applied general equilibrium models of taxation and international trade an introduction and survey we wish to acknowledge the help of three referees and of john pencavel on several earlier drafts as well as the assistance of the modelers whose work is referred to in the paper they corrected our lack of understanding of their work and provided many other helpful comments excellent research and bibliographical assistance have been provided by debbie fretz radwan shaban and janet stotsky helpful comments have been made by charles ballard michael boskin lans bovenberg sylvester damus harvey galper glenn harrison gordon lenjosek jack mutti serena ng t n srinivasan charles stuart and eric toder the authors also acknowledgefinancial support from the national bureau of economic research the national science foundation international business machines and the social sciences and humanities research council ottawa canada

crises and exchange rate regimes time to break down the bipolar view we revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes err using a panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980 2009 we find that corner err are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate err this finding holds for different types of crises banking currency and debt and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications consequently we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the err and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies

collusion and overlending i introduction for a long time have korean companies been engaged in unbridled expansionism financed through loans inefficient octopus style management and over and duplicate investment thus expediting the structural failure of the economy this failure to concentrate on profits consolidation and efficiency provided the fuse to the bankruptcy bombs that triggered the foreign exchange and economic crises the collusion between the conglomerates financial sector and politicians made this financial monopoly possible chosun ilbo december 26 1997 collusion and overlending in the korean financial sector may be best illustrated by the above editorial highlight of chosun ilbo the most read newspaper in korea its 1997 financial crisis is primarily triggered by continual bankruptcies of chaebols conglomerates which with assistance from politicians had borrowed heavily from financial institutions in financing their investment projects 1 unlike some other asian countries experiencing problems in their financial sector due to shifts in investment projects toward real estates such as japan hong kong and thailand chaebols in korea concentrated mostly on manufacturing activities 2 in this study we establish a tractable model of overlending with three key players namely chaebols financial institutions and politicians as highlighted in chosun ilbo the model is designed to achieve two primary goals that are crucial for matching some key observations during the korean turmoil first we illustrate how overlending can be an equilibrium outcome with collusion between chaebols and politicians when the economic environment is favorable this occurs despite that such a collusion distorts normal borrowing lending operation by causing a discernible shift in loan composition from more to less productive investment projects second we show that as the economic environment gradually deteriorates there can be a shift from a collusion to a no collusion equilibrium the combination of deterioration in fundamentals and expectations of an equilibrium shift can trigger economy wide financial crisis more specifically we construct a simple principal supervisor agent model of corruption and overlending the principal is the formal authority of loan decision making of a financial institution or in short the financial institution the supervisor is a politician who serves as the informational intermediary in the borrowing lending arrangement via his her connections and networking 3 the agent is a chaebol of an unknown type which seeks for external financing of a set of risky projects a politician s favorable signal about the borrowing chaebol s overall performance would grant the approval of the loan to finance an array of risky projects whose returns depend on idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be washed out in aggregation within the chaebol as an outside alternative to making the loan the financial institution can invest in the world capital market where a fixed rate of return is guaranteed this portfolio decision depends on a comparison of the expected average returns on the given set of risky projects with the safe returns on investments in the world capital market while both the chaebol s type and the state of nature are unobservable to the financial institution we for simplicity assume that politician s connections and networking can fully uncover the true type of the chaebol this valuable information possessed by the politician is one that the financial institution has an incentive to purchase but a low type chaebol has an incentive to conceal whether the politician ends up revealing truthfully this information depends on how much to obtain from the lender in terms of general support versus how much to gain from the borrower in terms of bribes or side payments when a low type chaebol has the politician on its side information is distorted and a collusion equilibrium arises

devaluation without common knowledge in an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime that suffers a random adverse shock we study the strategies of imperfectly and sequentially informed speculators that may trigger an endogenous devaluation before it occurs exogenously the game played by the speculators has a unique symmetric nash equilibrium which is a strongly rational expectation equilibrium in the set of all strategies with delay uncertainty about the extent to which the central bank is ready to defend the peg extends the ex ante mean delay between the exogenous shock and the devaluation we determine endogenously the rate of devaluation

determinacy of equilibrium in stationary economies with both finite and infinite lived consumers abstract we consider the determinacy of perfect foresight equilibrium near steady state equilibria of stationary infinite horizon economies the work of t j kehoe and d k levine econometrica 53 1985 433 453 is generalized by the inclusion of both infinite lived agents and overlapping generations of finite lived agents and the inclusion of production and non depreciating pure rents we show that indeterminacy is possible in robust examples and that the dimension of the indeterminacy can be as large as the number of goods per period we also discuss extreme cases in which determinacy is guaranteed

value added taxation in the ec after 1992 abstract this paper examines the quantitative effects of the transitional system of value added taxation for intra ec trade between 1993 and 1997 as recently adopted by the ecofin council first the administration of the current destination principle and the interim solution are described a short representation of the empirical general equilibrium model featuring seven ec regions and 14 production sectors follows finally the effects of a switch to the transitional system are evaluated by using numerical simulations the adopted provisions with regard to cross frontier sales to final consumers open tax arbitrage possibilities which favour low tax countries at the cost of their ec partners when decomposing welfare effects international tax revenue shifts prove to dominate while substitution effects have relatively little influence on economic welfare

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

seigniorage revenue deficits and self fulfilling currency crises abstract this paper examines potential resolutions to the conflict between a fixed exchange rate and seigniorage revenue requirement of a stylized developing economy that gives rise to a currency crisis the government has an informational advantage and can decide when it is optimal to invoke an escape clause i e to drop the peg and float speculators must guess when the crisis will happen based on their assessment of the probability of collapse and this makes pegged exchange rate equilibria unstable

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

measuring the cyclicality of real wages how important is the firm s point of view there is a growing consensus among economists that real wages in the postwar united states have been procyclical greatly bolstering technology driven theories of business cycles at the expense of more classical models this paper makes the point that technological movements in firm s labor demand curves should be tested with a wage that is deflated by the firm s own price of output with appropriate controls for intermediate inputs and with respect to the cyclical state of the firm s own industry as opposed to the state of the aggregate economy failure to control for these factors is found to lead to substantial overrejection of the classical model in detailed industry data with controls for changes in worker composition i find that a vast majority of sectors have paid real product wages that vary inversely that is countercyclically with the state of their industry

speculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime this paper investigates the extent to which it is possible for speculative attacks to be predictable given information on economic fundamentals a standard model of predictable attacks is extended to incorporate an optimizing monetary authority it is shown that while incorporating a forward looking monetary authority improves our understanding of many observed phenomena it also implies that the branch of the literature that places emphasis on predictable movements in fundamentals cannot generate predictable speculative attacks in addition the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies and a theoretical foundation for an important empirical methodology

discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises the flrst generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that in the absence of very large triggering shocks currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations this paper shows that these features of flrst generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information in particular this paper analyzes a generalization of the krugman flood garber kfg model which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals in this environment the kfg equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria in all the other equilibria the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

shadow rates and multiple equilibria in the theory of currency crises abstract this note generalizes to second generation models of currency crises the arbitrage based approach first applied by flood and garber to first generation models deriving policy switching rules based on the shadow exchange rate facilitates the comparative analysis of the literature using the shadow rate we provide and discuss an example of a common mechanism generating multiple equilibria in both first and second generation models

delaying the inevitable interest rate defense and balance of payments crises the classical model of balance of payments crises implicitly assumes that the central bank sits passively as international reserves dwindle in practice however central banks typically defend pegs aggressively by raising short term interest rates this paper analyzes the feasibility and optimality of raising interest rates to delay a potential bop crisis interest rate policy works through two distinct channels by raising demand for domestic interest bearing liquid assets higher interest rates tend to delay the crisis higher interest rates however increase public debt service and imply higher future inflation which tends to bring forward the crisis we show that under certain conditions it is feasible to delay the crisis but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually hasten the crisis a similar nonmonotonic relationship emerges between welfare and the increase in interest rates it is thus optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense but only up to a certain point i

distributional effects of crises the financial channel financial crises affect income distribution via different channels we argue that financial transfers is an important channel which has been overlooked by the literature by analyzing data from the mexican 1994 1995 and argentine 2001 2002 crises we investigate two types of financial transfers first we study transfers to the financial sector going from non participants to participants of the financial sector second we explore transfers within the financial sector which are transfers among participants of the financial sector as those from small to large and foreign depositors our analysis suggests that financial transfers increase income inequality

productivity capital and labor in labor managed and conventional firms an investigation on french data using two new data sets from france the authors present the first study of the comparative productivity of labor managed and conventional firms involving large representative samples of firms in a

the behavior of worker cooperatives the plywood companies of the pacific northwest using data collected by the authors on the largest and most durable of worker owned firms in u s manufacturing this paper is addressed to two questions first are the responses of cooperatives to changes in their economic environment different from those of conventional firms it appears that cooperatives are more inclined to adjust pay than employment second how profitable has membership in the cooperatives been using information on share prices the authors find membership to have been extremely profitable and in this sense the prices of co ops shares have been underpriced the riskiness of cooperative memberships is discussed copyright 1992 by american economic association

whose preferences are revealed in hours of work it has become orthodox in economics research to interpret the association between hourly earnings and working hours as the expression of the preferences of workers this convention originated in h gregg lewis explanation for the decline in hours of work since the nineteenth century his explanation rested on an explicit resolution of the identification problem inherent in any quantity hours price wage relation for over 40 years researchers have neglected this identification problem with the result that the findings in the purported labor supply literature are of questionable value jel j22 j23 c13

wages employment and capital in capitalist and worker owned firms the authors investigate how worker owned and capitalist enterprises differ with respect to wages employment and capital in italy the market economy with the greatest incidence of worker owned and worker managed firms estimates calculated using a matched employer worker panel data set for the years 1982 94 largely corroborate the implications of orthodox behavioral models of the two types of enterprise co ops had 14 lower wages than capitalist enterprises on average more volatile wages and less volatile employment given the quality of the data set analyzed the authors argue these results can be regarded as having broad generality

comparative statics and perfect foresight in infinite horizon economies does a pure exchange economy with an infinite time horizon have determinate perfect foresight equilibria when there is a finite number of infinitely lived agents equilibria are generically determinate this is not true with overlapping generations of finitely lived agents we ask whether the initial conditions together with the requirement of convergence to a steady state locally determine an equilibrium price path in this framework there are many economies with isolated equilibria many with continua of equilibria and many with no equilibria at all with two or more goods in every period not only can the price level be indeterminate but relative prices as well furthermore such indeterminacy can occur whether or not there is fiat money and whether or not the equilibria are pareto efficient this paper considers whether infinite horizon economies have determinate perfect foresight equilibria this question is of crucial importance if instead equilibria are locally indeterminate not only are we unable to make comparative static predictions but the agents in the model are unable to determine the consequences of unanticipated shocks the idea underlying perfect foresight is that agents expectations should be the actual future sequence predicted by the model if the model does not make determinate predictions the concept of perfect foresight is meaningless we consider two extreme cases the first with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers and the second with an infinite number of finitely lived consumers an overlapping generations model both are models of stationary pure exchange economies no production including the storage of goods between periods can occur these models are unrealistic but are the easiest to study extensions of the results of this paper to models with production infinitely lived assets and mixtures of the two types of consumers are presented by muller and woodford 29 when there is a finite number of infinitely lived consumers we argue that equilibria are generically determinate this is because the effective number of equations determining equilibria is not infinite but equal to the number of agents minus one and must determine the marginal utility of income for all but one agent generically near an equilibrium these equations are independent and exactly determine the unknowns when there are infinitely many overlapping generations this reasoning breaks down an infinite number of equations is not necessarily sufficient to determine

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

disinflation and fiscal reform a neoclassical perspective abstract many latin american countries engaged in disinflation programs based on both exchange rate management and fiscal reforms in most of the cases part of the fiscal reform was not implemented and the program had to be abandoned the aftermath of these programs is not encouraging in this paper we show that if the reform process is uncertain and inflation has welfare costs the optimal exchange rate policy indeed implies the initiation of a disinflation program at the announcement of the fiscal reform even if it implies the possibility of a balance of payments crisis finally we show that it is optimal to engage in a sequence of stabilization programs until one of them is successful

entry strategies of partnerships versus conventional firms from 1997 to 2001 the number of nonemployer businesses mostly partnerships grew faster than conventional firms in the united states a country with the mildest asymmetries between the two types of enterprises with respect to taxation administrative entry barriers and other institutional aspects partnerships are smaller than conventional firms and their different speeds of net entry could be the result of internal organization that makes them swifter and better equipped to be fast growing industries in a continuous time stochastic environment with sunk costs we model entry as a growth option partnerships and conventional firms display specific patterns in terms of output price and size in that they appear to react in diverse fashions to market uncertainty in most cases the partnership is less risky and better suited to enter under conditions of high volatility as between 1997 and 2001 in the united states

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

labor management bargaining contract curves and slutsky equations consider a firm in which labor and management bargain over division of the firm s organizational rent and negotiate the firm s policy i emphasize the relationship between the bargainer s contract curve and the firm s slutsky equations i can describe a bargaining firm as a hybrid of a neoclassical profit maximizing firm and a pure labor managed firm i apply the methodology to models of employment contracts and identify three separate circumstances in which labor s bargaining power affects the firm s comparative static behavior first there is inefficiency in contractual bargaining second income effects in the worker s utility function interact with the firm s capital cost burden third labor s interest in long term utility maximization need not coincide with management s interest in profit maximization this last case arises from the incompleteness of the market for property rights in the firm

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

the limits of equality insights from the israeli kibbutz what limits the capacity of society to redistribute what determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality this paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the israeli kibbutzim communities based on the principle of income equality to do this i exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially the main findings are that 1 productive individuals are the most likely to exit and a kibbutz s wealth serves as a lock in device that increases the value of staying 2 higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality and 3 ideology facilitates income equality using a simple model i show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving more generally these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations such as professional partnerships cooperatives and labor managed firms

exemption versus zero rating a hidden problem of vat abstract we examine the difference between exemptions and zero rating under a consumption based vat in a numerical general equilibrium model to allow for a better understanding of the accruing efficiency effects we first develop a method to convert the nominal vat rates into effective tax rates on categories of final demand then we show how these effective tax rates can be used to perform a gradual transition from exemption to zero rating

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

rational and self fulfilling balance of payments crises speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities suchattacks are fully rational as they reflect the market s response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable the authors shows that under someexpectations about policy balance of payments crises can also be purely self fulfilling events in such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis the behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack copyright 1986 by american economic association

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

a general equilibrium analysis of the 1986 tax reform in spain spain s recent entry into the european economic community eec has been accompanied by a number of economic reforms needed to comply with requirements imposed on a11 member countries a key ingredient of these reforms has been the introduction on i january 1986 of a vaiue added tax vat on consumption as a substitute for a complex range of indirect taxes including a turnover tax applied at every stage of the production process the fiscal reform has posed a number of interesting policy questions for instance one common criticism of the new tax system is that its rates have been chosen too high and will further depress the economy whose oflicial unemployment rate was 22 in 1985 government officials are very concerned however with the effect of the new tax system on public revenues and in turn on the substantial deficit of the public sector which was 8 of gdp in 1985 another current debate centers on whether the new tax system has a detrimental impact on the capital labor ratio due to the retention of social security taxes which are taxes on the use of labor in this paper we use an applied general equilibrium model of the spanish economy to analyze the impacts of the indirect tax reform on relative prices resource allocation and income distribution using the information contained in the social accounting matrix constructed by kehoe et al 1985 in the next section we describe the model placing emphasis on its novel features in

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

an interest rate defense of a fixed exchange rate defending a government s exchange rate commitment with active interest rate policy is not an option in first generation models of speculative attacks in those models the interest rate is the passive reflection of currency depreciation expectations in this paper we show how to adapt the first generation framework to allow for an interest rate defense it is shown that increasing domestic currency interest rate before the attack makes domestic assets more attractive according to an asset substitution effect but weakens the domestic currency by increasing the government s fiscal liabilities as a result an interest rate defense can be successful only conditional on sound fiscal policy

the international monetary system forty years after bretton woods review essay in may 1984 a distinguished group of central bankers and economists gathered for a conference at bretton woods to consider the evolution of the world monetary system that was born at that location forty years earlier this volume contains nine essays with accompanying discussion on issues of performance and reform of current international monetary arrangements these papers deal with problems facing the industrialized and the lessdeveloped countries and assess the institutions that have been set up to accommodate these problems the major accomplishments of the original bretton woods conference were of course the establishment of the system of payments based on fixed exchange rates and the organization of the world bank and the international monetary fund as the order developed in the late 40 s and early 50 s each central bank saw it as its duty to intervene in foreign exchange markets to ensure an essentially fixed parity of their currency with respect to the dollar the role of the u s was to guarantee the dollar price of gold at 35 an ounce the system has been called a dollar standard because the dollar played the role of a reserve currency one of the paradoxes of the system as robert triffin pointed out in the early 60 s is that in order to produce a continuing and rapid enough expansion of world reserves the u s had to run balance of payments deficits yet continued deficits by the u s threatened the convertibility of the dollar into gold as it happened the system of fixed parities broke down in the early 70 s not because of a lack of reserves but because a glut of dollars made the bretton woods dollar exchange rates untenable the system eventually evolved into one in which most of the industrialized countries currencies more or less are determined by the market while the currencies of most second and third world countries are pegged to a major currency the floating period has been

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

dynamic speculative attacks this paper presents a model of rational bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks various defense policies are analyzed a trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market s information for the coordination of speculators

the empirical performance of orthodox models of the firm conventional firms and worker cooperatives though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find we collected observations on two types of firms conventional proprietorships and worker owned cooperatives operating in the same industry in the same location and at the same period of time we compare the firms reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization

stabilization with exchange rate management stabilization programs in open economies typically consist of two stages in the first stage the rate of currency devaluation is reduced but the fiscal adjustment does not eliminate the fiscal deficit that causes growth of debt and loss of reserves making a future policy change necessary only later at a second stage is this followed by either an abandonment of exchange rate management or by a sufficiently large cut in the fiscal deficit we study how different second stage policy changes affect economic dynamics during the first stage these changes include tax increases budget cuts on traded and nontraded goods and increases in the growth rate of money

the recent growth of international reserves in developing economies a monetary perspective abstract the massive accumulation of international reserves in developing economies is a puzzling recent development in the world economy this paper studies reserve accumulation as the outcome of a simple model in which the central bank smooths inflation i explore the view that central banks accumulate reserves to face large fiscal shocks that need monetary financing central bank revenues are obtained through inflation but inflation is distortionary as a result the central bank optimally accumulates international reserves in order to spread the costs associated with inflation over time a simple numerical exercise for an average developing economy using data between 1970 and 2009 yields fast growth of international reserves

dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions abstract this paper presents a dynamic model of currency crises with frictions by construction a speculative attack is not an instantaneous event but takes a little time to deplete the country s reserves and in the event of an attack agents are uncertain about whether they will be able to act before the devaluation comes the currency will be overvalued ripe for attack for a long time before an attack takes place a discrete and sizable devaluation will occur small changes in fundamentals may trigger an attack the model brings insights about the dynamics of currency crises and the effects of some key policy variables

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis