ex day behavior with dividend preference and limitations to short term arbitrage the case of swedish lottery bonds abstract swedish lottery bonds offer a unique opportunity to study ex day effects in an environment where cash distributions are tax advantaged relative to capital gains thus in the lottery bond market we observe a reversal of the preference for capital gains that researchers have cited as an explanation for the ex day behavior of u s equities further in this market there are barriers to short term arbitrage when prices do reflect the tax preferences of individual investors we find the bonds are priced around the ex day to reflect differential tax rates on income and capital gains consistent with the prevailing tax regimes the bonds consistently experience negative returns over the coupon payment period and in fact often sell at negative yields prior to the cash distribution as one would expect given tax motivated trading between high tax investors who buy prior to the distribution and low tax investors who buy after the distribution

testing for risk aversion a stochastic dominance approach we conduct an experiment based on the stochastic dominance framework in order to investigate risk aversion in isolation of other effects such as subjective probability distortion the certainty effect and framing effects the result is striking most individuals are not risk averse 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

wealth inequality and asset pricing in an arrow debreu exchange economy with identical agents except for their initial endowment we examine how wealth inequality affects the equilibrium level of the equity premium and the risk free rate we first show that wealth inequality raises the equity premium if and only if the inverse of absolute risk aversion is concave in wealth we then show that the equilibrium risk free rate is reduced by wealth inequality if the inverse of the coefficient of absolute prudence is concave we also prove that the combination of a small uninsurable background risk with wealth inequality biases asset pricing towards a larger equity premium and a smaller risk free rate the model of the representative consumer a la lucas 1978 failed to explain observed security prices more specifically as first stated by mehra and prescott 1985 the model predicts an equity premium that is too low and a risk free rate that is too high given the observed low variability of consumption growth a recent strand of the literature with papers by constantinides and duffie 1996 heaton and lucas 1996 and krusell and smith 1997 for example explores whether incomplete asset markets and heterogeneity among consumers can explain these puzzles constantinides and duffie 1996 in particular conclude that it is at least in principle possible to generate larger equity premia when such ingredients are introduced the aim of this paper is not to provide another explanation of the puzzles but rather to better understand the relationship between asset prices the heterogeneity of consumers wealth and the market incompleteness when markets are complete heterogeneous consumers are able to equalize their marginal rates of substitution across states and across time as shown by constantinides 1982 this implies that the equilibrium of the heterogeneous consumer economy can be duplicated by the equilibrium in a lucas economy with a representative agent this means that taking account of the heterogeneity in the population alone cannot explain why the representative agent model is rejected hansen and singleton 1982 this does not mean however that the distribution of wealth in the population for example has no effect on asset prices in general in order to understand this consider the departure from an egalitarian distribution of wealth by introducing a mean preserving transfer of endowment under decreasing absolute risk aversion poorer agents will be more risk averse whereas wealthier people will be less risk averse there is no reason a priori for that the group s attitude towards risk be unaffected by this transfer we first show that if absolute risk tolerance i e the inverse of the arrow pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is concave then the risk aversion of the agent with the mean wealth will be smaller than the risk aversion of the representative agent thus if an outside observer overlooks wealth inequality he consequently underestimates the aversion to risk of society this leads to

intra plant diffusion of new technology role of productivity in the study of steel refining furnaces abstract this paper examines intra plant diffusion of new technology in the japanese steel industry the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace bof was the greatest breakthrough in steel refining in the last century using unique panel data the paper estimates total factor productivity by technology type and associates the estimates with intra plant diffusion the paper finds that intra plant diffusion accounts for about a half of the industry productivity growth large plants are likely to adopt the new technology earlier but retain the old technology longer than their smaller counterparts

market constraints as a rationale for the friedman savage utility function since the classic paper by friedman and savage 1948 it has generally been accepted that the observed fact that individuals or firms participate in unfair lotteries and other forms of unfair risk taking may be explained by a section in the individual s utility function in which the individual shows risk preference rather than risk aversion in their model friedman and savage specify a utility function which is in turn concave convex and concave thus allowing for simultaneous purchase of insurance risk aversion and participation in lotteries risk preference however while their specified utility function is indeed capable of explaining observed behavior it does seem to be rather unsatisfactory in that it is an ad hoc specification it is the purpose of this paper to suggest a set of circumstances which give rise to a friedmansavage type utility function in particular it is shown that when certain capital market imperfections exist the utility function defined over intermediate wealth should be distinguished from and may have different properties than the one defined on final wealth then even if we accept the common assumption made in the literature that individuals are risk averse that is that their utility function is concave over final wealth it is still possible that they participate in unfair gambling and of course may also purchase insurance

the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies the study of intra firm diffusion has largely been neglected and the limited extant literature overwhelmingly relies upon uncertainty reduction via information spreading or epidemic learning as the main driver in this paper an alternative approach is taken whereby the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies reflects the profitability of new technology adoption as proxied by firm characteristics the approach is tested using data relating to the diffusion of computer numerically controlled machine tools within firms in the uk engineering and metalworking sectors the empirical analysis does not reject the hypothesis that profitability considerations are important with a number of firm characteristics being isolated as of special relevance including firm size and the use of complementary technologies and managerial techniques however there is little support for the traditional epidemic effect

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

downside loss aversion and portfolio management downside loss averse preferences have seen a resurgence in the portfolio management literature this is due to the increasing use of derivatives in managing equity portfolios and the increased use of quantitative techniques for bond portfolio management we employ the lower partial moment as a risk measure for downside loss aversion and compare mean variance m v and mean lower partial moment m lpm optimal portfolios under nonnormal asset return distributions when asset returns are nearly normally distributed there is little difference between the optimal m v and m lpm portfolios when asset returns are nonnormal with large left tails we document significant differences in m v and m lpm optimal portfolios this observation is consistent with industry usage of m v theory for equity portfolios but not for fixed income portfolios

learning by doing export subsidies and industry growth japanese steel in the 1950s and 1960s abstract the paper examines the japanese steel industry to evaluate the role of export subsidy policies export subsidies can be instrumental in increasing an industry s cost competitiveness in the presence of learning by doing a characteristic of production in the steel industry using a dynamic estimation model this paper identifies a significant learning rate of above 20 with little intra industry knowledge spillover simulations made with the model indicate that the subsidy policy had an insignificant impact on industry growth the paper finds that the export subsidy had a small effect in stimulating industry growth because the estimated steel supply function was relatively inelastic

choosing rules to govern the commons a model with evidence from mexico abstract i develop a model to assess distributive rules observed in field data on 48 mexican farmer managed irrigation systems households decide whether to contribute maintenance effort the aggregate amount of which affects the level of output distributive rules with congruence between the sharing of collective costs and benefits elicit the highest level of effort empirically however incongruent rules dominate the surveyed systems i argue that transaction costs offset some efficiency benefits of congruent rules i estimate a model of rule choice inequality and the age of the water users association strongly increase the likelihood that a system chooses proportional water allocation

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

the valuation of nonsystematic risks and the pricing of swedish lottery bonds swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery they offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known observable distribution the risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium the bonds are traded in two forms allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk despite its idiosyncratic nature we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk we evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

entry exit and diffusion with learning by doing early entry has the advantage of higher revenues per unit of output early on late entry has the benefit of learning from the experience of earlier entrants and hence lower production costs the advantages are balanced off in a continuous time perfect foresight equilibrium competition generates s shaped diffusion and staggered entry and exit a monopolist will innovate less than a competitive industry but the innovation that he does do he will do sooner copyright 1989 by american economic association

models of technology diffusion abstract the literature on new technology diffusion is vast and it spills over many conventional disciplinary boundaries this paper surveys the literature by focusing on alternative explanations of the dominant stylized fact that the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an s curve the most commonly found model which is used to account for this model is the so called epidemic model which builds on the premise that what limits the speed of usage is the lack of information available about the new technology how to use it and what it does the leading alternate model is often called the probit model which follows from the premise that different firms with different goals and abilities are likely to want to adopt the new technology at different times in this model diffusion occurs as firms of different types gradually adopt it there are actually many ways to generate an s curve and the third class of models which we examine are models of density dependence popularized by population ecologists in these models the twin forces of legitimation and competition help to establish new technologies and then ultimately limit their take up finally we look at models in which the initial choice between different variants of the new technology affect the subsequent diffusion speed of the chosen technology such models often rely on information cascades which drive herd like adoption behaviour when a particular variant is finally selected

rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices a mean variance example abstract the paper uses an intertemporal mean variance model of the market for a dividend paying risky asset to analyse rational expectations equilibria when all agents condition their expectations on past rather than current prices the main result shows that if the time span between successive market periods is short the market will approximate full informational efficiency arbitrarily closely yet the returns to being informed are bounded away from zero this contrasts with the grossman stiglitz proposition that markets cannot come close to informational efficiency if the acquisition of information is costly

inter and intra firm effects in the diffusion of new process technology using primarily the example of computerised numerically controlled machine tools cnc in the uk metalworking and engineering industry it is shown that even many years after the date of first use of a new technology although the larger proportion of firms may be using that technology because the extent of intra firm diffusion is limited the proportion of total industry output produced on that technology may be quite small using backward projection techniques it is further shown that intra firm diffusion tends to lag behind inter firm diffusion over the whole of the diffusion process and inter firm diffusion patterns and extent may thus be poor indicators of overall diffusion although intra firm diffusion is therefore crucial to the understanding of overall diffusion patterns the existing literature relating to it has severe limitations and there are no associated policy results it is argued that much greater emphasis should be placed on intra firm issues in future diffusion research it is also suggested that discussions of intra firm policy could usefully proceed within the context of already established general diffusion policy principles

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

the spirit of capitalism and stock market prices in existing theory wealth is no more valuable than its implied consumption rewards in reality investors acquire wealth not just for its implied consumption but for the resulting social status max m weber 1958 refers to this desire for wealth as the spirit of capitalism the authors examine both analytically and empirically implications of weber s hypothesis for consumption savings and stock prices when investors care about relative social status propensity to consume and risk taking behavior will depend on social standards and stock prices will be volatile the spirit of capitalism seems to be a driving force behind stock market volatility and economic growth copyright 1996 by american economic association

individual vs aggregate preferences the case of a small fish in a big pond we study the relationship between the risk preferences of individuals and the risk preferences of the aggregate economy to emphasize the vast differences that can occur between individual and market preferences brought about through aggregation we assume an economy consisting entirely of risk seekers we show that such individuals can lead to an aggregate economy that is risk averse the converse is also true an aggregate economy that exhibits risk aversion does not imply an economy of individual risk averters an economy demanding a risk premium can be formed from individuals who do not demand such compensation understanding the relationship between the preferences of individuals and the preferences of the aggregate economy is crucial for understanding the connection between the behavioral finance literature which focuses on individual preferences and the asset pricing literature which focuses on aggregate prices we discuss empirical implications of these results this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

e business usage across and within firms in the uk profitability externalities and policy using data from the third uk community innovation survey we model the usage of e business across and within firms in the uk in the year 2000 as a single observation upon an integrated process of inter and intra firm diffusion the intra firm dimension is a significant extension to standard analysis the model estimates indicate that the pattern of e business usage reflects the heterogeneity of firms in terms of size other innovative activity and labour force skills generating differences in the payoffs to use as well as market and non market intermediated externalities the policy implications of the findings are discussed c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown