overconfident consumers in the marketplace when consumers sign contracts expectations about future usage of the product or service matter for instance the value provided by car insurance depends on how likely a consumer believes she is to file a claim the value provided by a gym membership depends on how often a consumer anticipates going to the gym and the value provided by a cellular phone contract depends on how many gigabytes of data a consumer anticipates using the standard modeling paradigm makes the expedient assumption that consumers have rational expectations imposing rational expectations drastically simplifies models and eliminates the need to directly measure beliefs as they coincide with the distribution of observed outcomes yet a large literature shows that consumer beliefs often deviate substantially from rational expectations in systematic ways this has important consequences for contract design firm profits consumer welfare and public policy the term overconfidence is used broadly in the psychology literature referring to both overoptimism and overprecision overoptimistic individuals overestimate their own abilities or prospects either in absolute terms or in comparison to others in contrast overprecise individuals place overly narrow confidence intervals around forecasts thereby underestimating uncertainty these biases can lead consumers to misforecast their future product usage or to overestimate their abilities to navigate contract terms in consequence consumer overconfidence causes consumers

the peter principle a theory of decline some have observed that individuals perform worse after being promoted the peter principle which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence suggests that something is fundamentally misaligned in the promotion process this view is unnecessary and inconsistent with the data below it is argued that ability appears lower after promotion purely as a statistical matter being promoted is evidence that a standard has been met regression to the mean implies that future ability will be lower on average firms optimally account for the regression bias in making promotion decisions but the effect is never eliminated rather than evidence of a mistake the peter principle is a necessary consequence of any promotion rule furthermore firms that take it into account appropriately adopt an optimal strategy usually firms inflate the promotion criterion to offset the peter principle effect and the more important the transitory component is relative to total variation in ability the larger

does the better than average effect show that people are overconfident two experiments we conduct two experimental tests of the claim that people are overconfident using new tests of overplacement that are based on a formal bayesian model our two experiments on easy quizzes find that people overplace themselves more precisely we find apparently overconfident data that cannot be accounted for by a rational population of expected utility maximizers who care only about money the finding represents new evidence of overconfidence that is robust to the bayesian critique offered by benoit and dubra jean pierre benoit and juan dubra 2011 apparent overconfidence econometrica 79 1591 1625 we discuss possible limitations of our results

relationship banking fragility and the asset liability matching problem we address a fundamental question in relationship banking why do banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarily with core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance such loans with purchased money we show that not only are relationship loans informationally opaque and illiquid but they also require the relationship between the bank and the borrower to endure in order for the bank to add value however the informational opacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawal risk that makes the bank fragile core deposits are an attractive funding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidity services to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihood of premature deposit withdrawal thereby facilitating the continuity of relationship loans that is we show that banks will wish to match the highest value added liabilities with the highest value added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizes the bank s fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizes the value the bank adds in relationship lending we also examine the impact of interbank competition on the bank s asset liability matching and extract numerous testable predictions

overconfidence and asymmetric information the case of insurance this paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself we first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations between observable variables in perfect competition asymmetric information insurance markets in monopolistic insurance markets in constrast we find that overconfidence may be observationally equivalent to variations in the risk composition of the economy our analysis provides a number of novel testable implications on i price heterogeneity within and across risk classes ii the relationship between ex post risk and insurance coverage iii the fact that a significant fraction of agents chooses to be uninsured and iv the relationship between underinsurance and age

overconfidence and moral hazard abstract in this paper i study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract on the one hand an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success contingent payments and thus prefers higher powered incentives on the other hand if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions affect outcomes lower powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort level if the agent is moderately overconfident the latter effect dominates because the agent bears less risk in this case there are efficiency gains stemming from his overconfidence if the agent is significantly overconfident the former effect dominates the agent is then exposed to an excessive amount of risk and any gains arise only from risk sharing under disagreement an increase in optimism or overconfidence increases the effort level implemented in equilibrium

a model of positive self image in subjective assessments this paper suggests a mechanism that describes individuals positive self image in subjective assessments of their relative abilities the mechanism assumes individuals have heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills make skill enhancing investments with the goal of maximizing their ability and make ability comparisons using their own production function within this framework the paper provides conditions under which there is positive self image positive self image is increasing in the ease of the task the number of different skills needed for the task and the variability of production technologies in the population

measuring ecological efficiency with data envelopment analysis dea abstract the measurement of ecological efficiency provides some important information for the companies environmental management ecological efficiency is usually measured by comparing environmental performance indicators data envelopment analysis dea shows a high potential to support such comparisons as no explicit weights are needed to aggregate the indicators in general dea assumes that inputs and outputs are goods but from an ecological perspective also bads have to be considered in the literature bads are treated in different and sometimes arbitrarily chosen ways this article aims at the systematic derivation of ecologically extended dea models starting from the assumptions of dea in production theory and activity analysis a generalisation of basic dea models is derived by incorporating a multi dimensional value function f extended preference structures can be considered by different specifications of f e g specifications for ecologically motivated applications of dea

job allocation rules and sorting efficiency experimental outcomes in a peter principle environment an important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives however the peter principle states that employees output tends to fall after a promotion lazear 2004 suggests that self selection may improve job allocation efficiency while preserving incentive effects we reproduce this peter principle in the laboratory and compare the efficiency of a promotion standard with subjects self selecting their task we find no evidence of effort distortion as predicted by theory furthermore we find that when the peter principle is not severe promotion rules often dominate self selection efficiency of task assignment results are consistent with imperfect appraisal of transitory ability and a lack of strategic behavior

the bright side of managerial over optimism human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over optimism in contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases we focus on positive effects we empirically examine a setting in which over optimism a is a related but different bias from overconfidence b emerges dynamically in a rational economic framework and c generates higher managerial effort importantly this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value

investment strategy and selection bias an equilibrium perspective on overoptimism investors of new projects consider the returns of implemented projects delivering the same impression and invest if the empirical mean return exceeds the cost the steady states of such economies result in suboptimal investment decisions due to the selection bias in the sampling procedure and the dispersion of impressions across investors assuming better impressions are associated with higher returns investors assessments of their projects are overoptimistic and there is overinvestment as compared with the rational benchmark the presence of rational investors aggravates the overoptimism bias of sampling investors thereby illustrating a negative externality imposed by rational investors

rational overoptimism and other biases rational agents with differing priors tend to be overoptimistic about their chances of success in particular an agent who tries to choose the action that is most likely to succeed is more likely to choose an action of which he overestimated rather than underestimated the likelihood of success after studying the comparative statics of this mechanism i show that it also causes agents to attribute failure to exogenous factors but success to their own choice of action to disproportionately believe that they will outperform others to overestimate the precision of their estimates and to overestimate their control over the outcome

tests of the efficiency of racetrack betting using bookmaker odds the objective of this study is to evaluate the informational efficiency of the market for betting on horse races whereas the price data used in previous studies have been drawn largely from totalizator parimutuel odds the data used in this study are derived from bookmaker odds the availability of a series of prices throughout betting facilitates the use of filter tests to evaluate market efficiency we conclude that this gambling market is efficient in the use of information supplied via both the movements in odds during the course of betting and the selections of newspaper tipsters however there is evidence to suggest that those with access to private information can earn positive returns from gambling

interpersonal authority in a theory of the firm this paper develops a theory of the flrm in which a flrm s centralized asset ownership and low powered incentives give a manager interpersonal authority over employees in a world with difiering priors the paper derives such interpersonal authority as an equilibrium phenomenon one key result is that a manager s control over critical assets through its efiect on the level of outside options allows the manager to order employees what to do the paper thus provides microfoundations for the idea that bringing a project inside a flrm gives the manager authority over that project while in the process explaining concentrated asset ownership low powered incentives and centralized authority as typical characteristics of flrms it also leads to a new perspective on the flrm as a legal entity and building on the insights of a parallel paper to a new theory for flrm boundaries based on the idea of break up a key feature of the latter theory is that flrm boundaries matter even though both ex ante investments and ex post actions are perfectly contractible

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

simulating weights restrictions in data envelopment analysis by means of unobserved dmus data envelopment analysis dea is a method for assessing the comparative efficiencies of decision making units e g banks and schools by relating their output to their input levels restrictions are often imposed in these assessments to reflect prior judgments on the values of input and or output variables this paper introduces a new approach to capturing and using value judgments in dea based on unobserved decision making units in so doing it opens up a whole new approach for reflecting value judgments in dea assessments which can offer advantages in certain situations

undesirable outputs in efficiency valuations abstract efficiency measurement is usually based on the assumption that inputs have to be minimized and outputs have to be maximized in a growing number of applications however undesirable outputs are incorporated into the production model which have to be minimized in this paper various approaches for treating such outputs in the framework of data envelopment analysis dea are discussed and the resulting efficient frontiers are compared new radial measures are introduced which assume that any change of the output level will involve both undesirable and desirable outputs

do bad risks know it experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection abstract subjects who overestimate their performance in experimental tasks unrelated to travel are less willing to insure against failing in the task and also less inclined to buy travel insurance this suggests intrinsic optimism influences insurance demand and diminishes adverse selection

measuring macroeconomic performance in the oecd a comparison of european and non european countries abstract we study the macroeconomic performance of 19 oecd countries over the period 1970 1990 performance is defined in terms of the ability of a country s macroeconomic managers to provide four services to their citizens a high level of real gdp per capita a low rate of inflation a low rate of unemployment and a favorable trade balance we use linear programming techniques to construct a best practice macroeconomic performance frontier and to measure the performance of each country in each year relative to the frontier we then add two environmental disamenities carbon and nitrogen emissions to the service list and repeat the analysis to see if the performance rankings change throughout the analysis emphasis is placed on a comparison of the performance of 14 european oecd countries with that of five non european oecd countries we find that performance rankings do change and that the relative performance of the european countries declines when the environmental disamenities are added to the service list

overconfidence ceo selection and corporate governance we develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager who sometimes makes value destroying investments has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to ceo under value maximizing corporate governance moreover a risk averse ceo s overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion overconfident ceos also underinvest in information production the board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident ceos finally sarbanes oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors but to reduce project investment

imperfect memory and choice under risk this paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self deception i assume that people have preferences over their own attributes e g skill knowledge or competence and can manipulate their memories the model provides a prior dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior dependent information attitudes it implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times

inventorship and authorship as attribution rights an enquiry into the economics of scientific credit abstract authorship and inventorship are attribution rights upon which individual scientists build their reputation and career social and legal norms concerning their distribution within research teams are currently criticized for failing to inform third parties on individual contributions we examine the case of teams engaged in the double disclosure of their research results through both publications and patents and model the negotiation process taking place between junior or female team members and the senior male ones we suggest that the former may give up inventorship in order to secure authorship even when entitled to the both based on a sample of 680 patent publication pairs related sets of patents and publications we show that very frequently one or more authors of a publication do not appear as inventors of a related patent this is less likely to happen for first and last authors which is in accordance both with our model and the prevailing legal norms on inventorship however the probability of exclusion from inventorship also declines with seniority and increases for women which is compatible with our model only

performance assessment of alternative energy resources in brazilian power sector using data envelopment analysis abstract the brazilian power sector is known for the strong participation of renewable sources this characteristic is maintained thanks to government incentives for alternative sources with particular emphasis on wind generation small hydroelectric and sugar cane bagasse fired power plants because these are more costly than conventional plants they are nevertheless less costly than other alternative sources such as residue based generation the government s policy is based however on a purely economic analysis if socio environmental variables were to be taken into account the government s orientation in favor of renewable sources might be different the present article uses the data envelopment analysis dea method to incorporate such variables in the government s energy policies the results demonstrate the advantage of promoting residue based generation above that from other sources

a cultural explanation of the foreign bias in international asset allocation abstract this paper examines the foreign bias in international asset allocation following extant literature in behavioral finance we argue that a society s culture and the cultural distance between two markets play an important role in explaining the foreign bias in particular we hypothesize that the degree of a nation s uncertainty avoidance affects the foreign bias more uncertainty avoiding countries allocate less to foreign markets as does the degree of a country s individualism in individualistic countries performance is more directly attributed to a person and less to teams causing these individuals to be more aggressive in their foreign asset allocations we further expect that the degree of cultural distance between two countries affects the amount of money allocated to that market based on extensive robustness analyses we find support for our hypotheses on the role of culture in international asset allocation

career concerns and bayesian overconfidence of managers we show that managerial overconfidence can be a rational response to the economic and institutional environment rather than a personal trait a manager whose contract may not be renewed upon poor performance relative to his peers chooses risky projects in the firm this may result in more than half of the managers rationally estimating their abilities to be better than average although there can be underconfident managers in equilibrium it is never the case that more than half of them estimate their abilities to be below average in any equilibrium

decision biases and entrepreneurial finance we study the effects of three cognitive biases by the entrepreneur on obtaining funding we find planning fallacy to increase funding amounts whereas optimism and overconfidence by the entrepreneur have no effects on funding amounts from others further planning fallacy positively impacts the probability of strong tie inside investments but negatively impacts the probability of weak tie outside investments mediation analyses further show that planning fallacy positively impacts venture performance through both self and other investor funding amounts our findings are not consistent with the pecking order theory of informal finance and suggest positive effects of at least one cognitive bias on entrepreneurial business success through increased funding

policy experimentation political competition and heterogeneous beliefs abstract we consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally but faces competition from a political opponent in the future both parties care about voters payoffs but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes we show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices policy experimentation future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future thus avoiding facing competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself the model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to over experiment relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods we thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on parties having conflicting objectives but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions

managerial optimism and earnings smoothing abstract this paper empirically examines how ceo optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises the main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller in absolute value earnings surprises a possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the torpedo effect the innate behavior of optimists and the risk of litigation prosecution for over reporting earnings

confidence enhanced performance there is ample evidence that emotions affect performance positive emotions can improve performance while negative ones may diminish it for example the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences shaking loss of concentration that may impair performance in sports on stage or at school there is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort while failures are attributed to bad luck in addition these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others the objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions biases in information processing enhance welfare

maxing out globally individualism investor attention and the cross section of expected stock returns we examine the role of cultural difference in the pricing of positive extreme returns max for 47 000 stocks from 42 countries from 1990 to 2012 we find that investors overpay for stocks with high max and that max premium the spread from long short strategy based on low and high max stocks is both statistically and economically significant worldwide the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns or idiosyncratic volatility puzzle exists only for stocks with high max implying that the puzzle may arise from the overpayment for stocks with high max and the subsequent return reversal consistent with the expectation that overpayment will be stronger for overconfident investors the max premium is larger in countries with high individualism index idv than it is in countries with low idv furthermore we find the max premium to be larger and the difference in the max premium between high and low idv countries to be more pronounced when vix and volatility are high our fi

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

how do beliefs about skill affect risky decisions abstract beliefs about relative skill matter for risky decisions such as market entry career choices and financial investments yet in most laboratory experiments risk is exogenously given and beliefs about relative skill play no role we use a laboratory experiment without strategy confounds to isolate the impact of beliefs about relative skill on risky choices we find that low high skill individuals are more less willing to take risks on gambles where the probabilities depend on relative skill than on gambles with exogenously given probabilities this happens because low high skill individuals overestimate underestimate their relative skill consequently the wrong people may engage in risky activities where performance is based on relative skill while the right people may be crowded out

games with incomplete information game theory is a theory of strategic interaction that is to say it is a theory of rational behavior in social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players countermoves are likely to be