wage bargaining central bank independence and the real effects of money the effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national institutional settings is not this article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage bargaining settings based on a rational expectations two stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments i argue that monetary policies have real employment effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems specifically in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment in highly centralized systems by contrast restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions pursuit of wage distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money neutral in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes the model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets the argument is supported by pooled time series data for fifteen oecd countries over a twenty one year period

environmental policy under oligopoly with endogenous market structure emission taxes under both fixed number oligopoly and endogenous market structure which are the most relevant market structures for policy issues are examined in the latter case and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition the optimal tax could exceed marginal external damages which implies that externalities generated by oligopolistic firms could be optimally controlled by overinternalizing environmental damages under endogenous market structure a scheme consisting of a license fee and a second best underinternalizing emission tax can increase social welfare as compared to the use of a single emission tax exceeding marginal damages copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

central bank transparency and cross border banking abstract we analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross border bank activities based on a panel gravity model for cross border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010 we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country on average increases cross border claims using interaction models we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent and operates in a stable economic environment central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad

veto players and the choice of monetary institutions i argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions party veto players and subnational governments which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems a crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players a second issue concerns the national party veto player s ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy in one party unitary governments identification and control are clear parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks in multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems identification is traditionally difficult and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt under federalism parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

trade gmos and environmental risk are current policies likely to improve welfare food with inputs from genetically modified organisms gmos has met considerable skepticism among european union eu consumers the eu import ban on gm food has triggered a great deal of controversy and has been partly replaced by a mandatory labeling scheme although there is no measure in the general agreement on tariffs and trade that directly addresses the use of product labeling wto and others have been skeptical to mandatory product labeling on the grounds that they may be used as hidden protectionism hampering global welfare this study has two foci first we examine how different policies for the production and use of gmos might influence the market outcome in consumer food markets second we evaluate the welfare effects of the policy measures we find that mandatory labeling often increases domestic welfare and may also enhance global welfare on the other hand a trade ban is more likely to decrease global welfare

necessity as the mother of invention monetary policy after the crisis we examine recent changes in monetary policy due to the financial crisis and ask whether they are likely to be temporary or permanent we present evidence from two original surveys one of central bank governors the other of academic specialists we find that central banks in crisis countries are more likely to have resorted to new policies to have had discussions about changing mandates and to have communicated more extensively but thinking has changed more broadly for instance many central banks in non crisis countries also report implementing macro prudential measures looking forward we expect central banks to have broader mandates use macro prudential tools more widely and communicate more actively than before the crisis while there is no consensus yet about the usefulness of unconventional monetary policies we expect most of them will remain in central banks toolkits as governors who gain experience with a particular tool are more likely to assess that tool positively finally the relationship between central banks and their governments might well have changed with central banks crossing the line into the political realm more often than in the past

eco labeling and horizontal product differentiation this paper investigates the impact of eco labels on the abatement of emissions in a market with horizontal product differentiation a distinction is made between an end of pipe abatement method and a clean technology approach in the former case underinvestment is likely to occur even if the marginal willingness to pay for abatement of consumers is equal to the social marginal benefit of abatement the level of abatement depends on the number of firms and on the number of consumers for a large market with few firms overinvestment in abatement is also possible clean technology abatement achieves a first best level regardless of market size if all consumers have a marginal willingness to pay for abatement equal to its social benefit

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

taxation within cournot oligopoly abstract when the production of output causes pollution we often consider taxation as a means to reduce it this paper examines various forms of taxation to control pollution within cournot oligopoly it shows that two commonly used forms can actually increase pollution in contrast both of these forms unambiguously reduce pollution within the competitive model the paper provides conditions in terms of demand and technology that make taxation effective in the cournot oligopoly case another implication of the analysis is that outside the price taking framework asymmetry of cost functions is particularly important and deserves careful attention when we examine the effect of taxation

