debt and financial expectations an individual and household level analysis in this article we show that optimistic financial expectations impact positively on both the quantity of debt and the growth in debt at the individual and household levels our theoretical model shows that this association is predicted under a variety of plausible scenarios in the empirical analysis we explore the determinants of debt and of growth in debt using british data we find convincing support for our theoretical priors and show that it is optimistic financial expectations per se that are important in influencing debt rather than the accuracy of individuals predictions regarding their future financial situation jel d18 d84 d91

a spatial model of international conflict 1 he model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function international coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis the two nation model is analyzed in detail and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved the two main conclusions of the two nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise because scientific understanding arises from theories the explication of theories is essential for the development of scientific understanding to understand international conflictthat is the resolution of disputes between nations by coercion or the threat of coercion a theory that can explain such conflict is needed this paper will present a model drawn from rational choice theory specifically game theory that explains national actions in conflicts as strategic choices made in order to gain preferred resolutions of the international issues in dispute compared to existing game theory models of international conflict the model presented here provides an explicit description of how each nation s evaluation of the issues in dispute affects its desire to pursue compromise or conflict a more detailed sequence of escalation allowing for the detailed study of escalation strategies and a framework that can explain the timing and extent of third party interventions into ongoing crises

environmental regulations under simple negligence or strict liability we use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care consequently we argue that even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority likein the european union this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome we also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence

a context based procedure for assessing participatory schemes in environmental planning the efficiency of participatory schemes in environmental planning is an emerging research area and many issues are not solved yet regarding the assessment of such procedures it is essential for decision makers to identify improvement opportunities of participatory schemes we propose an original procedure to address such issue through a bargaining model from the signaling game literature which accounts for participation design as well as for agents preferences beliefs and bargaining power the model is calibrated using qualitative data from surveys in french local communities involved in municipal solid waste management model simulations are used to test for assumptions on the stakeholder dialogue and explore sensitivity of game outcomes to structural parameters we propose a set of performance indicators to identify the most effective participatory schemes in achieving convergence in stakeholder positions regarding environmental and land use planning

environmental federalism and environmental liability abstract environmental federalism considers what level of government should optimally regulate pollution this paper addresses this question for accidental pollution which government regulates through the ex post liability regimes of either negligence or strict liability we find that decentralizing the choice between these regimes does not in general induce the socially optimal outcome when firms can pay all damages all regions may choose negligence and impose an overly strict standard of due care when firms may be bankrupted by damages all regions may choose strict liability which induces too little care in addition asymmetric equilibria are possible in which some regions choose negligence others strict liability combining negligence with a pigovian tax or strict liability with a bonding requirement can align regional authorities incentives with those of a central government

multilateral negotiations a spatial analysis of the arab israeli dispute a model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated the model based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the middle east the analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the soviet union the united states jordan the palestine liberation organization and israel

tax aversion in labor supply abstract in a real effort laboratory experiment labor supply decreases more with the introduction of a tax than with a financially equivalent drop in wages this tax aversion is large in magnitude when we decompose the productivity decrease that arises from taxation we estimate that 40 is due to the lower net wage and the remaining 60 to tax aversion this tax aversion affects labor supply more on the extensive margin working less than on the intensive margin being less productive while working the aversion is equally strong whether tax revenue goes to the u s government or back to the experimenter a laboratory tax we discuss the implications of our results for the relationship between labor supply and taxation

issue linkages in international crisis bargaining students of international relations have long been concerned with questions regarding the impact of issue linkages on bargaining outcomes unfortunately the body of theory attempting to provide a systematic and rigorous analysis of issue linkages is woefully underdeveloped in this study i contribute to the development of this theory with a particular emphasis on accounting for cases in which issue linkage fails in international crisis bargaining the spatial model of crisis bargaining which is a formal model constituting a synthesis of the spatial theory of voting and traditional utility based bargaining theory is used to develop a theory of issue linkages and to address a number of points regarding linkage strategy that are found in the literature after demonstrating how linking issues can affect the outcome of an international crisis i argue that existing explanations for linkage failure are inadequate the majority of the paper is devoted to determining what characteristics of the issues involved and of the disputants determine the likelihood that a linkage attempt will be successful i conclude with a brief discussion relating these results to the literature on crisis management

risk based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans abstract by focusing on observable default risk s role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid 1990s it tests three resulting predictions first the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period second debt levels should have reacted accordingly third fewer high risk households should have been denied credit further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest and lowest risk borrowers for people obtaining loans the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid 1990s for example for a 0 01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy the corresponding interest rate increase tripled for first mortgages doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six fold for second mortgages additionally changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices particularly for secured debt borrowing increased most for the low risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall furthermore while very high risk households gained expanded access to credit the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or sometimes fell

default and punishment in general equilibrium we extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools the equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates along with the usual prices of assets and commodities by reinterpreting the variables our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates it also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets we show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model and that default in conjunction with refinement opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets the market chooses the promises default penalties and quantity constraints of actively traded assets

explaining the puzzle of cross state differences in bankruptcy rates abstract bankruptcy rates vary tremendously across states and it is not obvious why the number of candidate explanations is large relative to the number of states to overcome this problem we use zip code level data to identify the importance of demographic variables using within state variation this preserves state level degrees of freedom to identify the impact of state policy variables demographics wage garnishment restrictions and the fraction of bankruptcies filed under chapter 13 explain 70 percent of the variation in filing rates across states exemption rates size of public safety nets and payday loan regulations contribute virtually nothing to the cross state variance in filing rates our findings suggest that state bankruptcy rates reflect the relative costs of filing for formal bankruptcy versus informal default states without effective wage garnishment provisions allow easy informal default furthermore repayment plans mandated under chapter 13 bankruptcy often lead to repeated bank

credit card debt and default over the life cycle this paper solves an empirically parameterized model of life cycle consumption which allows for uncollaterized borrowing and the possibility of default the simulation results show that i social stigma and credit limit have a very large impact on default rates ii education level also has a significant effect on the probability of default namely through differences in the shape of lifetime labor income profiles and iii the response of simulated default rates to labor income shocks is determined by the nature of labor income uncertainty temporary versus permanent additionally the model generates simultaneous consumer holdings of credit card debt and liquid assets

looking behind mortgage delinquencies abstract delinquency rates for mortgages originated before and after the financial crisis are examined using a novel and large panel obtained by merging data from tax records and credit registers first we estimate the selection into the mortgage market using an exogenous index of local credit supply as exclusion restriction second controlling for selection we estimate the impact of income shocks on the delinquency rate we find that since 2008 the selection process has led to the halving of the delinquency rate conditional on the creation of a new mortgage job losses nearly double the delinquency risk estimates uncorrected for selection are severely downward biased

bankruptcy as implicit health insurance this paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law i show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out of pocket medical payments conditional on the amount of care received in turn i find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance the implicit insurance from bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision using a microsimulation model i calculate that the optimal pigovian penalties are three quarters as large as the average penalties under the affordable care act

consumer durables and risky borrowing the effects of bankruptcy protection abstract there exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across u s states this paper exploits cross state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self insurance against bad shocks to earnings the generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth the gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small a more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle in addition the optimal level of exemption is positive but low

personal bankruptcy and credit market competition we document a link between u s credit supply and rising personal bankruptcy rates we exploit the exogenous variation in market contestability brought on by banking deregulation the relaxation of entry restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s at the state level we find deregulation explains at least 10 of the rise in bankruptcy rates we also find that deregulation leads to increased lending lower loss rates on loans and higher lending productivity our findings indicate that increased competition prompted banks to adopt sophisticated credit rating technology allowing for new credit extension to existing and previously excluded households the last quarter century saw a dramatic increase in the share of u s con sumers filing for personal bankruptcy thereby seeking a discharge of their unsecured debt in 2005 this increase led to the most comprehensive change to u s bankruptcy law since 1978 while several causes for the rise in bankruptcies have been advanced and it is the subject of ongoing research two potentially significant changes occurred during this period banking deregulation the relaxation of bank entry restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s and technological change in consumer lending banking deregulation by removing barriers to entry increases credit market competition and there fore affects the supply of credit new screening technologies change the way loans are made allowing for interest rates to better reflect underlying risk and thus facilitating lending to riskier borrowers in this paper we examine whether banking deregulation and technological change played a role in the increase in consumer bankruptcy the empirical literature has mostly focused on cross sectional differences in personal bankruptcy in particular it has revolved around legal institutions as a way to answer whether consumers file due to adverse events as part of a rational financial calculation or as a consequence of unfair or deceptive lending practices usually researchers have exploited the different asset exemptions across u s states i e the amount of personal assets protected from creditors

an evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection abstract the equilibrium nonexistence problem in rothschild and stiglitz s insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised profitable competitors contracts are imitated and loss making contracts are withdrawn occasionally a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts we show that rothschild and stiglitz s candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently similar to those currently on the market

personal bankruptcy and credit supply and demand this paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit while generous state level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policy makers as benefiting less well off borrowers our results using data from the 1983 survey of consumer finances suggest that they increase the amount of credit held by high asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low asset households conditioning on observable characteristics thus bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets interest rates on automobile loans for low asset households also appear to be higher in high exemption states

a new approach to the spatial theory of electoral competition in his unidimensional model of electoral competition downs argues that voters use party ideology as an informational short cut for forecasting the policies that a party will pursue if elected parties are perceived by voters as points on an ideological axis in the davis hinich multidimensional model on the other hand the axes are real issues and the principal actors are politicians who are modeled as points in the multi issue space this paper reformulates spatial voting theory in terms of a model that connects what we call predictive dimensions with political issues that are salient during a given election campaign this model is both a synthesis and an extension of the downs and davis hinich spatial models we obtain a median voter result for one predictive dimension that is similar to the downs result but with important differences we also obtain results showing the electoral advantage of incumbency and the tendency for incremental change when there is a great deal of heterogeneity in voter perceptions about the candidates

consumer bankruptcy a fresh start consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck but by driving up interest rates makes life cycle smoothing more difficult we argue that to assess this trade off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features life cycle component idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty and expense uncertainty exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets we find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules more persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect our findings suggest the current us bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values jel d14 d91 k35

endogenous debt constraints in a life cycle model with an application to social security this paper develops a simple life cycle model that embeds a theory of debt restrictions based on the existence of inalienable property rights a la kehoe and levine 1993 debt constrained asset markets review of economic studies 60 4 865 888 2001 liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets econometrica 69 3 575 598 in our environment net debtors have the option of defaulting on unsecured debt at the cost of being subjected to wage garnishment and or having some or all of their future assets seized by creditors one advantage of our framework is that it encompasses two standard versions of the life cycle model one with perfect capital markets and one with a non negative net worth restriction we study the impact of a payroll financed social security system to illustrate the role of endogenous debt constraints and compare our results to a model with exogenous debt constraints whereas the aggregate effects are similar under both types of constraints the distributional consequences are found to be significantly different across debt regimes

an anatomy of u s personal bankruptcy under chapter 13 we build a structural model of chapter 13 bankruptcy that captures salient features of personal bankruptcy under chapter 13 we estimate our model using a novel data set we construct from bankruptcy court dockets recorded in delaware between 2001 and 2002 our estimation results highlight the importance of debtor s choice of repayment plan length on chapter 13 outcomes under the restrictions imposed by the bankruptcy law we use the estimated model to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the impact of more stringent provisions of chapter 13 that impose additional restrictions on the length of repayment plans we nd that these provisions would not

the choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper consider a firm planning a project that poses a risk of environmental spillovers such a firm might be deterred by the threat of legal liability or restrained by gatekeeper regulation if regulators would be perfect gatekeepers then negligence based liability combined with regulation is more efficient that strict liability with or without regulation however if the regulator has incomplete information then any of a variety of regimes could be the most efficient harsher regimes regulation rather than laissez faire and strict liability rather than negligence are more appropriate for larger risks the choice of a liability regime is more complicated however if regulators are biased if they are biased against projects then negligence plus regulation is less likely to be the most efficient regime if regulators are biased toward projects then it is possible that apparently soft liability regimes are more desirable when risk is high

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

the compensation regime in liability law incentives to curb environmental harm ex ante and ex post this paper analyzes private incentives for precautions against environmental harm before accidents occur and for clean up after the fact we consider the compensatory regimes used in various jurisdictions which differ in terms of the basis for compensation the level of harm clean up costs or some combination of the two and the resulting levels of compensation we establish that socially optimal decisions are usually not induced by liability law in any of the compensatory regimes however the different types and levels of compensation have distinct effects allowing the policy maker to identify the most appropriate regime for specific circumstances

unsecured debt with public insurance from bad to worse abstract in u s data income interruptions the receipt of public insurance and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related the central contribution of this paper is to evaluate bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other our analysis delivers two striking conclusions first we find that u s personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier that prevents the public insurance system from improving welfare second contrary to popular belief we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more not less bankruptcy

the determinants of attitudes towards strategic default on mortgages we use survey data to measure households propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them strategic default when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house the willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home equity shortfall our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non pecuniary factors such as views about fairness and morality we also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued

what happens when information leaves a market evidence from postbankruptcy consumers federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years the removal s effect is market efficiency in reverse the short term effect is a spurious boost in apparent creditworthiness especially for the more creditworthy bankrupts delivering a substantial increase in both credit scores and the number and aggregate limit of bank cards the longer term effect is lower scores and higher delinquency than initial full information scores predict these findings relate to both the debate over the bankruptcy code and the wisdom of influencing market clearing by removing information

evidence on the insurance effect of bankruptcy exemptions abstract defaulting on one s debts when experiencing an adverse event can help insure households against unexpected income risks but the effect of allowing default on debt levels is ambiguous not least because lenders may restrict access to credit hence the optimal punishment for bankruptcy is unclear the us states allows householders to keep a variety of assets when filing for bankruptcy the bankruptcy exemptions and these exemptions change substantially between states and over time by exploiting these differences this study shows that raising the exemptions i marginally decreases the level of unsecured debt that household s hold ii makes consumption smoother thus despite the effect on debt levels the generous provisions to debtors in arrears may be helping us households to insure themselves against income risk

an empirical analysis of personal bankruptcy and delinquency this article uses a new dataset of credit card accounts to analyze credit card delinquency personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models we estimate duration models for default and assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting default we investigate how the propensity to default has changed over time disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default rates a deterioration in the risk composition of borrowers versus an increase in borrowers willingness to default due to declines in default costs even after controlling for risk composition and economic fundamentals the propensity to default significantly increased between 1995 and 1997 standard default models missed an important time varying default factor consistent with a decline in default costs debt issued by consumers is an understudied asset class there has been particularly little academic study of recent trends in default on this debt between 1994 and 1997 the number of personal bankruptcy filings in the united states rose by about 75 the 1 35 million filings in 1997 represented well over 1 of u s households delinquency rates on credit cards rose almost as sharply federal reserve bank of cleveland 1998 the resulting losses to lenders amounted to a sizable fraction of the interest payments they collect potentially raising the average cost of credit these trends in default both in bankruptcy and delinquency are especially surprising in light of the strong economy over the period they provide an unusually rich source of variation to test the stability of models that forecast personal default and of credit risk models more generally there are two leading explanations for these trends first the risk composition of borrowers might have worsened under the risk effect less

recent developments in consumer credit and default literature consumer credit and default literature this survey discusses recent contributions to the quantitative literature on unsecured consumer debt and default and some ongoing challenges for the literature key topics include the sources of the rise in personal bankruptcies the importance of asymmetric information and the effects of developments in information technologies on consumer credit markets delinquency and informal bankruptcy debt collection and restructuring of distressed debt the cyclical behavior of consumer debt and default and the insurance role of household debt implications for welfare analysis and policy design are discussed several theoretical contributions and approaches to modeling the consumer credit markets are also highlighted

modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior inferior or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees we explicitly consider the following factors the cost of care and its efficiency in reducing the probability of an environmental accident the social cost of public funds the net profitability of the risky activities the level of damages and the regulatory capture bias we characterize in such a parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other jel classification d82 k32

ex post liability for harm vs ex ante safety regulation substitutes or complements this paper concerns the regulation of hazardous economic activities economists have generally viewed ex ante regulations safety standards pigouvian fees that regulate an activity before an accident occurs as substitutes for ex post policies exposure to tort liability for correcting extemalities this paper shows that where there is uncertainty there are inefficiencies associated with the exclusive use of negligence liability and that ex ante regulation can correct the inefficiencies in such a case it is efficient to set the safety standard below the level of precaution that would be called for if the standard were used alone jel 619

consumer bankruptcy and financial health this paper estimates the effect of chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on financial health using a new data set linking bankruptcy filings to credit bureau records our empirical strategy uses the leniency of randomly assigned judges as an instrument for chapter 13 protection we find that chapter 13 protection decreases an index measuring adverse financial events such as civil judgments and repossessions by 0 323 standard deviations and increases the probability of being a homeowner by 13 2 percentage points chapter 13 protection has little impact on open unsecured debt but decreases the amount of debt in collections by 1 333

does issue linkage work evidence from european alliance negotiations 1860 to 1945 though scholars widely claim that issue linkage the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement can help states conclude international agreements there exist some notable skeptics resolving this debate requires empirical evidence however beyond a few case studies there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement i address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the alliance treaty obligations and provisions atop database using matching techniques i find that for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945 offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement besides confirming issue linkage s ability to help clinch an agreement this article s research design and evidence have far reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances the research design illustrates the value of considering the dogs that didn t bark as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations the article s evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process

macroeconomic effects of bankruptcy and foreclosure policies i study the implications of two major debt relief policies in the united states the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act bapcpa and the home affordable refinance program harp

arm breaking consumer credit and personal bankruptcy the consumer credit transaction is analyzed as a contract which provides insurance as well as present consumption for the borrower creditors remedies such as arm breaking are shown to facilitate provision of insurance forgiveness of debts when lenders cannot monitor outcomes alternatively if outcomes are observable but lenders do not ex ante know the risk associated with each borrower the market may generate an excessive amount of arm breaking and agreements to forgo discharge following bankruptcy as low risk borrowers signal their characteristics suggesting that government limitations on such provisions might be efficient the secured credit transaction is shown to be a complex contract which attempts to provide efficient repayment seller incentives for performance and mitigation following default and insurance for the borrower garnishment and discharge of debts following bankruptcy are also considered

progressive taxation in a tournament economy abstract not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals in particular those who work under different incentives to changes in marginal tax rates we ask whether changes in tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest to examine this potential rationale for a more progressive tax code we first model the effort decisions of workers faced with progressive taxation under tournaments and piece rates because of the difficulty identifying any distortion that may be induced by the tax code in naturally occurring data we then report on the results of a real effort experiment based on this model consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance we find that competitive tournament workers are less sensitive and hint in our discussion at the possible welfare benefits of progressive taxation in tournament economies

the household bankruptcy decision personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0 3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1 35 percent in 1998 and 1999 transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event lenders lost about 39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings but economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly until very recently studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult because no household level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings in this paper we use new data from the panel study of income dynamics which includes information on bankruptcy filings to estimate a model of households bankruptcy decisions we find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher our model predicts that an increase of 1 000 in households financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings our model also predicts that if the 1997 national bankruptcy review commission s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented there would be a 16 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year but if the 100 000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the u s senate were adopted our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings we find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay finally controlling for state and time fixed effects our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates

extraction of surplus under adverse selection the case of insurance markets abstract we consider a principal agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses abilities types are characterized by two distributions f and g which are agents private information all agents have the same increasing and strictly concave utility function u under which g has a higher certainty equivalent in this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distributions under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated we prove that a first best outcome can be achieved if and only if the distribution f is not absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution g if this condition is not satisfied the first best outcome can be approximated arbitrarily close if and only if the likelihood ratio df dg is unbounded journal of economic literature classification number d82

desegregation and black dropout rates in 1954 the united states supreme court ruled that separate schools for black and white children were inherently unequal this paper studies whether the desegregation plans of the next 30 years benefited black and white students in desegregated school districts data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses suggest desegregation plans of the 1970 s reduced high school dropout rates of blacks by two to three percentage points during this decade no significant change is observed among whites the results are robust to controls for family income parental education and state and region specific trends as well as to tests for selective migration

