when today s rewards are tomorrow s endowments the effects of inequality on social competition abstract in this paper we study the role of inequality in a model of repeated social competition where endowments the resources used in the competition and rewards the resources obtained as prizes are connected because the rewards of today s competition determine the endowments of tomorrow s competition we find that the harshness of social competition is maximal for an intermediate level of inequality and that increasing or decreasing inequality beyond that level monotonically mitigates social competition up to completely eliminating it at the extremes if social competition is wasteful utilitarian welfare is maximized in case of equality a greater uncertainty about the connection between today s rewards and tomorrow s endowments mitigates social competition finally there emerge concerns for others resources that are downward and not upward with the value of high social standing which changes non monotonically in the resources of those with lower standing

getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

a model of the it products in fashion one of the characteristics of the fashion marketplace is the unpredictability and apparent randomness of fashion hits another one is the information asymmetry among consumers in this paper we consider fashion as a means consumers use to signal belonging to a higher social rank and propose an analytical model of fashion hits in the presence of competition and consumers who can coordinate on which product to use we show that consistent with the observed market phenomenon in equilibrium consumer coordination involves randomization between products chosen i e in randomness of fashion hits analyzing optimal consumer choice we find that whenever low type consumer demand for a product is positive a price increase results in a higher probability of high type consumers choosing this product but lower low type consumer demand we also show that although high type consumers may prefer higher prices that would lead to complete separation of the high and the low type consumers through product use in equilibrium firms always price as to attract positive demand from low type consumers the equilibrium price and profits turn out to be nonmonotonic in the low type consumer valuation of being recognized as belonging to a higher social rank equilibrium profits first increase and then decrease in this valuation

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking consumers purchase conspicuous goods to satisfy not only material needs but also social needs such as prestige in an attempt to meet these social needs producers of conspicuous goods like cars perfumes and watches highlight the exclusivity of their products in this paper we propose a monopoly model of conspicuous consumption using the rational expectations framework and then examine how purchase decisions are affected by the desire for exclusivity and conformity we show that snobs can have an upward sloping demand curve but only in the presence of consumers who are weakly followers laboratory tests lend support for this model prediction and for the rational expectations framework the experimental results suggest that subjects used some degree of sophisticated thinking to arrive at their first period decisions their behavior in the subsequent trials however can be adequately captured by a purely adaptive learning mechanism we discuss the implications of consumer learning for optimal dynamic pricing policy by a monopolist

are german money market rates well behaved abstract we test the expectations hypothesis eh of the term structure of interest rates for the german money market at the short end of the maturity spectrum using a variety of metrics and on balance we argue that the results tend to broadly support the hypothesis we utilise monthly data on pure discount bonds with a maturity from 1 to 12 months over the period of 1976 to 1993 the var methodology is used to forecast future interest rates which under the eh results in a set of cross equation restrictions as well as tests based on the correspondence between the best forecast referred to as the theoretical spread and the actual spread the var methodology allows explicit consideration of potential non stationarity in the data as do our tests based on the cointegration literature we also perform more conventional tests based on applying the rational expectations re hypothesis in a single equation framework our relatively favourable results for the eh are in sharp contrast to those found in studies using us data and this we attribute in part to the policy of sustained credible monetary targeting by the bundesbank

fractional integration and the volatility of uk interest rates we find that short rates are more nonstationary than longer rates and that differences in conditional volatility exist between different maturities therefore their dynamics may be both maturity specific and country specific and any a priori generalizing assumptions may be misleading

explaining fashion cycles imitators chasing innovators in product space abstract this paper considers the problem of a fashion trend setter confronting an imitator who can produce the same product at lower cost a one dimensional product space is considered which is an abstraction of the key attribute of some consumer good three broad strategies can be optimal for the fashion leader 1 never innovate which milk profits from the initially advantageous position but ultimately concede the market without a fight 2 innovate once but only once which just temporarily defers conceding the market 3 cycle infinitely around product space never letting the imitator catch up and capture the market sometimes the cycles start immediately sometimes the innovator should wait for a time before beginning the cycles the optimal solution exhibits strong state dependency with so called skiba curves separating regions in state space where various of these strategies are optimal there are even instances of intersecting skiba curves in most cases analytical expressions can be stated that characterize these skiba curves

commonality in product design cost saving valuation change and cannibalization abstract offering a variety of products is important for a firm to attract different consumer segments however high product variety increases production and distribution costs modular product design and parts commonality are approaches used to counter this trend in cost and still offer a variety of products this paper develops a model to examine when modular products should be introduced and how much modularity to offer the model looks at a market consisting of a high segment and a low segment customers choose the product that maximizes their surplus which is defined as the product s utility minus its price presence of commonality affects the utility of a product greater commonality decreases production cost but makes the products more indistinguishable from one another this makes the product more desirable for the low segment but less desirable for the high segment the firm s objective is to design the products and set the prices so as to maximize its profit

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

incentive compatibility and informational requirements abstract this paper considers the relationship between incentives and informational requirements in decentralized allocation procedures the main question concerns the impact of incentive compatibility constraints in the dominant strategy sense on the minimal size of the message space a general theory is presented which is then applied to a simple resource allocation problem in this context it is shown that the dominant strategy requirement necessarily leads to an increased message space

the evolution of modern educational systems technical vs general education distributional conflict and growth abstract we study the evolution of an educational system founded on a hierarchical differentiation between vocational and general education with vocational playing an inferior role in the society the dynamics are best summarized by the ratio of the fraction of the population in vocational to that in general education which we interpret as a measure of the degree of stratification of the society we show that this ratio first rises and then declines with the level of development displaying an inverted u shape which reflects the complex interaction between economic and political forces including aggregate income growth wealth inequality and political participation

adverse selection without single crossing monotone solutions abstract the single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility if single crossing is violated global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account this paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one time violation of single crossing the results show that local and non local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions therefore the optimal decision might involve distortions above as well as below the first best decision furthermore the well known no distortion at the top property does not necessarily hold the results show that the decision can even be distorted above first best for all types sufficient conditions for existence strict monotonicity and continuity of the solution are presented a new necessary condition satisfied by such solutions is found an algorithm based on this condition can calculate continuous and strictly monotone solutions

political economy of growth with a taste for status abstract this paper investigates the political economy of growth when individuals prefer high levels of relative consumption a pivotal voter determines the equilibrium tax on capital the revenues from which fund the provision of productive public goods the taste for status and the distributions of wealth and political power interact to generate stylized versions of oligarchies middle class democracies and populist democracies a rise in the taste for status increases the role of distributional concerns in policy preferences lowering growth in an oligarchy or populist democracy but increasing it in a middle class democracy in addition the egalitarian redistribution of wealth or political power causes growth to first rise and then fall as the equilibrium tax rate approaches and then exceeds its growth maximizing level generating inverse u shaped relationships between democracy and growth and inequality and growth

measures of fit for rational expectations models this survey provides a detailed description of some of the recent theoretical and empirical literature on rational expectations econometrics the survey pays special attention to non stationarity of the data and to the various methods for evaluating rational expectations models that have been developed as alternatives to the classical statistical approach of testing overidentifying restrictions these methods have become very popular and widely used in empirical research we provide an illustration using danish stock market data and we summarize the many results obtained recently using these measures in areas as diverse as stock prices the term structure of interest rates exchange rates consumption and saving the balance of payments tax smoothing hyperinflation and linear quadratic adjustment cost models for inventories labour demand and money demand

macroeconomic implications of conspicuous consumption a sombartian dynamic model this chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model in which consumers have status preference i investigate the manner in which capital accumulation is impeded by conspicuous consumption a la corneo and jeanne j public econ 66 55 71 1997a following the literature social norms are given as either bandwagon type or snob type i then show that when the economy is characterized by a bandwagon type social norm capital accumulation exhibits interesting patterns those patterns include for example an oscillating convergence path the rise of the economy feeds its decay through conspicuous consumption and that decay suppresses conspicuous consumption and engenders prosperity as predicted by sombart liebe luxus und kapitalismus reprinted 1967 deutscher taschenbuch verlag munchen 1912

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

waves in consumption with interdependence among consumers this paper presents a model to analyze the development of consumption patterns when there are social interactions among consumers in particular a consumer in this model recognizes three reference groups a peer group of similar consumers with whom the consumer wishes to share consumption activities a distinction group from which the consumer wishes to distinguish him or herself and an aspiration group to which the consumer does not belong but wishes that he she did and with whom the consumer would like to share consumption activities the interplay of aspiration and distinction can lead to waves in consumption these can happen when for example the avant garde consumption of up market pioneers is copied by other types of consumer as the latter aspire to emulate the former the former in turn seek to distinguish themselves from these unwelcome companions by varying their consumption in consequence a particular consumption activity may start up market an then gradually proceed down the social spectrum more complex patterns with continuing cycles in consumption can also be found the paper argues that this model is not only applicable to the consumption behaviour of an elite or would be elite but is relevant in a wide range of consumption settings

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

pecuniary emulation inequality and growth abstract we study a two class growth model in which agents care about both consumption and the social perception of their wealth rank the latter determines the social status enjoyed by agents social perceptions are based upon noisy signals of wealth and in equilibrium there is incomplete separation of classes the steady growth rate of the economy increases with the full information status differential between classes and contrary to the growth model without status it is affected by the initial level of wealth inequality both too much equality and too much inequality are detrimental to economic growth

the persistence in volatility of the us term premium 1970 1986 abstract this paper examines the persistence of the volatility of the risk premia for excess holding period returns of the term structure using a garch m model of the conditional variance the finding of a high degree of persistence cannot be sustained once allowance is made for a structural break in the unconditional variance caused by a change in the operation of us monetary policy during 1979 1982

what s in a sign trademark law and economic theory the aim of this paper is to summarize the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature the proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics copyright 2006 the authors journal compilation 2006 blackwell publishing ltd

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

do stationary risk premia explain it all evidence from the term structure abstract predictable variations in excess returns have often been attributed to the presence of time varying risk premia in this paper we use an insight based upon new techniques from time series analysis to test whether stationary risk premia can alone explain the behavior of excess returns to long bonds relative to rolling over short rates surprisingly we reject this hypothesis using u s t bill returns we then show that either permanent shocks to the risk premia and or rationally anticipated shifts in the interest rate process could produce anomalous results

conspicuous consumption and race evidence from south africa abstract a century ago thorstein veblen introduced socially contingent consumption into the economic literature this paper complements the scarce empirical literature by testing his conjecture on south african household data and finds that black and coloured households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable white households following the approach of charles et al 2009 this paper explores whether the differences in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status seeking moreover it is assessed to which extent positional concerns motivate conspicuous consumption although the socially contingent share in visible consumption increases with income different incentives to consume conspicuously seem to explain that at every level of income black households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable white households in contrast to the findings of charles et al 2009 where differential spending on conspicuous consumption can be found also within each group separately the model s core hypothesis fails to hold within the group of white south africans

social status education and growth this paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth we consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers nonwage income and innate ability a greater emphasis on status may induce the wrong individuals that is those with low ability and high wealth to acquire schooling causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth enhancing industries this crowding out effect taken alone discourages growth growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth which reduces the demand for status

markov switching models rational expectations and the term structure of interest rates in order to evaluate the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism we develop the formulas for testing rational expectations theory in the term structure of interest rates with var models of stochastically switching regimes in which all the parameters are regime dependent these formulas are obtained for the strict version of rational expectations as well as for the case where measurement errors are assumed in the expectations relationship they are extensible to other contexts that involve variables linked by rational expectations behaviours the testing procedure is implemented on interest rates of the spanish inter bank money market measurement errors must be assumed to find signs favourable to the theory

optimal pricing of a conspicuous product during a recession that freezes capital markets abstract this paper considers the problem of how to price a conspicuous product when the economy is in a recession that disrupts capital markets a conspicuous product in this context is a luxury good for which demand is increasing in brand image brand image here means the ability of a consumer to impress observers by conspicuously displaying consumption of the good brand image is built up when the good is priced high enough to make it exclusive and eroded if the good is discounted recession is modeled as having two effects it reduces demand and it freezes capital markets so borrowing is not possible in pricing the conspicuous product the firm faces the following trade off reducing price helps maintain sales volume and cash flow in the face of reduced demand but it also damages brand image and thus long term demand the paper analyzes the firm s pricing policy facing scenarios of mild intermediate and severe recessions while taking the threat of bankruptcy into account for an intermediate recession the optimal solution is history dependent the results have implications for policy interventions in capital markets and for timing of mergers and acquisitions

globalization and household saving is there a link abstractthis article proposes that globalization can affect household saving in the long run in a number of ways social interactions between different cultures can induce value changes which can result in shifts in consumption and saving behaviour international trade allows consumers to have easier access to status goods stimulating consumption and dampening saving extending from veblen s conspicuous consumption theory saving may also decrease when globalization leads to greater population mobility and fosters urbanization thus enhancing the importance of consumption as a way to display wealth in addition financial globalization reduces credit constraints and allows households to save less using cross country data from the united nations un the oecd and other sources this article finds evidence that household saving declines as globalization deepens especially in the social and cultural dimensions

an efficient dynamic mechanism this paper constructs an efficient budget balanced bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents observe private information and decisions are made over countably many periods first under the assumption of private values other agents private information does not directly affect an agent s payoffs we construct an efficient ex post incentive compatible mechanism which is not budget balanced second under the assumption of independent types the distribution of each agent s private information is not directly affected by other agents private information we show how the budget can be balanced without compromising agents incentives finally we show that the mechanism can be made self enforcing when agents are sufficiently patient and the induced stochastic process over types is an ergodic finite markov chain publication abstract

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

pricing of conspicuous goods a competitive analysis of social effects abstract social needs play an important role in the purchase of conspicuous goods in this article the authors extend traditional economic models to accommodate social needs such as desire for uniqueness and conformism and examine their implications for pricing conspicuous goods first in the context of a duopoly the authors identify the conditions under which the desire for uniqueness can increase demand among some consumers as the price of a product increases second the authors show that though the desire for uniqueness leads to higher prices and firm profits a desire for conformity leads to lower prices and profits third the authors find that consumers purchase high quality products not because of their desire for uniqueness but despite it finally marketers of conspicuous goods may find it beneficial not to emphasize the functional differences among their products when the need for uniqueness is high in a laboratory test the authors find support for the claim that demand for a product amo

social limits to redistribution in many countries equality of political rights including the right to vote over taxes and transfers goes along with substantial inequality of economic conditions this observation lies at the root of one fundamental issue in political economy one about the factors that limit the extent of redistribution in democracies the conventional economic wisdom on this issue can roughly be summarized by two arguments firstly redistributive taxation may be limited by various kinds of incentive costs of taxation as e g in james a mirrlees 1971 kevin w s roberts 1977 dennis n epple and thomas romer 1991 and thomas piketty 1995 secondly redistribution may be dampened by the lobbying activity of high income groups and by various imperfections inherent to the political process that determines the tax system as e g in gary s becker 1983 and john e roemer 1995 while both arguments offer illuminating insights into the phenomenon of redistribution they are also based on a very crude description of human behavior one which ignores social motivations of action both in the economic and the political sphere the present paper develops an explanation that takes such motivations into account specifically it shows that limits to redistribution may arise when economic inequality has an informational value for social decisions our approach is based upon the following observation many goods and decisions that heavily affect an individual s quality of life are not allocated or made through markets but through social interactions thomas scitovsky 1976 for instance although people have strong preferences over how they are treated by others and over whom they mate with these things are not the object of market transactions a number of sources of satisfaction like conversation dinners and parties playing with others and being observed and admired are nonmarket goods for which a keen social competition between individuals often develops as shown by harold cole et al 1992 the existence of social rather than market competition for some goods can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in the income distribution when information about relative income is private individuals become interested in the observable consumption differentials between them and their social competitors since consumption differentials are influenced by redistributive taxation the political attitudes of people toward redistribution will be shaped by its expected impact on social competition in some identifiable environments this concern for social success may be the crucial factor that limits the extent of redistribution desired by a majority of voters specifically while the middle class may obtain economic benefits from a large amount of redistributive taxation it may oppose an equalization of living standards since this would harm its social success the fear of losing social status in favor of the poor induces the middle class to enter a political alliance with the rich which supports conservative taxation programs in the sociological literature scholars of voting behavior have often suggested that the need for social recognition plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes seymour m lipset 1967 pointed out that white collar workers tend to be socially valued similarly as those higher in the system and although their income may be only slightly larger than that of manual workers white collars are much more likely to corneo department of economics university of osnabruck rolandstrasse 8 d 49069 osnabruck germany cesifo munich and cepr london gruner department of economics university of mannheim d 68131 mannheim germany iza bonn and cepr london we would like to thank emmanuelle auriol dieter bos peter funk mike hout olivier jeanne peter jonas georg noldeke thomas piketty regis renault john roemer jens weidmann and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions we have also benefited from the comments of participants at workshops and conferences in barcelona bonn davis jena maastricht magdeburg mannheim montreal munich rotterdam silvaplana tel aviv tilburg toulouse and warwick at which we presented earlier versions of this work financial support from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn is gratefully acknowledged

dynamic models of religious conformity and conversion theory and calibrations abstract this paper develops overlapping generations models to explain and simulate changes in the proportion of secular and religious people the church is modeled as generating an externality associated with conformity enhancing education observed changes in the number of nonbelievers are explained by different birth rates among secular and religious parents and the relative proportion of young nonconformists calibrations for the conformity rates among secular and religious people show that the observed long run increase in the difference between percentage of secular people in europe and the united states can be attributed to lower conformity rates prevailing in europe

aspirations and inequality the premise of this paper is twofold first people s aspirations for their future wellbeing or that of their children aect their incentives to invest second the experiences of others help shape one s aspirations this paper marries a model of aspirations based choice with a simple theory of aspirations formation to study the relationship between aspirations and the distribution of income through its impact on investments aspirations aect economic mobility and the income distribution which in turn shape aspirations thus aspirations income and the distribution of income evolve jointly and in many situations in a self reinforcing way we study the consequences of this model for income distribution as well as for growth rates over dierent quantiles of the distribution we show that extreme equality is unstable moreover when the same aspirations are shared in a society polarization arises the theory we propose captures both the complacency stemming from low aspirations and the frustration resulting from aspirations that are too high as a result for commonly held aspirations growth rates have an inverted u shape along the income distribution

the expectations hypothesis of the term structure the uk interbank market using a high quality weekly data set the author provides several tests of the expectations hypothesis using the vector autoregression and cointegration methodologies for several maturities between one week and twelve months for the u k interbank market on the basis of the johansen cointegration analysis there appears to be a break in the term structure when both the six month and twelve month maturities are included as a pair the latter may be due to either the presence of liquidity constraints or market segmentation or a time varying term premium all of which would invalidate the assumptions underlying the expectations hypothesis the author provides some tentative explanations of these diverse results copyright 1996 by royal economic society

promotions and product pricing parsimony versus veblenesque demand the veracity of the parsimonious law of demand has long been challenged by analyses of the veblen effect and prestige pricing backward bending demand curves often attend discussions of conspicuous consumption probing the sociological and psychological intricacies of potential consumer interdependencies scholars in economics and marketing have overlooked mundane product promotions for a monopolistic firm we formalize the relationship between the optimal price quantity combination and the thoroughness of product promotions iterating toward the profit maximizing thoroughness of product promotion gives rise to a backward bending price quantity locus challenges to the law of demand that ignore product promotions are thereby undercut

if you tourist behave irrationally i ll find you abstract when departures from rational behavior can potentially be expected modeling should allow for their identification and their quantification in this regard prices in tourism might have effects that may not be as apparent as economic theory predicts this article incorporates the sticker shock formulation into the mixed logit model without imposing consistency with consumer theory to accommodate any possible positive or negative price effects by allowing the parameters of price and sticker shock term to take any value negative or positive we detect abnormal behaviors in the tourist demand not only is the negative relationship between price and demand inverted for some people but also some tourists might be willing to accept higher than expected prices the non well behaved groups shares are estimated

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

understanding the solar home price premium electricity generation and green social status this study uses a large sample of homes in the san diego area and sacramento california area to provide some of the first capitalization estimates of the sales value of homes with solar panels relative to comparable homes without solar panels although the residential solar home market continues to grow there is little direct evidence on the market capitalization effect using both hedonics and a repeat sales index approach we find that solar panels are capitalized at roughly a 3 5 premium this premium is larger in communities with a greater share of college graduates and of registered prius hybrid vehicles

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

signaling status the impact of relative income on household consumption and financial decisions this paper investigates the importance of status in household consumption and credit decisions using data from the survey of consumer finances linked to tract level data in the american community s

benchmarking the expectations hypothesis of the interest rate term structure an analysis of cointegration vectors i test cointegration restrictions that are consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure by employing the full information maximum likelihood methods developed by johansen yield curves appear to be the result of cointegration among interest rates the cointegration vectors that best describe the long term impact of interest rate levels on interest rate changes can often be written as linear combinations of interest rate spreads there is however difficulty in keeping short term yields in such a restricted cointegrated system with other interest rates short term speculative returns from long term bonds do not conform to the expectations hypothesis

multi period pricing in the presence of competition and social influence abstract this paper examines single and dynamic pricing policies of two competing firms over two periods in the presence of social influence assuming two firms adopt the same pricing policy we find that under either pricing policy firm profits always decrease with the degree of social influence firms prefer dynamic pricing policy when social influence is either relatively weak or sufficiently strong for firms under dynamic pricing policy to set zero prices in the first period otherwise single pricing policy is more preferable the conclusions are similar when the market size varies over periods except that dynamic pricing policy is always more profitable if the market size in period 2 is sufficiently large we have further compared the two pricing policies with posted pricing policy the results show that dynamic pricing policy dominates when social influence is relatively weak while posted pricing policy dominates when social influence is sufficiently strong because of the synergy between social influence and the reference price effect finally when each firm freely chooses either single or dynamic pricing policy we find that if the degree of social influence is relatively small two asymmetric equilibria exist where two firms adopt different pricing policies if the degree of social influence is very large however the unique equilibrium is both firms adopting dynamic pricing policy these findings provide important implications for firms to make more informed pricing decisions in an increasingly competitive environment with strong social influence

the communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets the paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the sincere agents privately know their preferences it shows that for a large class of choice rules any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is in the choice rule is by verifying a budget equilibrium i e that the alternative is optimal to each agent within a budget set given to him therefore any communication mechanism realizing the choice rule must find a supporting budget equilibrium we characterize the class of choice rules that have this property furthermore for any rule from the class we characterize the minimally informative messages budget equilibria verifying it this characterization is used to identify the amount of communication needed to realize a choice rule measured with the number of transmitted bits or real variables applications include efficiency in convex economies exact or approximate surplus maximization in combinatorial auctions the core in indivisible good economies and stable many to one matchings

an empirical note on the term structure and interest rate stabilization policies the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates supplemented by the rational expectations and time invariant risk premium assumption implies that the spread between the long and the short rate has in general predictive power for the short rate this implication was consistently rejected in recent studies shiller campbell and schoenholtz 1983 fama 1984 mankiw and summers 1984 with data at the short end of the maturity spectrum threeand six month treasury bills time variations of the risk premium which are probably important for the behavior of the yield on long term bonds are not an entirely satisfactory explanation for these findings in a more recent article of mankiw and miron 1986 who analyzed quarterly data for threeand six month interest rates over the period 1890 1979 an interesting new explanation for the failure of the expectations theory emerged they showed that the spread had substantial predictive power for changes in the short rate in the period before the founding of the federal reserve 1890 1914 whereas for all other periods considered 1915 1933 1934 1951 1951 1958 and 1959 1979 the spread did not help to predict the short rate thus mankiw and miron suggested that the rejection of the expectations theory with recent data is a consequence of the commitment of the federal reserve to stabilize interest rates resulting in random walk behavior of the short rate under these circumstances expected future short rates are equal to the actual short rate and variations of the spread are only brought about by changes in the risk premium in this note the short term interest rate stabilization explanation for the failure of the predictive implications of the expectations theory of the term structure is subjected to an additional empirical test using recent monthly data thereby the short end of the term structure of swiss german and u s interest rates is analyzed for the years 1974 1986 these three cases are of great interest in our context the swiss national bank and the german federal bank used the opportunity offered by the flexible exchange rate system to implement money supply targets and did not attempt to stabilize short term interest rates whereas the federal reserve was at

modelling inbound international tourism demand in small pacific island countries abstractin this study we estimate inbound international tourism demand models at the individual source market destination and overall destination levels for fiji cook islands tonga and vanuatu f

endogenous labor supply growth and overlapping generations abstract this paper explores a simple model of endogenous growth in an overlapping generations framework when labor supply is made endogenous the following results are obtained if leisure and consumption are substitutes the economy can experience multiple equilibrium paths including high growth and high labor supply or no growth and low labor supply if the demand for leisure is inelastic then the economy enjoys steady growth as in standard models if leisure and consumption are complements then production remains bounded although endogenous growth is possible and socially desirable

social status entry and predation the case of british shipping cartels 1879 1929 the authors incorporate social status and regional affiliation two variables of central sociological interest into an economic analysis of entry and predation they build on scott morton s 1997 examination of entry and predation in the merchant shipping industry and examine whether the social status of an entrant owner impacts on the predation behavior of the incumbent cartels they find that high social status entrants are significantly less likely 40 to be preyed upon than the low social status entrants they discuss several interpretations of this result subsequent analysis supports the hypothesis that cartel members use social status as an indicator of an entrant s propensity to be a cooperative cartel participant

crime and conspicuous consumption we study how property crime distorts consumption decisions using an incomplete information model we argue that consuming conspicuous goods reveals information to criminals seeking bountiful victims and increases the likelihood of being victimized thus property crime reduces the consumption of visible goods even when these cannot be directly stolen but simply carry information about a potential victim s wealth we exploit the large decline in property crime in the u s during the 90s to test this mechanism using data from the u s consumer expenditure survey from 1986 to 2003 we find that households located in states experiencing sharper reductions in property crime increased significantly their consumption of visible goods even when these goods are not generally stolen both in absolute terms and relative to other consumption goods our findings hold when we instrument the decline in property crime during the 90s using a variety of strategies

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

diversification and its discontents idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial risk in the quest for social status social status concerns influence investors decisions by driving a wedge in attitudes toward aggregate and idiosyncratic risks i model such concerns by emphasizing the desire to get ahead of the joneses which implies that aversion to idiosyncratic risk is lower than aversion to aggregate risk the model predicts that investors hold concentrated portfolios in equilibrium which helps rationalize the small premium for undiversified entrepreneurial risk in the model status concerns are more important for wealthier households consequently these households own a disproportionate share of risky assets particularly private equity and experience greater volatility of consumption consistent with empirical evidence diversification and risk sharing are fundamental principles of modern finance and macroeconomics however empirical evidence suggests that household portfolios are poorly diversified with many people reporting substantial holdings of a single stock for the wealthiest households large shares in closely held businesses constitute a particularly important source of risk e g heaton and lucas 2000a it is not surprising that entrepreneurs bear substantial undiversified risk since it is important for mitigating moral hazard and or adverse selection problems yet from a standpoint of portfolio theory entrepreneurship does not appear to be well compensated implying that many investors are willing to take poorly rewarded risks despite the availability of superior investment opportunities such as public equity that earns a large risk premium e g moskowitz and vissing j0rgensen 2002 hall and woodward 2007

status effects and negative utility growth this paper explains the observed stagnation of happiness measures through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption normal goods confer direct utility while status goods confer utility only at the expense of others firms can improve the quality of both goods through r d the nash equilibrium of the consumer game results in the share of expenditure on status goods increasing with the number of times the status good has been improved as the economy grows resources for innovation are transferred entirely to status good r d the resulting long run rate of utility growth is negative

why do people care about social status abstract this paper shows that complementary interaction can induce people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non observable abilities there is a unique separating equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status in this equilibrium a person s social status perfectly reveals his abilities and everyone matches with a person of like ability the analysis shows that people s instrumental concern for social status has important welfare and policy implications indeed peoples efforts to keep up with the joneses may be welfare enhancing

do coffee roasters benefit from high prices of green coffee abstract the german coffee industry has repeatedly made the puzzling statement that it would prefer higher prices of green coffee its main input likewise it supported the maintenance of the coffee tax in this paper an oligopoly model with differentiated products is used to illustrate the possibility of profit raising cost increases the relationship between prices and costs of roasted coffee in germany is estimated and the hypothesis of overshifting is tested in addition the demand for coffee is studied however the empirical analysis does not confirm that increasing costs lead to higher profits alternative explanations for the coffee industry s statements based on long term considerations are also discussed