lessons from the tequila crisis abstract this paper draws several important lessons from the tequila crisis of 1994 and 1995 the overriding lesson is that the dynamics of financial crises in emerging market countries differ from those in industrialized countries because institutional features of their debt markets differ several policy lessons for emerging market countries also emerge from the analysis 1 pegged exchange rate regimes are extremely dangerous 2 strong prudential supervision of the banking system is critical for prevention of financial crises 3 financial liberalization must be managed extremely carefully and 4 different policies are needed to promote recovery in emerging market countries than those that are applicable to industrialized countries

microcredit what can we learn from the past abstract six microcredit organizations of 19th century europe are compared to identify what institutional designs were conducive to success and sustainability organizations that depended on charitable funding were more fragile and tended to lose their focus more quickly than those that obtained funds from depositors an ability to adjust interest rates also appears important in sustainability examining historical microcredit is particularly useful since it offers an opportunity to explore the characteristics of organizations which were sustained over many decades a perspective which is rare in modern microcredit banks and programs most of which are less than 15 years old

outcome based accountability theory and evidence abstract a firm s payoffs can often depend on whether it exceeds a threshold of performance in a principal agent setting we demonstrate that the optimal contract induces efficient effort by basing firing decisions solely on whether the agent was successful even though the absolute level of performance is more informative we test the predictions of our model using thirty seasons of nfl data we find that a coach is 6 percentage points more likely to be fired after a close loss beyond this the margin of victory has no significant impact on firing probabilities despite being more informative about future success also consistent with the predictions of our model coaches maximize team effort by playing their best players when doing so has the largest impact on the probability of winning

development of financial markets and the size distribution of manufacturing establishments international comparisons abstract institutional determinants have largely been neglected in explaining international differences in the size distribution of manufacturing establishments this paper draws on recent developments in institutional analysis to derive certain hypotheses concerning the way in which the size distribution within manufacturing is affected by the degree of development of the markets for debt and equity these hypotheses are tested on the basis of an international cross section of 54 countries the results are generally supportive of the hypotheses especially in the case of developing countries

interlinked contracts and moral hazard in investment abstract in agricultural tenancy arrangements the tenant is often required to undertake effort aimed at maintaining and improving the productive stocks this paper investigate the design of contracts which induce optimal investment of such effort it is found that a long term contract which interlinks tenancy with a credit agreement is optimal in equilibrium the tenant obtains credit from the landlord at a rate of interest below the market and is perpetually indebted to the landlord

capital market development in china abstract this paper examines why and how capital markets have developed in a low income socialist country it shows that the development is the response of economic agents operating under a more market oriented economic environment with a highly regulated and inefficient banking system this development has presented new policy challenges and opportunities the paper argues that the developmental effects of the emergence of capital markets in china can be as important as its impact on improving allocative efficiency and resource mobilization

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage in many industries firms affect the environment in two distinct types of ways firstly they emit routine anticipated volumes of flow pollutants secondly they can potentially inflict catastrophic environmental damage liability for which may be overhanging or limited by the law operaters of chemical plants nuclear power stations and oil tankers are three examples if an emissions tax or charge is to be levied on the flow pollutants in these cases how should it be set we use simple dynamic programming techniques to characterise second best optimality we identify contexts in which the tax should be raised above its pigovian level to take account of the catastrophic potential and others where it should be set below that level the analysis has significant implications for how policymakers should go about calibrating ecological taxes in a number of high profile industries

vertical coordination financial structure and the changing theory of the firm developments for evaluating these changes including the relationships to financial structure the theoretical developments include contributions from the economics of organizations stiglitz 1991 agency relationships jensen and meckling transactions cost economics williamson 1979 1985 incomplete contracting hart 1988 asymmetric information and financial contracting 1 these theoretical developments provide rich opportunities to apply new interesting concepts toward understanding and evaluating the changing managerial and organizational environment in agriculture

debt maturity and the international financial architecture this paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture the analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks the paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates such as international lending in last resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries jel f34 o19

exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information this paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information one party the seller makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party the buyer has private information about its valuation a simple exit option contract which allows the buyer to refuse trade achieves the first best in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer s valuation is public information but when unverifiable and asymmetric information are combined exit options induce inefficient pooling and lead to a particularly simplecontract inefficient pooling is unavoidable also under the most general form of contracts which make trade conditional on the exchange of messages between the parties indeed simple exit option contracts are optimal if random mechanisms are ruled out

the role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information abstract the paper analyzes the structure of credit market equilibrium under imperfect information collateralization and credit rationing are compared as alternative means to cope with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard it is shown that lenders may use collateral as a self selection and incentive mechanism rationing occurs only if the borrowers collaterizable wealth is too small to allow perfect sorting or to create sufficiently strong incentives whenever there is rationing in an equilibrium some borrowers are charged the maximum amount of collateral

financial markets and development my views on this subject have been greatly affected both by the experience of developing countries during the past quarter century and by the major shift evolutionary if not revolutionary in the economists paradigm over that period we have seen that capital accumulation is not enough even the extremely high rates of savings of many of the socialist economies have not managed to compensate for their lack of ability in allocating capital and these countries have for the most part not fared well but extreme free market solutions have fared little better perhaps best illustrated by the experience of chile true believers in the doctrines of the left and the right have this in common they both claim that if the patient had only followed the doctor s orders more precisely the medicine would have worked

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model i construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever but are subject to optimal terminations upon a termination the firm hires a new worker and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts the model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble respectively the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice involuntary layos and voluntary retirements the model allows simultaneous determination of its equilibrium turnover unemployment and retirement as well as the expected utility of the new labor market entrants

the global credit boom challenges for macroeconomics and policy the recent financial crisis has put the spotlight on the rapid rise in credit which preceded it in this paper we provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the credit boom and the macroeconomic context in which it developed we find that the boom was unusually long and associated with neither particularly strong growth nor rising inflation in the economies in which it took place we show that this type of credit and financial cycle is hard to reconcile with existing economic theory and argue that while the global savings glut may account for the cycle s initial phase other factors such as the conduct of monetary policy and perceptions of declining macroeconomic risk were more important from the mid 2000s onwards we conclude by identifying some of the challenges now facing macroeconomics and policy

financial constraints and firm post entry performance abstract firms finance production by internally generated funds and external loans the benefits of leverage however come with a cost this cost is related to the uncertainty banks face about the firm s quality and output price as time evolves banks learn about the firm and adjust the terms of the loan contract because of this firms do not have equal access to credit small young firms face greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well known prospects the firm survival rate as well as the firm rate of growth are therefore important issues in analyzing firm post entry performance

incrementality of sme loan guarantees in many countries loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small and medium sized enterprises smes if loan guarantee schemes are to be effective a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources a property known as incrementality or additionality this paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality this work uses a two stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the canada small business financing csbf program first a logistic regression based model of loan outcomes essentially a credit scoring model is estimated based on a large representative sample of smes the resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness of fit the model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme incremental loans ought to be classified as turndowns by the model hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality for the csbf loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated with 95 confidence as 74 8 9 0

group credit a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment performance information asymmetries plague credit markets in developing countries leading to selective rationing and market segmentation with adverse income distributional consequences for small borrowers data collected from the finca group credit programme in costa rica were used to study the viability and cost effectiveness of group credit as a means to transmit information on borrower creditworthiness groups that screened members and used local information had lower delinquency rates than those that did not however less than half the groups had positive rates of economic return suggesting that group lending may improve information flow but is a cost sensitive institutional design

country risk analysis the demand and supply of sovereign loans abstract tis paper develops a general model of the demand and supply of loans made to the public sector of a third world country its objective is to identify the critical variables of demand and supply and to discuss the current international financial situation within this framework on the supply side these loans are treated as part of an optimal portfolio decision while the demand for external loans by a lesser developed country is based on a life cycle hypothesis of development after conditions for market equilibrium are established credit rationing instability and default probabilities are discussed

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

on authority distributions in organizations controls abstract a member s command game gives the direct boss and approval relations between him and other members in his organization in a complicated organization commands can be passed or implemented through command channels this implies a global authority topology in the organization this paper will investigate three related forms of command channels and their contexts in the stricter form a coalition has the complete power over a player this form can be found in the military a slavery as well as private property right the other two equivalent forms analyze the sharing power over commonly owned property they can explain such issues as the controlling power responsibility democracy in instituting governments e g one person one vote principle sharing sovereign and indivisible common property

an analysis of offer functions of banks and credit unions in guatemala economists have sought to identify institutions which might fill the gap in household access to credit arising from rationing by formal lenders credit unions have been identified as institutions which might use informational and monitoring advantages to fill that gap using information on household perceptions of their access to credit this article analyses the impact of certain credit unions on the access to credit of households in guatemala regression results indicate that credit unions serve markets unserved by formal lenders and that information on household perceptions of their access to credit is important in making inferences about lender lending activities

global financial instability framework events issues two of the key questions facing policymakers today are how to reduce the risk of global financial instability and how to cope with it when it occurs this paper starts by defining financial instability and then showing how it harms economic activity it then uses this framework to describe what happened during the recent financial crises in mexico and east asia the paper ends by raising several key policy issues not coincidentally these issues are addressed in the remaining papers in the symposium

credit rationing concessionary lending and debt maturity abstract a firm raises capital for a two period investment while creditors observe the project status midstream unobservable managerial perks may consume capital each period when the firm is unfortunate early on short term financing results in either concessionary lending or costly liquidation rolling over short term debt may be problematic because the high risk premium creditors demand when asset value is low relative to debt impares managerial motivation precisely when the incentive to defer perk consumption is weakest long term financing may reduce total agency costs be enabling lenders to charge higher initial premia in effect shifting loan repayments to states in which incentive constraints are non binding

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

financing new venture exporters this paper investigates the demand for and access to financing for young small and medium sized enterprises smes the work compares theoretically and empirically two sets of new firms those that export and those that do not export as to the frequency with which they seek and obtain external financing the work hypothesizes that new growth firms and new exporter firms are especially likely to seek external financing yet less likely to obtain financing empirical findings confirm these expectations demonstrating that young growth firms were more likely than non growth firms to seek all forms of capital and exporters were particularly likely to apply for equity and trade credit commercial lenders were less likely to approve loan applications from early stage growth firms and especially so for applications from young growth oriented sme exporters the implications of these results for research and public policy are discussed

adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard this paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions i contracts are subject to renegotiations ii the agent s action has long term effects the action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or type renegotiation proof contracts that implement various actions including random ones are characterized under appropriate conditions the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action therefore the equilibrium has standard properties of adverse selection models

loan collateral corporate investment and business cycle abstract collateral and loan rates are observed to be highly cyclical in their use for bank lending the effects of such cyclicality on corporate investment are analyzed in this paper using a dynamic model we find that more collateral causes firms to select riskier safer projects if the loan rate rises above falls below the expected investment return we show that the incentive effect of loan rates becomes stronger with greater collateral with the two credit terms having larger incentive effects on lower quality firms these results offer a new explanation for why lenient collateral policies are associated with rising loan rates in economic upturns but stricter collateral requirements come with falling loan rates during downturns

farm debt default and foreclosure an economic rationale for policy action economic analysis of farm programs typically focusses on economic costs here we show that because of market failures and imperfections there are possible economic benefits to be derived from programs which reduce or eliminate the threat of default and foreclosure a production model of an indebted firm is developed and serves as a basis for an aggregate model which identifies possible costs and benefits from a program of transfers to indebted farmers the challenge facing policy makers is to design programs which capture the benefits of reducing the probability of default while minimizing perverse incentive effects of such programs

competition risk neutrality and loan commitments abstract we rationalize fixed rate loan commitments forward credit contracting with options in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality future interest rates are random but there are no transactions costs borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a non cooperative nash game between the bank and the borrower the initial formal analysis is basically in two steps first we show that the only spot credit market nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank s informational handicap second we show that loan commitments because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank s expected profit and the loan interest rate enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium perhaps our most surprising result is that if the borrower has some initial liquidity it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

the incentive effects of dismissals efficiency wages piece rates and profit sharing the relation of several incentive schemes to productivity is studied with a particular emphasis on the effects and determinants of dismissals dismissals turn out to be positively but in a nonlinear way associated with productivity similarly profit sharing raises productivity wages and piece rates are insignificant profit sharing decreases the number of dismissals made by firms copyright 1991 by mit press

