corruption and the shadow economy one way or two way street this paper attempts to bring some resolution to the relation between corruption and the shadow economy while previous research focuses on the static relationship between the two we account for dynamics using a panel vector autoregression model and consider influences from the official economy and institutional quality using cross national panel data for 108 countries over the period 1984 2006 results show a bidirectional relationship with initial complementarity and substitution over time thus the nature of the two way street is shown to change over time and our consideration of dynamics reveals the complementarity substitution switch

the effect of taxes on labor supply in the underground economy this paper uses micro data from a randomized survey carried out in the metropolitan area of quebec city canada to analyze the decision to evade taxes and work in the underground economy the results indicate that taxes distort labor market activities away from the regular sector to the underground sector but the distortion is small for the average worker the distortion is large however for particular groups of the population such as welfare claimants copyright 1994 by american economic association

interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion rivalry in the vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game service station demand cost and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices costs and sales these functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game the actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution nevertheless all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

the work money does we present independent estimates of the two sides of fisher s identity mv pt exclusive of the financial circulation these show a fair agreement although or because measurement is rough and approximate total transactions are quite stable at 5 5 times national income and thus shed no new light on the transactions demand for money on the money side the overall velocity of circulation rises from 13 in 1950 to 23 in 1978 this is attributed to a strong increase of bank money velocity which by now far exceeds the cash velocity of 16 it may well rise further

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

an empirical test of the effect of excess capacity in price setting capacity constrained supergames abstract in a multi period game industry excess capacity may act to deter firms from cheating on a non cooperative oligopoly price a model is developed that translates the deterrrent influence of excess capacity into predictions about the relationship between excess capacity and oligopoly price cost margins the model is tested with time series data from the u s aluminum industry results are consistent with those predicted by the model

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

estimating the size of the shadow economy in spain a structural model with latent variables there has recently been a revival of international interest in measuring the size of the shadow economy the current study adopts an approach to the spanish case that is based on the theory of unobservable variables this methodology involves the estimation of structural models mimic which analyses a set of causes of the shadow economy while simultaneously taking into account its influence upon a series of indicators the proposed model permits the determination of a relative evolution over time of the size of the shadow economy which requires the calibration of the model with an exogenous estimation in order to obtain real values the exogenous estimation employed is that obtained by a monetary method based on a money demand function the results show a considerable shadow economy measuring between 8 and 18 8 of gdp in the period 1976 2002 and demonstrate that the shadow economy is significantly influenced by the tax burden the degree of regulation and unit labour costs a positive correlation is

oligopoly supergames some empirical evidence on prices and margins this paper is a panel data study on the behavior of prices and margins of oligopolies involved in repeated games the authors examine two supergame models which generate very different predictions about the cyclical behavior of prices and margins evidence on the levels of price cost margins indicates that oligopolies achieve equilibria that more closely resemble a one shot cournot nash outcome than monopoly the authors find however that industries with high price cost margins exhibit cyclical price behavior which is quite different from that of unconcentrated industries little evidence of price wars during either recessions or booms is found copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

pricing strategies in supergames with capacity constraints some evidence from the u s portland cement industry abstract theory demonstrates that demand variations can have nonmonotonic effects on pricing in supergames with capacity constraints furthermore this nonmonotonic relationship can be a function of capacity utilization rates time series data from 25 regional cement markets are used to examine this results empirically no statistically significant relationship is found between demand variations pricing and excess capacity

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

estimating the size of the danish shadow economy using the currency demand approach an attempt the currency demand approach provides some insight into the size and development of the shadow economy in denmark currency demand is statistically affected by tax rates the difference in currency demand is calculated by comparing the actual tax burden over time to the lowest tax burden in the period 1952 82 the shadow economy grew steadily to 10 per cent of gnp in 1977 and then fluctuated between 7 10 per cent of gnp for the period 1978 82 the calculated size fits nicely with the results obtained using the same

a general constitutional possibility theorem arrow s impossibility theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings similarly a generalization of sen s theorem of the impossibility of a paretian liberal implies under the same conditions that non pareto optimal outcomes may be present in the resulting cyclical preference relations this essay changes the customary perspective it demonstrates that for any profile of individual preferences we can always find a nonoligarchic assignment of rights to different subsets of society to decide between pairs of outcomes together with adequate decision rules which escapes these problems this assignment of rights can be a purely liberal one even for each profile but not one in which everybody participates in all decisions and which uses simple or qualified majority voting total direct democracy the adequate purely liberal constitution on the other hand may imply an oligarchy if too few outcomes are present

currency demand and the growth of the underground economy in canada 1991 1995 the extent to which the recent introduction of a value added tax in canada contributed to the growth of the underground economy remains controversial if underground economy growth led to increased currency holdings and shifted the currency demand function forecasts for the period after the introduction of the tax should tend to underestimate currency holdings using a cointegration based error correction mechanism in vector autoregression models currency demand is estimated using quarterly data for 1968 1990 and dynamic forecasts are made for 1991 1995 on average currency demand is underpredicted but by a small amount the results are consistent with an increase in the underground economy of between 0 01 and 0 3 of gdp as a result of the new tax if changes in marginal direct tax rates are considered the underground economy may have grown between 0 1 and 0 7 of gdp in 1991 1995

public choice theory some items for a research agenda to write about the expected development of public choice during the next twenty years is of course impossible for in order to predict the development of the field it would be necessary to know already today the results of future research but then the latter would be unnecessary thus i shall turn to a more modest and rather subjective endeavor namely to sketch some items which might prove fruitful for future research by filling gaps by integrating already existing insights and by extending the domain of public choice i will especially take up in the next section the relationship of public choice theory with constitutional economics law and economics institutional economics and social choice theory following this the relationship of public choice with the analysis of the international system will be discussed section 3 section 4 will take up public choice ideology and information and nondemocratic regimes finally section 5 offers some remarks on the evolution transformation and reform of political economic regimes

size and scope of the underground economy in germany the objective of this paper is to improve estimations of the size and scope of the underground economy by introducing a new approach that combines the advantages of the two most commonly used approaches i e currency demand and multiple indicators multiple causes mimic the new approach is applied to germany among other things it is shown that the approach yields improved estimation results some policy perspectives are discussed in the concluding section

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

keeping it off the books an empirical investigation of firms that engage in tax evasion this article uses a unique dataset that contains detailed information on firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under reporting behaviour the empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable which is interval coded and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically efficient estimator provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold these assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression model evidence is presented that shows that the firms in all regions engage in under reporting regression results indicate that government corruption has the single largest causal effect on under reporting resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 51 3 higher taxes have the second single largest causal effect on under reporting resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 18 0 higher followed by access to financing

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

tax evasion and the demand for currency in norway and sweden is there a hidden relationship variables associated with the level of hidden economic activity are examined in terms of their effects on the demand for currency in norway and sweden aggregate time series of marginal tax rates are compiled for this purpose no such effects are evident for norway while in the case of sweden the demand for currency was found to be significantly related to marginal tax rates these estimates are then used as a basis for deriving an estimate of the size of the hidden economy in sweden an analysis of the assumptions underlying this procedure shows that the uncertainty involved in applying the currency approach to measuring the size of the hidden economy is so great as to make it hazardous to rely on such estimates