re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

on the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is not optimal abstract an important result due to atkinson and stiglitz 1976 atkinson a b stiglitz j e 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is that differential commodity taxation is not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax given weak separability of utility between labor and all consumption goods this article demonstrates that this conclusion holds regardless of whether the income tax is optimal in particular given any commodity tax and income tax system differential commodity taxation can be eliminated in a manner that results in a pareto improvement also differential commodity taxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate a pareto improvement in addition for commodity tax reforms that neither eliminate nor proportionally reduce differential taxation a simple efficiency condition is offered for determining whether a pareto improvement is possible

a cost benefit analysis of a condom social marketing programme in tanzania this article uses the revealed preference willingness to pay approach to estimate the benefits in a cost benefit analysis of a condom social marketing csm programme in tanzania the demand curve used to derive the consumer surplus had unit elasticity and it was estimated from a cross sectional sample of 1272 persons people were willing to pay different prices for the condoms because perceived quality varied net benefits were close to zero for the minimum estimate that ignored external benefits with external benefits included the csm programme was judged socially worthwhile with our best estimate producing a benefit cost ratio ranging from 1 31 to 1 72

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

implications of energy subsidy reform in india abstract this paper analyses welfare impact of energy subsidy reform in india based on the data from 1970 71 to 2014 15 to this end auto regressive distributed lag ardl model and error correction model ecm have been estimated to quantify the short run and long run price and the income elasticity of various energy products the results show that the price elasticity of demand for all fossil fuels is low but the respective income elasticity is higher therefore an increase in the general price level caused by the subsidy reform will lead to the erosion of real income and will have related welfare implications in india the results also reveal that energy expenditure will obviously increase and hence energy consumption will decline depending upon the extent of the withdrawal of subsidy therefore policy makers in india while undertaking further reforms must ensure that the subsidy reaches to those who truly deserve so that the socioeconomic casualty of reforms can be minimized along with achieving fiscal goals

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

if we knew ability how would we tax individuals abstract the suggestion to tax people on earnings capacity instead of earnings has been around for a long time and is attractive in terms of economic efficiency in this paper we reflect on the feasibility of such a system and give an exploratory empirical implementation we apply the leyden welfare function of income a survey based measure of an individual s welfare associated with income to derive implications for ability taxation under the assumption that iq and schooling reflect earnings capacity we derive the tax functions using different criteria to distribute the utility loss due to taxation

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

fiscal interactions and the case for carbon taxes over grandfathered carbon permits this paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with pre existing tax distortions in the labour market both policies reduce labour supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages the resulting efficiency losses in the labour market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs however much of this added cost can be offset and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes consequently there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered carbon permits copyright 2003 oxford university press

a contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation abstract the paper provides a new formulation of the mirrlees seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax under weaker assumptions and in a more general model the formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution the formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

supplementing an emissions tax by a feed in tariff for renewable electricity to address learning spillovers abstract in the presence of learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies an optimal strategy to mitigate climate change should complement an emissions tax by a subsidy for renewables this article addresses the question how such subsidy should be designed it is shown that the widely used approach of a revenue neutral fixed feed in tariff can yield an optimal outcome under restrictive conditions only it has to be adapted continuously as the electricity price changes moreover funding the tariff by a surcharge on the electricity price has important implications for the design of the emission tax the optimal tax rate has to be below the pigovian level differentiated across fossil fuels and adapted over time as the patterns of technological development change these requirements may pose a formidable challenge for practical decision making however it is important to point out that the eventual choices made with respect to the design and funding of a feed in tariff have to be based on a careful and more comprehensive policy assessment including inter alia economic effects beyond the electricity sector and existing institutional constraints

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

tax effects versus budget effects on labor supply this paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types a number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of budget effects rather than isolated tax effects this comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets moreover the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated or possibly even removed by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes

marginal welfare costs of taxation with human and physical capital i introduction marginal welfare cost of taxation is the amount by which the social cost of an additional tax dollar differs from 1 because of distortionary taxation browning and johnson 1984 stuart 1984 browning 1987 ballard 1988 and allgood and snow 1998 use static models of the u s economy in which labor supplies adjust but the stocks of human and physical capital are fixed to calculate estimates of this welfare cost relevant to cost benefit analysis the studies by lucas 1990 and perroni 1995 incorporate human and physical capital into calculations of excess burden for the purpose of comparing alternative tax systems but do not address the welfare costs of marginal tax and spending reforms ballard et al 1985 and judd 1987 provide estimates of welfare cost using models that allow the stock of physical capital to change in response to marginal reforms but the stock of human capital is exogenous in these studies however judd 2001 argues that there is ample evidence indicating that human capital investment decisions have a significant effect on the cost of altering the tax system which suggests that these decisions could also have an important influence on marginal welfare cost in this article we present estimates of welfare costs for marginal reforms to government tax and spending policies when labor supply saving and education decisions are all endogenous we focus our analysis on marginal reforms because as skinner and slemrod 1985 observe most policy reforms enacted do not involve replacing one tax or spending system with another but instead typically entail marginal adjustments in tax laws and government appropriations using a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with a three period life cycle we derive analytical expressions for the changes in labor supply saving and education and use them to calculate marginal welfare cost as shown by auerbach et al 1983 in overlapping generations models steady state welfare comparisons of alternative tax policies are biased unless households are compensated for intergenerational redistribution along the transition path to arrive at our steady state estimates of welfare costs we adapt the compensation method introduced by gravelle 1991 for analyzing fundamental tax reforms to the context of incremental tax and spending reforms in a static one consumer model triest 1990 has shown that marginal welfare cost mwc is positive solely because of tax leakage the decline in tax revenue caused by reductions in the tax base we extend this insight to an intertemporal context that incorporates tax leakage arising from changes in both human and physical capital investment we evaluate three sets of reforms first a revenue neutral reduction in the tax on capital income funded by a higher tax on labor income second spending on a public good financed by either a higher tax on labor or interest income third a per capita lump sum transfer or demogrant also funded by either a higher tax on labor or interest income we find that marginal welfare costs are uniformly lower in the dynamic model where investment decisions are endogenous than in the static model where investment decisions are fixed and that the majority of the difference between the dynamic and static estimates is attributable to human capital decisions the principal reason is that a reallocation of time between labor hours and human capital investment has opposing and potentially offsetting effects on effective labor supply as a result labor supply responds less elastically in the dynamic model and changes in labor supply are the main source of tax leakage because wage taxation is the main source of tax revenue we also find that shifting marginal financing from capital to labor results in a lower welfare cost the reason being that such a change encourages saving which increases wage rates and stimulates labor supply leading to a reduction in marginal welfare costs

the role of technological availability for the distributive impacts of climate change mitigation policy the impacts of the availability of low carbon technologies on the regional distribution of mitigation costs are analyzed in a global multi regional integrated assessment model three effects on regional consumption losses are distinguished domestic measures trade of fossil energy carriers and trade of emission permits key results are i gdp losses and a redirection of investments in the energy system towards capital intensive technologies are major contributions to regional consumption losses ii a devaluation of tradable fossil energy endowments contributes largely to the mitigation costs of fossil fuel exporters iii in case of reduced availability of low carbon technologies the permit market volume and associated monetary redistributions increase the results suggest that the availability of a broad portfolio of low carbon technologies could facilitate negotiations on the permit allocation scheme in a global cap and trade system

separability and public finance abstract in a second best environment the optimal policy choice sometimes follows first best rules this paper presents a formal general argument which allows to unify much of the literature it lays down the information structure and separability assumptions under which the results hold in a variety of setups with extensions to preference heterogeneity and individual production sets

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity a simple proof indirect taxation is of no use when nonlinear income taxation is available in an economy where everyone has the same taste for goods an elementary proof of this result due to atkinson and stiglitz atkinson a stiglitz j 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is provided

technology adoption and agricultural price policy market interventions such as price supports or fertilizer subsidies can lead to gains from speeding up adoption of new technologies but the policies distort resource allocation a framework is developed for optimizing policies in light of the adoption allocation trade off based on adoption coefficients and production parameters from third world agriculture levels and duration of policies are estimated sensitivity analyses are performed gains are small at best and may be zero or negative in view of farmer costs of adjustment and deadweight losses from taxes profit technology adoption if new technologies are desirable why not use price supports or input subsidies to encourage faster technology adoption while frequently raised in policy deliberations this question has received little serious analysis particularly neglected has been the conflict or trade off between a gains in output as producers switch from old to new technologies and b the losses from resource use distortions brought about by price policies when output prices are raised or prices of inputs such as fertilizer are lowered the

nonconventional renewable energy governance in brazil lessons to learn from the german experience abstract this paper presents a comparative analysis of energy governance regarding nonconventional renewable energy sources ncres in brazil and germany brazil is a world leader in the use of conventional renewable energy sources such as hydro power while germany has been achieving outstanding results in fostering ncres the focus is on two critical issues the legal and regulatory framework and the institutions created to support the ncres market development the comparison shows that despite the very different energy situations and policy drivers valuables lessons can be extracted from the german experience the main lesson for brazil is to think ncres as a strategic opportunity to rely less on fossil fuel and large hydroelectric power plants to decentralize the electric power sector to use the huge solar biomass and wind power potential available in the country and to create a environment friendly ncres industry to this end three critical points were identified 1 the legal and regulatory framework should be improved 2 long term energy planning taking into account social economic and climate issues and 3 the current institutions supporting ncres in brazil should be upgraded and or new ones such as more specific energy agencies should be created

redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds abstract discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one consumer economy while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution this paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high wage to low wage workers in an optimal tax system the mcf will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one without optimality the mcf will in general differ between different sources of finance

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

the relationship between the marginal cost of public funds and marginal excess burden a large literature has recently developed which attempts to measure the marginal cost shadow price of public funds the motivation for much of this literature is the recognition that many of the tax instruments used by governments generate substantial amounts of excess burden deadweight loss jerry a hausman 1981 for example estimates that for an average prime aged american male with a wage of ten dollars in 1975 the excess burden generated by the federal income tax was over fifty percent of the revenue raised from taxing that individual one might suspect that such large excess burden estimates would require a change in the way government project costs are calculated in benefit cost analysis if the revenue required to finance a project is raised through distortionary taxation then intuition would suggest that the excess burden generated by the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project should be incorporated into the cost of the project however this analysis is not entirely consistent with the theoretical literature on the optimal provision of public goods which are financed by distortionary taxation when distortionary taxes are used to finance public goods and the level of public good provision does not affect consumption of the taxed goods the standard samuelsonian rule which equates the sum over consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between a private good and a public good with the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods must be modified to account for the marginal effect of increases in tax rates on the revenue raised from the existing taxes 2 the intuition behind this result is that we need to correct for indirect leakages from existing government revenue sources when considering an incremental expenditure if the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project causes a reduction in the revenue raised by the current tax structure then we need to account for this loss in calculating the cost of the project it is important to note that this result concerns the values of uncompensated demand elasticities an example first provided by atkinson and stern 1974 illustrates this point consider a world where the only tax is on labor earnings and incremental expenditure on the public good does not affect the demand for leisure in this case the marginal rate of transformation will overstate the cost of the public good as long as the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is negative this is because an increase in the tax rate causes an increase in labor supply leading to an indirect increase in government revenue from the excess burden perspective described earlier this example is very puzzling it is well known that even if the uncompensated own price elasticity of a good is zero a tax on that good can still result in a large deadweight loss we instead need the compensated elasticity to be zero to ensure that there will be no excess burden however the department of economics university of california davis ca 95616 this paper is based on chapter two of my dissertation at the university of wisconsin madison i wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee martin david robert haveman chair and arthur goldberger for very helpful advice and comments i have also benefited from comments by don fullerton and bruce hamilton an anonymous referee provided unusually helpful comments and corrected an error in the figure 1don fullerton 1989 provides a recent survey and analysis of this literature 2this is shown by anthony atkinson and nicholas h stern 1974 and david e wildasin 1979 the effect of provision of the public good on consumption of the taxed goods must also generally be taken into account

general equilibrium with free entry a synthetic approach to the theory of perfect competition the purpose of this essay is to explain a new theory of perfect competition that synthesizes the arrow debreu mckenzie and marshallian theories and summarizes the recent work of a large number of researchers the synthetic theory provides a logically precise general equilibrium framework that can be used both for positive analysis as well as to form a basis for the classical theorems of welfare economics in these aspects it follows the adm theory however as in the marshallian theory there is free entry in the form of an unbounded pool of firms which have access to the existing technology also as in the marshallian theory the average cost curves available to each firm are u shaped in contrast to both the marshallian and the adm theories we do not take price taking as a hypothesis we use the term perfect competition to describe a situation in which firms are arbitrarily small relative to the markets in which they are involved the firms in our model correctly perceive the effect of the amount that they place on the market on prices and they act to maximize profit with this in mind perfectly competitive equilibria are defined as the limit points of equilibria as firms become small relative to the market and following cournot we observe that as firms become small their ability to influence price disappears a new condition is identified which is important for the viability of competitive markets loosely speaking this condition requires that prices provide the proper entry signals for firms if one thinks of each firm as associated with the use of an unpriced and nondivisible resource sometimes referred to as entrepreneurship then in equilibrium the returns to that factor must fall with entry and rise with exit not only the stability theorems of the synthetic theory but also the existence theorem reject the application of the competitive model to a regime in which entry drives up and exit reduces the profit of similar firms

asymmetric industrial energy prices and international trade this paper measures the response of bilateral trade flows to differences in industrial energy prices across countries using a panel for the period 1996 2011 including 42 countries 62 sectors and covering 60 of global merchandise trade we estimate the short run effects of sector level energy price asymmetry on trade we find that changes in relative energy prices have a statistically significant but very small impact on imports on average a 10 increase in the energy price difference between two country sectors increases imports by 0 2 the impact is larger for energy intensive sectors even in these sectors however the magnitude of the effect is such that changes in energy price differences across time explain less than 0 01 of the variation in trade flows simulations based on our model predict that a 40 65 tco2 price of carbon in the eu ets would increase europe s imports from the rest of the world by less than 0 05 and decrease exports by 0 2

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

a marginal cost of funds approach to multi period public project evaluation implications for the social discount rate abstract although the use of marginal cost of funds mcf has been widely appreciated in public finance literature discussions of mcf have been confined to a static setting this paper develops a multi period project evaluation rule that is based on mcf unlike previous approaches the parameters required for implementing the mcf rule are independent of projects under consideration a lesson from this paper is that the government discount rate policies that are largely based on the concepts of social discount rate and shadow price of capital should be rewritten with the use of parameters representing mcf

when do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods abstract it is often argued that the optimal level of public good provision is below the first best level as long as the government s expenditures have to be financed by distortionary taxes i examine this hypothesis and show that it is correct in a representative consumer economy if i the public good is normal and ii private commodities are normal and gross substitutes otherwise counterexamples can be constructed these results hold also with heterogeneous households provided that equity considerations are ignored in general however distributional objectives may lead to a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best

