on the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing abstract this paper shows that even in a unionised labour market net and gross profit sharing as well as revenue sharing are isomorphic neither the capital stock nor the wage employment combination depends on the deductibility of base wages and or capital costs from the share base

profit sharing and productivity microeconomic evidence from the united states profit sharing has often been suggested as a potential solution to principal agent problems in the workplace the relationship between productivity and profit sharing is examined using a panel dataset drawn from 2 976 publicly held companies over the 1971 85 period alternatively using firm intercept and first difference specifications the regression results indicate that the adoption of profit sharing is associated with a 2 5 4 2 percent increase in productivity in addition the size of the effect increases with the proportion of employees participating in profit sharing these results hold under a variety of specifications and do not appear to be explained by accompanying changes in management or personnel policies copyright 1992 by royal economic society

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin a general model this paper develops a model of large group chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which 1 there are many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve the existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established in a companion paper more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model

forms of trust and conditions for their stability of the three principal approaches to trust we decided to investigate in greater detail the one in which trust is regarded as a belief that the individuals involved hold about a relationship trust was defined as a delegatory relationship based on anticipation of the delegatee s behaviour we reached four main conclusions first the solution to the problem posed by the indeterminacy of trust lies in the differentiation and hierarchisation of the various forms of trust contractual organisational and tacit on the basis of their degree of irreversibility and stability second contractual trust is unstable because it comes up against the problem of guarantees of individual intentions this leads to the third conclusion rational evaluation by individuals cannot by itself establish trust which is based on collective beliefs practices and rules fourth we identified two conditions for the stability of trust the creation of irreversibilities through adherence to a rule and the creation of a confidence interval within which different interpretations of contradictory individual strategies are tolerated thus the viability of the various forms of trust depends on the ability of institutions and organisations to create rules that are likely when applied to produce an interval in which tolerance of mutual intentions is the norm these analyses of trust hence highlight the role of time and period of time in the notion of trust

a competitive analysis of fail fast shakeout and uncertainty about consumer tastes abstract contemporary business strategy advocates fail fast the practice of launching a product early before the resolution of uncertainty about how product characteristics matter to consumers we consider how uncertainty about consumer preferences can contribute to shakeout when moving from the infant stage of an industry when this uncertainty is large to the mature stage of an industry when this uncertainty is small we find that consistent with the empirical literature due to firms uncertainty about consumers preferences there is excessive entry initially and on average positive shakeout in the number of firms in the market in the mature phase of the industry the paper also presents a new way to model uncertain preferences in product differentiation models that may prove useful in other applications

ranking alternative share contracts under rational expectations abstract this paper analyzes the price level and output stabilization properties of share contracts in a log linear rational expectations model profit sharing product wage and wage fund share contracts are compared to flexible and downwardly rigid nominal wage schemes we find that when the disturbances to the economy are nominal labor compensation schemes which reduce real variability exacerbate nominal variability when the disturbances are real compensation schemes which reduce real variability can also reduce nominal variability

on monopolistic competition and involuntary unemployment in a simple temporary general equilibrium model it is shown that if the number of firms is small imperfect price competition in the markets for goods may be responsible for the existence of unemployment at any given positive wage in our examples involving two firms facing their true demand curves total monopolistic labor demand remains bounded as the wage rate goes to zero and unemployment prevails for a sufficiently large inelastic labor supply in the competitive case total labor demand would go to infinity and intersect labor supply at a positive wage

uncertain spatial demand and price flexibility a state space approach to duopoly abstract sufficient conditions for a unique price equilibrium in terms of the uncertainty distribution and the state contingent consumer distributions are given for spatial duopoly also considered are efficiency and endogenous locations for the symmetric case and comparative statics on price flexibility

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

cross sectional versus panel estimates of union wage effects abstract the main objective of this paper is to compare and reconcile the cross sectional and the panel estimates of union wage effects it uses panel survey of income dynamics psid data for a period of 6 years 1979 1984 unlike what freeman 1984 predicted i e panel union wage estimates would be smaller than pure cross sectional estimates due to the cumulative nature of the errors in reporting union status in the former both the cross sectional and panel estimates of union wage effects are very similar ranging from 11 to 13 unions seem to have flattering effect on the age earnings profiles not surprisingly the rate of return to schooling of non union members is larger than that of the union members

lump sum payments and profit sharing plans in the union sector of the united states economy lump sum payments and profit sharing plans became increasingly prevalent in union contracts in the u s economy in the 1980s this paper analyzes the relationship between lump sums profit sharing labor costs and employment in firm level panel data for the union sector of the u s economy in general the firm level data suggest that profit sharing has a statistically significant effect of lowering labor cost growth profit sharing also appears to increase employment growth and reduce employment variability but these results are not statistically significant this evidence is generally consistent with hypotheses regarding the introduction of performance related pay weitzman 1984 and 1985 the effects of lump sums on the other hand are not consistent with hypotheses regarding performance related pay lump sums do not appear to lower labor cost growth or increase employment growth and increase rather than decrease employment variability copyright 1993 by royal economic society

aggregation and social choice a mean voter theorem a celebrated result of black 1948a demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single peaked the social choice follows the preferences of the median voter the median voter s most preferred outcome beats any alternative however this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension this paper provides a multi dimensional analog of the median voter result we provide conditions under which the mean voter s most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64 majority rule the conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of caplin and nalebuff 1988 the proof of our mean voter result uses a mathematical aggregation theorem due to prekopa 1971 1973 and borell 1975 this theorem has broad applications in economics an application to the distribution of income is described at the end of this paper results on imperfect competition are presented in the companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991

negotiation of profit sharing contracts in industry we examine the properties of profit sharing in a game theoretic oligopoly model of industry profit sharing contracts are viewed as a means of strategic commitment not as an internal incentive system in our model firms choose a contract subject to the employees participation constraint in a first stage and compete on the output market in a second stage we show that the choice of a profit sharing contract by each firm is a non cooperative equilibrium in the case of cournot competition the game under study has the structure of the prisoners dilemma the case of price competition on the output market leads to somewhat different conclusions

union vs nonunion wage norm shifts empirical investigations of wage determination have often produced autocorrelated residuals from time series wage equations runs of overor underprediction have usually been regarded as weaknesses in specification to be corrected or explained away in 1980 however george perry suggested that such runs represent an important if neglected characteristic of american wage setting he argued that norms of wage change develop in the labor market these norms according to perry change discretely there are periods of more or less wage pushiness aggregate wage indexes can be influenced even if norm shifts are not fully reflected everywhere providing those sectors that are affected have sufficient weight in the indexes an obvious division in the labor market is between the union and nonunion sectors there is reason to believe that while there has been a downward shift in wage norms recently the impact has been concentrated in the union sector see my 1985 article indeed the union sector is probably inherently more prone to norm shifts than the nonunion

ski lift pricing with applications to labor and other markets the market for ski runs or amusement rides often features admission tickets with no explicit price per ride therefore the equilibrium i nvolves queues which are systematically longer during peak periods s uch as weekends moreover the prices of admission tickets are much l ess responsive than the length of queues to variations in demand eve n when these variations are predictable despite the queues and stick y prices the authors show that the outcomes are nearly efficient und er plausible conditions they then show that similar results obtain f or some familiar congestion problems and for profit sharing schemes i n the labor market copyright 1987 by american economic association

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

equilibrium existence in the linear model of spatial competition this paper considers a generalization of the hotelling model of spatial competition it is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two stage location price game exists only under very stringent conditions these conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair when the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strategies if transport costs are not sufficiently convex the convexity of transport costs is crucial in determining whether there is excessive or insufficient diversity of products copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

profit sharing and employment stability this paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed time based wage the theory is tested on two data sets one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors the characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the theoretical requirements for stabilizing employment and the authors do find evidence in both samples to support the hypothesis the evidence however is of borderline statistical significance and is therefore more suggestive than definitive

asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition abstract the main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location price games in the case of symmetric triangular density it is shown that no symmetric equilibrium exists however we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies these equilibria are also characterized our secondary purpose is to study the sequential entry of two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space this leads us to uncover a substantial first mover advantage which has been neglected in the literature

product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty we investigate hotelling s duopoly game of location then price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations contrary to the individual level random utility models location uncertainty is a differentiation force in equilibrium increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation higher expected equilibrium prices and profits and a greater welfare loss

rent shifting and rent sharing a re examination of the strategic industrial policy problem this paper reexamines the market structure problem in the strategic trade policy literature it is shown that rent sharing between the home union and the home firms raises total home industry rents regardless of whether the international duopoly is cournot or bertrand furthermore home welfare also rises with cooperation if the international industry consists of more than two firms if the industry is faced with entry and if there is domestic consumption this paper shows that rent sharing can be a robust strategic industrial policy and can be interpreted as a solution to the market structure dilemma

robust equilibria in location games in the framework of spatial competition two or more players strategically choose a location in order to attract consumers it is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations to investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption we model heterogeneity in consumers distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph a profile of location choices is called a robust equilibrium if it is a nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers perceptions of distances for a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence furthermore we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena thereby we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters

oligopoly profit sharing contracts and the firm s systematic risk abstract this article examines the properties of wage and profit sharing contracts in a model of oligopoly with capital market equilibrium while profit sharing contracts dominate market wage contracts profit sharing also reduces the firm s cost of equity capital under fairly broad conditions of oligopoly by enforcing lower costs in exchange for a pre determined share of cash flows to workers this form of operational leverage both reinforces the classical effect of market power on systematic risk and the impact of profit sharing on the corporate finance of the firm as previously suggested by ichino 1994 european economic review 38 1411 1422

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

strategic design under uncertain evaluations structural analysis of design build auctions i investigate firms competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of design build db auctions reviewers design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder s perspective leading luck to curtail differences in firms chances of winning i model bidders behavior and derive semiparametric identification of the model primitives uncertain evaluations worsen the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer s uncertainty in auction outcomes a simple adjustment in the auction mechanism may completely shut down the impact of uncertain evaluations on bidding incentives restoring efficient allocations of projects

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

the demand for stocks an analysis of ipo auctions we analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedules of 27 israeli ipos that were conducted as nondiscriminatory uniform price auctions to the best of our knowledge this is the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset is described the demand schedules are relatively flat around the auction clearing price the average elasticity is 27 the elasticity is low when the return distribution contains a large unique component we also find a significant average abnormal return of 4 5 on the first trading day and a positive correlation between the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets abstract equilibrium existence and optimality are analysed in a market for products differentiated by their variety a game of three stages is analysed firms enter in the first stage choose varieties in the second stage and choose prices in the third stage the existence of subgame perfect equilibria is established at equilibrium products are symmetrically located in the space of characteristics and are offered at equal prices the surplus maximizing solution is characterized and it is shown that surplus maximizing product diversity is lower than the equilibrium one

some pitfalls in the conventional treatment of aggregate demand in recent years the aggregate demand aggregate supply model has replaced the is lm framework as the dominant pedagogical tool for teaching macroeconomics of course the is lm model is still used but its primary function has been relegated to that of providing a convenient vehicle for deriving the aggregate demand curve in the conventional derivation price induced changes in the real money supply shift the lm curve along a fixed is schedule absent wealth effects on consumption and map out levels of output where aggregate demand and output are equal implicit in this approach is the assumption that output supplied by firms responds passively to aggregate demand whatever the price level but this passive response necessarily implies firms raise output in response to a decrease in the price level and lower output in response to an increase in the price level a strikingly odd result that is fundamentally inconsistent with modem theories of aggregate supply our argument is that for internal consistency the aggregate demand curve must be derived using the aggregate supply curve that will eventually be paired with the aggregate demand curve to determine equilibrium price and output the conventional aggregate demand curve does not meet this consistency test because the keynesian assumption which generates the aggregate demand curve i e that output responds passively to demand is at variance with the supply response that is later paired with this aggregate demand curve the inconsistency is obvious firms cannot both raise and lower output in response to a change in the price level clearly the conventional approach to aggregate demand neglects serious consideration of the crucial role played by aggregate supply since output influences consumption expenditures the aggregate demand curve cannot be derived independently of the supply side of the economy therefore rather than use the keynesian assumption that output responds passively to demand we derive the aggregate demand curve by incorporating a lucas type supply response which

experimentation and learning in a differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper explores price setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential the informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in size of the price differential in markets with highly substitutable products price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information in markets with highly differentiated products firms compress their prices as they prefer to reveal less about the extent of product differentiation journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

on the failure of the linkage principle in multi unit auctions it is shown that the linkage principle milgrom and weber 1982 does not extend to the multi unit auction setting an analysis of the equilibium bidding strategies is carried out for the general two agent two unit vickrey auction in order to provide economic insight into the nature of the failure in addition an explicit counterexample is provided both authors acknowledge support from the binational science foudation grant 9500023 1 reny also acknowledges support from the national science foundation grant sbr 970932 and the university of pittsburgh s faculty of arts and sciences

elections with platform and valence competition abstract we study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences e g engage in campaign spending the marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization the closer platforms are the more valence affects the election outcome consequently candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition moreover exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence as a result the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms finally the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter s ideal point to a shock to one candidate s valence as is common in the literature leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values

codetermination and the modern theory of the firm a property rights analysis during the postwar period state sponsored codetermination programs have become increasingly important and by now are firmly established in most countries of western europe conventional wisdom suggests that this growth of reform legislation is part of a broad social movement designed to advance industrial democracy and enlarge the power of labor to influence corporate policy certainly there is no doubt that significant institutional change has taken place but since reorganization has been motivated more by political considerations than by any fundamental rethinking of the theory of the firm questions still exist concerning the effects the new system may have on economic behavior there are in fact serious doubts about the efficiency of mandatory codetermination various writers have suggested that the type of codetermination legislation found in europe may force firms to adopt organizational structure that would not be selected voluntarily by wealthwhen workers finance firm specific investments they supply one part of the total capital stock needed by the firm for production it is arguable then that worker investors should be regarded as equity holders and be granted control and income rights in the enterprise this article seeks to explain the property rights structure that such a codetermined firm must possess to be efficient and to determine the conditions under which this organizational form is likely to emerge under a voluntary contracting process compared to a legally mandated codetermined firm of the european type the voluntary variant shows clear superiority specifically it tends to promote productivity enhancing incentives relatively lower transaction costs and a more rational allocation of risk special thanks go to armen alchian who has provided encouragement advice and key ideas concerning the nature of the firm the article was written during my residence at the center for the study of the new institutional economics university of the saarland west germany 1985 financial assistance was received from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft and is gratefully acknowledged

is profit sharing a cure for unemployment in less developed countries abstract the effects of introducing profit sharing in modern sectors in ldcs are discussed within a dual model with endogenous wages and internal migration profit sharing does not have a direct job creation effect as long as firms set the pay parameters yet the new system may have long run effects on employment allocation under some circumstances profit sharing may in fact destabilize short run employment such that jobs last for a shorter duration modern sector wages are then raised to discipline workers and urban unemployment goes up arguments are also given for the hypothesis that profit sharing stabilizes short run employment with the opposite results

profit related pay prose discovered this paper estimates that in 1984 43 percent of british private sector establishments had some form of profit related pay regression results do not show that these establishments had statistically significant better financial performance cross ta bulations do not suggest that the establishments with income sharing schemes had noticeably greater employment growth or better industrial relations copyright 1988 by royal economic society

asset auctions information and liquidity a model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise it is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions jel d44 d82 g14 e58

nominal disturbances wage flexibility and shifting resources in a two sector economy the recent behaviour of european unemployment rates has sparked considerable interest in the connection between wage flexibility and unemployment see for example bruno and sachs i985 and the papers in the i986 supplement to economica much of the empirical work finds that economies adjust more rapidly and with less inflation when wages and prices are very responsive to unemployment this finding supports the belief that greater wage and price flexibility leads to greater macroeconomic stability in fact one can view martin weitzman s i 983 i 984 and i 985 share system as an institutional change aimed at providing sufficient wage and price flexibility to avoid unemployment it is hard to imagine how wage and price flexibility could increase in all sectors of the economy simultaneously instead greater aggregate wage and price flexibility is likely to result from increased wage and price flexibility at particular firms in particular sectors as a result realistic proposals for share systems involve some time perhaps forever when share firms and wage firms would coexist during this period an increase in aggregate flexibility will be associated with an increase in the difference in wage and price flexibility between sectors this paper analyses allocational issues raised by such an uneven increase in aggregate wage and price flexibility the analysis is done explicitly in terms of a short run two sector model where the first sector is a fixed wage sector and the second sector is a share sector the model is short run because both the number of firms in each sector and the pay parameters at all firms are fixed while the explicit analysis is done in terms of share firms in the second sector the model is more general the second sector can be thought of as the flexible sector where wage and price flexibility maintain full employment an important new phenomenon occurs in the mixed system relative prices change in response to nominal disturbances in particular the relative price of the flexible sector falls in response to a decrease in nominal aggregate demand as a result of the change in relative prices both the utilisation of labour and the mix of consumption shift to the more flexible sector in addition the opposite shifting of resources and consumption occurs in response to an increase

comparative economic performance of conventional and profit sharing firms abstract this paper compares the various economic properties of conventional firms and profit sharing firms the properties contrasted include wage level employment output price total economic rents and industry efficiency the firms operate in an oligopolistic industry with a labor union in general profit sharing firms outperform non sharing firms however there exist counterexamples in which non sharing firms can outperform sharing firms to test the robustness of the results the analysis is conducted for a variety of oligopolistic industries quantity setting pricesetting and joint collusion

optimal experimentation in a changing environment this paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes and who maximizes profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time we show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes determined by the discount rate and the intensities of demand curve switching and the dependence of the optimal policy on these parameters is discontinuous one regime is characterized by extreme experimentation and good tracking of the prevailing demand curve the other by moderate experimentation and poor tracking moreover in the latter regime the agent eventually becomes trapped into taking actions in a strict subset of the feasible set

strategic differentiation and strategic emulation in games with uncertainty when players who choose a common strategy face a common shock while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks equilibrium choices exhibit differentiation respectively emulation when the sign of the cross partial derivative of the firms profit functions with respect to the realizations of the uncertain variables is negative respectively positive i consider a variety of applications including technology choice brand investments and r d races many of which can be characterized as two stage games in such games i demonstrate that differentiation is more likely to occur when the second stage game is a game of strategic substitutes

imperfect competition and the suboptimality of rational expectations abstract this paper investigates whether nonrational expectations can lead to outcomes which other things being equal pareto dominate rational expectations outcomes in order to carry out this investigation we construct an intertemporal micro based macroeconomic model with the two following strong points a it accommodates both rational and non rational expectations b both prices and quantities are determined by optimizing agents in particular prices are determined by explicit price setters using objective demand curves in this model the first theorem of welfare holds so that the walrasian equilibrium with rational expectations cannot be pareto dominated this conclusion is extremely fragile however and we show that as soon as some degree of imperfect competition is present rational expectations are suboptimal in the sense that they are dominated by irrational expectations

some evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions abstract theoretical models of multi unit auctions predict that bidders have a stronger incentive to reduce demand in uniform price auctions than in discriminatory auctions i find support for this prediction using data from foreign currency auctions in zambia during the mid 1980 s 1997 elsevier science s a

wage bargaining and nominal rigidities abstract delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining holdout this holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock out threats integrating the bargaining model in a standard macroeconomic framework it turns out that holdout threats will prevail under certain circumstances in this case wages will be rigid in nominal terms so that an increase in aggregate nominal demand increases aggregate output

minimal and maximal product differentiation in hotelling s duopoly abstract hotelling s 1929 model of duopolistic competition is re examined a family of utility functions is used which has as a special case hotelling s original utility function in a two stage location price game it is shown that an equilibrium exists when the curvature of the utility functions in the space of characteristics is sufficiently high the subgame perfect equilibrium never exhibits minimum product differentiation on the other hand not all equilibria are at maximal product differentiation

profit sharing unions and investments the pay parameters in a profit sharing system are likely to be determined by collective bargaining between unions and employers in this case employment will not necessarily be higher under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system for a fixed capital stock the most likely case is that profit sharing is better for unions and worse for employers than a fixed wage system with endogenous investments both parties may be worse off under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system this might be one of the reasons why we in fact do not observe much profit sharing under collective bargaining

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

unions and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in britain abstract this paper examines the relationship between trade unions and the incidence of share ownership profit sharing and value added schemes in britain the first two schemes are more common in the union sector whilst the third occurs more in non union establishments a distinction is made between weak and strong unions and it is found that performance linked pay schemes are in general less likely to be present if an establishment has a strong union rather than a weak one

hotelling s competition with demand location uncertainty abstract firms product variety choices are examined in a differentiated products model where the range of consumers preferences is an unknown strict subset of the range of potential innovations it is found that the firms locating sequentially will follow the basic pattern of locations found by neven international journal of industrial organization 1987 5 419 434 the uncertainty however generally causes a greater more symmetric amount of differentiation among varieties as firms gamble on finding a market niche with less fierce competition for a sufficiently large pool of potential entrants some firms will lose this gamble and will fail

profit sharing employment stability and wage growth the authors conjecture that profit sharing reduces turnover and thus increases expected returns to firm specific human capital investments so that the optimal levels of skill acquisition and investment in firm specific skills rise and ultimately increase productivity empirical evidence from nlsy data on white men in nonunion jobs between 1988 and 1994 supports this hypothesis employees participating in profit sharing plans were less likely than non participants to separate from their jobs they also received training more frequently and for longer durations finally the authors show that profit sharing was related to higher wage growth indicating a faster rate of skill accumulation

increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory current approaches to macroeconomic theory divide roughly into two basic schools of thought one approach typically associated with rational expectations views the economy as basically at or near walrasian market clearing equilibrium in which case it becomes very difficult to explain away convincingly the undeniable persistence at times of involuntary unemployment another approach views the underemployed economy as being in a state of temporary fixed price disequilibrium in which case aside from having to repress suspicions that the essence of effective demand failure might not have to do with prices fixed at wrong values there is a lot of rationalising to be done about why profitable adjustments are so slow this paper argues that something like an internally consistent theory of steady state involuntary unemployment is possible and even plausible the cornerstone of this third approach is increasing returns to scale which blocks unemployed agents from breaking out of a low level equilibrium trap unless there is overall coordination or stimulation a simple model is presented which contains the basic ideas

the politics of infrastructure investment the role of product market competition abstract in spatial competition public infrastructure plays a crucial role in determining product market outcomes in our model consideration of infrastructure s impact on the product market drives the preferences of consumers in their dual role as voter taxpayers the spatial heterogeneity of consumers produces conflicting political interests and in many cases inefficient outcomes however across both exogenous and endogenous market environments product market competition consistently leads to higher levels of publicly funded infrastructure than monopoly collusion furthermore competition s boost to the popular support for infrastructure investment is often excessive while monopoly leads to underinvestment

union wage concessions in the 1980s the importance of firm specific factors this paper evaluates the effects of firm performance and firm characteristics on concession outcomes over the years 1980 87 across similar firms the author finds concessions were inversely related to stock price and employment growth concessions were also most likely in small firms in firms paying high wages and in firms with relatively low union coverage the effect of firm performance and firm characteristics on the likelihood of concessions was uniform across concessions of differing severity and was stable in magnitude over the eight year period

distribution and growth in an economy with limited needs variable markups and the end of work this article studies a model of the distribution of income under bounded needs utility derived from any given is bounded from above and demand is therefore not isoelastic on the other hand introducing new varieties always increases utility it is assumed that each variety is owned by a monopoly workers can specialise in material goods production or in the knowledge sector which designs new varieties as productivity increases the economy moves from a solovian zone where wages increase with productivity to a marxian zone where they paradoxically decline with productivity

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

profit sharing risk sharing and firm size implications of efficiency wages by taking account of output fluctuations this paper constructs a synthesis of profit sharing and efficiency wage models to highlight the role of the risk attitudes of the firm and its employees we show contrary to the traditional efficiency wage theory that in a profit sharing economy unemployment is no longer a necessary device to induce work effort and consequently the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by full employment such a result is more likely to be true when the economy is characterized by small sized firms in addition we also provide a preliminary sketch of the situations in which the firm chooses a profit sharing program or a fixed wage one and discuss how a firm determines its pay parameters and employment in response to output fluctuations

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

product differentiation decisions under ambiguous consumer demand and pessimistic expectations abstract this paper studies product differentiation decisions in a spatial duopoly with limited information on consumer demand in particular a situation is discussed in which the firms do not know the exact distribution of the random location of consumer demand and its responsiveness to price changes measured by the scale of transport costs but resolve the resulting ambiguity using the maxmin or minimax regret criteria when the firms are sufficiently pessimistic is high enough results are in contrast with the existing literature in particular an increase of demand location uncertainty decreases the equilibrium product differentiation intensifying the second stage competition in prices although the effect is dampened by uncertainty about transport costs endogenizing the choice of objective function leads to the dominance of an extreme form of pessimism which turns out to be socially optimal

shifting wage norms and their implications at least since the early 1970 s it has been apparent that the cyclical variations in inflation summarized by the short run phillips curve are only one part of the inflation problem that confronts modern industrial economies another part is the relative persistence of an established rate of inflation there is a good deal that we do not understand about this persistence but i find the most useful way to model it is to start with the concept of a relatively stable wage norm by which i mean a norm for the rate of wage increase the model distinguishes sharply between the cycle and the trend in inflation with the wage norm determining the trend the variations in inflation of the typical business cycle take place around the existing wage norm and generate the empirical short run phillips curve the wage norm itself is affected little if at all by the typical business cycle historically the wage norm has been shifted by prolonged departures from typical business cycles or by other extreme economic developments figuring out more precisely what it takes to shift wage norms or what might keep them from shifting is a central challenge for understanding inflation better before turning to its implications let me sketch the behavioral underpinnings of the wage norm model and the empirical evidence about wage norms the norm rate of wage increase has no allocational significance and describes the trend of nominal wages independent of real aggregate demand or relative demand effects in this respect it is like the anticipated rate of inflation in many familiar models wages are not determined in an auction like labor market that clears over any reasonable interval of time rather they are established by wage setting firms with a profit maximizing interest in their long run relation with their employees in some cases in a bargaining situation with unions under both the implicit and explicit contracts that thus dominate wage setting keeping up with the norm is the neutral standard for firms an individual firm that raises wages in line with the norm neither improves nor worsens its relative position as an employer a firm that wants to expand employment will typically offer a higher wage than would be required just to keep up with the norm relative wages and relative employment levels are thus codetermined in this process when most firms want to expand employment as in a cyclical upturn the same behavior is part of the process producing the modest cyclical rise in inflation that we observe as the short run phillips curve thus the onset of cyclical inflation is not a sign that capital and labor resources are being overutilized nor is it a sign that inflation is on an accelerating path or even that wage norms are shifting up in analyzing u s postwar data i have found the wage norm shifted up substantially by the end of the 1960 s and down again though not by as much by the end of the 1980 82 recession see my 1983 paper the first episode was a period with a historic expansion that ended with several years of very low unemployment rates the second was a recession of unusual length and severity that ended with the highest unemployment rates since the 1930 s there is also evidence of a small shift down in the wage norm after the weak economic performance of 1957 61 which featured two recessions with only an aborted recovery in between i also found evidence for germany the united kingdom and japan of upward shifts in wage norms in manufacturing industries after the 1960 s and downward shifts in the early 1980 s see my 1986 paper all these episodes suggest the kinds of extreme cyclical developments that have shifted wage norms in the postwar period the brookings institution 1775 massachusetts avenue nw washington d c 20036 in preparing this paper i benefited from discussions with charles schnl t7 e

the union nonunion wage differential over the business cycle evidence from psid abstract there is some prior evidence lewis 1963 mellow 1981 freeman 1984 to support the notion that union wage premium is counter cyclical this phenomenon may be a product of union wage rigidity which results from a long term union contracts and b union reliance on layoffs due to seniority dominance rather than work share practices in response to worsening economic conditions and efficiency wage considerations this paper within a pooled cross section time series framework empirically tests for the presence of perceived counter cyclical nature of the union nonunion wage differential using the psid data from 1979 1984 results from this study do support the presence of counter cyclical union wage premium during the time period studied

some evidence on the relationship between performance related pay and the shape of the experience earnings profile we investigate the relationship between performance related pay prp and the shape of workers experience earnings profiles in particular we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of equity held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of prp the implication is that the slope of the profile for prp workers falls between those of their zero equity fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity self employed counterparts our empirical analysis of three british data sets namely the british social attitudes survey the british household panel survey and the british family expenditure survey supports this prior in this paper we explore the shape of the experience earnings profile for individuals employed under different types of contracts fixed wage performance related pay prp and self employment contracts we follow lazear 1979 1981 and lazear and moore 1984 in hypothesizing that the slope of the experience earnings profile reflects agency costs and the reduction thereof with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles if monitoring costs are high firms may implement compensation schemes designed to encourage employees to self select behavior in the firms interests one such scheme defers a substantial amount of compensation until the later years of tenure the resulting experience earnings profile provides a penalty for shirking lazear and moore 1984 we therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage contracts are steeper than those of self employees for whom the issue of agency does not arise because of the duality of principal and owner lazear and moore 1984 the interesting case is that of workers employed under prp if such contracts represent a hybrid between fixed wage and self employment then one would expect their experience earnings profiles to lie somewhere between these two extreme