keeping up with the joneses competition and the evolution of collusion an economy consists of many markets each of which is a duopoly firms must earn normal profits in the long run if they have to survive normal profits are interpreted as the long run limit of average profits in the whole economy we adopt an aspiration based model of firm behaviour linking it to the economy with the requirement that in the long run the profit aspiration must be at least as great as normal profits we assume that the joint profits can be maximized with symmetric payoffs and with very few other assumptions are able to show that the almost global attractor is the cooperative outcome

tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization abstract this paper explores the impact of intensified tax competition within federal systems characterized by the presence of both horizontal tax externalities between the states and vertical tax externalities between states and federal government it shows that although these push tax rates in opposite directions horizontal towards state taxes that are too low vertical towards state taxes that are too high leaving the net outcome unclear intensified tax competition always worsens their combined effect that is intensified lower level tax competition in the form of an increase in the number of lower level jurisdictions is sure to reduce welfare but this is not because as usually supposed it makes excessively low state taxes even lower rather it is welfare reducing either for that reason or because it makes excessively high state taxes even higher

interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas charlot s paty s and piguet v does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas regional studies the main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in french urban municipalities a tax setting model for local business tax is estimated using spatial and panel econometric techniques for the period 1993 2003 controlling for population size it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and as a consequence to increase local business tax rates

the outlook for us oil dependence abstract oil dependence is defined as a dynamic problem of short and long run market power the potential monopoly power of an oil cartel depends on its market share and the elasticities of oil supply and demand while the economic vulnerability of oil consuming states depends most directly on the quantity of oil imported and the oil cost share of gross domestic product gdp of these factors only the market share of the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec cartel and the rate of growth of world oil demand are clearly different than they were 25 years ago opec still holds the majority of world oil and in the future will regain market share a hypothetical 2 year supply reduction in 2005 2006 similar in size to those of 1973 1974 or 1979 1980 illustrates the potential benefits to opec and harm to the us economy of a future oil price shock opec s revenues are estimated to increase by roughly 0 7 trillion while the us economy loses about 0 5 trillion strategic petroleum reserves seem ineffective against a determined multi year supply curtailment increasing the market s price responsiveness by improving the technologies of oil supply and oil demand can greatly reduce the costs of oil dependence each element of this interpretation of the oil dependence problem is well supported by previous studies this paper s contribution is to unite these elements into a coherent explanation and to point out the enormously important implications for energy policy

fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending much attention has been given to the impact of fiscal competition on the level of public expenditure but relatively little to the impact on its composition using a broadly familiar and reasonably rich model of fiscal competition in the presence of mobile capital this paper establishes a systematic bias in public spending patterns starting from the non cooperative equilibrium and holding tax rates constant welfare would be improved by a coordinated reduction in the provision of local public inputs and a corresponding increase in the public provision of local public goods benefiting immobile consumers c 1997 elsevier science s a

fuel taxes an important instrument for climate policy abstract this article shows that fuel taxes serve a very important role for the environment and that we risk a backlash of increased emissions if they are abolished fuel taxes have restrained growth in fuel demand and associated carbon emissions although fuel demand is large and growing our analysis shows that it would have been much higher in the absence of domestic fuel taxes people often assert that fuel demand is inelastic but there is strong research evidence showing the opposite the price elasticity is in fact quite high but only in the long run in the short run it may be quite inelastic which has important implications for policy makers had europe not followed a policy of high fuel taxation but had low us taxes then fuel demand would have been twice as large hypothetical transport demand in the whole oecd area is calculated for various tax scenarios and the results show that fuel taxes are the single most powerful climate policy instrument implemented to date yet this fact is not usually given due attention in the debate

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

vertical externalities in cigarette taxation do tax revenues go up in smoke abstract in federal systems where tax bases are joint property the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other this paper examines the interdependence of us federal and state cigarette tax rates our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate thus a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines and indirectly the state tax rate declines

