follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games this paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game as they arise in sequential play with the nash payoff in simultaneous play if the game is symmetric has a unique symmetric nash equilibrium and players payoffs are monotonic in the opponent s choice along their own best reply function then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff or even lower than in the simultaneous game this gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing

the effect of household wealth on fertiliser use in the presence of uncertainty abstractprevious studies of wealth effect on fertiliser use have produced mixed results on the direction of the impact our article looks at this issue from a different perspective by considering the presence of doubts such as about the true content or general effectiveness of fertiliser we show theoretically that there could be different responses between the high wealth and low wealth farmers we analyse also the wealth effect empirically using household panel data from the hebei province of china the results indicate that the direction of wealth effect does indeed change across the different levels of farmers wealth

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

fertilizer subsidies and private market participation the case of kano state nigeria this article estimates the effect of a fertilizer voucher program on farmer participation in the private fertilizer market in nigeria using a double hurdle model to address corner solution challenges with estimating input demand and a control function approach to account for the endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer acquired the study finds evidence that receiving subsidized fertilizer in kano nigeria increased both the probability and extent of participation in the private fertilizer market findings demonstrate that under certain circumstances e g where input dealers links to farmer are weak there could be significant gains from the temporary use of voucher programs to strengthen such links

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

challenges of existing in a market as a small low quality producer this paper explores the strategy of a small firm entering a monopolist s market thereby creating a duopoly market the small firm avoids competing with the larger incumbent firm by producing a lower quality product at a lower price the model here establishes an equilibrium under a specific set of assumptions and examines how exogenous factors affect prices qualities and profits although the strategy might allow the firm to enter and earn a profit the market conditions may make this position much less desirable to that of the large firm for several reasons in the case explored here where tastes for the product are uniformly distributed the small firm s profit is about six percent of that of the larger firm the smaller firm is more severely threatened by the entrance of a third firm furthermore even if the smaller firm can cut costs its position is not well suited for exploiting such increases in efficiencies

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

being a leader or a follower this paper deals with the analysis of conflicts in duopoly situations in particular with the distribution of roles in the von stackelberg framework which firm will be the leader which firm the follower under what circumstances will firms find a mutually advantageous distribution of roles will they fight for leadership or followship in von stackelberg s analysis of duopoly either firms do not choose their respective roles or they fight for leadership this situation is due to the particular strategy space namely the quantity to produce of an homogeneous good we extend here the strategy space to price quantity pairs we show that if costs are identical or similar then both firms will prefer the role of follower if there is a significant cost differential between the firms then the non cooperative equilibrium can only be of two types either the less efficient firm will act as the leader selling a limited quantity at a low price and the more efficient firm as the follower selling to the residual demand at a higher price or the more efficient firm acting as leader will drive the less efficient firm out of the market by adopting a limit pricing strategy but in so doing that firm makes less profits than if it acts as follower we suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that firms in a duopoly framework will tend to coordinate on their mutually advantageous role distribution even if they compete in a non cooperative strategic way in terms of both prices and quantities

institutional adjustment and transaction costs product and inputs markets in the tanzanian coffee system abstract commodity market liberalization can improve incentives for production of export crops by reducing the total costs of transforming products through space form and time or by reducing the costs of arranging and completing transactions while liberalization often leads to reduced costs in output exchange it can remove opportunities for linked input output transactions that sometimes lowered the costs of providing finance in state controlled markets assessments of liberalization that focus on output exchange alone obscure the impact of rising transaction costs in finance this study of liberalization in the tanzanian coffee market documents declining costs in output marketing rising transaction costs for financing farm activities and differential but generally positive net impacts on growers

diversification strategies and adaptation deficit evidence from rural communities in niger summary the paper provides fresh empirical evidence on the adaptation process in niger rural communities using original longitudinal socio economic panel data merged with granular geo referenced climatic information we identify the main drivers and impacts of crop and labor diversification which constitute two livelihood strategies on moderating the adaptation deficit in doing so we account for the interdependence between the two diversification practices and potential reverse causality between welfare outcomes and diversification behavior moreover we condition the impacts of diversification on different sections of the welfare distribution to capture potential non linear effects our results reveal that the diversification has positive and significant welfare impacts when most vulnerable households rely on it as an adaptation strategy to mid run climate variability and as a coping strategy to short run market shocks at the same time our results find lower but still positive impacts for well endowed households that are likely to diversify their activity portfolio given the very limited presence of policy support we conclude that the rural nigerien communities are characterized by a large and autonomous adaptation response which constitutes a key leverage mechanism for policy makers we thus suggest government interventions aimed at supporting the most important diversification drivers but also aimed at straightening some channels such as network infrastructures or the promotion of local crop varieties which may have a greater potential in triggering diversification

bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure evidence from surveys of commercial lending abstract this paper seeks to test two tenets that underlie the current practice of antitrust analysis in banking the first is the view that bank commercial loan markets are local in nature and the second is the view that banks in more concentrated markets are more likely to engage in some form of noncompetitive behavior tests of both of these tenets are conducted using an extensive set of loan specific survey information not previously employed to address these issues results consistent with the existence of local banking markets and the dominance of competitive differences as an explanation for observed differences in loan rates are found

the optimal size of a bank costs and benefits of diversification abstract this paper provides a theory of diversification and financial structure of banks it shows that by diversifying the bank portfolio and financing it with debt the bank can commit to a higher level of monitoring by linking the benefits of diversification to the costs the paper derives an optimal size of the bank which is bounded the costs of diversification lie in the higher overload costs with which the banker is faced by monitoring more projects the benefits of diversification lie in increasing the bank s owner s incentives to monitor the lenders

anticompetitive financial contracting the design of financial claims this paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product market channels in standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets a firm s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms we find that in order to deter entry the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky i e equity in contrast to the standard branderlewis 1986 result that debt deters entry the model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms it also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start up firms

is relationship lending special evidence from credit file data in germany the german financial market is often characterized as a bank based system with strong bank customer relationships the corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending it is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and normal banks as to their credit policy therefore we analyze a new data set representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading german banks over a period of five years we use credit file data rather than industry survey data and thus focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions in particular we use bank internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality and the bank s own assessment of its housebank status to control for information intensive relationships the major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long term commitment we find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings with respect to loan pricing we find no evidence for intra or intertemporal price differentiation related to housebanking

impacts of prices and transactions costs on input usage in a liberalizing economy evidence from tanzanian coffee growers despite improvements in production incentives agricultural output in africa remained sluggish through the 1990s low use of purchased inputs may be part of the cause of persistently low productivity in african agriculture this article analyzes the roles of relative prices and transactions costs in explaining low use of chemical inputs among tanzanian coffee growers a sample selection model indicates that output prices exert great influence on input purchases and that both fixed and variable transactions costs affect input use decisions travel costs in input and output markets have distinct effects on input usage implying distinct avenues for interventions to promote more intensive use of agricultural inputs

modeling technology adoption in developing countries an analysis of technology adoption decisions by poor farmers is provided some possible empirical models for studying technology adoption are reviewed the issue of theoretical consistency is dealt with in terms of the costs of such consistency measured in data needs and model complexity and the benefits measured in terms of understanding the micro economic foundations of adoption

stackelberg versus cournot a differential game approach abstract we propose an infinite horizon differential oligopoly game where at each point in time m stackelberg leaders and n m stackelberg followers exploit a common pool renewable resource and sell their harvest in the marketplace at a price that depends on total harvest we derive a feedback generalized stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium a generalization of the feedback stackelberg equilibrium nesting feedback stackelberg and feedback cournot as special cases we proceed with a comparison between the feedback stackelberg and the feedback cournot equilibria and find a number of interesting results in contrast with static oligopoly theory as to the relative efficiency of the two equilibria we show that the cournot equilibrium can be more efficient than the stackelberg equilibrium this holds true in the short run at the steady state and in terms of discounted welfare

oligopolistic competition for market share via voluntary excess supply an oligopoly model is developed in which firms produce a homogeneous good but there is no automatic price adjustment mechanism to ensure that the market clears though market demand is certain firm demand becomes random if producers oversupply the market because consumers are indifferent as to which firm s output they purchase firms may have the private incentive to oversupply the market in effect competing for market share equilibrium with excess supply is shown to exist in models in which price is determined exogenously and in which firms choose price in the latter case equilibrium price is invariant to entry and cost decreases the normative aspects of the equilibria are discussed

bank competition and firm creation we investigate the effects of competition in the financial sector on the creation of firms in the nonfinancial sector explicitly allowing for heterogeneous effects across borrowers characterized by different degrees of asymmetric information we find evidence of a bell shaped relationship between bank competition and firm creation in addition consistently with theories arguing that competition may reduce the availability of credit to informationally opaque firms we find that bank competition results less favorable to the emergence of new firms in industrial sectors where informational asymmetries are more important

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

the strategic analysis of intermediation the importance and the special character of intermediation were recognized as early as in the eighteenth century and have been stressed by many authors afterwards in spite of this long tradition comparatively little work has been done on the details of the economic theory of intermediation instead it was assumed that intermediation can simply be treated like any other economic activity in contrast i will argue that the theory of intermediation requires a specific game theoretic analysis and moreover that many preconceptions that one might have on the basis of standard microeconomic theory are wrong

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

debt agency costs and industry equilibrium we show that risk characteristics of projects cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry as a result in reasonable settings financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium without taxes capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders incentives but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels the effect of firms financial structures on subsequent investment and output decisions has recently received considerable attention in the finance literature the central insight that equityholders control the firm s investment and production decisions and in general do not maximize the value of a levered firm has been applied to the analysis of risk shifting underinvestment and firms abilities to enter into optimal contracts with their customers existing models of firms financial structures and their effect on investment decisions are generally based on a single firm framework and do not take into account the relationship between project cash flows and the investment decisions of all firms in the industry 2 in this paper we allow the distribution of investment projects within an industry to adjust and show that this generates new insights and reverses several key results of single firm agency cost models the new predictions conform with well documented

transactions costs and agricultural household supply response we develop and estimate a model of supply response when transactions costs create a situation where some producers buy others sell and others do not participate in markets we present two rationales for why producing households may have different relationships to the market proportional and fixed transactions costs using data on mexican corn producers we estimate an empirical model that allows for separate tests of the significance of both types of transactions costs revealing that both fixed and proportional transactions costs matter for the estimation the results provide consistent estimates of supply elasticity and measures of the relative importance of factors determining both proportional and fixed transactions costs

an empirical analysis of fertilizer use in pakistan one of the stylized facts in developing countries is the wide variation in agricultural per acre input and output levels across farm households here we focus on the variation in the level of chemical fertilizer applied in particular to high yielding wheat the model used to explain the variation in fertilizer input across farms incorporates the process by which zeros are generated in particular differentiating between households who do not apply because of lack of access and those who do not apply out of choice we find that access is positively correlated with farm size but that among users per acre fertilizer levels decrease with farm size we interpret the latter by appealing to input choice under uncertainty with this interpretation our results suggest that although larger farms have a higher level of non stochastic wealth which in the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion has the effect of increasing fertilizer intensity with farm size the presence of increasing relative risk aversion means that the net relationship between farm size and fertilizer intensity is negative this latter affect appears to dominate any tendancy for higher fertilizer intensity on larger farms arising from better knowledge or irrigation facilities

pre commitment and flexibility abstract this paper considers several related strategic duopoly settings in which uncertainty creates an option value from retaining flexibility by delaying investment or output decisions until after uncertainty is resolved this value of flexibility must be weighed against the strategic value of pre commitment yielding a trade off between flexibility and pre commitment we obtain a simple characterization of the timing of output decisions as a consequence of the degree of uncertainty particular attention is paid to the implications for entry deterrence by an incumbent firm and to the possible flexibility enhancing effects of investment in capital

the 1 5th mover advantage there has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games however one assumption usually goes unquestioned namely that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover in many cases this is not realistic since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree partial commitments an example is the announcements of price changes i analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized in the case of strategic complements a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly she chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover which gives her a 1 5th mover advantage

endogenous price leadership we consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow while the follower role is most attractive for each firm we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten a general theory of equilibrium selection in games mit press cambridge ma 1988 allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader

transport costs and smallholder cropping choices an application to siaya district kenya smallholders regularly devote shares of resources to low yielding food crops than they do to cash crops that have higher market returns in this paper costly exchange is incorporated into an agricultural household model and a numerical nonseparable version of the model is used to show that seemingly inefficient cropping choices of this type in siaya district kenya can be explained as rational food import substitution given high transport costs in product markets improved rural road networks that reduce these costs could abate motives to meet food needs through domestic production and promote specialization that raises farm incomes

is increasing inorganic fertilizer use for maize production in ssa a profitable proposition evidence from nigeria inorganic fertilizer use across sub saharan africa is generally considered to be low yet the notion that fertilizer use is too low is predicated on the assumption that it is profitable to use rates higher than currently observed there is however limited empirical evidence to support this using a nationally representative panel dataset this paper empirically estimates the profitability of fertilizer use for maize production in nigeria we find that fertilizer use in nigeria is not as low as conventional wisdom suggests low marginal physical product and high transportation costs significantly reduce the profitability of fertilizer use apart from reduced transportation costs other constraints such as soil quality timely access to the product and availability of complementary inputs such as improved seeds irrigation and credit as well as good management practices are also necessary for sustained agricultural productivity improvements

competition in loan contracts we present a model of an unsecured loan market many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts a debt level and an interest rate to a borrower the borrower may accept more than one contract her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed if this payoff is high enough deterministic zero profit equilibria cannot be sustained lenders earn a positive profit and may even charge the monopoly price the positive profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders despite the absence of asymmetric information the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit

diversification and competition financial intermediation in a large cournot walras economy abstract an economy with partially diversified imperfectly competitive cournot intermediaries is replicated the cournot walras equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive equilibrium with no uncertainty despite the convergence the tension between diversification and competition persists when the economy becomes large and is manifested in the rates of convergence of price quantities and per capita welfare to their respective limits to maximize the rate of convergence of per capita welfare resources must be allocated in a particular way that balances the gains from better diversified intermediaries and the gains from more competition in the intermediation sector journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d61 d89 g10 g21 l10 l16 o16

the application and economic interpretation of selectivity models substantial differences in economic interpretations may be inferred from the estimated selectivity model results using the demand for frozen concentrated orange juice fcoj as an example the study suggests that the consumption patterns are quite similar between national brand and private label when the marginal effects and elasticities are evaluated based on actual observations rather than unobserved latent variables results show that private label fcoj is considered as a normal inferior good if the income effect is assessed based on actual potential purchases the estimated cents off elasticities for private label fcoj also vary substantially depending on which approach is used

cost of delay and endogenous price leadership abstract we study the effects of discounting in a standard endogenous price leadership model we show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the leader with any cost of delay or discounting however small by analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes firms with shorter reaction times will be more likely to become the price leader as will firms with lower cost of delay if the firms reaction times are similar

dominant firms and their alleged decline abstract by way of a survey of recent literature on the theory of strategic competition this paper focuses on the question of whether dominant firms decline the traditional argument suggesting decline is found to be based on a rather unsatisfactory modelling of dominance and more acceptable conceptualizations suggest that such privileged positions will persist

production in advance versus production to order abstract we use a theoretical framework to compare production in advance type and production to order type environments carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity constrained bertrand edgeworth duopoly game we prove that the equilibrium profits are the same in case of production in advance and production to order in addition advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies

endogenous diffusion of technology abstract this paper presents a positive theory of diffusion of technology it examines a two period model strategic firms are confronted by a process technology with an uncertain reduction in marginal costs the uncertainty is automatically resolved between the two periods adoption in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not adopt while simultaneous adoption by firms results in a cournot equilibrium the firms strategies are both production quantities and adoption timings these decisions are made at the same time thus firms face a trade off between early adoption and possibly reaping first mover advantages on one hand and deferring the adoption decision until after all the uncertainty is resolved but face the possibiity of being a follower in the market interestingly an endogenously determined diffusion rate is obtained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium of this game this means that while adoption and diffusion of technology results with probability one diffusion of a bad innovation is also possible it is also shown that in a market with one large firm and a nonatomic continuum of small firms there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the large firm adopts first and is a stackelberg leader and all the small firms decide whether or not to adopt after the uncertainty is resolved the implication of this result is simply that the diffusion of technology is to some extent determined by the relative size of firms in the industry

a theory of banks industry expertise market power and credit risk the author analyzes banks incentives to acquire expertise in judging the creditworthiness of borrowers in an industry with uncertain business conditions the analysis shows that industry expertise enables banks to extract rents proportional to their exposure to industry specific credit risk this exposure is in turn determined by the number of banks aiming to focus on lending to an industry in equilibrium the industry receives funding from a limited number of banks with industry expertise as well as from a competitive fringe of financiers without such expertise the equilibrium yields testable predictions about the concentration of bank lending to an industry and about the correlation between this concentration and the recovery rates default rates and interest rates of bank loans

are kenyan farmers under utilizing fertilizer implications for input intensification strategies and research abstract it is widely perceived that african farmers are under utilizing inorganic fertilizer however very little long term evidence from farmers fields accounting for variations in agro ecological conditions has been assembled to back this claim or determine the conditions under which it is true using five waves of nationwide household survey data from kenya covering 13 years we estimate the relative and absolute profitability of nitrogen application rates on maize fields and compare these profitability conditions to observed nitrogen use patterns over time in general we find that farmers are consistently and steadily increasing towards risk adjusted economically optimal rates of fertilizer application over time and that in the most agriculturally productive areas farmers application rates on maize sometimes exceed rates that maximize profitability fertilizer use rates may nevertheless be profitably raised in these areas but doing so will require the adoption of complementary inputs and management practices that raise maize response rates to fertilizer application this motivates a more holistic approach to input intensification strategies in the region

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

smallholder market participation under transactions costs maize supply and fertilizer demand in kenya abstract this paper assessed the effects of transactions costs relative to price and non price factors on smallholder marketed surplus and input use in kenya a selectivity model was used that accounts for the effects of transactions costs assets technology and support services in promoting input use and generating a marketable surplus output supply and input demand responses to changes in transactions costs and price and non price factors were estimated and decomposed into market entry and intensity the results showed that while transactions costs indeed have significant negative effects on market participation institutional innovations such as group marketing are also emerging to mitigate the costs of accessing markets output price has no effect on output market entry and only provides incentives for increased supply by sellers on the other hand both price and non price factors have significant influence on adoption and intensity of input use overall the findings suggest that policy options are available other than price policies to promote input use and marketed surplus the paper concludes with implications for policy to induce greater input output market participation among smallholders in africa

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

the relation between farm size and farm productivity the role of family labor supervision and credit constraints abstract the paper shows that if the performance of hired farmhands is affected by supervision from family members and if the availability of credit is dependent on the amount of land owned then a systematic positive or negative relationship between per acre yields and farm size will prevail a model with no supervision effects on labor productivity would predict that yields are unaffected by farm size the paper also investigates the relation between land utilization and owned holding size when land rental possibilities are limited results are shown to be compatible with various observed patterns in ldcs