preserving religious identity through education economic analysis and evidence from the us abstract this paper models the decision of religious parents to send their children to private religious schools as reflecting their desire to shield their children from external influences and thus preserve their religious identity it follows that when the share of the minority in the local population grows and outside influences become less threatening the demand for separate religious schooling among the members of the religious group decreases this pattern implies concavity in the relationship between enrollment in private and religious schooling and the share of the religious group in the population we present empirical evidence from united states county data on catholic and private school enrollment that strongly supports our theory the paper contributes to a better understanding of the demand for religious education

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

redistributing income under proportional representation although majoritarian decision rules are the norm in legislatures relatively few democracies use simple majority rule at the electoral stage adopting instead some form of multiparty proportional representation moreover aggregate data suggest that average income tax rates are higher and distributions of posttax income flatter in countries with proportional representation than in those with majority rule while there are other differences between these countries this paper explores how variations in the political system per se influence equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions a three party proportional representation model is developed in which taxes are determined through legislative bargaining among successful electoral parties and the economic decision for individuals is occupational choice political economic equilibria for this model and for a two party winner take all majoritarian system are derived and compared

the economic effects of constitutions replicating and extending persson and tabellini persson and tabellini the economic effects of constitutions the mit press cambridge 2003 show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects here the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used in replicating and extending their analyses we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely with regard to electoral systems the original results are largely confirmed majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker the institutional details such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size are particularly important

local versus central wage bargaining with endogenous investments investment behavior may depend on whether wage bargaining takes place centrally or locally at the firm level the outcome of the wage bargain will in turn depend on previous investments ignoring other differences between the two bargaining regimes endogenous investments imply that wages are lower and profits higher under local wage bargaining than under central bargaining this does not necessarily imply that employment is highest under local bargaining since investments may differ in the two cases with a nash bargaining solution however reasonable assumptions imply that employment is highest under local wage bargaining

organizational determinants of wage moderation this article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000 it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others the authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other s wage dampening effect through case studies of ireland and italy the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance process

constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes we investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies we rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference due to non random selection of these constitutional rules the findings are consistent with our theoretical priors presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections

electoral systems and public spending we study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in oecd and latin american countries we emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services which are easier to target geographically and transfers which are easier to target across social groups we present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer public good spending in proportional majoritarian systems the model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional majoritarian systems when the share of transfer spending is high low after dee ning rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation we e nd considerable support for our predictions

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

the economic effects of direct democracy a first global assessment this is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a cross country basis we find that total spending as well as spending on welfare is lower in countries with mandatory referendums consistent with the previous literature but we also find that countries with national initiatives appear to spend more and be more corrupt finally budget deficits government effectiveness productivity and happiness appear unrelated to direct democracy institutional detail thus matters a great deal in general the effects of direct democratic institutions become stronger if the frequency of their actual use is taken into account effects are usually stronger in countries with weak democracies

the educational and professional background of central bankers and its effect on inflation an empirical analysis we assume that central banks can control inflation so that inflation rates reflect the preferences of the central bank council the hypothesis to be tested is that these preferences depend on the central bankers educational and or professional background in a panel data analysis for the euro area and eleven countries since 1973 we explain inflation either by the weights with which the educational and professional characteristics of the 391 council members were represented in the various central bank councils or by the education or profession of the median council members control variables are added using professional background weights we find that former members of the central bank staff and in some specifications former insurance executives commercial bankers other businessmen and public servants prefer significantly lower inflation rates than former union leaders and politicians do in the median voter analysis former central bankers commercial bankers businessmen and public servants are also significantly more inflation averse than economic scholars as for the education of the council members our results are less robust however if the median member of the central bank council has studied business the inflation rate is significantly lower than if she has studied economics taking educational and professional background together central banks seem to attract or produce primarily economists who are monetary conservatives whereas keynesian economists are more prominent in academia jel classification e42 e58

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

does school quality matter returns to education and the characteristics of public schools in the united states this paper estimates the effects of school quality measured by the pupil teacher ratio average term length and relative teacher pay on the rate of return to education for men born between 1920 and 1949 using earnings data from the 1980 census we find that men who were educated in states with higher quality schools have a higher return to additional years of schooling rates of return are also higher for individuals from states with better educated teachers and with a higher fraction of female teachers holding constant school quality measures however we find no evidence that parental income or education affects average state level rates of return

labour market regulation industrial relations and technological regimes a tale of comparative advantage in this paper we present comparative evidence from oecd countries concerning the impact of labour market institutions and regulations on technological specialization the interplay between the degree of labour market flexibility the system of industrial relations and the knowledge base of different industries determines the viability of different human resource strategies thereby shaping the patterns of comparative advantage our empirical results show that countries with coordinated industrial relations systems and strict employment protection tend to specialize in industries with a cumulative knowledge base we argue that two mechanisms explain these patterns the larger the scope for resorting to internal labour markets the lower the adjustment costs imposed by labour market regulation furthermore employment protection and coordinated industrial relations regimes by aligning workers and firms bjectives encourage firm sponsored training as well as the accumulation of firm specific competencies allowing firms to fully exploit the potential of the internal labour market copyright 2002 oxford university press

institutions and performance in european labour markets taking a fresh look at evidence this paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new empirical eu based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market adjustment although the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements as a consequence the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels although empirical evidence does not show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of the economic and monetary union and the creation of the euro the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and increasing labour market adjustment

constitutions politics and economics a review essay on persson and tabellini s the economic effects of constitutions in this essay i review the new book by torsten persson and guido tabellini the economic effects of constitutions which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules i also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy

do businessmen make good governors this paper evaluates the economic performance of u s state governors with a business background chief executive officer ceo governors applying a matching method i find first that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain second the tenures of ceo governors are associated with a 0 5 percentage points pp higher annual income growth rate a 0 4 pp higher growth rate of the private capital stock and a 0 6 pp lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non ceo governors state level income inequality is not affected by ceo governors holding office indicating that low income households benefit from the economic upswing

the political economy of school choice linking theory and evidence abstract we derive an improved methodology for linking theoretical parameters of a political economy model of school choice to empirical values estimated by regressing local private enrollment shares on mean income the median to mean ratio religious and ethnic composition and other variables this leads us to reject the commonly maintained assumption that a coalition of ends against the middle determines local school funding and to conclude instead that the median income voter is decisive it also allows us to estimate the perceived relative efficiency advantage of private schooling which we find to be about 30 at the margin

governmental structure trustee selection and public university prices and spending multiple means to similar ends estimate the effects of multiple instruments for exercising political control over public university prices and spending i find that public universities located in states with governmental structures that enhance political control and universities whose trustees are selected by nonacademic stakeholders charge significantly lower prices than universities located in states with decentralized systems

institutions and economic performance evidence from the labour market the institutional determinants of economic performance is analyzed taking european labor market institutions as a case in point european economic growth after the second world war was based on fordist technologies a setting to which the continent s institutions of solidaristic wage bargaining were ideally suited they eased distributive conflicts and delivered wage moderation which in turn supported high investment the wage compression that was a corollary of their operation was of little consequence so long as the dominant technologies were such that firms could rely on a relatively homogeneous labor force but as fordism gave way to diversified quality production which relied more on highly skilled workers the centralization of bargaining and the compression of wages became impediments rather than aids to growth assuming that growth will rely even more in the future on rapidly changing science based skilled labor intensive technologies countries with centralized labor market institutions will have to move still further in the direction of decentralization whether europe in particular can accommodate these demands will help to determine whether it is able to re establish a full employment economy in the twenty first century

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

endogenous constitutions politics and politicians matter economic outcomes don t abstract we study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions for a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950 2006 we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951 2000 for 146 countries we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system internal and external political conflicts and political leaders whereas economic and socio demographic variables do not matter

private and public choices in public education an investigation of trustee effects the paper applies the concepts of the horizon problem agency costs monitoring and special interest incentives to trustee management of public schools and higher education we examine whether south carolina s 1984 education improvement act a major restructuring of educational organization and spending in south carolina is related to the ratio of pupils in private versus public schools we employ 30 years of county level data in south carolina and we uncover several things there is no statistically credible relation between public school expenditures per pupil and the private school public school enrollment ratio however we do find that the directed changes in rules organizational structure and incentives mandated by the 1984 educational improvement act are associated with a reduction in the relative number of children attending private school we interpret this to mean that the features of the law requiring better accountability and the like were perceived by parents to make for better education while the increased money spent was only a transfer to teachers or some other groups we find that organization matters more than money

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

good and bad institutions is the debate over cross country firm level evidence from the textile industry using firm level data from nine developing countries we demonstrate that certain institutions like restrictive labour market regulations that are considered bad for economic growth might be beneficial for production efficiency whereas good business environment which is considered beneficial for economic growth might have an adverse impact on production efficiency we argue that our results suggest that there might be significant difference in the macro and micro impacts of institutional quality such that the classification of institutions into good and bad might be premature

school quality and black white relative earnings a direct assessment the wage differential between black and white men fell from 40 percent in 1960 to 25 percent in 1980 it has been argued that this convergence reflects improvements in the relative quality of black schools to test this hypothesis we assembled data on pupil teacher ratios annual teacher pay and term length for black and white schools in the eighteen segregated states from 1915 to 1966 these data are linked to estimated returns to education for southern born men from different cohorts and states in 1960 1970 and 1980 improvements in the relative quality of black schools explain 20 percent of the narrowing of the black white earnings gap between 1960 and 1980

pathology of path dependency the ilo and the challenge of new governance using archival sources the authors study strategic and organizational change in the international labour organization ilo over the last twenty years they focus specifically on the ilo s efforts to incorporate certain elements of the new governance model into its policies and organizational practices which include the shift from standards expressed as detailed legal norms to soft law the active involvement of civil society organizations other than trade unions and employer associations in regulatory activities and the introduction of quantitative indicators of compliance with labor standards they argue that the efforts of the ilo leadership have been waylaid by the organization s corporatist structure which gives employer associations and trade unions veto power over policy developments at a time in which these actors are increasingly unable to agree on concrete policy measures finally the authors ask whether this corporatist structure accurately reflects the ilo s self defined mission prov

the melting pot and school choice abstract in the united states parents are offered free public education in the mainstream culture but must pay the full cost of tuition if they educate their children privately this creates strong economic incentives for remaining within the public system which promotes the assimilation of minorities a pareto improvement can be achieved by subsidizing private education in exchange for modifying its social content so as to reduce polarization popular opposition to voucher programs that facilitate school choice without regulating cultural content may partly reflect voters concerns that such programs threaten to erode the common ground created by public education

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

how do migration and remittances affect human capital investment the effects of relaxing information and liquidity constraints abstractthis article explores the heterogeneous effects of the migration remittance process on the educational attainment of nepalese children the results suggest that when controlling for remittances the children of more educated or informed parents suffer from parental absence while the children of less informed parents gain from migration implying that the migration experience helps less educated parents estimate the value of and returns to education more precisely the results also suggest that remittances help severely credit constrained households enrol their children in school and prevent dropouts these remittances help households that face less severe liquidity constraints increase their investment in quality education