miracle on sixth avenue information externalities and search after a long dormant period lower sixth avenue in new york has undergone a rapid revitalisation we show that a simple search theoretic model with information spillovers can explain both the period of underuse and the rapid turnaround the model reduces to a simple equation which allows us to do comparative statics on the duration of vacancies we show how the solution reacts to changes in market structure and changes in search technology the model is suggestive of difficulties that may occur in many markets in which there are changes over time in the optimal use of resources at one time lower sixth avenue was one of the most fashionable retail centres in manhattan but the area collapsed as a retail centre when the affluent moved further uptown and to the suburbs today sixth avenue is in the midst of a rapid turnaround as reported in the sunday new york times by claudia

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

entrepreneurial human capital and the long run survival of firms in india abstract this paper analyses the characteristics of entrepreneurs that contribute to firms survival in less developed countries ldcs the study which relies on data collected in a 1971 survey of entrepreneurs in south india and a follow up survey of surviving firms in 1993 finds that entrepreneurial human capital greatly influences firm survival the results indicate that firms founded by older entrepreneurs in higher castes are most likely to survive but that increased education of the founding entrepreneur reduces survival these results provide evidence that opportunities of entrepreneurs outside the firm ignored in most theories are important in firm survival

search unemployment and the production of jobs the authors investigate the performance of the economy when search is required to find employment and when the duration of unemployment varies across sectors they assume that in one sector factor markets are frictionless while in the other se ctor idle factors of production must actively search each other out i n order to produce they focus on how well the economy allocates work ers across sectors and the conditions under which the factor mix with in a sector is correct the authors demonstrate that in equilibrium t he search sector is too small and its factor intensity is too asymmet ric copyright 1987 by royal economic society

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

the nonlinear time series properties of unemployment rates some further evidence the time series properties of unemployment rates for germany japan the uk and the us are re examined evidence of nonlinear structure in the residuals of the most parsimonious linear arma models is reported for all countries except japan modelling this nonlinearity using setar models suggests strong asymmetry in unemployment dynamics and the presence of a possible limit cycle for the uk however residual diagnostics for these models indicate remaining structure alternative tar models conditioned on past growth rates of industrial production yield substantial reductions in residual variance over both linear and setar counterparts iid residuals in all cases other than the us and threshold values at or very near zero clearly identifying the asymmetric behaviour of unemployment during expansionary and contractionary phases of the business cycle

deforestation and the rule of law in a cross section of countries relationships between deforestation and population pressure income growth and insecure property rights are examined with data from 120 countries insecure property rights are hypothesized to arise from two sources government instability or inability to enforce ownership and an absence of government accountability the former source is captured by measures of general lawlessness such as guerrilla warfare revolution and frequent constitutional change the latter is proxied by variables indicating the type of government executive frequency of political purges and the existence of an elected legislature general support is indicated for the property rights hypothesis and for the effects of population growth

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

entrepreneurship selection and performance a meta analysis of the impact of education in developing economies this meta analytical review of empirical studies of the impact of schooling on entrepreneurship in selection and performance in developing economies looks at variations impact across specific characteristics of the studies a marginal year of schooling in developing economies raises enterprise income by an average of 5 5 percent which is close to the average return in industrial countries the return varies however by gender rural or urban residence and the share of agriculture in the economy furthermore more educated workers typically end up in wage employment and prefer nonfarm entrepreneurship to farming the education effect that separates workers into self employment and wage employment is stronger for women possibly stronger in urban areas and also stronger in the least developed economies where agriculture is more dominant and literacy rates are lower

taxation in a two sided search model abstract this paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits if unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income then a wage tax decreases unemployment it also decreases the wage thereby overshifting the tax burden profit tax effects depend upon job entry in the short run with a fixed number of jobs filled jobs plus vacancies a profit tax decreases unemployment it also raises the wage again overshifting the tax in the long run the converse holds

efficiency aspects of the financing of unemployment insurance and other government expenditure this paper argues that if the disincentive effects of unemployment insurance result from higher reservation wages they may be eliminated by financing benefits with a progressive income tax the result is obtained within an equilibrium model with stochastic job matchings an optimal tax formula is derived for a linear income tax and shown to imply that the average tax rate should increase faster with income the higher the level of ui benefits relative to other government expenditure in some cases optimal financing may require the subsidization of low wage jobs

threshold nonlinearities in unemployment rates further evidence for the uk and g3 economies the paper appraises the in sample and out of sample adequacy of linear ar and nonlinear setar models of unemployment rates for germany japan the uk and the us tests are reported for the presence and specification of threshold nonlinearities setar model estimates limiting dynamic properties and residual diagnostics and out of sample forecasting performance in sample threshold non linearities are confirmed to be strongly present for the uk us and germany and more marginally so for japan out of sample excepting japan setar models provide superior onestep ahead forecast on rmse grounds most notably for the us final tests indicate that these models exhibit predictive accuracy in the sense of parameter and residual variance stability implying the potential for exploitation of such nonlinearity in official forecasting

trade unions and the efficiency of the natural rate of unemployment decentralized wage setting in search equilibrium models is inefficient because the meeting firm and worker ignore the dependence of job matching probabilities on the number of firms and workers engaged in search this paper investigates whether risk neutral monopolistic unions will have an incentive to internalize this externality i find that the externality will be internalized only if the union s policy is chosen by unemployed persons if employed persons influence union policy both the union wage and unemployment will be too high a tax on the union wage combined with an employment subsidy to firms can correct this inefficiency

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

the long term effects of job search requirements evidence from the uk jsa reform this paper investigates long term returns from unemployment compensation exploiting variation from the uk jsa reform of 1996 which implied a major increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle search theory predicts that such changes should raise the proportion of non claimant nonemployed with consequences on search effort and labor market attachment and lower the reservation wage of the unemployed with negative effects on post unemployment wages i test these ideas on longitudinal data from social security records llmdb using a difference in differences approach i find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after jsa introduction as opposed to six months earlier are 2 5 3 more likely to move from unemployment into incapacity benefits spells and 4 5 less likely to have positive earnings in the following year this latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial unemployment shock also annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non treated these results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits they were not successful in moving them onto long lasting or better jobs with fairly long lasting unintended consequences on a number of labor market outcomes

internationalization of western venture capitalists into emerging markets risk assessment and information in india this paper provides the first analysis of the internationalization of venture capital firms through an examination of risk assessment and information usage by firms in india personal interviews were conducted with executives in 31 84 of the active venture capital firms the paper extends previous research by comparing perceptions of the behavior of domestic venture capital firms in india foreign primarily u s venture capital firms in india and u s venture capital firms in their domestic markets foreign firms in india place significantly greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants reports than domestic firms in india they place significantly less emphasis on financial contributions of management in assessing risk and own due diligence and information from entrepreneurs than do u s firms in their domestic market they make more use of information from trade publications and relating to production capacity and technology and information from accountants reports than do domestic venture capital firms in india the evidence is consistent with venture capital firms adapting to local market conditions rather than implementing recipes from their domestic markets

search theory the 2010 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences this paper surveys search theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the 2010 laureates for the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences peter diamond dale mortensen and christopher pissarides

the right man for the job this paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types free entry and transferable utility we apply a second order taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium derive the cost of search and show that it is decreasing in the substitutability of worker types this cost of search is then decomposed into three components unemployment vacancy costs and mismatch our contact technology rules out congestion effects between different worker types and therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale one third of those increasing returns in contacts are shown to be absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy the resulting equilibrium is not efficient unemployment benefits can reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy numerical simulations of the model show that our taylor expansions are quite accurate 2004 the review of economics studies limited

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

labor market matching with precautionary savings and aggregate fluctuations we analyze a bewley huggett aiyagari incomplete markets model with labor market frictions consumers are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks against which they cannot insure directly the labor market has a diamond mortensen pissarides structure firms enter by posting vacancies and match with workers bilaterally with match probabilities given by an aggregate matching function wages are determined through nash bargaining we also consider aggregate productivity shocks and a complete set of contingent claims conditional on this risk we use the model to evaluate a tax financed unemployment insurance scheme higher insurance is beneficial for consumption smoothing but because it raises workers outside option value it discourages firm entry we find that the latter effect is more potent for welfare outcomes we tabulate the effects quantitatively for different kinds of consumers we also demonstrate that productivity changes in the model in steady state as well as stochastic ones generate rather limited unemployment effects unless workers are close to indifferent between working and not working thus recent findings are corroborated in our more general setting

the excess sensitivity of layoffs and quits to demand excessive layoffs in bad times and excessive quits in good times both stem from the same weakness in practical employment arrangements the specific nature of worker firm relations creates a situat

entrepreneurship social mobility and income redistribution in south india development economists have been preoccupied with the problem of increasing the size of the gnp pie to the relative neglect of its distribution despite the recent disenchantment with the viewpoint that all classes share in the benefits of industrial growth empirical data on the distribution of income business opportunity and economic power are in short supply many of the studies on entrepreneurship and economic development when they are not apologetics for ruthless capitalist exploitation as paul baran suggests extol the achievements of the capitalist entrepreneur without examining class origins and monopoly advantage joseph schumpeter sees entrepreneurs irrespective of class origin as heroic figures with the dream and will to found a private kingdom to conquer adversity to achieve success for its own sake and to experience the joy of creation for gustav papanek 1967 the private entrepreneur who is frugal diligent far sighted remarkably able and willing to take political risks is in large part responsible for the success of pakistan in achieving rapid industrialization

transferable skills job matching and the inefficiency of the natural rate of unemployment the idea of the natural rate of unemployment has been with us since friedman i 968 this can be interpreted simply as an assertion of the long run homogeneity of the walrasian or flexible price is lm system in prices see e g sargent i979 p 325 over the last ten years however attempts have been made to model the natural rate explicitly following the original friedman phelps idea that it could be thought of as the equilibrium rate of unemployment in a search framework although the main focus of attention especially on the empirical side has been on the determinants of the equilibrium rate and changes in this rate see johnson and layard i 984 it was soon recognised that in a search environment the equilibrium rate may not be efficient this point was made by tobin i972 among others who said the external effects are the familiar ones of congestion theory a worker deciding to join a queue or stay in one considers the probabilities of getting a job but not the effects of his decision on the probabilities that others face external effects also occur in the decisions of employers whether to fill a vacancy with the applicant at hand or to wait for someone more qualified recent papers by diamond and pissarides see diamond i 98 i i 982 pissarides i983 i984 have attempted to model these external effects in a stochastic matching model that can be described briefly as follows there are a number of jobs and workers who are paired by a stochastic matching process the number of jobs or workers may be fixed or determined by free entry conditions once a job and worker are paired the productivity of the match is determined by random draw and the partners must decide whether to accept or reject it there are potentially three margins of decision making in this type of model the decision to enter or exit the market the choice of lowest acceptable reservation productivity and the choice of search or advertising intensity it has been shown that individual decision making at each of these three margins may be socially inefficient what these inefficiencies have in common as pissarides i 983 makes clear is that they are all due to external effects that work through the matching technology that is when individuals choose to enter a market accept a match or search more intensively they ignore the impact of their decisions on the matching probabilities of other agents in the market one important limitation of the diamond pissarides model is that both firms and workers are assumed homogeneous we show in this paper that if this

mass layoffs and unemployment abstract mass layoffs give rise to groups of unemployed workers who possess similar characteristics and therefore may learn from one another s experience searching for a new job two factors lead them to exert too little effort in equilibrium the first is an information externality searchers fail to take into account the value of their experience to others the second is an incentive to free ride each worker would like others to experiment and reveal information concerning the location of productive jobs together these forces imply that in equilibrium the natural rate of unemployment is too high

bilateral trading as an efficient auction over time a market composed of pairwise trading under incomplete information is modeled in order to analyze how resources are allocated among competing uses when information about trade gains is incomplete contrary to the results from studying a single such trade sufficient homogeneity across potential trades guarantees that efficiency obtains this is analogous to simple first price auctions with homogeneous bidders where bidders have a common bid function and as a result the high bidder also places the highest value on the auctioned object with enough symmetry the decentralized bilateral trades in the present model occur as if they were made in a first price auction that occurs through time the robustness of the efficiency result to heterogeneities among agents and to nontrivial search intensity decisions is then considered

productivity gains from unemployment insurance this paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs and by encouraging rms to create those jobs we use a quantitative model to investigate whether this eect is comparable in magnitude to the standard moral hazard eects of unemployment insurance our model economy captures the behavior of the u s labor market for high school graduates quite well with unemployment insurance more generous than the current u s level unemployment would increase by a magnitude similar to the micro estimates but because the composition of jobs also changes total output and welfare would increase as well

employer search training and vacancy duration we develop a model of optimal employer search strategy when information about match quality is endogenous the model is tested using four data sets two of which have not previously been used as theory predicts we find that when filling positions requiring more training employers search more intensively and extensively employers also search more extensively when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience these findings provide strong evidence of systematic variation in search strategies based on the characteristics of the positions and job applicants factors that influence employer search also affect the duration of a vacancy

turnover externalities with marketplace trading this article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet costlessly since buyers have idiosyncratic match payoffs for each seller s good some buyers rather than trade with the current stock of sellers wait for new sellers to enter the marketplace to obtain a good they like a turnover externality exists where all traders are better off with higher entry rates of new traders furthermore this turnover externality supports multiple pareto rankable equilibria this provides new insights into similar results obtained in the random matching literature

migration with endogenous moving costs we study a dynamic model of labor migration in which moving costs decrease with the number of migrants already settled in the destination this assumption is supported by sociological studies of migrant networks with endogenous moving costs migration occurs gradually over time once it starts it develops momentum and migratory flows may increase even as wage differentials narrow in addition migration tends to follow geographical channels and low moving cost individuals migrate first these patterns are consistent with historical evidence from the great black migration of 1915 1960 in the united states much of which cannot be reconciled with existing migration models excerpt

returns to education a further international update and implications this paper updates evidence on the returns to investment in education by adding estimates for new countries and refining existing estimates to bring the total number of country cases to over 60 the new cross country evidence confirms and reinforces earlier patterns namely that returns are highest for primary education the general curricula the education of women and countries with the lowest per capita income the findings have important implications for directing future investment in education which for efficiency and equity purposes should concentrate on these priority areas

the efficiency of search under competition and monopsony this paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria while the competitive equilibrium is efficient the monopsonistic equilibrium is not there is too much search and the employment rate is too low

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

unemployment insurance and redistributive taxation abstract this paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance income taxation and experience rating it argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance when the government wishes to use redistributive taxes but cannot enforce lump sum transfers it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes one distortion should be used to off set another the state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs

from the static to the dynamic some problems in the theory of taxation abstract this paper considers problems and issues that arise when we attempt to extend the static theory of taxation and production planning to a dynamic context and to combine that theory with theories of growth the reasons dynamic theory is less developed include problems with the analytical tractability of even those dynamic models which attempt to retain the basic structure of the static model furthermore difficult and interesting issues arise in a dynamic context which are either not present or are much less severe in the static theory special attention is paid to these new issues and the difficulties they pose

footprints on the earth the environmental consequences of modernity growing evidence demonstrating clear threats to the sustainability of the ecosystems supporting human societies has given rise to a variety of sociological theories of human environment interactions these environmental impact theories fall into three general perspectives human ecology modernization and political economy these theories however have not been empirically tested in a common analytic framework here a framework that relies on ecological principles is adopted and modified using a revised stochastic formulation of that framework and the most comprehensive measure of environmental impact to date the ecological footprint the factors driving the environmental impacts of societies are assessed the overall findings support the claims of human ecologists partially support the claims of political economists and contradict the claims of modernization theorists basic material conditions such as population economic production urbanization and geographical factors all affect the environment and explain the vast majority of cross national variation in environmental impact factors derived from neo liberal modernization theory such as political freedom civil liberties and state environmentalism have no effect on impacts taken together these findings suggest societies cannot be sanguine about achieving sustainability via a continuation of current trends in economic growth and institutional change authors

survival of entrepreneurship in spain the aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of survival in entrepreneurship in spain for this purpose a cox proportional hazard model is estimated using information from the continuous working life sample the results show that opportunity entrepreneurs have a higher probability of continuing their entrepreneurial activity than entrepreneurs motivated by other reasons moreover women show a higher survival rate than men in addition a high educational level positively influences survival whilst previous work experience increases the risk of not surviving finally age with a nonlinear influence increases probability of survival but at a decreasing rate the implications of these results are that it should not be encouraged entrepreneurship indiscriminately and authorities should promote entrepreneurial training and help entrepreneurship of people under 30 and over 45 50 years

the political economy of public employment programs abstract what are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs almps have to please the employed majority this issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker firm wage bargaining it turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of almps and the political weight attributed to firm interests if firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure the employed will opt for excessive program activity

the long side of the market and the short end of the stick bargaining power and price formation in buyers sellers and balanced markets the determinants of bargaining power and price formation in a dynamic exchange market where new traders enter randomly over time are studied when agents on the long side of the market possess the option to wait for the arrival of future partners the terms of trade in the spot market must honor the value of this option the equilibrium terms of trade are expressed in intuitive closed form equations that highlight the distinct influences of short run spot market conditions and long run market demographics i introduction few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick that is they receive little or none of the gains from trade consider for instance the classic setting in which b identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogeneous good face s identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale it is well known that in a broad class of one shot trading games all of the surplus in this setting goes to the short side of the market in equilibrium that is if b s buyers bid the price up to their reservation value often it is only when b s that market institutions the rules of the game have any bearing on the equilibrium division of surplus this classic result is somewhat brittle because of the discontinuity in the terms of trade when moving from positive to negative levels of excess demand its logic is familiar however from bertrand competition and it is very compelling the option value to an agent frozen out of a trade in a one shot market game is his reservation payoff of zero any outcome that confers nonzero surplus to a long side agent cannot be sustained in equilibrium because all of the long side agents who would otherwise be frozen out possess a strict incentive to undercut

labor turnover job specific skills and efficiency in a search model this paper analyzes the implications for turnover of costly job specific training the presence of such costs in a search model implies that turnover decisions reduce the value of potential trades that are available to other market participants there is too much turnover because of this external effect and therefore too much retraining when the investment in job training is endogenous inefficient turnover again occurs and the investment in specific skills is inefficiently high the interactions between skill acquisition and turnover imply that it is essentially impossible for a brokerage institution to achieve efficiency

effects of the minimum wage on employment dynamics the voluminous literature on minimum wages offers little consensus on the extent to which a wage floor impacts employment we argue that the minimum wage will impact employment over time through changes in growth rather than an immediate drop in relative employment levels we show that commonly used specifications in this literature especially those that include state specific time trends will not accurately capture these effects using three separate state panels of administrative employment data we find that the minimum wage reduces job growth over a period of several years this finding is supported using several empirical specifications

unemployment and recruitment with heterogeneous labor this paper describes the equilibrium wage distribution and unemployment rate when firms recruit search for employees a model in which firms inability to distinguish workers who refuse job offers increases their expected recruiting costs is contrasted with one in which indistinguishable low productivity workers decrease firms expected gains from hiring in both work force heterogeneity enhances search uncertainty firms recruit less intensively than otherwise and so the equilibrium unemployment rate rises heterogeneity reflects searchers incomplete knowledge of desirable trading partners locations and will likely be a confounding influence and source of unemployment in large economies with imperfectly observable sector specific shocks

unemployment and vacancies with sectoral shifts recent analyses of unemployment vacancy series suggest that aggregate shocks rather than sectoral shocks are the primary factors responsible for unemployment fluctuations this inference follows from two widely held beliefs sectoral shocks induce only positive unemployment vacancy comovements while negative comovements are necessarily the result of aggregate demand shocks this paper describes an equilibrium matching model that identifies plausible circumstances in which neither assumption is correct thus suggesting that unemployment vacancy data are inconclusive interestingly this model s novel results are due to standard features in the contracting literature firms experience relative price shocks and negotiate contracts that prescribe temporary layoffs copyright 1994 by american economic association

job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard abstract we consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth constrained workers suffer from moral hazard specifically effort on the job is non contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract higher unemployment benefits affect the workers outside option the latter is improved for low skilled workers hence they receive a larger share of the surplus which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity effects are reversed for high skilled workers moreover raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase

on the job search mismatch and efficiency this paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two sided heterogeneity and on the job search besides the well known congestion externalities we show that on the job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a business stealing externality in the absence of congestion effects this leads to excessive vacancy creation under wage setting with commitment this externality is absent because when posting a wage firms take into account the expected productivity of future workers in their current jobs if firms are able to make and respond to counteroffers then they will not have to pay no quit premia and this also leads to excessive vacancy creation

efficiency of investment in human and physical capital in a model of bilateral search and bargaining a matching model is used to analyze the effect of search frictions on incentives to invest in human and physical capital equilibrium involves inefficient low levels of investment the source of the inefficiency cannot be attributed solely to either search or bargaining schemes that assist matching are pareto improving while the ratio of workers to firms remains fixed intermediaries that pay owners according to the amount of capital carried into the market are able to generate efficient outcomes such intervention may not eliminate inefficiencies when the ratio is endogenized policy implications include encouragement of investment even while abstracting from growth this paper examines investment in human and physical capital in an environment with explicit frictions in particular i analyze a random matching model where workers must search for employers and vice versa but one that is generalized beyond the previous literature to include ex ante investments on both sides of the market 2 the model generates equilibria with inefficiently low levels of investment to identify the source of the inefficiency its robustness to variations in the environment is considered i also analyze a generalized version of the model in which individuals can choose whether to invest in physical or human capital i e whether to become employers or workers the model predicts that the

employment adjustment in uk manufacturing this analysis differs from previous studies of labor demand in its explicit inclusion of the costs to the firm of adju sting its workforce these costs include institutional factors such a s employment protection legislation and unions and market factors su ch as the degree of slack in the labor market two questions are addr essed what is the quantitative impact of these forces and does their inclusion improve the fit of a labor demand function the results sh owed these factors to have a strong influence on the rate of hiring f iring and to improve significantly on conventional labor demand funct ions copyright 1988 by royal economic society

competitive equilibrium with search frictions a general equilibrium approach abstract when the trading process is characterized by search frictions traders may be rationed so markets need not clear we build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity in the spirit of the arrow debreu theory prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics but also on the probability that their trade is rationed the standard definition of competitive equilibrium is extended by replacing the market clearing condition with an exogenous matching function which describes a trading technology that is not frictionless as is typical in search models the matching function relates the rationing probabilities of buyers and sellers to the ratio of buyers to sellers in the market when search frictions vanish our model is equivalent to the continuous assignment model of gretsky et al 20 we adapt their approach which uses linear programming techniques and duality theory to show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient in our environment our competitive equilibrium notion is equivalent to that of directed or competitive search the strength of our formulation and the linear programming approach is that they allow us to generalize the constrained efficiency and existence results in the directed search literature to a much broader class of economies our framework also opens the door to the use of existing algorithms for computing equilibria and taking these models to the data

the impact of bad writing in economics we find significant style differences between articles written by economists for their professional journals and articles by the same economists in the wall street journal we find no evidence that style influences the professional success of economists which suggests that the private rewards to improving the quality of writing are low indeed each community of scholars has probably adopted a professionally correct writing style from which its members diverge little however scholars do alter their rhetorical style to communicate effectively with audiences other than the professional community this suggests that intra and inter group written communication by economists is efficient

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

the united states bilateral debt for nature swaps and forest loss a cross national analysis we engage with the theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of debt for nature swaps in promoting environmental protection we present cross national evidence that us bilateral deb

inflation and unemployment in the long run we study the long run relation between money measured by inflation or interest rates and unemployment we first document in the data a positive relation between these variables at low frequencies we then develop a framework where unemployment and money are both modeled using microfoundations based on search and bargaining theory providing a unified theory for analyzing labor and goods markets the calibrated model shows that money can account for a sizable fraction of trends in unemployment we argue it matters qualitativelynand quantitatively whether one uses monetary theory based on search and bargaining or an alternative ad hoc specification

an empirical index for labor market density we derive a structural index for labor market density based on the ellison glaeser index for industry concentration the labor market density index serves as a proxy for the number of workers that are potentially available for jobs in a particular area the index is based on observed home work location patterns it is particularly useful for testing theories where the scale of the market matters we apply this index to a standard wage equation and find that it explains almost half of the cross region wage variance

endogenous job destruction and job matching in cities we propose a spatial search matching model where both job creation and job destruction are endogenous workers are ex ante identical but not ex post since their jobs can be hit by a technological shock which decreases their productivity they reside in a city and commuting to the job center involves both pecuniary and time costs as a result workers with high wages are willing to live closer to jobs to save on time commuting costs we show that in equilibrium there is a one to one correspondence between the productivity space and the urban location space workers with high productivities and wages reside close to jobs have low per distance commuting costs and pay high land rents we also show that higher per distance commuting costs and higher unemployment benefits lead to more job destruction

long term partnership formation marriage and employment of course marriage and employment are different nevertheless a worker looking for a job a rm looking for worker or a single person looking for a marriage partner face similar problems as all are seeking a long term partner indeed forming long term partnerships is a common occurrence in life there are many other examples business people search for other business people to form a pro table relationship bridge players seek to nd a suitable partners students search for a good university we would all like to nd a good friend etc the problem becomes signi cant if there are substantial differences in the return obtained from forming a partnership with different partners for example employers differ in the wages they offer or in the work environment they provide in such a situation a worker may reject some job offers similarly as many have learned to their cost some make better marriage partners than others the problem is two sided while a worker is evaluating a potential employer the employer is also evaluating the worker it is this two sided aspect of the problem that generates a signi cant interest a worker s willingness to accept employment at a rm depends not only on the characteristics of the rm but also the other possible options open to the worker the better an individual s opportunities elsewhere the more selective he or she will be in evaluating a potential partnership an academic who believes harvard may make an offer in the near future will be more selective in evaluating offers from lesser universities in this way expectations play a role if a single man believes that few if any women will nd him an acceptable marriage partner then he may accept the rst opportunity that presents itself partnership formation typically does not comply with a classic market situation where all participants know everything and all trades take place at zero cost finding a job nding a husband or wife or nding a business partner is a time consuming activity where opportunities typically arrive over time at uncertain intervals of time of course we can act in ways that in uence the arrival rate of potential partner workers go to employment agencies or read help wanted advertisements in newspapers singles of a certain age go to discos or join tennis clubs the literature on search and matching sm see mortensen 1982 and pissarides 1990 for early examples 1 provides an excellent framework for the economic journal 109 june f307 f334 royal economic society 1999 published by blackwell publishers 108 cowley road oxford ox4 1jf uk and 350 main street malden ma 02148 usa

wage bargaining labor turnover and the business cycle a model with asymmetric information this paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other s reservation wage under specified circumstances the model s equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover in addition aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs these results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity long term contracting or aggregate price misperceptions

a dynamic model of weak and strong ties in the labor market the study develops a simple model where workers can obtain a job through either their strong or weak ties it shows that increasing the time spent with weak ties raises the employment rate of workers it also shows that when the job destruction rate or the job information rate increases workers choose to rely more on their weak ties to find a job the model is extended so unemployed workers can also learn of a vacancy directly from an employer results show that equilibrium employment and time spent with weak ties are sometimes but not in all cases positively related

alternative theories of wage dispersion abstract we analyze labor market models where the law of one price fails i e models with equilibrium wage dispersion we begin considering ex ante heterogeneous workers but highlight a problem with this approach if search is costly the market shuts down we then assume homogeneous workers but ex post heterogeneous matches this model is robust to search costs and delivers equilibrium wage dispersion however we prove that the law of two prices holds equilibrium implies at most two wages we explore other models including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity which is robust and delivers more realistic wage dispersion

mobility costs frictional unemployment and efficiency with imperfect job information flows it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed with word of mouth communication this condition is derived given this condition steady state equilibrium is not efficient with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral in this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept

hot and cold seasons in the housing market every year housing markets in the united kingdom and the united states experience systematic above trend increases in prices and transactions during the spring and summer hot season and below trend falls during the autumn and winter cold season house price seasonality poses a challenge to existing housing models we propose a search and matching model with thick market effects in thick markets the quality of matches increases rising buyers willingness to pay and sellers desire to transact a small deterministic driver of seasonality can be amplified and revealed as deterministic seasonality in transactions and prices quantitatively mimicking seasonal fluctuations in uk and us markets

layoffs recruitment and interfirm mobility contract and search theories are integrated to provide a consistent explanation of contract formation the intertemporal structure of labor markets the absence of ex post market clearing and thus of unemployment in a contractual setting self fulfilling equilibria are described in which low productivity firms lay off some workers while high productivity firms recruitment search intensity and the resulting degree of interfirm mobility are endogenous the effects of severance pay on layoffs and mobility are identified finally the market economy is shown to generate too few layoffs whenever high productivity firms recruit new hires without recruitment laidoff workers are immobile and equilibrium is constrained efficient

estimating social effects in matching markets externalities in spousal search this paper investigates the hypothesis that individuals are less willing to marry when there are more potential partners to search amongst and thus when others are also less prone to marry to do this it develops a reduced form method a variation on manski s 1993 model that allows identification of such spillovers in two sided matching markets estimates from this method are internally consistent unbiased robust to different definitions of the marriage market and large enough to warrant attention additional evidence suggests that the effect works via the proposed search mechanism

capabilities transaction costs and firm boundaries although the literature on firm boundaries has been greatly influenced by transaction cost economics strategy scholars often emphasize the importance of capabilities considerations in these decisions this has led to a debate that we suggest has generated more heat than light we argue that the two sets of considerations are in fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them as independent competitive explanations is fundamentally misleading we offer a theoretical synthesis of transaction cost and capabilities approaches to firm boundaries that seeks to overcome each approach s limitations and provides a unified and logically consistent understanding of boundary decisions

matching finding a partner for life or otherwise how do job worker and husband wife relationships form and why do some matched pairs subsequently separate economists and game theorists are in the process of developing and applying an equilibrium explanation of match formation and separation based on the principle of voluntary pairing under competitive conditions the purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of these developments the general existence of patnership structures with the property that no one has an incentive to separate has been established these equilibrium structures maximize aggregate value over the set of all feasible match structures in the transferable utility case according to this pure theory of matching competition for partners can be expected to yield equilibrium match structures that are both stable and socially efficient at least under conditions of frictionless certainty search theoretic models that take account of meeting costs and initial uncertainty about match values have been developed to explain sepa

human capital and voluntary unemployment there are numerous complementary arguments which partially explain the natural rate of unemployment salop 1979 and shapiro and stiglitz 1984 have shown that some equilibrium unemployment can be involuntary mortensen 1970 and diamond 1981 explain equilibrium unemployment of the voluntary search type the purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of voluntary unemployment by examining human capital accumulation the basic idea is a simple one each worker is assumed to enter the labor force with an initial endowment of human capital each worker s endowment is conformable to a particular industry and is of lesser productive value elsewhere if the worker gains employment in the industry where his capital is conformable he adds to it by learning by doing if he is unemployed or works elsewhere the initial human capital endowment depreciates if the depreciation rate is greater when the individual is employed in an alternative non conformable industry than when he is unemployed then periods of voluntary unemployment may arise from intertemporal expected utility maximization an islands type parable might be useful in explaining how these circumstances can arise consider industries and their labor pools to be separated as if on islands on joining the labor force individual workers first go to the island where their human capital is conformable if an individual gains employment he acquires more human capital by learning by doing if he is unemployed but remains on the island he receives full information about any technological or organizational changes in the production process furthermore interaction with his fellow islanders constantly reaffirms his knowledge and understanding of the production process if the individual shifts to another island to work he receives imperfect information about the industry where his human capital is conformable hence his human capital will depreciate at a faster rate whilst these arguments may describe a phenomenon which is contemporaneously unimportant in a full intertemporal context they may be substantial even a small quantity of human capital retained today can have significant implications over a lifetime

thick market effects housing heterogeneity and the determinants of transaction seasonality this article uses cross sectional variation in transaction seasonality and a search theoretic framework to develop a test for thick market effects from matching efficiency the test relates the extent of transaction seasonality to the degree of horizontal housing heterogeneity we find a strong positive association between measures of seasonality and housing heterogeneity using a transaction level dataset for norway which is consistent with the presence of thick market effects these results also show that the degree of horizontal heterogeneity of the housing stock is an important determinant of the extent of seasonality in a housing market

labor market opportunities and intrafamily time allocation in rural households in south asia this paper utilizes a time allocation survey of a four year panel of households from six villages in semi arid tropic rural india estimates of the inter relationships between adult male female and child market wage rates and time allocated to the market domestic production leisure and schooling by boys and girls are presented the role of individual unobservable heterogeneity and self selection into activity participation is also accounted for the overall results suggest the importance of the opportunity cost of time in intrafamily time use

the expectational stability of underemployment equilibria i introduction one of the most important recent developments in macroeconomic theory has been the demonstration of how external economies of scale may generate multiple perfect foresight equilibria a positive externality such as that studied by diamond 1982 may generate two saddle path equilibria one converging to a high employment steady state and the other converging to an inferior low employment steady state for given initial conditions there are therefore two equilibrium choices of employment in howitt and mcafee s 1988 model which has both a positive and a negative externality any one of a continuum of employment choices will satisfy optimality conditions and converge to the low employment steady state thus the literature on externalities demonstrates that there may exist a stable or saddle path stable pareto inferior low employment equilibrium in a perfect foresight model with market clearing and flexible prices 1 an intriguing feature of these models is the possibility that economic fluctuations might be driven by waves of optimism or pessimism that move the economy from one equilibrium to another along with the possibility of multiple equilibria there is however a problem of indeterminacy how do we say which equilibrium will be chosen the idea that waves of optimism or pessimism move the economy is provocative and intuitively appealing but a more explicit account of how individuals come to focus on a particular equilibrium a selection criterion is needed one criterion that has been used successfully to limit the multiplicity of equilibria in rational expectations and perfect foresight models is the stability of an adaptive learning procedure 2 under adaptive learning the agents in the model learn about the economy in much the same way as an econometrician they have a perfect foresight equilibrium model of the economy and they use the available macroeconomic data to infer the value of that model s parameters their parameter estimates determine their forecasts and these forecasts determine their choice of labor inputs if a given steady state equilibrium is unstable under a broad class of plausible learning rules it is unlikely that the economy will converge to that equilibrium even if it is stable under perfect foresight if a steady state is stable under learning then we are more confident that it may be observed in an actual economy in this paper i apply the concept of expectational stability to howitt and mcafee s 1988 model of aggregate employment in the presence of externalities 3 expectational stability is a simple and therefore highly tractable iterative learning scheme that has been used by evans 1985 and by bray 1982 proposition 4 to study the convergence of learning to rational expectations in addition to being tractable the procedure is general indeed the local stability conditions of the procedure used in this paper are the same as the conditions for local stability of least squares learning as derived by marcet and sargent 1989a 1989b these same conditions are necessary for the stability of a broad class of learning algorithms including least squares estimation kalman filtering and iterative gauss newton procedures as is shown in ljung and soderstrum 1983 i study learning in howitt and mcafee s 1988 model because it is also highly general it incorporates both thick market positive and congestion negative externalities it allows for multiple perfect foresight steady states that are alternately stable and saddle path stable 4 further i show that the widely cited model of diamond 1981 1982 is a special case of the howitt and mcafee model in this paper i show that the learning rule eliminates the problem of indeterminacy it will however also rule out those steady states that are unambiguously pareto inferior stable low employment steady states may exist but they cannot be ranked