statistical efficiency of double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation the statistical efficiency of conventional dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys can be improved by asking each respondent a second dichotomous choice question which depends on the response to the first question if the first response is yes the second bid is some amount greater than the first bid while if the first response is no the second bid is some amount smaller this double bounded approach is shown to be asymptotically more efficient than the conventional singlebounded approach using data from a survey of californians regarding their willingness to pay for wetlands in the san joaquin valley we show that in a finite sample the gain in efficiency can be very substantial

implications of bid design and willingness to pay distribution for starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we examine starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we investigate 1 the seriousness of the biases for the location and scale parameters of the willingness to pay wtp in the presence of starting point bias 2 whether or not these biases depend on the distribution of wtp and on the bid design and 3 how well a commonly used diagnostic for starting point bias a test of the null that bid set dummies entered in the right hand side of the wtp model are jointly equal to zero performs under various circumstances monte carlo simulations suggest that the effect of ignoring starting point bias depends on the bid design and on the true distribution of wtp a well balanced symmetric bid design may result in very modest biases even when the anchoring mechanism is very strong the power of bid set dummies in detecting starting point bias is low they tend to account for misspecifications in the distribution assumed by the researcher for the latent wtp rather than capturing the presence of starting point bias

equilibrium in hotelling s model of spatial competition we study hotelling s two stage model of spatial competition in which two firms first simultaneously choose locations in the unit interval then simultaneously choose prices under hotelling s assumptions uniform distribution of consumers travel cost proportional to distance inelastic demand of one unit by each consumer the price setting subgames possess equilibria in pure strategies for only a limited set of location pairs because of this problem pointed out independently by vickrey 1964 and d aspremont et al 1979 hotelling s claim that there is an equilibrium of the two stage game in which the firms locate close to each other is incorrect a result of dasgupta and maskin 1986 guarantees that each price setting subgame has an equilibrium in mixed strategies we first study these mixed strategy equilibria we are unable to provide a complete characterization of them although we show that for a subset of location pairs all equilibria are of a certain type we reduce the problem of finding an equilibrium of this type to that of solving three or fewer highly nonlinear equations at each of a large number of location pairs we have computed approximate solutions to the system of equations next we use our analytical results and computations to study the equilibrium location choices of the firms there is a unique up to symmetry subgame perfect equilibrium in which the location choices of the firms are pure in it the firms locate 0 27 from the ends of the market at this equilibrium the support of the subgame equilibrium price strategy is the union of two short intervals most of the probability weight is in the upper interval so that this strategy is reminiscent of occasional sales by the firms we also find a subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm uses a mixed strategy in locations in fact in the class of strategy pairs in which the firms use the same mixed strategy over locations and this strategy is symmetric about 0 5 there is a single equilibrium in this equilibrium most of the probability weight of the common strategy is between 0 2 and 0 4 and between 0 6 and 0 8 there is a wide range of pure nash as opposed to subgame perfect equilibrium location pairs the subgame strategies in which each firm threatens to charge a price of zero in response to a deviation support all but those location pairs in which the firms are very close

finding all pure strategy nash equilibria in a planar location game in this paper we deal with a planar location price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits if firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served we present characterizations of local and global nash equilibria then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible nash equilibrium pairs of locations the minimization of the social cost leads to a nash equilibrium an example shows that there may exist multiple nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost

firm mobility and location equilibrium two types of location equilibria are compared the first one is that of a simultaneous price and location game the second is that of a two stage location then price game it is suggested that equilibrium locations are further apart under the second and profits are higher since firms internalize the harmful price competition effect of moving close to each other the paper introduces a nonpurchase option into the logit model of spatial competition and the sensitivity of the equilibrium is analyzed

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

hotelling s spatial competition as a model of sales abstract hotelling s spatial competition model is used to explain the existence of sales it is shown that 1 an equilibrium in randomized strategies exists when a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist 2 with more dissimilarity among brands prices are chosen from a wider interval

product differentiation under congestion hotelling was right i introduction nobody goes there anymore it s too crowded attributed to yogi berra in the seminal hotelling 1929 model of spatial competition two firms compete to sell a product in stage 1 they locate along a unit line in stage 2 they set their prices consumers spread evenly along the line choose the best deal based on the posted price and linear transportation costs hotelling apparently solved for the stage 2 equilibrium in pure strategy prices and via backward induction showed that regardless of location either firm would increase its profits by moving closer to its competitor see figure 1 first line this gave rise to the principle of minimum differentiation the tendency of competing firms to make similar choices in geographical or product characteristic dimensions d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 critiqued this principle s validity within the hotelling model they showed that no pure strategy pricing equilibrium exists when the firms are sufficiently close together but not at the same location this is because for firms at close quarters the temptation is strong for one firm to cut its price just enough to steal the entire mass of customers located on the other side of its competitor in fact if locations are symmetric the hotelling pricing equilibrium exists only if firms locate in the outer quartiles thus hotelling s backward induction breaks down and there is no guarantee that firms located in the inner quartiles would want to move closer to each other see figure 1 second line at this point the literature diverges much of the literature follows d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 who introduce quadratic transportation costs and show that they provide greater tractability 1 with quadratic costs the differentiation result is reversed firms maximally differentiate in equilibrium 2 figure 1 omitted osborne and pitchik 1987 continue with hotelling s linear transportation costs despite the tractability challenges they characterize a mixed strategy pricing equilibrium when firms are located close to each other in the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium with pure location choices that they compute both firms locate at the edges of the inner quartiles 0 24 of the distance from the midpoint see figure 1 third line thus substantial near efficient differentiation remains in equilibrium evidently firms incentives are to move farther apart over much of the region where hotelling s pricing equilibrium fails to exist this paper also retains linear transportation costs and adds one feature to the model negative network externalities specifically consumers are assumed to derive disutility in proportion to the number of customers of the firm they patronize this negative externality can be interpreted as congestion arising from firm capacity constraints queuing for parking customer service or to pay 3 in many cases the more crowded a store or restaurant the less attractive it is to patronize all else equal it can also be interpreted as a specific kind of snobbery which we term brand snobbery preferring the brand less consumed 4 we find that the greater are congestion costs relative to transportation costs the more of hotelling s line contains a hotelling like pure strategy pricing equilibrium the centered interval where the equilibrium does not exist for symmetrically located firms shrinks as congestion costs grow in importance and in the limit vanishes that is the hotelling pricing equilibrium can be supported at any location where the firms are located on opposite sides of the midpoint given sufficiently high congestion costs relative to transportation costs this result has implications for product differentiation in essence congestion costs extend the portion of the line over which hotelling logic applies that is over which firms can increase profits by moving closer to each other

noncooperative bargaining and spatial competition the article develops a bargaining model of spatial competition sellers compete by choosing locations in a market region consumers face a cost to moving from one place to another the price of the good is determined as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game between seller and buyer in this game the buyer has the outside option to move to another seller and so the prices at all stores are interdependent existence of a location price equilibrium is established the outcome approaches the perfectly competitive one if the consumer s cost of traveling becomes negligible or if the number of sellers tends to infinity copyright 1989 by the econometric society

bargaining search costs and equilibrium price distributions this paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store in the market equilibrium the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game in this game the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller differences between the sellers types create price dispersions typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs the market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

choosing between internet and mail survey modes for choice experiment surveys considering non market goods in a choice experiment setup considering a non market good this paper adds to the literature on survey mode effects by providing evidence that internet surveys can be a viable alternative to traditional mail surveys when gathering feedback from a sample of respondents the case study concerns preferences for protecting different types of landscape from road encroachment when building new motorways in denmark two samples of respondents are surveyed one by internet and one by mail the performances of the two samples are compared over six different criteria response rates protest responses demographics preferences and wtp estimation precision and finally certainty in choice differences are observed for some of these criteria implying that analysts should be aware that choosing internet over mail could be accompanied by a survey mode effect however the observed differences do not translate into significant differences in the unconditional wtp estimates in most applied economic valuation studies of non market goods the main objective is in fact estimation of wtp hence in the present case the identified survey mode effects do not severely invalidate the applicability and continued use of the internet as a suitable means of collecting data for choice experiment economic valuation of non market goods

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

response strategies and learning in discrete choice experiments this study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent induce strategic behaviour we find evidence that strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents affect choice decisions strategic response the results suggest however that respondents may solely respond to high cost rather than low cost inconsistencies that is respondents are more cost sensitive and thus have a lower willingness to pay wtp if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a lower cost than if it was not yet the cost sensitivity and thus wtp remains unaffected if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a higher cost our findings further indicate that cost sensitivity increases and thus wtp decreases when respondents progress through the choice task with this increase decrease lessening as more choice questions are answered possible explanations are value learning and strategic learning

a bargaining model of financial intermediation abstract in a financial market the investor searches for investment projects and bargains with the entrepreneur about the financial contract alternatively he may delegate search and bargaining to a financial intermediary delegation generates a commitment advantage in bargaining it may however induce excessively risky investments because the investor cannot monitor the intermediary s search behavior this restricts the parameter constellations under which equilibrium intermediation occurs competition may not reduce the intermediaries profits to zero because of incentive restrictions

how much co2 emissions do we reduce by saving electricity a focus on methods abstract in this paper we evaluate two approaches for estimating co2 emission reduction from electricity savings one based on average co2 intensities of electricity generation and another that relies on marginal co2 intensities it is found that the average co2 intensity approach has a significant shortcoming when it comes to scenario based approaches for co2 emission reduction this shortcoming lies in the chicken egg problem created where larger future electricity savings are actually big enough to change the co2 intensity in such a way that it cannot be used anymore to estimate the co2 emission reduction we show that in these cases the marginal approach is preferred to correctly apply this approach it is important to determine the co2 intensity of the future power mix which will not be built in order to avoid under or overestimation of the co2 savings calculated we propose a seven step approach which can be used in scenario based potential studies as guidance for estimating the co2 emission reductions from not only electricity savings but also renewable electricity and mitigation options that consume electricity such as electric cars and heat pumps using our approach would avoid a disconnection of the co2 reduction potential with the underlying reference scenario

elections with platform and valence competition abstract we study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences e g engage in campaign spending the marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization the closer platforms are the more valence affects the election outcome consequently candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition moreover exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence as a result the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms finally the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter s ideal point to a shock to one candidate s valence as is common in the literature leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values

optimal designs for discrete choice contingent valuation surveys single bound double bound and bivariate models this paper finds the designs for discrete choice contingent valuation surveys which maximize the precision of a statistic of interest about the public s willingness to pay wtp for a change in the environmental quality such as median wtp an optimization problem is set up in which the efficiency of the estimate of median wtp or a related concept is the objective function to optimize with respect to the survey design i e the set of bids offered to the respondents in deriving the optimal designs we consider alternative econometric models such as the basic single bound model that uses the responses to the first payment question the traditional interval data or double bound model for surveys with a follow up payment question and the recently proposed bivariate binary response model simulations are carried out to compare the alternative design principles and assess their performances with respect to the statistic of primary interest median wtp and other welfare measures such as mean wtp other designs that are constructed ad hoc are also examined

spike models in contingent valuation spike models allow for a nonzero probability of zero willingness to pay in referendum style contingent valuation experiments they include many of the often used models as special cases and allow various analyses that are not possible in standard applications in this paper the economic rationale for the spike models and their estimation techniques are discussed and empirical illustrations are provided one study suggests that mean willingness to pay is zero and both studies strongly suggest that median wtp is zero these results have some bearing on the continuing debate of the incentive properties of hypothetical surveys and the construction of scenarios in contingent valuation experiments

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

driving forces for aggregate energy consumption a cross country approach abstract although a cornerstone for development past and current energy use has often posed a major challenge for policymakers with respect to planning and management within this context in this paper an updated multi sectorial cross country assessment of energy consumption trends was undertaken aiming at identifying the main drivers of changes in aggregate energy consumption these drivers have been interpreted in the light of the policy measures that have been implemented over the years by different countries to achieve a sustainable development of the energy sector the cross country assessment encompasses a set of developed united kingdom portugal and spain and emerging brazil china and india countries resorting to the logarithmic mean divisia index lmdi decomposition method changes in the aggregate energy consumption were decomposed into three main explanatory effects activity structure and intensity the major findings achieved reflect the relevance of intensity and activity effects in detriment of the structural effect the assessment of energy consumption trends using the lmdi decomposition method provides critical information regarding which is the dominant factor that should be focused in policy design

necessary conditions for demand revelation in double referenda abstract this paper demonstrates a set of necessary conditions that should generate unbiased internally consistent estimates of willingness to pay wtp from a double referendum mechanism these conditions are also sufficient for demand revelation in an experimental laboratory environment however the control over the mechanism achieved in the lab may not be transferrable to the field and wtp estimates derived from field surveys may remain biased

spatial competition with price taking firms we consider a price taking equilibrium in the spatial setting a unique pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations this equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two stage process in whiclh firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price taking outcome the result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms agglomeration does not occur if demand is too elastic or if there are more than two firms this paper presents a two stage model of spatial competition in which the prices in the second stage constitute a competitive equilibrium rather than being chosen by firms the analysis applies to an industry in which firms prices are regulated by an authority whose concern is to maximize social surplus as we show the prices the regulator would choose are those that would arise in the price taking equilibrium of course the full social optimum could be attained if the authority were also to regulate locations however apart from coarse restrictions such as zoning location regulation does not seem common in practice thus we model firms as deciding on the locations non cooperatively and anticipating correctly the subsequent price regulation for example when airlines were regulated they could choose the quality of their service such as departure times but price was controlled 2 the price taking equilibrium is also relevant even in the absence of regula tion when there are several suppliers at each location then the marginal cost curve associated with each point occupied by firms is simply interpreted as the supply curve the points occupied by suppliers can be thought of as market places or as shopping malls and the rents earned owing to increasing marginal costs can be extracted by the developer of the market place or mall the developer s location decision aims to maximize rents earned in choosing a location each developer takes into account how the ensuing price competition among suppliers both in the mall and across different malls affects the rents that can be extracted in this way locations are determined as a non cooperative equilibrium whereas prices are subsequently determined by walrasian competition we first assume that demand is completely inelastic and we prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium and that an allocation is optimal if and only if it can be supported by a price equilibrium the proofs do not require fixed point theorems and are a direct application of an intuitively appealing result of dubins and spanier 1961 we then extend our existence uniqueness and optimality results to allow for price sensitive demands different demand

spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous products product heterogeneity is introduced into the context of spatial price discrimination many of the strong properties of the standard homogeneous goods case which are attained as a limit case here are shown to be no longer valid in particular the social optimum is no longer sustainable as a market equilibrium unless products are either identical or else very different

consumer attitudes and voluntary rate schedules for public utilities attitudes enter as latent explanatory variables in a model of consumers choice among optional rate schedules offered by a public utility a consistent estimator of the choice model is described that utilizes the distribution of the latent attitude variables conditional on manifest indicator variables the model is applied to households choice between time of use and non time differentiated rates for electricity to determine the impact of attitudes about energy conservation copyright 1987 by mit press

unravelling projected energy savings in 2020 of eu member states using decomposition analyses abstract the objective of this paper is to provide deeper insights into the energy savings efforts of eu member states by exploring the impact of new policies the recent economic recession and other effects using decomposition analyses the results of the study show that the difference between the two official eu baseline projections primes 2007 pre recession pre climate and energy package and primes 2013 post recession including the new policies of the package can be explained by the combined impact of the new policies the economic recession and other effects such as differences in energy prices however the impact of the other effects remains largely unexplained in the official primes 2013 report and is clouding the right interpretation of the policy effect by providing these insights this study could help policy makers in better understanding scenario outcomes and the impact of their policies if eu member states would be able to achieve their 2020 energy savings targets then an important step has been taken to bridge the energy savings gap since the economic recession plays a major role in bridging this gap and economic recovery is aimed for further intensification of energy efficiency policies is crucial to contribute to the ghg reduction target for 2030 and beyond

preferences with and without prices does the price attribute affect behavior in stated preference surveys the experimental as well as the non market valuation literature include several examples of how an introduced price can affect behavior in otherwise not expected ways it has become standard to include a price vector as an attribute in choice experiments something that enables us to estimate a marginal willingness to pay for other attributes we test the impact on preferences by an inclusion of a price in a choice experiment preferences are affected as might be expected however also the relative ranking of individual attributes is affected

lmdi decomposition approach a guide for implementation since it was first used by researchers to analyze industrial electricity consumption in the early 1980s index decomposition analysis ida has been widely adopted in energy and emission studies lately its use as the analytical component of accounting frameworks for tracking economy wide energy efficiency trends has attracted considerable attention and interest among policy makers the last comprehensive literature review of ida was reported in 2000 which is some years back after giving an update and presenting the key trends in the last 15 years this study focuses on the implementation issues of the logarithmic mean divisia index lmdi decomposition methods in view of their dominance in ida in recent years eight lmdi models are presented and their origin decomposition formulae and strengths and weaknesses are summarized guidelines on the choice among these models are provided to assist users in implementation

imbalance in europe s effort sharing decision scope for strengthening incentives for energy savings in the non ets sectors abstract europe s 2020 greenhouse gas ghg reduction target consists of two sub targets one for the emissions trading scheme ets sectors and one for the non ets sectors the non ets target covers co 2 emissions in buildings transport and non ets industry and non co 2 ghg emissions the non ets target is known as europe s effort sharing decision this article discusses the gdp per capita method the european commission has applied in setting member state specific targets for the non ets the effort sharing and shows that it results in an imbalanced reduction effort among the member states it turns out that the principal mechanism of the gdp per capita method low gdp countries get room to catch up with high gdp countries by allowing them to increase emissions is obscured by the non co 2 ghgs the baseline projections of which are highly policy induced and not correlated with the growth of gdp per capita we propose an alternative method that 1 corrects for the policy induced decrease of non co 2 ghg emissions and 2 is based on energy savings potentials this approach could be used in future target setting for non ets sectors including in the case that the overarching eu wide target would be strengthened and would provide a direct support to europe s energy savings ambitions and policies

salt or sludge exploring preferences for potable water sources decision makers often use information about public preferences to guide public policy several disciplines gather information on preferences through surveys by asking respondents to make hypothetical choices over potential policies however the context of the choice question differs between approaches with some failing to make the full consequences of the respondent s choice explicit in the question in this study we investigate whether question context matters by exploring whether economic and psychology approaches yield a similar understanding of community preferences towards a large scale recycled wastewater scheme we find that stated preferences differ depending on whether the preference question is contextualised using economic incentives the findings provide insight into the implications of inappropriately contextualised preference questions methodological considerations in attitude identification and estimation and the diversity of values and public attitudes towards recycled wastewater

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

efficient spatial competition abstract game theoretic models of spatial competition usually assume that firms set prices after their choices of locations rather than make this assumption this paper uses the core to model the competition between the firms two conditions are shown to be sufficient for efficient spatial competition the first is that the firms location choices satisfy a no externalities condition the second is that the second stage game satisfy a separable value condition namely that the value gains from trade can be created on a buyer by buyer basis this approach yields two further benefits first efficient location can be stable in situations with arbitrary distributions of buyers arbitrary willingness to pay functions and completely general location spaces second efficiency in location games can be shown to be related to the second welfare theorem

product differentiation decisions under ambiguous consumer demand and pessimistic expectations abstract this paper studies product differentiation decisions in a spatial duopoly with limited information on consumer demand in particular a situation is discussed in which the firms do not know the exact distribution of the random location of consumer demand and its responsiveness to price changes measured by the scale of transport costs but resolve the resulting ambiguity using the maxmin or minimax regret criteria when the firms are sufficiently pessimistic is high enough results are in contrast with the existing literature in particular an increase of demand location uncertainty decreases the equilibrium product differentiation intensifying the second stage competition in prices although the effect is dampened by uncertainty about transport costs endogenizing the choice of objective function leads to the dominance of an extreme form of pessimism which turns out to be socially optimal

bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly this paper studies the stability of price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly the firms demand is derived from a distribution of consumer preferences this description of the consumer sector is applicable to a large class of differentiated commodity markets including spatial competition models the author shows that there is a pure price setting equilibrium when consumer tastes are sufficiently dispersed further conditions on the dispersedness of preferences guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in addition the author examines the relation between consumer preferences and the competitiveness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcome copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association