the effects of land policy quantity as well as quality is important most studies of land policy in the abstract and when applied to a country and to comparisons between countries use a theoretical framework which is derived ultimately from ricardo s land price theory this is used to predict the effects and the incidence of the costs and benefits which result from applying land policy instruments this article begins by comparing land policy in israel and the netherlands in that way both countries have a highly sophisticated and integrated set of land policy instruments however some very important differences between the effects of applying those instruments in the two countries cannot be explained within that framework in particular in the netherlands the development value of land is low and development gains small in stark contrast with israel a supplementary framework is needed and this is given by the stock adjustment model applied to housing with this the difference between the two countries can be explained as being the result of differences in the way

learning about a new technology pineapple in ghana this paper investigates the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new agri cultural technology in ghana we use unique data on farmers communication patterns to define each individual s information neighborhood conditional on many potentially confounding variables we find evidence that farmers adjust their inputs to align with those of their information neighbors who were surpris ingly successful in previous periods the relationship of these input adjustments to experience further indicates the presence of social learning in addition applying the same method to input choices for another crop of known technol ogy correctly indicates an absence of social learning effects jel d83 013 033 q16

decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem in markets with adverse selection only low quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low we show that under decentralized trade however both high and low quality units trade although with delay moreover when frictions are small the surplus realized is greater than the static competitive surplus thus decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem remarkably payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish even though both high and low quality units continue to trade and there is trade at several prices markets differ in the degree to which trade is centralized call markets used to set opening prices on the nyse are highly centralized and all trade takes place at a single price the market clearing price in contrast in housing labor or used car markets trade is highly decentralized and prices are determined by bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers and may differ between trades the competitive model abstracts away from these institutional aspects thus providing a model suitable in principle for the study of both centralized and decentralized markets our results suggest that decentralized markets with adverse selection may perform better than anticipated by the static competitive model and therefore that these institutional features cannot be ignored it is known that in markets for homogenous goods decentralized trade tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions are small because competitive equilibrium is efficient in these markets this implies that decentralized trade generates nearly efficient outcomes in markets with adverse selection however competitive equilibria ce need not be efficient which raises the possibility that alternative market structures perform better in this article we study a version of akerlof s 1970 market for lemons in which trade is decentralized each period an equal measure of buyers and sellers enters the market every seller is endowed with a unit of either high or low quality at each period every agent in the market has a positive probability of meeting an agent of the opposite type once matched a buyer without observing the quality of the seller s unit makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller accepts then they trade at the offered price and both agents exit the market if the seller rejects the offer then both agents remain in the market at the next period discounting of future gains and the possible delay in matching with a trading partner constitute trading frictions when the average quality of the good held by entering sellers is low the market has a unique competitive equilibrium ce in which the price equals the buyers value of a low quality unit

alfred marshall lecture social capital as good culture to explain the extremely long term persistence more than 500 years of positive historical experiences of cooperation putnam 1993 we model the intergenerational transmission of priors about the trustworthiness of others we show that this transmission tends to be biased toward excessively conservative priors as a result societies can be trapped in a low trust equilibrium in this context a temporary shock to the return to trusting can have a permanent effect on the level of trust we validate the model by testing its predictions on the world values survey data and the german socio economic panel we also present some anecdotal evidence that these priors are reflected in novels that originate in different parts of the country jel 04 016 043 p16

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

revisiting the lemons market this article extends the standard competitive adverse selection model by allowing for qualitatively different information structures of agents on the informed side of the market using the stylized framework of the market for used cars we examine the welfare properties of equilibria under the assumption that a fraction of the sellers remains uninformed about a parameter that is relevant for their own transaction whether market performance increases or decreases in the number of uninformed sellers is shown to depend on 1 the potential gains from trade in the market and 2 the average quality of the sellers information structure

coase versus pacman who eats whom in the durable goods monopoly in standard durable goods monopoly models both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua if the set of buyers is finite the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers a folk theorem is obtained if both sets are finite these results reflect a strategic disadvantage of having to make moves with a large impact on other players payoffs the analysis is extended to durable goods oligopoly

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

planning policy and retail property markets measuring the dimensions of planning intervention there is considerable case study based evidence that changes in the public policy environment have profoundly altered the structure and operation of retail property markets in england despite this however few studies of property market performance consider the influence of retail planning policies this paper seeks to fill the gap the empirical part of the paper uses data derived from a survey of local planning authorities to construct a range of measures of planning policy stance the indicators demonstrate that the role of policy is complex and multidimensional the paper then explores the relationship between planning policies and measures of property market performance the results show that while proactive policies do not guarantee a vibrant market they can play an important part in stimulating occupier and investor demand even where there are poor economic fundamentals

leasing lemons and buybacks in his seminal article of 1970 akerlof argued that the used car market is not efficient because adverse selection causes too little trade we construct a competitive model of the new and used car markets and investigate the relationship between new car leasing and adverse selection our analysis yields a number of interesting results including that new car leasing reduces the adverse selection problem and that buybacks also increase efficiency in the secondhand market we also discuss alternative explanations for new car leasing and an explanation for the growth in new car leasing during the last fifteen years copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

information and the market for lemons this paper revisits akerlofs 1970 classic adverse selection market and asks the following question do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade perhaps surprisingly the answer is no better information on the selling side worsens the buyers curse thus lowering demand but may shift supply as well whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects a characteization is given on the other hand improving the buyers information i e making private information public unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping

dynamic adverse selection and the supply size in this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information we obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium moreover we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough we conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

no lease is short enough to solve the time inconsistency problem the author provides a model of endogenous lease duration determination in the context of the durable goods monopolist problem he shows that infinitely many leases per finite unit of time are required to solve completely the time inconsistency problem thus suggesting that leasing may not provide a practical solution the author also provides a warning regarding the results that can be derived by exogenously setting lease durations equal to one period by resolving a paradoxical result in the literature copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

the intertemporal consequences of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in an intertemporal framework the harm to firms from unauthorized reproduction of their products may be significantly greater than that predicted by most static models copying by some consumers reduces the appropriable surplus from all consumers including those consumers lacking any propensity to copy somewhat paradoxically however the commitment value of copies may also imply that profits are higher with copying than without copying it is therefore suggested that firms may prefer differential copyright enforcement and that the commitment value of copies may offer a strategic explanation for free giveaways of abridged versions of intellectual property and vertical product differentiation more generally

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

extracting rents with forward contracts abstract we consider a risk neutral final goods producer operating with a concave production function we show that when faced with the possibility of quantity rationing in the spot market for an input the producer will always pay a premium to purchase some units of that input in a forward market a monopolistic supplier of the input can therefore earn additional rents by offering to sell units in both a forward market and a spot market effectively price discriminating along a producer s demand curve for the input we thus provide a model of forward contracting in which prices are set sequentially there is no risk aversion and customers purchase positive quantities in both the forward and the spot market

formal institutions and social capital in value chains the case of the ethiopian commodity exchange we explore whether the creation of the ethiopian commodity exchange ecx and its formal monitoring and enforcement institutions has affected social capital and trust in the ethiopian segment of the sesame value chain consistent with a simple theoretical marketing model our panel data suggest this is indeed the case trade in sesame is increasingly governed by formal rather than informal institutions and in response traders have broadened their trading network rely more frequently on traders with whom they do not have social relations and have reduced the provision of credit that cements personalized relationships they also have lower levels of trust in the intentions and capabilities of their trading partners and attach less weight to trust

land conversion at the urban fringe a comparative study of japan britain and the netherlands in the 1980s the multiplier between land values for agricultural and urban uses was found to run at 50 200 times or even higher in the areas surrounding expanding cities in japan and britain co

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

credible signals of the release of new versions i introduction many products are marketed some time after they have been developed for instance a new smartphone may be developed and tested well before it is available for purchase a new car might be prototyped and driven months before it comes to the market indeed a firm will often have several products concurrently in a development pipeline consumers may know a product is in that pipeline without knowing its progress towards the market because the outcome of such development and testing is not visible to outsiders the firm knows whether it can market a product before consumers do consumers are uninformed about when and if the new product will be marketed to them economists have long recognized that the present demand for durable goods depends on future prospects such as the future price or the introduction of an improved version 1 the existence of such an improved version is often the seller s private information if consumers anticipate a new version some will defer purchases until the new version is available and the seller will face low demand for the present version disclosing the new version is not in a monopoly seller s interest a seller whose good does not have a new version would also like to communicate that fact to consumers while a firm with a successful product innovation can credibly disclose the new version with relative ease a firm that has failed to develop a new product could have great difficulty convincing consumers that the product has no new version in such situations it is important to examine whether prices can inform consumers whether a new version will be marketed in the near future in a recent paper choi et al 2010 developed a model with a risky product development process in which reputation effects allow cheap talk announcements to signal successful product development to consumers an announcement induces consumers to delay or divert purchases to the announcer s coming product which increases the announcer s profit and can improve welfare 2 in their model the announcer and her non innovative rivals supply the original good competitively because of this an announcement does not reduce profit on the current version this paper will focus on markets where the seller has substantial market power before innovating so announcing a successful product development has a cost in terms of current revenue further because we attend to prices as signals this model may also apply to markets where a long run relationship between consumers and firms may not be sustainable another objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure a government policy mandating disclosure of any new version is an alternative means of informing consumers 3 as long as firms are not willing to lie to the government such a policy would credibly communicate whether a new version of a durable is coming mandatory disclosure would bring about full information as consumers are informed about any improved future version before observing the price of the current version in this paper we explore a two period model of a durable good monopoly in which consumers are initially uninformed about whether there will be a new version of the current good the monopoly seller is privately informed if he will be able to market an improved version in the second period in the first period consumers must decide whether to purchase the good now or wait for an upgraded version they may be able to infer from the price of the current version whether the seller will bring a new version to the market it is important to see first whether prices can serve as signals and second how welfare compares between any signaling outcome and a full information benchmark corresponding to mandatory disclosure we will show that there is a unique equilibrium supported by intuitive beliefs in this equilibrium the seller s private information about an improved version is completely revealed to consumers

when are agents negligible the authors examine the following paradox in a dynamic setting equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents they present a simple strategic setting in which this paradox is a general phenomenon however the paradox disappears when there is noisy observation of the players actions and the aggregate level of noise does not disappear too rapidly as the number of players increases the authors give several economic examples in which this paradox has recently received attention durable goods monopoly corporate takeovers and time consistency of optimal government policy copyright 1995 by american economic association

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

public information quality with monopolistic sellers abstract we show that in markets with asymmetric information even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality entrusting the choice of unverifiable public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies however delegation of information quality choice to an independent agent who is precluded from sharing in trading profits results in efficient implementation this result provides a game theoretic rationale for current institutional arrangements where a private organization that is independent of market traders the financial accounting standards board determines the standards for public disclosures journal of economic literature classification numbers d41 d42 d82

the value of public information in monopoly the logic of the linkage principle of milgrom and weber 1982 extends to price discrimination a non linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information a liated to the valuation of the buyer

leveling with friends social networks and indian farmers demand for a technology with heterogeneous benefits abstract agricultural technologies typically spread as farmers learn about profitability through social networks this process can be nuanced however when net returns for some farmers may not be positive we investigate how social learning influences demand for a resource conserving technology in eastern uttar pradesh india we identify potential adopters through an experimental auction and randomly select a subset to adopt we exploit this variation in adoption across networks to estimate network effects on demand for the technology one year later using a second auction technology benefits vary and network effects are completely conditional on benefits having a benefiting adopter in one s network increased demand by over 50 whereas having a non benefiting adopter had no effect these effects are strong enough to bring average demand in line with expected benefits for many farmers however demand remains below the market price suggesting that network effects will lead to increased but not rapid widespread adoption

explaining the performance of contract farming in ghana the role of self efficacy and social capital abstract self efficacy is the belief of an individual to have the ability to be successful in a given domain social capital is the economic value of a person s relationships in the context of this study self efficacy is the belief of a farmer to be able to improve her income with contract farming which increases her actual ability social capital increases the ability of the farmers through social support we surveyed 400 smallholder pineapple farmers and find that both self efficacy and social capital are decisive for their successful integration into contract farming to identify causal effects we use two instruments which are also of interest on their own the historical presence of 1 cocoa cooperatives and 2 christian missionary schools during ghana s colonial period the british established cocoa cooperatives which differed in their performance as a function of biogeographic factors and thus persistently shaped the self efficacy of the farmers roughly at the same time christian missionaries established missionary schools which impacted the traditional societies so that social capital decreased the finding that self efficacy and social capital are still shaped by historic variables could indicate that these variables are only slowly changing or that they only do so in the absence of policy intervention the latter raises the possibility that effective policies could benefit from strong reinforcing feedbacks once self efficacy and social capital improve

understanding how land is exchanged co ordination mechanisms and transaction costs this paper seeks to increase our understanding of how land is exchanged between suppliers and demanders most current land price theories and the land use models which are derived from them assume that co ordination between suppliers and demanders is achieved through the price mechanism there are however other possible co ordination mechanisms including imposed rules and mutual trust in order to take account of these the effect of institutions has to be included in the theories transaction cost economics as one strand of institutional economics seeks to explain which co ordination mechanism is chosen in practice in this paper the application of these ideas is illustrated with findings from a detailed survey of how dutch housing associations acquire land it appears that these housing associations choose to acquire land through the mechanism of mutual trust when there is a network in place which they can use and to acquire through the market when that mechanism is not available this applicat

durable services monopolists do better than durable goods monopolists the authors consider a monopolist who can commit to a price path when selling a good for which individual consumers demand at most one unit only if the monopolist can also commit to destroying unpurchased stock and the timing of stock release can she earn more than a static monopolist this additional commitment power has empirical revelance for a wide range of goods that the authors term durable services the inability to store output facilitates price discrimination by a durable services monopolist by permitting the credible threat of rationing the authors detail sufficient conditions for a durable services monopolist to produce more than a static or durable goods monopolist produces

leasing lemons and moral hazard abstract a number of recent papers have analyzed leasing in the new car market as a response to the adverse selection problem in the used car market originally explored in the seminal 1970 paper by george akerlof in this paper we consider a model characterized by both adverse selection as in these earlier papers and moral hazard concerning the maintenance choices of new car drivers we show that this approach provides explanations for a number of empirical findings concerning real world new and used car markets including that leasing has become more popular over time very high income new car drivers lease more and used cars that were leased when new sell for more than used cars that were purchased when new we also compare and contrast our approach to new car leasing with alternative approaches

the permanent effects of transportation revolutions in poor countries evidence from africa we exploit the construction and eventual demise of the colonial railroads in africa to study the impact of transportation investments in poor countries using ghana and sub saharan africa as a whole we assembled new data on railroads and cities spanning over one century to show that i railroads had large effects on the spatial distribution and aggregate level of economic activity during the colonial period as they constituted a transportation revolution in a context where no modern transportation technology previously existed ii these effects have persisted to date although railroads collapsed and road networks expanded considerably in the post independence period the analysis contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous impact of transportation investments it shows that initial investments may have a large effect in poor countries with basic infrastructure as the countries develop increasing returns may then solidify their spatial distribution and subsequent investments may have a smaller effect on local economic development

a property rights approach to externality problems planning based on compensation rules most european countries have implemented some kind of land use planning based on exclusionary zoning principles to achieve spatial goals this paper argues that to reduce externality problems regulatory planning is not always the best planning solution therefore an alternative planning approach which makes use of compensation rules is suggested in this paper this compensatory planning approach is based on property rights theory and refers to recent applications of this theory to planning practice to illustrate the usefulness of such an approach it is applied to the planning of out of town retail development in the netherlands the paper aims to demonstrate how deficiencies in the property rights regime can be repaired to deal with externality problems achieving a more socially acceptable outcome of out of town retail development the paper concludes with a discussion of the value of spontaneous order solutions for planning practice by introducing four pragmatic rules on how to choose between di

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

monopoly extraction of a durable non renewable resource failure of the coase conjecture the author studies a perfect information rational expectations markov equilibrium for the situation where a monopolist extracts a nonrenewable resource that is converted to a durable good even if short run extraction costs are constant the coase conjectur e fails provided that the depreciation rate of the durable good is positive copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

education and human capital externalities evidence from colonial benin colonial benin we investigate the effect of education on living standards occupation and political participation since both school locations and student cohorts were selected with very little information treatment and control groups are balanced on observables we can therefore estimate the effect of education by comparing the treated to the untreated living in the same village as well as those living in villages where no schools were set up we find a significant positive treatment effect of education for the first generation of students as well as their descendants they have higher living standards are less likely to be farmers and are more likely to be politically active we find large village level externalities descendants of the uneducated in villages with schools do better than those in control villages we also find extended family externalities nephews and nieces directly benefit from their uncle s education and show that this represents a family tax as educated uncles transfer resources to the extended family

a theory of land prices when land is supplied publicly the case of the netherlands most attempts to explain land prices assume free competition between suppliers and demanders of land if there are constraints on this competition e g land use planning this is added as a modification to the theory when however the supply of building land is in the hands of public agencies which determine the volume and price of supply specified by land use and location a different theoretical approach is needed in this situation certain economic principles apply which determine the maximum and minimum prices at which land will be bought for development and at which serviced building land will be supplied for development however both the limits of this range and the actual land prices within it will depend on political choices made by the public agencies in the netherlands municipalities dominate the supply of land for development and redevelopment information about the way dutch municipalities make the political choices and about the actual land prices there suggests they make the politic

impact of contracts in high yielding varieties seed production on profits and yield the case of nepal abstract nepal s population continues to grow but the agricultural sector s performance remains almost stagnant this has led to a decline in the per capita availability of food increasing agricultural productivity is the key to agricultural growth and one strategy for increasing agricultural productivity is to use improved seeds this study investigates the impact of contract farming cf in high yielding varieties hyv of paddy seed production on costs yield and profits of smallholder farms in nepal using farm level data and a non parametric propensity score matching estimator the study finds a significant positive impact of contract hyv seed farming on revenues profits and yield and a significant negative impact on total costs of production additionally very small farms 0 43 ha with cf in hyv paddy seeds tend to gain the most when it comes to yield per hectare our estimates reveal that the average smallholder household in nepal engaged in cf with input conditions receives higher profits however farmers engaged in cf with output conditions tend to have higher yields but smaller profits finally farmers engaged in cf in hyv paddy seeds with both input and output conditions have the highest yield gains and significantly higher profits

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

religious conversion in colonial africa within economics there has been a recent effort to better understand the notion of culture typically defined as beliefs values and norms held by individuals empirical work has focused on identifying systematic cultural differences between individuals from different ethnic and national backgrounds more recently attention has turned to the historical origins of cultural differences e g luigi guiso paolo sapienza and luigi zingales 2008 nathan nunn and leonard wantchekon 2009 colonial africa provides a natural laboratory to examine how an external intervention can have lasting impacts on people s beliefs and values this study examines the effect of european missionary activities in colonial africa on the subsequent evolution of culture as measured by religious beliefs the empirical results show that descendants of ethnic groups that experienced greater missionary contact are today more likely to self identify as christian this correlation provides evidence that foreign missionaries altered the religious beliefs of africans and that these beliefs persist as they are passed on from parents to children put differently the results show that historic events can have a lasting impact on culture the findings also provide rare empirical evidence of the historical determinants of longrun religious conversion studies of conversion typically focus on contemporary determinants see jason hwang and robert barro 2007 and the references therein although a number of studies have examined the long term impacts of missionary activities they have not considered their long run impacts on religious beliefs and values e g robert d woodberry 2004 one of the few papers that consider a historical determinant of long run conversion is by murat religious conversion in colonial africa

sequential bargaining with correlated values the paper analyzes an infinite horizon sequential bargaining game with one sided offers between a buyer and a seller when the buyer s valuation depends on the seller s the seller knows the value of the object and the buyer does not the influence of relative discount factors on the solution is studied it is shown for example that an impasse may result if the buyer offeror is too impatient relative to the seller the buyer makes a single take it or leave it offer

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

smallholder participation in contract farming comparative evidence from five countries summary supermarkets specialized wholesalers processors and agro exporters are transforming the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low income economies we develop a conceptual framework with which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity processing firm we then synthesize results from empirical studies of contract farming arrangements in five countries ghana india madagascar mozambique and nicaragua the resulting meta narrative documents patterns of participation the welfare gains associated with participation reasons for nonparticipation the significant extent of contract noncompliance and the considerable dynamism of these value chains as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently

dynamic sorting in durable goods markets with buyer heterogeneity in a competitive dynamic durable good market where sellers have private information about quality i identify certain inefficiencies that arise due to heterogeneity in buyers valuations even if the market induces dynamic sorting among sellers and all goods are eventually traded inefficiency can arise because high valuation buyers buy early when low quality goods are sold while high quality goods are allocated to low valuation buyers that buy later this misallocation adds to the inefficiency caused by delay in trading under certain circumstances high quality goods may never be traded as in a static market resume triage dynamique dans les marches de biens durables quand il y a heterogeneite des acheteurs dans un marche concurrentiel et dynamique de biens durables ou les vendeurs ont de l information privee sur la qualite l auteur identifie certaines inefficacites attribuables a l heterogeneite dans les evaluations des acheteurs meme si le marche declenche un tri dynamique entre les vendeurs et que tous les biens sont vendus l inefficacite peut emerger parce que les acheteurs qui valorisent le plus le bien achetent tot quand les biens de basse qualite sont vendus alors que les biens de haute qualite sont ecoules plus tard a des acheteurs qui valorisent moins le bien cette mauvaise affectation ajoute a l inefficacite causee par le retard a transiger dans certaines circonstances les biens de haute qualite peuvent ne jamais etre transiges comme dans un marche statique

the strategic implications for the randstad of the dutch property system the aim of this paper is to decide how well the dutch are served by their property system and whether it is organisation ally and functionally suited to advancing the competitive position of the randstad cities within a unified europe in the first part of the paper some of the distinctive features of the dutch property system are highlighted by drawing comparison with trends and outcomes found in the british and australian housing and office submarkets pricing policy in the netherlands is outlined followed by a consideration of some key outcomes including the relative stability of property prices modest inter regional price differentials public benefits of a regulated land supply occasional breakdown of coordination indifference towards development gains then the property system is discussed in the context of internationalisation subsidies and coordinated property development within the randstad the concluding assessment suggests that at present the dutch have a de facto as much as a strate

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

adverse selection in durable goods markets we present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets we find that the used market never shuts down the volume of trade can be large and distortions are lower than previously thought new cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence an extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade we contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates

supermarkets farm household income and poverty insights from kenya summary the expansion of supermarkets in developing countries may have important implications for poverty and rural development while previous studies have compared farm profits between participants and non participants in supermarket channels wider income effects have hardly been analyzed moreover most existing studies do not account for structural differences between the two groups we address these issues by using endogenous switching regression and building on a survey of vegetable farmers in kenya participation in supermarket channels is associated with a 48 gain in average household income which also contributes to poverty reduction to realize these benefits on a larger scale will require institutional support

the power of tv cable television and women s status in india cable and satellite television have grown rapidly throughout the developing world the availability of cable and satellite television exposes viewers to new information about the outside world which may affect individual attitudes and behaviors this paper explores the effect of the introduction of cable television on gender attitudes in rural india using a three year individual level panel dataset we find that the introduction of cable television is associated with improvements in womens status we find significant increases in reported autonomy decreases in the reported acceptability of beating and decreases in reported son preference we also find increases in female school enrollment and decreases in fertility primarily via increased birth spacing the effects are large equivalent in some cases to about five years of education in the cross section and move gender attitudes of individuals in rural areas much closer to those in urban areas we argue that the results are not driven by pre existing differential trends these results have important policy implications as india and other countries attempt to decrease bias against women authors

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

durable goods coasian dynamics and uncertainty theory and experiments this paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand we study the monopolist s pricing behavior as players uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit in the limit players are perfectly informed about the downward sloping demand we show that in all games belonging to a fixed and open neighborhood of the limit game there exists a generically unique equilibrium outcome that exhibits coasian dynamics and in which play lasts for at most two periods a laboratory experiment shows that consistent with our theory outcomes in the certain and uncertain demand treatments are the same median opening prices in both treatments are roughly at the level predicted and considerably below the monopoly price consistent with coasian dynamics these prices are lower for higher discount factors demand withholding however leads to more trading period

a behavioral economics view of poverty standard theorizing about poverty falls into two camps social scientists regard the behaviors of the economically disadvantaged either as calculated adaptations to prevailing circumstances or as emanating from a unique culture of poverty rife with deviant values the first camp presumes that people are highly rational that they hold coherent and justified beliefs and pursue their goals effectively without mistakes and with no need for help the second camp attributes to the poor a variety of psychological and attitudinal short fallings that render their views often misguided and their choices fallible leaving them in need of paternalistic guidance we propose a third view the behavioral patterns of the poor we argue may be neither perfectly calculating nor especially deviant rather the poor may exhibit the same basic weaknesses and biases as do people from other walks of life except that in poverty with its narrow margins for error the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced ways and can lead to worse outcomes in what follows we illustrate the kinds of insights that might be gained from a behaviorally more realistic analysis of the economic conditions of the poor and we propose that alternative policies for alleviating poverty be considered

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

on durable goods markets with entry and adverse selection we investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time the model is a dynamic version of akerlof 1970 identical cohorts of durable goods whose quality is known only to potential sellers enter the market over time we show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade the model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations jel classification d82 a propos des marches de biens durables quand il y a entree de nouveaux commercants et selection adverse les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendres par le mecanisme dynamique des prix dans un marche concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a selection adverse et entree exogene de nouveaux commercants dans le temps ce modele est une version dynamique du modele d akerlof 1970 des cohortes identiques de biens durables dont la qualite est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels arrivent sur le marche dans le temps il semble qu il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prevu par un modele statique en particulier on montre qu il existe un equilibre cyclique ou tous les biens sont transiges a l interieur d un nombre fini de periodes apres leur arrivage et que a chaque phase du cycle l eventail de qualite des biens transiges s accroit les commercants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualite attendent plus longtemps et l imperfection du marche se traduit par la longueur de temps d attente avant la transaction le modele fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marche

organic certification agro ecological practices and return on investment evidence from pineapple producers in ghana the recent empirical literature on economic sustainability of certified export crops shows that certification standards that enhance yields are important for improving farm revenues and household welfare however limited evidence exists on the impact of organic certification on the adoption of agro ecological practices in this study we use unique farm level data from pineapple producers in ghana to examine the impact of organic certification on the use of agro ecological practices such as organic fertilizers organic pest and weed control crop rotation and soil and water conservation as well as how using these measures affect farm outcomes such as return on investment our empirical results reveal that organic certification increases agro ecological practice use although from a very low starting point using a generalized propensity score approach we show that there is a positive but nonlinear relationship between the intensity of agro ecological practice use and return on investment

damaged durable goods i analyze a durable goods monopolist s incentives to introduce a damaged good a stripped down version of the original good in an infinite horizon framework the damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the coasian time inconsistency problem however it may lead to a welfare reduction low valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low quality damaged good early rather than buy the high quality original good later and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions this welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework

eliminating the market for secondhand goods an alternative explanation for leasing there are a number of prominent specific instances in which a durable goods manufacturer with significant market power employed a lease only policy i united shoe in the market for shoe machinery ii ibm in the market for computers and iii xerox in the market for copiers the obvious question that arises is why would such a firm prefer leasing over selling in this article i argue that one role of the lease only policy was to eliminate the market for secondhand goods the article formally demonstrates the argument discusses the relationship between this article and earlier literature on secondhand markets and discusses the implications for antitrust policy