interdependent international relations and the expansion of ethanol production and consumption the brazilian perspective abstract the global production and consumption of ethanol are expected to increase the growing interdependence of markets and nations producers and consumers of biofuels has led actors to seek and devise mechanisms intended to develop the sector this paper aims to analyze the interdependent international relations between brazil and other ethanol biofuel producer and consumer countries to do so the paper explores the theory of complex interdependence and the game theory a quali quantitative study was conducted involving the application of two questionnaires to experts on biofuels and documentary analysis aided by qda miner software the results show that brazil shares highly interdependent relations with the united states an intermediate degree of interdependence with europe and a low degree of interdependence with china the dimensions of those interdependent relations can be ranked according to importance in the following order first the political then the economic technical and finally the social environmental dimensions a number of actions can be envisaged that could lead ethanol to achieve an increasingly strategic position in the diversification of the energy matrix in different countries technological efforts to improve production efficiency the creation of globally integrated policies designed to provide security and develop the production and consumption infrastructure the reduction of international tariffs on the product and the transformation of ethanol into a global commodity with a large number of countries buying and selling the product this paper faced the challenge of integrating approaches and concepts from two complex theoretical areas complex interdependence theory and game theory the research methodology and the insights gained from the ethanol case contribute to the literature on the applicability of these two theoretical approaches

tax competition in federations revisited we extend keen and kotsogiannis 2002 2004 by considering all purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers horizontal externality resp vertical externality exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes

group dynamics in experimental studies the bertrand paradox revisited abstract different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects behavior considering the repeated bertrand duopoly game of dufwenberg and gneezy dufwenberg m gneezy s u 2000 price competition and market concentration an experimental study international journal of industrial organization 18 7 22 we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to nash equilibrium limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject s own opponent in contrast leads to competitive behavior when we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment full we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices we can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example

a spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses evidence from canada using a model of interdependent tax choices and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers this paper estimates making use of a spatial econometric framework corporate income tax setting functions for all canadian provincial governments the results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements general federal transfers and the federal corporate income tax a robustness check on the fiscal relationship between ontario and quebec verifies the existence of significant bi directional fiscal interdependencies the paper also introduces u s state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with canadian provinces a l aide d un modele de choix fiscaux interdependants et en tenant compte des paiements de perequation et des transferts generaux ce texte calibre a l aide d un cadre econometrique spatial les fonctions de definition de fiscalite des revenus de societes de tous les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens les resultats montrent qu il y a un effet d interaction positif significatif entre un sous ensemble de provinces et entre les provinces dans leur ensemble et le gouvernement federal les impots sur le revenu des societes des provinces sont co relies negativement avec les paiements de perequation les transferts generaux et l impot federal sur le revenu des societes des tests de robustesse montrent qu il y a relation d interdependance fiscale bidirectionnelle significative entre le quebec et l ontario le memoire introduit les impots sur le revenu des societes aux etats unis comme co variables et examine leur interaction avec ce qui se passe dans les provinces canadiennes

the geopolitics of cross border electricity grids the israeli arab case abstract countries often attempt to establish regional electricity grids however whereas research on natural resources frequently seeks to understand policy outcome through a geopolitical prism when it comes to electricity studies the prism is always economic or technical hence this study is a first attempt to identify the geopolitical dimension of cross border electricity grids the study argues that success in establishing electricity grids requires identifying how the geopolitical dimension interplays with the physical dimension to examine the role of these geopolitical bottlenecks the study examines negotiation protocols spanning over 15 years on establishing ten grid connections between israel and its arab neighbors it finds that electricity geopolitics has been used both as a platform for deeper international cooperation and as a stick against neighboring states when policies are driven by a peace dividend proposals for grid connection appear to evolve and overcome the dependency and the security economy bottlenecks when relations deteriorate proposals for grid connections appear to undergo reconsideration and to be held hostage by higher politics if when and how electricity grids materialize is a function of the nature of the electricity network as a twofold package and of the ability of the planning process to accommodate geopolitical uncertainty

towards sustainability of energy systems a primer on how to apply the concept of energy services to identify necessary trends and policies virtually all goods and services that characterize modern societies welfare depend on the provision of commercial energy the core objective of this paper is to identify necessary changes in trends for achieving a transition towards more sustainable energy systems and development paths the major conclusions of this analysis are i a rigorous rethinking process has to take place to identify which level of energy services per capita lead to enhancing human welfare and quality of life ii a significant increase in energy conversion efficiency has to be triggered to finally provide energy services with far less input of energy than today iii a continuous increase in the share of renewable energy sources and other low emission options has to be brought about iv however as history has shown this process of technological learning has to be accompanied by proper energy price and regulatory policies otherwise it is very likely that energy conservation gains due to technical efficiency improvements will be outweighed again by increases in energy service demand and straightforward energy consumption and co 2 emissions

mergers in fiscal federalism this paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition the merger of regions induces three eects on regional and local tax policies which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically i an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level ii a rise in the regional tax base and iii a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities it is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates this nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households states implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good a vertical fiscal externality reflecting the effect of state policies on federal revenues provides an incentive for state taxes to be too progressive a horizontal fiscal externality causes nonoptimal state taxes and expenditures because of the migration effect the federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states the federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states c 1998 elsevier science s a

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

does britain or the united states have the right gasoline tax this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the second best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution congestion and accident externalities as well as interactions with the broader fiscal system we provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the us and the uk under a variety of parameter scenarios under our central parameter values the second best optimal gasoline tax is 1 01 gal for the us and 1 34 gal for the uk current tax rates are much lower than this in the us and higher in the uk the calculations are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions the congestion externality is the largest component in both nations revenue raising needs also play a significant role as do accident externalities and local air pollution potential welfare gains from reducing the current uk tax rate are estimated at nearly one fourth the production cost of all gasoline used in the uk even larger gains could be achieved by switching to a tax on vehicle miles with equal revenue yield for the us the welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax are smaller but those from switching to an optimal tax on vehicle miles are very large

energy security and sustainability in northeast asia abstract energy security has typically to those involved in making energy policy meant mostly securing access to oil and other fossil fuels with increasingly global diverse energy markets however and increasingly transnational problems resulting from energy transformation and use old energy security rationales are less salient and other issues including climate change and other environmental economic and international considerations are becoming increasingly important as a consequence a more comprehensive operating definition of energy security is needed along with a workable framework for analysis of which future energy paths or scenarios are likely to yield greater energy security in a broader more comprehensive sense work done as a part of the nautilus institute s pacific asia regional energy security pares project developed a broader definition of energy security and described an analytical framework designed to help to compare the energy security characteristics both positive and negative of different quantitative energy paths as developed using software tools such as the leap long range energy alternatives planning system

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

indicators of energy security in industrialised countries energy security has become a popular catch phrase both in the scientific arena as well as in the political discussion yet in general the applied concepts of energy security are rather vague this paper sheds some light on concepts and indicators of energy security first we conceptually discuss the issue of energy supply security and explain why it is not to handle by one science alone and what economics may contribute in order to structure the topic after providing a brief survey of existing attempts to define or measure energy security we suggest an additional dimension along which indicators of energy security may be classified ex post and ex ante indicators finally we illustrate our concept on the basis of several simplified indicators while ex post indicators are mostly based on price developments ex ante indicators are to a greater extent aimed at illustrating potential problems our illustration suggests that it is worthwhile to take into account the market structure along with the political stability of exporting countries

in the name of energy security the struggle over the exportation of israeli natural gas the aim of this study is to place the notion of energy security under critical scrutiny by unpacking how different actors manipulate the term through the mobilization of existential language as a prism for creating securitization discourse through an examination of an israeli inter ministerial committee charged with developing national policy regarding newly discovered natural gas reserves off the coast of israel the study finds that the concept of energy security is open for manipulation and various interpretations while some actors stress environmental acceptability and independency as pillars of energy security others prioritized supply reliability and geopolitical benefits associated with gas exportation each definition of energy security was also found to be anchored in different ideologies goals policies and legitimizing factors the coupling of energy with securitization rhetoric was ultimately determined as working against cooperative efforts as committee conflicts intensified and suggested institutional measures became disproportional

fiscal decentralization and the size of government a european country empirical analysis this article is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size using a panel data set of the eu 15 countries we analyse the effect of decentralization on aggregate national and subnational government sizes by separating the long run effects of decentralization from its short run dynamics in the long run tax autonomy reduces central expenditure but increases and to a greater extent subnational public expenditure leading to higher aggregate public expenditure we find also that vertical imbalances tend to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

the evolution of walrasian behavior consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior occasionally experimenting with some small probability in this context it is shown that the unique long run outcome of the process has all firms playing walrasian i e choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market clearing price as given

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

vertical versus horizontal tax externalities an empirical test abstract we study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base one can observe two types of externalities a horizontal externality working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum and a vertical externality working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates building on the model of keen and kotsogiannis keen michael j kotsogiannis christos 2002 does federalism lead to excessively high taxes american economic review 92 1 363 370 we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables this test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of swiss municipalities that feature direct democratic fiscal decision making so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent governments of the theory we find that vertical externalities dominate they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition

vertical fiscal externalities in a federation abstract we examine vertical fiscal externalities in a model where a state government provides a productivity enhancing public input and both the state and the central government tax wages and profits previous literature has emphasized the negative tax externality that occurs when two levels of government impose distortionary taxes on the same tax base we show that an increase in the state government s tax rate on wage income can increase federal revenues if the federal government imposes an ad valorem tax on employees wages and the demand for labour is inelastic we also show that an increase in the provision of the public input can either increase or reduce federal tax revenues leading to either under or over provision of the public input by the state government

interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy abstract this paper explores the implications of the interaction between inter regional tax competition and intra regional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy a la osborne and slivinski 1996 and besley and coate 1997 as an extension of hoyt s 1991 finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered in particular we identify plausible conditions under which i there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and ii intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity

bertrand competition with asymmetric marginal costs this article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory the games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms marginal costs while the standard theory requires the low cost firm to set a price just equal to the high cost firm s marginal cost which is identical across all three games and win the entire market intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs we develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture jel l11 l12 c91 d43

tax effort and oil royalties in the brazilian municipalities abstract this paper estimates a stochastic production frontier to investigate whether municipalities covered by oil royalties in the last decade have reduced their tax effort in brazil the issue is relevant to the prospect of a substantial increase in these revenues and the new rules for distribution of the funds established by law no 12 734 2012 the inputs were provided by personnel and capital expenditures whereas the product was defined as the municipal tax collection with the purpose of overcoming the endogeneity problems due to reverse causality of output on inputs we used the lagged independent variable as instruments in the inefficiency equation the data set is composed of a panel of brazilian municipalities from 2002 to 2011 the results indicate that oil revenues have a negative impact on the estimated efficiencies signaling reduced fiscal effort by the benefiting municipalities

abandoning the concept of renewable energy abstract renewable energy is a widely used term that describes certain types of energy production in politics business and academia renewable energy is often framed as the key solution to the global climate challenge we however argue that the concept of renewable energy is problematic and should be abandoned in favor of more unambiguous conceptualization building on the theoretical literature on framing and based on document analysis case examples and statistical data we discuss how renewable energy is framed and has come to be a central energy policy concept and analyze how its use has affected the way energy policy is debated and conducted we demonstrate the key problems the concept of renewable energy has in terms of sustainability incoherence policy impacts bait and switch tactics and generally misleading nature after analyzing these issues we discuss alternative conceptualizations and present our model of categorizing energy production according to carbon content and combustion the paper does not intend to criticize or promote any specific form of energy production but instead discusses the role of institutional conceptualization in energy policy

vertical tax competition in brazil empirical evidence for icms and ipi in the period 1995 2009 abstract the main objective of this study is to quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the brazilian states considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states using panel data covering 26 brazilian states plus the federal district during the period 1995 2009 two models were estimated representing the average reaction of the states in response to changes in federal tax rates in the first model both levels of government act simultaneously whereas in the second model reaction is sequential with the federal government acting as the leader in defining its effective tax rates the results indicate a positive and significant response of states to increases in the federal tax rate resulting in an over taxation of the common tax base and higher tax rates additional tests show that the first model is the most suitable to represent the problem analysed

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

a unified world oil market regions in physical economic geographic and political space although there is a general consensus that the market is unified here we quantify the factors that create regions by analyzing the price relation between 33 crude oils adf statistics indicate that 447 of the 528 crude oil pairings cointegrate 81 do not the presence absence of cointegration is analyzed using a logit model the likelihood that the prices for two crude oils cointegrate depends on their physical characteristics density and sulfur content economic factors country risk for the nation of origin their geographic location distance between supply ports and political factors opec membership over the sample period the technology to refine heavy crude oils penetrates the market and this reduces the price difference between heavy and light crude oils the effect of country risk implies that crude oils from high risk nations are not perfect substitutes for crude oils of similar quality from low risk nations finally crude oils from widely separated suppliers are more likely to cointegrate than crude oils from near by nations which suggests consumers diversify supply across transportation chokepoints for this sample these sources of regionalization add 0 20 per barrel to the 2 86 average price difference between crude oils in the same market together these factors have important implications for the efficacy of policy aimed at reducing dependence on unreliable suppliers and the spill over effects of holding inventories

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

long term energy services security what is it and how can it be measured and valued abstract the paper reviews some recent approaches towards measuring the extent of long term energy security and security externality valuation it starts out to discuss the contextual connotations of notions of energy security in medium to long term time frames and reviews some indicators that have been proposed to quantify it special attention is paid to two of these approaches which the authors helped to develop i e diversity based indices and the supply demand index the paper takes issue with conventional welfare economic approaches that neglect i the scope on the demand side for raising security and ii negative feedback mechanisms of socio political impacts of international rent transfers in fossil fuels exporting countries the concept of energy services security is proposed with a demand side focus this enables application of an integrated approach to gauge the resilience of a society to meet the needs of its population for energy services over longer timescales ahead from various interrelated perspectives propositions are made on the attribution of security externalities to the use of fossil fuels policies and suggestions for further improvements of measures for energy services security

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

indicators for energy security the concept of energy security is widely used yet there is no consensus on its precise interpretation in this research we have provided an overview of available indicators for long term security of supply sos we distinguished four dimensions of energy security that relate to the availability accessibility affordability and acceptability of energy and classified indicators for energy security according to this taxonomy there is no one ideal indicator as the notion of energy security is highly context dependent rather applying multiple indicators leads to a broader understanding incorporating these indicators in model based scenario analysis showed accelerated depletion of currently known fossil resources due to increasing global demand coupled with increasing spatial discrepancy between consumption and production international trade in energy carriers is projected to have increased by 142 in 2050 compared to 2008 oil production is projected to become increasingly concentrated in a few countries up to 2030 after which production from other regions diversifies the market under stringent climate policies this diversification may not occur due to reduced demand for oil possible benefits of climate policy include increased fuel diversity and slower depletion of fossil resources

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels abstract it is shown that a win stay lose shift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games interaction takes place in many groups markets or locations simultaneously and the aspiration level in each round equals the current population average the class of games includes the prisoner s dilemma and cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

behavioral convergence properties of cournot and bertrand markets an experimental analysis abstract this paper reports an experiment that examines the relative convergence properties of differentiated product cournot and bertrand oligopolies overall bertrand markets tend to converge to nash equilibrium predictions more quickly and more completely than cournot markets further when products are close substitutes bertrand markets respond more quickly to an announced nominal shock as products become weaker substitutes however an increased tendency for tacit collusion degrades convergence in bertrand markets this effect is particularly pronounced following a nominal shock our results suggest that in an oligopoly context variations in decision error costs dominate a strategic substitutes effect isolated in previous experimental research

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

feedback and dynamics in public good experiments in this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and or earnings on contributions and the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game we include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings we find that in the aggregate contributions are lower when feedback on earnings is provided compared to when feedback on contributions is provided we also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback particularly individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions compared to individuals with a lower propensity to contribute

property taxation nash equilibrium and market power abstract differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area following wildasin 4 and bucovetsky 2 the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a nash game in the tax rate the tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

social learning in market games abstract our experiments test the effect of different information settings on firms behaviour in duopoly price and quantity games we find that when players have full information on their rivals choices the imitation rule prevails and such learning behaviour induces more competitive outcomes in the cournot market designs by the same token when information on the average industrial profit is provided there is evidence of an increase in cooperation and the majority of players experiment with new strategies when their payoff falls below the average profit palomino f vega redondo f 1999 dixon h d 2000

cournot versus walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory abstract this paper explores the impact of memory in cournot oligopolies where firms learn through imitation of success as suggested in alchian j polit econ 57 1950 211 and modeled in vega redondo econometrica 65 1997 375 as long as memory includes at least one period the long run outcome corresponds to any quantity between the cournot one and the walras one the evolutionary stability of the walrasian outcome relies on interfirm comparisons of simultaneously observed profits i e whether a firm earns more than others in a given period whereas the stability of the cournot nash equilibrium is derived from intertemporal comparisons of profits for each given firm i e whether a deviation pays off for that firm

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

security independence and sustainability imprecise language and the manipulation of energy policy in the united states abstract this article examines the impact of imprecise terminology on the energy policymaking process in us focusing on the manipulation of discourse by different political economic interests seeking to sway popular opinion using the 2012 us presidential elections as a backdrop the analysis highlights the cooption of the concepts security independence and sustainability in energy debates by different and often opposing interest groups the article s first section traces the malleability of energy terminology to the vagueness of the term energy itself and notes how qualifying words like security independence and sustainability have been selectively exploited to introduce further ambiguity to an already fungible concept the second section notes that while energy is a critical and complex factor of macroeconomic production its main public visibility comes via a few partially representative numbers like gasoline prices this mismatch of broad social importance and piecemeal public understanding enables organized interests to leverage vague terminology in support of particular policy ideas the third section examines three policymaking tools 1 taxation 2 regulation and 3 technology promotion and compares these administrative instruments ultimately the article concludes that loosely defined terminology inhibits energy policy discussion and stifles meaningful public debate over and action on energy issues