asset transformation and the challenges to servitize a utility business model abstract the traditional energy utility business model is under pressure and energy services are expected to play an important role for the energy transition experts and scholars argue that utilities need to innovate their business models and transform from commodity suppliers to service providers the transition from a product oriented capital intensive business model based on tangible assets towards a service oriented expense intensive business model based on intangible assets may present great managerial and organizational challenges little research exists about such transitions for capital intensive commodity providers and particularly energy utilities where the challenges to servitize are expected to be greatest this qualitative paper explores the barriers to servitization within selected swiss and german utility companies through a series of interviews with utility managers one of them is asset transformation the shift from tangible to intangible assets as major input factor for the value proposition which is proposed as a driver for the complexity of business model transitions managers need to carefully manage those challenges and find ways to operate both new service and established utility business models aside policy makers can support the transition of utilities through more favorable regulatory frameworks for energy services and by supporting the exchange of knowledge in the industry

war peace and the size of countries this paper studies the relationship between international con ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and non peaceful confrontations are possible we show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood bene ts and costs of con ict and war we also study the role of international law and show how better de ned international property rights may lead to country breakup and more numerous local con icts

truth effort and the legal battle in lawsuits relative success depends upon two main factors the true degree of fault and the efforts invested on eachside a proposed litigation success function displays thisdependence while satisfying other essential properties undertwo different protocols nash cournot and stackelberg solutions are obtained for the litigation efforts proportionate success and values of the lawsuit on each side outcomes are evaluated in terms of two normative criteria i achieving justice interpreted as equality between defendantfault and relative plaintiff success and ii minimizingaggregate litigation cost achievement of these aims isdetermined by the decisiveness of litigation effort relativeto true fault

the co evolutionary relationship between energy service companies and the uk energy system implications for a low carbon transition abstract the energy service company esco business model is designed to reward businesses by satisfying consumers energy needs at less cost and with fewer carbon emissions via energy demand management and or sustainable supply measures in contrast the revenue of the incumbent energy utility company euco model is coupled with the sale of units of energy which are predominantly sourced from fossil fuels the latter is currently dominant in the uk this paper addresses two questions first why has the esco model traditionally been confined to niche applications second what role is the esco model likely to play in the transition to a low carbon uk energy system to answer these the paper examines the core characteristics of the esco model relative to the euco model the paper then examines how escos have co evolved with the various dimensions of the energy system i e ecosystems institutions user practices technologies and business models to provide insight into how escos might help to shape the future uk energy system we suggest that institutional and technological changes within the uk energy system could result in a more favourable selection environment for escos consequently enabling the esco model to proliferate at the expense of the euco model

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

world wide non mandatory involvement of electricity utilities in the promotion of energy efficiency and the portuguese experience abstract the interest in the promotion of energy efficiency by utilities at the demand side started in the seventies caused by the high prices of oil and suffered a drastic set back during the restructuring of the electricity sector however growing awareness on the positive effects of energy efficiency on the economy and on the environment led many countries jurisdictions to impose utilities engagement in the promotion of energy efficiency in other countries jurisdictions utilities encourage their customers to improve energy efficiency on a non mandatory basis in this paper the non mandatory involvement of electric utilities in the promotion of energy efficiency at the demand side is addressed some world wide examples are given detailing the portuguese experience although this participation is important it seems that countries jurisdictions with regulatory impositions obtain more satisfying results

conditional cash transfers civil conflict and insurgent influence experimental evidence from the philippines abstract conditional cash transfer cct programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict affected areas despite their growing popularity there is limited evidence on how cct programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous we estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a cct program at the village level we find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages in the first 9 months of the program using unique data on local insurgent influence we also find that the program reduced insurgent influence in treated villages an analysis of possible spillovers yields inconclusive results while we find no statistical evidence of spillovers we also cannot rule out that the village level effect was due to displacement of insurgent activity from treatment to control villages

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

on the emergence of a classic work a short history of the impact of gordon tullock s welfare costs of tariffs monopolies and theft gordon tullock s welfare costs of tariffs monopolies and theft is by now widely regarded to be a classic work in public choice however like many classic papers it was not always so highly regarded it was rejected at several journals before finding its way to print and arguably took two or three decades to be fully appreciated this paper discusses developments in the public choice and rent seeking literatures that helped bring tullock s paper to its status as a classic work in political economy

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

vulnerable trade the dark side of an edgeworth box abstract we examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an edgeworth box economy appropriation possibilities generate equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price wedge wherein the effective relative price is lowered for the exporter and raised for the importer as the vulnerability of one or both goods increases the price wedge widens causing trade to diminish if vulnerability becomes sufficiently high then equilibrium with trade ceases to exist in the edgeworth box economy

modest secure and informed successful development in conflict zones abstract most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services reduces rebel violence empirically however development programs and economic activity sometimes increase violence using new panel data on development spending in iraq we show that violence reducing effects of development assistance are greater when i projects are small ii troop strength is high and iii professional development expertise is available these findings are consistent with an information centric hearts and minds model which implies that violence reduction is greatest when projects are secure valued by community members and services derived are conditional on government control of the territory

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

enhancing efficiency or crying over spilled milk the benefits of reform we analyze the welfare gains from the reform of existinggovernment induced distortions our results provide support forpolicies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economicdistortion welfare gains over the status quo exist wheneverderegulation occurs the threat of deregulation can induce amonopoly or cartel to modify its behavior so a reform policy canprove beneficial even if reform does not actually occur optimalpolicy with commitment in fact allows a monopoly to deterderegulation the possibility of reregulation does not reverse ourresults the per period welfare gain from reform remainsundiminished

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

on measuring energy poverty in indian households summary the relationship between energy and poverty is obvious and goes both ways recognizing this this paper provides a short overview of different approaches to measuring energy poverty it then presents a novel two dimensional measure of energy poverty and energy distribution that combines the elements of access to different energy types and quantity of energy consumed an assessment of the extent of energy poverty and changes in energy distribution pattern are analyzed by applying this measure to indian household survey data for 1983 2000 the analysis shows a significant reduction in the level of energy poverty and a rapidly developing subcontinent the new measure is a good complement to conventional monetary measures and is general enough to be applied to other developing countries

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

endogenous destruction in conflict theory and extensions this article develops a general equilibrium model of conflict to characterize the implications of endogenous destruction for bargaining and fighting specifically we consider the scenario where two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid fighting when there are direct costs e g arms buildups and indirect costs e g destruction to consumable resources of conflict without imposing specific functional form restrictions on conflict production and destruction technologies we show their interactions in determining an optimal decision between fighting and bargaining we find that under the shadow of conflict bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for guarding settlement through bargaining than in the event of fighting in contrast to conventional thinking that bargaining is pareto superior over fighting we show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the nash equilibrium choice the positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting without resorting to the assumption of incomplete information or misperceptions jel d74 h56 c7

deterrence in contests this paper explores the role of deterrence in contests as a general rule we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents it is necessary that the contest be destructive we show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist a corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions agents should always be expected to engage in contests applied to international relations our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts

crime confiscation and frowth for and against leviathan this paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model ofrent seeking in which the payoffs and the choices between productiveand non productive activity are endogenous the economy has the potential for endogenous growth but when agents can choose between confiscation and productive investment growth is no longer possible

profiting from negawatts reducing absolute consumption and emissions through a performance based energy economy abstract current energy and ghg emissions policies either focus directly on emissions or promote renewable production and the implementation of specific efficiency measures meanwhile the fundamental structure of the energy market based on profits through energy throughput remains largely unchallenged this policy oversight prevents the transition to an energy economy in which profits are based on energy services delivered at the lowest energy cost a performance based energy economy pbee the pbee applies the combined concepts of the performance economy and energy services to the energy sector energy service companies escos are discussed as an example of pbee practices the implications for energy suppliers and consumers as well as the conditions for pbee diffusion and consequences for technological change are also explored the expected environmental social and economic benefits are described however absolute consumption and emissions reductions may prove elusive due to the rebound effect in order to forestall rebound led increases complementary policy measures likely to lead to absolute reductions are required

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

understanding the development of fundamentalism we use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers observance level we model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function examining the intensity of observance in each we find that under reasonable conditions rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme

catalysing the energy service market the role of intermediaries the uk market for energy service contracts is expanding owing in part to the emergence of intermediaries for those contracts in different parts of the public sector these intermediaries combine a legal framework for establishing contracts with an organisational framework that facilitates contract negotiation and execution this paper examines the nature and operation of these intermediaries in more detail including their achievements to date and their similarities and differences it uses ideas from transaction cost economics to develop a theoretical model of the contracting decision and shows how intermediary organisations can lower the transaction costs incurred by both clients and contractors thereby increasing the viability of contracting the paper argues that intermediaries can play an important role in expanding the market for energy service contracts and hence in delivering cost effective energy efficiency improvements throughout the public sector

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

what encourages local authorities to engage with energy performance contracting for retrofitting evidence from german municipalities municipalities aiming at mitigating climate change by implementing new energy efficiency technologies face budgetary and capacity constraints outsourcing through energy service contracting could provide a solution this paper reports results from a survey of 1298 municipalities concerning barriers to retrofitting public street lighting and the possible role of energy service contracting to overcome these barriers using a logistic regression analysis the authors investigate determinants of opting for energy service contracts in the specific context of led retrofits results point to an advantage of outsourcing in a financially and capacity constrained environment which corresponds with the main reasons for engaging in contracting minimising investments and financial risks however municipalities often do not fully grasp the risks associated with retrofitting especially using a novel technology such as led in relation to that they underestimate the risk reduction potential of energy performance contracts epc previous experience with outsourcing increases the probability to engage in servitization although certain existing partnerships particularly with utilities prevent municipalities from considering energy performance contracts interestingly engaging an energy consultant has a negative propensity to use energy service contracts while pre negotiated standardised contracts for energy performance contracts have a positive influence

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

receptivity to the production of product service systems in the uk construction and manufacturing sectors a comparative analysis abstract trajectories of service innovations emanating from manufacturing sectors have been of particular interest to those wishing to improve resource productivity and promote sustainable development research has focused on product service systems psss which are a category of service innovations deliberately designed to offer superior environmental performance this paper draws on research which explored whether trajectories of pss can be induced on new uk housing developments to satisfy household demand and prevent household waste the research was undertaken with a uk speculative house builder and facilities management service providers from its supplier network qualitative data were collected via interviews and focus groups to enable rich accounts of the range of factors in these firms selection environments which affect receptivity to pss production to be developed these were compared with factors affecting receptivity to pss production identified in a study of uk manufacturers the results show that in contrast to the manufacturing study clear drivers for pss delivery on new housing developments are absent in external selection environments of participating firms and uncertainty associated with the potential of pss concepts to satisfy household demand inhibits development of requisite competence for pss delivery within these thus further research is needed to explore new pss supply arrangements involving a range of household service providers

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

can the shadow of the future harm cooperation abstract it is generally thought that in long term relationships high valuations of the future are conducive to cooperation in an intertemporal model of conflict however we demonstrate the possibility of the opposite effect a longer shadow of the future may harm cooperation in particular we show that the degree of inefficiency is positively related to i the agents valuation of the future ii potential growth rates in resources iii the size of initial resource endowments and iv the effectiveness of conflict

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

economies of scope and scale in green advocacy environmental advocacy is a large and growing activity whilst a number of economists have analysed the advocacy process no systematic attempt has been made to understand the factors influencing the organisation of the sector we explore the relationship between economies of scale and scope in advocacy under the most popular specification of a tullock type contest economies of scope arise when and only when the scale of that activity is sufficiently large the incentives for merger are socially efficient implying no need for policy intervention

the rebound effect some empirical evidence from india abstract the present paper looks at the effect of technical efficiency gains on energy use in three sectors in india at varying levels of aggregation high positive rebound implies that efficient technology unless supplemented by appropriate pricing policy will not be successful in containing demand however the main purpose of the paper is to focus on the unique mechanism of rebound that may occur in developing countries with unmet demand

distribution of energy consumption and the 2000 w capita target this viewpoint discusses the intra and international distribution of energy consumption and their implications for intergenerational equity for global development to be sustainable the inequality of energy consumption must have an upper limit a graphic depiction of energy consumption distributions intra and international shows that today s inequalities are large and it is argued that we may have already reached or perhaps even surpassed the sustainability limit of energy consumption inequality

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

a review of demand side management policy in the uk abstract demand side management dsm refers to actions undertaken on the demand side of energy metres a broad definition of dsm is proposed to include current policy objectives for emissions reduction energy security and affordability and encompasses energy efficiency demand response and on site back up generation and storage the paper reviews the concept of dsm outlines the historical impacts of dsm globally since the energy crises of the 1970s analyses uk dsm policy and examines the influence of eu directives on uk dsm policy as the country is currently deciding on how to include the demand side in its electricity market reform proposals and wider energy policy much of the focus of previous research has been on dsm technological trials and modelling studies rather than dsm policy and the paper contributes to filling this gap policy recommendations for the uk context are discussed and it is clear that the success of dsm policies is determined primarily by regulatory support and utility financial incentives it is important that policy clarity is provided and that current and new policies do not overlap

demand pull government policies to support product service system activity the case of energy service companies escos in the uk product service systems psss constitute a family of service based business models designed to satisfy our societal needs in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner to date however pss application has remained niche due to a variety of critical barriers this paper explores how demand pull national government policies could support pss activity by addressing these barriers and cultivating market demand lessons are drawn from a case study of how regulatory economic incentive informative and procurement policies have supported energy service company esco activity in the uk a sub set of the pss family focused on energy service provision subsequently five policy recommendations are presented to support pss activity 1 balancing economic incentives and regulatory disincentives 2 promoting indirect policy support 3 redesigning existing market structures 4 promoting locally led pss activity and 5 creating stable policy frameworks the paper warns however that national government policy cannot easily address all pss barriers such as customer preferences international developments technological progress and inherent business model weaknesses pointing to the need for other complementary solutions furthermore other governance actors beside national government could also implement pss supporting policies

the energy efficiency gap what does it mean abstract as renewed attention has been given by policy makers to energy conservation issues it has frequently been asserted that an energy efficiency gap exists between actual and optimal energy use the critical questions is how to define the optimal level of energy efficiency this paper seeks to disentangle some confusing strands of argument that are frequently brought to bear on this question by identifying the major conceptual issues that determine the set of feasible answers we identify five separate and distinct notions of optimality the economists economic potential the technologists economic potential hypothetical potential the narrow social optimum and the true social optimum each of these has associated with it a corresponding definition of the energy efficiency gap our analysis demonstrates that necessary preconditions for identifying the right measure of the energy efficiency gap include understanding and disentangling market failure and non market failure explanations for the gradual diffusion of energy efficient technologies

a comparison of rent seeking models and economic models of conflict this paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize the purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases a key finding is that where such comparisons are possible the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth redistribution activities than does the rent seeking model

quantifying the global and distributional aspects of american household carbon footprint abstract analysis of household consumption and its environmental impact remains one of the most important topics in sustainability research nevertheless much past and recent work has focused on domestic national averages neglecting both the growing importance of international trade on household carbon footprint and the variation between households of different income levels and demographics using consumer expenditure surveys and multi country life cycle assessment techniques this paper analyzes the global and distributional aspects of american household carbon footprint we find that due to recently increased international trade 30 of total us household co 2 impact in 2004 occurred outside the us further households vary considerably in their co 2 responsibilities at least a factor of ten difference exists between low and high impact households with total household income and expenditure being the best predictors of both domestic and international portions of the total co 2 impact the global location of emissions which cannot be calculated using standard input output analysis and the variation of household impacts with income have important ramifications for polices designed to lower consumer impacts on climate change such as carbon taxes the effectiveness and fairness of such policies hinges on a proper understanding of how income distributions rebound effects and international trade affect them

renewable energy policies and contradictions in causality a case of next 11 countries abstract numerous studies on the causal relationship between economic growth energy consumption and carbon dioxide co2 emissions have shown divergence in policy recommendations which arises mainly due to the choice of methodology and the period of study this inconclusiveness in policy prescriptions might turn out to be critical when the renewable energy policies of the developing nations are considered our study analyses the causal relationship between economic growth carbon emissions fossil fuel and renewable energy consumption in next 11 countries during the period of 1990 2016 along with conducting parametric and non parametric causality tests together introducing the geweke 1982 causality test in the literature of energy economics we attempt to establish a wholesome aspect of policy design by comparing and complementing results of different causality analysis and how the causality directions should comply with the context setting our empirical evidence confirms that robust renewable energy policy can be designed by complementing the various causality test results rather than focusing on one particular causality test

socio ecological regime transitions in austria and the united kingdom we employ the concepts of socio ecological regime and regime transition to better understand the biophysical causes and consequences of industrialization for two case studies the united kingdom and austria we describe two steps in a major transition from an agrarian to an industrial socio ecological regime and the resulting consequences for energy use land use and labour organization in a first step the coal based industrial regime co existed with an agricultural sector remaining within the bounds of the old regime in a second step the oil electricity based industrial regime agriculture was integrated into the new pattern and the socio ecological transition had been completed industrialization offers an answer to the input and growth related sustainability problems of the agrarian regime but creates new sustainability problems of a larger scale while today s industrial societies are stabilizing their resource use albeit at an unsustainable level large parts of the global society are in midst of the old industrial transition this poses severe problems for global sustainability

from demand side management dsm to energy efficiency services a finnish case study abstract energy conservation is expected to contribute significantly to climate change mitigation and energy security traditionally energy companies have had strong role in providing demand side management dsm measures however after energy market liberalization in europe energy companies dsm activities declined in response the eu issued directive 2006 32 ec on energy end use efficiency and energy services esd to motivate energy companies to promote energy efficiency and conservation closely followed by directive 2012 27 eu on energy efficiency eed requiring the setting up energy efficiency obligation schemes despite strong political and economic motivation energy companies struggle to develop energy efficiency services in liberalised energy markets due to conflicting institutional demands which arise from contradicting policy requirements and customer relations the main challenges in developing new innovative energy efficiency services evidenced by an in depth case study were 1 the unbundling of energy company operations which makes it difficult to develop services when the contribution of several business units is required and 2 the distrust among energy end users which renders the business logic of energy saving contract models self contradictory on the basis of the research avenues out of these dilemmas are suggested

how organizational structure can reduce rent seeking in multi tiered organizations individuals can engage in unproductive rent seeking activities both within and between the divisions of the organization nevertheless a multi tiered organizational structure can induce efficiency gains by decreasing rent seeking we present a model of production and simultaneous internal and external rent seeking assuming a logistic contest success function in equilibrium there is generically either internal or external rent seeking but not both a multi tiered organization leads to less rent seeking and higher welfare even though the production technology gives no reason for any specific organizational structure our findings constitute a new efficiency rationale for multi tiered organizations

equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two player model of society where only armed self enforcement of property rights is possible the main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players the parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur the equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by respectively neither player the richer player and both players the latter case involves a sub type in which the poorer player s entire endowment is expended on arms jel d30 d72 d74

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back