an economic analysis of bankruptcy statutes personal bankruptcy statutes are analyzed as social insurance agreements the risk sharing and incentive effects resulting from changes in bankruptcy laws are studied it is shown that increasing the leniency of bankruptcy statutes may have unambiguous short term benefits to potential bankrupts but may be detrimental in the long run

impact of state exemption laws on small business bankruptcy decision 1 introductionsmall businesses are a primary source of employment in the u s economy employing over half of the private sector workforce small businesses are responsible for about two thirds of all net new jobs created according to the 2002 small business economic indicators sbei 1 over 99 7 of the 5 7 million firms in the united states are classified as small to medium sized businesses hence small businesses are a substantial contributor to economic growth in the united states small business owners enjoy more flexibility and freedom to capitalize on profitable opportunities than their larger business competitors hence they challenge the larger firms to be more efficient which is ultimately beneficial to consumers unfortunately small and medium sized businesses have a very low survival rate sbei 2002 in 2002 on the heels of the 2001 recession there were 550 100 small business births and 584 500 small business terminations both academics and public policy analysts have become increasingly concerned about the success of small businesses recently there has been a surge in small business research particularly surrounding small business credit supply and demand not surprisingly much of the literature has been focused on changes in lending technologies relationship2 versus scored3 information processing technologies soft versus hard 4 loan size considerations 5 and loan type considerations6 as they relate to small business supply and demand however very few have actually examined why small and medium sized businesses have very low survival rates some studies have analyzed the sensitivities of small business administration sba guaranteed loans to macroeconomic changes industry risks maturity structures 3 7 and 15 year maturities as well as lender and debt characteristics e g glennon and nigro 2001 2002 dunsky and pennington cross 2003 meanwhile agarwal chomsisengphet and liu 2003 empirically assessed the significant importance of owner and firm characteristics in determining the risk of small business default while controlling for the macroeconomic and industry risks with bankruptcy filings continuing to rise significantly in recent years many policy makers are turning their attention to bankruptcy laws specifically congress is considering reforming personal bankruptcy laws that if passed will significantly impact the demand for and supply of both consumer credit and small business funding white 2001 concludes that this bankruptcy reform could potentially reduce small business ownership but increase the supply of small business credit and in turn affect the growth of the u s economy small business owners have an incentive to file for personal bankruptcy when their indebtedness exceeds the value of their assets because both their personal and business debts can be discharged 7 though the bankruptcy exemption law is primarily designed for consumers the personal bankruptcy exemption law is a de facto bankruptcy procedure for small business owners because the debt of a noncorporate firm is the personal liability of the entrepreneur owner fan and white 2003 hence investigating the potential impact of the exemption law on small business bankruptcy decisions may provide some insight into how the bankruptcy laws should be reformed further fan and white 2003 argue that while the expected return to creditors should be lower in states with higher exemption level upon small business shutdown it is not entirely clear whether lenders will actually shut down a financially troubled small business while they empirically find that small businesses in high exemption states are more likely to be shut down this positive relationship is statistically insignificant the authors conclude that additional research will be needed to determine if a significant relationship exists p

generalized progress of abatement technology incentives under environmental liability law this paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology our analysis considers technical progress in end of pipe abatement and in the production technology used thereby generalizing the approach taken by endres et al environ resour econ 36 341 366 2007 we establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability while the performance of strict liability is not compromised furthermore it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology or both decisively determines how ex ante and ex post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability

participation in the afdc program and the stigma of welfare receipt estimation of a choice theoretic model one of the important issues in policy discussions of the present welfare system and of welfare reform alternatives concerns the degree to which low income families eligible for welfare will in fact participate in the major program in the current system aid to families with dependent children afdc participation rates have risen over time particularly in the late 1960 s but have never been 100 percent explaining such changes in participation rates is an important subject of investigation because a participation rates lead directly to caseload sizes and thus to the possibility of a welfare explosion and b the estimates of the effect of welfare program tax rates and guarantees 10 are strictly applicable only to participants and not to non participants the most likely explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon of families rejecting an increase in disposable income lies in the stigma of welfare receipt for many families consider welfare participation to be demeaning socially undesirable and or destructive of self respect and feelings of self worth however although there has been considerable discussion of the nature of stigma 13 particularly in the sociological literature 11 there is a need to establish a firm theoretical base for the phenomenon and to formally investigate its properties in this paper a model of welfare participation is developed which incorporates stigma and thus establishes such a theoretical base and estimates of the parameters of the model are obtained there are two key characteristics of the model first participation in a welfare program is introduced into the utility function under the assumption that stigma represents a distaste for welfare the desire to participate is thus formulated within a traditional consumer

strategic or nonstrategic the role of financial benefit in bankruptcy i introduction personal bankruptcy rates have increased at an annual rate of 3 9 since 1990 from about 718 thousand non business bankruptcies in 1990 to about 1 5 million in 2010 partly as a response to this increase the congress passed the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act bapcpa of 2005 the largest overhaul of bankruptcy laws since 1980 although recent data are too sparse to determine the longer term effectiveness of the law we know that there was a spike in bankruptcy filings in 2005 just before the law took effect on october 17 2005 and a corresponding decline in 2006 since then bankruptcies have continued to rise reaching a level of about 1 5 million in 2010 the same level as in 2004 the bankruptcy rate has also begun to creep up to the earlier levels one of the major purposes of the new bankruptcy law was to cut down on abusive or fraudulent uses of the bankruptcy system or in other words strategic use of the law therefore it is important to understand the motivations of consumers who file for bankruptcy what constitutes strategic use of bankruptcy law and how widespread is its incidence in the literature there is no clear definition of what constitutes a strategic bankruptcy filing we shall consider strategic behavior to be a conscious decision to benefit from bankruptcy law to make this tractable consider a simple two period model of decision making in the first period consumers receive a noisy signal of experiencing a financial shock in the second period based on this signal consumers may update their probability of an adverse shock and choose their debt level in the second period the shock is realized and consumers decide whether to file for bankruptcy or not a strategic consumer is one who in the first period chooses her debt level after conditioning on the signal that is a strategic consumer takes on debt after accounting for the chance of filing for bankruptcy in other words a strategic consumer is one who is fully rational and takes decisions to maximize her benefit a nonstrategic consumer is one who chooses debt level without conditioning on the signal he plans to repay his debt in the absence of adverse events such a consumer is myopic and may be exhibiting rational inattention as described below consistent with this view we may distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic behavior by testing whether consumers make their debt and filing decision jointly or not strategic behavior is consistent with a joint decision whereas nonstrategic behavior is not in terms of empirical strategy this is implemented by testing whether financial benefit is endogenous to the filing decision or not our test is different from the one in the study by fay hurst and white 2002 henceforth fhw in that approach a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and financial benefit from filing ceteris paribus is taken as evidence of strategic behavior and a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and adverse events such as divorce health shocks employment shocks etc is taken as evidence of nonstrategic behavior using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid fhw show that financial benefit is positively and significantly related to the filing decision and after controlling for financial benefit adverse event variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision except for a marginally significant positive effect of divorce 1 this simple empirical relationship between bankruptcy filing and financial benefit does not consider more realistic relationships among financial benefit adverse events and strategic behavior for example financial benefit from filing may go up due to adverse events regardless of whether a consumer is trying to abuse bankruptcy law or not that is financial benefit goes up when a consumer consciously increases unsecured debts before filing consistent with strategic behavior and it also goes up when she uses unsecured debt e

group characteristics evolution arising from asymmetric information in asymmetric information problems agents with less information principals or contractors usually take as given the preferences of agents with more information agents or contractees moreover the distribution of characteristics of contractees is supposed to be invariant in this article we consider a mixed framework of asymmetric information adverse selection followed by moral hazard where those two assumptions are excluded specifically the contractor only knows the current distribution of characteristics and the contractees may change them after signing the contract if this improves their welfare thus we find that the asymmetric information problem leads to a group eect changes of characteristics this feedback defines a sequence of temporary equilibria we provide conditions for the convergence of that sequence to a stationary long run equilibrium we also prove that both temporary equilibrium and long run equilibrium coincide with the equilibrium in classical models of adverse selection and the moral hazard problem vanishes in the long run

negotiation arithmetic adding and subtracting issues and parties students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues the issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain s outcome using a variety of international cases i investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation a unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the addition or subtraction of issues can yield one sided gains to the use of power can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement the effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed however unintended complexity unforeseen interrelationships organizational considerations transactions costs and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves

net wage illusion in a real effort experiment in a controlled laboratory experiment subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money while the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0 25 and 50 percent although work incentives should be the same in all treatments subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed we conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect the existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives but the perception of a tax is also important

bad eggs learning by doing and the choice of technology we model long run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects there are four possible long run equilibria in a socially planned economy high growth adopt rapidly but abandon damaging technologies once revealed ddt cfcs cautious brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes genetically modified organisms no growth halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge and collapse adopt rapidly without ever abandoning damaging technologies in the base parameterization a short sighted social planner chooses the cautious strategy a far sighted planner chooses the high growth strategy unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious strategy again dominates regulatory options in the market economy are investigated pollution taxes do not affect the firm s level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits however they do encourage the abandonment of damaging technologies liability rules do affect precaution but may lead to excessive caution or even a no growth trap

product liability and regulation establishing the appropriate institutional division of labor society has several institutional mechanisms that promote the control of product health and safety risks and compensation of the income losses that these risks generated for risks traded in the market economic forces at work foster each of these objectives social insurance programs such as worker s compensation promote the compensation objective directly and influence safety incentives through the meritrating procedure two additional institutional mechanisms which are the focus of this paper are tort liability and regulation each of these institutions has assumed a more active role in the last two decades and has been the focus of considerable academic and policy debate what is most noteworthy about these discussions is that both policymakers and economic analysts generally view each institution as the only societal response to the risk in the field of legal scholarship this narrow approach has been termed the tortcentric perspective by richard stewart 1987a b such a piecemeal approach may be necessary in some cases as an analytic convenience but it neglects potentially important interactions of the two systems in this paper i explore the nature of the institutional interactions in section i and examine the appropriate institutional design in section ii the general conclusion is that risk regulation should play a dominant role in augmenting market incentives for risk reduction and that the scope of product liability remedies should be scaled back to reflect its subsidiary role

regulating an externality generating utility environmental taxes under limited information global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas in many countries coal fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases we examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non cooperatively we show that when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime

the effects of structures and power on state bargaining strategies when and why will states adopt more or less cooperative bargaining strategies standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power other scholars highlight socialization effects i argue that in most international negotiations the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization and drive state bargaining behavior factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt i introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the european union eu the results show that structural factors best explain variation in the eu states bargaining strategies i conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining

how unsecured credit policies influence mortgage and unsecured loan defaults before the global financial crisis the proportion of households defaulting on the mortgage while remaining current on the unsecured loan was almost the same as the proportion of households current on the mortgage but defaulting on the unsecured loan after the crisis the former ratio became higher than the latter by using a heterogeneous agent model with the mortgage and the unsecured loan i examine how the order of defaults changed before and after the crisis i then analyze the impacts of unsecured credit policies on households mortgage and unsecured loan defaults my quantitative exercise shows that both default rates can decrease as the cost for unsecured loan defaults increases

redistributive taxation and personal bankruptcy in u s states abstract personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary considerably across u s states and over time our hypothesis is that both policies are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk averse agents in incomplete markets exploiting data variation over time for 18 u s states for the period 1980 2003 we find considerable support for this hypothesis redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated and both policies are associated with more equal consumption growth

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

how work effort responds to wage taxation a non linear versus a linear tax experiment abstract this is one of a series of experiments by the author testing predictions of the labor supply model that comes from the theory of single period single person utility maximization where utility is a quasi concave function of consumption and leisure and where consumption is assumed a normal good this paper studies how people adjust their work effort in response to a gross wage rate change under a non linear tax system in comparison to a linear tax system the linear tax system is chosen as the hausman equivalent of the non linear system at the starting wage rate the prediction is that work effort will be higher under the linear tax system after the gross wage rate change this experiment supports the theorem the implication is that tax flattening will yield more labor and possibly more tax revenues as wage rates rise