interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

interbank networks in prewar japan structure and implications forthcoming as interbank networks in prewar japan structure and implications with michiru sawada industrial and corporate change 2011

how debt markets have malfunctioned in the crisis the financial crisis that began in 2007 is especially a crisis in debt markets a full understanding of what happened in the financial crisis requires investigation into the plumbing of debt markets during a financial crisis when funds often cannot be raised easily or quickly the fundamental values for certain assets can become separated for a time from market prices with consequences that can echo into the real economy this article will explain in concrete ways how debt markets can malfunction with deleterious consequences for the real economy after a quick overview of debt markets i discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions risk capital and risk aversion repo financing and haircuts and counterparty risk in each of these areas feedback effects can arise so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious spiral i will document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during the crisis next i will show how these issues caused debt markets to break down indeed fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far removed from the toxic subprime mortgage assets at the root of the crisis finally i will discuss briefly four steps that the federal reserve took to ease the crisis and how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

the effect of investment constraints on hedge fund investor returns this paper examines the effect of real world investor level investment constraints including several that have not been studied before on hedge fund performance and its persistence using a large consolidated database we demonstrate that hedge fund performance persistence is significantly reduced when rebalancing rules reflect fund size restrictions and liquidity constraints but remains statistically significant at higher rebalancing frequencies hypothetical investor portfolios that incorporate additional minimum diversification constraints minimum investment requirements and focus on open funds suggest that the performance and its persistence documented in earlier studies of hedge funds is not easily exploitable especially by large investors

financial contagion through capital connections a model of the origin and spread of bank panics financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks the equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined we explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious eects conditional on the failure of a financial institution we show that contagion is possible in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist at the same time we identify a direction of flow for contagious eects which provides a rationale for localized financial panics simulations identify the optimal level of interbank deposit holdings in the presence of contagion risk our results suggest that when the probability of bank failure is low maximal levels of interbank holdings are optimal when cross holding of deposits is complete we demonstrate that the intensity of contagion is increasing in the size of regionally aggregate liquidity shocks

uninsured by choice a choice experiment on long term care insurance abstract we examine evidence from two unique discrete choice experiments dce on long term care insurance and values several of its relevant attributes more specifically the experiments examine choices made by a large sample made of 15 298 individuals in the united states with and without insurance we study the valuation of a number of insurance attributes namely the daily insurance benefit insurance coverage the compulsory and voluntary nature of the insurance policy design alongside the costs insurance premium and health requirements this paper elicits both respondents preferences and willingness to pay wtp for these care insurance s attributes using a random parameter logit model and assesses the heterogeneity of choice responses using demographic socioeconomic and attitudinal motivations to segment response to insurance choices we find that an increase in the insurance premium by an additional 100 would reduce insurance uptake by 1pp insurance policy uptake is higher when it provides benefits for the lifetime the monthly marginal wtp being 178 64 and voluntary the monthly marginal wtp increases by an extra 74 71 as opposed to universal and when it forgoes health checks the monthly marginal wtp increases by an extra 28us

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

poverty traps and index based risk transfer products summary a growing literature suggests that in low income countries households with few assets can be trapped in chronic poverty this article reviews relevant threads of the poverty traps literature to motivate a description of the opportunities presented by innovative index based risk transfer products these products can be used to address some insurance and credit market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty among households in low income countries applications are considered at the micro meso and macro levels 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

on the contagion effect in the us banking sector by using the spatial econometrics methodology this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the us banking sector during 2001 to 2012 in addition the contagion signals up to the subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system however we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

financial fragility and distress propagation in a network of regions we investigate how the financial fragility in the real economy is affected by the average level of interdependence among agents across different regions of the economy to this end we develop a parsimonious agent based model of firms and banks organized in geographic regions the model is built on the framework of an existing class of models for business fluctuations the goal of our exercise is to clarify the effect on systemic failures of the interplay between network interconnectedness and financial acceleration in particular we investigate the probability of individual and systemic failures with varying levels of interconnectedness we find that in the absence of financial acceleration connectivity makes the system more resilient in contrast in the presence of financial acceleration the probability of both individual and systemic failures are minimized at intermediate level of diversification

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

production networks and economic policy in this paper we show how to combine data on input output tables and recent insights from the theory of production networks in order to inform policy we first describe the information contained in input output tables compiled by statistical agencies and show how to derive relevant statistics of production networks we then discuss the implications of production networks for policy intervention in a series of domains such as fiscal policy industrial policy or finance finally we present a quantitative exercise applied to french data in order to illustrate that production networks shape the overall impact of competition policy on the economy

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

informational contagion of bank runs in a third generation crisis model abstract this paper highlights the international spread of bank runs in a third generation model of financial crises through an informational channel banks short term liabilities include loans granted by foreign creditors who have imperfect information about the liquidation costs of banks assets a bank panic in a country induces lenders to downgrade early liquidation yields in other countries and thus to require higher interest rates to enable their banks to roll over their maturing debt those banks become therefore more prone to self fulfilling depositors runs the paper then studies the effect on contagion of increased transparency and bailouts

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

local banking panics of the 1920s identification and determinants abstract using a newly discovered dataset of u s bank suspensions from 1921 to 1929 we discovered that banking panics were more common in the 1920s than had been believed besides identifying panics we investigate their determinants finding that local banking panics were more likely when fundamental economic conditions were generally weak and more likely in overbanked states they were less likely in states with deposit insurance or states where a relatively large share of banks belonged to chain banking organizations

expectations and contagion in self fulfilling currency attacks this paper shows how expectations driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation the model of morris and shin 1998 is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market if speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely they will engage in trades that link the two markets a sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of ac risis there fulfilling the original expectations even though this contagion is driven solely by expectations the model places restrictions on observable variables and these restrictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence

the creditor channel of liquidity crises this paper presents a model to study the transmission of liquidity shocks across financial institutions through the creditor channel in the model a borrower institution obtains funds from a large institutional lender and small investors when the large lender s asset market is hit by a liquidity shock it might decide to withdraw funding extended to the borrower the potential withdrawal by the large lender causes small investors to panic and to close positions even if the large lender does not facing funding problems the borrower has to cut its activities contributing to further shocks to the supply of market liquidity the original shock is exacerbated which reinforces withdrawals by all creditors the model helps explain how the spreading of liquidity shocks from the broker dealer sector to the hedge fund sector and the feedback contribute to a systemic crisis

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

collateral amplification under complete markets abstract this paper examines the robustness of the kiyotaki moore collateral amplification mechanism to the existence of complete markets for aggregate risk we show that when borrowers can hedge against aggregate shocks at fair prices the volatility of endogenous variables becomes identical to the first best in the absence of credit constraints the collateral amplification mechanism disappears to motivate the limited use of contingent contracts we introduce costs of issuing contingent debt and calibrate them to match the liquidity and safety premia the data we find that realistic costs of state contingent market participation can rationalize the predominant use of uncontingent debt amplification is restored in such an environment

the role of regulatory credibility in effective bank regulation this paper develops a model of regulated brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system we show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity in fact perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly however when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired importantly we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule the optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator s level of absolute risk aversion

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

rollover risk liquidity and macroprudential regulation i study rollover risk in wholesale funding markets when intermediaries hold liquidity ex ante and fire sales may occur ex post multiple equilibria exist in a global rollover game intermediate liquidity holdings support equilibria with both positive and zero expected liquidation a simple uniqueness refinement pins down the private liquidity choice which balances the forgone expected return on investment with reduced fragility and costly liquidation due to fire sales liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes intermediaries free ride on the holdings of other intermediaries causing excessive liquidation to internalize the systemic nature of liquidity a macroprudential authority imposes liquidity buffers

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

a model of financial fragility abstract this article presents a dynamic stochastic game theoretic model with two essential features first agents hold diversified portfolios that link their financial positions to those of other agents second shocks to fundamentals at the initial date cause some portfolio losses agents who incur losses reallocate their portfolios thereby breaking some linkages in the pareto efficient symmetric equilibrium studied two related types of financial crisis can occur in response one occurs gradually as losses spread breaking more links the other type occurs instantaneously when forward looking agents preemptively shift to safer portfolios to avoid future losses from contagion an economy is more fragile the earlier its last remaining link breaks from such a crisis journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 e00 e3 e44 g1

informational channels of financial contagion two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion one is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets using global games i present a two country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and i test its predictions experimentally the experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly base rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior and thus weakens the fundamental channel an overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others even when this information is irrelevant these results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior

the effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and common shocks abstract this paper proposes a dynamic multi agent model of a banking system with central bank banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves according to their risk return and liquidity preferences they are linked via interbank loans and face stochastic deposit supply comparing different interbank network structures it is shown that money centre networks are more stable than random networks evidence is provided that the central bank stabilizes interbank markets in the short run only systemic risk via contagion is compared with common shocks and it is shown that both forms of systemic risk require different optimal policy responses

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

uncertainty in an interconnected financial system contagion and market freezes this paper studies contagion and market freezes caused by uncertainty in financial network structures our model demonstrates that in a financial system where financial institutions are interconnected a negative shock to an individual financial institution could spread to other institutions causing market freezes because of creditors uncertainty about the financial network structure our model also reveals that when both a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors are present the size of the large creditor will affect the severity of market freezes substantially moreover our model is used to examine central bank policies to alleviate market freezes

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

financial contagion and the role of the central bank abstract we investigate the role of a central bank cb in preventing and avoiding financial contagion the cb by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises we argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies as long as incomplete contracts are present the cb may have a useful role in curbing contagion moreover the cb allows the banking system to reach first best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive efficiency is considered if the analysis is restricted to constrained efficiency the cb still avoids contagion without however reaching first best consumption allocation the model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information

a role for capital markets in natural disasters a piece of the food security puzzle abstract natural disaster can create significant shocks in food supplies for small country states these events are very disruptive to the development process market based means for managing natural disaster risk are emerging for example despite the failure of government subsidized crop insurance around the world it is now possible to create index based contracts that would trigger when events that create serious crop failure problems occur this paper investigates the logic for such contracts and some basic designs using measures of rainfall

incentives and endogenous risk taking a structural view on hedge fund alphas hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives performance fee options call equity investors redemption options put and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage put the interaction of these option like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante depending on the distance of fund value from the high water mark we study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature we show that reduced form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases the result is stronger for low quality funds we propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds

banking crises and the lender of last resort how crucial is the role of information this article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses how the presence of a lender of last resort lolr affects the solvency of the banking system we obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy the study finds that the difference between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed lolr can be crucial our results indicate that a perfectly informed lolr is a pareto improvement however if the supervisory process of the lolr is subject to noise then the gains from ex post efficiency may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiency induced by moral hazard which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy

measuring network systemic risk contributions a leave one out approach abstract the aim of this paper is to propose a new network measure of systemic risk contributions that combines the pair wise granger causality approach with the leave one out concept this measure is based on a conditional granger causality test and consists of measuring how far the proportion of statistically significant connections in the system breaks down when a given financial institution is excluded we analyse the performance of our measure of systemic risk by considering a sample of the largest banks worldwide over the 2003 2018 period we obtain three important results first we show that our measure is able to identify a large number of banks classified as global systemically important banks g sibs by the financial stability board fsb second we find that our measure is a robust and statistically significant early warning indicator of downside returns during the last financial crisis finally we investigate the potential determinants of our measure of systemic risk and find similar results to the existing literature in particular our empirical results suggest that the size and the business model of banks are significant drivers of systemic risk

regionality revisited an examination of the direction of spread of currency crises abstract what determines the direction of spread of currency crises we examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992 1994 1997 and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion we simultaneously consider trade competition financial links and institutional similarity to the ground zero country as potential drivers of contagion to overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty we utilize bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion in particular we use the bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors we find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset we thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the wake up call hypothesis for financial contagion trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

strategic complementarities and the twin crises the economic literature has emphasized the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises motivated by evidence from recent financial crises we study a model where strategic complementarities exist not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators but also between the two groups the additional type of strategic complementarities generates a vicious cycle between banking crises and currency crises this vicious cycle magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilizes the economy we discuss some empirical implications and policy implications and in particular show that due to the interaction between the banking sector and the currency market a lender of last resort might not be able to prevent bank runs

overcoming limits of arbitrage theory and evidence abstract limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens using a model with limits to arbitrage where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean reverting and volatile returns using data on hedge fund performance we find robust support for these hypotheses funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals and funds with performance insensitive outflows recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage

how might climate change influence farmers demand for index based insurance the low observed uptake of non subsidised index based insurance policies in developing countries has been puzzling researchers for about a decade this paper analyses the role of drought frequency in farmers demand for index based insurance in developing countries while it is typically assumed that an increase in exposure to risk would result in higher demand for index insurance this paper finds the opposite an increase in drought frequency may result in lower demand for index insurance under fairly standard conditions in an expected utility model we show that the demand for insurance is an inverted u function of drought frequency we further show that downside basis risk decreases insurance demand under frequent drought conditions it implies that insurance against similar but more frequent events cannot meet large demand from farmers to check the empirical relevance of these effects we conduct an insurance field experiment in burkina faso with 205 farmers we analyse insurance demand for different drought frequencies different levels of basis risks and different loading factors through incentivised lottery choices this analysis confirms that for higher drought frequencies insurance demand is lower insurance demand also decreases with basis risk and the loading factor

collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism abstract kiyotaki and moore j polit economy 105 1997 211 have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output i clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks a theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in the economy is constrained by the aggregate value of collateral i illustrate how the constraint reinstates amplification effects and discuss empirical implications of this new mechanism

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

transparency in the financial system rollover risk and crises we present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk disclosing bank specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times thus the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises under this policy however information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information this commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis

contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms abstract this paper presents a model in which the contagion of a liquidity crisis between two nonfinancial institutions occurs because of learning activity within a common creditor pool after creditors observe what occurs in a rollover game for a firm they conjecture one another s type or attitude toward the risk associated with the firm s investment project creditors inference about one another s type then influences their decision to lend to the next firm by providing an analysis of the incidence of failure the threshold for a liquidity crisis for each firm this paper demonstrates that the risk of contagion increases sharply if it originates ex ante from a firm facing a low probability of failure in addition the paper proposes some policy measures for mitigating the severity of contagion during a liquidity crisis

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

optimal contracts and supply driven recessions abstract in models with financial frictions state contingent contracts stabilize the business cycle relative to contracts with predetermined repayments we show that this finding depends on whether predetermined repayments are set in real or nominal terms state contingent contracts may amplify supply driven recessions compared to contracts set in nominal terms

the formation of financial networks modern banking systems are highly interconnected despite various benefits linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion in this article i investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other when there is contagion risk in the financial system i model banks decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements a financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously i characterize the probability of systemic risk defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing in equilibrium interbank networks i show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur