quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand we study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated semi altruistic prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices competition is based on quality and demand adjusts sluggishly health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule we show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher resulting in higher steady state levels of quality in the closed loop solution than in the benchmark open loop solution if the price is sufficiently high however this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low and below unit costs sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady state quality prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated

war peace and the size of countries this paper studies the relationship between international con ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and non peaceful confrontations are possible we show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood bene ts and costs of con ict and war we also study the role of international law and show how better de ned international property rights may lead to country breakup and more numerous local con icts

proprietary public finance and economic welfare abstract we develop a positive theory of public finance in which the objective of tax and spending policy is to extract rents for the incumbent ruler the analysis shows how dependence of the incumbent ruler s survival probability on his tax and spending policy can lower the equilibrium tax rate and increase the equilibrium amount of spending on productive public services but only until the minimum credible tax rate which depends on the ruler s endogenous survival probability becomes a binding constraint the central result of the analysis is that if a relatively benevolent tax and spending policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability then the ruler s equilibrium policy is relatively benevolent

price adjustment in the hospital sector we analyse the properties of optimal price adjustment to hospitals when no lump sum transfers are allowed and when prices differ to reflect observable exogenous differences in costs we find that a when the marginal benefit from treatment is decreasing and the cost function is the power function price adjustment for hospitals with higher costs is positive but partial if the marginal benefit is constant the price is identical across providers b if the cost function is exponential or it is separable in monetary and non monetary costs and linear in monetary costs price adjustment is positive even when the marginal benefit is constant c higher inequality aversion of the purchaser increases concentration in prices and lowers concentration in quantities d if some dimensions of costs are private information a higher correlation between the observable and unobservable cost component increases the optimal price for providers whose observable costs are above the average

capital accumulation games of infinite duration abstract consider a market in which firms accumulate capital according to the nerlove arrow capital accumulation equation each player chooses a path of investment and thus an induced path of capital to maximize his total discounted profits which depend on his own capital and the capital stocks of his rivals existence is proved for such a nonzero sum infinite horizon differential game and conditions under which the game converges to a particular stationary point regardless of the initial conditions are shown thus the game possesses the property of conditional global asymptotic stability

nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism abstract this paper examines two noncooperative open loop solution concepts in a simple model of economic growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers who may save or consume and capitalists who may consume or invest it is demonstrated that both players prefer the stackelberg game to the nash game furthermore it is shown that under fairly realistic assumptions about the parameters of the model both workers and capitalists would prefer to act as the follower in the stackelberg game this means that capitalism is in a stalemate i e in a position where neither class wants to take the initiative and announce its strategy first the result is interpreted as an explanation of the difficulties met in designing and implementing incomes policies and social contracts

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism abstract one considers a differential game of capitalism a la lancaster feedback nash equilibria and pareto optimal solutions are characterized under the assumption that the planning horizon is infinite it is then shown that by combining a pareto optimal solution with the nash feedback equilibrium strategy pair which plays the role of a threat one can obtain an efficient equilibrium which is also subgame perfect in the sense of selten this result modifies sensibly the previous interpretation of the inherent inefficiency of capitalism

why countries are fiscally decentralizing this paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization or effective federalism in the world over the last 25 years a move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy which increases with national income growth greater relative hinterland population and increasing national population it is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally decentralization is measured by both institutional indices indicating greater devolution of power to local governments and the share of local governments in national government consumption empirically the paper finds that decentralization changes in ways predicted in particular it increases with economic growth country size and population institutional structures based on colonial experience and initial constitutional provisions also matter

dynamic duopoly with congestion effects abstract we analyze duopolistic competition between horizontally differentiated firms selling durable goods or services subject to congestion at each point of time new customers buy one unit of the commodity from one of the firms by comparing present prices and future congestion rates we study the linear markov equilibrium of this game which exists and is unique when firms are not too different the existence of negative consumption externalities is shown to soften the price competition moreover we show that the firm with the larger capacity has at the steady state a larger market share a higher price and a lower congestion rate the price of an entrant decreases gradually after entry while the price of the incumbent rises the faster the speed of convergence to the steady state is the stronger is the congestion effect

