does informative media commentary reduce politicians incentives to pander abstract elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander i e to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn prior to the election whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest this suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices we show that although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent s incentive to pander in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse furthermore in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a yes man suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice we explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies

the out of sample success of term structure models as exchange rate predictors a step beyond abstract a large literature suggests that standard exchange rate models cannot outperform a random walk forecast and that the forward rate is not an optimal predictor of the spot rate however there is evidence that the term structure of forward premia contains valuable information for forecasting future spot exchange rates and that exchange rate dynamics display nonlinearities this paper proposes a term structure forecasting model of exchange rates based on a regime switching vector equilibrium correction model which is novel in this context our model significantly outperforms both a random walk and to a lesser extent a linear term structure vector equilibrium correction model for four major dollar rates across a range of horizons

screening and signaling in communication in this paper we analyze a model of repeated strategic communication between a sender and a receiver the sender has private information on a policy relevant variable but does not know the receiver s motives together with the desire of the sender to please the receiver and the desire of the receiver to be pleased the two sided incomplete information creates an interesting communication problem in which players can choose to use information strategically we analyze various modes of communication which allow for information transmission and we compare them in terms of both the quality of the policy implemented and the welfare of the players

money supply announcements and interest rates another view in this paper i use a new approach to analyze the impact of money supply announcements on the bond market before 1980 the only available work on this subject consisted of a few unpublished papers by conrad 1978 sivesind 1978 and urich 1979 1 more recently published papers by grossman 1981 and urich and wachtel 1981 have appeared roley 1982 extends the grossman study to incorporate data after the federal reserve policy statement of october 6 1979 both grossman and urich and wachtel are primarily concerned with the question of money market efficiency using survey data made available by money market services of san francisco and data on treasury bill yields each finds that the market responds quickly to unanticipated changes in the money supply but that anticipated changes have no effect on interest rates in addition grossman finds that when he adds other variables such as past changes in the money

changing one s mind when the facts change incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols experts often collect and report information over time what reporting protocol elicits the most information here a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability who observes two signals about the state of the world the signals differ in initial quality and unlike previous work differ in quality improvement the paper finds that mind changes inconsistent reports can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster also sequential reports dominate when the principal s decision is very sensitive to information a single report dominates if the mediocre agent s signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre

the wisdom of the minority we consider a simple variant of the canonical model of social learning and show that in many situations it is optimal for an agent to abandon her own information and follow the minority rather than the majority this possibility depends on two economically meaningful requirements agents are differentially informed and observe only the number of agents having chosen each option such as consumers observing only market shares we show that minority wisdom arises when information is sufficiently heterogeneous and the well informed are not overly abundant yet the conditions necessary are not overly restrictive in fact it is possible for the minority to be wise even when the minority consists of a lone dissenter and a majority of citizens are well informed

price formation and liquidity in the u s treasury market the response to public information the arrival of public information in the u s treasury market sets off a two stage adjustment process for prices trading volume and bid ask spreads in a brief first stage the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading the spread widens dramatically at announcement evidently driven by inventory control concerns in a prolonged second stage trading volume surges price volatility persists and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views how do financial markets form prices and provide liquidity when information arrives efforts to address this issue have led to an extensive microstructure literature on equity markets and to a lesser extent on the foreign exchange fx market relatively little work has focused on the u s treasury market however in spite of its importance in its own right and the advantages it offers as an alternative testing ground for microstructure hypotheses

the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates and monetary policy some evidence from asian countries abstractthis article outlines a panel data approach to modelling the term structure of interest rates in the short and in the long run we find robust evidence supporting the expectations hypothesis of the term structure ehts for a small sample of asian emerging markets furthermore we detect some relevant differences in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the existence of a mccallum 2005 rule no exogeneity of monetary policy to the yield curve in some countries finally we document the influence of an international global factor i e a time varying global risk premium on the yield curve while local country specific factors are not statistically significant

economic news exchange rates and interest rates the paper esamines the post october 1979 response of exchange rates and interest rates to the new information contained in the first announcement of fifteen us macroeconomic series illarkets respond primarily to monetary news but also to news about the trade deficit domestic inflation and variables that reflect the state of the business cycle for all fifteen macroeconomic variables an increase decrease in interest rates is accompanied by an appreciation depreciation of the dollar which is consistent with models that stress price rigidity and absence of purchasing power parity the effect of economic news on asset prices has received increasing attention in the economic literature because an outcome of the efficient markets rational expectations hypothesis is that flesible asset prices change the moment new information about future fundamentals arrives in the market in the exchange rate literature the role of news has gained importance because structural models have failed to predict most of the variation in exchange rates during the 1970s see imeese and rogoff 1983 researchers were naturally led to investigate the types of news that make exchange rates so volatile and to utilize news in order to test which model of exchange rate determination is consistent with the floating eschange rate experience notable studies are those of dornbusch 1980 frenkel 1981 edwards 1982a b 1983 copeland 1984 and rose 1984 in this paper i also examine the effects of macroeconomic news on eschange rates but i adopt a different more direct strategy one that complements previous work avoids some of its shortcomings and promises interesting conclusions i examine the instantaneous response of exchange rates the moment a piece of economic news hits the market if one can isolate the exact time during a business day when news arrives it is straightforward to examine the response of exchange rates because financial data are continuously available the advantages of the present methodology are many first it is possible to identify the exact types of economic news and how they affect exchange rates second the simultaneity bias which plagues the previous literature on exchange rates and news is not present here the independent variables that represent news can be interpreted as causal the paper was presented at the 1985 meeting ofthe american economic association the author wishes to thank sebastian edwards r w hafer nicholas karamouzis andrew rose and two anonymous referees for helpful comments kim rupert of the money market services for providing the survey data soo kounne for able research assistance and barnard college for research support

predictability in financial markets what do survey expectations tell us abstract there is widespread evidence of excess return predictability in financial markets for the foreign exchange market a number of studies have documented that the predictability of excess returns is closely related to the predictability of expectational errors of excess returns in this paper we investigate the link between the predictability of excess returns and expectational errors in a much broader set of financial markets using data on survey expectations of market participants in the stock market the foreign exchange market the bond market and money markets in various countries the results are striking first in markets where there is significant excess return predictability expectational errors of excess returns are predictable as well with the same sign and often even with similar magnitude this is the case for foreign exchange stock and bond markets second in the only market where excess returns are generally not predictable the money market expectational errors are not predictable either these findings suggest that an explanation for the predictability of excess returns must be closely linked to an explanation for the predictability of expectational errors

international interest rates and us monetary policy announcements evidence from hong kong and singapore this paper investigates the responses of market interest rates to us monetary policy announcements for the us and two emerging economies hong kong and singapore which are similar on many respects but have experienced opposite exchange rate regimes in the last twenty years our results based on market expectations extracted from federal fund futures rates document that fomc announcements significantly affect the term structure of interest rate in the us and both asian countries further international interest rate differentials around fomc meeting dates tend to be negative for short maturities with the impact gradually dissipating as bond maturity increases finally for the case of singapore we find that domestic interest rates react to both external and domestic monetary policy announcements with a magnitude that is larger over the full bond maturity spectrum for domestic announcements these results are robust to time varying futures risk premia and alternative measures of interest rates expectations

the fed and short term rates is it open market operations open mouth operations or interest rate smoothing abstract it is widely believed that the fed controls the federal funds rate by altering the degree of pressure in the reserve market through open market operations when it changes its target for the funds rate recently however several analysts have suggested that the fed need not conduct open market operations to change the funds rate rather they argue it is sufficient that the fed indicate its desire for the funds rate this paper notes that there is yet a third alternative the interest rate smoothing hypothesis that suggests that the fed does not move rates per se but rather smooths the transition of rates to the new equilibrium required by economic shocks this paper tests the open market and open mouth alternatives using a methodology first used by cook and hahn journal of monetary economics 1989a 331 finding no evidence that either open market operations or open mouth operations can account for the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target a variety of evidence consistent with the interest rate smoothing hypothesis is considered the results suggest that many changes in the fed s funds rate target are an endogenous response to economic events and suggest that an alternative way to identify exogenous changes in policy is to identify exogenous changes in the fed s funds rate target

why interest rates rise when an unexpectedly large money stock is announced ment of an unexpectedly large growth in the money supply will lead to an immediate increase in interest rates this announcement effect is often taken as confirmation of the monetarist view that the way to bring down interest rates even in the short run is to reduce the rate of money growth in this paper we provide an alternative explanation of the announcement effect that is consistent with the keynesian view that in the short run the way to bring down interest rates is to expand the money supply we do not address the issue of inflationary expectations in a formal way though in the long run we would expect the well known fisher effect to hold looking closely at the announcement effect it is clear that whatever may be the true short run relationship between money growth and interest rates it cannot be inferred from a simple correlation of announcements of changes in the money stock with the resulting changes in interest rates this is because of several properties of the announcement phenomenon that we capture in the model

the handbook of international macroeconomics preface 1 introduction rick van der ploeg amsterdam 2 quantity constrained models of open economies neil rankin warwick 3 imperfect competition and open economy macroeconomics huw d dixon york 4 relative price movements in dynamic general equilibrium models of international trade david backus nyu patrick kehoe pennsylvania and finn kydland carnegie mellon 5 international fiscal policy coordination and competition assaf razin and efraim sadka tel aviv 6 capital taxation in the world economy a lans bovenberg tilburg 7 history of the international monetary system implications for research in international macroeconomics and finance barry eichengreen berkeley 8 on inflation unemployment and the optimal exchange rate regime george alogoskoufis athens 9 macroeconomic policy speculative attacks and balance of payments crisis pierre richard agenor and robert p flood imf 10 continuous time models of exchange rates and intervention giuseppe bertola princeton 11 stylized facts of nominal exchange rate returns casper g de vries leuven 12 partial versus general equilibrium models of international capital market equilibrium 13 sovereign debt kenneth kletzer santa cruz 14 growth and external debt daniel cohen cepremap 15 growth and deficits in an interdependent world index

the evolution of managerial expertise how corporate culture can run amok this paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate dynamically when workers become managers managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time raising investment distortions and reducing output if firms select managerial expertise strategically efficient investments can be retrieved when a identifying whether workers skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers and b initial investment distortions are small otherwise such strategic design worsens long run outcomes finally we determine when short run affirmative action policies are effective

ex ante versus ex post optimal promotion rules the case of internal promotion i introduction the literature on promotion practices within the firm identifies two distinct roles for a firm s promotion policies promotions serve both as a way for the firm to efficiently assign workers to tasks and as a way for the firm to reward prior performance 1 in this article i explore the time inconsistency problem that arises as a result of the dual nature of the promotion decision in particular i show that the common practice of favoring internal candidates for promotion can be understood as a response by firms to the problem of time inconsistency 2 consider a firm in which promotions serve as a reward for prior expenditures of effort and or prior investments in human capital the optimal promotion policy for this firm depends on the time frame from which we view the problem the ex ante optimal promotion rule is the optimal rule when the problem is viewed from a date prior to young workers deciding to work at this firm this rule takes into account both the assignment aspects of the promotion decision and that promotions serve as a reward for prior performance there is a second relevant rule however because at the date of the promotion decision the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance are in the past for example in a world where the possibility of future promotion serves to increase the effort levels of young workers by the time of the promotion decision those effort choices have already been made hence the ex post optimal rule only takes into account the assignment aspects of the promotion decision the time inconsistency problem that arises is now clear total profits are maximized when the firm follows the ex ante optimal promotion rule but in the absence of commitment this is not how the firm behaves at the time of the promotion decision the firm has an incentive to ignore the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance and instead follow the ex post optimal rule in other words the profits of the firm are decreased because at the time of the promotion decision the firm maximizes current profits and the anticipation of this behavior by workers has deleterious effects on behavior in prior periods in this article i explore a specific example of this time inconsistency problem consider a firm s decision concerning whether to fill a managerial position by promotion from within or by hiring an outsider i show that when confronted with this decision the firm faces the exact situation described that is the ex post optimal rule shows no preference for promotion from within over hiring from the outside whereas the ex ante optimal rule exhibits a preference for promoting from within the logic here is that the possibility of receiving the higher managerial wage in the future reduces the wage required to attract young workers into the firm but only the ex ante optimal rule takes this into account the result is that in the absence of commitment the firm hires from the outside too often the conclusion is that the establishment of an internal labor market in which the firm favors promotion from within can be understood as a way that the firm avoids this time inconsistency problem this result extends a finding in malcomson 1984 that article also shows that an internal labor market in which hiring from the outside is restricted can arise in a world where promotion serves as a reward for prior performance in that work however there is no time inconsistency problem the reason is that malcomson assumes workers are homogeneous and thus at the time of the promotion decision it is weakly optimal for the firm to have all promotions be from within in contrast i assume that workers are heterogeneous and find that if the firm maximizes ex post profits it lowers total profits the result is an internal labor market that not only limits hiring from the outside but also constrains the firm to behave in a manner different from that which maximizes profits at the time the promotion decision is made

publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent evidence from the us federal reserve transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers we consider one potential cost the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions we construct a model that compares incentives for members with career concerns to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private we test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee asking whether the fomc s 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent we find evidence that this is indeed the case there has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency in agency relationships both in and outside of government while research has attempted to model this issue theoretically there has been less progress with empirical tests a problem due no doubt in large part to the fact that it is difficult to make before and after comparisons of a shift in transparency often no data are available on an agent s actions prior to the establishment of transparency in this article we focus on one specific type of transparency publishing verbatim transcripts of committee meetings and one specific reason why this type of transparency might not be desirable the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a committee will suffer if the deliberations take place in public we develop a theoretical model that helps to identify the potential costs of this type of transparency and we then test the model empirically using an original dataset on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc our dataset is unique in that it records views expressed by policymakers at fomc meetings and not just their official votes our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed effect of the institutional change that occurred in 1993 when the fomc decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years transparency is a particularly relevant issue in monetary policy because it is commonly argued that when central banks take actions such as publishing macroeconomic forecasts revealing individual votes on monetary policy committees or releasing minutes of meetings this will lead to improved economic outcomes while simultaneously facilitating democratic accountability 1

the impacts of hong kong s currency board reforms on the interbank market abstract among the economies with a currency board system cbs hong kong hk is probably the one with the largest and most developed financial sector as well as the highest capital mobility hence studying hk s cbs is not only crucial to hk but also important for the understanding of the modern cbs this paper outlines the major monetary reforms in hk since the late 1980s the impacts of these reforms and the 1997 1998 asian financial crisis are then examined empirically we focus on the differentials between the us and hk interbank interest rates we assume the conditional mean equation follows an autoregressive process and the conditional variance equation follows a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity process this model captures the time varying level and volatility of the differential in light of the empirical results we provide an assessment of the reforms in hk

well informed intermediaries in strategic communication this paper studies how a sender with private information can influence the decisionmaker through well informed intermediaries both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased with the objective type assumed to pass on the most accurate information while the biased type wanting to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective although using one s own information is a sign of objectivity the biased intermediary selectively incorporates the sender s information to push his agenda and his truth telling incentives always decrease in those of the biased sender s hence measures raising the sender s reputation cost worsen the intermediary s distortion and may make the decisionmaker strictly worse off in contrast the biased sender s and the intermediary s truth telling incentives are strategic complements if they report simultaneously

ingratiation experimental evidence we investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity both individuals performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover in some treatments first movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover we find evidence of high ingratiation indices as opinion conformity is rewarded however second movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be manipulated strategically introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces ingratiation introducing performance related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely reducing the noise in the measurement of ability has little effect

global liquidity transmission to emerging market economies and their policy responses abstract this paper analyzes the transmission of global liquidity gl from advanced economies aes to emerging market economies emes we distill gl momenta from the macro financial data of aes through a factor model and identify them with sign restrictions as policy driven market driven and risk averseness factors using a panel factor augmented var analysis we then investigate eme responses to shocks to gl momenta a positive shock to policy driven liquidity boosts growth in emes elevating stock prices and currency values while a shock to risk averseness has a largely opposite effect a market driven gl expansion boosts stock markets and lowers funding costs increasing competitiveness and current account balance inflation targeting emes are found to fare better than emes under alternative regimes in terms of macro financial volatility

political accountability and sequential policymaking abstract we develop a model of political accountability with sequential policymaking when a bureaucrat s actions are transparent his overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policymaking process as a result the bureaucrat s equilibrium behavior overemphasizes later tasks if the overseer knows the technology by which policies translate into outcomes then she can eliminate these distortions using task specific budget caps however if the overseer is uncertain about this technology such budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency when uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential the overseer prefers an institutional environment with a fungible budget and no transparency such an environment allows the overseer to exploit the bureaucrat s expertise though at the cost of weaker overall incentives

the effects of money announcements under alternative monetary control procedures the response of interest rates to money announcement surprises is theoretically exam ined in this paper in the models developed not only changes in oper ating procedures but also reserve requirement systems are found to potentially affect the response the response also varies depending o n the desired degree of monetary control moreover under the current two week contemporaneous reserve requirements adopted in february 19 84 the responses in the first and second weeks of the two week reser ve maintenance period may differ previous empirical results conform to the predictions of the theoretical models copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

transparency in agency the constant elasticity case and extensions this paper considers a hidden action agency problem where the principal has a single source of hidden information concerning the agent s utility the agent s effort productivity or the agent s cost of effort we examine whether the principal should precommit to disclosing these different single sources of information to the agent if the optimal contract is invariant over the hidden information and thus the disclosure rules constant elasticity case such disclosure increases the agent s utility it can raise or lower profit and total surplus depending on the source of hidden information and non disclosure can be optimal if disclosure affects the agent s motivation if the contract varies with the hidden information and thus disclosure rule disclosure or non disclosure can be optimal depending on whether the party s payoff is convex or concave in the information variable respectively

domestic macroeconomic news and foreign interest rates abstract this study examines the impact of us and uk news on futures prices of us uk german and japanese government bonds we find that certain us information has a significant influence on german japanese and british interest rates while uk information has almost no effect on foreign rates second we examine the foreign term structure to investigate whether the importance of us information arises because it either signals common world wide shocks or induces an anticipated exchange rate stabilization by foreign central banks the evidence is mixed except for the us cpi surprise which appears to provide information about a common world wide shock g15

futures prices as risk adjusted forecasts of monetary policy many researchers have used federal funds futures rates as measures of financial markets expectations of future monetary policy however to the extent that federal funds futures reflect risk premia these measures require some adjustment in this paper we document that excess returns on federal funds futures have been positive on average and strongly countercyclical in particular excess returns are surprisingly well predicted by macroeconomic indicators such as employment growth and financial business cycle indicators such as treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads excess returns on eurodollar futures display similar patterns we document that simply ignoring these risk premia significantly biases forecasts of the future path of monetary policy we also show that risk premia matter for some futures based measures of monetary policy shocks used in the literature

currency substitution and the demand for money some evidence for canada recently the possibility that foreign and domestic currencies are substitutes has received considerable attention see 1 2 3 10 19 21 currency substitution has important implications for the working of flexible exchange rates if the degree of currency substitution is high small changes in the money supply would induce large changes in the exchange rate furthermore currency substitution would transmit the effect of monetary disturbances from one country to another indeed significant currency substitution would seriously undermine the ability of flexible exchange rates to provide monetary independence this paper examines the empirical importance of currency substitution in the framework of the demand function for money if currency substitution is important the expected change in the exchange rate should be a significant determinant of the demand for home currency in section 2 we undertake such a test for the canadian demand for money during the recent flexible exchange rate period there is considerable evidence that the forward exchange rate is a good measure of the expected exchange rate our own tests confirm these results for canadian data since 1970

careerist experts and political incorrectness abstract while political correctness is a dominant norm in many public situations we also observe behaviors that are apparently politically incorrect often from professionals and experts this paper examines the flip side of political correctness as analyzed in morris 2001 to shed some light on the elusive notion of political incorrectness and elucidate its equilibrium and welfare properties we show that there are circumstances in which unbiased experts deliberately take a politically incorrect stance out of reputational concerns and identify key elements which give rise to this perverse reputational incentive the results suggest that political incorrectness cannot necessarily be viewed as a sign of blunt honesty when informed experts have long term reputational concerns we also examine the welfare consequences of political incorrectness and argue that this form of information manipulation can be beneficial under some conditions

shock effects on stocks bonds and exchange rates abstract tick data and newswire searches are used to find events that led to large and rapid price changes in a stock future a bond future and three exchange rate futures knowledge of these events may be useful in future work they have the advantages that they are truly surprises and that the sign of their effect on each financial instrument is known the events are used in this study to analyze the effects of three types of events monetary price and real on the five instruments

the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market interest rates in the 1970s abstract this paper examines the influence of monetary policy on interest rates by estimating the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target the federal reserve s policy instrument on market interest rates in the 1970s we find that changes in the target caused large movements in short term rates and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long term rates we hypothesize that the similarity of the reactions of three six and twelve month rates to changes in the target offers a possible explanation for the lack of support for the expectations theory from studies that have tested the theory using these rates

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

money supply announcements interest rates and foreign exchange abstract this paper presents a test of the joint hypothesis that money supply announcements affect the real interest rate and that changes in the real interest rate affect the exchange rate in the short run the test results are consistent with the joint hypothesis for example it is found that announcement of an unexpected jump in the money supply is accompanied by an increase in interest rates and an appreciation of the dollar if the rise in interest rates was entirely due to higher inflationary expectations the dollar should not appreciate

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

a theory of self fulfilling political expectations abstract in their pursuit of being re elected politicians might not choose high quality policies but just conform to popular wisdom the larger are the office spoils and the more precise is an incumbent s knowledge of voter opinion the more likely that she will resort to such populism my main result is that the public s trust or distrust in politicians behavior may be self fulfilling when voters assess the quality of an incumbent politician they will compare her policy choices with their own prior opinion if voters think that the incumbent was just trying to conform a failure to do so will be even more damaging for the incumbent s election chances however this only increases the incumbent s incentives to conform which indeed confirm voters skepticism loosely put a skeptic voter attitude tends to generate conformist politicians while a trusting attitude tends to generate confident ones

currency substitution and speculative attacks on a currency board system abstract a currency board arrangement cba is supposed to be robust against attacks currency substitution complicates life with controversial implications for floating versus fixed exchange rate regimes after reporting evidence of currency substitution in hong kong a monetary model incorporating currency substitution is used to estimate the shadow exchange rate and the probability of speculative attack on the hong kong dollar a decomposition analysis of a markov switching model indicates that the no attack regime was the most durable one this implies that hong kong s quasi cba was relatively robust against both speculative attacks and currency substitution

a political theory of populism when voters fear that politicians may have a right wing bias or that they may be in uenced or corrupted by the rich elite signals of true left wing conviction are valuable as a consequence even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses populist policies i e policies to the left of the median voter as a way of signaling that he is not from the right truly right wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate or even left of center policies this populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o ce is higher for the politician when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right wing politicians when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right wing agenda when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive when politicians are more forward looking and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent we show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or in uenced through other non electoral means by the rich elite we also show that soft term limits may exacerbate rather than reduce the populist bias of policies

the impact of ecb and fed announcements on the euro interest rates abstract we investigate the impact of news in the ecb and fed monetary policy announcements on daily changes in euro interest rates we document significant impacts of ecb announcements throughout the period but only until mid 2004 of fed announcements

choosing children s environmental risk a model of endogenous risk provides a foundation to study a parent s child care decisions when the child could be exposed to an environmental hazard e g toxic substance foodborne pathogen the parent invests in childcare quality and quantity to reduce the likelihood of a hazard exposure occurring and to reduce its severity if the exposure is realized we supply conditions to sign unambiguously the effects on a child s hazard exposure of an increased probability a parent fails to access or have command over a technique of exposure prevention or that a technique is ineffective in preventing exposure also we consider these effects when the parent is unsure what a technique can do to reduce the child s probability of exposure we conclude public policies designed to encourage use of a particular childcare technique if childcare quality and quantity are stochastic substitutes can reduce parental use of other techniques the net impact of the policy could increase the chance the child suffers

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

the value of socialized medicine the impact of universal primary healthcare provision on mortality rates in turkey abstract this paper examines the impact of universal free and easily accessible primary healthcare on population health as measured by age specific mortality rates focusing on a nationwide socialized medicine program implemented in turkey the family medicine program fmp launched in 2005 assigns each turkish citizen to a specific state employed family physician who offers a wide range of primary healthcare services that are free of charge furthermore these services are provided at family health centers which operate on a walk in basis and are located within neighborhoods in close proximity to the patients to identify the causal impact of the fmp we exploit the variation in its introduction across provinces and over time our estimates indicate that the fmp caused the mortality rate to decrease by 25 6 among infants 7 7 among the elderly and 22 9 among children ages 1 4 these estimates translate into 2 6 1 29 and 0 13 fewer deaths among infants the elderly and children ages 1 4 respectively furthermore the effects appear to strengthen over time we also show evidence to suggest that the fmp has contributed to an equalization of mortality across provinces finally our calculations indicate that each family physician saves about 0 15 0 46 and 0 005 lives among infants the elderly and children ages 1 4 per province every year

currency substitution and instability in the world dollar standard comment myron ross correctly points out in his comment that u s price inflation is better predicted by the american money supply mlus than by the broader ten country world money supply mlw over the whole statistical time series from 1960 to 1980 provided in mckinnon s 1982 article specifically he showed that american price inflation is more highly correlated with mlus lagged one or two years than with mlw similarly lagged however mckinnon s present tense assertion that in general growth in the world money supply is a better predictor of american price inflation than is american money growth applies only to the weak dollar standard of the 1970 s and early 1980 s as his preceding discussion intended but failed to indicate clearly only in this later period of volatile exchange rates and price level instability in the united states do alternative hard currencies such as the yen and deutsche mark become competitive as international stores of value and units of account hence international currency substitution associated with the ebb and flow of speculation against or for the dollar significantly destabilized the demand for mlus in the 1970 s and 1980 s and only in this later period might one expect the sum of these internationally substitutable monies ml to predict world and perhaps even american price inflation better than does mlus in contrast during the strong dollar standard of the 1950 s and 1960 s the dollar was unchallenged as international money exchange rates were by and large convincingly fixed speculation for or against the dollar was incapable of substantially altering u s interest rates or of directly affecting the demand for mlus because cyclical international influences did not then destabilize the demand for dollars mlus was by itself a fairly efficient predictor of american prices thus ross s statistical results for the period 1960 to 1980 show somewhat greater predictive strength in mlus compared to ml because the 1960 s data outweigh the dissimilar data of the 1970 s let us instead partition the sample of imf data around the year 1970 whence began the transition from fixed to fluctuating exchange rates and the maturation of alternative monetary systems in europe and japan after applying similar statistical correlation procedures to those used by ross we show a striking structural shift in the world s monetary system the explanatory power of mlw increases sharply as that of mlus declines moderately tan 1982 for the early period of 1960 to 1970 table 1 shows simple correlation coefficients between annual percentage changes in money supplies and changes in american and world wholesale price indices the mlus provides a good explanation of u s prices and of world prices one to two years hence whereas the broader definition of mlw in which mlus enters with a 50 percent weight does surprisingly poorly being insignificantly correlated with american or world prices apparently money growth in industrial countries other than the united states was not then an independent source of worldwide inflationary pressure during the strong dollar standard table 2 shows the same simple correlations between percentage changes in prices and money for the weak dollar standard of stanford university please note that a typographical error giving the last word in the original title as market appeared on the cover of the june 1982 issue of this review the title was correct in the table of contents and on the article

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

the market for evaluations recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations the authors present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations the mechanisms overcome three major challenges first evaluations which are public goods are likely to be underprovided second an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise and third the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations

the roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts we analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts the information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo we show that it is optimal to publicly disclose both the expert s contribution and his identity surprisingly revealing the intensity of the expert s bias doesn t always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium the presence of a second expert raises the first expert s incentives to report truthfully when reports are public but reduces them when they are secret in particular having an option to call another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public finally sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are public but raises it when they are secret

hiding information in electoral competition abstract we model a two candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy relevant state of the world the candidates receive private signals about the true state which are imperfectly correlated we study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms our results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate s prior information transmission becomes more difficult the less correlated are the candidates signals the lower is the signals quality and the stronger is the electorate s prior indeed for weak priors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger and welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated

dictators and their viziers endogenizing the loyalty competence trade off the possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history more competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler to avoid this rulers especially those who are weakandvulnerable sacrificethecompetenceoftheiragents hiringmediocrebutloyalsubordinates furthermore any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator s own survival we endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings the dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face jel d72 h00 c72 c82

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

monetary policy and market interest rates this thesis contains four chapters each of which examines different aspects of the uncertainty facing monetary policymakers monetary policy and market interest rates investigates how interest rates set on financial markets respond to policy actions taken by the monetary authorities the reaction of market rates is shown to depend crucially on market participants interpretation of the factors underlying the policy move these theoretical predictions find support in an empirical analysis of the u s financial markets predicting monetary policy using federal funds futures prices examines how prices of federal funds futures contracts can be used to predict policy moves by the federal reserve although the futures prices exhibit systematic variation across trading days and calendar months they are shown to be fairly successful in predicting the federal funds rate target that will prevailafter the next meeting of the federal open market committee from 1994 to 1998 monetary policy with uncertain parameters examines the effects of parameter uncertainty on the optimal monetary policy strategy under certain parameter configurations increasing uncertainty is shown to lead to more aggressive policy in contrast to the accepted wisdom should central banks be more aggressive examines why a certain class of monetary policy models leads to more aggressive policy prescriptions than what is observed in reality these counterfactual results are shown to be due to model restrictions rather than central banks being too cautious in their policy behavior an unrestricted model taking the dynamics of the economy and multiplicative parameter uncertainty into account leads to optimal policy prescriptions which are very close to observed federal reserve behavior

the information content of discount rate announcements what is behind the announcement effect abstract a considerable volume of research shows that asset prices respond to changes in the federal reserve s discount rate while several competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the market s response to discount rate announcements comparatively little effort has been made to differentiate among alternative hypotheses the result is an abundance of evidence establishing that asset prices respond to discount rate announcements but little if any agreement about why markets respond this article attempts to fill a void in the literature by pointing out how competing hypotheses differ and by constructing tests explicitly designed to differentiate among competing explanations the evidence suggests that the market s reaction to discount rate changes is purely an announcement effect i e a reaction to new information contained in the announcement that the direct effect of discount rate changes on market rates is nil that the announcement effect is invariant to the federal reserve s operating procedure and that generally speaking changes in the discount rate do not signal a change in monetary policy the announcement effect appears to vary with both the nature and extent of the information that the announcement of a discount rate change is believed to contain

do formal salary systems really matter drawing on a single large u s corporation s personnel records for the years 1989 93 the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms they find that this firm s practices were consistent with most of the important conclusions of prior empirical research on internal labor markets the system was highly centralized covering salary levels salary ranges raises and bonuses supervisors had little discretion over pay other than through subjective performance ratings the firm held fairly strictly to the salary rules leading to observable constraints on pay for employees near the top of the salary range these constraints however apparently did not impose important costs on the firm in the form of increased turnover although the system operated without any apparent connection to external factors the authors conclude that it transmitted external labor market forces with little distortion

the fed and interest rates a high frequency identification we measure monetary policy shocks as changes in the fed funds target rate that surprise bond markets in daily data these shock series avoid the omitted variable time varying parameter and orthogonalization problem of monthly vars and do not impose the expectations hypothesis we find surprisingly large and persistent responses of bond yields to these shocks 10 year rates rise as much as 8 10 of a percent to a one percent target shock the usual view that monetary policy only temporarily raises long term rates and influences inflation would lead one to predict a negative long rate response this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

gmm estimates of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar this paper investigates the empirical strength of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar euler equations implied by a small open economy money in the utility function model are estimated and tested by hansen s generalized method of moments procedure the major empirical finding is that both the elasticity of currency substitution and the share of u s currency in the production of canadian liquidity services are economically small even though the combined domestic and u s real balances appear to provide statistically significant economizing on transactions costs copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

pandering to persuade a principal chooses one of multiple projects or an outside option an agent is privately informed about the projects benets and shares the principal s preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option we show that for moderate outside option values strategic communication is characterized by pandering the agent biases his recommendation toward conditionally better looking projects even when both parties would be better o with some other project a project that has lower expected value can be conditionally better looking we develop some comparative statics of pandering pandering is also induced by an optimal mechanism without transfers

currency substitution under nonexpected utility some empirical evidence this paper derives and tests the restrictions implied by an optimizing model of currency substitution under nonexpected utility using quarterly data for israel from 1978 to 1988 we find that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one the elasticity of currency substitution is greater than one relative risk aversion is about seven and the elasticity of currency substitution is greater than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and liquidity services in most cases the evidence supports the hypothesis of nonexpected utility as well as the inclusion of liquidity services in the representative agent s objective function the methodology of this paper can be applied to other interesting cases of currency substitution copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

managing exchange rate crises evidence from the 1890s abstract this paper investigates the effectiveness of the monetary authority s borrowing policies in resolving exchange rate cises it shows why obtaining loans or lines of credit in foreign currency may avoid at least temporarily the devaluation of a fixed rate and discusses the problem of the optimal size of the loan and or the line of credit the analysis focuses on a particular episode of foreign exchange rate pressure during the troubled years between 1894 to 1896 the results suggest that the borrowing policy followed by the us treasury in those years was effective in avoiding the collapse of the united states gold standard and that the amount of the borrowing undertaken by the treasury might have been optimal

money supply announcements and market reactions in an open economy an open economy model of the money supply announcement financial market reaction phenomenon under policy anticipations is formulated whose major divergence from earlier models is the prediction that short term interest rate movements need not be positively correlated with unexpectedly high monetary growth while at variance with the most consistent empirical regularity in the united states this prediction in fact accords with previous empirical findings for both the united kingdom and canada copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

on the derivation of monetary policy shocks should we throw the var out with the bath water this paper considers an alternative econometric approach to the standard var methodology for identifying and estimating the effects of monetary policy shocks the alternative approach makes more reasonable assumptions about economic agents information set by 1 restructuring the var variables according to what data are actually observable in each point in time and 2 augmenting the var model with available measures of market participants expectations of various economic variables thus increasing the assumed information set should we throw the var out with the bath water unfortunately the results of this paper are somewhat inconclusive the expectations measures prove to be quite valuable the variances of all innovations are reduced by at least one half compared to the standard var innovations nevertheless the innovations monetary policy shocks and impulse responses for both methods are fairly similar indeed they are similar enough that the standard var approach cannot be rejected out of hand but dissimilar enough that the standard approach cannot be validated

wic in your neighborhood new evidence on the impacts of geographic access to clinics a large body of evidence indicates that conditions in utero and health at birth matter for individuals long run outcomes suggesting potential value in programs aimed at pregnant women and young children this paper uses a novel identification strategy and data from birth and administrative records over 2005 2009 to provide causal estimates of the effects of geographic access to the special supplemental nutrition program for women infants and children wic my empirical approach uses within zip code variation in wic clinic presence together with maternal fixed effects and accounts for the potential endogeneity of mobility gestational age bias and measurement error in gestation i find that access to wic increases food benefit take up pregnancy weight gain birth weight and the probability of breastfeeding initiation at the time of hospital discharge the estimated effects are strongest for mothers with a high school education or less who are most likely eligible for wic services

from extreme to mainstream the erosion of social norms social norms usually persistent can change quickly when new public information arrives such as a surprising election outcome people may become more inclined to express views or take actions previously perceived as stigmatized and may judge others less negatively for doing so we examine this possibility using two experiments we first show via revealed preference experiments that donald trump s rise in popularity and eventual victory increased individuals willingness to publicly express xenophobic views we then show that individuals are sanctioned less negatively if they publicly expressed a xenophobic view in an environment where that view is more popular

distance to hospital and children s use of preventive care is being closer better and for whom i introduction this article examines the effect of distance to hospital on the utilization of preventive care among children many poor children lacking alternative providers rely on hospitals and clinics for preventive care moreover in many poor neighborhoods the majority of private doctors offices are located in buildings adjacent to a hospital thus hospitals indirectly serve to attract physician services that would otherwise be lacking in the neighborhood this pattern of service provision raises several concerns first it is inefficient for children to be receiving preventive care directly from hospitals because preventive care can be delivered more cheaply in doctors offices and doctors offices also provide greater continuity of care an index of quality second even when children are receiving care in a doctor s office adjacent to a hospital continuation of that service may be jeopardized if the hospital were to close in this study we use distance to hospital as a proxy for access to medical services to examine the effect of distance to hospital on the use of preventive care services if the use of these services falls with distance other things being equal then we interpret this as evidence of lack of access to alternative providers most previous studies of the effects of distance have concentrated on specific geographical areas and or hospitalizations for specific procedures we are therefore unaware of any previous studies that have focused on the effects of distance on the utilization of preventive care among children 1 we use a national sample of children created by matching records from the national longitudinal survey of youth s child mother nlscm file with the american hospital association s 1990 hospital survey we allow the effects of distance to vary with race ethnicity insurance status and degree of urbanicity we control for other factors that might affect utilization of preventive care by including a rich set of control variables and by estimating models that include either city dummy variables or mother fixed effects in particular city dummies control for unobserved differences across cities in public transportation services and population density mother fixed effects control for unobserved differences in preferences for preventive health care robust estimates across models allow us to rule out these alternative explanations for why distance to hospital might affect different groups differentially these innovations address the important question of whether children who rely on hospitals for preventive ca re do so because they lack access to other providers we find that distance to hospital has significant effects on access to preventive care only among central city black children for these children each additional mile from the hospital is associated with a 3 decline in the probability of having had a checkup from a mean baseline of 74 this effect is comparable to the 3 increase in the probability of having a checkup which is associated with having private health insurance coverage rather than being uninsured a striking result is that among these children the size of the distance effect is similar for both the privately insured and those with medicaid suggesting that even black urban children with private health insurance have difficulty obtaining access to preventive care outside the area around hospitals thus for this group questions of access to providers may be as important as insurance coverage in predicting use of preventive care ii children who rely on hospitals for primary care prior research suggests that children who are members of minorities uninsured covered by medicaid or residing in rural areas are all more likely to rely on hospitals for preventive care this section discusses each of these groups in turn bloom 1990 demonstrates that nationally black children are twice as likely as white children to receive care in an institutional setting such as a clinic or emergency room and that they are more likely to be attended by residents than by staff physicians

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

does distance matter for institutional delivery in rural india this article estimates the causal effect of distance to health facility on in facility birth in rural india taking into account the endogenous placement of the health facility we find that women living farther away from the health facilities are less likely to give birth at a health facility each additional kilometre from the nearest health facility is associated with a 4 4 decline in the probability of in facility birth policy simulation results indicate that providing access to a health facility within 5 km would increase institutional delivery by 10 overall our findings confirm that distance is an important barrier to in facility births in rural india

optimal dissent in organizations we model an organization as a two agent hierarchy an informed decision maker in charge of selecting projects and a possibly uninformed implementer in charge of their execution both have intrinsic preferences over projects this paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences that is dissent within the organization dissent is useful to 1 foster the use of objective and sometimes private information in decision making and 2 give credibility to the decision maker s choices however dissent comes at the cost of hurting the implementer s intrinsic motivation thereby impairing organizational efficiency we show that dissent can be optimal in particular when information is useful and uncertainty is high moreover dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when implementers can choose their employer or when decision makers have real authority over hiring decisions

special interests and the media theory and an application to climate change a journalist reports to a voter on an unknown policy relevant state competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter a reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests claims to the voter in equilibrium the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings the model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence

bond yields and the federal reserve bond yields respond to policy decisions by the federal reserve and vice versa to learn about these responses i model a high frequency policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrage free bond market in continuous time the fed s target is a pure jump process jump intensities depend on the state of the economy and the meeting calendar of the federal open market committee the model has closed form solutions for yields as functions of a few state variables introducing monetary policy helps to match the whole yield curve because the target is an observable state variable that pins down its short end and introduces important seasonalities around fomc meetings the volatility of yields is snake shaped which the model explains with policy inertia the policy rule crucially depends on the two year yield and describes fed policy better than taylor rules

exchange rate crises with domestic bank runs evidence from the 1980s abstract the sherman silver purchase act of 1890 led to inflation fears and a series of flights from the dollar in spite of these runs the dollar was never devalued the question remains why grilli 1990 argues that it was the treasury s ability to borrow that prevented collapse while this explains why the gold standard endured from 1894 to 1896 it does not explain why there was no successful attack before that time the paper argues that the gold standard endured during 1893 because an internal drain of commercial bank funds stopped the external drain a revised series of collapse probabilities is provided and shown to be zero during the internal drain

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

do measures of monetary policy in a var make sense no in many vector autoregressions vars monetary policy shocks are identified with the least squares residuals from a regression of the federal funds rate on an assortment of variables such regressions appear to be structurally fragile and are at odds with other evidence on the nature of the u s federal reserve s reaction function furthermore the residuals from these regressions show little correlation across various vars or with funds rate shocks that are derived from forward looking financial markets my results provide a sharp critique of current monetary vars

blue chip rationality tests this paper tests the rationality of forecasts made by individuals who contribute to the blue chip consensus forecasting service and tries by means of a questionnaire on forecasting methods to establish why some forecasters appear more rational than others tests based on consensus forecasts prove unreliable as guides to the number of individuals who produce rational forecasts individual forecasts are more likely to be rational if they are based on a mainstream economic theory and incorporate a substantial element of judgment copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds