governing india s land under conditions of market orientation and globalization land is being transferred from agriculture and common property uses to corporate farming private industry and the service sector how are intra and international land transactions governed using the case of india this paper emphasizes the sub national scale fieldwork in gujarat west bengal and tamil nadu reveals states to be competing with each other to attract private investment yet given institutional and political variation their land provision ranges from attempted market friendly policy change to narrower state business alliances it is time for scholarship and resultant policy recommendations to look beyond the national and global scales

what is a relationship worth repeated exchange and the development and deployment of relational capital organization scholars have highlighted the value of relationships in fostering effective exchange suggesting that repeated exchange creates a relational asset with latent value derived from elevated social connections norms and simple expectations of exchange continuity yet the empirical evidence supporting such claims remains largely indirect as a consequence few studies have been able to directly examine how contextual factors shape the accumulation of this relational asset or define its value in application we directly measure the value of relationships between suppliers and a large buyer using the buyer s choices in internet enabled procurement auctions to estimate the degree to which stronger relationship histories with suppliers increase willingness to pay for high volume commodity like parts our setting also allows us to examine how this willingness to pay for relationships is shaped by the social context in which they develop and by the exchange context in which they are subsequently depl

overcoming institutional voids via arbitration extending the literature on institutional voids we introduce theory from law that highlights the ability of firms to choose the laws and enforcement mechanisms that govern their international joint ventures ijvs specifically firms may overcome institutional voids by borrowing institutions via binding international commercial arbitration bica rather than relying on host market institutions leveraging an institution based view we develop a theoretical framework to articulate the conditions under which ijv partners may choose bica as opposed to domestic courts to overcome institutional voids in host markets

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

determinants of inter firm technology licensing in the eu this article investigates the determinants of technology licensing focusing on how country specific characteristics affect technology holders incentives to sell their proprietary technologies through licensing alliances an empirical examination of licensing is done using a unique panel data set of licensing transactions involving companies in the eu the strength of intellectual property rights ipr protection the degree of economic freedom the level of country risk and the number of patent granted in the country are found to be important determinants of inter firm technology licensing in addition firms with prior independent experience as a licensor and public companies tend to license technology more

royalties vs fees how do firms pay for foreign technology abstract the theoretical determinants of technology licensing contracts have been extensively studied but empirical evidence is scarce we assemble a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in india between 1989 and 1993 industry firm and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts our findings support theoretical arguments licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts we also find that firms are more likely to use output based payments to control the sale and diffusion of r d or brand intensive know how to unaffiliated firms

how smes exploit their intellectual property assets evidence from survey data this paper seeks to understand how motives to patent affect the use of the patent portfolio with a particular focus on motives aimed at the monetization of intellectual property the analysis relies on data from an international survey conducted by the european patent office there are three main results first small and medium sized enterprises smes exhibit a much stronger reliance on monetary patents than large companies and nearly half of the smes in the sample patent for monetary reasons second smes tend to use their patents more actively than large firms third smaller companies generally have a higher proportion of their portfolio that is licensed but the licensing rate is significantly higher in the usa an american sme is twice as likely as a european sme to have a high share of its portfolio that is actually licensed witnessing a fragmented market for technology in europe

global and domestic utilization of industrial relevant science patent citation analysis of science technology interactions and knowledge flows abstract the development of science based technologies may draw heavily on codified and tacit outputs from both domestic research bases and foreign sources having a view of the scientific underpinnings of these technical innovations and related knowledge diffusion and utilization processes especially those concerning public financed basic research is of major importance to policymakers nowadays some of those scientific and technical inputs are pivotal to technical inventions and are acknowledged as such by explicit references citations to related research papers in the reference list on the corresponding patents this case study deals with citations to dutch authored research papers on uspto patents granted during the period 1987 1996 results of the citation analysis reveal several important features of contributions made by the dutch science base to dutch invented and or foreign invented patents such as 1 a marked overall increase of patent citations to dutch research papers and 2 significant differences between domestic and foreign citation patterns where 3 domestic citation links are dominated by author inventor self citations and patents originating from the large r d intensive multinational firms such as philips these findings provide new empirical evidence that patent citation analysis produces systemic quantitative data providing strategic background information regarding nation specific and sector specific factors in domestic and cross border science technology linkages and knowledge flows

field of use restrictions in licensing agreements a widely used clause in license contracts the field of use restriction four precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified when a technology has several distinct applications four allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the lowest cost producer in each field of use this can improve production efficiency with complex technologies however the boundaries of fields of use may be difficult to codify entailing a risk of licensees rights overlapping we explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard framework where the licensor s effort determines the probability of overlap we show that depending on the contracting environment the license agreement may include output restrictions and non linear royalty schemes

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

strategizing by firms in the presence of markets for resources strategizing by firms from the resource based view is concerned with the process through which firms acquire a distinctive bundle of resources that is costly and time consuming for competitors to duplicate or imitate a central question facing any firm therefore is its strategy for accumulating the resources that underpin its production activities in this article the process of resource accumulation is discussed as one involving potentially both internal resource development and external resource acquisition from the perspective of the strategic issues involved in making a choice between these options emerging markets for technologies and know how through licensing and other forms of resource exchange have opened up new avenues through which firms may jostle for advantage the article is concerned with three major aspects of this process illustrating the discussion with cases from biotechnology and pharmaceuticals first the strategizing by firms around the internal development vs external sourcing issue is discussed as informed by the practices of leading firms and how these lend greater variety of strategic options for firms second the potential competitive advantages as well as disadvantages to be secured by firms through the process of external sourcing as compared with the well known potential advantages accruing to incumbents through internal development such as time compression diseconomies and causal ambiguity and third the criteria to be used by firms to strategically evaluate resources individually as contrasted with the strategic evaluation of the resource bundle or totality these criteria it is argued turn on the issues of marginal value contribution resource complementarities and synergies resource variety and transferability involving intellectual property issues successful firms it is argued expand their options through blending internal resource accumulation with external resource leverage thereby deepening their distinctive dynamic capabilities this approach extends the framework of the rbv enabling it to encompass resource driven schumpeterian competition and such aspects of industrial dynamics as specialization modularization and imitative challenge copyright 2003 oxford university press

an introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property although economists have written on topics of intellectual property for a long time the impact of economics on public policy in this area has been slight especially as compared to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation we believe that too few of the profession s resources have been devoted to these issues and that of those resources that have been employed too few have been devoted to empirical analyses we hope that this introductory essay and the three papers that follow will stimulate interest in this subject this introductory essay first describes some of the basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law and then describes the framework of the law in the six areas described above patent copyright semiconductor protection trademark trade secret and misappropriation it is intended both to provide thumbnail descriptions of the various intellectual property regimes to economists working in this area and to indicate where additional economic research might be useful

a patent system for both diffusion and exclusion public policy analysis of optimal patent regimes is often framed as a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency in this analytical framework weak patent protection and strict antitrust policy are taken to be directed toward static concerns while protection of intellectual property through strong patent laws is taken as a reflection of broader social concerns for long run growth and technological progress this characterization has some truth but the magnitude of the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency can easily be exaggerated in this article i want to argue that weak patent protection need not be inimical to economic growth and conversely that strong patent protection need not be an enemy of diffusion appropriately structured patent law and antitrust rules can together ensure incentives for r d and also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing r d results through licensing and other means at the same time cooperation among firms at the r d stage can counterbalance weak patent protection by internalizing spillovers from ongoing r d programs and such cooperation may also produce additional spillovers from the existing knowledge

international technology licensing monopoly rents transaction costs and exclusive rights as firms increasingly use licensing to exploit knowledge based assets in global technology markets appropriate structuring of these agreements has become an important line of research inquiry one area that has received less attention is the nature of rights granted in inter firm licensing relationships although it is an important clause that has implications for profit generation from licensing of proprietary assets conceptualizing licensing rights in terms of number of licenses granted and exclusivity rights given to a licensee in a foreign market this paper examines the determinants of these rights based on monopoly rents and transaction costs associated with different types of licensing contracts hypotheses are empirically tested through two studies one based on large us manufacturing firms and the other on a cross national sample of medium sized firms actively involved in international technology licensing results from both studies show a greater propensity to use non exclusive multiple licensing when the licensed technology has greater potential to produce differentiated products or when there is greater threat of substitutive technologies entering the market on the other hand innovative technologies and a higher degree of asset specific investments required of the licensee for the technology are related to the use of single exclusive licensing agreements

