costly arbitrage evidence from closed end funds arbitrage costs lead to large deviations of prices from fundamentals using a sample of closed end funds i find that the market value of a fund is more likely to deviate from the value of its assets 1 for funds with portfolios that are difficult to replicate 2 for funds that pay out smaller dividends 3 for funds with lower market values and 4 when interest rates are high these factors are related to the magnitude of the deviation as opposed to the direction i e whether discount or premium and explain a quarter of cross sectional mispricing variation these findings are consistent with noise trader models of asset pricing

benchmarking portfolio insurance and technical analysis a monte carlo comparison of dynamic strategies of asset allocation abstract this paper makes an extensive simulation comparison of popular dynamic strategies of asset allocation for each strategy alternative measures have been calculated for risk return and risk adjusted performance sharpe ratio sortino ratio return at risk moreover the strategies are compared in different market situations bull bear no trend markets and with different market volatility taking into account transaction costs and discrete rebalancing of portfolios the simulations show a dominant role of constant proportion strategies in bear and no trend markets and a preference for benchmarking strategies in bull markets these results are independent of the volatility level and the risk adjusted measure adopted

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

derivative pricing using multivariate affine generalized hyperbolic distributions abstract in this paper we use multivariate affine generalized hyperbolic magh distributions introduced by schmidt et al 2006 to show how to price multidimensional derivatives when the underlying asset follows a magh distribution we also illustrate the approach using market data from the bovespa sao paulo stock exchange and the exchange rate of the brazilian real vs us dollar to price some multidimensional derivatives

tempered stable and tempered infinitely divisible garch models abstract in this paper we introduce a new garch model with an infinitely divisible distributed innovation this model which we refer to as the rapidly decreasing tempered stable rdts garch model takes into account empirical facts that have been observed for stock and index returns such as volatility clustering non zero skewness and excess kurtosis for the residual distribution we review the classical tempered stable cts garch model which has similar statistical properties by considering a proper density transformation between infinitely divisible random variables we can find the risk neutral price process thereby allowing application to option pricing we propose algorithms to generate scenarios based on garch models with cts and rdts innovations to investigate the performance of these garch models we report parameter estimates for the dow jones industrial average index and stocks included in this index to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed model we calculate option prices based on the index

long forward and zero coupon rates can never fall in frictionless markets having no arbitrage the asymptotic zero coupon rate never falls the same is true of the long forward rate the long par coupon rate can rise and fall due to forward rate movements at short maturities this article relates the three types of interest rates and formalizes and proves the impossibility results for falling asymptotic rates these results can be tested in a parametric term structure specification that is rich enough to identify a time series of long rates the results show that it is not possible to specify arbitrarily the long forward or zero coupon rate process copyright 1996 by university of chicago press

mean variance theory in complete markets two paradigms in the pricing of risky assets are the complete markets model of arrow and debreu and mean variance pricing as embodied in the capital asset pricing model capm the former is primarily of theoretical interest in fact prior to the recent work of banz and miller 1978 and breeden and litzenberger 1978 there was little thought or hope of practical applications on the other hand the hegemony of the capm is due mostly to its apparent ease of applicability and to a lesser extent its empirical justification in a competitive market with no taxes transactions costs or institutional constraints on portfolio holdings the allocation of the available assets will be pareto optimal the end of period distribution of wealth or the consumption goods however will typically be pareto optimal only when there is available an arrow debreu security for each contingency since by definition a pareto superior reallocation is weakly preferred by all investors a complete set of arrow debreu markets should naturally arise provided they are not too costly to establish the complete markets model of arrow and debreu and the meanvariance capital asset pricing model capm are two paradigms of risky asset markets this paper provides an integration of these two theories we prove that the standard meanvariance separation theorem obtains in a complete market only if all investors have quadratic utility in addition the familiar capm pricing relation can hold for all assets in a complete market only if arbitrage opportunities exist on the positive side we show that the validity of this relation for the primary assets in a complete market is unaffected by the distribution of returns on the created financial assets

using asset allocation to protect spending the management of an educational endowment or other income producing portfolio involves two strategic decisions at the fund level asset allocation and choice of a spending rule traditionally these two decisions are linked for example to preserve capital on average but the optimal link would be more dynamic this article describes a new protective strategy that links spending and asset allocation in a way that preserves spending power in down markets but participates significantly in up markets the strategy is similar to constant proportions portfolio insurance in that part of the fund is maintained in safe assets to preserve the value needed for continued expenditures like portfolio insurance the strategy outperforms traditional strategies when markets are persistently up or persistently down but underperforms when portfolios are whipsawed by alternating ups and downs

cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline while with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities without a deadline we find that 1 when externalities are positive there exists no spne in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay 2 when externalities are negative it may happen that all spne with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity this is the cyclical delay phenomenon

zombie board board tenure and firm performance we show that board tenure exhibits an inverted u shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance the quality of corporate decisions such as m a financial reporting quality and ceo compensation also has a quadratic relation with board tenure our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors on the job learning improves firm value up to a threshold at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers to address endogeneity concerns we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from toward the empirically observed optimum level in the cross section are associated with negative positive announcement returns the quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted u shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director

entrepreneurial finance and innovation an introduction and agenda for future research the increasingly large role played by financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists and angels in nurturing entrepreneurial firms and in promoting product market innovation has led to great research interest in the area of entrepreneurial finance and innovation this paper introduces the special issue of the review of financial studies dedicated to entrepreneurial finance and innovation and highlights some of the promising topics for future research in this area the special issue combines papers presented at the june 2010 entrepreneurial finance and innovation efic conference which was jointly sponsored by the kauffman foundation and the review of financial studies with other related papers

coalitional bargaining in networks we analyze a noncooperative bargaining game with a general coalition structure in each period an opportunity for a feasible coalition to form arises according to a stochastic process and a randomly selected agent in the coalition makes a take it or leave it offer to the other agents in the coalition we develop a new technique based on convex programming to characterize the unique stationary equilibrium payoff of the game we apply the framework to various settings including trading networks with middlemen and cooperation networks with overlapping communities in these applications feasible coalitions are determined by an underlying network structure we study the effect of the underlying network on the pattern of trade and show how an agent s payoff is related to her position in the network

inefficient dynamic portfolio strategies or how to throw away a million dollars in the stock market a number of portfolio strategies followed by practitioners are dominated because they are incompletely diversified over time the payoff distribution pricing model is used to compute the cost of following undiversified strategies simple numerical examples illustrate the technique and computer generated examples provide realistic estimates of the cost of some typical policies using reasonable parameter values the cost can be substantial and should not be ignored by practitioners a section on generalizations shows how to extend the analysis to term structure models and other general models of returns this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

pricing discretely monitored asian options under levy processes we present methodologies to price discretely monitored asian options when the underlying evolves according to a generic levy process for geometric asian options we provide closed form solutions in terms of the fourier transform and we study in particular these formulas in the levy stable case for arithmetic asian options we solve the valuation problem by recursive integration and derive a recursive theoretical formula for the moments to check the accuracy of the results we compare the implementation of our method to monte carlo simulation implemented with control variates and using different parametric levy processes we also discuss model risk issues

optimal guaranteed return portfolios and the casino effect in this paper we address the problem of determining optimal portfolios that may include options in a framework of return maximization with risk constraints relative to a benchmark as well as in terms of absolute returns the model we propose allows for deterministic constraints as well as probabilistic constraints we derive properties of optimal and feasible portfolios and present a linear programming model to solve the problem the optimal portfolios have payoff functions that reflect a gambling policy we show that optimal solutions to a large class of portfolio models that maximize expected return subject to downside risk constraints are driven by this casino effect and present tractable conditions under which it occurs in our model we propose to control the casino effect by using chance constraints using results from financial theory we formulate an lp model that maximizes expected return subject to worst case return constraints and chance constraints on achieving prespecified levels of return the results are illustrated with real life data on the s p 500 index

estimation and empirical properties of a firm year measure of accounting conservatism we estimate a firm year measure of accounting conservatism examine its empirical properties as a metric and illustrate applications by testing new hypotheses that shed further light on the nature and effects of conservatism the results are consistent with the measure c score capturing variation in conservatism and also predicting asymmetric earnings timeliness at horizons of up to 3 years ahead cross sectional hypothesis tests suggest firms with longer investment cycles higher idiosyncratic uncertainty and higher information asymmetry have higher accounting conservatism event studies suggest increased conservatism is a response to increases in information asymmetry and idiosyncratic uncertainty

the relation between equity incentives and misreporting the role of risk taking incentives abstract prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport however if the manager is risk averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk the sensitivity of the manager s wealth to changes in stock price portfolio delta will have two countervailing incentive effects a positive reward effect and a negative risk effect in contrast the sensitivity of the manager s wealth to changes in risk portfolio vega will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect we show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature using both regression and matching designs and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals restatements and enforcement actions we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta collectively our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk

technical note local bargaining and supply chain instability we analyze the behavior of a competitive n tier supply chain system where agents bargain with each other locally we study the influence of transaction costs on the convergence of the system to a stationary outcome in particular we consider a dynamic bargaining game among a finite set of agents and its replications and use a limit stationary equilibrium to examine the system s behavior as the population s size goes to infinity the convergence of the system to a limit stationary equilibrium would capture the common belief that as the market gets large it converges to a competitive and stable outcome however we prove that depending on the underlying transaction costs the system might not converge to such an equilibrium interestingly our result shows that a small increase in the transaction cost at one end of the chain can be greatly amplified and shifts the system away from the steady state when a limit stationary equilibrium exists we show that it is unique we use such an equilibrium outcome

on dynamic investment strategies abstract this paper presents a new approach for analyzing dynamic investment strategies previous studies have obtained explicit results by restricting utility functions to a few specific forms not surprisingly the resultant dynamic strategies have exhibited a very limited range of behavior in contrast we examine what might be called the inverse problem given any specific dynamic strategy can we characterize the results of following it through time more precisely can we determine whether it is self financing yields path independent returns and is consistent with optimal behavior for some expected utility maximizing investor we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamic strategy to satisfy each of these properties

the empirical implications of the cox ingersoll ross theory of the term structure of interest rates the one factor version of the cox ingersoll and ross model of the term structure is estimated using monthly quotes on u s treasury issues trading from 1952 through 1983 using data from a single yield curve it is possible to estimate implied short and long term zero coupon rates and the implied variance of changes in short rates analysis of residuals points to a probable neglected tax effect the term structure of interest rates is important to economists because the relationship among the yields on default free securities that differ in their term to maturity reflects the information available to the market about the future course of events the expectations hypothesis the liquidity preference hypothesis hicks 10 and the market segmentation hypothesis culbertson 6 are theories of the term structure that predict little more than that the implied forward rate is either equal to or not equal to the expectation of future spot rates cox ingersoll and ross 5 cir model the term structure of interest rates in a competitive equilibrium context their model has elements in common with the earlier hypotheses of the term structure however the cir model has a rich class of empirical implications not only for the pricing of default free securities but also for the pricing of bond options callable bonds and other types of financial claims this paper examines the extent to which the model in its simplest one factor form is descriptive of the prices of u s treasury bills bonds and notes traded from 1952 to 1983 section i describes the model and the parsimonious representation of bond prices which it implies section ii describes the data and section iii outlines the preliminary results obtained by fitting the model to observed data the final section outlines directions for future research

throwing away a billion dollars the cost of suboptimal exercise strategies in the swaptions market abstract this paper studies the costs of applying single factor exercise strategies to american swap options when the term structure is actually driven by multiple factors using a multifactor string market model of the term structure we find that even when single factor models are recalibrated to match the market at every exercise date the exercise strategies they imply can be suboptimal based on estimates of notional amounts outstanding the total present value costs of following single factor strategies could be several billion dollars these results illustrate the importance of using well specified term structure models

buyers sellers and middlemen variations on search theoretic themes we study exchange that is bilateral but indirect it involves chains of intermediaries or middlemen in markets with frictions these frictions include search and bargaining problems we show how and how many intermediaries might get involved in a chain and how bargaining with one depends on upcoming negotiations with those downstream the roles of buyers sellers money and prices are discussed allowing us to clarify some neglected connections between different branches of search theory pursuing one such connection with monetary economics we show how bubbles can emerge in intermediation even with fully rational agents and perfect foresight

tobin s q and the gains from takeovers this paper analyzes the relation between takeover gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over the period 1972 1987 target bidder and total returns are larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios the relation is strengthened after controlling for the characteristics of the offer and the contest this evidence confirms the results of the work by lang stulz and walkling and shows that their findings also hold for mergers and after controlling for other determinants of takeover gains in a recent paper lang stulz and walkling lsw 1989 document that the abnormal returns in tender offers are related to the tobin s q ratios of the targets and the bidders in particular they find that target bidder and total returns are higher when takeover targets have high q ratios and bidders have low q ratios where one is used as a cutoff point to separate high q firms from low q firms in fact bidders with high q ratios have significant positive abnormal returns when they engage in a takeover while bidders with low q ratios have significant negative abnormal returns the best takeovers in terms of value creation are those where a high q firm takes over a low q firm the opposite scenario holds for the worst case takeovers low q firms taking over high q firms if q is interpreted as a measure of managerial performance these findings imply that better performing firms also make better acquisitions and that more value can be created from taking over poorly performing companies while the results of lsw are insightful they leave a number of questions unanswered their sample consists only of tender offers several studies have documented that the returns to targets in mergers are smaller than those in tender offers see jensen and ruback 1983 and huang and walkling 1987 it would therefore be useful to see whether the lsw 1989 results hold for a larger sample which includes both mergers and tender offers previous research has also shown that the characteristics of the takeover hostile versus friendly and single versus multiple bidder the form of payment cash versus securities the time period before 1968 1968 1980 1981 and later and the relative size of target and bidder are important determinants of the magnitude of takeover gains and their distribution

misery loves company equilibrium portfolios with heterogeneous consumption externalities the present article extends the arrow debreu portfolio model to consumption externalities it is assumed that each investor has a von neumann morgenstern utility that is a function of her own consumption and of the average consumption in the group to which she belongs individual degrees of risk aversion and conformism are heterogeneous within each group and between the different groups in the economy we show that under some conditions on the degree of conformism in the economy the optimal portfolio and consumption choices observed at equilibrium in each group with consumption externalities are equivalent to those that are optimal without any externality but with an adjusted degree of risk aversion if these conditions are not fulfilled groups have no representative agent and the demand for pure zero mean lotteries may be positive thereby showing that not all diversifiable risks are washed away at equilibrium we characterize the relationship between the distribution of conformism in the economy to the competitive allocation of risk and to the equity premium we provide conditions for the two fund separation property to hold

discussion of are executive stock options associated with future earnings abstract hanlon rajgopal and shevlin conclude that grant of stock options to executives is associated with a positive impact on future operating performance this discussion comment examines the impact of endogeneity model structure and the choice of a benchmark model on this conclusion while some results indicate that there is a position relation between stock option grants and operating performance alternative econometric approaches produce distinctly different results

delay in trade networks we study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen we do this by analyzing a noncooperative networked bargaining game we assume a complete information setup wherein all the agents know the structure of the network the values of the consumers and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consumers trade with middlemen in such a setting we show that sunk cost problems and a heterogeneous network can give rise to delay or failure in negotiation and therefore reduce the total trade capacity of the network in the limiting regime of extremely patient agents we provide a sharp characterization of the trade pattern and the segmentation of these markets

distributional analysis of portfolio choice trading in a market is compared with receiving some particular consu mption bundle given increasing state independent preferences and complete markets the analysis focuses on the distribution price of t he particular bundle the distributional price is the price of the ch eapest utility equivalent bundle sold in the market the distribution al price is determined by the distribution functions of the outside b undle and the state price density simple portfolio performance measu res illustrate the value of the approach unlike capm based measures these measures are valid even when superior information is the sourc e of superior performance copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

on equilibrium asset price processes in this article we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied by equilibrium asset price processes in apure exchange economy we examine a world in which asset prices follow a diffusion process asset markets are dynamically complete all investors maximize their state independent expected utility of consumption at some future date and investors have nonrandom exogenous income we show that it is necessary and suffcient that the coefficients of an equilibrium diffusion price process satisfy a partial differential equation and a boundary condition we also examine how the dynamics of asset prices are related to the shape of the representative investor s utility function through the boundary condition for example in a constant volatility economy the expected instantaneous return of the market portfolio is mean reverting if and only if the relative risk aversion of the representative investor is decreasing in terminal wealth

the analytics of performance measurement using a security market line security market line sml analysis while an important tool has never been fully justified from a theoretical standpoint assuming symmetric information and an inefficient index we show that sml analysis can be grossly misleading since in general efficient and inefficient portfolios can plot above and below the sml on a more positive note if sml analysis uses the return on a marketed riskless asset for the zero beta rate efficient portfolios must plot above the sml nonetheless arbitrarily inefficient portfolios also plot above the sml mean variance theory is still the premier theory in finance it continues to survive theoretical criticism and empirical rejection2 and it does so in no small part because of the popularity of using deviations from the security market line sml in performance measurement of portfolio managers and in event studies of the price impact of information the sml is the relationship between risk and return predicted by the mean variance model namely that risk as measured by beta and expected return are linearly related sml analysis interprets deviations in expected return from the sml as abnormal returns above or below what is appropriate or warranted for the amount of risk taken on however in the mean variance model all assets and portfolios lie on the sml ex ante and any ex post deviations from the sml are attributable solely to statistical measurement errors it is for this reason that roll 22 25 has argued that justification for sml analysis must lie outside the original mean variance model the purpose of this paper and its companion paper dybvig and ross 8 is to study whether sml analysis is valid in several plausible theoretical frameworks i e whether theory justifies intuition specifically in this article we examine the validity of using sml analysis when the index portfolio is inefficient in the companion paper we look at performance yale school of management the authors appreciate especially helpful comments from michael brennan gregory conner mike gibbons mark grinblatt jon ingersoll paul pfeiderer and richard roll the first author is grateful for support under the batterymarch fellowship program and the second author is grateful for support from the national science foundation this paper and its campanion paper dybvig and ross 8 evolved from dybvig and ross 7

bargaining and reputation in search markets in a two sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus the matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus the frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible they aect the terms of trade and eciency in an unbalanced market where the entering

a non cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers abstract rubinstein s alternating offers bargaining model is enriched by allowing players to choose when and whether or not to make an offer time is continuous and players make offers whenever they wish it is assumed that upon making an offer players must wait a fixed amount of time before making another it is shown that if players can react arbitrarily quickly to their opponent s offers then all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are rubinstein like in particular efficient however if it takes time to react then some delay can be supported this potential delay becomes arbitrarily large as reaction times increase journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c72

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

when are path dependent payoffs suboptimal abstract generalizing a result by cox and leland 2000 vanduffel et al 2009 this note shows that risk averse investors with fixed planning horizon prefer path independent payoffs in any financial market if the pricing kernel is a function of the underlying s price at the end of the planning horizon generally for every payoff which is not a function of the pricing kernel there is a more attractive alternative that depends solely on the pricing kernel at the end of the planning horizon

endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the ceo author s hermalin benjamin e abstract this paper develops a model in which the effectiveness of a board s monitoring of the ceo depends on the board s independence the independence of new directors is determined through negotiations implicit or explicit between the existing directors and the ceo the ceo s bargaining position and thus influence over the board selection process depends on an updated estimate of the ceo s ability based on prior performance many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena in this model we also explore the implications of this model for proposed regulations of corporate governance structures please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

middlemen in bilateral search markets this article examines the role of middlemen in bilateral search markets e g employment agencies real estate brokers it is shown that the middleman narrows the set of buyer firm and seller worker types who search seller types with high valuations and buyer types with low valuations drop out of the search market and instead trade through the middleman the middleman also decreases the equilibrium search intensities of those agents who search it is proven that the middleman improves welfare if search is very costly and inefficient and decreases welfare if search is effectively costless and very efficient

capital growth with security abstract this paper discusses the allocation of capital over time with several risky assets the capital growth log utility approach is used with conditions requiring that specific goals are achieved with high probability the stochastic optimization model uses a disjunctive form for the probabilistic constraints which identifies an outer problem of choosing an optimal set of scenarios and an inner conditional problem of finding the optimal investment decisions for a given scenarios set the multiperiod inner problem is composed of a sequence of conditional one period problems the theory is illustrated for the dynamic allocation of wealth in stocks bonds and cash equivalents

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

assessing empirical research in managerial accounting a value based management perspective this paper applies a value based management framework to critically review empirical research in managerial accounting this framework enables us to place the exceptionally diverse set of managerial accounting studies from the past several decades into an integrated structure our synthesis highlights the many consistent results in prior research identifies remaining gaps and inconsistencies discusses common methodological and econometric problems and suggests fruitful avenues for future managerial accounting research

estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility the costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives accounting choice financing decisions and the valuation of equity we present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year s proxy statement or annual report this method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm wide option plans in broad samples of actual and simulated ceo option portfolios we show that these proxies capture more than 99 of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics and is most severe in samples of ceos with a large proportion of out of the money options however the proxies explanatory power remains above 95 in all subsamples

an fft network for levy option pricing abstract this paper develops a simple network approach to american exotic option valuation under levy processes using the fast fourier transform fft the forward shooting grid fsg technique of the lattice approach is then generalized to expand the fft network to accommodate path dependent variables this network pricing approach is applicable to all levy processes for which the characteristic function is readily available in other words the log value of the underlying asset can follow finite activity or infinite activity levy processes with the powerful computation of fft the proposed network has a negligible additional computational burden compared to the binomial tree approach the early exercise policy and option values in the continuation region are determined in a way very similar to that of the lattice approach numerical examples using american style barrier lookback and asian options demonstrate that the fft network is accurate and efficient

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets given the exogenous price process of some assets we constrain the price process of other assets that are characterized by their final payoffs we deal with an incomplete market framework in a discrete time model and assume the existence of the equilibrium in this setup we derive restrictions on the state price deflators these restrictions do not depend on a particular choice of utility function we investigate numerically a stochastic volatility model as an example our approach leads to an interval of admissible prices that is more robust than the arbitrage pricing interval

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

hedge fund performance 1990 2000 do the money machines really add value we investigate the claim that hedge funds offer investors a superior risk return tradeoff we do so using a continuous time version of dybvig s 1988a 1988b payoff distribution pricing model the evaluation model which does not require any assumptions with regard to the return distribution of the funds to be evaluated is applied to the monthly returns of 77 hedge funds and 13 hedge fund indices from may 1990 april 2000 the results show that as a stand alone investment hedge funds do not offer a superior risk return profile we find 12 indices and 72 individual funds to be inefficient with the average efficiency loss amounting to 2 76 per annum for indices and 6 42 for individual funds part of the inefficiency cost of individual funds can be diversified away funds of funds however are not the preferred vehicle for this as their performance appears to suffer badly from their double fee structure looking at hedge funds in a portfolio context results in a marked improvement in the evaluation outcomes seven of the 12 hedge fund indices and 58 of the 72 individual funds classified as inefficient on a stand alone basis are capable of producing an efficient payoff profile when mixed with the s p 500 the best results are obtained when 10 20 of the portfolio value is invested in hedge funds

an analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths implications for the managerial labor market abstract certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive s continued employment these wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty three events these abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive s status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive s talents and decision making responsibility and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement

on the optimality of path dependent structured funds the cost of standardization abstract this paper examines the suitability of an important class of standard financial structured products namely those whose performances are based on smoothing the return of a given risky underlying asset while providing a guarantee at maturity using various assumptions about the customers attitudes towards risk we show that such standardized products are not optimal even if the financial market volatility is constant as a by product we provide in particular the optimal portfolio value in the regret rejoice framework to go further with the notion of aversion of getting a return smaller than the risk free one using the notion of compensating variation we determine for the first time the monetary losses of providing these standardized products instead of the optimal ones to the customers we show that these monetary losses can be very significant when the volatility of the risky asset is stochastic from the operational point of view such results highly suggest to trade on the volatility index vix and or to introduce derivatives written on it when selling standardized funds in order to better meet investors needs and preferences

the changing of the boards the impact on firm valuation of mandated female board representation in 2003 a new law required that 40 of norwegian firms directors be women at the time only 9 of directors were women we use the prequota cross sectional variation in female board representation to instrument for exogenous changes to corporate boards following the quota we find that the constraint imposed by the quota caused a significant drop in the stock price at the announcement of the law and a large decline in tobin s q over the following years consistent with the idea that firms choose boards to maximize value the quota led to younger and less experienced boards increases in leverage and acquisitions and deterioration in operating performance copyright 2012 oxford university press

efficient trading strategies in the presence of market frictions we provide a price characterization of efficient contingent claims that is chosen by at least a rational agent in multiperiod economies with market frictions frictions include market incompleteness transaction costs short selling and borrowing costs we characterize the inefficiency cost of a trading strategy its required investment minus the largest amount necessary to obtain the same utility level and we propose a measure of portfolio performance we show that arbitrage bounds cannot be tightened based on efficiency without restricting preferences or endowments we observe common investment strategies becoming inefficient with market frictions and others rationalized by them in this article we characterize efficient contingent claims to future consumption consumption bundles in multiperiod economies with uncertainty taking a wide range of market frictions into account 1 such as dynamic market

recovery of preferences from observed wealth in a single realization von neumann morgenstern preferences over terminal consumption can be inferred from wealth on a single sample path when markets are complete and returns follow a known law in a neoclassical investment problem in either a discrete time i i d binomial model or a continuous time diffusion model with a gaussian state variable numerical results suggest that useful information about preferences can be obtained from even a single noisy sample of monthly observations of a portfolio over 5 years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

differential information and performance measurement using a security market line an uninformed observer using the tools of mean variance and security market line analysis to measure the performance of a portfolio manager who has superior information is unlikely to be able to make any reliable inferences while some positive results of a very limited nature are possible e g when there is a riskless asset or when information is restricted to be security specific in general anything is possible in particular a manager with superior information can appear to the observer to be below or above the security market line and inside or outside of the mean variance efficient frontier and any combination of these is possible mean variance theory predicts that if we plot expected returns against beta coefficients all securities plot on a single line known as the security market line sml since fpi the beta coefficient for security i is interpreted as a measure of the riskiness of security i the market line is a graphical representation of the linear relationship between risk and return what are we to make of deviations from the sml i e of securities or managed portfolios that do not plot on such a line if we can retain our intuitive interpretation of fj as the riskiness of asset i and the market line as the appropriate expected return needed to reward agents taking on various degrees of risk then vertical deviations from the market line represent abnormal returns that differ from what is merited this paper and the companion piece dybvig and ross 10 explore in detail the validity of this intuition and the question of what sml deviations really measure the companion piece analyzes sml deviations caused by the choice of an inefficient market or reference portfolio in this paper we analyze sml deviations caused by superior performance based on superior information the intuitive explanation of deviations from the sml has motivated many

it pays to have friends abstract currently a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the ceo or to the firm we add another dimension social ties using a unique data set we find that 87 of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62 are conventionally and socially independent furthermore firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation exhibit stronger pay performance sensitivity and exhibit stronger turnover performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent our results suggest that social ties do matter and that consequently a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small