semi targeted all pay auctions a partial exclusion principle abstract this paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all pay auctions when players differ in ability the contest organizer splits the overall prize of the competition into a targeted and an untargeted prize the targeted prize is exclusively for disadvantaged low ability agents and excludes advantaged agents partially from the overall prize we consider a setting with one high ability and two low ability contestants and fully characterize equilibrium assuming that the contest organizer aims to maximize expected total effort we show that i almost any targeted prize is preferable to a standard all pay auction without targeted prize ii the exclusion principle baye et al 1993 can be implemented by a wide range of sufficiently large targeted prizes and iii partial exclusion by means of an appropriately chosen targeted prize benefits the organizer more than complete exclusion we also discuss the robustness of our results in settings with more than three agents

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

patent trolls on markets for technology an empirical analysis of npes patent acquisitions abstract patent trolls or npes appropriate profits from innovation solely by enforcing patents against infringers they are often characterized as relying on low quality patents an assessment that if correct would imply that eradicating such patents would effectively terminate the npe business in this paper we shed light on this issue by empirically analyzing npes patent acquisitions we draw on a unique dataset of 392 u s patents acquired by known npes between 1997 and 2006 which we compare to three control groups of 784 u s patents each acquired by practicing firms we find that the probability that a traded patent is acquired by an npe rather than a practicing entity increases in the scope of the patent in the patent density of its technology field and contrary to common belief in the patent s technological quality our findings thus support recent theoretical propositions about the npe business model showing that npes procure patents that are more likely to be infringed harder to substitute for and robust to legal challenges the fact that npe acquired patents are of significantly higher quality than those in the control group implies that elevating minimum patent quality will not put an end to the npe business and suggests that this business is sustainable in the long run we furthermore discuss the fact that npes are peculiar players on markets for technology insofar as they are solely interested in the exclusion right not in the underlying knowledge we posit that transactions involving npes may only be the tip of the iceberg of patent only transactions a conjecture with strong implications for the efficiency and the study of markets for technologies managerial and policy implications are discussed

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

competitive effect of cross shareholdings in all pay auctions with complete information abstract this paper investigates the competitive effect of cross shareholdings in winner take all all pay auctions with two asymmetric bidders we show that cross shareholdings may paradoxically create a pro competitive effect and elicit more effort than a standard contest without cross ownership this observation runs in contrast to the anti competitive effect that cross shareholdings usually create in standard oligopolistic settings such as cournot or bertrand competitions both bidding costs and the sizes of cross shares affect the resultant total effort non monotonically neither a cross share nor a higher bidding cost necessarily decreases effort supply a complete account of equilibrium bidding behaviors is provided and the necessary and sufficient conditions under which cross shareholdings lead to higher or lower levels of overall effort are identified however the pro competitive effect comes at a loss of efficiency

lottery versus all pay auction contests a revenue dominance theorem abstract we allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way i e she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort resp revenue the two predominant contest regimes are considered all pay auctions and lottery contests for all pay auctions the optimal bias is derived in closed form it implies extreme competitive pressure among active contestants and low endogenous participation rates moreover the exclusion principle advanced by baye et al 1993 becomes obsolete in this case in contrast the optimally biased lottery induces a higher number of actively participating contestants due to softer competition our main result regarding total revenue comparison under the optimal biases reveals that the all pay auction revenue dominates the lottery contest for all levels of heterogeneity among contestants the incentive effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule all pay auction dominates the participation effect due to a weakly discriminating contest rule lottery

global markets for technology evidence from patent transactions abstract the paper analyses the recent evolution of international markets for technology by examining changes in ownership of us granted patents we study the effects of the geographical origin of patents proxied by their first priority country on the probability of patents being traded on the timing of the transaction and on the probability of observing a cross border transaction while controlling for the characteristics of the patents the time and sector specificities the analyses are based on a comprehensive dataset that covers all the patents granted by the uspto over the 2002 2012 period the data from the us patent reassignment database have been cleaned and processed and a subset of 95 542 granted patents that have been traded has been identified we obtain evidence from survival models that there has been an increase in the rate of patent transactions in recent years the obtained results indicate that patents with a first non us original applicant have less probability of being traded and show a longer time to transaction than us first priority patents we also find that more science based patents which are usually characterized by a higher technological uncertainty are more likely to be traded but are much less likely to be involved in cross border deals the results are discussed in light of the impact of asymmetric information and search costs on international patent transactions

asymmetric contests with conditional investments rent seeking scenarios competitions for promotions and research and development r d races are examples of competitions in which participants expend resources regardless of whether they win or lose although similar in their all pay feature such competitions often differ in important dimensions these include the type of technologies employed in competition the type of asymmetries among competitors the degree to which expenditures are sunk and the number of prizes consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policymaker if expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital then it is reasonable to think of firms marginal cost of influence as linear but if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital its lobbying technology may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence due to the reputational advantage and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence due to the high costs of capital similarly the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs lobbying restrictions geographic location or preferential treatment by the policymaker further impact firms lobbying technologies inducing additional nonlinearities and asymmetries among firms in some lobbying settings firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome for example a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses thus the specification of firms lobbying technologies the type of asymmetries among firms the combination of unconditional and conditional investments and the number of eventual winners may change according to the lobbying setting studied the same is true for other competitions with an all pay feature in a competition for promotions workers often differ in their abilities experience and social skills more than one prize

patents versus ex post rewards a new look abstract economic studies that aim at comparing the patent system social efficiency versus an ex post reward system rest on an outdated view of patents they assume that firms use the patent system only in order to be granted a short term commercial monopoly rent this assumption is convenient because it allows straightforward comparisons between patents and rewards but it is not confirmed by empirical studies which stress that in many industries most firms use patents as strategic devices to trade technologies and to ease r d collaborations this change leads to rethinking the framework of the patent reward debate

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

what determines patent value insights from the semiconductor industry abstract this paper contributes to an understanding which impacts certain patent characteristics have on the value of patent rights in an exploratory study 127 individual patents from a semiconductor company were evaluated comprehensively by technical and marketing representatives the analysis of this rare data shows that for patents used as bargaining chips novelty and inventive activity are most important difficulty of inventing around and disclosure turn out to be of limited importance due to a selection bias the influence of patent age on its value cannot be determined the results hint at a differentiated theoretical plausibility of value indicators

optimal prize rationing strategy in all pay contests with incomplete information abstract a contest organizer e g a government regulatory agency is endowed with the capacity to provide unlimited homogeneous prizes e g medals that he can use to incentivize contestants to exert productive effort in an all pay auction with incomplete information each agent at most wins one prize we study the optimal number of prizes the organizer should grant in order to induce maximal expected total effort or expected highest effort from agents both are single peaked under mild regularity conditions when players abilities follow a family of beta distributions expected highest effort maximization requires a smaller set of prizes to be awarded for both goals the optimal number of prizes weakly increases when the pool of contestants expands or contestant quality improves

innovation through exaptation and its determinants the role of technological complexity analogy making patent scope the concept of exaptation has been recently introduced in innovation studies previous empirical studies have only focused on the organization level conditions of exaptation this paper fills the gaps by focusing on invention and inventor level conditions such as technological complexity inventors analogical ability and patent scope to test our hypotheses we analyse a large sample of u s patents obtained from the uspto and nber databases based on our findings we discuss a number of implications of exaptation for the management of innovation as well as for policy makers

the exclusion principle for symmetric multi prize all pay auctions with endogenous valuations abstract this paper explains why contest designers may limit entry into a symmetric multi prize all pay auction the revenue maximizing size of the group of finalists depends on the extent to which prize values decrease or increase with the number of contestants

multiple prize contests the optimal allocation of prizes abstract multiple prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics patent and r d races to tendering for governmental projects hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment this survey attempts to outline compare and evaluate the results from the literature while a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects depending on the objective function the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal

optimal favoritism in all pay auctions and lottery contests abstract we analyze the revenue enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants two instruments of favoritism are considered head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids in the all pay auction head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first best revenue in the lottery contest head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue as all pay auctions revenue dominate lottery contests under optimal biases we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments

patent protection in the shadow of infringement simulation estimations of patent value empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas computers textiles combustion engines and pharmaceuticals using new patent data for west germany 1953 1988 patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement the evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10 of related r d expenditure

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

improving patent valuations for management purposes validating new indicators by analyzing application rationales abstract this paper analyzes the validity of so far untested indicators of patent value to enhance the quality of patent assessments using indicators at the corporate level the article expands the theory by eliciting patent attorneys filing rationales to maximize profits from protecting intellectual property to inspire the computation of new value indicators including patent full texts then based on a newly compiled data set consisting of 813 ep patents the probability of an opposition against a patent is modeled by established and new value indicators the results show that accelerated examination requests and qualified word counts enhance the quality of existing valuation methods

a theory of affirmative action in college admissions i introduction race conscious preferential admissions have been widely practiced by selective colleges and universities to enhance minority representation in higher education for example the college of arts and sciences at the university of michigan automatically added 20 points out of a possible 150 points to a minority applicant s score in its rating system harvard university has an unofficial lift scheme which also targets minority applicants however controversy has surrounded affirmative action ever since its inception for instance california texas and florida have already terminated the use of race conscious admissions at state funded institutions this debate culminated in the recent supreme court ruling regarding admissions procedures at the university of michigan which endorsed admissions rules that took into account race as a qualifying characteristic unfortunately positive studies on this issue have been scarce relative to the high profile of the debate according to holzer and neumark 1999 theoretical studies of the efficiency of affirmative action on education are virtually nonexistent some have argued that affirmative action is merely a patronage program and necessarily results in mediocracy rather than meritocracy in the debate on affirmative action practices in college admissions a major criticism is that affirmative action designed to create diversity comes at the cost of academic quality a competing view offered by those opposed to affirmative action is that it weakens school applicants incentives to achieve academic excellence for instance justice thomas wrote in his opinion in grutter v bollinger that there is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the lsat once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score supporters of this practice tend to emphasize the importance of diversity and the positive influence of diversity on the pedagogical environment steele 1990 these views however do not fully recognize the incentive structure behind affirmative action admissions rules it is unclear how a college admissions rule affects high school students incentives to achieve academic excellence which adds to their human capital stock and future productivity the process of college admissions by and large resembles a contest in which contestants exert costly effort in order to win a limited number of prizes in the context of college admissions to compete for a limited number of seats in the incoming class college candidates have to present their academic credentials such as gpa and sat score to the admissions officer to win the seat high school students have to invest in their human capital which improves the academic performance whereas the academic investments are costly and nonrefundable regardless of the outcome for example the tuition the money spent on books the salary paid to tutors the time and energy and so on all of these features may be approximated by an all pay auction mechanism we propose a simple theoretical framework that models the process of college admissions as an all pay auction to investigate two major questions is there any theoretical rationale for an affirmative action admissions rule how do such rules affect college candidates incentives to invest in academic effort two candidates one a minority and the other a nonminority simultaneously choose their academic efforts human capital investments to compete for a seat in a college we show that an academic quality oriented college prefers to adopt an admissions rule that scales up the test score of the minority relative to the nonminority although this rule is designed purely to maximize the expected academic quality of the incoming class it turns out to favor the minority and create ethnic diversity we show that the unique equilibrium affirmative action admissions rule creates a positive cross group interaction between college candidates incentives to make educational effort

the two faces of inventions the relationship between recombination and impact in pharmaceutical biotechnology recombination and impact have become well established constructs to understand the origins of inventions and their importance for the development of future inventions despite forming these two familiar faces of inventions their specific relationship has only marginally been subject to inquiry to address this this paper studies the relationship between the level of recombination of inventions and their technological impact along two steps first in contrast to the common idea of a linear relationship between recombination and impact we argue that the relationship is in fact a non linear one second we distinguish between different levels of recombination low intermediate high and determine their differential impact thereby establishing which type of recombination leads to the highest level of technological impact we test our hypotheses on an extensive dataset comprised of all uspto granted patents in the biopharmaceutical industry between 1976 and 2006 our empirical findings indicate strong evidence for a curvilinear relationship between recombination and impact in addition we find that an intermediate level of recombination formed by a combination of components from local adjacent and distant knowledge domains carries the highest level of technological impact of all types of inventions finally we discuss implications for the academic literature and for firms innovation strategies

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

imitation costs and patents an empirical study it has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy as arrow i962 and others have pointed out if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation in their discussions of the innovation process economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them or to estimate their effects in this paper we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic in addition we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation

valuing patents on cost reducing technology a case study we present an approach for valuing patents on production process improvements specifically we focus on valuing a patent on cost reducing process improvements from the viewpoint of the patent holding firm we do this by considering the relevant cash flows that result from owning the patent the patent value is determined by 1 licensing fees and royalty income 2 competitive advantage resulting from the patent 3 patent maintenance costs we discuss a case study that presents the difficulties and challenges in finding the relevant information that is needed to estimate the cash flows we show that valuation of patents on production process improvements cannot be done without good knowledge of technology markets and competitors

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

internal sequential innovations how does interrelatedness affect patent renewal abstract the value of patented innovations has attracted substantial research attention especially in the context of patent renewal however research often assumes that a firm s patented innovations are independent from each other we draw upon evolutionary economics and suggest that some of a firm s patents share important genealogical relationships which we refer to as internal sequential innovations we propose internal sequential innovations are more valuable and therefore more likely to be renewed than stand alone innovations we examine our hypotheses from a dataset of us pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents the results confirm our hypotheses at both the patent and the firm levels

a penny for your quotes patent citations and the value of innovations the use ofpatents in economic research has been seriously hindered by the fact that patents vary enormously in their importance or value and hence simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output the purpose of this article is to put forward patent counts weighted by citations as indicators of the value of innovations thereby overcoming the limitations of simple counts the empirical analysis of a particular innovation computed tomography scanners indeed shows a close association between citation based patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovations in that field moreover the weighting scheme appears to be nonlinear increasing in the number of citations implying that the informational content of citations rises at the margin as in previous studies simple patent counts are found to be highly correlated with contemporaneous rd however here the association is within afield over time rather than cross sectional

estimates of the value of patent rights in european countries during the post 1950 period this paper examines the distribution of the values of patent rights in the united kingdom france and germany during the post 1950 period these values are inferred from the behavior of patentees with respect to payment of renewal fees on their patents a simple economic model of renewal decisions is combined with data on the proportion of patents renewed at alternative ages and the renewal fee schedules to produce estimates of the distribution and the total value of patent rights in these countries moreover the data indicate that there have been changes in the value distribution and we follow these changes over the period the empirical results of particular interest concern the total value of patent rights and the relationship between changes in it and changes in the quantity of patents the skew in the distribution of patent values and the rate of obsolescence on the returns to patents

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

patents as options some estimates of the value of holding european patent stocks in many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force this paper uses data on the proportion of patents renewed and the renewal fees faced by post world war ii cohorts of patents in france the united kingdom and germany in conjunction with a model of patent holders renewal decisions to estimate the returns earned from holding patents in these countries since patents are often applied for at a nearly stage in the innovation process the model allows agents to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept inforce formally then the paper presents and solves a discrete choice optimal stochastic control model derives the implications of the model on aggregate behaviour and then estimates the parameters of the model from aggregate data the estimates enable a detailed description of the evolution of the distribution of returns earned from holding patents over their life spans and calculations of both the annual returns earned from holding the patents still in force or the patent stocks in the alternative countries and the distribution of the discounted value of returns earned from holding the patents in a cohort this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

testing patent value indicators on directly observed patent value an empirical analysis of ocean tomo patent auctions the valuation of patents is an important albeit challenging task extant research to identify patent value indicators has so far relied on expert estimates of patent value exploited patent renewal data or depended on more indirect measures of patent value recently specialized market places for patent transactions have emerged that allow us for the first time to directly observe patent s private value one of the most prominent market places for patents is ocean tomo a platform that offers periodical patent auctions we make use of this auction data to empirically test predictions on patent value identifiers on real world auction prices we find empirical support for forward citations and the patent s family size however both indicators explain only a small variance in patent value in contrast our full model explains a large share of variance making us optimistic that with increased directly observed patent value such models can be useful tools in patent valuation

centralized vs decentralized contests we compare two contests decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and centralized in which all contestants fight for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests we study the relationship between payoffs and efforts between these two contests

dissecting the monty hall anomaly we assess competing explanations of irrational behavior in the monty hall problem by creating new variants of the problem some variants employ a feature that automates the merging of probabilities thus rendering transparent the probabilistic advantage of the rational choice that feature also enables systematic variation in informational asymmetry and in ordering of actions data from 77 subjects each of whom makes 30 binary decisions indicate that automated merging raises the fraction of rational choices from around 40 to over 80 other features examined have much less impact indicating the importance of a bayesian updating failure jel c91 d02 d81 d83

contests with endogenous discrimination abstract this paper builds a complete information contest model with endogenous discrimination we show that a revenue maximizing contest designer will optimally set a bias towards a weaker contestant against a stronger contestant and completely eliminate the asymmetry between the two moreover in contrast to fair contest models where the revenue maximizing contest designer is better off if the weaker contestant becomes stronger or the stronger contestant becomes weaker our model shows that the opposite result may arise

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

the effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on r d productivity new evidence from japanese panel data abstract this article reports the first results on how monetary compensation plans for employee inventions affect r d productivity based on the notable panel data of japanese firms the study finds that the introduction of revenue based compensation plans that are linked to patent performance lead to an increase in the number of high cited patents while this never leads to an increase in the number of patent applications furthermore this is strongly effective in smaller firms these results indicate that the monetary incentives based on patent performance are effective on enhancing the motivation of employee inventors