causalities between co2 electricity and other energy variables during phase i and phase ii of the eu ets the topic of this article is the analysis of the interplay between daily carbon electricity and gas price data with the european union emission trading system eu ets for co2 emissions in a first step we have performed granger causality tests for phase i of the eu ets january 2005 until december 2007 and the first year of phase ii of the eu ets 2008 the analysis includes both spot and forward markets given the close interactions between the two sets of markets the results show that during phase i coal and gas prices through the clean dark and spark spread impacted co2 futures prices which in return granger caused electricity prices during the first year of the phase ii the short run rent capture theory in which electricity prices granger cause co2 prices prevailed on the basis of the qualitative results of the granger causality tests we obtained the formulation testable equations for quantitative analysis standard ols regressions yielded statistically robust and theoretically coherent results

downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale prices are above costs we examine the consequences of allowing a bottleneck input supplier to vertically integrate downstream and compete with users of the input when the input has a regulated price above cost if the supplier maximizes the sum of short run profits from the downstream market and input market then allowing the vertical integration will increase social surplus even if it causes sellers of competing differentiated products to exit the market if the bottleneck supplier wishes to engage in predatory pricing increasing the regulated price of the input above cost reduces the incentive to engage in predation these questions are motivated primarily by assertions made in the public record that allowing bell operating companies into long distance can be harmful if access rates are above cost copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

informational asymmetries strategic behavior and industrial organization one of the most active and exciting areas of economic research over the last several years has been the use of noncooperative games of incomplete information to model industrial competition this work has yielded not only a remarkable number of papers but also several new insights on and explanations of fundamentally important issues the purpose of this paper is to attempt an appreciation and evaluation of this work because most of our individual and joint work since about 1979 has been in this mode it will come as no surprise that we are proponents of this line of research however there are several questions and potential problems that we see as arising in connection with this methodology and we will attempt to address these first a disclaimer we are not attempting a survey of the applications of asymmetric information games aig to industrial organization although we will refer in a highly selective fashion to a number of prominent strands in this literature in particular where any references are provided at all they are typically only to the earliest contributions to a subject even more we do not deal with work in which informational asymmetries are important but the analysis is not game theoretic for example search and price dispersion or the early work on the lemons problem and on moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets or with game theoretic treatments that assume complete information i aig methods and applications

the effect of entry on r d networks we investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of r d networks considering farsighted firms we show that the presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbent firms to establish an r d link in particular incumbent firms may choose to form an otherwise undesirable r d collaboration in order to deter the entry of a new firm moreover an incumbent firm may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable r d collaboration expecting to form a more profitable r d link with the entrant finally potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market we also perform a welfare analysisand show that market and societal incentives are often misaligned

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

entry deterrence under trade unions this paper argues for the integration of labor unions in the analysis of industrial organization such a linkage is important for at least two reasons first unions are often concentrated in big firms which tend in general to face an imperfectly competitive environment in their product markets second unions are usually able to extract in the form of higher wages some rents which result from the market power of firms see for example freeman and medoff 1984 on the impact of unions on firm profitability in the u s a firms should thus take union behavior into account and in particular realize that strategies toward rival firms will tend to affect unions ability to extract rents we illustrate here the impact of unions in industrial organization by focusing on the topic of entry deterrence ed in section 2 we first argue that unions tend to lower the profitability of two standard widely studied ed strategies limit pricing under incomplete information and the use of sunk costs section 3 then turns to union contracts as a possible alternative ed strategy available to incumbent tirms finally section 4 assesses the welfare impact of unions in these settings while section 5 suggests directions for research

the impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence an example abstract a simple non pathological example demostrates that when an incumbent firm has private information about the state of demand an entrant s profits and the likelihood of entry may be decreasing in the state of demand