stochastic demand production responses and hospital costs this paper considers the production responses to demand uncertainty within the hospital sector it is noted that such responses have an impact on hospital cost structures an empirical model is specified estimation is undertaken on a sample of uk hospitals over the period 1993 1995 differentiating between hospital output which arises from uncertain demand emergency treatment and output considered to be predictable elective treatment the model estimates that the cost of an elective admission is approximately 45 of the cost of an emergency admission demand uncertainty imposes a direct cost equivalent to around 5 of the total cost of emergency admission

unemployment insurance and male unemployment duration in canada a model of unemployment duration is estimated with weekly micro data on canadian men entitlement provisions in the unemployment insurance program and demand conditions are found to have a significant effect on the probability of leaving unemployment the probability of a worker leaving unemployment declines with the duration of unemployment holding unemployment insurance entitlement constant when entitlement is allowed to vary the probability of leaving first falls and then generally rises with unemployment duration these results are robust with respect to allowing for person specific unobserved heterogeneity and alternative specifications of duration dependence

quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs capitation in general practice we model a system akin to the british national health service nhs in which general practictioners gps are paid by capitation from general taxation gps are horizontally and vertically differentiated and compete for patients via their imperfect observed quality we show that for any given capitation fee quality is lower and the incentive effects of the fee on quality are smaller when there is imperfect information there are diminishing welfare gains from improving patient information but increasing welfare gains from reducing switching costs gps do not act efficiently to improve patient information via advertising or to reduce the costs of switching

congestion reducing investments and economic welfare in a hotelling model abstract we investigate optimal quality provision where quality is determined by congestion duopolists make congestion reducing investments and then compete in prices we find that an unregulated market leads to insufficient investment and that price cap below the equilibrium price eliminates this inefficiency

a dynamic theory of conjectural variations this paper explores the relationship between dynamic oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria using an infinite horizon adjustment cost model the author demonstrates that any steady state closed loop subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with a conjectural variations equilibrium in the case of linear demand and quadratic costs the dynamic conjectures consistent with closed loop steady state equilibria are negative constant symmetric and vary continuously with the discount rate and the adjustment cost parameter in an interval between the static consistent conjectures and zero cournot copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

union rivalry and economic growth a differential game approach two decades ago sen 1961 1967 demonstrated how private saving versus consumption decisions are fundamentally different from collective decisions and how individual decisions may result in an insufficient amount of investments for the future his analyses were essentially applications of the prisoner s dilemma assuming that given the decisions of others each individual would be better off by not saving an additional unit whereas all would be better off by saving collectively it follows that no one will save although everyone would have preferred one more unit of saving by each individual because of the external effects between individuals decisions and the lack of influence on others actions nobody wants to invest himself although each individual would like to see others invest i e all try to shift the burden of saving onto others a very similar result was obtained a decade ago by lancaster 1973 in a fully dynamic context by applying nonzero sum differential game theory to the modelling of growth and distribution in a two class economy he demonstrated that the separation of saving and investment decisions leads to a pareto inferior outcome in a model where workers can control their share of consumption in total output but have no influence on the investment decision which is in the hands of capitalists and where both classes devise their strategies so as to maximize their own consumption over a fixed horizon the fundamental fact here is that workers and capitalists have to act under a dynamic externality one group s decision to save or invest for the future is affected by the fact that the accumulated amount may be consumed by the other group this paper was written to illustrate how dynamic inefficiency may also result from the feature of present day societies whereby the working class is not a single decision making unit but has organized itself in a number of trade unions which have to operate under the above mentioned dynamic externality it is shown that the welfare loss which results from the isolation

bayesian semiparametric estimation of discrete duration models an application of the dirichlet process prior this paper proposes a bayesian estimator for a discrete time duration model which incorporates a non parametric specification of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution through the use of a dirichlet process prior this estimator offers distinct advantages over the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator of this model first it allows for exact finite sample inference second it is easily estimated and mixed with flexible specifications of the baseline hazard an application of the model to employment duration data from the canadian province of new brunswick is provided copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation abstract we consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation we prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone in the latter case the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both cournot and bertrand competition as well as social planning journal of economic literature classifications numbers c73 l13

threats and bargaining in capitalism a differential game view abstract the paper examines the nash bargaining equilibrium in a simple model of growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers who may save or consume and capitalists who may consume or invest optimal threats announced by the social classes to affect the negotiated solution to their own advantage are also derived it is demonstrated that the workers threat takes the form of refusing to save while capitalists threaten to refrain from investing the threats as well as the possible gains from cooperation determine the players relative importance or bargaining power it is shown that capitalists are in general in a stronger bargaining position than workers the dependence of the bargaining power on the parameters of the model is examined

