a mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms in this paper a mixed oligopoly model is considered in which a state owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms previous articles on mixed oligopoly did not include foreign private firms the effect on the equilibrium involves a lower price and a different allocation of production relative to the case when all private firms are domestically owned in addition issues such as the effects of an open door policy allowing foreign firms to enter and the effects of foreign acquisition of domestic firms are discussed

learning from failure towards an evolutionary model of collaborative ventures this paper reports on a longitudinal case study of the interaction between two partners to a failed international joint venture we develop a model of the collaboration process in partnership and alliances based on earlier work by ring and van de ven 1994 and by doz 1996 we employ a series of events that occurred in the course of the relationship as the unit of analysis in order to trace the interactions between the partners and to explicate the impact that external shocks have on their perceptions of efficiency and equity the impact of these events as well as the responses they elicit on the quality of the relationship and vice versa are also considered we find that the partners assessments cause them to either engage in renegotiation of the terms of the contract or to modify their behavior unilaterally in an attempt to restore balance to the relationship the process feeds back until a new mutual understanding of equity is restored or else the relationship deteriorates gradually until a point when the venture is dissolved we conclude that positive feedback loops are critical in the evolutionary process that relationship quality is both an outcome and a mediating variable and that procedural issues are critical from the start in fostering a climate for positive reinforcement and the building of mutual trust and confidence in the relationship

immigration and house prices in the uk this article studies the effect of immigration on house prices in the uk it finds that immigration has a negative effect on house prices and presents evidence that this negative effect is due to the mobility response of the native population natives respond to immigration by moving to different areas and those who leave are at the top of the wage distribution this generates a negative income effect on housing demand and pushes down house prices the negative effect of immigration on house prices is driven by local areas where immigrants have lower education

the impact of joint venture status on the longevity of japanese stakes in u s manufacturing affiliates a number of well known studies report that between one third and two thirds of international joint ventures eventually break up while many generalizations explanations and prescriptions have been based on these statistics their meaning is unclear first all foreign affiliates are subject to normal business risk and to the risk that they will be divested by parents for strategic or financial reasons are these risks higher for joint ventures than for wholly owned subsidiaries second joint ventures may be shorter lived not because of their joint venture status but because affiliates which are joint ventured have other characteristics that make them more likely to exit to know whether joint ventures are shorter lived one must control for the other factors that affect the longevity of affiliates whether wholly owned or joint ventured third many joint ventures contracts contain clauses that allow partners to sell their stakes to one another at specific intervals because they make exit easier joint ventures should have shorter lives but these shorter lives should only be due to sell offs not to liquidations it is therefore important to see whether the supposedly higher termination rate of joint ventures stakes is due to a higher rate of selloffs or to a higher rate of liquidations in this paper we 1 compare the longevity of stakes in joint ventures versus those in wholly owned subsidiaries 2 while controlling for other factors that affect the longevity of such stakes and 3 while distinguishing between two types of exit those through sale and those through liquidation while past authors have addressed these three issues in piecemeal fashion we believe we are the first to address them simultaneously we analyze the factors that affect the longevity of 355 japanese stakes in u s manufacturing affiliates controlling for all the factors that affect exit rates we find that japanese parents are more likely to terminate their stakes in u s joint ventures than in wholly owned subsidiaries this higher termination rate of joint venture stakes is explained by a higher probability of selling them but not of liquidating them most of the other factors that have been found significant in explaining gross divestment of foreign affiliates do in fact only affect exits through sales but not exits through liquidations hence it is true that joint ventures have shorter lives but dangerous to interpret this finding as necessarily meaning that they are more likely to fail

immigrant trade links transplanted home bias and network effects macro level data for the us and 73 trading partners spanning the years 1980 to 2001 is used with a gravity specification to investigate the influence of immigration on bilateral trade prior research has identified immigrant stocks as a significant determinant of trade however this study indicates that the us immigrant trade link is driven by immigration from relatively low income countries a 10 increase in the immigrant stock is found to generate respectively 4 7 and 1 5 increases in domestic imports from and exports to the typical low income home country the observed link is decomposed into two hypothesized channels network effects and transplanted home bias considerable variation in per immigrant trade effects is found across home countries imports from the typical low income home country are estimated to increase by up to 2057 due to transplanted home bias and by as much as 2967 as a result of network effects while exports rise by up to 910 as a result of networks

the economic modeling of strategy process clean models and dirty hands we argue that our model of learning in alliances khanna gulati and nohria 1998 is an economic model of strategy process we discuss implications of this view for the strategy process vs content debate for the appropriate testing of models of strategy process and for the role of economics in helping understand strategy process we propose that the clean models from economics and dirty hands of traditional process inquiries offer research designs that are complementary rather than incompatible hirsch michaels and friedman 1987 copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

do state trading exporters distort trade abstract in this paper we analyse the trade distorting effects of state trading enterprises stes which exist in some exporting countries because of these potential effects several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the doha round negotiations in the wto the belief is that stes in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy stes also exist in developing countries though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax we present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting stes in developed and developing economies the model is calibrated with data on two examples of stes one typical of an ste in a developed country the other typical of an ste in a developing economy in each case we allow for differences in the nature of the ste s pay off function the overall conclusion is that stes do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant

resources transactions and rents managing value through interfirm collaborative relationships this paper offers a theoretical explanation for why interfirm collaborations form yet fail and further suggests how firms might manage them for a more positive outcome based on a perspective of value we explain how a more inclusive and integrative perspective one which combines elements from transaction costs and resource based theory provides more robust insight into collaboration formation management and instability in doing so we differentiate rent yielding firm specific assets at the core of the resource based view from the transaction specific assets at the core of transaction cost theory the paper makes a crucial distinction between the potential value attainable through collaborations and its actual realization the crux of our argument is that firms enter into collaborative relationships because these are expected to yield superior value relative to alternate organizational forms in certain situations offering potentially synergistic combinations of complementary resources and capabilities yet such relationships are frequently prone to failure because the partner firms tend not to recognize ex ante the nature and extent of transaction specific investment that is required in the collaborative relationship to attain these synergies in our argument critically the relationship between organizations is seen not simply as a governance structure of a hybrid nature but more importantly as a productive resource for value creation and realization in this light transaction specific investment in what we term relational specificity becomes imperative in the search for value we explain why the transaction costs incurred in the exchange of resources are not independent of the nature of resources to be transacted and similarly why the returns realized from these resources are not independent of the relationship and transaction specific expenditures incurred in effectively combining them and maintaining the combination the interdependence between the two mediated by the quality of the relationship has direct implications for the earning of rents through collaborations these relationship specific expenditures can be of an internally generated nature endogenous to the alliance form itself and need not exceed alternative forms while the associated benefits have the capacity to potentially exceed the alternatives this translates into potentially superior value the paper contributes in three key related ways a the explicit recognition of the relationship as a value bearing asset embedded in a larger and endogenous institutional context namely a system of resource relationships both intraorganizational and inter organizational among partner firms and the collaboration b the recognition of the evolving relationship between production and exchange which at the level of the collaboration is directly dependent on the nature evolution and dynamics of the relationship among the parties to the transaction and c the provision of a nontrust explanation for why firms might knowingly forego opportunities to take advantage of their partners drawing from this the paper occasions a a shift in focus from the form to the process of governance which has direct implications for value creation and realization and b a shift in the primary identity of transaction specific and relationship specific expenditures from cost to investment in future value

effects of immigration on house prices in canada from the turn of the present century until late 2008 house prices in some developed countries including canada rose sharply compared to the increases in their per capita incomes some in the public circles of these countries argue that immigration fueled this rise each year canada admits about 225 000 immigrants but information on the effect of immigration on house prices in this country is lacking our extensive econometric analysis based on panel data at census division levels obtained from the 1996 2001 and 2006 population censuses indicates a statistically significant but small effect of immigration on prices of privately owned dwellings in canada an out migration of the native born from the areas where new immigrants settle or an increased supply of housing due to expectations of higher demand in those areas may have caused this result

three million foreigners three million unemployed immigration flows and the labour market in france this paper investigates the effect of the flows of immigrant workers on the french labour market from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s using a system of equations for unemployment labour force participation the real wage and the immigration rate it is shown that in the long run both legal and amnestied immigrant workers and immigrant families lower the unemployment rate permanently in the short run the arrival of immigrants increases unemployment slightly with an impact effect similar to that of an increase in domestic labour force participation the composition of immigration flows matters and the results indicate that the distribution between workers from the european union and other regions of the world also more skilled and less skilled workers should remain balanced

immigration and house prices under various labour market structures in england and wales this article estimates the impact of immigration on local house prices under various local labour market structures in england and wales typically for the nation as a whole newly arriving immigr

measuring the degree of market power exerted by government trade agencies the principle of profit maximization is used to derive an equilibrium condition for noncompetitive markets and to provide explicit parametric tests for market power exerted in both domestic and foreign markets by a government trade agency our study goes beyond previous work by considering simultaneous exertion of market power in both domestic and foreign markets and by jointly estimating market power parameters with cost and demand parameters these innovations allow nested tests of market power as opposed to prevailing nonnested tests based on simulation models or conditional tests based on prior estimates of demand and cost parameters japan is found to exert a high degree of monopsony power in the world wheat market and no monopoly power in the domestic market

redistribution state trading enterprises and politically optimal tariffs state trading enterprises stes are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy we analyse two aspects the first is their potential trade distorting effect the second is how they modify the case for the politically optimal tariff we show that the ste can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution this result introduces some ambiguity about how stes are interpreted from a multilateralist perspective they should be dealt with in the same way as other non tariff barriers from a nationalistic perspective they can reduce the need for politically optimal redistribution entreprises d etat impliquees dans le commerce international et tarifs politiquement optimaux les entreprises d etat impliquees dans le commerce international eeici sont communement utilisees comme instruments de politique commerciale on analyse deux aspects de cette intervention le premier est leur effet potentiel de distorsion sur les flux commerciaux le second est jusqu a quel point cette intervention modifie l argument du tarif politiquement optimal on montre que les eeici peuvent reduire le besoin d un tarif defini pour des fins de redistribution au niveau domestique le resultat injecte une certaine ambiguite dans le traitement des eeici d un point de vue international on devrait les traiter comme toute autre barriere non tarifaire d un point de vue nationaliste ils peuvent reduire le besoin de faire appel au politiquement optimal

friends acquaintances or strangers partner selection in r d alliances like governance structure and alliance scope partner selection may serve to safeguard firms intellectual assets in r d alliances we categorize potential alliance partners into friends acquainta

optimal policies and marketing board objectives abstract in this paper we examine optimal tax subsidy policies with export marketing boards that compete as oligopolists in world markets by taking a targeting approach to identifying optimal policies we are able to show how optimal policies vary with the objectives of board the nature of competition in world markets as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation in none of the cases examined does a marketing board without tax subsidy policy replicate the social optimum moreover we show that the policies necessary to attain the social optimum are quite different with the institutional variation considered arbitrage and regulation is the only case considered in which the optimal export policy is definitely a tax and in which the marketing board s objective does not affect policy

immigration and housing rents in american cities is there a local economic impact of immigration immigration pushes up rents and housing values in us destination cities the positive association of rent growth and immigrant inflows is pervasive in time series for all metropolitan areas i use instrumental variables based on a shift share of national levels of immigration into metropolitan areas an immigration inflow equal to 1 of a city s population is associated with increases in average rents and housing values of about 1 the results suggest an economic impact that is an order of magnitude bigger than that found in labor markets

the stability of joint ventures reciprocity and competitive rivalry the focus of the following empirical analysis is the influence of reciprocity and long term relationships on the stability of joint ventures these cooperative incentives are offset by industry structural conditions which may promote competitive rivalry among the partners to separate these effects on joint venture survival the hypothesized relationships are proxied by variables drawn from industry and questionnaire data and estimated under a hazard model specification a theoretical implication of the findings is to suggest a shift of attention from the transaction to the economic relationship as the unit of analysis copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

pre emptive patenting joint ventures and the persistence of oligopoly abstract gilbert and newbery 1982 have examined pre emptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly the present paper considers pre emptive patenting when there are several incumbent firms rather than just one it is shown why the incumbent oligopolists behaving non cooperatively might fail to deter entry this suggests that a joint venture in r and d might be a useful entry deterring device insofar as it pools the incumbents incentives to prevent entry this is indeed the case for small innovations but for large innovations the formation of a joint venture weakens the incumbents incentive to innovate by removing the competitive stimulus between them

do firms learn to create value the case of alliances we investigate whether firms learn to manage interfirm alliances as experience accumulates we use contract specific experience measures in a data set of over 2000 joint ventures and licensing agreements and value creation measures derived from the abnormal stock returns surrounding alliance announcements learning effects are identified from the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in alliance capabilities we find evidence of large learning effects in managing joint ventures but no such evidence for licensing contracts the effects of learning on value creation are strongest for research joint ventures and weakest for marketing joint ventures these results are consistent with the view that learning effects are more important in situations characterized by greater contractual ambiguity copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

political manipulation of a public firm s objective function abstract in the context of a government owned public firm that competes with a private firm this paper demonstrates how the government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a different objective function interestingly this assigned objective function need bear no resemblance to the actual objective being sought enabling the government to disguise a politically unpopular agenda and or outside influence

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

unexpected guests the impact of internal displacement inflows on rental prices in colombian host cities abstract we study the causal impact of internally displaced people idp inflows on rental prices in colombian host cities following an instrumental variables approach we find that as idp inflows increase low income rental prices increase and high income rental prices decrease we provide empirical evidence on two potential mechanisms for these findings excess demand for low income housing puts upwards pressure on rental prices increasing supply of high income housing coupled with rising homicide rates put downwards pressure on rental prices

the combination of gravity and welfare approaches for evaluating nontariff measures this article explores the link between gravity and welfare frameworks for measuring the impact of nontariff measures first an analytical approach suggests how to combine a gravity equation with a partial equilibrium model to determine the welfare impact of nontariff measures second an empirical application focuses on the effects of a standard that caps antibiotic residues in crustaceans in the united states the european union canada and japan while the econometric estimation of the gravity equation reports a negative impact on imports welfare evaluations show that in most cases a stricter standard leads to an increase in both domestic and international welfare

the dynamics of learning alliances competition cooperation and relative scope we show how the tension between cooperation and competition affects the dynamics of learning alliances private benefits and common benefits differ in the incentives that they create for investment in learning the competitive aspects of alliances are most severe when a firm s ratio of private to common benefits is high we introduce a measure relative scope of a firm in an alliance to show that the opportunity set of each firm outside an alliance crucially impacts its behavior within the alliance finally we suggest why firms might deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior patterns 1998 john wiley sons ltd

determinants of the variance in market shares in canadian manufacturing commonly used measures of industrial concentration can be expressed as functions of the number of firms in an industry and a measure of firm size inequality prior studies of the causes of industrial concentration have emphasized factors affecting the number of firms in an industry we expand the study of causes of concentration by examining factors which affect the variance in market shares as a measure of firm size inequality

effective interim collaboration how firms minimize transaction costs and maximise transaction value this study of automotive transaction relationships in the u s a and japan offers abta which indicate that transaction costs do not necessarily increase with an increase in reiation specijk investments we empirically examine the conditions under which transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benejits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs this is possible because the dtfferent safeguards which can be employed to control opportunism have different set up costs and result in different transaction costs over dl erent time horizons we examine in detail the ractices of javanese firms which result in effective inteq n collaboration 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

the trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises in importing countries abstract this paper focuses on the potential trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises an issue that is likely to receive greater attention than hitherto in the context of the current agricultural negotiations in the wto although state trading enterprises can arise in both exporting and importing countries the emphasis here is on the importing country case our results show that state trading enterprises do distort trade though the nature of the distortion i e whether it is equivalent to an import tariff or import subsidy depends on the nature of exclusive rights bestowed by government on the state enterprise we also consider state trading enterprises in both developed and developing economies the main difference being the nature of the government s pay off function the theoretical framework allows us to derive the tariff equivalent effects for various types of stes the results suggesting that the trade distorting effect is likely to vary considerably dependent on the type of ste that arises in particular circumstances

on the contractual governance of research collaborations allocating control and intellectual property rights in the shadow of potential termination abstract this paper investigates the governance design problem of a large company that wants to engage a small and cashless firm into a research collaboration this analysis reflects the frequently observed collaborations between pharma companies and biotechs and an actual research contract is assessed to link theory to practice the governance form refers to the allocation of control rights over the research process and property rights over research output s as determined by the initial contract yet this contract is incomplete the parties negotiate at a later stage from bargaining positions that depend on the initial choice of the governance but they also contemplate the possibility that the collaboration will be terminated by means of a simple model that captures the core aspects of the contractual environment i answer a key research question how should governance be designed in the shadow of potential termination to provide the research firm with the incentives to invest in the collaboration first it is in the company s interest to choose a governance form that eliminates the possibility of termination and stabilizes the collaboration whenever possible second if the collaboration cannot be stabilized the company faces a trade off between reducing the probability of termination and providing incentives which is ultimately resolved by making the collaboration highly unstable third property rights and control are substitutes in the governance design if the company collects more property rights it must relinquish more control rights

economies of scale and market structure in international grain trade a large body of literature has examined international grain trade in imperfectly competitive models the article develops a two stage duopoly model that considers a private trader and a state trading enterprise ste competing on a foreign market the key difference between the private trader and the ste is their international organization while the ste makes use of external agents to export the private firm may choose to internalize international transactions the game is solved for different modes of competition and under both assumptions of homogeneous and differentiated products in order to assess how these assumptions affect the outcome of the game the results of the game are examined by using numerical examples the analysis shows that external shocks on export markets may result in a change of market structure and consequently of market shares these effects depend on the initial market structure furthermore the degree of product differentiation and the assumed mode of competition significantly affect the relative values of transaction and fixed costs at which the market structure changes

the trade and welfare effects of state trading in china with reference to cofco the use of state trading to manage imports and exports has been a long standing feature of china s agricultural trade regime while the use of state trading was modified by china s accession to the wto state trading still dominates for some commodities even though there have been recent attempts to diminish its importance in this paper we analyse the potential trade distorting effect of cofco on market access and export competition by drawing on some recent research on the impact of stes on agricultural trade by using a calibrated model of china s imports of wheat and exports of maize we are able to quantify the size of the trade distortions

cross function and same function alliances how does alliance structure affect the behavior of partnering firms firms collaborate to develop and deliver new products these collaborations vary in terms of the similarity of the competencies that partnering firms bring to the alliance in same function alliances partnering firms have similar competencies whereas in cross function alliances partners have very different competencies on examining managers view of these alliances we find that on average same function alliances are expected to perform better than cross function alliances holding fixed the level of inputs a game theoretic analysis shows that this apprehension about cross function alliances is consistent with a pareto inferior equilibrium a pareto superior equilibrium however suggests that partners in cross function alliances may invest more in their alliances than those in same function alliances it is also often believed that increasing the number of partnering firms is not conducive for collaborative effort our analysis shows that this belief is correct for same function alliances but not for cross function alliances we test these equilibrium predictions in an experiment where we exogenously vary the type of alliance and the number of partnering firms the experimental results lend support for the pareto superior equilibrium partners in cross function alliances invested more than their counterparts in same function alliances and this difference in investment levels increased with the number of partnering firms we extend our model to consider alliances where firms have an opportunity to learn from their partners and later leverage this knowledge outside the scope of their alliance though such learning increases the resources committed by alliance partners in the learning phase it decreases investment in the subsequent competition and also dampens the overall investment across the two stages in addition an increase in interalliance competition decreases investments in the focal alliance but increases investment in the competition outside the scope of the alliance

differential gains between partners in joint ventures role of resource appropriation and private benefits i examine why there are differences in wealth gains between firms when they announce a joint venture jv building on transaction cost economics and the resource based view i argue that because jvs often involve incomplete contracts differences in wealth gains arise due to resource appropriation and private benefits as a result two factors become important in understanding whether a firm earns higher lower wealth gains than its partner 1 its potential for earning private benefits and 2 its ability to extract private benefits as a test of the impact of the first factor i propose that when a jv is formed the partner that possesses more valuable resources is likely to earn lower wealth gains whereas the partner that possesses less valuable resources is likely to earn higher wealth gains because its potential for earning private benefits over the course of the venture is also higher i then argue that the partner with less valuable resources is likely to extract higher private benefits and gain more when it has greater bargaining power and absorptive capacity conversely the partner with more valuable resources is likely to protect itself better from appropriation when it has jv capabilities i find support for these arguments in a sample of 344 ventures the implications are that private benefits significantly influence value creation in jvs and that a broad array of contingencies and factors affect these benefits which need to be considered when entering into a cooperation

assessing the distortionary impact of state trading in china state trading is a common feature in the management of imports and exports of agricultural products and it has been a long standing feature of china s agricultural trade regime while the use of state trading was modified by china s accession to the wto it remains a dominant feature for some commodities even though there have been recent attempts to diminish its importance in this article we review the role that the state trading enterprise ste china national cereals oils and foodstuffs import and export company cofco continues to play in the importing and exporting of some agricultural commodities we then review the economic theory that has been developed to measure the tariff equivalent of importing stes finally we apply that theory through a calibration exercise to measure the tariff equivalent of cofco in china s import market for wheat the distortionary impact of cofco depends on the bias in government policy toward agriculture the competitiveness of the domestic procurement market and also the number of firms that are allocated licenses to import alongside cofco

the legacy of immigration labour market performance and education in the second generation previous research finds that the children of immigrants or the second generation earn at least as much as other native born but that there are persistent ethnic differences in the intergenerational transmission of education and wages we explain why these results are not incompatible and extend the empirical evidence in several directions using the canadian survey of labour and income dynamics first we estimate a model of wages earnings and hours worked using modern econometric techniques to corroborate earlier us results of complete integration by the second generation in the labour market we find that ethnic differences in labour market performance are significant but that these difference do not alter conclusions about the relative performance of the second generation second we find a source of superior labour market performance for the second generation in higher educational attainment which constitutes an important legacy of immigration that should not be ignored third we find that the de

the substitutability of foreign born labour in canadian production circa 1980 the impact of immigrant workers on the employment of canadian born workers is analyzed in 125 canadian industries a translog production function is estimated using data for the year 1980 the estimated cross elasticities suggest no economywide displacement of canadian born workers by immigrants however displacement did occur in a portion of the canadian economy results are compared with a similar u s study

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

mixed oligopoly privatization and strategic trade policy this paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market if the government uses a domestic production subsidy then welfare is always increased with privatization while the optimal subsidy falls if the government uses an import tariff privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space the optimal tariff however may rise or fall in recent years many countries around the world are privatizing their state owned industries at the same time many of these countries are also showing remarkable changes in their economic policies toward international trade on many occasions tariffs are significantly altered and domestic production subsidies are substantially reduced for example russia has privatized its aircraft industry and doubled its tariff on imported aircraft colombia has privatized its stateowned automobile maker colombia automotriz and reduced the import tariffs on foreign made cars in argentina the government is pursuing a policy of selective privatization and subsequent reduction of subsidies in western europe countries such as germany and spain have privatized their major airlines lufthansa and iberia respectively and significantly reduced subsidies what is the connection between privatization and strategic trade policies does privatization require a welfare maximizing government to alter trade barriers the objective of this paper is to answer these questions by investigating the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies the effects of privatization are typically analyzed in the context of mixed oligopoly models where state owned welfare maximizing public firms interact with profit maximizing private firms 1 we investigate the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies by incorporating strategic trade instruments in an international mixed oligopoly model specifically we consider two strategic trade instruments an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy the government chooses the optimal level of tariff or subsidy to maximize domestic welfare for each trade instrument we primarily focus on two questions first does privatization increase

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

the value of the initial payment of the canadian wheat board as a signaling device this paper analyzes the role of the initial payment used by the canadian wheat board cwb in the determination of export prices and sales under the assumption that the cwb has better information about realized yields in canada than its us competitor in the separating equilibrium of the game the initial payment of the cwb is larger than the initial payment under complete information there exists an incentive under incomplete information to send a signal that realized yields are greater than expected to induce a reduction in the sales of foreign competitors we illustrate the strategic value of the initial payment for canadian wheat producers using a numerical simulation

trade policy issues and empirical analysis interest in u s trade policy has been stimulated in recent years by the massive american trade deficit by the belief that intervention by foreign governments in international markets has given other countries a competitive edge over the united states and by concern about the increase in protectionism among industrial countries in turn major analytical developments in international economics have revolutionized trade theory broadening its scope both by introducing in a more formal manner such concepts as imperfect competition increasing returns product differentiation and learning effects and by including the study of political and economic factors that shape trade policy decisions this collection of papers the result of a conference held by the nber applies these new trade theories to existing world cases and also presents complementary empirical studies that are grounded in more traditional trade theories the volume is divided into four parts the papers in part 1 consider the problem of imperfect competition empirically assessing the economic effect of various trade policies introduced in industries in which the new trade theory seems to apply those in part 2 isolate the effects of protection from the influences of the many economic changes that accompany actual periods of protection and also examine how the effects from exogenous changes in economic conditions vary with the form of protection part 3 provides new empirical evidence on the effect of foreign production by a country s firms on the home country s exports finally in part 4 two key bilateral issues are analyzed recent u s japanese trade tensions and the incident involving the threat of the imposition of countervailing duties by the united states on canadian softwood lumber

alliance experience and governance flexibility prior work has mapped the transaction at the heart of an alliance to the risks of opportunism inherent in that alliance and ultimately to how the alliance is structured and governed we extend this approach by noting that the parties in an alliance do not necessarily perceive the same hazards as predominant and thus may have different preferences for how the alliance is structured nevertheless it is in each party s best interest to find a structure that protects its interests while also allowing its partner to protect its interests sufficiently drawing from the alliance management capabilities literature we argue that firms with more alliance experience are better able to protect their interests under any given alliance structure making the choice of structure less consequential to them the resulting governance versatility provides a competitive advantage by enabling firms to form advantageous alliances that are less available to inexperienced competitors our study of innovative alliances in biopharmaceutical industry lends support to the hypotheses allowing us to advance the literature on governance choice in alliances the literature on alliance management and their intersection

the macroeconomic impact of foreign labour influx into the industrialized nation state and the complementary policies this paper makes a numerical assessment on the macroeconomic impact of foreign labor influx into the industrialized nation state allowing free trade in goods but imposing an immigration quota on labor and then explores the complementary policies for the impact of foreign labor influx one of the main findings is that immigration itself brings welfare gains only if prices are flexible but a skill biased intake policy can bring a much larger welfare gain the complementary policy options to boost welfare gains by immigration increase are monetary expansion adopting foreign components more and influencing foreign demand for intermediate goods indirectly by inviting foreign direct investment for these policies to cope the destination country should try to correct the market structure so that prices can be flexible

the scope of alliances we develop the notion that the choice of alliance scope materially affects the character of benefits that alliance participants receive and thereby affects a range of issues having to do with the initiation evolution and termination of the alliance indeed while under emphasized by academics determining alliance scope ranks among the most important tasks undert aken by practitioners of alliances restricting ourselves to alliances where mutual learning is the primary raison d etre we first define private benefits as those that accrue to subsets of participants in an alliance and common benefits as those that accrue collectively to all participants we demonstrate how the choice of alliance scope affects the mix of private and common benefits and draw on earlier work to show how this in turn affects alliance partners incentives to invest in learning as illustrations of the utility of the framework of private and common benefits we consider two applications a simple model illustrates the relationship between the choice of alliance scope the realization of private and common benefits and the stability or lack thereof of the alliance a second application sheds light on alliance evolution it examines factors affecting both a how a particular alliance evolves and b how firms manage sequences of alliances two broader theoretical points also emerge from this discussion of alliance scope first we argue that an analytical focus solely on the individual alliance may be inappropriate for studying a wide range of issues of the multiple sources of benefits that accrue to alliance participants there are some whose realization depends on activities in which the firm is engaged but that may have little to do with the alliance in question second in contrast to much of the literature on alliances our analysis is based upon the primitives of benefit streams rather than on transaction cost reasoning this complementary perspective is better suited to the task of highlighting how activities not governed by an alliance might nonetheless affect multiple aspects of the alliance

do immigrant inflows lead to native outflows we use 1980 and 1990 census data for 119 larger metropolitan statistical areas to examine the effect of skill group specific immigrant inflows on the location decisions of natives in the same skill group and on the overall distribution of human capital to control for unobserved skill group specific demand factors our models include lagged mobility flows of natives over the 1970 80 period we also estimate instrumental variables models that use the fraction of mexican immigrants in 1970 to predict skill group specific relative immigrant inflows over the 1980s despite wide variation across cities in the size and relative skill composition of immigrant population changes we find no evidence of selective out migration by natives we conclude that immigrant inflows exert a direct effect on the relative skill composition of cities cities that have received relatively unskilled immigrant flows have experienced proportional rises in the size of their unskilled populations this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item