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

a positive theory of discretionary policy the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution we offer an explanation of government s preference for discretionary policy action the main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects discretionary policy imposes a social cost we show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government an optimal state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government s opportunities to exploit its informational advantage rules of this kind and constitutional restrictions are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public

credible signals of the release of new versions i introduction many products are marketed some time after they have been developed for instance a new smartphone may be developed and tested well before it is available for purchase a new car might be prototyped and driven months before it comes to the market indeed a firm will often have several products concurrently in a development pipeline consumers may know a product is in that pipeline without knowing its progress towards the market because the outcome of such development and testing is not visible to outsiders the firm knows whether it can market a product before consumers do consumers are uninformed about when and if the new product will be marketed to them economists have long recognized that the present demand for durable goods depends on future prospects such as the future price or the introduction of an improved version 1 the existence of such an improved version is often the seller s private information if consumers anticipate a new version some will defer purchases until the new version is available and the seller will face low demand for the present version disclosing the new version is not in a monopoly seller s interest a seller whose good does not have a new version would also like to communicate that fact to consumers while a firm with a successful product innovation can credibly disclose the new version with relative ease a firm that has failed to develop a new product could have great difficulty convincing consumers that the product has no new version in such situations it is important to examine whether prices can inform consumers whether a new version will be marketed in the near future in a recent paper choi et al 2010 developed a model with a risky product development process in which reputation effects allow cheap talk announcements to signal successful product development to consumers an announcement induces consumers to delay or divert purchases to the announcer s coming product which increases the announcer s profit and can improve welfare 2 in their model the announcer and her non innovative rivals supply the original good competitively because of this an announcement does not reduce profit on the current version this paper will focus on markets where the seller has substantial market power before innovating so announcing a successful product development has a cost in terms of current revenue further because we attend to prices as signals this model may also apply to markets where a long run relationship between consumers and firms may not be sustainable another objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure a government policy mandating disclosure of any new version is an alternative means of informing consumers 3 as long as firms are not willing to lie to the government such a policy would credibly communicate whether a new version of a durable is coming mandatory disclosure would bring about full information as consumers are informed about any improved future version before observing the price of the current version in this paper we explore a two period model of a durable good monopoly in which consumers are initially uninformed about whether there will be a new version of the current good the monopoly seller is privately informed if he will be able to market an improved version in the second period in the first period consumers must decide whether to purchase the good now or wait for an upgraded version they may be able to infer from the price of the current version whether the seller will bring a new version to the market it is important to see first whether prices can serve as signals and second how welfare compares between any signaling outcome and a full information benchmark corresponding to mandatory disclosure we will show that there is a unique equilibrium supported by intuitive beliefs in this equilibrium the seller s private information about an improved version is completely revealed to consumers

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

business cycles and monetary regimes in emerging economies a role for a monopolistic banking sector abstract this study shows that the presence of imperfect competition in the banking system propagates external shocks and amplifies the business cycle strategic limit pricing aimed at protecting retail niches from potential competitors generates countercyclical bank markups markup increments during recessions directly increase borrowing costs for firms and indirectly damage the financial position of firms balance sheets increasing the risk perception of lenders i use bayesian techniques and data from argentina to show that the inclusion of monopolistic banking improves the fit of the new keynesian small open economy model

a framework to evaluate security of supply in the electricity sector security of electricity supply soes has become a major concern for regulators and policymakers over the last decade however most work focusses either more generally on energy security or on a single fuel we develop a comprehensive but flexible framework to assess the soes for a single jurisdiction taking into the account the specificities of electricity this framework has two aims i provide a snapshot of the situation to understand current weaknesses and determine what actions are required ii capture the evolution over time to evaluate progress and identify potential problems before they materialise the framework based on an extensive literature review consists of twelve dimensions that are critical for soes we develop metrics that capture the state and evolution of each dimension this framework is intended to be a management information tool for all stakeholders aimed at organising data and structuring its analysis to enable monitoring the evolution of the soes while also functioning as an early warning system by flagging potential future problems

factors influencing co2 emissions in china s power industry co integration analysis more than 40 of china s total co2 emissions originate from the power industry the realization of energy saving and emission reduction within china s power industry is therefore crucial in order to achieve co2 emissions reduction in this country this paper applies the autoregressive distributed lag ardl co integration model to study the major factors which have influenced co2 emissions within china s power industry from 1980 to 2010 results have shown that co2 emissions from china s power industry have been increasing rapidly from 1980 to 2010 the average annual growth rate was 8 5 and the average growth rate since 2002 has amounted to 10 5 secondly the equipment utilization hour as an indicator of the power demand has the greatest influence on co2 emissions within china s power industry in addition the impact of the industrial added value of the power sector on co2 emissions is also positive from a short term perspective thirdly the granger causality results imply that one of the important motivators behind china s technological progress within the power industry originates from the pressures created by a desire for co2 emissions reduction finally this paper provides policy recommendations for energy saving and emission reduction for china s power industry

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

monetary fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus abstract increases in government spending trigger substitution effects both inter and intra temporal and a wealth effect the ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate this paper estimates markov switching policy rules for the united states and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior when the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new keynesian model government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized the paper reports the model s predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the american recovery and reinvestment act s implied path for government spending under alternative monetary fiscal policy combinations

price drivers and structural breaks in european carbon prices 2005 2007 this article aims at characterizing the daily price fundamentals of european union allowances euas traded since 2005 as part of the emissions trading scheme ets the presence of two structural changes on april 2006 following the disclosure of 2005 verified emissions and on october 2006 following the european commission announcement of stricter phase ii allocation allows to isolate distinct fundamentals evolving overtime the results extend previous literature by showing that eua spot prices react not only to energy prices with forecast errors but also to unanticipated temperatures changes during colder events besides the sub period decomposition of the pilot phase gives a better grasp of institutional and market events that drive allowance price changes

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model abstract we analyze a nonrenewable resource model in which an incumbent firm faces potential entry from a rival firm the incumbent has private information about its stock size but the rival can observe extraction with observable extraction and unobservable stock the rival can use extraction as a signal about stock from which it can infer whether entry is likely to be profitable we characterize the necessary conditions for pooling and separating perfect bayesian equilibria in a signaling game of resource extraction and provide examples of each we show that the incumbent will often prefer pooling to separating even though welfare is higher in separating equilibrium

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

emission abatement untangling the impacts of the eu ets and the economic crisis abstract in this study we use historical emission data from installations under the european union emissions trading system eu ets to evaluate the impact of this policy on greenhouse gas emissions during the first two trading phases 2005 2012 as such the analysis seeks to disentangle two causes of emission abatement that attributable to the eu ets and that attributable to the economic crisis that hit the eu in 2008 09 to do so we use a dynamic panel data approach our results suggest that by far the biggest share of abatement was attributable to the effects of the economic crisis this finding has serious implications for future policy adjustments affecting core elements of the eu ets including the distribution of eu emission allowances

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

toward a theory of the political entrepreneur evidence from local government political scientists have been increasingly interested in entrepreneurs individuals who change the direction and flow of politics in this research note we synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship with concepts used in political science we then tie these theoretical observations to the emergence of entrepreneurs in local governments and test components of our theory using observations from a large set of suburban municipal governments empirically we identify several conditions that affect the probability that an entrepreneur will emerge in a local government especially slack budgetary resources that the political entrepreneur can reallocate we also find that the probability with which an entrepreneur is found in local government is a function of the difficulty of overcoming collective action problems in a community

causes of the eu ets price drop recession cdm renewable policies or a bit of everything new evidence the price of eu allowances euas in the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets fell from almost 30 tco2 in mid 2008 to less than 5 tco2 in mid 2013 the sharp and persistent price decline has sparked intense debates both in academia and among policy makers about the decisive allowance price drivers in this paper we examine whether and to what extent the eua price drop can be justified by three commonly identified explanatory factors the economic recession renewable policies and the use of international credits capitalizing on marginal abatement cost theory and a broadly extended data set we find that only variations in economic activity and the growth of wind and solar electricity production are robustly explaining eua price dynamics contrary to simulation based analyses our results point to moderate interaction effects between the overlapping eu ets and renewable policies the bottom line however is that 90 of the variations of eua price changes remains unexplained by the abatement related fundamentals together our findings do not support the widely held view that negative demand shocks are the main cause of the weak carbon price signal in view of the new evidence we evaluate the eu ets reform options which are currently discussed

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

dumping and signaling abstract a model of predatory dumping based upon incomplete and asymmetric information is developed the foreign firm may induce exit by the home firm through acting like a low cost competitor irrespective of its actual costs the home firm must infer the foreign firm s cost through its export price by tying the export price to the price that the foreign firm charges in the foreign market a home county antidumping law raises the cost of signaling low production costs to the home producer the law has signal enhancing or inhibiting effects which may adversely affect the home firm with ambiguous welfare consequences

unionization and plant closure in canada this paper examines for the first time the role of unionization as a determinant of plant closings in canada using the 1999 to 2001 canadian workplace and employee survey the paper contributes to the north american evidence by showing that the share of a plant s workers covered by collective bargaining has a robust positive partial correlation with the probability of larger plants closing for smaller plants the extent of unionization tends to be much lower and its variation plays no role in plant closure the study highlights the theoretical and statistical importance of examining closure separately for large and small plants ce memoire examine pour la premiere fois le role de la syndicalisation en tant que determinant de la fermeture d usines au canada a l aide des resultats de l enquete sur le milieu de travail et les employes de 1999 et de 2001 emte le texte contribue a enrichir le dossier qui montre qu il y a correlation positive partielle robuste entre la portion des travailleurs d usines couverts par une convention collective et la probabilite de fermeture des grandes usines pour les plus petites usines le degre de syndicalisation tend aetre plus faible et sa variation ne joue pas de role dans le processus de fermeture d usines cette etude montre l importance theorique et pratique qu il y a aetudier separement les fermetures des grandes et des petites usines

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

the impact of competitive entry in a developing market upon dynamic pricing strategies this paper analyzes dynamic pricing strategies for new durable goods in a two period context the first period is characterized as a monopoly market structure for a new product having dynamic demand the second period begins when a new firm enters the market and thereby changes the market structure to a duopolistic one we begin by analyzing the pricing strategies of three types of monopolists nonmyopic myopic and surprised a nonmyopic monopolist is a first entrant who perfectly predicts the competitive entry a myopic monopolist totally discounts the duopolistic period and a surprised monopolist is a first entrant who has the longer time horizon of the nonmyopic monopolist but who does not foresee the competitive entry our results indicate that the nature of these pricing strategies may be quite different it is optimal for the nonmyopic firm to price its product at a higher level than the myopic monopolist additional results indicate under what circumstances the surprised monopolist will p

a model of carbon price interactions with macroeconomic and energy dynamics abstract this paper develops a model of carbon pricing by considering two fundamental drivers of european union allowances economic activity and energy prices on the one hand economic activity is proxied by aggregated industrial production in the eu 27 as it provides the best performance in a preliminary forecasting exercise vs other indicators on the other hand brent natural gas and coal prices are selected as being the main carbon price drivers as highlighted by previous literature the interactions between the macroeconomic and energy spheres are captured in a markov switching var model with two states that is able to reproduce the boom bust business cycle hamilton 1989 first industrial production is found to impact positively negatively the carbon market during periods of economic expansion recession thereby confirming the existence of a link between the macroeconomy and the price of carbon second the brent price is confirmed to be the leader in price formation among energy markets bachmeier and griffin 2006 as it impacts other variables through the structure of the markov switching model taken together these results uncover new interactions between the recently created eu emissions market and the pre existing macroeconomic energy environment

carbon mitigation in the electric power sector under cap and trade and renewables policies in europe co2 emissions from the electric power sector and energy intensive industries are capped under a cap and trade system i e the eu ets when other indirect measures are taken to impact emissions in a specific sector under the cap such as a push for renewables in the electric power sector this has implications on the overall allowance price and on co2 emissions both from this specific sector and the other sectors under the cap the central contribution of this paper is the derivation of impact curves which describe these interactions i e the impact on allowance price and the shift of emissions across sectors from a set of detailed simulations of the electric power system operation a so called emission plane is obtained from which impact curves can be derived focus is on interactions between co2 abatement through fuel switching and measures affecting the residual electricity demand such as deployment of renewables in the electric power sector as well as on interactions with other sectors both in a short term framework a case study for central western europe is presented the analysis reveals a substantial impact of renewables on co2 emissions and hence on emissions shifts across sectors and or on the co2 price

modeling and forecasting the volatility of carbon dioxide emission allowance prices a review and comparison of modern volatility models abstract the launch of the markets for carbon dioxide emission allowances was guided by the aim to use the supposedly efficient price formation mechanism of an organized exchange to optimally allocate a certain quantity of emissions among potential polluters while this introduction of a centralized trading arrangement should have helped to achieve required emission reductions with a minimum of economic losses from the viewpoint of market participants it has raised concerns about appropriate risk management provisions to cope with the fluctuations of time varying allowance prices the present review provides an overview over state of the art models for price volatility expanding the scope from relatively simple garch type models to models with long term dependence and regime switches including the relatively recent class of so called multifractal models we provide a comparative application of these models to carbon dioxide emission allowance prices from the european union emission trading scheme and evaluate their performance with up to date model comparison tests based on out of sample forecasts of future volatility and value at risk

fulfilled expectations of entry i develop a two period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer s expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium i find that both expectations duopoly and monopoly are fulfilled in the incumbent s price setting game while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity setting game i also find that quantity is more entry deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity setting game

sunk capacity costs long run fixed costs and entry deterrence under complete and incomplete information this article considers a three stage extensive form game where capacity once installed is sunk but where fixed costs are not sunk we show that there may be multiple perfect equilibria of the complete information game when the entrant is incompletely informed about the incumbent s cost the entrant may use the incumbent s capacity choice as a signal of the incumbent s cost we present an example where the incumbent prefers a noninformative capacity signal since this has the effect of reducing the scale of entry we present a second example where the entrant is incompletely informed because the incumbent makes a choice over production technologies that is unobservable to the entrant

reply to schandl et al 2016 jclepro and hatfield dodds et al 2015 nature how challenging is decoupling for australia

impact of the economic recession on the european power sector s co2 emissions abstract this paper investigates the impact of the economic recession on co 2 emissions in the european power sector during the years 2008 and 2009 three main determinants of the power sector s emissions are identified the demand for electricity the co 2 price and fuel prices a counterfactual scenario has been set up for each of these i e what these parameters would have been if not affected by the recession a simulation model of the european power sector is then employed comparing a historical reference simulation taking the parameters as actually occurred with the counterfactual scenarios the lower electricity demand due to the recession is shown to have by far the largest impact accounting for an emission reduction of about 175 mton the lower co 2 price due to the recession resulted in an increase in emissions by about 30 mton the impact of fuel prices is more difficult to retrieve an indicative reduction of about 17 mton is obtained mainly as a consequence of the low gas prices in 2009 the simulated combined impact of the parameters results in an emission reduction of about 150 mton in the european power sector over the years 2008 and 2009 as a consequence of the recession

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

a failure to communicate an experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic play abstract we investigate why two person teams beat the truth wins benchmark in signaling games cooper and kagel 2005 cooper and kagel 2009 by studying an advice treatment where advisees have the benefit of two individuals insight but not bilateral communication the tw benchmark states that the performance of a team for problems with a demonstrable correct solution should be no worse than the performance of its most able individual if one individual solves the problem the team solves it as well advisees whose advisors play strategically have significantly higher levels of strategic play but fall well short of the truth wins benchmark as i many advisors who play strategically do not provide advice to this effect and ii many advisees fail to follow sound advice effect i is largely attributable to female advisors who are far less likely to provide advice than men whether or not advice contains a clear explanation for its effectiveness has no effect on the likelihood of advisees strategic play a result at odds with the idea that economic agents regularly consider all the available alternatives

an overview of co2 cost pass through to electricity prices in europe this paper investigates the link between wholesale electricity prices in europe and the co2 cost i e the price of european union allowances euas over the two first phases of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets we set up a theoretical framework and an empirical model to estimate to what extent daily fluctuations of co2 costs may have impacted electricity prices regarding estimation results for the first phase of the eu ets about 42 of estimated pass through rates appear to be statistically significant while only one third of them are statistically different from zero in the second phase we try to improve those results by proposing alternative estimates based on the eu ets compliance periods

crises and emissions new empirical evidence from a large sample abstract in this paper we empirically assess by means of the local projection method the impact of different types of financial crises on a variety of pollutant emissions categories for a sample of 86 countries between 1980 and 2012 we find that financial crises in general lead to a fall in co2 and methane emissions when hit by a debt crisis a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities or industrial processes during periods of slack financial crises in general had a positive impact on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions if a financial crisis hit an economy when it was engaging in contractionary fiscal policies this led to a negative response of co2 and production based emissions