does exchange rate variability depress trade flows evidence from error correction models this paper examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade flows of the g 7 countries in the context of a multivariate error correction model the error correction models do not show any sign of parameter instability the results indicate that the exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on the volume of exports in each of the g 7 countries assuming market participants are risk averse these results imply that exchange rate uncertainty causes them to reduce their activities change prices or shift sources of demand and supply in order to minimize their exposure to the effects of exchange rate volatility this in turn can change the distribution of output across many sectors in these countries it is quite possible that the surprisingly weak relationship between trade flows and exchange rate volatility reported in several previous studies are due to insufficient attention to the stochastic properties of the relevant time series copyright 1993 by mit press

theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions this paper reports the results of controlled experiments designed to test the harrisraviv generalization of the vickrey theory of bidding in multiple unit discriminative auctions the paper also discusses further development of the theory in a way suggested by the experimental results to include bidders with distinct risk preferences in a well known paper vickrey 20 formulated a nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in single unit auctions this analysis was subsequently extended in numerous papers vickrey 21 generalized his original model to include multiple unit auctions in which each of n risk neutral bidders can bid on one out of a total of q homogeneous items up for auction where 1 c q n in both of the vickrey papers individual values for the auctioned object s were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution holt 12 and riley and samuelson 19 for single unit auctions and harris and raviv 11 for multiple unit auctions have extended the vickrey model to the case in which valuations are from a general distribution function and all agents have identical concave utility functions this paper reports the empirical properties of individual bidding behavior and seller revenue for a group of 28 laboratory experiments designed to test the harris raviv generalization of the vickrey hereafter vhr model of nash equilibrium behavior in multiple unit discriminative auctions in section i we summarize briefly the theoretical results of the vhr model which form the basis for the hypotheses that we test section ii describes the experimental design that we use section iii describes the experimental results and various tests based on the bidding behavior of individual subjects and on aggregate market seller revenue data the results from six of the ten n q parameter designs reported

are impatient farmers more risk averse evidence from a lab in the field experiment in rural uganda based on data from a field experiment in rural uganda we show that impatient farmers are more risk averse than patient farmers we relied on a simplified version of the convex time budget ctb method to elicit farmers time preferences and on an independent method for eliciting their risk preferences we report two important findings first we show that our simplified ctb method applied to farmers from uganda replicates the key findings of andreoni and sprenger s lab experiments that involved student subjects second we establish the existence of a negative correlation between risk tolerance and impatience based on two independent measures

risk preferences at different time periods an experimental investigation intertemporal decision making under risk involves two dimensions time preferences and risk preferences this paper focuses on the impact of time on risk preferences independent of the intertemporal trade off of outcomes i e time preferences it reports the results of an experimental study that examines how delayed resolution and payment of risky options influence individual choice we used a simple experimental design based on the comparison of two outcome monetary lotteries with the same delay raw data clearly reveal that subjects become more risk tolerant for delayed lotteries assuming a prospect theory like model under risk we analyze the impact of time on utility and decision weights independent of time preferences we show that the subjective treatment of outcomes i e utility is not significantly affected by time in fact the impact of time is completely absorbed by the probability weighting function the effect of time on risk preferences was found to generate probabilistic optimism resulting in a higher risk tolerance for delayed lotteries this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

a rank dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime abstract in a continuous time life cycle model of consumption with an uncertain lifetime we use a non parametric specification of rank dependent utility theory to characterize the preferences of the agent we prove that time consistency holds for a subclass of probability weighting function providing the foundation for a constant rate of time preference that interacts multiplicatively with the hazard rate instead of additively as in the yaari 1965 seminal model we calibrate both models to explain the hump in the life cycle consumption and show that the multiplicative model is more robust

market structure and buyer behaviour price adjustment in a multi object progressive oral auction abstract working within the framework of an english or progressive oral auction with multiple unit trading the study addresses the question of the effect on price behaviour of variations in market size in the sense of the number of equal sized market competitors prices are shown to converge to near competitive equilibrium levels upon replication whatever the market size however by extending the focus of the study beyond equilibrium to the market behaviour revealed during the adjustment or disequilibrium phase of the market it is possible to advance some conjectures on the nature of the equilibrating processes

the ellsberg paradox and risk aversion an anticipated utility approach the paper describes a decision process under which it is rational to prefer a lottery with known probabilities to a similar ambiguous lottery where the decision maker does not know the exact values of the probabilities the ellsberg paradox this is done by modeling ambiguous lotteries as two stage lotteries by assuming the independence axiom without the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and by using the anticipated utility functional this paper also gives conditions under which less ambiguity is preferred and presents some comparative statics analysis as well as some inter personal comparisons finally it proves that within the anticipated utility framework risk and ambiguity are almost identical copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

deviations from purchasing power parity in the long run this paper demonstrates that deviations from purchasing power parity reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data since this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper proposes an alternative explanation which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism this paper will demonstrate that deviations from purchasing power parity ppp reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible exchange rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper therefore proposes an alternative explanation which does not presuppose free trade in goods but which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism the major implication of the theory and the results is that ppp is as likely to be violated in the long as in the short run as an empirical matter deviations from ppp can be observed for most currencies at any instant see kravis et al 21 stockman 37 and genberg 15 among others these deviations are typically both cumulative and persistent the real exchange rate can remain on either side of parity for lengthy but variable time intervals of a year or more as a consequence the current consensus shared

risk preferences are not time preferences balancing on a budget line comment in a recent experimental study of intertemporal risky decision making andreoni and sprenger 2012 find that subjects exhibit a preference for intertemporal diversification which is inconsistent with discounted expected utility theory it was claimed that their results are also at odds with models involving probability weighting such as rank dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory here we demonstrate however that rank dependent probability weighting explains intertemporal diversification if decision makers care about portfolio risk moreover we provide a unified account of all of andreoni and sprenger s key findings

rationalizing hyperbolic discounting abstract we show that if agents are uncertain about their discount rates it may be rational for them to discount the distant future hyperbolically rather than exponentially our findings thus may rationalize a common observation in experimental work which indicates that people discount the future at hyperbolic rates we show that under some assumptions uncertainty over hazard rates may lead to non constant discounting but not imply dynamically inconsistent behavior under other assumptions uncertainty over discount rates can lead to dynamically inconsistent behavior like violating planned consumption profiles by bringing consumption forward

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

winner s curse without overbidding abstract we report the results of a series of second price auction experiments where each bidder s signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error while bidders values differ in one treatment they are the same in another which allows for a direct test of the winner s curse irrespective of confounding factors bidders may also fall prey to a news curse when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated we find that the effects of the winner s curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

working over time dynamic inconsistency in real effort tasks experimental tests of dynamically inconsistent time preferences have largely relied on choices over time dated monetary rewards several recent studies have failed to nd the standard patterns of present bias however such monetary studies contain oftendiscussed confounds in this paper we sidestep these confounds and investigate choices over consumption real eort in a longitudinal experiment we pair this eort study with a companion monetary discounting study we conrm very limited time inconsistency in monetary choices however subjects show considerably more present bias in eort furthermore present bias in the allocation of work has predictive power for demand of a meaningfully binding commitment device therefore our ndings validate a key implication of models of dynamic inconsistency with corresponding policy implications

incentives and careers in academia theory and empirical analysis we study career concerns in italian academia we mould our empirical analysis on the standard model of contests formalised in the multi unit all pay auction the number of posts the number of app

quasi stationary cardinal utility and present bias abstract this note gives an axiomatic foundation for utility exhibiting quasi geometric discounting in addition it introduces a wider class of utility functions satisfying weakened stationarity called quasi stationary utility both are established as von neumann morgenstern utility indices in a model of risk preference

social motives vs social influence an experiment on interdependent time preferences we report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions to this aim we design an intertemporal dictator game to test whether dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched recipients we run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs our descriptive statistics show that heterogeneous social time preferences and information about others time preferences are significant determinants of choices dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of recipients both in the presence of externalities social motives and or when they know about the decisions of their matched partners social influence we also perform a structural estimation exercise to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes as for individual behavior our estimates confirm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting as for social behavior we find that social motives outweigh social influence especially when we restrict our sample to pairs of dictators and recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions

a theory of intergenerational altruism modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long term consequences of current decisions and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism we axiomatically develop a theory of pure direct altruism altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility rather than the mere consumption utility of future generations and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic forward looking preferences whose weight put on the consumption of a future generation generally depends on the consumption of other generations the only preferences lacking this dependence correspond to the quasi hyperbolic discounting model which our theory characterizes our approach provides a framework to analyze welfare in the presence of altruistic preferences and addresses technical challenges stemming from the interdependent nature of such preferences

the collapse of purchasing power parities during the 1970 s one of the striking facts concerning the relationship beiveen prices and exchange rates during the 1970 s has been the dismal performance of the predictions of the simple versions of the purchasing power parity doctrine ppp that doctrine in its absolute version states that the equilibrium exchange rate between domestic and foreign currencies equals the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels the relative version of the doctrine relates equilibrium changes in exchange rates to changes in the ratio of domestic to foreign prices during the 1970 s short run changes in exchange rates bore little relationship to short run differentials in national inflation rates and frequently divergences from purchasing power parities have been cumulative this paper reviews and analyzes the empirical record of exchange rates and prices during the 1970 s and the analysis is based on the experience of the dollar pound the dollar frecch franc and the dollar dm exchange rates section 2 presents the evidence on ppp during the 1970 s and contrasts it with the evidence from the 1920 s a period during which the doctrine held up reasonably well this analysis is relevant for assessing whether the flexible exchange rate system was successful in providing national economies with an added degree of insulation from foreign shocks and whether it provided policymakers with an added instrument for the conduct of macroeconomic policy the evidence regarding devia tions from purchasing power parities is also relevant for determining whether there is a case for managed float section 3 attempts to explain what went wrong with

time tradeoff sequences for analyzing discounting and time inconsistency this paper introduces time tradeoff tto sequences as a general tool to analyze intertemporal choice we give several applications for empirical purposes we can measure discount functions without requiring any measurement of or assumption about utility we can quantitatively measure time inconsistencies and simplify their qualitative tests tto sequences can be administered and analyzed very easily using only pencil and paper for theoretical purposes we use tto sequences to axiomatize quasi hyperbolic discount functions we demonstrate the feasibility of measuring tto sequences in an experiment in which we tested the axiomatizations our findings suggest rejections of several currently popular discount functions and call for the development of new ones it is especially desirable that such discount functions can accommodate increasing impatience

dynamically consistent beliefs must be bayesian abstract experimental evidence such as the ellsberg paradox contradicts the savage model of decision making under uncertainty since the representation of beliefs underlying preferces by a single probability measure leaves no room for the degree of imprecision in information to affect decisions proceeding axiomatically this paper shows that the existence of a bayesain prior is implied even if savage s sure thing principle is deleted if preferences i are based on beliefs and ii admit dynamically consistent updating in response to new information the result raises questions about the appeal of models of preference that feature a separation of tastes and beliefs journal of economic literature classification number d81

is there one unifying concept of utility an experimental comparison of utility under risk and utility over time the nature of utility is controversial whereas decision theory commonly assumes that utility is context specific applied and empirical decision analysis typically assumes one unifying concept of utility applicable to all decision problems this controversy has hardly been addressed empirically because of the absence of methods to measure utility outside the context of risk we introduce a method to measure utility over time and compare utility under risk and utility over time we distinguish between gains and losses and also measure loss aversion in two experiments we found that utility under risk and utility over time differed and were uncorrelated utility under risk was more curved than utility over time subjects were loss averse both for risk and for time but loss aversion was more pronounced for risk loss aversion over risk and time were uncorrelated this suggests that loss aversion although important in both decision contexts is volatile and subject to framing

timing and self control the dual self model of self control with one period lived short run selves is excessively sensitive to the timing of shocks and to the interpolation of additional no action time periods in between the dates when decisions are made we show that when short run selves have a random length of time this excess sensitivity goes away we consider both linear and convex cost of self control models illustrating the theory through a series of examples we examine when opportunities to consume will be avoided or delayed we consider the way in which the marginal interest declines with delay and we examine how preference reversals depend on the timing of information to accommodate the combination of short time periods and convex costs of self control we extend the model to treat willpower as a cognitive resource that is limited in the short run

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

a simple explanation of some key time preference anomalies individual time discounting behaviour experimentally exhibits important anomalies that are inconsistent with the standard discounted utility model these include the time preference reversal characteristic of hyperbolic discounting the magnitude effect and the extreme sign effect i propose a simple explanation of discounting that accounts for these three anomalies simultaneously within the context of the expected utility model with uncertainty risk aversion and preference for precautionary saving experimentalement le comportement individuel dans l escompte du temps revele des anomalies importantes qui cadrent mal avec le modele standard de l utilite anticipee ce sont par exemple le renversement de la preference temporelle qui caracterise le processus d escompte hyperbolique ou l effet de magnitude ou l effet de signe extr me on propose une explication simple du comportement d escompte qui explique simultanement ces trois anomalies dans le cadre du modele d utilite anticipee en presence d incertitude d aversion au risque et de preference pour l epargne de precaution

the all pay auction with nonmonotonic payoff i model innovation contests as an all pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly r d investments and as a result there is no winner in such a case the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid i derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium in the mixed strategy equilibrium the support of the low value bidder is not continuous and both the high value and the low value bidders place an atom in the distinct lower bound of their respective support under symmetric valuation both bidders place an atom at zero these results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest

time inconsistency and welfare program participation evidence from the nlsy we empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation for agents with potentially time inconsistent preferences using panel data on the choices of single women with children from the nlsy 1979 we provide estimates of the degree of time inconsistency and of its influence on the welfare take up decision with these estimates we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future decisions and the potential utility gains from commitment mechanisms such as welfare time limits and work requirements

strotz meets allais diminishing impatience and the certainty effect comment halevy 2008 states the equivalence between diminishing impatience i e quasi hyperbolic discounting and the common ratio effect the present paper shows that one way of the equivalence is false and shows the correct and general relationships diminishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect and that strong diminishing impatience i e hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to the common ratio effect

uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting we propose an evolutionary explanation for the pattern of intertemporal preference reversals often ascribed to hyperbolic discounting we take the view that preferences manifested for example in urges cravings and inclinations are the outcome of evolutionary forces and so will induce animals or humans to make survival maximizing choices in typical decision problems we show that if the typical problem involves payoffs whose realization times are uncertain then optimal preferences give rise to relatively patient behavior when the time horizon is long but induce a switch to impatience when the horizon grows short such reversals do not entail dynamic inconsistency in typical decision problems behavior there is optimal however if a decision maker is confronted with a choice for which the realization time uncertainty falls outside the evolutionary norm her preferences may well prompt her to behave inconsistently we argue that if such a choice problem recurs her evolutionarily endowed aability to learn will lead her to make self commitments against these urges this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

some remarks on quiggin s anticipated utility abstract this remark proves that quiggin s anticipated utility function may solve the allais paradox and the common ratio effect for some generalizations of these it is needed to assume that the decision weight function is concave

does the exchange rate follow a random walk a monte carlo study of four tests for a random walk abstract several authors have urged that real and nominal exchange rates follow a random walk conditions under which the exchange rate follows a random walk are reviewed in this paper many of these do not appear to hold therefore the empirical evidence presents a puzzle some evidence suggets the exchange rate follows a random walk while other evidence suggests the opposite should be true this paper attempts to reconcile the evidence it is argued that the tests for a random walk have low power monte carlo evidence on four tests for a random walk is presented that suppors this claim

contract design and self control with asymmetric information i introduction growing evidence from both experimental and field studies supports the view that people s behavior is often time inconsistent that is people are more impatient in the short run than in the long run laibson 1997 phelps and poliak 1968 such time preference is characterized by hyperbolic discounting where the discount rate declines with time into the future see loewenstein and prelec 1992 for a summary of the empirical evidence of such discounting some scholars argue that hyperbolic discounting even has a biological basis bateson and kacelnik 1996 robson 2001 others try to provide a rationale for hyperbolic discounting azfar 1999 halevy 2008 economists have noticed that such a time inconsistent preference has a profound impact on an individual s economic behavior and consequently on the way contracts will in equilibrium be designed a seminal paper by dellavigna and malmendier 2004 henceforth dm provides a framework to study a situation where a time consistent firm contracts with a time inconsistent consumer strikingly they find that for investment goods 1 by charging a per usage price below marginal cost but a higher entrance fee 2 the firm obtains the same profit as in the case where a consumer has no short run impatience as long as the consumer is sophisticated that is he is fully aware of his time inconsistency problem these findings are based on the assumption that the firm has complete information on the consumer s benefits in practice however a consumer may also hold private information on his own willingness to pay consumption benefit by introducing asymmetric information in the dimension of willingness to pay we find significant changes in the properties of the optimal contract the below marginal cost pricing rule may fail for consumers with low willingness to pay due to an upward distortion on the per usage price because of the trade off between efficiency and information rent extraction for investment goods evidence from field studies supports the co existence of both below and above marginal cost pricing see dellavigna 2009 dellavigna and malmendier 2006 use data from three u s health clubs which offer a choice between two contracts a monthly one with a lump sum fee l around 80 and no payment obviously below marginal cost per visit and a pay per visit contract with a price p of 10 probably above marginal cost their finding of consumer behavior is not consistent with the standard intuition of rationality the subscribers with the monthly contract go to the clubs rarely on average they pay 17 per visit although they could pay 10 per visit with the pay per visit contract the authors explanation is that these consumers are naive that is they are over confident toward future self control however in our article even when facing a population of sophisticated consumers as long as there exists asymmetric information on consumption benefit the firm may offer both below and above marginal cost pricing contracts since the per usage price can serve as a screening device which elicits consumers private information a sophisticated consumer may also buy the annual monthly contract with few attendances especially when he has a high consumption benefit in other words the long run self purchases an expensive commitment device to reduce the marginal cost of a visit from 10 to 0 and induce the impatient short run self to exercise more often more importantly unlike the complete information scenario with sophisticated consumers the firm s profit is no longer unaffected by the consumer s short run impatience interestingly the firm s profit is not monotonic in the consumer s short run impatience when the consumer s self control problem is not very severe that is the consumer is sufficiently patient in the short run the upward distortion on the per usage price prevents the first best discount on it so the short run impatience negatively impacts the firm s profit

decision making over time and under uncertainty a common approach this paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice we begin by demonstrating a one to one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains i e expected utility and discounted utility models we argue that such violations or preference reversals are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice specifically it appears that 1 if we add a constant to all values of an attribute then that attribute becomes less important 2 if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute or if we change the sign of an attribute from positive to negative then that attribute becomes more important the generality of these propositions as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences is discussed

on some international parity conditions an empirical investigation abstract this paper investigates weak semi strong and strong forms of the following international parity conditions a uncovered interest parity b the hypothesis of equal ex ante real interest rates and c ex ante purchasing power parity the main results are as follows using data which roughly cover the 1975 1984 decade we find little evidence in favor of the strong form of the parity conditions under consideration however most test results are consistent with the weak forms finally regarding the semi strong forms the results are mixed

waiting line auctions if prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first come first served basis then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue this choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction an equilibrium for this waiting line auction is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed tender auctions when individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line

dynamic consistency revelations in auctions and the structure of preferences analyzing the optimal bidding behaviour in ascending bid auctions and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values we show that expected utility maximizing behaviour is equivalent to a dynamically consistent bidding in ascending bid auctions b the equivalence of the optimal bids in ascending bid auctions and in second price sealed bid auctions c bidding the value of the object in second price sealed bid auctions in addition the optimal bid in ascending bid auctions equals the value of the object if and only if the bidder s preferences on lotteries are both quasi concave and quasi convex

making book against oneself the independence axiom and nonlinear utility theory an individual with known preferences over lotteries can be led to accept random wealth distributions different from his initial endowment by a sequential process in which some uncertainty is resolved and he is offered a new lottery in place of the remaining uncertainty this paper examines the restrictions that can be placed on an individual s preferences by axioms that stipulate that such a process not be able to generate a new wealth distribution that is prima facie inferior to the original the relationship of these axioms to the independence axiom of von neumann and morgenstern and to the quasi convexity of preferences in the wealth distribution are explored

a comparison of multiple unit all pay and winner pay auctions under incomplete information this article examines the properties of independent private value all pay and winner pay auctions when there are multiple units sold we study bidding behavior efficiency and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions our data show that the all pay auction and the winner pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral bayesian equilibrium our evidence also suggests that the winner pay auction is more likely to lead to a pareto efficient allocation than the all pay auction

strotz meets allais diminishing impatience and the certainty effect abstract decision makers tend to exhibit a higher degree of impatience when considering a delay to an immediate reward than when contemplating an identical delay to an equal future reward this work argues that diminishing impatience originates from the distinction between the certain present and the risky future a simple functional representation of preferences exhibiting time inconsistency when the future is uncertain is derived experimental evidence which is inconsistent with other formulations that account for diminishing impatience supports the proposed approach the new theory uncovers a tight relation between diminishing impatience and well known behavioral regularities in choice under risk and uncertainty jel d12 d81

less fighting than expected experiments with wars of attrition and all pay auctions while all pay auctions are well researched experimentally we do not have much laboratory evidence on wars of attrition this paper tries to fill this gap technically there are only a few differences between wars of attrition and all pay auctions behaviorally however we find striking differences as many studies our experiment finds overbidding in all pay auctions in contrast in wars of attrition we observe systematic underbidding

comment on risk preferences are not time preferences separating risk and time preference andreoni and sprenger 2012a b observe that utility functions are distinct for risk and time preferences and show that their findings are consistent with a preference for certainty we revisit this question in an enriched experimental setting in which subjects make intertemporal decisions under different risk conditions the observed choice behavior supports a separation between risk attitude and intertemporal substitution rather than a preference for certainty we further show that several models including epstein and zin 1989 chew and epstein 1990 and halevy 2008 exhibit such a separation and can account for the overall experimental findings jel c91 d81 d91 risk and time preferences are the cornerstones of economic analyses regarding risk preference expected utility eu has been the predominant theory in which the curvature of the utility index captures risk attitude regarding time preference discounted utility is the most widely used model in which the curvature of the utility index captures intertemporal substitution when risk and time are intertwined integrating the two theories yields discounted expected utility deu which evaluates a contingent consumption plan c c c 3 as follows

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

workaholics and dropouts in organizations this paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in contests in the aggregate the behavior of subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory but we find that such aggregate results mask an unexpected compositional effect on the individual level whereas theory predicts that subject efforts are continuous and increasing functions of ability the actual efforts of our laboratory subjects bifurcate lowability workers drop out and exert little or no effort and high ability workers try too hard this bifurcation which is masked by aggregation can be explained by assuming loss aversion on the part of the subjects jel c92 d44 d72 d82 j31

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

hyperbolic discounting a recursive formulation and an application to economic growth abstract we axiomatize decreasing impatience di in a discrete time setting as originally discussed by prelec and formulate a class of recursively defined discounting functions that conform to di the recursive formulation is used to analyze the ramsey growth problem using dynamic programming techniques

temptation biased preferences for risk and time abstract we introduce a model of temptation biased preferences that generalizes quasi hyperbolic discounting and quasi rank dependent probability weighting the model explains empirically observed interactions between risk and time preferences and empirically observed correlations between expected utility violations and discounted utility violations

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

ambiguity and the corporation group disagreement and underinvestment abstract we study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a utilitarian governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision in this setting we show that i group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent ii dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment and iii the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may in some cases lead to inefficient overinvestment our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups such as corporate boards on firms outcomes and more generally on the difference between group and individual behavior

self control and the theory of consumption to study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty we define and characterize dynamic self control dsc preferences dsc preferences are recursive and separable in economies with dsc agents equilibria exist but may be inefficient in such equilibria steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self control increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self control constant increases the equity premium removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

exchange rate volatility international trade and the value of exporting firms abstract increased exchange rate volatility positively affects the value of exporting firms via the price and volume impacts of exchange rates and also makes an exporting strategy more attractive relative to the direct investment investment in export production capacity could therefore be a positive function of exchange rate volatility firms would also be more willing to sustain losses i e to engage in dumping before they abandon their export markets the effect on the volume and value of trade is ambiguous

rational frenzies and crashes most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a walrasian auctioneer because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later rather than only now or never their current willingness to pay is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is a consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information leading to both frenzies in which demand feeds on itself and crashes in which price drops discontinuously the paper also shows how a result from static auction theory the revenue equivalence theorem can be applied to solve for a dynamic price path

contests with money and time experimental evidence on overbidding in all pay auctions competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest those who spend more time become more likely to obtain the prize we model this competition as an all pay auction under incomplete information and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time in the experiment subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time however they can bid in terms of time to leave early the auction has an all pay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group she must stay for the additional time that she bid we correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all pay auction played with money bids we also consider how two measures of sophistication the cognitive reflection test crt score and performance on a probability calibration task correlate with behavior we find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical and as a consequence average earnings are negative in both auctions thus the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all pay auctions extends to competition in terms of time

all pay auctions and group size grading on a curve and other applications we model contests with a fixed proportion of prizes such as a grading curve as all pay auctions where higher effort weakly increases the likelihood of a prize we find theoretical predictions for the heterogeneous effect auction size has on effort from high and low types we test our predictions in a laboratory experiment that compares behavior in two bidder one prize auctions with behavior in 20 bidder 10 prize auctions we find a statistically significant 11 8 increase in aggregate bidding when moving from the small to large auction the impact is heterogeneous as the auction size increases low types decrease effort but high types increase effort additionally the larger auction provides a stronger rank correlation between effort and ability awarding more prizes to the higher skilled and improving the efficiency of prize allocation

estimating time preferences from convex budgets experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what seems reasonable for economic decision making such high rates are often attributed to present biased discounting a well known bias of standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion to identify concavity researchers find reasonable discounting but at the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature we present a new methodology for identifying time preferences both discounting and curvature from simple allocation decisions we find reasonable levels of both discounting and curvature and surprisingly dynamically consistent time preferences jel c91 d12 d81 understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists marketers and policy makers consumers decide how much to invest in savings education real estate and life insurance how much to diet exercise and smoke whether to marry when to have children and what to leave in their wills while there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data 1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory environments 2 among the many laboratory techniques employed recent studies have favored multiple price lists mpl with monetary payments 3 with mpls individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future the interest rate increases monotonically in a price list such that the point where an individual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval

transaction costs the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving abstract we conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations people may intend to donate but because of the transaction costs of doing so postpone making the payment until they are less busy and having postponed making the donation once keep postponing we conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high we find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations

lessons from a behavioral economics success story comment on theory and experiment what are the questions among the many challenges that smith forthcoming details one that stands out is that theory and experiments face an incompatibility in the following sense theorists propose models which implicitly assume that the situation being modeled is divorced from everything else the individual might encounter either in the past or in the future in essence when they describe the game they preclude consideration of anything outside of the rules experimentalists on the other hand cannot make this implicit assumption while they have taken great pains to construct experiments that reflect as closely as possible the games described by theorists and often these experimental procedures are exceedingly clever they cannot remove subjects pasts or futures consequently economic experiments can never test only the theory they are designed to test instead they must test the theory in conjunction with all of the social cultural and historical baggage that subjects bring with them smith of course is right and his paper provides a call for new research to address this problem there are several directions that this researchmight go one is for experimental economists to somehow refine their procedures to isolate the laboratory from the outside world this after all is the technique used in the natural sciences but one can questionwhether this can ever be achieved for the social sciences an alternative direction is for theorists to write models that do not isolate rational actors from the rest of the world where the first direction lets theorists hold fast and expect experimentalists to adjust the second direction does the opposite something between these two is probably the right answer and indeed such a coordinated approach in which theorists address newmodeling questions and experimentalists change their approach to testing theoretical models was successful in a different part of economics the study of behavior toward risk my purpose here is to drawon the lessons from this successful research agenda and use them to develop a newdirection for experimental work on games

behavior in all pay auctions with incomplete information abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of single unit all pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory we study revenue individual bidding behavior and efficiency in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner pay first price sealed bid auctions we conclude that the all pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk neutral bayesian equilibrium and the winner pay auction bidders decisions move closer to equilibrium levels over time in the auction

risk preferences are not time preferences risk and time are intertwined the present is known while the future is inherently risky this is problematic when studying time prefer ences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present biased behavior we systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment discounted expected utility performs well with risk but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply the data cannot be explained by prospect theory hyperbolic discounting or preferences for resolution of uncertainty but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty the data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences jel c91 d81 d91 understanding individual decision making under risk and over time are two foundations of economic analysis 1 in both areas there has been research to suggest that standard models of expected utility eu and exponential discounting are flawed or incomplete regarding time experimental research has uncovered evidence of a present bias or hyperbolic discounting frederick loewenstein and o donoghue 2002 regarding risk there are number of well documented departures from eu such as the allais 1953 common consequence and common ratio paradoxes an organizing principle behind expected utility violations is that they seem to arise as so called boundary effects where certainty and uncertainty are combined camerer 1992 harless and camerer 1994 and starmer 2000 indicate that violations of expected utility are notably less prevalent when all choices are uncertain this observation is especially interesting when considering decisions about risk taking over time in particular certainty and uncertainty are combined in intertemporal decisions the present is known and certain while the future is inherently risky this observation is problematic if one intends to study time preference in isolation from

experimental comparisons of auctions under single and multi unit demand i introduction the study of multiple unit auctions is important because of their widespread use and the high value of goods sold examples include auctions of u s treasury debt cut flowers wine foreign exchange and other financial and monetary instruments moreover since auctions are often proposed by economists as a method of sale for other goods as in mcmillan 1994 the use of auctions can be expected to increase in the future many different auction rules are used to sell these diverse commodities and auction rule changes are often suggested usually with the intention of increasing revenue or improving the allocations and thus there is a considerable and increasing number of known auction formats evaluating new or comparing different auction mechanisms using field tests can be very costly and risky however experimental methods can and have been used by economists to study the behavioral characteristics of different auction procedures kagel 1995 provides a recent comprehensive survey most experimental studies consider the behavior of auctions when there is a single unit to be sold a few studies such as cox et al 1984 1985 and mccabe et al 1990 1991 study multiple unit auctions in environments in which each bidder demands at most one object from a set of identical objects being sold the studies of smith 1967 belovicz 1979 miller and plott 1985 and burns 1985 consider multi unit demand environments these are environments in which bidders have demand for multiple identical units and are permitted to purchase multiple units of the commodity sold the extension to multi unit demand is important since the presence of multi unit demand is a characteristic of many auctions in the field including all of the examples above in this study we consider the behavior of two types of multi unit auction under both single unit and multi unit demand we construct a laboratory environment which we use to study an english clock ec which is a special type of english auction and a sealed bid auction with lowest accepted bid pricing sb in the sb each bidder pays a per unit price equal to the lowest accepted bid the ec was chosen because it is known to provide highly efficient allocations in auctions of single unit goods and therefore is likely to be suggested for many field applications the sb was chosen because of its widespread use which makes its outcomes a useful basis of comparison for the outcomes of the english clock auction 1 however we do not attempt to represent a particular field situation here instead since our interest is in understanding the basic properties of the auctions we chose an experimental design that enables us to make simple comparisons across treatments and with previous and possibly future studies the design enables us to perform simple testing of game theoretic models in some of the treatments in our view the difference between single and multi unit demand is critical as we discuss in section ii many of the results of auction theory that are valid in single unit demand environments no longer apply in multi unit demand environments suggesting that the observed behavior of auctions might also differ between the two environments therefore we isolate the effects of multi unit demand by conducting single unit demand experiments under identical market demand and supply conditions as the multi unit demand experiments these and other aspects of the experimental design are described in detail in section iii the results and a discussion are given in sections iv and v respectively ii institutions theory and previous studies the english clock auction this variant of the english auction was modeled by milgrom and weber 1982 and studied by mccabe et al 1990 1991 in our version the auction begins with all bidders publicly and simultaneously announcing their initial quantity demanded at price zero if there is excess demand the price is increased by a small increment and the bidders then announce new quantities demanded

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

uncertain lifetime and intertemporal choice risk aversion as a rationale for time discounting this article makes explicit the links between preferences over lotteries on length of life and intertemporal choice it shows that the approach used by traditional life cycle models to account for uncertain survival corresponds to a strong assumption of risk neutrality with respect to length of life relaxing such an assumption leads us to develop a more general formulation of lifetime utility in which time discounting is directly related to preferences over length of life exponential and hyperbolic discounting are found to result in a first approximation from constant and hyperbolic risk aversion with respect to length of life

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press

time consistency stationarity and time invariance a sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic preference reversals between sooner smaller and later larger rewards when the sooner reward could be immediate the theoretically motivated design permits separate identification of time consistent stationary a ndtime invariant choices at least half of the subjects are time consistent but only three quarters of them exhibit stationary choices about half of subjects with time inconsistent choices have stationary preferences these results chal lenge the view that present bias preferences are the main source of time inconsistent choices the past twenty years have seen a surge of interest in time inconsistent preferences mostly this has been motivated by psychological experiments and introspection that have suggested the existence of present bias a decision maker prefers smaller immediate reward to a larger delayed reward but when she is asked about her preferences between these two alternatives when both are equally shifted into the future her preferences are reversed although there is no inconsistency per se in her answers this behavior has been taken to suggest that when the decision maker will be asked to update her choices in the future she will generally deviate from her ex ante plans our goal in the present study is to perform a dynamic preference reversal experiment as such one is required to extend the standard framework of pref erences over temporal payments to a dated collection of such preferences this extension allows us to formally define three distinct properties stationarity im plies that ranking of temporal payments depends only on the time distance and payment distance between the alternatives time invariance assumes that the decision maker evaluates each temporal payment relative to the evaluation pe

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

risk and preference reversals in intertemporal choice abstract this paper argues that observations of non stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual s discount function as we show the observed preference reversals in intertemporal choice are consistent with constant discounting and can alternatively be explained by decreasing absolute risk aversion together with the individual s risk perception this risk may concern the size of the actual outcome or the endowment consumption stream to which the outcome is added both types of uncertainty naturally appear in the context of intertemporal choice we show how relative degrees of changes in risk over time can determine choices