cooperation against theft a test of incentives for water management in tunisia water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi arid regions cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring using a theoretical model we show that theft is more likely when prices are high punishments are weak and cooperatives are large we also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring we test the model on data from tunisia for the years 2001 2003 relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs the results confirm that well designed incentives can reduce theft and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design

property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy abstract resource degradation in the third world is largely driven by the demands of farm households for fuelwood and land for agriculture since resources are often controlled through indigenous systems of property the tragedy of the commons has been used to explain resource degradation as a result private property is suggested as a solution to resource degradation a dynamic model capable of examining household incentives for resource use under private and common property is developed results of the model reject the conventional wisdom that gives rise to the presumed optimality of private individual property in natural resources and the correlated indictment of group management regimes

truth effort and the legal battle in lawsuits relative success depends upon two main factors the true degree of fault and the efforts invested on eachside a proposed litigation success function displays thisdependence while satisfying other essential properties undertwo different protocols nash cournot and stackelberg solutions are obtained for the litigation efforts proportionate success and values of the lawsuit on each side outcomes are evaluated in terms of two normative criteria i achieving justice interpreted as equality between defendantfault and relative plaintiff success and ii minimizingaggregate litigation cost achievement of these aims isdetermined by the decisiveness of litigation effort relativeto true fault

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

aggregate employment real business cycles and superior information abstract we test whether dynamic stochastic general equilibrium artificial economies associated with several labor market structures provide an adequate characterization of aggregate employment volatility and dynamics our test is robust to possible misspecifications about the information set used by economic agents to forecast future events accounting for agents superior information we find that the divisible labor indivisible labor labor adjustment costs and labor hoarding structures replicate employment volatility in contrast to the nominal wage contracts structure also the labor hoarding structure provides a substantially better account of employment dynamics

labor hoarding superior information and business cycle dynamics abstract in this paper we test whether a labor hoarding environment with basic and augmented laws of motion provide an adequate explanation for observed business cycle dynamics the basic law of motion assumes that the information set used by economic agents to forecast future forcing variables includes only the history of forcing variables augmented laws of motion assume that the information set is superior and include both forcing and hidden exogenous variables we show that the labor hoarding environment with the basic law of motion fails to replicate observed business cycle facts while the environment with augmented laws of motion successfully matches these facts

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

an optimal path to extinction poverty and resource degradation in the open agrarian economy this paper constructs a model of the open agrarian economy in order to explore the tendency of many such economies to evolve along paths characterised by severe environmental degradation it pays special attention to the importance of commodity prices and the transfer system in determining agricultural activity levels in ecologically delicate systems

how fast should we graze the global commons unlike the vast preponderance of planets earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive up to now man s activities have affected this environment negligibly scientists are becoming convinced however that release of carbon dioxide co2 from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate see woodwell how should we think about such a destruction of our heritage should it be treated as anathema like bondage or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic activities the present paper takes the second approach asking how fast the global economy should allow a buildup of atmospheric co2 the first section reviews the current scientific knowledge on this subject while the second puts this into an optimal growth framework the third section then presents a numerical example while the last presents some realistic policy views on the subject this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cooperative solution of local externality problems a case of mechanism design applied to irrigation abstract cooperative solutions to ameliorate externalities may be pareto superior compared to noncooperative abatement strategies but such solutions may not be adopted without appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve cooperative outcomes voluntarily there must be methods of determining cost shares and identifying preferred solutions here the design of a process and a related algorithm are proposed based on concepts of welfare economics and game theory for public goods and externalities simulation of the process for an irrigation externality problem in the central valley of california demonstrates existence of a unanimously preferred solution with improved water quality

influence of soil conservation on farm land values worldwide concern for the loss of agricultural soil has led many governments to establish programs to slow the loss of soil from farms mcconnell 1983 has shown however that in the absence of externalities farmer decisions on investment to reduce onfarm soil loss can be socially optimal and concludes p 188 as follows increasing soil loss does not imply that farmers ignore physical production relations if farmers know that the soil base affects farm resale value they will conserve it it suggests that the impact of soil depth on the value of farms be investigated earlier rausser 1980 reached a similar conclusion suggesting that land values which fail to reflect soil quality encourage the farmer to ignore his long run impact on the resource two recent studies failed to find clear cut relationships between soil erosion and farm land prices ervin and mill 1985 942 in a cross section study of farm land prices in page county iowa concluded the group of variables measuring past and future erosion damages and conservation structures did not exhibit large and reliable effects gardner and barrows 1985 studied the capitalization of the value of soil conservation practices into farm land prices in southwestern wisconsin and concluded p 946 the most reasonable conclusion is the most obvious conservation

the externalities associated with the common property exploitation of groundwater abstract in this paper the rate of groundwater extraction under the common property arrangement is the outcome of a dynamic game played with feedback strategies the analysis clarifies the externalities associated with the common property extraction of groundwater and identifies an risk externality that arises when firms are risk averse identifying the various externalities bears on the development of appropriate forms of groundwater management in particular the risk externality would be unknown to the watermaster of a central control agency suggesting the need for creative decentralized forms of groundwater management

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

reputation and the control of pollution this paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation in inducing a polluting firm to self regulate its emissions when consumers have imperfect information in particular we ask to what extent must consumers reward and punish the firm before it chooses self regulation as its dominant strategy we find that if payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and the polluting firm have beliefs that are consistent with each others behaviors then the firm has a positive probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game further we find that a weak reward punishment scheme may have an adverse effect on the environment and that there are both environmental and welfare gains associated with strengthening the scheme

the role of common law in environmental policy comment in a recent contribution to this journal fritz sillner 1994 provides a rather harsh critic of the working of common law in environmental policy and a strict recommendation to rely on statutory law only in this field in this comment i will argue that the distinction of the small versus the large number case which is central to his argument is an oversimplification and misleading moreover i will argue that judge made law does actually play an important role as part of an environmental policy mix s6llner s line of reasoning proceeds as follows if you take a look at the state of the environment in common law countries e g usa or great britain and compare them in this respect to civil law countries e g france or germany you will not find that the former have done better on that account as should be expected following the efficiency hypothesis of common law as proposed by posner 1986 priest 1977 and others a further look will show you that opposed to their naming common law does only play a minor role in the environmental policy of the common law countries this gives according to sallner a strong indication that the alleged tendency of common law towards efficiency does not hold in this particular case he provides two explanations for this finding

why is consumption so smooth for thirty years it has been accepted that consumption is smooth because permanent income is smoother than measured income this paper considers the evidence for the contrary position that permanent income is in fact less smooth than measured income so that the smoothness of consumption cannot be straightforwardly explained by permanent income theory the paper argues that in postwar u s quarterly data consumption is smooth because it responds with a lag to changes in income

international transmission of transitory and persistent monetary shocks under imperfect information abstract we analyze the transmission of monetary shocks in a new open economy macroeconomics model with one period nominal contracts and imperfect information shocks may have transitory and persistent components that can be disentangled only through the accumulation of information over time as a consequence the responses to shocks are significantly altered compared with the case of full information there are persistent effects on international relative prices and delayed exchange rate overshooting is possible following a persistent shock in some cases there are ex post excess returns as a positive interest rate spread is accompanied by an appreciating currency or vice versa lastly it is demonstrated that staggering reinforces persistence

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

litigation and settlement under the english and american rules theory and evidence in contrast to the american rule whereby each party bears its own costs the english rule requires losers at trial to pay the winner s legal fees up to a reasonable limit we develop six hypotheses regarding how these two cost allocation rules might affect settlements and litigated outcomes through changes in i the selection of cases reaching the settle versus litigate stage and ii behavior thereafter using data from florida which applied the english rule to medical malpractice claims during the period 1980 85 we examine the rules effects on the probability of plaintiffs winning at trial jury awards and out of court settlements the english rule increased plaintiff success rates at trial average jury awards and out of court settlements our interpretation of these findings emphasizes that the overall quality of the claims reaching the settle versus litigate stage must improve to generate the combination of effects observed

entitlements missing markets and environmental uncertainty reply abstract at one level dore and ward seem intent on immunizing received doctrine they say that i did not prove that rights violated nozick s principles of justice and that i did not prove that missing markets were the problem more telling they allege i did not prove that my story was better than the particular story favored by dore and ward that is they argue that there is an alternative approach based on the theory of public economics which is indeed operational 3 they then use the bulk of their comment to explain and defend this alternative model they hope to convince the reader that the model of public economics survives intact in the face of my alternative model to the extent that their model allows one to define the problem away it is not difficult to see why they find it so compelling more seriously dore and ward fail to make a coherent argument about the concept of rights and duties and the logic of a particular rights structure that happens to prevail they seem concerned that my article was tampering with some sacred social construct the status quo rights structure and that my article threatened the received wisdom of both public economics and paretian walrasian bliss indeed theirs seems to be a genuine fear that if economists release their grip on the certitude of received orthodoxy the floodgates will be open to all manner of bumbling regulators seeking to shift rights and wealth positions across generations my article is apparently threatening because it seems to suggest that the received wisdom may at times be misleading

what should fiscal councils do fiscal watchdogs so called fiscal councils have been proposed as a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy the paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surve

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

current issues in the economics of groundwater resource management the issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource in this article we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity we present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels in particular we critically review economic models of groundwater use examine the potential for groundwater management discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use allocation of this resource finally we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms

controlling stock externalities flexible versus inflexible pigovian corrections abstract this paper examines the use of inflexible pigovian taxes subsidies to correct a stock externality an optimal control framework is first used to characterize the first best path for a pigovian correction that varies continuously this first best path is then contrasted with inflexible second best paths in which the level of the correction can be set only once or twice the optimal timing of a fixed one time correction is also studied a deferment of this correction is desirable when the initial state of the environmental stock is less deteriorated than the first best steady state or the adjustment costs are sufficiently great

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

stock externalities pigovian taxation and dynamic stability abstract stock externalities represent a type of consumption externality in which individual consumption of a particular good leads to production of a public bad such as in the arms race and in the greenhouse effect certain of these stock externalities can be regulated by pigovian taxation of the good that produces the externality for others however depending on an ordinal property of preferences the equilibrium becomes dynamically unstable so it is necessary to use direct regulation to support an optimal equilibrium

has monetary policy become more effective we investigate the implications of changes in the structure of the u s economy for monetary policy effectiveness estimating a vector autoregression over the pre and post 1980 periods we provide evidence of a reduced effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period we estimate a structural model that replicates well the economy s response in both periods and perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the change in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the economy s volatility we find that by responding more strongly to inflation expectations monetary policy has stabilized the economy more effectively in the post 1980 period

status quo bias in bargaining an extension of the myerson satterthwaite theorem with an application to the coase theorem we use a generalized version of the myerson satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good where there is two sided private information on the valuations we show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution that the most efficient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo in the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism there is an expected bias towards the disagreement point in other words for the class of preferences we study there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information

the polluter pays versus the pollutee pays principle under asymmetric information abstract this paper compares the pollutee pays principle with the polluter pays principle in a model of one sided externalities and asymmetric information even allowing for mitigation through contracts pollution reductions traded for subsidies or compensations will not result in the perfect information social optimum but will bias the outcome favoring the one with the property right while the pollutee pays principle allows for global incentive mechanisms such voluntary arrangements are severely restricted for the polluter pays principle indeed these conditions for an out of court settlements low damage and large benefits from pollution somehow contradict the polluter pays principle

fiscal policy targeting under imperfect information abstract systematic deficit biases and the sovereign debt crisis have increased interest in fiscal rules and institutions in particular the setting of intermediate fiscal policy targets theoretical arguments point to targeting of the structural budget balance but it is difficult in practice because this variable is riddled with measurement problems and noise this paper first briefly documents the noise in measures of the structural budget balance and then proceeds to analyse how this inherent information problem affects budget targeting a strict targeting of the structural budget balance leads to excessive policy responses to transitory influences and thus causes excessive policy activism in contrast to the underlying smoothing aim motivating fiscal policy targets this points to a fundamental weakness of the recently implemented fiscal compact for eu countries requiring member states to target the structural budget balance on an annual basis

budget deficit persistence and the twin deficits hypothesis abstract this paper gauges the twin deficits hypothesis i e a positive causal relationship between the external and budget deficits this relationship is measured by the responses of the external deficit to changes in the budget deficit induced by blanchard s model these responses are positively affected by the birth rate and by the degree of persistence of the budget deficit empirical results for the canadian and us economies reveal that although the relevant birth rates are small the great persistence of the budget deficits yields responses that are numerically large and statistically positive this contrasts with previous tests of the twin deficits hypothesis which have never formally taken into account the stochastic properties of the budget deficit

the role of common law in environmental policy this paper discusses the role of common law in environmental policy it is shown that common law actually tends towards efficiency only under quite restrictive conditions conditions that are fulfilled only for very few less important environmental problems moreover in these cases common law need not even be efficient because an efficient solution can be negotiated once the allocation of rights is undisputed furthermore common law neglects important distributional and political questions and is biased towards the status quo therefore dealing with today s environmental problems cannot be left to the common law process but necessitates legislative action

the excess smoothness of consumption identification and interpretation deaton s observation that consumption appears to be too smooth is easily reconciled with the notion that consumption exhibits excess sensitivity to current income the reconciliation invokes the plausible assumption that households forecast on the basis of a larger information set than the econometrician the empirical case for excess smoothness is strengthened by showing that the innovations in permanent income can be inferred from an autoregression of income and saving not only under the permanent income hypothesis but also under the excess sensitivity model empirically parameter restrictions imposed on the bivariate autoregression by the excess sensitivity model are not rejected

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

the market value of water in the ogallala aquifer the ogallala aquifer also known as the ogallala formation or the high plains aquifer is a 174 000 square mile body of water that underlies parts of colorado kansas nebraska new mexico oklahoma south dakota texas and wyoming the ogallala contains about 3 5 billion acre feet of water symposium ii 1984 but in many areas the aquifer has been declining from continued deep well pumping sloggett and dickason 1986 the aquifer receives little recharge especially in the southern portion and as such represents a finite nonrenewable resource stock as a result of the concerns of residents of the high plains states over declines in the ogallala aquifer congress authorized the secretary of commerce to conduct a six state regional resources study of the ogallala in 1976 high plains associates 1982 the study indicated even under the most effective water conservation program more than a million acres of farmland then

designing more efficient markets lessons from los angeles smog control market based approaches for environmental protection are beginning to take root around the world this article attempts to improve our understanding of the performance of environmental markets by constructing and evaluating an information base on trades in los angeles which includes the first detailed data on trading prices the analysis suggests that trading activity has been shaped by the detailed regulations governing the market in addition transaction costs have played a crucial role we argue that the move toward adopting market based approaches for environmental protection needs to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to assess the properties of these systems as they are actually implemented

using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information abstract we consider the design of government policy to ration such scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the presence of limited information when government policy is formulated some informed agents e g established public utilities know how highly they value the resource other uninformed agents e g potential independent power producers only learn their valuations at some later date the government allows uninformed agents to trade the resource rights they receive on a competitive market informed agents may or may not have the same privilege the optimal initial distribution of resource rights differs significantly according to whether informed agents can trade the rights they receive

alleviating soil erosion pollution stock externalities alternative roles for government abstract this paper addresses two temporal externalities due to agriculture soil erosion and related pollution the possibility of decentralization of decisions the appropriate role of a resource manager and the efficiency of alternative policies are examined using traditional welfare economics concepts for a two sector model of rural urban linkage three alternative types of policies can be socially efficient but imply different involvement by government and have different knowledge requirements a pigouvian policy requires full information a bargaining solution involves government only in setting an entitlement but it may require too much knowledge by rural households in terms of understanding dynamic environmental relationships a third way is that government and rural households be co producers of environmental goods this concept assigns government the responsibility for maintaining knowledge about environmental relationships and government is a participant in a market system that determines prices for environmental related goods

valuing the future one of the most controversial areas of economics is the practice of discounting attaching a lower weight to future costs and benefits than present costs and benefits discounting appears to offend notions of sustainable development and the interests of future generations recent advances in the theory of discounting hold out strong hope that the tyranny of discounting can be avoided through the use of time varying discount rates tvdrs this paper reviews the recent rationales for tvdrs and applies the results to issues such as nuclear power and global warming control

present value tests of an intertemporal model of the current account abstract this paper first demonstrates that in a simple intertemporal open economy model the current account is equal to the expected decline of the present discounted value of net output of a country net output is defined as gross domestic product less the sum of investment plus government spending it then uses econometric methods for present value models to analyze the current account for four countries in two of these countries the model does a satisfactory job of explaining the current account

a procedure to evaluate cyclical fluctuations under superior information this article presents and assesses a procedure to evaluate conventional moments characterizing fluctuations at the business cycle frequency when the economic agents information set is superior to the econometrician s one first we derive the theoretical conditions under which the econometrician obtains valid statistics for the moments from laws of motion for forcing variables that fully recover the agents superior information second we use a new keynesian monetary model to document the numerical properties of the statistics when the laws of motion are possibly misspecified and to assess the ability of certain information criteria to detect the presence of superior information