fighting with one hand tied behind the back political budget cycles in the west german states theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre election period only if fiscal transparency is low i argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering governments may increase spending on highly visible policies the composition of the budget serves as a second best strategy it increases political support without straining the budget balance an empirical analysis of the west german states reveals alternative electoral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments choose between alternative fiscal instruments

political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

optimism and pessimism a cross country comparison optimism and pessimism influence economic choices if consumers are optimistic they tend to spend a greater proportion of their budget shares on luxuries and a lesser proportion on necessities many models of consumer expenditure do not take into account the influence of optimism and pessimism this paper demonstrates a way to indirectly measure optimism and pessimism by focusing on patterns in engel curve residuals for necessities and luxuries using the revised international comparison program icp 2005 data covering 144 countries this paper presents economy wide optimism and pessimism indicators these indicators provide a useful complement to traditional economic measures of standard of living such as real gross domestic product gdp in purchasing power parity ppp terms these indicators are non economic in traditional terms however since they are constructed as residuals from an economic analysis they could act as a very useful complement to traditional economic indicators and as such may be termed quality of life indicators

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies a comment we attempt to assess the effect of monetary policy in a panel model for 16 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd to answer the question of whether central banks actively create political business cycles we focus on the short term interest rate as a proxy for the use of monetary instruments our results indicate that central banks do not create political business cycles this conclusion holds whether or not central banks are independent and whether or not they are constrained by the exchange rate system in force

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed established democracies this paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal instruments using a sample of 19 high income oecd democracies during the period 1972 1999 we find that elections shift public spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment although we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and overall expenditures we find a negative effect of elections on revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation our results apply for predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections seem to increase deficit and leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected

an essay on the rationality of economic policy the test case of the electional cycle the literature on electional cycles is discussed in the light of the empirical findings by in particular the author two basically different types of explanations of such cycles are compared explanations based on the maximizing behavior of governments aiming at re election explanations building on the insufficiently controlled pressures of events in a democracy it is demonstrated that even when the most well known theory under the nordhaus macraemodel is a rather fragile construction a more robust argument termed the popularity investment argument can be constructed yielding the same basic result from the empirical literature it is concluded that almost the opposite pattern actually occurs in the data it is finally demonstrated that the weak but significant empirical pattern is easy to explain by the elections generate promises which give most real expansion in the second governmental year and most inflation in the third year an average behavior which hardly implies even medium term maximization by governments as assumed under

unemployment and inflation consequences of unexpected election results the empirical evidence toward rational partisan theory of business cycles is mixed and thus inconclusive this is due to the enormous heterogeneity of the existing empirical studies only a few of these test explicitly for the central theoretical innovation that post electoral blips in economic activity depend on the degree of the electoral surprise using polling data we present empirical evidence in favor of rational partisan theory for a panel of oecd countries

educational business cycles the political economy of teacher hiring across german states 1992 2004 strong institutional constraints and better informed voters may lead re election seeking incumbents to shift the use of political business cycle mechanisms away from monetary and fiscal policy towards other policy domains that are more easily manipulable targetable and timeable we investigate teacher employment patterns at the state level in germany and find strong evidence of cycling mechanisms in the form of electioneering and honeymooning against a backdrop of a continuously shrinking total teachers pool german state level incumbents accelerate the hiring of new teachers during election periods and partly reverse this during politically safer points in the electoral cycle cycles are mediated by issue salience heightened attention to german public schooling after the notorious pisa 2000 tests further strengthens the manipulation of new teacher hiring for electoral purposes

perceived trade off between education and sports career evidence from professional football to explore the attitudes towards risky career choices of young people in highly competitive environments we surveyed almost 1000 football players in the youth academies of german professional club

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

the bundesbank s path to independence evidence from the 1950s the german bundesbank is frequently called the world s most independent and conservative central bank taking account of the path dependency of this reputation both quantitative data and qualitative data on german central bank law and political conflicts are used to determine the factors that contributed to this reputation in the 1950s it is shown that quantitative analysis has its limits and that law might be a misleading indicator in this respect it is rather the analysis of policy conflicts between the bundesbank and the government that yields information on the bank s path to independence

opportunistic and partisan election cycles in brazil new evidence at the municipal level this article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of brazilian municipalities over the 1989 2005 period the results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments local tax revenues and budget surplus in election years they also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts these results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government

a positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits in a wage bargaining model a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages therefore the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process we consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential using panel data for 19 oecd countries we find support for these theoretical predictions moreover we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness

searching for political business cycles in germany one reslt of the revitalised literature on political business cycles is that there are signs in german data that elections and ideology have an impact however using monthly data for the period 1950 1989 and standard methods of time series analysis we reject both the nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles and the partisan approaches by hibbs ans alesina we show that some results are sensitive to the assumption of stationarity there are signs of policy cycles in m1 it is hard though to bring this in line with the rogoff hypothesis of rational opportunistic cycles because of the german institutional setting

inherited trust and growth this paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation we show that inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants is sig nificantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears we thus use the inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants as a time varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin this strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects jel n11 n12 n31 n32 o47 z13

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

electoral cycles in active labor market policies we examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote short term job creation such policies reduce measures of unemployment using german state data for the period 1985 to 2004 we show that election motivated politicians pushed job promotion schemes before elections

bread and the attrition of power economic events and german election results aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post war germany were determined by the weighted average growth of real per capita disposable income each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in germany no other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model however attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961 1994 and 1998

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

affluence and food a simple way to infer incomes accurate and timely measures of cross country real incomes are still a rarity as the share of expenditure devoted to food is readily available we use engel s law in reciprocal form to measure affluence analysis of real income data for over 100 countries indicates that this approach is viable to recognize the role of uncertainty in the analysis we present the results in the form of stochastic cross country income comparisons

the impact of personality traits on talents performance throughout development phases empirical evidence from professional football this paper addresses a critical gap in talent management research i e the question of what determines high performance by highlighting the importance of personality traits for the performance of

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

political budget cycles the case of the western german lander this paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenwestern german lander we verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974 1994 for the following budgetary variables totalexpenditures surplus deficit administration health care education roads and social security benefits while overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations

economic freedom and government ideology across the german states potrafke n economic freedom and government ideology across the german states regional studies this paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the german states the results show that in former west germany rightwing governments promoted economic freedom whereas leftwing governments confined it in the former east germany however rightwing governments were not associated with propagating economic freedom this finding appears to conflict with the common notion of policy convergence at the federal level in fact the observed variation in political preferences across states may indicate that politicians gratify the local electorate and in return offer moderate policies at the federal level potrafke n potrafke n la liberte economique et l ideologie du gou

how to help unemployed find jobs quickly experimental evidence from a mandatory activation program abstract this paper investigates how a mandatory activation program in denmark affects the job finding rate of unemployed workers the activation program was introduced in an experimental setting where about half of the workers who became unemployed in the period from november 2005 to march 2006 were randomly assigned to the program while the other half was not it appears that the activation program is very effective the median unemployment duration of the control group is 14 weeks while it is 11 5 weeks for the treatment group the analysis shows that the job finding rate in the treatment group is 30 higher than in the control group this result is mainly driven by the more intensive contacts between the unemployed and the public employment service

the risk concept for entrepreneurs reconsidered new challenges to the conventional wisdom abstract this paper explores the entrepreneurial risk construct focusing on how the decision to launch a new venture may entail risks different from what is found in established firms opportunities often emerge from the creation of specialized knowledge in start ups this knowledge is characterized by concerns for rent appropriation and information asymmetry we suggest that traditional measures of risk do not properly account for these concerns hence an illusion of greater risk taking attaches itself to entrepreneurs especially if the specialized knowledge is difficult to observe we suggest alternative measures that better capture these concerns including the dilution of control when issuing equity cash burn rates etc

regular effective demand systems reds empirical demand analysis is usually conducted on the basis of either regularity or flexibility this paper takes a middle ground between regularity and flexibility offering a compromise in the form of a new specification termed reds

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

us presidential elections and real gdp growth 1961 2004 in this paper i show that since 1960 an electoral cycle in us output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables that is controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes inflation money growth energy prices lagged output growth government spending or its growth and temporary partisan effects the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real gdp growth

the economics of real superstars the market for rock concerts in the material world beginning in 1997 the price of concert tickets took off and ticket sales declined from 1996 to 2003 for example the average concert price increased by 82 while the cpi increased by 17 explanations for price growth include 1 the possible crowding out of the secondary ticket market 2 rising superstar effects 3 baumols and bowen s disease 4 increased concentraion of promoters and 5 the erosion of complementarities between concerts and album sales because of file sharing and cd copying the article tentatively concludes that the decline in complementarities is the main cause of the recent surge in concert prices

fiscal policy and reelection in brazilian municipalities this paper uses a new panel of more than 2 000 brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors reelec tion we examine brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed effects model the results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party in par ticular higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to brazilian incumbent mayors

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

rhetoric and action what are central banks doing before elections central bank rhetoric need not always be followed bycorresponding measures in a number of regressions coveringgermany japan and the u s we examine differences in rhetoricand actual behavior before elections using a standard pbcmodel our results indicate that these three central bankshave not been influenced by electoral consideration in thepolicies they implement but the case of the german bundesbankindicates that it may be helpful to distinguish betweenrhetoric and action

endogenous elections electoral budget cycles and canadian provincial governments the existence of manipulative electoral budget cycles and opportunistic election setting is examined in the framework of a parliamentary democracy empirical tests are conducted using a pooled time series cross section data set derived from canadian provincial governments over the 1962 1992 period evidence in support of the electoral budget cycle hypothesis but not the opportunistic election timing hypothesis is obtained

federalism and central bank independence the politics of german monetary policy 1957 92 two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy first political threats to the status structure or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy second politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure that central bank appointees share their electoral and party political goals this paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of the degree of central bank independence zero partial or full and central bankers types partisans or technocrats based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the german central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between i argue that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of german federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure the behavioral independence of the german central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points the bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures

rent risk and replication preference adaptation in winner take all markets abstract we study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent seeking contest we assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs we show that in particular initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking

is german domestic social policy politically controversial this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using german data examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951 2007 period leftwing governments however spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after german reunification in 1990 since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon

are expectations on inflation and election outcomes connected an empirical analysis abstract in this paper we study whether inflation expectations react on variations of election outcome expectations using data from 6 countries we show that such a link in fact exists and thus provides empirical evidence supportive to rational partisan theory of business cycles

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

partisan political business cycles in the german labour market empirical tests in the light of the lucas critique this paper focuses on alternative specifications ofpartisan political business cycles partisan theory rational partisan theory and hysteresis augmentedrpt it elaborates on analogies of the natural ratehypothesis underlying all specifications and thecointegration concept accordingly problems of thespecification of hypotheses estimation and inferencein a cointegrating framework with politicalinterventions are treated super exogeneity tests areshown to be equivalent to tests of the lucas critiqueand the rpt therefore the concept ofsuper exogeneity is transferred to empirical tests ofpartisan cycles by this a new testing framework ofpartisan cycles is developed and applied to germanlabour market data

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

electoral misgovernance cycles evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in greece we present detailed empirical evidence from greece that around elections misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax evasion and has important economic implications these effects have led to the destruction of property or loss of government revenue estimated at 8 of gdp there are two plausible reasons why misgovernance might intensify around elections i attention and effort of elected officials is directed to campaigning instead of governing and ii the misgovernance may benefit special interests and serve as a pork barrel transfer that is hard to monitor or control empirically we find that redistributive politics are likely a dominant cause of electoral misgovernance in the case of wildfires we also find evidence that political competition tends to increase electoral misgovernance furthermore electoral misgovernance helps incumbents get reelected while misgovernance may manifest differently among countries our analysis suggests that electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and harmful than previous literature suggests

an empirically oriented demand system with improved regularity properties while the almost ideal demand system has received increasing attention in empirical studies of consumer demand the fact that the underlying piglog cost function is not globally regular has often led to violation of negative semidefiniteness in the estimated slutsky matrix this paper suggests a modification to the piglog class of preferences termed mpiglog which preserves regularity in a wider region of expenditure price space in an empirical section the almost ideal demand system special case of piglog is compared with the analogous special case of mpiglog which the authors term maids the comparison demonstrates the improved regularity features of maids

world food demand long term projections of global food demand are heavily dependent on which functional form of the food demand equation is used given that real incomes can change substantially over the long term key elements are the dependence of the income elasticity on income which ensures that the food budget share always lies within the 0 1 range and the role of income inequality this article analyzes these issues proposes a new functional form that deals with them and presents estimates of income and price elasticities for food in 138 countries copyright 2012 oxford university press

macroeconomic performance and government popularity in new zealand this article empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic variables on the popularity of the new zealand government by testing various popularity functions for the period 1970 1981 the results unambiguously show that the existence of this important politico economic relationship cannot be doubted in particular the empirical results suggest that new zealand voters are 1 forward looking rather than backward looking 2 capable of comparing the actual macroeconomic condition with some notion of a variable normal performance and 3 well aware of the openness of their economy

political models of the business cycle should be revived political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive this paper addresses the second issue demonstrating for u s real gnp unemployment and inflation that electoral cycles persistent patterns across electoral terms are significant but apparently only for republican incumbents and that partisan cycles persistent differences between parties are also significant these findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives

the impact of active labour market programmes on the duration of unemployment in switzerland this article evaluates the effects of swiss active labour market programmes on the job chances of unemployed workers the main innovation is a comparison of two important dynamic evaluation estimators the matching estimator and the timing of events estimator we find that both estimators generate different treatment effects according to the matching estimator temporary subsidised jobs shorten unemployment duration whereas training programmes and employment programmes do not in contrast the timing of events estimator suggests that none of the swiss active labour market programmes shortens unemployment duration the aim of the present article is to study the impact of active labour market policies almps on the duration of unemployment in switzerland the new swiss almps reflect the increasing consensus among policy makers that actively assisting the unemployed in job search is preferable to simply providing them with passive income support the danger is so the argument goes that reliance on passive income support may reduce work incentives and job search activities and therefore increase the risk of long term unemployment almps are seen by many as the key to minimise these risks the question how participation in almp measures affects labour market histories of individuals has been the subject of substantial debate the main problem is that labour market outcomes for participants may be systematically different from non participants

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

political biases despite external expert participation an empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in germany this paper explores whether and how political biases arise in an institutional setting where revenue forecasting is delegated to a body that includes experts from institutions neither part of nor controlled by the government the empirical analysis focuses on the performance of german federal tax revenue forecasts in the preparation of which the advice of external experts has a long tradition as an institutional safeguard while on average revenue forecasts turn out to be unbiased the results show that the government exerts an influence in particular optimism pessimism in the government s gdp forecast helps to explain why the revenue forecast turns out too optimistic pessimistic in addition governmental estimates of the revenue effects of tax law changes are found to contribute to forecast errors

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

rationality causality and the relation between economic conditions and the popularity of parties an empirical investigation for the federal republic of germany 1971 1982 abstract two questions are discussed using german popularity data from 1971 to 1982 it is asked whether it is true that using time series methods no relation can be found between economic variables and the popularity of parties taking ex post predictions strong evidence is presented that such a relation exists even if usual granger causality tests cannot detect it but is this relation compatible with rational expectations of the electorate this is at best partly the case as the anticipated part of the unemployment rate has a significant impact on the popularities of the two major german parties

public expenditures in canadian provinces an empirical study of politico economic interactions it is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures however frey and schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals and when popularity is low energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election data draw from the canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis the findings support the frey and schneider explanation