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

dynamics of banks capital accumulation we construct a dynamic neoclassical model of banking capital where the dynamics are governed by the process of financial capital accumulation and credit risk realizations in a structure where stylized banking characteristics are maintained this is aimed at focusing on how the profit maximizing capital ratio of banks evolves and how it reacts to exogenous shocks particularly so during periods of prolonged downturn of the economy we examine impulse responses of our model to credit risk shock business cycle shock and monetary policy shock the convergence of financial capital to its optimal level is also explored

collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information the authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered the principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts specifically some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept two somewhat surprising results emerge first high quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits second high quality borrowers may put up more collateral this paper explores the allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications we model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium under both banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits however under the first concept of equilibrium ti as in jaffee and russell 11 all rents accrue to borrowers whereas under the second concept t2 all rents accrue to depositors as in stiglitz and weiss 17 our research makes two main points first we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations specifically one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of stiglitz and weiss 17 and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used for instance

credit markets and the control of capital traditional discussions of the role of capital markets have identified a number of distinct functions which they perforrn they allocate scarce capital among competing users and uses l and they provide signals to guide managers in making their investment decisions 2 in this lecture i wish to focus on a rather different function of the capital market what i shall refer to as the control of capital 3 conventional theory treats the typical firrn in an anthropomorphic manner it acts as a single rational individual doing what it is supposed to be doing maximizing stock market value that may have been well and good in those nostalgic bygone days of small firrns each run tightly by their owners who were single mindedly pursuing their lust for wealth but today a majority of production occurs in large corporations in which no shareholder owns more than a small fraction of the shares in which the separation of ownership and control that frank knight was so concerned with in his writings some sixty five years ago has become a reality those

is work special justice and the distribution of employment i investigate from an egalitarian welfarist standpoint the issue of whether state guaranteed employment should be offered as a matter of right to able bodied poor citizens who suffer chronic or persistent unemployment an affirmative answer is defended one consideration supporting this right to work is that provision of transfer aid in the form of jobs rather than cash screens nonneedy bohemians from the class of beneficiaries the main conclusion of the essay is defended from one objection based on efficiency wage models of the labor market and from another based on the alleged impossibility of maintaining the self respect and self esteem of able bodied individuals who fail to earn their own keep independently in a market economy

why financial structure matters the 1958 paper by franco modigliani and merton miller has been justly hailed as a landmark in the modern theory of finance what has not been sufficiently emphasized is the importance of the paper to the development of economic theory and practice indeed it is ironic that a paper which purportedly established that one need not pay any attention to financial structure that financial structure was irrelevant should have focused economists attention on finance merton miller gives what must be part of the explanation in his preceding paper in this issue by providing conditions where financial policy was irrelevant conditions which were close to the assumptions used by most conventional economists the paper forced a reexamination of those standard assumptions that reexamination is still going on the mm results have such great intellectual power and appeal that their direct effect has sometimes been to lead economists astray this result may perhaps be seen most forcefully in the work in investment theory in the major study done prior to mm that of meyer and kuh 1959 financial variables like profitability were identified as having important independent effects on investment but the paradigm that became dominant following the publication of mm most forcefully articulated by dale jorgenson and his associates argues that in the absence of taxation financial structure for instance the magnitude of the firm s equity base or cash fiow would make no difference to the level of investment theory drove the econometrics financial structure variables were excluded because economic theory that is modigliani and miller said they should be excluded only recently as a developing and substantial body of economic theory says once again that such variables should be included have econometricians included profit variables again in their specifications

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

crisis costs and debtor discipline the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises abstract recent debate on the reform of the international financial architecture has highlighted the potentially important role of the official sector in crisis management we examine how such public intervention in sovereign debt crises affects efficiency ex ante and ex post our results shed light on the scale of capital inflows and the implications for debtor country output of such a regime the efficacy of measures such as officially sanctioned stays on creditor litigation depend critically on the quality of public sector surveillance and the size of the costs of sovereign debt crises

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

a characteristics definition of financial markets abstract this paper employs a characteristics approach to define and classify financial products and markets emphasis is placed on the demand side models for the supply side being comparatively well developed based on changes in the united kingdom the model is used to illustrate how applied economists might analyse the impact of regulatory and technological changes on financial markets avenues for further research are discussed

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

equilibrium matching and termination in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard jobs are dynamic contracts job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic contracts transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of random matching and nash bargaining non employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a standard growth model as well as whether or not to participate in the labor market the stationary equilibrium is characterized the model is then calibrated to the u s labor market to study quantitatively the worker flows and distributions the compensation dynamics and the effects of ui system

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

bank bias in europe effects on systemic risk and growth europe s financial structure has become strongly bank based far more so than in other economies we document that an increase in the size of the banking system relative to equity and private bond markets is associated with more systemic risk and lower economic growth particularly during housing market crises we argue that these two phenomena arise owing to an amplification mechanism by which banks overextend and misallocate credit when asset prices rise and ration it when they drop the paper concludes by discussing policy solutions to europe s bank bias which include reducing regulatory favouritism towards banks while simultaneously supporting the development of securities markets

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

what is different about international lending an attempt is made to explain how enforceability is achieved n international debt contracts each bank announces the policy of denying credit to borrowers who default and chooses to adhere to it to maintain its reputation of being a tough bank to discipline its other borrowers loans are made by syndicates of banks in order to make the penalty for default severe enough so borrowers would choose not to default voluntarily the model predicts that the interest rate charged on loans is smaller for the larger borrowers also for any given borrower the interest rate may fall after each successive default article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

recent advances in lending to the poor with asymmetric information abstract microfinance institutions have successfully extended unsecured small loans to poor and opaque borrowers at the bottom of the economic pyramid this success is largely due to innovative financial contracts that impose joint liability and create dynamic incentives to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information given recent advances in microfinance contracts there is a need to map the theoretical developments this article aims to accomplish that by performing a critical literature survey of microlending contracts focussing on joint liability and dynamic incentives bringing out some of the deficiencies of contract theoretic propositions that cannot effectively account for the social mission of microfinance

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

financial capacity and output fluctuations in an economy with multi period financial relationships this paper motivates a financial propagation mechanism in the context of an intertemporal production economy with asymmetric information and with borrowers and lenders who enter multi period financial relationships a key feature is that aggregate output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity which in turn may constrain current production especially in bad times a small but persistent shift in aggregate conditions may have a large impact on financial capacity making the framework capable of motivating large endogenous fluctuations in financial constraints understanding how small disturbances can induce large output fluctuations is an on going quest in macroeconomics this paper develops a simple framework in which shifts in aggregate economic fundamentals are amplified through their impact on financial conditions a distinguishing feature is that output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity and financial capacity may constrain current production especially in bad times a number of recent papers have resurrected the view that financial factors may play a part in propagating business fluctuations the underlying theories exploit the idea that with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders agency costs may drive the price of uncollateralized external funds above the price of internal funds in this kind of setting a borrower s financial position is a key determinant of the terms of credit she faces in the aggregate swings in borrower balance sheets over the cycle amplify fluctuations in investment and output essentially by inducing counter cyclical movements in the required premium for external finance this simple mechanism is broadly consistent with informal descriptions of how financial and real variables interacted in the great depression bernanke 1983 and in the postwar business cycles eckstein and sinai 1986 in addition numerous recent panel data studies beginning with fazzari hubbard and peterson 1988 support the notion of a financial investment accelerator mechanism

wages effort and incentive compatibility in life cycle employment contracts existing models of incentive compatibility in life cycle employment contracts arrive at different predictions partly because of the different kinds of contract breaking behavior allowed in them this paper sets out and classifies the full range of such behaviors argues that no model has yet incorporated all of them and examines the consequences of doing so in the context of lazear s well known model in the extended model wages cannot rise faster than marginal products throughout the entire contract and the set of feasible contracts can often be empty even when both parties can commit to terminate the contract whenever it is broken by the other party

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

credit market consequences of improved personal identification field experimental evidence from malawi we implemented a randomized field experiment in malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans this intervention improved the lender s ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms as predicted by a simple model fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers we provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard jel d14 d82 g21 o12 o16

short term contracting and strategic oil reserves the effect of short term contracting on resource extraction is studied in a two country model of international trade in oil countries planners are assumed to be fully rational with perfect information and perfect foresight contracts are assumed perfectly enforceable and complete except that short term contracts do not allow commitments to actions taken beyond the contract period we show that short term contracting limits countries opportunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing reducing their collective tolerance for temporal variation in consumption this tends to make them extract more slowly than in the efficient plan that results from long term contracting contractual relationships often outlive the contracts that govern them it is therefore common for a long term relationship to be governed by a sequence of short term contracts when these contracts allow complete control of the organization of the relationship within each contract period any outcome that can be achieved in a long term contract covering the entire life of the relationship is also feasible with a sequence of short term contracts short term contracting can nevertheless have significant effects on resource allocation because each contract must be voluntarily negotiated in the environment created by its predecessors an allocation that is acceptable to both parties as a long term contract might not be voluntarily negotiable as a sequence of short term contracts because short term contracting is so prevalent it is worth asking what sorts of relationship can be organized efficiently only by long term contract and what kinds of distortion are caused by short term contracting two kinds of answers to these questions have been given in the literature one important line of investigation considers the use of memory in contracts designed to control parties incentives under asymmetric information baron and besanko 1985 rubinstein and yaari 1983 sanchez and zapater 1985 stiglitz and weiss 1983 tirole 1986 and townsend 1982 among others have shown how parties can use

bank funding modes securitization versus deposits abstract we examine a bank s choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors with common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking we find that the choice is irrelevant with asymmetric information but without government intervention we find that better quality assets will be sold securitized and poorer quality assets will be funded with deposits public regulation can influence the bank s choice subsidies can cause a bank to favor deposit funding but mutual funds and third party insurers may mitigate the effects of governmental subsidies

information institutions and banking sector development in west africa i introduction banks and other financial intermediaries can perform an important developmental function especially in africa where alternative sources of finance are limited or nonexistent by providing firms with essential finance they help them to take advantage of productive investment opportunities which may not otherwise materialize by screening loan applicants they can help to address adverse selection in the credit market and channel funds toward productive uses by monitoring borrowers they can contain moral hazard behavior for example excessively risky investment activity that could undermine a borrower s ability to repay a loan through long term bank borrower relationships well established banks can address both adverse selection and moral hazard this not only helps banks to remain solvent but also ensures that bank finance is channeled toward productive and sound investments there is a large body of empirical evidence which suggests that the development of banking systems goes hand in hand with economic development see e g levine 2004 although the evidence on causality is mixed see e g demetriades and hussein 1996 there is broad consensus that well functioning banking systems promote economic growth demetriades and andrianova 2005 it is therefore a puzzle that so many countries remain financially underdeveloped this is particularly true of sub saharan africa which remains one of the most financially under developed regions in the world a recent study by the world bank has shown that african banking systems lack depth compared to other regions in the world but are also excessively liquid honohan and beck 2007 according to the world bank banks themselves complain that there is a lack of creditworthy borrowers while at the same time households and firms find finance to be a major constraint the evidence presented by the world bank also suggests that the least developed banking systems are also the most liquid suggesting that excess liquidity is a common feature of financial under development this article aims to shed light on these features of financial under development in africa utilizing a panel data set comprising the banks operating in the west african economic and monetary union uemoa during 2000 2005 the uemoa provides a uniform financial system across eight countries the structure of this system has changed little in the last 15 years therefore we can be sure that the variations in bank behavior we observe within the uemoa are not because of variations in the nature of public financial institutions which the banks face this makes feasible the identification of the institutional sources of the variations in bank behavior which are not correlated with variations in the quality of public financial institutions our data set includes balance sheet information on each bank in the uemoa including bank characteristics such as age and ownership type profitability and the number of urban and rural branches we also utilize country level data on loan defaults which provides information on the average quality of borrowers we use this as a proxy for the severity of information problems faced by banks in the credit market we combine this information with macroeconomic data including institutional quality indices constructed by the world bank our data set enables us to examine the extent to which informational and institutional factors and interactions between different factors can explain a bank s loans to assets ratio which is an inverse measure of bank liquidity our data set is also used to examine the microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the total volume of assets of an individual bank which is a good micro level indicator of overall banking sector development our results suggest that to a large extent financial under development including excess liquidity and low banking sector development can be attributed to severe informational problems

competing lending platforms endogenous reputation and fragility in microcredit markets this paper shows that market fragility and mass default can arise in microcredit markets as a result of the strategic interaction between a microlender using a reputation based mechanism and a traditional lender using physical collateral in our model borrowers solve a dynamic programming problem which induces an endogenous equilibrium distribution of reputational capital because the quality of each lender s pool of borrowers is affected by both lenders interest rates lender reaction curves are non monotonic and discontinuous this can result in knife edge equilibria and mass default on the microlender precipitated by minor parametric perturbations fragility is exacerbated by borrower screening and sovereign risk but ameliorated when microlenders have social welfare goals our results highlight the importance of studying the entire credit market rather than microfinance in isolation

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

when to fire a ceo optimal termination in dynamic contracts abstract existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever this paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts we modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which upon the dissolution of the contract allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match under this simple closure of the model two types of terminations emerge under one scenario the agent is fired after a bad output and he becomes too poor to be punished effectively under the second scenario the agent is forced out after a good output and he becomes too expensive to motivate

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory this article presents evidence of the failure of government intervention in rural credit markets of ldcs in the past three decades it then shows how lessons for policy analysis can be drawn from modern theory particularly those theories focussing on credit rationing in competitive markets and interlinking of credit contracts with labor and land contracts the article outlines the policy implications of these theories and finds them insufficient to account for the empirical evidence it contends that a more systematic and rigorous analysis of institutions and institutional environments is essential for understanding and implementing effective policy reforms of rural credit markets it presents suggestions for undertaking such an analysis

lloyd shapley s matching and game theory this is a survey of lloyd shapley s contributions to matching theory and game theory in general starting with the work that inspired the swedish academy to award the 2012 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences to lloyd shapley and alvin roth

the optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations we show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party this holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information under the optimal contract the uninformed party is protected by an exit option which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision exit terminates the relation and diminishes the project surplus we show that the first best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract

managerial short termism turnover policy and the dynamics of incentives i study managerial short termism in a dynamic model of project development with hidden effort and imperfect observability of quality the manager can complete the project faster by reducing quality to preempt this behavior the prin cipal makes payments contingent on long term outcomes i analyze the dynamics of the optimal contract and its implications for the level of managerial turnover i show that optimal contracts might be stationary and entail no termination in general i show that the principal reduces the manager s temptation to behave myopically by reducing the likelihood of termination and deferring compensation the model predicts a negative relation between the rate of managerial turnover and the use of deferred compensation that is consistent with evidence of managerial compensation contracts received may 23 2016 editorial decision may 27 2017 by editor francesca cornelli

equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture it is often argued that externally imposed contractual restrictions lead to inequitable credit rationing this paper argues that unrestricted laissez faire markets may also inequitably ration credit a formal model which grants borrowers autonomy in credit application and use demonstrates that adverse incentive and selection effects may cause banks to endogenously impose interest rate restrictions and ration small farms out of the credit market consequently liberalization of financial markets may be insufficient to guarantee small farms access to credit

on authority distributions in organizations equilibrium abstract one assumption in the shapley shubik power index is that there is no interaction nor influence among the voting members this paper will apply the command structure of shapley 1994 to model members interaction relations by simple games an equilibrium authority distribution is then formulated by the power in power out mechanism it turns out to have much similarity to the invariant measure of a markov chain and therefore some similar interpretations are followed for the new setting in some sense one s authority distribution quantifies his general administrative power in the organization and his long run influence on all members we provide a few applications in conflict resolution college and journal ranking and organizational choice