a seniority arrangement for sovereign debt a sovereign s inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long term debt costly the problem of debt dilution one mechanism to mitigate this problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in debt contracts in the event of default creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent the absolute priority or first in time rule in this paper we propose a modification of the absolute priority rule suited to sovereign debts contracts and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default jel e32 e44 f34 g15 h63 o16 o19

merger failure and merger profitability the focus of the paper is the effect of merger proposals on the expected profitability of the bidder and the target we illustrate how an unsuccessful bid may increase the profitability of the target but reduce the profitability of the bidding firm relative to the profitability of the firms before the merger offer the profitability of a merger proposal is lowered due to learning from rejection we use our theoretical model to explain empirical work on this issue theoretical work on the profitability of takeovers has rarely focused on the problem of unsuccessful merger proposals or tender offers this is unfortunate because the decision that is generally available to a firm is not whether it should merge with another firm but rather whether it makes a merger proposal or tender offer in this paper we contend that failure to take account of this may bias estimates of the profitability of takeover attempts the focus of the paper is the effect of merger proposals on the expected profitability of the bidding firm and the target firm we describe a theoretical model to show how an unsuccessful bid may increase the profitability of the target but reduce the profitability of the bidding firm relative to the profitability of the firms before the merger offer this is independent of any effect of potential future takeovers on the value of the firm consequently the profitability of a merger proposal will be lower than in the absence of any effect conditional on rejection the assumption causing this result is that a target firm has private information about its profitability which is not available to the bidding firm assume that there is uncertainty about the profitability of the target and that the bidder offers x dollars for the target the target accepts if its profits from not being merged are less than x and is rejected otherwise hence the response of the target to a merger proposal reveals information on the competitiveness or profitability of the target we further assume that the two firms the bidder and target compete in a duopolistic market and play a cournot game in quantities if a merger does not occur therefore we are restricting attention to horizontal mergers in the equilibrium of our model bidding firms that suffer rejection of their we would like to thank peter cramton norman ireland alvin klevorick and james mirrlees and two anonymous referees for helpful comments this is true for e g salant switzer and reynolds 1983 davidson and denekere 1983 perry and porter 1985 and grossman and hart 1980

nonparametric estimation of sample selection models sample selection models provide an important way of accounting for economic decisions that combine discrete and continuous choices and of correcting for nonrandom sampling nonparametric estimators for these models are developed in this paper these can be used for estimating shapes and important economic quantities as in standard nonparametnc regression endogeneity of regressors of interest is allowed for series estimators for these models are developed which are useful for imposing additivity restnctions that arise from selection corrections convergence rates and asymptotic normality results are derived an application to returns to schooling among australian young females is given

endogenous borrowing constraints and stagnation in latin america latin america has had striking changes in economic performance over time none more striking than consumption consumption per capita in the year 2004 was roughly the same as it was in 1980 latin america is also an open economic region with several international debt crises this paper studies the time path of consumption using a small open economy real business cycle model with limited commitment i compare the distortions to the planner s pareto weights and investment that are generated endogenously by the model to those that can be recovered from an international extension of a business cycle accounting exercise in the spirit of chari kehoe and mcgrattan 2007 i find that the limited commitment model does a good job at explaining the behavior of latin american consumption and that the endogenous distortions to the planner s pareto weights are very similar to those recovered from the accounting exercise

rational expectations analysts forecasts of earnings and sources of value gains for takeover targets abstract value gains to target firm shareholders in takeover bids may be due to potential synergy between bidder and target and or potential target restructuring based on new information released by the bid since these two models have different implications for the anticipated earnings of the target as a stand alone entity analysts earnings forecast revisions afr for the target during the bid may provide evidence for the new information hypothesis for 326 uk targets of takeover bids during 1987 1993 we estimate analysts earnings forecast revisions using the institutional brokers estimate system ibes and relate them to bid premia paid to target shareholders analysts revise their forecasts significantly up on bid announcement for failed especially failed hostile bids the earnings forecast revision and bid premium are more positively correlated than for successful and friendly bids this is consistent with the rational expectations behaviour of target shareholders modelled by grossman and hart s j grossman o d hart bell journal of economics 11 1 1980 42 s j grossman o d hart journal of finance 36 1981 253

borrowing constraints and credit demand in a developing economy summary this paper investigates the determinants of credit demand in the presence of borrowing constraints in a developing economy we model the determinants of observed debt for chilean households while accounting for selection bias and the endogeneity of their income and specific household assets using a novel chilean dataset we estimate the relationship between household characteristics and consumer and mortgage debt we find substantial differences in the nature of these relationships across the types of debt for example we find that the income elasticity for consumer debt is greater than 1 whereas for mortgage debt it is not the results suggest the increased availability of credit combined with the aging of the chilean population is likely to drastically change the distribution and level of chilean debt these findings are particularly relevant for other developing economies currently experiencing rapid income and debt growth copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

does acquisition of a cooperative generate profits for the buyer the dairyworld case this article examines the takeover of a cooperative dairyworld by an investor owned firm saputo that was not previously present in the industry determines if this takeover generates greater returns for the investor owned firms iof and on the basis of this evidence makes some inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and iofs the empirical evidence strongly supports the conclusion that saputo s stock price rose with its takeover announcement this outcome is consistent with a number of explanations including that saputo was unaffected by hubris a factor often suggested as the reason that many firms overbid when they undertake acquisitions dairyworld s poor liquidity and capital shortage problems as well as a limited number of suitors may have weakened its bargaining position in its dealings with saputo the observed increase in saputo s stock price is also consistent with the possibility that by taking over a cooperative saputo was able to decrease competition and thus increase its profits a fruitful area for future research would be a rigorous theoretical and empirical determination of the impact that these various factors have on acquisition profitability such analysis is required before inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and iofs can be fully answered

testing for liquidity constraints in euler equations with complementary data sources previous tests for liquidity constraints using consumption euler equations have frequently split the sample on the basis of wealth arguing that low wealth consumers are more likely to be constrained we propose alternative tests using different and more direct information on borrowing constraints obtained from the 1983 survey of consumer finances in a first stage we estimate probabilities of being constrained which are then utilized in a second sample the panel study of income dynamics to estimate switching regression models of the euler equation our estimates indicate stronger excess sensitivity associated with the possibility of liquidity constraints than the sample splitting approach

debt dilution and sovereign default risk we measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and study debt covenants that could mitigate these effects we calibrate a baseline model with endogenous debt duration and default risk in which debt can be diluted using data from spain we find that debt dilution accounts for 78 percent of the default risk in the baseline economy and that eliminating dilution increases the optimal duration of sovereign debt by almost 2 years eliminating dilution also increases consumption volatility but still produces welfare gains the debt covenants we study could help enforcing fiscal rules

personal bankruptcy and credit supply and demand this paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit while generous state level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policy makers as benefiting less well off borrowers our results using data from the 1983 survey of consumer finances suggest that they increase the amount of credit held by high asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low asset households conditioning on observable characteristics thus bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets interest rates on automobile loans for low asset households also appear to be higher in high exemption states

toehold acquisitions shareholder wealth and the market for corporate control this study examines the valuation consequences of control related outcomes that fol low toehold acquisitions we find evidence that toehold acquisitions facilitate valueenhancing control transfers the types of control transfers not only include takeovers but also internal mechanisms such as proxy fights and management turnovers we find that toehold targets experiencing such control transfers exhibit an abnormal increase in share value while those not experiencing such control transfers exhibit an abnormal de crease in share value the results suggest that the positive valuation effect associated with toehold acquisitions reflects the expected benefits of subsequent control transfers

optimal maturity of government debt without state contingent bonds abstract this paper shows that state contingent debt can be synthetically constructed using non contingent debt of different maturities a main policy implication of this principle is that the ramsey allocation with complete markets can be sustained with non contingent debt only by properly managing its maturity structure the numerical experiments however suggest that this policy implication ought to be taken with care we find that the debt positions that sustain the ramsey allocation are very high on the order of a few hundred times total gdp for a very simple four state economy and increasing in the number of states in addition they are very sensitive to small variations in the parameters of the model

capital flows under moral hazard abstract i analyze a model with moral hazard and limited enforcement in a small open economy i find that when state contingent contracting is allowed adding the moral hazard friction improves the model s predictions along several dimensions first it justifies why non contingent debt is an optimal way to finance an emerging economy second it explains the limited consumption risk sharing and high volatile and counter cyclical interest rates third it generates realistic crisis like dynamics in which capital inflows are brought to a halt and interest rates sky rocket the model also has a strong internal propagation mechanism limited enforcement friction alone or together with moral hazard has nearly no effect on the model s performance i also construct a simple empirical test to distinguish between the two frictions and it favors moral hazard over limited enforcement friction

who is credit constrained in the u s economy an important assumption of the life cycle model of consumption is the postulate of perfect capital markets this hypothesis has recently been challenged by substantial empirical evidence hall and mishkin 1982 using the panel study of income dynamics estimate that 20 percent of united states families are liquidity constrained mariger 1986 derives a life cycle model with endogenous liquidity constraints and using a cross section estimates this fraction to be 19 4 percent hubbard and judd 1986 simulate a model with a constraint on net worth which shows that with reasonable assumptions about preferences 19 0 percent of united states consumers are liquidity constrained the emerging consensus points therefore to a fraction of approximately 20 percent of the population behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the pure life cycle model in addition hayashi 1985 and zeldes 1989 investigate the correlation among consumption wealth and income for various population groups and infer that liquidity constraints are more important for younger families with low levels of wealth and saving the main limitation of these studies is that in their data sets constrained consumers are not observable and have to be identified via indirect evidence thus there is as yet little firm evidence about the characteristics of the consumers who are likely to be credit constrained this paper adopts an approach that differs from previous tests for liquidity constraints because it makes use of data where constrained consumers are observable and explicitly links their existence to credit market imperfections and personal characteristics the data drawn from the 1983 survey of consumer finances scf and described in section ii provide information on individuals whose request for credit has been rejected by financial intermediaries in section iii a model is developed in which consumers and lenders behavior jointly determines the probability that a consumer is rationed in the credit market this probability is then

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

international business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets backus kehoe and kydland 1992 baxter and crucini 1995 and stockman and tesar 1995 find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data in the models cross country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output while in the data the opposite is true and cross country correlations of employment and investment are negative while in the data they are positive this paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies the friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable any country can renege on its debts and suffer the consequences for future borrowing to solve for equilibrium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets the methods of marcet and marimon 1999 are extended incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more than does exogenously restricting the assets that can be traded

efficient sovereign default in this article i show that the key aspects of sovereign debt crises can be rationalized as part of the efficient risk sharing arrangement between a sovereign borrower and foreign lenders in a production economy with informational and commitment frictions the constrained efficient allocation involves ex post inefficient outcomes that resemble sovereign default episodes in the data and can be implemented with non contingent defaultable bonds and active maturity management defaults and periods of temporary exclusion from international credit markets happen along the equilibrium path and are essential to supporting the efficient allocation furthermore during debt crises the maturity composition of debt shifts towards short term debt and the term premium inverts as in the data

the rationale behind interfirm tender offers information or synergy this paper investigates the rationale behind interlirm tender offers by examining the returns realized by the stockholders of lirms that were the targets of unsuccessful tender offers and lirms that have made unsuccessful offers our results suggest that the permanent positive revaluation of the unsuccessful target shares documented by dodd and ruback 1977 and bradley 1980 is due primarily to the emergence of and or the anticipation of another bid that would ultimately result in the transfer of control of the target resources we also find that the rejection of a tender offer has differential effects on the share prices of the unsuccessful bidding firms depending upon whether the tender offer process results in a change in the control of target resources on the basis of these results we conclude that acquisitions via tender offers are attempts by bidding firms to exploit potential synergies not simply superior information regarding the true value of the target resources

efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance abstract this paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance we impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility the paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question what is the trade off between equality and efficiency in resource allocation journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 d82 j65

the effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth abstract this paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth i find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines also the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment the evidence implies that on average poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation

the social construction of market value institutionalization and learning perspectives on stock market reactions this study advances a social constructionist view of financial market behavior the paper suggests that the market s reaction to particular corporate practices such as stock repurchase plans are not as financial economists contend simply a function of the inherent efficiency of such practices rather stock market reactions are also influenced by the prevailing institutional logic and the degree of institutionalization of the practice the theory first predicts that the emergence of the agency perspective on corporate governance in the mid 1980s represented a powerful new institutional logic that would lead the market to reverse its prior aggregate reaction to stock repurchase plans in the united states the paper then considers the potential for institutional decoupling of repurchase plans and develops competing hypotheses about how the market value of these policies might have changed as more firms formally adopted but did not implement the plans over time in contrast to a financial economic pers

corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms stock returns this study explores the role of the method of payment in explaining common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids the results reveal significant differences in the abnormal returns between common stock exchanges and cash offers the results are independent of the type of takeover bid i e merger or tender offer and of bid outcomes these findings supported by analysis of nonconvertible bonds are attributed mainly to signalling effects and imply that the inconclusive evidence of earlier studies on takeovers may be due to their failure to control for the method of payment recent studies on corporate takeovers provide inconclusive results on the valuation effects of acquisitions on the common stock of bidding firms 1 substantial differences are reported between the studies that analyze acquisitions initiated as tender offers and those that confine their samples to merger proposals the existence of mixed empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions about the managers acquisition motivations nevertheless the reason for the substantial difference between empirical findings on mergers and tender offers still remains an unresolved issue it is observed however that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers are usually cash offers given that different methods of financing a project have different signalling implications myers and majluf 39 the differential stock returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers may be due to the method of acquisition financing

a reexamination of analysts earnings forecasts for takeover targets abstract we examine analysts earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and document that the announcement month forecasts are systematically revised upward supporting the hypothesis that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target firm in addition we find that abnormal forecast revisions of future stand alone earnings are significantly greater for targets with low tobin s q ratios relative to targets with high q ratios lending further support to the information hypothesis finally we provide evidence that managerial resistance to the takeover does not destroy value our results are in direct contrast to pound 1988

do liquidity constraints and interest rates matter for consumer behavior evidence from credit card data this paper utilizes a unique new dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how people respond to changes in credit supply the data consist of a panel of thousands of individual credit card accounts from several different card issuers with associated credit bureau data we estimate both marginal propensities to consume mpcs out of liquidity and interest rate elasticities we also evaluate the ability of different models of consumption to rationalize our results distinguishing the permanent income hypothesis pih liquidity constraints precautionary saving and behavioral models we find that increases in credit limits generate an immediate and significant rise in debt counter to the pih the average mpc out of liquidity ddebt dlimit ranges between 10 14 the mpc is much larger for people starting near their limits consistent with binding liquidity constraints however the mpc is significant even for people starting well below their limit we show this response is consistent with buffer stock models of precautionary saving nonetheless there are other results that conventional models cannot easily explain e g why so many people are borrowing on their credit cards and simultaneously holding low yielding assets unlike most other studies we also find strong effects from changes in account specific interest rates the long run elasticity of debt to the interest rate is approximately 1 3 less than half of this elasticity represents balance shifting across cards with most reflecting net changes in total borrowing the elasticity is larger for decreases in interest rates than for increases which can explain the widespread use of temporary promotional rates the elasticity is smaller for people starting near their credit limits again consistent with liquidity constraints

a note on unsuccessful tender offers and stockholder returns recent research shows that unsuccessful tender offers may affect target share returns for two years past the offer s announcement this note examines target returns in the interim between the announcement and one year after the offer s withdrawal analyzing a recent sample of targets that did not get another bid in the year following a failed tender offer this study reaches two conclusions first all of an offer s premium disappears by the time failure becomes public second excess returns are zero in the post failure year an explanation that is based on the causes of the tender offers failures is presented previous research has shown that shareholders of firms acquired by tender offers realize significantly positive excess returns see bradley 3 bradley desai and kim 4 and dodd and ruback 6 early studies such as bradley 3 and dodd and ruback 6 indicated that failed offers raise share values permanently recently bradley desai and kim 4 challenged this view with a study of returns to firms that did not receive offers for a long time following a cancelled bid they discovered that though a withdrawn offer may favorably affect a target s share value for months after the offer the initial price increase disappears within two years of the announcement similar developments such as those of asquith 1 dodd 5 langetieg 8 and mandelker 9 marked the research on mergers this note extends the work of bradley desai and kim hereafter bdk by analyzing returns to target shares in the time between the date of offer and one year after the offer s failure and public withdrawal the tests focus on two key but not fully explored phases of a failed offer the time from announcement to withdrawal and the first year after that event the sample of failed offers is quite special because it contains only those whose targets received no other bid in the year after the offer s withdrawal as bdk emphasize and as asquith 1 shows in his study of mergers only such rare cases provide the opportunity for a precise evaluation of returns to targets of failing acquisition efforts

competitive equilibria with limited enforcement we show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations in a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt in an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt the tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality the decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments

a theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics there is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival in this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing lending relationship with asymmetric information we show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long term lending contract and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower s claim to future cash flows increases we also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics in agreement with the empirical evidence as age and size increase mean and variance of growth decrease and firm survival increases

management buyout proposals and inside information this paper explores stock price behavior surrounding withdrawn buyout proposals to determine whether managers proposal announcements reveal any information which is unrelated to the efficiency gains associated with completed buyouts on average firms whose managers withdraw buyout proposals do not sustain significantly positive stock price effects unless they receive subsequent acquisition bids in addition managers of firms with completed buyouts are no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who withdrew proposals i interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that inside information commonly motivates management buyout proposals management buyouts occur when a group of investors including some incumbent managers buy all of a firm s outstanding common stock with the intent of taking it private critics of management buyouts argue that managers access to inside information allows them to time their proposals to expropriate the wealth of outside shareholders these opponents generally cite anecdotal evidence that favorable inside information motivates management buyout proposals 1 managers themselves suggest that their proposals are motivated at least in part by their information advantage 2 however assistant professor of finance texas a m university this paper is based on my univer

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

bank m a a market power story this paper analyzes capital market reactions to international bank m a we investigate the combined stock return patterns of targets bidders and their peers upon takeover announcement and closing or withdrawal we distinguish five common m a hypotheses and relate characteristic and mutually exclusive abnormal stock return patterns to each hypothesis the findings show that there are more investors who believe in gains through the exploitation of market power by the post merger entity than investors who believe in any of the other motives tested in the paper in a multinomial logistic model we show that patterns related to market power significantly concur with large relative target size intra industry mergers and increasing market concentration suggesting a substantial lessening of competition through m a

corporate acquisitions a theory of special cases a review of event studies applied to acquisitions mergers occur when an acquiring firm and a target firm s agree to combine under legal procedures established in the states in which the merger participants are incorporated a tender offer is an offer to purchase a proportion of the outstanding shares of the target firm at specified terms on or before a specified date those shareholders not tendering their shares retain an ownership interest in the firm the term acquisition is used in a generic sense to refer to any takeover economists especially those specializing in industrial organization have theories to explain the motivations for horizontal acquisitions and to a lesser extent vertical acquisitions however conglomerate acquisitions appear to present problems to some economists and governmental organizations the literature on mergers is replete with studies which evaluate the impact of acquisitions on the participants the original studies consider the impact of mergers on the risk of the resulting firm and on its profitability in investigating these isssues the pre and post acquisition behaviour of both bidders and targets is examined and there is an attempt to isolate and measure the impact of the acquisition from other events that affect the firm performance measures are based either on accounting data or on stock price reactions to the acquisition to identify acquisition specific influences comparisons of the merger sample to a non merger control group are used these studies are seriously compromised for the following reasons accounting data do not provide information on the expected long run impacts of the acquisition on the participants there are serious problems in defining a comparable control group and the comparison group does not provide information on how the specific firms would have performed without the acquisition this review focuses on those studies which utilize stock market data and measure the performance of merger participants over the acquisition period as

merger negotiations with stock market feedback do preoffer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs we present model based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target runups and markups offer value minus runup that is greater than minus one for one and inherently nonlinear if merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies markups become strictly increasing in runups large sample tests support rational deal anticipation in runups while rejecting the costly feedback loop

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

a theory of political and economic cycles abstract we develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined these cycles are driven by three political economy frictions policymakers are non benevolent they cannot commit to policies and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents our first main result is that in the most favorable equilibrium to the households distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run this result is driven by the interaction of limited commitment and private information on the side of the policymaker since in the absence of either friction there are no long run distortions to production our second result is that if the variance of private information is sufficiently large there is equilibrium turnover in the long run so that political cycles never disappear finally our model produces a long run distribution of taxes distortions and turnover where these all respond persistently to temporary economic shocks

price movements as indicators of tender offer success this paper examines movements in the prices of target stocks as predictors of the ultimate success or failure of tender offers an empirical investigation of 100 cash tender offers during the years 1976 to 1981 leads to the conclusion that with few exceptions market prices are well calibrated i e the current target price during the offer period measures the expected discounted stock price at the conclusion date the market s probability predictions improve monotonically over time

why do emerging economies borrow short term the authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long term debt they first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders by issuing long term debt the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis transferring risk to bondholders in equilibrium this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost therefore the government faces a tradeoff between safer long term borrowing and cheaper short term debt second the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance they show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium a higher risk premium on long term bonds than on short term bonds during crises the term premium increases with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities this suggests that changes in bondholders risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises

enjoying the quiet life corporate governance and managerial preferences much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers when they are not closely monitored will pursue goals that are not in shareholders interests but what goals would managers pursue this paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences we use plant level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws we find that when managers are insulated from takeovers worker wages especially those of white collar workers rise the destruction of old plants falls but the creation of new plants also falls finally overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life

long duration bonds and sovereign defaults abstract this paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long duration bonds this contrasts with previous studies which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter we show that when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one quarter bonds this narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data which indicates that the introduction of long duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

the price of government ownership a study of the domtar takeover abstract this paper presents an analysis of how government ownership of an enterprise may affect its profitability in august 1981 two quebec crown corporations announced that they had gained control of domtar a private canadian corporation upon receipt of this information the stock s market value dropped significantly over six trading days domtar s shareholders suffered cumulative abnormal returns of minus 25 percent which is equivalent to a reduction in market value of approximately 150 million much of this loss can be attributed to government control and the anticipated pursuit of non profit objectives

the effect of borrowing constraints on consumer liabilities this paper explores the effects of liquidity constraints on consumer liabilities while much empirical evidence attests to the importance of liquidity constraints in the u s economy evidence about the effects of borrowing constraints on consumer balance sheets is scarce using the 1983 survey of consumer finances data we estimate desired borrowing for unconstrained households we then evaluate the gap between predicted and observed debt for the sample of liquidity constrained consumers predicted debt is 75 percent higher than actual debt in the liquidity constrained sample thus the effect of removing borrowing constraints has quantitatively important implications for the allocation of debt in the household portfolio the removal of borrowing constraints would raise aggregate household liabilities by 9 percent copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions this paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange listed target firms from 1975 91 and the pre announcement stock price runups the evidence shows that the pre bid runup and the postannouncement increase in the target s stock price the markup are generally uncorrelated with little substitution between the runup and the markup the runup is an added cost to the bidder this finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading it also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment