an open economy model of the effects of unilateral environmental policy by a large developing country abstract in this paper we pose the following question why is it that despite the universal recognition of the need for global environmental protection developing countries have been lax in instituting stringent environmental regulations addressing this question from an economic standpoint we show that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which a large developing country can be worse off if it chooses to implement environmental policy in an uncoordinated fashion the empirical dimension of this question is stressed and the key parameters such as elasticities and marginal propensities to consume which are germane to any policy discussion regarding this issue are identified second we study once again from the perspective of a large developing country the possibility of using the domestic tax structure optimally to attain environmental policy objectives in a second best environment this scenario involves taxing pollution indirectly by using product taxes finally keeping the empirical dimension of the question in mind we show how to compute optimal externality correcting taxes these taxes are primarily a function of different kinds of elasticities

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

environmental policy in the european union fostering the development of pollution havens abstract a pollution haven occurs when dirty industries from developed nations relocate to developing nations in order to avoid strict environmental standards or developed nations imports of dirty industries expand replacing domestic production the purpose of this study is to determine whether the european union eu has increased its imports of dirty goods from poorer less democratic countries during a period of more stringent environmental standards previous empirical studies such as those by levinson and taylor levinson a and taylor m s in press unmasking the pollution haven effect international economic review ederington levinson and minier ederington j levinson a and minier j 2005 footloose and pollution free review of economics and statistics 87 92 99 kahn and yoshino 2004 and ederington and minier ederington j and minier j 2003 is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis canadian journal of economics 36 137 54 find evidence that united states imports are responsive to changes in environmental stringency but the effects of eu policy have not been examined as thoroughly our study follows kahn kahn m e 2003 the geography of us pollution intensive trade evidence from 1958 to 1994 regional science and urban economics 33 383 400 and examines the impact of industry energy intensity and toxicity measured by an energy index and a toxic release inventory tri index on imports into the eu at the 2 digit industry level from 1970 to 1999 we use the signing of the maastricht treaty to signify a period of more uniform and stringent community wide environmental standards 1993 1999 and identify the level of per capita gdp within an eu trading partner we find an increased amount of eu energy intensive trade with poorer countries during the period with more stringent eu environmental standards this result is not robust however when poorer countries are defined by oecd membership and geographic region we do not find an increased amount of eu toxic intensive trade with poorer countries although there is some evidence of increased eu imports of toxic goods from poorer oecd and non eu european countries for our full sample of trading partners in all regions the evidence supports the phh for eu energy intensive trade but not for toxic intensive trade results for regional trade analysis are less clear

deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

multiple environmental policies and pollution haven hypothesis evidence from china s polluting industries abstract theoretical studies of pollution haven hypothesis predict that differentiated environmental regulation policies will result in inter country relocation of polluting industries this paper investigates pollution haven hypothesis at domestic level in china using panel data of 30 provincial level regions for the period 2004 to 2013 this paper empirically examines to what extent multiple environmental policies affect intra country relocation of polluting industries in china it is found that the implementation of both economic policy instrument like pollution discharge fee and public participation like letter complaints on environmental problems encourages industrial relocation whereas the implementation of environmental legal policy instrument like laws regulations and rules prevents polluting industries from relocating to other regions it is also found that the relocation effect of environmental policies varies with industrial characteristics compared with water pollution intensive industry air pollution intensive industry dominated by stated owned capitals are insensitive to legal policy instruments these findings suggest that the validity of pollution haven hypothesis is jointly associated with the type of environmental policy as well as industrial characteristics

environmental regulations and industrial competitiveness evidence from china economic activities are closely related to real world environmental issues currently more attention is paid to the association between environmental regulations and industrial competitiveness ic because of pressures on economic development and environmental protection in this study we identify and explain the association between environmental regulations and ic in china as the largest developing country in the world china has the unavoidable responsibility of protecting the environment and promoting global economic development we analyse the mechanisms behind environmental regulations and industrial competiveness at the provincial level and conclude that the impact of environmental regulations upon ic is not a simple linear one but a u shaped relationship it is argued that the crucial intervention to activate the u shaped relationship or porter s hypothesis is innovation which can be triggered by stringent regulations and well designed policies

trade openness and the environmental kuznets curve evidence from chinese cities this paper examines the impact of economic growth and trade openness on environment in 261 chinese cities over the period of 2004 2013 using recently developed continuously updated fully modified method which allows for both cross sectional dependence and endogeneity two types of pollutants industrial waste water and sulphur dioxide are investigated and three measures of openness are employed in the regression from the results we find that the environmental kuznets curve hypothesis holds not only for the whole china but also in different regions it is estimated that wastewater pollution increases with economic development until per capita gdp reaching the turning point of 42 991 48 828 yuan in constant 2002 price which varies depending on the specific measure of trade openness the turning point for sulphur dioxide is found to occur at a much lower income level around 9 588 10 663 yuan per capita gdp furthermore export is mostly found to be positively related with pollution and the impact of import is likely to be negative for both the whole china and across regions if the significance is identified in the estimation results

regulation factor rewards and international trade this paper develops an approach for incorporating regulation into the theory of production distribution and trade using environmental regulation as an example four major conclusions emerge in the course of the analysis 1 production process regulation is equivalent in its effect on other cooperating factors to neutral technical regress i e negative progress 2 specific unambiguous income redistribution consequences follow from such regulation if commodity prices are held constant the factor used relatively intensively in the non regulated industry will gain absolutely in terms of both goods 3 unilateral or uncoordinated regulation destroys the link between uniform world commod ity prices and identical factor proportions factors prices across trading countries or regions 4 if any factor of production is freely mobile across frontiers the least differential regulation as between countries will entirely drive out the regulated industry from the more to the less regulated economy

collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract we show that efficient collusion by any subset of bidders in second price private value auctions is possible even when the bidders are heterogeneous an important property of efficient collusion is that a bidder s net payoff from participating in collusion is independent of her valuation we show that the cooperative game whose characteristic function evaluated at a coalition is the ex ante collusive surplus of that coalition has a nonempty core a feature of more technical interest is the mechanism characterization when the private information of agents does not enter in a linear or even piecewise linear manner

international trade and environmental quality a survey abstract international trade has been incorporating various aspects of environmental issues since 1970 the extent to which environmental problems might affect many facets of trade or vice versa has been the subject of considerable debate over these years in this article we have attempted to establish some of the links between international trade and environmental quality by performing a comprehensive literature review we discuss issues such as establishing direct and indirect effects of international trade on environmental quality effects of trade on economic development environmental quality and energy and their relation with each other and finally the role of governments and international organizations in this context studies have so far revealed some linkages between trade and environment through conventional trade theory however interactions between international trade and types of pollution their sink and assimilative capacity need to be analyzed using a general equilibrium approach currently very little knowledge and agreement on the nature of interactions between trade theories development process and environmental quality exist existing studies have shown that the structure of environmental regulations should be modified to reflect the existence of trade under imperfect competition therefore further research on the interaction between new trade theory and environmental regulation is needed also theoretical and quantitative analysis regarding the effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness and location decision is needed the intensity and type of environmental measures vary across issues and countries therefore harmonizing environmental measures creates an inefficient atmosphere and to assume that trade restrictions will either improve or reverse the environmental damages is a serious mistake given the dynamic and intricate nature of the problem trade and environment debate continues despite vast research and poses a challenge for researchers and policy makers in the foreseeable future

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

the enlargement of the european union effects on trade and emissions of greenhouse gases abstract with the gradual accession of various central and eastern european countries ceecs to the european union eu international trade between the eu and the ceecs will change as a result of trade liberalisation and the mobility of production factors within the eu the eu and most of the ceecs have already committed themselves to reduce by 2008 2012 their emissions of greenhouse gases ghgs by 8 compared to the 1990 level this paper reports on an investigation of the potential consequences of the enlargement of the eu and of the emission reduction target set by the kyoto protocol on the sectoral production patterns and international trade a comparative static general equilibrium model was developed to examine the impacts under different scenarios for illustrative purposes two regions the eu and the ceecs and three categories of goods and services agricultural goods industrial goods and services were included the model was calibrated by the 1998 data the model was subsequently applied to study the effects of free trade the mobility of factors and the environmental constraints on production and international trade in light of the enlargement of the eu we show that in this specific context free trade is beneficial to economic welfare and does not necessarily increase emissions of greenhouse gases the mobility of factors also increases economic welfare but in the case of fixed production technology it may harm the environment through more emissions of ghgs

mistakes in cooperation the stochastic stability of edgeworth s recontracting in an exchange economywith a finite number of indivisible goods we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability we show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed mistake free process consist of i all core allocations as absorbing states and ii cycles of non core allocations next we introduce a perturbed process where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes do not improve in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake if preferences are always strict we show that the unique stochasticallystable state of the perturbed process is the walrasian allocation in economies with indifferences non core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable while some core allocations are not

trims environmental taxes and foreign investment various second best policy mixes of investment measures and environmental taxes for a polluted small open economy with foreign capital and immovable trade restrictions are examined the optimal policy mix depends on the types of trade restrictions when tariffs are in place strict policies of pollution taxes and export requirements are optimal for alleviating tariff induced consumption and production distortions when involuntary quotas are used in lieu of tariffs however the optimal policy mix is a zero export requirement and pigouvian taxes on pollution for the case of vers however the optimal policy demands export requirements and a less stringent pollution tax trims impots environnementaux et investissement etranger ce memoire examine certains ensembles de politiques de second ordre portant sur l investissement et les impots environnementaux dans une petite economie ouverte polluee ou il y a capital etranger et restrictions au commerce international quand on a des droits de douane en place des politiques de fiscalite environnementale et d exportations requises sont optimales pour corriger les distorsions aux patterns de production et de consommation engendrees par les droits de douane cependant quand des contingentements involontaires sont en place plutot que des droits de douane le melange optimal de politiques est de ne pas requerir d exportation mais d imposer des taxes a la pigou sur la pollution pour ce qui est des restrictions volontaires a l exportation le melange optimal de politiques reclame une taxe moins forte sur la pollution accompagnee par un certain niveau d exportation requis

a study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel this paper examines bidding in over 1 700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel or ring of stamp dealers in the 1990s the knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by daniel graham robert marshall and jean francois richard 1990 following a reduced form examination of these data damages induced inefficiency and the ring s benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of emmanuel guerre isabelle perrigne and quang vuong 2000 a notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers

differential payments within a bidder coalition and the shapley value bidder coalitions at english auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or knockout when coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting the nested knockout s characteristics are investigated within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the shapley value incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed

trade and climate policies do emissions from international transport matter this paper provides orders of magnitude of the importance of co2 emissions from international transport freight activities under a variety of scenarios regarding trade and climate policies it is based on a stylized multi region multi sector cge model that includes the four modes of international transport air water road and rail and where choices regarding the energy mix and transport mode have been endogeneized a separate decomposition of emission changes into the well known scale composition and technique effects is provided scale effects turn out to be roughly double in international transport than in exports while technique effects are weaker due to less substitutability between energy inputs as a result international transport represents half of the world increase in global emissions when trade liberalization is considered isolately when trade liberalization is coupled with a carbon tax limited to rich countries international transport represents roughly one eigth of the carbon leakage effect

free trade and the environment development system abstract we develop a simulation model to analyze the trade environment development system that contains a number of important advances over the earlier and current theoretical models our model like other models has an income induced pollution policy allows country factor endowments to influence trade patterns and allows production factors to be mobile intersectorally unlike other theoretical models our model treats pollution stemming from both production and consumption in a way that does justice to empirical observations we model pollution policy explicitly as an abatement investment thus effectively allowing for differences in pollution intensive technology across countries in addition we allow for an internationally traded intermediate good a natural resource as a result of this novel approach we find that 1 the benefits of trade i can be either positive or negative and ii depend on country endowments and 2 the pollution effects of trade are closely tied to the benefits of trade our model generally shows higher pollution levels under free trade than autarky however our results do not support the pollution haven hypothesis i e trade causes less pollution in developed countries and more pollution in developing ones some developing countries produce more of the pollution intensive good but ultimately consume less pollution under autarky because they have higher per capita income and thus invest more heavily in environmental upgrading under autarky

an empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy abstract using a new dataset on the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy this study is the first to find robust confirmation of a pollution haven effect in a cross country context by accounting for strategically determined environment trade and intellectual property right ipr policies a simple game theoretic approach to policy determination is described which suggests an identification strategy based on other country characteristics it is found that for the top 20th percentile of countries in terms of growth in u s multinational affiliate value added as much as 8 6 of that growth between 1999 and 2003 can be attributed to declining relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policy the results are robust to a number of identification tests weak iv tests and third country spatial effects further evidence is found that relatively footloose industries are more likely to be affected by environmental policy than more traditionally dirty industries and enforcement of environmental policies tends to be a more important deterrent than the stringency of the policy set

environmental regulation and us state level production abstract using us data from 1977 1986 we estimate the impact of environmental policy on state level output using parametric and nonparametric techniques while the nonparametric approach yields additional insights the lack of a relationship between environmental regulation and output is robust

environmental regulation and french firms location abroad an economic geography model in an international comparative study abstract in this study we re examine the pollution haven hypothesis by a fresh take on both its theoretical and empirical aspects the originality of our work is twofold first we apply an economic geography model with the aim of deriving a rigorous specification for the impact of environmental regulation on firms location choice second we test a conditional logit model using french firm level data in an international comparative study we confirm evidence of a strong pollution haven effect for our pooled sample of countries receiving french direct investments however through a sensitivity analysis we validate this finding for developed countries and most of emerging economies and central and eastern european countries but not for most countries of the commonwealth of independent states and developing countries where a more stringent environmental regulation seems to attract investments furthermore we highlight a forward looking behavior of firms in terms of their location decision making

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

footloose and pollution free in numerous studies economists have found little empirical evidence that environmental regulations affect trade flows in this paper we propose and test several common explanations for why the effect of environmental regulations on trade may be difficult to detect we demonstrate that whereas most trade occurs among industrialized economies environmental regulations have stronger effects on trade between industrialized and developing economies we find that for most industries pollution abatement costs are a small component of total costs and are unrelated to trade flows in addition we show that those industries with the largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least geographically mobile or footloose after accounting for these distinctions we measure a significant effect of pollution abatement costs on imports from developing countries and in pollution intensive footloose industries

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

on the complexities of complex economic dynamics complex economic nonlinear dynamics endogenously do not converge to a point a limit cycle or an explosion their study developed out of earlier studies of cybernetic catastrophic and chaotic systems complexity analysis stresses interactions among dispersed agents without a global controller tangled hierarchies adaptive learning evolution and novelty and out of equilibrium dynamics complexity methods include interacting particle systems self organized criticality and evolutionary game theory to simulate artificial stock markets and other phenomena theoretically bounded rationality replaces rational expectations complexity theory influences empirical methods and restructures policy debates

the impact of selected abatement strategies on transnational pollution the terms of trade and factor rewards a general equilibrium approach abstract widespread publicity of international conflict over transfrontier pollutants such as acid deposition and the november 1986 chemical spill in the rhine river has increased the public s awareness of the need to devise abatement strategies appropriate for transnational pollution this article develops a general equilibrium approach for analyzing the economic impacts of selected abatement strategies the model includes internationally mobile goods capital and pollution flows and flexible output and factor prices the general equilibrium approach provides policymakers with important information which is usually not revealed by a partial equilibrium approach that is demonstrated by applying the model to the north american acid deposition issue

the impact of environmental policy on international competitiveness in manufacturing the aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that environmental stringency adversely affects the international competitiveness net exports in manufacturing sectors the model follows the standard factor endowment approach to explain the effects of environmental regulatory policy on net exports in different product based industries an econometric model is constructed which includes factor endowments and environmental regulations to examine how strict environmental policies impact export competitiveness a panel dataset of 10 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries over 17 years 1987 2003 was constructed for the modelling effort the study finds that environmental regulations can be a way to combat the flight of manufacturing out of developed countries if the output from these industries can be identified as environmentally friendly a positive relationship between net exports and environmental regulations was found for paper products wood products and textile prod

econometrics of first price auctions a survey of the theoretical and applied literature the analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical and empirical economists this paper provides an overview of the literature relevant to the econometrics of auctions from a structural approach perspective the structural approach is a framework to analyze auction data in which theory and econometrics are closely related there are three fundamental issues at the heart of the structural analysis i are there any testable restrictions imposed by the theoretic model on the data ii is it possible to identify the structural elements that characterize an auction without a priori parametric information iii what can be said about feasible estimation procedures which do not rely on parametric assumptions this survey shows how the structural approach literature has answered each question

testing the pollution haven effect does the type of fdi matter many studies have tested the pollution haven effect phe which predicts that the tightening of local environmental regulations would shift foreign direct investment fdi to less regulated jurisdictions however most of them ignored the heterogeneity of fdi this paper studies the phe on local market oriented and export oriented fdi and tests whether the two types have different responsiveness to environmental regulations in a host country a simple model is developed to describe how different types of multinational companies respond in distinct ways to stricter environmental policies in host countries using us outward fdi data for 50 host countries and a survey measure of both the stringency and the enforcement of local environmental regulations i find a significant deterrent effect of local environmental regulations on inward fdi furthermore fdi in a host country is not only affected by local environmental regulations but also by environmental regulations in proximate countries more importantly accounting for the relative stringency of environmental regulations between a host country and the united states is critical for identifying a phe i find a significantly stronger effect of environmental policies on both types of fdi in host countries with environmental regulations that are stricter than those in the united states in these countries export oriented fdi also exhibits a greater sensitivity to local environmental regulations than local market oriented fdi

environmental regulation and u s state level production using data from the u s over the period 1977 1986 we estimate the impact of environmental policy on state level output using both parametric and nonparametric techniques we find that while the added flexibility of the nonparametric approach yields much insight the lack of a relationship between environmental regulation and output is quite robust

impacts of trade and the environment on clustered multilateral environmental agreements many countries align their environmental policy and environmental regulation by way of multilateral environmental agreements meas previous work in economics provided insights in the economic and political determinants of meas at large this paper distinguishes meas by the main issues covered and classifies them in five clusters biodiversity atmosphere land chemicals and hazardous wastes and seas then the role of environmental economic and political factors and of dynamic and cross cluster effects is studied at the level of mea clusters two findings stand out from this empirical analysis first economic size and multilateral trade liberalisation of countries are found to be the most important drivers of mea participation across all clusters second adjustment costs turn out to deter and in particular cross cluster spillovers turn out to stimulate mea participation across countries and clusters

assessment of regional trade and virtual water flows in china the success of china s economic development has left deep marks on resource availability and quality some regions in china are relatively poor with regards to water resources this problem is exacerbated by economic growth flourishing trade activities on both domestic and international levels have resulted in significant amounts of water withdrawal and water pollution hence the goal of this paper is to evaluate the current inter regional trade structure and its effects on water consumption and pollution via virtual water flows virtual water is the water embedded in products and used in the whole production chain and that is traded between regions or exported to other countries for this assessment of trade flows and effects on water resources we have developed an extended regional input output model for eight hydro economic regions in china to account for virtual water flows between north and south china the findings show that the current trade structure in china is not very favorable with regards to water resource allocation and efficiency north china as a water scarce region virtually exports about 5 of its total available freshwater resources while accepting large amounts of wastewater for other regions consumption by contrast south china a region with abundant water resources is virtually importing water from other regions while their imports are creating waste water polluting other regions hydro ecosystems

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

the emergence of economic organization abstract a model of decentralized markets is studied in which transactors follow simple adaptive rules transactions are coordinated by specialist trading firms that bear the costs of market disequilibrium starting from an initially autarkic situation in which none of the institutions that support exchange exist computer simulation shows that for a wide range of parameter values a fully developed market economy will emerge spontaneously moreover in virtually every case where a market economy develops one of the commodities traded will emerge as a universal medium of exchange being traded by every firm and changing hands in every act of exchange

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

the evolution of value systems a review essay on ian morris s foragers farmers and fossil fuels foragers farmers and fossil fuels how human values evolve is a large scale history of the world through the different modes of production humanity has adopted over time and their implications in terms of moral values morris argues that the predominant value systems of human societies are cultural adaptations to the organizational structures of the societies themselves their institutions and ultimately to their modes of production in particular the book contains a careful analysis of how the hunting gathering mode of production induces egalitarian values and relatively favorable attitudes toward violent resolution of conflicts while farming induces hierarchical values and less favorable attitudes toward violence and in turn the fossil fuel that is industrial mode of production induces egalitarian values and nonviolent attitudes the narrative in the book is rich diverse and ultimately entertaining morris s analysis is very knowledgeable and informative arguments and evidence are rooted in history anthropology archeology and social sciences in general nonetheless the analysis falls short of being convincing about the causal nature of the existing relationship between modes of production and moral value systems

impact of electricity prices on foreign direct investment evidence from the european union in the course of recent years growing concerns over increasing energy prices have emerged in the context of maintaining europe s international competitiveness in particular rising electricity price differentials adversely affect firms total production costs and ultimately impact their investment decisions nonetheless electricity prices as locational determinants of foreign direct investment fdi have received little attention in the literature so far we address this gap by including electricity prices in the traditional framework of fdi analysis and examine the impact of price variation on net fdi inflows in countries of the european union eu we use a panel of 27 countries for a period of 2003 2013 and system generalised method of moments gmm as method of estimation the main findings of the paper confirm that besides tax rates unit labour costs and competitive disadvantage in secondary education also electricity prices contribute to eroding competitiveness of the countries yet the effect of electricity prices does not seem to be uniform across the eu in fact southwestern countries tend to be more adversely affected than north eastern both in the short and long run

using all bids in parametric estimation of first price auctions abstract recently laffont et al 1995 have proposed an snlls estimator using winning bids only here we derive a relationship between the means of observed bids and private values to propose an snlls estimator using all bids in first price auctions

asymmetric tax policy responses in large economies with cross border pollution we build a model of cross border pollution between two large open economies one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it and derive their non cooperative trade and environmental tax policies we show among other things that 1 in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries the former country s optimal policy is to lower its nash emissions tax while the latter s is to raise it and 2 in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries the former country s optimal reaction is to raise its nash import tariff while the latter s is to reduce its nash export tax that is in the present context freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies

environmental regulations transfers and trade theory and evidence abstract this paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations we show that the existence of transfers can give counter intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows in particular the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output and consequently on trade flows this may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns the theory is tested using agricultural sector data the evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers are positively correlated

heterogeneous impacts of regulatory policy stringency on the eu electricity industry a bayesian shrinkage dynamic analysis abstract environmental and technical efficiency in the electricity sector is a major focus of regulatory policies aimed at hastening greenhouse gas reduction and lowering energy prices for final consumers understanding the impact of market and environmental regulations on efficiency is crucial for the design and choice of policy packages at the national level the productivity response to regulations depends on unobserved country specific factors that current empirical analyses have not modelled in this framework we analyse the regulation effects on efficiency in the electricity sector for a panel of european union countries we explicitly consider the effects of the environmental regulation along with the market regulation our estimation strategy uses the bayesian shrinkage estimator which can deal with the bias aggregation problem and cross country heterogeneity it allows us to identify the different transmission channels through which regulatory policy is implemented the results highlight divergent behaviours at the country level the direct impacts of the market and environmental regulatory policies on productivity are negative around 2 7 and 2 3 respectively but the countries vary in the degree to which they are able to compensate these negative effects

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

is environmental efficiency trade inducing or trade hindering abstract global efforts to identify strategies for sustainable economic growth and development underline the need for understanding important links between environmental policies and international trade in this paper by constructing an environmental efficiency index for 111 countries from 1980 to 2009 we are able to empirically test for one such link an improvement in the environmental efficiency index in terms of carbon dioxide emissions reflects a decrease in the cost of efforts to mitigate the environmental costs associated with growth countries that improve their environmental efficiency are found to experience strong international trade effects both through increased exports and increased imports while the positive link between efficiency improvements and exports is supportive of the porter hypothesis the positive link between efficiency improvements and imports is supportive of strong positive income effects on account of environmental efforts these results which are robust to alternative estimation strategies lend strong support to global efforts to improve countries environmental efficiencies

environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region two firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants both firms pollute and market structure is endogenous to environmental policy there are increasing returns at the plant level imperfect competition between the home and the foreign firm and transport costs between the two markets at critical levels of environmental policy variables small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant or shifts production to from a foreign branch plant the implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional pigouvian marginal analysis

the curse of the haven the impact of multinational enterprise on environmental regulation abstract we analyze the behavior of multinational enterprises in the context of resource rich and poor countries and regarding high and low income countries we depart from the pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse the pollution haven hypothesis states that multinational enterprises move their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation the resource curse holds that economic growth in countries abundant in natural resources is reduced we find that more polluting firms are relatively more often located in countries with weak environmental regulation however multinational enterprises do not have a significant impact on environmental regulation in the host country it appears that it is mainly the quality of institutions that drives both the pollution haven and the resource curse

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

environmental regulation and foreign direct investment evidence from south korea abstract this paper studies how environmental regulation shapes the pattern of foreign direct investment fdi and thereby assesses the pollution haven hypothesis conflicting results exist in the case studies examining the most advanced countries partly due to the deterrent effect of clean technology adoptions on industry migration to minimize the clean technology effect we examine the pattern of south korean fdi over 2000 2007 the period that korean firms relied on old production technologies despite facing rapidly strengthened environmental standards a difference in differences type identification strategy circumvents other potential confounders we find strong evidence that polluting industries tend to invest more in countries with laxer environmental regulations in terms of both the amount of investment intensive margin and the number of new foreign affiliates extensive margin a similar finding is obtained when imports are analyzed

on the use of expectations data in estimating structural dynamic choice models despite the importance of expectations in models of decision behavior under uncertainty few empirical economists have made use of subjective expectations data in estimating such models assuming that expectations about future behavior accurately portray optimal future behavior conditional on current information it is shown that such data can provide similar information about the decision process as can data on current or retrospective behavior the value of self reported choice expectations is illustrated by using information on respondents expected future occupation in the estimation of a structural dynamic model of teacher career decisions under uncertainty

shifting chinese organizational responses to evolving greening pressures organizations are facing various evolving pressures to green their practices these pressures range from obligatory forces to voluntary measures environmental pressures traditionally influenced organizations to seek reactive and internal practices the adopted environmental management em practices have evolved to be more proactive and external as the focus has shifted to supply chains this paper aims to further understand the driving mechanisms for em practices under various external pressures to meet this research goal this study extends the theory of dynamic incentives of environmental policies and institutional theory to develop environmental pressures using an empirical study of 422 chinese manufacturers covering all 31 provinces and provincial cities an exploratory factor analysis reveals four em practices factors and four pressures drivers factors results of a hierarchical regression analysis show that coercive pressures positively relate to more reactive internal em practices less coercive pressures positively relate to more proactive external and green supply chain management practices the empirical findings provide further support that voluntary regulatory measures can help motivate companies in extending their em efforts to supply chains the work also provides insights into how organizations may respond to evolving regulatory regimes dynamic incentives of environmental regulatory policy and various institutional pressures

asymmetric information and collusive behavior in auction markets we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the behavior of a bidder s cartel in a multiperiod auction market in which the purchaser is relatively uninformed our work establishes a tentative connection between the economics of information and collusion by concentrating on the cartel s informational monopoly and its ability to both increase profits and mask its presence by passing misinformation to the purchaser in the models we develop costs are assumed to be stochastic and projects awarded in adjacent periods to be substitutes for one another as a result the purchaser will have incentive to intertemporally reallocate his demand buying more or less of the current period s project depending upon whether the current market price is lower or higher than the price which he expects to prevail in the future a purchaser who needs to form such price expectations yet is ignorant about production costs and market structure will be particularly attracted to the auction mechanism because the data contained in past auctions bids can apparently be incorporated into an explicit structural model of expected future price in fact such a purchaser may hold auctions frequently merely to acquire information such pleasant appearances are deceiving once the auction s bidders become aware of the informational use to which their bids are being put they will have incentive to form a cartel thereby extracting a premium for their knowledge by misinforming the purchaser and skewing his intertemporal decision making to their advantage in some respects the mechanics of our model resemble the case of a multiproduct monopolist selling goods that are substitutes for one another what is unique to our analysis is the dependence of one of the goods future demand on price expectations which are an information resource we are suggesting that information that is distributed asymmetrically among market participants is susceptible to the inefficiencies of collusion in some ways the implications of our work are considerably stronger than this because our cartel never reveals its true knowledge and thus our market may be more inefficient than more standard monopolies in which the good is always traded albeit at noncompetitive prices furthermore by explicitly modeling the purchaser s rational structural approach to price forecasting we point out that complete rational expectations models may be more susceptible to exploitation by informational cartels than simpler forecasting techniques we have tested the implications of our model in a case study of north carolina highway construction cartels the highway construction industry is an auction market characterized by government procurement agencies who are uninformed relative to suppliers and comes complete with a substantial record of known collusion in recent years thus it seems an ideal hunting ground for verification of our theoretical findings our paper proceeds as follows in section i we model a multiperiod competitive auction market and describe a bayesian mechanism through which the purchaser uses past data to improve the accuracy of his price expectations section ii establishes theoretical results for the bidders cartel which has incentive to form in this market we describe massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02109 and university of arizona tucson az 85721 respectively nold was formerly of rhodes associates and is now deceased we thank richard schmalensee and the participants of the economic and legal organization workshop at the university of chicago for valuable suggestions part of this research was supported under research grant 81 ij cr0062 from the national institute of justice