stock market volatility and investment do only fundamentals matter the empirical evidence in the volatility literature suggests that movements in stock prices cannot be satisfactorily explained purely in terms of changes in fundamentals this paper shows how to obtain proxies for the fundamental and fad components of changes in stock prices and asks the question do only fundamentals matter for investment decisions we find that changes in investment are significantly associated with movements in both components of stock prices the point estimates suggest that changes in fundamentals have a greater effect than changes in non fundamentals the statistical significance of the difference between their coefficients depends upon the financing regime these conclusions are shown to be robust to modifications and extensions of the model

dividend taxes corporate investment and q abstract taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a double tax on corporate income this view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view one explanation of why firms in the united states pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions this capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation s decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings this alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions this paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation by extending tobin s q theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived the competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory s predictions british time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions the econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions

wall street and the housing bubble we analyze whether mid level managers in securitized finance were aware of the housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004 2006 using their personal home transaction data we find little evidence of them timing the bubble or exercising cautious behavior in purchasing homes relative to two uninformed control groups one composed of non housing equity analysts and the other of non real estate lawyers to the extent that the practice of securitization may have led to lax screening of subprime borrowers the average person in our sample did not expect it to lead to problems in the wider housing market our findings suggest the need to expand the incentives based view of the crisis to incorporate a role for distorted beliefs

a theory of disclosure in speculative markets this paper presents a theory of disclosure in a market where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face short sale constraints assets trade above fundamentals reflecting the value of the option to sell to more optimistic investors in the future the initial seller has an incentive to commit to an imprecise disclosure policy despite the negative effect this has on the fundamental value of the asset in order to increase the potential for disagreement and hence the magnitude of the speculative premium i show that there is a strategic complementarity between sellers in their disclosure decisions this explains why financial misreporting and episodes of speculation occur together in waves and demonstrates that the endogenous choice of imprecise disclosure amplifies the extent to which assets are overpriced this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

corporate governance of banks a survey this paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks we start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special i regulation ii the capital structure of banks and iii the complexity and opacity of their business and structure next we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms we then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms i boards ii ownership structures and iii executive compensation our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions such as the positive negative association between board independence size and performance do not hold for banks also existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks performance we discuss potential explanations for these mixed results

economic consequences of housing speculation by exploiting variation in state capital gains taxation as an instrument we analyze the economic consequences of housing speculation during the u s housing boom in the 2000s we find that housing speculation anchored in part on extrapolation of past housing price changes led not only to greater price appreciation economic expansions and housing construction during the boom in 2004 2006 but also to more severe economic downturns during the subsequent bust in 2007 2009 our analysis supports supply overhang and local household demand as two key channels for transmitting these adverse effects

the welfare cost of bank capital requirements abstract capital requirements are the cornerstone of modern bank regulation yet little is known about their welfare cost this paper measures this cost and finds that it is surprisingly large i present a simple framework which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model a capital requirement limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to deposit insurance however this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity the key insight is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only using us data the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0 1 and 1

small business loan securitization and interstate risk sharing do credit risk transfers in general and loan sales and securitizations in particular by financial institutions enhance credit availability and financial stability or do they allow assets of poor credit quality to spread to unprotected investors and thus create financial crises and destroy values in this paper we contribute to the continuing debate by examining the effect of small business loan securitizations on interstate personal income insurance using data of u s banks for the period 1995 2008 we find that small business loans securitizations contribute to the smoothening of state personal income volatility and that this contribution is stronger in states where small businesses play a more important role in the local economy

house price expectations alternative mortgage products and default rapid house price depreciation and rising unemployment were the main drivers of the huge increase in mortgage default during the downturn years of 2007 to 2010 however mortgage default was also partly driven by an increased reliance on alternative mortgage products such as pay option arms and interest only mortgages which allow the borrower to defer principal amortization the goal of this paper is to better understand the forces that spurred use of alternative mortgages during the housing boom and the resulting impact on default patterns relying on a unifying conceptual framework to guide the empirical work the conceptual framework allows borrowers to choose the extent of mortgage backloading the postponement of loan repayment through various mechanisms that constitutes a main feature of alternative mortgages the model shows that when future house price expectations become more favorable reducing default concerns mortgage choices shift toward alternative contracts this prediction is confirmed by empirical evidence showing that an increase in past house price appreciation which captures more favorable expectations for the future raises the market share of alternative mortgages in addition using a proportional hazard default model the paper tests the fundamental presumption that backloaded mortgages are more likely to default finding support for this view the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the federal reserve bank of philadelphia or the federal reserve system this paper is available free of charge at http www philadelphiafed org research anddata publications working papers

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services throughout most of history bank loans have not in fact been marketable yet by the end of the 1980 s the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over 250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade to explain the opening of this loan sales market we present a model of incentive compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers we then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales

what fuels the boom drives the bust regulation and the mortgage crisis the weakly regulated independent mortgage companies imcs had a vastly disproportional contribution to the expansion in risky credit during the mortgage boom and to the ensuing foreclosure crisis we exploit a quasi experimental setting created by the inconsistency of state lender regulations between banks and imcs and their heterogeneity across states to isolate the impact of regulation on lending standards using county pairs straddling state borders we find that weaker state regulation of imcs is associated with a sharper expansion of imcs particularly in risky high yield loans which were also of worse quality in the weakly regulated states based on subsequent delinquency

