a two person game of information transmission we consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities one player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other who takes the decision this process is modeled as a game qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed the impact of improving the quality of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied better information generally may not improve welfare we give conditions under which it will

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

development trajectories and new comparative advantages costa rica and the dominican republic under globalization summary this paper compares the experiences of costa rica and the dominican republic in creating new comparative advantages in manufacturing exports and its impact on economic development it makes three main arguments first the apparel sector is currently unlikely to act as an engine of economic development second high public spending in health and education and selective targeting of foreign investment have been fundamental in the creation of comparative advantages away from apparel into exports with higher technological content in costa rica third the new export sectors still lack sufficient linkages to the rest of the economy and most of their value added goes into profits for the transnational corporations

integrated inventory model for deteriorating items under a multi echelon supply chain environment abstract as the industrial environment becomes more competitive supply chain management has become essential the objective of this research is to develop a multi echelon inventory model for a deteriorating item and to derive an optimal joint total cost from an integrated perspective among the supplier the producer and the buyer a computer code is developed to derive the optimal solution a numerical example is given to illustrate the model this paper shows that the integrated approach strategy results in the lowest joint total cost as compared with the independent decision approaches

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

the eoq with backlogging derived without derivatives abstract in previous work the eoq formula without consideration to backlogging has been given a derivation without reference to the use of derivatives neither for necessary conditions nor for second order sufficient conditions furthermore this algebraic derivation immediately provided the value of the average cost function in optimum this paper extends the previous result to the eoq formula taking the backlogging case into consideration it is shown that a similar derivation immediately provides the corresponding results for this case

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

optimal strategy for the integrated vendor buyer inventory model this note is concerned with the integrated vendor buyer inventory model two different strategies have been proposed in the literature for the problem one where the delivery quantity to the buyer at each replenishment is identical and another strategy where at each delivery all the inventory available with the vendor is supplied to the buyer we show that there is no one strategy that obtains the best solution for all possible problem parameters we also present the results of a detailed numerical study that analyses the relative performance of the two strategies for various problem parameters

the single vendor single buyer integrated production inventory model with a generalised policy abstract this note considers a more general type of policy for the single vendor single buyer integrated production inventory model than has hitherto been presented based on successive shipments to the buyer within a single production batch increasing by a fixed factor

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

a public and private choice model of broadcasting this paper has established a framework for the analysis of program diversity and audience shares under different regimes of ownership regulation and channel quality the model is one of comparative statics and lends itself to analytical solutions it can serve as a tool to clarify programming decision making and the impact of various institutional arrangements the audience maximization of commercial broadcasting leads to program quality similar to that of a direct democratic process to create a bias towards quality alternative mechanisms had to be introduced that together with the potential for the propaganda use of broadcasting and the potentially large rents of controlling a scarce channel made questions of broadcast policy extraordinarily hard fought especially in european countries however the emergence of alternative distribution channels and payment mechanisms has moved television programs much more into the mainstream of economic transactions in consequence the need to use the political arena to assure the supply of certain programs has declined the marginal losses to incumbent channels has successively decreased and the propaganda reach has been reduced by the spread of programs over the distribution therefore liberalization is less resisted because the stakes have become lower

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

government control of the media abstract we present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to take actions that further some political objective but are not necessarily in citizens individual best interest however the distinction between state and private media is smaller large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media media bias in state and private media markets diverge as governments become more democratic whereas media bias in democracies and autocracies converge as positive externalities from mobilization increase

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

is the media liberal an indirect test using news magazine circulation many critics allege that the us national news media is biased in favour of liberal causes and democratic candidates the lack of an objective measure of news content ensures that such charges remain controversial i consider an indirect test for media bias if the national news media do exhibit a liberal bias consumption should be higher in liberal media markets ceteris paribus i examine determinants of circulation of the three major weekly news magazines across the us and find that newsweek and time have higher circulation in liberal markets while us news has higher circulation in conservative markets the evidence is consistent with a liberal bias for time and newsweek while us news may be relatively conservative but still left of centre or absolutely conservative

aggravating the resource curse decentralisation mining and conflict in peru abstract in the early part of this decade at the beginning of the recent international commodity price boom peru adopted major components of the new localist policy paradigm for the management of natural resources a large fraction of revenues were transferred to the subnational governments in the mining areas additionally the government encouraged mining companies to assume a more active role locally the results have been disappointing statistical and fieldwork evidence shows that these policies have exacerbated local political conflicts the new localist policy paradigm is unlikely to be effective when as in contemporary peru national political institutions are not supportive

a one vendor multi buyer integrated inventory model abstract we consider a one vendor multi buyer integrated inventory model the vendor seeks to minimize his total annual cost subject to the maximum costs which buyers are prepared to incur in order to implement this model the vendor only needs to know buyer s annual demand and previous order frequency which can be inferred from buyer s past ordering behavior we find the optimal solution for the one vendor one buyer case and present a heuristic approach for the one vendor multi buyer case

when can a news organization lead public opinion ideology versus market forces in decisions to make news do news organizations purposefullylead the public to support a particularideological agenda when debating thisquestion many analysts draw conclusionsfrom weak empirical evidence we introducea model that clarifies how a newsorganization s internal structure combineswith market forces to affect when it canlead public opinion we identify conditionsunder which liberal reporters orpolitically driven media magnates canachieve ideological goals we alsoilluminate important barriers that preventmany would be public opinion leaders fromever satisfying these conditions we showthat internal structure and market forcesare critical determinants of any newsorganization s power over public opinion

good news and bad news evidence of media bias in unemployment reports this study employs information obtained from media content analyses as well as economic and political data to investigate negativity in unemployment news between 2001 and 2010 in germany the data indicate a substantial bias in terms of the amounts of negative and positive reports compared with the actual development of unemployment moreover the media tend to place negative unemployment reports more prominently than positive ones the estimates suggest that the bias is not the consequence of journalists asymmetrically interpreting the official unemployment numbers instead it is associated with the exploitation of often non economic information and structural influences in the process of news production

the joint economic lot size problem a review abstract this article reviews lot size models which focus on coordinated inventory replenishment decisions between buyer and vendor and their impact on the performance of the supply chain these so called joint economic lot size jels models determine order production and shipment quantities from the perspective of the supply chain with the objective of minimizing total system costs this paper first describes the problem studied introduces the methodology of the review and presents a descriptive analysis of the selected papers subsequently papers are categorized and analyzed with respect to their contribution to the coordination of different echelons in the supply chain finally the review highlights gaps in the existing literature and suggests interesting areas for future research

the failure of a socially responsive gold mining mnc in el salvador ramifications of ngo mistrust in july 2008 pacific rim mining a socially responsive canadian gold mining multinational corporation mnc with 77 million invested in el salvador experienced a 30 decline in stock price when it suspended exploration drilling for gold there in april 2009 the company filed a lawsuit against the government of el salvador through central american free trade agreement to recover its investments plus damages this corporate failure is explored based on 1 four globalization economic development models 2 the social political and economic history of el salvador 3 the el salvador gold mining industry and 4 social movement reactions to international mining companies mncs must carefully engage social justice nongovernment organizations when pursuing economic development projects to ensure a nation s successful integration into the global economy

inequality and media capture abstract popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion even when voters understand that the media can be biased i develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost the model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom this effect is stronger in democratic regimes i find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross country analysis

optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer corrections abstract recently sarker and kindi 2006a optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer international journal of production economics 100 2 195 211 presented an inventory model from the purchaser s perspective to determine the optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer established by the supplier for five possible cases this study presents some practical extensions to the optimal ordering policies developed by sarker and kindi 2006a optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer international journal of production economics 100 2 195 211

reporting for sale the market for news coverage this paper proposes a formal model of the market for political news under reasonable market conditions and when the audience has psychological biases it may be profitable for outlets to differentiate their coverage moreover the implications of the model speak to a deeper impact of political polarization of the electorate

optimizing the economic lot size of a three stage supply chain with backordering derived without derivatives abstract multi stage supply chain management integration provides a key to successful international business operations this is because the integrated approach improves the global system performance and cost efficiency the integrated production inventory models using differential calculus to solve the multi variable problems are prevalent in operational research this paper extends the integrated vendor buyer inventory problem by yang and wee yang p c wee h m 2002 the economic lot size of the integrated vendor buyer system derived without derivatives optimal control applications and methods 23 163 169 to solve the multi variable problems in the supply chain and simplifies the solution procedure using a simple algebraic method as a result the solution procedure may be easily understood and applied so as to derive the optimal solution

the economic production quantity epq with shortage derived algebraically abstract previously in several papers and textbooks the classical economic order quantity eoq and the economic production quantity epq formulas for the shortage case have been derived using differential calculus and solving two simultaneous equations derived from setting the two first partial derivatives to zero with the need to prove optimality conditions with second order derivatives in a previous original piece of work a new approach to find the eoq with backlogging using some slight algebraic developments appeared this paper extends the mentioned algebraic approach to the epq formula taking shortages into consideration within the case of only one backlog cost per unit and time unit the final expressions provide the same formulas that are available in the classic textbooks on inventory theory

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

mining conflict and the politics of obtaining a social license insight from guatemala mining as a development strategy has become ubiquitous throughout the developing world however if mining firms want to take advantage of the most mineral rich terrain in developing countries they must engage with the communities living near projected mining operations firms may sometimes use violence to quiet local opposition but increasingly they will seek a social license to operate this term refers not to the legal requirements firm must obtain such as governmental and environmental clearances but rather the elusive support of the affected local population that will help a firm avoid project delays maintain a positive public image and prevent further regulation of the mining industry there is a lack of research on how firms pursue a social license to operate through a qualitative case study of a mining conflict in guatemala this article addresses two questions first how do mining firms obtain a social license to operate in practice second what results from this process using a mix of qualitative data collected in 2009 2011 the article analyzes how a large guatemalan construction materials firm cementos progreso sought a social license to operate in the indigenous municipality of san juan sacatepequez guatemala and with what results an alliance of firm and state constructed new institutions for citizen participation in local governance promoted from within them the idea that mining was complementary with development and backed up this discourse with tangible results government transparency and accountability improved as did provision of basic services the findings suggest that the local state especially institutions designed to encourage citizen participation in local governance can play a crucial role in determining whether and how mining firms can operate