cyclical ratcheting in government spending evidence from the oecd this paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government spending gdp ratios in the oecd countries an empirical framework that includes both long run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering 1975 1998 the main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending gdp ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions the long run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2 of gdp also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending government consumption transfers and subsidies and capital expenditure as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

the incidence of secured debt evidence from the small business community critics claim that theories of secured debt fail to explain the widespread use of collateral because they incorrectly predict when a loan will be secured this paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of the transaction cost models of secured debt data from two samples of over 1 000 small business loans generally support the common set of predictions of these theories the incidence of secured debt is positively related to probability of default loan size loan maturity and marketability of assets changes in the legal and economic environment also alter firms decisions regarding the pledging of collateral

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

changes in the financial market welfare and price effects and the basic theorems of value conservation this paper analyzes the impact on both welfare and equilibrium prices of changes in the financial market in a general equilibrium two period context previous papers have focussed on the securities effect tending to essentially ignore the equally important endowment effect that arises when market structure changes are implemented two forms of endowment neutrality and market structure changes which either preserve expand or shift allocational feasibility differentiate the main theorems which are based on arbitrary preferences and beliefs and substantially extend and modify extant results in particular earlier statements identified with value conservation are sharply moderated very roughly the paper yields the following implications for some of the more common changes in the market nonsynergistic corporate spinoffs and the opening of option markets have on balance strongly positive welfare effects nonsynergistic mergers tend to have strong negative welfare effects while the welfare effects of alternative risky debt structures tend to be ambiguous all of the preceding however may under plausible conditions be redistributive changes in the structure of the financial market have long been of interest to financial economists while such changes may take many forms it is perhaps surprising that only a few of the more common ones have been systematically studied foremost among these are changes which involve the firm s capital structure the relative amounts of debt and equity mergers and other special recapitalizations this paper analyzes the impact on both welfare and equilibrium prices of changes in the financial market in a two period context it differs from previous studies primarily in that it is based on a fully integrated general equilibrium approach similar to that employed in international trade analysis thus while the resulting mosaic contains previous studies as clearly recognizable fragments such as the classic paper of modigliani and miller 33 it also provides the necessary framework and tools for an evaluation of market structure changes of any type such as changes involving subordinated debt convertibles warrants mergers spinoffs and the opening of option markets

partisan influence on the local tax burden in the netherlands this paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the netherlands can decide uponthemselves using a new data set on dutch local property taxes in1996 it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden we also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation finally taxexporting increases tax rates

taxation within cournot oligopoly abstract when the production of output causes pollution we often consider taxation as a means to reduce it this paper examines various forms of taxation to control pollution within cournot oligopoly it shows that two commonly used forms can actually increase pollution in contrast both of these forms unambiguously reduce pollution within the competitive model the paper provides conditions in terms of demand and technology that make taxation effective in the cournot oligopoly case another implication of the analysis is that outside the price taking framework asymmetry of cost functions is particularly important and deserves careful attention when we examine the effect of taxation

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations a duration analysis this article employs a duration analysis approach to empirically investigate whether political fractionalization leads to delayed fiscal stabilizations using a broad sample of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 2011 we consistently find strong evidence that political fractionalization is significantly associated with longer delays in stabilizing high deficits in particular political fractionalization has a greater impact on delays in periods of macroeconomic distress we also show that while the fractionalization of government parties delays fiscal stabilization the fractionalization of opposition parties tends to facilitate fiscal stabilization

government strength power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in oecd countries a voting power approach we test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inoecd countries from 1970 to 1999 government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by thebanzhaf index of voting power respectivelythe standard deviation of banzhaf indicesof coalition parties we believe that theseare better suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant however coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party

the impact of within party and between party ideological dispersion on fiscal outcomes evidence from swiss cantonal parliaments the impact of the fragmentation of executive and legislative bodies on the level and composition of government expenditure is a feature of politics that has attracted considerable attention from economists however previous authors have abstracted from two important concepts ideology and intra party politics in this paper we account for these two phenomena explicitly and make two main contributions first we show that both intra and inter party ideological dispersion matter in explaining the level of sub national public spending therefore it is improper to consider parties as monolithic entities we also show that ideological dispersion matters especially for current expenditures and not so much for investment expenditures to do so we construct a panel database 2003 2010 comprising data from a survey that quantifies the policy preferences of party members who were candidates in swiss elections

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

stackelberg cournot and collusive monopoly performance and welfare comparisons this article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models stackelberg leader cournot and collusive monopoly hahn s stability conditions render an unambiguous ranking of market price the monopoly price is highest and the stackelberg price is lowest welfare comparisons are less clear cut due to additional effects coming from reallocation of outputs among sellers conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welfare are discussed and examples are given possible implications for antitrust policy regarding constraints on market share of large producers in noncompetitive markets are examined

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

on the asset substitution problem in their seminal paper modigliani and miller 11 12 demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions furthermore if capital markets are perfect stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm see 6 motivated by this assumption the firm has been viewed as a black box namely as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value however in a growing body of recent literature see 1 2 7 9 13 and 14 researchers recognize that the firm in an imperfect capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can and do conflict jensen and meckling 9 study the roles of three important groups the owner manager the stockholders and the bondholders focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them they provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts

theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in chile although chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow they do so through arrears and leasing contracts a formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007 variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition politically diverse municipal councils years close to elections and deeper municipal involvement in education while leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

capital structure equilibrium under market imperfections and incompleteness this paper generalizes miller s supply side equilibrium argument to other forms of capital market imperfections and incompleteness if corporations possess a comparative advantage in dealing with these imperfections they have an incentive to act as financial intermediaries corporations attempts to profit from these intermediation activities dictate an optimal capital structure for the corporate sector as a whole but in equilibrium the capital structure of any single firm is a matter of indifference in addition the positive role that corporate finance plays in completing the market restores standard perfect market results on asset pricing and the associated portfolio separation properties

the stability of the cournot oligopoly model a reassessment abstract the stability properties of the cournot oligopoly model are examined for the continuous adjustment process sufficient conditions for instability are established which are shown to be of significance when the number of firms n is small local and global stability are shown under appropriate conditions which for global stability include the restriction n 5 the proof of global stability corrects a well known proof by f hahn rev econ stud 29 1962 329 331 results for the discrete time adjustment process are reported and the restrictiveness of the model s assumptions are discussed

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

financial contracting and leverage induced over and under investment incentives this paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over and under investment incentives associated with risky debt we show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under investment but increases over investment and vice versa under symmetric information the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets i e project financing under asymmetric information the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project s cash flow in the same rate if this is not possible the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large with regard to dividend convenants we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments when they are unconditioned allowing more dividends increases the under investment incentive in contrast conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over investment incentive

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

coalition governments versus minority governments bargaining power cohesion and budgeting outcomes recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult it combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament a general indifferenceresult applies an exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures at the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled if the formateur is strong a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

transaction cost two part tariffs and collusion i introduction this paper studies a situation in which cartelization serves to reduce prices and improve social welfare the unusual outcome can be attributed to demand complementarity that exists between the goods under consideration because market demand functions exhibit such complementarity a reduction in either seller s price raises the demand for the other seller s product a cartel internalizes this cross effect and sets prices at relatively low levels whereas the same firms acting as rivals ignore the interdependence and set prices somewhat higher the complementarity originates from transaction costs that customers pay in order to participate in exchange hence complementarity exhibits a specific mathematical form in market demand functions one could even adopt the view that these transaction costs are the underlying circumstance that makes collusion socially more attractive than rivalry another feature that must be mentioned is firms use of two part tariffs under this pricing scheme the customer pays a seller an entrance fee to obtain the privilege of purchasing merchandise then also pays a per unit price on merchandise actually obtained in the context of two part tariffs the paper s main finding can be stated as follows the sum of entrance fees facing customers is smaller when sellers form a cartel than when they set prices independently however per unit prices are the same whether sellers collude or not this model with transaction costs appropriately describes a geographical marketplace such as a shopping mall or central business district in which potential customers face expenses for transportation within the centralized shopping area a department store assesses customers an annual fee for the privilege of shopping this is the store s entrance fee in addition to per unit prices on merchandise a health spa next door imposes membership dues and pay as you go fees on its services a theater sells passes another type of entrance fee that entitle holders to special rates on movies attended later a similar situation is tourism in which case the tourist encounters expenses when traveling to a vacation or convention site at this location hotels charge a daily entrance fee for lodging plus something additional for each meal and telephone call rental cars are available for a fixed charge plus an added price per mile driven entertainment e g disneyland might be marketed through a two part tariff as well a different sort of transaction cost is the expense of educating oneself before being able to effectively utilize certain goods and services speculating in the stock market say requires prior study of finance and irs rules after paying this initial transaction cost the ready investor encounters two part tariffs through which related services are sold entrance fees might take several forms a stock broker levies an annual maintenance charge on accounts an advisory service s newsletter is available at a fixed subscription rate a mutual fund charges new shareholders a roughly constant load it is argued below that these entrance fees would all be lower if the vendors formed a cartel two part tariffs have been studied in this journal before murphy 1977 computes a monopolistic seller s profit maximizing multi part tariff although the seller cannot discriminate between rich and poor customers ex ante self sorting occurs if the seller designs the correct price schedule scott and morrell 1985 investigate a two good monopoly that employs two part tariffs if one good s entrance fee must be set equal to zero for exogenous reasons then optimal values of the remaining price parameters hinge on the exact nature of demand interdependence strong results are obtained when customers are identical levin 1988 compares the stackelberg nash and collusive behavior of firms that employ ordinary pricing in another journal stahl 1982 analyzes rivalry and collusion when buyers pay transportation costs and vendors use ordinary linear pricing

how many firms should be leaders beneficial concentration revisited we investigate how the number of stackelberg leaders and followers aects economic welfare first we discuss the model with m leaders and n m followers compete in a homogeneous good market daughety 1990 nds that under constant marginal costs the stackelberg model m2 0 n yield a higher welfare than the cournot model m 0 or