anticipating regret why fewer options may be better we study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the agent selects an alternative from a menu and experiences regret if her choice is ex post inferior since regret arises from comparisons between the alternative selected and the other available alternatives our axioms reflect the agent s desire to limit her options we prove that our representation is essentially unique we also introduce two measures of comparative regret attitudes and relate them to our representation finally we explore the formal connection between the present work and the literature on temptation

regret and feedback information in first price sealed bid auctions we investigate the effect of regret related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions two types of regret are possible in this auction format a winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid and a loser may regret missing an opportunity to win at a favorable price in theory under very general conditions being sensitive to winning and paying too much should result in lower average bids and being sensitive to missing opportunities to win at a favorable price should result in higher bids for example the u s government s policy of revealing losing bids may cause regret sensitive bidders to anticipate regret and bid conservatively decreasing the government s revenue we test these predictions in the laboratory and find strong support for both

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

herding with and without payoff externalities an internet experiment most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities yet the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities in this paper we experimentally investigate the effects of several different forms of payoff externalities e g network effects first mover advantage etc in a standard information based herding model our results are based on an internet experiment with more than 6000 subjects of which more than 2400 participated in the treatments reported here including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm we also replicate and review earlier cascade experiments finally we study reputation effects i e the influence of success models in the context of herding

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

does feedback really matter in one shot first price auctions does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one shot environments we revisit this question in first price auction markets we consider three feedback types minimal only knowing whether winning or not loser also knowing the winning bid and winner knowing the second highest bid if winning filiz ozbay and ozbay 2007 find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids we use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs using a sample of 624 subjects we find that bidders ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid value ratios

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

neural evidence of regret and its implications for investor behavior we use neural data collected from an experimental asset market to measure regret preferences while subjects trade stocks when subjects observe a positive return for a stock they chose not to purchase a regret signal is observed in an area of the brain that is commonly active during reward processing subjects are unwilling to repurchase stocks that have recently increased in price even though this is suboptimal in our experiment the strength of stock repurchasing mistakes is correlated with the neural measures of regret subjects with high rates of repurchasing mistakes also exhibit large disposition effects

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

the achilles heel of salience theory and a way to fix it abstract salience theory has been successfully used to explain a wide range of empirical and experimental phenomena such as the allais paradox framing effect the preference reversal phenomenon or the decoy and compromise effects in this paper we show that salience theory carries a notable flaw and under certain circumstances it suggests that a salient thinker may prefer a dominated option even when a strictly dominant alternative is available to her to solve this problem we propose a possible alteration of the theory and show how it accounts for the same phenomena as the salience theory

pricing substitutable products under consumer regrets abstract since many firms provide consumers with substitutable products which may be launched sequentially over several periods strategic consumers need to make their purchase or wait decisions at the beginning of the first period however they may face second period valuation uncertainty when such decisions are made and decisions made under uncertainty may lead to regrets ex post lots of empirical studies show that consumers anticipate these regrets and take anticipated regrets into consideration this paper studies the impact of valuation uncertainty and consumer anticipated regrets on consumer purchasing behavior firm s prices and pricing strategy we consider a firm selling two substitutable products over two periods one product for one period in a selling season the firm announces all its prices at the beginning of the selling season price commitment or announces each price at the beginning of each period dynamic pricing besides a consumer may experience purchase regret from missing a better choice if she chooses to buy in the first period and otherwise wait regret if she chooses to wait consumers make decisions based on the firm s prices and strategies and the anticipated regrets we find that a firm may need to set a lower price in the first period even when the average valuation in this period is higher second with price commitment the impact of each type of regret on the optimal second period price can be opposite and depends on the value of the uncertainty and regret parameters finally we show that price commitment dominates dynamic pricing and the value of price commitment depends on the uncertainty and anticipated regret

future bioenergy trade in the eu modelling trading options from a cost effectiveness perspective the purpose of this paper is to analyse under what conditions with respect to co2 emission reduction and biofuels for transport targets the trading in the eu of co2 credits and solid and or liquid biofuels is cost effective from the perspective of an optimisation energy systems model we use the peep model covering the eu27 except bulgaria malta and cyprus to generate insights about the cost effectiveness of different options under different policy scenarios trade in co2 credits is a cost effective option in all relevant policy scenarios trade in some biofuels mainly from central and eastern european countries to the eu15 is cost effective in all assessed scenarios in the case of co2 targets whether national or at the eu level there is trade in solid biofuels when biofuels for transport targets are also implemented trading both solid and liquid biofuels is cost effective

optimistic behavior when a decision bias is costly an experimental test the existence of optimism when biased decisions are costly is investigated experimentally subjects make an informed guess about an exogenously determined event the outside temperature a couple of days later payments in the control group depend only on how close the guess was to the realized temperature while payments in the treatment group also depend positively on realized temperature the data show the treatment group subjects to guess higher temperatures that is higher payments compared with the control group results thus indicate that there is optimism also when a decision bias is costly jel c91 d81 d84

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

is there an optimistic bias on betting markets bettors are subject to an optimistic bias when betting on the team they support this paper shows that this individual bias does not affect betting odds on british teams in association football soccer as it is often argued

the effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions while most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder s utility for an outcome depends only on his own profit we allow the utility to also depend on any regret that a bidder suffers after the fact and characterize when and how this affects bidding specifically a winner might regret money left on the table in federal offshore oil lease sales while a loser might regret seeing an object sell for less than his own value for it we show that for risk neutral bidders who after the fact know the winner s price for the object a bidder s optimal bidding strategy will not depend on the relative weight given to profit versus regret if both forms of regret weigh equally heavily however if bidders weight money left on the table regret more heavily then the bid taker suffers likewise if losers do not learn the winner s price then the bid taker also suffers thus the existing models exclusion of regret from risk neutral bidders utility functions affects the applicability of the

tournament incentives and asset price bubbles evidence from a field experiment abstract in this note we show at the example of an experimental stock market conducted on the occasion of the world soccer championship 2010 in south africa how tournament incentives might contribute to the formation of asset price bubbles

heterogeneity of beliefs and trade in experimental asset markets we investigate the relationship between traders expectations and market outcomes with experimental asset market data the data show that those who have high price expectations buy more frequently and submit higher bids and those who hold low price expectations sell more frequently and submit lower bids traders who have more accurate expectations achieve greater earnings simulations using only belief data reproduce the pricing patterns observed in the market well indicating that the heterogeneity of expectations is a key to explaining market activity

information feedback in first price auctions i apply the notion of a self confirming equilibrium sce to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders perceptions about their strategic environment and consequently their bidding behavior in a private values setting revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs justifying the assumption of nash equilibrium in contrast in every symmetric sce of a symmetric affiliated private values model bidding strategies and revenue are weakly higher if only the highest bid is revealed i also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

using market prices to predict election results the 1993 ubc election stock market economists believe that markets are exceptionally efficient aggregators of information this research tests this theory by asking whether markets can successfully predict uncertain outcomes specifically the ubc election stock market ubc esm was created to see if market prices could be accurate predictors of the outcome of the 1993 canadian federal election this paper presents the results of this experiment in which over 250 traders from across canada and the united states participated investing over 30 000 the structure and workings of the market are explained in some detail and the performance of the market is reviewed the market predicted the popular vote shares of the major parties very well but did less well at predicting the split of seats between the liberal and conservative parties coauthors are murray frank vasu krishnamurthy and thomas w ross

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

suckers are born but markets are made individual rationality arbitrage and market efficiency on an electronic futures market the iowa electronic markets are specially designed futures markets that appear to aggregate information efficiently to predict events such as election outcomes yet in theory perfect information aggregation is impossible further the markets are populated by a nonrepresentative sample of mistake prone and biased traders that is traders are prone to the behavioral anomalies predicted by behavioral finance how can this be reconciled with market efficiency here we take a first step by analyzing the behavior of two self selected types of traders dramatic differences in mistake rates across traders can help us answer the question market making traders who set prices are less mistake prone and appear to be more rational than price taking traders this highlights an important feature of markets marginal in this case market making not average traders set prices this can drive the efficiency of market prices in spite of large numbers of traders who display patently suboptimal behavior

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

robust monopoly pricing we consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information in the robust version the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution we characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors i maximin utility and ii minimax regret the equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty the concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty

developments in international solid biofuel trade an analysis of volumes policies and market factors abstract this paper presents and analyses international solid biofuel trade and concludes upon interactions with bioenergy policies and market factors it shows that trade has grown from about 56 to 300 pj between 2000 and 2010 wood pellets grew strongest i e from 8 5 to 120 pj other relevant streams by 2010 included wood waste 77 pj fuelwood 76 pj wood chips 17 pj residues 9 pj and roundwood 2 4 pj intra eu trade covered two thirds of global trade by 2010 underlying markets are highly heterogeneous generally though trade evolved whenever supply side market factors coincided with existing emerging demand patterns market factors and policies both defined trade volumes though policy changes did not have as prominent effects on trade developments as in the liquid biofuel sector economic viability is the key limiting factor main exporting countries have low feedstock costs and already existing wood processing industries trade relevant aspects are the commodity s monetary value determined by its homogeneity heating value and bulk density consumer markets are diverse in residential heating demand trade patterns have been influenced by local biofuel availability and short term price signals i e mainly price competitiveness and investment support for boilers stoves commodities are mainly sourced regionally but price differences have triggered a growing trade the industrial segment is greatly influenced by policy frameworks but more mature e g established routes trade is strictly linked to margins defined mainly by policies and combustion technologies uncertainties in the analysis are due to data gaps across and within databases regarding import export declarations to estimate bioenergy related trade anecdotal data was indispensable we believe datasets should be streamlined across international institutions to eventually enable reporting of global trade beyond digit 6 level research is needed to provide further insights into informal markets interrelations between trade factors are particularly relevant when mapping future trade streams under different policy trade regime scenarios

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

regret theory a bold alternative to the alternatives in their famous 1982 paper in this journal loomes and sugden introduced regret theory now more than 30 years later the case for the historical importance of this contribution can be made

internet based virtual stock markets for business forecasting the application of internet based virtual stock markets vsms is an additional approach that can be used to predict short and medium term market developments the basic concept involves bringing a group of participants together via the internet and allowing them to trade shares of virtual stocks these stocks represent a bet on the outcome of future market situations and their value depends on the realization of these market situations in this process a vsm elicits and aggregates the assessments of its participants concerning future market developments the aim of this article is to evaluate the potential use and the different design possibilities as well as the forecast accuracy and performance of vsms compared to expert predictions for their application to business forecasting after introducing the basic idea of using vsms for business forecasting we discuss the different design possibilities for such vsms in three real world applications we analyze the feasibility and forecast accuracy of vsms compare the performance of vsms to expert predictions and propose a new validity test for vsm forecasts finally we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future research

wishes expectations and actions a survey on price formation in election stock markets abstract with error prone and biased individual traders can markets aggregate trader information and produce efficient outcomes we review election stock market evidence that suggests this does happen individual traders appear biased and error prone consistently yet these markets prove quite efficient in predicting election outcomes we also review work which documents comparable but substantially different phenomena in related laboratory markets in addition we report the results from a new laboratory session which shows how we can create particular biases that mirror those in election stock markets finally we discuss how combined laboratory and field experiments can help us understand trader market interactions

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

bioenergy expansion in the eu cost effective climate change mitigation employment creation and reduced dependency on imported fuels presently the european union eu is promoting bioenergy the aim of this paper is to study the prospects for using domestic biomass resources in europe and specifically to investigate whether different policy objectives underlying the promotion of bioenergy cost effective climate change mitigation employment creation and reduced dependency on imported fuels agree on which bioenergy options that should be used we model bioenergy use from a cost effectiveness perspective with a linear regionalized energy and transport system model and perform supplementary analysis it is found that the different policy objectives do not agree on the order of priority among bioenergy options maximizing climate benefits cost effectively is in conflict with maximizing employment creation the former perspective proposes the use of lignocellulosic biomass in the stationary sector while the latter requires biofuels for transport based on traditional agricultural crops further from a security of supply perspective the appeal of a given bioenergy option depends on how oil and gas import dependencies are weighed relative to each other consequently there are tradeoffs that need to be addressed by policymakers promoting the use of bioenergy also the importance of bioenergy in relation to employment creation and fuel import dependency reduction needs to be further addressed

theory and misbehavior in first price auctions comment in his recent paper in this review glenn harrison 1989 argues that the conclusions of james cox et al 1982 1983 1985 1988 in their studies of first price private value auctions are not well supported because of shortcomings in the way their experimental investigations were designed analyzed and reported harrison argues that the expected cost of deviations from risk neutral nash equilibrium rnne bidding in these auctions was quite small less than 0 05 at the median so that in terms of expected monetary payoffs payoff space many subjects had little to lose from deviating from the rnne strategy harrison suggests that the significance of the differences cox vernon smith and james walker hereafter csw report between subjects bids and the rnne bids deviations in the message space may therefore need to be reexamined in discussing harrison versus csw we have three primary points to make first in arguing that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space harrison 1989 p 749 we think harrison has overstated his case however we agree with his more important point that looking at the cost of deviations is a useful diagnostic tool for determining when experimenters are likely to have lost control over subjects incentives further as we will show in section i this part of harrison s critique applies with special force to csw s studies of bidding second a broader examination of the results of private value auction experiments indicates that risk aversion cannot be the only factor and may well not be the most important factor behind bidding above the rnne found so often in first price privatevalue auctions the most telling evidence here is bidding above the dominant bid price found in second price auctions kagel et al 1987 kagel and levin 1990 and the risk loving found under several treatment conditions in csw s 1984 own multipleunit discriminative auctions auctions in which the high bidders pay their bid price these and other data inconsistent with risk averse bidding are largely ignored in csw 1988 but are nevertheless relevant to the substantive issue of risk aversion in private value auctions they are discussed in section ii third there are data gathered in other investigations which provide strong support for the view that the deviations from rnne bidding reported in first price auctions are not the results of the low expected cost of such deviations however these data unlike the higher stakes payoff data that csw offer in response to harrison are not consistent with csw s subsidiary conclusions that the data can be well accounted for by a narrow class of risk aversion parameters for the bidders together with the assumption that all agents are playing a nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information a key difference between these experiments and csw s is that if subjects do not respond to csw s treatment condition increasing the payoffs from experimental to u s dollars their behavior will be consistent with csw s theory in contrast department of economics university of pittsburgh pittsburgh pa 15260 we thank jack ochs and emilie roth for thoughtful discussions on earlier drafts of the paper jim cox and glenn harrison for helpful comments on the initial draft of the paper susan garvin for research assistance and ray battalio carl kogut and don meyer for providing us with access to their data research support was provided by the information science and technology and economics divisions of the national science foundation the alfred p sloan foundation and the russell sage foundation the usual caveat applies with special force iwe do not respond to specific comments that csw 1992 make in response to our comment as in order to avoid indefinite regress the ground rules for this debate required us to comment on csw s criticism of harrison after which they would be given the opportunity to respond to our comment

regret based capital asset pricing model abstract this study examines the influence of regret aversion on asset pricing by proposing a regret based capital asset pricing model in which individuals maximize the expected returns from chosen portfolios of assets while minimizing anticipated regrets in equilibrium a closed form pricing formula is derived whereby a risky asset s excess return is proportional to its regret beta that measures the exposure to investors emotions the market as a whole pays investors a positive regret premium as compensation for regret aversion as such this study proposes a conceptual framework to understand the aggregate effects of regret the model indicates that employing a regret related beta can help explain cross sectional returns it also implies that regret aversion is a possible reason for the flat security market line and high equity premium

regret aversion and opportunity dependence this paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision maker is driven by anticipated ex post regrets our model allows both regret aversion and likelihood judgement over states to coexist also we characterize two special cases minimax regret with multiple priors that generalizes savage s minimax regret and a smooth model of regret aversion

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

applying regret theory to investment choices currency hedging decisions we apply regret theory an axiomatic behavioral theory to derive closed form solutions to optimal currency hedging choices investors experience regret of not having chosen the ex post optimal hedging decision hence investors anticipate their future experience of regret and incorporate it in their objective function we derive a model of financial decision making with two components of risk traditional risk volatility and regret risk we find results that are in sharp contrast with traditional expected utility loss aversion or disappointment aversion theories we discuss the empirical implications of our model and its ability to explain observed hedging behavior

when does it pay to delay supplier qualification theory and experiments we study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening qualification screening is costly for the buyer involving product tests site visits and interviews in addition to a qualified incumbent supplier the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification the buyer wishes to run a price only open descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction we analytically study the buyer s optimal strategy accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract in our analysis we derive the incumbent s optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott the auction to preserve their profit margin and only lower cost incumbents bid to win these results are strikingly different from the usual open descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy we test our analytical results in the laboratory with human subjects we find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

future perspectives of international bioenergy trade abstract according to the iea world energy outlook 2012 primary demand for bioenergy will strongly increase up to the year 2035 the demand for biofuels and biomass for electricity is expected to triple these changes will have an impact on the regional balance of demand and supply of bioenergy leading to both increasing trade flows and changes in trade patterns the gfpm timer and poles models have been selected for a detailed comparison of scenarios and their impact on global bioenergy trade in ambitious scenarios 14 26 of global bioenergy demand is traded between regions in 2030 the model scenarios show a huge range of potential bioenergy trade for solid biomass in ambitious scenarios bioenergy trade ranges from 700 mt to more than 2 500 mt in 2030 for liquid biomass the ambitious scenarios show a bioenergy trade in the range of 65 360 mt in 2030 considering the currently very small share of internationally traded bioenergy this would result in huge challenges and require tremendous changes in terms of production pretreatment of biomass and development of logistic chains

elections and political risk new evidence from the 2008 taiwanese presidential election abstract we examine the effects of party platforms on the economic opportunities of firms using a unique data set from a political prediction market in taiwan a country with two dominant parties whose political cleavage derives mainly from a single issue the one china principle we find that during the 2008 presidential campaign the share price of taiwanese firms with investments in the mainland responded strongly and positively to a positive electoral outlook for the kmt the party which advocates lifting caps on cross strait investment in mainland china the response is strongest for those firms who have already hit their caps

integrated assessment of sustainability trade offs and pathways for global bioenergy production framing a novel hybrid approach abstract current controversies and debates on bioenergy production in the areas of greenhouse gases emission reduction food and energy security social exclusion and welfare erosion and ecosystem deterioration attest to the challenges which the bioenergy sector has to overcome to achieve its global production potentials because it is yet an evolving sector the sustainability of bioenergy production in different regions is very elusive experiences show that bioenergy policies in one region can have impacts not only on its own but also on other regions social economic and ecological sustainability it is thus important to assess development pathways for bioenergy to exploit the potential benefits and forestall any unnecessary costs this paper frames a novel hybrid approach for assessing bioenergy potentials for regions with diverging economic social and ecological systems the approach is based on a conceptual framework that takes into account trade offs decisions on sustainability goals and production options in the assessment of bioenergy pathways it combines different empirical techniques for the systematic investigation of trade offs and pathways including fuzzy logic conjoint logit and path analyses to show the relevance and utility of these techniques for the integrated assessment of trade offs and pathways in bioenergy development we illustrated their application using results and data from previous related studies

incentives for subjects in internet experiments abstract providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky one simple method is a high score as in computer games we test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives we find significant differences

prediction markets in the laboratory prediction markets are becoming an ever more popular method for aggregating disparate information companies use prediction markets to forecast sales release dates and other internal activities recently several well known economists have argued that government ought to eliminate impediments to unleashing the power of prediction markets broadly this survey paper looks at the laboratory experiments which provide part of the scientific justification for using prediction markets these systems work because people who have private knowledge can use this insider information in the market but doing so causes the price to reflect these data starting with early experiments that show markets can under certain circumstances aggregate information we discuss the robustness of prediction markets to various design features we also discuss places where performance does not match rhetoric and briefly look at experimental comparisons of alternative information aggregating institutions another issue consistently raised regarding the implementation of prediction markets is the degree to which traders can manipulate prices and thus the information gleaned by following a series of experiments on manipulation we present the circumstances that are and are not sufficient for manipulation attempts to be successful finally we offer suggestions on where we believe future experiments are needed in this area

behavioral models for first price sealed bid auctions with the one shot decision theory abstract we build an auction model with the one shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his her bidding price in first price sealed bid auctions the decision making procedure involves two steps first for each of his her possible bidding prices the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him her then the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs the optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets throwing away and overbidding are well explained

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

markets as information gathering tools the academic literature wall street commentary and even daily news reporting reflect a belief that markets can anticipate events the current movements in the stock market are interpreted as reflecting the likelihood that the federal reserve system will change interest rates futures markets are interpreted as reflecting the best estimates of things to come movements in individual stock prices are thought to anticipate earnings reports or the probability of a merger or buyout if we want to know about future weather in the south we should study the orange juice futures the academic journals are filled with the concept of rational expectations in which current prices are supposed to reflect the sum of all knowledge in the system prices according to this theory are a statistic that indicates the aggregation of information about underlying states of the economy those who are outsiders to the information in the system become insiders by simply observing the economic activity

information and efficiency in political stock markets using computerized markets to predict election results this study concentrates on four computerized political markets in germany between 1990 and 1998 while this new method for the prediction of election events worked quite well in the usa it did not perform as well in germany searching for the causes of this distinction it is shown that in contrast to the findings of forsythe et al 1992 i extraordinary profits were achieved less by people who took advantage of other people s anomalies than by those people who acquired an advantage from the existence of asymmetric information ii the marginal trader hypothesis does not hold when applied to german markets and that iii traders relied on public opinion polls it is argued that these distinctions are caused by the differences in the german and the us voting systems additionally it is shown that to a certain extent iv election markets were able to predict the contemporary mood of the electorate without the help of public opinion polls v first of all the informed traders used public opinion pol