the effect of using consumption taxes on foods to promote climate friendly diets the case of denmark abstract agriculture is responsible for 17 35 of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions with livestock production contributing by approximately 18 22 of global emissions due to high monitoring costs and low technical potential for emission reductions a tax on consumption may be a more efficient policy instrument to decrease emissions from agriculture than a tax based directly on emissions from production in this study we look at the effect of internalising the social costs of greenhouse gas emissions through a tax based on co 2 equivalents for 23 different foods furthermore we compare the loss in consumer surplus and the changed dietary composition for different taxation scenarios in the most efficient scenario we find a decrease in the carbon footprint from foods for an average household of 2 3 8 8 at a cost of 0 15 1 73 dkk per kg co 2 equivalent whereas the most effective scenario led to a decrease in the carbon footprint of 10 4 19 4 but at a cost of 3 53 6 90 dkk per kg co 2 equivalent the derived consequences for health show that scenarios where consumers are not compensated for the increase in taxation level lead to a decrease in the total daily amount of kj consumed whereas scenarios where the consumers are compensated lead to an increase most scenarios lead to a decrease in the consumption of saturated fat compensated scenarios leads to an increase in the consumption of added sugar whereas uncompensated scenarios lead to almost no change or a decrease generally the results show a low cost potential for using consumption taxes to promote climate friendly diets

input versus emission taxes environmental taxes in a mass balance and transaction costs perspective the standard policy recommendation to limit pollution is to use taxes or tradeable quotas on emissions a general emphasis on emissions does not however take proper account of the characteristics of the material flow through the economy an analysis of the relationships between transaction costs and features of this flow shows that it may be less costly to tax inputs into the economy the paper focuses on the advantages of a mass flow perspective in environmental economics the trade off between the precision of an environmental regulation and its implementation costs and develops criteria for choosing between input and emission related instruments

resource rents the effects of energy taxes and quantity instruments for climate protection abstract carbon dioxide emissions correspond to fossil resource use when considering this supply side of climate protection crucial questions come to fore it seems likely that owners of fossil resources would object to emission reductions moreover policy instruments such as taxes may not be effective at all it seems individually rational to leave no fossil resources unused in this context it can be expected that economic sectors will react strategically to climate policy aiming at a re distribution of rents to address these questions we investigate the effectiveness efficiency and resource rents for energy taxes resource taxes and quantity rationing of emissions the analysis is based on a game theoretic growth model with explicit factor markets and policy instruments market equilibrium depends on a government that acts as a stackelberg leader with a climate protection goal we find that resource taxes and quantity rationing achieve this objective efficiently energy taxation is only second best the use of quantity rationing to achieve climate protection generates substantial rents for resource owners

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

bequest motives and determinants of micro life insurance in sri lanka this paper emphasizes bequest motives by evaluating participation patterns in micro life insurance against insurance demand and supply side factors based on household survey data from sri lanka it presents evidence on the determinants of micro life insurance participation of low income households using probit and tobit models the results provide evidence that micro life insurance is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives such as the number of children or dependents besides better off households are less excluded from micro life insurance markets than their poorer counterparts the study finds a convincing need for the microinsurance sector to be more responsive to the needs of the poor with a key role in providing financial education to understand the need for microinsurance

converting technology to mitigate environmental damage there are many situations where policy makers would like to induce firms to make a major discrete conversion in production technology to help the environment this paper examines how heterogeneity in the operating condition of firms plant and equipment which cannot be observed by policy makers can affect the choice between incentives to encourage conversion to a cleaner technology by relating different conditions of firms plant and equipment to production costs extent of environmental damage and cost of conversion to a cleaner technology we show when a perfectly discriminating incentive to encourage conversion is not feasible in addition we show that firms with plant and equipment in better condition will convert their technology to mitigate their environmental damage and firms with plant and equipment in poorer condition will not this and a series of additional results lead to conditions under which an administratively simple uniform lump sum incentive to switch to cleaner technology is preferable to one based on output these results and conditions extend to cases where there are network externalities in conversion and where there is strategic timing in firms choice of when to convert

measurement error and state dependent pollution control enforcement abstract a two group model of state dependent enforcement is applied to identical firms which minimize the expected present value of costs and fines measurement error affects the probabilities of transitions between groups and the receipt of fines it is shown that state dependent enforcement can reduce social cost below the level attainable with static enforcement and that differentiation in both monitoring probabilities and standards may be optimal however setting fines for both groups at the maximum is likely to be optimal comparisons between models and alternative model interpretations are offered

avoiding invasives trade related policies for controlling unintentional exotic species introductions abstract international commodity trade serves as the primary conduit for unintentional introductions of damaging exotic species we use a simple model of contaminated goods trade to analyze the optimal mix of tariffs and inspections as means of controlling damage from this negative externality among other policy relevant results we find that 1 while it is always optimal to employ tariffs there are non trivial cases in which inspections should optimally be set to zero 2 a higher infection rate requires a higher tariff but beyond a point optimal inspections decrease in the infection rate and finally 3 taking a dynamic view and considering future effects of current introductions leads unambiguously to more stringent inspections but may give rise to higher or lower tariffs

racial disparities in life insurance coverage we evaluate the extent to which there are racial disparities in life insurance coverage using multiple years of the survey of income and program participation between 2001 and 2010 we find that african americans hold significantly more life insurance after controlling for other factors especially employer sponsored and whole life insurance we demonstrate that our findings diverge from prior work because we examine all households instead of focusing exclusively on married and cohabitating households the findings on life insurance coverage and composition imply that earnings shocks due to mortality are not a contributing factor to racial disparities in wealth

the family as an incomplete annuities market families can self insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members although family annuity markets are incomplete even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities given adverse selection and transaction costs family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities in the absence of public annuities these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation

second best energy policies for heterogeneous firms this paper investigates second best issues in the regulation of external costs of energy use by heterogeneous firms the efficiency of regulatory energy policies depends in general on the policy incentives given for both output reduction and input substitution the resulting endogeneity of firms supply functions appears to lead to complicated policy rules in contrast to earlier efforts the analysis considers an arbitrarily large number of non identical price taking firms in a joint market a large variety of possible production functions including varying levels of economies of scale and possibilities for input substitution and elasticities of market demand which may vary from completely elastic to completely inelastic two second best instruments are considered namely output taxes and energy efficiency standards and are compared to the benchmark of first best energy taxes the underlying market factors determining the relative efficiency of these second best instruments when used optimally are identified

effects of an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden this study evaluated the environmental impacts of introducing an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden three meat products beef pork and chicken four dairy products milk fermented products cream and cheese and four pollutants generating environmental damage greenhouse gases ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus were included in the analysis the unit tax applied corresponded to between 8 9 and 33 3 of the respective price per kg product in 2009 consumer response to the tax was calculated by econometric estimates of the almost ideal demand system aids for meat and dairy products using per capita consumption data and prices the results indicated relatively inelastic own price elasticities and high income elasticities for all meat products and slightly lower for dairy products simultaneous introduction of a tax on all seven products decreased emissions of ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus from the livestock sector by up to 12

the effect of social security on retirement in the early 1970s we analyze detailed longitudinal data on a cohort of males aged 58 67 in 1969 1973 a period of substantial increases in real social security benefits we find the following 1 the accelerating decline in labor force participation of elderly men in 1969 1973 can be explained by the large increase in real social security benefits 2 there is evidence of a liquidity constraint effect for an important subgroup of the elderly 3 the magnitude of this induced retirement effect is large enough that ignoring it can lead to serious underestimation of the fiscal implications of changes in benefit provisions our results are interpreted in the historical context of a particular cohort undergoing major unanticipated transfers of wealth the steady state effects of social security on retirement may not be the same

the permanent income hypothesis estimation and testing by instrumental variables the permanent income hypothesis with rational expectation is restated estimated and tested by an instrumental variables technique on the postwar u s aggregate time series data the hypothesis is accepted on a consumption series which includes service flows from consumer durables if the consumption series is the one in the national income and product accounts the hypothesis is decisively rejected an explanation is suggested to reconcile the conflicting test results

the mismatch between life insurance holdings and financial vulnerabilities evidence from the health and retirement study using data on older workers from the 1992 health and retirement survey along with an elaborate life cycle planning model the authors quantify the effect of each individual s death on the financial status of his or her survivors and the degree to which life insurance holdings moderate these consequences the average change in living standard that would result from a spouse s death is small both in absolute terms and relative to the decline that would occur without insurance however this average obscures a startling mismatch between insurance holdings and underlying vulnerabilities for many of the most vulnerable the amounts purchased are surprisingly small and for many of the least vulnerable the amounts are surprisingly large as a result uninsured vulnerabilities are quite widespread the magnitude of these vulnerabilities as well as the proclivity to address any given degree of vulnerability by purchasing life insurance vary systematically with individual and household characteristics

life insurance and household consumption abstract using life insurance holdings by age sex and marital status we infer how individuals value consumption in different demographic stages we estimate equivalence scales and bequest motives simultaneously within a fully specified model where agents face us demographics and save and purchase life insurance our findings indicate that individuals are very caring for dependents that economies of scale are large that children are very costly or yield very high marginal utility that wives with children produce lots of home goods and that females display habits from marriage while men do not these findings contrast sharply with standard equivalence scales

the wealth age relation among the aged aged people face the problem of allocating over the rest of their lifetimes the wealth that they have accumulated during their working years this problem is fairly complex because they are uncertain about the dates of their death and because they may wish to use their wealth to finance general consumption or hold it to meet emergencies leave estates or maintain power or status whether skilled at dynamic programming or not aged people effectively do make these decisions what are the results some studies of the entire lifetime pattern of saving and wealth tend to support the simple life cycle model in which the aged use up their wealth to help finance consumption harold lydall for example found saving rates to increase and then decrease with age in the whole population and to be negative for the group aged 65 and over guarded support for the theory was found by franco modigliani and albert ando in britain and by dorothy projector in the united states more recently a f shorrocks examined the lifetime pattern of wealth holding in estate tax data for a single cohort and found the hump pattern that is characteristic of life cycle saving other evidence on wealth holding runs contrary to this however in a study of estate tax returns in washington d c james d smith found that wealth increased with age among the aged after controlling for other demographic variables examining national estate tax data john brittain found wealth to increase with age in the united states and a b atkinson and a j harrison reported the same pattern in england and wales in a sample of tiaa annuity recipients analyzed by james mulanaphy over half reported that their total savings had increased during retirement and another quarter reported that their savings had remained about the same in this paper i examine wealth holding patterns among aged married couples using survey data representing the entire aged population of the united states in 1968 the statistical analysis serves as a test of the hypothesis that emerges from life cycle theory and provides some further exploration into the economic behavior of the aged i find that the aged tend to increase their wealth over time

the choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring we consider a regulator s choice between environmentally motivated emissions taxes and output taxes we investigate how the optimal instrument depends on the monitoring cost function the firm s technology and on social preferences regarding output and environmental quality pure emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs pure output taxes are optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs sufficiently limited options for emission reduction by means other than output reduction and sufficiently high substitutability of the output finally conditions for the optimality of mixed taxes are given

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

human capital risk contract enforcement and the macroeconomy we use data from the survey of consumer finance and survey of income program participation to show that young households with children are under insured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with human capital risk age dependent returns to human capital investment and endogenous borrowing constraints due to the limited pledgeability of human capital limited contract enforcement we show analytically that consistent with the life insurance data in equilibrium young households are borrowing constrained and under insured against human capital risk a calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life cycle variation of life insurance holdings financial wealth earnings and consumption inequality observed in the us data our analysis implies that a reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly like the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act of 2005 leads to a substantial increase in the volume of both credit and insurance

are life insurance holdings related to financial vulnerabilities using the 1995 survey of consumer finances and an elaborate life cycle model we quantify the potential financial impact of each individual s death on his or her survivors and measure the degree to which life insurance moderates these consequences life insurance is essentially uncorrelated with financial vulnerability at every stage of the life cycle as a result the impact of insurance among at risk households is modest and substantial uninsured vulnerabilities are widespread particularly among younger couples we also identify a systematic gender bias for any given level of financial vulnerability couples provide significantly more protection for wives than for husbands jel d10 g22

the economic effects of social security toward a reconciliation of theory and measurement abstract in this paper we argue that actuarial valuation of social security benefit streams is theoretically inconsistent with the assumption of pure life cycle motives instead we show that the simple discounted value of future benefits ignoring the possibility of death is often a good approximation to the relevant concept of value this observation motivates a re examination of existing empirical evidence concerning the economic effects of social security we focus our attention on studies of distributional equity and personal saving behavior in both cases we argue that the use of simple rather than actuarial discounting of survival contingent income streams produces results that differ dramatically from previous findings specifically estimates based on actuarial valuation may overstate the importance of redistribution between and within generations and may understate the depressive effect of social security on personal wealth accumulation by a factor of three or more

adverse selection and pigou taxes it id assumed that firms have different technologies and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist but not which is used by which firms neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable the output of each individual firm however can be monitored without cost based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions

to own or not to own your life insurance policy abstract life insurance proceeds are generally subject to the estate tax an exception is when the policy is owned by the beneficiaries and the insured gives up ownership and control including the ability to change beneficiaries should the insured strategically own the policy contract and potentially subject proceeds to estate and inheritance taxes or relinquish control with the beneficiaries owning the policy and escape such transfer taxes this paper addresses how the estate tax influences the choice of life insurance ownership using samples of estate tax returns the empirical evidence suggests that those facing high estate tax rates are more likely to forgo ownership and have proceeds excluded from their estates and provides further evidence on the incentive effect of taxes and in support of the strategic bequest motive

annuities and individual welfare advancing annuity demand theory we present suffcient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness that are substantially less restrictive than those used by yaari 1965 we examine demand with market incompleteness finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely but complete annuitization does not how uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk a new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases

self reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution abstract existing environmental regulations frequently require firms to self report their compliance status to regulatory agencies using a principal agent framework i derive and compare incentive compatible regulatory policies with and without self reporting i find the firm needs to be audited less often when self reporting is required but punished more often the sign and magnitude of the gains from self reporting depend on the relative size of audit and sanction costs the accuracy of the regulator s monitoring technology and the desired level of abatement effort

upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition when two markets are vertically related the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels this paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations we consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them in order to mitigate pollution the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant we show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax we further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax we argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government it will certainly increase social welfare

uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security this paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime share deathrelated risks when annuity markets operate a non discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources in the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities such a program will lead to a non optimal intragenerational allocation of resources however the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a pareto improving role for a mandatory non discriminatory social security program

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

issues in the design of environmental excise taxes t ax law has long had environmental consequences although the consequences have often been unintended for example tax provisions passed to assist the timber industry in the 1920s permitted expensing of the costs of reforestation and planting rather than having to depreciate them over a period of time along with capital gains treatment for harvested timber provisions which may have encouraged a more rapid harvest of domestic timberland percentage depletion allowances to assist the oil industry a deduction based on a percentage of the value of oil sold rather than the taxpayer s basis in the oil which became part of the internal revenue code in 1926 arguably have led to exploitation of oil and mineral deposits at a rate greater than the socially optimal rate similarly the purpose of the federal motor fuels tax when expanded in 1956 was to fund highway construction although now it is common to regard it as at least potentially an environmental tax aimed at addressing the externalities caused by automobile use of course these tax provisions were not motivated by environmental concerns the 1970s began to see efforts at environmental tax policy although at the time the focus of the policies more often was energy conservation rather than reduction in pollution between 1978 and 1986 congress provided tax credits for residential energy conservation expenditures in 1978 congress enacted the gas guzzler excise tax an excise tax that varies with the environmental protection agency s fuel economy rating of automobiles it remains in force today congress also made available tax exempt bond finance for pollution control equipment between 1978 and 1986

emission taxes versus other environmental policies in the environmental policy of most countries various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes this paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes the three arguments related to information asymmetries and non convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes the fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment although this argument is frequently used by politicians the analysis provides no justification for it on the contrary in the model used employment is higher with environmental taxes than with nonrevenue raising environmental policies

pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions in this paper a model of environmental regulation with imperfect monitoring of emissions is presented the regulator can use linear output taxes and emission taxes to influence the pollution level of a risk averse firm in contrast to the perfect monitoring case a tax mix will usually be optimal the relative weight depends on the degree of risk aversion and monitoring imperfection and on technological factors

economic analysis of social security survivors insurance this paper develops a heterogeneous agents model to analyze the effects of social security survivors insurance the model features a negative mortality income gradient asymmetric information of individual mortality rates and a warm glow bequest motive that varies by age and family structure the model matches lifecycle changes in life insurance coverage and generates advantageous selection in the insurance market for male agents reducing survivors benefits for dependent children generates welfare losses while reducing survivors benefits for aged spouses produces welfare gains the opposing welfare results are explained by differences in the timing of benefits and in the funding cost

imperfect observability of emissions and second best emission and output taxes abstract this paper studies the second best tax design problem when emissions are publicly unobservable but can be discovered through costly monitoring a representative firm in industry chooses its emissions and declarations to maximize its expected profits the paper shows the pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions is modified to take account of the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement emissions from different sectors must be taxed at different rates every polluting good must face an effective emission tax that is less than the full marginal social damage of emissions emission taxes do not reflect standard optimal tax objectives output taxes have a pigouvian role so that the targeting principle fails

monopoly incentives for cost reducing r d abstract it is shown in this paper that there exist cost innovations for which a monopolist has a higher incentive to invest than a social planner this unveils the limits of the claim based on arrow 1959 that a monopoly always has a lower incentive to innovate than a social planner and therefore than is socially desirable in contrast to previous results the comparison of incentives may also depend upon the demand function finally for a restricted domain of analysis a rule for comparing the monopoly and the social planner incentives is derived

the effect of succession taxes on family firm investment evidence from a natural experiment this paper provides causal evidence on the impact of succession taxes on firm investment decisions and transfer of control using a 2002 policy change in greece that substantially reduced the tax on intrafamily transfers of businesses i show that succession taxes lead to a more than 40 decline in investment around family successions slow sales growth and a depletion of cash reserves furthermore succession taxes strongly affect the decision to sell or retain the firm within the family i conclude by discussing implications of my findings for firms in the united states and europe

uncertain lifetime consumption and dissaving in retirement this paper asks whether the continued accumulation or mild dissaving observed among the retired can be explained by uncertain lifetime in the absence of annuities after an initial period influenced by borrowing constraints under constant relative risk aversion uncertain lifetime depresses consumption by a proportion increasing with age if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is small illustrative computations based on actual income and survival data show that plausible elasticities are sufficiently small to give this effect the reduction in consumption is large enough to explain much of the lack of decumulation by the elderly

regulating an externality generating utility environmental taxes under limited information global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas in many countries coal fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases we examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non cooperatively we show that when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime

the cost of reducing co2 emissions integrating abatement technologies into economic modeling we explore two methods of incorporating bottom up abatement cost estimates into top down modeling an economy wide method and a sector specific method carbon emissions generally depend on technology and scale given the technology options abatement is possible without a substantial reduction in scale otherwise the change must come purely through a reduction in demand our analysis shows that the cost of environmental policy is considerably overestimated by top down models if a bottom up abatement cost curve is not included using the data for the swiss economy we demonstrate two techniques of representing an abatement function explicitly in a computable general equilibrium model a traditional and a hybrid discrete technology modeling approach the results suggest that the current climate policy in switzerland will not be able to move the economy towards the required 10 co2 reduction both approaches provide virtually the same results when the calibration process is precisely executed which contradicts the results of previous studies

new evidence on the money s worth of individual annuities this paper presents new information on the expected present discounted value of payouts on individual life annuities the annuity we examine is the single premium immediate life annuity an insurance product that pays out a nominal level sum as long as the covered person lives in exchange for an initial lump sum premium this annuity offers protection against the risk of someone outliving his saving given uncertainty about longevity for reasonable estimates of behavioral parameters we calculate that individual annuities are currently priced so that retirees without bequest motives should find these policies of substantial value in configuring their portfolios to smooth retirement consumption we also find that the expected present discounted value of payouts relative to the initial cost of the annuity has increased over the last decade these findings bear on the policy debate regarding the role of individual choice and self reliance in retirement planning this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item