explaining the deteriorating entry earnings of canada s immigrant cohorts 1966 2000 abstract using the 1981 1986 1991 1996 and 2001 canadian censuses we explore causes of the deterioration in entry earnings of successive cohorts of immigrant men and women roughly one third of the deterioration is explained by compositional shifts in language ability and region of birth we find no evidence of a decline in the returns to foreign education for either immigrant men or immigrant women but a definite deterioration in the returns to foreign labour market experience most strongly among men from non traditional source countries we can explain roughly two thirds of the male and one half of the female deterioration without any reference to entry labour market conditions when we also account for entry conditions our results suggest canada s immigrants of the late 1990s would otherwise have enjoyed entry earnings equal to or higher than their counterparts of the 1960s

credible spatial preemption it is often argued that incumbent firms may deter entry by preemptive investment in new goods we show that these conclusions are reversed when multiproduct incumbentfirms may exit in response to entry once entrants are in an industry an incumbent will often want to withdraw some goods to prevent competition with the entrant from reducing profits on other goods such a reaction makes entry more attractive to a potential entrant the equilibrium industry structure is less likely to be monopolistic as the goods are better substitutes as exit costs are low and as the competition between producers of the same good is more intense

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

choosing and sharing implementing a project like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic in practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements we address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to implement the efficient site the host with the lowest cost and share the exact cost while retaining total control over realized transfers our mechanism is simple and in the vein of the well known divide and choose procedure the unique nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling is budget balanced individually rational and immune to coalitional deviations more generally our mechanism can also handle the symmetric case of positive local externalities e g olympic games and even more complex situations where the usefulness of the project regardless of its location is not unanimous

siting noxious facilities are markets efficient abstract this paper explores the economics and politics of the siting of noxious facilities in the base case facilities are sited by markets subject to majority agreement in the host jurisdiction by contrast with the existing market siting literature which assumes that all the disamenities of a facility will be contained in the host jurisdiction and fully reflected in the jurisdiction s willingness to accept here facilities impose disamenities on individuals as a function of distance and the process of majority agreement is explicitly modeled the principal finding is that when voters are uniformly distributed within a jurisdiction an individual who is median distance from a facility suffers less than average mean disamenity therefore a majority would be willing to serve as facility host for a price host fee that is strictly less than the aggregate disamenity that the facility imposes on the jurisdiction further by threatening the equilibrium host with a site just across its border a firm can induce majority acceptance of a nontrivial facility at zero host fee even when this threat site strategy is infeasible though market determined host fees will not signal efficient sites thus markets will produce an excessive number of noxious facilities and place them in the wrong sites these results are robust to alternative specifications of bargaining power and market structure if however host majority agreement is subject to the veto of a higher jurisdiction e g in response to cries of nimby then efficiency may be either improved or reduced

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

a sealed bid auction mechanism for siting noxious facilities this paper proposes a sealed bid mechanism for facilitating the siting process of noxious facilities such as prisons trash disposal plants and incinerators for hazardous waste these facilities have created such opposition by communities that the acronyms nimby not in my backyard or lulu local undesirable land use are now in common usage to describe the public s reaction to them the noxious facility siting problem arises because there are economies of scale associated with having only one plant to serve the needs of a wide region the community that hosts the plant absorbs all of the environmental costs while the rest of the region enjoys the benefits of the facility one reason that these facilities have been so strongly opposed by communities is that they generate relatively little new employment and provide limited additional taxes in relation to their perceived negative impact d morell and c magorian 1982 some compensation arrangement is thus needed to share the gains from the winners to the potential loser this paper discusses a sealed bid auction mechanism for selecting a location for the facility so that all communities feel they are better off than under the status quo

bidding for the surplus a non cooperative approach to the shapley value abstract we propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero monotonic environments with transferable utility the mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the shapley value payoffs we extend our results to implement the weighted shapley values finally we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments the modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure and implements the shapley values of the super additive cover of the environment journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

choosing wisely a multibidding approach reaching decisions about the location of noxious facilities such as dump sites environmentally hazardous plants nuclear power generators and the like is a highly contentious issue for instance in february 2000 the u s senate decided that nationwide nuclear waste would be shipped to the yucca mountain site in nevada conditional to it being approved as a high level nuclear waste repository despite the attractive compensation package the state of nevada voiced vehement opposition president clinton vetoed the bill and in may 2000 the senate failed to overturn it as such the major problem facing the u s nuclear industry on where to site a high level radioactive waste repository remains virtually unresolved neither are decisions about the location of desirable events easily solvable every two years the international olympic committee selects hosts for the summer and winter games a procedure that is constantly under review and revision in order to bring about the best possible outcome until about a year ago the decision was made by a vote based on bids and plans submitted by candidate cities however the recent controversy surrounding the choice of salt lake city to host the 2002 winter games culminated in the design of a new procedure for choosing the host of the 2006 winter games this procedure called for the selection of two finalist cities in this case turin and sion immediately after which the host was selected by secret ballot in this case turin another similar issue is currently the subject of heated debate in spain the spanish government both on the national and local level has recently been discussing various possible projects for transferring water from rivers in the north of spain to the arid southern regions the parties involved have conflicting interests with regard to several aspects of the projects proposed particularly the water rich regions are hesitant to give up parts of their water resources the parties involved have still not agreed upon the choice of a transport mode or the size of the transfer payments that would compensate the localities that are relinquishing part of the water supply these and several other cases belong to a class of problems in which a group of agents has to choose one out of several projects a project is efficient if it maximizes the aggregate welfare of the group members reaching an efficient outcome is trivial when the designer has all the relevant information however it is often the case that the parties concerned possess much more information than the designer hence the designer faces a nontrivial problem if she wishes to optimally choose one of the projects moreover from a normative point of view even if the designer has all the information it is easier to justify the use of a fixed procedure to reach a decision than to modify the procedure for various cases in light of information disclosed or already available to the designer several well known methods are available for the problem of choosing one out of a set of alternatives one class of methods consists of various voting schemes such as majority voting or the borda rule the outcomes generated by these methods need not be efficient due to strategic behavior on the part of the agents another class of methods consists of vickreyclarke groves mechanisms for this class truthtelling is a dominant strategy that always results in the choice of an efficient alternative however these mechanisms are not budgetbalanced and the payments collected from the perez castrillo department of economics code universitat autonoma de barcelona 08193 bellatera barcelona spain wettstein department of economics bengurion university of the negev monaster center for economic research beer sheva 84105 israel we thank herve moulin for his helpful suggestions suresh mutuswami who encouraged us to check for strong nash equilibria and francis bloch mark gradstein moshe justman jordi masso and two anonymous referees for their useful comments perez castrillo gratefully acknowledges financial support from bec2000 0172 and 2000sgr 00054

oligopoly limit pricing we expand milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents each incumbent is informed as to the level of an industry cost parameter and selects a preentry price while a single entrant observes each incumbent s preentry price we find that incumbents are unable to coordinate deception which results in a separating equilibrium in which preentry prices are not distorted further introducing the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs we show that the no distortion equilibrium is the only refined separating equilibrium plausible pooling equilibria fail to exist or involve downward distortions in preentry prices

choosing a common project experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism abstract perez castrillo d wettstein d 2002 choosing wisely a multibidding approach american economic review 5 1577 1587 and veszteg r f 2004 multibidding game under uncertainty working paper 14 04 universidad de navarra propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project examples are decisions involving public goods or public bads we report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects the mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments moreover the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior

why do workers join unions the case of israel the author argues that because almost all israeli wage earners were covered by collective agreements in the early 1980s neither the collective voice hypothesis nor the earnings premium hypothesis the two prevailing explanations of workers decision to join unions was then applicable to israel using 1982 survey data on israeli workers he examines four alternative explanations of unionization in israel non work benefits political ideology social values especially workers attitude toward unions as a means for solidarity and work and demographic attributes such as employing unit size gender ethnicity education and age he finds that israeli workers decision to join the israeli federation of labor the histadrut can be explained in part by non work benefits of the histadrut health insurance and legal aid for example and by the workers social values

a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed the author describes a class of simple two stage mechanisms that implement efficient allocations as subgame perfect equilibria for economic environments involving externalities these mechanisms known as compensation mechanisms solve a wide variety of externalities problems including implementation of lindahl allocations regulation of monopoly and efficient solutions to the prisoner s dilemma copyright 1994 by american economic association

immigrant earnings age at immigration matters a correlation between age at immigration and earnings is observed in canadian census data the evidence supports three underlying sources of the effect first work expe rience in the source country yields virtually no return in the host country second the return to education varies with age at immigration and finally an acculturation effect is observed for immigrants who are visible minorities or whose mother tongue is not english further it is found that educational attainment and relatedly earnings vary systematically across age at immigration with those arriving around age 15 to 18 obtaining fewer years of education

efficient allocation of a prize king solomon s dilemma abstract a planner is interested in allocating an indivisible good a prize to one of many agents in the economy his objective is to give the prize to the agent who values it most without any payments being made by the recipient the planner however does not know the identity of this agent while the agents themselves do this paper shows how the planner can construct simple multistage mechanisms with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome at this outcome the agent who values the prize most gets it without any transfer of money being made by any of the agents or the planner

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non cooperative mechanisms abstract in the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them the basic idea is very simple we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed we prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism moreover this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in bergantinos and vidal puga bergantinos g vidal puga j j 2007a a fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems journal of economic theory 137 326 352

noncooperative entry deterrence uncertainty and the free rider problem previous authors who have considered the issue of noncooperative entry deterrence have not found the free rider problem to be a significant factor these authors however have only considered models in which the exact investment needed to deter entry is known with certainty in this paper i add uncertainty to the models investigated by these previous authors and demonstrate that the free rider problem can be significant but is not so in all cases that is for certain types of entry deterring investments the introduction of uncertainty causes the oligopoly to underinvest in entry deterrence however for other types no underinvestment result arises

sequential entry industry structure and welfare in this paper we reexamine the relationship between potential competition industry structure and welfare in a market subject to a sequential entry threat where firms can make quantity commitments and have access to a constant returns technology it is shown that provided entry is not blockaded the incumbent s will either prevent entry or allow all the potential entrants in furthermore actual entry may decrease but social welfare never goes down with more potential entrants nevertheless with a finite number of potential entrants policies which lower the cost of entry need not be beneficial in welfare terms

voluntary auctions for noxious facilities incentives to participate and the efficiency of siting decisions abstract this paper explores the efficiency properties of a voluntary auction under which the city submitting the low bid hosts the region s noxious facility and receives the high bid as compensation in the nash equilibrium of the auction game the auction mechanism is individually rational participation is rational for all values of the local environmental costs of the facility incentive compatible the facility is located in the low cost city and revenue neutral if the compensation of the host city distorts location choices participation in the auction is rational for all values of local environmental costs if the scale economies associated with the noxious facility are large relative to the average local environmental cost and the distortionary cost per dollar of compensation

assimilation changes in cohort quality and the earnings of immigrants this paper reexamines the empirical basis for two facts that seem to be found in most cross section studies of immigrant earnings 1 the earnings of immigrants grow rapidly as they assimilate into the united states and 2 this rapid growth leads to many immigrants overtaking the earnings of the natives within 10 15 years after immigration using the 1970 and 1980 u s censuses this paper studies the earnings growth experienced by specific immigrant cohorts during the period 1970 80 it is found that within cohort growth is significantly smaller than the growth predicted by cross section regressions for most immigrant groups this differential is consistent with the hypothesis that there has been a secular decline in the quality of immigrants admitted to the united states

the legacy of immigration labour market performance and education in the second generation previous research finds that the children of immigrants or the second generation earn at least as much as other native born but that there are persistent ethnic differences in the intergenerational transmission of education and wages we explain why these results are not incompatible and extend the empirical evidence in several directions using the canadian survey of labour and income dynamics first we estimate a model of wages earnings and hours worked using modern econometric techniques to corroborate earlier us results of complete integration by the second generation in the labour market we find that ethnic differences in labour market performance are significant but that these difference do not alter conclusions about the relative performance of the second generation second we find a source of superior labour market performance for the second generation in higher educational attainment which constitutes an important legacy of immigration that should not be ignored third we find that the de

the labor market skills of recent male immigrants evidence from the current population survey using data from special supplements to the current population survey cps the authors track the education and hourly earnings of recent male immigrants to the united states in terms of these measures of labor market skills the cps data suggest that immigrants who came in the late 1980s were more skilled than those who arrived earlier in the decade this pattern represents a break from the steady decline in immigrant skill levels observed in 1940 80 census data despite the encouraging trend over the 1980s however the average skills of recent immigrants remain low by historical standards

labor market assimilation of immigrant women using 1970 1980 and 1990 u s census data the author examines the life cycle patterns of immigrant women s labor force participation he finds that the cross sectional approach that has been used in all previous studies leads to a substantial over estimate of the degree to which immigrant women s assimilation increases their labor force participation the effect of assimilation found by using the cohort approach however which acknowledges the possibility that patterns of labor force participation partly reflect the year of immigration is still sizable the effect is concentrated within the first 10 years after arrival there are substantial differences in participation and assimilation by country of birth immigrants from japan korea and china are found to have experienced the greatest degree of assimilation with an effect that raises the probability of working by 20 percentage points during the first 10 years after arriving in the united states

rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities this paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities within this framework we propose a new value that extends the shapley value to partition function form games the so called rational belief shapley rbs value we investigate the strategic foundation of the rbs value by constructing an implementation mechanism this mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree of freedom to form coalitions the same framework of bidding and renegotiation allows for natural variations of the rbs mechanism in this way alternative shapley like values are obtained and a unified platform to analyze and compare these solutions is provided

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

an assessment of the human capital content of international migrants an application to us immigration mcdowell j m and singell l d jr 1993 an assessment of the human capital content of international migrants an application to us immigration reg studies 27 351 363 numerous studies have examined the flow of international migrants generally these studies measure the extent or magnitude of international migration by use of a simple numerical count this paper extends this analysis by providing a methodology for adding an economic dimension to the measure of the magnitude of international migration an earnings equation approach is used to attach an economic value to immigration applying our methodology to us immigration we find considerable variation across source regions in the value of immigrants moreover we find that simply comparing initial earnings without controlling for differences in the characteristics and migration patterns of immigrants from the various source regions can misrepresent the relative earnings potential or value of migrants mcdowell j m et singell l d jr 1993 un

labor market discrimination against hispanic and black men h ispanic american men have lower average wage rates than white non hispanics in 1975 the average white non hispanic male wage earner in the united states earned 5 97 an hour mexican men earned 4 31 72 as much as white non hispanics puerto rican men earned 4 52 76 as much and cuban men earned 5 33 89 as much as white non hispanics by way of comparison black men s average wages in 1975 were 4 65 78 of the white male wage several possible reasons for the hispanics lower wages come to mind among them are age and education geographic location immigration language difficulties and discrimination for example as shown in table 1 mexicans and puerto ricans are younger on average than the white non hispanic population and earnings tend to rise with age hispanics have lower average levels of education than white non hispanics and wages are positively associated with education many mexican americans live in the southwest where prices are relatively low moreover hispanics are more likely to be recent immigrants and to lack fluency in english than white non hispanics and so to be at a disadvantage in the labor market in addition there is a widespread belief that hispanics suffer from employment discrimination and cannot obtain the wages that their human capital would command if they were non hispanic whites how much of the wage differentials described above are due to each of these factors and to other inter group differences in wage related characteristics in particular how much impact does labor market discrimination have on the average hispanic man s wage and how does this compare with discrimination against blacks this paper provides answers to these questions a few other efforts have been made to analyze the relative earnings of hispanic and white nonhispanic men using 1960 and 1970 census data fogel 1966 poston and alvirez 1973 poston alvirez and tienda 1976 long 1977 and gwartney and long 1978 we use more recent data from the 1976 survey of income and education this data set enables us to measure wage rates more accurately and to specify the wage function more completely than does the census unlike previous analysts in estimating the wage function we take account of possible selectivity bias due to the distinction between average wage offers and average observed wages thus we hope to obtain a more accurate and up to date measure of labor market discrimination against hispanic men section ii explains the method used to separate the minority white non hispanic wage differential into the portions due to differences in average characteristics and the portion due to differences in unobserved factors and discrimination taking into account the possibility of selectivity bias in the observed wage sample section iii describes the data used in the study and the specification of the wage equation the breakdown of the observed wage differentials into components due to differences in participation in the wage and salary sector local price levels average characteristics and discrimination are presented in section iv section v summarizes our findings and discusses their implications for efforts to improve the economic situation of hispanics in the united states

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

new evidence on the economic progress of foreign born men in the 1970s and 1980s this study examines the economic progress of foreign born men in the united states europeans entered the united states with relatively high wages and earned wages comparable to natives over their life course japanese korean and chinese men entered with lower wages but quickly caught up with u s born workers mexicans and central americans entered with low wages and the wage gap between themselves and u s born workers has not shrunk disparities in completed years of education and whether education was received in the united states can explain a large share of the differences in the level of wages for immigrants from some countries it is found that more highly educated men assimilate more quickly the rate of economic progress has not improved for more recent arrivals from any country but this is most problematic among mexicans and central americans because of their relatively low rates of wage growth excerpt

early labour market experiences of second generation immigrants in sweden this article investigates second generation immigrant s early labour market performances in sweden to study their labour market success we estimate dynamic transition rate models cox type proportional hazards in a competing risk framework using register based panel data set our results reveal that parental resources affect not only second generation immigrants continuing education but also their later labour market success the study verifies that finding a job is difficult for second generation immigrants and the significant unobserved heterogeneity parameter estimate may indicate discrimination as a whole second generation immigrants have worse labour market performances compared to their native born counterparts

the conditional auction mechanism for sharing a surplus a first bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision and a balanced set of transfers the mechanism is shown to implement an equal sharing of the surplus above the average utility level at the equilibrium an agent s message reveals the other agent s utility when only two players are involved and the exact value of the joint surplus a variety of other contexts allow for the construction of similar auction like mechanisms displaying the same mirror image effect

immigrant worker assimilation is it a labor market phenomenon the work in this paper contributes to the debate on the economic assimilation of immigrant workers in the u s labor market a model of simultaneous occupational choice and earnings is estimated for foreign born hispanic men foreign born east asian men and for native white men to test the general hypotheses of assimilation an important distinction is made between those who migrated as adults and those who migrated as children the results suggest that the appearance of assimilation may be the outcome of pre labor market experiences of individuals who migrate as children along with changes in u s immigration law that have relaxed skill criteria for entering immigrants

the earnings of immigrant men in canada job tenure cohort and macroeconomic conditions using eleven cross sectional surveys spanning 1981 92 the authors compare the earnings of immigrant and native born men in canada apparently recent immigrant cohorts have suffered no decline in earnings job tenure is found to be a strongly significant determinant of earnings previous estimates of immigrant earnings differentials which have not incorporated job tenure information may partly reflect differences in tenure between immigrants and the native born when the sample is restricted to pairs of surveys that are close to the census survey years the estimates of cohort effects are sensitive to the choice of survey years one possible explanation for that sensitivity is suggested by the finding that macroeconomic conditions are a statistically significant determinant of the rate of assimilation of recent immigrants

amicable divorce dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms abstract this paper considers mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership that can be specified without information on the distribution of valuations of the asset or the level of risk aversion of the participants for the case of a single asset and risk averse agents three simple mechanisms are considered these mechanisms can be ranked in terms of ex post efficiency and partially ranked in terms of interim expected utility the efficiency of the alternating selection mechanism is considered for environments when there are many items to be allocated agents are risk neutral and transfers are prohibited conditions are given when a myopic strategy of picking the most preferred abailable item forms an equilibrium and these conditions are satisfied under independence under the further assumption of identical distributions of valuations it is shown that the total expected efficiency loss is at most 1 2 of the maximal value of a single item regardless of how many items are to be allocated

efficient bidding with externalities we implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities these proposals extend the shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged we construct two slightly different mechanisms one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals

industry structure with sequential technology choice abstract noncooperative entry deterrence arises in a market where firms enter sequentially and irreversibly choose a technology in the case of delegated entry deterrence the earliest firms enter with a normal technology and pass on entry deterrence responsibilities to subsequent entrants in the case of partial entry deterrence the earlliest firms choose an inferior technology that allows some but not full entry of later firms with a normal technology in both cases entry is deterred in that the equilibrium number of firms is smaller than would prevail if all firms were to choose a normal technology

advertising and limit pricing we enrich milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow an incumbent to signal his costs with both price and advertisements our fundamental result is that a cost reducing distortion occurs in that the incumbent behaves as if there were complete information but his costs were lower than they are preentry price is therefore distorted downward and demand enhancing advertising is distorted upward as a consequence of signalling if advertising is a purely dissipative signal it is not used nor therefore distorted recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are featured