some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

real exchange rate volatility and economic openness theory and evidence this paper relates the volatility of the trade weighted effective real exchange rate to the degree of trade openness of an economy the theoretical part presents an intertemporal monetary model of a small open economy with nominal rigidities both monetary and aggregate supply shocks are shown to produce ceteris paribus smaller real exchange rate movements if the country is more open to foreign trade empirical evidence on a cross section of forty eight countries confirms this relationship differences in trade openness explain a large part of the cross country variation in the volatility of the effective real exchange rate

product differentiation in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly abstract in a bertrand edgeworth model with homogeneous goods an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist non existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not solely due to the homogeneous goods assumption in this paper i consider a bertrand edgeworth model with product differentiation and i parametrize when an equilibrium exists journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d4 l1

international evidence on the demand for money one of the current questions in the literature on the demand for money is whethe r the adjustment of actual to desired money holdings is in nominal or real terms this paper describes a simple procedure that can be used to test the nominal against the real hypothesis the test is carried out for twenty seven countries the paper also tests the structural stability of the demand for money equations and the correctness of th e dynamic specification the results are strongly in favor of the nom inal adjustment hypothesis there is however some evidence of moder ate structural instability before and after 1973 the instability doe s not affect the conclusion that the nominal adjustment hypothesis do minates the real adjustment hypothesis copyright 1987 by mit press

oligopoly game price makers meet price takers abstract the paper studies an oligopoly game where firms can choose between price taking and price making strategies on a mixed market price takers are always better off than price makers though the profits of both types decline in the number of price takers we investigate and confront two possibilities of firms decisions about their types forward looking equilibrium reasoning and backward looking individual learning we find that the cournot outcome is the only equilibrium prediction and it is learnable if firms are sufficiently sensitive to profit differences however with a larger number of firms a unilateral deviation from cournot behavior becomes profitable under learning this incentive creates a space for permanent oscillations over different markets with a positive but low number of price takers

an experimental examination of competitor based price matching guarantees we use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies our findings establish that when costs are symmetric price matching guarantees significantly increase market prices in markets with cost asymmetries guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference lesser use of guarantees combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior

on the complexity of strategy switching dynamics abstract a new approach has been proposed to analyze the strategy switching dynamics in a discrete model or a non cooperative game with the following characteristics i the agents are motivated by absolute payoffs rather than relative ones ii the payoffs vary as the composition of the population changes iii the agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they can only predict the outcomes of their own actions rich dynamic phenomena are exhibited for such discrete dynamic models or games the approach is then applied to explore the relative profitability of price taking behavior in a quantity competing heterogeneous oligopoly

a note comparing the capacity setting performance of the kreps scheinkman duopoly model with the cournot duopoly model in a laboratory setting abstract the paper reports the results of 39 laboratory duopoly markets for which pricing institution and participant experience are treatments cournot c duopolies quantity precommitment and a price determined to clear the market are contrasted with kreps scheinkman ks duopolies quantity precommitment and posted prices inexperienced participants in ks markets have much more difficulty selecting capacities consistent with the theoretical predictions than do those in c markets with experience the differences disappear

strategy subsets closed under rational behavior a set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior curb of it contains all its best replies each curb set contains the support of at least one nash equilibrium in mixed

international evidence on tradables and nontradables inflation abstract using 1970 1985 sectoral data for the oecd we find that inflation in nontradable goods exceeds inflation in tradables we identify a demand shift towards nontradables and faster growth of total factor productivity in the tradable goods sector as the prime causes of the differential inflation in addition disinflation attempts and the exchange rate regime appear to have exerted significant influence on the relative inflation rate

quantity precommitment in an experimental oligopoly market abstract the paper describes an experiment designed to test if the equilibrium in a market characterized by capacity precommitment followed by price competition as in the kreps and scheinkman model conforms with the outcome predicted by that model which is that capacities coincide with cournot output levels sessions were run with capacity precommitment in inexperienced and experienced triopoly markets the conclusion is that with inexperienced subjects capacity choices are more rivalistic than the model suggests but in line with those of the cournot experiments by fouraker and siegel with experienced subjects capacities are quite close to the prediction of the kreps and scheinkman model

competitive depreciation and the role of distorting taxes in an interdependent economy abstract this paper investigates the manners in which international cooperation in monetary policies affects the rate of inflation in a two country sticky price model within reasonable parameter values international monetary coordination increases the steady state inflation for given tax policies when the tax regime is endogenously chosen however self oriented monetary policies can engage in competitive depreciation and induce a higher average inflation than the first best inflation rate

on the incidence and variety of low price guarantees abstract this paper provides evidence of the incidence and variety of low price guarantees promises to match or beat a rival s price using data obtained from newspaper advertisements in 37 metropolitan areas in the united states we have a total of 515 low price guarantees in our sample we document their features and we infer firms motives and effects from these features the evidence suggests that the majority of low price guarantees are not consistent with their use as a facilitating device because they tend to apply only to rival firms advertised prices or they are associated with high hassle costs the evidence also suggests that price beating and price matching guarantees differ significantly in their features the former are associated with higher hassle costs apply disproportionately to rival firms advertised prices and are more likely to allow postsale search than are price matching guarantees

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

the new open economy macroeconomics of government debt in this paper we introduce an overlapping generations structure of the blanchard type in a new open economy macroeconomics model this allows us to study a wider range ofscal shocks compared to the traditional mundell fleming and to the baseline redux models one important policy implication of our model is that the tax cut imple mented in the us in 2001 might have contributed to the appreciation of the dollar vis a vis the euro in contrast the imposition ofscal constraint such as the golden rule proposed by the uk government can have opposite exchange rate e ects

does globalisation discipline monetary policymakers abstract this paper analyses globalisation using a small general equilibrium model it concludes that whether increased openness a reduction in the costs of international trade helps to discipline monetary policy in large open economies depends on the type of trade costs moreover to the extent that globalisation induces stronger competition in the goods market this may also have an adverse effect on monetary policy discipline the latter is due to international expenditure switching which becomes a more forceful channel as competition intensifies thus the answer to the question in the title is not necessarily affirmative

useful government spending direct crowding out and fiscal policy interdependence this paper introduces perfect substitutability between private and public consumption in a dynamic open economy with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this implies a direct crowding out effect that generalising to the two country case some well known properties of a closed economy tends to reduce consumption following both domestic and foreign expansions a less expected result is that sub stitutability has a positive effect on the short run output spillover we also show that if we modify the model to allow for home bias in government spending temporary fiscal expansions display a quasi neutrality property

advance production and cournot outcomes an experimental investigation abstract an experiment designed to assess the effects of advance production decisions on posted offer market performance is reported six of the twelve triopolies were conducted under standard posted offer rules in the remaining markets sellers made binding production commitments prior to posting prices an alteration that shifts the unique stage game nash equilibrium from the competitive to the cournot outcome as predicted advance production decisions raised prices and lowered output nevertheless stable cournot outcomes were never observed

output decisions and price matching theory and experiment we study the effects of price matching in a setting in which each firm selects both its price and output simultaneously we show that the availability of a price matching option leads to the cournot outcome in this setting our experimental study confirms this result in the laboratory our finding is a stark contrast to the one obtained in the standard price competition that the most likely market price in the presence of a price matching option is the monopolistic price in addition we show that price matching benefits consumers in markets with a large number of firms if a market has a few firms then the effects of price matching on consumers depend on the market demand and cost functions thus our study suggests that the effect of price matching depends on the strategic variables of the firms data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2788 this paper was accepted by eric anderson marketing

monopolistic competition relative prices and output adjustment in the open economy abstract this paper explains price and output dynamics in an open economy characterized by a monopolistic competitive market structure in which pricing decisions incur costs this leads producers to pre set the price path for several periods the paper derives an optimal pricing rule including the optimal pre setting horizon it does so for a rational expectation equilibrium characterized by staggered unsynchronized price setting for which the degree of staggering is endogenously determined

automated pricing rules in electronic posted offer markets i introduction electronic commerce affords the opportunity to automate the process by which buyers and sellers engage in an exchange at a mutually agreeable price for example buyers on the internet can use software agents to automate the gathering of information on price and other product attributes in online retail markets that are traditionally organized as posted offer markets 1 this technology obviously reduces the consumer transaction costs of comparing prices which presumably would induce stronger competition among sellers however as hal varian remarked in the e commerce magazine wired everybody thinks more information is better for consumers that s not necessarily true bayers 2000 215 the same technology that reduces consumer transaction costs can be employed by sellers to automate the monitoring of rivals prices which might mitigate or even overwhelm the procompetitive effect of reduced consumer search costs in addition electronic markets grant more than just ideal information on competitors pr ices with electronic commerce a seller can commit to implementing an automated algorithm that could possibly sustain tacitly collusive prices in this article we study the supply side effects of three automated pricing algorithms that use price information as an input that could be retrieved from consumer price gathering technology in an electronic market two of the three algorithms that we study have the theoretical potential to facilitate collusion low price matching and a trigger strategy the third and presumably more competitive algorithm which we refer to as undercutting is drawn from the common retail practice of beating competitors prices using the experimental method this article explores how sellers deploy these three automated pricing algorithms in electronic markets more specifically we ask 1 do sellers prefer to set their price manually or to adopt automated algorithms that adjust price more frequently 2 are markets with automated pricing algorithms more competitive or less competitive than markets with manually posted prices 3 does increased commitment to an automated pricing mechanism facilitate tacit collusion to study the impact of automated pricing on seller behavior we base our work on the model of price dispersion in retail markets by varian 1980 thus our article also explores how well a theory of mixed strategy pricing organizes the behavior of sellers in a market with a nearly continuous stream of differentially informed fully revealing customers 2 as a preview of the results we find that 1 sellers employ automated pricing algorithms more often than they manually set their own price 2a automated undercutting leads to prices similar to the game theoretic prediction 2b automated low price matching generates prices significantly higher than the game theoretic prediction 2c automated trigger pricing results in market prices below the game theoretic prediction and 3 greater commitment to automated low price matching shifts prices closer to the joint profit maximizing outcome the structure of the article is as follows section ii presents the three automated pricing algorithms we consider the experimental design and procedures are in section iii section iv presents and discusses our results and section v briefly concludes ii automated pricing algorithms the market environment is motivated by the model of sales in varian 1980 3 in this model there are n sellers that supply buyers who each desire to purchase at most one unit of a homogeneous product each seller has a commonly known constant marginal cost c of supplying a unit to a buyer and posts a price p which the buyer can accept or reject the private value v for each nonstrategic buyer is assumed to be a random variable drawn independently from a known uniform distribution with a support v v buyers differ based on the number of firms from which price quotes are received prior to making a purchasing decision

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

the macroeconomic effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy does the exchange rate regime matter abstract this paper develops a small open economy model in the spirit of obstfeld and rogoff 1995 the introduction of endogenous traded sector output unlocks current account and real exchange rate effects within this framework where specific consideration is given to the case with fixed but adjustable parities exchange rate devaluation generates similar qualitative effects as a money supply expansion under floating rates output and external effects of government spending shocks are broadly consistent with the adjusted basic non micro founded mundell and fleming mf framework but differ in significant ways from the baseline mf model contrary to the textbook mf model a government expenditure shock depreciates the nominal exchange rate and generates real effects under the fixed rate system

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

fiscal consolidation under fixed exchange rates abstract we present the fixed exchange rate version of the obstfeld and rogoff model and analyze the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks the welfare effects of an unanticipated contraction in government expenditure in the home country are shown to depend crucially on the way in which world money stock is set if home authorities alone are responsible for pegging the exchange rate a fiscal adjustment leads to a decrease in the real interest rate stimulates private consumption and limits the contraction in world output compared with a situation in which a cooperative scheme is implemented the model is then used to propose a new interpretation of recent events in the eu countries that have enacted restrictive fiscal policies while pegging their currencies to the dm

advance production inventories and market power an experimental investigation i introduction bertrand edgeworth games are an important part of any industrial organization economist s toolkit the unilateral market power created by capacity constraints represents one of economists primary methods for modeling supra competitive prices as a static equilibrium outcome in a price setting game 1 the standard bertrand edgeworth model however rather restrictively assumes that production is to demand and that goods are immediately perishable in the broad swath of modern economies that includes the production and sale of physical products these assumptions are often not even approximately satisfied goods are routinely produced prior to being offered for sale at retail establishments similarly while the effective shelf life of many products is quite short relatively few products perish immediately and many have effective shelf lives that extend throughout a sales season if not longer this paper reports a laboratory experiment conducted to assess the effects of having sellers make production decisions in advance rather than to demand and allowing sellers to carry unsold units across periods on market power in a bertrand edgeworth pricing game by way of preview we find that both advance production and an inventory option prominently affect market outcomes advance production reduces profits relative to a baseline condition while an inventory option reduces both prices and profits these results are important as they suggest that deviations from the standard oligopoly structures that routinely arise in natural contexts may fundamentally affect market performance we organize the paper as follows following a brief review of the pertinent literature in section ii we outline equilibrium predictions for baseline advance production and inventory treatments in section iii section iv describes the experimental design and procedures and section v presents the experimental results the paper concludes with a short section vi ii background a theoretical literature economists have long recognized the restrictiveness of the standard price setting oligopoly models shubik 1955 for example argues that when evaluating price setting duopolies economists should consider price quantity games where sellers simultaneously post prices and quantities in addition to games where price is the only decision variable 2 levitan and shubik 1978 compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for a duopoly given advance production and unlimited capacities more recently tasnadi 2004 analyzes the case of advance production for capacity constrained duopolists pertinent to the present investigation tasnadi shows that under very general conditions advance production raises prices but leaves seller profits unaffected the only theoretical work that analyzes the links between product durability and market prices of which we are aware is a stream of literature following coase 1972 regarding the effects of product durability on monopoly power specifically given sufficiently patient consumers the coase conjecture suggests that infinite durability will eliminate monopoly power analytical results are driven by consumers who drive prices down by waiting for future discounts 3 to the best of our knowledge no one has analyzed the effects of product durability on production and pricing incentives for capacity constrained price setting duopolists b experimental literature the relevant experimental literature consists of three strands a first strand consists of a series of papers establishing that laboratory sellers recognize and exercise the unilateral market power induced by capacity constraints pertinent seminal references are davis and holt 1994 and kruse et al 1994 while some relevant related papers include davis holt and villamil 2002 davis and wilson 2000 and wilson 1998 a second strand of the experimental literature studies the effects of advance production on posted price markets

a positive approach to non cooperative games abstract population steady states are defined for non cooperative games played repeatedly by individuals drawn from large populations these steady states balance the tendencies of immigration to an emigration from strategies according to certain simple measures of their relative performances approximate values for these steady states are computed for some examples and appear intuitively more plausible as descriptors of play than do nash equilibria

effective price matching a comment abstract corts economic lett 47 1995 417 showed that when allowing for price beating policies in addition to price matching policies the competitive outcome prevails in lieu of monopoly pricing i show by expanding the strategy set further to include effective price strategies the possibility of monopoly pricing is restored

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

experimental duopolies under price guarantees in a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of price guarantees pgs to raise prices above the competitive levels different types of pgs aggressive and soft price beating and price matching are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy our results show that pgs may lead close to the collusive outcome depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the aggressive price beating type

social stability and equilibrium in the field of noncooperative game theory nash equilibrium nash 1951 has played a central role as a solution concept in bold strokes one may discern two major interpretations of nash equilibrium in the context of rational players the first which is close to the eductive interpretation of binmore 1987 1988 and the complete information interpretation of kaneko 1987 assumes that the game is played exactly once if it is a repeated game the repetition occurs once and the players have sufficient knowledge and ability to analyze the game in a rational manner sometimes it is assumed that all players have consistent hierarchies of beliefs where the game and their priors are common knowledge bayesian interpretation such as proposed by aumann 1987 advanced this idea to the level that the players have a common prior from this point of view however nash equilibrium seems far from being satisfactory

income velocity of money in agricultural developing economies t he response of income velocity of money to economic growth has implications for monetary planning in a developing economy velocity is the ratio of nominal income to money stock and decreases only if money stock rises at a faster rate than nominal income a well known hypothesis in this context is that of friedman 1959 which states that in countries experiencing a secular rise in real income per capita the stock of money generally rises over long periods at a decidedly higher rate than does money income i e velocity declines ezekiel and adekunle 1969 and melitz and correa 1970 in their international crosscountry comparisons have found evidence largely in favour of the friedman hypothesis this in its turn has strengthened the hope for active growthoriented monetary planning the extent of resources that can be transferred for investment purposes through non inflationary monetary expansion increases as development proceeds cross section studies involving developed and developing economies do not provide satisfactory indications of what happens to velocity over time in any individual developing economy firstly velocities have not behaved uniformly in all the developing economies secondly international cross country comparisons do not adequately explain why velocity changes in any individual economy is it because money is a luxury good i e income elasticity of demand for money is greater than unity to the agents in the economy is it because economic development brings about structural changes in the economy which lead to the observed behaviour of velocity is it because monetary habits change in a systematic way it is important to have time series analyses of developing economies to provide answers to such questions for example in a study of malaysia and singapore short 1973 found that though velocity did move inversely to per capita income this negative impact was overpowered by the change in monetary habits which the increase in bank offices caused the aim of this paper is to analyse the temporal behaviour of income velocity of money in agricultural developing economies in the literature on velocity and demand for money in developing economies attention is focussed mainly on three issues i the incomeelasticity of demand for money and in particular whether money is a luxury good or not ii the growth of monetisation and changes in monetary habits and iii the effect of the cost of holding money one important factor which has suffered total neglect is the role of sectoral differences in money demand behaviour and the structural shifts in the sectoral composition of income that accompany development money demand behaviour may vary across sectors this is true not only in developing economies but also in developed economies for example goldfeld 1976 has found that the business sector and the household sector in the united states have different money demand functions an implicit specification error is committed in the aggregative money demand or velocity equation whenever the sectoral income composition factor is omitted on a priori grounds this factor should have special significance in developing economies where sectoral shares in national income change over time in the absence of flow offunds accounts and adequate data on sectoral money holdings for most of the developing economies direct estimation of sectoral demand functions is not possible thus an aggregative specification which incorporates the sectoral income composition factor is necessary to analyse the behaviour of velocity

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

different selling strategies in bertrand oligopoly abstract i analyse a bertrand oligopoly game where firms can choose between selling strategies i price announcements ii price announcements and offers to price match i establish the set of nash equilibria and show that only the monopoly price nash equilibrium satisfies iterative dominance

the importance of composition of fiscal policy evidence from different exchange rate regimes abstract we study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in an open economy we emphasize two transmission mechanisms the cost channel by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage firms must pay and the exchange rate channel by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by fiscal policy have real effects if some prices and wages are sticky the latter channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have different effects under flexible than under fixed exchange rates in a 1964 93 panel of oecd countries we find significant evidence for both channels moreover we find that the real product wage and profitability are more responsive than quantities employment and output to fiscal policy innovations

on the robustness of the argument that price matching is anti competitive abstract the existing literature suggests that price matching leads to monopoly prices i show that this argument relies on an arbitrary and unrealistic restriction of the firms strategies in particular if firms may adopt price beating policies the competitive outcome prevails

on the flexibility of monetary policy the case of the optimal inflation tax this paper examines optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a context in which policy makers are able to make credible policy commitments we study an optimal taxation problem of minimizing the social cost of financing a stochastic and exogenous level of government transfers since in the basic model the welfare costs of inflation derive only from expected inflation the optimal monetary policy is highly responsive to the state of nature in a benchmark case in which all shocks are transitory the optimal policy calls for loading all the variability of government transfers on the shoulders of the inflation tax

market size and substitutability in imperfect competition a bertrand edgeworth chamberlin model competition is often associated with the idea that there are many traders in the market or that each price maker is small as compared to the market this paper introduces this notion of market size in a model of price competition with imperfect substitutes by constructing a model which creates a bridge between the chamberlin and bertrand edge worth lines of work on price competition we investigate the role of two fundamental parameters in the existence of an equilibrium the market size given by the number n of competitors and the degree of substitutability we prove that a for a given number of n 2 of competitors a sufficiently large but finite degree of substitutability entails nonexistence this thus generalizes the bertrand edgeworth nonexistence result which applies only to perfect substitutes b conversely for a given upper bound on the degree of substitutability a sufficiently large number of competitors ensures existence which thus introduces a significant role for market size in models of imperfect competition we finally investigate the proximity of an equilibrium when it exists to a competitive outcome and we find that both high substitutability and large market size are a condition for competitiveness

traded goods competitiveness and aggregate fluctuations in the united kingdom this paper presents an investigation of the relations between wage adjustment competitiveness and aggregate fluctuations in the united kingdom it uses a real business cycle model based on the distinction between internationally traded and nontraded goods the traded goods sector is assumed a price taker and the focus is on the supply side the model can account quite well for fluctuations in competitiveness output wages and the terms of trade the results suggest output flexibility and wage price rigidity a combination that produces interesting patterns of macroeconomic adjustment which parallel the predictions of more traditional keynesian models copyright 1990 by royal economic society

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a naive but optimal route to walrasian behavior in oligopolies a paradoxical phenomenon where irrationality or ignorance lead to higher profits is shown to prevail in an oligopolistic market where three firms produce a homogeneous product with identical technologies under the conventional assumption on the convexity of cost function the profit made by a naive price taker will always be higher than or at least as much as the other two rivals no matter what kind of strategies the latter may take and whether they form a coalition or not by sticking to the price taking strategy a firm always gains a positive profit improvement should any one of its rivals try to upgrade from price taker to the cournotor with these incentives a firm prefers to remain as a naive price taker

excess capacity monopolistic competition and international transmission of monetary disturbances analyzes the excess capacity monopolistic competition and international transmission of monetary policy disturbances in the united states sheds light on the international impact of monetary policy emphasis on the spillover effects of monetary disturbances similarity of framework used with open economy macroeconomics

real exchange rates and macroeconomics evidence and theory since the early 1980s a large body of research has thrown doubt on the relevance of macroeconomic models for understanding exchange rates the authors argue that a balanced reading of recent literature in exchange rate economics gives a more optimistic assessment many studies have established the pertinence of long run purchasing power parity ppp and the explanatory power of macroeconomic fundamentals in real exchange rate fluctuations a reasonably strong case can be made for a traditional macroeocnomic interpretation of real exchange rates which emphasizes short run price stickiness but long run ppp but a central new ingredient in this interpretation is the presence of international commodity market segmentation and persistent deviations from the law of one price an example is given of a dynamic general equilibrium model that can reproduce some of the observed features of real exchange rate fluctuations

the long run benefits of chaos to oligopolistic firms abstract conventional economic beliefs that equilibrium is better than disequilibrium and stability is better than fluctuation are challenged with a heterogeneous oligopolistic model that consists of a naive firm and a group of sophisticated firms the naive firm is assumed to adopt a simple cobweb strategy while the sophisticate firms who command all market information form a collusion and best respond the naive firm s current action when the market equilibrium is unstable the naive firm is able to turn an explosively diverging market into a bounded but chaotic one by adopting simultaneously a cautious adjustment strategy that is limiting the growth rate of output there exists an upper bound such that as long as the growth rate does not exceed this bound the average profits made by all oligopolistic firms are higher than their respective equilibrium profits moreover the average economic surplus can also be higher than the equilibrium surplus in this sense chaos is beneficial not only to all oligopolistic firms but also to the economy as a whole

staggered wages and output dynamics under disinflation we study the output costs of a reduction in monetary growth in a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wages the money wage is fixed for two periods and is chosen according to intertemporal optimisation agents have labour market monopoly power we show that the introduction of microfoundations helps to resolve the puzzle raised by directly postulated models namely that disinflation in staggered pricing models causes a boom in our model disinflation whether unanticipated or anticipated unambiguously causes a slump

inflation in open economies abstract this paper relates the time consistent inflation rate to the degree of trade openness of an economy the mechanism linking the welfare effects of monetary surprises and hence the incentives to inflate to openness does not rely on a large country terms of trade effect but rather is due to imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the non traded sector the empirical evidence supports the main predictions of the model 1997 elsevier science b v

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

the markup and inflation evidence in oecd countries in this paper we evaluate the dynamic inconsistency argument put forth by kydland and prescott 1977 and barro and gordon 1983 as an explanation for differences in the average inflation experience across oecd countries the focus is on the empirical evidence relating the overall degree of competition among firms as measured by the markup of price over marginal cost and inflation over the 1973 88 period the prediction is that higher markups raise the monetary authority s incentive to increase output leading to higher equilibrium rates of inflation we find that the markup does well in explaining cross country differences in average inflation jel classification e31 e58 d43 l ecart du prix par rapport au cout marginal et l inflation resultats pour les pays de l ocde ce memoire examine l argument mis de l avant par kydland et prescott 1977 et barro et gordon 1983 pour expliquer les differences dans le taux moyen d inflation entre les pays de l ocde on porte une attention speciale aux resultats empiriques qui relient le degre general de concurrence entre les entreprises mesure par l ecart du prix par rapport au cout marginal et le niveau d inflation entre 1973 et 1988 la prediction est que des ecarts prix cout marginal plus eleves augmentent l incitation des autorites monetaires a accroitre le niveau de production ce qui entraine des taux d inflation d equilibre plus eleves il s avere que l ecart du prix par rapport au cout marginal tend a expliquer bien les differences dans le niveau moyen d inflation entre pays

melioration learning in games with constant and frequency dependent pay offs abstract the paper explores the implications of melioration learning an empirically significant variant of reinforcement learning for game theory we show that in games with invariable pay offs melioration learning converges to nash equilibria in a way similar to the replicator dynamics since melioration learning is known to deviate from optimizing behavior when an action s rewards decrease with increasing relative frequency of that action we also investigate an example of a game with frequency dependent pay offs interactive melioration learning is then still appropriately described by the replicator dynamics but it indeed deviates from rational choice behavior in such a game