fishing effort its testing specification and internal structure in fisheries economics and management abstract the concept of fishing effort is central to fisheries economics and management however effort is an aggregate index of inputs which can be consistently formed only under the condition on production technology of homothetic separability of inputs this paper develops the conditions under which effort can be consistently formed it then provides the first empirical test for effort and jointness in inputs in a fishery by estimating a multiproduct function for the new england otter trawl fleet after not rejecting input output separability and rejecting nonjointness in inputs the construction of a superlative index for effort is demonstrated through estimating a translog production function the implications of effort s internal structure for fisheries management are then considered

triple win for trade in renewable resource goods by use of export taxes abstract we challenge the free trade paradigm in particular for developing countries exporting natural resource goods by demonstrating positive economic and environmental effects of an export tax for renewable resource goods the two sector general equilibrium model designed has an open access renewable resource industry and a manufacturing industry the economic environmental and social effects of using an export tax on goods from the open access renewable resource industry are analysed it is demonstrated that the gross domestic product the steady state resource stock and the domestic consumption of both products increase with the resource export tax compared to free trade with no trade taxes

lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

strikes and political activism of trade unions theory and application to bangladesh the behavior of bangladeshi trade unions is characterized bypolitical activism and momentous strikes called hartalsthere have played a crucial part in most political changes inthis country we offer a theoretical framework for discussingthis fact and we test empirically its main prediction bybringing out the political cycle that characterizes theoccurrence of strikes in bangladesh

renewable resource economists and policy what differences have we made abstract this paper surveys developments in fisheries economics and fisheries policy over the past half century early work clarified the nature of the economic issues associated with open access laying the groundwork for changes in policies after coastal nations expanded their jurisdictions in 1976 perhaps the most important point made by economists is that property rights matter and that open access conditions create economic as well as biological problems the policy process has begun to create property rights systems although many of the world s fisheries still operate under mixed systems of regulations and open access incentives

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

public employment decline in developing countries in the 21st century the role of globalization abstract does globalization increases or decreases the size of government compensation versus efficiency hypothesis the debate is re visited with innovative bureaucracy and globalization indicators using panel data for the unexplored period 2000 2016 robust evidence suggests that global competition reduces public employment

auctions or grandfathering the political economy of tradable emission permits despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits we still observe that a hybrid policy in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions is adopted in some cases we also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits this paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering auctions or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy by constructing a two stage lobbying game in which the type of policy instrument auction grandfathering or a hybrid instrument is determined in the first stage and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups

illegal landings an aggregate catch self reporting mechanism to solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator s own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self reports of planned catch by fishermen we show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring nearly optimal exploitation and generating nearly correct entry and exit incentives finally we simulate the mechanism for the danish cod fishery in kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax it turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low

damned if you do and damned if you don t two masters abstract we study common agency problems in which two principals groups make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent s action our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments for our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium which typically involves randomization by both principals greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition the principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards sometimes strictly with rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals we study whether introducing an attractive compromise reduces competition between principals our framework of imperfect monitoring offers a natural perturbation of the standard common agency model of menu auctions which results in sharper equilibrium predictions the limit equilibrium prediction provides support to both truthful equilibria and the competing notion of natural equilibria which unlike the former may be inefficient

putting foxes in charge of the hen house the political economy of harvest quota regulations this paper considers a dynamic common agency model of natural resource harvest quota regulation in which both conservationists and harvesters vie to influence the regulator s quota allocations as well as the choice of regulator conservationists tend to benefit from the adoption of regulation since the regulator will reduce the aggregate harvest quota relative to the unregulated equilibrium harvesters however only support the adoption of regulation if the regulator places sufficient weight on their welfare because harvester s support of regulation is conditional while conservationist s support of regulation is unconditional harvester s interests tend to be over represented in the truthful markov perfect equilibrium

unions rent creators or extractors this paper proposes a model of workplace specific unions that integrates two views of what unions do one view holds that unions mainly engage in rent extraction another view holds that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity we demonstrate that the choice between the two activities is systematically related to the economic and regulatory environment in which the union operates product market competition encourages rent creation while labor market deregulation encourages rent extraction moreover we provide a rationale for why firms may want to subsidize unions the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics 2005

does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets empirical evidence from oecd countries this paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in oecd countries i analyze a dataset of non manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy transport and communication industries in 21 oecd countries over the 1980 2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology the results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process market oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy transport and communication industries this finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order

renewable resources and the gains from trade the brander taylor small open economy model of trade in a renewable resource and other goods is modified to allow for diminishing returns in the other goods sector it is shown that opening up for trade may result in steady state gains from trade even when there is open access to the resource and the country does not specialize fully in resource extraction it is also shown that transition to optimal management with price taking behaviour may result in a welfare loss resources renouvelables et gains en provenance du commerce international l auteur modifie le modele brander taylor de commerce international d une ressource renouvelable et d autres biens dans le cas d une petite economie ouverte afin de tenir compte des rendements decroissants dans le secteur des autres biens on montre que i ouverture au commerce international peut entrainer des gains en provenance de l echange international en regime permanent et ce meme quand l acces a la ressource est ouvert et que le pays ne se specialise pas dans l extraction de la ressource on montre que dans la periode de transition vers un management optimal quand il y a ajustement aux prix de marche il peut y avoir perte de bien etre

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

production quota in multiproduct pacific fisheries abstract assessing the individual firm s technology and costs in a multispecies fishery allows design of a more effective output quota prior to regulation by anticipating and controlling for the firm s regulation induced responses an empirical study of a pacific coast trawl fishery indicates that the firm s flexibility of product decision is tightly constrained by its technology and cost structure hence as the resource stock for the regulated species sablefish deteriorates and the trip quota progressively tightens the firm cannot sufficiently reorganize its product bundle to preclude increasingly large sablefish disposal this defeats the purpose of the production quota

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

an empirical model of fishery dynamics abstract the multiple cohort approach to population dynamics is seldom used for empirical analysis of catch and effort data due to the complexity of the resulting models and to limitations on available data the present paper addresses these problems by adopting a discrete time framework and simplifying assumptions for growth mortality and recruitment the result is a readily estimated econometric model of the commercial catch that is consistent with the multiple cohort paradigm this model is applied to catch and effort data for the california abalone fishery and the estimates obtained are used to analyze policy

private aquaculture and commercial fisheries bioeconomics of salmon ranching abstract this paper shows that common property problems associated with open access salmon ranching in the absence of a commercial fishery result in inefficiency characterized by overstocking the presence of an open access fishery presents additional common property problems which will inhibit the development of fish ranching at prices where salmon ranching does occur the open access commercial fishery will tend to overexploit the natural fish stock to a greater extent than if there were no salmon ranching it is shown that there exists a range of prices where both fish stocks can coexist with open access however there is a limit price above which the natural stock will be driven to extinction through overfishing stimulated by stock from salmon ranchers the range of prices under which both species can coexist can be increased through either restrictions of fishery effort or reducing the catchability of aquacultured stock cooperative management of both aquaculture and commercial fishing results in profits from both activities and will not cause extinction of the natural fish stock

determinants of the increase in the number of interest groups in western democracies theoretical considerations and evidence from 21 oecd countries mancur olson s theory of institutionalsclerosis is based on the notion that thenumber of interest groups within a countryincreases with the duration of itspolitical stability the following paperargues that the increase in the number ofinterest groups over time could also be aconcomitant of economic development theoretically both explanations provetenable an empirical cross sectionalregression analysis using data from 21oecd countries finds no evidence for asignificant impact of the duration ofpolitical stability on the number ofinterest groups a significantly positiveeffect is however reported for the degreeof economic development

the evidence on globalisation globalisation is blamed for many socioeconomic shortcomings i discuss the consequences of globalisation by surveying the empirical globalisation literature my focus is on the kof indices of globalisation that have been used in more than 100 studies early studies using the kof index reported correlations between globalisation and several outcome variables studies published more recently identify causal effects the evidence shows that globalisation has spurred economic growth promoted gender equality and improved human rights moreover globalisation did not erode welfare state activities did not have any significant effect on labour market interaction and hardly influenced market deregulation it increased however within country income inequality the consequences of globalisation thus turn out to be overall much more favourable than often conjectured in the public discourse

instrument choice in a fishery abstract this paper considers the choice of regulatory instruments in a fishery fishing captains consumers and input suppliers each attempt to influence the regulator s choice of instruments the regulator chooses among instruments such as input restrictions entry restrictions or individual transferable quotas itqs regulatory instruments that result in zero fishery rents can only occur if the regulator places an extraordinary weight on the welfare of input suppliers relative to fishing captains and consumers indeed heterogeneity of fishing captains is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain regulations that fail to generate fishery rents

optimal harvesting of ecologically interdependent fish species abstract the optimal exploitation of a two species predator prey system is considered using lotka volterra type equations due to the density dependence of ecological efficiency both species should be harvested simultaneously over a range of relative prices beyond the limits of this price range either the prey species should be utilized indirectly by harvesting the predator or the predator should be eliminated to maximize the prey yield neglecting harvesting costs the simultaneous harvest of prey and predators requires that a unit of prey biomass increase in value by being processed by predators certain results from single species fishery models are shown not to apply to multispecies models these are as follows i optimal regulation of a free access fishery may call for subsidizing instead of taxing the harvest of predator species ii increasing the discount rate may at moderate levels imply that the optimal standing stock of biomass increases instead of decreasing iii a rising price or a falling cost per unit fishing effort of a species may raise and not lower the optimal standing stock of that species

effects of regulations on expected catch expected harvest and site choice of recreational anglers the use of public lands and waterways is often subject to environmental regulations designed to limit the depletion of resource stocks such regulations may influence expectations of quality destination choice and consumer surplus this paper examines the effects of environmental regulations on recreational anglers the empirical application develops a joint model of expected catch and expected harvest in conjunction with a random utility model of site choice findings for maine anglers indicate that regulations have sizable effects on catch and harvest site choice and welfare

a model of regulated open access resource use abstract this paper develops a model of regulated open access resource exploitation the regulatory model assumes that regulators are goal oriented choosing target harvest levels according to a safe stock concept these harvest quotas are implemented by setting season lengths conditioned on the industry fishing capacity the industry enters until rents are dissipated conditioned on season length regulations harvest levels fishing capacity season length and biomass are determined jointly using parameter estimates from the long regulated north pacific halibut fishery predictions of these variables from the regulated open access model are compared to predictions that arise from the gordon model

trade liberalisation resource sustainability and welfare the case of east baltic cod abstract recent research has warned that liberalising trade in capture fish products originating from inefficiently managed fisheries might cause over exploitation reduced fish stocks and thereby a reduced steady state of welfare this paper qualifies the warning in a case study of the east baltic cod market by developing an age structured bio economic supply model combined with basic theory of trade between two countries welfare effects of trade liberalisation are identified taking fishing quotas input limitations mesh size regulations and shared ownership of stocks into account it is shown that although liberalising trade in products supplied by such a fishery might cause steady state welfare reductions in the supplier countries these welfare reductions are small compared to the welfare gains from a hypothetical change to optimal management hence the introduction of better fisheries management is much more important than trying to meet potential negative consequences of trade liberalisation since even small improvements in fisheries management may offset the negative effects of trade liberalisation

bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a patchy environment abstract this paper presents a model of renewable resource exploitation that incorporates both intertemporal dynamics and spatial movement the model combines the h s gordon vernon smith hypothesis of a rent dissipation process with ricardian notions that resources are exploited across space in a pattern dependent upon relative profitabilities the population structure is characterized in a manner consistent with modern biological ideas that stress patchiness heterogeneity and interconnections among and between patches generally we find the equilibrium patterns of biomass and effort across the system to be dependent upon bioeconomic conditions within each patch and the nature of the biological dispersal mechanism between patches we use simple examples to illustrate how the distribution of effort throughout the system reflects the heterogeneity and the spatial biological linkages

the optimal export tax for a primary commodity in a vertical market the conventional formula for the optimal export tax derived from a partial equilibrium model that ignores importers welfare is extended to include the deadweight loss to the domestic economy associated with the tax applying the extended formula to the tax russia imposes on its exports of logs results suggest ignoring the marketing channel causes the optimal export tax for a primary commodity to be understated the degree of understatement increases as the supply of logs and processing marketing inputs become less price elastic and as buyer and seller power in the downstream lumber industry increases for plausible values of model parameters however the degree of understatement is modest less than 19

prices versus quantities in fisheries models comment jensen and vestergaard 2003 compare price regulation with quantity regulation under economic uncertainty in the spirit of weitzman 1974 for a schooling fishery without search cost they find that price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation when demand for fish is elastic however this finding is based on an assumption that does not hold and in fact quantity regulation is always preferred for this type of fishery irrespective of the demand elasticity in this note we show that a pro quota result always applies for a schooling fishery without search costs

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

estimating the elasticity of substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs in a regulated fishery a probit approach abstract catch effort vessel and skipper characteristic data for a sample of boats involved in the tasmanian rock lobster fishery in the 1983 1984 season are used to estimate a fishing effort production function nested in a cobb douglas fishery production function the initial effort function is translog but tests suggest that the ces form cannot be rejected the vessel s choice of fishing ground is modeled by a probit equation the output from which is included in the ols estimation of the production function the elasticity of substitution between the inputs which are restricted by regulation and the other inputs is of particular interest as it determines whether input restriction is an efficient form of regulation for the fishery the results suggest a value significantly less than unity

production and investment in natural resource industries there has been a recent tendency for economists to view natural resource scarcity as a diminishing threat to man s existence and his ability to produce an abundant supply of worldly goods see john v krutilla this change in view has emanated from the world s experience of the last few decades with technological development and the absence of any evidence that this rapid accumulation of technical knowledge will cease in some respects one might think that modern technology has removed the need for an economic theory of conservation temporal allocation of natural resources on the other hand conservation of natural resources can now be looked upon with less emotion since the dire consequences of too rapid exploitation are no longer a threat the question of conservation is thus a cold economic problem removed from many of its older value connotations there is indeed considerable effort taking place in the economics profession to fill this need for a quantitative economic theory of conservation however with one exception vernon smith focus has been limited to specific resources earlier works by lewis c gray and harold hotelling concerning the theory of the mine have recently been extended in numerous papers see r cummings and 0 burt richard l gordon anthony scott 1967 problems associated with petroleum production are considered in paul davidson and the fishery is considered in j a crutchfield and arnold zellner h scott gordon james quirk and vernon smith anthony scott 1955 and ralph turvey an extensive literature exists on the temporal allocation of groundwater two recent contributions are gardner brown and charles b mcguire and burt a logical problem has been encountered however in efforts to examine the optimum allocation of a natural resource over time without explicitly considering the rate of investment associated with resource use this difficulty stems from the long life of many capital items used in the process of exploiting the natural resource earlier studies have either tacitly or explicitly amortized costs of investment associated with resource use and proceeded as though all costs of production were essentially variable smith was the first to explicitly bring capital investment into a production model for natural resources and his work was followed by the authors where only exhaustible resources were considered more recently quirk and smith have introduced a dynamic model of the fishery in which capital investment is treated explicitly it seems then that there is a need for a comprehensive model for simultaneously optimizing the rate of resource use and investment in natural resource industries

the compleat fish wars biological and dynamic interactions abstract in this article we study an example of a fishery in which there are two agents each harvesting two species of fish there are two externalities in the model the dynamic externality studied in levhari and mirman 1980 and the biological externality examined in fischer and mirman 1992 this model allows us to study the interactions between agents in a model in which the species of fish interact we find the unique closed loop nash equilibrium in the context of a differential game and we compare the resulting catch ratios to the results of the earlier papers which allow for only one externality we also study the efficiency of the solution

the size and composition of government expenditure abstract this paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure the purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude using government financial statistics data from the imf covering over 100 countries from 1970 2000 i look at cross sectional and inter temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure such as defense education health care and different levels of government central and local among other results i find a new explanation for wagner s law widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

a metapopulation model with private property and a common pool abstract a metapopulation illustrated by barnacles has a spatial distribution and a two stage life cycle in the model developed here space limits expansion introducing a profitable harvest activity of adults leads to harvest at only one site a solution driven by biological increasing returns the model is of interdisciplinary interest because the natural resource has common property characteristics in its larval stage but a private property character in its adult stage the model permits economic valuation of lost habitat

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

lobbying for minimum wages using a common agency lobbying framework this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced through lobbying to change the minimum wage specifically when the labor demand elasticity is large lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology however the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business friendly government to increase the minimum wage empirical analysis on a panel data for ten canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions the real minimum wage decreases in skill adjusted union density and political ideology while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying jel j38 d72 d78

employment effects of product and labour market reforms are there synergies this article investigates the effect of product market liberalisation on employment allowing for interactions between policies and institutions in product and labour markets using panel data for oecd countries over the period 1980 2002 we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labour market regulation is high the data also suggest that product market liberalisation may promote employment enhancing labour market reforms

strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities abstract this paper considers enhancement of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities by enhancement we refer to investments which affect the costs and benefits of controlling fish harvest rates or pollution emission levels in a two country two period model it is shown that enhancement may be used strategically to influence the behavior of rival governments and that the strategic effect may either offset or reinforce the standard free rider problem associated with such investment in some cases countries may have an incentive to invest in environmental destruction i e negative enhancement if policies are not coordinated internationally

inefficient equilibria in lobbying lobbying is often represented as a common agency game common agency games typically have multiple equilibria one class of equilibria called truthful has been identified by bernheim and whinston quarterly journal of economics 1986 101 1 1 31 in this paper we identify another class of equilibria which we call natural in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative the alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65 of the matches while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5 of the matches 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

discrete modelling of supply response under uncertainty the case of the fishery abstract in the absence of complete control in a regulated industry effective management requires prediction of firms behavioral responses to public policy this paper develops a discrete choice model of supply response under uncertainty and applies it to fishery choice problems of new england fishing firms while fishermen demonstrate a bias towards remaining within the same fishery sufficient incentives in terms of changes in expected returns and risk are shown to elicit response due to extreme uncertainty concerning population dynamics of fish stocks a satisficing approach to management facilitated by this type of modelling may be more appropriate than bioeconomic optimization

property rights renewable resources and economic development this paper analyzes the role of endogenous property rights in the development of an open resource based economy i incorporate renewable resources and endogenous decisions on property rights into a convex growth model with the formal and informal sectors i find that along the transition path to steady state property rights enforcement is not constant but improves with time as well as involves intermediate property rights specification between open access and perfect property rights international trade and labor market are driving these endogenous changes property rights improve with favorable terms of trade when the economy exports resource services and stronger property rights help maintain the resource stock by deterring illegal harvest this pushes labor away from the informal harvest sector toward greater participation in the formal sector of the economy in turn more labor participation in the formal sector along with capital formation increase the country s output and consumption overall with an open economy and well functioning institutions renewable resources have a positive impact on economic growth

inter country distancing globalisation and the coronavirus pandemic originating in china the coronavirus has reached the world at different speeds and levels of strength this paper provides an initial understanding of some driving factors and their consequences since transmission requires people the human factor behind globalization is essential globalization a major force behind global wellbeing and equality is highly associated with this factor the analysis investigates the impact globalization has on the speed of initial transmission to a country and on the scale of initial infections in the context of other driving factors our cross country analysis finds that measures of globalization are positively related to the spread of the virus both in speed and scale however the study also finds that globalized countries are better equipped to keep fatality rates low the conclusion is not to reduce globalization to avoid pandemics but to better monitor the human factor at the outbreak and mobilize collaboration forces to curtail diseases

conflict and cooperation the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency abstract this paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by b d bernheim and m d whinston 1986 quart j econ 101 1 31 by common agency we mean the following an agent decides upon an action which affects its well being as well as the well being of n other individuals the principals each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen under complete information bernheim and whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of nash equilibria they call truthful provide arguments in defense of this refinement and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs this paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent by focusing on complete information we are in a position to evaluate the effects of competition per se on the magnitude of the rent obtained by the agent we illustrate this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions competition for an input economic influence and private production of public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72