a test of independence of discounting from quality of life the quality adjusted life years qaly model assumes quality and quantity of life can be multiplied into a single index and requires quality and quantity to be mutually independent which need not hold empirically this paper proposes a new test for measuring independence of utility of life duration from quality of life in a riskless setting we use a large representative sample of dutch citizens and include two health states generally considered better than dead btd and one health state considered worse than dead wtd independence cannot be rejected when comparing the btd health states but is rejected when comparing the btd states with the wtd state in particular utility of life duration becomes more concave for the wtd state this may suggest that independence holds only for btd health states this has implications for the qaly model and would require using sign dependent utility of life duration functions

auctions with resale when private values are uncertain evidence from the lab and field abstract auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions remains under researched this study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3000 auctions over 10 000 individual bids for cutting rights of standing timber in british columbia from 1996 to 2000 in comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not we find evidence that is consistent with theory critical evaluation of the reduced form bidding model however reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types we therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect we find that while it does have the predicted effect a theoretical model based on risk averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk neutral bidders beyond testing theory the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data

the winner s curse experiments with buyers and with sellers this paper explores the winner s curse phenomena as it was studied experimentally by kagel and levin experiments with the winner s curse are complicated by the fact that subjects can lose money and the experimenter has only a limited means of collecting it from them thus subjects enjoy only limited liability which has theoretical implications for behavior in the kagel and levin experiments subjects were removed from the bidders competition after losses reached a predetermined value this experimental procedure has unknown implications for the results so ambiguity exists about whether the winner s curse was actually observed in this study their results were replicated in an environment in which subjects were not removed the case in which competitors are sellers is also studied bankruptcy cannot be a problem in sellers competition in both cases the winner s curse is observed thus the limited liability cannot be an explanation for the phenomenon reported by kagel and levin in addition the paper examines the bidding behavior of all individuals and shows that this behavior does not fit any of the tested theories either on the aggregate or individual level the winner s curse did not disappear over time during the conduct of the research

measuring discounting without measuring utility we introduce a new method to measure the temporal discounting of money unlike preceding methods our method requires neither knowledge nor measurement of utility it is easier to implement clearer to subjects and requires fewer measurements than existing methods

complementarity and external linkages the strategies of the large firms in biotechnology in biotechnology large firms enter into different kinds of linkages with universities and small medium sized research intensive firms we test the hypothesis that the strategies of external linkage of the large firms with other parties are complementary to one another we show that if any two strategies are complementary i e undertaking more of one strategy raises the marginal value of the other then they are positively correlated using data for a sample large us european and japanese chemical and pharmaceutical producers we find that the strategies above are positively correlated even after controlling for firm specific characteristics

optimal sales force diversification and group incentive payments in this research we show that the interaction between territory allocation and sales force compensation two key drivers of sales productivity strongly affects the firm s profitability we analyze an agency theoretic model that jointly considers the degree of negative or positive correlation across territory outcomes differences in territories sales potentials the agency problem with risk averse salespeople and the availability of both own territory compensation elements such as commission and elements dependent on the performance of others such as group commissions or tournaments we find that allocating salespeople to negatively correlated sales territories beneficially diversifies each salesperson s portfolio of sales outcomes when this allocation includes a group commission pay component and can improve profitability even with a decrease in average territory sales performance in a larger sales force a balanced allocation of salespeople coupled with a group commission dominates an imbalanced allocation comparing piece rate compensation with or without a group commission component to tournaments alongside the allocation problem we find that tournaments are favored over piece rate plans when territories are highly positively correlated territory sales potentials are similar and salespeople have a low disutility for effort and are not very risk averse a piece rate plan conversely dominates a tournament when these conditions are reversed

economics health and health economics hyes healthy years equivalent versus qalys quality adjusted live year this paper responds to culyer and wagstaff s cw and buckingham s b arguments we refute their claim about the equivalence of hyes and qalys they fail to distinguish between choice under uncertainty and under certainty cw assume that all individuals have a specific form of utility function which yields their conclusion of equivalence b s arguments confuse the measurement technique and the utility theory from which it stems his argument about the normative superiority of the qaly construct is inconsistent with economic thinking the hye by being compatible with the principles of economics is superior to the qaly for economic evaluations of health care interventions

assessing individual risk attitudes using field data from lottery games we use information from the television game show with the highest guaranteed average payoff in the united states hoosier millionaire to analyze risktaking in a high stakes experiment we characterize gambling decisions under alternative assumptions about contestant behavior and preferences and derive testable restrictions on individual risk attitudes based on this characterization we then use an extensive sample of gambling decisions to estimate distributions of risk aversion parameters consistent with the theoretical restrictions and revealed preferences we find that although most contestants display risk averse preferences the extent of the risk aversion implied by our estimates varies substantially with the stakes involved in the different decisions

skills in the marketplace market efficiency social orientation and ability in a field based experiment abstract neoclassical economic theory predicts that markets will clear leaving little or no marginal gains from trade laboratory experiments have largely confirmed this prediction though the results of recent field experiments have been mixed especially in developing countries i create a multiround trading market in uganda to explore the efficiency of trading and test whether traders personal traits are associated with market efficiency and individual bargaining success to test the effects of individual traits i utilize data on measures of the traders human and physical capital risk and time preferences and social orientation specifically pro and antisocial behavior and aggression i find that the buyers and sellers relative levels of social orientation and human capital are associated with levels of market efficiency within rounds measures of social orientation however are less associated with individual success i also find that rents obtained in the experiment are strongly associated with the wealth levels of participants two years later but this association is limited to those who were randomly assigned to be buyers in the experiment i present evidence that this association is driven by greater buyer bargaining ability

time preference the discounted utility model and health the constant rate discounted utility model is commonly used to represent intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations this paper examines the appropriateness of this model and argues that the model fails both normatively and descriptively as a representation of individual intertemporal preferences for health outcomes variable rate discounted utility models are more flexible but still require restrictive assumptions and may lead to dynamically inconsistent behaviour the paper concludes by considering two ways of incorporating individual intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations that allow for complementarity of health outcomes in different time periods

evaluation of salesforce size and productivity through efficient frontier benchmarking the efficient operation of a salesforce is a critical element in the profitability of many firms three factors play key roles the salesforce s size its allocation and its productivity this gives rise to the following questions can salesforce performance be improved by 1 hiring more salespeople 2 allocating them more effectively to the various sales districts and or 3 improving salesperson productivity through better calling patterns in terms of consumers and product line items the practice of most firms and the methodology used in most of the academic literature to address salesforce design and productivity questions is a bottom up approach this approach starts with assessments by each salesperson of the sales and effort corresponding to each customer and prospect in their territory these assessments are then aggregated to the territory district and national levels this paper takes an alternative top down approach it is based on an estimated relationship between district level sales and salesforce size effort and other variables this more macro level decision tool can be used by management in parallel to and as an objective check of the more conventional and more subjective bottom up approach we develop an efficient frontier methodology which allows us to estimate how total district sales respond to salesforce size district potential and competitive activity in the firm s best performing districts the methodology utilized is based on data envelopment analysis dea and yields a benchmark measure of each district s efficient frontier sales sales assuming the district s salesforce allocates its effort as done in the best performing districts based on the estimated response function we discuss the three potential sources of increased profitability closing the inefficiency gap of each of the lower performing districts optimally reallocating the current salesforce to the various districts and changing the current size of the salesforce to its optimal level the inefficiency gap issue is addressed through comparison of the parameter estimates for the best districts obtained through our methodology with those of an average district sales response function obtained using regression analysis this comparison points to an important methodological finding the use of multiple estimation results may lead to an improved understanding of the phenomenon being studied in our case the identification of the likely causes of district productivity inefficiencies the latter two sources of increased profitability salesforce reallocation and changes in the current salesforce size are addressed analytically given the district level efficient frontier sales response function the proposed top down procedure using the efficient frontier methodology and the insights it provides are examined by evaluating the operations of two different salesforces one selling manufacturing equipment and the other business equipment in both cases regression based analysis would have resulted in a declaration that the status quo was close to optimal while the frontier based analysis pointed out that strong gains were possible in certain districts in particular for both firms the greatest increases in profit are obtained through improved salesforce efficiency in the lower performing districts not through salesforce size or district allocation adjustments at the more micro level a comparison of the frontier and regression parameters made it possible to identify which specific changes in the daily operations of the salesforces would allow the realization of these potential productivity gains in our two cases this could be obtained through more emphasis on pursuing prospective accounts

contracting theory and accounting abstract this paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues i discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems i review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts and i compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes i also review the literature on communication including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place the paper also discusses capital allocation within firms including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems

do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate takeover market abstract we contrast the winner s curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers the winner s curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover in our empirical estimation we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals controlling for endogeneity we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition we also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding analysis of post takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition as a whole the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner s curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids

centralized pricing versus delegating pricing to the salesforce under information asymmetry the issue of delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce is of interest to marketing academics and practitioners it has been shown by lal 1986 that under certain situations with information asymmetry it is more profitable for the firm to delegate pricing authority to the salesforce than to have centralized pricing in this paper we re examine situations where information asymmetry exists and analyze its effect on the decision of the firm to set a price or delegate pricing responsibility to the salesforce using contract theory we find that when the salesperson s private information can be revealed to the firm through contracting centralized pricing performs at least as well as price delegation we derive the optimal centralized pricing contract under a set of standard assumptions used in the economics and business literature

on negative time preferences abstract survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses this holds for monetary and non monetary outcomes these results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non monetary outcomes

incentives versus reciprocity insights from a field experiment abstractthe authors conduct a field experiment in which they vary the sales force compensation scheme at an asian enterprise that sells consumer durable goods with variation generated by the experimental treatments the authors model sales force performance to identify the effectiveness of various forms of conditional and unconditional compensation they account for salesperson heterogeneity using a hierarchical bayesian framework to estimate the model they find conditional compensation in the form of quota bonus incentives to improve performance however such compensation may lead to lower future performance the authors find little difference in effectiveness between a quota bonus plan and punitive bonus plans framed as a penalty for not achieving quota they find that unconditional compensation in the form of reciprocity is effective at improving sales force performance only when it is given as a delayed reward however the effectiveness of this plan decreases with repeated exposure the authors

the fragility of time time insensitivity and valuation of the near and far future we propose that the temporal dimension is fragile in that choices are insufficiently sensitive to it and second such sensitivity as exists is exceptionally malleable unlike other dimensions such as money which are attended by default to test this we axiomatize a constant sensitivity discount function and in four studies we show that the degree of time sensitivity is inadequate relative to the compound discounting norm and strongly susceptible to manipulation time sensitivity is increased by a comparative within subject presentation experiment 1 direct instruction experiment 3 and provision of a visual cue for time duration experiment 4 time sensitivity is decreased using a time pressure manipulation experiment 2 in each study the sensitivity manipulation has an opposite effect on near future and far future valuations increased sensitivity decreases discounting in the near future and increases discounting in the far future in contrast such sensitivity manipulations have little effect on the money dimension

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

super experienced bidders in first price common value auctions rules of thumb nash equilibrium bidding and the winner s curse super experienced bidders have learned to overcome the winner s curse but still earn less than 50 of nash equilibrium profits subjects deviate from the complicated nash strategy employing piecew

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

interdependent value auctions with insider information theory and experiment abstract we develop a model of interdependent value auctions in which two types of bidders compete insiders who are perfectly informed about their value and outsiders who are informed only about the private component of their value because the bidding strategy of outsiders cannot efficiently adjust with that of insiders the second price auction is inefficient the english auction has an equilibrium in which the information outsiders infer from the history of drop out prices enables them to bid toward attaining efficiency the presence of insiders has positive impacts on the seller s revenue a laboratory experiment confirms key theoretical predictions despite evidence of naive bidding

researching preferences valuation and hypothetical bias a number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty this issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation cv as well as the debate over the divergence between wtp and wta in the context of cv it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses this paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate the model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate the first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value researching preferences the second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid the experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters hypotheticalness information costs and number of agents on the endogenous variables such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

frames of reference and the quality of life asked to choose most people state confidently that they would rather be killed in an automobile accident than to survive a quadraplegic and so we are not surprised to learn that severely disabled people experience a period of devastating depression and disorientation in the wake of their accidents what we do not expect however are the speed and extent to which many of these victims accommodate to their new circumstances within a year s time many quadraplegics report the same mix of moods and emotions as able bodied people do there is also evidence that the blind the retarded and the malformed are no less happy than other people ads for the new york state lottery show participants fantasizing about how their lives would change if they won i d buy the company and fire my boss people who actually do win the lottery report the anticipated rush of euphoria in the weeks after their good fortune followup studies done after several years however indicate that these people are no happier indeed are in many ways less happy than before as a young man fresh out of college i served as a peace corps volunteer in rural nepal my one room house had no electricity no heat no indoor toilet no running water the local diet offered little variety and virtually no meat and yet at no time during my two year stay in nepal did i experience a sense of material deprivation on the contrary my monthly stipend of 40 was much more than most others in my village had and with it i experienced a feeling of prosperity that i have recaptured only in recent years these observations illustrate the critical role of context as a determinant of human satisfaction the neoclassical economic model of choice abstracts from context saying that utility depends only on the level of consumption consumption levels obviously are important and the neoclassical model performs reasonably well in many instances and yet its narrow focus misses something important to predict people s behavior to draw inferences about their well being or to make intelligent policy decisions we must not only know the relevant levels of consumption but also have an appropriate frame of reference within which to evaluate them

the small sample bias of the gini coefficient results and implications for empirical research the gini coefficient is a downward biased measure of inequality in small populations when income is generated by one of three common distributions the paper discusses the sources of bias and argues that this property is far more general this has implications for i the comparison of inequality among subsamples some of which may be small and ii the use of the gini in measuring firm size inequality in markets with a small number of firms the small sample bias has often led to misperceptions about trends in industry concentration a small sample adjustment results in a reduced bias which can no longer be signed this remaining bias rises with the dispersion and falls with increasing skewness of the distribution finally an empirical example illustrates the importance of using the adjusted gini in this example it is shown that controlling for market characteristics larger shipping cartels include a set of firms that is stochastically identical in terms of relative size to those of smaller shipp

the complexity effects on choice with uncertainty experimental evidence we present experimental evidence suggesting that human subjects dislike complexity in choice with uncertainty our results suggest that the probability of choosing a given alternative decreases with the relative complexity of that alternative complexity increases the noise in the choice process and the chances that the otherwise inferior alternative will be selected our results contradict the predictions of discounted expected utility theory and intuitively appealing axioms like stochastic dominance and convexity these complexity effects may lead to inefficient portfolio selection the perceived complexity of a given lottery may depend on editing procedures and be subjected to framing effects the flourishing experimental research on individual choice over the last two decades has produced a list of anomalies suggesting that human agents behaviour is frequently incompatible with the formal models traditionally employed in the economic literature 1 some of these anomalies eg the certainty effect of kahneman and tversky 1979 have demonstrated that individual behaviour is inconsistent with the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory alternative models like prospect theory kahneman and tversky 1979 anticipated utility quiggin 1982 and many others have been suggested to resolve the contradictions other anomalies eg the evidence on hyperbolic discounting presented by thaler 1981 have referred to the case of intertemporal choice and suggested that human subjects do not comply with samuelson s discounted utility model again attempts have been made to develop alternative models that reconcile the inconsistencies see for example loewenstein and prelec 1992 this paper concentrates on a different anomaly that seems inconsistent with the evaluation models that are typically assumed in the economic literature the basic simple idea is that human subjects are inclined to avoid complicated lotteries accordingly they sometimes discriminate against complicated lotteries and prefer simple lotteries to complicated ones in cases where the value of the complicated lottery should be higher in particular we demonstrate that complexity affects choice in two ways 1 the probability of choosing a given alternative in binary choice tasks decreases with the relative complexity of that alternative 2 the noise in the choice process increases with complexity and thus the chances that the otherwise inferior alternative will be selected increase as well

cigarette smoking and self control this paper empirically studies time inconsistent preferences in the context of cigarette smoking behavior with hyperbolic discounting an individual has time inconsistent preferences which give rise to a lack of self control i e she may perpetually postpone the execution of a plan this implies that a smoker who wants to quit has a demand for control devices e g a smoking ban in public areas or a hike in cigarette excise taxes this paper empirically tests this implication using a sample that is based on survey data from taiwan the estimation results indicate that a smoker s intention to quit has a positive effect on the smoker s support for smoking bans and a cigarette excise tax increase these results lend support to the validity of the time inconsistent preferences in the context of cigarette smoking behavior this casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that individuals have time consistent preferences in becker and murphy s becker g s murphy k m 1988 a theory of rational addiction journal of political economy 96 4 675 700 rational addiction model

optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders abstract a mixed population of bidders consists of two asymmetric groups members of the first group are game theoretic players who maximize their expected profit and incorrectly believe that their opponents act similarly the second group of bidders adopts an irrational strategy they either choose their bids randomly following a given probability distribution in a naive form of bidding or follow a decision theoretic approach maximizing their expected profit under the assumption that all other bids are random in a sealed bid private value procurement auction we examine the optimal strategy of a new player who has perfect knowledge of the structure of the mixed bidder population and enters the auction the optimal bid of the new bidder is derived when the cost and mark up follow a uniform distribution in 0 1 the effect of the relative size of the group of game theoretic bidders and the population size on the optimal bid price is established

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

testing for complementarities in reduced form regressions a note abstract in many cases it is important to know whether choice variables for a decision maker are mutual complements but a structural model cannot be estimated a unified framework for testing for complementarity through reduced form regressions is provided

decision making over time and under uncertainty a common approach this paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice we begin by demonstrating a one to one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains i e expected utility and discounted utility models we argue that such violations or preference reversals are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice specifically it appears that 1 if we add a constant to all values of an attribute then that attribute becomes less important 2 if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute or if we change the sign of an attribute from positive to negative then that attribute becomes more important the generality of these propositions as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences is discussed

an investigation of the equal commission rate policy for a multi product salesforce for a multi product sales force the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general nonoptimal from the firm s profit maximization point of view for a homogeneous salesforce the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson s allocations of total time to the multiple products has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson s total selling time resulting from his her trading off income vs total time to maximize utility the equal commission rate policy is however optimal for the cases of i salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and ii fair income salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case if the salesforce is heterogeneous e g different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time this makes the equal commission rate policy to be in general nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases i and ii it is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities relating quantities sold to selling times the common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales rather than gross margins is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions

relationship organization and price delegation an experimental study price delegation to the salesforce is a practice widely adopted by firms this paper examines the relationship between price delegation and managerial profits using a laboratory economics experiment a novel feature of our experiment is that we study how varying the relationship organization of the sales manager and salesperson to allow for 1 requests by the salesperson for the manager to choose price delegation and for 2 the manager to award a small bonus after observing the salesperson s decisions can affect behavior the results show that contrary to the theoretical prediction managers choose price delegation frequently and salespeople respond reciprocally leading to higher manager profits under price delegation moreover this behavior increases when requests and bonuses are allowed we show that a behavioral economics model that incorporates positive reciprocity can explain these results well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1778 this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

auctions and land values an experimental analysis although urban land development is a well researched area there has been inadequate research on the allocation mechanism for land this paper offers a new perspective on the effects of the auction mechanism on land values by appealing to an experimental setting to examine the bidding behaviour of developers in repeated first price sealed bid fpsb auctions where resolution of price uncertainty development revenue is deferred it is shown that overbidding is pervasive participants consistently shave expected profit margins in order to secure land for development the actual profit margins reported in all experiments are significantly lower than the suggested benchmark made known before the experiments consequently participants tend to experience smaller ex post profits relative to ex ante expectations however we find that repeated bidding does mitigate overbidding to some extent as evidenced by lower differences in the winning bid to the second highest bid convergence in the range of bids occur

risk aversion and the winner s curse this article analyzes an auction in which bidders see independent components of a common prize value the nash equilibrium for two rational bidders is shown to be independent of risk attitudes the information structure allows explicit calculation of an alternative equilibrium in which naive bidders do not correctly discount the value of the prize contingent on winning and thus they suffer the winner s curse subjects in a laboratory experiment clearly fall prey to the winner s curse the data conform most closely to the predictions of the naive model moreover the level of risk aversion implied by fitting the naive model is similar to an independent risk aversion measure obtained in a separate private value bidding exercise

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information in this paper we present a theory of salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity to choose from a menu of compensation plans although such contractual arrangements are not commonly used in the industry they have been introduced and implemented by firms such as ibm and st regis paper as in our previous work on salesforce compensation plans basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 we use an agency theory framework in this paper we relax the assumptions of information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a menu of compensation plans we also show that even when these assumptions are relaxed there are situations where offering a single plan characterized by basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 is still optimal insights gained from the analyses are discussed in the context of an existing compensation scheme

optimization models for salesforce compensation abstract this paper reviews models which address the design of optimal salesforce compensation schemes the discussion starts with agency theoretic models that are able to derive the optimal form for a compensation scheme under assumptions regarding the degree of information asymmetry and heterogeneity within the salesforce for the four resulting extreme cases models are presented that allow for the determination of optimal parameter values for specific compensation schemes such as fixed salary plus commission bonus for quota achievement and menus of plans finally there follows an examination of approaches through which commission rates or bonuses can be optimally differentiated such that the salespersons allocate their selling time in their own and at the same time in the firm s best interest all of these models are reviewed in particular with respect to their applicability in practice

selection bias demographic effects and ability effects in common value auction experiments inexperienced women along with economics and business majors are much more susceptible to the winner s curse as are subjects with lower sat act scores there are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects these selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning

the impact of perceived environmental uncertainty and perceived agent effectiveness on the composition of compensation contracts recently a stream of theoretical development concerning the design of optimal compensation plans has emerged in the marketing literature little empirical work has been done so far to validate the theoretical predictions the findings from the few field studies are equivocal and conflicting which we ascribe to failure to account for the major assumptions underlying the theoretical predictions we argue that in order to enhance the rigor of theory testing the field studies must be complemented by laboratory experiments where the conditions stipulated by the assumptions of the theory can be systematically imposed and or relaxed this should help in the reconciliation of the differences found in the field studies the experiment reported in this paper is a first step towards filling this void in the empirical research in this area here we assess the impact of perceived environmental uncertainty and perceived agent effectiveness on the magnitude total pay and composition salary incentive mix of employment compensation the hypotheses stem from propositions analytically derived by basu lal srinivasan and staelin 1985 and lal and srinivasan 1988 the insurance industry middle management compensation problem served as the experimental context the results of the experiment ratified the hypothesis that an increase in perceived agent effectiveness leads to award of compensation contracts of larger total expected value and a larger proportion of performance contingent pay however the hypothesis that an increase in perceived environmental uncertainty prompts the principal to award compensation contracts of smaller total expected value and a smaller proportion of performance contingent pay was rejected we discuss possible alternative explanations for the conflicting results associated with the uncertainty variable and identify future research opportunities in this area

when does money make money more important survey and experimental evidence the authors investigate how the amount and source of income affects the importance placed on money using a longitudinal analysis of the british household panel survey and evidence from two laboratory experiments they found that larger amounts of money received for labor were associated with individuals placing greater importance on money but this effect did not hold for money not related to work the longitudinal survey analysis demonstrated these differential effects of the source of income on money s importance while holding constant stable individual differences the experiments provide causal evidence that the source of income has an effect on the importance of money as well as on the effort expended to earn more money the authors results suggest that even as individual differences in the importance placed on money may affect peoples income depending on its source income can also affect the importance people place on money

6 revenue effects and information processing in english common value auctions an experiment analyzing behavior in english common value auctions is reported english auctions raise more revenue than first price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a strong winner s curse agents employ other bidders dropout prices along with their private information as nash bidding theory predicts however a simple and natural signal averaging rule which does not require recognizing the adverse selection effect of winning the auction better characterizes the data than the nash rule monte carlo simulations using fiml estimates of the signal averaging rule predict a number of data characteristics not directly employed in the estimation procedure copyright 1996 by american economic association

asset pricing with a forward backward stochastic differential utility abstract in an intertemporal setting we model the anticipation disappointment effect through a habit formation process which is a function of past consumption and of past expected utility we show that in equilibrium the anticipation effect reduces the risk premium whereas the disappointment effect induces a higher risk premium

learning in common value auctions some initial observations abstract inexperienced bidders in first price common value auctions suffer from a winner s curse losing money on average with experience bidders approximate the nash equilibrium the mechanisms underlying this adjustment are 1 a market selection effect as the most aggressive bidders are less likely to return for subsequent sessions and 2 players who lose money bid less experiential learning and those who would have lost money had they won the auction with the high bidder s signal bid less observational learning

empirical determinants of intertemporal choice abstract we provide new evidence on the empirical determinants of intertemporal financial decisions we use an exogenously imposed choice affecting nearly all croatian retirees to study characteristics associated with choosing a larger deferred stream of payments over a smaller more immediate payment individuals are more willing to defer if they have higher incomes and are not liquidity constrained have a longer time horizon because of better health and longer life expectancy and have stronger bequest motives individuals who expect currency devaluation or political risk to reduce the value of future income are more likely to take the earlier income stream

technology success and failure in winner take all markets the impact of learning orientation timing and network externalities in industries characterized by network externalities a single technology standard often rises to dominance locking out competing technologies this research demonstrates that despite path depend

structuring a multiproduct sales quota bonus plan for a heterogeneous sales force a practical model based approach this paper presents an agency theoretic model based approach that assists sales managers in determining the profit maximizing structure of a common multiproduct sales quota bonus plan for a geographically specialized heterogeneous sales force operating in a repetitive buying environment this approach involves estimating each salesperson s utility function for income and effort and using these models to predict individual sales achievements and the associated aggregate profit for the firm under a specified plan the utility function estimation is based on the salesperson s own preference rank ordering of alternative sales quota bonus plans once these functions have been estimated they are incorporated in a mathematical programming model that the sales manager can use to determine the best plan the authors demonstrate the approach in the context of a case involving the design of a two product sales quota bonus plan for a set of salespeople at a pharmaceutical products firm

managerial motivation dynamics and incentives firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers we investigate drivers of managerial motivation and propose how firms can use performance pay to alter motivational patterns we focus on the agent s optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic setting surprisingly we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay are not necessarily motivating factors and identify the relevant effort drivers underlying the agent s utility and compensation plan we characterize properties of agents preferences for output lotteries risk aversion aggressiveness prudence that trigger systematic motivational patterns with respect to a variety of factors such as the agent s productivity and past performance time to evaluation the firm s capabilities and market factors our insights are robust holding under very general modeling assumptions on preferences rewards and the stochastic effort output function

are employee selection and incentive contracts complements or substitutes there is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting we argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm we examine these control choices in a setting where contracting difficulties arise due to the firm s choice of strategy and from the volatility created by the firm s external environment we select a firm s commitment to organizational learning ol as our strategic choice variable as this provides a useful proxy for identifying settings where explicit incentive contracting is difficult the results show that as firms become increasingly committed to ol incentive contracts and employee selection operate as complements however with a high commitment to ol and an increasing level of external volatility contracting on performance measures will become less effective in this context our results indicate that there is a substitution effect toward employee selection

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

habits and the anomalies in intertemporal choice this paper analyzes a model of discounted utility under habit formation habit formation means that utility in each period is determined by the difference between the received outcome and the customary outcome at that point in time preferences are rational in the sense that the decision maker correctly anticipates the habit formation process and behaves in a dynamically consistent manner i e plans are truly carried out the purpose is to demonstrate that this generalization of the discounted utility model accounts jointly and in a meaningful way for the most striking anomalies with respect to classical discounted utility theory the common difference effect is explained first this effect also called decreasing impatience effect has usually been viewed as evidence against exponential discounting then the frequently observed preference for increasing sequences of outcomes is examined such preference under the traditional discounted utility model would be regarded as a paradoxical case of negative discounting a discussion of the descriptive prescriptive and normative values of the model is included

a theory of sales quotas with limited liability and rent sharing sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus this article shows that under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota the results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed the model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job specific skill

an investigation of the average bid mechanism for procurement auctions in a procurement context it can be quite costly for a buyer when the winning seller underestimates the cost of a project and then defaults on the project midway through completion the average bid auction is one mechanism intended to help address this problem this format involves awarding the contract to the bidder who has bid closest to the average of the bids submitted we compare the performance of this mechanism with the standard low price mechanism to determine how successful the average bid format is in preventing bidder losses as well as its impact on the price paid by the buyer we find the average bid mechanism to be more successful than expected because surprisingly bidding behavior remains similar between the average bid and low price auctions we provide an explanation for the bidding behavior in the average bid auction that is based on subjects having problems processing signals near the extremes of the distribution this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

assessing empirical research in managerial accounting a value based management perspective this paper applies a value based management framework to critically review empirical research in managerial accounting this framework enables us to place the exceptionally diverse set of managerial accounting studies from the past several decades into an integrated structure our synthesis highlights the many consistent results in prior research identifies remaining gaps and inconsistencies discusses common methodological and econometric problems and suggests fruitful avenues for future managerial accounting research

the brain as a hierarchical organization based on recent neuroscience evidence we model the brain as a dual system organization subject to three conflicts asymmetric information temporal hori zon and incentive salience under the first and second conflicts we show that the uninformed system imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period furthermore decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conflicts under the first and third conflicts it becomes optimal to set a consumption cap finally we discuss the behavioral implications of these rules for choice bracketing and expense tracking and for consumption over the life cycle jel dil d74 d82 d87 d91

positive time preference the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling unless there is an infinite time horizon with the expectation of unending technological advance combined with what we call drastically diminishing marginal utility this finding holds both in the positive and normative senses a corollary is that savings are interest elastic

risk behavior in response to quotas and contests much of the salesforce compensation literature has focused on developing incentive schemes to maximize effort levels on the part of the salesforce the amount of effort to expend in the selling task is considered to be the sole decision variable for a sales representative in this paper we introduce another key decision variable for a sales representative which is how much risk to undertake in the selling task in other words we consider the fact that for a sales representative riskiness of performance e g the dispersion of the probability distribution for sales is often a choice and not a given fate for example a sales representative trying to increase sales may have the choice of allocating a given amount of effort on the low risk approach of pursuing a small set of existing customers or incur the same effort on the high risk option of getting new larger customers to switch from competitors this paper examines how decisions on risk behavior on the part of the sales representatives are influenced by compensation schemes we show that such decisions are sensitive to the payoff structure when a quota based or a rank order contest based compensation scheme is used more specifically we argue that a high quota level or a rank order contest where only the top few win induce sales representatives to opt for high risk prospects whereas a low quota level or a rank order contest where a high proportion win induce sales representatives to opt for low risk prospects this does not stem from any kind of violation of standard expected utility theory but arises from the specific structure of jumps in payoffs it is not that the inherent risk attitudes of the sales representatives are being altered rather under some quota and contest conditions a more risky prospect may yield higher expected utility for an inherently risk averse sales representative while under some other quota and contest conditions a less risky prospect may lead to a higher expected utility for an inherently risk seeking sales representative the theoretical propositions are tested in a series of five experiments the first two experiments test the theoretical results of quota based compensation the quota levels are manipulated subjects select between segment types where the mean expected sales are the same but the variance varies the next two experiments test the risk behavior of subjects in contest based incentive schemes when the proportion of winners in the contest is manipulated the results provide strong support for our models with only a few subjects departing from the theoretical predictions a fifth experiment shows some cognitive response data to explain the behavior that is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions this paper provides implications that are useful for managers who design compensation schemes a common assumption in most normative models on salesforce compensation is that all sales representatives are either risk averse or risk neutral this might often lead to the conclusion that sales representatives cannot be expected to engage in high risk activities in the absence of a risk premium over and above the compensation scheme while this may be true if sales representatives are facing only a piece rate compensation plan it need not be the case when quota based or contest based compensation schemes are used our results suggest that when the sales quotas are set high or if the proportion of winners in a sales contest is low sales representatives may engage in high risk behavior alternatively if the quotas are low or the proportion of winners in a sales contest is high sales representatives may engage in low risk prospects hence if a firm would like to dampen high risk behavior on the part of the salesforce lowering quota levels or increasing the proportion of winners in sales contests might do so similarly in order to reduce conservatism towards risk moving up the quota levels or reducing the proportion of winners in sales contests could be useful our results extend beyond just salesforce management to any situation where payoffs are based on reaching a certain threshold level in performance or are based on relative performance for example similar implications hold in tournaments for promotion to a limited number of top management positions in an organization influencing the portfolio of r d managers and so on

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

service for equity arrangements untangling motives and conflicts abstract many professional service organizations have adopted a little understood contractual form service for equity based on in depth case studies of 12 major professional service providers with a combined experience of 179 equity for service deals this paper documents 18 intended and unintended consequences emanating from and expanding beyond agency theory of adopting such a contractual form six propositions are developed which speculate how these consequences categorized under client development service operations financial management and organizational behaviour affect long run performance assuming these propositions cannot be rejected through empirical analysis the paper also provides managerial guidance for effective implementation of equity for service arrangements

first price common value auctions bidder behavior and the winner s curse first price common value auctions bidder behavior and the winners curse john h kagel dan levin raymond c battalio and donald j meyer experimental auction markets are characterized by a strong winner s curse in early auction periods as high bidders consistently lose money failing to account for the adverse selection problem inherent in winning the auction with experience and bankruptcy on the part of the worst offenders subjects earn positive average profits but these are far below nash equilibrium predictions as a sizable minority of bids exceed the expected value of the item conditional on having the highest estimate of value individual bidding behavior is explored to identify the mechanism whereby market outcomes no longer display the worst effects of the winner s curse i introduction numerous occurrences of the winner s curse have been reported in bidding for items of uncertain value resulting in below normal or even negative average profits for bidders the winner s curse results from bidders failure to account for the adverse selection problem inherent in winning auctions for items of uncertain value capen clapp and campbell 1971 claim that the winner s curse resulted in low profits for oil companies in the 1960s in bidding on offshore oil and gas leases regarding corporate takeovers and mergers roll 1986 proposes a hubris hypothesis acquiring firms generally fall prey to the winner s curse paying too much on average for their targets he claims that from the samples he has observed the hubris hypothesis explains merger data as well as tax factors synergy or inefficient target management cassing and douglas 1980 find that many baseball players in the free agency market have been overpaid on account of the winner s curse and dessauer 1981 reports a similar finding of overbidding in auctions for the book publishing rights based on these occurrences it appears that many agents are not fully cognizant of the intricacies involved with bidding on alternatives that have uncertain worth the winner s curse results from the fact that although bidders may hold unbiased estimates of the auctioned item s value this estimate can be overly optimistic given that participants bids are influenced by their estimates of value in other words the winner s curse results from an adverse selection problem that bidders fail to account for fully in submitting their bids the existence of a winner s curse implies a breakdown of rational expectations on the bidder s part as discussed by milgrom 1981 and identifies a market that is out of equilibrium a winner s curse need not result from bidding on items with uncertain value provided proper adjustments are made one adjustment to the adverse selection problem is to deflate the expected value of the item and hence the bid before any action is taken for example cox and isaac 1984 show that agents who maximize expected utility will revise their expectations downward and submit bids that are strictly less than the expected value conditional on the event of winning when agents behave in this fashion a winner s curse does not result in the sense of bidders paying more on average than the items are worth this paper focuses on sealed bid auctions for objects of uncertain value a market institution for which theoretical predictions and empirical evidence concerning a winner s curse are mixed current theoretical development excludes the possibility of bidders paying more on average than the items are worth yet some empirical evidence in the sale of oil tracts as seen in capen clapp and campbell 1971 lohrenz and dougherty 1983 and mead moseidjord and sorenson 1983 suggests that the winner s curse may be present a series of experiments is designed and conducted in order to answer the following empirical research questions does the winner s curse exist in this auction framework and if it does what is its duration its relation to agent experience in the market and its breadth of impact across agents

gain loss asymmetric stochastic differential utility abstract this study examines a gain loss asymmetric utility in continuous time in which the investor discounts their utility gain by more than the utility loss by employing the theory of stochastic differential utility the model allows an endogenously time varying subjective discount rate in addition the model can express various forms of utility functions including a version of the epstein zin utility under the model even if the state variables do not have any jump in their paths the optimal consumption wealth ratio and portfolio weight can change non smoothly

salesforce compensation theory and managerial implications this paper discusses recent advances in the study of salesforce motivation and compensation special emphasis is given to quantitative approaches from the economics finance and marketing literatures the paper summarizes the findings in this analytical work in the context of some examples of compensation practice in order to illustrate the usefulness of the paradigm for the evaluation and setting of compensation systems we consider some major issues in setting compensation such as the firm s own objective the salesperson s objective and the nature of the sales response function variations in these factors imply significant variation in optimal compensation policy where optimal takes into account the components in the plan the parameter levels of the components and whether or not a menu of such plans should be made available to the salesforce by highlighting the results in the literature in light of some relevant compensation examples we show the applicability of theory to the practical concerns of salesforce management we close with a summary of these insights and directions for future research in the area

the prevalence of hyperbolic discounting some european evidence experimental matching data are used from the 2000 bank of italy survey of household income and wealth shiw and the 2000 wave of the center for economic research center savings survey at tilburg university to compare the relative frequencies of hyperbolic and exponential discounters among 3200 italian respondents and 1400 dutch respondents less than a quarter exhibited hyperbolic discounting this finding is both statistically significant and robust with respect to various assumptions regarding utility moreover it holds across a wide variety of economic social and demographic characteristics the youngest poorest most urban and least educated individuals are the most likely to be hyperbolic discounters in addition it is found that hyperbolic discounters accumulate less wealth and are somewhat less likely than exponential discounters to utilize commitment devices to constrain their future choices

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

assessing salesforce marginal productivity marginal productivity of salesforce excluding checkout clerks in a retail store is difficult to assess an analytical model is presented here explaining this productivity using salesforce workers per hour as the factor of production the explanatory variable and sales transactions per hour as the level of production the explained variable the model incorporates self service transactions controls for various seasonal effects time of day day of the week month of the year and generates solutions for in store salesforce assignment across opening hours and sales points to control for possible endogeneity between the transactions and salesforce size variables instrumental variables are employed in the calibration process the model is calibrated using data from a major retail chain based in latin america both at the storewide level and for groups of individual store departments the results corroborate the existence of diminishing returns to scale for the workers per hour factor and a significant l

the loser s curse if the value of a commodity is unknown a prospective buyer must realize that a bid based on an overestimate of its value is likely to be accepted in this situation merely finding out that one s bid is accepted may cause one to reduce the estimate of a commodity s value so winning an auction can bring a feeling of regret 1 acceptance of a bid is an informative event and failure to incorporate this contingent information into the bidding strategy can lead to excessive bids and subsequent losses a result widely known as the winner s curse 2 there is considerable anecdotal evidence that bidders for a prize of uncertain value fall prey to the winner s curse and persistent overbidding has also been observed in laboratory experiments 3 there is a second factor that can also induce overbidding the thrill of winning this raises the possibility that overbidding is due to a utility of winning instead of being the result of an irrational failure to anticipate the informational content of a bid s acceptance one way to distinguish these explanations is to examine a situation in which the winner s curse effect is neutralized to see if bids are still too high in order to neutralize the winner s curse we identify an opposing bias a situation in which a failure to anticipate the informational content of a bid s acceptance will cause one to bid below the optimal bid resulting in a loser s curse since the loser s curse produces underbidding its effect is the opposite of that arising from the winner s curse

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk