discrimination competition and loan performance in fha mortgage lending this study tests for the presence of prejudicial or noneconomic discrimination on the part of mortgage lenders by evaluating the performance of home mortgage loans the approach differs from that of previous studies of loan performance in that it is based on the proposition that noneconomic discrimination should be more pronounced in less competitive lending environments while statistical discrimination should not using a rich set of fha insured loan records and measures of local market concentration to proxy the competitive environment we test for the prediction of better loan performance by minority borrowers relative to white borrowers in more concentrated markets we argue that this approach substantially reduces the potential for omitted variable bias that has cast a shadow on previous studies of lending discrimination results fail to reject the null hypothesis of no noneconomic discrimination

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

screening incentives and privacy protection in financial markets a theoretical and empirical analysis we study a model in which firms offer financial products to individuals post prices for their products and screen consumers who apply to purchase them any information obtained in the screening process may be traded to another firm selling related products we show that firms ability to sell consumer information can lead to lower prices higher screening intensities and increased social welfare by exploiting variations in the adoption of local financial privacy ordinances in five california bay area counties we are able to provide simple estimates of the effects of stricter financial privacy laws on mortgage denial rates during 2001 2006 consistent with the model s predictions denial rates for home purchase loans and refinancing loans decreased in counties where opt in privacy ordinances were adopted moreover estimated foreclosure start rates during the financial crisis of 2007 2008 were higher in counties where the privacy ordinance was adopted

market structure and discrimination the case of small businesses this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses the authors analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups this set of variables in combination with information on local bank market structure helps them distinguish among borrower preferences lender tastes and inadequate lender information as likely causes of differences in credit market experiences of small business operators from distinct demographic groups the authors find that white men and women can expect similar treatment in credit markets with some benefits to female owned firms located in concentrated banking markets minorities by contrast fare worse than whites moreover by appealing to becker s 1957 classic theories we find some clear evidence to support the view that prejudicial discrimination is at least partly to blame

lending to small businesses the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems we investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending we find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories are older and less experienced and for firms that are more informationally opaque supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk finally while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm creditor ties

complex economic dynamics obvious in history generic in theory elusive in data summary the capacity of nonlinear dynamic models to mimic qualitative features of economic data is illustrated with an adaptive version of the neoclassical growth theory implications for econometric methodology are discussed emphasizing structural estimation and qualitative inference

affirmative action programs and business ownership among minorities and women affirmative action programs are commonly used as a means to level the playing field for minority and women owned firms in public procurement markets and therefore may be a positive factor in business entry and survival to the extent that affirmative action programs also apply to traditional labor markets however they may alter the opportunity cost of starting a business we utilize the elimination of affirmative action in california and washington states through voter initiatives to identify the effect of affirmative action on minority and female self employment rates in our base specifications we find evidence of modest increases in self employment among minorities and women in both california and washington after elimination of affirmative action consistent with the hypothesis that the opportunity cost of starting a business fell due to restricting opportunities in the traditional labor markets the sign of the estimated effect however is not uniformly positive when considering specific race gender groups and the statistical significance of the main results is somewhat sensitive to the choice of control states

gender biases in bank lending lessons from microcredit in france the evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial to capture gender biases in banks loan allocations we observe the impact on the applicants of a microfinance institution mfi and exploit the natural experiment of a regulatory change imposing a strict eur 10 000 loan ceiling on microcredit descriptive statistics indicate that the presence of the ceiling is associated both with bank mfi co financing and with harsher treatment of female borrowers to investigate causal links we develop an econometric approach that addresses the concerns of selection biases multicollinearity and endogeneity our empirical findings suggest that the change in the mfi s gender related attitude was triggered by banks through co financing hence we speculate that co financing pushes ceiling constrained mfis to import whatever biases in loan granting that the banks are prone to overall this paper stresses that apparently benign regulations such as loan ceilings can significantly harm the women s empowerment efforts made by mfis

does racial prejudice affect black entrepreneurship evidence exploiting spatial differences in prejudicial attitudes abstractthis article explores the relationship between racial prejudice towards blacks and the black white self employment rate gap and provides the first direct empirical evidence that racial prejudice negatively impacts black self employment particularly in high start up cost industries to perform this analysis i construct a measure of prejudicial attitudes using responses from the general social survey and estimate the relationship between self employment and this index using the american community survey i find that an amount of prejudice equal to the difference in least and most prejudiced census divisions increases the black white self employment rate gap in high start up cost industries by 10 4 16 8 depending upon whether parental self employment is controlled for and represents the entire impact of racial prejudice on the black white self employment rate gap additionally racial prejudice widens the black white self employment income gap by between 6 4 and 8 2 in my full specification d

mortgage lending in boston interpreting hmda data the home mortgage disclosure act was enacted to monitor minority and low income access to the mortgage market the data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data making any conclusion about race s role in mortgage lending impossible the federal reserve bank of boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important though significantly diminished role in the decision to grant a mortgage copyright 1996 by american economic association

does access to formal agricultural credit depend on caste summary this paper analyzes whether caste impedes access to formal agricultural credit in india credit is provided mainly through cooperative and commercial banks using national data we find that cooperative banks discriminate against lower caste borrowers and find weak evidence that commercial banks instead bias lending in their favor in accordance with affirmative action policies we compare the organizational structures of the two types of bank and explain discrimination by cooperative banks in terms of interest group capture at the district level by showing that discrimination takes place in those districts where higher castes dominate

credit rationing race and the mortgage market abstract this study applies microdata from the 1983 survey of consumer finances to evaluate the effects of borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending the empirical analysis is based on a probit model of whether borrowers obtain fha or conventional mortgages the former are fully insured and are characterized by easier downpayment constraints but are typically more expensive hence households borrowing through the fha will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional market results of the analysis indicate that variables which proxy lender concerns about default risk and cost have an important effect on the type of loan borrowers obtain empirical estimates also suggest that minority households are significantly less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites even after controlling for various proxies of default risk these results suggest that race effects in mortgage lending may persist for reasons unrelated to borrower default risk

loan commitments and monetary policy abstract in this paper we examine the impact of loan commitment agreements on the way in which monetary policy affects the economy we estimate a vector autoregressive var model and find evidence of a smaller impact of monetary policy on loans made under commitment agreements than on loans not made under commitment our conclusion is that loan commitments effectively protect borrowers from quantity credit rationing and thus force monetary policy to work mainly through interest rate channels

does competition lessen discrimination some evidence this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses we analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups

product market imperfections job content differences and gender employment discrimination at the management level some evidence from the canadian manufacturing sector in 1971 and 1981 this paper presents a regression model of the relative employment level of female managers using data for 1971 and 1981 on a forty one industry sample drawn from the canadian manufacturing sector the object of the analysis is to test the neoclassical proposition that employment discrimination here against females is fostered by imperfect product market conditions in addition the model allows for the open nature of the canadian economy and for interindustry differences in the job and skill content of managerial occupations the results support the neoclassical view and as well emphasize the importance of post secondary education to the employment of females at the management level

sex discrimination and product market competition the case of the banking industry this paper examines the relationship between product market competition and employment discrimination using an especially constructed data set that links microeconomic data on female employment with measures of market concentration in the banking industry the use of firm specific data drawn from this one industry allows estimation of this relationship in a manner that avoids the problems of interindustry differences that have troubled previous studies the results provide strong support for a negative relationship between market concentration and the relative employment of women further we find that individual market shares are unrelated to female employment suggesting that the relationship is due primarily to differences across markets rather than individual firms

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

impatience reputation and offending reconviction rates for offenders are high despite sentence severity increasing with the number of convictions the standard one shot model of crime provides little scope for exploring persistence effects although recent papers by emons and others have sought to put offending decisions into a more dynamic setting this article develops a simple two period model of offending in which criminal convictions act as an adverse signal in labour markets ordinary and multinomial logistic regression modelling is used to test the predictions of the theoritical model and explore the link between unemployment and convictions the empirical results which are based on longitudinal data from the national child development study ncds in the uk strongly support the view that ceteris paribus individuals with previous convictions are at higher risk of being unemployed

an evaluation of lender redlining in the allocation of unsecured consumer credit in the us credit discrimination in the us has been a topic of considerable interest over the past few decades this paper examines the lending behaviour of a commercial depository institution with respect to unsecured consumer loans in minority versus non minority us census tracts in contrast to previous studies the data include information about applicants credit scores and marginal exceptions to loan policy in a logit model of the probability of denial no evidence of discrimination is found for overall loans or when an application is turned down even when a minimum credit score is reached the evidence of non discrimination is not as clear for applications that were approved despite falling short of minimum credit scores or applications that barely met the minimum score but were turned down the results suggest that future research on lending discrimination should focus on these marginal exceptions to loan policy

what constitutes evidence of discrimination in lending we analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination we show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants then contrary to a popular argument a uniform nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce i higher denial rates for minority applicants and ii equal default rates for minority and majority applicants moreover we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination in particular equal denial default rates imply discrimination against majority minority applicants is there discrimination in the bank lending market this question has recently attracted attention in the popular press and from federal regulators this interest was spurred by a 1992 boston federal reserve bank study which concludes that minorities are discriminated against in the home mortgage market 1 the study finds that minority applicants in the boston area are sixty percent more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than whites even after controlling for such factors as debt burdens loan to value ratios income and credit histories not surprisingly this conclusion has been controversial critics of the boston fed study have argued that the methodology used by the fed is flawed a representative example is macey 1994 who

discrimination nepotism and long run wage differentials the wage discrimination model developed by becker has been criticized for predicting that competitive forces will lead to the disappearance of racial discrimination in the long run we have reformulated the model in terms of nepotism toward white workers rather than discrimination against black workers in this new framework both nepotistic and taste neutral firms are expected to survive the competitive struggle in the long run therefore the new framework is consistent with long run as well as short run racial wage differentials

employers discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage discrimination this paper considers the linkage of empirical estimates of wage discrimination between two groups introduced by oaxaca 1973 to a theoretical model of employers discriminatory behavior it is shown that conditional on different assumptions about employers discriminatory tastes oaxaca s estimators of wage discrimination can be derived that the approach is more generally useful is demonstrated by deriving an alternative estimator of wage discrimination based on the assumption that within each type of labor e g unskilled skilled the utility function capturing employers discriminatory tastes is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to labor inputs from each of the two groups the estimators are compared empirically in an application to male female wage differentials

institutional and individual investors saving for old age this paper brings together the academic literature on individual and institutional investors in order to understand the nature of difficulties faced by them and set the background for the special issue this introductory article and the papers in the special issue contribute to the debate on how to support individuals in their savings commitments and investment decision making and whether and how institutional investors have fulfilled their role in supporting the development of the funded pension industry there are three main conclusions i individual investors are not ready for the role that has been assigned to them in the pension industry ii institutional investors are a long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with their clients and iii more effective regulation may be needed

economies of scale and the demand for money cross sectional data from four surveys of small business finance demonstrate that economies of scale in money holding exist that these economies appear to be increasing over time and that the magnitudes are greater than those estimated for large us corporations firms not practising several specific cash management techniques and firms facing constraints in the credit market hold lower money balances minority owned firms exhibit economies of scale similar to the overall sample but cash management practices and credit constraint variables generally do not influence their money holding behavior scale economies vary widely across industries but overall means are relatively stable over time

public guarantee schemes corruption and gender a european sme level analysis does a corrupt politico institutional environment affect the demand of public subsidies for credit access so called public guarantee schemes by small and medium sized enterprises smes helmed

the role of demographics in small business loan pricing demographic change influences the structure of the entrepreneurially active population which may affect credit risk and financing conditions of small firms using bank internal data of small business loans in germany we find that the lending relationship plays a larger role for loan prices than demographics loan rates decrease with soft information gained through longer loan processing time and a larger number of accounts at the same bank they increase with hard information about repayment arrears and reminders late payments have the largest influence on loan prices older entrepreneurs do not seem to be discriminated rather the younger have to pay more because their loans and businesses are smaller and they lack liquidity to pay in time marital status and population density of the business district do not matter this is good news for aging economies with a rising share of elderly and singles and growing disparities between peripheral and agglomerated regions

earnings differentials and market structure theoretical models suggest that market structure may influence the magnitude of earnings differentials and or discrimination observed in the marketplace empirical results with regard to wage differentials and labor force participation patterns have been mixed most wage differential studies have focused on males due to difficulty in obtaining reliable data for women and to the sample selection problem of women s labor force participation decisions this paper characterizes market structure by four categories regulated nonprofit government and nonregulated industries within these structural categories earnings differentials are examined for men and women adjusting for race occupational stratification and sample selection bias

are good or bad borrowers discouraged from applying for loans evidence from us small business credit markets this paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by kon and storey kon y storey d j 2003 a theory of discouraged borrowers small business economics 21 37 49 and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self rationing mechanism using us data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement which increase with longer financial relationships suggesting discouragement is an efficient self rationing mechanism it also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that in concentrated markets high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships we conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated than in competitive markets

venture capital investment in minority business this study analyzes the performance of mature investments made by venture capital vc funds that specialize in financing minority business enterprises we explore the hypothesis that vcs focusing on investing in minority businesses earn attractive returns because this market niche is underserved minority vc funds collectively earned yields on their realized investments that were estimated to be broadly equivalent to those of the mainstream vc industry however these yields vary greatly from fund to fund vc fund traits that predict high yields on individual investments are identified by estimating multivariate regressions explaining net investment returns copyright c 2008 the ohio state university

bribe or die gender differences in entrepreneurship in emerging markets this paper examines the relation between gender differences in entrepreneurship and firm level bribery one of the most impactful business obstacles to private sector growth using data from a comp

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

opacity of young businesses evidence from rating disagreements abstract a conventional wisdom in the contemporary corporate finance literature argues that small and medium sized enterprises smes are informationally opaque we use data from two credit information companies and in particular their disagreements over the creditworthiness of smes to study the empirical relevance of this often invoked assumption our panel data analysis shows that once unobserved firm effects are controlled for the disagreements i e rating splits are inversely related to the age of firms we are not able to document such a robust relationship between the disagreements and the size of firms this finding holds a lesson for empirical corporate finance researchers who need firm level proxies for informational imperfections and asymmetries of the two often used proxies firm size is not as closely related to informational opacity as firm age is

gender bias and credit access we extract an exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of u s immigrants on questions about the role of women in society we then use data on around 6 000 small business firms from 17 countries and find that in high gender bias countries female entrepreneurs are more likely to opt out of the loan application process and to resort to informal finance even though banks do not appear to actively discriminate against them these results are not driven by credit risk differences between female and male owned firms or by any idiosyncrasies in the set of countries in our sample

competition small business financing and discrimination evidence from a new survey we analyze credit applications loan denials and interest rates paid by small businesses across owner gender race and ethnicity in addition we examine data from owners who said they did not apply for credit because they believed that their applications would have been turned down after controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables including personal and business credit histories substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by african americans and white males remain moreover consistent with becker s classic theories 1957 we find evidence that increases in competition in the firm s local banking market reduces these differences