efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

retail bank deposits as quasi fixed factors of production neoclassical models of the banking firm for example michael klein 1971 treat all deposit liabilities as fully variable factors of production banks then maximize profits minimize liability costs by equating the marginal costs of all liability types during each period the empirical relevance of these models is difficult to establish because binding deposit rate ceilings regulation q force bank competition for many retail deposits into implicit interest channels that are not readily measured it is therefore noteworthy that during two recent periods when deposit rate ceilings were not binding banks paid retail deposit rates considerably in excess of the rate at which they could borrow via large unregulated certificates of deposit such behavior seems inconsistent with the cost minimization prescribed by neoclassical bank models however if retail deposit accounts are interpreted as quasi fixed gary becker 1962 walter oi 1962 donald parsons 1972 sherwin rosen 1968 inputs to the banking firm these important historical observations can be reconciled with bank profit maximization this paper first describes two historical episodes during which the bank retail deposit rate exceeded the negotiable certificate of deposit rate for substantial periods of time while no profit maximizing cost minimizing bank would pay such a rate differential if retail deposit quantities are costlessly variable interpreting retail deposit accounts as quasi fixed inputs to the bank explains the peculiar rate structures a simple two period model of bank liability selection formalizes the analysis i two puzzling historical episodes

continuous reaction functions in duopolies abstract friedman and samuelson 1990 games econ behav 2 304 324 have recently shown that continuous reaction functions can support nontrivial outcomes as subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games this paper examines continuous reaction functions in duopolies we first establish a folk theorem showing that any feasible individually rational outcome in the stage game can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in continuous reaction functions given sufficiently high discount factors we then show that the set of discount factors for which outcomes can be supported by continuous reaction functions is at least as large as the corresponding sets under nash reversion trigger strategies and optimal two phase symmetric punishments the implication of these findings is that no generality in terms of possible equilibrium outcomes need be sacrificed in the course of requiring continuity journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 c72

should commuting expenses be tax deductible a welfare analysis abstract this paper asks whether or not commuting expenses should be tax deductible in order to answer this question a simple multiregion model of im perfect household and worker mobility is employed the paper shows that deductibility is clearly inefficient only if households are perfectly mobile and if households cannot choose their place of work if the region of work is not exogenously fixed commuting expenses should be deductible at more than 100 even if households choose simultaneously the place of work and the region of residence and even if tax rates are not standardized within the federation

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

choosing a place to live and a workplace espanolen este trabajo se estudia como la politica fiscal y los costos de transporte determinan la distribucion geografica de los trabajadores y las familias se utiliza un modelo simple de dos regiones con costos de transporte bienes publicos locales e infraestructura local se presenta una breve revision de literatura relacionada que estudia otros factores determinantes de la localizacion de los agentes se argumenta que las cuestiones estudiadas juegan un rol importante en la distribucion geografica de la actividad economica en el area urbana del gran buenos aires englishwe study how fiscal policies and commuting costs determine the geographical distribution of workers and households in an economy we characterize equilibrium outcomes in a simple two region model with commuting costs local public goods and local infrastructure we also provide a short survey of the related economic literature that discusses other important factors driving the localization decisions of agents finally we argue that the issues raise in this paper play a significant role in the geographic distribution of economic activity in the greater buenos aires urban area of argentina

fiscal externality rent sharing and equalisation transfers in japan this article describes a quantitative analysis of japanese equalisation transfers based on the fiscal externality models of hartwick boadway and flatters in particular it examines whether the actual level of equalisation transfers matches the theoretically optimal level from the efficiency point of view although the purpose of interregional fiscal transfer is not necessarily in the pursuit of an efficient allocation of resources equalisation transfer surely affects it it is often said in japan that the equalisation transfer may distort efficiency too much and that it is one of the causes of serious fiscal conflict between the metropolitan area and local rural prefectures the quantitative results show that the actual amount of transfers from resource rich to resource poor prefectures was below the optimal level in the 1980s however the resource poor prefectures have received an excessive transfer after 1990 specifically the direction of the optimal transfer might change in the second half of t

incentive equivalence with fixed migration costs abstract if migration between communities is costless and if policy makers in each community anticipate the migration response to policy changes then the interests of the two communities are perfectly aligned decentralization is efficient this incentive equivalence is well known however the first order approach used in virtually all the literature may obscure the fact that no convexity assumptions need be made about technology or tastes this fact underscores the relevance of incentive equivalence even when there are scale economies in the public sector here the consequences of positive migration costs for this incentive equivalence are considered in contrast with much of the literature migration costs are assumed the same for everyone this formulation differs from the more common attachment to home assumption of heterogeneous migration costs conditional on the direction of migration interests of different communities are still perfectly aligned but natives of different communities may prefer different directions of migration weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the power to induce large changes in migration flows however incentive equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are important so that communities may be under populated

transboundary pollution and household mobility are they equivalent abstract recent research has shown that perfect household mobility can serve as a disciplinary mechanism inducing national policy makers to internalize interregional externalities caused by transboundary pollution this paper develops a differential game to illustrate that the result is not necessarily robust when migration costs and explicit dynamics are introduced the paper shows that if governments constantly reoptimize imperfect household mobility leads to a tragedy of the commons and individual countries overemit even when pollution is purely local moreover these dynamic externalities get worse as the degree of household mobility increases and there is a qualitative difference between almost perfect and perfect mobilty that is a discontinuity at zero migration costs

how bank capital buffers vary across countries the influence of cost of deposits market power and bank regulation abstract this paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002 after controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation supervision and institutions their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power institutional quality has the two opposite effects better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance however have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk taking incentives

tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility spillovers are parametrized by a matrix ij where ij 0 1 when spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 pure local public goods and pure public goods all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric however any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter in the class of utility functions with additive externalities we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of this is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good u c a 1 c with this specification of utility we show that an increase in results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large a jurisdiction which is more centrally located i e benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions has a larger population in equilibrium

where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care we consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons elderly care is publicly provided there is one big city where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work and a number of small villages we show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees and we characterize the second best solution decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages

inter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents abstractinter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents regional studies this paper shows that if taxes on economic rent are assigned to anticipatory first moving regions and inter regional transfers are mandated centrally rents are under taxed relative to optimal levels this provides a possible explanation for low rent capture observed in australia and canada two resource rich federal economies that also have fiscal equalization transfers between regions

loan pricing under basel ii in an imperfectly competitive banking market abstract the new basel ii accord 2006 established new and revised capital requirements for banks in this paper we analyze and estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans we relate to the two approaches for capital requirements internal and standardized and distinguish between retail and corporate customers our loan equation is based on a model of a banking firm facing uncertainty operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market we use israeli economic data and data of a leading israeli bank the main results indicate that high quality corporate and retail customers will enjoy a reduction in loan interest rates in big banks which most probably will adopt the irb approach on the other hand high risk customers will benefit by shifting to small banks that adopt the standardized approach

strategic investment and conjectural variations abstract this paper analyzes investment decisions under the alternative assumptions of competitive collusive open loop non cooperative and feedback non cooperative behavior steady state capital stocks prices and outputs are obtained and compared the paper shows that one of the linear feedback equilibrium decision rule coefficients is a dynamic version of a contemporaneous conjectural variation the same decision rule coefficients are shown to imply a particular value for the contemporaneous conjecture the implied conjecture embodies subgame perfection and approaches the competitive value as the number of firms in the industry increases

competition and commercial banks risk taking evidence from sub saharan africa region abstractthis study investigates the relationship between competition and the risk taking attitude of banks we test how this relationship manifests in the sub saharan african ssa region s commerci

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

correlated pollutants interregional redistribution and labor attachment in a federation we examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center s redistributive policy the center s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies

decentralized and efficient control of transboundary pollution in federal systems abstract decentralized control of transboundary pollution in federal systems can be efficient when population crowding is socially costly in this paper an upstream region abates pollution or makes an interregional income transfer to the downstream region with the sole intent of deterring immigration because either instrument abatement expenditure or interregional income transfer alone implements an efficient population distribution between the regions interregional income transfers are unnecessary for efficiency without explicit income transfers each region provides the efficient portion of the aggregate level of pollution abatement in the nash equilibrium

population mobility and transboundary environmental problems abstract a standard result in the literature on environmental economics is that efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination efficient policies can be adopted as a result of interregional treaties or mandated by a central authority the present paper demonstrates that if there is perfect population mobility between the regions affected by the transboundary pollution the efficient outcome is a nash equilibrium of the policy game between regional authorities this is true independently of what policies are available to the regional authorities however there may be more than one nash equilibrium so that policy coordination may be necessary in order to achieve the best equilibrium

the commercial banking firm a simple model a commercial bank must decide its volume of illiquid loans and investments without full knowledge of its deposits in case withdrawals exceed its defensive position in liquid assets the bank incurs extra costs in meeting reserve requirements penalties in borrowing or losses in disposing of illiquid assets in case of good luck on deposits an unnecessarily large defensive position sacrifices profits from more remunerative but less liquid assets the paper presents a simple model of this precautionary portfolio decision by a profit maximizing bank the effects of variations in monetary policy banking regulations and competitive structure are traced reserve requirements access to central bank credit deposit interest rate ceilings monopolistic power in loan and deposit markets relative importance of capital and time deposit liabilities size and nature of illiquidity penalties and degree of deposit uncertainty commercial banks are the most important kind of financial intermediary their liabilities are the closest privately issued substitutes for government currency demand deposits serve as means of payment generally acceptable for most transactions for several reasons depositors bear very little of the risks of the loans the banks make there are economies of scale in pooling of default risks specific to borrowers and in specialized administration and appraisal of the loans the banks shareholders assume the residual risk only after their equity is wiped out would depositors claims be jeopardized finally the government stands behind bank deposit liabilities both as lender of last resort to tide banks over crises of illiquidity and as insurer of deposits against the contingency of insolvency government monetary and credit policy operates mainly through the commercial banking system and this is the main reason today to give special attention to commercial banks historically the first reason for government intervention in the banking business was to protect depositors or in older times bank note holders against the risks of bank illiquidity and insolvency but the public regulations and institutions established for this purpose can also be used to regulate credit markets in the interests of economic stabilization maintenance of the value of the currency or other government objectives as the protective purpose of government intervenscand j of economics 1982 this content downloaded from 207 46 13 172 on fri 07 oct 2016 06 13 42 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons in this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered it is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect in the nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region however which corresponds to the policies of the central authority regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation it is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely jel classification h77 e61 and f36 le partage du risque dans une federation ou la population est mobile et l horizon temporel long ce memoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes a l interieur des regions et entre regions dans une federation ou il y a mobilite de la population et horizon temporel infini on montre que les autorites regionales n exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d un partage inter regional du risque quand la mobilite de la population est imparfaite cependant dans un equilibre a la nash il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque region ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorites centrales les autorites regionales qui tiennent a leur reputation peuvent etre capables de s engager a une allocation efficace il est possible que les ameliorations dans le degre de mobilite rendent ces engagements moins probables

interregional competition spillovers and attachment in a federation abstract we examine decentralized environmental policy making in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility due to attachment to regions energy consumption generates positive consumption benefits but energy supply generates federal air pollution regional authorities regulate energy supply by controlling supplies of pollution permits energy and pollution permits are traded in interregional markets the center redistributes incomes after it observes regional supplies of pollution permits regions are populated by mobile and immobile households and profits are expatriated we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the federal policy game played by regional and central authorities is socially optimal

a model of competing jurisdictions with locally polluting environments and mobile populations in this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated regional states withlocal taxing authority the residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution pollution is local innature and is a by product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution local authorities in the regions can andwill in the interest of local residents engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies the model isused to illustrate that nash equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality the resulting nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the cleanregion will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair

pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility abstract we examine the non cooperative provision of a pure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the european union where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and the central government is a stackelberg follower a federation with decentralized leadership the center makes interregional income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region despite the degree of labor mobility we show that the pure public good and interregional transfers are generally allocated efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership

are national pension systems efficient if labor is im perfectly mobile abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of labor market integration on national unfunded public pension systems that are organized according to a place of residence principle with this principle labor might migrate for purely fiscal reasons thus some kind of coordination becomes necessary we first show that for the case of unrestricted labor mobility the equalization of contributions is necessary and sufficient for efficiency if the pension systems remain decentralized however national decision makers do not in general have an incentive to voluntarily stick to equalized contributions with a segmented labor market where one segment is costlessly mobile whereas the other segment is completely immobile the coordination requirements are far more complicated if migration cannot compensate for differences in national fertilities if it can the efficiency of equalization turns out to be robust finally we show that replacing the principle of residence with the principle of nationality does not eliminate the risk of fiscal externalities

comment on what drives bank competition some international evidence the question of bank competition is vitally important for a number of reasons the essential role of bank credit and other financial services as an input in the production of most other goods and services places banks in a unique and influential position such that any allocative inefficiency or other market distortions in banking are almost certain to be felt throughout the economy moreover recent history has provided numerous instances where the textbook paradigm of atomistic competition has proven inadequate as a policy guide for efficient banking either because there are simply too few banks to rely on sheer numbers as a guarantee of vigorous competition as in canada or because of evidence that there can be such a thing as too much competition in banking as suggested by several studies or because of instances where nearly competitive pricing has been observed in markets containing only one or two banks or because conversely substantially noncompetitive pricing has sometimes been deduced in banking products such as credit cardswith thousands of suppliers thus the study of bank competition remains an urgent field of research claessens and laeven 2004 this issue of jmcb make two key contributions here first they extend a proven empirical method to an unprecedentedly large and varied crosscountry sample second they offer the logical and policy relevant additional step of seeking to identify factors associated with variations in measured conduct this step is needed to assess the empirical validity of the traditional structure conductperformance paradigm in their sample and is especially important where that paradigm is found lacking as a predictor of bank conduct indeed although the authors

determinants of bank market structure efficiency and political economy variables abstract this paper analyzes the influence of bank efficiency and political economy variables on bank market structure market share and market concentration using a panel data of 2 592 banks from 69 countries over the 1996 2002 period results indicate that the validity of the efficiency structure hypothesis to explain bank market structure varies across countries depending on national political economy variables in particular higher entry requirements more generous deposit insurance and higher extent of government bank ownership reduce the positive influence of bank efficiency on market share and market concentration however tighter restrictions on bank activities better quality of the contracting environment more market monitoring and more market orientation and development of the financial system increase the positive influence of bank efficiency on market share and market concentration jel classification g18 g21 g28 keywords banking structure efficiency regulations supervision institutions

local property taxation with external land ownership abstract when housing in a local jurisdiction is produced using perfectly mobile capital and land owned by non residents a property tax on housing results in tax exporting this paper examines how property tax poll subsidy policies are determined in the presence of tax exporting and shows that the optimal property tax is the optimal tariff when residents are homogeneous when residents have different incomes and are mobile across jurisdictions the majority voting equilibrium property tax poll subsidy policy depends on factors such as tax exporting intrajurisdictional redistribution and congestion if the effect of intrajurisdictional redistribution is negligible for the median voter household mobility may result in a property tax poll subsidy policy that induces emigration of rich households

bank capitalization and cost evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling we amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking the cost function is conditioned on the level of capital but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost we find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk

use of multicriteria decision analysis methods for energy planning problems most decision making requires the consideration of several conflicting objectives the term multiple criteria decision analysis mcda describes various methods developed for aiding decision makers in reaching better decisions energy planning problems are complex problems with multiple decision makers and multiple criteria therefore these problems are quite suited to the use of mcda a multitude of mcda methods exists these methods can be divided in three main groups value measurement models goal aspiration and reference level models and outranking models methods from all of these groups have been applied to energy planning problems particularly in the evaluation of alternative electricity supply strategies each of the methods has its advantages and drawbacks however we cannot conclude that one method generally is better suited than the others for energy planning problems a good alternative might be to apply more than one method either in combination to make use of the strengths of both methods or in parallel to get a broader decision basis for the decision maker until now studies of mcda in energy planning have most often considered energy networks with only one energy carrier more advanced energy systems with multiple energy carriers have been neglected even though this field ought to be suitable for use of mcda due to its high complexity many decision makers and many conflicting criteria

interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household mobility abstract when households are immobile across regions the decentralized provision of public goods that generate interregional benefit spillovers is inefficiently low we analyze this problem in an environment of interregional household migration and obtain the following results if households are perfectly mobile across regions then the decentralized provision of public goods generating spillovers is socially efficient there is no need for central government intervention if households are attached to particular regions for cultural or nationalistic reasons however at least one of two regions undersupplies the public good central government intervention can enhance efficiency

assessing competition with the panzar rosse model the role of scale costs and equilibrium the panzar rosse test has been widely applied to assess competitive conduct often in specifications controlling for firm scale or using a price equation we show that neither a price equation nor a scaled revenue function yields a valid measure for competitive conduct moreover even an unscaled revenue function generally requires additional information about costs and market equilibrium to infer the degree of competition our theoretical findings are confirmed by an empirical analysis of competition in banking using a sample containing more than 100 000 bank year observations on more than 17 000 banks in 63 countries during the years 1994 2004

on the implications of market power in banking evidence from developing countries abstract this paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies it sheds light on the competition stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators the degree of market power bank cost and profit efficiency and overall firm stability the results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency despite significant cost efficiency losses the findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies

externalities vs internalities a model of political integration abstract decentralized government leads to inter regional externalities whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem centralized government entails other costs in particular a neglect for minority interests the paper models formally the trade off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem

subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions abstract earlier efforts by friedman examined infinite horizon oligopolies trying and failing to show existence of subgame perfect nash equilibria with the firms strategies being continuous reaction functions here in a typical game theoretic model with discounting we prove the existence of such equilibria the equilibrium strategies mimic trigger strategies in their method of operation but are continuous so that small defections from equilibrium actions result in small per period punishments we prove our results by constructing equilibria in a fashion analogous to that found in proofs of folk theorems in repeated games

optimal taxation global externalities and labor mobility this paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model we assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the dirty good that is causing damage to the environment the purpose is to compare the globally optimal second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium we show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of i transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments ii interaction effects between environmental and other policies and iii labor mobility

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment in this model the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government we then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it we find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility

optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second best world evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players abstract this paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question in a second best world should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally we find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small this result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution i e it uses uniform standards whereas local authorities use different shadow prices and therefore different standards

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

non structural measures of competition toward a synthesis of alternatives abstract procedures for detecting or measuring market power have been suggested in recent years by iwata rosse and panzar and bresnahan this paper integrates elements from all three approaches to provide a single more unified alternative to the structure conduct performance paradigm

regulations market structure institutions and the cost of financial intermediation this paper examines the impact of bank regulations market structure and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bankspecific characteristics the data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation inflation also exerts a robust positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs while concentration is positively associated with net interest margins this relationship breaksdownwhencontrolling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation furthermore bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures thus bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation they reflect broad national approaches to private property and competition

energy management under policy and technology uncertainty energy managers in public agencies are subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting policy objectives regarding cost environmental and security concerns associated with alternative energy technologies making infrastructure investment decisions requires balancing different distributions of risks and benefits that are far from clear for example managers at permanent army installations must incorporate congressional legislative objectives executive orders department of defense directives state laws and regulations local restrictions and multiple stakeholder concerns when undertaking new energy initiatives moreover uncertainty with regard to alternative energy technologies is typically much greater than that associated with traditional technologies both because the technologies themselves are continuously evolving and because the intermittent nature of many renewable technologies makes a certain level of uncertainty irreducible this paper describes a novel stochastic multi attribute analytic approach that allows users to explore different priorities or weighting schemes in combination with uncertainties related to technology performance to illustrate the utility of this approach for understanding conflicting policy or stakeholder perspectives prioritizing the need for more information and making investment decisions we apply this approach to an energy technology decision problem representative of a permanent military base

a small world methodology of analysis of interchange energy networks the european behaviour in the economical crisis abstract european energy policy pursues the objective of a sustainable competitive and reliable supply of energy in 2007 the european commission adopted a proper energy policy for europe supported by several documents and included an action plan to meet the major energy challenges europe has to face a farsighted diversified yearly mix of energies was suggested to countries aiming at increasing security of supply and efficiency but a wide and systemic view of energy interchanges between states was missing in this paper a small world methodology of analysis of interchange energy networks iens is presented with the aim of providing a useful tool for planning sustainable energy policies a proof case is presented to validate the methodology by considering the european ien behaviour in the period of economical crisis this network is approached as a small world net from a modelling point of view by supposing that connections between states are characterised by a probability value depending on economic political relations between countries

transboundary environmental problems with mobile but heterogeneous populations most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant ignoringpopulation mobility we showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions and populations are homogeneous asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting even without any internationalenvironmental agreement in the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population and showthat when people differ a non cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient we alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient finally we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility butinefficient when there is population mobility

incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups abstract this paper presents a model on secessions and nationalism with special emphasis on the role of imperfectly mobile ethnic minorities individuals trade off political benefits of homogeneity against economic costs from increasing returns to scale in production the main findings are i mobility decreases the political motivation for independence because increased competition for labour forces the ethnic majorities in the separating countries to accommodate their policy ii the impact of mobility depends on whether separation is politically or economically motivated iii increased mobility leads to a less accommodated policy in case of no separation

local pollution in federal systems it is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed this paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant in aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias if the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy if the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy

interregional interactions and population mobility the institutional level at which policies should be determined is an important issue that has been extensively treated in the economics literature in particular the literature has discussed to what extent decentralization of policy decisions give an inefficient outcome with a homogeneous population and perfect population mobility as it conventionally is modeled the following result is derived for a very general class of economies with interregional interactions a socially efficient outcome is a nash equilibrium of the game of decentralized and uncoordinated policy setting however if decisions about migration take a longer time to make than decisions of policy changes the general result above no longer holds with this decision sequence decentralization may give an inefficient outcome also in situations where the decentralized outcome is efficient in the absence of population mobility

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

international aspects of public infrastructure investment m odelling infrastructure as an international public good in a two country m odel of trade where each country s social planner behaves strategically we show that the equilibrium levels of infrastructure are sub optimal from a global perspective utilising an appropriate econom etric fram ework and data from 16 european countries over the period 1987 95 we find evidence that accords well with the m ain predictions of our theory thus we are able to offer a plausible theoretical explanation why public capital m ay be undersupplied as suggested by previous em pirical literature