the monetary approach to exchange rate determination under rational expectations the dollar deutschmark rate abstract this paper reformulates the monetary approach after ascertaining that a money demand function with a partial adjustment mechanism had more empirical support than a money demand function which assumed instantaneous stock adjustment the resulting exchange rate equation is estimated by two rational expectations techniques the parameter estimates are reasonable and are robust to the estimation technique used to different specifications of the driving processes and to changes in the estimation period the structural model outperforms the random walk model and its own unconstrained equivalent a pure time series equation in outof sample forecasts

economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline industry this article estimates a structural model of competition among hub and spoke airlines in order to measure the strength of economies of traffic density on individual route segments we find that economies of density were strong during the sample period fourth quarter 1985 stronger than previous estimates by douglas caves laurits christensen and michael tretheway derived from traditional cost function methods we also find that the airlines competitive behavior was far from collusive in the markets under study markets requiring a connection at a hub airport our structural model also provides plausible estimates of demand elasticities we use our estimates to provide a cost based rationale for the major changes in the structure of the industry following deregulation for example the increase in airport and industry wide concentration and the increase in competition at the city pair market level and to simulate the effects of a merger of airlines that share a hub

buy lie or die an investigation of chinese st firms voluntary interim audit motive and auditor independence in the chinese stock market special treatment st firms are the firms listed as facing imminent danger of delisting unless they return to profitability after reporting two consecutive annual losses some st firms voluntarily pay substantial fees to their external auditors to conduct interim audits which are not required by regulations in this study we investigate and find that st firms that pay for voluntary interim audits report greater discretionary accrued earnings higher non operating earnings and higher returns on assets in ensuing annual reports as a result these firms are more likely to return to profitability and reduce their delisting risk our results which contribute to the current debate on auditor independence appear to be consistent with the possibility that st firms buy external auditors cooperation to manipulate earnings when faced with the threat of delisting

revisiting the bright and dark sides of capital flows in business groups prior studies report that the business group structure and the associated intra group capital flows are prone to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority investors yet business group is a prevalent and stable structure around the globe particularly where capital markets are underdeveloped using data from china this paper empirically studies the trade off between the negative and positive roles played by intra group capital flows and tests the efficiency implications of such trade off we find that from the perspective of the whole group intra group capital flows are most efficient when the groups are least subject to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and when they face strong external financing constraints

culture marketization and owner manager agency costs a case of merchant guild culture in china this study explores cultural influence on corporate behavior employing the case of merchant guild culture in china and further the moderating role of marketization using hand collected data on merchant guild culture we find that merchant guild culture is significantly negatively associated with owner manager agency costs suggesting that merchant guild culture in ancient china still has its continuous and remarkable effects on managerial behavior in contemporary corporations this finding also implies that merchant guild culture motivates managers to upgrade the efficiency of controlling operating costs reduces agency conflicts between management and shareholders and eventually mitigates owner manager agency costs moreover provincial marketization level attenuates the negative association between merchant guild culture and owner manager agency costs above results are robust to a variety of alternative measures of merchant guild culture and owner manager agency costs furthermore our findings are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between merchant guild culture and owner manager agency costs

does religion shape corporate cost behavior using u s listed firms during the period from 1971 to 2010 this paper investigates the effect of religion on corporate cost behavior we find that religion mitigates cost stickiness induced by agency or behavioral biases of managers this result holds for several robustness tests that address endogeneity concerns the mitigating effect of religion on cost stickiness is through the channel of reducing top managers overconfidence and optimistic bias regarding future demand change risk aversion mechanism and promoting managers adherence to fiduciary responsibilities and consideration of shareholder benefits ethic mechanism further evidence shows that the reduction in cost stickiness caused by religion increases firm value overall our findings suggest that religion reduces the wedge between a firm s actual and optimal resource commitments which helps to improve firm value and resource allocation efficiency

the collapse of purchasing power parities during the 1970 s one of the striking facts concerning the relationship beiveen prices and exchange rates during the 1970 s has been the dismal performance of the predictions of the simple versions of the purchasing power parity doctrine ppp that doctrine in its absolute version states that the equilibrium exchange rate between domestic and foreign currencies equals the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels the relative version of the doctrine relates equilibrium changes in exchange rates to changes in the ratio of domestic to foreign prices during the 1970 s short run changes in exchange rates bore little relationship to short run differentials in national inflation rates and frequently divergences from purchasing power parities have been cumulative this paper reviews and analyzes the empirical record of exchange rates and prices during the 1970 s and the analysis is based on the experience of the dollar pound the dollar frecch franc and the dollar dm exchange rates section 2 presents the evidence on ppp during the 1970 s and contrasts it with the evidence from the 1920 s a period during which the doctrine held up reasonably well this analysis is relevant for assessing whether the flexible exchange rate system was successful in providing national economies with an added degree of insulation from foreign shocks and whether it provided policymakers with an added instrument for the conduct of macroeconomic policy the evidence regarding devia tions from purchasing power parities is also relevant for determining whether there is a case for managed float section 3 attempts to explain what went wrong with

markets and institutions in financial intermediation national characteristics as determinants abstract given the importance of financial intermediation and the rise of globalization there is little prior research on how national preferences for financial intermediation markets versus institutions are determined by cultural legal and other national characteristics using panel analysis for data on a recent 8 year period for 30 countries this paper documents that national preferences for market financing increase with political stability societal openness economic inequality and equity market concentration and decreases with regulatory quality and ambiguity aversion we confirm with robustness tests that our result for regulatory quality is independent of differences in national wealth and that our result for political stability is independent of both wealth and political legitimacy these results should be of much interest to managers scholars regulators and policy makers

does confucianism reduce minority shareholder expropriation evidence from china using a sample of 12 061 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2011 and geographic proximity based confucianism variables this study provides strong evidence that confucianism is significantly negatively associated with minority shareholder expropriation implying that confucianism does mitigate agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders this finding suggests that confucianism has important influence on business ethics and thus can serve as an important ethical philosophy or social norm to mitigate the controlling shareholder s unethical expropriation behavior moreover my findings reveal that the nature of the ultimate owner attenuates the negative association between confucianism and minority shareholder expropriation suggesting that confucianism s negative impact on minority shareholder expropriation is less pronounced for state owned enterprises than for non state owned enterprises the above results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and my findings are valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between confucianism and minority shareholder expropriation

rational expectations and monetary models of exchange rate determination an empirical examination abstract one asset model of exchange rate determination that has received substantial attention in the literature is the monetary model as with other asset models expectations of future exchange rates play a key role usually these expectations are assumed to be formed rationally however to date there has been no attempt to empirically estimate a complete monetary model with rational expectations in this paper such a model is estimated and the restrictions implicity imposed by the rational expectation hypothesis tested the results suggest that both the parameter constraints associated with the monetary model and those implied by the reh are consistent with recent exchange rate behavior

does confucianism reduce board gender diversity firm level evidence from china this study extends previous literature on the association between confucianism and corporate decisions by examining confucianism s influence on board gender diversity using a sample of chinese listed firms during the period of 2001 2011 and geographic proximity based confucianism variables i provide strong and consistent evidence to show that confucianism is significantly negatively associated with board gender diversity suggesting that the proportion of women directors in the boardroom is significantly lower for firms surrounded by strong confucianism atmosphere than for firms located in regions with weak confucianism atmosphere this finding also implies that confucian philosophical system has important impacts on business ethics and women s status in corporate governance moreover gdp per capita the proxy for economic development level in a province in which a firm is located attenuates the negative association between confucianism and board gender diversity above results are robust to different measures of confucianism and board gender diversity and are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between confucianism and board gender diversity

simple menus of contracts in cost based procurement and regulation in an influential paper jean jacques laffont and jean tirole 1986 formulated a principal agent model of cost based procurement and regulation and showed that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by offering the agent a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts two related problems with applying this theory in practice have been that the economic logic and the underlying mathematics involved in calculating the optimal menu are quite complex and the principal must be able to specify the agent s entire disutility of effort function in order to calculate the optimal menu as a result the model has not been widely used in practice to either calculate actual incentive contracts or even to develop useful qualitative guidance about the nature of the optimal solution and how it is affected by various economic factors the purpose of this paper is to show that dramatically simpler menus which are easy to understand and calculate and which have lower informational requirements can at least in some cases capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the fully optimal complex menu in particular this paper considers two item menus where one item is a cost reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract such menus are called fixed price cost reimbursement fpcr menus for the case where the agent s utility is quadratic and the agent s type is distributed uniformly it is shown that the optimal fpcr menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves where the gain is measured relative to the result of using a cost reimbursement contract this paper s research was originally motivated by a policy issue in defense procurement in the united states the department of defense dod purchases almost all major weapons systems from sole source contractors using contracting methods that essentially amount to using cost reimbursement contracts the best way to understand why dod uses costreimbursement contracting methods is that they perform precisely the function identified in laffont and tirole s principal agent model they guarantee in a situation that amounts to a bilateral monopoly that dod and the firm can reach an agreement i e they guarantee that the agent will always produce the good of course the use of cost reimbursement contracting methods

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

religion and the method of earnings management evidence from china previous studies argue that religious firms are more ethical and thus engage less in accrual earnings management at odds with the ethical view we use a sample of chinese listed firms and show that firms in religious regions use more real earnings management we postulate that besides ethics religion also proxies for risk aversion which motivates firms to substitute accrual earnings management with real earnings management consistent with this view we show that the positive negative association between religiosity and real accrual earnings management is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk and for firms with less reputable auditors in addition we use a mediation model introduced by baron and kenny j pers soc psychol 51 6 1173 1182 1986 to show that religiosity affects earnings management through the channel of risk aversion we conclude that firms choose real earnings management over accrual based earnings management because of risk aversion rather than ethical reasons

does religion mitigate earnings management evidence from china using a sample of 11 357 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2011 we investigate whether and how religion can mitigate earnings management specifically based on geographic proximity based religion variables we provide strong and robust evidence to show that religion is significantly negatively associated with the extent of earnings management suggesting that religion can serve as a set of social norms to mitigate corporate unethical behavior such as earnings management our findings also reveal that the negative association between religion and earnings management is less pronounced for firms with closer distance to the regulatory centers than for their counterparts implying the substitutive effects between religion and the distance to regulators the proxy for regulatory intensity on mitigating earnings management the above results are robust to different measures of earnings management various religion variables and a variety of sensitivity tests

corporate environmental responsibility in polluting industries does religion matter using a sample of chinese listed firms in polluting industries for the period of 2008 2010 we empirically investigate whether and how buddhism china s most influential religion affects corporate environmental responsibility cer in this study we measure buddhist variables as the number of buddhist monasteries within a certain radius around chinese listed firms registered addresses in addition we hand collect corporate environmental disclosure scores based on the global reporting initiative gri sustainability reporting guidelines using hand collected buddhism data and corporate environmental disclosure scores we provide strong and robust evidence that buddhism is significantly positively associated with cer this finding is consistent with the following view buddhism can serve as social norms to evoke the consciousness of social responsibility and thereof strengthen cer our findings also reveal that the positive association between buddhism and cer is attenuated for firms with higher law enforcement index the results are robust to various measures of buddhism and a variety of sensitivity tests

an alternative approach to the american demand for money with a decade of evidence behind it the profession seems to have agreed on the fact that a structural break shifted the american demand for money shortly after 1973 it is difficult to pinpoint the source of the trouble precisely let alone to explain the event with an econometric model in their survey judd and scadding 1982 tentatively concluded that financial innovation is the source of the problem while this conclusion has not been universally accepted the instability of the money demand function is largely taken as a given stylized fact the primary goal of this article is to provide an alternative solution to the case of the missing money using the methods of hendry 1979 it should be stressed at the outset that as this paper deals with a problem in the applied literature it is unabashedly empirical in nature the paper attempts to explain an empirical difficulty without presenting a new theoretical model of money demand rather in the context of the standard transactions demand theory for narrow money a number of questions are analyzed with an atypical econometric model was there actually a shift or a series of shifts in the demand for money if not why have other investigators concluded that there was in fact a shift most importantly what function seems to be the most reasonable approximation to the data generation process during the period in question

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

multiproduct price regulation under asymmetric information we discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions the regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose when there is private information only about costs the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy when uncertainty concerns demand whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands if a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity discretion is good for overall welfare otherwise it is not

does religion mitigate tunneling evidence from chinese buddhism in the chinese stock market controlling shareholders often use inter corporate loans to expropriate a great amount of cash from listed firms through a process called tunneling using a sample of 10 170 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2010 i examine whether and how buddhism china s most influential religion can mitigate tunneling in particular using firm level buddhism data measured as the number of buddhist monasteries within a certain radius around chinese listed firms registered addresses this study provides strong evidence that buddhism intensity is significantly negatively associated with tunneling this finding is consistent with the view that buddhism has important influence on corporate behavior and can serve as a set of social norms and or an alternative mechanism to mitigate controlling shareholders unethical tunneling behavior in addition my findings also reveal that the negative association between buddhism intensity and tunneling is attenuated for firms that have high analyst coverage the results are robust to various measures of buddhism intensity and a variety of sensitivity tests

does religion matter to owner manager agency costs evidence from china in china buddhism and taoism are two major religions using a sample of 10 363 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2010 i provide strong and robust evidence that religion i e buddhism and taoism on the whole is significantly negatively associated with owner manager agency costs in particular using firm level religion data measured by the number of religious sites within a radius of certain distance around a listed firm s registered address i find that religion is significantly negatively positively associated with expense ratio asset utilization ratio the positive reverse proxy for owner manager agency costs this finding is consistent with the following view religiosity has remarkable effects on the way how an individual thinks and behaves and thereof can curb managers from unethical business practices moreover my findings suggest that the negative association between religion and owner manager agency costs is attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as higher marketization and high quality auditors furthermore after separating buddhism from taoism my finding indicates that above conclusions are only available for buddhism suggesting that different religions may have asymmetric influence on owner manager agency costs above results are robust to various measures of religiosity and a variety of robustness checks

does religion matter to informal finance evidence from trade credit in china informal finance plays an important role in transitional economies with weak legal institutions such as china as a major informal finance instrument trade credit relies on informal institutions

regulating without cost information the incremental surplus subsidy scheme the authors propose a regulatory mechanism called the incremental surplus subsidy iss scheme that can be implemented even when the regulato r has no knowledge of the monopolist s cost structure the regulator need only share the firm s knowledge of demand which may be imperfec t and be able to observe with a lag the firm s expenditures the i ss scheme induces the firm to set marginal cost prices to minimize p roduction costs and to undertake efficient investment levels it als o severely limits the firm s rents and eliminates them altogether if the firm s discount rate is known copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

effects of asymmetric information on airport congestion management mechanisms abstract we study and compare three different mechanisms for capacity slot allocation in a congested airport when airlines have one dimensional private information direct allocation of slots differentiated tolls and slot auctions with perfect information direct allocation is a first best policy which can be implemented through pigouvian taxes or slot auctions the mechanisms are equivalent in terms of social welfare with the introduction of asymmetric information this equivalence is lost direct allocation is always ex post inefficient and in some cases tolls and subsequent quantity delegation is a better alternative social welfare wise auctions may be superior or inferior to tolls we further show that naive application of pigouvian tolls is sub optimal when imperfect information exists

religion and economy religion has a two way interaction with political economy with religion viewed as a dependent variable a central question is how economic development and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs with religion viewed as an independent variable a key issue is how religiosity affects individual characteristics such as work ethic honesty and thrift and thereby influences economic performance in this paper we sketch previous studies of this two way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with international data

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

price vs quantity based approaches to airport congestion management abstract this paper analyzes price and quantity based approaches to management of airport congestion using a model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize congestion under these circumstances optimal congestion tolls are differentiated across carriers and a uniformity requirement on airport charges as occurs when slots are sold or tolls are uniform distorts carrier flight choices flight volumes tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers but quantity based regimes where the airport authority allocates a fixed number of slots via free distribution or an auction lead carriers to treat total flight volume and thus congestion as fixed and this difference generates an efficient outcome as long as the number of slots is optimally chosen

does religion matter in corporate decision making in america abstract we examine how corporate culture influences firm behavior prior research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion we find that this relationship also influences organizational behavior firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure as measured by variances in equity returns or returns on assets they exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth but generate a more positive market reaction when they announce new investments finally chief executive officers are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in their previous firm when they switch employers

prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement abstract i study whether incomplete enforcement of a regulation has any impact on the choice between price e g taxes and quantity e g tradeable quotas instruments results indicate that a second best design accounting for incomplete enforcement can be implemented equally well with either instrument as long as the benefit and cost curves are known with certainty if these curves are uncertain to the regulator however the quantity instrument performs relatively better than the price instrument the reason is that the effective amount of control under the quantity instrument is no longer fixed which makes this instrument come closer to a non linear instrument

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

introduction to the economics of religion after a very long hiatus economists have begun again to study the relationship between economics and religion this article seeks to summarize and evaluate the principal themes and empirical findings that have appeared in some 200 recent papers on the economics of religion although some of the research concerns the economic consequences of religiosity most applies standard economic theory to the study of individual religious activity the characteristics of religious groups and the impact of regulation and competition on religious markets

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

the dollar pound exchange rate in the 1920s an empirical investigation much of the empirical support for the monetary approach to exchange rate determination has been obtained with data from the 1920s for example clements and frenkel 4 frenkel 8 9 frenkel and clements 11 and huang 18 all obtained favorable empirical evidence estimating different versions of the monetary model the empirical results with data from the 1970s however are mixed bilson 1 2 3 edwards 7 hoffman and schlagenhauf 16 and woo 25 obtained favorable empirical evidence while dornbusch 6 hartley 14 huang 17 meese and rogoff 20 and shafer and loopesko 24 obtained contrary empirical evidence this mixed performance of the monetary exchange rate model in the 1970s has been attributed by dornbusch 6 and frenkel 10 to the failure of purchasing power parity ppp to hold in the short run and by meese and rogoff 21 to the instability of the u s money demand function we re examine the empirical evidence on the dollar pound exchange rate in the 1920s using the simple monetary exchange rate model popularized by bilson 1 2 and frenkel 8 9 thus it is not the purpose of this paper to suggest new empirical monetary exchange rate models nevertheless there are several important reasons why we re examine the simple monetary exchange rate model first several important implications of the monetary exchange rate model in our opinion are not adequately tested in existing work second there is a presumption that the failure of the monetary exchange rate model in the 1970s and the 1980s is due to special events such as real shocks that affected ppp and the instability of the u s money demand function by using the data from the 1920s we hope to avoid the problem of the instability of the u s money demand equation in the 1970s moreover frenkel 10 found that ppp held up reasonably well in this period thus the period of the 1920s provides a favorable setting to test the monetary approach finally we choose the dollar pound exchange rate based on data availability our empirical methodology differs from most previous empirical studies in that we estimate the reduced form equation of the exchange rate within a system of three equations in addition to the reduced form equation of the exchange rate there are also two equations describing monetary equilibrium one for the domestic economy and one for the foreign economy the estimation

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand the authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand than the regulator from the outset of their relationship the firm s cost structure is common knowledge but monitoring of output is prohibitively costly the authors find that when marginal production costs increase with output the firm command s no rents from its private information and the efficient price is established for each realization of demand in contrast with declining marginal costs the same price is established by the regulator for all demand realizations and the firm s rents can be substantial overall major qualitative differences in the optimal regulatory policy arise when the firm s private information concerns demand rather than costs copyright 1988 by american economic association

the monetary approach to exchange rate in an efficient foreign exchange market tests based on volatility the variance bounds on exchange rate movements implied by the monetary approach to exchange rate in an efficient foreign exchange market is shown to be violated by sample data the paper also presents evidence showing that the forecast errors implied by the monetary model can be forecasted using historical data the results are interpreted to suggest either the incompatibility of the monetary approach with sample data or an inefficient foreign exchange market or both models of exchange rate determination based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments imply when coupled with an interest rate parity relation and the assumption of an efficient foreign exchange market that exchange rates are related to a long average of money stocks differentials 1 2 the long average is analogous to the difference across countries of the long average of expected future money stocks which was supposed to characterize the price level of a single country see e g sargent and wallace 20 since long averages are known to have certain smoothing properties it appears that the observed volatility of exchange rates may be inconsistent with these models thus alternative tests of the models may be produced which rely on those properties the aim of this paper is to determine if the observed volatility is consistent with those properties the paper is the first to use tests based on the volatility of the exchange rate in an efficient market model of the monetary approach the first set of tests is based on the property of implied variance bounds for exchange rate movements and the second set consists of the more familiar efficient market tests of forecastability the empirical results violate these two sets of tests of the model thus casting doubt on the model even though the claim that exchange rates are too volatile has been commonly made few direct attempts have been made in the past to determine the validity of the claim some studies have presented estimates of variances of spot and forward rates but lacking an objective criterion to determine what constitutes

floating exchange rates in less developed countries a monetary analysis of the peruvian experience 1950 54 since the collapse of the bretton woods system in 1973 there has been an increasing discussion concerning the appropriateness of different exchange rate systems for less developed countries ldcs however this discussion has been marked by the absence of empirical analysis on how floating exchange rate systems behave in ldcs the purpose of this paper is to analyze from a monetary perspective the peruvian experience with floating exchange rates during the early l950s a short run version of the simple monetary approach to exchange rate determination is tested using monthly data for 1950 54 the results obtained are quite satisfactory indicating that the monetary view of exchange rate determination provides a useful benchmark for analyzing the behavior of floating exchange rates in developing economies l

exchange rate determination and the demand for money this paper examines the conventional monetary equation of exchange rate determination under certain exogeneity conditions one can write the price level at home and abroad as the ratio of the nominal money supply to the demand for real money balances then since the exchange rate is the domestic price of foreign exchange one can equate the exchange rate to the ratio of domestic to foreign prices this then allows one to write and estimate the exchange rate as a function of the money supply differential income differential and interest rate differential if the domestic and foreign money demand errors are autocorrelated and if deviations from purchasing power parity are autocorrelated tests based on the above model may be invalid only if all autoregressive parameters are equal will test results be valid a full information maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate and test the assumptions necessary for the conventional procedure to be correct finally two alternative models of exchange rate determination are considered to illustrate the importance of introducing the error terms at the beginning of the analysis this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item