new product introduction and incumbent response strategies their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact in this article the author studies the determinants of both new product introduction and incumbent response strategies in a single integrated framework building on previous research in strategic

international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

sticks and carrots two incentive mechanisms supporting intra group cooperation abstract in this note we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra group cooperation in the context of prisoner s dilemma payoffs rewards for cooperating and punishments for defection where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship

trade policy coordination and food price volatility many countries adjust their trade policies counter cyclically with food prices to the extent that the use of restrictions by food exporting countries has occasionally threatened the food security of food importing countries these trade policies are inconsistent with the terms of trade motivation often retained to characterize the payoff frontier of self enforcing trade agreements as they can worsen the terms of trade of the countries that apply them this article analyzes trade policy coordination when trade policies are driven by terms of trade effects and a desire to reduce domestic food price volatility this framework implies that importing and exporting countries have incentives to deviate from cooperation at different periods the latter when prices are high and the former when prices are low since staple food prices tend to have asymmetric distributions with more prices below than above the mean but with occasional spikes a self enforcing agreement generates asymmetric outcomes without cooperation an importing country uses its trade policy more frequently because of the concentration of prices below the mean but an exporting country has a greater incentive to deviate from a cooperative trade policy because positive deviations from the mean price are larger than negative ones thus the asymmetry of the distribution of commodity prices can make it more difficult to discipline export taxes than tariffs in trade agreements

is there more than one critical concentration ratio an empirical test for the portland cement industry past attempts to estimate the critical concentration ratio maintained the hypothesis of only two structural groupings competitive versus non competitive in view of the spectrum of competitive conduct allowed by oligopoly theory the validity of the two groupings is restrictive and should be tested using data from the portland cement industry this paper conducts such a test employing a non linear switching regression technique based on the logistic function the hypothesis of two structural groupings is not rejected

umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard abstract in a framework of repeated purchase experience goods with seller s moral hazard and imperfect monitoring umbrella branding may improve the terms of the implicit contract between seller and buyers whereby the seller invests in quality and buyers pay a high price in some cases umbrella branding leads to a softer punishment of product failure which increases the seller s value in other cases umbrella branding leads to a harsher punishment of product failure which allows for a reputational equilibrium that would otherwise be impossible on the negative side under umbrella branding one bad signal may kill two revenue streams not one combining costs and benefits i determine the set of parameter values such that umbrella branding is an optimal strategy

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

collusion in multiproduct oligopoly games under a finite horizon applying recent results on finitely repeated games to oligopoly theory the author finds that there exists a class of finite horizon output games in which collusion can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium trigger strategies prevent defection from the cooperative outcome by credibly threatening that the defector will be forced to exit the industry for the case of a multiproduct oligopoly it is shown that collusion in one market can be enforced by the threat of punishment in a second market if someone defects even though the two markets are structurally independent the firms make them strategically interdependent through their strategies copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multimarket contact imperfect monitoring and implicit collusion abstract this paper presents a theoretical foundation to the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms ability to sustain implicit collusion when firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor their opponents choices it is impossible to achieve efficiency even if these firms have a long term strategic relationship we show that when firms encounter each other in a number of distinct markets and the extent of this market contact is large efficiency can be approximately sustained by a perfect equilibrium this efficiency with imperfect monitoring holds under almost the same condition on the discount factor as with perfect monitoring journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 c73 d43 l11 l22 l41

entry exit and performance in airline markets abstract data from the airline industry indicate that 1 entry generally is not induced by price levels substantially above the norm 2 entry reduces fares and increases output and exit increases fares and reduces output and 3 incumbents cut price and maintain output in response to entry and survivors increase both price and output in response to exit these findings cast doubt on the ability of entry to prevent or reverse price increases from anticompetitive mergers

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

pricing and financial resources an analysis of the disk drive industry 1980 88 this paper empirically examines the long purse hypothesis formalized by patrick bolton and david scharfstein 1990 that incumbents may drive out entrants through aggressive pricing the author analyzes the pricing of 733 disk drives between 1980 and 1988 drives that are adjacent to those manufactured by thinly capitalized undiversified rivals are priced lower than other drives during the later years in the sample when little equity financing was available to these firms the results are robust to controls for alternative hypotheses and to other specifications of the hedonic regression copyright 1995 by mit press

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

non price strategic behavior the case of bank branches abstract we perform an empirical study of banks branching decisions as a strategic non price variable in an oligopolistic setting using panel data of banks from norway we find clear evidence that banks act strategically in their branching decisions taking into consideration the future response from rival banks the analysis is applied to a unique data set which covers the entire banking sector during both pre and post banking crisis periods where very different types of conduct are found in each of these periods both for banks and borrowers moreover we find that a bank specific branch network does not confer externality on other banks as a result branch network affects only market shares but not market size

protecting intellectual property rights are small firms handicapped this paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978 99 by linking information from the u s patent office the federal courts and industry sources we find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade or other characteristics that facilitate cooperative resolution of disputes are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits however postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics these findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs

multi market contact and competition evidence from the depression era portland cement industry abstract theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion empirical work on this link has been limited we address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant level dataset for the cement industry during the great depression we find that multi market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher prices based on a new measure of contact that accounts for capacity utilization a one standard deviation increase in our measure of contact increases prices by around 4 3 we then examine the effect of the national industrial recovery act s codes of fair conduct introduced in 1933 to stem deflation through cooperative behavior within industries we find that the effects of the codes were most strongly felt in markets with the highest level of multi market contact this suggests that multi market contact can be a useful tool for firms to support collusive outcomes tacit or otherwise

firm reputation and horizontal integration author s cai hongbin abstract we study effects of horizontal integration on firm reputation in an environment where customers observe only imperfect signals about firms effort quality choices firms cannot maintain reputations of high quality and earn quality premium forever even when firms are choosing high quality effort there is always a possibility that a bad signal is observed in this case firms must give up their quality premium at least temporarily as punishment a firm s integration decision is based on the extent to which integration attenuates this necessary cost of maintaining a good reputation horizontal integration leads to a larger market base for the merged firm and may allow better monitoring of the firm s choices hence improving the punishment scheme for deviations on the other hand it gives the merged firm more room for sophisticated derivations we characterize the optimal level of integration and provide sufficient conditions under which nonintegration dominates integration we show that the optimal size of the firm is smaller when 1 trades are more frequent and information is disseminated more rapidly or 2 the deviation gain is smaller than the honesty benefit or 3 customer information about firm choices is more precise

resale and collusion in a dynamic market for semidurable goods the paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second hand markets it will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity the main contribution of the paper shows that an active second hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude as do policies that affect the functioning of the second hand market e g leasing policy and buy back it will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits

competitive pricing behavior in the auto market a structural analysis in a competitive marketplace the effectiveness of any element of the marketing mix is determined not only by its absolute value but also by its relative value with respect to the competition for example the effectiveness of a price cut in increasing demand is critically related to competitors reaction to the price change managers therefore need to know the nature of competitive interactions among firms in this paper we take a theory driven empirical approach to gain a deeper understanding of the competitive pricing behavior in the u s auto market the ability motivation paradigm posits that a firm needs both the ability and the motivation to succeed in implementing a strategy boulding and staelin 1995 we use arguments from the game theoretic literature to understand firm motivation and abilities in different segments of the auto market we then combine these insights from the game theoretic literature and the ability motivation paradigm to develop hypotheses about competition in different segments of the u s auto market to test our hypotheses of competitive behavior we estimate a structural model that disentangles the competition effect from the demand and cost effects on prices the theory of repeated games predicts that firms with a long run profitability objective will try to sustain cooperative pricing behavior as a stable equilibrium when conditions permit for example markets with high concentration and stable market environments are favorable for sustaining cooperative behavior and therefore provide firms with the ability to cooperate the theory of switching costs suggests that in markets in which a firm s current customers tend to be loyal firms have a motivation to compete very aggressively for new customers recognizing the positive benefits of loyalty from the customer base in the long run as consumer loyalty in the market increases the gains from increasing market share by means of aggressive competitive behavior are more than offset by losses in profit margins firms therefore have the motivation to price cooperatively empirically we find aggressive behavior in the minicom pact and subcompact segments cooperative behavior in the compact and midsize segments and bertrand behavior in the full size segment these findings are consistent with our theory based hypotheses about competition in different segments in estimating a structural model of the auto market we address several methodological issues a particular difficulty is the large number of car models in the u s auto market existing studies have inferred competitive behavior only in markets with two to four products they also use relatively simple functional forms of demand to facilitate easy estimation functional forms of demand however impose structure on cross elasticities between products such structure when inappropriate can bias the estimates of competitive interaction we therefore use the random coefficients logit demand model to allow flexibility in cross elasticities we also use recent advances in new empirical industrial organization neio to extend structural estimation of competitive behavior to markets with a large number of products we use the simulation based estimation approach developed by berry et al 1995 to estimate our model a frequent criticism of the neio approach is that its focus on industry specific studies limits the generalizability of its findings in this study we retain the advantages of neio methods but partially address the issue of generalizability by analyzing competitive behavior in multiple segments within the auto industry to see whether there is a consistent pattern that can be explained by theory theoretical modelers can use our results to judge the appropriateness of their models in predicting competitive outcomes for the markets that they analyze a by product of our analysis is that we also get estimates of demand and cost apart from competitive interactions for the market managers can use these estimates to perform what if analysis they can answer questions about what prices to charge when a new product is introduced or when an existing product s characteristics are changed

trade costs and multimarket collusion contrary to conventional wisdom this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare with the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets we first show that if trade costs i e tariffs transport costs and discount factors are not too high efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross hauling of goods as that entails lower deviation incentives in this setting we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level but may reduce total output and thus be pro collusive when trade costs are below that threshold level

multi market collusion with territorial allocation abstract we develop a supergame model of collusion between price setting oligopolists located in different markets separated by trade costs the firms produce a homogeneous good and sustain collusion based on territorial allocation of markets we first show in a much more general framework than some earlier literature that a reduction in trade costs can paradoxically increase the sustainability of collusion then we prove a new paradox in which the scope for collusion may be enhanced by an increase in the number of firms the paper thus highlights several hitherto unknown theoretical implications of collusion under price competition

on the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default this paper reviews the lessons learned from the application of the tools of game theory to the theoretical study of sovereign debt and default we focus on two main questions first we review answers to the most fundamental question in the theory of sovereign debt given that there is no supranational institution for enforcing the repayment of debts why do countries ever repay their debts second we review theories of the process by which sovereign debts are restructured with a view to answering the following question why does the process of sovereign debt restructuring appear so inefficient the first question raises issues in the design of self enforcing contracts and on the credibility of threats to punish a country in default the second question involves applications of the theory of bargaining in environments where the parties to a bargain cannot commit to honour the terms of the bargain or even commit to enter into negotiations in the first place copyright 2013 oxford university press

a dynamic theory of countervailing power in this article i develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers the buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which similar to a boom in demand forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting if the buyer s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint profit maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one the model is extended to allow for multiple buyers large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers buyer mergers increase pro t for all buyers not just the merging pair at the expense of the sellers in contrast buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers

credible entry threats into contestable markets a symmetric multi market model of contestability the theory of contestable markets emphasizes potential competition yet it is reticent on the identity of potential entrants recent literature discusses the im possibility of hit and run entry for several types of entrants r d cairns and d mahabir 1988 argue that existing firms in related markets are most likely to be capable of hit and run entry but unlikely to be motivated this paper expands their arguments by sketching a multimarket framework and by discussing a model that captures most of the current debate the model marks a first step into revising contestability theory along the lines of this debate copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

economic integration and the sustainability of multimarket collusion abstract we examine the impact of and links between two types of economic integration on the stability of multimarket collusion when firms interact in quantities in segmented markets 1 multilateral trade liberalization captured by a reduction of trade costs across all markets and 2 preferential trade liberalization captured by an expansion in the size of individual markets while holding the level of external trade costs tariffs constant in general collusive stability is non monotonically related to economic integration in the case of multilateral liberalization the effect depends on the initial level of trade costs and the extent of liberalization however on the average the complete elimination of trade costs is pro competitive when these costs are sufficiently high initially in the case of regional integration the effect of liberalization is pro competitive when external trade barriers are sufficiently high but anti competitive when these barriers are sufficiently low

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

foreign direct investment location strategies in the tire industry we analyze the nature of international competition among multinational firms in the tire industry using the frameworks of the theories of oligopolistic reaction and foreign direct investment we find that the firms investment patterns are related to the number and identities of competitors host country characteristics and foreign experience global tire companies from several nations demonstrate oligopolistic reaction behavior

global cartels leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation in this paper we analyze cartel formation and self reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions we are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies when international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated multi market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively we then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged we show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self reporting by cartel members

on the stability of multimarket collusion in price setting supergames abstract in this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions the model we consider is a segmented markets duopoly with differentiated goods in which price setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome we find that when goods are very close substitutes and trade costs are sufficiently high a marginal reduction in trade costs facilitates collusion exactly the opposite is true if for any given degree of product substitutability trade costs are sufficiently low we also study the dependence of multimarket collusion on product differentiation

swedish co2 emissions 1900 2010 an exploratory note abstract this paper projects swedish co 2 emissions during the period 2000 2010 based on data covering 1900 1999 swedish climate policy is currently based on the assumption that carbon emissions will increase ceteris paribus by 5 15 relative to the 1990 level this forecast has motivated a number of policy measures including carbon taxes subsidies and an information package we find however that co 2 emissions may well be lower in the future this outcome is broadly consistent with the literature on the environmental kuznets curve which portrays the relationship between emissions and gdp the key contribution of this paper is that our analysis is based on a long time series current literature is invariably based on short panel data sets while we study a single country through several phases of development our analysis also sheds some light on the key importance played by nuclear power for carbon emission projections

competing globally allying locally alliances between global rivals and host country factors an emerging literature highlights the relationship between competitive intensity and the likelihood that two rival firms will form an alliance placing this argument in an international context we first suggest that the global competitive intensity between two rival multinationals positively affects the likelihood that they will ally in any host country additionally we highlight how a number of host country contextual factors moderate the relationship between global competitive intensity and alliance formation in a given host country we test our hypotheses with a sample of 13 global automobile companies operating in 27 countries and the results largely support our predictions

multi market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement this paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand related markets we show that cartel prosecution can have a knock on effect bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break up of the cartel in the adjacent market cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets we discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus explore antitrust spillovers the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

multimarket contact and pricing evidence from the u s cement industry abstract we empirically examine the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s cement industry a model of price and quantity formation is estimated for a panel of 25 regional cement markets over 16 years the results indicate that the divergence of price from marginal cost in a particular market is directly related to the extent of multimarket contact among firms in that market

interfirm bundled discounts as a collusive device this paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods i e bertrand competitors can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts by committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups such brand specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome consumers become worse o due to higher effective prices our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other s market power without excluding rivals

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

cross licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device this paper hypothesizes that when their products are imperfect substitutes firms can promote collusion by cross licensing their competing patents cross licensing is shown to enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm s product the paper then examines the consistency of the theory developed with the available evidence antitrust implications of the practice of cross licensing of competing patents are discussed

collusive conduct in duopolies multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry the deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition one example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the united states where the fcc created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes we find that cross ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non competitive prices

does issue linkage work evidence from european alliance negotiations 1860 to 1945 though scholars widely claim that issue linkage the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement can help states conclude international agreements there exist some notable skeptics resolving this debate requires empirical evidence however beyond a few case studies there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement i address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the alliance treaty obligations and provisions atop database using matching techniques i find that for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945 offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement besides confirming issue linkage s ability to help clinch an agreement this article s research design and evidence have far reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances the research design illustrates the value of considering the dogs that didn t bark as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations the article s evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

conspiracy at the pump abstract on the basis of evidence of price fixing in may 2006 the canadian competition bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of quebec in june 2008 criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets we employ a differences in differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets we find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1 75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation we also briefly discuss how well the stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real world conspiracy

tariff wars in the ricardian model with a continuum of goods this paper describes strategic tarichoices within the ricardian framework of dorn busch fischer and samuelson 1977 using ces preferences the optimum tarischedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country in the nash equilibrium of taris larger economies apply higher tarirates pro ductivity adjusted relative size gdp ratio is a su cient statistic for absolute produc tivity advantage and the size of the labor force both countries apply higher tarirates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost are low a su ciently large economy prefers the ine cient nash equilibrium in taris over free trade due to its quasi monopolistic power on world markets the required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost i discuss the implications of the static nash equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

expropriation risk and technology abstract this paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement the firm s technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking order of expropriations long run investment distortions may be pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum the dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives backloading or efficiency frontloading concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus an increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare the model provides a technology driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

the dynamics of markups and inventories in retailing firms this paper is concerned with the interaction between price and inventory decisions in retailing firms and its implications for the dynamics of markups and the existence of sales pro motions we consider a model where a monopolistically competitive retailer decides price and inventories and assumes lump sum costs when placing orders or changing nominal prices tn this model the existence of stockout probabilities and fixed ordering costs generate a cyclical price behaviour characterized by long periods without nominal price changes and short periods with very low prices i e sales promotions we estimate this model using a unique longitudinal dataset with information about retail and wholesale prices inventories orders and sales for several brands in a supermarket chain based on the estimated model we perform several counterfactual experi ments that show the important role that inventories and fixed ordering costs play in the dynamics of retail prices and the frequency of sales promotions in this dataset

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

trends in aggregate concentration in the united states i assemble two rarely used data sets to measure aggregate concentration in the u s in the 1980s and 1990s despite the merger waves of those decades aggregate concentration declined in the 1980s and the early 1990s but rose modestly in the late 1990s the levels at the end of the decade were at or below the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s the average size of firm and the relative importance of larger size classes of firms increased however gini coefficients for employment and payroll shares of companies showed moderate but steady increases from 1988 through 1999

a new test for monopoly with limited cost data abstract the test s intuition is that demand estimates in isolation may diverge from demand estimates under joint estimation with cost if the monopoly null hypothesis is false simulations indicate that the test can have substantial power using duopoly data

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

market segmentation and collusive behavior abstract the recent literature on oligopolistic third degree price discrimination has been primarily concerned with rival firms incentives to acquire customer specific information and the consequences of such information on firm profitability and welfare this literature has taken mostly a static view of the interaction between competing firms in contrast in this paper we investigate the impact of customer specific information on the likelihood of tacit collusion in a dynamic game of repeated interaction this issue is very important because competitive price discrimination usually leads to a cutthroat price competition prisoners dilemma among firms firms therefore may seek ways to soften competition and sustain higher prices our main result is that collusion becomes more difficult as the firms ability to segment consumers improves

the structure of competition how competition between one s rivals influences imitative market entry this paper investigates how the pattern of encounters between a firm s competitors affects the firm s inclination to follow its competitors into a new market we theorize that direct encounters between a firm s rivals lead to a herding effect making imitative market entry more likely past mutual forbearance between a firm s competitors resulting from asymmetric multimarket competition further strengthens this herding effect by enhancing the firm s expectations of market attractiveness in contrast aggressive past rivalry between the competitors resulting from symmetric multimarket contact dampens these expectations producing a competition effect that makes herding less probable we test our idea in two distinct contexts the chinese pharmaceutical industry and the taiwanese computer hardware industry and find consistent support in both settings we discuss how our analysis of what we call the structure of competition can be extended to research on other forms of firm behavior

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

inefficient diversification in multi market oligopoly with diseconomies of scope this paper considers the incentives of oligopolistic firms to diversify into technologically related markets when there are diseconomies of scope there is a rent extraction incentive for firms to adopt flexible technologies which enable them to enter technologically related markets thereby increasing competition however this strategic motive leads to inefficiency in production owing to diseconomies of scope this paper shows that the welfare gain arising from increased competition is offset by the inefficiency in production which may lead to lower welfare than in the case of pure monopoly this is a counter example to the contention that the diversification increases social welfare

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

strategic pricing and detailing behavior in international markets we study three determinants of the levels of price and detailing effort across geographic markets the within market response to each variable the nature of interfirm strategic interactions both within that market and across markets we empirically examine the interactions of prozac zoloft and paxil across the united states the united kingdom germany france and italy our results indicate that all three factors driving marketing mix interactions are at play in this product category the u s market is less price sensitive than the european markets detailing elasticities are comparable across the united states germany and italy while the united kingdom and france show greater elasticity for the u s market we find that almost all deviations from nash pricing and detailing levels are due to within market interactions in the u k market deviations from nash prices come about due mostly to across market interactions both with the united states as well as the rest of europe whereas deviations from nash detailing levels are mainly due to across market interactions with the united states for italy we observe that both within and across market interactions affect price and detailing levels overall the pattern of interactions makes observed prices more similar across countries than prices implied by the estimated elasticities this underscores the importance of considering within and across market interactions in developing multimarket strategy

r d cooperation and product market competition abstract i derive equilibria that is self enforcing agreements for firms that cooperate in improving their product and compete in marketing it i am particularly interested in the interaction between rd ii product improvement is a function of the effort by each firm iii firms cannot observe each other s effort iv firms market the product by simultaneously setting prices the analysis reveals some surprising results i find that in some cases although monopoly prices can be sustained in equilibrium optimal equilibria call for firms to set lower than monopoly prices in the short run thus providing the right incentives for investment in r d under a different set of assumptions i find that it is optimal to reduce r d effort below the efficient level as a means to sustain short run collusion in prices even though efficient r d effort could be achieved in equilibrium

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

the co2 abatement game costs incentives and the enforceability of a sub global coalition abstract this paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short term climate change policy package guided by the united nations framework convention on climate change and the berlin mandate initiatives game theoretic tools and the global trade environment interface are explored within a 26 region 13 commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of oecd regions to comply with a non binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition the results showed that in the absence of side payments the achievement of such a coalition might require the design of suitable trade instruments

concentration in the european electricity industry the internal market as solution abstract this article offers an analysis of the present competitive and regulatory framework of the european electricity sector and the results achieved with the liberalisation process considering the reactions of incumbents to the liberalisation the focus in this work is mainly on the problem of market concentration in the sector the new trends toward the creation of national champions as well as recent mergers between gas suppliers and electricity producers raise serious concerns about abuses of market power and risk of future collusion in particular the strategic linkage of existing markets and the expansion into new ones are analyzed in the light of the multimarket contact theory considering investment in interconnection among member states the internal market issue is investigated as a solution to the risks coming from liberalisation

multimarket contact economies of scope and firm performance we integrate the efficiency and competitive effects of product market scope choice into a comprehensive model of economic performance and empirically test the model in the context of the u s airli

seasonality in the u s motion picture industry the observed seasonality of box office revenues reflects both seasonality in underlying demand for movies and seasonality in the number and quality of available movies i separately identify these aspects by estimating weekly demand for movies using movie fixed effects a long panel of movies weekly revenues and restrictions on their decay pattern i find that the estimated seasonality in underlying demand is much smaller and slightly different from the observed seasonality of sales the biggest movies are released at times when demand is highest amplifying the underlying seasonality price rigidities in the industry may facilitate this amplification effect

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

price discrimination or uniform pricing which colludes more abstract conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs we offer a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to behavioral aspects rather than demand or supply side effects in particular in a symmetric bertrand duopoly laboratory experiment for which theory predicts no differences between the two pricing regimes we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

adjustment costs and the sequencing of trade liberalisation a common feature of trade agreements between countries is that the integration of markets proceeds in stages this paper examin es conceptually the role played by adjustment costs in determining the best way to structure an agreement between two countries when there are multiple sectors to be liberalised adjustment costs to liberalisatio n of industries might influence the timing of liberalisatio n with the analysis bearing similarity to why tariff reductions tend to be phased in over time when two industries have no spillover eff ects trade agreements with sequential liberalisation will be less costly to sustain however if the liberalisation of one in dustry influences permanently the flow of benefits from liberalising the other industry simultaneous liberalisation may be easier to sustain

collusion at the extensive margin abstract we augment the multi market collusion model of bernheim and whinston 1990 by allowing for firm entry into and exit from individual markets we show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other s markets or territories we characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart specifically it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable finally we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a proportional response enforcement mechanism