performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision abstract this paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends by lessening local information spill overs to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto correlation among local government expenditures it analyses local government expenditures on personal social services in the uk before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system sspr social services performance rating that would attribute a rating to each local authority the empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the sspr has reduced local yardstick competition

local government efficiency determinants and spatial interdependence we analyse the determinants of local government efficiency taking into account the presence of spatial interactions among neighbouring municipalities to do so first we estimate an efficiency inde

tax competition when governments lack commitment excess capacity as a countervailing threat consider a multinational firm that can produce for the world market from two countries in each country the firm has to make a costly ex ante investment in capacity after which each government chooses a tax rate and then the firm determines output levels if there were only one country there would be the standard timeinconsistency problem the government would set a confiscatory tax ex post the firm would realize this ex ante and no investment would be made the interesting point of this paper is that the situation is very different when there are two countries the firm invests in both countries so as to gain leverage ex post if the firm holds more capacity than is needed to meet world demand then this induces tax competition for capacity utilization among governments ex post because the firm can threaten to serve the market at least partially from a plant in a different country competition leads to low enough tax rates to justify the initial investment in excess capacity when capacity costs are sufficiently low when capacity costs are too high the firm will not invest at all as the standard timeinconsistency problem suggests thus the paper generates and combines tax competition and lack of government commitment within a single framework the above logic provides also a novel argument for becoming a multinational firm there is some evidence in support of the strategic use of excess capacity for example general motors gm announced it will build almost identical plants in several risky countries which allows gm to shift production easily at the same time the newly established capacity will probably exceed gm s sales another application is the problem of how multinationals export oil from the caspian sea the caspian sea is surrounded by politically unstable countries multinationals started to build and lobby for multiple pipelines through several countries in order to keep transit fees low these and other applications are discussed in more detail in section v the paper sheds new light on the relationship between multinational firms and host governments on the one hand a multinational firm can be viewed as the powerful agent in the relationship because the firm decides in which country to invest eager governments often offer substantial tax benefits in order to attract investment this view is underlying the literature on tax competition see for example john d wilson 1986 dan a black and william h hoyt 1989 ian king et al 1993 on the other hand and in a separate literature multinational firms are portrayed as the potential victims of host governments who may renege on tax promises after the firm has made a sunk investment and has become partially immobile see for example eric w bond and larry samuelson 1989 chris doyle and sweder van wijnbergen 1994 jonathan thomas and tim worrall 1994 hence the host government is the powerful agent and this may lead to underinvestment if anticipated by the firm 2 while both views capture elements of truth it is unsatisfactory that our understanding of the relationship seems to department of economics university of colorado boulder co 80309 e mail janeba colorado edu this research was undertaken while i was at indiana university in bloomington i am grateful to mike baye susanne janeba dave schmidt greg shaffer jay wilson and two anonymous referees as well as participants at the stanford institute for theoretical economics 1998 and workshop participants at the universities of bonn colorado indiana michigan munich pennsylvania state and toronto for very helpful comments the usual disclaimer applies l in a different context patrick j kehoe 1989 considers also tax competition after a private sector decision is made in his model however atomistic individuals decide on savings and cannot influence the degree of tax competition 2 it should be noted that in the second literature strand tax holidays are sometimes derived endogenously in an infinite horizon game tax holidays help overcome lack of commitment see for instance doyle and van wijnbergen 1994

value for money german local government efficiency in a comparative perspective in this article we investigate the cost efficiency of german local governments in the state of baden wurttemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach besides being the first study on german data we add two elements to the literature first we provide a comparative perspective allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature second unlike most previous studies we explicitly account for exogenous or nondiscretionary influences when estimating municipal efficiency scores the results suggest that disregarding such exogenous factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels particularly underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment

the role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition abstract in this paper we analyse the role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition our primary result is that increasing mobility of firms leads to increasing net tax revenues under plausible assumptions while enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition it weakens subsidy competition the resulting fall in government subsidy payments can overcompensate the decline in tax revenues leading to a rise in net tax revenues interestingly the opportunity costs of subsidy competition can rise along with net tax revenues we derive these conclusions in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to successive policy choices on taxes and subsidies

asymmetric competition among nation states a differential game approach abstract this paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country s economy in the context of international competition to that end we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries the model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision making than larger countries however we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services the model shows that the long term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility in particular we show that flexibility mitigates against but does not eliminate the likelihood of collapse in a small economy finally we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness

expansionary fiscal contractions evidence from panel data we examine the ability of the expansionary fiscal contraction efc hypothesis to explain the performance of oecd economies during fiscal crises we find some limited evidence in its favour if public consumption is reduced in response to a fiscal crisis as defined by a high level of debt private consumption does seem to increase however the size of the effect is smaller than that typically found in other studies furthermore the increase in private consumption is usually not sufficient to offset the direct effect of a reduction in public consumption on output fiscal contractions are not literally expansionary

citizen coproduction and efficient public good provision theory and evidence from local public libraries abstract in both public administration and economics efficiency is brought forward as an important criterion for evaluating administrative actions clearly its value as an assessment principle depends on our ability to adequately measure efficiency this article argues that citizen s coproduction in public services requires a careful reassessment of how we approach the measurement of productive efficiency in public service delivery theoretically we illustrate that using observable outcomes e g library circulation school results health outcomes fires extinguished and crimes solved as output indicators is inappropriate and leads to biased estimates of public service providers productive efficiency this bias arises because citizens co determine final outputs leaving them at least partly beyond the service providers control empirically we find supportive evidence of both the existence and importance of such demand induced bias

on the determinants of local government performance a two stage nonparametric approach abstract this article analyzes the efficiency of local governments in the comunitat valenciana spain and their main explanatory variables the analysis is performed in two stages firstly efficiency is measured via nonparametric activity analysis techniques specifically we consider both data envelopment analysis dea and free disposable hull fdh techniques the second stage identifies some critical determinants of efficiency focusing on both political and fiscal policy variables in contrast to previous two stage research studies our approach performs the latter attempt via nonparametric smoothing techniques rather than econometric methods such as ols or tobit related techniques results show that efficiency scores especially under the nonconvexity assumption fdh are higher for large municipalities thus there is empirical evidence to suggest that resources may be better allocated by large municipalities however the inefficiency found is not entirely attributable to poor management as second stage analysis reveals both fiscal and political variables to be explicably related to municipality performance moreover the explanatory variables impact on efficiency is robust to the chosen technique either convex dea or nonconvex fdh

the public sector and convergence with spatial interdependence empirical evidence from spain abstractwe propose a framework to analyse convergence between regions incorporating the public sector and technological knowledge spillovers in the context of a neoclassical growth model second we apply novel estimation methods pertaining to the spatial econometrics literature introducing a spatial durbin panel data model based on instrumental variables and maximum likelihood estimation our model makes it possible to analyse in terms of convergence the results obtained in spanish regions with the policies implemented during the period 1980 2011 the results support the idea that education and fiscal policies have a positive effect on regional development and cohesion therefore we can conclude that it is possible to obtain better results for regional convergence with higher rates of public investment in education and tax revenues we also obtain interesting results that confirm the existence of spillover effects in economic growth and public policies identifying their magnitude and significance

competition in the political arena and local government performance competition reduces rent extraction in private sector firms in this article we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local level governments performance in flanders the results indicate that electoral competition measured via the number of parties competing in elections significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy intertemporal competition measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time has a similar but weaker positive effect these beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments which is shown to work against their productive efficiency overall though the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample

is ireland really the role model for austerity this paper describes the causes and consequences of ireland s economic crisis in the context of the policy solution implemented to contain that crisis protracted fiscal austerity i describe the causes of the recent crisis in ireland and look at the logic of austerity with a simple model i compare the current crisis to the crisis of the 1980s when fiscal austerity was touted as the trigger for the celtic tiger i discuss the measures implemented to date in the current crisis tracing their effects on sectors of ireland s macroeconomy i show that ireland is not the role model for austerity policies

non parametric analysis of multi output production with joint inputs we focus on analysing cost minimising production behaviour in multi output settings we distinguish between two approaches for modelling the use of joint inputs the cooperative approach assumes cost minimisation at the aggregate firm level while the non cooperative approach assumes cost minimisation at the level of the individual output division our framework extends the existing non parametric framework for analysing single output production an empirical application to the english and welsh drinking water and sewerage sector shows the practical usefulness of our framework specifically we compare the empirical validity of the cooperative and non cooperative models for describing the observed production behaviour

the impact of government debt on private consumption in oecd countries abstract this paper establishes a non linear relationship between private consumption and government debt in oecd countries with high government debt a fiscal expansion is partly crowded out by a fall in private consumption in contrast in low debt countries private consumption is insensitive to changes in government debt thus fiscal policy is less effective in stabilising business cycle fluctuations at higher levels of government debt

expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions empirical evidence from local governments in spain abstract the paper presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure policies we identify and test for two different types of expenditure spillovers i benefit spillovers arising from the provision of local public goods and ii crowding spillovers arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions benefit spillovers are accounted for by assuming that the representative resident enjoys the consumption of a local public good in both his own community and in those surrounding it crowding spillovers are included by considering that a locality s consumption level is influenced by the population living in the surrounding localities we estimate a reaction function with interactions between local governments occurring not only between expenditure levels but also between neighbors populations and expenditures the equation is estimated using data on more than 2500 spanish local governments for the year 1999 the results show that both types of spillovers are relevant

searching for non linear effects of fiscal policy evidence from industrial and developing countries several recent studies suggest that the response of national saving to scal policy may be non linear in this paper we use two data sets to search for the circumstances in which such non linear response may arise a sample of oecd countries already used in previous studies and a sample of developing countries using more recent world bank data we nd that in both samples non linear e ects tend to be associated with large and persistent scal impulses in the oecd sample the non linearity of the response is stronger for scal contractions than for expansions an increase in net taxes has no e ect on national saving during large scal contractions while it has a positive e ect in less pronounced contractions high or rapidly growing public debt does not appear to be a good predictor of non linear e ects in the world bank sample of developing countries non linearities in the response national saving to scal policy are not limited to large scal contractions and also tend to occur in periods in which debt is accumulating rapidly regardless of its initial level 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation e21 e62 h31

the importance of government commitment in attracting firms a dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy abstract agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition this paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms most of the previous studies on tax competition in the new economic geography framework employ static models in this study two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies it is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run specifically if governments find each others tax policies credible then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant if policies are not credible both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force

road tax interactions among local governments a spatial panel data analysis of the french case over the period 1984 2000 abstractthis article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments via an indirect local tax on vehicles such as th

revealed yardstick competition local government efficiency patterns in norway this paper investigates whether the production efficiency of norwegian local governments exhibits a spatial pattern that is compatible with the hypothesis of yardstick competition in order to check whether yardstick competition is really responsible for the observed spatial pattern and rule out alternative theoretical explanations the paper exploits unique information from a survey on local politicians attitudes towards comparative evaluation of local bureaus performances against other jurisdictions benchmarking merging the latter information with the observed interdependence in efficiency the paper provides evidence that comparative performance evaluation generates positive spatial auto correlation in local efficiency indicators

market size and tax competition abstract with international externalities different country sizes imperfect competition and trade costs tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency enhancing with respect to the free market outcome under both scenarios the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough otherwise only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms

strategic fiscal interaction across borders evidence from french and german local governments along the rhine valley abstract this article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments across national borders we use panel data for the french and german municipalities in the rhine valley for the period 2000 2007 the local governments of each country influence firms overall tax burdens but the tax instruments available at the local level differ we estimate panel models that distinguish between the effects of competing municipalities belonging to the same country and belonging to the other country our empirical model shows that local jurisdictions along borders choose their business tax rates based on those of their domestic neighbors and that foreign fiscal policy does not have an impact on the local domestic tax setting behavior in these contexts

public spending interactions and local politics empirical evidence from french municipalities this paper aims at testing whether there exist spending interactions between french municipalities by estimating a dynamic panel data model our results suggest that there are some interactions between neighbouring municipalities as regards primary and investment expenditures a positive relationship between municipalities wage bill and un employment rates is likely to stress a rise of temporary employment in those municipalities that suffer from social troubles further the estimation results show that these interdepen dences also exist between cities whose mayors have the same partisan affiliation finally our results confirm the opportunistic behaviour of local governments which increase all categories of public spending in pre electoral periods

capacity investment preemption and commitment in an infinite horizon model the commitment value of capacity is analyzed in an infinite horizon duopoly model the paper focuses on the role of alternative behavioral assumptions about the ability of firms to commit to investment paths each firm s investment strategy in a feedback nash equilibrium is shown to be a decreasing function of its rival s current capacity this creates an incentive for a firm to expand its capacity to preempt subsequent rival investment in a precommitment equilibrium there are no incentives to invest preemptively as a consequence steady state capacity levels are greater in a feedback nash equilibrium than in a precommitment equilibrium copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

fiscal policy in good times and bad in the 1980s several countries with large government debt or deficit implemented substantial and in some cases drastic deficit cuts contrary to widespread expectations in many cases private consumption boomed rather than contracted this paper shows that in times of fiscal stress shocks to government revenues and especially expenditure have very different effects on private consumption than in normal times

developing by borrowing inter jurisdictional competition land finance and local debt accumulation in china although the investment oriented development model for economic growth adopted by chinese governments has generated spectacular results the risks of debt financed urbanisation and economic development have recently become evident in mounting local debts that are undermining the financial system triggering concerns with respect to local governments indebtedness financial stability and sovereign risk in china in this paper we portray the uneven spatial and temporal dynamics of local government debt in china and examine the ways in which it is intertwined with institutional political and economic factors our analysis shows that while global and national economic conditions have resulted in a dramatic increase in local government debt particularly in the late 2000s and the early 2010s the spatial variation of local debt accumulation in china could be partly explained by two institutional factors land finance and inter jurisdictional competition we argue that the behaviour of local governments may

public sector efficiency the roles of political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether efficiency in public service provision is affected by political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation in order to address this issue we take advantage of a new global efficiency measure for norwegian local governments we find that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency in addition there is some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency while a centralized top down budgetary procedure is associated with low efficiency

nominal interest rates consumption booms and lack of credibility a quantitative examination abstract exchange rate based stabilization programs in chronic inflation countries have often been accompanied by an initial expansion of private consumption followed by a contraction this consumption cycle has been attributed to lack of credibility in the sense that the public views the reduction in the devaluation rate as temporary this paper assesses the quantitative relevance of the temporariness hypothesis by comparing the predictions of a simple model to the actual figures for seven major programs the paper concludes that nominal interest rates must fall substantially for the temporariness hypothesis to account for an important fraction of the observed consumption booms

explaining differences in productive efficiency an application to belgian municipalities the purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in belgium technical efficiency is evaluated using a non parametric method based on the free disposal hull fdh reference technology we first calculate input output and graph farrell efficiency measures for a cross section of all 589 belgian municipalities in a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment

short and long term evaluation of efficiency and quality an application to spanish municipalities this article analyses efficiency and quality levels in spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of the data envelopment analysis methodology it aims to discover to what extent inefficiency arises from both quality considerations and external factors beyond the organization s control or alternatively how much inefficiency is due to inadequate resource management as a component of inadequate resource management we test the existence of political budgetary cycles in the temporal evolution of inefficiencies the results show that on the whole there is still a wide margin within which local government efficiency and quality levels could be increased although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous or noncontrollable factors in particular it has been found that the size of the municipality the per capita tax revenue the per capita grants and the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors related with local government effici

trigger points and budget cuts explaining the effects of fiscal austerity we propose and solve an optimizing model which explains counterintuitive effects of fiscal policy in terms of expectations if government spending follows an upward trending stochastic process which the public believes may fall sharply when it reaches specific trigger points then optimizing consumption behavior and simple budget constraint arithmetic imply a nonlinear relationship between private consumption and government spending this theoretical relation is consistent with the experience of several countries jel e62 e21 textbook aggregate demand models suggest simple relationships between the government budget and economic activity a cut in the government deficit for example depressing consumption and output though such models heavily influence the design of stabilization policies their micro foundations are unclear and their sharp predictions are not always consistent with reality in many countries large cuts in government spending carried out as part of stabilization programs have led to expansions rather than contractions in economic activity the absence of simple relationships be