accounting for emerging market countries international reserves are pacific rim countries different abstract popular perception is that emerging market economies emes and asian pacific rim countries china indonesia korea malaysia philippines thailand and vietnam rims in particular have been rapidly accumulating reserves perhaps beyond what is justified by precautionary motives this paper compares and contrasts the determinants of the demand for international reserves in the rim countries with other emes over the last three decades based on current and capital account risks mercantilism and other motives our findings suggest that the motives for holding reserves has shifted from insurance against current account shocks mostly in the 1980s to insurance against capital account shocks in the 1990s and as the by product of possible mercantilism in the 2000s we also find some differences between country groups rim countries tend to hold more reserves against current account vulnerabilities and fewer reserves against capital account vulnerabilities but more reserves overall there is also greater evidence of mercantilist motives being at play for rim countries though this motive accounts for only a small fraction of the rise in reserve holdings in recent years peaking in 2004 and declining thereafter

foreign exchange market intervention and reserve accumulation in emerging asia is there evidence of fear of appreciation abstract asian central banks react more strongly to currency appreciations than depreciations and more to nominal effective exchange rates neers than to bilateral us dollar rates this rationalizes the relative exchange rate stability and the sustained reserve accumulation in the region

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

the supply and demand side impacts of credit market information abstract we utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes a guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it one year later we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender this pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game the credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones increasing economic differentiation

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

an exchange market pressure measure for cross country analysis abstract emp measures in the existing literature are oriented towards applications in crisis dating and prediction we propose a modified emp measure where cross country comparisons are possible this is the sum of the observed change in the exchange rate with an estimated counterfactual of the magnitude of the change in the exchange rate associated with the observed currency intervention we construct a multi country dataset for emp in each month this opens up many new research possibilities

federal lending and the market for credit abstract federal lending is an important but unrecognized feature of modern credit markets this paper analyzes the effects of credit interventions on credit allocation and economic efficiency the underlying model posits asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and allows for market clearing rationed or redlined equilibria principal results include unsubsidized credit interventions are neutral the relative effectiveness of alternative lending instruments depends on whether rationing occurs interactions among programs can have perverse effects and even without an informational advantage the government may enact welfare improving credit policies under certain conditions

income insurance with uncertain output this paper examines the properties of a market solution to the output uncertainty problem faced by unincorporated primary producers an insurance contract is formulated and shown to provide income insurance to producers without exposing insurers to moral hazard the equilibrium relative to this contract is shown to be equivalent to that effected by a stock market available to all producers copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

welfare improving adverse selection in credit markets a model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral hazard only case adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model high quality borrowers cross subsidize low quality borrowers the cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices the analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

on the effectiveness of exchange rate interventions in emerging markets we analyze the effectiveness of exchange rate interventions for a panel of 18 emerging market economies during the period 2003 2011 using an error correction model approach we find that on average intervention is effective in moving the real exchange rate in the desired direction controlling for deviations from the equilibrium and short term changes in fundamentals and global financial variables our results are robust to different samples and estimation methods we find little evidence of asymmetries in the effect of sales and purchases but some evidence of more effective interventions for large deviations from the equilibrium we also explore differences across countries according to the possible transmission channels and nature of some global shocks

the role of interest rate taxes in credit markets with divisible projects and asymmetric information this paper assumes that entrepreneurs have divisible projects with random payoffs however managerial skill is unobservable to outsiders projects are assumed to be financed through debt a pooling equilibrium is shown to exist in which good and bad entrepreneurs sell debt at the same price if both types of entrepreneur have a positive probability of bankruptcy project scale will be too large this provides a prima facie case for raising interest rates and hence the cost of capital through taxation if in equilibrium only the poor entrepreneurs go bankrupt there is an outlying possibility that interest rates are too low and a subsidy is called for

perquisites risk and capital structure in a corporate agency problem perquisites and risk interact to produce novel complex comparative statics for example even if additional debt induces risk neutral insiders to increase risk they never seek to increase the market value of their stock instead insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent conditionally optimal perquisites also the firm s optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults however the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds stocks options and their hybrids

sharing default information as a borrower discipline device abstract creditors often share information about their customers credit records besides helping them to spot bad risks this acts as a disciplinary device if creditors are known to inform one another of defaults borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders this increases their incentive to perform however sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect borrowers incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information in some instances by fine tuning the type and accuracy of the information shared lenders can raise borrowers incentives to their first best level

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts the effects of monetary policy existing theory and evidence on the effects of monetary policy are reviewed substantial room for disagreement among economists remains new evidence based on multivariate time series studies of several countries is presented while certain patterns in the data consistent with effective monetary policy are strikingly similar across countries others particularly the tendency of interest rate increases to predict high inflation are harder to reconcile with effective monetary policy

incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints abstract we explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk neutral agents operate in correlated environments our focus is on the subgame equilibrium in which each agent is induced via a direct mechanism to truthfully reveal his private information as a nash response to truth telling by his counterpart we identify a class of examples in which in contrast to the case where the agents are risk averse the nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium thus implementation via direct mechanisms is feasible for this class more generally however the truth telling nash equilibrium may be subgame dominated so the question of implementation via direct mechanisms remains a delicate one

multiple equilibria in markets with screening this paper adds endogenous screening to broecker 1990 and shows the possibility of multiple screening equilibria a high intensity of screening by a bank decreases average quality of firms applying to other banks which in turn have further incentives to screen the link between the degree of concentration of the banking industry and the extension of credit is also discussed

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cointegration and threshold adjustment this article proposes an extension to the engle granger testing strategy by permitting asymmetry in the adjustment toward equilibrium in two different ways we demonstrate that our test has good power and size properties over the engle granger test when there are asymmetric departures from equilibrium we consider an application namely whether there exists cointegration among interest rates for instruments with different maturities this issue has been widely tested with mixed results we argue that either cautious policy or possibly opportunistic behavior on the part of the federal reserve implies that an equilibrium relationship between short and long term interest rates exists but that adjustments from disequilibrium are asymmetric in nature empirical tests using u s yields confirm the asymmetric nature of error correction among interest rates of different maturities

reputation in a public goods game taking the design of credit bureaus to the lab abstract we present the results of a new laboratory experiment designed to mimic the ways in which credit bureaus will alter microfinance markets where loans are taken in groups bureaus can build reputations for borrowers at the group or the individual level and the optimal contract is not obvious in a modified public goods game with ejection and re assignment played by guatemalan micro entrepreneurs we find the use of group reputation to be effective in increasing contributions given the costs of transitioning microfinance bureaus to the sharing of individual information our results suggest that this change would not be cost effective

signal jamming in new credit markets this paper develops a simple two period model in which a lender s credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers repayment capabilities this information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period

imperfect information and the theory of government intervention in farm credit markets this paper describes some possible economic motivations for government intervention in farm credit markets these motivations are made possible by explicit departures from the perfect information and complete market assumptions that underlie both the neoclassical competitive paradigm and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics to be more precise the analysis focuses on three types of asymmetric information between farmers and prospective outside investors both of whom are assumed to be risk neutral arguably the three informational asymmetries examined here represent natural departures from perfect markets in that unlike the unencumbered neoclassical model each elicits farmers optimal use of debt contracts rather than equity instruments or other contractual forms to raise investment capital despite their consistency with observed contractual choices all three of the models analyzed below yield free market equilibria that diverge from first best perfect information outcomes given the inefficiency of these market equilibria the key question raised and discussed here is can government improve upon the derived competitive outcomes and if so how despite the enormity of the credit rationing literature only a few extant studies address this question in models that are consistent with debt contracts among them are demeza and webb 1987 1988 1989 and innes 1988 which focus on the third type of informational asymmetry considered below the other two information structures posited in this paper have been studied in several analyses of credit markets but with attention focused on positive attributes of the unfettered competitive equilibrium rather than on prospective implications for welfare enhancing government intervention in what follows th s literature is surveyed and for the first two information structures some new policy results a e presented a critical discussion of the paper s limitations concludes the article

what does the bank of japan do to east asia abstract in recent policy debates some have argued that expansionary monetary policy in japan can increase real output in japan and in japan s neighbors while others have warned that it is a beggar thy neighbor policy in this paper we estimate structural vector autoregressions to assess the effects of japanese monetary policy shocks we find that the effects of japanese monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variation in east asia have been modest and difficult to reconcile with the beggar thy neighbor view we estimate that the asian crisis was preceded by expansionary monetary policy shocks in japan but we fail to find support for the view that these shocks contributed to the crisis

staying in business abstract the paper analyses factors which help a small entrepreneurial firm to stay in business the time scale for the analysis is three years 1985 1988 the main issue that the paper is concerned with is the role of market and financial variables primary source data are used an estimated probit model indicates that for this sample product range and gearing are the key maket and financial variables respectively the greater the product range and the lower the gearing ceteris paribus the better the chances of staying in business

consumption asymmetry and the stock market empirical evidence abstract this paper examines whether u s stock market value affects consumption asymmetrically using cointegration and error correction methodology the results confirm that stock market value asymmetrically affects real per capita consumption negative news affects consumption more than positive news

the trade off between cash flow and net present value in a world of asymmetric information it is shown that firms need to convey information to the market about the quality of their earnings streams this effort to mitigate the adverse selection problem in financial markets results in a bias in project selection which has a myopic characteristic the result is developed in a simple model it is contrasted with alternative explanations of short termism which invoke earnings distortion by management to mislead a market perceived to be myopic the robustness of the result to the introduction of partially informative cash flows and alternative mechanisms for conveying information is also discussed

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

why are capitalists the bosses this paper addresses the question why does capital typically hire labor rather than the other way around it models a situation in which a capitalist owner of money capital can choose between lending out his capital for production and using it to set up production under his own supervision it is demonstrated that the moral hazard of potential borrowers on account of limited liability provides the capitalist with the incentive to become a firm owner supervising hired labor the capitalist s choice is endogenized in terms of his opportunity cost of time it is argued that moral hazard with respect to the use of borrowed capital is an important determinant of the social hierarchy in the workplace copyright 1989 by royal economic society

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

understanding america s hesitant steps toward financial capitalism politics the depression and the separation of commercial and investment banking few would disagree that the glass steagall act of 1933 is thecontinental divide in american financial and banking history bydisallowing banks from getting involved in the investment bankingindustry this act imposed an institutional change that shaped howfinancial institutions conduct their business even today in itsdecline conventional wisdom has it that the act was enacted tocorrect the deficient financial system that existed during theperiod in this paper we investigate whether this assertion can beempirically verified by analyzing the senate vote on a predecessorof this act which included the clause separating commercialbanking from investment banking activities using multinomiallogits we examine what may have motivated senators to vote for itspassage the econometric evidence indicates that the senate votewas significantly influenced by important interest groups including national banks as well as manufacturing sectorinterests despite the large populist outcry for financial marketreforms at the onset of the depression

economic effects of positive credit information sharing the case of korea in many countries in addition to negative credit information such as loan default and arrears positive credit information is also exchanged on a voluntary and reciprocal basis employing optimal credit decision models of profit maximizing banks and utilizing a unique dataset of 2 million consumer loan obligors in korea we investigate the economic effects of sharing positive credit information in addition to negative credit information already exchanged we find that the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model improves significantly we proceed to investigate the economic effects of the information gap in a competitive credit market by assuming two representative banks that differ only in the level of credit information sharing the bank that utilizes negative information only suffers from deterioration of the borrower pool and reduced profit as high credit risk borrowers are more concentrated on this bank due to underpricing of risks our finding suggests that banks have incentives to volunt

from real estate to consumption the role of credit markets in the usa the aim of this article is to test whether the credit market conditions affect the strength of transmission of real estate wealth effects on household consumption in the us economy although many different works have dealt with the analysis of the existence of a real estate wealth effect most of them as a reaction to the dramatic increase of housing prices in several oecd countries there are only few papers analysing whether the consumption response depends on the positive or negative sign of the wealth shock and as far as we know none of them takes the effects of credit market conditions on that asymmetric response into account this article tries to fill the existing gap in the literature on this matter from an econometric perspective we estimate the asymmetries in the consumption response within the momentum threshold autoregressive model m tar proposed by enders and siklos 2001 but following stevans 2004 it is applied to a multivariate framework the main results show that the credit mar

are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal a highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock the reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability bankruptcy constraint limits the payments the principal can make provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small this finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms even though limited liability becomes an issue for different ranges of liquidation values under the two schemes tournaments are still superior when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values surprisingly uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are dominant because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk these findings provide insight into policy implications in the contracting out of services by state and local governments in procurement in rent seeking contests and in tournaments used by hmos

credit information systems in less developed countries a test with microfinance in guatemala abstract increases in formal sector lending among the poor have created a need for credit information systems that provide potential lenders with borrower information in this article we present fixed effects estimations that attempt to measure the effect of a newly implemented credit information system in guatemala our results indicate that improved screening effects from the system caused the level of portfolio arrears to decline approximately 2 percentage points after it was implemented in branch offices we observe an even more substantial and significant effect of the information system in reducing late payments that occur during the loan cycle

does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article publisher s version available at http dx doi org 10 1016 j jbankfin 2014 02 010

credit reporting relationship banking and loan repayment how does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior we show in a laboratory credit market that information sharing increases repayment rates as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit this incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third party enforceable and lending is dominated by one shot transactions if however repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders ability to extract rents from relationships copyright 2007 the ohio state university

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

credit market efficiency and tax policy in the presence of screening costs after establishing the existence of capital market equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information and screening costs this paper examines tax policies designed to correct the attendant externalities when projects differ in expected returns it is shown to be ambiguous whether costly private screening weakens or strengthens the case for an interest income tax however when projects differ only in riskiness as in the model of stiglitz and weiss screening opportunities cause the efficiency case for tax intervention to disappear

seasonal patterns of futures hedging and the resolution of output uncertainty abstract optimal futures hedging is examined in a two good model with stochastic output and sequential information arrival a producer s optimal hedge depends on demand elasticity sensitivity of his output to weather his correlation with aggregate output and how rapidly his output uncertainty is resolved relative to other producers during different seasonal periods because regional output uncertainties are resolved at different times the optimal futures position of a grower will commonly reverse in direction during the crop year a producer with non stochastic output who faces price risk arising from demand shocks may remain unhedged or even maintain a long position

the suspension of borrowing an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information abstracta credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information we show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates but loosened otherwise to improve the repayment performance of borrowers we also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

design and marketing of financial products marketing costs are introduced into the security design environment outlined in allen and gale 1988 it is shown that splitting the firm s cash flow between products enhances their investor appeal and reduces marketing costs we also explain how the extremal product design in allen and gale is thereby avoided and how in simple cases debt equity or warrants can be optimal furthermore we illustrate in general terms how the optimal solution employs portfolios of option type products and we give an example of two optimal products that share profits in seven of eight states article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

monetary policy and exchange rate interactions in a small open economy the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a small open economy like norway are analysed through structural vars with special emphasis on the interdependence between monetary policy and exchange rate movements by imposing a long run neutrality restriction on the real exchange rate thereby allowing the interest rate and the exchange rate to react simultaneously to news i find considerable interdependence between monetary policy and the exchange rate in particular following a contractionary monetary policy shock the real exchange rate immediately appreciates after which it gradually depreciates back to the baseline the results are found to be consistent with findings from an event study

do exchange rate shocks have asymmetric effects on reserve accumulation evidence from emerging markets it is generally argued that central banks in emerging market countries motivated by a desire to defend export competitiveness tend to intervene in foreign exchange markets to limit currency appreciations rather than depreciations using panel data from 13 emerging market countries for the period 1998 m1 to 2016 m12 we find that exchange rate shocks play an important role in determining the accumulation of international reserves moreover we find evidence that central banks in emerging markets tend to follow a leaning against the depreciation wind policy rather than the appreciation wind i e we provide evidence of a fear of depreciation

entrepreneurial learning and the existence of credit markets abstract i explore the economic implications of learning by doing by borrower entrepreneurs who are initially imperfectly informed about their innate abilities it is shown how entrepreneurial learning worsens the adverse effects of moral hazard causing the possible disappearance of otherwise viable credit markets and thereby decreasing social welfare the reason is that learning reduces subjective uncertainty about risky future outcomes thus encouraging excessive risk taking behaviour

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

controlling preferences for lotteries on units of experimental exchange in an experimental setting when outcomes are stochastically related to actions predictions of equilibrium behavior depend not only on the participants preference orderings of outcomes but also on their orderings of lotteries on outcomes as well we introduce and test a reward structure that can be utilized in any experimental setting to allow the experimenter to decree beforehand the subjects preferences for lotteries on experimental outcomes we show analytically that the proposed reward structure can induce subjects to behave as if they have the decreed preference function defined on experimental outcomes empirical tests using two different choice settings provide evidence to support this ability to control preferences

the response of hours to a technology shock a two step structural var approach the response of hours to a technology shock is a controversial issue in macroeconomics part of the difficulty lies in that the estimated response is sensitive to the specification of hours in structural vector autoregressions svars this paper uses a simple two step approach to consistently estimate the response of hours the first step considers a svar model with a relevant stationary variable but excluding hours given a consistent estimate of technology shocks in the first step the response of hours to this shock is estimated in a second step simulation experiments from an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model show that this approach outperforms standard svars when applied to u s data the two step approach predicts a short run decrease followed by a hump shaped positive response this result is robust to other specifications and data

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

moral hazard and adverse selection the question of financial structure this paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed but competitive financial market the adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur s ability to transform effort into value moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing we consider the joint use of both debt and equity and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes it is shown that 1 investment and financing are not separable 2 there is an underinvestment problem for better firms and 3 simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty we also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation agency problems in corporate finance originated with the influential papers of jensen and meckling 11 myers 17 ross 21 and leland pyle 14 they show that the market imperfections induced by unobservable actions lack of contracting ability and information asymmetry generally lead to second best outcomes in which the distribution of corporate ownership is achieved only at significant cost these costs take the form of excessive perquisite consumption overinvestment underinvestment and incomplete diversification of personal investment portfolios moral hazard and adverse selection comprise two forms in which agency problems may take shape arrow 1 equates these two terms with hidden action and hidden information respectively moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to the principal adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the principal the resolution of such difficulties has been explored in a number of contexts with both signals and contingent contracting mechanisms these definitions exclude certain agency problems in the delegation literature for which the preference incongruity results from a lack of precommitment rather than some exogenous feature of the model in corporate finance one would thus identify the jensen meckling paper with moral hazard because perquisites enter the insider s objective differently from outsiders while darrough is from columbia university and stoughton is from the university of california irvine the second author s research was partially supported by grant number 410 83 0786 r 1 from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada this paper was presented at the 1984 meetings of the western finance association in vancouver and at the 1985 european finance association meetings in bern we thank kose john and frans tempelaar for their comments at the meetings

moral hazard and limited liability implications for the theory of the firm this paper presents a theory of the firm based on moral hazard in the provision of effort by an owner manager who borrows money in financial markets under conditions of limited liability the authors examine the relationship between the financial structure of the firm and the effort and output decisions of the owner manager results are reported concerning the determination of the firm s optimal financial structure and concerning the positive and normative implications of financial structure for pure competition and monopoly they also identify a strategic advantage from equity finance under cournot oligopoly copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

fear of appreciation abstract in recent years the term fear of floating has been used to describe exchange rate regimes that while officially flexible in practice intervene heavily to avoid sudden or large depreciations however the data reveals that in most cases and increasingly so in the 2000s intervention has been aimed at limiting appreciations rather than depreciations often motivated by the neo mercantilist view of a depreciated real exchange rate as protection for domestic industries as a first step to address the broader question of whether this view delivers on its promise we examine whether this fear of appreciation has a positive impact on growth performance in developing economies we show that depreciated exchange rates indeed lead to higher growth but that the effect rather than through import substitution or export booms as argued by the mercantilist view works largely through the deepening of domestic savings and capital accumulation

futures markets and production decisions this paper investigates the use of futures prices in making production decisions we derive a preference independent production rule for firms that face both demand and production uncertainty this rule is compared to a simple marginal cost equals future price rule which previously has been suggested for firms with deterministic output data for agricultural producers are used to examine the importance of output uncertainty in the determination of the proper production rule our analysis suggests that for many crops the simple rule is sufficiently accurate to be a useful guide to production

group lending under asymmetric information abstract this paper examines joint liability loan contracts as part of a screening mechanism adopted by lenders using group lending schemes a model and one period game are introduced in order to analyze the type of optimal loan contracts that emerge when lenders have less information than borrowers it is shown that under imperfect information lenders may be able to utilize joint liability contracts as a means of screening agent types by inducing endogenous group formation and self selection among the borrowers

should courts enforce credit contracts strictly the intimate linkages between law and nance are currently the centre of wide rangingempirical investigations this article presents a simple banking model with informationasymmetries concerning borrowers entrepreneurial talent it is shown that improvements inthe enforcement of contract by courts reduce agency problems but can also reduce the bank sincentive to screen borrowers adequately thus worsening credit allocation a stricterenforcement of credit contracts therefore may be socially harmful even if costlessly achieved improvements in accounting standards however always make bank screening of borrowers lesscostly and improve credit allocation and social welfare

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

financial contracting under risk neutrality limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information this paper derives equilibrium financial contract forms in a risk neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers entrepeneurs and investors in doing so the analysis generalizes the work of demeza and webb 1987 by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices the main result of this inquiry is as follows when higher quality entrepreneurs have better ex post profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non decreasing in firm profit without the monotonicity constraint contracts often take a different live or die form

investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information abstract this paper models private firm investment choices and government credit policy in an entrepreneurial firm financial market wherein firm owners have better information about the quality of their return distributions than do external financiers the analysis shows that despite the absence of an informational advantage the government can often increase social welfare by offering subsidized debt contracts however the paper also finds that some common credit subsidy policies including loan guarantees and government backing of targeted lending institutions yield constrained inefficient outcomes in general

asymmetric information option to wait to invest and the optimal level of investment abstract this paper analyzes equilibrium rationing on credit markets in the case of gains from waiting to acquire information about the future profitability of investment we compare the competitive outcome with the socially optimal level of investment we show that the opportunity to postpone investment changes the nature of the inefficiencies of the competitive outcome fundamentally without the option to wait high risk firms tend to invest and the outcome is characterized by a situation of underinvestment if firms can wait high risk firms benefit the most from waiting in this case low risk firms tend to invest immediately and a situation of overinvestment will result since from the banks point of view firms do not delay enough

dynamic hedging with uncertain production this paper provides a closed form rule for dynamic hedging with production uncertainty the rule is obtained by considering a discret e time control problem in the limit as the interval between hedging opportunities goes to zero price may be expected to increase or decrease so that a speculative motive is present in the absence of this motive and of discounting the optimal hedge is myopic for a given expected rate of change in price the hedge may be expected to rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

does bank affiliation mitigate liquidity constraints evidence from germany s universal banks in the pre world war i period this paper compares two similar samples of mining and steel corporations in pre world war i germany one sample consists of corporations that were affiliated to one or more of the german universal banks and the second sample consists of companies that had to rely on other sources of finance statistical analysis conducted in the framework of a linear fixed effects model indicates that the non affiliated companies were liquidity constrained the paper also sets out the corporate control structure as laid down in the trade law reform of 1884 and traces the origins of the current german dual board system as well as the origins of several other aspects of the institutions that tied the german banking system to industrial concerns

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

the effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit cost of credit and loan performance evidence from a credit registry introduction abstract using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in albania we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the albanian central bank in january 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on 1 access to credit 2 cost of credit and 3 loan performance our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit but improves loan performance specifically loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3 points less likely of turning problematic representing a 35 reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability we further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas where competition is weak this indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit

long term financial contracts can mitigate the adverse selection problem in project financing this paper shows that long term contracts can be used in competitive financial markets to separate entrepreneurs of different abilities in equilibrium poor entrepreneurs are financed with a sequence of standard debt contracts good entrepreneurs are financed with a modified contract in which the terms of the second part of the contract are contingent upon whether default is observed at the first date sorting is achieved through the contingent term in the contract in equilibrium good entrepreneurs will typically pay high interest rates to start with followed by relatively lower rates later if they are successful the solution in the paper is contrasted with the use of collateral incomplete information plays an important role in explaining the existence and form of enduring relationships when agents have private information and cannot precommit to future actions and announcements there may be a role for multiperiod contracts see townsend 1982 and hart and holmstrom 1986 such contracts tie future contractual terms to current behaviour moreover these contracts can be self enforcing simply relying upon the self interest of agents to see them through this paper shows that long term relationships may help overcome adverse selection problems the basic idea is very simple entrepreneurs have different probabilities of completing successive projects successfully observation of the returns cannot reveal the type of project however repeated observation of returns does give information about the type of project by the law of large numbers even if there are only two observations at successive dates it may be possible to separate types by making the terms of the contract at the second date conditional upon whether default is observed at the first we consider an entrepreneur who is risk neutral and who has a project at each of two successive dates the projects may require outside finance from banks risk neutral banks offer two period credit contracts to the entrepreneur we assume that there are two types of entrepreneur one with a high probability of completing projects successfully and a second with a low probability the probability of success is private information to the entrepreneur it is not known by the bank the problem of generalising the analysis to more entrepreneur types is discussed in the conclusion in section 2 of the paper it is shown that in this setting an adverse selection problem may arise we consider a sequence of standard debt contracts which specify a fixed payment at each date the important point to note here is that with

house price shocks negative equity and household consumption in the united kingdom we examine the impact of unanticipated housing capital gains on consumption behavior using data from the british household panel survey and county level house price data we condition the models on household financial expectations and on household real financial capital gains imputed from the family resources survey we find a marginal propensity to consume out of unanticipated shocks to housing wealth of 0 01 omitting the measure of financial expectations biases the results upward we find little evidence of heterogeneity in responses of young and old homeowners but differences between owners and renters we also find asymmetric behavior between house price rises and falls and a disproportionate impact on saving if the household had negative housing equity at the start of the period jel d91 e21 r31 c 2010 by the european economic association

did banks security affiliates add value evidence from the commercial banking industry during the 1920s this paper finds that banks security affiliates added 4 percent to 7 percent to the market value of commercial banks in 1926 and 1927 this result is robust to the inclusion of a large array of control variables including risk regulatory environment and financial health variables such as the capital asset ratio and profitability measures bank size explains about 40 percent of this premium thus suggesting that economies of scale were present the remaining 60 percent of the premium most likely came from economies of scope this result implies that the glass steagall act by disallowing banks involvement in the securities industry had a direct cost in lost market value for the commercial banking industry

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption