competition between multiple asymmetric networks theory and applications this paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms elastic subscriber demand off net price discrimination call externalities and cost and market share asymmetries we characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm and market level network effects the model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates market maturity and retail pricing strategies we show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading in particular concerning the effects of termination rates

transmission system management and pricing new paradigms and international comparisons the transmission system once the necessary but nearly invisible component of the electric power system is now the focus of physical electrical and financial attention of the utility and more significantly their potential suppliers customers this paper has three primary objectives the first is to present a discussion of a new paradigm for the electric power industry the second is to review transmission pricing options specifically those utilizing either long run lrmc or short run srmc marginal cost based approaches the third is to provide a review of innovative approaches to transmission asset management and finance as seen from international experience

designing and rating an area yield crop insurance contract this article documents the design and rate making procedures used in the development of the group risk plan grp the new federal crop insurance product that insures based on area yield the authors of this article worked closely with personnel in the federal crop insurance corporation and others in developing methodological and practical constraints needed in implementing a workable area yield contract grp indemnity payments are made based on percentage shortfalls in actual county yields relative to a forecasted yield historical county yield data are used to develop forecasted yields and premium rates

why is on net traffic cheaper than off net traffic access markup as a collusive device abstract mobile telephony networks typically overcharge each other for the termination of incoming calls leading to high prices for off net traffic the existing theory claims that this behavior reduces profits since high termination charges make firms set high marginal prices thus leading to lower subscription fees and reduced profits this paper bridges the gap between theory and reality by incorporating several assumptions in a model that reflects the reality of mobile telephony markets one of the key assumptions is the fact that subscribers tend to place their calls to a limited number of people consisting mostly of friends and relatives the existence of such calling clubs combined with switching costs supports high access fees at the equilibrium we also discuss the implications of our analysis for eu regulation

promoting network competition by regulating termination charges abstract this paper contributes to the policy debate about the optimal termination charge when penetration rates are explicitly taken into account although lowering termination charges towards cost leads to more efficient usage its impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous since it induces an increase in fixed subscription fee through the so called waterbed effect we show that a reduction in termination charge below cost has two opposing effects on consumer surplus it softens competition but also helps to internalize network externalities hence it can decrease or increase penetration depending on whether or not the first effect dominates the second we show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak substitutes or the penetration rate is high

bill and keep vs cost based access pricing revisited abstract we study network competition with two part tariffs and termination based price discrimination in the presence of call externalities we show that both the collusive and the welfare maximizing access charges fall below marginal cost moreover bill and keep arrangements are welfare improving compared with cost based access pricing

energy efficiency vs economic efficiency new zealand electricity sector reform in the context of the national energy policy objective abstract in this article i review the diverse commentaries on new zealand s ongoing electricity sector reform process within the context of the government s energy policy objective in doing so my purpose is to highlight the interactions between the concepts of energy efficiency and economic efficiency in particular i ask how do the various commentators on reform define these concepts what indicators do they use to measure them and what level of each do they prescribe as appropriate my main objective is not to decide whether any commentator is right or wrong rather i seek to identify the distinct world views or paradigms underlying the commentaries with respect to both energy efficiency and economic efficiency i conclude that economic efficiency is consistent with a supply side paradigm valuing economic growth whereas those who value energy efficiency over economic efficiency subscribe to a demand side paradigm recognising the limits to growth such a paradigm derives from the ethic of sustainability i close by posing the as yet unanswered question are these paradigms mutually exclusive

mobile termination network externalities and consumer expectations we re examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and o net calls or when subscription demand is elastic this literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase this is puzzling since in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators this puzzle is resolved when consumers expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as defined by katz and shapiro aer 1985 instead of being responsive to non equilibrium prices as assumed until now

network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers abstract this paper analyses two way access pricing in a telecommunications market where consumers are heterogeneous in their demand for calls and firms are allowed to use non linear tariffs we first investigate how the presence of access charges affects the tariffs offered by firms in symmetric equilibrium next we show that under certain conditions each firm s profit is independent of the level of reciprocal access charge and therefore collusion using access charges is not sustainable this result suggests that efficient call allocations can be achieved under a minimal regulatory intervention i e recommending firms set access charges equal to call termination cost

normal markets market imperfections and energy efficiency abstract the conventional distinction between economic and engineering approaches to energy analysis obscures key methodological issues concerning the measurement of the costs and benefits of policies to promote the adoption of energy efficient technologies the engineering approach is in fact based upon firm economic foundations the principle of lifecycle cost minimization that arises directly from the theory of rational investment thus evidence that so called market barriers impede the adoption of cost effective energy efficient technologies implies the existence of market failures as defined in the context of microeconomic theory problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality on the part of consumers for example may lead real world outcomes to deviate from the dictates of efficient resource allocation a widely held contrary view that the engineering view lacks economic justification is based on the fallacy that markets are normally efficient

poverty traps and index based risk transfer products summary a growing literature suggests that in low income countries households with few assets can be trapped in chronic poverty this article reviews relevant threads of the poverty traps literature to motivate a description of the opportunities presented by innovative index based risk transfer products these products can be used to address some insurance and credit market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty among households in low income countries applications are considered at the micro meso and macro levels 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

a retail benchmarking approach to efficient two way access pricing no termination based price discrimination jeon gratefully acknowledges financial support from the spanish government under sej2006 09993 econ and a ramon y cajal grant hurkens gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the spanish ministry of science and technology under sej2006 01717 both authors acknowledge support through grant consolider ingenio 2010 csd2006 00016 and through the net institute netinst org

using bill and keep interconnect arrangements to soften network competition abstract this paper demonstrates that low below marginal cost interconnect or access charges can be used to sustain high subscription prices under network competition with two part tariffs and price discrimination this result stands in contrast to other results in the literature suggesting that high interconnect charges can play a collusive role

prices versus quantities comparing economic efficiency of feed in tariff and renewable portfolio standard in promoting renewable electricity generation abstract in order to promote renewable electricity generation several countries have been adopting a feed in tariff fit or a renewable portfolio standard rps of these two renewable energy policies investigating which one has better performance is a subject of debate this study comparatively analyzes the economic efficiency of fit and rps in the south korean renewable energy market fit was implemented from 2002 to 2011 while rps has been in force since 2012 hence a comparative analysis of the two policies is ideal the benefit cost ratio and net present value were measured from two different perspectives the government and energy producers the results showed that rps was more efficient for photovoltaic energy from the government s perspective whereas fit for non photovoltaic energy such as wind power bio energy and fuel cells however from the energy producers perspective fit was more efficient for photovoltaic energy while rps was more efficient for non photovoltaic energy

entry access pricing and welfare in the telecommunications industry abstract this paper investigates the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunications industry equilibrium pricing parameters for monopoly and duopoly situations are determined where access charges are chosen non cooperatively welfare comparisons between alternative access pricing regimes are also performed

can two part tariffs promote efficient investment on next generation networks abstract we analyze if two part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of next generation networks we model the industry as a duopoly where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant that requires access to the incumbent s network compete on hotelling s line the incumbent can invest in the deployment of a next generation network that improves the quality of the retail services we have three main results first we show that if the regulator can commit to a policy a regulatory moratorium may emerge as socially optimal second we show that if the regulator cannot commit to a policy it can induce investment only when the investment cost is low third we show that in this case two part tariffs involve very large payments from the entrant to the incumbent

intraconnectivity and interconnectivity when value creation may reduce profits this paper analyses firms decisions to provide connectivity to their customers we distinguish between intraconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect to each other and interconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect with another firm s customers the profitability implications of allowing connectivity are not a straightforward consequence of the consumer value of connectivity because connectivity affects not only the customer value but also the intensity of competition by creating or changing network externality we find that if sales are driven by brand switching rather than by category expansion a firm may find it optimal not to provide intraconnectivity even if providing it is not costly and may find it optimal to provide interconnectivity even at a cost exceeding the consumer value of connectivity on the other hand if category expansion is possible providing intraconnectivity may be profitable in this case either the equilibrium intraconnectivity provision may be asymmetric or both firms may find it individually optimal to provide intraconnectivity under certain conditions in the latter case the firms choice of intraconnectivity is a prisoner s dilemma game

price regulation of access to telecommunications networks abstract without access of networks to each other competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system wide monopolist one way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants while two way access concerns the interconnection between networks whereas one way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power two way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities among the numerous pricing rules discussed none clearly dominates this article provides a roadmap vis a vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation

intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty this paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power under uncertainty the unconstrained firm waits longer before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry in the certainty case the imposition of an inter temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution by contrast under uncertainty it cannot even if the price cap is optimally chosen under uncertainty the monopoly firm will generally a under invest and b impose quantity rationing on its customers

network competition with price discrimination bill and keep is not so bad after all abstract we study the impact of access charges on the incentives to invest in competing telecommunications networks of different quality high access charges soften competition in the investment stage and can be used to sustain higher profits under competition with two part tariffs and termination based price discrimination below cost charges such as bill and keep arrangements have a positive impact on investments

outsourcing vertical integration and price vs quantity competition abstract we show that standard conclusions about duopoly competition can be reversed when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power under such outsourcing bertrand competition can produce higher prices higher industry profit lower consumer surplus and lower total surplus than cournot competition in addition to limiting the intensity of retail competition bertrand competition can limit the extent of wholesale competition by reducing the incentive of retail providers to produce key inputs themselves

the assessment european networks competition interconnection and regulation recent events such as the california energy crisis the failures of the uk s railways and the consequences of the third generation 3g mobile licence auctions have called into question the european reliance on a strategy of network industry liberalization substantial concentration in energy and telecoms markets has also raised the issue of the consistency of competition policy with the creation of internal energy and communications markets the paper considers the multiple market failures in these industries and the problems raised by a series of national policy approaches which fail fully to reflect the economies of scale and scope and the european level public goods security of supply in energy the roll out of broadband and the gains for an overarching approach to climate change require a more european focus this in turn will require institutional reform at the european level failure to address this europe wide agenda will leave europe behind the usa copyright 2001 oxford university press

cross licensing and competition we study bilateral cross licensing agreements between n 2 firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase it is shown that the most collusive cross licensing royalty i e the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements in a symmetric setting if the terms of the cross licensing agreements are not observable to third parties the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty however when the terms of the agreements are public the most competitive royalty i e zero can also be bilaterally efficient policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross licensing agreements are derived from these results

bertrand competition under network externalities abstract two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network the value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good when the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market the set includes marginal cost mc pricing as well as bipartition pricing which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others we show that mc pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non linear externalities in a general network but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity the analysis is applied to platform competition in a two sided market under local and approximately linear externalities

network competition in nonlinear pricing previous research assuming linear pricing has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion i show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing i as long as subscription demand is inelastic profits can remain independent of the access charge even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second degree price discrimination ii when demand for subscriptions is elastic networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost relative to cost based access pricing welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost

anatomy of a future energy crisis restructuring and the energy sector in new zealand abstract up until the mid 1980s new zealand had been characterized by an economy that was heavily protected extensively regulated and in which production was subsidized to a considerable extent in 1984 the government embarked upon a programme of extensive public sector and economic restructuring described by some as being among the most wide reaching and radical in new zealand s history for the energy sector the restructuring has meant a move away from an administrative infrastructure of the 1970s and 1980s that was strongly centralized and government led to one that is based much more on market forces energy development production and delivery have been corporatized and privatized the energy sector has been largely deregulated and government has disavowed itself of responsibility for energy resource management and policy the primary motivation that underlies all of the reform is economic efficiency concerns are widely held however for the implications that follow from this restructuring of the energy sector for the efficient management of energy resources security of supply long term management of the sector and for the maintenance of environmental quality it is possible that greater economic efficiencies might be achieved although this is by no means certain but it would seem that specific characteristics of the restructuring will militate strongly against the achievement of other objectives in the sector recommendations for amendment refer to the need to strike a sensible balance between market forces and government involvement

the proof of the pudding making energy efficiency work abstract if western industrialized market economies are to realize a substantial proportion of the potential benefits of increased energy efficiency there is a need to move beyond engineering and economic estimates of efficiency potential and to consider seriously the implications of the behavioural and programme evaluation literature on energy efficiency that literature suggests that reliance upon market mechanisms alone will not permit realization of economically efficient levels of energy efficiency however if points the way toward designing energy efficiency programmes that show real promise of significantly achieving their potential in industrialized market economies

asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets abstract in liberalized telecommunications markets the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant s profits are high so that entry is encouraged i show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant this is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with european legislation

access to bottleneck inputs under oligopoly a prisoners dilemma we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market first two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept if any second firms compete on salop s circle the firms may be asymmetrically located on the circle to reflect differences in consumer shares for some levels of asymmetry the incumbents face a prisoners dilemma with respect to conceding access to their bottleneck inputs entry by a downstream firm may lead to lower retail prices however entry may also lead to higher retail prices for the access provider and for the entrant we also consider the cases where there are several incumbents and where the entrant makes the access price offers

your network or mine the economics of routing rules in many markets including payment cards and telecommunications service providers operate networks that support customer transactions with each other when the two sides of a transaction belong to more than one network in common the question arises as to which network will carry the transaction we show that the answer depends on a combination of who has the formal authority to choose and the parties network subscription decisions our central finding is that granting formal authority to one side of the market can increase the extent to which transactions run over the network preferred by the other side of the market we also characterize competing networks equilibrium choices of routing rules and prices

empirical evidence on the relationship between mobile termination rates and firms profits the theoretical literature on mobile termination rates mtrs is inconclusive on how the level of mtrs affects overall consumer charges and firms profits we show that when firms offer bundles with fixed included usage a tariff structure that has become more common in recent years an identical change in all mtrs does not affect firms retail prices or profits we use a panel dataset from saturated european markets to estimate the effect of mtrs on mobile operators profits as predicted by the theoretical model we cannot reject the fact that firms profits are unaffected by an identical change in all mtrs

termination fees revisited we reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation the interaction between these two features yields new insights in our model i the profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost ii the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost iii the welfare maximizing termination fee is below the profit maximizing one in the absence of termination based price discrimination but can be above it otherwise

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

foreclosing competition through high access charges and price discrimination this article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks an incumbent and a new entrant networks compete in non linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on net and off net calls when access charges are high this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large in the absence of termination based price discrimination however such foreclosure strategies are not profitable

calling circles network competition with non uniform calling patterns we introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns contrary to previous predictions jointly profit maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated we discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on and off net price discrimination

been top down so long it looks like bottom up to me abstract while technologists emphasize suboptimal choices by individuals and organizations many economists have ignored behavior exhibiting technical inefficiency this paper selectively discusses efforts by some economists to identify and measure technical inefficiency as applied to the energy efficiency gap bottom up economics would seek to measure significant departures from best practice technology distinguish between inefficiency that is more less wasteful of energy than other inputs and focus on developing testable hypotheses about technical inefficiency support for widespread intervention in energy use decisions may not necessarily follow from such an inquiry

a marginal measure of energy efficiency the shadow value abstract economists are well aware of the importance of marginal versus average measures of energy efficiency yet in the energy literature there is no consensus on the appropriate method for defining and measuring energy efficiency this paper sets out the shadow value of energy as a proper and meaningful marginal energy efficiency index a restricted profit function is used to model the shadow value we explore four scenarios to characterize and evaluate the shadow value of energy a within country comparison of different production processes with different energy requirements a comparison of different countries with different resource endowment a government policy to impose a tax to alter the shadow value to address environmental issues and a within country comparison of externalities arising from two sources of energy a comparative static analysis is carried out to sign the functional arguments defined for the shadow value

do consumers discount the future correctly a market based valuation of residential fuel switching abstract dsm and energy efficiency options are generally evaluated using engineering oriented discounted cash flow procedures which value all cost and benefit streams using a single arbitrary discount rate usually the firm s weighted average cost of capital wacc the wacc based approach ignores financial risk and hence leads to unreliable results in a recent paper in this journal hassett and metcalf depart from this tradition they reflect financial risk by simulating the total variability of returns from energy saving investments their findings indicate that dsm projects are potentially risky suggesting that the net benefits must be discounted at significantly higher rates thus lowering their present values this paper presents a market based evaluation of a particular dsm option residential fuel switching using the capital asset pricing model capm under the capm approach a risk adjusted market based discount rate is estimated for each cost stream fuel maintenance and avoided outlays for electricity the market based results which reflect the systematic risk of each cost stream suggest that fuel switching is probably not cost effective because it is considerably more risky than indicated by a wacc based analysis this supports hassett and metcalf s conclusion that consumers who reject dsm projects are not necessarily acting irrationally

rate making for farm level crop insurance implications for adverse selection this research identifies two problems in the new federal crop insurance that may cause adverse selection a the relationship between rate making and expected yields for individual farmers and b the bias introduced in coverage protection when trends are not used to establish expected yields a theoretical investigation using the normality assumption demonstrates the potential severity of these problems and empirical results from farm level data lend further support as crop insurance changes to individualized methods of protection these issues will be particularly important for developing rates

a role for capital markets in natural disasters a piece of the food security puzzle abstract natural disaster can create significant shocks in food supplies for small country states these events are very disruptive to the development process market based means for managing natural disaster risk are emerging for example despite the failure of government subsidized crop insurance around the world it is now possible to create index based contracts that would trigger when events that create serious crop failure problems occur this paper investigates the logic for such contracts and some basic designs using measures of rainfall

information exchange and competition in communications networks we develop a model of information exchange between calling parties we characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls we show that networks have reduced incentives to use off net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange this breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges we also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges we identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first best retail prices i introduction people use electronic communications in order to exchange information this exchange may take very different forms take as an example a situation with two individuals a and b a and b are academics trying to work on a joint paper but live in different places thus they rely on telephone conversations and e mail exchanges to conduct their work one day a and b are struggling to solve an equation a finds the solution and calls b b is obviously happy but then does not need to call a back since the problem has been solved another day a has an embryo of an idea and calls b b needs some time to ponder over this rudimental idea and then calls a back to tell him what she thinks about it in this second case b is still happy to have received a call from a since it may lead to an improvement of their paper but now the original call has initiated a chain reaction that has led b to return the call

nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities abstract this paper investigates how call and network externalities affect a monopolist s optimal nonlinear tariff in a two way telecommunication service market where consumers valuations for outgoing and incoming calls are positively correlated and the firm is not allowed to charge incoming calls it is shown that in contrast to the traditional efficiency on the top result all subscribers including those with the highest willingness to pay make suboptimal quantities of calls in the equilibrium the presence of call externalities may result in the existence of no call making subscribers in equilibrium also the firm may have incentives to sell the service below costs to some low valuation consumers in order to take advantage of the effect of network externalities

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

competition in communication networks pricing and regulation by any measure the communication sector is important it is no surprise then that the communication sector has attracted the attention of both policy makers and economists in this paper we argue that four characteristics of the networks that deliver communication services make this area of particular interest we analyse the implications of networks cost structures the strong complementarity between their components the demand side externalities that arise from consumption of their services and the social obligations attached to them despite the attention that the communication sector has received many aspects of competition between networks are still poorly understood we identify some of the key issues that will continue to trouble regulators and interest academics

electricity distribution as an unsustainable natural monopoly a potential outcome of new zealand s regulatory regime abstract the ongoing reform of new zealand s electricity supply industry has attempted to separate its potentially competitive elements from those with naturally monopolistic characteristics yet some competition for distribution services is occurring raising the question as to whether electricity distributors are natural monopolies as is typically assumed this paper presents a simple model of a representative new zealand distribution business and shows that in a true economic sense distributors are most probably sustainable natural monopolies as expected however the model demonstrates that a mechanism for competition may arise because the financial principles enshrined in the ministry of commerce s regulatory regime can produce unsustainable cost structures and unintentionally introduce elements of contestability into the market for distribution services

toward a theory of agricultural insurance in this paper we develop a theory of crop insurance we start by reaffirming the risk spreading role of competitive crop insurance markets it is argued however that once the problems of imperfect information are recognized a competitive crop insurance market may not exist at all two candidates present themselves first is market insurance with the public sector as a source of costly information gathering and dissemination and second is the direct provision of crop insurance by the public sector we focus on the latter and develop a model of public insurance as a decentralized plan where the farmer determines factor utilization taking the insurance contract as given in turn the insurance agency taking factor utilization as determined by the farmer chooses the optimal contract so as to maximize the value of aggregate output in the economy

concept and unintended consequences of weather index insurance the case of mexico recently weather index insurance wii has received considerable attention as a tool to insure farmers against weather related risks particularly in developing countries donor organizations local governments insurance companies development economists as well as agricultural economists are discussing the costs and benefits of wii while the literature on wii has mainly focused on many cases in africa and asia in this article we analyze the wii program in mexico which is one of the largest wii programs worldwide in this context we discuss potentially important spill over effects on related markets which so far have not been considered in the academic literature first we argue that wii creates disincentives to invest in other non insured crops leading to potential overspecialization and monoculture secondly wii generates disincentives to invest in irrigation systems because farmers are insured only as long as production takes place on non irrigated land third in case of catastrophic events food prices can potentially inflate with indemnity payments at the expense of the uninsured poor we also suggest that in mexico the thresholds of the weather index be continuously re calibrated in order to adjust for the development of drought resistant seeds finally the index could relatively easily be extended to account for precipitation variances we argue that these factors and spillover effects should be accounted for in cost benefit analysis of wii this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

network competition and entry deterrence we develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi firm industry the traditional duopoly framework of network competition firstly we show that incumbents establish inefficiently the reciprocal access charge below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities secondly we study how incumbents determine the industry wide access charge under the threat of entry we show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants only a group of them or may completely deter entry when entry deterrence is the preferred option incumbents distort the access charge upwards

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

strategic investment timing under asymmetric access charge regulation in telecommunications in a liberalized telecommunications market an incumbent has several advantages over any entrant an asymmetric access charge regulation for two such asymmetric firms stimulates competitive investment we show that an entrant with a cost disadvantage has an incentive to invest as a leader under an asymmetric access charge regulation these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work moreover we also investigate the effects of an asymmetric access charge regulation on competitive investment strategies

international network competition under national regulation we extend the workhorse model of network competition to international calls this model enables us to show that national regulatory authorities nras maximizing domestic welfare have incentives to increase termination rates above the social optimum to extract rent from international call termination excessive termination rates distort prices but transfer surplus from foreign to domestic consumers via intensified network competition the model can explain the regulation of termination rates through rate floors international network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of nras to distort termination rates we identify conditions under which each of these policies increases aggregate welfare

the energy efficiency gap what does it mean abstract as renewed attention has been given by policy makers to energy conservation issues it has frequently been asserted that an energy efficiency gap exists between actual and optimal energy use the critical questions is how to define the optimal level of energy efficiency this paper seeks to disentangle some confusing strands of argument that are frequently brought to bear on this question by identifying the major conceptual issues that determine the set of feasible answers we identify five separate and distinct notions of optimality the economists economic potential the technologists economic potential hypothetical potential the narrow social optimum and the true social optimum each of these has associated with it a corresponding definition of the energy efficiency gap our analysis demonstrates that necessary preconditions for identifying the right measure of the energy efficiency gap include understanding and disentangling market failure and non market failure explanations for the gradual diffusion of energy efficient technologies

how might climate change influence farmers demand for index based insurance the low observed uptake of non subsidised index based insurance policies in developing countries has been puzzling researchers for about a decade this paper analyses the role of drought frequency in farmers demand for index based insurance in developing countries while it is typically assumed that an increase in exposure to risk would result in higher demand for index insurance this paper finds the opposite an increase in drought frequency may result in lower demand for index insurance under fairly standard conditions in an expected utility model we show that the demand for insurance is an inverted u function of drought frequency we further show that downside basis risk decreases insurance demand under frequent drought conditions it implies that insurance against similar but more frequent events cannot meet large demand from farmers to check the empirical relevance of these effects we conduct an insurance field experiment in burkina faso with 205 farmers we analyse insurance demand for different drought frequencies different levels of basis risks and different loading factors through incentivised lottery choices this analysis confirms that for higher drought frequencies insurance demand is lower insurance demand also decreases with basis risk and the loading factor

systemic risk reinsurance and the failure of crop insurance markets without affordable reinsurance private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm level yields defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms using an empirical model of the u s crop insurance market we find that u s crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms we also find that area yield reinsurance contracts would enable crop insurers to cover most of their systemic crop loss risk reducing their risk exposure to levels typically experienced by more conventional property liability insurers copyright 1997 oxford university press

impact of competition investment and regulation on prices of mobile services evidence from france in this paper we assess the impact of competition investment and regulation on prices of mobile services in france we estimate hedonic price regressions using data on tariff plans offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in france between may 2011 and december 2014 in this time period the obtained quality adjusted price index decreased by about 42 8 as compared to a decline in weighted average prices without quality adjustment of 8 7 in a second step we relate the quality adjusted prices to a set of competition investment and regulation variables and find that the launch of 4g networks by mobile operators was the main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment low cost tariffs without commitment which were introduced to pre empt the entry of low cost competitor declined at the time of entry moreover we find that regulation which is approximated by the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and data has a joint significant impact on quality adjusted prices in percentage terms competition is responsible for about 23 4 of total price decline and investments in 4g for 56 1 we conclude that the reduction in quality adjusted prices in the last years was largely caused by competition between operators for a new 4g technology and by entry of a fourth low cost operator jel l13 l50 l96

network competition with income effects i generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect this also holds when operators discriminate between on net and off net calls if networks are differentiated operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on net off net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic