compensation and span of control in hierarchical organizations this article presents evidence on the relationship between compensation ratios and spans of control within hierarchical organizations we find that compensation ratios are lower than span of control at any position within the hierarchy which is consistent with an elasticity of compensation to a number of subordinates lower than one managers human capital endowments determine a significant part of the salary differences throughout hierarchical levels as predicted by models of talent allocation in hierarchies differences in the size of firms should be attributed more to differences in their number of hierarchical levels than to variations in the span of control

discussion of incentives for accruing costs and efficiency in regulated monopolies subject to roe constraint the paper incentives for accruing costs and efficiency in regulated monopolies subject to roe constraint investigates the implicit contracts that are used to compensate executives in the electric utility industry the conference discussion of this paper centered on the economics underlying the contracting issues investigated as well as the research design and econometric approach discussion related to the underlying economics is organized below under the following topics 1 the economics of electric utility regulation which determines the nature of the contract between the regulators and the firm and 2 the structure of compensation schemes in the electric utility industry i e the nature of the implicit contract between shareholders and managers of electric utilities questions raised about the research design and econometric approach are subdivided as follows 3 design questions including potential problems with the time period selected and the paper s crosssectional approach 4 operational definitions of constructs used e g measures of efficiency and 5 econometric issues especially those related to the estimation of cost versus production functions

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

globalization and emerging markets with or without crash we analyze the effects of financial and trade globalization on the likelihood of financial crashes in emerging markets while trade globalization always makes crashes less likely financial globalization may make them more likely especially when trade costs are high pessimistic expectations can be self fulfilling and lead to a collapse in demand for goods and assets such a crash comes with a current account reversal and drops in income and investment lower income countries are more prone to such demand based financial crises a quantitative evaluation shows our model is consistent with the main stylized facts of financial crashes in emerging markets

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

employment bonuses and labor turnover the purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a two part compensation system composed of a rigid base salary and a flexible bonus can reduce turnover it is shown that bonus pay is an effective retention device if it is risk reducing and is correlated with outside contract offers for the first time to the best of our knowledge a model of bonus payments is tested with u s instead of japanese data the empirical results are suggestive of the conditions that give bonuses an important even dominant role in worker retention

ceo compensation and bank efficiency an application of conditional nonparametric frontiers the paper investigates in a dynamic context the effect of chief executive officer ceo bonus and salary payments on banks technical efficiency levels our methodological framework incorporates the latest developments on the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement as introduced by b din et al 2012 we apply time dependent conditional efficiency estimates to analyse a sample of 37 us banks for the period from 2003 to 2012 the empirical evidence reveals a non linear relationship between ceo bonus and salary payments and banks efficiency levels more specifically it is reported that salary and bonus payments affect differently banks technological change and technological catch up levels finally the empirical evidence suggests that higher salary and bonus payments are not always aligned with higher technical efficiency levels

does the form of compensation matter abstract the role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986 different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities the effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested with mixed results the evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem

rewards to academia the remuneration of vice chancellors and principals this paper models the financial remuneration to vice chancellors and principals at uk higher education institutions after describing the alternative theoretical underpinnings for the determination of pay an earnings function is estimated utilizing institutional and personal characteristics the model suggests only a partial linkage of managerial and performance related indicators to remuneration levels this suggests substantial scope for reorientation of rewards towards such indicators rather than relying on an efficiency wage this would appear particularly appropriate given the present and continued disclosure of this information together with the increased focus on performance indicators relating to teaching and research within the uk higher education sector

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

distance constraints the limits of foreign lending in poor economies how far does mobility of multinational banks solve problems of financial development using a panel of 80 000 loans over 7 years i show that greater cultural and geographical distance between a foreign bank s headquarters and local branches leads it to further avoid lending to informationally difficult yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contracting greater distance also makes them less likely to bilaterally renegotiate and less successful at recovering defaults differences in bank size legal institutions risk preferences or unobserved borrower heterogeneity cannot explain these results these distance constraints can be large enough to permanently exclude certain sectors of the economy from financing by foreign banks

the epidemiology of corporate pac formation 1975 1984 abstract most work on corporate political action committees pacs accounts for their formation or activity level in terms of market concentration and collective action dilemmas subsidiary concerns include the effects of regulatory burden and the firm s internal organization however these cross sectional designs yield little insight into the dynamics of the process results of logit and event history analyses of panel data on 119 u s firms from 1975 1984 show that changes in corporate profitability pac formation by other firms in a firm s board of directors interlock network and the degree of managerial dominance of corporate governance also affect the likelihood that a firm will form a pac analyses also reveal important differences in pac formation dynamics across different types of firms particularly in their response to pac formation by linked firms

on the relative performance of linear vs piecewise linear threshold intertemporal incentives this paper employs numerical simulations to compare the relative performance of linear contracts with piecewise linear threshold contracts in the case where the agent chooses actions over time these contracts are restricted to be functions of the ending value of aggregate output we find strong evidence that only linear contracts need be considered in comparison with piecewise linear threshold contracts in the situation where cumulative output is only updated periodically and the agent s utility function is exponential this finding holds even when there are only two periods and hence one change of action by the agent however we find that the best piecewise linear threshold contract is significantly superior to the best linear contract when the agent has a power utility function these numerical simulations also call into question the use of a cap when the agent s compensation is based on the ending value of aggregate output and the agent s effort takes place over time

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

layoffs top executive pay and firm performance this paper examines the connection between layoffs executive pay and stock prices firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their ceos more and give their ceos larger percentage raises than firms which do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year however the likelihood of announcing a layoff varies dramatically along other dimensions for example firm size which are also correlated with ceo pay once firm specific fixed effects are controlled for the ceo pay premium for laying off workers disappears in addition there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements copyright 1998 by american economic association

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

uncertainty risk and incentives theory and evidence uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives we study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager in contrast to the standard negative risk incentive trade off this learning by doing effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives we document empirical support for this prediction this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

top executive rewards and firm performance a comparison of japan and the united states this paper studies top executive turnover and compensation and their relation to firm performance in the largest japanese and u s companies japanese executive turnover and compensation are related to earnings stock returns and to a lesser extent sales performance measures the fortunes of japanese top executives therefore are positively correlated with stock performance and current cash flows or with factors contributing to such performance the relations for the japanese executives are generally economically and statistically similar to those for their u s counterparts there is some evidence however that the fortunes of japanese executives are more sensitive to low income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of u s executives

collusion in organizations the principal agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations this theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome at least partially the asymmetries of information he faces by now optimal contracts with adverse selection or hidden knowledge with moral hazard or hidden action or with nonverifiability by a third party of some variables known ex post by both the principal and the agent are relatively well understood despite insightful extensions to multiagent or multiprincipal organizations this body of knowledge falls short of a comprehensive theory of organizations one major reason beyond the restrictive nature of the organizations studied lies in the noncooperative approach generally followed to model multiagent settings indeed in this standard paradigm the cooperation of agents desired by the principal can be induced by the contracts he offers to the agents each of them maximizing his own welfare given the behavior of the other agents what remains is that the principal has complete control of the game played by the agents unwanted communication or side contracting between agents can be prevented this is a rather unrealistic assumption contract theory teaches us that the principal structures the contracts so as to minimize the informational rents given up to the agents because of their informational advantages it is quite natural to expect a collective reaction on the part of the agents to protect their rents we need to understand how agents can react to the rules of an organization and beyond to understand how a principal who is aware of the incentives for collusion should design the organization modeling coalitional or collusive behavior and characterizing the regulatory responses to such behavior is a major task of organization theory the empirical relevance of this line of work is easy to establish a clear example is that of auctions for which the occurrence of cooperative behavior between bidders is a general and well documented phenomenon see porter and zona 1993

performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk abstract we examine the effect that an exogenously specifically governmentally required change in compensation contract had on a managerial decision we find that a group of mutual funds changed their portfolio risk levels after they were forced to change their performance fee schedules their portfolio risk choices differed predictably from a randomly selected group of nonperformance fee funds and a group of performance fee funds that were not required to change their compensation contracts in addition the affected mutual funds lost both shareholders and assets around the time of the imposition of the restriction while the other funds exhibited little change or gained assets and shareholders

optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices recent developments in economic theory have focused attention on efficient methods for providing incentives within a corporation especially to top management jensen meckling 12 have examined some implications of incentive or agency problems for corporate finance in this paper we combine a simple model of security market equilibrium with that of an optimal managerial incentive contract using results of harris raviv 8 and holmstrom 9 we provide a rationale for including security prices in the managerial incentive contracts of publicly held firms in this model we also show that non systematic diversifiable risks will be considered in the capital budgeting decisions of a managerial firm operated in the interests of its stockholders this is in contrast to the implication of the arbitrage pricing theory a similar result follows from the capital asset pricing model which abstracts from incentive problems and suggests that only systematic risks ought to be considered the optimal contract model of the corporation takes the following view of the firm since decision makers within a firm are not sole owners of the business but employed agents the decisions which they make depend on the incentives which the organization provides these incentives are embodied explicitly in employment contracts and implicitly through the threat of dismissal or effect on reputation the contract whether explicit or not describes the decision maker s anticipation of the consequences to him conditional on various observable outcomes these outcomes are used to provide information useful in determining whether he did his job properly in the simplest optimal contract scenario there is a single principal and a single agent whose decision concerns the level of effort he expends the level of effort affects the level of output of the firm but not unambiguously because the output is also governed by other stochastic elements as a result some information about the agent s level of effort can be inferred

understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance comment abstract himmelberg et al j financial econom 53 1999 353 384 argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance i show that managerial ownership while substantially different across firms typically changes slowly from year to year within a company with rational managers maximising long term utility small one year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within year changes in performance by relying on within variation fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists

wealth and executive compensation using new data on the wealth of swedish ceos i show that higher wealth ceos receive stronger incentives since high wealth excluding own firm holdings implies low absolute risk aversion this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation to examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power i use lagged wealth typically measured before the ceo was hired and the results remain for one of two incentive measures also the wealth incentive result is not stronger for ceos likely to face limited owner oversight finally wealth is unrelated to pay levels and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill the compensation of chief executives of large listed companies is often largely in the form of risky instruments such as shares and options since share prices are affected by many factors outside management control this exposes ceos to risk according to standard agency theory the risk inherent in incentive compensation should reduce optimal incentives looking across firms the evidence that volatile stock prices reduce incentives in actual compensation has been mixed see e g aggarwal and samwick 1999 core and guay 2001 and prendergast 2002 for different views the importance of risk for incentives is thus in dispute 1 this paper takes another look at ceo incentives exploiting variation in risk aversion rather than risk decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that a wealthy ceo is less risk averse than a similar same coefficient of relative risk aversion but less wealthy ceo wealth should therefore proxy for risk aversion wealth may also be related to ceo skill and power obviously using wealth variation empirically hinges on having adequate data on individual wealth i use swedish tax filings to construct a proxy of wealth in sweden tax authorities provide data on aggregate yearly income

managerial reputation and divisional sell offs a model and empirical test abstract this paper presents a reputation model of divestiture activity that yields a sharp cross sectional implication for event studies of sell off announcements a decision to divest a division that is known to be successful conveys good news about the division in contrast a decision to divest a division that is known for underperformance conveys no news about the division we test these hypotheses on a sample of sell off announcements for which we find stories in the wall street journal unambiguously characterizing the division being sold as either a winner or a loser the stock price reaction to the sell off of losers is indistinguishable from zero while the stock price reaction to the sell off of winners is a statistically significant 2 5 these results are strengthened when we expand the sample to include divisions whose profitability was announced in the company s annual report for this expanded sample the average stock price reaction to the announcements of sell offs of losers remains indistinguishable from zero while returns from the sell offs of winners average a highly significant 3 4

information and bank credit allocation abstract private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders we analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders first we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries second when faced with greater competition from outside lenders banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers flight to captivity third if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lender s overall loan portfolio the model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations

heads i win tails you lose a career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance the paper utilises a novel career perspective to examine managerial theories of organisational control in the context of executive reward principal agent theory managerial power and neo institutionalism are evaluated detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all ftse350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised using both a fixed effects panel and a career based approach rival hypotheses are tested in addition to the payperformance relationship the probability of job loss as a function of performance is also estimated the evidence presented points to the importance of institutional considerations in the standard agency theory and managerial power perspectives and lends support to a social theory of agency the analysis is empirical in nature and an effort is made to draw on qualitative studies to further flesh out the discussion the practical implications of the findings point to the inadequacy of existing arrangements to deliver efficient pay outcomes where performance is poor whilst highlighting dangers of relying on naive policy remedies that ignore the role played by institutional forces in their implementation also highlighted is the distinct advantage of boards adopting a cumulative or career oriented approach when evaluating executive performance from a policy perspective the case is made for truly long term incentives in the form of career shares

on the formation of industry lobby groups abstract this paper provides a step towards a more complete theory of lobbying extending the menu auction model of grossman and helpman grossman g m helpman e 1994 american economic review 84 833 850 a new explanation is proposed for why more concentrated industries more easily overcome the free rider problem inherent in political collective action instead of focusing on transactions costs as olson olson m 1965 the logic of collective action harvard university press cambridge ma we show that more collusive industries with higher collusive profits have a greater incentive to form lobby groups and to contribute to industry lobbying moreover more polluting industries also have a greater incentive to form and contribute to a lobby group

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

market valuation of employee stock options this study investigates whether investors incorporate the value of a firm s outstanding employee stock options into its stock price i estimate the outstanding options value for a sample of firms for which outstanding fixed options exceed 5 of outstanding common shares in 1988 i find a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and a firm s share price the correlation is stronger i for the option s intrinsic value than for the option s time value ii for options that are later in their vesting stage than earlier in their vesting stage and iii for large firms than for small firms in addition the fasb s method for calculating compensation expense has no explanatory power in the presence of this paper s calculation of the options value

playing for keeps pay and performance in the nba i introduction a basic insight of agency theory is that properly designed incentive contracts can align the interests of agents with those of the principal and recent empirical work shows that workers do indeed respond to financial incentives 1 contractual incentives however are not the only force motivating workers workers also have incentives to vary effort at different points of their contract cycle to increase effort just before a new contract is signed to lock in a more lucrative deal and then reduce it after a multi year contract is secured these types of contract related incentives create clear moral hazard problems but have received little empirical attention the motivating hypothesis in this paper is that imperfect information and multi year contracts create an implicit incentive for workers to strategically alter effort over the contract cycle in the year prior to signing the contract their contract year workers may exert above average effort to convince employers that they are high quality and thus raise long term compensation once the contract is signed however workers may exert less effort because wages are effectively independent of contemporaneous performance an empirical difficulty is that this moral hazard may be obscured by two factors a selection effect may lead only high quality workers to receive contracts and career concerns may provide additional incentives and dampen the post contract decline 2 this paper employs a unique dataset for professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba from 1988 to 2002 to examine the contract related incentive effects the data include contract information year signed length of contract and value of contract for every active player in 2000 and performance measures points scored rebounds assists etc throughout each player s career contract related incentive effects are estimated from changes in individual performance over the contract cycle if performance systematically improves just before signing a new contract and falls afterward some of the fluctuation is likely due to contract related incentives i also examine the traditional link between pay and past performance which is necessary for these types of incentives to be relevant the critical advantage of this data is the detailed information on individual performance individual contract status and individual pay 3 in contrast previous work on individual incentives for example lazear 2000 paarsch and shearer 2000 and shearer 2004 studied changes infirmwide compensation plans while the empirical literature on executive pay and performance for example murphy 1985 1986 jensen and murphy 1990 gibbons and murphy 1992 kaplan 1994 and hall and liebman 1998 typically examined the link between individual pay and firm performance the individual level data constructed here have the critical variation across individuals which is needed to identify the impact of these contract related incentive effects the empirical work begins with a test of the link between pay and performance which is necessary for contract related incentives to be operational not surprisingly better performers in the nba are rewarded with higher salaries and longer contracts more relevant to the incentive issue players are strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year a one point increase in a player s scoring average for example is associated with an annual salary increase of over 300 000 this link provides the crucial motivation for the hypothesis that players will exert additional effort in their contract year to lock in the better contracts that they expect to follow the data then provide strong evidence of contract related incentive effects as overall performance does in fact improve relative to a player s long run average in the contract year and then declines after a long run contract is signed

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

economic interests party and ideology in early cold war era u s foreign policy although it is widely acknowledged that economic interests influence the politics of trade policy most research on international relations treats security issues differently do conflicting economic interests shape political debate over foreign policy even when security issues are highly salient to answer this question i test a range of hypotheses about conflicting interests in the economic stakes of u s foreign policy during the early cold war era i present evidence that economic interests in their home states were closely related to senators voting patterns on foreign policy issues these patterns hold across economic and security issues i also find that political parties play an important mediating role making senators more or less receptive to various economic interests

asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in ceo cash compensation calculations abstract we provide evidence that ceo cash compensation is relatively less sensitive to pension expense than pension income suggesting that compensation committees shield ceo cash compensation from pension expense amounts we also provide evidence that managers use relatively higher expected rate of return estimates when reporting pension income suggesting that managers select income increasing accounting estimates in response to compensation committees greater emphasis on pension income in ceo cash compensation determinations pension cost amounts represent a unique setting to examine such behavior as their effect on ceo cash compensation can be detrimental or beneficial but arise from the same underlying economic activity

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

strategic orientations incentive plan adoptions and firm performance evidence from electric utility firms this study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy managerial motivation and control managerial risk bearing and incentive plan characteristics a pooled cross sectional time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms consistent with theory results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with defender strategic orientations in contrast firms with prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance 1997 john wiley sons ltd

polluters and collective action theory and evidence 1 introductionthe seminal theory by olson 1965 predicts that industries with fewer firms have a greater ability to undertake collective action they organize cooperative political action more easily because greater concentration lowers the cost of political action 1 the empirical evidence is inconclusive however andres 1985 masters and keim 1985 heywood 1988 and humphries 1991 find positive effects of industry concentration on the probability of making political action committee pac contributions see also mckeown 1994 pittman 1976 finds that concentrated industries generate greater contribution levels grier munger and roberts 1991 find an inverted u shaped relationship between the level of pac formation and industry concentration with a maximum political participation rate occurring at a four firm concentration ratio around 0 45 esty and caves 1983 and zardkoohi 1985 report ambiguous effects of concentration on pac contributions 2in this paper we suggest an alternative perspective on firms ability to organize collective action which to our knowledge has been ignored so far the novel argument is that industries that face multiple regulations a greater number of policy issues find it easier to overcome collective action problems and sustain lobbying in particular we focus on the difference between firms in polluting and clean industry sectors using a simple repeated game framework similar to spagnolo 2000 we argue that firms in industries that are naturally polluting because of their input requirements and therefore incur pollution abatement costs will face an additional policy battle compared with other industries everything else equal 3 this enables such industries to sustain greater cooperation and lobbying this is because firms seeking to form a lobby group face a free riding problem due to a limited amount of enforcement power available to punish deviation and ensure cooperation firms that face multiple areas of regulation have an advantage in the formation of lobby groups because they have a greater amount of enforcement power available to reallocate between policy issues when joint lobbying gives large gains in environmental policy this surplus can be reallocated to trade policy for example free riding behavior on trade policy lobbying may more easily be disciplined the prediction that emerges from our theoretical model is that polluting industries are relatively less affected by the free riding problems involved in organizing political action and we thus expect the level of political contributions to be higher in these sectors 4we evaluate this prediction using a cross section data set of u s manufacturing industries our empirical model builds on a multiple equation model by gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 who test the well established theory of grossman and helpman 1994 on the pattern of protection their theory takes lobby group formation as given we augment gawande and bandyopadhyay s model with an additional equation for environmental policy stringency 5 the empirical results lend support to our theory industry pac contributions and thus the level of lobby group cooperation are greater in industries with larger pollution abatement costs this result is robust to several measures of lobby group formation and environmental policy the present paper contributes to the recent literature on the formation of lobby groups in the area of pollution taxation damania and fredriksson 2000 argue that collusive industries may more easily form lobby groups that oppose such taxes using a related setup damania and fredriksson 2003 discuss the effect of exogenous trade liberalization on environmental policy formation when lobby group formation is endogenous pecorino 1998 and mitra 1999 discuss the formation of trade lobby groups 6 neither of these papers explore the relationship between collective action and the number of policy instruments however

financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries we model a small open economy in which both domestic financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs face incentive constraints as in holmstrom and tirole 1997 to study the general equilibrium impact of various types of capital inflows on the efficiency and governance of domestic banks banks have an advantage in monitoring firms but the latter can collude with banks and offer side payments to reduce the intensity of monitoring opening up to international capital flows makes domestic banks capital scarcer relative to uninformed capital thus increasing the relative cost of monitoring we show that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the governance of the domestic financial system by sometimes increasing firms incentives to collude with banks we characterize the conditions under which governance is more likely to deteriorate after opening up the capital account and discuss the effects on investment productivity and output we also analyze the effects of foreign direct investment in the corporate and banking sectors stylized facts are consistent with the predictions of the model

total board remuneration and company performance using a hitherto neglected source of data this paper combines executive emoluments with executive options to construct a broader measure of executive pay than has been possible in earlier british studies the result of including the long term share option component of pay along with the more commonly utilized short term component of emoluments is to reveal executive pay as being significantly more sensitive to company performance than has previously been thought to be the case the paper questions the current policy stance of british institutional investors and of the greenbury committee with respect to executive share options copyright 1996 by royal economic society

delays in new product introductions and the market value of the firm this paper empirically estimates the impact of not meeting promised new product introduction dates on the market value of the firm we estimate the average abnormal change in the market value for

the role of comparative advantage and learning in wage dynamics and intrafirm mobility evidence from germany this article measures the importance of job level assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers ability in explaining intrafirm wage and mobility dynamics using survey data from the german socio economic panel the results reveal the importance of nonrandom selection of workers into the rungs of the firm s job ladder measured and unmeasured ability play important roles in workers rank assignment with unmeasured ability being more important at higher levels of the hierarchical job structure there is some evidence of learning effects for workers below age 35 generating mobility between upper and executive levels

international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises abstract we build a model of emerging markets crises which features two types of collateral constraints firms in a domestic economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other we study how the presence and changes in these collateral constraints affect financial and real variables a binding international constraint in the aggregate leads to a sharp rise in interest rates and fire sales of domestic assets while limited domestic collateral can lead to wasted international collateral these two collateral constraints can interact in important ways the first is disintermediation a fire sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail in their function of reallocating resources across the economy leading to wasted international collateral the second is a dynamic effect we show that firms in an economy with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks increasing the severity of these shocks

ceo compensation after deregulation the case of electric utilities the 1992 national energy policy act nepa intensified competition in the electric utility industry by allowing nonutility generators to produce and sell power in wholesale energy markets congress expected nepa to lead to improved operating efficiencies by substituting market forces for regulation a data set that is unique to the utility industry allows us to test how and whether utility firms reallocated resources to improve efficiencies and more important for this study whether ceo compensation changed in accordance with agency theory predictions that ceo compensation would become more incentive based and more equity based in the competitive operating environment

law endowments and property rights while scholars have hypothesized about the sources of variation in property rights for over 2500 years it is only very recently that researchers have begun to test these theories empirically this paper reviews both the theory and empirical evidence supporting and refuting the law and endowment views of property rights the law view holds that historically determined differences in national legal traditions continue to shape cross country differences in property rights the endowment view argues that during european colonization differences in climate crops the indigenous population and the disease environment influenced long run property rights

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

equilibrium warrant pricing models and accounting for executive stock options under apb opinion no 25 compensation expense arising from executive stock options consists of the excess of the market value of the stock over the exercise price of the options on their grant dates if the exercise price equals the market value of the stock on the grant date which is typically the case no compensation expense is recognized this accounting treatment has been frequently criticized for its bias toward underestimating the cost of an option to the issuing firm and a number of alternative valuation models have been suggested in the accounting literature by and large these valuation models have been borrowed from the finance literature where they were developed to explain the pricing of warrants and traded options the purpose of this paper is to assess empirically how well two of these valuation models perform in providing estimates of the value of traded securities warrants that are similar in many respects to executive stock options 2 this evidence should help calibrate the magnitude of the errors

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

market structure and political influence new data on political expenditures activity and success this paper utilizes new data to evaluate the determinants of the political influence of thirty five manufacturing industries on the u s congress during 1976 80 several measures of influence serve to distinguish between political activity and success seller concentration and geopolitical dispersion increase both activity and success but neither industry size nor leading firm size proves significant we test whether political expenditures facilitate obtaining the favors conferred on an industry by its market structure or by influence independent of that strurture statistical inference strongly confirms both roles

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

endogenous financial intermediation and real effects of capital account liberalization abstract we consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in a small developing economy we allow different forms of financial contracts to arise endogenously financial intermediaries mitigate a moral hazard problem in investment choice through costly monitoring we then examine the impact of opening the capital account on both welfare and the structure of lending contracts liberalizing the capital account may improve or worsen the efficiency of financial intermediaries leading to an improvement or worsening of the aggregate composition of investment projects we show that efficient financial intermediaries in the closed economy are neither necessary nor sufficient for a capital account liberalization to improve welfare

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

the effect of accounting procedure changes on ceos cash salary and bonus compensation abstract this paper examines the effect of accounting procedure changes on cash salary and bonus compensation to ceos we estimate whether there is an adjustment to the statistical relation between compensation and corporate earnings following changes that lower earnings fifo to lifo inventory valuation and that raise earnings accelerated to straight line depreciation the results indicate that 1 subsequent to these changes salary and bonus payments are based on reported earnings rather than earnings under the original accounting method and 2 the potential compensation effect of the changes is small compared to the effect of economy or industry wide changes in compensation

asset specificity and the political behavior of firms lobbying for subsidies in norway previous research into endogenous trade policy has described extensively the political incentives of firms with specific assets but no studies have shown directly that firms behave as predicted we adopt insights from transaction costs economics to develop measures of asset specificity and to investigate how variation in these measures affects the political behavior of firms in particular we examine the lobbying choices of norwegian firms in the 1980s given available subsidy funds from norway s oil boom and some government decisions in the 1970s firms with more specific assets faced potentially greater losses from adjusting to new activities in the face of competitive pressures and thus had greater incentives to lobby for subsidies to protect themselves joint contacting of parliament and government on behalf of firm interests by representatives of both management and labor should be particularly likely where firms had specific assets data analysis shows that asset specificity as indicated by r d intensity and job immobility predicts joint contacting independently of plausible alternative explanatory variables like firm size and export orientation

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

bank supervision and corruption in lending abstract which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms financing obstacles we find that the traditional approach to bank supervision which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor discipline and influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending rather we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance in extensions we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions

interlocks pacs and corporate conservatism two alternative corporate political strategies are identified for political action committee pac contributions to candidates in the 1980 congressional elections 1 a pragmatic effort to promote a particular company s best interests and 2 an ideological effort to promote conservatism with the use of multiple regression this article examines three theoretical explanations of corporate political strategies the expectations of corporate liberal theory are not confirmed rather there is support for both state structure and interlock theories it is argued that at least in 1980 business political behavior was ideologically conservative which business understood to represent classwide rational interests

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

the dependence of pay performance sensitivity on the size of the firm i analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm s shareholders i use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship estimating this model on chief executive officer ceo compensation data using nonlinear least squares i determine that pay performance sensitivity as defined by jensen and murphy 1990b appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size however measured i also analyze the properties of pay performance sensitivity for teams of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as ceo pay performance sensitivity

the risk preferences of u s executives in this paper i elicit risk attitudes of u s executives by calibrating a subjective option valuation model for option exercising data 1996 to 2008 yielding approximately 65 000 values of relative risk aversion rra for almost 7 000 executives the observed behavior is generally consistent with moderate risk aversion and a median mean rra close to one three values are validated for chief executive officers ceos by testing theory based predictions on the influence of individual characteristics on risk preferences such as gender marital status religiosity and intelligence senior managers such as ceos presidents and chairpersons of the boards of directors are significantly less risk averse than non senior executives rra heterogeneity is strongly correlated with sector membership and firm level variables such as size performance and capital structure alternative factors influencing option exercises are tested for their influence on rra values this paper was accepted by brad barber finance

are company founders underpaid this article examines the relation between founder status and ceo compensation in publicly listed us firms the results suggest that ceo founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers in contrast ceos who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards the findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three ceo types when examining the determinants of executive compensation

why bank credit policies fluctuate a theory and some evidence in a rational profit maximizing world banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit this paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions this leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies evidence from the banking crisis in new england in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

ceo incentives and firm size we develop a model that clarifies how to measure ceo incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms the crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of ceo productivity with respect to firm size we find that ceo marginal products rise significantly with firm size confirming rosen s conjecture that ceos of large firms have a chain letter effect on firm performance and overall ceo incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size we employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems

on the mis use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion tests of risk sharing in the contracting literature often rely on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion the intuition behind these tests is that since contract choice is monotonic in the coefficients of risk aversion which are themselves assumed monotonic in wealth the effect of a change in wealth on contract choice is clearly identified we show that tests of risk sharing relying on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion are identified only insofar as the econometrician is willing to assume that a the principal is risk neutral or her preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion cara and b the agent is risk neutral

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research