strategic amnesty and credible immigration reform why do countries that impose employer sanctions to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal immigrants in this article i provide a positive theory of amnesty provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform involving the joint use of employer sanctions and border interdictions is time inconsistent in particular my framework demonstrates that host countries of immigration can enhance the credibility of their immigration reforms by binding their own hands and strategically granting a socially excessive amount of amnesty to illegal workers

macroeconomic features of the french revolution this paper describes aspects of the french revolution from the perspective of theories about money and government budget constraints we describe how unpleasant fiscal arithmetic gripped the old regime how the estates general responded to reorganize france s fiscal affairs and how fiscal exigencies impelled the revolution into a procession of monetary experiments ending in hyper inflation

debt restructuring with a public good endogenous government expenditure is introduced into lucas and stokey s 1983 model of optimal wage taxation so long as the government can precommit to taxes or to expenditures a debt maturity structure that keeps the value of the debt invariant to interest rate changes will make the optimal policies time consistent in the absence of partial precommitment debt restructuring cannot enforce time consistency but it can still limit the costs of time inconsistency numerical examples show 1 average debt is smaller than under the precommitment solution 2 the debt structure is much longer than under partial precommitment and 3 restricting the government to one period debt overstates the welfare losses from time inconsistency

a positive theory of foreign currency debt abstract this paper makes a case for foreign currency debt as a hedging device in an open economy subject to stochastic shocks to output a government can reduce uncertainty in wealth and in consumption by issuing foreign or domestic currency debt if unexpected domestic and foreign inflation are negatively correlated with domestic output foreign currency debt is desirable in comparison to domestic currency debt if growth rates of output of both countries are closely related and if domestic inflation is relatively uncertain it has an additional advantage if domestic debt creates time consistency problems

openness and inflation a general equilibrium model of a small open economy is developed to analyse the optimal rate of inflation under discretion once agents welfare is the sole policy objective it is possible to show that openness and inflation no longer have a simple inverse relationship a greater degree of openness may lead the policy maker to want to exploit the short run phillips curve more aggressively even if involves a smaller short run benefit because changes in export demand affect the terms of trade inflation can then be higher in a more open economy

principles of fiscal and monetary policy abstract this paper describes a complete and internally consistent set of principles for the conduct of a welfare maximizing fiscal and monetary policy issues of time consistency that arise in applying these principles to actual economics are also discussed

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

critical natural capital a socio cultural perspective abstract critical natural capital cnc is commonly defined as that part of the natural environment which performs important and irreplaceable functions so far the challenge to determine the criticality of natural capital nc has mainly been taken up by the natural sciences and the critical functions of nature mainly associated with its life support and ecological services little attention has been paid to the socio cultural functions of nc and to their values for the health and well being of human societies the aim of this paper is to encourage a more complete accounting of the critical functions of nc and its associated values by highlighting the importance of the information functions health recreation amenity education heritage etc for the quality and sustainability of human life it is argued that despite their immaterial and often intangible nature these functions provide many socio economic benefits which might be assessed through both qualitative and quantitative valuation methodologies integration of ecology sociology and economics is essential to operationalize the concept of cnc as a tool for more balanced environmental planning and decision making

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy a solution this paper demonstrates how time consistency of the ramsey policy the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment can be achieved each government should leave its successor with a uniq

time consistent fiscal policy and government cash flow abstract this short paper provides an interpretation and some extensions of lucas and stokey s results on optimal fiscal policy the discussion relies heavily on the concept of government cash flow which is related but not equal to the budget surplus time consistency of the optimal policy requires that a positive cash flow is used to buy up some debt of each maturity and contingency

the optimal inflation tax when money reduces transactions costs abstract it has been argued that if money acts as an intermediate good the optimal inflation tax is zero this paper reexamines such a claim in the context of a model in which money reduces transactions costs it is shown that modeling money as an intermediate good does not necessarily imply that the optimal inflation tax is zero the optimality of a zero inflation tax depends on the properties of the transactions costs technology in particular if the transactions costs technology does not exhibit constant returns to scale it is optimal to resort to the inflation tax

international policy coordination in interdependent monetary economies abstract an optimising equilibrium model of two interdependent monetary economies with no other assets except cash perfect foresight flexible exchange rates and imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods is analysed both non cooperative and cooperative market oriented outcomes are time inconsistent since each government has an incentive to renege and levy a surprise inflation tax international policy coordination without pre commitment can be counterproductive even though there are no tax distortions and the provision of public goods is optimal since it exacerbates the credibility problems perceived by the private sectors and therefore leads to a too low level of real money balances and excessive inflation

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

the optimum quantity of money rule in the theory of public finance this paper examines optimal tax policy in a monetary economy in which money serves as an intermediate good that helps facilitate the conversion of scarce resources into tinal consumption goods by enabling consumers to economize on the costs of transacting it is shown that in such an environment even though distorting taxes must be levied for revenue purposes the optimal tax structure calls for abstaining from inflationary finance and adopting the optimum quantity of money rule

the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of very short term rates statistical tests and economic value this paper re examines the validity of the expectation hypothesis eh of the term structure of us repo rates ranging in maturity from overnight to three months we extend the work of longstaff 2000a in two directions i we implement statistical tests designed to increase test power in this context ii more importantly we assess the economic value of departures from the eh based on criteria of profitability and economic significance in the context of a simple trading strategy the eh is rejected throughout the term structure examined on the basis of the statistical tests however the results of our economic analysis are favorable to the eh suggesting that the statistical rejections of the eh in the repo market are economically insignificant

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy a comment in an important recent contribution persson persson and svensson 1987 hereafter pps suggest that through careful restructuring of its nominal and real debt obligations a government may be able to induce future governments to follow the monetary and fiscal policies that it regards as optimal today the pps argument builds on lucas and stokey s 1983 demonstration that in a special nonmonetary setting the time inconsistency of optimal fiscal policy can be avoided through managing the term structure of real government obligations to the public the basic idea of the pps scheme for monetary economies is disarmingly intuitive in addition to continually restructuring nominal and real debt obligations a la lucas stokey each government must ensure that the next government inherits a stream of nominal claims on the public whose present discounted value equals the stock of money this equality pps argue removes the incentive for surprise inflation or deflation because such surprises would not affect the real net worth of the government this note shows that the pps prescription for avoiding time inconsistency appealing as it is is not generally sufficient even under the debt restructuring they recommend optimal policy is likely to be time inconsistent the main reason why their scheme fails is that the restrictions it imposes on government asset stocks satisfy first order but not second order conditions for an optimum because of the complex interactions between the current price level and future interest rates a government can raise its objective function by moving several variables at once away from the levels planned by the previous government even though price level changes alone would not affect government net worth we develop our argument using the model notation and equation numbers of pps to which the reader is referred for details the maximization problem associated with

time consistency and the feasibility of alternative exchange rate regimes abstract in a stochastic cash in advance model of an open economy a fixed exchange rate regime is dynamically inconsistent and hence economically infeasible in a cournot nash equilibrium if there are no exogenous constraints imposed on government behaviour and nominal interest rates are strictly positive on the other hand a perfectly floating exchange rate regime is feasible but it cannot sustain any international asset trade however a noncooperative equilibrium with nonzero asset trade and a fixed exchange rate regime may become feasible when we allow policymakers to employ trigger retaliation strategies

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

time consistency of monetary policy in the open economy abstract this paper shows that in an open economy time consistency problems are created not only by nominal government debt but also by nominal private debt to foreigners given any external nominal debt inflation redistributes wealth between domestic residents and foreigners a government that cares about the welfare of its residents will be tempted to inflate whenever it or its residents have issued nominal debt to foreigners an analysis of the u s net investment position shows that these international considerations have become increasingly relevant for the united states because the recent external deficits have largely been financed in nominal terms

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

central bank reputation and the monetization of deficits the 1981 italian monetary reform in 1981 the bank of italy was freed from the obligation to purchase the unsold public debt at the treasury auctions since then the bank of italy has reduced debt monetization the paper seeks to explain this policy shift by analyzing a game between the monetary and fiscal authorities the fiscal authority is imperfectly informed about the central bank preferences an equilibrium exists in which the central bank does not monetize so as to establish a reputation of being independent monetization raises fiscal deficits and may raise public debt relative to a non accommodative policy

money and asset prices in a cash in advance economy an asset pricing model with money introduced via a cash in advance constraint is presented the monetary velocity is variable hence money demand does not obey the trivial quantity equation the effects of disturbances in output and money growth on real balances the price level and interest rates are examined monetary policy has effects on real asset prices the fisher relation and the premium on nominal bonds are discussed the precise role of the timing of information and transactions for properties of price levels and interest rates are clarified

the time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies we show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for a class of economies often used in applied work economies appealing because they are consistent with the growth facts we establish our results in two steps we first show that for this class of economies the friedman rule of setting nominal interest rates to zero is optimal under commitment we then show that optimal policies are time consistent if the friedman rule is optimal for our benchmark economy in which the time consistency problem is most severe the converse also holds if optimal policies are time consistent then the friedman rule is optimal

a comparison of nominal and indexed debt under fiscal constraints this paper makes a welfare comparison between the issuance of price indexed and nominal public debt in the presence of fiscal constraints viz a debt constraint a deficit constraint and a combination of both distortionary taxes or public consumption are regulated to avoid the violation of the relevant fiscal constraint s under a debt constraint indexed debt is generally preferred while under a deficit constraint the results are more mixed introducing inflation persistence and raising the maturity of the debt tend to increase the magnitude of the welfare differences between the two types of debt welfare differences are further affected by the degree to which public consumption and tax revenues are indexed to actual versus structural nominal gdp

public debt and optimal taxes without commitment abstract benhabib and rustichini optimal taxes without commitment j econ theory 77 1997 231 259 study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt they find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state this note shows that once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero

georgescu roegen daly versus solow stiglitz revisited there are two key issues which are not fullyelaborated in the papers in a recent special issueof ecological economics the contribution ofnicholas georgescu roegen vol 22 no 3 1997 i the operational meaning of substitutionin production function and ii the effect of tech nological improvement on resource utilization inthis piece we examine these two issues based on i georgescu roegen s conceptualization of pro duction process and ii jevons paradox neoclassical production functions whether forindividual rms or the aggregate economy as sume that any factor can always be substituted forany other factor except the cases of xed coef cients and or the existence of limitational factors the implication or entailment of this assumptionis that an increase in the input of any factoralways yields an increase in output this is thebasis for solow s contention that t he world can in effect get along without natural resources solow 1974 however those neoclassical economists adopt ing the substitution assumption have not paid dueattention to the essential distinction between ows quantities of materials qualitatively trans formed in the process and funds agents trans forming a given set of in ows into a given set ofout ows in the material production process georgescu roegen 1971 neglecting this dis tinction results in a systematic indifference to thebiophysical foundation of economic activities infact according to georgescu roegen 1990 fordesigning a blueprint of a factory process anexpert has to consider a set of three relationships i the normal rate of output

sustainability and growth when manufactured capital and natural capital are not substitutable abstract a two sector neoclassical growth model of manufactured capital and natural capital is used in examining the importance of factor substitution to the issues of sustainability and economic growth analytical conclusions are established on the sustainability of the stocks of natural capital and manufactured capital as well as on the importance of factor substitution to the issues of technical progress and recycling policy and welfare implications of the analysis are also discussed

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

globalisation and sustainability environmental kuznets curve and the wto abstract economic globalisation is seen by many as a driving force for global economic growth yet opinion is divided about the benefits of this process as highlighted by the wto meeting in seattle in late 1999 proponents of economic globalisation view it as a positive force for environmental improvement and as a major factor increasing the likelihood of sustainable development through its likely boost to global investment these proponents mostly appeal to analysis based on the environmental kuznets curve ekc to support their views about environmental improvement but ekc analysis has significant deficiencies furthermore it is impossible to be confident that the process of economic globalisation will result in sustainable development if weak conditions only are satisfied strong conditions probably need to be satisfied to achieve sustainable development and given current global institutional arrangements these are likely to be violated by the economic globalisation process global political action seems to be needed to avert a deterioration in the global environment and to prevent unsustainability of development this exposition demonstrates the limitations of ekc analysis identifies positive and negative effects of economic globalisation on pollution levels and highlights connections between globalisation and the debate about whether strong or weak conditions are required for sustainable development the article concludes with a short discussion of the position of wto in relation to trade and the environment and the seemingly de facto endorsement of wto of weak conditions for sustainable development it suggests that wto s relative neglect of environmental concerns is no longer politically tenable and needs to be reassessed in the light of recent developments in economic analysis the skew of economic growth e g in favour of developing countries is shown to be extremely important from a global environmental perspective

why a government might want to consider foreign currency denominated debt abstract as the real value of foreign currency denominated debt is not affected by domestic inflation such debt eliminates the discretionary incentive to inflate this in turn will reduce the expected and thus equilibrium rate of inflation however as foreign currency debt is affected by foreign inflation such debt could be an attractive alternative to indexed bonds if the foreign country inflates when the domestic one would like to

development of ecological economics in australia and new zealand abstract this paper reviews the development of ecological economics in australia and new zealand since its beginnings in the late 1970s a historical account is presented that focuses particularly on the activities of the australia new zealand society for ecological economics and key ecological economics research activities achievements of ecological economics in australia and new zealand are assessed using a range of quantitative and qualitative data the main areas of expertise developed by australian and new zealand ecological economists were found to be theoretical foundations and visions for ecological economics biodiversity and resilience input output analysis heterodox valuation approaches analysis of economy environment interactions sustainability indicators sustainable agriculture fisheries and oceans and energy thermodynamics both countries are ranked at the top or near the top of the world rankings in terms of per capita isee membership and publication rates in ecological economics a defining feature of ecological economics in australia and new zealand has also been its practical and problem solving focus and the level of end user engagement the paper concludes by discussing the challenges that face the future development of ecological economics in australia and new zealand

nominal versus indexed debt a quantitative horse race abstract the main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks we model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance we use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion government outlays uncertainty and contingent debt service our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment thus the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates we obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions we further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing volatile countries

more on the time consistency of monetary policy abstract we introduce costs of unexpected inflation in a general equilibrium monetary model by changing the timing of the constraints faced by consumers we show that in this environment monetary policy is still time inconsistent but the nature of the inconsistency is very different from the standard result found in the literature in particular we find that the government may find optimal to deviate by choosing inflation rates lower than expected by making a brief review of the monetary literature we argue that the model of this paper is more attractive than the ones proposed before to study the time consistency of optimal monetary policy

optimal time consistent government debt maturity this paper develops a model of optimal debt maturity in which the government cannot issue statecontingent debt as the literature has established if the government can perfectly commit to fiscal policy it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short term assets and issuing long term debt these positions are quantitatively very large relative to gdp and do not need to be actively managed by the government our main result is that these conclusions are not robust when lack of commitment is introduced under lack of commitment large and tilted debt positions are very expensive to finance ex ante since they ex post exacerbate the government s problem stemming from a lack of commitment in contrast a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost entailed by a lack of commitment though this structure also limits the ability to insure against shocks and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions we show that the optimal time consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility thus under lack of commitment the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols

optimal maturity of nominal government debt abstract we report a first set of empirical results obtained from estimating on u s data a model of the optimal maturity structure of nominal government debt in a context where there is no full policy precommitment and markets are incomplete

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

rules commitment and the search for stable money a review essay political economists have always criticized existing monetary institutions and struggled to articulate a vision of an ideal monetary system the volume under review the search for stable money essays on monetary reform edited by james a dorn and anna j schwartz university of chicago press 1987 stands firmly in this tradition it addresses the shortcomings of modern monetary institutions and debates the merits of various alternative arrangements the volume consists of nineteen essays and a number of short comments among the contributors are three nobel prize winners buchanan friedman and hayekthough buchanan simply comments on bernholz generally speaking the essayists disapprove of the virtually unlimited discretion invested in the federal reserve they argue that discretion leads to unnecessarily high and variable rates of inflation the essayists also agree that the solution ought to take the form of a change in the political rules which would have the effect of limiting government control over the monetary system beyond this there is no consensus the contributors consider money growth rules the gold standard a proposal for a compensated dollar and competitive currency systems but often find one another s proposals as objectionable as the status quo the essays in this volume are about five years old with the exception of the introductory piece by james dorn each was originally published elsewhere most originally appeared in the cato journal in 1983 sometimes the age of the essays shows careful analysis of federal reserve policy in 1981 82 was no doubt of topical interest when the essays were written but is less so now

on the flexibility of monetary policy the case of the optimal inflation tax this paper examines optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a context in which policy makers are able to make credible policy commitments we study an optimal taxation problem of minimizing the social cost of financing a stochastic and exogenous level of government transfers since in the basic model the welfare costs of inflation derive only from expected inflation the optimal monetary policy is highly responsive to the state of nature in a benchmark case in which all shocks are transitory the optimal policy calls for loading all the variability of government transfers on the shoulders of the inflation tax

time consistency of government financial policy in a small open economy this paper derives sufficient conditions for the time consistency of optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy results depend critically on the debt instruments used by the government if the government employs only conventional debt a sufficient condition for time consistency is that the optimal policy equalizes tax rates across periods if the government also issues consumption indexed debt the optimal policy can always be made time consistent by an appropriate mix of conventional and indexed debt for a specific example a simple rule for indexed debt management can be derived

optimal maturity of nominal government debt an infinite horizon model the role of debt maturity is analyzed in a framework that blends tax smoothing with time inconsistency of optimal policy when policymakers have an incentive to use unanticipated inflation to reduce the real value of nominal government liabilities three conclusions emerge 1 nominal debt leads policymakers to resort to inflation even though in equilibrium inflation collects no revenue 2 when under full precommitment the optimal policy calls for complete tax smoothing and a constant debt level the equilibrium policy without precommitment calls for anticipating tax collection and early debt repayment and 3 management of debt maturity is an essential component of the equilibrium policy copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

classifying monetary economics fields and methods from past to future we propose a simple yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics it comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields the elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness we rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large

the term structure of very short term rates new evidence for the expectations hypothesis abstract empirical researchers have frequently rejected the expectations hypothesis the expectations hypothesis however has seldom if ever been tested at the extreme short end of the term structure where maturities are measured in days or weeks using overnight weekly and monthly repo rates i find that term rates are almost unbiased estimates of the average overnight rate this evidence provides new support for the expectations hypothesis

on the optimal and best sustainable taxes in an open economy abstract we study a representative agent open economy in which government provided services that enter the domestic production function must be financed with distortionary taxes and focus on the optimal size of government and the associated optimal tax rate if the government can precommit its actions it maximizes individual welfare by announcing and implementing a constant tax rate which we refer to as the first best tax rate this tax rate is time inconsistent and under discretion the government implements a tax that maximizes each period s output which may be higher or lower than the first best rate depending on whether the elasticity of substitution in production between private and public inputs is below or above one in this paper we characterize the best sequence of tax rates that can be sustained through trigger strategies this best sustainable sequence of tax rates is constant and lies between the first best and discretionary extremes

sequential equilibria in a ramsey tax model this paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a ramsey tax model more generally it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households by selectively incorporating euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem

fiscal policy coordination and emu a dynamic game approach abstract this paper examines the case for fiscal policy coordination in a european economic and monetary union emu a two bloc model with two market structures is examined emu producing a single homogeneous good in both blocs emu1 and a two good emu emu2 where each bloc produces a single home good the european central bank sets monetary policy so as to achieve credibly low inflation rates we find that for emu2 as relative prices can change countries have an incentive to improve their terms of trade leading to an inefficient noncooperative outcome which can be avoided by cooperation

debt structure as an indicator of central bank independence kydland and prescott 8 demonstrated that as a government with discretion often has an incentive to deviate from previously announced policy the optimal policy under commitment is not time consistent under discretion moreover as the optimal time consistent policy under discretion usually leads to a welfare loss relative to the optimal policy under commitment social welfare can be increased by adopting a credible policy commitment since that finding many authors have examined how a carefully designed debt management strategy can serve as an effective means of commitment to low inflation for example persson persson and svensson 12 and calvo and guidotti 3 illustrate that by trading in nominal and indexed debt the government can eliminate its incentive to engineer inflationary surprises and thus increase social welfare in a rational discretion world in a somewhat related paper missale and blanchard 10 demonstrate how effective debt maturity can serve as a credible means of committing to no inflation 2 the above models of debt management as commitment to low inflation implicitly assume that the fiscal authority has access to the process of money creation when that is the case the optimal structure of government debt depends crucially on how that structure affects expectations of inflation however when the central bank is independent of the central government in the sense that money growth targets are set by the central bank and independently of the federal debt and deficits the expected rate of inflation will be unaffected by the debt management decision thus unlike a government with close ties to its central bank a government that does not control inflation will be able to choose the structure of its debt without affecting the expected rate of inflation this implies that the optimal debt management strategies for governments with and without independent central banks will differ and suggests that one can look at the particular structure of a given government s debt in order to obtain inferences about the state of its central bank s independence

the deflation bias and committing to being irresponsible i model deflation at zero nominal interest rate in a microfounded general equilibrium model i show that one can analyze deflation as a credibility problem if three conditions are satisfied first the government s only policy instrument is increasing the money supply by open market operations in short term bonds second the economy is subject to large negative demand shocks third the government cannot commit to future policy i call the credibility problem that arises under these conditions the deflation bias i propose several policies to solve it they all involve printing money or issuing nominal debt in addition they require cutting taxes buying real assets such as stocks or purchasing foreign exchange the government credibly commits to being irresponsible by pursuing these policies it commits to higher money supply in the future so that the private sector expects inflation instead of deflation this is optimal since it curbs deflation and increases output by lowering the real rate of return

the financial structure of government debt in oecd countries an examination of the time consistency issue abstract this paper analyzes the financial structure of government debt in the oecd countries from the perspective of time consistency problems with a focus on debt held by financial institutions testable implications from a theoretical time consistency model are derived and incorporated into the framework of a cost minimizing model for public debt service the approach is tested for a sample of 15 oecd countries over the period 1974 1989 the theoretical analysis and the empirical results show how in addition to maturity ownership of government debt in those oecd countries with debt accumulation problems can be related to time consistency considerations

on time inconsistency a technical issue in stackelberg differential games abstract stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied this paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue in particular we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature the issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained we show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases as a result our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 e62 h21

natural capital and sustainability abstract this paper develops and rigorously analyses a model describing the optimal use of natural capital in a utilitarian framework natural capital is treated as an aggregate including exhaustibles renewables and environmentals performing several functions it is found that it converges to a steady state in which it is kept constant by simultaneous investments and use

time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy abstract this paper characterizes conditions under which optimal monetary and fiscal policy is time consistent in a stylized small open economy with a flexible foreign exchange rate regime it shows that these conditions depend on the way in which leisure is assumed to enter preferences and or on the process which productivity is assumed to follow this paper further argues that these conditions may fail to be sufficient if the small open economy implements a fixed foreign exchange rate regime thus a credible fixed exchange rate regime does not necessarily help render optimal policy time consistent

the recursive core core allocations may be defined for infinite horizon capital accumulation models if agents cannot trust each other in the sense of gale then agents may renege on their commitments their decisions appear time inconsistent a core allocation is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period we show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract at any date it follows that if the proper distribution of the streams of capital is achieved then the allocation in the core is also in the recursive core the latter therefore forges a link between the distribution of wealth capital the problem of trust and time consistent intertemporal contracts

sustainable plans and debt abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal fiscal policy similar to that of lucas and stokey j monet econ 12 1983 55 93 except that we let the government default on its debt we consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we concentrate on trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the markov equilibrium after deviations by the government and show that such mechanisms cannot support equilibria with positive debt we go on to show by way of examples that there can be more complicated trigger mechanisms which support positive debt journal of economic literature classification numbers e61 e62

endogenous capital utilization investor s effort and optimal fiscal policy abstract the present paper studies the implications of endogenous capital utilization and investor s effort on the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal policy the main results are that levies of old capital are distortionary and should therefore not be used at confiscatory rates that in a steady state capital and labor income should be taxed at the same rate and investment should be subsidized at the same rate as the tax rate and that the optimal tax policy can be made time consistent through debt restructuring

time inconsistency capital mobility and debt restructuring in a small open economy honest government announcements may not be credible governments may have incentives to change their plans when it is time to carry them out or in technical terms the plans may be time inconsistent a dramatic example is the reaction to a hostage crisis governments should announce they will never negotiate with kidnappers to prevent future abductions after the fact however there are strong incentives to break this promise to save the lives of hostages of course intelligent people understand this so without commitment no one expects time inconsistent policies to be undertaken and in general this represents a welfare loss hostage crises occur as shown by kydland and prescott 1977 and calvo 1978 credibility is a problem in tax policy in general governments have an incentive to change tax rates unexpectedly for example to exploit differences between ex ante and ex post elasticities take the taxation of capital ex ante optimal taxes are low to promote elastically supplied investment ex post the supply of capital is inelastic so optimal taxes are high of course if governments can change tax rates at any time then in order to be credible tax plans should be consistent with future incentives as with a hostage crisis this constraint in general represents a welfare loss in a more subtle way the taxation of labor and consumption is also in general time inconsistent optimal tax rates depend on endowments initial plus acquired for example as a rule tax rates should be high on complements to leisure and other endowments that can be directly consumed in a dynamic economy endowments change when assets are accumulated