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

show me the money interjurisdiction political competition and fiscal extraction in china we argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation promotion seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues the greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal the more intense political competition is resulting in higher taxation however too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability using a panel dataset of all chinese county level jurisdictions from 1999 2006 we find strong evidence for an inverse u shaped relationship between the number of county level jurisdictions within a prefecture our proxy for the intensity of political competition and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions the results are robust to various alternative specifications including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence

competition and the efficiency of markets for technology the sale of r d projects through licensing facilitates the division of labor between research and development activities this vertical specialization can improve the overall eciency of the innovative process however these gains depend on the timing of the sale the buyer of an r d project should assume development at the stage at which he has an eciency advantage we show that in an environment where the seller is overcondent about the value of the project she may delay the sale to the more ecient rm in order to provide veriable information about its quality though this delay implies higher total development costs for the project we obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of licensing and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential buyers inuence it we show that a wide array of dierent explanations based on dierences in information beliefs or risk proles lead to the same qualitative results we present empirical evidence from pharmaceutical licensing contracts that is consistent with our theoretical predictions

going global in groups structural transformation and china s special economic zones overseas summary china s special economic zones helped the country industrialize by attracting foreign investment in 2006 beijing initiated an overseas trade and cooperation zone program assisting chinese companies to invest abroad while also building china s soft power through the transfer of a key component of china s development success little is known about the 19 zones approved so far under this program or the impact they are likely to have on structural transformation and industrial development in their host countries this paper identifies the 19 zones and their proposed locations the process of selection developers implementation and the chinese incentive regime it then focuses on the african zones using a typology of factors that have proven critical for zone development in the past the paper evaluates the potential of these zones for fostering structural transformation in africa

a structural model on the impact of prediscovery licensing and research joint ventures on innovation and product market efficiency abstract using a novel database on prediscovery licensing agreements one type of r d cooperation as well as detailed firm level and semiconductor market specific information we estimate the impact of prediscovery licensing agreements pdlas on innovation and product market efficiency our results show that pdlas reduce innovative activity in the semiconductor industry by 10 percent or 4089 patents throughout the 1989 1999 period on the contrary research joint ventures a different type of r d cooperation increase innovative activity based on a structural model we provide evidence that pdlas increase production costs and semiconductor prices by 1 percent which results in customers paying an additional 1 1 billion for semiconductors per year beyond the common concern that r d cooperations facilitate coordination activities in product markets via price fixing our study highlights that pdlas can be used as an instrument to coordinate r d activities which can reduce innovation activity and increase costs and prices

the quality of innovation and the extent of the market abstract i present a comprehensive model of international trade in technology that considers both the demand for inventions and the supply of inventions on the demand side domestic and foreign firms make strategic technology adoption decisions on the supply side inventors compete to sell licenses for their technology to domestic and foreign firms countries benefit from international trade in technology because they obtain the best invention from a larger pool of inventions international trade in technology increases the extent of the market for inventions and thereby improves the quality of innovation technology trade lowers prices increases outputs and increases the volume of trade in differentiated products when traded products are not close substitutes international markets for technology generate gains from trade the results of the analysis are robust to the possibility of technology transfer either through expropriation or imitation protection of intellectual property rights preserves incentives for entry of inventors and improves the quality of innovation

do special economic zones induce developmental spillovers evidence from india s states abstract do special economic zones induce local development research drawing on the case of china s special economic zones suggests that subnational polities can target the location of export zones in order to catalyze local and regional socioeconomic development since 2006 a number of indian states have pushed forward similar zones in the face of accusations of land grabbing arguing that the zones will be engines for improvement in exports employment and infrastructure i argue that local development spillovers are an important albeit previously understudied dimension by which to evaluate the effects of special economic zones i then present the first systematic analysis of the developmental effects of india s sezs leveraging an original dataset on their locations together with 2001 and 2011 census data containing a host of social and economic developmental variables the findings show these sezs have failed to bring about local socioeconomic development to explain this absence of developmental spillovers i provide a theoretical framework based on the crucial role of political economy incentive structures facing local politicians i outline the mechanism through which indian state politicians use state owned development corporations for rent capture undermining the potential effectiveness of sezs and leading to their developmental failures the combination of available means for extracting rents and the limited political constraints on such rent extraction leads to a lack of developmental spillovers this framework can also help to explain the difference in the effects of sezs in india and in china these findings have theoretical importance for understanding the conditions under which subnational polities can use export zones and other export policies to catalyze development and practical implications for understanding the mixed pattern of sez success across the world

a general tce model of international business institutions market failure and reciprocity in this study i propose a general transaction cost economics tce model of international business institutions in which cross border transactions can be conducted at multiple market levels e g output asset and equity and the buyer seller relationship can go both ways a sells to b and b sells to a this general model addresses two major gaps in the literature first although market failure is the driving force behind the rise of multinational enterprises mnes most researchers have focused on the failure of a single market without exploring the presence of substitute markets for cross border transactions second many previous studies have begun their analysis with a bilateral setup between an mne and an indigenous firm for example a licensing agreement but concluded with a unilateral decision made by the mne to evade the indigenous firm in the case of direct investment in bridging the two literature gaps i propose a general tce model to integrate all institutional modes available to firms for governing international business such as licensing outsourcing acquisitions and joint ventures built on a multi market framework my analysis reveals that the choice of the optimal international business institution is tantamount to the selection of the most efficient market to conduct cross border transactions drawing on a bilateral setup it explicitly recognizes the power of reciprocity in solving the problem of market failure this distinct approach points out promising directions for future researchers to advance international business studies particularly after my transaction level analysis has been expanded to also consider institutional contexts and firm capabilities

licensee technological potential and exclusive rights in international licensing a multilevel model granting of exclusive rights is an important consideration for firms using licensing as a mode of entry into foreign markets as exclusive contracts reduce licensors flexibility in a given market during the term of the agreement by granting exclusivity to a licensee with greater technological potential the exchange partners can increase the potential transactional value of the licensing agreement at the same time a licensee with strong technological potential will increase the threat of transactional hazards due to underinvestment and rent appropriation in this paper we develop and empirically test a model that evaluates the balancing of transactional value and transaction costs in exclusive licensing in particular we identify the conditions under which exclusive contracts are likely to be granted to foreign licensees with strong technological potential empirical results from a multilevel model based on 375 international licensing agreements of us firms in high technology industries during 1995 2008 show that licensees with a stronger technological potential are more likely to be granted exclusive rights in countries with strong intellectual property rights protection and in industries with a high rate of technological change but are less likely to be granted exclusive rights when there is a high degree of overlap between licensor and licensee products

local economic development agglomeration economies and the big push 100 years of evidence from the tennessee valley authority we study the long run eects of one of the most ambitious place based economic development policies in u s history the tennessee valley authority using a rich panel dataset of counties we conduct an evaluation of the dynamic eects of the tva on local economies in the seventy years following the program s inception we nd that the tva led to short run gains in agricultural employment that were eventually reversed while impacts on manufacturing employment continued to intensify well after the program s subsidies had lapsed a pattern consistent with the presence of strong agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector economists have long cautioned that the local gains created by place based policies may be oset by losses elsewhere yielding ambiguous eects on the u s as a whole building on the framework in glaeser and gottlieb 2008 we develop a novel approach to assessing the aggregate consequences of shifting the spatial distribution of manufacturing employment our ndings suggest the aggregate productivity gains associated with relocating manufacturing activity to the tva region were probably minimal

university start up formation and technology licensing with firms that go public a resource based view of academic entrepreneurship abstract although academic entrepreneurship is a topic receiving some attention in the literature higher education s appetite for expanding technology transfer activities suggests that more research is needed to inform practice this study investigates the effects of particular resource sets on two university commercialization activities the number of start up companies formed and the number of initial public offering ipo firms to which a university had previously licensed a technology utilizing multisource data on 120 universities and a resource based view of the firm framework a set of university financial human capital and organizational resources were found to be significant predictors of one or both outcomes

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

a dynamic model of open source vs proprietary r d abstract we propose a dynamic model in which firms compete to produce sequential and cumulative innovations and in which the more firms do research in one sector the more likely it is that one of them innovates firms choose research effort and whether to patent innovations or to use an open source license like the general public license we show that i patents generate a larger stationary reward but foreclose research within a sector and that ii open source generates a smaller stationary reward but allows everyone to use the technology and therefore by attracting firms to the sector it induces a faster pace of innovation we characterize all the equilibria of the model and show that in equilibrium an open source sector appears only after a proprietary sector we also find conditions under which the model has a unique equilibrium in which a proprietary and an open source sector coexist and compete in the short run but the open source sector dominates the industry in the long run we use our model to study whether patents are inefficient and to explain firms behavior in the software and the biomedical industry

inventor moral hazard in university licensing the role of contracts abstract we examine commonly observed forms of payment such as milestones royalties or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is risk averse the model also predicts the use of consulting contracts which improve the firm s ability to monitor inventor effort because these contracts increase the firm s expected profits the upfront fee that the university can charge is higher than otherwise these results therefore support the commonly observed university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing firms outside of their university contracts they also support firm policies of including milestones an empirical analysis based on a survey of 112 businesses that license in university inventions supports the complementarity of milestones and consulting suggested by the theory

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

the dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents this article explores new data on the transfer and renewal of u s patents and interprets this new evidence using a model of patent transfers and renewal we find that the proportion of transferred patents is large and differs across technology fields and especially type of patentees we also find that the probability of a patent being traded depends on a number of factors the age of the patent the number of citations received by a given age the patent generality and whether the patent has been previously traded or not these findings are consistent with the predictions of a model of patent transfers and renewals

endogenous network formation in patent contests and its role as a barrier to entry in a setting of r d co opetition we study by using an all pay auction approach how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest and how the latter influences the possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form the all pay auction approach allows us to 1 endogenize both network formation and r d intensities and 2 take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account we find that different from previous literature the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network even and especially if the benefits from cooperating are important interestingly the other possible stable networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest thus weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation we further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known refinement of pairwise stability strong stability which imposes networks to be immune to coalitional deviations

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

why do firms do basic research with their own money abstractthe question to be addressed is why do private firms perform basic research with their own money interest in this question derives from both analytical and utilitarian considerations there is empirical evidence in the united states which provides the main context for this paper supporting the view that basic research makes a significant contribution to the productivity growth of the economy 4 7 it is widely held that social returns from basic research are significant and higher than private returns and it is for this reason that most such activities continue to be financed by the taxpayer this also implies that measures aimed at increasing basic research by the private sector will be welfare improving in the united states the federal government in the years since the second world war has provided the vast majority of all funds devoted to basic research although the federal share has been declining in recent years and although that share is at its lowest level in about 20 years it still constitutes about two thirds of the total 10 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cross licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device this paper hypothesizes that when their products are imperfect substitutes firms can promote collusion by cross licensing their competing patents cross licensing is shown to enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm s product the paper then examines the consistency of the theory developed with the available evidence antitrust implications of the practice of cross licensing of competing patents are discussed

academic patent quality and quantity before and after the bayh dole act in the united states abstract this paper summarizes the results of empirical analyses of data on the characteristics of the pre and post 1980 patents of three leading us academic patenters the university of california stanford university and columbia university we complement the analysis of these institutions with an analysis of the characteristics of the patents issued to all us universities before and after 1980 our analysis suggests that the effects of the bayh dole act on the content of academic research and patenting at stanford and the university of california were modest the most significant change in the content of research at these universities one associated with increased patenting and licensing at both universities before and after 1980 was the rise of biomedical research and inventive activity but bayh dole had little to do with this growth both uc and stanford university administrators intensified their efforts to market faculty inventions in the wake of bayh dole this enlargement of the pool of marketed inventions appears to have reduced the commercial yield of this population at both universities but we find no decline in the importance or generality of the post 1980 patents of these two universities the analysis of overall us university patenting suggests that the patents issued to institutions that entered into patenting and licensing after the effective date of the bayh dole act are indeed less important and less general than the patents issued before and after 1980 to us universities with longer experience in patenting inexperienced academic patenters appear to have obtained patents that proved to be less significant in terms of the rate and breadth of their subsequent citations than those issuing to more experienced university patenters bayh dole s effects on entry therefore may be as important as any effects of the act on the internal research culture of us universities in explaining any decline in the importance and generality of us academic patents after 1980

did government decentralization cause china s economic miracle many scholars attribute china s market reforms and the remarkable economic performance they have fostered in part to the country s political and fiscal decentralization political decentralization is said to have stimulated local policy experiments and restrained predatory central interventions fiscal decentralization is thought to have motivated local officials to promote development and harden enterprises budget constraints the locally diversified structure of the prereform economy is said to have facilitated liberalization reexamining these arguments the authors find that none establishes a convincing link between political or fiscal decentralization and china s successes they suggest an alternative view of the reform process in which growth enhancing policies emerged from competition between promarket and conservative factions in beijing

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

how do patents affect follow on innovation evidence from the human genome we investigate whether patents on human genes have affected follow on scientific research and product development using administrative data on successful and unsuccessful patent applications submitted to the us patent and trademark office we link the exact gene sequences claimed in each application with data measuring follow on scientific research and commercial investments using this data we document novel evidence of selection into patenting patented genes appear more valuable prior to being patented than non patented genes this evidence of selection motivates two quasi experimental approaches both of which suggest that on average gene patents have had no quantitatively important effect on follow on innovation

trust and the market for technology abstract conditional on the decision to enter the market for immature technology we test for the effects that trust proxied by the context in which the negotiating parties first met has on the likelihood that these negotiations are successful using survey responses from 860 university firm and firm firm technology transactions we find that trust matters parties with high levels of trust i e know each other from a previous business are between 6 and 23 per cent more likely to conclude a transaction compared with those with low levels of trust i e cold callers we also find that patents can effectively substitute for a lack of trust and that trust is more important in upstream stages basic or applied science

the structure of payments as a way to alleviate contractual hazards in international technology licensing this article proposes an empirical model in which the option of choosing between royalties fixed payments or a combination of the two is made to mitigate contractual hazards in licensing contracts we examine licensing contracts between spanish and foreign firms during the 1960s and early 1970s using a new data source of 925 contracts the link between patenting and licensing is also analyzed the work provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the moral hazard problem truly influences the type of payment established in arm s length contracts when there is an important technological gap between unaffiliated firms this study also shows that the payment chosen depends on the size of the licensee firm copyright 2009 the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

how strong are weak patents economists usually conceive of patents as property rights that prevent others from practicing the patenting technology unless they first obtain a license from the patent holder even for ironclad patents i e for patents that are certain to be valid the existing literature has shown that the analysis of equilibrium licensing contracts is surprising subtle and complex 1 for example the analysis is quite different depending upon whether one firm s licensing contract is observable to the other firms likewise equilibrium outcomes are quite different if royalties must be linear than in the case where two part tariffs and other non linear royalties are permitted in that literature a downstream firm that refuses to sign a contract with the upstream supplier either exits the industry in the case that the upstream supplier controls an essential input or must rely on more costly inputs in the case of a non essential input in other words the downstream firm s threat point is to use some backstop technology in practice however patents are issued after a brief examination by the patent office to see if they meet the statutory requirements for novelty and non obviousness mounting evidence indicates that many weak patents i e patents unlikely to be found valid if challenged in court are issued by the u s patent and trademark office uspto 2 some observers view this with great alarm arguing that uspto is handing out undeserved monopolies others by contrast have suggested that these weak patents are of little concern because they will have little commercial impact because they will be licensed at commensurately low royalty rates or not enforced at all we study the commercial impact of weak patents more precisely we define a patent s strength as the probability that it will be found valid if challenged in court and we examine the relationship between a patent s strength and the royalties that it can command the distinctive

the disadvantaged incumbents estimating incumbency effects in indian state legislatures this paper estimates the incumbency effects using a large dataset on state legislative elections in india during 1975 2003 i use a regression discontinuity design rdd that estimates the causal effect of incumbency by comparing candidates in closely fought elections i find that there is a significant disadvantage to incumbency in indian state legislative elections and the adverse effect of incumbency has increased after 1991 also the incumbency disadvantage is higher in states that have lower availability of public goods such as health centers and lower employment poverty and per capita income

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

traveling agents political change and bureaucratic turnover in india abstract we develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns and the consequent implications for bureaucrats career investments unique microlevel data on indian bureaucrats support our key predictions politicians use frequent reassignments transfers across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats high skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts we find evidence of two alternative paths to career success officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill but caste affinity to the politician s party base also helps secure important positions

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

social capital as obstacle to development brokering land norms and trust in rural india summary based on a study of how rural land brokers mediate the arrival of a special economic zone in rural rajasthan this paper argues that theories of collective social capital cannot explain how networks norms and trust interact in a process of economic change it then reconstructs bourdieu s distinct theory of individual social capital by showing how better connected farmers are able to broker land and capture profits at the expense of fellow villagers undermining trust norms and collective action it argues that social capital is most plausibly seen as an aspect of social inequality that hinders inclusive development

licensing duration in foreign markets a real options perspective licensing can be considered an initial trial of a foreign market before a firm fully commits to it through other investment modes the length of trial has great importance because licensing duration represents part of the licensing agreement when it is too short the firm may not acquire the necessary experience and knowledge of the foreign market but if it is too long the firm misses optimal expansion timing arguing that licensing can be considered as a european style real option with a fixed holding period we develop and test a model of the determinants of licensing duration in foreign markets empirical results based on a sample of firms in various countries show that uncertainty and threat of competitive pre emption in the foreign market are related to shorter duration of the technology licensing agreements we also find that irreversibility of the impending investment moderates the relationships between uncertainty and duration specifically market and technology uncertainties in the foreign market induce shorter contracts under low levels of irreversibility

universities and industrially relevant science towards measurement models and indicators of entrepreneurial orientation abstract which university departments engaged in industrially relevant science are likely candidates to become entrepreneurial at present there are neither measurement models nor leading indicators that can answer such questions at an international comparative level this paper introduces concepts theory and a measurement model for identifying the early stages of a university s enterpreneurial orientation within a quantitative analytical framework this approach focuses specifically on university industry interactions in which the connectivity between academic science and industrial research is captured and measured empirically in terms of 1 public private co authored research articles and 2 references citations within corporate research articles to university research articles the paper examines a range of country level and institutional determinants of industrially relevant science across 18 research areas of significant industrial interest and at two different levels of analysis research systems of oecd countries and large sets of research universities within those countries the results of these large scale analyses along with those of a case study dealing with european universities active in the field of immunology research suggest that many structural factors determine university industry interactions and the potential for entrepreneurial orientation the two connectivity indicators appear to be of minor significance compared to a university s country of location and the magnitude of its research activities in industrially relevant fields of science

the value of u s patents by owner and patent characteristics abstract this paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of u s patents controlling for patent and owner characteristics estimates of u s patent value are substantially larger than estimates for european patents however the ratio of u s patent value to r d for firms is only about 3 contrary to a common assertion patents issued to small patentees are much less valuable than those issued to large corporations litigated patents are more valuable as are highly cited patents however patent citations explain little variance in value suggesting limits to their use as a measure of patent quality

on the duration of technology licensing abstract we model an innovator s choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer we find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion moreover licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

patent protection and the industrial composition of multinational activity evidence from u s multinational firms using data on u s firms technology licensing to local agents in developing countries this paper examines the impact of patent protection on internal and arms length technology transfer the effects of protection vary across products according to their complexity consistent with theories of internalization we find that patent reforms enable local firms to attract more arms length technology transfer especially of simple products which are relatively easy to imitate affiliated licensing also rises among simple products but falls among complex products the results withstand several robustness checks including controlling for endogeneity by using colonial origin as an instrument and are equally strong whether patent protection is measured by its intensity or by the timing of reforms the results have significance for patent policy in the developing world where access to knowledge is critical through arms length technology contracts proprietary knowledge diffuses beyond firm boundaries enabling local agents to access not only the protected technology but also know how

intellectual property protection and the industrial composition of multinational activity in a north south model with endogenous fdi we examine the impact of southern ipr protection on the mode and industrial composition of international technology transfer a novel feature of the model is that due to technological reasons industries differ with respect to their susceptibility to imitation in equilibrium licensing occurs in industries where the risk of imitation is low and fdi where it is of intermediate magnitude stronger iprs in the south i alter the industrial composition of multinational activity towards licensing at the expense of fdi ii reduce local imitation and iii increase licensing and to a lesser extent fdi

licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion abstract we present a differential game to study how companies can simultaneously license their innovations to other firms when launching a new product the licensee may cannibalize licensor s sales albeit this can be compensated by gains from royalties nonetheless patent royalties are generally so low that licensing is not an attractive strategy in this paper we consider the role of licensing to speed up the product diffusion word of mouth by licensee s customers and licensee s advertising indirectly push forward sales of the licensing company accelerating new product diffusion we find evidence that licensing can be a potentially profitable strategy however we also find that a weak intellectual property right ipr protection can easily diminish the financial attractiveness of licensing

shirking sharing risk and shelving the role of university license contracts abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard risk sharing and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties the potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm this supports the rationale for bayh dole march in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives