limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

pure strategy nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities abstract this paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with positive externality which admit a pure strategy nash equilibrium since in general a nash equilibrium may fail to exist in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium we impose two additional assumptions anonymity and order preservation the proof of our main result is carried out by constructing for a given game g a potential function over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of yields a nash equilibrium in pure strategies of g journal of economics literature classification numbers c72 d62 h73

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy abstract this paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi linear preferences jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax we show that under a proportional income tax scheme a nash equilibria may fail to exist under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but in general nash equilibria violate a very weak efficiency condition we conclude by commenting on the stabilizing effect of zoning policies journal of economic literatureclassification number c71

efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities abstract in the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by barbera and bevia self selection consistent functions j econ theory 105 2002 263 277 locating public facilities by majority stability consistency and group formation games econ behav 56 2006 185 200 we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

optimal procurement contracts under a binding budget constraint the traditional literature on agency models predicts that for zero liability contracts it is optimal for the principal to pay for the information he cannot observe however this principle is not valid for a set of contracts mostly used by government agencies whose distinguishing feature is represented by a stringent budget constraint for the principal this paper shows that in this environment the principal will either choose a structure exibiting pooling or a bargaining solution the bargaining solution represents the analytical proof to the intuition of the difficulty in implementing procurement contracts stated by laffont and tirole 1993

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

socially responsible investment a multicriteria approach to portfolio selection combining ethical and financial objectives abstract in a context of socially responsible investment sri this paper deals with portfolio selection for investors interested in ethical policies in the opportunity set there are ethical assets and other assets which are not characterized as ethical two goals are considered the traditional financial goal in the classical utility theory under uncertainty and an ethical goal in the same utility framework a new financial ethical bi criteria model is proposed with absolute risk aversion coefficients and targets depending on the investor s ethical profile this approach is relevant as an increasing number of mutual funds are becoming interested in sri strategies from the proposed model an actual case on green investment is developed concerning this case without generalizing to other contexts an analysis of the numerical results shows that efficient portfolios obtained by the traditional e v model outperform the strong green portfolios in terms of expected return and risk but this does not significantly occur with weak green investment

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

safety first portfolio choice based on financial and sustainability returns the aim of this paper is to expand the methodological spectrum of socially responsible investing by introducing stochastic sustainability returns into safety first models for portfolio choice we provide a foundation of the notion of sustainability in portfolio theory and establish a general model for generalized safety first portfolio management with probabilistic constraints and three specifications of it moreover we prove theorems about conditions for unique optimal solutions and for the constraints of one model being more restrictive than those of another in an empirical part we calculate the costs of investing according to our approach in terms of less financial return

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

editorial does good marketing cause bad unemployment questionable methods for increasing nominal wages reduce real wages i e buying power by creating inflation shortages lower quality and long term unemployment to increase real wages i e the ability to buy more economic principles prescribe increasing productivity i e greater output from less input in contrast marketing principles prescribes increasing the value of output i e greater customer benefits through innovation beyond increasing real wages innovation spawns new occupations better matching individuals with skills and providing greater nonmonetary benefits i e job satisfaction unfortunately threatened entrenched incumbents often solicit protectionist legislation claiming negative externalities e g short term unemployment lower wages and burdens on society innovation does require labor to move from inferior to superior organizations i e unemployment however protectionism only delays and dramatically aggravates the inevitable trauma associated with progress as worker skills firm practices and buyer welfare fall further behind recent attacks demonizing wal mart e g the dubious vlasic pickle claim epitomize this situation they are archaic vanilla protectionism menacing both imperiled consumers and every consumer driven business

equilibria in a model with partial rivalry abstract in this paper we show that a non cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals preferences satisfy independence of irrelevant choices anonymity and partial rivalry moreover if any of these assumptions is violated then even a pure strategy nash equilibrium may fail to exist further more we demonstrate that even with a continuum of players the same three assumptions yield the existence of a pure strategy strong nash equilibrium and in addition the equivalence of the sets of nash and strong nash equilibria in pure strategies journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62

money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability a case for pay for performance abstract research on subjective evaluation in principal agent models have shown that the optimal contract should give uniform reward with zero money burning at all but the worst performance in a static game involving two independent tasks with only high or low output possible it is shown that when the agent is subjected to limited liability the optimal contract is more likely to exhibit pay for performance full money burning if both tasks yield low outputs partial money burning for mixed performance of low and high outputs and zero money burning following high output in both tasks

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

locating public facilities by majority stability consistency and group formation abstract we consider the following allocation problem a fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line society is composed of n agents who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities there is no congestion we show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that 1 these decisions are condorcet winners whenever one exists 2 the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location and 3 no agent wishes to become a user of another facility even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

creativity and incentives creativity is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon with tremendous economic importance a crucial question for economists and for firms is the interplay of incentives and creativity we present experiments where subjects face creativity tasks where in one case ex ante goals and constraints are imposed on their answers closed tasks and in the other case no restrictions apply open tasks the effect of tournament incentives on creativity is then tested our experimental findings provide striking evidence that financial incentives in the form of tournament competition affect creativity in closed constrained tasks but do not facilitate creativity in open unconstrained tasks whereas being ranked relative to one s peers is an effective nonmonetary incentive with both types of tasks we develop a structural model that allows for subjects heterogeneity in being affected by the openness of the task and then use the structural model to not only estimate creative output in tournaments but also to predict creative output in two counterfactual incentive schemes piece rate and target bonus

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation experimental evidence abstract in this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment we introduce a novel scrabble like word creation task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process we use this task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to impose license fees on their innovations we find intellectual property to have an adverse effect on welfare as innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated introducing communication among innovators does not reduce this detrimental effect introducing intellectual property results in more basic innovations with subjects failing to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths subjects act more self reliant and non optimally in order to avoid paying license fees our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovation especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

markets for ideas prize structure entry limits and the design of ideation contests contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation in marketing design and other creative industries firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high quality ideas for ads new products and even business strategies from participants a central question faced by contest sponsors is how to appropriately structure prizes and entry regulations i develop an empirical model of idea generation ideation contests and investigate the impact of the number of prizes prize amount and submission limit on participation and quality outcomes using data from a popular marketing ideation platform the model explains participant submission decisions jury ratings and sponsor rankings of winning submissions counterfactuals reveal the impact of design parameters on outcomes and provide guidance for the optimal design of ideation contests and platforms

synthetic indicators of mutual funds environmental responsibility an application of the reference point method abstract socially responsible investing sri is broadly defined as an investment process that integrates not only financial but also social environmental and ethical see considerations into investment decision making sri has grown rapidly around the world in the last decades in the last years given the causes of the 2008 financial crisis ethical social environmental and governance concerns have become even more relevant investment decision criteria however while a diverse set of models have been developed to support investment decision making based on financial criteria models including also social responsibility criteria are rather scarce the aim of this paper in which we focus on the environmental dimension is to assist individual investors in their investment decisions providing them with a synthetic indicator of mutual funds environmental responsibility which is by nature a multicriteria concept and therefore multicriteria techniques are to be used to measure it the proposed approach is based on the double reservation aspiration reference point method this scheme is applied to each fund of a randomly selected set of u s equity mutual funds in order to determine on the basis of a given set of indicators a pair of synthetic indicators that measure the weak and the strong environmental responsibility degree of each mutual fund relying on the particular preferences of the investor

on coalition proof nash equilibria in common agency games abstract in this paper we consider two notions of a coalitional deviation strict deviation where each of member of a deviating group is better off and weak deviation where at least one member of a deviating group is better off while all other members are at least as well off we then examine for the class of common agency games introduced in bernheim and whinston quart j econ 101 1986 1 31 the structure and properties of two notions of a coalition proof nash equilibrium generated by strict and weak deviation we also study a relationship between coalition proof equilibria strong equilibria and pareto undominated nash equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d79

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

implications of reduced search cost and free riding in e commerce this paper examines a market where the provision of information service is costly but information service has the characteristics of a public good consumers on the other hand can use the information service to make an informed purchase decision and derive higher utility from consuming their ideal product however after receiving the information service from an information service provider consumers can easily free ride by purchasing at low price sellers who do not provide any information service the paper examines the competition where sellers compete by providing information service for horizontally differentiated products and where technology reduces consumers search cost it is found that in this market a seller needs to establish itself as an information service provider in order to make positive profits even when there is free riding a seller however cannot make positive profits by free riding all the time also with an increase in competition in the information service market sellers have reduced incentives to provide information service it is also found that in this market a decrease in search cost may increase or decrease social welfare

reply to managing channel profits comment we welcome moorthy s comment moorthy k s 1987 managing channel profits comment marketing sci 6 fall 375 379 it provides an opportunity to clarify several issues raised in our 1983 paper that paper was motivated by one concern channel coordination we believed that channel members benefit from coordination and that many institutional arrangements such as quantity discounts are actually coordinating mechanisms we developed a simple model to demonstrate our belief for historical accuracy mcguire and staelin cited by moorthy had already independently developed a useful model of duopolistic channel competition being unaware of their working paper our model not surprisingly differed from theirs both papers provide important but different insights into channel management

self selection consistent functions abstract this paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society the need for such rules arises in different contexts including the establishment of jurisdictions the location of multiple public facilities or the election of representative committees we define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect we investigate the possibility of designing efficient allocation consistent rules we also explore whether such rules may in addition respect the condorcet criterion journal of economic literature classification numbers d7 d71

tri criterion inverse portfolio optimization with application to socially responsible mutual funds we present a framework for inverse optimization in a markowitz portfolio model that is extended to include a third criterion the third criterion causes the traditional nondominated frontier to become a surface until recently it had not been possible to compute such a surface but by using a new method that is able to generate the nondominated surfaces of tri criterion portfolio selection problems we are able to compute via inverse optimization the implied risk tolerances of given funds that pursue an additional objective beyond risk and return in applying this capability to a broad sample of conventional and socially responsible sr mutual funds we find that after the screening process there appears to be no significant di erence between how assets are allocated in socially responsible and conventional mutual funds which is likely to be di erent from what most sr investors would expect

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

idea generation creativity and incentives idea generation ideation is critical to the design and marketing of new products to marketing strategy and to the creation of effective advertising copy however there has been relatively little formal research on the underlying incentives with which to encourage participants to focus their energies on relevant and novel ideas several problems have been identified with traditional ideation methods for example participants often free ride on other participants efforts because rewards are typically based on the group level output of ideation sessions this paper examines whether carefully tailored ideation incentives can improve creative output i begin by studying the influence of incentives on idea generation using a formal model of the ideation process this model illustrates the effect of rewarding participants for their impact on the group and identifies a parameter that mediates this effect i then develop a practical web based asynchronous ideation game which allows the implementation and test of various incentive schemes using this system i run two experiments that demonstrate that incentives do have the capability to improve idea generation confirm the predictions from the theoretical analysis and provide additional insight on the mechanisms of ideation

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

multiple public goods lexicographic preferences and single plateaued preference rules abstract we study the problem of providing a menu of identical public goods for a group of agents with single peaked preferences over 0 1 a decision rule selects for each preference profile and for each public good a location in miyagawa 1998a phd dissertation an agent consumes of each menu without rivalry only his most preferred public good we extend preferences from 0 1 to the set of alternatives lexicographically we identify a certain agent who might leave and require population monotonicity only if he leaves the entire population when we provide two public goods we characterize the class of single plateaued preference rules by pareto optimality anonymity and population monotonicity

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

tri criterion modeling for constructing more sustainable mutual funds one of the most important factors shaping world outcomes is where investment dollars are placed in this regard there is the rapidly growing area called sustainable investing where environmental social and corporate governance esg measures are taken into account with people interested in this type of investing rarely able to gain exposure to the area other than through a mutual fund we study a cross section of u s mutual funds to assess the extent to which esg measures are embedded in their portfolios our methodology makes heavy use of points on the nondominated surfaces of many tri criterion portfolio selection problems in which sustainability is modeled after risk and return as a third criterion with the mutual funds acting as a filter the question is how effective is the sustainable mutual fund industry in carrying out its charge our findings are that the industry has substantial leeway to increase the sustainability quotients of its portfolios at even no cost to risk and return thus implying that the funds are unnecessarily falling short on the reasons why investors are investing in these funds in the first place