guarding the guardians good government requires some restraints on the powerful but how can those be impose if there is no one above them this paper studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power commitment to uphold individuals rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be ex post power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo and thus want to defend it

fully absorbing dynamic compromise abstract i consider a repeated divide the dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period s allocation see kalandrakis 14 i show that if proposals can be non exhaustive then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a markov perfect equilibrium this result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence

power illusion in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis abstract one feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power game theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality we conduct an experimental test of the classical baron ferejohn model with five player groups holding real power constant we compare treatments with differences in nominal power we find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place finally and of particular importance as a methodological observation giving subjects a pause accelerates learning

buying supermajorities in finite legislatures i analyze the finite voter version of the groseclose and snyder vote buying model i identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal ma1onty and universal coalitions to form and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in groseclose and snyder is incorrect

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

the inventory investment equation an empirical work using business survey data abstract the most widely used model in empirical work on inventory investment has been the one that combines the accelerator motive with a target adjustment mechanism however the rationale for this type of relations remains normally quite vague in this paper a small theoretical model of inventory investment developed with solid micro economic foundations is presented and estimated using portuguese and belgian business survey data the model can help explaining some concepts that are frequently confused in empirical work and can also rationalize some of the most popular beliefs about inventory behaviour

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

existence of stationary bargaining equilibria abstract this paper addresses the question of existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation general sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments e g models with non convexities consumption lower bounds or an evolving state variable the main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity conditions without the structure of convexity or strict comprehensiveness used in the extant literature the proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following different proposals using a generalization of fatou s lemma

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

bargaining in bicameral legislatures when and why does malapportionment matter malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures it is widely argued confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures the theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak it is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed rule infinite horizon model of baron and ferejohn 1989 we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures two sets of results are derived first when bills originate in the house and the senate considers the bill under a closed rule the equilibrium expected payoffs of all house members are surprisingly equal second we show that small state biases can emerge when 1 there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber 2 the senate initiates bills which produces maldistributed proposal probabilities and 3 the distributive goods are lumpy we thank seminar participants at new york university the university of pennsylvania and the 2002 annual meeting of the american political science association for helpful comments james snyder and michael ting gratefully acknowledge the financial support of national science foundation grant ses 0079035 stephen ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the carnegie corporation under the carnegie scholars program this paper was written while michael ting was at the university of north carolina at chapel hill and he thanks the department of political science there for their support

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

a carrot and stick approach to agenda setting this paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods showing how he can exploit a legislature completely in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him in equilibrium a large majority of legislators vote for the first period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities or even unanimously that benefit few or even none of them the results are robust but institutional arrangements such as entitlements can reduce the agenda setter s power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators and rules such as sequential voting can increase a legislator s ability to resist exploitation

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

the effect of green investment on corporate behavior this paper explores the effect of exclusionary ethical investing on corporate behavior in a risk averse equilibrium setting while arguments exist that ethical investing can influence a firm s cost of capital and so affect investment no equilibrium model has been presented to do so we show that exclusionary ethical investing leads to polluting firms being held by fewer investors since green investors eschew polluting firms stock this lack of risk sharing among non green investors leads to lower stock prices for polluting firms thus raising their cost of capital if the higher cost of capital more than overcomes a cost of reforming i e a polluting firm cleaning up its activities then polluting firms will become socially responsible because of exclusionary ethical investing a key determinant of the incentive for polluting firms to reform is the fraction of funds controlled by green investors in our model empirically reasonable parameter estimates indicate that more than 20 green investors are required to induce any polluting firmss to reform existing empirical evidence indicates that at most 10 of funds are invested by green investors

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

religious beliefs gambling attitudes and financial market outcomes this study investigates whether geographic variation in religion induced gambling norms affects aggregate market outcomes we conjecture that gambling propensity would be stronger in regions with higher concentrations of catholics relative to protestants consistent with our conjecture we show that in regions with higher catholic protestant ratios investors exhibit a stronger propensity to hold lottery type stocks broad based employee stock option plans are more popular the initial day return following an initial public offering is higher and the magnitude of the negative lottery stock premium is larger collectively these results indicate that religion induced gambling attitudes impact investors portfolio choices corporate decisions and stock returns

power brokers middlemen in legislative bargaining abstract we study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers we establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon we show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes and can be inefficient to fulfill this role the middleman s policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible but the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change the results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies

coalition formation and bargaining protocols a review of the literature this paper offers a review of the vast literature regarding bargaining and coalition formation this topic has been generally described as the attempt to provide strategic foundations to cooperative solution concepts it can therefore be seen as the linking ring between the non cooperative and the cooperative game theoretic approach to coalition formation its central role in economic theory and its relatively long history that goes back to the nash program have fostered a large academic production including surveys nonetheless this paper will focus on an aspect that is often neglected in the dedicated surveys the specificities of the bargaining protocols leading to different outcomes although generally downgraded to the rank of details the differences in bargaining protocols even when minor can cause significant changes in fundamental aspects such as the possibility to reach full cooperation the distribution of final pay offs and the time taken to reach an agreement focused on externalities free games therefore on bargaining protocols sustaining solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic function form the paper aims at providing a brief but exhaustive review of the topic that could result in a very useful tool for any researcher approaching the subject of coalitional bargaining

aggregate inventory behavior in large european economies abstract inventory fluctuations are known to be an important propagation mechanism for u s business cycles this paper compares the significance of inventory fluctuations in the u s with four other major industrial economies in europe a general model of aggregate inventory demand is specified which seeks to encompass the models presented in recent studies of inventory behavior this model is estimated for the large european economies united kingdom west germany france and italy the preferred models that result from this analysis are compared with the empirical evidence for the u s

the opportunity cost of negative screening in socially responsible investing this paper investigates the impact of negative screening on the investment universe as well as on financial performance we come up with a novel identification process and as such depart from mainstream socially responsible investing literature by concentrating on individual firms conduct and by studying a much wider range of issues firstly we study the size and financial performance of fourteen potentially controversial issues abortion adult entertainment alcohol animal testing contraceptives controversial weapons fur gambling genetic engineering meat nuclear power pork embryonic stem cells and tobacco we investigate an international sample of more than 1 600 stocks for more than twenty years we then analyze the impact of applying negative screens to a market portfolio our findings suggest that the choice for negative screening strategies does matter for the size of the investment universe as well as for risk adjusted return performance investing in controversial stocks in many cases results in additional risk adjusted returns whereas excluding them may reduce financial performance these findings suggest that there are opportunity costs to negative screening

universalism and the value of political power although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive i develop a game theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation to quantify the effects of political power on the agreed upon allocation i structurally estimate the model using the bridge bill capital budget in 1992 i find that 16 73 of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

the heterogeneity of socially responsible investment many writers have commented on the heterogeneity of the socially responsible investment sri movement however few have actually tried to understand and explain it and even fewer have discussed whether the opposite standardisation is possible and desirable in this article we take a broader perspective on the issue of the heterogeneity of sri we distinguish between four levels on which heterogeneity can be found the terminological definitional strategic and practical whilst there is much talk about the definitional ambiguities of sri we suggest that there is actually some agreement on the definitional level there are at least three explanations which we suggest can account for the heterogeneity on the other levels cultural and ideological differences between different regions differences in values norms and ideology between various sri stakeholders and the market setting of sri discussing the implications of the three explanations for the sri market we suggest that there is reason to be sceptical about the possibilities of standardisation if not standardisation is imposed top down whether this kind of standardisation is desirable or not we argue depends on what the motives for it would be to the extent that standardisation may facilitate the mainstreaming of sri it could be a good thing but we entertain doubts about whether mainstreaming really requires standardisation

doing well while doing bad csr in controversial industry sectors in this article we examine the empirical association between firm value and csr engagement for firms in sinful industries such as tobacco gambling and alcohol as well as industries involved with emerging environmental social or ethical issues i e weapon oil cement and biotech we develop and test three hypotheses the window dressing hypothesis the value enhancement hypothesis and the value irrelevance hypothesis using an extensive us sample from 1995 to 2009 we find that csr engagement of firms in controversial industries positively affects firm value after controlling for various firm characteristics to address the potential endogeneity problem we further estimate a system of equations and change regression and continue to find a positive relation between csr engagement and firm value our findings support the value enhancement hypothesis and are consistent with the premise that the top management of us firms in controversial industries in general considers social responsibility important even though their products are harmful to human being society or environment

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

does it really hurt to be responsible prior literature on socially responsible investment has contended that excluding sin stocks from a portfolio negative screening will reduce performance and increase risk further incorporating stocks of firms with positive social responsibility scores positive screening will improve performance and reduce risk we simulate portfolios designed to mimic typical equity mutual funds holdings and investigate these propositions we remove the potentially confounding influences of differences in manager skill transaction costs and fees and conduct a clean experiment on the effect of positive and negative portfolio screening we find no difference in the return or risk of screened and unscreened portfolios we conclude that a typical socially responsible fund will neither gain nor lose from screening its portfolio

interest group size and legislative lobbying abstract we develop a model of legislative decision making in which lobbying and public policy are jointly determined we examine how policy outcomes depend on the sizes of the interest groups while a larger size typically involves favorable effects on policy we also identify threshold levels of interest group size where a lobby will be harmed if it becomes larger this may provide another rationale as to why some interests do not or not fully organize spending limits can remove adverse policy effects of interest group size however this is not necessarily welfare improving moreover we find that endogenous proposal making may turn a second mover advantage in standard legislative lobbying models into a second mover disadvantage

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting in light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models tullock 1981 asks why so much stability our results suggest the following answer political agents engaged in long term relationships can sustain highly stable allocations if there are strongly held norms for punishment of defectors 1

procedural choice in majoritarian organizations a puzzling feature of self governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive seemingly nonmajoritarian procedures e g chairs and committees this article provides a theory of self enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures we ask 1 why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place 2 why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter and 3 with what policy consequences in the model a risk averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency i e reduce the procedural uncertainty of free for all bargaining an equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive generating nonmajoritarian policy bias still a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty

sequential legislative lobbying under political certainty in this paper we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game theoretical model of lobbying based on groseclose and snyder 1996 describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies lobby 0 and lobby 1 that compete by bidding for legislators votes in this model there is a strong second mover advantage

veto games spatial committees under unanimity rule there exists a large literature on two person bargaining games and distribution games or divide the dollar games under simple majority rule where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else here we extend the study to an n person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo briefly we find a nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the pareto optimal set and the pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values and punishments are never implemented comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas sequential recognition and random recognition we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule we also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely

the maturing of socially responsible investment a review of the developing link with corporate social responsibility this paper reviews the development of socially responsible investment sri over recent years and highlights the prospects for an increasingly strong connection with the practice of corporate social responsibility the paper argues that not only has sri grown significantly it has also matured in particular it has become an investment philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large investment institutions this shift in sri from margin to mainstream and the position in which institutional investors find themselves is leading to a new form of sri shareholder pressure although this bears some resemblance to lobbying campaigns which might take advantage of shareholder rights we seek to distinguish it as an important phenomenon in its own right one to which corporate executives are likely to be paying increasing attention in the years to come we further argue that this approach potentially meets some of the earlier ethical criticisms of certain forms of sri but ironically probably owes its existence to those pioneering approaches we conclude with some suggestions for further research to inform discussion of the issues highlighted in the paper

the domestic politics of banking regulation this article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics based on evidence from twenty two industrialized countries we argue that electoral rules specifically the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system moreover despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels

why wine is not glue the unresolved problem of negative screening in socially responsible investing the purpose of socially responsible investing sri is to 1 allow investors to reflect their personal values and ethics in their choices and 2 encourage companies to improve their ethical social and environmental performance in order to achieve these ends the means sri fund managers employ include the use of negative screening or the exclusion of companies involved in sinful industries we argue that there are problems with this methodology both at a theoretical and at a practical level as a consequence current sri offerings cannot accurately reflect the values and ethical beliefs they propose to represent moreover the use of a priori criteria is potentially misleading as we show by discussing examples of glue and wine making applying this flawed approach sri funds fail to influence the direction of the firms they deem most in need of re directing rather than engaging in the simple a priori assumption that some industries are saints while others are sinners freeman 2007 we suggest a new framework upon which the sri screening methodology could be grounded embracing the philosophical tradition of american pragmatism we suggest that sri methodology could be improved by engaging in an analysis based on 1 the actual impacts of the company s products and services 2 the company s relationships with its specific real stakeholders and 3 the contingent environment social economic political legal and cultural in which the business operates

formal versus informal legislative bargaining we study how the formality of a bargaining procedure affects its outcome we compare a formal baron ferejohn bargaining procedure to an informal procedure where players make and accept proposals in continuous time both constitute non cooperative games corresponding to the same bargaining problem a three player median voter setting with an external disagreement point this allows us to study formality in the presence and absence of a core and provides a natural explanation for the effects of preference polarization our results show that polarization hurts the median player and that formality matters the median player is significantly better off under informal bargaining

drivers of socially responsible investing a case study of four nordic countries in this study we try to establish what determines the substantial differences in the nordic countries size and composition of socially responsible investing sri we investigate if these differences between denmark finland norway and sweden can be associated with key characteristics in economics finance culture and institutions we find that in particular economic openness the size of the pension industry and cultural values of masculinity femininity and uncertainty avoidance can be associated with the differences in sri in the four countries on basis of these findings we lay foundations for an international theory of sri

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

interest group politics under majority rule abstract we develop a model of interest group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise and the form of redistributive policies sought are jointly determined the model generates three key results first programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes second nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers third many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income

on the theory of the firm underlying empirical models of aggregate price behavior recent empirical work on aggregate and industrial price behavior has been conducted within the framework of a static neo classical theory of price formation 2 the purpose of this paper is to propose a more general theoretical framework for analyzing price behavior the proposed framework is neo classical in its basic characteristics but unlike the recent literature it is based on a dynamic theory of firm behavior in which decisions on price inventories and the capital stock are integrated to serve as a basis for comparison with the model developed here it is useful to state briefly the main propositions of the static neo classical model the model presumes that the typical firm behaves as if it were a simple monopolist that faces competitive factor input markets and sets its price so as to maximize current profits assuming a log linear demand function and production function the model yields the result that the firm s long run optimal price policy in general is

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

inventories and sticky prices more on the microfoundations of macroeconomics the role of inventories in making prices sticky is studied by analyzing a dynamic linear quadratic model of a monopoly firm facing stochastic demand but able to store its finished goods in inventory it is shown that in contrast to the usual presumption firms that exhibit the smallest output responses to demand fluctuations may also exhibit the smallest price fluctuations specifically firms which have very flexible inventory storage facilities or are subjected to very transitory demand shocks will rely on inventories as buffers and will change neither production nor price very much on the other hand firms which have very inflexible storage facilities or whose demand shocks are quite permanent will display large swings in both price and output the standard assumption about inventory carrying costs that has been used in the literature that they are linear is shown to imply that production is impervious to fluctuations in demand it is also established that prices may respond more strongly to positive demand shocks than to negative ones if it is impossible to hold negative inventories i e to have unfilled orders the model offers an explanation for stickiness in relative prices however under certain circumstances it may help explain the persistence of inflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

political competition and mirrleesian income taxation a first pass we study downsian competition in a mirrleesian model of income taxation the competing politicians may dier in competence if politicians engage in vote share maximization the less competent politician s policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents the less competent politician wins with positive probability which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of besley and coate 1998 political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities nevertheless the two equilibria cannot be pareto ranked the minority may be better o under vote share maximization

can the production smoothing model of inventory behavior be saved the production smoothing model of inventory behavior has a long and venerable history and theoretical foundations that seem very strong yet certain overwhelming facts seem not only to defy explanation within the production smoothing framework but actually to argue that the basic idea of production smoothing is all wrong most prominent among these is the fact that the variance of detrended production exceeds the variance of detrended sales this paper first documents the stylized facts then it derives the production smoothing model rigorously and explains how the model can be amended to make it consistent with the facts finally it reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence and tries to draw some tentative conclusions

chaotic shop talk or efficient parliament the reichstag the parties and the problem of governmental instability in the weimar republic the german parliament in the weimar republic was very instable and governments did not last long historical research has tried to determine what caused this instability those historical hypotheses are re examined by studying a completely new dataset covering 489 roll call bills in the parliament during the 14 years in question according to the findings of this study it is very unlikely that it was only the system its conditions and its actors that caused instability and that the reasons rather have to be found outside parliament

an investigation of the determinants of manufacturing employment in the united kingdom in this paper we present and estimate an adjustment cost model of industry employment which takes explicit account of both expectations and aggregation over different labour types the resulting model is subject to a large number of tests and is a highly robust representation of the data finally forecasts are produced for manufacturing employment up to 1990

strategic delegation in a legislative bargaining model with pork and public goods abstract this paper examines the incentives of voters to appoint legislators with different preferences from their own the paper adopts an underlying legislative bargaining model proposed by volden and wiseman 2007 in which legislators with heterogeneous preferences divide a fixed budget between a public good and pork projects local public goods we show that voters have an incentive to strategically delegate to affect how the budget is divided at the legislative level when voters preferences for pork are not too strong the incentives for strategic delegation exist to appoint representatives who will direct more money to the public good and not to pork projects this generally results in at least as many representatives as districts that favor the public good the comparative statics predict that when strategic delegation occurs increasing the size of the legislature increases the fraction of the budget spent on the public good

economic policy and special interest politics a great deal of research has been done on the boundary between economics and political science in the last five to ten years this research in political economics spans many subfields such as macroeconomics trade public finance regulation rational choice politics and game theory a common denominator has been to study structural models of the political process agents behave rationally within well specified economic and political institutions where the policymaking process is formulated as an extensive form game methodologically much progress has been made relative to traditional approaches which were often based on inconsistent or irrational political and economic behaviour relying on non derived influence functions political support functions or vote functions yet the modem work has largely developed separately in each subfield without much contact with other subfields and each of the resulting literatures tends to focus on a distinct but partial aspect of the political process in this lecture i shall argue that even though the progress to date has been substantial we can gain a better understanding of policymaking in democracies by combining the insights from different strands of thinking on some economic policy issues the conflicting views both among citizens and politicians basically reduce to a single left to right dimension examples may include the politics of inflation vs unemployment capital taxation or the size of government we can think about policy issues within this domain of general interest politics as being resolved via traditional downsian electoral competition at least to a first approximation but the economic policy process also allows narrow interest groups ample opportunities to concentrate benefits to their own group at the expense of the population as a whole the resulting policy conflict is generically multi dimensional resolving it by voting alone would thus result in condorcet cycles we therefore need to go beyond the simplest electoral models to understand policy determination within this domain of special interest politics this lecture deals with special interest politics to make my point about fruitful analytical arbitrage i will stick to the same underlying policy example throughout this will be a simple model of a society where the government uses