labor force participation interest rate shocks and unemployment dynamics in emerging economies abstract emerging economies emes have highly volatile unemployment and real wages standard models with interest rate shocks can generate higher unemployment volatility but still fall quantitatively short of matching the empirical volatility of unemployment a small open economy search model with endogenous participation and self employment a feature of emes generates 90 percent of the volatility of unemployment in the data highly volatile wages and quantitatively consistent cyclical aggregate dynamics amid productivity and interest rate shocks of plausible magnitudes endogenous participation amplifies shocks and plays a critical role in overcoming a key limitation of standard search models for emes

remittances and the informal economy abstract many developing countries are characterized by a large informal sector and are also often heavily dependent on remittance inflows from abroad we develop a general equilibrium framework to understand better the dynamic absorption of remittances in a two sector small open economy by incorporating many of the stylized features of the informal sector calibrating the model to yield a long run equilibrium consistent with sample averages for 56 developing countries for the period 1990 2014 we show that the effect of remittances depends critically on how they impinge on the recipient economy i e whether these inflows are i permanent or temporary ii associated with a collateral effect to securitize borrowing and iii exogenous or countercyclical we also identify the conditions under which remittances are associated with an expansion of the informal sector as well as the dutch disease effect

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

the labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality abstract unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies this paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality we build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction on the job search and intersectoral flows where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs we calibrate the model for mexico and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs even if they obtain informal jobs can lead to an increase in formality in the economy while also producing small increases in unemployment the exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits we also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market in particular combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality such as lower employment taxes and firing costs can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation

corruption norm violation and decay in social capital the paper studies the link between corruption and social capital measured as trust using data from a lab experiment subjects play either a harassment bribery game or a strategically identical but differently framed ultimatum game followed by a trust game in a second experiment we elicit social appropriateness norm of actions in the bribery game and ultimatum game treatments our experimental design allows us to examine whether subjects who have been asked to pay a bribe are less likely to trust than those in an isomorphic role in the ultimatum game we also uncover the underlying mechanism behind any such behavioral spillover results suggest that a there is a negative spillover effect of corruption on trust and the effect increases with decrease in social appropriateness norm of the bribe demand b lower trust in the bribery game treatment is explained by lower expected return on trust c surprisingly for both the bribery and ultimatum game treatments social appropriateness norm violation engenders the decay in trust through its adverse effect on belief about trustworthiness

quantitative restrictions in the presence of cost based informational asymmetries this study introduces a cost based informational asymmetry into a two period model where a domestic incumbent firm s behavior in the first period affects the entry decision of a foreign firm in the second period the effects of import quota policy within this environment are examined and compared to the standard full information effects when quota quantities are set exogenously the standard effects of quota policy may be significantly altered depending on whether or not policy induces the domestic firm to signal cost structure for example higher quotas may discourage foreign entry because of the induced signaling effects of quota policy recognition that incomplete information is the rule rather than the exception when decisionmakers interact in an international setting has stimulated an emerging literature on the effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures particularly germane to the present study are those papers that introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policy to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firms compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies collie and hviid 1993 qiu 1994 maggi 1995 brainard and martimort 1997 wright 1998 collie and hviid 1994 on the other hand allow for domestic consumption and consider optimal import policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist analysis that focuses on the positive effects of trade policy in the presence of informational failures is more limited one such example is a study by hartigan 1994 which considers the effects of antidumping duties to date however there has been no analysis of how and whether the introduction of an informational failure alters the effects of quantitative restrictions to trade the aim of the present study is to extend the existing literature by examining the effects of a quantitative restriction to trade in the presence of a cost based informational asymmetry within a standard two period entry model 2 during the initial time period a domestic firm supplies the home market and

money laundering as a crime in the financial sector a new approach to quantitative assessment with an application to italy this study provides an answer to the question of how much cash deposited via a financial institution can be traced back to criminal activities by developing a new approach to measure money laundering and proposing an application to italy we define a model of cash in flows on current accounts considering besides dirty money to be laundered also the legal motivations to deposit cash and the role of the shadow economy we find that the average amount of cash laundered in italy is around 6 of gdp these findings are coherent with estimates of the nonobserved economy obtained in previous studies

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game abstract we examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist with unknown costs with complete information the home government uses a discriminatory tariffs policy to extract rents if the government is incompletely informed about costs we show that under reasonable conditions the unique equilibrium involves pooling where the firm exports the same quantity regardless of its efficiency we find that in general home welfare is higher under alternative policies such as uniform tariffs or free trade suggesting that trade policies that are motivated by rent extraction are unlikely to be robust to the introduction of incomplete information

anti dumping measures as a tool of protectionism a mechanism design approach in this paper we explore the design of optimal incentive compatible anti dumping ad measures when the weight given to the domestic firm s profit in the government s objective function is relatively small it is shown that no ad duty should be imposed if the foreign firm reports its own costs but a constant ad duty should be imposed if the domestic firm reports the foreign firm s cost when this weight is large in either case of reporting the ad duty is a prohibitive tariff the optimal ad measures are modified in the presence of a gatt wto constraint jel classification f12 f13 les mesures anti dumping en tant qu outil de protectionnisme une approche en termes de construction de mecanismes ce memoire examine la construction de mesures optimaales anti dumping ad quandla valence des profits de la firme domestique est faible dans la fonction objective du gouvernement on peut montrer qu aucune mesure ad ne devrait etre imposee si l entreprise etrangere revele ses propres couts mais qu un droit ad constant devrait etre impose si c est la firme domestique qui revele les couts de l entreprise etrangere quand la valence des profits de la firme domestique est grande quelle que soit la source de l information la mesure ad qui s impose est un droit de douane prohibitif les mesures optimales doivent evidemment etre modifiees pour prendre en compte la contrainte engendree par l existence des regles du gatt omc

informal self employment and macroeconomic fluctuations article i nfo article history informal self employment is a major source of employment in developing countries its cyclical behavior is important to our understanding of the functioning of ldc labor markets but turns out to be surprisingly complex we develop a flexible model with two sectors a formal salaried tradable sector that may be affected by wage rigidities and an informal non tradable self employment sector faced with liquidity constraints to entry this labor market is then embedded in a standard small economy macro model we show that different types of shocks interact with different institutional contexts to produce distinct patterns of comovement between key variables of the model relative salaried self employed incomes relative salaried self employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate model predictions are then tested empirically for argentina brazil colombia and mexico we confirm episodes where the expansion of informal self employment is consistent with the traditional segmentation views of informality however we also identify episodes where informal self employment behaves pro cyclically here informality is driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the non tradable sector

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

export subsidies and high productivity cause or effect according to the emerging strategic theory of trade policy countries selling in imperfectly competitive world markets may benefit from export subsidies this paper demonstrates that the theory predicts that it is the countries with the lowest production costs that offer the highest subsidies it is argued that this result diminishes the attraction of the theory as a positive explanation of trade policy

inflation in mozambique empirical facts based on persistence seasonality and breaks this article investigates inflation in mozambique using long range dependence lrd techniques in monthly data from december 1995 to october 2012 two important features of the data are analysed persistence and seasonality looking at aggregated and disaggregated data the stability of the parameters across the sample is also investigated the results indicate a high degree of persistence in the data along with a strong seasonal pattern policy implications are discussed

shadow economies at times of banking crises empirics and theory this paper investigates the response of the shadow economy to banking crises our empirical analysis based on a large sample of countries suggests that the informal sector is a powerful buffer which expands at times of banking crises and absorbs a large proportion of the fall in official output to rationalise our evidence we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which accounts for financial and labour market frictions and for nominal rigidities in line with the empirical literature on the shadow economy we assume that in the informal sector access to external finance is limited and the production technology is relatively more labour intensive following a banking shock in the official sector the model predicts a large negative transmission to the unofficial economy that substantially dampens the overall effect of the shock

