computer use and earnings in britain this paper estimates various models of the effect of computer use on earnings using recent ncds data the cross section estimates are large and significant while the standard fixed effects estimates are small or insignificant the panel estimates change considerably once we allow the coefficients to differ across individuals conditional on assumptions about when individuals use computers conventional panel estimates may not identify the crucial parameters and alternative methods are needed we conclude that there was a substantial premium associated with computer use for some individuals in the uk

if not computers then what returns to computer use in the uk revisited in recent years much attention has been paid to the effect on wages of skill biased technology especially the use of computers although empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between computer use and earnings doubts have been cast on whether this is a causal relationship or merely represents unobserved other factors which are themselves positively linked to computer usage this study provides evidence that computers themselves raise wages although their impact on wages falls as other controls are included in the regression it still remains significant whilst the effect of another proxy for unobserved factors becomes insignificant furthermore improvements in computer use have an additional impact on earnings supporting the productivity interpretation

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

envy in mission oriented organizations according to the labor donation theory workers adhering to their firms mission are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor in this paper we study how workers fairness concerns limit the firm s ability to extract labor donation from its employees we find that in sectors where the firm s mission is important optimal contracts are such that high ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low ability employees and they must be rewarded with an envy rent the opposite is true in sectors where the firm s mission does not play a relevant role we empirically test the predictions of the model using the german socio economic panel finding support for our theoretical results

dynamic reform of public institutions a model of motivated agents and collective reputation abstract state capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public service motivation however when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment steady state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation reputation in the mission oriented sector exist reforming a low motivation institution requires a non monotonic wage path since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a high reputation institution but positive for a low reputation institution a transition to a high reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in followed by a wage decrease to crowd non motivated workers out

product introduction with network externalities the authors study the introduction of a new product in a market with network externalities there is a common presumption that such markets exhibit excess inertia i e that they are biased toward existing products in contrast the authors provide conditions under which equilibrium involves insufficient friction i e a tendency to rush into new incompatible technologies they also analyze the firms incentives to make their products compatible and they show that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against compatibility copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

technological expectations and adoption of improved technology abstract attention is focused upon the adoption demand rather than the creation supply of new technology which improves from time to time based on the expected flow of technological progress over which the firm demander has no control it must decide either to adopt the current best available technology or to postpone adoption the distinguishing features of the model are that more than one technological innovation is anticipated and expectations about the likelihood of such innovations are revised as time passes since the last innovation our analysis shows that the firm will adopt the current best practice if its technological lag exceeds a certain threshold moreover as time passes without new technological advances it may become profitable to purchase a technology that has been available even though it was not profitable to do so in the past

money and economic activity inventories and business cycles abstract incomplete information is a necessary condition for any real effects produced by monetary impulses an alternative to the local global inference problem is explored in this paper agents are confronted with permanent and transitory shocks even with full knowledge about the stochastic structure their best perception at any particular time will usually be erroneous prices for each period are set at the beginning of the period on the basis of market conditions the realization of the shock process thus creates a short run disequilibrium absorbed by inventory adjustments this adjustment translates perceived transitory monetary shocks into serially correlated output movements the analysis proceeds within the context of rational expectations it offers a generalization of equilibrium analysis in two respects prices are always in equilibrium relative to perceived conditions but they do not reflect all ongoing shocks quantity adjustments reflect the perceived transitory shocks the framework used involves moreover a stock flow interaction operated by inventory adjustments the stock flow interaction imposes at any time a future expected adjustment path for price level and quantities to the system s unique stock equilibrium a major implication of the analysis resolves a puzzle experienced in a recent paper by robert hall it reconciles intertemporal substitution with lagged effects of monetary impulses it also reconciles small and inconclusive cyclic movements in real wages with the occurrence of production function and large variations in unemployment lastly the nature of the inference problem determined by the pattern of incomplete information produces serially correlated movements conditioned on large permanent shocks

how important is pro social behaviour in the delivery of public services a number of papers have suggested that pro social behaviour in the workplace may be sensitive to the institutional environment but there is little empirical research that attempts to test this directly using data on worker behaviour this is the aim of this paper we show that individuals in the non profit sector are significantly more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the for profit sector however we find no evidence of adjustment along either the extensive or intensive margins when individuals change sectors the results of our analysis therefore point to selection and we find supporting evidence that individuals do self select on the basis of their propensity to donate labour

wage elasticities in working and volunteering the role of reference points in a laboratory study we experimentally test how effort responds to wages randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity in the presence of expectations based reference points or targets when individuals earn money for themselves higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior when individuals earn money for a charity higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior a reference dependent theoretical framework suggests an explanation for this differential impact when individuals place less value on earnings such as when accruing earnings for a charity instead of themselves more targeting behavior and a more sluggish response to incentives should result results from an additional experiment add support to this explanation when individuals select into earning money for a charity and thus likely place a higher value on those earnings targeting behavior is muted and no longer generates a negative effort response to higher wages data and the online appe

coordination cooperation contagion and currency crises we analyze the effect of trade competition international coordination and cooperation on currency crises to do this we present a micro founded model where governments have an incentive to devalue to increase the national market share in a monopolistically competitive sector currency crises generated by self fulfilling expectations are possible because private agents demand high wages when they expect a devaluation this decreases the competitiveness and profits of national firms and induces the government to devalue we show that the more important trade competition the more likely self fulfilling speculative crises are and the larger the set of multiple equilibria coordination decreases the possibility of simultaneous self fulfilling speculative crises in the region and reduces the set of multiple equilibria however regional coordination even though welfare improving makes countries more dependent on other countries fundamentals so that it may induce more contagion cooperation further reduces the set of multiple equilibria with currency crises

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

does hospital competition harm equity evidence from the english national health service increasing evidence shows that hospital competition under fixed prices can improve quality and reduce cost concerns remain however that competition may undermine socio economic equity in the utilisation of care we test this hypothesis in the context of the pro competition reforms of the english national health service progressively introduced from 2004 to 2006 we use a panel of 32 482 english small areas followed from 2003 to 2008 and a difference in differences approach the effect of competition on equity is identified by the interaction between market structure small area income deprivation and year we find a negative association between market competition and elective admissions in deprived areas the effect of pro competition reform was to reduce this negative association slightly suggesting that competition did not undermine equity

discontinuous adoption paths with dynamic scale economies this paper examines the equilibrium adoption patch for two innovations when there are network externalities we show that the existence of significant increasing returns in system scale can give the result that one variant will drive out the other one and so emerges as the unique standard for the industry moreover if network externalities are sufficiently strong then the equilibrium adoption path is discontinuous that is it includes a catastrophe point

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

technology and the wage structure this article reports direct evidence on how technological change is related to changes in wage gaps by schooling experience and gender wage gaps by schooling increased the most in industries with rising r d intensity and accelerating growth in the capital labor ratio estimates of their relationship to high tech capital are inconclusive contrary to popular notions that technological change harms older workers wage growth of experienced workers is much greater in r d intensive industries than in industries with little r d activity the gender gap narrowed more in industries that most intensively used high tech capital in 1979

optimal allocation of an indivisible good abstract in this paper we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good efficiently between two agents with monetary transfers we focus on allocation mechanisms that are dominant strategy incentive compatible when agents types are private information inefficiency of an allocation mechanism may come from two sources misallocation of the indivisible good and an imbalanced budget unfortunately as green and laffont 1979 demonstrate no allocation mechanism can always overcome both kinds of inefficiency we identify allocation mechanisms that maximize the expected total utilities of agents and characterize optimal mechanisms for a large class of agents type distributions for strongly regular type distributions we show that the optimal mechanisms must be budget balanced they are either fixed price mechanisms or option mechanisms the result may not hold for other type distributions for certain type distributions we show that optimal mechanisms are hybrids of vickrey clarke groves mechanisms and budget balanced mechanisms

the effect of ambiguous risk and coordination on farmers adaptation to climate change a framed field experiment the risk of losses of income and productive means due to adverse weather can differ significantly among farmers sharing a productive landscape and is of course hard to estimate or even guesstimate empirically moreover the costs associated with investments in reduced vulnerability to climatic events are likely to exhibit economies of scope we explore the implications of these characteristics on farmer s decisions to adapt to climate change using a framed field experiment applied to coffee farmers in costa rica as expected we find high levels of risk aversion but even using that as a baseline we further find that farmers behave even more cautiously when the setting is characterized by unknown or ambiguous risk i e poor or non reliable risk information secondly we find that farmers to a large extent coordinated their decisions to secure a lower adaptation cost and that communication among farmers strongly facilitated coordination

household income dynamics a four country story in this article we analyse the dynamics of household per capita incomes using longitudinal data from indonesia south africa spain and venezuela we find that in all four countries reported initial income and job changes of the head are consistently the most important variables in accounting for income changes overall and for initially poor households we also find that changes in income are more important than changes in household size and that changes in labour earnings are more important than changes in other sources of household income

computer use and wages evidence from taiwan we find a significant positive relationship between computer use and wages using taiwan microdata controlling for endogeneity of computer use with simultaneous equations suggests that although ols estimates are biased upward workplace computer use increases productivity d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

not for profit entrepreneurs abstract entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not for profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives such incentives protect donors volunteers consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur we derive conditions under which completely self interested entrepreneurs opt for not for profit status despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises we also show that even in the absence of tax advantages unrestricted donations would flow to non profits rather than for profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non profits

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

computers skills and wages computer technology is most prominently used by skilled high wage workers this suggests that computer use requires skills to take full advantage of the possibilities which are particularly present among relatively skilled workers this article develops a simple technology adoption model showing that the decision to adopt computer technology depends on i the tasks to be performed ii the level of skill or education and iii the level of wages applying this model to british data it is shown that the effect of wages and particular tasks on computer adoption is larger than the effect of skills on adoption the estimates suggest that in britain computer use is likely to be a matter of cost efficiency and not so much of workers skills

whither the nonprofit wage differential estimates from the 1990 census this article provides new estimates of the nonprofit for profit wage differential in the u s economy using observations on 4 1 million private sector employees from the 1990 census i find either zero or slightly positive economy wide wage differences between nonprofit and for profit employees in a standard earnings equation format significant wage differentials are found at the disaggregated occupation and industry level and provide a basis for testing hypotheses explaining nonprofit for profit wage differences

when does learning in games generate convergence to nash equilibria the role of supermodularity in an experimental setting this study clarifies the conditions under which learning in games produces convergence to nash equilibria in practice previous work has identified theoretical conditions under which various stylized learning processes achieve convergence one technical condition is supermodularity which is closely related to the more familiar concept of strategic complementarities we experimentally investigate the role of supermodularity in achieving convergence through learning using a game from the literature on solutions to externalities we systematically vary a free parameter below close to at and beyond the threshold of supermodularity to assess its effects on convergence we find that supermodular and near supermodular games converge significantly better than those far below the threshold from a little below the threshold to the threshold the improvement is statistically insignificant within the class of supermodular games increasing the parameter far beyond the threshold does not significantly improve convergence simulation shows that while most experimental results persist in the long run some become more pronounced

does history matter only when it matters little the case of city industry location when will an industry subject to agglomeration economies move from an old high cost site to a new low cost site it is argued that history in the form of sunk costs resulting from the operation of many firms at a site creates a first mover disadvantage that can prevent relocation it is demonstrated that developers of industrial parks can partly overcome this inertia through discriminatory pricing of land over time and empirical evidence is provided that they actually engage in such behavior it is also shown that other aspects of developer land sale strategy can be a source of information on the nature of interfirm externalities

occupational social value and returns to long hours this paper examines the phenomenon of uncompensated long hours in jobs with pro social characteristics and presents evidence that long hour wage premiums and occupational social value are substitutes in compensating salaried workers who supply hours exceeding the standard working week i show that the social value of an occupation in particular the degree to which jobs involve helping or providing service to others is inversely related to long hour pay allowing for heterogeneity in the degree to which workers value their job s helping orientation lets me explore how gender differences in employees attitudes toward pro social behaviour can explain some of the observed occupational sorting trends and gender differences in long hour compensation women tend to be more strongly drawn to helping occupations and at the same time receive lower long hour premiums in these jobs relative to men i offer a theoretical framework to rationalize the empirical trends

multidimensional platform design successful platforms attract not just many users but also those of the right kind the right kind of user is one who can either be directly monetized or who differentially attracts other valuable users bonacich centrality on the network of user sorting with direct value of monetization captures this feedback loop and thus characterizes the value of user characteristics we use this value to determine optimal steady state platform design and reliable means for platforms to reach such a steady state we apply these results respectively to explain the dynamic growth strategy of social networks and urban development policies of cities

the public pay gap in britain small differences that don t matter the existing literature on inequality between private and public sectors focuses on cross section differences in earnings levels forward looking agents however care about income and job mobility too which we show are substantially different between the two sectors using data from the bhps we estimate a model of income and employment dynamics allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to be employed in eitherjob sector we detect a positive average public premium both in income flows and in the present discounted sum of future income flows we also find that income inequality is lower but more persistent in the public sector there is an ongoing debate as to whether public sector workers experience better or worse pay conditions than their private counterparts a recurring message in the recent literature is that although raw differences can be large most are likely to reflect differences in the composition of the workforce both in terms of observed characteristics such as age and education and in terms of unobserved characteristics nevertheless a look at labour markets in the two sectors suggests that individuals do perceive some differences between the sectors katz and krueger 1991 document the fact that blue collar workers are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs whereas highlyskilled workers are notoriously hard to recruit and retain in the public sector the focus of most of the literature on public pay gaps is on cross section differences in earnings levels 2 yet the public private differences are arguably equally marked in terms of income mobility income volatility and job loss risk than in terms of mean income levels public sector employers are widely perceived to offer more job security 3 there is also plentiful evidence of relative wage compression in the public sector moreover as we shall point out public sector incomes are substantially more persistent over time than private sector incomes the motivating point of this article is that forward looking agents are likely to care about income and job mobility as well as income levels so that a more general assessment of the existence and magnitude of a public premium should be based on

levels of computer self efficacy computer use and earnings in china abstract levels of self efficacy in computer use were found to be positively related to computer use at work among a sample of workers in shanghai the simultaneous estimation of computer use and earnings indicated that an earnings premium for computer use accrues only to females not to males

what happens when agent t gets a computer the labor market impact of cost efficient computer adoption this paper offers a model of how computer technology has changed the labor market demonstrating that wage differentials between computer users and non users are consistent with computers first being introduced in high wage jobs following cost efficiency furthermore skill upgrading occurs following a reemphasis on non routine tasks after adoption the model also reveals that neither differences in computer skills nor complementary skills are needed to explain wage differentials between users and non users skill upgrading and the changing organization and intensity of work finally the predicted effects on the wage structure are consistent with empirical evidence

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

bertrand competition under network externalities abstract two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network the value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good when the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market the set includes marginal cost mc pricing as well as bipartition pricing which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others we show that mc pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non linear externalities in a general network but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity the analysis is applied to platform competition in a two sided market under local and approximately linear externalities

the incentive effects of missions evidence from experiments with ngo employees and students abstract this paper studies the incentive effects of an organization s mission on the effort provision of agents across treatments i exogenously vary how much the agents and their projects missions match in the first study ngo employees are assigned the role of agents in an online one shot principal agent experiment in the second study i replicate the experimental design with a student subject pool in both experiments the agents effort choices are for any given piece rate increasing in their mission match in a third study a laboratory experiment with a finitely repeated principal agent game with random matching i do not find a motivational effect of missions unlike in my first two studies

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

endogeneity computers language skills and wages among university graduates in vietnam one would expect that returns to supplementary skills in developing countries are considerably higher compared to those documented for developed countries as is the case with returns to schooling i derive estimates of returns to the use of computer and foreign language skills in vietnam after controlling for endogeneity using a binary instrument hypothesized to reflect reconstruction doi moi policies in vietnam i find that a the use of both computers and language skills is associated with very large earnings premiums b iv return estimates are as high as and sometimes higher than ols estimates however they should be interpreted in relation to the instrument used

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

signaling and screening of workers motivation abstract this paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm we characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers motivation is private information while posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply the optimal wage scheme entails a trade off between the probability of filling the vacancy the rents left to the worker and the expected worker s motivation

new technologies wages and worker selection we study the effect of new technologies nt on wages and employment using a unique panel that matches data on individuals and on their firms as in the united states we show that computer users are better paid than nonusers 15 20 more but these workers were already better compensated before the introduction of the nts total returns to computer use amount to 2 measurement errors do not affect our estimates furthermore computer users are protected from job losses as long as bad business conditions do not last too long this result holds even after controlling for possible selection biases

computers and the changing skill intensity of jobs this paper investigates the impact of computer usage at work and other job features on the changing skills required of workers it compare skills utilization in britain at three data points 1986 1992 and 1997 using proxies for the level of skills actually used in jobs this study questions the validity of investigating the facts about and the sources of rising skills by using just educational attainment or occupational grouping data this paper finds that job skills have increased more quickly for women than for men these increases are more extensive than those captured by changes in the occupational class structure the spread of computer usage is very strongly associated with the process of upskilling and accounts in part for narrowing of the gender skills gap expanded use of quality circles is also linked to upskilling evidence for any direct role of trade in inducing skills increases is weak using the qualification held or occupation as a skills measure can lead to erroneous conclusions as to the origin of skills changes

corporate philanthropy and productivity evidence from an online real effort experiment contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and nonprofit sectors as well as in firms that engage in corporate philanthropy or other corporate social responsibility policies this paper compares the effectiveness of a social incentive that takes the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject s choice to a financial incentive we find that social incentives lead to a 13 rise in productivity regardless of their form lump sum or related to performance or strength the response is strong for subjects with low initial productivity 30 whereas high productivity subjects do not respond when subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation with women more likely to do so than men furthermore offering subjects some discretion in choosing their own payment schemes leads to a substantial improvement in performance comparing social incentives to equally costly increases in private compensation for low productivity subjects reveals that the former are less effective in increasing productivity but the difference is small and not statistically significant data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1985 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

small is beautiful motivational allocation in the non profit sector we build an occupational choice general equilibrium model with for profit firms non profit organizations and endogenous private warm glow donations lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non profit sector because of a higher incomein the for profit sector a stronger preference for giving or an inflow of foreign aid worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non profit sector we also analyze the conditions under which donors through linking donations to the motivational composition of the non profit sector non profits themselves through peer monitoring or the government using a tax financed public funding of non profits can eliminate the low effectiveness equilibrium we present supporting case study evidence from humanitarian emergencies and developing country ngo sector and humanitarian emergencies

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities abstract this paper investigates how call and network externalities affect a monopolist s optimal nonlinear tariff in a two way telecommunication service market where consumers valuations for outgoing and incoming calls are positively correlated and the firm is not allowed to charge incoming calls it is shown that in contrast to the traditional efficiency on the top result all subscribers including those with the highest willingness to pay make suboptimal quantities of calls in the equilibrium the presence of call externalities may result in the existence of no call making subscribers in equilibrium also the firm may have incentives to sell the service below costs to some low valuation consumers in order to take advantage of the effect of network externalities

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

make money surfing the web the impact of internet use on the earnings of u s workers much research on the digital divide presumes that adults who do not use the internet are economically disadvantaged yet little research has tested this premise after discussing several mechanisms that might produce differences in earnings growth between workers who do and do not use the internet we use data from the current population survey to examine the impact of internet use on changes in earnings over 13 month intervals at the end of the internet boom our analyses reveal robustly significant positive associations between web use and earnings growth indicating that some skills and behaviors associated with internet use were rewarded by the labor market consistent with human capital theory current use at work had the strongest effect on earnings in contrast to economic theory which has led economists to focus exclusively on effects of contemporaneous workplace technology use workers who used the internet only at home also did better suggesting that users may have benefited from superior

warrant exercise dividends and reinvestment policy in this paper we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants we analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies first we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding however sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders even absent dividends because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm s scale increases the riskiness of an equity share second oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding

compensation in the nonprofit sector we investigate the determinants of pay in the nonprofit sector using data for 25 55 year olds from the 1994 88 current population survey outgoing rotation groups our results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensation is primarily determined in competitive markets without labor donations to nonprofit employers one implication is that nonprofit workers receive virtually the same wages as observationally equivalent employees in similar positions with profit seeking enterprises we cannot rule out the possibility of nonprofit penalties or premiums for selected groups however the differentials are generally small and competition appears to play a dominant role in nonprofit wage setting

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

incentives choice and accountability in the provision of public services this paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profitoriented market model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the u k it uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non profits we also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality

adoption externalities as public goods abstract a public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities for positive externalities agents furnish a public good by taking an action similarly for negative externalities agents furnish a public good by not taking an action we examine these externalities in a binary choice problem i e adoption externalities in each case there is a potential role for government intervention even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed since one equilibrium pareto dominates all others we analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention

incentives and the sorting of altruistic agents into street level bureaucracies many street level bureaucrats such as caseworkers have the dual task of helping some clients while sanctioning others we develop a model of such a street level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients when bureaucrats are paid flat wages they do not sanction and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy pay for performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution we also show how client composition affects sorting and why street level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

the diffusion of computers and the distribution of wages abstract when the costs are decreasing workers adopt technology at the point where the costs equal the increased productivity output per worker increases immediately while productivity benefits increase only gradually if costs continue to fall as a result workers in computer adopting labor market groups experience an immediate fall in wages due to increased supply on the other hand adopting workers experience wage increases with some delay this model explains why increased computer use does not immediately lead to higher wage inequality more specifically the results of the model are shown to be consistent with the question why within group wage inequality among skilled workers as a result of computer technology adoption in the united states increased in the 1970s while between group wage inequality and within group wage inequality among the unskilled did not start to increase until the 1980s the model also predicts that the more compressed german wage structure leads to a lagged diffusion of computer technology along with smaller changes in wage inequality our empirical analysis suggests that this is consistent with the actual developments in germany since the 1980s finally the theoretical predictions seem to be of the right magnitude to explain the empirical quantities observed in the data

the impact of advanced technology adoption on wage structures evidence from taiwan manufacturing firms we examine the impact of advanced technology adoption on wage and employment structures in taiwan using a survey of manufacturing firms that provides direct information on the use of advanced technologies we find that firms using more advanced technologies pay higher wages to both non production and production workers and employ higher fractions of non production workers controlling for the possible endogeneity of technology adoption suggests that the estimated impact of new technologies on wages is downward biased and that the effect on production workers wages may be minimal

long and short term interest rates in a risky world abstract the paper develops and tests a general equilibrium model in which variability or risk affects the choice of portfolios our measures of variability include only the variability of unanticipated growth in monetary and non monetary aggregates and our tests use data ending with the change in federal reserve procedures in october 1979 we find that increased variability of unanticipated money growth raises demands for debt and money and reduces the demand for real capital interest rates on both short and long term debt rise by a risk premium we estimate the size of the risk premium before and after the october 1979 change and we show that the change in federal reserve procedures moved the economy to a less efficient point

does unmeasured ability explain the higher wages of new technology workers abstract we study the impact on new technologies nt on wages using a unique data set that matches data on individuals and on their firms in his important article on the same topic krueger 1993 did not give a definitive answer to the following question if workers who use nt are better paid is it because they are abler or because nt increases their productivity we try to provide a precise answer to this question comparing cross section estimates firm effect estimates and person effect estimates we show that computer based new technologies are used by abler workers these workers appear to become more productive when they get more experienced with these nt in terms of wage differentials the introduction of computer based nt contributes to the increase but less than supposed before each year experience with computer based nt adds around 1 to the wage of workers using such techniques