implications of economic interdependence for endogenous wage indexation decisions this paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices if stochastic disturbances are common across countries interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries however if disturbances are country specific numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy we also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises

wage indexation and the time consistency of government policy this paper concerns the role of wage indexation as a mechanism for enabling an economy to achieve outcomes that would not otherwise be time consistent the desirability of indexation depends on the size of real and nominal shocks and on a policymaker s incentives for short run inflation surprises policymakers incentives to utilize wage indexation are examined and it is found that weak policymakers are more likely to choose wage indexation hence in an electoral equilibrium voters may choose a policymaker who cares more about unemployment than inflation but who chooses wage indexation to commit to low inflation copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

optimal wage indexation in a multisector economy optimal wage indexation is analyzed in an economy subject to common and sector specific supply shocks and aggregate demand shocks where one sector has wage contracts and the other has a walrasian labor market it is shown that it is optimal in this setting to index wages partially to unanticipated economywide inflation and to industry specific profits consequently this study provides possible theoretical explanations for observation of both cpi indexation and profit sharing contracts and for the failure of purely aggregative indexation models to explain disaggregate level behavior copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

wage indexation and discretionary monetary policy since the early 1970 s both academic researchers and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the macroeconomic effects of wage indexation however these two groups have focused on different effects starting with jo anna gray 1976 and stanley fischer 1977a formal models emphasize the role of indexation in stabilizing or destabilizing output in contrast informal policy discussions usually focus on the allegation that indexation is inflationary e g arthur okun 1971 mario simonsen 1983 eliana cardoso and rudiger dornbusch 1987 to reduce this gap this paper presents a model of the effects of indexation on inflation and asks whether indexation raises economic welfare when these effects are taken into account until recently it was difficult to formalize the argument that indexation is inflationary because economists lacked models of the sources of inflation this paper applies the insight of robert barro and david gordon 1983a that with discretionary policy the employment gains from surprise inflation tempt the monetary authority to create positive trend inflation as stressed by fischer and lawrence summers 1989 policies that reduce the costs of inflation such as indexation cause barro gordon policymakers to choose higher inflation indeed inflation can rise so much that welfare falls despite greater protection against inflation this effect is appealing because it captures the common argument that indexation weakens policymakers will to fight inflation 1 this is not the end of the story however because wage indexation has a second effect it reduces the employment effects of surprise inflation that is unlike most policies to reduce the costs of inflation such as indexation of interest rates wage indexation steepens the phillips curve in the barrogordon model a steeper phillips curve reduces the temptation to inflate and hence reduces equilibrium inflation since indexation has one inflationary effect lower costs of inflation and one anti inflationary effect a steeper phillips curve the net effect appears ambiguous even if the net effect on inflation is determined the welfare effect may remain unclear if inflation rises the welfare loss might or might not be outweighed by the lower cost of a given amount of inflation 2 these ambiguities cannot be resolved with the barro gordon model alone because the phillips curve and the effect of inflation on welfare are ad hoc it is plausible that indexation affects these relations but the relative strengths of the effects are unclear resolving the ambiguities requires a more structural model in which the effects of indexation are derived rather than assumed this paper studies such a model specifically we use a model of staggered wagesetting based on gray 1976 fischer 1977a b and john taylor 1980 the degree of indexation is an explicit parameter and so we can derive its net effects on inflation and welfare section i of this paper presents our basic model and derives equilibrium inflation in

wages relative prices and the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates this paper reexamines the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates to take into account wage indexation and flexible prices the difference in output variation in the two exchange rate regimes is shown to be dependent on wage behaviour in the domestic economy being proportional to one minus the degree of wage indexation foreign wage behaviour is also shown to be of key importance since high wage indexation abroad can insulate the domestic country from some foreign disturbances regardless of domestic behaviour while for other economic disturbances it is the relative degree of wage indexation which determines the desirability of flexible rates niveaux de salaires prix relatifs et le choix entre les regimes de taux de change fixes ouflucttuants ce memoire reouvre le dossier du choix entre regime de taux de change fixes et regime de taux de change fluctuants quand on tient compte de l indexation des salaires et de la flexibilite des prix il appert que l ecart entre les variations du niveau de production domestique entre les deux regimes depend du comportement des salaires dans l economie domestique il est proportionnel a 1 le degre d indexation des salaires le comportement des salaires dans le reste du monde est aussi important puisque un haut degre d indexation des salaires dans le reste du monde peut proteger l economie domestique de certaines perturbations economiques h l etranger quel que soit le comportement des salaires domestiques dans le cas d autres perturbations economiques c est le degre relatif d indexation des salaires h l interieur et h l exterieur qui devient le facteur determinant dans le choix d un regime de taux de change how much difference a flexible exchange rate makes to the economic performance of a country depends significantly on wage behaviour if wages are sufficiently sensitive to exchange rates output will exhibit much the same variability under flexible exchange rates as under fixed rates foreign wage behaviour is also of key importance since high wage flexibility abroad can insulate the domestic country from some foreign disturbances regardless of domestic wage behaviour while for other economic disturbances it is the relative degree of wage flexibility which determines the desirability of flexible rates this paper re examines the choice between fixed and flexible rates taking into account both domestic and foreign wage

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

price prediction errors and real activity a reassessment price prediction errors and real activity a reassessment i introduction macro models employing rational expectations and natural rate assumptions have proven to be powerful and tractable analytical tools in these models output and employment fluctuations are typically demand driven with aggregate demand disturbances transmitted to the real sector through price prediction errors the waning popularity of natural rate models is due in part to the widely held belief that although theoretically appealing the models are of questionable empirical relevance this view appears to be based on a small number of studies which fail to find evidence of a robust empirical relationship between price level surprises and aggregate real activity indeed the available evidence has led some influential macroeconomists to conclude that the channels through which aggregate demand influences the economy have yet to be identified 1 this has had the two fold effect of i stimulating research on channels other than price through which aggregate demand may affect the economy and ii discouraging research on channels that do act through the price level while the first of these effects may be desirable the second is of concern this paper is motivated by our conviction that potentially valuable research has been discouraged on the basis of thin and seriously suspect evidence the sections that follow reassess the role of price prediction errors in determining aggregate real activity we provide evidence that the inability of other researchers to verify a positive correlation between demand driven price prediction errors and real activity is due to misspecified models and in some cases inappropriate estimation procedures we demonstrate that in a more correctly specified and estimated model the relationship between price surprises and real activity is positive and strongly significant thus we conclude that previous researchers were incorrect in discarding the major natural rate paradigms as empirically irrelevant these models do appear to identify an important channel namely price surprises through which aggregate demand influences the real sector ii issues and early evidence price prediction errors play a central role in the most prominent natural rate macro models these models typically fall into one of two general classes equilibrium models and contracting models in both classes of models unanticipated movements in the price level are the channel through which aggregate demand disturbances influence the real sector the exact nature of transmission process however differs across the two sets of theories equilibrium models of the sort pioneered by lucas 1973 depend on the assumption of incomplete information to produce non neutrality of aggregate demand disturbances in the best known examples of this kind of model confusion between relative and aggregate price movements causes firms to react to unanticipated price level movements as though they were at least in part relative price movements thus positive price level shocks cause all firms to increase output and generate positive deviations of aggregate output from its natural rate contracting models as developed in the work of fischer 1977 and gray 1976 depend on contractually set wages to produce non neutrality in these models nominal wages are incompletely responsive to unexpected changes in the price level during the term of the contract under which they are set consequently an unanticipated rise in the price level causes a fall in the real wage of all workers whose contracts are not in the process of renegotiation at that moment with employment determined by the firm during the contract interval the result is a rise in aggregate employment and output our present concern is with testing the common implications of equilibrium and contracting models possibilities for distinguishing between the two classes of models are explored in separate work

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

islands indexation and monetary policy this paper develops a synthesized macroeconomic model that incorporates the local global informational asymmetries of an islands economy into a setting characterized by endogenous wage indexation in such an economy agents are unable both to filter out the separate influences of demand and supply shocks on observed output prices and to distinguish between the separate price effects of local and aggregate disturbances so that optimal wage indexation depends upon both the variances of supply and demand disturbances and the information conditioned forecasts of agents as a result optimal monetary policy generally depends upon the variances of local and aggregate supply and demand

wage indexation and time consistency note this note presents a simple model where the decision on the degree of wage indexation is taken by a large agent such as the government the optimal degree of indexing is shown to depend on the variance of real shocks and on the inflations bias of the government due to the incentive to raise employment above the market clearing level wage indexation will be low if real shocks are large and if the government is inflation averse the ability of monetary policy to offset monetary disturbances makes them irrelevant to the determination of the optimal degree of indexing copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

nominal wage flexibility wage indexation and monetary union membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non membership this counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence but more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy it is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability the interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full indexation equilibrium

regulatory dealing revisiting the harrington paradox abstract despite the fact that i when the epa observes regulatory violations it rarely pursues the violator and ii the expected penalty faced by a violator who is pursued is small compared to the cost of compliance it is still the case that iii firms comply a significant portion of the time winston harrington harrington w 1988 enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted journal of public economics 37 29 53 provides a dynamic model consistent with this apparent paradox we offer an alternative rationalisation in a model of regulatory dealing in which the agency uses tolerance in some contexts to induce increased compliance in others the observed tolerance of the epa to non compliance may be a strategic response by the agency to a difficult enforcement environment rather than evidence that it has gone soft on pollution or been captured by industry interests we use the model to consider the impact of the growing trend towards citizen suits and ngo enforcement of regulation arriving at some unconventional conclusions we argue that the model is consistent with existing empirical analyses

discretionary monetary policy and socially efficient wage indexation it is not uncommon for policy makers especially when they are trying to reduce inflation to create incentives or restrictions that change individual decisions regarding nominal wage indexation this raises a very interesting question for economists if indexation of nominal contracts is the result of utility maximizing behavior why would policy makers try to alter private indexation decisions the usual rationale for governmental involvement in markets provided by microeconomic theory is that individual decisions may cause externalities that create a conflict between individual and social optima extending this logic to the case of indexation suggests that private indexation decisions may create an inflation externality and thus are not socially efficient blanchard 1979 and ball 1988 have investigated the social efficiency of private decisions to index to the price level they find that the equilibrium degree of wage indexation to the price level is socially inefficient if indexation to other relevant variables is costly since indexation costs do not appear to be empirically significant these models do not provide a very convincing argument for governmental involvement in the indexation process furthermore these models do not tie the degree of indexation to the trend inflation rate which seems to be the crucial element for justifying governmental intervention thus in order to pinpoint the exact nature of this externality a model is required that considers endogenous wage indexation but links indexation to the trend inflation rate devereux 1987 1989 uses such a model to examine the relationship between indexation and mean inflation by combining a gray 1976 indexation model with a barro gordon 1983 inflation model he shows that wage indexation affects the mean inflation rate but he does not address the issue of indexation efficiency in this paper we use a synthesis of ball and devereux s models to demonstrate that individual indexation decisions are in general socially inefficient however in contrast to blanchard and ball s

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted a reconsideration under asymmetric information abstract harrington harrington w 1988 enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted journal of public economics 37 29 53 offers an explanation for how relatively high compliance rates might co exist with low expected fines his results are highly dependent on the assumptions that all firms are identical and their compliance costs are known this paper shows that harrington s results are not necessarily robust in a more general model where asymmetric information and uncertainty are present

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

a reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted abstract harrington s 1988 model of state dependent enforcement of pollution standards indicates the potential for significant reductions in monitoring cost however this approach results in firms with identical pollution cost functions polluting at different levels and thereby failing to minimize control cost for a given total pollution reduction derivations indicate that a state independent approach with a modified standard will often yield a lower sum of pollution control and monitoring cost for a given level of pollution control

regime uncertainty and optimal investment timing abstract we construct a real options model in which a regime change is expected at a pre determined future time and study the effects of regime uncertainty on a firm s strategic investment decision taking into consideration the remaining time to the regime change and the probability of each regime state we show that just before the time of a regime change firms should act as if the worst case scenario was about to happen even if a good state is highly possible

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

is equilibrium indexation efficient this paper investigates the welfare properties of equilibrium indexation in a decentralized economy if indexation is costless so all firms index then the equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient but if indexation is costly and this leads some firms not to index equilibrium indexation is inefficient because indexation has externalities for nonindexed firms firms choose too little indexation if labor demand is more responsive to movements in real money than to movements in real wages the results do not depend on the relative importance of real and nominal shocks

regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior economic models of enforcing environmental law have incorporated varying assumptions about regulatory objectives this paper examines the consequences of different attitudes toward the benefits and costs of pollution control on the part of regulators who have limited powers and resources we find that greater weight given to compliance costs relative to the social damages of the polluting activity will bring outcomes closer to the optimum when the regulator is strong but may move outcome further from the social optimum when regulatory powers are weak when negotiated noncompliance is an option greater consideration of compliance costs will tend to produce better results

optimal wage indexation and monetary policy in an economy with imported raw materials abstract an economy s openness from the input side has important effects on the optimal design of its macroeconomic policies given the exchange rate regime the larger the share of imported raw materials in domestic production the smaller the optimal degree of wage indexation to unanticipated inflation alternatively given the wage indexation parameter the larger the share of imported raw materials in domestic production the smaller the optimal degree of foreign exchange intervention by the monetary authority the more flexible the exchange rate

inflation and wage indexation in the postwar united states this paper examines the relationship between inflation and wage indexation in the postwar united states using data on the prevalence of cost of living adjustments in major collective bargaining agreements the author finds that increases in inflation precede increases in wage indexation but reductions in inflation do not precede reductions in wage indexation there is virtually no evidence that wage indexation affects inflation copyright 1995 by mit press

policy credibility and inflation in a wage setting game this paper combines the conventional monetary policy game with a wage setting game among several non cooperating wage setters each with some monopoly power the inflationary bias in market economies is explained in terms of the wage competition bias this bias does not disappear even when the central bank communicates its policy goals precisely and credibly in a policy game with several non cooperative monopolistic wage setters and a central bank if discretionary policy is interpreted as wage setters being stackelberg leaders relative to the central bank a discretionary policy leads to both higher inflation and lower output

discretion wage indexation and inflation it is now well understood that discretionary policy making frequently leads to socially sub optimal outcomes this point was first made by kydland and prescott 12 using an example of a monetary policy game they argued that in the presence of output distortions in the economy the monetary authority has an incentive to renege on earlier promises to maintain price stability by expanding the money supply in order to create unexpected inflation thereby increasing output and employment since private wage setters form expectations rationally this policy action is anticipated and in equilibrium leads to excessive inflation without any resulting change in output or employment consequently in the absence of enforceable policy rules the time consistent discretionary monetary path produces a socially sub optimal inflation rate this form of policy behavior has important implications for the decisions of private agents such as their choice of the degree of wage indexation however most work in the literature on endogenous wage indexation stemming from the seminal paper by gray 10 has analyzed the equilibrium indexation choice assuming either a constant money growth rule 1 or a monetary rule involving lagged or contemporaneous feedback 8 17 only the recent papers by devereux 5 6 have attempted to examine the implications of time consistent discretionary monetary policy for endogenous wage indexation the informational structure he considers has the monetary authority setting the money stock prior to the realization of shocks so that the authority has no information regarding current period disturbances when determining its course of action this assumption precludes any contemporaneous attempt by the monetary authority to stabilize output or the price level devereux reaches the conclusion that wage setters who are aware of the authority s policy decision will find it optimal to index positively to unanticipated price level surprises since none of the aggregate shocks are offset directly by the monetary authority thus the informational environment confronting the authority influences the degree of indexation and subsequently the manner in which aggregate demand and supply variability impinge upon social welfare

stabilization with wage indexation and exchange rate flexibility abstract this survey examines the role of wage indexation and exchange rate policy in dampening fluctuations in output around its target level it is demonstrated that the appropriate choice for wage indexation and exchange rate flexibility is highly sensitive to the nature and the relative importance of the shocks impinging upon the economy as well as to the relevant parameters in the economy moreover the question of the desired flexibility of the exchange rate should be studied in the context of wage indexation and vice versa this interdependence raises the possibility of both policies being complements or substitutes to each other depending on the number of shocks that perturb the economy

reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines should the penalty fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers these models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected this article shows that if the judicial system is built on the reasonable doubt test then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent in particular as the penalty increases the probability of conviction falls as a result uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it this article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction that is the penalty should fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government this approach has led becker 1968 and others to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law while this normative prescription is natural and intuitive there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high but rather rise with the severity of the crime one possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty psychologists however have found that a juror s willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay

the effect of monetary variability on welfare in a simple macroeconomic model abstract in many rational expectations macro models monetary variability reduces welfare this note provides a counterexample based on an extension of the discretionary equilibrium of barro and gordon 1983 to an economy with endogenous wage indexing greater monetary variability leads to greater wage indexing this lowers the authority s perceived return to discretionary monetary policy and thereby lowers the equilibrium rate of inflation the implication is that over a certain interval monetary variability may increase welfare

the transmission of disturbances under alternative exchange rate regimes with optimal indexing the paper develops a general stochastic macroeconomic model that can be used to study the international transmission of disturbances under four alternative exchange rate systems uniform flexible exchange rates uniform fixed exchange rates and two versions of two tier exchange rates the analysis makes two general points first one cannot assume stability of structure when assessing the consequences of alternative exchange rate regimes for example the slope of the aggregate supply curve and the rationally formed expectations in the asset markets can respond dramatically to the government s choice of exchange rate regime second exchange rate regimes that provide full insulation from foreign disturbances may nevertheless be inferior to other regimes in terms of their ability to maximize social welfare

the dynamics of optimal environmental regulation the problem of environmental control by direct regulatory restrictions on firms maximum discharge levels is examined the problem can be viewed as one of optimally selecting this upper bound and of selecting a time at which it comes into force firms are normally given time to adjust to the new regime the firm chooses a private cost minimising adjustment path and the control authority needs to take account of this in setting the regulatory control the resulting second best solution is contrasted with the first best environmental adjustment path

wage flexibility and openness this paper analyzes the degree of short run real wage flexibility in a two sector economy under floating rates this is done by deriving optimal wage indexation in a contracting framework we find that the more closed the economy the lower the degree of wage indexation as a result output will fluctuate less around its desired level in a more closed economy these findings further imply that a given unexpected monetary shock will cause as maller output shock in a more open economy whereas a given real shock will induce a smaller output shock in a more closed economy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

pollution permits and compliance strategies abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters compliance decisions polluters can buy permits invest in pollution abatement or else stop production or source out we show that stand alone spot markets induce excessive investment the introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest but is not the optimal way to control pollution a menu of options on pollution rights possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales yields higher welfare because of its focus on long run demand elasticities and rent extraction this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand side management public transportation bypass in telecommunications or forward sales by a private monopolist

monetary policy games inflationary bias and openness abstract when a country s central bank has higher output objectives than those of wage setters the noncooperative nash equilibrium contains an inflationary bias which is higher the flatter the economy s aggregate supply curve an economy s openness from the input side is an exogenous observable characteristic that provides a direct way of testing the theory when the imported intermediate goods displace capital labor in production a higher degree of openness flattens steepens the economy s aggregate supply curve and increases decreases the inflationary bias

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

does contractual wage rigidity play a role in determining real activity interest in nominal wage ridigity as a source of macroeconomic fluctuations has waxed and waned over the past half century the most recent wave of interest was triggered by the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s which inspired an improved sticky wage paradigm the paradigm posits the existence of short term contractual arrangements that in their simplest form fix wage schedules in nominal terms for a predetermined period the life of the contract and leave employment at the discretion of the firm the most influential examples of the paradigm incorporate rational expectations and satisfy the natural rate hypothesis 9 14 thus meeting the new minimum standards for demand driven theories of the business cycle nominal wage contracting models have been vigorously criticized for both a lack of theoretical rigor and an absence of empirical support despite their critics however the models have remained a popular analytical tool and after almost a decade of inattention economists are showing a renewed interest in empirical tests of nominal contracting models the studies produced to date are small in number and offer conflicting conclusions they are perhaps as important for the objections they provoke as for the answers they provide while the work reported in this paper

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

to comply or not to comply pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning in this paper we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard a probability of inspection and a fine for non compliance in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly and the penalty may include gravity and non gravity components at the regulator s discretion under given penalties the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met non compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages interestingly the appropriate structure of the penalty under non compliance is highly progressive while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear if the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance

optimal monetary policy endogenous supply and rational expectations abstract in this paper we demonstrate that the choice of monetary policy regime will affect the variability of output when private agents in forming their supply decisions take into account the authority s selection of a policy rule a striking feature of the analysis is that the choice between policy rules in sargent wallace 1975 framework but with endogenous aggregate supply depends only on the variability of aggregate demand under each rule and not on the variability of aggregate supply it follows that the choice of monetary policy rules reduces to the problem analyzed by poole 1970 in the stochastic keynesian structure

optimal wage indexation foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy this paper deals with the design of optimal monetary policy and with the interaction between the optimal degrees of wage indexation and foreign exchange intervention the model is governed by the characteristics of the stochastic shocks which affect the economy and by the information set that individuals possess because of cost of negotiations nominal wages are assumed to be precontracted and wage adjustments follow a simple indexation rule that links wage changes to observed changes in price the use of the price level as the only indicator for wage adjustments may not permit an efficient use of available information and may result in welfare loss the analysis specifies the optimal set of feedback rules that should govern policy aiming at the minimization of the welfare loss these feedback rules determine the optimal response of monetary policy to changes in exchange rates interest rates and foreign prices the adoption of the optimal set of feedback rules results in the complete elimination of the welfare cost arising from the simple indexation rule and from the existence of nominal contracts since optimal policies succeed in the elimination of the distortions issues concerning the nature of contracts and the implications of specific assumptions about disequilibrium positions become inconsequential the analysis then proceeds to examine the interdependence between the optimal feedback rules and the optimal degree of wage indexation it is shown that a rise in the degree of exchange rate flexibility raises the optimal degree of wage indexation one of the key conclusions is the proposition that the number of independent feedback rules that govern a policy must equal the number of independent sources of information that influence the determination of the undistorted equilibrium thus it is shown that with a sufficient number of feedback rules for monetary policy there may be no need to introduce wage indexation it is also shown that an economy that is not this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a simulation model for a competitive generation market the simulation of a wholesale electricity market should go beyond a simple optimization based on the operating costs of the generating units a model of a competitive electricity market must consider the market structure the strategy of the market participants and any other factor that lead to prices different from costs this paper presents cosmee a model of a wholesale electricity market based on simple bids that estimates expected bid prices and quantities system hourly prices and generation schedules taking into account the bidding strategies of generators and the structure of the market the model reflects the profit maximizing behavior of the market agents subject to different types of constraints cosmee has been used to simulate a real wholesale market