tax collection with agency costs private contracting or government bureaucrats historically governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes this paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors while bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs profit maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level generally the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

an efficiency explanation for why firms second source firms facing research costs and demand uncertainty may engage in second sourcing in which potential suppliers agree to pool production facilities i show how sellers and buyers both can benefit from the practice second sourcing allows firms to meet a wider range of possible rates of demand and often to supply a given rate of demand at a lower total cost than under non cooperation buyers benefit through a reduced probability of stock outs and frequently a lower purchase price semiconductor industry data are found to be consistent with the paper s predictions i introduction the practice of second sourcing is frequently observed among firms facing technological and demand uncertainty second sourcing encompasses agreements between buyers and sellers requiring that a firm license its proprietary technology to rivals as well as agreements among potential suppliers to pool production facilities the first type of agreement is often explained as guaranteeing buyers a secure supply at a fair price in this type of second sourcing agreement control over production and pricing decisions resides with each supplier the second arrangement where the owner of the production technology controls production and pricing has largely been overlooked by the literature despite its adoption by firms in a wide range of technologically dynamic industries including semiconductors robotics and biotechnology a primary motivation for this second form of secondsourcing i will argue is to achieve a more efficient matching between the industry s productive capacity and market demand this paper indicates how second sourcing of this form may benefit both purchasers and suppliers and identifies the conditions making second sourcing profitable for firms the existing literature has offered two explanations for second sourcing according to the first explanation second sourcing is sought by prospective buyers purchasers may require that a developer license alternative suppliers to force revelation of private cost information in the contract bidding process or to discipline the eventual supplier s pricing behavior examples of this line of reasoning are found in riordan and sappington 1989 anton and yao 1987 demski sappington and spiller 1987 and rob 1986 if this motivation is correct however it is sufficient for firms to compete at the contract bidding stage demsetz 1968 in contrast we often observe competition at the production stage with active second sourcing and a large number of licensed alternative suppliers in a single industry see section v this explanation s exclusive focus on the gains to buyers from second sourcing also is inconsistent with swann s 1987 observation that many manufacturers have actually sought second sources the literature s alternative explanation suggests that second sourcing may be preferred by producers farrell and gallini 1988 and shepard 1987 show how a monopoly supplier can use second sourcing as a commitment not to raise price or lower product quality in the future either of which would debase the value of sunk investments made by prospective purchasers if credible this commitment may stimulate industry demand sufficiently to yield higher profits for the former monopolist despite increased product market competition an important shortcoming of this second explanation is its apparent incongruity with the existence of five six or more second sourced suppliers in a single industry shepard 1987 for example shows that a single licensed alternate supplier will provide the monopolist with its desired credible commitment to future price and quality this paper suggests an alternative explanation that is consistent with observed trends in second sourcing i depart from the existing literature s focus upon principal agent problems to analyze secondsourcing in a market flamework the paper indicates why sellers may secondsource voluntarily explains why multiple second sources will be preferred and shows how both sides in the agreement may benefit

exclusive contracts and protection of investments we consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship contrary to some informal claims in the literature we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship i e are purely internal exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer s trade with other sellers i e have external effects we examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare and the private incentives of the buyer seller coalition to use it

street level political controls over federal bureaucracy local partisan activities of legislators and their electoral coalitions systematically influence field office activities of federal bureaucracies in their electoral districts this alternative to centralized democratic controls over bureaucracy occurs because discretionary policy decisions made at the field office level are influenced by local resources generated through partisan activities our study of county level occupational safety and health administration enforcement in new york 1976 85 finds that county state and federal elected officials influence local enforcement activities with liberal democratic legislators associated with more active enforcement the county political parties are most influential for activities with the most local discretion while members of congress are more influential for local activities more readily controlled by the national office

buyer supplier interaction asset specificity and product choice abstract firms often differentiate their products through the use of inputs that are differentiated or specialized the goal of this paper is to explore how the demand for specific investments may affect product variety in a bilateral duopolistic industry i develop a model where the degree of specificity of investments is endogenously determined through the product choices of both downstream buyers and upstream suppliers of inputs the existence of non contractible investments results in the emergence of a single supplier of a non specialized input however as the importance of having specific inputs increases fully specialized suppliers may emerge the buyers choose to increase their own competition by producing more similar products only in cases when the inputs are non specialized they do so to increase the investment incentives of the suppliers

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

savings and loan and finance industry pac contributions to incumbent members of the house banking committee this paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry pacs and membership on the house banking committee the distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the house banking committee the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator we find that members of the house banking committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance pacs than do other members of congress and that being chairman of the house banking committee also pays a dividend

product introduction with network externalities the authors study the introduction of a new product in a market with network externalities there is a common presumption that such markets exhibit excess inertia i e that they are biased toward existing products in contrast the authors provide conditions under which equilibrium involves insufficient friction i e a tendency to rush into new incompatible technologies they also analyze the firms incentives to make their products compatible and they show that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against compatibility copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

complements and substitutes in profiting from innovation a choice experimental approach the ability of firms to effectively use mechanisms that support them in profiting from technological innovation is key to outperforming competitors yet such mechanisms have for the most part been studied in isolation without accounting for interactions between them we address this gap by developing a conjoint based method to study such interactions and by applying it to analyze interactions between product related patents and three other appropriability mechanisms to this end we conduct and analyze a series of discrete choice experiments with 319 managers within a leading international communications equipment company as a result we find the number of product related patents to be complementary to the overall size of the patent portfolio and complementary with an interesting exception to contributions to open standards we also find indications of a substitutive interaction with lead time advantages hence the effectiveness of patents seems to be leveraged by controlled diffusion of the underlying technologies and by the size of the firm s patent portfolio a finding that may contribute to explaining the patent paradox theoretical and managerial implications are discussed

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

nonmarket performance evidence from u s electric utilities building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of political markets where firms transact over public policies with government policy makers we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms nonmarket strategies we propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians the firm s recent experience with policy makers and the opportunity to learn from other firms recent experiences and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of u s privately owned electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our arguments

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design

market structure and the timing of technology adoption with network externalities abstract the paper shows that in the presence of network externalities consumers adopt conventional technologies too early the waiting option for a newly emerging technology is not exercised enough this problem is aggravated when the new technology is provided by a single producer with market power because any positive value created via waiting by current consumers will be ex post appropriated by the monopolist therefore the monopolist s power to extract surplus operates against his own interests in this dynamic setting the paper also shows how the producer of a new technology can partially overcome the problem of too little waiting by using licensing as a commitment device

the dynamics of political bureaucratic adaptation through the 1980s political science research produced a more dynamic view of how bureaucracies respond to changing political conditions however much of this research ignored the complex stimulus environment within which bureaucracies operate as well as the potentially rich bureaucratic response dynamic that can exist we extend our previous work on the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy by developing a model of political bureaucratic adaptation themodel is tested with output data from four environmental protection agency programs between 1979 and 1988 the results show that politicalbureaucratic adaptation is indeed a more complex phenomenon than suggested by earlier research stimuli to bureaucratic behavior include discrete events event progressions and tonal shifts in the policy environment bureaucratic responses can be immediate delayed or distributed through time in probabilistic fashion substantively the results offer new insights on how political institutions affect bureaucratic behavior they also suggest how why and to what bureaucracy responds

price competition and compatibility in the presence of positive demand externalities in many cases the benefit to a consumer of a product increases with the number of other users of the same product these demand interdependencies are referred to in the literature as positive demand externalities or network externalities this paper examines the dynamic pricing behaviors of an incumbent and a later entrant with special attention to the impacts of demand externalities compatibility and competition on prices and profits defining market power as the ability to price above a competitor without losing market share we show how demand externalities and installed base combine to confer market power we model optimal pricing as a differential game with the optimal price trajectory established as nash open loop controls for a duopoly durable goods market with strong demand externalities the results show an increasing price trajectory can be optimal as expected a new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of the incumbent especially when demand externalities are strong and the installed base of the incumbent is large less intuitively the incumbent as well may be better off agreeing on common standards the comparison of monopoly and duopoly shows that under strong demand externalities and a small installed base the incumbent profits from compatible entry

restructuring agricultural economics extension to meet changing needs the evidence is increasing that cooperative extension if not the agriculture component of the land grant university system itself may be unraveling the director of the office of management and budget has recommended that federal funding for extension be eliminated three fellows of the aaea suggest that if the land grant system were reformulated today there would be no extension component a past president of the aaea argues that the whole land grant university system has lost its sense of mission schuh to many these positions defy logic ignore the contribution that extension has made to

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

politics and the rescue of insolvent savings and loans before 1989 the results presented in this paper are consistent with those predicted by public choice economists who believe that regulatory agencies represent the interests of their controlling congressional committees membership on committees is not random congressmen seek committee assignments where they can represent the interests of their constituency congressmen from states where financial institutions are significant will seek membership on their respective banking committees once on those committees congressmen will seek to protect and promote their own constituency in the case of the savings and loan industry insolvent savings and loans received benefits from staying in operation these savings and loans gained another chance to gamble for resurrection being shut down or placed in a management consignment program did not give this option the results presented in our paper indicate that participation in one of the rescue programs is not random savings and loans in states with political power representation on the senate banking committee are less likely to be resolved

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

labor market dynamics in the u s food sector a simultaneous equation model is estimated to explain labor market phenomena including wages employment and labor productivity and food prices at manufacturing and retail levels of the u s food industry dynamic simulation results show that endogenizing input costs in a fully specified markup pricing model leads to a complex long run pattern of food price determination wage determination is found to play a central role linking general price levels to food sector prices and labor market behavior energy price changes are shown to significantly affect food prices food sector labor productivity is found to decline in response to exogenous commodity price shocks

regulation of price increases abstract u s federal and state governments rarely regulate healthcare price levels but do regulate price changes for pharmaceuticals hospitals and health insurance previous research showed that limiting price increases can raise launch prices and reduce both profit and social welfare assuming consumers are myopic we show that with forward looking consumers limiting price increases can have the opposite effect that is launch prices fall while profit and social welfare rise ironically inflation regulation can cause inflation to rise but only because firms are reducing launch prices to make the regulation bind and credibly commit to future prices

will bounty hunting revenue agents increase enforcement while the final version of the 1986 tax reform act retained budget funding of the irs the senate proposal to finance spending from audit revenues represented a seriously debated alternative that continues to receive attention as a method for increasing enforcement at one level the ultimate failure of the proposal is puzzling given congress s unwillingness to raise tax rates to cover spending the budget deficits of the 1980s must be financed from some other source inflation borrowing or increased enforcement turning the irs into a bounty hunting agency would seem to be a straightforward way of producing extra revenue

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

agricultural economics beyond the farm gate the industrialization of american agriculture during the past three decades has diminished farm numbers and the farm population while total agricultural production has increased the input finance service processing transportation and distribution industries surrounding production agriculture have now become the dominant economic components of the food and agriculture system the transformation of production agriculture from a major economic sector of the u s economy to minor status has been in progress since the founding days of the republic but has received impetus in the post world war ii era via the technological revolution involving mechanical chemical biological and managerial innovations on the farm what has emerged from this process is a highly interdependent subsystem of the u s economy for providing food and fiber for consumers at home and abroad agricultural scientists including agricultural economists have tended to place undue emphasis upon the technological economic and social aspects of production agriculture as the food and fiber system changed over time while public investments in research and education for the production side of agriculture are admittedly inadequate the lack of attention to the technological and economic problems of the balance of the food and fiber system is deplorable in terms of value added employment or other measures of economic importance the food and fiber system beyond the farm gate is roughly twice that of production agriculture more significantly productivity and inflation problems beyond the farm gate have affected national economic performance more persistently than gyrations in the farm economy per se the overall purpose of this paper is to challenge agricultural economists and policy makers to think about some important issues facing our contemporary economic system this emphasis does not mean that farm production economics is unimportant or unnecessary it is argued however that changes are needed within the agricultural economics profession to deal with a large number of significant economic problems and concerns beyond the farm gate

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

sales and consumer lock in this paper examines the dynamically consistent price path for a new product monopolist unable to commit to future prices when consumers must incur setup costs of adopting the product the authors find that setup costs give rise to a price path with introductory sales along the path periods of high prices during which only locked in or captive customers buy the product alternate with sales low price periods during which new customers adopt the product as the stock of captive customers increases over time sales become less frequent after the customer base reaches some critical level no further sales take place they show that the monopolist may hold a sleeping patient in which initial sales of the product are postponed to avoid locking into a high pricing strategy that ignores new customers copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

constituency interests and delegation in european and american trade policy trade policy in the eu and the united states is to a large extent delegated to executive agents existing explanations claim that legislators delegate because they wish to liberalize but are unable to achieve this on their own the authors show that legislators delegate powers to obtain foreign market access for exporters and protection for import competing interests confronted with heterogeneousdemands from both groups principals delegate to two sets of agents to confer concentrated benefits on these constituencies and install control to avoid concentrated losses while maintaining the flow of resources from lobbying the authors derive the empirically observable implication that with the increase in the share of tradables in the overall economy delegation as well as control should steadily increase with time they then test the validity of this proposition for u s trade policy since 1916 and for european trade policy since 1958

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

information and the hold up problem we examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input we study how the resulting hold up problem is affected by the seller s information about the investing party s likely returns from its investment our principal focus is on the effects of the investment s being observable by the non investing party contrary to popular intuition we find that an improvement in the seller s information e g the investment s being observable rather than not can benefit the buyer and harm the seller we also find that other popular intuitions about this problem are either false incomplete or require strong assumptions to be valid

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

capital rules the domestic politics of international regulatory harmonization in the past fifteen years financial regulators from the developed world have attempted to create international regulatory standards in a variety of financial issue areas their negotiations are notable for the stark variation in the preferences of regulators toward international regulatory harmonization certain regulators actively resist any attempts at regulatory harmonization while others are vocal in their advocacy for an international agreement when will regulators seek to harmonize their rules with their foreign counterparts i propose a principal agent framework for analyzing regulator behavior that views international harmonization as a means of satisfying domestic political pressures the framework predicts that regulators are more likely to seek international regulatory harmonization when confidence in the stability of financial institutions is declining and when competitive pressures are increasing from foreign firms facing less stringent regulations i explore the consistency of the framework with two important cases in the history of international financial regulation the negotiations among bank regulators leading up to the 1988 basel accord on bank capital adequacy and the negotiations among securities regulators over capital adequacy for securities firms between 1988 and 1992 i thank gabe aguilera david bach ethan bueno de mesquita dan carpenter bill clark mark copelovitch jeff frieden dan gingerich dan ho devesh kapur joseph n r sanberg ross schaap allan stam matt stephenson two anonymous reviewers and the editors of io for helpful comments discussions and feedback i am also indebted to the thirty current and former regulators and financial industry executives who participated in interviews to advance this project finally i thank the weatherhead center for international affairs and the center for european studies for research funding

consumer investment in product specific capital the monopoly case for many pairs of complementary products one good might usefully be called a consumption good and the other a capital good a concrete example of such complements is gasoline and automobiles because of complementarity investment in automobiles depends on the price of gas since cars bought today will be around for several years there is a dynamic link between the current price of gas and future demand for gas opec has a strategic incentive to set a low oil price today since a low price promotes investment in big cars and other oil fueled equipment which in turn increases the future profit of the oil industry consumer investment in product specific capital is a feature of the markets for many products especially if one takes a broad perspective of what this capital decision can be for instance continuing the example of the gas market the decision to reside far from work is analogous to the decision to buy a big car since 1 the decision may be influenced by the current price of gas and 2 the decision affects an individual s future demand for gas as another example consider the demand for phone service in response to a low price of phone service businesses makes capital decisions such as the purchase of computer telemarketing machines and other phone equipment the businesses may also configure their marketing strategy to use human phone contact rather than direct personal contact and such a strategy involves investment in human capital these investment decisions all tend to make the future demand for phone service relatively inelastic this paper presents a model in which there are capital goods cars which can be used for two periods and a consumption good gas which fuels the cars big cars are gas guzzlers i e car size and gas are complements consumers select the size of their car on the basis of the current price of gas and their expectations of the future

complementary network externalities and technological adoption abstract we address the adoption of technology when there are network externalities and networks are characterized by complementary products produced by different firms we show that when the software firms are bertrand competitors a hardware technology with lower software development costs is adopted for many parameter values for which it is socially optimal to adopt the other technology the over adoption is due to a discrepancy between the private and social benefit of having a larger network

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

nonmarket strategy performance evidence from u s electric utilities this paper develops and tests a theory of the performance determinants of a firm s nonmarket strategy in shaping public policy outcomes building on the concept of political market attractiveness we argue that nonmarket performance is influenced by both the characteristics of a firm s regulatory and political environment especially rivalry among interest groups or politicians and by internal capabilities that enable a firm to mitigate political transaction costs using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by u s electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our approach

impact of licensing on investment and financing of technology development technology innovations continue to be one of the greatest drivers of economic growth realizing the value of such innovations however requires substantial follow on investments in development and commercialization the value of these investments is difficult to capture because of uncertain demand and potential competition this often leads to difficulties in obtaining outside financing for these investments in this paper we explore how licensing contracts can both dissuade other firms from developing alternative technologies and alleviate the financing problem we develop a model in which a firm that invests in the development efforts of an innovation can license its technology to a potential competitor a variety of licensing possibilities is considered including fixed fees royalty schedules and two part licenses consisting of an up front payment and a capped royalty schedule when the firm has no financial constraint a royalty schedule that depends on realized demand dominates a fixed fee per license when investment funds are constrained a royalty cap license with an up front payment can serve as a source of financing we also study the investment problem conditional on the licensing and financing decisions

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

strategic second sourcing by multinationals multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities we argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost the increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits we argue that this theory also has implications for the make or buy literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization

growth incentives to invest in a network externality environment firms that operate in the telecommunications industry often have to make large and risky investments in digital infrastructure this paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in infrastructure projects in industry environments that incur substantial network externalities we suggest that in the presence of network externalities a firm s rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base an implication of this result is that firms may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms investments pre empt them the results mean that firms that undertake earlier successful investment may achieve preemption very quickly the sources of network externalities contribute to the incidence of strategic alliances in network industries particularly when coupled with the pressures of technical uncertainty copyright 1998 by oxford university press

conflicts interest groups and politics in structural reforms abstract the present study is to my knowledge the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms politicians regulators and interest groups special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform thereby weakening their confidence in it conflicts also benefit interest groups increasing their effectiveness vis a vis politicians using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform israel s financial market i find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups the lower the probability that a reform will be approved these conflicts together with the strength of interest groups have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms so that it takes on average 10 years for a reform to be adopted

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

doctors with borders occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking conclusions that skilled americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants in this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition in practice high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high skill migrants who share their occupation specific skills licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants from a collective action perspective skilled natives can more easily secure sub national occupation specific policies than influence national immigration policy we exploit the unique structure of the american medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations we show that over the 1973 2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and as a consequence received fewer new migrant physicians by our estimates over a third of all us states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements this article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration regulatory rent seeking as a barrier to the cross national mobility of human capital and the public policy implications of such barriers

funding for agricultural economics needs and strategies for the 1980s public funding for work in agricultural economics teaching research and extension appears to be declining in real terms at the start of the 1980s following two decades of real increases there is a call for reductions in spending by government at all levels a call for less taxes and for public accountability at the same time there are more students in the courses that agricultural economists teach there is a renewed interest in agricultural business curricula graduate study in agricultural economics is attracting new students from the biological and social sciences as well as agriculture the demand for competent applied economists particularly agricultural economists with advanced degrees appears to be growing the anomaly of apparent increases in demand coupled with declining public funding presents a challenge to the profession it should be one for which economists are prepared after all we regularly teach students about economic decision rules for allocating scarce resources among competing ends the political environment requires that we take our classroom lessons seriously and put them in practice in our own operations this paper explores several approaches and strategies for funding work in agricultural economics and more effective use of current resources we begin with an overview of changes in funding during the decade of the 1970s drawing upon secondary data and results of a mail questionnaire sent to agricultural economics department chairmen and administrators in the spring of 1981 we turn then to discussion of the demand current and prospective for services of agricultural economists and the capacity of current institutions to service that demand we conclude with discussion of funding strategies and recommendations on actions which might be pursued by the aaea

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

determinants of the amount and type of corruption in state fiscal bureaucracies an analysis of late imperial china a principal agent model of relations between rulers and state officials is used to derive several propositions concerning the amount and type of corruption in state bureaucracies the model is appl

the impact of monetary regime changes some exchange rate evidence abstract lucas has argued that coefficient changes can be explained by changing expectations caused by the policy regime shifts this paper provides evidence consistent with the lucas critique using an efficient markets news framework kalman filter results show that surprise relative u s monetary expansion is associated both with periods of u s depreciation and appreciation i show that variables representing changes in monetary policy regimes can explain a substantial fraction of the movements in the time varying parameter

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

a political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments one of the main themes of partisan dispute in the recent past and doubtless in the foreseeable future is whether or not the value of detailed governmental regulation of the economy exceeds the cost this is exactly the kind of dispute that might be resolved by raising it from the level of mere partisan interest to the level of economic and political science unfortunately however it has not been raised because we do not have the necessary intellectual apparatus namely a theory about the motivation for the operation of and the consequences of regulation as a result most of the discussion consists of biased ad hoc explanations of particular cases with little effort to formulate and test alternative generalizations we have therefore nothing but unresolved and unresolvable disputes about a more or less random collection of stories and some contradictory recipes about cause and effect

efficiency equity and politics democratic controls over the tax collector a tradeoff among the principles of efficiency equity and political responsiveness is often alleged but seldom analyzed empirically in public administration we show that the tradeoffs among these principles implicit in the allocation of resources across different jurisdictions can be explicitly modeled in terms of an agency utility function we then use a sur regression model to estimate the relative impact of each principle on districtlevel audit allocation by the irs for the periods 1963 1980 and 1982 1991 the results indicate that efficiency has by far the greatest influence on the allocation of irs audits with equity and direct political responsiveness playing lesser roles the relative emphasis on efficiency is also responsive to historical and partisan changes in national politics before 1981 the irs increased its concern with equity when democratic influence increased however after the 1981 reagan tax cut and consequent revenue shortfalls the direction of partisan impact reversed as democrats became more concerned with efficiency and republicans with equity furthermore efficiency and political responsiveness both increased in importance relative to equity as deficits and partisan differences over tax and spending policies grew following 1981

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

do epa defendants prefer republicans evidence from the 2000 election i introduction there is an extensive body of literature documenting the effects of political interference in bureaucratic agencies much of this deals with the enforcement of antitrust disputes as mediated by the federal trade commission a corresponding literature on the political control of the environmental bureaucracy does not exist however there is a perception that the aggressiveness of environmental protection agency epa enforcement could vary from one administration to the next 1 the present article aims to subject these anecdotal impressions to empirical tests it uses the change in the price of publicly quoted companies that have civil judicial litigation outstanding with the epa when a political event takes place such as a presidential election to assess the market s reaction to this event ii literature review the biggest problem in doing empirical studies of the effect of political and legislative changes on stock market valuations is the fact that these changes happen slowly over a period of months or years given the assumption of efficient markets stock markets should immediately reflect all available information including the possibility of political changes this is the reason why studies of the effect of legislation and political change on market valuations have generally found insignificant results as in binder 1985 cutler 1988 downs and tehranian 1988 and graddy et al 1992 2 this article uses a better measure of the probability of a political event the measure of the probability of the outcome of an election is obtained from the iowa electronic market iem only herron et al 1999 and knight forthcoming have used this data source for similar purpose before 3 the iem is a set of continuous double auction markets operated by the university of iowa henry b tippie school of business most of the existing literature in this field has used opinion poll data such as brander 1991 the disadvantages of this are well known they are usually conducted over several days and so do not represent the probability of the election of a candidate on a single day they do not represent probabilities of election but rather expected vote shares they are not usually released daily and finally they have wide margins of error especially long before an election when many people have not yet made up their minds who to support herron et al 1999 pp 58 59 these are also some of the reasons that economists are generally skeptical of surveys preferring to rely instead on revealed preferences the only other possibility is the use of bookmaker s odds as used by roberts 1990b this still has the disadvantage that odds are not quoted daily and so must be interpolated also the present study attempts to measure the importance of political control of the environmental bureaucracy the existing literature focused on a variety of other federal agencies and industries iii data and empirical model data the dependent variable used here is the abnormal daily returns to the stock market price of a company that has environmental litigation outstanding on the day of an election the idea is that if the market considers the company to be politically sensitive then the returns to the company s shares should respond to changes in the probability of a political event as reported by the iem the stock market data comes from the center for research in security prices cr sp 4 the article uses individual company returns as opposed to the construction of portfolios of stocks that are then combined with data on returns to the portfolio as used by roberts 1990b and herron et al 1999 the present paper uses interaction terms between the likelihood of political events and individual characteristics of the companies such as the industry that they are in and the number of times they have been sued before this is not possible when aggregate portfolio returns are used because that would not allow the isolation of disaggregated individual company effects

exclusionary vertical contracts with multiple entrants abstract this paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in the presence of multiple entrants unlike the single entrant model in previous literature an entrant competes not only with the incumbent to deal with buyers but also with other entrants the competition among entrants then serves as a commitment such that low wholesale prices are offered to buyers when they deviate from exclusive contracts we argue that this commitment effect becomes a barrier to exclusive dealing and that the results differ drastically from the predictions of the single entrant framework

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

open architecture and r d incentives in open systems firms give up their property rights to technologies and permit other companies to use these technologies we ask how an incumbent s architecture choice affects social welfare by altering r d competition among firms more specifically we ask whether an incumbent by adopting an open system can establish its socially inefficient technology as the market standard while an entrant is developing a more efficient technology it is shown that an incumbent has an incentive to preempt an entrant s competing technology by choosing an open system but that the open system might result in a premature market standard

the economics of repeated extortion we provide a simple model of repeated extortion in particular we ask whether corrupt government officials opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations if the choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce entrepreneurs to pursue a fly by night strategy by adopting a technology with an inefficiently low sunk cost component the unique equilibrium is characterized by a mixed strategy of the government official in future demand our model thus explains why arbitrariness is such a central feature of extortion we also investigate implications of the stability of corrupt regimes for dynamic extortion and discuss alternative applications for our framework

fragmented standards and the development of japan s microcomputer software industry abstract the japanese software industry has yet to join the ranks of japan s other industries pre eminent in global competition this research offers a perspective on the delay of a significant japanese presence in global markets that relies on newly developed network externalities theory in economics after summarizing the influence of the hardware industry on the development of the downstream software industry the paper describes the deleterious impact of multiple standards on the emerging microcomputer software industry the paper outlines public policy efforts to address problems that arise from multiple standards and notes that public policy has proven less successful in this industry a comparison of the competitiveness of the us and japanese microcomputer software industries follows the discussion on competitiveness suggests that while japanese firms may lag in the near term the problems posed by multiple standards may well aid in the long term adaptability and performance of the japanese industry in contrast the us industry while benefiting from the existence of a single dominant standard has evidenced difficulty moving to new standards

balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower licensing process the u s federal energy regulatory commission ferc must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation s growing demand for power production every time it issues a hydroelectric license this paper models the bureaucratic agency s decision making process in issuing these licenses data on nearly 500 hydro power licenses issued from 1983 to 2005 are utilized it is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are by far the largest influences on ferc s regulatory decisions implying that if the current allocation of surface water in the united states is considered inefficient the most effective way to alter this allocation is by passing new legislation or by implementing institutional reform at ferc

intertemporal common agency and organizational design how much decentralization abstract in common agency where one agent contracts with several principals to what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision of incentives if the agency is over contract complements where an increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of contracting with other principals complete centralization seems optimal since this internalizes all externalities we show that this intuition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations for although centralization provides more accurate incentives to the agent it also aggravates the ratchet effect and this negative effect may dominate the optimal degree of decentralization is discussed and partly characterized

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

political solutions to market problems for some market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention however the fact that self interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion it is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions and hence to analyze self interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector our approach emphasizes this institutional structure warts and all and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance

a public choice theory of the great contraction the conventional chicago wisdom about the great contraction is that it was the result of a massive policy failure according to this view the collapse of the economy was brought about mostly by the fact that the monetary policymakers of the day were more concerned with internal power struggles than with supplying reserves to member banks an explanation which with apologies to professor stigler must have elicited uproarious laughter at the bankers club it has been our purpose in this paper to suggest an alternative theory briefly stated the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the fed from 1929 to 1933 was motivated by the economic interests of member banks the fed s policy produced a massive differential failure rate between member and nonmember banks in which the latter were eliminated at a rate at least five times higher than the former fed member banks faced substantially less competition in the banking market after the house cleaning than before although all banks suffered net losses in the short run in the long run member bank profitability was enhanced by the reduction in the number of nonmember competitors at the same time the fed itself benefitted from a substantial increase in the proportion of the total banking system within its bureaucratic jurisdiction and from a change in its method of finance putting the great contraction in interest group terms we suggested that the fed was acting as the agent of congressmen serving on important oversight committees who in turn were representing the interests of the member banks in their states due to interstate branching restrictions the state is the relevant geographic market within which banks compete we tested this hypothesis using bank failure rate data across states and found that holding other things equal the failure rates of nonmember banks in the early 1930s were significantly higher in states with representation on the house banking and currency committee of course not even friedman and schwartz 1963 299 301 argue that fed policy was the sole direct cause of the great contraction but instead maintain that the fed acted in such a way as to take a relatively severe contraction and turn it into by far the most severe business cycle contraction in the whole of u s history but to the extent that the great contraction was worsened by fed policy and this in turn led to the succession of events called the great depression the latter was a side effect of economically rational interests of federal reserve member banks to say the least this would appear to have been an enormously inefficient method of obtaining the postulated benefits certainly there were other less costly methods available by which member banks could have reduced the number of their nonmember rivals this is perhaps the most difficult problem our theory of the great contraction confronts we can offer two responses first although the literature on the great depression tends to focus on fluctuations in national macroeconomic aggregates e g the money supply unemployment and so on it is clear that the severity of the depression differed radically across states states with relatively large agricultural sectors tended to be especially hard hit suffering the highest rates of unemployment and the most significant numbers of bank failures by contrast states in some other areas most notably new england and the southeast seemed to be less seriously affected we note that in some of our regressions the number of nonmember bank failures was negatively and significantly related to state unemployment rates in 1934 this is certainly not conclusive evidence but it does suggest a pattern of differential costs associated with the great contraction that is the costs of providing benefits to federal reserve member banks in states with representation on the relevant oversight committees may have fallen more heavily on the economies of states not so represented if so this would cast a very different light on the actual costs of these policies to the relevant political decision makers second the potential dilemma in this case is no worse than that encountered in the application of the economic theory of politics to many other kinds of government behavior economists since adam smith have ascribed protectionist trade policies to the influence of special interest groups who benefit modestly at the cost of relatively huge economic inefficiencies many other government actions that might be plausibly explained from an interest group perspective would similarly seem to involve costs to the economy which grossly outweigh the benefits special interests might reasonably expect presumably even in such seemingly extreme cases marginal benefits equal marginal costs to the relevant actors some writers have suggested that the political marketplace in modern democracies is characterized by much larger transactions costs than are normally encountered in ordinary markets see demsetz 1982 this might help explain the seemingly huge discrepancies we observe between apparent concentrated benefits and diffused costs in depression era monetary policy in any event this problem is not peculiar to our theory but is shared by many applications of the interest group model of government it is worth emphasizing that the events we have described do fall into the interest group model s stylized depiction of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs moreover without having a complete picture of all of the options available to the monetary policymakers we cannot be sure that any of the alternatives was in fact more efficient we do know the path that was chosen and that contrary to the conventional wisdom this path had a rationally motivated interest group basis

u s politics and greater regulation of inward foreign direct investment an analyst of u s foreign economic policy observes that each wave of antiforeign sentiment associated with the surge of foreign direct investment fdi coming into the united states washes ashore a flotsam of restrictive and exclusionary laws that recedes slightly or becomes buried and forgotten in the sand only to advance again with a new wave during the late 1980s the controversy generated by the sharp rise of japanese acquisitions in the united states washed ashore the latest flotsam of regulatory measures and further advanced the tangle of rules and regulations targeting inward foreign direct investment ifdi of the various types of fdi the present study is concerned mainly with the policy change toward foreign investment in an already established domestic business this type of investment often involves merger or acquisition and is distinct from a greenfield investment where the foreign investor establishes from scratch a new business in the host economy

testing theories of agency behavior evidence from hydropower project relicensing decisions of the federal energy regulatory commission theories of agency behavior are examined via an application to hydropower project relicensing by the federal energy regulatory commission ferc in the relicensing of each project fish and wildlife agencies submit recommendations to ferc ferc then enters a twostage deliberation process for each recommendation econometric analysis of these decisions covers 933 recommendations made for 72 projects relicensed during 1980 96 a new law the electric consumers protection act substantially altered ferc s decisions while a new administration the clinton administration exerted a mixed effect both events influenced the number of recommendations per project made by the fish and wildlife agencies

competing for global capital or local voters the politics of business location incentives the competition for global capital has led to interjurisdictional competition between countries states and cities as to who can offer the most attractive incentives to firms in this study we examine the domestic politics of this competition by focusing on incentive use in the united states from 1999 to 2012 we define incentives as the targeted tax deductions or exemptions that are used to lure businesses into a locality drawing on data from municipal incentive programs we examine how electoral competition shapes the use and oversight of targeted incentives we find evidence that cities with elected mayors provide larger incentives than non elected city managers by taking advantage of exogeneity in the assignment of city government institutions and a database of over 2000 investment incentives from 2010 to 2012 we also find that elected mayors enjoy more lax oversight of incentive projects than their appointed counterparts our results have important implications for the study of interjurisdictional competition and the role of electoral institutions in shaping economic policy

bundling new products with old to signal quality with application to the sequencing of new products abstract this paper provides a new rationale for bundling based on informational leverage bundling a product of established quality to one of unknown quality can mitigate the problem of asymmetric information encountered in the latter market leveraging reputation in one market into another has implications for the timing of new product introductions bundling motivated by informational leverage enhances efficiency by increasing consumer s access to costly information when the possibility of endogenous timing of product introduction is considered however the welfare consequences of bundling are ambiguous the positive effect of market creation must be weighed against the negative effect of market delay

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union

orders to supply as substitutes for commitments to aftermarkets a number of recent antitrust cases in canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service or ganizations earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply this paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit it goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages

paying for permanence an economic analysis of epa s cleanup decisions at superfund sites we analyze epa s cleanup decisions at over 100 superfund sites and examine whether and how epa trades off the cost against the permanence of cleanup epa s decisions reveal both a preference for permanent solutions and an aversion to cost for example epa prefers incinerating soils to isolating and containing them in place but not at any price at larger sites epa appears willing to accept additional costs of as much as 40 million to incinerate with regard to environmental equity we find little evidence that epa s cost permanence tradeoff is affected by socioeconomic characteristics in the communities surrounding the sites

economies of scale and inefficiency in county extension councils a case for consolidation current funding mission and organizational difficulties question the long run survival of extension and the land grant system consolidation of county extension offices is seen as a possible remedy for extension s problems this paper estimates scale economies and inefficiencies in county extension offices in kansas using parametric and nonparametric techniques large economies of scale and inefficiencies are found based on the empirical results several simulations are performed to measure the short run cost savings associated with consolidation the results reveal that while all counties would experience significant savings from consolidating rural and less populated counties would experience the greatest per unit savings copyright 2001 oxford university press