do governors get what they want an alternative examination of the line item veto this paper reconsiders the impact of the governor s line item veto on the state budget process the governor s ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness rather than a smaller expenditure budget the percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor s original budget request over fiscal years 1983 1989 is examined the empirical results indicate that under certain political situations the line item veto authority enhances the governor s ability to obtain his or her desired budget

decision costs in legislative bargaining an experimental analysis we conduct an experiment to assess the effects of different decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation specifically we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule our main finding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject offers under unanimity rule this higher rejection rate as well as the requirement that all subjects agree leads to more costly delay this result provides empirical support for a classic argument in favor of less than unanimity decision rules put forth by buchanan and tullock the calculus of consent logical foundations of constitutional democracy university of michigan press ann arbor 1962

do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform the western world exhibited a significant trend towards larger local governments in the twentieth century which was driven to a large extent by boundary reforms boundary reforms can provide economic benefits but may also give rise to costs driven by opportunistic political behavior this study uses a swedish compulsory reform to test for such behavior the reform gives a local government the incentive to accumulate debt before a merger takes place since the taxpayers in the new locality will share the cost the strength of the incentive to free ride is determined by the population size of the initial locality relative to that of the new locality i find an economically large and statistically significant free riding effect

supermajority voting requirements for tax increases evidence from the states abstract this paper measures the effect of state level supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates unobserved attitudes towards taxation tend to influence both the adoption of supermajority requirements and tax policy consequently one cannot distinguish between the effect of these requirements and their correlation with these unobserved attitudes a model is presented in which legislatures controlled by a pro tax party adopt a supermajority requirement to reduce the majority party agenda control the propensity of pro tax states to adopt supermajority requirements results in an underestimate of the true effect of these requirements on taxes to correct this identification problem the paper first uses fixed effects to control for unobserved attitudes and then employs instruments that measure the difficulty of amending state constitutions the paper concludes that supermajority requirements have significantly reduced taxes

supermajority rule and the law of 1 n this paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1 n which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government our analysis suggests that supermajority rule despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending increases the 1 n effect because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members using data from us states from 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust worsening effect on the fiscal commons problem identified by the law of 1 n

non radial cost luenberger productivity indicator abstract this study decomposes cost inefficiency into technical and allocative components in a more general way based on the directional russell measure drm of fukuyama and weber 2009 with the allocative component being completely clear of technical inefficiency based on this decomposition we develop a cost oriented productivity indicator the cost luenberger productivity indicator cl which completely embraces the concept of cost minimization and provides four sources of productivity change technical efficiency change the change in allocative efficiency the shift of technology and the effect of input price change to illustrate the above decompositions of cost inefficiency and productivity change and to investigate whether the establishment of a financial holding company fhc offers a bank greater operating efficiency and an improvement in productivity change this study employs data on taiwan s banking industry covering the period 2006 2012

tiebout with politics capital tax competition and constitutional choices this paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation we describe a non cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes we show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries and even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction

optimal taxation and fiscal constitution abstract assuming a world with excessive taxes the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes in particular it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases as currently used in some us states is the means of attaining this objective their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries that of franchise restrictions is discussed

supermajority rule the law of 1 n and government spending a synthesis i develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending where the coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition an increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending a higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition i develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of i a nonexcludable good ii a distributive consumption good iii infrastructure spending and iv a transfer payment a supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending an increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending i also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1 n if the coase theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement thus the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1 n

how to succeed at increasing spending without really trying the balanced budget amendment and the item veto congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending in particular the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents interests through pork barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest however assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results the supermajorities requires by the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log rolling that promote and may indeed increase pork barrel spending

do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny evidence from the us states 1960 1997 buchanan and tullock 1962 demonstrates that supermajority rules can reduce tyranny of majority problems in a democracy however recent theoretical work by dixit grossman and gul 2000 postulates that this static analysis of supermajority rules may be inadequate to explain political decisions in a dynamic setting in fact supermajority rules may increase the incidence of majority tyranny because of rotating political representation using data from us state legislatures we examine the effect of supermajority rules on different categories of government expenditures and tax revenues during the latter half of the 20th century we find supermajority rules have little effect on general government expenditures and tax revenues however supermajority rules are associated with lower public welfare transfers which supports the traditional analysis of the fiscal effects of supermajority rules

the decision to regionalize in the provision of education an application of the tiebout model abstract in the standard tiebout equilibrium consumers sort themselves into an array of communities which cater to the specific preferences of their residents for public services given congestibility of these services the efficient size of a community minimizes the average cost of provision in reality communities provide several services each with a different optimal scale a common response to this situation is for communities to jointly provide some services while retaining local control over others this paper theoretically examines the conditions under which joint provision of education or regionalization will occur in a tiebout framework a case study is used to illustrate the results of the model

separation of powers and the tax level in the u s states we estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party in the states with the line item veto the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified with a regression discontinuity design we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect we propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship the sequential nature of the budget bargaining game that is the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line item veto implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level

productivity growth in large us commercial banks the initial post deregulation experience abstract we explore productivity growth for a group of 201 large us commercial banks over the initial post deregulation period from 1984 to 1990 using data envelopment analysis dea we measure productivity growth using malmquist productivity indexes and isolate the contributions of technical change technical efficiency change and scale change to productivity growth we find overall productivity growth at the rate of about 4 5 per year on average but productivity declined by 7 61 between 1984 and 1985 and by 0 33 between 1988 and 1989 our second stage panel regressions reveal that larger asset size and specialization of product mix associate with higher productivity growth while higher equity to assets associates with lower productivity growth

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

term length and the effort of politicians we evaluate the eects of a fundamental lever of constitutional design the dura tion of public o ce terms we present a simple model grounded in interviews with legislators and highlight three forces shaping incentives to exert legislative eort we exploit two natural experiments in the argentine congress where term lengths were assigned randomly to ascertain which forces are empirically dominant results for separate measures as well as an aggregate index of legislative eort show that longer terms increase eort shorter terms appear to discourage eort not due to campaign distractions but due to an investment payback logic when eort yields returns over multiple periods longer terms yield a higher chance of capturing those returns a broader implication is that job stability may promote eort despite making individuals less accountable rossi acknowledges nancial support from grant pict 2007 787 we thank the editor marco

changing the price of pork the impact of local cost sharing on legislators demands for distributive public goods abstract the provision of public services through national legislatures gives legislators the chance to fund locally beneficial public projects using a shared national tax base nationally financed and provided local congestible public goods will be purchased at a subsidized price below marginal cost and may be inefficiently too large as a consequence an important assumption behind this inefficiency is that national legislators in fact demand more of the locally beneficial project as the local price for projects declines this paper provides the first direct test of this important assumption using legislators project choices following the passage of the water resources development act of 1986 wrda 86 we find legislators chosen water project sizes do fall as the local cost share rises with a price elasticity of demand ranging from 0 81 for flood control and shoreline protection projects to 2 55 for large navigation projects the requirement of wrda 86 that local taxpayers contribute a greater share to the funding of local water projects reduced overall proposed project spending in our sample by 35 and the federal outlay for proposed project spending by 48

deviations between china s and international gold price role of fundamentals contagion and financial shocks china has been the world s largest gold producer since 2007 and the world s largest gold consumer since 2013 however despite it being the second largest exchange traded market in the world gold

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

indian bank efficiency and productivity changes with undesirable outputs a disaggregated approach the objective of this study is to examine technical efficiency and productivity growth in the indian banking sector over the period from 2004 to 2011 we apply an innovative methodological approach introduced by chen et al 2011 and barros et al 2012 who use a weighted russell directional distance model to measure technical inefficiency we further modify and extend that model to measure tfp change with npls we find that the inefficiency levels are significantly different among the three ownership structure of banks in india foreign banks have strong market position in india and they pull the production frontier in a more efficient direction spbs and domestic private banks show considerably higher inefficiency we conclude that the restructuring policy applied in the late 1990s and early 2000s by the indian government has not had a long lasting effect

malmquist indices of productivity growth during the deregulation of norwegian banking 1980 89 productivity growth during the deregulation of the norwegian banking industry is studied within the framework of data envelopment analysis which explicitly allows for multiple outputs introducing malmquist indices for productivity growth total growth can be decomposed into frontier growth and change in each bank s distance to the frontier both the total growth index and its components can be consistently chained over time we find productivity regress at the average bank prior to the deregulation but rapid growth when deregulation took place deregulation also led to less dispersion of productivity levels within the industry

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

the effects of reform on china s bank structure and performance abstract this paper investigates the relationship between market structure and performance in china s banking system from 1985 to 2002 a period when this sector was subject to gradual but notable reform using panel data estimation techniques both the market power and efficient structure hypotheses are tested in addition the model is extended to consider issues such as the impact of bank size ownership and whether the big four banks enjoy a quiet life on average x efficiency declined significantly and most banks were operating below scale efficient levels estimation of the structure performance models lends some support to the relative market power hypothesis in the early period the reforms had little impact on the structure of china s banking sector though the joint stock banks became relatively more x efficient there was no evidence to support the quiet life hypothesis probably because strict interest rate controls prevented the state banks from earning monopoly profits thus the ongoing liberalisation of interest rates should be accompanied by reduced concentration overall to improve competitive structure new policies should be directed at encouraging market entry and increasing the market share of the most efficient banks

electoral vulnerability and size of local governments evidence from voting on municipal mergers abstract we analyze how anticipated changes in the electoral vulnerability of municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers the electoral vulnerability changes due to a merger because it changes the composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next election we use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the increase in the electoral vulnerability of a councilor the more likely he is to vote for the merger the documented effect is not driven by the behavioral response of the voters or by party line considerations the councilors desire to avoid personal electoral competition may lead to sub optimally small municipalities from the local citizens point of view

a spatial merger estimator with an application to school district consolidation abstract this paper develops a spatial merger estimator to explain political integration generally and then applies this method to a wave of school district mergers in the state of iowa during the 1990s our estimator is rooted in the economics of matching and thus accounts for three important features of typical merger protocol two sided decision making multiple potential partners and spatial interdependence rather than simply explaining when a particular region is likely to experience a wave of political integration our method allows us to explore the factors driving which specific subregional mergers take place this allows us to explore how those districts that merge choose with which of their neighbors to do so our results highlight the importance of state financial incentives for consolidation economies of scale diseconomies of scale and a variety of heterogeneity measures in this particular application we also demonstrate the power of our estimator relative to existing estimators to detect a statistically significant role for heterogeneity factors while our application is limited to school district consolidation our method can be adapted to include the salient features of many spatial integration problems

public spending and the paradox of supermajority rule this article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending we propose a simple conjecture if rent seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators demands for rent seeking activities are price inelastic a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending other things equal using data from u s state legislatures 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures

efficiency and productivity growth in the banking industry of central and eastern europe abstract we employ the directional technology distance function and provide estimates of bank efficiency and productivity change across central and eastern european cee countries and across banks with different ownership status for the period 1998 2003 our results demonstrate the strong links of competition and concentration with bank efficiency they also show that productivity for the whole region initially declined but has improved more recently with further progress on institutional and structural reforms input biased technical change has been consistently positive throughout the entire period suggesting that the reforms have induced favorable changes in relative input prices and input mix however we find evidence of diverging trends in productivity growth patterns across banking industries and that foreign banks outperform domestic private and state owned banks both in terms of efficiency and productivity gains overall we find that productivity change in cee is driven by technological change rather than efficiency change

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the sources of bank productivity growth in china during 2002 2009 a disaggregation view this study investigates the sources of bank productivity growth in china over the period 2002 2009 in order to perform this research we propose an advanced index input slack based productivity index isp a model that disaggregates total factor productivity growth into each input productivity change funds capital and employees are chosen as the inputs whereas loans and other earning assets are outputs in this study our results show that technological gains transcend the efficiency regressions and result in total factor productivity growth more specifically technical progress in capital productivity reveals the dominant force behind the total factor technical change and productivity improvement in addition this paper uses these disaggregation terms to find out the competitive advantages and disadvantages of input usages for each chinese bank these findings indicate that the isp index provides more insights than traditional total factor productivity indices

socially optimal districting a theoretical and empirical exploration this paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections in the model districting matters because it determines the seat vote curve which describes the relationship between seats and votes the paperrst characterizes the optimal seat vote curve and shows that under a weak condition there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship the paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting this is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect u s state legislators during the 1990s

budget institutions and political insulation why states adopt the item veto abstract forty three of the fifty states of the united states have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions in this paper i test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power using data from 1865 to 1994 i show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future liberal legislatures the results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas first by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions second it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily insulate policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power e g moe 1989 de figueiredo 2002

a comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk measures on bank efficiency evidence from emerging asian countries this study investigates the role of risk in determining the cost efficiency of international banks in eight emerging asian countries researchers of this paper consider three distinct risk aspects under a total of eight risk measures credit risk operational risk and market risk we apply a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model to estimate bank cost efficiency in our analysis additionally this study analyzes the marginal effects of all risk measures on the inefficiency effect in order to explore a more detailed relationship between risks and efficiency the empirical results indicate that the risk measures represent significant effects on both the level and variability of bank efficiency we also find that these effects vary across countries and over time

externalities vs internalities a model of political integration abstract decentralized government leads to inter regional externalities whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem centralized government entails other costs in particular a neglect for minority interests the paper models formally the trade off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem

the political economy of inaction abstract this paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two party democracy i e it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue the risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party s policy for example by losing the electron regarded as even worse than the status quo the model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious the more evenly matched is political competition the more risk averse the parties the less voters trust the parties the more divided is public opinion and the more important the issue the model is illustrated with a number of examples of real world inaction e g on fiscal deficits abortion the transition to socialism and the fall of the weimar republic in general the analysis also suggests that over a range more representation of political viewpoints implies a smaller likelihood of political action so that democracy implies a tradeoff between representation and the capacity for political action

the consumer demand for education this paper presents new evidence on the estimation of the demand for education unlike previous studies this study uses the translog les indirect utility function to analyze the demand for education within a multicommodity framework for annual u s consumption expenditures for the period 1958 82 various restrictive existing specifications of the demand for education are tested and rejected income and price elasticities of education are estimated that are larger than those of existing studies taste change has moved toward the consumption of education and the consumer has suffered from a loss in welfare due to increases in prices over time

a nonparametric approach for assessing productivity dynamics of large u s banks the 1980s marked an era of substantial change for the us commercial banking industry an issue of considerable interest to banking analysts and economists alike is whether the intensified competitive pressure generated by deregulation and notable financial innovations enhanced productivity to investigate the response to these changes the non parametric malmquist index is used to evaluate productivity dynamics a statistically significant productivity surge found between 1983 and 1984 is followed by productivity regress the next period post 1985 sustained productivity progress is observed for the remainder of the decade productivity movements are primarily attributable to technological changes rather than scale changes or convergence to the production frontier

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

size democracy and the economic costs of running the political system the search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought given the validity of arguments for and against small units one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes however the reform trend is uniform units often at the local level are amalgamated to harvest scale effects the purpose of this article is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems our testing ground is a recent danish reform it allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms the reform was directed by the central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities whereas 32 municipalities were left untouched we thus have a quasi experiment with pre and posttreatment observations for both an experiment and a control group our findings show that scale effects measured as administrative costs per inhabitant are considerable

geometric representation of the mean variance skewness portfolio frontier based upon the shortage function the literature suggests that investors prefer portfolios based on mean variance and skewness rather than portfolios based on mean variance mv criteria solely furthermore a small variety of methods have been proposed to determine meanvariance skewness mvs optimal portfolios recently the shortage function has been introduced as a measure of e ciency allowing to characterize mvs optimal portfolios using non parametric mathematical programming tools while tracing the mv portfolio frontier has become trivial the geometric representation of the mvs frontier is an open challenge a hitherto unnoticed advantage of the shortage function is that it allows to geometrically represent the mvs portfolio frontier the purpose of this contribution is to systematically develop geometric representations of the mvs portfolio frontier using the shortage function and related approaches