endogenous discounting the world saving glut and the u s current account abstract we study the evolution of the u s current account in a two country dynamic stochastic endowment model in which a single non state contingent bond is the only internationally traded asset the paper focuses on the world saving glut as the primary cause of continual deterioration in the current account and departs from the standard framework by introducing a three parameter model of the subjective discount factor that depends on societal per capita variables that are external to household choices when agents in the model are presented with u s and rest of world endowment data as the realization of the exogenous state vector endogenously driven short run international differences in subjective discounting that display increasing relative u s impatience create saving and current account imbalances that matches patterns observed in the data

reclaiming virtue ethics for economics contrast virtue ethics the study of moral character has been an important strand in moral philosophy for literally thousands of years but has received little strand in moral philosophy for literally thousands of years but has received little attention from contemporary economists that neglect has not been reciprocated attention from contemporary economists that neglect has not been reciprocated a signifi cant body of philosophical work in virtue ethics is associated with a radical a signifi cant body of philosophical work in virtue ethics is associated with a radical critique of the market economy and of economics expressed crudely the charge critique of the market economy and of economics expressed crudely the charge sheet is this the market depends on instrumental rationality and extrinsic motisheet is this the market depends on instrumental rationality and extrinsic motivation market interactions therefore fail to respect the internal value of human vation market interactions therefore fail to respect the internal value of human practices and the intrinsic motivations of human actors by using market exchange practices and the intrinsic motivations of human actors by using market exchange as its central model economics normalizes extrinsic motivation not only in markets as its central model economics normalizes extrinsic motivation not only in markets but also in its ventures into the territories of other social sciences in social life but also in its ventures into the territories of other social sciences in social life more generally therefore economics is complicit in an assault on virtue and on more generally therefore economics is complicit in an assault on virtue and on human fl ourishing we will argue that this critique is fl awed both as a descriphuman fl ourishing we will argue that this critique is fl awed both as a description of how markets actually work and as a representation of how classical and tion of how markets actually work and as a representation of how classical and neo classical economists have understood the market we will show how the market neo classical economists have understood the market we will show how the market and economics can be defended against the critique from virtue ethics and economics can be defended against the critique from virtue ethics crucially our response to that critique will be constructed crucially our response to that critique will be constructed using the language and logic of virtue ethics in this respect it is fundamentally different from a response in this respect it is fundamentally different from a response that many economists would fi nd more natural to point to the enormous benefi ts that many economists would fi nd more natural to point to the enormous benefi ts

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying abstract this paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a free trade agreement fta it uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously the effect of foreign lobbying under the fta is examined empirically using canadian industry level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin the analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy the heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important the presence of an organized lobbying group in an fta partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the fta is associated with less protection

intertemporal substitution and durable goods long run data abstract in this paper we use long run annual data to estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution while accounting for the intra temporal substitution between nondurable consumption goods and durable consumption goods we apply a two step procedure that combines a cointegration approach to preference parameter estimation with generalized method of moments

endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system i evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas ftas on the world trading system i use an oligopolistic political economy model where the external tariffs of fta members as well as the decision to form ftas are endogenously determined in this context i show that ftas are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system this conclusion is based first upon the finding that ftas induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between fta members and non members while this ensures gains for the latter in general fta members may not gain i show however that governments will endorse only welfare improving arrangements in spite of their political motivations as a result fta members benefit from ratified arrangements as well finally i find that ftas by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments trade regime decisions also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level

optimal tariff equilibria with customs unions the authors construct a model of customs unions in which countries charge optimal tariffs customs unions internalize the externality that exists whenever two countries import the same good also customs unions make several countries into one large unit with more market power big customs unions can improve their members welfare relative to the free trade the authors model of customs unions separates the effects of tariff reduction from the effects of policy coordination the movement from nash equilibrium to a free trade association improves global resource allocations moving from a free trade association to a full customs union has ambiguous resource allocation effects

the value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures an argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that by committing to free trade a government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies but several existing models of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing interest group pressures since governments derive rents from the political process we develop a small country model in which factors are sector specific in the short run but mobile in the long run we show that in this setting a government may be worse off in the political equilibrium than under commitment to free trade and hence it may value a trade agreement

games parents and adolescents play risky behaviors parental reputation and strategic transfers this article examines parental reputation formation in intra familial interactions in a repeated two stage game children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18 drawing on milgrom and roberts 1982 and kreps and wilson 1982 we show that under certain conditions parents have the incentive to penalise older children for their adolescent risk taking behaviour in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviour when reaching adolescence we find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model

inter vivos transfers and intergenerational exchange the surge of interest in intergenerational transfers in the past decade has sparked a debate over the motivation for them are transfers given out of altruism or part of an exchange while each motive is probably at work to some extent we know little about whether one motive predominates the question is relevant for issues concerning public income redistribution and inequality in the family but despite its importance empirical evidence about motives is scarce because of limited data we investigate a new data set the national survey of families and households which remedies many of the shortcomings of other data sets containing private transfer information we find that empirical patterns for inter vivos transfers i e transfers between living persons are more consistent with exchange than altruism

the clash of liberalizations preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization in the european union there has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization the authors model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers next they use detailed data on product level tariffs negotiated by the european union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model the authors confirm the main prediction the european union s preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization and find that the effect is quantitatively significant moreover they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the european union

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

an empirical model of labor supply in a life cycle setting this paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior a two step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly abstract we analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price setting bertrand firms both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits and hence the long run number of firms we provide summary conditions for these effects to arise the conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form surprisingly the analysis largely corroborates cournot results with homogeneous demand

tough love and intergenerational altruism tough love and intergenerational altruism this article develops and studies a tough love model of intergenerational altruism we model tough love by modifying the barro becker standard altruism model in two ways first the child s discount factor is endogenously determined so lower childhood consumption leads to a higher discount factor later in life second the parent evaluates the child s lifetime utility with a constant high discount factor our model predicts that parental transfers will fall when the child s discount factor falls this is in contrast with the standard altruism model which predicts that parental transfers are independent of exogenous changes in the child s discount factor

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

inter vivos transfers and intended bequests abstract empirical work on intergenerational transfers has focused on distinguishing between altruistic and exchange motivated behavior however these two models are unable to explain the strong tendency for inter vivos transfers to be negatively related to the income of the recipient while bequests bear no relationship to income this paper presents a new framework for analyzing transfers from parents to children that is more consistent with observed behavior than are the altruistic and exchange models alone in particular the model developed here predicts differing behavior with respect to inter vivos transfers and bequests due to liquidity constraints and uncertainty about the recipient s permanent income the empirical work uses data from the health and retirement study and the asset and health dynamics study the patterns observed in these data are consistent with earlier findings that inter vivos transfers go disproportionately to less well off children while bequests are divided equally across children further the results support the predictions of the model in that differences in inter vivos transfers arise from differences in current income while differences in bequests result when indicators of the children s permanent incomes differ

preferential and multilateral liberalization evidence from latin america s use of tariffs antidumping and safeguards abstract i test the predictions of bagwell and staiger s 1999 theory of the effects of preferential liberalization on import protection imposed against non member countries in contrast to the existing literature which has for the most part focused on investigating whether external tariffs rise or fall due to preferential trade liberalization by testing the predictions of a specific model in a way that closely follows the theory i am able to examine the channels through which those effects take place importantly and unlike most existing studies i analyze not only tariffs but also the temporary trade barrier ttb policies of antidumping and safeguards i focus on latin america and find strong support for the theoretical predictions of bagwell and staiger 1999 first there is evidence of tariff complementarity i a larger reduction in the preferential import protection leads to a larger reduction in protection against non members ii the more consumption increases the more external protection decreases with the fall in preferential protection and iii the more imports from the rest of the world fall the more external protection decreases with a preferential protection cut furthermore i also find evidence consistent with the punishment effect and the tariff discrimination effect which arise when enforcement difficulties are incorporated into the theory finally the overall results point toward a building block effect of preferential liberalization

the peculiar scale economies of lotto the best selling lottery game in the united states is lotto a parimutuel game of long odds and large jackpots unlike in the other popular lottery games numbers and instant there is a strong tendency for per capita lotto sales to increase with the size of the population base the fact that the jackpot also tends to increase with population size is not a complete explanation since the probability of winning tends to be inversely proportional to state population our explanation for why the games are more successful in large states is that players tend to judge the likelihood of winning based on the frequency with which someone wins then a larger state can offer a game at longer odds but the same perceived probability of winning as a smaller state this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

trade deflection and trade depression this is the first paper to empirically examine whether a country s use of an import restricting trade policy distorts a foreign country s exports to third markets we first develop a theoretical model of worldwide trade in which the imposition of antidumping and safeguard taris or trade remedies by one country causes significant distortions in world trade flows we then empirically test this model by investigating the eect of the united states use of such import restrictions on japanese exports of roughly 4800 products into 37 countries between 1992 and 2001 our estimation yields evidence that us restrictions both deflect and depress japanese export flows to third countries imposition of a us antidumping measure against japan deflects trade as the average antidumping duty on japanese exports leads to a 5 7 increase in japanese exports of the same product to the average third country market the imposition of a us antidumping measure against a third country depresses trade as the average us duty imposed on a third country leads to a 5 19 decrease in japanese exports of that same product to the average third country s market we also document the substantial variation in trade deflection and trade depression across dierent importing countries and exported products

occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism the british industrial revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group we propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern parents shape their children s preferences in response to economic incentives middle class families in occupations requiring effort skill and experience develop patience and a work ethic whereas upper class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure these class specific attitudes which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape i introduction the industrial revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth it also set off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribution of income and wealth before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth century britain wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land over the course of the nineteenth century a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged as the economic elite for the most part the members of this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origins in the urban middle classes the landed elite was left behind and eventually lost its political and economic predominance many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences in values attitudes and ultimately preferences across social classes there are countless examples both in scholarly and in fictional writing of portrayals of members of the landowning class as averse to work unwilling to save ill disposed tocommercialactivity andunabletoconsidermoneyassomething

estimating tax incidence market power and market conduct the european cigarette industry abstract recent theoretical work has shown that the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes may differ and each may be over or under shifted onto consumers in the presence of imperfect competition these results are used to derive a method of estimating market power and conduct an application is made to the european cigarette industry previous empirical comparison of the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes is limited for a group of countries with broadly similar cigarette industries there is evidence of undershifting of both taxes with the specific tax having a significantly greater impact on price the extremes of both perfect competition and monopoly can be rejected behaviour is no less competitive than the equivalent of cournot

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

an equilibrium model of child maltreatment we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of human capital development of a child that can explain why a parent child relationship might lead to child maltreatment assuming that a parent cannot observe a child s human capital accumulation or effort and that the child s time preference develops endogenously an unstable path of the parent s beliefs regarding the child can persist in equilibrium when the parent faces a high degree of uncertainty in inferring the child s human capital the parent with an initial high estimate of the human capital then tends to underestimate the child s effort which results in persistently punitive abusive nteractions

accounting for the u s earnings and wealth inequality we show that a theory of earnings and wealth inequality based on the optimal choices of ex ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of efficiency labor units accounts for the u s earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly

rent destruction and the political viability of free trade agreements this paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements ftas the key element of the analysis is the rent destruction that these arrangements induce by eliminating intrabloc trade barriers an fta lowers the incentives of import competing industries to lobby for higher external tariffs thereby inducing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process using a conventional competitive model i show that the prospect of rent destruction can critically undermine and in some cases rule out entirely the political viability of welfarereducing ftas this result contrasts sharply with findings from the earlier regionalism literature

the effect of the canada us free trade agreement on canadian multilateral trade liberalization in this paper show that the canada us free trade agreement cusfta tariff preferences have triggered a decline in canadian external tariffs explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998 next we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the us firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in canada this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the us and canada finally we estimate the effect of the cusfta on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity resume l effet de l accord de libre echange canada u s sur la liberalisation multilaterale du commerce canadien dans ce texte on montre que les preferences tarifaires de l accord de libre echange canada us alecus ont declenche un declin dans le niveau des droits de douane externes canadiens et expliquent une reduction de deux points de pourcentage dans le tarif moyen entre 1989 et 1998 ensuite on decouvre que les industries qui generent le moins de rentes des exportations vers les etats unis font l experience de reduction de tarifs plus importante au canada ce resultat revele une cooperation dans les politiques commerciales entre canada et etats unis enfin on evalue l effet de l alecus sur l intensite du lobbying industriel a propos de la politique commerciale au canada et on decouvre qu il n existe pas de relation entre la liberation preferentielle du commerce et l intensite de l activite de lobbying

the social discount rate what discount rate should be applied to social investments it is standard to use the market interest rate thereby respecting private preferences we show that application of this revealed preference criterion rests on faith not on logic it is justified only if preferences over all choices including past choices are time invariant the conditions for this to be true are stringent under more reasonable conditions policy makers should be more patient than private citizens whose choices define the most short sighted pareto optimum

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of free trade areas we consider the impact of the formation of free trade agreements on multilateral tariff cooperation we assume that countries are limited to selfenforcing multilateral arrangements that balance the gains from deviating against the costs of an ensuing trade war we find that the emergence of free trade areas will be accompanied by a temporary retreat from liberal multilateral trade policies as the initial balance supporting multilateral cooperation is upset eventually however as the full impact of the emerging free trade agreement on multilateral trade patterns is felt this initial balance tends to reemerge and liberal multilateral trade policies can be restored

wealth varying intertemporal elasticities of substitution evidence from panel and aggregate data abstract this paper constructs and estimates a model of consumer preferences in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ies of consumption expenditure rises with the level of wealth the purpose of this paper is to measure the effect that systematic variation in the ies of poor and rich consumers has on the ies of aggregate consumption expenditure we find economically significant differences in the ies of poor and rich consumers in indian panel data on the consumption of individual households we also find economically significant differences in the ies measured in aggregate time series data for the u s and india

identifying the hand of past distinguishing state dependence from heterogeneity a basic problem in social science is to ascertain the importance of initial endowments on subsequent outcomes of a dynamic process interest in this topic centers on two distinct issues a do initial endowments have a temporally persistent effect on outcomes i e is there heterogeneity b are the effects of initial endowments attenuated or accentuated by subsequent experiences of the process being studied or by related processes i e is there state dependence these two questions show up in a variety of contexts 1 the importance of family background on a person s subsequent education and earnings is a hotly debated topic do market or nonmarket mechanisms reinforce or diminish initial endowments 2 the incidence of criminal activity is concentrated among a small population of repeated offenders are certain persons prone to criminality or does crime breed crime 3 are persons who experience unemployment more likely to experience future unemployment due to loss of work experience or market stigma 4 does early entry into an industry confer an advantage of incumbency or does it merely proxy the basic managerial and innovative ability of early entrants many formal models of state dependent processes or processes with persistent effects of initial conditions have been formulated invariance of steady states to initial endowments was viewed as a desirable feature of an economic model in the 1960 s and 1970 s path dependent synergism and nonergodicity are fashionable features of models today is the choice between models with long run dependence on initial conditions and those without solely a matter of intellectual esthetics can data discriminate between these two classes of models how many economically extraneous statistical regularity conditions have to be imposed in order to distinguish between these models how many and what kind of maintained assumptions are required in order to let the data speak on these important questions in this paper i focus on one nonergodic model that receives much attention in the literature the model of duration dependence and heterogeneity discussed by herbert silcock 1954 and also examined by tony lancaster 1979 chris elbers and geert ridder 1982 myself and burton singer 1984 and myself and bo honore 1989

the intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes recent theories endogenize the attitude endowments of individuals assuming that they are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models this paper tests empirically for the relevance of three aspects of the attitude transmission process highlighted in this theoretical literature 1 transmission of attitudes from parents to children 2 an impact of prevailing attitudes in the local environment on child attitudes and 3 positive assortative mating of parents which enhances the ability of a parent to pass on his or her attitudes to the child we focus on two fundamentally important attitudes willingness to take risks and willingness to trust others we find empirical support for all three aspects providing an empirical underpinning for the literature an investigation of underlying mechanisms shows that socialization is important in the transmission process various parental characteristics and aspects of family structure are found to strengthen the socialization process with implications for modeling the socialization production function and for policies focused on affecting children s non cognitive skills the paper also provides evidence that the transmission of risk and trust attitudes affects a wide variety of child outcomes implying a potentially large total effect on children s economic situation

the international transmission of economic fluctuations abstract this paper suggests that for a wide class of international real business cycle models including models with imperfect competition the traditional channels of international transmission of business cycles through world interest rate and terms of trade variations cannot explain the cyclical response of the canadian economy to innovations in u s output empirically testable quantitative models of the effects on canadian economic activity of shocks to the u s economy are developed and their empirical relevance is tested by comparing impulse responses estimated from vector autoregressions to the quantitative predictions of the theoretical models

are preferential trade agreements with non trade objectives a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization in many preferential trade agreements ptas countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non trade issues such as labor and environmental standards intellectual property etc we provide a model of ptas motivated by cooperation in non trade issues and analyze its implications for global free trade and welfare we find that such ptas increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade this occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in ptas and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them by explicitly modeling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model s key prediction the welfare analysis shows that the current wto rules allowing this type of ptas may be optimal for economically large countries thus the model can predict the rules we observe we also analyze alternative rules that constitute a pareto improvement

regionalism and falling external protection in high and low tariff members abstract this paper provides evidence that the reduction in applied most favoured nation mfn tariffs resulting from a decrease in preferential tariffs is restricted to or significantly larger in high tariff members of preferential trade agreements ptas this heterogeneous impact is observed only when the share of preferential imports increases leading to a decline in tariff revenue this makes countries which tend to heavily depend on tariff revenue as a source of government funding more likely to reduce their mfn tariffs which is also observed in the data these results that are consistent with a mechanism operating through trade deflection and the associated loss of tariff revenue therefore lend support to the building bloc view of regionalism in countries applying high external tariffs before the agreement in contrast driven by other factors the impact in low tariff countries remains unclear with either insignificant effects or tariff substitution

rate of time preference intertemporal elasticity of substitution and level of wealth the rate of time preference rtp and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ies are two important factors shaping intertemporal consumption decisions models in which the rtp and or the ies differ systematically between rich and poor households have different empirical and policy implications for economic development growth and the distribution of income and consumption from those of standard models in which these parameters are constant across households in this chapter we estimate a model in which both rtp and ies are allowed to differ across rich and poor households using household level panel data from india our empirical results are consistent with the view that the rtp is constant across poor and rich households but the ies is larger for the rich than it is for the poor

multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements abstract this paper examines the interaction between preferential trade agreements ptas and multilateral tariff reduction in a model of imperfect competition a growing literature finds that the formation of ptas alters the incentives for and the sustainability of multilateral tariff reduction we show that the causation is not one sided multilateral tariff reduction also affects the formation of ptas specifically tariff reduction enhances the incentives to form a pta and increases the likelihood that it is self enforcing thus each round of multilateral tariff reduction should lead to a new wave of ptas this may help to explain the current trend towards regionalism

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

should the wto require free trade agreements to eliminate internal tariffs abstract in a three country model of endogenous free trade agreements ftas we study the effects of requiring fta members to eliminate tariffs on one another as is essentially stipulated under current wto rules we explain why in the absence of such a requirement ftas members impose positive tariffs on each other even when maximizing their joint welfare we show that requiring fta members to eliminate internal tariffs induces them to lower their external tariffs such external trade liberalization by fta members undermines the prospects of global free trade since it reduces the non member s incentive to enter into trade agreements with them

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

exchanging market access at the outsiders expense the case of customs unions under a customs union countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries i show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union even if its members are relatively small in world markets such gains come however at the expense of excluded countries i show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade le cas des unions douanieres dans le cas d une union douaniere les pays peuvent marchander l acces preferentiel a un marche en coordonnant leurs tarifs externes de maniere a extraire des profits des pays exclus on montre que les rentes a l exportation qui resultent de cette coordination peuvent compenser les pertes attribuables a la diversion du commerce qui decoule de l union douaniere meme si ses membres sont relativement de petite taille dans les marches mondiaux de tels gains se font cependant aux depens des pays exclus on montre que les petits pays peuvent utiliser les unions douanieres pour stimuler la cooperation multilaterale en accroissant les incitations des pays exclus a poursuivre des strategies de libre echange global

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

costly revenue raising and the case for favoring import competing industries abstract a standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export oriented industries to attract more assistance than import competing industries in reality however trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries this paper shows how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable in a standard protection for sale framework the model is then estimated and its predictions tested using u s tariff data an empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue raising is also obtained

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

protection for sale or surge protection this paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential grossman and helpman protection for sale pfs model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting a model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges but only for organized industries is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework this suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions abstract we study the implications of customs union formation for multilateral tariff cooperation we model cooperation in multilateral trade policy as self enforcing in that it involves balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed upon trade policy against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a unilateral defection would imply the early stages of the process of customs union formation are shown to alter this dynamic incentive constraint in a way that leads to a temporary honeymoon for liberal multilateral trade policies we find however that the harmony between customs unions and multilateral liberalization is temporary eventually as the full impact of the emerging customs union becomes felt a less favorable balance between current and future conditions re emerges and the liberal multilateral policies of the honeymoon phase cannot be sustained

lifetime incidence and the distributional burden of excise taxes this implies that low income households in one year have some chance of being higher income households in other years and significantly affects the estimated distributional burden of excise taxes this paper shows that household expenditures on gasoline alcohol and tobacco as a share of total consumption a proxy for lifetime income are much more equally distributed than expenditures as a share of annual income from a longer horizon perspective excise taxes on these goods are therefore much less regressive than standard analyses suggest this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

mothers and sons preference formation and female labor force dynamics this paper argues that the growing presence of a new type of man one brought up in a family in which the mother worked has been a significant factor in the increase in female labor force participation over time we present cross sectional evidence showing that the wives of men whose mothers worked are themselves significantly more likely to work we use variation in the importance of world war ii as a shock to women s labor force participation as proxied by variation in the male draft rate across u s states to provide evidence in support of the intergenerational consequences of our propagation mechanism

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

an incentive model of the effect of parental income on children economists explain the positive relationship between parental income and children s outcomes using an investment model building on work in psychology and sociology this paper emphasizes the importance of child rearing practices which vary with income i argue that parents ability to mold their children s behavior through pecuniary incentives is limited at low incomes leading to lower outcomes and increased reliance on nonpecuniary mechanisms such as corporal punishment my model generates a positive relationship between parental income and children s outcomes especially at low incomes and endogenously produces a relationship between parental income and child rearing practices empirical work confirms these implications

economic development and time preference schedule the case of japan and east asian nics the constancy of the time preference rate has been a traditional assumption of the literature on intertemporal choice of consumers this chapter examines empirically the validity of the constancy hypothesis of the time preference schedule three alternative hypotheses concerning the time preference rate are investigated the first hypothesis posits that the time preference rate decreases as the economy develops fisher hypothesis the second hypothesis posits that the time preference rate increases as the economy develops uzawa hypothesis the third hypothesis which is a combination of the second and third hypotheses posits that as a nation develops the time preference rate decreases up to a certain point and thereafter the time preference rate increases fukao hamada hypothesis post war annual time series data from taiwan japan and korea are employed to examine these hypotheses i find that the fukao hamada hypothesis is supported for taiwan and japan while the time preference rate is constant for korea

a strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas abstract we construct a three country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas ftas affects optimal tariffs and welfare we find that at constant rest of the world row tariffs the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the kemp wan j int econom 6 1976 95 97 level and causes row s terms of trade to improve and its welfare to rise when row also behaves optimally its policy response to the formation of the fta is to raise tariffs generally fta members prefer to liberalize internal trade partially and find regional integration appealing only if their collective size is sufficiently large we also demonstrate how ftas may undermine the attainment of global free trade

inequality and social discounting we explore steady state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks when the welfare function depends only on the initial generation efficiency requires immiseration inequality grows without bound and everyone s consumption converges to zero we study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare the social discount factor is then higher than the private one and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady state cross sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists with no one trapped at misery

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

market reasoning as moral reasoning why economists should re engage with political philosophy abstract in my book what money can t buy the moral limits of markets 2012 i try to show that market values and market reasoning increasingly reach into spheres of life previously governed by nonmarket norms i argue that this tendency is troubling putting a price on every human activity erodes certain moral and civic goods worth caring about we therefore need a public debate about where markets serve the public good and where they don t belong in this article i would like to develop a related theme when it comes to deciding whether this or that good should be allocated by the market or by nonmarket principles economics is a poor guide deciding which social practices should be governed by market mechanisms requires a form of economic reasoning that is bound up with moral reasoning but mainstream economic thinking currently asserts its independence from the contested terrain of moral and political philosophy if economics is to help us decide where markets serve the public good and where they do

tough love and intergenerational altruism this chapter develops and studies a tough love model of intergenerational altruism we model tough love by modifying the barro becker standard altruism model in two ways first the child s discount factor is endogenously determined so lower childhood consumption leads to a higher discount factor later in life second the parent evaluates the child s lifetime utility with a constant high discount factor our model predicts that parental transfers will fall when the child s discount factor falls this is in contrast with the standard altruism model which predicts that parental transfers are independent of exogenous changes in the child s discount factor