price wars caused by switching costs in many markets consumers have switching costs for example learning costs or transaction costs of changing between functionally equivalent brands of a product or of using any brand for the first time we analyse a four period complete information model of a market with switching costs in which new entry occurs after the second period the new entry results in equilibrium in a price war that is the new entrants prices are higher in the post entry period than in the entry period and the incumbent s price falls in either the pre entry period or the entry period and subsequently rises we can interpret the incumbent s lowering its price in the pre entry period as limit pricing behaviour we distinguish between two types of price war that can occur and show how the type or mixture of types that arises depends on the size of switching costs

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy this paper studies incentives and loss of control in a hierarchy model which combines and generalizes the models of williamson calvo wellisz and keren levhari in our model of the hierarchy the levels of effort from managers and workers the wage scales the span of control and in particular the total number of tiers are all endogenous using optimal control techniques we show that in the optimal hierarchy the wage scales and effort levels decrease as one moves down the hierarchy as the hierarchy expands with no technological progress workers exert less effort and are paid less top managers work harder and are paid more and the wage distribution becomes increasingly skewed

real time decentralized information processing as a model of organizations with boundedly rational agents this paper studies the properties of real time decentralized information processing as a model of human information processing in organizations real time decentralized processingwhich models the computation of decision rules in a temporal decision problem by members of an organization captures both the cost of computation in terms of the members time and the constraints imposed by computational delay on the use of recent information unlike a batch processing model it has no single measure of delay because decisions are computed from data of heterogeneous lags furthermore decentralization does not unambiguously reduce delay because processing a message precludes processing current data 1 real time decentralized information processing

trade ins and introductory offers in a monopoly we model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers trade ins or new buyers introductory offers of a quasi durable good we analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third degree price discrimination in our two period model the monopolist sets a first period price that segments the second period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good in the second period different prices are quoted to the two market segments we present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers rationality

managerial leverage is limited by the extent of the market hierarchies specialization and the utilization of lawyers human capital abstract this paper examines the role of hierarchies in the organization of human capital intensive production we develop an equilibrium model of hierarchical organization and provide empirical evidence based on confidential data on thousands of law offices the equilibrium assignment of individuals to hierarchical positions varies with the degree of field specialization which increases as the extent of the market increases as individuals knowledge becomes narrower but deeper managerial leverage the number of workers per manager optimally increases to exploit this depth consistent with our model the share of lawyers who work in hierarchies and the ratio of associates to partners increase as market size increases and lawyers field specialize other results provide evidence against alternative interpretations that emphasize unobserved differences in the distribution of demand or firm size effects and lend additional support to the view that in legal services hierarchies help exploit increasing re

reaching for the stars who pays for talent in innovative industries innovative firms need to hire and motivate highly talented workers this article connects the potential returns to innovation to the structure of compensation for skilled employees we show that the software firms that operate in software sectors with high potential upside gains to innovation pay more to star workers than do other firms that operate in stable markets firms operating in product domains with highly skewed positive returns pay employees more in up front starting salaries and offer higher compensation growth the large estimated effects on earnings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls for worker and firm characteristics

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

hearts and spades paradigms of household economics abstract this paper explains why the feminist critique of inequalities within the family poses a serious challenge to conventional economic theories of the household but it also discusses those aspects of both neoclassical and marxian theory that are useful to an analysis of conflict within the family arguing that the bargaining power models being developed by some neoclassical theorist are complementary to marxist influenced structural accounts

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

learning about the nature of production from equilibrium assignment patterns this paper exploits empirically a key insight from lucas 1978 and rosen 1982 that the organization of production and the distribution of earnings across individuals are jointly determined by the equilibrium assignment of individuals to firms and hierarchical positions we study how different classes of production functions generate alternative equilibrium assignments we then use confidential census data on u s law offices to investigate the form that the production function should take to rationalize earnings patterns in legal services we argue that earnings patterns in this industry are consistent with a production function that is characterized by asymmetric sensitivity to the skill of agents in different organizational positions complementarity between managers and workers skill and scale effects in individual skill

the function of authority in transaction cost economics abstract this paper questions the transaction cost characterization of observed authority relations as efficient governance structures various inadequacies in the transaction cost account of work organization and the limits of firm size are traced to its neglect of the possibility that authority may be abused opportunistically this exemplifies a more general propensity in the transaction cost literature that of explaining economic organization in functionalist terms with little attention to the causal mechanisms through which efficient governance structures might actually arise three such mechanisms are considered but none is found to provide an adequate rationale for the imputation of efficiency to observed structures

toward an economic model of the japanese firm i owe a great deal to professor moses abramovitz who suggested that i write this article i appreciate his constant encouragement and guidance which aided me throughout its preparation i am also indebted to three anonymous referees of the journal and to professors ryutaro komiya and michael riordan for their critical comments and helpful suggestions needless to say i am solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper

a behavioral model of the economic long wave abstract this paper presents a simple model of the economic long wave the model is based on the system dynamics national model since 1975 the national model has provided an increasingly rich theory of the economic long wave the theory relates capital investment employment and workforce participation monetary and fiscal policy inflation productivity and innovation and even political values the model presented here focuses on capital investment the structure of the model is shown to be consistent with the principles of bounded rationality the behavior of the model is analyzed and capital self ordering is shown to be sufficient to generate long waves the model complements the national model by providing a representation of the dynamic hypothesis that is amenable to formal analysis and is easily extended to include other important mechanisms that may influence the nature of the long wave

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

sales and consumer lock in this paper examines the dynamically consistent price path for a new product monopolist unable to commit to future prices when consumers must incur setup costs of adopting the product the authors find that setup costs give rise to a price path with introductory sales along the path periods of high prices during which only locked in or captive customers buy the product alternate with sales low price periods during which new customers adopt the product as the stock of captive customers increases over time sales become less frequent after the customer base reaches some critical level no further sales take place they show that the monopolist may hold a sleeping patient in which initial sales of the product are postponed to avoid locking into a high pricing strategy that ignores new customers copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

does product market competition lead firms to decentralize there is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation but there is less empirical evidence especially across countries this has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization to address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal organization of firms including their decentralization decisions across a large range of industries and countries in this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization for example tougher competition may make local manager s information more valuable as delays to decisions become more costly since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play including human capital information and communication technology culture and industrial composition to tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of firms across nations the few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or at best across many firms in a single country we analyze data on almost 4 000 firms across twelve countries in europe north america and asia we find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

incentives in academics why is there tenure this paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market the major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this the analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including tenure track appointments contract buy outs early retirement plans and when a budget crunch hits the elimination of entire departments the results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions

firm employee matching an industry study of u s lawyers the authors study the sources of match specific value at large u s law firms by analyzing how graduates of law schools group into law firms they measure the degree to which lawyers from certain schools concentrate within certain firms and then analyze how this agglomeration can be explained by natural advantage factors such as geographic proximity and by productive complementarities across graduates of a given school large law firms tend to hire from a select group of law schools and individual offices within these firms are substantially more concentrated in terms of hires from particular schools the degree of concentration is highly variable as there is substantial variation in firms hiring strategies two main drivers of variation in law school concentration occur within law offices first geography drives a large amount of concentration as most firms hire largely from local schools second school based networks and possibly productive complementarities appear to be important because p

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process abstract we consider a consumption portfolio problem in continuous time under uncertainty a martingale technique is employed to characterize optimal consumption portfolio policies when there exist nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth we also provide a way to compute and verify optimal policies our verification theorem for optimal policies involves a linear partial differential equation unlike the nonlinear partial differential equation of dynamic programming the relationship between our approach and dynamic programming is discussed we demonstrate our technique by explicitly computing optimal policies in a series of examples in particular we solve the optimal consumption portfolio problem for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility functions when the asset prices follow a geometric brownian motion the optimal policies in this case are no longer linear when nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth are included by these examples one can see that our approach is much easier than the dynamic programming approach

optimal consumption and investment under time varying liquidity constraints we study consumption and investment decisions given realistic time varying constraints on borrowing we first consider the case where borrowing is constrained by a maximum debt to income ratio we then consider collateral borrowing with a maximum loan to value ratio the resulting implications for optimal policies differ considerably from those obtained in the existing literature based on fixed borrowing limits but are consistent with those documented in the empirical literature

do patents slow down technological progress abstract this paper challenges the widely held view in the industrial organization literature that patents always speed up technological progress we introduce a model of an innovating firm with uncertain property right to its innovation the impact of a commitment to an r d project is to create future options for patenting and market introduction each decision undertaken will change the conditions in which the innovator operates it is shown that an increase in patent protection reduces the elasticity of the option value of the program with respect to the value of the project raising the threshold value of market introduction and enhancing the ability of the innovator to wait thus while the effect of patent is to raise the rents on and thereby the potential amount of innovations it also tends to slow down market introduction

optimal asset allocation with fixed term securities we investigate the optimal asset allocation of an investor who can invest in a fixed term security that is only traded at time 0 using a generalized martingale approach we solve the investor s optimal portfolio problem determine the optimal allocation to fixed term securities and provide a representation of trading strategies in terms of a liquidity related derivative we apply our approach to two benchmark scenarios fixed term fixed rate bank deposits and unspanned closed end securities that can only be traded at time 0 we show that both can be key parts of the investor s optimal asset mix and we investigate the dependence of optimal allocations to fixed term investments implied liquidity premia and other characteristics on the underlying model parameters

incentives for lawyers moving away from eat what you kill the authors study an international law firm that changed its compensation plan for team leaders to address a multitasking problem team leaders were focusing their effort on billable hours and not spending sufficient time on leadership activities to build the firm compensation was changed to provide greater incentives for the leadership activities and weaker incentives for billable hours the effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm s team leaders was large and robust team leaders increased their non billable hours and shifted billable hours to team members the firm s new compensation plan combining an objective formula with subjective evaluations is the fastest growing compensation system among law firms today

hedging in incomplete markets with hara utility in the context of merton s original problem of optimal consumption and portfolio choice in continuous time this paper solves an extension in which the investor is endowed with a stochastic income that cannot be replicated by trading the available securities the problem is treated by demonstrating using analytic and in particular viscosity solutions techniques that the value function of the stochastic control problem is a smooth solution of the associated hamilton jacobi bellman hjb equation the optimal policy is shown to exist and given in a feedback form from the optimality conditions in the hjb equation at zero wealth a fixed fraction of income is consumed for large wealth the original merton policy is approached we also give a sufficient condition for wealth under the optimal policy to remain strictly positive

technical change and the profit rate a simple proof of the okishio theorem this note presents a simple geometrical proof of okishio s celebrated theorem on the falling rate of profit okishio 1961 my intent is simply to clarify how okishio s theorem works i will thus refrain from comment on the general debate on the falling rate of profit in marxian economics on the limits of the general linear model used here or on the importance and range of applicability of okishio s contribution to those unfamiliar with the general linear model and the frobenius theorems used here i recommend reference to brody 1970 or pasinetti 1977 the essential economic assumptions underlying the following proof are that there are no scarce non produced means of production no land that each industry produces a single product no joint products that labour is homogeneous and that there are no fixed capital goods the period of production of all goods and the turnover time of all capital goods is one period these are okishio s assumptions recent contributions those of roemer 1979 for example have generalized okishio s result somewhat using the usual notation i will let

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

thick market effects and churning in the labor market evidence from u s cities using u s census microdata we show that on average workers change occupation and industry less in more densely populated areas the result is robust to standard demographic controls as well as to including aggregate measures of human capital and sectoral mix analysis of the displaced worker surveys shows that this effect is present in cases of involuntary separation as well on the other hand we actually find the opposite result higher rates of occupational and industrial switching for the subsample of younger workers these results provide evidence in favor of increasing returns to scale matching in labor markets results from a back of the envelope calibration suggest that this mechanism has an important role in raising both wages and returns to experience in denser areas

nontraded assets in incomplete markets pricing and portfolio choice this paper examines portfolio choice and asset pricing when some assets are nontraded for instance when a country cannot trade claims to its output on world capital markets when a government cann

the firm as a communication network this paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information when these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm it is shown that efficient networks involve centralization that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items

the credibility of social climbing when does inter firm mobility not influence organizational status this paper examines when inter firm mobility influences organizational status whereas a low status firm can accumulate prestigious affiliations by hiring from a high status firm the status distance between these firms may influence whether the mobility event is perceived as credible if the mobility event lacks credibility meaning that market participants believe that the employee moved for a reason other than the new employer s quality then the hiring firm is less likely to improve its status position we also explore this effect s symmetry and find that a high status firm is less likely to experience status decline when the mobility event lacks credibility we assess these hypotheses in the context of the inter firm mobility of partners of the subsidiary offices of international law firms in hong kong from 1998 to 2008

explicit solutions to an optimal portfolio choice problem with stochastic income abstract this paper solves in closed form the optimal portfolio choice problem for an investor with negative exponential utility over terminal wealth facing imperfectly hedgeable stochastic income the returns on income and the stock are imperfectly correlated so the market is incomplete we identify how an investor adjusts their merton rev econ statist 51 1969 247 portfolio of the stock and riskless asset via an intertemporal hedging demand in reaction to the stochastic income under general assumptions on the process governing the income the sign of the hedging demand is the opposite of the sign of the correlation between the income and stock the optimal portfolio in the stock is long stock if the risk premium is positive and correlation negative and short if these signs are reversed specializing in turn to normally distributed income and lognormally distributed income with or without mean reversion the effect of a number of parameters on the optimal portfolio in the stock can be studied when the risk premium on the stock and correlation have opposite signs the optimal portfolio decreases in magnitude with risk aversion unhedgeable variance of income and time and increases in magnitude with the magnitude of correlation under both the lognormal without mean reversion and normal models for income these relationships do not necessarily hold if the signs on the risk premium and correlation are the same in particular the optimal portfolio is not necessarily monotone in risk aversion violating well known static results in models without income when income follows a lognormal model with mean reversion more complicated behavior can occur for instance the optimal portfolio does not have to be monotonic in time regardless of the signs of correlation and the risk premium

rebates introductory sales and the coase conjecture abstract a model of a durable goods monopoly is presented in which results can differ qualitatively from the coase conjecture when introductory sales are used the second price can be higher than the opening price when a rebate is given for the first unit purchased the opening price is strictly greater than the minimum valuation

factors affecting inter industry variation of foreign ownership of manufacturing industry a set of hypotheses incorporating various explanations to foreign direct investment are developed and tested on a simultaneous equation model on australian data the analysis shows that foreign ownership of industry tends to be higher in the humanskill intensive and technology intensive industries high protection seems to be an important inducement for multinational enterprises participation in australian industry the results demonstrate how a major bias can be introduced when the simultaneity involved in the determination of foreign ownership is ignored

radical political economy and the economics of labor markets this essay is the result of a long process involving many drafts and revisions i am grateful to duncan foley for the careful and constructive criticisms offered throughout the project the following people read the manuscript at different stages and although they often disagreed with me they generously provided helpful comments two anonymous referees for this journal samuel bowles william dickens greg dow robert drago richard edwards kathleen engel richard freeman james galbraith herbert gintis jody hoffer gittel sandfordjacoby tom kochan david levine lisa lynch paul osterman michael piore bob rebitzer gil skilman dan slesnick robert thomas and tsuyoshi tsuru comments from participants in seminars at the massachusetts institute of technology university of massachusetts at amherst and hitotsubashi university are also gratefully acknowledged

firm size and industry structure under human capital intensity insights from the evolution of the global advertising industry although existing literature assumes that the human capital intensity of professional services leads to small and flimsy firms several professional services feature large long lived firms to develop insights about firm size and industry structure in human capital intensive industries i analyze the structure and evolution of the advertising industry drawing on a range of quantitative and qualitative evidence i develop two hypotheses regarding the industry s structure and consolidation 1 size differentiation in which firm size and industry structure are connected to the size distribution of clients projects and 2 financial intermediation in which the industry s consolidation is ascribed to organizational innovations that mitigate transaction costs between external investors and ad agency owners i then discuss the applicability of these two hypotheses to other professional services the analysis suggests several new insights about the value of capital the nature of demand and the nature of assets in human capital intensive industries

labor specialization and the extent of the market this paper presents an analytical model of labor specialization workers make human capital investment decisions on the depth and the breadth of their skill given that firms have diverse job requirements and increasing returns to scale workers invest more for the depth of their human capital and less for the breadth as the size of the labor market increases also the larger the size of the market the more varieties of job requirements are used so that the average match between a worker and a firm improves

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

optimal consumption investment policies with undiversifiable income risk and liquidity constraints abstract this paper examines the continuous time optimal consumption and portfolio choice of an investor having an initial wealth endowment and an uncertain stream of income from non traded assets the income stream is not spanned by traded assets and the investor is not allowed to borrow against future income so the financial market is incomplete we solve the corresponding stochastic control problem numerically with the markov chain approximation method prove convergence of the method and study the optimal policies in particular we find that the implicit value the agent attaches to an uncertain income stream typically is much smaller in this incomplete market than it is in the otherwise identical complete market our results suggest that this is mainly due to the presence of liquidity constraints

optimal consumption and equilibrium prices with portfolio constraints and stochastic income abstract this paper examines the intertemporal optimal consumption and investment problem in the presence of a stochastic endowment and constraints on the portfolio choices short sale and borrowing constraints as well as incomplete markets can be modeled as special cases of the class of constraints we consider existence of optimal policies is established under fairly general assumptions on the security price coefficients and the individual s utility function this result is obtained by using martingale techniques to reformulate the individual s dynamic optimization problem as an equivalent static one an explicit characterization of equilibrium risk premia in the presence of portfolio constraints is also provided in the unconstrained case this characterization reduces to consumption based capital asset pricing model journal of economic literatureclassification numbers g11 g12 c61 d52 d91