involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

corner solutions in duality models a cross section analysis of dairy production decisions comrner solutions are often observed in cross section samples of farm level production decisions an estimation strategy is presented and applied to a uniquely comprehensive data set for pennsylvania dairy farms a complete set of choice functions is derived consistent with multiple outputs and multiple inputs expected profit maximation and the existence of comrner solutions with respect to the labor hiring decision results illustrate that substantial estimation bias may occur if the existence of comrner solutions is not recognized estimated elasticities of choices with respect to input and net output prices indicate substantial responsiveness of choice to price results indicate that changes in education and acreage operated result in substantial changes in output and input mixes and that the differences in results for farms with and without hired labor are substantial

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

a rational expectations model of agricultural supply this work suggests a dynamic linear rational expectations modeling strategy for using time series observations to study the impact of product prices on agricultural production and land allocation the farmer s decision consists of specifying each period the portion of his land to be devoted to the growing of alternative crops the dynamic element in the farmer s problem comes from the technology a quadratic production technology is used the farmer s optimal land allocation decision rules are derived as linear functions of past land allocations expectations of future product prices and other exogenous variables and they can be interpreted as an optimal crop rotation assuming rational expectations and the exogeneity of prices for a small open economy one obtains closed form linear regression equations representing decision rules and stochastic processes these are then estimated and tested using maximum likelihood methods and aggregate data from the egyptian agriculture

credit rationing and the demand for owner occupied housing abstract this study applies cross sectional data to test whether default risk induced credit constraints affect the demand for owner occupied housing credit constrained households are argued to exhibit different elasticities of demand for housing than less constrained households housing demand elasticities are then estimated separately for households obtaining va insured and non va loans the government guarantee on va loans insures lenders against default enabling lenders to apply easier nonprice terms of credit results indicate that observed demand elasticities differ significantly across va and conventional mortgage holders that marginal changes in credit constraints affect housing demand and that fha financing mitigates the effect of mortgage constraints

replicative evidence on the demand for owner occupied and rental housing some important results in urban economic theory and policy analysis rest upon housing demand and its associated price and income elasticities the extent to which the affluent choose to live away from the city s center thus increasing their commuting time depends on the relative income elasticities of housing demand and valuation of leisure in a more policy oriented framework the relative efficacies of income as opposed to housing price subsidies for low income households depend on the relative values of income and price elasticities

multicrop production models with multinomial logit acreage shares the main objective of this paper is to show that the multinomial logit mnl framework can be used for deriving simple acreage share models more specifically we show that mnl acreage choice models can be defined as parts of consistent multicrop models when coupled with suitably designed crop production models e g a specific parameterization of the standard quadratic yield function the parameters of these multicrop models are easily interpreted and estimated although mnl acreage choice models are usually derived by aggregating crop choices defined at the plot level we show that these models can also be derived by considering a profit maximisation problem at the farm level this provides a simple theoretical background for the standard mnl acreage share model as well as for simple extensions of these models the nested mnl acreage share models an empirical application on french farm level data over the period 1996 2007 investigates the empirical performances of the multicrop econometric models based on the proposed mnl framework for modelling acreage choices

cash crop choice and income dynamics in rural areas evidence for post crisis indonesia in this article we investigate the factors affecting levels and growth of incomes in rural indonesia following the crisis of 1997 1998 in particular we investigate the relative roles of nonfarm incomes and productivity improvements achieved via changes in crops versus improvements on the same crops on income dynamics framing the article in the context of an optimal labor allocation model relying on unique household panel data from central sulawesi and using advanced panel econometric methods we find that local innovations related to the adoption and intensification of new cash crop varieties more specifically the shift from coffee to cocoa production can explain a substantial part of the observed post crisis developments causal estimates of the effect of growing cocoa suggest that households were on average able to achieve about 14 higher income levels during the post crisis period compared to the planting of other crops most notably coffee also our results demonstrate the importance of engagement in nonfarm activities for household income growth comparative analyses using a nationally representative survey suggest that similar processes are at play in other parts of indonesia

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

dynamic adjustment in the u s dairy industry a dual model is used to examine the dynamic structure of the u s dairy industry properties implied by the theory of the competitive firm and independent adjustment of two quasi fixed inputs labor and herd size are tested and not rejected instantaneous adjustment however is soundly rejected for each quasi fixed input input adjustment to optimal levels is estimated to take about two years for labor and ten for cows quality adjustments of the labor and cow series do not fully embody the technological change that has occurred in this industry over the study period

estimating demand for owner occupied housing subject to the income tax the federal income tax code includes several provisions which benefit homeowners first the imputed rent from the ownership of a house is not incorporated into a household s taxable income second mortgage interest and property tax payments are tax deductible finally capital gains go untaxed if they are reinvested these provisions reduce the effective price of housing services by reducing the factor prices for land and structure but they do not reduce the price of operating inputs nor do they necessarily reduce the prices of land and structure proportionately thus they alter the optimum factor input combinations in the production of owner occupant housing services by influencing relative factor prices the homeowner tax provisions also increase effective income if the deductions and exclusions are large enough to shift the households into a lower tax bracket in this case the household receives an effective income transfer in the amount of income saved by not having to pay taxes at a higher rate few attempts at quantifying owner occupant demand behavior have systematically incorporated federal income tax provisions none have considered the effects of these provisions on housing service production behavior maisel et al 121 conducted a study in which income but not price was adjusted for taxes while straszheim 21 using household interview data made an adjustment to the gross price of housing without adjusting income in an analysis of the welfare effects of owner occupant tax benefits laidler l l acknowledges that taxes alter both price and income but uses an estimate of price elasticity which does not incorporate income tax provisions rosen 18 191 however has adjusted both price and income for taxes in a recent estimation of housing demand while rosen s work represents a

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

on levies to reduce the nitrogen surplus the case of dutch pig farms pig farms in the netherlands pay a zero or low price for using the environment as a consequence the environment is overused the dutch government wants to reduce the emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus possible instruments are regulation and levies in this study a levy on feed and a levy on the nitrogen surplus are investigated by incorporating a bad output in the production model the model is estimated using panel data of dutch pig farms over the period 1975 1989 levies on nitrogen turn out to be more cost effective than levies on feed

short run and long run dynamics of farm land allocation panel data evidence from denmark1 this study develops and estimates a dynamic multi output model of farmers land allocation decisions that allows for the gradual adjustment of allocations that can result from crop rotation practices and quasi fixed capital constraints estimation is based on micro panel data from danish farmers that include acreage output and variable input utilization at the crop level results indicate that there are substantial differences between the short run and long run land allocation behaviour of danish farmers and that there are substantial differences in the time lags associated with different crops to our knowledge this is the first dynamic micro model of land allocation estimated on data from the temperate climate zone since similar farming conditions are found in northern europe and parts of the united states and canada this result may be of wider interest

household specific food price differentials and high value crop production in rural ghana using panel data from ghana we have examined the relationship between household specific producer consumer price differentials and rural household cropland allocation between food and high value crops we test the hypothesis that cereal price bands induce a shift of resources away from high value crop production making smallholders appear unresponsive to price incentives our results lend support to this hypothesis implying that a policy aiming at increasing farmers income through high value crop production may fail if hard and soft infrastructure does not improve in rural areas and if staple crop productivity does not increase significantly

limited contract enforcement and strategic renegotiation this paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation in this theory suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past the authors develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motivate renegotiation copyright 1988 by american economic association

trading uncertainty enforcement and labor unions it is shown that when contracts can be perfectly enforced trading uncertainty leads to discrimination among workers with the same skills and experience in this case anti discrimination laws lead to inefficiencies in the absence of perfect enforcement anti discrimination practices may be used as enforcement devices and need not lead to inefficiencies in particular firms may wish to precommit to an anti discrimination policy say by inviting in a labor union in order to offer credible insurance to its workers this leads to an equilibrium in which union workers get a higher wage than non union workers but unions do not have monopoly power

a residence time model of housing markets abstract this paper estimates a semi markov model of housing markets in which families move from one home to another spend a random amount of time in each home and choose whether to own or to rent at each move limiting conditions of the semi markov process are used to characterize the steady state frequency of owner occupied housing and to simulate the impact of changes in housing tax policy this approach differs markedly from previous studies of housing tax policy which focus on the entire population as opposed to the movers and ignore the effect of household residence times see king 1980 rosen 1979 white and white 1977 or laidler 1969 residence times further influence the analysis by affecting the relative cost of owning to renting in the tenure choice model homeowners pay legal and realtor fees at the time they move out of their homes which renters do not have to pay the discounted value of these fees declines with length of stay and provides a structural explanation of why families with longer residence times have a greater propensity to own results from the empirical analysis suggest that the semi markov model closely predicts conditions in the united states and provide important insights into the effects of housing tax policy residence times are also found to influence household tenure choice through their impact on the discounted legal and realtor fees paid by homeowners

is land leasing a solution to unaffordable housing the increase in u s mortgage rates from nine per cent in 1976 to fifteen per cent in 1982 raised monthly mortgage payments by about sixty per cent even before rising house prices in the united states over this period are taken into account not surprisingly attention has been focused on ways and means of counteracting spiralling housing costs one proposed solution is land leasing under such an arrangement the homebuyer purchases the house but leases the land there may be an option to buy the land at some time in the future land leasing reduces the overall purchase price and hence lowers the minimum down payment and the initial monthly mortgage payment in hawaii land leasing has been a readily available alternative to land owning throughout the postwar period the analysis of residential housing prices in hawaii provides some quantitative estimates of the relative prices of leasehold versus fee simple properties the average price differential is surprisingly small one explanation of these small price differentials for which a model is developed and tested here is that borrowing constrained households use high discount rates to calculate the present value of the future land price that they will in effect have to pay at the expiration of the lease these discount rates are estimated in a nonlinear hedonic property price equation the results are then employed to answer the question under what conditions would a leaseholder buy the land outright before the expiration of the lease

multicrop production decisions in western irrigated agriculture the role of water price applying a model of the multioutput firm econometric results are reported for irrigated production in four multistate regions of the american west cross sectional microdata from the farm and ranch irrigation survey and limited dependent variable methods are used to estimate crop choice supply land allocation and water demand functions for field crops farm level water demand is decomposed into the sum of crop level water demands and crop level demands are further separated into an extensive margin land allocations and intensive margin short run water use response to water price measured as groundwater pumping cost occurs primarily at the extensive margin

allocatable fixed inputs and two stage aggregation models of multioutput production decisions allocation decisions for a fixed input such as land are incorporated into a two stage aggregation model of multioutput production decisions the resulting two stage model is more realistic and is as tractable for empirical research as the standard model

uncertainty asymmetric information and bilateral contracts on considere un monopole bilateral avec incertitude et information asymetrique on donne les conditions necessaires et suffisantes a l existence de contrats qui soient efficaces et a la fois stimulants