involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

implicit contracts labor mobility and unemployment firms inability to monitor their employees search effort forces a tradeoff between risk bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment related insurance since the provision of insurance against firm specific shocks adversely affects workers incentives to find better jobs the optimal contract provides only partial insurance it prescribes low high wages and under over employment to encourage workers to leave stay at low high productivity firms and it employs quits and layoffs as alternative means of inducing separations at low productivity firms with the mix depending upon the relative efficiency of the on and off the job search technologies our analysis of implicit contracts with asymmetric search information establishes that any consistent explanation for worksharing layoffs severance pay quits and unemployment must focus on questions of labor mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

renegotiation proof labour and credit contracts with worker mobility this paper investigates the interaction between a privately informed firm s contracts for labour and its contracts for credit the analysis shows that if the worker has no ex post outside opportunities or if the liquidation value of the firm is large then the credit contract can always be state independent if the worker has outside opportunities and the liquidation value is small then the credit contract must be state dependent however if the worker is unable to precommit not to renegotiate with the firm then the credit contract must be state independent to ensure renegotiation proofness and protect the interests of the creditor this leads to credit rationing and under investment

nonrevelation in employment contracts the author considers an employment contracting model in which firms have private information that is directly payoff relevant to workers and workers are always free to quit in contrast to existing models firms will sometimes fail to reveal adverse information to workers in equilibrium because of the effect this will have on quits risk averse workers can prefer such pooling contracts to separating ones because inducing truth telling requires firms to cut wages in states that are already bad for the worker applications to firms incentives to reveal unsafe working conditions and impending layoffs or plant closures are discussed copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a new theory of aggregate supply macroeconomic theory contains two competing explanations of business cycle fluctuations according to the intertemporal substitution mechanism its observed variations in employment represent the optimal response of labor supply to misperceived variations in the expected real rate of interest a competing theory is offered by the literature on overlapping contracts that attributes employment variations to contracted nominal wage rigidities such rigidities prevent prices from adjusting in a way that would allow quantities to mimic the theoretical predictions of the walrasian marketclearing model both of these theories incorporate the property that employment converges in the long run to a natural rate of employment this paper develops an alternative theory it presents a model of an economy in which agents are rational utility maximizers with perfect foresight of future prices nevertheless the competitive equilibrium is pareto inefficient this situation arises because the economy does not contain a complete set of markets perfect capital markets do not exist because of asymmetric information ai a complete set of futures markets does not exist because agents have finite lives and trades cannot be negotiated with the unborn these two sources of market failure are modeled by embedding a theory of ai contracts into an overlapping generations model olg in which a critical role is played by the additional assumption that in some states of nature bankruptcy may be a binding constraint the nonexistence of futures markets generates a model with the property that government debt is real wealth which implies that fiscal policy can have a permanent effect on the real rate of interest the bankruptcy constraint translates changes in the rate of interest into changes in the frequency of contract default simply stated a high interest rate increases the probability that a firm will go bankrupt or that it will layoff workers in sharp contrast to either the new classical or the sticky price contract explanations of business cycle fluctuations this theory is not a natural rate theory even in the long run it predicts that the steady state employment level is an endogenous variable which varies systematically with fiscal policy

labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy abstract this paper investigates the interaction between a firm s contracts for labor and its contracts for credit under asymmetric information and limited liability when workers are either always committed to their contract or they lack the power to commit ex post because arbitrage opportunities are available to them the analysis contains two main results first contrary to the perceptions of the limited liability literature where limited liability is thought of causing both underemployment and income underinsurance limited liability is in fact shown to only cause underemployment existence of outside sources of credit eliminates the underinsurance side of the inefficiency but can not eliminate underemployment second the factor that does cause underinsurance is the existence of ex post arbitrage opportunities for the worker worker mobility leads to underinsurance regardless of whether limited liability is binding or not and even if outside sources of credit exist thus underemployment stems from limited liability and underinsurance stems from worker mobility

do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries summary few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world this paper fills this lacuna by constructing and analyzing a new data set on international migration remittances inequality and poverty from 71 developing countries the results show that both international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level depth and severity of poverty in the developing world after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration and controlling for various factors results suggest that on average a 10 increase in the share of international migrants in a country s population will lead to a 2 1 decline in the share of people living on less than 1 00 per person per day after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances a similar 10 increase in per capita official international remittances will lead to a 3 5 decline in the share of people living in poverty

involuntary layoffs in a model with asymmetric information concerning worker ability this paper examines the contract between a risk neutral firm and its risk averse employees assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm such as the number of workers it lays off the threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels a seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

aspirations and inequality the premise of this paper is twofold first people s aspirations for their future wellbeing or that of their children aect their incentives to invest second the experiences of others help shape one s aspirations this paper marries a model of aspirations based choice with a simple theory of aspirations formation to study the relationship between aspirations and the distribution of income through its impact on investments aspirations aect economic mobility and the income distribution which in turn shape aspirations thus aspirations income and the distribution of income evolve jointly and in many situations in a self reinforcing way we study the consequences of this model for income distribution as well as for growth rates over dierent quantiles of the distribution we show that extreme equality is unstable moreover when the same aspirations are shared in a society polarization arises the theory we propose captures both the complacency stemming from low aspirations and the frustration resulting from aspirations that are too high as a result for commonly held aspirations growth rates have an inverted u shape along the income distribution

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

wage and employment structure in an economy with internal labor markets the paper discusses the economics of promotion and in particular studies wage and employment structure in an economy with internal labor markets it is shown under a wide range of assumptions that firms will set a nondecreasing wage profile that for reasons apparently not suggested before both junior and senior workers may be paid more or less than their marginal product and that firms will offer a flat wage schedule if labor hours are supplied perfectly inelastically

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

wage secrecy as a social convention there is a time to keep silent and a time to speak out ecclesiastes 3 7 ask anyone who works for a living how much money he or she makes and you are likely to encounter a range of responses from evasion to outright hostility such responses however should not be surprising according to organizational etiquette it is considered gauche to ask others their salaries in a study at e i du pont de nemours all employees were asked if the company should disclose more payroll information so that everyone would know everyone else s pay only 18 voted for an open pay system dolan and schuler 1987 315 m any organizations have strict policies and norms about the secrecy of pay it is seen as inappropriate in most companies for employees to talk about what they earn and data are rarely given out even internally on salaries some organizations even fire individuals who release salary data this is one way to make it very clear that the organization means it when it says it believes in pay secrecy lawler 1990 239 t he issue of openness or secrecy in the communication of compensation information is one of the most important issues facing senior management henderson 1985 379 i introduction despite the general belief that a free flow of information enhances efficiency social convention appears to call for secrecy regarding individuals wages this paper provides an explanation for this convention we suggest that the role of wage secrecy is to reduce effective labor mobility and thereby enhance the feasibility of risk shifting contracts wage secrecy may yield a mix of mobility and risk shifting that is superior both to a spot market for labor and to a social convention that binds workers to their employers in promising to pay a worker a pre agreed wage rate labor contracts shift uncertainty from workers to employers and provide workers with insurance in particular if workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral such contracts may enhance the welfare of workers without imposing a cost on firms since a risk shifting contract shields workers from the vicissitudes of the market wage rates need not equal the marginal product of labor in good outcomes workers pay the firm an insurance premium by accepting a wage rate that is lower than their marginal product in bad outcomes workers collect on their insurance policy earning a wage rate that exceeds their marginal product 1 if workers can move freely from one firm to another however risk shifting labor contracts may not be feasible given such freedom of movement workers will stay with their firm if the wage rate exceeds that offered elsewhere and move if they can obtain a higher wage rate in another firm hence without restrictions on labor mobility risk shifting contracts will not be offered and wage rates will vary with the marginal product of labor in this case the market in labor is a spot market the risk shifting role of labor contracts may be salvaged by a social convention that binds workers to their firms this would require that a worker who leaves his employer earlier than the accepted norm would be viewed as breaking a social convention and develop a damaging reputation we shall refer to this type of convention as a binding convention 2 it appears that a binding convention is assumed in most of the implicit contract literature binding however comes at a cost while facilitating risk shifting it may lead to inefficient resource allocation with a binding convention the tradeoff between the loss in output and the extent of workers exposure to risk depends on the nature of risks faced by the firm when the only risk that firms face is an aggregate shock defined as a shock that affects all firms in a sector in the same way binding does not reduce production efficiency if the marginal product of labor is the same in all firms the worker s place of employment does not affect output

efficiency wage models of unemployment keynesian economists hold it to be self evident that business cycles are characterized by involuntary unemployment but construction of a model of the cycle with involuntary unemployment faces the obvious difficulty of explaining why the labor market does not clear involuntarily unemployed people by definition want to work at less than the going wage rate why don t firms cut wages thereby increasing profits

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

optimal severance pay with incomplete information this paper contrasts optimal employment contracts in a world of full information and in a world in which the worker s alternative employment possibilities cannot be observed by the firm the difference between income and severance pay that is the opportunity cost of separating will be higher in more productive states of nature with complete wage insurance no longer possible we therefore have an explanation of higher ability individuals receiving high wages in the short run in long term contracts the explanation does not rely as past explanations have done on the imperfections in bonding arrangements or in loan markets

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

equilibrium wage distributions the observation that different firms charge different prices for what appears to be the same commodity or pay different wages for what appears to be equivalent labour has long been explained in economics by a reference to imperfect information this paper is concerned with characterising market equilibrium with imperfect information we do not present a general theory rather we develop in some detail an example of importance in its own right imperfect information in the labour market several properties of our example in particular the existence of equilibria with price wage dispersion unemployment excess supply of labour positive profits multiple equilibria and the nonoptimality or some of all of the equilibria are of more general validity other results may not be this paper is concerned with two kinds of imperfect information a individuals may not know the wage paid in any particular firm or whether there is a vacancy in any particular firm until they apply for a job 1 b there are several characteristics besides the wage rate associated with a job which are important to the individual some like the normal length of a work week become known when the individual applies for the job information about other characteristics e g personalities of colleagues is acquired only gradually there is one important difference between the two kinds of imperfect in