social norms regulation and environmental risk we add social norms into laffont s mechanism designed for environmental risk we find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms the optimal contract induces more less effort from the green brown firm

liml estimation of import demand and export supply elasticities i apply limited information maximum likelihood liml to estimate import demand and export supply elasticities for a range of eurozone countries the results highlight inconsistencies in the parame

the effect of cognitive moral development on honesty in managerial reporting this study examines whether truth telling in the form of honest reporting is associated with cognitive moral development conventional agency theory assumes that people are self interested and willing to tell a lie to increase their personal payoffs while recent empirical evidence shows that some people give up monetary rewards to tell the truth e g evans et al account rev 76 537 559 2001 the social psychology literature suggests that cognitive moral development influences individuals ethical decisions we carried out an experiment whereby participants submitted managerial reports in which truth telling decreased their monetary payoff despite the fact that their decisions were not subject to monitoring auditing or reputation effects some participants reported honestly or partially honestly we find the relationship between honest reporting and cognitive moral development to be both positive and linear compared with those at lower stages of cognitive moral development participants at higher stages of cognitive moral development were more likely to submit an honest report and give up potential monetary gains from lying we further examine the economic impact of honest reporting on the firm s profit with the assumption of self interest and profit maximization antle and eppen manag sci 31 163 174 1985 suggest that a contract with a hurdle rate feature reduces managers information rent we find that in comparison with the expected outcome of a hurdle contract the firm can yield higher profits with a trust contract by hiring managers with a p score higher than 16 67

estimating import supply and demand elasticities analysis and implications i feenstra 1994 developed and broda and weinstein 2006 refined a structural estimator to estimate import demand and supply elasticities working through the first principles of the methodology from leamer 1981 this paper analyzes and improves the technique to provide a unified estimator of import supply and demand elasticities the proposed liml routine corrects small sample biases and constrained search inefficiencies standard estimates are shown to overestimate the median elasticity of substitution by over 35 applied to us import data from 1993 2007 the biases of the standard estimates translate into an understatement of consumer gains from product variety by a factor of 6 lastly i investigate the implications of violations to the underlying assumptions of the model

dynamic reform of public institutions a model of motivated agents and collective reputation abstract state capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public service motivation however when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment steady state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation reputation in the mission oriented sector exist reforming a low motivation institution requires a non monotonic wage path since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a high reputation institution but positive for a low reputation institution a transition to a high reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in followed by a wage decrease to crowd non motivated workers out

new evidence on the puzzles results from agnostic identification on monetary policy and exchange rates abstract past empirical research on monetary policy in open economies has found evidence of the delayed overshooting puzzle and the forward discount puzzle we revisit the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates by applying uhlig s uhlig h 2005a what are the effects of monetary policy on output results from an agnostic identification procedure journal of monetary economics 52 2 381 419 identification procedure that involves sign restrictions on the impulse responses of selected variables in a first step we leave the response of the exchange rate agnostically open and find sizeable evidence for both puzzles in a second step we additionally rule out the delayed overshooting by construction our results indicate that the forward discount puzzle is robust even without delayed overshooting

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

ex post participation constraint in a principal agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output additionally the contract is constrained to satisfy the agent s ex post participation we highlight three features of this model first the agent faces countervailing incentives second the separation of types is never optimal third the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level

how reliable are simple single equation specifications of import demand this paper examines nine models of aggregate import demand for each of five countries canada germany japan united kingdom and united states in an attempt to determine which of the frequently used single equation models of import demand are appropriate an appropriate model is defined as one which generates unbiased or at least consistent and efficient elasticity estimates while models without lagged adjustments and almon lag models perform rather poorly according to these criteria models including dynamic behavior through lagged values of the dependent variable are frequently accepted results are reported regarding functional form measures of variables and structural shift economists have devoted considerable attention to the estimation of aggregate import demand elasticities because of their importance in trade theory the simplest procedure for estimating these elasticities which is consistent with economic theory is to assume that the elasticity of supply of imports is infinitely elastic and to estimate

natural gas price elasticities variations by region and by sector in the usa abstract this article s primary objective is to estimate the own price and cross price elasticities of demand for natural gas in the residential commercial and industrial sectors by doe region in the usa a simultaneous equations model was developed and its reduced form was employed for natural gas consumption demand elasticity estimation in conjuction with the instrumental price variables data from 1967 to 1978 were used in the estimation but the 1973 oil embargo effect was separated with the use of a dummy variable the demand for natural gas was much more price elastic in the long run than in the short run and the industrial sector was more less price sensitive than others however there were significant interregional and intersectoral variations among the elasticities estimated

one lump or two unitary versus bifurcated measures of injury at the usitc i introduction firms that face competition frequently have a number of legal avenues to limit such competition when such competition comes from overseas competitors they might avail themselves of laws to limit imports in the major industrialized countries laws to limit competition from imports fall into two broad categories safeguards and laws against unfairly traded imports safeguards also known as escape clause procedures allow a world trade organization wto member state to temporarily restrict imports when a product is imported to its territory in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to competing domestic producers these temporary restrictions quotas or tariffs can either allow the domestic industry to become more competitive or allow an orderly transfer of resources from the industry unfairly traded imports are imports that are subsidized and or dumped that is sold at less than fair value fair value can be the price that the imports are sold for in their home market the price that the imports are sold for in a third country or the estimated cost of production including a profit in accordance with international agreements u s law requires that remedial duties antidumping duties or countervailing duties can only be imposed on unfairly traded imports if these imports have caused or threaten to cause material injury to competing domestic producers the u s international trade commission usitc is responsible for investigating and determining whether unfairly traded imports have caused material injury to a domestic industry the usitc is also responsible for investigating and determining whether a domestic industry that petitions for relief in a safeguard proceeding has suffered serious injury because of increased imports usitc commissioners have adopted a variety of approaches to determining whether dumped or subsidized imports have caused material injury to competing domestic producers an important one that has been used by several commissioners is the unitary approach this approach uses production and prices for the unfairly traded imports the domestic industry and fairly traded imports if any estimates of demand and supply elasticities and dumping or subsidy margins to calculate what the performance of the domestic industry would have been had it not had to compete with unfairly traded imports an alternative approach that has been adopted by more commissioners is the bifurcated approach this approach first asks if the domestic industry has suffered material injury and then asks whether unfairly traded imports contributed to this injury by separating the injury determination into two separate questions the presence of injury and the causation of injury the bifurcated approach is similar to the sort of inquiry that the usitc conducts in its safeguards investigations commissioners who used the unitary approach relied on an explicit economic model to compare actual domestic industry performance with what the performance would have been absent competition from unfairly traded imports in contrast commissioners who used the bifurcated approach rejected formal economic analysis in fact many of them were openly hostile to the use of economic analysis because of these different attitudes toward quantitative economics the unitary approach has also been called the economic approach we adapt an economic model developed to measure the causes of injury in usitc safeguard investigations to measure the effect of unfairly traded imports to domestic industry performance that is the second question under the bifurcated approach we apply this methodology to all usitc unfairly traded import investigations for a time period between two major changes in the law during this period there were commissioners who used the unitary approach and commissioners who used the bifurcated approach

hedging price volatility using fast transport abstract purchasing goods from distant locations introduces a significant lag between when a product is shipped and when it arrives these transit lags are trade barriers for firms facing volatile demand who must place orders before knowing the resolution of demand uncertainty we provide a model in which airplanes bring producers and consumers together in time fast transport allows firms to respond quickly to favorable demand realizations and to limit the risk of unprofitably large quantities during low demand periods the model predicts that the likelihood and extent to which firms employ air shipments is increasing in the volatility of demand they face decreasing in the air premium they must pay and increasing in the contemporaneous realization of demand we confirm all three conjectures using detailed us import data fast transport thus provides firms with a real option to smooth demand volatility on international markets and we provide simple calculations of that option value this enables us to identify how the option value relates to goods characteristics and to changes in air transport premia associated with technological and policy change including the introduction of jet engines and liberalization of trade in air services

is there agreement between beneficiaries on who should bear the costs of conserving farm landscapes abstract in recent years market based incentives have been regarded as a potential solution for addressing market failure related to environmental externalities determining the optimal payment schedule to facilitate such market mechanism typically involves a valuation exercise to capture the static benefits received by beneficiary groups from the public good in this study we augment the valuation estimates with a notion of fair share by assessing opinions of two beneficiary groups tourists and bed and breakfast owners regarding an acceptable division of the burden of financing the public good we find a significant difference in views tourists believe that their accommodation providers should contribute almost twice the amount that they themselves are willing to pay on the contrary a majority of bed and breakfast owners surveyed were against burdening tourists with any additional payments

controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules some evidence from ocs leasing under the ocs lands act firms are strictly liable for damages from oil spills to the extent that this liability rule causes firms to internalize environmental risks incentives for damage avoidance behavior are provided using data from the 1979 georges bank lease sale we use a robust estimation technique to test the hypothesis that potential environmental costs are reflected in bids for ocs leases the results indicate a substantial response to environmental risks recognizing reduced rents we estimate that total high bids have declined by 20 because of firms perceptions of environmental risks the results suggest that liability rules have considerable potential in controlling stochastic pollution events

monitoring moral hazard asymmetric information and risk sharing in procurement contracting this article characterizes the optimal procurement contract for a monopsonistic purchaser who contracts with a risk averse supplier with private information about his costs and who contributes an unobservable effort the costs incurred by the supplier may be uncertain and the purchaser has access to a monitor of costs that may be subject to noise that complicates risk sharing the purchaser prefers to respond to the observability problem with afixed price contract and to respond to the private information problem with a cost plus contract with uncertain costs and a perfect monitor the optimal contract relieves the supplier of some risk and the purchaser prefers that the effort of the supplier be subsidized with deterministic costs and a noisy monitor the optimal contract places risk on the supplier and the purchaser may prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed procurement of goods and services is an important form of economic exchange that is often characterized by bargaining and contracting rather than by exchange in a competitive market the procurement setting analyzed here corresponds to the case in which the purchaser is a monopsonist who contracts with a single supplier as in the case of the department of defense contracting for the delivery of a military system in such a setting a principalagent model may be a reasonable representation of the relationship between the purchaser and the supplier and the economics of the procurement arrangement is then captured in the contract when the item procured is standardized the relevant information is likely to be common knowledge and risk may be minimal in such a case a fixed price contract may satisfactorily resolve the purchaser s contracting problem in contrast the model considered here is intended to represent the procurement of a nonstandardized item about which information is incomplete costs are uncertain and observability of supplier costs by the purchaser is limited procurement thus is complicated by the conjunction of adverse selection risk sharing and moral hazard problems

financial statement comparability and expected crash risk this study examines the impact of financial statement comparability on ex ante crash risk using the comparability measures of de franco et al 2011 we find that expected crash risk decreases with financial statement comparability and this negative relation is more pronounced in an environment where managers are more prone to withhold bad news we also provide evidence that comparability can mitigate the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news disclosures our results suggest that financial statement comparability disinclines managers from bad news hoarding which reduces investors perceptions of a firm s future crash risk

how control system design influences performance misreporting this paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance we argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers i e other managers at the same hierarchical level this effect depends on the design of the organization s control system in particular on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports the reward structure determines if peers monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance the information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms we present the results of a laboratory experiment as predicted we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others monetary gains in addition overstatements are lower under an open information policy where each individual s reported performance is made public compared to a closed information policy where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice

did us safeguards resuscitate harley davidson in the 1980s abstract this paper examines us safeguards applied to the motorcycle market in the 1980s after receiving temporary protection by means of a maximum tariff of over 45 harley davidson sales recovered dramatically simulations based on structural demand and supply estimates indicate that while safeguard tariffs did benefit harley davidson they only account for a fraction of its increased sales this is primarily because consumers perceived that harley davidson and japanese large motorcycles were poorly matched substitutes for each other our results provide little evidence that safeguard provisions triggered restructuring in harley davidson

regulation moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks abstract a large class of major environmental risks are subject to severe moral hazard problems the purpose of this paper is to study the potential conflicts between cost minimization and safety care the intuition is that regulatory efforts or sheer competition inducing a greater focus on cost minimization may tilt the agents trade off towards taking too much risk here we study the problem in the context o regulation of a natural monopoly and see how high powered incentives may conflict with safety care we address the issue of moral hazard in environmental risk with adverse selection limited liability risk aversion and multiprincipals

effects of foreign exchange intervention under public information the chilean case this paper studies the effects of exchange rate interventions using daily and intraday data for chile from 1998 to 2003 its main contribution is the recognition of the role played by transparency and public announcements in the success of the intervention policy through the existence of an expectations mechanism which directly impacts the exchange rate three foreign exchange policy instruments are distinguished spot dollar denominated papers bcd s and announcements and treated as independent interventions time series estimations are used to capture the effect of the traditionally studied spot interventions as well as the effects associated to the announcement channel that we propose as potentially relevant results show that the impact of individual interventions spot and bcd are extremely small and in most cases non significant also the importance of the hypothesized announcement mechanism is confirmed the impact of central bank actions on the exchange rate s level and trend seem to be channeled through the public announcements made by the monetary authority the market adjusts its expectations to the information revealed through them with the exchange rate responding accordingly these effects occur on longer time spans than the ones suggested by the traditional literature the negligible effect of individual interventions is also found for the year 2001 with the use of intraday data

regulation of a risk averse firm abstract we extend the laffont tirole regulation model to the case of risk averse firms our main results are the impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost plus contract as compared with the risk neutral case distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller for high levels of risk aversion the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 l5

social norms of work ethic and incentives in organizations abstract in this paper i model the relation between the dissemination of social norms of work effort work ethic in a given society and the choice of incentives by firms and i motivate it by presenting evidence from three different datasets that suggests that work ethic is correlated with the intensity of firms incentives when the effort choices of different agents in a firm are complementary having hard working coworkers makes an agent more productive therefore in equilibrium she will work harder foreseeing that a work ethic is more useful to hard working agents parents will be more willing to transmit it in societies in which the probability that their offspring will have coworkers with strong work ethic is higher i then expand the model to incorporate the firm technology choice allowing firms to decide between complementary and separable production processes in societies with wide dissemination of work ethic firms will want effort to be complementary as in modern production processes while the opposite is true when the dissemination of work ethic is narrow finally i investigate the comparative dynamics of the model

consistent estimation of general equilibrium welfare effects a general equilibrium demand curve is appropriate for measuring the surplus changes in several markets induced by a policy intervention in one market guidelines for the identification and consistent estimation of such a demand curve are discussed specifically conditions are stated under which the dropping of prices of related goods yields a consistent estimate of the slope of the general equilibrium demand curve also a method similar to leamer s is proposed to provide consistent bounds for the general equilibrium demand slope when the slope is underidentified

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings evidence from four countries abstract this paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory examining the filing patterns of the four major users of ad law during the 1980 98 period we find that real exchange rates and domestic real gdp growth both have statistically significant impacts on filings bilateral filing data indicate that a one standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33 we also find one standard deviation fall in domestic real gdp increases filings by 23

age structure and inflation a wicksellian interpretation of the oecd data wicksell s cumulative inflation process is founded on the separation of investment and saving decisions the demographic age structure influences the aggregate of both these decisions and therefor

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

a meeting of the minds informal agreements and social norms using coordination games we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists we combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior we demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion we estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10 of total earnings and more than 120 in the bertrand game we show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

scandinavian evidence on growth and age structure the age distribution is seldom taken into consideration in macroeconometric papers in spite of the fact that established economic theories predict that demographic factors will affect the aggregate economy this paper investigates empirically the influence of age variables on growth unlike recent papers on the subject the focus here is on investigating the relationship on annual data for individual scandinavian countries estimations of a typical growth specification augmented with age variables are run and the results indicate that economic growth is indeed affected by the age distribution where the demographic structure catches the mediumrun trend in the growth rate the robustness of this finding is first checked by instrumental variable regressions to control for the potential endogeneity of the economic variables and then by running ridge regressions to mitigate the collinearity between the age variables rarement les etudes macro economiques considerent la distribution de la population par ge

optimal contracting with endogenous social norms research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers within an agency framework we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent s cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent s peer group we show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents sensitivities to social norms are unobservable

the benefits of extended liability we characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity this firm the agent is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder the principal the level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable this level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent increasing the wealth of the principal that can be seized upon an accident has no value when private transactions are regulated but might otherwise strictly improve welfare an incomplete regulation supplemented by an ex post extended liability regime can sometime achieve the second best

a cointegration analysis of the impact of the age structure of the population on the household saving rate in japan this paper analyzes the impact of the age structure of the population on japan s household saving rate by applying cointegration techniques to time series data for the 1955 1993 period it finds th

import dynamics and demands for protection what kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection to address this question this paper uses detailed monthly u s import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24 month window immediately preceding the filing of a petition for protection a decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports from two groups of countries supplying the same product those that are named in the petition and those that are not the same decomposition can be applied to products quite similar to the imports in question but not subject to a petition the results suggest that industries typically seek protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks first a persistent positive relative supply shock favors imports from named countries second a negative demand shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic industries petition for protection the relative supply shock is a broad one it applies both to named commodities and to the comparison product group the import demand shock by contrast is narrow hitting only named products the latter shock is also large import growth over the two year window is 15 percentage points lower in named products than in reference products with most of this gap arising in the final two quarters before the petition the negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in the run up to the filing of a petition it has been missed by previous studies using more aggregated data

the optimal regulation of a risky monopoly we study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky venture a natural monopoly is regulated i for economic purposes ii because it can cause losses of substantial size to third parties the environment or people the regulator observes the production cost without being able to distinguish the initial type an adverse selection parameter from the effort a moral hazard variable in addition the investment in prevention is non observable another moral hazard variable and the monopoly is protected by limited liability we fully characterize the optimal regulation in this context of asymmetric information plus limited liability we show that incentives to reduce cost and to invest in safety are always compatible but in some cases higher rents have to be given up by the regulator

monitoring of performance in organizational contracting the case of defense procurement this paper contains an agency theoretic analysis of procurement contracts in which the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk averse supplier in the presence of moral hazard private information and imperfect monitoring optimal contracts deviate from first best risk sharing the direction of the deviation depends on the relative severity of the moral hazard and private information problems and on the precision of the monitor in contrast to the usual result in the moral hazard literature the government may in some cases prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed choice of the precision of the monitor and the categories of costs covered by the monitor are also studied

real wage growth technical change and competition in the labor market the paper measures the rate of growth of average labor cost and the real wage for the twenty u s two digit manufacturing industries 1948 76 it is argued that these rates of growth give interesting information which other studies on the real wage ignore the results suggest that the gains from technical advance are shared equally across all labor markets consistent with the competitive paradigm a simple and appealing rationale for the observation that high growth industries show the slowest relative rate of growth of prices is also given t he general theory keynes 1936 unleashed many controversies one of the earliest and still topical controversy is the cyclical behavior of the real wage essentially the real wage employment debate has focussed on whether or not the demand schedule slopes downwards and there have been many studies on this topic producing a variety of conflicting findings a common feature of the real wage employment studies is to abstract away from the growth in the real wage that is bound to occur in a growing economy these studies are primarily concerned with deviations from trend or innovations in the real wage and the theme of this paper is that to ignore the growth in the real wage is to throw away valuable and interesting information this information on real wage growth tells us a great deal about competition in the labor market this study should be seen as being complementary rather than conflicting with the real wage employment studies the existence of a downward sloping demand curve for labor is after all not sufficient and probably not necessary for the functioning of competitive labor markets over the span of years 1948 76 i find that individual u s manufacturing industries record widely varying rates of productivity growth however these same industries tend to show a common rate of growth of the real wage this feature of productivity growth was emphasized by the late salter 1960 in his pathbreaking analysis of technical change he writes there is no tendency for above average increases in labour productivity to be accompanied by above average increases in earnings

measures of effectiveness for governmental organizations for organizations whose objective is not necessarily the maximization of a financial quantity there is little written in the economics and management literature about methods that quantify their effectiveness potential users of such methodologies are typically governmental organizations and agencies to whom congress allocates funding periodically but may also include many nonprofit organizations such research is importantly needed because government is no longer making outlay allocations on a merely historical basis but is using as a criterion how effectively an organization uses its resources in meeting its objectives in this paper we analyze the maritime safety program of the u s coast guard uscg which is responsible for monitoring the quality of vessels that sail in u s waters and present measures of effectiveness moes for the program we do this at two levels of activity at an overall program level level i and at a component activity level level ii poisson models are used to construct the moes using data on maritime casualties accidents between 1990 1993 from the real time marine safety management system msms database maintained by the coast guard a feature of the empirical methodology is the bayesian imputation of missing data the moes constructed here have at least four important uses first as the name suggests they perform the function that financial quantities such as returns on equity or returns on sales perform for private sector organizations that is they are indicators of efficiency second they can be used as inputs into allocative decisions within the organization for example the level ii moes can be used as inputs into a programming problem that determines the optimal allocation of resources among component activities third internal performance evaluation across uscg programs or across port units called marine safety offices can be based on their respective level i moes fourth and possibly the most important long run consideration moes provide the basis for better regulation by the government without moes the nature of regulation is probably suboptimal by adopting these moes as criteria it will be easier for the government to redesign those aspects of its regulation of the coast guard which curtail incentives

demography national savings and international capital flows this paper addresses the relationship between age distribution national savings and the current account balance the results point to substantial demographic effects with increases in both the youth and old age dependency ratios associated with lower savings rates they also point to differential effects on savings and investment and thus to a role for demography in determining the current account balance the estimated demographic effect on the current account balance exceeds 6 percent of gdp over the last three decades for a number of countries and given expected demographic trends is likely to be substantially larger over the coming decades copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

life cycle individual thrift and the wealth of nations this paper provides a review of the theory of the determinants of individual and national thrift that has come to be known as the life cycle hypothesis lch of saving applications to some current policy issues are also discussed part i deals with the state of the art on the eve of the formulation of the lch some 30 years ago part ii sets forth the theoretical foundations of the model in its original formulation and later amendment calling attention to various implications distinctive to it and sometimes counter intuitive it also includes a review of a number of crucial empirical tests both at the individual and the aggregate level part iii reviews some applications of lch to current policy issues though only in sketchy fashion as space constraints prevent fuller discussion this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes abstract the paper studies the effect of taxes on labor supply in a model with interdependent behavior i e individuals preferences depend on other people s behavior it is found that not taking the interdependency into account can lead to a serious bias in the predicted effects of a tax change it is also shown that interdependent behavior can give rise to spikes in the hours distribution such spikes often have been attributed to quantity constraints

profit shifting and trade agreements in imperfectly competitive markets profit shifting and trade agreements in imperfectly competitive markets do new rationales for trade agreements arise once imperfectly competitive markets are allowed we consider several trade models that feature imperfectly competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is in fact the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets in all of the models that we consider and whether or not governments have political economic objectives the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficient terms of trade driven restrictions in trade volume we also show that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination continue to be efficiency enhancing in these settings

managerial incentives and environmental compliance abstract this paper uses a principal agent model to analyze the role of monetary incentives to implement corporate environmental policy the model assumes that the agent has to split a limited amount of effort between two tasks profit enhancement and environmental risk reduction we find that when the agent s effort constraint is not binding wages should increase with performance in each task moreover the sharpness of the optimal monetary incentives for a given task should depend positively on the principal s eagerness to influence performance on this task and on the accuracy of the monitoring technology when the agent s effort constraint is binding however the necessity for the principal to provide insurance to the agent may make it inefficient to link managerial effort expended on environmental risk reduction to the corporate compensation system

empirical research on accounting choice abstract we review research from the 1990s that examines the determinants and consequences of accounting choice structuring our analysis around the three types of market imperfections that influence managers choices agency costs information asymmetries and externalities affecting non contracting parties we conclude that research in the 1990s made limited progress in expanding our understanding of accounting choice because of limitations in research design and a focus on replication rather than extension of current knowledge we discuss opportunities for future research recommending the exploration of the economic implications of accounting choice by addressing the three different reasons why accounting matters

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the supply and demand for imports and exports in a simultaneous model previous studies on the behaviour of aggregate exports and imports have tended to ignore the simultaneous relationship between quantity and price this paper investigates the price responsiveness of export and import demand and supply in eight african countries the results indicate that export demand price elasticities are smaller when the sample is african the import supply and demand elasticities were found to be generally large the marshall lerner condition of balance of payment stability is found to be easily satisfied a positively sloped function of export supply is found to exist for a majority of countries in the sample the average time lag of export supply is found to be about a year the disequilibrium model is found to be more appropriate for import demand import supply and export supply

modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior inferior or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees we explicitly consider the following factors the cost of care and its efficiency in reducing the probability of an environmental accident the social cost of public funds the net profitability of the risky activities the level of damages and the regulatory capture bias we characterize in such a parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other jel classification d82 k32

principals preferences for agents with social preferences abstract this study explores a nested representation of ethical moral social identity motivated opportunistic and reciprocal agent preferences to characterize screening contracts in a principal agent model under adverse selection this leads to a ranking of the type of social preferences that principals should seek in agents based upon the information rents associated with each agent type when moral hazard is introduced the ranking further depends upon the interaction of limited liability with self selection these results are interpreted in light of the 2010 dodd frank act and principal agent experiments

incentive contracts for natura 2000 implementation in forest areas the implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners in this article we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post the results show that agents who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome with a bonus for a high ecological level of the forest when conservation measures are correlated with forest management we show that the contractual measures involve distorted transfers we analyse the payment mechanisms used in france and denmark in the context of the natura 2000 policy these mechanisms result in overcompensation and under performance since they do not take the problem of moral hazard and natural variability into account

an evaluation of japan s first safeguards actions japan has been one of the major gatt wto member countries with relatively little experience in implementing protectionist measures however in april 2001 for the first time in its history japan invoked provisional safeguard measures against imports of welsh onions shiitake mushrooms and tatami mats mainly from china this paper reviews and evaluates the chain of events regarding these safeguard actions and considers the means by which japan might be able to deal with its trilemma policy problem involving how to coordinate the promotion of trade liberalisation the administration of wto consistent safeguards and responses to domestic political demands for protection the paper first attempts to review the theoretical rationale for implementing safeguard measures and counterarguments against these measures second it discusses the economic circumstances in which japan implemented the safeguard measures and evaluates these measures critically from the standpoint of economic efficiency and the political economy interests involved finally it concludes with a recommendation that the aforementioned trilemma policy problem in japan can be best addressed by means of the introduction of a well institutionalised domestic programme to provide adjustment assistance to ameliorate the displacement resulting from import surges

national treatment at the wto the roles of product and country heterogeneity this paper analyzes the world trade organization s wto s national treatment nt clause in a two country model where quality of goods and or market size are heterogenous across countries when market size is symmetric across countries a reciprocal nt agreement i benefits the high quality country ii hurts the low quality country and iii delivers higher aggregate world welfare however such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high quality country s market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small i e goods are sufficiently alike the qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

the effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly abstract we analyze the effects of antidumping law when utilized by competitive domestic petitioners against a foreign monopolist the monopolist reduces the cost of holding excess capacity in periods of slack foreign demand by dumping on the domestic market antidumping law reduces trade volume both directly under successful petitions and indirectly when no petition is filed by causing the monopolist to alter its capacity and the allocation of that capacity between markets finally we consider the effects of self enforcing agreements in which the domestic industry agrees not to file in exchange for a promise that the foreign monopolist limit exports

can contracts signal social norms experimental evidence we investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences a one shot principal agent experiment is studied where prior to contract choice principals are informed about the past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior compared with a setting in which principals are uninformed agents exert substantially higher effort under a fixed wage contract when they are aware that an informed principal chose this contract the informed principal s choice apparently signals a norm not to exploit trust which leads to more trustworthy behavior this mechanism s robustness is explored in further experiments data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2336 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the analysis of causality in escape clause cases under section 201 of the trade act of 1974 the so called escape clause a domestic industry that is seriously injured can obtain temporary relief if imports are the substantial cause of such injury this paper develops a methodology to determine the change in a domestic industry s production as a result of changes in import supply demand and domestic supply and so determine whether or not an industry is entitled to section 201 relief this methodology is illustrated by application to two recent section 201 investigations wood shakes and shingles and nonrubber footwear copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

industry rent seeking and the filing of unfair trade complaints abstract this paper adopts a rent seeking framework to explain the incidence of antidumping and countervailing duty complaints brought to the u s international trade commission and the department of commerce tobit analysis on all 3 digit sic industries is employed to examine the relationship between the frequency of unfair trade complaints and such factors as industry concentration unionization capital intensity and levels and or changes in employment price cost margins and import penetration large capital intensive industries particularly those facing employment losses and rising import shares are found to be most likely to file complaints protection of quasi rents accruing to capital and labor rather than protection of monopoly returns appears to be the primary impetus behind the filing of unfair trade complaints

imports as a threat to cartel stability abstract it is an old story that increased imports may have competitive effects on a domestic market the usual effect is felt through a reduction in demand for the products of the domestic industry what is more subtle is the effect that imports in particular an unexpected surge in imports from a new source country may have on the stability of a domestic cartel and more generally on the conduct of a domestic oligopoly implying a further competitive influence of international trade this paper discusses the issue in the context of several models and presents some relevant evidence from a recent case brought before the u s international trade commission

two cheers and a qualm for behavioral environmental economics behavioral economics can gain more in roads into environmental economics if we better understand why exchange institutions fail more effectively reduce health risks and environmental conflicts encourage more coordination and cooperation design better incentive systems more accurately estimate economic measures of value and promote more protection at less cost behavioral economics deserves two cheers for advancing ideas of context dependence and social preferences which we illustrate with two examples of recent research

intra metropolitan shifts in labor demand and the adjustment of local markets abstract i offer new evidence on the adjustment of local labor markets to geographic shifts in labor demand within us metropolitan areas using a unique data set in which metropolitan subregions are geographically matched across the 1970 1980 and 1980 1990 decades the evidence uncovered paints the following picture workers especially those with less education make incomplete adjustments within metropolitan areas in response to intra metropolitan demand shifts although blacks may not make especially limited adjustments they have disproportionately suffered deleterious effects from job movements because the demand shifts have tended to be away from their places of residence

foreign subsidization and excess capacity abstract the u s steel industry has long held that foreign subsidization and excess capacity has led to its long run demise yet no one has formally examined this hypothesis in this paper we incorporate foreign subsidization considerations into a model based on staiger and wolak s 1992 cyclical dumping framework and illustrate testable implications of both cyclical excess capacity and structural excess capacity stemming from foreign subsidization we then use detailed product and foreign country level data on steel exports to the u s market to estimate these excess capacity effects while the full sample results provide evidence of both cyclical and structural excess capacity effects for exports to the u s market these effects are confined to such a narrow range of country product combinations that it is unlikely that such effects were a significant factor in the fortunes of u s steel firms over the past decades

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

the returns from rent seeking campaign contributions firm subsidies and the byrd amendment this is the first empirical study to examine congressional support of a new law that distributes antidumping duties to protected firms because the law produces a transparent measure of how much each firm was rewarded for its efforts to secure the bill s passage it provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the link between the expected financial returns to firms campaign contributions and congressional behaviour our results indicate that campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law while contributions from the law s beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive ceci est la premiere etude empirique examinant le support par le congres americain d une nouvelle loi qui distribue les droits anti dumping collectes aux entreprises protegees parce que la loi produit une mesure transparente de la recompense versee a une entreprise pour ses efforts de lobbying afin de s assurer que la loi est mise en vigueur cela permet aux chercheurs d etudier le lien entre les rendements financiers anticipes pour les entreprises leurs contributions aux campagnes electorales et les actions du congres les resultats indiquent que les contributions aux campagnes electorales en provenance des beneficiaires potentiels accroissent la probabilite que les legislateurs vont supporter la loi et que les contributions en provenance des beneficiaires de la loi s accroissent a proportion que la taille de la recompense anticipee s accroit

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

social norms and gift behavior theory and evidence from romania in many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution inter household transfers in general and gifts in particular are sizable and very important we use unique romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers we explicitly focus on the importance of community wide social norms and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts more exactly our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among romanian households is a norm of reciprocity moreover this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle and high income households even though poor households receive to the same extent norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important hence although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich they still receive since there is a social norm to give especially to the poor

a multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy evidence from the financial services industry we use an incentive compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on the job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders and the normative expectations each group has of the other we examine whistle blowing on a peer an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client we find patterns of agreement among advisers among leaders and between the two groups that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante however we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers when there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers finally we show that when advisers personal ethical opinions do not match group norms this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

tariffs and the risk of invasive pest introductions in commodity imports theory and empirical evidence abstract we investigate using tariffs as corrective taxes to reduce risks from biological invasions due to expanded world trade a theoretical analysis indicates that higher tariffs have ambiguous effects on invasive pest introductions an econometric analysis using data from us department of agriculture surveillance screening indicates that tariff rates exert a negligible influence on expected invasive pest introductions from commodities currently facing positive tariffs removal of duty free status would decrease expected pest intercepts but undermine other goals of us trade policy and lower consumer welfare consumer welfare loss is on the order of 38 million per expected intercept avoided

preferential trade agreements and multilateral tariff cooperation are preferential trade agreements ptas building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization i address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly the central result is that when countries are symmetric a free trade agreement fta undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union cu does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members however when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost there exist circumstances where ptas facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation

environmental risks and bank liability abstract many governments have introduced or are considering introducing laws to recover from the liable parties the cleanup costs caused by pollution damages in particular the banks who finance the firms causing environmental damages may be considered liable in various court cases in the us and elsewhere banks have been found liable while they have been exempted in others we develop a model in which the insurance sector may insure the firm for the pollution risk and the bank may lend money for investment under complete information of the bank about the firm s activities the limited liability of the firm induces excessive investment and insufficient care but full liability of the bank creates the appropriate internalization of the environmental risk this rationalization of the laws on lender liability must be qualified because in general the banks suffer from agency problems adverse selection and moral hazard in their relationships with firms in the adverse selection case full liability of the bank leads to underinvestment partial liability is better but may fail to implement the optimal second best allocation in the case of moral hazard full responsibility is killing the project too often while still leading to low care too often partial responsibility may achieve the second best optimal allocation but in some cases the level of responsibility necessary to induce the proper level of care is too high for the project to be financed by the bank we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results with regards to liability laws for environmental damages

antidumping cases in the us chemical industry a panel data approach factors motivating the decision to file an antidumping petition are analyzed with data from 1976 88 for the u s chemical industry the incidence of antidumping filings is related to disaggregate levels of and changes in macroeconomic variables in a count model framework import penetration number of employees price cost margins the chemical production index and dumping margins all significantly influence the filing decision while average wages the capital to shipments ratio and the new capital expenditures to shipments ratio do not there is also evidence that antidumping filings increased significantly following implementation of the trade agreements act of 1979 copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd