line item veto where is thy sting roponents of giving the president the authority to use a line item veto argue that the institutional change is needed to limit special interest legislation and restrain spending opponents respond that it would grant too much added power to the president thereby upsetting the delicate balance wisely crafted by the founding fathers this article focuses on the presumption evidently shared by both sides in the debate that adoption of item veto authority will have significant consequences in terms of budget outcomes and the distribution of power 1 curiously there presently exists little empirical support for the presumption that item veto authority is important most studies comparing states with various types of veto authority have failed to detect significant effects associated with item veto additional tests of our own are consistent with these results after reviewing the empirical evidence we reconsider the alleged effects of item veto authority by seating the popular depiction in an explicit model of the budgetary process formal modeling exposes logical inconsistencies contained in popular veto discourse further the model makes clear that the predicted consequences of item veto commonly projected as ubiquitous in fact arise only in select settings

institutions and equilibrium in the united states supreme court over the last decade the scholarship on judicial politics has increasingly emphasized the strategic aspects of decision making in the united states supreme court this scholarship however has struggled with two significant limitations the restriction to unidimensional policy spaces and the assumption of binary comparisons of alternatives these two assumptions have the advantage of implying stable predictable outcomes but lack a sound theoretical foundation and assume away potentially important aspects of strategic behavior on the court in this article we identify institutional features of the court that under certain conditions allow us to relax these two assumptions without sacrificing stable predictable policy outcomes in particular we formalize the part by part opinion voting used by the justices a feature that together with separable preferences over policy issues implies stable policy outcomes around the issue by issue median of the justices

the power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation in a distributive setting this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous it is found not surprisingly that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage what is surprising is the degree of this advantage we find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 for an majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members the voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process

pairwise convergence of district level house prices in london this paper investigates the long run convergence of district level house prices in greater london using the recently developed pairwise approach this methodology allows for unit root tests to be conducted on all n n 1 2 possible pairs of house price differentials across the n boroughs of london thus avoiding the need to choose a base borough of reference or the regional average as the benchmark it also permits the estimation consistently of the proportion of the pairs that are stationary and convergent using hm land registry house price data for 33 inner and outer london boroughs over the period 1996q1 2009q2 no overall multidistrict long run convergence is found some evidence of district level segmentation of house prices in greater london is found with the sub group of the boroughs contiguous to the city of london district and the wider central sub market emerging as the clubs with the highest rate of convergence

a model of political competition in the underlying space of ideology this study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition i develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment three important results arise for thehomogeneous polity case first the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election second a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party third political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate

rules and games this paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes we develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of pareto improved equilibria points we then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules including examples from malaysia india brazil turkey and canada we show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy

the cost of governing strategic behavior of the president and legislators in brazil s budgetary process several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing such as presidentialism federalism an open list with proportional representation a multiparty system and coalition governments although brazil suffers from all of these pathologies the authors argue that other characteristics of the brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost in particular the authors examine the role of legislators amendments to the budget which provide the executive a low cost means of obtaining support the authors provide evidence that the brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in congress although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers

polarization politics and property rights links between inequality and growth most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution however empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth the authors analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization they argue that social polarization whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension makes large changes in current policies including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements the resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth they find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument the policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution if redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth if on the other hand the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

electoral majorities political parties and collective representation in practice democracies privilege plurality parties theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice abstract social choice theory wonders whether an elec

rational deterrence theory and evidence the causes and effects of the use of force raise crucial questions of substance and method issues are multiple and often are confused with each other thus while many case study findings contradict second wave deterrence theory they are consistent with some rational deterrence theories many findings however cannot be squared with the assumptions of rationality policies are suboptimal and behavior is often inconsistent furthermore the actor s values beliefs and calculations are exogenous to rational theories and can only be supplied by empirical analysis

gordon tullock s contributions to the theory of public choice i introduction gordon tullock came to economics and political science through a circuitous route he had almost no formal training in economics beyond a one quarter course that he took as a law student at the university of chicago from henry c simons he served in the foreign service for a number of years his first publications in economics date from the mid 1950s and were on monetary economics campbell and tullock 1954 1957 tullock 1956 tullock s formal entry into academia came in 1958 when he arrived at the thomas jefferson center for studies in political economy and social philosophy part of the department of economics at the university of virginia as a postdoctoral fellow tullock s biography from this point is fairly well known 1 tullock s contributions to economics and political science span almost forty years the following discussion is offered as a modest review of tullock s contributions the presentation is not meant to be detailed or copious but simply efficient in conveying what is important in tullock s work 2 ii methodology and style before turning to tullock s work a brief word is in order about his general approach to economic analysis and his writing style in fact tullock has shown far more interest in obtaining useful results than he has in how he happened to go about obtaining them in this way he has been a methodological anarchist operating under the general maxim that in science anything goes and results count his well known papers generally rely upon simple price theoretic or spatial constructs and perhaps a little algebra and game theory where he has found a need for more formidable tools he has generally acquired them through coauthors this anything goes approach does not seem to have hampered his work he has shown a talent for getting at the essence of problems and avoiding clutter in his work moreover he has shown almost no penchant for methodological exegesis in his work with the major exception of his general insistence that rational economic man models are the best description of behavior in almost any setting on this point he has been steadfast in fact buchanan 1987 uses tullock s emphasis on the homo economicus assumption to describe tullock as a natural economist i think this is an accurate interpretation of tullock we have all known people who are naturally good at things like playing short stop or the piano and in this sense it is analogous to say that tullock has a natural inclination toward economic reasoning and behavior tullock is not a great stylist his normal routine is to dictate the first draft of his papers and work through them from there this allows him to make his points but sometimes not very eloquently or clearly 3 the real question about scientific writing style is whether it matters or not there are protagonists on either side of this issue empirical research laband and taylor 1992 suggests that style has no marginal impact on citations this result can be interpreted in various ways but perhaps the most appropriate interpretation is that researchers have not yet found the margin on which writing style matters tullock of course could interpret this differently to say that style does not matter only results matter and this is what he has been about nonetheless mccloskey lists tullock along with several other modern economists as a good writer to wit when you read any of these in economics pay attention this is as good as it gets 1987 9 this either defends tullock s writing skills or calls into question the care with which mccloskey drew up his list of economists as writers iii the calculus the calculus of consent 1962 by james m buchanan and gordon tullock is a work of astounding creativity of all the classic works in the theory of public choice this book stands out for its range and depth of contribution it is moreover a readable book

the political economy of the fair labor standards act of 1938 this paper examines the congressional passage of the american minimum wage law the fair labor standards act of 1938 voting on the act is modeled as a function of the concentration of the constituencies for minimum wage legislation north south differentials and legislator ideology it is shown that the house radically altered the final content of the bill abandoning a proposed wages and hours board with discretionary powers to determine minimum wages in favor of a flat rate following the objections of several interest groups north south divisions over the bill had little influence over congressional voting and the influence of constituent groups increased relative to legislators ideology as the bill became an important election issue

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

executive veto legislative override and structure induced equilibrium in this study the structure induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override a multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors a legislature an appropriations committee and an executive in order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process in particular the committee has monopoly agenda power a closed amendment control rule is operative and perfect foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive given these assumptions utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure induced equilibrium the general model is illustrated geometrically with a two dimensional example permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions the analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions in the illustration executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision similar relationships however are not found to exist for total budget expenditures

power politics and the free trade bandwagon what explains the world s newfound enthusiasm for free trade are government leaders integrating their economies to achieve pareto improving gains or is it because a critical mass of pro free trade governments has acquired the capacity to go it alone leaving would be protectionists with a choice between a bad option opening their markets at very high political cost and an even worse alternative incurring the still higher political costs of exclusion this article suggests that in practice mutual gains seeking motivations are frequently dominated by defensive ones the north american free trade agreement is a case in point without in any way being bullied or coerced the mexican and canadian governments agreed to take part in a multilateral arrangement that the evidence suggests neither much liked although hard to reconcile with the political economy literature s positive sum model of international cooperation this finding is consistent with the broader power politics model introduced here

discretionary ratings and the pricing of subprime mortgage backed securities using a dataset of home equity loan securities issued up to june 2007 and rated by moody s and or sp however these alternative thresholds do not appear to play a role as relevant as that of the ig sg boundary rating bias is also found to have an asymmetric impact on spreads the relevance of actual over expected ratings is greater for tranches receiving evaluations that are higher rather than lower than expected taken together these pieces of empirical evidence point toward ratings based regulation as an important explanation for the observed mispricing of structured finance products

a synoptic view of regional growth and unemployment ii the post keynesian theory this paper discusses the post keynesian explanation of the causes of disparities in regional growth and unemployment rates it begins by examining the relationship between the real wage rate the level of demand and regional unemployment next it shows how regional growth is primarily determined by the rate of growth of exports a two region model is outlined which demonstrates how regional growth rates are interrelated through interregional trade flows and the regional balance of payments constraint the paper concludes with a discussion of the cumulative causation theory of regional growth

on the political economy of state highway expenditures some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models this paper explores the extent to which the public demand for roads and or power of special interest groups determines road expenditures at the state level using an extension of the methodology developed in congleton and shughart 1990 reduced form models of median voter demand special interest group equilibria and a combined model are estimated using cross sectional state data from the united states we generally find support for the hypothesis that voting matters the pure median voter models have a better fit than the pure special interest group models moreover in our combined model we find that variables from the median voter model can not be dropped without significantly reducing the combined model s fit

the spatial and temporal diffusion of house prices in the uk abstract this paper provides a method for the analysis of the spatial and temporal diffusion of shocks in a dynamic system we use changes in real house prices within the uk economy at the level of regions to illustrate its use adjustment to shocks involves both a region specific and a spatial effect shocks to a dominant region london are propagated contemporaneously and spatially to other regions they in turn impact on other regions with a delay we allow for lagged effects to echo back to the dominant region london in turn is influenced by international developments through its link to new york and other financial centers it is shown that new york house prices have a direct effect on london house prices we analyse the effect of shocks using generalised spatio temporal impulse responses these highlight the diffusion of shocks both over time as with the conventional impulse responses and over space

regional house price interactions in the uk 1975 81 a cross spectral analysis 1986 regional house price interactions in the uk 1975 81 a cross spectral analysis applied economics vol 18 no 9 pp 1011 1023

multilateral negotiations a spatial analysis of the arab israeli dispute a model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated the model based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the middle east the analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the soviet union the united states jordan the palestine liberation organization and israel

why democracies may actually be less reliable allies recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies this need not be the case alliances serve as commitment devices adding ex ante credibility to states claims about ex post behavior variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments put simply democracies are most improved by formal commitments we offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically we test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention rather than on the duration or the number of commitments our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

a new perspective on the ripple effect in the uk housing market comovement cyclical subsamples and alternative indices an alternative perspective is provided on the existence of a ripple effect in the uk housing market in contrast to previous studies the analysis involves consideration of information on the changes in house prices to which the hypothesis of house price diffusion posited by the ripple effect relates rather than their levels in an examination of changes in house prices in london relative to other regions of the uk directional forecasting methods are employed to establish the extent of the relationship between geographical proximity and comovement across the three month window provided by quarterly data consequently the analysis provides a direct examination of the ripple effect which refers to changes in prices rather than the convergence of levels which has become a feature of the empirical literature the literature is extended further by both the application of dating techniques to perform the analysis across cycles and phases of cycles recovery and recessionary periods in the uk housing market

medium term cycles and housing is regional integration different drehmann et al drehmann m borio c and tsatsaronis k 2012 characterising the financial cycle don t lose sight of the medium term bis working papers no 380 bank for international settlement

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

is there long run convergence among regional house prices in the uk this paper investigates the long run convergence of regional house prices in the uk existing studies have failed to reach a consensus on whether or not regional house prices exhibit long run convergence with each other the application is proposed of a new test involving unit root testing of the first principal component based on regional national house price differentials using mix adjusted quarterly data for 1973 2006 it is found that the first principal component is stationary this suggests that all uk regional house prices are driven by a single common stochastic trend further analysis suggests that those regions that are more distant from london exhibit the highest degrees of persistence with respect to deviations in house price differentials

a correction in elementary public choice geometry this paper corrects a long standing errorin elementary geometrical constructionsthat involve collective choices inmultidimensional settings the seeminglyinnocuous assumption of separability amongarguments in individual utility functionsdoes not imply symmetric indifferencecontours in shared goods space sharedgoods necessarily become gross substituteswhen resource or budgetary constraints areintroduced the corrected constructionsuggests that issue by issue voting is lessefficacious than is indicated in theconventional analysis

the synchronization of credit cycles abstract this paper proposes a simple econometric procedure to test for the synchronization of credit cycles using a century of data for 14 advanced economies we find that credit cycle synchronization dropped in the early 1920s from initially relatively high levels between the 1920s and the 1970s synchronization was overall low and concentrated within five predominantly regional clusters however synchronization has significantly increased in the post bretton woods era and has become less associated with geographic proximity australia denmark france italy japan norway spain switzerland the uk and the us form a single major credit cycle cluster since the 1970s a smaller cluster is formed by canada the netherlands and sweden while the german credit cycle follows a distinct path using logistic regressions we find that the synchronization of credit and business cycles go hand in hand our findings are especially relevant for the international coordination of macroprudential policy as well as to spur and inform further analysis on credit cycle dynamics

democracy as insurance explaining the existence and stability of democracies pose difficulties for the public choice paradigm the article argues that these difficulties may be resolved by focusing on the insurance aspect of democratic decision making procedures democratic regimes may be better able than autocratic regimes to provide the inhabitants with insurance against the risk of being subjected to arbitrary suppression from the ruling elite this propensity of democratic regimes may explain the origin as well as stability of such regimes

seasonality and cointegration of regional house prices in the uk the data generation process underlying regional house prices in the uk is investigated using new statistical tests it is found that causal flows tend to be northwards the south east rather than greater london acts as an exogenous price determinator of the other regions in the south the midland regions have a great influence on prices in the north and flows through the east midlands are characterised by bi directional causality these results are largely independent of assumptions made about the data generation process and tests of these assumptions have low power in any case there are also similarities between this causality and migration patterns particularly in the south of england

why so much stability the impact of agency determined stability in this article i have shown that institutionally induced stability models can be expanded to incorporate the role of implementing agencies acting in conjunction with the legislature by so extending stability models inferences can be made on agency behavior as well as on legislative behavior in particular the expanded model can be used to show how the two actors together determine the ultimate location of stable policies coalition building considerations jurisdictional limitations and the other customs and institutional considerations that restrict the legislature s policy space make it possible for committees to produce a stable policy mandate but these stability inducing arrangements do not directly apply to agencies the policy mandate constrains but does not completely restrict the area of the policy space open to the agency thus legislative structures do not in and of themselves induce stable policy outcomes legislative policy mandates are changed and defined by the acts of the implementing agency in its role as a non voting decision making actor in the policy process endless cycling by the agency among possible implementation points is prevented by the agency s organizational goal of a stable environment i suggest then that legislative arrangements acting in conjunction with an agency executive s need to create a certain regular and predictable environment lead to the creation of an agency determined stability

governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

antebellum tariff politics regional coalitions and shifting economic interests abstract throughout u s history import tariffs have been put on a sustained downward path in only two instances from the early 1830s until the civil war and from the mid 1930s to the present this paper analyzes the political economy of tariff reductions in the antebellum period tariff politics was highly sectional the north supported high tariffs the south favored low tariffs and the west was a swing region in the 1820s a coalition between the north and west raised tariffs by exchanging votes on import duties for spending on internal improvements president andrew jackson delinked these issues by vetoing several internal improvements bills the nullification crisis led to the compromise tariff of 1833 which phased out tariffs above 20 percent over a 9 year period by this time transportation improvements gave the west access to foreign markets giving the region a stake with the south in maintaining a low tariff equilibrium thus the west s changing position on trade policy helps explain the

bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the u s congress explaining why committee systems emerge there but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries to analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures we adopt a vote buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers we show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader

an empirical example of the condorcet paradox of voting in a large electorate social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon especially in large groups of decision makers however empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real world examples of such and none in large electorates this paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of danish voters preferred prime minister using pair wise comparisons this result is compared with those of a similar poll but by using different voting methods each resulting in different choices the example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions

circumventing formal structure through commitment presidential influence and agenda control although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the congress and president ought to provide congress with agenda power the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship we show that if the president can make clear cut commitments presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes thus the details of political interactions in particular the possibilities for commitment may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure

chameleon voters and public choice a model is presented of an open voting public choice process that features pressure groups vying for society s support individuals choose what policy to advocate on the basis of their private preferences which are those they would express in a secret ballot endogenous social pressures and the utility they gain from integrity they falsify their preferences when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs an implication is that a policy advocated by few people in private might receive strong public support the paper goes on to explore why secret voting which eliminates this possibility might not be adopted

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

credit ratings and security prices in the subprime mbs market we present and discuss preliminary evidence suggesting that credit ratings significantly influenced prices for subprime mortgage backed securities issued in the period leading up to the recent financial crisis ratings are closely correlated with prices even controlling for a rich set of security and loan level controls this incremental variation in ratings has much less predictive power for security defaults however based on findings to date from our ongoing research suggesting prices were excessively sensitive to ratings relative to their informational content

some evidence of congressional political markets in dod personnel allocations across states an empirical analysis of the distribution of department of defense dod personnel both military and civilian across states is developed with a commonly used public choice model of resource allocation in a legislative setting the model specification employs congressional seniority congressional committee representation presidential electoral votes and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of dod personnel across states over time the empirical analysis is performed over the last three decades and the results indicate that this particular public choice legislative model performs well in explaining the variation in dod personnel allocations across states the results also provide some limited evidence of a possible political market between the states for dod personnel allocations this analysis has implications for future testing of whether the base realignment and closure commission established in 1988 under president reagan and the defense base closure and realignment commission of 1990 under president bush were effective in significantly decreasing the legislative politics involved in the selection and approval process for base closure and realignment

equilibrium in fiscal choices evidence from a budget game this is an applied study about the stability of collective decision making in fiscal matters and the features of individual preferences which are sufficient to reach a social ordering it is based on data about citizens preferences collected through a budget game played by a sample of voters in turin a large italian city by simulating a series of individual choices a social ordering of the municipal budget items is arrived at the role played by restricted i e single peaked single caved etc preferences to avoid cycles in choice simulations is then assessed

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

bureaucratic inefficiency failure to capture the efficiencies of outsourcing this paper analyzes the political economy ofoutsourcing by 16 federal bureaus during 1981 96 inan era of restricted budgets and budget balancing thepaper questions why federal bureaus did not exploitfully the efficiencies of outsourcing it proves thatfederal bureaus can achieve technical and costefficiency through outsourcing when contracts can benearly fully specified federal bureaus outsource byobtaining inputs to their production processes throughcontracts with competitive market producing units econometric results substantiate the hypothesis that institutions matter and reveal that bureausachieve varying levels of technical efficiency throughdifferent levels of outsourcing

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

why so much stability another opinion in this paper i have suggested three important factors that render majority rule stable in real world settings small numbers of alternatives constraints on agenda setters and a meaningful weakening of the single peakedness condition these simple points along with shepsle s complementary notion of structure induced equilibria and an extension thereof incorporating strategic behavior krehbiel 1983 go a long way toward explaining the existence of stable outcomes in the real world

an approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes an update and extension by tradition public choice theorists have pointed out many paradoxes of collective choice the phenomenon of cyclical majorities and the more general issue of political equilibrium have proven to be fertile searching grounds one class of paradoxes derives from the intransitivity of social orderings implied by the cycle as riker 1982 notes this property of majority rule is most perplexing and paradoxical to those who hold populist beliefs that voting reflects a fair and meaningful amalgamation of individual preferences and must therefore reflect the will of the people if voting in general elections and committees is interpreted this way then the existence of voting cycles and the implied intransitivity or more generally the impossibility of any rule for making social choices assuring transitive sometimes equated with rational outcomes shakes the foundations of populist principles of political philosophy another paradox of cyclical majorities and simulations of voting games in general concerns the stability of political equilibria the body of theory regarding this issue is skillfully summarized by shepsle and weingast 1982 and can be reduced to a simple proposition with sufficient assumptions regarding the states of participants knowledge and the manipulability of

political solutions to market problems for some market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention however the fact that self interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion it is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions and hence to analyze self interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector our approach emphasizes this institutional structure warts and all and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance

money and majorities in the federal republic of germany evidence for a veto players model of government spending i formulate a veto players model of policy making by coalition government in the federal republic of germany the model gives testable predictions about how patterns of federal spending respond to changes in government some of the predictions are consistent with conventional wisdom namely that the spd fdp government decreased spending on right wing items when it came to power in 1969 and the return of cdu fdp coalition in 1982 produced a decline in leftwing spending other predictions are less intuitive for example there is no predicted increase in left wing spending associated with the spdfdp coalition and no increase in right wing spending with the cdu fdp government these predictions and those of competing models are tested using disaggregated budget data from fiscal years 1961 1989 controlling for category specific effects and economic conditions the data support the veto players model and this support is robust to a wide variety of plausible assumptions about the parties spending preferences

the logic of institutional preferences german electoral law as a social choice outcome institutions determine the results of social decision processes yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices this paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies the choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions this approach is used to study the choice of an electoral system in germany after world war ii the hypothesis that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two vote ballot in 1953

electoral politics and the executive veto a predictive theory we argue that winner take all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested larger states when making policy decisions this hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states in a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988 we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents

the political economy of gordon tullock it is fair to say that few public choice scholars have contributed to so many areas of public choice research as frequently or with as much insight as gordon tullock professor tullock s work considers not only political and contractual relationships within a well established legal order but also extraordinary political behavior within rent seeking societies within firms at court within communities at war among those considering revolution and among those emerging from or falling into anarchy the result is an unusually complete political economy that includes theories of the origin of the state theories of decision making within bureaucracy dictatorship democracy and the courts and within science itself it is also fair to say that professor tullock uses relatively simple tools to analyze these far reaching topics indeed it is the use of relatively simple tools that makes the broad scope of his work possible all the principal actors in tullock s analysis maximize expected net benefits in circumstances where the perspective on tullock s work presented here is based partly on his prolific writings and partly on numerous conversations with him over the course of several decades he was kind enough to read through a previous draft and the version presented here reflects his comments and suggestions comments and suggestions received at the 2002 meeting of the public choice society and from james buchanan charles rowley robert tollison and an

the political economics of redistribution inequality and tax avoidance a central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality however empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed this paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement by focusing on structure induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution depending on two opposing effects the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

the convergence of regional house prices in the uk the ripple effect hypothesis implies a long run convergence of regional uk house prices however despite many authors believing in the existence of such an underlying constancy statistical evidence has yet to be presented supporting this implication in this paper an alternative approach is proposed to analyse regional house price ratios in contrast to the findings of previous studies application of this new procedure results in the detection of widespread convergence of house prices in a number of regions of the uk the results suggest that the failure of previous analyses to uncover convergence is due to an underlying asymmetry in the adjustment process being ignored interestingly the form of asymmetry detected varies between regions while regions in the south east experience faster convergence following downswings in prices other regions exhibit more rapid convergence following increases in prices

agent discretion regulatory policymaking and different institutional arrangements this paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process based on several distributions of lawmaking powers different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies the analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players particularly monopoly initiation power which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper has a substantial impact on discretion agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogenous preferences the framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking

political deadlocks and distributional information the value of the veil contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice by eliminating distributional information the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions this paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day to day decision making of democratic institutions our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the u s congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

did credit rating agencies make unbiased assumptions on cdos article appears in papers and proceedings of the 123rd annual meeting of the amerian economic association denver co usa 6 9 january 2011

pluralism and social choice pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the stability of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to stability in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules and other patterns as leading to unstable social choice but the preference patterns identified by pluralist theory as promoting stability are essentially those identified by social choice theory as entailing instability thus the notions of stability and the implicit normative criteria associated with the two theories are very close to being logically incompatible this incompatibility suggests that the social choice ideal of collective rationality may not be one that we should endorse indeed the generic instability of the pluralist political process and its consequent collective irrationality may contribute to the stability of pluralist political systems

the median voter setters and non repeated construction bond issues the median voter model pervades the literature concerning the estimation of demands for collective expenditures but with some unanswered criticism the general issue addressed in this paper is whether observed collective expenditure levels and the characteristics of observed majorities are more adequately described by the median voter model or the romer and rosenthal setter model on a sample of non repeated hospital construction referenda bond issues the median voter model and the romer and rosenthal setter model are compared in both full information and uncertainty contexts little empirical support of the setter model is found indeed the evidence supports the absence of expenditure maximizing behavior the specific conclusions are 1 the standard median voter model explains quite well for this sample of non repeated bond issues 2 the explanatory power of the median voter model appears to vary across both voting arrangements and types of reversion threats 3 the explanation of hospital expenditures which have been judged too large may be due to how benefits and costs are distributed among voters and 4 the preponderance of large majorities for hospital construction in the face of evidence that such facilities typically become a burden on the general tax fund is consistent with setters offering the median ideal in the presence of a reversion below the ideal

institutionalizing majority rule a social choice theory with policy implications recent results in the theory of pure majority rule demonstrate the genericity of majority rule cycles as established by richard mckelvey 1979 l cohen 1979 and n schofield 1978 majority rule nearly always breaks down and when it does the breakdown is complete the theorems given below may be summed up in the following three assertions 1 for any policy or alternative there exists a set of alternatives that command a majority of votes against it 2 this situation is not an abberation but rather is the general case and 3 it is almost always possible in multidimensional choice settings to find a sequence of votes that begins at any point and ends at any other point majority rule may wander anywhere yet when these theoretical assertions are applied to legislatures based upon majority rule they contain no obvious policy content or predictions the key insight which we elaborate in this paper is that majority rule is not self implementing there is no majority rule machine into which we feed preferences and out of which come outcomes rather there is a complex series of institutional arrangements underpinning the operation of majority rule legislatures arrangements from which theorists have mistakenly abstracted in fact majority rule theorists have not focused at all on institutional details instead they have restricted themselves to the majority rule dominance relation operating under the implicit assumption that what may be proved true about this relation is true of all legislative institutions based upon it in this paper we show that this assumption is misleading and that the the results based upon it must be reinterpreted in order to be useful for understanding real world committees and legislatures

executive veto and spending limitation positive political economy with implications for institutional choice the consequences of institutional change in the budgetary process are not generally determinate independent of the preferences of political actors nonetheless this study shows for a general class of preference configurations that the legislative branch cannot be made better off by a spending limitation unless the executive is empowered with a line item veto in the absence of executive item veto authority there is no incentive for the legislature to constrain spending

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

convergence and divergence in british housing space abstractthe degree of convergence that exists among british house prices is an open question inferences vary with the method applied and periods considered using the rank of the cointegrating matrix among four decades of regional data two contiguous groups of regions are revealed these super regions have some common members through which price changes are transmitted from south to north with london found to be deviating from the south east neither it nor the uk are likely to be indicative of the regional series of the south of england

recontracting trustworthiness and the stability of vote exchanges tullock 1981 has recently restated a discrepancy between theory and observation that exists in collective decisions and made a start toward explaining the discrepancy the discrepancy stated simply is this the theory of rational action in collective decisions implies that any outcome which requires vote exchanges to be achieved is unstable in that it can be overturned by a coalition all of whom find it their interest to do so yet a high degree of stability is observed in legislation despite the fact that much of this legislation required vote exchanges in order to be passed tullock accounts for this stability in part by pointing out that defections necessary to create the instability e g a defector induced to become an aristocrat in an inegalitarian coalition create an exposed position for the defector and the possible instability is likely to inhibit the defection in the first place tullock looks at two extreme forms that a winning coalition could take given a set of bills each of which has a special interest for one legislator a logrolling form which encompasses all of nearly all the legislature and a minimal winning coalition although the latter dominates the former in a game theoretic sense tullock argues that the latter will be unstable because of the power of enticement held by the excluded minority logrolling which includes nearly all the legislature is although formally dominated stable because of the absence of this potential enticement thus for tullock if i understand correctly his argument the potential instability of minimal winning coalitions leads any one of them to be succeeded not by another minimal winning coalition but by a non minimal winning coalition that it formally dominates shepsle and weingast in a subsequent paper argue that the institutional structure of actual legislatures restricts the richness of logrolling and coalition possibilities that under pure majority rule without such institutions could overturn a proto coalition or reverse an outcome shepsle and weingast 1981 511 thus they explain stability by stability inducing institutions

redistribution tax under non benevolent governments i analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system i employ these assumptions members gain special benefits in the majority parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers the member s utility function is given in a quasi linear function the government s objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and i classify governments according to the weight the four main results are a stable majority dose not support myopic government the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers the stable transfer of non benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy

why so much stability an optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either 1 extreme restrictions upon preferences or 2 constraints upon the agenda the implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics

organizational politics and complexity coase vs arrow march and simon this article argues that the transaction cost approach to the problem of organizing economic activities is undermined by a neglect of the consequences of the complexity of the interconnections among such activities and in particular of the complexity generated by conflict and divergent interests of the agents involved with the increase of conflict organizational equilibria cease to exist thus hierarchy is in principle not necessarily an efficiency increasing remedy to the existence of transaction costs but can be explained also as a way to provide temporary equilibria in the everlasting organizational conflict

non optimal unanimous agreement in collective decision making unanimous agreement is accepted as a benchmark for economic efficiency because with everyone in agreement on an issue a pareto superior move will result from the issue s approval 1 this view of unanimous agreement is not completely accurate though because when unanimous agreement occurs under a less than unanimous decision rule a situation could arise in which individuals could agree with a majority in order to avoid being in the minority there is an important distinction to be made between a decision rule of unanimity and unanimous agreement under a less than unanimous decision rule under a unanimous decision making rule every voter has veto power and so can vote against an issue to keep it from being approved this means that under a unanimous decision rule nobody will approve an issue unless approval makes the individual better off that the status quo under a less inclusive rule like simple majority rule an issue can be approved without the vote of any particular voter as long as a majority of the voters approve typically the voter s single vote will not affect the outcome of a majority rule election thus the voter faces the more complex choice of being in the majority coalition or in the minority coalition sometimes a voter will be better off in the majority coalition than in the minority coalition even if changes proposed by the majority coalition make the voter worse off than the status quo therefore one would not be justified in concluding that because there is unanimous agreement on an issue everyone is made better off unanimous agreement under majority rule may result from all voters in a majority rule system being better off in the majority rather than the minority even if the change that is unanimously approved is not a pareto superior move 2 the general idea behind non optimal unanimous agreement is relatively straightforward under majority rule a majority has the power to exploit the minority 3 therefore under some situations everybody joins the majority on an issue even though some find themselves worse off when the

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

bureaucratic agenda control imposition or bargaining niskanen s economic model of bureaucratic behavior assumes that bureaucratic agenda control allows the bureau to impose upon a passive legislature its most preferred alternative from among the set of alternatives that dominate the status quo but does a monopoly on the agenda give bureaus this degree of influence over a voting body this article reports on experiments that demonstrate that a monopoly on the agenda puts the agenda monopolist in a position to bargain with a voting body without being able to impose his or her most preferred alternative on that body this evidence supports theories of bureaucratic legislative bargaining at the expense of theories of bureaucratic imposition

transaction costs and coalition stability under majority rule 1 introduction under a majority voting rule representatives of specific political districts must bargain with representatives of other districts to build a coalition for enacting legislation that benefits their narrow constituencies but the theoretical public choice literature warns of potential for unstable majorities minimum winning coalitions divide program benefits just among their members creating incentives for those left out to entice defection by offering rewards to those who leave and form a different coalition as noted in mueller 1989 new coalitions emerge undermining the old ones leading to cyclical majorities short term programs and highly skewed distributions of program benefits 1 despite these dire predictions there is a general consensus in the literature such as tullock 1981 that programs are more stable and allocations more equal than the theory suggests 2 in an effort to explain the discrepancy between prediction and observation researchers have pointed to institutional rules and practices in congress for example as stated in shepsle and weingast 1981a and weingast and marshall 1988 the committee system provides a structure induced equilibrium that limits the possible range of vote trading and thereby helps maintain coalitions further shepsle and weingast 1981b miller and oppenheimer 1982 and collie 1988 argue that universalist sharing of program benefits enlarges the winning coalition and extends its political support 3 in this article we offer additional evidence of broad stable sharing in many programs enacted by congress by describing interstate distributions from the federal highway trusts fund htf the allocation formula for the htf was initiated in 1916 but despite wide divergence across the states in growth of various economic factors over the rest of the twentieth century such as vehicle registration and population that might have led to redirection of highway funds there were comparatively limited htf allocation adjustments analysis of state receipts from the htf relative to tax payments into the fund reveals that some states collect much more than they contribute whereas others pay in more than they receive even so interstate ratios of htf apportionments to payments have remained stable across the years varying less than changes in highway use measures would suggest going beyond this specific program we examine overall federal expenditure and tax shares among the states from 1975 to 1997 and show that there has been a similar continuity in the interstate distribution of federal funds and taxes 4 as with the highway program there is broad stable sharing of federal expenditures across the states with some receiving more than they contribute in taxes to the federal government to better understand this observed stability and use of relatively egalitarian sharing rules and to go beyond existing explanations we emphasize the desire of politicians to minimize the high transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing political coalitions politicians have incentive to prevent unraveling of political agreements to avoid the costs of searching for new coalition partners reaching agreement on the nature and distribution of program benefits and costs and verifying compliance these activities detract from a legislator s ability to address other voter concerns moreover legislators seek to protect constituent benefits accruing from long term programs that would be lost if coalitions unraveled 5 accordingly we argue that politicians assemble greater than minimum sized coalitions to build broad political support for their legislative programs offering benefits to a larger constituency in exchange for additional votes considerable negotiation over the distribution of program benefits a nd costs may be required so that once agreements are reached politicians will be loath to consider a major reallocation that could undermine the coalition

executive veto power and credit claiming the line item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods the item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature

the constitutional political economy of gordon tullock this paper surveys gordon tullock s contributions to constitutional political economy his first major contribution was his joint project with james buchanan on liberal constitutional design the explicitly constitutional analysis of the calculus was followed by a series of papers and books that focused on the use of resources in conflict including tullock s contributions to the anarchy and rent seeking literatures tullock also pioneered the rational choice based analysis of dictatorships and the relative merits of alternative legal systems topics that has been neglected until fairly recently by most scholars working in the cpe tradition