economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

earnings rents and competition in the airline labor market transformation of the airline labor market continues long after deregulation airline wages changed little immediately following deregulation implying either the absence of regulatory rents or maintenance of product market power and union strength analysis for 1973 1997 however indicates that prior to recent gains the relative earnings of air transport workers decreased markedly during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s some of the earnings advantage of airline workers represents returns to occupational skills and worker specific quality labor rents are attributable largely to union bargaining power which in turn is constrained by the financial health of carriers

informational constraints and the overlapping generations model folk and anti folk theorems this paper analyses the sustainability of inter generational transfers in samuelson s consumption loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events we find that with mild informational constraints transfers cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information so that a version of the folk theorem holds however these equilibria are not robust if each agent s utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in harsanyi 1973 these mixed strategy equilibria unravel and only the zero transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome this result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

do unionized firms hire better workers i introduction many economists firmly believe that union firms offset higher union wages by hiring better workers the contrasting view that union employers react to higher union wages by hiring poorer quality workers is regarded as impossible 1 yet this contrasting view is highly plausible in the context of standard economic modeling and with what is known about labor markets there is evidence supporting this view the standard story for unionized firms hiring better workers goes like this a union raises wages and the firm foils the union by hiring better quality workers the problem with this myopic story is that it ignores what happens in the future it assumes that unions will sit idly by and let union firms whittle away any union wage differential by hiring better quality workers i would argue that it is more likely that unions would respond to better quality workers by raising wages even more employers anticipating this may respond by hiring lower quality workers this article is the first to consider how unionized firms choose worker quality when they anticipate the future consequences of quality on wages under reasonable conditions these consequences cause employers to hire lower quality workers while i do not contend this always occurs i do argue that there are reasonable grounds for rejecting the better quality proposition in addition there is evidence that unionization often does result in lower quality workers the results presented here suggest that economists should look again at how unions affect wages productivity equality and society this is not the first paper to suggest unions lead to lower quality workers it is however the first to suggest this result is due to employers making profit maximizing decisions when they anticipate the future consequences of their actions there are two other articles that also suggest unions can lead to lower quality workers first robinson 1989 assumes that unionized employers do want higher quality workers but do not hire them because nonunion firms pay them more as the nonunion firms are assumed to have better monitoring technology and a more flexible reward system second bronars and lott 1989 show that unions that seek the maximum dues will want poorer quality workers while these models focus on factors that may prove to be important the model presented here is theoretically more forceful first it is based upon standard economic modeling second using ochkam s razor it assumes the least added factors and finally its central assumption that people anticipate the future has a large body of economic evidence behind it by demonstrating that the better quality proposition is not supported by conventional economic analysis this article shows the better quality proposition should not be given a greater weight in the priors of economists having done this these other models then should and hopefully will be examined more closely ii the case for unions leading to better quality workers in discussing the wage gap between union and nonunion workers h gregg lewis 1986 46 concisely presents the case that union firms select better workers i have strong priors on the direction of the selectivity bias let a union through collective bargaining impose on an employer higher wages for his workers than he otherwise would pay them with worker quality not tightly specified in the collective bargaining agreement the higher wages will lengthen the queue of the applicants for the unionized jobs including some applicants of greater productiveness than otherwise would have applied the employer has an incentive to evade the increase in his labor costs by employing workers of greater quality the evasion will take time and will be impeded by the cost of screening workers imperfect substitution in production among worker quality and employment constraints in the collective bargaining agreements

policymakers horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation abstract this paper examines the impact of policymakers horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation we describe a prisoners dilemma game between two infinitely lived countries run by policymakers we show that re election incentives can act as a discipline device making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely lived policymakers we also show that when voting suffers from a recency bias policymakers may have incentives to collude to get re elected and term limits may help international cooperation

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

national politics and international agreements abstract in this paper we set up a political economy model of a two country world economy where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross border externalities such as environment protection subject to feasibility efficiency and equity constraints has to be negotiated by two elected national delegates we prove that any international agreement involves higher public good provisions through higher contributions in both countries than in the case of no agreement if feasible an ia may generate losers in either country under an equal tax rate rule an international agreement may or may not be reached unlike under an equal gain rule turning to the election stage depending on the type of equity rule imposed on the ia the choice of delegates depends crucially on distributive characteristics both between and within countries this is due to the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country s taxpayers

chasing after good jobs do they exist and does it matter if they do most people believe that there are such things as good jobs jobs that a worker would consider herself lucky to get but for economists the existence of good jobs is debatable in this paper i provide a definition of a good job based on various theories of the labour market a job that involves a surplus captured partly by the worker i use that definition to guide an empirical investigation of the existence and importance of good jobs i conclude that good jobs do exist that the labour market does not just function according to a roy model with wage differentials reflecting only skill differentials compensating differentials or bond posting and that their impact on the overall wage structure is substantial finally i discuss the implications of the existence of good jobs for policy setting and for assessments of the justice of a society resume la chasse aux bons emplois est ce qu ils existent et est ce que cela importe qu ils existent la plupart des gens croient qu il y a telles choses que de bons emplois des emplois qu un travailleur se trouverait chanceux d avoir mais pour les economistes l existence de bons emplois est discutable dans ce texte l auteur propose une definition de bon emploi fondee sur diverses theories du marche du travail un emploi qui engendre un surplus capture en partie par le travailleur il utilise cette definition pour guider son enquete empirique sur l existence et l importance de bons emplois on conclut que les bons emplois existent que le marche du travail ne fonctionne pas seulement selon le modele de roy avec des differentiels de salaires qui refletent seulement les differentiels d habiletes les differentiels compensatoires ou le depot d une caution et que leur impact sur la structure globale des salaires est substantielle finalement l auteur discute les implications de l existence de bons emplois sur la definition de politiques et sur l evaluation du caractere juste d une societe

domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies abstract this paper investigates the desirability of international fiscal policy coordination in the presence of a domestic political distortion the domestic distortion results from the inability of the current policymaker to enter into a binding agreement with future policymakers about the composition of public spending this distortion generates a bias towards budget deficits international coordination can exacerbate the deficit bias and thus reduce social welfare at home and abroad the reason is that international coordination reduces the cost of running budget deficits and thus enhances the adverse effects of the domestic political distortion

self imposed term limits in reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits dick and lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent seeking there is an inefficient tendency to re elect incumbents in their model term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative however many term limits are unilaterally self imposed in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents terms to two and their model cannot explain these limits in this comment i suggest that term limits may be self imposed by risk averse voters who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once and for all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate the market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter

the impact of deregulation on the employment and wages of airline mechanics this paper describes the effects of deregulation on negotiated wage rates and employment levels of aircraft mechanics in the scheduled airline industry between 1978 and 1984 a firm by firm analysi

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

rent destruction and the political viability of free trade agreements this paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements ftas the key element of the analysis is the rent destruction that these arrangements induce by eliminating intrabloc trade barriers an fta lowers the incentives of import competing industries to lobby for higher external tariffs thereby inducing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process using a conventional competitive model i show that the prospect of rent destruction can critically undermine and in some cases rule out entirely the political viability of welfarereducing ftas this result contrasts sharply with findings from the earlier regionalism literature

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of free trade areas we consider the impact of the formation of free trade agreements on multilateral tariff cooperation we assume that countries are limited to selfenforcing multilateral arrangements that balance the gains from deviating against the costs of an ensuing trade war we find that the emergence of free trade areas will be accompanied by a temporary retreat from liberal multilateral trade policies as the initial balance supporting multilateral cooperation is upset eventually however as the full impact of the emerging free trade agreement on multilateral trade patterns is felt this initial balance tends to reemerge and liberal multilateral trade policies can be restored

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

mutual gains or zero sum labor relations and firm performance in the airline industry the authors examine competing theoretical arguments regarding whether union representation shared governance wage levels and two features of the quality of labor relations workplace culture and conflict in negotiations lead to better or worse outcomes for airlines and they test these interpretations using a mix of historical and quantitative data from major u s airlines both the qualitative and quantitative results suggest that relational factors conflict and workplace culture are more important determinants of performance than the structural factors of unionization shared governance and wages the authors conclude that efforts to recover from the current crisis in the airline industry that depend primarily on reductions in wages or union power will at best bring only short term relief from immediate financial pressures sustained improvement in service quality and financial performance will require more fundamental improvements in the quality of labor relations

dynamic seemingly unrelated cointegrating regressions we propose the parametric dynamic seemingly unrelated regression dsur estimator for simultaneous estimation of multiple cointegrating regressions dsur is efficient when the equilibrium errors are correlated across equations and is applicable for panel cointegration estimation in environments where the cross section is small relative to the available time series we study the asymptotic and small sample properties of the dsur estimator for both heterogeneous and homogeneous cointegrating vectors we then apply the method to analyse two long standing problems in international economics our first application revisits the estimation of long run correlations between national investment and national saving our second application revisits the question of whether the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate

a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics we develop a novel model of campaigns elections and policy making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators this generates a distinction between policy rhetoric and policy reality and introduces an important role for party discipline in the policy making process we identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics when trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens i introduction in a democracy the majority rules often this means that the policies enacted by elected governments reflect the preferences of some citizens more than those of others this feature of democracy commonly known as tyranny of the majority arises in institutional settings in which elected officials represent disproportionately the interests of their own constituents and electees who represent the minority have limited means to influence policy in this paper we argue that tyranny of the majority imparts a protectionist bias to democratic politics this is so even when the average citizen covets free trade and when every citizen has an equal probability of being represented in the policy making process by protection we mean policies that favor quasi fixed factors of production thus protection in our parlance refers both to tariffs that shield import competing industries from foreign competition and subsidies that promote exports the bias refers to the average or expected policy outcome we focus on majoritarian systems in which elected legislators represent geographic regions the existence of a protectionist bias requires only that i national party leaders cannot fully commit their candidates to adopt particular policies if elected ii mem

unions wages and skills studies uniformly conclude that union wage effects are largest for workers with low measured skills longitudinal analysis using 1989 90 1994 95 cps matched panels produces union premium estimates equivalent across skill groups following appropriate sample restrictions and control for worker specific skills nlsy evidence on aptitude scores confirms that union workers with high measured skills have relatively low unmeasured skills differential selection by skill class and skill homogeneity in union workplaces result from employer and employee sorting in response to wage standardization union organizing where skills are homogeneous and unionized employers reluctance to hire the most as well as least able workers

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

a repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players abstract this paper analyzes infinitely repeated noncooperative games where the players have finite but overlapping terms thus the nature of the game remains constant but the identity of the players changes over time this type of scenario depicts the situation facing firm managers in regulated or oligopolistic environments despite finite lives which lead players to always choose opportunistic actions at the end of their careers it is shown that there are equilibria where cooperative behavior emerges in this noncooperative setting further a folk theorem result is obtained any individually rational payoffs can be realized as a subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026

international capital mobility evidence from panel cointegration tests abstract panel cointegration techniques applied to pooled data for 50 developed and developing economies for the period 1970 2000 indicate that savings and investment are non stationary and cointegrated that there are marked differences in saving retention ratios between different country groups and that retention ratios have fallen

sluggish institutions in a dynamic world can unions and industrial competition coexist during the 1930s and 1940s collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the u s industrial sector following its peak in the 1950s union density in the u s private sector fell steadily to only 7 4 percent in 2006 governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion in competitive and dynamic economic environments a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies two industries automotives and airlines are used to illustrate these points if worker based institutions are to flourish they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms

renewable energy consumption and economic growth evidence from a panel of oecd countries abstract this study examines the relationship between renewable energy consumption and economic growth for a panel of twenty oecd countries over the period 1985 2005 within a multivariate framework given the relatively short span of the time series data a panel cointegration and error correction model is employed to infer the causal relationship the heterogeneous panel cointegration test reveals a long run equilibrium relationship between real gdp renewable energy consumption real gross fixed capital formation and the labor force with the respective coefficients positive and statistically significant the granger causality results indicate bidirectional causality between renewable energy consumption and economic growth in both the short and long run

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

a simple sieve bootstrap range test for poolability in dependent cointegrated panels abstract we develop a sieve bootstrap range test for poolability of cointegrating regressions in dependent panels and evaluate by simulation its performances the test seems to have good size and power properties even with small cross sections moderate time samples and low heterogeneity

repeated games played by overlapping generations of players the present paper tries to explain cooperative behaviour in an organization run by a sequence of long but finitely lived agents we show that the folk theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely lived players any mutually beneficial outcome can approximately be sustained if the player s life span and the overlapping periods are long enough the result is stronger than the usual folk theorems in that it employs no assumption on the stage game such as the full dimensionality of payoff set or multiplicity of equilibria

what have you done for me lately release of information and strategic manipulation of memories how should a rational agent politician employee advertiser release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor electorate supervisor consumer this article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency similarity and repetition i show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic optimisation problem and we describe the properties of the optimal profile for releasing information the theoretical results are applicable in a wide range of social and economic contexts such as political campaigns employee performance evaluations and advertising strategies

party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections in a federal system west germany 1961 1989 the hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in u s presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis here these hypotheses are applied to the german federal system that is characterized by staggered national and land provincial elections they are tested using data on real gnp growth at the national and land levels party vote shares in national and land elections party seat shares in national and land parliaments and the party composition of national and land governments over the time period 1961 1989 perhaps surprisingly all three hypotheses party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections find empirical support when applied to the german federal system although these hypotheses were formulated with reference to u s political institutions they travel well bar some modifications that take into account special features of the german political system

a new poolability test for cointegrated panels this paper proposes a new test of the null hypothesis that the parameters in a cointegrated panel data regression are equal across the cross section the asymptotic distribution of the new test statistic is derived and simulation results are provided to suggest that it performs very well in small samples an empirical application to the monetary exchange rate model is also provided copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

electoral cycles and international policy cooperation abstract this paper analyzes the interaction between domestic politics and international policy coope ration as a two level repeated prisoners dilemma at the domestic level two party competition generates an electoral cycle in monetary growth inflation and real output at the international level the policymakers desire to promote domestic expansion by depreciating the currency gives rise to an inflationary bias in monetary growth a move towards international cooperation reduces the inflationary bias but may increase the amplitude of the electoral cycle moreover international cooperation may not be desirable for one of the domestic parties nevertheless domestic and international cooperation may be jointly sustained by the credible threat of a reversion to the regime under which the destabilizing effect of domestic politics is at a maximum

gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries this paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size we show that at points on the frontier where only one country s incentive constraint binds the efficient agreement will be a non stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade our analysis illustrates how i relative country size ii consumption smoothing incentives and iii sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements in contrast to previous work on gradualism our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary