involuntary unemployment in economies with efficient risk sharing abstract we study economies where employment lotteries determine random layoffs and incomes for employed and unemployed agents allocate risk efficiently we ask for which specifications are unemployed agents worse off a situation we call involuntary unemployment we show unemployed agents are worse off iff an exogenous increase in wealth decreases aggregate unemployment in a monetary economy we show that in equilibrium the unemployed are worse off iff high inflation implies high unemployment our model also generates nominal wage stickiness as an equilibrium phenomenon but neither involuntary unemployment nor nominal stickiness implies these economies are operating inefficiently or are out of equilibrium

consistent solutions in atomless economies we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we prove for an atomless economy with possibly satiated preferences any solution that is efficient equitable and consistent must select allocations that are supported by equal budget walrasian equilibria with slack we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we search for systematic methods or solutions of resolving this problem for a solution to be considered desirable we propose that it should satisfy several requirements first it should be efficient second it should be equitable a variety of distributional require ments have been proposed in the literature the requirement we will impose here is that it select allocations at which no agent would prefer the equal division of the social endowment to his own consumption in addition to these two basic efficiency and equity conditions we require that the solution be consistent the recommendations it makes for any economy are never contra dicted by the recommendations it makes for any reduced economy obtained by allowing some subgroup of agents to leave the scene with their allotted consumptions the requirement of consistency is very natural here is a motivation for it offered by thomson 1988 consider all the resources available on the planet earth one would like not only that they be distributed fairly when the planet is considered as a whole but also that whatever resources end up in each continent country city be fairly distributed among the members of that subpopulation when considered in isolation in this paper we study economies with a large number of agents modelled as a complete atomless measure space our main result is a characterization of the solutions that satisfy all three requirements of efficiency equity and con sistency it follows from our result that under standard assumptions on preferences any such solution must select allocations that are supported by equal income walrasian equilibria however our characterization holds for more general economies since it applies to economies in which preferences are possibly satiated mas colell 1988 extended traditional general equilibrium theory to the class of such economies by introducing the notion of walrasian

what money canʼt buy efficient mechanism design with costly signals i study the ex ante efficient allocation of a set of quality heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk neutral agents agents have independent private values which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality the designer faces a trade off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening because the cost sustained is wasted the optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distributes objects to higher ranked agents the ranking is independent of the scarcity of objects or the extent of their heterogeneity if the hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing agents are ranked according to their expected values if hazard rates are decreasing and agents are symmetric the objects are allocated to the agents that sustain the highest costs in general optimal mechanisms combine both pooling and screening of values

auctions development and privatization efficient auctions with liquidity constrained buyers abstract we exhibit an efficient auction an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget or liquidity constrained

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

labor contracts in a model of imperfect competition we propose a definition of involuntary unemployment which differs from that traditionally used in implicit labor contract theory we say that a worker is involuntarily unemployed if the marginal wage implied by the optimal contract exceeds the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption we construct a model where risk neutral firms have monopoly power and show that such monopoly power is necessary for involuntary unemployment to arise in the optimal contract we numerically compute examples and show that such unemployment occurs for a wide range of parameter values

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

public support for reducing us reliance on fossil fuels investigating household willingness to pay for energy research and development abstract in order to reduce future dependence on foreign oil and emissions of co2 how much would us households be willing to pay annually to support increased energy research and development r d activities designed to replace fossil fuels does it matter whether the r d includes nuclear energy options we explore these questions using data from a unique set of national telephone and internet surveys using a national advisory referendum format the contingent valuation method is applied to estimate annual household willingness to pay wtp for us household support of a national energy research and development fund erdf for investments in energy sources not reliant on fossil fuels while accounting for the level of un certainty in voting responses the wtp modeling includes a comparison of both classic maximum likelihood estimation mle and bayesian analysis evidence indicates that mle and bayesian analysis achieve similar statistical inference while the bayesian analysis provides a narrower confidence interval around estimated wtp

consumers willingness to pay for green electricity a meta analysis of the literature at present electricity generated from power plants using renewable sources costs more than electricity generated from power plants using conventional fuels consumers bear these expenses directly or indirectly through higher prices for renewable energy or taxes the number of studies published over the last few years focusing on people s preferences for renewables has increased steadily making it more and more difficult to identify key explanatory factors that determine people s willingness to pay wtp for renewables we present results of a meta regression on valuation of consumer preferences for a larger share of renewable energy in their electricity mix our meta regression results reveal a number of important factors that explain the differences in wtp values for renewable energy different valuation methods show widely different values with choice experiments producing the highest estimates our results further indicate that consumers wtp for green electricity differs by source with hydropower being the least valued variables that are often omitted from primary valuation studies are important in explaining differences in values these variables describe individual and household characteristics as well as information on the type of power plant that will be replaced by renewables further the marginal effect of a survey conducted in the us is pronounced we also assess the potential for using the results for out of sample value transfer and find a median error of 21 c 2015 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the utilitarian maximin social welfare function and anomalies in social choice two major criteria of distributive justice are the utilitarian criterion and the maximin criterion we offer a simple axiomatic characterization of a mixed utilitarian maximin social welfare function this social welfare function explains recent empirical violations of the standard cardinal social choice theory such as the social allais paradox and the social common ratio effect in addition it offers a new foundation for the positively skewed wealth distributions in society it also provides an objective function for mechanism design applications that trades off maximizing surplus and minimizing inequality

using contingent valuation to explore willingness to pay for renewable energy a comparison of collective and voluntary payment vehicles abstract this study uses a split sample dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey of 1574 u s residents to explore willingness to pay wtp for renewable energy under collective and voluntary payment vehicles and under government and private provision of the good we also evaluate the impact of participation expectations on stated wtp we find some evidence that when confronted with a collective payment mechanism respondents state a somewhat higher wtp than when voluntary payment mechanisms are used similarly private provision of the good elicits a somewhat higher wtp than does government provision we also find that contingent valuation responses are strongly correlated with expectations for the wtp of others our results shed light on strategic response behavior and the incentive compatibility of different cv designs and offer practical insight into u s household preferences for how to support renewable energy

an analysis of mortgage contracting prepayment penalties and the due on sale clause the due on sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan we analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low in that case the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments we also demonstrate by a risk sharing argument that the due on sale clause is optimal in some settings even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales almost all conventional fixed rate home mortgage contracts written in the last decade contain a due on sale clause which gives the lender the contractual right to declare the total indebtedness due immediately if the mortgaged property is transferred as mortgage rates rise lending institutions suffer capital losses on fixed rate mortgage loans while borrowers earn capital gains equal to the difference between the face value and market value of their loans the due onsale clause gives the lending institution the right to demand the borrower s capital gain as a prepayment penalty in order to increase the probability of prepayment it can be optimal for the bank to accept a partial settlement in this paper we analyze the bank s strategy for setting the prepayment penalty it demands under the due on sale clause and examine the optimality of the clause the model we develop also applies to other types of prepayment penalties i e loan covenants which require payment of a premium over market value in order to extinguish

waiting line auctions if prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first come first served basis then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue this choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction an equilibrium for this waiting line auction is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed tender auctions when individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line

nonrevelation in employment contracts the author considers an employment contracting model in which firms have private information that is directly payoff relevant to workers and workers are always free to quit in contrast to existing models firms will sometimes fail to reveal adverse information to workers in equilibrium because of the effect this will have on quits risk averse workers can prefer such pooling contracts to separating ones because inducing truth telling requires firms to cut wages in states that are already bad for the worker applications to firms incentives to reveal unsafe working conditions and impending layoffs or plant closures are discussed copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

internationalization as a strategy to overcome industry barriers an assessment of the marine energy industry abstract research on conditions to develop new innovations within emerging renewable energy industries is often done with a national focus however recent research on international entrepreneurship has revealed that firms operate on international levels very early in their life time thus based on former research on international entrepreneurship and case examples we build the propositions that firms in the marine energy industry use internationalization as a strategy to overcome industry barriers our primary source of data is a unique dataset from a global survey of all the companies in the marine energy industry who are aiming to commercialize a wave or tidal energy device this paper is organized in two steps first we identified the most challenging industry barriers perceived by companies second we use these to form propositions which we assess through empirical data the two most challenging barriers perceived by the companies are need for capital and need for supportive political schemes our findings reveal that internationalization certainly is a common strategy to access capital and attractive support schemes in foreign countries the early internationalization has implications for researchers managers and policy makers

unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment the case of adverse selection abstract this paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device it is shown that private provision will not occur essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage respecting the same informational constraints public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate

the public s value for developing ocean energy technology in the republic of korea a contingent valuation study abstract ocean energy is a type of renewable energies and is considered as having a potential power of providing a substantial amount of energy although some forms of ocean energy are developed there is a need for further technological advances to better utilize ocean energy government should take observable actions to compensate for the costs of developing the technology this paper attempts to apply a contingent valuation cv method to obtaining at least a preliminary evaluation of the benefits that ensue from the development of the technology that commercializes ocean energy in the republic of korea overall the cv survey was successfully carried out to elicit the willingness to pay wtp for ocean energy the wtp was statistically significantly estimated from one and one half bounded spike model and the monthly mean wtp estimates was krw 1003 usd 0 9 per household the estimates of the annual benefits to relevant residents amounted to krw 206 4 billion usd 183 8 million

reserve design unintended consequences and the demise of boston s walk zones we show that in the presence of admissions reserves the effect of the precedence order i e the order in which different types of seats are filled is comparable to the effect of adjusting reser

an optimal auction for complements abstract this paper considers the optimal selling mechanism for complementary items when buyers are perfectly symmetric the optimal procedure is to bundle the items and run a standard auction in general however bundling the items is not necessarily desirable and the standard auctions do not maximize revenue moreover the optimal auction allocation may not be socially efficient since the auction must discriminate against bidders who have strong incentives to misrepresent their true preferences journal of economic literature classification number d44

optimal labour contracts and involuntary unemployment under costly and imperfect monitoring this paper provides an explanation for the concurrence of rigid wages and involuntary unemployment we consider cases in which a firm monitors its workers but at some cost a key assumption in the model is that the firm cannot perfectly distinguish shirkers from nonshirkers thus the firm has to rely on negotiated compensation and work effort as well as monitoring to reduce the incentive to shirk we find that rigid wages and involuntary unemployment arise simultaneously when monitoring costs are large and the effectiveness of monitoring is low

increasing synergies between institutions and technology developers lessons from marine energy abstract this paper describes innovation activities in the marine energy sector across ten european countries in 2011 intense knowledge creation occurred in the uk and northern european countries while european research networks encouraged public private partnerships facilitating knowledge diffusion an analysis based on a technological innovation system tis has identified challenges for the system to evolve from one phase of development to another i e from pre development to take off phase in order for marine energy to pass successfully through the commercialisation valley of death entrepreneurial experimentation and production is crucial entrepreneurial initiatives were developed mainly in the united kingdom denmark norway and ireland whereas france germany and sweden were active through venture capital initiatives additional system builders such as the authorities in charge of energy policies could offer guidance for research ensure legitimacy and effectively mobilise resources for system development although public support was efficient in stimulating private investment national targets seemed less efficient in creating a long time horizon for private investors due to consecutive unexpected changes in contrast positive interactions between technology developers and policy makers could empower market formation ultimately the creation of a policy community also involving local communities could foster a positive environment for the development of innovation activities

public willingness to pay and policy preferences for tidal energy research and development a study of households in washington state puget sound in washington state wa has significant tidal energy resources but the industry is at a nascent stage of development at this stage the availability of research and development r d funding plays a critical role in the success or failure of renewable energy schemes however information about public interest in developing marine renewable energy technology including tidal energy technology in wa and the u s has been limited responses to a dichotomous choice referendum question on a mail survey sent to a representative sample of wa households were used to estimate residents willingness to pay wtp for tidal energy r d public preferences for policies to support tidal energy r d were also assessed wa households are wtp between 29m and 127m annually for tidal energy r d indicating public preference for an increase in government spending on tidal energy r d over current levels public perceptions of potential social environmental and economic risks and benefits of developing tidal energy emerged as highly significant predictors of wtp

contingent valuation controversies and evidence contingent valuation cv has become one of the most widely used non market valuation techniques cv s prominence is due to its flexibility and ability to estimate total value including passive use value its use and the inclusion of passive use value in benefit cost analyses and environ mental litigation are the subject of a contentious debate this paper discusses key areas of the debate over cv and the validity of passive use value we conclude that many of the alleged problems with cv can be resolved by careful study design and implementation we further conclude that claims that empirical cv findings are theoretically inconsistent are not generally supported by the literature the debate over cv however has clarified several key issues related to nonmarket valuation and can provide useful guidance both to cv practitioners and the users of cv results

u s energy research and development declining investment increasing need and the feasibility of expansion investment in energy research and development in the u s is declining despite calls for an enhancement of the nation s capacity for innovation to address environmental geopolitical and macroeconomic concerns we examine investments in research and development in the energy sector and observe broad based declines in funding since the mid 1990s the large reductions in investment by the private sector should be a particular area of concern for policy makers multiple measures of patenting activity reveal widespread declines in innovative activity that are correlated with research and development r d investment notably in the environmentally significant wind and solar areas trends in venture capital investment and fuel cell innovation are two promising cases that run counter to the overall trends in the sector we draw on prior work on the optimal level of energy r d to identify a range of values which would be adequate to address energy related concerns comparing simple scenarios based on this range to past public r d programs and industry investment data indicates that a five to ten fold increase in energy r d investment is both warranted and feasible

optimal allocation without money an engineering approach we study the allocation of heterogeneous services to agents with incomplete information and without monetary transfers agents have private multidimensional utilities over services drawn from commonly known priors the social planner s goal is to maximize a potentially complex public objective for tractability we take an engineering approach in which we solve a large market approximation and convert the solution into a feasible finite market mechanism that still yields good results we apply this framework to real data from boston to design a mechanism that assigns students to public schools in order to maximize a linear combination of utilitarian and max min welfare subject to capacity and transportation constraints we show how to optimally solve a large market formulation with more than 868 types of students and 77 schools and we translate the solution into a finite market mechanism that significantly outperforms the baseline plan chosen by the city in terms of efficiency equity and predic

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

estimating arizona residents willingness to pay to invest in research and development in solar energy abstract we estimate arizona residents willingness to pay wtp to invest in a solar energy research and development fund using data obtained from a dichotomous choice contingent valuation mail survey we examine differences in wtp estimates using different categorizations for respondent uncertainty we also employ both commonly used maximum likelihood and less frequently applied bayesian estimation techniques we find that respondent uncertainty has an economically significant impact on wtp estimates while wtp estimates are robust to different estimation techniques our robust specification with strict uncertainty coding indicates the average arizona household is wtp approximately 17 per month to invest in research and development in solar energy

labor contracts with voluntary quits this paper considers labor contracts between the risk neutral firm and risk averse workers with heterogeneous outside opportunities alternative wages which become known to the worker after a costly on the job search in the case of a deterministic alternative wage self selection over a menu of contract wages would achieve the first best contract if the alternative wages are stochastic the second best contract emerges as a trade off between productive efficiency and risk sharing workers who voluntarily search are fewer and workers who search are less likely to quit if the search effort is not monitored even fewer workers search

an equilibrium model of quits under optimal contracting abstract this article develops an equilibrium model of quits in a labor market and examines the effect of contracting under asymmetric information when compared with symmetric information and noncontractual base lines we demonstrate that quits increase in periods of high output without postulating exogenous price rigidity

coordination in auctions with entry abstract we examine self enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria under slightly stronger conditions within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders if preplay communication is possible every no communication equilibrium payoff is interim pareto dominated for the bidders by some cheap talk equilibrium payoff when the number of auctions is large communication equilibria exist that yield ex post efficient payoffs for the bidders almost surely journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82

pension portability and labor market efficiency a survey of the literature this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature evaluating the labor market effects of policies to enhance pension portability one perspective is that reducing the cost of job change w

wage secrecy as a social convention there is a time to keep silent and a time to speak out ecclesiastes 3 7 ask anyone who works for a living how much money he or she makes and you are likely to encounter a range of responses from evasion to outright hostility such responses however should not be surprising according to organizational etiquette it is considered gauche to ask others their salaries in a study at e i du pont de nemours all employees were asked if the company should disclose more payroll information so that everyone would know everyone else s pay only 18 voted for an open pay system dolan and schuler 1987 315 m any organizations have strict policies and norms about the secrecy of pay it is seen as inappropriate in most companies for employees to talk about what they earn and data are rarely given out even internally on salaries some organizations even fire individuals who release salary data this is one way to make it very clear that the organization means it when it says it believes in pay secrecy lawler 1990 239 t he issue of openness or secrecy in the communication of compensation information is one of the most important issues facing senior management henderson 1985 379 i introduction despite the general belief that a free flow of information enhances efficiency social convention appears to call for secrecy regarding individuals wages this paper provides an explanation for this convention we suggest that the role of wage secrecy is to reduce effective labor mobility and thereby enhance the feasibility of risk shifting contracts wage secrecy may yield a mix of mobility and risk shifting that is superior both to a spot market for labor and to a social convention that binds workers to their employers in promising to pay a worker a pre agreed wage rate labor contracts shift uncertainty from workers to employers and provide workers with insurance in particular if workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral such contracts may enhance the welfare of workers without imposing a cost on firms since a risk shifting contract shields workers from the vicissitudes of the market wage rates need not equal the marginal product of labor in good outcomes workers pay the firm an insurance premium by accepting a wage rate that is lower than their marginal product in bad outcomes workers collect on their insurance policy earning a wage rate that exceeds their marginal product 1 if workers can move freely from one firm to another however risk shifting labor contracts may not be feasible given such freedom of movement workers will stay with their firm if the wage rate exceeds that offered elsewhere and move if they can obtain a higher wage rate in another firm hence without restrictions on labor mobility risk shifting contracts will not be offered and wage rates will vary with the marginal product of labor in this case the market in labor is a spot market the risk shifting role of labor contracts may be salvaged by a social convention that binds workers to their firms this would require that a worker who leaves his employer earlier than the accepted norm would be viewed as breaking a social convention and develop a damaging reputation we shall refer to this type of convention as a binding convention 2 it appears that a binding convention is assumed in most of the implicit contract literature binding however comes at a cost while facilitating risk shifting it may lead to inefficient resource allocation with a binding convention the tradeoff between the loss in output and the extent of workers exposure to risk depends on the nature of risks faced by the firm when the only risk that firms face is an aggregate shock defined as a shock that affects all firms in a sector in the same way binding does not reduce production efficiency if the marginal product of labor is the same in all firms the worker s place of employment does not affect output

cardinal bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers abstract in allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities i study the nontransfer allocation of two ex ante identical objects under bayesian incentive compatibility with symmetric agents and independent private valuations i find the ex ante utilitarian optimal mechanism in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as numeraire to purchase probability units of the other object i characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries auctions and insurance the latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible if the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents ordinal preferences

pricing and design of differentiated services approximate analysis and structural insights we consider a model of a service system that delivers two nonsubstitutable services to a market of heterogenous users the first service is delivered subject to a guaranteed g processing rate and the second is a best effort be type service in which residual capacity not allocated to the guaranteed class isshared among be users users in turn are sensitive to both price and congestion related effects the service provider s objective is to optimally design the system so as to extract maximum revenues the design variables in this problem consist of a pair of static prices for the two services a policy that controls admission of g users into the system and the mechanism by which users are informed of the state of congestion in the system because these objectives are difficult to address using exact analysis we pursue approximations that are tractable and lead to structural insights specifically we first solve a deterministic relaxation of the original objective to obtain a fluid optimal solution that is subsequently evaluated and refined to account for stochastic fluctuations using diffusion limits we derive approximations that yield the following structural results 1 pricing rules derived from the deterministic analysis are almost optimal 2 the optimal operational regime for the system is close to heavy traffic and 3 real time congestion notification results in increased revenues numerical results illustrate the accuracy of the proposed approximations and validate the aforementioned structural insights

investment barriers and incentives for marine renewable energy in the uk an analysis of investor preferences abstract deployment of marine renewable energy mre in the uk is desirable in order to address climate change meet mandatory eu renewable energy targets and provide significant economic development opportunities including new export markets public funding constraints in the uk mean that substantial investment is required from the private sector to commercialize the industry by focussing on investor attitudes and behaviours towards wave and tidal technologies this paper reveals significant observations from the investment community with serious implications for the future of the mre industry through a series of in depth interviews with individuals from the investment community device developers and industry support the research seeks to identify common barriers and incentives to investment the paper demonstrates that although investors attitudes are generally aligned they do appear to have changed over time of the participants that had previously invested in early stage mre device development none were likely to do so again it is concluded that this is a function of investors greater understanding of the scale and unpredictability of the costs and the length of time required to develop these technologies this presents a significant policy challenge for all actors interested in the commercialization of wave and tidal technologies

generalized reduced form auctions a network flow approach we develop a network flow approach for characterizing interim allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints both ceilings and floors applications include a variety of settings of practical interest ranging from individual and group specific capacity constraints set aside sale partnership dissolution and government license reallocation

social acceptance of renewable energy sources a review of contingent valuation applications abstract this paper presents a literature review addressing the public acceptance of renewable energy as a replacement for fossil fuels in electricity production this review was motivated by the global tendency for a substitution of conventional fuels by renewable energy sources res during the global financial crisis it studies research on the preferences and attitudes of local communities towards investments in renewable energy projects and their perception of the use of new energy technologies in their daily lives through various case studies worldwide an effort is made to identify the parameters that influence consumers energy behaviour together with their interest or lack thereof in the environmental impact of using fossil fuels to produce energy and their willingness to reduce it applications of contingent valuation are examined which are employed to analyse public attitudes towards the use of res for electricity production willingness to pay is observed to be correlated to socioeconomic characteristics including education interest in environmental issues and knowledge of res finally the profile of a typical green energy consumer and appropriate policy paths for the penetration of res into the energy market are outlined

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies in this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allociation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies we prove that when agents utility functions are differentiable the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal income walrasian equilibria this is shown using both the limit theorem approach and the limit economy approach we also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector these results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal income walrasian equilibria in terms of economic efficiency and economic equity

how to control controlled school choice we characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body the stable or fair assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools preferences for diversity we show that the conflict can be useful in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations we also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed

bias in discrete response contingent valuation abstract the empirical literature on discrete response contingent valuation has found that seemingly innocuous changes in the statistical models estimated result in significantly different point estimates of willingness to pay this paper hypothesizes and tests several potential explanations for these results first it investigates and compares the biases inherent in single bounded and double bounded maximum likelihood estimation procedures and examines how they react to various bid designs and sample sizes then it examines the presence and identification of outliers in binary choice data and how these outliers influence estimation finally it presents an alternative approach to addressing the issue of outliers which explicitly acknowledges the possibility of upwardly biased response probabilities

amicable divorce dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms abstract this paper considers mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership that can be specified without information on the distribution of valuations of the asset or the level of risk aversion of the participants for the case of a single asset and risk averse agents three simple mechanisms are considered these mechanisms can be ranked in terms of ex post efficiency and partially ranked in terms of interim expected utility the efficiency of the alternating selection mechanism is considered for environments when there are many items to be allocated agents are risk neutral and transfers are prohibited conditions are given when a myopic strategy of picking the most preferred abailable item forms an equilibrium and these conditions are satisfied under independence under the further assumption of identical distributions of valuations it is shown that the total expected efficiency loss is at most 1 2 of the maximal value of a single item regardless of how many items are to be allocated

resolving conflicting preferences in school choice the boston mechanism reconsidered the boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro cedures in use yet the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances which led the boston public schools to recently replace it with gale and shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm henceforth da the da elicits truthful revelation of ordinal preferences whereas the boston mechanism does not but the latter induces participants to reveal their cardinal preferences i e their relative preference intensities whereas the former does not we show that cardinal preferences matter more when families have similar ordinal preferences and schools have coarse priorities two common features of many school choice environ ments speci cally when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities the boston mechanism pareto dominates the da in ex ante wel fare the boston mechanism may not harm but rather bene t participants who may not strategize well in the presence of school priorities the boston mechanism also tends to facilitate a greater access than the da to good schools by those lack ing priorities at those schools these results contrast with the standard view and cautions against a hasty rejection of the boston mechanism in favor of mechanisms such as the da

optimal severance pay with incomplete information this paper contrasts optimal employment contracts in a world of full information and in a world in which the worker s alternative employment possibilities cannot be observed by the firm the difference between income and severance pay that is the opportunity cost of separating will be higher in more productive states of nature with complete wage insurance no longer possible we therefore have an explanation of higher ability individuals receiving high wages in the short run in long term contracts the explanation does not rely as past explanations have done on the imperfections in bonding arrangements or in loan markets

ordinal versus cardinal voting rules a mechanism design approach abstract we consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a bayesian environment agents have independent private values there are at least three alternatives and monetary transfers are prohibited first we show that in a neutral environment meaning alternatives are symmetric ex ante essentially any ex post pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible importantly however we can improve upon ordinal rules we show that we can design an incentive compatible cardinal rule which achieves higher utilitarian social welfare than any ordinal rule finally we provide numerical findings about incentive compatible cardinal rules that maximize utilitarian social welfare

optimal multi object auctions this paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects in the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object in which case the optimal auction is efficient the optimal auction takes one of two formats either objects are sold in independent auctions or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other the format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders in the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed and the optimal auction is then inefficient

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector this article analyzes the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency each worker is assumed to have two type dependent reservation utilities the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that the worker expects to obtain by entering the private sector the efficient mechanism consists of a menu of probability of remaining in the public sector and transfer pairs that induces self selection a worker s full cost is defined by the sum of production cost in the public sector and reservation utility in the private sector it is optimal to start by laying off the agents with higher full cost when the public sector before downsizing is discriminating as the differential of private information about productive efficiency suggests there are countervailing incentives this makes the size of downsizing smaller under asymmetric information than under complete information

redundancy payments and firm specific training this paper attempts to provide an economic rationale for the existence and pattern of redundancy payments a model of firm specific training with uncertain returns to training and uncertainty about the outside options of workers is constructed for this purpose the central result is that an optimal contract will involve the firm in bearing only a part of the training costs because workers may quit since workers bear part of the cost of training they will have to be compensated by a redundancy payment if dismissed furthermore the optimum level of this redundancy payment will vary across firms with large payments being offered by firms where the returns to training are highly variable these insights into the nature of redundancy payments differ from those of other models where they are viewed either as a transfer fee or as representing the difference between inside and outside wages for contracted workers

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules we consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives independent private values and no monetary transfers the utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule where agents weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen it is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient we also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules