guaranty funds and risk taking evidence from the insurance industry abstract this paper examines change in property liability insurers risk taking around enactments of state guaranty fund laws our evidence suggests that the risk of insurers asset portfolios increases following enactments but this increase in risk is significant only for stock insurers our evidence of increased risk taking following guaranty fund adoptions suggests that the way these funds are organized creates counterproductive investment incentives especially for stock companies because these laws were enacted by states over the period 1969 1981 our evidence on changes in risk taking helps resolve statistical problems that have been troublesome for studies of bank deposit insurance

proprietary public finance and economic welfare abstract we develop a positive theory of public finance in which the objective of tax and spending policy is to extract rents for the incumbent ruler the analysis shows how dependence of the incumbent ruler s survival probability on his tax and spending policy can lower the equilibrium tax rate and increase the equilibrium amount of spending on productive public services but only until the minimum credible tax rate which depends on the ruler s endogenous survival probability becomes a binding constraint the central result of the analysis is that if a relatively benevolent tax and spending policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability then the ruler s equilibrium policy is relatively benevolent

joint effects of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on optimal bank portfolio adjustments the 1980 depository institution deregulation and monetary control act didmca mandates that regulation q be phased out by 1986 with deregulation of interest rate ceilings the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more closely related with interest rates in the money and capital markets thus value maximizing bank managers would need to be concerned not only with the internal risk but also with the external risk in bank portfolio management decisions based upon the cash flow version of the capital asset pricing model this paper analyzes the joint impact of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on the portfolio behavior of a banking firm the 1980 depository institution deregulation and monetary control act didmca mandates that regulation q be phased out by 1986 with deregulation of interest rate ceilings the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more correlated with interest rates in the money and capital markets the bank s cash profit would be more dependent on the interest rate fluctuation ceteris paribus thus the value of a banking firm would also be more dependent on the correlation of the banking firm s cash profit with that of the external market ceteris paribus therefore as deregulation continues a value maximizing bank manager would need to be concerned not only with variance and covariances among the returns on bank assets but also with covariances between rates on bank assets and liabilities as well as that in the external markets study of portfolio behavior of a banking firm should distinguish between the impact of internal risk and external risk on firm value furthermore with interest rate deregulation and the ensuing interactions among various risks banks may also react differently to capital regulation imposed by the regulatory agency despite numerous studies on regulation of bank capital the joint effects of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on bank

bank regulation and risk taking incentives an international comparison of bank risk abstract this paper uses a panel database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk taking after controlling for deposit insurance and for the quality of a country s contracting environment the results indicate that regulatory restrictions increase banks risk taking incentives by reducing their charter value banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value which increases their incentives to follow risky policies these results corroborate a negative relation between regulatory restrictions and the stability of a banking system deposit insurance has a positive influence on bank charter value mitigating the risk shifting incentives it creates this positive influence disappears when we control for the possible endogeneity of deposit insurance

the pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies the paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis despite of the potential moral hazard problems we argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance especially when the insured institution is insolvent applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option we first derive a closed form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies then we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for the properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk based pricing scheme

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

prompt corrective action and bank efforts to recover from undercapitalization abstract this study empirically examines the likelihood and timing of bank recoveries from positions of undercapitalization our findings indicate that 1 there appears to be only a limited capacity for banks to correct positions of undercapitalization by growth limitations or dividend restrictions 2 the impact of profitability on recovery is greater the longer a bank remains undercapitalized and 3 equity infusions are the primary mechanism by which banks can recapitalize quickly this evidence is relevant to regulators in their implementation of the fdic improvement act of 1991 which requires that undercapitalized banks take prompt corrective actions to recapitalize quickly under threat of early closure

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

growth opportunities and risk taking by financial intermediaries we show that growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash under conditions of financial distress gz are a critical determinant of an intermediary s choice of risk financial institutions in which gz is a low proportion of total assets will be much more likely to engage in go for broke behavior the model leads to a reevaluation of the effectiveness of several traditional remedies for dealing with banks that take excessive risks such as raising insurance premiums intervening before capital is depleted and restricting investment options the model also has implications about a new approach to the examination of financial intermediaries the insuring agencies are painfully aware that when a bank is at or near insolvency it has an incentive to take greater risks stanley silverberg 1984 p 100 director of research at the federal deposit insurance corporation has observed that under such conditions it is generally in the interest of managers and owners to gamble in an effort to recoup if the bank rolls the dice and loses the fdic typically bears the loss of course bank shareholders like shareholders in other limited liability corporations have an incentive to take larger gambles than if their activities were financed entirely by equity what distinguishes go for broke behavior however is that a firm in go for broke mode will be willing to play with dice loaded against it go for broke behavior occurs when a firm chooses an operating strategy that will lower the expected value of its assets a firm in go for broke mode causes a loss to society since it will allocate resources to uses that have a lower expected return than the opportunity cost of funds in this paper we examine the conditions under which a bank has an incentive to adopt go for broke behavior and the challenge faced by regulators in controlling such behavior we show that weakly capitalized banks with negligible opportunities for profitable growth pose the greatest threat and that traditional supervisory remedies are least effective against such banks

deposit insurance and wealth effects the value of being too big to fail this paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the comptroller of the currency s announcement that some banks were too big to fail and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided using an event study methodology we find positive wealth effects accruing to tbtf banks with corresponding negative effects accruing to non included banks we demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size we also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the wall street journal and not that actually intended by the comptroller the role of deposit insurance has become a topic of increasing debate advocates argue that by removing the incentive to run deposit insurance protects individual financial institutions from instability in the intermediation process thereby providing stability to the financial system as a whole 1 the recent rise in bank failures and the concomitant crises in the s l industry however demonstrate that this stability is not guaranteed moreover critics note that deposit insurance may introduce incentive problems and wealth effects into the financial system both of which can impede the effective functioning of any deposit insurance system these problems have prompted concern about the structure of the current deposit insurance system and have led to numerous proposals regarding its restructuring 2 this paper investigates one aspect of this debate by analyzing the effect on bank equity values of the policy decision to insure completely some banks but not others specifically in september 1984 the comptroller of the currency testified before congress that some banks were simply too big to fail tbtf and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided while not explicitly naming the banks the comptroller admitted that this policy would apply to the eleven largest banks using an event study methodology we analyze

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

medium of payment in corporate acquisitions evidence from interstate bank mergers it has been known for some time that the medium of payment used in acquisitions is an important factor to consider see carleton et al 1983 it has also been noted that different methods of financing a project have different infor lllational implications myers and majluf 1984 krasker 1986 furthermore a substantial volume of empirical literature on stock issues reports negative stock price reactions to new offerings of seasoned common stock for example asquith and mullins 1986 kalay and shimrat 1987 this paper examines the role of medium of payment in corporate acquisitions with the help of evidence from a large sample of interstate bank mergers which took place over the five year period from 1982 through 1986 under state statutes passed in compliance with the douglas amendment to the bank holding company act 1956 initiated in 1982 merger activity of this type has grown rapidly in volume ever since and has already dramatically changed the stiucture of the commercial banking industry in this country the results of this study indicate that when the full sample of banks involved in interstate bank mergers is divided into subsamples by medium of payment the abnormal announcement period returns for the subsamples are equal to each other as well as to the results for the full sample the finding that bidder returns are not affected by the bidder s choice of medium of payment is in contrast with findings of the existing empirical studies that have explored this issue in the context of nonbank mergers see asquith biuner and mullins 1987 travlos 1987 eckbo and langohr 1989 franks hams and mayer 1988 they all report significantly higher bidder returns from cash financed acquisitions than from stock financed acquisitions

a note on the risk adjusted price concentration relationship in banking abstract price concentration studies in banking typically find a significant and negative relationship between consumer deposit rates i e prices and market concentration this implies highly concentrated banking markets are bad for depositors it also provides support for the structure conduct performance hypothesis and rejects the efficient structure hypothesis however these studies have focused almost exclusively on supply side control variables and neglected demand side variables when estimating the reduced form price concentration relationship for example previous studies have not included in their analysis bank specific risk variables as measures of cross sectional derived deposit demand we find that when bank specific risk variables are included in the analysis the magnitude of the relationship between deposit rates and market concentration decreases by over 50 we offer an explanation for these results based on the correlation between a bank s risk profile and the structure of the market in which it operates these results suggest that it may be necessary to reconsider the well established assumption that higher market concentration necessarily leads to anticompetitive deposit pricing behavior by commercial banks this has direct implications for the antitrust evaluations of bank merger and acquisition proposals by regulatory agencies and in a more general sense these results suggest that any structure conduct performance based study that does not explicitly consider the possibility of very different risk profiles of the firms analyzed may indeed miss a very important set of explanatory variables and thus the results from those studies may be spurious

risk shifting incentives of depository institutions a new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform abstract we characterize the risk shifting incentives of a depository institution as arising fundamentally from the existence of limited liability and the associated convex payoff to equity holders this risk incentive feature is unchanged by deposits being insured and hence excessive risk taking by depository institutions is not solely attributable to the flat rate insurance premium consequently the incentive problem cannot be resolved through a risk based insurance premium contrary to the prevailing view we propose a solution that eliminates risk shifting through an optimal tax structure and specify a corresponding insurance premium that is revenue neutral from the social planner s regulator s standpoint the solution is derived in the context of a social objective function that trades off the benefits of liquidity services by banks and the unique informational role of bank loans with the costs of investment distortions engendered by risk shifting

derivatives regulation implications for central banks abstract we review aspects of derivatives markets that affect central bank operations we focus on how derivatives affect monetary policy and bank supervision and argue that derivatives have no material adverse impact on the conduct of monetary policy our analysis suggests that both derivatives users and dealers face relatively small default risks from derivatives systemic risk the risk of widespread default has been largely exaggerated policy debates have neglected incentives of employees the nature of this agency risk suggests that internal controls are more likely to reduce these problems than derivatives regulation

modeling structural and temporal variation in the market s valuation of banking firms hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value such unbooked capital has on balance sheet and off balancesheet sources this paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants in effect the analysis expands the twoindex model by endogenizing the market and interest rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on balance sheet and off balance sheet elements for a sample of banks during 1975 1985 the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital to the extent that an accounting representation of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value the firm is said to have hidden capital two sources of hidden capital exist accountants misvaluations of portfolio positions that accounting principles designate as on balance sheet items and the systematic neglect of off balance sheet sources of value that these principles do not permit to be formally booked this paper develops a model for estimating both types of hidden capital the model makes direct use of accounting information on the bookable positions of a firm and separates bookable from unbookable sources of value we use regression analysis to partition the market value of a firm s stock i e its market capitalization mv into two components recorded capital reserves and unrecorded or hidden net worth hidden capital is in turn allocated between values that are unbooked but bookable through asset turnover or writedowns on a historical cost balance sheet under generally accepted accounting principles gaap and values which gaap currently designates as an unbookable offbalance sheet item we estimate the net unbooked value of on balance sheet positions by estimating an intermediate variation ratio k this variable expresses the ratio of the market value to the book value of the collected components of a firm s bookable

market expectations of the effects of the tax reform act of 1986 on banking organizations abstract this study investigates market expectations regarding the effect of the tax reform act of 1986 on the banking industry the evidence shows that overall the tax reform did not adversely affect the stocks of banking institutions the findings suggest that overall banking organizations were expected to largely mitigate any negative effects of the tax reform on their cash flow by rebalancing and or repricing their portfolios of assets and liabilities the most significant provision of the new act was the limitation on foreign tax credits interestingly the markets did not expect any adverse valuation effects from the recapture of loan loss reserves or the elimination of the interest deductibility for carrying tax exempt securities

the impact of regulation on bank equity infusions abstract this article examines the extent to which regulatory capital standards influence infusions of external equity into commercial banks while such infusions occur infrequently they result in large adjustments to overall bank capital and provide important signals to regulators of managerial intent using a sample of 753 equity capital issues occurring during 1986 and 1987 we find evidence that regulatory minimum capital constraints are instrumental in influencing the financing decisions made by a significant subset of banks

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions current theories of the rule of law argue that public officials respect rights if the citizens are coordinated on an equilibrium in which they collectively resist abuse constitutional rules are means to coordinate on this equilibrium in past and present states however constitutional rules often have no effect on the rule of law this paper suggests an alternative view of the origin and development of the rule of law instead of considering constitutional rules as coordination devices for citizens at large history suggests considering them as manifestations of equilibria with rulers constrained by administrators required to implement policy analysis of the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions may be the key to a theory and policy that would foster the rule of law in developing countries and those in transition in particular constitutional reforms might benefit from focusing on altering the equilibrium distribution of administrative capacity and power providing incentives to the administratively powerful to check predation by each other and the central authorities and to align administrators interests with social welfare

a note on the stock market effects of the adoption of risk based capital requirements on international banks in different countries abstract the present note provides empirical evidence on the relative competitive effects of the adoption of risk based capital requirements on large international banks in the u s canada u k and japan a two index regression model is used to calculate prediction errors in periods with numerous announcements concerning the new capital rules including the basle conference we find significant declines in equity returns for u s canadian and u k banks in response to news announcements with u s bank stocks exhibiting the largest negative reaction for japanese banks the equity return results are mixed which may be due to uncertainty among investors regarding the handling of their sizeable hidden reserves under the new risk adjusted capital rules

state contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance abstract this paper presents a model of incentive compatible bank regulation under moral hazard and adverse selection we derive a wide range of simple and conceptually implementable mechanisms that can solve each type of incentive problem separately and also achieve the first best outcome but only when regulatory instruments involve ex post pricing that is contingent on the bank s performance relative to the market an important feature of these mechanisms is that they do not involve a subsidy to the bank when the regulator faces both moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously we identify the conditions under which the same mechanism can achieve the first best solution

government clubs and constitutions abstract this paper analyzes constitutional effectiveness the degree to which constitutions can be enforced in the system of government vs the system of clubs i argue that clubs have residual claimants on revenues generated through constitutional compliance operate in a highly competitive environment and permit individuals to sort themselves according to their governance needs these features make their constitutional contracts self enforcing government lacks these features so its constitutional contract is not institutional augmentations that make government more club like such as federalism democracy and limited government scope improve government s constitutional effectiveness but constitutional effectiveness remains superior in the system of clubs

monetary policy under alternative bank market structures abstract the purpose of this paper is to derive and compare the short run effects of monetary policy under both perfectly and imperfectly competitive banking markets within the context of a general equilibrium framework which emphasizes the demands for and supplies of financial assets it is demonstrated that the structure of banking markets can have a bearing on the appropriate choice of policy targets and instruments specifically the federal funds rate is shown to be a potentially ineffective target instrument for policy under a competitive banking system although it can be used to produce conventional short run effects when banking markets are imperfect in contrast the level of currency and unborrowed reserves can be utilized as an effective target instrument under either form of bank market structure

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

variable rate deposit insurance a re examination abstract this paper investigates the impact of variable rate deposit insurance on the financial and real sectors of the economy and its role as an absorber of bankruptcy risk within these sectors a variable rate system raises the cost of funds to the real sector and increases probability of bankruptcy of the borrowing firms when such bankruptcies occur society experiences a dead weight loss we argue that appropriate deposit insurance pricing must weigh the social costs connected with both financial firm failure and real sector bankruptcy

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

valuation capital structure and shareholder unanimity for depository financial intermediaries the theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision making the lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm first when intermediaries accept deposit financing they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources second the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid in this paper a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived

risk taking behavior of banks under regulation abstract this paper analyzes the value maximization of regulated banks within a moral hazard framework in the model regulators monitor both the capital ratio and the asset portfolio and banks simultaneously select the optimum capital ratio and asset portfolio a key assumption is that a bank cannot expect a positive put option value once it is classified as risky by regulators the optimum values of the two variables depend on investment opportunities and charter values as well as regulatory parameters the model that explicitly incorporates regulation can explain various phenomena that are seemingly inconsistent with the predictions of moral hazard models for example a positive relationship between the capital ratio and the riskiness of the asset portfolio a particularly interesting result is that a larger charter value results in a higher risk interior solution

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

what does it take for a roving bandit settle down theory and an illustrative history of the visigoths a roving bandit provides exclusive rivalrous collective goods to members of its in group a stationary bandit further provides inclusive non rivalrous public collective goods to the out group the inclusive goods are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in group as such the transition from roving to stationary bandit is likely to involve the redefinition of the in group its collective interest and the type of goods that it provides to illustrate these points i employ a case study of the roving visigothic confederacy as it evolved during the fourth and fifth centuries towards the stationary visigothic kingdom the illustration provides insights into why competition amongst roving bandits does not always or often lead to the emergence of a non predatory state

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

the wealth effects of the risk based capital requirement in banking the evidence from the capital market abstract the imposition of risk based capital requirements has been advocated by some regulatory authorities as a means of mitigating the incentive problems created by fixed premium deposit insurance however their imposition also constitutes a requirement to maintain an exogenously influenced capital structure which may adversely affect the values of the firms involved this paper examines the wealth effects of the announcement of the basle committee s intention to impose across international boundaries a pre determined minimum level of risk adjusted capital we find that in general the equity values of a sample of large publicly traded banks decrease at the time of the announcement further those banks with capital levels which are deficient relative to the mandated levels suffer the largest relative losses

bank capital and equity investment regulations abstract this paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks minimum required capital asset ratio and the regulation that limits and in some countries forbids banks investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms there are two sources of moral hazard in the model one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project among other things the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank s stability and can also be pareto improving equity regulation is never pareto improving and does not increase the bank s stability

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

deposit insurance around the world in the past two decades in a series of banking crises around the world banks have become systematically insolvent these crises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike to make such financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur policymakers feel the need for financial safety nets these include such policies as implicit or explicit deposit insurance a lender of last resort function of the central bank bank insolvency resolution procedures and bank regulation and supervision of these policies explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes almost tripled with most oecd countries and an increasing number of developing economies adopting some form of explicit depositor protection in 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the european union establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing economies

two bandits or more the case of viking age england the olsonian distinction between roving and stationary bandits outlines the rationale behind the transition from anarchy to the emergence of the predatory state this two bandit model may however be expanded to include more bandit types in the case of viking age england local english kings were unable to monopolize violence and defend their realms against competing viking raiders as the vikings time horizon grew so did the accumulated value of more formal taxation and bandit types evolved in four steps the first step is the olsonian roving bandit who executed viking hit and run attacks and plunders during the second half of the tenth century the second step is the gafol bandit gafol is payment for leaving paid to among others swein forkbeard the third step is the heregeld bandit heregeld is a tax to support an army for hire most notably thorkell the tall s the fourth step is the olsonian stationary bandit i e the strongest military leader among the vikings cnut the great settled down as the new king overall the olsonian two bandit model can be expanded to a four bandit staircase model in which the new gafol and heregeld bandit types explain the steps from anarchy and short run raiding to long run formal taxation in a predatory state

the effect of stock for debt swaps on bank holding companies abstract twenty two of the numerous stock for debt swaps that have taken place since august 1981 have been by bank holding companies although the most oft quoted reason for making the swap is its positive effect on reported earnings we argue that the effects of the bankruptcy tax act of 1980 on the tax treatment of early retirement of discount debt often makes stock for debt swaps a preferable alternative to cash repurchases of discount debt for sinking fund obligations furthermore for bank holding companies the swaps allow them to adjust their capital positions to new optimal levels ad dictated by the more stringent capital standards promulgated by the regulatory authorities in 1981 for 99 non banking firms we found a significant and negative abnormal average return on the swap announcement date of 0 49 percent for the 22 bank holding companies however we found no significant abnormal average return on the announcement date of the swaps the results suggest that swaps may be reducing the potential costs of regulatory interference for bank holding companies if they are overlevered which offsets whatever other force is driving down stock prices on new issue announcement dates

determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability using bank level data for 80 countries in the years 1988 9s this article shows that differences in interest margins and bank profitability reflect a variety of determinants bank characteristics macroeconomic conditions explicit and implicit bank taxation deposit insurance regulation overall financial structure and underlying legal and institutional indicators a larger ratio of bank assets to gross domestic product and a lower market concentration ratio lead to lower margins and profits controlling for differences in bank activity leverage and the macroeconomic environment foreign banks have higher margins and profits than domestic banks in developing countries while the opposite holds in industrial countries also there is evidence that the corporate tax burden is fully passed onto bank customers while higher reserve requirements are not especially in developing countries

size growth and transnationality among the world s largest banks this essay investigates the relationship between size and growth rate of large international banks and then relates these to the banks degree of transnationality we test two sets of three propositions each the first three propositions are pi that the growth rate of each bank over some period is independent of its size p2 that the variability of growth rates is independent of the banks size and p3 that the banks growth rates in two consecutive periods are independent of each other the second three propositions are p4 that there is no association between size and transnationality p5 that transnationality and growth are independent and p6 that there is no relationship between transnationality and the variability of growth rates the growth referred to is primarily that of assets as a measure of size for the two propositions concerning the variability of growth rates we supplement this measure with one of the market value of the banks equity the results have implications for concentration in internathis paper investigates six propositions relating to gibrat s law of proportionate growth the growth referred to is that of book assets and total market value the results have implications for concentration in international banking and for depositor safety and the social cost of insuring it and provide evidence on economies of scale and on the transnational spread of the industry

bank capital regulation and the valuation effects of latin american debt moratoriums abstract we examine effects of the mexican and bolivian debt moratoriums on bank share prices and analyze whether bank capital regulation influences these returns we hypothesize that investors perceived that capital deficient banks with exposure to this debt would sustain greater regulatory costs due to increased pressure from regulators to strengthen their capital bases or to reduce leverage consistent with this hypothesis we find that the impact of these debt moratoriums on bank stock returns is more unfavorable for capital deficient banks than for banks that met regulatory standards of capital adequacy

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

a dynamic analysis of the adoption of a new technology the case of optical scanners two p roportional hazard models are used to investigate the differingeffects of marke t structure variables on the conditional probabilityof a firm initially adoptin g the new technology of optical scanners as the innovation spreads through the f ood store industry during the early stage leading firms with large average sto re size which are not members of chains and which operate in less concentrated m arkets with higher incomes and wage rates tend to adopt scanners sooner later on differences in seller concentration market share and size become less impo rtant as other firms follow prior adoptions copyright 1987 by mit press

deposit insurance and financial development the authors examine the effect of different design features of deposit insurance on long run financial development defined to include the level of financial activity the stability of the banking sector and the quality of resource allocation their empirical analysis is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that employ an agency framework the authors examine the effect of deposit insurance on the size and volatility of the financial sector in a sample of fifty eight countries they find that generous deposit insurance leads to financial instability in lax regulatory environments but in sound regulatory environments deposit insurance does have the desired impact on financial development and growth thus countries introducing a deposit insurance scheme need to ensure that it is accompanied by a sound regulatory framework otherwise the scheme will likely lead to instability and deter financial development in weak regulatory environments policymakers should at least limit deposit insurance coverage

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

hedging interest rate risk with futures portfolios under term structure effects this study develops and tests a methodology for reducing interest rate risk in a fixed spot portfolio of assets and liabilities with default free cash flows a minimum variance hedge is constructed by adding a portfolio of financial futures to the spot portfolio theorems are given which establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of unique and zero variance hedges the risk reduction characteristics of the methodology are demonstrated by an empirical analysis unexpected interest rate fluctuations may have significant impact on the market value of both bond portfolios and interest sensitive institutions the early literature on this subject includes the seminal works of samuelson 27 redington 26 and wallas 29 all of whom consider the impact of unexpected interest rate changes on financial institutions briefly their results indicate that interest rate risk is minimized when the mean time of the assets and liabilities are equal assuming equal initial asset and liability values redington coined the term immunization to refer to the absence of interest rate risk the immunization solutions in their simplest form depend on the duration mean time of asset and liability cash flows the concept of duration was apparently developed independently by macaulay 22 and hicks 18 macaulay interested in the effective maturity of a bond defined duration as

when and why did fslic resolve insolvent thrifts abstract this paper develops an optimal resolution triage strategy for a deposit insurance regulator the regulator seeks to maximize the market value of the deposit insurance enterprise subject to budget personal bureaucratic political informational and legal restraints testable hypotheses are derived concerning the timing of insolvency resolutions the paper tests these hypotheses using a two step hazards model and a data set of thrift resolutions during 1985 1989 the tests focus on the relative roles of value maximization and constraint pressures in decisions to grant capital forbearance the results suggest that regulators seldom conformed to the benchmark resolution timing strategy that an unconflicted agent would follow under only a budget constraint instead the evidence shows that the resolution timing decision was distorted by personal political informational and legal constraints

the bank capital decision a time series cross section analysis this paper seeks to explain the dramatic decline in capital to asset ratios in u s commercial banks during the last two decades it is hypothesized that the rise in nominal interest rates during this period might have contributed substantially to the fall in capital ratios time series cross section estimation supports the hypothesis regarding the interest rate bank capital is the sum of equity plus debt subordinated to deposits capital provides a cushion that protects the bank from insolvency when the value of its assets falls a bank can meet its obligations to depositors as long as losses on its asset portfolio do not exceed its capital the ratio of capital to total assets in u s commercial banks has fallen dramatically in the last two decades dropping from 11 7 percent in 1961 to 5 7 percent in 1978 the lowest level since world war ijj1 figure 1 shows the decline in the ratio of capital to noncash assets these figures suggest that the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic and uninsured depositors are being exposed to increased probabilities of losses from bank insolvencies however relatively little empirical research has been devoted to the determinants of the bank capital decision further the existing work see for example peltzman 24 mingo 20 or mayne 17 18 uses only cross sectional data and therefore does not necessarily explain the decline in capital to asset ratios over time previous empirical research has also focused on book values rather than market values of debt and equity although market values provide better estimates of the protection afforded by capital this practice might be partly justified by the attention paid to book values by bank regulators however the increasing use of qualitative factors as well as book ratios in capital regulation indicates that regulators are aware of the deficiencies in book values many of the so called qualitative considerations are precisely the factors that distinguish market from book value 6 pp 78 80 finally difficulties arise over the proper measure of capital the empirical studies cited above treat equity and debt capital symmetrically both equity and assistant professor of finance economics boston university school of management this paper was originally written as part of a doctoral dissertation at m i t helpful suggestions from robert mcdonald richard schmalensee larry summers and edward j kane are gratefully acknowledged l these statistics are based on the market values of capital and assets the methods used to construct the market value series are described in the appendix capital asset ratios based on book values also have fallen over the period in question although not as severely

predator or prey parasitic enterprises in economic development abstract in many developing and transition economies mafia like activities are rampant extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives incorporated in a model of industrialization bimodal club convergence may result economies may get stuck in a predators club characterized by a vicious cycle of poverty and predation societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club poor societies with a high flow of new entrepreneurs however may grow out of the trap and join the rich producers club

correlated default risks and bank regulations bank regulatory design relies critically on bank risk modeling traditionally the bank s aggregate value is assumed to obey an exogenously specified process e g a lognormal diffusion we demonstrate that this assumption is generally invalid given the truncated and correlated payoff structure of individual bank loans instead the bank s aggregate terminal payoff is significantly left fat tailed this skewness remains even when the bank holds an infinitely large number of loans in its portfolio unless they are uncorrelated by ignoring skewness in bank payoffs deposit insurance premia and capital requirements have traditionally been significantly mis calculated

a framework for assessing credit risk in depository institutions toward regulatory reform abstract this paper develops and illustrates a new method for evaluating the credit risk borne by depository institutions that may prove to be an important element in a regulatory mechanism sensitive to risk in our framework depository institutions are forced to bear the costs of their risk exposure and hence to internalize this cost when extending loans using various loan portfolios and alternative macroeconomic scenarios we present numerical calculations demonstrating the ability of our framework to capture variations in risk exposure and highlighting the significance of portfolio concentrations these calculations are based on an important new source of information that permits an econometric analysis of loan losses by industry

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks abstract how bankers choose the riskiness of their individual assets is an important question it is well known that fixed premium deposit insurance leads a bank to prefer a high variance asset portfolio but its effect on individual asset choice has not been carefully evaluated this paper demonstrates how bank examination procedures and capital adequacy standards can make the value of a bank s deposit insurance contract concave in individual asset risks insured bankers may therefore have a rational preference ceteris paribus for relatively safe individual loans even while they prefer risky portfolio returns the model s implications for loan securitization and the federal regulators new risk based capital standards are discussed

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

tax planning regulatory capital planning and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks we test whether banks investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status we document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense we also document an association between banks marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles however banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs we posit specific types of transaction cost impediments to tax planning and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax planning benefits article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the integration of insurance and taxes in corporate pension strategy this paper examines the implications of the joint effects of insurance and taxes for the optimal corporate pension strategy it is shown that neither the mini max nor the maxi min strategy advocated by previous authors is necessarily best in corporate pension management in the presence of capital market imperfections the analysis via a single period contingent claims model indicates that optimal corporate pension strategy in both asset allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior solution since the passage of the employee retirement income security act erisa in 1974 considerable attention has been given to the development of optimal strategies for corporate pension management under erisa the corporate pension liabilities have become parts of corporate liabilities and consequently the management of corporate pension plans has become an integral dimension of the overall corporate financial policy at present corporate pensions are subject to special tax treatments in the internal revenue code as well as various erisa regulations therefore it is important to analyze the complex tradeoffs among various explicit and implicit benefits and costs in order to derive an optimal corporate pension strategy several important contributions in the area of corporate pension strategy have been developed in finance and economic literature for instance sharpe 18 has shown that in the absence of taxes and under the current structure of a fixed insurance premium charged by the pension benefit guaranty corporation pbgc the insurance effect calls for the mini max corporate pension strategy that involves a minimum level of pension plan funding and a maximum level of pension investment in risky assets conversely black 1 and tepper 19 have argued that in the absence of default risk and pension insurance the tax effect calls for the maxi min corporate pension strategy that suggests a maximum level of plan funding and a minimum level of investment in the lowtax risky assets in their recent work harrison and sharpe 8 and marcus 12 have shown that the corner solutions in pension strategy are optimal even when the insurance and tax effects are considered jointly the purpose of this study is to examine the joint insurance and tax effects on corporate pension strategies in the presence of some relevant market imperfections the single period contingent claim analysis is applied to examine these important effects on corporate pension strategies

capital and risk in property liability insurance markets abstract this paper investigates the capital and portfolio risk decisions of property liability insurance firms a theoretical model based on option pricing theory is developed which predicts a positive relationship between insurer capital and risk as firms balance these two factors to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk the implications of the model are then tested empirically using a simultaneous equations methodology the results support the predictions of the model they also provide evidence that managerial incentives play a role in determining capital and risk in insurance markets the findings have significant implications for insurance solvency regulation

investment policy financing policy and performance characteristics of de novo savings and loan associations abstract this paper develops a simultaneous equation model to investigate the investment policies financing policies and risk return characteristics of de novo thrift institutions a model to explain state entry rates for de novo institutions is also presented entry dates are significantly influenced by investment powers as the numbers of de novo charters are found to be significantly higher in states with the most liberal set of permissible activities economic growth and the demand for financial services also contributed to higher entry rates utilization of the liberal powers did not however contribute positively to returns firms with riskier asset portfolios were found to have lower realized returns efficiency in operations and strong capitalization were found to be positively associated with higher returns

managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks in this paper we investigate the effects of regulatory policies on troubled banks in our analysis banks portfolio decisions are unobservable and are made by management management s decisions are influenced by the compensation and intervention policies of shareholders and regulators as well as the impact of its portfolio choice on its share of firm specific rents we demonstrate that firm specific rents may induce managers to prefer risky asset portfolios these incentives may be exacerbated by shareholder designed compensation contracts intended to align managerial and stockholder interests depending on the parametric specifications of the model both the often criticized practice of regulatory forbearance and the compensation regulations proposed in the federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act of 1991 may form part of the deposit insurance loss minimizing regulatory policy

the administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy a note in this paper we present evidence on the direct administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy the investigation is directed toward providing evidence that may be helpful in answering questions about the role of bankruptcy costs as a determinant of corporate capital structures the importance of bankruptcy costs as a determinant of corporate financing policy has been extensively debated in the finance literature the origins of the debate can be traced to modigliani and miller 8 and robichek and myers 9 under the assumption that debt is default free and interest payments are taxdeductible modigliani and miller demonstrated that firms will maximize their market values by maximizing their use of debt financing robichek and myers demonstrated that this conclusion also holds when debt is not default free but bankruptcy is costless to explain observed corporate debt to total value ratios which typically fall in the range of 20 percent to 30 percent robichek and myers 9 and baxter 1 appealed to the existence of bankruptcy costs as a possible counterweight to the tax deductibility of interest payments subsequently kraus and litzenberger 5 scott 10 lee and barker 6 kim 4 and turnbull 13 developed formal models in which firms maximize value by increasing their use of debt financing to the point where the marginal present value of future tax shields equals the marginal present value of future bankruptcy costs the bankruptcy cost literature has identified three types of costs as potentially relevant to the determination of a firm s optimal mix of debt and equity financing 1 the direct administrative expenses paid to various third parties involved in the bankruptcy proceedings 2 the shortfall in realized value when assets are sold in liquidation or the indirect costs of reorganization and 3 the loss of tax credits which the firm would have received had it not gone bankrupt contrarily haugen and senbet 3 and to a lesser extent miller 7 and warner 14 have argued that the only bankruptcy costs relevant to the determination of a firm s optimal capital structure are the direct administrative costs of bankruptcy the crux of their argument is that the shortfall costs of liquidation the indirect costs of reorganization and the loss of tax credits which occurs upon dissolution of the firm are in fact relevant to the liquidation investment decisions of the firm these costs would be borne by the security holders of a failing firm

charter value minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium abstract this paper shows that leaving insolvent banks with large enough charter values open can be optimal and derives normative bank closure reorganization policies based on the liquidation value of assets and the charter value the charter value of a bank is broadly defined as the value that would be foregone due to a closure our simulations of risk taking show that an optimal forbearance for an insolvent bank with a large enough charter value alleviates the moral hazard problem this is because increasing the risk raises the probability of losing the charter value although it generates a moral hazard gain

deposit insurance pricing and social welfare abstract recent literature has established that financial disruption has real costs which justify government intervention in the financial sector one form of government intervention is deposit insurance in this paper we determine the optimal pricing and subsidy of deposit insurance in a social welfare context the main conclusion is that optimal deposit insurance need not be actuarially fair in an economy with a real and a financial sector we consider the effects of taxation and social political weights of the sectors we analyze two policy tools government supervision and deposit insurance pricing

aggregate deposit insurance funding and taxpayer bailouts abstract recent events have focused attention on the fragility of the federal deposit insurance funds and made redesign of the insurance system an active policy issue this paper explores the implications of different rate structures for the long term solvency of the fund using two simulation techniques based on historical loss distributions three findings stand out 1 under the former 8 33 bp premium rate as well as under the 15 bp premium rate mandated as the new long run target or default premium rate by both firrea and the fdic assesment rate act of 1990 the probability that the fund could become insolvent over a given 55 year period is higher than previously recognized 2 raising the effective cap on the fund to as low as 2 5 of deposits can substantially reduce the probability of insolvency without further increasing the premium rate and 3 the anticipated temporary 1991 premium rate of 19 5 bp implies a quite low probability of insolvency

ceo compensation and bank risk is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking abstract this paper examines whether executive compensation in banking is structured to promote risk taking we find that on average bank ceos receive less cash compensation are less likely to participate in a stock option plan hold fewer stock options and receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and stock than do ceos in other industries cross sectional differences in the structure of compensation contracts within banking are also examined we find a positive and significant relation between the importance of equity based incentives and the value of the bank s charter this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that compensation policies promote risk taking in banking

rational bandits plunder public goods and the vikings the paper applies and extendsinsights from mancur olson s study of statemaking to the vikings in a world ofroving bandits a sub optimal provision ofpublic goods exists most notably ofsecurity roving banditry leads toover plundering and zero profits for theplunderers which makes stationary banditryprofitable the most efficient banditsmonopolize violence begin to tax andprovide some amounts of public goods inorder to stimulate economic growth theanalysis demonstrates how the vikings activities and settlements are consistentwith such an explanation with the dynamicsof the process being reflected in thevariation in the number of raids and theamount of wealth extracted

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

the distributional impact of foreign deposits on federal deposit insurance premia abstract rapid growth of deposits in u s foreign bank branches and current u s government policies have combined to create a new inequality in the deposit insurance system our research shows that smaller banks are substantially subsidizing the insurance costs of the larger multinational institutions when insurance premiums are viewed in the context of an implicit tax it is highly regressive with the wealth transfer growing over time recent reform proposals do not fully address important international influences and therefore underestimate the scope of the problem

market discipline and deposit insurance cross country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking internationally deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage funding and management this reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured to inform this debate we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline

optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation and deposit insurance this paper examines the relationships among capital regulation deposit insurance and the optimal bank interest margin in a model where loan losses are the source of uncertainty changes in capital regulation or deposit insurance premiums have direct effects on the bank s interest margin an increase in bank capital requirement or in deposit insurance premiums results in a reduced interest margin under nonincreasing risk aversion comparative static analysis also explores the relation between asset quality and interest margin it is shown that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of loan losses results in a reduced margin

the pbgc s flat fee schedule moral hazard and promised pension benefits abstract the pension benefit guarantee corporation pbgc initially insured private pension benefits in exchange for a premium that was not risk sensitive this paper derives conditions under which a moral hazard problem caused promised pension benefits to increase the hypotheses are tested using data on individual pension contracts from the pre and post pbgc periods

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

the effects of a shift in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks abstract this paper examines the effects of the fed s october 6th 1979 change in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks using capital market data and an event study methodology it was found that bank stocks exhibited significant abnormal returns during the announcement week of the policy change when these abnormal returns were decomposed into a part related to unexpected interest rate changes and a part assumed to reflect increased rate variability the results were consistent with a negative relationship between bank returns and interest rate surprises as well as between bank returns and rate variability

management structure and technology diffusion in chinese state owned enterprises abstract this paper identifies factors that can explain the variation in the diffusion of continuous casting technology among chinese steel firms during the period 1985 1995 potential factors affecting firm level diffusion of continuous casting technology are tested econometrically using data from 75 chinese steel firms the results suggest that institutional factors such as management structure have had a significant influence on a firm s rate of diffusion in particular the results show that although centrally managed firms are typically the first to acquire a new technology complete integration of the technology into the production process occurs more rapidly in firms that are locally managed furthermore the results suggest that certain market factors are important in a locally managed firm s decision to convert but seem to have played a lesser role in centrally managed firms these results imply that although centrally managed firms have better access to new technologies due to their close ties to the central government locally managed firms may possess a greater incentive to improve production efficiency through the incorporation of new technology

avoiding bank runs in transition economies the role of risk neutral capital abstract in a general equilibrium model with risk neutral and risk averse agents we show that if banks issue both demand deposits and equity then free banking is run proof and efficient in particular we obtain the first best insurance solution if there is adequate risk neutral capital if sufficient risk neutral capital is unavailable then a partial suspension of convertibility is optimal in general therefore policies like capital adequacy norms and deposit insurance are neither necessary nor desirable