price dumping in intermediate good markets abstract we analyze price dumping and anti dumping duties in the context of a model with a vertical industry structure dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country specific final good production costs the price differential or dumping margin is shown to increase as the productivity difference increases an anti dumping duty designed to reduce the equilibrium price differential has two effects on welfare a welfare loss from reduced final good production and a contrasting gain achieved by producing the lower output level more efficiently

linking permit markets multilaterally we formally study the determinants magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains generated in multilateral linkages between permit markets we provide two novel decomposition results for these gains characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when banking and borrowing are allowed using the paris agreement pledges and power sector emissions data of five countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and linking we quantify the efficiency gains we find that the computed gains can be sizable and are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing

environmental policy intra industry trade and transfrontier pollution the paper discusses effects of domestic environmental policy on foreignemissions and on transboundary pollution we use a dixit stiglitz typemodel of monopolistic competition with an endogenous number of firms production generates environmental externalities which spill over to theother country it is shown that environmental policy has an impact onmarket structure at home and abroad these market structure effectsinduce changes in emissions abroad in contrast to what has been derivedin earlier contributions it turns out to be possible that tighterenvironmental standards at home lead to less emissions abroad the paperderives these results and provides the economic intuition behind them finally conditions for optimal environmental policies are derived

bargaining and devolution in the upper guadiana basin increasingly central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision making responsibility to local stakeholders this paper conceptualizes devolution as a three stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to real world conditions to analyze devolution in spain s upper guadiana basin the spanish national government has proposed spending over a billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels we investigate how the government can most effectively allocate this money to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a local negotiation process using a numerical nash model of local bargaining we find that if the national government creates appropriate incentives local bargaining can produce water stabilization the actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central government s decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy which will be influenced by the relative value the government places on various financial and environmental outcomes our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government s preferences over water levels

inequality and rules in the governance of water resources this paper considers two types of farmer with unequal land endowments who voluntarily contribute to a joint project for the maintenance of an irrigation network the collective output water is distributed according to some allocation rule and used by each farmer in combination with land to produce a final good the analysis shows that the initial degree of inequality affects the allocation rule that maximises the amount of water collectively provided specifically two forces act in opposite directions the first effort augmenting force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher return to water in the attempt to maximise the aggregate level of effort this is the prominent force when efforts are highly substitute if efforts display some degree of complementarity the effort mix alongside with aggregate effort becomes important a second effort mix force then emerges that favours more egalitarian or even progressive water allocation rules

permit trading merely an efficiency neutral redistribution away from climate change victims in this paper we present a climate policy game with international emissions trading where governments first select their amounts of emissions permits these permits are transferred to firms and then traded competitively on an international market compared with a game without trading we find that the potential efficiency gains from permit trading which have been identified in other studies are totally undone if governments also employ a tax or subsidy on domestic emissions the only effect of permit trading in this case is a redistribution of income away from those most affected by climate change

environmental policy under oligopoly with endogenous market structure emission taxes under both fixed number oligopoly and endogenous market structure which are the most relevant market structures for policy issues are examined in the latter case and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition the optimal tax could exceed marginal external damages which implies that externalities generated by oligopolistic firms could be optimally controlled by overinternalizing environmental damages under endogenous market structure a scheme consisting of a license fee and a second best underinternalizing emission tax can increase social welfare as compared to the use of a single emission tax exceeding marginal damages copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

intra industry trade between the industrial countries and the developing world abstract intra industry trade in manufactures between the industrial countries and the developing world is far from negligible and it cannot be explained away by the level of aggregation used our results indicate a complementarity between the heckscher ohlin family of explanations of trade between countries and the observed intra industry trade in manufactures between the industrial countries and the developing world further both natural and artificial barriers to trade seems to encourage such intra industry trade but this should provide little consolation to protection lobbies as the cost reductions implied by the intra industry trade adjustments will have high if they were to compensate for the welfare losses resulting from barriers to trade

a note on the optimal tariff retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intraindustry trade abstract this paper uses krugman s 1980 model of trade with product differentiation and monopolistic competition to examine the effects of a uniform ad valorem tariff the main results are there exists an optimal tariff even for a small economy and the optimal tariff rate is an increasing function of the size of the economy and the degree of production differentiation under reasonable parameter assumptions a tariff war between two countries of equal size in which each country retaliates by imposing its own optimal tariff causes a welfare loss equivalent to a drop in income of about 4 percent

effluent regulation and long run optimality a regulator faced with free entry of firms is concerned not only with the implications of public policy for the discharges from a representative firm but also with the total pollution observed at the long run market equilibrium the regulator must take into account not only the effects of regulations upon the net marginal returns of the firm but must also consider the total profit of the firm and incentives for entry and exit this paper shows that effluent charges and tradeable effluent permits lead to long run optimality with entry of small firms the difference between firm payments and environmental damages is interpreted as the rent accruing to the environmental resource this result applies only to the competitive case with small polluters the analysis presented here allows a comparison and clarification of the literature on small and large polluters in a multi input framework with social damages dependent upon total effluents effluent charges are shown here to result in socially optimal entry confirming an assertion of baumol and oates 2 p 179 fn 161 and the important result of schulze and d arge 15 by taking average as well as marginal damages into account the effluent charge results in optimal firm scale levels and the correct input mix at the free entry market equilibrium the firm subject to an effluent tax will operate above or below the private minimum efficient scale depending upon whether average external costs exceed or are less than marginal external costs since public policy to reduce effluents is often directed at reducing the effluentgenerating activity some policy recommendations include a tax on the final output of the polluting firm in some theoretical analyses a relation between the output of the firm and the effluent level is identified and a pigouvian output tax is applied this approach should not be followed by policymakers since an output tax does not provide firms with the correct incentives for either input substitution or market entry it is shown that while a lump sum transfer is needed to provide correct entry incentives when a pigouvian output tax is applied no such transfer is needed if the tax is correctly applied to effluents contrary to 5 even if optimal firm scale and i thank the referees for helpful suggestions the support of the national science foundation under grant ses 82 19121 is gratefully acknowledged any errors are my responsibility 103

competition and unilateral dumping this paper presents an analysis of the effects of market structure on the propensity of firms to dump goods the analysis of brander and krugman is extended to show that in the presence of transportation costs bilateral intra industry trade is not possible without dumping contrary to the conventional wisdom this paper finds that firms in markets with a large number of domestic competitors are more prone to dump unilaterally than firms in less competitive markets this dumping is not predatory but may result in export prices being below average cost

emission trading with fiscal externalities the case for a common carbon tax for the non ets emissions in the eu a government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first best level of public spending when involved in emission trading a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales this fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries our theory explains how and when fiscal externalities may be expected to arise moreover we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect 1 the price of emission permits 2 the global distribution of abatement effort and 3 total greenhouse gas mitigation costs this is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets our findings are especially relevant for the eu which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between eu member countries for all emissions outside the european emissions trading system

climate policy with technology transfers and permit trading in this paper we analyze technology transfers tt and tradable emission rights which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations subsidizing tt leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the south thereby reducing the international permit price this is beneficial for the north as long as it is a permit buyer hence it chooses to subsidize tt by contrast the permit selling south suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates despite receiving subsidies we also consider how tt affects countries non cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions finally a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics

global trading versus linking architectures for international emissions trading abstract international emissions trading is widely seen as an indispensable policy pillar of climate change mitigation stern n 2007 the economics of climate change the stern review cambridge university press new york this article analyzes five different types of trading architectures classified into two top down unfccc driven and three bottom up driven by individual countries or regions approaches the two types of approaches are characterized by a trade off between environmental effectiveness and political feasibility respectively whereas their relative cost effectiveness depends on implementation details bottom up architectures constitute imperfect substitutes for top down architectures in terms of environmental effectiveness and thus remain mere fallback options however especially the formal linking architecture can act as complement in terms of cost effectiveness

the eco efficiency of tourism the use of fossil energy is one of the major environmental problems associated with tourism and travel consequently the need to limit fossil energy use has been highlighted as a precondition for achieving sustainable tourism development however tourism is also one of the most important sectors of the world economy and fears have thus been expressed by the tourist industry and its organisations that increasing energy prices for example as a result of eco taxes could substantially decrease the economic welfare of countries and destinations in this article the interplay of environmental damage and economic gains is thus analysed within the context of tourism carbon dioxide equivalent emissions are assessed in relation to the revenues generated allowing for conclusions about the eco efficiency of tourism

nonpoint pollution control inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats abstract this paper develops an economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre specified environmental goal we show that such a policy can be designed to induce cost minimizing abatement without actually imposing the tax because the threat of imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance thus the combined policy approach can not only be more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach but can also be less costly than a pure ambient tax approach however whether the cost minimizing choices are a unique equilibrium or not depends on the design of the tax policy and whether or not it can be applied retroactively all results still hold if the background threat takes the form of a reducing in government subsidies

bottom up world climate policies preserving fossil fuel deposits vs capping fuel consumption the policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies this paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand side policy in a model with international trade and non cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices we investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and in particular with respect to the countries mitigation effort and welfare if countries are symmetric mitigation is stronger in the demand side than in the supply side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries if countries have different endowments of deposits in a two country economy the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply side than with the demand side policy finally we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments politiques climatiques mondiales ascendantes preservation des gisements de combustibles fossiles par opposition a la limitation de la consommation de carburant la politique d achat de gisements de combustibles fossiles aux fins de preservation represente une alternative aux politiques climatiques axees sur la demande predominant a la fois dans la pratique mais aussi dans les etudes professionnelles cet article analyse l approche fondee sur l achat de gisements et la compare a la politique standard axee sur la demande dans un modele de commerce international et de gouvernements non cooperatifs prenant en compte les effets de leurs politiques sur les prix d equilibre nous avons recherche en quoi les deux regimes differaient relativement a leur repartition de l equilibre et notamment relativement a l effort d attenuation et a la protection sociale si les pays sont symetriques l attenuation est plus prononcee dans un systeme axe sur la demande comparativement a un systeme axe sur l offre et la transition du second au premier systeme permet d ameliorer la protection sociale pour tous les pays dans une economie a deux pays differemment dotes en matiere de gisements le pays ayant les couts d extraction les plus eleves n achete pas de gisements a des fins de preservation tandis que le pays ayant les couts d extraction les moins eleves se retrouve en meilleure posture dans une politique axee sur l offre plutot que sur la demande pour terminer nous examinons le cas des politiques combinees et etonnamment nous constatons qu il n existe aucun equilibre en matiere de strategies pures lorsque des pays heterogenes appliquent les deux moyens d action

transferable licenses versus nontransferable licenses what is the difference this paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare we show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe however transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function we also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power the models have implications for several issues including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales

intra industry trade in financial services abstract intra industry trade iit has been central to increasing the variety of products available to consumers unlike traditional trade theories the recent trade theories have placed an emphasis on the role of foreign direct investment fdi in generating trade and increasing the volume of iit this study is the first study of intra industry trade in banking services in which the key elements of the new trade theories of iit have been taken into account in measuring the determinants of iit in banking services the empirical results of the determinants of iit in banking services indicate that factor endowments average per capita income fdi in banking economies of scale in the banking sector trade intensity between the us and its partners and market openness make a positive contribution to the volume of iit in banking services furthermore the empirical results indicate that intra trade activities amongst the us multinational corporations reduce the level of iit in banking services for the us

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

the voluntary provision of a pure public good the case of reduced cfc emissions and the montreal protocol abstract this paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon cfc emissions during the late 1980s by devising an empirical test we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with nash behavior when taste parameters are controlled the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory if the sample is purged of potential outliers then the linear relationship results a significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude

the enlargement of the european union effects on trade and emissions of greenhouse gases abstract with the gradual accession of various central and eastern european countries ceecs to the european union eu international trade between the eu and the ceecs will change as a result of trade liberalisation and the mobility of production factors within the eu the eu and most of the ceecs have already committed themselves to reduce by 2008 2012 their emissions of greenhouse gases ghgs by 8 compared to the 1990 level this paper reports on an investigation of the potential consequences of the enlargement of the eu and of the emission reduction target set by the kyoto protocol on the sectoral production patterns and international trade a comparative static general equilibrium model was developed to examine the impacts under different scenarios for illustrative purposes two regions the eu and the ceecs and three categories of goods and services agricultural goods industrial goods and services were included the model was calibrated by the 1998 data the model was subsequently applied to study the effects of free trade the mobility of factors and the environmental constraints on production and international trade in light of the enlargement of the eu we show that in this specific context free trade is beneficial to economic welfare and does not necessarily increase emissions of greenhouse gases the mobility of factors also increases economic welfare but in the case of fixed production technology it may harm the environment through more emissions of ghgs

the triple inefficiency of uncoordinated environmental policies when pollution is transboundary and there is international trade a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well known inefficiencies at the international level more precisely there will be a nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries however there will also be a nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions in this nash equilibrium welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries

the clean development mechanism in a world carbon market this paper discusses the role of the clean development mechanism cdm on the market for carbon quotas and countries commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels we show that the cdm contributes to an efficient funding of clean technology investments in least developed countries however the cdm is not neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps the cdm may also make inappropriate the inclusion of any country that takes no emission abatement commitment it can even make inefficient a country s decision to commit to an emission target

emissions trading with updated allocation effects on entry exit and distribution allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects it is well known that cost efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner e g based on emissions levels before the start of the system grandfathering bohringer and lange eur econ rev 49 2041 2055 2005 show that a cost effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated updating given that banking and borrowing are prohibited in this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering and how it affects profits for new and existing firms we find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar first the incentives to entry and exit are identical second the total value of free quotas to existing firms based on emissions before the system starts is also identical without any auctioning with updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances the two effects exactly cancel each other out if there is some combination of auction and free allocation the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same entry and exit incentives are still equal

decomposition of tourism greenhouse gas emissions revealing the dynamics between tourism economic growth technological efficiency and carbon emissions abstract this study proposes an analytical framework for decomposing the national tourism carbon footprint and carbon efficiency to identify the dynamics between economic growth technological efficiency and environmental externality using the environmentally extended input output model and decomposition methods tourism carbon changes are decomposed into the economic factors of total consumption and purchasing patterns and the production factors of industry input structure and technological improvement this macro level approach provides a basis for 1 assessing whether total tourism emissions increase in direct proportion to tourism consumption over time 2 tracing the underlying determinants and their effects on tourism emissions expansion and eco efficiency performance and 3 comparing the carbon performance of the tourism industry against the national average based on the example of taiwan the results demonstrate that we are a long way from the goal of using the technological efficiencies of production to offset tourism based carbon emissions

strategic investment in climate friendly technologies the impact of global emissions trading our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development r d of greenhouse gas ghg abatement technologies r d investments influence the future ghg abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries we distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries abatement costs unlike earlier contributions we include global trading in emission permits this changes the nature of the game with global permit trading industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home this comes in addition to investments abroad second we show that r d investments always decrease total emissions finally we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits

extending the sectoral coverage of an international emission trading scheme in a model inspired by the eu emissions trading scheme non cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non trading sectors each country is better off with trading than without and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme we analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two country model with quadratic abatement costs if only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries if the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric one country might lose but there is an aggregate welfare gain if the original trading sector and the non trading sector are asymmetric both countries always gain

political influence on non cooperative international climate policy we analyze non cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups in the first stage countries decide whether to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market which only forms if it is supported by all countries in the second stage countries non cooperatively decide on the number of tradable emission allowances in both stages special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor we find that i both the choice of regime and the levels of domestic and global emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups and ii an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the lobby group s less preferred regime

welfare ranking of environmental policies in the presence of capital mobility and cross border pollution we construct a model of two regions with cross border pollution and with inter regional regional capital mobility rcm or international international capital mobility icm capital mobility each region uses emission taxes or intra regionally or inter regionally tradable emission permits to reduce pollution we show that the non cooperative settings of all three instruments are always inefficient relative to their cooperative settings when regions are symmetric then i with rcm the non cooperative setting of intra regionally tradable emissions permits is welfare superior to that of the other two instruments ii with icm the non cooperative settings of intra regionally tradable emission permits and of emission taxes are equivalent and superior to that of inter regionally tradable emission permits and iii with icm the three instruments are equivalent only when cross border pollution is perfect

network economics and the environment insights and perspectives local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many environmental problems this paper discusses a wide range of issues and potential areas of application including the role of relational networks in the pattern of adoption of green technologies common pool resource problems characterized by a multiplicity of sources the role of social networks in multi level environmental governance infrastructural networks in the access to and use of natural resources such as oil and natural gas the use of networks to describe the internal structure of inter country relations in international agreements and the formation of bilateral links in the process of building up an environmental coalition for each of these areas we examine why and how network economics would be an effective conceptual and analytical tool and discuss the main insights that we can foresee

who should abate carbon emissions an international viewpoint abstract we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 1993b the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these conditions are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

scale and transfers in international emissions offset programs abstract voluntary emissions offset programs between developing and industrialized countries suffer from adverse selection because participants will self select into the program in contrast pure subsidies for mitigation lead to full participation and hence efficiency but require large financial transfers which make them unattractive to industrialized countries we present a simple model to demonstrate the impact of three policy options on the performance of offset programs 1 baseline scale increases 2 offset discounting and 3 setting stringent baselines with baseline scale increases entire political jurisdictions such as regions or nations are assigned a single aggregate baseline and must choose whether to participate as one entity we find that increasing scale both improves efficiency and reduces transfers from offset buyers to sellers offset discounting means paying less than the value of abatement and can be paired with trading ratios between offsets and allowances in a cap and trade system we show that discounting is inefficient but can make offsets more attractive to industrialized countries setting stringent baselines also involves a tradeoff between efficiency and transfers we finally show that pareto efficient policies that are individually rational for buyers and sellers entail some combination of discounting and or stringent baselines offset policies are never first best but can be efficiency improving especially with increased scale

international emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices abstract this paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non tradable emission allowances by non cooperative countries i find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution in particular environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries moreover if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall conversely a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution

greenhouse gas emission controls and firm locations in north south trade this paper studies greenhouse gas emission ghg controls in the presence of international carbon leakage through international firm relocation in a new economic geography model with two countries north and south only north sets a target for ghg emissions we compare the consequences of emission quotas and emission taxes under trade liberalization on location of two manufacturing sectors with different emission intensities and degrees of carbon leakage with low trade costs further trade liberalization increases global emissions by facilitating carbon leakage regulation by quotas leads to spatial sorting resulting in less carbon leakage and less global emissions than regulation by taxes

market integration and competition in environmental and trade policies recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers to address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of trade and the environment we develop a two stage game model where governments choose environmental and trade policies and firms play a cournot nash game we show that reductions in transport costs lead to lower emission taxes and higher tariffs and we find that the degree of pollution damage plays a central role in whether market integration is welfare improving relative to autarky

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

on international equity weights and national decision making on climate change abstract estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different jurisdictions implicitly or explicitly such estimates assume a social welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice we show that previous approaches to equity weighting are inappropriate from a national decision maker s point of view because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values we propose four alternatives sovereignty altruism good neighbour and compensation with different views on concern for and liability towards foreigners the four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy

monopolistic competition and international trade reconsidering the evidence we test some propositions about international trade flows that are derived from models of monopolistic competition developed by elhanan helpman and paul krugman we investigate whether the volume of trade between oecd countries is consistent with the predictions of a model in which all trade is intraindustry trade in differentiated products we then repeat the test with non oecd countries we also investigate whether the share of intraindustry trade is consistent with a more general theoretical model in which some but not all trade is intraindustry trade our results lead us to question the apparent empirical success of these models

environmental policy in open economies and monopolistic competition this paper analyses the implications of international trade for non cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities a particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade a tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad since such a policy reduces their variety of imports due to fewer domestic product inventions or their consumption of each imported brand due to higher import prices ignoring the negative spillover non cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium in contrast to this clear cut inefficiency result the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous

current issues in the economics of groundwater resource management the issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource in this article we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity we present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels in particular we critically review economic models of groundwater use examine the potential for groundwater management discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use allocation of this resource finally we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

intra industry trade and strategic interaction theory and evidence abstract we conduct a theory based empirical study of intraindustry trade in homogeneous products we derive an oligopolistic model of intra industry trade which is an extension of the segmented market model of trade initially proposed by brander j a 1981 intra industry trade in identical commodities journal of international economics 11 1 14 the empirical implementations of the model are investigated in the context of the petrochemical industry our analysis employs a unique data set containing detailed product and location specific data on the petrochemical industries in germany and the united states allowing for different empirical specifications we find that cross product variations in bilateral intra industry trade of petrochemicals are well explained by the variables suggested by the theoretical model

inter market variability in co2 emission intensities in tourism implications for destination marketing and carbon management there is a growing gap between tourism s rapidly growing greenhouse gas emissions and the sector s aspirational emission reduction targets as well as the international policy consensus to reduce emissions from this and all other sectors of the economy the transport component is the largest ghg contributor to the global tourism system in the absence of supranational policy agreements to curb emissions from international aviation and cruise tourism as well as limited national policy initiatives there has been a recent shift in research to the potential role of market based carbon management for destinations to reduce emissions air travel is the most important subsector generating ghgs in international tourism this article analyses the composition of international tourism markets arriving by air and their respective contribution to emissions at 11 selected countries with distinctly different tourism economies the implications of changes in the market composition of these countries between 1995 and 2010 for average tourist carbon intensity and total emissions are examined results indicate variations in inter market emission intensities of up to a factor 30 127 3930 kg co2 tourist if comparing individual markets for the whole range of destinations and up to a factor 5 370 1830 kg co2 tourist if comparing average emission intensities between destinations findings are discussed with regard to the potential for destinations to reduce emissions from tourism by strategically fostering specific markets c 2014 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

intra industry trade and industry distribution of productivity a cournot ricardo approach this paper constructs a cournot ricardo model of trade by incorporating cournot competition in a ricardian trade model in this model the share of intra industry trade in bilateral trade volume decreases as trading partners become more different in terms of the industry distribution of labor productivity we show that this relationship is a special case of a more general relationship the share of intraindustry is decreasing in a specialization index this specialization index turns out to be equal to the difference in the industry distribution of productivity in the case of our cournot ricardo model while it is given by the difference in capital labor in the well known case of monopolistic competition as both technologies and factor endowments would be important in shaping specialization patterns in the real world we conjecture that the share of intra industry trade is decreasing in two measures of specialization the difference in the industry distribution of productivity and the difference in capital ratio our ols estimations strongly support this conjecture in fixed effects regressions both measures lose significance in the entire sample but the industry distribution of productivity is significant in explaining trade between high income countries

how bad is antidumping evidence from panel data abstract current research on antidumping suggests a number of channels through which antidumping affects the volume of world trade this paper uses a structural approach to the gravity model framework to evaluate these hypotheses using data on trade volume over the period 1948 to 2001 we conclude that the volume and welfare effects have been negative but quite modest

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

goods prices and exchange rates what have we learned import prices typically change by a smaller proportion than the exchange rate between the exporting and importing country recent research indicates that common currency relative prices for similar goods exported to different markets are highly correlated with exchange rates between those markets this evidence suggests that incomplete pass through is a consequence of third degree price discrimination while distance matters for market segmentation borders have independent effects the source of the border effect has not been clearly identified furthermore there is little evidence yet to suggest substantial market power is implied by the observed price discrimination

the principal agent model with multilateral externalities an application to climate agreements we consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present the motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness to pay wtp for emissions abatement due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and thus can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading moreover optimal contracts can include a boundary part i e the endogenous type dependent participation constraint is binding which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract compared to this outside option a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low wtp and reduce her payoff for high types subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal

transitional restricted linkage between emissions trading schemes linkages between emissions trading systems are deemed an important element of the future climate policy landscape they are however difficult to agree and remain few and far between temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and gradually approach unrestricted full linkage we compare the relative merits of several link restrictions in this respect namely quantitative transfer limits border taxes on transfers exchange and discount rates and unilateral linkage to this end we develop a simple model to have a unifying framework which in conjunction with lessons we draw from real world experiences serves as a basis for a broader policy oriented discussion while quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage they can lead to uncertain distributional effects and weaken price signals these aspects are mitigated under a border permit tax but this policy seems harder to implement exchange rates have potential to adjust for programmes stringencies and raise ambition over time but can be challenging to select as experience corroborates unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach

international emissions trading good or bad abstract using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency

environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region two firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants both firms pollute and market structure is endogenous to environmental policy there are increasing returns at the plant level imperfect competition between the home and the foreign firm and transport costs between the two markets at critical levels of environmental policy variables small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant or shifts production to from a foreign branch plant the implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional pigouvian marginal analysis

intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and internationally increasing returns this paper examines the relationship between intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and increasing returns we develop a two country model in which production occurs in two stages final and intermediate good production intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and final good production exhibits increasing returns with respect to the number of varieties of intermediates pollution occurs in the production of the final good when polluting intermediates are used we analyze the effects of international trade in intermediate products on pollution output and welfare under an endogenous tax scenario and with two types of pollution functions the results show that because of increasing returns international trade either leads to lower total pollution in each country or lower pollution per unit of output in at least one country in addition intra industry trade causes countries to import the environmental quality of their trading partners

international emission permit markets with refunding we propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the eu trading scheme each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer a fraction of these permits is grandfathered the remainder is auctioned revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions we show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets if the share of grandfathered permits is sufficiently small we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions

product differentiation competition and international trade in this paper the two workhorse theories of international trade under imper fect competition krugman s taste for variety model and brander s strategic intra industry trade model are integrated into a single analytical framework a quadratic utility function allows for a nesting of these two theories by postulating a consumer taste for variety over differentiated products where the extent of product differentiation is linked to the intensity of strategic interaction among firms the model yields intuitive predictions on the effects of the degree of product differentiation on the volume of trade and on the composition of the gains from trade under imperfect competition jel classifi cation f12

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

is trade in permits good for the environment we analyze the impact of trade in emission permits on environmental policy when countries trade a differentiated good pollution is always higher with tradable permits as compared to the case where permits are not internationally tradable if pollution is a pure global public bad i e the marginal damage from transboundary pollution is the same as that from local pollution the permit price under trade equals the domestic marginal damage from own emissions if pollution is not a pure global public bad i e the marginal damage from transboundary pollution is less than that from local pollution trade results in a permit price lower than the domestic marginal damage from own emissions pollution is higher under trade relative to autarky regardless of the nature of transboundary pollution the permit price equivalent pollution tax is lower and pollution is higher with internationally tradable permits than with nontradable permits

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds

the case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy we evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self interest to do so we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies countries decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made noncooperatively so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains despite this we find that emission trade agreements can be effective that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes