campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

wind power in the danish liberalised power market policy measures price impact and investor incentives wind power has a strong position at the danish electricity market mainly caused by high feed in tariffs in the 1990s investments in new wind power installations on land however have declined dramatically after the danish electricity market was liberalised in 1999 first the paper describes how policy measures directed towards wind power have been redesigned to match the liberalised market then we estimate the impact of the redesigned tariffs on the electricity prices finally we assess whether the new tariffs make an incentive to invest in wind power the paper concludes that the new tariffs not by itself make evidence for the actual danish recession in new wind power installations after the electricity reform the main causes could include a combination of problems in spatial planning high risk aversion of new wind turbine investors and perhaps more favourable support schemes in other countries

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

an irrational party of rational members the collision of legislators reelection quest with party success in the japan socialist party this study presents a new explanation to a puzzle regarding the reluctance of the japan socialist party jsp to moderate its hard liner marxist platform the author does so by focusing on the pref

innovation subsidies versus consumer subsidies a real options analysis of solar energy abstract given the interest in the commercialization of affordable clean energy technologies we examine the prospects of solar photovoltaics pv we consider the question of how to transition to a meaningful percentage of solar energy in a sustainable manner and which policies are most effective in accelerating adoption this paper develops a stochastic dynamic model of the adoption of solar pv in the residential and commercial sector under two sources of uncertainty the price of electricity and cost of solar the analytic results suggest that a high rate of innovation may delay adoption of a new technology if the consumer has rational price expectations we simulate the model across alternative rates technological change electricity prices subsidies and carbon taxes it is shown that there will be a displacement of incumbent technologies and a widespread shift towards solar pv in under 30 years and that this can occur without consumer incentives and carbon pricing we show that these policies have a modest impact in accelerating adoption and that they may not be an effective part of climate policy instead results demonstrate that further technological change is the crucial determinant and main driver of adoption further results indicate that subsidies and taxes become increasingly ineffective with higher rates of technological change

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition evidence from a bachelor s degree requirement for legislators in pakistan in the 2002 election candidates for pakistan s federal legislature had to possess at least a bachelor s degree this policy disqualified 60 out of the 207 incumbent legislators from running for election again using a difference in differences approach with panel data on all electoral constituencies in pakistan i find that this ballot access restriction does not affect political competition across all constituencies with disqualified incumbents equally stronger political competition is defined as a larger number of candidates contesting election a smaller vote share and vote margin for the winning candidate and a less concentrated candidate field as measured by a herfindahl hirschman index hhi of vote shares competition declined significantly in constituencies where the disqualified incumbent belonged to a small party and where literacy levels were lower signifying a smaller pool of substitute candidates however political competition increased in areas where the disqualified incumbent was stronger in terms of his winning vote margin

the future developments of the electricity prices in view of the implementation of the paris agreements will the current trends prevail or a reversal is ahead abstract we assess the impact on the european electricity market of the european union clean energy for all europeans package which implements the eu nationally determined contribution in paris cop 21 we focus on the year 2030 which is the year with defined climate targets for the assessment we employ a game theoretic framework of the wholesale electricity market with high technical detail the model is applied to two core scenarios a base scenario and a low carbon scenario to provide insights regarding the future electricity capacity generation mix cross border trade and electricity prices we also assess three additional variants of the core scenarios concerning different levels of a fossil and co2 prices b additional flexibility provided by batteries c market integration we find that the electricity prices in 2030 substantially increase from today s level driven by the increase in fuel and co2 prices the flexibility from batteries helps in mitigating the price peaks and the price volatility the increased low marginal cost electricity generation the expansion of non dispatchable and distributed capacities and the higher market integration further reduce the market power from producers in the electricity markets from today s level

multicandidate equilibrium in american elections the united states presidential election of 1992 is anexample of a multicandidate contest involving bothdemocratic and republican candidates using a spatialmodelling approach i analyze candidate policystrategy for such elections under the assumption thatvoters choose according to the multivariate votingmodel of behavioral research this model representsvoters decisions as probabilistic functions of theirpolicy preferences and political partisanship isuggest reasons why partisan voting motivatescandidates to locate near their party s partisans inthe policy space and illustrate this argument withrespect to the 1992 presidential election the resultsof computer simulations suggest that these motivationslead to multicandidate spatial equilibria which arerobust to changes in the model s parameters partisanship appears to be an important source ofstability in multicandidate electoral competition

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

equilibrium strategies for final offer arbitration there is no median convergence final offer arbitration is a procedure for settling disputes between two parties in which an arbitrator chooses the final offer of the party closest to what he considers a fair settlement this procedure is modeled as a two person zero sum game of imperfect information in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator s fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found such equilibria when they exist in pure strategies represent bids which are symmetric about the median and for most common distributions are separated from one another by two or more standard deviations this finding suggests that final offer arbitration may not accomplish its avowed purpose of inducing the two parties to converge on what they perceive to be t

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

distributional costs of wind energy production in portugal under the liberalized iberian market regime abstract wind generation in portugal and spain has grown due to a decrease in technology cost and the availability of renewables electricity generation incentives there is a strong interconnection between spain s and portugal s transmission systems resulting in common prices in both countries however portuguese and spanish producers receive the incentives for producing wind based electricity that are specified in their own national policies resulting in different costs to rate payers in this paper we estimate the costs to portuguese rate payers associated with the current market design and policy incentives to do so we regress hourly spot electricity market prices as a function of hourly wind generation and estimate the resulting feed in tariff costs distributional effects over the various rate payer categories total costs for rate payer are at the minimum level if joint wind generation in portugal and spain increases by 5 5 from what it is today if wind generation increases much further then the costs increase due to the fit overcost increase if wind generation decreases from current levels then costs also increase due to the merit order effect furthermore we find that rate payer categories will endure different portions of the costs with an increase in wind generation penalizing predominantly 20 7 kva rate payers

the merit order effect in the italian power market the impact of solar and wind generation on national wholesale electricity prices abstract italy promoted one of the most generous renewable support schemes worldwide which resulted in a high increase of solar power generation we analyze the italian day ahead wholesale electricity market finding empirical evidence of the merit order effect over the period 2005 2013 an increase of 1 gwh in the hourly average of daily production from solar and wind sources has on average reduced wholesale electricity prices by respectively 2 3 mwh and 4 2 mwh and has amplified their volatility the impact on prices has decreased over time in correspondence with the increase in solar and wind electricity production we estimate that over the period 2009 2013 solar production has generated higher monetary savings than wind production mainly because the former is more prominent than the latter however in the solar case monetary savings are not sufficient to compensate the cost of the related supporting schemes which are entirely internalized within end user tariffs causing a reduction of the consumer surplus while the opposite occurs in the case of wind

rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities this paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities within this framework we propose a new value that extends the shapley value to partition function form games the so called rational belief shapley rbs value we investigate the strategic foundation of the rbs value by constructing an implementation mechanism this mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree of freedom to form coalitions the same framework of bidding and renegotiation allows for natural variations of the rbs mechanism in this way alternative shapley like values are obtained and a unified platform to analyze and compare these solutions is provided

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

solar feed in tariffs and the merit order effect a study of the german electricity market abstract this study investigates the merit order effect moe of the recent years implementation of solar power in germany market clearing electricity prices and production levels are compared for the years 2009 2011 and a model for the relationship between the electricity price and price sensitive electricity production is developed and applied to predict electricity prices in germany from july 2010 to july 2011 with and without solar electricity generation seg the results show that the seg has caused a 7 reduction in average electricity prices for this period the average daily maximum price and daily price variation are also found to decrease by 13 and 23 respectively when taking the moe into account the net consumer s cost of the solar feed in tariff fit system is found to be 23 less than the charge listed in the electricity bill the german fit policy for solar power has been subject to considerable public debate and a common argument brought up in disfavor of the system is the high cost for the consumers in this study we demonstrate the importance of including the moe when evaluating the total costs and benefits of the fit policy mechanism

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

revitalising the wind power induced merit order effect to reduce wholesale and retail electricity prices in australia this paper investigates the effect of increasing the number of wind turbine generators on wholesale spot prices in the australian national electricity market s nem given the existing transmission grid from 2014 to 2025 we use a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect of five different levels of wind power penetration on prices ranging from scenario a no wind to scenario e that includes existing and planned wind power sufficient to meet australia s original 2020 41twh large scale renewable energy target lret we find divergence in prices between states and similar prices for nodes within states this supports the garnaut climate change review assessment on the prevalence of gold plating the intrastate transmission network and underinvesting in interstate connectivity we find that increasing wind power penetration decreases wholesale spot prices but that retail prices have increased in deregulated south australia and queensland similarly in victoria we argue that there is a pressing need to split the large generator retail companies into separate retail and generator companies and to reassess regulatory rules more generally interconnector congestion limits the potential for wind power to further reduce wholesale prices across the nem so the need for a high capacity transmission backbone in the nem is becoming clearer and will become pressing when australia moves beyond its current 2020 lret

multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates it is known that multidimensional downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters bliss points are imposed plott 1967 this paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are dierentiated that is candidates strategically decide po sitions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest their positions are assumed to be xed these xed dimensions may be viewed as candidates immutable characteristics race religion culture etc we nd that if candidates are su ciently dierentiated if in the xed dimensions their positions are su ciently dierent then a unique nash equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist for any distribution of voters bliss points perhaps more importantly we show that this is true even if there exists a unique xed dimension and candidates instrumentally decide their positions in all other n 1 dimensions

consumer loss in czech photovoltaic power plants in 2010 2011 this paper provides a financial survey of a small sample of czech photovoltaic pv plants to evaluate the extent of market losses we calculate the shadow market price of solar electricity from the profit and loss accounts of the pv plants and the shadow market price we estimate the total economic loss generated by pv electricity sector in the czech republic the presented microeconomic approach has two main advantages firstly we work with real observed data which offsets the drawback of a limited sample secondly the profit accounting calculation enables sensitivity analysis with respect to key variables of the plants we show that money invested in pv plants would generate an annual loss of 8 given the estimated solar assets of czk 165 6 billion eur 6 6 billion as of december 2011 this translates in at least czk 12 6 billion lost in the czech solar sector in 2012 about 43 of this loss is due to high technology costs and corresponds to pure dead weight loss while the remaining 57 constitute the redistributive profit component of subsidies finally we calculate that unless electricity prices increase or technology costs decrease approximately sevenfold pv plants will remain loss making

the mean voter theorem necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution this paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence valence can be interpreted as the non policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders the theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence the condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance when the condition fails the low valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre the inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the israel election in 1996 copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

a social coalitional equilibrium existence lemma the purpose of this paper is to construct an abstract model of a society in which each member can cooperate with others by forming a coalition but at the same time can be influenced by the members outside the coalition a new concept of equilibrium called here a social coalitional equilibrium is proposed and a sufficient condition for its existence provided the social coalitional equilibrium may be considered a synthesis of the nash equilibrium a noncooperative solution concept and the core a cooperative solution concept the paper provides a broadly applicable mathematical tool for proving existence of equilibrium for models of labor managed market economies the purpose of the present paper is to construct an abstract model of a society in which each member can cooperate with others by forming a coalition but at the same time can be influenced by the members outside the coalition a new concept of equilibrium called here a social coalitional equilibrium is proposed and a sufficient condition for its existence provided a coalition structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium when the model is suitably specified it describes noncooperative behavior of the members and the social coalitional equilibrium is reduced to the nash equilibrium given another extreme specification the model is reduced to a cooperative game without sidepayments in characteristic function form and the set of social coalitional equilibria corresponds precisely to the core the need for study of the present model arose originally out of the author s recent investigation of labor managed market economies both the socialistic version and the capitalistic version in 10 11 12 indeed the model and the concept of social coalitional equilibrium were obtained by abstracting and generalizing the formal aspect of those studies the socialistic labor managed market economy has long been the object of study of various authors see e g vanek 19 the capitalistic labor managed market economy seems to reflect the institutional aspect of the modern capitalistic society better than the economies formulated by other available general equilibrium models it differs for example from the standard private ownership economy of arrow and debreu 1 see also debreu 6 sec 5 5 in that i the ownership and control of a firm are separated ii no particular firm is given a priori but instead the list of potential firms is given as a primitive datum and iii the behavioral principle of the economic agents involves both noncooperative behavior and cooperative behavior because of the above feature ii any general equilibrium model of this economy has to formulate the economic mechanism that underlies the formation of firms in equilibrium as

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

campaign contributions as valence i study how the possibility of voters contributing to candidates in response to the candidates policy proposals affects the equilibrium policy in winner take all political competition more specifically i allow each partisan voter to contribute to her preferred candidate where the amount contributed depends on the relative positions of the two candidates candidates then use the donations to build valence through campaigning which in turn affects the voting decision of impressionable voters since candidates are concerned with raising money as well as picking a policy position preferred by the median voter i show that campaign contributions may lead to divergent equilibria in winner take all elections when politicians are policy motivated albeit only under stylized utility functions and donor densities further under symmetric voter and donor densities if either the donor density is single peaked or the voter utility is concave a unique equilibrium exists in which both candidates propose the ideal policy of the median voter

a new bargaining set of an n person game and endogenous coalition formation abstract the two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are when a game is played what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen few solution concepts or theories in the current literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions answers are especially lacking for the first one in this paper we introduce a new bargaining set which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that provides answers to both fundamental questions endogenously journal of economic literature classification number c71

renewable generation and electricity prices taking stock and new evidence for germany and austria abstract economic theory predicts that the increase of renewable electricity production should reduce the price of electricity in the short run which is also known as the merit order effect although the merit order effect is only one of several consequences of renewable production on the electricity system it is crucial to determine its size for the economic evaluation of renewable energies in this paper we present a comprehensive overview of relevant past research results on the price effect of renewables additionally we conduct a new empirical analysis of the price effect of renewable production for the austrian german region a market that clearly qualifies for a merit order effect analysis given its characteristics based on the review and our own analysis we show that the merit order effect varies depending on the region and the assessment method chosen we also find that the size of this effect is less dispersed throughout different markets than previously suggested by the literature

impact of renewables on electricity markets do support schemes matter abstract rising renewable shares influence electricity markets in several ways among others average market prices are reduced and price volatility increases therefore the missing money problem in energy only electricity markets is more likely to occur in systems with high renewable shares nevertheless renewables are supported in many countries due to their expected benefits the kind of support instrument can however influence the degree to which renewables influence the market while fixed feed in tariffs lead to higher market impacts more market oriented support schemes such as market premiums quota systems and capacity based payments decrease the extent to which markets are affected this paper analyzes the market impacts of different support schemes for this purpose a new module is added to an existing bottom up simulation model of the electricity market in addition different degrees of flexibility in the electricity system are considered a case study for germany is used to derive policy recommendations regarding the choice of support scheme

the nash bargaining solution in general n person cooperative games abstract we present a noncooperative foundation for the nash bargaining solution for an n person cooperative game in strategic form the nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept called the nash core for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle we prove that the nash bargaining solution can be supported in every subgame by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if the nash bargaining solution belongs to the nash core

retrospective modeling of the merit order effect on wholesale electricity prices from distributed photovoltaic generation in the australian national electricity market in electricity markets that use a merit order dispatch system generation capacity is ranked by the price that it is bid into the market demand is then met by dispatching electricity according to this rank from the lowest to the highest bid the last capacity dispatched sets the price received by all generation ensuring the lowest cost provision of electricity a consequence of this system is that significant deployments of low marginal cost electricity generators including renewables can reduce the spot price of electricity in australia this prospect has been recognized in concern expressed by some coalfired generators that delivering too much renewable generation would reduce wholesale electricity prices in this analysis we calculate the likely reduction of wholesale prices through this merit order effect on the australian national electricity market we calculate that for 5 gw of capacity comparable to the present per capita installation of photovoltaics in germany the reduction in wholesale prices would have been worth in excess of a 1 8 billion over 2009 and 2010 all other factors being equal we explore the implications of our findings for feed in tariff policies and find that they could deliver savings to consumers contrary to prevailing criticisms that they are a regressive form of taxation

globalization party positions and the median voter the authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in western europe are conditional on the position of the median voter if the median is far enough to the right such parties will adopt business friendly policies because they are required to win office only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility it is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median in addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median the authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

the merit order effect a detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in germany the german feed in support of electricity generation from renewable energy sources has led to high growth rates of the supported technologies critics state that the costs for consumers are too high an important aspect to be considered in the discussion is the price effect created by renewable electricity generation this paper seeks to analyse the impact of privileged renewable electricity generation on the electricity market in germany the central aspect to be analysed is the impact of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices the results generated by an agent based simulation platform indicate that the financial volume of the price reduction is considerable in the short run this gives rise to a distributional effect which creates savings for the demand side by reducing generator profits in the case of the year 2006 the volume of the merit order effect exceeds the volume of the net support payments for renewable electricity generation which have to be paid by consumers

a combined modeling approach for wind power feed in and electricity spot prices abstract wind power generation and its impacts on electricity prices has strongly increased in the eu therefore appropriate mark to market evaluation of new investments in wind power and energy storage plants should consider the fluctuant generation of wind power and uncertain electricity prices which are affected by wind power feed in wpf to gain the input data for wpf and electricity prices simulation models such as econometric models can serve as a data basis this paper describes a combined modeling approach for the simulation of wpf series and electricity prices considering the impacts of wpf on prices based on an autoregressive approach thereby wpf series are firstly simulated for each hour of the year and integrated in the electricity price model to generate an hourly resolved price series for a year the model results demonstrate that the wpf model delivers satisfying wpf series and that the extended electricity price model considering wpf leads to a significant improvement of the electricity price simulation compared to a model version without wpf effects as the simulated series of wpf and electricity prices also contain the correlation between both series market evaluation of wind power technologies can be accurately done based on these series

an ex post analysis of the effect of renewables and cogeneration on spanish electricity prices abstract growing concerns about climate change and energy dependence are driving specific policies to support renewable or more efficient energy sources such as cogeneration in many regions particularly in the production of electricity these policies have a non negligible cost and therefore a careful assessment of their impacts seems necessary in particular one of the most debated impacts is their effect on electricity prices for which there have been some ex ante studies but few ex post studies this article presents a full ex post empirical analysis by looking at use of technologies and hourly electricity prices for 2005 2009 in spain to study the effects that the introduction of renewable electricity and cogeneration has had on wholesale electricity prices it is particularly interesting to perform this study in spain where an active system of public support to renewables and cogeneration has led to a considerable expansion of these energy sources and electricity pricing is at the center of intense debate the paper reports that a marginal increase of 1 gwh of electricity production using renewables and cogeneration is associated with a reduction of almost 2 per mwh in electricity prices around 4 of the average price for the analyzed period

consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities in order to calculate the worth of a coalition of players the coalition needs to predict the actions of outsiders we propose that for a given solution concept such predictions should be made by applying the solution concept to the reduced society consisting of the non members we illustrate by computing the r core for the case of bertrand competition with differentiated commodities

czech republic and indicative targets of the european union for electricity generation from renewable sources abstract in 2010 the czech republic was one of the states of the european union which met the indicative target for the share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity consumption that year gross electricity generation from renewable sources amounted to a total volume of 5851 gwh which corresponds to 8 24 of gross electricity consumption in the czech republic in the given time period the largest share of the total came from hydroelectric power plants 47 7 and biomass power plants 25 8 and a smaller share from photovoltaic power plants 10 5 biogas power plants 8 7 and wind farms 5 7 compared with 2009 the highest year on year growth came from photovoltaic power plants 527 gwh 44 2 and as far as other renewable sources are concerned electricity generation at hydroelectric power plants 360 gwh 30 2 and biogas power plants 184 gwh 15 4 rose more sharply as well

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

tax contracts and elections in this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections policies and welfare we consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically parties have policy preferences about the level of public good provision and benefit from perks when in office a government raises taxes for both purposes we show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government moreover in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates

explaining party ideological stances we apply the iterative algorithm by merrill and adams political analysis 9 347 361 2001 to compute the optimal positions of vote maximizing parties along a one dimensional space for a large number of elections this allows us to systematically evaluate factors that push parties toward more centrifugal locations in equilibrium our findings largely corroborate expectations suggested by the theoretical literature albeit with one notable exception the relative size of a partisan constituency reduces rather than enhances the likelihood of a party having an extreme optimal position we then compare derived equilibrium positions with actual party positions with the aim of understanding the nature of electoral incentives and offering insights about party system competition in particular we show that the age of a party the party family to which it belongs post election expectations and internal rules for candidate and leader selection are all factors that increase the probability of a party approaching the position predicted by pure vote maximizing considerations

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

slovak electricity market and the price merit order effect of photovoltaics abstract this paper analyses slovak electricity market with a focus on photovoltaic energy it evaluates the impact of the solar electricity penetration into electricity mix on spot prices seeks evidence of the merit order effect in the slovak electricity market and quantifies it based on hourly data the multivariate regression analysis covers the period 2011 2016 the rather small merit order effect estimated by an ols time series model leads to the small decrease of slovak electricity wholesale prices this spot price reduction attributable to the photovoltaics does not outweigh the costs of the support scheme borne by end users what implies a consumer loss

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

campaign allocations under probabilistic voting we develop a probabilistic voting model where candidates compete by advertising in different media markets ads are viewed by everyone within a market and cannot be targeted to subgroups such as one candidate s partisans candidates estimate the distribution of voter preference intensities in a market and campaign ads then shift this distribution individuals with any intensity vote with some probability for each candidate we derive comparative static implications of changes in a variety of factors on the advertising decisions of each candidate using campaign advertising data from 2002 we find these results to be consistent with actual campaign allocation behavior

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

solar energy markets economics and policies abstract solar energy has experienced phenomenal growth in recent years due to both technological improvements resulting in cost reductions and government policies supportive of renewable energy development and utilization this study analyzes the technical economic and policy aspects of solar energy development and deployment while the cost of solar energy has declined rapidly in the recent past it still remains much higher than the cost of conventional energy technologies like other renewable energy technologies solar energy benefits from fiscal and regulatory incentives including tax credits and exemptions feed in tariff preferential interest rates renewable portfolio standards and voluntary green power programs in many countries the emerging carbon credit markets are expected to provide additional incentives to solar energy deployment however the scale of incentives provided by the existing carbon market instruments such as the clean development mechanism of the kyoto protocol is limited despite the huge technical potential the development and large scale deployment of solar energy technologies world wide still has to overcome a number of technical financial regulatory and institutional barriers the continuation of policy supports might be necessary for several decades to maintain and enhance the growth of solar energy in both developed and developing countries

coalition theory and its applications a survey we survey some of the major advances in coalition theory in recent years we then look at the recent applications of the theory in the area of political economy and touch upon some important theoretical and applied open questions in the field

sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities abstract the sequential coalition formation model of bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts bloch f 1996 sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division games econ behav 14 90 123 we elaborate on these problems define a modification of bloch s model and show that its order independent equilibria coincide with the pessimistic recursive core koczy l a 2007 a recursive core for partition function form games theory dec 63 41 51

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

the merit order effect of czech photovoltaic plants abstract we assess the impact of photovoltaic power plants on the electricity supply curve in the czech republic the merit order effect is estimated as the elasticity of electricity spot price with respect to change in supply of electricity from renewable sources data for the czech electricity spot market from 2010 to 2015 are analyzed as this is the period with the steepest increase in a renewable generation capacity the effect is estimated separately for solar and other renewable sources we find a significant difference between these two groups our results show that based on hourly daily and weekly data energy produced by czech solar power plants does not decrease electricity spot price creating double cost to the end consumer however the merit order effect based on averaged daily and weekly data is shown to exist for other renewable sources excluding solar mainly water and wind this contributes to the conclusion that the czech renewables policy that prefers solar to other renewable sources may be considered as suboptimal

the impact of renewables on electricity prices in germany an estimation based on historic spot prices in the years 2011 2013 abstract germany s public opinion and media usually attribute increasing electricity prices to the high share of renewables in the german power system but average electricity prices at the european energy exchange dropped during the last years due to an excess of renewable energy this study uses historic market data in order to quantify the effect of renewables on prices historic demand and supply curves from 2011 to 2013 have been used to reconstruct electricity prices under the assumption that no wind and pv would be available the analysis reveals an astonishingly high increase of market prices up to 5 29 ct kwh due to a lack of non renewable power capacities in 2013 the available conventional capacity would not have been able to cover the demand during 269 hours the estimated maximum deficit of 5 6 gw is in good agreement to data published by the german grid operators the discussion of the origin of this deficit leads to the conclusion that the current situation has not been caused by renewables the liberalization of the european energy market established investment risks that hindered required investment a long time before the renewables boomed

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

multiparty electoral competition in the netherlands and germany a model based on multinomial probit a typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share here we use euro barometer survey data and european elite study data from 1979 for the netherlands and germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response based on multinomial probit estimation for each of these countries we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model the latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics the pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions we use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions we go on to propose a model of internal party decision making based both on pre election electoral estimation and post election coalition bargaining this model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions we argue that maximizing expected vote will not in general be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation

patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the united states house of representatives our most robust findings can be summarized as follows u the spatial location of candidates is important in determining the pattern of campaign contributions many pacs and all pac types except agricultural cooperatives contribute in a manner highly consistent with a simple spatial model there is little giving by an individual pac to candidates at opposite ends of the dimension there is no instance of a pac contributing to incumbents located at each end of the dimension and only to challengers of incumbents in the middle or vice versa contributions against incumbents i e to challengers of incumbents are often spatial mirror images of a pac s giving in favor of incumbents though this statement must be tempered by the fact that the large majority of pacs give relatively little money to challengers few pacs give money to both challenger and incumbent in the same race giving in open seat races is if anything even more spatially consistent than in races where an incumbent is running while many individual pacs exhibit patterns of contributions consistent with the ideological dimension the data for 1980 suggest that there was no particular bias toward one end of the spectrum or the other taking all pacs together essentially eliminates the effect of the location variable in the regressions giving in races with an incumbent on the ballot was overall balanced across the dimension there are however ideological distinctions even among groups as broadly defined as the fec categories for the corporate labor and trade membership health groups the incumbent s location on the ideological dimension is an important explanatory variable even when other factors specific to the incumbent are considered of course ideology matters to nonconnected groups too they just tend to balance each other off in positive money though not in negative on average corporate and trade groups favor conservative incumbents and opponents of liberal incumbents labor pacs do the opposite except for labor pacs party is not an important variable in explaining positive contributions once the incumbent s voting record is taken into account for contributions to challengers however party is significant corporate nonconnected and trade pacs gave to opponents of democrats labor pacs did the opposite the expected closeness of the election is always an important variable both positive money and contributions to challengers increase as the probability of a strong challenge increases this suggests that pacs are sensitive to the potential impact of contributions on electoral outcomes although committee assignments have some importance in explaining campaign contributions by pac categories their net effect is never strong except in the case of cooperatives this is almost certainly because of the diversity of interests represented by pacs in every category except coops which are essentially one giant pac of milk producers we would surmise that competitive forces in the house result in most members having a portfolio of committee assignments that provides maximum advantage vis a vis each member s constituency it would therefore be surprising if overall committee assignments by themselves pointed to significant differences in generating campaign resources being chairman or ranking minority member of a committee has no impact on campaign contributions other things equal seniority as measured by number of consecutive years in office has a complicated role for positive contributions seniority has a nonmonotonic effect with contributions being higher for the most junior and most senior members ceteris paribus than for incumbents with average seniority negative contributions however are not significantly related to seniority

elections with limited information a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources a one dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested candidates do not know voter utility functions and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined using poll and endorsement data as information sources it is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters any equilibrium extracts all available information all participants voters and candidates alike act as if they were fully informed for fixed candidate strategies a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect

green investment scheme experience and results in the czech republic abstract the key goal of this study was to analyse application of the green investment scheme in the czech republic through the green savings programme finalising in 2015 the programme was evaluated in terms of aspects of both reduction effectiveness and economic aspects of the basic subsidy categories a insulation b low energy houses c biomass boilers d solar thermal systems and e heat pumps the essential results of the programme were also covered including the number of projects supported the total volume of emission reduction and the volume of financial funding the basic evaluation was based on selected indicators including abatement costs greening ratio payback period and subsidy share of investment costs the primary data for calculating originated from the database of the information system of the green savings programme by the state environmental fund of the czech republic the calculated value of abatement cost was between 12 heat pumps and biomass boilers and 272 t co 2 1 low energy houses the shortest payback time periods were calculated for insulation at 11 2 and 3 8 years respectively without and including the provided subsidy on the contrary there was no economic payback in the case of biomass boilers due to transition to an economically costlier fuel

labor pac contributions and labor legislation a simultaneous logit approach labor pacs are used to explore the potential congressional influence of campaign contributions from special interest groups pacs of organized labor are particularly useful for two reasons first a set of labor issues are defined each year by the afl cio and so ad hoc decisions about pertinent legislation are not made by the researcher secondly there are measurable traits of representatives and constitutents that may lead to a predisposition of labor support by combining these two attributes a model is developed to investigate the question of congressional influence

three candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence stochastic voting we study the effects of stochastic probabilistic voting on equilibrium locations equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogeneous candidates and a single dimensional issue space comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior the model has a pure strategy nash equilibrium psne that is free from several non plausible features of the psne under deterministic voting this result is robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization

the economics and politics of the structure of public expenditure the paper derives a complete system ofdemand equations for public consumptionexpenditures as the outcome of rationalbehaviour in a model where governmentmaximizes expected electoral support theallocation of expenditures is found todepend not only on the prices of publicservices and total expenditure and tosatisfy the constraints of demand theory which have been the focus of attention ofprevious empirical studies of theallocation of public expenditures but inaddition on the prices of privateconsumption goods the distribution ofvoter incomes and the expected change invoter support from varying the levels ofpublic provision

the monopoly of violence evidence from colombia many states in latin america africa and asia lack the monopoly of violence even though this was identified by max weber as the foundation of the state and thus the capacity to govern effectively in this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence we build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors paramilitaries in a democracy the model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections since paramilitaries have preferences over policies this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them we then investigate these ideas using data from colombia between 1991 and 2006 we first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive next we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well finally we use roll call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the executive and paramilitaries in colombia language en

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

the impact of renewables on electricity prices in germany an update for the years 2014 2018 abstract increasing electricity prices for private consumers manifested the idea of price boosting renewable energy sources in germany s public opinion literature however widely concurs that wind and photovoltaics have a reducing effect on spot market electricity prices the underlying merit order effect led to historically low exchange prices in the past years to quantify this effect this study analyses historic demand and supply curves from the german day ahead market to reconstruct electricity prices without the feed in of wind and photovoltaics from 2014 to 2018 results show that renewable energy sources considerably reduced electricity prices by between 2 89 ct kwh in 2014 to 8 89 ct kwh in 2017 this allowed german end consumers to save a total of 40 billion from 2014 to 2018 additionally wind and pv contributed significantly to security of supply demand could not have been met by domestic conventional and nuclear generation capacities in up to 424 hours in 2018 the study highlights the necessity to further speed up the expansion of wind and photovoltaics

voters private valuation of candidates quality abstract different voters might have different valuations of candidates qualitative features we argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated pure strategy equilibria may exist unlike when all voters favor the same candidate perhaps more importantly it affects candidates platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner when voters are evenly split in terms of their candidates quality valuations then both candidates have incentives to locate sufficiently near but not necessarily exactly at the center of the policy space however as the number of voters who favor the same candidate rises maximum equilibrium differentiation follows a non trivial u shaped pattern it is first decreasing and then increasing in the fraction of voters who prefer the more popular candidate

the merit order effect of wind and solar power volatility and determinants abstract the investment in renewable energy sources power generation is coming into a stall in face of the removal of incentives in most of the european countries the technological maturity of wind and solar power generation is the justification basis and market integration of extensive amounts of renewable energy is seen with concern by electricity systems stakeholders given the low marginal cost of renewable power generation the available load in the spot electricity market for conventional and dispatchable power plants is diminishing the so called merit order effect in this study we estimate the value of the merit order effect due to wind and solar power generation in the iberian electricity market with historical bid supply and demand offers from 2008 to 2017 the estimated values are then used to value determinants and volatility through garch econometric modelling results demonstrate that the merit order effect in iberia is influenced negatively by the residual load and positively by demand wind power and solar power additionally the high merit order effect volatility found mirrors the behavior of spot electricity market

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election the theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory however has not been possible with existing data using a novel survey design this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions the results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and furthermore that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in congress these ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory as information levels increase we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting i develop a general model of multiparty competition in which parties model voters choices by means of probabilistic choice rules the model is specified in terms of an issue salience coefficient which varies with the importance voters attach to issues as opposed to unmeasured nonissue motivations i show that when the policy salience coefficient is sufficiently low then both vote maximizing and rank maximizing parties have a dominant strategy to adopt the most popular platform which maximizes voter utilities over the entire electorate this most popular platform therefore represents a convergent equilibrium when all parties are vote or rank maximizing numerical estimates suggest that this equilibrium result holds for degrees of issue voting which exceed the parameters behavioral researchers have estimated for various historical elections