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

a theory of impact philanthropy this article develops a new model of altruism called impact philanthropy an impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally make a difference while that motive is straightforward its logical implications are significantly different from other models of philanthropy for example the contributions of other donors can reduce an impact philanthropist s charitable fulfillment as a result cooperation among impact philanthropists can reduce aggregate giving in addition impact philanthropy can lead to a codependent relationship between givers and receivers in which both benefit from the other finally the model suggests a conflict between charitable organizations and its donors concerning the allocation of charitable gifts in particular a charitable organization prefers to spread a donor s contribution across many goods whereas a donor prefers to target his or her contribution at a specific good d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the signaling effect of emission taxes under international duopoly we analyze equilibrium emission taxes under international cournot duopoly in the presence of asymmetric information between firms when each firm does not know the production cost of its rival located in the other country the government of each country can use its emission tax as a signal of the competitiveness of its domestic firm we show that owing to this signaling effect the equilibrium emission tax and expected welfare of each country can be higher than those under symmetric information between firms or even higher than those obtained if the governments were to non strategically set the tax rate equal to the expected marginal damage from pollution i e the pigouvian tax level our results suggest that the presence of asymmetric information between firms can mitigate a race to the bottom in strategic environmental policymaking

location costs product quality and implicit franchise contracts abstract in the literature on international trade only little attention has been given to informational asymmetries between firms and consumers with respect to product quality the few economic models that analyze the question of how asymmetric information about product quality might affect trade flows treat product quality as exogeneous in contrast our model takes product quality as an endogeneous variable i e firms can choose the quality they wish to produce in this case location costs can signal product quality under certain conditions and thereby affect international trade flows more specifically intra industry trade in vertically differentiated experience goods can be determined by information asymmetries about product quality

elections and capital flows this paper investigates the extent to which elections affect capital flows i find little evidence of political capital flow cycles in advanced economies in emerging and developing countries however presidential elections significantly lower preelection foreign direct investment fdi inflows but have no effect on other types of capital flows furthermore i find evidence that these cycles are not caused by economic crises related to elections or preelection manipulation of policy variables these results suggest that uncertainty about future government policies which should have greater impact on more irreversible forms of capital flows like fdi may be an important factor in generating this cycle

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

the emergence of regional business cycle in africa a reality or myth a bayesian dynamic factor model analysis this paper examines the evolution and the underlying forces of the business cycle co movements among seven african a 7 countries over the period 1970 2016 these countries accounted for over 60 of regional gdp have abundant natural resources access to the global capital market and widely viewed as potential drivers of regional or african business cycle we model the national business cycle using real output consumption and investment we employ a dynamic factor model to decompose fluctuations in these macro variables into a regional country specific and idiosyncratic components using bayesian methods we also analyse the relative importance of some notable drivers of business cycle fluctuations found in the literature we find that the idiosyncratic component is dominating cyclical fluctuations in the a 7 countries while country specific and regional factors play a negligible role suggesting the inexistence of a common regional cycle despite deepening intra african trade among the driving variables the terms of trade shocks exert greater influence on the a 7 business cycle while exchange rate movements and changes in money supply explain sizeable fluctuations in consumption and investment in most of the a 7 countries shocks associated with changes in relative domestic oil prices monetary and fiscal policies cause large output fluctuations

informality and credit constraints evidence from sub saharan african mses abstractthe attributes of micro and small enterprises mses influencing access to credit in particular the level and role of firm informality are analysed in the article the puzzle is the push for mses to join the formal sector and the tug to avoid the extra burden it places on the firm it is important to know more clearly what forces are at work and the sources of the causal effects this study uses data from the world bank enterprise surveys for five low income countries lics in sub saharan africa the method is empirical and as we find informality to be endogenous to credit constraints an instrumental variable approach is estimated further to address the possibility of reverse causality an instrument for the informality variable is required not registered with inland revenue tax office is the chosen instrument variable the findings reveal that as the probability of a firm operating in the formal sector increases there is greater access to external credit the causality relationships are

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

export subsidies as signals of competitiveness in a cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm this signalling effect strengthens the usual profit shifting argument for an export subsidy the optimal export subsidy in the signalling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit shifting export subsidy under complete information

recessions and the vulnerable abstract this study evaluates the impact of recessions on households vulnerable to poverty the results indicate that recessions impact vulnerable households asymmetrically in comparison to the impact of growth on poor households we also demonstrate that this outcome is significantly influenced by a country s extent of development we argue that a direct consequence of the foregoing is that the efficacy of growth in poverty reduction tends to be under stated by conventional measures of poor households responses to economic growth and that safety nets need to be constructed to incorporate vulnerability to recessions

determinants of exchange rate regime switching abstract exchange rate policy in many emerging markets shifts between a stronger and weaker commitment to peg this observation raises the following questions which we address in our paper does intervention policy exhibit switching and if so what causes policy to shift the theoretical literature increasingly points to the critical importance of financial fundamentals chinn m d kletzer k m 2001 imperfect information domestic regulation and financial crises in glick r moreno r spiegel m eds financial crises in emerging markets cambridge university press cambridge pp 196 237 dooley 2000 chang r velasco a 2005 monetary policy and the currency denomination of debt a tale of two equilibria kennedy school of government working paper series harvard university cambridge massachusetts among others direct empirical validation to date is limited however although relevant intuitions come from duration and indicators literature kaminsky g l reinhart c m vegh c a 2004 when it rains it pours procyclical capital flows and macroeconomic policies nber macroeconomics annual national bureau of economic research inc domac i peria m s 2003 banking crises and exchange rate regimes is there a link journal of international economics 61 41 72 tudela m 2004 explaining currency crises a duration model approach journal of international money and finance 23 799 816 we use a panel of quarterly data starting 1985 through 2004 for 14 countries mainly from latin america and east asia and adopt a novel two step empirical strategy first we apply regime switching methods to two simple indices of central bank exchange rate policy this generates likelihoods of high and low intervention in the second step we establish the variables that determine these probabilities we find strong evidence that the economy s balance sheet and economic performance determine the likelihood of switching in the exchange rate regime specifically an increase in reserve currency debt relative to assets raises potential capital losses from devaluation and reduces the probability of switching to a low intervention regime as does a decline in growth the purpose here is not to present an alternative regime classification levy yeyati e sturzenegger s 2005 classifying exchange rate regimes deeds vs words european economic review 49 1603 1635 reinhart c m rogoff k 2004 the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation quarterly journal of economics available at http www puaf umd edu faculty papers reinhart papers htm but to establish the relative importance of different constraints on the central bank which has policy implications the empirical approach and specification is flexible to whether intervention is discrete or gradual and to whether or not the central bank sterilizes

modelling the informal sector formally abstract the theoretical characterization of formal informal sector dualism by labor market dualism is integrated with its empirical characterization by size dualism by supposing that the minimum formal sector wage is only enforced for firms greater than a certain size a firm s size varies directly with the talent of its enterpreneur manager and the choice between formal and informal sector entrepreneurship is determined endogenously it is then shown that the size gap between the smallest formal sector firm and largest informal sector firm varies directly with the formal informal sector wage differential which in turn is shown as expected to increase the further is the minimum wage above the market clearing wage the comparative statics of changes in the size of the firm above which the minimum wage is enforced are also examined

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

informality and the labor market effects of financial crises abstract we provide evidence based on a large sample of countries on the effects of financial crises on key labor market indicators including official and unofficial employment unemployment and the participation rate crises are followed by a drop in the official market participation rate and by an increase in informal employment these responses are strongly persistent empirical results are then interpreted with a dsge model which accounts for informality and for financial and labor market frictions in this framework the informal sector acts as a buffer which absorbs workers in bad times and vice versa our simulations suggest the informal sector also is a crisis amplifier for the official economy for a given financial shock the ensuing contraction in the official economy is deeper and more persistent the larger the initial size of the unofficial sector this implies that in less developed economies financial crises cause a relatively stronger reallocation of inputs towards less efficient sectors expose a larger fraction of the population to the adverse effects of informality cause a sharper deterioration of public finances limiting governments ability to supply public goods and to engage in countercyclical fiscal policies

informal employment safety net or growth engine summary is informal employment a safety net or a growth engine to address this question this paper studies the trends and cycles of informal employment it first presents a theoretical model of long and short run behavior of informal labor then it analyzes these relationships empirically using the share of self employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment in the long run informality is larger when labor productivity is lower government services weaker and business flexibility less prevalent in the short run informal employment behaves counter cyclically indicating that it acts primarily as a safety net the degree of counter cyclicality however varies inversely with the size of informal labor itself

elections capital flows and politico economic equilibria we study an open economy where a pro labor and a pro business candidate compete in an election the winner chooses taxes which affect investment returns electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election the resulting interaction is novel and has several implications elections are associated with increased volatility politico economic crises can occur inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy but such commitments have predictable effects on the election empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed jel d72 f34 o17 o19

are labor markets segmented in developing countries a semiparametric approach abstract we test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations using data from argentina s household survey and various definitions of informal employment we find that on average formal wages are higher than informal wages parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics however this approach suffers from several econometric problems which we address with semiparametric methods the resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant or negative neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors we invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal informal lines in developing nations such as argentina

leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods field evidence from bolivia abstract we conduct a controlled field experiment in 52 communities in rural bolivia to investigate the effect that local authorities have on voluntary public good provision in our study community members pool resources to provide environmental education material for local schools we find that voluntary contributions increase when democratically elected local authorities lead by example the results are driven by two factors 1 authorities like other individuals give more when they are called upon to lead than when they give in private and 2 high leader contributions increase the likelihood that others follow both effects are stronger when authorities as compared to randomly selected community members lead by example we explore two underlying sources of leadership influence first we provide evidence that the effect of a leader s contribution is not limited to signaling the value of the public good second we examine how leader characteristics affect the likelihood that others follow specifically our study shows that authority influence is driven by a combination of formal leadership status observable characteristics and the amount that authorities contribute when they give publicly before others

lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market in this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the lyapunov method the model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the nash equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up in this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided

altruism spillovers are behaviors in context free experiments predictive of altruism toward a naturally occurring public good abstract this paper addresses the external validity of experiments investigating the characteristics of altruism in the voluntary provision of public goods we conduct two related experiments that allow us to examine whether individuals who act more altruistically in the context free environment are also more likely to act altruistically toward a naturally occurring public good we find that laboratory behavior can be predictive of contributions toward naturally occurring goods but not in a uniform way in fact parametric measures of altruism do a poor job of predicting which subjects are most likely to contribute to a naturally occurring public good

the impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations this paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections we do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks we do find evidence however in developing countries that lack central bank independence furthermore we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election related fiscal expansions this suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles

short long and spatial dynamics of informal employment di caro p and nicotra g short long and spatial dynamics of informal employment regional studies this paper analyses regional shadow labour markets cross regional migration flows are introduced in a stochastic two sector model used to study the effects of regional interactions on informality empirical results show that informal activities across italian regions are driven by the inefficient provision of public goods and high taxes regional connections are found to be significant place specific reactions of informal employment to national shocks in the official economy are investigated finding that the informal sector can act as a complement to or a substitute for formal activities the summary of the results and policy conclusions are then discussed

institutions informal labor markets and business cycle volatility i build a business cycle labor search and matching model with informal labor markets which shows that different dimensions of institutional quality have similar effects on the size of the informal sector but different effects on the relationship between informality and long run macroeconomic outcomes and between informality and labor market volatility for the same change in informal sector size changes in different proxies for institutional quality have contrasting quantitative implications for the steady state and the volatility of the labor market despite having similar consequences on other macroeconomic variables these results highlight the importance of identifying the source behind changes in the size of the informal sector to characterize the link between informality and business cycle dynamics

informality in developing economies regulation and fiscal policies abstract this paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections they have monopoly power in the goods market they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers through either individual or collective bargaining our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis in this framework we study the impact on informality wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality we consider changes in product market regulation pmr and in two types of fiscal policies labor taxes and formality enforcement we find that lessening pmr decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment the tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used though moreover the impacts of pmr on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining with respect to wage inequality lessening pmr reduces it while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium

tariff policy and entry with cost based informational asymmetries i introduction how does the presence of incomplete information alter the usual effects of trade policy recognition that incomplete information characterizes most decision making processes that take place within an international setting has stimulated an emerging body of literature which addresses this question particularly germane to the present study are those papers which introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policies to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firm compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies examples include works by brainard and martimort 1997 collie and hviid 1993 maggi 1995 and qiu 1994 another study collie and hviid 1994 allows for domestic consumption and considers optimal import tariff policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist in general optimal trade policy in the presence of informational failures is found to differ from that under complete information the emphasis of the present study is not on the conduct of optimal trade policy but rather on how the introduction of an informational asymmetry alters the realized impact of trade policy on quantities and welfare 1 specifically we examine the effects of import tariff policy within a standard two period model of entry where the costs of the domestic firm are proprietary information the incumbent domestic firm recognizes the threat of a potential foreign rival entering exporting to the domestic market where the latter is uninformed of the cost structure of the domestic firm as is well known from the industrial organization literature the incumbent domestic firm may have an incentive to change its time period one behavior so as to signal information on costs to the foreign firm in an effort to deter entry see milgrom and roberts 1982 in specifying the degree of knowledge possessed by domestic policymakers we adopt the premise that informational deficiencies on the part of policymakers are likely to be quite acute in trade policy formation indeed as brander 1995 notes it is reasonable to suppose that governments are less informed on market conditions and firm characteristics than firms themselves in contrast to previous studies however we also assume that policymakers either cannot acquire information or if they are able to cannot respond by altering policy here the formation of trade policy does not reflect or incorporate full information and thus cannot provide signals to the other uninformed party the foreign firm moreover because policymakers cannot alter policy the foreign firm perceives the tariff rate as credibly fixed the inability to incorporate information into trade policy is especially relevant for situations where policymakers are subject to previously negotiated trade agreements here even should uninformed policymakers subsequently acquire information on domestic cost structure they will be unable to respond our emphasis on the realized effects of tariff policy reflects this information structure to conduct optimal policy government must hold complete information on markets and firm characteristics at the time policy is set as in collie and hviid 1993 1994 or be able to acquire it through signaling or a screening mechanism as in qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 2 when policymakers lack the ability to acquire or respond to such information optimal policy is not a consideration what is of interest to policymakers in this situation is the response of domestic output and imports to a given tariff rate at the outset of the game then there is a tariff rate set previously by domestic policymakers who were uninformed of domestic costs since the foreign firm cannot infer domestic cost structure by merely observing the tariff rate set by uninformed policymakers any signaling that takes place is on the part of the domestic firm

rent extraction and prosocial behavior abstract we present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non profit associations holding the price of giving constant we compare contributions between two conditions a rent extraction condition in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction we find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions studying the channels through which this effect operates we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers suggesting that it undermines the contributors general preference for giving in contrast we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator

giving overseas and public policy remarkable numbers of people give to overseas development charities the aim of this paper is to consider how such overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy widely used theories of charitable giving based on warm glow or the provision of public goods provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as explanations of giving for the specific purpose of development instead an identification approach to individual giving is proposed here that combines the results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm glow model the theoretical model is used to examine the implications for public policy including the extent to which official aid crowds out private giving and how public policy should take account of private willingness to make charitable transfers overseas

unleashing waste pickers potential supporting recycling cooperatives in santiago de chile summary the informal economy currently provides two out of three jobs worldwide with waste picking activities providing employment for millions of the poorest of society moreover waste picking could provide a sustainable solution for solving the waste management crisis that affects the 3 billion people lacking access to waste services governmental policies toward waste pickers in particular and the informal economy in general have been fundamentally based on four policy approaches 1 dualist and voluntarist which proposes repressive policies against waste picker activity and the expansion of formal solid waste management systems 2 structuralist which argues for weak supporting policies aimed at reinforcing waste picker associations 3 legalist which promotes the competition of waste picking with other recycling alternatives without government intervention and 4 co production which supports waste picking with local policies as a means of enhancing waste pickers productivity both qualitative and particularly quantitative evidence testing the impact of these four approaches is scarce in this paper we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by operationalizing concepts building a waste picker sustainable performance index and estimating the impacts of these four competing policy approaches an exploratory sequential design method is used to analyze data first a thematic analysis to examine 40 in depth interviews and then multiple linear regressions to analyze a census survey of 100 waste pickers in four cooperatives in santiago de chile our empirical results suggest a positive association between the level of government support and waste pickers sustainable performance consequently further positive government intervention particularly in supporting a stronger structural organization for the waste picker recycling system is advocated as the primary policy recommendation of this paper