a one period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games we study strategies with one period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games a strategy has one period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period we show that if players are sufficiently patient given any proposal in the space of possible agreements there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted in period zero as a corollary we derive that also perpetual delay can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium our strategies are pure and have one period recall and we do not make use of a public randomization device the players discount factors are allowed to be heterogeneous we also construct a finite automata representation of our strategy profile

outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake abstract a simple bargaining model in which the cake decays over time at a positive rate is analysed in the limit the unique perfect equilibrium payoffs take the split the difference form these results generalise to three party bargaining

nutrition alternative definitions and policy implications a growing body of literature has examined the interaction between nutrient intake household income and nutritional status in ldcs and has made policy recommendations on how to improve nutrition based on empirical studies of food expenditure systems at the household level recent studies include those by d f mccarthy k n murty and r radhakrishna j strauss m m pitt and j r behrman and a b deolalikar the recommendations derived from their analysis depend critically on the definition of nutrition used in those studies in this article we suggest that the definitions used in the above studies are unsatisfactory and in section ii we propose an alternative definition this is followed by a comparison of the implications of the different definitions for the income elasticity of nutrition in section iii for nutrition standards and malnutrition in section iv and for policies designed to improve nutrition in section v we intend hereby to further elucidate the nature of the relationship between nutrition nutrient intake income and other variables discussed below the policy implications are found to differ significantly for urban and rural areas section vi is the conclusion

a folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting we introduce a dynamic non equivalent utilities dneu condition and the notion of dynamic player specific punishments for a general repeated game with unequal discounting both naturally generalizing the stationary counterparts in abreu et al 1994 we show that if the dneu condition i e no pair of players have equivalent utility functions in the repeated game is satisfied then any feasible and strictly sequentially individually rational payoff sequence allows dynamic player specific punishments using this result we prove a folk theorem for unequal discounting repeated games that satisfy the dneu condition

non cooperative bargaining of n 3 players abstract extensions to n 3 players of rubenstein s 1982 bargaining model with fixed common discount factor are considered if voting takes place simultaneously then any partition of the cake is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium outcome

reputation and dynamic stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games abstract the paper studies a repeated game in which a long run player without discounting faces another long run player with strict discounting the game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player s strategy choice she may be a rational player but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies the rational patient player s equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed in particular it is shown that the lower bound on her payoff in the set of extensive form trembling hand perfect equilibria is given by her stackelberg payoff in a dynamics sense journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

technological expectations and adoption of improved technology abstract attention is focused upon the adoption demand rather than the creation supply of new technology which improves from time to time based on the expected flow of technological progress over which the firm demander has no control it must decide either to adopt the current best available technology or to postpone adoption the distinguishing features of the model are that more than one technological innovation is anticipated and expectations about the likelihood of such innovations are revised as time passes since the last innovation our analysis shows that the firm will adopt the current best practice if its technological lag exceeds a certain threshold moreover as time passes without new technological advances it may become profitable to purchase a technology that has been available even though it was not profitable to do so in the past

the power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation in a distributive setting this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous it is found not surprisingly that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage what is surprising is the degree of this advantage we find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 for an majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members the voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process

understanding the health and nutritional status of children in ghana abstract the data set of the ghana living standards survey glss round 1 1987 1988 was utilized to analyse the principal determinants publicly and privately of health and nutrition of children under five in ghana while in most health and nutrition studies the emphasis is either on health related factors such as occurrence of illness immunization accessibility to light electricity the role of breastfeeding or on food availability and food consumption related factors in the present study an attempt has been made to incorporate both aspects simultaneously on the basis of the glss ghanaian households spend at the average approximately 60 of total expenses on food changes in relative prices of the various food commodities differently affect household food availability lowering prices of relatively cheap foods e g millet cassava tends to have a strong positive effect on total household kcal availability at the level of the household the absolute number of nondependents presumed to represent the available labour force is positively correlated with household food availability there is also a positive correlation between the mothers level of education 10 yrs of schooling and above and the nutrition level of children occurrence of illness in children could be shown to negatively affect their health and nutrition status finally a specific finding in the analysis was a rather strong negative effect of prolonged breastfeeding on the nutritional status of children among the policy recommendations emanating from the research are 1 promotion of efficient production and marketing of cassava 2 efforts to achieve slowing down of rural urban migration to prevent labour shortages in rural households 3 improving water and sanitation conditions 4 expanding immunization programmes in particular in rural areas and 5 promoting better weaning practices when children are no longer fully breastfed

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

repeated games with differential time preferences when players have identical time preferences the set of feasible repeated game payoffs coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage game payoffs moreover all feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained by equilibria if the players are sufficiently patient neither of these facts generalizes to the case of different time preferences first players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time hence the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage game payoffs second it is not usually the case that every trade plan that guarantees individually rational payoffs can be sustained by an equilibrium no matter how patient the players are this paper provides a simple characterization of the sets of nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two player repeated games

being a leader or a follower this paper deals with the analysis of conflicts in duopoly situations in particular with the distribution of roles in the von stackelberg framework which firm will be the leader which firm the follower under what circumstances will firms find a mutually advantageous distribution of roles will they fight for leadership or followship in von stackelberg s analysis of duopoly either firms do not choose their respective roles or they fight for leadership this situation is due to the particular strategy space namely the quantity to produce of an homogeneous good we extend here the strategy space to price quantity pairs we show that if costs are identical or similar then both firms will prefer the role of follower if there is a significant cost differential between the firms then the non cooperative equilibrium can only be of two types either the less efficient firm will act as the leader selling a limited quantity at a low price and the more efficient firm as the follower selling to the residual demand at a higher price or the more efficient firm acting as leader will drive the less efficient firm out of the market by adopting a limit pricing strategy but in so doing that firm makes less profits than if it acts as follower we suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that firms in a duopoly framework will tend to coordinate on their mutually advantageous role distribution even if they compete in a non cooperative strategic way in terms of both prices and quantities

perfect public equilibrium when players are patient we provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work it also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full dimensionality condition fail as in the strongly symmetric equilibrium studied by abreu abreu d 1986 extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames j econ theory 39 191 228 and abreu et al abreu d pearce d stacchetti e 1986 optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring j econ theory 39 251 269 finally we use our characterization to give a sufficient condition for the exact achievability of first best outcomes equilibria of this type for which all continuation payoffs lie on the pareto frontier have a strong renegotiation proofness property regardless of the history players can never unanimously prefer another equilibrium

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability the argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new innovations will typically have certain characteristics a diffusion curve for an innovation is usually defined as the proportion of its potential users who have already adopted as a function of time measured from the first adoption many empirical studies by both economists and other social scientists have shown that diffusion curves nearly always have two distinct characteristics i they are s shaped the proportion adopted is an increasing function of time which is initially convex but eventually becomes concave and ii they tend to be right hand skewed the inflection point occurs at a time corresponding to a proportion adopted which is less than one half so that the function is concave over the greatest amount of time in fact this skewing is occasionally severe enough to make the diffusion curve appear concave everywhere the focus of most empirical studies of innovation diffusion has centered on identification of either the major determinants of the speed of diffusion or the characteristics of firms which determine how long they delay adoption the seminal contributions are griliches 6 study of hybrid corn and mansfield s 121 study of 12 industrial innovations these studies and most of the similar ones following conclude that diffusion is faster for innovations with higher profitability and that large firms tend to be the earliest adopters some studies e g mansfield 121 herregat 71 have attempted to ascertain

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

poverty food intake and malnutrition implications for food security in developing countries the relation between household income food intake and nutritional status in less developed countries is examined and a framework that explicitly relates household behavior patterns with public policy options designed to improve the nutritional status of the rural and urban poor is presented for rural areas nutritional and health status depends largely upon the levels of private inputs provided by households in turn level depends upon income consequently increasing income may also lead to improvements in nutrition and health status regrettably post world war ii development strategy in most developing countries has undervalued the potential contribution of agricultural development to economic development domestic economic policies practiced thus far have most probably had serious negative effects upon the nutrition and heal status of the poorest segments of developing nations economic development policy reform is therefore called for as a measure to alleviate rural poverty in developing countries

innovation adoption and diffusion when there are competing innovations abstract firms face a choice between two innovations without knowing which of the two is better each firm has a prior that one of the innovations is better which is updated by bayes rule as trials with the innovations are made a simple decision rule indicating which innovation should be tried given any posterior is derived and used to define an expected diffusion curve for the better innovation this curve has the commonly observed ogive shape even in the absence of any external demonstration effect when the distribution of firm priors belongs to a general class

maintaining a reputation against a long lived opponent we consider a game between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient opponent player 2 as usual in reputation models we suppose that the patient player s type is private information and that he may be a commitment type who is locked into playing a particular strategy we investigate the extent to which an uncommitted or normal type of patient player can exploit his less patient opponent s uncertainty to maintain a reputation for playing like a commitment type

on the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games abstract we show that any feasible individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available

legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values theory and experiments we study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations in that case each player receives an exogenous disagreement value we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q majority rules under unanimity rule equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values under all less than unanimity rules expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values we conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule finding qualitative support for several but not all of our main predictions having a high disagreement value is indeed an advantage under unanimity under majority the player with the highest disagreement value is more likely to be excluded but this does not consistently result in a lower average payoff

a note on three player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings abstract a three player bargaining game where only the central player can negotiate with two different partners has a unique perfect equilibrium outcome we discuss when the a priori favored position of the central player is really advantageous in terms of equilibrium payoffs

a multilateral telephone bargaining game abstract this paper studies a multilateral bargaining game with unanimity rule offers and responses are communicated through private telephone conversations and they are never revealed to all players with a plausible restriction on beliefs we obtain a unique perfect public equilibrium

on the folk theorem with one dimensional payoffs and different discount factors abstract proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage game payoffs fudenberg and maskin 1986 assume full dimensionality of payoffs while abreu et al 1994 assume the weaker neu condition nonequivalent utilities in this note we consider a class of n player games where each player receives the same stage game payoff either zero or one the stage game payoffs therefore constitute a one dimensional set violating neu we show that if all players have different discount factors then for discount factors sufficiently close to one any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium with public correlation

on the convergence to the nash bargaining solution for action dependent bargaining protocols we consider a non cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action dependent bargaining protocol that is the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected an important example is the frequently studied rejector becomes proposer protocol we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player we consider the limit as the bargaining friction vanishes in case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized otherwise equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted nash bargaining solution where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on one s own rejection

myopic perception in repeated games abstract in obtaining the celebrated folk theorem not only everyone must value his future sufficiently high but also everyone must be perceived so by the others this common perception of players time preferences must be maintained even after someone deviates this paper explores the implications of myopic perception in repeated games with perfect monitoring under myopic perception a deviator will not be perceived as a long run player in the continuation game which in turn affects the equilibria in the repeated game before deviation we develop an algorithm to compute a set that characterizes almost all equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor is sufficiently high when the stage game has a unique nash equilibrium and it strictly dominates all other stage game payoffs then under myopic perception the corresponding repeated game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium

collusion and heterogeneity of firms we examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic bertrand competition we show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting first we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold with or without capacity constraints next we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the long run the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market

a generalized model of pricing for homogeneous goods under imperfect information this paper generalizes the model developed in wilde and schwartz 1979 to allow downward sloping demand curves and u shaped average cost curves it shows that the basic qualitative conclusions of wilde and schwartz still hold moreover it shows that the critical proportion of comparison shoppers needed to generate a competitive equilibrium falls as demand becomes more elastic or average costs become more inelastic finally it shows that when imperfect information generates non competitive outcomes they are bounded below in welfare terms by the monopolistically competitive equilibrium

expropriation risk and technology abstract this paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement the firm s technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking order of expropriations long run investment distortions may be pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum the dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives backloading or efficiency frontloading concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus an increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare the model provides a technology driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries

multilateral bargaining with concession costs this paper presents a new non cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining we consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients i there is an exogenous deadline by which bargaining has to end ii prior to the deadline players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like iii changing one s demand is costly and this cost increases as the deadline gets closer the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which agreement is reached immediately and switching costs are avoided moreover this equilibrium is invariant to the particular order and timing in which players make demands this is important as multilateral bargaining models are sometimes too sensitive to these particular details in our context players with higher concession costs obtain higher shares of the pie their increased bargaining power stems from their ability to credibly commit to a demand earlier we discuss how the setup and assumptions are a reasonable description for certain real bargaining situations

rent seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining abstract in non cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of rubinstein the proposer s bargaining power stems from the prospect of a delay in case of disagreement since players are impatient this delay is costly for everyone we consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose the length of this delay we assume that the size of the surplus depends endogenously on the chosen length of the prospective delay intuitively the proposer faces the following trade off the more he exploits his proposer power the smaller is the surplus that can be divided one interpretation is that aggressive bargaining tactics hurt the fruitful cooperation among players and thus the surplus we characterize stationary equilibrium strategies and payoffs and obtain sharp predictions on the extent of surplus destruction the size of the social loss and the surplus allocation

valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors abstract we study repeated prize allocation when the discount factors of the agents are unequal the feasible set of payoffs behaves badly the pareto frontier is everywhere discontinuous and there is an open subset of high discount factors under which the feasible set is totally disconnected

does it matter how we survey demand for food evidence from kenya and the philippines abstract this article examines the reliability of food quantity information collected from expenditure surveys and finds that measurement errors will very often be systematically correlated with income such that the response of food intakes to increases in income is seriously overstated this may be firstly because food quantities are not measured independently of income if total expenditures are the proxy used for income and secondly because food transfers in the form of guest and hired worker meals are under recorded these biases are illustrated using household surveys from kenya and the philippines

a unique solution to n person sequential bargaining abstract rubinstein s two person sequential bargaining model yields a unique subgame perfect equilibrium this uniqueness result does not hold with three or more persons based on greenberg s theory of social situations uniqueness is here offered as follows assume a player can profitably reject a suggested path at one of his decision nodes by suggesting a new one to later players if by doing so he gains more than e a path is acceptable of and only if no player can profitably reject it by suggesting another acceptable path it is shown that only the stationary division is acceptable for any e 0

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

endogenous diffusion of technology abstract this paper presents a positive theory of diffusion of technology it examines a two period model strategic firms are confronted by a process technology with an uncertain reduction in marginal costs the uncertainty is automatically resolved between the two periods adoption in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not adopt while simultaneous adoption by firms results in a cournot equilibrium the firms strategies are both production quantities and adoption timings these decisions are made at the same time thus firms face a trade off between early adoption and possibly reaping first mover advantages on one hand and deferring the adoption decision until after all the uncertainty is resolved but face the possibiity of being a follower in the market interestingly an endogenously determined diffusion rate is obtained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium of this game this means that while adoption and diffusion of technology results with probability one diffusion of a bad innovation is also possible it is also shown that in a market with one large firm and a nonatomic continuum of small firms there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the large firm adopts first and is a stackelberg leader and all the small firms decide whether or not to adopt after the uncertainty is resolved the implication of this result is simply that the diffusion of technology is to some extent determined by the relative size of firms in the industry

on effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting abstract we show that the folk theorem in wen q wen 1994 the folk theorem for repeated games with complete information econometrica 62 949 954 may not fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff set in a repeated game with unequal discounting where a player s equilibrium payoff could be strictly less than her effective minimax payoff

working women in an urban setting traders vendors and food security in accra abstract data collected from a 1997 household survey carried out in accra ghana are used to look at the crucial role that women play as income earners and securing access to food in urban areas one third of the households surveyed are headed by women for all households women s labor force participation is high with 75 of all households having at least one working woman the high number of female headed households and the large percentage of working women in the sample provide a good backdrop for looking at how women earn and spend income differently than men in an urban area livelihood strategies for both men and women are predominantly labor based and dependent on social networks for all households in the sample food is still the single most important item in the total budget yet important and striking differences between men s and women s livelihoods and expenditure patterns exist compared to men women are less likely to be employed as wage earners and more likely to work as street food vendors or petty traders women earn lower incomes but tend to allocate more of their budget to basic goods for themselves and their children while men spend more on entertainment for themselves only despite lower incomes and additional demands on their time as housewives and mothers female headed households petty traders and street food vendors have the largest percentage of food secure households women may be achieving household food security but at what cost this paper explores differences in income expenditure and consumption patterns in an effort to answer this question and suggests ways that urban planners and policy makers can address special concerns to working women in urban areas

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized