welfare dominance an application to commodity taxation in this paper the authors propose a method to identify commodity tax changes that will be favored by all individuals who can agree on certain weak assumptions with regard to the social welfare function the method is based on an extension of the criterion of second degree stochastic dominance and is illustrated using data from israel copyright 1991 by american economic association

clocks and trees isomorphic dutch auctions and centipede games we report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and dutch auctions centipede games with a clock format unravel as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two player tree format centipede games dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral nash equilibrium bids unlike previous literature on clock format dutch auctions our data provide a new expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and dutch auctions

market forces meet behavioral biases cost misallocation and irrational pricing psychological and experimental evidence as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples suggests that firms may confound fixed sunk and variable costs leading to distorted pricing decisions this article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions we envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real world accounting practices including ones that confuse the relevance of variable fixed and sunk costs to pricing decisions firms follow naive adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced in some market structures but not in others this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions

why do parents socialize their children to behave pro socially an information based theory we present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children dierently from existing models of cultural transmission of values such as bisin and verdier 2001 and tabellini 2008 we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children s material welfare if parents coordinate their educational choices a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries with whom she may interact a parent may thus choose to instil prosocial values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted this implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare even if their children s material welfare is all they care about jel codes d64 d82 h41 z13

equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences abstract a population of fully rational agents plays a symmetric 2 player game in biological fitnesses but each agent s play is determined by his payoffs which are free to evolve according to survival of the fittest pressures an equilibrium selection mechanism is assumed to exist and deliver a unique outcome for any given profile of payoffs this allows the evolution of payoffs to be modeled as a well defined replicator dynamics the existing static stability results that efficient strict nash implies stability and stability implies efficiency are translated to this dynamic context although the latter gives way to indeterminacy in the absence of a specific equilibrium selection mechanism a strong form of stability is established for the efficient outcome of games with common interests whilst a weaker stability result is provided for efficient mixed strategy equilibria of doubly symmetric games the results are illustrated using the equilibrium selection mechanism provided by global games

the endowment effect as blessing we study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation we pay specific attention to barter trade of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies and suggest that the endowment effect and the winner s curse could have jointly survived natural selection together we develop a new family of hybrid replicator selection dynamics and show that under such dynamics even if biases only partially compensate for each other individuals with both biases can survive in the population in the long run

evolution of preferences in an exchange economy abstract we propose an evolutionary theory of how economic environments shape individual preferences consumption is assumed to have both a standard utilitarian payoff and a biological payoff which determines long term survival we show that heterogeneous preference types can co exist in equilibrium

a biological basis for expected and non expected utility abstract a biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk with a fixed environment the type maximizing expected offspring is selected this yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities with a random environment however the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals the implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the expected utility theorem and may induce choice of a gamble which is first order stochastically dominated journal of economic literature classification number d81

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

a cognitive miser theory of cooperators advantage the aa propose a new model of cooperators advantage depending neither on supplementary incentives nor on cooperators capacity to recognize and play selectively with other cooperators it depends rather on players making the play no play decision by the heuristic of projecting their own cooperate defect choices onto potential partners cooperators offer to play more often and fellow cooperators will more often accept their offer when certain boundary conditions are met this results in a higher expected payoff for cooperators than for defectors empirical support for this heuristic is suggested by expectations data from related social dilemma experiments moreover its use can be justified in bayesean terms our model brings behavioral decision theory s cognitive miser paradigm to bear on interdisciplinary concern with the evolution of cooperative behavior and shows how if other mechanisms provide a suitable initial kick cooperation can evolve in the absence of iteration and in large mobile societies

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

a chinese sky trust distributional impacts of carbon charges and revenue recycling in china abstract the introduction of carbon charges on the use of fossil fuels in china would have a progressive impact on income distribution this outcome which contrasts to the regressive distributional impact found in most studies of carbon charges in industrialized countries is driven primarily by differences between urban and rural expenditure patterns if carbon revenues were recycled on an equal per capita basis via a sky trust the progressive impact would be further enhanced low income mainly rural households would receive more in sky trust dividends than they pay in carbon charges and high income mainly urban households would pay more than they receive in dividends thus a chinese sky trust would contribute to both lower fossil fuel consumption and greater income equality

promises and endogenous reneging costs we present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency we explore a two player partnership game where before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort we allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises we demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging and show that these intermediate costs induce second best optimal outcomes

evolution population growth and history dependence abstract we consider an evolutionary model with mutations which incorporates stochastic population growth we provide a complete characterization of the effects of population growth on the evolution of play in particular we show that if the rate of population growth is at least logarithmic the stochastic process describing play converges only one equilibrium will be played from a certain point forward if in addition the rate of mutation is taken to zero the probability that the equilibrium selected is the first equilibrium played approaches one thus population growth generates history dependence the contingency of equilibrium selection on historical conditions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 o33

poverty and household size the widely held view that larger families tend to be poorer in developing countries has influenced research and policy the scope for size economies in consumption cautions against this view we find that the correlation between poverty and size vanishes in pakistan when the size elasticity of the cost of living is about 0 6 this turns out to be the elasticity implied by a modified version of the food share method of setting scales by contrast some measures of child nutritional status indicate an elasticity of unity consideration of the weight attached to child versus adult welfare may help resolve the non robustness of demographic profiles of poverty excerpt

fiscal policy and economic reconstruction in latin america abstract this paper surveys the fiscal landscape of latin america it analyzes external and domestic factors that over the years have led to the deterioration of the fiscal accounts it also discusses difficulties that are encountered in pursuing a sound fiscal policy under inflationary conditions issues such as the connection between external debt and fiscal policy and the role of public investment are also discussed general guidelines are provided for a fiscal policy for the economic reconstruction of latin america

the evolution of preferences for conflict we consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations we show that whereas aggregate conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of conflict effort

wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective abstract this paper develops a one population indirect evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer supplier and many a sufficiently large number of retailers to study how the retailer s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price its observability the error probability of the observed result on the rival s preference the market scale and the retailer s bargaining power this paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer we find that the profit revenue maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high low given an appropriate wholesale price the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers population the larger the market scale the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price the cross effects of the retailer s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process

preferences dependent learning in the centipede game the persistence of mistrust abstract a candidate explanation for the persistence of heterogeneous behavior in a sequential social dilemma played many times is the existence of heterogeneous preferences preferences dependent conjectures about opponents behavior are an additional source of heterogeneity by behaving differently different preference types acquire different information thus when observing only outcomes of own past interactions heterogeneous and possibly wrong conjectures about opponents strategies may endogenously arise and persist in a centipede game experiment played for forty rounds we manipulate the type of ex post information and the method of play we find that when the game is played in its reduced normal form and subjects have only access to personal statistics heterogeneity of behavior across preference types persists in the long run in this case behavior resembles a self confirming equilibrium selfish subjects take at earlier nodes due to an unjustified lack of trust when subjects have also access to public statistics heterogeneity disappears selfish subjects tend to pass more often and play moves towards bayes nash equilibrium

inflation and the demand for money in israel abstract this paper examines the impacts of rational price expectations and foreign exchange reform in addition to adaptive price expectations on money demand in israel the regression results are used to determine the upper limit on the amount of seigniorage

observations on cooperation we study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a prisoner s dilemma and each player observes a few of the partner s past actions against previous opponents we depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types the presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation we present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments moreover we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation and it is robust to various perturbations finally we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation

seigniorage and the case for national money in countries with high rates of inflation there is typically movement away from the use of the local currency the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of using a local currency with emphasis on the seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money even if it should be desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate it still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own money the case for using a foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed on domestic policymakers by removing their control over the money supply alternative methods of imposing discipline are discussed estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by different governments are presented seigniorage amounts in some cases to about 10 percent of government revenue estimates are also presented of both the annual flow and one time stock costs of giving up use of domestic currencies and instead using the dollar the flow cost is typically about 1 percent of gnp and the stock cost is around 10 percent of gnp

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

the evolution of attitudes to risk lottery tickets and relative wealth abstract individual attitudes to risk are examined in an evolutionary model males obtain more offspring as a consequence of greater wealth both directly and because this attracts more mates the second effect induces gambling driven by relative wealth and can create pareto inefficiency fair bets involving small losses and large gains are taken if any fair bets at all are taken altogether the model accords with observations concerning bets taken and declined by typical individuals despite settings of widely varying per capita wealth journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

intergenerational transmission of preferences we propose a perfect empathy model of cultural transmission to capture the evolution of preferences in a population unlike existing imperfect empathy models focusing on stable interior equilibria we demonstrate that a corner outcome will eventuate however which corner outcome emerges is unknown and depends on the interplay of history and expectations

exchange rate fiscal and agricultural policies in africa does adjustment hurt the poor abstract trade exchange rate fiscal and agricultural sector policy reforms are the pillars of structural adjustment programs in africa results indicate that trade and exchange rate reforms are associated with a large decline in economic rents and a shift in relative prices that favor the rural and urban poor fiscal reforms have not brought about draconian belt tightening measures although the incidence of public spending particularly in the social sectors and in terms of public sector employment remains far from progressive reduction of export crop taxation contributes to higher incomes for the poor and domestic food crop liberalization has not led to increases in purchase prices of staple commodities for most low income households

trust trustworthiness and the consensus effect an evolutionary approach abstract people often form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes the so called consensus effect we study the implications of this for trust and trustworthiness in an evolutionary model where social preferences are endogenous trustworthy individuals are more optimistic than opportunists and are accordingly less afraid to engage in market based exchanges where they may be vulnerable to cheating depending on the distribution of social preferences in the population the material benefits from greater participation may compensate for the costs of being trustworthy by providing an explicit account of how individuals form and revise their beliefs we are able to show the existence of a polymorphic equilibrium where both trustworthiness and opportunism coexist in the population we also analyze the effect of enforcement distinguishing between its role as deterrence of future misbehavior and as retribution for past misbehavior we show that enforcement aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior has ambiguous effects on social preferences it may favor the spreading of trustworthiness crowding in but the opposite crowding out may also occur by contrast crowding out never occur when punishment is merely intended as retribution

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

evolution of preferences1 we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

on the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences abstract this note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability presented by bester and guth bester h guth w 1998 journal of economic behavior and organization 34 193 209 applies under more general preference and payoff functions

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

evolution of time preference by natural selection this paper entertains the hypothesis that human time preferences are in evolutionary equilibrium i e that no mutation changing time preferences could be favored by natural selection this hypothesis implies that the marginal rate of substitution mrs holding darwinian fitness constant must equal the mrs holding utility constant furthermore in a market economy the latter must equal the mrs in exchange exploiting these principles the author finds that the long term real interest rate should equal ln 2 per generation about 2 percent per year and that young adults should discount the future more rapidly than their elders copyright 1994 by american economic association

recent instability of the demand for money an international perspective aggregate money demand functions once an apparent bulwark for macroeconomic research have had to be re examined in the light of the events and discoveries of the 1970s following goldfeld s extensive analysis it now is widely recognized that the demand for mi balances in the united states cannot be explained satisfactorily by standard functions apparently because of shifts occurring in the early 1970s similar reservations see below have been expressed with respect to m3 balances in the united kingdom where the demand relationships appear to have been upset by the introduction of regulatory reforms in 1971 in both cases part of the problem can be traced to specific events but the possibility remains that a more general instability may be present the rapid inflation experienced by all major industrial countries after 1973 the concurrent collapse of the bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates and the attempts by most major central banks to control growth in domestic money stocks may all have altered the responses of the demand for money to the standard functional arguments this paper presents a range of stability tests for a set of demand functions estimated for two monetary aggregates in each of six countries in order to determine whether money demand functions more generally have been stable over the recent period and to attempt to identify the nature and causes of any observed instabilities the major conclusions are that none of the other functions examined displays instabilities as severe as those of the mi function for the united states and that the latter may be unstable in a more persistent and fundamental way than has heretofore been recognized the equations estimated for this study are based on a variant of goldfeld s log linear real balances function the deflated value of money balances is related to real income interest rates and inflation with lagged adjustments introduced via a simple koyck transformation this function obviously is in a simplified form especially with respect to the lag struc

the evolution of preferences and competition a rationalization of veblen s theory of invidious comparisons we examine how preferences evolve by natural selection in a competitive environment similar to that characterizing much of our evolutionary past we find that the evolutionarily stable preferences in this context exhibit a concern not only for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs and that this intensifies the degree of competition relative to what obtains when players consider only absolute payoffs we argue that this has consequences for the equilibrium population size we argue that the premise of this analysis is consistent with the available anthropological evidence and that the prediction is broadly consistent with the findings of experimental game theory

privatization and changes in welfare costs of inflation the case of entel argentina abstract in a country with permanent deficit driven inflation problems the proceeds from privatization may translate into potential reductions of the seigniorage needed to finance a given a level of government expenditure the changes in welfare costs of inflation brought about by divestiture are quantified in a monetary model in an argentine case study these changes were found to be small both in terms of gdp and as a percentage of seigniorage revenue within the model this is mainly explained by the low values encountered for the elasticities of money demand with respect to expected inflation and by the exclusion of considerations about unanticipated inflation

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

real wages monetary accommodation and inflation abstract we analyze the dynamics of inflation in an economy characterized by a forward looking staggered price and wage determination process and by monetary accommodation in our model inflation reconciles the conflicting claims of workers and firms the model is capable of generating a positive association between real wages and inflation of the type that has been observed in some high inflation countries it generates a price wage spiral but does not result in inflationary inertia

the right amount of trust we investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance we find that individual income is hump shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population coupled with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of trustworthiness could generate this non monotonic relationship highly trustworthy individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population on the other hand less trustworthy individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated but give up profitable opportunities therefore underperforming the cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college our findings in large scale survey data are supported and extended with experimental findings we show that in the trust game own trustworthiness and beliefs about others trustworthiness are strongly correlated and persistent and that patterns in earnings lost due to incorrect beliefs are comparable to those in the survey data

eliciting beliefs proper scoring rules incentives stakes and hedging accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments proper scoring rules psr are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent s beliefs this paper generalizes the analysis of psr to richer environments relevant to economists more speci cally we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a psr may be biased when i the psr payments are increased ii the agent has a nancial stake in the event she is predicting and iii the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs thereby raising concerns about the ability of psr to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

assessing equitable health financing for universal health coverage a case study of south africa abstractthis article argues that an assessment of progressivity over time can provide an indication of progress towards a more progressive or a less regressive health financing system and can be useful to policymakers it introduces a framework to characterize shifts in progressivity in health financing between two time periods using the popularly known kakwani index of progressivity and other associated indices it also decomposes the shifts in progressivity into the relative contributions of the changes in income distribution and the changes in the distribution of health payments further it proposes graphics that statistically analyses how the shifts in progressivity vary along the distribution of income a pro poor pro rich shift implies that the health financing mechanism is becoming more less progressive or less more regressive between two time periods a proportional shift means that progressivity is constant between the two periods this framework is applied to nationally represen

self confirming equilibrium rium path of play thus if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs even though beliefs about play at off path information sets need not be correct we characterize the ways in which self confirming equilibria and nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self con firming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts nash equilibrium and its refinements describe a situation in which i each player s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and ii each player s beliefs about the opponents play are exactly correct we propose a new equilibrium concept self confirming equilibrium that weakens condition ii by requiring only that players beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play thus each player may have incorrect beliefs about how his opponents would play in contingencies that do not arise when play follows the equilibrium and moreover the beliefs of different players may be wrong in different ways the concept of self confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that noncooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play suppose that each time the game is played the players observe the actions chosen by their opponents but that players do not observe the actions their opponents would have played at the information sets that were not reached along the path of play then if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs so the equilibrium is self confirming in the weak sense of not being inconsistent with the evidence by analogy with the literature on the bandit problem e g rothschild 1974 one might expect that a non nash self confirming equilibrium can be the outcome of plausible learning processes this point was made by fudenberg and

endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints abstract we consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses 1 there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn a subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in subsequent play and 2 agents choose their game partners through a costly search process we show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails thus all agents in a society will abide by the same ethical standard although what standard this will be cannot be predicted we also show that these are essentially the only spe outcomes we suggest that this provides at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

statistical inference for the measurement of the incidence of taxes and transfers we establish the asymptotic sampling distribution of general functions of quantile based estimators computed from samples that are not necessarily independent the results provide the statistical framework within which to assess the progressivity of taxes and benefits their horizontal inequity and the change in the inequality of income which they cause by the same token these findings characterise the sampling distribution of a number of popular indices of progressivity horizontal inequity and redistribution they can also be used to assess welfare and inequality changes using panel data and to assess poverty when it depends on estimated population quantiles we illustrate these results using micro data on the incidence of taxes and benefits in canada

grouping in group bias and the cost of cheating abstract the tendency of people to divide into groups and to show in group bias preferential treatment for insiders is widely observed this paper shows that it arises naturally when people incur a moral cost when defecting against cooperators provided that this cost is concave in the number of such defections if some people are asocial i e insusceptible to the moral cost then under incomplete information free riding and cooperation can coexist within groups costly signaling of sociality enables groups to screen out free riders but its availability may decrease the welfare of all individuals in society finally the concave moral cost is shown to be evolutionary stable with respect to an invasion by a convex mutation

the demand for money in argentina 1978 1987 before and after the austral program in this study a monthly money demand function for argentina is estimated for a period that ends one month before the austral program may 1985 the performance of the traditional econometric approach is compared with the new cointegration approach to time series econometrics the comparison is carried out by a postsample forecast of the demand for money for a period of two years after the stabilization until july 1987 the cointegration approach is found superior to the traditional approach the first produces a relatively stable money demand whereas the second yields an unstable one

recent developments in the theory of rules versus discretion policymaker this perspective on rules versus discretion was changed by kydland and prescott 1977 who looked at rules as a form of commitment a commitment amounts to a binding contract which specifies in advance the actions that someone will take possibly contingent on some exogenous variables that everyone can observe in contrast under discretion a person promises only to take those future actions that will best further his objectives later on such promises are easy to keep thus discretion is the special case of a rule or contract in which none of today s provisions restrict a person s future actions in the area of private business dealings it is natural to think about optimal forms of contracts which would not usually be pure discretion similarly for public policy the perspective becomes the optimal form of rules or prior restrictions even the smart benevolent policymaker is likely to desire and use

selfcon rming equilibrium and model uncertainty we propose to bring together two conceptually complementary ideas 1 selfcon rming equilibrium sce at rest points of learning dynamics in a game played recurrently agents best respond to con rmed beliefs i e beliefs consistent with the evidence they accumulated and 2 ambiguity aversion agents other things being equal prefer to bet on events with known rather than unknown probabilities and more generally distinguish objective from subjective uncertainty a behavioral trait captured by their ambiguity attitudes using as a workhorse the smooth ambiguity model of klibano marinacci and mukerji 2005 we provide a de nition of smooth sce which generalizes the traditional concept of fudenberg and levine 1993a b here called bayesian sce and admits waldean maxmin sce as a limit case we show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases the intuition is simple by playing the same strategy in

learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the centipede game abstract several studies show that evolution favors non selfish preferences only if preference types are observable we present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the centipede game where we adopt self confirming equilibrium to capture behavior we show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma more than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience as suggested by backward induction remains inconclusive this paper provides a meta analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game we describe forces that affect initial play formation of cooperation and unraveling breakdown of cooperation first contrary to the backward induction prediction the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation we identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect to account for an important part of this effect second despite these initial differences the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations importantly despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round and conditional on establishing cooperation the first defection round moves earlier with experience simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation

children and household economic behavior this paper looks at some of the methodological issues that arise in modeling the effects of children on household behavior and presents some estimates for selected areas for our purposes household behavior will be taken to refer to household decisions on labor supply the allocation of expenditure to different periods and the decision as to what to do with the difference between income and expenditure i shall be concerned mainly with the effects of dependent children and i restrict attention largely to western societies excerpt

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

altruists egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model the authors study a population of agents each of whom can be an altruist or an egoist altruism is a strictly dominated strategy agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs interactions between agents are local so that each agent affects and is affected by only his neighbors altruists can survive in such a world if they are grouped together so that the benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by other altruists who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated altruists continue to survive in the presence of mutations that continually introduce egoists into the population copyright 1998 by american economic association

incentives in experiments a theoretical analysis experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks we provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question assuming statewise mo

the evolution of preferences why sovereign preferences may not lead to sustainable policies and what to do about it abstract the conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and in the short term this assumption makes sense sustainability is an inherently long term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed and given if preferences are expected to change over time and under the influence of education advertising changing cultural assumptions etc the old assumption of consumer sovereignty is not adequate different criteria of optimality are needed how preferences change how they relate to the goal of sustainability and how they can or should be actively influenced to satisfy the new criteria needs to be determined ecological economics has emphasized the three rank ordered goals of ecological sustainability fair distribution and allocative efficiency this paper examines how preferences evolve and change over time and the implications of this for developing policies that meet these three goals in democratic societies

the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games abstract we consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games provided such equilibria exist we identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion we find that at least moderate degrees of risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria

the origin of utility sexual selection and conspicuous consumption abstract this paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival opportunity off conspicuous consumption i argue that this desire was moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as sexual selection whereby an observable trait conspicuous consumption in this case is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex it then shows that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of individual fitness the ability to pass genes to future generations and thus establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous consumption in the utility function

cooperation secret handshakes and imitation in the prisoners dilemma building on a j robson 1990 j theoret biol 144 379 396 we introduce into the repeated prisoners dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a costly signal i e the secret handshake before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent we show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities we obtain similar results surprisingly in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d60

learning to like what you have explaining the endowment effect the endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it the existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments we attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect the reason is that an endowment effect improves one s bargaining position in bilateral trades we show that for a general class of evolutionary processes strictly positive endowment effects will survive in the long run

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

an experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information in the trust game first player 1 decides between non cooperation or trust in reciprocity only in the latter case player 2 chooses between exploiting or rewarding player 1 in our computerized experiment player 2 can be always rewarding implemented as a robot strategy or decide opportunistically to allow for reputation formation this base game is played repeatedly learning can be analyzed since participants play successively several repeated games with changing partners participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level

the government s revenue from money creation and the inflationary effects of a decline in the rate of growth of g n p abstract this paper studies the inflationary consequences of an exogenous decline in the rate of growth of g n p the government s insistance on keeping its revenue from money creation unaffected results in a compensating increase in the inflation tax due to the loss of revenue stemming from the decline in growth it is shown that the magnitude of the necessary compensating increase in the rate of inflation depends crucially on the specification of the demand for money based on a cagan type demand for money we present the inflationary consequences of a decline in the rate of growth for israel six o e c d countries and argentina

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

guidelines on searching for a dalton improving tax reform an illustration with data from indonesia this article documents the search for a dalton improving tax and expenditure reform using a methodology developed by yitzhaki and slemrod 1991 and mayshar and yitzhaki 1995 the methodology overcomes the need to define a specific social welfare function by searching instead for reforms that improve each social welfare function belonging to a wide class of functions the authors apply the method to the energy sector of indonesia ignoring distributional constraints and find that both the subsidy on kerosene and the tax on gasoline should be reduced but taking distributional concerns into account the present structure of energy taxes is reasonable and the country may benefit by increasing the subsidy to kerosene taxing electricity and reducing the gasoline tax these conclusions are robust to changes in the relevant parameters representing the indonesian economy

malthusian selection of preferences the authors study natural selection of preferences using a golden age model with endogenous population in equilibrium all agents have preferences with maximum biological fitness given resource constraints and total population is the maximum the environment can sustain naturally selected agents follow the golden rule acting as if they maximize the undiscounted sum of per capita felicities of current and future generations selected preferences and hence work saving consumption and population density vary predictably with environmental differences copyright 1990 by american economic association

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

sharp disinflation strategy israel 1985 curing hyperinflation michael bruno in the summer of 1985 the israeli government introduced an economic programme aimed at reducing inflation from nearly 500 per annum this paper sets forth the theoretical background to the plan and assesses progress so far the astronomical inflation rate was the consequence of two features of the israeli economy a large budget deficit and the full accommodation of inflation in monetary aggregates progress has been made at reducing the deficit and the indexation of liquid assets has been ended rather than fix a target for the rate of growth of the money supply the authorities have opted for an exchange rate target on the grounds that the public s desired holdings of cash and bank deposits are likely to be very unstable in such an environment however the choice of one nominal anchor for the price level is insufficient a reduction in inflation is likely to lead to disparate movements in wages and prices because wage and price setting decisions are not synchronized in the economy this is likely to lead to increased unemployment to avoid this the authorities have negotiated wage and price controls through an agreed social contract a programme which involves a rapid adjustment from a very high to a low inflation rate is likely to be more credible politically than one that requires only gradual adjustment so far the programme seems to have been successful with inflation falling to under 3 per month by the end of 1985 accompanied by only a modest rise in unemployment

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

the influence of aggregation on the ordering of distributions researchers often compare distributions using some criterion or other of inequality poverty or welfare it is standard practice to base such comparative analysis on aggregated data but will the results obtained be dependent on the degree of aggregation of the data this paper argues on the basis of a simulation study that they will be since the probability of obtaining a ranking can increase rapidly with the degree of aggregation aggregation exaggerates the differences between similar distributions and overlooks crossings at the lower tail a change in research strategy is warranted aggregation should be avoided where possible copyright 1996 by the london school of economics and political science

israel s stabilization program of 1985 or some simple truths of monetary theory the period since the second world war has seen many instances particularly in latin america of repeatedly unsuccessful attempts by governments to eliminate three digit inflation not to speak of hyperinflation a frequent pattern has been that the governments in question adopted policies which at first achieved near stabilization of the price level but which then led to such political pressures that after a short time the governments resumed their expansionary inflationary policies these failures in turn generated a lack of credibility of the government in the eyes of the public that further militated against the success of subsequent attempts to achieve stabilization see bruno et al 1988 bruno and meridor 1991

tax incidence in madagascar an analysis using household data this article discusses tax incidence in madagascar and asks who pays the taxes that finance government spending its main concern is to identify the progressivity of different taxes levied in madagascar based on the consumption and income patterns found in the 1994 enquete permanente aupres des menages a nationally representative survey the results suggest that most taxes are progressive meaning that wealthy households pay proportionately more of these taxes relative to their expenditures than do poor households two notable exceptions are taxes on kerosene and export duties on vanilla both of which are regressive these results are consistent with those of a study of ghana the only other comparable research on tax incidence in africa that study found taxes on kerosene and cocoa exports to be the most regressive taxes in ghana making firm policy recommendations for tax reform would require an analysis of the economic efficiency and administrative efficacy of different taxes to complement this article s work on their equity implications nevertheless the results suggest that the movement away from trade taxes especially export duties and toward broadly based value added or income taxes would be more equitable and more economically efficient the only legitimate impediment to such reforms in madagascar is administrative that is the government s ability to collect different taxes effectively although administrative efficiency may be a problem for value added or income taxes taxes on petroleum products except kerosene are highly progressive and provide a good tax handle