extrinsic uncertainty and the informational role of prices abstract we study a financial economy with finitely many states of private information there are two agents informed and uninformed we define agents expectations on future equilibrium prices as a probability distribution over k distinct values i e we introduce k extrinsic events we show that there are open sets of economies with nonrevealing and also with partially revealing equilibria for an appropriate choice of self fulfilling price expectations observable equilibrium prices are signal invariant journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d82 d84

a class of monotone economies in which rational expectations equilibria exist but prices do not reveal all information abstract some economies having excess demands which depend monotonically on agents information signals are examined if there are no multiple market clearing prices then these economies have strict rational expectations equilibria in which equilibrium prices alone do not transmit all information

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

rational expectations in microeconomic models an overview abstract this paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations more specifically we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria the implementation of equilibria the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets the purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the journal of economic theory symposium on rational expectations in microeconomic models

labor income and risky assets under market incompleteness evidence from italian data abstract theory suggests that uninsurable income risk induces individuals to accumulate assets as a precautionary reserve of value most assets however bear rate of return risk that can be diversified only if every asset is traded by a large number of individuals and arbitrage is frictionless using italian micro data we find evidence of income and asset risks that affect consumption italian households are particularly well insured against illness but not against job losses moreover we detect a positive yet weak effect of asset holding on the variability of consumption streams across households

strict rational expectations equilibria with diffuseness abstract for smooth static pure exchange economies under uncertainty it is shown that a diffuseness condition on the distribution of traders characteristics as the state of the world varies permits one to use only a weak dimensionality restriction in the proof of the genericity of existence of strict rational expectations equilibria a generic result on the amount of information conveyed by equilibrium price functions and comparisons with some examples of nonexistence are given

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

rational expectations equilibrium an alternative approach we study a dynamic market process in which traders condition their beliefs about payoff relevant parameters on past endogenously generated market data and current exogenous data we say that a market process is informative if the beliefs of traders who receive only endogenously generated market data converge almost surely to the true parameter value our main result is that under standard regularity hypotheses the generic market process is informative we define an equilibrium as the limit points of the market process journal of economic literature classification numbers 02 1 026 c 1984 academic press inc

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

efficient prizes in prototype development contests abstract a prototype has a specific payoff with technological uncertainty about the costs of development market uncertainty involves the issue of which developer has his prototype accepted by the sponsor an efficient prize induces the welfare maximizing amount of r d

aggregation determinacy and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information abstract we identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi complete for quasi complete economies we determine equilibrium trades show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria besides unifying some familiar settings such as those of grossman 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 the following new results are proved a the same restrictions that deliver gorman aggregation under symmetric information are sufficient for gorman aggregation under asymmetric information even under partially informative prices b the traditional assumptions of quadratic utilities and endowment spanning that result in the capm under symmetric information deliver a conditional capm under asymmetric information with prices that need not be fully informative c the linear equilibrium in grossman s 1976 model is the only equilibrium linear or not while minor changes in the normality assumptions result in indeterminacy and partially informative equilibria and d if there is no aggregate endowment risk asymmetrically informed agents with common priors sell the risky part of their endowment in every equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g14 c62

rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts the objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive tullock s standard rent seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts a positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest because a contender s private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent seeking model the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous it is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful excessive aggregate efforts

trade and revelation of information abstract we consider an economy with asymmetric information and two types of agents fully informed and uninformed uninformed agents update their information observing equilibrium prices and the equilibrium levels of other agents excess demand we show that for a generic set of economies there are rational expectations equilibria which are partially revealing on an open dense set of signals of positive lebesgue measure provided that the dimension of the signal space is sufficiently larger than the dimension of the commodity space

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

rational expectations in stationary linear models linear time series models have come to dominate the macroeconomic literature on rational expectations and equilibrium business cycle theory but the explicit solution of such models has generally required strong restrictions upon the exogenous process of stochastic shocks e g temporal independence as well as upon the values of various demand and supply elasticities this paper exhibits a solution technique the method of z transforms which does not require one to impose such restrictions the value of this method is illustrated by applying it to completely characterize the symmetric stationary rational expectations equilibria of a naive linear model of land speculation this approach also permits systematic study of the informationally asymmetric equilibria of the model this paper develops a method for analyzing rational expectations re equilibria in linear economic models the methods i shall discuss usually enable one to determine whether or not a given model has a re equilibrium and if one exists to exhibit an explicit expression for the stochastic process of equilibrium prices the techniques apply to linear models driven by stationary processes of exogenous random shocks

a privately revealing rational expectations equilibrium for the futures market abstract this paper develops a model of the futures market with two types of participants farmers and speculators farmers undertake production decisions and face both output and spot price risk as opposed to speculators who face only spot price risk agents have constant absolute risk aversion von neumann morgenstern utility functions and form rational expectations about the future output shock and spot price we assume that traders specialize in information collection in our model the futures price is not a sufficient statistic for the market information we show that the rational expectations equilibrium ree futures price is privately revealing to traders who purchase costly information this ree is efficient in the sense that in equilibrium traders are in possession of all market information we demonstrate that traders a have an incentive to collect costly information and b are better off by specializing in collecting the information in which they have a comparative advantage in terms of the quality of the information that they can obtain finally we show that the futures market stabilizes the spot price

the generic existence of rational expectations equilibrium in the higher dimensional case abstract the study of the generic existence of rational expectations equilibrium has concentrated on three cases according to whether the space of states of private information has dimension less than equal to or greater than the price space previous results have shown that in the first case fully revealing equilibria exist generically and in the second case there are open sets of environments with no equilibrium this paper shows that in the third case there is a residual set of environments which permits equilibria which are arbitrarily close to fully revealing

rational behavior and rational expectations abstract this paper presents a new definition of rational expectations equilibrium in security markets characterized by a rigorous treatment of the decision problem facing each agent a rational expectations equilibrium is one in which it is common knowledge among the agents that all of them are rational and that the price observed is the market clearing price the paper shows that such equilibria always exist and that they need not have the property that for generic economies the equilibrium price reveals all economically relevant information the paper also shows that the new definition generalizes existing definitions of rational expectations equilibrium

the resurgence of inventory research what have we learned abstract recent empirical and theoretical research on business inventories is surveyed and critically evaluated while most inventory research has had macroeconomic motivations we focus on its microtheoretic basis and on potential conflicts between theory and evidence the paper asks two principal questions first how can inventories which are allegedly used by firms to stabilize production nonetheless be a destabilizing factor at the macroeconomic level second why if firms are following the production smoothing model is production more variable than sales in many industries we suggest that the so called s s model may help answer both questions

partial revelation with rational expectations we exhibit a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium where no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by any other individual c 1998 academic press

a dynamic model of expectations equilibrium abstract this paper describes a dynamic information adjustment process which achieves rational expectations equilibria for stochastic exchange environments an informational temporary equilibrium is an exchange equilibrium in which agents expectations are conditioned on their initial information and market data generated in previous informational temporary equilibria an equilibrium is a temporary equilibrium which reveals no further information this process leads to an equilibrium even when the data observed by agents is insufficient to permit the existence of an expectations equilibrium

continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria abstract we investigate the implementability of the social choice correspondence induced by constrained rational expectations equilibria we construct an almost continuous mechanism that implements it provided that information held by each agent is non exclusive

the existence of fully rational expectations approximate equilibria with noisy price observations abstract nonrevealing fully rational expectations approximate equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which uninformed agents have suitably dispersed noisy price observations such traders maximize a state dependent expected utility conditional on the price vector they observe the distributions of noisy price observations and the correct equilibrium relationship between states of the world and prices in equilibrium aggregate excess demand is small with high probability in every state of the world and its expectation is also small this magnitude diminishes as the noisy price observations become more accurate equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state dependent excess demand functions which are smooth because of the noisy price observations

admissible market data structures a complete characterization abstract this paper characterizes the market data which if observed by traders in a stochastic exchange environment will permit the general existence of rational expectations equilibria it is proved that if a trader observes and conditions his expectations on some nonconstant market data he must observe at least the equilibrium price and his own equilibrium trade any data which do not satisfy this requirement such as the price alone or the price and the volume of trade will fail to permit the existence of an expectations equilibrium for some otherwise well behaved stochastic environment

ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information abstract firms reveal private information about the value of investment through their investment decisions as a consequence they may have ex post regret once they see other firms investments we define a notion of rational expectations equilibrium for games which imposes a no regret property in this equilibrium all firms make the same investment decision but despite the absence of ex post regret the investment herd can be inefficient in addition equilibrium might not exist we introduce a notion of probabilistic existence and identify conditions under which if the number of firms is large enough information comes out so that investment herds are first best efficient with high probability and equilibrium exists with high probability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c7 d8

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

information transparency of business to business electronic markets a game theoretic analysis the abundance of transaction data available on the internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces in such a transparent environment it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals costs is this good news or bad news in this study we focus on theinformational effects of business to business b2b exchanges and explore firms incentives to join a b2b exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission we then study the equilibria by developing a game theoretic model under asymmetric information we examine whether the incentives to join a b2b exchange would be different under different competition modes quantity and price different information structures and by varying the nature of the products substitutes and complements our results challenge the information transparency hypothesis i e open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms in contrast to the popular belief we show that information transparency could be a double edged sword the individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality this may have important implications for the microstructure design e g data access rules of b2b electronic marketplaces

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

patent races optimal with respect to entry we introduce a patent prize which induces entry at a level which satisfies the basic condition of optimality with respect to the size of the race a second best patent we observe that for the lee wilde model of a patent race the second best prize induces approximately the socially optimal first best outcome the approach of the second best patent provides one explanation for why discoverers should only receive a fraction of the ex post social value of their discovery

credit channel trade credit channel and inventory investment evidence from a panel of uk firms abstract in this paper we use a panel of 609 uk firms over the period 1980 2000 to test for the existence of a trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy and for whether this channel plays an offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel we estimate error correction inventory investment equations augmented with the coverage ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio differentiating the effects of the latter variables across firms more or less likely to face financing constraints and firms making a high or low use of trade credit our results suggest that both the credit and the trade credit channels operate in the uk and that the latter channel tends to weaken the former

u s soviet chinese relations routine reciprocity or rational expectations international relations theorists disagree about whether great power behaviors reflect bureaucratic routine or reciprocity recently some have suggested that these behaviors result from great powers rational expectations rather than from simple routine or reciprocity the debate is flawed in several respects the quasi experimental studies of great power behavior suffer from specification and measurement errors furthermore most studies of great power behavior focus exclusively on the superpowers without adequately appreciating china s role in world politics we present an improved analysis that recognizes the potential effects of chinese behavior and ameliorates the methodological flaws in existing work the results indicate that the behaviors of the united states the soviet union and china are a relatively stable mix of bureaucratic routine and reciprocity the results also indicate complex asymmetrical connections among u s soviet u s chinese and soviet chinese relations consistent with the notion of a strategic triangle

the adjustment of stock prices to information about inflation this paper analyzes the reaction of stock prices to the new information about inflation based on daily returns to the standard and poor s composite portfolio from 1953 78 it seems that the stock market reacts negatively to the announcement of unexpected inflation in the consumer price index c p i although the magnitude of the reaction is small it is interesting to note that the stock market seems to react at the time of announcement of the c p i approximately one month after the price data are collected by the bureau of labor statistics

risk aversion market liquidity and price efficiency a model of a noncompetitive speculative market is analyzed in which privately informed traders and market makers are risk averse market liquidity is found to be nonmonotonic in the number of informed traders their degree of risk aversion and the precision of their information it is also shown that increased liquidity trading leads to reduced price efficiency and that under endogenous information acquisition market liquidity may also be nonmonotonic in the variance of liquidity trades article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a theory of fed watching in a macroeconomic policy game this paper examines the phenomenon of fed watching within the context of a macroeconomic policy game following a cukierman and a h meltzer s 1986 article the policymaker s preferences are private information and noisy monetary control causes past observations of money growth to be a noisy signal of the monetary authority s future intentions individuals are allowed to acquire additional information about the monetary authority s preferences thus both past observations of money growth and costly information about the policymaker s preferences are used by agents in forming expectations about policy the public s acquisition of information alters the monetary authority s strategic calculus making noisy monetary control less desirable copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimal r d levels when firm j benefits from firm i s inventive activity abstract we amend the static model of industry structure in dasgupta and stiglitz to include external benefits from a firm s r d now the market can be seen to underinvest in r d relative to the social optimum the work of mansfield suggests that such external benefits are pervasive

on endogenous formation of price expectations abstract we study a two period exchange economy with complete financial markets and endogenous borrowing constraints contrary to perfect foresight paradigm we assume that agents are heterogeneous in their ability to forecast future prices we introduce a new equilibrium concept called informationally constrained equilibrium where the formation of price expectations is endogenous and reflects the revelation of information from observing bounds on liabilities designed to ensure solvency at any contingency we prove that under standard assumptions an equilibrium always exists and we characterize the degree of information revealed by the endogenous debt limits

a battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium abstract potential manipulation of prices and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium is studied in a game without noise traders informed players with initially long and short positions bulls and bears seek to manipulate consumer expectations in opposite directions in equilibrium period 1 prices reveal the state so manipulation is unsuccessful bears and uninformed consumers sell up to their short sale limits in period 1 bulls buy in period 1 but receive arbitrage losses when the number of bulls and bears approaches infinity the equilibrium converges to the ree without short sale constraints there is a non revealing equilibrium but no revealing equilibrium

evidence on the role of cash flow for investment abstract recent work in macroeconomics argues that imperfections in capital markets may lead to business cycle fluctuations by propagating relatively modest shocks evidence for such a mechanism also known as the financial accelerator consists largely of firm level studies showing that cash flow is an important predictor of investment but this evidence is often viewed with skepticism because cash flow is also a good indicator of investment opportunities in this paper we develop a framework for estimating the extent to which the predictive power of cash flow can be attributed to its role as a fundamental versus its role in alleviating credit frictions for firms with access to commercial paper and bond markets we find that the perfect capital markets model of investment can fully account for the role of cash flow for firms with only limited access to capital markets as indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets however investment appears to be excessively sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow these results thus clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations and provide support for the existence of a financial accelerator

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

market enforced information asymmetry a study of claiming races this is a study of complementary markets the race track polices the betting market with information revealed in a claiming horse market this policing reduces the adverse consequences of asymmetric information experts in identifying horses and fraud are deterred from biasing betting odds against bettors at large consequently bettors specialize in evaluating published race information this monitoring theory is compared to a competing theory of claim races as a self assessed horse market parametric data is used to evaluate each theory institutional details also provide a test of each theory

the more we know about the fundamental the less we agree on the price i allow trading horizon heterogeneity across groups in a standard differential information model of a financial market this approach can explain the well established phenomenon that after a public announcement trading volume increases more private information is incorporated into prices and volatility increases in such environments public information has the important secondary role of helping agents learn about the information of other agents therefore whenever the correlation between the private information of different groups is sufficiently low a public announcement increases disagreement among short horizon traders regarding the expected selling price even as it decreases disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset additional testable implications are also suggested

the revelation of information and self fulfilling beliefs abstract at a rational expectations equilibrium ree individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices this hypothesis has two components that agents agree consensus and that they have point expectations degeneracy we consider economies where agents beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium beliefs are self fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price the corresponding equilibria are beliefs equilibria be the further restriction that agents have the same beliefs results in common beliefs equilibria cbe we study the relationship between be cbe and ree thus isolating the role of consensus and of degeneracy in achieving rational expectations journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d82

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

dutch inventory investment are capital market imperfections relevant this paper analyses inventory investment using a balanced panel of 82 dutch firms we start from the lovell 1961 inventory model and amend it with cash flow to introduce capital market imperfections the empirical evidence provides support for the relevance of capital market imperfections in explaining dutch inventory investment the results suggest that cash flow is a relevant variable omitted from the original lovell model the study provides a better understanding of inventory behaviour in general