multiple applications competing mechanisms and market power abstract we consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm s candidate when the contract space includes application fees there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient and it has a posted wage equal to match output in the inefficient equilibria the wage is below match output and the value of a worker s application depends on whether he or she receives another offer this allows individual firms to free ride on one another and gives firms market power when we endogenize the number of applications and allow for general mechanisms only the efficient equilibrium survives by allowing for general mechanisms we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature

decentralized college admissions we study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below when students attributes are multidimensional colleges avoid head on competition by placing excessive weight on school specific attributes such as essays restricting the number of applications or wait listing alleviates enrollment uncertainty but the outcomes are inefficient and unfair a centralized matching via gale and shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm attains efficiency and fairness but may make some colleges worse off than under decentralized matching

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

hospital ownership and performance this study compares the performance of three ownership forms of hospitals for profit private nonprofit and public further classified according to whether or not the hospital is run by a hospital chain data come from a 1979 national survey of u s hospitals the authors find that hospital cost is quite similar among alternative ownership forms as is profitability the results do not provide much empirical support for standard property rights theory several reasons are suggested why this may be so

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing evidence from the german states 1975 2005 abstract cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergovernmental transfer schemes this paper explores whether such features of cooperative federations lead to subnational soft budget constraints using panel data from the german states covering the 1975 2005 period the methodology is based on the premise that subnational governments borrowing will exhibit vertical and horizontal strategic interactions if they operate under soft budget constraints therefore a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to infer whether a cooperative federation like germany is susceptible to soft budget constraints the results suggest that state borrowing in germany exhibited horizontal but not vertical interactions during the time frame of the analysis this indicates i that german states faced soft budget constraints and ii that they were more concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume

labour im mobility and monopsonistic exploitation of workers in the urban informal sector lessons from a field study it is well recognised in labour economics that employers in monopsonistic competition have market power to set wages below the productivity of workers if workers are immobile which causes monopsonistic exploitation of workers monopsonistic exploitation is propelled by employers expectations about the degree of im mobility of workers and therefore by ex post mobility of workers it hence begs a question of what determines the relative im mobility of informal workers which has significant implications for monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty in the urban informal sector from our field study of urban and peri urban labour markets in bangladesh by modifying the method of stochastic frontier analysis we explain the behavioural foundation to the relative im mobility of informal workers we thereby unravel the effects of individual and household characteristics sociological institutional factors and household ties including worker s kinship on the relative immobility of a worker that can in turn explain monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty widely prevalent in the urban informal sector of south asia

thick market effects housing heterogeneity and the determinants of transaction seasonality this article uses cross sectional variation in transaction seasonality and a search theoretic framework to develop a test for thick market effects from matching efficiency the test relates the extent of transaction seasonality to the degree of horizontal housing heterogeneity we find a strong positive association between measures of seasonality and housing heterogeneity using a transaction level dataset for norway which is consistent with the presence of thick market effects these results also show that the degree of horizontal heterogeneity of the housing stock is an important determinant of the extent of seasonality in a housing market

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

hospital profits the effects of reimbursement policies this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of cost based reimbursement cbr on hospital costs and charges it takes issue with previous analyses which have treated cbr as paying economic costs plus a mark up and have concluded that the mark up is too small to significantly distort hospital decision making the basic thesis here is that if reimbursement is based on costs accounting costs become a price to cost paying patients and will be optimized to maximize revenue a hospital serving both cost and charge paying private patients can set two price schedules accounting profits ratio of charges to costs are not a measure of economic profit but of relative prices to these two groups of patients in the absence of constraints from regulation or patient co payment the optimum level of accounting costs would be infinite in practice the medicare reimbursement formula links allowable costs to charges received from charge paying patients this formula creates incentives for the hospital to raise charges above the single price profit maximizing monopoly level this inflationary effect of the medicare formula does not presuppose that medicare pays less than full cost the empirical analysis of hospital laboratory costs and charges generally supports the predictions for other departments the conclusions are consistent but more tentative because of data limitations overall evidence suggests minimal cross subsidy between cost and charge paying patients comparisons of cost and charge levels in for profit voluntary non profit and government hospitals are presented but it is emphasized that inferences about relative efficiency and profitability cannot be drawn from accounting data given the incentives created by cbr