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in american public education naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation i derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area my results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling little of the effect of tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting this finding may be explained by another finding students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of tiebout choice among districts

nation states vs united empire effects of political competition on economic growth is political fragmentation i e nation states more favorable to economic growth than political unification i e a united empire this study develops an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification under unification the economy is vulnerable to excessive leviathan taxation and possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations under fragmentation the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense if capital mobility is above below a threshold then fragmentation unification would favor growth and this threshold is increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the costs of heterogeneity

why do previous choices matter for hospital demand decomposing switching costs from unobserved preferences abstract using data on women s choice of hospital for childbirth in florida we find that women return to the same hospital approximately 70 of the time we separate explanations of switching cost

contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality this paper analyses contracts to keep down costs while maintaining quality of health services when patient demand does not reflect quality there is then a natural role for forms of contract that have emerged during the reforms of the nhs in britain that differ from pure fixed price or cost reimbursement contracts the optimal form depends on whether the provider is entirely self interested or benevolent in having genuine concern for patient welfare with fully benevolent providers there are roles for block and cost and volume contracts with partially benevolent providers some degree of cost sharing is typically optimal

employment spells and unemployment insurance eligibility requirements in this paper we examine whether the requirements that workers must satisfy to qualify for unemployment insurance ui benefits in any succeeding period of joblessness affect the duration of employment spells this behavioral consequence of a ui system has been neglected in empirical research which has instead focused on the effects of ui parameters on the actions of the unemployed the effect is identified by a unique change in the eligibility requirements of the canadian ui system in 1990 which increased the weeks of employment required to establish ui eligibility we provide a variety of estimates of this behavioral effect in our preferred set of results we find a significant increase in the employment hazard in the week that an individual satisfies the eligibility requirement in many regions of the country in the spirit of feldstein s 1976 study of temporary layoffs the results provide new evidence of the impact of ui system parameters on the actions of employers and workers

the politics of 1992 fiscal policy and european integration the internal market in europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources how will this affect fiscal policy in different countries we consider taxation of capital in a two country model where a democratically chosen government in each country chooses tax policy higher capital mobility changes the politico economic equilibrium in two ways on the one hand it leads to more tax competition between the countries this economic effect tends to lower tax rates in both countries on the other hand it alters voters preferences and makes them elect a different government this political effect offsets the increased tax competition although not completely

the breakup of nations a political economy analysis this paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations in each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting a basic trade off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted the model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies the main results of the paper are i when income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small separation occurs in equilibrium and ii when all factors of production are perfectly mobile all incentives for separation disappear i introduction following the demise of communism the entire map of europe from the atlantic coast to the urals is being redrawn and issues of separation unification and the redrawing of borders are yet again at the forefront of european concerns many of the issues raised by this process are primarily of a political cultural or linguistic nature however there are also economic considerations that bear on this problem the objective of this paper is to analyze some important economic and political determinants of the process of unification and separation of democratic nations the starting point of our analysis is to suppose that from an economic efficiency point of view separation of nations is never desirable a unified nation is always more efficient since free trade among regions is guaranteed duplication costs in defense and law enforcement are avoided and local public goods provision such as transportation and communication networks or common standards can be coordinated furthermore any benefits of decentralization that might be obtained in a world with several nations may also be achieved within a unified nation by replicating the administrative structure of the world with several

the cartelization of local governments intergovernmental competition can enhance efficiency centralization of government expenditures inhibits intergovernmental competition because it makes governments more homogeneous and so cartelizes local governments cartelization reduces tiebout competition and limits benchmark competition in which one government s performance can be compared with neighboring governments measuring fiscal centralization as the ratio of local to state and local government expenditures within the state the evidence shows that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher levels of state per capita income cartelization of local governments negatively impacts income

