cores of inventory centralization games abstract consider a set of n stores with single item and single period demands assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty costs only in this case a cooperative inventory centralization game defines allocations of the cost we examine the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we prove the existence of nonempty core for demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal demand distribution we establish the equivalency of four different nonempty core conditions for the newsboy problem and demonstrate their efficacy for discrete independent and identically distributed iid demands journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c62 c71

cost allocation in rescheduling with machine unavailable period abstract we study a rescheduling problem faced by multiple job owners sharing a single machine where jobs need to be rescheduled when the machine becomes unavailable for a period of time the disruption caused by any new schedule is restricted such that the difference between the completion times in the initial and the new schedules of any job is no more than a given threshold a natural way to reschedule is to process the jobs in the initial sequence each as early as possible this defines a feasible schedule over which cost saving can potentially be achieved by optimal rescheduling as long as the cost saving can be fairly shared by job owners we define a cooperative game for job owners accordingly to share the cost saving given that the optimization problem is computationally intractable we find several optimal properties and develop an optimal pseudopolynomial time dynamic programming algorithm for rescheduling we provide a simple closed form core allocation of the total cost saving for all the jobs and also provide the shapley value of the game in a computable form then we computationally evaluate the extra cost caused by machine unavailability the cost saving from optimization relative to the naturally constructed schedule the likelihood for the shapley value to be a core allocation and how the shapley value allocates cost saving among job owners managerial insights are derived from the computational studies this work contributes to the literature by explicitly incorporating two classic scheduling topics sequencing game and rescheduling

technical note capacity allocation under retail competition uniform and competitive allocations when retailers orders exceed the supplier s available capacity the supplier allocates his capacity according to some allocation rule when retailers are local monopolists uniform allocation eliminates the gaming effect so that each retailer orders her ideal allocation however when two retailers engage in cournot competition under complete information a recent study has shown that uniform allocation fails to eliminate the gaming effect so that some retailer may inflate her order strategically by examining a more general situation in which two or more retailers engage in cournot competition under complete information we establish exact conditions under which uniform allocation fails to eliminate the gaming effect these exact conditions enable us to construct a new rule called competitive allocation that can eliminate the gaming effect without inflated orders from the retailers the supplier s profit could be lower under competitive allocation than under uniform allocation when certain restrictive conditions hold in contrast competitive allocation generates higher average profits for the retailers and for the supply chain hence it reduces the inefficiency of the decentralized supply chain

stability and endogenous formation of inventory transshipment networks this paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple firms in this game firms first make their inventory decisions independently and then decide collectively how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands in modeling transshipment we use networks of firms as the primitive which offer a richer representation of relationships among firms by taking the coalitions used in all previous studies as special cases for any given cooperative network we construct a dual price allocation under which the network is stable for any residual demands and supplies in the sense that no firms find it more profitable to form subnetworks under the allocation based on the marginal contribution of each firm to its network called the mjw value we show that various network structures such as complete hub spoke and chain networks are stable only under certain conditions on residual amounts moreover these conditions differ across network structures implying that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability of a decentralized transshipment system finally we consider the case when firms establish networks endogenously and show that pairwise nash stable networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems

congestion games with player specific payoff functions a class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described the payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the

collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries in complex supply chains downstream buyers would often replenish individually from intermediaries instead of directly dealing with original manufacturers although collaborative replenishment from intermediaries might generate benefits significant cost reductions could be achieved when direct replenishments from manufacturers are considered this paper constructs a general model to study collaborative replenishment in multi product chains with alternative sources of supply i e manufacturers and intermediaries a collaborative organization determines the optimal choices of replenishment sources on behalf of its members to minimize collective costs we introduce a class of cooperative games associated with these situations and give sufficient conditions for their concavity we investigate the choice of allocation rule and its effect on supply chain efficiency when buyers strategically participate in the collaborative organization we prove that the shapley value coordinates the supply chain i e it makes complete participation the best strategy for buyers even under asymmetric information this setting is compared with an alternative structure where buyers can only collaborate in source specific replenishment organizations that purchase all requested products either from intermediaries or manufacturers although there are always participation strategies that result in minimum collective cost it is impossible to find allocation rules for source specific replenishment organizations that always motivate the buyers to choose such strategies

let me dream on anticipatory emotions and preference for timing in lotteries we analyze one of the explanations why people participate in lotteries our hypothesis stipulates that part of the value that a unit of money buys in lotteries is consumed before the actual resolution in the form of emotions such as hope in other words a person holding a lottery ticket may prefer a delayed resolution of risk due to positive anticipatory emotions this conjecture is tested in an experiment with real lottery tickets we show that our theoretical considerations may contribute to explaining empirical puzzles associated with lottery participation timing of resolution and the spreading of lots over drawings more specifically we find that a substantial minority of participants prefer delayed resolution that anticipated thrill is the main variable explaining this choice and that emotions actually experienced during the waiting period are indeed predominantly positive and correlated with predictions finally we find that a great majority prefers to spread chances that is to obtain one ticket for each of two drawings rather than two for the same drawing

order quantity and timing flexibility in supply chains the role of demand characteristics we study how differences in product demand characteristics affect the strategic value of different types of supply chain flexibility for accurate response we propose a single period inventory modelling framework with two ordering opportunities the second order reflects updated demand information and potentially capitalizes on supply chain flexibility we consider two complementary forms of flexibility quantity flexibility in production and timing flexibility in scheduling in this framework we analyze the total inventory cost of a firm for alternate demand types we model functional products through the standard assumption of independent demand over the period fashion driven innovative products through a bayesian model and innovative products with evolving demand through a martingale process the three demand processes exhibit very different behavior with respect to the value of the alternate forms of flexibility we observe that quantity flexibility is of moderate value for functional goods and of high value for fashion driven products for all lead times quantity flexibility is of low value for goods with evolving demand with long lead times but of high value for short lead times alternately we observe timing flexibility is of highest value for functional goods especially for cases of high holding cost and is of lesser value for fashion driven goods it is of least value for goods with evolving demand both quantity and timing flexibility capabilities are required to significantly reduce the relevant supply chain costs for evolving demand innovative goods when the lead times are long

the effects of selling packaged goods on inventory decisions in this paper we study within a newsboy type modeling framework the common business practice of retail firms to sell products not only as independent items but also as part of multiproduct packets packaged goods our emphasis is on understanding the effects of such practices on the inventory decisions of the firm we provide insights on the resulting level of suboptimality when inventory decisions are made with demand information only on the independent items and without accounting for the demand substitution structure induced between independent items and packaged goods our stylized model studies an environment with two products that are not direct substitutes for each other sold either independently or as part of a packet that contains one unit of each we provide necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for this model and suggest an efficient numerical search for obtaining the optimal stocking levels an extensive computational study allowed us to provide insights on the nature of the optimal stocking policies the suboptimality of independent newsboy policies the effects of demand correlation among individual products and multiproduct packets and the determining role of induced substitution structure among products during stockout occasions on the profitability of the inventory system

the cost allocation issue in joint replenishment abstract joint replenishment for several products to achieve a lower inventory logistics cost has been a topic of extensive studies less attention has been paid to the issue of deciding how the joint replenishment costs should be allocated across the individual products ideally when items are ordered together one would require a stable cost allocation such that no subset of products subsidizes another subset when part of each product s ordering cost is product specific and part can be shared with other products like in a 3pl setting of anily and haviv it has been shown that even when a stable allocation exists such an allocation might be difficult to compute in addition usually the components of ordering costs are partially determined using estimates and accounting discretion this paper provides two main insights for determining an appropriate cost allocation it provides the means to test how sensitive a stable cost allocation is to a range of cost parameter values then in a computational study it is shown how to obtain a stable cost allocation without excessive computation

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

the newsvendor game has a nonempty core we settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game we prove that its core is always non empty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands we give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non negative elements

motivated health risk denial and preventative health care investments abstract people deny health risks invest too little in disease prevention and are highly sensitive to the price of preventative health care especially in developing countries moreover private sector r d spending on developing country diseases is almost non existent to explain these empirical observations i propose a model of motivated belief formation in which an agent s decision to engage in health risk denial balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention i use the model to study firms price setting behavior and incentive to innovate i also show that tax funded prevention subsidies are welfare enhancing

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

pharmaceuticals and the developing world pharmaceuticals have greatly improved health in developing countries but many people in developing countries do not obtain even inexpensive pharmaceuticals and little pharmaceutical r d is oriented toward products needed by developing countries such as a malaria vaccine access to existing products could be improved by facilitating differential pricing for example by subsidizing donation programs and reforming health care delivery r d incentives could be improved if rich countries or international organization committed to purchase needed products when they are developed and make them available to the poor

social classes and state behavior abstract van winden 1983 developed the interest function approach to the study of politico economic phenomena it starts from the familiar premise that economic agents have preferences with regard to the results of economic and political processes this paper develops a behavioral model with four classes of participants in the system and attempts to estimate the behavioral influences of these groups on the state

stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences abstract we study stochastic linear programming games a class of stochastic cooperative games whose payoffs under any realization of uncertainty are determined by a specially structured linear program these games can model a variety of settings including inventory centralization and cooperative network fortification we focus on the core of these games under an allocation scheme that determines how payoffs are distributed before the uncertainty is realized and allows for arbitrarily different distributions for each realization of the uncertainty assuming that each player s preferences over random payoffs are represented by a concave monetary utility functional we prove that these games have a nonempty core furthermore by establishing a connection between stochastic linear programming games linear programming games and linear semi infinite programming games we show that an allocation in the core can be computed efficiently under some circumstances

distributed consensus in noncooperative inventory games this paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users we show that these games present a unique pareto optimal nash equilibrium that dominates all other nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria as it minimizes the sum of all the players costs we assume that the players adopt a best response strategy at each stage they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior and then simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs within this context we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players strategies to the pareto optimal nash equilibrium the protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player s data exposure to the competitors

business cycle comovement in the g 7 common shocks or common transmission mechanisms what are the sources of macroeconomic comovement among g 7 countries two main candidate explanations may be singled out common shocks and common transmission mechanisms in the article it is shown that they are complementary rather than alternative explanations by means of a large scale factor vector autoregressive fvar model allowing for full economic and statistical identification of all global and idiosyncratic shocks it is found that both common disturbances and common transmission mechanisms of global and country specific shocks account for business cycle comovement in the g 7 countries moreover spillover effects of foreign idiosyncratic disturbances seem to be a less important factor than the common transmission of global or domestic shocks in the determination of international macro economic comovements

stock wars inventory competition in a two echelon supply chain with multiple retailers this paper studies the competitive and cooperative selection of inventory policies in a two echelon supply chain with one supplier andn retailers stochastic demand is monitored continuously retailers incur inventory holding and backorder penalty costs the supplier incurs holding costs for its inventory and backorder penalty costs for backorders at the retailers the latter cost reflects the supplier s desire to maintain adequate availability of its product to consumers previous research finds the supply chain cost minimizing reorder point policies the cooperative solution the competitive solution is a nash equilibrium a set of reorder points such that no firm can deviate from the equilibrium and lower its cost it is shown that nash equilibria exist and a method is presented to find all of them in some settings the cooperative solution is a nash equilibrium competition does not necessarily lead to supply chain inefficiency in other settings competition leads to costs that are substantially higher than optimal usually but not always the competitive supply chain carries too little inventory three cooperation strategies are discussed change incentives change equilibrium and change control a set of contracts is provided that changes the firms incentives so that the optimal policy is a nash equilibrium an equilibrium change can improve performance but does not guarantee optimal performance to change control the firms let the supplier choose all reorder points a key component in vendor managed inventory that change leads to optimal supply chain performance

cooperation in service systems we consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers this economies of scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady state mean total number of customers in the system the question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system when the individual incoming streams of customers form poisson processes and individual service times are exponential we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers or jobs in the pooled system we show that despite the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave the game and its subgames possess nonempty cores in other words for any subset of servers there exist cost sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition we give an explicit expression for all infinitely many nonnegative core cost allocations of this game finally we show that except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid to join the grand coalition

the applicability of the traditional theory of economic policy abstract the traditional theory of economic policy requires targets instruments an empirical economic model and a social welfare or criterion function to be specified in order to derive the optimal economic policy empirical studies of reaction functions suggest that economic policy is carried out in some systematic manner subject to interference from political factors this survey addresses the problems of specifying estimating and applying an economic model when economic policy is following a path specified by a reaction function attention is paid to rational expectations the lucas critique and the policy neutrality proposition lack of knowledge of the policy maker s objective function poses the most serious difficulty when applying the theory of economic policy various methods of determining this function are reviewed and the possibility that policy makers might be satisficing is discussed the role played by political factors is considered in the light of the public choice literature

the cost allocation problem for the first order interaction joint replenishment model we consider an infinite horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction under this model the setup transportation reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group independent major setup cost plus retailer dependent minor setup costs in addition each retailer is associated with a retailer dependent holding cost rate the structure of optimal replenishment policies is not known thus research has focused on optimal power of two pot policies following this convention we consider the cost allocation problem of an optimal pot policy among the various retailers for this sake we define a characteristic function that assigns to any subset of retailers the average time total cost of an optimal pot policy for replenishing the retailers in the subset under the assumption that these are the only existing retailers we show that the resulting transferable utility cooperative game with this characteristic function is concave in particular it is a totally balanced game namely this game and any of its subgames have nonempty core sets finally we give an example for a core allocation and prove that there are infinitely many core allocations

inventory centralization games with price dependent demand and quantity discount consider a distribution system consisting of a set of retailers facing a single period price dependent demand of a single product by taking advantage of the risk pooling effect and the quantity volume discount provided by suppliers or third party carriers the retailers may place joint orders and keep inventory at central warehouses before demand realization and allocate inventory among themselves after demand realization to reduce their operating costs under rather general assumptions we prove that there is a stable allocation of profits among the retailers in the sense that the resulting inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we also show how to compute an allocation in the core

a three stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers we present and study a three stage model of a decentralized distribution system consisting ofn retailers each of whom faces a stochastic demand for an identical product in the first stage before the demand is realized each retailer independently orders her initial inventory in the second stage after the demand is realized each retailer decides how much of her residual supply demand she wants to share with the other retailers in the third stage residual inventories are transshipped to meet residual demands and an additional profit is allocated our model is an extension of the two stage model of anupindi et al abz 2001 which implicitly assumes that all residuals enter the transshipment stage we show however that allocation rules in the third stage based on dual solutions which were used in the abz model may induce the retailers to hold back some of their residual supply demand in general we study the effect of implementing various allocations rules in the third stage on the values of the residual supply demand the retailers are willing to share with others in the second stage and the trade off involved in achieving an optimal solution for the corresponding centralized system

stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations this study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers each of them facing a newsvendor problem and a supplier groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by joint ordering and inventory centralization however we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should be dedicated to them in this situation we show that the associated cooperative game has a non empty core afterwards we concentrate on a dynamic situation where several model cost parameters and the retailers dedicated stock levels can change we investigate how the profit division might be affected by these changes we focus on four monotonicity properties we identify several classes of games with retailers where some of the monotonicity properties hold moreover we show that pairs of cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general when changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern

pooling of spare parts between multiple users how to share the benefits companies that maintain capital goods e g airplanes or power plants often face high costs both for holding spare parts and due to downtime of their technical systems these costs can be reduced by pooling common spare parts between multiple companies in the same region but managers may be unsure about how to share the resulting costs or benefits in a fair way that avoids free riders to tackle this problem we study several players each facing a poisson demand process for an expensive low usage item they share a stock point that is controlled by a continuous review base stock policy with full backordering under an optimal base stock level costs consist of penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for on hand stock we propose to allocate the total costs proportional to players demand rates our key result is that this cost allocation rule satisfies many appealing properties it makes all separate participants and subgroups of participants better off it stimulates growth of the pool it can be easily implemented in practice and it induces players to reveal their private information truthfully to obtain these game theoretical results we exploit novel structural properties of the cost function in our s 1 s inventory model

capacity allocation and scheduling in supply chains we consider a multiple product supply chain where a manufacturer receives orders from several distributors if the orders cannot all be met from available production capacity then the manufacturer allocates that capacity and a set of resubmittable orders among the distributors the distributors may share their allocated capacity among themselves before submitting revised orders finally the manufacturer schedules the revised orders to minimize its cost we consider three practical coordination issues first we estimate the benefit to the manufacturer from considering scheduling costs and constraints in making capacity and order allocation decisions second we estimate the additional profit that the distributors achieve when they share their allocated capacity third we estimate the value of coordination between the manufacturer and the distributors our work is among the first to consider all three issues simultaneously we model scheduling costs and constraints within the manufacturer s capacity allocation problem we model the distributors capacity sharing problem as a cooperative game that has properties that are unique within cooperative game theory finally we develop optimal algorithms for all the models defined by the three coordination issues our exact evaluation of decisions about the appropriate coordination level improves managers ability to make those decisions

can higher prices stimulate product use evidence from a field experiment in zambia the controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests in part on whether higher prices can increase use either by targeting distribution to high use households a screening effect or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk cost effect we develop a methodology for separating these two effects we implement the methodology in a field experiment in zambia using door to door marketing of a home water purification solution we find evidence of economically important screening effects by contrast we find no consistent evidence of sunk cost effects jel c93 d12 i11 m31 o12

dynamics and rationality in ordered externality games abstract we describe a class of games in which the players payoffs depend only on their own play and an externality which we call ordered externality games oegs these include service facilities with customer self selection and cost sharing games we then analyze the dynamics of these games assuming best reply cournot dynamics finally we prove that any oeg which is convergent under best reply dynamics is also convergent under adaptive learning this allows us to compute the convergence properties of an oeg easily journal of economic literature classification numbers c63 c70

the euro changeover and its effects on price transparency and inflation despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on prices european consumers perceived the opposite to shed some light on this puzzle we develop a model of imperfect information in which cheaper goods experience higher price growth after the changeover retailers aware of consumers difficulties in adopting the new currency use currency changeovers to increase profits by increasing prices the lower the price transparency after the changeover the higher the euro related inflation using data on inflation eurostat and price levels economist intelligence unit we show that although the euro changeover did not significantly increase inflation it nevertheless had a distortionary effect on prices after the changeover cheaper goods had higher inflation and this effect was stronger in countries in which people found dealing with the new currency problematic

large newsvendor games we consider a game called newsvendor game where several retailers who face a random demand can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers a game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors we prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game and we show that in a game with a continuum of players under a nonatomic condition on the demand the core is a singleton for a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases

benefit sharing in holding situations a situation is studied where one agent has available an amount of storage facility and the other agents have some goods part of which can be stored generating benefits the problem of sharing the benefits produced by full cooperation between agents is tackled in this paper by introducing a related cooperative game this game turns out to be a big boss game with interesting theoretical properties a solution concept relying on optimal storage plans and associated holding prices is also introduced and its relationship with the core of the above holding game is explored in detail the family of monotonic decreasing bijective mappings defined on the set of non negative real numbers plays an important role in our approach

unfair allocation of gains under the equal price allocation method in purchasing groups certain purchasing groups do not flourish a supposed reason for this is a creeping dissatisfaction among various members of a group with the allocation of the cooperative gains in this paper we analyze unfairness resulting from using the commonly used equal price ep method for allocating gains under the assumption of continuous quantity discounts we demonstrate that this unfairness is caused by neglecting a particular component of the added value of individual group members next we develop two fairness ratios and tie these to fairness properties from cooperative game theory the ratios show among other things that being too big a player in a purchasing group can lead to decreasing gains they can be used to assess if ep is an unfair method in specific situations finally we discuss measures a purchasing group could consider in order to attenuate perceived unfairness thereby the group may improve its stability and prosperity

a three person game theory model arising in stochastic inventory control theory abstract in this paper we build a game theory model for a single period inventory problem where each of three retailers tries to determine his optimal order quantity their products are substitutable and have random demands therefore multiple direction demand transfers occur when one or more retailers are sold out it is shown that by using nash equilibrium optimal decision exists for each retailer when they work independently the optimal order quantity in this case is larger than that under the newsboy problem model this is because substitution can be a source of sales and hence a justification for inventory in situations where some retailer may act irrationally to inflict a damage on the others the defensive strategy for the latter is to totally ignore the existence of the irrational player we also study the cooperation of retailers by switching excess inventory to those who have excess demand both when side payments are and are not allowed if side payments are not allowed secure nash strategies always exist for each retailer and cooperation will reduce inventory the latter is especially true when the depreciation of value of the item and or inventory carrying cost are large we give conditions for cooperation in both cases and show that although all player cooperation is often feasible it may not always be obtainable even if side payments are allowed

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems in this paper we study models of cooperation between the nodes of a network that represents a distribution problem the distribution problem we propose arises when over a graph a group of nodes offers certain commodity some other nodes require it and a third group of nodes neither need this material nor offer it but they are strategically relevant to the distribution plan the delivery of one unit of material to a demand node generates a fixed profit and the shipping of the material through the arcs has an associated cost we show that in such a framework cooperation is beneficial for the different parties we prove that the cooperative situation arising from this distribution problem is totally balanced by finding a set of stable allocations in the core of an associated cooperative game in order to overcome certain fairness problems of these solutions we introduce two new solution concepts and study their properties

an economic model of the meat paradox abstract many individuals have empathetic feelings towards animals but frequently consume meat we investigate this meat paradox using insights from the literature on motivated reasoning in moral dilemmata we develop a model where individuals form self serving beliefs about the suffering of animals caused by meat consumption in order to alleviate the guilt associated with their dietary choices the model predicts that the price of meat has a causal effect on individuals beliefs high prices foster realism by lowering the returns to self deception which magnifies the price elasticity of meat consumption the model also predicts a positive relationship between individuals taste for meat and their propensity to engage in self deception a causal effect of aggregate consumption on individual beliefs and the coexistence of equilibria of collective realism and collective denial

supplier commitment and production decisions under a forecast commitment contract manufacturing firms in capital intensive industries face inherent demand volatility for their products and the inability to change their capacity quickly to cope with these challenges manufacturers often enter into contracts with their customers that offer greater certainty of supply in return for more predictable orders in this paper we study a forecast commitment contract in which the customer provides a forecast the supplier makes a production commitment to the customer based on the forecast and the customers minimum order quantity is a function of the forecast and committed quantities we provide a complete analysis of the suppliers decisions when there is a single customer facing uncertain demand we first show that the supplier has two dominant commitment strategies committing to the forecast or committing to the production quantity we then characterize the jointly optimal commitment and production strategy for the supplier and extend the results to consider a capacity constraint we show that the proposed contract can moderate the suppliers motivation to underproduce and due to the structure of the contract and the form of the suppliers optimal strategy also limits the customers incentive to overforecast we also provide results for a capacitated two customer example which show that the suppliers choice of production quantity for each customer is not necessarily nondecreasing in the total available capacity

the illusion of sustainability this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the illusion of sustainability conducted during the time period 1998 to 2001 in kenya the study observed that deworming is a public good since much of its social benefit comes through reduced disease transmission people were less likely to take deworming if their direct first order or indirect second order social contacts were exposed to deworming the introduction of a small fee for deworming drugs led to an 80 percent reduction in treatment rates take up was not sensitive to the exact price level suggesting that it is particularly counter productive to charge small positive prices for the treatment of infectious diseases an intensive school health education had no impact on worm prevention funding for the study derived from world bank nih fogarty international center berkeley center for health research

allocating production capacity among multiple products we consider the problem of allocating production capacity among multiple items assuming that a fixed proportion of overall capacity can be dedicated exclusively to the production of each item given a capacity allocation production of each item follows a base stock policy i e each demand triggers a replenishment order to restore safety stocks to target levels we present procedures for choosing base stock levels and capacity allocations that are asymptotically optimal our objective is to minimize holding and backorder costs or to minimize holding costs subject to a service level constraint asymptotic optimality refers to large backorder penalties or stringent service level constraints numerical results indicate that our rules perform very well even far from the asymptotic regime a further approximation step results in allocation rules based on heavy traffic limits these too perform well

on the cooperation of recycling operations abstract this paper addresses two important issues that may affect the operations efficiency in the recycling industry first the industry contains many small scale and inefficient recycling firms especially in developing countries second the output from recycling a waste product often yields multiple recycled products that cannot all be sold efficiently by a single firm to address these two issues this paper examines how different firms can cooperate in their recycling and pricing decisions using cooperative game theory recycling operations under both joint and individual productions with different cost structures are considered decisions include the quantity of waste product to recycle and the price at which to sell each recycled product on each firm s market these decisions can be made jointly by multiple cooperating firms to maximize total profit we design allocation schemes for maximized total profit to encourage cooperation among all firms managerial insights are provided from both environmental and economic perspectives

managing flexible capacity in a make to order environment flexible capacity has been shown to be very effective to hedge against forecast errors at the investment stage in a make to order environment this flexibility can also be used to hedge against variability in customer orders in the short term for that purpose production levels must be adjusted each period to match current demands to give priority to the higher margin product or to satisfy the closest customer however this will result in swings in production inducing larger order variability at upstream suppliers and significantly higher component inventory levels at the manufacturer through a stylized two plant two product capacitated manufacturing setting we show that the performance of the system depends heavily on the allocation mechanism used to assign products to the available capacity although managers would be inclined to give priority to higher margin products or to satisfy customers from their closest production site these practices lead to greater swings in production result in higher operational costs and may reduce profits

a postponement model for demand management in this paper we analyze demand postponement as a strategy to handle potential demand surges under demand postponement a fraction of the demands from the regular period are postponed and satisfied during a postponement period this permits capacity to be procured to satisfy the postponed demands a reimbursement per unit is paid to customers whose demands are postponed the basic idea is that by preempting stockouts through demand postponement we can reduce overall stockout costs we formulate and solve a two stage capacity planning problem under demand postponement we propose a power range class of distributions to capture the nature of demand surges we establish the scalability and conjugate properties of the power range distributions under demand postponement which leads to a tractable analysis of the problem we analytically solve the problem of determining the optimal regular and postponement period capacities and the demand splitting rule to minimize the supplier s expected cost we show that a the value of postponement may be significant depending on cost and demand parameters b a postponement strategy may lead to reduced investment in initial capacity and c it may be optimal to do no demand postponement over a range of demands even after observing a higher demand signal we then relax several model assumptions and provide results for these extensions we conclude with managerial insights

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

oligarchic versus democratic societies this paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes an oligarchic society where political power is in the hands of major producers protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs democracy where political power is more widely diffused imposes redistributive taxes on producers but tends to avoid entry barriers when taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time the typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies an oligarchic society may first become richer but later fall behind a similar democratic society i also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies how within elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place jel p16 o10

non cooperative strategies for production and shipment lot sizing in one vendor multi buyer system abstract this paper considers a decentralized dynamic production distribution control a discrete deterministic model in which a vendor produces a product and supplies it to the buyer is considered several papers on vendor buyer integrated production inventory management assume that policies are set by a central decision maker to optimize total system performance although vendor and buyer may agree to minimize the total cost at least one of them has a private incentive to deviate from the agreement in the competitive situation the objective is to determine schedules which minimize the individual average total cost of production shipment and stockholding we assume that the division of shipment costs is centrally coordinated or negotiated initially it leads to a class of non cooperative constrained games indexed by two parameters connected with partitions of shipment costs non cooperative strategies are considered as feasible strategies in a restricted non cooperative game some properties of equilibrium strategies are investigated as acceptable equilibrium strategies of subgames in the game

handbook of game theory with economic applications volume 3 this is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in game theory and its applications to many and varied fields in particular to economics the chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area the applications include empirical evidence the following topics are covered communication and correlated equilibria coalitional games and coalition structures utility and subjective probability common knowledge bargaining zero sum games differential games and applications of game theory to signalling moral hazard search evolutionary biology international relations voting procedures social choice public economics politics and cost allocation this handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics political science psychology mathematics and biology handbook of game theory with economic applications vol i

coordinating supply chains with competition capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing abstract this paper motivated by the experiences of a major us based semiconductor manufacturer presents an integrated model of incentive problems arising in forecasting and capacity allocation our model involves multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers who forecast the means of their respective demand and capacity distributions a central coordinator is responsible for allocating capacities to product lines when these distributions are unknown to the central coordinator and capacity is scarce the managers misrepresent their forecasts a product manager inflates his forecast to gain a greater allocation of the capacity a manufacturing manager deflates his forecast to cover for the uncertainties in production we propose a game theoretic model and design a mechanism a bonus scheme for all managers and an allocation rule to allocate realized capacity to the product managers that elicits truthful reporting by all managers the results herein show that the structure of the truth eliciting bonus schemes is rather simple with easily calculable parameters we also show that large classes of allocation rules including the current allocation practice of the firm are manipulable a bonus is often required for elicitation of truthful information we synthesize the implications of our results for the practitioners

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction we study the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction we compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply the shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the total cooperative cost among players we design a mechanism for allocation over time of total individual cost so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game

psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings we extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty we show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency we provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices

towards a politico economic theory of social security social security which will be taken here in its wide european sense not only encompassing public pension schemes but also other income transfers such as to unemployed sick and disabled persons and to widows and orphans nowadays figures large among government outlays after its continuous and fast expansion over especially the past two decades see e g saunders and klau 1985 and table 0 1 accordingly social security is receiving increasing attention in the economic profession recent discussions have focused on the effects of social security on capital accumulation and on its ability to achieve a more desirable distribution of income in these studies social security programs are typically treated as exogenously determined little attention has hitherto been paid to the explanation of social security policies

capacity allocation using past sales when to turn and earn consider a supplier selling to multiple retailers demand varies across periods but the supplier s capacity and wholesale price are fixed if demand is high the retailers needs exceed capacity and the supplier must implement an allocation mechanism to dole out production we examine how the choice of mechanism impacts retailer actions and supply chain performance in particular we analyze turn and earn allocation a method commonly used in the automobile industry this scheme bases current allocations on past sales and thus enables retailers to influence their future allocations they compete for scarce capacity even if they do not compete for customers we show that turn and earn induces the retailers to increase their sales when demand is low and the supplier s capacity is otherwise underutilized supplier profits thus increase the impact on the supply chain depends on how restrictive capacity is with mildly tight capacity the retailers higher sales rate does not significantly lower their profits but does reduce the cost of idle capacity supply chain performance improves with extremely tight capacity the retailers intense competition dissipates more profits than the supplier gains and supply chain performance suffers consequently turn and earn does not generally coordinate the system it is best characterized as a means for the supplier to increase her profits at the expense of the retailers and potentially even the supply chain furthermore these results hold even if the retailers can hold inventory in anticipation of scarce capacity

production inventory games a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games in this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production inventory problems several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed each agent has its own unit production inventory holding and backlogging cost cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost we prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced and the owen set reduces to a singleton the owen point based on this type of allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games finally we point out the relationship of the owen point with other well known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the shapley value

adverse selection and entrepreneurship in a model of development this paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identified as the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation entrepreneurial skills are private information which prevents full risk sharing development into a modern industrial economy might fail to take place since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks an interesting feature of the model is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing activities

shipment consolidation who pays for it and how much this paper examines the subject of cost allocation in a multiple product inventory system allowing for consolidation of shipments if we order multiple items using an economic order quantity eoq policy and consolidate shipments part of the ordering cost is shared and part is specific to each item we want to find the consolidation choice with optimal total cost and divide the cost fairly among the individual items such a fair division is central to a costing system in which no group of items subsidizes the others there are no free riders we use a cooperative inventory game to determine when this can be done this game is usually not concave so we want to know what consolidation combinations determine when this cost can be fairly divided using the core of the game we prove that consolidation of all the items is cheaper exactly if there are fair cost allocations core of the game is not empty which happens when the portion of the ordering cost common to all items is not too small we further show how sensitive the nonempty core result is to adjustments in the cost parameters and show how to determine a threshold value for the shared ordering cost which assures the existence of a fair cost allocation

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

overconfidence insurance and paternalism it is well known that when agents are fully rational compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of insurance markets we find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks compulsory insurance makes low risk agents worse off hence behavioral biases may weaken some of the well established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information

free distribution or cost sharing evidence from a randomized malaria prevention experiment author s cohen jessica dupas pascaline abstract it is often argued that cost sharing charging a subsidized positive price for a health product is necessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not need the product we explore this argument through a field experiment in kenya in which we randomized the price at which prenatal clinics could sell long lasting anti malarial insecticide treated nets itns to pregnant women we find no evidence that costsharing reduces wastage on those that will not use the product women who received free itns are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices we also find no evidence that costsharing induces selection of women who need the net more those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the average prenatal client in the area in terms of measured anemia an important indicator of malaria cost sharing does however considerably dampen demand we find that uptake drops by 75 percent when the price of itns increases from zero to 0 75 i e from 100 to 87 5 percent subsidy the price at which itns are currently sold to pregnant women in kenya we combine our estimates in a cost effectiveness analysis of itn prices on child mortality that incorporates both private and social returns to itn usage overall our results suggest that free distribution of itns could save many more lives than cost sharing programs have achieved so far and given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of itns it would likely do so at a lesser cost per life saved

a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price all units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described the effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

wage bargaining and the phillips curve a macroeconomic view 1983 wage bargaining and the phillips curve a macroeconomic view applied economics vol 15 no 1 pp 61 71

cooperation and game theoretic cost allocation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review we study cooperation strategies for companies that continuously review their inventories and face poisson demand our main goal is to analyze stable cost allocations of the joint costs these are such that any group of companies has lower costs than the individual companies if such allocations exist they provide an incentive for the companies to cooperate we consider two natural cooperation strategies i the companies jointly place an order for replenishment if their joint inventory position reaches a certain reorder level and ii the companies reorder as soon as one of them reaches its reorder level numerical experiments for two companies show that the second strategy has the lowest joint costs under this strategy the game theoretical shapley value and the distribution rule a cost allocation in which the companies share the procurement cost and each pays its own holding cost are shown to be stable cost allocations these results also hold for situations with three companies

inventory games with permissible delay in payments abstract meca et al 2004 studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common item decide to cooperate and make joint orders with the eoq policy in this paper we extend their model to the situation where retailer s delay in payments is permitted by the supplier we introduce the corresponding inventory game with permissible delay in payments and prove that its core is nonempty then a core allocation rule is proposed which can be reached through population monotonic allocation scheme under this allocation rule the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a farsighted point of view

supply chain coordination perspectives empirical studies and research directions supply chains sc are generally complex and are characterized by numerous activities spread over multiple functions and organizations which pose interesting challenges for effective sc coordination to meet these challenges sc members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other a systematic literature review is presented in this paper to throw light on the importance of sc coordination the objectives of this paper are to report and review various perspectives on sc coordination issues understand and appreciate various mechanisms available for coordination and identify the gaps existing in the literature a framework is suggested indicating scope for further research

strategic ignorance as a self disciplining device we analyse the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare the extent of the externality is initially unknown but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure we show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions incomplete learning may occur on a markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra personal game in such a case each agent s incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self restricted information this conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance all equilibria featuring this property strictly pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs

computing core allocations in cooperative games with an application to cooperative procurement abstract cooperative game theory defines several concepts for distributing outcome shares in a cooperative game with transferable utilities one of the most famous solution concepts is the core which defines a set of outcome allocations that are stable such that no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition in this paper we propose a general procedure to compute a core element or to detect that no core allocation exists which is based on mathematical programming techniques the procedure proposed in this paper can be applied to a wide class of cooperative games where the characteristic function is given by the optimum objective function value of a complex optimization problem for cooperative procurement which is an example from the field of supply chain management where some literature on the core concept already exists we prove the applicability and provide computational results to demonstrate that games with 150 players can be handled

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

optimal pricing and lot sizing under conditions of perishability and partial backordering we formulate a generalized model of dynamic pricing and lot sizing by a reseller who sells a perishable good we assume that when it is economic to backlog demand the reseller can plan for periods of shortage during which demand can be partially backordered when the good is highly perishable the reseller may need to backlog demand in order to market the good at a reasonable price we present a simple solution procedure for solving the optimization problem the procedure entails solving first a single nonlinear equation and then if required two nonlinear equations

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

transshipment of inventories among retailers myopic vs farsighted stability the author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized after demand realization retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers this is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing the author addresses the following issue suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit such as the shapley value but may not belong to the core is it likely that in this framework all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable unlike the prior work the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense that is retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions in a symmetric setting with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition the author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues