an economic analysis of the homeownership decision analysts of the homeownership decision have traditionally asserted that owning makes much greater sense than renting 16 p 359 for families in high tax brackets however empirical studies of homeownership propensities indicate that not all high income families own nor do all low income families rent for example li 8 p 1081 notes that a large number of studies find that a variety of variables such as family size age of the head and race are generally found to be determinants of homeownership even when income or the marginal tax bracket are held constant previous attempts to explain why the marginal tax bracket is not a sufficient statistic for homeownership argue that people differ in their preferences for homeownership either because owning and renting are not perfect substitutes in consumption see for example 13 141 or because of differences in liquidity mobility ability at home repairs and home management and simply peculiar circumstances 4 p 14 this paper develops a general model of the homeownership decision and explores two alternative explanations of why the marginal tax bracket is not a sufficient statistic this is accomplished by incorporating both transaction costs and housing market quality sorting into the model section ii derives a simple parametric statement of the homeownership decision the third section examines the special case which yields a homeownership decision rule which is comparable to existing models an alternative special case is presented in the fourth section which incorporates consumer sorting across quality markets it is demonstrated that the housing market may adjust until

marriage divorce and asymmetric information we use data on people s valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses options the data demonstrate that in some couples one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information we estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses better off and in doing so offset much of the inefficiency generated by their imperfect knowledge thus we find evidence of asymmetric information and interdependent utility in marriage

did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates a reconciliation and new results application of the coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across us states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization i show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock i find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade but that this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade that said this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century both administrative data on the flow of new divorces and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion these results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage with an eye to their partner s divorce threat

credible research designs for minimum wage studies a response to neumark salas and wascher the authors assess the critique by neumark salas and wascher 2014 of minimum wage studies that found small effects on teen employment data from 1979 to 2014 contradict nsw the authors show th

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

when does it take a nixon to go to china substantial policy changes like market oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by hawks are sometimes implemented by unlikely parties to account for such episodes this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters the incumbent is unable to credibly transmit all this information since voters are also imperfectly informed about his ideology the paper identifies conditions under which an incumbent party s electoral prospects increase the more atypical the policy it proposes popular support for a policy or its credibility depends on the policymaker policy pair copyright 1998 by american economic association

marriage divorce and legal change new evidence from england and wales in this article we explain the evolution of divorce rates in england and wales over the post war period following the approach of the predominantly north american literature in this area we focus on the liberalization of divorce law and socioeconomic factors as determinants of the divorce rate in line with the development of the literature we find that the introduction of liberalized no fault divorce law had a significant effect on the divorce rate in england and wales the finding that the law affects the divorce rate is consistent with the view that marriage is characterized by indivisibilities that inhibit coasian bargaining

mutual monitoring and corporate governance abstract mutual monitoring in a well structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem i empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm if given authority incentive and channels for communication and influence is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self interested ceo i find strong evidence that 1 measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the no 2 executive are positively related to future firm value tobin s q 2 the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the no 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the ceos and 3 mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms the results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on ceo power

when it rains it pours under what circumstances does job loss lead to divorce much of the previous research that has examined the effect of job loss on the probability of divorce either rely on data from the 1970s 80s data from european countries or focus on aggregate divorce rates this study uses u s micro data from 2000 to 2012 thus including effects of the great recession to examine how displacement i e exogenous job loss affects the probability of divorce the author finds displacement significantly increases the probability of divorce but only if the husband is the spouse that is displaced and his earnings represented approximately half or less of the household s earnings prior to displacement similarly results show that the probability of divorce increases if the wife is employed and as her earnings increase while the mechanism behind these asymmetric results remains unclear these results are consistent with recent research that finds a destabilizing effect on marriages when a wife earns more than her husband

house prices and marital stability we investigate the effect of house price changes on divorce using data for 1991 2010 from the current population survey and the federal housing finance agency our findings suggest that changing house prices significantly affect the share of a cohort that is divorced and that these effects are asymmetric with respect to housing gains versus losses in addition we find differential effects for groups that are more likely to be homeowners versus renters some of this evidence is consistent with homeowners being locked into their homes and hence marriages by increased transactions costs in down markets

equity and time to sale in the real estate market evidence from the boston condominium market of the early 1990s reveals that an owner s equity position determines his experience as a seller an owner of a property with a high loan to value ratio sets a higher asking price has a higher expected time on the market and if he sells receives a higher price than an owner with proportionately less debt the down payment requirement for purchasers but not incumbent owners provides a simple explanation for this phenomenon among owner occupants the results provide supporting evidence for equity based aggregate theories of price volume movements in the housing market copyright 1997 by american economic association

the effects of anticipated inflation on housing market equilibrium an increase in the anticipated rate of inflation causes distortions in the housing market due to a nonindexed tax system since nominal rather than real interest payments are tax deductible an increase in inflation decreases the aftertax cost of capital for homeowners which in turn increases the demand for housing and increases its real price this tax gain is shown to be larger for rental housing than for owner occupied housing in a competitive market this implies that although the real price of housing increases with a rise in anticipated inflation real rental rates fall in the last decade the real price of corporate capital fell while the price of housing increased dramatically during this same period the rate of inflation increased substantially empirical studies have found a negative relationship between stock returns and the inflation rate 1 while housing has been found to have been a good hedge against inflation 2 tax distortions related to the change in the rate of inflation provide one popular explanation for the negative relationship between stock prices and inflation 3 the effect of similar tax induced distortions on the equilibrium in the housing market will be studied in this paper it is shown that the real price of housing increases with the anticipated rate of inflation while the real rental rate declines these results are consistent with published data for the period 1967 77 during which the anticipated rate of inflation increased substantially 4 the general price level as measured by the consumer price index increased 81 5 percent between 1967 and 1977 5 in this

has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub saharan africa evidence from micro data does democracy help babies survive in sub saharan africa by using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 african countries i compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics which is infeasible with country level statistics on infant mortality i find that infant mortality falls by 1 2 percentage points 12 of the sample mean after democratization in the post cold war period relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change

life cycle theory inflation and the demand for housing there has been considerable interest lately in the influence of economywide inflation on the demand for housing under suitable equilibrium conditions such inflation creates three effects each of which may influence housing decisions first inflation raises initial mortgage payments through higher interest rates second it causes such payments to fall rapidly over time in real terms and third it creates a real growth in housing equity as borrowed debt is leveraged against the inflating value of homes two empirical studies one by kearl 6 and more recently by follain 3 have concluded that the sum of these impacts is adverse that is housing demand is reduced by greater economy wide inflation each suggests that credit constraints may explain this result in an attempt to understand better the microeconomic foundations of this empirical result schwab 9 and dougherty and van order 2 have developed fisher type models of intertemporal utility maximization which include a housing consumption choice schwab concludes that with a perfect capital market inflation should induce no distortion in consumer decisions about housing consumption dougherty and van order building on some unpublished work by poterba 8 argue that with interest deductibility from income taxes inflation reduces the after tax cost of housing capital and thereby increases housing demand these conclusions suggest that capital market imperfection must exist to explain the empirical results but just what kind schwab s paper addresses this question by introducing a borrowing constraint into a two period model 9 the constraint is absolute although schwab acknowledges that allowing collateralized borrowing is more realistic schwab s conclusions are two first he argues that if the constraint is nonbinding then the perfect capital market results prevail and second he demonstrates that if the constraints are binding the effect of inflation on

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

immigration regional conditions and crime evidence from an allocation policy in germany after the collapse of the soviet union more than 3 million people with german ancestors immigrated to germany under a special law granting immediate citizenship exploiting the exogenous allocation of ethnic german immigrants by german authorities across regions upon arrival we find that immigration significantly increases crime the crime impact of immigration depends strongly on local labor market conditions with strong impacts in regions with high unemployment similarly we find substantially stronger effects in regions with high preexisting crime levels or large shares of foreigners

bargaining in the shadow of the law divorce laws and family distress this paper exploits the variation occurring from the different timing of divorce law reforms across the united states to evaluate how unilateral divorce changed family violence and whether the option provided by unilateral divorce reduced suicide and spousal homicide unilateral divorce both potentially increases the likelihood that a domestic violence relationship ends and acts to transfer bargaining power toward the abused thereby potentially stopping the abuse in extant relationships in states that introduced unilateral divorce we find a 8 16 percent decline in female suicide roughly a 30 percent decline in domestic violence for both men and women and a 10 percent decline in females murdered by their partners

inflation and other aggregate determinants of the trend in us divorce rates since the 1960s this article extends empirical research on the determinants of divorce in two ways first i examine the effect of inflation on divorce second the use of a structural time series modelling approach attributes unobservables and omitted variables to an unobserved component which allows for the model s parameters to be estimated consistently inflation is statistically significant positive and persistent i show that the effects of inflation are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and various trend specifications the long run implications of inflation are also substantial i conclude that price stability has the potential to reduce divorce rates

opinions as incentives we study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions a difference of opinion about payoff relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission a decision maker faces a fundamental trade off a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser s incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic disclosure of any information that is acquired nevertheless when choosing from a rich pool of opinion types it is optimal for a decision maker to select an adviser with some difference of opinion centralization of authority is essential to harness these incentive gains since delegation to the adviser can discourage effort

marriage and divorce reply in the popular press and among policymakers the effect of no fault divorce laws on divorce rates remains an issue see e g new york times 23 july 1991 in my 1986 article in this review i show that the adoption of one form of no fault divorceunilateral divorce does not lead to a significant increase in divorce rates the theoretical model that is consistent with this empirical evidence would imply that the new law does not decrease the costs of divorce it merely redefines which party has the right to terminate the marriage

waking up from the american dream on the experience of young americans during the housing boom of the 2000s we exploit regional variations in house price fluctuations in the united states during the early to mid 2000s to study the impact of the housing boom on young americans choices related to home ownership household formation and fertility we also introduce a novel instrument for changes in house prices based on the predetermined industrial structure of the local economy we find that in regions that experienced large increases in house prices between 2001 and 2006 the youngest households were substantially less likely to purchase residential property to be married and to have a child both in 2006 and in 2011

match quality new information and marital dissolution this article investigates the role of surprises in marital dissolution surprises consists of changes in the predicted earning capacity of either spouse data from the national longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 is used we find that an unexpected increase in the husband s earning capacity reduces the divorce hazard while an unexpected increase in the wife s earning capacity raises the divorce hazard couples sort into marriage according to characteristics that are likely to enhance the stability of the marriage the divorce hazard is initially increasing with the duration of marriage and the presence of children and high levels of property stabilizes the marriage

lucky in life unlucky in love the effect of random income shocks on marriage and divorce abstract economists have long been interested in the extent to which economic resources affect decisions to marry and divorce however this issue has been difficult to address empirically due to a lack of exogenous income shocks we overcome this problem by exploiting the randomness of the florida lottery and comparing recipients of large prizes to those of small prizes results indicate that while positive income shocks of 25 000 to 50 000 do not cause statistically significant or economically meaningful changes in divorce rates single women are less likely to marry as a result of the additional income

marriage and trust some lessons from economics this paper examines the role of marriage as an institution for providing couples with the confidence to make long term investments in their relationship no fault divorce has undermined the notion of marriage as a contract thereby reducing the security offered by marriage and promoting opportunism by men this has weakened the bargaining power of wives both within marriage and when divorce occurs current legal reforms will improve the economic position of all divorced wives including those who are primarily responsible for the breakdown of their marriage the latter feature will encourage opportunism by women and make men less prepared to invest in their marriage the paper argues that the only way to achieve parity between men and women and deter opportunism by either sex is to return to fault based divorce both divorce settlements and the custody of children should depend on preceding marital conduct

timing decisions in organizations communication and authority in a dynamic environment this paper develops a theory of how organizations make timing decisions we consider a problem where an uninformed principal decides when to exercise an option and interacts with an informed but biased agent this problem is common examples include headquarters deciding when to close a plant drill an oil well or launch a product because time is irreversible the direction of the agent s bias is crucial for communication and allocation of authority when the agent favors late exercise centralized decision making where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent often features full information revelation but ine cient delay delegation is never optimal in this case in contrast when the agent favors early exercise communication under centralized decision making is partial while option exercise is unbiased or delayed delegation is optimal if the bias is small or delegation can be timed thus delegating decisions such as plant closures is never optimal while delegating decisions such as product launches may be optimal

did unilateral divorce raise divorce rates evidence from panel data since early 1996 at least eight states have begun to consider rolling back unilateral and no fault divorce a major reversal of the liberalizing trend in divorce laws which began around 1970 the proponents of tightening the divorce regime often argue that making divorce more difficult will strengthen families however both theoretical and empirical evidence is decidedly mixed over whether the no fault revolution actually contributed to the sharp increase in divorce rates in the united states observed over the last 30 years in this paper i address the dispute by using a panel of state level divorce rates including state specific trends allows unobserved state divorce propensities to trend linearly and even quadratically over time and reveals that unilateral divorce raised divorce rates significantly and strongly excerpt

how the other half lived marriage and emancipation in the age of the pill abstract the contraceptive pill was fda approved in 1960 however it would be another decade before young unmarried women had full access in the meantime marriage constituted a way to the pill the later 1960s early 1970s also saw a convergence on 18 as the minimum age of marriage many states lowering it from 21 exploiting these law changes we find that a lowered minimum age precipitated marriage delayed marital fertility and improved women s educational and occupational outcomes marriage easing credit constraints combined with the contraceptive properties of the pill form the hypothesized pathway

housing decision with divorce risk we build a realistically calibrated life cycle model of housing decisions under divorce risk as observed in the data our model predicts the recent increase in divorce rates leads to reduced homeownership rates the event of a divorce negatively affects homeownership and this effect is long lasting the risk of a divorce triggers a precautionary savings motive however this motive is weaker when individuals can invest in owner occupied homes because homeowners higher savings partially substitute for precautionary savings when young the larger asset accumulation due to divorce risk induced precautionary savings enables households to buy homes earlier whereas the presence of transaction costs leads to reduced homeownership for middle aged and older households when divorce risk goes up

the importance of legitimacy within organizations there are typically limits to leaders legitimacy this article explores how organizations are structured in the face of such constraints the concept of legitimacy is formalized in the context of a single agent moral hazard model the principal can give the agent monetary incentives in addition he can give the agent an order the agent finds it costly to disobey orders provided they are legitimate we find that it may be optimal for the principal to take costly actions to bolster legitimacy we argue that many organizational phenomena can be understood as attempts to bolster legitimacy examples include rejection of overqualified workers bureaucracy merger decisions and above market clearing wages

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

real estate assets and consumer spending in an interesting contribution to this journal elliott 1980 shows that consumer spending is better explained if permanent income is estimated from explicit measures of wealth the wealth approach rather than current and past incomes the income approach in the income approach permanent income yp is computed as a distributed lag mechanism in the wealth approach this procedure is followed for labor income but permanent nonhuman income is specified as a constant multiple 72 of actual nonhuman wealth at the beginning of a period ant the distinction between income and wealth approaches is intuitively appealing and has been tried before elliott s equation 12 is the same as equation 5 in bhatia 1972 except that elliott uses actual wealth instead of bhatia s expected wealth the novelty in elliott s specification lies in considering different components of wealth which is also appealing because measures of wealth ranging from real money balances to broad aggregates of human and nonhuman wealth have been used in the literature elliott s most striking result that real assets mainly real estate and durable goods have no significant effect on consumer spending however is disturbing because real estate is a major household asset in fact the largest one in many years according to frb balance sheets 1983 and accrued gains on real estate have often been larger than gains on corporate equities during the last decade or two also there is some recent empirical evidence that gains on real assets significantly reduce personal saving peek 1983 the main purpose of this note is to reexamine and rehabilitate the role of real assets one can question elliott s specification which does not adequately allow for expected gains or his use of undistributed corporate profits as a contemporaneous proxy for all capital gains tenuous at best but the heart of the matter is the residential value series derived by elliott from perpetual inventory benchmarks pp 533 34 which being accumulations of construc

toward an economic theory of leadership leading by example this paper explores leadership within organizations leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers this paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them copyright 1998 by american economic association

spatial lock in do falling house prices constrain residential mobility abstract falling house prices have caused numerous homeowners to suffer capital losses those with little home equity may be prevented from moving because of imperfections in housing finance markets the proceeds from the sale of their home may be insufficient to repay their mortgage and provide a down payment on a new home a data set of mortgages is used to examine the magnitude of these constraints estimates show that average mobility would have been 24 higher after 3 years had house prices not declined and after 4 years it would have been 33 higher among those with high initial loan to value ratios the differences are even greater

who marries whom in a surging housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of a surging housing market on marital sorting our empirical analysis shows that there is increasing assortativeness on original family background in response to housing price appreciation that is for husbands when the down payment doubles one more year of paternal schooling predicts a marriage in which the father in law s schooling is 0 057 year greater than in a scenario in which the down payment does not increase the rising assortativeness could exacerbate the already expanding inequality caused by the booming housing market in addition to the benchmark analysis we find that a divorce reform which awards assets proportionate to the shares the spouses paid for the initial down payment rather than awarding equal shares upon divorce alleviates assortativeness the evidence suggests that joint investment in housing is likely to be a significant consideration in marital sorting

house prices wealth effects and labour supply we examine the impact of house prices on labour supply decisions using uk microdata we combine household survey data with local level house price measures and controls for local labour demand our microdata also allow us to control for individual level income expectations we find significant house price effects on labour supply consistent with leisure being a normal good labour supply responses to house prices are concentrated among young married female owners and older owners this finding suggests that house prices affect the decisions of marginal workers in the economy our estimates imply that house prices are economically important in the participation decisions for these workers

residential mobility housing equity and the labour market henley a g 1998 residential mobility housing equity and the labour market economic journal 108 447 414 427

the firm as a communication network this paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information when these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm it is shown that efficient networks involve centralization that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items

rational herding in microloan markets microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders we use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on prosper com the largest microloan market in the united states we find evidence of rational herding among lenders well funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities moreover instead of passively mimicking their peers irrational herding lenders engage in active observational learning rational herding they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences counterintuitively obvious defects e g poor credit grades amplify a listing s herding momentum as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd similarly favorable borrower characteristics e g friend endorsements weaken the herding effect as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits follow up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

marriage and divorce informational constraints and private contracting the relationship between divorce rates in the united states and laws regulating divorce are analyzed using data from a special current population survey undertaken in 1979 with particular reference to the adoption by many states of no fault divorce laws the author utilizes a contract theoretic framework to examine the impact of both legal and informational constraints on several aspects of the marriage relationship 1 the probability of divorce 2 compensation at divorce i e the terms of the divorce settlement 3 the probability of entering marriage and 4 incentives for investment in marriage specific capital two different models are developed the first assumes that ex post information about the value of each spouses opportunites at divorce is symmetric and that since divorce would only occur if the joint benefits outweigh the joint costs the law has no effect on the divorce rate the second model asserts that the existence of asymmetric information results in a fixed wage marriage contract and that divorce would be higher in states that allow unilateral divorce the evidence supports the first of these hypotheses excerpt

tying the double knot the role of assets in marriage commitment what explains the growing gap in marriage rates between socioeconomic groups we present a robust stylized fact not previously documented marriage rates are higher for individuals with more assets we argue this may be driven by marriage and cohabitation becoming increasingly similar in a number of ways except for the way assets become marital property to be divided upon divorce in marriage while they remain individual property in the case of cohabitation we propose that ownership of assets may provide insurance to the partner making individually costly but jointly optimal investments in children thus raising the value of marriage

does inflation affect real behavior the case of housing an important tradition in economics is to assume that demand depends upon relative prices and is homogenous of degree zero for the most part this has been interpreted as meaning inflation changes in the price level leaves demand unchanged recent work by a number of economists has challenged this position for the case of housing demand two arguments have been made that inflation acting in concert with existing institutions alters the quantity of housing demanded and the decision to rent or own a house the first argument states that inflation and the standard fixed payment mortgage combine to reduce the size of the mortgage loan a household can obtain for the purpose of buying a home this works to reduce the quantity of owner occupied housing demanded given the importance of mortgage finance to the demand for owner occupied housing the second argument focuses on the inflation adjusted after tax cost of owner occupied housing it simply states that an increase in the rate of anticipated inflation of the general price level reduces the after tax cost of housing thus increasing the demand for housing and the demand for homeownership there has been little empirical testing of these two arguments the purpose of this paper is to formulate and estimate a model which will give an indication of the quantitative significance of the two arguments a housing demand equation and a tenure choice equation own versus rent are estimated using a sample of about 6000 households from the 1975 annual housing survey 10 the estimates suggest that inflation dampens housing demand and homeownership opportunity for most households even though the inflation adjusted after tax cost of owner occupied housing declines as inflation heats up the paper consists of six sections including the introduction section two examines the ways inflation affects housing choices in more detail the third section contains the specification of the econometric model that forms the basis of the study section four is a discussion of econometric problems and the data used the results of the estimates are discussed in the fifth section the paper concludes with a presentation of the major conclusions and policy implications of the study

job displacement disability and divorce earnings shocks should affect divorce probability by changing a couple s expected gains from marriage we find that the divorce hazard rises after a spouse s job displacement but does not change after a spousal disability this difference casts doubt on a purely pecuniary motivation for divorce following earnings shocks since both types of shocks exhibit similar long run economic consequences furthermore the increase in divorce is found only for layoffs and not for plant closings suggesting that information conveyed about a partner s noneconomic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more important than financial losses in precipitating divorce

marriage and divorce comment the author comments on an article by h elizabeth peters concerning the impact of state laws particularly no fault divorce laws on divorce rates in the united states a reply by peters is included pp 686 93 annotation

real and nominal interest rates and the demand for housing abstract this paper is an empirical study of the relationship between inflation expectations and the demand for housing the major findings are that housing demand is a function of both expected inflation and the real interest rate but that demand cannot be specified as a function of the nominal rate it is also shown that expected inflation has a larger impact on those households that are likely to be constrained by capital market imperfections

optimal dissent in organizations we model an organization as a two agent hierarchy an informed decision maker in charge of selecting projects and a possibly uninformed implementer in charge of their execution both have intrinsic preferences over projects this paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences that is dissent within the organization dissent is useful to 1 foster the use of objective and sometimes private information in decision making and 2 give credibility to the decision maker s choices however dissent comes at the cost of hurting the implementer s intrinsic motivation thereby impairing organizational efficiency we show that dissent can be optimal in particular when information is useful and uncertainty is high moreover dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when implementers can choose their employer or when decision makers have real authority over hiring decisions

a lost generation education decisions and employment outcomes during the us housing boom bust cycle of the 2000s abstract we exploit regional variations in u s house price fluctuations during the boom bust cycle of the 2000s to study the impact of the housing cycle on young americans choices related to education and employment we find that in msas which experienced large increases in house prices between 2001 and 2006 young adults were substantially more likely to forego a higher education and join the workforce lowering skill formation during the bust years the young especially those without higher education were more likely to be unemployed in areas which experienced higher declines in house prices

pricing home mortgages and bank collateral a rational expectations approach the efficiency of the housing finance system is of interest to homeowners financial intermediaries and policy makers we study the design of optimal mortgage contracts for risk averse economic agents with access to symmetric information on the payoffs of a risky home our non linear framework helps demonstrate the pareto efficiency of a risk free loan over its risky counterpart it also allows us to evaluate the unique equilibrium interest rate loan amount and home price in contrast to the capital structure theorems finally we conduct numerical simulations in lieu of comparative statics to shed some light on the complex causal relationship between mortgage pricing parameters and the underlying collateral i e home value

the economics of the marriage contract theories and evidence abstract we analyze the role of the marriage contract we first formalize three prominent hypotheses on why people marry marriage provides an exogenous payoff to married partners it serves as a commitment device and it serves as a signaling device for each theory we analyze how a reduction in the costs of divorce affects the propensity to divorce for couples at any given duration of marriage we then use individual marriage and divorce certificate data from the united states to bring these alternative views of the marriage contract to bear on the data we exploit variations in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce laws across states to proxy a one off and permanent reduction in divorce costs the results suggest that the dominant reason that couples enter into a marriage contract is that it serves as a commitment device

measuring the average marginal tax rate from the individual income tax the economic effects of taxation depend on the configuration of marginal tax rates we consider here the appropriate measure of a marginal tax rate for the federal individual income tax which has a graduated rate structure and allows for numerous legal and illegal deductions from total income our conclusion is that the explicit marginal rate from the tax schedule is the right concept for many purposes hence we construct approximately weighted averages of these marginal tax rates for 1916 80 when weighted by adjusted gross income the arithmetic average of marginal tax rates is 5 in 1920 2 in 1930 6 in 1940 20 in 1950 23 in 1960 24 in 1970 and 30 in 1980 we also discuss the dispersion of marginal tax rates as well as the behavior of average tax rates and deductions from taxable income one noteworthy result concerns the fraction of adjusted gross income that accrues to families that face a marginal tax rate of at least 35 this fraction quadruples from 1964 to 1980 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

replication in empirical economics the journal of money credit and banking project this paper examines the role of replication in empirical economic research it presents the findings of a two year study that collected programs and data from authors and attempted to replicate their published results the research provides new and important information about the extent and causes of failures to replicate published results in economics the findings suggest that inadvertent errors in published empirical articles are a commonplace rather than a rare occurence copyright 1986 by american economic association

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

nominal loss aversion housing equity constraints and household mobility evidence from the united states abstract this paper exploits the recent variation in us house prices to examine the effect of equity constraints and nominal loss aversion on household mobility detailed data from the 1985 1996 national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy79 were matched with house price data from 149 metropolitan areas to estimate instrumental variables linear probability and semi parametric proportional hazard models of intra metropolitan mobility household mobility is significantly influenced by nominal loss aversion there is little evidence that low equity because of fallen house prices constrains mobility

financial risk management when does independence fail the recent turmoil on credit markets has drawn attention to the risk management function on many trading oors around the world traders have been writing insurance against rare events examples include keeping long positions on cdo tranches or selling protection against default cds in normal times it is the role of risk management to ensure that the received insurance premia are not entirely considered as income and that enough capital is set aside to protect the institution against the risk that it is taking in the period that led to the current crisis however risk management has failed to play this role 1 this is particularly troubling as the nance industry is one that has embraced the notion of using counter powers to limit risk and the importance of dissent within organizations for instance the head of risk management at kfw a german bank argued for the superiority of having a central risk management function independent of the business units the great advantage of central risk management is the absence of conict of interest the central risk management is not driven by the market we look at the business from a different angle we are not involved at the personal level quoted by pricewaterhousecoopers 2007 the purpose of this paper is to study when such virtuous organizational design may fail we rst propose a model of risk management following augustin landier et al forthcoming we model the trading oor as a simple hierarchy the role of the trader t is to select an asset to invest in while the risk manager rm can decide to approve or not due to his