how does aversion to intertemporal variation affect hedging behavior standard models of hedging behavior assume that hedgers wish to minimize net price variation they treat variation as risk and fail to distinguish random variation at a specific point in time from pre determined intertemporal variation recursive utility differentiates between random and nonrandom variation by allowing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution eis to be imperfect the inverse of the eis measures the hedger s aversion to intertemporal variation and is distinct from aversion to risk optimal hedge ratios decline toward zero as aversion to intertemporal variation increases these results may help explain why hedgers commonly hedge less than recommended by standard models

production risk in multi output industries estimates from norwegian dairy farms farmers who produce multiple outputs are portfolio managers in the sense that they use inputs to balance expected economic return and variance of return this article estimates the structure of the stochastic multioutput production technology in norwegian dairy farming allowing for a more flexible specification of the technology than previous studies we find that an increase in input levels leads primarily to higher output variability and that inputs also influence the covariance of shocks between outputs risk reducing effects of inputs on outputs are primarily present in the covariance functions technical change leads to shifts in the profit distribution over the data period but no welfare improvement for risk averse farmers

employment with connections negative network effects abstract in less developed countries it is widely observed that employers hire workers through employee referrals in this paper we show an extension of this kind of networks that may decrease applicants payoffs while a diversification of the networks can raise referred applicants payoffs we also discuss the effect of the extension of interlinked contracts on farmers wages

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

migration livelihood and well being evidence from indian city slums what helps workers from low income households to access urban job market information and whether migrants are able to experience upward mobility at the place of destination are the two pertinent issues in urban development which this paper tries to examine results based on a slum survey in four indian cities highlight the importance of various informal channels through which urban jobs are accessed however these networks reduce the probability of upward mobility as network extension leads to excess supplies of labour relative to demand the issue of upward mobility has also been examined by constructing a well being deprivation index based on the factor analysis of a large number of social economic demographic education and health specific variables although findings are indicative of improvements in the well being of migrant workers over time several of the long duration migrants and natives in the cities still lead a low quality life the paper therefore argues in favour of urban employment

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

consumption and demand during the recent economic downturn anec dotal reports in the press indicate that some demands are recession resistant beer while others are very procyclical e g wine this naturally causes economists to attempt to infer something about engel curves just as macroe conomists think differently about growth and business cycles so it seems should microe conomists think differently about how con sumption responds to growth and business cycles using quarterly national income and product account nipa data figure 1 depicts consumption and food expenditure growth mean percentage growth rates for food con sumption was 2 3 in the period 1948 1977 and 1 85 in the period 1978 2009 while the standard deviation of growth rates fell from 0 37 in the earlier period to 0 27 in the later pe riod consistent with engel s law the growth rate of food consumption has fallen over time in either total or per capita forms unsur prisingly the quarterly growth rate of medical consumption not shown is higher than food with a mean growth of 5 97 in the earlier period and reduced growth of 3 4 and de clining in the later period interestingly stan dard deviation d of medical growth rate has fallen substantially from 0 51 to 0 18 the mean growth of overall consumption expendi tures was 3 9 d 4 15 in the earlier period and 3 1 d 2 62 in the later period finally housing expenditure growth rates not shown halved from 5 04 in the early period to 2 51 in the latter period with very stable rates of growth d 0 15 however negative growth rates occur during recessions 2001 is an ex ception indeed food expenditures fell almost 15 in the recent quarter from the previous quarter which was also negative growth sim ilar patterns of negative growth rates during re cessions occur for the other two categories of consumption in the period 1978 2009 and for total consumption as expected consumption and consumption growth behave very differ ently in recessions the question is are the negative growth rates just due to a fall in cur rent income or do they reflect uncertainty if uncertainty is key then one must funda mentally think about model future expecta tions in order to understand measure current demand as simple as these basic engel curve consid erations are one of the liveliest debates in eco nomics centers on consumption in response to income for decades there has been the steady accumulation of evidence for and against a keynesian type view that people consume out of current income the contrary view is most commonly called the permanent income hypothesis or pih due to modigliani and brumberg 1954 friedman 1957 and oth ers generally forward looking intertemporal models of consumption and savings might be called the life cycle hypothesis with pih as a special case yet economists have not been particularly successful at amassing convincing evidence that is consistent with the life cycle model of behavior in all of its ramifications and many find models of conventionally ra tional economic agents wanting e g laibson 1998 the pih is that individuals consume out of an annuity derived from expected lifetime wealth this is particularly relevant when dis cussing the effects of countercyclical fiscal pol icy john taylor 2008 recently sided with the pih against the keynesian or neo keynesian view a second major issue is whether liquid ity constraints mitigate the forward looking life cycle predictions a third issue is how un certainty affects consumption and saving pre cautionary behavior much research has focused on the demand response to changes in total expenditure or even food expenditure allocations to particu lar foods engel curve notions of this research could be stated as dqt dc 1 n where c is real total consumption expenditures c j2 i piqi where qt and pt are the th quantity and real price respectively macroeconomics fellows address rulon d pope is professor of economics at brigham young university the author would like to thank daniel sullivan for assistance fellows address was presented at the 2008 aaea annual meet ing in milwaukee wi august 2009 invited addresses are not sub jected to the journal s standard refereeing process

estimating intertemporal preferences for natural resource allocation in this article we show how the degree of risk aversion discounting and preference for intertemporal substitution for a natural resource manager can be structurally estimated within a recursive utility framework we focus on the management of a reservoir in california and test the data for consistency with a recursive utility model specification versus standard time additive separability the results show that the data are consistent with a risk averse manager with recursive preferences the data also reject time additive separability with or without risk aversion such as the standard constant relative risk aversion utility model the improvement in model fit when recursive preferences are used is notable natural resource management problems are typically stochastic and dynamic in nature by virtue of the characteristics of the underlying physical or biological processes that govern the evolution of the resource this has been the reason for a number of empirical applications of dynamic programming within the natural resource literature as chronicled by williams however the tendency of researchers to use risk neutral expected net present value epv objective functions when modeling natural resource problems has caused policy makers to be somewhat skeptical of the real world relevance of resource economics analysis 1 given the uncertainty facing the decision maker in each period of the planning horizon due to the realization of stochastic shocks we would expect risk aversion and intertemporal substitution to feature prominently in the characterization of intertemporal preferences

density social networks and job search methods theory and application to egypt we first develop a theoretical model in which individuals are embedded within a network of social relationships we show that conditional on being employed the probability to find a job through social networks relative to other search methods increases and is concave with the size of the network the effects are stronger for the uneducated there is however a critical size of the network above which this probability decreases we then test empirically these theoretical findings for egypt using the 1998 labor market survey the empirical evidence supports the predictions of our theoretical model

research note cost uncertainty is bliss the effect of competition on the acquisition of cost information for pricing new products we examine the optimal acquisition of information about a common uncertain cost factor by two competing firms seeking to price a new product we show that existing findings regarding the acquisition of demand information or the acquisition of either cost or demand information related to quantity decisions do not extend to this case for cost information with price competition the information acquisition strategies are strategic substitutes even though the price decisions that are based on the information are strategic complements competition decreases the expected value of cost information moreover when competition is intense and the cost of information low identical firms do not acquire the same amount of cost information even when information is free cost uncertainty acts like a fog that lessens the destructive effect of price competition when products are close substitutes and thus increases expected profits buyers on the other hand are better off when competing firms are informed about cost even though the expected value of cost information strictly decreases with competition the optimal price for industry specific cost information set by an information vendor increases with competition when the firms products are sufficiently substitutable

decoupled farm payments and the role of base acreage and yield updating under uncertainty we analyze the coupling effect of expectations about base acreage and yield updating in future farm policy on production decisions in the presence of price yield and policy uncertainty for a risk averse farmer producing a single crop the farmer receives market revenue and government payments using stochastic dynamic programming optimum decisions under present value calculations positively link current acreage and fertilizer decisions to future government payments through expected updates of base acreage and yield in the future regime moving from a zero probability of updating to a probability of one increases optimum acreage and yield by 6 25 and 0 134 respectively copyright 2010 oxford university press

migration with endogenous moving costs we study a dynamic model of labor migration in which moving costs decrease with the number of migrants already settled in the destination this assumption is supported by sociological studies of migrant networks with endogenous moving costs migration occurs gradually over time once it starts it develops momentum and migratory flows may increase even as wage differentials narrow in addition migration tends to follow geographical channels and low moving cost individuals migrate first these patterns are consistent with historical evidence from the great black migration of 1915 1960 in the united states much of which cannot be reconciled with existing migration models excerpt

using consumption and asset return data to estimate farmers time preferences and risk attitudes the generalized expected utility model is fitted to u s farm data to estimate farm operator s time preferences and risk attitudes the estimated farmer s utility parameters are quite reasonable and exhibit high accuracy the forward looking expected utility model is soundly rejected in favor of the generalized expected utility paradigm importantly the generalized expected utility model is also found to fit the data better than the myopic model typically used to study agricultural production under risk finally u s farmers relative aversion to risk appears to have diminished significantly over time

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

job contact networks abstract many workers hear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives the aim of this paper is twofold first we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts second we study strategic network formation to this purpose we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents and the process by which information about jobs is obtained and transmitted we show that equilibrium networks always exist and that only moderate levels of network asymmetry can be sustained at equilibrium also we establish a general non monotonicity result on information flow and unemployment with respect to network size in symmetric networks

imperfect information screening and the costs of informal lending a study of a rural credit market in pakistan many governments have perceived the rural moneylender as usurious this article takes a first step toward directly testing the validity of this view in a study of services costs and charges of fourteen informal market moneylenders and their clients in chambar pakistan the article examines whether the high implicit interest rates charged reflect the actual costs of operating in that market estimates of the resource costs incurred by informal lenders for screening pursuing delinquent loans overhead and cost of capital including unrecoverable loans suggest that lenders charges are equal to their average cost of lending but exceed their marginal cost this finding is consistent with the view that the informal credit market is characterized by excess capacity and monopolistic competition in the presence of imperfect information

information acquisition and relative efficiency of competitive oligopoly and monopoly markets this paper analyzes the relative efficiency of a competitive equilibrium against cournot oligopoly and monopoly equilibria when firms have diverse private information about the stochastic market demand when firms have information of the same precision the competitive equilibrium yields a larger expected welfare however when information is costly cournot oligopoly and monopoly firms acquire more information and hence may yield a larger expected welfare than the competitive firms under certain conditions the author also finds that competitive firms acquire less than the efficient level of information while cournot oligopoly and monopoly firms may acquire more than the efficient level copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

measuring producers risk preferences a global risk attitude construct in applied agricultural economic research various risk attitude elicitation techniques are used here we investigate whether risk attitude measures rooted in the expected utility framework are related to measures rooted in the multi item scale framework using a second order factor analytical model and data obtained from personal computer guided interviews with 373 farmers we investigate whether the common variance among the latent risk attitude measures can be accounted for by a global risk attitude construct we find that the different risk attitude measures are related and that the global risk attitude construct is significantly related to farmers intention to use futures contracts our research suggests that farmers risk attitude is a higher order characteristic that cannot be effectively extracted by a single measure in empiricalstudies deal ing with risk risk attitudes and producers market behavior various risk attitude measures are used two major approaches to quantify directly farmers risk attitudes can be distinguished measures derived from the expected utility framework and measures derived from responses to multi item scales e g antle chavas and holt goodwin and schroeder saha shumway and talpaz smidts the purpose of this research is to test whether risk attitude measures rooted in the expected utility framework are related to the risk attitude scales rooted in the multiitem scale approach and if so whether these risk attitude measures share a common

pricing diagnostic information diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior we analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different privately known ex ante success probability investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers the value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante success probability when the information seller can offer only one quality level and negative payments are not allowed we find that the optimal menu of linear contracts is remarkably simple a pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability

do counter cyclical payments in the 2002 us farm act create incentives to produce analytical results in the literature suggest that counter cyclical payments create risk related incentives to produce even if they are decoupled under certainty hennessy d a 1998 the production effects of agricultural income support polices under uncertainty am j agric econ 80 46 57 this paper develops a framework to assess the risk related incentives to produce created by commodity programmes like the loan deficiency payments ldps and the counter cyclical payments ccps in the 2002 us farm act because ccps are paid based on fixed production quantities they have a weaker risk reducing impact than ldps the latter have a direct impact through the variance of the producer price distributions while the impact of ccps is due only to the covariance between the ccp and the producer price distributions the methodology developed by chavas j p holt m t 1990 acreage decisions under risk the case of corn and soybeans am j agric econ 72 3 529 538 is applied to calculate the appropriate variance covariance matrix of the truncated producer price distributions under the 2002 farm act risk premia are computed showing that the risk related incentives created by ccps are significant and do not disappear for levels of production above the base production on which ccps are paid

the value of business planning before start up a decision theoretical perspective in this paper we analyze business planning from the perspective of the nascent entrepreneur we measure its value for the entrepreneur at the point where he must decide whether or not to plan and we contrast our results with empirical studies that compare firms performance after market entry within a formal decision theoretical framework we show that the value of planning is driven by the possibility of evaluating alternative actions and being able to improve strategies before market entry the main purpose of evaluation is to pursue good and terminate bad business ideas we show how the value of planning is determined by the venture under consideration and how it depends on the quality of planning our theoretical model yields several behavioral and statistical implications that we compare with empirical observations found in the literature in particular we show how our model of rational decision making can be used to explain important hypotheses and contradictory observations that have fueled the debate on business planning

optimal information acquisition for heterogenous duopoly firms abstract this paper analyzes a stochastic duopoly market in which heterogenous firms acquire costly information about the stochastic market demand prior to their production decisions the equilibrium amounts of information acquired by each firm are compared the comparative statics analyses show the differential effects of a change in information cost the degree of uncertainty in the market demand and the demand and cost function parameters journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l13 l15

old boy networks as screening mechanisms this paper studies a fulfilled expectations equilibrium in situations in which intermediaries provide personal opinions on the likelihood of success of personnel projects or investments each referee must recommend some candidates from a group of people about whom he has private information the employer uses the recommendations to choose the workers using his expectations about the quality of the recommended and the nonrecommended applicants although the referees use their information strategically the competition among them produces optimal use of the information in the sense that employers make the same choices in equilibrium as they would if they had the same information as the referees

economic behavior under uncertainty a joint analysis of risk preferences and technology a method is developed to estimate jointly risk preferences and technology under general conditions the approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of u s corn soybean acreage decisions over time the results provide useful information on the nature of farmers risk preferences and on the influence of price risk and production risk on acreage allocation and farmers welfare copyright 1996 by mit press

optimal pricing strategy in marketing research consulting this paper studies the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolistic marketing research consultant who sells high cost proprietary marketing information to her oligopolistic clients in the manufacturing industry in designing an optimal pricing strategy the consultant needs to fully consider the behavior of her clients the behavior of the existing and potential competitors to her clients and the behavior of her clients customers the authors show how the environment uncertainty the capability of clients internal research department and the number of potential clients can affect the optimal pricing scheme copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

networks in the modern economy mexican migrants in the u s labor market this paper attempts to identify job networks among mexican migrants in the u s labor market the empirical analysis uses data on migration patterns and labor market outcomes based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin communities in mexico over a long period of time each community s network is measured by the proportion of the sampled individuals who are located at the destination the united states in any year we verify that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job when his network is exogenously larger by including individual fixed effects in the employment and occupation regressions and by using rainfall in the origin community as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination

the impact of social structure on economic outcomes s ocial structure especially in the form of social networks affects economic outcomes for three main reasons first social networks affect the flow and the quality of information much information is subtle nuanced and difficult to verify so actors do not believe impersonal sources and instead rely on people they know second social networks are an important source of reward and punishment since these are often magnified in their impact when coming from others personally known third trust by which i mean the confidence that others will do the right thing despite a clear balance of incentives to the contrary emerges if it does in the context of a social network economists have recently devoted considerable attention to the impact of social structure and networks on the economy for example see the economists chapters in rauch and casella 2001 and the illuminating review essay of this volume by zuckerman 2003 as well as dutta and jackson 2003 and calvoarmengol 2004 however i focus here on sociologists contributions sociologists have developed core principles about the interactions of social structure information ability to punish or reward and trust that frequently recur in their analyses of political economic and other institutions i begin by reviewing some of these principles building on these i then discuss how social structures and social networks can affect economic outcomes like hiring price productivity and innovation