a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

media and gridlock abstract i develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism i show that when voters are less informed by media obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party the model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via signaling by contrast the previous literature on causes of gridlock focuses on polarization and other factors the model also makes several auxiliary predictions consistent with recent trends in u s politics

what s my line a comparison of industry classification schemes for capital market research this study compares four broadly available industry classification schemes in a variety of applications common to capital market research standard industrial classification sic codes have been available since 1939 but are being replaced by north american industry classification system naics codes the global industry classifications standard gics sm system jointly developed by standard poor s and morgan stanley capital international msci is popular among financial practitioners whereas the fama and french 1997 algorithm is used primarily by academics our results show that gics classifications are significantly better at explaining stock return comovements as well as cross sectional variations in valuation multiples forecasted and realized growth rates research and development expenditures and various key financial ratios the gics advantage is consistent from year to year and is most pronounced among large firms the other three methods differ little from each other in most applications

earnings manipulation and the cost of capital the cost of capital the widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short term stock price performance this paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm s cost of capital using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle depending on a firm s earnings profile it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times because of this dependence on the state of the economy earnings manipulation can influence a firm s cost of capital despite the forces of diversification

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

implications of power when the ceo can pressure the cfo to bias reports abstract building on archival anecdotal and survey evidence on managers roles in accounting manipulations i develop an agency model to examine the effects of a ceo s power to pressure a cfo to bias a performance measure like earnings this power has implications for incentive compensation reporting quality firm value and information rents predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like sox and the extent to which the ceo s or cfo s incentives significantly impact on earnings management the model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non powerful ceo can extract rents which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between ceo power and excessive compensation

government turnover in parliamentary democracies in this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena 1 cabinet terminations due to replacement or early election 2 cabinet reshuf es 3 minority and surplus governments 4 the relative instability of minority governments

the information content of losses abstract this study hypothesizes that because shareholders have a liquidation option losses are not expected to perpetuate they are thus less informative than profits about the firm s future prospects the results are consistent with the hypothesis they also show that the documented increase in the earnings response coefficent as the cumulation period increases appears to be due exclusively to the effect of losses the liquidation option effect extends to profitable cases where earnings are low enough to make the option attractive alternating explanations for the low informativeness of losses such as mean reversal of earnings are not supported by the tests

the two stage hedonic wage approach a methodology for the valuation of environmental amenities abstract this paper extends the hedonic wage model to a two stage model in which willingness to pay may be estimated for specific amenities in concert with supply relationships which may be estimated independent of the hedonic model these willingness to pay functions allow for the computation of the value of changes in the level of the amenity the technique has several important advantages over other valuation techniques including less stringent data requirements and fewer econometric problems such as intractable identification problems and truncation biases the model is applied to freshwater fishing and benefits associated with changes in fishing quality are estimated both generically and through specific water quality improvements

new estimates of climate demand evidence from location choice abstract we develop and apply to census data a new method for estimating climate demand the method is useful for ranking quality of life based upon a willingness to pay criterion our two major findings are that the willingness to pay quality of life index is correlated with the hedonic approach s ranking but that the migration approach generates much larger estimates of willingness to pay for a more moderate climate this finding is relevant for evaluating the economic impact of global warming

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations abstract this paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts earnings expectations mbe enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations further such a premium to mbe although somewhat smaller exists in the cases where mbe is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management the findings also indicate that the premium to mbe is a leading indicator of future performance this premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the mbe is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

local authority fiscal stance and the pattern of residential migration in the north west of england the degree of fiscal mobility present in household migration flows between local authority areas in northwestern england is assessed following an introduction the paper is divided into three sections the first reviews the methodologies of previous attempts to assess the extent of fiscally induced migration noting the dominance of american studies and outlines a choice theoretic structure within which it is possible to model human migration patterns section iii considers the problems inherent in modelling migration flows and section iv presents results for a compound poisson analysis of migration between local authority areas within the four counties of the north west region of england as well as an assessment of the prevalence of fiscal mobility excerpt

imperfect accounting and reporting bias errors and bias are both inherent features of accounting in theory while errors discourage bias by lowering the value relevance of accounting they can also facilitate bias by providing camouflage consistent with theory we find a hump shaped relation between a firm s propensity to engage in intentional misstatement and the prevalence of unintentional misstatements in the firm s industry for the whole economy and a majority of the industries the result is robust to using firms number of items in financial statements and exposure to complex accounting rules as alternative proxies for errors and to using the restatement amount in net income to quantify the magnitude of bias and errors to directly test for the two effects of errors we show that when errors are more prevalent the market reacts less to firms earnings surprises and bias is more difficult to detect our results highlight the imperfectness of accounting advance understanding of firms reporting incentives and shed light on accounting standard setting

cabinet survival and competing risks we attempt to resolve a recent controversy in the study of cabinet terminations pertaining to the shape of hazard rates on the one hand warwick 1992b provides evidence that cabinets are more likely to terminate the longer they are in office alt and king s 1994 analysis on the other hand suggests that hazard rates are constant over the life time of a cabinet this issue is of particular theoretical importance since a constant hazard rate would add support to the nonstrategic model of cabinet termination due to browne et al 1986 while an increasing hazard rate would seem to favor lupia and strom s 1995 strategic approach by applying a semi parametric competing risk approach to data on cabinet durations we are able to show that through its use of theory based censoring the previous literature in effect analyzed only one mode in which cabinets terminate the case where one cabinet is replaced by another without a new election once cabinet terminations that lead to chamber dissolutions with subsequent elections are analyzed directly we can show that they are governed by a very different stochastic process hazard rates are not flat as in the case of replacements but increase over the life of the government further the covariates governing replacement terminations fail to explain dissolution terminations these findings add support to the strategic approach suggested by lupia and strom

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

procedural choice in majoritarian organizations a puzzling feature of self governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive seemingly nonmajoritarian procedures e g chairs and committees this article provides a theory of self enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures we ask 1 why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place 2 why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter and 3 with what policy consequences in the model a risk averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency i e reduce the procedural uncertainty of free for all bargaining an equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive generating nonmajoritarian policy bias still a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty

executive control and legislative success the higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential governments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary governments superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities we show that this approach is at odds with some of the empirical regularities across and within political systems we then propose a legislative bargaining model to elucidate this puzzle in the model the policies of a confidence dependent parliamentary government enjoy more predictable support from governing coalition members because their short term policy goals are less important than the government s survival coalition support is stronger when the government has more agenda power and is weaker with a larger ruling coalition we explore the empirical implications of these findings and their consequences for the comparative study of legislative institutions

estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility the costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives accounting choice financing decisions and the valuation of equity we present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year s proxy statement or annual report this method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm wide option plans in broad samples of actual and simulated ceo option portfolios we show that these proxies capture more than 99 of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics and is most severe in samples of ceos with a large proportion of out of the money options however the proxies explanatory power remains above 95 in all subsamples

multiyear budgets and fiscal performance panel data evidence abstract in the last two decades more than 120 countries have adopted a multiyear budget process medium term framework or mtf that enables the central government to set multiyear fiscal targets this paper analyzes a newly collected dataset of worldwide mtf adoptions during 1990 2008 it exploits within country variation in adoption in a dynamic panel framework to estimate mtfs impacts on aggregate as well as sectoral measures of fiscal performance we find that on average multiyear budgeting improves budget balance by about 2 percentage points with more advanced mtf phases having a larger impact higher phase mtfs also reduce health spending volatility while only the top phase mtf has a measurable impact on health sector technical efficiency

urbanization in a developing country city size and population composition abstract in developing countries typically there is a very high correlation between city size and educational attainment of the local population which is less pronounced or even absent in developed countries such as canada the u s a or the u k two explanations are examined first the types of goods produced in larger cities require relatively high skill labor inputs second public and perhaps private services demanded by higher skill people are only offered in larger cities the paper econometrically tests these hypotheses for brazil estimating the elasticities of substitution or typically complementarity between high and low skill labor and the bright lights effect for high versus low skill labor

do the right thing incentives for policy selection in presidential and parliamentary systems constitutional structures shape politicians behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the dierent incentives schemes they generate in this paper we analyze these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems the comparison is carried out by analyzing how the two systems may select the ecient policy in presence of asymmetric information presidential and parliamentary systems dier in that the policy proposed by the executive in the parliamentary system is condence depende nt and observable the main ndings suggest that the parliament responds better to the incentive scheme in the presidential system due to the lower uncertainty legislators face over their term limit however the parliamentary system generates a more ecient behavior of the executive due to selection and disciplining eects

bias and the commitment to disclosure this paper studies the propensity of firms to commit to disclose information that is subsequently biased in the presence of other firms also issuing potentially biased information an important aspect of such an analysis is the fact that firms can choose whether to disclose or withhold information we show that allowing the number of disclosed reports to be endogenous introduces a countervailing force to some of the empirical predictions from the prior literature for example we find that as more firms issue reports or as the correlation across firms cash flows increases the firm biases its report less however when we treat firms disclosure choices as endogenous we show that the number of firms that commit to disclose decreases as the correlation across these cash flows increases and this in turn offsets the direct effect of the correlation on bias this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting