upward pricing pressure in two sided markets measuring upward pricing pressure upp has recently been proposed by farrell and shapiro 2010 as an alternative screening device for horizontal mergers we extend the concept of upp to two sided markets examples of such markets are the newspaper market where the demand for advertising is related to the number of readers and the market for online search where advertising demand depends on the number of users the formulae we derive depend on four sets of diversion ratios that can either be estimated using market level demand data or elicited in surveys in an application we show that it is important to take the two sidedness of the market into account when evaluating upp

the energy ladder theoretical myth or empirical truth results from a meta analysis abstract modern fuels are an important enabler of social and economic development still over 2 billion people rely on traditional biomass for their daily energy needs to overcome the negative effects of traditional energy on human health and the environment and to enhance the livelihood conditions of the poor a transition towards cleaner and more efficient forms of energy is needed understanding household fuel choice and fuel switching behaviour is of vital importance in search for policies to support such a transition process this paper adds to the existing energy transition literature in two ways first we provide a novel conceptual framework to analyze the decision environment underlying energy and fuel choices second we apply this framework in a meta analysis of existing choice models investigating energy switching and stacking behaviour in urban and rural areas in developing countries the meta analysis shows that socio economic household characteristics appear to receive most attention so far in identifying groups of fuel users while relatively little information is available on the impact of the external decision context on household energy choices

household fuelwood demand and supply in nepal s tarai and mid hills choice between cash outlays and labor opportunity abstract subsistence households are a leading source of deforestation and their consumption of fuelwood in particular is important in many developing countries yet the empirical economic examinations of fuelwood consumption are sparse particularly for rural areas where the deforestation occurs and we would argue that forest policy is often designed without a good understanding of the potential responses of subsistence households to the new policy this paper addresses these issues with household evidence from the two major populated regions of nepal market prices labor opportunities the availability of substitutes and measure of access to the basic resource are the most reliable predictive variables for fuelwood consumption and production there are however regional differences and important distinctions between the elasticities of fuelwood collecting or purchasing households with respect to these predictive variables the difference between collecting and purchasing households is notable it recommends forestry policies that target the labor opportunity and the physical resource in regions where collecting households dominate and policies that affect the fuelwood market itself in regions where purchasing households are important a second interesting finding is that fuelwood is relatively scarcer prices are higher in the mid hills and both collecting and purchasing households in this region are beginning to respond to deforestation by using their own land for fuelwood production

price coherence and excessive intermediation suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary s technology we develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates with this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary we show that this leads to inflated retail prices excessive adoption of the intermediaries services over investment in benefits to buyers and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise we discuss applications to payment card systems travel reservation systems rebate services and various other intermediaries jel codes d40 l11 l14 l42

migration and fuel use in rural mexico many households in developing countries rely on renewable natural resources as their main source of energy collecting and burning firewood requires a considerable amount of time has negative health consequences and can cause deforestation and depletion of local resources if forests are not properly managed a transition from traditional to modern fuels can benefit households by reducing these negative effects migration a quintessential feature of development may facilitate this transition but its impacts on fuel choice are theoretically ambiguous it can reduce the household labor available for firewood collection and provide cash to purchase substitutes however it has an income effect that changes the demand for home cooked food and energy to cook it firewood or gas could be used to meet the increase in energy demand to resolve this theoretical ambiguity we use an instrumental variables method with household panel data from rural mexico and investigate the impact of mexico to us migration and remittances on gas expenditures and household labor allocated to firewood collection sending a migrant to the united states causes a significant decrease in reliance on firewood collection and an increase in both stove and gas purchases these findings have potentially far reaching environmental implications as labor moves off the farm

a survey of agricultural household models recent findings and policy implications semicommercial farms that produce multiple crops make up a large part of the agricultural sector in developing economies these farms or agricultural households combine two fundamental units of microeconomic analysis the household and the firm traditional economic theory has dealt with these units seperately but in developing economies in which peasant farms dominate their interdependence is of crucial importance researchers have developed models of agricultural households that combine producer and consumer behavior in a theoretically consistent fashion recent empirical applications of these models have extended them and expanded the range of policy issues which can be investigated using this general framework this article reports the results of empirical applications of this model in india indonesia japan the republic of korea malaysia nigeria senegal sierra leone taiwan and thailand it provides a comparative analysis of the policy implications of the approach for such matters as the welfare of farm households the size of marketed surplus the demand for nonagricultural goods and services and for hired labor and the availability of budget revenues and foreign exchange

mobile termination network externalities and consumer expectations we re examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and o net calls or when subscription demand is elastic this literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase this is puzzling since in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators this puzzle is resolved when consumers expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as defined by katz and shapiro aer 1985 instead of being responsive to non equilibrium prices as assumed until now

agricultural household models extensions applications and policy this book presents the basic model of an agricultural household that underlies most of the case studies undertaken so far the model assumes that households are price takers and is therefore recursive the decisions modeled include those affecting production and the demand for inputs and those affecting consumption and the supply of labor comparative results on selected elasticities are presented for a number of economies the empirical significance of the approach is demonstrated in a comparison of models that treat production and consumption decisions separately and those in which the decisionmaking process is recursive the book summarizes the implications of agricultural pricing policy for the welfare of farm households marketed surplus the demand for nonagricultural goods and services the rural labor market budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings in addition it is shown that the basic model can be extended in order to explore the effects of government policy on crop composition nutritional status health saving and investment and to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the effects on budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings methodological topics primarily the data requirements of the basic model and its extensions along with aggregation market interaction uncertainty and market imperfections are discussed the most important methodological issues the question of the recursive property of these models is also discussed

trading volume and asset liquidity since the depth and liquidity of a market depend on the entry decisions of all potential participants each trader assesses them according to conjectures about entry by others if trade is equally costly across markets this externality leads to the concentration of trade on one market if not it can produce multiple conjectural equilibria some where trade concentrates on one market and others where large traders resort to a separate market or to search for a trading partner while fragmentation is welfare reducing in the two market case no such ranking is possible if it involves off exchange search

how important is selection experimental vs non experimental measures of the income gains from migration measuring the gain in income from migration is complicated by non random selection of migrants from the general population making it difficult to obtain an appropriate comparison group of non migrants this paper uses a migrant lottery to overcome this problem providing an experimental measure of the income gains from migration new zealand allows a quota of tongans to immigrate each year with a lottery to choose among the excess number of applicants a unique survey conducted by the authors in these two countries allows experimental estimates of the income gains from migration by comparing the incomes of migrants to those who applied to migrate but whose names were not drawn in the lottery after allowing for the effect of non compliance among some of those whose names were drawn the authors also conducted a survey of individuals who did not apply for the lottery comparing this non applicant group with the migrants enables assessment of the degree to which non experimental methods can provide an unbiased estimate of the income gains from migration they find evidence of migrants being positively selected in terms of both observed and unobserved skills as a result non experimental methods are found to overstate the gains from migration by 9 to 82 percent a good instrumental variable works best while difference in differences and bias adjusted propensity score matching also perform comparatively well

negative intra group externalities in two sided markets two types of agents interact on a pre existing free platform agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type we ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit we show that this might be impossible if intra group negative externalities are sufficiently but not too strong with respect to positive inter group externalities

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

two sided markets with pecuniary and participation externalities the existing literature on two sided markets addresses participation externalities but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms in this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities in our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising and offer consumers a service free of charge such as a tv program that is financed through advertising we show that advertising can exhibit the properties of a strategic substitute or complement surprisingly there exist cases in which platforms benefit from market entry moreover we show that from a welfare point of view perfect competition is not always desirable

how much is a dollar worth tipping versus equilibrium coexistence on competing online auction sites theory models of platform competition predict that prices and buyer seller ratios should be approximately equal on coexisting auction sites using field experiments on ebay and yahoo auctions we find evidence that is inconsistent with equilibrium hypotheses and suggest that the market is tipping prices on ebay are consistently 20 70 percent higher than those on yahoo and ebay attracts two additional buyers per seller on yahoo prices and bidders counts are unaffected by the auction ending rule various differences between the sites cannot account for the magnitude of these disparities however a model of imitation dynamics can rationalize our findings

urban household energy use in tanzania prices substitutes and poverty abstract this paper presents the findings of the tanzanian urban household energy survey undertaken as part of the tanzania urban energy project household energy use varies by income group according to local fuel availability considerable differences between the marginal costs of supplying fuels and market prices paid by consumers have led to major misallocations of resources when the results of this survey are compared to the results of the 1987 household energy survey a significant shift by households toward kerosene and electricity away from fuelwood charcoal and lpg is shown to have taken place these shifts toward modern fuels are consistent with the claims of the households in the 1990 survey and can largely be explained by fuel prices finally an assessment of the lifeline tariff and the kerosene cross subsidy demonstrate that the latter is a more effective method of ensuring the basic energy needs of the urban and rural poor

from linear fuel switching to multiple cooking strategies a critique and alternative to the energy ladder model abstract promoting sustainable development requires evaluating the technical and policy options that will facilitate the adoption and use of energy efficient and less polluting cooking stoves and practices the transition from traditional to modern fuels and devices has been explained by the energy ladder model that suggests that with increasing affluence a progression is expected from traditional biomass fuels to more advanced and less polluting fuels in this paper we evaluate the energy ladder model utilizing data from a four year 1992 96 case study of a village in mexico and from a large scale survey from four states of mexico we show that an alternate multiple fuel model of stove and fuel management based on the observed pattern of household accumulation of energy options rather than the simple progression depicted in the traditional energy ladder scenario more accurately depicts cooking fuel use patterns in rural households the multiple fuel model integrates four factors demonstrated to be essential in household decision making under conditions of resource scarcity or uncertainty a economics of fuel and stove type and access conditions to fuels b technical characteristics of cookstoves and cooking practices c cultural preferences and d health impacts this model also allows better estimates of the expected fuelwood demand and indoor air pollution in rural households

dynamic competition with network externalities why history matters we consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network exter nalities a platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes focal in the current period in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists yet when faced with higher quality competition can a low quality platform remain focal in the finite horizon case the unique equilibrium is efficient for patient platforms with an infinite time horizon however there are multiple equilibria where either the lowor high quality platform dominates if qualities are stochastic the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability even when its realized quality is lower and this probability increases as platforms become more patient hence social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking

competing by restricting choice the case of search platforms we show that a two sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice we develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other starting from these microfoundations we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side agents resolve the trade off between these competing effects differently depending on their outside options for agents with high outside options the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect leading them to prefer an unrestricted choice platform the opposite is the case for agents with low outside options who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice as

nepali fuelwood production and consumption regional and household distinctions substitution and successful intervention this article uses household data from nepal s two major populated regions and 27 of 59 districts within those regions to examine fuelwood consumption and production in contrast with a purely market assessment household analysis includes production which is consumed in the producing household the household regressions yield coefficients and elasticities that are very different from and more reliable than a comparable assessment of market demand and supply household results generally support the hypotheses that expenditures on fuelwood are a small share of total household activity and that fuelwood is not sufficiently scarce to alter household behaviour fuelwood is sufficiently scarce however to alter behaviour for those households in the hill region that do not participate in market exchange these households may be the best targets for public market interventions designed to alter fuelwood supply and deforestation

transforming rural economies migration income generation and inequality in rural mexico abstract we analyse how migration shapes the distribution and sources of rural income using nationally representative panel data from mexico income source gini decompositions provide some support for the migration diffusion hypothesis nevertheless migration s influence on other income sources and household re ranking substantially alter distributional impacts we find significant impacts of migration on non remittance income as well as changes in the effects of non migration activities on inequality over time we conclude that migration is transforming rural economies in ways that go beyond the scope of most past research on migration and inequality

spatial patterns of market participation and resource extraction fuelwood collection in northern uganda while distance to markets is a key determinant of market participation for households that are dependent on natural resources the distance to the resource stock is also essential thus a household s location with respect to markets and the resource stock determines household market participation and associated resource degradation applying a discrete choice framework for fuelwood collection in a developing country we characterize the spatial pattern of market participation regimes and forest use all else being equal autarkic households are closest to the forest and furthest from the market buyer households are closest to the market and furthest from the forest and seller households are at intermediate distances empirical tests based on survey data from northern uganda support the predictions from our theoretical model our findings have important implications for understanding the spatial patterns of forest degradation and determining the control group when designing impact evaluations of the effectiveness of development and conservation interventions

tying and freebies in two sided markets abstract in two sided markets where platforms are constrained to set non negative prices tying can be deployed by platforms as a tool to introduce implicit subsidies for a monopoly this raises participation and benefits consumers on both sides in a duopoly tying on one side makes a platform more or less competitive on the other side depending on externalities tying may not be ex ante optimal while the competing platform may benefit from it the impact on consumers surplus depends on whether competition is softened or intensified on the profitable side moreover tying increases total welfare if network effects are strong

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

lessons about markets from the internet many of us have grown used to tired of and finally downright skeptical of claims of the transformative powers of the internet it was to usher in the new economy but we seem mostly to have the old it would transform retail but toys r us has outlasted etoys frictionless commerce would be the norm but plenty of friction still exists the internet was also claimed to require a whole new economics with all new laws while this too was very far from the truth existing theories have mostly done quite well the internet has had a substantial effect on economic thought in this paper we discuss some ways in which the internet has affected how economists think about markets

when do markets tip a cognitive hierarchy approach the market structure of platform competition is critically important to managers and policy makers network effects in these markets predict concentrated industry structures whereas competitive effects and differentiation suggest the opposite standard theory offers little guidance full rationality models have multiple equilibria with wildly varying market concentration we relax full rationality in favor of a boundedly rational cognitive hierarchy model even small departures from full rationality allow sharp predictions there is a unique equilibrium in every case when participants single home and platforms are vertically differentiated a single dominant platform emerges multihoming can give rise to a strong weak market structure one platform is accessed by all and the other is used as a backup by some agents horizontal differentiation in contrast leads to fragmentation differentiation rather than competitive effects mainly determines market structure

switching costs in two sided markets in many markets there are switching costs and network effects yet the literature gen erally deals with these two concepts separately this paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction effects or indirect bargain in a dynamic two sided market i show that in a symmetric equilibrium the classic result that the first period price is u shape in switching costs does not emerge but instead switching costs always intensify first period price competition moreover an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first period price on the other side thus policies that ignore these effects may underestimate the welfare enhancing effects of switching costs

platform competition and seller investment incentives many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for profit platforms which charge buyers and sellers for access what is the effect of for profit intermediation on seller investment incentives since for profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for profit platforms however we show that for profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and thus access prices we characterize the effect of for profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes

private contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract this paper considers the efficacy of divide and conquer strategies in principal agent games involving contracting with externalities we find that whereas divide and conquer offers can arise in equilibrium under some conditions when the principal s offers are publicly observable they cannot arise in equilibrium when the principal s offers are privately observable and the agents hold passive out of equilibrium beliefs this insight applies to technology and platform adoption decisions with network effects labor relations settlement negotiations and input licensing among others

reassessing the energy ladder household energy use in maun botswana abstract in the context of sub saharan africa s rapid urbanization improved insight into urban energy use is increasingly important based on the predictions of energy transition theory a regional shift from biomass to modern fuels has long been expected to occur in tandem with urban growth however trends observed in the region s towns and cities have often not followed such patterns and fuelwood continues to be important in most areas this paper examines the practical relevance of transition theory using a recent case study conducted by the authors in maun botswana and results previously reported in the literature it finds that despite the long term link between socio economic development and increased modern fuel consumption at the national scale the notion of transition does not accurately reflect ongoing energy use patterns at lower levels of aggregation this is chiefly because its model of household fuel switching largely dismisses the importance of active and strategic decision making by urban consumers and their responsiveness to structural factors such as relative fuel prices as the botswana case illustrates this weakness can significantly distort expectations and policies around urban fuelwood use

mixed bundling in two sided markets in the presence of installed base effects we analyze mixed bundling in two sided markets where installed base effects are present and find that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as well as the standard two sided markets literature we determine prices on both sides fall with bundling mixed bundling acts as a price discrimination tool segmenting the market more efficiently consequently as a by product of this price discrimination the two sides are better coordinated and social welfare is enhanced we show unambiguously that platform participations increase on both sides of the market after theoretically evaluating the impact mixed bundling has on prices and welfare we take the model predictions to data from the portable video game console market we find empirical support for all theoretical predictions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

the dynamic effects of bundling as a product strategy several key questions in bundling have not been empirically examined in marketing is mixed bundling more effective than pure bundling or pure components does correlation in consumer valuations make bundling more or less effective does bundling serve as a complement or substitute to network effects to address these questions we develop a consumer choice model from microfoundations to capture the essentials of our setting the handheld video game market we provide a framework to understand the dynamic long term effects of bundling on demand the primary explanation for the profitability of bundling relies on homogenization of consumer valuations for the bundle allowing the firm to extract more surplus we find that bundling can be effective through a novel and previously unexamined mechanism of dynamic consumer segmentation which operates independent of the homogenization effect and can in fact be stronger when the homogenization effect is weaker we also find that bundles are treated as separate products distinct from component products by consumers sales of both hardware and software components decrease in the absence of bundling and consumers who had previously purchased bundles might delay purchases resulting in lower revenues we also find that mixed bundling dominates pure bundling and pure components in terms of both hardware and software revenues investigating the link between bundling and indirect network effects we find that they act as substitute strategies with a lower relative effectiveness for bundling when network effects are stronger

household fuel use in developing countries review of theory and evidence because of recent concerns about the negative externalities of traditional fuel use on the environment and health the issue of the household fuel transition in developing countries from dirty fuels towards clean fuels has received growing research attention this paper provides an up to date survey of the economic literature on household fuel use in these countries first we present the conceptual and theoretical frameworks then we discuss the empirical results that show how a wide range of factors drive the household fuel transition finally we suggest priorities for policy initiatives and highlight areas of future research

estimating market power in a two sided market the case of newspapers the newspaper industry is a two sided market the readers market and the advertising market are closely linked by inter market network externalities we estimate market power in the italian newspaper industry by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation

price structure in two sided markets evidence from the magazine industry we present and estimate a model of competition in a two sided market the market for magazine readership and advertising using data on magazines in germany we find evidence that magazines have properties of two sided markets the results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are subsidized and that magazines make all their money from advertisers consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices

migration networks and microenterprises in mexico are migration networks associated with lower capital costs or the alleviation of capital constraints we examine these questions with data measuring access to remittance flows among small scale entrepreneurs in mexico using a survey of more than 6000 self employed workers and small firm owners located in 44 urban areas of mexico we estimate the impact of attachment to migration networks on the level of capital investment the capital output ratio sales and profits of microenterprises the impact is identified from the geographic pattern of migration from mexico driven by the completion of rail lines in the early 1900s for the full sample of firms we find that migration is associated with higher investment levels and higher profits but not higher sales the strongest effects on investment are in the categories of automobiles tools and inventories when the sample is limited to firms in high capital sectors investment sales and profits all increase with attachment to the migration networks suggesting that attachment to the migration network alleviates capital constraints in those sectors

commons as insurance and the welfare impact of privatization abstract it is shown here that despite the efficiency gains from privatization when markets are incomplete all individuals may be made worse off by privatization even when the resource is equitably privatized such market incompleteness is common in the developing world and can explain the often encountered resistance to efficiency enhancing privatizing reforms especially in the case of village level landholdings and forests the advantage of common held property arises because of its superior insurance properties which tend to provide income maintenance in low states sufficient conditions are established under which any feasible insurance scheme under private property cannot ex ante pareto dominate allocations under the commons

the strategic analysis of intermediation the importance and the special character of intermediation were recognized as early as in the eighteenth century and have been stressed by many authors afterwards in spite of this long tradition comparatively little work has been done on the details of the economic theory of intermediation instead it was assumed that intermediation can simply be treated like any other economic activity in contrast i will argue that the theory of intermediation requires a specific game theoretic analysis and moreover that many preconceptions that one might have on the basis of standard microeconomic theory are wrong

the role of online platforms for media markets two dimensional spatial competition in a two sided market abstract we analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions for integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner s dilemma specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions this is in contrast to the maximum minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition we show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets

bertrand competition under network externalities abstract two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network the value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good when the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market the set includes marginal cost mc pricing as well as bipartition pricing which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others we show that mc pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non linear externalities in a general network but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity the analysis is applied to platform competition in a two sided market under local and approximately linear externalities

heavily skewed pricing in two sided markets a common feature in two sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other we show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand the most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price full participation of the high elasticity low price side of the market attracts the other side as this side is less price elastic the platform is able to extract high prices

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the effect of migration on wages evidence from a natural experiment the objective of this paper is to employ the hurricane katrina evacuation into houston tx as a natural experiment to estimate the effect of large scale in migration on regional earnings given the characteristics of the evacuees their influx would have caused the supply of applicants for lower skilled jobs to increase proportionately more than for higher skilled jobs we utilize a differences in differences in differences methodology in which we compare differences in average earnings in the low skill non traded goods industries to the corresponding differences in the set of high skill industries in the houston and dallas fort worth msas before and after the katrina induced migration unlike previous studies we include a measure of the post storm increase in demand for local goods and services on the demand for labor we find evidence that the relative average payroll in the low skill non tradable goods industries in houston decreased by 7 when compared to the relative change for the same group of industries in dallas our findings also suggest that failure to account for demand side influences following the migration results in significant under estimation of wage effects due to the shift in labor supply

international migration remittances and household investment evidence from philippine migrants exchange rate shocks how do households respond to overseas members economic shocks overseas filipinos in dozens of countries experienced sudden heterogeneous changes in exchange rates during the 1997 asian financial crisis appreciation of a migrant s currency against the philippine peso leads to increases in household remittances from overseas the estimated elasticity of philippine peso remittances with respect to the exchange rate is 0 60 positive migrant shocks lead to enhanced human capital accumulation and entrepreneurship in origin households child schooling and educational expenditure rise while child labour falls households also work more hours in self employment and become more likely to start relatively capital intensive household enterprises

a mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis we revisit the tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens it is shown in quasi linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed

the environmental impact of poverty evidence from firewood collection in rural nepal abstract we investigate determinants of household firewood collection in rural nepal using 1995 96 and 2002 3 world bank living standards measurement survey lsms data we incorporate village fixed effects endogenous censoring measurement error in living standards and heterogeneous effects of different household assets we find no evidence in favor of the poverty environment hypothesis the evidence for the environmental kuznets curve depends on the precise measure of living standards and time period studied firewood collections fall with a transition to modern occupations and rise with increasing population and household division the local interhousehold collection externality is negligible indicating that policy interventions are justified only by ecological considerations or nonlocal spillovers

on the evolution of market institutions the platform design paradox we study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them we ask whether walrasian platforms leading to market clearing trading outcomes will dominate the market in the long run if several market designers compete we find that traders learn to select non market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market clearing level provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer this in turn leads market designers to introduce non market clearing platforms hence platform competition induces non competitive market outcomes

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

middlemen in bilateral search markets this article examines the role of middlemen in bilateral search markets e g employment agencies real estate brokers it is shown that the middleman narrows the set of buyer firm and seller worker types who search seller types with high valuations and buyer types with low valuations drop out of the search market and instead trade through the middleman the middleman also decreases the equilibrium search intensities of those agents who search it is proven that the middleman improves welfare if search is very costly and inefficient and decreases welfare if search is effectively costless and very efficient

competing for talents abstract two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking the peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership equilibrium is asymmetric with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per rank high quality agents are present in both organizations while low quality agents receive no resources from either organization and are segregated by quality into the two organizations a stronger peer effect increases the competition for high quality agents resulting in both organizations concentrating their resources on fewer ranks with steeper increases in resources per rank and yields a greater equilibrium difference in average quality between the two organizations

customer coalitions monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence abstract this paper analyzes the interplay between a profit maximizing monopolist and a set of consumers who are able to form coalitions that bargain with the monopolist and or integrate into production we show that the monopolist will deter the formation of these countervailing coalitions through strategic selection of generic limit price offers to each consumer these limit prices are derived as subgame perfect equilibria in two alternative models of customer monopoly interplay in both models price discrimination emerges in environments wherein it has previously been considered unprofitable welfare analysis of the equilibria demonstrates the procompetitive effects of potential customer coalitions and generally provides an efficiency based motivation for a government ban on price discrimination

economic growth and the rise of forests although forests have diminished globally over the past 400 years forest cover has increased in some areas including india in the last two decades aggregate time series evidence on forest growth rates and income growth across countries and within india and a newly assembled data set that combines national household survey data census data and satellite images of land use in rural india at the village level over a 29 year period are used to explore the hypothesis that increases in the demand for forest products associated with income and population growth lead to forest growth the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis which also shows that neither the expansion of agricultural productivity nor rising wages in india increased local forest cover

application of an almost ideal demand system aids to ethiopian rural residential energy use panel data evidence abstract it is well known that poor rural households in low income economies are reliant on traditional fuels to meet basic domestic energy needs but little is known about the specific underlying socio economic drivers of residential fuel choices in ethiopia i used the linear approximation almost ideal demand system laaids with normalized prices to compute expenditure elasticity and a multinomial logit model mlm to examine household fuel use the laaids model result showed that expenditure was elastic for modern fuels but inelastic for traditional fuels regression results from the mlm indicated that fuel choice behaviour of rural households could be more accurately described as fuel stacking behaviour as opposed to the energy ladder hypothesis in rural areas household fuel choice may be constrained by limited access to commercial fuels and efficient cook stoves supply dependency and affordability consumer preferences and a web of other intricate factors rural households had less incentive for fuel switching due to underlying factors and the availability of fuel wood without direct financial cost with continued deforestation and receding forests households are expected to develop inter fuel substitution and switching behaviour conditional on access to modern energy technologies

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

marketplace or reseller intermediaries can choose between functioning as a marketplace in which suppliers sell their products directly to buyers or as a reseller by purchasing products from suppliers and selling them to buyers we model this as a decision between whether control rights over a noncontractible decision variable the choice of some marketing activity are better held by suppliers the marketplace mode or by the intermediary the reseller mode whether the marketplace or the reseller mode is preferred depends on whether independent suppliers or the intermediary have more important information relevant to the optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specific product we show that this trade off is shifted toward the reseller mode when marketing activities create spillovers across products and when network effects lead to unfavorable expectations about supplier participation if the reseller has a variable cost advantage respectively disadvantage relative to the marketplace then the trade off is shifted toward the marketplace for long tail respectively short tail products we thus provide a theory of which products an intermediary should offer in each mode we also provide some empirical evidence that supports our main results data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 2042 this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

optimal auction design in two sided markets a key feature of online markets for advertising e g sponsored links is that clicking rates depend on the searchers expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers this article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run where clicking rates are mechanism dependent in line with the practice of the major search engines the revenue maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers by trading off rent extraction and clicking volume this mechanism works as a cross subsidization device between searchers and advertisers

search diversion and platform competition abstract platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products e g advertising we show that competition between platforms leads to lower equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the intensity of competition is high on the other hand if there is only mild competition then competing platforms induce more search diversion relative to a platform monopolist when platforms charge consumers fixed access fees all equilibrium levels of search diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level irrespective of the nature of competition furthermore relative to platforms that cannot charge such fees platforms that charge positive negative access fees to consumers have weaker stronger incentives to divert search

is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two sided markets this paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two sided markets while formally showing that below cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti competitive conduct instead i find that in sufficiently asymmetric two sided markets exclusion is always beneficial and if anything there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry further prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive or inefficient entry

a semi parametric analysis of two sided markets an application to the local daily newspapers in the usa summary this paper considers an empirical semiparametric model for two sided markets contrary to existing empirical literature on two sided markets we specify network effects and probability distribution functions of net benefits of the two sides nonparametrically we then estimate the model by nonparametric instrumental variables regression for local daily newspapers from the usa we show that semiparametric specification is supported by the data and the network effects are neither linear nor monotonic with a numerical illustration we demonstrate that the mark up of the newspaper on each side changes drastically with the nonlinearly specified network effects from the case with linear network effects copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

platform pricing at sports card conventions platform pricing at sports card conventions we study a new data set of us sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two sided markets conventions are two sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers we have detailed information on consumer price dealer price and since most conventions are local the market structure for conventions we present several findings first consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition second when consumer price is zero and thus constrained dealer price decreases more strongly with competition these results are compatible with existing models of two sided markets but are difficult to explain without such models

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

networks in the modern economy mexican migrants in the u s labor market this paper attempts to identify job networks among mexican migrants in the u s labor market the empirical analysis uses data on migration patterns and labor market outcomes based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin communities in mexico over a long period of time each community s network is measured by the proportion of the sampled individuals who are located at the destination the united states in any year we verify that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job when his network is exogenously larger by including individual fixed effects in the employment and occupation regressions and by using rainfall in the origin community as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination

appropriating value from computerized reservation system ownership in the airline industry it is difficult for the firm competing through information technology resources to gain a sustainable advantage because systems are easy to imitate and substitute resources are often available to competitors the innovator may be unable to appropriate all of the benefits from information technology investments airlines have installed computerized reservations systems in travel agencies to appropriate the returns from their investments in information technology the airlines expected to obtain a number of benefits from this strategy including increased efficiency possible bias in favor of the computerized reservations systems owner on the part of the travel agent and fees from other airlines for making reservations for them the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the appropriation of value by computerized reservations systems owners from deploying systems in travel agencies these benefits beyond fees from travel agents should be seen in the vendor airline s market share between cities and in the overall performance of the airline at an industry level this paper models airline performance as a function of computerized reservations systems ownership at two levels for selected city pairs and at the overall level of the firm the city pair analysis employs a multinomial logit market share model that analyzes five years of data on 72 city pair routes the industry model uses longitudinal data for a panel of 10 airlines for 12 years the results of both analyses support hypotheses that computerized reservations systems ownership is positively related to airline performance it appears that strong airlines have appropriated the benefits of their computerized reservations systems turning them into highly specialized assets for further travel related innovation this work offers useful theoretical extensions and methodological approaches for the study of similar kinds of network technology innovations that are currently being deployed in association with electronic commerce on the internet

advertising competition and entry in media industries this paper presents a model of media competition with free entry when media platforms are financed both from advertising receipts and customers subscriptions we establish a relationship between the equilibrium levels of prices advertising and entry the welfare maximizing levels and the advertising technology under constant or increasing returns to scale in the audience size we find an excessive level of entry and an insufficient level of advertising we then extend the analysis along several dimensions the price as a strategic variable on the market for advertising free media platforms and the media quality dimension

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns non monotone participation in optional intermediation in many decentralised markets the traders who benefi tm ost from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them at the same time employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade together these decisions amount to non monotone participation choices in intermediation only traders of middle type employ intermediaries while the rest the high and the low types prefer to search for a trading partner directly we provide a theoretical foundation for this hitherto unexplained phenomenon we build a dynamic matching model where a trader s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type we also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non monotone equilibria

does migration make rural households more productive evidence from mexico abstract the migration of labour out of rural areas and the flow of remittances from migrants to rural households are an increasingly important feature of less developed countries this paper explores ways in which migration influences incomes and productivity of land and human capital in rural households over time using new household survey data from mexico our findings suggest that a massive increase in migration to the united states increased per capita incomes via remittances and also by raising land productivity in migrant sending households they do not support the pessimistic view that migration discourages production in migrant sending economies nor the view implicit in separable agricultural household models that migration and remittances influence household incomes but not production

gender based price discrimination in matching markets this paper develops a new model to analyze price discrimination in matching markets where agents have private information about their respective qualities on the basis of signals car clothing club membership etc purchased from profit maximizing firms men and women form beliefs about each other s qualities the matching must then be stable in the following sense there cannot be a man and woman who are unmatched and who both believe they would be better off if they were matched with one another the model enables an analysis of the impact of third degree or gender based price discrimination on welfare when third degree price discrimination is not feasible the cost of eliciting private information is higher but a monopoly intermediary may have stronger incentives to implement an efficient allocation i show that gender based price discrimination is more likely to have a positive impact the more symmetric the matching environment is