state regulation and hospital costs the effects of various regulations on hospital costs are estimated using a two decade long panel data set which spans the initiation and in some instances the repeal of various forms of hospital regulation the long panel fosters two improvements over previous research first as state hospital cost levels may affect states incentive to regulate fixed effect estimators alleviate omitted variable bias derived from the states regulatory discretion second the long panel permits the estimation of many different regulatory program effects but also facilitates the analysis of potential regulatory program interaction the empirical results suggest that previous studies have exaggerated regulatory cost savings although some interaction effects are indicated hospital costs appear unresponsive to most regulatory programs copyright 1995 by mit press

search theory the 2010 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences this paper surveys search theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the 2010 laureates for the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences peter diamond dale mortensen and christopher pissarides

exit and inefficiency the effects of ownership type this study uses data on hospital closures to examine the relation between exit and inefficiency in an industry where for profit not for profit and government firms coexist the likelihood of hospital exit over the period 1986 91 is estimated as a function of hospital relative inefficiency ownership type and other factors where hospital relative inefficiency is measured using residuals from estimation of a stochastic frontier cost function we find that less efficient hospitals were more likely to exit when ownership was for profit or not for profit but that relative inefficiency did not have a significant effect on the probability of exit for government hospitals

what do not for profit hospitals maximize abstract massive structural change is occurring in health care provision in the united states significantly reducing the number of not for profit suppliers this trend is fueled in part by government policies to evaluate these policies one must know about the motives of not for profit health care providers the theory of not for profit hospitals suggests buyers may prefer dealing with sellers who are not acting out of avarice yet this theory does not imply the absence of rent seeking motives we formulate a test of not for profit hospitals goals and apply it to hospitals in virginia modeling average revenues as a function of caseload private medicare medicaid charity we identify prices as latent variables by analyzing the response of the estimated private price to exogenous differences in medicare medicaid and charity caseload we reject the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals maximize profits i e maximize rents for a set of agents who control the hospital we also reject pure welfare output maximization these results combined with other evidence we discuss are consistent with the hypothesis that these hospitals consider both profits and output as objectives current us government policies treat all not for profit hospitals as if they were profit maximizers these policies appear to be biased towards reenforcing the trend towards less health care provision from not for profits and our results suggest that this may not be entirely beneficial to consumers

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

directed search and the bertrand paradox i study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition extended to incorporate general capacity constraints congestion effects and pricing based on ex post demand in the presence of any one of these ingredients the bertrand paradox fails to hold hence despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails specifically bertrand s paradox will not arise whenever the buyers expected utility from visiting a seller is decreasing in that seller s realized demand

sorting and decentralized price competition we investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to sorting of heterogeneous agents there are two aspects of value creation the match value when two agents actually trade and the probability of trading governed by the search technology we show that positive assortative matching obtains when complementarities in the former outweigh complementarities in the latter this happens if and only if the match value function is root supermodular that is its nth root is supermodular where n reflects the elasticity of substitution of the search technology this condition is weaker than the condition required for positive assortative matching in markets with random search

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

price dispersion with directed search we model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity constrained sellers sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price we study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares we also determine endogenously

directed search with multiple job applications we develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs the main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous wage dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of application choice risk neutral workers apply for both safe and risky jobs the former yield a high probability of a job oer but for low pay and act as a fallback option the latter provide with higher potential payo but are harder to get furthermore the density of posted wages is decreasing consistent with stylized facts unlike most directed search models the equilibria are not constrained ecient

the spillover effects of state spending abstract this paper estimates the extent to which state spending is influenced by the spending of neighboring states examining several different metrics of neighborliness in order to better identify the channels for interstate spillovers it improves on previous studies by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to state medical spending to abstract from correlated local conditions and by allowing for spatial autocorrelation focusing on mandated increases in medical spending the analysis shows that each dollar of state spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by almost 90 cents the most predictive measure of neighborliness is the degree of population mobility between states suggesting that rational concerns about adverse migration may drive the interdependence of state spending policy

determinants of interest rates on tax exempt hospital bonds abstract the aim of this paper is to examine the determinants of interest rates on tax exempt hospital bonds the results highlight the potential and actual roles of federal and state policy in the determination of these rates the shift to a prospective payment system under medicare has subsidized the borrowing costs of some hospitals at the expense of others the selection of underwriters by negotiation rather than by competitive bidding results in higher interest rates the federal tax of 1986 raised the cost of hospital debt by encouraging bond issues to contain call features

nonprofit hospital mergers and the exercise of market power government challenges to mergers within the hospital industry have become more frequent many of those mergers involve nonprofit organizations rather than the for profit firms that are the norm in most other industries this difference in ownership has made no apparent difference in the antitrust agencies approach to proposed hospital mergers in this article i test the proposition that nonprofit and for profit hospitals price differently in response to the structure of the markets in which they compete based on a cross sectional analysis of california hospitals i find that estimated merger effects on hospital prices do vary by type of ownership in response to either higher market share or to the joint combination of higher share and higher market concentration private nonprofit hospital prices are statistically significantly lower than for profit hospital prices and on balance in this sample there is no evidence of any systematic price increasing effect on private nonprofit hospitals

job queues and wages this paper uses job applications data to investigate the relationship between job queues and wage differentials the main finding is that openings for jobs that pay the minimum wage attract more job applicants than jobs that pay either slightly more or slightly less than the minimum wage this spike in the job application rate distribution suggests that ex ante rents generated for employees by an above market level minimum wage are not completely dissipated by reductions in nonwage benefits in addition we find that highly unionized firms large firms and firms in high wage industries tend to receive relatively many job applicants for openings

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

the 2005 lawrence r klein lecture emergent class structure this article presents a model of the emergent class structure in which a society inhabited by inherently identical households may be endogenously split into the rich bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat for some parameter values the model has no steady state where all households remain equally wealthy in this case the model predicts emergent class structure or the rise of class societies even if every household starts with the same amount of wealth the society will experience symmetry breaking and will be polarized into two classes in steady state where the rich maintain a high level of wealth partly due to the presence of the poor who have no choice but to work for the rich at a wage rate strictly lower than the fair value of labor the nonexistence of the equal steady state means that a one shot redistribution of wealth would not be effective as wealth inequality and the class structure would always reemerge thus the class structure is an inevitable feature of capitalism for other parameter values on the other hand the model has the unique steady state which is characterized by perfect equality in this case the model predicts dissipating class structure or the fall of class societies even if the society starts with significant wealth inequality labor demand by the rich employers pushes up the wage rate so much that workers will escape from the poverty and eventually catch up with the rich eliminating wealth inequality and the class structure in the long run in an extension we introduce self employment which not only provides the poor with an alternative to working for the rich but also provides the rich with an alternative to investment that creates jobs due to this dual nature of self employment the effects of self employment turn out to be quite subtle yet within the present framework it is possible to offer a complete characterization of the steady states even in the presence of self employment

the demise of hospital philanthropy the demise of hospital philanthropy i introduction until the beginning of this century most hospitals primarily served the poor and derived a major portion of their revenue from private philanthropy the more affluent avoided hospital care and were treated in doctors offices and at home starr 1982 rosenberg 1987 this situation changed largely because of technological improvements such as anesthesia and asepsis and the nonpoor began to demand care in hospitals private insurance plans offering the nonpoor nearly complete coverage for hospital care began in the 1930s and spread rapidly after world war ii major health legislation medicare and medicaid was enacted in 1965 extending hospital insurance to the elderly and the poor by the late 1960s hospitals derived nine tenths of their revenue from insurance real donations for medical facility construction rose from 76 million in 1935 to a peak of 2 1 billion in 1965 and fell to 603 million by 1981 1984 dollars 1 in 1984 only 5 percent of the total spent on such construction was funded by philanthropy levit et al 1985 the conventional wisdom has it that private and public hospital insurance has crowded out philanthropic support of hospitals the public insurance argument is consistent with that of abrams and schmitz 1978 and roberts 1984 who maintain that public welfare expenditures reduce or eliminate private giving to the poor this argument appears to extend to private insurance as well this article describes the decline in donations to hospitals from conceptual as well as empirical perspectives we first describe a simple one period model of hospital and donor behavior hospitals choose utility maximizing levels of output while altruistic donors decide how much to contribute to hospitals and how much to spend on other goods the model is used to analyze how insurance various government subsidies and other factors affect hospital and donor behavior the major insight from this model is that although rising insurance coverage tends to increase hospital output in the same way as a lump sum government subsidy the two have different effects on donations to the hospital growing insurance coverage may increase or decrease donations while lump sum subsidies to the hospital will unambiguously crowd out private donations the empirical work following the model incorporates empirical counterparts of the exogenous and donation variables examined in the theoretical section data come from 1 a time series spanning 1935 81 and 2 a single cross section of nonprofit hospitals in 1978 the results indicate that increased insurance coverage for hospital care especially the enactment of medicare and medicaid in the mid 1960s reduced giving to hospitals the contribution of public subsidies for construction varied depending on whether the subsidy more closely resembled a matching or a lump sum subsidy ii model the model consists of a single not for profit hospital and a single representative donor 2 the hospital chooses output n to maximize its utility from output 3 while the donor chooses donations d to maximize utility from total hospital output and other goods y the donor behaves altruistically in that he does not use hospitals himself the behavior of hospital patients is not explicitly modeled although their presence will be felt the output and donation decisions are interrelated since the donor likes hospital output and the level of donations affects the hospital s budge get constraint to untangle the endogenous feedback effects between output and donations the problem is described as a two stage sequential game in the first stage the donor decides how much to donate in the second stage the hospital chooses how much output to produce given the previously determined level of donation of course the donor is acutely aware that the hospital s subsequent output decision will affect his utility

too big or too small a synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers abstract there is a growing body of literature on the commitment problem of interregional transfers the problem occurs because of an ex post bailout by a central government leading to ex ante adverse incentive consequences for a local government however different models have yielded different economic consequences the local government may be too large overspending and or overborrowing or it may be too small raising less of its own revenue in the presence of interregional spillovers the equilibrium may yield a pareto efficient outcome the present paper aims to synthesize these models developing a simple decentralized leadership model a critical question concerns what decision is made ex ante by the local government namely public expenditure or tax collection with the remaining policy instrument being residual adjusted by ex post transfers we discuss how different scenarios affect the equilibrium outcome

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

the changing effects of competition on non profit and for profit hospital pricing behavior abstract has the nature of hospital competition changed from a medical arms race in which hospitals compete for patients by offering their doctors high quality services to a price war for the patients of payors this paper uses time series cross sectional methods on california hospital discharge data from 1986 1994 to show the association of hospital prices with measures of market concentration changed steadily over this period with prices now higher in less competitive areas even for non profit hospitals regression results are used to simulate the price impact of hypothetical hospital mergers

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search abstract this paper studies constrained efficiency in guerrieri et al s 2010 model of adverse selection and directed search buyers post contracts and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade if the guerrieri shimer wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not ex ante constrained efficient under certain conditions the planner achieves an allocation that even pareto dominates the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient under other conditions the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best cross subsidization is the key to these results

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

assessing competition in hospital care markets the importance of accounting for quality differentiation quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry where the choices of medicare patients are unaffected by prices unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market i estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial the estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness

pricing by non profit institutions the case of hospital cost shifting abstract this paper shows that a hospital whose objective function includes output as well as profits may raise price to private paying patients in response to cuts in the price it receives for madicaid or medicaid patients evidence is presented to show that hospitals in illinois cost shifted in this manner in response to substantial reductions in medicaid payments in the early 1980s as private sector pricing becomes more competitive however the ability and willingness of hospitals to cost shift will wane

directed search on the job and the wage ladder we model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers search using wage offers and employment probabilities applicants observe all offers and face a trade off between wage and employment probability there is wage dispersion among workers even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous equilibrium wages form a ladder as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time this is because low wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage with a lower chance of success

search intensity directed search and the wage distribution we propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous rms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogenous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking the key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers the search market is continuously segmented by wage level individuals can spread their search investment over the di erent sub markets and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns on each sub market we show that there exists a non degenerate equilibrium wage distribution the density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages under additional restrictions it is hump shaped and it can be right tailed our results are illustrated by an example originating a beta wage distribution

decentralisation as an incentive scheme recent changes have introduced more decentralization in a number of traditionally centralized countries 1 in the case of france it is sometimes claimed that the 1982 1983 reform of subcentral government is of historical importance although the principles of that reform are not contested any more by the new majority elected in 1986 opinions still differ on a number of policy issues some of the issues are presented in this introductory section but the main purpose of this paper is not to expose or discuss in detail the problems of decentralization in france as argued in the second part of the introductory section the theoretical framework in which the policy issues of decentralization are usually discussed by economists is somewhat unsatisfactory in particular when applied to unitary states such as britain or france the bulk of the paper is devoted to the exploration of a different approach to decentralization it is not purported however that this approach could completely replace the more traditional one consequently when in the concluding section we return briefly to the policy issues identified here this is to be read as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the relevance of the reasoning developed in the paper

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

efficiency of simultaneous search this paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity they observe firms wage postings before choosing where to apply owing to coordination frictions a firm may not receive any applications otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers it is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient walrasian outcome as application costs vanish even for nonnegligible application costs the entry of firms the search intensity and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

market power and efficiency in a search model we build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications of firms market power in a frictional labor market our environment has two main characteristics wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there is a finite number of agents we find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and that the firms market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms a minimum wage forces the low productivity firms to increase their wage leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit firms market power by improving the workers outside option

should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market to answer the question in the title this article characterizes the socially efficient organization of the market with search frictions the efficient organization depends on the relative elasticity in the supply between the two sides of the market the costs of participating in the market and organizing trade and the a symmetry in matching we also show that the social optimum can be implemented by a realistic market equilibrium where the organizers set up trading sites to direct the other side s search the results provide a unified explanation for why trade has often been organized by sellers in the goods market by buyers firms in the labor market and by both sides in the asset market the analysis also sheds light on how the efficient market organization can change with innovations such as e commerce and just in time production

behavioural differences among hospitals it is ownership or location by about 1988 the consensus among leading health economists was that no meaningful differences existed among hospitals of differences owernership form and this position was embraced by the antitrust division of the us department of justice but behavioural differences among hospitals of different among hospitals of different owernership has continued to be a matter of both academic and judicial interest recent empirical studies have concluded that real differences do exist while many earlier studies reached the opposite conclusion this contradiction in finding over time as competition intensified is exactly opposite to what expense preference theory would predict we examine this apparent paradox using a very general test of behavioural differences by hospital ownership we find that the omission of location specific variables can lead to biased estimates of ownership effects and that no significant behavioural differences exist among private california hospitals in 1986 90 when this source of o

ex ante price offers in matching games non steady states a matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market when demand and supply are nearly equal the equilibrium ex ante price offer lies below the price associated with the nash bargaining split this relationship reverses when the level of excess demand is large sellers always have an incentive to make ex ante offers when prices elsewhere are determined by nash bargaining this can be interpreted to mean that nash bargaining is an unstable pricing institution copyright 1991 by the econometric society

the validity of profits structure studies with particular reference to the ftc s line of business data the simple proposition that consumerdamaging collusion is more likely to occur when there are fewer competitors has given rise not only to legal restrictions of economic activity thought to restrict output but also to an enormous amount of empirical work attempting to relate market concentration to the exercise of monopoly power most such studies measured market structure by an index of concentration for example four firm concentration or herfindahl and performance by accounting profit for example net profit divided by assets or price cost margins sales less direct costs divided by sales from the positive statistically significant correlations often found between greater concentration and profit with other factors presumably accounted for some researchers conclude that increases in concentration are anticompetitive and that concentration therefore is bad the concentration profits studies have been criticized essentially on two grounds one is that the positive relationship is not indicative of collusive behavior in particular oliver williamson 1968 john mcgee 1971 harold demsetz 1973 1974 and sam peltzman 1977 point out that higher profits could result from efficiencies experienced by large firms which resulted both in greater market shares and high levels of concentration analytical arguments show that higher profits logically follow as much from lower costs that are associated with higher levels of concentration as from collusion determined higher prices some empirical evidence that supports this belief is presented by demsetz peltzman and bradley gale and ben branch 1982 however their findings have been contested on the grounds that the data used are biased or inadequate or that the researchers have not demonstrated that the observed higher profits greater concentration relationship was caused by lower costs 2 the second criticism is that available data provide an inadequate basis for such conclusions the concentration numbers are based usually on industries defined by the commerce department s standard industrial classifications sic the sic definitions tend to be supply production rather than demand determined include nonhomogeneous products and exclude sales of similar products that are included in different sic groups or are imported the profit data are taken from accounting reports that provide poor measures of economic values weiss 1974 describes many of these problems however he does not believe that these shortcomings invalidate the studies as weiss 1979 concludes

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

how do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings abstract we hypothesize that unlike for profit firms nonprofit hospitals have incentives to manage earnings to a range just above zero we consider two ways managers can achieve this they can adjust discretionary spending hoerger t j 1991 profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals journal of health economics 10 259 289 and or they can adjust accounting accruals using the flexibility inherent in generally accepted accounting principles gaap to test our hypothesis we use regressions as well as tests of the distribution of earnings by burgstahler and dichev burgstahler d dichev i 1997 earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses journal of accounting and economics 24 99 126 on a sample of 1 204 hospitals and 8 179 hospital year observations our tests support the use of discretionary spending and accounting accrual management like hoerger 1991 we find evidence that nonprofit hospitals adjust discretionary spending to manage earnings however we also find significant use of discretionary accruals e g adjustments to the third party allowance and allowance for doubtful accounts to meet earnings objectives these findings have two important implications first the previous evidence by hoerger that nonprofit hospitals show less variation in income may at least partly be explained by an accounting phenomenon second our findings provide guidance to users of these financial statements in predicting the direction of likely bias in reported earnings

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

directed search with multi vacancy firms abstract i construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create within this framework the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously wages play an allocative role in the matching process and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms i characterize the unique equilibrium comparative statics generate testable implications for cross sectional variation in matching efficiency as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment moreover allowing for ex ante heterogeneity across firms the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size wages profitability and hiring

fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations a cross country analysis abstract fiscal decentralization consists primarily of devolving revenue sources and expenditure functions to lower tiers of government by bringing the government closer to the people fiscal decentralization is expected to boost public sector efficiency as well as accountability and transparency in service delivery and policy making decentralization also entails greater complexity in intergovernmental fiscal relations and coordination failures in fiscal relations are likely to have a bearing on fiscal positions nationally and subnationally evidence provided in this paper for a sample of 30 countries suggests that coordination failures in intergovernmental fiscal relations are likely to result in a deficit bias in decentralized policy making particularly in the case of developing countries which may not meet important requirements for successful decentralization

directed search and optimal production abstract i consider a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms a mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments as a function of ex post realized demand buyers observe these advertisements and visit one seller without being able to coordinate their visiting strategies despite the oligopolistic nature of the model all symmetric equilibria are constrained efficient in small markets multiple equilibria exist that are not payoff equivalent this indeterminacy vanishes as the market grows large i provide closed form solutions for equilibrium prices profits and the matching function under any parameter values

search costs and efficiency do unemployed workers search enough many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search the impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs in this paper we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the dutch labor market in our model the wage distribution job search intensities and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium given the distribution of search intensities which we directly observe we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non market time these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities from a social point of view some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold up problem while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent seeking behavior our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare improving

applications and interviews firms recruiting decisions in a frictional labour market i develop a directed search model to study the recruitment decisions of firms competing for workers who ex post differ in two dimensions 1 their match productivity and 2 their probability of accepting a job offer endogenously determined by their choice of application portfolio to attract these workers firms post a recruiting intensity and a hiring standard in addition to terms of trade a higher recruiting intensity is costly but allows the firm to select more applicants for an interview which reveals their productivity the hiring standard solves the tradeoff between immediate hiring and waiting for a potentially better match in the future i characterize equilibrium and find that various outcomes including uniqueness of equilibrium and the cyclicality of recruiting intensity crucially depend on firms recruiting cost and workers search cost calibration of the model to the u s labour market indicates a continuum of equilibria given selection of a particular equilibrium hiring standards are countercyclical while recruiting intensity is procyclical the calibrated model creates more amplification than a standard model without intensive margins and gives rise to procyclical match efficiency when viewed through the lens of a cobb douglas matching function

profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals this paper proposes two tests of the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals the profit variability test states that the profits of an nfp will be less variable over time than profits of a for profit hospital if the nfp maximizes utility subject to a profit constraint the second test examines whether nfp profits respond less to change in exogenous factors such as medicare reimbursement rates than profits of for profit hospitals both tests performed on panel data from 1983 to 1988 support the hypothesis that nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals

identifying sorting in theory assortative matching between workers and rms provides evidence of the complementarities or substitutes in production the presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to achieve the optimal allocation of resources for example unemployment insurance we argue that using wage data alone it is virtually impossible to identify whether assortative matching is positive or negative even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting we can identify the strength i e the magnitude of the cross partial and the associated welfare loss we show rst that the wage for a given worker is non monotonic in the type of his employer this is due to the fact that in a sorting model wages reect the opportunity cost of mismatch we show analytically that this non monotonicity prevents standard rm xed eects to correlate with the true type of the rm we then propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions knowing the strength of sorting facilitates the measurement of the output loss due to mismatch

the effect of reimbursement on the intensity of hospital services we examine how hospital treatment intensity is affected by an exogenous change in average reimbursement for an admission theory predicts that treatment intensity would be most affected for highly profitable services but unaffected for unprofitable services we use medicare inpatient data from 11 states for 16 disease categories that vary in the generosity of reimbursement to test this prediction using the coefficients from quantile regressions we calculate a difference in difference estimate of the effect of the balanced budget act bba of 1998 comparing the pre and post bba change in treatment intensity at high medicare share hospitals to low medicare share hospitals we find that not for profit hospitals cut treatment intensity at the 50th 75th and 95th quantiles only for generously reimbursed services intensity at the 25th percentile was unaffected regardless of generosity we did not measure a statistically significant response at for profit or public hospitals to the bba

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

an empirical equilibrium search model of the labor market in structural empirical models of labor market search the distribution of wage offers is usually assumed to be exogenous however because in setting their wages profit maximizing firms should consider the reservation wages of job seekers the wage offer distribution is essentially endogenous we investigate whether a proposed equilibrium search model in which the wage offer distribution is endogenous is able to describe observed labor market histories we find that the distributions of job and unemployment spells are consistent with the data and that the qualitative predictions of the model for the wages set by employers are confirmed by wage regressions the model is estimated using panel data on unemployed and employed individuals we distinguish between separate segments of the labor market and we show that productivity heterogeneity is important to obtain an acceptable fit to the data the results are used to estimate the degree of monopsony power of firms further the effects of changes in the mandatory minimum wage are examined

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

identifying strategic interactions in swedish local income tax policies abstract this paper uses data on swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting we make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms using such additional predictions of the theories serves a twofold purpose first it helps us establish if the spatial coefficient is due to strategic interactions or merely reflecting spatial error correlation and second it helps identify the source of interaction the analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among swedish local governments moreover we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates

direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism this paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in the german state of bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy in the first part of the paper we establish the relationship between referenda activity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all 2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011 this selection on observables approach however suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application the main part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design rdd to safeguard against co treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simultaneously at the same thresholds we validate our results by extending the rdd approach to a difference in discontinuity did design by studying direct legislation in an archetypical cooperative federation as germany our paper extends the literature to a novel institutional setting the results indicate that in our setting and in contrast to most of the evidence from switzerland and the us direct democracy causes an expansion of local government budgets

matching with phantoms searching for partners involves informational persistence that reduces future traders matching probability in this article traders who are no longer available but who left tracks on the market are called phantoms we examine a dynamic matching market in which phantoms are a by product of search activity no coordination frictions are assumed and non phantom traders may lose time trying to match with phantoms the resulting aggregate matching technology features increasing returns to scale in the short run but has constant returns to scale in the long run we embed a generalized version of this matching function in the canonical continuous time equilibrium search unemployment model long run constant returns to scale imply there is a unique steady state whereas short run increasing returns generate excess volatility in the short run and endogenous fluctuations based on self fulfilling prophecies

the effects of for profit status and system membership on the financial performance of hospitals this research examines whether for profit status or system membership is significantly related to the financial performance of hospitals panel data containing 573 observations of florida hospitals for 1984 through 1987 are used in a fixed effects regression model the results indicate that it is system membership rather than forprofit status that is significantly related to better financial performance for profit status is unrelated to overall financial performance system hospitals have higher revenues per admission but not higher expenditures per admission than independent hospitals the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that expanding hospital systems target locations and services that are potentially profitable

overlapping soft budget constraints abstract our paper identifies a potential problem with decentralization at a time when its virtues are widely extolled we show that responsibility for equalization at multi levels within a decentralized federation creates an overlapping equalization policy that can worsen fiscal discipline contrary to qian and roland 1998 we also show in our set up that fiscal competition among regional rescuers does not act as a commitment device to harden the local budget constraint

it s about time implications of the period length in an equilibrium search model empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month i analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous time model with bilateral meetings whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers in this environment i show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes including the unemployment rate unemployment duration and the cross sectional wage distribution

homevoters vs leasevoters a spatial analysis of airport effects we use a public referendum on a new aviation concept in berlin germany as a natural experiment to analyze how the interaction of tenure and capitalization effects influences the outcome of direct democracy processes we distinguish between homevoters i e voters who are homeowners and leasevoters i e voters who lease their homes we expect that homevoters would be more likely to support initiatives that positively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood because some of the related benefits of leasevoters are neutralized by adjustments in market rents likewise homevoters would be more likely to oppose initiatives that negatively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood our empirical results are consistent with these expectations implying that public votes on local public goods do not necessarily reflect the spatial distribution of welfare effects in mixed tenure environments