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector this paper discusses policy instruments for redirecting technical change within the electricity sector to mitigate climate change first we unravel the mechanism behind directed technical change explaining why markets may underprovide innovations in expensive renewable technologies in comparison to innovations in energy efficient fossil fuel generators subsequently we characterize technical change in electricity generation technologies stressing the heterogeneity of knowledge spillovers both within and between clean electricity generation technologies we argue that there exists a rationale for a portfolio approach to innovation in the electricity sector i e optimal innovation policies are neither fully generic nor fully specific and they need to be adapted in response to new information learned by the government the existing innovation literature does not however provide a clear cut answer for designing such a policy we compare policy instruments and argue that public r d support to clean technologies either in the form of subsidies or prizes seems to be the prime candidate for implementing non generic innovation policy

the welfare effects of environmental taxation on a green market where consumers emit a pollutant this paper examines the welfare impact of emission taxes and subsidies in a green market where consumers emit a pollutant through their usage of products produced by duopolists for this purpose we employ a discrete continuous model including both consumer choice and usage of an environmentally differentiated product in a utility consistent framework the findings indicate that an emission tax is always welfare dominant over a subsidy on consumer purchases of the clean product because of its contribution to a reduction in environmental damage it does this by both inducing firms to improve the environmental qualities of their products and by constraining consumer usage of these products

optimal production for manufacturers considering consumer environmental awareness and green subsidies abstract manufacturers provide products that have distinct green levels i e higher degree of environmental friendliness to satisfy consumer demands with different green preferences a product with a higher green level generate fewer emissions but have higher costs to encourage those manufacturers to produce environmentally friendly products a government can implement subsidy policies this paper focuses on the decision making problem faced by manufacturers to determine which levels of green products to produce and production quantities at each green level we develop an optimization model under oligopolistic competition considering green preferences and subsidies with the objective of profit maximization for the manufacturers we prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and propose a converged algorithm with theory of finite dimensional variational inequality numerical results show that an increase of consumer environmental awareness will incentivize manufacturers to produce more green products with higher green levels but this does not necessarily lead to higher profits for the manufacturers moreover a well designed subsidy policy can not only generate more profits for manufacturers but also save subsidy investment for the government in addition with the changes of consumer environmental awareness or and subsidy policy manufacturers may obtain more profits even if the competition is more fierce

environmental tax in a green market we examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed we show that the emission tax improves welfare thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation the higher the marginal environmental damage is the higher the optimal tax will be the optimal tax however becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large finally when marginal environmental damage is not too low the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly

the politics of finance how capital sways african central banks abstractwhile there is a large literature on the politics of central banking its insights are difficult to translate to sub saharan africa this article addresses gaps in this literature by considering how the interests of those who control financial resources sway african central banks case studies of kenya nigeria and uganda demonstrate that variation in the sources of capital on which countries rely to finance investment helps to account for the pattern of variation in central bank policy stances the analysis further develops and probes arguments about power derived from the control of capital in the context of developing countries

the bundesbank s path to independence evidence from the 1950s the german bundesbank is frequently called the world s most independent and conservative central bank taking account of the path dependency of this reputation both quantitative data and qualitative data on german central bank law and political conflicts are used to determine the factors that contributed to this reputation in the 1950s it is shown that quantitative analysis has its limits and that law might be a misleading indicator in this respect it is rather the analysis of policy conflicts between the bundesbank and the government that yields information on the bank s path to independence

environmental policy in a green market this paper studies the impact of some frequently used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods when consumers differ in their environmental awareness a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium the higher the average willingness to pay for the good the lower are variants unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents a maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants but boosts firms sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions as a result social welfare may be reduced we also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges including differentiation of charges

a dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism abstract in an evolutionary game theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural common pool resource cpr we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent the basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications first there is a highly non linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms second increases in the number of the cpr s users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation

on the taxation of polluting products in a differentiated industry this paper studies the provision of environmental quality in an imperfectly competitive market it uses a vertical differentiation model in which the free entry equilibrium results in an under provision of quality the following main results are obtained first a commodity tax may have a significant impact on the market structure in this setting it tends to increase the number of active firms second through its impact on market structure a commodity tax may be welfare improving even though quality creates a positive externality third a commodity tax may bring about an equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to a pareto efficient allocation

transparency democratic accountability and the economic consequences of monetary institutions debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action i examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency democratic accountability and the gains from monetary delegation i begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts will find it easier to acquire a reputation despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes i also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers the paper then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs my results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment

price stability and central bank independence discipline credibility and democratic institutions despite mixed empirical evidence in the past two decades central bank independence cbi has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure cbi seventy eight countries 1973 2008 we reexamine this relationship distinguishing the role of printing less money discipline from the public s beliefs about the central bank s likely actions credibility democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions cbi in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth besides being more disciplinarian it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and therefore inflation empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions as well as a credibility effect

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

on voluntary eco labeling and fiscal incentives abstract the conditions under which a government would initiate a fiscal incentive scheme to encourage the use of an eco label in a duopoly are determined the results reveal a scope for fiscal incentive provision in conjunction with the eco label scheme for highly polluting industries

pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame abstract this paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies the analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment even when this lowers their production costs

quality choice trade policy and firm incentives quality choice is examined in a duopoly with one foreign and one domestic firm where consumers have similar preferences for quality but different preferences for brands firms make quality commitments prior to choosing price and policy intervention assumes several forms the policy conclusions depend on whether firms face set up costs in raising product quality in the absence of set up costs both domestic and foreign firms make socially optimal quality choices in the presence of set up costs the foreign firm and often the domestic firm sets quality below the socially optimal level incomplete information alters these conclusions however copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

central bank reform liberalization and inflation in transition economies an international perspective this paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of new central banks in 26 former socialist economies fse this data is constructed using the codification system for measuring legal independence developed in cukierman webb and neyapti 1992 and in chapter 19 of cukierman 1992 this makes it comparable with earlier data on central bank independence cbi in the industrial democracies and in non fse developing countries and permits experimentation with alternative indices of cbi like those reviewed in eijffinger and van keulen 1995 the new indices of independence indicate that central bank cb reform in the fse during the nineties has been quite ambitious in spite of the large price shocks induced by the transformation from plan to market reformers in those countries chose to create central banks with levels of legal independence that are substantially higher on average than those of developed economies during the eighties based on data from 1989 through 1998 the evidence in the paper suggests that cbi is unrelated to inflation during the early stages of liberalization but for sufficiently high and sustained levels of liberalization and controlling for variables like price decontrols and wars legal cbi and inflation are significantly and negatively related these findings are consistent with the view that legal cbi no matter how high cannot contain the powerful inflationary impact of wide scale liberalization of formerly controlled prices but once the process of liberalization has gathered sufficient momentum legal independence becomes effective in slowing inflation down and the cumulative liberalization index developed by de melo et al 1996 becomes relatively less important the paper also presents evidence on factors that affect the level of cbi and examines the relation between inflation and cbi within a broader sample composed of the transition and of the developed economies

green greener greenest eco label gradation and competition abstract this paper analyzes two common features of markets in which eco label programs certify that products are green gradation single programs offering multiple certification standards e g platinum gold silver and competition multiple programs vying to certify to their respective standards we find that depending on whether programs are sponsored by industry environmental groups or a government they have strikingly different incentives to grade or compete industry sponsors are indifferent about both environmentalist sponsors optimally grade or compete with other environmentalist sponsors only if consumer preferences for green consumption are skewed in a specific way and government sponsors decisions depend on the relative importance of private vs public benefits generated by the green market we find also that it is no accident that green markets frequently have an environmentalist program competing with an industry one for each of the cases examined our analysis is consistent with casual empirical evidence

central bank independence an update of theory and evidence this paper reviews recent research on central bank independence cbi after we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed finally the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on cbi are discussed we conclude that the negative relationship between cbi and inflation is quite robust

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint una vez mas new latin american evidence evidence on the degree to which central bank independence can constrain government budget deficits remains surprisingly scarce this paper finds empirical support for the importance of the central institutional constraint for a 14 country sample of latin american countries over 1990 2012 these results suggest that greater central bank autonomy has indeed helped reign in fiscal excesses in a region that has been plagued by inflationary deficit expansion for much of the post war period the ability to potentially discipline government policy adds to an independent central bank s inherent role in adding to the checks and balances essential to a well functioning democracy

credence goods efficient labelling policies and regulatory enforcement we analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of credence goods via alternative labelling procedures when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute producers can either self label their products or have them certified by a third party the government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the green or the brown producers our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information we extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers when corrupt producers can affix spurious labels the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities we find that mandatory self labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling unless the market share effect greatly exceeds the incentive to cheat effect

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

eco labels trade and protectionism eco labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes we analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm the environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm while both firms can adopt the eco label pollution is production related and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an environmentally friendly way our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco label and get both firms to adopt the label instead of setting an environmental standard however to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous in particular if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard on the other hand if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

checks and balances private information and the credibility of monetary commitments the authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power checks and balances the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs conversely the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation exchange rate pegs however mitigate these problems the authors present extensive evidence from cross country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions

performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution abstract this paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market two forms of regulation are considered performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized a welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs however the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator s objective is total surplus less pollution damage an equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards

federalism and central bank independence the politics of german monetary policy 1957 92 two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy first political threats to the status structure or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy second politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure that central bank appointees share their electoral and party political goals this paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of the degree of central bank independence zero partial or full and central bankers types partisans or technocrats based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the german central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between i argue that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of german federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure the behavioral independence of the german central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points the bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures

intra union flexibility of non ets emission reduction obligations in the european union the eu proposal on greenhouse gas emission reduction has 28 targets for 2020 an eu wide one for co2 emissions covered by the european trading system ets and one target for non ets emissions per member state implementation is more expensive than needed i consider three alternative proposals to reduce costs in the irish proposal member states can purchase ets permits to offset excess non ets emissions in the polish proposal member states can sell excess non ets emissions in the ets in the swedish proposal member states can trade their non ets allocations i compare these alternatives to the default policy no flexibility outside the ets and the cost effective solution full flexibility i calibrate a simple model to the results of the eu impact assessment which did not disclose all details and made odd assumptions the non ets allocation exceeds the projected emissions for three member states the alternative flexibility mechanisms would be used to only a limited extent but would cut the costs of meeting the target the swedish and polish proposals come closest to the cost effective solution because of the hot air the irish proposal performs best if there are negative surprises in either abatement costs or emissions the swedish proposal will become policy

taking time seriously dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics we have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series but three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis first analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification second researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models third analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results the consequences include weak connections between theory and tests biased estimates and incorrect inferences we outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors we recommend analysts 1 start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and 2 use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications we illustrate this strategy with data on congressional approval and tax rates across oecd countries

the eurotower strikes back crises adjustments and europe s austerity protests the 2008 global financial crisis came with fears and for some hopes that a new wave of public mobilization would emerge in industrialized countries especially throughout the european union eu the epicenter of the crisis large protests were expected yet the energy with which social groups mobilized against the proposed austerity measures quickly fizzled this article provides new evidence for why this was the case in line with neo keynesian theory we argue that the interest rate adjustments and political announcements of the european central bank ecb limited the potential for mass unrest in the member states of the economic and monetary union emu affected by the crisis we provide evidence for our argument with yearly panel data and a new original data set of monthly political protests between 2001 and 2013 our analyses support the hypothesis that the ecb was able to successfully assuage dissatisfaction with the limited reform options of the eurozone member states in the wake of the eurocrisis

eu climate change policy 2013 2020 using the clean development mechanism more effectively in the non eu ets sector abstract under european union proposals for co 2 emission reduction between 2013 and 2020 a member state can transfer to another member state the right to use its unused clean development mechanism cdm credits the paper addresses three issues in relation to these cdm warrants cdm w first how should the member state treat the cdm w in making decisions concerning emission reduction the price of the property right is an important signal for a member state in deciding the level of domestic abatement compared to trading in cdm w s in other words a shadow price for cdm w s should be used in formulating the emission strategy in order to determine whether or not a member state is a buyer or seller of cdm w s second what mechanism should be used to facilitate the exchange of cdm w s the preferred mechanism depends on the market size over which there appears to be some ambiguity market intermediaries such as over the counter trades and exchanges are preferred if market size is small auctions if the market size is large third who should realise the value of cdm w s the state existing polluters etc the value of cdm w s should accrue to the state

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

exchange rate regimes and independent central banks a correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments however the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments thus the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adopt both institutions and the interaction between them this paper presents a model that allows policymakers the simultaneous choice of monetary institutions and shows that imperfectly credible institutions will overlap when exchange rates are fixed but adjustable and central bank independence is not fully ascertainable governments choose both institutions more generally the paper generates hypotheses about the conditions that make fixed exchange rates and independent central banks complements or substitutes thus contributing to an explanation of the diversity of global monetary institutions in the post bretton woods period

does central bank independence really matter new evidence for developing countries using a new indicator abstract this paper provides a new indicator for central bank independence cbi based on the turnover rate of central bank governors for 82 developing countries over the period 1980 1989 using this new indicator it is concluded that this proxy for cbi is related to inflation only if the high inflation countries are included in the sample the view that both cbi and inflation are caused by effective opposition towards inflation is not supported using both the extreme bound analysis and sala i martin s method we do not find evidence that cbi is robustly related to economic growth

fighting inflation in a transitional regime russia s anomalous stabilization russia s recent experience fighting inflation dramatic success in 1995 96 after repeated failures in 1992 94 poses a challenge for existing theories of the politics of macroeconomic stabilization monthly inflation rates fell to close to zero despite a deeply unpopular president distracted by heart disease a government penetrated by economic lobbies a far from independent central bank a parliament dominated by opposition factions a lively election season and the fiscal pressures of fighting a regional war the article reviews this experience shows its incompatibility with existing political economy theories and proposes an explanation with implications for other reforming regimes success was achieved by offering previous beneficiaries from inflation major commercial banks and subsidized sectors other sources of government protected rents that did not increase the money supply even when expropriating powerful rent seekers is politically infeasible it is sometimes possible to trade them less inflationary rents for ones that are more inflationary

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

checks and balances and the supply of central bank independence abstract the paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which policymakers can credibly commit to an independent central bank and thereby mitigate the well known time consistency problem in monetary policy it is shown theoretically that granting independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two heterogeneous decision making bodies which both have veto rights for example bicameral systems this thesis is supported by empirical evidence the legal independence of central banks is significantly higher in those oecd countries whose legislative processes are characterized by extensive checks and balances furthermore the negative relation between legal independence and inflation is larger in countries with checks and balances than in countries without checks and balances

media freedom political knowledge and participation this paper examines the relationship between media freedom from government control and citizens political knowledge political participation and voter turnout to explore these connections i first examine media freedom and citizens political knowledge in thirteen central and eastern european countries with data from freedom house s freedom of the press report and the european commission s candidate countries eurobarometer survey next i consider media freedom and citizens political participation in 60 countries using data from the world values survey finally i investigate media freedom and voter turnout in these same 60 or so countries with data from the international institute for democracy and electoral assistance i find that where government owns a larger share of media outlets and infrastructure regulates the media industry more and does more to control the content of news citizens are more politically ignorant and apathetic where the media is less regulated and there is greater private ownership in the media industry citizens are more politically knowledgeable and active these results are robust to sample specification and alternative measures of media freedom

how does financial development alter the impact of uncertainty abstract how does the impact of uncertainty on output vary with financial development levels we investigate this question empirically using a quarterly panel data set of 50 countries between 1971 and 2009 and an instrumental variables model the results support the conjecture that financial development mitigates the negative impact of uncertainty on output at the lower end of the distribution of the financial development levels one standard deviation increase in uncertainty decreases output by more than two standard deviations at the higher end of financial development the impact on output is statistically insignificant these results suggest that strengthening the financial system and increasing liquidity and credit availability improce the robustness of growth performance during periods of uncertainty

the institutional environment for infrastructure investment the empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years however virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades this paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries the results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure copyright 2002 oxford university press

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

unravelling projected energy savings in 2020 of eu member states using decomposition analyses abstract the objective of this paper is to provide deeper insights into the energy savings efforts of eu member states by exploring the impact of new policies the recent economic recession and other effects using decomposition analyses the results of the study show that the difference between the two official eu baseline projections primes 2007 pre recession pre climate and energy package and primes 2013 post recession including the new policies of the package can be explained by the combined impact of the new policies the economic recession and other effects such as differences in energy prices however the impact of the other effects remains largely unexplained in the official primes 2013 report and is clouding the right interpretation of the policy effect by providing these insights this study could help policy makers in better understanding scenario outcomes and the impact of their policies if eu member states would be able to achieve their 2020 energy savings targets then an important step has been taken to bridge the energy savings gap since the economic recession plays a major role in bridging this gap and economic recovery is aimed for further intensification of energy efficiency policies is crucial to contribute to the ghg reduction target for 2030 and beyond

strategic policy and environmental quality helping the domestic industry to provide credible information this paper shows that a country can improve an industry s competitiveness by requiring domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating competitiveness will improve because this regulation will help the domestic industry to provide credible information about the environmental quality of its production the credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market and in this way increase consumers willingness to pay for domestic products even if the government has no preferences for environmental quality it has incentives to regulate its cheaters in order to help the domestic industry to provide credible information and thereby improve competitiveness

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

carbon tax emission standards and carbon leak under price competition we consider a two country model of price competition with one polluting firm in each country and differentiated products assuming away to simplify abatement efforts and input substitution we compare the impact on output leakages and trade volumes of a carbon tax versus an emission standard policy unilaterally enacted by the home country under the tax the two firms set their prices simultaneously in a bertrand game under the standard the home firm s price is conditioned on the price of the foreign firm so as to abide the emission constraint as a result the tax leads to higher leakages and global emissions than the standard the standard also implies a better trade balance for the home country than the tax

competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers abstract in a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition i study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms incentive to invest in cleaner technology firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices i also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting compared to full information incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and or expected liability are not too high requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed competition has a positive effect relative to monopoly on the incentive to invest

tax subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers abstract we study policy measures to improve environmental quality in the presence of environmentally aware consumers we consider two sets of policy instruments uniform policies for the firms and policies that discriminate between the firms based on their environmental quality for the latter set either the better performer is rewarded with a subsidy or the worse performer is punished with a tax we find that while a uniform subsidy policy improves average environmental quality a uniform tax policy worsens it further while a discriminatory subsidy policy reduces total pollution and enhances aggregate welfare a discriminatory tax policy may increase total pollution and may reduce aggregate welfare

imbalance in europe s effort sharing decision scope for strengthening incentives for energy savings in the non ets sectors abstract europe s 2020 greenhouse gas ghg reduction target consists of two sub targets one for the emissions trading scheme ets sectors and one for the non ets sectors the non ets target covers co 2 emissions in buildings transport and non ets industry and non co 2 ghg emissions the non ets target is known as europe s effort sharing decision this article discusses the gdp per capita method the european commission has applied in setting member state specific targets for the non ets the effort sharing and shows that it results in an imbalanced reduction effort among the member states it turns out that the principal mechanism of the gdp per capita method low gdp countries get room to catch up with high gdp countries by allowing them to increase emissions is obscured by the non co 2 ghgs the baseline projections of which are highly policy induced and not correlated with the growth of gdp per capita we propose an alternative method that 1 corrects for the policy induced decrease of non co 2 ghg emissions and 2 is based on energy savings potentials this approach could be used in future target setting for non ets sectors including in the case that the overarching eu wide target would be strengthened and would provide a direct support to europe s energy savings ambitions and policies

a political explanation of variations in central bank independence although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies their institutional structures their levels of independence differ greatly my explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and in a multiparty government coalition partners an independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts politicians will choose an independent bank 1 if government ministers party legislators and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and 2 if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute i statistically test the argument against the cross national variation of central bank institutions i also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in germany britain and italy

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

voluntary eco labeling and the price premium international environmental organizations propose voluntary eco labeling as a market incentive to promote industry to operate in an ecologically sustainable and environmentally friendly manner a microeconomic analysis questions whether voluntary eco labeling will cause producer profits in a competitive industry to decline and whether eco labeling will necessarily generate different prices for labeled and unlabeled product using wood product as an example results identify conditions that may exist when firms lose profits even under a voluntary system and where existing production constraints may lead to a single price regardless of labeling

the switching effect of environmental taxation within bertrand differentiated duopoly we investigate second best optimal taxation of the polluting variety of a product in a bertrand duopoly with differentiated varieties the analysis provides novel insight on a useful social function of environmental regulation besides internalizing the environmental externality the taxation of the polluting variety improves the matching of consumers and product varieties and so creates a socially desirable business switching between the differentiated varieties

money and monetary stability in europe 1300 1914 abstract this paper investigates the determinants of monetary stability in europe from the late medieval era until world war i through this period the anchor for monetary policy was the silver or gold value of the monetary unit states however frequently abandoned this anchor some depreciating their monetary units against silver and gold less than 10 fold and others more than 10 000 fold between 1500 and 1914 to understand the determinants of these differences we compile a new and comprehensive monetary history dataset for all major states in europe and test alternative theories we find strong evidence that political factors and in particular fiscal capacity political regime and warfare explain patterns of monetary stability this finding is robust to addressing endogeneity controlling for the instability induced by the mechanics of the monetary system and accounting for the impacts of new monetary technologies and the advent of fiat standard

two illustrations of the quantity theory of money of two central implications of the quantity theory of money that a given change in the rate of change in the quantity of money induces i an equal change in the rate of price inflation and ii an equal change in nominal rates of interest the illustrations were obtained by comparing moving averages of the three variables in question using quarterly u s time series for the period 1953 77 readers may find the results of interest as additional confirmation of the quantity theory as an example of one way in which the quantity theoretic relationships can be uncovered via atheoretical methods from time series which are subject to a variety of other forces or as a measure of the extent to which the inflation and interest rate experience of the postwar period can be understood in terms of purely classical monetary forces the theoretical background of the study is reviewed very briefly as it is familiar material in the next section the data processing methods are described and rationalized in section ii the illustrations

duopoly and quality standards abstract in the absence of sunk costs a low quality producer benefits from a mildly restrictive quality standard whereas a high quality producer suffers from it consumers welfare increases if the firm producing the higher quality does not increase its quality significantly in response to the increase in quality by its rival a sufficiently severe standard causes exit from the industry when there are no sunk cost the high quality producer exits first

quality standards versus nutritional taxes health and welfare impacts with strategic firms the goal of this paper is to better understand firms strategic reactions to nutritional policies targeting food quality improvements and to derive optimal policies we propose a model of product differentiation taking into account the taste and health characteristics of products we study how two firms react to alternative policies an mqs policy linear taxation of the two goods on the market and taxation of the low quality good the mqs and the taxation of the low quality product are the preferred options by a social planner if taste is moderately important the mqs policy is chosen by a populist and a paternalist social planner if taste is a major component of choice the populist planner chooses to tax the low quality product whereas the paternalist planner prefers the mqs policy finally for a paternalist social planner an mqs based policy always allows for higher levels of welfare than an information policy alone