when today s rewards are tomorrow s endowments the effects of inequality on social competition abstract in this paper we study the role of inequality in a model of repeated social competition where endowments the resources used in the competition and rewards the resources obtained as prizes are connected because the rewards of today s competition determine the endowments of tomorrow s competition we find that the harshness of social competition is maximal for an intermediate level of inequality and that increasing or decreasing inequality beyond that level monotonically mitigates social competition up to completely eliminating it at the extremes if social competition is wasteful utilitarian welfare is maximized in case of equality a greater uncertainty about the connection between today s rewards and tomorrow s endowments mitigates social competition finally there emerge concerns for others resources that are downward and not upward with the value of high social standing which changes non monotonically in the resources of those with lower standing

efficient non contractible investments in large economies abstract do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions we present a two sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching once matched buyer and seller bargain over the price taking into account outside options efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium we characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient we also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d51

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

a model of educational investment social concerns and inequality we consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains signaling power and social status the latter depends on the agent s relative achievement in one of three dimensions innate skills level of schooling and income we study the three scenarios separately and characterize the conditions under which social concerns increase or decrease educational and income inequality inequality increases decreases if education lowers the stigma suffered by low skilled workers less more than it boosts the prestige enjoyed by high skilled workers we discuss the expected results of some policies in light of these findings

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

the pre marital investment game abstract two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively the purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage the paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large it is shown that mixed nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much

arms races and negotiations two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game each player s type determines his propensity to arm types are private information and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution with probability close to one the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will there is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons we find conditions under which the unique bayesian nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one however if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small then there is an equilibrium of the cheap talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

the social basis of interdependent preferences abstract most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an important aspect of many economic problems there has traditionally been a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there are few if any restrictions on equilibrium behavior and hence such models would have little or no predictive power in this paper we discuss how reduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend in part on relative standing there are several advantages of modelling concern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even when there is no similar concern in the deep preferences it provides structure and constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility and further it can yield testable implications about the way that changes in the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concerns in this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relative standing can affect savings investment and labor choice decisions

status the distribution of wealth and growth we analyze a simple model of endogenous growth in which individuals care about both consumption and their rank in the distribution of wealth we show that the steady growth rate of the economy increases with both the strength of the status seeking motive and the initial equality of the wealth distribution contrary to the basic model of endogenous growth the equilibrium growth rate is not necessarily smaller than in the social optimum and we identify the circumstances under which the two coincide

altruism jealousy and the theory of optimal non linear taxation abstract this paper studies optimal non linear taxes in a world in which there is altruism and jealousy a formula for optimal marginal tax rates is derived which turns out to be a simple and intuitively appealing extension of a result due to mirrlees the paper shows that in this sort of economy all of optimal tax theory s general results either no longer hold or need not hold and it sets out appropriate modifications to standard tax rules

games of status and discriminatory contracts following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers wellbeing this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank dependent utility functions into a moral hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers but no correlation in production we show that workers concern for the rank of their wage in the firm s wage distribution induces the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

assortative matching with explicit search costs in this paper i analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility composed of heterogeneous agents i explore whether becker s assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search in an economy with explicit additive search costs complementarities in joint production supermodularity of the joint production function lead to assortative matching this is in contrast to previous literature which had shown that in a search economy with discounting assortative matching may fail even when the joint production function is supermodular

resource allocation for control of infectious diseases in multiple independent populations beyond cost effectiveness analysis traditional cost effectiveness analysis cea assumes that program costs and benefits scale linearly with investment an unrealistic assumption for epidemic control programs this paper combines epidemic modeling with optimization techniques to determine the optimal allocation of a limited resource for epidemic control among multiple noninteracting populations we show that the optimal resource allocation depends on many factors including the size of each population the state of the epidemic in each population before resources are allocated e g infection prevalence and incidence the length of the time horizon and prevention program characteristics we establish conditions that characterize the optimal solution in certain cases

social status in economic theory social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour this paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status concerns first a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis i then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status discuss the endogenous derivation of such preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalizations of these preferences subsequently the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings the last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy

pecuniary emulation inequality and growth abstract we study a two class growth model in which agents care about both consumption and the social perception of their wealth rank the latter determines the social status enjoyed by agents social perceptions are based upon noisy signals of wealth and in equilibrium there is incomplete separation of classes the steady growth rate of the economy increases with the full information status differential between classes and contrary to the growth model without status it is affected by the initial level of wealth inequality both too much equality and too much inequality are detrimental to economic growth

social organization status and savings behavior abstract we develop a model of status seeking in the presence of incomplete information and derive its implications for aggregate savings status seeking endogenously takes the form of conspicuous consumption its impact on savings depends on the scheduling of the contests for status over the life cycle if individuals engage in conspicuous consumption when old aggregate savings are increased we also study the role of social segmentation while social segmentation reduces the inequality across status seekers and fuels social rivalry under complete information we show that under incomplete information social segmentation weakens the incentive to strive for greater status

inequality and growth in the presence of competition for status abstract we investigate a simple endogenous growth model where agents care about their social status as greater equality tends to provide greater incentives to differentiate oneself redistribution may increase wasteful competitive consumption and lead to lower growth

the efficient side of progressive income taxation abstract this paper examines allocative properties of progressive income taxation when individuals care about their relative income it shows that introducing a progressive income tax can yield a pareto improvement if pre tax income is evenly distributed implementing undistorted choices of working hours requires a progressive tax schedule and the optimal degree of progressivity decreases with pre tax income inequality

class systems and the enforcement of social norms abstract we analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people in this model self enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition however the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose we demonstrate that in such cases it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

on the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem i e two sided one to one matching with non transferable utility for small economies this condition is also necessary this class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

conspicuous consumption dynamics abstract we formalize veblen s idea of conspicuous consumption as two alternative forms of interdependent preferences dubbed envy and pride agents adjust consumption patterns gradually in the direction of increasing utility from an arbitrary initial state the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution when pride is stronger the equilibrium distribution has a right skewed density when envy is stronger the equilibrium is concentrated at a single point and the adjustment dynamics involve a shock wave that can be interpreted as a growing moving homogeneous middle class

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

social limits to redistribution in many countries equality of political rights including the right to vote over taxes and transfers goes along with substantial inequality of economic conditions this observation lies at the root of one fundamental issue in political economy one about the factors that limit the extent of redistribution in democracies the conventional economic wisdom on this issue can roughly be summarized by two arguments firstly redistributive taxation may be limited by various kinds of incentive costs of taxation as e g in james a mirrlees 1971 kevin w s roberts 1977 dennis n epple and thomas romer 1991 and thomas piketty 1995 secondly redistribution may be dampened by the lobbying activity of high income groups and by various imperfections inherent to the political process that determines the tax system as e g in gary s becker 1983 and john e roemer 1995 while both arguments offer illuminating insights into the phenomenon of redistribution they are also based on a very crude description of human behavior one which ignores social motivations of action both in the economic and the political sphere the present paper develops an explanation that takes such motivations into account specifically it shows that limits to redistribution may arise when economic inequality has an informational value for social decisions our approach is based upon the following observation many goods and decisions that heavily affect an individual s quality of life are not allocated or made through markets but through social interactions thomas scitovsky 1976 for instance although people have strong preferences over how they are treated by others and over whom they mate with these things are not the object of market transactions a number of sources of satisfaction like conversation dinners and parties playing with others and being observed and admired are nonmarket goods for which a keen social competition between individuals often develops as shown by harold cole et al 1992 the existence of social rather than market competition for some goods can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in the income distribution when information about relative income is private individuals become interested in the observable consumption differentials between them and their social competitors since consumption differentials are influenced by redistributive taxation the political attitudes of people toward redistribution will be shaped by its expected impact on social competition in some identifiable environments this concern for social success may be the crucial factor that limits the extent of redistribution desired by a majority of voters specifically while the middle class may obtain economic benefits from a large amount of redistributive taxation it may oppose an equalization of living standards since this would harm its social success the fear of losing social status in favor of the poor induces the middle class to enter a political alliance with the rich which supports conservative taxation programs in the sociological literature scholars of voting behavior have often suggested that the need for social recognition plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes seymour m lipset 1967 pointed out that white collar workers tend to be socially valued similarly as those higher in the system and although their income may be only slightly larger than that of manual workers white collars are much more likely to corneo department of economics university of osnabruck rolandstrasse 8 d 49069 osnabruck germany cesifo munich and cepr london gruner department of economics university of mannheim d 68131 mannheim germany iza bonn and cepr london we would like to thank emmanuelle auriol dieter bos peter funk mike hout olivier jeanne peter jonas georg noldeke thomas piketty regis renault john roemer jens weidmann and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions we have also benefited from the comments of participants at workshops and conferences in barcelona bonn davis jena maastricht magdeburg mannheim montreal munich rotterdam silvaplana tel aviv tilburg toulouse and warwick at which we presented earlier versions of this work financial support from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn is gratefully acknowledged

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

competing premarital investments this paper studies premarital parental investments in children s wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage by investing in their children s wealth parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry in large marriage markets the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition but equilibrium investments are not efficient

fixed equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games abstract this paper studies equilibrium refinements in signaling games through an examination of rationalizability in derived games obtained by replacing the equilibrium path with a sure outcome that yields the equilibrium payoff to all players the informed player chooses between the sure payoff and sending an out of equilibrium signal from the original game whether or not the strategy of choosing the sure payoff is rationalizable is related to the iterated intuitive condition divinity when the original game is viewed as having imperfect incomplete information our results also demonstrate the significance of testing out of equilibrium signals as a set rather than individually

measuring future grandparents preferences for equality and relative standing individuals aversion to risk and inequality and their concern for relative standing are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies it is found that on average individuals are both fairly inequality averse and have a strong concern for relative income the results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian swf and a modified crra utility function it is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative even at income levels that are far from extreme

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

review 1 obesity unhappiness and the challenge of affluence theory and evidence is affluence a good thing the book the challenge of affluence by avner offer 2006 argues that economic prosperity weakens self control and undermines human well being consistent with a pessimistic view we show that psychological distress has been rising through time in modern great britain taking over eating as an example our data reveal that half the british population view themselves as overweight and that happiness and mental health are worse among fatter people in britain and germany comparisons also matter we discuss problems of inference and argue that longitudinal data are needed we suggest a theory of obesity imitation where utility depends on relative weight copyright 2007 the author s journal compilation royal economic society 2007

monotone matching in perfect and imperfect worlds we study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known necessary conditions which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function are also offered changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative statics of matching patterns across environments we apply our framework to some examples adapted from the literature accounting for and extending several comparative static and welfare results we also explore the dependence of the matching pattern on the type distribution

mortality and immortality the nobel prize as an experiment into the effect of status upon longevity it has been known for centuries that the rich and famous have longer lives than the poor and ordinary causality however remains trenchantly debated the ideal experiment would be one in which extra status could somehow be dropped upon a sub sample of individuals while those in a control group of comparable individuals received none this paper attempts to formulate a test in that spirit it collects 19th century birth data on science nobel prize winners correcting for potential biases we estimate that winning the prize compared to merely being nominated is associated with between 1 and 2 years of extra longevity

should public policy respond to positional externalities abstract a nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment more generally a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category 1 a positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated 2 for example if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom tailored suits a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers from any individual job seeker s point of view the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others lest her chances of landing the job fall but this outcome may be inefficient since when all spend more each candidate s probability of success remains unchanged all may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful in such cases however it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern in attempting to answer this question i employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by john stuart mill 3 who wrote the state may not legitimately constrain any citizen s freedom of action except to prevent harm to others i argue that many positional externalities appear to meet mill s test causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill equipped to avoid them i also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution the paper is organized as follows section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities

selfish drug allocation for containing an international influenza pandemic at the onset recent epidemiologic studies have suggested that the prophylactic use of antiviral drugs could slow down the spread of an influenza epidemic because drug stockpiles are presently scattered in different countries the outbreak of an epidemic gives rise to a game in which each country must make decisions about how best to allocate its own stockpile in order to protect its population we develop a two period multivariate reed frost model to represent the spread of the epidemic within and across countries at its onset we consider the first two periods only to mimic the exponential growth of an epidemic in its early stage while keeping the model tractable preliminary numerical studies suggest that insights from the two period model hold in general when considering the entire time horizon our model captures three critical sources of uncertainty the number of initial infections the spread of the disease and drug efficacy we show that for small probabilities of between country infections the underlying game is supermodular nash equilibrium exists and there is a unique one that is pareto optimal among all existing equilibria further we identify sufficient conditions under which the optimal solution of a central planner such as the world health organization constitutes a pareto improvement over the decentralized equilibrium suggesting that countries should agree on an allocation scheme that would benefit everyone by contrast when the central planner s solution does not constitute a pareto improvement minimizing the total number of infected persons globally requires some countries to sacrifice part of their own population which raises intriguing ethical issues

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

a test of the relative income hypothesis the original permanent income and life cycle models were constructed around the view that savings rates are independent of the level of long run income 19 since then it has been well documented using household data that savings rates rise with long run income to be consistent with the empirical evidence modigliani suggests modifying the life cycle hypothesis to include a bequest motive his hypothesis however is that the share of lifetime resources that a household plans to devote to bequests is an increasing function of its lifetime resources relative to others in the same age cohort 17 the share of resources devoted to bequests is made a function of the relative and not the absolute level of resources so as to be consistent with menchik and david s empirical study of the bequest function 16 but if saving for bequests is influenced by relative income why not other forms of saving a simple model in which all types of saving are influenced by relative income was proposed by duesenberry in 1949 4 his basic hypothesis was that households are concerned about community consumption standards and that this concern leads to savings rates being an increasing function of a household s position in the income distribution although a per se desire for status is seen by some economists as inconsistent with rational behavior it is clear that a relative advantage is often instrumental in achieving absolute goals 6 7 10 11 22 while several policy implications of the relative income hypothesis have come to light 2 6 it has rarely been analyzed empirically the purpose of this paper is to present a test of the relative income model the hypothesis is that if income rank is really the variable driving savings rates then it should be possible to hold the level of income constant and still see the average propensity to save aps moving with income rank section ii presents a simple model of the savings decision in which concern for relative standing in the current consumption hierarchy is integrated into a permanent income framework the model is then used to explore the issue of functional form section iii discusses the data the equation to be estimated and the regression results section iv presents a summary and concluding remarks

contractual signaling in a market environment abstract we consider a game of signaling where the informed sender proposes a contract which can only be accepted or rejected by the receiver while most of the literature considers a bilaterally monopolistic setting we embed the game in a market environment where a sender may switch to another receiver in case of rejection we analyze how this structural extension can be employed to restrict the set of stationary equilibrium allocations journal of economic literature classification number c78 d82

rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings abstract at the beginning of a dynamic game players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents will play if these theories are commonly known players will refine their first order beliefs and challenge their own theories through strategic reasoning i propose a new solution concept selective rationalizability which captures the following hypothesis when the observed behavior is not compatible with the beliefs in rationality and in the theories of all orders players keep the beliefs in rationality that are compatible with the observed behavior and drop the incompatible beliefs in the theories thus selective rationalizability captures common strong belief in rationality battigalli and siniscalchi 2002 and refines extensive form rationalizability pearce 1984 battigalli 1996 whereas strong rationalizability battigalli 2003 battigalli and siniscalchi 2003 captures the opposite epistemic priority choice selective rationalizability is extended to encompass richer epistemic priority orderings among different theories of opponents behavior this allows to shed some new light on strategic stability kohlberg and mertens 1986

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

a game theoretic model of international influenza vaccination coordination influenza vaccination decisions in one country can influence the size of an outbreak in other countries due to interdependent risks from infectious disease transmission this paper examines the inefficiency in the allocation of influenza vaccines that is due to interdependent risk of infection across borders and proposes a contractual mechanism to reduce such inefficiencies the proposed contract is based on an epidemic model that accounts for intranational transmission and that from a source country where the dominant strain emerges the contract reduces the overall financial burden of infection globally and improves the total number infected by seasonal influenza outbreaks this is consistent with recent recommendations to improve pandemic preparedness numerical experiments demonstrate that the benefits of the contract can prevent millions of influenza cases and save tens of millions of dollars and that the benefits are even greater when cross border transmission is higher even if cross border transm

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

marriage as a rat race noisy premarital investments with assortative matching we study the efficiency of premarital investments when parents care about their child s marriage prospects in a large frictionless marriage market with nontransferable utility stochastic returns to investment ensure that equilibrium is unique we find that generically investments exceed the pareto efficient level unless the sexes are symmetric in all respects girls will invest more than boys if their quality shocks are less variable than shocks for boys or if they are the abundant sex the unique equilibrium in our continuum agent model is the limit of the equilibria of finite models as the number of agents tends to infinity

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two sided matching with non transferable utility in this paper we apply the instrumental approach to social preferences in order to distinguish among various shapes of preferences for social status in particular we consider the shape of reduced preferences that emerge in the equilibrium of a twosided matching model with non transferable utility cole et al 1992 1995 show that under full observability of potential mates attributes instrumental concerns for social status are ordinal i e only one s own rank in the distribution of attributes matters we show that when we depart from full observability instrumental concerns for social status become cardinal i e also other features of the distribution of attributes matter we also show that the actual shape of cardinal concerns depends on how individuals can deal with the informational asymmetry alternatively leading to upward concerns i e making comparisons with higher rank people downward concerns i e making comparisons with lower rank people or bidirectional concerns i e being both upward and downward

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

social organization in an endogenous growth model we develop an endogenous growth model in which individuals form matches in order to consume goods that are not explicitly traded the matching process endogenously generates a concern for relative wealth and is thereby beneficial for capital accumulation and economic growth we then study how social segmentation in the matching process affects economic growth under strong segmentation social competition over mates occurs inside homogeneous groups this homogeneity increases the severity of the rat race of wealth accumulation and fosters economic growth

conspicuous leisure optimal income taxation when both relative consumption and relative leisure matter previous studies on public policy under relative consumption concerns have ignored the role of leisure comparisons this paper considers a two type optimal nonlinear income tax model where people care both about their relative consumption and their relative leisure increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both the high ability and the low ability type whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role however this offsetting role is not symmetric concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component i e a component that is larger for the high ability than for the low ability type moreover leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public good provision when the income tax is optimally chosen

why do people care about social status abstract this paper shows that complementary interaction can induce people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non observable abilities there is a unique separating equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status in this equilibrium a person s social status perfectly reveals his abilities and everyone matches with a person of like ability the analysis shows that people s instrumental concern for social status has important welfare and policy implications indeed peoples efforts to keep up with the joneses may be welfare enhancing

migration incentives migration types the role of relative deprivation the authors explore the role of relative deprivation versus absolute income as an incentive for migration in developing countries in section i of this paper we outline the relative deprivation model of migration and present an illustration of the divergent policy implications of a relative deprivation model versus an absolute income model an attempt is made to identify distinct empirical implications of relative and absolute income motives for migrating in section ii a migration decision model is estimated and is used to explore absolute and relative income motives for internal and international migration in a sample of rural mexican households as well as to test the extent to which discontinuity in labour markets shapes the choice of migrant destination in section iii we present our conclusions excerpt