agents fail to trade even though it is efficient to do so second agents spend resources acquiring socially useless information the model predicts a nonlinear relationship between inflation and output and a complex pattern of price dispersion with the nature of the relationship changing with the degree of volatility journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 e40 d82

the welfare cost of inflation in a cash in advance economy with costly credit the paper presents a modification of the lucas stokey 1983 cash in advance economy in which the representative consumer decides based on relative prices which goods to buy with cash and which with costly credit an explicit baumol 1952 condition emerges that guides this consumer choice deriving and estimating a closed form welfare cost function in an example economy the paper shows that the welfare cost of inflation depends on the margins of substitution the consumer avoids inflation through costly credit and faces higher welfare costs of inflation than in standard cash in advance economies

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

sticky goods prices flexible asset prices monopolistic competition and monetary policy a monetary general equilibrium asset pricing model with sticky goods prices is developed goods prices are set by monopolistically competitive firms that maximize stock market value equilibria with underutilization of resources excess capacity in some states result in contrast to previous monetary asset pricing models the degree of competition affects capacity utilization monetary policy can affect output and resource utilization in addition to real asset prices depending upon the amount of information available to the monetary authority

the impact of competitive entry in a developing market upon dynamic pricing strategies this paper analyzes dynamic pricing strategies for new durable goods in a two period context the first period is characterized as a monopoly market structure for a new product having dynamic demand the second period begins when a new firm enters the market and thereby changes the market structure to a duopolistic one we begin by analyzing the pricing strategies of three types of monopolists nonmyopic myopic and surprised a nonmyopic monopolist is a first entrant who perfectly predicts the competitive entry a myopic monopolist totally discounts the duopolistic period and a surprised monopolist is a first entrant who has the longer time horizon of the nonmyopic monopolist but who does not foresee the competitive entry our results indicate that the nature of these pricing strategies may be quite different it is optimal for the nonmyopic firm to price its product at a higher level than the myopic monopolist additional results indicate under what circumstances the surprised monopolist will p

optimal fiscal policy public capital and the productivity slowdown abstract this paper develops a quantitative theoretical model for the optimal provision of public capital we show that the ratio of public to private capital in the us economy since 1925 evolves in a manner that is broadly consistent with an optimal transition path derived from a simple growth model the model is used to quantify the conditions under which an increase in the stock of public capital is desirable and to investigate the degree to which nonoptimal fiscal policies can account for the us productivity slowdown

the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge the paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem two players have to play one of two possible coordination games only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played it is shown that the situation with almost common knowledge is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

model uncertainty and intertemporal tax smoothing in this paper we examine how model uncertainty due to the preference for robustness rb aects optimal taxation and the evolution of debt in the barro tax smoothing model 1979 we rst study how the government spending shocks are absorbed in the short run by varying taxes or through debt under rb furthermore we show that introducing rb improves the model s predictions by generating i the observed relative volatility of the changes in tax rates to government spending ii the observed comovement between government decits and spending and iii more consistent behavior of government budget decits in the us economy finally we show that rb can also improve the model s predictions in the presence of multiple shocks

product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly this paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm s product line when products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices we investigate whether holding the value of the characteristic constant there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and or the firm frontier that is for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm s product line we also investigate the existence of price premia for lower ranked products and other product line pricing questions using personal computer price data we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers even after holding absolute quality constant we find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market there is also evidence that a product s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip holding the total number of a firm s offerings constant possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization finally a product s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm suggesting intertemporal price discrimination ce memoire examine la decision conjointe de tarification des produits dans la ligne de produits d une firme quand les produits se distinguent par une caracteristique verticale ceux qui ont de plus grandes valeurs pour cette caracteristique commanderont de plus forts prix on se demande si gardant la valeur de cette caracteristique constante il y a une prime additionnelle des prix pour les produits de l industrie ou pour les produits de pointe de la firme i e les produits avec la plus haute valeur de cette caracteristique dans le marche ou dans la ligne de produits de la firme on examine aussi s il existe une prime de prix pour les produits qui se classent moins bien ou d autres questions sur la tarification des lignes de produits en utilisant des donnees de prix pour les ordinateurs personnels on montre que les prix chutent a mesure qu on s eloigne de la frontiere des produits de pointe pour l industrie et la firme meme si on garde la qualite absolue constante les resultats montrent que le gout des consommateurs pour les marques est plus fort pour les consommateurs des produits de pointe et que la concurrence entre firmes est plus faible dans cette section du marche on montre aussi que le prix d un produit est plus eleve si une firme offre des produits avec une puce juste plus rapide et plus lente tout en gardant le nombre total de produits de la firme constant possiblement dans un effort pour reduire la cannibalisation enfin le prix d un produit decline a proportion que la periode de temps ou il est offert par une firme s allonge ce qui suggere qu il y a discrimination intertemporelle par les prix

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

the role of countercyclical monetary policy when firms set nominal prices in advance optimal monetary policy insulates aggregate output against shocks to demand it can do so however by following the constant money growth rule advocated by milton friedman it need not respond to the shocks in an actively countercyclical way in addition to the extent that output fluctuations are driven by shocks to supply money growth should be procyclical

optimal monetary policy optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent given frictions in the economic environment constructing a model with two sets of frictions costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles first the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low as suggested by milton friedman that there should be deflation on average yet the keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive second as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors the price level should be largely stabilized as suggested by irving fisher albeit around a deflationary trend path since expected inflation is roughly constant through time the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the fisherian determinants of the real interest rate although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were flexible in our benchmark model there is some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

credible commitment and exchange rate stability canada s interwar experience in 1929 the canadian government floated the exchange rate which stayed at parity with sterling until 1931 when the canadian dollar appreciated with respect to sterling and depreciated with respect to the u s dollar this paper uses barro and gordon s reputation theory to explain the stability of the canadian dollar before 1931 and the subsequent depre ciation appreciation econometric analysis is then used to support the argument that between 1931 and 1933 the level of the exchange rate was determined by expectations of a return to parity with either sterling or the u s dollar

communication and coordination in social networks i model people in a coordination game who use a communication network to tell each other their willingness to participate the minimal sufficient networks for coordination can be interpreted as placing people into a hierarchy of social roles or stages initial adopters then followers and so on down to late adopters a communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways by informing each stage about earlier stages and by creating common knowledge within each stage we then consider two examples first we show that low dimensional networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than high dimensional networks second we show that wide dispersion of insurgents people predisposed toward participation can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad although collective action depends on both social structure and individual incentives these integral aspects have been formalized separately in the fields of social network theory and game theory by considering them together this paper engages the classic question of which structures are conducive to coordination and shows that structure and strategy are related in a mutually interesting way here we consider a coordination game in which each person wants to participate only if others participate social structure is thought of as a communication network by which people tell each other their willingness to participate each person knows whether her neighbours in the network are willing but does not know about anyone else our model is thus a game of incomplete information in which each person given his local knowledge decides whether to participate the main result is a characterization of the minimal sufficient networks for coordination in terms of a hierarchy of social roles or stages initial adopters then followers and so on down to late adopters for example a communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways by informing each stage about earlier stages and by creating common knowledge within each stage we also consider two simple examples first we show that low dimension or strong link networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than high dimension or weak link networks second we show that wide dispersion of insurgents people predisposed toward participation can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad this paper is built on the assumption that the most basic and common mechanism for coordination is the i ll go if you go mechanism individuals first communicate with each other about their preferences and then each individual chooses whether to participate or not hence a person s participation depends on what he knows about his neighbours it does not depend solely on their participation itself either through learning adaptation or social influence the physical analogies of contagion or diffusion are not

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

balanced budget rules and aggregate instability the role of consumption taxes it is known that in a real business cycle model with constant returns to scale and a balanced budget fiscal policy rule steady state indeterminacy may arise due to endogenous labour income tax rates this article shows that when the government finances its expenditures via an endogenous consumption tax instead a steady state is always saddle path stable consequently combining income taxes with consumption taxes makes the ranges of indeterminacy shrink thus reducing the possibility of aggregate instability from a policy perspective the results provide an additional argument in favour of consumption taxes in place of capital taxes

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

the recursive core core allocations may be defined for infinite horizon capital accumulation models if agents cannot trust each other in the sense of gale then agents may renege on their commitments their decisions appear time inconsistent a core allocation is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period we show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract at any date it follows that if the proper distribution of the streams of capital is achieved then the allocation in the core is also in the recursive core the latter therefore forges a link between the distribution of wealth capital the problem of trust and time consistent intertemporal contracts

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

the international ramifications of tax reforms supply side economics in a global economy this paper studies tax reforms in a dynamic model of a global economy calibrated to current u s and european tax policies world capital markets add consumption smoothing and income redistribution effects that alter closed economy predictions in the absence of taxes on foreign interest welfare gains of eliminating u s income taxes are enlarged by up to 34 percent at the expense of european losses caused by transitional declines in consumption and leisure and a permanent capital outflow in contrast if foreign interest is taxed the same tax reform reduces u s welfare 0 7 percent and increases european welfare 1 8 percent copyright 1998 by american economic association