clearly heard on the street the effect of takeover rumors on stock prices this article examines the effects of takeover rumors on stock prices using a sample of rumors published in the wall street journal s heard on the street column we find that the market reacts efficiently to rumors simple trading strategies based on buying or selling rumored targets stocks yield zero excess returns we document a significant price run up for rumored targets in the month before publication of the takeover rumor we find that widespread takeover rumors accurately predict imminent takeover bids less than half the time finally we find that most takeover rumors are preceded by unusual price and volume activity in the stock of the rumored target which may stimulate speculation that a large block position is being accumulated copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

nonstationarity in job search theory generally structural job search models are taken to be stationary in this paper models are examined in which every exogenous variable can cause nonstationarity for instance because its value is dependent on unemployment duration a general differential equation that describes the evolution of the reservation wage over time is derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated that focuses on the consequences of a downward shift in the level of benefits it appears that the elasticity of duration with respect to the level of benefits after the shift is much larger than the elasticity with respect to the level before the shift this paper examines the movement of a job seeking individual s reservation wage over time in a general nonstationary job search model also results concerning comparative dynamics of the reservation wage and the distribution of the duration of unemployment are derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated the nonstationarity originates from the decrease in the level of benefits when unemployment duration equals two years from the results some detailed policy recommendations can be deduced as one is able to distinguish the effect of a change in the level of benefits in the first two years of unemployment from the effect of a change in the level after that period recently the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment duration has become widespread the reduced form approach in empirical studies see e g lancaster 1979 in which only the hazard of the duration distribution is estimated is gradually being replaced by a more structural approach the latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use in empirical analysis of the reservation wage equation as stated by the theory e g yoon 1981 lancaster and chesher 1983 lynch 1983 narendranathan and nickell 1985 and van den berg 1988 use the complete theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search behaviour however the structural models used in these studies are stationary this implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment which is often at variance with reality what is more various reduced form empirical studies indicate a significant durationdependence of the re employment probability which is generally interpreted as evidence in favour of the presence of nonstationarity see e g blau and robins 1986 kooreman and ridder 1983 lancaster 1979 and narendranathan nickell and stern 1985 consequently there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time based on a nonstationary theoretical framework

caught in the trap welfare s disincentive and the labor supply of single men abstract youth unemployment is particularly large in many industrialized countries and has dramatic consequences in both the short and long term while there is abundant evidence about the labor supply of married women and single mothers little is known about how young childless singles react to financial incentives the french minimum income revenu minimum d insertion rmi often accused of generating strong disincentives to work offers a natural setting to study this question since childless single individuals primarily males constitute the core group of recipients exploiting the fact that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for this program we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis using french census data we find that the rmi reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7 10 at age 25 we conduct an extensive robustness check and discuss the implications of our results for youth unemployment and current policy developments

is there a winner s curse in the labor market abstract when a firm can make counteroffers to workers who have received outside wage offers a winner s curse effect may exist raided firms do not make counteroffers to those whose value is less than the raider s wage offer so the raider always earns negative profit when a raid is successful in this paper i demonstrate that when a raided firm makes reassignment decisions in anticipation of outside wage offers and there is at least an infinitesimal probability of exogenous turnover a winner s curse will not occur when there are counteroffers except possibly for workers at the lowest task assignment

assessing the case for social experiments rs ecent academic debates pit two alternative approaches to policy evaluation against one another the first is the experimental approach based on the random assignment of accepted program applicants to a recipient or treatment group and a non recipient or control group the second is the nonexperimental or econometric approach that uses a variety of microdata sources statistical methods and behavioral models to compare the outcomes of participants in social programs with those of nonparticipants the central question addressed in this paper is whether or not randomized social experiments aid in securing answers to basic questions about the evaluation of social programs there are many distinct and complementary approaches to the study of the impact of public policy including full general equilibrium analysis of policy impacts tinbergen 1956 auerbach and kotlikoff 1987 shoven and whalley 1992 kydland and prescott 1991 and less ambitious partial equilibrium microeconomic structural research programs such as those designed to estimate the impact of taxes on labor supply both approaches offer answers to many interesting counterfactual policy questions but their credibility rests critically on the quality of the empirical input used to generate their answers

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

the effects of changes of the job offer arrival rate on the duration of unemployment generally it is acknowledged that changing the job offer arrival rate has two opposite effects on unemployment duration for a basic job search model sufficient conditions on the wage offer distribution have been derived ensuring that one of the effects dominates however these are not satisfied for the popular families of wage offer distributions here i show that the conditions can be weakened at virtually no cost the set of distributions satisfying the new conditions is considerably larger than the set previously established in particular it includes all wage offer distribution families that are popular in structural empirical research

structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring to evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers it is important to take account of post unemployment wages and job to job mobility we structurally estimate a model with search channels using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized the data include registers and survey data on search behavior we find that the opportunity to move to better paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment job mobility compensates for adverse long run effects of monitoring on wages we examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

estimating a simultaneous search model the primary goal of this article is to specify and estimate a structural simultaneous search model and then determine the empirical importance of simultaneous search the results indicate that new labor force entrants search simultaneously a secondary goal is to identify and estimate job offer arrival rates and wage offer rejection probabilities separately the results indicate that a significant portion of unemployment spells are caused by slow arrival rates but policies intended to speed arrival rates would increase the average length of unemployment spells

is the glass steagall act justified a study of the u s experience with universal banking before the glass steagall act of 1933 removed commercial banks from the securities underwriting business we evaluate the argument for the separation of commercial and investment banking that conflicts of interest induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing in securities which turn out to be of low quality a comparison of the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment banks prior to the act shows no evidence of this instead the public appears to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflicts of interest and this appears to have constrained the banks to underwrite high quality securities jel g21 g24 n22

measuring the effect of subsidized training programs on movements in and out of employment despite over two decades of u s experience in operating large scale subsidized training programs for low income and unemployed workers the effects of these programs are still highly controversial the controversy arises from the difficulty of specifying the model of participant outcomes in the absence of training that is necessary in any nonexperimental program evaluation in this paper we suggest that some of these difficulties may be overcome by focusing on a very simple measure of outcomes namely the probability of employment we present a variety of estimates of the effect of training on the probability of employment for the 1976 cohort of adult male participants in the comprehensive employment and training act ceta program our methods range from a simple comparison of pre and post training employment probabilities between trainees and nonparticipants to a fully specified first order markov model of employment probabilities with individual heterogeneity there is consistent evidence across methods that ceta participation increased the probability of employment in the three years after training by from 2 to 5 percentage points classroom training programs appear to have had significantly larger effects than on the job programs although the estimated effects of both kinds of programs are positive we also find that movements in and out of employment for trainees and nonparticipants are reasonably well described by a first order process conditional on individual heterogeneity in the context of this model ceta participation appears to have increased both the probability of moving into employment and the probability of continuing employment

the rise and fall of bank control in the united states 1890 1939 this article studies how equity ownership and corporate control were separated in the united states initially railroads and industrial firms were tightly controlled by a few shareholders this situation was altered in the 1890s by massive mergers and reorganizations which allowed private banks to control railroads and industrial firms between 1912 and 1939 bank control faded away as a result of a political reaction against financial institutions using stock market data from 1914 the author shows that the eviction of banks from corporate boards depressed firm values by about 7 percent and that part of this value came from cartelization copyright 1998 by american economic association

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

cohabitation marriage and divorce in a model of match quality the objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships we develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation marriage and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships jovanovic s journal of political economy 87 1979 972 90 theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship what form this relationship will take and the relative stability of the various types of unions the structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the united states new numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation the empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model they show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks the estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments for example we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices

the perverse effects of partial labour market reform fixed term contracts in france we argue that the effects of a partial reform of employment protection by allowing firms to hire workers on fixed term contracts may be perverse the main effect may be high turnover in entry level jobs leading to higher not lower unemployment even if unemployment falls workers may be worse off going through many spells of unemployment and entry level jobs before obtaining a regular job considering french data for young workers since the early 1980s we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration if anything the effect on their welfare appears to have been negative

placement service and offer arrival rates abstract determinants of job referrals by the austrian employment exchange are analyzed concentrating on three issues the validity of the poisson assumption allocation strategies of scarce vacancies and the stationarity of offer arrival rates over time

does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes in this paper we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment for that purpose we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service especially for low educated and low skilled workers they also show that the search effort is more costly for low educated women and low skilled adult unemployed workers this last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear

the determinants of black white differences in early employment careers search layoffs quits and endogenous wage growth this paper studies the transition from school to full time employment and subsequent labor mobility during the first five postschooling years for several recent cohorts of black and white male terminal high school graduates using unique data from the 1979 youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys of labor market experience a constrained optimization model of labor force dynamics is implemented empirically integrating features of models previously described in the literature the estimates of the model provide quantitative evidence on underlying structural differences in labor market constraints faced by blacks and whites for example while blacks have overall a substantially smaller wage return to work experience and face a less disperse wage offer distribution blacks face a higher probability of receiving job offers

how changes in labor demand affect unemployed workers this study analyzes the manner in which certain favorable shifts in labor demand affect job search although all shifts increase reservation wages they do not necessarily decrease expected unemployment spell durations and increase expected post unemployment wages so that upward sloping short run phillips curves may occur a result due to chamberlain is used to demonstrate that if the wage offer distribution is restricted to be logconcave two of the shifts guarantee downward sloping phillips curves for one of these two shifts previous research by flinn and heckman used logconcavity in a different manner to achieve properly shaped phillips curves

insider trading and the valuation of international strategic alliances in emerging stock markets because stock markets in emerging economies are relatively new under regulated and often segmented investors responses to public announcements by firms in these economies may differ from responses in developed economies stock markets we draw on the institutional and corporate governance literatures to explain investor reactions to announcements of international strategic alliances isas between foreign and emerging market firms we argue that emerging economies stock markets positively value isas however information leakages due to weak regulatory environments siphon off the good news before the isa announcement date the level of state ownership of publicly traded firms and the nationality of foreign partners both affect the size and timing of market reactions

estimating a structural search model the transition from school to work this paper presents a finite horizon search model that is econometrically implemented using all of the restrictions impli ed by the theory following a sample of male high school graduates fr om the youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys from graduat ion to employment search parameters are estimated reservation wages and offer probabilities are estimated to be quite low simulations a re performed of the impact of changing the parameters on the expected duration of unemployment copyright 1987 by the econometric society

an empirical examination of the sources of changes over time in the job finding rate using reservation wages and rejected wage offers we consider a structural dynamic job search model where nonstationarity originates from the change over time in the benefit level the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution the model is estimated on the french sample of the echp taking advantage of direct observation of reservation wages rejected job offers and associated rejected wages we find that the offered wages deteriorate rapidly 13 8 over six months 19 2 over one year and 30 over two years and that changes in the wage offer distribution are the unique source of negative duration dependence in the hazard

search and nonwage job characteristics this paper quantifies the importance of nonwage job characteristics to workers by estimating a structural on the job search model the model generalizes the standard search framework by allowing workers to search for jobs based on both wages and job specific nonwage utility flows within the structure of the search model data on accepted wages and wage changes at job transitions identify the importance of nonwage utility through revealed preference the estimates reveal that utility from nonwage job characteristics plays an important role in determining job mobility the value of jobs to workers and the gains from job search

making the most out of programme evaluations and social experiments accounting for heterogeneity in programme impacts the conventional approach to social programme evaluation focuses on estimating mean impacts of programmes yet many interesting questions regarding the political economy of programmes the distribution of programme benefits and the option values conferred on programme participants require knowledge of the distribution of impacts or features of it this paper presents evidence that heterogeneity in response to programmes is empirically important and that classical probability inequalities are not very informative in producing estimates or bounds on the distribution of programme impacts we explore two methods for supplementing the information in these inequalities based on assumptions about participant decision making processes and about the strength in dependence between outcomes in the participation and non participation states dependence is produced as a consequence of rational choice by participants we test for stochastic rationality among programme participants and present and implement methods for estimating the option values of social programmes

fishing in different pools job search strategies and job finding success in canada in the early 1980s this article examines the job search methods of jobless workers and emphasizes sample selectivity in choice of job search strategies especially use of public employment agencies longitudinal data from the labour force survey of canada for 1981 1983 and 1986 indicate that job search methods change with the business cycle and that many people find jobs without any reported search the determinants of job search success also vary substantially over the business cycle implying a substantial social return to public employment agencies at the 1983 trough of the recession but no noticeable benefits when aggregate unemployment is relatively low

the employment effect of reforming a public employment agency by how much does an increase in operating effectiveness of a public employment agency pea and a reduction of unemployment benefits reduce unemployment using a recent labour market reform in germany as background we find that an enhanced effectiveness of the pea explains about 20 of the observed post reform unemployment decline the role of unemployment benefit reduction explains just about 5 of the observed decline due to disincentive effects resulting from the reform the reform of the pea could have had an even higher impact on unemployment reduction if there had been less focus on long term unemployed workers

experimental evidence on the effects of early meetings and activation we analyze the effects of four randomized social experiments involving early and intensive active labour market policy conducted in denmark in 2008 the experiments entailed different combinations of early and intensive treatment in terms of meetings and active labour market programmes we find that frequent meetings between newly unemployed workers and case workers can increase employment rates over the next two years by up to 10 weeks the effects continue to grow over the whole 4 year horizon studied for men we find evidence of a threat effect of having to participate in early active labour market programmes while no such effect is found for women we conduct a cost benefit analysis of each ofthe four experiments and find that meetings yield the largest net benefits

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

the invisibility hypothesis and promotion efficiency abstract this paper considers the invisibility hypothesis in which an individual not promoted is of unknown ability to other employers previous research finds that only some of those efficiently promoted are promoted however this paper shows that with no prohibition on wage cuts and no specific human capital all are promoted owing to a reverse lemons effect

search behaviour transitions to non participation and the duration of unemployment using longitudinal micro data on unemployed individuals for 1983 85 a structural job search model is estimated the model allows for transitions from unemployment to nonparticipation an extended version of the model deals with the influence of on the job search and prospective wage increases on search behavior of the unemployed the empirical results show that the probability of accepting a job offer is almost one for most unemployed individuals a large portion of unemployment spells ends in a transition out of the labor force the effects of changes in benefits on duration appear to be extremely small copyright 1990 by royal economic society

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

the impact of being offered and receiving classroom training on the employment histories of disadvantaged women evidence from experimental data we address two questions using experimental data on disadvantaged women first what is the impact of being offered jtpa classroom training on the duration of unemployment and employment second what is the effect of actually participating in this training on the length of such spells belonging to the treatment group shortens unemployment spells but has no effect on employment spells actually participating in training has a larger positive effect on the exit rate from unemployment than the effect of simply being a member of the treatment group ignoring the endogeneity of actual training in estimation substantially underestimates its effect

estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance identifying policy relevant treatment effects from randomized experiments requires the absence of spillovers between participants and nonparticipants sutva or variation in observed treatment levels we find that sutva is violated for a danish activation program for unemployed workers using a difference in differences model we show that nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs more slowly after the introduction of the program than workers

job search by employed and unemployed youth analysis of data from the new youth cohort of the national longitudinal survey yields evidence that young unemployed job seekers chose higher levels of search effort as measured by number of methods used and time spent per method and lower reservation wages relative to offered wages than did comparable employed job seekers in 1981 these differences in search choices at least partly explain differences in search outcomes between the two groups unemployed searchers apparently were more likely than employed searchers to gain new employment and the wages they obtained were slightly lower the author argues that the greater search effort by unemployed job seekers is due to the higher costs of search they bear because of foregone earnings

why has europe become environmentally cleaner decomposing the roles of fiscal trade and environmental policies this paper examines the role of fiscal policy trade and energy taxes on environmental quality in europe using disaggregated data at the monitoring station level for the 12 richest european countries spanning the period from 1995 to 2008 our estimations show that fiscal policies and energy taxes are important determinants of pollution through various mechanisms we find that increasing the share of fiscal spending in gdp and shifting the emphasis towards spending in public goods and against non social subsidies significantly lower the concentrations of sulfur dioxide and ozone but not nitrogen dioxide at the same time energy taxes reduce nitrogen dioxide concentrations but have no effect on ozone and sulfur dioxide finally trade openness has a direct effect on sulfur dioxide but no effect on nitrogen dioxide or ozone our estimates account for time varying unobserved heterogeneity

did j p morgan s men add liquidity corporate investment cash flow and financial structure at the turn of the twentieth century this article presents evidence suggesting that the relationship that existed between the partnership of j p morgan and its client firms partially resolved the latter s external financing problems by diminishing the principal agent and asymmetric information problems i estimate and compare investment regression equations for a sample of morgan affiliated companies and a control group of nonaffiliated companies the econometric results seem to indicate that companies not affiliated to the house of morgan were liquidity constrained

youth employment policies in france abstract in this paper we present a summary of recent microeconometric results on the evaluation of the effects of active labor market policies on youth employment in france we focus our discussion on three types of policies 1 youth employment schemes for out of employment and low skilled young adults 2 on the job training schemes 3 payroll tax subsidies for minimum wage workers training programs for unemployed young workers have in general no effects on post training wages or employment probabilities except if they have a large training content in contrast the reduction of labor costs have significant effects on employment probabilities of low wage workers however their effects appear to be stronger for workers between 25 and 30

evaluating the impact of french employment policies on individual labour market histories this paper deals with the evaluation of some public employment policies set up in france during the 1980 s to improve the labour market prospects of unskilled young workers the evaluation implemented in this paper is restricted to the impact of such public measures on durations and outcomes of subsequent spells of unemployment and employment the econometric study is conducted with non experimental longitudinal microdata recording individual labour nlarket histories a particular attention is paid to the differential effects of various types of measures according to the educational level of recipients programmes involving a higher level of on thejob training such as alternating work training programmes in private firms are principally beneficial to the less educated young workers in contrast for more educated young workers work fare programmes in the public sector decrease the intensity of transition from the subsequent unemployment spell to regular jobs for that subgroup work fare programmes may act as a signal of low employment performance

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

insider trading in a rational expectations economy it is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading in this article an opposing efficiency argument is formalized the model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage if outsiders expect insiders to take advantage of them in trading outsiders will reduce their investment the insiders loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains consequently a prohibition on insider trading may effect a pareto improvement insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information govemment regulation accomplishes exactly this jel 022 026 313 the traditional rationale articulated for insider trading regulation and other securities law is that such rules promote confidence in markets indeed president franklin d roosevelt justified the first major u s securities legislation by saying it should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence similar language is still invoked half a century later in connection with enforcement efforts against insider trading and in proposals for tightened stock

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

disclosure decisions by firms and the competition for price efficiency this paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied it is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal this is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure this paper develops a model of the relationship between firms investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied the costs of disclosure are twofold first there are costs of producing and disseminating the information included here are opportunity costs of firms employees auditing and legal expenses costs of printing and distribution and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information second there are traders costs of assimilating the information for instance while it is not very costly to obtain a firm s 8 k and 10 k once produced it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents while the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure the latter costs have not that is while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information the information contained in firms disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all see for instance diamond 1985 and dye 1987 1 taking traders costs of learning the information content of firms disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure in particular it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal this overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders this is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms on their own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

search method use by unemployed youth this article presents a search model which shows that search method choices should be related to their costs and expected productivities as well as to nonwage income and wage offer distributions the empirical evidence then shows that the most frequently used search methods i e friends and relatives and direct applications without referral are also the most productive in generating offers and acceptances the number of methods used is affected by factors that presumably reflect opportunities as well as income sources and needs specific methods are chosen in a manner that generates positive average effects on outcomes for those using them

job search and academic achievement abstract the paper develops a structural model for the labor market behavior of students entering the labor market we explicitly model the trade off between devoting effort to studying and to job search furthermore we allow for on the job search the model is estimated using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the netherlands between 1995 and 2001 our estimation results show that labor market returns of high grades are low wage increases between jobs are explained by labor market friction rather than returns of early work experience our results indicate that a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases wage offers on average by 3 percent but that the amount of job search effort is not very sensitive to business cycle fluctuations policy simulations show that study effort and hence academic achievement are much more sensitive to financial incentives than job search effort and labor market outcomes

high frequency trading and end of day price dislocation abstract we show that the presence of high frequency trading hft has significantly mitigated the frequency and severity of end of day price dislocation the effect of hft is more pronounced on days when end of day price dislocation is more likely to be the result of market manipulation moreover the effect of hft is more pronounced than the role of trading rules surveillance enforcement and legal conditions in curtailing the frequency and severity of end of day price dislocation we show our findings are robust to different proxies of the start of hft by trade size cancellation of orders and co location

why regulate insider trading evidence from the first great merger wave 1897 1903 we use event time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900 for mergers with prospective disclosures similar to today s we find substantial value gains at announcement implying participation by outside shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints furthermore preannouncement stock price runups relative to total value gain are no more than those observed for modern mergers insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders with the inside information pricing function and related gains shifting to external information specialists other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure i e insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment

reference dependent job search evidence from hungary we propose a model of job search with reference dependent preferences with loss aversion relative to recent income the reference point in this model newly unemployed individuals search hard since consumption is below their reference point over time though they get used to lower income and thus reduce their search effort in anticipation of a benefit cut their search effort rises again then declines once they get accustomed to the lower postcut benefit level the model fits the typical pattern of exit from unemployment even with no unobserved heterogeneity to distinguish between this and other models we use a unique reform in the unemployment insurance ui benefit path in 2005 hungary switched from a single step ui system to a two step system with overall generosity unchanged the system generated increased hazard rates in anticipation of and especially following benefit cuts in ways the standard model has a hard time explaining we estimate a model with optimal consumption endogenous search effort and unobserved heterogeneity the reference dependent model fits the hazard rates substantially better than plausible versions of the standard model including habit formation our estimates indicate a slow adjusting reference point and substantial impatience likely reflecting present bias jel codes d03 j64 j65

anomalies the winner s curse abstract next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch try the following experiment in your class take a jar and fill it with coins noting the total value of the coins now a

markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions this paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange listed target firms from 1975 91 and the pre announcement stock price runups the evidence shows that the pre bid runup and the postannouncement increase in the target s stock price the markup are generally uncorrelated with little substitution between the runup and the markup the runup is an added cost to the bidder this finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading it also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations

search for nonwage job characteristics a test of the reservation wage hypothesis previous structural models of job search behavior have been based upon the reservation wage property this article provides estimates of a more general search model that nests models with the reservation wage property the estimates lead to rejection of the reservation wage property the model includes hours of work in the utility function but other nonwage job characteristics can be included as well an experiment based on the estimated parameters indicates that a significant proportion of job offers would be mistakenly predicted to be accepted or rejected under the restrictions implied by the reservation wage property

are autocratic rulers also inside traders cross country evidence i introduction this article explores one aspect of the relation between a country s political structure and its regulation of economic activity the central premise is that authoritarian governments operate at least in part for the purpose of enriching their rulers consequently economic regulations are enforced or not so as to benefit the autocrats and their supporters by its nature insider trading is clandestine it is therefore unobservable and its existence must be inferred from indirect evidence my approach is to examine the enforcement of insider trading regulation more than 100 countries have stock markets most also have laws ostensibly designed to protect the general investing public from trading with insiders possessing superior material information regarding the value of particular firms enforcement has occurred however in less than one half of the countries with laws my key hypothesis is that enforcement is less likely in autocracies where government officials and their supporters both control the regulatory and judicial systems and are likely to engage in inside trading put simply they will be disinclined to prosecute themselves data are available that identify countries with stock markets those with insider trading laws and those that enforce them also available are indexes that gauge levels of political freedom economic freedom and corruption for almost all countries these serve as measures of the degree of autocratic rule my statistical analysis indicates a strong correlation between the presence of autocratic government and the absence of insider law enforcement supporting the main hypothesis ii background the economic theories of regulation and public choice presume that government officials are self interested utility maximizers whose behavior is substantially affected by the personal costs and benefits of exercising their political power 1 in autocracies officials generally have significant control over economic activity and are unconstrained by democratic institutions such as political competition elections the rule of law an independent judiciary and a free press opportunities for personal aggrandizement are therefore more readily available including in particular financial enrichment all such behavior amounts to wealth transfers from the population at large and a tax on productive economic activity 2 government regulation of the economy is ostensibly about rectifying market failure for example market entry restrictions are justified by arguments that consumers are protected from incompetent unstable or dishonest firms various other government imposed requirements and permits for the conduct of business are justified under the guise of protecting workers saving the environment nurturing infant industries earning foreign exchange and a variety of other public interest grounds all such regulation however can be viewed alternatively as creating tollgates through which entrepreneurs must pass to legally conduct business 3 unrestrained government officials charged with regulatory enforcement can extract tolls bribes for personal gain given this potential autocratic rulers have an incentive to impose numerous regulations simply to create opportunities to enrich themselves and their supporters 4 if a law or regulation is to serve as a tollgate enforcement must occur the threat of prosecution must be real to create the incentive for market participants to pay bribes autocrats must establish that attempts at circumvention without payment or compliance involve real costs that are greater through their control of government regulatory agencies and the judicial system they can exempt bribe payers while others are subject to prosecution that is enforcement occurs but is selective more generally autocrats might view all types of economic activity within their country as providing opportunities for personal economic gain