a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

imposing a turnout threshold in referendums we construct a model of a yes no referendum for which the outcome is valid only if the voter turnout rate is greater than a predetermined value with such a turnout threshold three types of equilibria exist in each of which the voters who favor the status quo either go to the polls abstain or use mixed strategies we show that abstaining is more likely to realize the status quo than going to the polls if the threshold is sufficiently high whereas one of the mixed strategy equilibria is least likely to realize the status quo for any level of threshold

incumbents interests and gender quotas the introduction of mandatory gender quotas in party lists is a reform that many countries have recently adopted or have been considering the electoral system affects the incumbents incentives to make such reforms their details and their effectiveness we show that male incumbents can actually expect an increased incumbency advantage when gender quotas are introduced if they are elected through single member district majority rule on the other hand no expectation of male advantage can reduce the incumbents fear of being replaced if they are elected through closed list proportional representation as france has both electoral systems we validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in france displaying the existence of male bias in the last three elections we also show that parity may have assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

price manipulation in an experimental asset market we analyze in the laboratory whether an uninformed trader is able to manipulate the price of a financial asset by comparing the results of two experimental treatments in the benchmark treatment 12 subjects trade a common value asset that takes either a high or a low value only three subjects know the actual value of the asset while the market is open for trading the manipulation treatment is identical to the benchmark treatment apart from the fact that we introduce a computer program as an additional uninformed trader this robot buys a fixed number of shares in the beginning of a trading period and sells them again afterwards our main result shows that the last contract price is significantly higher in the manipulation treatment if the asset takes a low value and that private information is very well disseminated by both markets if the value of the asset is high finally even though this simple manipulation program loses money on average it is profitable in some instances

predicting catastrophe risk evidence from catastrophe bond markets abstract compared to the past literature on prediction markets that uses small scale observational field data or experiments this present research examines the efficiency of such markets by studying catastrophe cat bonds we collect actual catastrophe loss data match them with the defined trigger events of each cat bond contract and then employ an empirical pricing framework to obtain the excess cat premiums in order to represent the market based forecasts our results indeed show that market based forecasts have more significant predictive content for future cat losses than professional forecasts that use natural catastrophe risk models although the predictive information for cat events is specialized and complex our evidence supports that cat bond markets are successful prediction markets that efficiently aggregate information about future cat losses our resultsalso highlight that actual cat losses in future periods can explain the excess cat bond spreads in the primary market and provide support for market efficiency when pricing cat risk

outcome manipulation in corporate prediction markets this paper presents a framework for applying prediction markets to corporate decision making the analysis is motivated by the recent surge of interest in markets as information aggregation devices and their potential use within firms we characterize the amount of outcome manipulation that results in equilibrium and the impact of this manipulation on market prices jel d71 d82 d83 d84

the informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets abstract when can policy makers use policy relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness i analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions and policy in turn affects asset values i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punishes traders for revealing their information if the policy maker is uninformed then policy objectives do not change price informativeness but they do if the policy maker has independent information about the state i also analyze policy maker transparency and find that policy makers with objectives having a large impact on asset values should publish their information before trading to make prices more informative in other cases intransparency can be optimal

referendum design quorum rules and turnout in this article we focus on the consequences of quorum requirements for turnout in referendums we use a rational choice decision theoretic voting model to demonstrate that participation quorums change the incentives some electors face inducing those who oppose changes in the status quo and expect to be in the minority to abstain as a result paradoxically participation quorums decrease electoral participation we test our model s predictions using data for all referendums held in current european union countries from 1970 until 2007 and show that the existence of a participation quorums increases abstention by more than ten percentage points

wage structure and gender earnings differentials an international comparison using microdata to analyse the gender pay gap in ten industrialized nations we focus on the role of wage structure the prices of labour market skills in influencing the gender gap we find wage structure enormously important in explaining why the us gender gap is higher than that in most other countries we conclude that the us gap would be similar to that in sweden and australia the countries with the smallest gaps if the united states had their levels of wage inequality this finding reflects the larger penalty in the united states for those with low skill levels or employed in low wage sectors 650 o 75 the united states was amoung the countries with the largest differ entials oecd ilo usbls this paper uses microdata to analyse inter national differences in the gender pay gap among a sample of ten industrialized nations we focus particularly on explaining the surprisingly low ranking of the united states in comparison with other industrialized countries an advan tage of an international perspective is that countries vary considerably with respect to governmental policies women s relative labour market qualifications and wage setting institutions such variability allows one to infer reasons for differences in the pay gap and by implication the impact of alternative govern ment policies empirical research on gender pay gaps has traditionally focused on the role of gender differences in qualifications and on differences in the treatment of otherwise equally qualified male and female workers i e labour market dis crimination analyses of trends over time in the gender differential within countries as well as inter country comparisons of gender earnings ratios have tended to emphasize these types of gender specific factors an innovative feature of our study is to focus on the role of wage structure as an additional factor influencing the gender gap to analyse the impact of wage structure we adapt a framework developed by juhn et al 1991 to analyse trends over time in race differentials in the united states our findings suggest that labour market institutions that affect overall wage inequality have an extremely impor tant effect on the gender earnings gap wage structure describes the array of prices set for various labour market skills measured and unmeasured and rents received for employment in par

on the possibility of informative equilibria in futures markets with feedback we study the existence of equilibria and the information content of prices in futures markets where the probability of future payoffs can be altered by an intervening agent who acts in response to the market price hence creating a feedback effect we focus on the market with the simplest possible structure traders betting on the occurrence of a future event by buying or selling arrow debreu securities one dollar claims contingent on a binary outcome we find that in the presence of feedback i a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist ii the market price may decline in response to information that is ex ante more favorable to the occurrence of the underlying event iii an equilibrium that reveals no information may obtain thus feedback from an intervening agent materially alters the way in which price responds to information and potentially undermines the viability of the market itself

eliciting beliefs proper scoring rules incentives stakes and hedging accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments proper scoring rules psr are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent s beliefs this paper generalizes the analysis of psr to richer environments relevant to economists more speci cally we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a psr may be biased when i the psr payments are increased ii the agent has a nancial stake in the event she is predicting and iii the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs thereby raising concerns about the ability of psr to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

quorum and turnout in referenda we analyze the effect of turnout requirements in referenda in the context of a group turnout model we show that a participation quorum requirement may reduce the turnout so severely that it generates a quorum paradox in equilibrium the expected turnout exceeds the participation quorum only if this requirement is not imposed furthermore a participation quorum does not necessarily imply a bias for the status quo we also show that in order to induce a given expected turnout and avoid the quorum paradox the quorum should be set at a level that is lower than half the target finally we argue that a super majority requirement to overturn the status quo is never equivalent to a participation quorum jel d72

can gender quotas break down negative stereotypes evidence from changes in electoral rules abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of gender quotas on women s involvement in political activity by using a rich data set providing information on all italian local administrators who were elected from 1985 to 2007 gender quotas were introduced by law in italy in 1993 and were in force until 1995 because of the short period covered by the reform some municipalities never voted under the gender quota regime this allows us to identify a treatment and a control group and to estimate the effects of gender quotas by using a difference in differences estimation strategy our estimates show that women s representation in politics after the reform increased significantly more in municipalities that were affected by the reform than in municipalities that were not affected this result also holds true if we exclude from our analysis elections which took place during the period in which the reform was in force moreover the higher women s representation in gender quota municipalities is not related to the advantages that women who were elected during the reform have obtained from incumbency and does not seem to be driven by differences in temporal trends between southern and northern regions these findings suggest that affirmative actions can be of use in breaking down stereotypes against women

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

bayesian learning in social networks we study the perfect bayesian equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social network each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world observes the past actions of a stochastically generated neighbourhood of individuals and chooses one of two possible actions the stochastic process generating the neighbourhoods defines the network topology we characterize pure strategy equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning convergence in probability to the right action as the social network becomes large we show that when private beliefs are unbounded meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in observations we also characterize conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning when private beliefs are bounded

stock price manipulation it is generally agreed that speculators can make profits from insider trading or from the release of false information both forms of stock price manipulation have now been made illegal in this article the authors ask whether it is possible to make profits from a different kind of manipulation in which an uninformed speculator simply buys and sells shares they show that in a rational expectations framework where all agents maximize expected utility it is possible for an uninformed manipulator to make a profit provided investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an informed trader article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

how costly is diversity affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness affirmative action is often criticized for causing reverse discrimination and lowering the qualifications of those hired under the policy however the magnitude of such adverse effects depends on whether the best suited candidate is hired absent the policy indeed affirmative action may compensate for the distortion discrimination imposes on the selection of candidates this paper asks whether affirmative action can have a similar corrective impact when qualified individuals fail to apply for a job we evaluate the effect of introducing a gender quota in an environment where high performing women fail to enter competitions they can win we show that guaranteeing women equal representation among winners increases their entry the response exceeds that predicted by the change in probability of winning and is in part driven by women being more willing to compete against other women the consequences are substantial as the boost in supply essentially eliminates the anticipated costs of the policy this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

are women pawns in the political game evidence from elections to the spanish senate abstract this paper investigates the reasons behind the low representation of women among legislators using data from spain we find that parties tend to nominate female candidates to poorer positions on the ballot we examine whether this is due to voter bias or party bias and find two pieces of evidence supporting the latter female candidates attract more votes and political competition improves the quality of positions to which female candidates are assigned moreover gender quotas fail to erode the strategic nomination of female candidates the evidence in this paper helps explain why quotas in candidate lists might often lead to disappointing increases in the number of elected female politicians

do better paid politicians perform better disentangling incentives from selection the wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed first if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector an increase in politicians pay may change their mind second if the re election prospects of incumbents depend on their in office deeds a higher wage may foster performance we use data on all italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi experimental setup in italy the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds we apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase 5 000 inhabitants exploiting the existence of a two term limit we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance our results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates and that better paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency importantly most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians rather than by the incentive to be re elected

the good the bad and the different can gender quotas raise the quality of politicians the debate over political gender quotas is unduly confined to a supposed trade off between diversity and competence we characterize the effects of a political gender quota in a citizen candidate model to find that quotas do increase the overall quality of those elected whenever the rewards from public office are high or the skill premium or political gender discrimination are sufficiently low in such cases high skill women candidates run for office in sufficiently high numbers driving off low skill male and female candidates our model compares quotas with other policies in terms of their impact on the number and quality of those elected

economic theories of voter turnout i the voting paradox why would the rational individual bother to spend time and resources to become well informed go to the polls on the election day and maybe even wait in a queue why would a rational voter vote downs 1957 ii the paradox of indeterminacy if they vote why do they care who they vote for kirchgassner 1992 kirchgassner and pommerehne 1993 iii the paradox of ignorance to the extent that information is costly the rational voter must be ignorant about relevant aspects of his decision making downs 1957

manipulation and the allocational role of prices it is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources this paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices it shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm s stock when this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens the trader profits from this trading strategy partly because his trading distorts the firm s investment we therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation we show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation and providing justification for restrictions on short sales

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

women and power unpopular unwilling or held back we use spain s equality law to test for the existence of agency problems between party leaders and their constituents the law mandates a 40 percent female quota on electoral lists in towns with populations above 5 000 using pre and postquota data by party and municipality we implement a triple difference design we find that female quotas resulted in slightly better electoral results for the parties that were most affected by the quota our evidence shows that party leaders were not maximizing electoral results prior to the quota suggesting the existence of agency problems that hinder female representation in political institutions

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

do prediction markets produce well calibrated probability forecasts this article presents new theoretical and empirical evidence on the forecasting ability of prediction markets we develop a model that predicts that the time until expiration of a prediction market should negatively affect the accuracy of prices as a forecasting tool in the direction of a favourite longshot bias that is high likelihood events are underpriced and low likelihood events are over priced we confirm this result using a large data set of prediction market transaction prices prediction markets are reasonably well calibrated when time to expiration is relatively short but prices are significantly biased for events farther in the future when time value of money is considered the miscalibration can be exploited to earn excess returns only when the trader has a relatively low discount rate