the varieties of resource experience many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that

the big push natural resource booms and growth a simple application of big push reasoning suggests that natural resource booms can be important catalysts for development in poorer countries in this paper we present evidence from seven latin american countries that natural resource booms are sometimes accompa nied by declining per capita gdp we present a model with natural resources increasing returns in the spirit of big push models and expectations to clarify some of the reasons this may happen q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the green paradox and budgetary institutions abstract we examine oil production strategies in response to the rise of alternative energy in context of saudi arabia and the united states in a unified simultaneous equation model sem over the period 1976 2015 we investigate the extent to which budget balance behaviour explains the nature of oil production strategies we find that green regulations have a positive impact on u s oil production while an inverse relationship holds for saudi arabia we argue that the nature of budgetary institutions prevents saudi arabia from following a profit maximising behaviour saudi arabia is incentivised to ensure political cohesion through adopting a procyclical fiscal policy rather regulators seem incentivised to channel surplus towards individuals to gain popularity in the united states a thriving shale oil industry is a plausible rationale for u s production strategies also known as a weak green paradox this is problematic for climate change initiatives to reduce global emissions climate experts may wish to pay more attention to the supply side of oil markets when designing decarbonisation plans the results challenge conventional wisdom of the green paradox neglecting the role of incentive structure between different types of oil producers

the political economy of resource driven growth abstract in recent decades resource poor countries have out performed resource abundant ones a stylised facts model of competitive industrialisation describes the long run development of a resource poor country with a political state that is developmental only minor change is required to adapt the model to trace the development trajectory of a resource abundant country with a similar political state however most resource abundant countries engender a political state that is factional or predatory and distorts the economy in the pursuit of rents a staple trap model describes the development trajectory under these conditions the model predicts a growth collapse from which recovery is protracted especially for small economies that lack a niche trade link with a large economy

learning to love the dutch disease evidence from the mineral economies abstract recent literature proposes that a booming minerals sector may not only lead to dutch disease effects it may also be a development curse mineral economy case studies have tentatively confirmed this recourse curse thesis this paper examines the long run economic and development performance of a more general grouping of mineral based economies and finds little corroborating evidence

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

natural resource abundance and economic growth this paper explores whether natural resource abundance leads other things equal to slower growth rates we distinguish between natural resource dependence rd and the natural resource endowment re we estimate three models using world bank data on national capital stocks in a one equation model we show that rd has a negative effect on growth rates apparently confirming the main results of the resource curse literature re however has a positive impact on growth we then estimate a twoequation model in which the impacts of re are much weaker finally we estimate a three equation model in which the impacts of natural resources on growth disappears

natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation summary this paper studies the link between resource abundance and human capital accumulation it reviews the commonly used indicators of resource abundance and human capital accumulation the case for a form of resource curse in human capital accumulation is not robust to reasonable changes in these indicators in fact subsoil wealth and resource rents per capita are shown to be significantly correlated with improved indicators of human capital accumulation if mineral wealth is what authors have in mind when they refer to natural resource abundance then they should choose indicators that measure this concept as accurately as possible

asymmetric information and the structure of the banking industry abstract we analyze the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi period model of spatial competition in the process of lending incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients acquiring an advantage over potential entrants we show that these informational asymmetries are important determinants of the industry structure and of banks strategic behavior contrary to traditional models of horizontal differentiation the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of exogenous fixed costs in addition less concentrated industry structures may be associated with higher interest rates

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

resource intensity institutions and development summary we examine the relationship between resource abundance and several indicators of human welfare consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth we find that given an initial income level resource intensive countries tend to suffer lower levels of human development while we find only weak support for a direct link between resources and welfare there is an indirect link that operates through institutional quality there are also significant differences in the effects that resources have on different measures of institutional quality these results imply that the resource curse is a more encompassing phenomenon than previously considered and that key differences exist between the effects of different resource types on various aspects of governance and human welfare 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

comment on bank competition and access to finance international evidence there are two commonly acknowledged albeit conflicting predictions on the effect of banks market power on firms access to credit the structure performance hypothesis asserts that more market power leads to lower supply at higher prices in contrast the information based hypothesis asserts that more market power increases bank lending to informationally opaque borrowers in bank competition and access to finance international evidence beck demirguii kunt and maksimovic 2004 this issue of jmcb henceforth bdm investigate which hypothesis survives empirical scrutiny this is a research question that will never disappoint as the results will be important no matter which hypothesis prevails in the end it is not the first time the question has been addressed in the literature but bdm have made the most comprehensive study on this issue policymakers in developing countries no longer have to rely mostly on results from the u s banking market when they formulate policies for their emerging banking markets they can now learn a lesson from the experience of more than 6000 companies in 74 countries bdm s results suggest that in more concentrated banking markets high market power firms face higher financing obstacles bdm interpret this finding as evidence in support of the structure performance hypothesis and emphasize the negative effects of bank market power in my comments i would like to reinterpret these results emphasizing the positive effects of market power and express some concerns about the method of the paper

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

governance matters iii six dimensions of governance are estimated covering 199 countries and territories for four periods 1996 1998 2000 and 2002 the indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 25 data sources constructed by 18 organizations these individual measures are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance an unobserved components model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods point estimates of the dimensions of governance are provided as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods methodological issues are also addressed including tests for potential biases and the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors for the indicators the data and a web based graphical interface are available online at www worldbank org wbi governance govdata2002 index html

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

parameter heterogeneity in growth regressions abstract this paper explores the appropriateness of pooling many diverse countries together in growth regressions it is shown that estimates are sensitive to small changes in the sample and separating oecd and non oecd countries can result in drastic differences

savings growth and the resource curse hypothesis an important connection between recent attempts to understand the determinants of economic growth and the measurement of sustainability is the finding of a negative and significant relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth this is the so called resource curse hypothesis using cross country regressions we offer evidence that the curse may itself be a manifestation of the inability of governments to manage large resource revenues sustainably in particular these results offer another perspective on the resource curse hypothesis the countries where growth has lagged are those where the combination of natural resource macroeconomic and public expenditure policies have led to a low rate of genuine saving net saving adjusted for resource depletion

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

resource abundance and economic growth in the united states abstract it is a common assumption that regions within the same country converge to approximately the same steady state income levels the so called absolute convergence hypothesis focuses on initial income levels to account for the variability in income growth among regions empirical data seem to support the absolute convergence hypothesis for us states but the data also show that natural resource abundance is a significant negative determinant of growth we find that natural resource abundance decreases investment schooling openness and r d expenditure and increases corruption and we show that these effects can fully explain the negative effect of natural resource abundance on growth

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

minerals institutions openness and growth an empirical analysis competing explanations of the resource curse are tested using panel data the data support the existence of a mineral resource curse for developing countries with weak institutions consistent with the hypothesis that owners of mineral resources use weak institutions and openness to trade to stifle the development of human capital to the detriment of growth in other sectors of the economy manufacturing imports substitute for the development of domestic production so openness to trade correlates with lower growth in mineral dependent economies the dutch disease and debt overhang explanations of the resource curse are not supported

industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries the resource curse thesis abstract all six large newly industrializing countries nics in this study favored an autarkic industrial policy aip in the 1950s aip required however the rapid build up of heavy and chemical industry hci which caused foreign exchange shortages if the hci matured slowly this is because the import and subsidy demands of the growing protected hci sector became too burdensome for the competitive primary sector whose rents shrank in relative importance as the economic structure evolved the two least well endowed nics abandoned aip early in favor of a competitive industrial policy cip which relied on labor intensive exports to earn foreign exchange and resulted in rapid economic growth in contrast the resource bonus of the four best endowed nics sustained aip longer but the longer aip lasted the harder it became to reform and the slow maturing hci sector adversely affected economic growth in this way the resource bonus became a curse rather than a blessing

trade openness and economic growth a cross country empirical investigation abstract this paper demonstrates that trade liberalization does not have a simple and straightforward relationship with growth using a large number of openness measures for a cross section of countries over the last three decades we use two groups of trade openness measures the regression results for numerous trade intensity ratios are mostly consistent with the existing literature however contrary to the conventional view on the growth effects of trade barriers our estimation results show that trade barriers are positively and in most specifications significantly associated with growth especially for developing countries and they are consistent with the findings of theoretical growth and development literature

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

trade in a tiebout economy the purpose of this paper is to explore both the positive and normative aspects of commodity trade in a tiebout economy by tiebout economy i mean an economy with a large number of small regions for example communities or states and no impediments to the mobility of individuals between these regions this type of economy has received widespread attention since the appearance of charles tiebout s classic 1956 article on local public goods in part because it bears a close relation to the standard competitive model this relation suggests that tiebout economies may serve as an

bank concentration and financial constraints on firm level investment in europe abstract this study examines the effect of bank concentration on financing constraints of non financial firms in 14 european countries between 1992 and 2005 using firm level data we analyze financial constraints with the euler equation derived from the dynamic investment model we find that with a highly concentrated banking sector firms are less financially constrained this result is robust to consideration of firm opacity firm size and business cycle relaxation of financial constraint while greater for firms in less opaque industries also accrues for firms in more opaque industries greater bank concentration is associated with less tight financial constraint during both expansions and recessions results overall are consistent with an information based hypothesis that more market power increases banks incentives to produce information on potential borrowers findings are robust to consideration of country specific institutional factors