economic impacts of new unionization on private sector employers 1984 2001 economic impacts of unionization on employers are difficult to estimate in the absence of large representative data on establishments with union status information estimates are also confounded by selection bias because unions could organize at highly profitable enterprises that are more likely to grow and pay higher wages using multiple establishment level data sets that represent establishments that faced organizing drives in the united states during 1984 1999 this paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of unionization on business survival employment output productivity and wages essentially outcomes for employers where unions barely won the election e g by one vote are compared with those where the unions barely lost the analysis finds small impacts on all outcomes that we examine estimates for wages are close to zero the evidence suggests that at least in recent decades the legal mandate that requires the employer to bargain with a certified union has had little economic impact on employers because unions have been somewhat unsuccessful at securing significant wage gains

securitization and moral hazard evidence from credit score cutoff rules abstract a growing literature exploits credit score cutoff rules as a natural experiment to estimate the moral hazard effect of securitization on lender screening however these cutoff rules can be traced to underwriting guidelines for originators not for securitizers moreover loan level data reveal that lenders change their screening at credit score cutoffs in the absence of changes in the probability of securitization credit score cutoff rules thus cannot be used to learn about the moral hazard effect of securitization on underwriting by showing that this evidence has been misinterpreted our analysis should move beliefs away from the conclusion that securitization led to lax screening

bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis this paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the us mortgage crisis real estate related assets are overvalued in banks balance sheets especially those of bigger banks compared to the market value of these assets banks with large exposure to mortgage backed securities also provision less for bad loans furthermore distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage backed securities to inflate their books our results indicate that banks balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules

financial regulation and securitization evidence from subprime loans we examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate to distribute otd market the information asymmetries in the otd market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders we find using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality we interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators capital structure can mitigate moral hazard in addition we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have skin in the game and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting finally having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent overall our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the otd market the findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders incentives with the investors of mortgage backed securities

credit rationing income exaggeration and adverse selection in the mortgage market we examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market we show that the majority of additional risk associated with low doc mortgages originated prior to the great recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to we provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self employed borrowers abstract from author

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

are market based measures of global systemic importance of financial institutions useful to regulators and supervisors we analyze whether four market based measures of the global systemic importance of financial institutions offer early warning signals during three financial crises the tests based on the 2007 2008 crisis show that only one measure covar consistently adds predictive power to conventional early warning models however the additional predictive power remains small and it is not normally confirmed for the asian and the 1998 crises we conclude that it is problematic to identify a market based measure of systemic importance that remains valid across crises with different features the same criticism also applies to several conventional proxies of systemic importance of which size is the most consistent performer

comment on financial regulation and securitization evidence from subprime loans by benjamin keys tanmoy mukherjee amit seru and vikrant vig

asymmetric information in securitization an empirical assessment abstract asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages both securitized and not and using a methodology previously applied to insurance data that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability the main finding is that for given observable characteristics securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non securitized ones we show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons

monetary policy and the global housing bubble what caused the housing boom of the 2000s a number of researchers have suggested that loose monetary policy during the first half of the 2000s was a primary cause of the substantial run up in house prices in many countries however using a common statistical approach we find that monetary policy was not the main factor that should not be surprising although low interest rates raise house prices the increase in prices during the mid 2000s was much larger than the historical relationship between the two variables would suggest instead we investigate further the link between the marked loosening in terms and standards for mortgage credit and the most rapid increases in house prices this link provides some evidence for a story where credit provision and the demand for housing fed on each other and helped spur the housing boom our work suggests a greater role for macroprudential regulation rather than monetary policy in managing asset price booms jane dokko brian m doyle michael t kiley jinill kim shane sherlund jae sim and skander van den heuvel

the front men of wall street the role of cdo collateral managers in the cdo boom and bust i study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for abs cdos securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low quality securities underwritten by the cdo s arranger these securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments diversified managers who did assemble cdos suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds overall the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and cdo underwriters this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

testing effeciency in gambling markets a comment in a recent article in this journal even and noble point out that the regression based test for unbiasedness in point spread betting markets is not valid test when the mean and median of the market s forecast errors are different in the case where skewness is present even and noble propose a likelihood ratio statistic to test for market efficiency in this comment three concerns are explored i whether distributions of market forecast errors in these markets are consistently and significantly skewed ii whether the test proposed by even and noble suffers from the same problem of low power as do other statistical tests in these markets iii whether the even and noble test statistic is actually a new test or simply the equivalent of very simple well known statistical test

securitization of mortgage debt domestic lending and international risk sharing securitization makes mortgage related risks internationally tradeable and thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroeconomic risk in the years 2003 2008 the increase in international cross holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries conditional consumption volatility relative to the united states by about 10 15 percentage points we turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining this result domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if debt is securitized and traded internationally conversely the risk sharing benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up as it did in the recent financial crisis la titrisation fait que les risques attaches aux hypotheques peuvent etre transiges internationalement voila qui contribue de maniere significative a la diversification internationale des risques macroeconomiques dans les annees 2003 2008 l accroissement dans la dette hypothecaire titrisee detenue dans d autres pays a reduit la volatilite de la consommation relative par rapport aux etats unis des pays industrialises de 10 15 points de pourcentage on examine le role du credit domestique dans l explication de ce resultat on montre que le credit domestique entraine un meilleur partage international du risque seulement si la dette est titrisee et negociee internationalement a contrario les avantages de la titrisation semblent s evaporer si le credit s asseche comme ce fut le cas dans la recente crise financiere

monopolistic competition and the q theory of investment abstract in this paper we analyse the implications for q models of investment of replacing the assumption of perfect competition in the output market with the assumption of monopolistic competition the structural investment equation that can be derived in this case has a richer dynamic structure than the conventional one and it contains in addition to present and future q output as an explanatory variable in the applied section we discuss the extent to which monopolistic competition helps in providing a remedy for the empirical weaknesses of q models the estimates are obtained using aggregate data for u k industrial and commercial companies for the period 1951 1979