increasing the capital income tax may lead to faster growth this paper shows that under rather mild conditions higher capital income taxes lead to faster growth in an overlapping generations economy with endogenous growth government expenditures are financed with labor income taxes as well as capital income taxes since capital income accrues to the old taxing it reliefs the tax burden on the young and leaves them with more income out of which to save we argue that savings are sufficiently interest inelastic so that higher savings and therefore higher growth result the basic argument is not seriously challenged by a grandfather clause for initial capital or by the old receiving some labor income as well the reasoning is similar to feldstein 1978 auerbach 1979 and in particular jones and manuelli 1992 but in contrast to the conventional wisdom about the effect of capital income taxation as say in lucas 1990

understanding the costs of consumer durable adjustments this article examines whether adjustment frictions help account for the patterns of household consumption expenditures observed in the consumer expenditure survey namely that the variance of log durable expenditure is four times larger than that of log nondurable expenditure for annual data and this gap substantially widens for quarterly data estimating a structural model of household consumption with nondurable and durable goods with the simulated method of moments i find that the fixed costs associated with durable adjustments are important in matching the cross sectional moments using the estimated model i also examine the response of nondurable and durable expenditures to income shocks jel d12 d91 e21

long run equilibria with dominated strategies abstract we show that the predictions of long run behavior under the evolutionary process are highly sensitive to the addition and elimination of strictly dominated strategies in particular for the best response dynamics cf kandori m rob r 1995 evolution of equilibria in the long run a general theory and applications j econ theory 65 2 383 414 we prove that for any symmetric normal form game any strict nash equilibrium can be selected as the unique long run equilibrium by appropriately adding only one single strategy which is strictly dominated by all original strategies moreover if we further assume instantaneous adjustment then any convex combination of strict nash equilibria with rational number weights can be realized as the long run distribution by appropriately adding strictly dominated strategies

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

is the response of output to monetary policy asymmetric evidence from a regime switching coefficients model this paper investigates regime switching in the response of u s output to a monetary policy action we find substantial statistically significant time variation in this response that corresponds to high response and low response regimes we then investigate whether the timing of the regime shifts are consistent with three particular manifestations of asymmetry by modeling the transition probabilities governing the switching process as functions of state variables we find strong evidence that policy actions taken during recessions have larger effects than those taken during expansions we find less evidence of asymmetry related to the direction or size of the policy action

interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents a misleading evolutionary equilibrium abstract in a two population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs a game is played among individuals in the two populations they imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population when a revising agent is matched with someone in the alternative population who plays differently his expected payoff and the observed payoff of his partner diverge hence he conjectures the payoff from switching to the other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes the evolutionary dynamics has a unique locally asymptotically stable fixed point which typically differs from the evolutionary stable equilibrium without inter population imitation for a collective action game we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from the nash equilibrium and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to what they see

qe a successful start may be running into diminishing returns existing studies may have underestimated the impact of qe1 on uk gdp because they did not take full account of the beneficial effect on credit risk spreads and on the exchange rate however all such effects were also influenced by the roughly simultaneous introduction of similar easing in the usa which complicates the analysis another area where qe has been positive is in reducing public sector borrowing costs where qe1 and subsequent rounds have disappointed is in their inability to stimulate a recovery in credit and monetary growth amid an increased desire among banks to hold far more of their reserves at the central bank moreover there is growing evidence of significant diminishing returns in qe2 as gilt rates have already fallen to historically low levels and the risk is that if policy makers fail to resuscitate the bank lending channel further rounds of qe could potentially have negative returns

life cycle savings bequest and a diminishing impact of scale on growth the present paper shows that the savings motive critically affects the size and sign of scale effects in standard endogenous growth models if the bequest motive dominates the scale effect is positive if the life cycle motive dominates the scale effect is ambiguous and may even be negative

a brave new world kantian nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation abstract we model game theoretic situations in which agents motivated by kantian ethics interact with conventional nashian agents we define the concept of generalized kant nash equilibrium which encompasses the nash equilibrium the kantian equilibrium and the kant nash equilibrium as special cases we show the existence and uniqueness of a kant nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation and derive its properties in a dynamic setting we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents and compare their markov emission strategies for both the static model and the dynamic model as the population share of kantians increases the quality of the environment improves and both types of agents are better off

life cycle individual thrift and the wealth of nations this paper provides a review of the theory of the determinants of individual and national thrift that has come to be known as the life cycle hypothesis lch of saving applications to some current policy issues are also discussed part i deals with the state of the art on the eve of the formulation of the lch some 30 years ago part ii sets forth the theoretical foundations of the model in its original formulation and later amendment calling attention to various implications distinctive to it and sometimes counter intuitive it also includes a review of a number of crucial empirical tests both at the individual and the aggregate level part iii reviews some applications of lch to current policy issues though only in sketchy fashion as space constraints prevent fuller discussion this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

evolution of preferences1 we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

finite lifetimes and growth abstract in this paper we study the long run growth property of overlapping generations models it is shown that in one sector models with convex technologies the asymptotic growth rate must be zero this results because the young do not have sufficient income to purchase a large capital stock thus a policy of income redistribution to the young can generate growth even if financed by income taxation additionaly it is shown that two sector models and one sector models with nonconvex technologies are consistent with growth

consumption dynamics during recessions when will durable expenditures respond strongly to economic stimulus we build from micro evidence and show that in a heterogeneous agent business cycle model with xed costs of durable adjustment responsiveness is substantially dampened during recessions our model estimates imply that during the great recession durable expenditures were half as responsive to additional stimulus as during the boom in the 1990s this procyclical responsiveness is driven by changes in the distribution of households desired durable holdings over the cycle we directly test our model by estimating this distribution empirically using psid micro data and nd that the distribution in the data moves cyclically as predicted in addition to this micro evidence we also provide support for our model s procyclical responsiveness using aggregate time series data and we show this time series evidence is inconsistent with simpler models featuring smooth adjustment costs

measuring the effects of federal reserve forward guidance and asset purchases on financial markets i extend the methods of gurkaynak sack and swanson 2005 to separately identify the effects of federal reserve forward guidance and large scale asset purchases lsaps during the 2009 15 u s zero lower bound zlb period i find that both forward guidance and lsaps had substantial and highly statistically significant effects on medium term treasury yields stock prices and exchange rates comparable in magnitude to the effects of the federal funds rate before the zlb forward guidance was more effective than lsaps at moving short term treasury yields while lsaps were more effective than forward guidance and the federal funds rate at moving longer term treasury yields corporate bond yields and interest rate uncertainty however the effects of forward guidance were not very persistent with a half life of 1 4 months the effects of lsaps seem to be more persistent i conclude that overall in terms of these criteria lsaps were a more effective policy tool than forward guidance during the zlb period

monetary policy expectations at the zero lower bound we show that conventional dynamic term structure models dtsms estimated on recent u s data severely violate the zero lower bound zlb on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates in contrast shadow rate dtsms account for the zlb by construction capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates and achieve good forecast performance these models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy including the timing of policy liftoff from the zlb and the pace of subsequent policy tightening we also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow rate dtsm when yields are constrained near the zlb

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

imitation and the evolution of walrasian behavior theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust a well known result by vega redondo implies that in symmetric cournot oligopoly imitation leads to the walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost in this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs instead of obtaining the walrasian outcome as unique prediction every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run we then conduct experiments to check this fragility we obtain that contrary to the theoretical prediction the walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior

the importance of bequests and life cycle saving in capital accumulation a new answer as the workhorse of consumption and saving research for the past four decades the life cycle model has proved flexible and useful for examining a variety of questions in a classic paper albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 p 56 stated a key assumption of the basic model t he individual neither expects to receive nor desires to leave any inheritance although the authors contended that the absence of a bequest motive was not critical to the heart of their results the assumption set off a long standing battle over the relative importance of different motives for saving in an influential study laurence kotlikoff and laurence summers 1981 estimated that a large fraction of the u s capital stock was attributable to intergenerational transfers modigliani and his collaborators vigorously disagreed and based on their own empirical work claimed that life cycle saving was the primary source of capital accumulation modigliani 1988 subsequent work has failed to reach a consensus since this debate began an important advance in the consumption literature has been the incorporation of uncertainty in life cycle models see e g r glenn hubbard et al 1995 we argue that allowing for uncertainty resolves the controversy over the importance of life cycle and bequest saving by showing that these motives for saving are overlapping and cannot generally be distinguished a dollar saved today simultaneously serves both a precautionary life cycle function guarding against future contingencies such as health shocks or other emergencies and a bequest function because in the likely event that the dollar is not absorbed by these contingencies it will be available to bequeath to children or other worthy causes under this view households have a bequest motive but bequests are given i e the motive is operative in only some states of the world wealth is something like traveler s checks you take them along on vacation just in case but odds are they will remain uncashed and available for sundry goods after the journey is complete we first demonstrate the result using a simple model and then argue that this approach reconciles the apparent importance of bequests with households declared focus on life cycle saving finally we consider implications of our analysis

growth effects of taxation under altruism and low elasticity of intertemporal substitution an increase in the tax rate on capital income may raise the rate of economic growth when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low and intergenerational transfers are absent since the strength of the bequest motive depends on tax rates this paper provides conditions under which taxing capital income and then reducing the labour income tax is more growth enhancing than the classical policy of zero taxes on capital income and vice versa this paper analyses the effects of different taxes on the rate of economic growth we consider an economy in which public spending is a fixed fraction of the gnp and the government can obtain revenues from proportional taxes on both labour and capital income obviously the growth effects of these two instruments will depend on the assumptions made about the economic environment in the standard overlapping generations olg model with production diamond 1965 an increase in capital income taxes allows a reduction in labour income taxes and thus agents will enjoy more income when they are young since in the olg model young agents must purchase the total stock of capital installed in the next period and saving is increasing in young income higher taxes on capital income may lead to faster capital accumulation in order to complete the argument we must ensure that the associated decrease in the after tax interest rate does not lead to a reduction in saving which would outweigh the previous income effect in other words we need a sufficiently low elasticity of intertemporal substitution the argument is thus similar to the one of jones and manuelli 1992 who have already pointed out that if the technological environment makes sustained growth feasible then taxing the old agents and subsidising the young ones may increase the rate of economic growth however the situation is completely different if we consider instead an economic environment in which the life cycle considerations are absent for instance in endogenous growth models with a representative agent or dynasty and infinite life span an increase in the capital income tax rate typically translates into lower growth see for instance sato 1967 feldstein 1974 stiglitz 1978 and the more recent contributions of lucas 1990 and rebelo 1991 a way to give a unified treatment to these two alternative models is by means

altruists egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model the authors study a population of agents each of whom can be an altruist or an egoist altruism is a strictly dominated strategy agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs interactions between agents are local so that each agent affects and is affected by only his neighbors altruists can survive in such a world if they are grouped together so that the benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by other altruists who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated altruists continue to survive in the presence of mutations that continually introduce egoists into the population copyright 1998 by american economic association

evolution to equilibrium in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods abstract we present results on finite population evolutionarily stable strategies esss and stochastically stable states for a model of evolution with an imitative rule of strategy choice in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods and two groups of firms one group of low cost firms and one of high cost firms the firms play price setting and quantity setting oligopoly games under linear demand functions we will show that the stochastically stable state in a price setting oligopoly and that in a quantity setting oligopoly coincide

the evolution of strategic behaviour this paper is a selective survey of recent work on evolutionary models of games it is shown how evolution in a literal biological sense may have generated the attitudes to risk that are the basis of strategic behavior such attitudes to risk may or may not conform to the expected utility theorem although strategic behavior itself is bound to be importantly influenced by nongenetic mechanisms these mechanisms may remain analogous to biological inheritance at least in special cases the theory of evolutionary games derived in this way is sketched and applications to various coordination games are discussed

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities abstract j bergin and b lipman econometrica 64 1996 943 956 show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in m kandori g mailath and r rob econometrica 61 1993 29 56 and p young econometrica 61 1993 57 84 is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states we here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy this is shown to corroborate the results in kandori mailath rob 1993 and under certain regularity conditions those in young 1993 journal of economic literature classification number c72

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

rule evolution and equilibrium selection abstract this paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria two rules are investigated the myopic best response and naive imitation if agents cannot change rules equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules when agents can only change rules through mutation the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk dominant one if agents can change rules by updating then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk dominant one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d81

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

factor shares in olg models of growth abstract in standard infinite horizon optimizing models of balanced growth aggregate savings are positively related to private rates of return on investment or for a given technology to the share of accumulated factors of production in aggregate income a relationship of opposite sign may however obtain in overlapping generations olg models where higher rates of return on older agents wealth imply lower disposable income for young laborers with high saving propensity this paper explores such issues in the context of a continuous time olg model deriving simple parametric restrictions conductive to results of either type and discussing how infinite horizon results may carry over to olg settings

the effects of asset purchases and normalization of u s monetary policy this paper examines changes in the effects of unconventional monetary policies in the united states to this end we estimate a markov switching var model with absorbing regimes to capture possible structural changes our results detect regime changes around the beginning of 2011 and the middle of 2013 before 2011 the u s large scale asset purchases lsaps had relatively large impacts on the real economy and prices but after the middle of 2013 their effects were weaker and less persistent in addition after the middle of 2013 which includes the monetary policy normalization period the asset purchase or balance sheet shocks had slightly weaker effects than during the early stage of the lsaps but stronger effects than during the late stage of the lsaps while interest rate shocks had insignificant effects on the real economy and prices finally our results suggest that the positive responses of durables and capital goods expenditures to interest rate shocks weakened the negative impacts of interest rate hikes after the middle of 2013 including the period of monetary policy normalization jel c32 e21 e52