an econometric model of crowding out of lower education levels abstract unemployment in the netherlands has risen strongly in recent years there are large differences in unemployment rates between education levels according to neo classical theory these differences should be explained by distorted relative prices or by lack of human capital in this paper we test an alternative explanation according to this view the high unemployment rate for lower education levels is caused by excess labour supply highly educated people take the jobs which could be occupied by less educated people to test this view a regression model is developed estimation results indicate that differences in unemployment rates can indeed be explained by excess supply of qualified labour

simple strategy proof approximately walrasian mechanisms abstract this note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the walrasian mechanism it presents mechanisms under which truth telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies in contrast to the walrasian mechanism and whose outcomes generically approximate walrasian ones for large economies these mechanisms provide new insights on the well know trade off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies journal of economic literature classification numbers d50 d71 d78

does drinking affect long term sickness absence a sample selection approach correcting for employment and accounting for drinking history this article studies the effect of alcohol consumption on the probability of long term sickness related absenteeism for women using swedish matched survey and register data we apply sample selection models to correct for nonrandom sampling into paid employment there are three main findings of the study first diverging from the most prevalent consumption group long term light drinkers is associated with an increased probability of long term sickness ranging from 10 for long term heavy drinkers to 18 for former drinkers second controlling for former consumption errors especially former drinker and former abstainer errors and sample selection into employment are important for unbiased consistent estimations third by predicting the effect of changes in consumption on long term sickness related absence we find that alcohol only explains a small part of the overall picture of long term sickness related absenteeism notwithstanding this fact long term sickness related absenteeism due to alcoho

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform price auctions abstract we prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent value uniform price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy we show that the uniform price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price more generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model approximations to analyze the large market behavior of game theoretic models we demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the finite game approaches infinity

pricing of fluctuations in electricity markets abstract in an electric power system demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers furthermore in the near future deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to exacerbate the variability of demand on conventional thermal generating units we address this issue by explicitly modeling the ancillary cost associated with demand variability we argue that a time varying price equal to the suppliers instantaneous marginal cost may not achieve social optimality and that consumer demand fluctuations should be properly priced we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism that explicitly encourages consumers to adapt their consumption so as to offset the variability of demand on conventional units through a dynamic game theoretic formulation we show that under suitable convexity assumptions the proposed pricing mechanism achieves social optimality asymptotically as the number of consumers increases to infinity numerical results demonstrate that compared with marginal cost pricing the proposed mechanism creates a stronger incentive for consumers to shift their peak load and therefore has the potential to reduce the need for long term investment in peaking plants

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

threshold strategy proofness on manipulability in large voting problems in voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives a voting rule is threshold strategy proof if any agent can obtain only a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative if the number of agents is large enough for anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but is in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent decreasing to zero as the number of agents grows if there are at least five agents the mean rule taking the average vote is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy proofness

informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents abstract for an incomplete information model of public good provision with interim participation constraints we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated with approximately full surplus extraction when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small the result holds even if agents payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs the contrary result of neeman z neeman the relevance of private information in mechanism design j econ theory 117 2004 55 77 rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

on the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information in interim economies with asymmetric information we show that the coarse core of wilson 1978 does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated this failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either interim core or price equilibrium

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

market power and information revelation in dynamic trading we study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty there is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers all buyers are uninformed while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world when n 1 full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period with n 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers information and even more importantly on the intensity of competition allowed by the existing trading rules when there is intense competition absence of clienteles information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough regardless of the number of informed sellers on the other hand for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition presence of clienteles for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed moreover in that case when only one seller is informed for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation even for large n jel c72 c78 d82 d83

the efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information we consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically specifically a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy in our model some traders may have non vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved we show that given any desired level of approximation there is n such that any bayesian nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with n or more traders leads with high probability to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy in particular allocations are approximately efficient a key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non strategically

trade with heterogeneous prior beliefs and asymmetric information no trade theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the same prior beliefs this paper explores the structure of no trade theorems with heterogeneous prior beliefs it is shown how different notions of efficiency under asymmetric information ex ante interim ex post are related to agents prior beliefs as well as incentive compatible and public versions of those efficiency concepts these efficiency results are used to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on agents beliefs for no trade theorems in different trading environments

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

monotonicity and rationalizability in a large first price auction this paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases wilson 1977 instead of analysing the symmetric nash equilibrium we examine rationalizable strategies bernheim 1984 pearce 1984 among the set of monotonic bidding strategies to prove that any monotonic rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the truthful valuation of the object conditioned on the signal received by the bidder we obtain an information aggregation result similar to that of wilson 1977 while dispensing with almost all symmetric assumptions and using a milder solution concept than the nash equilibrium in particular if every bidder is ex ante identical then any rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the symmetric nash equilibrium in a symmetric first price auction the symmetry of outcomes is implied rather than assumed copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders abstract a mixed population of bidders consists of two asymmetric groups members of the first group are game theoretic players who maximize their expected profit and incorrectly believe that their opponents act similarly the second group of bidders adopts an irrational strategy they either choose their bids randomly following a given probability distribution in a naive form of bidding or follow a decision theoretic approach maximizing their expected profit under the assumption that all other bids are random in a sealed bid private value procurement auction we examine the optimal strategy of a new player who has perfect knowledge of the structure of the mixed bidder population and enters the auction the optimal bid of the new bidder is derived when the cost and mark up follow a uniform distribution in 0 1 the effect of the relative size of the group of game theoretic bidders and the population size on the optimal bid price is established

private information in large economies this paper examines the effect of private information in large economies we show that in a model with stochastic information structures the restrictions imposed on allocations by the presence of private information disappear in large economies we also show that for a large class of direct mechanisms the incentive for any agent to falsely report private information goes to zero as the number of agents becomes large these results provide an informational smallness analog to existing quantity smallness limiting results in the literature

strategic investments trading and pricing under forecast updating this paper considers two independent firms that invest in resources such as capacity or inventory based on imperfect market forecasts as time progresses and new information becomes available the firms update their forecasts and have the option to trade their resources the trade contract is determined as the bargaining equilibrium or alternatively as the price equilibrium assuming a fairly general form of the profit functions we characterize the nash equilibrium investment levels which are first best under the price equilibrium trade contract but not under the bargaining equilibrium trade contract to gain additional insights we then focus on firms that face stochastic demand functions with constant price elasticity and have contingent pricing power assuming a general forecast evolution process we characterize the impact of the option to trade and the firms cooperation on equilibrium investments expected prices profits and consumer surplus finally to study the main driving forces of trading we employ a well established and empirically tested forecast updating model in which the forecast evolution process follows a two dimensional geometric brownian motion under this model we prove that the equilibrium investments expected prices profits and consumer surplus are nondecreasing in the quality and timing of forecast revisions in market variability and in foreign exchange volatility but are nonincreasing in market correlation

money as a mechanism in a bewley economy we study what features an economic environment might possess such that it would be pareto ecient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money we prove a conjecture that is essentially due to bewley 1980 1983 the gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly ecient ex ante in an environment where very patient agents can accumulate large enough money stocks to be completely self insured we also study examples where a nonmonetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to any monetary mechanism at least when the comparison is restricted to stationary equilibria and where an inflationary monetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to a laissez faire or deflationary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient agents j e l classification e31 e42

asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information the authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible individually rational and nearly efficient the main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty in addition the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer s bid double auction problem akerlof s lemons problem and insurance with asymmetric information copyright 1992 by the econometric society

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

the genealogy of modern theoretical public economics from first best to second best abstract the development of second best modelling in the seventies has shaped modern theoretical economics the paper discusses some key changes in the economists conceptions the first two sections examine the efficiency equity dilemma the study of non convexities has shown that counterintuitive efficiency enhancing income redistribution might occur the introduction of asymmetric information has shed doubts on virtues of lump sum compensation the last sections focus on the intricate geometry of second best optimisation and the ambiguous value of the signals provided by the price system outside a first best world

total cost procurement auctions impact of suppliers cost adjustments on auction format choice we consider sealed and open bid total cost procurement auctions where two attributes are used for contract award decisions price which is bid by the supplier and a fixed cost adjustment which is included by the buyer to capture nonprice factors such as logistics costs suppliers know only their own true production cost and their own cost adjustment and the buyer does not know the suppliers true production costs but does know all suppliers cost adjustments which she herself sets in order to make an informed total cost decision the buyer who seeks to minimize her total price and cost adjustment procurement cost can choose to run a first price sealed bid auction where suppliers bids are affected by their beliefs about each other s total costs or a descending open bid auction where only the actual realizations of suppliers total costs drive the auction outcome we characterize the buyer s choice between the two formats as a threshold decision over suppliers cost adjustments and analyze the effect of supplier beliefs on her decision we also study the impact of additional suppliers on the buyer s decision the effect of correlation between suppliers production costs and their cost adjustments and additive as well as multiplicative total cost functions the results suggest that procurement managers can use their evaluations of suppliers cost adjustments to make better auction format decisions

exploring the variability of patient costs in disease management programs a hierarchical modelling approach disease management programs include a wide variation of patients with different chronic diseases and different health care utilization the aim of this article was to identify factors on patient level and organizational level that explain the variability in costs of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in a dmp by employing a rigorous analytical model a generalized linear mixed model glmm was specified to perform a multi level analysis of cross sectional hierarchical data from 16 dmps in the netherlands multiple imputation sub group analysis per disease and analysis from both the health care and the societal perspectives were also performed our model showed that age the presence of cardiovascular disease multi morbidity and payments on top of the payment for the usual care had positive relation with costs while better quality of life was associated with lower health care costs in the copd sample physical activity and employment were associated with health care costs our study show

on the economic foundations of cea ladies and gentlemen take your positions abstract there are still many ongoing debates about several aspects of the methodology of economic evaluations of health care interventions some of the disparities in recommendations on methodological issues may be traced back to different viewpoints on cost effectiveness analysis cea in general two important views are the welfarist approach which aims at embedding cea into traditional welfare economics and the decision maker s approach which takes a broader and more pragmatic view on cea the focus in welfarism may be on utility while that of the decision maker s approach may be considered to be on health in this paper it is examined how these two views differ and how these differences may subsequently lead to debates in methodological areas it is indicated that embedding the practical operationalisation of cea in welfare economics seems impossible in a strict welfarist approach it is necessary to view qalys as being utilities although one may question whether such an approach to qalys is appropriate also equity considerations may play an important role in cost effectiveness analysis and these should preferably be taken into account in a way that reflects societal attitudes towards an equitable distribution of health care these equity considerations may not always be directly related to utility or efficiency furthermore both camps may prefer different methods for cost measurement in areas such as productivity costs and informal care a better recognition of the contents and origins of controversies and disputes may enhance the clarity of discussions

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

perfect competition in asymmetric information economies compatibility of efficiency and incentives the idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents and the individual agents relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature thus there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information the existence of incentive compatible ex post walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without common values consequently the conflict between incentive compatibility and pareto eciency is resolved exactly and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large but finite private information economies

equilibria and incentives in private information economies abstract this paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy namely walrasian expectations equilibrium private core and insurance equilibrium it shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy in contrast to the finite agent setting one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any walrasian expectations equilibrium private core insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type

the friction cost method for measuring indirect costs of disease a new approach for estimating the indirect costs of disease which explicitly considers economic circumstances that limit production losses due to disease is presented the friction cost method for the netherlands the short term friction costs in 1990 amount to 1 5 2 5 of net national income nni depending on the extent to which short term absence from work induces production loss and costs the medium term macro economic consequences of absence from work and disability reduce nni by an additional 0 8 these estimates are considerably lower than estimates based on the traditional human capital approach but they better reflect the economic impact of illness

the friction cost method a comment the friction cost method has been proposed as an alternative to the human capital approach of estimating indirect costs we argue that the friction cost method is based on implausible assumptions not supported by neoclassical economic theory furthermore consistently applying the friction cost method would mean that the method should also be applied in the estimation of direct costs which would mean that the costs of health care programmes are substantially decreased it is concluded that the friction cost method does not seem to be a useful alternative to the human capital approach in the estimation of indirect costs

a note on incentives in large economies nash equilibria of anonymous and efficient mechanisms are studied in economies with a continuum of traders conditions are given under which some or all the nash equilibria of such mechanisms yield competitive allocations particular attention is payed to the case of direct mechanisms where the truth constitutes a nash equilibrium

informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty in mclean and postlewaite econometrica 56 1992 p 2421 we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents we defined a notion of informational size and showed that when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature the conflict between incentive compatibility and ex post efficiency can be made small if agents have sufficiently small informational size this paper investigates the relationship between informational size and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present i e when significant uncertainty about the world persists even when the information of all agents is known

cyclical variation in vacancy durations and vacancy flows an empirical analysis abstract this paper presents an empirical analysis of vacancy durations and vacancy flows in the netherlands over the years 1980 1988 we distinguish vacancies according to required occupation and educational levels we derive estimates of average vacancy durations and we use these to derive estimates of vacancy flows we find that vacancy durations generally increase with the required educational level moreover vacancy flows tend to be more responsive to the business cycle at lower educational levels while vacancy durations are more responsive at higher educational levels the number of vacancies generated by employers has not decreased during the recession in the early 80s which points to a dominant role of the supply of applicants in explaining the cyclical pattern of vacancy durations

compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope preference elicitation is a fundamental problem in single unit combinatorial auctions but it becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multi unit combinatorial auctions the bidders cannot express their preferences exactly as this would take a huge number of bids typically leading to inefficient allocations hence markets with economies of scale and scope require more compact and yet expressive bidding languages in this thesis we propose an expressive bidding language allowing bidders to describe the characteristics of their cost functions bidders in these auctions can specify various discounts and markups and specify pricing rules as logical functions finding the optimal allocation given these pricing rules is a strongly np hard optimization problem and we propose a mixed integer program to solve it based on field data we introduce a multi item cost function and provide extensive computational experiments to explore the computational burden and the impact of different language features on the computational effort and total spend of the auctioneer in addition we explore characteristics of the knowledge representation of the bidding language

information aggregation in a large multi stage market game abstract a three stage market game mechanism is devised that is simple actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy and achieves efficiency in a two divisible good pure exchange setting with potential information aggregation after an entry stage agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small randomly selected group then those offers are announced and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a shapley shubik market game for a finite and large number of players there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium conditions for uniqueness are also provided

core convergence with asymmetric information we analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies we show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately walrasian for the associated arrow debreu economy

a multi attribute e auction mechanism for procurement theoretical foundations abstract we describe a multi attribute e auction mechanism with a focus on its theoretical foundations our mechanism is designed for auctioning multiple units of a good primarily in b2b transactions it can be used in various types of forward and reverse auctions rfqs request for quote although the emphasis in this paper is on procurement to incorporate the auction owner s preferences across issues attributes in an auction negotiation setting we adopt a novel application of the pricing out technique another key feature of our mechanism is the optimization based suggested price decision support component which momentarily gives the best price acceptable to the buyer

rfq auctions with supplier qualification screening we consider a manufacturer using a request for quotes rfq reverse auction in combination with supplier qualification screening to determine which qualified supplier will be awarded a contract supplier qualification screening is costly for the manufacturer for example involving reference checks financial audits and on site visits the manufacturer seeks to minimize its total procurement costs i e the contract payment plus qualification costs although suppliers can be qualified prior to the auction prequalification we allow the manufacturer to delay all or part of the qualification until after the auction postqualification using an optimal mechanism analysis we analytically explore the trade offs between varying levels of pre and postqualification although using postqualification causes the expected contract payment to increase bids from unqualified suppliers are discarded we find that standard industrial practices of prequalification can be improved upon by judicious use of postqualification particularly when supplier qualification screening is moderately expensive relative to the value of the contract to the manufacturer

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

multiple sourcing and procurement process selection with bidding events we examine the procurement process selection problem of a large industrial buyer who employs reverse auctions for awarding procurement contracts we contrast two classes of commonly used strategies under multiple sourcing namely single stage reverse auctions and two stage processes where price quantity adjustments between the buyer and the suppliers follow a first stage reverse auction deriving bounds of efficiency for these two classes of procurement processes under convex supplier production costs we present insights on the conditions under which each class is preferable for the buyer considering the effect of contracting and processing costs a single stage process is likely to be preferable to a two stage process when the number of bidding suppliers is high especially when capacity is rigid a two stage process with one information transfer in the second stage may be the preferred procurement mode when production is highly scalable i e when the marginal production cost increase with increased production is small when the number of suppliers is low the effect of a decrease in production scalability depends on the current scalability level for high scalability levels a decrease in production scalability may decrease the efficiency of both single stage and simple two stage processes whereas for low scalability levels it tends to increase efficiency for both of these process classes a decrease in production costs makes employing simple processes more attractive when production is highly scalable or when supplier capacity is rigid for intermediate production scalability however a cost decrease may make employing two stage processes with multiple information transfers in the second round preferable for the buyer

fair allocations in large economies the purpose of this paper is the study of problems of equity in an economy with many agents conditions are given under which every equitable and pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for all agents the results are also of potential relevance for the literature on incentive compatibility since the allocations that are obained through incentive mechanisms in large economies turn out to be equitable

the effect of asymmetric bidder size on an auction s performance are more bidders always better one commonly held belief in designing auctions is that increasing the number of bidders makes an auction more competitive therefore a buyer who wishes to minimize her procurement costs is better off inviting more suppliers to participate in this paper we question the validity of this belief by shedding light on bidders behavior when bidders experience economies of scale in production and differ in their production capacity we consider a setting with two different sized bidders global and small we assume that global bidders have a large production capacity can win in more than one auction and experience economies of scale in production whereas small bidders can win in at most one auction in this new setting we focus on the impact of allowing both global and small suppliers to compete against each other on the performance of an auction

informational robustness of competitive equilibria abstract consider an exchange economy with complete information we perturb this economy by assuming that each agent s observation about the true state of the world is noisy the paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information we provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economies with incomplete information as the noise in the signal converges to zero journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

revenue deficiency under second price auctions in a supply chain setting consider a firm called the buyer that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second price procurement auction call this the standard auction in the hope of lowering its purchase cost the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands call this the multiple winner auction choosing the multiple winner auction over the standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer we provide a bound on how much greater the buyer s cost can be in the multiple winner auction and show that this bound is tight we then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon under a monotonicity condition we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios finally this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the t period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands