optimal shared savings contracts in supply chains linear contracts and double moral hazard in many supply chains consumption of indirect materials sold by a supplier to a customer for use in her production process can be reduced by efforts exerted by either party since traditional supply contracts provide no incentive for the supplier to exert such effort shared savings contracts have been proposed as a way to improve incentives in the channel leading to more efficient effort choices by the two parties such shared savings contracts typically combine a fixed service fee with a variable component based on consumption volume we formalize this situation using the double moral hazard framework in which both parties decide how much effort to exert by trading off the cost of their effort against the benefits that they will obtain from reduced consumption we also extend the double moral hazard framework to analyze a broader class of cost of effort functions than considered so far including the linear cost of effort functions commonly found in practice we show that the supplier can still always induce the optimal second best equilibrium with a linear shared savings contract under this broader class of functions however the behavior of the optimal contract as a function of the problem parameters becomes more complex we illustrate how small changes in the problem parameters can turn profits from being a well behaved to a poorly behaved function of the contract and provide some theoretical characterization of this phenomenon the practical significance of this is that simple linear contracts are sufficient in many double moral hazard contexts even for the broader class of functions we consider but care must be taken in selecting the optimal contract parameters

behavioural development economics lessons from field labs in the developing world abstract explanations of poverty growth and development depend on the assumptions made about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in strategic behaviour economic experiments especially those conducted in the field have begun to paint a picture of economic agents in developing communities that is at variance with the traditional portrait we review this growing literature with an eye towards preference related experiments conducted in the field we also offer lessons on what development economists might learn from experiments we conclude by sharing our thoughts on how to conduct experiments in the field and then offer a few ideas for future research

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

alfred marshall lecture social capital as good culture to explain the extremely long term persistence more than 500 years of positive historical experiences of cooperation putnam 1993 we model the intergenerational transmission of priors about the trustworthiness of others we show that this transmission tends to be biased toward excessively conservative priors as a result societies can be trapped in a low trust equilibrium in this context a temporary shock to the return to trusting can have a permanent effect on the level of trust we validate the model by testing its predictions on the world values survey data and the german socio economic panel we also present some anecdotal evidence that these priors are reflected in novels that originate in different parts of the country jel 04 016 043 p16

trust market participation and economic outcomes evidence from rural china markets can only function properly in the presence of sufficient trust we explore the relation between trusting behavior and market integration in rural china we link the results of a trust experiment to actual behavior in the field participation in the labor market versus informally exchanging labor and find that high trust households are more likely to use formal markets we proceed by exploring the relation between labor market participation and economic outcomes finding tentative evidence of a causal relation running from market participation to higher levels of income

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

a comparison of milestone based and buyout options contracts for coordinating r d partnerships we analyze optimal contractual arrangements in a bilateral research and development r d partnership between a risk averse provider that conducts early stage research followed by a regulatory verification stage and a risk neutral client that performs late stage development activities including production distribution and marketing the problem is formulated as a sequential investment game with the client as the principal where the investments are observable but not verifiable the model captures the inherent incentive alignment problems of double sided moral hazard risk aversion and holdup we compare the efficacy of milestone based options contracts and buyout options contracts from the client s perspective and identify conditions under which they attain the first best outcome for the client we find that milestone based options contracts always attain the first best outcome for the client when the provider has some bargaining power in renegotiation and identify their applicability to different r

tropic trust versus nordic trust experimental evidence from tanzania and sweden undergraduates in tanzania and sweden participated in one trust game one dictator game and answered a standard set of survey questions relating to trust in both countries we detected a strong and significant relation between dictator donations and proportions returned in trust games indicating that unconditional distribution preferences matter in trust game behaviour in sweden incentive compatible evaluations of unrevealed dictator donations significantly predicted the amount sent in trust games the predictive power of survey trust questions differed between countries a plausible relation between survey trust and trust behaviour was found in sweden but not in tanzania

the foundations of trust macro and micro this comment on beugelsdijk s 2006 critique of trust and its measurement argues that it misses the mark and that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical foundation for thinking that the macro and micro foundations of trust or its measurement are different from each other generalised trust is more than a simple illusion hiding behind institutional structures

sect subsidy and sacrifice an economist s view of ultra orthodox jews israeli ultra orthodox men study full time in yeshiva until age 40 on average why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance yet attendance typically continues long after exemption fertility rates are high tfr 7 6 and rising a social interaction approach explains these anomalies yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community which provides mutual insurance to members prohibitions strengthen communities by effectively taxing real wages inducing high fertility historically the incursion of markets into traditional communities produces ultra orthodoxy subsidies induce dramatic reductions in labor supply and unparalleled increases in fertility illustrating extreme responses social groups may have to interventions

inherited trust and growth this paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation we show that inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants is sig nificantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears we thus use the inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants as a time varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin this strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects jel n11 n12 n31 n32 o47 z13

trust across borders we make the case for fresh approaches to examine the role of trust in international collaborations based on the idea that not only do the levels of trust differ across international borders but also both the nature of trust and the institutional and cultural support for trust can vary across different national contexts collaboration partners from different countries are therefore likely to bring either symmetric or asymmetric conceptions of trust to the business relationship we develop a model and propositions linking symmetry and asymmetry in the institutional and cultural support for trust in international collaborations with the degree of partner interdependence and identify implications for governance and trust building investments we conclude with some suggestions for research that incorporates trust asymmetries between partners

specific investments contracts and opportunism the evolution of railroad sidetrack agreements he maximization ofjoint long term profits in a purchaser supplier relationship often requires investment in assets that are in some way dedicated to the specific relationship and that once in place would have significantly reduced value in alternative uses such a disparity in value between first best and second best applications may create the potential for postinvestment opportunistic behavior jockeying over the available quasi rents and the potential for such behavior may act as a deterrent to the initial investment

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

people s opium religion and economic attitudes since max weber there has been an active debate on the impact of religion on people s economic attitudes much of the existing evidence however is based on cross country studies in which this impact is confounded by differences in other institutional factors we use the worldvalues surveys to id entify the relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes controlling for country fixed effects we study several economic attitudes towardcooperation the government working women legal rules thriftiness andthe market economy we also distinguish across religious denominations differentiating on whether a religion is dominant in a country we find that on average religious beliefs are associated with good economic attitudes where good is defined as conducive to higher per capita income andgrowth yet religious people tendto be more racist andless favorable with respect to working women these effects differ across religious denominations overall we find that christian religions are more positively associatedwith attitudes conducive to economic growth r 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification a1 e0 n4 z1

on the existence of share contracts under limited liability abstract in a principal agent relationship under limited liability the agent in general receives the full share of revenue we show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability

paths to development is there a bangladesh surprise using aggregate indices of education health demographic and gender equality outcomes we empirically investigate the hypothesis that bangladesh achieved a higher level of social development compared with countries of similar level of per capita income stylized facts and cross country regression results support this hypothesis for a broad range of dimensions further tests show that such achievements do not simply reflect income mediated channels and social expenditure programs we conclude by speculating on the role of bangladesh s development to sustain the process of growth and on the role of governance and institutional quality for the nexus between growth and development

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

moral hazard asset specificity implicit bonding and compensation the case of franchising i introduction there is a large and growing interest in the structuring of compensation to deal with the moral hazard problem much of this literature treats various forms of income sharing such as piece rates and sharecropping as a means for a principal to provide incentives to an agent this literature has been extended to the case of two sided moral hazard where both parties to an exchange may shirk another mechanism to induce effort discussed in the literature is bonding where workers post a bond that is forgone if effort is inadequate klein 1980 and klein and leffler 1981 treat the possibility of specific assets as constituting an implicit bond where poor performance by a firm is penalized by bankruptcy and sale of assets at a loss this paper studies a situation where these issues coalesce the case of compensation arrangements in franchising the typical franchise contract calls for the sharing of franchise income between franchisee and franchisor additionally franchisees may be terminated for poor performance if franchise assets have a degree of specificity the ensuing sale of assets at a loss provides a penalty for poor performance we examine the determinants of franchise royalty rates and fees in this setting while there is a literature on two sided moral hazard and some empirical work on franchising based on this idea none incorporates the potential influence of asset specificity we explicitly consider the role of implicit bonding and asset specificity in conjunction with moral hazard on the part of both trading parties we go beyond previous work in franchising by estimating the effects of asset specificity and other influences on the royalty rate further part of our empirical work utilizes improved micro data on actual franchise contracts our approach and its implications are discussed in section ii consistent with previous work we expect the royalty rate to decrease increase as the importance of the franchisee s franchisor s input increases however more specific capital with the threat of termination acts as an implicit bond and substitutes for a reduced royalty rate in inducing franchisee effort thus we expect royalty rates to increase with asset specificity also unlike other approaches we do not necessarily expect an inverse relationship between the royalty rate and the franchise fee for example the greater the importance of franchisor effort the higher the royalty rate but the franchise fee may also increase if franchise revenue rises by enough our hypotheses are tested using two different data sets an original firm level data set is taken from federal trade commission ftc required uniform franchise offering circulars ufoc 1 in addition data are obtained from bond s 1989 the source book of franchise opportunities the data are discussed and the results presented in section iii we find substantial support for our approach for example factors that increase the importance of the franchisee s effort such as the number of employees supervised lower the royalty rate and increase the franchise fee also a reduction in the specificity of the franchisee s investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee 2 section iv summarizes our findings and concludes the paper ii the approach and the hypotheses the typical franchising contract consists of a two part payment by the franchisee to the franchisor the franchisee pays an up front nonrefundable franchisee fee and a continuing royalty payment usually a percentage of sales in return the franchisee receives the right to use the franchisor s brand name capital and a method of operation in addition the franchisor provides on going support to the franchisee however the franchisor maintains the right to unilaterally terminate the contract if the franchisor determines that the franchisee is not delivering a product consistent with the quality guaranteed by the brand name

franchising and risk management franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states fairness in franchising laws the advisability of such regulation depends on the long run incentives to franchise if franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration regulation may be called for alternatively if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution regulation is at least contestable this paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise copyright 1988 by american economic association

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

cooperation in games with forgetfulness companies and managers are apt to forget information yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall this paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior we find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions on one hand forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators making cooperation more difficult on the other hand under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments even below stage minimax punishments credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall we apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

regulation and distrust in a cross section of countries government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital we document this correlation and present a model explaining it in the model distrust creates public demand for regulation while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation leading to multiple equilibria a key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt we test this and other implications of the model using country and individual level data on social capital and beliefs about government s role as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism

incentive contracts in two sided moral hazards with multiple agents abstract the paper studies a contracting problem in which a principal enters in two sided moral hazards withnindependent agents there are no technological or informational linkages among thenagency problems despite this independence optimal incentive schemes essentially eliminate the principal s incentive problem when team size is large enough reputation like effects appear in a static setting through an improved aggregation of information about the actions of the principal one implication of this result is that it is generally suboptimal to require an agent s compensation to depend only on his own outcome another implication is the existence of purely informational economies of scale to increasing team size thus the concentration of otherwise unrelated transactions in a single firm creates wealth through a more efficient use of information about the principal s actions the paper also shows that extremely simple statistical contracts are approximately optimal in large teams the outcome of such contracts is observationally indistinguishable from standard principal agent contracts this provides a theoretical justification for using standard principal agent contracts in environments that involve two sided hazard in a fundamental way journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 d23

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

choosing peers homophily and polarization in groups this paper studies the formation of peer groups entailing the joint production of public goods in our model agents choose their peers and have to pay a connection cost for each member added to the group after groups are formed each agent selects a public project to make a costly contribution to and all members of the group experience the benefits of these contributions since agents differ in how much they value one project relative to the other the group s preferences affect the generated profile of public goods we characterize mutually optimal groups groups that are optimal for all their members when contribution costs are low relative to connection costs mutually optimal groups must be sufficiently homogeneous as contribution costs increase relative to connection costs agents desire more connections which in turn raises the risk of free riding extreme peers are then more appealing since they are more willing to contribute and polarization arises

incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal agent model several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the current financial crisis using a principal agent model this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent s and principal s behavior specifically we show how bonus taxes affect the agent s incentives to exert effort and the principal s decision regarding the composition of the compensation package fixed salary and bonus rate we find that surprisingly a bonus tax can increase the bonus rate and decrease the fixed salary if the agent is highly risk averse additionally a bonus tax can induce the principal to pay higher bonuses even though the agent s effort unambiguously decreases nevertheless a bonus tax reduces the overall salary of the agent further results are derived with respect to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a general effort cost function

how strong are weak patents economists usually conceive of patents as property rights that prevent others from practicing the patenting technology unless they first obtain a license from the patent holder even for ironclad patents i e for patents that are certain to be valid the existing literature has shown that the analysis of equilibrium licensing contracts is surprising subtle and complex 1 for example the analysis is quite different depending upon whether one firm s licensing contract is observable to the other firms likewise equilibrium outcomes are quite different if royalties must be linear than in the case where two part tariffs and other non linear royalties are permitted in that literature a downstream firm that refuses to sign a contract with the upstream supplier either exits the industry in the case that the upstream supplier controls an essential input or must rely on more costly inputs in the case of a non essential input in other words the downstream firm s threat point is to use some backstop technology in practice however patents are issued after a brief examination by the patent office to see if they meet the statutory requirements for novelty and non obviousness mounting evidence indicates that many weak patents i e patents unlikely to be found valid if challenged in court are issued by the u s patent and trademark office uspto 2 some observers view this with great alarm arguing that uspto is handing out undeserved monopolies others by contrast have suggested that these weak patents are of little concern because they will have little commercial impact because they will be licensed at commensurately low royalty rates or not enforced at all we study the commercial impact of weak patents more precisely we define a patent s strength as the probability that it will be found valid if challenged in court and we examine the relationship between a patent s strength and the royalties that it can command the distinctive

percentage rent contracts between co stores abstract high rental rates and space scarcity in popular retail areas are encouraging retailers to share available space creating co stores co stores with complementary products enjoy a boost in foot traffic thus higher sales when the space is owned by one a common practice for retailers is to engage in a revenue sharing agreement we study the optimal design of a percentage rent contract between two co stores each having his her own random sales dependent on effort levels of both retailers since the effort level exerted by a retailer is often unverifiable it results in a double moral hazard problem we show that a linear percentage rent which is composed of a sales share and a based rent achieves the second best effort levels the landlord may also find it optimal to set a fixed rent by setting the sales share to zero with cobb douglas sales and power disutility of effort functions we obtain closed form expressions for the optimal contract we show that the landlord charges a high sales share for a tenant with low demand externality and a high sales scale the landlord is better off renting out space to a small but high revenue generating retailer rather than one generating larger traffic but with lower sales scale when the landlord s externality potential is low but he is successful in generating sales optimal sales share is low but the base rent is high the percentage rent can increase the landlord profit by up to 13 compared to the conventional fixed rent

a note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth this paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differences in economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust i discuss the world values survey wvs measure that is used to operationalise trust at the macro level i hypothesise that there is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and the empirical operationalisation of trust instead of measuring trust the wvs measure may instead proxy the well functioning of institutions i provide circumstantial evidence for this thesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutions and a robustness test of zak and knack s 2001 trust and growth economic journal vol 111 295 321 seminal study on trust and economic growth

a dynamic model of supplier switching abstract while a broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer supplier relationships limited research exists under which circumstances a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier recently wagner and friedl 2007 have developed a framework to analyze a static one shot supplier switching decision when the buyer has asymmetric information about the supplier s production costs we extend their basic framework to a dynamic one assuming that the supplier learns the production costs over time when he sets up the production process since the supplier s cost information at the individual stages crucially determines the setup and the switching decision it becomes essential for supply chain management to provide proper incentives so that the supplier reveals his cost information truthfully over time we characterize the optimal setup and switching strategy as well as the optimal supply chain contract we also compare our findings with those of the static setting to provide further insights

implications of an economic theory of conflict hindu muslim violence in india we model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups we show that if group incomes are low increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it we then apply the model to data on hindu muslim violence in india our main result is that an increase in per capita muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict an increase in hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect these findings speak to the origins of hindu muslim violence in post independence india

cooperative advertising models in supply chain management a review this paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising a topic which has gained substantial interest in recent years thereby we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature after that we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising which is the most common object of investigation it is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer s advertising expenditures in total we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising these articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting e g the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program after that we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models the last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel

all units discounts and double moral hazard abstract an all units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer s total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price cliff at the threshold that triggers the discount this paper shows that all units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard i present conditions under which all units discounts dominate two part tariffs and other continuous tariffs i also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry in the case considered all units discounts deter entry by less efficient rivals without distorting price and investment whereas continuous tariffs either accommodate such entry or deter it by distorting price and investment

is trust the missing root of institutions education and development we report evidence that trust is the missing root relating education institutions and economic development we observe that more trust both increases education and improves legal and bureaucratic institutions which in turn spurs economic development we substantiate this intuition with a series of regressions that provide evidence that trust determines both education and the quality of institutions and that education and institutions in turn affect gdp per capita

the not so dark side of trust does trust increase the size of the shadow economy this paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust in a sample of countries both developed and developing that relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic policy and institutional variables to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period and to controlling for endogeneity it is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system

efficient moral hazard abstract this paper presents an infinite horizon discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals an agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals since each principal s return is not maximized by the agent s optimal allocation moral hazard occurs in equilibrium however since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects the agent s allocation of effort is efficient if the agent chooses a single principal then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient these results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal agent p a and common agency c a models

trust membership in groups and household welfare evidence from kwazulu natal south africa unfortunately these two literatures have remained largely unconnected the group and network literature concludes that participation has important economic benefits even when the stated function of the group is noneconomic in most cases however the mechanisms by which groups and networks achieve this are unclear the determinants of trust and participation in groups literature highlights the importance of income and social homogeneity what remains less understood is whether and how trust can be generated for example via participation in groups this article links the empirical literatures referenced above by exploring the relationship between membership in groups and trust specifically using longitudinal data from kwazulu natal province south africa we examine 1 the importance of trust in the decision to join groups 2 the subsequent ability of groups to generate trust and 3 the effect of group membership and trust on a measure of well being per capita household income in addition we disaggregate groups into financial and nonfinancial and we categorize trust in people by agent or actor therefore we can explore whether trust in different kinds of actors is important for participation in different kinds of groups and whether participation in different kinds of groups is important for generating trust in different kinds of actors excerpt

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

individual s religiosity enhances trust latin american evidence for the puzzle this paper explores the effect of religious observance and affiliation to the dominant religion catholicism on trust in institutions towards others and market attitudes the analysis is performed using a latin american database of twenty thousand respondents from 2004 by means of ordered probit models the most interesting results are i trust toward others is positively correlated with religious observance and with catholic affiliation ii there is a positive correlation between

trust and development in this paper we examine linkages between social trust and economic development using for the first time a panel of data we confirm earlier cross sectional studies finding that trust is a significant factor in development and also show for the first time that trust significantly interacts with both investment in physical and human capital we provide a robustness analysis of our results via a set of jackknife experiments on our main equations and the trust coefficients and interactions are very tightly distributed indicating that the results are not highly sample dependent we also consider whether trust directly influences investment and find that in a panel framework it does not unless we allow for a trust education interaction in the investment equation