unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

the role of agriculture and its prerequisites in economic development a vision for foreign development assistance abstract the aim of this paper is to establish a vision for foreign development assistance based upon the evolution of thought and empirical evidence found in the development literature the paper spotlights the agricultural led approach the empirical record shows that agricultural growth had a more pronounced impact on increases in developing country income than did growth in the nonagricultural sector the reason for the differential impact is that developing countries focusing on agricultural development experienced more broad based income growth and increases in the demand for domestically produced goods whereas the developing countries promoting rapid industrialization experienced narrow based income growth with a demand pattern oriented toward nonfood and capital intensive products a precondition for agriculture to play its proper role is the existence of a conducive environment in which private enterprise can flourish developing country governments need to assume responsibility for the creation and maintenance of essential institutions government investments are required in education infrastructure and other areas where the commercial market is not capable of delivering critical services finally governments must responsibly manage the macroeconomy pursuing sustainable pricing policies and fiscal and monetary policies that are consistent with real equilibrium exchange rates

does agricultural growth in poor countries harm agricultural exporting rich countries abstract the commonly held view that agricultural exporting developed countries would lose from agricultural growth in less developed countries lcds is shown to be based on an incomplete argument it considers only the effects on ldc agricultural supply or at best only that and the first round effects of increased farmer incomes on the demand for tradables what also needs to be considered is the effect on the demand for nontradables and hence the second round effects of increased spending by producers of nontradables when all these effects are considered the positive correlations obtained between agricultural output growth in ldcs and agricultural imports from developed countries is not surprising it is then shown that selling or giving away agricultural research and management skills to developing countries can be beneficial to developed countries including agricultural exporters by setting out to do good they may end up also doing well

regulatory attitudes and environmental innovation in a model combining internal and external r d the extent to which environmental regulatory institutions are either green or brown impacts not just the intensity of regulation at any moment but also the incentives for the development of new pollution control technologies we set up a strategic model of r d in which a polluter can deploy technologies developed in house or license technologies developed by specialist outsiders an eco industry polluters exert r d effort and may even develop redundant technologies to improve the terms on which they procure technology from outside we find that while regulatory bias has an ambiguous impact on the best available technology strategic delegation to systematically biased regulators can improve social welfare

bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator abstract we present a model of environmental regulation in which the stringency of a firm s emissions standard is determined by cooperative bargaining between the firm and a regulator we show that bargaining can be socially beneficial because it can achieve the first best outcome this outcome is never an equilibrium of the noncooperative stackelberg game we also show that the social cost function is not the preferred objective function for a regulator when regulations are determined by bargaining social costs are lower with a regulator that attaches more importance to damages and enforcement costs than to the firm s compliance costs

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

optimal tariffs and the choice of technology discriminatory tariffs vs the most favored nation clause abstract we compare the effects of optimal tariffs on the technology choice of exporters under the discriminatory tariffs regime and the most favored nation mfn clause it is shown that a lower marginal cost mc technology will be chosen in equilibrium under the mfn clause as a result the importing country s long run welfare increases with the adoption of mfn while in most cases the exporting countries welfare decreases however ex post technology choice the importing country prefers discriminatory tariffs this result therefore highlights the role of mfn as a commitment mechanism to resolve a time inconsistency problem facing the importing country

pollution taxes when firms choose technologies we consider the properties of a pollution tax when the regulated firm has a discrete choice of technologies with which to reduce pollution the firm s technology choice makes possible two sequences of play the traditional one in which the regulator moves first committing to a tax rate before the firm adopts a technology and an alternative one in which the firm moves first by adopting a technology we find that a range of pollution levels including possibly the first best one are unattainable when the regulator moves first the regulator may be better able to achieve the first best outcome when the firm moves first

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

information and the hold up problem we examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input we study how the resulting hold up problem is affected by the seller s information about the investing party s likely returns from its investment our principal focus is on the effects of the investment s being observable by the non investing party contrary to popular intuition we find that an improvement in the seller s information e g the investment s being observable rather than not can benefit the buyer and harm the seller we also find that other popular intuitions about this problem are either false incomplete or require strong assumptions to be valid

ideas for rent an overview of markets for technology this article surveys some of the recent literature on technology markets and summarizes its main issues and insights we structure our analysis in three parts the supply and demand of technology the factors that condition the formation and growth of technology markets industry structure and dynamic issues in addition we summarize some of the studies that have tried to document the size and growth of these markets we find that the literature has focused mainly on the supply of technology but several other aspects of these markets remain under studied including the demand for external technology the role of uncertainty in technology markets and the dynamic interaction between industry structure and the market for technology understanding these will illuminate whether markets for technology will continue to grow or remained confined to pockets of the economy copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

reexamining the effect of the most favored nation provision in input prices on r and d incentives abstract we examine the effect of the most favored nation provision in input prices on downstream firms r and d incentives contrary to the previous literature we show that the effect depends on the extent of substitutability between downstream firms if they compete in two part tariffs when a downstream firm lowers its marginal cost it entails two conflicting effects on the upstream firm s pricing for inputs the standard elasticity effect of penalizing the low cost firm and the market share effect of rewarding it if substitutability between downstream products is high enough the latter dominates the former and thus downstream firms will choose a higher marginal cost technology under the mfn provision

dynamic incentives of environmental regulations the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion abstract we develop a framework for comparing empirically the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments on the diffusion of new technology market based and command and control approaches can he quantitatively compared by estimating the economic penalty that firms through their actions reveal to be associated with violation of standards in the context of concerns about global climate change we empirically examine the likely effects of pigouvian taxes technology adoption subsidies and technology standards we employ state level data on the diffusion of thermal insulation in new home construction comparing the effects of energy prices insulation cost and building codes

information design in the holdup problem we analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good the seller after observing the buyer s distribution but not the realized valuation makes a take it or leave it offer if distributions are costless the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1 e in the unique equilibrium outcome the buyer s equilibrium distribution generates a unit elastic demand and trade is ex post efficient these properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution

third world development food employment and growth interactions over the next few decades an unprecedented number of people and proportion of the world s population will reside in countries passing through a development phase in which domestic demand for food grows at a high rate relative to domestic production of food that phase is described by high per capita income growth rates in a context of low base incomes and rapid population growth in this phase the innate difficulty for food production growth rates to keep pace with demand growth is enhanced by the still immature system for shifting agricultural supply schedules which is characteristic of this relatively early stage of economic growth a substantial proportion of the population now experiencing accelerating economic growth falls in countries which derive a major portion of income from exports of oil but increasingly the source is greater resource productivity through economic development and technological change the latter is the result of the past few decades of concentrated effort to lay the institutional and physical infrastructure of a modern economic system rising real food prices caused by greatly accelerated growth in demand for food will tend to restrain growth in developing countries and increase relative and absolute poverty the extent of real price increase for food will be substantially determined by the rate of technological change and supply elasticity in developed countries this is because in the eveloping countries says law tends to operate in the market for food and so accelerated growth in food production tends to create a roughly commensurate or even greater increase in demand for food in this context it becomes economic for developing countries to place a greater emphasis on agricultural production in their development strategies than was justified in earlier decades success in such an effort will diffuse the benefits of growth more widely than alternative strategies and will even accelerate growth if as has often been the case previous emphasis on agriculture was suboptimal for the earlier conditions thus over the next decade the economic pressures on the food front may well have a salutary effect on the pace and pattern of development

incomplete contracts the hold up problem and asymmetric information abstract given symmetric information in a standard hold up problem a buyer s investment incentives are always increasing in his bargaining power while this result is robust under one sided private information it can be overturned under two sided private information

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

the effect of within sector upstream and downstream energy taxes on innovation and productivity the aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of environmental regulatory stringency on innovation and productivity using a panel of 8 european countries for 13 manufacturing sectors over the years 2001 2007 this research topic falls under the heading of the porter hypothesis ph of which different versions have been tested we consider both the strong and the weak versions of the ph while also adding some peculiar features to the analysis firstly we assess the role played by environmental taxes that is an instrument rarely tested as a factor which can support the ph secondly we analyse not only the effect of environmental taxes within a given sector within sector but also the role played by environmental taxes in upstream and downstream sectors in terms of input output relationships thirdly we test these relationships also indirectly by verifying whether innovation is one of the channels through which higher sectoral productivity can be achieved by imposing tighter environmental regulations our main findings suggest that downstream stringency is the most relevant driver of innovation and productivity while within sector regulations only affect productivity but not innovation moreover the effect of regulations on productivity is mostly direct while the part of the effect mediated by induced innovations as measured by patents is relevant only for what concerns downstream regulations

the contribution of agriculture to economic growth some empirical evidence the paper analyzes the contribution of agriculture to economic growth by employing cross section data for the developing and developed countries during 1960 1970 and 1970 1979 it is found that in the context of mr chenery syrquin s model intercountry variation in agricultural growth explains a significant portion of intercountry variation in the industrial non agricultural growth further in the context of an aggregate production function agricultural growth is found to contribute significantly to productivity increases and thus to overall economic growth for the developing countries sample of the 1970 79 period the results show that a one percent increase in agricultural growth leads to approximately four tenths of a percentage point increase in productivity it is also found that export growth contributes positively to productivity growth while the inflation rate contributes negatively

information control in the hold up problem we study the use of information control to mitigate hold up risks we identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive we characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold up risks

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

information and bargaining in the hold up problem this article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold up problem the optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency the information rent effect and ex post efficiency the bargaining disagreement effect with one shot bargaining it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry when there is repeated bargaining it is attained with perfect asymmetry asymmetric information the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold up problem our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow

pollution controlling innovation in oligopolistic industries some comparisons between patent races and research joint ventures abstract much of the literature on pollution control innovation has focused on normative comparisons of exogenous regulatory policies in light of the incentives they induce on firms r d efforts in contrast in the positive analysis below both r d incentives and regulatory policy arise endogenously as functions of market structure and external cost differentials incentives for pollution controlling innovation are found to arise from within the industry in a patent race setting when innovation gives the race winner s a cost advantage over the other industry members this cost advantage is shown to come about when innovating firms successfully use their influence to raise their rivals costs by bringing about a policy change forcing industry members to internalize pollution externalities in contrast an industry wide research joint venture rjv has incentive to collusively prevent development of innovation unless environmental activists are sufficiently strong this latter result is illustrated by the case u s vs automobile manufacturers association where the justice department found evidence that the big three used an rjv to slow the introduction of pollution control innovation

price discrimination in input markets we analyze the short and long run implications of third degree price discrimination in input markets in contrast to the extant literature which typically assumes that the supplier is an unconstrained monopolist in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand side substitution in our model the more efficient buyer receives a discount a ban on price discrimination thus benefits smaller but hurts more efficient larger firms it also stifles incentives to invest and innovate with linear demand a ban on price discrimination benefits consumers in the short run but reduces consumer surplus in the long run which is once again the opposite of what is found without the threat of demand side substitution

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

does host market regulation induce cross border environmental innovation this paper evaluates the effect of host country environmental policy stringency on the offshoring of environmental patents for 2000 top world r d performers it is shown that a more stringent environmental regulation triggers both the extensive and intensive margin of patent offshoring in the field of environmental technologies results are robust to various different specifications alternative definitions of innovation offshoring and of regulation restrictions and to the consideration of possible endogeneity of regulation it is suggested inter alia that r d subsidies and non market based regulatory measures are more important than market based instruments as drivers of cross border environmental innovation length 26 pages

determinants of environmental innovation in us manufacturing industries abstract this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of environmental innovation we employ panel data models to study how environmental innovation by us manufacturing industries responded to changes in pollution abatement expenditures and regulatory enforcement during the period 1983 through 1992 we find that 1 environmental innovation as measured by the number of successful environmental patent applications granted to the industry responded to increases in pollution abatement expenditures however 2 increased monitoring and enforcement activities related to existing regulations did not provide any additional incentive to innovate we also find some empirical evidence that environmental innovation is more likely to occur in industries that are internationally competitive

investing in a relationship a principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining i study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment when investment returns are observable informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts as they induce higher investment ex ante the principal invests not only to generate direct returns but also to improve relational incentives unobservability of returns increases the principal s ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives the optimal information structure depends on bargaining power

price regulation in the spanish energy sectors who benefits abstract this paper analyses the distribution of benefits between firms and consumers due to the price regulation of the spanish energy sectors electricity oil fuels and gas during the decade 1987 1997 to that effect we compare the actual evolution of energy prices with alternate benchmarks in order to assess the potential existence of a pro industry or a pro consumer bias in the pricing policies followed by the regulator our results show a pro industry biased regulatory context where consumers benefitted very little from price control the successive price adjustments over time allowed the companies to keep all the productivity gains and cost reductions and to increase their profitability rates relative to those achieved in the manufacturing sector

timing and commitment of environmental policy adoption of new technology and repercussions on r d we investigate the interplay between environmental policy incentives to adoptnew technology and repercussions on r d we study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in r d and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms we consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies ex post taxation or issuing permits interim commitment to a tax rate a quota of permits after observing r d success but before adoption and finally two types of ex antecommitment before r d activity one with a unique tax rate quota of permits the other one with a menu of tax rates permit quotas we study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare in particular we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes

environmental corporate social responsibility and financial performance disentangling direct and indirect effects abstract this paper assesses the impact of environmental corporate social responsibility ecsr on corporate financial performance cfp measured by roa and tobin s q we show that the relationship between firms return on assets roa and ecsr strengths and concerns is negative and statistically significant we also show that firms tobin q and ecsr strengths and concerns are negatively correlated in a statistically significant way however accounting for the interaction between firms environmental efforts and r d yields a different perspective while the direct impact of ecsr on cfp is still negative the interaction of ecsr and r d has a positive and significant impact on it ecsr strengths and concerns harm cfp since they are perceived as a potential cost however this csr activity fosters r d efforts of firms which generates additional value indirect effect

the strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards this paper investigates the welfare consequences of strategic behavior by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face environmental regulation often attempts to force an industry to develop cleaner technology but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard this lack of regulatory commitment induces firms to choose innovation strategically it is well known that firms have incentives to suppress innovation to induce the regulator to ratchet down the standard and this strategic behavior lowers welfare this paper explores a countervailing incentive in oligopoly settings firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals costs in equilibrium the incentive to raise rivals cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment also a regulator who is unable to commit ex ante to the stringency of a regulatory standard can induce more clean technology than a regulator with a commitment mechanism

innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology abstract new evidence is presented on environmental innovation and diffusion over the 1970s and 1980s at a global level a substantial amount of innovations occurred in the united states japan and germany the share of environmental patents in all patents varied between 0 6 and 3 and as such was higher than the corresponding share of pollution abatement expenditure in gdp japanese environmental innovation rates were consistently high certain plausible connections between environmental regulation and innovation also emerge across these three countries and over time innovation responded to pollution abatement expenditure an indicator of the severity of environmental regulations environmental patenting rates in developing countries were also high reaching 2 in many years in brazil developing country innovators obtained a non trivial number of patents most of which appear geared towards adapting imported technologies to local conditions however domestic innovation was only one path to new technologies imports of disembodied environmental technologies foreign patents registered in developing countries were substantial foreign patents were typically important or generic patents evidence also suggests that such patents protected intellectual property in equipment exported developing countries especially in east asia often chose to obtain technologies embodied in pollution abatement equipment

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

environmental regulation with technology adoption learning and strategic behavior we analyze a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting firm we compare environmental policy under discretion in which policy is updated upon learning new information versus under rules in which policy is not updated when investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an efficient solution except in special cases when there is little uncertainty rules are superior to discretion because discretionary policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future regulation however when uncertainty is large discretion is superior to rules because it allows regulation to incorporate new information taxes are superior to standards under discretion regardless of the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal damages for the case of quadratic abatement costs and damages