international and historical dimensions of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 abstract this article provides an interpretative overview of the papers in this special issue of jimf devoted to international aspects of the 2007 2009 financial crisis it then goes on to provide additional empirical evidence of two sorts the first documents the difference between the monetary policies pursued by the european central bank the bank of japan the bank of england and the federal reserve in this episode and the policies pursued by the federal reserve in the great depression in the course of this episode unlike the great depression policies were not contractionary and the recessions were less severe than in the united states in 1929 1933 the second compares the recovery in the united states in the aftermath of the recent crisis and in recoveries following periods of previous banking crises this recovery is much weaker than average

the effect of payoff feedback and information pooling on reasoning errors evidence from experimental markets avast literature shows that individuals frequently violate normative principles in reasoning in this paper we report the results of four studies designed to determine if information dissemination in competitive auctions can reduce or even eliminate logical errors in the wason selection task our results show that payoff feedback and exposure to the information flow drive the aggregate behavior toward the normative solution we also found evidence of spillover effects from informed to uninformed traders in one sided combinatorial auctions as well as positive transfer effects from competitive to individual settings

market behavior in the presence of costly imperfect information experimental evidence abstract we investigate the effects of imperfect private information on prices in an experimental asset market we compare bayesian predictions with market prices examine information dissemination and consider the value of imperfect information we find some evidence that market prices are consistent with bayes rule we also find that non bayesian prices are more likely to arise as the degree of uncertainty associated with private information increases imperfect information is disseminated in our experimental markets and traders perceive that imperfect information has value

information and efficiency goal arrival in soccer betting an efficient market incorporates news into prices immediately and fully tests for efficiency in financial markets have been undermined by information leakage we test for efficiency in sports betting markets real world markets where news breaks remarkably cleanly applying a novel identification to high frequency data we investigate the reaction of prices to goals scored on the cusp of half time this strategy allows us to separate the market s response to major news a goal from its reaction to the continual flow of minor game time news on our evidence prices update swiftly and fully

information aggregation with costly information and random ordering experimental evidence the cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations although the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome in this experiment we study an information aggregation process in which participants decide in a random sequence participants observe predecessors decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price we analyze participants information acquisition behavior and updating procedures about one half of the individuals act rationally whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value this leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity

the known unknowns and unknown unknowns of european monetary union abstract the early literature on economic and monetary union emu in europe provided insights into the difficulties involved in forming a monetary union among diverse economies several of the problems that emerged in the euro crisis were correctly diagnosed beforehand the fact that they were not addressed is not attributable to the shortcomings of research but to a complacent reading of the literature by the policy community the possibility of balance of payments crises within monetary union and the degree of correlation between the default risks of banks and sovereigns were however underestimated or even ignored in the literature an analytical reassessment of emu helps define options for policy reform

an experiment on learning with limited information nonconvergence experimentation cascades and the advantage of being slow abstract we present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous time low information setting for a dominance solvable version of a cournot oligopoly with differentiated products we find little evidence of convergence to the nash equilibrium in an asynchronous setting characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies play tends toward the stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player convergence is significantly more robust for a serial cost sharing game which satisfies a stronger solution concept of overwhelmed solvability as the number of players grows this improved convergence tends to diminish seemingly driven by frequent and highly structured experimentation by players leading to a cascading effect in which experimentation by one player induces experimentation by others these results have implications both for traditional oligopoly competition and for a wide variety of strategic situations arising on the internet

forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets a theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences for example wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers experimental markets studied here featured decentralized privately negotiated contracts typical of the wholesale electricity markets two conclusions emerge i such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and ii forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices

risk aversion in a dynamic asset allocation experiment we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of merton 1971 in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk free and risky asset using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants despite substantial heterogeneity decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types we also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain finally the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes

bubbles crashes and endogenous uncertainty in linked asset and product markets in laboratory asset markets subjects trade shares of a firm whose profits in a linked product market determine dividends treatments vary whether dividend information is revealed once per period or in real time and whether the firm is controlled by a profit maximizing robot or human subject the latter variation induces uncertainty about firm behavior bridging the gap between laboratory and field markets our data replicate well known features of laboratory asset markets e g bubbles suggesting these are robust to a market based dividend process compared to a sample of previous experiments both real time information revelation and endogenous uncertainty impede the bubble mitigating impact of experience

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

price manipulation in an experimental asset market we analyze in the laboratory whether an uninformed trader is able to manipulate the price of a financial asset by comparing the results of two experimental treatments in the benchmark treatment 12 subjects trade a common value asset that takes either a high or a low value only three subjects know the actual value of the asset while the market is open for trading the manipulation treatment is identical to the benchmark treatment apart from the fact that we introduce a computer program as an additional uninformed trader this robot buys a fixed number of shares in the beginning of a trading period and sells them again afterwards our main result shows that the last contract price is significantly higher in the manipulation treatment if the asset takes a low value and that private information is very well disseminated by both markets if the value of the asset is high finally even though this simple manipulation program loses money on average it is profitable in some instances

overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game strategic motives and action disclosure abstract we study whether coordination failure is more often overcome if players can disclose their actions at a lower cost in an experiment subjects first choose their action and then choose whether to disclose this action to other group members and disclosure costs are varied between treatments we find that no group overcomes coordination failure when action disclosure costs are high but half of the groups do so when the costs are low simulations with a belief learning model can predict which groups will overcome coordination failure but only if it is assumed that players are either farsighted risk seeking or pro social to distinguish between these explanations we collected additional data on individual preferences and the degree of farsightedness we find that in the low cost treatment players classified as more farsighted more often deviate from an inefficient convention and disclose this action while the effect of risk and social preferences is not significant

the behavior of money and other economic variables two natural experiments abstract the object of this paper is to test the performance of the quantity theory model and the related proposition of monetary neutrality in a context in which to use bernanke s phraseology money move d for reasons that were plausibly unrelated to the current state of the economy we investigate this question using data from two recent episodes of monetary policy regime change the move to floating exchange rates throughout the industrialized world following the breakdown of bretton woods in the early 1970s and the shift toward less expansive monetary policy that to varying degrees took place in these countries a decade or so later the results of this exercise are highly positive the money price relationship that we observe is fully consistent with theory growth shifts in the nominal stock of money and in the price level are highly correlated and bear a one to one relation to one another growth shifts in exchange rates are significantly related both to growth shifts in relative price levels and to growth shifts in relative excess supplies of money the classical neutrality proposition in this context superneutrality in general receives strong though not totally unambiguous support

how do market prices and cheap talk affect coordination in many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors how information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored this paper examines how two communication mechanisms market and cheap talk affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental and strategic uncertainty i find that the market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination failures will occur is self fulfilling while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest alleviate strategic uncertainty

introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium abstract this paper surveys the literature which examines the stability of the expectations that agents are assumed to have in a rational expectations equilibrium ree this issue is more complex than the usual statistical estimation problem because the relationship between observable variables and payoff relevant variables is endogenous one approach taken in the literature yields convergence to a ree but requires agents to have extensive knowledge about the structure and dynamics of the model that prevails while they learn a second approach does not assume that agents have correctly specified likelihood functions and finds that ree may not be stable

the financial crisis of 2008 in fixed income markets we explore how a relatively small amount of heterogeneous securities created turmoil in financial markets in much of the world in 2007 and 2008 the drivers of the financial turmoil and the financial crisis of 2008 were heterogeneous securities that were hard to value these securities created concerns about counterparty risk and ultimately created substantial uncertainty the problems spread in ways that were hard to see in advance the run on prime money market funds in september 2008 and the effects on commercial paper were an important aspect of the crisis itself and are discussed in some detail

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

affecting policy by manipulating prediction markets experimental evidence abstract documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions this has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company s sales to movie box office receipts recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy however we present evidence from the lab indicating that single minded well funded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market s ability to aggregate informative prices and mislead those who are making forecasts based upon market predictions however we find that manipulators primarily influence market trades meaning outstanding bids and asks remain informative

do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak link contest abstract laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states moves of nature however in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival this is particularly important in aggressor defender contests this paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor s action the results of the experiments indicate that the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender s win rate prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors decisions that is not being exploited by defenders and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast

markets as information gathering tools the academic literature wall street commentary and even daily news reporting reflect a belief that markets can anticipate events the current movements in the stock market are interpreted as reflecting the likelihood that the federal reserve system will change interest rates futures markets are interpreted as reflecting the best estimates of things to come movements in individual stock prices are thought to anticipate earnings reports or the probability of a merger or buyout if we want to know about future weather in the south we should study the orange juice futures the academic journals are filled with the concept of rational expectations in which current prices are supposed to reflect the sum of all knowledge in the system prices according to this theory are a statistic that indicates the aggregation of information about underlying states of the economy those who are outsiders to the information in the system become insiders by simply observing the economic activity

what affects the market s ability to adjust for optimistic forecast bias evidence from experimental asset markets abstract this study uses experimental asset markets to investigate the effects of experience and common knowledge on a market s ability to adjust for optimistic forecast bias as a baseline we find that period end prices reflect unbiased forecasts in markets with private information and inexperienced traders with low bias forecasts traders need experience before price adjusts for the bias with high bias forecasts traders need experience and public forecast releases before price adjusts for the bias overall our findings provide insight into identifying conditions that are critical for the full revelation of biased imperfect forecasts and provide direction for future theoretical work

rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets the idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization hurwicz 1972 and rational expectations lucas 1972 we report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations in two of the three series one in which participants trade a complete set of arrow debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium

recessions growth and banking crises abstract we examine the relationship of banking crises with economic growth and recessions our data cover 21 economies from around the world most from 1870 to 2009 with the rest starting in 1901 or earlier the data include capital investment and human capital formation we have two major findings first there is very large heterogeneity in growth of gross domestic product gdp and capital investment after banking crises most strikingly twenty five percent of counties experience no decrease in real gdp per capita in the year of the crisis or the following two years some countries see an increase in long run growth after a crisis while others see a fall with no clear overall pattern second we find clear evidence consistent with zarnowitz s law if there is a contraction in economic activity after a banking crisis larger decreases in real gdp per capita are followed by faster subsequent growth

market for information experimental evidence predictions of the noisy rational expectations equilibrium ree model are found to be relatively accurate for both asset and information markets in the laboratory when information about an asset s uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders prices allocations efficiency and distribution of profit predictions of the full revelation ree model in the asset market dominate the predictions of the walrasian model demand for information shifts to the left and its price declines close to zero when the price of information is fixed at a relatively high level the number of informed agents and the informativeness of the asset market tends to adjust to permit the informed agents to recover their investment in information

judgemental overconfidence self monitoring and trading performance in an experimental financial market we measure the degree of overconfidence in judgment in the form of miscalibration i e the tendency to overestimate the precision of one s information and self monitoring a form of attentiveness to social cues of 245 participants and also observe their behaviour in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information miscalibrated traders underestimating the conditional uncertainty about the asset value are expected to be especially vulnerable to the winner s curse high self monitors are expected to behave strategically and achieve superior results our empirical results show that miscalibration reduces and self monitoring enhances trading performance the effect of the psychological variables is strong for men but non existent for women

coordination in the presence of asset markets markets aggregate widely dispersed information and direct resources to where they produce the greatest value friedrich a hayek 1945 adam smith 1776 these dual roles of informational and allocative efficiency help explain why asset markets are often used to guide economic activity such as production and investment many economic contexts involving production and investment are characterized by multiple equilibria john bryant 1983 jack hirshleifer 1983 russell w cooper 1999 colin camerer and marc knez 1997 jordi brandts and david j cooper 2006 when asset markets are linked to such contexts it is important to understand what role they play in aiding coordination and selecting equilibria if asset markets obtain both informational and allocative efficiency in a multiple equilibrium con text then they should coordinate the beliefs of economic agents and guide behavior to an efficient equilibrium indeed some evidence suggests that one sided auction markets may facilitate efficient coordination in an environment with multiple equi libria john b van huyck raymond c battalio and richard o beil 1993 vincent crawford and bruno broseta 1998 however the broader question of whether asset markets generally lead to efficient coordination in environments with multiple equi libria remains an open question in this paper we explore experimentally the influence of two sided futures asset markets on behavior and outcomes in an economic activity characterized by multi plicity of equilibria we use laboratory experiments where we can control impor tant features of both the market and the underlying activity and focus on situations where the outcome of the economic activity is sensitive to the behavior of small numbers of agents the economic activity in our setting consists of a coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria in which the payoff to each player is a function of her own choice or input and group output which is some order statistic such as the minimum of all players input choices see van huyck battalio and beil 1990 van huyck battalio and beil 1991 crawford 1995 players all do better if they coordinate on the highest output efficient equilibrium which is pareto optimal but they also prefer to select a lower input if they believe others will do so coordination games of this kind have been applied widely to model economic activity from the relationship between beliefs and output in macroeconomic models cooper 1999 to public good provision hirshleifer 1983 to firm production

underreaction to fundamental information and asymmetry in mispricing between bullish and bearish markets an experimental study abstract in contrast to existing literature we implement experimental asset markets with fluctuating fundamental values following a stochastic process therefore we can measure traders behavior in both bullish and bearish markets we observe underreaction of price changes to changes in fundamental value which induces overvaluation in bearish and undervaluation in bullish markets we also find an asymmetry between markets with bullish fundamental values and those with bearish ones as the former markets show a higher degree of informational efficiency the reason for the observed underreaction lies in the relatively large volatility of the underlying fundamental value process

market behavior in the presence of divergent and imperfect private information experimental evidence from canada china and the united states abstract we conduct 27 asset markets to examine market behavior when traders have divergent and imperfect information each market consists of well informed wi and less informed li agents nine markets each are conducted in canada china and the us we find that wi agents private information is partially but not fully reflected in prices we also document cross country differences in the degree to which private information is reflected in prices lastly we find that wi agents are able to exploit their informational advantage and outperform li agents this result holds across countries

credit reporting relationship banking and loan repayment how does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior we show in a laboratory credit market that information sharing increases repayment rates as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit this incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third party enforceable and lending is dominated by one shot transactions if however repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders ability to extract rents from relationships copyright 2007 the ohio state university

screening peers softly inferring the quality of small borrowers this paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers creditworthiness we find that these peer lenders predict an individual s likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45 greater accuracy than the borrower s exact credit score unobserved by the lenders who only see a credit category moreover peer lenders achieve 87 of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower quality borrowers our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

a dynamic model of expectations equilibrium abstract this paper describes a dynamic information adjustment process which achieves rational expectations equilibria for stochastic exchange environments an informational temporary equilibrium is an exchange equilibrium in which agents expectations are conditioned on their initial information and market data generated in previous informational temporary equilibria an equilibrium is a temporary equilibrium which reveals no further information this process leads to an equilibrium even when the data observed by agents is insufficient to permit the existence of an expectations equilibrium

an experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets abstract we test in a controlled laboratory environment whether traders in a bilateral exchange internalize the impact of their actions on market prices better than in a large market in this model traders choose asset holdings constrained by a technology frontier next each trader experiences a random shock which makes only one type of asset profitable in a general equilibrium environment with incomplete markets this leads to pecuniary externalities because traders increase scarce asset holdings beyond what is socially optimal this behavior is especially exacerbated in large experimental markets as traders fail to internalize the impact of their actions on prices we find that when markets are incomplete a bilateral exchange can slightly mitigate the extent of pecuniary externalities and weakly increase welfare

information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike critics worry that these markets are susceptible to price manipulation by agents who wish to distort decision making we study the effect of manipulators on an experimental market we find that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy subjects without manipulation incentives compensate for the bias in offers from manipulators by setting a different threshold at which they are willing to accept trades

equilibrium relationships between money and other economic variables central to the quantity theory of money are a number of important propositions about the long run equilibrium effects of changes in the nominal stock of money on other economic variables a standard way of testing these propositions is to use quarterly or annual data explicitly model the lag structure and then derive the long run solution of the model from the empirical estimates an alternative is to use some type of smoothing procedure to approximate positions of equilibrium and then to use these transformed data directly in testing hypotheses the national bureau technique of averaging data over reference cycle phases is one such method robert lucas s application of fourier transforms in two illustrations of the quantity theory of money 1980 is another and john geweke s method 1982 of frequency decomposition is a third an entirely different way of approaching the problem is to use cross country average rather than time series data as the basic units of observation the advantage according to lucas is that since the two quantity theoretic laws that he examines are obtained as characteristics of steady states or limiting distributions of theoretical models the ideal experiment for testing them would be a comparison of long term average behavior across economies with different monetary policies but similar in other respects p 1006 in this paper i conduct such an experiment the data that i use are for 20 oecd countries over the period 1956 80 the specific relationships that i examine are those between money and the price level money and real income money and interest rates and money and exchange rates in the main the data accord well with the quantity theoretic model classical neutrality holds there is evidence of a fisher effect albeit a less than complete effect on interest rates finally the data are consistent with long run purchasing power parity and hence correspondingly with a long run monetary approach to exchange rate determination

stock market quality in the presence of a traded option we use an economic experiment to examine the implications of asymmetric information for linkages between a stock and a traded option we find the presence of the option splits price discovery across markets and changes the process by which conditional expectations are updated the time series properties of the stock price depend directly on the intrinsic value of the option when the intrinsic value of the option is positive informational efficiency is higher in the market for the stock and volatility is lower we provide evidence that the introduction of an option improves market quality in the underlying asset

internet based virtual stock markets for business forecasting the application of internet based virtual stock markets vsms is an additional approach that can be used to predict short and medium term market developments the basic concept involves bringing a group of participants together via the internet and allowing them to trade shares of virtual stocks these stocks represent a bet on the outcome of future market situations and their value depends on the realization of these market situations in this process a vsm elicits and aggregates the assessments of its participants concerning future market developments the aim of this article is to evaluate the potential use and the different design possibilities as well as the forecast accuracy and performance of vsms compared to expert predictions for their application to business forecasting after introducing the basic idea of using vsms for business forecasting we discuss the different design possibilities for such vsms in three real world applications we analyze the feasibility and forecast accuracy of vsms compare the performance of vsms to expert predictions and propose a new validity test for vsm forecasts finally we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future research

money output and inflation in the longer term major industrial countries 1880 2001 i introduction the empirical role of money growth in the macroeconomy has been studied by many researchers using different data and methods the most prominent studies focusing on the quantity theory of money are those of friedman and schwartz 1963 1982 using data averaged over the phases of the business cycle in order to capture longer run movements with u s and u k data back to 1867 the study by mccandless and weber 2001 is a representative example for a different approach for 110 countries in the post wwii period longer run growth rates are approximated by growth of a variable over a 30 year period average growth rates 1 the problem with phase averaging is that it does not deal with possible nonstationarity of the data 2 the problem with growth averages over long periods while informative to a degree is that they have limitations too it is impossible to assess the timing of movements in these variables 3 in the frequency domain the long run is associated with frequency zero which in our terminology is the long run trend previous studies in the frequency domain on the long run neutrality of money at zero frequency include the studies of lucas 1980 and geweke 1986 the theory of spectral analysis provides a rigorous framework for extracting specific frequency bands from the data instead of considering only frequency zero stock and watson 1998 applied the band pass filter of baxter and king 1999 to extract cycles frequency bands for u s data and focused on the business cycle and on mostly the post wwii period christiano and fitzgerald 2003 proposed an improved band pass filter and provided an application to the longer run relation of money and inflation for bands of 8 20 years and 20 40 years in the united states from 1900 to 1997 4 the usefulness of monetary aggregates for conducting monetary policy has been seriously called into question because of the instability of money demand a prominent empirical study is that of estrella and mishkin 1997 recent mainstream new keynesian models have no explicit role for money woodford 2008 a contrasting view is that the longer term role of money is still of relevance for monetary policy the european central bank explicitly emphasizes a supporting role that monetary aggregates should play in order to provide an anchor for inflation expectations hafer haslag and jones 2007 issing 2006 king 2002 nelson 2003 christiano motto and rostagno 2007 provided a theoretical new keynesian model where inflation expectations lose their anchor unless money is monitored and reacted to also beck and wieland 2008 presented a new keynesian model where cross checking with money growth movements improves inflation control similarly assenmacher wesche and gerlach 2006 2007 found a significant role for a low frequency low pass filtered component of money in the empirical new keynesian phillips curve equation 5 in the spirit of friedman 1961 we use long time spans so that our results are unlikely to be because of a specific policy rule in place in a given period we have 122 years of annual data from 1880 to 2001 before the introduction of the euro in 2002 we have real gross domestic product gdp money and consumer price indices cpis with no gaps for 11 industrialized countries 6 the countries included in our study differ in such terms as their institutions fiscal and monetary policies and economic growth rates nonetheless at least in peace time they were similar in generally having comparatively free markets in which prices and interest rates were determined our aim is to apply analytic methods that are free from economic and statistical models as much as possible in order to explore empirical regularities or stylized facts in the data also the focus of our research is the longer run we employ band pass filters to pick out cycles from each time series that last 8 40 years that is the longer term component

portfolio choice and risk attitudes an experiment i introduction suppose an investor is faced with a decision concerning how to allocate financial resources between a risky lottery asset with a higher expected return and an asset with a fixed and guaranteed lower return is the choice of portfolio independent of preferences outside the standard neoclassical model in experiments with financial incentives we study how portfolio choice depends on three well documented behavioral phenomena ambiguity aversion the illusion of control and myopic loss aversion we also investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge such preferences pay for more perceived control less ambiguity or more frequent opportunities to change the portfolio based on feedback about its performance while standard finance theory presumes that investors successfully identify and process information relevant to reaching optimal decisions in recent years a body of empirical evidence suggests that there are systematic departures from this behavior behavioral finance is concerned with psychological influences in financial decision making and markets investors make decisions while trying to stay afloat in a sea of uncertainty when predictability is low people may be prone to unjustified beliefs that may survive and even flourish in such an environment 1 people may resort to rules of thumb on a conscious or subconscious level to the extent that psychological influences are present it is economically important to consider which of these actually affect risk attitudes and portfolio choice a key issue is whether any such influences disappear when monetary incentives are present we pursue a systematic experimental comparison of three of the most prominent behavioral phenomena documented in the literature the illusion of control langer 1975 is concerned with greater confidence in one s predictive ability or in a favorable outcome when one has a higher degree of personal involvement even when one s involvement is not actually relevant ambiguity aversion ellsberg 1961 is the desire to avoid unclear circumstances even when this will not increase the expected utility myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 combines loss aversion kahneman and tversky 1979 tversky and kahneman 1992 and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently this combination leads investors to be more willing to invest a greater proportion of their portfolio in risky assets if they evaluate their investments less frequently we show that these phenomena are present with monetary incentives and also investigate whether people are willing to pay money to accommodate such preferences or whether they are closer to the rational model when incentives are present with the procedure we chose the willingness to actually pa for such preferences depends on the preference the great majority of investors pay for less ambiguity or more frequent feedback investment opportunities but fewer than 10 pay to roll a determinative die themselves 2 we then examine how the preferences between lotteries in the different treatments affect portfolio choice we have participants allocate their investment capital between an asset with a sure return and a risky asset with a higher expected rate of return in fact there is very little variation in investment behavior across any of the illusion of control or ambiguity aversion treatments in contrast the results found in previous experimental studies of myopic loss aversion suggest that participants invest less in their preferred option the main conclusion we draw from these findings is that the relation between which procedure or lottery people prefer and how much they are willing to actually invest in this lottery is not trivial at all people are generally unwilling to pay even small amounts of money to indulge the illusion of control and it does not influence their portfolio choice people are generally willing to pay money for less ambiguity but having less ambiguity does not influence their portfolio choice finally in some cases people are willing to pay money for more frequent feedback and opportunities to change their portfolio but again previous studies have shown that people invest less with this additional information and greater flexibility

confidence and decision making in experimental asset markets abstract this paper examines how traders confidence and market confidence affect outcomes in an experimental asset market with known fundamental values in this type of market prices usually present large deviations from the fundamental value in other words bubbles are known to occur we measure beliefs by asking participants to forecast the one period ahead price as a discrete probability mass distribution we define confidence as the inverse of the dispersion of beliefs for each trader and also create a market wide measure of this to measure agreement across traders we find that confidence affects price formation and is also important in explaining the dynamics and size of the bubble moreover as traders are successful they become increasingly certain of their beliefs even if these beliefs are on non fundamental values thus increasing the likelihood of price bubbles

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

margin short selling and lotteries in experimental asset markets the robustness of bubbles and crashes in markets for assets with finite lives is perplexing this paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets in some markets price bubbles form in these markets traders pay higher prices for the asset with lottery characteristics i e a claim on a large unlikely payoff however institutional design has a significant impact on deviations in prices from fundamental values particularly for an asset with lottery characteristics price run ups and crashes are moderated when traders finance purchases of the assets themselves and are allowed to short sell

j shaped returns to timing advantage in access to information experimental evidence and a tentative explanation abstract the question of how useful information is in financial markets has been discussed for decades and is still unresolved in this paper we challenge the widely held belief that additional information is never a disadvantage we present results from experimental financial markets with asymmetrically informed traders in all treatments we conduct we find a j shaped distribution of returns while the best informed outperform all others average informed traders have significantly lower returns than the least informed this can mainly be attributed to trend reversals in the fundamental information prices in our markets do not reflect ree but rather naive trader equilibrium

price conveyed information versus observed insider behavior a note on rational expectations convergence in a recent paper on behavior in experimental securities markets plott and sunder 1982 concluded that the rational expectations re model was superior to the traditional prior information pl model in predicting equilibrium prices and holdings in particular given a market with one commodity three possible states of the world and three groups of trader types each with differing valuations on the commodity per state initially uninformed traders were able to infer the underlying state from the current market price and act accordingly in a related paper friedman harrison and salmon 1984 observed that given the existence of a futures market the re model outperformed the pi model in multiperiod single commodity markets as well one source of potential misinterpretation however comes from the fact that although one half of the traders of each type were informed of the true state at the beginning of each period in plott and sunder 1982 and one third of the traders of each type in friedman harrison and salmon 1984 the same traders were informed in almost every period in a more recent paper plott and sunder 1983 constructed markets where all traders received partial information i e given possible states x y and z a trader s private information would be either not x or not y if the state were z yet the combinations of traders receiving a certain message in any period were determined randomly

endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination we examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously this positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay we decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic anticipation we use a reverse sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is sufficiently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay yielding coordination at high effort levels in spite of low incentives

experimental evidence on varying uncertainty and skewness in laboratory double auction markets abstract we investigate the influence of skewness in asset fundamentals on asset prices under different states of uncertainty in double auction markets three different types of assets are considered risky assets ambiguous assets and assets where the fundamental value distribution can be learned by repeated sampling of realizations we show that market prices for skewed assets initially differ from those of non skewed assets for risky as well as for ambiguous assets because of learning the difference in market prices mostly disappears towards the end of trading when fundamentals are learned by experience sampling prices of all assets irrespective of skewness are very efficient from the beginning thus when probabilities are not described but experienced subjects are better able to estimate the fundamental value of an asset

do option like incentives induce overvaluation evidence from experimental asset markets abstract one potential reason for bubbles evolving prior to the financial crisis was excessive risk taking stemming from option like incentive schemes in financial institutions by running laboratory asset markets we investigate the impact of option like incentives on price formation and trading behavior the main results are that i we observe significantly higher market prices with option like incentives than linear incentives ii we further find that option like incentives provoke subjects to behave differently and to take more risk than subjects with linear incentives iii we finally show that trading at inflated prices is rational for subjects with option like incentives since it increases their expected payout

the effect of reliability content and timing of public announcements on asset trading behavior financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements we use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter randomly selected or determined by past asset market prices we find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement or rekindling the preset message the price is too high decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude meanwhile a preset or random message the price is too low prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles we account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent irrational trading behavior

economics of efficiency measurement by the dea approach three aspects of efficiency measurement by data envelopment analysis are discussed here analytically these aspects comprise output specific input allocations by each firm flexibility in the production process and the role of learning by doing in efficiency improvement

distinguishing the effect of overconfidence from rational best response on information aggregation this article studies the causal effect of individuals overconfidence and bounded rationality on information aggregation by using a new multiperiod game in which agents are rewarded for submitting accurate estimates of an unknown asset s value based on i their private information and ii others past estimates by carrying out laboratory sessions of this game in which subjects overconfidence is a treatment variable i find that overconfidence affects the information aggregation process by increasing the dispersion of estimates and decreasing the rate of estimates convergence however even when subjects are not overconfident qualitatively similar deviations from the fully rational model predictions are observed i show that this can be explained by subjects strategic response to errors the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

the demand for money from the great depression to the present myths and legends about the great depression have dominated the public s perception of the business cycle they have shaped government policy and until recently they have even held powerful sway among economists in the immediate aftermath of the great depression many economists came to question the fundamental concept of economic equilibrium velocity was thought to be highly unstable as in the case of the liquidity trap so that the quantity of money supplied was consistent with any level of nominal income in the real sector there was the frightening specter of underemployment

modern hyper and high inflations since 1947 hyperinflations by cagan s definition in market economies have been rare much more common have been longer inflationary processes with inflation rates above 100 percent per annum based on a sample of 133 countries and using the 100 percent threshold as the basis for a definition of very high inflation episodes this paper examines the main characteristics of such inflations among other things we find that i close to 20 percent of countries have experienced inflation above 100 percent per annum ii higher inflation tends to be more unstable iii in high inflation countries the relationship between the fiscal balance and seigniorage is strong both in the short and long run iv inflation inertia decreases as average inflation rises v high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic performance and vi stabilizations from high inflation that rely on the exchange rate as the nominal anchor are expansionary

information dissemination and the distribution of wealth evidence from experimental asset markets abstract we conduct 24 experimental asset markets to investigate the effects of differentially informed and experienced agents on information dissemination and the distribution of wealth in our markets private information is incomplete in that it reduces but does not eliminate state uncertainty private information is not fully disseminated even in markets with experienced traders informed agents exploit their informational advantage and earn greater profit than uninformed agents but only in markets with inexperienced traders lastly uninformed agents earn greater profit when some agents are informed but only in markets with experienced traders overall uninformed agents benefit from design specific trading experience

experimental stock market dynamics excess bids directional learning and adaptive style investing in a call auction with multiple multi period lived assets abstract we study the behavioral dynamics of limit orders in simultaneous experimental call auction markets with multiple multi period lived securities as analytical decision variable we use excess bids the number of submitted bids minus the number of offers the feedback variable is excess return our results suggest that excess bids are predictive of qualitative asset returns and that excess bids are formed in an adaptive way we conclude that the price trend or reversal is reinforced by rejected excess bids and the fundamental laws of demand and supply instigate a regression to the mean our analysis of portfolio adjustment dynamics which is based on learning direction theory shows that adaptive value style investing and path dependence explain a significant share of individual behavior

the predictive ability of relative efficiency for future earnings an application using data envelopment analysis to spanish smes research on earnings prediction has documented that the transitory component of current earnings undermines its predictive ability about future earnings the implication of this finding is that a measure that better captures the underlying persistent component of earnings may prove very useful in predicting future earnings when used along with current earnings our study based on a large sample of 1939 spanish small and medium enterprises smes investigates whether an alternative measure of performance ignored in previous research on earnings forecasting i e relative efficiency has predictive ability over and above current earnings and book value of equity relative efficiency captures the inherent ability of a firm as compared to other similar firms to make the most productive use of available resources and is measured using data envelopment analysis dea nonparametric technique our findings highlight that our dea based efficiency measure has an incremental predictive ability over and above current

information use and transference among legally separated share markets an experimental approach several countries have adopted legally separated share markets lssm where local firms market separate claims to the same dividend flow to domestic and foreign investors who cannot arbitrage across lssm we designed a laboratory experiment to test whether the inside information in one lssm is reflected in the prices of both markets we find that insider information does transfer across markets the extent of this transfer depends upon whether the location of insiders is publicly known how close prices in the informed market get to the full information equilibrium and how much the price variance is in this market we also observe insiders behavior and performance under different market conditions efforts by insiders to manipulate the market increase when their location is unknown to the public on average such efforts pay off to the whole group of insiders but not to the initiator of these manipulative transactions

what price coordination the efficiency enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play a model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group subjects bid the market clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria the efficiency enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements the model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection copyright 1998 by american economic association

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

monetary policy and the twin crises abstract after presenting a brief overview of the recent financial crisis and the european debt crisis that followed in its wake this paper goes on discuss monetary policy in the united states the united kingdom and the euro bloc prior to and during the course of the two crises the paper presents historical evidence for the three areas on the relationships linking the volatilities of output inflation and monetary growth in all three these relations are strongly positive there is therefore no tradeoff between inflation and output volatility the two move up and down together both moreover move up and down with the volatility of monetary growth viewed from this perspective the increased volatilities of money supplies and the monetary base in the united states the united kingdom and the euro bloc over the last half decade pose problems

experiments on percolation of information in dark markets in dark markets order submissions are bilateral and transaction prices are known only to the trading counterparties here we study to what extent the information aggregation theory proposed by duffie and collaborators predicts outcomes in a laboratory version of such markets we find that prices aggregate the available information but not in the strict sense of the theory where prices converge exponentially fast to average private signals prices instead fluctuate within bands around this average the band widths reflect in the best case the precision of the average signal and otherwise the precision of a single private signal

the use of information system technology to develop tests on insider trading and asymmetric information issues related to insider trading remain popular research topics empirical studies using historical data are limited by two key factors 1 the inability to identify exactly who possesses inside information and 2 the inability to identify the accuracy of information possessed advances in information system technology enable us to overcome these problems in the laboratory using this technology we create a research shell to conduct experiments where we can identify the exact type and quality of information accessible by each trader our system includes the capability to monitor individual activities in accessing inside information the system can automatically impose a monetary penalty if random monitoring identifies a trader accessing inside information our experiments involve traders who receive access to inside information without initial knowledge of the quality of that information the results indicate that traders were able to outperform the market if penalties for being caught accessing such information were not included once penalties were included however no significant performance differences were observed finally in a second set of experiments involving a simplified market with infrequent electronic monitoring and low penalty amounts inside information seemed to be rapidly and effectively disseminated to traders possessing no inside information

prediction markets in the laboratory prediction markets are becoming an ever more popular method for aggregating disparate information companies use prediction markets to forecast sales release dates and other internal activities recently several well known economists have argued that government ought to eliminate impediments to unleashing the power of prediction markets broadly this survey paper looks at the laboratory experiments which provide part of the scientific justification for using prediction markets these systems work because people who have private knowledge can use this insider information in the market but doing so causes the price to reflect these data starting with early experiments that show markets can under certain circumstances aggregate information we discuss the robustness of prediction markets to various design features we also discuss places where performance does not match rhetoric and briefly look at experimental comparisons of alternative information aggregating institutions another issue consistently raised regarding the implementation of prediction markets is the degree to which traders can manipulate prices and thus the information gleaned by following a series of experiments on manipulation we present the circumstances that are and are not sufficient for manipulation attempts to be successful finally we offer suggestions on where we believe future experiments are needed in this area

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

eliminating public knowledge biases in information aggregation mechanisms we present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings a two stage mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is used to reveal and adjust for individuals public information a nonlinear aggregation of their decisions then allows for the calculation of the probability of the future outcome of an uncertain event which can then be compared to both the objective probability of its occurrence and the performance of the market as a whole experiments show that this nonlinear aggregation mechanism outperforms both the imperfect market and the best of the participants

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally