information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace this paper examines the interaction of information provision product quality and pricing decisions by competitive firms to explore the following question in a competitive market where consumers face uncertainty about product quality and or their preference for quality which firms those that sell higher or lower quality products have the higher incentive to provide what type of information we find that while the higher quality firm should always provide information resolving consumer uncertainty on product quality the lower quality firm under certain conditions will have the higher incentive to and will be the one to provide information resolving consumer uncertainty about their quality preferences in the analysis we trace the latter result to competition and to free riding on the information provision specifically in a monopoly market or when consumer free riding is restricted by the costliness of store visits the lower quality firm would have a lower incentive to provide information resolving consumer preference uncertainty than otherwise the model is also adapted to examine product returns as a possible strategy of information provision

pricing under quality of service uncertainty market segmentation via statistical qos guarantees abstract this article examines how performance contingent pricing schemes with long term statistical performance guarantees can be applied to many it services we study two forms of performance contingent pricing with rebate proportional to failure rate and fixed rebate for below threshold performance we show that threshold performance contingency pricing can increase both profits and fairness customers who receive higher benefits pay higher effective price relative to standard pricing but an even better solution is to offer a menu of performance guarantees this can increase the firm s profit and segment the market only service providers whose performance level is sufficiently better than the industry standard can benefit from this pricing mechanism

price pass through and the minimum wage this paper tests a textbook consequence of competitive markets that an industry wide increase in the price of labor is passed on to consumers through an increase in prices using several data sources on restaurant prices i explore the price impact of minimum wage hikes in canada and the united states particular attention is paid to the timing of these price responses to gauge the stickiness of minimum wage cost shocks i find that restaurant prices generally rise with changes in the wage bill and that this response is concentrated in the quarter surrounding the month during which the legislation is enacted

money back warranties vs replacement warranties a simple comparaison product warranties are one of the most common time honored and visible contractual relationships entered into by consumers moreover under the uniform commercial code consumers are covered by an implied warranty of merchantability even without a written warranty in this paper we compare the outcomes of two contrasting types of consumer product warranties money back warranties and replacement warranties both these types of warranties are ubiquitous in fact a best and a r andreasen 1977 find that returning an item is the most common action taken by dissatisfied consumers c l kendall and f a russ 1975 in a study of the consumer packaged goods industry find that money back and new merchandise are the two most common responses made by firms to consumer complaints yet as our analysis shows there are significant differences in the incentives they provide firms and in their welfare properties in particular we find that the comparison depends crucially on the observability of quality and on the cost of servicing warranties although there are certainly more complicated explanations for warranties we rely on a simple model of imperfect consumer information in which to embed our comparison of the relative performance of these two forms of warranty consumers are confronted by seller moral hazard that is either they are unable to discern the quality of a product before purchase or alternatively this information is extremely costly for consumers to obtain or for firms to publicly demonstrate we abstract from issues such as differing degrees of risk aversion consumer moral hazard and screening each of which is frequently the rationale behind warranty provision our model is perhaps closest to the model presented in michael spence s 1977 article in which he analyzes the provision of warranties in an environment with biased consumer information

the dissipation of minimum wage gains for workers through labor labor substitution evidence from the los angeles living wage ordinance author affiliation david fairris department of economics university of california riverside ca 92521 usa david fairris ucr edu corresponding authorleon fernandez bujanda oficina de investigaciones economicas banco central de venezuela av urdaneta esq carmelitas edf sede piso 2 caracas dc venezuela lefernan bcv org ve acknowledgment we have received helpful comments from philip babcock charlie brown david card eve caroli arin dube shelly lundberg mindy marks david neumark and participants in presentations at the society of labor economists uc berkeley ucla and pse in paris we acknowledge financial support from the ford foundation and the university of california labor and employment research fund and research support of various kinds from researchers at the los angeles alliance for a new economy 1 introductioneconomic theory suggests that firms will replace low skill workers with high skill workers if the two are substitutes in production and the wages of low skill workers increase as the result of a minimum wage labor labor substitution may also take place along dimensions other than skill if for example employers have a taste for discrimination and the minimum wage reduces the wage premium they must pay for favored personal characteristics of workers if affected firms replace low skill workers with high skill workers following enactment of a wage minimum the initial benefits of the regulation for workers at these firms will be dissipated over time as the wage gains for new hires are less than for members of the original workforce a similar dissipation of wage gains will occur if employers replace workers that are discriminated against in the labor market with those that are not most theoretical depictions of labor labor substitution focus on employer initiated causes it may result from changes in firms demand for worker skills from employer efforts to dissipate worker minimum wage rents by requiring greater work effort or less absenteeism from workers and by seeking workers that better match these new employer goals or from employers invoking their taste for discrimination however successful labor substitution rests on workers supply decisions as well indeed such substitution could result solely from labor supply effects if for example firms were to hire nonselectively from an altered more highly skilled or otherwise favored applicant pool which is brought on by the higher wage the empirical literature on the employment effects of wage minimums has found little employment loss among affected jobs or more highly impacted worker populations such as teenagers brown 1999 this suggests that there may be little labor labor substitution across broad skill occupational categories for example adults for teenagers workers with some college experience for high school graduates or backhoe operators for ditch diggers 1 however labor labor substitution may still take place along more refined dimensions of workers skills abowd and kilingsworth 1981 for example neumark and wascher 1996 find evidence that minimum wages lead firms to substitute away from younger teenagers and toward older more experienced teenagers labor substitution following a minimum wage may dissipate the initial wage gains for workers empirical evidence suggests however that just as in the case of unions card 1996 the rent dissipation is by no means complete it is now well established empirically that a spike exists in the wage distribution around the relevant minimum wage card and krueger 1995 dinardo fortin and lemieux 1996 suggesting that the wages of low skill workers are indeed affected by wage mandates 2 moreover job queues exist for minimum wage jobs suggesting that economic rents are earned by low wage workers in these positions holzer katz and krueger 1991

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

a multisector model of efficiency wages the pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model firms choose effort endogenously easily monitored or low turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model workers can search for and avail of on the job offers if sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected

minimum wages and the wage distribution in estonia abstract this article studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage have affected the wage distribution in estonia a post transition country with little collective bargaining and relatively l

contextual influences on perceptions of merchant supplied reference prices two contextual variables that have theoretical roots in information processing attribution and social judgment theories were manipulated along with three levels of merchant supplied reference price in a 2 2 3 analysis of variance design results support the hypothesized effects of consistency and distinctiveness as contextual variables that influence internal price standards and purchase evaluations the three price levels resulted in a curvilinear pattern of results for the purchase evaluation and source credibility dependent variables as hypothesized however contrary to assimilation contrast theory the impact of the merchant supplied reference price on estimates of normal and fair prices was monotonic

unfunded liabilities and uncertain fiscal financing we develop a rational expectations framework to study the consequences of alternative means to resolve the unfunded liabilities problem the projected exponential growth in federal social security medicare and medicaid spending with no known plan for financing the transfers resolution requires specifying a probability distribution for how and when monetary and fiscal policies will change as the economy evolves through the 21st century beliefs based on that distribution determine the existence of and the nature of equilibrium we consider policies that in expectation combine reaching a fiscal limit some distorting taxation modest inflation and some reneging on the government s promised transfers in the equilibrium inflation targeting monetary policy and debt targeting tax policy cannot anchor expectations on those target variables expectational effects are always present but need not have large impacts on inflation and interest rates in the short and medium runs in the economy s stationary distribution the capital stock may grow or shrink and substantial probability falls on little or no reneging

minimum wages and the gender wage gap estimates are made of the effect of minimum wages on the size and composition of the gender wage gap in canada in 1986 it is found that minimum wages close the wage gap substantially for young workers and less so for adults the reduction in the gap is most attributable to the adverse employment effects of minimum wages the results also indicate that most of the reduction in the gap is realized through a fall in the discriminatory component

refunds and returns in a vertically differentiated industry abstract firms frequently offer refunds both when physical products are returned and when service contracts are terminated prematurely we show how refunds act as a metering device when consumers learn about their personal valuation while experimenting with the product or service our theory predicts that low quality firms offer inefficiently strict terms for refunds while high quality firms offer inefficiently generous terms this may help to explain the observed variety in contractual terms

funded pensions and intergenerational and international risk sharing in general equilibrium we explore intergenerational and international risk sharing in a general equilibrium multiple country model with two tier pensions systems the exact design of the pension system is key for the way in which risks are shared over generations the laissez faire market solution fails to provide an optimal allocation because the young cannot share in the financial risks however the existence of wage indexed bonds combined with a pension system with a fully funded second tier that pays defined wage indexed benefits can reproduce the first best if wage indexed bonds are not available mimicking the first best is not possible except under special circumstances we also explore whether national pension funds want to deviate from the first best by increasing domestic equity holdings with wage indexed bonds this incentive is absent while there is indeed such an incentive when wage indexed bonds do not exist

oligopsony and the distribution of wages we propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non wage characteristics while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics we completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that inside and outside forces interact in wage determination this interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence

tournaments as a worker discipline device c c yang i introduction in the absence of unemployment a worker caught shirking and subsequently fired could obtain a new job at the market wage without difficulty as a result of this and the imperfect monitoring of workers on the job effort shapiro and stiglitz 1984 argued that there must be involuntary unemployment in equilibrium to serve as a worker discipline device making job loss costly so as to discourage shirking 1 in response to shapiro and stiglitz s argument carmichael 1985 suggested that workers could pay employment fees to purchase their jobs and that the competition among workers for jobs would raise such fees until all involuntary unemployment disappeared alternatively there is the so called bonding scheme bonds are posted by workers when initially hired and forfeited if the workers are caught shirking the fear of losing the bonds then substitutes for the threat of becoming unemployed in creating work incentives the competition among workers for jobs would allow firms to charge an amount for bonds until there were no difference between employment and unemployment and so again there would be no involuntary unemployment in a nutshell the introduction of an employment fee or a bonding scheme can eliminate involuntary unemployment making obsolete unemployment as a worker discipline device in the real world however rarely are employment fees or bonding observed why do employment fees bonding or the like not then emerge to arbitrage the difference between employment and unemployment so as to eliminate involuntary unemployment this is a puzzle for shirking models romer 1996 461 2 it has been claimed that contracts with upward sloping age earning profiles the so called implicit bonding can act as perfect substitutes for contracts with explicit employment fees or bonds akerlof and katz 1989 negate this claim and show that the implicit bonding in general does not eliminate the need for involuntary unemployment as a worker discipline device to resolve the bonding issue katz 1986 suggests that future theoretical work is required to analyze the problem in an explicitly contractual setting this article offers an attempt in this direction we study a type of contract which is prevalent in the real world and most importantly can act as a perfect substitute for the employment fee or bonding scheme as far as the elimination of involuntary unemployment is concerned the contract in question is the so called tournament 3 a tournament contract compensates workers on the basis of their relative performance prizes arising from tournaments are fixed in advance and a worker receives the winner s prize not by being good in the absolute sense but by being better than the other workers contracts with the characteristics of tournaments are prevalent in labor markets the salesman who sells the most is given a large bonus the best worker gets promoted to become the company manager etc the incentive effects of tournaments have been analyzed in detail by lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 malcomson 1984 and others 4 in contrast to the extensive analysis of the microeconomic incentives of tournaments this article focuses on the macroeconomic implications of tournaments in the vein of shirking models it is shown that all involuntary unemployment will disappear if it is feasible for firms to exploit tournaments to full flexibility this finding pinpoints the power of tournament contracts in resolving involuntary unemployment as a consequence of this result the generation of equilibrium unemployment will require that there be certain impediments to the full exploitation of tournaments we suggest institutional constraints legal rules or social norms as possible candidates for the impediments the rest of this article is organized as follows

using regional variation in wages to measure the effects of the federal minimum wage the imposition of a national minimum wage standard provides a natural experiment in which the treatment effect varies across states depending on the fraction of workers initially earning less than the new minimum the author exploits this fact to evaluate the effect of the april 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage on teenagers wages employment and school enrollment comparisons of grouped and individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage increased teenagers wages there is no evidence of corresponding losses in teenage employment or changes in teenage school enrollment

optimal long run fiscal policy constraints preferences and the resolution of uncertainty we construct a computational dynamic stochastic overlapping generations general equilibrium model with uncertain lifetimes and explore the impact of policy stickiness specifically a major reform will preclude future reforms for a generation on optimal long run fiscal policy under such circumstances entitlement reforms exhaust a valuable option to move in the future we explore the conditions under which the gain to waiting is large enough to induce optimizing policymakers to delay reforming a suboptimal system we also allow for the uncertainty to have arch characteristics and explore the impact of time varying uncertainty on the optimality of delayed policy action

the contribution of minimum wages to increasing wage inequality recent research has shown the reduction in the minimum wage to be the main cause of the rise in wage dispersion in the lower half of the wage distribution in the us during the 1980s however the return to human capital does not seem to have been much affected using new methodology this paper confirms previous conclusions regarding the wage distribution but shows that the return to human capital has also increased strongly a 10 reduction of the minimum wage causes the wage of someone earning the previous minimum to fall by 8 evidence in favour of a distance dependent elasticity of substitution dides production function there has been a massive increase in wage inequality in the us the 10 50 and 50 90 log wage differential grew by 0 10 and 0 06 respectively during the 1980s economists have tried to put their finger on the causes of this phenomenon wood 1995 believes globalisation to be the main cause however most empirical research suggests that international trade is only a small part of the explanation see freeman 1995 for a survey others hold skill biased technological progress responsible for example bound and johnson 1992 technology is always a kind of residual item for which appropriate variables are hardly available its impact is therefore difficult to pin down empirically autor et al 1998 have shown that the use of computers by industry is strongly correlated to the increase in the employment of college graduates dinardo et al 1996 called attention to the role of institutions in particular declining unionism and the fall in minimum wages during the 1980s they hold minimum wages responsible for 25 of the increase in wage dispersion pictures of the estimated density functions for the period 1973 90 show that minimum wages have had a large impact dinardo et al calculate the effect of minimum wages by assuming a change in the minimum wage to have no effect on the shape of the wage distribution to the right of the minimum at first glance the wage distributions plotted in their paper suggest that this assumption is not supported by the data implying that their estimate of 25 is a lower bound indeed applying a different methodology lee 1999 reached the conclusion that the decrease in minimum wages can explain virtually the whole increase in wage inequality he simply regresses 10 50 and 50 90 log wage differentials by year and state on the relevant minimum wage using state variation in minimum wages lee s results open the question as to what mechanism makes that minimum wages have so large an impact there are two potential channels either minimum

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

money back contracts with double moral hazard we analyze money back contracts in which a seller promises to refund some fraction of the buyer s purchase price if an item is returned as a three stage game in a cooperative first stage the players determine a price and refund share in the second stage they noncooperatively choose inputs the buyer decides whether to return the item in the final stage this process economizes on the information necessary to enforce a contract and serves an incentive function when transactions involve double moral hazard efficient contracts exist when uncertainty is moderate inefficiencies result when there is either insufficient or excessive uncertainty

exit option in hierarchical agency abstract we explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option we study a hierarchy with a principal a productive supervisor and an agent communication is imperfect in that only the supervisor can communicate with the principal while the agent has no direct voice to the principal we show that the principal is better off if she grants the agent the option to walk away from the contract by doing so the principal is implicitly giving a veto power to the agent this in turn restricts the manipulation of report by the supervisor thus the exit option can be interpreted as a remedy for limits on communication our finding contrasts to the traditional result from the contract theory literature that the exit option reduces the principal s welfare while protecting the agent our result is robust to the case of collusion between the supervisor and the agent we also examine the optimal exit option i e whether exit should entail a payment to or from the agent

a search model of costly product returns abstract this paper analyses a market in which consumers buy horizontally differentiated products without knowing their exact valuations by paying return costs the consumers may return less preferred items and obtain refunds the consumers shop sequentially and their shopping strategy is similar to the search strategy of a consumer in a sequential costly search model thus the pricing strategies of firms are identical to those in a price directed sequential search model price competition is more intense and the symmetric equilibrium price is lower when returns are costlier as a result consumer surplus is increasing in the return cost

managing consumer returns in a competitive environment this paper investigates the pricing and restocking fee decisions of two competing firms selling horizontally differentiated products we model a duopoly facing consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for the products and who must experience a product before knowing how well it matches with their preferences the analysis yields several key insights restocking fees not only can be sustained in a competitive environment but also are more severe when consumers are less informed about product fit and when consumers place a greater importance on how well products attributes fit with their preferences we compare the competitive equilibrium prices to a scenario in which consumers are certain about their preferences and find conditions defining when consumer uncertainty results in higher equilibrium prices comparison to a monopoly setting yields a surprising result equilibrium restocking fees in a competitive environment can be higher than those charged by a monopolist this paper was accepted by jagmohan s raju marketing

customer return policies for experience goods this paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies by focusing on the experience goods aspect of many products return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods in so doing they insure consumers against ex post loss which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise it is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high consumers are strictly better off under the return policy but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

minimum wage policy and employment effects evidence from brazil the international literature on minimum wages greatly lacks empirical evidence for latin america in brazil not only are minimum wage increases large and frequent but they also have been used as both a social policy and an anti inflationary policy this paper estimates the effects of the minimum wage on wages and employment using panel data techniques and brazilian monthly household data from 1982 to 2000 a number of conceptual and identification questions are discussed for example the paper summarizes various strategies on how best to measure the effect of a constant national minimum wage presenting a menu of minimum wage variables that are then used to estimate wage and employment effects the paper also uses an employment decomposition that separately estimates the effect of the minimum wage on hours per worker and on the number of jobs robust results indicate that an increase in the minimum wage strongly compresses the wages distribution with small adverse effects on employment

the impact of minimum wages in mexico and colombia there are diverging views about how minimum wages affect labor markets in developing countries advocates of minimum wages hold that they redistribute resources in a welfare enhancing way and can thus reduce poverty improve productivity and foster growth opponents on the other hand contend that minimum wage interventions result in a misallocation of labor and lead to depressed wages in the very sectors the rural and informal urban sectors where most of the poor are found with the effect of wasting resources and reducing the growth rate data from colombia and mexico for the 1980s provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of minimum wages in mexico in the 1980s the minimum wage fell in real terms roughly 45 percent by 1990 mexico s minimum wage was about 13 percent of the average unskilled manufacturing wage during the same period the minimum wage in colombia increased at nearly the same rate reaching roughly 53 percent of the average unskilled wage the author charts how the mandated minimum wage affected the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in both countries during that decade findings are as follows in mexico minimum wages have had virtually no effect on wages or employment in the formal sector the main reason the minimum wage is not an effective wage for most firms or workers in the informal sector in turn there is considerable noncompliance with the mandated minimum wage especially among part time and female workers as a result significant numbers of workers are paid at or below minimum wages in colombia minimum wages have a much stronger impact on wages judging from their proximity to the average wage and both cross section and time series estimates the estimates imply that the elasticity of low paid unskilled employment with respect to minimum wages is in the range of 2 to 12 percent

the impact of the minimum wage on other wages in this paper i explore how changes in the minimum wage affect various occupational wages i postulate that other wages increase for two reasons first firms try to mitigate the deterioration in a worker s relative wage which would cause him to reduce his work effort and second there is an increase in the demand for nonminimum wage workers wage adjustment patterns are examined to ascertain whether wage comparisons play a role in the adjustment process the empirical work shows a short run wage compression among white collar occupations which is consistent with the wage comparison model however large standard errors make inferences weak

the option value of returns theory and empirical evidence when a firm allows the return of previously purchased merchandise it provides customers with an option that has measurable value whereas the option to return merchandise leads to an increase in gross revenue it also creates additional costs selecting an optimal return policy requires balancing both demand and cost implications in this paper we develop a structural model of a consumer s decision to purchase and return an item that nests extant choice models as a special case the model enables a firm to both measure the value to consumers of the return option and balance the costs and benefits of different return policies we apply the model to a sample of data provided by a mail order catalog company we find considerable variation in the value of returns across customers and categories when the option value is large there are large increases in demand for example the option to return women s footwear is worth an average of more than 15 per purchase to customers and increases average purchase rates by more than 50 we illustrate how the model can be used by a retailer to optimize his return policies across categories and customers

sales talk cancellation terms and the role of consumer protection this paper analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in mar kets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their oering when customers are fully rational it is optimal for sellers to oer the right to cancel or return on favorable terms a generous return policy makes the seller s cheap talk at the point of sale credible this observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews when customers are credulous instead sellers have an incentive to set unfavorable terms to exploit the in ated beliefs they induce in their customers the imposition of a minimum statutory standard even if it is not binding can improve welfare and consumer surplus when at least some customers are credulous in con trast competition policy reduces contractual ine ciencies with rational customers but it is not eective with credulous customers

minimum wage effects throughout the wage distribution this paper provides evidence on a wide set of margins along which labor markets can adjust in response to increases in the minimum wage including wages hours employment and ultimately labor income not surprisingly the evidence indicates that low wage workers are most strongly affected while higher wage workers are little affected workers who initially earn near the minimum wage experience wage gains nevertheless their hours and employment decline and the combined effect of these changes on earned income suggests adverse consequences on net for low wage workers

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

minimum wage effects across the private and public sectors in brazil abstract most of the available evidence on the effect of minimum wages concerns the private sector of developed countries in this paper we examine minimum wage effects in both private and public sectors for a key developing country we use monthly data from a brazilian household survey from 1982 to 2000 we find a strong compression effect in the wage distribution for both the private and public sectors however we find no evidence of adverse employment effects in either sector at the aggregate level or for vulnerable groups such as teenagers women and the low educated hence minimum wage policies in brazil appear to be a potentially viable anti poverty instrument

uncertainty and optimal social security systems this paper examines the annuity aspect of social security within the framework of an overlapping generations model the duration of life is assumed to be uncertain under a fully funded system demand for social security is determined by each generation so as to maximize expected lifetime utility taking into account the welfare of future generations under a pay as you go system with intergenerational transfers demand for retirement benefits by the working population takes into account taxes paid by descendants it is shown that the two modes of finance are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates effects of changes in expected lifetime and in the birth rate are analyzed starting at the optimal level a compulsory balanced increase in social security taxes and benefits is shown to increase short run savings

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

do living wage ordinances reduce urban poverty living wage ordinances typically mandate that businesses under contract with a city or in some cases receiving assistance from a city must pay their workers a wage sufficient to support a family financially we estimate the effects of these ordinances on wages hours and employment in cities that have adopted such legislation we then examine the effects of these laws on poverty our findings indicate that living wage ordinances boost wages of low wage workers moreover we find a moderate negative employment effect finally some of the evidence suggests that living wages achieve modest reductions in urban poverty

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

optimal reverse channel structure for consumer product returns consumers often return a product to a retailer because they learn after purchase that the product does not match as well with preferences as had been expected this is a costly issue for retailers and manufacturers in fact it is estimated that the u s electronics industry alone spent 13 8 billion dollars in 2007 to restock returned products lawton c 2008 the war on returns wall street journal may 8 d1 the bulk of these returns were nondefective items that simply were not what the consumer wanted to eliminate returns and to recoup the cost of handling returns many retailers are adopting the practice of charging restocking fees to consumers as a penalty for making returns this paper employs an analytical model of a bilateral monopoly to examine the impact of reverse channel structure on the equilibrium return policy and profit more specifically we examine how the return penalty is affected by whether returns are salvaged by the manufacturer or by the retailer interestingly we find that the return penalty may be more severe when returns are salvaged by a channel member who derives greater value from a returned unit also the manufacturer may earn greater profit by accepting returns even if the retailer has a more efficient outlet for salvaging units

product market evidence on the employment effects of the minimum wage we infer the employment response to a minimum wage change by calibrating a model of employment for the restaurant industry whereas perfect competition implies that employment falls and prices rise after a minimum wage increase the monopsony model potentially implies the opposite we show that estimated price responses are consistent with the competitive model we place fairly tight bounds on the employment response with the most plausible parameter values suggesting that a 10 increase in the minimum wage lowers low skill employment by 2 4 and total restaurant employment by 1 3

the effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry using a longitudinal survey of fast food restaurants in texas the authors examine the impact of recent increases in the federal minimum wage on a low wage labor market less than 5 of fast food restaurants were using the new youth subminimum wage in july august 1991 even though the vast majority paid a starting wage below the new hourly minimum wage immediately before it became effective although some restaurants increased wages beyond the level needed to comply with higher minimum wages in both 1990 and 1991 those federal minimum wage increases greatly compressed the distribution of starting wages in the texas fast food industry two findings at variance with conventional predictions are that 1 employment increased more in those firms likely to have been most affected by the 1991 minimum wage increase than in other firms and 2 price changes were unrelated to mandated wage changes

promotions and product pricing parsimony versus veblenesque demand the veracity of the parsimonious law of demand has long been challenged by analyses of the veblen effect and prestige pricing backward bending demand curves often attend discussions of conspicuous consumption probing the sociological and psychological intricacies of potential consumer interdependencies scholars in economics and marketing have overlooked mundane product promotions for a monopolistic firm we formalize the relationship between the optimal price quantity combination and the thoroughness of product promotions iterating toward the profit maximizing thoroughness of product promotion gives rise to a backward bending price quantity locus challenges to the law of demand that ignore product promotions are thereby undercut

do minimum wages fight poverty i introduction one of the most compelling rationales for a national minimum wage floor is to raise the incomes of poor or near poor families with members in the workforce this general point however is often missed in the debates over the merits of a higher minimum wage in contrast to these oft stated distributional goals much of the focus in such debates has been on the employment effects of minimum wages especially among the teenage population in large part this focus is probably attributable to the extensive body of economic research on the effects of minimum wages on employment of low skilled workers however although negative employment effects represent a cost of minimum wages such costs do not necessarily imply that minimum wages constitute bad social policy in particular the employment losses associated with a higher minimum wage may be more than offset by positive effects on low income families especially if minimum wages are a significant factor in helping move families out of poverty 1 this is not to argue that research on employment effects of minimum wages is irrelevant but such research may be more important as a test of the theory of labor demand and as a method of learning how employers and individuals adjust to exogenous wage increases than as a method of assessing the wisdom of the policy in addition we do not mean to suggest that the short run effects of minimum wages on the incomes of poor families should be the sole criterion for evaluating such policies other studies have found evidence suggesting for example that minimum wage increases reduce school enrollment rates and training neumark and wascher 1996a hashimoto 1982 factors that may affect longer run earnings or earnings growth these deleterious longer run effects might offset the benefits of shorter run effects of minimum wages on family incomes nonetheless our perception is that potential increases in the incomes of poor families provide the main motivation for raising the minimum wage making it important to assess the evidence on whether minimum wage increases achieve this goal in this regard there are two questions that pertain to the influence of minimum wages on family incomes generally and on poverty in particular first there is the question of the effects of minimum wages on low wage workers that is do the wage gains received by employed workers more than offset the lost earnings suffered by those who lose or cannot find jobs 2 second there is the question of how minimum wages affect workers in different parts of the family income distribution because many roughly speaking a large minority of minimum wage workers are in relatively affluent families gramlich 1976 card and krueger 1995 burkhauser et al 1996 which workers gain and which lose will have an important influence on the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes in this article we present evidence on the effects of minimum wages on family incomes focusing in particular but not solely on the effectiveness of minimum wages in reducing poverty using matched march current population surveys cpss we estimate the effects of minimum wages on the probabilities of various transitions in the family income distribution such as transitions into and out of poverty given that federal changes in minimum wages may be confounded with other aggregate level shocks influencing family income we rely heavily on state level changes in minimum wages to identify minimum wage effects in a nutshell our empirical strategy is to compare rates of transition through the family income distribution in states in which minimum wages do and do not increase for example if poor families are more likely to escape from poverty when minimum wages increase in their states of residence we would infer that minimum wage hikes help families move out of poverty on the other hand if transitions in to poverty are more common when minimum wages increase we would infer that the disemployment effects of minimum wages play a dominant role among the low income population

the political economy of minimum wage legislation two questions are addressed in this paper a why do labor unions and certain employer organizations respectively promote and impede minimum wage legislation b do these groups have significant impacts on minimum wages question a is examined in the context of models that identify the economic self interest of unionized skilled workers and capitalists in legal wage floors question b is approached by a median legislator utility maximization model that leads to tobit estimation of the relationship between state minimum wage rates and measures of statewide organized labor and capital and average hourly earnings

minimum wage increase and firm productivity evidence from the restaurant industry abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of increasing the federal minimum wage on productivity in the restaurant industry based on the equity theory and fair wage hypothesis this study empirically investigated the relationship between the federal minimum wage and restaurant productivity the results revealed that increasing the federal minimum wage immediately enhances restaurant productivity for up to two years the results further indicated that both full service restaurants and low wage restaurants benefit from the positive effect while there is no significant effect on limited service restaurants and high wage restaurants the results suggest that restaurants should cope with minimum wage policies by focusing on implementing initiatives that can maximize enhanced work efforts and productivity more importantly the results further highlight that restaurants should consider either continuously raising wage levels or raising them every two years to consistently obtain enhanced motivation and productivity

informing consumers about their own preferences we analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences e g about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication when more consumers become informed we show that this benefits also those consumers who remain uninformed as it reduces the firm s incentives to extract information rent by reducing the costs of information acquisition or forcing firms to supply consumers with the respective information about past usage policy can further improve welfare as contracts become more efficient the last observation stands in contrast to earlier findings by cremer and khalil american economic review 1992 where all consumers are uninformed

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

inflation minimum wage and other wages an econometric study on french macroeconomic data this study examines the set of interdependences between the formation of wages prices and the minimum wage smic through a vectorial error correction model estimated on french quarterly macroeconomic data covering the 1970 1 1999 4 period two periods are distinguished the period of inflation rise from 1970 to 1981 which coincides with an important squeeze of the wage range measured by the ratio of the minimum wage to the hourly wage rate the period of disinflation since 1981 that has been concomitant with a stability of wage inequalities disinflation has hardly benefited the evolution of the smic which has always profited by price rises in real and relative terms which have become less strong this evolution does not benefit any more on wage rises when the interdependences between variables are taken into account the smic seems however to have gained in efficiency as an instrument on wage disparity reduction it rises are finally more persistent in real terms and relatively to the other salar

warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard this article examines the use of prices and warranties as signals of product quality to consumers who choose how to maintain their purchases the seller s incentives are strongly affected by the interaction of quality and maintenance in determining product reliability two different assumptions about this interaction are made a separating equilibrium in which high quality is signalled with a low warranty and low price is shown to be possible in both cases

monopsony in the labor market this paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets broadly defined as upward sloping labor supply to an employer we compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search we also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average

market regulation of voluntary add on contracts abstract this paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add on insurance for their products we develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale under retail competition the consumers option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss leadership inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard which can even reduce consumer surplus the results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by uk legislators

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights we introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model this captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as for instance mandated by european union regulation of distance sales contracts with such additional constraints the optimal contract is static and unlike with only ex ante participation constraints does not elicit the agent s information sequentially this holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints

why unions reduce wage inequality a theory of domino effects numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences i demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages and still not sacrifice higher wages much if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency enhancing wage differences if these domino effects are strong enough then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage

minimum wage effects under endogenous compliance evidence from peru latin american labor markets feature large informal sectors in practice however the simple duality formal informal has many different shades firms tend to comply more with certain legislation than with other recent evidence has suggested that minimum wages have significant effects on the informal sector bell 1997 for mexico gindling and terrell 2004 for costa rica lemos 2004 and fajnzylver 2001 for brazil and maloney and nunez 2004 for colombia further some of this evidence suggests effects throughout a large part of the wage distribution this has been interpreted as evidence of lighthouse or numeraire effects we test this hypothesis using panel data from peru to identify effects throughout the wage distribution although there are some effects on informal sector workers overall results provide little support for numeraire or lighthouse effects labor monthly earnings are affected only at the bottom of the distribution 0 25 0 60 of the minimum wage made up mostly of informal workers and for formal workers earning between the old the new minima negative effects on the probability of retaining employed status after a minimum wage shock are either weak or non significant for wage earners below the minimum wage but significant for formal workers trapped between minima and for both formal and informal earning between 1 2 and 2 times the minimum wage independent workers earning below minimum suffer negative effects on both earnings and employment

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

the effect of changes in firm diversification on union wage settlements for 15 major u s industrial firms a well known argument is that conglomerate firms may exploit their ability to cross subsidize price wars for the purpose of engaging in predatory pricing a similar argument advanced by organized labor is that conglomerate firms can often outlast unions during strikes because they can cross subsidize strike costs indefinitely 1 15 17 this cross subsidizing of strike costs labor argues greatly reduces the effectiveness of striking as a bargaining weapon resulting in lower wage settlements for the union another fear articulated by organized labor is that conglomerates can simply eliminate divisions with troublesome unions since this threat is perceived by most unions as credible it may further increase the bargaining power of the firm 19 while the opportunity to cross subsidize strike costs or to eliminate troublesome divisions clearly exists for many conglomerates there is no empirical evidence that they engage in these activities or that they enjoy lower wage settlements 12 15 this paper tests the proposition that diversification efforts by the firm can lead to lower wage settlements unlike earlier studies that examine the effect of a firm s conglomerate nature on wage levels this paper examines how recent changes in the firm s level of diversification may affect wage settlements the remainder of the paper is outlined as follows in section i several key aspects of organized labor s argument are discussed and a formal testable hypothesis is proposed section ii proposes a simple empirical test of the hypothesis section iii discusses the data and the construction of key variables section iv reports and interprets the results of the regressions section v concludes the paper