effects of quotas under variable returns to scale the large country case the welfare effects of import quotas have been studied by a host of trade theorists see for example dei 8 brecher and bhagwati 3 and neary 20 recently chao hwang and yu 4 have examined the welfare impacts of quotas under variable returns to scale vrs for a small home economy the purpose of this paper is to consider the welfare effects of quotas under vrs in a two country trading world the large country case for both the home as well as the foreign country specifically we will explore the conditions under which a quota can benefit either the home country the foreign country or both countries in addition we will derive and interpret a formula for computing the second best quota in the presence of vrs

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

hospital systems and bargaining power evidence from out of market acquisitions competition analyses generally restrict their attention to how mergers alter concentration in the relevant consumer market studying hospital competition by focusing on the local patient market may be misleading however as multi market hospital systems often play an important role in the price negotiations of their members with managed care organizations we focus on out of market hospital mergers to investigate the cross market effects of system membership on member hospital reimbursement rates based on acquisitions occurring across the united states during 2000 2008 we find that hospitals exhibit significant increases of around 14 in their net reimbursement rates after becoming affiliated with an out of market system compared to independent stand alone hospitals we find no evidence that the price effect results from changes in patient case mix the cost of providing care generally or hospital quality the findings reveal that systems can impact the market power of hospitals in ways that have not been considered in recent antitrust analysis

bargaining with asymmetric information an empirical study of plea negotiations this paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining the analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by bebchuk 1984 i provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model propose a consistent nonparametric estimator and implement it using data on criminal cases from north carolina employing the estimated model i evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases my results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts but may increase conviction rates in contrast the broader use of non incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time i also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains depending on the case characteristics over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

structural analysis of nonlinear pricing this paper proposes a new methodology for analyzing nonlinear pricing data we establish identification of the model primitives with a known tariff and characterize the model restrictions on observ

insurance with multiple insurers a game theoretic approach this paper studies the set of pareto optimal insurance contracts and the core of an insurance game our setting allows multiple insurers with translation invariant preferences we characterise the pareto optimal contracts which determines the shape of the indemnities closed form and numerical solutions are found for various preferences that the insurance players might have determining associated premiums with any given optimal pareto contract is another problem for which economic based arguments are further discussed we also explain how one may link the recent fast growing literature on risk based optimality criteria to the pareto optimality criterion and we show that the latter is much more general than the former one which according to our knowledge has not been pointed out by now further we extend some of our results when model risk is included i e there is some uncertainty with the risk model and or the insurance players make decisions based on divergent beliefs about the underlying risk these robust optimal contracts are investigated and we show how one may find robust and pareto efficient contracts which is a key decision making problem under uncertainty

the strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations an empirical analysis using multiple equilibria commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played this article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations equilibrium timing incentives it shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available it finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time suggesting that stations incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours when more listeners switch stations and in smaller markets

welfare gains from capital inflows under import quotas abstract the presence of tariffs was assumed in the literature which examined the effect of additional foreign investment on the welfare of the host country in the small country setting however this paper analyzes the case of import quotas and shows that additional inflows of foreign capital improve the host country s welfare when import quotas are kept constant

unionization and distribution of income under variable returns to scale abstract variable returns to scale are introduced into the two sector analysis of unionization and income distribution and some new results are obtained specifically with increasing returns to scale it is possible for both union and non union workers to lose gain from unionization even when the unionized sector is relatively capital labor intensive

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

variable returns to scale urban unemployment and welfare the proposition that free trade is superior to no trade has a classical ancestry adam smith and ricardo were amongst the first proponents of free trade samuelson 26 proved and it is held by economists today that free trade is the optimal policy in the presence of standard paretoconditions it is also generally agreed amongst economists that lower trade intervention is superior to higher trade intervention given competitive conditions in a small country these propositions do not hold however in the presence of factor market imperfections such as wage differentials in a small country and therefore production or wage subsidies improves social welfare the two models which are generally used to investigate the positive as well as normative aspects of trade theory in the presence of unemployment are the uniform real minimum wage model which is based on the assumption of general rigidity of real wage in one or two sectors of production and the sector specific minimum wage model which focuses on the phenomenon of rural urban migration in the face of large scale urban unemployment these two models are commonly utilized by trade theorists to analyze trade and unemployment specifically studies by haberler 13 johnson 16 batra and seth 3 findlay 12 and brecher 6 7 investigate the consequences of rigid factor prices for a small country whereas the normative as well as positive aspects of sector specific unemployment have been explored by harris and todaro 15 bhagwati and srinivasan 4 5 and more recently by batra and naqvi 2 das 10 and kahn 19 it has been correctly observed that the introduction of an exogenously specified real minimum wage among other things generates unorthodox results concerning unemployment and gains from trade a large body of research has also been concerned with the welfare implications of different commercial policies in the context of variable returns to scale kemp and negishi 20 have pointed out the beneficial effects of trade in the presence of variable returns to scale production subsidy and consumption taxes eaton and panagariya 11 have analyzed the question of gains from trade in the presence of variable returns to scale and in the context of pareto welfare criterion whereas choi and yu 8 have examined the welfare implications of tariffs and consumption taxes as well as the welfare rankings of these policies under variable returns to scale while panagariya and succar 25 have modified the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability under increasing returns to scale in urban sector

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

hospital ownership and public medical spending the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and government owned and operated i use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior i find that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint of government owned institutions the decision makers in private not for profit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profit maximizing facilities my final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent i introduction the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and publicly owned and operated in this paper i examine how a hospital s type of ownership influences its response to profitable opportunities that are created by changes in government policy the policy change that i exploit was designed to improve the quality of medical care for lowincome individuals by significantly increasing hospitals financial incentives to treat them this program also substantially increased the revenues of those hospitals that had been serving a disproportionate share of the indigent i use this plausibly exogenous change in government policy to test three different theories of organizational behavior and then to assess the impact of hospital behavioral responses on health outcomes the response of organizations to changes in government policy will have an important impact on the consequences of these policies this is likely to be especially true in the medical sector in which the federal state and local governments contract directly

mergers when prices are negotiated evidence from the hospital industry in recent years many hospitals have merged in part to gain bargaining leverage with managed care organizations mcos we investigate the price impact of hospital mergers by formulating and estimating an equilibrium bargaining model between hospital systems and managed care health insurers over prices for inpatient services we estimate the parameters of the model using claims and discharge data from northern virginia in 2006 inova health system proposed to acquire prince william hospital we nd that this merger would have raised prices signicantly and that the remedy of separate bargaining imposed by the ftc in a separate hospital case would have resulted in a larger price increase

livestock disease indemnity design when moral hazard is followed by adverse selection averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves the government and individual livestock producers producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak ex ante moral hazard and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected ex post adverse selection we investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government in the presence of asymmetric information we compare the relative magnitude of the first and second best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to demonstrate the tradeoff between risk sharing and efficiency and we discuss the implications for status quo u s policy

vertical separation with private contracts we consider a manufacturer s incentive to sell through an independent retailer rather than directly to final consumers when contracts with retailers cannot be observed by competitors if retailers conjecture that identical competing manufacturers always offer identical contracts symmetric beliefs manufacturers choose vertical separation in equilibrium even with private contracts vertically separated manufacturers reduce competition and increase profits by inducing less aggressive behaviour by retailers in the final market manufacturers profits may be higher with private than with public contracts our results hold both with price and with quantity competition and do not hinge on retailers beliefs being perfectly symmetric we also discuss various justifications for symmetric beliefs including incomplete information

nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first price auctions under exclusion restrictions this paper studies the nonparametric identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders within the private value paradigm first we show that the benchmark model is nonindentified from observed bids we also derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables and show that these restrictions are weak second we establish the nonparametric identification of the bidders utility function under exclusion restrictions our primary exclusion restriction takes the form of an exogenous bidders participation leading to a latent distribution of private values that is independent of the number of bidders the key idea is to exploit the property that the bid distribution varies with the number of bidders while the private value distribution does not we then extend these results to endogenous bidders participation when the exclusion restriction takes the form of instruments that do not affect the bidders private value distribution though derived for a benchmark model our results extend to more general cases such as a binding reserve price affiliated private values and asymmetric bidders last possible estimation methods are proposed

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

welfare effects of quotas under variable returns to scale recently there has been a growing use of quantitative restrictions on imports by countries for protecting their import competing industries it is well known that the quantitative restriction on imports set below the free trade level would result in higher domestic prices smaller quantities of importables available to consumers and hence a reduction in national real income thus import quotas similar to tariffs in a small economy reduce welfare this result has been derived in the traditional heckscher ohlin trade model with production functions subject to constant returns to scale crs while the assumption of crs greatly simplifies the analysis it is not easily justified in view of reality firms usually are exposed to various kinds of externalities which give rise to economies or diseconomies of scale

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts we study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored or are not contractible upon we fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for such economies as well as discuss their welfare properties depending on the parameters of the economy either the optimal action choice is not sustained in equilibrium or if it is agents necessarily enter into multiple contractual relationships and intermediaries make positive profits even under free entry conditions the main features and implications of these environments are consistent with several stylized facts of markets for unsecured loans

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

the impact of competition on management quality evidence from public hospitals in this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality we analyze the hospital sector where geographic proximity is a key determinant of competition and english public hospitals where political competition can be used to construct instrumental variables for market structure since almost all major english hospitals are government run closing hospitals in areas where the governing party has a small majority is rare due to fear of electoral punishment we find that management quality measured using a new survey tool is strongly correlated with financial and clinical outcomes such as survival rates from emergency heart attack admissions ami more importantly we find that higher competition as indicated by a greater number of neighboring hospitals is positively correlated with increased management quality and this relationship strengthens when we instrument the number of local hospitals with local political competition adding another rival hospital increases the index of management quality by one third of a standard deviation and leads to a 10 7 reduction in heart attack mortality rates

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

interest rate uncertainty and the financial intermediary s choice of exposure the financial intermediary s choice of operating as a broker with minimal risk exposure or as an asset transformer with interest rate risk is modeled as a funds inventory decision made prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the borrowing or lending interest rates it is shown that an increase in the interest rate uncertainty leads the intermediary to reduce its exposure thereby offering decreased asset transformation and more brokerage services however a stochastic increase in the interest rates leads to greater asset transformation and less brokerage services the high and volatile nominal interest rates associated with contemporary inflation have prompted a pronounced change in commercial bank balance sheets low cost deposits have been replaced by alternative funding vehicles bearing high and increasingly variable interest rates see budzeika 3 4 kane 9 and silber 13 in an apparent adaptive response to the loss of deposits banks have eschewed fixed rate loans in favor of variable rate lending thereby more closely matching the durations of their assets and liabilities see flannery 6 and boltz and campbell 2 this change in bank lending practices has been popularly interpreted as an effort to immunize cash flows in the face of increased interest rate uncertainty see haley 8 and wojnilower 15 however apart from niehans and hewson 11 the adaptive recomposition of bank balance sheets has not been formally addressed in this paper we provide a model of balance sheet duration mismatching and then show that an increase in interest rate volatility is likely to lead an intermediary to choose a balance sheet that is more closely matched 1 balance sheet mismatching can be understood in terms of the two basic functions of financial intermediaries as explained by niehans 10 brokerage and asset transformation if a financial intermediary precisely matches the properties of its assets and liabilities and thereby maintains a perfectly hedged position it functions exclusively as a broker joining borrowers and lenders without assuming any risk the broker s function is then simply to reduce the search costs associated with joining complementary transactors the brokerage function is deshmukh is professor of managerial economics and decision sciences greenbaum is harold l stuart professor of banking and finance and kanatas is assistant professor of finance all at northwestern university s j l kellogg graduate school of management we gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions of michael brennan and an anonymous referee this project was supported by the banking research center and the kellogg center for advanced study in managerial economics and decision sciences

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

optimal insurance against climatic experience an optimal insurance contract against a climatic risk is derived in the presence of an uninsurable and dependent aggregate production risk the optimaldesign depends on the stochastic dependency between both sources of uncertainty and on the producer s attitude towards risk especially on his prudent behavior rationalweather insurance purchasing decisions are al so derived the prudent producer responds to actuarially fair weather insurance by increasing his exposure towards risk the u s multiple peril crop insurance program in which indemnity payments are based on the producer s individualyiel ds has been disappointing in that premiums have not been sufficient to cover indemnity payments and administrative costs this failure has induced the u s government to promote alternative insurance policies since 1993 the risk management agency has offered areayield contracts under its group risk plan in selected counties skees black and barnett another alternative is to base the indemnity on a weather index such as rainfall or temperature this policy was proposed in the past by sanderson but has failed to gain acceptance among policy makers the difficulties of rainfall insurance were a subject of debate in australia e g bardsley abey and davenport quiggin 1986 patrick the recent development of weather based instruments on financialmarkets known as weather derivatives for which the payoff depends on the cause of risk rather than on its effect on yield provide new opportunities for covering exposure to unfavorable weather events the objective of this article is threefold first a stochastic production function affected by a climatic risk and by an aggregate production risk where both sources of risk are stochastically dependent is de

robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities the paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and n agents when each agent s utility depends on the principal s unobservable contracts with other agents we show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents beliefs this bound yields for example competitive convergence as n in environments in which an appropriately defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists we also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal

competition in loan contracts we present a model of an unsecured loan market many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts a debt level and an interest rate to a borrower the borrower may accept more than one contract her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed if this payoff is high enough deterministic zero profit equilibria cannot be sustained lenders earn a positive profit and may even charge the monopoly price the positive profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders despite the absence of asymmetric information the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

risk sharing in the adjustable rate loan market are existing contracts efficient abstract a previous paper arvan and brueckner 1986 showed that in an optimal loan contract interest rate risk should be shared between lender and borrower with the slope of the loan rate function which relates the loan interest rate to the lender s uncertain cost of funds lying between zero and one existing adjustable rate mortgage arm contracts violate this rule since they require complete risk absorption by the borrower when interest rate caps are not binding the present paper shows that when the earlier model is modified by adding a second type of borrower efficient loan contracts look more like existing arms

income tax deductions for losses as insurance the federal income tax allows deductions for some categories of personal losses notably for casualty losses such as destruction of one s home or car and medical expenses above a threshold the latter even with lower marginal rates and further restrictions brought about by the 1986 tax reform involves more than a 3 billion annual revenue loss office of management and budget 1990 1 deductions like these act as partial insurance individuals receive a tax benefit equal to their marginal rate multiplied by the magnitude of their loss however this form of insurance is unnecessary when private insurance is available moreover as will be emphasized here these deductions have a perverse effect because they are allowed only for the uninsured portion of losses this induces individuals to be less protected against risk in the aggregate than if the implicit insurance provided by the tax system were unavailable if the tax rate is sufficiently high individuals would forgo insurance coverage altogether 2 it will be demonstrated that a tax system with no deductions for personal losses pareto dominates the current system these conclusions are demonstrated in section i using a simple model in which risk averse individuals may purchase actuarially fair insurance against loss and individual behavior does not affect the risk of loss no moral hazard section ii considers the applicability of the results when one allows for moral hazard administrative costs and other imperfections it also discusses the applicability of traditional notions of tax equity

buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations we study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides in case of a bilateral disagreement flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment a larger buyer pays a higher per unit price when buyers bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low and a lower price otherwise an analogous result holds for sellers these predictions and the implications of different technologies are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power

efficient contracts in credit markets subject to interest rate risk an application of raviv s insurance model interest rate risk borne by financial institutions has increased markedly as the credit markets have become more unstable in recent years the burden of this new instability has been especially severe for lending institutions whose balance sheets show the greatest mismatch between the maturities of assets and liabilities the savings and loan industry for example which borrows short and lends long suffered serious losses in recent years as income from its portfolio of old mortgages failed to keep pace with the escalating cost of short term funds the specter of such losses has led to the emergence of adjustable rate mortgages arms as well as other types of variable rate contracts these contracts often specify a complex functional relationship between the future loan interest rate and the lender s uncertain future cost of funds in view of the growing popularity of variable rate loans it is important to know what features an efficient contract of this type would possess to answer this question the present paper derives the form of the optimal variable rate contract focusing especially on the contractual relationship between the loan rate and the future cost of funds the framework used in the analysis is very similar to artur raviv s 1979 optimal insurance model section i derives the form of the optimal loan contract and evaluates the risk sharing efficiency of arms in light of the results subsequent sections discuss extensions of the model and offer conclusions 1 i analysis

european community external protection and 1992 voluntary export restraints applied to pacific asia european community external protection and 1992 voluntary export restraints applied to pacific asia

designing optimal crop revenue insurance when the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer s price and individual yield an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer s gross revenue however this design is not efficient if as is the case with available contracts the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and or price the producer s degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule in this broader context optimal protection is not provided by available u s crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance yield insurance futures and options contracts

transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion abstract this paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated hotelling duopoly increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price it also decreases the punishment profit the net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain in the limiting homogeneous market the effect vanishes here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion

tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints with and without internationally mobile capital this paper presents a general framework for comparing the effects of tariffs quotas and vers voluntary export restraints both with and without international capital mobility expressions for the shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of capital under each type of trade restriction are derived and it is shown that although international capital mobility raises the welfare cost of tariff protection it lowers the welfare cost of quantitative restrictions in most cases the effects of exogenous shocks in the presence of quotas are intermediate between those in the presence of tariffs and those in the presence of vers tarifs douaniers contingentements et restrictions volontaires d l exportation quand le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur presente un cadre general d analyse qu il utilise pour comparer les effets de tarifs douaniers de contingentements et de restrictions volontaires a l exportation dans des contextes ofu le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur derive le prix fictif du change etranger et le prix fictif du capital sous l un et l autre types de restrictions au commerce et montre que meme si la mobilite internationale du capital augmente le cofut en terme de bien etre de la protection tarifaire elle reduit le cofut en terme de bien etre des restrictions sur les quantites echangees dans tous les cas les effets de chocs exogenes quand des contingentements existent sont toujours dans la fourchette entre ceux qu on observe quand des tarifs douaniers existent et ceux qui prevalent quand des restrictions volontaires i l exportation existent

implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance we investigate the demand for insurance when contracts are subject with positive probability to two distinct types of incomplete performance when partial performance means payment of some fraction of the indemnity under full performance the latter exhibits a disappearing deductible when partial performance is due to insufficient financial capacity optimal insurance contracts for any given level of financial capacity offer full marginal coverage above a deductible for either type of non performance the optimal deductible under full performance is positive when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm

the home selling problem theory and evidence this paper formulates and solves the problem of a homeowner who wants to sell their house for the maximum possible price net of transactions costs including real estate commissions the optimal selling strategy consists of an initial list price with subs equent weekly decisions on how much to adjust the list price until the home is sold or withdrawn from the market the solution also yields a sequence of reservation prices that determine whether the homeowner should accept bids from potential buyers who arrive stochastically over time with an expected arrival rate that is a decreasing function of the list price this model was developed to provide a theoretical explanation for list price dynamics and bargaining behavior observed for a sample of homeowners in england in a new data set introduced by