investment and financial constraints in hungarian agriculture we investigate credit market imperfections in hungarian agriculture farmers with low debts and using mainly rented land are liquidity constrained we find also evidence for the presence of soft budget constraint for high debt and corporate farms

loss aversion and learning to bid bidding challenges learning theories even with the same bid experiences vary stochastically the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss in such an environment the question arises of how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics we analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the experienced weighted attraction model of learning our experimental results suggest that individual learning dynamics are highly heterogeneous and affected by loss aversion to different degrees apart from that the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific to rare decision making

the realization effect risk taking after realized versus paper losses abstract understanding how prior outcomes affect risk attitudes is critical for the study of choice under uncertainty a large literature documents the significant influence of prior losses on risk attitudes the findings appear contradictory some studies find greater risk taking after a loss whereas others show the opposite that people take on less risk i reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing between realized versus paper losses using new and existing data i replicate prior findings and demonstrate that following a realized loss individuals avoid risk if the same loss is not realized a paper loss individuals take on greater risk jel d11 d14 d81 g11

framing effects and impatience evidence from a large scale experiment we confront a representative sample of 1102 dutch individuals with a series of incentivized investment decisions and also elicit their time preferences there are two treatments that differ in the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount the low frequency treatment stimulates decision makers to frame a sequence of risky decisions broadly rather than narrowly we find that the framing effect is significantly larger for impatient than for patient individuals this result is robust to controlling for various economic and demographic variables and for cognitive ability

risk rationality and time diversification the validity of the concept of time diversification is the subject of long running debate supporters of the concept argue that risk decreases as investment horizon increases detractors suggest that the concept is false on the face of it we argue that time diversification is consistent both theoretically and empirically with current conceptions of risk and rationality and we also note the implications of changes in investment horizon for stock market behavior

risk aversion in a dynamic asset allocation experiment we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of merton 1971 in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk free and risky asset using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants despite substantial heterogeneity decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types we also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain finally the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes

the behaviour of state firms in eastern europe pre privatisation in this paper we explore the behaviour of state firms pre privatisation the incentives and the constraints facing managers and the nature and the power of the coalitions within the firms we show that managers on low incentive payment schemes with little formal stake in privatisation and who face possible redundancy have little incentive to embark on restructuring hardened budget constraints career concerns and potential stakes in the privatised firm however may strengthen managerial incentives to restructure we then introduce an influence function which captures how the distribution of winners and losers within the firm and size of their loss and gain affects the probability of restructuring the function illustrates how strong opposition coming from large concentrated losses is likely to dominate diffuse support from small widely distributed gains government measures such as hardening budget constraints financing of severance payments and selective debt writedowns affect the distribution of gainers and losers and may be used to overcome blocking coalitions and increase support for restructuring examination of a range of enterprise case studies vindicates our hypothesis that the structure of control and production strongly affect incentives to restructure centralised management structures the presence of non performing units and a functional division of activities have all acted as serious constraints on the unbundling restructuring process whilst the removal of state subsidies has been critical in forcing firms to rationalise production and unbundle activities

causes consequences and cures of myopic loss aversion an experimental investigation we examine in an experiment the causes consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion mla for investment behaviour under risk we find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of mla longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments however when given the choice subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention that increases investment levels

comparing the impact of credit constraints on the growth of smes in a transition country with an established market economy in this paper we compare the role of internal finance on the growth of firms between a leading transition country slovenia and an established market economy belgium we find that firms in slovenia are more sensitive to internal financing constraints than their belgian counterparts furthermore we find that de novo firms and firms with long term debt are most constrained and that micro and smes can face great difficulties in accessing external sources of finance foreign firms however are able to raise external finance and consequently their growth is less reliant on the availability of internal finance our findings appear to indicate that although slovenian firms are no longer recipients of soft budget constraints the financial environment is not yet fully functional

impact of information technology capital on firm scope and performance the role of asset characteristics this research draws on transaction cost and resource based theory to examine how information technology it capital moderates the relationship between different types of assets and firm scope both vertical integration and diversification the analysis suggests that it capital enables firms with narrowly valuable assets to be less vertically integrated and less diversified and enables firms with broadly valuable assets to be more vertically integrated and more diversified the moderating influence of it capital on the relationship between different types of assets and firms vertical and product market scope is consistent with transaction cost as well as resource based traditions abstract from author

do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis two behavioral concepts loss aversion and mental accounting have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle recent experimental evidence supports the theory as students behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion mla yet much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision making these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals using traders recruited from the cbot we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with mla to a greater extent than students

coase s choice of methodology this paper examines the nature of ronald h coase s realism by considering the relationship between theories and facts in his methodology i focus especially on coase s criticisms of friedman s 1953 essay as set out in a lecture published in 1982 it is shown that in developing his argument coase applies his institutional economics to address the question of how economists operating within a regulated market for ideas choose their theories he calls for realism in methodology and carries out an empirical study of economists choices he explores how the profession is regulated and highlights how discourse impacts on the functioning of science a key question addressed within this paper is how can coase maintain a sociological and rhetorical view of science without falling into relativism i identify the different motives for theory choice that coase considers and show that his answer is both institutional and epistemic this helps to clarify the status of the empirical basis in coase s methodology and sheds new light on the nature of his realism i conclude by carrying out a reflexive analysis of coase s text as a text that attempts to justify the methodology on which it is itself based

social identity and governance the behavioral response to female leaders this paper uses data from artefactual field experiments and surveys conducted in 61 villages in india to examine whether men and women respond differently to women as leaders we investigate the extent to which behavior towards female leaders is influenced by experience with women in leadership positions we find evidence of significant male backlash against female leaders which can be attributed to the transgression of social norms and in particular a violation of male identity when women are assigned to positions of leadership through gender based quotas increased exposure to female leaders reduces the extent of bias

the effects of income mobility and tax persistence on income redistribution and inequality we explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies an infinite horizon theoretical model is developed and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after tax inequality are characterized mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate however neither is sufficient by itself social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility the two forces are complementary tax persistence leads to higher levels of post tax inequality for any amount of mobility the effect of mobility on inequality is less clear cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence a laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory and the results are generally supportive

firm growth and liquidity constraints a dynamic analysis using a large unbalanced panel data set of portuguese manufacturing firms surviving over the period from 1990 to 2001 the purpose of this paper is to examine whether liquidity constraints faced by business firms affect firm growth we use a gmm system to estimate a dynamic panel data model of firm growth that incorporates cash flow as a measure of liquidity constraints and persistence of growth the model is estimated for all size classes including micro firms our findings reveal that smaller and younger firms have higher growth cash flow sensitivities than larger and more mature firms this is consistent with the suggestion that financial constraints on firm growth may be relatively more severe for small and young firms nevertheless the same finding can be interpreted in a different way if we consider the more recent literature which interpret the higher investment cash flow sensitivity of younger and smaller firm in absence of financial market imperfection as the outcome of these firms reaction to the fact that realisation of their cash flows reveals them the direction to go in presence of uncertainty of their growth prospect besides firms that were small and young at the beginning of the sample period exhibited more persistent growth than those that were large and old finally these results have significant policy implications

no myopic loss aversion in adolescents an experimental note abstract myopic loss aversion mla has been found to play a persistent role for investment behavior under risk we study whether mla is already present during adolescence quite surprisingly we find no evidence of mla in a sample of 755 adolescents this finding is at odds with previous findings and it might be explained by self selection effects in other dimensions however we are able to replicate stylized findings in our pool of adolescents such that teams invest higher amounts than individuals and that women invest less than men

decision support for retirement portfolio management overcoming myopic loss aversion via technology design as firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee managed retirement plans tremendous demands are being placed on the decision making proficiency of future retirees as reflected in the equity premium puzzle individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time consequently there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement given that most retirement plans can now be managed online a potential solution lies in designing a web based decision support system dss that helps future retirees make more profitable portfolio management decisions this paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30 year period using a psychological approach toward designing the dss myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios armed with this knowledge three design features information horizon system restrictiveness and decisional guidance are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors willingness to take calculated risks the results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the dss presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons in contrast short term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors however when confronted with short term information horizons risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a dss to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation these findings carry important implications for theory and practice

no deep pockets some stylized empirical results on firms financial constraints this paper is a survey of recent empirical work on financial constraints faced by firms it is organized as a series of stylized results which mirror what is generally understood about the severity of financial constraints and the effects that they have upon firms the review of the literature shows that a financial constraints are a widespread key concern for firms hindering their ability to carry out their optimal investment and growth trajectories and b the severity of such constraints depends on institutional and firm specific characteristics as well as on the nature of investment projects

the effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking an experimental test myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally 1 investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often 2 if all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses investors will accept more risk in a task in which investors learn from experience both predictions are supported the investors who got the most frequent feedback and thus the most information took the least risk and earned the least money language en

union influence in post socialist europe we examine enterprise level union influence in post socialist countries we hypothesise that calculative hrm is more strongly associated with low levels of union influence than collaborative hrm using the uk as a benchmark we find that calculative hrm is indeed more damaging to union influence than collaborative although to a much lesser extent than in the uk we find that union influence corresponds to enterprise union density and is most apparent when the business cycle is unfavourable we explain our findings by reference to east european members continued attachment to unionism for non bargaining reasons

regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability this paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance in the random audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection in the tournament audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting to study the effects of social information the experiment varies the observability of identity output and compliance decisions optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme but equilibrium reporting is higher under the tournament mechanism than random auditing experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting but deviate modestly for output in particular we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the tournament treatment compared to the random audit treatment at the individual level a majority of participants misreported in most periods social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments

myopic loss aversion and stock investments an empirical study of private investors abstract myopic loss aversion was suggested by benartzi and thaler 1995 as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle its main prediction is that loss averse investors who evaluate their investment performance too frequently and therefore often observe small losses on their stock portfolios would invest too little in equity we investigate the link between myopic loss aversion and actual investment decisions of individual investors using survey data our results are consistent with the predictions of benartzi and thaler higher myopic loss aversion is associated with lower stock investment as a share of total assets investors tend to evaluate their stock portfolio performance too often which contributes to the prevalence of myopic loss aversion the effect of myopia is most apparent when investors both evaluate their portfolios frequently and trade stocks regularly

paying is believing the effect of costly information on bayesian updating the supposed irrelevance of historical costs for rational decision making has been the subject of much interest in the economic literature in this paper we explore whether individual decision making under risk is affected by the cost of information to do so one must distinguish the effect of cost from self selection by individuals who value information the most outside of the laboratory it is difficult to disentangle these two effects we thus create an experimental environment where subjects are o ered additional useful and identical information on the state of the world across treatments we find a systematic effect of sunk costs on the manner in which subjects update their beliefs subjects over weigh costly information relatively to free information which results in a push of beliefs towards the extremes this shift does not necessarily lead to behavior more attuned with bayesian updating we find that an intensification of representativeness bias due to cost is the most likely explanation of our results

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

risk taking by agents the role of ex ante and ex post accountability we study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal we observe that in the absence of accountability agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision ex ante and where they are accountable for the outcome ex post

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion one acclaimed role of managers is to monitor workers in team production processes and discipline them through the threat of terminating them from the team alchian and demsetz 1972 we extend a standard weakest link experiment with a manager that can decide to replace some of her team members at a cost the amount of contractual commitment termination possibilities and the precision of the manager s monitoring information serve as treatment variables our results show that the fear of exclusion has a profound effect on team performance even if workers are imperfectly monitored the most flexible contract induces the highest output while the one with no firing possibilities leads to the lowest production however once the fear is eliminated for some workers because permanent workers cannot be fired after a probation phase effort levels steadily decrease

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

myopic risk taking in tournaments abstract there is a common notion that incentive schemes in the financial industry trigger myopia and risk taking in some sense this contrasts with the concept of myopic loss aversion mla which implies that myopia mitigates risk taking a number of experimental studies support the mla hypothesis by showing that people take less risk the more frequently their investments are evaluated in this paper we show experimentally that if subjects are exposed to tournament incentives the standard mla effect disappears rather there is a tendency towards more risk taking the more frequently investments are evaluated

are teams prone to myopic loss aversion an experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior abstract myopic loss aversion mla has been found to have a persistent influence on individual decision making under risk in this paper i show that team decision making attenuates mla but that teams are also prone to mla

clumped or piecewise evidence on preferences for information in this paper we examine individuals attitudes toward the timing of information we test a theoretical prediction that people prefer to get information clumped together rather than piecewise we conduct a controlled lab experiment where subjects participate in a lottery and can choose between different resolutions of uncertainty clumped or piecewise and analyze which kind of resolution is preferred two additional treatments allow us to get a quantitative measure of subjects preferences over different information structures our data provide little support for a systematic aversion to piecewise information on the aggregate level in additional treatment conditions we demonstrate the robustness of our findings and explore potential explanations data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1884 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind ing period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky asset in an experimental study we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period to analyze how both variables alone contribute to the change in myopia and how they interact we find a strong effect for the length of commitment a much less pro nounced effect for the feedback frequency and a strong interaction between both variables the results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision making

how persistent are the effects of experience sampling on investor behavior abstract investor behavior was shown to be considerably different when the risk return tradeoff is presented by experience sampling as opposed to a descriptive communication we analyze the persistency of this difference in a setting in which investors are faced with multiple decisions over time and are consequently able to adjust the risk level they initially chose for this we use an experimental setting with repeated investment decisions over multiple trading days and we also test a new form of risk simulation in which wealth paths over time are presented rather than just final outcomes after investors initial decisions for which we confirm previous findings we do not find persistent differences of simulation based learning on investors risk taking behavior with regards to trading volume only a simulation in which investors see wealth paths and not only final outcomes leads to lower trading frequency soon after the initial asset allocation

stereotypes and false consensus how financial professionals predict risk preferences abstract we analyze the prediction of risk preferences of others using an artefactual field experiment with financial professionals and students for their prediction the subjects receive information on multiple demographic characteristics and a self assessment of risk taking of the target when analyzing the predictions we find three significant effects subjects use the demographic information for stereotyping as well as the target s self assessment on risk taking and we find a considerable false consensus effect the false consensus effect is the strongest for experienced professionals regarding the prediction s accuracy we find that the forecasts of the professionals are more accurate than the forecasts of the students

does aggregated returns disclosure increase portfolio risk taking many experiments have found that participants take more investment risk if they see returns less frequently see portfolio level returns rather than each individual asset s returns or see long horizon rather than one year historical return distributions in contrast we find that such information aggregation treatments do not affect total equity investment when we make the investment environment more realistic than in prior experiments previously documented aggregation effects are not robust to changes in the risky asset s return distribution or the introduction of a multi day delay between portfolio choice and return realizations

risk taking for oneself and others a structural model approach economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk we examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality and compare them to individual decisions by estimating a structural model we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses we also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter these results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature they also have implications for financial agency which we discuss

accounting and the theory of the firm abstract this paper describes the background and objectives of a series of papers written fifty years ago at the london school of economics lse one objective was to encourage the use of accounting numbers in economic research a second objective was to improve the theory and practice of accounting understanding cost accounting and opportunity costs within a firm was tied to understanding the organization of firms the theory of the accounting system is part of the theory of the firm like a similar request made fifty years ago the paper concludes with a call for interdisciplinary studies between economics and accounting

hardening the budget constraint the experience of the post socialist countries abstract the study surveys the typical manifestations of the softness of the budget constraint such as state subsidies soft taxation non performing loans the accumulation of trade arrears between firms and the build up of wage arrears in the various post socialist countries it was widely maintained at the outset of the post socialist transition that the holy trinity of liberalization privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy since then it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these unless this occurs the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations as they have in russia

relative pay and labor supply we examine the impact of relative wages on labor supply in a laboratory experiment we test the hypothesis that ceteris paribus making a given wage high low relative to other wage levels will lead to an increase decrease in labor supply we find that labor supply does respond significantly to relative pay and in the expected direction however when a strong enough reason for the relative low pay is given this difference disappears

transition and enterprise restructuring the role of budget constraints and bankruptcy costs the focus of analysis is on the impact of financial leverage as a measure of bankruptcy costs on enterprise restructuring based on budget constraints in the economy data of bulgarian manufacturing firms allow comparison of firm behavior under soft and hard budget constraints as distinguished by the inception of a currency board in 1997 controlling for change in sales firm size and type of ownership statistically significant relationship between financial leverage and firm restructuring through labor adjustments is found to exist under hard budget constraints only

myopic prospect theory vs myopic loss aversion how general is the phenomenon abstract individuals often act myopically in evaluating sequences of investment opportunities for loss averse decision makers myopia causes the sequence to look less attractive and might result in rejecting an investment program that would have been accepted otherwise in this paper we argue that the relation between myopia and the attractiveness of a lottery sequence is less general than previously suggested in the literature we extend the concept myopic loss aversion to myopic prospect theory predicting that for specific risk profiles myopia will not decrease but increase the attractiveness of a sequence we support our theoretical predictions by experimental evidence

investment flexibility and the acceptance of risk abstract the hypothesis examined in this paper is that the greater the investor s flexibility the easier it is for him to change his portfolio depending on his results the more willing he will be to accept risks when the investor has no control on the size of the risky investment but can choose between one risky and one riskless asset this conjecture is shown to be correct however if there is more than one risky asset each period counterexamples demonstrate that flexibility rarely ensures greater risk taking for the standard portfolio problem in which investors are free to determine the size of their investment in a risky asset flexibility always raises the demand for the risky asset if constant relative risk aversion is less than unity but counterexamples can always be found when the constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity journal of economic literatureclassification numbers g11 d81 d84

investment and financial constraints in transition economies micro evidence from poland the czech republic bulgaria and romania we investigate to what extent firm investment in transition countries is sensitive to internal finance we find that firms in bulgaria and romania are less sensitive to internal financing constraints in contrast to firms in poland and the czech republic a likely explanation is that bulgaria and romania experience a stronger persistence of soft budget constraints than the other two more advanced countries

how price path characteristics shape investment behavior abstract price paths are often the only graphical representation of financial products investors receive before making an investment decision we argue that price paths serve as graphical frames that influence the perceived attractiveness of an asset by highlighting specific asset characteristics in a controlled lab experiment we find that price paths have an impact on investment decisions in a regression we test a simple model relating the perception of price path shapes to several heuristics these heuristics are focusing on more recent outcomes deriving implicit reference prices from focal prices focusing on losses and estimating risk from the amplitude of the path we conclude that investment decisions are systematically biased due to the shape of an asset s price path

myopic loss aversion information feedback vs investment flexibility we experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion

evaluation periods and asset prices in a market experiment we test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets in line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced this result supports the findings from individual decision making and shows that markets do not eliminate such behavior

investment irreversibility and financing constraints evidence from a panel of transition economies abstract focusing on a panel of unlisted firms from transition economies we observe that only firms facing low irreversibility exhibit high and significant investment cash flow sensitivities our findings provide a new explanation for why some financially constrained firms may exhibit low sensitivities

myopic loss aversion and market experience abstract we probe the boundaries of myopic loss aversion mla theory through market treatments designed to reduce the mla effect our market settings separate investment commitment from information frequency display a running average asset value and explore the influence of participant experience the market based results suggest mla persists with inexperienced participants despite efforts to mitigate mla prices in markets with returning participants do not display an mla effect however the same experienced participants individually succumb to mla in an allocation setting immediately following the market overall our results suggest that while market experience mitigates the mla effect participants do not transfer these results to other settings

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training