income elasticities of exports and imports a re examination of the empirical evidence it is conclusively shown that in times of world wide economic expansionceteris paribus developing countries balance of trade accounts improve but those of developed countries deteriorate

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

balance of payments the harrod foreign trade multiplier and economic growth the european and north american experience 1970 85 1988 balance of payments the harrod foreign trade multiplier and economic growth the european and north american experience 1970 85 applied economics vol 20 no 12 pp 1635 1642

the harrod foreign trade multiplier and economic growth in asian countries the validity of the harrod foreign trade multiplier for 11 asian countries is tested the results obtained generally support thrilwall s specification of the multiplier this suggests in an open economy relevant economic management is the factor that manipulates the income elasticities of exports and imports

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

daily monetary policy shocks and new home sales abstract the conventional notion of a monetary policy shock as a surprise change in the fed funds rate is misspecified the primary news for market participants is not what the fed just did but is instead new information about the fed s future intentions revisions in these anticipations show up instantaneously in long term mortgage rates home sales do not respond until much later this paper attributes this delay and hence much of the hump shaped response of economic activity to monetary policy to cross sectional heterogeneity in search times this framework allows one in principle to measure policy impacts at the daily frequency

using romer and romer s new measure of monetary policy shocks to identify the ad and as shocks this article re examines the series of exogenous federal funds rate ffr shocks created by romer and romer 2004 for the period 1969 01 1996 12 we hypothesize that if romer and romer have constructed a reasonable set of monetary policy shocks then including them in a small vector autoregression var should help to identify other structural shocks that affected the united states economy during their sample period using a sample period of 1971 01 1996 12 we are easily able to identify both an aggregate demand ad shock and an aggregate supply as shock without imposing any sign or long run restrictions we present historical decompositions that allow us to compare the relative importance of these shocks with that of the exogenous monetary policy shocks in explaining output fluctuations during the 1973 1975 1980 1984 and 1990 1991 business cycle episodes

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

the politics of public good provision evidence from indian local governments this paper uses village and household survey data from south india to examine how political geography and politician identity impacts on public good provision we provide evidence that the nature of this relationship varies by type of public good for high spillover public goods residential proximity to elected representative matters in contrast for low spillover public goods sharing the politician s group identity is what matters jel d78 h40

monetary policy and long term interest rates in germany abstract in this paper we provide new empirical evidence on the relationship between short and long run interest rates for germany we find a positive correlation after a supply and demand shock and a negative correlation after a monetary policy shock this finding is consistent with the theory of ellingsen and soderstrom american economic review 2001 91 5 1594 1607

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

redistribution pork and elections why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit many scholars focus on wedge issues such as religion or race but another explanation might be geographically based patronage or pork we examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide the dollar environments the model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution and under which rich voters support left wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution the model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs the model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior and it describes why right wing parties should have an advantage over left wing ones in majoritarian systems

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

thirlwall s law and balance of payments constrained growth more on the debate the various criticisms that have levelled against thirlwall s law by mcgregor and swales are examined it is shown that their arguments are untenable the relationship between the necolassical law of one price and thirlwall s law is clarified thirlwall s law is not overwhelmingly rejected by the evidence as mcgregor and swales assert their suppression of the influence of the price term on the estimates used in the test proposed by mccombie is inappropriate their regression analyis is also mid specified and a preferable specification provides no support for their conclusions they repeatedly argue that thirlwall s modele cannot account for changes in market shares and the that the estimated income elasticities of demand for exports and imports cannot capture the effects of non price competition this was shown to be erroneous by mccombie and the reasons advanced are further elaborated mcgregor and swales provide another interpretation of the relationship between thirlwll s law and the harrod foreign tr

static versus dynamic specifications and the harrod foreign trade multiplier the validity of the harrod foreign trade multiplier is tested using new econometric techniques the equations obtained still support the conclusions drawn from the results obtained in the past

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

redistribution and affirmative action abstract the paper develops an integrated political economy model in which individuals are distinguished by earning ability and an ascriptive characteristic race the policy space is a transfer payment to low income workers financed by a flat tax on wages and an affirmative action constraint on firms hiring decisions the distribution of income and the policy are endogenous with the latter being the outcome of a legislative bargaining game between three legislative blocs the model provides support for the common claim that racial divisions reduce support for welfare expenditures even when voters have color blind preferences we show that relatively advantaged members of both the majority and minority group benefit from the introduction of a second dimension of redistribution while the less advantaged members of the majority are the principal losers

what do the vars mean measuring the output effects of monetary policy abstract vars describe the history of output and other variables following monetary shocks to measure the effects of monetary shocks one must add economic identifying assumptions i specify the relative effects of anticipated and unanticipated money and i calculate how var based measures of the effect of money on output change as one varies this assumption the anticipated unanticipated assumption influences measured output effects as much or more than the variable selection and shock orthogonalization assumptions on which the var literature focuses assuming that anticipated monetary policy can have some effect on output results in much shorter smaller and perhaps more believable estimates of the output response to monetary shocks

a new look at pass through abstract this paper examines the relationship between exchange rates and prices rather than assuming exchange rate changes are exogenous shocks that affect prices i use a long run restrictions var to identify shocks and explore the way domestic prices import prices and exchange rates react to a variety of shocks consumer price pass through is nearly complete in response to some shocks but low in response to others alternatively import prices and exchange rates typically respond in the same direction and pass through seems quick this supports the idea that import prices are set in the producer s currency and that lower cpi pass through is a result of changes in quantities or margins further down the supply chain

do measures of monetary policy in a var make sense a reply to christopher a sims using the estimated var system one can trace out how monetary policy innovations affect the economy as john cochrane 1996 p 1 notes this literature has at last produced impulse response functions that capture common views about monetary policy for example in finding that a positive innovation to monetary policy is followed by increases in output prices and money and by a decline in the short term nominal interest rate in addition despite ongoing debates about precisely how the policy innovation should be identified the estimated responses of key macroeconomic variables to a policy shock are reasonably similar across a variety of studies and suggest that monetary policy shocks can have significant and persistent real effects

do measures of monetary policy in a var make sense no in many vector autoregressions vars monetary policy shocks are identified with the least squares residuals from a regression of the federal funds rate on an assortment of variables such regressions appear to be structurally fragile and are at odds with other evidence on the nature of the u s federal reserve s reaction function furthermore the residuals from these regressions show little correlation across various vars or with funds rate shocks that are derived from forward looking financial markets my results provide a sharp critique of current monetary vars

diversity and redistribution abstract in this paper we analyze the interaction of income and preference heterogeneity in a political economy framework we ask whether the presence of preference heterogeneity arising for example from different ethnic groups or geographic locations affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich we study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties parties propose platforms and all individuals vote with the winning policy chosen by plurality political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible in that they belong to the pareto set of their members the platforms specify the values of two policy tools a general redistributive tax which is lump sum rebated or used to fund a general public good and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific targeted goods tailored to particular preferences or localities our analysis demonstrates that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests when the degree of taste diversity is low the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers as taste diversity increases in society the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution as diversity increases further however the only policy that can emerge supports exclusively general redistribution

mandated political representation and redistribution mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority group candidates are permitted to contest such quotas have been implemented in india for certain social groups and for women although gender quotas in the legislature are popular in several other countries this paper builds a political economy model to analyze the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium our model predicts that in situations where the minority group is economically disadvantaged and where voters favor candidates from their own group such a quota actually reduces transfers to poorer groups moreover redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within minority group inequality

term structure views of monetary policy under alternative models of agent expectations abstract term structure models and many descriptions of the transmission of monetary policy rest on the empirical relevance of the expectations hypothesis small differences in the perceived policy reaction function in var models of agent expectations strongly influence the relevance in the transmission mechanism of the expected short rate component of bond yields mean reverting or difference stationary characterizations of interest rates require large and volatile term premiums to match the observable term structure however short rate descriptions that capture shifting perceptions of long horizon inflation evident in survey data support a more substantial term structure role for short rate expectations