the marginal cost of public funds hours of work versus labor force participation this paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds mcf to account for labor force participation responses our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive participation responses are more important than intensive hours of work responses in the modelling of extensive responses we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non convexities created by fixed work costs in a non convex framework tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first order effects on government revenue these revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for mcf tend to be substantial

experimental evidence on the effects of early meetings and activation we analyze the effects of four randomized social experiments involving early and intensive active labour market policy conducted in denmark in 2008 the experiments entailed different combinations of early and intensive treatment in terms of meetings and active labour market programmes we find that frequent meetings between newly unemployed workers and case workers can increase employment rates over the next two years by up to 10 weeks the effects continue to grow over the whole 4 year horizon studied for men we find evidence of a threat effect of having to participate in early active labour market programmes while no such effect is found for women we conduct a cost benefit analysis of each ofthe four experiments and find that meetings yield the largest net benefits

optimal public expenditure with inefficient unemployment this article proposes a theory of optimal public expenditure when unemployment is inefficient the theory is based on a matching model optimal public expenditure deviates from the samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap the difference between current and efficient unemployment rates such optimal stimulus spending is described by a formula expressed with three sufficient statistics the unemployment gap the unemployment multiplier the decrease in unemployment achieved by increasing public expenditure and the elasticity of substitution between public and private consumption when unemployment is inefficiently high and the multiplier is positive the formula yields the following results 1 optimal stimulus spending is positive and increasing in the unemployment gap 2 optimal stimulus spending is zero for a zero multiplier increasing in the multiplier for small multipliers largest for a moderate multiplier and decreasing in the multiplier beyond that 3 optimal stimulus spending is zero if extra public goods have no value it becomes larger as the elasticity of substitution increases and it completely fills the unemployment gap if extra public goods are as valuable as extra private goods

the substantial bias from ignoring general equilibrium effects in estimating excess burden and a practical solution we show that under typical conditions the simple excess burden triangle formula substantially underestimates the excess burden of commodity taxes in some cases by a factor of 10 or more this formula performs poorly because it ignores general equilibrium interactions most important interactions between the taxed commodity and the labor market many prior studies have shown that general equilibrium interactions affect excess burden but have not appreciated the bias associated with ignoring these interactions or the quantitative importance of this bias we derive an implementable alternative to the simple formula this alternative formula captures interactions that the simple formula omits as a result it is both unbiased and usually more accurate

patent protection and strategic delays in technology development implications for economic growth we present an endogenous growth model in which both the investment to develop a new technology that upgrades the quality of machines and entry of imitators are determined endogenously according to the model how soon the new technology machine is launched after the patent is granted is influenced by two factors returns to scale in technology development and strategic delays strategic delays in technology development are most likely to occur when earlier dates of success enable imitators to enter an industry i e when imitation is swift and relatively cheap and or patent protection is relatively lengthy we then explore the link between the optimal patent length and economic growth and find that the equilibrium investment in technology development and thus the expected rate of technological progress exhibit an inverted u shape relationship with respect to the legal patent length our results further suggest that in order to minimize the strategic delays in technology development and spur technological progress legal patent lengths should be shorter in industries where barriers to entry are relatively low

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

externalities and optimal taxation this paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem income and commodities in the presence of externalities the nature of the second best and the choice of the tax instruments are motivated by the informational structure in the economy the main results are i environmental levies linear or nonlinear differ in formula from pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods ii externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas linear and nonlinear for private goods iii externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear and iv a general income tax plus strictly pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution at any given consumption bundle

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

a generalization of the atkinson stiglitz 1976 theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation abstract the atkinson stiglitz 1976 theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when all agents have homogeneous separable preferences is extended to allow for nonseparability with respect to endogenous variables that will be subject to distortions

optimal provision of public goods a synthesis the standard approach to the optimal provision of public goods highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns a new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the income tax schedule we demonstrate that both approaches are derived from the same basic formula we also take the new approach further by deriving an intuitive formula for the optimal level of public goods without imposing strong assumptions on preferences this formula shows that distortionary taxation has a role to play as in the standard approach however the main determinants of optimal provision are different and the modified samuelson rule is likely to lead to underprovision

zipf s law and maximum sustainable growth abstract zipf s law states that the number of firms with size greater than s is inversely proportional to s most explanations start with gibrat s rule of proportional growth but require additional constraints we show that gibrat s rule at all firm levels yields zipf s law under a balance condition between the effective growth rate of incumbent firms which includes their possible demise and the growth rate of investments in entrant firms under the additional assumption that firms do not consume more resources than available we show that zipf s law is the signature that firms grow at the maximum reachable long term rate

on the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities abstract the set of technological opportunities in a given industry is one of the fundamental determinants of technical advance in that line of business we examine the concept of technological opportunity and discuss three categories of sources of those opportunities advances in scientific understanding and technique technological advances originating in other industries and in other private and governmental institutions and feedbacks from an industry s own technological advances data from the yale survey on industrial research and development are used to measure the strength of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern interindustry differences in the importance of these sources we find that interindustry differences in the strength and sources of technological opportunities contribute importantly to explanations of cross industry variation in r d intensity and technological advance

the unequal benefits of fuel subsidies a review of evidence for developing countries summary this paper reviews evidence on the impact of fuel subsidy reform on household welfare in developing countries on average the burden of subsidy reform is substantial and is approximately neutrally distributed across income groups a 0 25 decrease in the per liter subsidy results in a 5 decrease in income for all groups more than half of this impact arises from the indirect impact on prices of other goods and services consumed by households fuel subsidies are a costly approach to protecting the poor due to substantial benefit leakage to higher income groups in absolute terms the top income quintile captures six times more in subsidies than the bottom

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

long term climate policy implications of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies abstract it is often argued that fossil fuel subsidies hamper the transition towards a sustainable energy supply as they incentivize wasteful consumption we assess implications of a subsidy phase out for the mitigation of climate change and the low carbon transformation of the energy system using the global energy economy model remind we compare our results with those obtained by the international energy agency based on the world energy model and by the organization for economic co operation and development oecd model env linkages providing the long term perspective of an intertemporal optimization model the results are analyzed in the two dimensions of subsidy phase out and climate policy scenarios we confirm short term benefits of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies as found in prior studies however these benefits are only sustained to a small extent in the long term if dedicated climate policies are weak or nonexistent most remarkably we find that a removal of fossil fuel subsidies if not complemented by other policies can slow down a global transition towards a renewable based energy system the reason is that world market prices for fossil fuels may drop due to a removal of subsidies thus low carbon alternatives would encounter comparative disadvantages

maize and the free trade agreement between mexico and the united states setting the price of maize in rural mexico above the world price is inefficient and likely to have negative distributional effects because many subsistence producers and all landless workers are net buyers in fact it screens out the relatively poor rather than the relatively rich the policy objective therefore should be to move toward free trade this would yield large gains in efficiency the free trade agreement provides an ideal opportunity to pursue this objective it will provide freer entrance into the united states for other agricultural products as well as a broad range of manufactured products ensuring secure and sustained access for labor intensive agricultural and manufactured products can help ease the impact on the labor market of a transition away from subsistence maize cultivation

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

the cost disease and government growth qualifications to baumol changes in real world wage movements across sectors account for about a third of the rise in the cost of u s government services between 1959 and 1989 while relatively slower productivity in the public sector accounts for the remaining two thirds even though it is slower however the productivity record still is positive even in the labor intensive government sector consequently baumol argues that the public s likely future objection to necessary increases in the share of expenditures over the next 50 years will betray a fiscal illusion unless policymakers take pains to dissolve it but slower productivity may be equally due to the structural organization removing public monopolies reducing bureaucracies and undertaking privatization in education for example are other policy options that could radically change the productivity record meanwhile in his recent calculations of dramatic government expenditure increases expected in the next half century baumol omits reference to the marginal welfare cost of public funds which on our estimates will increase at least ten times to reach 1 71 by the year 2040

lifetime and annual marginal costs of redistribution in england sweden and the united states both the annual and lifetime marginal costs of redistribution in england sweden and the united states are calculated the annual marginal cost of redistribution is 2 90 in the united states 3 53 in england and 6 77 in sweden the lifetime marginal cost of redistribution is 4 46 in the united states and 7 96 in england the lifetime marginal cost of redistribution in sweden indicates that additional redistribution reduces the incomes of both the poor and nonpoor this study also shows that when there is greater income equality the marginal tax rate at which the incomes of the poor and nonpoor begin to be reduced will be at lower and lower levels copyright 1993 by mit press

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

external costs of energy do the answers match the questions looking back at 10 years of externe abstract while the claim for getting prices right is quite popular in conceptual policy papers the implementation of appropriate internalisation strategies is still hampered by a lack of reliable external cost data great expectations were set into the externe project a major research programme launched by the european commission at the beginning of the 1990s to provide a scientific basis for the quantification of energy related externalities and to give guidance supporting the design of internalisation measures after more than a decade of research the externe label became a well recognised standard source for external cost data looking back into the externe history the paper pursues how emerging new scientific insights and changing background assumptions affected external cost estimates and related recommendations to policy over time based on externe results the usefulness and inherent limitations of external cost estimates for impact categories like climate change or nuclear waste disposal is discussed the paper also gives examples on how external costs in spite of remaining uncertainties are successfully used to support environmental policy

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

a generalized approach to multigeneration project evaluation 1 introductionit is well known that the choice of discount rate plays a significant role in the ranking of projects with varying time paths of costs and benefits for public projects the choice of the appropriate social discount rate sdr is not clear cut even in the context of short lived projects in which costs and benefits occur within a single generation in particular when capital taxes produce a wedge between gross and net rates of return should one discount at the economy s rate of return the before tax rate or the individual s rate of return the after tax rate in the single generation context the literature falls in two camps 1 one camp argues that the appropriate sdr is a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return with weights typically determined by the fractions of resources drawn from consumption and private investment respectively 2 a second camp argues that future benefits should be discounted at the net rate of return but that the initial investment should be multiplied by a scale factor so that the direct costs of the project can be expressed in terms of consumption units 3both approaches suffer from severe implementation problems for the first approach there is no general formula for the weights needed to calculate the sdr as a weighted average of two market rates of return dreze 1974 indeed the appropriate sdr to use is project specific stiglitz 1982 without a systematic methodology to derive project specific sdrs the weighted average approach is hard to implement for the second approach which equalizes the sdr to the net rate of return the scale factor the opportunity cost of public investment must be quantified the opportunity cost of public investment depends on whether resources come from private investment or consumption and on the calculation of the present value of the future consumption yielded by a unit of capital discounted at the net rate of return that is the shadow price of capital as lind 1997 points out however there is no general agreement on a specific procedure for calculating the shadow price of capital indeed the concept of the opportunity cost of public investment suffers the same project dependence problem as the first view of the sdr diamond 1968 multigeneration projects such as nuclear waste disposal natural resource conservation or even social security reform further complicate discount rate choice specifically intergenerational equity in addition to intertemporal efficiency plays a role in determining the appropriate social discount rate for multigeneration public project evaluation 4 as in the single generation context there are two competing views on the appropriate discount rate when evaluating multigeneration projects the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches 5the descriptive approach to discounting is a market based approach it does not rely on an explicit social welfare function swf or the pure time preference rate embedded in the swf however the descriptive approach works under the assumption that intergenerational compensation through changes in the tax debt policy is available 6 it is argued that under appropriate intergenerational compensation the market rates of return are still relevant for calculating the sdr for multigeneration project evaluation and in general the sdr should be a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return this descriptive view of setting the sdr equal to the market return appears to underlie the office of management and budget s omb adoption of 7 as the appropriate discount rate for federal programs 7the intent of the prescriptive approach is to use the social discount rate as an expression of ethical judgment on how consumption of future generations should be compared to consumption of current generations

atkinson and stiglitz theorem in the presence of a household production sector we show that the celebrated atkinson and stiglitz 1976 result on the uniformity of the commodity tax rates when preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure does not hold when at least one of the goods is produced within the household the result is restored if preferences are weakly separable in market goods on the one hand and leisure and household goods on the other

firm size rivalry and the extent of the market in endogenous technological change abstract evidence shows that firms build their market position by accumulating knowledge protected by secrecy patents and other appropriation devices i explore the implications of this fact in a model economy where oligopolistic firms establish in house r d programs in symmetric equilibrium the number of firms determines concentration and firm size these determine the scale and the efficiency of r d operations and the rate of innovation the number of firms moreover is endogenous and determined jointly with the rate of growth by the zero profit condition this property yields new results for example the scale effect of population size may be negative the market allocation of resources is not pareto optimal i discuss the nature of this distortion

the impact of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies on the low carbon transition abstract there is growing consensus on the fact that fossil fuel subsidies provided by governments in high income countries represent a misalignment on emissions reduction with the global climate agenda in addition a discussion emerged on the negative socio economic and environmental externalities associated with fossil fuel subsidies nevertheless pathways for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in high income countries and their implications on the low carbon transition have not yet been assessed with the aim to narrow this knowledge gap we extend the eirin stock flow consistent behavioral model to study the implications on sustainable development of the gradual phasing out of fossil fuels subsidies whose revenues could be used by the government to subsidize energy investments in green capital e g solar panels either via fiscal policies or green bonds we assess the effects on green growth employment credit and bonds market as well as the distributive effects across heterogeneous households and sectors a smooth phasing out of fossil fuels subsidies contributes to improve macroeconomic performance to decrease inequality and helps the government to find fiscal space to support stable renewable energy policies renewable energy subsidies contribute to foster the low carbon transition but could imply distributive effects depending on the way in which they are implemented

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

funding transportation spending in metropolitan washington dc the costs of alternative revenue sources abstract this paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising additional revenue from taxes on labor property gasoline peak road use and higher transit fares for the washington dc area the model incorporates driving externalities and interactions between the different policies an economic case can be made for using congestion taxes and possibly gasoline and property taxes to raise extra revenue though it should be qualified for example the inelastic demand for driving limits the congestion benefits per dollar of revenue raised and these taxes have adverse employment effects in the same way that a tax on labor income does

on the ir relevance of distribution and labor supply distortion to government policy should the assessment of government policies such as the provision of public goods and the control of externalities deviate from first best principles to account for distributive effects and the distortionary cost of labor income taxation for example is the optimal extent of public goods provision smaller than indicated by the samuelson rule because finance is distortionary or should environmental regulations fail to internalize externalities fully if the incidence of the regulations is regressive it is suggested that these questions are best addressed by considering distribution neutral implementation in which budget balance is achieved by choosing an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the distributive impact of the policy in question in basic cases both distribution and labor supply distortion are moot because the target policy and the tax adjustment produce offsetting effects on each thus traditional first best principles provide good benchmarks for policy analysis after all moreover even when actual implementation will not be distribution neutral in aggregate distribution neutral policy analysis has many conceptual and practical virtues that render it quite useful to investigators

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers

factor augmentation factor elimination and economic growth economic growth theory distinguishes between reproducible and nonreproducible factors of production in traditional growth models based on factor augmenting technical change perpetual economic growth requires that each essential nonreproducible factor such as labor be augmented by a reproducible factor such as human capital recent models of factor eliminating technical change deliver perpetual growth by eliminating the nonreproducible factors heretofore the literature has kept factor augmentation and factor elimination separate we analyze a model with both the model generalizes the traditional factor augmentation approach by relaxing the usual restriction that factor elimination is absent we obtain the striking result that factor augmenting technical change is a misspecification when factor eliminating technical change is present the result raises several questions about technical change and endogenous growth jel o41 o31 o33

fossil fuel reform in developing states the case of trinidad and tobago a petroleum producing small island developing state abstract trinidad and tobago is an oil exporting small island developing state sids with a 0 12 contribution to global emissions and with important socio economic challenges it has producer electricity and transport fuel subsidies it is at an interesting juncture in subsidy reform the government faces the embeddedness of distributive justice norms that are contested by fiscal prudence and environmental stewardship norms the value of the paper is twofold first it develops a subsidy intractability framework to explain reform global narratives that highlights the power of agents the nature of contested economic justice and environmental norms and the availability of mechanisms for reform second this framework is used to explain reform narratives and trajectories in trinidad and tobago using data from public documents and from a unique elite survey of former and present heads of state politicians policy makers and stakeholders even in conditions of falling oil prices and national revenue and pressures to reduce emissions where redistributive justice arguments are heavily embedded in public discourses those aspects of the subsidy that have developmental or distributive justice goals are more intractable the results of the study have implications for carbon emission reduction strategies in developing states with fossil fuel reserves

reconciling alternative views about the appropriate social discount rate abstract this paper shows that in an economy with an exogenous rate of return and a given capital income tax distortion and with lump sum taxes as the marginal tax instrument the soc and mcf criteria both correctly identify all worthwhile projects if the criteria are properly applied the equivalence between the soc and mcf criteria continues to hold i if distortionary taxes are used to balance the budget and ii if the rate of return to capital is endogenous apparent differences between the soc and mcf criteria arise from different definitions of a project s indirect revenue effect neither criterion has an implementation advantage because the information requirements for each are identical

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

reexamination of the relative efficiency of the draft and the all volunteer army economists are in almost universal agreement that the all volunteer approach to recruiting military personnel is more efficient than the draft several related considerations form the basis for this agreement first the draft imposes a discriminatory tax on recruits equal to the difference between their market wages and the below market military wage plus a compensating differential for serving in the military second below market pricing of personnel under the draft leads to a military with too many recruits third the all volunteer approach attracts those recruits with the lowest opportunity costs and hence secures a given number of recruits at less cost these standard economic arguments for the all volunteer approach over the draft have been heavily influenced by hansen and weisbrod 7 and oi 10 the purpose of this paper is to argue that under certain conditions the above considerations fail to make a compelling case for the all volunteer approach over the draft the conventional economic case for the all volunteer approach fails to recognize that the relative difference between the cost of the all volunteer approach and the draft depends on the percentage of the eligible population recruited into the military and the dead weight loss associated with conventional taxation as the number of recruits increases relative to the eligible population the advantage of being able to discriminate between high and low opportunity cost recruits diminishes also the larger

the marginal rate of corruption in public programs evidence from india abstract optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending in developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption we analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in india s employment guarantee scheme strikingly workers received none of the increase even though initially they were on average overpaid the data are inconsistent with theories of voice in which the threat of complaints limits corruption but consistent with theories of exit in which outside options in the private sector limit how much rent officials can extract

on the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods abstract this paper argues that in models with heterogeneous agents the concept of the marginal cost of public funds mcpf will only be useful if it is compared with an analogous concept for the benefit side the mcpf does not assume a unique value and is not particularly illuminating in and out of itself also gone is the benchmark status of mcpf 1 turning to the provision of public goods using a mechanism design approach the paper constructs a two stage proof for kaplow s kaplow l 1996 the optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation national tax journal 49 513 533 proposition concerning the irrelevance of labor supply and distributional concerns in public good provision this highlights the two fundamental ingredients for his result first the provision of public goods per se when it satisfies the samuelson s rule is only potentially pareto improving second the actual pareto improvement will materialize when or if one reforms the income tax structure if the reform is not forthcoming the decision on public goods provision must rely on redistributional concerns finally the paper generalizes broadway and keen s boadway r keen m 1993 public goods self selection and optimal income taxation international economic review 34 463 478 result to a model with many types of agents many private goods and without making any assumptions regarding which self selection constraints are or are not binding

redistribution and education subsidies are siamese twins abstract we develop models of optimal linear and non linear income taxation with endogenous human capital formation to explore optimal education subsidies optimal subsidies on education ensure efficiency in human capital accumulation and thus play an important role in alleviating the tax distortions on learning induced by redistributive policies if the government cannot verify all investments in human capital education policy offsets some but not all tax induced distortions on learning non pecuniary educational costs benefits may increase decrease subsidies on education especially if they are complementary to work effort

on the construction of marginal federal personal and social security tax rates in the u s abstract in this article i correct and extend my earlier series on marginal federal personal income tax rates i also construct a measure of the marginal social security tax rate and add this to the income tax rate to obtain a measure of the effective marginal tax rate on income due to federal taxes finally i compare my series on marginal income tax rates and its method of construction with those of barro and sahasakul

distortionary taxation and optimal public spending on productive activities mutsumi matsumoto using a general equilibrium model with endogenous factor supplies this article investigates the provision of factor augmenting public inputs such inputs are intermediate goods that affect production functions in a collective manner and give rise to increasing returns unlike with collective consumption goods deviation from the first best condition for a public input is inappropriate if taxes are set optimally when taxes are not optimal a second best rule must include a feedback effect on revenue as well as the deadweight cost of taxes implications for benefit cost analysis and for interpretation of estimates of the social returns to public capital are explored jel h21 h54 o4 i introduction government spending on public infrastructure and on human capital formation are often cited as important contributing forces to economic growth with reference to less developed economies isham and kaufmann 1999 show that the returns from public infrastructure investments are very high where the overall policy regime is basically sound turning to human capital psacharopolous and woodhall 1985 point out the sizable excess of social over private returns from education temple 1999 indicates that the importance of these public investments and others like them for example research and development is not limited to less developed countries appropriate levels are important across all economies the key characteristic of these sorts of commodities is that they exhibit positive externalities across productive entities in short they may be categorized as public intermediate goods or public inputs although such commodities are beneficial they are also costly spending on them takes a large portion of p ublic budgets moreover government financing of these costs typically involves the use of distortionary taxes those taxes create excess burden the magnitudes of which may be substantial for instance in an influential contribution browning 1987 21 suggests the marginal excess burden of taxes on labor income ranges from 31 8 to 46 9 the crux of this article is the relevance of distortionary taxes to decisions about public input expenditure bruce 1998 457 and musgrave et al 1987 288 89 suggest the incorporation of the deadweight cost of taxation as a cost when evaluating public projects boardman et al 1996 62 64 in their authoritative benefit cost text recommend the inclusion of deadweight loss in the assessment of net benefits of tax funded public projects these recommendations are intuitively appealing they are also consistent with the second best expenditure condition for spending on public consumption goods atkinson and stern 1974 show that marginal cost of a public consumption good must include the excess burden of the tax system indeed some of the most important recent empirical work on the returns from public capital have assessed those returns after netting out the deadweight loss of the tax system see morrison and schwartz 1996 and nadiri and mamuneas 1994 this article investigates the theoretical basis for deviating from the first best rule for public input provision when taxes are distortionary 1 one finding is that despite the deadweight losses a second best rule for public inputs should not be followed when taxes are set optimally the first best condition remains appropriate in effect the production efficiency theorem of diamond and mirrlees 1971 extends to a public input economy however and importantly for actual policy when taxes are not optimal then not only the excess burden but the impact of the public input on the government s budgetary position must be taken into account these qualifications need to be incorporated into empirical studies and benefit cost analysis ii the model the analysis makes use of a general equilibrium model of a competitive economy in which factor supplies are variable and there is a public input

the trade off between equality and efficiency this paper uses a 1976 microdata base to estimate the marginal cost of reducing income inequality with a policy that has distributional effects similar to the present tax transfer system the analysis uses a simulation methodology in which only the labor supply effects are evaluated other behavioral effects are ignored the most striking finding is that marginal cost is quite high even for modest labor supply elasticities for example in the benchmark case with a weighted average economy wide uncompensated wage elasticity of 0 2 and compensated elasticity of 0 31 the disposable money income of upper income quintiles of households is depressed by 9 51 for each dollar increase in the disposable money income of lower income quintiles when income equivalent values that take account of the value of leisure are compared the marginal cost for this case is estimated to be 3 49

should urban transit subsidies be reduced this paper derives empirically tractable formulas for the welfare effects of fare adjustments in passenger peak and off peak rail and bus transit and for optimal pricing of those services the formulas account for congestion pollu tion accident externalities scale economies and agency adjustment of transit service offerings we apply them using parameter values for washington dc los angeles and london the results support the efficiency of the large cur rent fare subsidies even starting with fares at 50 percent of operating costs incremental fare reductions are welfare improving in almost all cases these findings are robust to alternative assumptions and parameters jel l92 r41

revisiting the cost of protectionism abstract most studies of the welfare impacts of trade policy have ignored interactions between these policies and pre existing distortions from the income tax this paper demonstrates that when these interactions are taken into account the potential gains or losses from tariffs import quotas or voluntary export restrictions are significantly magnified however as long as the trade barrier doesn t generate rents for domestic households the optimal level of the trade barrier is unchanged from the first best case trade policies which do increase domestic rents either in the form of quota rents or rents to fixed factors in production suffer an additional efficiency cost and the optimal policy in this case is less strict than in the first best case

baumol s cost disease and the sustainability of the welfare state if productivity increases more slowly for services than for manufactured goods then services suffer from baumol s cost disease and tend to become relatively more costly over time since the welfare state in all countries is an important supplier of tax financed services this translates into a financial pressure that seems to leave policymakers with a trilemma increase tax distortions cut spending or redistribute less under the assumptions underlying baumol s cost disease we show that these dismal implications are not warranted the welfare state is sustainable and there is even scope for pareto improvements under baumol s cost disease