choice competition and pupil achievement choice and competition in education have recently found growing support from both policy makers and academics yet evidence on the actual benefits of market orientated reforms is at best mixed moreover although the economic rationale for choice and competition is clear in existing work there is rarely an attempt to distinguish between the two concepts in this paper we study whether pupils in primary schools in england with a wider range of school choices achieve better academic outcomes than those whose choice is more limited and whether primary schools facing more competition perform better than those in a more monopolistic situation in simple least squares regression models we find little evidence of a link between choice and achievement but uncover a small positive association between competition and school performance yet this could be related to endogenous school location or pupil sorting in fact an instrumental variable strategy based on discontinuities generated by admissions district boundaries suggests that the performance gains from greater school competition are limited only when we restrict our attention to voluntary aided schools which have more freedom in managing their governance and admission practices do we find some evidence of a positive causal link between competition and pupil achievement jel i20 h70 r5

strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly abstract we compare steady states of open loop and locally stable markov perfect equilibria mpe in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment strategic incentives at the mpe depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the mpe there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity a full characterization is provided in the linear quadratic case then with price competition and costly production adjustment static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the mpe steady state outcome is more competitive than static bertrand competition

workers investment funds and the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism abstract this paper examines the effects of the partial transfer of control over the investment decision from capitalists to workers which is an essential feature of plans to establish workers investment funds in a two class model of capitalism formulated as a differential game it is shown that the institutional change which provides the workers with means to invest their savings directly instead of having to use the capitalists as agents for accumulation improves economic efficiency as a consequence the economy saves invests grows and consumes more than the pure capitalist society which is characterized by the keynesian separation of saving and investment decisions

how does the benefit effect vary as unemployment spells lengthen summary this paper investigates how the effect of income while unemployed on the probability of an individual leaving unemployment varies with the length of time that the individual has been unemployed we examine this question in the context of a variety of alternative econometric models we extend the proportional hazards model with unrestricted baseline hazard to one in which there are unrestricted effects of a subset of the explanatory variables and also consider models that can be estimated as series of binary response models the proportional hazard restrictions are rejected for the sample of british unemployed men analysed and in the binary sequence framework logit and probit models based on symmetric distributions dominate in likelihood terms the extreme value form model implied by extension of the proportional hazards formulation logit models with a flexible form for the duration dependence which also incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in a flexible way are estimated the results for all formulations indicate a rapidly declining effect of unemployment income as a spell lengthens with no significant effect for the long term unemployed the preferred specifications which allow for omitted heterogeneity indicate no significant effect after about 5 months and this result is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of previous labour market experience variables and to the choice of mixing distribution

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

optimal dynamic volume based price regulation abstract we consider a model of optimal price regulation in markets where demand is sluggish and asymmetric providers compete on quality using a spatial model which is suitable to investigate the health care and education sector we analyse within a dynamic set up the scope for price premiums or penalties on volume under the assumption of symmetric cost information we show that the socially optimal time path of quality provision off the steady state can be replicated by a simple dynamic pricing rule where the dynamic part of the rule is ex ante non discriminatory in the sense that the price premium or penalty on volume is common across providers despite their differing production costs whether the price schedule involves a penalty or a premium on volume relates to two concerns regarding production costs and consumer benefits which go in opposite directions price adjustments over time occur only through the price penalty or premium not time directly which highlights the simplicity and thus applicability of this regulation scheme

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

divided we stand united we fall the hume north jones mechanism for the rise of europe the great divergence in incomes between europe and the rest of the world occurred relatively recently why was it that western europe once a backward outpost on the fringes of the eurasian continent able to dominate in terms of income and technology the previously successful eastern economies several mechanisms have been identi ed to account for the rise of europe this paper formalizes one important mechanism the intellectual origins of which can be traced back to hume and weber and which was fully though informally articulated by e l jones this mechanism emphasizes the contrast between the european states system and the eastern empires political competition for a mobile tax base in a states system forces rulers to expropriate less from their subjects and to supply relatively more public services by effectively limiting the exit options of the ruled an empire rewards its ruler with a captive tax base that can be subjected to relatively higher levels of expropriation without a similar rise in public services provided the states system thus encourages higher levels of capital accumulation while the empire stises it the successes of the eastern empires in their consolidation phase are due to the competition they initially faced from neighboring states since europe escaped such consolidation the process of accumulation there never faced the impediments its eastern counterparts did the paper thus also provides a structural explanation for the emergence of institutions in europe that led to relatively secure property rights

hospital competition and quality with regulated prices we analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices considering the effect of both introducing competition monopoly versus competition and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs increased substitutability or a higher number of hospitals with semi altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous in contrast to the received body of theoretical literature this is consistent with and potentially explains the mixed empirical evidence

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

assessing competition in hospital care markets the importance of accounting for quality differentiation quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry where the choices of medicare patients are unaffected by prices unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market i estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial the estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness

hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly this paper analyzes the optimal structure of a regulated health care industry in a model in which the regulator cannot enforce what hospitals do unverifiable quality of health or does not know what hospitals know incomplete information about production costs or both we show that if quality is unverifiable the choice between monopoly and duopoly does not change with respect to the verifiable case but if there are fixed costs assumed to be quality dependent and the monopoly is the optimal market structure the quality level of the operative hospital decreases asymmetry of information introduces informational rents that can be reduced by increasing the most efficient hospital s market share a monopoly is chosen more often

efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists abstract we show that there exists a time independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path the optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low a surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output this subsidy however induces firms to produce less than they would under laissez faire

unemployment insurance and job duration in canada we use data from the canadian 2 year longitudinal labour market activity survey of 1986 87 to estimate the effect of the unemployment insurance ui system on job duration particular attention is focused on the entrance requirements of the ui system which relate eligibility for ui benefits to an individual s recent employment history the article makes operational the ui entrance requirement provisions which take into account variations in the regional unemployment rate controlling for many personal and job characteristics we find evidence that a significant number of jobs terminate when they have reached the duration that would permit a ui claim

the rise and decline of nations economic growth stagflation and social rigidities the years since world war ii have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions leading political economist mancur olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts of the world

is hospital competition socially wasteful we study the consequences of hospital competition for medicare beneficiaries heart attack care from 1985 to 1994 we examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare expenditures on treatment and patient health outcomes in the 1980s the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous but in the 1990s competition unambiguously improves social welfare increasing hmo enrollment over the sample period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital competition

could do better the effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools this paper studies the eects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and stu dents in a set up where their eort aects the students educational attainment we show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the eectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive ef fect of lowering the students attainment in a simple dynamic set up where the reputation of the schools aects recruitment we show that increased competition leads to segregation of pupils by ability

dictators development and the virtue of political instability a large body of literature stresses the benefits of regime stability for economic growth in poor countries this view however discounts the gains from threats to regime security when populations living under dictatorial regimes cannot benefit from the disciplining of political competition available to voters in democracies this paper applies a model of economic growth to study the sources of the differences in economic performance and repression policy among dictatorships as well as the parallel in dictatorial regimes of the benefits achieved through political competition in democracies threats to the security of dictatorial regimes are shown to be a means of benefiting the population through the responses of the regime

quality incentives for gps in a regulated market abstract this paper analyses whether gps in a capitation system have incentives to provide quality even though health is a credence good a model is developed where the quality of the service varies due to inherent differences between the gps and rational patients make choices based on the outcome of treamtent we find that it is difficult to provide appropriate incentives since the search activity of patients offsets direct effects of a change in reimbursement variation in the inherent ability of the gps is good since it increases the search activity of the patients and the optimal reimbursement scheme is inversely proportional to the dispersion in types finally we find that offering a menu of contracts can potentially increase social welfare above the level of a simple capitation regime but it tends to lead to a higher variation in quality levels

on time inconsistency a technical issue in stackelberg differential games abstract stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied this paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue in particular we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature the issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained we show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases as a result our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 e62 h21

a bayesian semiparametric competing risk model with unobserved heterogeneity this paper generalizes existing econometric models for censored competing risks by introducing a new flexible specification based on a piecewise linear baseline hazard time varying regressors and unobserved individual heterogeneity distributed as an infinite mixture of generalized inverse gaussian gig densities nesting the gamma kernel as a special case a common correlated latent time effect induces dependence among risks our model is based on underlying latent exit decisions in continuous time while only a time interval containing the exit time is observed as is common in economic data we do not make the simplifying assumption of discretizing exit decisions our competing risk model setup allows for latent exit times of different risk types to be realized within the same time period in this setting we derive a tractable likelihood based on scaled gig laplace transforms and their higher order derivatives we apply our approach to analyzing the determinants of unemployment duration with exits to jobs in the same industry or a different industry among unemployment insurance recipients on nationally representative individual level survey data from the us department of labor our approach allows us to conduct a counterfactual policy experiment by changing the replacement rate we find that the impact of its change on the probability of exit from unemployment is inelastic copyright 2014 john wiley sons ltd

rules discretion and reality both with respect to inflation and productivity macroeconomic performance in the last decade or so has been disappointing promises of policymakers to improve things have been frequently thwarted not only in terms of inflation and growth but also in terms of achieving targets for such summary measures of policy as the budget deficit or the money supply moreover critics have charged that policy failures are to blame for many of our economic difficulties the net effect has been to raise the practical question of whether the political process as now constituted can produce good economic policies the last decade or so has also been marked more than coincidentally by substantial professional criticism of conventional neokeynesian macro models and the theory of policy associated with them one of the major punch lines of this research is that activist macroeconomic policy is misguided indeed at best it is seen as ineffective and at worst highly counterproductive as a consequence the so called new classical economists argue that policymakers should avoid activism or discretion and instead be guided by simple rules the issue of rules vs discretion has of course been a source of long standing professional debate and while the new classical economists have provided some additional intellectual ammunition for rules this hardly serves to explain the apparent popular resurgence in advocacy of rules recent interest in rules is reflected in the emphasis on monetary targeting in proposed legislation even constitutional amendments for controlling the federal budget and in attempts to untarnish the gold standard this paper reviews the current state of the rules vs discretion debate i the nature of policy some preliminaries

dynamic hospital competition under rationing by waiting times abstract we develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where i waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply ii patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times and iii hospitals incur waiting time penalties we show that whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower waiting times policies that promote patient choice will instead lead to higher waiting times these results are robust to different game theoretic solution concepts designs of the hospital penalty structure and patient utility specifications furthermore waiting time penalties are likely to be more effective in reducing waiting times if they are designed with a linear penalty structure but the counterproductive effect of patient choice policies is smaller when penalties are convex these conclusions are partly derived by calibration of our model based on waiting times and elasticities observed in the english nhs for a common treatment cataract surgery

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

high school completion and future youth unemployment new evidence from high school and beyond in this paper i provide new evidence from high school and beyond hsb on the effects of compulsory attendance on high school completion and future youth unemployment i develop bayesian estimation approaches to the simultaneous equation model with ordered probit and two limit censored regression and the bivariate duration model accounting for the heterogeneity in returns to education and the nonlinearity in the effects of compulsory attendance i find substantial variability in returns to education across schools and evidence of diminishing marginal effects of compulsory attendance on high school completion the simulation results suggest that increasing the compulsory attendance age raises the probability of completing high school and reduces the proportion of time the individuals are unemployed these effects are much more pronounced for disadvantaged students but less pronounced for advantaged students suggesting the potential effects of compulsory attendance on reducing the inequality in education and employment copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

duopoly and quality standards abstract in the absence of sunk costs a low quality producer benefits from a mildly restrictive quality standard whereas a high quality producer suffers from it consumers welfare increases if the firm producing the higher quality does not increase its quality significantly in response to the increase in quality by its rival a sufficiently severe standard causes exit from the industry when there are no sunk cost the high quality producer exits first

competition and quality in health care markets a differential game approach we investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach in which quality is a stock variable using a hotelling framework we derive the open loop solution health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period and the feedback closed loop solution providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states under the closed loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information if the marginal provision cost is constant the open loop and closed loop solutions coincide and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models if the marginal provision cost is increasing investment and quality are lower in the closed loop solution when competition is more intense in this case static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect