stabilization policy a reconsideration i introduction in 1936 keynes s general theory explained how fiscal and monetary policy could be used to end depressions since that time no developed country has ever seen a downturn on the scale of the 1930s the general theory was not just a how to book on the avoidance of depressions it was an argument for stabilization policy itself the years since the general theory have seen a revolt against keynesian economics in a revisionist mode milton friedman argued that countercyclical policy cannot affect the average level of unemployment and output robert lucas and thomas sargent 1979 went further contending that it is not only impossible to increase average output it is also impossible to stabilize it more recently lucas 1987 2003 has argued that policies to stabilize output even if effective would yield negligible welfare gains thus stabilization policy should not be a macroeconomic priority lucas s conclusion notwithstanding stabilization policy has long been an explicit or implicit objective of monetary policy in most industrial countries even including those countries with inflation targets the volatility of output has in fact declined in most major industrial countries since the mid 1980s and monetary policy arguably deserves at least partial credit see bernanke 2004 mirroring practice monetary policy research commonly takes it as given that along with price stability stabilization policy the minimization of squared deviations of output around potential is an appropriate policy objective see for example clarida et al 1999 in this article we explore the economic rationale for stabilization as a policy goal concluding that it does in fact deserve high policy priority we survey a large body of literature that critiques the validity of key assumptions in lucas s argument we also offer suggestive evidence that stabilization policy can significantly reduce average levels of unemployment by providing stimulus to demand in circumstances where unemployment is high but underutilization of labor and capital does little to lower inflation a monetary policy that vigorously fights high unemployment should however also be complemented by a policy that equally vigorously fights inflation when it rises above a modest target level the federal reserve act thus wisely enunciated price stability and maximum employment as twin goals for monetary policy ii the case against stabilization policy macroeconomic analysis typically assumes that social welfare depends negatively on both inflation above a modest target level here assumed zero and unemployment above some minimum socially efficient level for example a standard social welfare function is the discounted sum of period losses l sub t of the form see among others barro and gordon 1983 pp 592 93 1 l sub t a u sub t 1 k u sup 2 b pi sup 2 sub t where u sub t and pi sub t are the unemployment and inflation rates in period t and u sup is the natural rate of unemployment the coefficient k is positive reflecting the desirability of unemployment below the natural rate because real economies deviate in many respects from perfect competition the natural rate of unemployment is likely to exceed the socially optimal unemployment rate for example with monopolistic competition goods are underproduced because they are priced above marginal cost so potential output is inefficiently low and equilibrium unemployment is too high standard macroeconomic analysis additionally assumes that inflation is determined by an expectations augmented accelerationist phillips curve of the form 2 pi sub t pi sup e sub t f u sub t u sup epsilon sub t where pi sup e sub t is the expected inflation rate at time t with expectations formed at t 1 and epsilon sub t captures supply shocks to the phillips curve at t

bureaucratic minimal squawk behavior theory and evidence from regulatory agencies this paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye the policy implications of this minimal squawk behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of capture an empirical test using data from us state public utility commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis longer puc terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills jel d73 l51 l97 l98

investment and interest rate policy abstract the paper s theorems reverse two standard results of new keynesian economics simply by appending endogenous investment to a benchmark imperfect competition sticky price model our results are a a passive interest rate rule where the monetary authority responds to inflation by lowering the real interest rate implies local equilibrium uniqueness whereas an active rule does not generate a locally unique equilibrium b a temporary exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate causes a temporary increase in output and investment extensions of the benchmark model including generalized preferences and alternative interest rate rules are also examined journal of economic literature classification numbers e12 e31 e52

distinguished lecture on economics in government the economist vs madmen in authority this lecture given to the society of government economists in january 1995 examines the influence of research on policy and vice versa using three widely believed propositions the first is that government spending is wasteful or ineffective and can readily be cut back in order to reduce the deficit the second is that welfare should be time limited and made conditional on people s behavior the third is that education and training are more than ever the ticket to individual and national prosperity the paper explores the interplay of facts of economic analysis with political and institutional constraints and public values

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

limited rationality and strategic interaction the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational forward looking decisions this raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results we examine this question in the context of a long standing and important economic problem the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rationality money illusion and anchoring are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia however depending on the strategic environment bounded rationality has vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment if agents actions are strategic substitutes adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick whereas under strategic complementarity adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects this adjustment difference is driven by price expectations which are very flexible and forward looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity moreover subjects expectations are also considerably more rational under substitutability

capture by threat we analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by nasty interest groups in the absence of these groups the policy maker s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock when pressure groups can harass the policy maker good policies will be chosen for only a subset of states of nature hence honest and able leaders might implement bad policies and needed reforms could be delayed in order to make good policies more likely the public will want to increase the cost of exerting pressure for nasty groups and provide rents to those in power this last result can be used to explain the existence of political parties they play a role resembling that of the supervisor in the literature on collusion in hierarchical agency a rational public may also choose to ignore negative media reports on a politician s personal life and in general elect strong political leaders the prevalence of coercive methods of infl

the response of firms to eligibility thresholds evidence from the japanese value added tax abstract it is common to define benefit eligibility for small business policies by restrictions on the firm size this paper documents the effects of the value added tax vat threshold in japan focusing on the incentives for a large firm to masquerade as many small firms by separately incorporating business segments a comparison of the corporate size distributions before and after the vat introduction of 1989 shows a clustering of corporations just below the threshold a pattern that is attributable to the behavioral responses to rule out the confounding influences of the changes in the company attributes over the years we applied a semiparametric density decomposition technique developed by dinardo fortin and lemieux dinardo j fortin n m lemieux t labor market institutions and the distribution of wages 1973 1992 a semiparametric approach econometrica 1996 64 1001 1044 this study suggests that the masquerading behavior by firms may be commonplace in other settings

the role of party reputation in the formation of policy abstract this paper shows that a party can credibly establish a platform more moderate than the ideology of its members and thereby raise the probability that the party s nominee wins the election a lame duck incumbent optimally implements his party s platform in order to maintain his party s reputation for having a moderate platform this increases the likelihood that his party retains power when candidates credibly locate themselves in policy space via this mechanism we show that if candidates are sufficiently impatient then their policies are bounded away from one another the policy convergence result is not robust

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

recent trends in the uk income distribution what happened and why the uk income distribution changed its shape dramatically during the 1980s this paper documents the trends and analyses their causes copyright 1996 by oxford university press

does money illusion matter reply the data in fehr and tyran ft 2001 and luba petersen and abel winn pw 2013 show that money illusion plays an important role in nominal price adjustment after a fully anticipated negative monetary shock money illusion affects subjects expectations and causes pronounced nominal inertia after a negative shock but much less inertia after a positive shock thus pw provide a misleading interpretation both of our and their own data

firm specific capital nominal rigidities and the taylor principle in the presence of firm specific capital the taylor principle can generate multiple equilibria sveen and weinke new perspectives on capital sticky prices and the taylor principle j econ theory 123 2005 21 39 obtain that result in the context of a calvo style sticky price model one potential criticism is that the price stickiness which is needed for our theoretical result to be relevant from a practical point of view is somewhat to the high part of available empirical estimates in the present paper we show that if nominal wages are not fully flexible which is an uncontroversial empirical fact then the taylor principle fails already for some minor degree of price stickiness we use our model to explain the consequences of both nominal rigidities for the desirability of alternative interest rate rules

monetary policy rules macroeconomic stability and inflation a view from the trenches i estimate a forward looking monetary policy reaction function for the federal reserve for the periods before and after paul volcker s appointment as chairman in 1979 using information that was available to the fomc in real time from 1966 to 1995 the results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods this contradicts the hypothesis based on analysis with ex post constructed data that the instability of the great inflation was the result of weak fomc policy responses to expected inflation a difference is that prior to volcker s appointment policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious drawing on contemporaneous accounts of fomc policy i discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the great inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then

what causes rockets and feathers an experimental investigation prices usually adjust much faster when costs increase than when costs decrease in spite of the many empirical studies confirming this rockets and feathers phenomenon for different industries the mechanism driving it is not well understood we use simple experimental markets with and without search frictions and either privately or publicly observed cost shocks to study how sensitive the rockets and feathers phenomenon is to changes in search costs and information conditions in contrast to standard theoretical predictions we observe price dispersion and spontaneous asymmetric price adjustments in all treatments neither search costs nor private information on cost shocks are indispensable for prices to adjust asymmetrically in the short term the initial asymmetry quickly disappears if the direction of the cost shocks are publicly known while it persists in both treatments with private information

learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity an experiment experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements under identical shocks however repetition allows adaptive learning so that inertia in adjustment should fade away with experience if this finding proves to be robust inertia in adjustment may be irrelevant among experienced agents the conjecture in the literature is that inertia would still persist perhaps indefinitely in the presence of real world complications such as nonidentical shocks herein we empirically test the conjecture that the inertia in adjustment is more persistent if the shocks are nonidentical for both identical and nonidentical shocks we find persistent inertia and similar patterns of adjustment that can be explained by backward looking expectation rules a reformulation of naive expectations with similarity based learning approach is found to have a higher predictive power than rational and trend following rules

plata o plomo bribe and punishment in a theory of political influence we present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes plata spanish for silver and the threat of punishment plomo spanish for lead we then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country s public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution the use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high ability citizens to enter public life cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians this predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians moreover the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the influence game so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials protecting officials from accusations of corruption immunity will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians these predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used the positive evils and dangers of the representative as of every other form of government may be reduced to two heads first general ignorance and incapacity or to speak more moderately insufficient mental qualifications in the controlling body secondly the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community

a theory of soft capture in this paper wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information in a three tier model a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator the firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator in a self enforcing equilibrium the regulator transmits the firm produced signal internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents the main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

charity donations and the euro introduction some quasi experimental evidence on money illusion we compare the revenues of a house to house collection for a charity before and after the introduction of the euro in a ceteris paribus setting we find strong evidence of money illusion supplementing earlier econometric experimental and survey evidence on its existence

institutional traps and economic growth this article s point of departure is that low quality institutions concentration of political power and material wealth and underdevelopment are persistent over time its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality thereby promoting growth the politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails the possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited with concentration of political and economic power low quality institutions and slow growth and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources high quality institutions and faster growth

inflation illusion and the taylor principle an experimental study we develop a simple experimental setting to evaluate the role of the taylor principle which holds that the nominal interest rate has to respond more than one for one to fluctuations in the inflation rate to exert a stabilizing effect in our setting the average inflation rate fluctuates around the inflation target if the computerized central bank obeys the taylor principle if the taylor principle is violated the average inflation rate persistently deviates from the target these deviations from the target are less pronounced if inflation rates cannot be as readily observed as nominal interest rates this result is consistent with the interpretation that subjects underestimate the influence of inflation on the real return to savings if the inflation rate is only observed ex post

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

a cross national comparison of permanent inequality in the united states and germany traditional cross sectional measures find greater inequality in the united states than in industrialized western european countries but are unable to distinguish transitory from permanent inequality with longitudinal data we measure cross sectional inequality during the 1980s using the shorrocks measure of income stability to find the degree to which single period measures exaggerate permanent inequality surprisingly given the smaller social welfare system and the less restrictive labor markets in the united states we find that both single period inequality and the share of that inequality that persists over time are greater in the united states than in germany

lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy this paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen candidate model of representative democracy with the menu auction model of lobbying positive and normative issues are analysed on the positive side lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences on the normative side coordination failure among lobbyists can result in pareto inefficient policy choices in addition by creating rents to holding office lobbying can lead to excessive entry into electoral competition

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

an experimental test of an optimal growth model this paper describes the design and behavior of an experimental economy with the structure of the ramsey cass koopmans model of optimal growth the experiment includes three different implementations of the model a decentralized implementation with multiple agents and a market for capital a treatment where individual subjects are placed in the role of social planners and a treatment where the social planner consists of five agents making a joint decision the findings highlight the role of market institutions in facilitating convergence to the optimal steady state jel c91 c92 o40

robust monetary policy with competing reference models abstract the existing literature on robust monetary policy rules has largely focused on the case in which the policymaker has a single reference model while the true economy lies within a specified neighborhood of the reference model in this paper we show that such rules may perform very poorly in the more general case in which non nested models represent competing perspectives about controversial issues such as expectations formation and inflation persistence using bayesian and minimax strategies we then consider whether any simple rule can provide robust performance across such divergent representations of the economy we find that a robust outcome is attainable only in cases where the objective function places substantial weight on stabilizing both output and inflation in contrast we are unable to find a robust policy rule when the sole policy objective is to stabilize inflation we analyze these results using a new diagnostic approach namely by quantifying the fault tolerance of each model economy with respect to deviations from optimal policy

computerisation and wage dispersion an analytical reinterpretation the rich countries have recently seen a dramatic rise in income inequality all the more surprising because the long term trend had been toward equality this paper examines one of the leading explanations computerisation in the workplace i offer a theory of computers impact on white collar work which goes far toward explaining the timing form and locus of recent labour market changes the theory looks at the bureaucratic and organisational applications of computers that have been first largest and most influential they have two effects on firms demand for labour at different skill levels

the future of the income tax the federal income tax has been under attack by the economics profession for more than a decade the attack comes from two directions supply siders who believe that progressive income taxation impairs economic incentives and more traditional economists who would substitute a progressive expenditure tax for the income tax 2 at one time support for the expenditure tax was confined to a few members of our profession including such distinguished names as john stuart mill irving fisher nicholas kaldor and james meade today it is fair to say that many if not most economists favor the expenditure tax or a flat rate income tax this group has joined the opponents of progressive taxation in the attack on the income tax despite an incessant barrage from both groups no country in the world is planning to abandon the income tax or is even considering a personal expenditure tax a wave of tax reform beginning with the u s reform in 1986 has been sweeping the world aimed at improving the income tax not at eliminating it tax preferences formerly regarded as sacrosanct are being removed and there is a distinct movement toward comprehensive income taxation 3 however individual income tax rates are being cut tax progressivity has been declining almost everywhere and reliance on the income tax has been diminishing it will come as no surprise to this audience that i approve of the base broadening feature of the current tax reform movement but i believe that the reduction in the redistributive effect of the income tax has gone too far in this paper i shall show that the progressivity of the u s tax system never very pronounced except during and immediately after the two world wars has been declining for more than two decades and that the tax reform act of 1986 reversed this decline but only slightly consequently we have a long way to go to improve the equity of the tax system i believe this can be done without punitive tax rates that will hurt economic incentives i begin with a brief review of recent changes in the u s distribution of income and follow this with an analysis of the effect of taxes on the income distribution i next examine arguments for and against the income tax with particular emphasis on its effects on economic incentives and its merits when compared with the expenditure tax i then evaluate the income tax as it emerged from the 1986 tax reform and conclude with tjoseph pechman passed away on august 19 1989 his presidential address was delivered at the onehundred second meeting of the american economic association december 29 1989 atlanta georgia joseph a pechman economic studies program the brookings institution 1775 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 i have benefited from the comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper by henry j aaron richard goode jane g gravelle robert w hartman donald w kiefer herbert e klarman robert d reischauer clifford m winston and h peyton young but they should not be held responsible for the views expressed in this paper i am indebted to richard kasten for various simulations i am also grateful to stephen j kastenberg for research assistance and to diane a shugart valerie m owens and sara c hufham for secretarial assistance some of the more extreme supply siders argued that large tax cuts pay for themselves see for example laffer 1981 but i believe it is fair to say that this view has been totally discredited for a more reasonable supply side view see the economic report of the president 1982 2see for example michael j boskin 1978 david e bradford 1980 charles l ballard don fullerton john shoven and john whalley 1985 paul courant and edward gramlich 1982 martin feldstein 1978 robert hall and alvin rabushka 1985 john kay and mervyn king 1983 charles mclure 1987 mieszkowski 1980 and lawrence summers 1981 it is interesting that the recent popularity of the expenditure tax among economists was stimulated by a tax lawyer william d andrews 1974 3see pechman 1988

testing the significance of income distribution changes over the 1980s business cycle a cross national comparison using kernel density estimation we describe the distribution of household size adjusted real income and how it changed over the business cycle of the 1980s in the united states and the united kingdom we confirm previous studies that show income inequality increased in the two countries and the middle of the distribution was squashed down using a series of statistical tests however we find that while the mass in both tails of the distribution increased significantly in both countries over the period by far the greatest gains were in the upper tail copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

the role of local officials in new democracies evidence from indonesia this paper shows that the body of appointed officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new democracies i develop a model that predicts that appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters during national level elections because of their career concerns i test the implications of the model using data from indonesia s transition to democracy both the pattern of alignment of electoral results between village and district levels and the pattern of subsequent turnover of appointed village heads corroborate the predictions of the model

hard heads soft hearts tough minded economics for a just society introduction murphys law of economic policy needed hard heads and soft hearts striking a balance between unemployment and inflation do we know how to manage the national economy who will protect us from protectionism cleaning up the environment sometimes cheaper is better it can happen here the improbably saga of tax reform on breaking murphys law

does money illusion matter comment abstract this paper experimentally investigates whether money illusion generates substantial nominal inertia building on the design of fehr and tyran 2001 we find no evidence that agents choose high nominal payoffs over high real payoffs however participants do select prices associated with high nominal payoffs within a set of maximum real payoffs as a heuristic to simplify their decision task the cognitive challenge of this task explains the majority of the magnitude of nominal inertia money illusion exerts only a second order effect the duration of nominal inertia depends primarily on participants best response functions not the prevalence of money illusion jel c91 d21 d83 e31 e41 e52 l11

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

euro illusion a natural experiment we collect and analyse data on church collections to assess whether the introduction of euro notes and coins had real effects on giving data for italy suggests that money is not completely neutral while irish data suggests a lower degree of money illusion a smaller data set from continental europe suggests different sorts of money illusion

recounting winners and losers in the 1980s a critique of income distribution measurement methodology abstract studies measuring winners and losers in the 1980s using a cross over methodology are sensitive to years compared income sharing unit chosen and inflation index used we show these and other studies exaggerate losses by mixing cyclical with cross cycle differences

the demand for bad policy when voters underappreciate equilibrium effects most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians motives to supply bad policy but voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy in this article we posit that voters may systematically err when assessing potential changes in policy by underappreciating how new policies lead to new equilibrium behaviour this biases voters towards policy changes that create direct benefits welfare would rise if behaviour were held constant even if those reforms ultimately reduce welfare because people adjust behaviour conversely voters are biased against policies that impose direct costs even if they induce larger indirect benefits using a lab experiment we find that a majority of subjects vote against policies that while inflicting direct costs would help them to overcome social dilemmas and thereby increase welfare subjects also support policies that while producing direct benefits create social dilemmas and ultimately hurt welfare both mistakes arise because subjects fail to fully anticipate the equilibrium effects of new policies more precisely we establish that subjects systematically underappreciate the extent to which policy changes will affect the behaviour of other people and that these mistaken beliefs exert a causal effect on the demand for bad policy

regional income stratification in unified germany using a gini decomposition approach frick j r and goebel j regional income stratification in unified germany using a gini decomposition approach regional studies using representative micro data from the german socio economic panel study soep this paper delivers new insights into the development of income inequality and regional stratification in germany after unification this paper applies a new method for detecting social stratification by a decomposition of the gini index that yields the obligatory between and within group components as well as an overlapping index for the different sub populations it is found that east germany is still a stratum on its own when using post government income but since 2001 no longer is when using pre government income these results remain stable when using alternatively defined regional classifications however there are also indications of some regional variation within west germany frick j r et goebel j les tranches de revenu regional dans l allemagne unifiee employant une decompositi

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

mafia elections and violence against politicians organized crime uses political violence to influence politics in a wide set of countries this paper exploits a novel dataset of attacks directed towards italian local politicians to study how and why criminal organizations use violence against them we test two complementary theories to predict the use of violence i before elections to affect the electoral outcome and ii after elections to influence politicians from the beginning of their term we provide causal evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis the probability of being a target of violence increases in the weeks right after an election in areas with a high presence of organized crime especially when elections result in a change of local government

scandal protection and recovery in the cabinet empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals we explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls we find that protection can sometimes discourage activism it enhances the value of a minister s career and hence encourages him to sit tight by moderating his activities on the other hand an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to live for today by pursuing controversial policies the prime minister s ability to protect ministers is limited by her short term incentive to fire she may however enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role

does trade openness matter for aggregate instability abstract this paper presents a cash in advance model of a small open economy and shows that whether an inflation targeting interest rate rule introduces aggregate instability depends in general on the degree of openness to international trade this result emerges regardless of whether prices are sticky or flexible in a closed economy as the monetary authority responds to movements in inflation the resulting changes in interest rates affect aggregate consumption through an intertemporal substitution effect and an inflation tax effect in a small open economy this policy also induces changes in the terms of trade which depending on the degree of openness can generate counteracting effects on consumption as a consequence the implications of interest rate rules on macroeconomic stability in an open economy differ from those in a closed economy

imperfect credibility and inflation persistence in this paper we formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered nominal contracts in which households and rms use optimal ltering to disentangle persistent and transitory shifts in the monetary policy rule the calibrated model accounts quite well for the dynamics of output and insation during the volcker disinsation and implies a sacri ce ratio very close to the estimated value our approach indicates that insation persistence and substantial costs of disinsation can be generated in an optimizing agent framework without relaxing the assumption of rational expectations or relying on arbitrary modi cations to the aggregate supply relation jel classi cation e31 e32 e52

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

keeping the keynesian faith this wide ranging discussion takes in the development of macroeconomics and the influence of ideas and events on that development the nature and causes of the great depression keynesianism lessons from the high inflation period of the 1970s the role of macroeconomic policy and the idea of the new economy

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

inequality and poverty in united states the effects of rising dispersion of men s earnings and changing family behaviour using semiparametric density estimation techniques we analyse the effect of rising dispersion of men s earnings and related changes in family behaviour on increasing inequality in the distribution of family income in the united states for the period 1969 1989 the growing dispersion of men s earnings and changing family structure can account for most of the rise in family income inequality by contrast the increase in labour force participation by women offset this trend inequality grew at a slower rate in the 1990s than in earlier decades largely because of stabilization in the relative earnings of men from low income families

discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence rational expectations models of staggered price wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods the current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning in this paper i re examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy i show that when the central bank is allowed to re optimize a quadratic loss function each period imperfect credibility and learning even in the absence of staggered contracts can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period

the speed of euro adoption this paper estimates the speed and determinants of euro adoption across italian provinces by exploiting the natural experiment in early 2002 when euro and lira dually circulated as legal tender a unique data set with daily observations on the net flows of euro banknotes from the branches of the bank of italy province by province is used the speed of euro adoption differs according to the availability of transaction technology and demographic characteristics lessons for countries adopting a new currency are obtained

effect of face value on product valuation in foreign currencies ringgits p 1 u s dollar four studies demonstrate the robustness of the face value dinar p 1 effect across different currencies exchange rate frames and with samples from two countries and two studies show that ability related factors such as time pressure and experience moderate the face value effect the article concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings

strengthening state capabilities the role of financial incentives in the call to public service we study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in mexico different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites and job offers were subsequently randomized screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants intellectual ability personality and motivation this allows the first experimental estimates of i the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants ii the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer and iii the role of job attributes distance attractiveness of the municipal environment in helping fill vacancies as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities a theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry we find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their iq personality and proclivity towards public sector work i e we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities

do single mothers face greater constraints to workforce participation in non metropolitan areas increasing workforce participation among single mothers is the primary goal of recent welfare reform measures this article shows that increased workforce participation in the mid to late 1990s led to improvements in the economic well being of non metropolitan and metropolitan area families headed by single mothers differential benefits and costs of workforce participation of single mothers in non metropolitan and metropolitan areas are then examined single mothers are found to face lower costs to workforce participation and receive lower hourly earnings in non metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas young children do however raise workforce participation costs more in non metropolitan areas copyright 2003 oxford university press

inequality and media capture abstract popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion even when voters understand that the media can be biased i develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost the model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom this effect is stronger in democratic regimes i find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross country analysis

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

a global compact to end poverty brian snowdon presents the text of a two hour interview conducted with jeffrey d sachs of columbia university a wide ranging discussion relating to professor sachs s work over the past thirty years on macroeconomic stabilisation the economics of transition and several important issues in the field of international economic development first snowdon provides some background to the debate relating to professor sachs s most recent work that has helped focus international attention on the growth tragedy of sub saharan africa this key humanitarian issue has received enormous coverage in the media throughout 2005 and has been highlighted in particular at the g8 meetings in gleneagles and worldwide live 8 concerts in july 2005 and the un world summit in september

are deep recessions followed by strong recoveries results for the g 7 countries the hypothesis is examined that the severity of a recession favourably affects the rate of growth of output during the period immediately after the recession our empirical analysis is based on the behaviour of industrial output in the g 7 countries during the period 1960 to 1985 the depth of a recession defined as the cumulative output loss between the peak and trough dates is shown to be negatively correlated with growth in the first 12 months of the subsequent expansion

the role of political parties an analysis based on transaction costs this paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the transaction costs of electoral participation political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate s policies and personal characteristics and in this way reduce voters information costs with reference to transaction cost economics political parties offer an implicit contract between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians this impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties

investment and interest rate policy a discrete time analysis this paper analyzes the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce local real indeterminacy into the economy it conducts the analysis in a calvo style sticky price model a key innovation is to add investment spending to the analysis in this environment local real indeterminacy is much more likely in particular all forward looking interest rate rules are subject to real indeterminacy

the effect of unemployment on consumption an experimental analysis this paper reports on an experiment that investigates the apparently robust phenomenon of over sensitivity of consumption to current income using a particularly simple formulation we also investigate whether individuals correctly respond to their employment status we find that subjects over react our data enables us to investigate where this over sensitivity originates we conclude that economic agents differ in their ability to plan ahead and understand the dynamic process determining their employment status however agents seem able to respond appropriately to changes in the parameters governing their decision processes in that the comparative static predictions of the theory are largely confirmed

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

investment and monetary policy learning and determinacy of equilibrium we explore determinacy and expectational stability learnability of rational expectations equilibrium ree in new keynesian nk models that include capital using a consistent calibration across three different models labor only firm specific capital or an economy wide rental market for capital we provide a clear picture of when ree is determinate and learnable and when it is not under a variety of monetary policy rules our findings make a case for greater optimism concerning the use of such rules in nk models with capital while bullard and mitra s 2002 2007 findings for the labor only nk model do not always extend to models with capital we show that determinate and learnable ree can be achieved in nk models with capital if there is i plausible capital adjustment costs ii some weight given to output in the policy rule and or iii a policy of interest rate smoothing

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

the political economy of indirect control this paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority we develop a dynamic principal agent model in which a principal a government delegates the prevention of a disturbance such as riots protests terrorism crime or tax evasion to an agent who has an advantage in accomplishing this task our setting is a standard dynamic principal agent model with two additional features first the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players second the principal suffers from limited commitment using recursive methods we derive a fully analytical characterization of the likelihood intensity and duration of intervention the first main insight from our model is that repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the efficient equilibrium this is because they serve as a punishment to induce the agent into desired behavior the second main insight is a detailed analysis of a fundamental tradeoff between the intensity and duration of intervention which is driven by the principal s inability to commit finally we derive sharp predictions regarding the impact of various factors on likelihood intensity and duration of intervention we discuss these results in the context of some historical episodes

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

choosing agents and monitoring consumption a note on wealth as a corruption controlling device there are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered when investigating levels of consumption that appear to be hard to justify the informativeness of an agent s level of consumption depends on his legal income and initial level of wealth as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal s belief about their honesty this introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they are easier to monitor more generally we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption with the aim of reducing corruption and discuss features of the practical applications castrated slaves called eunuchs were employed by sultans to guard their harems this solution to a particularly distressing principal agent problem is one instance of a general strategy that can be called choosing agents in this strategy the principal selects an agent to whom he is about to delegate a task based on an observable characteristic in the standard agency model it is clear that the agent s degree of risk aversion can be costly to the principal perhaps because of the difficulty in observing risk aversion few economists have emphasised the potential benefits of using particular types of agents an exception is schelling 1960 who discusses the use of agents with a low personal cost of conflict and mentions the strategic advantages of delegating authority to a military commander of known motivation a subsequent paper by vickers 1985 emphasises the potential value of hiring a manager who is committed to maximise the company s sales instead of profits similarly rogoff 1985 analyses the benefits of delegating the conduct of monetary policy to a conservative central banker in a setting where there is time inconsistency while rotemberg and saloner 2000

price clustering and natural resistance points in the dutch stock market a natural experiment abstract this paper focuses on the tendency of stock prices to cluster at round numbers like 10 20 30 etc and to a lesser extent 5 15 25 etc and the related effect of round number price barriers prices pass round numbers less frequently than other numbers two competing hypotheses are tested using data from the dutch stock market of the period 1990 2001 after 1 january 1999 stock prices were listed in euros while guilders were still the currency of daily life until 2002 the aspiration level hypothesis predicts that round number effects in guilders will only slowly disappear the odd price hypothesis predicts an abrupt change in round number effects after 1 january 1999 generally the results are consistent with the odd price hypothesis