fiscal policy expectation traps and child labor i introduction child labor is widespread in the contemporary world in fact the international labor organization ilo estimates that 246 million of the world s children aged 5 17 or 16 are child laborers most living in developing countries 1 recently there has been renewed interest in this topic among economists which has led to a series of theoretical studies with the aim of better understanding the causes and consequences of child labor in order to help guide appropriate policy responses as in grootaert and kanbur 1995 basu 1999 and basu and tzannatos 2003 for useful literature surveys typically theoretical models designed to address the important policy issues surrounding child labor posit that a family s decision to send a child to the labor market is taken only as a last resort in order to escape the dire consequences of poverty for example basu and van 1998 baland and robinson 2000 show that this response on the part of the family may be stronger in a dynamic setting because contracts between children and adults are not self enforcing and capital markets are incomplete 2 in this case an adult decision maker may not only send their children to work to escape poverty in the present but do so to escape poverty in the future as well this decision will hinder a child s ability to accumulate human capital and can lead to persistent cycles of poverty and child labor across generations 3 we begin by showing that a benevolent government can address the incidence of child labor that results from the non enforceability of intergenerational contracts and incomplete capital markets through the appropriate use of fiscal policy and that this policy is pareto improving it is then shown that if society s confidence in their government is incomplete this lack of confidence can render the same fiscal policy ineffective in other words if households do not believe that the government will follow through on their policy promise then in fact it is quite possible that the government will not be able to follow through on their promise as a result of these beliefs 4 this self reinforcing nature of fiscal policy in the presence of uncertainty can leave a country in an expectations trap with a low level of human capital and child labor 5 to formally demonstrate this fiscal policy expectations trap hypothesis we employ a three period overlapping generations model in which child labor exists 6 this stylized setup will keep the dynamics manageable and allow us to highlight the effects of uncertainty also within this framework we introduce a missing intergenerational contracts market in conjunction with a human capital production function that exhibits a threshold with respect to parental human capital which gives rise to two locally stable steady states there is a good equilibrium where there is a relatively high level of parental human capital which results in a high level of income and no child labor and there is a bad equilibrium where there is a relatively low level of parental human capital which results in a low level of income and positive child labor this low income child labor equilibrium is the standard poverty trap scenario that typically exists in a deterministic economy with multiple equilibria it is then shown that a benevolent government can replicate the missing intergenerational contracts market with a pay as you go social security program thereby eliminating this component of child labor in an economy with perfect foresight in addition it is also shown that this policy is pareto improving in the sense that all generations are strictly better off under this policy except the initial old who are no worse off the dynamics of this social security program are intuitive if child labor is one possible mechanism adults can use to redistribute resources from their children then the government can reduce this incentive by announcing a social security program that will begin during the current adults old age an institutional intergenerational contract

liberalization of capital movements and of the domestic financial system this paper analyzes the dynamic impact of a joint liberalization of capital movements and of the domestic financial sector both a simultaneous and a sequential liberalization are examined in an overlapping generations model with a q theory of investment a liberalization generally leads to an initial period of capital inflows followed by capital outflows it also increases investment and causes an overshooting in share prices furthermore the interest rate level before a liberalization will usually not indicate the direction of net capital flows copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility this paper studies optimal pay as you go social security with investment externalities positive bequests and endogenous fertility with an investment externality a competitive solution without social security suffers from under investment in capital and over reproduction of population we show the existence of time consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity we also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to gdp

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

a median voter model of social security this paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security the framework for the analysis is a continuous time overlapping generations model with nonaltruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market a majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity constrained the desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the preexisting level of social security as a consequence in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level the program initially overshoots its steady state value copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multinationals response to repatriation restrictions abstract we present a model that explains how repatriation restrictions can increase or decrease a multinational s capital investment in and technology transfer to its subsidiary past remittance restrictions influence the multinational s expectation of current and future repatriation policies which affect its operations we show that the model can capture the flows of united states multinational s capital and technology in response to various forms of brazilian repatriation restrictions seen in the eighties by comparing steady state level effects of the restrictions we show countries should expect an inflow of foreign direct investment with the abolishment of restrictions not an outflow as some countries fear

a federal voting mechanism to solve the fiscal externality problem abstract fiscal externalities arise whenever several countries choose independently some tax or regulation policy this results into a severe loss for everybody if the taxed or regulated factor is very mobile for example this implies a bias toward little or no capital taxation if capital can move easily toward the lowest tax rate federalism would induce voters to internalize these externalities but implies full harmonization which harms countries whose most preferred policy is too far from the federal median which may lead them not to enter the federation in the first place we study a natural intermediate mechanism between full independence and full federalism introducing flexible divisions of the surplus generated by the removal of these externalities in the first stage voting takes place in each country simultaneously in order to choose a federal policy in the second stage each country decides through voting whether to adopt the federal policy or to leave the federation in which case it chooses its own policy and possibly pays a fixed cost to the remaining federation even if the fixed cost is null the federal voting stage acts as a commitment device and softens the inefficiency of full independence by allowing voters to internalize the undesirable effects of federal break up in stage 2 moreover the fixed cost can be chosen so that situations where harmonization is desirable get self selected as a result every country always benefits from entering this mechanism combining the benefits of common decision making with those of flexibility

endogenous transfer institutions in overlapping generations abstract we characterize the set of equilibrium transfers between overlapping generations when transfer institutions are endogenous in stationary economies pareto improving transfers require institutions cost as much to construct as they convey even if less costly institutions exist that make the same transfer if institutions can be built upon they may cost less and convey more but transfers may become excessive interpreting such institutions as social security we introduce private saving with time social security crowds out savings still the potential to save limits any excess transfer endogenous costly to create gold money institutions are examined and the role of compulsion in evolving to costless to create fiat currency detailed

when liberal policies reflect external shocks what do we learn abstract we present a model where policies of free capital mobility can signal governments future policies but the informativeness of the signal depends on the path of world interest rates capital flows to emerging markets reflect investors perception of these markets political risk with low world interest rates emerging markets experience a capital inflow and engage in a widespread policy of free capital mobility with higher rates only sufficiently committed countries allow free capital mobility whereas others impose controls to trap capital onshore thus signaling future policies affecting capital mobility these predictions are consistent with the recent experience of capital flows and policies affecting capital mobility in developing countries

socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities fertility and endogenous growth abstract this paper considers socially optimal government policies in a dynastic family model with physical capital human capital endogenous fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital such spillovers reduce human capital investment but raise fertility from their social optimum we first characterize the social optimum with a non convex feasible set due to the quantity quality tradeoff concerning children we then show that social security and education subsidization together financed by labor income taxes can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the spillovers and achieve the social optimum under plausible conditions however none of the policies can do so alone

voting on pensions a survey abstract the paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence size and political sustainability of pay as you go pension systems it proposes a simple framework of analysis a small open two overlapping generation economy model around which some variants are displayed dictatorship of the median voter is assumed the text is organized to answer the following questions i do political equilibria with payg pension schemes exist ii why do they emerge iii what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified and finally iv what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous e g demographic shock

increasing longevity and social security reforms a legislative procedure approach abstract increasing longevity causes an upward trend in the dependency ratio in many countries this raises concerns about the financial sustainability of social security schemes and reform proposals and initiatives abound it is shown that a fundamental policy choice inevitably arises since a given social security system cannot be maintained by simply indexing pension ages to longevity the political reform process is analysed using the so called legislative procedure when longevity increases the retirement age is raised more than proportionally to the increase in longevity but the young also make larger transfers to the old

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states experience the existing political and legal institutions of fiscal policy making are under challenge as the united states and the eastern european and soviet states experiment with policy decentralization the states of western europe are looking to a more centralized policy structure via the e e c this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts notably the need to consider and balance the inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization spillovers and wasteful fiscal competition against the inefficiencies of fiscal policy centralization policy cycles and localized pork barrel spending and taxes the need to develop new fiscal policy institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive agenda setters is stressed robert p inman daniel l rubinfeld department of finance and economics school of law and the wharton school of management department of economics university of pennsylvania university of california philadelphia pa 19104 berkeley ca 94720 and neer fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states e perienc by robert p inman and daniel l rubinfeld2 in democratic and totalitarian regimes alike the existing political and legal institutions of economic policy making are under challenge the wisdom of centralized fiscal regimes is now being questioned quietly under the banner of the new federalism in the united states and vocally if not violently through the secessionist movements of eastern europe and the soviet states as these nations experiment with decentralized fiscal institutions the countries of western europe are now looking to the potential of a more centralized economic order within the new european economic community this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and within that context to offer some cautionary advise for the design of e e c fiscal institutions based upon the recent american experience with centralized fiscal policy making ii the role for central government fiscal policies in economic unions the european community s progress towards an economic and monetary union the authors wish to thank allesandra casella and barry eichengreen for helpful comments and discussions 2 the authors are professor of finance and economics university of pennsylvania and research associate of the nber and professor of law and economics university of california at berkeley respectively professor rubinfeld gratefully acknowledges the support of the center for real estate and urban economics at the university of california berkeley based upon a common currency will create new demands for the design of fiscal policy 3 perhaps most importantly with a common currency and thus a common monetary policy member states will no longer be able to influence their local economies through exchange rate or monetary policies when state specific economic shocks occur 4 state specific fiscal policies stand as an alternative three questions arise 1 can member state fiscal policies be effective in offsetting local economic shocks in an integrated economic union 2 if effective are such policies likely to be optimally managed at the state level and 3 if ineffective or non optimal what central government policies might be then preferred the recent united states experience is instructive on each point can member state fiscal policies be effective in open integrated economies deficit financed demand creation may be of only limited usefulness to small member states first the demand stimulus of deficit financing is dissipated through import demands from other union states gramlich 1987 has shown that the effectiveness of deficit policies in the smallest u s states is significantly import constrained though larger states may be able to use own deficits to affect state employment prospects second in member states the use of such deficits to combat local shocks may be significantly limited by what the capital markets will allow while deficits may be see eichengreen 1990 there is growing evidence of the economic importance of state specific economic shocks to the short run and long run prospects of states and regions in integrated economic unions see bernard and durlauf 1991 for a study of oecd countries many of which are in the eec and brown coulson and engle 1990 for a study of u s states member states which manage these shocks well are likely to enjoy higher long run growth beneficial to the local economy during downturns and while member states may promise to repay those deficits with surpluses during the upswing such promises are difficult to enforce the u s capital market has appeared reluctant to accept a state s promise of a balanced budget over a business cycle such promises lack credibility when temporary economic downturns are not easily distinguished from long run structural declines when good deficits cannot be distinguished from bad the only credible local government promise may be a balanced budget in each fiscal year the stringent u s state budgets for the recessionary 1992 fiscal year balanced through major tax increases and deep spending cuts offer evidence on the point 5 even if member state deficit policies are economically feasible their management may be non optimal in interdependent economic unions the benefits from local demand creation through deficit financing may spillover to other member states via import expansion while the interest costs of deficits remain with the borrowing state the result will be an under provision of expansionary fiscal policies by member states using the arguments of hart 1982 central government fiscal policies stand as the policy

how income transfer programs affect work savings and the income distribution a critical review for helpful comments on earlier drafts we thank without implicating moses abramovitz yves balcer john bishop alan blinder richard burkhauser michael darby irwin garfinkel alan gustman daniel hamermesh martin holmer george jakubson robert lampman paul menchik robert moffitt michael murray joseph quinn timothy smeeding eugene smolensky barbara wolfe and two anonymous referees

fiscal federalism in europe in democratic and totalitarian regimes alike the existing political and legal institutions of economic policy making are under challenge the wisdom of centralized fiscal regimes is now being questioned quietly under the banner of the new federalism in the united states and vocally if not violently through the secessionist movements of eastern europe and the soviet states as these nations experiment with decentralized fiscal institutions western europe is now looking to a more centralized economic order within the new european economic community this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and within that context to offer some cautionary advise for the design of e e c fiscal institutions

dynamic efficiency in the gifts economy abstract in the standard analysis of overlapping generations economies with gifts from children to parents each generation takes the actions of other generations as given the resulting equilibrium is dynamically inefficient in reality however parents realize that children will respond to higher parental saving by reducing gifts for a broad class of gift economies this implicit tax on saving pushes the equilibrium to dynamic efficiency this result reestablishes the potential relevance of the gift model to the us economy renders moot an important part of the ricardian equivalence debate and provides a motivation for a type of social security system

the multinational enterprise under the threats of restriction on profit repatriation and exchange control abstract this paper models and analyzes the effects of uncertainties about restriction on profit repatriation and exchange control faced by the multinational enterprise in the host country on its international investment trade and sales the former uncertainty constrains investment in the host country its effects on exports to the host country and sales there depend on transfer pricing by the multinational enterprise by contrast the threat of exchange control on overall exchange transactions is neutral with respect to international investment but it decreases exports and sales in the host country and hence are detrimental to its consumers

productivity growth and the political economy of social security the present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social securityas the outcome of a public decision making process in an endogenousgrowth economy it employs a model in which there is a non monotonic relationship beween productivity growth and the scale ofpublic intergenerational redistribution the paper shows thatalthough unfunded social security need not harm growth in general it is likely to harm growth in a democracy this effect isreinforced by population aging

public pensions choices for the future abstract the purpose of this paper is to analyze to what extent pay as you go government mandated pensions can provide adequate retirement income to future generations this question is particularly relevant at times when the financial viability of public pensions is threatened by demographic aging and possibly declining productivity and when more importantly there is little consensus as to why those programs exist as they are that is mandatory public and unfunded the gist of our argument is that an aging population particularly if combined with declining productivity would jeopardize the financial and political viability of public pensions if individuals behavior doesn t adjust to this new reality and public authorities don t adopt the appropriate reforms as to mandatory retirement age payroll taxes and benefits structure among key individual decisions we focus on saving labor participation retirement education migration and fertility we consider how sensitive each of these is to changes in the environment and to changes in policy parameters then we turn to a number of issues unsolved either because of analytical complexity or because they arise from new realities

reform support in times of crisis the role of family ties we argue that an important determinant of voters support for economic reform is the strength of family ties while the crisis hypothesis predicts that crises facilitate reform we show in a political economy model that this relation can break down and even reverse when agents take into account the effect of reform on their family members applied to southern european countries with strong family ties the model rationalizes why the extremely high youth unemployment following the great recession has not led to more substantial labor market reforms in such countries austerity might block rather than foster additional structural reforms

the politics of 1992 fiscal policy and european integration the internal market in europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources how will this affect fiscal policy in different countries we consider taxation of capital in a two country model where a democratically chosen government in each country chooses tax policy higher capital mobility changes the politico economic equilibrium in two ways on the one hand it leads to more tax competition between the countries this economic effect tends to lower tax rates in both countries on the other hand it alters voters preferences and makes them elect a different government this political effect offsets the increased tax competition although not completely

social security reform and investment in education is there scope for a pareto improvement we propose a pareto improving policy which reduces the overall wage tax burden in an economy with intergenerational trade in a fixed factor of production here labelled as land we analyse a second best environment in which the government cannot resort to non distortionary land taxes reducing the social security contribution rate encourages investment in human capital future efficiency gains accruing to complementary land are capitalized in its value the capital gains may compensate land owning pensioners for reduced benefits we also explain why the unfunded pension system may have lost its appeal even for pensioners after its introduction

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

tax competition in wilhelmine germany and its implications for the european union the twenty five german states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy after german unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility in contrast the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through world war i this paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914 in spite of a diversity of political systems tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors in states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance taxes on land were reduced while in states with more open systems tax rates remained higher one unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward the most dominant state prussia served as the lowest common denominator state but pressure from the national government especially to increase expenditures forced all states to raise their tax rates these results suggest possible ways for the european union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor

bounded rationality expectations and child labour this paper develops a model with overlapping generations where the household s optimal fertility child labour and education decisions depend on the parents expectations or beliefs about the return to education it is shown that there exists a range of parental income where the fertility rate is high and children participate in the labour market and receive an incomplete education if a parent believes the return to education is low the act of participating in the labour market reduces the child s ability to accumulate human capital thus the action of sending a child into the labour market is sufficient to ensure that the parents initially pessimistic expectations are fulfilled it is then shown that a one time policy intervention such as banning child labour and mandatory education can be enough to move a country from the positive child labour equilibrium to an equilibrium with no child labour rationalite limitee anticipations et travail des enfants ce memoire developpe un modele de chevauchement des generations ou la fecondite optimale du menage le travail des enfants et les decisions a propos de l education dependent des anticipations des parents ou de qu ils croient etre le rendement sur l education on montre qu il existe un eventail de revenus des parents pour lequel le taux de fecondite est eleve et les enfants participent au marche du travail et recoivent une education incomplete si un parent croit que le rendement sur l investissement en education est faible le fait d entrer sur le marche du travail reduit la capacite de l enfant a accumuler du capital humain et donc le fait de l envoyer sur le marche du travail est suffisant pour s assurer que les anticipations pessimistes du parent se realisent on montre qu une intervention ponctuelle de politique publique a un moment donne comme bannir le travail des enfants ou imposer l education obligatoire peut suffire pour deplacer un pays d un equilibre avec travail des enfants vers un equilibre sans travail des enfants

social security the family and economic growth we show that a defined benefits payg social security system distorts key family based choices that affect economic growth we identify human capital as the engine of growth and the motivating forces linking the family s overlapping generations as mutually productive intergenerational transfers and or altruism the payg system is shown to affect adversely at least one of three determinants of the economy s growth path fertility savings and investment in human capital the specific effects may vary over different stages of economic development the growth rate is expected to fall in advanced economies our analysis indicates that the effect may be sizeable jel 915 111 850

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy abstract this paper is concerned with the issue does there exist a social security program which can be maintained period after period to address this issue the paper considers dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy the altruism is intergenerational nonpaternalistic and two sided it is assumed that generations coexisting in the same period agree on a social welfare function which evaluates the consumption of various generations and play a game against those living in different periods a perfect equilibrium of this game is shown to exist and its properties are examined journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62 h55

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination

lessons for an aging society the political sustainability of social security systems what is the future of social systems in oecd countries in our view the answer belongs to the realm of politics we evaluate how political constraints shape the social security system in six countries france germany italy spain the uk and the us under population aging two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the analysis first the increase in the dependency ratio the ratio of retirees of workers reduces the average profitability of the unfunded social security system thereby inducing the agents to reduce the size of the system by substituting their claims towards future pensions with more private savings second an aging electorate leads to larger systems since it increases the relevance of pension spending on the policy makers agenda the overall assessment from our simulations is that the political aspect dominates in all countries albeit with some differences spain the fastest aging country faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate when labor market considerations are introduced the political effect still dominates but it is less sizeable country specific characteristics not accounted for in our simulations such as the degree of redistribution in the pension system and the existence of family ties in the society may also matter our simulations deliver a strong policy implication an increase in the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters while often increasing its generosity finally delegation of pension policy to the ec may reduce political accountability and hence help to reform the systems

the politics of technological upgrading international transfer to and adaptation of gm cotton in argentina summary we describe patterns of international transfer to and adaptation of genetically modified gm cotton in argentina and ask whether political bargaining between the technology owner a multinational enterprise mne and host country actors may have influenced upgrading we suggest that the mne was able to use its exclusive capacity to upgrade gm cotton technologies as a negotiation tool to persuade host actors to change the rules that affected its multi lines of business in the country this implies wider policy scope to encourage technology upgrading host actors could negotiate over a wider range of aspects of interest to mnes

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

an exact solution for the investment and value of a firm facing uncertainty adjustment costs and irreversibility this paper derives closed form solutions for the investment and value of a competitive firm with a constant returns to scale production function and convex costs of adjustment solutions are derived for the case of irreversible investment as well as for reversible investment optimal investment is a non decreasing function of q the shadow value of capital relative to the case of reversible investment the

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

public pensions as optimal social contracts abstract a simple overlapping generations model is modified to allow for an externality experienced by the young from consumption by the elderly this sets up a game between generations in which one generation s strategy may be to save too little and rely on gifts from the young e g public assistance for retirement income social security can therefore be viewed as a pareto optimal contract to restore efficient intertemporal allocation a funded public pension plan corresponds to forced saving but is vulnerable in that the next young generation may stop contributing rely on its children for retirement assistance and meanwhile reap the consumption externality from the current elderly s social security benefits this suggests a forced giving or pay as you go type of compulsory pension plan such as exists in most nations which also has the advantage of aiding the initial old generation and therefore generating an immediate consumption externality for the initial young the approach can also be used to explain other aspects of existing social security

a note on fiscal policy investment location decisions and exchange rates abstract the paper argues that trade balances and exchange rates may be quite responsive to changes in the relative attractiveness of locating production facilities or storing other taxable forms of wealth in different countries this suggests that there are at least three important channels through which fiscal policy changes may be transmitted to exchange rates it is argued that a country oriented analysis of asset choice as distinct from the traditional currency oriented portfolio balance framework may be important for understanding the behavior of exchange rates

constraints in perfect foresight models the case of old age savings and public pensions abstract the solution of discrete time perfect foresight models with constrained state variables differs considerably from the solution of models without constraints in this paper this is worked out for a simple model of decision making on public pensions

pay as you go public pensions with endogenous fertility abstract veall s 1986 model of public pensions is generalized to allow for endogenous fertility we show that gifts to the old which can be viewed as social security contributions are always positive in the steady state an optimal stationary allocation is sustainable if savings are zero and fertility is exogenous however the optimal allocation is in general not sustainable in particular if a government enforces a social security plan setting the pension level at the optimal gifts and individuals optimize under the pension constraint the resulting sustainable outcome is in general different from either the optimal or nash outcome

social security and endogenous growth abstract this paper examines the effects of social security on the steady state growth of per capita income in an endogenous growth model in which agents care about their own consumption the number of children and the welfare of each child it shows that an unfunded program may simulate growth by reducing fertility and increasing the ratio of human capital investment per child to per family income when bequests are positive also it may cause faster growth than funded programs especially when receipts from funded programs are independent of contributions when voluntary saving is positive funded social security is neutral if receipts are linked to contributions and most likely depresses growth if receipts are independent of contributions

expectations on pension schemes under non stationary conditions abstract the way expectations are treated in models concerning pension schemes in generally decisive for their predicted development in this letter we show how these expectations can consistently be modeled in a dynamic context without having to rely on adhoc assumptions

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

antisocial security the puzzle of beggar thy children policies the u s social security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents after some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of social security s future retrenchment incorporating elements of tabellini s 2000 positive theory of social security and benabou and ok s 2001 analysis of income mobility the model identifies specific forces affecting this time varying individual support for social security these forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility relative income level and age an ordered logit analysis of cumulative anes data supports these hypotheses

comparing social security programs with leisure and bequests this paper compares social security programs in the ak model with leisure and bequests it will show that the unfunded program with contribution dependent benefits has smaller distortions than programs funded or unfunded alike with contribution independent benefits c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

social security as trade among living generations we model u s social security that is legislated endogeneously by living generations specifically we consider the effects of social security on resource allocation and pareto optimality examining which generations gain from social security and whether some generations lose because saving and transfer decisions are made sequentially in the real world we use an infinite horizon overlapping generations framework in which life cycle saving and transfers to the old are determined by living agents we focus on the case in which agents are altruistic but place sufficiently greater weight on own comsumption than on the consumption of agents in other generations so that starting from a steady state without social security living agents would gain utility if consumption were shifted marginally to them from later generations excerpt

government debt in an overlapping generations model with bequests and gifts in 1974 robert barro argued that if individuals in successive generations were linked by bequests changes in the stock of government debt or in social security programs would have no effect on the steady state capital stock barro assumed that individuals held static expectations and that the size of the population was constant martin feldstein 1974 1977 had concluded that social security would reduce the capital labor ratio in models that did not admit a bequest motive and in his 1976 comment on barro argued that the introduction of government debt or social security into a perfect foresight dynamic growth model with bequests would still reduce the capital labor ratio barro replied that feldstein s criticisms were invalid if the steady state capital labor ratio were smaller than the golden rule level but would be correct if the opposite were true barro did suggest however that the latter possibility with overaccumulation of capital might be ruled out in his model as it was in miguel sidrauski 1967 but he was unable to demonstrate that the required behavior would be consistent with utility maximization by finite lived individuals 1976 p 345 although recent work by willem buiter 1979 jeffrey carmichael 1979 1982 truman bewley 1981 a b and others has helped to elucidate the nature of overlapping generations models with bequests and gifts and the issues in the barro feldstein debate they remain far from clear the purpose of this paper is to shed a little more light on the subject in what follows i contend that some of the authors cited above either have specified the individual s optimization problem in an asymmetric way or have failed to impose necessary conditions for a sensible optimization problem or both there is a natural specification of the barro model 1 that emphasizes the similarity between this model and optimal growth models see for example david cass 1965 peter diamond 1973 here in steady state equilibrium the aftertax interest rate r must equal the rate at which individuals discount the utility of their heirs p r p has become known as the modified golden rule and a meaningful individual optimization problem requires that p exceed n the natural growth rate of the economy my results confirm barro s hunch about his model in a barro model r must exceed n much of the barro feldstein 1976 interchange which assumed that r could have any relation to n is wrong headed barro and feldstein reach different conclusions about the effects of government debt and social security because they assume different individual utility functions also my results contrast sharply with those of buiter and carmichael for example carmichael concluded that with intergenerational transfers from parents to children bequests r must exceed n but with transfers in the opposite direction n must exceed r 1982 pp 205 06 indeed i believe that the buiter carmichael representation of the barro model is logically faulty see section ii in section i i outline an overlapping generations model with gifts and bequests and derive its steady state properties in the next section i discuss the shortand long run effects of introducing government debt into the model and contrast my results with those

pareto efficient international taxation this paper analyzes pareto efficient international tax regimes because every country faces its own national budget constraint the diamond mirrlees production efficiency theorem which underlies key tenets of policy advice in international taxation the desirability of destination basis for commodity taxation of the residence principle for capital income taxation and of free trade does not apply the paper establishes conditions relating to the availability of explicit or implicit devices for reallocating tax revenues across countries under which production efficiency is nevertheless desirable and characterizes the precise ways in which pareto efficient international taxation may require violation of established tenets

national tax systems versus the european capital market capital taxation alberto giovannini the current structure of taxes on capital income across ec countries can be exploited by corporations to reduce tax burdens skilled individuals can indulge in tax avoidance too the liberalization of capital movements stands to turn tax avoidance into a cottage industry this article provides a primer on capital income taxes and describes strategies which reduce the tax burden from a policy perspective the question is how to avoid massive tax evasion after 1992 there is no need to harmonize if the right taxation principle is adopted two principles are contrasted the territorial principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic investment irrespective of the country of residence of the beneficiary and the worldwide principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic savings irrespective of where they are invested it is shown that the worldwide principle involves much fewer distortions than the territorial principle a strict application of this principle would effectively solve the problem of tat evasion in europe without requiring full harmonization of the tax systems its full implementation would require the abolition of withholding taxes the elimination of tax deferrals which are quite pervasive throughout europe and an in depth review of blocking and secrecy laws

a positive theory of social security in many countries social security accounts for a large fraction of the government budget why is this so given that at any point in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors in the overlapping generations model studied in this paper all individuals currently alive vote on social security in every period in equilibrium the size of social security is larger the greater is the proportion of elderly people in the population and the greater is the inequality of pre tax income within each generation both predictions of the theory are supported by the empirical evidence in cross country data

capital account liberalization as a signal the authors present a model in which a government s current capital control policy signals future policies controls on capital outflows evolve in response to news on technology conditional on government attitudes toward taxation of capital when there is uncertainty over governmental types a policy of liberal capital outflows sends a favorable signal that may trigger a capital inflow this prediction is consistent with the experience of several countries that have liberalized their capital accounts copyright 1997 by american economic association