a principal agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system abstract mechanism design problems optimize contract offerings from a principal to different types of agents who have private information about their demands for a product or a service we study the implications of uncertainty in agents demands on the principal s contracts specifically we consider the setting where agents demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution we present analytical solutions for the special case when there are two distributions each taking two discrete values as well as a method for deriving analytical solutions from numerical solutions we describe one application of the model in carbon capture and storage systems to demonstrate various types of optimal solutions and to obtain managerial insights

equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

quality choice of multiproduct monopolist and spill over effect abstract this paper considers the cost relatedness between qualities that are generally taken as being mutually independent in the standard self selection models unlike the standard results the quality distortion occurs in all qualities offered to both types of consumers and interestingly the direction of that distortion is determined by the rate of the marginal cost down from the spill over effect even a pooling menu may occur

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

differences in social capital between 54 western european regions beugelsdijk s and van schaik t 2005 differences in social capital between 54 western european regions regional studies 39 1053 1064 based on the extant literature a newly developed index measuring social capital at the regional level in europe is presented it is shown that there are large regional differences on this social capital index it was tested if higher scores on this social capital index correlate with higher levels of economic development and regional economic growth in 54 western european regions though further research is required these preliminary results suggest a positive relationship exists between social capital and regional economic development the paper concludes with suggestions for future empirical research

does the evidence on corruption depend on how it is measured results from a cross country study on microdata sets while much of the existing literature on corruption looks at the effect of corruption on macro variables such as growth rates and income distribution this study provides a departure by focussing on victims of corruption by using microdata to compare civilian and business corruption this study finds that businesses face a stronger incidence of bribe demands than individuals though there are several differences between the determinants of the two forms of bribe victimization there are also some similarities policies to combat corruption need to take into account both the differences and the similarities

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

is inequality harmful for growth comment endogenous growth models have reignited interest in institutional and path dependencies in the economic growth process one reason for the interest in endogenous growth models is that they may explain why countries consistently grow at different rates in this vein it has been recently proposed that greater economic inequality reduces future economic growth an important paper in this literature is by torsten persson and guido tabellini 1994 who will be referred to as pt pt s model shows why it is reasonable to expect a negative relationship between inequality and future economic growth moreover their empirical evidence is consistent with their contention if pt s findings are robust to other data sets there would be important policy implications for example they imply that policy makers should not only be concerned with the distributional implications of government policies for political and social reasons but also because income distribution has long run effects on economic growth this indicates that greater u s income inequality since the early 1970 s may have resulted in lower subsequent economic growth however pt s results are somewhat fragile to various specifications suggesting that they should be replicated with different data sets and over different time periods pt p 617 with these implications in mind this study employs data from a panel of u s states to further explore the relationship between economic growth and income inequality in what follows section i summarizes pt s study and discusses how this comment extends their findings the empirical implementation and results in section ii directly examine the link between overall income inequality and growth section iii expands the analysis to alternative measures of income distribution and government policy one emphasis in section iii is the distinction between how the overall income distribution especially at the tails influences economic growth from how the relative well being of the median voter affects economic growth section iv provides some concluding discussion

monopoly and product quality abstract this paper points out that without restrictions on the cost function distribution of consumer types and on the extent of market coverage the standard parameterization of preferences cannot by itself guarantee that a monopolist would choose a separating menu moreover there may not be any quality distortion

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

hiring and leasing with nonlinear prices this paper examines the problem of a monopolist setting an optimal nonlinear pricing schedule in the face of consumers of unknown type who arrive randomly over time and self select a choice of hire period the major determinant of pricing policy is the customer arrival distribution with the overall level of price higher than in the atemporal yield management nonuniform pricing solution by a margin which increases with the average frequency with which potential customers arrive by contrast the solution is generally fairly insensitive to variations in the time rate of discount although there is a tendency for the rate of price discount to increase with increases in the time discount rate

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

technological advances transaction costs and consumer welfare consumers incur many transaction costs in purchasing and using most products this paper examines the effects of a reduction in such consumer transaction costs caused by market level technological advances using a model in which consumers are simultaneously heterogeneous in their transaction costs and in their marginal valuations of product quality this paper highlights two mechanisms that can cause such reductions in consumer transaction costs to lower consumer surplus and reduce consumer share of the total social surplus specifically market level technological advances reduce different consumers transaction costs by different amounts and increase their reservation prices by different amounts which can lead to i product design changes that many current consumers do not like and ii homogenization in consumer reservation prices that allows a seller to extract more surplus through its pricing policy this paper also shows that consumers may be better off with seller induced higher consumer transaction costs finally the paper shows how depending on the nature of the quality production process such reductions in consumer transaction costs can either lower or raise product qualities and consumer prices

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

quality discrimination among income constrained consumers abstract this paper provides a complete characterization of equilibrium menus offered by a monopolist to the income constrained consumers in a vertically differentiated market even when all consumers have the same marginal willingness to pay the monopolist can profitably discriminate between them provided they have different binding budget constraints

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal pricing and quality choice of a monopolist under knightian uncertainty abstract this paper analyzes a simple vertical product differentiation model with demand uncertainty and derives a risk neutral monopolist s optimal market entry timing her optimal pricing and optimal quality choice by incorporating knightian uncertainty irreversibility and flexibility in quality enhancing investment into a continuous time stochastic model it is shown that an increase in knightian uncertainty induces decreases in the optimal price the optimal quality and the value of undertaking the quality enhancing investment by the monopolist the social optimal entry timing pricing and quality are also analyzed

optimal nonuniform prices we consider optimal nonuniform pricing schedules where the price depends upon the amount purchased such schedules are regularly used by public utilities and other services welfare optimal nonuniform prices are related to the theory of optimal uniform prices developed by ramsey we characterize situations in which upward or downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal our results are applicable to a number of related problems including optimal taxation insurance and incentives economic theory has confined most of its attention to markets with uniform prices in which the price per unit charged is invariant to the level of a customer s purchases this focus is warranted when goods are resellable since any attempt to charge nonuniform prices could be circumvented by reselling amongst customers but when goods are not resellable nonuniform prices are not only possible but common public utilities have declining block pricing with lower unit charges for large levels of consumption many agencies providing services including communications transportation even education use two part pricing with a fixed entry or retainer charge and a further charge per unit consumption nonuniform price schedules can be expected to be ever more common as services become a larger fraction of total output the increasing prevalence of nonuniform pricing policies have made them the focus of recent public and economic attention oi 1971 feldstein 1972 and ng and weisser 1974 have examined optimal two part pricing policies leland and meyer 1976 examine block pricing and show by example that optimal welfare policies may require nonuniform prices if zero profit constraints are binding in this paper we consider arbitrary nonuniform pricing policies using variational techniques two part and block pricing schedules are of course special cases of the environment we consider the work most closely related to our examination is the seminal paper by spence 1978 and subsequent analysis by roberts 1979 spence however does not pay explicit attention to the key role played by constraints on optimal pricing schedules roberts considers upward price discontinuities which lead to bunching of consumers at a given level of consumption but not downward price discontinuities which lead to regions in which no consumer chooses to consume gaps bunching or gaps may appear in the optimal price schedule even when underlying demand and cost functions are smooth and well behaved the prevalence of discontinuous pricing schedules e g the block pricing structures of public utilities argues that these questions are of practical as well as theoretical interest

cost functions in non linear pricing abstract this paper compares the optimal selling strategies with symmetric and asymmetric information when monopolist s cost function depends both on individual and aggregate production we show how standard underproduction and higher exclusion with incomplete information are affected

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

regional economic disparities and decentralisation the study of the influence of decentralisation on economic growth has received some attention in recent years but very few studies deal with its impact on regional inequalities this paper analyses the impact of both fiscal and political decentralisation on regional inequalities using alternative measures for a sample of 17 oecd countries in order to check for other possible influences the study also includes measures of public sector size and the type of party in government the final section studies the relevance of fiscal decentralisation in the regional convergence process observed by several authors during the past two decades the research reveals a strong negative correlation between decentralisation especially fiscal decentralisation and regional inequalities and also a positive influence of decentralisation on regional convergence

intertemporal quality discrimination of a durable good monopolist abstract consider a durable good monopolist facing the technology constraint that when he introduces a new product he cannot produce a cheaper variant without a time lag we show that the qualities of his high end and low end products are higher than their efficient quality levels

the drivers of local income inequality a spatial bayesian model averaging approach this study analyzes the drivers of local income inequality in spain it derives a novel data set of inequality metrics for a sample of municipalities over the period 2000 06 spatial bayesian model

quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly in the mussa and rosen model j econ theory 18 1978 301 of vertical differentiation a monopolist may optimally choose to underprovide quality if consumers are allowed to buy several units of the indivisible good even if quality provision involves no cost of any sort c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

is income inequality harmful for regional growth evidence from the european union this article examines the relationship between income inequality and economic growth in the regions of several european union countries over the period 1993 2002 using the information provided by the european community household panel taking into consideration the relevance of spatial effects in this context different versions of a spatial econometric model are estimated the results indicate that the degree of income dispersion is negatively associated with regional growth this finding is in fact robust to various alternative specifications including a number of additional explanatory variables such as initial per capita gdp the sectoral composition of economic activity human capital stock population density and market potential furthermore the observed negative correlation between income inequality and economic performance does not depend on the specific measure used to quantify the degree of income dispersion

public trust and corruption perception disaster relief public trust in government and nongovernment organizations is essential to the public s willingness to donate and to support those organizations we measure public trust in disaster aid using people s perception of these organizations effectiveness in delivering aid relief to the victims of two recent major earthquakes in china based on the survey data collected in 2013 from about 2100 residents in hong kong we document the vulnerability of these residents trust perceptions in aid delivery we find that the sharp decline in trust perception is highly negatively correlated with their perception of corruption of local governments in china

promise and pitfalls in the use of secondary data sets income inequality in oecd countries as a case study this paper examines the role of secondary data sets in empirical economic research taking the field of income distribution as a case study we illustrate problems faced by users of secondary statistics showing how both cross country comparisons and time series analysis can depend sensitively on the choice of data after describing the genealogy of secondary data sets on income inequality we consider the main methodological issues and discuss their implications for comparisons of income inequality across oecd countries and over time the lessons to be drawn for the construction and use of secondary data sets are summarized at the end of the paper

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation abstract this paper analyzes profit maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation two forms of regulatory constraint are considered i a cap on the firm s average revenue and ii a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge of the regulatory regimes the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least but there are also distributional effects between consumers although the optional tariff regime pareto dominates uniform pricing it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime an example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity

the short run relationship between inequality and growth evidence from oecd regions during the great recession abstractthis paper provides evidence on the relationship between income inequality and economic growth in organisation for economic co operation and development oecd regions during the decade 2003 13 it combines household survey data and macroeconomic databases covering over 200 comparable regions in 15 oecd countries the econometric results based on two alternative sets of instruments highlight a general negative association between inequalities and economic growth since the start of the economic crisis this relationship is sensitive to the type of urban structure higher inequalities seem to be more detrimental for growth in regions characterized by medium to large sized cities while regions characterized by small cities and rural areas are less affected

a comment on a model of vertical product differentiation in a duopoly model with vertical differentiation if the firms do not cover the market the lower quality firm chooses a quality level exactly 4 7 of that of the higher quality firm and chooses a price that is 2 7 of the price of the higher quality firm copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

equivalence between the diamond dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model abstract it is shown that the diamond dybvig journal of political economy 96 1983 768 banking model with a continuum of types of agents has the same analytical structure as the standard optimal income taxation model review of economic studies 38 1971 175 review of economic studies 43 1976 261 insights from the income taxation literature immediately imply that a bank run equilibrium exists in the banking model as long as the long term project is sufficiently costly to liquidate

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

optimal number of standards under economies of scope in quality abstract stivers stivers andrew e 2003 quality standards with exogenously distributed quality economics letters 80 1 130 136 finds the optimal segmentation of quality when the distribution of quality is exogenous this paper characterizes the optimal number of standards as the cost of information falls both the number of standards and the market coverage of the firm rise

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

between development and social policies the impact of european structural funds in objective 1 regions rodriguez pose a and fratesi u 2004 between development and social policies the impact of european structural funds in objective 1 regions reg studies 38 97 113 european regional support has grown in parallel with european integration the funds targeted at achieving greater economic and social cohesion and reducing disparities within the european union eu have more than doubled in relative terms since the end of the 1980s making development policies the second most important policy area in the eu the majority of the development funds have been earmarked for objective 1 regions i e regions where gdp per capita is below the 75 threshold of the eu average however the european development policies have come under increasing criticism based on two facts the lack of upward mobility of assisted regions and the absence of regional convergence this paper assesses using cross sectional and panel data analyses the failure so far of european development policies to fulfil their objective of de

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

quality and congestion in environmental goods the road to the wangapeka abstract an increasing complaint heard among new zealand residents is that their enjoyment of local environmental resources is being diminished by increased congestion from foreign visitors this paper considers a model of vertical differentiation in which foreign high value and domestic low value consumers incur congestion costs in using a common resource we demonstrate that reducing quality in the face of increased foreign demand is optimal absent discriminatory prices but not otherwise we also consider the provision of multiple environmental goods and demonstrate that providing differential qualities may be optimal even if domestic consumers do not use the high quality resources at all

what determines corruption international evidence from microdata this paper uses a microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals who live in those countries in addition it investigates the determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual level the results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery examples are gender income education marital status the city size the country s unemployment rate average education and the strength of the institutions in the country jel k4 d73 p16

income distribution and sociopolitical instability as determinants of savings a cross sectional model the purpose of this cross national study is twofold first it introduces income distribution and sociopolitical instability as arguments in the savings function second it presents some empirical evidence in relation to their quantitative effects on savings it is shown that sociopolitical instability has profound effects on the savings ratio it is also shown that the bulk of savings is produced by the middle income class as a result a redistribution of income at the expense of the upper income class yields a constant or an increased savings ratio developing on whether such a redistribution includes the lower income class or not

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

us regional income convergence a spatial econometric perspective rey s j and montouri b d 1999 us regional income convergence a spatial econometric perspective reg studies 33 143 156 this study reconsiders the question of us regional economic income convergence from a spatial econometric perspective recently developed methods of exploratory spatial data analysis provide new insights on the geographical dynamics of us regional income growth patterns over the 1929 94 period strong patterns of both global and local spatial autocorrelation are found throughout the study period and the magnitude of global spatial autocorrelation is also found to exhibit strong temporal co movement with regional income dispersion a spatial econometric analysis of the familiar baumol specification reveals strong evidence of misspecification due to ignored spatial error dependence because of this dependence shocks originating in one state can spillover into surrounding states potentially complicating the transitional dynamics of the convergence process rey s j et montouri

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had